# German commando attack on the US, Canada Alaska



## Soren (May 26, 2008)

German commando attack on the US, Canada possibly Alaska

The time is early 1942 and Amerika recently entered the war, and so to sabotage its war effort by striking fear into the hearts of the civilian population Germany is planning a commando raid on the US Canada and perhaps even a small town in Alaska just to demonstrate their abilities.

A further purpose of the mission is to be putting up weather stations and radio transmitters, allowing Germany to monitor in some degree what's going on in the country.

Question is how would they do it? How effective would it be ? How long would it last ? Do the commandos get extracted or escape the countries somehow after their attack, or do they fight to the death, or perhaps even let themselves capture ? Also what equipment would be needed, and what would be the most effective ?

Looking forward to hear your thoughts.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 26, 2008)

Well it was tried on a very low scale and it didn't work too well...

America in WWII magazine: Nazi spies, Erich Gimpel, William Colepaugh, Maine, Boston, New York, FBI

Attacks on North America during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Soren (May 26, 2008)

Hehe FLYBOYJ, those were spy operations, which is completely different from a commando attack.


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## comiso90 (May 26, 2008)

If they played by the rules of today, one of the most effective things they could do would be blowing up a highschool football game in the heartland or planting land mines on the beach for sun bathers to find... Loading a suitcase full of explosives into a Yellow Cab in Times Square...

Not playing by the rules of war? Was blindly launching V-1's into London or the firebombing of cites any more civil?


IMO, German agents could only effect the war in a couple of ways:
Passive observation and intelligence gathering
Attacks against soft, low value targets to spread terror an hysteria
Attacks against lightly protected, unprotected civilian infrastructure.. telephone lines, power stations, starting fires

Attacking / sabotaging military targets is romantic but not practical.


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## Soren (May 26, 2008)

Very interesting links nonetheless FLYBOYJ, thanks.


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## Haztoys (May 26, 2008)

If I were running the the Axis..I would of done more moves like you have said here Sorens .... Not that it would of helped militarily per say as to win land or said battle...But as in the Dambusters move ...The wreaked dams did not stop the Germans factory's.. But it did tied up men and machines that should and could of been used else were... Workers had to fix the dam ..The workers were pulled from the Atlantic Wall to fix the dam ...And the Germans moved troops to defend the dams...That could of been at D-day and the Eastern Front...


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## syscom3 (May 26, 2008)

The US industrial machine was so vast, theres nothing the commando team could have done to materially effect the war.


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## Soren (May 26, 2008)

What about blowing up the hoover dam ?


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## Haztoys (May 26, 2008)

Soren said:


> What about blowing up the hoover dam ?



You ever been to Hoover dam Sorens...?.. Its way in land... and not much down stream to hurt the war machine...And it would have to be a hell of alot of commandos to pull it off ..Packing a lot of explosives... Was just over it two weeks ago ...The wrecked German dams were real long ... Hoover is short and in a very deep canyon...

Not that it could not be done...

I would think a move near the coast would be a better move ... If your picturing a Dambusters move like the Brit's did "I" would not think it could be done... A Lanc at 60 feet would lose it wings as narrow as the canyon is..We in America do dams in deep canyon ..At list out west we do..Not wide places as they do over in Europe

But I do think Cmmando raids would of tied up alot of the war machine..America had a bigger war machine ...Harder to hurt then the Germans Machine...


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## Soren (May 26, 2008)

Hehe, no no, I'm not talking about another dambuster raid. But I do believe that exploding the dam was possible, but it would be a very tough task and a commando team wouldn't be capable of it.


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## pbfoot (May 26, 2008)

according to what I've heard Goebbels threatened my neck of the woods with its hydro electric capacity and the chemical and abrasives industries whether this folk lore or not I don't know.


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## syscom3 (May 26, 2008)

Hoover dam has survived a mag 5 quake. No amount of explosives is going to take this one out.

Damaging the power generators or transmission towers would be a good bet. But its not the only power source for California.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 26, 2008)

In the end I do not think it would have accomplished anything.

Blowing up the Hoover Damn would hurt a small portion of America. The US's resources were spread out all over the United States.

A "terrorist" attack would have put fear into the people, but in the end it would have only rallied the US people even more and given them more resolve to end the war and more than likely "punish" Germany on an even greater scale.


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## RabidAlien (May 26, 2008)

I don't think a commando attack on the US, anywhere, would've done Germany any good. Keep in mind that the country was _really _unified after Pearl Harbor. Even the Isolationists were all for attacking and gettin some back. A commando attack would not have done any good....raids that small, in a country that has no "front line borders" anywhere near it, would not have diverted any significant amount of troops from critical front line positions. Raids that small, in a country with such a huge industrial capability, would not have slowed production or distribution of war materiel in any insignificant way. The Japanese managed to surface a submarine and fire a few shells on the west coast, damaging (I believe) an un-occupied carnival or something like it...no military benefits whatsoever. All they managed to do was to get the civilians to organize themselves into a sort of neighborhood-watch....not the military, but the civilians. So, unless the commando raid happened to take out pretty much every military and civilian leader at once, it would've done nothing more than really piss off the populace and get a group of skilled military men killed/captured for no reason whatsoever. Also keep in mind that, to pull it off successfully, they would've had to come in in Allied uniforms/clothes, not German uniforms. Therefore, if caught, they would be treated as spies and subject to execution according to the Geneva Convention.

If they had tried it, I believe the best thing they could've done would be to land small groups to, as stated earlier, mine beaches and coastal waterways and roadways. Yes, they would've eventually been caught, but nighttime commando raids would've had a slightly longer longevity than one or two "terroristic" strikes. The submarines, while waiting for the commandos to perform their missions, could surface and fire off a few deck-gun rounds at targets of opportunity, such as wealthy mansions (nuttin like a couple of pissed off rich folks to put pressure on the military to divert a trainload of troops or two!) or factories. America and Canada, however, have the rather unique advantage of not sharing common borders with a bunch of different, potentially beligerent, nations. Anything out to get us would have to cross alot of water. So all of our output can be channeled into the offensive, instead of split between offense and defense.

My head hurts now from all this thinking...if such it can be called. *g*


ETA: Erich Gimpel wrote a book about his experience as a spy. I used to own the book, but can't find it...probably got stuck in the wrong pile and went to Half-Price Books at some point. Here's the Amazon.com link: Amazon.com: Agent 146: The True Story of a Nazi Spy in America: Erich Gimpel: Books


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## Soren (May 26, 2008)

The thing I find confusing here is that some seem to suggest that the US wasn't already doing all it could when it hadn't suffered commando raid. In my mind that makes no sense at all. 

The US industry was running as fast as it could right after Pearl Harbour, so a Commando could only hamper that to some degree, it certainly wouldn't strenghten it.


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## pbfoot (May 26, 2008)

Soren said:


> The thing I find confusing here is that some seem to suggest that the US wasn't already doing all it could when it hadn't suffered commando raid. In my mind that makes no sense at all.
> 
> The US industry was running as fast as it could right after Pearl Harbour, so a Commando could only hamper that to some degree, it certainly wouldn't strenghten it.


I can just imagine these guys landing on the east coast of Canada without drawing attention to themselves , I'm quite sure no one in Germany speaks french Acadian style or talks like a Newfoundlander . They would generally be limited to rail transport for the 1st 700miles


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## RabidAlien (May 26, 2008)

*LOL* @PBfoot


Soren....not sure if I came across clearly or not. Immediately after Pearl, the US started shifting over to a war-footing. It took a little time to do that. Even when running full-steam, yes a commando attack would've slowed down production a bit....kinda like pulling a bucket full of water lessens Niagra Falls. Sure, it does, but only to a degree that would interest a mathemetician. The grunts on the front lines/boats/skies wouldn't've noticed any appreciable decline in parts/supplies/ordinance/replacements.

Anyhoo....that's my conjectures on the topic. *g*


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## FLYBOYJ (May 27, 2008)

Soren said:


> The thing I find confusing here is that some seem to suggest that the US wasn't already doing all it could when it hadn't suffered commando raid. In my mind that makes no sense at all.
> 
> The US industry was running as fast as it could right after Pearl Harbour, so a Commando could only hamper that to some degree, it certainly wouldn't strenghten it.



It might of diverted resources to prevent further attacks, the strength would of come from the people who would of produced even more toward the war effort.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 27, 2008)

Soren said:


> The thing I find confusing here is that some seem to suggest that the US wasn't already doing all it could when it hadn't suffered commando raid. In my mind that makes no sense at all.
> 
> The US industry was running as fast as it could right after Pearl Harbour, so a Commando could only hamper that to some degree, it certainly wouldn't strenghten it.




How was the US running at full speed after Pearl? The US war effort grew stronger and faster with each passing year.


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## parsifal (May 27, 2008)

Adler

You are absolutely correct. US Productive output is estimated by Overy (I think) never to have exceeded about 75% of its maximum warmaking potential, even as it reached its peak levels of output in early 1944. Proper rationing was never introduced in the US. About 60% of aircraft produced, never left the continental US. The home air force of the US was about 5000 a/c from memory. The US army was expanding rapidly, and in training. As far as I can see, putting a couple of hundred German commandoes is going to give the massive continental air force targets to find and bomb, and the US army live targets to practice on. The majority of the US army formations were raised either pre-war, or in 1942, but did not leave the continental US until 1943-44, so there were oodles of "unemployed" US troops to run around all day hunting down the Commandoes. Any damage to the US economy is going to be very slight, and easily taken up by the uncommittedd elements of the US economy. 

Finally, how are these commadoes going to get past the blockade. By June 1941 the OKM enigma coses (less the U-Boat codes in 1942), were being read to a significant degree. All of the tankers sent out to support Bismarck had been rounded up by June 1941, as a result of the enigma code intelligence, preventing any significant continuation of the surface raider war after that time. Those raiders already at sea in June were able to continue to the end of 1941. However, new raids by the surface raiders were not breaking out effectively from the second half of 1941 on. The blockade of Germany was more or less complete (with the exception of restricted cargoes being smuggled into Germany via some of the neutrals) from the middle of 1941 onward.

A mission of this type would have to involve the use of coded messages on the enigma system, and these are almost certainly going to be intercepted and understood by Bletchely Park. It has all the makings of another Zimmermann telegram IMO, and similar consequences. From Septmeber 1941, even the slightest hint of belligerent action by Germans against the continental US would have brought an immediate and swift response from the US, and not one that Herr Hitler would be too pleased about.


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## Kruska (May 27, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> In the end I do not think it would have accomplished anything.
> 
> Blowing up the Hoover Damn would hurt a small portion of America. The US's resources were spread out all over the United States.
> 
> A "terrorist" attack would have put fear into the people, but in the end it would have only rallied the US people even more and given them more resolve to end the war and more than likely "punish" Germany on an even greater scale.



I would agree with D.A.I.G. on this.

Instead Adolf should have send Brezels and Beer to the USA since 1933, reminding the US about its historical ties (e.g. Steuben) and population heritage to Germany, the common issues between Nazis and KKK or the general affiliation of the southern states to Nazi Germany.

Who knows, but there might have been a chance to disrupt the US – England affiliation, rather then ignorantly declaring war against the largest economic power in the world.

Regards
Kruska


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## eddie_brunette (May 27, 2008)

Interesting...mmmmm

Leave the commandos and concentrate on the Heavy Water and FW200 project


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## johnbr (May 27, 2008)

Some years ago they did find a German on maned weather station off Labrador.It was found out after the war that the Uboat men would go on fur lo
in east coast provinces.Because they would find ticket Studs in dead Uboat crew for the theater and movies.


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## Freebird (May 28, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> The US industrial machine was so vast, theres *nothing the commando team could have done to materially effect the war.*



I would disagree.



> *But I do think Cmmando raids would of tied up alot of the war machine*..America had a bigger war machine ...Harder to hurt then the Germans Machine...





FLYBOYJ said:


> *It might of diverted resources to prevent further attacks*.



This is exactly the point.



RabidAlien said:


> I don't think a commando attack on the US, anywhere, would've done Germany any good. Keep in mind that the country was _really _unified after Pearl Harbor. Even the Isolationists were all for attacking and gettin some back. A commando attack would not have done any good....raids that small, in a country that has no "front line borders" anywhere near it, *would not have diverted any significant amount of troops from critical front line positions.*



I would disagree with that. Remember that the US has only about 1 division available after Pearl Harbour, {other than those troops already committed, and those training} There was a significant panic after Pearl Harbour, Eisenhower writes that the War Dept. was deluged with requests from dozens of west coast cities for troops aircraft to protect them. Imagine how much more strident those requests would be if there were some actual attacks? And if they were ignored and some commando attacks were later committed, the Isolationist opposition would be calling for more troops to protect "America First", and worry about overseas deployments later. The congress was more united after Pearl, but there were still serious disagreements over war strategy.
[/QUOTE]

Here is a thought for you all - How about a "frogman" style attack by commandos similar to the Italians that hit British Battleships in Alexandria other ships in Gibraltar.

These two ports were major British Naval bases, at wartime, vigilantly guarded by patrols that were expecting just these type of attacks.

Suppose that the Italians sent some of these teams, with gear, to be inserted at night by German U-boats near the US East coast ports.

The USA was at peace, they did not expect to be attacked, and were much less vigilant than British ports {which were in a war zone}

Compare the defence {or lack therof} of Pearl harbour which was threatened by its location, and which had been warned of iminant hostilities by Japan.

*Is there any reason to think that Norfolk or the other Eastern ports would be even as prepared as Pearl Harbour?*


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## syscom3 (May 28, 2008)

The US had several divisions available available on the eve of Pearl Harbor. You dont need big armoured units backed by artillery to protect key structures.

As for industrial targets? The most vulnerable targets were the transmission lines coming from the dams in the NW states, where the majority of raw aluminum was made. 

But remember, the commando teams could only damage, not destroy. Damaged things can be repaired. And as events proved during the war, the US showed it could rapidly repair or build anything. Drop a bridge into a river? No problem. A new one will be built within a few months.

The only thing a commando group could do is inflict terror, and you can only do that for so long. And like I said, the US industrial capacity and infrastructure was so vast and redundant, nothing of key importance could be knocked out for long.


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## RabidAlien (May 28, 2008)

I guess it all depends on "when" this commando raid(s) would take place. If Hitler had gotten together with Yamamoto and coordinated the attacks, I think the Isolationists would've had a larger following, instead of everybody abandoning them and flocking to the recruiters. But we did have several divisions available (not to mention countless pissed-off police, fire, Boy Scouts, and every redneck hunter/poacher in the nation), and unless there was a full-scale German invasion, they would've taken the commando raiders fairly quickly. I was assuming this would be taking place in '43 or '44, maybe as a last-ditch strategy by Hitler in early '45. Even ignoring Hitler's mania for a moment, there would realistically be nothing for Germany to gain by poking the US with what would amount to a fuzzy Q-tip. Sure. Some damage would be done. But nowhere near enough to really matter.


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## Soren (May 28, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> How was the US running at full speed after Pearl? The US war effort grew stronger and faster with each passing year.



Yes ofcourse it did. As the war progessed more factories, more workers etc etc were assembled, hence the higher output pr. year. (The German industry ouput aslso increased pr. year)

Still this doesn't mean the US wasn't doing all it could, it was but it had to build up the industrial output over time just like any other nation. You can't just start off producing thousands of a/c from one week to the other, you need the factories, materials workers to do the job first.

This whole theory that the US industry wasn't even producing 75% of what it could is extremely far fetched.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 28, 2008)

The US was able to "industrialize for war" rather quickly. That is fact.

A commando raid on one small locations is not going to stop the US from doing so.


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## parsifal (May 28, 2008)

Soren said:


> *Yes ofcourse it did. As the war progessed more factories, more workers etc etc were assembled, hence the higher output pr. year. (The German industry ouput aslso increased pr. year)*
> 
> It was actually a changeover of factories from domestic to miltary production, and even at the height of US mobilzation, US production is reliably estimated to have never exceeded 75% of its maximum warmaking potential
> 
> ...



US war production would have been completely unnaffected by any sort of commando raid that involved a couple of hundred men. it would have been a complete waste of German expertise, and would have handed the numerous formations then under training in the US with the opportunity for a live firing excercise basically


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## Soren (May 28, 2008)

Parsifal,

I for one don't believe that only 75% of the US warmaking potential was used, it would mkae no sense to have such an attitude in war, esp. a two front war. Also the various advertizements for buying war bons, donating all things of metal etc etc, also keeps me from believing it. But let us just agree to disagree about the warmaking potential utilized by the US.

Now as for the German commando attack affecting the US industrial output, I agree that it really couldn't to any really maeningful extent, but it has never been about that either. The purpose of the attack would be to cause terror within the US, Canadian possibly the Alaskan public and last but not least set up a multitude of weather stations radio transmitters.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 28, 2008)

Soren said:


> Now as for the German commando attack affecting the US industrial output, I agree that it really couldn't to any really maeningful extent, but it has never been about that either. The purpose of the attack would be to cause terror within the US, Canadian possibly the Alaskan public and last but not least set up a multitude of weather stations radio transmitters.



What would that do?

Nothing. All it would do is hurt Germany even more. The people would have been more angry and would have more resolve to fight the war and win it. You have seen how the people were after Pearl.

No weather stations and radio transmitters would last. If the Germans could set them up the US could take them out just as easy.


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## Soren (May 28, 2008)

> What would that do?
> 
> Nothing. All it would do is hurt Germany even more. The people would have been more angry and would have more resolve to fight the war and win it. You have seen how the people were after Pearl.



It would scare them witless and force the US government to spend huge amounts of money on securing its coasts, cities, towns, villages and so on, basically everyone would want protection.



> No weather stations and radio transmitters would last. If the Germans could set them up the US could take them out just as easy.



That isn't true as the German put up several weatherstations on US soil and they all functioned beautifully, and none were found during the war. Some were found after the war and some have been found recently, still functioning...

German weatherstation:






From Uboat.net (Read the entire article, it's very interesting):
uboat.net - U-boat Operations - Weather station Kurt erected in Labrador in 1943


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## FLYBOYJ (May 28, 2008)

Interesting about the weather stations but also look where they were....

Remember the Japanese occupied part of Alaska and although their removal resulted in one of the bloodiest battles of WW2 for the most part they could of just stayed put and their impact on the war would of still been negliable, in fact I think it was a bad move for the US to retake Kiska and Dutch Harbor when they did. All the US had to do is wait out the occupying Japanese forces and the ultimate battle to remove them would of been a lot less bloody, but again it's easy to look at the situation in retrospect as we now know how the war actually played out.


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## syscom3 (May 28, 2008)

Soren, we discussed the US industrial production in another thread.

But to remind you ...

1) The factories were in place and had been underutilized for a decade or more.
2) The US had been in a naval and AF buildup since 1940
3) The US GNP was still growing even in summer 1945.
4) As weapons and material (including airplanes) were being standardized throughout the services, even more output was being planned.
5) With the naval buildup completed by 1945, millions of tons of steel was going to be available for other uses.
6) By late 1944, the housing and transport issues for the factory workers was being solved, so even higher efficencies was being planned.


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## pbfoot (May 28, 2008)

Soren said:


> It would scare them witless and force the US government to spend huge amounts of money on securing its coasts, cities, towns, villages and so on, basically everyone would want protection.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


have ever been to Labrador , its the size of Germany and has a population under 50000 today , I know when the GAF came over they were amazed at how isolated it was . I lived in Goose Bay and I believe the next town was 400nm away


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## Njaco (May 28, 2008)

IMHO I think you would have to narrow it down a bit as far as a commando objective. Such as where they were building Norden bombsights. Wouldn't that raise a little hell? Something like "Eisenhammer"?

I thought some commando types were dropped off in Florida and made their way to New York and other cities before being captured. One of them turned on the others and was the only one not executed.


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## RabidAlien (May 28, 2008)

There were a few spies that were dropped off on the Eastern Seaboard, all of whom were caught or turned themselves in. I don't know that any of them "turned state's evidence" or not, but they were all caught. In a country that was willing to put thousands and thousands of American citizens of direct Japanese descent into concentration camps, strangers were generally looked at rather closely. As for hitting the Norden bombsight plant...there were more than one, and I don't think Germany would've wanted to disrupt that anyway. It wouldn't have stopped the production of the bombsight, and would only have clued the US in to the fact that Germany knew where it was made, knew the significance of it, and regarded it as so inferior that it wasn't worth stealing. It would've been much smarter to sneak in to the plant some night (difficult when they were running round-the-clock), photostat some copies of the designs, and sneak out again. A successful op would've netted Germany the bombsight without anyone being the wiser, which would've greatly increased the accuracy of German bombing. Why carpet-bomb London, when you can plant a planeload on Churchill's doorstep?

Then again....nobody ever accused Hitler of thinking logically and progressively. He probably would've ordered a plant or two blown up, then staffed his bomber crews with psychics and mediums. *g*


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## Haztoys (May 29, 2008)

Do we really need to call the Japaneses Camps "concentration camps" ...I do not think they were starved and worked to death and gas as the Nazi's did to the Jew... They were interned and keep against there will...But concentration camp bring up pictures of die staved people in a mass grave... Or it just me I guess..??? .......... ...

My Mom worked at the one in Bishop California..She drove a truck to and from LA with supplies


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## syscom3 (May 29, 2008)

Haztoys said:


> Do we really need to call the Japaneses Camps "concentration camps" ...I do not think they were starved and worked to death and gas as the Nazi's did to the Jew... They were interned and keep against there will...But concentration camp bring up pictures of die staved people in a mass grave... Or it just me I guess..??? .......... ...
> 
> My Mom worked at the one in Bishop California..She drove a truck to and from LA with supplies



I went to visit that camp last summer. Its now a national monument due to the historical significance of it.

Best way to call it is a "detention camp".


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## Haztoys (May 29, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> I went to visit that camp last summer. Its now a national monument due to the historical significance of it.
> 
> Best way to call it is a "detention camp".



I to have been there last year...When the camps came up a few years ago .. And the news were calling it a concentration camp..My Mom roller her eyes ...And said " They ate better were warmer and there roof did not leak then how she lived during the war"...And she also did not see a reason to keep them in the camps and they were very caring people...She did say that there was a very deep hate for the Japanese people from the American public...And felt they were probably safer there then in there homes with all the upset Americans ...

Sorry to get this off tread ...Back to were this was going...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 29, 2008)

Soren said:


> It would scare them witless and force the US government to spend huge amounts of money on securing its coasts, cities, towns, villages and so on, basically everyone would want protection.



For a few days, Soren. You underestimate the US people. 2 weeks later no would have cared. It would not have effected the US resolve at all and the money that would have been allocated would have been negligable.



Soren said:


> That isn't true as the German put up several weatherstations on US soil and they all functioned beautifully, and none were found during the war. Some were found after the war and some have been found recently, still functioning...
> 
> Operations - Weather station Kurt erected in Labrador in 1943[/url]



Soren look at the locations of those things. They had 0 impact on the war. If they had been placed any closer to the real mainland of the US, they would have been destroyed rather quickly.


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## Freebird (May 29, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> The US had several divisions available available on the eve of Pearl Harbor.



Which divisions? I believe that only the 1st was available, the Marines were earmarked for Pacific operations, while the rest of the Army div's were still training. 



RabidAlien said:


> I guess it all depends on "when" this commando raid(s) would take place. If Hitler had gotten together with Yamamoto and coordinated the attacks, I think the Isolationists would've had a larger following, instead of everybody abandoning them and flocking to the recruiters. I was assuming this would be taking place in '43 or '44, maybe as a last-ditch strategy by Hitler in early '45.



By 1943 the writing is on the wall, it's too late to have any chance to affect the outcome of the war. This type of operation must be done in the first 6 - 8months or so to have any real benefit

US war production would have been completely unnaffected by any sort of commando raid that involved a couple of hundred men. [/QUOTE] 

Agreed, the purpose of the raids would not be to affect production.



parsifal said:


> It would have been a complete waste of German expertise.



I would disagree. An argument along the same lines could be made that operation "Mincemeat" achieved no benefit because it did not destroy even 1 Geman aircraft or soldier. However the deception that it fostered was a huge help to the Allies, as the Axis deployed 1,000's of troops airpower to Sardinia, that were needed in Sicily. 

*Does anybody have thoughts on my previous question?*



freebird said:


> Here is a thought for you all - *How about "frogman" style commando attacks by the Germans or Italians* similar to those that hit British Battleships in Alexandria other ships in Gibraltar?
> 
> These two ports were major British Naval bases, at wartime, vigilantly guarded by patrols that were expecting just these type of attacks. Yet the Italians were still able to achieve their missions.
> 
> ...


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## Glider (May 29, 2008)

I admit that this is one of the whackiest ideas I have heard for a while. Listing the problems
1) The Germans had no recc information, 
2) No spies to assist with planning or logistics
3) No method of transporting the men and equipment that would be needed to the USA _assuming that you need more than 4-5 men and backpacks_
4) No method of transport when (if) they arrive
5) Every chance of being detected by Enigma code breaking before they arrive.
6) Little chance of doing any damage if they pass items 1-5
7) Every chance of handing the Allies a PR goldmine
8) Every chance of binding the USA together in the fight against the Axis forces.


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## Soren (May 29, 2008)

Glider, you're wrong on many of your points:

1.) The Enigma wasn't completely broken in 42 43, infact there was a period were it was fully kryptic.
2.) The men could easily be transported by U-boat, the Germans set off spies in the US quite a few times, not to mention a multitude of weatherstations etc etc. And a Type IXD could carry tons of equipment and men, easily carrying about 25 men beyond the crew
3.) When they arrive they can commandeer a vehicle if needed.
4.) Civilian clothes is brought along to give the ability to blend in when needed. 
5.) Spies could be set off long BEFORE the raid, gathering information beneficial to the succes of the raid.

__________________________________________

Guys,

Here is a possible hypothetical scenario:

In early 1942 the planning of the raid has been completed, and it goes as follows:

3 weeks prior to the commando attack automated weatherstations radiotransmitters are set up on the coasts closest to the target areas by U-boats. During the following weeks intel is gathered on the weather conditions and the various US radio stations are monitored as-well as any radio communication in the area. 

The purpose of this is to make sure that beyond the weather being good at the time of the landing, and perhas knowing about certain events taking place in the area, it is also made sure that no'one has gotten hint of anything, perhaps discovering one of the weather radio stations, in which case the operation can be called off. 

To further safe guard against the cover being blown German spies are set off a week before the raid, there mission being to gather intel much the same way as the radio weather stations while at the same time making sure they aren't uncovered. The spies will also gather the crucial information on the landscape terrain of the target area, having ready detailed maps at the arrival of the commandos. The spies can also acquire transportation to the commandos as they land, picking them up in a purchased truck or truck(s).

Now as to the goal of the operation itself, well let's say 25 commandos are dropped off at each landing zone (During the night ofcourse). Now after having landed and reached the target area time has pretty much run out to carry out any further tasks that day, therefore the men will plan then rest until next nightfall. 

Now as to the attack itself, well we can think about that but there are few possible things they could do:

They could sneak in at night, place some explosives, and heck perhaps even break into a bank, acquiring valuables. While that is done another team would bust the local police station, taking out the personnel (Or taking them hostage). All the while five other men are cutting telephone lines as well as electricity to the town. If this was done to a town it would be helpless until the next day.

However remember no'one is suggesting any of this will be a walk in the park, many things could go wrong, and it often only takes one thing to go wrong for the rest to follow suit. So if the mission is to have any chance of success it is crucial that all details regarding the operation stay secret right up till the night of the landing itself. Regardless to say the right planning coupled with highly skilled spies commandos are absolutely essential to the success of the operation.

Now as for all of you who are skeptical, think for a moment, how would you carry out a similar operation, remember there is always some way to do it.


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## Juha (May 29, 2008)

Soren
what is your definition for “quite a few times” in this time, I can recall one, maybe two cases of Germans landing spies into USA.

Now according to U-Boat net only one automatic weather station was landed in North America and that in KANADA, not in USA.

And for ex. weather station near the landing point only gives info what the weather is at the moment, it doesn’t predict what the weather will be on next day or next week. And even the possibility to got current weather info from the station would not be sure, because, from U-boat.net. “Reports indicate that the weather station sent out normal transmissions for a few days, but then there was apparent jamming on that frequency.” That station would not have helped much on planning a raid. etc

Juha


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## Glider (May 29, 2008)

Soren said:


> Glider, you're wrong on many of your points:
> 
> 1.) The Enigma wasn't completely broken in 42 43, infact there was a period were it was fully kryptic.
> 2.) The men could easily be transported by U-boat, the Germans set off spies in the US quite a few times, not to mention a multitude of weatherstations etc etc. And a Type IXD could carry tons of equipment and men, easily carrying about 25 men beyond the crew
> ...



1) It was however broken to a degree and even if not cracked plots were often made and an indication of the tracks made. 
2) Taking your examples, spies were in groups of 4 no more, The multitude of weather stations were not that numerous and I note with interest it took *48 hours* to unload the U Boat at anchor and of course they didn't didn't weigh a huge amount. As for carrying 25 men over and above the crew, it never happened and I doubt that it could.
3) 'Obtaining a Lorry' how many men are we talking about, how many trucks and no one will notice!!
4) Civilian clothes, so we are talking spies and no one will notice men carrying packs talking with a foriegn accent, lord knows how many miles in land.
5) Spies, Germany didn't have any of any note in the USA and once war was declared they were rounded up. For instance, the only country Germany had a decent spy network in the Americas was in Brazil not exactly convenient for the USA. In case your interested, eight weeks after Germany declared war on the USA Brazil severed relations with Germany and eight weeks after that all their spies in Brazil had been rounded up. Some of these fled to Chile and Argentina but these were soon captured as the USA kept tabs on them and leant on the authorities.


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## Njaco (May 29, 2008)

Freebird, I'll take a stab at it.

U-boats did make it off the coast of New Jersey rather close so some type of froggy commando attack could have been made up the Delaware to the Philadelphia and Camden boat yards. Now I have no idea about the defenses or how shallow the Delaware is but maybe we could start there. Those two yards were very active during the war. And as they sit half-way between DC and NY, I'm sure some type of over reactive panic would ensue.

As an added bonus, there was a German POW camp in the southern portion of the state, I believe around Vineland and the first USAAF airfield built during the war that trained pilots on the P-47 was at Millville. So a coordinated attack against ship yards and airfield along with letting loose some prisoners. Oh I feel like Ian Flemming!


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## RabidAlien (May 29, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> I went to visit that camp last summer. Its now a national monument due to the historical significance of it.
> 
> Best way to call it is a *"detention camp"*.





Agreed. It was late last night after a crappy day at work. That's all my poor, overworked braincell could supply at the time. *g* Yep. Detention camp, or internment camp. Most assuredly, no matter what its called, they were NOT one of the USofA's most shining moments.


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## RabidAlien (May 29, 2008)

Hmmmm...not sure how most of those POW's would react to being "freed". Consider that they were usually being worked in the fields around the camps, being paid, being fed three squares a day. They had access to privileges even few of the upper-eschelon in Berlin had access to. Early in the war, when the outcome was still up for grabs, sure, the majority of them would probably have raised a ruckus, then gotten shot as an escapee or been re-captured. Late '43, and definitely from mid-'44 on, most of the Axis soliders who could think knew there was very little hope of winning, and only fought on because the Fatherland was threatened....and the SS was standing about fifteen yards behind them. So, once again, depending on when said raid would take place, there probably wouldn't be much support from the POW camps. A few die-hards, yes. But didn't a good percentage of the POW's interred in the US and Canada apply to stay when the war was over, instead of being repatriated to a devestated country?


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## Soren (May 29, 2008)

It would take place in early to mid 1942 Rabid.

Now contrary to what Glider believes a Uboat could carry many men besides the dedicated crew, a Type IX could easily haul along 25 extra men, and even more if the number of torpedoes carried were cut down. On top of that the Type IX had a cargo hold on the top deck, usually used for extra torps or mail, food (Incase of milkcow), equipment, looted goods etc etc. This cargo hold could ofcourse therefore be used to hold all the equipment needed for the raid.

Oh and I don't know where Glider got the idea from that it took 25 men 48 hours to get out of the sub, into rubber boat and head for shore - guess they must have been really sloooow according to Glider.


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## Njaco (May 29, 2008)

Does anyone know what the closest a U-boat has come to the US shoreline?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 29, 2008)

I believe there were U-Boots within site of New York City. They surfaced just outside of the harbor and they could see the lights of the city.


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## timshatz (May 29, 2008)

Njaco, the Delaware is pretty shallow for the most part. About 40 foot in the channel with plenty of shoals. Be impossible to run a sub up there underwater. On top of the hazards to navigation, there would be a ton of traffic (especially during war time). Somebody would run it over. 

I think a sub managed to lay some mines in the mouth of the Ches in early 42. Same thing for the sea lanes into NYC. One also got into the St. Lawrence Seaway in 42. There were also a bunch of them shooting up tanker traffic off Diamond Shoals down off Cape Hatterus (sp?). Also, close enough to see the lights on the following cities:

Miami
Jacksonville (made a landing there with spies)
Charleston 
Wilmington NC
Atlantic City
N. Jersey
NYC

Those are the ones I know of. Seems there was a big problem with the local mayors not wanting to black out their cities because of worries over the tourist trade. Finally, after losing 400 ships in 6 months, it became manditory. 

Here's a link to the wiki on it:

Second Happy Time - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Decent book on the whole thing is "Operation Drumbeat". Rough english translation for the German Sub attacks on the East Coast. Link to book on Amazon. Ok book. Read it a while ago. 

Operation Drumbeat, Germany's U-Boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II - Yahoo! Shopping


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## Glider (May 29, 2008)

Soren said:


> It would take place in early to mid 1942 Rabid.
> 
> Now contrary to what Glider believes a Uboat could carry many men besides the dedicated crew, a Type IX could easily haul along 25 extra men, and even more if the number of torpedoes carried were cut down. On top of that the Type IX had a cargo hold on the top deck, usually used for extra torps or mail, food (Incase of milkcow), equipment, looted goods etc etc. This cargo hold could ofcourse therefore be used to hold all the equipment needed for the raid.
> 
> Oh and I don't know where Glider got the idea from that it took 25 men 48 hours to get out of the sub, into rubber boat and head for shore - guess they must have been really sloooow according to Glider.



Soren
The 48 hours to unload the U Boat for the weather station came from your posting I quote 
_On October 22 U-537 arrived at Martin Bay at the northern tip of Labrador. *For the next 48 hours U-537 lay at anchor *while the crew manhandled the 220-pound canisters, along with a tripod and mast, into rubber boats and then onshore._

Re the carrying of 25 extra people in a Type IX I don't believe it. I haven't been in a Type IX but I have been in an Oberon Class submarine which is of a similar size and the idea is just not on.

The only submarines that I know that carried raiding parties were three American submarines that weighed an extra 1000 tons and were originally designed as minelayers. The minespaces were free to be used as troop carriers.


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## Haztoys (May 29, 2008)

On U-boats getting places... I could be wrong on the river or the whole info..But "I was thinking" that a U-boat got up the Saint Lawrence river and wreaked its ruder ..And its some were in a museum up in that part of the world ... Flame me and shoot me down if I'm keeping rumors going ... Ring a bell ...?? 

I'm sure with the nuts of the U-boat captains they were sniffing around the US coast line more then we knew...


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## pbfoot (May 29, 2008)

Haztoys said:


> On U-boats getting places... I could be wrong on the river or the whole info..But "I was thinking" that a U-boat got up the Saint Lawrence river and wreaked its ruder ..And its some were in a museum up in that part of the world ... Flame me and shoot me down if I'm keeping rumors going ... Ring a bell ...??
> 
> I'm sure with the nuts of the U-boat captains they were sniffing around the US coast line more then we knew...


There actually was a a battle up here its called the Battle of the St Lawrence there was a number of U boat patrols in the St Lawrence one almost got to Quebec City
this link will explain it better then I but 42 attacks were made 22 ships were sunk including 3 naval vessels
The Battle of the Gulf of St. Lawrence - Veterans Affairs Canada


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## syscom3 (May 29, 2008)

Soren, the commando's will only be able to haul a couple of hundred pounds of explosive at any given time.

Just exactly what can they do to materially effect the war?

Blow up a dam? Nope.

Bring down a bridge? Possibly. But how will that effect production?

Take out a power plant? No.

Take out transmission lines? Yes, but for how long?


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## pbfoot (May 29, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren, the commando's will only be able to haul a couple of hundred pounds of explosive at any given time.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## syscom3 (May 29, 2008)

But theres the issue of damage vs destruction. The amount of explosives the commando's could use was always limited.

Also, if something critical was wrecked, the US and Canadians would repair it so fast, the interruption in production wouldn't be noticed.


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## pbfoot (May 29, 2008)

In the 1940's if you knocked the out the hydro electric power (possibly largest in the world)plants you'd have no abrasives i believe this area was the hub for abrasives . No abrasives no machining


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## FLYBOYJ (May 29, 2008)

pbfoot said:


> In the 1940's if you knocked the out the hydro electric power (possibly largest in the world)plants you'd have no abrasives i believe this area was the hub for abrasives . No abrasives no machining



Which one? Niagara or Hoover? In either case one could of probably covered for another if a grid could be quickly built.


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## syscom3 (May 30, 2008)

Canada and the US was blessed with multiple centers of manufacturing and basic industrial production.

There was no single point of vulnerability.


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## Freebird (May 30, 2008)

Good thread Soren! Interesting topic, there is alot more I will get to later.



Njaco said:


> *Freebird, I'll take a stab at it.*
> 
> U-boats did make it off the coast of New Jersey rather close so some type of froggy commando attack could have been made up the Delaware to the Philadelphia and Camden boat yards. Now I have no idea about the defenses or how shallow the Delaware is but maybe we could start there. Those two yards were very active during the war. And as they sit half-way between DC and NY, I'm sure some type of over reactive panic would ensue.



*Hey Njaco, I have a question for you *- The Philly Camden are Navy yards correct? Is there any hill or high point that you can observe the yards at a distance? Could a recce team posing as sightseers or whatever in Nov 1941 get a good look into the yards? 



Soren said:


> It would take place in early to mid 1942 Rabid.
> 
> Now contrary to what Glider believes a Uboat could carry many men besides the dedicated crew, a Type IX could easily haul along 25 extra men, and even more if the number of torpedoes carried were cut down. On top of that the Type IX had a cargo hold on the top deck, usually used for extra torps or mail, food (Incase of milkcow), equipment, looted goods etc etc. This cargo hold could ofcourse therefore be used to hold all the equipment needed for the raid.



*And a question for you Soren,* looking at the pics of the Italian "manned torpedoes" could a U-boat transport 2- 4 of these things? I would assume that they are about 2,000 - 2,500 pounds, and that the shields for the riders can be removed



Njaco said:


> Does anyone know what the closest a U-boat has come to the US shoreline?





DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I believe there were U-Boots within site of New York City. They surfaced just outside of the harbor and they could see the lights of the city.





From Wikipedia _The United States mainland was first Bombardment shelled by the Axis on February 23, 1942 when the *Japanese submarine I-17 attacked the Ellwood oil production facilities at Goleta, near Santa Barbara, California. * Although only the pumphouse and catwalk were damaged, ''I-17'' captain Nishino Kozo radioed Tokyo that he had left Santa Barbara in flames. No casualties were reported and the total cost of the damage was officially estimated at approximately $500-1000. However news of the shelling triggered an invasion scare along the West Coast. 

In WWII a Japanese sub surfaced off Vancouver Island and fired some rounds at the lighthouse there, but missed. *This marked the first enemy shelling of Canadian soil since the War of 1812.* Though no casualties were reported, the subsequent decision to turn off the lights of outer stations was disastrous for shipping activity.

In what became the only attack on a mainland American military installation during World War II, the *Japanese submarine I-25, under the command of Tagami Meiji, surfaced near the mouth of the Columbia River, Oregon on the night of June 21 and June 22, 1942 and fired shells toward Fort Stevens (Oregon). *The only damage officially recorded was to a baseball field's backstop. Probably the most significant damage was a shell that damaged some large phone cables. The Fort Stevens gunners were refused permission to return fire, since it would have helped the Japanese locate their target more accurately. American aircraft on training flights spotted the submarine, which was subsequently attacked by a US b.omber, but it escaped._





timshatz said:


> Njaco, the Delaware is pretty shallow for the most part. About 40 foot in the channel with plenty of shoals. Be impossible to run a sub up there underwater. On top of the hazards to navigation, there would be a ton of traffic (especially during war time). Somebody would run it over.
> 
> I think a sub managed to lay some mines in the mouth of the Ches in early 42. Same thing for the sea lanes into NYC. One also got into the St. Lawrence Seaway in 42. There were also a bunch of them shooting up tanker traffic off Diamond Shoals down off Cape Hatterus (sp?). Also, close enough to see the lights on the following cities:
> 
> ...



