# Dunkirk: Hitler's "Halt" Order



## Njaco (May 22, 2011)

Finshed reading "Miracle at Dunkirk" by Walter Lord for the umpteenth time and was wondering what everyone thought about Hitler's "Halt" Order of 24 May. As Mr. Lord writes.....

"That day Guderian's panzers had reached Bourbourg, only 10 miles south-west of Dunkirk. Nothing stood between them and the port. The bulk of the BEF still lay near Lille, 43 miles to the south. By the time the tanks began rolling again in the predawn hours of 27 May, the escape corridor had been established, the BEF was pouring into Dunkirk and Ramsay's rescue fleet was hard at work."

So what was the reason for the "Halt" order? Whats your opinion?


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## Readie (May 22, 2011)

Germany is not a sea nation. They have little experience in this area, and have never used naval transportation in any larger scale. Therefore, they were unaware of how to deal with such a situation (a German general has once stated, that crossing the channel would just be large-scale river crossing!).
They saw the ocean as a wall, through which it was impossible to transport an army, as such short notice anyway. They could not imagine that Operation Dynamo could even happen! The British, being an island kingdom, were seing the channel as a highway, with many opportunities.
When the German Panzers arrived at the river before the Dunkirk area, they were exhausted. They could not continue - they were tired, and running low on fuel and supplies. Furthermore, they had no infantry backup, and they had nearly been cut off at one point from their main force. It was a part of their tactic to keep driving, leaving the infantry behind, and just go on, not stopping at anything - this was their tactic, and it worked for penetration. Therefore, it was a sane military decision to halt them for rest and refit. After all, the Germans didn't think they could go anyway, so they could just prepare to finish off the enemy nice and calmly.
The Luftwaffe, which could use the publicity (the Panzers had recieved much of the credit so far) asked for permission to destroy the BEF on the beaches. Therefore, they were allowed to attack the BEF.

So far, the Germans had not used fighter support, simply because the French airforce was not being used. It was actually not practice among the Allies either. The French could easily have destroyed the Ju 87s, that were about as galant in a dogfight as a rock with wings. They were, however, so shocked by the German attack (as well as uncertain who were actually in command of the French aircrafts - they didn't have any real airforce, and the Generals of the individual army departments were unable to get in contact other than through couriers, and hte French high command was in general ignorant of the danger.) that they just had their fighters hidden in parks, etc. - with retrieveing Allied soldiers seing it with disbelief!
At Dunkirk, the RAF was able to get straight from England, into the attack. They shot the Ju 87s to pieces before they ever reached the beaches (which is why you hear the BEF cursing the RAF for not being there - they were there, but they were taking the enemy out BEFORE they ever reached the lines (if they had attacked after the bombs had been dropped, it wouldn't realy matter...). Therefore, the BEF were relatively left alone. The Germans, who had advanced to the outskirts of the evacuation area by the time the evacuation was more or less over, didn't believe their eyes. They were as amazed as when Moses divided the Red Sea - but they were not stupid enough to attempt to follow them, as the waters - the Royal Navy and the BEF - would have come down on them as on the Pharao.

One point of view.
I don't think anyone really knows why the German's halted....least of all themselves.
I have been on board a Dunkirk small boat veteran in Dartmouth, Odd to think that it did so much.
Cheers
John


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## Njaco (May 22, 2011)

> At Dunkirk, the RAF was able to get straight from England, into the attack. They shot the Ju 87s to pieces before they ever reached the beaches (which is why you hear the BEF cursing the RAF for not being there - they were there, but they were taking the enemy out BEFORE they ever reached the lines (if they had attacked after the bombs had been dropped, it wouldn't realy matter...). Therefore, the BEF were relatively left alone. The Germans, who had advanced to the outskirts of the evacuation area by the time the evacuation was more or less over, didn't believe their eyes.



Not exactly true. At Dunkirk the Luftwaffe was there - in fact their attacks on the shipping caused an order for the destroyers to work only during evening hours and eventually removed because there was concern that too many were being lost. As far as on the beaches, for most of the time, smoke from fires and burning ships covered, from the air, the operations being conducted on the moles in the harbour. When the smoke cleared on one or two days, the Luftwaffe was devastating.


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## vikingBerserker (May 22, 2011)

I think it was a combination of his troops needing to rest/repair and Goering offering the Luftwaffe to Hitler to finish them off instead.

