# Germany's Doomed Plan: Operation Bodenplatte and the Battle of Y-29. Thoughts?



## tbfighterpilot (Dec 15, 2011)

What do people think about Germany's Operation Bodenplatte (bottom plate), and the aerial battle of Y-29? Could it have been a success? Here are some videos from the History Channel's show Dogfights:

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=booCDyCFxFg_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JyJUXttD2oQ_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rjnYo7qECzg_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LryvsoDEl7w_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ss1TWvRhDGI_


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 15, 2011)

Dang it, I missed this show. Thanks for posting!


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## mhuxt (Dec 15, 2011)

No, I don't think it could have been a success. A "Grosser Schlag" to reverse the defeats of early 1944 might have worked if the 262 had been ready to take up the slack immediately thereafter, in March or so, but that's all woulda coulda shoulda. By April '44 (give or take a month or two?) the Third Reich was already dead, it just hadn't fallen down yet.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 16, 2011)

Instead of attacking the airports by sun rise, they attacked around 10 o'clock. Expecting that Allie pilots AAA crews would've been still in bed by that time was wishful thinking. While the attack might've been a pretty unpleasant deal for Allies, the outcome of war was decided some 2 years ago.


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## gjs238 (Dec 16, 2011)

Just seems that the greater the effort Germany expended in the West meant more of the East that would be occupied by the Soviets.
Regardless, it was just delaying the inevitable.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 16, 2011)

There was a lot of low time pilots in the Bodenplatte attack, a predawn takeoff would had added extra hazards, and low level navigation in the dark is difficult even for experienced pilots.

I don't know how much distance there was between the fields they took off from and the points they attacked, but 10 am does seem a little late. Maybe there was some early morning fog that delayed takeoffs.


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## pbfoot (Dec 16, 2011)

It was New Years day and if half of the Allied crews were not hungover , I`ll paint your house. They were young guys away from home surounded by Congnac. Champagne etc . 
here is link to a story about a Xmas party 
A Biggin Hill Christmas > Vintage Wings of Canada


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## gjs238 (Dec 16, 2011)

Vat 69?


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## pbfoot (Dec 16, 2011)

delete


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## pbfoot (Dec 16, 2011)

gjs238 said:


> Vat 69?


Its gotta be in there , I'm aware of one Sqn that had over 50cs of champagne which worked out to about 2.5 bottles for everyone including groundcrew


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## Milosh (Dec 16, 2011)

Sun rise for Brussels is 8:45AM.

At 8:25AM, 16 Me109s of I./JG27 took off. Take off times for most units taken part in Bodenplatte can be found in the Bodenplatte book by Manrho and Putz.

Many of the units flew with navigation lights on for part of the flight to the target.

Sun rise times can be found @ Sunrise and Sunset for Belgium – Brussels – January 1992


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## tomo pauk (Dec 16, 2011)

The same book claims that time of attack was set at 9:20. It also states that many (most?) of the losses inflicted by Allied fighters occurred after 9:30, mostly around the bases they were defending. 

Another fail of the planning was that quite a few of front-line crossing routes chosen were just above the areas of bitter ground battles, where Allies have had decent amount of AAA assets. And by 9:30 the AAA guarding Allied airfields was ready to harm the attackers.

Another thing that was going against LW fighter units was that many of young pilots were having hardly any experience of ground strafing, not to mention strafing of a target defended by AAA. Hence they've inflicted less damage, while experiencing greater losses.


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## davebender (Dec 16, 2011)

It's my understanding the operation was originally supposed to compliment the Ardennes Offensive. Take out U.S. and British CAS aircraft so they couldn't attack the Heer in Belgium. That has some military logic.

Launching Bodenplatte during January 1945 was simply throwing aircraft away as the Ardennes Offensive was already over. IMO they should have launched a massive attack on a daylight bomber formation instead.


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## Siegfried (Dec 16, 2011)

Germany had to defeat the Allies at the Normandy beach head. It was certainly possible in certain circumstances: for instance IF the Germans had of moved their troops and aircraft there at least 2 weeks earlier then what happened at Omaha might have lead to failure for the alliers there and at other landing sites. Had they widely introduced the rewirable reflector for the enigma machine; UKWD, (Unkehr Walze D) in 1943 then allied cypher penetration of enigma would have collapsed and with it a huge allied advantage. UKWD was only used in small numbers from 1943 and hence made no difference; in fact it sometimes made things worse as opperators asked "Do you have UKWD" which provided a crib for a break in.

