# What went wrong most for Germany?



## schwarzpanzer (Sep 13, 2005)

What went wrong most for Germany?

Attacking Russia, oil being bombed, Italy switching sides, supporting Japan etc.


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## plan_D (Sep 13, 2005)

What went the worst for Germany? I'd say that'd have to be ...the war. 

The Battle of the Atlantic would have to be my choice though. It allowed Britain to stay a capable enemy which ultimately led to the loss of North Africa, Italy and the invasion of Normandy.


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## evangilder (Sep 13, 2005)

When Hitler stopped listening to his Generals and tried to lead the battles himself.


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## Gnomey (Sep 13, 2005)

I'd agree with that Evan especially after the July 20th Plot when a lot of the Generals who where in command where loyal Nazi's rather than capable Generals. Though the loss of the Battle of the Atlantic and Goering's incompetence in the Battle of Britain ultimately helped Hitler to lose the war.


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 13, 2005)

All of the above.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 13, 2005)

Id say the whole war, but mostley attacking Russia when they did.


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## Udet (Sep 13, 2005)

Not exterminating the BEF in and around Dunkirk, when the table was served to have a juicy banquet.


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## reddragon (Sep 13, 2005)

It looks to me like the main culprit was Hitler, too. It looks like the German army and it's leadership was very capable but he continued to change the objectives and override his generals.


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## P38 Pilot (Sep 13, 2005)

Oh yeah. Its Hitler's fault. He didnt listen to the Generals that were winning the battles. Like Rommel for instance, Hitler deinied Rommel for more tanks at Normandy. Also, everyone was to afraid to wake up Hitler at D-day so he could send the few tanks they had to crush the oncoming allies.


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## lesofprimus (Sep 13, 2005)

What Generals were winning what battles -38??? The Germans werent winning much just before and after D-Day......

Also, there was more than a "few" tanks available to Rommel during D-Day.....


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## Glider (Sep 13, 2005)

Taking a different view, Germany didn't have the economic ability to win the war. It wasn't self sufficient in food or raw materials and never took the oppertunities that came their way to redress the balance. 

A good example being the invasion of Russia. They captured large parts of Russian including the most productive farming areas. The people hated Stalin for forcing them into collective farms with the famine that followed. If handled differently, they would have been staunch allies of anyone who got rid of Stalin for them. This would have fed a large proportion of Germany and its dependancies and given it valuble manpower in the fight against Stalin. As we know, they threw it away.

They had the Technology and the designs, but lacked the means to take on more than one enemy.

Strangely they also lacked the planning. The navy for one was planning on a war two years later. The U Boat war was the one thing that worried Churchill. Can you imagine what would have happened if the war started with a Hundred boats at sea?

Strangely this also applied to the Army. It started the war with a large number of Pz 1s which were never as good as they should be. Even at the end of the war the German army still relied on horse drawn transport to a significant degree.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 14, 2005)

> Not exterminating the BEF in and around Dunkirk, when the table was served to have a juicy banquet.



Not so easy Udet, with what happened at Arras etc.

Yes Hitler was bad for micro-management, but if he had been listened to pre '41 all PzIII's would have carried the 50mm L60 for e.g, giving the MatildaII, Char Somua T34 less of an advantage etc.

Also Hitler had to act as a mediator between Guderian and Rommel etc.

The Battle of the Atlantic's a good point, but he had no real interest in Africa at that time. He should have ignored Russia untill Britain was finished, but then Stalin definately would've attacked.

The Russian people part Glider is my belief.



> The U Boat war was the one thing that worried Churchill.



Yes, but it spurred on the development of countermeasures.



> Even at the end of the war the German army still relied on horse drawn transport to a significant degree.



There was a plan by Rommel which would have allowed Germany to win, or at least come to a favourable agreement, it involved horses and AT-guns.

BTW: Like your sig lesofprimus 8) , is it big guns/green hearts?

I'll add another, what about the He112 instead of the Me109 for the BoB?


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

Crushing the BEF would have been an easy task for the Wehrmacht. They would have suffered a lot of casualities trying to do so but they would have been able to. The British forces had few Matildas left and the Matildas were what carried the couter-offensive at Arras. 
Although, the German forces didn't completely abandon attacks on the Dunkirk area. The 26th Coldstream Guards did a remarkable job holding the line around Dunkirk and it's beaches while the Germans tried to breakthrough. 

Guderian and Rommel didn't come into clash until April 1944. Rommel was wrong in that instance. As he seemed to believe the tanks should be placed behind the beaches, which as history shows left them open to Allied aerial and naval bombardment. 

The German offensive in North Africa was important even if Hitler didn't have interest in it. It was security for Hitler's Europe, it contained oil fields and it also had the Suez Canal which allowed easier shipping to South-East Asia.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 14, 2005)

I think the number of mistakes were too many to name. Some most notable was Hitlers idea in 1940 that no new serious aircraft designs needed to be made because the designs they had were eneogh to win the war within 2 years. Another being Dunkirk. The most serious though I still believe was Russia. I also think Hitler not allowing his military commanders to run the war was a deadly mistake. As others have posted the Wehrmacht was very capable to win a war just not against so many enemies and not with Hitler commanding it.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 14, 2005)

You have to admit though he was a good leader at the start, would anyone else have listened to Guderian etc?

The no retreat orders he gave later were where he went wrong, also saying let the Germans rot was a pretty daft thing to say.

I heard it said that Hitler turned into Stalin, Stalin Turned into Hitler - very true.

Hitler also replaced the successful BlitzKrieg with copied Maginot Line tactics - durr!

What gets me is why did Hiler listen to Goering and let him off so easily when he tried to usurp him and fled the Reichstag etc (perhaps he'd got past caring?).

Also did Goering really think the air war could be won in 2 years and the RAF smashed in 4 weeks?

Most German pilots highly respected their British counterparts and Ernst Heinkel revered Reginald Mitchell. And his obsession for zerstorers (Me110) WTF? He must have known??

This is where something Hitler said that made sense, Britain had superior sea/air power so why not concentrate these efforts against someone with worse (Russia) and of course he never thought his ground forces could lose...

He would have been better off with North Africa, but then he exposes himself to Stalin...

I don't think surrender at Dunkirk would be an option, not with the (truthful) Totenkoph rumours flying about. But if they were taken prisoners I believe they would want to irritate the war machine whenever possible.

Another mistake of course could be the Maus (or not!).


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

Hitler was a good political leader, not military leader. Guderian was accepted by quite a few German General Staff officers by 1939. Hitler was only amazed by his work because it was new and technical. 

Hitler into Stalin? A raving Communist that purged his Generals and threw men in pieces at the enemy with no tactics? The war made Hitler a fantasist and Stalin a realist. 

Replaced the Blitzkrieg with Maginot Line tactics? What are you going on about? Maginot was not a tactic. And if you're refering to Hitler wanting static warfare, then that's wrong also. The lines of defence in Germany were much more intelligent. They relied on counter-attacks, mobile reserves and block defence rather than a static line. 

Goering was a high Nazi official and a friend of Hitler. That's why he didn't bother him. Guderian requested that Goering be replaced in 1944 but Hitler explained the situation while admitting he knew that Goering was incompetant. 

He'd have been better off with Russia but North Africa was a loss. Royal Navy supremacy secured his defeat. 

And it's already been discussed about the Maus. It was a pointless and wasteful design. With no tactical or operational use.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 14, 2005)

I agree with everything that you said there. I think it is ironic though how Hitler would not replace him until 1945 right before he committed suicide because he disobeyed his orders. I believe he fired Himmler at the same time also.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 14, 2005)

No he never sacked Himmler, or even Goering I think?

He stopped Goering being executed though at one point.

Both said they had "urgent business", Himmler was really going to secret talks with the Jewish council-somethingorother, Goering was just crapping himself IIRC?


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

You mean right at the end? Goering reported to Hitler that he had taken over as Fuhrer...but then Doenitz became Reich-Fuhrer and Goering...waddled away. Himmler was too busy killing himself to care what people were doing.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 14, 2005)

No on April 29, 1945 Hitler dictated his personal will and his political testamen. Hitler expelled Goering and Himmler from the Nazi party because of there disloyalty to his last minute commands. He then appointed Karl Doenitz President of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces. He then concluded "I myself and my wife - in order to escape the shame of overthrow or capitulation - choose death." Hitler then had his dog poisoned and poison was distributed to his secretaries. (most if not all did not take the poison though). At 3:15 PM of April 30th Eva Braun (whom he married on the 29th) took poison. At 3:30 PM Hitler blew a bullet through his mouth (so the story goes).

From my understanding the disloyalty that Goering and Himmler committed was sending SS General Karl Wolff to Northern Italy and Switzerland to try and make a peace with the Allies through Allen Dulles the head of O.S.S operations for Europe. One of the people he tried to work with Lyman Lemnitzer who became the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff and later the NATO Commander.


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

I heard that Goering sent some message to Hitler saying he had taken over but...it obviously didn't last long. I knew that Hitler had expelled Goering from the Nazi party. I did not know about Himmler...however, we do know the fate of both men. Death by suicide. Goering at the Nuremburg trials.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 14, 2005)

Yep and Goebbels too. Except that he killed all of his children too.


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## trackend (Sep 14, 2005)

I think Hindenburg was Germany's biggest problem he allowed Adolf in and failed to assist his people at all post 1918 he could have improved the nations lot immensely but was too weak to act against the reparations that where destroying the German nation.
Hitler showed that Germany could recover but went way too far the other way which resulted in the nation being destroyed for a second time in side 35 years.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

I think one of the reasons was many in the German Staff didnt understand the economic potential of the US. They saw a country still wracked in depression and having a 4th rate military. I dont think it occured to them what would happen if the factories started to mass produce weapons for war and not razor blades.

Theres a book "Why the Allies Won", which makes a point that the best generals in Germany commanded the field units, and the engineers and logisticians got the rest. In the US, it was the opposite. It explains why the Germans seemed to do so well in battle, but then have to withdraw from lack of support.

In the end, they lost more to attrition than anything else. Hitler had his role in it, but the mind set of the whole army also played a part.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 16, 2005)

Yes but that mindset of the Army was brouht on because Hitlers Cronies were in command of the Army.


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## RAGMAN (Sep 23, 2005)

The biggest blunder is when Hitler declared war on the US when the US was going to concentrate on Japan only and not Germany. If Japan had shown the same loyalty and declared war on the Russia during the fall of 1941, Russia would have had to leave the troops near the japanese area and Moscow would have been open to attack.Or at the very least, Germany would not have been beaten so badly during the winter of 1941/42. A second mistake was when Hitler ordered the army into the Caucasus? leaving a huge salient that was a juicy target of attack for encirclement.(especially when the wing was guarded by other axis forces of dubious value)


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## P38 Pilot (Sep 24, 2005)

RAGMAN said:


> The biggest blunder is when Hitler declared war on the US when the US was going to concentrate on Japan only and not Germany. If Japan had shown the same loyalty and declared war on the Russia during the fall of 1941, Russia would have had to leave the troops near the japanese area and Moscow would have been open to attack.Or at the very least, Germany would not have been beaten so badly during the winter of 1941/42. A second mistake was when Hitler ordered the army into the Caucasus? leaving a huge salient that was a juicy target of attack for encirclement.(especially when the wing was guarded by other axis forces of dubious value)



Exactly. Now guys heres something. Hitler hated communism. Russia was the largest country with communist. If Hitler had been smart, he would have allowed Russia to show itself and the true meaning of Communism to the allies. That way if Hitler had invaded Russia, he could of had the support of the other countries into doing this. There would have been a strong chance of Germany defeating the USSR.

Think about it. The Korean war or maybe even Vietnam would nver have happened. Why? Because USSR gave full support to Korea and China. Then later China and Russia gave guns, bombs, ammo and supplies to the North Vietnamese.

Hitler also could have handled the Jewish issue better. Instead of being evil and ordering their deaths, he could of had sent some out of the country. Thats it. 

If Hitler had done this, he could have prevented 2 more wars that America would later fight. Also ridding the world of Communism and preventing the Cold War. We may have still fought with China, but we would have weakended them so badly Communism would have been destroyed.

Germany probably could have become a powerful country next to USA or UK. Hitler would have gone down as the leader who destroyed Communism and left it at that by not invading other countries beside Russia and recieving support from other nations. Germany would have been a leading power today. Almost as strong as the US. Germany would have been our allied when it came down to liberating countries. 

The world would have been better if Hitler did this instead of invading Poland on September 1st, 1939.

Fascism, i dont think it would have lated but it would have changed too democracy very peacfully.


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 24, 2005)

You _are_ joking...aren't you? P-38, have you ever heard of a book called Mein Kampf? It's not an easy book to read, but I'd suggest that you give it a look sometime.


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## evangilder (Sep 24, 2005)

I was wondering the same thing, NS...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 24, 2005)

P38 Pilot said:


> RAGMAN said:
> 
> 
> > The biggest blunder is when Hitler declared war on the US when the US was going to concentrate on Japan only and not Germany. If Japan had shown the same loyalty and declared war on the Russia during the fall of 1941, Russia would have had to leave the troops near the japanese area and Moscow would have been open to attack.Or at the very least, Germany would not have been beaten so badly during the winter of 1941/42. A second mistake was when Hitler ordered the army into the Caucasus? leaving a huge salient that was a juicy target of attack for encirclement.(especially when the wing was guarded by other axis forces of dubious value)
> ...



Where do you come up with this?  

Lets see the allies and the Soviet Union were fighting the same enemy so the US and England would not have just let Germany roam through Russia.

As for the Jewish Situation just like NS said read "Mein Kampf". An Evil Book but will give you an insight of what was going through Hitlers mind. Even if WW2 had not happened he probably would have doen the Holocaust anyhow.

Attack Russia instead of Poland? How would he do this? Please look at a map and see where Russia lies and where Germany lies. Poland is smack dap right between them. Hitler had to invade other countries in order to get to Russia and therefore the Allies would fight against Germany. 

Read some History Books and not the ones that biased based off of one Countries exploits.


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## syscom3 (Sep 24, 2005)

P38, the western world knew exactly about communism. Read the following, its from a web site. 

"In 1932-33 millions of Ukrainians died in the largest Famine of the 20th century. This Famine was not caused by a natural calamity such as drought or epidemic or pestilence. It was not the result of devastation or privation caused by a cataclysmic event such as war.

The Famine in Ukraine was engineered, orchestrated and directed from the Kremlin. It was implemented by Stalin and his comrades in order to complete Ukraine's subjugation to Moscow. Starvation became the tool and the Ukrainian farmers became the main victims."

http://www.faminegenocide.com/resources/backgrounder.html

P38, did you know the US did not recognize the USSR untill Nov 1933?

P38, Did you know that in 1918, US troops actually fought INSIDE of Russia on the side of the anti-communists?

P38, did you know that in 1939, the greatest hope of France and Britain is that Hitler would fight it out with Stalin and leave western Europe out of the fight?

I myself think that we owe it to the Russians for so weakening Germany, we could successfully invade Normandy. Consider the alternative if we werent in Germany by the time we deployed the first atmic bomb. Berlin was going to be nuked.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 24, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> I myself think that we owe it to the Russians for so weakening Germany, we could successfully invade Normandy. Consider the alternative if we werent in Germany by the time we deployed the first atmic bomb. Berlin was going to be nuked.



I agree. If Germany were not fighting a 2 front war at the time. D-Day may have been differently and the war may have lasted longer.

I agree that Germany would have been Nuked but I dont think it would have been Berlin. I think it would have been a smaller city somewhere.


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## P38 Pilot (Sep 24, 2005)

Well you can also thank the Russians for powering China and even North Korea causing two more wars with a devasating effect. We still have a problem with N.Korea this very day. Having to make peace agreements fearing that the Korean leader may hit the US or some other country with a nuke.

I actually thought of that plan all up on my own. It was just a little idea that what if Hitler had never been som evil and cruel and had not ordered Holocaust excutions.

With Communism, the world is under a little threat. Hell there are communist in Cuba and where i live they are considered our "next-door-neighbors." 

Im not praising Hitler. He was sick, demented, and insane. But what if history took another toll. What if Hitler hadnt done the stuff he did to start a Second World War? We knew that Russia would sooner or later start invading other countries. For example, they made a attempt in the 1980's into invading Afghanisatn and almost turing that into USSR terroritory having not only power in the east but in the Middle East!

Alder, you are right about the Nuclear bomb. Germany was producing their own nuke and could have dropped it. But history plays itself.

Nazi Germany was stopped. Soviet Union grew. Korean war later came knocking at our doors. Soldiers later fought Communist in Vietnam.

Today Communism still exists. It exists today and hopefully one day it will be destroyed. It may be a war I might have to fight. Who knows?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 24, 2005)

P38 Pilot said:


> Alder, you are right about the Nuclear bomb. Germany was producing their own nuke and could have dropped it. But history plays itself.



Where did I say that Germany was going to use a Nuke? I never said that, what I said was that Germany would have eventually got nuked.



P38 Pilot said:


> Today Communism still exists. It exists today and hopefully one day it will be destroyed. It may be a war I might have to fight. Who knows?



I seriously doubt we will see a war like the one you are thinking about in our lifetimes again.


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## Udet (Sep 24, 2005)

" I myself think that we owe it to the Russians for so weakening Germany, we could successfully invade Normandy"

Well, it depends on how you approach it. May or maybe not...

Of course the eastern front "drained" Germany´s resources. I find it amusing many researchers and history buffs use such assertion to imply some sort of German incompetence.

It was by far the largest front Germany opened, both in terms of territory and of human/material resources of the enemy.

So what do those researchers would have liked Germany to do? 

Oh, easy answer: to launch Barbarossa with just 2 panzer divisionen and 5 infantry divisions, and to keep the 90% of the Heer in occupied France waiting for the eventual return of the small and shocked BEF resting and refitting in its island. Wasn´t Hitler such an idiot in using the bulk of the Heer in the USSR?


To affirm Russia "weakened" Germany is a somewhat tricky game of words.

Can be quite the oppposite, the German smash of 1941, 1942 made the soviet giant stumble.