In regards to never using navel transportation on a large scale, they did for the invasion of Norway.


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## michaelmaltby (May 22, 2011)

Great post Readie. Thanks. 

(Ever read "The Snow Goose" ?

MM


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## Readie (May 23, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> Great post Readie. Thanks.
> 
> (Ever read "The Snow Goose" ?
> 
> MM


 
The Snow Goose: A Story of Dunkirk by the American author Paul Gallico.
Yes I have, to be honest I found it too sentimental for me but, I can see the appeal as it the whole episode is still very emotional here.
'The Dunkirk spirit' is a phrase that has entered the English language as a rallying cry.
Judging from the constant bad news of late we need it...
Cheers
John


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## Readie (May 23, 2011)

vikingBerserker said:


> In regards to never using navel transportation on a large scale, they did for the invasion of Norway.


 
Operation Weserübung - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This gives the flavour of the campaign albeit from wiki.The German's certainly had some powerfull battleships available. But,it did not go all the German's way and probably made them wary of a cross channel assault before the RAF in particular were beaten.
Cheers
John


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## Njaco (May 24, 2011)

Readie said:


> Operation Weserübung - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> This gives the flavour of the campaign albeit from wiki.The German's certainly had some powerfull battleships available. But,it did not go all the German's way and probably made them wary of a cross channel assault before the RAF in particular were beaten.
> Cheers
> John



That I will agree with. While the Luftwaffe caused some tremendous problems at Dunkirk, the RAF was still present and gave Goering the first true test of his Air Force.


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## stona (May 25, 2011)

I thought Von Runstedt ordered the "halt". His grasp of a "Blitzkrieg" did not extend to allowing his armoured spear head to operate without the infantry who Guderian had outpaced. Old soldiers often show themselves to be creatures of habit and Von Runstedt was planning a conventional assault to reduce the allied pocket,which he certainly wasn't expecting to be evacuated across the Channel.
Was there really "nothing" between Guderian and the port? The BEF wasn't the only army involved.
Steve


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## Njaco (May 28, 2011)

Well, again only gathering what I read by Mr. Lord....

At the time of the Halt order von Runstedt did indeed want to short stoppage but only slightly for several reasons. One, his panzers had stretched from supply and were tiring. An Allied counterattack near Arras had reduced the panzers by about 50%. The area outside Dunkirk was not tank country and really ideal for panzer operations.

But von Runstedt did not make the Halt order.


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## davebender (May 28, 2011)

*1940 Allied forces.*
(data from "Strange Victory")
104 divisions. 3,254 tanks. France.
10 divisions. 640 tanks. BEF.

Military logic dictates that you defeat the greatest threat first. Which force was a greater threat to Germany during May 1940?


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## Readie (May 29, 2011)

davebender said:


> *1940 Allied forces.*
> (data from "Strange Victory")
> 104 divisions. 3,254 tanks. France.
> 10 divisions. 640 tanks. BEF.
> ...


 

Not la belle France. Numbers are not everything DaveB.
You have to look at the global picture.
Cheers
John


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## davebender (May 29, 2011)

I agree.

France shares a land border with Germany. Which makes the huge French army even more dangerous. Not to mention the French air force which has airfields located only a few minutes flying time from the Ruhr industrial region.


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## Readie (May 29, 2011)

davebender said:


> I agree.
> 
> France shares a land border with Germany. Which makes the huge French army even more dangerous. Not to mention the French air force which has airfields located only a few minutes flying time from the Ruhr industrial region.



History shows that The French were defeated by their low morale. I don't think that,as a nation, they had fully recovered from WW1 and the great depression.