Tim I would think that the subs would lurk farther out in the mouth of the Chesapeake and sink ships there. I was thinking of a mini-sub commando attack against Norfolk Va. there were three carriers stationed there + a couple of battleships. The Italians holed two British battleships by this method in Alexandria, Egypt in Dec 1941. One BB took about 8 months to repair, the other took about 15 IIRC.

Pic of a Italian mini-sub below

*Has anyone considered how vulnerable the US refineries were? * Most of them are on the coast, and in Dec. 1941 were unprotected and also were lit up at night. Attacks by subs in the first few nights after Pearl Harbour would be almost impossible for the US to defend against. Destruction or significant damage to several oil facilities would be more than a passing "blip" to the war effort. At this point in the war the UK was increasingly more reliant on US oil, because many British Allied facilities were in the Persian Gulf in the Far East, and ships had to be detoured around Africa


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## Njaco (May 30, 2008)

Freebird, definately can look on the Philly yard from the Jersey side either through the Rveolutionary battlefirld at National Park or anywhere along the shoreline. In fact there are several large islands that are unihabited that everyone uses for parties. Great cover.

Not sure from the Philly side onto Camden. Maybe Tim would have a better view.

The Navy yard is surrounded by refineries.

How about sinking a few block ships at the entrance to the Delaware? Maybe ships can be built but not sail?


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## Freebird (May 30, 2008)

I was thinking more along the lines of commando attacks on the major ships


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## Glider (May 30, 2008)

If you are going to use a human chariot which is a good idea then I would blow one of the gates in the Panama Canal.


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## Haztoys (May 30, 2008)

pbfoot said:


> There actually was a a battle up here its called the Battle of the St Lawrence there was a number of U boat patrols in the St Lawrence one almost got to Quebec City
> this link will explain it better then I but 42 attacks were made 22 ships were sunk including 3 naval vessels
> The Battle of the Gulf of St. Lawrence - Veterans Affairs Canada



PD...You are a God of info..As always... I never new that so much went on in the Lawrence..The German U-boaters had nuts to do what they need...

We are lucky the Japanese did not use there subs right ..Or America and the Allies would of had a much harder fight in the PTO...And Germany would of had more subs


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## Soren (May 30, 2008)

> And a question for you Soren, looking at the pics of the Italian "manned torpedoes" could a U-boat transport 2- 4 of these things? I would assume that they are about 2,000 - 2,500 pounds, and that the shields for the riders can be removed



Yeah, I certainly can't see why not, the space was there (Providing the shields are removed).


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## timshatz (May 30, 2008)

Freebird, as Njaco says, you can see into the Philly yards from Jersey and from the river. But back in 1940, they were building ships as far north as Bristol (about 25 miles north) and as far south as Wilminton, DE (about 30 miles south) as well as all over the Jersey side. So, to get a look into it, you'd probably have to be in the middle of the shipyard. 

There were two bridges up at that time that would give you a bird's eye view of the Rivers but neither was directly alongside the Phila Navy Yard. 

There are no hills within LOS of the Phila Navy Yard. Jersey is dead flat at that point and so is most of Pa around there. 

Getting a midget sub into Norfolk is a possibility. Back then, there were also other shipyards in the area as well as Portsmouth, VA and Baltimore further up the Chesapeake Bay. Combined, it was a huge navy base and the Ches an inland lake. Going in an putting holes in a CV or BB would make news but not really affect the Navy materially. They were just pumping so many of the things out. Plus, you'd be holing it right in the middle of the repair yards. Float 'em, run them over to a dry dock and fix 'em. Not simply, but not as hard to deal with as putting a couple of torpedoes in them in the middle of an ocean. Similar to what happened to the BBs at Pearl Harbor but without a trip to the repair yards. 

There were a ton of refineries in the area of Phila. Plus, the long pipeline from Texas to Phoenixville was terminalled only 40 miles from Phila. Back in the 40s, Phila was a big time refiniery area (as was and is North Jersey). But destroying a refinery is actually pretty hard. You've got to actually wreck the equipment in a lot of different places to make a real affect. Hitting one or two valves and blowing up some tanks looks like big stuff but it can be fixed fairly fast. And it takes time to put all the explosives in. You can look at the Ploesti raids to see how long it took to really knock the thing out. 

I guess, what I am saying is the US had capacity to spare in fixing stuff as well as making stuff. While it might take the Brits 8 months to fix a BB, holing one in it's home port would probably not take more than 3-4 to fix at the outside. And given the way refineries are constructed and how they were being expanded, blowing up a section of it wouldn't do more than passing damage that would be fixed in less than a month.


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## syscom3 (May 30, 2008)

Tim, arent the currents around there quite tricky?

And navigating a midget sub in water thats usually murky isnt exactly easy to do.


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## timshatz (May 30, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Tim, arent the currents around there quite tricky?
> 
> And navigating a midget sub in water thats usually murky isnt exactly easy to do.



Yeah, in both the Delaware and the Ches, the currents are hairy. Both are tidal runs which means the variation can be pretty wierd. Probably not much of a problem if you are on a boat and navigating the flow above the surface. You can always up your speed and adjust for drift and stay in the dredged channel. But if you are trying to run a midget sub in, underwater, with only occasional periscope sightings for bearings (very close to the water), it would be very easy to run aground. 

One thing about the Delaware, it has a dredged channel that is 40Ft deep all the way to about North Philadelphia. About a good, I'm going on memory here, about 70-80 miles. 6 hours as a sea and anchor detail. But the dredged channel is only about 300 yds wide. It is very easy to get out of the lane and then you're screwed. Mud or rocks all over the place. 

Think the Ches is the same. Every so often ('bout every 10 -15 years) a Navy ship runs aground in the Ches and in the blink of an eye the Captian and Navigator are history. Tricky channels down in the mouth of the Ches with all that water coming down the bay.


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## parsifal (May 31, 2008)

someone has raised the possibility of using Italian Chariots from a German submarine. There are a number of problems with that idea.

Technically, it would be possible to do that, but this is not the problem. Italian Chariots were TOP SECRET to the Italian Navy, and were never going to be easily or willingly shared with the germans. After the attacks in November against the british Battleships in Alexandria, everybody (except the US) wanted to get hold of them. The British had the most luck, they managed to capture several of the Mailie from failed Italian operations. Despite being allied to the Italians, the germans never got their hands on one of these devices, even after the Italian surrender. It was more than two years before the german had anything comparable to the Mailie, and then only in a very crude form (the Neger, and later the Marder types). 

There just was not the level of co-operation between the axis partners, that existed between the allies. This was particualrly true of the Italians, who despised the Germans because of the way the germans treated them. Mussolini was particulalry incensed by the fact that germany failed to inform the Italians of the invasion of Russia in June. Many italians working in Russia (mostly bringing in food and oil supplies) were left stranded because of this german oversight. 

So, providing the specialist equipment to a country whom many in Italy considered to be the true enemy was the first proble. The second problem was training. At this stage, frogmen were a raraity,, highly trained, and requiring a lot of time to prepare. 10th MAS, the specialist Italian outfit that operated these craft had been training and preparing its personnel since the beginning of 1938, and even by the middle of 1941 the italians were still perfecting the techniques required to use this specialist equipment. How on earth are the Germans, who had shown zero interest in this kind of warfare until after November 1941, going to all of a sudden going to acquire the highly specialized skills needed to operate these craft. They were at least two years of having the personnel needed, ready for action, assuming the italians are going to show them in the first place. 

This of course also raises the problem of anticipation. Since the entry of the US was not something that the germans had planned for, in a proper sense (admittedly Doenitz had anticipated it, but the German Admiralty as a whole had not expected it). The Germans would have needed veritable eyes in the back of their heads to start preparing for this kind of operation. Assuming all manner of co-operation with their allies (for which NO evidence exists) one can reasonably suggest that they would have needed at least a year to prepare for the operation. A year in which signal traffic would need to go nuts about how and where and with what they were going to attack. Given that the German Naval codes, including the U-Boat codes were broken in June 1941 (although they were subsequently restored for a time) it is almost certain that the plan would have been discovered. 

Someone also made the flippant remark that it would be "easy" to convert a type IX to be the carrier of these subs. Well, thats intersting. Considering that it took 8 months for the italaians to complete the conversions to enable the launching of the Mailie from just two Coastal Subs 9the Scire and the Da vinci), ther again is a proble. I dont doubt that it would be possible to convert a Type IX to the purpose, but how do you think Doenitz, and Hitler are going to react to the loss of a U-Boat from operations for 8 month?. Tey are going to go bonkas, and refuse to give up the Boat for such a scheme. moreover, the maximum number of craft that the italian boats could carry was just two....lets be generaous and surmise that the German Boat which is about twice as big, can carry four such craft.....for the loss of eight months of operation by a major unit of the KM, you are going to be able to launch just four craft....and for what?????


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## Njaco (May 31, 2008)

> There are no hills within LOS of the Phila Navy Yard. Jersey is dead flat at that point and so is most of Pa around there.



Thats why our nickname is "flatlanders". 

Parsifal, good points but I could throw in the following.

As far as US being in the war and not a target, I think lend-lease would have appealled to Hitler in the respect that convoys of Liberty ships and such were coming from US regardless whether they were in the war or not. It may have been a taget objective for Germany.

That being said, Doenitz may have supported a raid on these ships or supplies to stem the convoys. Just a thought. I doesn't seem that far gone. Thats was why I brought up the Philly Navy yards.

Now as to how, I leave that up to far better experts. Subs and minis and all.


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## Soren (May 31, 2008)

Parsifal,

I'm sure that if the Germans had wanted the Mailie they would've gotten it right away. And as for the co-operation between Italy and Germany, don't forget that Daimler Benz was delivering new engines to the Italians for use in their fighter designs. Furthermore the Italians were given new Bf-109G's as-well by the Germans, and in return the Germans were given Macchi, Reggiane Fiat fighters by the Italians.


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## parsifal (May 31, 2008)

The Italian Navy would most definately have not shared their "secret weapon with the Germans unless absolutely forced to. The italians were really dirty about not receiving what they regarded as their proper share of fuel oil. Moreover, after the November attacks on Alexandria, despite repeated requests, the Italians refused to provide the Germans with ANY help in this specialised form of warfare. The British got more from the Italians than the Germans when it came to the Chariot technology and training. Even so, it would be 1944 before the British could undertake any missions with these submersibles, and then only with help from the members of the 10th MAS. 
The Italian navy would only be more incensed by the help you described. That was help to the air force, which the Navy hated almost as much as the Germans...dont forget, these are super senitive latins we are talking about here, and the germans never quite got that


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## Soren (Jun 1, 2008)

Parsifal,

Had the Germans wanted the Mailie they would've gotten it, infact they almost certainly already knew most of the things worth knowing about it, the Abwehr being all over the Italian armed forces. However the Germans had no use for it in late 43, and so a procurement of one wasn't even considered.

But again, had the Germans wanted it they would've gotten it, either the easy or the hard way. I'm sure the KM could persuade the Italian Navy to hand over a few examples of the Mailie in exchange for some KM hardware. If not the Abwehr could simply steal all the plans.

Now moving onwards, how would you guys equip the 25 man teams set off on US, Canadian Alaskan soil ?


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## syscom3 (Jun 1, 2008)

Soren, and just what were the 25 man teams going to accomplish?

What targets? How are they going to carry enough explosives to destroy their targets? 

Especially when it came to Alaska. Nothing was there, save what was on the Pacific Coast.


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## Soren (Jun 1, 2008)

Syscom,

It doesn't take a lot of explosives to do a lot of damage. The prefered explosives would be plastic explosives, such as DM12.

In Alaska the goal is merely to create terror, while in Canada the US there are possible targets to destroy as-well.


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2008)

*Had the Germans wanted the Mailie they would've gotten it, infact they almost certainly already knew most of the things worth knowing about it, the Abwehr being all over the Italian armed forces. However the Germans had no use for it in late 43, and so a procurement of one wasn't even considered*.

The chief Abwehr operative in the Italian Admiralty was the KM naval Attache. I think his name was Raus, from memory. 

I am not going to assert that the abwehr didn’t know about Chariots, but neither is ther any evidence that I know of to say that they did know of it. If you have evidence to the contrary, I would like to see it.

In fact the circumstantial evidence very strongly suggests otherwise. The reports that I have seen (but I cannot now find) suggest that the OKM was very surprised by the equipment, and the success of Chariot attacks in November. Moreover, what is not so well known is that the 10 MAS had been operating for some months out of a disused merchant hulk, anchored across the bay to Gibraltar, in the Spanish port of Algerciras. The British had been unable to locate the source of these attacks. This small group of saboteurs managed to sink over 100000 tons of ships in Gibraltar, and were never caught. The british did eventually get a good clue as to what was happening, but this was never the result of covert intelligence. Now, if the germans had known about this they would have talked about it, and if they had talked about it the british would have found out about it, because the german security services were basically a swiss cheese with holes all over it, when it came to the SOE. There has seldom been a more compromised security organization as the abwehr. Moreover there is also the weakness of Enigma, which throughout 1941, the Allies were reading

The Italians had a weak security service as well, but it did not suffer from enigma style breaches like the germans, because they didn’t use it (until 1942), and their own security services were actually superior to the Abwehr 9there wwere other security organizations, namely the B-Dienst service, the SD and Gehlens team attached directly to OKW. But none of these services had operatives working in Italy in 1941. 

y 
*But again, had the Germans wanted it they would've gotten it, either the easy or the hard way. I'm sure the KM could persuade the Italian Navy to hand over a few examples of the Mailie in exchange for some KM hardware. If not the Abwehr could simply steal all the plans.*
The german intelligence services were not on a par with its armed forces. The abwehr was basically the laughing stock of Europe, because all the intelligence agencies knew that they could sell any story to the organizations and it would accept it, hook, line and sinker. The german intelligence system suffered from being over rigid, and too centralized in terms of its control. This prevented many of its spy networks from employing the sort of quick thinking tactics that were needed in order to work successfully as a spy. Moreover, the over rigid approach taken by the abwehr meant that their operatives were generally very easily identified and compromised. In England for example, there was not one German spy that had not either been captured or compromised from early 1941 on .

Whilst I cant prove which spy service (Italian or German) had the upper hand, my suspicions are that it was the Italian. The italain spy service was nothing like the Italian military, it was actually quite efficient. For example, the Italians predicted, with a great deal of accuracy, the Torch and Sicilian landings, whereas the Germans were basically floundering.

Certainly, if the germans did know about the Italian chariots, they did not act on it, until after the November attacks. After that, they, in common with nearly everybody else, wanted to get their hands on the technology. AFAIK, they never did, and the proff of this is in the rather p[oor efforts they made in the form of the Neger and the Marder minisubs, which were based on the same general idea. 

Lastly, the 10MAS outfit was the crème de la crème of the Italian military, It was a thoroughly professional outfit, full the equal to anything in any other army, and not an easy organization to penetrate when it came to its most jealously guarded secrets. 

An overt “raid” would have had disastrous impacts on Italo-German relations. Are you suggesting that you would jeapodize the whole southern front, for the sake of delivering 4 Chariot attacks against the Americans. This really is getting a bit silly. 

*Now moving onwards, how would you guys equip the 25 man teams set off on US, Canadian Alaskan soil ?*

Err equipping 25 man teams from U-Boats. Considering that each type IX is able to carry no more than fourteen men , exactly how many teams are we talking about. Given that you will want to so lavishly equip these teams, I estimate that you will need at least 4 boats per team. I don’t know how many type IXs there were at this time, but it wasn’t many. Each boat was basically sinking about 100000 tons of shipping per patrol, so, if youo are pulling these boats out of the subs available for tonnage warfare, as you must, in order to train the crews, and modify the boats for the operation, then you have foregone the loss of about 800000 tons of British shipping per team, and for what??????/


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## syscom3 (Jun 2, 2008)

Soren doesnt know anything about the size or terrain for Alaska and Northern Canada.

Therefore we should concentrate on these potential spy teams for deployment on the eastern seaboard, maybe even Gulf Coast.


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## pbfoot (Jun 2, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren doesnt know anything about the size or terrain for Alaska and Northern Canada.
> 
> Therefore we should concentrate on these potential spy teams for deployment on the eastern seaboard, maybe even Gulf Coast.


I totally agree 
the eastern seaboard is really the only option


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## Soren (Jun 2, 2008)

Parsifal, study the Type IX boats abit mroe before making blanket statements like that. The Type IX boats could carry more than just 14 additional men, infact 25 extra men was easily carried, and then there was still a lot of room for the equipment. Did you miss the top cargohold ? 

Now as for missing out on 80000 tons of Allied shipping, are you suggesting that this is what the boat which set off spies in Labrador did ?? Your ignorance is becoming laughable Parsifal.

And as for the Abwehr being the laughing stock of Europe, you don't know what you're talking about Parsifal. Or are you trying to suggest that all those Allied spies caught executed by the Abwehr just walked right into their office headquaters with their arms in the air yelling *I surrender!* ?? You're right Parsifal, this is getting abit silly.

Like I said, the Abwehr no doubt knew about the Mailie, but seeing there was no use for it a procurement of one was never planned.

Also I'd lke to know from where you got the info that the Italian secret service got the landings of the Allies right whilst the Abwehr was in the woods ???


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## Soren (Jun 2, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren doesnt know anything about the size or terrain for Alaska and Northern Canada.



Yes I do. Remember people live there Syscom, so you can get there. 



> Therefore we should concentrate on these potential spy teams for deployment on the eastern seaboard, maybe even Gulf Coast.



Spy teams ??


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## pbfoot (Jun 2, 2008)

Soren said:


> Yes I do. Remember people live there Syscom, so you can get there.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## syscom3 (Jun 2, 2008)

Tundra, mountain ranges, vast malarial marshes impassable during the summer, bittter cold .... plus the hundreds of miles they would need to travel to get to any military or industrial target worth hitting.

Very, very few people lived in the northern reaches of the continent. And the few that did were such expert survivalists and trackers, they would simply find and then pick off the commando teams one by one.

Soren, stick to an eastern seaboard or gulf attack.


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## pbfoot (Jun 2, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Tundra, mountain ranges, vast malarial marshes impassable during the summer, bittter cold .... plus the hundreds of miles they would need to travel to get to any military or industrial target worth hitting.
> 
> Very, very few people lived in the northern reaches of the continent. And the few that did were such expert survivalists and trackers, they would simply find and then pick off the commando teams one by one.
> 
> Soren, stick to an eastern seaboard or gulf attack.


Mosquitos and No see ums (blackkflies) I don't believe it was possible to drive across Canada at tha point in time let alone get up north that was all done by boats and aircraft


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## parsifal (Jun 2, 2008)

Soren said:


> *Parsifal, study the Type IX boats abit mroe before making blanket statements like that. The Type IX boats could carry more than just 14 additional men, infact 25 extra men was easily carried, and then there was still a lot of room for the equipment. Did you miss the top cargohold ? *
> 
> The japanese i-boats were about 2.5 times the size of the Type IX, and after full modification could transport 24 fully armed soldiers. they could also carry a 46 foot Daihatsu LCI that was lashed to the deck, or up to 10 tons of cargo, located in the seaplane hangar, which was many times the size of the cargo spaces in the Type Ixs.
> 
> ...


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

Parsifal you keep claiming that the proof is in the pudding yet you have no sources to back up your claims.

And no you obviously don’t know German Uboats Parsifal, and your weird attempt at comparing them to Japanese boats only verifies this.

The std. type IX could easily accommodate an extra 25 men with no problems what’so’ever , esp. If the number of torps were reduced. A Type IXD could hold over 252 tons of cargo Parsifal!

So again Parsifal, study the German subs before making blanket statements about them.

As for the Abwehr, again no proof or sources from you. Also the Soviets got most of their intel from Western Allied intelligence gathering, the Soviets had nothing to do with it themselves.


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

Syscom Pbfoot,

Check the map plz, there are rivers running all over Alaska. How do you think the Germans were able to set off Spies in Labrador Canada ? Heck if I wanted to I could land my 25 men in Quebec.

Like I said, people live there, and so you can get there: An old but very true slogan.


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## timshatz (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren, you might want to check the details on Alaska as far as infiltration is concerned. I see your point that you can get there using a sub. There are a multitude of places to land where there wouldn't be anybody around. Rivers could be used as routes of travel further inland. I agree, strictly from a potential point. 

The problem with Alaska, especially in the 1940s, is the same as what they used to say about Los Angles. "When you get there, there's no there there." In short, it is very much like Siberia. Nothing was there. No industry, a few military bases, the odd Eskimo settlement and lot of nothing in between. Trees, mountains, rivers. No industry, no cities (to speak of), no reason to be there in the first place. Same could be said with the Hudson's Bay region of Canada. Land there? Sure. Land anywhere you want. By why would you want to?

There used to be a running joke/ nugget of truth in the US when I was growing up. Alaska is the largerst state in the United States, but it's population is smaller than that of Rhode Island (the smallest state).

Says a lot.


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## syscom3 (Jun 3, 2008)

Ummmm Soren ...... in 1940, the number of people living in the northern reaches of Alaska and the NW territories numbered in the thousands. And considering the size of the area, thats a very low density. 

And look at those rivers. Not all of them navigatable. All certeinly frozen most of the year. And then there is the issue of the mountain ranges. 

Now tell us all, how these teams are going to cary their rations, supplies, weapons and explosives in some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world, for hundreds of miles in order to instill terror on outposts that have zero military or commercial value.

And that doesnt account for them being tracked down themselves and picked off one by one by the locals.

Stick to an eastern seaboard attack.


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

Syscom, 

The target area in effect needed to hold no more than half a thousand civilians, as the goal of the attack on Alaska was but to cause terror, nothing else. But besides that you could land men in both Fairbanks Anchorage, both of which housing thousands of people. And as for dealing with the terrain, the German commandoes were trained by the Gebirgsjäger to travel, fight survive in such terrain.

And as for Canada, look at the map, one can land men in or close to all the major cities there, Quebec, Torronto, Montreal etc etc no problem. 

Take a look at the map Syscom.


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## Glider (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren said:


> Parsifal you keep claiming that the proof is in the pudding yet you have no sources to back up your claims.
> 
> And no you obviously don’t know German Uboats Parsifal, and your weird attempt at comparing them to Japanese boats only verifies this.
> 
> The std. type IX could easily accommodate an extra 25 men with no problems what’so’ever , esp. If the number of torps were reduced. A Type IXD could hold over 252 tons of cargo Parsifal!.



I believe the onus is on you Soren to explain why they could carry an additional 25 men without any problems. Parsifal has supported his contention with the example of the Japanese Submarines which were twice the size of a Type IX. I have mentioned that the only other Submarines that carried raiding parties were the thre USA submarines that used their mine hold for soldiers and were 50% bigger than the Type IX. I have been on a submarine similar in size to a Type IX (the Oberon Class) and can promise you that there was no way you could get many exra's on board, if your interested there were four of us.
A type IX D could take 252 tons of cargo but *only *if all the torpedo tubes and torpedos were taken out and it was converted to transport configuration. This doesn't mean that you could get 25 men on as men already slept in the torpedo rooms.




> As for the Abwehr, again no proof or sources from you. Also the Soviets got most of their intel from Western Allied intelligence gathering, the Soviets had nothing to do with it themselves.


I take it you can support the statement that the Soviets got most of their intel from the western allies. I say this as I have a couple of very good books on the intelligence war and assure you that as far as they are concerned, your statement couldn't be more wrong if you tried.


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

Glider, do you even understand how much space the torpedoes took up alone ??

A Type IX with half the normal torpedo load could easily accommodate another 30 men for transport, heck the nr. of dedicated crew members varied from an extra 5 to 8 men, and this was for entire patrols.

Remember this is no spy landing, and so the nr. of men landed need not be small. Also in this case the Uboat crew will be aware of the purpose of the men aboard.


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

As for Soviet intelligence, tell me what they achieve Glider.

I suppose you're refering to the Red Orchestra ?


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## Glider (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren
How many times must I say to you that I have been in a Submarine of the same size as a Type IX and the concept of getting an extra 25+ men inside is impossible. The crew already hot bunk and you are increasing the compliment by around 50%.
Yes I have seen torpedo's have you?

Re the Russian intelligence, let me know what type your interested in. Tactical, Strategic, Economic or Counter Intelligence. I will happily give you examples on any of the above. All I ask is you support your statement that Russia got most of its intel from the Western Allies.


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## parsifal (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren said:


> *Parsifal you keep claiming that the proof is in the pudding yet you have no sources to back up your claims.
> 
> And no you obviously don’t know German Uboats Parsifal, and your weird attempt at comparing them to Japanese boats only verifies this.
> 
> ...


I have suggested some sources incidentally, but we are yet to see the colour of any of your source material. I would very much like to see it if you have any


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## Glider (Jun 3, 2008)

This might be of interest. A type IX submarine torpedo room with only one spare torpedo, bunks already in the torpedo room and you want to put another 25+ men in there for weeks.
Museum of Science and Industry | What's Here | Exhibits | U-505 | The Exhibit | On-Board Tour


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## parsifal (Jun 3, 2008)

Glider said:


> I believe the onus is on you Soren to explain why they could carry an additional 25 men without any problems. Parsifal has supported his contention with the example of the Japanese Submarines which were twice the size of a Type IX. I have mentioned that the only other Submarines that carried raiding parties were the thre USA submarines that used their mine hold for soldiers and were 50% bigger than the Type IX. * I have been on a submarine similar in size to a Type IX (the Oberon Class) and can promise you that there was no way you could get many exra's on board, if your interested there were four of us.*A type IX D could take 252 tons of cargo but *only *if all the torpedo tubes and torpedos were taken out and it was converted to transport configuration. This doesn't mean that you could get 25 men on as men already slept in the torpedo rooms.
> 
> 
> 
> I take it you can support the statement that the Soviets got most of their intel from the western allies. I say this as I have a couple of very good books on the intelligence war and assure you that as far as they are concerned, your statement couldn't be more wrong if you tried.



Glider have you been on the Oberons, I served 9very briefly on such aboat....great boats, but no way could you cram 25 men and keep them alive for a month over and above the needs of the standard crew. Soren needs to get out a bit more i think


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren said:


> Syscom,
> 
> The target area in effect needed to hold no more than half a thousand civilians, as the goal of the attack on Alaska was but to cause terror, nothing else. But besides that you could land men in both Fairbanks Anchorage, both of which housing thousands of people. And as for dealing with the terrain, the German commandoes were trained by the Gebirgsjäger to travel, fight survive in such terrain.
> 
> ...



Soren I suggest you go to Alaska. I have been there, hell I am moving to Alaska next year.

If you are not familiar with the terrain you will not survive in the wilderness. Being trained in mountain terrain and being trained for the kind of wilderness in Alaska can not be compared. I am sorry...


Besides what kind of terror are they going to cause? To a few very small settlements or eskimos. It really is a stupid scenerio.


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

Parsifal do you even understand what you quote ??!

You have quoted how U-boats meant for long patrols were crammed with food, fuel, ammunition torpedoes, knowing that they'd be out there a VERY long time, sometimes just laying in wait. However what you don't seem to understand at all is that the goal of the operation not is to go on a long patrol but to transport men from Europe to America. Is that really so hard to understand ? It's no freakin wonder you critize everything I write when you don't even care to read it! Or is it that you just don't know what the difference is and that U-boats were differently equipped depending on what type of task they were to perform?? 

Now Glider unknowingly demonstrated just how much room a SINGLE torpedo takes up. Take out 10 torpedoes and you've got yourself a very nice amount of room. 

Another picture to show just how much room a single Torpedo took up: (Take away that torp and you've got an entire extra row of bed space)






One more:





Now remember that this (Forward torpedo room) is but ONE of the many rooms used as bedrooms by the crew, and even on long patrols where the boat was stuffed with extra food, fuel, ammunition torpedoes there always was space for all 55 to 63 dedicated crewmembers. So a short tour de tour like the suggested operation would definitely allow an extra 30 men to come along, seeing that only a fraction of the food, ammunition torpedoes would be needed. Also keep in mind the Type IXD is bigger inside than the boats pictured above.


*Adler,*

Have you tried travelling by foot in Alaska, or heck even Austria, Norway or Switzerland ? It can be done, I know it can, esp. by men trained to travel, fight and survive in mountainous terrain. It also depends a lot on how long you need to go.

Anyhow I don't even know why you guys think the men would have to travel many miles by foot over the mountains to reach the target area, as at both suggested target places they could be set off right next to it. So why are we even discussing this ???



If you want to critize something atleast read understand it properly first.


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

This is the type of terrain the GebirgsJägers trained, lived, travelled fought in during the war:










*The GebirgsJägers*






























A good read: 6518 - Gebirgsjager - German Mountain Infantry

And today they carry on the tradition:














Heck even during the first world war there were men especially trained to live, travel fight in mountainous terrain, such as the German alpine troops fighting the Italians. (Below: Austrian Mountain corps):


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren do not even try to compare the Alps and Western Europe to the climate and terrain of Alaska. Again before you make a comparison. Go to to both. I have...


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## Glider (Jun 3, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Glider have you been on the Oberons, I served 9very briefly on such aboat....great boats, but no way could you cram 25 men and keep them alive for a month over and above the needs of the standard crew. Soren needs to get out a bit more i think



I didn't serve on them. The RN were trying to get people to volunteer for the Submarine service. Our branch which was the fixed wing airframes and engines was being cut and we went on board 'Odin' for three days for a taster.
I stayed with the FAA, but your right there were only four of us but there is no doubt that 25 is impossible.


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## Glider (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren has missed the point. Those torpedo spaces are empty and the bunks are already in them and are occupied. You want to put 25 men in the room that you see.
I don't know how they stored the spare torps on a Type IX but in a Type VII most of the torpedo's were on the deck with a false floor on to on which people lived and worked. Taking the torpedo's out simply lowered the floor.

As for the photo's of the troops, can I ask if your taking the mules with you?


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

> Soren has missed the point.



Nope, but you have a habbit of twisting what I say. You need to read before you respond. I don't want to stuff 25 or 30 men into one room, they'd be spread over the entire sub. Furthermore a Type IXD is a good deal larger inside than the Uboats pictured above.



> Those torpedo spaces are empty and the bunks are already in them and are occupied.



You noticed that too ?? Wow! Well then Glider, don't you find it funny that despite being stuffed with the absolute max amount of food, ammo torps (Which means those bunks were totally inaccessable) 63 men were still able to live inside that boat for months ?? And yet still you're trying to suggest that for a transport operation the boat was unable to hold an extra 25 to 30 men.



> As for the photo's of the troops, can I ask if your taking the mules with you?



Eerr, you do know that these weren't used over 80% of the time, right ? Unless they're special mules able to climb cliffs ofcourse


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Soren do not even try to compare the Alps and Western Europe to the climate and terrain of Alaska. Again before you make a comparison. Go to to both. I have...





So Adler, what is the major difference between Alaskan terrain and climate compared to the climate terrain of the Austrian, Swiss, French Norwegian mountain range that would make it alien country to try and survive in by comparison ? And remember this is refering to the climate terrain around the target area (Both places accessable via rivers)

Alaska.com | Weather climate

_The climate of Southcentral Alaska -- the region encompassing Anchorage, Seward, Homer, Prince William Sound and Wrangell-St. Elias -- is mild, at least by Alaska standards. The temperatures are moderated by the Gulf of Alaska, and the truly cold winds of the north are often blocked by the Alaska and Talkeetna mountain ranges.
Southcentral Alaska doesn't get as much rain as Southeast Alaska, but it gets a lot more snow. On the other hand, it has a lot more clear days.

When moisture-laden air blowing off the Gulf of Alaska meets the chilly Alaska, Chugach, Talkeetna, Wrangell and St. Elias ranges, precipitation happens. In July, August and September, especially along the Gulf coast, rain falls. In the winter, there's lots of snow. This is often most apparent along Prince William Sound. Valdez, for example, averages 303 inches -- 25 feet -- a year, and Whittier gets 250 inches. 

Although so much snow requires shoveling and plowing in town, it's beloved by skiers and snowmachiners. Snow in the mountains feeds the glaciers and the myriad streams that salmon come home to. Snow and rain also nurture the lush coastal forests.

Blocked from the Gulf by mountains, Anchorage's official measuring station at the international airport gets only 70 inches.

The snow near sea level generally melts away by early May. When termination dust -- the first coating of mountaintop snow -- falls in late August or early September, Alaskans know winter isn't far away.

Summer sunlight in Anchorage lasts 19.5 hours at the June solstice. At the winter solstice, daylight lasts 5.5 hours._


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## parsifal (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren said:


> *You have quoted how U-boats meant for long patrols were crammed with food, fuel, ammunition torpedoes, knowing that they'd be out there a VERY long time, sometimes just laying in wait. However what you don't seem to understand at all is that the goal of the operation not is to go on a long patrol but to transport men from Europe to America. Is that really so hard to understand ? It's no freakin wonder you critize everything I write when you don't even care to read it! Or is it that you just don't know what the difference is and that U-boats were differently equipped depending on what type of task they were to perform?? *
> 
> Soren
> 
> ...



If you want people to understand you properly, try making your posts clearer, instead of leaving innuendo and unclear messages there.


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## Glider (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren said:


> Nope, but you have a habbit of twisting what I say. You need to read before you respond. I don't want to stuff 25 or 30 men into one room, they'd be spread over the entire sub. Furthermore a Type IXD is a good deal larger inside than the Uboats pictured above.



I am twisting nothing. You are the one who kept saying that by taking the torpedo's out you would have room for the men, so I concentrated on the torpedo rooms. So now they are spread out all over the boat, your change not mine. Tell me who are you going to move them to, remembering that the crew aready hot bunk. 
By the way the size of the Submarine doesn't automatically mean a lot more space. British Nuclear Subs still hot bunked until the latest class due to lack of space



> You noticed that too ?? Wow! Well then Glider, don't you find it funny that despite being stuffed with the absolute max amount of food, ammo torps (Which means those bunks were totally inaccessable) 63 men were still able to live inside that boat for months ?? And yet still you're trying to suggest that for a transport operation the boat was unable to hold an extra 25 to 30 men.


I take it that you can support these assumptions. Bunks were not made inaccessable, they were vital for the health and safety of the crew.




> Eerr, you do know that these weren't used over 80% of the time, right ? Unless they're special mules able to climb cliffs ofcourse



Just thinking of your supermen from the raid in Australia. 

By the way, I am still waiting for your supporting information IRO the Russians getting their Intel from the western allies. Any information re the source welcome.


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## parsifal (Jun 3, 2008)

there is a way for a commando raid to be launched against the US, but it does not involve U-Boats.

Instead of basically killing your people by cramming them into a naval verion of the "Black Hole Of calcutta", why not just send your people to spain where they would then be embarked on a "neutral" merchantman. A lot easier, with a lot more space in it.....sure there is a risk that the ship might get pulled over by customs, or the neutrality patrols...you might use the commadoes as make believe crew, and just hope that all the hardware you are packing is not detected, but at least this approach is feasible. The germans used that approach in Norway, and whilst a US adventure is, IMO infintely more difficult thana little jump across the Kattegat, at least you have a plausible base of operations and means of transport, instead of trying to make something that is unworkable, work


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

> Soren
> 
> All those preparations that you read about allowed U-123 to undertake an extended deployment from the 23 December, arriving back at Lorient 2 February 1942. She was on station for just 8 days, from 13th January until 21st January. The rest of the time she was in transit.
> 
> ...



Again you haven't even been following attention.

Spies would be set off a week or two prior to the attack to monitor and find the proper landing area along with automated weather radio stations. 

And as for your suggested 10 days of looking through a telescope to see wether the coast is clear, that's just completely ridiculous Parsifal, with or without spies doing all the preliminary work. And then on top of that you're suggesting that it takes NINE days to get the 25 men out of the boat, into rafts and head for shore ??? Parsifal how did you ever come up with that ?



> If you are travelling to Alaska, you are dooming your Boat to a one way mission, and attempting to coop your people up for more than 60 days. in total that means they are incarcerated for more than 70 days.....Jesus, I dont think i have heard a more silly proposal in my life



The only one making silly proposals here is you Parsifal, and you're ignorance to the fact that hundreds of boats were on patrols lasting months just proves that.

Ever heard of milkcows ??



> Despite the photos, which is what I expected, there is insufficient space to carry these troops in any sort of fighting condition, and also carry their equipment, and ensure that the boat can return to safe port. And there are not too many additional spaces to accommodate people or supplies. The pictures of the boat you supplied are of a different subtype not commissioned until the 20 Septmeber 1943, when a lot more attention had been paid by the Germans to habitability standards and endurance . It is not representative of the conditions that existed in the earlier Type IXs. and it should also be noted that this is a photo of a static museum display, where a lot of equipment has been removed for safety reasons. Try achieving that amount of space on an operational Boat. You wont find it
> 
> And I do know that U-Boats could be fitted out according to mission profile. Trouble is, what you are suggesting exceeds the endurance parameters for a Type IX B Boat



Again you demonstrate your complete lack of knowledge on the subject of German U-boats and how they operated. 

Let me ask you again: Have you ever heard of Milkcows Parsifal ? Ever wondered how German subs were able to patrol the US Canadian coasts for weeks, attack and then return all the way home again ??

Fact is what I'm suggesting doesn't even come close to exceeding either the space or endurance parameters of the suggested boats.

So again Parsifal, study the subject before making blanket statements about it.



> As I said earlier, if you are going to argue your case, you should not refer to bunkspaces as "bedrooms". Other spaces are refered to as compartments. They are either cabins or bunk psaces, or a mess. A bedroom is a place that you go to when you are visiting your mother. And a "room" does not exist on a commissioned ship



You've got to be kidding me man! You're just desperately grasping for straws now Parsifal! You obviously don't know what sarcasm or figure of speach is!

Parsifal when I say: _Used as bedrooms by the crew_ it is the same as when saying: _The men used the three as a toilet_ or _"The men used their rifles as clobs"_

But then ofcourse comes to the scene an extreme nitpicker and starts ranting: _"Rifles certainly aint clubs! They're firearms!"_

Give me a break!


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## pbfoot (Jun 3, 2008)

The Alps thats a pimple
the Rocky Mountains extend the Rockies are 4000 miles long and thats one range here are some more in the Pacific West
Kenai Mountains, southern Alaska 
Chugach Mountains, southern Alaska 
Talkeetna Mountains, southern Alaska 
Yukon Ranges, Alaska, Yukon 
Wrangell Mountains, southern Alaska 
Saint Elias Mountains, southern Alaska, southwestern Yukon, far northwestern British Columbia 
Alsek Ranges 
Fairweather Range 
Takshanuk Mountains, Haines, Alaska-area. Between Chilkat and Chilkoot watersheds 
Coast Mountains 
Boundary Ranges, southeastern Alaska, northwestern British Columbia 
Cheja Range (southeast of Taku/Whiting Rivers) 
Chechidla Range 
Chutine Icefield 
Adam Mountains 
Ashington Range 
Burniston Range 
Dezadeash Range 
Florence Range 
Halleck Range 
Juneau Icefield 
Kahpo Mountains 
Kakuhan Range 
Lincoln Mountains 
Longview Range 
Peabody Mountains 
Rousseau Range 
Seward Mountains 
Snowslide Range 
Spectrum Range 
Stikine Icecap 
Kitimat Ranges BC North Coast 
Pacific Ranges BC South Central Coast 
Rainbow Range northwest Chilcotin, also classifiable as part of the Interior Plateau 
Pantheon Range Homathko area 
Niut Range Homathko area 
Waddington Range Homathko area 
Whitemantle Range Homathko area 
Bendor Range 
Garibaldi Ranges 
Clendinning Range 
Tantalus Range 
Chilcotin Ranges 
Dickson Range 
Shulaps Range 
Camelsfoot Range 
Lillooet Ranges, Fraser Canyon west bank 
Cantilever Range 
Cayoosh Range 
Douglas Ranges 
forget Alaska and stick the east coast


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

And what does that change Pbfoot ? It was mountain terrain all the same.

But again the men don't have to travel through the mountain terrain, they could simply be set off at or close to Anchorage.


