# The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread.



## Lighthunmust (Jul 5, 2011)

For decades I can recall reading that a third of all Bf 109s were lost due to landing and takeoff accidents. The design of the landing gear is frequently mentioned as a contributing cause. More specifically the wheel angle on the narrow, outward retracting gear being unlike the Spitfires vertical orientation greatly contributed to causing crashes. I am sure my first reading of this started with books I owned before they were “lost” by Movers in 1993. This 33.3% statistical claim is surprisingly similar to the claim that in the amount of man hours it took to build a Spitfire, three 109s could be built. Both statistical claims have shall we say, questionable parentage. I would like to investigate the family tree of the landing gear claim. Below I have listed a few sources referring to this specific claim or claims of landing gear design significantly contributing to 109 accidents and loses. I will continue to add to the list as I find new examples Please help me determine the origin of these claims by listing where you saw them, who made them, and the date they made them. PLEASE DO NOT POST REFERENCES OR OPINIONS DISPUTING THESE CLAIMS. If you find a published dispute of these claims, provide the source, name, date and quote of the claim they are disputing. I only want a list of where seen, who said what, and date so I can find the earliest date to determine origin of the claim of 11,000 Bf 109s lost in landing and takeoff accidents. Once that is found we all can figure out how these claims got started and why?

2003 August, Flight Journal, “The Best WWII Fighter” by Corky Meyer

“....11,000 of the 33,000 built were destroyed during takeoff and landing accidents...”

“Chief aerodynamicist for the the Messerschmitt Me 163 rocket fighter, Josef Hubert ....told me that Willy Messerschmitt had adamantly refused to compromise the Bf 109’s performance by adding the drag-producing wing-surface bumps and fairings that would have been necessary to accommodate the wheels with the proper geometry. This would have reduced its accident rate to within expected military-fighter ranges and made it a world standard!” 


2000 Winter, Flight Journal Special Edition WWII Fighters, “The Bf 109s real enemy was itself!” by Corky Meyer

Meyer sites a letter in 1980 written by Colonel Johannes “Macki” Steinhoff -

“He sent me a long letter relating that I should be sure of the absolute vertical alignment of the tailwheel ais; he also wrote that its inherently weak brakes sould be in excellent condition because in WWII, the Luftwaffe lost 11,000 out of 33,000 Bf 109s to takeoff and landing accidents. Steinhoff directly attributed this terrible record to the bad geometry of the plane’s very unstable, splayed-out, narrow landing-gear configuration. In his letter, he said twice that if a German mechanic who really knew the Bf 109 wasn’t handy, I should not get into the cockpit.”


1999 December, Flight Journal, “Combat Warrior, The Historical View” by Captain Eric Brown

“But the Bf 109’s deficiencies almost equal its fabulous assets. The Luftwaffe lost 11,000 of these thoroughbred fighting machines in takeoff and landing accidents, most of them at the end of the War when they needed them most.” 

“I felt certain, too, that the landing gear’s being slightly splayed outward aggravated the ground-looping tendency and contributed to the excessive tire wear and bursts. The Spitfire had a similar, narrow-track landing gear, but it was not splayed out like that of the Bf 109, and the Spitfire didn’t show any ground-looping propensities.” 

Brown goes on to explain that high accident rates in 1939 resulted in a tailwheel lock being added to later models.


More to come when you or I find it. I hope we can find out who originally made the claim in question.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 6, 2011)

no way no how 30% loss for t/o or landings due too the landing gear. landing accidents most often was the result 
of running out of fuel, or mechanical problems. nose overs on landing was either rough fields or over zealous use 
of brakes. takeoff nose overs were mostly letting the tail get off the ground BEFORE the rudder became effective.
locking they tailwheel worked very well, as long as the wheel was kept on the ground until the rudder was usable.

the biggest headache of the splayed landing gear was ground handling while taxing.


----------



## Lighthunmust (Jul 6, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> no way no how 30% loss for t/o or landings due too the landing gear. landing accidents most often was the result
> of running out of fuel, or mechanical problems. nose overs on landing was either rough fields or over zealous use
> of brakes. takeoff nose overs were mostly letting the tail get off the ground BEFORE the rudder became effective.
> locking they tailwheel worked very well, as long as the wheel was kept on the ground until the rudder was usable.
> ...


 
P-40K-5 did you read the thread starting post?

If you did, do you understand the following? 

"PLEASE DO NOT POST REFERENCES OR OPINIONS DISPUTING THESE CLAIMS. If you find a published dispute of these claims, provide the source, name, date and quote of the claim they are disputing. I only want a list of where seen, who said what, and date so I can find the earliest date to determine origin of the claim of 11,000 Bf 109s lost in landing and takeoff accidents. Once that is found we all can figure out how these claims got started and why?"

I remember you posting that English is not your first language but I think you are sufficiently fluent to understand the purpose, methodology, and procedures of this thread. Please do not make any more posts similar to the one you just made. This thread is not for disputing this claim, it is only for identifying the origin of the claim. I know you love the Bf 109 but please restrain yourself from further comment disputing the claim. Please help me by researching in your library any publishing history of the claim. There are going to be quotes posted to this thread that are going to get your self-described bluntness infused "blood" boiling, take a cold shower when this happens. Please do not attempt to "boil alive" any people posting these quotes. Whether you intentionally or unintentionally did it, you just behaved disrespectfully to me by not adhering to the "rules" I established for this thread. Thank you for your future cooperation.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 6, 2011)

Very good thread. Will check my sources as many of my books came from my father's collection which he started in the 60's. Should be interesting.

and if we can keep sarcasm to a minimum.


----------



## Snautzer01 (Jul 6, 2011)

Bf109F evaluation report Us army Airforce


.


----------



## Snautzer01 (Jul 6, 2011)

RAF report on handling of Bf109E



.


----------



## Snautzer01 (Jul 6, 2011)

Taken from LEMB

The distance between the wheels is 2.1m for the Bf109 and 1.68m for the Spit. Both required different techniques because of propeller rotation, the spit also has two different procedures as the earlier Merlins turned in different rotation to the later Griffin. The Bf109 wheels were canted at the same angle of the legs which made it very easy to ground loop and very loose on hard runways, why most German pilots preferred landing on grass. The Spit wheels are canted out 4.5 degrees from the angle of the leg which makes the wheel close to vertical on touchdown hence a little more controllable than the Bf109 even though a narrower track and the Spit has a much larger wing area.

and Also LEMB

http://www.k-silmailumuseo.fi/?action=alar...HMA=9&ID=20
We've been asked "Why was the Bf 109 so prone to swing on take-off?". (Nov 10th 1999)

The Bf 109 take-off swing was a very well known and notorious phenomenon. Already the external looks of the aircraft’s landing gear indicate that it is very easy to suspect it to be the culprit for the whole event. However, this is not the case. The swing is mainly caused by the the propeller slipstream which does not move backwards in a straight line along the fuselage but in a spiral path which is caused by the angle of the propeller blades to the aircraft’s center line. When this spiral airflow hits the tail, it tends to turn the rudder (seen from the back where the starboard and port sides of the aircraft are defined) to the right and the nose to the left. The swing can be compensated with an appropriate use of opposite rudder. If the tail is lifted too soon during the take-off, the propeller’s gyroscopic forces contribute to the left swing.

The narrow landing gear track creates the conditions for the swing: the brakes turn (prevent the swing) less effectively than with a wider track gear. The Bf 109 gear track is undeniably narrow ( Bf 109 E 1,97 m, 109 G 2,06 m, 109 K 2,1 m), but, for example, the Spitfire’s track is only 1,68 m. However, this is only a half of the case.

The other and decisevily important factor is the aircraft’s relatively rearward center of gravity. If the swing is allowed to develop, the rearward c.g. increases the swing and not even the highly regarded Messerschmitt brakes could no longer rectify the situation. If the pilot at this stage closes the throttle, it increases the swing still and the inevitable will happen: the landing gear collapses. In reality the process is also very quick. In addition it must be said that although the take-off swing is well-known and notorious, almost as many accidents took place during landings when the aircraft was allowed to swing.

The Bf 109 landing gear has been blamed for the swing without a cause. The real reason has been between the stick and the seat. The whole swing problem was a mere instructional mistake. The pilots should have been made to adopt one golden rule: the Messerschmitt Bf 109 must be steered to go absolutely straight during the ground run in take-off and landing and any tendency to swing must be corrected immediately with a well-timed use of the brakes and/or the rudder.

In short the aircraft had a bit of tendency to swing unless caught early, and the cause was the lack of directional stabilitiy of the aircraft. This was continously improved through the war by introducing :

- larger mainwheel tires
- larger tailwheel tires for better traction on ground
- change of main wheel mounting angle to near-vertical (-> kidney bulges originate to the change of angle, not tire size!, that why they're so shaped!)
- enlarged tail
- tall tailwheel

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Njaco (Jul 6, 2011)

I think Lightnmust is looking more into how the myth began - not evidence to the contrary.

Something such as this, although no figures are given.....

"Fighters of the Luftwaffe" by Joachim Dressel and Manfred Griehl 1993
page 15

"At Rechlin the Bf 109V-1 suffered a broken undercarriage as a result of damag to the telescopic leg connections to the fuselage. This problem affected the Bf 109 right through to the end of the war, and led to high losses, especially later with inexperienced pilots."


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 6, 2011)

I measured the gear on a MKIX and 109e7 and IIRC the difference was 6" wider on the 109 (its posted somewhere on the site but I can't find it) also find attached is a very recent flight test on a 109 and Spit in which he desribes the gear problem in 109
Bounding Clouds - Flying the Messerschmitt Bf-109 > Vintage Wings of Canada
Flying the Spitfire - with Mike Potter > Vintage Wings of Canada


----------



## Crimea_River (Jul 6, 2011)

Intersting thread. I'll see what I can dig up.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 6, 2011)

If I recall the problem was not really in the track but in the toe out configuration. I might be wrong, but I believe that 109 and the Spit had a similiar size in wheel track but the 109 had a more toe out condition. I believe pbfoot went and actually confirmed this by measuring a Spit and 109 at the museum he volunteers at.


----------



## davebender (Jul 6, 2011)

Axis History Forum • View topic - The Me 109....

Using Veolcette motorcycle suspension as an example to explain how Me-109 suspension worked. Now that's an act of genius.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 6, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> If I recall the problem was not really in the track but in the toe out configuration. I might be wrong, but I believe that 109 and the Spit had a similiar size in wheel track but the 109 had a more toe out condition. I believe pbfoot went and actually confirmed this by measuring a Spit and 109 at the museum he volunteers at.


 
Already noted in previous posts.


----------



## Kryten (Jul 6, 2011)

cant find anything that can confirm the 11000 claim, but several sources mentioning increases in losses due to the torque increase on the G model?
also mentions of Israeli Jumo engined 109 clones being lethal on the ground!


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 6, 2011)

Milosh said:


> Already noted in previous posts.



Excuse me for missing that. I guess trying to read over every post here on this forum is not possible...


----------



## Lighthunmust (Jul 6, 2011)

Njaco said:


> I think Lightnmust is looking more into how the myth began - not evidence to the contrary.


 
I knew when I posted this thread late last night some people would react to it as a bull to the matador’s cape. I did my best to prevent this by including language specifically to prevent this reaction if read, comprehended, and complied with. This is not a thread to goad the lovers of all things Bf 109. On the contrary they should be its greatest contributors because this thread has the potential to definitively discredit the claim that is being researched. This thread was not up for even an hour before a counterproductive reply post was made. Hence my immediate, blunt, attention getting, chiding response to prevent this thread from rapidly deteriorating to nothing but more obfuscation of the truth. The very claim being researched is almost certainly the greatest example of obscuring and confusing the truth of the matter. I took some time to compose this thread and I don’t want to waste my time on it if people are just going to fill it with irrelevant for topic landing gear comments that make it worthless. 

Back to the purpose of this thread. Does anyone have a copy of the book “ME-109” by Martin Caidin? This was a Ballintine series soft-back sold for a dollar from racks in supermarkets/drugstores/bookstores in the late 1960s early 1970s. I lost this book in 1993. This book may be where I first heard the claim of 33% loses due to landing gear design. Mr. Caidin is deceased. Would it not be great to contact the earliest published author of the claim that is still alive to ask for an explanation? 

Please stop making any posts that don't comply with the research methodology as you are only making research more difficult with masses of text that waste time.
Please post names, publication dates, text of the claim, and very little else unless it is a suggested source for the original claim that needs to be checked-out.


----------



## davebender (Jul 6, 2011)

Bomber engine and propellor installed in a fighter airframe. Not a good indication of Me-109 performance when equipped with a properly matched engine and propellor.


----------



## Kryten (Jul 6, 2011)

Not why I mentioned it, just wondering if that issue has been integrated into the "Myth" also is there any corrsponding comments toward the Buchon?, it could all shine light on myth or fact??


----------



## Lighthunmust (Jul 6, 2011)

davebender said:


> Bomber engine and propellor installed in a fighter airframe. Not a good indication of Me-109 performance when equipped with a properly matched engine and propellor.


 


Kryten said:


> Not why I mentioned it, just wondering if that issue has been integrated into the "Myth" also is there any corrsponding comments toward the Buchon?, it could all shine light on myth or fact??


 
These types of comment just make more time consuming text to wade through. Please just post the specifically requested information. This thread is going to end up being an impossible mess if you don't. Start another thread to discuss all these other issues. Thank you.


----------



## davebender (Jul 6, 2011)

> “I felt certain, too, that the landing gear’s being slightly splayed outward aggravated the ground-looping tendency and contributed to the excessive tire wear and bursts. The Spitfire had a similar, narrow-track landing gear, but it was not splayed out like that of the Bf 109, and the Spitfire didn’t show any ground-looping propensities.”


The web link I posted provides technical information specific to this issue.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 6, 2011)

Lighthunmust said:


> P-40K-5 did you read the thread starting post?
> 
> If you did, do you understand the following?
> 
> ...


 
so you rather have published reports disputing these claims rather then individual opinions? well, good luck on that. oh wait, you could start here:

virtualpilots.fi: 109myths

just a bunch of pilots who actually flew the Bf109. 

sorry that my lack of comprehension interfeared with genuine research. or that individual unpublished opinions don't amount to a hill of beans.


----------



## davebender (Jul 6, 2011)

More specific technical information. It appears to me JG-26 had more take off and landing accidents with the Fw-190 then with the Me-109. I assume that has to do with declining pilot experience rather then the Fw-190 being prone to landing accidents.
Kurfürst Discussion Boards • Login


----------



## parsifal (Jul 6, 2011)

Probably doesnt help, but this site mentions the landing gear issue

Messerschmitt Bf 109 (Me 109) - History and Pictures of German WW2 Fighter Plane

Relevantly it says:

"At first, the Luftwaffe pilots, from Ernst Udet on down, distrusted the aircraft. It seemed frail; its enclosed canopy was disconcerting; it had a very high wing loading; and its narrow track landing gear was prone to failure. (On this last point, their concerns were well founded. Landing gear troubles plagued the 109 its entire career.)"

And here is a vlink to a video of a restored Me 109 suffering a gear failure 

VIDEO: EADS Messerschmitt Bf-109 undercarriage collapse and groundloop at ILA Berlin 2008-29/05/2008-London-Flightglobal.com


Generalleutnant Werner Funck, Inspector of Fighters, 1939;
'_The 109 had a big drawback, which I didn't like from the start. It was that rackety - I always said rackety - undercarriage; that negative, against-the-rules-of-statics undercarriage that allowed the machine to swing away._'


----------



## Lighthunmust (Jul 6, 2011)

These types of posts do not supply the requested information. They have good information but are not relevant to the very narrowly defined data requested.


----------



## Lighthunmust (Jul 6, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Probably doesnt help, but this site mentions the landing gear issue
> 
> Messerschmitt Bf 109 (Me 109) - History and Pictures of German WW2 Fighter Plane
> 
> ...


 
Thank you Parsifal but as I have told others I am really trying to keep all replying posts to the specified criteria. I don't want to have a thread filled with so much extraneous information that it is difficult for new posters to determine if the specific information relevant to the thread has already been posted. I just want to create a timeline back to the originator of the specified claim. Then attempt to discover what justification was used to make it and use much the data already available and unfortunately reposted on this thread to challenge the claim.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 6, 2011)

I believe I saw such figures in "Famous Fighters of World War II " by William Green Vol 1 on the last page of the chapter on the 109 but I cannot find my copy to verify this. I believe this was a 1959 0r 1960 copyright?

Maybe somebody else has this book?


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 6, 2011)

Lighthunmust, this is a very good thread but please grow a backbone and stop reporting each and every post you don't like!!!! I do not want to shut this thread down but I will if this sniveling continues!!!!


----------



## Lighthunmust (Jul 6, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Lighthunmust, this is a very good thread but please grow a backbone and stop reporting each and every post you don't like!!!! I do not want to shut this thread down but I will if this sniveling continues!!!!


 
PM sent to moderators requesting closure of thread. I will not waste my time on a thread that is being made a mockery of and results in unwarranted insult for protesting the mockery.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 6, 2011)

' _it is only for identifying the origin of the claim_ '

you would probably have to go waaaaay back to around 1936/1937. maybe Willy said " well screw it anyways, its easier to ship and assemble,
and perform maitneance in the field ". IF it was that big a deal, there would have been a major change with the "F" model. but there wasn't.

the reason I posted the link above was it was ACTUAL Bf109 pilots who gave there reasoning for "the myth"

TRUE research my friend requires looking at ALL aspects of the myth, not just how the myth originated. becouse IF that is your main
focus, I promise you you will not find the answer.

anyways from what I've read, the biggest complaint seems to be from RAF test pilots flying DAMAGED Bf109's. Dave Brown, a USAAF 
test pilot, had no complaints of the landing gear configuration.

Kind Regards.


----------



## Gnomey (Jul 6, 2011)

I'm not closing it just because you disagree with the views being expressed. It is a *discussion* forum people have opinions, some will be different from yours. Deal with it and stop being a pu$$y.


----------



## imalko (Jul 6, 2011)

One should also note that Bf 109 was tested with wide landing gear configuration, but it wasn't adopted for series production.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 6, 2011)

Gnomey said:


> I'm not closing it just because you disagree with the views being expressed. It is a *discussion* forum people have opinions, some will be different from yours. Deal with it and stop being a pu$$y.


 BINGO! Now press on folks....


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 6, 2011)

imalko said:


> One should also note that Bf 109 was tested with wide landing gear configuration, but it wasn't adopted for series production.


 
yes, many did not make the cut:


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 6, 2011)

Lighthunmust said:


> These types of comment just make more time consuming text to wade through. Please just post the specifically requested information. This thread is going to end up being an impossible mess if you don't. Start another thread to discuss all these other issues. Thank you.





Lighthunmust said:


> These types of posts do not supply the requested information. They have good information but are not relevant to the very narrowly defined data requested.


 

How about you let us play moderator?



Lighthunmust said:


> PM sent to moderators requesting closure of thread. I will not waste my time on a thread that is being made a mockery of and results in unwarranted insult for protesting the mockery.



NO we will not close the thread.

Why?

1. There is no reason to. It is an interesting thread.
2. There have been no insulting posts or any reason to close it.
3. This is an internet "forum". A forum is defined as such:

_an assembly, meeting place, television program, etc., for the discussion of questions of public interest._ 

That is exactly what is taking place. People are discussing ideas and thoughts on the topic and it has remained on topic.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 6, 2011)

Lighthunmust said:


> Does anyone have a copy of the book “ME-109” by Martin Caidin? This was a Ballintine series soft-back sold for a dollar from racks in supermarkets/drugstores/bookstores in the late 1960s early 1970s. I lost this book in 1993. This book may be where I first heard the claim of 33% loses due to landing gear design. Mr. Caidin is deceased. Would it not be great to contact the earliest published author of the claim that is still alive to ask for an explanation?


 
Just for the record (and to get this thread back on track) Martin Caidin was a very entertaining writer who sometimes exaggerated and then some in many of his books so anything statistical mentioned by him should be taken with a grain of salt. My favorite is the story about the captured P-38 flown by an Italian pilot dueling with a YB-40.


----------



## Kryten (Jul 6, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> yes, many did not make the cut:


 
On first glance I mistook that lower 109 for an early mustang!!
is that the carrier version they trialled or a one off?


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 6, 2011)

That is the Bf 109V-31 (at least off the top of my head I believe that is the V-31) which was a prototype with wide landing gear. The carrier version was the Bf 109T and all it was a Bf 109E with longer wingspan and arrester gear


----------



## davebender (Jul 6, 2011)

> Bf 109 was tested with wide landing gear configuration, but it wasn't adopted for series production.


I would hazzard a guess wide track landing gear increased production cost, which is why it wasn't adopted. The Me-109 was intended to be as inexpensive as possible.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 6, 2011)

thanks for the info on the V-31! most appreciated! the four wheel monster in the pic is one the many experiments with the Bf 109 was the attempt to make it carry and deliver a 500kg bomb. Fieseler in Kassel did the design work and Skoda in Bohemia Moravia built the prototype wich was designated FiSk 199. A Bf 109 G-0, BD + GC, was converted to test the development potential. The DB601 was replaced by a DB605, one R4 drop tank was added beneath each wing, as well as an ETC500 bomb rack under the fuselage. To clear the large 500kg bomb from the ground during take off, a third main landing gear leg and wheel was plugged in a middle position in the fuselage, right behind the pilot’s seat. After take off, the supplementary wheel was jettisoned and went back to earth with a parachute. Some tests were made but didn’t led to production. Usually when you see the 20cm extension on the tailwheel, its a good bet that the aircraft could be equipt with the 500kg bomb. problem solved the easy way.


----------



## jim (Jul 6, 2011)

I really do not understand. Today we have direct acces to units diaries (Prien s JG77, JG53 ,JG1?11), Caldwells JG26 war diary, and many more . Anyone can see day per day both the human loses and the materials loses. We have the memoirs of many Bf 109 operational pilots (Lipfert,Hanning,Rall,Schuck,Galland,the finlands, and dozens others) How is possible to disguss ,in our days ,seriously about 33% writes off in take off accidents? 
The opinions of alleid test pilots based on damaged machines and unfamiliar with the aircraft is more reliable than the german pilots? The books of past dacades are more reliable than units diaries ? The same books that credited Bf 109 in 1945 with a speed of 620 km/h


----------



## Milosh (Jul 6, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> I believe I saw such figures in "Famous Fighters of World War II " by William Green Vol 1 on the last page of the chapter on the 109 but I cannot find my copy to verify this. I believe this was a 1959 0r 1960 copyright?
> 
> Maybe somebody else has this book?


 
First published in 1957. My 1965 version makes no mention of 33% losses due to landing accidents. He does state the landing characteristics were "malicious" (his word with quotation marks) and a little later the swerve on landing and taking off.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 6, 2011)

thank you, I guess my memory is faulty.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 6, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> That is the Bf 109V-31 (at least off the top of my head I believe that is the V-31) which was a prototype with wide landing gear. The carrier version was the Bf 109T and all it was a Bf 109E with longer wingspan and arrester gear



Yes the V31, a trial a/c for testing the wide track undercarriage for the Me309. WNr 5642, SG+EK This a/c also tested the new radiator.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 7, 2011)

Just a general post to all members reading this thread.

There is NO such thing as an irrelevent post. If the post is on topic and has to do with the topic then there is nothing wrong with that. If it pertains to the topic which every post in this thread has done so far, then it is RELEVENT. This is a forum for open discussion. People may learn from the so called "irrelevent" posts and these posts might even lead to what the thread originator is looking for. 

Now carry on with the discussion...


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 7, 2011)

Is there a definition of an accident? Do records detail the cause as undercarriage collapse or ground loop. A pilot may be injured and plane damaged but elect to land the plane and crash but that isnt the fault of the plane. Are there records from training schools, I would think they would suffer most with take of and landing. Were old Bf 109s withdrawn from the front line and used as trainers. 

I am just thinking of ways the figures could be inflated. In the BoB many hurricanes were lost in take off and landing incidents not because they were harder to fly than a spitfire but because they were easier and therefore used more as a night fighter. 

For the thread topic I think someone somewhere took data from one particular theatre or operation and then calculated wrongly for the whole war creating an urban myth.


----------



## Kryten (Jul 7, 2011)

I suppose we could throw in the standard of the airfields as well, there can be no doubt some strips were "rougher" than others and that must have had some bearing?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> Is there a definition of an accident? Do records detail the cause as undercarriage collapse or ground loop. A pilot may be injured and plane damaged but elect to land the plane and crash but that isnt the fault of the plane. Are there records from training schools, I would think they would suffer most with take of and landing. Were old Bf 109s withdrawn from the front line and used as trainers.
> 
> I am just thinking of ways the figures could be inflated. In the BoB many hurricanes were lost in take off and landing incidents not because they were harder to fly than a spitfire but because they were easier and therefore used more as a night fighter.
> 
> For the thread topic I think someone somewhere took data from one particular theatre or operation and then calculated wrongly for the whole war creating an urban myth.



G-5/6's were used/built right to the end of the war for front line service. Gyor Hungary plant would be an example. 


I have training loss records from JG 101/102/103/104/106/108, EJG 1, Erg.NJGr, and I./FKG(J) from 1942-1945. most takeoff losses were due to pilot error, a few to engine problems, 1 due to gear collapse.

most landing accidents again were due to pilot error, a few to engine problems, a few to running out of fuel, combat damage. nothing mentioned about landing gear collapse or otherwise.

very few 'ground loops' were listed.




Kryten said:


> I suppose we could throw in the standard of the airfields as well, there can be no doubt some strips were "rougher" than others and that must have had some bearing?


yep, especially if one was brake happy.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 7, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> yep, especially if one was brake happy.



One could stand on the brakes of the 109, and unlike the Spitfire, it would almost never nose over.


----------



## Kryten (Jul 7, 2011)

a factor of the ballast in the back of the 109?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

Milosh said:


> One could stand on the brakes of the 109, and unlike the Spitfire, it would almost never nose over.


 
bumpy/wet mud runway + 130kph or so + heavy brakes would = a groundloop I would think, no? well, I guess any taildragger. Anyways,
wonder whats the comparison to P-51 P-47 takeoff/landing accidents. betcha they had higher accident rates. 

whatever the case, an educated guess, I would say Bf109 losses due to ALL accidents was maybe 7%-8% of total production. Certainly no
where near the 33.3% as previously stated.


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 7, 2011)

Milosh said:


> One could stand on the brakes of the 109, and unlike the Spitfire, it would almost never nose over.


 
Having read the posts on this thread and links the brakes on a 109 were critical in preventing it swinging.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

on takeoff yes. Pilots used the brakes to control the sway until the rudder became effective, usually at that time they
would also rotate the tail. raising the tail to fast fell under the ' crash due to pilot error ' in most training units.


----------



## GrauGeist (Jul 7, 2011)

Milosh said:


> One could stand on the brakes of the 109, and unlike the Spitfire, *it would almost never nose over*.


Not true, the '109 would indeed nose over if the brakes were applied too aggressively.


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 7, 2011)

Were there any S/E fighters that were considered good wheels on the ground aircraft. Certainly on the western allied side the P 47, P 40, Typhoon and Hurricane operated from some pretty ropey temporary airfields without too much trouble. 

Personally just by looking at photos of various aircraft the one I would want to be flying from a rough strip would be the Grumman Hellcat. Decent vision for the period, heavy duty under carriage, big wing and big flaps.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

P-40's had the same problems. I still would like to know the accident rates for P-51s P-47s, also, the all seeing all knowing spitfire.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 7, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> on takeoff yes. *Pilots used the brakes to control the sway until the rudder became effective, usually at that time they
> would also rotate the tail.* raising the tail to fast fell under the ' crash due to pilot error ' in most training units.


 

What's your reference for that and are you talking about a specific aircraft??? I ask that because I fly tail draggers and you're NEVER on the brakes during takeoff!!!


----------



## Milosh (Jul 7, 2011)

Kryten said:


> a factor of the ballast in the back of the 109?


 
Well sort of. Think of the fulcrum point on a teeter totter.

Just an example GrauGeist. If a Spit and a 109 were doing say 30mph and the pilot stood on the brakes, the Spit would be on its nose and the 109 would not.

Note I didn't say the 109 wouldn't never nose over.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

Flyboy,

sorry, that would be in reference to the Bf109. In order to control fuse sway, the pilots used the left/right brakes to keep the a/c in a straight line more or less.
It was nessesary do to the castering tailwheel. once enough ground speed was aquired for the smallish rudder to become effective, brakes were released, or when
it was obviouse the a/c was tracking straight. later, they used a 'locking tailwheel', which helped some, and a taller fin/rudder. 

two things with a 109. keep the tail down control the sway, until the rudder became effective. hope this made sense(?).


----------



## Milosh (Jul 7, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> What's your reference for that and are you talking about a specific aircraft??? I ask that because I fly tail draggers and you're NEVER on the brakes during takeoff!!!


 
Are those 1000+hp a/c and how do you keep the a/c pointing in the right direction during the initial take of roll until the rudder becomes effective?


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2011)

I dont believe that th Me109 suffered 33% accident rates simply and solely because of gear failures. However, as a percentage of overall losses, a 33% accident rate due some failure during landing and T/O would actually be a fairly low attrition rate. Losses to non-combat causes generally outnumbered losses due to combat operations for any type during wartime conditions. 

I had always assumed that narrow track landing gear was an overall liability, but I also think that as a problem it was certainly overstated. There is a thread at the moment relating to the Fulmar and f4f, inevitably we got onto the Seafire accident rate. Certainly in its early career (1943-4) whilst operated by crews unfamiliar with the type, from unsuitable decks, in weather conditions unfavourable to safety, the type had a very poor accident rate. However this was as much due to gear weakness as it was to the narrow track gear. In 1945, in the final wartime campaigns in the pacific (off Okinawa and Japan), the type enjoyed a very good accident rate. By then the gear had been strengthened, it was operating from appropriate carriers, and by crews experienced in its characteristics.

When I was in the service, we operated A-4s. The RAN acquired a total of 24 Skyhawks. Over a 12 year period, in peacetime, the type suffered a 42% serious failure rate, due mainly to weaknesses in the gear. Operating from a small carrier like the melbourne, with a wrinkly short deck, and dodgy catapult, our accident rate was unnacceptably high. Parrallels can undoubtedly be drawn for the 109, oftn operating from rough strips in the East, by crews with increasingly serious levels of inexperience, I would be surprised if the accident rates were as low as 33% to be honest, but only a fraction of these would be due to gear failures or the narrow track.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 7, 2011)

With even a German pilot saying the Spitfire and Hurricane (early ones) were childishly easy to land compared to a 109 there had to be something to it. with roughly 1/3 of civil aviation accidents happening in the approach and landing phases of flight it is not hard to believe that the 109 could suffer a high rate of accidents in those phases. As Parsifal says, it may be due to a combination of a number of different things all adding up. While the majority of those landing accidents may have been due to pilot error there is no getting around the fact that some planes are easier to land than others and more tolerant of some pilot errors. 
I think that if the landing accident rate or % of aircraft lost in landing accidents for other types were known the the 1/3 figure for the 109 might not look quite so shocking. Still on the high side perhaps.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

to throw a monkey wrench into the works...


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2011)

not sure what you are getting at P-40......


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

21350 total day fighter (all day fighters) losses. 16400 due to combat losses (fighter/flak) 4428 due to 'other' (mechanical/pilot/etc) thats around 27% 'other' rate. 
fair to say half the combat losses were Bf109's. also fair to say that a third of 'other' losses were Bf109's. so thats around 17% 'other' loss for Bf109's. sound fair? 
or am I way, way, out to lunch here?


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2011)

Dont know, I will have to look at a typical sample to get an idea. I will have a look at that tonite


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 7, 2011)

I don't know, with 30-33,000 109s built and with only 8200+4200 "lost" due to combat and 'other' there should have been 19-20,000 109s left at the end of the war?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

well you gotta remember that most likey alot of the A,B,C,D,E,F, G1-G4 models were 'recycled'. what does that account for? also, I highly doubt more then half the total losses were 109's.
maybe 55% at the most.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 7, 2011)

Why recycle a flyable airplane? 
A,B,C,D,E and later were used as fighter trainers in fighter schools, where, I imagine, a fair number of them were reduced to recycling by student pilots. Quite possibly in take-offs and landings.

You may want to rethink the math too. If less than 1/2 the losses were 109s that just means that there are even more 109s unaccounted for. 

For all I know Mustangs and F4Us may have suffered 20% or higher losses in take-off and landing accidents. How ever this is a rather vague term. what we may never know is what was the loss rate per 100,000 hours flown or loss rate per 100,000 landings. The last is probably the most accurate reflection of how hard or dangerous a plane is to land. With Mustangs flying two, three, four and more time per flight than 109s they landed a lot fewer times per 100,000 hours of use than 109s did. With 109s on the Russian front flying several missions a day at times it may have been just a matter of time before landing accidents claimed a fair number of them. Mustangs flying escort missions only flew one mission a day (mostly) and didn't fly every day of the week due to weather.
Maybe some of the people who know more about operational histories than I do can correct me but how many missions a month did some allied fighter groups fly (granted there were training missions and test/check flights of planes/equipment) compared to how many missions a month some of the 109 groups flew in the east. Or even in defense of Germany. Did the allies rotate fighter groups at all on escort missions and while the Germans may have used a regional defense system, was their a difference in use?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 7, 2011)

well the ball is in your court. show me better math.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2011)

I know that few 109Es survived after 1943. Many were sent to the secondary TOs including the med where they remained the domionant type until early 1942. 

It is possible that quite a few 109s were "recycled", if you want to put it that way. The LW always suffered from a shortage of newly constructed spares (for example, in 1941, operational readiness rates for the LW in the East dropped to less than 40% after the end of July, because of difficulties in obtaining spare parts for the entire fleet). Its likely that older models might have been scrapped as spare parts. Another source of spare parts might be those aircraft classified as damaged, but in fact never able to fly again. The LW had a method of classifying damage. anything above 70% was imediately scrapped. But in reality anything above 30% was unliklley to fly again. Because of gorings (and Hitlers) obsession with numbers, I believe that these aircraft in the 30-70% damage bracket were kept listed as "frontline -operational" when in fact all they were doing was sitting on the side of airfields and in hangars, being cannabalized for spares, which were always in short supply with the LW.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2011)

I dont have figures on the average numbers of sorties per month for allied fighters, but I do know that the average life of a P-51 was eight months in 1944


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 8, 2011)

I'd have to agree with post #70. the manifests for III./JG 53 on December 31/44 showed for example 68 aircraft 'on hand' with 20 ready for operation service.
that theme was carried out with most JG units. so more then likely those 48 a/c served as spare parts. then when they had to move, those a/c were left behind.


----------



## Jabberwocky (Jul 8, 2011)

Where are those day fighter figures from?

Don Caldwell gives 17,023 Luftwaffe day fighter losses between September 1943 and December 1944 alone.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 8, 2011)

It all gets down to what is a loss. Not all losses were aircraft spinning uncontrollably out of the sky. Some losses are aircraft with engines gradually seizing, oil everywhere, but the aircraft still able to make it home, perhaps to belly land, only to be scrapped or "recycled" sometime down the track.....when is a loss actually a loss????

And further, when is a loss a combat loss and a non-combat loss. is an aircraft dmaged in combat, but destroyed whilst not in combat, say on landing , or scrapped after landing, a combat loss, or a noncombat loss. The demarkation lines can rapidly become very blurred, very quickly.

A breeding ground for lies, damn lies and statistics....


----------



## Jabberwocky (Jul 8, 2011)

Quick run through of JG2 losses between July 1940 and the beginning of 1942 – thanks to Tony Wood’s excellent loss lists – to determine losses by cause. Stopped at the end of 1941, as FW-190A losses begin about February.

Out of 350 Bf 109 losses, I counted 37 total losses or partial damaged due solely to take-off or landing accidents or mechanical failures of the landing gear. About two thirds of these were total losses, the rest varying between 10% and 80%. 

There were another eight damage/losses due to failed/burst tyres on take-off/landing – mostly light damage (20-40%).

I also counted another 17 landing accidents that could be related to either combat or landing gear problems or a combination of – there was not enough information to clarify. Most of these were total losses.

So, of 350 losses that gives a maximum of 62 that could be attributed to landing gear – roughly 18%. 

Of this, I’d guesstimate a maximum of 70% were total losses. 

That gives me a maximum of about 14% of Bf 109 losses due to landing gear problems.

Going through the loss lists, what did jump out at me were the number of aircraft losses/damaged due to engine failure. These would outnumber landing gear related accidents by at least 2 to 1, probably more. Particularly with the E7 and F2.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 8, 2011)

I did a similar excercise, but just for April 1941, using John Foremans book "1941 - The Blitz to the non-stop offensive". It gives a day by day account of the losses and the reasons. I came up with five main categories of losses: 
(1) lost in combat (or away from the airfield) 
(2) lost in TO or landing (I suspect some of the losses on landing may be already damaged aircraft and/or wounded pilot), 
(3) lost for reasons unknown
(4) lost in noncombat circumstances (such as training), 
(5) lost on the ground (usually strafing)


The results are markedly different to those you have posted:

(1) 23
(2) 40
(3) 5
(4) 4
(5) 6

Thats a total of 72 fighter losses. 31% were lost whilst airborne, in or after combat. 55.5% were lost either landing or taking off. how many of these were attempting this in a damaged condition I dont know, and the cause of the crash is also unknown. The remainder were for the other causes.