However,there were 117 French divisions in total, of which 104 divisions (including 11 in reserve) were for the defence of the north. The British Army contributed only 13 divisions, three of which had not been organised when the campaign began. Some 22 Belgian, 10 Dutch and 1 Polish division were also a part of the Allied order of battle. British artillery strength amounted to 1,280 guns. Belgium fielded 1,338 and the Dutch, 656. France had 10,700 pieces. This made a total of around 14,000 artillery pieces.Although the Dutch, British and Belgians had barely any armour, the French had a powerful force of 3,254 tanks.
The French Army was of mixed quality. It had in its order of battle some formidable units, particularly the light and heavy armoured divisions (DCR and DLM), and several professional infantry divisions. However, a lot of divisions were composed of reserve soldiers, above 30 years old, and were ill-equipped. A serious qualitative deficiency was a lack of anti-air artillery, mobile anti-tank artillery and radio communication systems This was despite the efforts of Gamelin to produce mobile artillery units.
French tactical deployment and the use of mobile units operationally was also inferior to that of the Germans. Tactically, armour was spread thinly along the French line: French infantry divisions were supported by tank battalions of about 100 tanks, which prevented them from being a strong, independent operational force. Making matters worse, only a handful of French tanks in each unit had radios installed, making communication difficult, most of them being unreliable.[76] French tanks were also very slow in speed in comparison to the Panzers (except for the Somua S-35), as they were designed as infantry support, enabling German tanks to offset their disadvantages by outmanoeuvring the French on the battlefield. In 1940, French military theoreticians still considered tanks as infantry support. As a consequence, at various points in the campaign, the French were not able to react as quickly as German armour.

The German advance up to 21 May 1940
The Panzer Corps now slowed their advance considerably and put themselves in a very vulnerable position. They were stretched out, exhausted, low on fuel, and many tanks had broken down. There was now a dangerous gap between them and the infantry. A determined attack by a fresh and large enough mechanised force might have cut the Panzers off and wiped them out.
The French High Command, however, was reeling from the shock of the sudden offensive and was now stung by a sense of defeatism. On the morning of 15 May French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud telephoned the new Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill and said "We have been defeated. We are beaten; we have lost the battle." Churchill, attempting to offer some comfort to Reynaud, reminded the Prime Minister of all the times the Germans had broken through the Allied lines in World War I only to be stopped. Reynaud was, however, inconsolable.
Churchill flew to Paris on 16 May. He immediately recognised the gravity of the situation when he observed that the French government was already burning its archives and was preparing for an evacuation of the capital. In a sombre meeting with the French commanders, Churchill asked General Gamelin, "Où est la masse de manoeuvre?" that had saved Paris in the First World War. "Aucune" ["There is none"] Gamelin replied. After the war, Gamelin claimed his response was "There is no longer any." Churchill described hearing this later as the single most shocking moment in his life. Churchill asked Gamelin where and when the general proposed to launch a counterattack against the flanks of the German bulge. Gamelin simply replied "inferiority of numbers, inferiority of equipment, inferiority of methods".
The French also lacked radios and orders were passed from mouth to mouth. This gave the German's an advantage with their radio equipment.

Its interesting to note this about the German army.
The German Army, contrary to what the blitzkrieg legend suggests, was not fully motorised. Just 10% of the Army was motorised in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles, compared to the 300,000 of the French Army.Most of the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.
Only 50% of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best-equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".
Mr Hitler played a role too. Halder's plan has often been compared to the Schlieffen Plan, which the Germans attempted to execute in 1914 during the opening phase of the First World War. It was similar in that both plans entailed an advance through the middle of Belgium, but while the intention of the Schlieffen Plan was to gain a decisive victory by executing a surprise encirclement of the French Army, Aufmarschanweisung N°1 was based on an unimaginative frontal attack, sacrificing a projected half a million German soldiers to attain the limited goal of throwing the Allies back to the River Somme. Germany's strength for 1940 would then be spent; only in 1942 could the main attack against France begin.
Hitler was very disappointed with Halder's plan and reacted first by deciding that the German army should attack early, ready or not, in the hope that Allied unpreparedness might bring about an easy victory. This led to a series of postponements, as time and again commanders convinced Hitler to delay the attack for a few days or weeks to remedy some critical defect in the preparations, or to wait for better weather. Hitler also tried to alter the plan which he found unsatisfactory, without clearly understanding how it could be improved. This mainly resulted in a dispersion of effort, since besides the main axis in central Belgium, secondary attacks were foreseen further south. Hitler made such a suggestion on 11 November. On 29 October, Halder let a second operational plan, Aufmarschanweisung N°2, Fall Gelb, reflect these changes by featuring a secondary attack on the Netherlands.

Cheers
John


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## davebender (May 29, 2011)

> History shows that The French were defeated by their low morale.


Plus poor training and leadership. Of course poor training and leadership are a prime cause of poor morale so they are connected.

However....
The French army of August 1914 also had poor training and leadership. But given a chance to recover that's exactly what they did. 