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## pbfoot (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren said:


> And what does that change Pbfoot ? It was mountain terrain all the same.
> 
> But again the men don't have to travel through the mountain terrain, they could simply be set off at or close to Anchorage.


where do you get your drugs ? could you hook me up please


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

Take a look at the map (Even Fairbanks is accessible):


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## pbfoot (Jun 3, 2008)

What don't you understand there was only one road to the north west called the Alaska Highway it was built by the US and Canada but mostly American in 42- 43 its purpose was twofold it was way for the US to move troops to the Alaska but mainly to supply the airports that were built at the same time in the North west to allow combat aircraft to be supplied to the USSR . To understand the magnitude of this venture it was the *2nd* mostly costly project in WW2 after the Manhattan Project and your guys are going to be wearing Lederhosen singing Horst Wessel and other selected tunes from the Sound of Music along a military road to a military zone . Alaska was not a state but a military zone. Your Lederhosen guys wouldn't stand out in the least in Fairbanks in 1940 with its population of 3500 or Anchorage at 3500 or Nome at 1500 or Fairbanks at 5500 
give your head a shake and stick to the East coast


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## Soren (Jun 3, 2008)

What are you talking about Pbfoot ?? Why do you keep talking about this road ?? Why would you want to walk hundreds of miles along a road when you can land right at or next to the target area. Anchorage can be reached directly via the cook inlet !

As for Fairbanks, I see there's a large river running all the way up to it, but how deep it is I don't know, but if deep enough for a Uboat to submerge then this can be used to directly reach Fairbanks.


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## pbfoot (Jun 3, 2008)

John Candy on the SCTV had a documentary about a U boat penetrating the mississippi I tried to find it on You tube but had no joy but came up with this other John Candy WW2 doc

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2BbPke2I1E_


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## syscom3 (Jun 3, 2008)

Soren, if youre going to sail a commando ship right up to Anchorage, then why waste your time with them and simply have a mission to use the sub as a merchant hunter.

But then again, sailing a sub in the arctic waters in poorly charted sea's was a recipe for disaster.

They wouldn't even get there in the first place.

BTW, Fairbanks is several hundred miles inland and not deep enough for a sub. Fat chance your commando team has enough supplies to get that far.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 4, 2008)

Soren said:


> So Adler, what is the major difference between Alaskan terrain and climate compared to the climate terrain of the Austrian, Swiss, French Norwegian mountain range that would make it alien country to try and survive in by comparison ? And remember this is refering to the climate terrain around the target area (Both places accessable via rivers)
> 
> Alaska.com | Weather climate
> 
> ...



Soren you don't get -60 F in Switzerland or Austria and the area is harder to naviagate.

Again Soren I have actually been to both of these places included Alaska. Have you? I am not basing my opinion by looking at a map while sitting 10,000 miles away...

Also how do you plan to get to Fairbanks. I hope you are not talking about Rivers. None of the rivers are fully navigable at that time. Hell most are not today...


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## parsifal (Jun 4, 2008)

Hi soren



Soren said:


> *Again you haven't even been following attention.
> 
> Spies would be set off a week or two prior to the attack to monitor and find the proper landing area along with automated weather radio stations.
> 
> ...


_


I'll give you a break when yoou do the same courtesy for others_


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## Freebird (Jun 4, 2008)

parsifal said:


> someone has raised the possibility of using Italian Chariots from a German submarine. There are a number of problems with that idea.



Very interesting post Parsifal, thanks for the info about the Maille's.

First, Parsifal you have great posts but could you please not leave your replys inside the "quotations". You can't "quote" another "quote", so it makes it difficult to reply point by point. If you want to reply by bold paragraphs between the quoted segments, either insert {QUOTE} {/QUOTE} with square brackets around each segment you are quoting, or else just eliminate the {QUOTE} {/QUOTE} and put your comments in bold between segmants of the other. 



syscom3 said:


> Soren doesnt know anything about the size or terrain for Alaska and Northern Canada.
> 
> Therefore we should concentrate on these potential spy teams for deployment on the eastern seaboard, maybe even Gulf Coast.



Syscom you are 100% correct about Alaska, it would be almost impossible and very pointless.

Soren I don't think the idea of Germany attacking Alaska would be of any use at all. It would take a few extra months to get there, and the results would be almost worthless, Alaska is too far away for people to take much notice.

With the more limited range of German boats, they would be best employed on the US Eastern seaboard, or on the US Gulf Coast, as Syscom points out.



parsifal said:


> there is a way for a commando raid to be launched against the US, but it does not involve U-Boats.
> 
> Instead of basically killing your people by cramming them into a naval verion of the "Black Hole Of calcutta", why not just send your people to spain where they would then be embarked on a "neutral" merchantman. A lot easier, with a lot more space in it.....sure there is a risk that the ship might get pulled over by customs, or the neutrality patrols...you might use the commadoes as make believe crew, and just hope that all the hardware you are packing is not detected, but at least this approach is feasible. The germans used that approach in Norway, and whilst a US adventure is, IMO infintely more difficult thana little jump across the Kattegat, at least you have a plausible base of operations and means of transport, instead of trying to make something that is unworkable, work



An good idea Parsifal, I mentioned that on the earlier commando thread. Most of the hardware could be seen as "legitimate" if it is mortars, MG's, etc, going to Vichy or Spanish overseas colonies. I don't think the British had restrictions on *outgiong * munitions from Europe did they? At this point in the war the British were very worried about Spanish Vichy neutrality, so would not want to provoke them. 

Another option would be for the cargo freighter to carry some supplies mundane weapon, pass through the British "picket" blockade line, then {about 2 or 3 days out} rendezvous with 
a U=boat to pick up the commandos a some specialized equipment. That way the journey by sub would be only a few days, not weeks. There wouldn't be many patrols on the western half of the Atlantic, and the commandos could pose as crew, as you say.



freebird said:


> Soren I think Glider is right about the difficulty, I don't think inflatable boats would be the best method. {uloaded from subs}
> 
> *For a German commando attack on the US I think a cargo freighter would be the best transport.* Since the Brandenburgers would be attacking targets in the US East Coast, they could send the equipment by *cargo ship, of neutral flag {Vichy or Spanish}* Then if the ship was stopped by the Royal Navy the cargo would appear to be munitions being sent to re-supply some of the colonies. There was no embargo on outbound arms, only inboud to Germany, IIRC.
> 
> ...


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## parsifal (Jun 4, 2008)

Freebird

In the next war, remind me to suggest that you be put in command of the future SOE division please


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## Soren (Jun 4, 2008)

Parsifal I'm not the one out of his element here, you are, and your belief that Milk Cows first became available in 42 demonstrates that very well. Fact is that the "milk cows" (Type XIV) were commisioned starting in 1941, a whole year before the time of the operation!

Also your claim that German intel was a laughing stock is ridiculous and completely untrue, and therefore it is no wonder you can't support your claim.

The Abwehr was very proffessional and demonstrated this throughout the war, the problem however was they were a SINGLE agency and they had nearly no foreign agencies to co-operate with. This meant it was very hard to gather intel and that they had to infiltrate other agencies by themselves. This was completely unlike Allied intelligence agencies which had contacts in nearly every country invaded by the Germans, all which were happily willing to help out seeing their country had been aggressively invaded.

The point is that the Abwehr had allot more to deal with than any Allied agency as they had nearly no contacts to rely on for any information needed, meaning they themselves had to infiltrate enemy agencies. 


And as for the German spies set off in America, they wouldn't be caught before the operation, that's nearly 100% sure. Just look at what happened on nearly all the landings undertaken in Canada the US, the spies managed to land and go all the way to New York without getting caught or even suspected. The cover was only broken when one sold off the others (A former American), giving himself up to the Police after having talked to an old school friend.


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## pbfoot (Jun 4, 2008)

Soren said:


> And as for the German spies set off in America, they wouldn't be caught before the operation, that's nearly 100% sure. Just look at what happened on nearly all the landings undertaken in Canada the US, the spies managed to land and go all the way to New York without getting caught .


I'm interested in the spies in Canada aside from the weather station in unpopulated Labrador I'm not aware of any others


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## Soren (Jun 4, 2008)

Here you go: uboat.net - U-boat Operations

Again the spy turned himself in to the native authorities.

That the Abwehr was able carry out several successful landings of spies in America right up until late 44, and that none of them were caught, only demonstrates the very high skill and effectiveness of the Abwehr and its presonnel. Abwehr agents were very well trained, perhaps better than any other in the world, which is the sole reason that so many were able to accomplish their missions despite being in enemy territory without any contacts.


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## pbfoot (Jun 4, 2008)

Soren said:


> Here you go: uboat.net - U-boat Operations
> 
> Again the spy turned himself in to the native authorities.
> 
> That the Abwehr was able carry out several successful landings of spies in America right up until late 44, and that none of them were caught, only demonstrates the very high skill and effectiveness of the Abwehr and its presonnel. Abwehr agents were very well trained, perhaps better than any other in the world, which is the sole reason that so many were able to accomplish their missions despite being in enemy territory without any contacts.


what missions did they do I've never heard of any successful ones in North America as far as I know they all turned turtle. But the pastorious mission was intended to blow up the power plants in Niagara. but as for being accomplished I would say the opposite and they were inept getting busted for using out of date currency does not sound competent


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## parsifal (Jun 4, 2008)

*Parsifal I'm not the one out of his element here, you are, and your belief that Milk Cows first became available in 42 demonstrates that very well. Fact is that the "milk cows" (Type XIV) were commisioned starting in 1941, a whole year before the time of the operation!*


U-459 was the first Milch cow, she was commissioned late November 1941, but had not yet worked up. she was not declared ready for operations until late April 1942. 

I assume you are planning this operation December 1941, so unless you are planning it for late '42, in which case your chances for success are zero, it is very relevant that the Milch Cows are not ready. 

*Also your claim that German intel was a laughing stock is ridiculous and completely untrue, and therefore it is no wonder you can't support your claim.*

But the evidence is there...the systemic failures of the abwehr spy rings, the inability of the abwehr to prevent covert operations within occupied europe to any great extent, the repeated and serious breaches in security within Germany itself, as high as the senior management of OKH. What proof do you need?? 

*The Abwehr was very proffessional and demonstrated this throughout the war, the problem however was they were a SINGLE agency and they had nearly no foreign agencies to co-operate with. This meant it was very hard to gather intel and that they had to infiltrate other agencies by themselves. This was completely unlike Allied intelligence agencies which had contacts in nearly every country invaded by the Germans, all which were happily willing to help out seeing their country had been aggressively invaded*.

Trouble is, however, that the abwehr was not the only agency operating. There was, to my knowlege also the SD and the Intelligence arm of OKW that eventually came under Gehlens control. These other agencies really did produce some good results 9particulalry Gehlens efforts on the east front)Abwehr operations were increasingly narrowed to countering the allied efforts, and in this regard they were an abject failure. this was even recognized within Germany, because the Abwehr was basically taken over in 1943 by the SD. So your assertion that it was an organization with multiople responsibilities is not true, and your argument that it was a professional body (implying that it was doing its job well0 is also not true. By any measure it was not doing its job properly. It was in fact materially contributing to germany's defeat. 

*The point is that the Abwehr had allot more to deal with than any Allied agency as they had nearly no contacts to rely on for any information needed, meaning they themselves had to infiltrate enemy agencies*. 

As above, Abwehr operations were mostly related to counterintelligence of the western allies. By comparison, the US and British agencies were dealing with operations against Germany, Japan, Italy, and even the russians (the last named efforts were not that successful, otherwise they would have revealed the Philby connection. By comparison to the Abwehrs pathetic efforts, the Allied achievments are legion.....

*And as for the German spies set off in America, they wouldn't be caught before the operation, that's nearly 100% sure. Just look at what happened on nearly all the landings undertaken in Canada the US, the spies managed to land and go all the way to New York without getting caught or even suspected. The cover was only broken when one sold off the others (A former American), giving himself up to the Police after having talked to an old school friend*

My understanding is that the rings operating in the US were known at least by the british, and were being tagged and tailed to see what contacts and operations they were up to. This was occurring from mid'41. I am sure the Americans and canadians of this forum can answer better than I


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## Soren (Jun 4, 2008)

> Trouble is, however, that the abwehr was not the only agency operating.



Which I have neither claimed it was. And you're so terrorfyingly missing the entire point. You see as I've been trying to tell you the Allies had plenty of foreign contacts some of them being freedom fighters, partizans etc etc.. the Abwehr didn't have this luxury, THE reason they were rounded up in the UK - unless you're going to claim that there were nazi underground freedom fighters in Britain the US 



> My understanding is that the rings operating in the US were known at least by the british, and were being tagged and tailed to see what contacts and operations they were up to. This was occurring from mid'41.



That is complete and utter bollocks however. The British knew nothing of the German agents in America, nothing.



> U-459 was the first Milch cow, she was commissioned late November 1941, but had not yet worked up. she was not declared ready for operations until late April 1942.



Wrong. She was 100% ready by Nov 41, her crew just had to be trained for their coming jobs, refueling resupplying subs in the Atlantic, and in March this was done. 



> I assume you are planning this operation December 1941, so unless you are planning it for late '42, in which case your chances for success are zero, it is very relevant that the Milch Cows are not ready.



Like I said the operation was to take place in early to mid 42. And no chances are not zero, they are very good. Infact mid to late 42 is the best period, so the operation should ideally take place in June or July 42.


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## Soren (Jun 4, 2008)

pbfoot said:


> what missions did they do I've never heard of any successful ones in North America as far as I know they all turned turtle. But the pastorious mission was intended to blow up the power plants in Niagara. but as for being accomplished I would say the opposite and they were inept getting busted for using out of date currency does not sound competent



What mission are you talking about ?

Anyhow the spies were landed successfully and no'one suspected a thing, which is the point. It was only when someone sold the others out that the cover was blown in nearly every incident. The other times they just turned themselves in.

Knowing this we can quite safely conclude that spies could be landed two weeks prior to the attack to establish the best landing area without any fear of being detected by the native authorities. 


_________________________________________


Freebird,

The merchant idea is another possibility which I won't deny succeeding. However how will you get 25 men with equipment weapons past the dock inspectors ? You'd need trucks to hide it all in, and all your men must be able to speak either fluently english or Spanish, otherwise there's a great risk of getting caught.

Now if they could load all the equipment into trucks onboard the merchant vessel then they could perhaps just drive straight out with the men equipment in the back. But again what about the inspectors, how do you get past these ?


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## Njaco (Jun 4, 2008)

Can somebody explain how you even get a German sub anywhere near Alaska? By train across Central America? That in itself would defeat the operation IMHO.


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## syscom3 (Jun 4, 2008)

Soren is betting that ice packs and flows dont exist in summer.


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## parsifal (Jun 4, 2008)

*Which I have neither claimed it was. And you're so terrorfyingly missing the entire point. You see as I've been trying to tell you the Allies had plenty of foreign contacts some of them being freedom fighters, partizans etc etc.. the Abwehr didn't have this luxury, THE reason they were rounded up in the UK - unless you're going to claim that there were nazi underground freedom fighters in Britain the US *


Your right, the allies had plenty of foreign contacts, but do you think this advantage just happened. The British (and the allies) were far more adept than Germany at cultivating these "middle men" than the germans....why might that be??? I would suggest that part of the reason for that was because of the gross incompetence of the Abwehr


*That is complete and utter bollocks however. The British knew nothing of the German agents in America, nothing.*

Ah sorry, but they did, mostly because the German communications system was completely compromised by 1941. I can find the proof for this if you want, but it will take some time. And given your revised mission time of mid '42, it is most definately true, therewere no uncompromised operatives working in either the US or Canada in Mid 1942

*Wrong. She was 100% ready by Nov 41, her crew just had to be trained for their coming jobs, refueling resupplying subs in the Atlantic, and in March this was done. *

Here are the patrol details from the U-Boat Net, which i know you have been accessing, but choosing to ignore for some reason

15 Nov, 1941 - 31 Mar, 1942 4. Flottille (training)
1 Apr, 1942 - 31 Oct, 1942 10. Flottille (front boat)
1 Nov, 1942 - 24 Jul, 1943 12. Flottille (front boat

Now, if you are looking, you can see that she was engaged in training until 31 March 1942. However, because of faults in her systems she did not actually depart for her first frontline operation until 1 May, even though she had been nominally allocated to front line operations on 1 April 1942.

You are quoting commissioning dates. What you are not realizing is that commissioning does not mean ready. in order for a vessel to be ready, it must "work up", which involves testing of the systems, and the rtraining of the crew. Because the U-459 was a new type, it took a long time for her to be ready. Infact she was not ready until mid to late April, at the earliest 

*Like I said the operation was to take place in early to mid 42. And no chances are not zero, they are very good. Infact mid to late 42 is the best period, so the operation should ideally take place in June or July 42*

Well thats interesting, because up to now you have been hinting that the operation was to occur whilst the US was at peace or just after, seems now the mission parameters have changed. is this because you have finally realized that the toys needed wernt available at the time you originally indicated??? But thats still okay, now your mission is proposed at a time just as the allies are starting to regain the initiative in ASW, have more than 5000 aircraft based in the continental US, most of whom are available for ASW work, the german communication system is completely compromised, ther are definately no spies operating in the US by that stage, and there are over 60000 LDV (coastwatchers) working in the US alone. In addition to the the US army has nearly completed the training on the first wave mobilzation, giving it access to about 40 divs by then, all of them in the continental US. So rather than enhancing your chances by changing your scenario, you have made the chances even worse


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## pbfoot (Jun 4, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Can somebody explain how you even get a German sub anywhere near Alaska? By train across Central America? That in itself would defeat the operation IMHO.


Up the Mississippi then portage to the Mackenzie and boom your right their


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## pbfoot (Jun 4, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren is betting that ice packs and flows dont exist in summer.


The first crossing of the North West passage was completed in 40-43 period of time it took a full year by the St Roch


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## parsifal (Jun 4, 2008)

This is an extract from a report from the ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence)

Source: "German Espionage and Sabotage Against the United States" O.N.I. Review [Office of Naval Intelligence] 1, no.3 (Jan. 1946): 33-38. [declassified, formerly "confidential"].



Reasons for Failure of the German Intelligence Services

In conclusion one may speculate as to the reasons why the German intelligence services failed to produce results more in keeping with the effort expended. The first reason seems to be over-organization, with conflicts and duplication between the Abwehr and R.S.H.A. and within the two organizations themselves. The Abwehr was further handicapped by bureaucracy, lack of initiative, and corruption on the part of many of its officers, who were lukewarm Nazis at best and regarded a berth in the Abwehr as an opportunity to avoid service on the Russian front. By contrast the R. S. H. A. tended to be aggressive and imaginative, but it suffered from lack of experience and inability to evaluate information objectively. The personnel of both services was poorly chosen. The comment has often been made by Allied counterintelligence agencies that most German agents were of low grade and quality. The fault appears to have been with the initial recruiting and not with the training, although this was sometimes superficial.

Of course in spite of these weaknesses, the constant attention of the Allied agencies was required to prevent the Germans from getting information which might have been of immense value to them. Our experience showed that passive security measures, while essential, are not enough. There must be constant active counter-intelligence, in the form of both research and field work and a coordination of the two, directed toward increasing our knowledge of the enemy's intelligence organization, methods, capabilities and personnel.

On the matter of the 8 sabeteurs dropped by U-Boat, the relevant FBI report on the matter makes the following observations

Source: Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[This handout provided by the FBI, was revised by the FBI in March 1984, and retyped in July 1993. It was subsequently digitized with information added in brackets, and a note at the end by the Naval Historical Center.]

Shortly after midnight on the morning of June 13, 1942, four men landed on a beach near Amagansett, Long Island, New York, from a German submarine, clad in German uniforms and bringing ashore enough explosives, primers, and incendiaries to support an expected two-year career in the sabotage of American defense-related production. On June 17, 1942, a similar group landed on Ponte Vedra Beach, near Jacksonville, Florida, equipped for a similar career of industrial disruption.

The purpose of the invasions was to strike a major blow for Germany by bringing the violence of war to our home ground through destruction of America's ability to manufacture vital equipment and supplies and transport them to the battlegrounds of Europe; to strike fear into the American civilian population, and diminish the resolve of the United States to overcome our enemies. 

By June 27, 1942, all eight saboteurs had been arrested without having accomplished one act of destruction. Tried before a Military Commission, they were found guilty. One was sentenced to life imprisonment, another to thirty years, and six received the death penalty, which was carried out within a few days.

The magnitude of the euphoric expectation of the Nazi war machine may be judged by the fact that, in addition to the large amount of material brought ashore by the saboteurs, they were given $175,200 in United States currency to finance their activities. On apprehension, a total of $174,588 was recovered by the FBI -- the only positive accomplishment of eight trained saboteurs in those two weeks was the expenditure of $612 for clothing, meals, lodging, and travel, as well as a bribe of $260.

So shaken was the German intelligence service that no similar sabotage attempt was ever made again. The German naval high command did not again allow a valuable submarine to be risked for a sabotage operation.



So, how do you like them apples


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## Soren (Jun 4, 2008)

That's a 1946 report of the mission I already mentioned, and ofcourse it doesn't mention how they were caught, god forbid that the Americans didn't notice them!  

But how great of you to get such a truly unbiased report, cause we all know that by this time the Americans certainly weren't gloating with self confidence 

Oh and btw, the claim that the operation was such a failure that the German intelligence service were so shaken that no sabotage missions were ever attempted again is to no surprise false. In 1944 atleast two similar operations I know of were initiated, and two agents went to New York, where again one had second thoughts and turned himself in and sold out the other.


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## Soren (Jun 4, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren is betting that ice packs and flows dont exist in summer.



Nope, I aint.


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## Soren (Jun 4, 2008)

> Ah sorry, but they did, mostly because the German communications system was completely compromised by 1941. I can find the proof for this if you want, but it will take some time.



No you can't Parsifal. Why ? Because from Feb 42 till late Nov 42 the Enigma was fully kryptic. Hence why the operation should ideally take place at this time.




> And given your revised mission time of mid '42, it is most definately true, therewere no uncompromised operatives working in either the US or Canada in Mid 1942



Wrong again Parsifal. All the German agents in America were uncompromised until they turned themselves in.



> You are quoting commissioning dates. What you are not realizing is that commissioning does not mean ready. in order for a vessel to be ready, it must "work up", which involves testing of the systems, and the rtraining of the crew. Because the U-459 was a new type, it took a long time for her to be ready. Infact she was not ready until mid to late April, at the earliest



Wrong once again. When the boat was commisioned it functioned perfectly. Like I said the period 15. April 1941 till 24. April 1942 was spent training the crew. Nothing was wrong with U-459.



> Well thats interesting, because up to now you have been hinting that the operation was to occur whilst the US was at peace or just after, seems now the mission parameters have changed.



Once again you're wrong. I've been saying from the start that the operation should take place in early to mid 42.


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## Soren (Jun 5, 2008)

Oh almost forgot to mention that hundreds of Uboats went on patrols lasting for months, U-217 was for example made two 90+ day patrols.


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2008)

*No you can't Parsifal. Why ? Because from Feb 42 till late Nov 42 the Enigma was fully kryptic. Hence why the operation should ideally take place at this time.*
It wasnt fully cryptic. Professor Harry Hinsley describes the situation with regard to the Battle of the Atlantic

"The new system was one by which the christian name surname and address of an imaginary person indicated the table that was in use at any one time for encoding the large square di-graphs of the [standard North Atlantic]grid. By informing the U-Boats that a new address was in force, the U-Boat command could bring a new set of Di-Graph equivalents into use at once at frequent intervals. and since it did frequaentlychange addresses the problem of decoding the position given in the Enigma Signal was able to resist systemisation and require continous ad hoc research until a copy of the address book was captured."

This made it hard enough for Bletchely Park, but then inFebruary 1942 U-Boat Command added an additional wheel on their Enigma machines , that greatly restricted the ability of British Intelligence to pinpoint the exact position of U-Boats, until the latter part of 1942. So that part of your claim is basically correct, but in the context of what we are discussing, it misses or attempts to distort other important issues. 

By February 1942 British Inteligence had built up such a comprehensive knowledge of U-Boat commands procedures and U-Boat operations, and could still draw on large amount of other source material, including the fully cracked Wehrmacht codes, the SIS codes (ie the abwehr) the Luftwaffe codes, the OKM Home waters code (which included U_boat movements in the Bay Of Biscay and to the ports in Norway, the CinC Norways codes, that the temporary success achieved by U-Boat command in February was far from complete. The defeat in february meant that convoys could no longer be routed around U-Boat concentrations (because the individua positions of U-Boats could no longer be pinpointed). However the overall level of security of German communications, in particular those outside U-Boat Command remained completely compromised. When you consider that an operation of the kind would need to be planned and discussed outside of U-Boat commands structure, then the chances of such a plan being discovered remained very high


*Wrong again Parsifal. All the German agents in America were uncompromised until they turned themselves in.*

What is your source for saying this. You have rejected the US reports into the matter, on the face of what appears to be simply that they dont serve your purpose. I'd like you to produce some evidence to support your claim please, otherwise i think most people reading this can safely conclude you are simply blowing off hot air.What other agents were there in addition to the eight mentioned in the FBI and ONI reports 

*Wrong once again. When the boat was commisioned it functioned perfectly. Like I said the period 15. April 1941 till 24. April 1942 was spent training the crew. Nothing was wrong with U-459.*

Source material please. If the U-Boat was ready from the date of commissioning she must truly be an amazing boat. I know of NO instances where a boat of any navy was ready for operations from the date of her commissioning. Just as an example, Bismarck was commissioned 24-08-40, but was not declared "ready for operations" until the end of february 1941. Yes, of course some of that relates to training the crew, but without a properly trained crew how on earth is the boat going to operate properly. If you take an already trained crew, they are still going to spend several months in the work up process.

I suppose I should not get so excited , from someone who describes bunks as bedrooms, and periscopes as telescopes!!!

*Once again you're wrong. I've been saying from the start that the operation should take place in early to mid 42*.

Thats funny, your very last post said Mid to late 1942....so nominate a date please so we can all start responding to your claims properly


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2008)

*Oh almost forgot to mention that hundreds of Uboats went on patrols lasting for months, U-217 was for example made two 90+ day patrols*



I will deal with these other examples as an when you mention them. The U-217 did indeed embark on two 90 day cruises, one beginning in November 1942, and the other in April 1943. there was a third deployment whilst attached to the U-Boat training command , which does not really qualify since she was in and out of Home ports the whole time.

Moreover it appears that most of the time she was operating as a torpedo re-supply vessel, with reduced crews, and extra torpedoes embarked. She is erroneously listed as a Type VIID, but in fact other sources indicate she was completed as a Type VIIF

Also, please read my post on this. I said that U-Boats prior to 1942......this example was a boat not ready until the end of 1942. The big tchnical achievement for the U-Boats was the greatly increased ranges and endurances that were achieved in what is generally referred to as Type VII/42 (for the Type VIIs) and Type IXD (for the Type IXs). The Type VIIs managed to achieve increases in endurance from about 4500 nm to about 7500-10500, depending on model. Similar improvements were achieved for the Type IXs, the longest legged being the Type IX D2 with an endurance of 15000 miles (just enough to make it from Bordeaux to Penang)

But for the period you are nominating (which admittedly keeps changing... a standard tactic by Soren) these LR boats were not really available....


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## Glider (Jun 5, 2008)

Soren said:


> Wrong again Parsifal. All the German agents in America were uncompromised until they turned themselves in.



Soren
Where on earth do you get your information re German agents in the USA or anywhere else.

This again is so far from reality its almost unbelievable. 

I have asked a number of times for your source re the Russians getting the majority of their intel from the allies without any response. Can I ask where your information is for this particular Gem.

Germany had a small number of spies pre war in the USA but they were picked up very quickly once the war started. They only had one who operated at a senior level for the first couple of years of the war and he was captured and shot. I assure you he didn't turn himself in.

So once again what are your sources?


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2008)

*That's a 1946 report of the mission I already mentioned, and ofcourse it doesn't mention how they were caught, god forbid that the Americans didn't notice them! 

But how great of you to get such a truly unbiased report, cause we all know that by this time the Americans certainly weren't gloating with self confidence* 

It may be biased, but you need to refutte it by producing alternative evidence to back up your claim. Also, I am at a loss as to why a classified document would produce a "biased" report. Wouldnt the American just be trying to find out how they won. Who are they pandering to to produce a "biased report"

*Oh and btw, the claim that the operation was such a failure that the German intelligence service were so shaken that no sabotage missions were ever attempted again is to no surprise false. In 1944 atleast two similar operations I know of were initiated, and two agents went to New York, where again one had second thoughts and turned himself in and sold out the other*

Well, you know the Drill soren, produce the evidence to support your counterargument, and well have a look at that evidence


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## syscom3 (Jun 5, 2008)

Well the historic fact is the German agents were turning themselves in.

I suspect his commando and spy teams would do the same.


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## Freebird (Jun 5, 2008)

Soren said:


> Like I said the operation was to take place in early to mid 42. And no chances are not zero, they are very good. Infact mid to late 42 is the best period, so the operation should ideally take place in June or July 42.



Soren I think you are wrong about the start date for the commando operations. You are mainly correct about Enigma in 1942, however the Axis did not *know* that there was any problem, they were sure that Enigma was impenatrable by the Allies from 1939 - 1945. The best time to start would be as soon as war is declared to gain maximum advantage. IMO

The problem is that *we* know about Enigma's weakness, but the Germans at the time did not, so they would not delay the operations for a vulnerability they did not think existed.




Soren said:


> _________________________________________
> 
> 
> Freebird,
> ...



The ship would have a "legitimate" cargo, and a smaller clandestine one. Again, I am assuming that the mission is done pre-war or as soon as possible after "Pearl" The port controls at this time were almost non-existant in the US, most ships would just come go as they pleased. The ship would have the material commandos loaded into a small cutter to put ashore in some isolated area on the east coast {in Chesapeake Bay, Pamlico Sound or Long Island Sound}. If by some chance the ship is stopped by the USN, it is carrying a cargo for Martinique or South America, and is just stopping in the US to take on supplies. Some of the crew would speak Spanish or French, the rest would be belowdecks. 

Again, perhaps some of the teams would go via U-boat, but as Glider says a sub might only be able to take a 5 or 6 man team. Also I share his doubts about the ease of unloading from a sub into inflatables.

Something that has not been mentioned earlier, it may be easier to land the teams in Mexico and then go by land into the US! In 2008 the US with all modern technologies, can stop less than 20% of the illegals crossing through Arizona/N.M., so I would not think it would be too hard to do in 1941!

More on Mexico later.



Njaco said:


> Can somebody explain how you even get a German sub anywhere near Alaska? By train across Central America? That in itself would defeat the operation





pbfoot said:


> Up the Mississippi then portage to the Mackenzie and boom your right their



Damn pb! I never thought of that! You are a crafty one!  

Soren, I really can't see any benefit in wasting 3 months chugging around N. S. America to land in Alaska. {unless you are trying to recruit the Sasquatch to the Axis cause?}


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## Glider (Jun 5, 2008)

The Germans had a merchant vessel specifically for the transport of agents across the Atlantic.
What might be unexpected is that it was a 50ft sailing boat, called the Passim which was based in Le Havre. She had a crew of 4 captained by Lt Garbers a pre war sailor who had sailed the Atlantic solo in 1938. She made one trip to South Africa in 1942. In June 1943 she sailed for Brazil a journey that took two months, only to find when they arrived that the Brazilians were waiting for them. The two spies were arrested and the Passim was sent back, another two months.
In 1944 she tried again and this time made it to Buenos Aires with two spies.

Lt Garbers was awarded the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class, the German Cross in Gold and the Knights Cross making him the most highly decorated person in the entire German Intelligence effort.


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## Freebird (Jun 5, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Freebird
> 
> In the next war, remind me to suggest that you be put in command of the future SOE division please



Thank for the compliment!  



Parsifal said:


> *Once again you're wrong. I've been saying from the start that the operation should take place in early to mid 42*.
> 
> Thats funny, your very last post said Mid to late 1942....so nominate a date please so we can all start responding to your claims properly



With Soren's permission {it's his thread} I will take a stab at the scenario.

I will start off at the beginning.

First off, it starts with the Axis leadership in Tokyo Berlin asking the planners "Can we win this war"? {Assuming that they are competent ones, like Manstien, Donitz, Yamamoto etc}

Both German Japanese military leaders identify that the best way to defeat the Allies is to strangle the shipping, and that some basic joint planning is needed. {we have gone into that in another thread}. *The SOE offensive will assist in this effort *

After the Imperial Japanese conference at the beginning of July, it is decided to go to war with the USA, if Japan cannot obtain oil resources from the Dutch East Indies. At this point Japan informes Germany of its intention to go to war in the beginning of Nov if negotiations fail, and askes if Germany will join in attacks against the US. Japan *does not* tell Germany about the planned attack on Pearl Harbour, nor of the exact date.

*Germany promises to begin U-boat operations against the USA, and to plan prepare SOE* {commando, "black ops" political manipulations etc.} 

*Germany will have to wait for the news of the Japanese attack against the USA to begin*, otherwise they risk fighting the US alone if Japan changes it's mind.

*There is no big danger of the intelligence leaking out*, as the planned entry of Japan into the war is not something that would be sent out over Enigma to U-boats or to Generals in Europe. If the British detect more U-boats heading towards the US, it would be assumed that they are moving to begin attacks in Canadian or British Caribbean waters. 

In any event, it was no secret that tensions with Japan are increasing, and both UK US expected attacks against their colonies in the Far East. The information that hostilities against US posts would shortly begin would be given to U-boat officers only, not broadcast. If some of the information does leak out, it is unlikely to affect US preparations, as the US is already worring about German moves into Brazil {which had a Fascist government in 1941, along with Argentina Bolivia}. Also there are enough in the US who would suspect this information is a British ploy to bring the US into the war.


*The SOE attacks against the US should begin the day after Pearl Harbour*, at the same time as the U-boat offensive begins.

*The aims of the Commando offensive are:*

*1.)* To influence public opinion in the USA

*2.)* To decieve the US about actual Axis war plans, and to divert US forces to theaters where they will not be effective, which lessens the amount sent to where they are really needed.

*3.)* To provide a "distraction" from the U-boat offensive, which is the main danger, but not as "headline grabbing" as commando attacks

*4.)* To provide US planners intelligence with some "busy work", if your enemy is busy trying to anticipate your plans, they have less time to make plans of there own.

*5.)* To stir up divisions in the Allied government military command

*6.)* To provoke tensions in the western hemisphere, a major worry of the USA in 1940 - 1942


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## syscom3 (Jun 5, 2008)

I take fault with only one item.

Nearly all of the US Divisions wouldnt be diverted in any menaingfull way, as they were bound to stay in the US throughout 1942 as there wasnt any shipping capability to support them.


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## Njaco (Jun 5, 2008)

from Nazi Spies In America thehistorychannel.co.za

"The first group of four saboteurs left by submarine in May 1942 from the German base at Lorient, France, and on May 28, the next group of four departed the same base. Each was destined to land at points on the Atlantic Coast of the United States familiar to the leader of that group. 

Four men, led by George John Dasch, age 39, landed on a beach near Long Island, New York on 13 June, 1942. Accompanying Dasch were Ernest Peter Burger, Heinrich Harm Heinck, and Richard Quirin. 

On 17 June, 1942, the other group landed at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. The leader was Edward John Kerling, with Werner Thiel, Herman Otto Neubauer, and Herbert Hans Haupt. Both groups landed wearing complete or partial German uniforms to ensure treatment as prisoners of war rather than as spies if they were caught.

The eight were tried before a Military Commission, appointed by President Roosevelt. They were all found guilty and sentenced to death. Appeals were made to President Roosevelt to commute the sentences of Dasch and Burger. 

As a result, Dasch received a 30-year sentence, while Burger received a life sentence. The remaining six were executed by electric chair on 8 August, 1942. 

The eight men had been born in Germany and each had lived in the United States for substantial periods. Burger had become a naturalised American in 1933. Haupt had entered the United States as a child, gaining citizenship when his father was naturalised in 1930. 

Dasch had joined the Germany army at the age of 14 and served about 11 months as a clerk during the conclusion of World War I. He had enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1927, and received an honourable discharge after a little more than a year of service. 

Quirin and Heinck had returned to Germany prior to the outbreak of World War II in Europe, and the six others subsequent to September 11, 1939, and before December 7, 1941, apparently feeling their first loyalty was to the country of their birth. 

In April, 1948, President Truman granted executive clemency to Dasch and Burger on condition of deportation. They were transported to the American Zone of Germany, where they were freed."

from George John Dasch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"On June 13, 1942, John C. Cullen, a Coast Guardsman from a station in Amagansett, New York noticed Colonel Dasch and three others posing as fisherman off the coast of Long Island with a raft. When the soldier investigated, he found that the men were armed and also noticed a submerged submarine. The men offered him a $260.00 bribe to keep the information of their whereabouts undisclosed. He took the bribe, then alerted his superiors. Investigations later found that the men had left explosives, timers, blasting caps, incendiary devices, cigarettes and German uniforms at the scene. The submarine, however, had since been removed.

It was then confirmed that Nazis had landed on American soil. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director, J. Edgar Hoover were immediately alerted, and the FBI went on a massive manhunt for the men. Hoover also ordered that all information remain undisclosed to avoid public panic and to not alert the German spies that there was investigation pending.

George John Dasch had been at odds with the Nazi regime. He eventually talked to one of his compatriots, a naturalized German citizen named Ernst Peter Burger, about defecting to the United States. Their original plan was to surrender immediately to the FBI; however, officials disregarded Dasch and Burger’s stories. In order to prove collaboration with the Nazis, Dasch poured $84,000 cash on the office desk of D.M. Ladd, the director of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Dasch was arrested, and interrogated for eight days. Dasch immediately disclosed the whereabouts of all other men connected in the sabotage operation, including Burger. The two vital goals of the sabotage program were to disrupt war industries and to launch a wave of terror by planting bombs, grenades etc. into railway stations, department stores and public places."


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## Soren (Jun 5, 2008)

For those interested in some of the special operations carried out by the Abwehr in America: uboat.net - U-boat Operations - Special Operations

As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend. 

*The Abwehr*
_At the outbreak of World War II, Abwehr resumed operations similar to those carried out during World War I. The agency was in charge of tracking troops and munitions transports, tapping wires and intercepting radio messages, and infiltrating foreign intelligence and military units. Abwehr placed two operatives inside the British intelligence agency for two years, and developed a highly successful encryption device called the Enigma machine. Agents tracked and monitored various resistance movements in occupied Europe, and even sabotaged military and government strongholds behind Allied lines.

Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

One of the Abwehr's responsibilities during World War II was the extraction of information from prisoners of war. While Abwehr agents remained largely in control of seeking strategic information from British, French, and American prisoners, the Nazi government issued a special directive to various branches of the military regarding Russian prisoners of war. The Commissar Order, as it became known, instructed the Army to handle Russian prisoners as harshly as they deemed necessary for the retrieval of military information. At one time, German concentration camps held more that 1.5 million Russian prisoners. Canaris himself raised several objections to this policy, largely on the grounds that it undermined the authority and efficacy of his agency and could cripple the German war effort.

In 1944, Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police, assumed control of Abwehr after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler and several other high ranking Nazi officials. Himmler suspected that the plot was the work of agents inside the government, most especially the Abwehr. The July Plot also exposed the work of those Abwehr agents who had intentionally leaked sensitive information to the Allies. Several agents, including Canaris, were charged with treason and executed. The Abwehr was then dissolved._


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## Soren (Jun 5, 2008)

*More:*

Under Canaris the Abwehr expanded and proved relatively efficient during the early years of the war. Its most notable success was Operation Nordpol, which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive. In March 1941, the Germans forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did not notice this. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch operation and maintained this state of affairs for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.

But it was ineffective overall for several reasons. Much of its intelligence was deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Moreover, it was in direct competition/conflict with SS intelligence activities under Reinhard Heydrich and Walter Schellenberg. The animosity between the SS and Abwehr did not stop there. Many of the Abwehr's operatives — including Canaris himself — were in fact anti-Nazi and were involved in many assassination attempts against Hitler, including the most serious one on July 20, 1944. Canaris even employed Jews in the Abwehr and used the agency to help a small number of Jews to escape from Germany into Switzerland. But perhaps the biggest reason was that Canaris himself sought to undermine the Nazi cause, although not Germany's war effort itself.

Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, its effectiveness was more than negated by agents who — with Canaris's blessing — aided the Allies in whatever covert means were necessary. He personally gave false information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland (Operation Tannenbaum). He also persuaded Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade Gibraltar (Operation Felix). He even provided intelligence to the Allies on German intentions as well.

The SS continually undermined the Abwehr by putting several Abwehr officers under investigation, believing them (correctly) to be involved in anti-Hitler plots. The SS also accused Canaris of being defeatist in his intelligence assessments, especially on the Russian campaign. One such briefing reportedly resulting in Hitler seizing Canaris by the lapels, and demanding to know whether the intelligence chief was insinuating that Germany would lose the war.


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## Soren (Jun 5, 2008)

As for the Enigma machine, it was fully cryptic from Feb 42 until late Nov 42.

A great article: uboat.net - Technical pages - Enigma


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2008)

*As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend*. 


As U-Boat net points out, however, with virtually no success, as nearly all the agents dropped were captured, or surrendered very shortly after the event. The point about the failure being related to its (ie abwehrs) poor choice of operatives is well supported by the source. 

It is also not true that articles state that the allies did not know about it. On seversl occasions at least the articles state the exact opposite 


[*B]The Abwehr*
_At the outbreak of World War II, Abwehr resumed operations similar to those carried out during World War I. The agency was in charge of tracking troops and munitions transports, tapping wires and intercepting radio messages, and infiltrating foreign intelligence and military units. Abwehr placed two operatives inside the British intelligence agency for two years, and developed a highly successful encryption device called the Enigma machine. Agents tracked and monitored various resistance movements in occupied Europe, and even sabotaged military and government strongholds behind Allied lines.

Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

One of the Abwehr's responsibilities during World War II was the extraction of information from prisoners of war. While Abwehr agents remained largely in control of seeking strategic information from British, French, and American prisoners, the Nazi government issued a special directive to various branches of the military regarding Russian prisoners of war. The Commissar Order, as it became known, instructed the Army to handle Russian prisoners as harshly as they deemed necessary for the retrieval of military information. At one time, German concentration camps held more that 1.5 million Russian prisoners. Canaris himself raised several objections to this policy, largely on the grounds that it undermined the authority and efficacy of his agency and could cripple the German war effort.

In 1944, Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police, assumed control of Abwehr after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler and several other high ranking Nazi officials. Himmler suspected that the plot was the work of agents inside the government, most especially the Abwehr. The July Plot also exposed the work of those Abwehr agents who had intentionally leaked sensitive information to the Allies. Several agents, including Canaris, were charged with treason and executed. The Abwehr was then dissolved[/B]._

Can you give the source of this material please. it does not seem to appear at the link that you have provided, and if it does, completely contradicts all of the other posts made on that site with respect to german special operations in north America. 

This article seems to suggest that the germans introduced a device referred to as an Enigma machine. is this the same machine as is referred to as an Enigma machine by the Allies???. If so the material is immediately highly suspect as to its veracity. Why on earth would the germans give the Allies an Enigma machine????


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2008)

*As for the Enigma machine, it was fully cryptic from Feb 42 until late Nov 42.

A great article*: 

Your right that its a great article, but i suggest you read it agin. it definately does not support the assertion that all of enigma was cryptic for the period specified. It establishes th U_Boat commands cyphers were much more secure for that period, the average time tasken to decipher code being increased from an average of 17 hours, to 442 hours.

Also U-Boat command was but one arm of the armed forces that were using enigma. the other arms of the navy, and the armed forces, and diplomatic services continued to use forms of enigma that were fully compromised by Bletchely park.

That is not to say that the introduction of Shark and the additional rotor was not a problem, it was an enormous problem. but it falls well shy of the statement that you have made, namely that enigma was fully cryptic (implying that all of enigma operations were blinded....they werent)


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2008)

*Under Canaris the Abwehr expanded and proved relatively efficient during the early years of the war. Its most notable success was Operation Nordpol, which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive. In March 1941, the Germans forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did not notice this. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch operation and maintained this state of affairs for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.

But it was ineffective overall for several reasons. Much of its intelligence was deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Moreover, it was in direct competition/conflict with SS intelligence activities under Reinhard Heydrich and Walter Schellenberg. The animosity between the SS and Abwehr did not stop there. Many of the Abwehr's operatives — including Canaris himself — were in fact anti-Nazi and were involved in many assassination attempts against Hitler, including the most serious one on July 20, 1944. Canaris even employed Jews in the Abwehr and used the agency to help a small number of Jews to escape from Germany into Switzerland. But perhaps the biggest reason was that Canaris himself sought to undermine the Nazi cause, although not Germany's war effort itself.

Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, its effectiveness was more than negated by agents who — with Canaris's blessing — aided the Allies in whatever covert means were necessary. He personally gave false information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland (Operation Tannenbaum). He also persuaded Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade Gibraltar (Operation Felix). He even provided intelligence to the Allies on German intentions as well.

The SS continually undermined the Abwehr by putting several Abwehr officers under investigation, believing them (correctly) to be involved in anti-Hitler plots. The SS also accused Canaris of being defeatist in his intelligence assessments, especially on the Russian campaign. One such briefing reportedly resulting in Hitler seizing Canaris by the lapels, and demanding to know whether the intelligence chief was insinuating that Germany would lose the war*


This is still unsourced material, but it just happens that i have seen it before. this hardly supports the notion that the Abwehr was a professional outfit that achieved a high level of competency, or materially aided the german war effort, quite the opposite in fact


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## Glider (Jun 7, 2008)

Soren said:


> For those interested in some of the special operations carried out by the Abwehr in America: uboat.net - U-boat Operations - Special Operations
> 
> As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend.
> 
> ...


_
The Abwehr certainly were pretty good at counter intelligence but never got on top of the problem with the exception of the Dutch operations. However I do not agree with the statement that they sabotaged military or Goverments.




Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

Click to expand...

It isn't often that I would disagree with U Boat Net but I do in this case. Germany certainly tried to do this but with little if any success. Its interesting that they say that the Germans had all the plans for American fighters which they didn't, but they don't mention the biggest secret that the Germans did obtain. By 1939 Germany had a complete working example of the Norden Bomb sight which was tested by the Luftwaffe. This was stolen by Hermann W Lang. What is interesting is that he wasn't a spy put in place by Germany but an American citizen with roots in the USA who offerred his services to Germany. This was the pattern for German spies in the USA they achieved nothing with their own spies but people who offered to help did bring some results. However they didn't last long and Lang did nothing more to assist the German war effort.[/QUOTE]_


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## Glider (Jun 7, 2008)

Soren said:


> *More:*
> 
> 
> Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, .



Would appreciate more on this topic as I don't know of many.


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## Soren (Jun 8, 2008)

Guys it's not all from Uboat.net, only the special operations part.

Parsifal the article you've seen before is from Wiki. 

The other is from Answers, which I found is incorrect after looking through my books. I don't see any mention of German agents infiltrating the US airplane industry at all in any of my books (Has anyone heard about this before?)

Anyway the point I was trying to stress is: The Germans could easily land spies in the US without any problems and without the US knowing squat about it, and they did it right up till late 44.

Remember the purpose of the spies to be landed before our little hypothetical operation aren't supposed to infiltrate any US organization or industry, just provide detailed maps of the target area, pick a landing site and make sure all is clear before the landing. Hence why we can be nearly 100% sure that they wont be compromised, seeing they won't be trying infiltrate any sensitive government area.


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## syscom3 (Jun 8, 2008)

Soren, no doubt the Germans could land spies and commando's anywhere on the eastern seaboard and Gulf seacoasts.

But their capacity to influence the war was zero! There just was to much redundancy and production capacity in the economy and temporary interruptions wouldn't alter the outcome.

But .... I will grant you this. A commando attack on the Panama canal would impact operations to some degree.


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## Juha (Jun 8, 2008)

"The Germans could easily land spies in the US without any problems and without the US knowing squat about it, and they did it right up till late 44."

Soren
in 42 one of two groups landing to USA was seen by a Coast Guardsman, that's 50%. The 2 agents which landed in 44 were seen IIRC after they got some 500y from the beach. One problem of landing in sparcely populated area is, if seen by locals they easily think that something strange is happening. So also in this case. Police was noticed and hunt was on but the agents had got a lift to nearest station and police lost their trail even if they strongly suspected that the agents had went to NY.

So contrary to your claim the odds were that US would notice a landing.

Juha


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## Soren (Jun 8, 2008)

Did you miss all the other landings Juha ? 

Many landings were made, not all are described at Uboat.net.


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## Glider (Jun 8, 2008)

Soren said:


> Did you miss all the other landings Juha ?
> 
> Many landings were made, not all are described at Uboat.net.



Soren
This sounds like another of your unsupported statements. How many is many? and what have you got to support this statement.

In case you have forgotten you still have to support the following statements
1) Your statement that the USSR got most of their intel from the western allies
2) That the Germans had many sucessful operations
3) That the Germans always turned themselves in
and now 4) That many landings were made.


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## Soren (Jun 8, 2008)

The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.

As for successful German special operations, well do I need to remind you of the rescue of Mussolini ? The capture of Maikop ? etc etc. There are littlerally hundreds of successful operations to mention Glider.

As for the spy landings in the US, go take a look yourself, in all the operations mentioned one of the crew turned himself in and sold out the others.

And many landings were made Glider, two seperate landings of four man team just for operation Pastorius in 1942, one team at Ponte Vedra beach near Jacksonville, and the others at Amagansett in New York.


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## pbfoot (Jun 8, 2008)

Soren said:


> The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.
> 
> As for successful German special operations, well do I need to remind you of the rescue of Mussolini ? The capture of Maikop ? etc etc. There are littlerally hundreds of successful operations to mention Glider.
> 
> ...


they landed and screwed up in every one obviously the selection of operatives standards were very low . That must be considered to a failure of intelligence command


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## Juha (Jun 9, 2008)

Soren
In U.boat.net I found only the 2 in 42 and the one in 44 which I mentioned, plus one in which the U-boat was sunk on the way to USA, the agent survived and probably landed on USA but as a prisoner, IMHO that could not be counted as a successful landing, You seem to disagree but frankly I cannot see rationality of that. What else? I checked the 44 Maine landing, the story was more complicated than I remembered and agents were lucky and got to NY but even if local police dismissed the agents sightings as buglars sightings the FBI put on hunt when the U-boat U-1230 sunk the Canadian ship Cornwallis on 3 Dec and learned the sighting of the 2 agents whose trail had began from a beach. But FBI only checked bus/coach connections but the agents had got a taxi drive to nearest station.

Juha

PS And your claim that the USSR got most of their intel from the western allies is rather ridiculous, they were capable to do a good intelligence gathering by themselves.


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## parsifal (Jun 9, 2008)

*The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.*

WRONG!!! To this day the source of the Lucy rings information sources remains classified. There is SOME evidence to suggest it, but like all the other theories, it can't cover all the bases.

The latest, and best theory is that there was a combination of sources. It appears that the Soviet mole(s) at Bletchley gave initial indications to Stavkha, but the final compilation of the German OOB, and operational plans came from the yet to be identified mole in OKH.

It is simply not true that the Soviets obtained their information from the British. The British NEVER willingly shared Enigma Decrypts with the Soviets. What they MAY have done is provide pointers for the Soviets to follow on the well known and most sophisticated spy networks in Europe at the time, which happened to be controled by the Soviets


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## Glider (Jun 9, 2008)

Soren said:


> The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.


I believe that this has been dealt with by Parsifal



> As for successful German special operations, well do I need to remind you of the rescue of Mussolini ? The capture of Maikop ? etc etc. There are littlerally hundreds of successful operations to mention Glider.


Personally I make that two not hundreds. 
Its always been a question in my mind as to why the Germans didn't do more special forces raids. For instance I am not aware of any against the UK despite only being 25 miles away and wide open for attack for the first 18-24 months. They didn't have anything like the LRDPG or SAS/SBS. They had mountain troops but not on the scale of the Commando's or Rangers.


> As for the spy landings in the US, go take a look yourself, in all the operations mentioned one of the crew turned himself in and sold out the others.


A large number did turn themselves in but by no means all as I have mentioned and given examples of before. The important thing is that the achieved NOTHING, hardly a success.



> And many landings were made Glider, two seperate landings of four man team just for operation Pastorius in 1942, one team at Ponte Vedra beach near Jacksonville, and the others at Amagansett in New York.


Again your understanding of Many and mine differ. British secret services made many landings of special operatives in Europe literally hundreds. LRDPG made many incursions behind German/Italian lines.

That said, you did reply and its only fair that I fulfill my part of the debate ie Russian/German intelligence

German Intelligence Gathering (Using Spies)
The Germans were very poor at this making basic easily avoidable mistakes that cost nearly all their spies their lives. For example
1) False papers were prepared but the various stamps that were used were well made with crisp edges, Russian ones were blurred. 
2) The staples used were made of metal that didn't rust, Russian ones did and it was an instant give away.
3) Badges were sewn on incorrectly and the stiching was too precise
4) They used ex POW's who were only to keen the offer their help to get out of the POW camps and promptly gave themselves up once behind the lines. The NKVD shot them anyway but only after debriefing them.

I will post more items later but I did give you the choice af Strategic, Tactical and Economic examples so if you have a preference, just let me know.


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## Soren (Jun 9, 2008)

> They didn't have anything like the LRDPG or SAS/SBS. They had mountain troops but not on the scale of the Commando's or Rangers



That is just downright wrong Glider. The Brandenburger commandos were perhaps the best trained spec ops soldiers in the world, being trained by the FallschirmJäger, GebirgsJäger, Panzergrenadiers, Pioniers, Wehrmacht Luftwaffe. And yes, they did carry out *hundreds* of successful operations, two of them being mentioned above. The number of successful operations in the east are so numerous that it would take several pages to cover them all.

Furthermore the GebirgsJägers FallschirmJägers both recieved better more specialized training than the Rangers.

Yous should read "The Brandenbuger Commandos" by Franz Kurowski.


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## parsifal (Jun 9, 2008)

*The Brandenburger commandos were perhaps the best trained spec ops soldiers in the world, being trained by the FallschirmJäger, GebirgsJäger, Panzergrenadiers, Pioniers, Wehrmacht Luftwaffe. And yes, they did carry out hundreds of successful operations, two of them being mentioned above. The number of successful operations in the east are so numerous that it would take several pages to cover them all.

Furthermore the GebirgsJägers FallschirmJägers both recieved better more specialized training than the Rangers.

Yous should read "The Brandenbuger Commandos" by Franz Kurowski./*QUOTE]

Err, thats a pretty big claim..... just for starters read about the achievements of the LRDGs in the Desert. Then we can move onto to Commando Brigades if you like, and finally the SOE Saboteurs that tied down scores of German Divisions allover Europe, but with some especially noteworthy operations, like the destruction of the heavy water plants in Norway, and the destruction of the Lorient drydocks, etc, etc.

There is no denying that the Brandenburgers were outstanding, but the overwhelming majority of their operations were relatively short ranged penetrations of enemy controlled territory.

The "Brandenburgers, incidentally finished the war (from 1943 on) as regular line Infantry, so evidently their own high command did not think all that much of them.

In North africa, where four companies were sent to assist Rommel, their efforts were unimpressive. 

The unit used captured British vehicles to operate behind enemy lines in raids and reconnaissance missions, mirroring the actions of the British LRDG. Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel disapproved of the Brandenburgers, but after he saw the damage being inflicted by the LRDG and Stirling’s SAS, he realised their value and accepted their unorthodox methods. The unit was charged with disrupting British supply lines, but it was difficult to resupply them or provide transportation, so most men were either killed or captured.

This rather dismal effort stands in stark contrast to the mainly New Zealander manned LRDGs who were a constant thorn in the Axis behinds, and coming from men who for the most part were not supermen, but dairy farmers for the most part!!!!!

This is not to say that the brandenburgers did not undertake a lot of tactically successful missions. the Maikop infiltration is perhaps the best known, along with their infiltration to India, and of course the operations in neutral Holland. However, even here it (Maikop) the efforts amounted to nothing, since Maikop after its capture was found to be so thoroughly demolished that it was estimated by the "Oil Brigades" to take more than two years to restore its production to anything like "normal", and then only if more than half the trains allocated to AGS were used for non-military purposes.

Against the british, with the exception of the Operation Bajadere (operations in Afghanistan, Iran and India), the Brandenburgers were not very succesful against the British, or the Americans (although I am less certain about the US).

By late 1942, the Brandenburger unit was mostly concentrated in the Balkans, where it was basically used as an elite Infantry regiment, hardly a ringing endorsement of its special operations credentials.

The majority of Brandenburgers that survived the war found their way to organizations like the french Foreign Legion, and other mercenary organizations


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## parsifal (Jun 9, 2008)

Franz Kurowski is rated on the googlebooks "good read" reviews page as having a rating of just 3.7 out of 20. He is described as "innaccurate, biased, and poorly written" in several reviews. Other sites review his work quite highly, though without being specific. His background is as a serving member of the wehrmacht. one might suspect he has an agenda, other than to present the facts in an unbiased fashion.


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## Soren (Jun 9, 2008)

Parsifal,

The Brandenburgers were disbanded in 1944, not 1943, and it wasn't because the high command didn't think highly of them, they were considered to be amongst the creme de la creme of the German army, it was simply because they were part of the Abwehr which by then was known to be behind an assasination attempt on Hitler that they were disbanded. Canaris and several other high ranking men within the Abwehr were arrested and executed. The Brandenburgers however, although disbanded, just joined other specialized units within the army, such as the JagdVerbände, another equally well trained spec ops unit within the German army. 

As for the SAS LRDG's, they did well, but for a good reason, they had the support they needed. 

Also remember that if the plan isn't good, then it really doesn't matter how good your men are. And I really can't express enough how true that is!



> Franz Kurowski is rated on the googlebooks "good read" reviews page as having a rating of just 3.7 out of 20. He is described as "innaccurate, biased, and poorly written" in several reviews. Other sites review his work quite highly, though without being specific. His background is as a serving member of the wehrmacht. one might suspect he has an agenda, other than to present the facts in an unbiased fashion.





How about you read the book before you make such statements Parsifal ?? It's completely pointless otherwise.

But if you don't like it then you can read Spearheads book _Brandenburgers - The Third Reich's Special Forces_ by Ian Westwell. A great book.


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## parsifal (Jun 9, 2008)

*The Brandenburgers were disbanded in 1944, not 1943, and it wasn't because the high command didn't think highly of them, they were considered to be amongst the creme de la creme of the German army, it was simply because they were part of the Abwehr which by then was known to be behind an assasination attempt on Hitler that they were disbanded. Canaris and several other high ranking men within the Abwehr were arrested and executed. The Brandenburgers however, although disbanded, just joined other specialized units within the army, such as the JagdVerbände, another equally well trained spec ops unit within the German army. *

I didnt mention that they were "disbanded" in 1943. In fact AFAIK, they were never actually disbanded, they just came under the control of the SD.

However, as specialist commandos they had pretty much had their day by the end of 1942. By late 1942, the majority of the Brandenburg regiment was being used as elite infantry and plugging gaps in the German lines, principally in yugoslavia. In February 1943, the Brandenburgers were pulled out of the line and moved back to Germany. The Regiment was being expanded again, this time to become Division Brandenburg, this expansion hardly suggests a lack of support. the "lack of support" was relating to the Abwehr control, who had generally proven such incompetent commanders of such an elite force. The division was to be formed by four regiments. One regiment was returned to the Eastern front, to resume duties as a fire brigade, One battalion was sent to Med front to continue harassing the Allies in the Mediterranean. The remainder of the division was sent to the Balkans, to engage in anti-Partisan operations


*As for the SAS LRDG's, they did well, but for a good reason, they had the support they needed*. 

They were no more supported than the Brandenburgers. The only difference is that the people controlling them, with the priceless advantage of ULTRA, were able to achieve measurable results, and were clearly being provided with superior leadership, as evidenced by their measure of operational success. The british army as a whole, however, looked down on these "private armies". There were a significant number of british officers who worked hard to have them closed down. However inspirational leaders such as Wingate (of the Chindits), and Bagnold (of LRDG fame) along with the Stirling (of the SAS) were the difference between the British efforts and German. The other huge difference was co-ordination, whereas the various German special forces really were run more or less as "private armies" those in the British Army were always controlled from a central point. It was always intended that they were controlled centrally (I say intended, because it sometimes did not work out that way) 

*Also remember that if the plan isn't good, then it really doesn't matter how good your men are. And I really can't express enough how true that is!*

For once we agree!!! But this failure was not limited to just the germans. The british were just as good at stuffing things up....just look at Dieppe


*How about you read the book before you make such statements Parsifal ?? It's completely pointless otherwise.

But if you don't like it then you can read Spearheads book Brandenburgers - The Third Reich's Special Forces by Ian Westwell. A great book*

I will read your sources, but all I want from you is that you assess things properly, and in a balanced way. I know that you have a lot of knowledge, but you often present it in such a cockeyed and biased way as to damage the credibility of the discussion. When you are on the money, you demand absolute precision, when you are not, you appear to want to allow the debate standards to drop, and allow "the multitude of sins" to cover dangerous generalizations. This originally quoted source does have its supporters, and overall may be worth looking at, but it is not "the bible" because it cannot establish it credentials as being totally unbiased


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## Glider (Jun 10, 2008)

In my previous posting I mentioned some examples showing the poor preparation of German SPies before being sent to Russia. This applied across the board with similar examples on the spies sent to the USA. In one case the spy was challenged as soon as he went into a tailors store as the cut of his coat was foreign, but he was able to talk his way out of that.

I thought a note on Economic Warfare might balance this up. In the conflict with Russia, German Economic Intelligence was very good.
Using the interrogation of POW's Germany was able to build up a list of the key factories in Russia and get an initial estimate of their production. By using this information and combining it with intercepted reports on the amount of power used in these factories they were able to estimate the increase in production.
This information was double checked by taking the manufacturers plates off the bottom of destroyed T34 tanks and by sophisticated statistical techniques arrive at final numbers.
The results were impressive, T34 production estimates were within 9% of actual and total lend lease aid to Russia was within 0.6% of actual.

Interesting aside. The intelligence teams were able to authorise leave for every plate taken off the bottom of a T34, they were flooded with them.


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## Soren (Jun 10, 2008)

Aah, now I see where we get off each other.

German spies weren't the most successful, agreed, but only in achieving mainly sabotage missions and for the reasons Glider Parsifal pointed out.

I was looking at the Abwehr as a whole, where the Brandenburgers launched hundreds of successful opeartion until the end of the war, esp. in the east but also against the western allies.

You guys should really read Spearheads book, it's very good!


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## Glider (Jun 11, 2008)

It wasn't Just the spies Soren. The following is an example of how poor, some would say inept, Strategic Intelligence played a large part in the failure of the war in Russia.

When Germany planned the attack on Russia the Abwher estimated the Russian Army as having 200 divisions. 
On the day the attack was launched the estimate had gone up to 226 divisions in Eastern Russia. Thats bad enough but by the 51st Day of the attack, the Germans had identified 360 Divisions in Eastern Russia, getting close to 80% more than the Germans had planned for.

Franz Halder, Head of the General Staff admitted that they had totally understimated the Soviet forces from the planning stages.


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## Njaco (Jun 11, 2008)

Gonna stick my head out again for a bit.

What units rescued Mussolini and participated in Wacht am Rhein?



> The "Brandenburgers, incidentally finished the war (from 1943 on) as regular line Infantry, so evidently their own high command did not think all that much of them.



I'm not sure that this is a true representation of events. Towards the end, all units were collapsing just to shore up front-line units. Even SS Leibstandarte was conscripting foreigners and non-aryans to its ranks.


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## parsifal (Jun 11, 2008)

*Gonna stick my head out again for a bit.

What units rescued Mussolini and participated in Wacht am Rhein?



I'm not sure that this is a true representation of events. Towards the end, all units were collapsing just to shore up front-line units. Even SS Leibstandarte was conscripting foreigners and non-aryans to its ranks.*
_SS-JägerVerbände-Mitte was the SS commando unit. which in the early part of the war was the sole province of the German military's Abwehr. Members of SS-JägerVerbände-Mitte participated both in the rescue of Mussolini and covert operations during the Battle of the Bulge. There appears to be a number of Paras involved as well. But the unit, and Skorzeny were not abwehr, and were not members of the brandenbuirger regiment

After his successful and daring commando raid to rescue Italian dictator Benitio Mussolini, SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny became commander of the Waffen-SS covert operations units. However, Hitler and Himmler had him off doing all sorts of special missions (mostly political) that he lost lost touch with his agents/troops and did not oversee their administration properly . Consequently, the activity, status and morale of the units under his command suffered. 


The main headquarters for all the the SS-Jägerverband units was Fuehrungs Stab Friedenthal, with a strength of 700 men.In April 1945 FS "Freidenthal" became "Schutz Korps Alpenland" - a 250 man scratch feldjäerkorps for the Alpine Redoubt. 

COMPOSITION 
3 rifle companies 
1 heavy weapons company 
4 foreign volunteer companies 
total compliment: 600 men; many from Freidenthal unit, but supposedly some W-SS probationers and Heer volunteers 
In addition, each Jäverbände unit formed replacement "jadgeinsatz" - organized by nationality. 

1942: RSHA VI-F (Reich Security Office/Foreign Intelligence/ Foreign Intelligence Technical Assistence Dept. ) forms the "SS Sonder Lehrgang 'Orienburg'" - 70 NCO's and 30 enlisted men under SS-Hauptsturmscharführer Vessem. The organization's instigates several covert operations including "Einsatz Franz" - an attempt to instigate an insurgency in Iran. Unit changes its name to "Sonder Lehrgang zbV Friedenthal" 


June 1943: Waffen-SS begin to recruit men for a covert operations unit, possible transfers from Sonder Lehrgang zbV Friedenthal 

August 1943: Aug 5: The first Waffen-SS commando unit, SS-Sonderverbünde z.b.V. Friedenthal offically formed, although recruitment efforts may have begun in June. 

September 1943: Sept 5: Some unit members, including commander SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, participate in the daring glider-borne rescue of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, held captive at the Gran Sasso lodge. 

October 1943: 1st. company sent on antipartisan operations in Croatia 


February 1944: 3rd company formed with Flemish/Dutch personnel; 1 2nd companies sent to Kurmark for 6 week tour of duty on the Eastern front. 

April 1944: Apr 17: unit redesignated "SS-Jäger-Bataillon 502;" company of foreign conscripts added to unit? 

July 1944: Conspiracy of German Army officers attempt to assassinate Hitler but fail. Skorzeny is instrumental in putting down the coup, holding the berlin HQ building for over 36hours. 

August 1944: Unit placed on alert south of Berlin, due to the bomb plot. 

September 1944: unit (dissolved?) renamed SS-JägerVerbände-Mitte 
Sept 10: Hitler summons SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny to discuss plans for a Hungarian coup. 

October 1944: Oct 13: Skorzeny travels to Budapest under the alias "Dr. Wolff"; meets with SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski to discuss coup. Von dem Bach wants to pulverize the Hungarian government center, Castle Hill, with a huge "Big Bertha" type gun, but Skorzeny favors a more delicate operation. 
Oct 15/16: participates in Operation Panzerfaust along with SS-Fallschirmj·ger Abteilung 500 
Supported by 40 King Tiger tanks of Heer Schwere Panzer Abtleitung 503, the unit attacks Castle Hill. 
November 1944: unit renamed "SS-Jagdverband Mitte"? 

December 1944: Unit becomes part of the 150 Panzer Brigade for a special commando mission during the Operation Wacht am Rhein. 


January - February 1945: Heavy defensive fighting, Schmeldt, Germany, against the Soviet Army. 

March 1945: March 31: unit strength: 250 

April 1945: sent to "Alpine Redoubt" (the mountainous area of Austria where a supposed Nazi "last stand" was to occur; Remnants surrender Linz. _
I never had a problem with the SS commandoes, or even with the Abwehr special forces units. the failure of the German special forces was at its command levels, and with co-ordination. It also suffered in its espionage efforts which are largely a failure
SOURCES: 
After The Battle #40: Budapest - Winston G. Ramsey - Battle of Britian Prints International Ltd. - 1983 

Forgotten Legions: Obscure Combat Formations of the Waffen-SS - Antonio Munoz - Axis Europa Books - 1991 

Forgotten Legions Addenda - Antonio Munoz - Axis Europa Books - 2000? 

Hungary 1944-45: The Forgotten Tragedy - Perry Pierik - Aspekt - 1998


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## Kruska (Jun 11, 2008)

Glider said:


> Its always been a question in my mind as to why the Germans didn't do more special forces raids. For instance I am not aware of any against the UK despite only being 25 miles away and wide open for attack for the first 18-24 months. They didn't have anything like the LRDPG or SAS/SBS. They had mountain troops but not on the scale of the Commando's or Rangers.



*  You...mea..n ttthat..The Eagle has Landed...iiis..just aaa..movie???  *

I read in a non German Book (Sorry can’t remember the title – but could have been in the Book Desert Fox) that in summation British Commando raids had a very good impact on the moral of the people, but in relation of work and money spend these “spectacular” raids did not pay off – and none of them had any decisive impact on any strategic operation. 

Has this been or could this be verified by any additional soures?


Regards
Kruska


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## Njaco (Jun 11, 2008)

What!!! It wasn't a documentary!!!

 

Thanks, Parsifal. Was just curious if that would count as "spy" ops.


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## Glider (Jun 11, 2008)

Sorry about any dissapointments everyone 

As for their effectiveness I believe the truth is a bit of both. 
The attack on the Wurtzberg Radar was a definate success. It had a millitary aim and achieved it as well as waking the Germans up.

The SOE missions had a large measure of success that proved of great assistance in the war and tied the Germans down. Not all of them but a good many. They also gave good intel as to developments for example, parts of the V2 were smuggled back long before they started firing them at the UK.

No doubt a good few were mainly for propaganda and morale benefits but these shouldn't be ignored.

German forces in Europe couldn't have been that happy knowing that the British were moving men and materials in and out of the continent almost at will.
Look at it the other way. Just after the fall of France the whole of the UK was at best very jumpy about an invasion, as worst close to panic. If the Germans had launched a few hit raids, the impact may well have been mainly on the morale of the population, but what an impact it might have been.


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## Soren (Jun 11, 2008)

Parsifal,

Brandenburgers, FallschirmJägers AND members of the JagdVerbände all participated in the rescue of Mussolini.



> It wasn't Just the spies Soren. The following is an example of how poor, some would say inept, Strategic Intelligence played a large part in the failure of the war in Russia.



It was pretty much just the spies Glider. The intel blunder you just mentioned happened for the Allies as-well and wasn't an uncommon mistake in war.

However the Brandenburgers remained effective till the end, carrying out hundreds of successful operations, and along with the JagdVerbände were the best trained troops on the planet, recieving three times the training of the men enlisted by the Wehrmacht, which already recieved three times the training of any Allied soldier. However one must note also that not all Brandenburgers were as well trained as the elite core, as allot of foreigners were drafted, such as turks etc etc. 


Btw, I'm thinking about buying this book: Axis History Factbook: Review - Brandenburg Division

Sounds like a very good book.


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## parsifal (Jun 11, 2008)

In the desert, the operations of the LRDG had an enormous impact on the outcome. From a force that in totasl never amounted to more than about 250 men, the unit was responsible for the destruction of over 500 men, the capture of Kufra (a strategic town in southern Libya, that provided the only link to IEA) the destruction of many tens of thousands of tons of supplies. It tied down about 5 divisions of troops on rear area security, and very nearly succeeded in bagging Rommel himself at one point. Not bad for a force that was the mapower equivalent of about 4 aircraft,


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## Soren (Jun 11, 2008)

The LRDG mostly fought against the Italians though Parsifal, and their most successful operations were against the Italians.

As for them being close to bagging Rommel, hardly.


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## Freebird (Jun 11, 2008)

parsifal said:


> I never had a problem with the SS commandoes, or even with the Abwehr special forces units. the failure of the German special forces was at its *command levels, and with co-ordination*. It also suffered in its *espionage efforts* which are largely a failure




Agreed. I have some interesting detailed thoughts on the German SOE operations, I will post them this weekend, a little busy now. However I will post them with the caveat, the intelligence and command would be the Achillies heel of the operations. The German's over confidence in Enigma and the unreliability of Canaris would have the potential to mess up the whole operation. That being said, there are some very interesting possibilities that have not yet been considered


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## syscom3 (Jun 11, 2008)

Freebird, why not consider a German attack on the Panama Canal?

Knocking that out for a few weeks or more WOULD have an impact on allied naval operations!


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## Glider (Jun 11, 2008)

Soren said:


> It was pretty much just the spies Glider. The intel blunder you just mentioned happened for the Allies as-well and wasn't an uncommon mistake in war.



Soren
I take it you can find something to support your statement. Missing 160 divisions is a little careless in particular as the British, Japanese, Finns and Japanese had closer figures and they were not going to war with Russia.
I have a number of other examples and this is but one. 

Be fair, I did offer you the choice of types of intelligence and you didn't make one, so I am giving a *fair *example of each. 

If you wish I can give more on this topic.

Your choice


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## Freebird (Jun 11, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Freebird, why not consider a German attack on the Panama Canal?
> 
> Knocking that out for a few weeks or more WOULD have an impact on allied naval operations!




*That is one of your interesting ideas, and an excellent one.* Most attacks against the US would be to influence public opinion affect military planning, with little actual or lasting damage, however there are a few that would have a serious effect. Knocking out the canal would be one, or a frogman style attack on the US Atlantic carriers would have some real consequences.


Do you know how well guarded the canal was prior to Pearl? Could a cargo ship with explosives packed in the bows or something like that work? {Spanish or Portugese flagged presumably}

Considering the amount of explosives used at St. Naziere {on the drydock gates} by the British commandos, I don't think a couple of torpedoes would do, would they?

I would think that a cargo ship approaching at dusk or something like that would be more workable than trying to land commandos to attack from land


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## Freebird (Jun 11, 2008)

Glider said:


> Soren
> I take it you can find something to support your statement. Missing 160 divisions is a little careless in particular as the British, Japanese, Finns and Japanese had closer figures and they were not going to war with Russia.
> I have a number of other examples and this is but one.
> 
> ...



Actually Glider, the Allies had more than a little luck on this one. According to Brooke, while in France in 1940 some of Monty's troops {his division} captured an almost complete "TO E" for the German army, listing the strengths deployments of about 90% of the German divisions. After this intelligence coup, the British were from then on fairly well aware of German deployments.

Luckily for the Allies the Germans never got hold of the British strengths in 1940, they over-estimated the available British troops by 50% - 100%


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## Glider (Jun 11, 2008)

freebird said:


> Actually Glider, the Allies had more than a little luck on this one. According to Brooke, while in France in 1940 some of Monty's troops {his division} captured an almost complete "TO E" for the German army, listing the strengths deployments of about 90% of the German divisions. After this intelligence coup, the British were from then on fairly well aware of German deployments.
> 
> Luckily for the Allies the Germans never got hold of the British strengths in 1940, they over-estimated the available British troops by 50% - 100%



Interesting but the first point was a gift that the British were able to aquire and use. What would be interesting is to compare the reality with what the British security estimates were then we would be able to understand the accuracy of those estimates.

The second point is another example the Germans getting it very wrong.


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## Kruska (Jun 11, 2008)

Glider said:


> Sorry about any dissapointments everyone
> 
> *Oh well never mind I will just keep watching "The Needle"  *
> 
> ...



Regards
Kruska


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## Soren (Jun 11, 2008)

> In the DSO in which I served last, the "KSK" is a part of it. The Bundeswehr itsself is not creating a nimbus or aura around this unit. Acctual missions are classified and not known to anyone. Those who participated are trained and possess a selected character that ensures secrecy. And yet all over the internet and bookstores and even movies this unit is highlighted as if the authors would have been members, and novelist ideas and stories are placed on the market.
> 
> Off course there are a lot of "ex" members, which IMO have a tendency to fantasis or exagerate on the topic and hide the fact that even within the so called elite there is another elite.
> 
> ...



This is 100% true.


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## Glider (Jun 11, 2008)

Kruska said:


> *As for their effectiveness I believe the truth is a bit of both.
> The attack on the Wurtzberg Radar was a definate success. It had a millitary aim and achieved it as well as waking the Germans up.*
> 
> Sorry I wouldn't know about its compossition, so I might forward that a Mossie could have done the job as well?



Kruska
This attack was a little different. The objective wasn't to destroy the radar, that as you say could have been done in any number of ways. 
The objective was to land, take control of the radar, then dismantle the key components and bring them back to the UK. This would give the British scientists a chance to investigate the latest radar developments with the obvious intention of designing countermeasures.
They landed by parachute and withdrew by sea.

The following link may be of interest.
Bruneval

Imagine what the benefit would have been, if Germany had done a similar raid on a British coastal radar site before the BOB. 

Regards
David


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## Kruska (Jun 11, 2008)

Glider said:


> Kruska
> This attack was a little different. The objective wasn't to destroy the radar, that as you say could have been done in a number of ways.
> The objective was to land, take control of the radar, then dismantle the key components and then bring them back to the UK. This would give the British scientists a chance to investigate the latest radar developments with the obvious intention of designing countermeasures.
> They landed by parachute and withdrew by sea.
> ...



Hello Glider,

Well, now that is what I would call an efficient and well executed Commando raid, which -not trying to downplay anything-a selected Luftwaffe paragroup could have done just as well without being called Commandos. Just as they did for Gran Sasso and countless other operations without being highlighted as a special group by the press or towards the public. 

The offical Press text was: Mussolini freed by paratroopers under the leadership of the renowned Skorceny. (Actually Scorceny wasn't even involved in the planing nor in leading the action).

German history accounts actually shows that the Germans used Commando Raids all the time, by using regular – most suitable – paratroopers of the Luftwaffe and SS to perform such missions at random without being trained and specialized as an independent pure Commando unit with an aura of elite.

As Soren already pointed out, the standard capability of the German paratroopers or SS was already as sufficient as that of the British Commandos – taking off course the initial 1939/41group and not some Galicia SS or 1023rd Fallschirmjaeger Division. And the name or unit insignia of SS or Fallschirmjaeger already implied superduper and Commando or LRDP.

So again as not to be misunderstood, the SAS or LRDG or Commandos were indeed a highly specialized bunch that was simply more highlighted then the “ordinary” German equivalents. Who could be identified not by a special unit insignia or name but by Frontkampfspange, Nahkampfabzeichen or Panzervernichtungsabzeichen. Frontcombat clasp, close quarter combat clasp and Tankkill ribbons and some Ritterkreuz.

The Brandenburger unit was actually established in order for the Wehrmacht to have their own elite in contra to Hermann and Heinrich’s command. .

Regards
Kruska

thanks for the link.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2008)

*Brandenburgers, FallschirmJägers AND members of the JagdVerbände all participated in the rescue of Mussolini*

The brandenburgers did not serve as a brandenburger unit AFAIK. They were under the control, and serving as members of the JGDV.....i am not as sure about the FJ units however, i think they were an identifieable separate unit 

*The LRDG mostly fought against the Italians though Parsifal, and their most successful operations were against the Italians.*

Unless you have very specific evidence to the contrary, i dont think this is true.

Most attacks were against supply columns or depots, or airfields. The airfields attacked were a mix of italian controlled, and german controlled. and the truck convoys were again a mixture of german, italian, and italian-german. Increasingly however the logistic services were being run by the germans, because the italians were increasingly being relegated to the sidelines as 1942 wore on. 

Some source material i have read suggest the attacks were roughly in the order of 60% against the italians, and 40% against the germans. Beyond that i cannot be any more specific. if you have better material, I would like to see it, but i do not think you can dismiss the attacks as just being against the italians, just because they were rear area attacks 


*As for them being close to bagging Rommel, hardly.*

It was a complete balls up, thats true, but more because of just bad luck than bad planning. The stuff up incidentally arose because of an SAS stuff up, fromm memory. The fact that the mission could be seriously considered is a pretty good snapshot as to the effectiveness of the British Special forces by that time.


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## Kruska (Jun 12, 2008)

parsifal said:


> *Brandenburgers, FallschirmJägers AND members of the JagdVerbände all participated in the rescue of Mussolini*
> 
> The brandenburgers did not serve as a brandenburger unit AFAIK. They were under the control, and serving as members of the JGDV.....i am not as sure about the FJ units however, i think they were an identifieable separate unit



Hello parsifal,

Mussolini, Not quite: the Jadverbaende SS were only instituted in September 1944 and in Oktober 1944 the Div. Brandenburg (formerly an independent Wehrmacht unit) was incorporated into the SS Jagdverbaende. These Jagdverbaende however were primarily towards anti partisan duties and not really considered in the term of a British Commando Unit.

