# What was wrong with the F4F Wildcat?



## Clay_Allison (Dec 28, 2008)

I have wondered for quite some time what it was about the Wildcat that made it such a poor performer in the Pacific Theatre. The F6F was a very similar design (essentially an F4F scaled up in size and power), and was the most numerically successful aircraft in the history of the US military.

So I came up with a few rudimentary thoughts and since you lot know more about this stuff than I do and seem tolerant enough to put up with an aircraft novice who thinks outside the box, and comes up with crazy ideas, I'll share them.

Claire Chennault learned that the Japanese airplanes and tactics were vulnerable to climb and dive tactics by American planes. The F4F would be ideally suited if it weren't for one thing: its climb rate was a joke, or would have been if it wasn't terribly unfunny.

The Zero's climb rate wasn't to be matched by any American plane but with a head start a good plane could enough altitude to outdive it and disengage if in trouble. With the F4F-4 I think you'd need an hour. 

Here are two features that I think could have been included in the design to make it a specialist in the field of vertical fighting.

1. Wider eliptical wings for more lift and wing surface without making it more difficult to pack into escort carriers. Level top speed would not be helped but since it was a brick, it would still dive fast and be far more maneuverable in a dive than the Zero, plus it would be able to climb effectively and turning might well be better as well.

2. Just at a glance, the prop on the F4F looks tiny. I think a 4 or 5 blade prop with big fat air-eating blades would take better advantage of the 1200 HP offered by the Twin Wasp. Perhaps landing gear would have to be lengthened to accomodate it.

Additionally, I think a 4-Gun 1000 round weapons loading was best load for that model, even if you needed to give the pilots extra time in gunnery school blasting targets. Including extra guns at the cost of ammunition gives arguably very limited advantage anyway, but considering the increase in weight I think it's unjustifiable.


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## HoHun (Dec 28, 2008)

Hi Clay,

>The F6F was a very similar design (essentially an F4F scaled up in size and power), and was the most numerically successful aircraft in the history of the US military.

If you look at its absolute performance, however, you'll find that it is about the poorest performer with a 2000+ HP engine ever built as a fighter. Its success is owed to the lack of development in Japanese aircraft, not to aeronautical excellence.

Grumman is pretty unique in having built a second major fighter type, the F8F, with the same engine as the first. Normally, proven airframes get souped-up by being re-equipped with different engine types ... quite telling if that doesn't happen.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Waynos (Dec 28, 2008)

Good point Hun, I'm no expert on Grumman types but your description also brought to mind the Hawker Typhoon and Hawker Tempest, both with the Napier Sabre, sounds like the same sort of story.


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## Marcel (Dec 28, 2008)

I thought the wildcat didn't perform so badly against the Japanese. It was mostly lack of experience that got the us pilots killed at the start of the war, not necessary the a/c's fault.


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## evangilder (Dec 28, 2008)

Marcel said:


> I thought the wildcat didn't perform so badly against the Japanese. It was mostly lack of experience that got the us pilots killed at the start of the war, not necessary the a/c's fault.



That's more like it, Marcel. The Wildcat's performance wasn't that bad and it took some time for allied pilot to learn not to get into a slow speed turning fight with the Zero. That will get you killed quickly. But once you get some speed on the Zero, the ailerons, which are the size of friggin barn doors are not movable. Once you hit about 250 MPH, you can forget it. 

Joe has the numbers, but the Zero never had better than a 1.<something>:1 kill ratio against the Wildcat. They did their job, and the did it well.

Any changes to the landing gear would involve quite a bit of change. The Wildcat's landing gear was hand cranked by the pilot. Any changes to the wing will effect the CG, balance and aerodynamics of the airplane. Adding and subtracting guns, ditto. It's always a balancing act with things like that and given the time of it's design, the Wildcat was a good performer.


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## The Basket (Dec 28, 2008)

If you compare the Wildcat against a contempary Spitfire and Bf 109 then the Wildcat was certainly behind the times.

Remember that at Midway in 1942, the Fw 190 had already appeared...the Wildcat was certainly not up to European performance levels.

However...as a carrier fighter...well the one that was available in numbers...

It was robust and had enough perfromance to deal with the Japs whose own aircraft also were not up to European levels of the day.

It was strong, well armed and reliable and if lacking...well the pilots could make up the rest.


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## claidemore (Dec 28, 2008)

We all love to debate performance of various planes, and speculate on which 'was/is/should have been' better. That being said, the Wildcat is an excellent example of performance _*not *_being the deciding factor in combat! At least as far as popular opinion goes. 

It was relatively slow, climbed poorly, didn't turn as well as it's major opponent (Zero), had an awkward landing gear system, and in early models problems with guns jamming. Yet it remained in combat throughout the war and racked up an enviable record. 

Here is something interesting that I found concerning the 4 guns vs 6 gun installation. 

A quote from this site:
The Grumman F4F Wildcat


> The two outboard guns could be fired separately from the four inboard guns, and many pilots would only use the four inboard guns, retaining the outboard guns as an emergency reserve.


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## HoHun (Dec 28, 2008)

Hi Waynos,

>Good point Hun, I'm no expert on Grumman types but your description also brought to mind the Hawker Typhoon and Hawker Tempest, both with the Napier Sabre, sounds like the same sort of story.

Ah, important parallel! The Tempest was designed becaues the Typhoon didn't cut it, and it didn't even have to be a total redesign like the F8F since the Typhoon's weakness were its thick wings, while the rest of the aircraft was basically sound.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 28, 2008)

Lets not forget guys that some of the early F4F's limatations were addressed in later models, especially on the FM-2 which served well on small escort carriers. JoeB will question this but this is from Wikipedia...

_"the course of the war, Navy and Marine F4Fs and FMs flew 15,553 combat sorties (14,027 of these from aircraft carriers[19]), destroying 1,327 enemy aircraft at a cost of 191 Wildcats (an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 6.9:1). True to their escort fighter role, Wildcats dropped only 154 tons of bombs during the war."_

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## HoHun (Dec 28, 2008)

Hi Claidemore,

>That being said, the Wildcat is an excellent example of performance _*not *_being the deciding factor in combat! 

As this is mainly due to the Japanese missing out the 1930s' revolution in tactics brought about by "radio telephony", the example strikes me as less than excellent.

(I believe I have actually written quite a number of posts pointing out that poor tactics can undermine the advantages of superior performance ...)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (Dec 28, 2008)

Clay_Allison said:


> I have wondered for quite some time what it was about the Wildcat that made it such a poor performer in the Pacific Theatre.


'Poor performer in the Pacific' implies you're speaking of the plane's operational record, not its 'pure plane combat effectiveness'; however we define or calculate that nebulous concept.

Anyway operational record is a simple fact and your statement is exactly the wrong way around as far as operational record. The F4F had the best operational record of any Allied fighter in 1942 v Japanese fighters, especially the Zero. It was mentioned that its actual (per recorded losses on both sides) kill ratio v the Zero was around 1:1 in 1942, but to put that in context every other Allied fighter, which saw any significant combat that year, had a worse record, mostly much worse. Hurricane and Buffalo ballpark of 1:5 v the Zero in '42, P-39 and P-40 ballpark of 1:2~3, P-38's didn't establish superiority over Zero's in few encounters of late '42; even in 1943 the Spitfire V's fighter-fighter exchange ratio v the Zero was worse than that of the Hurricane in 1942.

In Sept 1944-Aug 1945 the FM-2 Wildcat's claimed fighter-fighter kill ratio was higher than that of either the F6F or F4U (which claimed almost exactly the same ratio in that period, again suggesting the possiblity of wasted breath and electrons debating whether the F6F or F4U was better based on stats: whatever real difference there was doesn't seem to have been enough to create any noticeable difference in results when flown by similar or same air arm, USN/USMC, against the same enemy fighters, same theater, same time period).

The Wildcat is, as was mentioned, exhibit A in the limited relevance of simple plane statistics to combat effectiveness of fighter units, and perhaps even limited relevance to combat effectiveness of planes themselves, depending whether the stats analysis emphasizes the stats which really mattered most in combat (and how do we determine that?), and if it leaves out less tangible but perhaps as important factors as for example 'good gunnery platform' (in which Grumman fighters were generally thought to exel).

Joe

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## renrich (Dec 28, 2008)

What was wrong with the F4F? Not very much was wrong considering when it was designed. It held it's own during 1942 with the vaunted A6M. As far as performance was concerned, it was not that bad compared, for instance with the P39 or P40 which were contemporaries of it. The P40E at 8100 pounds took almost fifteen minutes to climb to 20000 feet with normal power. The F4F4 at 7975 pounds took about thirteen minutes for the same altitude at normal power. An early F4F3 could do it in nine and one half minutes and the later FM2 could pretty much equal the early F4F3s.


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## Clay_Allison (Dec 28, 2008)

JoeB said:


> 'Poor performer in the Pacific' implies you're speaking of the plane's operational record, not its 'pure plane combat effectiveness'; however we define or calculate that nebulous concept.
> 
> Anyway operational record is a simple fact and your statement is exactly the wrong way around as far as operational record. The F4F had the best operational record of any Allied fighter in 1942 v Japanese fighters, especially the Zero. It was mentioned that its actual (per recorded losses on both sides) kill ratio v the Zero was around 1:1 in 1942, but to put that in context every other Allied fighter, which saw any significant combat that year, had a worse record, mostly much worse. Hurricane and Buffalo ballpark of 1:5 v the Zero in '42, P-39 and P-40 ballpark of 1:2~3, P-38's didn't establish superiority over Zero's in few encounters of late '42; even in 1943 the Spitfire V's fighter-fighter exchange ratio v the Zero was worse than that of the Hurricane in 1942.
> 
> ...


I think that the actual service record was more a combination of good piloting and probably encountering Zeros in ones and twos while they were in larger formations. I don't know for sure if that last is true, but I think it's a good guess.

I always thought of the F6F as a poor man's P-47 for carrier service. It killed far more Japanese planes than the F4U for all the latter's fanfare and John Wayne movies.


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## renrich (Dec 28, 2008)

F4U had 2155 kills in the Pacific, F4F had 1408 kills in the Pacific, 2 in ETO and 26 in the Med. As a matter of fact, in the early going in the Pacific, the F4F was usually outnumbered by IJN fighters.


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## comiso90 (Dec 28, 2008)

Boom and Zoom tactics along with the Thatch Weave are what made the Wildcat competitive.

In a single plane vs plane engagement, I'd rather be in a Zero but in a multiple plane aerial battle, I'd take the F4F.

.

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## Clay_Allison (Dec 28, 2008)

renrich said:


> F4U had 2155 kills in the Pacific, F4F had 1408 kills in the Pacific, 2 in ETO and 26 in the Med. As a matter of fact, in the early going in the Pacific, the F4F was usually outnumbered by IJN fighters.