What strikes me is the lag in introduction of the Me 109G-10, Me 109K-4 and FW 190D-9 and D-12 was so late. These aircraft need to be moved forward some 6-9 months so that they are seeing service at the begining of 1944 (january) in serious numbers instead of the end. It is at this time that the P-51B is seeing its first service. The Me 109G-14AM and probably also the Me 109G-14ASM also need to be moved forward 9 months and the 1.42 ata rating also needs to be released earlier. This at least gives the Luftwaffe pilots aircraft that keeps more of them alive. At the very minimum the very basic mods that could be done to the Me 109 to keep its speed up need to be introduced in the manufacturing line:
cleaned up gun bulges, retractable tail wheel, ERLA haube, galland hood and higher precision manufacturing. The latter alone can easily add 12km/h. In total there is over 12 perhaps 20 mph there. This was all understood. 

I'm also inclined to assert that had a lightweight ejection seat similar to that used on the He 162 been introduced on 109s, 190s and 262s in early 1944 that so many more pilots would have survived it would have kept the skill level of the Luftwaffe up dramatically.

The Me 262 could have been ready. Though seeing service trials in mid 1944 it wasn't untill late 1944 with the introducion of the Jumo 004B4 with hollow blades that the production engine became reasonably reliabe. An aspect of reliabillity that could have been much earlier was better fuel control, the so called beschleunigungs ventile (accelerator valve) that would have helped to keep the engines temperaturs stable and controlled. This poor fuel control was a problem with allied engines as well. In general the engineers involved regretted that not enough attention had been paid early on in introducing proper control; there was not leap in technology required, just an application of existing art. Measure or estimate the airflow rate accuratly and add fuel proportionatly such that the engine neither falmes out from fuel starvation nor burns through due to over supply.


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## pbfoot (Dec 16, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> I'm also inclined to assert that had a lightweight ejection seat similar to that used on the He 162 been introduced on 109s, 190s and 262s in early 1944 that so many more pilots would have survived it would have kept the skill level of the Luftwaffe up dramatically.


Not really lots more guys in the hispital with back problems, and to eject from 109 you are going to loose your legs from mid thigh down . So alls you achieve is a lot of LW pilots bumming around


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## Readie (Dec 16, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> and to eject from 109 you are going to loose your legs from mid thigh down



How come? Is it because of the size of the cockpit?
John


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## Siegfried (Dec 16, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> Not really lots more guys in the hispital with back problems, and to eject from 109 you are going to loose your legs from mid thigh down . So alls you achieve is a lot of LW pilots bumming around



Feldwebel Alfred Staffa ejected ejected no less than 3 times from He 219 in night combat, unhurt each time.
2005
2005

I see no reason why a pilot should loose his knees ejecting from a 109, it would be engineered appropriatly with foot straps to pull in the knees or foot rests to position accordingly.

German ejection seas did not use a blind, but used an arm rest to relieve the torso of weight and compose correct spinal alignment.

Some post was soviet seats had a bad reputation for causing spinal injury, they opperated at nearly 25g.


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## pbfoot (Dec 16, 2011)

Hmmm obviously never seen an ejector seat nor a 109 , so when ejecting from 109 it would have to be a capsule taking with the instrument panel (that where the legs cease to hang onto body) probably adding a minimum of 600lbs to an already over stretched airframe . Gotta love them rockets or 20mm shells blowing straight down into fuel tank to get seat out . And as for Staffa good for him I haven't met anyone that ejected from aircraft that hasn't been alittle bacnged up but I forgot we are dealing with a better class of human


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## pbfoot (Dec 16, 2011)

Readie said:


> How come? Is it because of the size of the cockpit?
> John


instrument panel and all the structure under wind screen realizing your legs are tucked under it . So as you ejected your legs would catch under all that , would be the same in a Spit or Hurri and probably every single seater of WW2 vintage its a fools errand


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## Erich (Dec 16, 2011)

the op was ill-conceived from the very start chatted with several LW pilots that flew on this ill fated day, would of been better to send bombed up equipped LW night fighters to attack the bases as they probably would of been more familiar with the AF and the surrounding landscape since they were involved in ground attack from the very onset of the bulge battles. some of the NJG Ju 88 crews never flew in this area since some were from NJG 100 serving on the Ost front.
as to ejection seats none of the single seaters were equipped like the 109/Fw 190 variants it was protocol to zoom upward at 1000 ft if lying low level, pop the canopy and then turn the craft upside down and drop out this again told to me from over 20 LW pilots during 44/45. many of you have seen the US Mustang cine films that proves this very procedure


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## tbfighterpilot (Dec 16, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> The same book claims that time of attack was set at 9:20. It also states that many (most?) of the losses inflicted by Allied fighters occurred after 9:30, mostly around the bases they were defending.
> 
> Another fail of the planning was that quite a few of front-line crossing routes chosen were just above the areas of bitter ground battles, where Allies have had decent amount of AAA assets. And by 9:30 the AAA guarding Allied airfields was ready to harm the attackers.
> 
> Another thing that was going against LW fighter units was that many of young pilots were having hardly any experience of ground strafing, not to mention strafing of a target defended by AAA. Hence they've inflicted less damage, while experiencing greater losses.