The Fallschirmjaeger never had Jagdverbaende. Only the SS Fall. 600 was also integrated into the SS JV.

Regards
Kruska


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2008)

Kruska said:


> Hello parsifal,
> 
> Mussolini, Not quite: the Jadverbaende SS were only instituted in September 1944 and in Oktober 1944 the Div. Brandenburg (formerly an independent Wehrmacht unit) was incorporated into the SS Jagdverbaende. These Jagdverbaende however were primarily towards anti partisan duties and not really considered in the term of a British Commando Unit.
> 
> ...



Hi Kruska, are you suggesting that the SS did not form commando units until the latter part of 1944? If so, I will have to disagree, the SS beagn forming its first commando units from the latter part of 1942, which included Skorzeny. 

However, because my German is not good, i may have mislabelled them. If that is the case, then i stand corrected.

The SS commandos undertook many special ops, including anti-partisan, but for once i agree with soren, they undertook a whole range of special operations from 1943 onwards. The brandenburgers, on the other hand, as a unit really effectively became (mostly) an elite Infantry organization from 1943 on. The WERE mostly employed in anti-partisan operations. i expect that a good proportion of Brandenburger personnel transferred to the SS commando unit(s) after 1943, but dont actually know for sure.


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## Soren (Jun 12, 2008)

> The brandenburgers did not serve as a brandenburger unit AFAIK. They were under the control, and serving as members of the JGDV.....i am not as sure about the FJ units however, i think they were an identifieable separate unit



Members of the Brandenburg Div. did take part in the rescue, they might have been assigned to either the FJ or JV unit. As for the FallschirmJägers, they were there as-well and accounted for most of the men participating in the operation. The rescue of Mussolini was joint operation between the FallschirmJägers JagdVerbände, with members of the Brandenburger Div. participating as-well.


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## Soren (Jun 12, 2008)

> Unless you have very specific evidence to the contrary, i dont think this is true.
> 
> Most attacks were against supply columns or depots, or airfields. The airfields attacked were a mix of italian controlled, and german controlled. and the truck convoys were again a mixture of german, italian, and italian-german. Increasingly however the logistic services were being run by the germans, because the italians were increasingly being relegated to the sidelines as 1942 wore on.
> 
> Some source material i have read suggest the attacks were roughly in the order of 60% against the italians, and 40% against the germans. Beyond that i cannot be any more specific. if you have better material, I would like to see it, but i do not think you can dismiss the attacks as just being against the italians, just because they were rear area attacks



Parsifal, take a look at their most successful raids, they were all against the Italians. They did run into the Germans a number of times, but when they did they didn't enjoy too much success.



> It was a complete balls up, thats true, but more because of just bad luck than bad planning. The stuff up incidentally arose because of an SAS stuff up, fromm memory. The fact that the mission could be seriously considered is a pretty good snapshot as to the effectiveness of the British Special forces by that time.



It wasn't going to happen Parsifal, not by a long shot.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2008)

Soren

Actually, we are both wrong. The LRDG was at its best when it was not attacking or being attacked directly. 


The most successful raids by the LRDG did not involve combat at all. Usually if the LRDG was engaged in combat, it was a sign they were in trouble. The most important missions by the LRDG were recon related, their survey work that allowed the British to outflank the germans time and again, in areas that had not been mapped properly, and the road watch on the Via Balbia, which observed both German and italian forces. their acts of sabotage were usually not against defended targets, makes a nonsense of this assertion that their targets were somehow exclusively German.

I suggest that you read the book, The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North Africa, 1940-1943 by JW Gordon. On those occasions that there were brushes with Axis forces, there are about as many instances of firefights with germans as there were with Italians. Often the enemy consisted of Italian AND german units. Keep in mind that if the LRDG patrol got into a fight, it was in trouble anyway. That is not the way special forces were intended to operate, Axis or Allied (there were some exceptions to this, most notably the Chindits, but these were a specialized combat unit anyway, and not a special force as such). 

The LRDG was primarily a recon and sabotage unit, with occasional direct attacks on airfields , and supply dumps (but even here the idea was not to raise the alarm by direct attacks, the most successful missions were those when the damage began to happen after the LRDG had effected its extraction..... One of its favourite tactics was the mining of roads and runways. So I just cannot see how we can say that the primary targets are Italian. The primary targets were the Axis communications, and recon, and axis logistics networks. On those occasions where firefights occurred, there are just as many instances of fights with germans as there are fights with Italians. And there were just as many losses suffered to the italins by the LRDG as there were suffered by the Germans (ie just as many LRDG were lost to the germans as there were to the Italians). 

Moreover, in their efforts to emulate the LRDG, it was the italians who appeared to show a greater understanding of how to put it all together when compared to those of the germans. The operations of their "Sahariano Company" showed signs of promise more advanced than that of the germans, whose efforts and concepts were not nearly as well developed in this specialized field. The one big exception I can think of to that, was the special operation mounted by the Abwehr group headed by the hungarian Count Laszlo Almasi, which in 1942 managed to get two Abwehr agents into Cairo, for Intelligence gathering purposes. But even here, the success was pyrhhic....the agents turned within a very short space of time.


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## Soren (Jun 12, 2008)

I am asking you to look at their most glorious moments Parsifal, not the number of times they came into firefights. The LRDG's most glorious moments were against the Italians.



> Moreover, in their efforts to emulate the LRDG, it was the italians who appeared to show a greater understanding of how to put it all together when compared to those of the germans. The operations of their "Sahariano Company" showed signs of promise more advanced than that of the germans, whose efforts and concepts were not nearly as well developed in this specialized field.



That is not true Parsifal, the Germans had the Fallschirmjäger Brigade Ramcke, an elite combat unit which proved highly successful during the African campaign, often making a complete fool of the Commenwealth forces. One of its duties was also to quickly intercept the LRDG during their raids.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2008)

*I am asking you to look at their most glorious moments Parsifal, not the number of times they came into firefights. The LRDG's most glorious moments were against the Italians*.

Most glorious moments is not the relevant issue. The relevant issue is the most effective moments. They were most effective when they undertook both an insertion AND extraction without being detected. If that occurred (and that was the objective most of the time, the LRDG could classify the operation as a success. If they were detected at any point, they could fight, but the mission was usually busted. And in those circumstances the LRDGs were usually better than the italians, so in that sense you are right. But you are definately missing the point....Special Forces are designed to operate on a stelth basis rather than a "shoot em up" basis. The fact that the LRDGs could get into, and then out of enemy held bases with a minimum of interference is an amazing feat, not that they could fight better or worse than their opposition

*That is not true Parsifal, the Germans had the Fallschirmjäger Brigade Ramcke, an elite combat unit which proved highly successful during the African campaign, often making a complete fool of the Commenwealth forces. One of its duties was also to quickly intercept the LRDG during their raids*.

I know of the fighting qualities of the Ramcke Brigade, although I dont think they ever made fools of anyone. If they did, Rommel certainly didnt think so. Rommel thought the best Infantry in the deseert was the Australians incidentally, not the Ramcke outfit. 

However, even this misses the point. As you say, Ramcke was a combat unit, not a Special Forces unit. Ramcke was not designed, trained or equipped for deep penetration behind the lines sabotage intell gathering etc work of the type the LRDGs undertook. The only formations capable of this type of work on the German side were the four companies of the Brandenburgers assigned to the theatre. These guys did not perform well in their intended role (except on a few occasions ), for a number of reasons, but these reasons can all be linked back to the systemic problem that existed in the Abwehr at the time, namely poor leadership, and co-ordination


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## syscom3 (Jun 12, 2008)

Lets hear Sorens plans for a commando attack on the Panama Canal, followed by a small anti-shipping campaign on the Gulf side of the canal.

Maybe even couple it with an IJN attack on the Pacific side..


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## Soren (Jun 13, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Most glorious moments is not the relevant issue. The relevant issue is the most effective moments. They were most effective when they undertook both an insertion AND extraction without being detected. If that occurred (and that was the objective most of the time, the LRDG could classify the operation as a success. If they were detected at any point, they could fight, but the mission was usually busted. And in those circumstances the LRDGs were usually better than the italians, *so in that sense you are right. *But you are definately missing the point....Special Forces are designed to operate on a stelth basis rather than a "shoot em up" basis. The fact that the LRDGs could get into, and then out of enemy held bases with a minimum of interference is an amazing feat, not that they could fight better or worse than their opposition



Which is all I was saying Parsifal. Ofcourse not being detected was the prime goal, that's a no brainer even for an amateur. The LRDG was a small unit and thus getting into a firefight was potentially disasterous.



> I know of the fighting qualities of the Ramcke Brigade, although I dont think they ever made fools of anyone.



They made fools out of the British;
_During the Second battle of El Alamein. the brigade covered Rommel's withdrawal and was given up for lost once it was encircled by Commonwealth forces. Despite being cut off, the brigade managed to to turn initial defeat into a moment of complete embarrassment for the British when they captured a convoy without firing a shot on the night of 6/7 November 1942. The Brigade then drove the entire captured convoy back to German lines complete with food, fuel and ammunition meant to supply a Commonwealth Armored division. The Brigade continued to use the captured vehicles until there eventual withdrawal from North Afrika. _



> If they did, Rommel certainly didnt think so. Rommel thought the best Infantry in the deseert was the Australians incidentally, not the Ramcke outfit.



I doubt that Parsifal, got a source ?


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## parsifal (Jun 13, 2008)

I doubt that Parsifal, got a source ?[/QUOTE]

will forward the source from home. Sys wants you to finish your submission for the panama canal raid, so I will hold off from other replies until then


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## parsifal (Jun 13, 2008)

I am home now, The sources are "Where the Australians Fought_ The Encyclopedia Of Australian Battlefields", Chris Coulthard, Allen Unwin, 1988; "Panzer! Tank Warfare 1939-45", Nigel Cawthorne, Arcturus Publishing 2003. Also "Tobruk 1941" Peter Cochrane Australian Broadcasting Comission 2001. 

There are a number of variations to the basic quote, but that contained in wiki is probably the most generic. He is reported as saying _"If I had to take hell, I would use the Australians to take it and the New Zealanders to hold it"._

Other quotes from Rommel

_Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives, and brains save both
would be rather more happy had he given me one more division_. 
Comment after Hitler made him a Field Marshal 
_The German soldier astonished the world, the Italian Bersagliere astonished the German soldier. 
I didn't die nor win. _
Referred to the order "either win or die trying!" of Hitler during the retreat of the campaigning in North Africa. 
_For me, soldiers are all equal. Those black people wore your same uniform, fought on your side, and so you will be in the same jail._ 
Said to a captured South African white officer that asked to be put in a different jail from the one with black soldiers. 
_Gentlemen, you have fought like lions and been led by donkeys._ 
Said to captured British officers after Tobruk 
_Good soldiers, bad officers; but remember that without them we wouldn't have civilization. _
Referred to Italians.


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## Kruska (Jun 13, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Soren
> 
> Actually, we are both wrong. The LRDG was at its best when it was not attacking or being attacked directly.



Hello parsifal,

The Brandenburg unit existed before 1943 and fulfilled many operations during the early stages of Barbarossa, by e.g. posing as Russians in order to take control of vital bridges.
On 1.4.1943 the Sonderverband (Special Unit Brandenburg was renamed into Division Brandenburg with 5 Regiments.

BTW, this is the official order regarding the initial setting up of SS Jagdverbaende:
OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt. I/19280/44 g.Kdos. v. 13.9.1944, so before September 1944 there were no Jagdverbaende.

I am not aware about any reliable sources that document about members of the Brandenburg unit having taken part in the raid Gran Sasso.

LRDP, Commandos or LRDP and Combat performance.

Let me put it this way: The British were the first ones to define a unit and specific tasks of this unit then termed commandos. The LRDP was not a commando unit but a recon unit as already forwarded, which was sometimes also ordered commando raids (not a wise decision) but in majority their action was based on recon.

Today’s Bundeswehr has the Fernspaeher which are the core group of the KSK unit. The training unit is still based at the International Long Range Recon Patrol School (ILRRPS) since 2003 termed AusbZSpezlOp (Training school for special operations). 
It is the equivalent to the British SAS section SRR- Special Reconnaiccance Regiment.

These units are speciffically instructed and trained not to engage in combat but to remain hidden. These members are far to valuable to be „wasted“ in a commando raid. This specific mission design was unfortunatly not accepted by the cofounders of the ILRRPS – Great Britain - which in the end resulted in the withdrawal of the SAS from the ILRRPS.

It was then in 2005 that the British agreed to this mission spectrum and training and as such instituted the SRR within the SAS.

Regards
Kruska


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## Njaco (Jun 23, 2008)

Found this while posting todays events in the Daily thread. From U-Boat.net...

"_'U-200' _(Type IXD2) was sunk southwest of Iceland by 2 depth charges from a British Liberator aircraft (Sqdn. 120/H). 67 dead (all crew lost). The dead included 7 members from the German special force "Brandenburg" unit."


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2008)

Good find Njaco.

I was also thinking of a possible attack on the large airport in Fairbanks, it was used as the depature point from which Lend Lease a/c and supplies went to the USSR (Hence the layout of access route on the map), the Alsib air route. A team of 25 commandos could cause a lot of damage if landed there.


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## syscom3 (Jun 30, 2008)

Soren said:


> Good find Njaco.
> 
> I was also thinking of a possible attack on the large airport in Fairbanks, it was used as the depature point from which Lend Lease a/c and supplies went to the USSR (Hence the layout of access route on the map), the Alsib air route. A team of 25 commandos could cause a lot of damage if landed there.



And what type of impact on the war would it have?


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## Glider (Jun 30, 2008)

Back to the 25 commando's again I see.


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## Njaco (Jun 30, 2008)




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## Soren (Jun 30, 2008)

Glider said:


> Back to the 25 commando's again I see.




And so ? Still ignorant to the fact that a Type IXD easily could carry along 30 extra men ??

An attack on the airport at Fairbanks wouldn't require 75 men, infact 10 would be enough.


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> And what type of impact on the war would it have?



What impact on the war did Market Garden have ? Come on syscom... 

Destroying lots of material and damaging the airfield would delay shipments to the east and require the whole area to be strenghtened in security.


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## JugBR (Jun 30, 2008)

Soren said:


> German commando attack on the US, Canada possibly Alaska
> 
> The time is early 1942 and Amerika recently entered the war, and so to sabotage its war effort by striking fear into the hearts of the civilian population Germany is planning a commando raid on the US Canada and perhaps even a small town in Alaska just to demonstrate their abilities.
> 
> ...



they used the u-boats for block the suply of allies in atlantic. but not very effective in the end.

germany doesnt have any kind of "comandos" like that, but they had some spys over the american territory. but that would be useless, i believe "comandos" just goes against the germanic war philosophy in ww2. maybe they could lauch a v1 or v2 like from a u-boat or other ship from kriegsmarine. but i doubt, because their main military targets was revenge against brits and french forcing both to sign a cease-fire and dizimate the slavians from the east-europe who they believed was an inferior race.

the only enemy hitler thoughts was dangerous was the britons. he said once, the americans fight as childrens and the russians was an inferior race wich means germans should not find too much resistance in anihilate the slavians, but in his opinion, the english will fight and resist as lions. he was wrong about the americans and russians, but very right about the britons ! besides the disaster of dunkerke, the britons made an heroic resistence in the skies of the islands. also, polaks, frenches and many others helped in those effort.


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## Haztoys (Jun 30, 2008)

Were there any 25 man commando attacks that did do damage from any country..??? ..I know the Germans did get Mussolini freed... Soren you under estimate the US army as the Germans did in WW2...


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## syscom3 (Jun 30, 2008)

Soren said:


> What impact on the war did Market Garden have ? Come on syscom...
> 
> Destroying lots of material and damaging the airfield would delay shipments to the east and require the whole area to be strenghtened in security.



25 commando's would knock out Fairbanks for a few days. Big deal. 

It would have no impact on the AAF and USN.


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## parsifal (Jun 30, 2008)

and so far we have a maximum carrying capacity of just 7 men in the biggest boat in the german Navy, which was not available until the end of 1942, at the earliest. On that basis it will require 4 boats to be taken out of the line for something like ten weeks for a minor raid unlikely to have any impact on the war.

U-Boat s were expensive pieces of hardware, and their job was to sink ships. Having them swan around dropping off agents for hair brained schemes would be a total waste of time, and handing a minor victory on a plate to the Allies, because the boats are not doing what they should be.....which is to sink ships


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## JugBR (Jul 1, 2008)

Haztoys said:


> Were there any 25 man commando attacks that did do damage from any country..??? ..I know the Germans did get Mussolini freed... Soren you under estimate the US army as the Germans did in WW2...



yeah, rssss i dint saw the situation by that point rssssssss

should be 25 german chuck norris lolllllll


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## Glider (Jul 1, 2008)

Soren said:


> And so ? Still ignorant to the fact that a Type IXD easily could carry along 30 extra men ??
> 
> An attack on the airport at Fairbanks wouldn't require 75 men, infact 10 would be enough.



Now your increasing it to 30, it gets better and better.


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## syscom3 (Jul 1, 2008)

Sometimes the airport in Fairbanks would be socke din from weather for several days at a time.

The war wasnt effected then, was it?


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## garyhardison (Jul 10, 2008)

After considering all the options available, I believe that a raid would have been somewhat feasable. The primary objective would be the Electric Boat Co. Yard located in Groton, CT. This would severely hamper the us sub building capability, the only other primary yard being the Portsmouth Naval Ship Yard in NH. 

I believe that the primary attack would be a Platoon of combat engineers from the FJR Pioneer Bn. 1, loaded on 2-FW 200(condors). 
The planes would make the flight nonstop from Berlin to Ct. in under 25 hours nonstop and painted as commercial Airliners, possibly flying low under radar like the japanese at pearl harbor. The planes total capacity would be 46 pax and a extra squad of engineers could be attached to provide security for the aircraft as well as the 9 crew memebers of the aircraft once they landed at the Groton Airfield (Civilian) and refuel and prep the aircraft for the return flight. The assault force would then commandeer vehicles to drive to the shipyard and then infiltrate the shipyard causing as much damage as possible, a excellent job for combat engineers. This would definitely be a worthwile mission and excellent propaganda mission, cutting US Sub production in half possibly.

Off the coast UBOATs could offload raiders in boats as a secondary attack force, maintaining radio contact with the primary assault force. The UBOATS would be a secondary means of escape also if the airfield was overrun. Once the timed explosives did their job on the shipyard the UBoats could cause some confusion to the shipyard to cover the withdrawl of the engineers back to the airfield. 

I dont think that a attack on Alaska is at all feasable and ther would be no way to resupply a long term military force in the USA or Canada, remember at this time all the long range transport aircraft in the luftwaffe were trying to resupply the russian front. There were simply not enough aircraft available to make any long term operation statesid viable.


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## timshatz (Jul 10, 2008)

I dunno. While I could see them landing at Groton Civilian, they would definitely get people's attention. Granted, they're dressed up as Allied Air Liners. But once you land, the clock starts ticking for a response. 

Getting into the sub yards is feasable, but again, only for a short time. After that, the reaction from local forces (very confused and sporatic, but that is what makes it so tough to deal with-they're everywhere) would be hard to handle with only 70 guys. 

All that being said, it's got a decent chance of accomplishing some damage. But I wouldn't put much money on them getting away.


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## Njaco (Jul 10, 2008)

Were US subs that much of a problem for Germany? IIRC it was more airbourne patrols and surface ships that caused the most damage against U-Boats. Don't know if cutting sub production would affect the ETO that much.

And I don't think it would be that easy for Fw 200s to fly non-stop that distance, especially with the load you mention. If it was, the frontline would have been straight up Broadway.


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## syscom3 (Jul 11, 2008)

The US subs were primarily directed at Japan.

And even if the commando's knocked out the torpedo factory, no big deal. They weren't working either.


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## Soren (Jul 11, 2008)

Parsifal, 

A single Type IX could easily carry an extra 25-30 men if the number of torpedoes stored were cut down. Again remember the role of the Uboat is but to act as transport, and thus it would need hardly any torps, and the ordinary nr. of crewmembers could even be decreased. 

And again one of the primary goals of the entire operation is to strike fear into the American public, not just to destroy key targets. After an attack like proposed the American public would demand better protection, meaning A LOT of money needed be poured at securing coastlines and what not.



JugBR said:


> germany doesnt have any kind of "comandos" like that



Get more educated on the subject before making such blanket false statements.


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## Glider (Jul 11, 2008)

All
The attached photo was posted much earlier on in the thread. For those that did't see it ,this is the forward torpedo room of Type IX submarine with only one torpedo in it.

Museum of Science and Industry | What's Here | Exhibits | U-505 | The Exhibit | On-Board Tour

I suggest that you look at the picture, think about Sorens statement that 25-30 men could easily live on board a Type IX with the torpedo's taken out and draw your own conclusions.

Re replacing some of the crew that is an interesting idea but as a Type IX only had a crew of around 63 how many could you replace?


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2008)

*All
The attached photo was posted much earlier on in the thread. For those that did't see it ,this is the forward torpedo room of Type IX submarine with only one torpedo in it.

Museum of Science and Industry | What's Here | Exhibits | U-505 | The Exhibit | On-Board Tour

I suggest that you look at the picture, think about Sorens statement that 25-30 men could easily live on board a Type IX with the torpedo's taken out and draw your own conclusions.

Re replacing some of the crew that is an interesting idea but as a Type IX only had a crew of around 63 how many could you replace*

For about 18 days no less, with 20-30 tons of equipment as well.

Specially modified I-Boats, with about twice the displacement of a Type IX, and with an entire hangar to boot, and even with srores lashed to the upper deck (techniques unkown and unused in the Kriegsmarine) could carry just 14 tons of cargo. 

Dont ever let the facts get in the way of a good fantasy, I guess.


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## timshatz (Jul 11, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> And even if the commando's knocked out the torpedo factory, no big deal. They weren't working either.



Good one, gave me a chuckle.


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## syscom3 (Jul 11, 2008)

The Germans could have found a way to stuff a platoon sized contingent into their subs, with their gear. Its also not out of the realm of possibilities that the KM simply have a couple oversized subs built for special purposes. Put in a 15 - 20 foot "plug" into the boat.

Besides, the US did it in the Pacific on occasion, most notably when regular fleet subs were used to evacuate Corregidore in the PI.

But, in the end, the Germans couldnt effect the war to any degree. It would have been a waste of resources. Now if they went after the refineries in Texas or in the gulf ..... that might do something.


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## Soren (Jul 11, 2008)

Some people here seem ignorant to the fact that the forward torpedo room is by far not the only room used for bunking in the boat. Also just by looking at the picture and seeing how much room a single torp actually takes up there should be no doubt that if 63 men could be onboard when 22 of those torpedoes were carried then without them another 25-30 men should be able to come along. 

Also ignored is that a different and larger type boat than the Type IX is suggested for the operation.

And then there's the equipment of the commandoes, well as tried to be explained most of the German subs featured top cargo holds with enough space for 4 - 6 torpedoes combined, making for plenty of room for the 8 -10 or so equipment boxes needed. (Model of German equipment box below)


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## Njaco (Jul 11, 2008)

I agree Soren, that it is possible to load a boat with commandos and carry out some sort of mission but I just don't see any target that would be worthy of the effort.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Jul 11, 2008)

What if Germany had captured Alaska and started some oil field up there? They could have really used the extra oil.

(Something Bush hasn't done even yet, not all his fault. )


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## Glider (Jul 11, 2008)

Soren said:


> Some people here


I wonder who that might be 


> seem ignorant to the fact that the forward torpedo room is by far not the only room used for bunking in the boat.


Then again, others tend to forget that the bunks were already hot bunked and are not available for anyone else.


> Also just by looking at the picture and seeing how much room a single torp actually takes up there should be no doubt that if 63 men could be onboard when 22 of those torpedoes were carried then without them another 25-30 men should be able to come along.


All the torpedos for use were kept in the torpedo rooms, so the space you see is the space you have. There is of course the rear torpedo room which was half the size so multiply what you see by 50%.
Also you need to remember that in a type VII most of the spare torpedos were stacked up on the deck with a false wooden deck on top for the crew to walk on. I believe that Type IX's used a similar process (the technology was basically the same) so replacing torpedo's with people isn't as straight forward as it seems.



> Also ignored is that a different and larger type boat than the Type IX is suggested for the operation.


Which carried 24 instead of 22 torpedo's which isn't a huge difference. Also you have made the same mistake in your assumptions that exta size equalls more space inside. British nuclear attack subs for instance, which are huge by WW2 standards still had hot bunks and could not carry 30 additional troops. 



> And then there's the equipment of the commandoes, well as tried to be explained most of the German subs featured top cargo holds with enough space for 4 - 6 torpedoes combined, making for plenty of room for the 8 -10 or so equipment boxes needed.


As long as the equipment is basically small arms and the size of backpacks I don't believe that would be a problem.


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## Soren (Jul 11, 2008)

Lets see some sources to back up those false claims Glider, so far you have put forward nil.

Hot bunking was done when all 22 torps were carried, which filled up a lot of space in the torpedo rooms, space where there could be a lot of extra bunks. But that's not the only place the crew sometimes slept, they also made some nice little beds on the flor occasionally. 

In your picture I see a lot of space extra space by just removing that one torp.

And below I see space for a lot more men, were those two torps removed. When the boats were fully equipped the torps were stacked and filled up nearly all the space for the bunks, and would've filled the space where the below bunks are on this picture:






As for modern Uboats, regardless of what you think Glider these are actually used as transports by Spec Ops on many occasions, just ask Les.


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## Juha (Jul 12, 2008)

SysCom3
IIRC US usually used Argonaut and Nautilus to transport their raiders and those were huge boats at that time, more than a double the size of Type IXs, displacement submerged appr 4000tns vs 1400-1500tns. So if Nautilus could carry 80-100 men after modifications that doesn't necessary mean that Type IX could carry a platoon.

Soren
have you any facts other than speculations? SysCom3? found out that one sunken sub was carrying 7 Brandenburgs, have you any knowledge of U-boat carrying greater number of commodo men?

Juha


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## Glider (Jul 12, 2008)

Soren
At the end of the day you are left with 20 men in that forward torpedo room and 10 in the rear torpedo room for about three weeks. You think that isn't a problem, I and others do.
On our side a number of people have looked and as Juha has said the max anyone can find was 7.
I have been on a similar submarine for 4 days and know haw difficult it was not to get in the way. Parsifal has supported this statement from his personal experience on an Oberon class submarine which is a similar size.

On one side of the debate are the photo's that show the size of the space, the research of actual missions, personal experience on board submarines.

On your side there is a theory which has changed slightly as the thread developed.
a) You started off by saying that with some of the topedos removed 30 men could be carried.
b) Then it became with all the torpedos removed the men could be carried.
c) Things then changed so that there were plenty of other places where people could sleep 

All of this supported by nothing


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 12, 2008)

Interesting Soren that you used a picture of the Bavaria Film Studios set for Das Boot.

You do realize that your picture above is a movie set.

Granted the set was very realistic.


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## Soren (Jul 12, 2008)

I actually wasnt aware of that Adler, but as you noted I really see no difference between the real thing and that set, and compared to the torpedo room of the real things it certainly isn't too large:

(Note the nr. of bunks rendered unusable by a single torpedo and a little food supply, when on patrols the boat would litterally be stuffed with both and yet still 63 were able to live inside for two months or more)





Oh and Glider, as for experience, I've had rides in subs before and with full crew there was still room for me and me mates. So as for the experience factor, well sorry but that isnt in your favor either.


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## Glider (Jul 12, 2008)

How many mates I was with 3 and I admit that it wasn't easy. Can I ask which sub you were in and for how long, also how did you find it.

Re the pictures you posted, are those of the film set in which case there is one huge difference between those pictures and the one that I posted of U505 which is of course a real Type IX submarine. The torpedo room in the pictures you posted is twice as long as the real submarine which is a big difference.


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## Freebird (Jul 12, 2008)

Soren said:


> Hot bunking was done when all 22 torps were carried, which filled up a lot of space in the torpedo rooms, space where there could be a lot of extra bunks. But that's not the only place the crew sometimes slept, they also made some nice little beds on the flor occasionally.



If some of the crew look like this lady then double-bunking will *NOT* be a problem!


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## parsifal (Jul 12, 2008)

Here is a link to the missions undertaken by the USN subs, for transport type missions 

WWII US Submarine Special Transport Missions in the Pacific During World War II 1941 to 1945

Now, as you can see, there are a lot of missions undertaken, and some involving quite large numbers of people. However, there needs to be word of caution thrown in. Firstly, the evac missions are not comparable to a commando raid, because they would be unlikely to involve a large amount of stores and equipment, and secondly so long as you get your evacuees out alive, the mission is a success...it doesn't matter what state they are in when they disembark, so long as they are OK. 

Now, we should also compare the available hardware, of both the German Navy, and the USN. As you can see, a lot of the missions were undertaken by regular USN fleet boats, which typically were the gato class. These boats had a deep load displacement of 2400 tons, so were quite large in comparison to the German counterparts. But perhaps it is best to look at the two "commando" subs, the Nautilus and the Narwhal, and specifically compare them to what might be available to the Germans.

Nautilus and Narwhal were quite old subs, but they were unique in that they were designed as mine layer. They reportedly were designed to carry up to 200 mines II RC. They were huge boats as well, with a deep load displacement of over 4000 tons. This enable them to carry a full company (less one rifle section) per boat, so that for the famous raid on Makin in August 1942, the two boats were able to land 211 men, and over 30 tons of stores, but only after they had been converted to the purpose. This conversion took about 4 months to complete, from Pearl Harbour through to some time in April. From that point until the actual operation, the Boats and the commandos were in training, although the actual target was not finalized until June.

Finally, it is worthwhile to take note of the actual time spent at sea, the boats cleared PH 9 August, spent two days on station, and returned to PH 26 August. Total Mission time was 16 days, and total sea time was 14 days

Now, lets compare that to the likely German capability. Sorens suggestion is that the mission takes place early 1942, and that it would involve about 30 commandos. He has not stated the amount of cargo being hauled, but from the looks of it, it could be conservatively estimated to be about 30 tons.

Now if the mission is to take place in early 1942, it immediately rules out using the biggest of the German boats, the Type IXD2, because these were not ready until later in 1942. Moreover, they would have needed some time to be made suitable for this purpose, as we have see, it took the American 4 months to convert the Nautilus and Narwhal, so it seems reasonable to estimate that the Type IXD2s would not be ready until the end of 1942, at the earliest. So this mission, in order to be carried out at the times designated would necessarily have to rely on one of the earlier types, most likely a Type IXC. These boats have a deep load displacement of 1200 tons, so, on a straight comparison of displacement alone, they are going to be able to carry about 32 troops. However, the difficulty with this, is the mission time. To complete the German mission, the total mission is going to be about 33 days, 14 days outbound, 14 days return journey, and Say about seven days at the target. If the troops are to arrive in any sort of combat capable state, the numbers per boat will have to drop. having spent time on a submarine, they are a most uncomfortable means of transport. If you apply the rule of thumb, and apply the mission time to a range to payload equation, you arrive at a carrying capacity per boat of about 16 troops per boat. Now that means a minimum of two boats to complete the mission.

On top of that you need to consider the down time for the boats themselves. Based on the US experience, it would take about 4 months to make the conversion, and another 3 months to train for the mission, and then another say two months to return the boats to normal operations. And there is also the mission time itself. All up your two boats are unavailable for other missions for at least 10 months, a massive cost in the tonnage war. 


Missions of this type are certainly possible. The Australians undertook two extremely daring anti shipping missions into Singapore harbor, the most famous of which involved the use of a small trawler, the MV Krait. These raids cost the Japanese over 40000 tons of shipping, but required many months of advance planning to implement. 

For the Germans, I think a far more cost effective approach would be to engage in an intensive mine laying campaign in the Caribbean by as many blockade runners as they could lay their hands on. Even a modest mine laying campaign would have disrupted the movement of vital fuel oil for months, and caused serious dislocation to Allied economic development. And at no cost to the all important tonnage war, which had to be pursued relentlessly, if there was any hope of winning in 1942. 

For those interested in the Carlson raid, here some good links as a start

From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War (Makin)


Historical Reflection

For those interested in the correct way to approach commando style operations , I recommend having a second look at the operations of the Krait. Here are some links which i think are interesting:

MV Krait - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Two Events of 1943


I also recommend the following written publication 

Subs Against the Rising Sun: U.S. Submarines in the Pacific, Keith H. Milton, Yucca Free Press, 2000


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## syscom3 (Jul 12, 2008)

freebird said:


> If some of the crew look like this lady then double-bunking will *NOT* be a problem!



Yes, I thought the same thing.

8)


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

Glider said:


> How many mates I was with 3 and I admit that it wasn't easy. Can I ask which sub you were in and for how long, also how did you find it.



I have no idea what kind of sub it was, too long ago, but we didn't find it, it found us 



> Re the pictures you posted, are those of the film set in which case there is one huge difference between those pictures and the one that I posted of U505 which is of course a real Type IX submarine. The torpedo room in the pictures you posted is twice as long as the real submarine which is a big difference.



The first picture Adler commented on is from Das Boots film set apparently, the second one is from a real one, the forward torpedo room of the U-505 specifically. (From here: Tom Maglione's DESA Web Page)

Oh and btw, don't fool yourself by thinking that space has increased in modern Uboats compared to those in WW2, it hasn't..


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 13, 2008)

Soren said:


> Oh and btw, don't fool yourself by thinking that space has increased in modern Uboats compared to those in WW2, it hasn't..



I beg to differ. Modern Subs today have much more room. Even the modern U-Boots built by Germany today have more room that the Type VII, IX, XXI. The US and Russian subs today have lots of more room.


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## Juha (Jul 13, 2008)

Hello Parsifal
IIRC only Argonaut was minelayer sub, that's why it was able to carry 121 men of the Makin raider force, it didn't have stern tubes as very similar Nautilus and Narwhal had. The 2 latter were fleet submarines and Nautilus transported "only" 90 men of the Makin raiding party. And IIRC even with modifications which incl extra air conditioning units the air conditioning wasn't enought and the Marines had very uncomfortable cruise to Makin even if the skippers allowed them onto deck daily for a short period of time in order to keep them combat capable.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I beg to differ. Modern Subs today have much more room. Even the modern U-Boots built by Germany today have more room that the Type VII, IX, XXI. The US and Russian subs today have lots of more room.



Now I wasn't really thinking about the top modern Uboats of today (Or the Russian Kursk  ), but more about the ones in service in the 70's and up until the early 90's, and can tell you for a fact they were definitely no more roomy!

Here's a picture from inside the SSN-571 (Forward torpedo room) which saw service until 1980, which is even less roomy than that of the WW2 German Type IX:


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

And here from inside the WW2 German sub U-995:


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 13, 2008)

Soren said:


> Now I wasn't really thinking about the top modern Uboats of today (Or the Russian Kursk  ), but more about the ones in service in the 70's and up until the early 90's, and can tell you for a fact they were definitely no more roomy!
> 
> Here's a picture from inside the SSN-571 (Forward torpedo room) which saw service until 1980, which is even less roomy than that of the WW2 German Type IX:



Lets see the Los Angeles Class Subs have been in service in starting in 1976 and they are much bigger, so lets through out the service from the 70s on up. If you want to talk about "modern" subs then you start with the 70s, and they are way roomier and much larger than U-Boots from WW2.

I know I have been in both...


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

Same here Adler and I strongly disagree.

And the the Los Angeles class is a very bad example Adler as not all modern subs are that large, infact most aren't even close.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 13, 2008)

I accidently closed this thread while I was typing my info, I am not going to type it all over again.

What I was going to post (before I accidently closed the thread) was a list of about 30 different class of Submarines from around the world that were in service from the 1960s until now.

They were all much larger than your German U-Boots in length and beam. Take into account the larger size and more modern equipment Soren and speaks for itself...

You might want to rethink what you posted up there.


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

Nope, I'm fine with it cause I've been crammed into one of those iron coffins for 10 days. 

Sure the larger boats can hold more men, that's a no brainer, but they're no more roomy inside Adler, not the least bit, they just got the exact same little extra space for the larger crew... the bunks don't get larger with the boat. 

Oh and all that marvelous modern equipment you talk about, well guess how much space it takes up.

Modern doesn't always translate into lighter or more roomy Adler, and you can take a look at the development in fighter a/c to spot that as-well. 

I challenge you to take a peak inside the Dutch Sea Dragon class or the SSN-571, and as for size you forgot to mention how big these 30 or so different subs you found are in comparison to the Los Angeles class sub - rather small I'd presume.


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## syscom3 (Jul 13, 2008)

Soren, just what targets are these commando's going to attack, with any hope of effecting the war effort?


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

Lets compare the Los Angeles class submarine to the Type IXD2:

LA Class:
Displacement: ~6,700 tons
Crew: 129

Type IXD2:
Displacement: ~1,790 tons
Crew: 63

So LA class equates over three times the displacement of the Type IXD2 yet only carries double the amount of crew aboard. I sincerely doubt that space has gotten bigger pr. man aboard, but since I've never been inside any of the top modern boats I can't say for sure. However the boat I was in contained ~70 crewmembers, was fully equipped and had me and me mates along as-well, and space is not something there was plenty of for sure! Walking inside a Type IX it doesn't feel any more cramped.


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren, just what targets are these commando's going to attack, with any hope of effecting the war effort?



Good question Syscom3, I would think someone like you could find something ? But remember like I said the goal wasn't just that.


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## Freebird (Jul 14, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren, just what targets are these commando's going to attack, with any hope of effecting the war effort?





Soren said:


> Good question Syscom3, I would think someone like you could find something ? But remember like I said the goal wasn't just that.




I have given this some thought, have some ideas that will probably raise a few eyebrows...
But a little too busy to post right now, I will do it tomorrow.


By the way Soren, is that your GF in the U-boat pic?
Very blonde, cute. Congrats if it is, condolences if it ain't! 8)


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## syscom3 (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren, forget about these misguided adventures on the US and Canadian mainlands. 

Go for bigger fish, with dramatic results.

Panama Canal and the oil refineries in Aruba, Mexico and other Caribbean facilities.


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

Well syscom3 I disagree about forgetting to attack facilities and towns/cities close to the coastline. But I'm interested in your suggestionn about the Panama Canal and the oil refineries in Aruba Mexico and I agree they are possible targets.

Could you post a map with their locations pointed out ? That would help a lot in trying to figure out what was needed to accomplish the mission.


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

freebird said:


> I have given this some thought, have some ideas that will probably raise a few eyebrows...
> But a little too busy to post right now, I will do it tomorrow.



Looking forward to hear them Freebird!




> By the way Soren, is that your GF in the U-boat pic?
> Very blonde, cute. Congrats if it is, condolences if it ain't! 8)



Haha, no I'm afraid it isn't, but I'm already spoken for so that's fine


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren said:


> Nope, I'm fine with it cause I've been crammed into one of those iron coffins for 10 days.
> 
> Sure the larger boats can hold more men, that's a no brainer, but they're no more roomy inside Adler, not the least bit, they just got the exact same little extra space for the larger crew... the bunks don't get larger with the boat.
> 
> ...



Soren you just gave me an example of two class of submarines that are small compared to most modern subs today.

You forget you are talking to someone who has also been in Submarines. You are not the only one who has had that experience. Yes they are cramped but not as cramped as WW2 submarines.


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## Glider (Jul 14, 2008)

A question to you both as the submarines that you have been in are far more modern than the Oberon Class that I was on. Could you have got 30 Special forces on those boats for 3 weeks?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 14, 2008)

Glider said:


> A question to you both as the submarines that you have been in are far more modern than the Oberon Class that I was on. Could you have got 30 Special forces on those boats for 3 weeks?



To be honest? I do not know that. Having a very brief tour did not give me that kind of knowledge or impression.

I would be very surprised though if there was even a team that large (30 soldiers) that would need to be transported. I would think they would be in smaller teams.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2008)

This the forward torpedo room of the Collins class subs that replaced the Oberons at the end of the '90s. The subs displace more than 3000 tons. The layout of modern subs is a lot "neater" than those of the WWII era, with many valves and such more carefully located and not placed as to be a hindrance to movement

Note, however, that the torpedo room are now fully automated. In this photo, two of the reloads are missing, so the guys bunking in the torpedo room, literally have to slide to their bunk spaces. Its cramped, believe me, but the amount of usable space is still probably better overall than the WWII counterparts, because of better internal layouts and design


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## Glider (Jul 15, 2008)

What a difference, its chalk and cheese, thanks for that.