How comparable these are to your figures is unknown. My source does not give the reasons for the individual losses, so I cannot tell if the cause of the loss was pilot killed, gear failure, engine failure, structural failure, fire, or what. All I can tell you are those losses recorded whilst landing or takingt off, whilst way from the airfield etc.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 8, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I know that few 109Es survived after 1943. Many were sent to the secondary TOs including the med where they remained the domionant type until early 1942.
> 
> It is possible that quite a few 109s were "recycled", if you want to put it that way. The LW always suffered from a shortage of newly constructed spares (for example, in 1941, operational readiness rates for the LW in the East dropped to less than 40% after the end of July, because of difficulties in obtaining spare parts for the entire fleet). Its likely that older models might have been scrapped as spare parts. Another source of spare parts might be those aircraft classified as damaged, but in fact never able to fly again.



Cannibalization is common with air force. Any air force. Simple reason - repair is uneconomical above certain point. Think fighter or bomber moderately crashed in Kiev. What is cost of ship back aircraft to Germany, repair it, ship it back to Russia, also same time, ship spare parts like engine, wings, guns for other aircraft? Many time more easy to take plane apart, use it for spares, and ship a new plane.. German do not had shortage of machines of war. Big industry - but they lack fuel and men.

I would surprise me if US for example would be senting any major damage B-17 or P-51 for USA back to repair in factory.. US were not stupid. German were not stupid, which is why GPW took so long and costly to won in end.. undersestimate enemy - greatest fault, Zhukov said. Also Chin Szun Cu many thousend year before.. you do not fight believe enemy is stupid.. you fight know his strenght, and your strenght. Make him fight your strenght, so he loose..



> The LW had a method of classifying damage. anything above 70% was imediately scrapped.



Yes. 60-99% was scrapped. 100% was what went into ground and was aluminium dust.. 30-60% - repairable by factory. 10% - repairable by immediate unit, like few bullet holes non important places. 10-30% - repairable by mother unit, like Gruppe or Geschwader. This was so. 

Also, keep mind: % of damage was written where aircraft was destined, not aircraft destination dependant on % of damage.. % of damage was decided on base what need to be done with aircraft. Also % damage was decided by what was hit - say major component hit, no replace possibility - immindiate classify 60%.



> But in reality anything above 30% was unliklley to fly again.



Aircraft above 30% was not flying, was sent to repair centrers, repairt, rebuilt, flown again.



> Because of gorings (and Hitlers) obsession with numbers, I believe that these aircraft in the 30-70% damage bracket were kept listed as "frontline -operational" when in fact all they were doing was sitting on the side of airfields and in hangars,


 
Sorry this sounds very incorrect... what obsession? Just above you write operational readiness rates were reported to fall below 40% towards 1941 on Eastern Front campaign.. contradict, is not?

Beside - 30-60% damage was to be sent to factory, if repairable.



> being cannabalized for spares, which were always in short supply with the LW.



I do not think there was special shortage. LW service rate - very similiar to USSR, UK, USA air forces - roughly 70% typical in war. Better when unit doing nothing, less, when far from supply chain and in hard action. Normal. Fighter Command had 60% readiness in Combat of England. Shortage of spares, too? I think there is theoriy of conspiration here...


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> Flyboy,
> 
> sorry, that would be in reference to the Bf109. In order to control fuse sway, the pilots used the left/right brakes to keep the a/c in a straight line more or less.
> It was nessesary do to the castering tailwheel. once enough ground speed was aquired for the smallish rudder to become effective, brakes were released, or when
> ...


 
It still doesn't. I'd liketo see if that's out of the POH or maybe the writer is confusing the use of the brakes for the use of the rudder. I do know that rudder effectivness happened a lot earlier than may have been advertised, this coming from a pilot who flew "white 14" when it was out at Mojave. For the most part the rudder should become pretty effective as soon as there's airflow over it (20, 30 mph?) and the nose should be able to be brought up within 5 seconds of starting a take off role. maybe Bill M (Dragondog) can chime in here as he has time in a P-51 and can give a comparison.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 8, 2011)

well the rudder will work with the engine running at 1800rpm and 5mph too. thats not the point. 1400+hp + 9m diameter prop + 6600lb a/c +
smallish rudder = all kinds of pilots accounts for having to use the brakes to control sway on take off.



Jabberwocky said:


> Where are those day fighter figures from?
> 
> Don Caldwell gives 17,023 Luftwaffe day fighter losses between September 1943 and December 1944 alone.


Claes Sundin, Jochen Prien, Peter Rodeike. as far as I'm concerened, the upmost authority on the subject

13,000 combat losses in the West (approx), 4000 losses in the East (approx). can break it down by years if you want.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

Milosh said:


> Are those 1000+hp a/c and how do you keep the a/c pointing in the right direction during the initial take of roll until the rudder becomes effective?


 
They are not, but the principal is the same whether it be a -109 or a cub. You're continually "dancing" on the rudder as most tail draggers do have a tie in between the rudder and tail wheels. Those aircraft with out tailwheel steering are kept on center line with rudder and the rudder becomes effected a lot quicker than you would think (as previously mentioned). The big difference on the higher HP aircraft is the amount of torque you're going to get at take off rpm. Combine that with a crosswind and a green pilot and it can get interesting.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> well the rudder will work with the engine running at 1800rpm and 5mph too. thats not the point. 1400+hp + 9m diameter prop + 6600lb a/c +
> smallish rudder = all kinds of pilots accounts for having to use the brakes to control sway on take off.


 
5 mph is a taxi - at that point you're using the brakes and if you're in any kind of wind that will play on what you're doing during taxi. You're trying to assume that the rudder is not effective on initial take off roll. It becomes effective once enough airflow is going over it, my guess is about 20 -30 mph and I can tell you that happens quickly.

I'd like to know where you're getting "all kinds of pilots accounts for having to use the brakes to control sway on take off" and again are you just talking about the -109?


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 8, 2011)

I believe most Brit aircraft had a non locking tail wheel and an even sillier braking system with the brake being on the control column as opposed to the more sensible brakes on the rudder pedals


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

Here is a link from this forum for -109 manuals

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/other-mechanical-systems-tech/new-bf-109-manuals-thread-17837.html

Look on page 5, section 2 there is a big note that speaks about using rudder peadals (specifically from the heels) to keep the aircrafft straight during takeoff. This comes from a Finnish -109G6 POH translated. Toe brakes work from the top of the rudder pedals, when you're on the rudder pedals at the heels you're off the brakes.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> I believe most Brit aircraft had a non locking tail wheel and an even sillier braking system with the brake being on the control column as opposed to the more sensible brakes on the rudder pedals


 
Hi Neil, hope all is well...

Yes they did and the Soviets picked up the same system and still use it today.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 8, 2011)

_Cannibalization is common with air force. Any air force. Simple reason - repair is uneconomical above certain point. Think fighter or bomber moderately crashed in Kiev. What is cost of ship back aircraft to Germany, repair it, ship it back to Russia, also same time, ship spare parts like engine, wings, guns for other aircraft? Many time more easy to take plane apart, use it for spares, and ship a new plane.. German do not had shortage of machines of war. Big industry - but they lack fuel and men._

I would generally agree with that canabalization was common amongst all powers. Thats not the issue. the issue was what was happening to Me109s. there was a discussion about differeing losses, and I offered the probable reason for the discrepancy as aircraft not initially listed as lost, but eventually written off. When is a loss a loss...... 

Germany had a big industry. Trouble is, it was poorly organized and outputs were correspondingly low. Germany had the second biggest economy in the world, yet its outputs were generally very low. as an example, they produced about 325000 soft skinned vehicles. this is lower than even Canada


It wasnt cost of shipment, so much that caused the higher canabalization rates on the easterrn front (roughly double that of the RAF in the ME), it was an overstretched supply sytem. German armed forces in the East were heavily reliant on rail for strategic re-supply, but even as late as Autumn 1942 were only receiving 63% of their allotted tonnages of supplies. There were chronic shortages all along the front in all categories of equipment. This led to high unserviceability rates. 

_I would surprise me if US for example would be senting any major damage B-17 or P-51 for USA back to repair in factory.. US were not stupid. German were not stupid, which is why GPW took so long and costly to won in end.. undersestimate enemy - greatest fault, Zhukov said. Also Chin Szun Cu many thousend year before.. you do not fight believe enemy is stupid.. you fight know his strenght, and your strenght. Make him fight your strenght, so he loose.._

No one is aying the Germans are stupid, although they made their fair share of mistakes. Hitler was the leader of the German armed forces. he was a soldier, but had no formal training as an officer. He tended to overrule his advisers, especially as the war progressed. Compare that to the Combined Chiefs Of Staff, all professional soldiers, all general officers, with a unified command system and a combined united approach to war strategy. Who is going to tend to act stupidly with those two respective models???????


_Yes. 60-99% was scrapped. 100% was what went into ground and was aluminium dust.. 30-60% - repairable by factory. 10% - repairable by immediate unit, like few bullet holes non important places. 10-30% - repairable by mother unit, like Gruppe or Geschwader. This was so_. 

30-60% was repairable, but seldom was. According to both Foreman and Hayward (The Luftwaffe in the East), Germans had a tendency to scrap these moderately damaged airframes rather than repair them. It was more prevalent on the eastern front, because of the logistical difficulties, but an airframe 50% damaged is never going to fly properly again. A car suffering a 50% amount of damafge is unquestionably a write off...planes maybe a litlle more leniency, but if you have logistic problem and are battling with serviciability rates, you will choose scrapping over just sitting on the edge of the tarmac every time 

_Also, keep mind: % of damage was written where aircraft was destined, not aircraft destination dependant on % of damage.. % of damage was decided on base what need to be done with aircraft. Also % damage was decided by what was hit - say major component hit, no replace possibility - immindiate classify 60%._
I'll keep that in mind, but its not relevant to the issue

_Aircraft above 30% was not flying, was sent to repair centrers, repairt, rebuilt, flown again._

At 30% its a possibility, for an air force with logisitc problems, struggling to keep units airborne, anything much above that, not a chance

_Sorry this sounds very incorrect... what obsession? Just above you write operational readiness rates were reported to fall below 40% towards 1941 on Eastern Front campaign.. contradict, is not?_

Not a contradiction at all. Again I refer you to Hayward. He goes into detail about this. Readiness rates are different to frontline strengths. Readiness rates are those numbers ready to fly. Frontline strengthds are those aircraft on strength. Hitler was never interested in readiness rates, he only wanted strengths. His obsession with numbers is well known and well documented, and his sycophantic staffs pandied to that.

The Operational commands hardly ever gave operational readiness rates above the operational command levels to the central command, at least not to reports that Hitler would see. The best operational readiness rate after 1941, was achieved by Richthofens command, just prior to the bombardment of Sevastopol, at 73% overall. Thereafter in that Fall Blau offensive the readiness rates dropped to an average of just over 50%, before plumetting to just over 25% in the winter. 

_I do not think there was special shortage. LW service rate - very similiar to USSR, UK, USA air forces - roughly 70% typical in war. Better when unit doing nothing, less, when far from supply chain and in hard action. Normal. Fighter Command had 60% readiness in Combat of England. Shortage of spares, too? I think there is theoriy of conspiration here_...

With the exception of the Reich defences, this is simply untrue. On the eastern front readiness rates dropped to around 50%, in Summer, and less than 30% in winter. This was before there were any fuel shortages. After the fuel began to run out, in the latter part of '44, readiness rates outside the Reich dropped to less than 10%. Only over the Reich itself were the germans able to maintain a comparable readiness rate.

Over Alamein in'42, Alles had a readiness rate approaching 85%, before the offensive opened. german readiness rates were about 63% from memory ( I can dig my notes if you are interested). In similar situations, and conditions, the Germans were outclassed as they were in everything relating to supply and logistics. Murray examines this in a great deal of detail in his book, and whilst I admit his bias in his conclusions, his research is first rate.

Soviet rates were about 60% in Summer, dropping to about 30-40% in Winter. For the allies their worst commands were in the South Pacific, where readiness rates could drop to very low levels temporarily, but from the end of 1942, were never below 60%. And this was with a supply chanin several thousand miles long, and under constant threat. In Europe, the major home commands never really dropped to less than 75%, summer or winter. This is reflected in the sortie rates incidentally. Granted the Germans were outnumbered, but they were also outsortied, even on a per aircraft basis. And not by a small amount....by miles in fact


----------



## renrich (Jul 8, 2011)

From "The Great Book of WW2 Airplanes" page 470, some direct quotes from Herbert Kaiser, a LW pilot with 68 credited aerial kills. He indicates the BF109 was a very difficult airplane to fly, particularly for inexperienced pilots and particularly in landings and takeoffs because of the torque, narrow landing gear and poor ground visibility. No specific figures however. It does sound as if there must have been numerous landing and takeoff accidents which might have contributed to the "myth". The fact is that practically all WW2 fighters, especially the tail draggers, could be a handfull in landings and takeoffs. Many of the P40s the AVG received were wrecked in landing accidents before they ever saw combat. Tex Hill confirmed this in an interview.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

renrich said:


> From "The Great Book of WW2 Airplanes" page 470, some direct quotes from Herbert Kaiser, a LW pilot with 68 credited aerial kills. He indicates the BF109 was a very difficult airplane to fly, particularly for inexperienced pilots and particularly in landings and takeoffs because of the torque, narrow landing gear and poor ground visibility. No specific figures however. It does sound as if there must have been numerous landing and takeoff accidents which might have contributed to the "myth". *The fact is that practically all WW2 fighters, especially the tail draggers, could be a handfull in landings and takeoffs.* Many of the P40s the AVG received were wrecked in landing accidents before they ever saw combat. Tex Hill confirmed this in an interview.


 
BINGO!


----------



## parsifal (Jul 8, 2011)

According to Dunnigan Operartional readiness rates for the Allies at the beginning of Crusader was 78%. They had a total of 489 a/c ready to fly in the DAF, out of a frontline strength of 628 a/c. 

German readiness rate at the same time, in the same TO was 65%, or 186 out of 286 frontline aircraft. The Italian readiness rate was 53.1%

At Alamein, at the beginning of the battle, the DAF had a readiness rate actually approaching 90% (I was wrong). Guess Monty's "be prepared" principals were having an effect. Italian readiness rates were down to under 50%, whilst german readiness rates were down to 57%.

I fail to see how that is a comparable readiness rate


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 8, 2011)

can't seem to see page 3... or anything after post #80, guess I'm out 

edit: nevermind, now I can... weird....


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 8, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I'd like to know where you're getting "all kinds of pilots accounts for having to use the brakes to control sway on take off" and again are you just talking about the -109?




virtualpilots.fi: 109myths happy reading. also of note.. if you have access, read General Gunther Rall's new book (R.I.P.)

but anyways, I'm out of this thread. cause its gonna turn into a pissing match about #'s, #'s, #'s.

cheers.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> virtualpilots.fi: 109myths happy reading. also of note.. if you have access, read General Gunther Rall's new book (R.I.P.)
> 
> but anyways, I'm out of this thread. cause its gonna turn into a pissing match about #'s, #'s, #'s.
> 
> cheers.


 
Read it - I think in the translation there is something being lost between brake and rudder pedal which on many aircraft are one of the same. As stated, I have flown GA aircraft tail draggers and its a stone written rule that you NEVER tap the brakes when rolling on take off. NOW if you have some high time combat veteran who did this as a norm, all I can say is their experience and nerve overcame what the POH actually states and if they did smack up and aircraft (regardless how many kills or how many hours they had) they are still doing something that is violating the POH.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 8, 2011)

or maybe they just know the Bf109 very very well. fly for 500-1000 missions in the same basic aircraft through every imaginable conditions
and I'm sure they learned a trick or two, or 10. like landing and taking off from 50ft wide fire breaks in densely packed evergreen forrests in 
Germany, with runways of brush, grass, water, mud, bumps, dips, Yogi Bear. BooBoo was listed MIA.


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 8, 2011)

The 109 is designed for grass field operation it was prefered over other surfaces


----------



## stona (Jul 8, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> The 109 is designed for grass field operation it was prefered over other surfaces



What's the source for that information? I've not read anywhere that the type was designed specifically to operate from any particular surface. I've seen pilots express the opinion that it was easier to handle on unpaved surfaces.
Steve


----------



## Glider (Jul 8, 2011)

I don't know about the me109 but the preference on Spits and Hurricanes is to use the grass if its suitable. I have been to Duxford a number of times and they always use the grass, at our local airport again they use the grass in preference to the main runway.
The 109's always used the grass at Duxford and nearly all the other WW2 fighters, so its certainly a preference.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

Only twp pilots from virtualpilots.fi: 109myths talk about Tapping" the breaks during a take off roll. Others are specific about using the rudder. I think the myth here is real effectivness of the rudder on the -109.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

stona said:


> What's the source for that information? I've not read anywhere that the type was designed specifically to operate from any particular surface. I've seen pilots express the opinion that it was easier to handle on unpaved surfaces.
> Steve


 
Its mentioned in this clip;

http://www.eaf51.org/newweb/Documenti/Storia/Flying_ 109_ENG.pdf


----------



## stona (Jul 8, 2011)

It's definitely a preference for most tail draggers which is why they do indeed use the grass at Duxford.I think it is fair to suppose that at the time,mid thirties,anticipated operations would have been from unmade airfields rather than paved surfaces but that's not the same as designing the gear specifically for grass fields. It may have been so,the old memory ain't what it used to be! That's why I wondered at the source.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 8, 2011)

stona said:


> It's definitely a preference for most tail draggers which is why they do indeed use the grass at Duxford.I think it is fair to suppose that at the time,mid thirties,anticipated operations would have been from unmade airfields rather than paved surfaces but that's not the same as designing the gear specifically for grass fields. It may have been so,the old memory ain't what it used to be! That's why I wondered at the source.
> Cheers
> Steve


 
agree


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 8, 2011)

just the several109 pilots I've talked to like Rob Erdos 
once again if you have read this link about flying the 109 from a present day pilot your not paying attention
Bounding Clouds - Flying the Messerschmitt Bf-109 > Vintage Wings of Canada


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 8, 2011)

I think that what type of surface the 109 (and just about all fighters of the mid 30s) were designed to operate from can be guessed at by looking at the airfields that were common or in use during the mid to late 30s. While taxiways or aprons in front of the hangers/terminals were paved the actual "flying field" usually wasn't. The major commercial airports of many European nations used grass surfaces for take-off and landing and in some cases the 'field' was nearly circular so that the planes could almost always take-off and land into the wind. 
with even the Tempelhof airport at Berlin having a grass flying surface I doubt that regular fighter fields had paved flying surfaces at the time. 
However they may be a vast difference between a carefully graded, prepared, and maintained grass surfaced air field of the late 1930s and hastily prepared front line airstrips in combat zones. Think of the difference between a carefully tended Golf course fairway and a farmers wheat field. They both can loosely be considered "grass".


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 8, 2011)

the amazing is that the 660mm x 160mm tires were able to handle those ' runways '.. especially in the east.
what tires were they? Continentals?


----------



## renrich (Jul 8, 2011)

My brother in Llano, Texas, recently bought a completely restored N2S, (Stearman). Of course it is a tail dragger and a bi plane. He is an experienced pilot in a Saratoga(tri cycle landing gear) He took lessons in a tail dragger before beginning to fly the N2S. They have a grass crosswind run way at Llano International Airport  and he has been doing all his flying in the N2S from that runway. I went flying with him a couple of months ago and while taxiing around the grass field, he asked if I wanted to taxi it. I declined but later handled it a little in the air, a few turns and such. He has ground looped it once but only limited damage to a wing tip. Easily repaired. Apparently it, as well as other tail draggers, like grass fields better than paved.

That grass field in Llano is just Texas Hill Country mostly dead grass mowed with most of the rocks and cactus removed.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 8, 2011)

self explanitory pics. shows what conditions the 109 can operate in.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 8, 2011)

I dont know about the 109, but for the Spit it was certainly possible to operate in muddy or wetr conditions, though in heavily inundated fields there was a tendency for the brakes to fade a bit

Bill McCrae in an interview had this to say about differential braking on landing:

"_On the lighter side; many RAF fields were designed like an overturned saucer, probably to improve drainage, so that on landing we always ended up going downhill. At low speed the Spit's rudder was ineffective and without a steerable tailwheel differential braking was needed to steer. Loss of brakes could mean trouble. One night I landed a bit long, probably overused the brakes to slow down, and they faded. I switched off and sat helpless as the Spit slowly rolled downhill, veering toward the side of the runway. First one wheel dropped off into the mud, swinging the machine around so the second wheel followed. The tail rose high but dropped back before the prop could hit the ground. I was lucky, but several others were not. Paul, one of three Free French pilots we had, lost his brakes one night and ran off the end of the runway. When we got to him his aircraft was balanced, vertically, with the spinner and prop embedded in the mud. Paul was looking down at the ground from his lofty perch, repeating over and over `SHEET, SHEET' to our great amusement_." 

This suggest brakes were used to steer, until sufficient air speed was travelling over the rudder. I have no idea how fast an aircraft needed to be going for that. 

I have a strong suspicion that if the 109 pilots did use this technique, they might have learnt it off the Russians. Russians in 1941 were able to get airborne in muddy conditions at about twice the sotie rate as the Germans. Perhaps this was one of the tricks they used


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 9, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> self explanitory pics. shows what conditions the 109 can operate in.


they can all operate in such conditions if necessary of the one landing or taking off , but on a side note i think you have a little tunnel vision and should listen to those on this web sight are a little brighter or aware of real life aviation


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> self explanitory pics. shows what conditions the 109 can operate in.



I would note that in the second picture the aircraft is *NOT* operating, it is just sitting there. Which is not to say that any other fighter in the same conditions would be doing anything else but sit there.


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 9, 2011)

parsifal said:


> This suggest brakes were used to steer, until sufficient air speed was travelling over the rudder. I have no idea how fast an aircraft needed to be going for that.


 
Parsifal this is covered in post #7. As I read it and other posts a wet or muddy field isnt as adverse as a dry tarmac or concrete runway. The problem of the wheels "toeing in"
is caused when one wheel grips more than the other. There is a video of a 109 undercarriage collapse and that is on a hard runway.


----------



## stona (Jul 9, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> they can all operate in such conditions if necessary of the one landing or taking off /QUOTE]
> 
> There's some great footage about of some Fw190 (Doras) taking of from a flooded field. I can't find it but it is hair raising to watch.
> Cheers
> Steve


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 9, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> There is a video of a 109 undercarriage collapse and that is on a hard runway.


 
that would have been a 'homemade' 109 replica that your refering too.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 9, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> , but on a side note i think you have a little tunnel vision and should listen to those on this web sight are a little brighter or aware of real life aviation


 
' real life aviation'. show me any example today which replicates the aircraft conditions faced in WWII. I'm not bright enough
to find any. thanks.


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 9, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> ' real life aviation'. show me any example today which replicates the aircraft conditions faced in WWII. I'm not bright enough
> to find any. thanks.



_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19teA1bHvY8_ and did you even look at the link of the pilot a current day test pilot who did the descriotion of 109 take off , BTW thats an origianal 109 flown by Marseille in BoB


----------



## parsifal (Jul 9, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> ' real life aviation'. show me any example today which replicates the aircraft conditions faced in WWII. I'm not bright enough
> to find any. thanks.


 
I can think of one at least. The example i quoted before of the RAN Carrier Melbourne. A 14000 ton WWII Light carrier, with a corrugated deck, a maximum speed of just 21 knots, a short flight deck, and an underpowered catapult. Yet she was asked to operate A4 Skyhawks, S2 trackers, Wessex and Sea Kings, all aircraft way outside her original design specs/

Another example, from my own backyard. Australia continued to operate fixed wing aircraft from unimproved rough jungle strips in New Guinea well into the 1990s. Mostly Caibous, but also Hercules Iroquois, Chinook Nomads and once or twice, Sabres (I am told).

Then there are untold operations in Vietnam that I can think of.

Not all modern operations are undertaken from asphalt or under anything like ideal conditions. And to be blunt about it, the mud operations that you posted are pretty standard in jungle operations



_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K8NlZfg-omg_


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 9, 2011)

aight, so, those examples are a direct equivilent to properler driven 1400+hp 6700lb taildraggers operating in the mud/water? if so, I stand corrected, thanks for the information.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 9, 2011)

I think a great example of this would also be the Swedish Airforce. At least with the Viggens they operated them from non-paved runways.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 9, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> aight, so, those examples are a direct equivilent to properler driven 1400+hp 6700lb taildraggers operating in the mud/water? if so, I stand corrected, thanks for the information.



Indeed, a trick question. What air forces operate taildraggers in their modern inventories? I assumed you were referring to the difficulty of operations. Because no-one operates WWII aircraft in their modern airforces (with the possible exception of the gooney bird, it is impossible to find comparable examples from the modern era. 

An oxymoron, but you you are correct


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 9, 2011)

if you look at a lot of eastern block aircraft they have fenders over nose wheel to prevent fodding engine out when operating from unprepared fields


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2011)

And the real question is not if you could operate in those conditions but what it did to the accident rate. What was considered an acceptable loss rate due to accidents caused by weather conditions before they stopped operations?


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 10, 2011)

The allies developed PSP, (pierched steel planking ) 2x8 pieces of interlocking panels to make usable runways out of the muddiest ground, you could lay it directly over dirt, or even better over a crushed stone base. It was used a lot in Europe and the Pacific, for temporary or semi-permanent airfields.
In the late 60's I was at Naknon Phanom, Thailand. They operated 3000hp + hp taildraggers ( A-1E H's ) off a dirt stip, ( mud, during monsoon season ) until they put the psp down in , I think, 66.


----------



## Kryten (Jul 10, 2011)

many cases of fields being out of commision due to waterlogging during the winter of 1944!


----------



## stona (Jul 10, 2011)

This is so but some were more determined than others to get off. Check the footage from the 2'.15" mark here.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zALt0-BM-wI_

Steve


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 10, 2011)

nice vid, thanks! Its good to see some of those 109 pilots knew exactly how to handle their planes.

that one 'nose over' save was a prime example.

I think even an Alaskan bush pilot would say " damn... their good!"


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 10, 2011)

I forgot, somebody asked what happened to all the aircraft:







burried all over the forests of Germany.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 10, 2011)

Man oh man, what a lot of landing accident victims


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 10, 2011)

ahhhh to have a metal detector while taking a stroll through the forests of Central Germany!


----------



## Jabberwocky (Jul 10, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> Claes Sundin, Jochen Prien, Peter Rodeike. as far as I'm concerened, the upmost authority on the subject
> 
> 13,000 combat losses in the West (approx), 4000 losses in the East (approx). can break it down by years if you want.


 

Please do.

Which book by Prien Rodeike?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 10, 2011)

try Dokumente der Deutschen Luftrüstung 1933-1945


----------



## parsifal (Jul 10, 2011)

On the basis of those numbers, there were between 16000 and 20000 Me 109s on strength with the LW at the end of the war. Hardly......


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 10, 2011)

What a depressing photo....


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 10, 2011)

vikingBerserker said:


> What a depressing photo....


 
yup, super depressing.

for the rest with these stupid #'s game... some of you are just not getting it.
Cheers


----------



## parsifal (Jul 10, 2011)

No, we are getting it, we are just not buying what you are attempting to peddle....this was your original statement, to refresh your memory

_21350 total day fighter (all day fighters) losses. 16400 due to combat losses (fighter/flak) 4428 due to 'other' (mechanical/pilot/etc) thats around 27% 'other' rate. 
fair to say half the combat losses were Bf109's. also fair to say that a third of 'other' losses were Bf109's. so thats around 17% 'other' loss for Bf109's. sound fair? 
or am I way, way, out to lunch here?_

There are some real problems with these numbers, and they dont add up, even close to the numbers I have for LW losses.

Just as a exampole, this link suggest an attrition rate of 40-55%, just to accidents.

http://www.angelfire.com/ct/ww2europe/stats.html

I recommend that you have a look at Williason Murrays "The Luftwaffe - Strategy For Defeat" which goes into a lot of detail about this very issue. Whilst I disagree with his intrepretations of the raw data, the basic research is acknowledged as sound. I will dig it out tonite, but I can assure you. Luftwaffe fighter losses were much bigger than are contained in your claim.

You cannot make unsubstantiated claims as you have, that enter the realms of the fantastic, and not expect a reaction, and then attempt to put the monkey back in the box by saying we dont get it. We get it alright.........


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 10, 2011)

yup well, I'm not gonna argue read the book Dokumente der Deutschen Luftrüstung. just gonna talk about landing gear. have an awesome day.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

I'll say it again - stop the sarcasm. If you can't get your point across with civility, then don't even post.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 11, 2011)

Im not troubled NJ, and I did push P-40 a little. Having said that, yes it would be nice to put the differing points of view across with a little less bile. I will try.

We are still on topic in my opinion. I could not really understand the thrust of the of the thread starter, but this disscussion has tended to revolve around two issues. Firstly, waht was the average attrition rate in the LW, and secondly did the 109 suffer a higher than average attrition rate, orabout the same as all the other types.

To9 be honmest, I can answer the first, or at least have a point of view backed up by hard data, but I dont have much information on the specifc attrition rate for the 109. My gut feeling is that there was no diffefrence in the attrition rate of the 109 due to its narrow track or general undercart design.....others however are likley to have better information than me.


Anyway, here is a link to a short version of Murray, which clearly shows the loss rates for the LW to be much higher than claimed......


Attrition and the Luetwaffe


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 11, 2011)

There are a number of factors that can make a plane difficult to land. Narrow track, bouncy landing gear, landing speed, landing attitude, vision while landing, effectiveness of various controls, center of gravity and/or tendency to ground loop and so on. "IF" one aircraft has a higher loss rate in landing accidents than other aircraft of it's type it may be hard to pin it down to just one cause. It may be that a particular aircraft was even superior in one or more attributes but others brought it to below average.


----------



## Glider (Jul 11, 2011)

An excellent paper many thanks


----------



## parsifal (Jul 11, 2011)

so what is the attrition rate of the Me109 compared to the average for the LW....lower, higher or about the same?


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 11, 2011)

parsifal said:


> No, we are getting it, we are just not buying what you are attempting to peddle....this was your original statement, to refresh your memory
> 
> _21350 total day fighter (all day fighters) losses. 16400 due to combat losses (fighter/flak) 4428 due to 'other' (mechanical/pilot/etc) thats around 27% 'other' rate.
> fair to say half the combat losses were Bf109's. also fair to say that a third of 'other' losses were Bf109's. so thats around 17% 'other' loss for Bf109's. sound fair?
> ...



It seems problem is yours. This seem perfectly normal for air for in operation.. non-combat loss, typical 20-40% 



> Just as a exampole, this link suggest an attrition rate of 40-55%, just to accidents.
> 
> </title> </head> <body bgcolor="#f5f5f5" text="#000000" link="#2f4f4f" alink="#2f4f4f" vlink="#2f4f4f"><script type="text/javascript" src="http://hb.lycos.com/hb.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript"><![CDATA[//><!]]></script> <script type="te



Possible also. Do you speak of same? One may speak of shot down by enemy, did not return.. other data may include: shot down, damaged, write off, damaged so bad write off, damaged in accidents... and also in rear country, in traning..

USAAF accident loss - around 20% mid war. Late war - 40% of loss. 

There is off course write off for many reason. Engine failure, pilot error, faulty assembly.. even aging. Airframe can a number of hours, then need rebuilt. For example 109 - 400 hour for airframe, factory data.. Engine - 200 hour. In real of course airplane almost never survives that long..

I think I saw data for Bf 109 accident rate for landing accidents. Not very high - 1-2% of all loss I recall my memory. Of course all planes had accidents. Fw 190 had wide landing gear - think it never ground looped..? I do not.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Im not troubled NJ, and I did push P-40 a little. Having said that, yes it would be nice to put the differing points of view across with a little less bile. I will try.
> 
> We are still on topic in my opinion. *I could not really understand the thrust of the of the thread starter*, but this disscussion has tended to revolve around two issues. Firstly, waht was the average attrition rate in the LW, and secondly did the 109 suffer a higher than average attrition rate, orabout the same as all the other types.
> 
> ...


 
No prob, parsifal.

As far as the intent of the thread as per Lightnmust I will try my best.....

There is a myth that 33% of bf109s crashed because of the undercarriage.

How did this myth of 33% start?

He suggested everyone checking sources and possible tracing it back through books such as William Green's, Dr. Alfred Price, Martin Caiden, etc and maybe finding the starting point for this myth.

Now what has happened - as the internet will do - is that instead of the narrow focus of the myth, this has developed into a discussion about the 109 undercarriage, which, in the end, may actually arrive at the answer the thread starter was looking for. I love how this developes and everyones post is informative in its own way.

My 2 cents (and don't know if this has been posted):

My understanding is that other things such as engine torque or green pilot actually were the causes for such accidents. The narrow track just contributed to the problem. It wasn't, in itself, the actual problem but when the engine created torque, the narrow track enhanced the resulting handling problem. And presto! the pilot's memorial!


----------



## stona (Jul 11, 2011)

Njaco said:


> My understanding is ......... The narrow track just contributed to the problem. It wasn't, in itself, the actual problem



Absolutely correct. The landing and ground handling characteristics of any aircraft are the sum of many factors. The Bf109s gear geommetry is not ideal because it is a compromise (as it is on most aircraft). If you don't want a bulge on your wing you have to angle the wheel. If you want to easily remove or replace a wing the gear must attach to the fuselage and so it goes on. There are other factors ,related to low speed flight. The Bf109s high wing loading,leading edge slats and many more. On the ground you may have issues with rudder authority,the list goes on and every single item pertains to the overall handling of the aircraft in these the trickiest of the phases of flight. Torque effects were common to all single engine fighters of the period,many types finished the war with double the power they started it with and were essentially massively over powered.
My references don't contain a handy breakdown of losses by cause that is useful to this debate and the Luftwaffe system unfortunately didn't detail PRECISE causes of every accident,particularly if the accident was not fatal. 
There are plenty of "fliegerdenkmal" featuring other types! 
Steve


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jul 11, 2011)

"..... My understanding is that other things such as engine torque or green pilot actually were the causes for such accidents. The narrow track just contributed to the problem. It wasn't, in itself, the actual problem but when the engine created torque, the narrow track enhanced the resulting handling problem. And presto...." 

The Me-109 was a great plane to fly and fight in .... the numbers show that .... plus the longevity and manufacturability of the design (RM's). But it was an *unforgiving* aircraft. True or False?

MM

MM


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 11, 2011)

Any aircraft in unforgiving to some degree, some are just more unforgiving than others.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 11, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> USAAF accident loss - around 20% mid war. Late war - 40% of loss.


 
Do you have a source for that? Does that include combat losses not attributed to actual combat. See link

United States Army Air Forces in World War II


----------



## Milosh (Jul 11, 2011)

Table 159 -- Airplane Losses on Combat Missions in European Theater of Operations, By Type of Airplane and by Cause of Loss: Aug 1942 to May 1945

All Types

Total - 11,687 
Enemy Aircraft - 4,274	
Anti-Aircraft - 5,380	
Other Causes - 2,033 > *17.4%*

Table 160 -- Airplane Losses on Combat Missions in Mediterranean Theater of Operations, By Type of Airplane and by Cause of Loss: Jun 1942 to May 1945

Total - 6,731 
Enemy Aircraft - 2,526	
Anti-Aircraft - 2,441	
Other Causes - 1,764 > *26.2%*


----------



## stona (Jul 11, 2011)

tyrodtom said:


> Any aircraft in unforgiving to some degree, some are just more unforgiving than others.



Which is why a factor that nobody has mentioned,pilot training,is such an important factor.
Steve


----------



## parsifal (Jul 11, 2011)

_It seems problem is yours. This seem perfectly normal for air for in operation.. non-combat loss, typical 20-40% _


Trouble is, the Luftwaffe hardly ever operated under normal conditions. Even when they were enjoying their best victories, over France and Poland, they suffered a heavier than "normal". Over Poland, they suffered 285 combat losses and a further 220 to noncombat reasons. Often forced to operate from rough forward strips the attrition rate is particulalry noteworthy. Over France the LW suffered an attrition rate (combat and noncombat) of over 36%. 

The losses to noncombat reasons in Russia. Though some aircraft were just rendered unserviceable, by the end of July '41, the German operational strength had fgalen to about 30% of its strength at the beginning of the camapign. Thereafter the best month for operational runners was June 1942, when 4 air fleet achieved an operational readiness rate of 72%. According to Hayworth, German losses to non-combat courses ran at between 40 and 45% per month. Some of these might be repairable, some mighht not, but small wonder that by 1945, there were only 1500 aircraft available on the front. This is after over 100000 aircraft had been produced.

As the bombing offensive warmed up, the accident rate over Germany also increased. It makes sense that pilots with limited ezxperience, called upon to operate in conditions of extreme stress are going to suffer a high attr4ition rate. At the beginning of 1944, over Germany it was about 30% of the force structure per month. By the end of the year, this had increased to 45%. For Night Fighters and the Wild Sau aircraft, the loss rates exceeded 50% per month. 

It is not valid to try and compare the allied loss rates to those suffeered by Germany. At least not the western allies. They were never subjected to the same stresses as the Luftwaffe, had some inbuilt advantages (like stell matting for rough strips) and all round, never pushed their air forces to the same extent as the Axis 



_I think I saw data for Bf 109 accident rate for landing accidents. Not very high - 1-2% of all loss I recall my memory. Of course all planes had accidents. Fw 190 had wide landing gear - think it never ground looped..? I do not._

Well, over France in April 1941, the losses due to landing/TO accidents as a proportion of the total losses were about 40%. These were the best pilots in Germany at the time. Does not tally up to your claim......


----------



## bobbysocks (Jul 11, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> I forgot, somebody asked what happened to all the aircraft:
> 
> View attachment 172698
> 
> ...


 

if i am not mistaken this pic is of an lw installation in norway. all the ac that wasnt whisked away for testing and the like were bull dozed into a ditch and covered over. i have friends in norway i keep encouraging to go treasure hunting. i dont think you would find that in mainland germany. after the war the contry was in shambles and they recycled anything that was of use. while the 357th was stationed at neubiberg the former LW maintenance crews were tasked with dismantling, first the former LW ac, and then the non-essential planes of the occupation force.