The German fighters also had to face some of their own AAA, along with the AAA defending the bases.


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## Siegfried (Dec 17, 2011)

View attachment 187094


Serious consideration was given to a standard ejection seat for the FW 190, at one point pilots at rechlin demanding it.
I believe weight of the early pneumatic seats was one concern, which was overcome with latter seats like the below
pyrotechnical unit from a He 162

View attachment 187100


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## tomo pauk (Dec 17, 2011)

tbfighterpilot said:


> The German fighters also had to face some of their own AAA, along with the AAA defending the bases.



Indeed; a need to hold the assault in secret fired back vs. Luftwaffe, since many of their AAA crews were not informed that single engined planes coming from west could be LW's own ones.


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## davebender (Dec 17, 2011)

Most RAF Spitfires were the Mk V model right up to 1944. The U.S. was still using thousands of P-40s plus early model P-47s and P-51s. These are aircraft the Me-109F4, Me-109G6 and Fw-190A can deal with.

1944 Germany didn't have enough fuel to train pilots for the surprisingly large number of Me-109s, Fw-190s and Ju-88Gs that Albert Speer was producing. I think building additional hydrogenation plants for production of aviation gasoline would do more good then earlier introduction of any specific aircraft type.


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## Siegfried (Dec 17, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> Indeed; a need to hold the assault in secret fired back vs. Luftwaffe, since many of their AAA crews were not informed that single engined planes coming from west could be LW's own ones.



Supposedly 25% of the Boddenplatte strike was lost in some way through own FLAK. Was it REALLY that effective?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 17, 2011)

Hi, Dave,

LW is in war with 3 major air forces. The numbers are clearly against them, whether we talk about planes, pilots or fuel. So if they need a plane with pilot and fuel, they better produce planes with clear edge capability-wise. IOW, if the adversaries are fielding 400-430-mph fighters, a production of a plane that can hardly make 410 is not a good bet. The 450 mph plane is a must, but there is nothing that can achieve such a performance leap, short of a jet. At least not before 1945, and even then in token numbers.

As for what types were used vs. LW on West:
Even in 1st half of 1944 the wast majority of P-47s was of -D sub series, with water-injection paddle blade prop. The vast majority of P-51s was of B C sub types. P-40s were present only in Italy, for USAAC. The major RAF fighters in 1944 in ETO are Spit IX, XII, Typhoon, with Spit XIV and Tempest being introduced. Spit V is in good numbers present in MTO, not ETO. So the LW battles in ETO vs. types that are either equal, or better performers.

I do agree that Germany was in need of more hydrogenation plants, it's better to have Bf-109G-6 in the air, then Bf-109G-10 the airport


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## Erich (Dec 17, 2011)

German ground defenses were not told of the approaching LW led by Lohste pathfinder crews which in essence got lost themselves, the combination of Allied and German AA on the LW was horrific and a person can understand the depression that was already setting in with the doom of the mission before any Allied A/C parked on fields were taken on.

as per the second part of the question on Y-29 and the 352nd fg bluenosers, I have interviewed a couple chaps flying with the Mustang group on this very mission and certainly the two squads left on the ground watching the op unfold were curious why the attacking 109's Fw's of JG 11 seem to be so focused on Allied ground targets that the US 487th fg even on taking off were shooting the LW out of the skies. almost as if all raw recruits as JG 11 it appeared did not watn to mix it up with the Mustangs or the P-47's on the far side of the field operated by the 9th AF. for JG 11's attack it became a slaughter of German youth.


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## Juha (Dec 17, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Supposedly 25% of the Boddenplatte strike was lost in some way through own FLAK. Was it REALLY that effective?



No. one of the myths Galland spread, 5% was shot down by German Flak and 47% by Allied AAA.

Juha


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## Gixxerman (Dec 17, 2011)

> Germany's Doomed Plan: Operation Bodenplatte and the Battle of Y-29. Thoughts?



A tragic loss of young lives (on all sides) as the Luftwaffe leadership attempted to pi$$ up a rope. 
In short a tragic utterly futile badly planned waste which could and would make no difference at all to the coming total defeat.

Speer might well have organised things extremely well gathered some very impressive production results.....but it was basically (if what I have read is true) the total 'hollowing out' of German productive capacity and supply; in other words they pretty much used up all the resources they had available to accomplish this and after mid 1945 there was very little left in the cupboard, from strategic metals to oils to avgas it had all either been used up or destroyed - or stranded in places where it was of no use whatsoever - within a transport network that was on the verge of being utterly and totally destroyed.
Primarily - and most disastrously - this means no rail network or canal network......and God help anything trying to move in daylight on the roads.