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2008)

The Collins class have come in for some voracious criticisms, which I am not sure is completely justified.

At the heart of the issue are two problems, the Collins class are relatively noisy (especially when compared to the Oberons), and they have a relatively clumsy weapons management system. 

The weapons management system has finally been solved (reportedly), by a major computer upgrade. whereas previously there were at least forty keystrokes needed to achieve a firing solution, it is apparently now completely automated, and fast, taking only seconds to achieve what used to take minutes.

The noise issue arose from an RAN requirement for extra large propellors to be fitted, along with more powerful machinery. this was intended to achieve a submerged speed, apparently, in excess of 25 knots (pubglished speeds continue to be 20 knots, but these are not correct. Unfortunately the props were built with incorrect geometry, and this led to a huge cavitation problem. A new propellor design has apparently now been installed, and the boats now seem to be operating a lot better. At excercises three years agao, off Hawaii, Collins apparently managed to slip past an American Anti-submarine cordon, not once, but twice, and achieved firing solutions against the defending US carrier both times. This was with Mk 48s, and on the second run, with more conventional torpedoes

These boats have a complement of 42, and can carry 44 mines in place of torpedoes. Whilst i was a great fan of the Oberons, I believe these boats to be amongst the most potent in conventional subs in the world, combining high submerged speed, deep diving, quiet operation, potent arment, and long range in one package. It just took a while to fix the bugs......


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 15, 2008)

Thank you parisifal, that is pretty much what I was saying with larger sub with more modern technology gives more room.

Are the cramped? Hell yes they are, but not nearly as bad as WW2 subs.


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## Soren (Jul 15, 2008)

In the boats used during the 70's to the early 90's there were definitely no more room pr. man than in WW2 subs. Now they might have had a more convenient layout in some places, but overall it was the same, and the modern equipment just took up a lot of extra space. 

The Royal Navy one me and 9 others had to be crammed into for 10 days had roughly a 70 man crew, and inside it was like being in a Type IX boat, no more or no less space pr. man. The boat was fully loaded with weapons supplies, and yes space WAS scarse but we definitely didn't suffer as Parsifal seems to suggest, and we could've definitely been in there for longer. 

Now regarding the suggested operation, again remember no torps despite those already in the tubes would be carried, which means a lot of extra space, and its no two month patrol either. And finally the boats suggested for the operation were the Type XIV IXD2, both larger than the Type IX and with a lot more internal space.


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## Juha (Jul 15, 2008)

Soren
round-trip from Europe to Eastern coast of USA seemed to have taken appr. a month, if the boat waited your commandos back, the cruise would take over a month. And Your scenario was an attack on Alaska, that would have taken clearly more than 2 months with 30 extra mouths.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 15, 2008)

Sorry Juha but it normally took around 15-16 days to reach America's east coast.


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2008)

If the plan involves either a type IXD2 or a type XIV, then the timing of the attack would necessarily need to be put back to the latter part of 1942. The boats nominated would simply not be available, in modified condition, until that time.

The US experience shows that a 4000 ton minelayer could carry about 100 troops, and 15 tons of cargos, for a 14 day mission. A 12 ton Type IX could, by comparison of the tonnage, only carry 32 troops for a 15 day mission, or by deduction, a 16 man assault team for a 30 day mission. On top of that, ther is the time needed to convert the boat (4months, based on the US experience) and a further 3-4 months to prepre for the mission. Then the boats would need to be converted back to their operational state, which I wstimate would take a further 2 months. Total down time, therfore would be 10 months, and would require two boats, not one, in order to move the 30 man team and 30 tons of stores and assault equipment (and general stores as well).

Thes observations are made by comparison of the german equipment, to the best known US commando mission, the Carlson raid, in august 1942


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2008)

Soren, are you sure that you spent 10 days on a british Submarine. Did it submerge at any time during that embarkation? In order for you to be admitted on board, you would need to have undertaken safety training to board the boat. I would be intersted to know where, and how, you obtained that clearance. I know the details of the course, where, how long, and what it involves, so i am curious to know what you did, and how you got on board if you didnt complete that course


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## Juha (Jul 16, 2008)

Soren
Quote: "Sorry Juha but it normally took around 15-16 days to reach America's east coast."

That's what I wrote, round-trip means there and back, or are you planning that the crew fast on the way back. 

And to your pet target Alaska it would have taken nearer to 3 months one way! So even for one way trip needed provisions for say 3 months or a trip to Penang, took 2 months and a week, and from there to Japan and from there to Alaska and same time compromising the security. One can get past Cap Horn also with the help of some supply ship or supply U-boat but on the Pacific side of Americas, a big supply problem I would say. I would expect better insights from ex special force man.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Soren, are you sure that you spent 10 days on a british Submarine. Did it submerge at any time during that embarkation? In order for you to be admitted on board, you would need to have undertaken safety training to board the boat. I would be intersted to know where, and how, you obtained that clearance. I know the details of the course, where, how long, and what it involves, so i am curious to know what you did, and how you got on board if you didnt complete that course



Absolutely. We knew the procedures, it was part of our training Parsifal, again ask Les if in doubt.


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## parsifal (Jul 17, 2008)

sorry, didnt quite come out the way I wanted it to project. I was just very curious about how a member of a foreign service would be allowed on a british submarine, without doing the specialised and various safety courses in the RN. I would have thought the foreign troops would need to pass the RN certificate courses in order to board a British boat. In the RAN that is certainly the case. They would want to know, for example, whether you were claustrophobic, and what allergies you had. Nothing like breaking out with an allergic reaction at 600 feet. Ive seen one fellow have a claustrophobia attack at 190 ft, and it was not pretty. In the RAN, you are not allowed to board an Australian Boat, unless you have passed the Australian basics course. A lot of the training used to be done in England, but has since been transferred to Fremantle in Western Australia. I guess maybe that under the NATO agreements there must be some cross border agreements for this sorts of thing

Part of the training involved emergency escape procedures, involving exiting a simulator at 60 feet below, and rising slowly to the surface using a special re-breather. I know that the US Navy seals train in that technique, as do ours and the RNs UDTs, and of course, those people that trained as submariners.. i didnt know that it was also taught in the "european" army based special forces


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

Juha said:


> Soren
> Quote: "Sorry Juha but it normally took around 15-16 days to reach America's east coast."
> 
> That's what I wrote, round-trip means there and back, or are you planning that the crew fast on the way back.



And exactly what's wrong with that ? Juha more than one boat could be used, and like explained a milkcow could be stationed to resupply the transport boat if the wait was long.



> And to your pet target Alaska it would have taken nearer to 3 months one way! So even for one way trip needed provisions for say 3 months or a trip to Penang, took 2 months and a week, and from there to Japan and from there to Alaska and same time compromising the security. One can get past Cap Horn also with the help of some supply ship or supply U-boat but on the Pacific side of Americas, a big supply problem I would say. I would expect better insights from ex special force man.



Oh give me a break Juha, you don't know **** about what to expect so spare me the bullshit snide remarks. 

3 months to reach Alaska ??! Are you well ?? The trip to Alaska would be about 10,000 km, and the US east coast which was reached in 15 to 16 days is 6,700 km from Brest.

Furthermore the team going to Alaska needed not be very large, perhaps 5-7 men, thats it. Again it was but a terror operation and not crucial as I've said multiple times by now.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 17, 2008)

Soren, Juha...

Tone it down both of you!

If anyone derails another topic with stupid childish flame wars, the thread will be closed and infractions given!

Do you both understand?


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## Juha (Jul 17, 2008)

Soren
Quote: "3 months to reach Alaska ??! Are you well ?? The trip to Alaska would be about 10,000 km, and the US east coast which was reached in 15 to 16 days is 6,700 km from Brest."

Northern routes were not practical because of a well known phenomenon, so what route you think to use?

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

Depends on which route you take and when you take it Juha, cause the Northern route is entirely possible for a Uboat.


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## Juha (Jul 17, 2008)

Soren
why you think KM used the route around Cap Of Good Hope in their U-boat trips to Japan, even if it took over two months to Penang and three months to Japan? At summer nightless nights and narrow waterways plus large areas of shallow seas were a deadly combination for U-boats and during winters ice blocked the routes.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 17, 2008)

Soren
I bothered to check the NW Passage, in 1940-42 an "ice-fortified schooner" made the second passage in history, Admunsen's 3 years passage was the first, in 28 MONTHS, and its skipper, Larsen had over decade experience on the area, in 1944 Larsen succeeded to make the passage, 3rd in history, in 86 days. So I would say that NW Passage wasn't possible to U-boats during the WWII.

The NE Passage was neither but that I have known for years.

Juha


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## Glider (Jul 17, 2008)

All
This may be of interest its the forward torpedo room of U570, a type VII submarine with the spare torpedo's.
The torpedo's are under the false wooden deck that you can see and space is almost zero.

You have to doff your hats to men who could live in these condtions.


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## syscom3 (Jul 17, 2008)

Soren, all evidence shows that the NW passage was not possible for any navy in WW2. And even if the KM was hell bent in doing it, there was absolutely nothing in Alaska worth attacking.

Stick to potential commando raids in the Gulf of Mexico. hey, even have your soldiers hijack a commercial ship and use it for raids.


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

What passage are we talking about Juha ? The one running along Russia or the one accessed via the Labrador sea ?


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren, all evidence shows that the NW passage was not possible for any navy in WW2. And even if the KM was hell bent in doing it, there was absolutely nothing in Alaska worth attacking.
> 
> Stick to potential commando raids in the Gulf of Mexico. hey, even have your soldiers hijack a commercial ship and use it for raids.



Rgr that Syscom3 but right now it's is about wether it was possible to reach Alaska by going north. I believe it is.


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## Juha (Jul 17, 2008)

NE Passage as the name says is along the northern coast of Russia.
NW Passage as the name says through Labrador Sea or whatever between islands N of Canada's mainland.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

And why would the North East coast not be possible ? The goal is to reach the Bering strait.


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## Juha (Jul 17, 2008)

Heh Soren!
If you know something on Arctic you would know that in 40s You would need a help by Soviet ice-brakers to travel NE Passage during the most favourable time, in late summer. I doubt that Soviet would let in 42 even one of their ice-breakers to help a German U-boat to do the passage, my bet is that they would give Germans a couple of bombs/depth-charges/shells instead. And as I wrote earlier even before the worst, ice-wise, part of passage the combination of lack of darkness, narrow area between coast and ice and shallowness of sea made the area very unhealthy to U-boats.

Juha

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

Well in that case I was also thinking of the Panama Canal, that would cut off quite abit of time to reach Alaska.

Is the entire NE region packed with ice in the summer ? No, I seem to recall it being quite passable. Sure there was more day light, but what problem is that ? Are there Allied patrols in the area ?

You'd need to run along the Russian coast, there being possible icepacks to navigate through between the Kara Lapta sea..


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## Juha (Jul 17, 2008)

Not entire Passage but substantial stretches of it, German Disguised Merchant Cruiser Komet needed help of two big Soviet ice-breakers, Lenin and Stalin, to get over the worst stretch in late summer 1940 and a help of an another at another bad stretch and even with help the journey took 2 months.

Soviet patrolled in the area and the lack of darkness means that you would need to recharge your batteries in conditions of reasonable visibility, not a good position to be spotted in narrow and shallow seas.

Juha


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## syscom3 (Jul 17, 2008)

Soren, in 1939, the KM was blocked from any type of transit across the Panama Canal.


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## Freebird (Jul 17, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren, in 1939, the KM was blocked from any type of transit across the Panama Canal.



perhaps he was thinking of sneaking in underneath a cargo ship?




Soren said:


> Well in that case I was also thinking of the Panama Canal, that would cut off quite abit of time to reach Alaska.
> 
> Is the entire NE region packed with ice in the summer ? No, I seem to recall it being quite passable. Sure there was more day light, but what problem is that ? Are there Allied patrols in the area ?
> 
> You'd need to run along the Russian coast, there being possible icepacks to navigate through between the Kara Lapta sea..



I know that in WWII the NW passage is pretty much locked in with ice, and the NE would be too.

Also remember that if the time of the passage is from Nov 1941- Feb 1942 it will be the northern winter, so temps will be -40 or colder, darkness 24 hours per day above the Arctic circle, + the ice will be the thickest.

IIRC the passage is semi passable in July/August, but it would be awfully late to begin ops in the Pacific.


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Well sneaking in directly under a cargo ship wasn't really necessary, you'd just need to pass through when there's already a lot of traffic. 

I'm still not convinced that the northern route is implausible though, the Russians didn't patrol those areas very much, and a Uboat could certainly cross the only "dangerous" section between the Kara Lapta sea without any trouble. Once past there it would be a fast run through the Bering strait and over to Alaska's south eastern coast.


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren
with that level of arguments, what can I say!
Hopefully your imaginary captain chose Panama, crew or at least part of it would have had much better chances in US than in USSR PoW camp.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

How thick is the ice packs between the Lapta Kara sea in the summer months Juha ? And how spread is it ? Really. 

I really see little trouble for a U-boat as it could run on the surface until the ice packs get too compacted and then dive under them to emerge up again when on the other side. Heck the ice packs might be so spread out that you could easily navigate through them on the surface.

Today Uboats just go straight underneath the ice, but they can also stay submerged for nearly an unlimited amount of time, and they can emerge through 7m thick ice. So there's a difference, but they also operate in the toughest areas of arctic ocean.


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## pbfoot (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> How thick is the ice packs between the Lapta Kara sea in the summer months Juha ? And how spread is it ? Really.
> 
> I really see little trouble for a U-boat as it could run on the surface until the ice packs get too compacted and then dive under them to emerge up again when on the other side. Heck the ice packs might be so spread out that you could easily navigate through them on the surface.
> 
> Today Uboats just go straight underneath the ice, but they can also stay submerged for nearly an unlimited amount of time, and they can emerge through 7m thick ice. So there's a difference, but they also operate in the toughest areas of arctic ocean.


Fine idea if you only knew how deep the water was it might work and where the coast was as this was a very uncharted area


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Well the U-boat was equipped with an instant depth measuring device, sonar.

Also remember the section between the Lapta Kara sea which needs be crossed is rather close to the Russian northern coast, where the icepacks are very scattered and thin.


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## Njaco (Jul 19, 2008)

Gonna stir the pot alittle: May have found a tempting target.

from May 1990 issue of World War II magazine by John H. Loux;

"More than 90% of all small arms cartridge cases the United States used during World War II were processed through equipment designed and built by a single, small company in the sleepy town of Salem, Ohio. The size of these cartridges ranged from the standard .30 and .50 caliber to the 20 mm ammunition used in the guns of fighting aircraft.....Sam Keener was the sole owner and undisputed boss of Salem Engineering Company, a small cog in the overall war effort, to be sure. But during each of those World War II years when everything seemed crucial - and often was - his small company provided manufacturing equipment for war materials worth more than $11 million - thats more than $50 million all told, no small sum by 1940's standards."

Thought it might be a tempting target.


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Interesting Njaco. That might very well be a worthwhile target.

Btw, I'd like to point out that German Uboats operated successfully under the ice in the Gulf of St.Lawrence.


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## Glider (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Interesting Njaco. That might very well be a worthwhile target.
> 
> Btw, I'd like to point out that German Uboats operated successfully under the ice in the Gulf of St.Lawrence.



They operated between May and November sinking 18 vessels in that period. They were then withdrawn due to the risk at Donitz personal order. 18 vessels in 7 months isn't massive.

Also this period is outside the main Ice season, with the possible exception of May and November in a bad winter. It varies year by year but in this period it is normally ice free with the exception of icebergs which are always a hazard. They would not have operated 'under ice'


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Glider said:


> They operated between May and November sinking 18 vessels in that period. They were then withdrawn due to the risk at Donitz personal order. 18 vessels in 7 months isn't massive.
> 
> Also this period is outside the main Ice season, with the possible exception of May and November in a bad winter. It varies year by year but in this period it is normally ice free with the exception of icebergs which are always a hazard. They would not have operated 'under ice'



That's funny considering what is written about it Glider. The German Uboats apparently DID operate UNDER the ice and enjoyed considerable success.


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

An excerpt from _Unknown Waters_ by Alfred S. McLaren, Captain, 
USN (Retired), 2008:

_""Seasoned German Arctic U-boat veterans, including Hans-Gunther Lange of U-711, who made the longest uninterrupted patrol in the Kara and "West Siberian" seas 
from 22 July to 30 September 1943, were a confident lot. They considered that 
'a submarine is never helpless in the ice because it can submerge, proceed under 
the ice. select an open area with the aid of its high-angle periscope, come to 
the surface, recharge the battery with the diesels, and submerge again.' They also observed that 'the sea is always calm in the drift ice even if a gale is blowing' and that 'there are always clear lanes in the drift ice which permits 
boats to proceed.' "_


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren
problem was that around Cape Chelyuskin there were usually permanent sea ice and then often also area between New Siberian Island and Wrangel Is. 
You don't happily dive under permanent sea ice in early 40s boat if you didn't have info were the next open area was. One can navigate around floating ice but a normal ship or U-boat needed a ice-breaker to help them through permanent sea ice. That's why Soviet submarines which travelled through NW Passage during the war had ice-breaker support even if they could obtain info on ice-situation from coastal stations. During the summer 42 CCCP transferred a flotilla leader and 3 DDs from Pacific to Kola, ships departed from 15 July and arrived Kola Fjord on 14 Oct and needed to be accompanied by an ice-breaker. And those modern subs that operated in Arctic are designed on that your Type IX or whatever wasn't, so if trapped under ice you probably stayed there. Try do find out something on Komet's passage in 1940.

Juha


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Hey lets leave the question of U-boats and transport for the minute, and look at some of the objectives, assets strategies for something that would have the potential to change the war.



{Ok so I will begin with my manifesto:}

I have taken the point of view of a British/American planner making strategic analysis, and trying to predict/foresee what the *WORST CASE SCENARIO* for the Allies. There is no benefit in hoping your enemy will fail to use the most effective strategy, one must always assume that he will.

I should also have a Disclaimer #1, the possible Axis plans assume that there are *NO* restrictions on any moral, humanitarian or humanitarian grounds.

*Do not assume that I advocate these methods*, including assassination worse, only that they could have been used by the Axis.

Also disclaimer #2 I posted these as an analysis of what the best Axis strategy would be from a planning point of view, if the plans were compromised by Canaris, of course this could ruin everything. Soren believes that he would not, we have really no way to determine this so I would just leave it as a wild card


I have re-printed my earlier post about the objective of the campaign, as a starting point. 






freebird said:


> Both German Japanese military leaders identify that the best way to defeat the Allies is to strangle the shipping, and that some basic joint planning is needed. {we have gone into that in another thread}. *The SOE offensive will assist in this effort *
> 
> After the Imperial Japanese conference at the beginning of July, it is decided to go to war with the USA, if Japan cannot obtain oil resources from the Dutch East Indies. At this point Japan informes Germany of its intention to go to war in the beginning of Nov if negotiations fail, and askes if Germany will join in attacks against the US. Japan *does not* tell Germany about the planned attack on Pearl Harbour, nor of the exact date.
> 
> ...





syscom3 said:


> I take fault with only one item.
> 
> Nearly all of the US Divisions wouldnt be diverted in any menaingfull way, as they were bound to stay in the US throughout 1942 as there wasnt any shipping capability to support them.


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

BTW Soren
St Lawrence Bay is 50deg North and we are talking areas some 75deg North, that is a big difference.

Juha

there is sometimes some ice in Kiel Bay (54 deg N) but to think that situation there gives a good idea on situation off Oulu, 65deg N, is misleading. Even 11 deg northward makes a big difference in Baltic.


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Using my above objectives as a starting point, the best method to achieve them is to use the isolationist movement in the USA, their paranoia about "hemisphere defence" and the explosive situation in Mexico to forment some very grave trouble for the US.

By having to deal with an unstable situation close to home, the US will have less troops available for "Bolero" and interfere with the preparations for "Torch". Additionaly it will be very hard to convince the US public to get involved in "foreign entanglements" {ie a European war} when the US has been attacked by Japan, and there is an explosive situation south of the border.

In 1941 Mexico is a real tinderbox waiting for a spark to set it off. The elections of 1940 were disputed, and probably rigged. The losing candidate Almazan was right-wing and had the backing of the army, in fack a large number of his supporters started some armed conflict to protest the results.

There was also some considerable friction between Mexico and both the US UK, due to former President Cardenas expropriating the oilfields owned by British American companies in 1938. The man who supposedly won the election in 1940 was Camacho, a protege of Cardenas.

The Axis also already have tens thousands of agents/operatives/supporters in Latin America in the "Synarchist" movement, which has been pushed by Franco Mussolini.


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Freebird
Quote: "There is no big danger of the intelligence leaking out"

There may well be, the messages of Japan's Berlin ambassor were a big help to Allied intelligence, bacause they were able to read them. I cannot recall when they crack the Japanese diplomatic code but because they were able to read the instructions to Japanese embassy in Washington prior 7.12.41 odds are that they were able to read the messages in mid-41.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Juha are you reading the excerpts with comments by actual Uboat commanders?? Want more ?:

_"As we surveyed the [Vilkitsky] Strait's eastern approaches at periscope depth throughout 11 August [1970] and into the early morning hours of 12 August, I 
recounted to those on watch some of the hair-raising exploits of the brave German 
submariners who had operated in these waters some twenty-five years earlier. 
During an exceptionally mild-ice summer, three Type VIIC U-boats, U-302 (Sickel), 
U-354 (Herbschleb), and U-711 (Lange) of Group Viking of the 13th U-boat Flotilla, based at Trondheim, Norway, on patrol in theKara Sea during late August 
1943 trailed a Soviet convoy into the Vilkitsky Strait. U-301 and U-354 sub- 
sequently sank one ship each of the small convoy. A month later,U-302, U-354, and U-601 (Grau) of this same group returned to patrol the western entrance of 
these straits in hopes of intercepting another convoy. During the following 
summer of a much less favorable ice year, three more Type VIIC U-boats of Group 
*Gryphon of the 13th Flotilla, U-711 (Lange), U-739 (Mangold), and U-957 (Schaar), 
succeeded in reaching Cape Chelyuskin on 18 September 1944* while attempting to 
reach an assembly point for Soviet coastal convoys at Nordwik Bight to the east 
of Chelyuskin. Only heavy drift ice prevented them from going farther._


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren
Quote:
"succeeded in reaching Cape Chelyuskin on 18 September 1944 while attempting to 
reach an assembly point for Soviet coastal convoys at Nordwik Bight to the east 
of Chelyuskin. Only heavy drift ice *prevented them from going farther"*

So much reaching Bering via NW Passage

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Read: *succeeded in reaching Cape Chelyuskin on 18 September 1944 *

They were trying to reach *Nordwik Bight*, in LATE SEPTEMBER!

Also did you get this:
_*"Seasoned German Arctic U-boat veterans, including Hans-Gunther Lange of U-711, who made the longest uninterrupted patrol in the Kara and "West Siberian" seas 
from 22 July to 30 September 1943"*_

So much for your theory that reaching the Bering strait sea was impossible as the German Uboats actually operated in the worst section of the proposed route!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren I believe the point that Juha is trying to point out, is that you are using examples from U-Boot commanders who operated in a more southern region.

He is pointing out that farther north there is permanent ice coverage and no drift ice to navigate through.

Just my observation. You are both talking right past each other...


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Before we go any further, let me introduce another sneaky tactic that should be used by Germany Total denial of involvement Nazi Germany does not admit to any involvement with the attacks on the USA, and does not declare war. This will seriously hamper Roosevelt's attempt to get the public behind the war effort against Germany, and will keep the "isolationists" more relevant.

1.) The true scale of U-boat sinkings were not ever admitted to the US public, so the few incedents that are known will be blamed on the British, who will be accused of trying to drag the US into a European war.

2.) the events in Mexico are the result of "Mexican agitation" for "Reconquista", and in the event that any German operatives are caught, as a last resort this will be passed off as Franco's meddling. The German veterans of the "Condor" legion will be very helpful as they mostly speak Spanish quite well.

3.) The instability in Mexico can also partly be blamed on the British operatives, who have very good reason to be hostile to the new President, and his statement that he will continue Cardenas policy of nationalizing Mexican oil, without much compensation to the British or USA 

4.) The Japanese might be miffed that they will get the full force of the US anger, but after Pearl Harbour there is not much that they can do about it.



I think the first move in the campaign will be to assassinate the new President Camacho, which will be blamed on agents of British American oil companies. 

The second assassination will be of the loser of the election Almazas, who was less inclined to support armed conflict by his supporters. This will be blamed on the US government attempting to stifle Mexican nationalism.



This campaign of inciting instability in Latin America also depend on manipulating public opinion in both the USA in Mexico, so inj the few months before the war German "Bund" sympathisers in the US and "Synarchist" supporters in Mexico will gain control or access to some key newspaper radio media in both countries. Remember that as the action heats up it will be easier to "feed" stories to the media, who are desparate to get a hot story printed before their competition "scoops" them.



Some links with information about Mexico the "Synarchists", and ""Hemisphere defence"


Nazi instigated synarchist plots

The Nazi-Instigated National Synarchist Union of Mexico

Mexico between Hitler Roosevelt - review

H-Net Review: David R. Buck <[email protected]@wvu.edu> on Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lazaro Cardenas, 1934-1940


hemisphere defence 

HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Guarding the United States [Chapter 1]

Mexico - Dec 7 41

Sunday, July 7, 1940

WWII mexico

Mexico - Forgotten World War II Ally - BY SHEP LENCHEK - IN MEXICO CONNECT


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Take a peak at this map Juha:






Do you know where the Vilkitsky Strait is located ??? Right smack in the middle of the worst section of the proposed route, right where the most compacted icepacks are situated!

Yet: _three Type VIIC U-boats, U-302 (Sickel), 
U-354 (Herbschleb), and U-711 (Lange) of Group Viking of the 13th U-boat Flotilla, based at Trondheim, Norway, on patrol in theKara Sea during late August 
1943 trailed a Soviet convoy into the Vilkitsky Strait. _

If they can operate and run patrols in Vilkitsky then they can pass it as-well, reaching the Laptev sea from which point on there will be much less in the way of icepacks!


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Juha said:


> Freebird
> Quote: "There is no big danger of the intelligence leaking out"
> 
> There may well be, the messages of Japan's Berlin ambassor were a big help to Allied intelligence, bacause they were able to read them. I cannot recall when they crack the Japanese diplomatic code but because they were able to read the instructions to Japanese embassy in Washington prior 7.12.41 odds are that they were able to read the messages in mid-41.
> ...



What I meant was that if the Allies do get some intelligence and do believe it, it won't help them much anyways.

Both the Allies and the Nazis *already knew* that the Japanese were gearing up for war, they just didn't know about Pearl Harbour, the information didn't help very much at Pearl Harbour.

The Allies also knew that German U-boats were on the way to the US east coast before "Drumbeat", but this didn't help them at all either.

The Allies also knew to some extent about the "Synarchist" movement, but there is less danger of Enigma decoding because they would not be sending "black ops" instructions to the machine in the Mexico city embassy, these orders would all be given by hand to the operatives. If some of the teams are taken over by U-boat, Berlin will not be sending detailed "black ops" instructions to the U-boat. Anyways I agree with Parsifal others that cargo ship is a better means of transport than wasting U-boats.


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

> Anyways I agree with Parsifal others that cargo ship is a better means of transport than wasting U-boats.



But how do you get your men and all their equipment aboard the cargo ship, let alone off the ship and through the dock inspectors in Anchorage ?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> But how do you get your men and all their equipment aboard the cargo ship, let alone off the ship and through the dock inspectors in Anchorage ?



Easy they get off of there ass's and walk onto the ship while carrying there equipment...

How do they get off?

Why do they have to get past dock inspectors? Do you think an U-Boot is going to pull right up to the dock in Anchorage, and the men are just going to get off and walk onto the dock followed by the cheers of the liberated Anchoraginians?

Somewhere off of the coast they get into little rubber rafts and go to the shore under darkness. Just like they would with an U-Boot.

I agree transport ships are much more better suited than a small ass U-Boot.


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren
to my knowledge U-boats never went through Vilkitsky, even when they were ordered to do so, in 44. Sept. was probably best time to try in that year or KM was incompetent. 
And the more eastern area between New Siberian Is and Wrangler Is was worst stretch in 40 for Komet IIRC. 1942 it was area around Cape Chelyuskin that was worst ice-wise. 

So to my understanding no U-boat ever got into Laptev Sea, correct me if I'm wrong. To get at one end of icebound straight isn't same than be able to travel through it. For example if one gets to Harmaja (lighthouse and pilot station off Helsinki) in normal winter doesn't mean that one necessarily is able to sail to Helsinki without help.

Juha


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> But how do you get your men and all their equipment aboard the cargo ship, let alone off the ship and through the dock inspectors in Anchorage ?



First off I wouldn't have Alaska on my list of targets, there really is no benefit to it. 

There is no reason to go to Alaska (oops I'm going to get it from Der Adler!  }

In 1941 Alaska has no connection to the rest of North America, only by ship. There is no oil or vital resource there {in 1941} and is considered so far away remote that news of an attack would not make much of an impression, unlike attacks on Texas California.

The US was not that put out when Japan siezed parts of Alaska, they didn't panic, they just waited them out. The location is so cold and remote that keeping your team supplied and fed in Alaska will be brutal {remember the winter there is as cold as it was at "Stalingrad".

The benefit of thr Latin American strategy I proposed is that cargo ships could have some cover that they are headed to Martinique or Mexico if stopped by the British. {as mentioned in earlier post.}


Ultimately Soren, assuming that the U-boat *can* get under the ice, and that you *could* fit 25 commandos on board, what would it accomplish? You would lose that very scarce Type IX U-boat for a couple of month round trip {minimum}, and if you are thinking July/August 1942 it is way too late to alter the course of the war, in an area that the US is not that concerned about, because they know that it is just an isolated attack.

The Commando attacks should be *immediately* after Pearl Harbour, and designed to cause the *maximum* panic and anxiety in Washington London


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Errr Adler, IIRC the plan was to board an Allied cargo ship with some crates labelled with all kinds of spanish sh*t containing the equipment, and then when Anchorage was reached they'd drive it off the boat. I see problems there. 

As to your plan, are you proposing a German cargo ship on its own travelling the northen route to drop off the commandos just outside Anchorage ??


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Freebird
Quote: "The Allies also knew to some extent about the "Synarchist" movement, but there is less danger of Enigma decoding because they would not be sending "black ops" instructions to the machine in the Mexico city embassy, these orders would all be given by hand to the operatives."

Bit farfetshed, Germans had almost absolute trust on Enigma, so they would have used it. On the other hand I cannot recall the system Abwehr used, so I cannot state that as a fact and anyway not all Enigma systems were solved in late 41. So IMHO right thing to do is to assume that Germans used their normal system for sending black ops instructions.

Juha


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> But how do you get your men and all their equipment aboard the cargo ship, let alone off the ship and through the dock inspectors in Anchorage ?




As I have just posted, i think an attack on Alaska would be pointless, considering the cost.

*However* if you were absolutely intent on getting there, I would think the best cover would be of a Russian or Norwiegan whaling ship, putting into Alaska for supplies. Some old fishing boat aquired in Mexico or South America could be disguised as a whaling sloop. {Russia has ships in the Bering Sea, Norway had ships operating in the Antarctic, until the raiders showed up there}


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Do you think an U-Boot is going to pull right up to the dock in Anchorage, and the men are just going to get off and walk onto the dock followed by the cheers of the liberated Anchoraginians?



I think I made it quite clear, nearly ten times, that they would get out of the Uboat and into rubber rafts a kilometer or so from the shore and some 10 km from the target area.

The way I understand Freebird'a idea they would board a foreign cargo ship disguised obviously, with spanish crates filled with their equipment and then just drive it off the ship in what'ever port was the goal.


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

> I would think the best cover would be of a Russian or Norwiegan whaling ship, putting into Alaska for supplies. Some old fishing boat aquired in Mexico or South America could be disguised as a whaling sloop. {Russia has ships in the Bering Sea, Norway had ships operating in the Antarctic, until the raiders showed up there}



Roger that, but the question is how do you land the men then ? As I understood it you wanted them to land in the harbour itself, which I find extremely problematic.


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Juha said:


> Freebird
> Quote: "The Allies also knew to some extent about the "Synarchist" movement, but there is less danger of Enigma decoding because they would not be sending "black ops" instructions to the machine in the Mexico city embassy, these orders would all be given by hand to the operatives."
> 
> Bit farfetshed, Germans had almost absolute trust on Enigma, so they would have used it. On the other hand I cannot recall the system Abwehr used, so I cannot state that as a fact and anyway not all Enigma systems were solved in late 41. So IMHO right thing to do is to assume that Germans used their normal system for sending black ops instructions.
> ...



The Germans never used Enigma for Commando/Black ops contack {AFAIK}, for the obvious reason of the danger of the machine being captured in the field. It was used to contact Generals in Army HQ {Europe}, U-Boats, and Embassies. Even if it was considered 100% secure, it was not used to send info to "Black Ops" teams, because of the danger of the messages being read by staff at the embassy, and also the danger to the agents being identified if they show up at the embassy to get a message.

Another point to remember that in the fall of 1941 *ONLY THE BRITISH * have access to enigma data, and the US does not know how reliable this data is.

So assume that the message is given to the USA "Britain has passed along that the Nazi's are preparing plan XYZ in Latin America", would it be believed or acted upon?

1.) Some in the US suspect that the data may be fake or planted
2.) They may also suspect that the British are "crying wolf" to try to push the USA into the European war.
3.) There is so much intelligence data that comes in, it was often overlooked, so even if it was believed, it may not have made any difference.
4.) The British were also deliberatly vague about their intel before the US got into the war, as they didn't want to let anyone know how much they knew


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Errr Adler, IIRC the plan was to board an Allied cargo ship with some crates labelled with all kinds of spanish sh*t containing the equipment, and then when Anchorage was reached they'd drive it off the boat. I see problems there.



Why would they get on an allied cargo ship? Why cant they get on a ship from Argentina or how about this...

I know this is a revolutionary idea! They get on a German ship that is named something else and flagged from a different country.... 



Soren said:


> As to your plan, are you proposing a German cargo ship on its own travelling the northen route to drop off the commandos just outside Anchorage ??



Not necessarily. I dont think I would go the northern rought. I would go through less hospitable waters to the south.

A. There is no need to go through the northern passage. You are making it more difficult than it needs to be.

B. Why Alaska? As others have put out, there is no need or reason to go there (except that it is the most beautiful place on earth!)

C. They would never acomplish a mission in Alaska, no matter how much you think the uber troops would.

D. The mission would be pointless as I pointed out above.

All in all this discussion is rather pointless...


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Juha said:


> Soren
> to my knowledge U-boats never went through Vilkitsky, even when they were ordered to do so, in 44. Sept. was probably best time to try in that year or KM was incompetent.
> And the more eastern area between New Siberian Is and Wrangler Is was worst stretch in 40 for Komet IIRC. 1942 it was area around Cape Chelyuskin that was worst ice-wise.
> 
> ...



Juha I don't think you quite understand;

The German Uboats U-302, U-354 U-711 trailed a Soviet convoy straight into the middle of the Vilkitsky strait, attacked and sunk two ships. If it was possible to actually engage in battle right smack in the middle of the Vilkitsky strait then you can be sure they could slip right under the ice and into the Laptev sea if necessary.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> I think I made it quite clear, nearly ten times, that they would get out of the Uboat and into rubber rafts a kilometer or so from the shore and some 10 km from the target area.



They can do that with a ship as well, which would be much better for the crew and troops.



Soren said:


> The way I understand Freebird'a idea they would board a foreign cargo ship disguised obviously, with spanish crates filled with their equipment and then just drive it off the ship in what'ever port was the goal.



Could possibly work as well.


----------



## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Roger that, but the question is how do you land the men then ? As I understood it you wanted them to land in the harbour itself, which I find extremely problematic.




There are many small fishing ports/fishing villages etc close to Anchorage, it would not seem out of place for a whaling/fishing ship to land to get supplies. Your team could probably walk right off the dock in the middle of the night carring their gear. There would be no "passport customs control" or any guards at all in the minor ports, once the ship had landed. i would assume that you would do this in 1941 though, not mid '42.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Roger that, but the question is how do you land the men then ? As I understood it you wanted them to land in the harbour itself, which I find extremely problematic.



They can get into rubber rafts just like from the U-Boot...


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

freebird said:


> There are many small fishing ports/fishing villages etc close to Anchorage, it would not seem out of place for a whaling/fishing ship to land to get supplies. Your team could probably walk right off the dock in the middle of the night carring their gear. There would be no "passport customs control" or any guards at all in the minor ports, once the ship had landed. i would assume that you would do this in 1941 though, not mid '42.



Ditto...


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Why would they get on an allied cargo ship? Why cant they get on a ship from Argentina or how about this...
> 
> I know this is a revolutionary idea! They get on a German ship that is named something else and flagged from a different country....



Hey I was no fonder of the idea! I'm just telling you what I thought he was proposing!



> Not necessarily. I dont think I would go the northern rought. I would go through less hospitable waters to the south.
> 
> A. There is no need to go through the northern passage. You are making it more difficult than it needs to be.



Wrong. Taking the Northern ruote would cut A LOT of distance time off the trip.



> B. Why Alaska? As others have put out, there is no need or reason to go there (except that it is the most beautiful place on earth!)



Remember it would be done at the same time as the attacks in the US Canada to achieve as big a terrorfying effect as possible, letting the US public know that you can strike at them everywhere any time if you wish. Defeating your enemy phsycologically has its benefits.



> C. They would never acomplish a mission in Alaska, no matter how much you think the uber troops would.



Spare me the patronising and snide remarks plz. I guess all of us operating for a over a month in Norway during the winter should all have perished and never achieved a single of our objectives according to you Adler ?? You mock us.



> D. The mission would be pointless as I pointed out above.
> 
> All in all this discussion is rather pointless...



Then leave it be Adler.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Wrong. Taking the Northern ruote would cut A LOT of distance time off the trip.



If you can get through it...

In the end an U-Boot is still the worst idea.



Soren said:


> Remember it would be done at the same time as the attacks in the US Canada to achieve as big a terrorfying effect as possible, letting the US public know that you can strike at them everywhere any time if you wish. Defeating your enemy phsycologically has its benefits.



And Alaska would still be pointless.

A. There are no targets to cause terror with.

B. The population is so small in an area larger than most of Europe. The entire population of Alaska in 1942 was only 72,500 people in such a larger area. Many of the people lived in remote areas and would never even know the Germans had landed in Alaska and most of the US population would never ever find out either because communications sucked in Alaska back then.

C. There are much better targets that are easier to get to on the main US continent.

D. Again you are making it more difficult than it needs to be.




Soren said:


> Spare me the patronising and snide remarks plz. I guess all of us operating for a over a month in Norway during the winter should all have perished and never achieved a single of our objectives according to you Adler ?? You mock us.



Patronizing? Snide Remarks?

I was trying to make my posts a bit humorous. You need to lighten up a bit!

No Soren but I think you underestimate the Alaskan climate. I have been to both Norway (training for a month) and been to Alaska. Both in the winter time. I would rather be in Norway anyday...

And to be honest, it was not my intent to mock anyone. If you feel mocked though, then you get a taste of what alot of your posts seems like.

Don't forget Soren, you are not the only one who apparantly has served and done something, and been around the world and done this and done that...


Soren said:


> Then leave it be Adler.



No I dont think so...

Soren, I am always here lurking. When I feel like posting something, I will!


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 19, 2008)

freebird said:


> There are many small fishing ports/fishing villages etc close to Anchorage, it would not seem out of place for a whaling/fishing ship to land to get supplies. Your team could probably walk right off the dock in the middle of the night carring their gear. There would be no "passport customs control" or any guards at all in the minor ports, once the ship had landed. i would assume that you would do this in 1941 though, not mid '42.


I believe that Alaska was run by the military or it was a military zone


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

It is true that there were a lot of military in Alaska during that time, but I believe the military build up did not start until WW2 because it was easy way to get supplies to Russia through the Alaska-Canada Highway.

I could be wrong though.