By the numbers, you can't beat the Hellcat.



Wikipedia said:


> Navy and Marine F6Fs flew 66,530 combat sorties (45% of all fighter sorties of the war, 62,386 sorties were flown from aircraft carriers[19]) and destroyed 5,163 (56% of all Naval/Marine air victories of the war) at a cost of 270 Hellcats (an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 19:1).[20] The aircraft performed well against the best Japanese opponents with a 13:1 kill ratio against Mitsubishi A6M, 9.5:1 against Nakajima Ki-84, and 3.7:1 against Mitsubishi J2M during the last year of the war.[21] The F6F became the prime ace-maker aircraft in the American inventory, with 306 Hellcat aces.[22]


 That is from Wiki, but with good cited sources.


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## JoeB (Dec 28, 2008)

Clay_Allison said:


> I think that the actual service record was more a combination of good piloting and probably encountering Zeros in ones and twos while they were in larger formations. I don't know for sure if that last is true, but I think it's a good guess.


F4F and Zero numbers were generally comparable in their 1942 combats, which were pretty extensive in a fair variety of tactical situations. Pilots are obviously always a big variable, the problem is always *quantifying* that variable, rather than just using it as a fudge factor when analysis of simple stats gives the 'wrong' answer (as it notably tends to do with the F4F's combat record compared to its simple performance stats).



comiso90 said:


> Boom and Zoom tactics along with the Thatch Weave are what made the Wildcat competitive.


As of late 1942, USN intel reports noted that it was the *Zeroes* who tended to use boom and zoom tactics v the F4F; both tried to get altitude and energy advantage if they could. That was unsurprising, for this was the Zero's standard tactic in China in pre-Pacific War combat when it was faster than all its opponents. IJN pilots sometimes fell back on earlier individual aerobatic tactics, but the IJN's official doctrine based on experience in China emphasized cooperative quick firing and break away passes by the 3 plane 'shotai'. Their coordination skills were to be honed by such intense training that they didn't need radios to anticipate one another's moves, and that worked with the highly trained 1942 (and actually, 1943 to a still significant extent) IJN pilots.

The Thach Weave was seldom used in 1942. Thach himself experimented with it in his own division at Midway, but it didn't fully work itself through the USN training system to become standard, until later.

I don't think there is a single simple explanation why the Wildcat overperformed its paper stats so much in effectiveness in fighter combat, especially compared to other Allied fighters v the Zero in 1942. Pilot training (gunnery training particularly) was certainly one aspect; the fact that it turned relatively well compared to the Zero (though not *as* well) was probably another reason. Real knowledge of the Zero was pretty limited until quite late in '42 (by which time there was cumulatively a fair amount of combat experience against it, plus the flight results of the example captured in the Aleutians came out out late in the year). Instinctively engaging in turning combat, an F4F wouldn't be at as much of a disadvantage as some other Allied fighters v the Zero. 

Re; Wiki numbers good cited sources but of *claims*, claims and actual results is apples and oranges in WWII fighter combat. The F4F's 1942 fighter-fighter record of 1:1 is real, not claimed. It can't be compared to F6F (or FM-2 for that matter) claimed stats of the period Sept '44 to Aug '45 (which is what those stats quoted by Japanese type are). We can to a degree compare FM '44-45 claims to F6F '44-45 claims but can't accurately compare F4F real results to FM or F6F claims, nor even 45 claims to 42 claims, the accuracy of claims probably changed over that time. Performance of F4F would most reasonably be compared based on real results v other Allied types' real results against the same opponents in the same period. In that comparison, the F4F's results, v the Zero, in 1942, were better than any other Allied fighter at that time.

Joe


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## renrich (Dec 28, 2008)

Actually the Navy pilots did OK against the A6M before Jimmy Thach spread the word about the Beam Defense Maneuver. He first tested his theory at Midway and one of the guys in his section did not know what to do as he had not been briefed and his radio was out. Interestingly the first Navy pilots that engaged the A6M at Coral Sea thought it was VSB, (scout bomber) because of it's elongated cockpit. They were astounded by it's performance. Some VSB! They would have liked to have used energy tactics but the Zeros often had the altitude advantage because of the Wildcats being stuck as an escort or because of the F4F's slow rate of climb as an interceptor at Guadalcanal. The IJN pilots did not like to dogfight but their preference was for energy tactics. Lundstrom goes into great detail about this subject in his books. Joe B, I was working on my post while yours was being posted and you stole all my thunder but did it in better style. Attaboy. It is interesting how well the F4F performed versus other contemporary US fighters in the same time period. Probably the worst characteristic of the Wildcat was it's lack of range,(a combat radius from a carrier on internal fuel of only 175 miles) the Zero had twice that.


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## Clay_Allison (Dec 28, 2008)

Problem with the Zero using energy tactics is that it lost its' famed maneuverability at high speeds, especially in a dive.


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## comiso90 (Dec 28, 2008)

JoeB said:


> F
> 
> As of late 1942, USN intel reports noted that it was the *Zeroes* who tended to use boom and zoom tactics v the F4F; both tried to get altitude and energy advantage if they could. That was unsurprising, for this was the Zero's standard tactic in China in pre-Pacific War combat when it was faster than all its opponents. IJN pilots sometimes fell back on earlier individual aerobatic tactics, but the IJN's official doctrine based on experience in China emphasized cooperative quick firing and break away passes by the 3 plane 'shotai'. Their coordination skills were to be honed by such intense training that they didn't need radios to anticipate one another's moves, and that worked with the highly trained 1942 (and actually, 1943 to a still significant extent) IJN pilots.
> 
> ...



Even if the IJN used Energy tactics too, it's still true that :

_Boom and Zoom tactics along with the Thatch Weave are what made the Wildcat competitive
_

Unless everything I've read is incorrect. A quick Google for "Boom and Zoom f4f zero." produces dozen of sites that say exactly what I did.

..


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Dec 28, 2008)

The F4F wasn't the best, but it did fill it's role as a stop gap fighter until better fighters were developed.


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## JoeB (Dec 28, 2008)

comiso90 said:


> Even if the IJN used Energy tactics too, it's still true that :
> 
> _Boom and Zoom tactics along with the Thatch Weave are what made the Wildcat competitive
> _
> ...


The Beam Defense Manuever (Thach Weave) was definitely not a widespread 1942 tactic. Lots of websites repeat each other about all kinds of misconceptions, that means zilch.  See Lundstrom ("First Team" and "First Team in the Guadalcanal Campaign", but also Frank ("Guadalcanal"), or any of the first hand accounts of the Marine units fighting at Guadalcanal (which represented most of the Zero kills by F4F's in 1942), who did not use that particular tactic. The Thach Weave was a mainly post-1942 tactic.

As far as boom and zoom, if it just means trying to initiate combat with an altitude advantage, then sure, but that's what most fighters usually tried to do, including the IJN as of 1942. It wasn't something limited to the F4F that the Zeroes didn't do also, nor something the F4F did in 1942 that other Allied types didn't try to do too. For example, in the defense of Australia in spring-summer 1942 49th FG P-40's were trying to use 'hit and run' tactics but still only downed around 1/2 as many Zeroes as P-40's lost to Zeroes, better than P-40's had previously done against Zeroes (in Philippines and DEI), but not as well as F4F's did in 1942.

And later in the Guadacanal campaign (still during 1942) Marine units in some cases specifically sought to 'dog fight' Zeroes whose quality of pilots they perceived as having declined. Also, the engagements between carrier based F4F's and carrier based Zeroes in the 4 carrier battles of 1942 gave no particular advantage to the F4F's in establishing superior initial altitude, as some of the Guadalcanal combats did, but the F4F's did about as well in those combats as at Guadalcanal.

Thach Weave was not widely used in 1942, fact. 'Boom and zoom' is a major oversimplification of reason for the F4F's relative success in 1942, IMO.

Joe


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## comiso90 (Dec 28, 2008)

JoeB said:


> The Beam Defense Manuever (Thach Weave) was definitely not a widespread 1942 tactic. Lots of websites repeat each other about all kinds of misconceptions, that means zilch.  See Lundstrom ("First Team" and "First Team in the Guadalcanal Campaign", but also Frank ("Guadalcanal"), or any of the first hand accounts of the Marine units fighting at Guadalcanal (which represented most of the Zero kills by F4F's in 1942), who did not use that particular tactic. The Thach Weave was a mainly post-1942 tactic.
> 
> As far as boom and zoom, if it just means trying to initiate combat with an altitude advantage, then sure, but that's what most fighters usually tried to do, including the IJN as of 1942. It wasn't something limited to the F4F that the Zeroes didn't do also, nor something the F4F did in 1942 that other Allied types didn't try to do too. For example, in the defense of Australia in spring-summer 1942 49th FG P-40's were trying to use 'hit and run' tactics but still only downed around 1/2 as many Zeroes as P-40's lost to Zeroes, better than P-40's had previously done against Zeroes (in Philippines and DEI), but not as well as F4F's did in 1942.
> 
> ...




I simply stated that the Thatch Weave helped the Wildcat overcome some weaknesses. That point cannot be argued. Why is 1942 an issue?... the thread is about the F4F. Not the F4F in 1942... The only one mentioning 1942 is you. I never said the Thatch weave was used much in 1942.

Boom and Zoom? 
Major oversimplification yes.... and so????

The point is that tactics were develop to equalize the playing field.

Move on! Quibbling over semantics is not constructive


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## claidemore (Dec 28, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Claidemore,
> 
> >That being said, the Wildcat is an excellent example of performance _*not *_being the deciding factor in combat!
> 
> ...



Note: I did not say that *lack *of performance *was *the deciding factor, I said performance was *NOT *the deciding factor. There is a difference.


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## Clay_Allison (Dec 29, 2008)

I'd say that the old fashioned answer to why the F4F held its own is correct. It was durable enough to stay alive with a Zeke on its 6 until another F4F could come help out.


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## Amsel (Dec 29, 2008)

One of the main problems with the Wildcat was its low rate of climb. That is a major issue in the early war when radar was still pathetically lacking. Luckily the USN had a good system for using aircraft for early warning so the fighters could have the 30 something minutes it took to reach altitude. As a matter in fact Jimmy Thach wrote a scathing report about the inferiority of the F4F in rate of climb and manueverability.
The Thach weave took a bit of time to be taught universally. It was devised by Jimmy Thach in his hotel room in san Diego before his unit deployed. Upon studying the reports by Claire Chenault and others about the Zero fighter he spent two nights devising a method to keep his guys alive. It worked good. By the time Guadacanal came around the Navy pilots were showing the move to the Marines and the rest is history.
The Marines had confidence in their armor,protected fuel tanks, and rugged Pratt Whitney radial engine. And the Thach weave confounded the japanese pilots for some time. It was perfect for fighting the fragile but nimble Zero. All in all the Wildcat was not a great plane but it did its job by taking off and landing on the carriers, something the P 40 could not do.