I just don't see it, there is no imminent German 'wonder weapon' that can reverse the tide from east west.......with the exception, as everyone probably knows I'm bound to say at this point, of the A-bomb, which was not imminent for Germany (despite some bizzarre claims about tests in the east).
But then, thankfully, the German leadership were crazy enough not only to throw out large numbers of the world's best atomic scientists but they were also nuts enough to let them leave and go over to the allied nations. 

Whether it's more underground fuel facilities or slightly better aircraft or more jets or whatever all I can see happening is the inevitable gets delayed, until the bomb is deployed in Europe or the Soviet armies occupy most, if not all, of western Europe......or just as happened with Japan the bomb is deployed at least in part to stop the Soviets occupying most, if not all, of western Europe.
Thank God that one never happened.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 17, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> The major RAF fighters in 1944 in ETO are Spit IX, XII, Typhoon, with Spit XIV and Tempest being introduced. Spit V is in good numbers present in MTO, not ETO.



the 1st january '44 the RAF had in ETO 24 squadrons with Spitfire V, 20 with Spit IX, 2 with Spit XII (so it's not a major), 19 with Typhoon, (5 edit 3, i had write 5 before to add Spit XII, with other fighters); was reported that V squadrons were in more safe area. the 1st july there were 33 Spitfire IX squadrons (+2 with IX&XVI), 19 with Typhoon , 8 with Mustang III, 6 with Spit V and 6 with Spit V&IX, (and 19 with other or mixed fighters (1 with Spit XIV and 3 with Tempest V + 1 in transition to Tempest V, 1 with Spitfire XII).


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## Elmas (Dec 17, 2011)

It has to be remembered, as Albert Speer states in his memories, that the Third Reich has chromium reserves for his armament factories just until the end of 1945.
And without chromium, no heat resistant steel...
And without heat resistant steel , no armaments.....
Bodenplatte was just a pinprick for the Allied.....


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## tomo pauk (Dec 17, 2011)

Hi, Vicenzo,
That makes 46 non-Spit V squadrons (more than 700 fighters - quite s number for Germans to compete) vs. 24 Spit V squadrons, for 1.1.1944.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 17, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> Hi, Vicenzo,
> That makes 46 non-Spit V squadrons (more than 700 fighters - quite s number for Germans to compete) vs. 24 Spit V squadrons, for 1.1.1944.


 
i edited there was 44 not Spit V squadrons, and so? Spit V remain a major type sure more of Spit XII

sure the fighter line of FC changed look in winter/spring 44 (they take out also the old original Spit IX was the most common in 1/1/44)


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## Siegfried (Dec 17, 2011)

Elmas said:


> It has to be remembered, as Albert Speer states in his memories, that the Third Reich has chromium reserves for his armament factories just until the end of 1945.
> And without chromium, no heat resistant steel...
> And without heat resistant steel , no armaments.....
> Bodenplatte was just a pinprick for the Allied.....



A number of German engines were to receive turbine blades of mild carbon steel to overcome the looming chromium shortage. There was the BMW P.3307 (a 1900kg thrust engine ordered as a backup to the HeS 011), the HeS 011 itself and (from memmory) the disposable Porsche 005 for the V1.

About 2 hours service life was expected. This is not as silly as it sounds as it is sufficient for 1 or 2 missions. The turbine on the BMW 003 could be swapped out in less than two hours while the engine remained on the wing and better engineering could surely cut that down to much less, perhaps 10 minutes. Such a turbine would be cheap to produce (hollow and stamped) and so it would be affordable, the metal would be recycled. Proably less costly than the ammunition the aircraft would fire and the fuel it would burn.

Other solutions included water cooling (some blades were built) and ceramics. The ceramics would likely have only been used on the inlet nozzle vanes as they tended to fracture as blades


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## Juha (Dec 17, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> ... The turbine on the BMW 003 could be swapped out in less than two hours while the engine remained on the wing and better engineering could surely cut that down to much less, perhaps 10 minutes...



IMHO probably not, Germans found out that the theoretical engine change time for Jumo 004B was clearly optimistic because of poor fitment, the price of dispersed production and the use of semi-skilled workers, and the conditions on airfields because of numerous air attacks.