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Adler let me tell you how I took it as you mocking us:

You claim that "My Uber soldiers" wouldn't achieve a single mission in Alaska. "Uber soldiers" Adler ?? 

Adler have you ever heard of the Sirius patrol team in Greenland ? I have aquaintences who have been there and they operate(d) for months far away from any civilization in Greenland, which mind you is a heck of a lot rougher than Alaska to survive in. (An interesting OT note; Their main weapons are K98k's rechambered in 7.62NATO)

So by claiming that commandos (My Über commandos just as the cherry on top) haven't got a chance to achieve a single mission in Alaska is mocking. Ok you didn't mean to mock, fair enough, I'm also only telling you this cause I found it strange for you to claim such stuff in light off what I know has been and is being achieved by the former and todays spec ops members.

Oh and when I say "Then leave it be" I mean: If you don't wish to participate, cause you have every right to do so, then why bother ?


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Adler let me tell you how I took it as you mocking us:
> 
> You claim that "My Uber soldiers" wouldn't achieve a single mission in Alaska. "Uber soldiers" Adler ??



Did I say *your* Uber soldiers Soren? Go back and read the damn post. I said *the* Uber Soldiers.

Dont take everything so personal. You are not as important as you think you are...(NOTE TO SOREN, I AM NOT SAYING YOU ARE NOT AN IMPORTANT PERSON. EVERYONE HERE IS AN IMPORTANT PERSON. I AM JUST IMPLYING THAT YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE EVERYTHING SO PERSONAL  ) 



Soren said:


> Adler have you ever heard of the Sirius patrol team in Greenland ? I have aquaintences who have been there and they operate(d) for months far away from any civilization in Greenland, which mind you is a heck of a lot rougher than Alaska to survive in. (An interesting OT note; Their main weapons are K98k's rechambered in 7.62NATO)



No but I can not imagine that it is more difficult to survive in than Alaska. Probably about the same, but not more difficult.

I have aquaintances that were stationed in Greenland and USAAF bases there and they have nothing but good thoughts about Greenland. A bit barren but nothing out of the ordinary for a northen land.



Soren said:


> So by claiming that commandos (My Über commandos just as the cherry on top) haven't got a chance to achieve a single mission in Alaska is mocking. Ok you didn't mean to mock, fair enough, I'm also only telling you this cause I found it strange for you to claim such stuff in light off what I know has been and is being achieved by the former and todays spec ops members.



The differene Soren, is that for all we know you are some guy sitting behind a computer with no experience (I believe you served, and I will never take that away from you), but you make a lot of claims with out explaining anything...

As far as we know, they are nothing more than claims.



Soren said:


> Oh and when I say "Then leave it be" I mean: If you don't wish to participate, cause you have every right to do so, then why bother ?



No because someone has to keep you in check...


----------



## Glider (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> That's funny considering what is written about it Glider. The German Uboats apparently DID operate UNDER the ice and enjoyed considerable success.



What success Soren? It wasn't me that ordered the U boats to stop operating in that area, it was Donitz.

Happy to be proved wrong but I can say that U711 achieved nothing in that area.


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren
Quote: "The German Uboats U-302, U-354 U-711 trailed a Soviet convoy straight into the middle of the Vilkitsky strait, attacked and sunk two ships. If it was possible to actually engage in battle right smack in the middle of the Vilkitsky strait then you can be sure they could slip right under the ice and into the Laptev sea if necessary."

Now once again you imagination ruins your ability to understand the text you read.

Now from Rohwer's Axis Submarine Successes 1939-1945 the sinking by U-302 was 75.37 N / 89.10 E and that of U 354 75.15 N / 84.30 E and the Vilkitsky strait is past 100 E. If these numerical expressions are too much to you, please go to U-boat.net they have red spots marked on maps where the sinkings happened and they are way west of what you claim!!

So please. Next time read texts carefully and try to understand them before making wrong claims. So you don't waste others time and also you give more adult impression on yourself.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

I'm not taking it personal at all Adler, seriously I could care less, I'm just telling you that Alaska aint that rough and that it sounds odd for you to say _"They wouldn't achieve a single mission in Alaska"_ when I know what spec ops members have achieved and are required to achieve.

And so I brought forward the Sirius Patrol Team, which use dog sleds and roam across greenland's large stretches of ice (The guys from the US ober there are in the mild areas) which IS a harsher inviroment that Alaska with lower temperatures and much harsher weather in general.



Furthermore I don't see myself as important at all Adler, so your continious habbit accusing me of that is tiring to say the least. I don't accuse you of being an uptight bastard do I ?

Why come across harsh against me just because you disagree with what I say, why not just present a counter argument free of insults and the startingshot to a personal argument?


Ok so you don't question my service with the military, fine by me, I appreciate your trust, but truthfully it really matters little to me as like I've said I know what I've done and I don't need to prove anything to anyone. All I can do is share what I know and then present my arguments.


Now finally for what you said Adler:



> no matter how much you think the uber troops would



Now are you honestly not implying that in YOUR opinion I think of the German commandos as "Über soldiers". Come on Adler, that really wasn't necessary and I'm quite sure it wasn't meant to make me laugh either, correct ??[/quote]


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Juha said:


> Soren
> Quote: "The German Uboats U-302, U-354 U-711 trailed a Soviet convoy straight into the middle of the Vilkitsky strait, attacked and sunk two ships. If it was possible to actually engage in battle right smack in the middle of the Vilkitsky strait then you can be sure they could slip right under the ice and into the Laptev sea if necessary."
> 
> Now once again you imagination ruins your ability to understand the text you read.
> ...




You're too funny Juha, you and your child condescending remarks, hahaha...

Ok Juha, what here is it I misunderstood, please I'd really like to know where I went from adult to, eeerrmm what was that ? Directly from the book _"Unknown Waters"_by Alfred S. McLaren:

_"three Type VIIC U-boats, U-301 (Sickel), U-354 (Herbschleb), and U-711 (Lange) of Group Viking of the 13th U-boat Flotilla, based at Trondheim, Norway, on patrol in theKara Sea during late August 1943 trailed a Soviet convoy into the Vilkitsky Strait. U-301 and U-354 sub-sequently sank one ship each of the small convoy." _

Are you just too adult to read and comprehend that it was *U-301* and *U-354* who sank one ship each in the Vilkitsky strait ?? Is that it ?  You give me such good laughs Juha, you really do.

Btw, I've got some buddies of mine who'd like to know what body armour it was you Finnish draftees were wearing when you determined that it was perfectly safe to stand within 10m of a 5 kg HE shell going off - sounds incredible! We need that stuff!


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## pbfoot (Jul 19, 2008)

I have to say this but Soren you don't have a clue about the Northern regions of N America have you ever been north of 60. I did a month TDY in Badafoss and another in Stavenger the climate is moderated by the Gulf Stream . I wasted to much luggage on Arctic gear as opposed to winter gear when I did the deployment to Badafoss


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

dear Soren
Rohwer had went trough the original KM documents and gives the locations both with original KM code and also by normal degs N and E. He is also very respected expert of WWII sea warfare and everybody can check locations from Uboat.net, choose the U-boat, then choose sorties then the sortie that ended late Sept 43, one can see the daily locations of the boat and by strolling downward one can see the location of the sinking.

Everybody can check that if one has copy of Rohwer's book that would be better but Uboat.net also gives the same info.

So Soren, You are a bit sorry figure, even in this thread there are numerous examples on your misunderstandings, one automatic weather station in Canada tranformed to several in USA in your fertile mind etc.

So hopefully you'll get back reality soon

Juha


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> I'm not taking it personal at all Adler, seriously I could care less, I'm just telling you that Alaska aint that rough and that it sounds odd for you to say _"They wouldn't achieve a single mission in Alaska"_ when I know what spec ops members have achieved and are required to achieve.



You see Soren. You are taking that too seriously. Yeah if they were to get there they could take over and terrorize some small town with 200 inhabitants, but the overall mission of causing terror to the United Stated would not be achieved in Alaska.

There are much better targets that are easier to get to and a lot more worth while in the continental United States. That is my point, that you seem not to get...




Soren said:


> And so I brought forward the Sirius Patrol Team, which use dog sleds and roam across greenland's large stretches of ice (The guys from the US ober there are in the mild areas) which IS a harsher inviroment that Alaska with lower temperatures and much harsher weather in general.



Yes Jedi Master Soren!  



Soren said:


> Furthermore I don't see myself as important at all Adler, so your continious habbit accusing me of that is tiring to say the least. I don't accuse you of being an uptight bastard do I ?



You do not have to. I know how you feel. I dont let you get away with acting like a snob. I don't take it personal though... 



Soren said:


> Why come across harsh against me just because you disagree with what I say, why not just present a counter argument free of insults and the startingshot to a personal argument?



I already explained that to you Soren. In this thread, I have not been harsh. I have been trying to have a humorous. Why do you think I have been using the smilies. When I am pissed off, I do not use smilies. 



Soren said:


> Ok so you don't question my service with the military, fine by me, I appreciate your trust, but truthfully it really matters little to me as like I've said I know what I've done and I don't need to prove anything to anyone. All I can do is share what I know and then present my arguments.



Yeah but you would come across alot more believable if you would not just make claims...


Now finally for what you said Adler:



Soren said:


> Now are you honestly not implying that in YOUR opinion I think of the German commandos as "Über soldiers". Come on Adler, that really wasn't necessary and I'm quite sure it wasn't meant to make me laugh either, correct ??



No I was just having fun with the fact that even though the Germans lost the war, they were the greatest thing since bread and butter in your eyes (you have to admit that 99.9% of your posts on this forum come across this way you see there is the smiley again!)

It actually was in jest, like I said before. Take it as you wish though. I do not need to explain myself to you. I have been doing so, for the sake of this thread however.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Now to the members posting in this thread:

I wish to apologize for derailing this thread so badly. Everyonce in awhile I go through these phases with Soren.

I will try not to do it so much in the future.


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

> So hopefully you'll get back reality soon



 So funny coming from you mr. spin doctor!


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

pbfoot said:


> I have to say this but Soren you don't have a clue about the Northern regions of N America have you ever been north of 60.



1st Perhaps not 
2nd What do you base it on ? (Something I said, I would really like to know this!)
3rd But I'll ask you this: Ever been in Siberia m8 ?? Does Alaska often experience -50 degrees Celcius ?? Now THAT is harsh!
4th Have you ever been to Greenland ? I have, although not all over for months like the SPT, but I got a good taster of what to expect. 

Now before the final question consider this: People live in all these places, Spec Ops often conduct training excercises in the mentioned areas and they achieve their objectives 90% of the time.

So finally what the heck is it that is so darn special about Alaska that makes it harder to survive in than in Greenland, the Northpole, Siberia, Norway, Sahara desert, rain forests around the world etc etc.. 

I am eagerly awaiting your expert knowledge on this subject!



> I did a month TDY in Badafoss and another in Stavenger the climate is moderated by the Gulf Stream . I wasted to much luggage on Arctic gear as opposed to winter gear when I did the deployment to Badafoss



So how many fingers toes did you loose ? You barely survived right ??


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Now to the members posting in this thread:
> 
> I wish to apologize for derailing this thread so badly. Everyonce in awhile I go through these phases with Soren.
> 
> I will try not to do it so much in the future.



Yeah I'd also like to apologize very much to all on this forum for being such a hardcore Nazi sympathizer that Adler has to constantly keep me in check! Man if he would but leave me alone for 10 sec so I could convert you all! Damn it! 

PS: The F4U-4 was made in Germany, be sure!!


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 19, 2008)

A . Google Snag Alaska 
B. Yes I've had Frostbite got it in Wainwright Alberta in 82 it was only minus 40c while on excercise . I was foolish
C. been to greenland several times it was easy to catch flips out of Goose Bay and it was something to do on days off
D .you have no idea about the Arctic in any shape or form as indicated by your posts


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Btw, looked at Uboat.net and sure enough both U-302 (Typo in book apparently) 354 went straight into the Vilkitsky strait!


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

PS: The Kara sea contains more icepacks and freezes up earlier than the Lapta sea, and yet the German operated both Uboats and Warships in the Kara sea.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Yeah I'd also like to apologize very much to all on this forum for being such a hardcore Nazi sympathizer that Adler has to constantly keep me in check! Man if he would but leave me alone for 10 sec so I could convert you all! Damn it!
> 
> PS: The F4U-4 was made in Germany, be sure!!



I should not take this personally, but that is a very serious accusation you just made!

I have never claimed you were a nazi sympathizer! You want to ****ing put words in my mouth? 

Bring it on!


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

pbfoot said:


> A . Google Snag Alaska



Thought so.



> B. Yes I've had Frostbite got it in Wainwright Alberta in 82 it was only minus 40c while on excercise . I was foolish



How many fingers toes pbfoot ?

Btw, they were all dead besides you when your supervisors came to pick you guys up right ? Makes one wonder what the purpose of those excercises are right ? 



> C. been to greenland several times it was easy to catch flips out of Goose Bay and it was something to do on days off



Again just as I thought, come back when you've actually been *inside* of Greenland.



> D .you have no idea about the Arctic in any shape or form as indicated by your posts



I know how it is, you just have your ideas, thats the difference.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Does Alaska often experience -50 degrees Celcius ?? Now THAT is harsh!



Um actually yes.

From Fairbanks on up temps regularly reach -52 to -60C, with an average temp of -50C. You have to keep a engine heater plugged in at all tims so your car will start in the morning. When you go to a grocery store, you dont turn your car off.

Below Fairbanks, Alaska regularly gets temps in the extreme spectrum of both sides. In the summer it can reach 35 C in the summer and -50C in the winter.

I had a friend in Anchorage (born and raised, live his whole life in Alaska) who went up to Barrow (very top of Alaska) to work for 6 months. He quit after 3 weeks because he could hack it.


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I should not take this personally, but that is a very serious accusation you just made!
> 
> I have never claimed you were a nazi sympathizer! You want to ****ing put words in my mouth?
> 
> Bring it on!



What accusation ? Also didn't you notice the smiley ?? 

You see Adler, we're only human and my above post was very clearly a sarcastic joke, something which you can't say about your Über soldier 99.9% German appraisal remark cause you see the difference is I meant nothing of what I said in the post you just responded to while you did in the one I responded to.


----------



## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Um actually yes.
> 
> From Fairbanks on up temps regularly reach -52 to -60C, with an average temp of -50C. You have to keep a engine heater plugged in at all tims so your car will start in the morning. When you go to a grocery store, you dont turn your car off.
> 
> ...



In the summer Anchorage usually doesn't experience anywhere near -50 degrees celcius. I experienced -60 in Siberia, and at that temperature I would agree that any form of mission would be problematic. Amazingly people still manage to live there though. But forget about sleeping in a tent..


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> In the summer Anchorage usually doesn't experience anywhere near -50 degrees celcius. I experienced -60 in Siberia, and at that temperature I would agree that any form of mission would be problematic. Amazingly people still manage to live there though. But forget about sleeping in a tent..



I said above Fairbanks it does. Go back and read the post again, instead of picking out what you want to hear. It does not work that way.


----------



## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Why would they get on an allied cargo ship? Why cant they get on a ship from Argentina or how about this...



Perhaps he meant a country "allied to Germany"?

IMO the best method to get German Commandos to N. America is to land them on the east coast of Mexico, where any nosy port inspector could easily be bribed. From Mexico they could even *DRIVE* right into the US from Texas, New Mexico or Arizona



DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> If you can get through it...
> 
> In the end an U-Boot is still the worst idea.
> 
> ...



Good points!



pbfoot said:


> I believe that Alaska was run by the military or it was a military zone



Much depends on the time. If it's fall 1941, the place is wide open.

After the Japanese occupation of Attu Kiska in 1942 {the diversion for Midway!} then all of Alaska is on high alert.





DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Now to the members posting in this thread:
> 
> I wish to apologize for derailing this thread so badly. Everyonce in awhile I go through these phases with Soren.
> 
> I will try not to do it so much in the future.



No worrys, I think we will get back on track eventually.... 8) 



Soren said:


> Remember it would be done at the same time as the attacks in the US Canada to achieve as big a terrorfying effect as possible, letting the US public know that you can strike at them everywhere any time if you wish. Defeating your enemy phsycologically has its benefits.



The only possible reason that might work for Alaska would be to pose as Japanese scouts, to concern the Allies about that route. The US will not be that concerned about German attacks in Alaska, because they know Germany could never hold or supply Alaska.

However:

1.) It would be far less difficult for the Japanese to do this, rather than bring attackers 8,000 or 10,000 miles or whatever.

2.) If you went to the effort to rig a fishing/whaling ship in Tiajuana, Mexico or somewhere like that to transport your commandos up the west coast, why go all the way up to Alaska? Why not land them in Puget Sound {Seattle} or San Fransisco bay and wreak havoc there?

3.) Another complication is that the population in Alaska was so small and isolated that the US government could probably cover up the whole attack prevent any publicity. If you were to launch Mortar attacks on refineries, ports, railway bridges etc in Seattle, Los Angeles, San Fransisco etc there would be too many witnessess to cover the story up.



DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> There are much better targets that are easier to get to and a lot more worth while in the continental United States. That is my point, that you seem not to get...



After we finish with Alaska I think we might come back to that...


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> What accusation ? Also didn't you notice the smiley ??
> 
> You see Adler, we're only human and my above post was very clearly a sarcastic joke, something which you can't say about your Über soldier 99.9% German appraisal remark cause you see the difference is I meant nothing of what I said in the post you just responded to while you did in the one I responded to.



Bullshit...


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

freebird said:


> IMO the best method to get German Commandos to N. America is to land them on the east coast of Mexico, where any nosy port inspector could easily be bribed. From Mexico they could even DRIVE right into the US from Texas, New Mexico or Arizona



Agreed and there are much better targets in those areas. That is why I don't understand this facination with Alaska...


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Bullshit...



_Go back and read the post again, instead of picking out what you want to hear. *It does not work that way. *_

Ahem!

And no, I never believed you believed I was a Nazi, but just as I thought you can't take a joke yourself yet you are happy dealing them out on others.

Anyway I'd like to file a complaint for the 3 points infraction I just recieved by you Adler as it is based on wrong assumptions.


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> In the summer Anchorage usually doesn't experience anywhere near -50 degrees celcius.



Thats the problem Soren, is that if you attack in Dec 1941 the temps will be killer.

If you are thinking of doing this in Summer 1942 there will not really be much effect, as remember that the Japanese *have already* occupied the outer Alaskan islands, so the area is already on high alert.

Interesting though to compare the panic on the west coast after Pearl Harbour and the Japanese subs shelling Vancouver Island Santa Barbara. {Huge panic} and the reaction to the Japanese invading Alaskan Islands {not nearly the same reaction}


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> Anyway I'd like to file a complaint for the 3 points infraction I just recieved by you Adler as it is based on wrong assumptions.



Complaint noted...

Whats your point. Do you think I am going to remove it? I don't think you were kidding Soren, and right now I am not either...

If you wish to continue this, we can do so in a PM. This thread has been derailed eneogh. Of course I wont read it until tomorrow, because I am going to bed right about now.


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## Freebird (Jul 19, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Agreed and there are much better targets in those areas. *That is why I don't understand this facination with Alaska...*



Soren loves the place Adler!!!!

{Perhaps you two will be neighbors....}


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

freebird said:


> Soren loves the place Adler!!!!
> 
> {Perhaps you two will be neighbors....}



I might just mistake him for an Elk...8)


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Quote: "Btw, looked at Uboat.net and sure enough both U-302 (Typo in book apparently) 354 went straight into the Vilkitsky strait!"

Yes, and have you strenght to admit that the sinkings were marked well W of the strait in that site?


Juha


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Juha said:


> Quote: "Btw, looked at Uboat.net and sure enough both U-302 (Typo in book apparently) 354 went straight into the Vilkitsky strait!"
> 
> Yes, and have you strenght to admit that the sinkings were marked well W of the strait in that site?
> 
> ...



What's your point ? 

Did you note that the Kara sea is more treacherous than the Lapta sea ? Yet the German Uboats operated straight in the middle of the worst section! Heck even Scheer went there, with NO icebreakers!


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2008)

Point?
You claimed earlier that U-302 and -354 attacked and sunk 2 ships inside the strait, and I claimed that sinkings happened clearly W of strait. So were the sinkings in the strait according to Uboat.net?

IIRC the well known sortie of Scheer went only near Dikson well W of the strait

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

freebird said:


> Soren loves the place Adler!!!!



Is that an invitation ????! I'd go in a heartbeat ! 



> {Perhaps you two will be neighbors....}



I hope he's not a policeman there though, cause then I'll definitely have to watch what I say! Jokes are out of the question!  

It'll probably go something like this:

Adler: Hello Soren
Soren: Hello Adler
Adler: Soren I hopefully wont have to listen to all your bullshit Über German crap now that we're neighbours do I ?
Soren: Wow wow wow! Why so harsh??
Adler: *rolleyes* Come on! It was just a joke, don't take it so damn personally all the time!
Soren: ?? Err.. ok. Btw now that were making jokes, do you know what happened to the tomato which tried to cross the street ? *grin*
Adler: What are you insinuating?! Are you calling me a tomato ??! That's it pal, you just got a timeout!
Soren: But..
Adler: Shh!!


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## Njaco (Jul 19, 2008)

An attack on Alaska would be nothing more than say, the attack on Pearl Harbor. Because its not part of the Continental US it would get the populace pissed instead of causing terror.

And why a sub to Alaska? Weren't the Japanese in the Aluetians or nearby? Couldn't German commandos gone overland to Japan and taken a ride from there? I think that would be much easier.


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## Soren (Jul 19, 2008)

Juha said:


> Point?
> You claimed earlier that U-302 and -354 attacked and sunk 2 ships inside the strait, and I claimed that sinkings happened clearly W of strait. So were the sinkings in the strait according to Uboat.net?
> 
> IIRC the well known sortie of Scheer went only near Dikson well W of the strait
> ...



The book says they attacked in the strait, that all I'm gonna say about that, and it's a new book btw. But that exactly changes what in our debate about the Northern route ??? Nothing! as a multitude of German Uboats operated successfully within the strait, and NONE I repeat NONE were lost there due to hitting icepacks. No on the contrary the Uboats clearly demonstrated they were capable of operating the worst section of the proposed route, and thus it is quite clear they could've went straight through and into the Laptev sea, the only reason they didn't was because there were no valuable targets in the area. The KM did after-all successfully operate in the even more treacherous Kara sea, and why ? Because there were targets to strike there.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> It'll probably go something like this:
> 
> Adler: Hello Soren
> Soren: Hello Adler
> ...



I told you take our little spat to the PM. Is that to hard to understand? Would you care for another infraction?


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## lesofprimus (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren u are openly mocking a Moderator now, and this sh!t is gonna stop now... U got me pissed off, and if u reply in any sorta smart ass remark, Im gonna ban ur Uber German loving ass... 

I beg u, please say something smartass...


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## Glider (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren said:


> The book says they attacked in the strait, that all I'm gonna say about that, and it's a new book btw. But that exactly changes what in our debate about the Northern route ??? Nothing! as a multitude of German Uboats operated successfully within the strait, and NONE I repeat NONE were lost there due to hitting icepacks. No on the contrary the Uboats clearly demonstrated they were capable of operating the worst section of the proposed route, and thus it is quite clear they could've went straight through and into the Laptev sea, the only reason they didn't was because there were no valuable targets in the area. The KM did after-all successfully operate in the even more treacherous Kara sea, and why ? Because there were targets to strike there.



Soren
We seem to have gone from great success, to a multitude of U Boats operating successfully.
Can I ask what results all this effort achieved and if that fits your description of successfully?
Personally if all this multitude of U Boats only achieved what you have described then that doesn't fit my definition of Successfully. It would fit a description of a huge waste of time and resources, or almost total abject failure but it could depend on the definition of success.
I have asked before what was achieved after November 1942 but received no reply, can you amplify further what this success was?


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## syscom3 (Jul 19, 2008)

Soren, why not expend your energy in coming up with a successfull plan to attack the "soft" and poorly defended targets in the Gulf of Mexico.

I already gave you an option. Use your commando's to hijack a ship and use it for operations.


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## Juha (Jul 20, 2008)

Rohwer used the war diaries of the C-in-C of Submarines, the Chief of Submarines North Sea (Norway), and other commanders, U-boats logs, torpedo data reports in which the U-boat captains carefully recorded each torpedo attack, incl. detailed firing data, figures, target observation, and plots also years of conversations and written correspondence with key figures from Dönitz downwards, incl numerous ex. submarines and all is checked against Allied info. for ex U-354 hit but not sink 3771 tn Petrovskij at 75.15 N/ 84.30E, so only sinking was 2900 tn Dikson by U-302. So for their efforts U-boats sunk one and damaged one ship in Aug 43 in the Kara Sea.
So if one wants info on U-boat successes, Rohwer’s book is the book.

If you want to know what the Germans knew or more exactly how little they knew on situation in the Kara Sea in July 42, try to find out the report of the Group Command North which led to Operation Wunderland (Admiral Scheer’s sortie a month later). And Germans had no idea on the ice situation in the East Siberian Sea, which had been so difficult area to cross during Komet’s passage 2 years earlier. Laptev Sea had easier ice-situation because of the Lena-river. So IMHO the NW Passage wasn’t a realistic option to KM in the summer 42.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 20, 2008)

BTW
for those who want rely on facts and not beliefs one find some info on the NW Passage passage of the KM's disguised merchant cruiser Komet in summer 40 from here Vladimir Kroupnik. The "Komet" raider

As one can see the real problems began E of the Vilkitsky strait.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 20, 2008)

And you base that on a single event Juha ??

The real problems started in the Kara sea, the Laptev sea freezes up later and is less covered with pack ice. All that needed be done was cross the Vilkitsky strait, then the way was open.

Here again an excerpt from _Unknown Waters_ by Alfred S. McLaren, Captain, USN (Retired), 2008:

_""Seasoned German Arctic U-boat veterans, including Hans-Gunther Lange of U-711, who made the longest uninterrupted patrol in the Kara and "West Siberian" seas from 22 July to 30 September 1943, were a confident lot. They considered that 'a submarine is never helpless in the ice because it can submerge, proceed under the ice. select an open area with the aid of its high-angle periscope, come to the surface, recharge the battery with the diesels, and submerge again.' They also observed that 'the sea is always calm in the drift ice even if a gale is blowing' and that 'there are always clear lanes in the drift ice which permits boats to proceed.' "_



> Soren, why not expend your energy in coming up with a successfull plan to attack the "soft" and poorly defended targets in the Gulf of Mexico.
> 
> I already gave you an option. Use your commando's to hijack a ship and use it for operations.



We can do that syscom3 but I need to know exactly where the targets are located syscom3.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 20, 2008)

Soren said:


> We can do that syscom3 but I need to know exactly where the targets are located syscom3.



Figure out the targets yourself!

You are the one that came up with the meaningless target of Alaska. Why Alaska?


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## Soren (Jul 20, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Figure out the targets yourself!



We're talking about the Mexico Gulf Adler, not Alaska. The targets in Alaska would've been Anchorage and the airbase in Fairbanks.



> You are the one that came up with the meaningless target of Alaska. Why Alaska?



Meaningless ? Adler I've already explained the purpose of the attacks. Also if an attack on the airbase in Fairbanks is possible that might very well prove pretty devastating.


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## parsifal (Jul 20, 2008)

It is difficult to pinpoint the coldest place oin the Northern hemisphere, but according to one source, this was the following comment

_Considerable controversy has arisen about the record low temperature extremes at Verkhoyanskbecause of instrument corrections. From Dr. A. Meshcherskaya: "It is accepted that the coldest temperature for the Northern Hemisphere occurred in Verkhoyansk, Russia on 6 and 7, 1892. But in those days the temperature was measured by spirit thermometer, which is less accurate than a mercury thermometer. The spirit is the evaporating liquid, therefore measurement by spirit thermometers must be corrected (usually the correction is positive, being about 0.2°C, but is not so simple). According to "Climate of the USSR, issue 24, part I, Leningrad, 1956," the coldest temperature (-67.7°C) occurred in Oimaykon on 6 February 1933. It is necessary to have in view that winters in East Siberia during the 20th century have become about 3°C warmer.
By the opinion of the majority of Russian climatologists, the coldest place in the Northern Hemisphere is Oimyakon. Since the 30-th years of 20th century, almost every winter Oimaykon is colder than Verkhoyansk. The mean difference of minimum winter (December-February) temperature in Verkhoyanskand in Oimyakon for 43 coupled _

I have never been to the Northern arctic zones, but I did volunteer for the re-supply run to Australian Antarctic Base, at Mawson. The temperatures on that trip toched -30 degrees, celsius. I got so sick i passed out, fell into a coma, and didnt regain conscouiusness for nearly five days. I never returned to full duties, and was discharged from the navy within four months.

In Russia, the troops experienced conditions as low as -40 degrees, but even though this happened quite a bit, it was an unusual event, according to my stepfather . It was more normal for temperatures to be at -10 to -25, occasionally ther might even be a partial thaw for a few days, with tempaeratures climbing into the positve zone.

At minus 60, it is impossible for people to survive in the open for long. Just for you non-metric people to get a handle on that, I make that -76 degrees F. The coldest recorded natural temperature in history is -83C at the russian base in Antarctica, in 1983. 

-60 is getting very close to a northern hemisphere record. People dont survive long outside in those temperatures


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## Soren (Jul 20, 2008)

In -60 degrees a liter of water freezes before it falls a meter, looks weird.

Btw Parsifal, what did you get so sick from ? Going into a koma is serious!


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## pbfoot (Jul 20, 2008)

At -40c there will not be any fighting it would be painful just to use your weapon exposed flesh will freeze in minutes and a glove won't help , the only time I experianced -40c my shifter in my truck froze as well as the foam in the seats


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## parsifal (Jul 20, 2008)

I had a predisposition to hypoglycemia, which the cold weather and the stress made worse. The outcome was that i contracted full blown diabetes, insulin dependant. Similar to the way that some pregnant women develop diabetes.

I basically went into hyploglycemic shock. My brain shut down as a result of the cold, and the lack of glucose getting to my brain. i very nearly died


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## Soren (Jul 20, 2008)

I will again post this chart:


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## Soren (Jul 20, 2008)

parsifal said:


> I had a predisposition to hypoglycemia, which the cold weather and the stress made worse. The outcome was that i contracted full blown diabetes, insulin dependant. Similar to the way that some pregnant women develop diabetes.
> 
> I basically went into hyploglycemic shock. My brain shut down as a result of the cold, and the lack of glucose getting to my brain. i very nearly died



I have a friend who experienced somewhat the same deal, although less serious, whilst working for the Navy in Greenland. He went into shock and passed out. He was found to be a diabetic as-well. He was not allowed at sea from that point on.


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## Freebird (Jul 20, 2008)

Soren said:


> We can do that syscom3 but I need to know exactly where the targets are located syscom3.



The oil refineries would be prime targets. As I mentioned earlier, I think railway bridges would make an easy and profitable target. {No railway to Alaska BTW} If you blew the bridge just as a freight train is crossing the momentum will pull several dozen more boxcars into the river. Once you have your men cross the border a mortar team could wake up the cities by dropping rounds on port facilities, army barraks, airport, city hall, etc

There is something else I was thinking, suppose you dropped a few bombs on an airfield, what would be the immediate reaction? They would scramble the planes thinking that they were under attack right? So you have a couple of guys at the end of the runway with a HMG to knock the planes down before takeoff.


If we are talking about the "Mexican strategy" Then San Diego CA, San Antonio TX, El Paso TX, Tucson AZ, Brownsville Texas would be good targets. There is a Naval station in SanDiego {both a port air station}. San Antonio also has an Army Air Corps training field IIRC


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## Juha (Jul 20, 2008)

Soren
Quote: "And you base that on a single event Juha ??"

Soren, that single event was the only time during the WWII that a German vessel was past the Vilkitsky strait and the only recent info on situation past the strait on which KM had to base their planning. And as I wrote earlier summer 42 wasn't easy, it took from July to Oct by Soviet flotilla leader and DDs to travel from Vladivostok to Kola Fjord. And why KM didn't use that according to you quite passable route by its tranport subs which travelled between Europe and Japanese areas?

Quote: "All that needed be done was cross the Vilkitsky strait, then the way was open."

Somehow the crew of Komet experienced in the real world something quite different than what you believe. But who cares, you can believe what you want, we live in a free world.



On cold, the coldest temperature that I experienced during military manouvres was -32,5 deg C, it was quite possible to live in tents but of course we had some difficulties with food and drink, and 3 men had to sent to hospital after our motor march to the training area on open trailers behind tractors. We stopped every 45 minutes to march 15 minutes then back to trailes for another 45minutes, IIRC. Without those stretches of foot march probably more of us would have found ourselves in hospital beds. That march was the worst part of that manouevre. It was so and so that the manouevres was held, officers talked a while what to do but then decised to go on.

Ordinary Finnish troops could definite fought in -35 deg C.

Juha


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## Freebird (Jul 20, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren, why not expend your energy in coming up with a successfull plan to attack the "soft" and poorly defended targets in the Gulf of Mexico.
> 
> I already gave you an option. Use your commando's to hijack a ship and use it for operations.




Syscom, { Parsifal} I would be interested to hear your thoughts on the Axis deliberatly de-stabilizing Mexico. I started posting this on page 8 {posts # 303, 305, 311, 313 323}, before we got more involved in the "Alaska" gambit. I think that the situation in Mexico was unstable enough to collapse given the right actions by the "Black ops" teams, and would pose a far greater danger to the US


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 20, 2008)

Soren said:


> I will again post this chart:



You talk of Anchorage as if that is the climate of the whole state (territory at that time).

I have news for you Soren Anchorage is mild and that average temp you just posted is wrong.

It gets much warmer in the summe time and it gets much much colder in the winter. The average high in the winter time is around 18 F....

Just as you say, you know what you know based off of your experience. I have been there, you have not, so I guess I know what I know based off of my experience...

It works both ways.

Don't believe everything you read on the internet or put all your faith in all of these charts you love so much.


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## parsifal (Jul 20, 2008)

Freebird

I am not quite going to answer your question, but I will give you my opinion.

I have never said that small scale raids against the US are not impossible, or that compared to history a greater effort could not have been mounted. however, what I think is a mistake is the diversion of such a large amount of high quality assets off on what I consider to be minor operations. The primary function of the U-Boats has to be the sinking of ships, and any deviation away from that objective by ANY U-Boats, is a defeat for the Axis, and a victory for the allies. In fact the way to assist by Special Operations is to seek ways to to enhance that capability. Sinking a few ships by submarine, and then knocking out a refinery, or an oil well, is not working to the same purpose. if you have a few less ships, then a knocked out refinery is not going to increase allied probls. What needs to be done is to sink ships by submarine, and to sink ships (or its equivalent) using other means to augment the process. 

The prime target to achieve this would be to look for some way to render the panama canal inoperative, even if temporarily. if it gets knocked out, or made unusable, the pressure on US shipping becomes immense. Moreeover, even a small delay of say two months might be enough to tip the whole balance of power in the pacific, its that serious.

Now, Panama was one of the most heavily guarded targets prewar from landward attack. It was protected by more than a full brigade of troops pre-war, and this was rapidly increased soon after hostilities broke out. So, IMO a landward attack is not a great idea.

However, the US has two achilles heels pre-war, and continuing for many months into the war. Its ASW capability is abysmal. Less well known is its hopeless minesweeping capability. My idea would be to exploit those two weaknesses to the maximum. 

The ASW weakness would require many more U-Boats to be sent to the western hemisphere immediately upon hostilities breaking out. This would require a re-deployment of the 62 boats in the med, and the 15 boats from the arctic for as rapid as possible re-deployment to the US and carribean. I would also push forward as many of the boats currently under training, about 90 to the US as soon as possible, even if those boats are not fully trained, or trained to quite the samer high standards as are usually demanded in the Km. 


The result of all this expediancy is that instead of having just 6-10 boats with which to undertake Drumbeat, the germans have 60-100. Sure, some of them arent fully trained but they are carrying mines rather than torpedoes, or spares and fuel for the front line subs. The aim here is to produce a submarine equivalent of a "thousand bomber raid", to create an event of such shock value, that it is likley to affect allied nerves and planning, and thereby give germany and Japan vital breathing space.

To assist in this effort, I would augment the minelaying effort by prepareing as many fast blockade runners as I could with as many mines as they could covertly carry. In late 1941, I believe there were as many as 30 German controlled blockade runners still at sea. If all of them were carrying 100 to 150 mines, and were ordered to move to various locations in the carribean, particularly off shore of Panama Canal, and rather than just blindly rush and declare war straight after PH, but rather wait a few days or a week whilst the blockade runners were put into position, then lay the mines just before the DOW, using the newer versions of mag mines, which the US could not sweep, my opinion is that utter chaos would reign in the US and carribean for many months.

Historically, the Germans only laid about 300 mines off the US coast. those few were quite devastating sinking, IIRC about 10 ships. Now, what I am talking about is a sudden minelaying effort, aimed at sowing something like 5-8000 mines, and backed up by a sub force of 50-100 U-Boats, properly supplied. 

The result IMO would have been utter chaos for the US, and its allies. it is not beyond the realms of possibility to suppose the loss of 2-3000000 tons of shipping in a month. Morever, the mining of the approaches to the Canal, would have been the equivalent to the loss of a further 2000000 tons, at least.

The losses of this magnitude would not have won the war , in itself, and would not have been sustainable, but it would have had major impacts on US thinking. The possibilities, IMO might have included

1) A major reduction of Shipping for the pacific, significantly delaying the counteroffensive in the pacific.
2) Suspension or delay in the blue water navy currently under construction in favour of increase MS and small ship production.
3) A cut or abandonment of the more agressive parts of US aircraft production, such as the heavy bomber program, to free up more resources for MS and escort production.
4) Diversion of more DDs and carriers to Europe from the Pacific.
5) Reduction or abandonment of the Arctic Convoys to Russia. 
6) Diversion of more RN assets to assist the USN in its coastal convoy battles. Woulds almost certainly have resulted in the loss of malta

These name just a few of the advantages that might become possible. They dont win the war, but they lead to some mighty big changes to the way the allies prioritise the war, and may possibly lead to a negotiated peace, rather than unconditional surrender.


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## Soren (Jul 20, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> You talk of Anchorage as if that is the climate of the whole state (territory at that time).
> 
> I have news for you Soren Anchorage is mild and that average temp you just posted is wrong.
> 
> It gets much warmer in the summe time and it gets much much colder in the winter. The average high in the winter time is around 18 F....



The chart lists the average temp for all months + the lowest highest temperatures. It is a pileup of data from 4/1/1952 to 12/31/2000, so how can it be wrong ?



> Just as you say, you know what you know based off of your experience. I have been there, you have not, so I guess I know what I know based off of my experience...
> 
> It works both ways.
> 
> Don't believe everything you read on the internet or put all your faith in all of these charts you love so much.



Fair enough Adler, but I don't understand why it is written here then: Alaska.com | Weather climate



_The climate of Southcentral Alaska -- the region encompassing Anchorage, Seward, Homer, Prince William Sound and Wrangell-St. Elias -- is mild, at least by Alaska standards. The temperatures are moderated by the Gulf of Alaska, and the truly cold winds of the north are often blocked by the Alaska and Talkeetna mountain ranges.
Southcentral Alaska doesn't get as much rain as Southeast Alaska, but it gets a lot more snow. On the other hand, it has a lot more clear days.

When moisture-laden air blowing off the Gulf of Alaska meets the chilly Alaska, Chugach, Talkeetna, Wrangell and St. Elias ranges, precipitation happens. In July, August and September, especially along the Gulf coast, rain falls. In the winter, there's lots of snow. This is often most apparent along Prince William Sound. Valdez, for example, averages 303 inches -- 25 feet -- a year, and Whittier gets 250 inches. 

Although so much snow requires shoveling and plowing in town, it's beloved by skiers and snowmachiners. Snow in the mountains feeds the glaciers and the myriad streams that salmon come home to. Snow and rain also nurture the lush coastal forests.

Blocked from the Gulf by mountains, Anchorage's official measuring station at the international airport gets only 70 inches.

The snow near sea level generally melts away by early May. When termination dust -- the first coating of mountaintop snow -- falls in late August or early September, Alaskans know winter isn't far away.

Summer sunlight in Anchorage lasts 19.5 hours at the June solstice. At the winter solstice, daylight lasts 5.5 hours._

I would think that such research is quite accurate Adler, unless you know a more reliable source ?

PS: At the moment it's 54 degrees F in Anchorage.