The USSR, sorry for my countrymen, would have never get past the Dniester (that being generous) without the Lend Lease, and the massive build up of the 8th and 15th Air Foces in Europe, no matter how many books and articles russian WWII websites continue releasing to "prove" the war would have ended the same with or without LL and the help of the armies of the west.

Likewise, the USA was, in fact, very dependant of soviet blood. A regime such as Stalin´s had a valuable item: the lives of millions of soldiers, partisans and citizens to be spared waging the war *with an astonishingly high death toll accepted*. Add LL and the fleets of heavy bombers of both RAF and USAAF in the west, also their armies.

Any amateur can come up with the most likely of the outcomes.


The USA also had a numerically juicy human base; a fundamental difference, however, is evident. The USA is not willing to spend human lives following the bolshevik fashion, no matter how many millions they can send to the fronts.

In a democracy, USA democracy, the lives of their men DO matter.

A tyranny has the upper hand over a Democracy when a war is being waged.

So? Do we detect some sort of symbiosis here? Both parties equally depending on the effort of the other?

What went wrong? It is most likely Hitler sent his armies out to fight a war impossible to be won, even if he had the most skilled and professional warriors of the planet.


With 2 individuals such as Hitler and Stalin in office in the same period of time in Europe, nothing different from the known facts still discussed today could have happened.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 24, 2005)

In a way the East Front did weaken Germany. The East front too up so much of Germany's manpower, weapons, tanks, and aircraft. Imagine all that being on the Western Front.


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## syscom3 (Sep 24, 2005)

Stalingrad and Kursk removed 500,000 troops from the battlefield. That includes untold numbers of tanks, self propelled guns, towed artillery pieces and aircraft. Now also include the divisons that had to be stationed in the east just to slow down the red army, let alone stop it. In the end, a significant ammount of Germanys resources was consumed in the east.

All it would have taken for the Normandy landings to have failed was to have a few more panzer divisions located near (not on) the beachheads.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 24, 2005)

I agree syscom.


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## cheddar cheese (Sep 25, 2005)

Ditto.


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## Gnomey (Sep 25, 2005)

Well put syscom3.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2005)

A lot of people dont understand how of a mutual thing it was for the allies and the soviets. Both sides depended on one another.


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## P38 Pilot (Sep 25, 2005)

Yeah, well, you have a point there.... Germany was split two sides in fighting. You either went east or west.


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## reddragon (Sep 25, 2005)

I have some thoughts on it but will have to wait until later to post, but it's always easy to look back and see mistakes than it is to be at the point of decision making and trying for a different outcome.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 25, 2005)

Churchill hated Communism, but gave a speech about it paling into insignificance vs Nazism.



> We may have still fought with China, but we would have weakended them so badly Communism would have been destroyed



It was likely Soviet influence that caused China to go Communist?

Communists aren't demons either P38!  



> Hitler also could have handled the Jewish issue better. Instead of being evil and ordering their deaths, he could of had sent some out of the country. Thats it.



Agreed, but as others have said, very unlikely.



> Germany probably could have become a powerful country next to USA or UK.



Germany is more powerful than the UK.

Apart from the fact that nukes are forbidden.



> The world would have been better if Hitler did this instead of invading Poland on September 1st, 1939.



This was the whole point, taking back Dansig and Krakow etc.



> P38, did you know that in 1939, the greatest hope of France and Britain is that Hitler would fight it out with Stalin and leave western Europe out of the fight?



Suppose Stalin had won though?

This was not an option.

The closest thing to what P38 is talking about would be what Patton said?



> Consider the alternative if we werent in Germany by the time we deployed the first atmic bomb. Berlin was going to be nuked.



Churchill actually planned chemical attacks!  



> It exists today and hopefully one day it will be destroyed.



What the hell are you saying! You're nearly as bad as Hitler??



> So what do those researchers would have liked Germany to do?



I think it's well accepted that his mistake was pursuing idealogical goals, but then was Stalin's mistake in defending them?

Also he could have had most of the USSR on his side, if he had played his cards right.

I think it was well said earlier (by PlanD) that with UK air and sea superiority, that the Axis had no chance whatsoever?

Kursk was a beauty! someone said to Hitler:

"Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is??"



> A lot of people dont understand how of a mutual thing it was for the allies and the soviets.



Very true, Hitler criticised the German WW1 leaders for taking Germany to war on two fronts, then did it himself.  

He also knew what happened to Napoleon, but did it anyway!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> It was likely Soviet influence that caused China to go Communist?
> 
> Communists aren't demons either P38!



I agree here. Most people that lived in the Soviet Union or China were not bad evil people. They were oppressed by there government and kept in the dark about democracy.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 25, 2005)

If Communist Countries actually were Communist, that would be Utopian IMHO.

However, the exact opposite is true.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2005)

Technically you are right but the system never works and never will work.


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## syscom3 (Sep 25, 2005)

China went communist mainly because the gap between the poor and wealthy was insurmountable. Hungry people tend to support the other party when that happens. Not to mention the nationalists also had an incredibly corrupt govt.

I remember a lesson from politics 101....."make sure the pesants are fed and happy"


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2005)

Yes but communism in the end allways fails. The ideas are not bad but in order for it to work there can be no social classes like rich and poor and if there are you can not let the poor see what the rich are living like.


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## syscom3 (Sep 25, 2005)

Agree'd. But if youre a hungry peasant in 1946, tired of a corrupt ruling party, perhaps you too would be seduced by communism. Remember, we have the hindsight of 75 years to see it was a failure.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2005)

That is true, just like many fell for Fascism also. You go for what gives you the most hope at the time.


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## P38 Pilot (Sep 25, 2005)

Thats what i meant about Communism being destroyed! Not by nukes, but by the people rebeling against the Communist Leaders! Hopefully it will cease soon.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 25, 2005)

I suppose it all depends on if the leaders are genuine Communists, I suppose the only one who came close was Stalin.

Otherwise it's always going to be abused.

Then again, who can say they live in a genuine Democracy when even disagreeing with something or being outspoken can make life a lot harder, or even get you killed?

Also the Iraq protests were not heeded also, I am sure there are other examples?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2005)

What about the Iraq protests. That is democracy at its finest. You are able to voice your opinion.


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## P38 Pilot (Sep 25, 2005)

Thats what the American soldiers died for, so people can spit on them or backsass them. But soldiers one day meet people who apprecitate what they do.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 26, 2005)

P38 Pilot said:


> Thats what the American soldiers died for, so people can spit on them or backsass them. But soldiers one day meet people who apprecitate what they do.



P38 what did I tell you ealier, please think about what you write before you write it. That is not what any American Soldiers have fought for and that is not what myself or any of my comrades fought for in Iraq. We do not fight to be spit on or backsass (what ever the hell backsass is). What we do gives them the right to do that but it is not what we fight for.


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## reddragon (Sep 26, 2005)

I don't believe the Soviets were ever a true communist form of government. In actuality, they were a military dictatorship.


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## reddragon (Sep 26, 2005)

As far as what went wrong for Germany, there really isn't a simple answer. I think it was a multitude of factors. 

I feel the war with Russia was probably the largest mistake. I think there were three things that went wrong, leading them to be unable to reach Moscow. The delay in launching Operation Barbarosa because of the attack on Greece and Yugoslavia contributed to this. Even more important was taking tanks from Army Group Center's advance on Moscow for several weeks, slowing the advance to a crawl. I have to wonder if they could have occupied Moscow had those tanks not been taken away. Of course, even if they had occupied Moscow, that doesn't guarantee victory, but Moscow was a MAJOR hub for transportation and communications, as well as where the leadership was concentrated. Capturing Moscow would have been a major disruption to communications and supply, since it appears all roads went through Moscow. Of course, the way they treated the Russian people was also a factor. I'm under the impression that the Germans were welcomed as heros when they first entered many Russian towns and villages. If Germany had created an independent Russian state, I think they would have had a strong ally rather than what turned out to be a strong enemy. Of course, failure to prepare for a winter campaign was a VERY bad move, too.


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## Medvedya (Sep 26, 2005)

reddragon said:


> I don't believe the Soviets were ever a true communist form of government. In actuality, they were a military dictatorship.



Urmm, at the very beginning perhaps, but certantly not after Lenin introduced the N.E.P to placate the people after the Kronstadt uprising.


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## syscom3 (Sep 26, 2005)

Ive always wondered if the nazi's had bypassed Stalingrad and rolled on towards the Caspian Sea oil fields, that they would have won.


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## Medvedya (Sep 26, 2005)

Hard to say. Off the back of a Enigmarised and decoded report about the Maikop and Grozny oilfields from Churchill, Stalin had rigged all the refining and cracking equipment to go up in smoke should it look as if it was going to be captured. 

To be sure, they could have captured the fields, but if all the equipment to extract and use the oil was wrecked then it would have taken them some time to build the facilities themselves.


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## syscom3 (Sep 26, 2005)

But the oil fields would also not be producing for the soviets. That could have crippled their tank divisions in the center and south.


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## Medvedya (Sep 26, 2005)

The fundamental problem though, and in some ways the biggest factor in finishing the Germans was the lack of raw materials back home. To be sure, there were the refineries in Romania, but it's getting it as far as the Caspian - that's gonna be the killer. Bear in mind that the Soviets still had oil production in Siberia, and by hook or by crook they would have found a way of getting it to the Southern front - and they'd be doing it on home turf, without any hassle from partisans to literally throw spanners in the works.


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## reddragon (Sep 26, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> Ive always wondered if the nazi's had bypassed Stalingrad and rolled on towards the Caspian Sea oil fields, that they would have won.



I could be wrong, but I believe they had to capture Stalingrad in order to hold that area. I also believe that the city was open and they could have easily captured it at one point, but they ignored it and gave the Russians time to set up defenses. Even if they had captured the city, the Russians had a huge number of armies nearby (and out of range of the German recon aircraft) and the willingness to sacrifice them so I don't know that the Germans could have held the area, unless they could have somehow destoyed those armies.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 27, 2005)

Stalingrad was mostly for polotical reasons. Yes there was some strategic value but not much compared to the Polotical Value it meant to Hitler to take the city with Stalins name in it.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 27, 2005)

> I also believe that the city was open and they could have easily captured it at one point, but they ignored it and gave the Russians time to set up defenses.



That was Moscow, Stalingrad may have been similar? - but I doubt it.



> I don't know that the Germans could have held the area, unless they could have somehow destoyed those armies.



Moscow could have been garissoned, giving obvious defensive advantages and also leaving the Russian troops to freeze, whilst the Germans stayed nice and cosy.

Stalingrad didn't really have as much of a 'temperature defence' IIRC?

So it could have still been lost, so why bother with it?  

- Like DerAdler said, it was for it's idealogical value (though there was an important tank factory there)


Someone here said Moscow was a hub?

That would have been great (I didn't really know that!) however Soviet railtracks were useless to the Germans, as they couldn't take German trains (they had to be converted to metric)

However, with cover to work under, the engineers would have had an easier task.


The failure to take Moscow had something to do with Hitler having the Panzers being told to wait for the infantry, as someone here has said, though I forget the exact details.

A leader who knew this actually said he "even saw sunlight dancing off the Kremlin!"

So near, yet so far away...


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## reddragon (Sep 27, 2005)

Someone here said Moscow was a hub?

That would have been great (I didn't really know that!) however Soviet railtracks were useless to the Germans, as they couldn't take German trains (they had to be converted to metric)

However, with cover to work under, the engineers would have had an easier task.
[/quote]

Moscow was a major communications and transportation center for the Russians. It seems most everything went through Moscow at some point. I may be wrong but I believe if Moscow had been captured, it would have lead to a major disruption in the distribution of material and men for the Russian military.


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## reddragon (Sep 27, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> The failure to take Moscow had something to do with Hitler having the Panzers being told to wait for the infantry, as someone here has said, though I forget the exact details.



I may be thinking of the Battle of Smolensk where the panzers were turned from their drive on Moscow and took part in huge pincer movements to trap Russian troops, resulting in a delay of about six weeks on the drive. It seems like after the panzers were released from that action, they may have been sent to support the attack on Leningrad, resulting in a futher delay on Moscow. Shortly after they started the advance again, the rain started, causing major delays because of the mud. The Russians were able to take advantage of these delays and strengthen their defenses of Moscow.


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## reddragon (Sep 28, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> > I also believe that the city was open and they could have easily captured it at one point, but they ignored it and gave the Russians time to set up defenses.
> 
> 
> 
> That was Moscow, Stalingrad may have been similar? - but I doubt it.





Nope, it was Stalingrad. According to von Kleist:

von Kleist remembered : 

The 4th Panzer Army was advancing on my left. It could have taken Stalingrad without a fight, at the end of July, but was diverted to the south to help me crossing the Don. I did not needs it's aid, and merely congested the roads I was using. When it turned north again, a fortnight later, the Russians had gathered just sufficient forces at Stalingrad to check it. 


In late July, 4th Panzer Army was detached from 6th Army and sent south to Rostov/River Don to support Army Group A, leaving 6th Army with around 13 infantry and 3 motorized divisions. I THINK it may have also had 3 panzer divisions, but I can't be sure. By turning 4th Panzer to the south, it slowed 6th Army's advance and gave the Russians time to prepare defenses for the city. Of course, during July, the Germans engaged Russian strongpoints which also slowed their advance. It wasn't until August that they begin to bypass those strongpoints but 6th Army did not have the mobility of the panzer units for a while and it gave the Russians time, which they badly needed. If they had bypassed the strong points from the beginning and not sent 4th Panzer south, I believe Stalingrad may very well have been taken (as does von Kleist, it seems).


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## syscom3 (Sep 28, 2005)

Well, I think that if Stalingrad was taken, the Soviets were in a bad situation. Go southwards and you have the Caspian Sea oil fields. Head east a bit and you might flank the Russian forces in center Russia. Imagine a Kursk like battle in the early fall.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 28, 2005)

> I may be wrong but I believe if Moscow had been captured, it would have lead to a major disruption in the distribution of material and men for the Russian military.



Yes that would've denied the Soviets the advantages too, could they have bypassed it though? 



> I may be thinking of the Battle of Smolensk...



Some of what you've said rings bells.  

Smolensk, dunno what I'd do there?

Leningrad I'd have just left, the same with Stalingrad.

Moscow was vital, as were the oil fields.

Moscow always had excellent air defense though, but the Panzers could have taken it easily, allowing the infantry to hold it easily again.

Why bother with SG and LG though?

Hitler could have bombed them into oblivion? 
The same could go for Smolensk? - allowing the infantry to clean up the remainder (if they didn't surrender or run away!) and not stopping the Panzers?

I'd have left the London Blitz, just defended France with Me109's FW190's and used the He111's etc to smash infantry, tank masses, cities, factories etc. Could that be done?

Then the oil fields should have been reasonably alienated?

If they surrendered...

With the taking of Moscow, Stalin may even have been deposed?



> Imagine a Kursk like battle in the early fall.



Kursk was stupid and IMHO, unwinnable. 
I mean, using Ferds at point-blank??  

If it was much earlier, it would probably be a few KV's vs a lot of PzIII's.

The Germans would have lost more tanks in that situation, maybe leaving not enough to crack Moscow?


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## RAGMAN (Sep 30, 2005)

Did the British take the Iran/Iraq area when Germany could have taken the oilfields?If they did I was wondering how Germany could have kept the supply line open back to Germany?They would have to fight Britain and Russia on two fronts with the same threatend cut off at the Sea of Azlov or the Black Sea.Turkey was neutral and I don't know if the kriegsmarine was in the black sea or not,if they were, ships could have shipped the oil to Germany by tanker or simular ships. It would have been interesting to see how long Russia could have fought for until Siberia could have picked up the slack.


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## reddragon (Sep 30, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> Leningrad I'd have just left, the same with Stalingrad.
> 
> Moscow was vital, as were the oil fields.
> 
> ...



Although I would consider it a secondary target, I think reason for the attack on Leningrad was to allow the Germans to link up with Finland. It may be they were also looking for major port facilities for the attack on Moscow, but I can't be sure. 

I believe the attack on Stalingrad was necessary. It would have acted as an anchor on the left flank of the drive to the Caucases, as well as cut river traffic on the Volga. I don't think the Caucases could have been held if the Russians were able to use Stalingrad as a staging area for attacks there.


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## reddragon (Oct 1, 2005)

Oops! My mistake! Looks like the panzers were taken out of the drive to Moscow to attack Kiev rather than Smolensk. 

July 19, 1941 - The OKW gives orders that, after defeating the Soviet forces in the Smolensk sector, the II Panzergruppe (Guderian) and the 2nd Army are to abandon the offensive against Moscow and turn south to wipe out the Soviet 5th Army, surround Kiev and join up with I Panzergruppe (von Kleist) in a pincer movement. Guderian protests against giving up the thrust against Moscow, but his objections are overruled. 

That is a major reason I believe the Germans were defeated in Russia.


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## schwarzpanzer (Oct 1, 2005)

Kiev, course it was!  

Halting the Moscow advance would't have been as bad had winter not set in.

However of course it did and was IMHO the single biggest mistake.

I do believe that I have a conclusion! 8) 



> I believe the attack on Stalingrad was necessary. It would have acted as an anchor on the left flank of the drive to the Caucases, as well as cut river traffic on the Volga. I don't think the Caucases could have been held if the Russians were able to use Stalingrad as a staging area for attacks there.



If SG had been bombed (with planes transferred from London) 
- would SG have be a problem?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 2, 2005)

Stalingrad was bombed to pieces. It was bombed worse than London.


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## schwarzpanzer (Oct 3, 2005)

Yes I know, but I'd have bombed it more!

I wouldn't have stopped until it was a wasteland, not 1 wall left standing, I'd have sent in the Rammtigers to make sure.  

It would have been as good in that state as captured?

- SG was impossible to hold IMHO.


Also the bombers relieved from London could have made life hell for massed Soviet troops and tanks?

This makes me wonder whether London was a dafter target than SG?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 3, 2005)

What are you talking about Stalingrad was bombed to ruins. It was a wasteland. I wish my Grandfather would have been able to bring back photos from SG. Stalingrad was leveled to nothing.