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## HoHun (Dec 29, 2008)

Hi Claidemore,

>Opinion.

Sentence?

>Note: I did not say that lack of performance was the deciding factor, I said performance was NOT the deciding factor. There is a difference.

I did not say that lack of performance was the deciding factor either, so what are you trying to tell me?

What I said was that tactics were the deciding factor, and that can hardly be construed as blaming "lack of" performance.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Dec 29, 2008)

Hi Comsio,

>>the IJN's official doctrine based on experience in China emphasized cooperative quick firing and break away passes by the 3 plane 'shotai'. Their coordination skills were to be honed by such intense training that they didn't need radios to anticipate one another's moves

>Unless everything I've read is incorrect. A quick Google for "Boom and Zoom f4f zero." produces dozen of sites that say exactly what I did.

You might find a real-world tactical manual ("No Guts, No Glory" by "Boots" Blesse) interesting:

http://www.simhq.com/_air/PDF/NGNG.pdf

It was written for application in the Korean war, but gives a detailed summary of what leader/wingman-element and four-finger tactics that were introduced just before or - for most air forces - during WW2 are about.

As the point of these formations was to improve the defensive strengh and combined situational awareness of the fighter formations, you'll recognize that the suggestion that "intense training" can eleminate the need for radios is missing the point (to put it mildly).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Dec 29, 2008)

One of the problems with looking at the Wildcat, are that the popular accounts are nearly all based on allied accounts, with very little Primary Japanese sources avcailable or referred to in these accounts. so the situation arises that the histories we read are nearly all based on one sided accounts so that the claims and victories are nearly all taken from the allied perspective. this is what Joe B is alluding to, and he is basically right.

I am reading the translated version of the IJN operations in the south pacific 1942-43. It is giving the japanese admitted losses, which blow holes in the routinely made claims in non-primary sources. I admit that the claims of allied losses made by the Japanese are just as fantastic, and fanciful as those made by the allies. However, if you read or are relying on "popular" accounts of Japanese losses, for the south pacific at least, you need to roughly halve those losses.

I tend to look at the overall trends before getting into the minutae of battles. The bottom line is this...up to the end of April, the IJN had only lost some 200 aircraft to combat, and had shot down over a 1000. For land based air, there were less than 250 zeroes available, and overall, the IJN only had about 1000 land based air craft to call upon. By the end of April the air force had expanded to just over 2000 frontline aircraft. Given the slow rate of expansion of the IJN air flotillas, that hardly suggests that the allies were doing much of anything, really, except getting themselves shot down


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## renrich (Dec 29, 2008)

The Wildcat was practically the only fighter deployed by the USN and Marines in 1941-42. The Corsair(landbased) began to supplant the Wildcat in Feb. 43 and the Hellcat on carriers a few months later. However, the Wildcat never completely disappeared although it played a minor role after 1943. Actually the performance of the F4F3 even with armor and ss tanks was not that inferior to the A6M. The F4F4 was where the performance disparity really showed up. It is interesting to compare performance of F4F3 without armor or ss tanks with A6M. What enabled the F4F4 to compete on an even basis with the Zero was: It was better armed, it was more resistant to battle damage, it's pilots were better gunners and those pilots became better trained because of IJN attrition and the US pilots began to use good tactics which exploited the Zero weaknesses and the Wildcat's strengths. During the Guadalcanal campaign the IJN suffered from the same disadvantages the LW did in BOB and the AAF did later in the ETO. The Wildcats were defending near their bases and the Zeros had to fly and fight hundreds of miles away from their bases.


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## Amsel (Dec 29, 2008)

parsifal said:


> I am reading the translated version of the IJN operations in the south pacific 1942-43. It is giving the japanese admitted losses, which blow holes in the routinely made claims in non-primary sources. I admit that the claims of allied losses made by the Japanese are just as fantastic. Given the slow rate of expansion of the IJN air flotillas, that hardly suggests that the allies were doing much of anything, really, except getting themselves shot down


That is correct. The Americans got their butt kicked most of the time up until Guadacanal. By the time Guadacanal was over American aces were teaching what they knew in classrooms ,spreading the knowledge to thousands of pilots. The aircraft was also getting better. But the early war for America was a scary time. The Japanese knew their business and knew it well. They did not pass the knowledge on to student pilots in the classroom. And that was a mistake on their part.


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## davparlr (Dec 29, 2008)

An early monoplane design, it was orginally a bi-plane design, the F4F performed admiralby throughout the war, and was, at the on-set the best allied carrier fighter. It was certainly comparable to its allied contemporaries in the Pacific, the P-40, P-39, and Hurricane, although the F4F was, understandabley, somewhat slower, but then, so was the Zero. 

The F4F held off the Japanese when the Japanese were at their best. Much of the F6F glory came at the expense of a lesser trained and experienced enemy, including Kamikaze (which I suspect was basically target practice). I think it would be interesting to see how many F6F kills were Kamikazes.

The Zero only obtained its fame due to exteme lightness, which gave it very good power loading and wing loading, and would never have been acceptable in alllied or other axis airforces.

The F4F, along with its pilots, should always be honored as a vital part of the "thin red line" that fought toe-to-toe with, and stopped, the Jappanese juggarnaut in the Pacific while America was still ramping up its war fighting ability.


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## JoeB (Dec 29, 2008)

comiso90 said:


> 1. I simply stated that the Thatch Weave helped the Wildcat overcome some weaknesses. That point cannot be argued. Why is 1942 an issue?...
> 
> 2. Boom and Zoom?
> Major oversimplification yes.... and so????


1. 1942 is an issue because the thread asks 'why was the F4F a poor performer in the Pacific' and historically, the F4F's key role was in 1942. By the time carrier action picked up significantly again in 1943 the USN carrier sdns were mainly equipped with F6F's and Marine land units were predominantly F4U equipped not long into 1943. In 1945, the FM had a smashingly successful record, so that can't be what we're talking about. So why was the F4F in fact not a 'poor performer in the Pacific' in combat record, in the key period where it was a 'performer' in the Pacific: not the Thach Weave.

2. Let's get beyond oversimplifications to the actual facts in more detail, I'd say.

Joe


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## JoeB (Dec 29, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Comsio,
> 
> >>the IJN's official doctrine based on experience in China emphasized cooperative quick firing and break away passes by the 3 plane 'shotai'. Their coordination skills were to be honed by such intense training that they didn't need radios to anticipate one another's moves
> 
> ...


Combined situational awareness doesn't depend altogether on radio's (which Zeroes were fitted with, just often were removed). Boots Blesse re: Korean War and his knowledge of WWII tactics as US aviator, doesn't disprove the fact that contrary to a lot of misconception, IJN fighter tactics in 1942 were section not individual based, and often energy, not turn and burn based. They were not as entirely different from the actual tactics used by the USN n 1942 as is often assumed. Later on US tactics became more oriented specifically towards the Japanese (for example widespread use of the unique Beam Defense Manuever or Thach Weave in the USN, though that mainly in the F6F era), as more was learned about them. Later still the Japanese did adopt tactics more exactly like those of the US air arms.

But any extensive reading of first hand accounts of Pacific combat (which I'd really re-suggest you bone up on, instead of constantly bringing up Shaw's book or Blesse as if they really address those specifics, I've read both many years since, and they really don't) or really any WWII fighter combat resounds again and again with descriptions where the protagonist pilot finds himself alone after completing a kill or manuever to evade an enemy a/c. The reality was often different from the doctrine anyway, in all air arms.

Joe


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## JoeB (Dec 29, 2008)

Amsel said:


> That is correct. The Americans got their butt kicked most of the time up until Guadacanal. .


Yes, Brit/CW/Dutch fighter forces too (statistically more so). However exceptions before Guadalcanal were Coral Sea and Midway where F4F's in the first battle nearly held their own in fighter-fighter kill ratio, and in the second bested the Zeroes in that measure, first combats between USN F4F's and Zeroes*, and the first time the Zero hadn't come out on top v any fighter opponent in the Pacific War**.

*carrier based Zeroes downed one and badly damaged another of the Marine F4F-3's w/o loss in the final air combat over Wake Dec 22 1941 (though didn't prevent loss of a trio of Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes to the F4F's). It was the only F4F v Zero combat before Coral Sea.

**other Allied types won a (very) few individual combats with Zeroes before that, but were always being defeated several:1 in other combats a few days before or after, not consistently holding their own, or better, in a series of fighter combats such as comprised Coral Sea and Midway.

Joe


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## tomo pauk (Dec 29, 2008)

May I suggest change of the thread's name? Perhaps the 'Airplane that bested the best*: the Wildcat' would be more appropriate?

*Meaning the IJN air arm.


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## renrich (Dec 29, 2008)

Michael, if you can, do yourself a favor and get copies of Lundstrom's books. They address the issues we are discussing here as well,IMO, as they have ever been addressed. I only wish that he would follow through and get into early 1943. My impression is that the IJN were even more enthusiastic in overclaiming than the USN pilots. But the intersting point is, and you alluded to it is that neither side in 1942 had very many AC, at least not by ETO standards. The actual number of kills by USN Wildcats over IJN Zekes and vice versa was very small, somewhere around thirty each but regardless it was pretty even. Both sides labored under tremendous handicaps, shortages, breakdowns, bad intelligence, poor weather forecasting and in the case of the land based elements, poor food and living conditons and hygeine.


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## parsifal (Dec 29, 2008)

renrich said:


> Michael, if you can, do yourself a favor and get copies of Lundstrom's books. They address the issues we are discussing here as well,IMO, as they have ever been addressed. I only wish that he would follow through and get into early 1943. My impression is that the IJN were even more enthusiastic in overclaiming than the USN pilots. But the intersting point is, and you alluded to it is that neither side in 1942 had very many AC, at least not by ETO standards. The actual number of kills by USN Wildcats over IJN Zekes and vice versa was very small, somewhere around thirty each but regardless it was pretty even. Both sides labored under tremendous handicaps, shortages, breakdowns, bad intelligence, poor weather forecasting and in the case of the land based elements, poor food and living conditons and hygeine.