If allowed time the French army of May 1940 will also recover. And nobody who remembered the WWI west front wanted to repeat the experience.


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## Readie (May 30, 2011)

davebender said:


> Plus poor training and leadership. Of course poor training and leadership are a prime cause of poor morale so they are connected.
> 
> However....
> The French army of August 1914 also had poor training and leadership. But given a chance to recover that's exactly what they did.
> ...


 

France also had a severe manpower shortage. The real irony is that:

The French were not ready
The Germans were not really ready
The British were also not ready

Cheers
John


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## davebender (May 30, 2011)

I don't think that was an issue as France used large numbers of colonial conscripts for cannon fodder during both world wars.


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## Jabberwocky (May 30, 2011)

davebender said:


> I don't think that was an issue as France used large numbers of colonial conscripts for cannon fodder during both world wars.



What a terrible slur against both the French and the bravery and skill of the colonial troops that fought for France. 

French colonial troops accounted for ~5% of total French military deaths in WWI and ~10% of French military deaths in WW2.


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## Readie (Jun 1, 2011)

davebender said:


> I don't think that was an issue as France used large numbers of colonial conscripts for cannon fodder during both world wars.



France's manpower shortage in 1939 and the reasons for that are well documented Dave as I think you well know.
The French fought as bravely as they could in the circumstances they found themselves. The last thing they wanted was to be under the German heel.
The BEF also fought on but, both armies were overwhelmed and had to live to fight another day.
Cheers
John


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## davebender (Jun 1, 2011)

France and Britain declared war on Germany. Not the other way around.


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2011)

Yep, thats true. But then the Germans had a nasty habit of invading countries without worrying about the niceties of declaring war. The only nation they ever declared war on before they attacked was the United States.

And then there was the small matter of invading Poland, to which Britain and France had given public gurantees. Germany decided to risk these gurantees and miscalculated. The mood had changed in Britain, and Hitlers bluff was called. 

It was still Germany who was the aggressor in the lead up to the war.


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2011)

The reasons for the halt order are diverse and complex, but the most immediate reason was the concern generated by the counterattack at Arras. This, and the knowledge that the French were readying other counterattacks in tyhe vicinity of Bethune and elsewhere on the flanks of the salient made the Germans hesitate. The initial order to halt was given by Rundstedt, but it rapidly permeated the higher echelons of the high command, who took what was a prudent step made by Rundstedt and blew it out of all proportion. 

The decision to halt for three days was a miscalculation of the allied counterattack abilities, and an over-reaction. There were subsequent rationalizations given by both the German high command at the time, and in some otherwise distinguished post war narratives, but this was the reason, a bad feeling of jitters that led to a miscalculation.


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## Readie (Jun 1, 2011)

davebender said:


> France and Britain declared war on Germany. Not the other way around.



'under the German heel' was to be defeated. You are just being mischievous Dave


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## mikewint (Jun 1, 2011)

Thought we had but this to bed a while back. As most have stated: The “Halt Order”, did not originate with Adolf Hitler. Gerd von Rundstedt and Günther von Kluge suggested that the German forces around the Dunkirk pocket should cease their advance on the port and consolidate, to avoid an Allied break. Hitler sanctioned the order on 24 May with the support of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. Walther von Brauchitsch had managed the logistics of the western Blitzkrieg offensive brilliantly. Although Hitler rewarded him with a marshal’s baton, signifying promotion to the rank of field marshal, he repeatedly ignored his military advice, including a plea to reverse the order that halted the German advance short of Dunkirk and thereby allowed the trapped British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to be evacuated.

Letter written by General Franz Halder: 
During the following days... it became known that Hitler's decision was mainly influenced by Goering. To the dictator the rapid movement of the Army, whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling, became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed...

Halder’s Diary 30 May
Brauchitsch is angry ... The pocket would have been closed at the coast if only our amour had not been held back. The bad weather has grounded the Luftwaffe and we must now stand and watch countless thousands of the enemy get away to England right under our noses."


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## Njaco (Jun 1, 2011)

> Thought we had but this to bed a while back.......



Has this been questioned before Mike? Sorry, wasn't aware if it was. I was reading Lord's book on Dunkirk nd got the idea for a good discussion. That said, I'm now reading Matthew Cooper's "The German Army 1933-1945" and its very interesting the relationship of Hitler to his generals.