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## Soren (Jul 20, 2008)

Juha I suggest to read abit aboút the Kara Laptev sea before you decide in your mind what is reality and what is not.

Oh and btw, we're still talking about submarines here, not merchant ships 

Do I need to quote the opinion of the German Uboat commanders regarding operating under icepacks ?

There's a reason so many Uboats successfully operated near and in the Vilkitsky strait, not a single one lost to crashing into an iceberg.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 20, 2008)

Soren said:


> The chart lists the average temp for all months + the lowest highest temperatures. It is a pileup of data from 4/1/1952 to 12/31/2000, so how can it be wrong ?



When I was there, the average high in the summer time was 70 to 80 F and the average high in the winter was 18F. That is the temp around Anchorage.

What more can I say, that is based off of actual experience, which you are so fond of using. I guess in this case actual experience does not mean anything, because it is not your actual experience?



Soren said:


> PS: At the moment it's 54 degrees F in Anchorage.



Yeah look what time it is there Soren...

Right now it is 10:50 in the *morning* and the temp is 60F. By noon the temp will be about 70 to 75 (probably closer to 70)...

Source:

Current weather from the municipality of Anchorage website...


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## Soren (Jul 20, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> When I was there, the average high in the summer time was 70 to 80 F and the average high in the winter was 18F. That is the temp around Anchorage.
> 
> What more can I say, that is based off of actual experience, which you are so fond of using. I guess in this case actual experience does not mean anything, because it is not your actual experience?



Adler it was a simple question, why is it you feel the need to go back to argueing again? Did I say: *You are wrong Adler!*, no I said how can data piled up over 43 years of research be wrong ? 

I have no problem believing what you say Adler, you've been there, I haven't, and infact the warmer there is the better. But I'm just surprised that the website I referenced can be so terribly wrong ?(You must admit that being off by 10-20 degree's is quite substantial?)



> Yeah look what time it is there Soren...
> 
> Right now it is 10:50 in the *morning* and the temp is 60F. By noon the temp will be about 70 to 75 (probably closer to 70)...
> 
> ...



10:50 is usually cooler than midday, that's true.


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## Freebird (Jul 20, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Freebird
> 
> I am not quite going to answer your question, but I will give you my opinion.
> 
> I have never said that small scale raids against the US are not impossible, or that compared to history a greater effort could not have been mounted. however, what I think is a mistake is the diversion of such a large amount of high quality assets off on what I consider to be minor operations. *The primary function of the U-Boats has to be the sinking of ships,* and any deviation away from that objective by ANY U-Boats, is a defeat for the Axis, and a victory for the allies. What needs to be done is to sink ships by submarine, and to sink ships (or its equivalent) using other means to augment the process.



I think you misunderstood my point, I am in full agreement with you that the U-boat campaign is # 1 priority.

I would only use a U-boat as a transport as a last resort, and only if the U-boat is going that route anyways. As we have previousl discussed there are other options ie cargo transport under Vichy flag etc.





parsifal said:


> *The ASW weakness would require many more U-Boats to be sent to the western hemisphere immediately upon hostilities breaking out.* This would require a re-deployment of the 62 boats in the med, and the 15 boats from the arctic for as rapid as possible re-deployment to the US and carribean. I would also push forward as many of the boats currently under training, about 90 to the US as soon as possible, even if those boats are not fully trained, or trained to quite the samer high standards as are usually demanded in the Km.



Again you make an excellent point, most of the U-boats are poorly utilized in the Med, Arctic etc.

My point with the commandos was to supplement the U-boat campaign, and to distract public opinion from the gravest threat. {shipping strangulation}

I will go over the rest of your polst a little later!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 21, 2008)

Soren said:


> Adler it was a simple question, why is it you feel the need to go back to argueing again? Did I say: *You are wrong Adler!*, no I said how can data piled up over 43 years of research be wrong ?



Because I am up past my neck now.... 



Soren said:


> I have no problem believing what you say Adler, you've been there, I haven't, and infact the warmer there is the better. But I'm just surprised that the website I referenced can be so terribly wrong ?(You must admit that being off by 10-20 degree's is quite substantial?)



The only thing I can think of is that it is throwing winter and summer temps together and getting an overall average.


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## Juha (Jul 21, 2008)

Soren
It seems to be useless to repeat but one more go
Quote: “There's a reason so many Uboats successfully operated near and in the Vilkitsky strait, not a single one lost to crashing into an iceberg.”

If you understand something on sailing you know that freely floating icebergs are not a problem if they can be seen, one can always dodge them, real problems began when the floating “flat” ice is bagged together without enough open water between floating mass, in these circumstances icebergs could be hazard to U-boats because there might be them among “flat” ice and in shallow water their under surface parts may even went down to the sea floor.

You seemed to miss from Vladimir Kroupnik. The "Komet" raider the fact that Komet found the going E of Vilkitsky strait harder than W of it or in the strait itself. And worst part of Komet passage was that of through East Siberian Sea. That was even worse than the area E of the Vilkitsky strait. So navigating W of or in the strait doesn’t prove that one can do it E of the strait. 

And quote from your message #307 :” *During an exceptionally mild-ice summer*, three Type VIIC U-boats, U-302 (Sickel), 
U-354 (Herbschleb), and U-711 (Lange) of Group Viking of the 13th U-boat Flotilla, based at Trondheim, Norway,on patrol in theKara Sea during late August 
1943 trailed a Soviet convoy into the Vilkitsky Strait. U-301 and U-354 sub- 
sequently sank one ship each of the small convoy. A month later,U-302, U-354, and U-601 (Grau) of this same group returned to patrol the western entrance of 
these straits in hopes of intercepting another convoy. During the following 
summer of a much less favorable ice year, three more Type VIIC U-boats of Group 
Gryphon of the 13th Flotilla, U-711 (Lange), U-739 (Mangold), and U-957 (Schaar), 
*succeeded in reaching Cape Chelyuskin on 18 September 1944 while attempting to 
reach an assembly point for Soviet coastal convoys at Nordwik Bight to the east 
of Chelyuskin. Only heavy drift ice prevented them from going farther*.”

So summer 43 was exceptional and in 44 the U-boats got to Cape Chelyuskin but were then stopped by drift ice. So 2 more points
1) in 44 it was possible to went into the Vilkitsky strait but not further, again, as during the Komet's passage real problems began E of the Vilkitsky strait or at the eastern end of it. So both times when German ships went through the Vilkitsky strait they found situation worse on the eastern side, contrary your claim. 
2) in 44 U-boats were stopped by drift ice not by icebergs

Juha


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## syscom3 (Jul 21, 2008)

Soren, end the argument about the climate temps of Alaska, because you are sadly mistaken.

The interior sections of Alaska routinely get down to -50 in the winter and is bracketed by two major mountain ranges, both far larger and more extensive than the Alps, and have massive sections of swamp, marsh and bogs, which makes summer travel very difficult.

The only part of Alaska your commando's could hope to penetrate is the Pacific coastal area's. But then, the million dollar question is, why expend do much time and effort to put together a nuisence raid of no value in a backwater part of the war. And since your U-Boat couldnt sail through the arctic to get there, then why not put your sub to better use by sinking allied ships in conjunction with the IJN?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 21, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren, end the argument about the climate temps of Alaska, because you are sadly mistaken.
> 
> The interior sections of Alaska routinely get down to -50 in the winter and is bracketed by two major mountain ranges, both far larger and more extensive than the Alps, and have massive sections of swamp, marsh and bogs, which makes summer travel very difficult.
> 
> The only part of Alaska your commando's could hope to penetrate is the Pacific coastal area's. But then, the million doallr question is, why expend do much time and effort to put together a nuisence raid of no value in a backwater part of the war. And since your U-Boat couldnt sail through the arctic to get there, then why not put you sub to better use by sinking allied ships in conjunction with the IJN?



This man knows what he is talking about.


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## Freebird (Jul 21, 2008)

Has anyone here actually been in this terrain in Alaska? {Adler?}

I have not been to Alaska, but I have been in the wilderness of the north coast of B.C. {~200 miles south of Ketchican} This is some of the most rugged difficult terrain in the world! Sharp coastal ridges heavily forested with old-growth forest! *Even in summer* it would be difficult to cross overland except by road. Your team might only make a few miles a day hacking through bush lugging gear

Has anyone else here done any work in winter at -40temperatures? I have had to repair equipment outside in {*mild*, balmy!} Winnipeg when it was -38 degrees {not including wind chill} In -50 you can barely survive, let alone try to make effective attacks


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 21, 2008)

freebird said:


> Has anyone here actually been in this terrain in Alaska? {Adler?}



Yes I have visited. Me and my wife should be moving there next year.



freebird said:


> Has anyone else here done any work in winter at -40temperatures? I have had to repair equipment outside in {*mild*, balmy!} Winnipeg when it was -38 degrees {not including wind chill} In -50 you can barely survive, let alone try to make effective attacks



We did some arctic weather flight training in Norway. I dont believe the temp was -40 when we were there though. I believe the coldest was about -30.


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## drgondog (Jul 21, 2008)

Juha said:


> Soren
> with that level of arguments, what can I say!
> Hopefully your imaginary captain chose Panama, crew or at least part of it would have had much better chances in US than in USSR PoW camp.
> 
> Juha



I am just imagining a surfaced U-Boat being 'lifted' in one of the Locks and waving gaily to the dock hands, or submerged thrying to sneak under a freighter in a lock that avearges 60-65 feet in total depth from top of concrete wall to bottom of the lock.

I seem to recall three primary locks. 

In the three times I have been through the Canal - it was one vessel at a time. I suspect they wouldn't lift a surfaced U Boat.


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## drgondog (Jul 21, 2008)

freebird said:


> There are many small fishing ports/fishing villages etc close to Anchorage, it would not seem out of place for a whaling/fishing ship to land to get supplies. Your team could probably walk right off the dock in the middle of the night carring their gear. There would be no "passport customs control" or any guards at all in the minor ports, once the ship had landed. i would assume that you would do this in 1941 though, not mid '42.



Certainly true then and mostly true today


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## drgondog (Jul 21, 2008)

freebird said:


> The oil refineries would be prime targets. As I mentioned earlier, I think railway bridges would make an easy and profitable target. {No railway to Alaska BTW} If you blew the bridge just as a freight train is crossing the momentum will pull several dozen more boxcars into the river. Once you have your men cross the border a mortar team could wake up the cities by dropping rounds on port facilities, army barraks, airport, city hall, etc
> 
> *It would be a PR shock but 30 people are not going to destroy a refinery - you could hurt production with enough equipment to destroy key procees equipment but contrast the damage done and repaired at Ploesti by 150-300 bomber raids.*
> 
> ...



The only approach I can think of that would have made sense would have been a Sarin attack on major cities - say NYC - with appropriated light transfort of sprayer - and make it 'deniable' to make tracing it to Germany impossible - back to your "mexican' mole concept. IIRC the allies never discovered Sarin until after the war. Could work today... and probably will.

Other than that I think Panama Canal is a strategic target particularly if you could stop or greatly restrict transport. If you could destroy one lock system you might be able to stop traffic for a month or so.


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## drgondog (Jul 21, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Soren, end the argument about the climate temps of Alaska, because you are sadly mistaken.
> 
> The interior sections of Alaska routinely get down to -50 in the winter and is bracketed by two major mountain ranges, both far larger and more extensive than the Alps, and have massive sections of swamp, marsh and bogs, which makes summer travel very difficult.
> 
> The only part of Alaska your commando's could hope to penetrate is the Pacific coastal area's. But then, the million doallr question is, why expend do much time and effort to put together a nuisence raid of no value in a backwater part of the war. And since your U-Boat couldnt sail through the arctic to get there, then why not put you sub to better use by sinking allied ships in conjunction with the IJN?



Syscom dead on. 

I have been in 20 below even in Kodiak in January although it is rare for that temp to go below zero F. Lived in Nome for a year - not rare there - Jets and turbos running all the time on the AFB with surface 'tunnels' connecting Quonset huts in the winter.

In the summer, in the Kenai range area for example, the bog/tundra is impossible to use a wheeled vehicle (reliably) and the mosquitos are so big they can flat foot fornicate with a caribou. Big reason for aircraft and boats to get from point a to point b then hump the rest of the way. Back in the late 60s and early 70s I used to hunt Kodiak, Katmai, Kenai areas - mostly coastal but as Syscom sez.


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## Matt308 (Jul 21, 2008)

drgondog said:


> Certainly true then and mostly true today



Actually, I took a boat tour of Cooks Inlet and you could still see the Army structures that fortified the various docks, provided top cover for those manning the submarine nets at the various inlets to port facilities, and other equipment (searchlights, comm gear, etc). So it would appear that protection of Alaskan port facilities was very high on the list of US defensive measures. However, I don't reckon the risk of attack was deemed too high to orginate from Germany.


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## drgondog (Jul 21, 2008)

Soren said:


> Juha I suggest to read abit aboút the Kara Laptev sea before you decide in your mind what is reality and what is not.
> 
> Oh and btw, we're still talking about submarines here, not merchant ships
> 
> ...



Submarine losses are notorious for Loss - Cause Unknown..certainly for US losses. 

any of of those for U-Boats in the North that might be due to an iceberg?


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## pbfoot (Jul 21, 2008)

As for targets why not Arvida or Alma Quebec 40%of the allied aluminium production cannot be a bad target and its down the St Lawrence river right turn up the Saguenay river and your there.
or Sudbury Ontario with 90% of WW2 nickel although it might be a little tougher for the sub


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## drgondog (Jul 21, 2008)

pbfoot said:


> As for targets why not Arvida or Alma Quebec 40%of the allied aluminium production cannot be a bad target and its down the St Lawrence river right turn up the Saguenay river and your there.
> or Sudbury Ontario with 90% of WW2 nickel although it might be a little tougher for the sub



Pb - that is a great choice - but was there any long lead time, relatively small and vulnerable process system that could realistically be taken out by a small force? I'm thinking refinery scale target complex which would be hard to destroy absent a lot of heavy bombers.


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## pbfoot (Jul 21, 2008)

drgondog said:


> Pb - that is a great choice - but was there any long lead time, relatively small and vulnerable process system that could realistically be taken out by a small force? I'm thinking refinery scale target complex which would be hard to destroy absent a lot of heavy bombers.


aluminium requires a large amount of electricity take out the power source and watch the ovens fill with hardened metal


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## Soren (Jul 21, 2008)

It is definitely possible to operate in -30 degrees Celcius, even in -40 degrees, although it is extremely hard in the latter. In -50 to -60 it gets way too extreme and most equipment doesn't work at all, so forget about any work in those temperatures, setting up a tent alone is exhausting.



syscom3 said:


> Soren, end the argument about the climate temps of Alaska, because you are sadly mistaken.
> 
> The interior sections of Alaska routinely get down to -50 in the winter and is bracketed by two major mountain ranges, both far larger and more extensive than the Alps, and have massive sections of swamp, marsh and bogs, which makes summer travel very difficult.



Sysom3 you're completely missing the point. Remember the attack is to take place in the summer, not the winter. In the winter it wouldn't work at all, and mostly because the northern route was then out of the question. 

Note the average temperature in Fairbanks during the summer is 60 degrees Fahrenheit. 



> The only part of Alaska your commando's could hope to penetrate is the Pacific coastal area's. But then, the million doallr question is, why expend do much time and effort to put together a nuisence raid of no value in a backwater part of the war. And since your U-Boat couldnt sail through the arctic to get there, then why not put you sub to better use by sinking allied ships in conjunction with the IJN?



Anchorage would be an easy target for the commando's as they can be landed so very close to it, and like Adler said the temperatures are in the 60-70F degrees in the summer.

The biggest problem facing the entire Alaskan mission is the journey over there. Taking the southern path through the Panama canal it would take roughly a month and 10 days to reach Anchorage.


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## Soren (Jul 21, 2008)

Anyway lets leave the Alaska mission behind for now and lets start to debate the other areas such as the Panama canal and targets in Canada.


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## Freebird (Jul 21, 2008)

Soren said:


> Anyway lets leave the Alaska mission behind for now and lets start to debate the other areas such as the Panama canal and targets in *Canada*.



Targets in Canada? oh we are just a bunch of peace loving folks! No targets here!


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## Freebird (Jul 21, 2008)

freebird said:


> There is something else I was thinking, suppose you dropped a few mortar bombs on an airfield, what would be the immediate reaction? They would scramble the planes thinking that they were under attack right? So you have a couple of guys at the end of the runway with a HMG to knock the planes down before takeoff.



What did you think of this? How difficult is it to bring down a fighter during take-off with an MG?

{If you had your commando team set up close to one of the Allied air bases during the night}


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## Soren (Jul 21, 2008)

That beaver just makes you ROFL!


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## Soren (Jul 21, 2008)

freebird said:


> What did you think of this? How difficult is it to bring down a fighter during take-off with an MG?
> 
> {If you had your commando team set up close to one of the Allied air bases during the night}



Some MG nests should be able to make sure that no a/c leave the ground, shooting up their engines as soon as they enter the runway, and once a couple have been stopped they will block for the rest. On the ground a/c are sitting ducks and its easy to hit a target the size of their engines with an MG at 500y. Just load up some AP ammunition and shoot up the engine block. A 7.92mm S.m.K. round will punch straight through a V8 engine block at 100y.


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## Matt308 (Jul 21, 2008)

With a protected airbase? Assume you team is able to get real close to ensure reliable hits (within 200-300m). Sure you could knock down 1. A few. The scramble would be immediately canceled and then base personnel would be all over you. HMGs make a lot of noise and have no flash suppressors.

You are going to travel halfway around the planet, risking the lives of a U-Boat complement and SFs, to shoot down a couple of airplanes? Where is this thread headed?

I thought that the thread was to discuss strategic targets of importance. Heck airplanes came off the US assembly lines in minutes. So now the strategically unimportant Alaska is off the subject for debate (good it was stoopid anyway). On to the Panama Canal and Canada.

Panama Canal - Good target. But a single Uboat would do nothing other than shortly gum up the works. An efficiency hit at best. Your not going to destroy the locks with a singe SF team. Not with the defensive forces in place of such a strategic world asset.

Canada - Coastline targets on the east coast. How much physical damage could possibly occur? Psychological? Squash the press and paint it as an ordnance explosion, gas explosion, diaper fire.

Only a massive coordinated attack (time, target relavance, location, and psyops providing intent) are going to make ANY difference. Hell we had numerous occasions in the US during WWII where whole port facilities went up in flames. Didn't stop the war machine, irrespective of cause. The will and industrial machine was already 'balls out'.


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## Njaco (Jul 21, 2008)

No chance of that little cartridge making plant in Ohio, huh? Thought 90% of all cartridges being stopped might cause alittle panic.

(going back to my crayons now)


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## Freebird (Jul 21, 2008)

Njaco said:


> No chance of that little cartridge making plant in Ohio, huh? Thought 90% of all cartridges being stopped might cause alittle panic.
> 
> (going back to my crayons now)



No Njaco, it is an interesting suggestion. Do you think the Germans were aware of it's location importance.



Matt308 said:


> With a protected airbase?
> 
> First off, I think this attack has to occur *immediately* after Pearl Harbour, by summer 1942 these commando attacks would have much less chance of success and make little difference.
> 
> ...


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## Matt308 (Jul 21, 2008)

I heard ya Njaco. Are you implying that the UBoat would come down the St Lawrence Seaway? I didn't think that was completed until the 1950s. And then traverse the coast guard and land forces to Ohio? I'm not following.


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## Matt308 (Jul 21, 2008)

Right after Pearl? Perhaps defences would be sub par. But Germany was MORE than occupied on two fronts. And the Japanese Axis pact was only a discussion over Sake and Wine. To commit such an act would have dragged the US in on definite terms much earlier. Germany knew better based upon lessons learned from WWI. What would be the impetus to open another front on the ocean with a known industrial powerhouse? And my Alaskan boat tour indicated that the Alaskan defenses were established in 1939.

And now I'm speaking out of the knowledge base, but living in Seattle you get a historical perspective of the war industrial machine. I can assure you that the US govt did not begin defensive measures for industrial complexes on Dec 7th, 1941. They were more than mature by that time. It was only Pearl that put those plans into immediate play.


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## Freebird (Jul 21, 2008)

Matt308 said:


> Assume you team is able to get real close to ensure reliable hits (within 200-300m). Sure you could knock down 1. A few. The scramble would be immediately canceled and then base personnel would be all over you. HMGs make a lot of noise and have no flash suppressors.



In Nov of 1941 {during peacetime} how many troops would typically guard an airbase in the continental US?



Matt308 said:


> You are going to travel halfway around the planet, risking the lives of a U-Boat complement and SFs, to shoot down a couple of airplanes? Where is this thread headed?



The threads got a little confused earlier. As Parsifal stated {and I am in full agreement} the U-boats are too valuable, so they should be used for transport as little as possible. The best method IMO is if the Germans are to send commandos/saboteurs that they be sent via Vichy ships, probably embarking at Dakar, heading for the Caribbean. They would then enter Mexico and cross the US border on foot {or driving}. If the ship was stopped en route, the commandos would be posing as Vichy soldiers with small arms on their way to Martinique etc. {The US recognised the Vichy government, and made no attempt to restrict travel to Martinique pre-war.} 



Matt308 said:


> I thought that the thread was to discuss strategic targets of importance. Heck airplanes came off the US assembly lines in minutes. So now the strategically unimportant Alaska is off the subject for debate (good it was stoopid anyway). On to the Panama Canal and Canada.



At the outbreak of war the US has about 970 fighters in the continental US. The purpose of a few "spoiler attacks" against US airbases would be to bring confusion panic, and to make the government less likely to send everything overseas.

You are correct in stating that anymaterial losses will not make any difference. The prime purpose of these commando attacks IMO is to panic distract the government people of the US so that there is less imputus to send troops aircraft overseas quickly. The idea is for the Axis to buy enough time to consolidate Asia conquer Russia.

The secondary purpose of the commando attacks is to provide "headlines" so that the most urgent threat {the U-boat campaign} does not get attention.



Matt308 said:


> Panama Canal - Good target. But a single Uboat would do nothing other than shortly gum up the works. An efficiency hit at best. Your not going to destroy the locks with a singe SF team. Not with the defensive forces in place of such a strategic world asset.



Agreed, this target would not be feasable. I think Parsifal had the right idea, about laying mines using U-boats to lurk in the approaches.



parsifal said:


> *Now, Panama was one of the most heavily guarded targets prewar from landward attack. * It was protected by more than a full brigade of troops pre-war, and this was rapidly increased soon after hostilities broke out. *So, IMO a landward attack is not a great idea.*
> 
> If all of them were carrying 100 to 150 mines, and were ordered to move to various locations in the carribean, particularly off shore of Panama Canal, and rather than just blindly rush and declare war straight after PH, but rather wait a few days or a week whilst the blockade runners were put into position, then lay the mines just before the DOW, using the newer versions of mag mines, which the US could not sweep, my opinion is that utter chaos would reign in the US and carribean for many months.
> 
> ...





Matt308 said:


> Canada - Coastline targets on the east coast. How much physical damage could possibly occur? Psychological? Squash the press and paint it as an ordnance explosion, gas explosion, diaper fire.



Any attacks would have to be so blatent and undeniable so that they cannot be passed off as a "gas explosion"

Canada would be a more difficult target in the fall of 1941 IMO, because the better targets are farther away from the coast, and usually guarded because Canada is already at war.


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## Freebird (Jul 21, 2008)

Matt308 said:


> Right after Pearl? Perhaps defences would be sub par. But Germany was MORE than occupied on two fronts.



Well we are discussing what possible actions could have been taken. The investment is not that great, perhaps 500 - 1,000 "Brandenburger" commandos, and some small arms.

The other option is to stay neutral, allow the US Japan to fight it out, and to concentrate on fighting USSR UK. There is considerable disagreement whether Roosevelt could have got Congress to declare war on Germany, except that Hitler did it first. There was a large push in Congress {backed by the majority of the public} to stay out of the "European war" and to concentrate on smashing the Japanese.

*The worst possible option for Germany*, IMO is what Hitler was foolish enough to do, declare war on the USA while he had no way to do anything about it.



Matt308 said:


> And the Japanese Axis pact was only a discussion over Sake and Wine. To commit such an act would have dragged the US in on definite terms much earlier.



No actually Germany "dragged the US in" by declaring war the day after Pearl




Matt308 said:


> What would be the impetus to open another front on the ocean with a known industrial powerhouse?



The point would be this. Germany recognises that the US will enter the war on the side of the UK sooner or later. In fact the US is already halfway into the war by providing the UK with aircraft. They use the impending attack on "Pearl" to impede the US ability to aid the UK.



Matt308 said:


> And my Alaskan boat tour indicated that the Alaskan defenses were established in 1939.



Agreed. I cannot see any profitable attack on Alaska, it's too remote and without any easy targets. 



Matt308 said:


> And now I'm speaking out of the knowledge base, but living in Seattle you get a historical perspective of the war industrial machine. I can assure you that the US govt did not begin defensive measures for industrial complexes on Dec 7th, 1941. They were more than mature by that time. It was only Pearl that put those plans into immediate play.



What would have been the defences at an industrial complex in Nov 1941? Say at Boeing for example. A couple of squads?? Or a platoon? I wonder if Syscom might know the answer.

Remember that the US was very surprised to be attacked, it was only after war was declared that the complexes god adequate defence.


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## Matt308 (Jul 21, 2008)

Yes, yes. Agree.

So post Pearl, any attack of rather insignificant value would be ballyhooed in the US. It might serve as a moral booster to the German populace ( c.f., Doolittle's raid). But to what end? Certainly not in the context of a counterblow to an embarrassing German loss (i.e., like Pearl).

Panama Canal is the most intriguing target by far. Capable of suffering damage with the minimal amount of resource expenditure, yet creating the most amount of assymetric effect. But yet this was not lost on the US nor other western hemisphere countries.

It seems to me that any such attack on the Americas would need to be multifaceted (naval, air, SF), well timed in its execution to maximize the US press and local populace reaction, and be closely coordinated with an orchestrated psyops activity that provided indigenous people a direct understanding of the attacks and their relevance.

To do otherwise would be easily squashed by the US military machine. Small attacks never being capable if disabling the US war machine and occurring over extended timelines would be easily explained as accidents or natural disasters. Success would have to reside in maximizing the populace rumour machine and that would require timing and dissemination of propaganda directly to the local citizens.

All this spells of a MUCH bigger operation to be successful. This is not a single Uboat operation. Nor a SF team or two. This is big stuff requiring considerable assets, planning, and thus risk of discovery.


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## Matt308 (Jul 21, 2008)

I was composing my post at the same time as you Freebird. Looks like we are coming to very similar conclusions.


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## Freebird (Jul 21, 2008)

Matt308 said:


> Yes, yes. Agree.
> 
> So post Pearl, any attack of rather insignificant value would be ballyhooed in the US. It might serve as a moral booster to the German populace ( c.f., Doolittle's raid). But to what end? Certainly not in the context of a counterblow to an embarrassing German loss (i.e., like Pearl).



German public opinion is of little concern. Their reports in the fall of '41 are mostly about the Panzers carving up Russia. The point of the attacks it to influence US public opinion.

I am basing the probable US reaction on the historical reaction to the attack at Pearl on public opinion on the West coast. There was a sizable panic, as many people thought the Japanese were about to invade. *Imagine how much worse the panic if there were some actual attacks on the contimnental US!*

Consider some of the reports from the time:

Harry Elmer Barnes: Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century

*This Washington panic* relative to the Pearl Harbor situation, until it was evident that the Japanese task force was on its way home and there was no probability of any further immediate Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, *was momentarily so extreme that even some persons of high rank in Washington envisaged an actual Japanese occupation of the west coast of the United States.* The United States would then trade space for time and meet the advancing Japanese forces at the crest of the Rocky Mountains, with a final rampart around Denver. {Secratary of War} Stimson was one of those who were much alarmed and this may have suggested to him the cruel and precipitate action in moving the Japanese off the Pacific coast for which he was mainly responsible. 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Palo Alto Daily News


*It was believed that the West Coast stood completely defenseless and terrified civilians braced themselves for the possibility of Japanese troops storming up California beaches.* 

Looking back decades later with a certain amount of victorious historical hindsight, an American continent bordered on both sides by vast oceans seems rather impenetrable. But especially after the profound shock of Pearl Harbor, the possibility of a Japanese attack on the U.S. mainland seemed all too plausible - especially in the Bay Area. 

As rumors were flying everywhere, hours after the initial Japanese strike, *a report came into the Army's Western Defense Command that a Japanese fleet was just 30 miles off the San Francisco coast.* Sixty army trucks raced to the water below the Golden Gate Bridge to install anti-aircraft guns, and by nightfall every available Army man at the Presidio was digging trenches on the beach. 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

And I think that you will find that there was a similar panic reaction in Australia after the "Darwin raid"


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## Freebird (Jul 21, 2008)

Matt308 said:


> I was composing my post at the same time as you Freebird. Looks like we are coming to very similar conclusions.



Great minds think alike?  {or fools?}  




Matt308 said:


> Panama Canal is the most intriguing target by far. Capable of suffering damage with the minimal amount of resource expenditure, yet creating the most amount of assymetric effect. But yet this was not lost on the US nor other western hemisphere countries.



I don't see any easy way to attack it by land, but perhaps a freighter entering full of explosives, similar to "St. Naziere"? I can't imagine that they would be so careless though. A better plan would be to use the mines U-boats to wreak carnage on the traffic exiting.



Matt308 said:


> It seems to me that any such attack on the Americas would need to be multifaceted (naval, air, SF), *well timed in its execution to maximize the US press and local populace reaction,*





Matt308 said:


> *and be closely coordinated with an orchestrated psyops activity that provided indigenous people a direct understanding of the attacks and their relevance. *



Now those last part was brilliant! You understand exactly what the thrust will be!




Matt308 said:


> To do otherwise would be easily squashed by the US military machine. Small attacks never being capable if disabling the US war machine and occurring over extended timelines would be easily explained as accidents or natural disasters. Success would have to reside in maximizing the populace rumour machine and that would require timing and dissemination of propaganda directly to the local citizens.



Yes exactly!


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## Matt308 (Jul 21, 2008)

Yes, but the likelihood of pulling such a coordinated attack off with limited assets is very remote.

And the example that mass panic would ensue over a small scall attack is not supported by historical evidence. What about the Japanese phosphorous bombs dropped on Oregon. Or the Uboats in the Gulf of Mexico or just offshore of the eastern seaboard sinking ships within land sight.

I'm just not tracking on this one without a more massive and planned attack. I know I understand the thrust. I'm just trying to ascertain my continued participation in a hopeless scenario.


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## Freebird (Jul 22, 2008)

Matt308 said:


> All this spells of a MUCH bigger operation to be successful. This is not a single Uboat operation. Nor a SF team or two. This is big stuff requiring considerable assets, planning, and thus risk of discovery.



True enough. However I think there is a good chance that the true danger will not be realized until *after* the attacks, much the same way that the information hinting at the "9-11" attacks was only noticed after the fact.

Juha had some questions about intelligence Enigma, I'm not an expert, but I think Enigma was mot used to send info about "Black ops"

{There were a bunch of posts about Alaska following this, so I will re-quote it} 



Juha said:


> Quote-Freebird: "There is no big danger of the intelligence leaking out"
> 
> There may well be, the messages of Japan's Berlin ambassor were a big help to Allied intelligence, bacause they were able to read them. I cannot recall when they crack the Japanese diplomatic code but because they were able to read the instructions to Japanese embassy in Washington prior 7.12.41 odds are that they were able to read the messages in mid-41.
> 
> Juha





Freebird said:


> What I meant was that if the Allies do get some intelligence and do believe it, it won't help them much anyways.
> 
> Both the Allies and the Nazis *already knew* that the Japanese were gearing up for war, they just didn't know about Pearl Harbour, the information didn't help very much at Pearl Harbour.
> 
> ...






Juha said:


> Freebird
> 
> Bit farfetched, Germans had almost absolute trust on Enigma, so they would have used it. On the other hand I cannot recall the system Abwehr used, so I cannot state that as a fact and anyway not all Enigma systems were solved in late 41. So IMHO right thing to do is to assume that Germans used their normal system for sending black ops instructions.
> 
> Juha





Freebird said:


> The Germans never used Enigma for Commando/Black ops contack {AFAIK}, for the obvious reason of the danger of the machine being captured in the field. It was used to contact Generals in Army HQ {Europe}, U-Boats, and Embassies. Even if it was considered 100% secure, it was not used to send info to "Black Ops" teams, because of the danger of the messages being read by staff at the embassy, and also the danger to the agents being identified if they show up at the embassy to get a message.
> 
> Another point to remember that in the fall of 1941 *ONLY THE BRITISH * have access to enigma data, and the US does not know how reliable this data is.
> 
> ...


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## Freebird (Jul 22, 2008)

Matt308 said:


> Yes, but the likelihood of pulling such a coordinated attack off with limited assets is very remote.



Well that is what we might explore, just how feasable it is.



Matt308 said:


> And the example that mass panic would ensue over a small scale attack is not supported by historical evidence.



I think the "panic" factor wears out after 6 - 12 months, so it has to be done right away after "Pearl" We already know that there was considerable panic after Pearl, so any more attacks by commando's will only add to the general panic.




Matt308 said:


> What about the Japanese phosphorous bombs dropped on Oregon. Or the Uboats in the Gulf of Mexico or just offshore of the eastern seaboard sinking ships within land sight.



I think the phospho bombs were in late 42/43? The plan there was to start forest fires, but it didn't work. The problem with that plan is that the public didn't know about it. 

I guess the public just didn't connect with the sinking of ships, the same way that bombs falling seemed to get everybody exited.




Matt308 said:


> I'm just not tracking on this one without a more massive and planned attack. I know I understand the thrust. I'm just trying to ascertain my continued participation in a hopeless scenario.



Well I think it certainly has to be coordinated with the "maximum" U-boat offensive that Parsifal wrote in his last post. The primary purpose of the commando operations would be distraction IMO, and to push US public opinion against "foreign entanglements" in Europe, but towards a stronger defence of the USA.

If the USA devotes the majority of its forces to defend the Western Hemisphere and abandon Asia Europe to the Axis- well that's a win for the Axis I would think.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2008)

I think the role of any special forces committed to the "carribean/Panama solution, would be to try and neutralize the air assets in the region so as to facilitate the minelaying and U-Boat offensive that I mentioned. Here is the OB for the US in December 1941, including the available air strips.

Puerto Rico Sector, Caribbean Defense Command, United States Armed Forces, 7.12.1941

Caribbean Defense Command, United States Armed Forces, 7.12.1941

Whilst the canal zone is very heavily guarded, the limited number of airfields in the region dont appear as formidable. Taking out the airfields, or denying their use for even a few days will reduce the German losses from the air assets in the region. There are not that many airfields, plus the US would simply not be ready psychologically for such a concerted attack. the troops would need to be hidden in the transports, Norway style, with the transports (being some of the blockade runners also carrying mines) laying offshore, in International waters (where the US cannot legally board and search), until the signal to attack is given. You 500 elite forces men might just have a chance of neutralizing the key airfields, at least for a short while

Another possibility we have not talked about, is the use of italian chariots, or even SBS (Small Boat Squadrons) groups, to attack key navy yards, in the way of the Royal oak attack in 1939. The possibilities of this style of attack were shown to be feasible elsewhere, in places like Singpaore (1943, the Australian attack on Jap shipping by Kayaks launched from the MV Krait), the attacks in the gironde by the british (again using Kayaks) or even the 10 MAS, using limpet mines attached by frogmen in the style of the italaian attacks on the QE and Valiant, 1941. These would be launched from a modified merchant ship, in the style of of the Italian attacks intoGibraltar harbour, from that MS vessel in the Spanish Port near to Gib.

An attack into a major Navy yard, to sink or disable any major warship would cause material and psychological losses that can only be guessed at. Moreover, with US shipping being sunk at a massive rate, and the US forces seemingky unable to do anything about it, with what looks like an axis invasion into the Carribbean (shades of the cuban missile crisis i guess) and even major losses in the defended naval bases, I believe it is entirely likley that the US might retreat into a sort of isolationist panic, that may well have altered their fundamental war strategies


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## Negative Creep (Jul 22, 2008)

In material terms, the Commando team could only ever inflict a tiny amount of damage. Even if they blew up 100 B-17s, in a week or so another 100 would've been built to take their place. Unless they assassinated a top general or the President, their best weapon would be a psychological one. Attacking a base on mainland USA would mean the US wouldn't feel safe, and divert troops from the front to defend bases


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## drgondog (Jul 22, 2008)

Njaco said:


> No chance of that little cartridge making plant in Ohio, huh? Thought 90% of all cartridges being stopped might cause alittle panic.
> 
> (going back to my crayons now)



I think this company made dies and cartridge making loading tools. I know it did not make 90% of the ammunition.. there were arsenals all over the country that may have used their equipment but the revenues size clearly shows it was a reasonably small company.

It sounds to me like Pb hit a very key precision target with a small and vulnerable component - namely the power grid coming in.


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## syscom3 (Jul 22, 2008)

The problem with small commando teams is their inability to cause extensive damage, damage enough to really impact war production.

But ......I would suspect the following targets if damaged, would really cause problems.

1) The turbines at large dams
2) The boiler "room" at oil refineries.

The Panama Canal was always relatively simple to knock out. And if done by a commando crewed freighter, stuffed with explosives (like the USS Campball), they could shut down the canal for months with immense impact on naval operations.


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## Freebird (Jul 22, 2008)

Syscom3 said:


> The problem with small commando teams is their inability to cause extensive damage, damage enough to really impact war production.
> 
> I would suspect the following targets if damaged, would really cause problems.
> 
> ...



Yes and I don't imagine that they were very well protected pre-war {if at all}

The Axis presumably knew how to make diesel/fertilizer explosives? It would be much better if the teams could make explosives, rather than trying to bring tons of the stuff from Europe. How many pounds of explosive would be needed to blow a turbine room/boiler room? Could say 3 - 4 guys each with 40 pound backpacks do the job? {160 lb of explosive?}



syscom3 said:


> The Panama Canal was always relatively simple to knock out. And if done by a commando crewed freighter, stuffed with explosives (like the USS Campball), they could shut down the canal for months with immense impact on naval operations.



Did the US carefully search each ship before it approached the locks? {pre-war} And it would have to be a detailed search too, as IIRC the Germans were not aware of the explosives in the bow of the "Cambelton".



Parsifal said:


> Another possibility we have not talked about, is the use of italian chariots, or even SBS (Small Boat Squadrons) groups, to attack key navy yards, in the way of the Royal oak attack in 1939. The possibilities of this style of attack were shown to be feasible elsewhere, in places like Singpaore (1943, the Australian attack on Jap shipping by Kayaks launched from the MV Krait), the attacks in the gironde by the british (again using Kayaks) or even the 10 MAS, using limpet mines attached by frogmen in the style of the italaian attacks on the QE and Valiant, 1941. These would be launched from a modified merchant ship, in the style of of the Italian attacks intoGibraltar harbour, from that MS vessel in the Spanish Port near to Gib.



That's what I had thought too, although you said the Italian chariots would be top secret, so it would be "frogman style". The only problem is that the attacks would have to take place on "Pearl + 1". Germany would not want to risk drawing the US into the war until Japan attacks. I have assumed that the Germans are told that the Japanese will go to war with the US Allies if they don't get Dutch oil, *but* Germany does not know that Pearl will be attacked, or the exact date.

So when the attack happens in Hawaii {7 am} it is already 9 am in San Diego and noon in Norfolk Virginia. Assume that the Commando teams are ready to go into action the following night, would not every Naval base be on full alert?



Parsifal said:


> An attack into a major Navy yard, to sink or disable any major warship would cause material and psychological losses that can only be guessed at. Moreover, with US shipping being sunk at a massive rate, and the US forces seemingky unable to do anything about it, with what looks like an axis invasion into the Carribbean (shades of the cuban missile crisis i guess) and even major losses in the defended naval bases, I believe it is entirely likley that the US might retreat into a sort of isolationist panic, that may well have altered their fundamental war strategies



That would also play a big part in the "end game' strategy for the Axis. With a severe lack of shipping, and trouble brewing south of the border, the uS Congress may well decide to abandon plans for a major effort overseas. Perhaps Japan would agree to some compromise where control of the Philippines are returned {demilitarized of course} but that Japan keeps Indonesia, Malaya China. With enough distraction at home the public might be willing to accept that. {but perhaps not}


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