Hi Richard 

I will try and get a hold of Lundstroms books. I would say this in favour of the Americans. I believe that their biggest advantage was in the higher leadership of the Pacific Theatre. It is hard to find commanders with the air mindedness of the likes of Halsey, Spruance and later Mitscher in the Japanse camp. I do concede that Ozawa was probably the most gifted carrier admiral of the war (many will take me to task on that comment) but in 1942, the Japanese relied too heavily on the technical prowess of their pilots and gave insufficient attenttion to pilot recovery, unit rotation, air defence etc. They were just so wedded to the concept that the war would be resolved quickly, and that they needed to focus everything on the attack, that the balance of their forces suffered tremendously. This, more than the airframe benefits, tactics and pilot skills accounted for the losses in the latter part of 1942 more than anything (although those other factors are still significant )


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## MikeGazdik (Dec 30, 2008)

What you are describing is humility of the free man. The spirit of freedom is what won WWII.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Dec 30, 2008)

Hear, hear!


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## renrich (Dec 30, 2008)

The IJN pilots in the early going were extremely well qualified but attrition diminished the overall quality and their training programs could not keep up. On the other hand the USN training which includes the Marines,prewar, was lengthy, comprehensive and included, according to Lundstrom, an emphasis on deflection shooting which was equaled by no other air force in the world. He gives much of the credit for the ability of the Navy pilots to hang in with the crack IJN pilots in superior AC to that emphasis on gunnery skills. The training program in the US was streamlined after the war began but the fresh pilots coming to the fleet were still well trained and ready to contribute unlike the IJN fledglings.


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## Amsel (Dec 30, 2008)

renrich said:


> Michael, if you can, do yourself a favor and get copies of Lundstrom's books. They address the issues we are discussing here as well,IMO, as they have ever been addressed. I only wish that he would follow through and get into early 1943. My impression is that the IJN were even more enthusiastic in overclaiming than the USN pilots. But the intersting point is, and you alluded to it is that neither side in 1942 had very many AC, at least not by ETO standards. The actual number of kills by USN Wildcats over IJN Zekes and vice versa was very small, somewhere around thirty each but regardless it was pretty even. Both sides labored under tremendous handicaps, shortages, breakdowns, bad intelligence, poor weather forecasting and in the case of the land based elements, poor food and living conditons and hygeine.


 The lack of modern radar played probably the most significant role in the confusion. It is interesting to see how many technological advances were made so quickly. Fleets of ships trying to gauge enemy fleets with constant disinformation. The Americans had the advantage of a better plan for combing the seas with a/c then the Japanese; for some reason the Japanese did not adhere strictly to a coordinated grid search and it cost them dearly in ships.


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## fly boy (Dec 31, 2008)

Clay_Allison said:


> I have wondered for quite some time what it was about the Wildcat that made it such a poor performer in the Pacific Theatre. The F6F was a very similar design (essentially an F4F scaled up in size and power), and was the most numerically successful aircraft in the history of the US military.
> 
> So I came up with a few rudimentary thoughts and since you lot know more about this stuff than I do and seem tolerant enough to put up with an aircraft novice who thinks outside the box, and comes up with crazy ideas, I'll share them.
> 
> ...



three things bad about it 1 power 2 range and 3 turning


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## renrich (Jan 1, 2009)

As earlier stated the Wildcat was at least as good a climber as the P40 and the early F4F3 and Late FM2 were better climbers. The P40s of the Flying Tigers under Claire Chennault did not have to compete against the IJN and A6Ms.


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## Clay_Allison (Jan 2, 2009)

renrich said:


> As earlier stated the Wildcat was at least as good a climber as the P40 and the early F4F3 and Late FM2 were better climbers. The P40s of the Flying Tigers under Claire Chennault did not have to compete against the IJN and A6Ms.


Were they mostly fighting Oscars then?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 2, 2009)

Clay_Allison said:


> Were they mostly fighting Oscars then?



Oscars and Nates.


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## Amsel (Jan 2, 2009)

The AVG fought the Ki-43s' mostly but did engage the "zero" also. Claire Chenault was the one to first report the capabilities of the A6M. The Ki-43 is underated while thew A6M might be overated in their capabilities as fighters. The difference is in the way you fight. The AVG found out early that "dogfighting" was obselete. Pilots from both countries were still being trained to dogfight. As a low level dogfighter the Ki-43 and the A6M-2 was superior to the American "energy" fighters so the AVG turned the tables on them.

The Oscar actually had a better chance early war against the Boom and Zoom tactics. The Ki-43 had better wing loading and power loading than the Zero, had superior initial acceleration, a better roll rate and a tighter turning circle. It also had a substantially better rate of climb. The Ki-43 was, in some ways, more dangerous to deal with than the A6M, chiefly because it had a better rate of roll and was armed with two 12.7mm machineguns.


The P 40 with a zero on his tail could usually break contact with an aileron roll. This was much less likely with the Ki-43. The Oscar driver could plant himself behind the P-40 and stay. It also meant that when the Ki-43 was jumped from above he would only have to roll into a tight turn faster then could be followed and when they bounced the Zero and it turned the American plane could roll with the turn and stay in it for just long enough to make the shot.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 2, 2009)

Amsel said:


> The AVG fought the Ki-43s' mostly but did engage the "zero" also. Claire Chenault was the one to first report the capabilities of the A6M.



I think you'll find that is more or less a myth. Check into where the A6M was deployed during late 1941 and early 1942, I don't think you'll find any were land based in Burma.

Chenault's reports were based on early Zero deployment and engagements between the USSR and Japanese as well as Chinese units along the Manchurian frontier.


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## Amsel (Jan 2, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I think you'll find that is more or less a myth. Check into where the A6M was deployed during late 1941 and early 1942, I don't think you'll find any were land based in Burma.
> 
> Chenault's reports were based on early Zero deployment and engagements between the USSR and Japanese as well as Chinese units along the Manchurian frontier.


I understand that Chenault got much of his info from seeing a crashed A6M. EriK Shilling claims that the AVG did engage the Zero fighters. I am looking for his "proof" though.



> Also there are those including Dan Ford, a frequent visitor on
> this net, who say the AVG never fought the Zero. I believe I have
> undisputable proof that we did, but will also post this information
> in a sperate posting.
> ...


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 2, 2009)

Amsel said:


> I understand that Chenault got much of his info from seeing a crashed A6M. EriK Shilling claims that the AVG did engage the Zero fighters. I am looking for his "proof" though.


Several AVG pilots mis-identifed Oscars as Zeros on more than one occasion. I don't know about Chenault seeing a crashed Zero, if he did it was not attained over Burma. According to my sources, when the Japanese deployed 15 Zeros over China, not one was shot down.

In July 1940 there were 15 Zeros (model 11s) deployed to Manchuria and fought against the USSR and Chinese. At the same time the first Model 11s were rolling off the assembly lines. 65 model 21s were delivered by late 1941. The Pearl Harbor attack force had 127 Zeros attached to it. ASAIK most (if not all) of the operational Zeros deployed on carriers during that period which was the same time the AVG was beginning operations.


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## Amsel (Jan 2, 2009)

Roger that.


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## HoHun (Jan 2, 2009)

Hi Flyboyj,

>According to my sources, when the Japanese deployed 15 Zeros over China, not one was shot down.

Are you aware of "Neumann's Zero"? 

Zeros over China, 1941-1942

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 2, 2009)

HoHun said:


> Hi Flyboyj,
> 
> >According to my sources, when the Japanese deployed 15 Zeros over China, not one was shot down.
> 
> ...


Very interesting read - I would of been more accurate to say not one was lost to air-to-air combat.  

Also at the end of the text; _"It may be impossible to completely disprove, but so far I do not see any evidence that proves the AVG shot down A6M2s or otherwise encountered them in combat over China prior to October 1942." _ Also interesting.

I would love to get more information on how they were assembled. As the text described, t seems most of the components were had fitted which would be typical of pre production aircraft. I read the 15 Zeros sent to China were the first 15 production models. I do know that the Japanese did have problems with interchangeability of parts on many of their aircraft through out the war, so fact that the aircraft required "filling" may or may not play into the fact that the "captured" aircraft was part of the original 15.

Again, great info!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 2, 2009)

After reading that text I did some surfing - it seems Mr. Neumann was quite and interesting character!

Gerhard Neumann - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Inventor of the Week: Archive


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 2, 2009)

Here's more!

About Gerhard Neuman

It turns out there's a memorial for him in one of the buildings at the USAFA (where I work). Next time I'm on "the hill" I'm going to try to track it down.


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## renrich (Jan 2, 2009)

I believe that Flyboy is correct. The AVG only was in action for six months and the JAAF did not have A6Ms at the time. In fact the Claude was a fighter the AVG had success against.


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## slaterat (Jan 2, 2009)

Heres what a couple of American pilots had to say re the Wilcat vs Zero:

LT John Thach

In connection with the performance of the Zero fighter, any success we 
had against the Zero is not due to performance of the plane we fly, but is
the result of the comparatively poor marksmanship on the part of the
Japanese stupid mistakes by a few of their pilots and superior 
marksmanship and teamwork on the part of some of our pilots...

VMF-121 pilot Roger Habermane

...we'd work like hell to get to to climb to 23,000-24,000 feet. At that
altitude when you malke a turn you lose 1,000 ft, and its very easy to 
stall out. In theory the F4F had a higher service ceiling but not in
practice. You'd look up and there sit the Japs at 30,000 ft looking
right down at your gazoo. A real fun time. You couldn't get that bird 
much higher than 24,000: not you, not Jesus, nobody. The bird
Wouldn't go any higher.

The early war success of the Wildcat when compared to other allied fighters was largely based on the Wildcats toughness, the excellent training of its pilots and that it largely engaged zeros in near equal numbers.

Joe B basically got it right



> F4F and Zero numbers were generally comparable in their 1942 combats, which were pretty extensive in a fair variety of tactical situations. Pilots are obviously always a big variable, the problem is always *quantifying* that variable, rather than just using it as a fudge factor when analysis of simple stats gives the 'wrong' answer (as it notably tends to do with the F4F's combat record compared to its simple performance stats).



Slaterat


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## renrich (Jan 2, 2009)

Quote from Jimmy Flatley. " What the F4F4 lacks in climb and maneuverability is more than compensated for by it's excellent armament, protective armor, protected fuel system and greater strength. Add to this the inherent superior ability of the Navy pilot, particularly as regards using his armamnet and the outlook is favorable." "Let us not condemn our equipment. It shoots the enemy down in flames and gets most of us back to base."


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## HoHun (Jan 2, 2009)

Hi Slaterat,



slaterat said:


> LT John Thach
> 
> In connection with the performance of the Zero fighter, any success we
> had against the Zero is not due to performance of the plane we fly, but is
> ...