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## Freebird (Jun 2, 2011)

Njaco said:


> So what was the reason for the "Halt" order? Whats your opinion?



Njaco, you've left out some of the more important stuff here, you should have also included as options.
Also you should allow multiple votes, as there were several reasons that contributed to the affair.



vikingBerserker said:


> I think it was a combination of his troops needing to rest/repair and Goering offering the Luftwaffe to Hitler to finish them off instead.



Neither was a primary reason.
The Germans were not in any position to "repair" the Panzers division on the fly in Flanders in the last week of May, that would need to wait until the campaign was over.
I doubt that giving the troops "rest" was that big of a concern either.

Parsifal has posted part of the reason in his reply.



parsifal said:


> The reasons for the halt order are diverse and complex, but the most immediate reason was the concern generated by the counterattack at Arras. This, and the knowledge that the French were readying other counterattacks in tyhe vicinity of Bethune and elsewhere on the flanks of the salient made the Germans hesitate. The initial order to halt was given by Rundstedt, but it rapidly permeated the higher echelons of the high command, who took what was a prudent step made by Rundstedt and blew it out of all proportion.



Some reasons:

1.) Panzer divisions needed to repel an another expected Allied attack

The Germans were indeed very concerned about a counterattack, Rommel himself had reported to OKH that they had been attacked by _several hundred_ British tanks, and several divisions. In fact the British attack comprised only about 70 Matildas and a couple of battalions of infantry.
However _as far as OKH was concerned_ there were several Allied divisions in the area, likely planning an attack.

2.) Significant AT danger to the Panzers

OKH had also been made very aware that their 37mm AT guns, (also used on the PzIII) were almost useless against the British Matilda tank, and they had no effective anti-armour tank guns either. In fact most of their Panzers were the Pz I or II, armed only with 20mm gun or MG's. 
On the other hand, the British infantry 2 pdr AT gun (also used on the Matilda) was very effective against all the German tanks.
The Germans were able to repel the British attack with static 88mm guns, but if they were _advancing on the attack_ it would be difficult to use.

3.) Poor terrain for attack.

The area around Dunkirk is flanked by several major minor canals. While the lead elements of the Panzer corps wasn't that far from Dunkirk, they wouldn't have all of the bridging equipment on hand. Even if they could have gotten across, they would also be concerned with getting trapped on the wrong side of the canal, with the main force of the BEF on their flank.

4.) Shortage of Panzergrenadiers.

German Panzer divisions in 1940 contained less Panzergrenadiers, it wasn't until 1941 that they were reorganized with two PzG regiments per division. In the drive towards Dunkirk they were streched very thin, as they needed to hold the perimeter to the NW (facing the BEF) as well as to the SE (facing the rest of the French army). For a drive towards Dunkirk to be successful they would need to have enough boots on the ground to push across the canal, and then hold the port against counterattack. (unlikely)

5.) Lack of information about Allied forces deployment.

The British had a huge stroke of luck early in the battle, when the 3rd division (Monty's) captured an almost complete German OOB, it gave them a very good idea of what they were facing, and where. On the other hand, the Germans didn't have a good idea of Allied deployment, partly due to the exaggerated reports from Arras.

Its easy for us to analyze the battle with 20/20 hindsight, but at the time the Germans really had a poor idea of exactly what they were facing.


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## Njaco (Jun 2, 2011)

Thanks Free for the additions. Will change in the morning. And I left it as a singular vote to spur discussion.


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## Freebird (Jun 2, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Finshed reading "Miracle at Dunkirk" by Walter Lord for the umpteenth time and was wondering what everyone thought about Hitler's "Halt" Order of 24 May. As Mr. Lord writes.....
> 
> "That day Guderian's panzers had reached Bourbourg, only 10 miles south-west of Dunkirk. Nothing stood between them and the port. The bulk of the BEF still lay near Lille, 43 miles to the south. By the time the tanks began rolling again in the predawn hours of 27 May, the escape corridor had been established, the BEF was pouring into Dunkirk and Ramsay's rescue fleet was hard at work."


 
Lord's account is a bit thin on Allied positions, there were both Allied forces on the canal line ( BEF French 16th) and British forces that were sent in to hold the channel ports. 