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## schwarzpanzer (Oct 3, 2005)

Almost nothing, then again the sewers still held soldiers and civilians and T34's were still being made. There was something for the Soviets to take back, I'd have denied them even that small part.

What you said is obviously true, just a little more pressure?

Also with no German tropps on the ground, the bombers could have free reign and there would be no capturees?


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## reddragon (Oct 3, 2005)

I don't think it would have been possible to use air power against the Russian army. I don't know at what time it happened, but the Russians gained control of the air in the latter stages of Case Blue.


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## plan_D (Oct 4, 2005)

It was impossible to bomb Stalingrad into any worse of a state. Stalingrad had become a massive pile of rubble and it provided excellent cover for the ground troops. Rubble is much easier to defend than standing buildings. 

The object of Moscow was to destroy the Soviet communication and rail centre, which has been mentioned. Capturing the city would have slowed all Red Army reserve movements to any of the other fronts. It would have affected all those actions to the west of Moscow, most importantly at the time being Leningrad. All reserves that moved to the front against the Wehrmacht went through Moscow. It was *the* rail center of the Soviet Union. It mattered little to the Wehrmacht if they could use it or not, they would have destroyed the Red Armies capability to move troops quickly. 

The object of Leningrad was simply to destroy a garrison in it's rear area and link up with the forces of Finland. The siege of Leningrad occured because the Wehrmacht knew it was a pointless venture to waste troops on. 

The object of Stalingrad was political when concerning the city itself. When concerning the whole operation, it was far from political. The original plan called for an advance of the 6th Armee and 4th Panzer Armee on the River Don. The 6th Armee would arrive just north of Stalingrad with the city on it's right flank. This would cut off the Caucasus, with Stalingrad included leaving a small avenue of escape through Stalingrad (although risky because of the Luftwaffe) and just south of the city. 
4th Panzer Armee was to advance south into the Caucasus after capturing Rostov on Don (the north-western point of the net on the Caucasus). They would swoop in, destroy all Red Army forces in there and capture the oil fields. Stalingrad itself was never an objective. 

The Red Army, however, melted away from the advancing Army Group South. Hitler took this as an all out rout of the Red Army and diverted forces from the 6th Armee to head south with the 4th Panzer Armee. This deprived the 6th of it's armour, but it still had to move on to it's objective which it did capture thus encircling the Caucasus. However, Hitler then ordered the 6th into Stalingrad ...and the rest is history. 

During Operation Barbarossa, the only thing that halted the panzers were the weather and the mud baths the Russians called "roads". Hitler wanted his forces to press on faster but had to be told, repeatedly, that it wasn't possible. The one thing that stopped a full advance on Moscow was the diversion of panzers from the attack on Moscow to encircle the forces outside Kiev, which was the biggest encirclement in history.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 4, 2005)

As for the T-34s still being made, the Russians were very good at building out of nothing. They did in just about all of the cities that were laid to rubble or waste and were being sieged. The factory would be destroyed and they would continue to build.


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## schwarzpanzer (Oct 5, 2005)

Cheers for that reddragon  , could that have been countered?



> It would have affected all those actions to the west of Moscow, most importantly at the time being Leningrad.



Aha! Cheers PlanD.  



> All reserves that moved to the front against the Wehrmacht went through Moscow.



Nice!  



> This would cut off the Caucasus, with Stalingrad included leaving a small avenue of escape through Stalingrad (although risky because of the Luftwaffe) and just south of the city.



Yeah I mentioned that.



> However, Hitler then ordered the 6th into Stalingrad...



What an idiot.  



> The one thing that stopped a full advance on Moscow was the diversion of panzers from the attack on Moscow to encircle the forces outside Kiev, which was the biggest encirclement in history.



Also THE biggest mistake of WW2 IMHO, I think the main critic of this was Guderian?



DerAdler said:


> The factory would be destroyed and they would continue to build.



There's destroyed, then there's destroyed, but if that was all that could be done...

I still say ALL bombers should have hit it though?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 5, 2005)

No read your history books, they continued to produce out of the destroyed factories in besieged cities.


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## Gnomey (Oct 5, 2005)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> No read your history books, they continued to produce out of the destroyed factories in besieged cities.


They also uprooted their factories and put them together again the otherside of the Urals out of reach of the Germans.


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## schwarzpanzer (Oct 5, 2005)

That would frustrate me, I can only guess how Hitler felt about it!  

The Stalingrad factory was a weird one, unlike the Kirov plant etc it seemed to be copied rather than moved?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 6, 2005)

Yes that they did too, they moved behind the Urals. The Germans needed long range bombers and that they did not have.


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## HealzDevo (Nov 6, 2005)

It was a waste of resources having tanks such as the Panzer III or earlier on the battlefield. Also the Kingtiger was a waste of resources. If the Germans had of fielded a large army of Panthers they could have been more successful. Also if they weren't pumping help to Italy they could have devoted more resources to attacking the Allies and winning. Also more long-sightedness in aircraft design such as redesigning the engines of the He-177 Grief which would have made it an effective Heavy Bomber for Germany. A squadron or two of Horton flying wings as fighters, fighter-bombers, and bombers would have done a lot of damage to the Allies at least during their initial period in operation.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 7, 2005)

The Horton Ho-229 if that is what you are talking about did not fly until 1945 and still had a lot of work on it.

Germany had to invest in Italy, if they did not then the Soft Underbelly would have been just that.


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## schwarzpanzer (Nov 8, 2005)

*HealzDevo:*



> It was a waste of resources having tanks such as the Panzer III or earlier on the battlefield.



True to a point, but the Stugs/JgdPz's and Pz38 for e.g. were still very useful.



> Also the Kingtiger was a waste of resources.



It was an effective 'hero tank' IMHO, pity about the mechanicals/quality.  



> If the Germans had of fielded a large army of Panthers they could have been more successful.



Don't forget the T34/76 and Sherman and Cromwell 75mm's could take the Panther/JagdPanther out (and frequently did). Not so the KonigsTiger. 8) 



> Also if they weren't pumping help to Italy they could have devoted more resources to attacking the Allies and winning.



IMHO Britain itself should have been ignored and it's Empire attacked sooner with help from Japan/Italy.

Also give out plans for the PzIV-F2+, StuG-G, Hetzer and FW190.



> Also more long-sightedness in aircraft design such as redesigning the engines of the He-177 Grief which would have made it an effective Heavy Bomber for Germany.



Have you got a picture of the He-177 Grief please?



> A squadron or two of Horton flying wings as fighters, fighter-bombers, and bombers would have done a lot of damage to the Allies at least during their initial period in operation.



I know it would be a great NachtJager/bomber, dunno about dayfighter/bomber?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 9, 2005)

I think it wuold have been a great day fighter. Why would it not have?


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## Gnomey (Nov 9, 2005)

Heinkel He 177 Greif

http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/he177.html










Captured He 177A-5 in flight.


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## schwarzpanzer (Nov 9, 2005)

DerAdler said:


> I think it would have been a great day fighter. Why would it not have?



Dunno, it had stealth ability, good speed/handling, range and could cary 2 seats and a good payload (3 X 1000) so IMHO should have been used to bomb radar installations and intercept radar-eqipped Nightfighters and bombers.

Perhaps not having it as a day-fighter would keep it a secret?

Still, I'm not sure of it's fighter performance. I have the data, I'm just incapable of understanding it.  



Cheers for the pics Gnomey.  

Is that the plane on CharlesBronsons siggy? 8) 

If so, I was gonna ask about that!


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## Gnomey (Nov 9, 2005)

No it isn't the plane of Charles's sig, not sure what that is.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 10, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> DerAdler said:
> 
> 
> > I think it would have been a great day fighter. Why would it not have?
> ...



There were actually 2 versions. A single seat fighter and a 2 seat day fighter. The V6 was the first 2 seat version.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 10, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> Is that the plane on CharlesBronsons siggy? 8)
> 
> If so, I was gonna ask about that!



CharlesBronsons siggy is of a Messerschmitt Me-264/6m which is the 6 engined version of the Me-264.

Here is some info on the 4 engined version. I dont believe any 6 engined versions were completed but I may be wrong.

Type: Ultra Long Range Bomber
Origin: Messerschmitt AG
Engines:
Four 1,700 hp BMW 801D or G 18-cylinder radials

Dimensions:
Span: 43m
Length: 20.90m Height: 4.30m

Weights:
Empty 46,627lb.
Max. Loaded 123,460lb.
Performance:
Max. Speed: 565km/h (351mph)
Max range at 217mph 9,321 miles


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## Gnomey (Nov 10, 2005)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> schwarzpanzer said:
> 
> 
> > Is that the plane on CharlesBronsons siggy? 8)
> ...


Thought I recognised it from somewhere. I had a look last night and found the ME264 which I thought was it but it only has 4 engines, thanks for clearing that up Alder.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 10, 2005)

There was the design work done for the Me-264/6m however I do not believe a prototype was built. The Me-264/6m had 6 engines instead of 4.


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## schwarzpanzer (Nov 11, 2005)

*DerAdler:*



> There were actually 2 versions. A single seat fighter and a 2 seat day fighter. The V6 was the first 2 seat version.



I know, I'm just not sure if it'dve make a good single-seater?

Thanks for the Me-264/6m info DerAdler, great stuff! 8)


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 12, 2005)

Why would it not have made a decent single seater?


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## ChuckW (Jan 9, 2006)

Went Went Wrong For Germany?

1) Attacking Russia while still at war with England..

2) Declaring War on America after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor

3) Not settling on specific choices for weapons developments


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 9, 2006)

While I agree with 1 and 3 I do not agree with 2 because the United States would have declared war on Germany even if Germany had not done it first.


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## ChuckW (Jan 9, 2006)

Well, suppose Hitler had kept his temper and ego in check and "Hadn't" declared war on America? Roosevelt would have made numerous attempts to goad Hitler into attacking American forces, or even civilian ships. 
Hitler was doomed when he went to war with America while sending men to be chewed up and frozen in the Russian Winter. 
A Heavy Bomber Squadron, with ME-109 Escorts would have done much more damage(to land and morale)then V-1 or V-2 rockets hurled at indiscriminate targets.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 10, 2006)

Even if Hitler had not declared war on the US, after Pearl Harbor the US would have declared war on Germany.


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## Soren (Jan 12, 2006)

schwarzpanzer said:


> I'll add another, what about the He112 instead of the Me109 for the BoB?



Wouldn't have made any difference at all, other than maybe an even more devasting defeat for the luftwaffe.

The Bf-109 was clearly the superior aircraft.


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## Erich (Jan 12, 2006)

simple fact, Germany in her stupidity let a small UGLY Austrian come into power with other UGLY renagade numb-nutz to bolster his insane ideas..........end of a terrible story


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## Soren (Jan 12, 2006)

Lets be honest....

Hitler made no mistake in attacking Russia in 41, infact it was perfect timing, he caught the Russian army completely offguard. No his mistake was declaring war on the U.S., that was his biggest mistake ever, it was a mistake that if it had been avoided Hitler could've won the war. 

Without a war against the U.S., Germany could've easily defeated the Soviet Union, heck even with a war on three fronts they came damn close to succeed in doing so anyway.



> Even if Hitler had not declared war on the US, after Pearl Harbor the US would have declared war on Germany.



Why ? The Japanese dropped those bombs at Pearl Harbor, not the Germans.

I don't think Roosevelt would have had any interest in waging war against the Germans by then, as he knew he would already have to fight the Japanese (which up till then had shown to be a deadly foe of considerable strength), and seeing that Russia was on the brink of defeat it would've made very little sense to make such a decision.


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## Soren (Jan 12, 2006)

Erich said:


> simple fact, Germany in her stupidity let a small UGLY Austrian come into power with other UGLY renagade numb-nutz to bolster his insane ideas..........end of a terrible story



Amen.


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## syscom3 (Jan 12, 2006)

I have to look closer at the record on the political situation in the US in the days after Pearl Harbor, but it does seem that once we were at war with Japan, taking shots preemptively at Germany would come a lot easier than before. Congress and the President were in no mood to listen to the rants and raves from Hitler.

"the Genie was out of the bottle" so to speak.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 13, 2006)

Erich said:


> simple fact, Germany in her stupidity let a small UGLY Austrian come into power with other UGLY renagade numb-nutz to bolster his insane ideas..........end of a terrible story



Agreed



Soren said:


> Hitler made no mistake in attacking Russia in 41, infact it was perfect timing, he caught the Russian army completely offguard.



Negative the timing was wrong. Read your history books and read what the German Field Marschals and Generals said. Hitler postponed the invasion because of the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece. Those 6 weeks I believe it was that he postponed it meant 6 weeks earlier of the Harsh Winter that eventually was the destruction of Hitlers Army's just like Napoleon before him. Hitler obviously did not read his history books either.



Soren said:


> Why ? The Japanese dropped those bombs at Pearl Harbor, not the Germans.



Roosevelt was silent supporter of Englands war against Germany. He even stated in memoirs that he wanted to help out his European friend. Once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt would have pushed for a declaration of war against Germany aswell.


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## Soren (Jan 14, 2006)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Negative the timing was wrong. Read your history books and read what the German Field Marschals and Generals said. Hitler postponed the invasion because of the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece. Those 6 weeks I believe it was that he postponed it meant 6 weeks earlier of the Harsh Winter that eventually was the destruction of Hitlers Army's just like Napoleon before him. Hitler obviously did not read his history books either.



No Adler the timing was good enough, had he tried to attack 2 months earlier his army wouldn't have been as ready as it was. It was litterally having mountains of winter-clothes hanging on standby in Germany while the winter raged in Russia which was bad timing, not the start of the war. Cause the German army was actually fully prepared for the winter, however 'again' Hitler made a crucial mistake of not sending them their winter-clothes. (Thats something you can read in the History books Adler ) 

Btw I wouldn't exactly call the winter war a "failure" for Hitler either, just look up the casualty list Adler, the Russians lost way more men in that period. (Like always)



> Roosevelt was silent supporter of Englands war against Germany. He even stated in memoirs that he wanted to help out his European friend.



So ? Just because he wasn't a supporter of Hitlers campaign doesn't mean he would actually go ahead and go to war with him. I mean you wouldn't go punch someone who was about to pick up a weapon which could kill you just because you don't support his opinion, now would you ?

By putting yourself in Roosevelt's shoes and looking at the troublesome situation of the time, going to war with Hitler would've made no sense what so ever. What if Russia fell ?, then the U.S. would be in serious trouble, having to fight two powerful armies at once, with one now having unlimited supplies. Can't you see it ? 



> Once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt would have pushed for a declaration of war against Germany aswell.



Negative Adler, that would've been very stupid of Roosevelt, cause he did not yet know how powerful Japan was, which up till then had shown to be of considerable power, severely bashing the U.S. pacific fleet. And seeing that Russia was on the brink of defeat, waging war against Germany and Japan simultaneously would've looked very stupid indeed.

Try to look at it from a 1941ish point of view, cause that Russia wasn't going to fall because of a series of stupid decisions by Hitler no'one could know at that point.


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## plan_D (Jan 14, 2006)

I believe the timing for the invasion of Russia was perfect in it's original form. The delay that the Balkans campaign caused was unfortunate, but the year of assault was perfect. The Red Army was in no way prepared tactically or mechanically to wage a new kind of war, by spring 1942 they would have been ready to halt the German advances with waves of T-34s that they just did not have in 1941. 

I do not believe it to be the fault of Hitler for the lack of winter clothing, nor do I believe the Wehrmacht was ready for winter, as I have read the opposite in _Panzer Leader_ by Col. Gen. Heinz Guderian;

_"Preparations made for the winter were utterly inadequate. For weeks we had been requesting anti-freeze for the water coolers of our engines; we saw as little of this as we did of winter clothing for the troops. This lack of warm clothes, was, in the difficult months ahead, to provide the greatest problem and cause the greatest suffering to our soldiers-and it would have been the easiest to avoid of all our problems."_ - Pg. 237.

_"On November 13th...The combat strength of the infantry had sunk to an average of 50 men per company. The lack of winter clothing was become increasingly felt."_ - Pg. 247.

_"In XXIV Panzer Corps the frost was unpleasantly in evidence, since the tanks could not move up the ice-covered slopes for lack of the requisite calks for the tanks."_ - Pg. 247.

_"The supply situation was bad. Snow shirts, boot grease, underclothes and above all woollen trousers were not available. The high proportion of the men were still wearing denim trousers, and the temperature was 8 below zero! [Farenheit]."_ - Pg. 248

Now, this is the section that shows how Hitler was not at fault. In a conversation between Guderian and Hitler;

_"I [Guderian]: 'Naturally it is my duty to lessen the suffering of my soldiers so far as that lies within my power. But it is hard when the men have even now not yet received their winter clothing and the greater part of the infantry are still going about in denim uniforms. Boots, vests, gloves, woollen helmets are either non-existent or else hopelessly worn out.'
Hitler shouted: 'That is not true. The Quartermaster-General informed me that the winter clothing had been issued.'
I: 'I dare say it has been issued but it has never arrived. I have made it my business to find out what has happened to it. At present it is in Warsaw station, where it has been for the last several weeks, since it cannot be sent on owing to a lack of locomotives and obstructions to the lines. Our requests that it be forwarded in September and October were bluntly refused. Now it's too late.'

The Quartermaster-General was sent for and had to admit that what I had said was correct."_

It was, in actual fact, the fault of OKW not Hitler that winter provisions had not been provided to the front-line troops.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 14, 2006)

Soren said:


> No Adler the timing was good enough, had he tried to attack 2 months earlier his army wouldn't have been as ready as it was. It was litterally having mountains of winter-clothes hanging on standby in Germany while the winter raged in Russia which was bad timing, not the start of the war. Cause the German army was actually fully prepared for the winter, however 'again' Hitler made a crucial mistake of not sending them their winter-clothes. (Thats something you can read in the History books Adler )



I* dont have to read it in a History Books Soren, I have read my Grandfathers diaries. He fought on the East Front and was captured at Stalingrad.* I have read about him opening up packages of Summer Uniforms in the dead of winter rather than recieving Winter Uniforms that is unprepared, and that was a grave Mistake.

Yes it was the right year and yes the Russians were not ready, but had they attacked on time rather than the delay for the Balkans, the Eastern Front may have been over by the time Winter hit.