Thanks for that quote! It's nice to see my point about poor tactics undermining the advantages of superior performance confirmed by a Wildcat pilot as famous as Thach himself 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Amsel (Jan 2, 2009)

Here is the text of a despatch from Admiral Nimitz to
Admiral King sent on 20 June 1942:

ALL AIR COMBAT REPORTS BATTLE OF MIDWAY EMPHASIZE EXTREME
AND APPARENTLY INCREASED SUPERIORITY PERFORMANCE OF 0 FIGHTERS
X ALTHOUGH THESE PLANES ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN OURS THE 
PRIMARY SOURCE OF ANY COMBAT SUCCESSES TO DATE BY NAVY FIGHTING
PLANES HAS BEEN OWN EXPERT TACTICS OPPOSED TO FAULTY ENEMY
TACTICS X OVERALL RESULTS HAVE BEEN BAD AND WILL BE SERIOUS
AND POTENTIALLY DECISIVE WITH IMPROVEMENT THAT MUST BE EXPECTED
IN ENEMY TACTICS X 

CONSIDER ACTION ALL OF FOLLOWING LINES TO BE OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE
X PROVIDE P-40F PLANES OR COMPARABLE TYPE FOR ALL MARINE FIGHTING
SQUADRONS ASSIGNED TO OUTLYING BASES X IF P-40F OR COMPARABLE TYPE
CAN BE MODIFIED FOR AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS PROVIDE THESE
PLANES FOR CARRIER FIGHTING SQUADRONS X TAKE ANY POSSIBLE STEPS
TO LIGHTEN F4F4 AND INCREASE AMMUNITION CAPACITY EVEN AT COST OF
REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF GUNS X GIVE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY TO 
PRODUCTION AND DELIVERY NEW F4U FIGHTERS


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## HoHun (Jan 2, 2009)

Hi Amsel,

>Here is the text of a despatch from Admiral Nimitz to
Admiral King sent on 20 June 1942:

Wow, that makes Thach's statement look like a rather cautious comment in comparison! Thanks a lot!

Nimitz demanding Army aircraft ... that probably didn't make him popular in the Navy 

Apparently, the Navy's victory at Midway did not leave Nimitz with a false sense of satisfaction with his main fleet fighter ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Amsel (Jan 2, 2009)

Nimitz I think expected that the Japanese would recognize that they were using bad tactics and improve on them but they never did. The Japanese thought they were doing just fine until they ran into the F4U and P-38s and other 1943 aircraft. It seems that tactics trumped the supposed superiority of the Zero fighter. As far as giving the Marine units P 40's some say the Marines were better off with the Wildcat due to the fact that the Japanese bombers were coming in at about 25,000 feet.


----------



## Clay_Allison (Jan 3, 2009)

Amsel said:


> Nimitz I think expected that the Japanese would recognize that they were using bad tactics and improve on them but they never did. The Japanese thought they were doing just fine until they ran into the F4U and P-38s and other 1943 aircraft. It seems that tactics trumped the supposed superiority of the Zero fighter. As far as giving the Marine units P 40's *some say the Marines were better off with the Wildcat due to the fact that the Japanese bombers were coming in at about 25,000 feet*.





VMF-121 pilot Roger Habermane said:


> ...we'd work like hell to get to to climb to 23,000-24,000 feet. At that
> altitude when you malke a turn you lose 1,000 ft, and its very easy to
> stall out. In theory the F4F had a higher service ceiling but not in
> practice. You'd look up and there sit the Japs at 30,000 ft looking
> ...



Maybe not though.


----------



## renrich (Jan 3, 2009)

Nimitz in June, 1942, was only reflecting the viewpoint of pilots like Thach who were fresh from the Midway battle and who were already critical of the changes made to the F4F3 that resulted in the F4F4. If, and this is a big if, Vought had been a bigger company and if the urgency had been there, the F4U could have been available in early 1942 with most of the bugs out which hindered it's use on carriers. The long gestation period of the Corsair was most unfortunate for the USN. The USN fowarded a request to Vought for the proposal on a production aircraft in Nov., 1940. A contract for 584 F4U1s was signed in June 1941. The Navy accepted the first two F4U1s in July 1942 and the Corsair was still not ready for operations off of carriers.


----------



## Amsel (Jan 3, 2009)

Clay_Allison said:


> Maybe not though.


True, but my comparison was to the P-40. The P-40 struggled at 18,000'. On the E and K models it could reach 22,000' but struggled maybe flying only barely above stall speed at full throttle. If the nose was raised or the guns were fired it would go into a stall. The wildcat could still fight at 24,000' where the p-40s at altitude would be sitting ducks.


----------



## HoHun (Jan 11, 2009)

Hi Amsel,

>True, but my comparison was to the P-40. The P-40 struggled at 18,000'. On the E and K models it could reach 22,000' but struggled maybe flying only barely above stall speed at full throttle. If the nose was raised or the guns were fired it would go into a stall. The wildcat could still fight at 24,000' where the p-40s at altitude would be sitting ducks.

When Nimitz complained about the poor performance of the F4F-4 and demanded the adoption of the P-40 by the Navy, he well-advisedly called for the P-40F with its Merlin engine featuring a two-speed (but single-stage) supercharger.

This gave superior altitude performance if you compare it to the P-40 models historically flown by the USAAF in the Pacific hemisphere, though the heavy weight of the P-40F countered some of that advantage, and it was hardly an improvement over the F4F-4 in climb rate, and a step backward in turn rate.

On the other hand, it was much faster than both the F4F-4 and the A6M2 at all altitudes, and that advantage must have been appreciated by the Navy, or they wouldn't have called for the type ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## MikeGazdik (Jan 15, 2009)

I had never read that before, about Nimitz asking for P-40's! I love it! I can see medium blue over white P-40's !!!


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## Marshall_Stack (Jan 15, 2009)

It is interesting about the navy considering P-40s. Along with the other comments here, it is also surprising because they exclusively used radial engines. 

Hw about considering the P-43? It had a turbosupercharger and was close to the Wildcat as far as speed.


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## HoHun (Jan 15, 2009)

Hi Marshall,

>Hw about considering the P-43? It had a turbosupercharger and was close to the Wildcat as far as speed.

Good question. Here is an older comparison I did quite a while back based on what little data I could find on the P-43.

I guess it would be able to hold its own against the A6M2 above 5 km altitude - the higher the better -, but below that, it wouldn't be so good (though probably better than the F4F-4).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Marshall_Stack (Jan 16, 2009)

HoHun,

How do you make these graphs?


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## HoHun (Jan 16, 2009)

Hi Marshall,

>How do you make these graphs?

Do you mean the technical process of turning numerical data into graphs, or do you mean the method of arriving at the numerical data?

For the former, I mostly use Gnuplot and sometimes a spreadsheet.

For the latter, some aerodynamic calculations based on the engine power curve (which in the case of the P-43 is an educated guess), with calibration of the total drag done according to the historical speed data.

Obviously, the more accurate and complete the source data, the more reliable the results. For the P-43, there was little source data, so don't expect perfect accuracy.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Marshall_Stack (Jan 16, 2009)

HoHun, Yeah I was just curios on how you produced the graphs. Thanks for the info.

Does anyone know why the FM-2 used a single stage supercharger vs the two stage on the Wildcat? Was it to conserve weight and/or fuel?


----------



## Clay_Allison (Jan 16, 2009)

Going back for a moment to the original question fo the thread. Does anyone think a bigger 4-blade prop would have helped? That Twin Wasp wasn't awesome but it had decent horsepower. I think it had enough torque to pull a little more air per revolution.


----------



## HoHun (Jan 16, 2009)

Hi Clay,

>1. Wider eliptical wings for more lift and wing surface without making it more difficult to pack into escort carriers. Level top speed would not be helped but since it was a brick, it would still dive fast and be far more maneuverable in a dive than the Zero, plus it would be able to climb effectively and turning might well be better as well.

Hm, if you're aiming for an improved climb rate and manoeuvrability, the first thing to look at should be a possible weight reduction. The F4F-4 had an empty weight of 2670 kg, compared to the (carrier-capable!) Me 109T-2's empty weight of just 2262 kg. (That's flying weight minus fuel, oil, ammunition and pilot in both cases.)

This difference of 400 kg is your weight reduction potential ... exploit it fully, and you will gain 2 m/s climb rate and 3 degree per second turn rate at sea level.

>2. Just at a glance, the prop on the F4F looks tiny. I think a 4 or 5 blade prop with big fat air-eating blades would take better advantage of the 1200 HP offered by the Twin Wasp. 

As a rule of thumb, normally you would prefer to have the smallest number of blades that can transfer the required power. The propeller of the Wildcat was quite adequate ... not much different from that of the Me 109T-2, which offered far superior performance on about the same engine power.

Drag reduction would be the second priority for the F4F-4 (or maybe even the first). 

For the Brewster F2A Buffalo, the NACA prepared a report showing the influence of every aerodynamic imperfection, which added up to a pretty bad penalty. (Some of them were unavoidable on a real aircraft, of course), but similar wind tunnel tests on the Grumman F4F might have helped to make the type a bit faster, I imagine.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


----------



## Marshall_Stack (Jan 16, 2009)

slaterat said:


> VMF-121 pilot Roger Habermane
> 
> ...we'd work like hell to get to to climb to 23,000-24,000 feet. At that
> altitude when you malke a turn you lose 1,000 ft, and its very easy to
> ...



I have read this quote in "Fire in the Sky" and a few pages later there is an account of F4Fs flying at 26,000 or 28,000 feet. So which it, can't get any higher than 24,000 or not?


----------



## delcyros (Jan 16, 2009)

It depends on the actual flying weight. This weight changes as the fuel get´s burned. The plane gets lighter the service ceiling increases.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 16, 2009)

Marshall_Stack said:


> HoHun, Yeah I was just curios on how you produced the graphs. Thanks for the info.
> 
> Does anyone know why the FM-2 used a single stage supercharger vs the two stage on the Wildcat? Was it to conserve weight and/or fuel?



simply was a different engine


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## Marshall_Stack (Jan 16, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> simply was a different engine



But why did the Navy select an engine with only a single speed supercharger when its other fighters had the two stage?


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## Vincenzo (Jan 16, 2009)

maybe, this is my speculation, the 2 staged engine need on other aircrafts more usefull for war


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## Skip M (Jan 16, 2009)

Marshall_Stack said:


> Does anyone know why the FM-2 used a single stage supercharger vs the two stage on the Wildcat? Was it to conserve weight and/or fuel?



The FM-2 was planed for escort carriers performing ASW and close support. The new engine was lighter and had better power down low. The same reason that the Navy's B-24 version PB4Y-2 got rid of the turbo chargers to save weight.