This is the map from Historyofwar.org, for 25 May. 
Operation Dynamo, the evacuation from Dunkirk, 27 May-4 June 1940
The original map doesn't show the canals, so i've drawn them in.
And while "The bulk of the BEF" was indeed near Lille, there were in fact two divisions facing SW on the canal line between Bethune and Dunkirk, and another in reserve near Dunkirk.

As you can see, there was a gap between the French 16th and the BEF, but had the Germans moved up to the canal, the BEF would have certainly moved up to block the way.


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## mikewint (Jun 2, 2011)

Njaco, no criticism intended at all, Perhaps it was not directly covered but in passing when there was quite a thread on the German invasion of France followed by the fall of France. Been several months.
I've always considered this a open and closed issue. Hitler was a moron


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## parsifal (Jun 2, 2011)

He certasinly over-reacted in this issue, especially when he was the very one advocating bold and radical action before the campaign. But he was not the only one who screwed the pooch on this occasion. The whole wehrmacht command structure seemed to get the jitters at the slightest challenge to their supremacy. As FB points out, Arras was a pretty low scale, scratch built affair, yet for the germans they believed they were being attacked by hundreds of tanks. And they had some intell on the allied preparations, which suggested several more divs making ready for an attack or attacks. Mind you, even with the halt order in place ther was still some progress, and some armoured support continued to be provided. But the Germans lost an opportunity of some sort nevertheless


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## Readie (Jun 2, 2011)

mikewint said:


> Hitler was a moron



Just as well eh....


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## Njaco (Jun 2, 2011)

parsifal, I just read a very interesting passage in that Cooper book about the OKH and OKW which I'll try to post on Sunday. It changed my whole concept as to when the Germans lost the war and, with this new info (for me) I would say Nov. 39. There was a much dissention among Hitler and his generals.


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## parsifal (Jun 3, 2011)

I'll look at that with interest....November '39....thats an odd date....I cannot think of any momentous event or decision that put the writing on the wall that early.

I will say this however, hitlers war from the very beginning was an affair conducted in near desperation driven in part by the parlous state of her economy. At some point the war changed however, from a war for profit, to balance the german ledger sheets, to a war of national survival, wheree the ledger ceased to be important. If Germany had somehow survived by making peace after 1943, for example, she would have been an even worse basket case than Britain IMO. 

Even though it was a war motivated in part by economic desperation, it was still a win-able war for Germany. Germany retained good chances for victory until December 1941, and good chances for a negotiated settlement until possibly the middle of 1943. Thereafter it was just a matter of time.....


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## Readie (Jun 3, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Germany would have been an even worse basket case than Britain IMO.



Harsh but, fair...


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## Njaco (Jun 4, 2011)

I'll post a passage I found that if you think long term into its implications I would say was the point the war was lost for Germany. Gotta get some time to do it. At work now.....


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## Njaco (Jun 5, 2011)

Ok, here we go.......

"The German Army 1933-1945" by Matthew Cooper pages 184-190 (_parenthesis are mine_)

".....The climax of the Bendlerstrasse's official opposition to Hitler came on 5 November (_1939_), the day set for deciding to unleash the offensive on the 12th (_against the West_). Von Brauchitsch held a fatal meeting with the Fuhrer, which von Manstein believed caused 'an irreparable breach between Hitler and the generals. The Army Commander began by reading out a memorandum summarising all his reasons against the venture in the west. Many cogent, thoroughly sensible arguments were advanced, all incontrovertable, but they included one that served to undermine completely the worth of the others. Von Brauchitsch made the mistake of criticising the performance of the infantry during the Polish campaign, accusing it of being over-cautious and insufficently aggressive. Moreover, he went on, discipline had become exceedingly lax. Whatever the truth or otherwise, of these assertions, they proved fatal to the Army Commander. Keitel, who was present, recorded: "After the Commander-in-Chief had finished speaking, the Fuhrer jumped up in a rage and shouted that it was quite incomprehensible to him that jst because of a little lack of discipline a Commander-in-Chief should condemn his own Army and run it down....he left the room, slamming the door behind him, leaving all of us just standing there.....It was plain to me that this signaled the break with von Brauchitsch and that what little confidence there had been between them was finally over."