Juha


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## Siegfried (Dec 17, 2011)

Juha said:


> IMHO probably not, Germans found out that the theoretical engine change time for Jumo 004B was clearly optimistic because of poor fitment, the price of dispersed production and the use of semi-skilled workers, and the conditions on airfields because of numerous air attacks.
> 
> Juha



Probably yes. The BMW 003 was a different design and the anular combustion chamber had a life of 200 hours; this meant that only the turbine needed service and that could be done on the wing: 2 hours maintenance per hour 20 hours of flight time is a good ratio. The Jumo did require more work: more because the combustion chamber cans (which were of mild steel) needed replacement every 25 hours: this required the engine to be dropped from the airframe to get access, furthermore more disassembly was required to access the turbine. In practice engines were swapped out (an relatively easy task) and maintained offline. Anthony Kay gives 8 manhours for the total opperation. It was quite achievable, though not on first attempt. People learn.


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## davebender (Dec 17, 2011)

Only at high altitude where American heavy bombers operated. 

Most air combat (and all CAS) took place below 6,000 meters. The Me-109G6 was as good or better then the P-47 and P-51 below 6,000 meters.


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## Juha (Dec 17, 2011)

Hello Dave
whether or not 109G was better than worse than Allied fighters near deck, during Bodenplatte Allied fighters won the air combats appr. 66 vs 15 kills, ie exchange rate was over 4:1 to Allied advance.

Juha


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## davebender (Dec 17, 2011)

Germany deployed about 1,000 aircraft for the operation. 66 kills = 6.6% loss rate. IMO that's not a terribly impressive performance by Allied fighter aircraft who had the benefit of ground control radar.


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## Gixxerman (Dec 17, 2011)

Well fundamentally there remains the not so small issue of how you transport anything that still can be manufactured in a country with an utterly devastated transportation system incapable of moving large or heavy objects in safety and which needs to import aluminium ores, amongst numerous other materials.

.....or where the trained pilots are going to come from in a country swarming with huge numbers of allied aircraft night and day to fly whatever can still be made.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 17, 2011)

davebender said:


> Germany deployed about 1,000 aircraft for the operation. 66 kills = 6.6% loss rate. IMO that's not a terribly impressive performance by Allied fighter aircraft who had the benefit of ground control radar.


 Bodenplatte lost 270-274 Luftwaffe aircraft, and in the great confusion of battle there's no way for sure what shot down each aircraft, they didn't have time to call in CSI to investigate, though, no doubt AA got the majority.
Seeing as how 11 of the 34 strikes did achieve surprize, and the attackers came in below radar, I'd say the allies done pretty well.


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## Elmas (Dec 18, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> A number of German engines were to receive turbine blades of mild carbon steel to overcome the looming chromium shortage. There was the BMW P.3307 (a 1900kg thrust engine ordered as a backup to the HeS 011), the HeS 011 itself and (from memmory) the disposable Porsche 005 for the V1.
> ..................



Chrominum serves not only for the turbine blades, but for the gun barrels, for the piercing armor bullets etc....


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## Siegfried (Dec 18, 2011)

Elmas said:


> Chrominum serves not only for the turbine blades, but for the gun barrels, for the piercing armor bullets etc....



There seem to have been a number of programs to eliminate the requirement for chromium entirely for some weapons: For instance various techniques (anealing, tempering etc) were developed to produce High Velocity Anti Tank ammunition quite succesfully I might add. The BMW 801 was being developed into an engine made of heimats material while the important 55mm Geraet 58 FLAK gun was also being developed in this way not to use any alloy steels at all: and this weapon had a muzzle velocity of 3,350 fps (1,020 mps). I would say they would be able to work around their alloy shortages. I might add the Germans were even working on replacing molydenum and tungsten on the filaments of their light bulbs and vacuum tubes with titanium which they seemed to have indigenous supplies of, from Cuxhaffen. Uranium cores were even used to replace tungsten in some PzGr 40 rounds.


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## Siegfried (Dec 18, 2011)

davebender said:


> Only at high altitude where American heavy bombers operated.
> 
> Most air combat (and all CAS) took place below 6,000 meters. The Me-109G6 was as good or better then the P-47 and P-51 below 6,000 meters.



I would tend to disagree, the P-51B/C/D was significantly faster at any altitude, the gap was only closed off at and only at alitude with the Me 109K-4 and perhaps G-10 from October 1944, this is too late. These aircraft could it seems out turn a P-51. At low altitude the P-51 was faster. Having said that an Me 109K4 running at 1.98 ata could outrun a Spitfire Mk XIV usiing 100/150 octane and 25psig at sea level. The Luftwaffe would need something better than the Me 109G6 when the USAAF introduces the P-51B in December 43. The plane Jane Me 109G6 did have some tricks, for instance a steep corkscrew climb that no allied aircraft could follow. The P-47, despite a modest climb, was still fast, and came into its own at altitude.