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## Dave Fenton (Jan 19, 2009)

know anything about night fighters f6f on the randolph cv 15 1945?

skip, know anything about cv 15 randolph night fighters...

know anything about f6f on the randolph...night fighter?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 20, 2009)

Dave Fenton said:


> know anything about night fighters f6f on the randolph cv 15 1945?
> 
> skip, know anything about cv 15 randolph night fighters...
> 
> know anything about f6f on the randolph...night fighter?



Dave I combined all 3 of your posts - go to the new member's section and read up on this site before you make any more posts like this.


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## Clay_Allison (Feb 24, 2009)

I was reading more into the F4F and I was thinking that a LOT of weight might have been saved not only in armor but in replacing the 6x.50 armament with 6x.30 machine guns. In the Pacific Theatre of operations, it didn't seem like the extra power of the .50 did much good against practically unarmored Japanese fighters. 6x.30-06 with API ammo with a few more rounds per gun would do just as well against thin skinned Zeroes and save a ton of extra weight in both gun weight and ammo.


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## claidemore (Feb 25, 2009)

Clay_Allison said:


> In the Pacific Theatre of operations, it didn't seem like the extra power of the .50 did much good against practically unarmored Japanese fighters. 6x.30-06 with API ammo with a few more rounds per gun would do just as well against thin skinned Zeroes and save a ton of extra weight in both gun weight and ammo.



What about bombers? And ships?

British Hurricanes had 8 or 12 rifle caliber mgs, and they mostly switched to 4 x 20mm cannon in the Pacific and Burma/India theatres.


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## slaterat (Feb 25, 2009)

From what I have read its seems the RAF reduced the guns from 12 to 8x.303s in their Hurri IIbs as they considered the smaller number of guns more than adequate to deal with the Oscars, Zeros and Nates. By the time the IIc s, with 4x20mm, arrived Hurricanes were largely used for ground attack .

Slaterat


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## Nightwitch (Feb 25, 2009)

Does anybody have any detailed information on the Wildcat's success (or lack thereof) in the operations in which it was used in the MTO/ETO? I'm pretty sure Wildcats or Martlets were used quite a bit in the early stages of the war in the Mediterranean, and I know they were used for Operation Torch. How did they perform in that setting?


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## JoeB (Feb 25, 2009)

Nightwitch said:


> I'm pretty sure Wildcats or Martlets were used quite a bit in the early stages of the war in the Mediterranean, and I know they were used for Operation Torch. How did they perform in that setting?


For USN F4F's in Torch following is a cleaned up cut and paste of previous responses by me to others on previous threads follows. To summarize, the F4F did better against the French fighters in Torch than v Zeroes (around 2:1 v around 1:1 in a much larger sample of combats in 1942 v Zeroes) but the situation was more favorable and the opponent less formidable (by all evidence of the thrashings administered to most Western fighters units by JNAF ones in 1942).

I don't know any two sided accounts of FAA fighter v fighter combat with Martlet/Wildcats except May '42 v Ms406's in Madagascar (see recent Ms406 thread) and March '45 FAA FM-2's v Bf109's off Norway (3 Bf109's downed per German accounts, one FM written off on return per some accounts). FAA Martlets claimed at least a couple of Italian fighters in landbased ops in Egypt and Med convoy battles, but I don't know the Italian side (never conclude anything based on claims alone  )

USN F4F's in Torch:
"Definite/probable/possible air combat losses:
F4F (VF-41) Ens CE Mikronis WIA, POW: said his engine was ko'd by AA in the strafing/air combat encounter with GC II/5 H75's over Cazes a/f 11/8
F4F (VF-41) Lieut.(jg) CA Shields to H75A, POW Cazes 11/8
F4F (VF-41) Lieut GH Carter, ditched due to damage from H75, Cazes 11/8
F4F (VF-41) Lieut.(jg) CV August, POW: like Mikronis could have been AA or fighter bullets over Cazes, but August didn't claim to know which
F4F (VF-9) Ens CW Gerhardt of VF-9 ditched after an oil leak that appeared following the 11/9 combat with GC I/5 H75's. 
F4F (VF-41) Ens AD Conner, was in the 11/8 VF-41/GC II/5 combat, claiming an H75, ditched after the mission but cause not given in any source I know. 

sometimes listed as air combat but probably not:
F4F (VF-9) Ens LA Menard: implied combat loss in the 11/9 combat in Lambert, but seems purely operational in Cressman. 

The sources are: 
"Wildcats over Casablanca" by Lambert, "Ranger" by Cressman. The total of F4F air combat losses was apparently between 2 and 7 a/c. with varying degrees of probability that enemy fighters were the cause. 

French fighter losses also cover a range among sources: 
from French sources in Lambert GC II/5's losses 11/8 were 5 pilot KIA, 1 WIA parachuted, 1 WIA 'landed roughly', 1 WIA plane fate not given, several other planes inoperative. The losses of GC 1/5 11/9 are given in Cressman as 2 pilot KIA, 1 pilot 'seriously burned', 2 'force landed'. French sources say the Armee de l'Air didn't use its Dw.520's though VF-41 claimed some in the first combat. 

Another victory is found in comparing "Bataille de Casablanca" by Mordal with Lambert. VGF-26 F4F's off Sangammon in the Northern Task Force claimed 1 + 2 probable French fighters w/o loss morning of 11/8 at Port Lyautey, but were not officially credited. However an Aeronavale Dw.520 failed to return at the same time and while the French assumed it was downed by AA of US warships, there's no matching warship claim. 

So total French fighter losses to F4F's might have been 12-14, F4F's to French fighters 2-7. Something like 2:1 ratio conservatively. In the big 11/8 combat over Cazes some of the French fighters were struggling to takeoff, but it's not always noted (though clear in French accounts) that others were already airborne on patrol and jumped the F4F's as they strafed. In the 11/9 combat the French had superior numbers and there as no element of surprise on either side. F4F's were officially credited with and downed a Potez 63, plus several Aeronavale Martin 167's to Sangamon's a/c which like their victory v the Dw520 are apparent in French accounts but weren't officially credited on the USN side, plus unfortunately two British a/c (Hudson and recon Spitfire with failed to return to Gibraltar, apparently corresponding to F4F claims for Axis a/c). An SBD downed a Potez 63 and French fighters also downed an OS2U." 

Joe


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## renrich (Feb 25, 2009)

Clay, the armament on the F4F3 which was in use in the early fighting in the Pacific was four fifty cals with 400 rounds each. The F4F3 had superior performance to later Wildcats until the FM2 came along once again with four guns.The six fifties with reduced ammo load came in the F4F4 only because the British insisted on six guns, either because their pilots were not considered as good at gunnery as the USN pilots or because they did not understand the vast difference between the 30 cal and 50 cal. The USN did not like the six gun battery and in fact a number of F4F4s had the four gun battery. The primary mission of the Navy fighter was to defend the fleet against enemy bombers, torpedo planes and recon planes. The USN and AAF did not consider the 30 cal as adequate for the mission of the fighter by 1941. The 50 cal performed admirably against IJN AC and especially well against the big four engined flying boats and also in strafing against patrol craft and light escort vessels.


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## Nightwitch (Feb 25, 2009)

Thanks very much for the info, Joe. I appreciate it.

Is there any record of the F4F fighting German fighters in Torch, or was the opposition mostly Vichy French?


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## JoeB (Feb 25, 2009)

Nightwitch said:


> Is there any record of the F4F fighting German fighters in Torch, or was the opposition mostly Vichy French?


All the actual air opposition was French. The F4F's claimed a single Bf109 but it tragically turned out to be an RAF recon Spitfire from Gibraltar, which the USN aircrews were apparently given no warning might be present in the area. German a/c weren't a farfetched possiblity; the Germans asked for access to North African bases for their a/c to assist the French repelling the Allies, but the Vichy authorities declined.

Joe


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## Clay_Allison (Feb 25, 2009)

claidemore said:


> What about bombers? And ships?
> 
> British Hurricanes had 8 or 12 rifle caliber mgs, and they mostly switched to 4 x 20mm cannon in the Pacific and Burma/India theatres.


We had P-38s in the theatre, I'd suggest they split up interceptor duty whenever possible (like Hurricanes going for the bombers as Spits fought the 109s). Remember I'm talking about the early pacific war, when the F4F was a vital part of the effort.

I think a battery of 30-06 (slightly more modern and powerful than the .303 anyway) would be enough to take out a "Nate" and effectively protect its' ships. 

If the US wasn't the only world power of the war that was totally incapable of making a 20mm cannon work, I'd just suggest two of them but sense we couldn't figure out how to head space the H.S. cannon and didn't try to come up with an alternative, it's .30 or .50.


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## Clay_Allison (Feb 25, 2009)

renrich said:


> Clay, the armament on the F4F3 which was in use in the early fighting in the Pacific was four fifty cals with 400 rounds each. The F4F3 had superior performance to later Wildcats until the FM2 came along once again with four guns.The six fifties with reduced ammo load came in the F4F4 only because the British insisted on six guns, either because their pilots were not considered as good at gunnery as the USN pilots or because they did not understand the vast difference between the 30 cal and 50 cal. The USN did not like the six gun battery and in fact a number of F4F4s had the four gun battery. The primary mission of the Navy fighter was to defend the fleet against enemy bombers, torpedo planes and recon planes. The USN and AAF did not consider the 30 cal as adequate for the mission of the fighter by 1941. The 50 cal performed admirably against IJN AC and especially well against the big four engined flying boats and also in strafing against patrol craft and light escort vessels.


I agree that the 4-gun armament was better than 6, but the plane was still overweight. I think it was a bit overarmored as well, there's something to be said for not getting shot up as much in the first place.


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## claidemore (Feb 26, 2009)

Clay:
Yeah, there were P38s in the PTO, but they weren't on the carriers, so were limited in where they could be used, particularly early war. F4Fs were generally slugging it out alone. 

When I mentioned ships, I was referring to the use of .50 cal for strafing enemy ships, something it is much better suited for than rifle caliber mgs. I understand that there were Japanese warships that were put out of action solely with .50 strafing fire. 

While I agree that multiple .30 caliber mgs could do the job, (as they did in BOB), I don't see replacing .50s with .30s to gain a bit of performance as a good trade off. 

To me, lightening the F4F's armor (or weapons) to increase it's performance, is basically trying to turn it into a Zero, or at least match the Zeros attributes. 

If you match the opponent exactly, you each have a 50/50 chance of winning. The key to beating an opponent with different strengths is to capitalize on your own strengths, and with the F4F that strength was it's ruggedness and firepower.


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## renrich (Feb 26, 2009)

The early F4F3 had little armor and no ss tanks and had a rate of climb well over 3000 fpm at SL. From memory, it weighed less than 6000 pounds.