Mustang Aces of the 357th Fighter Group - Google Books

this link shows carson's Nooky Booky IV and others in the process of being scrapped.

if you are going to talk about the gear and landing accidents there are a lot of things you will have to consider. 1) under normal conditions any accident where the gear didnt malfunction is most likely going to be deemed "pilot error". they are not going to blame the plane. 2) the conditions under which the crash landing prevailed.... a lot of guys nursed shot up birds hoping to get back to any friendly base if possible. there, often a normal landing was impossible due to shot up flight controls. so they bellied in...considered a crash landing. 3) weather. escorts based in the uk would often have to put down at a 9th AF base in france due to low fuel or bad weather back home. i know of one guy who made a perfect landing on the snow covered "pierced steel" runway but when he tapped the brakes his bird skided into a dirt pile. others got back to england to 0 viz and 0 ceiling. some tried to land ( some cracked up a few made it in safely) but others bailed out. the LWs operation in the east was often a constant move. they were moving up to the front or pulling back and had to deal with make shift fields. read Rall or Hartmann's accounts. they werent looking for grass strips in particularly. they were looking for anyplace they could operate from. most of the major air dromes in germany were paved runways and 109s and 190s flew out of them but they were easy to spot and thus easy targets. after Doolittle took over and game the USAAF the chance to go hunting the LW took to hiding installations. a large paved runway is a dead givaway. many of the ad hoc airstrips were discouvered by accident while straffing something else.

as for the 109 in particular i have yet to find the story i was looking for. it was from one of the major german aces and his recounting of learning to fly the 109. they way i remember it was after several hours of training in some sort of duel control ac they set out to solo. the first 2 boys took off and flew around the traffic pattern a couple times. but both crashed and died on landing. this was unsettling for the rest of the class who had to fly next. i will keep digging until i find it. but he was not too keen on this aspect of the plane.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

I search through some of my old resources and found losses for Norway 1942 - 45 - all losses with explanation and % damaged rates. I'm trying to sperate just the 109s and break it down. Now I understand its only one small theatre but it may give us an idea. Will try to post later tonight.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 11, 2011)

@ bobby,

it was one possible reason on where did " all the 109's go". I'm sure they did the same in Germany.
plus, I don't see any finnish markings on those warbirds.

cheers.

*edit, I should have prefaced this by saying no doubt there were more lost in accidents then what I posted.
thanks.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 11, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> it was one possible reason on where did " all the 109's go". I'm sure they did the same in Germany.
> plus, I don't see any finnish markings on those warbirds.


 
Why would there be Finnish markings on Luftwaffe aircraft in Norway???


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 11, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Why would there be Finnish markings on Luftwaffe aircraft in Norway???


 
haha.. its confirmed.. I need hooked-on-phonics! my humble appologies...


----------



## Jabberwocky (Jul 11, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> try Dokumente der Deutschen Luftrüstung 1933-1945


 
Author(s) and ISBN?

Closest match I can find is Nowarra's 'Die Deutsche Luftrüstung 1933-1945'

And, the loss list?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 11, 2011)

same guy. _'Dokumente der Deutschen Luftrüstung by H.J. Nowarra'_. I think theres three editions.

*edit:

or:::

'_The secret conferences of the General Aircraft Production: selected and annotated documents on the history of the German air defense and air war, by George Hentschel_'


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 11, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Why would there be Finnish markings on Luftwaffe aircraft in Norway???


 
What else were the Swiss going to fly?????

I'll show myself out...............


----------



## Mosshorn (Jul 11, 2011)

I found this post in the archives. It comes out of a thread from a couple of years ago where the Bf-109's undercarriage was repeatedly discussed.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

"Has anyone read Horrido!? In the paperback version, on page 255 is an interesting first-person account by the 237 victory ace, Willi Batz:

(The preface reads: His second washout will be of interest to students of Me-109 history.)

"In Austria near the end of the war we [transferred to] a base that had a bitumen runway. Such luxury! For years we had been operating from grass strips near the front. The unaccustomed experience of using the bitumen strip played havoc with our group. 

Out of (42) forty-two aircraft, (39) thirty-nine cracked up on landing due to the sensitivity of the Me-109 to its brakes and the strange feel and response of a solid runway. Only the first three aircraft landed safely.""

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hard to parse this...I don't care what anyone says.

Moss


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

Ok, found the info for 1943. This is from a website many years ago called "Luftwaffe in Norway" ...tried to find it again an was unsuccessful. As I said, its for all types lost in Norway during 1943. I pulled the Bf 109s and offer them here.....

Dato	Unit	F/H	Sted	Reason	Type	Personopplysninger 
05.01.43	4./J.G.5	F	Kovda	Enemy flak Bf 109F-4	Fw. Reinhold Bigalk Missing 
08.01.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Værløse flyplass, Danmark	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
08.01.43	8./J.G.5	F	Murmansk havn	Unknown	Bf 109F-4	Uffz. Friedrich Rennemann (F) POW 
11.01.43	5./J.G.5	F	Schnetshusnaja (Murmansk)	Engine damage	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
12.01.43	4./J.G.5	H	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
16.01.43	10./J.G.5	H	Underveis fra Gardermoen til Trondheim	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Heinz Schmitz (F) found dead 18.7.43

16.01.43	10./J.G.5	H	Joelsjøen	Emergency landing due to bad weather	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
23.01.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
24.01.43	4./J.G.5	F	Sørøst for Alakurtti	Crash due to engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury (Flyger var Uffz. Gärtner) 
25.01.43	6./J.G.5	F	Ved Bojarskaja	Missing Bf 109F-4	Lt. Friedrich Lüdecke (F) POW ( 
01.02.43	III./J.G.5	F	Ved Kirkenes	Emergency landing due to bad weather	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
01.02.43	III./J.G.5	F	Ved Kirkenes	Emergency landing due to bad weather	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
10.02.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
19.02.43	6./J.G.5	F	Området Kandalakscha	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Rudolf Fenten (F) POW 
19.02.43	III./J.G.5	F	Ikke oppgitt	Missing	Bf 109F-4	Fw. Kurt Dylewski (F) returnerte til avdeling. 
21.02.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
21.02.43	9./J.G.5	F	Ikke oppgitt	Missing	Bf 109F-4	Fw. Paul Schwippert (F) Missing 
23.02.43	II./J.G.5	F	Øst for Alakurtti	Crash due to engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
26.02.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Nordvest for Trondheim	Emergency landing on sea	Bf 109G-1	No personal injury 
01.03.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109F-4	Oblt. Konrad Schlossaryk (F) Wounded 
02.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Njal-Jarwi sjøen	Probably engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury Flyet ble ført av Oblt. Gerd Senoner, Staffelkapitän for 7./J.G.5 fra 1.1.43 — 15.6.43. 
05.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Nord for Petsamo	Shoot down by enemy fighter	Bf 109F-4	Fw. Gert Schülze (F) Wounded 
05.03.43	8./J.G.5	F	Ikke oppgitt	Emergency landing after battle with Il-2	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury Flyger var Lt. Jakob Norz. 
05.03.43	9./J.G.5	F	Nordøst for Luostari	Probably by LAGG-3 fighter	Bf 109F-4	Lt. Gerd Grosse-Brauckmann (F) Killed 
06.03.43	Stab II./J.G.5	H	Pontsalenjoki flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109F-4	Oblt. Lorenz Bauer (F) Wounded 
08.03.43	II./J.G.5	H	Sør for Alakurtti	engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	Ofw. Rudolf Müller (F) Wounded 
09.03.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Lade flyplass	Emergency landing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
10.03.43	II./J.G.5	F	Vestspissen av Tovan-sjøen	Enemy fire	Bf 109F-4	Uffz. Bruno Röhrle (F) Wounded 
10.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
10.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Nord for Petsamo flyplass	engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
12.03.43	6./J.G.5	F	Nordøst for Alakurtti flyplass	Engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	Fw. Emil Stratmann (F) Killed 
12.03.43	5./J.G.5	F	Murmaschi	Missing after airbattle with Soviet P-39	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Dietrich Weinitschke (F) POW 
13.03.43	II./J.G.5	F	Liza	Shoot down by enemy A/C	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Horst Rolly (F) Wounded 
14.03.43	5./J.G.5	F	Sør for Petsamo	Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury Flygeren hoppet ut i fallskjermen. 
14.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Ved Murmaschi	Unknown.	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury Flygeren hoppet ut i fallskjermen. 
14.03.43	7./J.G.5	F	Pjaivejärvisjøen	Missing	Bf 109F-4	Uffz. Alfred Kern (F) POW men døde senere i fangenskap 
14.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Sørvest for Petsamo	Engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
16.03.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Sørvest av Trondheim Joel-sjøen?	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
16.03.43	Reserve Luftflotte 5	H	Pori flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
17.03.43	III./J.G.5	H	Sørøst for Kemi	Unknown	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
18.03.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Järvisjøen	Emergency landing due to flak	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
18.03.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Friendly flak	Bf 109F-4	Uffz. Paul Müller (F) Wounded 
19.03.43	12./J.G.5	H	Sørvest for Lade flyplass (Pl.Qu. 16 Ost/0447).	Crash i Trondheimsfjorden	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Karl Grundhöfer (F) Missing 
20.03.43	Stab/J.G.5	F	Sør for Fedosero	Flak	Bf 109F-4	Uffz. Karl Merker (fra 5./J.G.5) Killed 
20.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Sørvest for Petsamo flyplass	Shoot down by enemy fighter	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
21.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
23.03.43	10./J.G.5	F	Nordvest for Lade flyplass (Pl.Qu. 16 Ost/04472).	Crash in sea	Bf 109G-1	Lt. Hans-Henning Kolbe (F fra 11./J.G.5) Killed 
24.03.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Mellom Leka og Vikna	Emergency landing on sea due to Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Günter Seraphim (F) Wounded 
24.03.43	Reserve Luftflotte 5	H	Pori	Crash	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
26.03.43	Reserve Luftflotte 5	H	Pori	Emergency landing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
27.03.43	6./J.G.5	F	Ved Murmaschi	Shoot down by P-39 Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Edmund Krischkovski (F) POW (Døde i fangenskap) 
27.03.43	7./J.G.5	F	Ved Murmaschi	Shoot down by P-40	Bf 109F-4	Uffz. Andreas Riess (F) Missing 
27.03.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Landing accident due to fight with Hurricane	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
28.03.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Salmijärvi flyplass	Enemy fire	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury Flyger var Oblt. Theodor Weissenberger. 
30.03.43	II./J.G.5	F	Tolvand sjøen	Crash due to Engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
01.04.43	I./J.G.5	F	Sola flyplass	Damage during taxing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
03.04.43	III./J.G.5	H	Petsamo	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
03.04.43	III./J.G.5	H	Petsamo	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
03.04.43	9./J.G.5	F	Ukjent	Missing	Bf 109F-4	Obgfr. Eugen Fritz (F) Missing 
03.04.43	1.(F)/124	H	Salmijärvi	Landing accident	Bf 109G-4	No personal injury 
04.04.43	4./J.G.5	F	Tolwand sjøen	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Bela Preisler (F) POW 
04.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Kandalakscha	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Oblt. Lorenz Bauer (F) først rapportert Missing, men kom Probably til rette. 
04.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Petsamo	Enemy fire	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury Flyger var Ofw. Albert Brunner. 
04.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Petsamo	Emergency landing	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
07.04.43	I./J.G.5	F	Sola flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
10.04.43	2./J.G.5	H	Værløse flyplass i Danmark	Crash	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Heinz Graupner (F) Killed 
11.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Kujama sjøen	Crash due to. Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
16.04.43	I./J.G.5	F	Take off accident	*	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
17.04.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Lade flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
18.04.43	II./J.G.5	H	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
19.04.43	6./J.G.5	F	6 km SØ for innsjøen Maljavr	Shoot down	Bf 109G-2	Ofw. Rudolf Müller (F) POW. Senre Missing i fangenskap. 
19.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Adamsfjorden i bunnen av Laksefjord	Unknown	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury Flygeren hoppet i fallskjerm. 
19.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
19.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
19.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
19.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
19.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
19.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
20.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Crash due to Engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
20.04.43	I./J.G.5	F	Fornebu flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
21.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
21.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
21.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
21.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
21.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
22.04.43	III./J.G.5	H	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

22.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 36 Ost/2752	Shoot down byflak	Bf 109E-7	No personal injury 
22.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
22.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
23.04.43	4./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Herbert Lorenz (F) Killed 
25.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Alakurtti	flak	Bf 109E-7	No personal injury 
25.04.43	II./J.G.5	H	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
26.04.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Ørlandet flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
28.04.43	12./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 16 Ost/3721	Crash in sea Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Gerhard Stavenhagen (F) funnet Killedmet 5.5.43. 
29.04.43	1.(F)/124	H	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-4	No personal injury 
29.04.43	6./J.G.5	F	Ved Murmansk	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Erwin Fahldieck (F) Missing 
29.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
29.04.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
30.04.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
30.04.43	1./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 06 Ost/6332	Unknown	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Hubert Schaub (F) Killed 
30.04.43	Überführ.Kdo./LZ Gr.1	H	Pori flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
01.05.43	1./J.G.5	F	Herdla flyplass	Crash	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Rudolf Rödig (F) Killed 
02.05.43	I./J.G.5	H	Fornebu flyplass	Emergency landing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
02.05.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Lade flyplass	Damage durung taxing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
02.05.43	II./J.G.5	F	Kotozero sjøen	Shoot down by flak	Bf 109F-4	Oblt. Friedrich Leitner (F) Wounded 
03.05.43	I./J.G.5	F	Sola flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	Ofw. Anton Schulte (F) Wounded 
03.05.43	Stab II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
03.05.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Gerhard Teinhod (F) Wounded 
06.05.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
06.05.43	III./J.G.5	F	Ved Kirkenes	Crash (fire)	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury Flygeren reddet i fallskjermen. 
07.05.43	6./J.G.5	F	Ved Polarnyje	Shoot down by Enemy fire	Bf 109G-2	Ofw. Albert Brunner (F) Killed 
07.05.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
07.05.43	III./J.G.5	F	Kirkenes flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
08.05.43	Stab III./J.G.5	F	Ved Ura Guba	Shoot down by enemy fighter a P-39	Bf 109F-4	Lt. Rolf-Viktor Sadewasser (F) Missing 
10.05.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Lade flyplass	Crash due to Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
11.05.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Damage on UC	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
11.05.43	4./J.G.5	F	Kowdosero	Shoot down byflak	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Günther Steinmann (F) Missing 
13.05.43	Stab/J.G.5	F	Nord for Polarnij Krug	Shoot down by flak	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Günther Zeuch (F) Killed 
13.05.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
14.05.43	3./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 05 Ost/5936	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Arnold Koch (F) Killed 
15.05.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Bodø flyplass	Crash due to Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
17.05.43	2./J.G.54	H	Malmi flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
18.05.43	II./J.G.5	H	Salmijärvi flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	Inggen personskade. 
19.05.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Lade flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-1	No personal injury 
21.05.43	I./J.G.5	H	*	Take off accident p.g.a. flygerfeil	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
22.05.43	III./J.G.5	F	Motka, Kolakysten	Shoot down in battle with Hurricanes	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
01.06.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Lade flyplass	Crash	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
01.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
03.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
03.06.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Crash due to. Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
03.06.43	III./J.G.5	H	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
03.06.43	6./J.G.5	F	Nordvest for Kola-munningen	Airbattle with a P-39	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Gerhard Harder (F) Missing 
04.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
05.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Alakurtti flyplass	Shoot down by enemy fighter	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Manfred Dahlschmidt (F) først meldt Missing men returnerte til avdeling. 
05.06.43	9./J.G.5	F	Nord for Urabukten	Airbattle	Bf 109F-4	Lt. Hellmut Steinle (F) Missing 
07.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 36 Ost/1725	Air battle	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury Flygeren, Fhr. Weitzenberger, reddet av Ar 196A-4 BB+YB fra Sumpfnotdienst. 
07.06.43	II./J.G.5	H	Pontsalenjoki flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
08.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Sørøst for Murmansk	Damage due to collision with enemy plane	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
08.06.43	III./J.G.5	H	Kirkenes flyplass	Emergency landing	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
09.06.43	Stab/J.G.5	H	Pori flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
10.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
11.06.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Rognan flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
12.06.43	7./J.G.5	F	Ved Motowskibukten	Shoot down byflak	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Ludwig Gaehme (F) Killed 
14.06.43	8./J.G.5	F	Øst for Nautsi	Air battle with aP-39	Bf 109F-4	Uffz. Günther Kimmeskamp (F) Killed 
15.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Nordøst for Kusamo	Shoot down in Air battle with a P-39	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Alois Mayrhofer (F) Wounded 
15.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Tolvandsjøen	Engine damage	Bf 109E-7	No personal injury 
15.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Nordvest for Murmaschi	Air battle	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. August Mors (F) først meldt Missing men returnerte til avdeling etter å ha blitt plukket opp av Ar 196A-4 BB+YB fra Sumpfnotdienst. 
15.06.43	Ld.Kdo. Norwegen	H	Kjevik flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109E-7	Ludwig Tigges (F) Wounded 
17.06.43	I./J.G.5	H	Sola flyplass	Damage during taxing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
16.06.43	4./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 36 Ost/2742	Shoot down by flak	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Georg Seedorf (F) POW 
18.06.43	6./J.G.5	F	Sør for Murmansk (Pl.Qu. 37 Ost/1089).	Shoot down by flak	Bf 109	Flygeren reddet av en Ar 196 fra Sumpfnotdienst og fløyet til Kirkenes. 
20.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Vest for Knjashaja-Guba	Shoot down by flak	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Otto Kaspar (F) først meldt Missing men returnerte til avdeling etter å ha blitt reddet av Ar 196A-4 BB+YB fra Sumpfnotdienst. 
21.06.43	6./J.G.5	F	Øst for Kowdosero sjøen	Shoot down by flak	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury Flygeren, Hptm. og Staffelkapitän Heinrich Erler, ble reddet av Ar 196A-4 BB+YB fra Sumpfnotdienst. 
21.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Heinrich Schmidt (F) Wounded 
22.06.43	7./J.G.5	F	Ved Murmansk	Shoot down by Hurricanes	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Walter Geisen (F) Missing 
22.06.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
23.06.43	4./J.G.5	F	Ved Kouta-Knjashaja	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Herbert Simon (F) Missing 
25.06.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Lade flyplass	Crash	Bf 109G-1	No personal injury 
27.06.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Gardermoen flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
27.06.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Gossen flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
27.06.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Gossen flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
29.06.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Bodø flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
29.06.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alakurtti flyplass	Crash	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
30.06.43	6./J.G.5	*	*	*	Bf 109G-6	Fw. Hans Döbrich 
03.07.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Værnes flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-1	Uffz. Bruno Buzzi (F) Wounded 
04.07.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Lade flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
04.07.43	I./J.G.5	H	Fornebu flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
06.07.43	II./J.G.5	H	Pori flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
07.07.43	1./J.G.5	F	Sørvest for Egersund	Shoot down inAir battle	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Josef Sommereger (F) Missing 
09.07.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Crash	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
09.07.43	6./J.G.5	F	Ca. 30 km sør for Vardø.	Probably Shoot down inAir battle	Bf 109G-6	Uffz. Hans Grosser (F) Missing


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

09.07.43	9./J.G.5	F	Nord for Petsamo	Probably Shoot down in Air battle with a P-39	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Oskar Günthroth (F) Killed 
11.07.43	I./J.G.5	F	Ved Orre	Crash Bf 109G-2	Obfhr. Benno Schmieder (F) Wounded 
12.07.43	7./J.G.5	F	7 km sørøst for Kiberg	Probably Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
12.07.43	7./J.G.5	F	7 km sørøst for Kiberg	Probably Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
15.07.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Gossen flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Günther Seraphim (F) Wounded 
16.07.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Fiskerhalsen	Shoot down byJAK-1	Bf 109G-6	Fw. Hans Döbrich (F) Wounded 
16.07.43	II./J.G.5	H	Salmijärvi flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
16.07.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Fiskerhalsen	Damage by Enemy fire	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
17.07.43	I./J.G.5	H	Sola flyplass	Crash	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
19.07.43	III./J.G.5	F	Olkkajärvi-sjøen	Engine fire	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
19.07.43	III./J.G.5	H	Alta flyplass	Engine trouble	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
20.07.43	6./J.G.5	F	Nord for Fiskerhalvøya	Probably in Air battle with a P-39.	Bf 109G-6	Uffz, Horst Oberländer (F) Killed 
20.07.43	5./J.G.5	F	Sørøst for Vardø	Air battle	Bf 109G-6	Hptm. Franz Wienhusen (F + Staff.kapitän) Wounded 
22.07.43	Ld.Kdo. Norwegen	H	Kjevik	Take off accident	Bf 109E-7	No personal injury 
25.07.43	Stab II./J.G.5	F	Nord for Kirkenes	Probably Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	Oblt. Fritz Leitner (F) Killed 
25.07.43	II./J.G.5	F	Ved Kiberg	Shoot down by Enemy fire	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Karl Vogel (F) Wounded 
25.07.43	I./J.G.5	F	Herdla flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
25.07.43	III./J.G.5	H	Alta flyplass	Engine fire	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
28.07.43	I./J.G.5	H	Sola flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
04.08.43	I./J.G.5	H	Sola flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
06.08.43	III./J.G.5	F	Sør for Njal-Java sjøen	Ground fire	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Heinfried Wiegang (F) Wounded 
10.08.43	II./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Emergency landing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
10.08.43	7./J.G.5	F	Ved Berlevåg	Shoot down by a P-39	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Alfred Leipersberger (F) Missing 
11.08.43	III./J.G.5	H	Kemi flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
11.08.43	6./J.G.5	F	Pontsalenjoki flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-6	Lt. Herbert Knigge (F) Killed 
13.08.43	III./J.G.5	F	Nordøst for Kirkenes	Crash. Unknown.	Bf 109G-2	Fw. August Lütking (F) Wounded 
14.08.43	II./J.G.5	H	Salmijärvi flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Martin Stahlschmidt (F) Wounded 
17.08.43	II./J.G.5	H	Rovaniemi flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-6	Fw. Horst Rolly (F) Wounded 
17.08.43	II./J.G.5	H	Rovaniemi flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-6	Uffz. Helmut Munedorf (F) Wounded 
18.08.43	6./J.G.5	F	Motovski	Shoot down byflak	Bf 109G-6	Fw. Christian Stolz (F) Missing 
19.08.43	9./J.G.5	F	Nord for Kirkenes	Shoot down by own flak	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Hans Thomann (F) Killed 
20.08.43	II./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Karl Mayerhofer (F) Wounded 
21.08.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Damage during taxing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
22.08.43	II./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Tire damage	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
22.08.43	II./J.G.5	F	Sørvest for Petsamo	Shoot down inAir battle	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Hans Enderle (F) Wounded 
24.08.43	10./J.G.5	F	Sør for Hustad	Unknown	Bf 109G-6	Uffz. Georg Kauper (F) Killed 
25.08.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Sola flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
26.08.43	II./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Damage during taxing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
26.08.43	I./J.G.5	F	Ikke rapportert	Crash	Bf 109G-2	Obfhr. Benno Schmieder (F) Wounded 
27.08.43	I./J.G.5	F	Fornebu flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G	No personal injury 
28.08.43	II./J.G.5	H	Petsamo flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Hans Yahle (F) Wounded 
29.08.43	Stab/J.G.5	H	Pori flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
30.08.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Ikke rapportert	Crash Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
31.08.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Herdla flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-4	No personal injury 
31.08.43	1.(F)/124	H	Nord for Pori	Emergency landing	Bf 109G-4	No personal injury 
01.09.43	III./J.G.5	H	Alta flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
03.09.43	III./J.G.5	F	Poljarny-Krug	flak	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
07.09.43	II./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
07.09.43	II./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Emergency landing	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Bernhard Messenzehl (F) Wounded 
07.09.43	6./J.G.5	F	Nordvest for Salmijärvi flyplass	Crash	Bf 109G-4	Uffz. Otto Caspar (F) døde av skadene 16.9.43. 
08.09.43	I./J.G.5	F	Fredrikshavn	Landing accident	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
09.09.43	Ld.Kdo. Finnland	H	Kemijärvi flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109E-4	No personal injury 
10.09.43	II./J.G.5	H	Nord for Petsamo flyplass	Collision in air Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
10.09.43	III./J.G.5	F	Alta flyplass	Crash Bf 109F-4	No personal injury Flygeren hoppet ut i fallskjerm. 
10.09.43	I./J.G.5	F	Fornebu flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
11.09.43	I./J.G.5	F	Fornebu flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
13.09.43	II./J.G.5	H	Salmijärvi flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
14.09.43 7./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 37 Ost/0175 (Ved Kiberg)	Air battle	Bf 109G-2	Ofw. Erich Beulich (F) Missing 
16.09.43	I./J.G.5	F	Lista flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
18.09.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Hit by a Bf 109.. on runway	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
19.09.43	III./J.G.5	F	Pontsalenjoki flyplass	Crash	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
20.09.43	Stab II./J.G.5	F	Kongsøyfjorden nordøst for Vardø	Shoot down by enemy A/C	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Manfred Stahlschmidt (F) Killed 
26.09.43	II./J.G.5	H	Salmijärvi flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
26.09.43	9./J.G.5	F	Motovskibukta	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Friedrich Schumann (F) Missing 
26.09.43	III./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 37 Ost/2057	flak	Bf 109G-6	Uffz. Helmut Neumann (F) Wounded 
27.09.43	I./J.G.5	F	Herdla flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	Fw. Hans Fiebrandt (F) Wounded 
27.09.43	II./J.G.5	H	Herdla flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
27.09.43	II./J.G.5	H	Herdla flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
27.09.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Herdla flyplass	Collision during take off	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
27.09.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Herdla flyplass	Collision during take off	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
28.09.43	9./J.G.5	F	Ukjent	Missing	Bf 109F-4	Uffz. Hans Link (F) POW 
29.09.43	III./J.G.5	H	Salmijärvi flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109E-7	No personal injury 
29.09.43	II./J.G.5	H	Petsamo flyplass	Damage duringtaxing	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
29.09.43	II./J.G.5	H	Petsamo flyplass	Damage duringtaxing	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
30.09.43	I./J.G.5	F	Fornebu flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
01.10.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Sola flyplass	Damage duringtaxing	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
04.10.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Sola flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
05.10.43	II./J.G.5	F	Alta flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109F-4	Fw. August Schneider (F) Wounded 
06.10.43	5./J.G.5	F	Sørøst for Vardø	Crash Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Richard Fleischmann (F) Killed 
07.10.43	2./J.G.5	F	Sørvest for Egersund	Missing	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Fritz Hüllenhütter (F) Killed 
07.10.43	Ld.Kdo. Norwegen	H	Kjeller flyplass	Crash	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
08.10.43	IV./J.G.5	H	Sola flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
09.10.43	13.(Z)/J.G.5	F	Anklam	Enemy bombs	*	Fw. Heinz Mähling (F) Killed 
11.10.43	2./J.G.5	H	Nordvest for Egersund	Crash Bf 109G-1	Uffz. Gärtner (F) Wounded 
12.10.43	II./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
12.10.43	II./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
12.10.43	II./J.G.5	H	Alta flyplass	Damage on UC	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
12.10.43	III./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
13.10.43	2./J.G.5	H	Sør for Mandal	Collision in air Bf 109G-2	Lt. Manfred Assmy (F) Killed 
15.10.43	1.(F)/120	H	Sola flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-4	No personal injury


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

17.10.43	II./J.G.5	H	Salmijärvi flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
19.10.43	II./J.G.5	H	Sørvest for Petsamo	Engine fire	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
25.10.43	2./J.G.5	F	Lista flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
25.10.43	10./J.G.5	F	Trolla Bruk	Crash. Unknown	Bf 109G-1	Fw. Fritz Wawrzin (F) Killed 
25.10.43	4./J.G.5	H	Nordøst for Pori	Crash. Unknown.	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Hans-Georg Pötter (F) Killed 
27.10.43	III./J.G.5	H	Svartnes flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
27.10.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Sola flyplass	Take off accident Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
31.10.43	II./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
31.10.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Lade flyplass	Collision with a Bf 109 during landing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
31.10.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Lade flyplass	Collision with a Bf 109 during landing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
01.11.43	I./J.G.11	H	Lista flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109T	No personal injury 
02.11.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Vest for Sola flyplass	Emergency landing on sea	Bf 109G-6	Gfr. Werner Ziersch (F) Wounded 
03.11.43	I./J.G.11	F	Sørvest for Farsund	Emergency landing on sea	Bf 109T	No personal injury 
03.11.43	II./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
03.11.43	II./J.G.5	F	Svartnes flyplass	Emergency landing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
03.11.43	II./J.G.5	F	Sørvest for Petsamo flyplass	Emergency landing	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
07.11.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Ørlandet flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Günther Seraphim (F) Wounded 
16.11.43	IV./JG 5	F	Sola flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
16.11.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Egersund	Air battle	Bf 109G-6	Gfr. Albert Schmilitzky (F) Wounded etter fallskjermutsprang 
16.11.43	I./JG 11 Lista flyplass	Emergency landing	Bf 109T-2	No personal injury 
17.11.43	1.(F)/120	F	Ved Scapa Flow	Missing. Bf 109G-4	Hptm. Willi Lerch (F) Missing 
17.11.42	II./J.G.5	H	Ved Hamna	Emergency landing	Bf 109F-4	No personal injury 
18.11.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Sola flyplass	Emergency landing on sea	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
18.11.43	1.(F)/120	H	Sola flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-4	No personal injury 
26.11.43	III./J.G.5	F	Petsamo flyplass	Emergency landing after friendly flak	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
01.12.43	III./J.G.5	H	Petsamo flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
02.12.43	9./J.G.5	F	Pl.Qu. 37 Ost/2070	Air battle with a P-39	Bf 109G-2	Lt. Günther Eichhorn (F) POW 
08.12.43	5./J.G.5	F	Ljutkova (nær Moskva)	Air battle	Bf 109G-2	Uffz. Helmut Weiser Killed 
16.12.43	III./J.G.5	H	Sør for Kirkenes	Engine trouble	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
20.12.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Værnes flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-2	No personal injury 
22.12.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Sola flyplass	Landing accident	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 
22.12.43	11./J.G.11	F	Lista flyplass	Damage during taxing	Bf 109T	No personal injury 
27.12.43	IV./J.G.5	F	Sola flyplass	Take off accident	Bf 109G-6	No personal injury 

* F = Operativ flyging. H = Ikke operativ flyging.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

The upshot of all this is this.......

Landing Accident - 31
Combat - 59
Emergency Landing - 15
On Sea - 6
Engine Problem - 24
Take Off - 94
Crash (unknown) - 22
Taxiing - 9
Missing - 16
Unknown - 7
Undercarriage - 2
Tire Damage - 1
Collision in Air - 2
Hit by Bf 109 on Ground - 1
Enemy Bombs - 1


Now this would give 110 loss of Non-Undercarriage loss 
Combat
Enemy Bombs
Missing
Hit by Bf 109
Collision
Engine Problem
On Sea

Leaving 180 for

Landing Accident
Emergency Landing
Take Off 
Crash (unknown)
Taxiing
Unknown
Undercarriage

Let the fighting begin.......


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 11, 2011)

That's really amazing!

Is this by chance the website: http://www.rafandluftwaffe.info/


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

It very well could be. That info I had is 10 years ago so maybe the site was updated and changed. But here is a good link at that site....

Luftwaffe Loss Register - Part 9 Fighters


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 11, 2011)

I see the vast vast majority were Bf109E/T's.. thats crazy. 'F' and up was a tiny fraction. the FW190 had far far more accidents then the Bf109F/G's. guess from now on I'll refer to the 'F' and up models only. thats probably typical for the rest of the JG units also. thanks.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2011)

Well, I also have the lists for 1944-45 and, as expected, you have the Fs/Gs. My point was to only take a slice of the whole picture and maybe deduce some truth from that.


----------



## Mosshorn (Jul 11, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Now [this means we have] *110* non-undercarriage losses from:
> 
> Combat
> Enemy Bombs
> ...




_Yeah, okay, sure, but how about that other thing, you've failed to factor that in, you know, the thing..._

Moss


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 12, 2011)

Thank you Njaco, for all that hard work. It is much appreciated.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

ditto. It shows landing and t/o accidents are a significant factor in aircraft losses. This is consistent with what one would expect. Aircraft whilst airborne dont tend to fall out of the sky. their greatest moments of risk are when they are being shot at, and when they get close to the ground.

What we dont know as yet is whether the Me109 suffered a higher than normal atttrition rate due to its narrow track and general undercarriage design. We have heard from people that flew it that it was a handful to fly, and an even bigger handful to land/takeoff. Maybe thats as good as we can do, simply to note that it had landing.takeoff characteristics that were "tricky"


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 12, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Do you have a source for that? Does that include combat losses not attributed to actual combat. See link
> 
> United States Army Air Forces in World War II


 
Sorry I do not know source. I recall reading it in book, cannot recall which.. but figure stuck, because it was surprising to me, how many aircraft were lost due to fault of pilots, mechanics.. and not to enemy! I recall figures were ca. 20% during mid war, and source said, 40% lost of all in accidents in 1944/45, USAAF! But you can check source Milosh and you gave. 

Also I find source for 2% loss. I recall wrong exact number, but it is in "ballpark".

Bf109 has very little torque....why? - Topic

less than 1000/26 000 = less than 3.8% incident.. so say this list shows all cases.. even minor like 10% damage, say, undercarriage damaged, replaced, plane flew next day. So myth solved - BUSTED! 1/3 is myth.

But one idea... I believe basic attitude is wrong.. we look at how many plane lost out of how many produced.. of course sooner or later all planes would be lost in theory, if they fly long enough.. accidents happen. Professionals for reason use statistics like flying hours against accidents.. our accident per flying hour.. higher the better.



butch2k said:


> FYI checking my 109 incident/accident list mentions less than 1000 takeoff/landing accident out of 26000 cases...
> 
> An example :
> Bf 109G-2 (wknr 10619) of I./JG 5 on 27-Aug-43 suffered a lanfing accident in Norwegen, at Fl.Pl. Oslo-Fornebu and was 20% damaged.
> ...


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 12, 2011)

I think Tante Ju makes a good point, if the LW in Norway never saw an enemy AC then all losses would be some sort of accident. The 109 cannot have been intrinsically dangerous in skilled hands or Gallend et al would not have finished the war.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> I think Tante Ju makes a good point, if the LW in Norway never saw an enemy AC then all losses would be some sort of accident. The 109 cannot have been intrinsically dangerous in skilled hands or Gallend et al would not have finished the war.



Unfortunately, the premise on which this theory is based is flawed. The Luftwaffe in Norway, whilst a relatively quiet sector, nevertheless saw considerable action. Firstly, it was the base of operations for LF5, which undertook considerable activity attempting to suppress the port of Murmansk, and also in attacking the Arctic Convoys to Russia. In between these major operations, the LW also had to do its best to protect its own coastal convoys from attack from Coastal Command (Beafdighters and Mosquitoes mostly) undertake patrol duties up and down the coast, training duties and a whole bevy of other reoutine things that airforces do. It was anything but a quiet sector from the point of view of air activity.

My point isnt so much that the 109 was more or less dangerous compared to its other stablemates. However credible sources have been advanced that show in at least two sectors (France'41 and Norway 42-3) attrition rates due to landing and takeoff accidents was about 50-70% of all non-combat losses, and non-combat losses accounted for a staggeringly high proportion of overall LW losses (never less than 30%, even in quiet times of the war). According to Murray, at various times in the war this climbed to and attrition rate of nearly 45% per month of the force structure. 

Unfortunately, we cannot deduce from those figures, whether the 109 had a relatively higher, or lower accident rate expressed as a percentage of its total number


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The Luftwaffe in Norway, whilst a relatively quiet sector, nevertheless saw considerable action.





parsifal said:


> It was anything but a quiet sector from the point of view of air activity.



This is contradict one self. In one sentence. Do you have figures? Or you talk?


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> My point isnt so much that the 109 was more or less dangerous compared to its other stablemates. However credible sources have been advanced that show in at least two sectors (France'41 and Norway 42-3) attrition rates due to landing and takeoff accidents was about 50-70% of all non-combat losses, and non-combat losses accounted for a staggeringly high proportion of overall LW losses (never less than 30%, even in quiet times of the war). According to Murray, at various times in the war this climbed to and attrition rate of nearly 45% per month of the force structure.


 I agree, but by the same token an airforce that is doing very well as in France 1941 will suffer high accident losses as a percentage of the total because they wernt suffering large combat losses. An airforce that is wiped out on a mission will have no landing accidents. The problem I feel is in the use of percentages, they dont represent the whole picture.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 12, 2011)

Mosshorn said:


> _Yeah, okay, sure, but how about that other thing, you've failed to factor that in, you know, the thing..._
> 
> Moss


 
What the 'ell are you talking about?

Mustang, you're right. If you look at those stats I hope people don't automatically assume that 180 losses were U/C related. THose are just non-combat related. There were emergency landing without petrol, hit obstacles and a few unknows and crashes. And how much of a loss? Maybe only 15% and it was repaired? Those are things to consider.

And to state again, this was only a part of the whole to move discussion along. Norway had its fair share of combat.




> we look at how many plane lost out of how many produced.. of course sooner or later all planes would be lost in theory, if they fly long enough..