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## Erich (Dec 18, 2011)

losses for Bodenplatte :

Allies

S/E 143 destroyed, 139 damaged
T/E 74 destroyed, 12 damaged
4/E 232 destroyed, 156 damaged

LW losses

9 Ju 88 destroyed, 4 damaged

271 109/190's destroyed, 65 damaged

claims by Allied 2nd TAF 57
claims by 9th AF 40

total AAA claims 129

reasons for LW failure:

47 % by Allied AAA
23 % by Allied fighters
5 % by German Flak
5 % by accidents
5 % by Allied Flak or Allied fighters
3 % by tech probs
1 % by fuel starvation
11 % to unknown causes

R. Pütz and J. Manhro tome, anyone care to share more about the original title of this thread: Y-29 ?


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## Vincenzo (Dec 18, 2011)

what's the source for this losses?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 18, 2011)

The book 'Bodenplatte' by authors Erich stated:

Amazon.com: Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope -The Attack on Allied Airfields, New Year's Day 1945 (9781902109404): John Manrho: Books


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## Erich (Dec 18, 2011)

the authors names are at the bottom of my posting, the most authoritative volume on the subject besides the many US 8th fg histories published and yes I have a few plus knowing some of the US Mustang pilots flying this very mission..........

"Bodenplatte" published through Hikkoki publications. all books are second rate to this single volume


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## Vincenzo (Dec 18, 2011)

sorry i explain wrong, i've understand that losses came from Putz and Manhro book, but they used luftwaffe source for the luftwaffe losses and allied for allied losses or used allied sources alone?


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## Juha (Dec 18, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> sorry i explain wrong, i've understand that losses came from Putz and Manhro book, but they used luftwaffe source for the luftwaffe losses and allied for allied losses or used allied sources alone?


They used both LW and Allied sources, a book worth of having if you are interesting 1944-45 actions in ETO.

Juha


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## Milosh (Dec 18, 2011)

LOL, it was a good day when there was a staffel of Ta152Hs.


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## Njaco (Dec 18, 2011)

Lets keep the sarcasm to a minimum, please.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 18, 2011)

if i understad right BS274 (painted bf274) was w/o guns production page 031


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## Njaco (Dec 18, 2011)

May I suggest we get back on track.

If you want to discuss Spit vs 109, try here.....

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/spitfire-v-me109-i-have-found-these-links-net-29431.html


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## tyrodtom (Dec 18, 2011)

The performance of the individual aircraft had very little to do with the failure of operation Bodenplatte, It was the faulty planning based on poor intelligence, and having too few experienced pilots to perform the mission. The attack was doomed before the first aircraft took off. 

The Luftwaffe never before lost as many pilots in a single day, they never recovered from the losses. The allies lost a lot of aircraft in the attacks also, but few pilots.

The allies easily replaced the aircraft lost. The Luftwaffe lost experienced pilots they could never replace, and inexperienced pilots who with a little more experience might have made some difference later.


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## parsifal (Dec 18, 2011)

Spot on the money Tyrodtom.


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## Elmas (Dec 19, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> There seem to have been a number of programs to eliminate the requirement for chromium entirely for some weapons:
> ..................



The development of all these programs required the most scarce raw material of the Third Reich: time.


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## tbfighterpilot (Dec 20, 2011)

Thank you Njaco, I think we should get back on track. You can go to the thread: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/spitfire-v-me109-i-have-found-these-links-net-29431.html to talk about the Me 109 and Spitfire.


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## Njaco (Dec 28, 2011)

I just love being ignored.


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## pbfoot (Dec 28, 2011)

Njaco said:


> I just love being ignored.


kinda like being married


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## MikeGazdik (Dec 28, 2011)

It was a waste of planes and pilots. Now, if somehow they could have sent all of those fighters across the Channel and hit only the 4 engined bomber bases, it may have had more of an affect maybe. But it was too little, too late regardless. You cannot win a war, while only in a defensive posture. And since around 43 or so, the Luftwaffe was primarily defensive. (in the West)


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## Njaco (Dec 28, 2011)

MikeGazdik said:


> It was a waste of planes and pilots. *Now, if somehow they could have sent all of those fighters across the Channel and hit only the 4 engined bomber bases*, it may have had more of an affect maybe. But it was too little, too late regardless. You cannot win a war, while only in a defensive posture. And since around 43 or so, the Luftwaffe was primarily defensive. (in the West)



or Galland's Big Blow. How would that have been if Galland was able to use those machines the way he wanted to?


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## Njaco (Jan 2, 2012)

I can see this is starting to get heated, so I will say again - move the Spitvs109 conversation to the appropriate thread. I know threads wander but this is far off topic.


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## Erich (Jan 2, 2012)

Njaco has given final warning and ANY more proceeding and this thread starting up as quite interesting will be shut down, members will be personally warned in the upcoming year to stay on topic during 2012, this crap stops today..........................

VERSTEHEN SIE ?