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## claidemore (Feb 26, 2009)

According to wiki, loaded weight was 7000 lbs for F4F-3. (empty weight for F4F-4 should be 5500 lbs?)
Cockpit armour was added early in the production run, not sure exactly when the ss tanks were added. Even without those the Wildcat still earned a reputation for absorbing punishment.


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## JoeB (Feb 26, 2009)

The F4F-3's and 3A's in service in December 1941 had neither armor nor self sealing tanks. The Marine F4F's on Wake did combat that way, but had only a single air combat with Japanese fighters, a pair downing 3 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes but Zeroes downed one F4F and shot up the other so it couldn't be returned to service before the Japanese invasion. Navy F4F's were initially fitted with 3/8" mild steel, not armor, plates behind the pilot's seat before entering combat w/o self sealing tanks. In their only combat w/ Japanese fighters pre-Coral Sea, Feb 1 '42 raid in the Marshalls, one Type 96 Fighter was downed without loss though some F4F's were hit, including in one hit in the main fuel tank but there was no fire. 

By the time of Coral Sea the carrier based F4F-3's had field-fitted armor and tank bladders, but there were pretty few victories and losses v fighters (perhaps 3 Zeroes and 2 Type 96's for around 5~6 F4F's). By Midway the -4 was standard on the carriers to fit more fighters per carrier (folding wings); the few Marine F4F-3's on Midway were the last to see fighter combat, losing 2 along with 13 F2A's in downing perhaps 2 Zeroes. So, the overwhelming majority of F4F kills and losses v Japanese fighters in 1942 involved F4F-4's, and there was, again, less 'wrong' with the actual results of the F4F-4 v Zeroes, approximate parity, than any other Allied fighter in 1942 v Zeroes.

Joe


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## renrich (Feb 26, 2009)

According to Dean, empty weight of F4F3 was 5426 and F4F4 was 5778. That F4F3 must have had armor and ss tank as FM2 empty weight is given as 5448 in 1944. Just as Joe B states early F4F3s had no armor or ss tanks. The F4F3A had a different supercharger that F4F3 and was lacking in high altitude performance, I think. The USN had such a shortage of aircraft that for a short while some squadrons operated with 3s and 3As together. In fact some squadrons operated with Buffaloes and Wildcats together. Who would have thought the US would have been that unprepared?


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## cherry blossom (Feb 26, 2009)

renrich said:


> During the Guadalcanal campaign the IJN suffered from the same disadvantages the LW did in BOB and the AAF did later in the ETO. The Wildcats were defending near their bases and the Zeros had to fly and fight hundreds of miles away from their bases.


I think that I have read that it was even worse for the IJN in that the Zeros had to (or chose to) retain their drop tanks for combat over Guadalcanal. Can one of you experts please either confirm or deny this.


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## R Leonard (Feb 26, 2009)

Musings on Operation, Grumman F4F-3 and -4 from a USN pilot who fles the F4F-3 from 3-41 to 5-42 (VF-42) and F4F-4 from 5-42 to 8-43 (VF-3, VF-11), penned 21 September 1993.

1. Pre-flight Procedure - (From the standpoint of an aircraft carrier deck launch): Each item must be carried out as promptly as safety/accuracy permit because ship will turn into the wind with the intent of launching promptly to minimize the length of time on a steady course – a dangerous time under torpedo threat.
“Pilots man your planes” – on this order leave ready room and double time to assigned plane. Greet plane captain, get assurance ‘she’ is ready to go and climb in. PC helps getting settled in cockpit. Parachute already there – put buckles in place but don’t connect until airborne and assured the Wright brothers were indeed right.​Set controls, settings, switches to ready for prompt action on the word:​“Start engine” - Fire up, warm up, run up, check mags, etc. Give thumbs up if plane is OK for TO. Watch deck controlman for hand signals freeing plane from tie downs. Follow directions into take off spot. When turned over to launch officer, give him final thumbs up. On his signal, run engine up to TO power and, when he flags you away, release breaks and GO.​Quite a few things happening here and not much time; much teamwork - pilots, PC, deck handlers, and all coordinated with the movement of 30000 tons of ship. This was a good way to start the day/mission. F4F-3 was a steady solid machine, somewhat complex but not tricky. Rather fight in this machine than anything else available in the period. Better machines were coming, but oh, so, slowly.​2. Cockpit:
a. Comfort – like all Grummans there was plenty of room once inside the narrow opening. Well tailored to the average pilot, all controls and adjustments were reasonable. Never worry about heating, cockpit was a noisy, hot box. Oxygen- very up to date diluter, demand good for a machine that could go to 35000 feet (but took a long time to get there and almost never found business at that level). Seat – no special remarks, it was adjustable if you knew how to use your thigh muscles. Rudder pedals nicely adjustable for the shorties. Hand cranked landing gear a pain, but bearable, a simplicity bonus.​b. Instruments – A fair layout, though the magnetic compass was hard to see. Fuel gauge wildly inaccurate – had to rely on the clock to keep track of fuel state. Gun charging was all manual, a chore. Luckily, it was not often needed. Some folks did have fits with the guns until we learned the facts of feeding and care - avoid negative G!​c. Control – F4F-3/4 conformed well to USN standards of stability and control. Rudder control at take-off and low speeds deficient and caused incidents. Rudder trim changed with changes in speed – bad for gunnery until the pilot got wise and remembered what to do. Plane was fast but well behaved carrier landing machine – hard to slow down. With some experience, the average pilot looked good landing this plane. At high combat speeds, the F4F had excellent control and response. Too bad, there was not enough engine to fly that way and maintain altitude.​d. Vision – OK, superior except for directly aft and taxiing. In the latter, nose high stance could be helped by zigzag path.​e. Communications – Radio equipment was primitive, weak, complex. This was one of the great problems of this period of the fighting.​3. Engine: 
a. It was nice, smooth running, but noisy. Heavy – had a big weight investment in 2 speed, 2 stage superchcharger which was under-used because 1942 fighters found full employment at moderate altitudes. There was not enough power for the heavy F4F-3/4.​b. Highly reliable and trouble free. Hard to start with the shotgun starter in humid conditions. Rugged, stood up to high demands. The Curtiss electric prop gave some reliability problems, not the engine’s fault.​c. Fuel consumption – also not engine’s fault – but there was not enough on board. So, F4F was short legged and short winded. Fuel gauge was a mess (see instruments). Aux tanks not experienced until Guadalcanal – the 2 x 58 gal. added range and endurance, but not much and hurt fighter performance; had to be dripped to fight, quantity not gauged.​
4. Climb to altitude: Deficient, poor power loading so no cure short of buying a new airplane.

5. Cruise: No complaints save hot, noisy cockpit, lying fuel gauge and no hands-off flying stability.

6. Combat:
a. Guns – 4 x .50 cal. with corresponding ammo tolerable; 6 x .50 cal. with less ammo a poorer battery
The .50 cal. Browning a good piece but needed care and understanding. In good hands it was a winner. Ammo for this gun was good and reliable. F4F-3 reflector sight was a poor installation – cleaner in the F4F-4, but still a big threat projecting into the pilot’s face on an arrested or forced landing.​b. Bombs or rockets not used. Strafing quite impressive – had a good session on a Jap destroyer on 4 May 42. Ran him aground.​ c. Great freedom diving and turning, no fear of high G structural effects. Climb was poor – already noted above. Engine was willing and put out without overheat or complaint, just not enough power. Hard pulling and fast turning saved many lives. You can develop an affection for a machine like that.​d. Part of c above comes from Grumman’s Iron Works way of putting the machine together. When perforated or bashed it still could fly and fight. No armor seat, plates on bulkheads ahead and behind. Main tank self-sealing fuel protection – it worked. Aux tanks inerted with CO2 when empty – no known failure of that system.​e. Evaluation – When aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the F4F-3/4 a knowledgeable pilot could earn his keep. Do not dog fight, keep speed up, watch fuel state, and you can tally, come home, and repeat. Enemy flashy maneuverability was worrisome, but don’t play their game. Against their dive and torpedo planes, the F4F-3/4 turned into a flying dragon. Problem was to create an engagement – largely the doing of a good fighter director and functioning communications. When these clicked, there was joy in fighter town. Improvement was a goal slowly attained.​
7. Landing: The F4F-3/4 behaved very well here, especially on the carrier. Ground loop tendency on field landings was a problem, not much harm except to the pilot’s ego. Time and experience were the usual remedies.

8. Bail out and ditching: I have no personal experience with these – yet (knock on wood). However I attended numerous events close up. F4F-3/4 seemed to have average bail-out score, tolerable. Until we got shoulder straps in the summer of 1942, all over-water flight suffered from the dread of fatality because the F4F landed fast, sank fast, and the pilot was usually knocked senseless by the gun sight or instrument panel. We flew in this state of peril from early 1941 through the summer of 1942 and it was uncomfortable. Once we had a good shoulder harness, our peril receded to that normally acceptable for our calling.

End

For what it’s worth, I thought it might be interesting. He mentions the ground loop problem and I sat down once with him and went over the issue. Not trusting my memory, somewhere around here I have the write up of the fruits of that conversation; I’ll try to find it.

I also note the phrase “Rather fight in this machine than anything else available in the period.” This from a pilot not only an F4F ace, but also one of the few experienced USN A6M pilots, having time in both the A6M2 and the A6M5; and the guy who, in the late summer – early fall of 1944, introduced the concept of using a Zero to train with USN fighter pilots head west.

Rich


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## Amsel (Feb 26, 2009)

Great post! Hope you got more.

I know the USMC pilots loved their F4F's. Reliable with heavy armor in the cockpit and from the sturdy P&W in front.


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## JoeB (Feb 26, 2009)

cherry blossom said:


> I think that I have read that it was even worse for the IJN in that the Zeros had to (or chose to) retain their drop tanks for combat over Guadalcanal.


In some cases Zeroes definitely dropped their tanks, as in early war operations when the tanks were seen on the ground by the Allies. In the early missions of Tainan Air Group from Rabaul to Guadalcanal they apparently didn't, not sure why, shortage? USN F6F's sometimes didn't drop their tanks in air combat either, in that case it was limited supply of them on a carrier.

On range it's true the Zeroes were flying at very long range on the early missions to Guadalcanal, from Vunakanau field at Rabaul almost 650 statue miles one way to Henderson Field. However later on they were flying from, or could divert to, Buin, around 345 statue miles, far for most 1942 fighters but not for a Zero (Model 32's, aka 'Hamps', could only reach Henderson from Buin, not from Rabaul). And some combats between F4F's and Zeroes were between carrier based ones, a few Japanese carrier strikes on Guadalcanal, or F4F's escorting attack a/c against Japanese convoys well north of Guadalcanal, yet the results didn't seem to change dramatically.