Soren said:


> Btw I wouldn't exactly call the winter war a "failure" for Hitler either, just look up the casualty list Adler, the Russians lost way more men in that period. (Like always)



Whats your point, Vietnam was a military victory for the United States. Over 2 million N. Vietmanese and VC were killed to aprox. 60,000 US soldiers. Was Vietnam a victory? NO. Killing people does not determine how successful a campaign is.




Soren said:


> Negative Adler, that would've been very stupid of Roosevelt, cause he did not yet know how powerful Japan was, which up till then had shown to be of considerable power, severely bashing the U.S. pacific fleet. And seeing that Russia was on the brink of defeat, waging war against Germany and Japan simultaneously would've looked very stupid indeed.



No if that were the case, Roosevelt would not have decided to make Germany the priority over Japan anyhow when the US entered. Now would he have?


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## Soren (Jan 15, 2006)

First of all thanks pD for clearing up who was at fault for the already ready stocks of winter-clothes not arriving.



> I* dont have to read it in a History Books Soren, I have read my Grandfathers diaries. He fought on the East Front and was captured at Stalingrad.* I have read about him opening up packages of Summer Uniforms in the dead of winter rather than recieving Winter Uniforms that is unprepared, and that was a grave Mistake.



Indeed it was, but it can't be blamed on the start of Operation Barbarossa. The Winter-clothes should've been there, but by some mistake it wasn't, eventhough it was made and ready.



> Yes it was the right year and yes the Russians were not ready, but had they attacked on time rather than the delay for the Balkans, the Eastern Front may have been over by the time Winter hit.



It may or it may not, that is something we can ponder about for ages, but had the winter-clothes just arrived on schedule the German advance would have been effected very little by the winter, and the outcome could've been very different. 



> Whats your point, Vietnam was a military victory for the United States. Over 2 million N. Vietmanese and VC were killed to aprox. 60,000 US soldiers. Was Vietnam a victory? NO. Killing people does not determine how successful a campaign is.



I did not mention anything about how "successful" the winter war was for Hitler, cause it was anything BUT that, but it wasn't the ultimate death-blow to the German army either. By 1942 the German army still had the capability to actually win the war in the east.



> No if that were the case, Roosevelt would not have decided to make Germany the priority over Japan anyhow when the US entered. Now would he have ?



Ofcause he would, only a complete fool would see Japan as the biggest threat at that time ! Germany was at its might by this time, having made a fool of both the French, British, Polish, Danish, Norwegian and Russian army in a very short space of time ! 
Japan was still a mystery, but had afterall only had one major success by this time, with Germany having countless major successes. So it wouldn't take a genius to figure out which of those two was the biggest threat. 

Deliberately going to war with Germany in 41 would've looked insane, almost like pure suicide, so Roosevelt wouldn't have done it. 

That Hitler would make a large series of mistakes which would ultimately lead such a powerful army to defeat, absolutely no'one could know or imagine at that point. Because had Hitler defeated the Russians in 41, which everyone thought he would, the US would've been in no condition to actually wage a successful war against him.

So would it have been a grave mistake by Roosevelt to deliberately go to war with Hitler at the time ? NO ! but would it have looked that way ? YES ! And had Hitler actually defeated the Russians in 41, then it would've not only looked like a grave mistake by Roosevelt, but it would've also been one.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 15, 2006)

Soren said:


> Indeed it was, but it can't be blamed on the start of Operation Barbarossa. The Winter-clothes should've been there, but by some mistake it wasn't, eventhough it was made and ready.



I never blamed the loss of the winter war on the fact that winter equipment was not supplied. I just said it was a facter. There are many more factors that come into play in the Winter that ruined things for Hitler. His tanks and equipment became stuck in the hard terraign, the soldiers equipment did not work as effectivly. If Hitler had not delayed the start of the Barbarossa, this may or may not have happened. I believe had Hitler started 6 weeks ealierer as orginially planned Hitler would have defeated Russia.



Soren said:


> It may or it may not, that is something we can ponder about for ages, but had the winter-clothes just arrived on schedule the German advance would have been effected very little by the winter, and the outcome could've been very different.



I agree with you that it is something that we will never know, but there is more to it than just the uniforms. Equipment works differently in the winter also. 



Soren said:


> I did not mention anything about how "successful" the winter war was for Hitler, cause it was anything BUT that, but it wasn't the ultimate death-blow to the German army either. By 1942 the German army still had the capability to actually win the war in the east.



Then make yourself more clear when you post something because many times people dont understand what you are sayint because of the way you say it. Because by saying this below:



> Btw I wouldn't exactly call the winter war a "failure" for Hitler either, just look up the casualty list Adler, the Russians lost way more men in that period.



It sounds like you are saying that that is the only way conflicts are won and that Hitler actually won the winter war because he killed more Russians than the Russians killed German. 

I understand now what you were saying but make yourself more clear.


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## Soren (Jan 16, 2006)

I'm sorry I did not making myself clearer, and I'm glad you now understand what I was saying. 

And I fully agree that winter-clothes wouldn't have been the solution to everything either, mechanical difficulties would still occur, but it would've made life on the eastern front much much easier on the Germans. Cause having your soldiers wear the right clothing would also solve alot of mechanical difficulties as-well, cause when your soldiers hands and feet are frozen then they don't work very well at all, allowing many mechanical difficulties to arise which could've otherwise been avoided with the proper clothing.


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## plan_D (Jan 16, 2006)

Most mechanical difficulties could have been solved simply by the issue of anti-freeze. The OKW were so drunk on the scent of victory that none believed the war could drag on into the winter. I believe the Wehrmacht was ready, but the Wehrmacht at the front wasn't.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 16, 2006)

I agree with both you on that.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Jan 18, 2006)

I tell you what went wrong for Germany. Having that psychopathic idiot Hitler who never reached a rank beyond corporal in the armed forces. Yet when his generals who knew more about tatics than him offered sound advice, he didn't listen to him and instead issued the " fight to the last man" crap that sent the 6th army at stalingrad to starve in the russian POW camps. Before D-day he solved the argument between Von Rundstedt and Rommel about the panzer release by saying he would control the movement of the panzer divisions in Normandy, yet on D-day he took sleeping pills and slept through the invasion.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 20, 2006)

Yeap that is a valid point. My grandfather was captured at Stalingrad by the way.


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## R988 (Jan 24, 2006)

I think we know your grandfather was captured at Stalingrad, you have mentioned it just a couple of posts above 

I assume that he made it out alive and wasn't one of those who 'disappeared' in the gulags after the war?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 25, 2006)

R988 said:


> I think we know your grandfather was captured at Stalingrad, you have mentioned it just a couple of posts above
> 
> I assume that he made it out alive and wasn't one of those who 'disappeared' in the gulags after the war?



OOps sorry about that, sorry that I posted that over again.

Yes he did make it out in 1946 actually. He was a doctor and for some reason they let him go.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 8, 2006)

he was, I've read what happened at those camps. Im sorry to what happened to your grandfather.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 13, 2006)

Well he made it out alive so that is a good thing.


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## Zippythehog (May 3, 2017)

What went wrong most was that their leaders truly believed their own propaganda. They thought that they proved their point after beating France. They thought they didn't need to work any harder at it. 

Their own ideals prevented self examination. 

Their economy wasn't really on a war footing until about '43 when Al Speer took control of it. By then it was too late.


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## parsifal (May 4, 2017)

An old old threadf......


Where do I start with this…..there are just so many errors and so many failures by the german leadership its not funny.


At the top of the list, was the fundamental failure that assumed the war would be won quickly, or at worst in a series of short sharp punctuated campaigns that would not place the fragile German economy too much at risk. This was a fair enough aspiration, given that Germany in 1914-18 had been ground into the dust by a continuous and unrelenting war of attrition. But if anyone had bothered to listen to their opponents, or indeed to the bombast coming from hitler at the time, it would have been quickly apparent that Germany was in fact going into a long drawn out conflict in 1939. The war leadership displayed from all the senior players in the german leadership, not just hitler, was amateur hour in the extreme. They lived and wanted to live in lala land and not face facts. Ultimately this can be traced back to hitler. He had systematically eliminated all opposition to him before the outbreak of the war (in the case of the army), or competent leadership was never there (particularly for the navy) or was suppressed (by Goring in the case of the LW, eg his treatment of Milch and others).


A failure in military thinking to think beyond the concept of the continent, and the decisive battle. Germany was never able to grasp the concept of truly global nature of the war, nor to embark on a globalised view for war aims. From the fuhrer to the lowliest private it was always about winning in Europe. No-one in Germany seems to have ever realised the war was much more than that.


A failure to create a unified command system, in which the available resources were properly distributed and utilised according to the needs and capabilities of the nation and the situation at the front, rather than the personal goals and prestige aspirations of the individuals trying to curry favour with the fuhrer


A failure to match the obvious technological advances obviously present in a people as talented as the germans to the immediate needs of the nation. The Germans never really rationalised and integrated their R&D in the same as the Allies did. The result was that the germans wasted a lot of time on pointless and irrelevant research schemes and had a whole bunch of prototypes at the end of the war, whilst the front line soldiers, sailors and airmen slogged it out with essentially obsolete equipment. Moreover, the constant tinkering of designs even whilst production lines had opened up caused constant delays and stoppages in the production lines that in turn caused serious shortages of equipment at the front. The overweaning desire to try and win the war by quality is understandable, but insisting on top shelf technology when second or third tier was often sufficient greatly increased the unit costs of certain items. Case in point being the cost of a tiger tank in 1942….roughly 20 times that of anequivalent soviet product.


The war industries supporting the front line forces were never properly rationalised nor was equipment properly standardised. Whilst the germans utilised the competitive tender process, they would often give some production work would often be awarded to the losing tender bid as a compensation for all their hard work. This was a luxury the allies did not fall for. A hallmark of the US army for example was its far superior levels of standardisation that greatly eased the logistic issues for the American forces. German failures in their standardisation efforts is most apparent in their motorisation programs. They never achieved satisfactory levels of standardisation here, with the result their soft skinned logistic support and MT was basically kaput from the end of 1942 on. This severely restricted the flexibility of responses open to the germans after that date.


Support echelons like coal production, steel production, rolling stock and the like were never properly or rationally managed. Result was that there was a constant series of bottlenecks in production that were totally avoidable.


As the fortunes of war turned against Germany, the germans never seriously looked for an exit strategy. They needed to search for some form of settlement with at least one of their opponents…..they never really tried to do this


The germans never tried to conduct the war as a coalition, in which the shortcomings and shortages of their allies were addressed. The Axis war effort was firstly attempted as a series of “parallel wars” and later more simply on the basis of serving german needs only. Germany could have offset the obvious failings of her allies for not a lot of cost but always chose not to do this.

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## pbehn (May 4, 2017)

A great post Parsival but the shortcomings were obvious. Germany was led by a madman, you had to be mad to take on the whole world. If things had been left to those who were competent and rational then Germany wouldnt have gone to war. At almost every major point there was a screw up but even i Germany had adopted the best possible policy and tactics at all times it is almost imossible to see a victory in the long term.


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## pbehn (May 4, 2017)

parsifal said:


> The overweaning desire to try and win the war by quality is understandable, but insisting on top shelf technology when second or third tier was often sufficient greatly increased the unit costs of certain items. Case in point being the cost of a tiger tank in 1942….roughly 20 times that of anequivalent soviet product.
> .


By coincidence I watched "The World at War" concerning Barbarossa last night. when bogged down outside Moscow much of the German equipment didnt work because of lack of low temperature oils/lubricants and design like tank track width. In this case quality and complication were frequently mixed. It is only when a tank works that you can start comparing its properties to the opposition.

The programme also covered the additional liabilities Germany took on having to support its ally Italy in North Africa and getting involved in Crete Greece Romania Hungary all of which were a drain.


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## stona (May 4, 2017)

The Nazi government certainly did have a world view and was not eurocentric. Almost everything they did, the timetables on which they ran the war, was governed by the certain knowledge that they would always be over matched by an American contribution to the coalition lined up against them. Nazi heads must have spun when Roosevelt announced on 16th May 1940 that US aircraft production would be raised to 50,000 per year. Two weeks later Congress approved the Two Oceans Naval Expansion Plan, shortly thereafter an unprecedented peacetime draft was introduced, intended to raise a trained force of 1.4 million men. The United States may not have been in the war, but the Germans were aware that this enormous accumulation of force was ultimately aimed at them, and the clock was ticking.

The Nazis greatest failing was within the Europe they controlled. Stunning victories in 1940 briefly tipped the balance of economic power in their favour. IF, and it's the big if and most calamitous failing, the Germans had managed to move the economies which they now controlled to their immediate pre-war levels they would have controlled an economic block larger then the British Empire, or the USA, though not both combined. They tried to avail themselves of the window of opportunity which opened, without that sound economic base, but the failure to remove Britain from the conflict and the failure to defeat the Soviet Union in short order doomed them to eventual defeat.
Once the United States became fully committed it was just a matter of time. I always take exception to the notion that the Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany whilst everyone else played a peripheral role. The USSR certainly played a significant role, but no more than the vast economic strength of the United States once unleashed.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (May 4, 2017)

Steve have you read Gorings interview with Hechler after the war. It certainly does point that there were concerns about US potential, but they were largely dismissed, because the Germans did not believe that the Americans could translate and transfer that force projection effectively to Europe. in other words, a eurocentrist view of the world.

When confronted again with US production figures in 1942, Goring refused to believe it possible. He made a moderately famous comment about how the US would not be able to convert their production of toasters into weapons manufacture so easily.

Goring is the relevant man to look at incidentally given his management of some very key positions within the Reich.. The german view of areas outside Europe was essentially a 19th century imperialist view, further they vastly and irrationally considered they were in a position to dominate that world order.

It was always about Europe for the Nazis, although they would view the influence of the outside world to some extent, it was about how they could position themselves so as to dominate Europe "for the next 1000 years" and all that rubbish. They believed they were the leaders of Europe, born to rule Europe, and hence the world.


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## stona (May 5, 2017)

In 1940 neither Britain, nor America, posed a direct military threat, but the Germans were well aware of the medium term threat posed by their combined economic potential. Germany's strategic dilemma in 1940 was how to defeat or neutralise Britain before the United States intervened decisively on her side. It was never resolved. The U-boat war was a strategy that ran the highest risk of bringing down the full weight of American power on Germany (even Nazis read their history books) and the Luftwaffe proved incapable of forcing a decision by any means. As long as Britain remained in the war the United States had a means to project their industrial power against Germany, I can't buy into the idea that the Germans ignored this or were unaware of it. 

It is fair to say that historians are divided on this point. As examples, Weinberg has argued in at least two of his volumes that the Germans did ignore, or at least under rate, Anglo-American economic potential (for me somewhat unconvincingly) whereas Hillgruber (Hitlers Strategie) makes convincing arguments that it was one of the over riding factors in the Nazis timetable for war. 

Tooze quotes the first lines of the report from Germany's Washington embassy on lend- lease, sent to the Foreign Ministry, the OKW, Army and Air Ministry.

_'The Lend-Lease Act currently before Congress...stems from the pen of the leading Jewish confidants of the President. It is intended to give him the possibility of pursuing without limitation of influencing the war through all means "short of war". With the passage of the law the Jewish world-view will therefore have firmly asserted itself in the United States.'_

The document then continued, listing the huge deliveries which could now be expected by_ 'England, China, and other vassals'._

I think it can be debated to what extent the American potential drove Nazi plans, but not whether they were a factor. The Germans were well aware of the potential imbalance of economic power and resources which would prove insurmountable over a 'long' war.

Cheers

Steve


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## Wavelength (May 15, 2017)

The idea that the Germans soldiered on with obsolete equipment doesn’t hold up to scrutiny, in my opinion. A late model FW-190A, also the Dora, was more or less as capable as a late model Spitfire. An ME-262 was probably a better jet than its contemporary rival jets. A Type XXI U-boat was a revolutionary advance in submarine design. A Tirpitz was at least as good and probably better a battleship than a KGV. A Panther was a far more capable tank than a Sherman and more or less as a good as a T-34. A FuMO26 radar was a better fire control radar than a Type 284M and as capable as a Mk8. I could go on, but Germany lost the war based mostly on numerical inferiority rather than overall weapons quality/obsolesces, and also to a lesser extent, but related, to the incompetence of its bureaucrats.


It goes without saying that the Nazis should never have got themselves involved in a war against multiple opponents on multiple fronts. Nonetheless, if we look at each decisive campaign or battle such as El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Normandy, the Bulge… the Allies had a lot more of everything. The Allies had more ships, more tanks, more trucks, more men, more airplanes, more guns, more gasoline, more diesel fuel, more fuel oil, more ammunition, more spare parts, more food, more clothing, more medical supplies…..


This numerical advantage for the Allies in just about every case boils down to two things:


1) The Germans lost the war at sea.

2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy’s ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west.


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## stona (May 15, 2017)

Wavelength said:


> 1) The Germans lost the war at sea.



They never fought it in a meaningful way. They could not compete with the RN and when the Americans joined in (long before they declared war) the odds were even worse. The Kriegsmarine never recovered from the losses of the Norwegian campaign! A half arsed U-boat campaign was about as good as it got, and for a few months it did look promising.



Wavelength said:


> 2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy’s ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west.