V/R E ~


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## Erich (Jan 2, 2012)

jabber what the H** you understand English obviously and you went ahead and answered on OT .......................


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## Kryten (Jan 2, 2012)

Other than Y29, were there any other major engagements during Bodenplatte?


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## Njaco (Jan 2, 2012)

Enough is enough!

All posts relating to the Spitfire have been moved to here....

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...09-i-have-found-these-links-net-29431-30.html

If you want to continue the discussion, I suggest you spend your time on that thread. One more post about the Spitfire *not *within the context of this thread will bring a 30 day vacation.

No more warnings.


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## Matt308 (Jan 2, 2012)

Well. Pretty much sums that up.

Carry on.


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## pbfoot (Jan 2, 2012)

wasn't 2 TAF more of a target then the USAAF


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## Njaco (Jan 3, 2012)

I think they got the brunt of it Neil.

This is something I put together about 10 years ago from various sources - I can't remember which. Some stuff you may recognize but I make no claim to being the author. This is the part about Y-29.

JG 11 went after the 2nd TAF airfield at Asch in Belgium, operational base for four Spitfire-squadrons. The attack on the Asch airbase, known as Y-29, was a total disaster. When JG 11 reached Y-29 they found eight Thunderbolts of the 390th Fighter Squad, 366 Fighter Group circling the field and twelve Mustangs of the 487th Fighter Squad, 352nd Fighter Group just taking off.

The Luftwaffe units assigned to attack Asch in Belgium were the I, II, and III Gruppen of JG 11, commanded by Oberstleutnant Gunther Specht, Kommodore of the Geschwader. The three Gruppen of JG 11 were stationed at Darmstadt-Griesheim, Gross-Ostheim and Zellhausen all southwest of Frankfort. Sixty-five Fw 190's and Bf 109's of the three Gruppen of JG 11 took off from their respective bases just before 08:30 hours and formed up over Aschaffenburg, joining with two Ju 188 pathfinders and headed for Asch. Radio silence and low altitude were the order of the day. So secret was Unternehmen Bodenplatte that the Germans own ground forces were not notified of the large formations of German fighters that would be flying overhead. This resulted in at least one casualty for JG 11 as they were assaulted by friendly fire on their way to Asch.

On December 31st 1945, the 352nd had received its orders for the 1st day of the New Year. They were to provide escort for 8th Air Force Bombers on a mission to bomb targets near Berlin. The 366th also had received their orders for the New Year. The 391st was to leave early in the morning to attack German armor at Ondenval. Two flights of the 390th were also scheduled to take off slightly later in the morning with the same objective. Thus it was that eight P 47's of the 366th would be circling over Asch, and twelve P 51's of the 487th would be on the flight line as the Luftwaffe approached.

As JG 11 approached Asch, the eight P 47's of the 390th were just forming up over Asch to head out over the Ardennes in search of German armor. As the 390th finished forming up they spotted flak bursts over the Ophoven field. At this same moment Lt Col. John Meyer was just beginning to roll down the runway. Heading for Ophoven to investigate, the 390th was surprised to see a large formation of Fw 190's and Bf 109's approaching Asch from the northeast at 1500 ft. The eight P 47's of the 390th jettisoned their bombs and external tanks and attacked, breaking up the formation. This turned out to be a key blow to the JG 11, without which the mustangs of the 487th may not have so easily taken to the air. The 390th claimed seven German aircraft in this attack taking a loss of only one.

Meanwhile Meyer was lifting off with the rest of the 487th behind him. As he rose from the runway he found himself faced with the oncoming JG 11. With a full load of fuel in his fuselage tank, making low altitude maneuvering difficult, and gear still retracting he fired at an oncoming Fw 190 scoring hits and sending the German aircraft crashing into the field. Meyer went on to claim a second Fw 190 before the battle was over.

The battle over Asch went on for 30 minutes. Eleven pilots of the 487th claimed twenty-three victories while sustaining no losses, and just three aircraft damaged in the air. Among those killed or missing from JG 11 were Lt. Alwin Doppler of 2./JG 11, Ofw. Franz Meindl of 8./JG 11, Major Günther Specht of Stab./JG 11 and Alfred Mannchen. JG 11 also lost Hptm. Horst-Günther von Fassong of Stab./JG 11 with 136 victories (including four four-engined bombers) when he was shot down and killed near Maastricht. Ofw. Karl Hiller of Stab III./JG 11 was shot down and taken prisoner. On the return trip several more JG 11 and other German fighters fell to friendly fire before the German guns could be called off.


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## pbfoot (Jan 3, 2012)

It looks at least to me and using wiki that in each airfield attacked the losses were over 33% for the LW just curious as to why Y29 seems to be the battle that everyone talks about , is it possibly because its the only one "Dogfights" covered


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## Njaco (Jan 3, 2012)

I dunno why.