.....Disregarding all von Brauchitsch's factual arguments, Hitler took umbrage at the criticism he had presumed to direct against his - Hitler's own - achievements [the creation of the new Wehrmacht].....It was the end of the official opposition....The confrontation with von Brauchitsch on 5 November marked the final, irreconciable breach between Hitler and his Army Leaders....The climax of this campaign came on 23 November, when Hitler addressed senior officers of the Wehrmacht in the imposing surroundings of the Reich Chancellery. His determination to attack was reaffirmed: "My decision is of Belgium and Holland unchangable....Breach of the neutrality is meaningless...I consider it is possible to end the war only by means of an attack." For the rest, as von Manstein put it, "his speech constituted a massive attack not only on OKH but on the generals of the Army as a whole, whom he accused of constantly obstructing his boldness and enterprise." In one part of his speech, the Fuhrer referred back to von Brauchitsch's blunder of 5 November: "If the leadership in national life always had the courage expected of the infantryman, there would be no setbacks. When supreme commanders, as in 1914, already begin to have nervous breakdowns, what can one ask of the simple rifleman?...With the German soldier I can do everything if he is well led."

Parsifal, the book then goes onto events where the OKH is gradually left out of everything. If you look for a flashpoint for the end, I would say this is close.


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2011)

I would argue that there were a number of "defining moments" that served to undermine the independance of the General Staff. The first was undoubtedly the new oath of alleginace that every membe of the armed forces were made to say. This oath was not to the state, or the german people, but to Hitler personally. Most men in the german army were honourable men, and this oath became a major obstruction to independant thought. The second major event was the destruction of Blomberg and Fritsch, who together had been largely responsible for the reconstitution of the army, With their destruction saw the elevation of Hitler to the head of the armed forces. Lastly came the destruction of Von Brauxhitsch, which made Hitlers control over ther army absolute.

I dont agree, however that Hiotler was a moron, or that he was responsible for the defeat of the german army. I believe that his temper tantrums have been overplayed, and overblown, to cover many personal and organisational failures within the German armed forces. There are many examples of Generals defying Hitler or giving Hitler bad news, and for a time surviving and thriving. Good examples of that independance can be found in Rommel, in Manstein in 1943 and many others. Those generals that didnt have answers to the problems they faced, found it all too easy to just blame Hitlers stupidity.....when in reality their own failings were at least as much to blame

One also needs to be aware that OKH, and its air and naval equivalents were inherently conservation and restrained organizations. The German naval high command, with the exception of Doenitz was more efficient than inspired, as their behaviour in many actions demonstrated. 

In the lead up to the invasion of France the OKH basic plan was a revisited Schlieffen plan, which is exactly what the Allies were expecting. A right hook, or unfolding fan through the low countries would in all probability have been defeated. Thanks to Hitler and Manstein, this sort of crotchety uninspired thinking was tossed out the window, and replaced with a radical new plan....a left hook at the hinge of the expected advance into Belgium by the allies, at a point deemed relatively safe because of the terrain. This plan would never have come to anything if not for Hitlers intervention.....the best OKH could agree to was to allocate a mere Panzer Corps when a Panzer Army was needed, and as we know they were overruled. And then there were operations like the airborne assault into Holland and onto the Belgian strategic fort at Eban Emal, again a basic concept brought to fruition through Hitlers support.

Hitler, so long as he didnt get involved in the detailed planning was an asset whilst things relied on surprise and dash for success. But Hitler tended to fall to pieces when faced with a meatgrinder that required quick, but cool thinking, such as what faced his army in late May 1940. A few precautions were needed, and a more cautious advance, but Hitler panicked, called a full halt, and made the British escape even more certain.....


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## Njaco (Jun 5, 2011)

You should get this book, parsifal. The comment about Hitler falling to pieces happened even earlier when the Narvik situation occurred. the author really gets into what was happening in Berlin while Dietl was hammering it out with the Brits. But this separation with his generals I believe bears on the subject of this thread as it wasn't so much his generals asking for reprive but rather some reason that Hitler decided on to halt.