Tante Ju, great point!


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 12, 2011)

Thank you.. so real interest: how many accidents per take off.. or flown hours.. say, compared 190?


----------



## Njaco (Jul 12, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> Thank you.. so real interest: how many accidents per take off.. or flown hours.. say, compared 190?


 
Wow, now that would be difficult. I would say you would first try to establish how many sorties and then how many L T/O accidents. I have the losses for Fw190s from mid-43 to 45 from that Norway file but sorties........ugh. Like I said, the Norway file I have covers all A/C losses of all types. I'll see if I can post the whole file somehow - not like those previous posts but something downloadable.


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 12, 2011)

Njaco said:


> If you look at those stats I hope people don't automatically assume that 180 losses were U/C related. THose are just non-combat related. There were emergency landing without petrol, hit obstacles and a few unknows and crashes. And how much of a loss? Maybe only 15% and it was repaired? Those are things to consider.
> 
> And to state again, this was only a part of the whole to move discussion along. Norway had its fair share of combat.


 Not at all Najco, I think the origin of the myth is that the stats are so difficult to interpret. A 30% loss in take off and landings could mean the undercarriage was suspect, it could also mean it was a brilliant fighter with a reliable engine flying a lot of sorties from dodgy airfields with no spares.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 12, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> Sorry I do not know source. I recall reading it in book, cannot recall which.. but figure stuck, because it was surprising to me, how many aircraft were lost due to fault of pilots, mechanics.. and not to enemy! I recall figures were ca. 20% during mid war, and source said, 40% lost of all in accidents in 1944/45, USAAF! But you can check source Milosh and you gave.


 I did - his numbers are more believeable and matches some of the tables posted


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 12, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> Not at all Najco, I think the origin of the myth is that the stats are so difficult to interpret. A 30% loss in take off and landings could mean the undercarriage was suspect, it could also mean it was a brilliant fighter with a reliable engine.


 
I think that this is something we have to decide, are we talking under carriage failures or landing accidents or landing AND take-off accidents?

I believe the "myth" was landing and take-off accidents. Of which collapsing landing gear would only be a minor percentage. Running into obstacles is certainly an accident but may have more to do with forward view than width of landing gear track. 

Some how people keep confusing the issue. 
Like this from a gaming board >

"Me-109 had an astonishing 11,000 takeoff/landing accidents resulting in destruction of the a/c! That number represents roughly one-third of the approximately 33,000 such a/c built by Germany." (usual internet claim)

followed by 

- 5 % of the 109's were lost in take off/landing accidents.
- The magazine has it wrong or has misintepretated the numbers. Luftwaffe lost about 1500 Me-109's in landing gear failures. 

Now even if this gentleman's numbers are correct 1500 is 4.5% of 33,000 which doesn't leave many other reasons for landing and take-off accidents. 
He is not actually comparing the same thing.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> This is contradict one self. In one sentence. Do you have figures? Or you talk?


 
Not contradictory at all. It was quiet because there was not as much combat action compared to other LW commands. But it was busy because there were persistent fears of invasion and a need to protect convoys along the coast from CC attacks. This is reflected in the level of committment the LW was forced to make to an otherwise backwater T/O.

According to Bauer the LW had approximately 250 A/C in Norway by June 1942. These aircraft took a heavy toll on allied convoys, but as time progressed, they also suffered heavy losses as well. I have the figures, and will dig them out for you.

In the meantime, the actual units deployed at various times into this TO were as follows (information previously posted by Lucky 13 in a Thread "Luftwaffe in Norway '40-'45..... "....but Ive seen this list in print myself:

GERMAN AIR FORCE UNITS IN NORWAY 1940-45 

Source: ”Flyalarm!” (Sem Stenersen 1991) ISBN 82-7046-058-3, 
authors Hafsten, Larsstuvold, Olsen, and Stenersen. 
Compiled by Bjoern Jervaas and Kurt Monsen. 


Between 1/9-39 – 8/4 –40 these German A/C were captured: 
Date Type C/N Unit Markings 
9/10-39 DO 18D-3 816 2/.Ku.Fl.Gr.606 8L+FK 
29/11-39 DO 18D-3 830 1/.Ku.Fl.Gr.406 K6+KH 
8/4-40 Ar 196A-2 0044 Bordfl.St.1/19 Unknown 
The latter was given to the Norwegian Navy, Trondheim..

During the attack on Norway the 9th of April 1940, these A/C were used: 
Unit Type Airfield Time Number 
of A/C Mission 
1./506 He 115 List auf Sylt 0630 6 Reccon 
2./506 He 115 List auf Sylt 0630 10 Reccon 
1./106 He 115 List auf Sylt 0700 10 Reccon 
1.(F)122 He 111/Do 17Hamburg 0830 3 Reccon 
1.(F) 120 Do 17 Lubeck 1350 1 Reccon 
Stab/K.G.4 He 111 Fassberg 1445 1 Reccon 
III/KG 26 He 111 Schwerin 0245 25 Bomb missions 
7./KG 4 He 111 Delmenhorst 0522 8 Bomb missions 
8/KG 4 He 111/Ju 88Delmenhorst 0712 11 Bomb missions 
9/KG 4 He 111 Delmenhorst 0430 6 Bomb missions 
K.Gr 100 He 111 Nordholz 0615 15 Bomb missions 
I./KG 26 He 111 Marx-Oldenburg 0935 8 Bomb missions 
II/KG 4 He 111 Fassberg 1043 9 Bomb missions 
III/KG 4 He 111 Delmenhorst 1335 17 Bombing of Oscarsborg 
II/KG 4 He 111 Fassberg 1400 4 Bombing of Oscarsborg 
I/KG 4 He 111 Perleberg 1454 19 Bombing of Oscarsborg 
I/St.G.1 Ju 87 Kiel-Holtenau 1100 6 Bombing of Oscarsborg 
1/ZG 76 Me 110 Westerland ukn 8 support for para units 
3/ZG 76 Me 110 Westerland ukn 8 support for para units 


The Norh Sea was heavily patroled by bombers, most from KG 30 and KG 26

Units attached to Luftflotte 5, 30/11-43 

Unit Aircraft Number Airfield 
Fliegerfuhrer Nord(Ost) Kirkenes 
Stab JG 5 Me 109 G 2 2 Petsamo, Finland 
Stab III/JG 5 Me 109 G 2 2 Petsamo, Finland 
7,8 9/JG 5 Me 109 G 2 25 Petsamo, Finland, with det. in Alakurti ”Jagdkdo Sud” 
Me 109 F 4 3 Petsamo, Finland, with det. in Alakurti ”Jagdkdo Sud” 
13.(Z)/JG 5 Me 110 G 0 1 Kirkenes 
Me 110 G 2 11 Kirkenes 
Me 110 G 4 2 Kirkenes 
Me 110 F 2 2 Kirkenes 
14 (jabo)/JG 5 FW 190 A 2 / A 3 13 Petsamo 
Jagdkdo.Nord Me 109G 1 Schwarm Altengard 
1.(F)/124 Ju 88D 1 13 Kirkenes, det.in Alakurti as Kette Lappl. 
Ju 88D 5 1 Kirkenes, det.in Alakurti as Kette Lappl. 
Ju 88A 4 Kirkenes, det.in Alakurti as Kette Lappl. 
Me 109 G 4 2 Kirkenes, det.in Alakurti as Kette Lappl. 
Me 109G 4/R 3 2 Kirkenes, det.in Alakurti as Kette Lappl. 
Westa 6 Ju 88 D ukn Banak 
3.(F)/S.A.Gr.130 BV 138 C1 8 Billefjord 
1.(H)/32 FW 189 A 12 Alakurti, det in Petsamo.(Finl.) 
I./S.G 5 Ju 87 D 5 13 Nautsi, transferred to Luftflotte 1 
Tr.St.Fl.Fhr.N Ju 52 3m 5 Rovaniemi, Finland 
4/T.Gr.20 Ju 52 3m 12 Kemi, Finland 
Sanflugber.8 Ju 52 3m 3 Kemi, Finland 
Fi 156 C 4 Kemi, Finland 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer Lofoten Bardufoss 
Stab/S.A.Gr 130 Ar 196 A 3 1 Tromsoe 
1.(F)/S.A Gr 130 BV 138 C 1 9 Tromsoe 
2.(F)/S.A Gr 130 BV 138 C 1 10 Tromsoe 
Kü.fl.St.1/406 He 115 B/C 11 Soerreisa 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer Nord (West) Trondheim 
Westa 5 Ju 88 D ukn Vaernes 
1.(F)/22 Ju 88 D 1 8 Vaernes 
Ju 88 D 5 1 Vaernes 
3./KG 40 FW 200 C 16 Vaernes 
1(F)/120 Ju 88 D 1 10 Sola 
Ju 88 D 5 1 Sola 
Ju 88 A 4 2 Sola 
Stab/S.A.Gr 131 Ar 196 A 3 1 Sola see 
1.(F)/S.A Gr 131 BV 138 C 1 8 Trondheim 
2.(F)/S.A Gr 131 BV 138 C 1 6 Sola See 
Ar 196 A3/5 5 Bergen 
Bordfl.St.1./196 Ar 196 A3/5 12 Aalborg, Denmark 
1/Versuchsverb.Ob.d.L ukn 1 rotte Aalborg, Denmark 
* 
Jagdfliegerfuhrer Norwegen Forus, Stavanger 
Stab IV/JG 5 Me 109 G 2 12 Lade 
10/JG 5 Me 109 G 6 5 Gossen 
11/JG 5 FW 190 A 2/3 21 Sola 
12/JG 5 FW 190 A 4 2 Herdla 
* 
Lg.Kdo.Norwegen Oslo 
Stab/T.Gr.20 Fornebu 
Seetr.Fl.St 3 Ju 52 See 12 Hommelvik, transf, to Athens 
2/T,Gr,20 Ju 52 12 
3/T.Gr 20 Ju 52 12 
Seetr.Fl.St.2 Ju 52 See 11 Hommelvik 
* 
Seenotdienstfuhrer 5 (Nord) Oslo 
5.Seenotstaffel Do 24 T 3 7 Stavanger, various detatchments 
Ar 196 A 4 4 Stavanger, various detatchments 
Ar 196 A 0 2 Stavanger, various detatchments 
10.Seenotstaffel Do 24 T 3 5 Tromsoe, various detatchments 
He 115 B 2 Tromsoe, various detatchments 
Hilfseenotdienst Nord FW 58 C 7 Diff. Coastal areas.


Strength of Luftwaffe in Norway and Finland 27/7-44

Unit Airfield Type(s) Remarks 
General der 
Luftwaffe in Finland Rovaniemi, Finland 
I/SG 5 Pontsalenjoki (Finl) FW 190 
I/SG 5 Immola (Finl) FW 190 
Stab/N.S.Gr.8 Pori (Finl) 
1/N.S.Gr 8 Pori (Finl) Ju 87 
2/N.S.Gr 8 Kemijaervi (Finl) Ju 87 
3/N.S.Gr 8 Pori (Finl) Ar 66 
1 (H) / 32 Alakurtti (Finl) FW 189 / 
Me 109 
* 
Schwarm Lappland Kemi (Finl) Ju 88 D Det. from 1 (F) / 24 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer 3 Kirkenes 
III/JG 5 Petsamo, Finl. Me 109 
1 (F)/124 Kirkenes Ju 88 D / 
Ju 188 Det. in Kemi, Finl. 
3 (F)/S.A Gr 130 Billefjord BV 138 C 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer 5 
Stab/S.A.Gr 130 Tromsoe Ar 196 1 schwarm det. in Aalesund. 
1.(F)/S.A Gr 130 Tromsoe BV 138 C 
2.(F)/S.A Gr 130 Trondheim BV 138 C 
3/KG 40 Vaernes FW 200 
1/406 Hommelvik He 115 det. in Kirkenes 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer 4 
Stab/KG 40 Gardermoen 
II/KG 40 Gardermoen He 177 
1 (F)/129 Horten BV 222 Det. to Tromsoe 
* 
Aufkl.Kette Skagerak Kjevik 
1 (F)/22 Kjevik Ju 88 D / 
Ju 188 Det. to Vaernes 
Stab/S.A.Gr 131 Sola See Ar 196 
2 (F)/S.A Gr 131 Sola See BV 138 / 
Ar 196 Det. to Bergen 
1 (F)/120 Sola Ju 88 D / 
Ju 188 
* 
Jagdfliegerfuhrer Norwegen Forus (Stavanger) 
Stab/JG 5 Forus FW 190 / Me 109 
Stab IV/JG 5 Forus 
10/JG 5 Lister FW 190 / Me 109 
11/JG 5 Sola FW 190 / Me 109 
12 / JG 5 Forus FW 190 / Me 109 
N.J.St Finland Lister Me 110 / 
Ju 88 C 
10/ZG 26 Herdla Me 110 
12/ZG 26 Gossen Me 110 
Luftwaffe in Norway – 25th december ’44

Unit Airfield Type(s) Remarks 
Fliegerfuhrer 3 Bardufoss 
Stab/N.S.Gr 8 Elvenes 
1/N.S.Gr 8 Elvenes Ju 87 
2/N.S.Gr 8 Bodoe Ju 87 
3/N.S.Gr 8 Elvenes Ju 87 
1.(F)/124 Bardufoss Ju 88 / Ju 188 
1./N.A.Gr 32 Bardufoss FW 189 
Stab/S.A.Gr 130 Tromsoe BV 222 
3.(F)/S.A.Gr 130 Tromsoe BV 138 
2/T.Gr 20 Rognan Ju 52 
Tr.St.Fl.Fhr.3 Bardufoss Ju 52 
San.Flugber.8 Bodoe Ju 52 / Fi 156 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer 5 Trondheim 
Stab/KG 26 Vaernes Ju 88 
I/KG 26 Bardufoss Ju 88 
II/KG 26 Vaernes Ju 88 
Westa 3 Oeysand Ju 88 / Ju 188 
1.(F)/S.A.Gr 130 Trondheim See BV 138 
Arado-Kette Hommelvik Ar 196 
Tr.Kette Fl.Fhr 5 Lade Ju 52 
Seenotstaffel 51 Tromsoe Do 24 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer 4 Kjeller 
2.(F)/S.A.Gr 131 Sola See Ar 196 
1 (F)/120 Eggemoen Ju 88 / Ju 188 
1.(F)/22 Kjevik Ju 88 
Seenotstaffel 50 Sola See Ar 196 
Tr.Fl.St.”Condor” Vaaler FW 200 
* 
Jagdfliegerfuhrer Norwegen Forus 
Stab IV/ZG 26 Lade 
10/ZG 26 Lade Me 110 
11/ZG 26 Gardermoen Me 410 
12/ZG 26 Herdla Me 110 
N.J.St.Norwegen Lister Me 110 / Ju 88 
Stab/JG 5 Lade 
Stab III/JG 5 Gossen 
9/JG 5 Herdla FW 190 
10/JG 5 Gossen FW 190 
11/JG 5 Gossen FW 190 
12/JG 5 Herdla FW 190 
Stab IV/JG 5 Gossen 
13/JG 5 Forus Me 109 
14/JG 5 Sola Me 109 
15/JG 5 Forus Me 109 
16/JG 5 Sola same

Units directly under command of Komm.Gen.d.dt.Lw in Norwegen

Unit Airfield Type(s) 
Stab/T.Gr.20 Fornebu FW 58 ”Weihe” 
3/T.Gr 20 Eggemoen Ju 52 
4/T.Gr 20 Rygge Ju 52 
See Tr.Fl.St.2 Hommelvik Ju 52 See 
Flugber.Norwegen Fornebu He 111 / Do 17 


ere not a


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

And in 1945 the OB was 

Luftwaffe forces in Norway 10th of May ’45

Unit Airfield Type Number 
of A/C 
General der Luftwaffe Oslo 
5.Fliegerdivision Moen 
1 (F)/Aufkl.Gr 124 Bodoe Ju 188 F1 2 
Bodoe Ju 188 D2 1 
Bodoe Ju 88 D1 2 
Bodoe He 111 H 6 1 
Bodoe Fi 156 C 3 1 
Gardermoen Ju 188 D2 1 
Stab/Seeaufkl.Gr 130 Soerrreisa BV 222 C 12 1 
3 (F)/Seeaufkl.Gr.130 Tromsoe Ar 196 A4 2 
1./Nahaufkl.Gr.32 Bodoe Me 109 G-8/R5 7 
Bodoe FW 189 A2 2 
Bodoe FW 189 A 3 2 
Bodoe Fi 156 C3 3 
Bodoe Ar 199 A 0 1 
Bardufoss Fi 156 D 1 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer 4 Trondheim 
Stab Kjeller Fi 156 C3 1 
Stab/KG 26 Vaernes Ju 88 A 1 
Vaernes He 111H 6 1 
II/KG 26 Gardermoen Ju 88 A 17 20 
Vaernes Ju 88 A 17 2 
III/KG 26 Gardermoen Ju 188 A3 26 
Vaernes Ju 188 A 3 5 
1(F)/Aufkl.Gr 120 Sola Ju 188 D2 2 
Sola Ju 88 D1 1 
Sola Ju 88 D5 1 
Sola Fi 156 C3 3 
Vaernes Ju 88 D1 1 
Vaernes He 111 H6 1 
Gardermoen He 111 H6 1 
1.(F) Seeaufkl.Gr 130 Trondheim Ar 196 A 3 2 
Einsatzkdo 1 / F.A.G 1 Sola Ar 234 B2 2 
Wettererk.Staffel 3 Oeysand Ju 188 D 2 1 
Vaernes Ju 88 D 1 2 
11./ZG 26 Oerland Me 410 A/B 15 
Oerland FW 58 
Seetransportfl. 
Staffel 2 Sola Ju 52 See 3 
Kjevik Ju 52 See 4 
Hommelvik Ju 52 See 1 
Transportfl.Gr 20 Fornebu Ju 52 See 13 
Fornebu Me 108 B 1 1 
Fornebu FW 189 A 3 
Fornebu FW 58C 2 
Kjevik Ju 52 11 
Kjevik FW 189 A2 1 
Kjevik FW 58 B 2 1 
Bardufoss Ju 52 
* 
Jagdfliegerfuhrer Norwegen. 
Staff use: Forus Fi 156 C3 1 
Forus Ju 52 1 
Forus Me 108 1 
Lade Fi 156 1 
Stab II / JG 5 Herdla FW 190 A8 1 
Herdla FW 190 F 8 1 
Herdla Fi 156 C 3 1 
5/JG 5 Herdla FW 190 A8 9 
Herdla FW 190 F8 1 
7/JG 5 Sola Me 109 G 6 16 
Sola Me 110 G 2 1 
9/JG 5 Herdla FW 190 A 3 5 
Herdla FW 190A 8 4 
Herdla Me 110 G2 1 
Stab III / JG 5 Gossen Me 109 G-14 1 
6/JG 5 Rygge Me 109 G 6 16 
10/JG 5 Gossen Me 109 G 6 6 
Gossen Me 109 G-14 6 
Gossen Me 110 G 2 1 
11/JG 5 Gossen Me 109 G 6 16 
Stab IV/JG 5 Kjevik Kjevik Me 109 G-14 2 
Forus Fi 156 C 3 1 
Forus FW 58B 2 1 
13/JG 5 Lista Me109G 6 7 
Lista Me 109 G-14 8 
Lista Me 110 G 2 1 
14/JG 5 Kjevik Me 109 G 6 7 
Kjevik Me 109 G-14 9 
Kjevik Me 110 G 2 1 
15/JG 5 Lista Me 109 G-14 14 
4/N.J.G 3 Kjevik Me 110 G 4 2 
Gardermoen Ju 88 G 6 5 
Gardermoen Ju 88 C 6 1 
* 
Other units: 
Verbindungsstaffel Norwegen. 
Fornebu Ju 52 2 
Fornebu Si 204 D1 1 
Fornebu Fi 156 2 
Vaaler He 111 H5 1 
Vaaler Me 108 B 1 1 
Vaernes He 111 E 1 
Tromsoe W.34 hi See 1 
Kjevik Ju 52 1 
Lade Fi 156 C 2 
Bardufoss Fi 156 C 2 
Bardufoss Si 204 D 1 1 
Flugbereitschaft/Fl.Verbindungs- 
Geschwader 2 Fornebu Fi 156 F 3 
Bergen Fi 156 F 3 
Kdo.Flughafen- 
Bereich Oslo Fornebu Fi 156 C 3 1 
Kdo.Flughafen- 
Bereich Dronth. Lade Fi 156 C 3 1 
Kdo.Flughafen- 
Bereich Narvik Bardufoss Fi 156 C 3 1 
Fliegerhorstkdtr.Bodoe Bodoe Fi 156 C 3 1 
Hoeh.Kdo.71 Bardufoss Fi 156 C 3 1 
2/M.S.Gr 1 Fornebu Ju 52 MS 
Listing – All flying units of Luftwaffe in Norway 
Unit 
Reccon 
Kustenfliegergruppe 106, 125, 406, 506, 606, 706 and 906 
Bordfliegergruppe 196 
Seeaufklarungsgruppe 130, 131 
Arado-Kette 
Aufklarungsgruppe (H) 10, (F) 22, (H) 32, (F) 120, 122, 124, 129, Ob.d.L, 
Fernaufklarungsgruppe 5 
Aufklarungsketta A.O.K 20 
Aufklarungskette Skagerak 
Wetterkundungsstaffel 3, 5, 6 
Sea Rescue units 
Seenotdienststaffel 5, 10, 50, 51 
Bomb units 
Lehrgeschwader 1 
Kampfgeschwader 4, 26, 30, 40, 54, 60, 200, 100 
Dive bombers heavy fighters 
Lehrgescwader 1 
Sturzkampfgeschwader 1, 5 
Schlachtgeschwader 5 
Nachtschlachtgruppe 8 
Zerstoerergeschwader 76, 26 
Nachtjagdstaffel Finland, Norwegen 
Nachtjagdgeschwader 3 
Jachtgeschwader 5, 77, 2, 5, 11, 77 
Tragergeschwader 186 
Jagdgruppe Drontheim 
Jagdgruppe z.b.V 
Jagdkommandos Sud Nord 
Transport,- and other support units 
Versuchsverband Ob.d.L 
Minensuchgruppe 1 
Kampfgruppe z.b.V 9, 11, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 
Kampfgeschwader z.b.V 108, 1 
Ransportfliegergruppe 20 
Seetransportfliegerstaffel 2, 3 
Transportfliegerstaffel Condor 
Transportstaffel z.b.V 
Kampfgruppe z.b.V 4 
Verbindungsstaffel 2, 4 
Verbindungsstaffel Norwegen 
Transportstaffel Fl.Fuhr. Nord (Ost), Nord (West) 
Sanitatsflugbereitschaft 8 
Fliegerverbindungsgeschwader 2 
Flugbereitschaft Luftflotte 5 
Flugbereitschaft Komm.General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Finland. 
Kampfgeschwader z.b.V 5 
Fliegerzielstaffel 50, 51 
Luftdienstkommando Norwegen, Finland 
Transportkette Fl.Fuhrer 3, 5 
Fuhrungskette X Fliegerkorps 
Sonderstaffel Transozean 
Abbreviations used:

Kampfgeschwader KG 
Kampfgruppe K.Gr 
Jachtgeschwader JG 
Jagdgruppe J.Gr. 
Transportgeschwader T.G 
Transportgruppe T.Gr. 
Zerstoerergeschwader Z.G 
Sturtzkampfgeschwader St.G 
Schlachtgeschwader S.G 
Aufklarungsgruppe (F) (F) /Aufkl.gr 
Aufklarungsgruppe (H) (H) /Aufkl.gr 
Bordfliegergruppe B.Fl.Gr. 
Kustenfliegergruppe Ku,.Fl.Gr. 
Seeaufklarungsgruppe S.A.Gr 
Minensuchgruppe M.S.Gr 
Nachtschlachtgruppe N.S.Gr. 
Wetteerkundungsstaffel Westa or, Wekusta 
Sanitetsflugbereitschaft San.Fl.Ber. 
* 
Naval planes (See) 
Dive bombers (St.) 
Heavy fighter (Me 110) (Z) 
Distant reccon (F) 
Close reccon (H) 
Fighter-Bomber (Jabo) 
Railway Bombers (Eis.)


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

And in 1945 the OB was 

Luftwaffe forces in Norway 10th of May ’45

Unit Airfield Type Number 
of A/C 
General der Luftwaffe Oslo 
5.Fliegerdivision Moen 
1 (F)/Aufkl.Gr 124 Bodoe Ju 188 F1 2 
Bodoe Ju 188 D2 1 
Bodoe Ju 88 D1 2 
Bodoe He 111 H 6 1 
Bodoe Fi 156 C 3 1 
Gardermoen Ju 188 D2 1 
Stab/Seeaufkl.Gr 130 Soerrreisa BV 222 C 12 1 
3 (F)/Seeaufkl.Gr.130 Tromsoe Ar 196 A4 2 
1./Nahaufkl.Gr.32 Bodoe Me 109 G-8/R5 7 
Bodoe FW 189 A2 2 
Bodoe FW 189 A 3 2 
Bodoe Fi 156 C3 3 
Bodoe Ar 199 A 0 1 
Bardufoss Fi 156 D 1 
* 
Fliegerfuhrer 4 Trondheim 
Stab Kjeller Fi 156 C3 1 
Stab/KG 26 Vaernes Ju 88 A 1 
Vaernes He 111H 6 1 
II/KG 26 Gardermoen Ju 88 A 17 20 
Vaernes Ju 88 A 17 2 
III/KG 26 Gardermoen Ju 188 A3 26 
Vaernes Ju 188 A 3 5 
1(F)/Aufkl.Gr 120 Sola Ju 188 D2 2 
Sola Ju 88 D1 1 
Sola Ju 88 D5 1 
Sola Fi 156 C3 3 
Vaernes Ju 88 D1 1 
Vaernes He 111 H6 1 
Gardermoen He 111 H6 1 
1.(F) Seeaufkl.Gr 130 Trondheim Ar 196 A 3 2 
Einsatzkdo 1 / F.A.G 1 Sola Ar 234 B2 2 
Wettererk.Staffel 3 Oeysand Ju 188 D 2 1 
Vaernes Ju 88 D 1 2 
11./ZG 26 Oerland Me 410 A/B 15 
Oerland FW 58 
Seetransportfl. 
Staffel 2 Sola Ju 52 See 3 
Kjevik Ju 52 See 4 
Hommelvik Ju 52 See 1 
Transportfl.Gr 20 Fornebu Ju 52 See 13 
Fornebu Me 108 B 1 1 
Fornebu FW 189 A 3 
Fornebu FW 58C 2 
Kjevik Ju 52 11 
Kjevik FW 189 A2 1 
Kjevik FW 58 B 2 1 
Bardufoss Ju 52 
* 
Jagdfliegerfuhrer Norwegen. 
Staff use: Forus Fi 156 C3 1 
Forus Ju 52 1 
Forus Me 108 1 
Lade Fi 156 1 
Stab II / JG 5 Herdla FW 190 A8 1 
Herdla FW 190 F 8 1 
Herdla Fi 156 C 3 1 
5/JG 5 Herdla FW 190 A8 9 
Herdla FW 190 F8 1 
7/JG 5 Sola Me 109 G 6 16 
Sola Me 110 G 2 1 
9/JG 5 Herdla FW 190 A 3 5 
Herdla FW 190A 8 4 
Herdla Me 110 G2 1 
Stab III / JG 5 Gossen Me 109 G-14 1 
6/JG 5 Rygge Me 109 G 6 16 
10/JG 5 Gossen Me 109 G 6 6 
Gossen Me 109 G-14 6 
Gossen Me 110 G 2 1 
11/JG 5 Gossen Me 109 G 6 16 
Stab IV/JG 5 Kjevik Kjevik Me 109 G-14 2 
Forus Fi 156 C 3 1 
Forus FW 58B 2 1 
13/JG 5 Lista Me109G 6 7 
Lista Me 109 G-14 8 
Lista Me 110 G 2 1 
14/JG 5 Kjevik Me 109 G 6 7 
Kjevik Me 109 G-14 9 
Kjevik Me 110 G 2 1 
15/JG 5 Lista Me 109 G-14 14 
4/N.J.G 3 Kjevik Me 110 G 4 2 
Gardermoen Ju 88 G 6 5 
Gardermoen Ju 88 C 6 1 
* 
Other units: 
Verbindungsstaffel Norwegen. 
Fornebu Ju 52 2 
Fornebu Si 204 D1 1 
Fornebu Fi 156 2 
Vaaler He 111 H5 1 
Vaaler Me 108 B 1 1 
Vaernes He 111 E 1 
Tromsoe W.34 hi See 1 
Kjevik Ju 52 1 
Lade Fi 156 C 2 
Bardufoss Fi 156 C 2 
Bardufoss Si 204 D 1 1 
Flugbereitschaft/Fl.Verbindungs- 
Geschwader 2 Fornebu Fi 156 F 3 
Bergen Fi 156 F 3 
Kdo.Flughafen- 
Bereich Oslo Fornebu Fi 156 C 3 1 
Kdo.Flughafen- 
Bereich Dronth. Lade Fi 156 C 3 1 
Kdo.Flughafen- 
Bereich Narvik Bardufoss Fi 156 C 3 1 
Fliegerhorstkdtr.Bodoe Bodoe Fi 156 C 3 1 
Hoeh.Kdo.71 Bardufoss Fi 156 C 3 1 
2/M.S.Gr 1 Fornebu Ju 52 MS 
Listing – All flying units of Luftwaffe in Norway 
Unit 
Reccon 
Kustenfliegergruppe 106, 125, 406, 506, 606, 706 and 906 
Bordfliegergruppe 196 
Seeaufklarungsgruppe 130, 131 
Arado-Kette 
Aufklarungsgruppe (H) 10, (F) 22, (H) 32, (F) 120, 122, 124, 129, Ob.d.L, 
Fernaufklarungsgruppe 5 
Aufklarungsketta A.O.K 20 
Aufklarungskette Skagerak 
Wetterkundungsstaffel 3, 5, 6 
Sea Rescue units 
Seenotdienststaffel 5, 10, 50, 51 
Bomb units 
Lehrgeschwader 1 
Kampfgeschwader 4, 26, 30, 40, 54, 60, 200, 100 
Dive bombers heavy fighters 
Lehrgescwader 1 
Sturzkampfgeschwader 1, 5 
Schlachtgeschwader 5 
Nachtschlachtgruppe 8 
Zerstoerergeschwader 76, 26 
Nachtjagdstaffel Finland, Norwegen 
Nachtjagdgeschwader 3 
Jachtgeschwader 5, 77, 2, 5, 11, 77 
Tragergeschwader 186 
Jagdgruppe Drontheim 
Jagdgruppe z.b.V 
Jagdkommandos Sud Nord 
Transport,- and other support units 
Versuchsverband Ob.d.L 
Minensuchgruppe 1 
Kampfgruppe z.b.V 9, 11, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 
Kampfgeschwader z.b.V 108, 1 
Ransportfliegergruppe 20 
Seetransportfliegerstaffel 2, 3 
Transportfliegerstaffel Condor 
Transportstaffel z.b.V 
Kampfgruppe z.b.V 4 
Verbindungsstaffel 2, 4 
Verbindungsstaffel Norwegen 
Transportstaffel Fl.Fuhr. Nord (Ost), Nord (West) 
Sanitatsflugbereitschaft 8 
Fliegerverbindungsgeschwader 2 
Flugbereitschaft Luftflotte 5 
Flugbereitschaft Komm.General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Finland. 
Kampfgeschwader z.b.V 5 
Fliegerzielstaffel 50, 51 
Luftdienstkommando Norwegen, Finland 
Transportkette Fl.Fuhrer 3, 5 
Fuhrungskette X Fliegerkorps 
Sonderstaffel Transozean 
Abbreviations used:

Kampfgeschwader KG 
Kampfgruppe K.Gr 
Jachtgeschwader JG 
Jagdgruppe J.Gr. 
Transportgeschwader T.G 
Transportgruppe T.Gr. 
Zerstoerergeschwader Z.G 
Sturtzkampfgeschwader St.G 
Schlachtgeschwader S.G 
Aufklarungsgruppe (F) (F) /Aufkl.gr 
Aufklarungsgruppe (H) (H) /Aufkl.gr 
Bordfliegergruppe B.Fl.Gr. 
Kustenfliegergruppe Ku,.Fl.Gr. 
Seeaufklarungsgruppe S.A.Gr 
Minensuchgruppe M.S.Gr 
Nachtschlachtgruppe N.S.Gr. 
Wetteerkundungsstaffel Westa or, Wekusta 
Sanitetsflugbereitschaft San.Fl.Ber. 
* 
Naval planes (See) 
Dive bombers (St.) 
Heavy fighter (Me 110) (Z) 
Distant reccon (F) 
Close reccon (H) 
Fighter-Bomber (Jabo) 
Railway Bombers (Eis.)


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

This site also provides an excellent resource from which to research this issue

Nordic Aviation During WW2


Now, just having a quick lok at a random sample.....JG11 is attached to LW Norway, though in reality it is based in Denmark and Northern Germany (with some of its formations defending southern Norway). It was heavily engaged in the defence over Northern Germany including operations against Operation Gommorrah and the "Blitz week". In a one year period, from 15/04/43 to 15/04/44 it suffered exactly 200 losses, of which 78, or 38% were non-combat related

If we assume an average paper strength of 48 a/c attached to the gershwader at any given time, then in that 12 month period, the group suffered an overall attrition rate of 417% for the whole year, or 35% of its force strength per month. The attrition rate due to non-combat reasons (accidents), was 162.5% for the whole year, or 13.5% per month. Thats 6-7 aircraft out of 48, lost every month to non-combat causes.

39% of the gershwaders losses for the were due to attrition. And this is in a T/O that was partly a "quiet sector". In point of fact there were no "quiet sectors" for the LW, no areas where it could sit back and take it easy


----------



## Nikademus (Jul 12, 2011)

Interesting thread, given that i'd only recently read from a recent author who also disagreed with the narrow carriage issue with the 109.

This excerpt from James Holland's recent book "The Battle of Britian" published this year.

_ It was also true that the Me 109E had a comparatively narrow undercarriage, which made it less stable on the ground, potentially a hazard in the hands of inexperienced pilots when touching down. However, although it's roots were much narrower than that of the Spitfire, it's legs were splayed so that in fact, they were about the same width as that of the British fighter. The Hurricane, with it's inward folding undercarriage, was the most stable of the three on the ground, but the great advantage of the Me 109 arrangement was that the legs were attached to the underside of the fuselage rather than the wing. This meant wings could be replaced with comparative ease, without having to dismantle the wheels, legs and hydraulics. 

It is a myth, however, that it was the narrow undercarriage that made the Me 109 so potentially lethal to the inexperienced. Rather, it was it's unforgiving nature at low speeds, more a result of it's high wing loading and the enormous torque of it's DB601 engine. 

At Guines, for example, there was a track running about two-thirds of the way across the airfield. 'It was only a slight dip' says Hans-Ekkehard Bob, 'but it was just where you took off and where you landed back down again. If you didn't judge it right, it was very easy to jolt the plane as the wheels went over it. Then a wingtip would hit the ground, then the propeller, and before you knew it the machine had flipped. It never happened to me, but it did to lots of others.'

It is also true that considerable numbers of Me 109s were lost or damaged in flying accidents, but there is little to suggest that they were any higher than those of the RAF, which suffered it's fair share too. Despite it's wide and stable undercarriage, a staggering 463 Hurricanes, for example, were damaged as a result of accidents between 7/10/40 and 10/31/40. Some of these were minor prangs, others were fatal. _

snip.

_It has been suggested that these [non combat losses] contributed as much as 20-30% of the losses during the battle - on both sides. Most were caused by a mixture of inexperience, lack of concentration and fatigue. _



From my end....last year i went to a local airshow staged by the Flying Heritage Museum in Everett WA. They have a flyable Me-109E (or Bf-109E if you prefer) and I watched it fly that day. I asked the pilot afterwards if the landing gear was of particular concern to him. He said no. In fact i overheard him comment to a honored guest Colonel Ralph C. Jenkins who was there to watch the show and see his preserved P-47, "Did you catch my mistake?" Apparantly he'd come down a little too hard and bounced the plane slightly off the landing gear on touchdown.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 12, 2011)

Good stuff guys, this thread has really really become interesting. 

I guess it is a good thing we did not close it like the originator of the thread wanted huh?


----------



## Mosshorn (Jul 12, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> They have a flyable Me-109E (or Bf-109E if you prefer) and I watched it fly that day. I asked the pilot afterwards if the landing gear was of particular concern to him. He said no.



Well... As we all know, a Bf-109E with the guns, ammo and armor stripped out *is not* a Bf-109G loaded for combat. The difference in the weight of the two different engines alone makes the E versus the G _two very different aircraft._

Bronc


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 12, 2011)

This really hs become a great thread, thanks fellas.


----------



## davebender (Jul 12, 2011)

Flying in northern Norway is a lot like flying in the Aleutian Islands. Accident rates in those areas are going to be much higher then elsewhere.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 12, 2011)

I was looking at the Hungarian Stats for accidents, far different then the Luftwaffe. Same goes with the Fins. whats going on there? better pilots? doubt it. can't be becouse they had fewer Bf109's, cause the t/o-landings accident percentages would be the same, no? I mean, math is math right?


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Good stuff guys, this thread has really really become interesting.
> 
> I guess it is a good thing we did not close it like the originator of the thread wanted huh?



It is a good thread. Its a pity that the author, Lighthunmust got irritated because we didnt understand what he was after. You cant execise that amount of control over a thread, it doesnt work that way. Theres always a degree of meandering and off topic discussion that goes with this stuff. we always seem to sort of follow the topic.....