JG 1 was decimated as was JG 2 among the fighters. REading a book "Six Months to Oblivion" by Werner Gerbig that - while having some mistakes gives a good account from the German perspective.

Also "To Win the Winter Sky" isn't bad either.

Here is a map from Gerbig's book.


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## Sirkreu (Apr 17, 2013)

Hello all,

An important factor (together with others) for the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the airbattle above Y-29/Y-32, and the luck for the Americans on Y-29 is the fact that the Luftwaffe probably had mistaken about which airfields to attack. 

I will explain. First of all Y-32 and Y-29 were situated 5 miles apart, near to the village of "Genk" (used to be called Genck in 1945) situated in the middle of the province of Limburg, Flanders, Belgium. Genk was and is known for its coalmines, so a lot of high slag-heaps (black hills) were in the vicinity (also a factor for confusion). But most of all, Y-32 was called "Ophoven" (Ophoven is next to the village of Opglabbeek). But there is another "Ophoven" in the province of Limburg, Flanders, Belgium. This Ophoven is situated in the North-East part of Limburg next to the village of "Kinrooi" (near the Dutch/German border). The Luftwaffe probably came from the North-East direction and didn't found an airfield in this "Ophoven", so they went to Y-32 (which they probably took for Y-29). So the American pilots on the real Y-29 had an all important postpone of time to start the airbattle. Ofcourse also luckily they were awake and in their planes! A lot of factors were playing for this defeat.

On Y-32 there were several planes destoyed by the Germans. The GPS-coordinates for Y-32 are N51°02'30" and E05°32'31".

Y-29 was called Asch (knowadays the village is called "As"), but actually the village where Y-29 was situated is "Wiemesmeer" near the village of "Zutendaal", province of Limburg, Flanders, Belgium. The GPS-coordinates for Y-29 are N50°57'46" and E05°34'25".

In the village of "As" there was a WWI Fliegerschiesschule (gunnery school) for the German Luftwaffe situated. Often confused with Y-29 because this loctaion was only 1 mile apart from Y-29. 

To visualize you better need some maps... 

Hope this helps. Friendly greetings.


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## Milosh (Apr 17, 2013)

Njaco said:


> I dunno why.
> 
> JG 1 was decimated as was JG 2 among the fighters. REading a book "Six Months to Oblivion" by Werner Gerbig that - while having some mistakes gives a good account from the German perspective.
> 
> ...



The best book is 'Bodenplatte' by Jon Manrho and Ron Putz. ISBN 1-902109-40-6

There is 28 pages devoted to the attack on Asch.


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## Njaco (Apr 17, 2013)

Thanks Milosh. Added to the "I Want..." library!


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## stona (Apr 17, 2013)

Milosh said:


> The best book is 'Bodenplatte' by Jon Manrho and Ron Putz. ISBN 1-902109-40-6.



I couldn't agree more. It is pretty much a must have book for anyone interested in the Bodenplatte fiasco.

Cheers

Steve


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## drgondog (Apr 17, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> The performance of the individual aircraft had very little to do with the failure of operation Bodenplatte, It was the faulty planning based on poor intelligence, and having too few experienced pilots to perform the mission. The attack was doomed before the first aircraft took off.
> 
> The Luftwaffe never before lost as many pilots in a single day, they never recovered from the losses. The allies lost a lot of aircraft in the attacks also, but few pilots.
> 
> The allies easily replaced the aircraft lost. The Luftwaffe lost experienced pilots they could never replace, and inexperienced pilots who with a little more experience might have made some difference later.



While Boddenplatte was disastrous, November 1944 was even more disastrous to LW in the West.


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## parsifal (Apr 18, 2013)

havent read the full extent of this thread, but an air battle aimed at wresting control of the skies over germany in late 1944 was doomed to failure. The allies by that time were simply too strong especially in terms of fighter support for the Germans to realistically do anythning to make any difference. Even if the operation had been 3 or 5 times more effective than it was historically, the best that the germans could hope for was a disruption to allied operations by maybe 24 hours at best. 

The only thing that might have made a difference in the latter part of 1944, was if somehow the LW could withdraw from operation (accepting massive damage in the Reich), and train their fighters for ground attack. Then as part of the Ardennes offensive, commit everything that flies to supporting the ground offensive. Losses would be prohibitive......no thought to air defence, everything carrying bombs to try and give the ground assault enough steam to cross the Meuse and encircle the Allied armies either in the north or the south. The only weakness for the allies in late 1944 was the shortages of trained manpower for their ground armies....put a hole in the ground ofensive, and the germans might have gained a bargainng chip at the peace table. 

highly unlikley, but the best option in my opinion...


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