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## Freebird (Jun 6, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I will say this however, hitlers war from the very beginning was an affair conducted in near desperation driven in part by the parlous state of her economy





> Even though it was a war motivated in part by economic desperation, it was still a win-able war for Germany. Germany retained good chances for victory until December 1941,



Good points, and I agree on both




parsifal said:


> I dont agree, however that Hitler was a moron, or that he was responsible for the defeat of the german army. I believe that his temper tantrums have been overplayed, and overblown, to cover many personal and organisational failures within the German armed forces. There are many examples of Generals defying Hitler or giving Hitler bad news, and for a time surviving and thriving. Good examples of that independance can be found in Rommel, in Manstein in 1943 and many others. Those generals that didnt have answers to the problems they faced, found it all too easy to just blame Hitlers stupidity.....when in reality their own failings were at least as much to blame
> 
> One also needs to be aware that OKH, and its air and naval equivalents were inherently conservation and restrained organizations. The German naval high command, with the exception of Doenitz was more efficient than inspired, as their behaviour in many actions demonstrated.


 
An interesting point about using Hitler as a scapegoat of sorts when things went poorly, I think there is some truth to that.




parsifal said:


> The whole wehrmacht command structure seemed to get the jitters at the slightest challenge to their supremacy. As FB points out, Arras was a pretty low scale, scratch built affair, yet for the germans they believed they were being attacked by hundreds of tanks. And they had some intell on the allied preparations, which suggested several more divs making ready for an attack or attacks. Mind you, even with the halt order in place ther was still some progress, and some armoured support continued to be provided. *But the Germans lost an opportunity of some sort nevertheless*





> Hitler, so long as he didnt get involved in the detailed planning was an asset whilst things relied on surprise and dash for success. But Hitler tended to fall to pieces when faced with a meatgrinder that required quick, but cool thinking, such as what faced his army in late May 1940. *A few precautions were needed, and a more cautious advance,* but Hitler panicked, called a full halt, and made the British escape even more certain.....



I believe that "a cautious advance" was exactly what occurred. "A lost oppertunity"? Perhaps. But given the totality of the situation, and what they knew at the time, it was a prudent move, and Rundstedt was certainly well justified to call a temporary halt, to have tried to attack towards Dunkirk would have been reckless foolhard in the extreme.

There are a few more points that I might add to the ones I made above. 

6.) OKH doesn't know about "Dynamo" nor about RN capabilities.

At this point (May 24) Rundstedt OKH don't know that the BEF is planning to evacuate, nor would he know what the RN could possibly do. How many troops could be saved? 5,000 per day perhaps? 30,000 or 40,000 of the 400,000? Hardly a big concern.
His main concern would be to defend against a major allied push to cut the German Panzerarmy in two.
And in any event, the superior German LW could prevent any evacuation right? 

7.) Simply too few troops to guard 3 fronts - with more Allied forces arriving.
I think we are also forgetting that the Germans were not expecting an Allied evacuation, because the British were pushing troops *IN* to France, and open a third front. Between May 21 - 24 there were about two British brigades _sent in_ by ship, one to Boulogne and one to Calais. So not only was Rundstedt concerned about the forces facing him to the NE (in the pocket) and the SW (the rest of the French army) there were also British troops building up in the channel ports. 

Unfortunately Lord gives the impression that the German Panzercorps were doing nothing from May 24 - 27, which is certainly not the case at all.
The Germans did in fact conduct operations, from may 22 - 24 against Boulogne, and May 23 - 26 against Calais. It was certainly the best course of action, to eliminate Boulogne Calais before moving against Dunkirk.
Battle of Boulogne
Siege of Calais

Consider the map position on the 24th (when the halt order was made).
The Germans have 11 divisions, - 7 Panzer divisions, (from Kliest's army Hoth's panzercorps), plus 4 motorized divisions, the 2nd, 13th 29th, + the Totenkopf, which has taken some significant casualties.
Two Panzer divisions are attacking Boulogne Calais (2nd 10th). That would leave about 4 divisions facing both the BEF French 1st army, with perhaps 3 divisions facing the French across the Somme, and 2 divisions in reserve.
(The 3rd 4th Panzer from the XVI corps would swing around from Army group B, but are not yet in place on the 24th)
The 24 hr. "halt" order allowed the German infantry to continue catching up with the Panzers, they moved into the Somme river positions, freeing up the Panzers to swing north and attack the BEF.

The 24th of may was an extremely dangerous situation from the OKH point of view unless they knew _*in advance*_ that the French weren't able to mount a counter attack. 

Given the fact that the Germans had already won a massive strategic victory, why risk their situation with a reckless attack by the Panzers? And given the totality of the situation, the halt order was the correct thing to do at the time.


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## Njaco (Jun 6, 2011)

Excellent post FB!!


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