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> Flying in northern Norway is a lot like flying in the Aleutian Islands. Accident rates in those areas are going to be much higher then elsewhere.



I'd agree with that, except that the example I quoted JG11, was based in Denmark and Northern Germany, and then finally in southern Norway. 

Weather plays an important part in atrition rates in wartime. Aircraft are routinely asked to exceed safe weight limits, fly in wether that would be judged unsuitable in peacetime, and fly beyond the design limits of the aircraft 9including beyond range limits). However in this particulalr case, there should not be anything unusual or extraordinary about the weather conditions that JG11 were asked to operate in.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> I was looking at the Hungarian Stats for accidents, far different then the Luftwaffe. Same goes with the Fins. whats going on there? better pilots? doubt it. can't be becouse they had fewer Bf109's, cause the t/o-landings accident percentages would be the same, no? I mean, math is math right?



I would need to see the stats to make any suggestion. The figures from Knutsens site are for aircraft damged above 60%, so they are write offs. Perhaps the hungarian air force wa not asked to fly as hard, or as often, or in conditions as bad as was often put onto the LW. But we need to look at your data to try and make sense of it.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 12, 2011)

its not my data, its the publishers, in this case, the Hungarian Airforce, and Various websites on the Finnish Bf109's.
anyways you hit the nail on the head. theres more to it then just the L/G design. ALOT more to it. the Luftwaffe pilots
in some cases were asked to fly from, and land in places that under normal circumstances they would have said " no
fricken way!". they had to invent new ways to land an aircraft. and invent new ways to takeoff as well. pioneers I say.

Imagine scambling to intercept a formation of 100's of B-17 from an airfield that was little more then a 50ft wide firebreak
barely 3/4mile long in the middle of a forrest. fighting the B-17's, sometimes barely escaping death, other times watching your
friends die, then having to turn around with next to no fuel, and try to land in that mess. 

can anybody blame them if they were less then perfect on their landings?


----------



## Juha (Jul 12, 2011)

As for first 8 days of June 44, just before the massive Soviet attack on the Finnish field army, so at the time heightened but not extraordinarily high air activity , the FAF lost in air combat 2 Bf 109Gs + one dam and 2 damaged in accidents, one groundlooped during landing and one swerved during t/o.

Juha


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 12, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> Imagine scambling to intercept a formation of 100's of B-17 from an airfield that was little more then a 50ft wide firebreak
> barely 3/4mile long in the middle of a forrest. fighting the B-17's, sometimes barely escaping death, other times watching your
> friends die, then having to turn around with next to no fuel, and try to land in that mess.
> 
> can anybody blame them if they were less then perfect on their landings?



No one can blame them, the question is would a different aircraft, with different landing/ground handling characteristics suffered fewer accidents or allowed more of those pilots to make safe homecomings in those conditions.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 12, 2011)

well In this case I thing the gear is very suited for the conditions.. maybe Willy was onto something. Can't imagine a spit or p-51 handling those conditions with any authority.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> No one can blame them, the question is would a different aircraft, with different landing/ground handling characteristics suffered fewer accidents or allowed more of those pilots to make safe homecomings in those conditions.



we are never going to get a perfect comparison, because the variables are just too many, but I wonder if we could get loss data for an allied fighter unit of similar size, operating in similar weather conditions, at about the same time in the war, to compare loss ratios. At this mid point in the war, the levels of pilot experience were similar, the combat stresses at least comparable, the only real difference should be the aircraft. Although the type and finish of the srtips they were operating from may be different, I admit.

So does anyone have a readily available set of loss numbers for an allied fighter unit of wing or group size operating out of say England or Scotland mid war.... we need loss by cause and loss by date basically


----------



## Njaco (Jul 12, 2011)

nothing from me ....only LW. Sorry.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2011)

we would need as our random sample something "normal" or "typical", not unusual or extraordinary. Picking a unit that lost its entire fighter strength in a day, for example due to accidents, is not going to yield a comparable result, unless thats what happened to every allied fighter unit in Europe.


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 13, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> It is also true that considerable numbers of Me 109s were lost or damaged in flying accidents, but there is little to suggest that they were any higher than those of the RAF, which suffered it's fair share too. Despite it's wide and stable undercarriage, a staggering 463 Hurricanes, for example, were damaged as a result of accidents between 7/10/40 and 10/31/40. Some of these were minor prangs, others were fatal. [/i]


 
The period 7/10/40 and 10/31/40 was when hurricanes were also being used as night fighters. I think it is very difficult to get the whole picture.


----------



## davebender (Jul 13, 2011)

> period 7/10/40 and 10/31/40 was when hurricanes were also being used as night fighters.


10./(N)JG26, 10./(N)JG53, and IV./(N)JG2 employed Me-109s as night fighters until October 1940.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> well In this case I thing the gear is very suited for the conditions.. maybe Willy was onto something. Can't imagine a spit or p-51 handling those conditions with any authority.



Why?
any sound reasoning or just love of the 109?

I will grant you that some American fighters might have been a disaster in a similar situation. But Landing gear alone is not the determining factor in landing and take off accidents. Torque effect on take-off with narrow runways and having enough rudder authority is one factor. Take-off and landing speed is another. A plane may have a reputation for rugged landing gear but if it's touch down speed is close to 100mph it is going to need rugged landing gear compared to a plane that touches down at 80mph. Braking and controlability can make a difference between a good landing (one you can walk away from) and clipping the trees with a wing tip.


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 13, 2011)

The only thing Willy was on to was making the landing gear so the aircraft could be moved around minus it's wings. That made for easy manufactor and transport.

The Luftwaffe just did like military men around the world have to do, they coped with what they had.


----------



## Nikademus (Jul 13, 2011)

Mosshorn said:


> Well... As we all know, a Bf-109E with the guns, ammo and armor stripped out *is not* a Bf-109G loaded for combat. The difference in the weight of the two different engines alone makes the E versus the G _two very different aircraft._
> 
> Bronc



Whether an E or a G, both planes still have the same landing gear. A better argument would be to point out that there's a big difference between landing on a grass field vs. a concrete runway, or the difference in fatigue of the pilots on landing etc etc. However the differences in a plane's characteristics in different load conditions as with weather and airfield conditions are a matter of pilot experience. I doubt, for example that the pilot quoted in the BoB book experienced in flying a 109E under combat conditions is suddenly going to start ground looping in Russia using a new 109G. If he did have an accident....was it in fact because of the landing gear? 

In regards to the pilot's opinion of whom i spoke too, i think it would be foolish to discount the views of one who actually flies the plane in question. It doesn't make his word absolute but it's good food for thought. In the end, I am personally more swayed by Holland's reasoning and research and add the opinion of an actual modern pilot of the plane as adding support.

In that same fashion I was able to ask the pilot of the Collection's flyable I-16 Ishak on whether the plane was as hard to fly as i've read. His answer was also interesting. He said it wasn't "hard" per se.....but that you had to be careful....because the plane has no flaps and as such you have to use the throttle to help land the plane. Compounding this is the cockpit arrangement. The landing gear has to be manually cranked down but the device is located on the opposite side of the throttle (he told me)...so with having to keep one hand on the flight stick, your forced to use the other hand going back and forth from one side of the cockpit to the other as you crank (and it takes ALOT of cranks) the gear down, then with the same hand swap back to the throttle. All this while landing....which, unless i'm mistaken is the most difficult part of flying. (I know i'd be terrified trying to bring a plane down without making a mess)


----------



## Nikademus (Jul 13, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> The period 7/10/40 and 10/31/40 was when hurricanes were also being used as night fighters. I think it is very difficult to get the whole picture.



I believe the author's point was that even boasting the "most stable" landing gear of the three planes in question, there were still plenty of accidents, ranging from the very minor (a "prang") to fatalities. I should probably have included more of his text as he goes on to say that many of these accidents were given different labels of which few specified the 'landing gear' of the plane. All in all I personally agree that this points to the conclusion that in regards 109 operational accidents and losses, there's no real reason to single out the plane's landing gear as being signifigant to the point where it's labeled a "design weakness"


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 13, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> I believe the author's point was that even boasting the "most stable" landing gear of the three planes in question, there were still plenty of accidents, ranging from the very minor (a "prang") to fatalities.


 
I agree Nikademus, the point I was making was that the hurricane was certainly a better plane for night fighting than the spitfire and because of that it was used more which meant that it had more accidents on take of and landing. Another poster said the 109 was used as a night fighter which i am sure will have added to accident rates.


----------



## davparlr (Jul 13, 2011)

errant entry


----------



## davparlr (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> yes, many did not make the cut:


 
The real question here was why the Germans experimented with conventional gear in the first place. It certainly wasn't because the engineers were bored. Also it did not improve manufacture or repair. Was it possibly trouble with the landing gear configuration? It is also not difficult to understand that they would not interrupt the production to implement this change. There are plenty of examples of flawed weapons systems that were kept in production due to the need for quantity.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> The landing gear has to be manually cranked down but the device is located on the opposite side of the throttle (he told me)...so with having to keep one hand on the flight stick, your forced to use the other hand going back and forth from one side of the cockpit to the other as you crank (and it takes ALOT of cranks) the gear down, then with the same hand swap back to the throttle. All this while landing....which, unless i'm mistaken is the most difficult part of flying. (I know i'd be terrified trying to bring a plane down without making a mess)



Just a comment here - no matter how difficult bringing down the landing gear may sound, this process would normally be done on a downwind leg or after an overhead break, configuring the aircraft for landing (flaps would be lowered as well) and allowing time to get everything prepared for landing. Turning base to final, the aircraft should be configured for landing and the final approach stabilized. Depending on pilot and technique, sometimes you may have someone try to do this on final. It may work for an experienced pilot but a "greener" pilot may be overworked during this process (especially if landing in a crosswind).


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> well In this case I thing the gear is very suited for the conditions.. maybe Willy was onto something. Can't imagine a spit or p-51 handling those conditions with any authority.


 
Have you ever seen pics of the P-51 operating in dirt fields during the Korean War?


----------



## Nikademus (Jul 13, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Just a comment here - no matter how difficult bringing down the landing gear may sound, this process would normally be done on a downwind leg or after an overhead break, configuring the aircraft for landing (flaps would be lowered as well) and allowing time to get everything prepared for landing. Turning base to final, the aircraft should be configured for landing and the final approach stabilized. Depending on pilot and technique, sometimes you may have someone try to do this on final. It may work for an experienced pilot but a "greener" pilot may be overworked during this process (especially if landing in a crosswind).



Sounds reasonable to me.  Now that i'm thinking back on it, I believe a big part of the "careful" that he mentioned was that the plane has a nasty stall habit where one wing will suddenly drop if the speed goes below a certain threashhold. The tricky part is that the plane having no flaps, as mentioned required him to use the throttle to compensate and adjust speed, which IIRC is fast even when landing but he's trying to go as slow as the plane will safely allow....however when cranking down the grear on approach....it changes the plane's aerodynamics enough that the throttle must be adjusted to compensate. (I believe....i am going by memory here....wish i had wrote it down!)

Anyway....I also noted that according to the info posted with the plane...there are currently only 2 or 3 pilots in the world qualified to fly the thing.


----------



## davparlr (Jul 13, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> As stated, I have flown GA aircraft tail draggers and its a stone written rule that you NEVER tap the brakes when rolling on take off. NOW if you have some high time combat veteran who did this as a norm, all I can say is their experience and nerve overcame what the POH actually states and if they did smack up and aircraft (regardless how many kills or how many hours they had) they are still doing something that is violating the POH.


I really am out of my class here as all the aircraft I have flown were tricycle geared and had power steering, except the T-41 (Cessna 172), but I would think that if differential brakes are used for steering during taxi then it would also be used for takeoff run until rudder is effective (20-30 mph). Interesting side note was that the original Me-262 was a tail dragger and the pilot had to tap the brakes during take off roll to get the tail off the ground, otherwise it would not take off.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> Sounds reasonable to me.  Now that i'm thinking back on it, I believe a big part of the "careful" that he mentioned was that *the plane has a nasty stall habit where one wing will suddenly drop if the speed goes below a certain threashhold*. The tricky part is that the plane having no flaps, as mentioned required him to use the throttle to compensate and adjust speed, which IIRC is fast even when landing but he's trying to go as slow as the plane will safely allow....however when cranking down the grear on approach....it changes the plane's aerodynamics enough that the throttle must be adjusted to compensate. (I believe....i am going by memory here....wish i had wrote it down!)
> 
> Anyway....I also noted that according to the info posted with the plane...there are currently only 2 or 3 pilots in the world qualified to fly the thing.


 
All true - a fairly experienced pilot (or at least an efficient and cautious pilot) can do all that and keep his airspeed above stalling while not exceeding landing gear extension speed (VLE). There's usually a pretty wide window there on most aircraft unless you're flying a U-2! The key to this is continually trimming the aircraft as the pilot changes power settings and is lowering the landing gear.

I seen "White 14" fly at Mojave before it went to Canada. The day it was flown the winds were dead calm and you can see the pilot was very cautious, flew long extending downwinds and seemed to try to do everything by the book.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

davparlr said:


> *The real question here was why the Germans experimented with conventional gear in the first place*. It certainly wasn't because the engineers were bored. Also it did not improve manufacture or repair. Was it possibly trouble with the landing gear configuration? It is also not difficult to understand that they would not interrupt the production to implement this change. There are plenty of examples of flawed weapons systems that were kept in production due to the need for quantity.


 
for aircraft carrier use, along with an arrester hook. the 109 was as pure of a fighter as one can get.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

davparlr said:


> I really am out of my class here as all the aircraft I have flown were tricycle geared and had power steering, except the T-41 (Cessna 172), but I would think that if differential brakes are used for steering during taxi then it would also be used for takeoff run until rudder is effective (20-30 mph). Interesting side note was that the original Me-262 was a tail dragger and the pilot had to tap the brakes during take off roll to get the tail off the ground, otherwise it would not take off.


 
You would think that but unless you really know what you're doing, tapping the brakes on a takeoff roll is asking for trouble. I can tell you that just from flying a Super Cub or Citabria that 20 - 30 mph comes very quick when you advance the throttle and although smaller aircraft, their rudder becomes effective almost immediately. In the case of a -109 I believe you're going to have trouble (besides the "normal" left/ right swing as noted on the POH) if you try to take off in a stiff crosswind. It would be interesting to know wind conditions of those take off accidents listed in the previous pages.

This "rudder effictiveness" in the -109 IMO is being a bit exaggerated. I cannot see a -109 not accelerating quickly enough to gain rudder effectiviness within at least 6 or 7 seconds


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Have you ever seen pics of the P-51 operating in dirt fields during the Korean War?


 
nope. and I doubt very much in anything that the 109's were subjected too.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 13, 2011)

Lol - Joe I have seen situations where 6-7 seconds is an eternity looking for bad events to fill the void.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 13, 2011)

As 51's operating out of the goo - there is no reason to suspect it would be more difficult than a 109 or 190 (or F4U or P-40 or whatever in SWP back in Guadalcanal days before PSP). Simply we operated from PSP or concrete where possible and we weren't moving around as much as the Germans.


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 13, 2011)

There's a video on U-tube that show the entire uninteruped takeoff of a modern Me109, A G model I think. Grass runway.
Tailwheel off the ground in about 5-6 seconds, liftoff about 12-13 seconds.

There's plenty of pictures of operations in Alaska, and the Aleutians during WW2, just as rough or worse than Russia. Some of them I don't even see how they kept the engines running let alone take off.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> nope. and I doubt very much in anything that the 109's were subjected too.


 
Keep doubting - it was the same and probably worse


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Lol - Joe I have seen situations where 6-7 seconds is an eternity looking for bad events to fill the void.


 
LOL - I know, especially when going on "Mr. Toad's Wild Ride." Get the stick in your gut and hang on!


----------



## Nikademus (Jul 13, 2011)

drgondog said:


> As 51's operating out of the goo - there is no reason to suspect it would be more difficult than a 109 or 190 (or F4U or P-40 or whatever in SWP back in Guadalcanal days before PSP). Simply we operated from PSP or concrete where possible and we weren't moving around as much as the Germans.



Good point. F4F landing gear was not exactly condusive to the early dirt field conditions at Guadalcanal (Ground loops were common) yet the plane was successfully operated out of it. The only plane i'm aware of that had genuine gear issues was the USN F2A's which was allegedly a quality control issue. Lots of recorded gear failures and repairs.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> Good point. F4F landing gear was not exactly condusive to the early dirt field conditions at Guadalcanal (Ground loops were common) yet the plane was successfully operated out of it. The only plane i'm aware of that had genuine gear issues was the USN F2A's which was *allegedly a quality control issue*. Lots of recorded gear failures and repairs.


 
Actually an engineering issue - the aircraft was built the way it was designed although there were other workmanship issues at Brewster (different story).


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

tyrodtom said:


> There's plenty of pictures of operations in Alaska, and the Aleutians during WW2, just as rough or worse than Russia. Some of them I don't even see how they kept the engines running let alone take off.


 
well I searched, seen alot of -51's take of from clay surfaces covered in cheese graters in the Aleutians. seen 'mud' ones too with
cheese graters on it. P-40's seem to be the king of the 'Erdschleifen'. HAVE yet to see anything from WWII Europe with -51s/-47s
taking off from anything other the nice airfields runways. care to point me in the right direction? also, does this mean that Germans
had the better pilots?? flame away!


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 13, 2011)

When you're saying cheese graters, I guess you're meaning PSP or Marston Mat, as I think the British version was called.

Look at the allied forward airbases after D-Day, they used temporary airfields, sometimes X Luftwaffe fields, but they had PSP, etc. , so they used it.

I've read about a Russian version for rough, muddy airfields. It was a steel mat on a drum. I guess the Allies had the excess steel to come up with aids like PSP to make wet airfields a little safer. Everybody had to operate from the same mud, it didn't just rain over Luftwaffe airfields.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> well I searched, seen alot of -51's take of from clay surfaces covered in cheese graters in the Aleutians. seen 'mud' ones too with
> cheese graters on it. P-40's seem to be the king of the 'Erdschleifen'. HAVE yet to see anything from WWII Europe with -51s/-47s
> taking off from anything other the nice airfields runways. care to point me in the right direction? also, does this mean that Germans
> had the better pilots?? flame away!


 No - it meant that the US and her allies had the logistical ability to manufacture and deploy PSP on bases they operated out of - but there were still plenty of bases where US aircraft operated from that matched or exceeded the same adverse conditions the -109 had to operate from, both in WW2 and Korea.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

well I (we?) are not talking about korea or anywhere else around the pacific.. just Europe. and, I have yet to see a picture
or video showing P-51s/47s t/o ~ land in the same conditions as some JG units did.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> well I (we?) are not talking about korea or anywhere else around the pacific.. just Europe. and, I have yet to see a picture
> or video showing P-51s/47s t/o ~ land in the same conditions as some JG units did.


 
It shouldn't make a difference - I think the point here is that other allied aircraft had the ability to operate in the same conditions as the -109 and although you have showed pic of the 109 trampling through the mud, I can tell you from being around the aircraft first hand that it's landing gear was adequate for its purpose but like any other taildragger can be torn off in an instant by any act of neglect or mis-handling.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2011)

I apologize in advance for the sheer tripe at the beginning of this film. Its embarassing I would not waste my time watching the first half of the film. But go to about the 11min mark of the film and you will see vision of P-39s P-40s, and twin engined bombers of various kinds operating under conditions at least as bad as anything the Germans were ever asked to operate from. Its relating to the battle for Milne Bay, July-September 1942. 


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=huaWOyDzm1c_


Have also done some backhround research about losses and attrition in the USAAC in Europe and the US during the war. I have seen a few sites with bits of this information, but its not as well organized as I had thought it would be. Just the same, here are some of the basic numbers, for comparison

USAAC lost 41000 aircraft in the ETO, of which 19000 were lost to direct enemy action. The remaining 21000 were lost to other causes, which I would put down to non-combat causes. A total of 80000 aircraft were shipped to the ETO during the war. 


In the continental US there was a high accident rate, probably due to its training and patrol function. There were a total of 52000 flying accidents, with 6609 of these ending in some fatality. Approximately 1/4 of the total accidents ended up in the aircraft being written off totally. Thats about 13000 write offs. I know that the US produced about 230000 a/c during the war, and that 50-60% of these remained in the continental US for the duration. Thats about 115-138000 aircraft. So the attrition rate for the US whilst operating under "quiet" conditions is about 11.3% over a 4 year period. 

In the war zones, the attrition rate shoots up to about 25% under combat conditions. That is compared to the 37% that I found applicable to the LW, operating under wartime conditions in "average" european weather, from established bases.

Cause for thought and reflection I guess......


----------



## drgondog (Jul 13, 2011)

Ya know - the 354th had crappy airfields in France when they deployed from Boxted. Cricoqueville was described as 'a cow pasture between trees" but Korea had some real dirtbags when ROK AF was run out of Seoul.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> . HAVE yet to see anything from WWII Europe with -51s/-47s
> taking off from anything other the nice airfields runways. care to point me in the right direction? also, does this mean that Germans
> had the better pilots?? flame away!


 
I don't know - certainly not from 1944 forward. 

Some time back you explained away the destruction of the Luftwaffe to overwhelming numerical superiority - and I posed the question to you to demonstrate that claim with facts - for the Battle of Germany, over Germany/Poland/Czechoslovakia with USAAF escort fighters.

Have you had a chance to look up the forces of P-38s and Mustangs over Germany - out of range of P-47s and Spitfires - between December 1943 and May 1944?

If so, you will see that LuftFlotte Reich had significant numerical superiority in that time slice in, aggragate, (single engine day fighters only - don't include the helpless twins) and always locally at the points they chose to attack.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

oh lordy, what do you think all those B-17's were bombing? certainly not oil/fuel depots or Manufacturing plants? right?
no fuel/spare parts = no flying, correct?

superior #'s, well I don't know what you'd call 300 or so 109's facing 500-700 fighter escorts and up too 1000 B-17s on
a single mission? suicide perhaps?

P-47s had the range with the paper drop tanks.

and you forget my friend.. look to the east in 1943/44, where the russians roam, where do you think most of Germany's aircraft were?
the west? I don't think so....


----------



## Milosh (Jul 13, 2011)

I don't think you know much about USAAF operations in the ETO P-40. Just because it says there was 500-700 fighters on a mission does not mean that all those 500-700 fighters were escorting the bombers *at the same time*.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2011)

Regarding Luftwaffe committment to the East Front, in 1943 it was 42% of the total foce structure, falling to 38% in 1944. However in the critical area of fighters, it was much lower, 29% of LW fighters were deployed to the eastern front in 1943, falling to below 25% in 1944. However, because of the high wastage of aircraft on the Eastern Front, due to the rough conditions and constant emergency, attrition was high, so a large number of aircraft passed through this front as wastage. It was a front relatively small on numbers, and high on attrition.

About 60% of LW fighter strength was deployed into the home defence organizations by 1944. In January there were more than 1600 fighters attached to the Reichj defences. I'm not as sure about the fighters attached to the 8th AF, but critically, only a small proportion were ca[pable of providing escort to the bomber formations, perhaps 3 or four wings, from memory. 

The difficulty for the Germans was not the numbers they had. Its one of those urban myths that over Germany they were outnumbered. It was that at any given point they had great difficulty in concentrating available forces for a concentrated effective counterrattack. Which make a bit of a mockery of earlier claims made elswhere that aircraft like the 109 did not have a range issue. They were unable concentrate for a number of reasons, not least of which was their short legs.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

obviously milosh. just like it dosn't mean those 300 -109s were attacking the bomber formations.-


----------



## drgondog (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> oh lordy, what do you think all those B-17's were bombing? certainly not oil/fuel depots or Manufacturing plants? right?
> no fuel/spare parts = no flying, correct?
> 
> superior #'s, well I don't know what you'd call 300 or so 109's facing 500-700 fighter escorts and up too 1000 B-17s on
> ...


 
You are seriously misinformed. If you care to research the formation of LuftFlotte Reich in summer/fall of 1943, accompanied by a steady transfer of approximately 30 staffeln from east and south you will note the build up to strengthen the skies over Germany in order to defeat the 8th AF.

The LW temporarily achieved stopping deep penetrations between August 17 and October 14, 1943 by inflicting 20-25% attrition on 8th BC - primarily because the P-47 could not go beyond Munster/Frankfurt.

The two P-38 wings which started Ops in ~November/December timeframe combined with the 354th FG (Mustangs) which went operational in December 1943. So Jan 1, 1944 there were three long range escort Fighter Groups available to escort 30+ Bomb Groups over a 70-100 mile line - against approximatlely 450 s/e day fighters (109s and 190s) - and both the P-38 and P-51B were experiencing 'issues' that rendered effective strength at approximatel 50% --------> so maybe 30+ USAAF fighters were around to fight off anywhere from 150-250 s/e 190/109 plus another 50+ t/e Me 110/410 and Ju88s.

Between late February and late March, the 4th, 355th and 357th were equipped with P-51s and the 364th, 20th and 55th had P-38s. So in the period mid February to the end of March, the escort force doubled to six groups and effectives grew from 50% to 70%. In that period the number of fighters able to perform target escort past Dummer Lake grew to approximately 200 USAAF escort fighters against the combined forces of the LW in any concentration the controller could amass...

Between mid April and Mid May, the 352nd and 339th and 359th FG joined the escort force. So let us pause.

First three months from November 1943, the deep escorts were responsible for one understrength fighter group per 8th AF Bomb Division with up to 11 Bomb Groups, each, in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd BD. That means that the one escort group available per BD had the responsibility to cover up to 300+ B-17s or B-24s along a 30 mile line against whatever number the Controller decided to use.

Second three months - the number of escort fighters per 300 bomber went from 1 to 2 fighter groups of up to 48 each at 100% effective (normally 75% about then) along the same 30 mile stretch against whatever the LW could concentrate in areas loosely defended or not defended at all.

Do the math, look at the LW losses, look at the 8th AF BC losses drop from nearly 8% avearge to 3% and continue downward by the end of May. 

The 'rest of the 700 you mention' were the 56th, 78th, 353rd, 356th and 361st P-47 groups that were left out of most of the Germany action and relegated to Penetration and Withdrawal support on the sidelines - basically fighting against JG2 and JG26 in LuftFlotte 3. 

The Battle for Germany was fought (and won) against the Luftwaffe with an inferior numerical count until parity of escorts to available German fighters over Germany was reached in July, 1944. 

Shift to the Invasion Front - different story where the allies with RAF, TAC, 8th and 9th AF had overwhelming superiority up to approximately Hannover to Kassel to west of Mulhausen as the P-47D-25 gained longer legs.

Do some research.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

well according to the book, Boddenplatte: the Luftwaffe's Last Hope(f/p 2004) (which gets into detail about Luftwaffe strengths during 1944 by the way), I think your the one miss informed. I suggest purchasing the book as I have.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2011)

I wouldnt say DG was misinformed on issues relating to the 8AF or the Mustang in particular. Thats a VERY brave statement...actually its a VERY silly statement


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> obviously milosh. just like it dosn't mean those 300 -109s were attacking the bomber formations.-


 
What else would those 300-109s be doing ?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I wouldnt say DG was misinformed on issues relating to the 8AF or the Mustang in particular. Thats a VERY brave statement...actually its a VERY silly statement


 
about the Luftwaffe strengths.. USAAF #'s have been done to death already.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

tyrodtom said:


> What else would those 300-109s be doing ?


 
crashing on takeoff due to faulty landing gear


----------



## Milosh (Jul 13, 2011)

Luftwaffe Orders of Battle

May 31 1943 Luftwaffe Reich


----------



## bobbysocks (Jul 13, 2011)

all planes had some sort of nasty habit....i think if you blew the landing in a p51..thus having to go around... if you hit full throttle without trimming you could get into trouble. Drgondog may be able confirm or dispel. it may have been a p40 quirk...

the thing about landing a 109 that gets me and i didnt think of it until flyboy j ran through the traffic pattern set up....usually like he said you are dropping so many degrees of flaps per leg and have your glide plane/ rate of decent set up all nice and cozy. but the 109 had the automatic slats...and as i understand they deployed pretty quickly. depending on where you were in the pattern when they deployed it could get exciting. i am wondering if 109s were brought in hot... at a higher speed so the slats wouldnt deploy? and that too could add to complicate landing.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2011)

Milosh said:


> Luftwaffe Orders of Battle
> 
> May 31 1943 Luftwaffe Reich



Great Information. This was before the commencement of the big daylight bomber offensive. and yet even then 845 out of about 1200 fighters (SE and TE) were attached to the reich defences. According to Murray Reich defences had increased to over 1600 fighters by January 1944. As I said, one of the great myths of the war was that the Luftwaffe was outnumbered by Allied fighters over Germany in 1944


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 13, 2011)

well did you check and see availbility vs combat ready in that list? and what about pilots availbility to fly those combat ready
fighters? Didn't see the last part there.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> well did you check and see availbility vs combat ready in that list? and what about pilots availbility to fly those combat ready
> fighters? Didn't see the last part there.



According to you guys the LW had the same serviceability rates as the Allies.....but now all of a sudden its an additional factor affectibg the number of German fighters that can be put into the air. You cant have it both ways. If the LW enjoyed the same rates of serviceability as the allies, then the two factors cancel each other out. If they didnt....well, then what have you and the other germanophiles been feeding us all this time.

The truth is that over germany itself, serviceability rates were comparable. I will do the math tonite, but it will be quite satisfactory for the LW for those units in Germany. As to Pilots, there were sufficient pilots to render 4900 of its airc strength "serviceable. Serviceablke means "ready for operations, and that means you have a pilot to fly it. Or are you attempting to argue that they could not fly all 4900 at the same time.

What was rupturing in the LW were pilot standards. They were losing experienced aircrew hand over fist throughout 1941-3. The replacements in 1941-2 were adequate, no better, but those from 1943 onwards showed a distinct lack of skill due to very limited training times. this was reflected in the massacres of 1944. Exchange rates of 4, 5 or 6:1 were not uncommon


----------



## drgondog (Jul 13, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> about the Luftwaffe strengths.. USAAF #'s have been done to death already.



Yes they have - but what you miss in your scholarship is what the force balance over GERMANY was, in January 1944 through July, in fighter versus fighter numbers. The oft repeated "there I was minding my own business attacking B-17s and B-24s when a HORDE (pick a ratio 5:1, 10:1) of Mustangs attacked us."

Well 10:1 (a true Horde) over Berlin, for a force of say 125 fighters German fighters defending - implies 1250 US fighters in that 10 cubic mile airspace - when only 30-50 were within 20 miles. You decide on the exagerations but defend your views with facts.

They are well documented and easy to discern simply by range capabilities of the P-47 and Spit in the first half of 1944.

Simply, the GAF could neither defeat or seriously bloody the noses of the USAAF 8th FC over Germany - you decide what the reasons were -but it wasn't "more escort fighters than the attacking GAF force".


----------



## Milosh (Jul 13, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The truth is that over germany itself, serviceability rates were comparable. I will do the math tonite, but it will be quite satisfactory for the LW for those units in Germany. As to Pilots, there were sufficient pilots to render 4900 of its airc strength "serviceable. Serviceablke means "ready for operations, and that means you have a pilot to fly it. Or are you attempting to argue that they could not fly all 4900 at the same time.



I don't think that is correct. The number of serviceable a/c is the number of a/c capable of operations whether there was pilots or not to fly them.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2011)

Then would they not place the numbers in the reserves list if there are insufficient crews to man the aircraft. In fact, I am certain that the LW had a small reserve of aircraft, and a larger reserve of pilots in 1943. Thy were churning out more than a 1000 pilots per month in 1944. but losing more than that number from about April 1944 onward. Its true that from late in 1944 onward, the training and replacement system completely broke down, and the LW was forced to send pilots with virtually no training. But remember the time period we are talking about...March 1943, what major cataclysm had befallen the LW at that stage. There was a constant and serious drain on their elite pilots and expereineced aircrews, but no great rupturing of their training system. They had been forced to curtail training times and flight hours for crews because of 
1) a shortage of training aircraft, 
2) a shortage of instructors, particulalry for the bomber crews after Stalingrad
3) a shortage of fuel, particularly in 1942

This caused a crisis in training standards, but not yet availablity. That happned from the end of 1943, when the 8th AF tore into the rookie LW fighter pilots with a vengeance. By that stage, USAAC replacements were receiving an average of 400 hours of training before committment, compared to about 150 hours for the average LW jock. And, for whatever reason (I suspect from overcommittment), the LW was suffering a much higher percentage of atrition than the USAAC. This had to be having an effect on retention rates of exerienced aircrw as well.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2011)

Some easily digested basic material on German pilot training in WWII

Pilot Training of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) in WW2.

The Germans were not short of pilots in 1943, but they were running short of good pilots. Outside the ever shrinking elite, the majority of the LW pilots were just chaff for the machine

This site is useful as well, and it is worth noting the average numbers of fighter pilots in Jamuary-May 1944 for the Germans was 2262 at any given time. It would have been higher in March 1943

The November 1944 battles between the Luftwaffe and the US Air Force


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

General Gunther Rall said:
' In my experience, the Royal Air Force pilot was the most aggressive and capable fighter pilot during the Second World War. This is nothing against the Americans, because they came in late and in such large numbers that we don't have an accurate comparison. *We were totally outnumbered when the Americans engaged*, whereas at the time of the Battle of Britain the fight was more even and you could compare. The British were extremely good. '

I'm sorry, but I'll believe a highly respected person like General Rall. When he says the Luftwaffe was outnumbered, you can take that as the truth. Especially from those who were there.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

General Rall does deserve respect, and overall, the USAAC did outnumber the LW by a significant amount. But in the crucial area of fighters over germany, the esteemed General is not correct.... for that critical period March 1943 to May 1944, it was most definately the other way around. What perhaps does need to be conceded are the limits of the german equipment. though they clearly had superior numbers over germany, the limited endurance of their machines meant they had difficulty in concentrating their forces for a decisive blow. Of course, even this is an over simplification. There were other factors at work other than range of the LW interceptors.....issues like radar jamming, communications, spoofing to name just a couple.

I do not mean any disrrespect to Rall, but he does have a reason to say what he says. By saying they were outnumbered, it is a convenient raison detre to explain why they were defeated. If he had to get into the failures of the LW to adequately prepare for the final showdown....inadequate training, inadequate arrangements for fuel reserves, inadequate endurance in the design, inadequate command and control, overextension of the LW, profligate wastage in the lead up to 1944, he would have had to accept a degree of culpability for the LWs defeat. By putting it all down to the numbers, he has a ready made and convenient scapegoat that leaves him, and indeed the LW blameless for its defeat.

In a way, and in the finish, Rall is correct. The LW was in part beaten by numbers. But this was no accident, and more than a little it was the fault of the LW itself that it found itself so outnumbered at the end of the war....

Its also a little humourous for Rall to claim that in the BoB, the LW was only on par in terms of numbers, whereas in 1943-4 the LW was outnumbered. In the BoB there were 3000 a/c engaging at the beginning 300 British fighters, which later increased to about 500. Over Schweifurt, i think there were 250 German interceptors engaging about 300 bombers. So Rall thinks 10:1 in favour of the LW is an even match, whilst 1;1, the LW is heavily outnumbered.......hmmmm


----------



## Jabberwocky (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> General Gunther Rall said:
> ' In my experience, the Royal Air Force pilot was the most aggressive and capable fighter pilot during the Second World War. This is nothing against the Americans, because they came in late and in such large numbers that we don't have an accurate comparison. *We were totally outnumbered when the Americans engaged*, whereas at the time of the Battle of Britain the fight was more even and you could compare. The British were extremely good. '
> 
> I'm sorry, but I'll believe a highly respected person like General Rall. When he says the Luftwaffe was outnumbered, you can take that as the truth. Especially from those who were there.



Rall transferred to the West in late April 1944, just when 8th AF fighter strength was in the ascendancy and the situation in the West had dramatically deteriorated for the Luftwaffe.

If he'd transferred over in April 1943, when the 8th AF flew just 510 sorties over the month and a grand total of *eight* - yes 8 - bomber escort sorties, isn't it possible his opinion might be a little different?

Monthly effective fighter sorties by 8th AF fighters

1943 

Jan 422
Feb 435
Mar 584
Apr 510
May 2109
Jun 1879
Jul 2133
Aug 2017
Sep 2987
Oct 2888
Nov 3436
Dec 5101

1944

Jan 6464
Feb 9703
Mar 14613
Apr 19216
May 32860
Jun 50748
Jul 39923
Aug 42409
Sep 30397
Oct 27132
Nov 27871
Dec 33242

In May 1943, 8th AF fighters flew more combat sorties in 20 days than they had in the whole of 1943. It was not until November 1943 that 8th AF fighters claimed more than 100 aircraft in a month.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Its also a little humourous for Rall to claim that in the BoB, the LW was only on par in terms of numbers, whereas in 1943-4 the LW was outnumbered. In the BoB there were 3000 a/c engaging at the beginning 300 British fighters, which later increased to about 500.



This is complete false what you say.. Rall is right. British German strenght in BoB - equal. The myth of the RAF outnumbered - false. Very stubborn myth of course.

Also like USAAF in 1944, LW did not sent all its aircraft to France to fly against Britain; part was sent. Which fly from France, did not all fly against Britain on day. Most rest. Numbers clear.

Study example 15 September 1940. In both case or raid, few of German bomber escort by more - 2-3x - fighters, but engaged far more British fighters in each occasion. Battle of Britain Day - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Also you are wrong about the Luftwaffe outnumbering the USAAF over Germany. This is false. If you want to prove, show numbers. Not tactical - local superiority is possible from time. Operation numbers on level..Even late 1944, sometimes bomber were caught un-escorted. Results as expect..This was rarer.



parsifal said:


> The difficulty for the Germans was not the numbers they had. Its one of those urban myths that over Germany they were outnumbered. It was that at any given point they had great difficulty in concentrating available forces for a concentrated effective counterrattack. Which make a bit of a mockery of earlier claims made elswhere that aircraft like the 109 did not have a range issue. They were unable concentrate for a number of reasons, not least of which was their short legs.