An extremely difficult and costly thing to do. It took an enormous effort by the Anglo-American air forces, and the eventual results are debated hotly today. The only sure thing is that the huge strategic campaign waged by the USAAFs ensured the destruction of the Luftwaffe in its efforts to defend against it. A similar campaign (to "grind down the Red Air Force" or destroy Soviet production capacity) was always way beyond the scope of Nazi Germany, even in the most optimistic plans of the late 1930s and early 1940s.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (May 15, 2017)

Wavelength said:


> The idea that the Germans soldiered on with obsolete equipment doesn’t hold up to scrutiny, in my opinion. A late model FW-190A, also the Dora, was more or less as capable as a late model Spitfire. An ME-262 was probably a better jet than its contemporary rival jets. A Type XXI U-boat was a revolutionary advance in submarine design. A Tirpitz was at least as good and probably better a battleship than a KGV. A Panther was a far more capable tank than a Sherman and more or less as a good as a T-34. A FuMO26 radar was a better fire control radar than a Type 284M and as capable as a Mk8. I could go on, but Germany lost the war based mostly on numerical inferiority rather than overall weapons quality/obsolesces, and also to a lesser extent, but related, to the incompetence of its bureaucrats.
> 
> 
> It goes without saying that the Nazis should never have got themselves involved in a war against multiple opponents on multiple fronts. Nonetheless, if we look at each decisive campaign or battle such as El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Normandy, the Bulge… the Allies had a lot more of everything. The Allies had more ships, more tanks, more trucks, more men, more airplanes, more guns, more gasoline, more diesel fuel, more fuel oil, more ammunition, more spare parts, more food, more clothing, more medical supplies…..
> ...




Yes it does, although there are always exceptions to generalisations. You’ve cited two examples, but for every example of parity or superiority, there are 20 examples of obsolescence, or more often sheer absence. Time spent and production devoted to introduction of new types had the effect of impeding mass production of weapons systems, meaning that the soldiers at the front struggled with massive shortages whilst the Nazi leadership were able to ogle the fantastic technologies under development.


The nazi penchant for introducing totally new technologies in favour of developing or improving exiting ones using currently on the shelf technology is reflected in the generally poor showing of Germany in the critical supply side of the war. 


As to the claim the FW 190A late models were equal or superior to allied types, this claim simply does not stand up to close scrutiny. You have not clarified what you actually mean by the term “late model FW190As, but I assume you are referring to the A6 subtype and subsequent. The earlier A5 subtype introduced in mid 1942 was certainly a shock to the allies when introduced. The LW took advantage of this temporary advantage by a series of nervous tip and run attacks over SE England, until thwarted by the introduction of the Typhoon and spitfire IX, which clearly had this type under control, causing the LW to discontinue its nuisance raids with FW190s.


The subsequent development of the FW 190 A airframe followed several strands of development


Some recon capability, not really a fighter. 


A heavy emphasis on ground attack capability as displayed in the F-8 subtype, Certainly a highly capable ground attack weapon, though again, the constant meddling in the design led to a plethora of subtypes and a quite unnecessary brake on outputs. Further and more importantly the fighter bomber versions of the FW 190 design could act as fighters, but were definitely not the equal of later allied fighters like the spitfire XIV or P-51 ,


The general fighter configuration, epitomized in the A6 and A-8 subtypes. These were not designed to match or exceed allied fighter technologies and performance at the time of their introduction in 1943-4. It was adequate, but in no way equal to the later allied types becoming available at that time. Nor were they intended to, though that is implied in your claim. In fact these later types of the basic FW190-A were intended to do two things, vastly improve their levels of protection and secondly to augment the firepower they carried so that they could deal with bombers more effectively. If you had said the FW was developed into an ideal bomber destroyer, I would not object, but you didnt claim that at all. Your claim was that they were superior to allied fighters, which simply is untrue.


The appearance of heavy bombers in vast numbers caused a problem for the German fighter force. The USAAC heavy bombers in particular could absorb heavy punishment. The armament of the Bf 109 and then current Fw 190 were not adequate for bomber-destroyer operations, with the B-17's eventual deployment in the box formations providing their defensive armament with formidable massed firepower from many.50 caliber machine guns or more between all the bombers in such a formation, from almost any conceivable direction. In addition, the _Luftwaffe_'s original solution of Zerstorers while effective against unescorted Allied bomber formations, lacked maneuverability and were eviscerated by the USAAF's fighter escorts in late 1943 and early 1944.

.

In response FW took the 190 design, already a great bomber killer design redesigned parts of the wing structure to accommodate larger armament. The Fw 190A-6 was the first sub-variant to undergo this change. Its standard armament was increased from four MG151/20s, an armament able to deal with both bombers and fighters, with four more in two underwing cannon pods for the 30mm weapon ( a weapon of indifferent performance against fighters, but devastating against bombers) The aircraft was designated A-6/R1. The first aircraft were delivered on 20 November 1943. Brief trials saw the twin cannon replaced by the MK 103 autocannon in the outer wing, which then became the A-6/R2. The cannons were blowback-operated, had electric ignition, and were belt fed. The 30mm MK 108 was simple to make and its construction was economical; the majority of its components consisted of just pressed sheet metal stampings. In the A-6/R4, the GM-1 (nitrous oxide) Boost was added for the BMW 801 engine to increase performance at high altitude for very short periods. For protection, 30 millimetres (1.2 in) of armoured glass was added to the canopy. The A-6/R6 was fitted with twin heavy calibre werfer granate 21 unguided, air-to-air rockets, fired from single underwing tubular launchers (one per wing panel). This was again a welcome addition to the capability of the aircradft in dealing with bombers, but virtually of no help in combatting fighters, and caused quite substantial loss of airborne performance.


The increased modifications, in particular heavy firepower, made the Fw 190 a potent bomber-killer, but it was no longer front line material as a pure fighter. The A-7 evolved in November 1943. Two synchronized 13mm (.51 caliber) MG131 machine guns replaced the twin cowl-mount synchronized 7.92mm (.318 cal) MG 17 machine guns. The A-7/R variants could carry two 30mm MK 108s as well as BR 21 rockets. This increased its potency as a _Pulk-Zerstörer_ (Bomber Formation Destroyer). The A-8/R2 was the most numerous Sturmbock aircraft, some 900 were built by Fiesler with 30mm MK 108s installed in their outer wing panel mounts. While formidable bomber-killers, the armour and substantial up-gunning with heavier calibre firepower meant the Fw 190 was now cumbersome to maneuver. Vulnerable to Allied fighters, they had to be escorted by Bf 109s. so much for the claim the later versions of the FW 190A rivalled allied fighters in performance.


more to follow........

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## pbehn (May 15, 2017)

In my teens there was a magazine called the history of "World war two" which could be collected to form an encyclopedia. The designs of the German military were in some cases fantastic, machine guns firing around corners and taper bore anti tank guns each with a different round and caliber using exotic materials. The boring plodding Russians basically used as few different types as possible and made them by the million.


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## Wavelength (May 15, 2017)

Stona, I don't dispute that those two failing would have been difficult to rectify, but those were ultimately required to win the war they brought onto themselves.


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## Wavelength (May 15, 2017)

parsifal, I never wrote that the FW was superior.


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## Shortround6 (May 15, 2017)

Wavelength said:


> The idea that the Germans soldiered on with obsolete equipment doesn’t hold up to scrutiny, in my opinion. A late model FW-190A, also the Dora, was more or less as capable as a late model Spitfire. An ME-262 was probably a better jet than its contemporary rival jets. A Type XXI U-boat was a revolutionary advance in submarine design. A Tirpitz was at least as good and probably better a battleship than a KGV. A Panther was a far more capable tank than a Sherman and more or less as a good as a T-34. A FuMO26 radar was a better fire control radar than a Type 284M and as capable as a Mk8. I could go on, but Germany lost the war based mostly on numerical inferiority rather than overall weapons quality/obsolesces, and also to a lesser extent, but related, to the incompetence of its bureaucrats.



When trying to decide if one weapon was better than another try flipping the roles, Could a Tirpitz (or 5 of them) performed the same roles as the KGVs? The hundreds of thousands of miles steamed during the course of the war? Of course the Tirpitz was almost 22% heavier at full load so, yes, it should have some advantages in military capabilities. The MK XX I u-boat was a tremendous advance in submarine design but with only two war patrols it is more than a little difficult to credit it with any increase in _operational _capabilities of the German Navy WW II, potential yes but not in effect. You also have the tank question a bit reversed. The T-34 wasn't really up to the standards of the Sherman despite it's somewhat over blown reputation. In a stand-up gun fight with little movement the Panther was hard to beat. Throw in a road march of several hundred miles before firing the first shot and the Panther starts showing up (or not showing up at the battle field) a few weaknesses.




> 1) The Germans lost the war at sea.


Not only lost, they _lost _bad. In fact there was never any doubt about the Germans* failing to win *the war at sea. Some debate continuous about the U-boat war but the German surface Navy had about zero chance of *winning *anything against Royal Navy.



> 2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy’s ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west.



This is one of the great myths of WW II. Give the Germans 3-4000 B-29s and the air bases they had historically and they still couldn't have mounted an effect bombing campaign against the Ural factories. The distances between the air bases and the Factories were simply too great and the logistics of trying to supply a bombing force of several thousand large 4 engine bombers deep within Russia was beyond the Germans ability. Distance from even 120 miles behind Stalingrad to Tankograd was about 950 miles or about the same distance from Norwich to the Polish/Russian border. It is about 550 miles from such a point to Odessa and about 525 miles to Kiev. Amount of rail transport needed for fuel, parts and bombs is enormous. Not to mention feeding the tens of thousands of ground crew needed.

as an example promotional photo of a B-17 and "Crew"






38 men, granted some of the men (gas and oil truck crews) probably serviced more than one aircraft and even some of the others could double up if needed but maintaining heavy bombers on near front line airfields is going to be difficult.


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## parsifal (May 15, 2017)

_In my opinion. A late model FW-190A, also the Dora, was more or less as capable as a late model Spitfire._


See above for my comments regarding the late model A subtypes. They tended to be adapted for either fighter bomber or ground attack


Now, turning to the FW 190D and comparing that to the ‘late model spitfire. The first thing we have to do is define what a ‘late model spitfire might be. You could argue that the d subtype began service from the latter part of 1942, and in a technical sense it would be correct to say that. However, until the advent of the D-9 subtype the D did not see a lot of combat service. It was essentially a bunch of proto types until that point.


I will happily stand corrected on this, but the d-9 in my book began to make some impact on combat from July 1944. Flight tests were continuing from that time, but there are also some records of combat from around about that time. There is no doubt in my mind that the 190D was a thoroughly competitive fighter, but it was also essentially forced into the category of one long and expensive prototype as the Germans embarked on seemingly endless detail changes to the basic design. Despite the most dire of situations facing them at the time, they seemed determined to place their dwindling production capabilities at tisk by these continual changes, with their inevitable stoppages and delays to production. Figures are admittedly spongey for the d production numbers, but most sources suggest around 700 were built…..their number 1 fighter, for nearly a year, from the second most important economy in the world, amounted to essentially a pre-production run. One has to wonder why.


_An ME-262 was probably a better jet than its contemporary rival jets. _


A technological marvel, and an operational failure that made no impact on front line operations until it was way too late, and remained mostly grounded due to issues with serviceability. A war winner not, you don’t win wars, or even battles by staying grounded.


_A Type XXI U-boat was a revolutionary advance in submarine design._


It was a revolutionary design, but unfortunately for the germans it fits perfectly into the category of an interesting prototype that had no effect on the war, which was my main claim about german production.


_A Tirpitz was at least as good and probably better a battleship than a KGV. _


The Tirpitz and Bismarck were both laid down in 1936. There is no doubt they were fantastic ships, built in contravention to existing treaties at the time, which the KGVs were, so it should not be a surprise that the Bismarcks were superior as a ship design. It helped that they were vastly bigger, at nearly 53000 tons for the Tirpitz to 42900 for the KGV class. It took an average of 5.0 years to complete the Bismarcks. The KGVs were all laid down after the bismarcks but finished earlier, at an average of 4.5 years building time. And there were five of them, coming from a nation with half the production capacity of Germany. A fairer and more relevant comparison would be to compare the entire class. Against the incomplete PoW and woefully protected hood, the Bismarck, with the Eugen. Five days later, however, against ships led by the Duke of York and the Rodney, the Bismarck rolled over and sank after just 40 minutes. Hardly the stuff of superior design.


_A Panther was a far more capable tank than a Sherman and more or less as a good as a T-34. _


I think you overrate the quality of the t-34. The Panther was the best all round tank of the war. None came close to it. Yet the productive effort needed to build one, based on the hours per copy, was roughly 20 times that of a t-34, and 5 times that of a Sherman. In the Normandy battles, the Germans needed to achieve an exchange ratio in AFVs of around 7:1 in their favour, One the eastern front in 1944, the odds were even longer, with Dupuy estimating the necessary exchange rate needed to be in the order of 10:1+. just to reach the break even point. They only ever managed 2.3:1 in the west and about 4.5:1 in the east. Moreover there is a strong argument that the germans lost the war because of the Panther. The desire to have the biggest and meanest tank around, delayed the launching of their critical citadelle operation….a classic case of the front line forces being starved of equipment whilst the Nazis pottered around tinkering with the design. And despite its technical excellence, in these critical early deployments the panther was a failure. Of the 200 rushed to the Kursk…..


As at 20 July 1943 when the general retreat was ordered the status of the 200 Panthers was:


2 caught fire and were total write-offs before the campaign started

41 operational

85 not operational but repairable, subsequently lost when the repair workshops were overrun by the soviet counterattack.


16 listed as seriously damaged, located at the regimental repair depots. Fate unknown, but that they were slated to be sent back to Germany for major repairs. Within days of this report the Soviets had overrun the regimental depot where they were located. I do not know if they were evacuated, or not. I think most likely they did not get away.


56 total write-offs, lost in combat. Of these 56, 49 were blown-up to prevent them being captured by the enemy while 7 were captured by the enemy before they could be destroyed


from _Panther Tank: The Quest for Combat Supremacy_ by Jentz, Jentz is notoriously pro-german and these figures are hotly disputed by the Russians. Even so of the starting total of 204 14 July, 156 lost or captured by the end of the month, not a great look for a tank that had lost the battle and probably the war for the germans.


In losing this number, the panther is thought to have destroyed 267 enemy tanks/afvs, for an exchange rate of 1.67:1. Hardly the hallmark of a war winning piece of kit.


_A FuMO26 radar was a better fire control radar than a Type 284M and as capable as a Mk8. _


And as far as I know never used in anger to any significant degree. A show pony in other words.


_I could go on, but Germany lost the war based mostly on numerical inferiority rather than overall weapons quality/obsolesces, and also to a lesser extent, but related, to the incompetence of its bureaucrats._


Germany lost the war because of numerical inferiority. This should not have been the case. Germany in 1938 had a TWI at least 5 times that of the USSR, about twice that of Britain and about 3 times that of france. After the conquest of Europe she also had all that conquest at her disposal. None of it, and none of her home production was used efficiently. Why? a multitude of reasons, but right up there is the desire to make up in quality what she lacked in outputs. Understandable but fraught with problems as it turned out. Wanting the best of everything caused delays in delivery times and rates as production lines were incessantly held up by constant tinkering and detail changes that were of highly questionable bene3fit given the costs to outputs that such changes entailed.


Blaming the faceless ‘bureaucrats” is a cop out in my opinion. Those “faceless buraeucrats included men like Speer and milch. There many other, less well know, but still very capable organisers of the war effort. What killed their efforts was the political and military interference. Not just hitler either. The general Staff as a whole never quite got it that the heer and other arms all faced the most dire of crises mid war that needed immediate increases in production.


Germany faced the crisis that she did because she had planned for a series of short wars in which she would have long periods to recover. Her economy was strong on paper, but vulnerable in certain respects. When the war didn’t go as planned. Notably Britain failed to surrender and the Russians fought on in front of Moscow, the germans rapidly descended into a series of uncontrolled crises that ultimately lost them the war.


_It goes without saying that the Nazis should never have got themselves involved in a war against multiple opponents on multiple fronts. Nonetheless, if we look at each decisive campaign or battle such as El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Normandy, the Bulge… the Allies had a lot more of everything. The Allies had more ships, more tanks, more trucks, more men, more airplanes, more guns, more gasoline, more diesel fuel, more fuel oil, more ammunition, more spare parts, more food, more clothing, more medical supplies….._


_This numerical advantage for the Allies in just about every case boils down to two things: _


_1) The Germans lost the war at sea._


_2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy’s ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west._


Your observations about being outnumbered are good and I agree, but your reasons why are about as cockeyed as ive ever seen from a german apologist. Sure losing the war at sea was an issue, but really some refinement of naval theory is required to understand its importance.


There are really two types of naval battle, sea control, and sea denial. Sea control is about maintaining sufficient control over the oceans to allow your own shipping to reap the trade benefits that such control will yield. This was from the allied perspective what the Battle of the Atlantic was all about. It was also the conditions needed in order to execute major naval operations like amphibious operations or bombardments.


The Germans never excercised sea control in the Atlantic. They possessed sea control in the Baltic. For a time they could claim some limited forms of sea control in the coastal ports of western Europe. They never really enjoyed success at controlling the med or even the black sea. After Norway the losses to german shipping were so severe that sea control became a bit pointless for the germans, they no longer possessed sufficient quantities of shipping to make a lot of difference. This affected operations on every front.


The other major form of naval operations centre around the concept of “sea denial”….basically preventing the enemy’s safe use of the sea, using weapons like submarines, surface raiders aircraft, mines and the like. The germans were highly successful at this….initially. gradually however the allies got the better of them by a combination of factors.


The british relied on the classic blocakade warfare to try and strangle the germans into surrender. They augmented this with a bombing campaign of German cities. The bombing campaign until 1942, at best was not a success. The naval blockade was somewhat successful, but circumvented by the treaty with the Russians. Then the germans decided the Russians were their enemy and took to them with a dagger. Initially successful militarily, economically it was disastrous for the germans


Despite this, German production should have been adequate to the point they reached but was not. They weren’t efficient enough to win the war as it became a truly global event, but they should have done better than they did. Why. There are a few reasons for that. Logistically, German efforts were poor, very poor. Whilst troops at the front in 1941 froze to death and watched their meagre numbers of soft skinned vehicles just fall away, huge stocks of winterized equipment sat idly by at rail sidings in Poland. Whilst Rommel sat starving for fuel and other reserves, massive amounts of manpower tanks and fuel was either just sitting around doing nothing, or sitting in Libyan ports waiting for shipment to the front. Germany failed in the production because of its poor strategic direction, poor logistics, the lack of a long range game plan and just sheer petty inefficiencies in the regime itself.

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## stona (May 16, 2017)

Wavelength said:


> Stona, I don't dispute that those two failing would have been difficult to rectify, but those were ultimately required to win the war they brought onto themselves.