And mainly, we're compared the results of Zero v F4F in 1942 to performance of other Allied fighters facing Zeroes in the same period. In many of those other cases the Zeroes were also flying from far away, as Formosa to Philippines, northern DEI to Java, Timor to Darwin: 500+ mile one way missions where Zeroes were more successful against other Allied types than against F4F's.

Also the other side of coin of campaigns were the Zero and Allied bases were close was that in latter case the Allied fighters could apply direct pressure against the Zero bases, destroying a/c on the ground and possibly catching them taking off: the RAAF and USAAF P-40/P-39 units in New Guinea in '42 operating from Port Moresby against Zeroes based at Lae, within their short range, were able to do this on occasion.

Joe


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## renrich (Feb 27, 2009)

Rich, that was a good post and really enjoyed. Much of it was reflected in Lundstrom, "The First Team." Interesting to hear the pilot relate effectiveness of 50 BMGs on DDs. That was also reflected in Lundstrom and was debunked by some "experts" on this forum during a discussion on AC armament. Sometimes all pilots were not really adept at identifying ships so the "DD" might have been a lesser ship, but the 50 cal can do a lot. One point which has nothing to do with the F4F but does illustrate problems of preparedness is that, before Midway, the pilots had no survival apparatus so they often trooped to the galley for meat cleavers or butcher knives for survival knives. One point that us "armchair pilots" often don't understand is that the range of AC we read about online or in books is often "yardstick" range which is only good(sometimes) for comparison. It is basically the number of miles an AC can cover at best cruise with full tanks, internal or external. For instance, the F4U4 is often given a range of 1005 miles(that is on internal fuel and where does the five come from?) That means it has a combat radius of around 500 miles, right? Wrong! That 1005 miles does not take into account, warm up, take off, climb out, cruise to target, combat for a few minutes, cruise back and reserve. Around 75% of the yardstick range is more accurate for a combat mission and that varies a lot according to land based, carrier based and other factors, so the combat radius of an F4U4 might be 350 to 375 miles. Lundstrom said that the A6M had a combat radius of around 300 miles from a carrier to 500 miles from a landbase. The Wildcat could get about 175 miles from a carrier. Another factor to remember is that a 150 gallon drop tank would not give you the extra range you would expect because of increased drag and weight especially during climb out. I have heard that a 150 gallon tank would only give about 75 gallons extra range. Don't know if that is true and suspect it depends on the shape of the tank. Some of the early drop tanks were shaped like bathtubs.


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## Amsel (Feb 27, 2009)

I have seen stories from pilots on different occasions use .50 fire to deter ships. The strafing runs kill crew, blow up ordnance, damage weapons, and start fires. strafing the bridge can be an effective way to deter ships for a vital minute or two as seen in the Battle off Samar with Wildcats strafing 'ships of the line'.


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## Captain Dunsel (Feb 27, 2009)

Good points, Renrich. 

I wonder how many of those experts would, if they were told their car got 25 MPG (average) and had a 20 gallon tank, expect that they could wait until the odometer said 495 miles had elapsed before they'd start looking for a gas station?

CD


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## JoeB (Feb 27, 2009)

renrich said:


> Rich, that was a good post and really enjoyed. Much of it was reflected in Lundstrom, "The First Team." Interesting to hear the pilot relate effectiveness of 50 BMGs on DDs. That was also reflected in Lundstrom and was debunked by some "experts" on this forum during a discussion on AC armament. Sometimes all pilots were not really adept at identifying ships so the "DD" might have been a lesser ship, but the 50 cal can do a lot.


In the particular case mentioned above, during the strike on Tulagi May 4 1942, one of the targets of strafing was a real DD, Yuzuki, whose physical damage is variously described as heavy (in Lundstrom) or light (some Japanese sources) but the CO was killed along with 9 others by all accounts. The ship didn't run aground and survived. Her sister Kikuzuki was struck by a TBD's torpedo and beached (mostly picked away by scrap scavengers over the decades but some of it is still visible today), and strafing by F4F's also caused the smaller vessel Tama Maru (confusion exists as to its exact type) to be beached, sank later, wreck is within recreational diving depth.

Another well documented case of highly effective F4F strafing was by a mixed formation of VF-9 and -41 v the French 2nd Light Sdn as it sortied from Casablanca Nov 8 1942. The French DD's and super-DD's were outgunned already by the US surface force but the strafing caused heavy casualties among command, fire control and communications personnel on several of the ships, greatly reducing their effectiveness thereafter; the steering gear on one was also disabled temporarily. They downed one F4F in return.

Both the Japanese and French increased protective plating on the bridges of their DD's as a direct result of such incidents.

Joe


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## renrich (Feb 27, 2009)

Joe B, one can always rely on you to come up with informative posts. Very many thanks. Hope the skeptics about the 50 BMG read your post. When I said that the Wildcats disabled some IJN ships by strafing, there was scoffing. The fact is that I don't believe that DDs of any description had much armor plate anywhere. An interesting point is that after being on board the BB, Alabama, I observed single mount 20 mm Oerlikons almost everywhere on deck that was unobstructed, yet modern light USN vessels don't seem to mount any 20 mms at all except in the CIWSs. There are always 50 bmgs though. Saw a picture of a vessel just launched the other day, of which this was the first of many. This ship looks like a combination of a stealth AC and the USS Moniter and is to operate in the littoral. The only guns visible were a 57mm in a gun house near the bow and two single 50 BMGs on the stern. Wonder why the 50s rather than 20 mms as they are about the same size?


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## Clay_Allison (Feb 28, 2009)

renrich said:


> Joe B, one can always rely on you to come up with informative posts. Very many thanks. Hope the skeptics about the 50 BMG read your post. When I said that the Wildcats disabled some IJN ships by strafing, there was scoffing. The fact is that I don't believe that DDs of any description had much armor plate anywhere. An interesting point is that after being on board the BB, Alabama, I observed single mount 20 mm Oerlikons almost everywhere on deck that was unobstructed, yet modern light USN vessels don't seem to mount any 20 mms at all except in the CIWSs. There are always 50 bmgs though. Saw a picture of a vessel just launched the other day, of which this was the first of many. This ship looks like a combination of a stealth AC and the USS Moniter and is to operate in the littoral. The only guns visible were a 57mm in a gun house near the bow and two single 50 BMGs on the stern. Wonder why the 50s rather than 20 mms as they are about the same size?


.50s are cheap, easy to maintain, and on modern Navy ships their mission is still to provide protection against suicide bombing, not by kamikaze pilots, but boats like the USS Cole.


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## KrazyKraut (Feb 28, 2009)

A 20mm (with correct ammunition) will be equally or more effective against lightly armored ships. The F4U-1C shows very well that, for ground attack purposes, even the US acknowledged the overall superiority of the cannon.

Modern destroyers today still use cannons for close air defense, like AK-630, Mauser MLG, Phalanx etc. The CIWS is the primary anti air defense on the destroyers not the .50 cal. The 50 is still used because it's available, cheap and against unarmored "suicide boats", it doesn't take more, like Clay mentioned.


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## renrich (Mar 1, 2009)

Another factor to consider when discussing the range of WW2 fighters is that essentially the combat radius was determined by the amount of internal fuel carried. No matter how much external fuel could be carried the fighter had to perform ACM and return to base on the internal fuel, since few pilots wanted to start combat with external drop tanks attached. One of the weaknesses of the P39 was that it could carry only 120 gallons of internal fuel, which essentially determined the combat radius. It had a 1710 CI, 12 cylinder engine which burned fuel quickly, especially at military power. My brother has a 300 HP Saratoga that carries 100 gallons of internal fuel. Imagine the difference. The F4U4 could carry two 150 gallon drop tanks but when entering combat, it had to rely on the 234 gallons in the fuselage tank to fight on and then go home. Another factor involved was in, for instance, the Merlin P51s there was an 85 gallon internal fuel tank that sat behind the pilot, well aft of the CG. Violent maneuvers were not a good idea with that tank full so it needed to be empty or nearly so before combat which meant the P51 had to fight and go home on the other internal fuel which was around 185 gallons, even though it too could carry 300 gallons of external fuel.


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## davparlr (Mar 1, 2009)

renrich said:


> Another factor to consider when discussing the range of WW2 fighters is that essentially the combat radius was determined by the amount of internal fuel carried. No matter how much external fuel could be carried the fighter had to perform ACM and return to base on the internal fuel, since few pilots wanted to start combat with external drop tanks attached. One of the weaknesses of the P39 was that it could carry only 120 gallons of internal fuel, which essentially determined the combat radius. It had a 1710 CI, 12 cylinder engine which burned fuel quickly, especially at military power. My brother has a 300 HP Saratoga that carries 100 gallons of internal fuel. Imagine the difference. The F4U4 could carry two 150 gallon drop tanks but when entering combat, it had to rely on the 234 gallons in the fuselage tank to fight on and then go home. Another factor involved was in, for instance, the Merlin P51s there was an 85 gallon internal fuel tank that sat behind the pilot, well aft of the CG. Violent maneuvers were not a good idea with that tank full so it needed to be empty or nearly so before combat which meant the P51 had to fight and go home on the other internal fuel which was around 185 gallons, even though it too could carry 300 gallons of external fuel.



Another factor in determining range was fuel efficiency. While the P-51D only had 185 gallons internal, it used only about 80 gallons to go 400 miles, leaving about 105 gallons for combat at this range. Similarly, the F4U-4 would use an estimated 144 gallons to fly 400 miles leaving 90 gallons for combat at this range. With better fuel efficiency, the p-51D would have about 20 minutes more combat time at normal rated power at this distance.


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## renrich (Mar 2, 2009)

Right on. I forgot to mention that because of it's "cleaness" the P51 could get very good gas mileage. That 180 gallons could go a long way. I think that the very best a Corsair could do was about 42 gallons per hour at most economical cruise.


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## jgalliett (Mar 14, 2009)

True the F4F And the F6F are simaliar. Also true the Tatch weave helped even the odds. However the F6F and F4U had a biger armement, A beter Engine(A PratandWhitneyR2800 to be exact), longer range,Climb rate was terrible,guns weren't always working properly,and was more manueverable. Also the F6F had a kill ratio of 18 to 1 to the Wildcat's 9 to 1.
I am not trying to criticize the F4F. It was a good little plane. Just not the right plane for the job.


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## Elvis (Mar 15, 2009)

What was wrong with the F4F?
Not much, and what was, was fixed with the FM-2.
If I had to fight using the Wildcat, that's the version I'd choose.

Oddly enough, tests on the F4F using a more powerful engine (R-2000) and information based on performance of the Japanese fighter combined to create the F6F.
An experimental version of the F6F eventually led to the development of the F8F.



Elvis


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## R Leonard (Mar 15, 2009)

THACH, only 1 T


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