 
Sorry, you are wrong again. It was shown and calculated with shortrund that 109 and 190 had enough range. This is fact, shown, proven. So why you keep argue and just you say again opposite means nothing without proof? ou have false claim, simple case of this, sorry, I do not mean to offend you, but has to say.

IF there was trouble of concentration - no proof again, and funny, dragondog says they had concentration all the time - that is how they outnumber USAAF as I understand him, hope right, if not sorry! - it was not due to range. Also, 100% concentration is difficult to achieve - time and space factors, consideration of tactical thinking, like spoof raids, delay in report and order etc.

Funny side, problem always searched on German side.. some people are bit signs of desperating try to so show I say. But thing were much more simple, in 1943 USAAF had few planes, so German had success, but in 1944 US number built up so rapid, despite strong losses in early 1944, that German simply could not keep equal, no matter what they try. USAAF ocean simply washed German fighter away.. this is truth.


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> This is complete false what you say.. Rall is right. British German strenght in BoB - equal. The myth of the RAF outnumbered - false. Very stubborn myth of course.
> 
> Also like USAAF in 1944, LW did not sent all its aircraft to France to fly against Britain; part was sent. Which fly from France, did not all fly against Britain on day. Most rest. Numbers clear.
> 
> ...


 
"Battle of Britain day" was the day that it became obvious Germany was losing The conflict took place from the fall of France the ratio of fighters changed from overwhelming German superiority at the start to almost parity in the end. The figures and ratios vary by what is termed a fighter and what is termed available the British had gladiators defiants and blenheims but they could hardly be called fighters.

The Luftwaffe needs more planes to defend than the USAAF needs to attack, a 
bf 109 cannot defend Belin Hannover Dortmund and Munich at the same time.


----------



## Glider (Jul 14, 2011)

Servicable RAF fighters in Fighter Command 15th September 9.00 hours

192 Spitfires
389 Hurricanes
47 Blenheim
24 Defient
8 Gladiators

581 front line fighters in ALL of Fighter Command including 13 group against how many German aircraft?.

The fact that the RAF made better use of their resources doesn't alter that fact that the German forces had the numbers


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

Mustang Nut you answered the issues about the BoB pretty well spot on, even if we want to compare fighters to fighters, a more realistic comparison, the numbers of fighters possessed by the Luftwaffe outnumbered those available to the RAF considerably. Especially as at 15 June when Fighter Command was down to 300 machines, spread allover the UK. The Germans had the advantage of being able to concetrate, but failed to exploit that advantage.


Funny how these guys will say anything, without the slightest shred of supporting evidence, in any way they like, but squeal "show me the proof" or "you cant talk to me like that" at the smallest opportunity....Im always amazed by that.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

But there was simply no overwhelming German superiority at the start. Just study numbers.. 

Also, if you look at 15 September, you can see on that day, biggest considered for BoB, certain more famous, how few Luftwaffe planes were in air at time - say midday attack, 112 bombers only attacked with ~300 fighters escort, about 1/3 in close contact, British had 275 fighters in air. 

But in morning raid situation was opposite: around 120 Bf 109s and 25 Do 17s were facing 245 Spitfires and Hurricanes in air.

Also very evident neither side sent up just all in the air.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Mustang Nut you answered the issues about the BoB pretty well spot on, even if we want to compare fighters to fighters, a more realistic comparison, the numbers of fighters possessed by the Luftwaffe outnumbered those available to the RAF considerably.



No, this is false. Shown already.



> Especially as at 15 June when Fighter Command was down to 300 machines, spread allover the UK. The Germans had the advantage of being able to concetrate, but failed to exploit that advantage.



Ever hear of Battle of France..? It was going on still in June. Are you say German should have just left France, only real enemy, before defeating it complete, and start of other Battle - with enemy (England) already defeated (Dunkerque)...? And just ignore that German air units were also tired, needed repairs, replacements, just like British? Sorry, you make no sense to me.. you sound like armchair historian who always know better than the professional soldiers of time.. like many historians, see June 1940 as some kind of irrational time "given" by German to RAF as "gift", complete blind and ignore French were still fighting.. and still did not sign rest of arms.



> Funny how these guys will say anything, without the slightest shred of supporting evidence, in any way they like, but squeal "show me the proof" or "you cant talk to me like that" at the smallest opportunity....Im always amazed by that.



Actual: self description.. sorry. For example you argue 109 had not enough range - just week ago shown to you not true, with lot of time spent and research.. you ignore. You claim LW had outnumber USAAF over Reich, poster Milosh shows you number of LF Reich numbers in May 1944, shows ca. 300 singe engine fighter, plus about 100 day-night s-e fighter capable of operations.. total about 400.. in best case. And you say this outnumbered USAAF force which flew ca 20 000 fighter sortie a month.. that is, avarage 6-700 fighter sortie a day. And you ignore and accuse other "squeal". 

As practice, you use rude and insult when they do not agree.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> But there was simply no overwhelming German superiority at the start. Just study numbers..
> 
> Also, if you look at 15 September, you can see on that day, biggest considered for BoB, certain more famous, how few Luftwaffe planes were in air at time - say midday attack, 112 bombers only attacked with ~300 fighters escort, about 1/3 in close contact, British had 275 fighters in air.
> 
> ...



I dont agree with your figures,and neither do any of the 6 reputable references including Gallands own account. you are using highly selective and biased techniques to try and push a point that is so hopelessly out of step with reality its laughable

Anyway, the numbers of aircraft involved in this last major daylight attack against England, after the RAF had been given more than a week to recover and had substantially reinforced its badly depleted forces saw 630 RAF defenders pitted against morethan 900 Luftwaffe attackers. And remember, this was basically after the overall battle had been decided. Prior to that the numbers were heavily in favour of the Germans, even in category to category basis

Wiki is about the standard of information needed to counter the argument being mounted here. Relevantly it says:

_In the two main engagements, the fighter losses had been about equal. The big difference was the bombers losses. Fighter Command had had greater success against the afternoon attack rather than the morning assault, which it out numbered 2:1. The ratio of German fighters to bombers had been 3:1 in the morning but 5:1 in the afternoon, so there were more targets. The more bombers Kesselring sent, the more were lost.

Kesselring was back where he started. Park's handling of the actions was a masterpiece of aggressive defence, yet he was not under the same pressure as he had been in the battles during August when air battles were so confusing they were hard to control. A big set-piece offensive played into his hands._


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> Ever hear of Battle of France..? It was going on still in June. Are you say German should have just left France, only real enemy, before defeating it complete, and start of other Battle - with enemy (England) already defeated (Dunkerque)...? And just ignore that German air units were also tired, needed repairs, replacements, just like British? Sorry, you make no sense to me.. you sound like armchair historian who always know better than the professional soldiers of time.. like many historians, see June 1940 as some kind of irrational time "given" by German to RAF as "gift", complete blind and ignore French were still fighting.. and still did not sign rest of arms.


 
Tante I am reading "The most dangerous enemy" by Steven Bungay at the moment but I am at work and the book is in the hotel. From memory at the time of the fall of France the RAF had just over 300 fighters and were hugely outnumbered mainly because so many had been lost supporting the BEF and French forces including Dunkerque. The crux of the BoB was fighter and bomber production. By and large in the key period of the battle July to Sept, Britain rarely lost more than it produced on a week by week basis and the LW rarely produced more than it lost. At the end of the Battle the RAF was substantially stronger than at the start and the LW substantially weaker. I will quote the full figures tomorrow.


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Anyway, the numbers of aircraft involved in this last major daylight attack against England, after the RAF had been given more than a week to recover and had substantially reinforced its badly depleted forces saw 630 RAF defenders pitted against morethan 900 Luftwaffe attackers. And remember, this was basically after the overall battle had been decided. Prior to that the numbers were heavily in favour of the Germans, even in category to category basis
> 
> _In the two main engagements, the fighter losses had been about equal. The big difference was the bombers losses. Fighter Command had had greater success against the afternoon attack rather than the morning assault, which it out numbered 2:1. The ratio of German fighters to bombers had been 3:1 in the morning but 5:1 in the afternoon, so there were more targets. The more bombers Kesselring sent, the more were lost.
> _


 
Good point parsifal, what is not said in those ratios is it was almost a maximum effort in the bomber numbers, the LW was having to merge units because bomber losses couldnt be replaced by production.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante

How about you post your sorces and we will examine them, rather than reduce this to name calling and emotionalism. Not that this has a lot to do with the topic, but I am willing to give you the opportunity to present your case in the best way you can. 

I am aware of your efforts to prove the adequacy of the 109s range, but it just doesnt add up up, and to be honest, remains unsupported argument, and as I said at the time, show documented evidence of the 109 having an effective range of 700km, ie the ability to either intercept out to 700 km, or escort out to the same range, and I will start to believe you. Show verifiable records that the LW was outnumbered as at 15 September 1940 and your argument will start to get traction. Show evidence that LW losses on the whole of the west front in April '41 were limited to less than 58 machines, and you will start to establish credibility with me. Dont rely on unsubstantiated dogma to get you through, it wont work. You have to prove your case, not just stomp your feet, accuse me of bullying or whatever other tricks you want to employ to try and get your point across. none of this works with me. The only thing that will, will be if you can present a well researched dossier of supporting material that will prove the point.

Now, as for being rude or a bully, well, I am truly sorry if that is how you feel. Most do not. Most people that know me, know that I am a hard debater, but I always try to be fair and courteous as can be in situations like this. guess it comes from my part German heritage


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I dont agree with your figures,and neither do any of the 6 reputable references including Gallands own account. you are using highly selective and biased techniques to try and push a point that is so hopelessly out of step with reality its laughable



You are only capable of insults again.. bravo. I think however the one lost contact reality is you, sorry.. that is why you are so angry and aggressive.

What is more joke, you now say the same source (Price report of servicable Luftwaffe fighters, shown by poster Milosh), which earlier you said how good it was, is now bad source.

Do you feel dizzy from all spinning you do, and your mouth dry from all the forth at other posters if they disagree? 



> Anyway, the numbers of aircraft involved in this last major daylight attack against England, after the RAF had been given more than a week to recover and had substantially reinforced its badly depleted forces saw 630 RAF defenders pitted against morethan 900 Luftwaffe attackers. And remember, this was basically after the overall battle had been decided.



Yes very interesting, but to tell truth, I have read so many of your post now, and I start believe you do not really read how it was, you simply say it.. how you like it have been. And it is very little connection with reality, even when people tell you in a discussion, how it was, and you can learn, you simply say same again.. like if you think you cannot be wrong ever. So I consider, maybe read what you say is not economical for me in time..



> Prior to that the numbers were heavily in favour of the Germans, even in category to category basis



Support your empty talk with figures, thank you... but I think you are simply wrong. Study numbers. Bombers, fighters. From start of battle in August, the number Germans deployed in combat against UK was very same. No great difference.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Tante
> 
> How about you post your sorces and we will examine them, rather than reduce this to name calling and emotionalism.



That is what you do, sorry... it is funny you accuse others with it.. perhaps you should read post of yours...



> I am aware of your efforts to prove the adequacy of the 109s range, but it just doesnt add up up, and to be honest, remains unsupported argument, and as I said at the time, show documented evidence of the 109 having an effective range of 700km, ie the ability to either intercept out to 700 km, or escort out to the same range, and I will start to believe you.



Proof already shown, you ignore.



> Show verifiable records that the LW was outnumbered as at 15 September 1940 and your argument will start to get traction.



Proof already shown, you ignore.



> Show evidence that LW losses on the whole of the west front in April '41 were limited to less than 58 machines, and you will start to establish credibility with me.



Proof already shown, you ignore.



> Dont rely on unsubstantiated dogma to get you through, it wont work. You have to prove your case, not just stomp your feet, accuse me of bullying or whatever other tricks you want to employ to try and get your point across. none of this works with me. The only thing that will, will be if you can present a well researched dossier of supporting material that will prove the point.



Sorry, that is what you do.. and many has shown you numbers, evidence and sources. It is not their fault if you deaf and blind, but always will to insult when they try best to show you the point..



> Now, as for being rude or a bully, well, I am truly sorry if that is how you feel. Most do not.



So in this case they must have also asked you so you can tell how THEY feel about you.. I am sorry, you simply do not seem to interest in reason, or cultured discuss...


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> From start of battle in August, the number Germans deployed in combat against UK was very same. No great difference.



The problem is Tante the battle didnt start in August the LW was losing aircraft from the minute it invaded Poland. After the fall of France Goering was shocked at how few planes he had left. By August the battle was reaching its peak, it started long before then.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

Pick the issue that you want to prove. post your sources, or tabulate your data, and we will make a start. there is no point in me responding to your last post Tante, because it is just unsubstantiated comment, as is mine at the mome, but I have my ducks lined up and ready my friend


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> Good point parsifal, what is not said in those ratios is it was almost a maximum effort in the bomber numbers,



the LW was having to merge units because bomber losses couldnt be replaced by production.[/QUOTE]

How 25 German bombers in morning attack, 112 German bombers in noon attack become "maximum effort"? German had 1400 bomber (see Murray), I do not know how many operation, or deployed against Britain. Guess - 7-800.



> the LW was having to merge units because bomber losses couldnt be replaced by production.



Which units? I read Murray numbers of German bomber force. Steady through battle. So I doubt this is true.



Mustang nut said:


> The problem is Tante the battle didnt start in August the LW was losing aircraft from the minute it invaded Poland. After the fall of France Goering was shocked at how few planes he had left. By August the battle was reaching its peak, it started long before then.


 
I believe real battle started in August. With Day of the Eagle. Yes, before there were air combat, but relative small scale.. its not like land battle, in air there is never stop of fight, but scale is different. But think of it, also in land battle there is no stop.. small patrols, taking "tongue" for information.. like in July 1940, small raids on convoys, few aircraft, few loss on both sides.. much less than in 2nd part August. IMO most intense period was mid-August and mid-end September. That is real battle period. 

I agree about France. Luftwaffe losses were very significant in France, if you read Murray, you see you are right!


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> I believe real battle started in August. With Day of the Eagle.



I think that is where the misundersatnding is Tante. As a UK citizen I consider the BoB to start with Churchills speech on June 18 

" What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. "
However as a conflict between the RAF and the LW it started with the BEF in Belgium IMO.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

Well, I guess i will have to pick an issue. At one point we have discussed losses to the LW in April 1941.
You will need to go to the following to pick up on this http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/best-air-force-1939-1941-a-28607.html
Your "proof" consisted of unreferenced claims that losses did not exceed 58 machines for the whole western front for the whole month (reference Your post No 66)

My substantive reply to that occurs in my Post 81 in which I posted scanned daily reports that are based on the OKL daily loss sheets. I stopped after I had reached the fourth day of operations (about the 8th April from memory) because the LW losses to that point already exceeded the 58 you had claimed in your post number 66. You never responded to my reply, and after that the thread topic evolved to something else. 

And where is your proof that the LW was outnumbered. I dont see it. Have you posted an OB somewhere, other than just what you say it is. What is the documented strength of the Luftwaffe,, the documented strength of the raids mounted, and the documented strength of the British defence. I dont believe I have seen any of that contained in any of your posts

Can you direct to your proof about 109 range, I will look at the source material and reconsider. But from memory alone, you never posted any proof, just opinion. But if not, please direct me to the point that you did prove your position, and I will look at it.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

Yes, there is many interpretations possible. Churchill speech is one of them. It is a rarer, but typically British definition. I believe Day of Eagle is more proper, because not like previous operations, this was specific about a campaign design for destroy RAF. Previous - no. 

But I agree, many interpreation possible. I do not think it is very great importance but - as you say, RAF and Luftwaffe combat before that and after.. no stop, so difficult to pick a start.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

Parsifal, you keep deny, insult.. funny, you always describe your own post as substantive... I think: when it will become real, when someone else also think of that of your post, too? You have much confidence, certain. Anyone else is "unrefereced claim" etc. always. 

I think I did best to support my posts. If you tell I did not, I think this is very dishonest. And because you behave such way, I do not see why I support it AGAIN. I wrote down once. Read. But you ignore. You pretend I did not. You are even too lazy to read it, say I have to search it for you. 

Why would I? I do not fear your talk will mislead anyone. Basical, you only talk... use big words, have big and strange opinions, but I do not learn from your posts. That is my opinion. If you want to pick fight with people, why not find somebody else? And why should I waste time? You said many opinion here, but proved none. Others did.


----------



## Glider (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante
Can I ask you to just tell us how many aircraft do you believe that the Luftwaffe had available at the start of the BOB and the 15th September. Then we have a baseline to start from.

I just want to take the sting out of the postings.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> Parsifal, you keep deny, insult.. funny, you always describe your own post as substantive... I think: when it will become real, when someone else also think of that of your post, too? You have much confidence, certain. Anyone else is "unrefereced claim" etc. always.
> 
> I think I did best to support my posts. If you tell I did not, I think this is very dishonest. And because you behave such way, I do not see why I support it AGAIN. I wrote down once. Read. But you ignore. You pretend I did not. You are even too lazy to read it, say I have to search it for you.
> 
> Why would I? I do not fear your talk will mislead anyone. Basical, you only talk... use big words, have big and strange opinions, but I do not learn from your posts. That is my opinion. If you want to pick fight with people, why not find somebody else? And why should I waste time? You said many opinion here, but proved none. Others did.




Tante I can see that some of this issue is related to a misunderstanding. "Substantive response" does not mean "better response", or "your stuff is ****, and my stuff is perfect" . In the context of my employment of that phrase, it means "my main response" or my "main reply". Its not a put down of what you said or an elevation of what i said, its just contextural (that is putting it into order or sequence). it is simply saying "you said this, and i said that"

And as to insult, I dont think that I did, but if so, I am offering my apologies , publicly, and want to get on with the discussion. I hope you are adult enough to accept that so we can get on with the discussion. 

Now, in regard to your posts, I cant find two of them, and am simply asking you to direct me to them. if you dont want to then thats your perogative (oh dear perogative....that means its your right), but then that leaves you saying one thing and me not believing you. Can I just say that its okay to disagree but its not okay to engage in what we have been, which is to attack each other because of those opinions. that is not and was not my intention, but still i maintain my disagreement with the positions you take on various issues

In relation to the one matter that I did find, I do apologise, you did quote a source for that, but in such a way that I cant check it. And I did provide you with a rebuttal (that means counterproof, or alternative), this was my "substantive reply"). It took the form of reproduced records from the OKL war losses. Which is a pretty goosd source. So we have differing sources and vastly differing results. We either live with that, or try to tear each others heads off. I dont want to tear your head off, do I make myself clear. 

I dont seek to pick a fight with you my friend, I have offered an apology in public, but I do not agree with your positions. That doesnt mean I disrespect your person, I just dont agree with your opinions or your "facts". I understand that you dont learn from my posts, which is unfortunate I guess, but its not a problem. All that has to happen is that when either of us enters the same discussion, neither of us attacks the other with direct insult. It should be okay to disagree, express different opinions post differnt information, but is not okay, for the posts to say "you are wrong" or "that is not correct". Why? Because it will attract a reply from the other party that perhapss we dont really want to hear


----------



## Njaco (Jul 14, 2011)

from "The WWII Data Book" by John Ellis..

6 July 1940 S/E fighters: RAF - 644 LW - 750
10 August RAF - 749 LW - 805
7 September RAF - 746 LW - 623

Service rates and location must be factored into the numbers, i.e. while RAF shows 644 a/c for 6 July, how many were stationed in 10,11 and 12 Groups who did most of the fighting in the BoB? Many squadrons were stationed elsewhere which reduces the actual number of a/c operating against the LW.

and I can see tempers and name-calling rising again. This has turned into a good thread. Lets not muck it up.

and lets not forget the bf 110s.


----------



## Glider (Jul 14, 2011)

Servicable figs for 10th August
■Blenheim - 60 
■Spitfire - 245 
■Hurricane - 382 
■Defiant - 22 
■Gladiator - 2 
627 Hurricanes and Spits

■Blenheim - 44 
■Spitfire - 223 
■Hurricane - 398 
■Defiant - 20 
■Gladiator - 9 
■Total - 694 of which 621 Spits and Hurricanes


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

would it also be necessary to exclude the Blenheims, Defiants and Glads if we were to exclude the Bf 110s. I would prefer to put all fighters into the mix, because thats the way the chips fall, but then again, fighters based in Germany or Scotland are not really in the battle.

What we need as well is the overall aircraft committments for specific days. How many aircraft were committed by either side.

There is a problem that I can agree with Tante on, German raids on the 15th were too numerous and too disjointed to be mutually supportive, whereas the british, operating on interior lines were able to concentrate against individual strikess, and also refuel and ready aircraft because the raids were too widely dispersed in terms of time.

I hear you about the name calling. I have tried to set it right, but I dont know....I will avoid it as best I can


----------



## Njaco (Jul 14, 2011)

No prob. I'm gonna check my BoB thread and see if I posted any numbers.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

parsifal, on the issue serviceable a/c and pilots

Unit Type (A/C) Est. On Str. Serv. (pilots)	Est. Pres. Ready Ltd. Duty 

I./JG3 Bf 109E 39 37 *30* 39 24 *18*

Note the number of pilots 'ready' to the number of 'serviceable' a/c.

Single engine fighters - 28.09.40


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

I understand, I think. For some formations I note there were more pilots available, and ready than there were a/c ready, other cases it was the reverse. But would this not be similar for the allies, or do they have hundreds of unemployed pilots.....I am not referring to 1940 so much as that later periuod in the war.

My belief is that the allies maintained larger squadron reserves, which probably meant they could use all their pilots more often. Then again, a lost pilot over enemy territory is a lost pilot altogether, a lost pilot over friendly territory is probably on his way back to base already.....


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju,

you can't win my friend. you can post documented facts all day about Luftwaffe strengths in the west, ie: outnumbered, and some just won't
believe it. what some don't realize is that most of the a/c were based in the east. for two reasons. the russians, and the Americans coming
up from Italy. with the russian being considered the much bigger threat. 

one can look a the ' big week' Between February 20–25, 1944, in preperation for Operation Overlord, when the allies had to have air supreamacy
at any cost. ANY cost. massive #'s on the allied side. and if anybody thinks the Luftwaffe wasn't outnumbered needs to give there head a shake.

another thing to remember is deployment. not every single Luftwaffe fighter was at a single place at one time. it was spread over 3 fronts, and
for Homeland defence. 

with the massive #s on the allied side, it was just a matter of time for the defeat of the Luftwaffe. " one mosquito is annoying, a million will
suck you dry".


----------



## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

Murray's "Strategy for Defeat' is available on line.
http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/Murray_Strategy_For_Defeat.pdf


----------



## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> Tante Ju,
> 
> you can't win my friend. you can post documented facts all day about Luftwaffe strengths in the west, ie: outnumbered, and some just won't
> believe it. what some don't realize is that most of the a/c were based in the east. for two reasons. the russians, and the Americans coming
> ...


 
You might want to look at this P-40, http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

*LW a/c*
Sept-Dec 1943: West - 56.4%, East - 43.6%
Jan-May 1944: West - 57.3%, East - 42.7%
June-Oct 1944: West - 53.5%, East - 46.5%

*LW fighters*
Sept-Dec 1943: West - 78.1%, East - 21.9%
Jan-May 1944: West - 78.4%, East - 21.6%
June-Oct 1944: West - 75.7%, East - 24.3%


----------



## drgondog (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> Tante Ju,
> 
> you can't win my friend. you can post documented facts all day about Luftwaffe strengths in the west, ie: outnumbered, and some just won't believe it. what some don't realize is that most of the a/c were based in the east. for two reasons. the russians, and the Americans coming up from Italy. with the russian being considered the much bigger threat.
> 
> ...


 
The debate isn't about 'total Allied air strength - it is about the Order of Battle of USAAF daylight Strategic Forces arrayed against LuftFlotte Reich single engine and twin engine day fighters. It is about the numerical superiority of the LW Fighter arm against the USAAF long range escorts during the big air battles over Germany from December 1943 through May 31. It is about the numbers of German fighters destroyed by US long range escorts (P-38 and P-51) in that timeframe in the air - as well as on the ground from Brunswick to Posnan to Brux to Munich.

There were no more US/RAF fighters involved east of Munster/Dummer Lake/Frankfurt

It is absolutely true that the number of bombers that the LW defended against was huge. It is absolutely true that many times the LW deployed far more fighters into a volume of space than the defending US fighter escorts - and were severely punished by the US escorts - despite the overwhelming local superiority of the LW in the volume of engagement.

It is absolutely true that the LW Fighter arm picked where they chose to engage the US forces in most cases. It is equally true that the German fighter arm was succcessful at punishing the B-17s and B-24s, and at least 10 times between February 20th and May 12, achieved destruction of 8-10% of the attacking bomber force.

It is also absolutely true that the Ost Front did NOT have the majority of the German Fighter Force during that period and did not even come close until the last several months of the war.

Produce your sources if you believe otherwise?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

there was no overwhelming local superiority of the Luftwaffe at anytime in the west between Dec./43 and May/44,
and June/44 ~ until the end of the war. yes I know you said against fighters, not bombers. picking and choosing
single aspects of the whole. interesting. make the #'s work anyway they can eh? 

so becouse as certain USAAF fighter wing associated with a bomber group means what? that it was the only fighers
escorting that particular bomber group? I don't think so.

anyways, how can one seriously consider overwhelming #'s on the Luftwaffe part. 28 USAAF fighters, 300 bombers.
show me one instance where the Luftwaffe deployed 329 fighters to intercept. an advantage of 1, let alone say
429 fighters, an overwhelming advantage of 101 (just an example). 300(B-17s) x 10 guns is 3000guns + tight flying formations. not including
fighters. oh yah.. advantage Luftwaffe  one can't pick and choose on how to play the numbers.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 14, 2011)

Njaco has told you all to quit with the childish name calling and insults. This goes for all sides.

At the moment I am in Normandy and just checking in for a few minutes from my hotel. The next time I log in, if I see insults, childish name calling and just stupidity going on, offenders will be removed from the forum. It is getting really tiresome and I am done with it! The stupidity being done by both sides of the argument is ruining this thread, and I will not have that.

In short, think before you post. If you would not want someone talking to you that way, then don't say it either. 

This is the final warning, for everyone...


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

I never posted anything insulting. never singled anybody out or used the word "you", "your a", etc. well I did in reference to Tante Ju but
that was in support of him.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40 what is the source of these numbers so we can at least have a look at them. is ther an online source that you could post a link to that we could see perhaps. Obviously there are those among us that dont agree with you, so its time for you to direct us to where you seee these numbers and figures and words.

Perhaps we should do the same, although quite a bit has already been posted I see


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

google " the big week", "Operation Overlord", some wikipedia entries, books would be "Gunther Rall's: A memoir", although a bit later, but gives a excellent overview of the Luftwaffe, "Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope", anything by said/written by "Adolf Galland", especially his arguments with the FATMAN Hitler. theres lots of excellent sources now other then 40 year old books. hope this helps, becouse I really don't feel like scanning tons of pages.


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> google " the big week", "Operation Overlord", some wikipedia entries, books would be "Gunther Rall's: A memoir", although a bit later, but gives a excellent overview of the Luftwaffe, "Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope", anything by said/written by "Adolf Galland", especially his arguments with the FATMAN Hitler. theres lots of excellent sources now other then 40 year old books. hope this helps, becouse I really don't feel like scanning tons of pages.


I believe you have a lot more reading to do to catch up to some of the folks you are disputing, some of these folks have spent more time researching this stuff then you've been alive


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> there was no overwhelming local superiority of the Luftwaffe at anytime in the west between Dec./43 and May/44,
> and June/44 ~ until the end of the war. yes I know you said against fighters, not bombers. picking and choosing
> single aspects of the whole. interesting. make the #'s work anyway they can eh?
> 
> ...


 
The figures quoted by others about "the west" must be taken as true IMHO. Consider what the west is though. It stretches from France up to Norway down to Italy and of course Germany, I dont know if Poland is considered east or west for this purpose. I doubt if a 109 could cover a front of more than 100 miles for a successful interception, maybe others could clarify. To cover all the areas the LW had to cover even the numbers they had were spread thin.
On the other side a formation of B17s was vulnerable but not completely helpless to cope with return fire the LW armoured their fighters which detracted from their performance against escorts. To shoot down a bomber you give the escorts a relatively easy job.

In Aircraft production Germany just started to pass Britain in 1943 so I dont think there is any doubt that with the USA USSR and Commonwealth production they were outnumbered from 1940 onwards, that isnt to say at times they didnt have local superiority in numbers and control of the air.



parsifal said:


> My belief is that the allies maintained larger squadron reserves, which probably meant they could use all their pilots more often.


This was certainly the case in Britain a squadron had a number of aircraft and a number of pilots, it was recognised that not all aircraft would be serviceable and pilots needed some rest, from memory during the BoB a squadron of 12 planes actually should have had 16 planes and pilots to be at establishment strength. For much of the battle 13 group itself was a reserve. Even during the height of the BoB about 30% of qualified pilots wernt flying but were training others or on ground staff.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> I believe you have a lot more reading to do to catch up to some of the folks you are disputing, some of these folks have spent more time *researching this stuff then you've been alive*


 
I'm not going to take the time to type out ever last little tibit that I looked at. also, what does my age have to do with anything?
more brilliant minds then mine thought for the longest time that the earth was flat, and the sun revolved around the earth.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> .snip.


 
I think France was the western front. right up to the German Border. Italy was part of the MTO,
Greater Germany was Homeland. East Prussia, Austria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Romania, etc
was the East. Cant remember the Scandinavian countries TO name. Kannel front maybe? dang
memory lol.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

During the BoB RAF fighter squadrons average ~20 a/c per squadron.

Don't have the full document as the source was being a jerk and wouldn't post the rest of the document. Maybe Glider can help with the rest of the document.


----------



## Glider (Jul 14, 2011)

I would need to know a bit more about the paper. I have never seen anything like that before in the folders that I have seen


----------



## drgondog (Jul 14, 2011)

Let us take one example - 1st BD 239 B-17s, 42 P-51s 355th FG, 47 P-51's 357th FG attacking Erding Af, Landsberg and Oberpfaffenhofen around Munich. Summary 89 Mustangs, 239 B-17s.

Luftwaffe order of Battle - all of JG3, Strumstaffel 1, I. and IV/JG27, I/JG301, III/JG26, III/ZG26, I/JG5 plus elements of Edo/Kmdo. According to Caldwell and Prien the LW had approximately 240 s/e and 25 t/e fighters attacking from Ulm to Augsburg to Erding to Se Munich to sw Munich to Landsberg and Oberpfaffenhofen from 1305 to 1430.

So, in this example the LW ratio of fighters to the entire Task force was say 265/(239+89) = .81. the ratio of LW fighters to 8th AF fighters was 265/89 = 3:1. The two Mustang fighter groups were awarded credits for 30 Me 109s, 10 Me 110's, 1 Fw 190, 1 Ju 88 and lost 6 Mustangs in air to air combat. At no time did the Mustangs engage in greater force than 8 ship sections, and in most case four ship flights against the German fighters.

The known losses to the Mustangs, for which I have pilot, unit, type of aircraft and in most cases werk no = 31 Me 109s, 9 Me 110's, 1 Fw 190 and 1 Ju 88. The awards to 8th AF FC (355th and 357th) were 30 Me 109s, 2 Fw 190s, 1 Ju 88 and 10 Me 110's -----> a total overclaim for 8th AF FC of 1 Me 110, 1 Fw 190 and underclaim 1 Me 109.

The GAF accounted for 27 B-17s lost from the 1st TF - of which 9 claimed sanctuary in Switzerland, 2 were shot down by flak over France, 1 Ditched. Of the 24 destroyed in the air around Munich or sought sanctuary, 13 were LW fighters, 7 were LW Flak and 4 were combined flak/fighter.

Parse the data anyway you wish. Spin the results anyway you choose. The LW Fighter arm skillfully placed over 250 fighters in the same volumes of air for which there only 89 Mustangs - but could only destroy 24 bombers (including the limp offs to Switzerland) and 6 Mustangs for the loss of 32 single engine fighters, 10 T/E fighters.

Tell me again about no local superiority and that 8th AF achieved victory only with overwhelming numbers. I will answer you with facts, so far you talk generalties without local tactical awareness.

Get your own examples and we'll talk.. and BTW look up the LW Order of Battle over Misburg for November 26, 1944 versus 90 B-24s and 42 Mustangs of the 355th and 2SF against all of JG301, most of JG1 and parts of JG6


----------



## drgondog (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> there was no overwhelming local superiority of the Luftwaffe at anytime in the west between Dec./43 and May/44,
> and June/44 ~ until the end of the war. yes I know you said against fighters, not bombers. picking and choosing
> single aspects of the whole. interesting. make the #'s work anyway they can eh?
> 
> ...



I can't tell whether you simply can't visualize a 100 mile bomber stream branching toward mutiple targets, with one of three Bomb Divisions (each BD with up to 12-13 Bomb Groups of 36+ bombers) going in a different direction at some point short of a target cluster ...??

So take one BD headed for Lutkendorf, Halle, Bernburg and Merseburg to bomb all four targets, along with their long range escorts. And the second BD branches for Berlin with their escorts. And the 3rd bomb division heads for Munich. Sat for speculation sake that the bomber stream and fighter escort headed, together, to Kassel before splitting into three separate forces and reduced each bomber stream into three 30+ mile streams.

Now take January 1944. No P-47s or Spitfires passed Munster. For the mission suggested above there are two P-38 Groups and one P-51 Group available - one FG per 30 mile stream of Bombers. The fighter group took off with 48-52 fighters and lost several which had to return due to mechanical issues - average in those early days ~ 35% -------> leaving say 32 P-51s for their escort assignment.

Now look at the German controllers - they can choose to send say JG11 and JG1 after the Berlin attacking force, and allocate equal sized forces to each of the other two thrusts, or they might draw JG1, JG3, JG11 and JG27 plus ZG26 to converge on the Halle force and attck southeast of Kassel.

For sure there will be overwhelming numbers of German fighters concentration on that force -defended by a reduced sized US escort fighter force of ~ 32 Mustangs (or P-38s). The LOCAL air superiority of the German Air Force over the American Fighter force is unquestionable is it not. Further that scenario, when there were no long range escorts (i.e. Schweinfurt 8/17, 10/14/1943) resulted in the LW fighter arm inflicting damage to 8th AF that they could not sustain... so the LW succeeded enormously even if the number of fighters attacking the total force of bombers was less than 1:1.. but you must realize that the attacking fighters even in this illustration was not along 60-100 mile stream - it was against two or three bomb groups - one at a time and LOCAL air superiority in that volume was still with the attacking force of LW s/e and t/e fighters.

Fast forward to March 15th. Now there could be two 8th AF FG escorting say 200+ bombers from one BD against 200+ fighters attacking one bomb group at a time - and for sure only one of the two fighter groups (of say 40 P-51s) would be close enough to provide resistance. And this is best case because there are only 5 long range escort FG's to escort three separate bomb divisions - and have to be split among all three.

Fast forward to April 15, for one Task Force of 300 bombers there will be two each for the three BD .

Fast forward to May 15, for one task force of 300 bombers, there were up to three Fighter groups as seven combined P-38/P-51 groups flying 70+% effectives... which meant that at any point the LW chose to concentrate the LuftFlotte Reich resources he could put 250 fighters into a volume that at best could be met head on by One FG of say 40 Mustangs with two more that could get there in five to ten minutes.

That is the tactical scenario over Germany from December 1, 1943 through July 1944.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

yes, I can visulaize a 100mile wide/long bomber stream, very well. the Luftwaffe spread itself over that stream. not always though mind you.
just like not all 200+ bomber formations broke up. they stayed in the tight formations. not always, but sometimes. 

I think you are seriously under estimating the strength of the USAAF fighter forces. read all you can on Operation Overlord and Allied quest for air superiority.
the number of Luftwaffe a/c your quoting is not from official German records, I can promise you that. *there more likey taking from allied pilot accounts of 
estimated enemy a/c numbers*. three things one needs to know before hand

1. planes on hand for any givin groupe
2. planes combat ready for any given groupe.
3. pilots on hand for any given groupe.

just becouse US reports say thay for instance 7./JG11 had 40 a/c, it could mean that as little as 10 were ready.
in the sky, who knows how many single a/c were numbered twice, or three times maybe.

Luftwaffe records and LW pilots accounts are in my book, far more reliable. and thats what I go by. 

one more thing... not all of the German a/c was on the west front. I can't stress that enough. the Luftwaffe had
no clear advantage during Dec./43 through July/44. It was just not possible. except for, and I'll concede this fact,
a very few isolated pockets.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Let us take one example - 1st BD 239 B-17s, 42 P-51s 355th FG, 47 P-51's 357th FG attacking Erding Af, Landsberg and Oberpfaffenhofen around Munich. Summary 89 Mustangs, 239 B-17s.
> 
> Luftwaffe order of Battle - all of JG3, Strumstaffel 1, I. and IV/JG27, I/JG301, III/JG26, III/ZG26, I/JG5 plus elements of Edo/Kmdo. According to Caldwell and Prien the LW had approximately 240 s/e and 25 t/e fighters attacking from Ulm to Augsburg to Erding to Se Munich to sw Munich to Landsberg and Oberpfaffenhofen from 1305 to 1430.
> 
> So, in this example the LW ratio of fighters to the entire Task force was say 265/(239+89) = .81. the ratio of LW fighters to 8th AF fighters was 265/89 = 3:1. The two Mustang fighter groups were awarded credits for 30 Me 109s, 10 Me 110's, 1 Fw 190, 1 Ju 88 and lost 6 Mustangs in air to air combat. At no time did the Mustangs engage in greater force than 8 ship sections, and in most case four ship flights against the German fighters.