The Germans could never have competed at sea. What they needed to do, as I wrote above, is find a means of removing Britain from the war before the huge potential of the United States could be developed and projected against her, across the Atlantic Ocean. When this failed, in 1940, the war was lost. I don't believe that the war was lost when the Soviet Union was attacked. I do not demean or diminish the losses inflicted by the Soviets on the Germans, nor the cost at which they came, but ultimately Germany was in an unwinnable war from the moment it lost the Battle of Britain. They lost the BoB because they could barely compete in the air, and from 1940 through to the end of the war they fell further and further behind in both quality and quantity of aircraft and the men to fly and operate them. At the end of the war the British and their Commonwealth allies had just shy of 50,000 qualified aircrew or aircrew in training, none of whom would see action. I don't know the equivalent figure for the Americans, but I would bet it was substantial. The Germans on the other hand were producing fighters with nobody to fly them.
Cheers
Steve


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## Wavelength (May 16, 2017)

Parsifal,

I'm am not new to this, nor am I a German apologist. The need to prevail at sea, and in the air, is a given.

Thank you, for agreeing that the Germans were not entirely saddled with obsolete weapons.


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## Wavelength (May 16, 2017)

stona said:


> What they needed to do, as I wrote above, is find a means of removing Britain from the war before the huge potential of the United States could be developed and projected against her, across the Atlantic Ocean. When this failed, in 1940, the war was lost.


 Yes, nevertheless, the only feasible means to accomplish this was to win the Battle of the Atlantic.


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## Wavelength (May 16, 2017)

parsifal said:


> Blaming the faceless ‘bureaucrats” is a cop out in my opinion.


 Once you study the failings of the KM naval bureaucracies, it becomes clear that is one primary reason why they were unable to compete in the war at sea.


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## pbehn (May 16, 2017)

The problem for the German battleships no matter how formidable their designs were was that they needed supplies and repairs after an engagement. The Bismark took a lot to sink it but it was damaged enough to need repair in the Baring straight and further damaged by air launched torpedoes. A similar story for the Graf Spee. Once the supply network of the surface raiders was taken out it didnt matter how good they were. The ships were good, the concept didnt work in practice.


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## stona (May 16, 2017)

Wavelength said:


> Once you study the failings of the KM naval bureaucracies, it becomes clear that is one primary reason why they were unable to compete in the war at sea.



The German economy simply couldn't support the shipbuilding programs proposed, and they were never enough to contest naval superiority with the Anglo-American alliance. I often see the 'build more U-boats mantra' repeated...but with what, there was neither the money nor raw materials available. 
Post 1939 all shipbuilding comprised a very small percentage of German armaments, spending. 
Cheers
Steve

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## Shortround6 (May 16, 2017)

Wavelength said:


> Yes, nevertheless, the only feasible means to accomplish this was to win the Battle of the Atlantic.



And this the Germans could not do with their historical assets/capabilities or with any _likely _variation.
The super subs were running way too late in timing.
The "not build surface ships--build subs instead" school ignores that the British had a pretty fair Idea of what was going on and such a radical shift in German building programs would have meant a change in the British building programs such as fewer big ships and more escorts. It may have also changed the armament fit of escorts. No surface raiders to torpedo means more depth charges carried early in the war by escorts for example.
Germans could have used more maritime reconnaissance aircraft, but here again a radical shift in numbers from historic would have seen some sort of reply by the British. More patrol aircraft of their own, change in carrier deployment, earlier CAM ships?
Take of platforms for Gladiators? Something?


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## pbehn (May 16, 2017)

Also SR the more successful the U Boats were the more Harris would be pressured into using Bomber Command to attack factories and resupply harbours


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## Zippythehog (May 16, 2017)

Wavelength, one other very important consideration is that the Wehrmacht lacked motorized transportation to the same degree as the allies. They were still largely a horse and rail army. 
Having limited supplies of petroleum ensured that tanks, planes and subs got priority.

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## parsifal (May 17, 2017)

This is not quite fully correct. In 1939, when Germany entered the war, the heer enjoyed quite high levels of motorisation. They entered the war with 6 Pz divs, fully motorised, 4 motorised rifle divisions, which more or less permanently had attached as independent units at least a bn of AFVs for support. There were about 5 “Leichte” divs, that in essence were light armoured formations. After the fall of Poland all of these units were converted to smallish Panzer Divs thus enabling the heer to enter the French campaign with 10 fully armoured divs.


In addition to that there were sizable formations of SS and the LW demonstation units, that ultimately became the HG heavy armoured Div (this happened later, but the assets were there from the outbreak of the war).


All of the 30 odd wave 1 Infantry Divs enjoyed high levels of motorisation, better than the equivalent British unit actually. They were assigned nearly 2000 vehicles actually. The standard line infantry ToE still called for just under 1000 vehicles per div in 1939.


The BEF quickly deployed to France in 1939, and initially consisted of 6 divs and 21000 vehicles. Many of these vehicles were not part of the divisional TOE, rather they were attached to the support echelons of each div. The supply head for the BEF remained at Cherbourg rather than move to the channel and thus massive dislocation of the BEFs support echelons occurred after Guderians dash to the sea had been achieved


The levels of motorisation for each division were good, but not as good as those top shelf heer formations in September 1939. Between September 1939 and May 1940 this fundamentally changed with the British army receiving massive amounts of motorised equipment. The BEF was equipped with no less than 87000 vehicles for the 10 divs assigned to the force. All of these vehicles were lost or destroyed. The 90 (or so) divs involved in offensive operations for the heer and its support echelons amounted to 660000 vehicles. In crude terms there were 8700 vehicles per div (including non- divisional support) for the BEF, to 7300 vehicles per div (including non-div support) for the heer. It is often touted that the german army was not motorised, and in terms of what happened 1942 and after, this is true, but in 1940-41, relative to their opponents, the heer was one of the most mechanised formations in the world. Its yet another one of those myths used to explain away why Germany lost…if only theyr were motorised in 1939….sorry but they were motorised to a very high level


Moreover, the depth of british preparations and planning compared to the bumbling efforts of the heer in subsequent campaigns is brought into sharp focus in what happened after Dunkirk. The BEF emerged from the campaign with virtually no equipment particularly for its vehicles. By the following February, these losses in material had been replaced and increased as the british army front line forces gradually increased.


The germans initially reduced the force structure of the heer after the surrender of france, then steeply increased as the decision to invade the USSR was made. German losses in soft skinned vehicles had been heavy during the French campaign, and production at home could not even keep pace with normal wastage, and German industry was slow to pick up the uptake needed to improve the supply of vehicles. They made a conscious decision at the time not to place their economy under strain by increasing military outputs, particularly for vehicles. The supply of spare parts and exchange engines remained far too low. Worse, despite repeated recommendations for rationalisation of the vehicle park, culminating in the Schnell plan, the numbers of different models in army service skyrocketed, made worse by the expedient of drafting into army service various lightweight (and unsuitable) ex-civilian vehicles and foreign manufactured vehicles (mostly french), that were fragile and completely unsuitable for what was about to happen


The vehicles per div (including non-div support echelons) had dropped to 4285 by the time of the Russian invasion, moreover OKOH at some point, without any rational reason to do so, had increased the radius of action for formations (the range at which military formations were deemed capable of operations from their supply heads) for Barbarossa, from 60 miles maximum in the west, to well over a 100miles for operations in the east. Such cavalier changes in operational requirements is utterly inexplicable , but as the inevitable happened and vast quantities of the flimsy soft skinned vehicles were lost and not replaced, the ability of the heer to project its force became less and less. This was made worse by the loss of horse drawn vehicles and draft animals as well which mirrored the crisis in the MT park. In 1939 there were between 5 and 7000 draft animals per div on average in the heer. By the end of 1942, this figure had dropped to about 2000 horses per div.


The effects of all this was that the highly mobile and effective force that existed in 1940 was largely immobilised by 1943. Hitler is often criticised for his stand fast orders, but in reality his order was more realistic than the heers stupid calls to withdraw. By 1943, a wholesale front wide withdrawal in the east was impossible, due to the shortage of MT and draft animals. Only by pooling of resources, closing ones eyes and praying that nothing would happen in quiet sectors was the heer able to shift decreasingly small amounts of the front intact


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## Wavelength (May 17, 2017)

Allow me to highlight two particular egregious examples of the failings of the KM bureaucracies, which affected the war at sea at critical times.

The first was the Torpedo Failures Scandal. KM torpedoes usually didn't work for the first year of the war. If they had, the initial U-boat campaign would have been far more effective. U-boats actually had to be recalled and the campaign suspended for a time. Additionally the losses of the German destroyers during the Norway conquest would not have been as severe and RN losses would have been much greater. The responsible people were brought up on charges.

Another was the failure to train KM officers about radar and its capabilities. This was supposed to be done during 1941, but by the close of 1942 it still had made virtually no progress. By Oct 1941 Raeder had to give authority to the MND (Marine Nachricten Dienst) to train officers and a special branch of the MND was created. Still no progress was made. This would go on for not months, but years. Finally, in March 1943 (!) the First Officer of the Scharnhorst was reassigned to jump start the program. He did so in only a few months but by then it was far too late.

Bureaucratic malfeasance of course was not unique to the KM. I could list several examples of British and American failings as well, and the malfunctions of the USN BuOrd (which also had a torpedo failure scandal) are well known, but the KM bureaucracies were especially dysfunctional.


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## stona (May 17, 2017)

Wavelength said:


> Bureaucratic malfeasance of course was not unique to the KM. I could list several examples of British and American failings as well, and the malfunctions of the USN BuOrd (which also had a torpedo failure scandal) are well known, but the KM bureaucracies were especially dysfunctional.



I think we could all list numerous failings from all the combatants. I don't think that the failings of the KM stand out above the others.

Cheers

Steve

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## cherry blossom (May 17, 2017)

The failure of the Germans to keep their cypher traffic secure was clearly one thing that went very wrong for Germany. It didn’t actually decide the outcome of the war but it certainly didn’t help.

There is a good book “Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers” by Rebecca Ratcliff which stresses the German confidence that they were clever than their their opponents as a partial explanation of their failure. There were quite early indications that the German codes were insecure and that the Poles had broken Enigma Christos military and intelligence corner: Case ‘Wicher’ – Information from the war diary of Inspectorate 7/VI and the German Navy also had several good indications that the British were reading their codes.

The really surprising thing was that a much stronger cipher machine existed as at least a prototype from 1939 but there was no urgency in putting it into service. This was the Schlüsselgerät 39 (SG 39) Schlüsselgerät 39 – Wikipedia or https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptolog...lications/wwii/assets/files/german_cipher.pdf. There is some debate about who designed the SG 39 with the NSA site attributing it to Fritz Menzer and Michael Pröse’s thesis mentioning the company Telefonbau & Normaluhr (T&N) http://archiv.tu-chemnitz.de/pub/2005/0011/data/DissProese.pdf.

Had only the Luftwaffe decided in 1939 to adopt the SG 39 and had replaced their Enigmas by early in 1941, we could imagine that Bismarck would have reached Brest and that the paratroops attacking Crete would have suffered far fewer loses.

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## tomo pauk (May 17, 2017)

stona said:


> I think we could all list numerous failings from all the combatants. I don't think that the failings of the KM stand out above the others.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



That is probably true. 

It can help if one has bigger pockets, and/or more allies, and/or bigger industry. Germany was not in such position, UK was. Kinda makes mistakes easier to bear and do the right thing afterwards.

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## pinehilljoe (Aug 5, 2017)

IMHO, The economy couldn't support the War aims, and the war was directed ideologically in many instances, not militarily by Hitler.

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## swampyankee (Aug 5, 2017)

schwarzpanzer said:


> What went wrong most for Germany?
> 
> Attacking Russia, oil being bombed, Italy switching sides, supporting Japan etc.



Don't forget vile and obscene regime that forced some of the nation's best and brightest into the arms of the enemy, an occupation policy in the parts of the USSR they invaded making Stalin seem like a better choice, and placing a greater priority on industrial-scale murder than on supplying their forces, by using trains to move people to their human abattoirs instead of transporting war materiel.

Supporting Japan did Germany neither any good nor harm. Supporting Hitler got Mussolini hanged; had he sat out the war, like Franco, he'd have gotten to die in bed.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 5, 2017)

".... Don't forget vile and obscene regime that forced some of the nation's best and brightest into the arms of the enemy"

Hardly a strategic flaw .... your words equally describe the USSR. There have been "vile", "obscene" regimes throughout history and some have succeeded. 

".... Supporting Japan did Germany neither any good nor harm. Supporting Hitler got Mussolini hanged; had he sat out the war, like Franco, he'd have gotten to die in bed."

Agreed.


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## Zippythehog (Aug 5, 2017)

Parsifal, your comments are very accurate and on point. I was using a gross generalization that referenced the situation from late 42 on. 
One other element is that the Nazis truely believed their poo was odorless. They consumed their own propaganda and did not tolerate dissent. Without constructive criticism, no human system will thrive.

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## swampyankee (Aug 6, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... Don't forget vile and obscene regime that forced some of the nation's best and brightest into the arms of the enemy"
> 
> Hardly a strategic flaw .... your words equally describe the USSR. There have been "vile", "obscene" regimes throughout history and some have succeeded.
> 
> ...



We're not discussing Stalin here. The topic about Germany's strategic blunders, not where they stand in the realm of moral relativism. Their regime's politics, quite literally, drove vast numbers of their most educated people to work for the Allies. Had Hitler not centered his entire ideology around murdering Jews, most of the Manhattan Project's scientists would have been employed at Goettingen, not Los Alamos. Had his troops not treated the Slavs in Ukraine worse than Stalin's had, he'd have had a much more pacific population. Of course, without his racist and anti-semitic ideology, he'd never have been embraced by the German right, because those were two very important points of differentiation from the German left.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 6, 2017)

".... We're not discussing Stalin here."
"... they invaded making Stalin seem like a better choice"
Then why did _you_ introduce the comparison between Stalin and the Nazis?

Nazism is _not_ a moral absolute .... though you clearly think it is.


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## stona (Aug 6, 2017)

He's got a point about a scientific exodus though. Maybe not vast numbers but men like Szilard, Frisch, Peierls, Bethe, Fuchs (more famous later for different reasons), Born, Franck, Wigner, Teller, van Neumann, von Karmann, Rotblat (whose wife was murdered in Majdenek) and probably a few more I've forgotten, most of whom worked directly on the Manhattan Project. Then there's Einstein himself. Later, after Mussolini finally passed anti-semetic laws in 1938, some came from Italy, Segre and Fermi (whose wife was Jewish) would be the most well known. Even Bohr eventually fled Denmark.

Find a copy of Robert Jungk's 1958 book 'Brighter Than a Thousand Suns' or satisfy yourself with this anectdote

_"The clearest account of the state of the once-great Gottingen University was given by the mathematician David Hilbert, by that time well advanced in years. About a year after the great purge of Gottingen he was seated at a banquet in the place of honor next to Hitler's new Minister of Education, Rust. Rust was unwary enough to ask: 'Is it really true, Professor, that your institute suffered so much from the departure of the Jews and their friends?' Hilbert snapped back, as coolly as ever: 'Suffered? No, it didn't suffer, Herr Minister. It just doesn't exist anymore!'"
_
According to Frisch the annual Bohr conference in Copenhagen each year became a 'labour exchange". In September 1933 the Royal Albert Hall in London hosted a benefit for refugee scientists hosted by Ernest Rutherford and with a certain Albert Einstein as the keynote speaker. Initially it was to British universities that many came, but as funds became short, more and more went to the U.S. At Columbia University, a Faculty Fellowship Fund was established and the U.S. government became involved through its formation of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars. The Emergency Committee officially welcomed more than 300 scientists and scholars between 1933 and 1941. Of these, approximately 100 were physicists.
This HAS to have made a difference. The Anglo-American Allies enjoyed a technological lead in most areas throughout WW2, maybe contrary to the popular perception, and it is men like these that contributed to that advantage._
_
Cheers

Steve

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## swampyankee (Aug 6, 2017)

The thread title is "What went wrong most for Germany?" not "which regime was more morally corrupt?" Had that been the question, I'd call a tie. 

Soviet behavior in Ukraine was so bad that a reasonably kind German occupation could have freed tens of thousand of troops for something else. Trains were diverted from transporting supplies for the troops to shuttling Jews to the ovens. Both of these behaviors were as intrinsic to the nazi ideology as was Stalin's genocidal collectivization of Ukraine. Both of these behaviors were militarily counter-productive. 

How would Germany have run WW2 with a hyper-nationalist regime that did not have enslavement of Slavs and genocide of Jews and Gypsies as primary war goals?


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## parsifal (Aug 6, 2017)

rationalise its auto industry
adopt a true competitive tender process for procurement.
terminate all research projects with no direct or immediate wartime benefits
adopt a more discerning policy to protect skilled workers from the draft
introduce proper rationaing from the beginning of the war
instead of opting for short term loot gains from occupied territories, instead opt for more long term integrated . approach, beginning with no one sided fixing of cash rate
abandon the more overtly objectionable racial purity laws, to try and attract a wider level of support from Europe generally.
plan realistically
develop clear and war aims and work consistently towards that

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## parsifal (Aug 7, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... We're not discussing Stalin here."
> "... they invaded making Stalin seem like a better choice"
> Then why did _you_ introduce the comparison between Stalin and the Nazis?
> 
> Nazism is _not_ a moral absolute .... though you clearly think it is.



I agree or accept that its relevant to compare the economic and military performance of the two regimes and the relative success of each. but the minute we start to manipulate the discussion to begin a discussion on the relative levels of moral bankruptcy of the two systems, we are just having a cheap and nasty attempt to hijack the thread.

As to your last comment, that is so offensive, and laughable actually as to not deserve any further comment from me

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## michaelmaltby (Aug 7, 2017)

"... How would Germany have run WW2 with a hyper-nationalist regime that did not have enslavement of Slavs and genocide of Jews and Gypsies as primary war goals?"

How did the Soviet Union finance an industrialization program through the confiscation and sale of the Ukraine food production, the starvation and enslavement of millions of the rural population?
How did the SU develop its far eastern resource and insustrial base through the enslavement of Estonians, Latvians, Armenians, Tartars not to mention German and Japanese POWs?

And all this with the enthusiatic approval and adoration of like-minded Western observers.

Nazism is _not_ a moral absolute .... though you clearly think it is Parsifal so laugh your head off or be offended.

_I_ did not introduce Stalin or the USSR into a "What Went Wrong ...", Germany thread.


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## pbehn (Aug 7, 2017)

It all went wrong when Adolf came to power because he was not the person to do what he wanted to achieve. To win he needed to take western Europe quickly, but even during the Battle of Britain the UK was producing more single engine fighters than Germany. He needed many more U Boats and surface ships too. In the east he needed more tanks and tracked or motorised transport. He didn't have them because he was a politician and he didn't want the civilian population to realise that they were actually in a war. Germany didn't actually fully mobilise for war until the tide had turned and it was just about to lose.

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## parsifal (Aug 8, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... How would Germany have run WW2 with a hyper-nationalist regime that did not have enslavement of Slavs and genocide of Jews and Gypsies as primary war goals?"
> 
> How did the Soviet Union finance an industrialization program through the confiscation and sale of the Ukraine food production, the starvation and enslavement of millions of the rural population?
> How did the SU develop its far eastern resource and insustrial base through the enslavement of Estonians, Latvians, Armenians, Tartars not to mention German and Japanese POWs?
> ...



Probably didn’t deal with that as well as was possible, or required.

With regard to point 1, there were many Germans that were hyper nationalists and supported Hitler in 1933. Many wanted revenge for the perceived unfair treatment meted out on Germany after 1918 armistice. But such feelings and aspirations were still within the accepted norms of social and international moral standards.

Hitler wooed many of the Jewish vote in 1933. Many Jews were led to believe that his anti Semitism was just talk prior to his election.

Hitler needed to take a different path from 1933, but it was certainly possible for him to do so. Like so many politicans before and since, he had to abrogate some of his pre-election rhetoric. Certainly possible. He just didn’t want to. He didn’t see it as rhetoric. He believed his own lies.

As to the Soviet Union, between the wars it was at least as morally bankrupt as the germans, but there were no German or Japanese PoWs, there was no support for the regime from the west (at least none that mattered).

The difference between the soviets and the Nazis was that the soviet system was a true command economy, whereas the nazi system was a series of loosely formed and barely co-operating fiefdoms operating within the german state, with rampant corruption and barely any real co-operation.

I still don’t understand your claim that Nazism was a moral absolute. It advocated racial purity, came up with a crackpot idea about “Aryan superiority” and the divine right of the german people to “lead” (ne enslave) the rest of Europe to serve for germany’s benefit and with no regard for the rule of law to be applied to these other peoples that saw as their inferiors.

If that is not a moral extreme, you can strip me naked and make me walk backwards to Berlin.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2017)

The Germans were caught in a vicious circle. The economy, under the Nazi regime, was geared for a war which had to be inevitable by somewhere around 1940, but at the same time that same economy could not support a protracted war. Just as logistics win battles, economies win wars.
What went wrong for Germany happened long before September 1939 and June 1941.
Militarily and politically for Germany the only chance of a short war in the West was a defeat (virtually impossible) or accommodation (which seemed feasible to Berlin) with the British Empire. This might have prevented the intervention of the United States and, ultimately, in a completely different scenario, ensured an eventual German victory in the East, but not in 1941.
For the British Empire/Commonwealth the exact opposite was true. It's only chance of ultimate victory was a long war, long enough to bring the industrial might, and hopefully developing military potential, of the United States to bear across the Atlantic. It's why the BoB and the often overlooked Italian debacle in North Africa* assume greater importance than they might otherwise do. They ensured that there would be no quick German victory in Europe.

*The Mediterranean is usually overlooked at this time. It is impossible to over estimate its importance to Britain. On August 10th 1940, at a time when many thought an invasion of the Home Islands or Eire was imminent, a decision was taken to reinforce North Africa from Home Forces. There's a clue there.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Aug 8, 2017)

Without discussing the moral aspect of Hitler's strategy in Eastern and to a lesser extent Western Europe it was an appalling military strategy. When Germany attacked some in the east were welcoming to them, some were ambivalent and some were opposed. Within a very short time all were opposed and many joined partisan groups. People can debate how effective these groups were but they certainly did nothing positive for an occupying army. Similarly much intelligence was sent by resistance groups to the allies at great risk, purely because of their hatred of the occupiers.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Without discussing the moral aspect of Hitler's strategy in Eastern and to a lesser extent Western Europe it was an appalling military strategy.



The political and military strategies of Nazi Germany were ideologically driven. This is a redundant argument, these things were a direct outcome of the application of the ideology. If the Nazis and their ideology hadn't come to power in 1932/3, then WW2 as we know it would never have happened. In this sense what went wrong for Germany was the NSDAP's 'machtergreifung'.
Cheers
Steve


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 8, 2017)

No argument there, great post, thank you. 

There was a disastrous mixture of arrogance, self-pity and dedication in the German state that created the inferno .... but .... and this is my point ..... it didn't _begin _with Hitler and the Nazis .... the 30 Years War and War of Spanish War of Succession put a stamp on Germans and the German character that was manifest in Frederick I and Bismark and carried forward. Much of this stemmed from the Protestant Reformation and Catholic France and Spain's efforts to crush and suppress Protestantism. 

Shortly after WW2 George Orwell was commenting about the outrages of war and humankind and he said (and I paraphrase): "The German are _irredeemable_. They think they are _civilized_."

And of course he was right, they _do_ think they are civilized and they _are_. But so do the English, the French, the Russians, the Chinese, the Japanese and many smaller ethnic groups .... all think they are civilized. By his definition they are all irredeemable. The critical matter that Orwell did not acknowledge is: what does your civilization _include _and what does it _exclude? _Britain, for example, learned early on that The Crown had to accept/include _dissent_ if it wanted funds (Magna Carta) and parliamentary democracy was born.

Germany made the critical mistake in 1933 of _not _learning from mistakes that it had made before. But .... so did Britain, France although with vastly different consequences.

I rest my case.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2017)

Where do we draw a line? The influence of history is pervasive, but other Protestant states managed to shake off the shackles of Catholicism and develop into democracies, the Netherlands being one of the earliest and most successful. 

Can we blame the Spanish conquistadors for Allende's suicide in the Palacio de La Moneda? A bit extreme, I admit, but it illustrates a point.

I think the success of National Socialism in Germany, and fascism in other European states had much stronger roots in more recent history, most notably the effective collapse of the established European order caused by WW1. I am always wary of singling out the Germans as being in some way different from other Europeans in this respect. I simply don't believe that to be the case. 
For example, Goldenhagen made the argument that German culture suffered from a special type of aggressive and virulent anti-semitism. I don't buy it. Anti-semitism is something that runs deep in all Christian-European culture. It was unscrupulously exploited in Germany for many reasons, beyond the scope of a reply like this. It was then implemented in an aggressive war, but I think it foolish to imagine that, given the right conditions, it might not have happened somewhere else. 
You will know the origin, but I often ask people engaged in such debate to look up the origin of the English phrase 'beyond the pale'. It has nothing to do with buckets, sixties rock bands...or Germans 

Cheers

Steve

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## michaelmaltby (Aug 8, 2017)

Very thoughful, Steve.


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## swampyankee (Aug 8, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... How would Germany have run WW2 with a hyper-nationalist regime that did not have enslavement of Slavs and genocide of Jews and Gypsies as primary war goals?"
> 
> How did the Soviet Union finance an industrialization program through the confiscation and sale of the Ukraine food production, the starvation and enslavement of millions of the rural population?
> How did the SU develop its far eastern resource and insustrial base through the enslavement of Estonians, Latvians, Armenians, Tartars not to mention German and Japanese POWs?
> ...



Not relevant who introduced him, but, again, the question was what GERMANY did wrong. One of the things they did wrong was they way German forces treated the people of Ukraine with similar levels of brutality as did Stalin. (numbers? Some 10,000,000 Ukrainians died between 1941 and 1944: see http://www.irekw.internetdsl.pl/ww2/ukr/; some 7 million died due to Stalin's policies between 1929 and 1933, see Ukrainian Famine). Had German troops not been playing out nazi racial policies in Ukraine, it may have had greater agricultural production for the Germans and required fewer occupation troops. Stalin primed the people of Ukraine to accept foreign occupation. The Germans blew their opportunity.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 8, 2017)

... first link is faulty, SwampYankee. The 2nd link is at odds with Churchill's recollection of his conversation with Stalin who claimed the program cost 10M souls. [The Grand Alliance, Winston Churchill]

".... is NOT a moral absolute" 
Not IS a moral absolute, Parsifal.

"... there were no German or Japanese PoWs".
From August, 1939 there WERE Japanese PoWs, thousands as the Japanese Army was crushed at Nomonhan. [Nomomhan, Alvin D. Coox]. This affair had been resolved _before _M-R Pact was signed.

I'm glad that you have reversed you recusal on this thread, Parsifal.


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## swampyankee (Aug 8, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> ... first link is faulty. The 2nd link is at odds with Churchill's recollection of his conversation with Stalin who claimed the program cost 10M souls. [The Grand Alliance, Winston Churchill]


The semi-colon got appended to the first; try this: World War II in Ukraine
I won't defend the accounting for the second; Stalin may have been exaggerating, Churchill may have misquoted, or the linked article and Stalin were counting different areas or different time periods. Either way, Ukraine lost close to 25% of its population under German occupation and about the same amount under Stalin.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2017)

I think the true nature of the Nazis ideology is being overlooked in their actions in the Ukraine and other occupied territories. It was always the intention, overtly expressed in Nazi circles to rape the land and starve, murder or relocate (which amounted to the same thing) the populations of areas like the Ukraine. It wasn't something that just happened subsequent to 'Barbarossa'.
This was part of what has been called (by Tooze I think, haven't checked) 'the grand strategy of racial war'. It was a strategy and mode of warfare that lay at the heart of Nazi ideology. In June 1941, just as the Germans were preparing their onslaught on the Soviet Union plans were also being made far broader programme of racial rearrangement of Poland. This involved not only removing the Polish population of the German annexed territories, but the population of the Government General too. _The Germans commenced planning of a genocide against the entire Polish population._
On 21st June 1941 Himmler instructed the Reichs Commissioner for the Security of the German Race (abbreviated RKF in German) to draw up a plan for the demographic reorganisation of the entire Eastern Territories expected to fall into German hands. This became the 'Generalplan Ost', drawn up by the RKF's settlement expert, Professor Konrad Meyer. Believe me, it didn't matter that it condemned millions to death, as long as they were not German. Meyer addressed himself primarily to the majority Slav populations of these territories, the fate of the Jewish populations was already a given, and they only constituted a large minority in Poland and the Ukraine. In Poland Meyer planned to remove 80-85% of the native population. This was to be followed by the expulsion of 64% of the population of the Ukraine and 75% of the White Russian population. You don't need much imagination to work out the consequences of this 'removal'. This is the horrific plan behind the seemingly benign concept of 'Lebensraum' for the German people.
Estimates of how many people this meant, excluding the Jewish minorities, vary even in German documents. The lowest figure is 31 million, a more likely figure is about 45 million. Only people capable of work were of any interest to the Germans, By the end of 1942 the 'physical annihilation' of entire populations, not just Jewish minorities was being discussed.
I would never seek to disrespect the victims of the Jewish Holocaust, nor diminish it in any way, but sometimes it does dominate concepts of the Nazi's repugnant racial ideology and cause the true extent of its implementation, not just in its rabid antisemitism, to be misunderstood and, almost inconceivably, under estimated.

Steve

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## parsifal (Aug 8, 2017)

Hitler being in the box seat, and Nazi extremism was not a necessary precondition for Germany to enter into aggressive war. They had already proven that in 1914, and in many ways, WWII was an extension or continuation of that conflict.


Germany was driven to war in 1914 by undercurrents of its sense of entitlement, coupled with self delusions of the nation’s importance and an insane pathological psychosis against anything foreign. The French had possessed the same dangerous mindset in the age of napoleon. Britain and the US had boundless ambition, but were fundamentally different in that they lacked the insane desire to bully their neighbours in quite the same way as Germany.


So what might have happened if hitler had not come to power. The thing that sets hitler apart from any of the other possibilities is his lack of education, his latent antisemitism, his lack of any semblance of a moral compass. There were plenty of right wing radicals far more rational than he that could have easily filled his shoes. Mostly from the army, and mostly drawn from the von seekct school of thinking. Utterly ruthless, militarily brilliant, aggressive, but differing from hitler and his thugs in that all of them possessed, to a greater or lesser extent, some sense of right and wrong. This was the sort of person hitler was assumed to be when the army threw its support behind the corporal.


There were any number of industrialists that had the management skills and industrial savvy to run the country more efficiently than Hitler and his lackeys and still have sufficient aggression embedded into their national outlook to allow a war of expansion to permit Germany superior economic growth.Run a war for profit in other words.


There were any number of conservatives from the dispossessed ruling classes, leftovers of the Kaisers Germany that would have run the country autocratically with the intent of restoring Germany to her “rightful” position of dominance in Europe.


Germany may have continued on its radical trajectory and ended up falling to communist control after 1918. In this situation, almost certainly the aggressors would have been her neighbours and Britain as these nations would fear even more than hitler the social unrest that a communist revolution in Germany, in the middle of Europe as opposed at the edges like the soviet Union and posing a massive risk to the status quo in both Britain and France. A different trajectory to war, admittedly, but an inevitable path just the same.


Any of these outcomes were possible in the unstable climate that existed after 1918. But the unsatisfactory peace that emerged from 1918 left germans feeling dudded resentful and able to foster the misbelief that had been stabbed in the back and could win a further war. Once that point had been reached, germany’s trajectory to war was sealed. It did not mean it had to be hitler, it did not mean it had to be the same war as was historically fought, but war was inevitable the moment a negotiated peace was accepted. The only solution to avoid this was unconditional surrender to the allies in 1918.


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## stona (Aug 9, 2017)

Britain didn't have to bully her neighbours because she could bully just about everybody else, and had done so for over a hundred years. Germany tried in these simplistic terms to bully her neighbours because she had already largely missed the imperial boat and the space she considered she needed was in Europe,to the east.

As for Hitler, he attracted a certain type of extremist, and some of them were very smart indeed. There was no lack of intelligence in the higher echelons of the NSDAP. They may have been thugs, but they were not stupid thugs, which made them all the more dangerous. Germans love their titles, still do, look at the number of doctors and professors who were commanding various elements of the Einsatzgruppen that swept into Eastern Europe in 1941.

Whatever alternatives there may have been, two or three years of Nazi terror ensured that he and his party came to power, and none of those alternatives could prevent it. Many of them connived in it.

Cheers

Steve


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 9, 2017)

".... The French had possessed the same dangerous mindset in the age of napoleon"
Back up a 100 years, man .... Louis 14!


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## stona (Aug 9, 2017)

parsifal said:


> ...abandon the more overtly objectionable racial purity laws, to try and attract a wider level of support from Europe generally....
> develop clear and war aims and work consistently towards that



These two are inseparable.
The aim of the war was to push the ethnic boundary of the German race 1,000 kilometres to the east. This involved the murder and removal of many of the tens of millions of people who occupied this vast territory. Over a twenty to thirty year period this area would be resettled with about 10 million ethnic Germans.

Dose any of this sound familiar? It does if you substitute west for east and reduce the numbers somewhat. The vision that inspired this German colonial project in the east shared something with the American ideology of the frontier than it did with Teutonic Knights or the Middle Ages. In 1941 Hitler referred on several occasions to the American example, even declaring that the Volga would be Germany's Mississippi. The American 'conquest' of the west was also quoted by Hitler as an example to justify the clearance of the Slavs.

_"Here in the East a similar process will repeat itself for a second time, as in the conquest of America....Europe and not America will be the land of unlimited possibilities."_

Now, I am not comparing the implementation of Nazi policies in the East with that of the Americans as they pushed into their West, disease not political and military policies had already done most of the damage to the native populations long before the Americans pushed west in numbers, but the Nazis clearly saw parallels, and some justifications, between the two.
Be very careful when characterising one nation or culture as more prone to such radicalisation than another.

As for the Slavs, well, they would survive for a while as worker-slaves, both on the land and building German towns and factories in the new territories, but eventually they would be replaced by Germanic people, as Himmler explained at a meeting of senior SS leader in the summer of 1942.

_"If we do not fill our camps with slaves - in this room I mean to say things very firmly and clearly - with worker slaves, who will build our cities, our villages, our farms without regard to any losses, then even after years of war we will not have enough money to be able to equip the settlements in such a manner that real Germanic people can live there and take root in the first generation."
_
The remnants of Slav race, the majority having already been 'removed', would survive in The Greater German Reich for only as long as it was useful to the Germans.

In Hannah Arendt's famous phrase,_ "the banality of evil".
_
The budget for Generalplan Ost was initially set at 40 billion Reichsmarks, but Himmler soon raised this to 67 billion Reichsmarks, more than the combined investment in the entire German economy between 1933 and 1938. It was the raison d'etre of the German war.

Steve

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## stona (Aug 9, 2017)

I'll just add that all the above is quite separate from the so called 'hunger plan'. The need to feed the Wermacht and the German home population meant that millions would die elsewhere.
On 2nd May 1941 the State Secretaries representing all the major Ministries met with General Thomas to discuss the forthcoming occupation. Point two of the final minutes actually dwarfs even the conclusions of the Wannsee Conference.

_"2. If we take what we need out of the country, there can be no doubt that many millions will die of starvation."_

How many millions is not listed, but Herbert Backe put the_ 'excess population'_ of the Soviet Union as between 20 and 30 million. This is similar to the figure used by Himmler, who addressed a group of SS Gruppenfuehrer about the forthcoming _'Volkstumskampf'_ (race war) a week before Barbarossa was launched.