*Did all 265 German fighter attack same time? *I very heavy doubt they would that skillfull... very difficult to achieve. Planes take off different base, different time, they do not arrive at same time, even difficult to make them meet and join in one point.

Mustangs were concentrated on the other hand.. this is advantage, even if smaller force.. you take great effort to emphasize: only 8 Mustangs or four attack at one time. You are right of course, because it is important detail. But at same time, it seems you assume the German arrived in big single blob of 250+ fighter.. or at least do not give details much. I am sorry if I misunderstood, but it reads so.

You did not give date so I guess first half 1944. Februar? So I have to look up bases more difficult.

I/JG 3 likely near Magdeburg, in Sachsen-Anhalt
II/JG 3 in Northern German, in triangle of Berlin-Hamburg-Lübeck
III / JG 3, Bavaria.. West of München.
IV / JG either North German like II Gruppe or Western German border (Venlo)
III/JG 26 was in Belgium. 
I/JG 27 in Austria, Wagram. 
IV/JG 27 in West Hungary or Zagreb/Balkans I believe.. 
I./JG 301 in Bavaria, near Münich... 
I/JG 5 a little more North more, near Nürnberg.

III/ ZG 26 near Hannover

That's where they took off. These are bases of units, hundreds of kilometers away.

Are you saying Bf 109G from Belgium, Austria, Balkans, Bavaria from München and Nürnberg, Magdeburg etc., all managed to converge and attack at same time 89 Mustangs? Sorry, I so much unbelieve that there is not words.. if true the Germans were masters of air defence coordination. Far better than British who could not do same in 1940 with much more closer space and airfields where fighters were stations.. at best, 2-3 Squadrons in Big Wings. 250 attack at same time? Never..

BTW all unit of them Bf 109G. And* people all say how poor range was, and how limiting factor was in defence operation.. above example operation shows how false. *109G can Belgium, Austria, Balkans, Bavaria from München and Nürnberg if you example is true. 
So please never never never again like hear this board claim again about how short range was disadvantage for 109G.. this is also example of people ask for in last discussion, parsifal, shortrund and I think, Juha. Here is example for them.. so I think myth really rested now. You also.



> Parse the data anyway you wish. Spin the results anyway you choose. The LW Fighter arm skillfully placed over 250 fighters in the same volumes of air for which there only 89 Mustangs - but could only destroy 24 bombers (including the limp offs to Switzerland) and 6 Mustangs for the loss of 32 single engine fighters, 10 T/E fighters.



Did all 250 fighter attack once? Or in groups of 10, 30, 50 etc. against 89 Mustangs? Because if they attack in piece - "over 250 fighters in the same volumes of air for which there only 89 Mustangs" is great misleading. Especiallyas one German Gruppe come from Belgium, and another take off to intercept from Hungary... while Mustangs are all there all the time.



> Tell me again about no local superiority and that 8th AF achieved victory only with overwhelming numbers. I will answer you with facts, so far you talk generalties without local tactical awareness.



Okay. I tell. Please comment on US made graph. Tell no overwhelming numbers... perhaps not local.. not all time.. but general, in most case, it is true.


----------



## Micdrow (Jul 14, 2011)

Maybe a few of you will find this document interesting. Translated german documents by a Lt Col of the USAF on the german perspective of the battle of Britain including the german sources of his document.

View attachment Battle of Britain A german perspective.pdf


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

Sorry to argue... LOL, really do not mean to be trouble. But if you read this paper - what makes the perspective "German"? The title? It is a study write by US colonel.. based on sources mostly British. Hardly German.. the only German source he quotes is Klee, but only a few times.. otherwise: lot of quote of Irving, Murray, Macfarland, Lee, Mason, Wood and Dempster.. even British Air Ministry. All British, except Murray, who had a cold war propaganda in his mind.. sorry, I think he quotes Bekker once.. but that is not very good book. IMHO, no offense meant for author.

Why not read actual German perspective - can you find Karl Klee study? That IS German perspective.

Find here:

http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090518-051.pdf
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090518-052.pdf
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090518-055.pdf

VERY long read.. also difficult to read.. but extreme interesting. There is actual view on what was going on in heads in German HQ.. not like post-war historians, typical British, "imagine" it how it should have gone..!

PS. I sorry could not answer to everyone.. but I like parsifal did more serious approach to discussion.. I read his post of clearance.. so will try to answer, but I have also work to do etc.



Milosh said:


> Note the number of pilots 'ready' to the number of 'serviceable' a/c.
> 
> Single engine fighters - 28.09.40


 
There are 920 fighter plane (109 type) servicable, 917 pilots to fly them.. what about it?


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

heres an example of the 'Blitz Week'. *100 P-47's *escorting a group of bombers

_'On the last day of Blitz Week (30 July) VIII Bomber Command targeted the Fieseler Works in Kassel. III./JG 11 and III./JG 1 were not scrambled until after the bombers crossed into Germany over Eifel. By the time they were in the air the bombers were near Emmerich am Rhein before they were intercepted. *The Bf 109s were unexpectedly surprised by some 100 P-47 Thunderbolts escorts*, newly equipped with drop tanks. III./JG 11 shot down two bombers but in the first major fighter combat of the Defense of the Reich lost two aircraft, with one pilot wounded and one dead_.'

III./JG11 III./JG1 at that time had around 50 Bf109's ready. maybe 53. remarkable.

however no matter how good the LW pilots were, they were outnumbered, and thus, had a limited shelf life.


----------



## Micdrow (Jul 14, 2011)

Wow Tante Ju, you need to calm down. Its almost like you are insulted by the document. I will check out your documents.

Thanks Paul


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

I am very cool, dear Micdrow, no worry.. even if wheater is very hot.. not insulted at all! Just say, sorry sometime, I cannot say right the things..


----------



## Micdrow (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> I am very cool, dear Micdrow, no worry.. even if wheater is very hot.. not insulted at all! Just say, sorry sometime, I cannot say right the things..


 
No worries here, Ive been out of the saddle for two years on the board and trying to catch up due to personal problems. Documents of WWII I love as you can see by the technical library.

All the best
Paul


----------



## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> There are 920 fighter plane (109 type) servicable, 917 pilots to fly them.. what about it?



It says there was *676 pilots* ready to fly those *712 serviceable 109s*.

There was not 920 serviceable 109s. That is the number of 109s on hand. There was *208* 109s not capable of operations for one reason or another. It also shows that establishment strength was *212* a/c short.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

pardon me:

III./JG1 had 12 aircraft ready and 12 aircraft flown out of 18 a/c available.
III./JG11 had 31 aircraft ready and 31 aircraft flown out of 68 a/c available.

thats 43 aicraft scambled to intercept the heavies P-47s.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

Sorry you are right. I missed table. Indeed it was 712 serviceable 109s (out of 920) with 917 pilots to fly them at end of September.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> heres an example of the 'Blitz Week'. *100 P-47's *escorting a group of bombers
> 
> _'On the last day of Blitz Week (30 July) VIII Bomber Command targeted the Fieseler Works in Kassel. III./JG 11 and III./JG 1 were not scrambled until after the bombers crossed into Germany over Eifel. By the time they were in the air the bombers were near Emmerich am Rhein before they were intercepted. *The Bf 109s were unexpectedly surprised by some 100 P-47 Thunderbolts escorts*, newly equipped with drop tanks. III./JG 11 shot down two bombers but in the first major fighter combat of the Defense of the Reich lost two aircraft, with one pilot wounded and one dead_.'
> 
> ...


 
At the beginning of July, III./JG1 had 57 *109G*s and at the end of July had 60 109Gs on hand.

At the beginning of July, III./JG11 had 40 *Fw190A*s and ended the the month with the same number on hand.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> Sorry you are right. I missed table. Indeed it was 712 serviceable 109s (out of 920) with 917 pilots to fly them at end of September.



You still misread the table Tante Ju. Even though there was 917 pilots 'on hand' (present) there was only 676 pilots 'serviceable' (ready).


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 14, 2011)

No, I do not. Do you know what "Einsatzbereit" means? What is German definition for this? I think no... This is what translated "ready". So there were 917 pilots who could fly planes, for 920 planes, but of that servicable was 712 planes, other were under repair etc.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

917 - 676 = 241

So what were the other 241 pilots doing? 

Est. Pres. Ready (Establishment Present Ready) is what the table says.

So lets look at the first unit in the table, I./JG2 

Establishment 39 
Present 39 
Ready 33

There was only 33 of the 39 were able to fly. The 6 that were not able to fly could have been on leave or sick.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 14, 2011)

> Tante Ju,
> 
> you can't win my friend. you can post documented facts all day about Luftwaffe strengths in the west, ie: outnumbered, and some just won't
> believe it. *what some don't realize is that most of the a/c were based in the east*.



Since Bill brought it up, here are the numbers from Dr. Price's "Luftwaffe Data Book". 

These are TOTAL aircraft in theatre, not just fighters which includes, transports, recon, etc. Dr. Price got his numbers from the Quatermaster reports.

*JULY 1942*
Luftflotte 1 - Eastern Front
Total vs Servicable
392 - 265

Luftflotte 2 - Meditteranean
927 - 463

Luftflotte 3 - Western Front
558 - 416

Luftflotte 4 - Eastern Front
1803 - 980

Luftwaffenkommando Ost - Eastern Front
604 - 392

Luftflotte 5 Eastern Front / Western FRont
396 - 307

Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte - Germany
1000 - 656

*MAY 1943*
Luftflotte 1 - Eastern Front
414 - 342

Luftflotte 2 -Med
1105 - 572

Luftflotte 3 - Western Front
685 - 541

Luftflotte 4 - Eastern Front
1257 - 829

Luftflotte 5 Eastern Front / Western FRont
373 - 288

Luftflotte 6 - Eastern Front
708 - 498

Luftwaffenkommando Sud Ost - Eastern / Meditteranean Fronts
163 - 141

Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte - Germany
2432 - 1457 ( *WOW!!*)

*MAY 1944*
Luftflotte 1 - Eastern Front
415 - 347

Luftflotte 2 - Med
348 - 227

Luftflotte 3 - Western Front
1079 - 597 

Luftflotte 4 - Eastern Front
1060 - 805

Luftflotte 5 Eastern Front / Western FRont
294 - 262

Luftflotte 6 - Eastern Front
917 - 706

Luftflotte Reich - Germany
2374 - 1306

Luftwaffenkommando Sud Ost - Eastern / Meditteranean Fronts
353 - 284



> books would be "Gunther Rall's: A memoir", although a bit later, but gives a excellent overview of the Luftwaffe, "Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope", anything by said/written by "Adolf Galland", especially his arguments with the FATMAN Hitler.



Those are the numbers I have and Bill references. I don't like to google. I have the books. Now could you please post the numbers that Galland and Rall posted in their books?


----------



## drgondog (Jul 14, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> *Did all 265 German fighter attack same time? *I very heavy doubt they would that skillfull... very difficult to achieve. Planes take off different base, different time, they do not arrive at same time, even difficult to make them meet and join in one point.
> 
> *No - good question - answer - neither all 250+ german fighters attacked at one time at one place. I believe I gave a timeline of 1 1/2 hours for the main battle - which was in fact a series of skirmishes. Now take it a step further, given a series of small skirmishes, what is the probability didtribution that the available escort defense outnumbered the attacking force of LW fighters? And I will give you one more piece of info. The 358FS/355th FG --- 1/6 of the 89 fighters available to the 8th AF in this battle - never engaged because they stayed with the lead box throughout the battle. *
> 
> ...



When I feel like you have enough credibility to debate with me on this topic I will devote more time on your 'requests'. In the interim do your Homework!!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 14, 2011)

> The Bf 109s were unexpectedly surprised by some 100 P-47 Thunderbolts escorts, newly equipped with drop tanks. III./JG 11 shot down two bombers but in the first major fighter combat of the Defense of the Reich lost two aircraft, with one pilot wounded and one dead.





> III./JG1 had 12 aircraft ready and 12 aircraft flown out of 18 a/c available.
> III./JG11 had 31 aircraft ready and 31 aircraft flown out of 68 a/c available.
> 
> thats 43 aicraft scambled to intercept the heavies P-47s.



43 LW a/c against 100 P-47s. 2 Allied bombers lost and only 2 LW fighters lost.

and who had air superiority?


----------



## drgondog (Jul 14, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> heres an example of the 'Blitz Week'. *100 P-47's *escorting a group of bombers
> 
> _'On the last day of Blitz Week (30 July) VIII Bomber Command targeted the Fieseler Works in Kassel. III./JG 11 and III./JG 1 were not scrambled until after the bombers crossed into Germany over Eifel. By the time they were in the air the bombers were near Emmerich am Rhein before they were intercepted. *The Bf 109s were unexpectedly surprised by some 100 P-47 Thunderbolts escorts*, newly equipped with drop tanks. III./JG 11 shot down two bombers but in the first major fighter combat of the Defense of the Reich lost two aircraft, with one pilot wounded and one dead_.'
> 
> ...



If you didn't know that Blitz week was 20-25 February 1944, and that one P-47 Group had two big days in that interval? The 56th FG P-47s shot down ~ 9 t/e (110, 217, 88 ) plus 3 109s on Feb 20 west of hannover, and 12 Me 109s from Zuider Zee to Munster on the 21st and 8 Fw 190s on the 24th from W/Kassel to w/Hannover to Quackenbruck to Minden.. The ones near Kassel were close to Geissen ne of Frankfurt. 

So one Group of ~ 48 P-47s were to '100' Thunderbolts near Kassel?

In the same period the 357th FG and the 354th FG, the only operational Mustangs doing long range escorts were killing German pilots from Gotha to Erfurt to Magdeburg to Oschersleben to Halbertstadt to Brunswick.

Get your facts straight - avoid internet Google searches - crap in -----> crap out


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

It doesnt surprise me that the LW had difficulties in concentrating, or that in detail the USAAC was able at times to achieve superior concentration of force. LW had a number of issues to contend with....its radar detection systems were being downgraded by window, and other measures, it had a wide arc of territory to defend, by the latter part of Jan-May it was running out of pilots and fuel, and spares, and a whole range of other difficulties. We could draw some similarities (and differences) to the british situation in 1940 I might add.

But these issues are part of the battle, i would submit. They are the manouverings that makes comparisons of raw numbers somewhat arbitrary. Ther will be occasions when the germans achieve superiority of numbers, others when they wont. But they certainly wont if they dont have the numbers in the first place. And here lies the question that we have to turn our minds to....in terms of raw numbers available, did the defending fighters have more available than the USAAC could put fighters over the target? from there ther are numerous supplementary questions like, were there other factors that conspired to reduce that raw total for the germans and make it hard for them to achieve the necessary concentrations?

My opinion is that the Germans did outnumber the US 8FC in terms of available numbers, but by various tactical advantages the Americans were able to achieve better concentrations most of the time at the critical points of contact. So perhaps there are elements of truth in both arguments......something none of us had considered perhaps.....


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 14, 2011)

One thing to consider is that the American fighters may have had to engage several German fighter groups. Dragondog certainly knows better than I and several other members of this forum have detailed accounts of the some of the German units. but did some of those American fighters have to engage one group of German fighters and then another 20 minutes later and perhaps a 3rd group even later? All after dropping tanks at the first combat and not being able to re-arm guns?


----------



## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

I wonder if the escort ever received radar assistance from Britain? Were they forewarned of enemy interceptions imminent, or were they on their own???

To what extent did radar, and ECM affect the performance of both sides in the battle????


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 15, 2011)

How where the US escort squadrons controlled was there a senior officer in a bomber or a fighter who called in the escorts or was it just down to any pilot to shout for assistance.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 15, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I wonder if the escort ever received radar assistance from Britain? Were they forewarned of enemy interceptions imminent, or were they on their own???



I think unlikely. Radar in Britain did not have range.. I think about listening to German radio traffic, but then - radio sets in US fighters probably did not have range either.. it was typical range of less 100 km in fighter sets..



> To what extent did radar, and ECM affect the performance of both sides in the battle????


 
German were in use of radar, like RAF in 1940. One development I know of was Y guide use. This was very useful for navigation and control - all fighter plane had Y device for 1944, one in group turn it on, and it guided to exact point fighters like X anbd Y device in 1940 bombers.. may seem small but naviation is not so easy in fighter.

I wonder - did US use Window? But here concern - Germans had worked counter measures by 1944, multi change of Hz rating of radar and other. Also as I think of it - maybe window not very use at all. Window does not make plane invisible to radar, it just gives many false signals.. and since plane drop window, you just head for false signal path, like blood dog to blood.. of course it makes estimate of strenght, altitude very hard still.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

I believe the first AEW aircraft were converted Wellingtons which began operations with 100 Group either late'44 or early '45. 

Extensive use of spoofing and ECM was adopted by the RAF in the Night Operations,But I am unaware of any equivalent assets in the USAAC. Perhaps they had them, perhaps not. I also know that Window was effective at times, but less so at other, exactly as you say. RAF used it a lot, and when it worked it reduced losses greatly. Flak was also affected by all this stuff as well 

Centimetric ground based radars in Britain had effective ranges that could reach to the German western borders whilst the AI MkIX had a detection range out to 100km with a degree of error of no more than +/- 10 yds. More important than that was the search arc width. The radar assisted "field of vision" was wide which was of great help in tactical situations. The combination of effective airborne detection and Airborner Early Warning capability in theory at least would have removed or lessened the need for GCI in England for the RAF, but I do not know the actual extent this was integrated during the war. But all of the ingredients of a modern airborne control system were there.

The RAF used OBOE I in 1943 as a more advanced and developed version of the German XGerat system. This allowed radar assisted blind bombing with great accuracy out to the 250 mile mark, which was gradually increased as the war progressed. Because of its narrower bandwidths it was more accurate than XGerat, and the gradually increasing range of the system increased its capability markedly. Harris's decision to jump ahead of his technology, and advance to Berlin was one of the biggest blunders of the war in my opinion...he should have waited....he would have halved BC losses, done about 80% more damage per ton dropped over an admittedly more restricted area, but he couldnt resist the magnet of Berlin, like a light for a Butterfly....

I mention all of this merely to point out that the allies had at their disposal considerable blind bombing, blind navigation and radar assisted and airborne controlled fighters for the night offensive that by wars end could reach deep inside of germany. I dont know (but I doubt it) whether the Americans ever adapted their Day bomber forces, and the fighters that went with them, to include this sort of technology.


----------



## Hop (Jul 15, 2011)

> I wonder if the escort ever received radar assistance from Britain? Were they forewarned of enemy interceptions imminent, or were they on their own???
> 
> To what extent did radar, and ECM affect the performance of both sides in the battle????



Not so much radar, but the RAF "Y" intelligence, based at Kingsdown, listened in to German radio traffic to, and between, fighters. From Signals Intelligence Support to the Cockpit
Captain Gilles Van Nederveen (Van Nederveen is the Associate Editor of the Aerospace Power Journal at Maxwell AFB)



> The Eighth Air Force also exploited Y intelligence near real time during bombing
> missions over Western Europe. Activated in 1943 the RAF Kingsdown Hook-up produced and
> disseminated near-real-time intelligence from voice intercepts to the pilots of Eighth Fighter
> Command as they flew escort missions and fighter sweeps in Northwest Europe. RAF
> ...


http://www.dodccrp.org/events/6th_ICCRTS/Tracks/Papers/Track7/012_tr7.pdf


----------



## drgondog (Jul 15, 2011)

Hop is correct. 

8th AF FC exploited both "Y Intelligence" and migrated to flying Radio Relay missions over the channel to relay to and from BC flying deep in Germany.

As to tactical communications the 'C" channel in the Mustang radio, set specifically for each mission to reduce jamming from German sources, was designed for Bomber to Fighter communications. It was set specifically for a block of bombers and the assigned fighter groups to provide updates relative to waypoints and times to let the fighter commander know whether his assigned block of bombers were on time for the R/V or more importantly if they needed help - as the fighters assigned might be covering a space of say 20 miles and could not always see a German attack.

From about May, 1944 Beachy Head and Type 16 Controls were able to use radar located near East Anglia coast to detect formations and direct specific fighter groups to investigate - sometimes allied and sometimes German formations... the range grew as the war progressed to western Germany.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 15, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> One thing to consider is that the American fighters may have had to engage several German fighter groups. Dragondog certainly knows better than I and several other members of this forum have detailed accounts of the some of the German units. but did some of those American fighters have to engage one group of German fighters and then another 20 minutes later and perhaps a 3rd group even later? All after dropping tanks at the first combat and not being able to re-arm guns?


 
Shortround - the point is dead on. Over time Erich and I have disseminated one of many such examples for the November 26 Battle over Misburg in which ~ 42 Mustangs of the 355FG/2SF dribbled off sections at a time trying to cover 90 B-24s against three separate waves of between 75 and 125 German fighters from all of JG301, JG1 and squadrons of high cover 109s from JG4

It was a battle which lasted from first contact ~ 1210 all the way through 1245 from Celle to Misburg to south of Hannover to sw Hannover and the last German waves managed to break through and take out 20 B-24s from two bomb groups before the last Mustang force of 7 (2SF) broke up the last attack. The 355th were credited with 20 fw 190s, 5 109s

Afterwards, the 339th FG entered the fray and continued the engagement with JG301 from west Hannover to Dummer Lake.

The two Groups destroyed 44 Fw 190s and 8 Me 109s. the 355th had no losses and I think the 339th lost two.

From a an historical note the author of Sernade to a Big Bird, Bert Stiles - former B-17 pilot(and narrated by quotes in WWII in HD?) was one of the 339th KIA chasing a 190 into the ground. He had voulnteered for fighters after his tour in B-17s.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

So DG, perhaps it is more correct to describe localised superiorities of numbers as the actual function of the battle. What I am trying to say by that is that there were tactical advantages at work....communication, radar, tactics, that might give the Americans an advantage in numbers at a particular point, but overall the Germans enjoying a numerical superiority over those escorts. If so, thats just a product of the development of the battle......just another area where the germans were being overtaken


----------



## drgondog (Jul 15, 2011)

fastmongrel said:


> How where the US escort squadrons controlled was there a senior officer in a bomber or a fighter who called in the escorts or was it just down to any pilot to shout for assistance.



Each of the BS commanders within a specific 'box' (maybe more than one bomb group within a box) had the "C" Channel crystal installed in their radios - tuned to the escort squadron/Group leaders assigned to cover the one or more bombers.

So the radio transmissions to/from the bombers and fighters were limited to a few sets and the radio C channel frequencies were different from one Task Force of many bombers to another Task Force so as not to cause confusion.

The problem to be solved is that you didn't want a general call for 'help' to come from an unkown distance and direction with subsequent confusion on the part of a fighter commander.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 15, 2011)

parsifal said:


> So DG, perhaps it is more correct to describe localised superiorities of numbers as the actual function of the battle. What I am trying to say by that is that there were tactical advantages at work....communication, radar, tactics, that might give the Americans an advantage in numbers at a particular point, but overall the Germans enjoying a numerical superiority over those escorts. If so, thats just a product of the development of the battle......just another area where the germans were being overtaken


 
Absolutely - and the tactics evolved over time to improve efficiency, reduce confusion, etc. One valid complaint on the part of German fighter pilots was a fight evolving from one in which their fighters had caught an undefended box of bombers, were in the middle of a fight when the escorts poured in.

Having said that, it was rare when one Fighter Group (US) responded to a call for help en masse. I have seen many examples when one commander would see a big fight miles in the distance, see the assigned escorts of a bomber box 10 miles out in front engage, and issue orders for say one squadron of his own group to move forward and fill the vacuum.

I am not saying that US escorts never had numerical or tactical advantage. A Sweeping Group of Mustangs might catch a Gruppe forming up 50 miles out in front and catch them by surprise - and have a field day because of altitude and speed advantage even if the numbers were balanced.

But the tactics solidified to enable fighter commanders the discretion to direct flights or sections into a gaggle of German fighters while retaining escort cohesion with the balance of his Group. He might direct a flight to bounce a couple of German fighters, he might lead an entire squadron into a large force of German fighters. He might get bounced and call for help from other elements of his force.

Remember a Fighter Group in escort might have one squadron (broken into two sections and weaving) 5,000 feet above and in front of the leading bombers of his box, one squadron in same mode of sections and essing off 5 miles to one side and 2,000 feet above the bombers while the third might be in trail sweeping from front to back.

At any one volume of space of 5x5x1 cubic miles there might be just one squadron in position to meet any attack... or none.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 15, 2011)

What I find interesting is that many of those that claim the LW was outnumbered in the battles over Germany in 1944, claim during the BoB that the RAF was not outnumbered.

1944: LW fighters vs USAAF fighters and bombers
1940: LW fighters vs RAF fighters, excluding the LW bombers


----------



## drgondog (Jul 15, 2011)

parsifal said:


> It doesnt surprise me that the LW had difficulties in concentrating, or that in detail the USAAC was able at times to achieve superior concentration of force. LW had a number of issues to contend with....its radar detection systems were being downgraded by window, and other measures, it had a wide arc of territory to defend, by the latter part of Jan-May it was running out of pilots and fuel, and spares, and a whole range of other difficulties. We could draw some similarities (and differences) to the british situation in 1940 I might add.
> 
> *The German controllers were well informed from radio chatter leaking during bomber assy, to radar and spotters picking up bomber direction and altitude, to repeated entry points on the continent suggesting to the controllers where the highest probability target(s) could be, placing units on alert, moving units from say Augsburg to stage at Huldesheim if the Controller thinks Berlin. Big cat and mouse game. *
> 
> ...


 
There was zero possibility of two US fighter groups collaborating except by sheer accident like the April 24 battle I described above, until late in 1944 when all but the 56th and 78th FG had converted to P-51s. By that time the 8th could provide 3-4 P-51 Groups of 40-48 effectives on any one 30 mile section of bombers.

November 1944 is a classic example when the Germans could easily place 250+ fighters into a volume of airspace like Misburg to Celle against a tactically vulnerable US force. 

Another example is the September 27 massacre when the 448th BG wandered off course on an attack on Kassel, alone, and was hit by a huge force of Sturms near Eschwege and lost 27+ B-24s in the span of minutes - and it took escort fighters at least 5-10 minutes to respond to cries for help.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

Thanks for that, and you kinda answered my next line of questioning....what advantages the germans could rely on to achieve local superiority.

Its not an easy situation to understand


----------



## TheMustangRider (Jul 15, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> I wonder - did US use Window? But here concern - Germans had worked counter measures by 1944, multi change of Hz rating of radar and other. Also as I think of it - maybe window not very use at all. Window does not make plane invisible to radar, it just gives many false signals.. and since plane drop window, you just head for false signal path, like blood dog to blood.. of course it makes estimate of strenght, altitude very hard still.



Relying on my memory, first-hand accounts of bomber crew members describe the use of metalized paper strips used in a attempt to throw off radar guided flak guns and sometimes it worked, saving the life of many bomber crews.
Don't remember such measure being called Window though.


----------



## TheMustangRider (Jul 15, 2011)

drgondog said:


> From a an historical note the author of Sernade to a Big Bird, Bert Stiles - former B-17 pilot(and narrated by quotes in WWII in HD?) was one of the 339th KIA chasing a 190 into the ground. He had voulnteered for fighters after his tour in B-17s.



In case you are not completely sure Drgondog, I can confirm that the story of Bert Stiles was featured in WWII in HD.
From my personal point of view his story is very sad, having gone through so much as a bomber co-pilot, eager to become a fighter pilot and then tragically lost in his first contact with the enemy seconds after achieving his first kill.
I'm looking forward to get a copy of his book.


----------



## TheMustangRider (Jul 15, 2011)

Double post.


----------



## davparlr (Jul 15, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> for aircraft carrier use, along with an arrester hook. the 109 was as pure of a fighter as one can get.


 
This has already been disproven, right? According to DerAdler, the Naval version was the Bf-109T, which used the conventional Bf-109 gear, which was strengthened, not the revised swing shown on the V-31.



> That is the Bf 109V-31 (at least off the top of my head I believe that is the V-31) which was a prototype with wide landing gear. The carrier version was the Bf 109T and all it was a Bf 109E with longer wingspan and arrester gear



Which brings me back to my original question, if there was no problem, why did the Germans expend time and money looking at a more conventional gear?


----------



## drgondog (Jul 15, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> I wonder - did US use Window? But here concern - Germans had worked counter measures by 1944, multi change of Hz rating of radar and other. Also as I think of it - maybe window not very use at all. Window does not make plane invisible to radar, it just gives many false signals.. and since plane drop window, you just head for false signal path, like blood dog to blood.. of course it makes estimate of strenght, altitude very hard still.


 
Yes - the first example was the 3 day/night pounding of Hamburg in July 1943. As you note the Germans developed effective countermeasures. Also notable is that the Germans picked up the H2X frequencies and used them as target ranging for flak - which was very accurate and effective.


----------



## marshall (Jul 15, 2011)

TheMustangRider said:


> I can confirm that the story of Bert Stiles was featured in WWII in HD.
> From my personal point of view his story is very sad, having gone through so much as a bomber co-pilot, eager to become a fighter pilot and then tragically lost in his first contact with the enemy seconds after achieving his first kill.


 
War is a very sad story.


----------



## jim (Jul 15, 2011)

I understand that many of the olders members have much more years of research , Mr Drgondog for example , as they are much older than the younger members, and their opinion is more important but let us the youngers too have an opinion. We too spend A LOT of money in books- ask my angry fiance.
1)German controllers during the deep penetration missions had to deal with a lot of feints attacks , bombers courses changes , weather limitations over german airfields, diferent flight performances of various types of intercepting fighters. So never did the defending fighters attacked at once. p51 faced them in turns.
2) The MISSION PROFILE of german fighters was to engage the bombers or face execution so always P51s entered the fight with great altitude advantage. Even 8 P51s versus 30 Fw190, is not equal if p51 are 3000ft higher and the Fw 190s are concentrated to attack the bombers . And one bounce is enough to destroy the attack as every german fighter dived away.It took a lot of time to reorganize a gruppe even in the days of unescorted raids. And only massive attacks were effective.
3) German controllers were bad . Never warned german leader formation of approaching alleid fighters . No equal combat took place. Most german formations were attacked from higher altitude approachingbombers or during their attacks . in such conditions not even experience could help. Galland of II/JG26 deid that way 17/8/43 ,Egon Mayers February 44, Philip fall 43 ( excuse me, i write from memory) all the same way , attacked from above without warning during their attacks in bomber formations.
4) Some people insist not to consider the bombers part of the air superiority. Firstly bombers were credited with douzens of german fighters after each missions according to western mythology. Secondly if the bombers were not there P51s would have suffered the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941/42.
5) Escort fighters were never attacked . It was not nessecary to score kills. Just force them to jettion early the drop tanks and disrupt their randevous programme. It was proposed but was rejected.
6) Several of the mentioned units did fought in areas that could not be reached by P47s/ Spitfires but had to take off from airfields within range of medium bombers and sometimes short range fighters.
7)bmw 801 was useless at altitude (irrelevant!)
In my country there is a moto. The best way to lei is using the numbers. We all do it more or less. But to claim that LW had numerical superiority ?!?!
Just my opininon , i may be wrong.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

Hi and welcome Jim.

What was the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941-2? Much is made about the losses they sustained, and in the latter half of 1941, it really did get quite bad. However this is to overlook the conditions that they were forced to fight under. 

I will acknowledge that my position is disputed, but evidence to disprove what I support is yet to be posted. In a related thread, I have posted that the LW took heavy losses up to June 1941, when its bombers were withdrawn. Thereafter the balance of losses tipped in favour of the LW, and remained in favour of the LW throughout 1942, but was less one sided. Plus these Allied losses achieved something, ultimately the LW losses only weakened their defences.

Beginning in April 1941, anbd continuing right through to the end of 1942, the RAF began a program of gaining the upper hand in Western European skies. This followed a planned deliberate and staged program. It began by denying access to the LW to British skies. This had been achieved by the beginning of June (well apart from some minor nuisance raids). It also included denying the Germans the ability to interfere with channel maritime traffic. This was achieved also by mid 1941 (again, some nuisance raids are an exception). Then it proceeded to deny the germans control of French airspace close to the channel. This was a much longer and more difficult process. Although the German bombers were quickly pulled away from the Coast, German fighters simply refused to come up unless they could attack from a position of numerical and tactical advantage. The RAF was forced to attack at known disadvantage in order to entice the LW into the fight. Results were often against the RAF as a result, but strategically this was still a victory. Gradually German losses mounted, less and less were they able to come up and defeat the British sweeps. Last big Hurrah for the LW along the channel was Dieppe, and this was not quite the one sided affair it is often made out to be.

By the time all this had ended, RAF was left in control of channel, British airspace, French coast....everything they had set out to do in other words. it was a very hard fought for set of preconditions that made cross channel invasion a possibility as early as 1942. Germans came away from this long, unsung series of clashes with a big material victory, but had lost all the key objectives that caused those clashes. 

Plus, I cannot make the connection between this fight, and a possible fight between Mustangs and the LW.


----------



## Nikademus (Jul 15, 2011)

I guess i'm missing the point of the last 10 pages or so. Seems like the 109's landing gear is no longer suspect at least.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 15, 2011)

jim said:


> I understand that many of the olders members have much more years of research , Mr Drgondog for example , as they are much older than the younger members, and their opinion is more important but let us the youngers too have an opinion. We too spend A LOT of money in books- ask my angry fiance.
> 1)German controllers during the deep penetration missions had to deal with a lot of feints attacks , bombers courses changes , weather limitations over german airfields, diferent flight performances of various types of intercepting fighters. So never did the defending fighters attacked at once. p51 faced them in turns.



Germans had used feints and course changes in the BoB, not exactly new stuff here. Hurricanes, Defiants and Spitfires had different flight performances, nothing new here either. The P-51s, fighting fresh units in turns had to keep their engines in, if not WEP, at least a much higher throttle state for long periods of time and burn more fuel. P-51s did not have unlimited amounts of ammunition. Whatever they started "fight #3" with was what they finished "fight #2" with. 


jim said:


> 4) Some people insist not to consider the bombers part of the air superiority. Firstly bombers were credited with douzens of german fighters after each missions according to western mythology. Secondly if the bombers were not there P51s would have suffered the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941/42.



I think what some people are insisting on in consistency. If Luftwaffe bombers don't count for numbers in 1940 then why should American bombers count in 1943? Chose one method of counting or the other, not the method that makes your chosen side look the best at a given moment.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 15, 2011)

jim said:


> I understand that many of the olders members have much more years of research , Mr Drgondog for example , as they are much older than the younger members, and their opinion is more important but let us the youngers too have an opinion. We too spend A LOT of money in books- ask my angry fiance.
> 1)German controllers during the deep penetration missions had to deal with a lot of feints attacks , bombers courses changes , weather limitations over german airfields, diferent flight performances of various types of intercepting fighters.
> 
> *True*
> ...



You are in every example of mission dates I mentioned above, and probably many more examples in which the overall battle fought was with smaller than Gruppe to Group engagements.


----------



## jim (Jul 15, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Hi and welcome Jim.
> 
> What was the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941-2? Much is made about the losses they sustained, and in the latter half of 1941, it really did get quite bad. However this is to overlook the conditions that they were forced to fight under.
> 
> ...


 
Its out of topic so a short reply. RAF in 41/42 achieved what? Deny Britsh air space? Generally True. Deny channel airspace ? I don t aggre but let s say it s true.Deny French airspace? No. How he succed these results? By confronting 18-20 staffeln with 60-70-80 squadrons and losing from 2-1 (Raf fans) to 4-1 (LW fans). Good job. Excellent performance. In Dieppe with massive numerical superiority (750 aircrafts) lost 88 fighters to 23 germans and with B17s bombing JG26 airfields.
Of course it was mainly the german tactics and not pilot quality or performance gap that created the diference. Only when Heavy bombers begun insecond half 42 to make serius damage and LW was forced to make them priority RAF saw better results. Combat fighter losses of LW in 41/42 in Channel front in no way were unsustainable JG 26 lost 47 KIA pilots in 1941. Raf lost 71 in Dieppe alone


----------



## TheMustangRider (Jul 15, 2011)

marshall said:


> War is a very sad story.


 
Agreed.


----------



## jim (Jul 15, 2011)

Mr Drgondog

About Mayers, The book i posses sates his formation was bounced by 29 P47 from 5000ft higher. And its aircraft took hits in the engine and cocpit areas. Perhaps someone could help?
An formation leader could not choose, he was obligated to engage the bombers. But even if he could his formation ,positioned to attack bombers, was at energetic disadvantage in comparison to escort fighters . 
The idea about attacking the escorts was to engange them by several small units in hit and run attacks . Destroy the time plan and then the main force attack the bombers later hopefully unescorted . Of course the solution would be simple for the alleis.Additional P51s!
German controllers were bad. Despite the special equipment carried by formations leaders aircrafts were unable to help their pilots . Countless cases. Alleid superiority in electronics was so total
P51s would have suffered without the bombers simply because they would be the target and LW would choose how and when to engange them. In equal combat P51 is not superior to the Bf109 with MW50
The alleis because of the ULTRA knew exactly the place ,composition and strength of each gruppe So could design their flight plans to make even harder for the germans to concntrate their forces


----------



## mhuxt (Jul 15, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Also notable is that the Germans picked up the H2X frequencies and used them as target ranging for flak - which was very accurate and effective.


 
I'm aware of the Germans having used Naxos in their night-fighters to pick up H2X emissions from about March '44 onwards, but I'd not heard of the flak arm having any similar device.

Got an equipmnent name / reference for me, out of interest?