_"...through military actions and the food problems 20 to 30 million Slavs and Jews will die."_

Unlike other aspects of German planning, like Generalplan Ost, this was not secret in any sense of the word. The hunger plan was agreed between the Wermacht, all key civilian Ministries and the Nazi political leadership. It was referred to in official instructions and instructions issued about its implementation to thousands of subordinates. No effort was made to hide the wider rationale of the individual acts of brutality required to carry it out. The soldiers of the Wermacht, taking horses, vegetables, barrels of apples and grain supplies, burning farmsteads,leaving the civilian population with literally nothing were as complicit in the plan as the men who made it.
Again the roots of this can be traced to WW1. The necessity of securing the food supply of the German population was as obvious to Corporal Schmidt as it was to Adolph Hitler. If this was to be at the expense of the population of the Soviet Union, then so be it. It too lay at the root of Germany's racial war.

Sometimes even writing about the Nazi regime leaves a bad taste in the mouth.

Steve

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## Robert Porter (Aug 9, 2017)

Honestly I think what went wrong for Germany in WW2 the most is its leadership. Hitler insisted on very direct control of his forces, and their use. The decisions he made, often overruling experienced field commanders, I believe directly led to the loss of the war. As time progressed he became more and more unstable. I mean he might have been politically savvy, but he was a corporal in WW1 and not exactly a military genius, yet he chose to wear a military uniform the majority of the time. And he infamously made or caused to made, very bad tactical and strategic decisions. His reluctance to press forward at Dunkirk let the majority of the British Expeditionary Force escape, his hesitation at D-Day allowed allied forces the toe hold they needed. His switch from attacking RAF bases to bombing cities during the BoB driven by pride due to the bombing of Berlin was another example, followed closely by the decision not to invade England.

It is rather scary to me when I think of the places where a decision made differently might well have altered the outcome of the war. Had the US not had England available as a staging area and place to launch attacks from in concert with the allies I don't think America would have had as much impact on the outcome of the war as quickly. 

He was also easily swayed in his priorities, squandering or causing to be squandered money and resources on fanciful weapons systems, and of course architecture. His largest mistake in my opinion was opening a 2 front war. From what I have read his hatred of communism drove him to make decisions that his command staff strongly objected to. And of course his massive programs to eradicate other races and undesirables both at home and in captured territories consumed huge amounts of resources that could have been otherwise used. Both in terms of transportation as well as the various troops used to round up, transport, confine, and kill those prisoners. 

So in short I truly believe they would have eventually lost the war, but it could have been a very different outcome, especially if Sea Lion had been launched. It might even have been a negotiated end rather than an outright defeat, at least initially.

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## swampyankee (Aug 9, 2017)

I want to be fairly precise here: Hitler, Lenin, and Stalin were dictatorial rulers who felt it their authority was more important than people's lives. This is completely independent of the economic system they promulgated (crony capitalism for the nazis and state-ownership and central control for the bolsheviks). Fascism, it's even more corrupt child, nazism, were ideologies based around a sense of victimization of the ruling classes; the nazis, especially, blaming Germany's defeat on liberals and Jews, on the stupid basis that the kaiser and German Army were invincible, so it must have been a stab in the back; Hitler became its cultish leader. Bolshevism was based on the victimization _by _the ruling classes, but it was more a cultish cabal based around Lenin and a few of his cronies. 

This need to blame somebody else for Germany's WW1 defeat was the _entire_ basis of nazi ideology: they believed that only some international conspiracy of their inferiors (everybody else) was keeping them from their rightful place. This ideology justified, in the nazi mind and to many persons in the German military the slaughter of Slavs, Jews, and Rom, the murder of captured French colonial troops, US African-Americans, and vicious reprisals in occupied territories. That the bolsheviks frequently behaved no better is no justification for German behavior. 

What Germany did wrong _militarily_ is not separable from their ideology because that ideology _demanded _that they maltreat German Jews to the point of pushing them into the hands of Germany's enemies, it demanded that they prioritize extermination of the non-Gemanic peoples, and demanded that they treat the Slavs in conquered territories so badly that Stalin began to look good. After all, they were so superior that they could not lose, so diverting finite rail transport to shuttle people to death camps was irrelevant. It's just lucky for Germany that there was Stalin; had there not been, the peace treaty Germany signed would have made the Treaty of Vienna, Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and Treaty of Versailles look incredibly generous.


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## stona (Aug 9, 2017)

It has been said that the devil's greatest trick is convincing people that he doesn't exist.
The greatest trick of the German military class at the end of WW1 was establishing the 'stab in the back' legend as fact, at the same time thereby abdicating responsibility for defeat. It was defeat, absolute and unequivocal. Some Germans, even today, don't like to admit it. The German armies were not stabbed in the back, they were defeated on the fields of battle.
The roots of Nazi ideology are deeper than just the defeat in WW1, and the ideology itself was opportunistic and shifting. That defeat, or, as you correctly say, the need to blame someone for it, were certainly an important factor, even a critical factor, but there was more to it than that.
Cheers
Steve

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## Robert Porter (Aug 9, 2017)

Both of the previous posts point to why WW2 began, and to some extent why resources were spent on reducing the non germanic populations, reprisals etc. But ideology while it played a central role I agree with Stona, there was a lot more in play, mostly really bad leadership. Heck we had a version of the same issue with Johnson and his cronies trying to run Vietnam from DC. Bad leadership translates directly into battle/war losing decisions, especially when a personality cult is involved or a psychopath (Stalin) or sociopath (Hitler) or a Narcissist (Mussolini).


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## swampyankee (Aug 9, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> Both of the previous posts point to why WW2 began, and to some extent why resources were spent on reducing the non germanic populations, reprisals etc. But ideology while it played a central role I agree with Stona, there was a lot more in play, mostly really bad leadership. Heck we had a version of the same issue with Johnson and his cronies trying to run Vietnam from DC. Bad leadership translates directly into battle/war losing decisions, especially when a personality cult is involved or a psychopath (Stalin) or sociopath (Hitler) or a Narcissist (Mussolini).



Nazism was, ultimately, a cult centered around Hitler. Jeff Davis' management of the Civil War is probably an equal or better analogy than Johnson's of Vietnam; much of the strategy in Vietnam was a result of what he was told by his military advisors, including those in uniform. It also gets people away from their antipathy to Johnson's success in enforcing the 14th and 15th Amendments.

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## Robert Porter (Aug 9, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Nazism was, ultimately, a cult centered around Hitler. Jeff Davis' management of the Civil War is probably an equal or better analogy than Johnson's of Vietnam; much of the strategy in Vietnam was a result of what he was told by his military advisors, including those in uniform. It also gets people away from their antipathy to Johnson's success in enforcing the 14th and 15th Amendments.


I forgot about Davis to be honest, but he is good analogy. But Johnson with his infamous sand tables, often delayed significantly action that then was ineffective due to the nature of the conflict. And it was actually the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments that he supported, but actually very reluctantly. It was his party that did most of the work behind the Civil Rights Act and it's follow on with Johnson a very public figure head for the publicity and public face, but in several different biography's of him some not very supportive quotes he made about the whole issue figure fairly prominently. Lets just say his private beliefs did not seem to dovetail with his public statements.


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## Robert Porter (Aug 9, 2017)

Because I am often asked to cite sources to back that kind of claim up, read Robert Caro's biography. A good example is here: Lyndon Johnson was a civil rights hero. But also a racist.


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## stona (Aug 9, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> Bad leadership translates directly into battle/war losing decisions, especially when a personality cult is involved or a psychopath (Stalin) or sociopath (Hitler) or a Narcissist (Mussolini).



It doesn't even need the cultism. I am reminded, in the context of the thread of Ludendorff's description of his supposedly war winning offensive in 1918.

"We shall punch a hole into [their line]. For the rest we shall see."

The March 1918 offensives actually left the Germans in a worse position strategically than it had been at the beginning of the year. They say history repeats itself, and it certainly did in 1943/44

Cheers

Steve

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## Fighterguy (Aug 9, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> Honestly I think what went wrong for Germany in WW2 the most is its leadership. Hitler insisted on very direct control of his forces, and their use. The decisions he made, often overruling experienced field commanders, I believe directly led to the loss of the war. As time progressed he became more and more unstable. I mean he might have been politically savvy, but he was a corporal in WW1 and not exactly a military genius, yet he chose to wear a military uniform the majority of the time. And he infamously made or caused to made, very bad tactical and strategic decisions. His reluctance to press forward at Dunkirk let the majority of the British Expeditionary Force escape, his hesitation at D-Day allowed allied forces the toe hold they needed. His switch from attacking RAF bases to bombing cities during the BoB driven by pride due to the bombing of Berlin was another example, followed closely by the decision not to invade England.
> 
> It is rather scary to me when I think of the places where a decision made differently might well have altered the outcome of the war. Had the US not had England available as a staging area and place to launch attacks from in concert with the allies I don't think America would have had as much impact on the outcome of the war as quickly.
> 
> ...


Exactly! Hitler's micro-management of so many aspects, without expert knowledge, severely hampered German efforts. The push to develop the many wonder/super weapons, Tiger tank, Me-262, V-1 & V-2 rockets, and a host of others, versus continued improvement/modifications of current (proven) designs, hampered the German war production effort. Opening a second front certainly didn't help either. I'd argue, invading Poland was done too early.

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## swampyankee (Aug 10, 2017)

Fighterguy said:


> Exactly! Hitler's micro-management of so many aspects, without expert knowledge, severely hampered German efforts. The push to develop the many wonder/super weapons, Tiger tank, Me-262, V-1 & V-2 rockets, and a host of others, versus continued improvement/modifications of current (proven) designs, hampered the German war production effort. Opening a second front certainly didn't help either. I'd argue, invading Poland was done too early.



Invading Poland was an essential war aim, as there were many Jews to murder and Slavs to enslave, both of which were key parts of the nazi ideology. The Allies were getting stronger, and there was a finite window where invading Poland could succeed.

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## stona (Aug 10, 2017)

The Nazi management of the German economy made the war inevitable at sometime close to the actual time. The Germans were well aware of British and others' rearmament which further limited their options.
The murder of millions of Jews was not in itself a war aim* in 1939*, but once these people fell under German control it became inevitable, even if it didn't actually start in an organised way for some time. 
The removal and enslaving of the populations in the eastern occupied territories and exploitation of their resources was a war aim. In the West the aim was to use the existing economies to German advantage, but their management was so inept that none of the ever returned to their pre-invasion levels. Major economies, like France, never came close.That's just one more thing that the Germans got wrong.
Cheers
Steve

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## swampyankee (Aug 10, 2017)

stona said:


> The Nazi management of the German economy made the war inevitable at sometime close to the actual time. The Germans were well aware of British and others' rearmament which further limited their options.
> The murder of millions of Jews was not in itself a war aim* in 1939*, but once these people fell under German control it became inevitable, even if it didn't actually start in an organised way for some time.
> The removal and enslaving of the populations in the eastern occupied territories and exploitation of their resources was a war aim. In the West the aim was to use the existing economies to German advantage, but their management was so inept that none of the ever returned to their pre-invasion levels. Major economies, like France, never came close.That's just one more thing that the Germans got wrong.
> Cheers
> Steve




Of course, the most rational German option would have been to not start the war.

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## stona (Aug 10, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Of course, the most rational German option would have been to not start the war.



German option, yes. But the Nazi regime had painted itself into an economic corner, while at the same time alarming it's neighbours into crash armaments programmes (albeit on nothing like the scale of their own, but they were starting from close to zero).
Had the Germans not invaded Poland when they did, or at a date not far removed, then the stability of Germany, her economic survival, and certainly the survival of the Nazi regime would all have been threatened.
By 1939 the 'not starting the war' option didn't exist anymore, it hadn't for at least a years, possibly longer, depending whose interpretation of the data you believe.
The only option was a regime change, this could have prevented a war, but at some cost to Germany. There are a lot of reasons why this didn't happen. 
When Hitler intervened in Czechoslovakia there were many voices raised in protest among the military leadership. Beck's analysis, widely accepted, expected an immediate French attack on Germany's western frontier, and this prospect, frankly, scared the sh*t out of the German Army. When the attack on Poland was launched there was hardly a dissenting voice, so total was the control of the regime.

Cheers

Steve

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## Robert Porter (Aug 10, 2017)

stona said:


> German option, yes. But the Nazi regime had painted itself into an economic corner, while at the same time alarming it's neighbours into crash armaments programmes (albeit on nothing like the scale of their own, but they were starting from close to zero).
> Had the Germans not invaded Poland when they did, or at a date not far removed, then the stability of Germany, her economic survival, and certainly the survival of the Nazi regime would all have been threatened.
> By 1939 the 'not starting the war' option didn't exist anymore, it hadn't for at least a years, possibly longer, depending whose interpretation of the data you believe.
> The only option was a regime change, this could have prevented a war, but at some cost to Germany. There are a lot of reasons why this didn't happen.
> ...


Agreed! The Nazi party had indeed painted itself into a corner in multiple ways. Their economic aims were unsustainable without a war time economy and territorial acquisition, but they had also roused the population and came to power by flogging public opinion over the way they were treated by the allies at the end of WW1, indeed in the 30's a recurring party theme was regaining territory and the populations lost by treaty at the end of the previous war. Basically in order to stay in power they had to deliver on their promises to their constituents which could only be done via invasion and conquest. Then the ideology kicked in and they had to deal with the vast numbers of "undesirables" in the conquered territories.

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## Fighterguy (Aug 12, 2017)

It should be noted, as has been previously stated by historians, that Germany's wartime armaments production output increased despite allied strategic bombing efforts. "Hero worshippers" of the Soviet war effort conveniently ignore, or are unaware of the consequences the allied bombing and other campaigns had on preventing much of that production being sent to the Eastern front. All those 88mm guns, aircraft, and other resources that had to remain in France and the German homeland to protect the Reich, fighting a multi-front war in the North Atlantic and North Africa. Add to that, the German proclivity towards over-sophistication and uber weapons development, caused a massive waste of dwindling resources. It's said, that the production of one Tiger tank expended the resources of what it took to produce three fighter aircraft. Add to that, the rush to field weapons platforms such as the Tiger 1, Panther, Me 262, and others, without sufficient testing and flaw correction. However, in spite of that, the Germans had a 3:1 tracked AFV combat loss rate over the Soviets (it should be noted, that "1" for German losses includes vehicles surrendered to the Allies at the end of the war). If it weren't for the British, Germany would've been triumphant. Germany's inability to defeat the British before "crossing the Rubicon" into Russia was the pivotal error.

The Nazi agenda's compulsive drive toward ethnic cleansing, in my opinion, was one of many contributing factors.

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## stona (Aug 12, 2017)

The question should not be what German production did, we know that in a qualified way it increased.
The question should be what it might have achieved with no bombing.
Cheers
Steve

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## Fighterguy (Aug 12, 2017)

My point exactly! Had the Germans been free to concentrate their efforts on one belligerent at a time, the outcome may have been far different.


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## Robert Porter (Aug 12, 2017)

Goes to my failure in leadership point, I have seen no end of books and "alternative history" type fiction that points out possible ways Germany may have won the war, or at least been able to fight it to a conclusion that left it with considerably more territory than it started with. But ONLY if the genocides did not happen. Those acts alone would have doomed Hitler no matter what else.


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## stona (Aug 12, 2017)

Someone else (apart from Manstein) just made the point that the war was lost for Germany when Britain remained undefeated in 1940. This led almost inevitably to the projection of US economic and then military power across the Atlantic.
With no war in the east, Germany would still have lost eventually. Possibly not so catastrophically

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## swampyankee (Aug 12, 2017)

stona said:


> Someone else (apart from Manstein) just made the point that the war was lost for Germany when Britain remained undefeated in 1940. This led almost inevitably to the projection of US economic and then military power across the Atlantic.
> With no war in the east, Germany would still have lost eventually. Possibly not so catastrophically



...but possibly more so. It would have taken longer, and, with nazism's intrinsic antisemitism, they would have still alienated many of the best and brightest in Germany and Austria to take up arms, either directly (when I was at Lycoming, one of the managers was an Austrian Jew who flew for the RAF) or indirectly (Manhattan Project). If Germany takes too long to lose, atomic glass from Berlin becomes a souvenir.


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## stona (Aug 12, 2017)

In the realms of what iffery, but I would argue that the Germans would not have felt compelled to fight to the bitter end against the Western Allies. The chance of a negotiated peace may well have emboldened those who might have removed Hitler and the regime.
We will never know


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## swampyankee (Aug 12, 2017)

stona said:


> In the realms of what iffery, but I would argue that the Germans would not have felt compelled to fight to the bitter end against the Western Allies. The chance of a negotiated peace may well have emboldened those who might have removed Hitler and the regime.
> We will never know



They were given the a negotiated armistice in 1918. The Allies wouldn't repeat that mistake; they'd want to make very, very sure that another "stab in the back" myth wasn't invented. Also, liberating one or two death camps may have made the Allies unwilling to do anything else.

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## michaelmaltby (Aug 13, 2017)

Illuminating .... George Orwell's review of Mein Kampf, 1940

George Orwell’s 1940 Review of Mein Kampf


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## The Basket (Aug 18, 2017)

Orwell knew much.
Like that

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## stona (Aug 18, 2017)

You can hardly expect a man who fought for a Marxist militia in Spain to be a fan of Mein Kampf !

Orwell had a brilliant mind, whatever his politics he wasn't likely to fall for Hitler's clap trap.

Cheers

Steve

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## swampyankee (Aug 18, 2017)

stona said:


> You can hardly expect a man who fought for a Marxist militia in Spain to be a fan of Mein Kampf !
> 
> Orwell had a brilliant mind, whatever his politics he wasn't likely to fall for Hitler's clap trap.
> 
> ...



Nor Stalin's. He saw oppression both by Franco's Falange and its Nazi and Fascist allies and by Stalin's bolsheviks. Adding outsiders to a civil war makes it worse, as the outsiders' agenda is never in the interest of the people who started fighting.


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## The Basket (Aug 18, 2017)

Orwell has Hitler down to a very fine point.
Not degrading him as a nut but speaking of Hitler as the the historical megalomaniac with cosmic hatreds and a vision where that hatred can take you. It was written in 1940 but was disturbingly accurate.
Hitler has said to them ‘I offer you struggle, danger and death,’ and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet. 
That's scary.


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