----------



## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

Hi Jim

There are a lot of areas of disgreement, so perhaps to simplify our discussion I will concentrate on just one isse that you reluctantly acknowlwdge, but have lingering doubts about....the control of the channel.


I have attached the shipping losses by T/O for the Allies. In 1941, for the british Isles, the British lost 740000 tons of shipping. By the following year it had dropped to 214000, and the year after that 52000 tons. There was an increase later in the war, but these were due mainly mines. In terms of shipping losses to Axis aircraft in the waters around the british Isles, shipping losses went from more than 100000 tons in June 1940, to less than 10000 tons a year later. The LW no longer had any significant impact on local shipping, despite the deployment of two full Gerswaders with abilities to do just that.

I do not know the losses to Axis controlled shipping in the channel, and along the North Sea, but I think you would agree it was very minor. I have a book about MTBs operations that mentions in passing that Axis shipping losses due to MTB action were less than those inflicted by Allied air action, and for the period 1941-2, Axis shipping losses due to MTBs in the channel were about 100000 tons. So the best figure I can offer is that Allied airpower sank about 100000 tons or more of Axis shipping in the Channel and the north sea in 1941-2. 

Now in terms of warship losses, channel became an increasingly dangerous place for the German Navy. By June 1941, they had lost 11 vessels of 300 tons or greater to air attack. More importantly, the RAF was containing the two battlecruisers in Brest and preventing them from deploying. They couldnt sink them, but these high value targets were heavily defended. They eventually escaped, true enough, but not before they had to tacitly admit defeat and withdraw from the TO. 

I cannot see how it can be argued that the Allies did not gain control of the Channel airspace in 1941, on the basis of these figures and historical facts


----------



## drgondog (Jul 15, 2011)

Freeman's Mighty Eighth War Diary - I would have to look up mission but believe Stettin/Posnan in summer of 44


----------



## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

Jim

With regard to your claim that the LW retained air superiority over western Europe, and france in particular, I refer to John Foreman "1941 - The Blitz to the Non-Stop Offensive - The Turning Point", and also to Gallands autobiography.

Relevantly it is stated 

"_Thus in the air war the wheel had turned full circle. The RAF was now firmly on the offensive. Their opponents were now fighting a near totally defensive war in the west, and would remain so for the rest of the war. They retained the advantages of defence (which caused many losses for the allies), but they had lost one important psychological factor. Lufwaffe fighter pilots were known as "jagdfliegers" literally "hunting flyers", and by being deployed so defensively, they had lost much of this advantage. Adolph Galland summed this up perfectly in his autobiography_"

Gallands book says, in relation to the 1941 operations

" _(The Jagdfliegers) element is to attack, to track, to hunt, and to destroy the enemy. Only in this way can the eager and skillful fighter pilot display his ability to the full. Tie him to a narrow and confined ddefensive task , rob him of his initiative and you take away from him the best most valuable qualities he possesses: his aggressive spirit, joy of action and the passion of the hunter."_

Foreman goes on to state

" _the germans did not relish thei new defensive role._......" Of course there was much hard fighting, heavy, even one sided losses, and the germans retained the ability to react selectively. But this is not air superiority by any definition.

However, using the strict definition of "air superiority", the British had achieved it by 1941. Remember the three states of air control....air parity, in which both sides retain the ability to undertake operations with some degree of comparability, then there is air superiority, where one side has the ability to undertake operations with greater freedom than the other, and finally there is air supremacy, where the opponent cannot undertake any operations of any kind without incurring heavy losses. 

If we apply those definitions to the airspace over Britain, France and Germany from 1941, the Germans could no longer undertake any significant operations over large parts of the airspace. They retained limited freedom of action for their fighters. The allies denied large areas of the sky to their opponents, and routinely entered the airspace of ntheir opponents, but would suffer loss if they did. Thats not air supremacy, but it is air superiority, according to the theory, because the allies had much greater freedom of action than the germans did.


----------



## mhuxt (Jul 15, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Freeman's Mighty Eighth War Diary - I would have to look up mission but believe Stettin/Posnan in summer of 44


 
Cheers, will see if I can find a copy. Should note that to be perfectly accurate, I should have said Naxos picked up H2*S*.


----------



## The Basket (Jul 15, 2011)

Going back to the Bf 109 undercarriage...

It wasnt copied. Which pins it for me. Any advantage wasnt worth having. So the Bf 109 undercarriage wasnt good.


----------



## Glider (Jul 15, 2011)

I would like to support Parsifals comment about having control of the air. I have a copy of No 2 Group (which I would recomend to anyone) and what I didn't expect were the number of raids which resulted in few or even no losses to German fighters, even using the Ventura which wasn't liked by the Group.
Its not quite true to say that No2 Group could bomb at will but they did have a lot of flexibility and freedom.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

Duplicate Post (DELETED)


----------



## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

Glider said:


> I would like to support Parsifals comment about having control of the air. I have a copy of No 2 Group (which I would recomend to anyone) and what I didn't expect were the number of raids which resulted in few or even no losses to German fighters, even using the Ventura which wasn't liked by the Group.
> Its not quite true to say that No2 Group could bomb at will but they did have a lot of flexibility and freedom.



Yes its just the application of the theory. People see the word "air superiority" and cant make the correlation because of the losses inflicted on the allies. But there is no doubt who held air superiority in the west after the end of May 1941.

For the record, the theory as applied by NATO is: "Air supremacy is the complete dominance of the air power of one side's air forces over the other side's, during a military campaign. It is the most favorable state of control of the air. It is defined by NATO and the United States Department of Defense as _'that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference_.'

Friendly Forces /Enemy Forces 
Air supremacy /Air incapability 
Air superiority /Air denial 
Air parity /Air parity 

There are normally thought to be three levels of control of the air. Air supremacy is the highest, meaning there is complete control of the skies. Air superiority is the next highest, which is being in a more favorable position than the opponent. It is defined in the NATO Glossary as "_That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces_." Air parity is the lowest level of control, meaning control of the skies only above friendly troop positions.

For those air forces which are unable to contest for air superiority or even air parity a course of action would be Air denial, that is maintaining a level of operations that although it concedes air superiority to the other side prevents it from achieving air supremacy and having a totally free use of the air space."

Once the theory is laid out, it is easy to see why the RAF achieved a state of air superiority from May 1941, whilst the Germans were achieving air denial. Air denial enabled them to exact a price on the British in their exercise of air superiority, but it did not allow them to undertake action free of interference, or in some areas with any prospect of real success. 

Hopefully this will explain why Britain can claim air supoeriority from quite early in the campaign. Over time, of course, that superiority developed into air supremacy, but that took at least another 1.5 years over the occupied territories and 3 years to achieve over Germany itself


----------



## TheMustangRider (Jul 15, 2011)

Very informative parsifal.


----------



## riacrato (Jul 16, 2011)

I was under the impression the V31 was, like other later V-models of the Bf 109, first and foremost a testbed for planned Me 309 features. In this case: Semi-retractable radiator and main landing gear.


----------



## Glider (Jul 16, 2011)

Taking the Air Superiority situation in Europe the following stats iro 2 Group may be of interest. 

1941 Sorties 4,990 losses 211 (95 Flak, 39 Fighters, 16 Battle accidents, 61 unknown) approx 4.2% loss ratio
1942 Sorties 2,253 losses 97 (No Breakdown) approx 4.3% loss ratio
1943 Sorties 5,531 losses 108 (18 Flak, 22 Fighters, 12 Battle Accidents, 56 Unknown) approx 1.95% loss ratio
1944 Sorties 27,022 losses 188 (46 Flak, 3 Fighters, 13 Battle Accidents, 126 unknown) approx 0.695% loss ratio
1945 Sorties 12,311 losses 86 (29 Flak, 1 Fighters, 3 Battle Accidents, 53 Unknown) approx 0.699% loss ratio

Its fair to say that the German Fighters were never the main threat with the possible exception of 1943 when they did quite well. However even then for the fighters to only destroy 22 bombers (plus say 20 of the unknowns) over 12 months is hardly a huge success. I had expected the German fighters to do better in 1941 but again, flak was a much greater danger.

Stats from 2 Group RAF A complete History


----------



## davparlr (Jul 16, 2011)

jim said:


> Mr Drgondog
> 
> 
> P51s would have suffered without the bombers simply because they would be the target and LW would choose how and when to engange them. In equal combat P51 is not superior to the Bf109 with MW50


 
Jim, you are kind of being ganged up on but I must comment on your statements regarding the P-51 including the one above and this one. 



> 4) Some people insist not to consider the bombers part of the air superiority. Firstly bombers were credited with douzens of german fighters after each missions according to western mythology. Secondly if the bombers were not there P51s would have suffered the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941/42.



While there is a general consensus and, good reason to believe, that the P-51 is overrated as the best fighter of the war, there also tends to a belief that the only reason the P-51 was successful was because of its range and quantity. This opinion does not hold up to scrutiny. When compared at equivalent fighter weights, the P-51B with the -7 engine and pulling 67” Hg boost (late ’43 to May ’44) was faster than any Bf-109F or G from SL to ceiling, often significantly so. This includes the Bf-109G -14 with both the ASM and AM engines using MW50. In climb the P-51B was generally superior to the F and roughly equivalent to the G. Against the later model Bf-109G-14 with MW-50, the P-51B had slightly less climb capability up to about 20k ft where it started to perform better than its rivals. Post May, 1944, with higher octane fuel, the P-51B /D, pulling 75” boost, was significantly superior in speed averaging maybe 30-40 mph faster to any model Bf-109G from SL to ceiling. In climb, the P-51B has the advantage from SL to ceiling of all Bf G models. The P-51D is at a slight disadvantage to the G-14 up to about 15k ft. where it starts to perform better. In general, the P-51 will out dive the Bf models and roll better. Turning is competitive and acceleration favors the Bf. Endurance easily falls to the Mustang. The only Bf model that was competitive to the P-51B/D is the K, and it is only roughly equal in performance to the P-51B with 75” boost.

I think your statement that the P-51 is not superior to the Bf-109 with MW50 is quite debatable since the P-51 is faster, generally climbs better, dives better, rolls better, and only gives up a few areas including acceleration. And can do this while running the Bf out of fuel, shooting it down on landing and flying home several hours. In my opinion, the P-51 is the better performer against any contemporary Bf-109 and the post May, “44 version is overpoweringly better than any Bf model except the K.


----------



## jim (Jul 16, 2011)

davparlr said:


> Jim, you are kind of being ganged up on but I must comment on your statements regarding the P-51 including the one above and this one.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


 
Mr Davabir , i simply disagree. Flight Performance comparison has been made many times in the past .Everyone has his opinion Just explain me only this. How is possible a heavier aircraft wtih 1600ps ,with low drug wing ("laminar flow"), outclimb and out turn a smaller,lighter ,1700-1800ps aircraft?(Which additionaly have a bigger displacemenmt engine)
Anyway P51 as a whole package was superb and i understand the proud of the american people about it.
Anyway i do consider P51 superb weapon system


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 16, 2011)

davparlr said:


> This has already been disproven, right? According to DerAdler, the Naval version was the Bf-109T, which used the conventional Bf-109 gear, which was strengthened, not the revised swing shown on the V-31.



Correct the V-31 had nothing to do with Carrier ops. By that point in time the Bf 109Ts were in service in Norway and the GZ was becoming an afterthought (if I recall correctly that is ). 

The V-31 was a test bed for the Me 309.

Falcon's Messerschmitt Bf 109 Hangar

Not pertaining to this topic, but for those that are interested in the Bf 109T which was built for carrier use check out the following book. It is on my shelf and very interesting. 

*Sea Eagles: The Messerschmitt Bf109T
By: Francis Marshall

ISBN: 1871187230*


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 17, 2011)

Glider said:


> 1943 Sorties 5,531 losses 108 (18 Flak, 22 Fighters, 12 Battle Accidents, 56 Unknown) approx 1.95% loss ratio
> 
> Its fair to say that the German Fighters were never the main threat with the possible exception of 1943 when they did quite well. However even then for the fighters to only destroy 22 bombers (plus say 20 of the unknowns) over 12 months is hardly a huge success.



That is two sides of story - if RAF hardly flying it is no surprise to anyone few planes lost... you say, 2 Group flied 5531 sorties in 1943. In_ one year_. Loss: 108 (all cause)

Please compare that to 4970 bomber sortie fly by German in 1-15 September 1940._ Two week_..

If enemy does not show, he cannot shot down. Of course.. but if you ask air superiority, you have to ask: why does enemy does not show..? Why did RAF did not show? Surely not - not enough bomber. RAF had bomber enough. Will to show up daylight - no.

Since RAF was denied of sustain air bomber operations over Europe during day, it is clear who had air superiority in opinion mine. I know you agree not, but that is my opinion. I think this thesis of parsifal is far-reached. But it is interesting discussion, too.



jim said:


> Mr Davabir , i simply disagree. Flight Performance comparison has been made many times in the past .Everyone has his opinion Just explain me only this. How is possible a heavier aircraft wtih 1600ps ,with low drug wing ("laminar flow"), outclimb and out turn a smaller,lighter ,1700-1800ps aircraft?(Which additionaly have a bigger displacemenmt engine)
> Anyway P51 as a whole package was superb and i understand the proud of the american people about it.
> Anyway i do consider P51 superb weapon system


 
I agree with Jim. This is usual discussion - data I saw suggest P-51 type had advantage in speed over medium altitude, 109G-6 or G-14 with 605A, 605AM. Means high alitude over. Generally in speed but not in climb, or turn. This favours 109.

P-51B is good performance, but not mature type - problem with vision, too light guns, reliability with them. P-51D is mature type.

Case is different with high altititude AS or D type engine - this is G-6/AS, G-14/AS G-10 or K-4 type. All equal to P-51 at altitude. 109K also slightly better in speed etc. At altitude, climb better, turn better. It is question of engine.
General - speed characteristics of both types excellent.. top speed, cruise speed. Equal. Bf 109 is more suited for close fights, because it is superior in turn, roll, climb. P-51 is superior in high speed fights. There are also many other factors - gun, vision, range etc. This gives mixed picture. Both types excellent for purpose, equal in combat.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 17, 2011)

jim said:


> Mr Davabir , i simply disagree. Flight Performance comparison has been made many times in the past .Everyone has his opinion Just explain me only this. How is possible a heavier aircraft wtih 1600ps ,with low drug wing ("laminar flow"), outclimb and out turn a smaller,lighter ,1700-1800ps aircraft?(Which additionaly have a bigger displacemenmt engine)
> Anyway P51 as a whole package was superb and i understand the proud of the american people about it.
> Anyway i do consider P51 superb weapon system



A Mustang pulling 75" is using 150 fuel and put out ~2000hp. At higher speeds the Mustang's control surfaces needed less force on the control stick by the pilot, than on the 109.

Max speed of the K-4 was at 23,000ft while the top speed of the P-51D was at 26,000ft.

The 109 was also a razorback, so I see no reason why the 109 had better pilot vision.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 17, 2011)

Was not 2000 HP at 81", but that RAF only, USAAF 72"? A bit over 67".. (1700 HP)?


----------



## Kryten (Jul 17, 2011)

well the Mustang has to be the best fighter of world war two simply because it can do everything all the other types could do but they could not do what it could!

quoting performance figures is pretty much irrelevant when the tactical situation is the most relevant in all air to air combats, and the fact the P51 could be there to make that tactical situation speaks volumes!


----------



## Glider (Jul 17, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> That is two sides of story - if RAF hardly flying it is no surprise to anyone few planes lost... you say, 2 Group flied 5531 sorties in 1943. In_ one year_. Loss: 108 (all cause)
> 
> Please compare that to 4970 bomber sortie fly by German in 1-15 September 1940._ Two week_..
> 
> ...


 
At the end of the day, the Luftwaffe fighters were shooting down on average *2-3 bombers a Month*, over northern Europe in 1943 *approx 0.45%* of the bomber sorties launched against them. 

Now you have every right to consider that an acceptable defence, one that shows that the Luftwaffe had command of the air but I suspect that you would be in a very small minority.

Bomer Command itself as you know was a strategic force that generally didn't operate during the day.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

Hi Tante

Just a quick note about No2 Group and the Luftwaffe. No 2 Group is not the entire RAF. Its just one group (about 100 aircraft), tasked with the operations over France after June 1940, I believe. In 1939 it had 76 Blenheims attached, which remained its main equipment until somrtime in '42 (I think, I will stand corrected on that). It was then re-equipped with American equipment. In the latter part of 1943 it was transferred out of BC and became part of 2 Tactical Air Force, equipped with Mosquitoes and B-25s. Ny wars end it had a strength of about 260 aircraft. 

Its certainly not the entire RAF, and during the whole course of the war is credited with over 57000 sorties overall. I think the number quoted by Glider are those just over France.

I dont know if 5000 sorties for a year is a lot or a little. Its an average of 14 aircraft over the continent every day. The usual cycle for daylight tactical operations over France in April-May 1941 was about 1 major mission every four days or so. At that rate, the group was sending 55 bombers to the continent every four days. I am unaware of that many bombers being the bomber force for the 17 fighter squadrons assigned to the offensive, perhaps some sorties were flown at night, or to areas where the JGs were not deployed (though with over 32 staffeln deployed in France at that time, its hard to imagine any part of France not being covered) .

No 2 Gp at the beginning of the offensive consisted of 7 squadrons, Nos 18, 21, 82, 101, 105, 110 139. All were equipped with Blen IVs. Average frontline strength of BC squadrons at that time was about 12 aircrcraft, so the styrength of the Gp was about 84 aircraft or so.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 17, 2011)

Glider said:


> At the end of the day, the Luftwaffe fighters were shooting down on average *2-3 bombers a Month*, over northern Europe in 1943


 
No, this is false. Sudden - your No 2 Group bomber sorties become the all the bomber sorties flown against Luftwaffe. Of course and 2-3 bombers shot down - in fact many more. You know well this was not true. Your data only refers 2 Group. 



> *approx 0.45%* of the bomber sorties launched against them.



While we discuss - what were these bomber sorties good for? What damage do they make to German? All this - bombing France? So why would German care? France is enemy country. Britain is enemy country. Britain bombs France. Good..



> Now you have every right to consider that an acceptable defence,



I do not consider this "defence". You can only defence against attack. RAF had no attack of meaning. You said 5513 sorties a year. 460 sortie a month.. insignificant. Diversion raid at best.



> one that shows that the Luftwaffe had command of the air but I suspect that you would be in a very small minority.



This "small minority" include USAAF Bomber Command after Schweinfurt and and RAF bomber command who did not fly exactly because it knew Luftwaffe had command of air.. I know, annoying fact, but little difficult to avoid it.



> Bomer Command itself as you know was a strategic force that generally didn't operate during the day.



It operated in the day until the Luftwaffe denied it of that possibility in 1940. The reason it operated during the night was forced on it, by fact that the LW had air superioity over Europe.

The RAF wasn't flying many day bomber sorties because it couldn't. If enemy planes do not fly, they can't be shot down. Of course if you already force them do not fly to effect, LW already achieve mission success, RAF failed. 
So claim air superiority if you wish, it is good propaganda, play numbers a little... say few shot down, forget they hardly fly at all this is real reason.. 

Basical: RAF goal was use bombers bait, force German fighter into fight, and shoot them down with strong fighter numbers, ie. having advantage. But German did not play this game.. they played theirs. RAF failed.
German goal was simply to skirmish RAF in West, with minimal force, cause maximum casulties... LW succeed in goal, until 1944, and USAAF escort, that is.

I fear I am on firm opinion is that thesis that RAF was gaining air superiority in West after 1940 is like alternate history... like rezunism. It was allowed to fly when it did not hurt German interest. But how German could take it back anytime - shown during Cerberus, Dieppe.. LW had complete superiority when wanted.

PS. @parsifal._ ''Just a quick note about No2 Group and the Luftwaffe. No 2 Group is not the entire RAF.''_ '- I agree. Good information you share, thank you, even if I do not agree thesis. That is I point out to Glider - No 2 Group is not RAF, so if he lists what LW shoots down from No 2 Group sortie, it is not equal to what LW shoots down from all RAF sortie..


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

Bomber operations over france were carried out for a number of reasons. No.2 Gp was not the only Bomber force committed to the offensive, but it was a significant part. For example the attacks against the German Naval Heavy units in Brest were carried out mostly by Coastal Command units, as was the suppression of marine traffic in the Channel 

2 Group were the poor devils who provided the decoy forces for the RAFs fighter sweeps, so to that extent their bombing attacks were insignificant.....at first. However they were also responsible for forcing the LW to pull back their bomber elements later on, thereby rendering the British Isles more safe from LW attack. 

Later on the Group also undertook attacks of the French transport networks, bombing bridges, rail junctionsetc. This slowed, but did not stop, the construction of fortifications along the coast, and always made re-supply difficult for the forward elements. Of course, a much heavier effort, of which 2 group was a part, occurred in 1944, but in 1941-2, he germans had far less materiel to lose in these attacks.

Lastly, the Germans looked to French industry as a supplement to their own industrial resources. They had expected that the French auto industry could supply aomething like 100000 MT for the german military. In the finish they received about 30000. The bombing of the great automotive works in France and the supply chains leading to them, is credited with part of that suppressive effort. 

Lastly, though I dont think 2 group was directly involved, the overall offensive did allow support to be provided to the emerging French resistance, which was always a thorn in the side of the Occupying power, and a great source of intell for the allies. 

The efforts of 2 Group, was a small, but nevertheless noteworthy contribution to those overall outcomes


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 17, 2011)

parsifal said:


> 2 Group were the poor devils who provided the decoy forces for the RAFs fighter sweeps, so to that extent their bombing attacks were insignificant.....



That must have been fun for the crew of a obsolete Blenheim. Not the ideal aircraft for raids over France but I suppose thats all that was available till US twins got into service.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 17, 2011)

Tante, I can't see how you can claim that the RAF was almost non-existant over Occupied Europe.

Check this link and you will find almost daily they were operating in some fashion -

RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary

Like Parsifal posted, France was a target rich area for the Allies against Germany.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

yeah thats a great resource that site NJ, and drives home what was happening on the French Coast


----------



## Milosh (Jul 17, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Tante, I can't see how you can claim that the RAF was almost non-existant over Occupied Europe.
> 
> Check this link and you will find almost daily they were operating in some fashion -
> 
> ...


 
And BC Main Page


----------



## Njaco (Jul 17, 2011)

Fantastic Milosh!

check this....

BC Operational Stats


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 17, 2011)

Milosh said:


> And BC Main Page


 
Great link. According to source Bomber Command ceased complete day air operations in May 1943. Did not resume for a year.. Daylight losses were very heavy.

The Bomber Command War Diaries, by M. Middlebrook C. Everitt and Lancaster To Berlin, by Walter Thompson

BC Operational Stats


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

Fantastic resources guys....goes straight to the favourites...

What I would say about all this is that the RAF enjoyed considerable freedom of action over occupied Europe from the end of May 1941 onwards. Of course there were many reasons for this, including the redeployments of many LW units to the Eastern Front. However, what is blindingly apparent is that to an ever decreasing extent the LW challenged the RAF along the coastal areas of occupied Europe. When they did, they tended to be devastating. I am not trying to prove that the LW was inneffective. Anything but. However the original point being made was that the RAF suffered enormous losses over France 41-3, for no point. That I do contest. The losses were heavy, on occasion, but most operations were untroubled by LW activity, until the RAF vextended itself into Germany proper.

If you want to go back to the air superiority issue, this all suggests a rather complex relationship. My reading of the situation is that over Britain, and the channel, the Brits had won air supremacy by the latter part of 1942. The one big exception to that was the channel dash by the two Battlecruisers....a source of intense embarrassment for the RAF by that stage. Over France and most of the western euriopean occupied nations, the RAF could claim air superiority (remember the deefinition of what that means). Over Germany, the Germans retained air superiority to air supremacy by day, and air parity to air superiority by night


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

I’m more with the Tante Ju on the air superiority over France, the balance began to turn against LW only in 43. Fighter Command had taken beating from LW fighters in 41-42 but in 43 situation was much more even, sometimes LW roughed RAF sometimes it was other way around, and when the year wear out FC began to get upper hand. Still in July 43 it was rather even, LW had a slight advance but in Nov 43 Spitfires seemed to have won all the bigger fighters vs. fighters engagements.

RAF pilots had learned from past errors, they got Spitfire IX with Merlin 63s and 66s which were better than those with Merlin 61s and more and more reliable Typhoons for lower altitude combats. Also during early part of 43 RAF got new, longer range radars for fighter control over France which meant better situation awareness to RAF formation leaders over France.

All this had nothing to do with Bf 109’s landing gear but IMHO Snautzer’s message # 7 gives answer to the question on the problems with the gear. T/o and landing in 109 was more demanding than in Hurricane or in Merlin Spitfire but with right training and concentration it was not overly difficult.

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

hello Juha


You and tante are not understanding what the definition of air superiority is. You do not need air superiority to shoot down a lot of enemy attackers. LW was not enjoying air superiority when they did this. They were exploiting the advantages of defence, and were also being selective in what strikes they were intercepting. By latter half of 41, they were not intercepting many strikes that were in the coastal region. Only those left deliberately under-defended, to entice them up off ther deck. RAF had to place itself in unfavourable positions deliberately to entice the Luftwaffe up.

This only applied close to the coast, not further inland. here the LW continued to enjoy the advantage.

Other main reason to support that LW no longer enjoyed air superiority was that they were forced to pull their bomber units well back. If it was they who had the advantage, it would have been RAF pulling their bombers back. This never happened.

Remember the five main states of air activity.....air supremacy, air superiority, air parity, air denial and no action. And what your air force must be doing to claim those various state. LW was not doing what needed to be done to claim air superiority, as defined by NATO handbook. Anything else is mis-use of the term.


----------



## Glider (Jul 17, 2011)

I never claimed that 2 Group were Bomber Command clearly they were not. However they were the Group that operated normally by daylight, on a regular basis, over the French Coast. Throughout that time German fighters were not the major threat, Flak was, I mentioned 1943 as that was the year when the Luftwaffe fighters did the best and even here the fighters only shot down a tiny percentage of the bombers.

Even in 1941, despite the accepted obsolescence of the Blenheim, the superiority of the Fw190 over almost anything the RAF had, plus being used as a decoy, far more bombers were lost to Flak, than to fighters. 

I was trying to show that the RAF could and did operate over France whenever they wanted with limited interference by Luftwaffe fighters. Of course the Luftwaffe shot down more fighters than they lost, they should have done, they had all the advantages. However, they didn’t stop the raids or inflict serious losses to the bombers. They did not have control of the air.

To use Bomber Command figures would have been misleading as the Me109 and Fw190 day fighters would be powerless to stop them. We can only speculate how well large daylight raids by Bomber Command on limited incursions similar to the luftwaffe during the BOB would have done when escorted by fighters, to the best of my knowledge it wasn't really tried.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

Glider said:


> I was trying to show that the RAF could and did operate over France whenever they wanted with limited interference by Luftwaffe fighters. Of course the Luftwaffe shot down more fighters than they lost, they should have done, they had all the advantages. However, they didn’t stop the raids or inflict serious losses to the bombers. They did not have control of the air.
> 
> To use Bomber Command figures would have been misleading as the Me109 and Fw190 day fighters would be powerless to stop them. We can only speculate how well large daylight raids by Bomber Command on limited incursions similar to the luftwaffe during the BOB would have done when escorted by fighters, to the best of my knowledge it wasn't really tried.


 
Yes, bomber losses over France were limited, with day bomber losses about half those lost at night, and as you say, the majority of combat losses were to flak, not the LW fighters. Even the few attacks on inland targets do not seem to have been intercepted....my best guess is because of the limited endurance of the LW fighters, the location of the target and the location of the interceptors. 

But when RAF placed themselves deliberately in harms way, at a disadavantage in numbers and/or position, for the sole purpose of enticing the LW up for a "circus", the LW would generally oblige, and generally get the upper hand. But apart from getting the best tallies of those encounters, these affairs gave the Germans absolutely nothing, because strategtically it was the RAF dictating, when, how often, and how serious these battles were. In other words, and to put it crudely, the RAF only gambled what it was prepared to lose. 

Moreover, by mid 1941 the RAF had already established the strategic victory....air superiority over France and the Channel. From there it became a battle for air supremacy, which they had largely won by late 1943.

As far as massed escorted raids, well, it was never attempted, but this was precisely what the fighter commanders were advocating from July '41. In hindsight they were probably right....the night bombing offensive in 1941 was about as near to defeat as the RAF ever came. That was the era of the Butt report, casualty rates of 7%. It would take additional technolgy, new aircraft and the arrival of a very controversial figure named Harris to turn BC fortunes at night around in 1942.


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
not being interested in NATO terminology all what I said was that IMHO RAF didn’t enjoy air superiority over France in 41-42 in daytime, even with strong escorts its small bomber formations suffered rather heavy losses, day-time bomber sortie rates were fairly low. Or at least RAF didn’t use its claimed air superiority effectively, look 2 Group sortie rate in 42. To be able to sent a couple sqns of bombers, usually light bombers, with the need of 5 or more fighter wings to escort that token force, doesn’t show at least a clear air superiority. IMHO if the RAF has been able to sent a wing of heavy bombers with 3 fighter wings acting as escorts rather regularly deep into France without heavy losses, that would have been IMHO air superiority. IMHO LW didn’t win air superiority over southern England during the BoB even if it was able to sent sizeable bomber formations regularly to bomb targets in southern England during it.

And LW was not forced to move bomber units more rear during 41-42. Its main bomber unit in West, KG 2, used more or less same bases during 41-43 but when part of it was transferred first to Balkans and then to East during the second half of 41.

Juha


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

Hello Glider
what I recall, when BC used its heavy bombers over France during 41-42, losses tended to be rather high, at least a few Stirling and Halifax missions I can recall. Same to the Lanc low level raid to Augsburg when a few 190s low in fuel intercepted the raiders for a short time before forced to disengage because of lack of fuel.

Juha


----------



## Glider (Jul 17, 2011)

I think the key difference is that the German raids were stopped, they were stopped due to heavy losses and a large majority of those losses were caused by RAF fighters. The Luftwaffe did not gain control of the air.
The RAF raids on France and the other occupied countrys were not stopped by the Luftwaffe, the losses were not caused by the fighters and the RAF could attack anywhere they wanted, whenever they wanted. The RAF dictated the combat, not the Luftwaffe.

Re the sortie rate in 1942, part of the reason was that it was a year of significant change to No 2 Group. All the Blenheim and handful of Fortress I were withdrawn and replaced with Ventura's, Bostons and Mosquito's. This would have had some impact as tactics were developed, tried out and implemented. I do not pretend this was the whole reason but they inevitably did impact operations.


----------



## Glider (Jul 17, 2011)

Hello Juha
True but these were normally single figures raids often as low as three and the Lancs (I think, happy to be corrected on this) didn't have any escort. Had the RAF launched say a 100 bomber raid with an escort who knows what would have happened. 109F's found penny packet Sterlings difficult but the Fw190 would be a really serious danger. That said the Luftwaffe were not around in numbers and couldn't be everywhere. 

We are in the world of speculation here. I do believe they would have done better than the early RAF daylight raids which had heavy losses. Those aircraft had no escort, armour or self sealing fuel tanks and were up against cannon armed Luftwaffe aircraft who sometimes outnumbered them. There was only ever going to be one winner in those battles.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 17, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> This "small minority" include USAAF Bomber Command after Schweinfurt and and RAF bomber command who did not fly exactly because it knew Luftwaffe had command of air.. I know, annoying fact, but little difficult to avoid it.
> 
> *The LW achieved a position of stength and effectiveness against US Strategic Daylight Bombing operations during the period August 1, 1943 through February 19, 1944 - during which the US actually considered transitioning to night bombing in November 1943. - so TJ you are correct.
> 
> ...



Generally true (nearly equal) except at altitude, Excess Power over Required Power is even more critical for the 'draggier' airframe (the 109) and the stall characteristics are more subtle- and the 109 simply did not outroll the Mustang.

Turning may be better in low to medium speeds - unproven at higher speed ranges - and turning is over rated when comparing the two fighters. Usually the one that sees and engages the other first, with higher energy entering the fight wins.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> not being interested in NATO terminology all what I said was that IMHO RAF didn’t enjoy air superiority over France in 41-42 in daytime, even with strong escorts its small bomber formations suffered rather heavy losses, day-time bomber sortie rates were fairly low. Or at least RAF didn’t use its claimed air superiority effectively, look 2 Group sortie rate in 42. To be able to sent a couple sqns of bombers, usually light bombers, with the need of 5 or more fighter wings to escort that token force, doesn’t show at least a clear air superiority. IMHO if the RAF has been able to sent a wing of heavy bombers with 3 fighter wings acting as escorts rather regularly deep into France without heavy losses, that would have been IMHO air superiority. IMHO LW didn’t win air superiority over southern England during the BoB even if it was able to sent sizeable bomber formations regularly to bomb targets in southern England during it.
> 
> And LW was not forced to move bomber units more rear during 41-42. Its main bomber unit in West, KG 2, used more or less same bases during 41-43 but when part of it was transferred first to Balkans and then to East during the second half of 41.
> ...



Hi Juha


How would you describe air superiority if you are not interested in NATO terminology. What are you referring to when you aree saying the LW enjoyed air superiority. If you are basing that simply as the numbers of aircraft shot down, but are ignoring the limited freedom of action the germans had in other airpower applications, such as strike, transport, aeronaval interdiction, then what you are referring to as "air superiority - Finn style" equates to air denial in NATO speak (which is everybody else I might point out) 

I'll put it to you this way, air superiority is about freedom of manouvre, freedom to undertake operations at relatively low cost. You make a number of claims that are simply untrue in this respect:

1) That large numbers of RAF bombers were shot down over france in the daylight raids....never happened, infact the daylight raids over France suffered a lower attrition rate than the Night bombers over Germany, AND the majority of those losses were to flak, not the fighters.

2) You make the claim that 5 or 6 wings of fighters would escort these bomber formations over france. Another myth. In fact the maximum was six squadrons in 1941 for any given raid. Another urbaqn myth I am afraid, that the RAF used all the resources based in England to try to overpower the LW. If they had trried that, the LW would simply not come up to fight, as they actually did on numerous occaasions

3) You say that the German bomber formations did not move. I know that isnt true, since the units KG26 and 30 had been transferred from the Paris/Calais area to Bardofoss as part of LF5s operations against Murmansk in the first instance, but on their return were deployed to the Bordeaux Merignac area as part of Fliegerfuhrer Atlantik. The elements of KG-40 that had remained in France after the 1940 battles were quickly redeployed from Brest to Bordeaux because of the threats posed by RAF retaliation. This squadron suffered losses to RAF bombers before moving in March 1941 out of range. Later it had two additional staffeln attached to the KG. Some small recon elements and seaplanes did remain in the area, but these were of no threat to British control of the area.

Now, in the way that I describe air superiority, how can the LW mount effective operations over Britain after May 1941? They cannot. But the RAF could do the reverse, moreover, despite your claims to the contrary, bomber losses were tolerable, and fighter losses acceptable. The RAF gained control of the skies over the channel, as witnessed by the much reduced losses to shipping for the allies, and the sharp increase in losses to the Axis navy. They gained control over Northern France as well , as witnessed by the modest losses, and moderate to severe damage they inflicted on French industry. LW could only react selctively to these incursions, and then only with fighters acting on the defensive. There were no offensive operations of any note in reverse by the germans. No one is saying the germans could not react defensively to the Allies, but they were limited to reacting defensively, they had no offensive potential at all. The allies had far more options, could penetrate enemy airspace with confidence and undertake a much wider range of operations. In other words, they had air superiority.


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
I’m not saying that LW had air superiority over France only denying that RAF had, other than local time to time. Even FAF was able to achieve local air superiority over targets areas during the Summer 44 Soviet strategic offensive in Karelian Isthmus, at least it lost no bombers to Soviet fighters during escorted bombing raids against Soviet army targets but nobody claims that FAF had air superiority over the Isthmus. LW was able to use air transport and liaison a/c over France in 41-43, it had no needs of strike or aeronaval interdiction there, I’m not speaking situation over Channel but over France, even if LW was able to made strikes against British shipping in the Channel time to time.

1)	If you look BC statics, daylight losses were in some months rather high, in fact unsustainable level, don’t know the exact causes, but 6% loss rate is unsustainable in long run, whatever the causes were, in fact some experts claimed that only loss rates 3% or under were sustainable.

2)	One can see that myth stated for ex Price’s Spitfire Mark V Aces book pp. 18-19. According to him “Typical for these ops was Circus No 62…” 6 Blenheims were covered by 18 sqns of Spits and 2 of Hurricanes, ie ½ sqn of Blenheims covered by 20 sqns of fighters.

3)	I’d not count units moved to other theatres as units moved because of RAF attacks, of course almost all bombers were moved from France as a preparation for Operation Barbarossa during late spring early summer 41 but RAF had not any effect on that. As I wrote, the main bomber unit operating against GB from mid 41 to mid 43 was KG 2 and it was not moved to rear, it changes its based time to time because of operational needs, ie was it operating against East England, against Hull for ex or against SW England, against Bristol for ex.

IMHO if the RAF would have air superiority over France it could have used regularly its medium/heavy bombers against important targets in central France with reasonable losses. It didn’t do that even if daytime bombing in 41-mid 43 was clearly more effective way to deliver effective strikes against industrial and military targets.

Juha


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

Hello Glider
have you LW bomber loss rates during the BoB, IMHO they might not be much worse than those of RAF over France in 41-42, in fact lower than those in BC daylight loss rates when it flew 200 or more sorties/month in 42 (between 6 and 9%), 43 between 2.1-6.6%. IMHO it was only that British were more stubborn in their air campaign and were not stopped even if the price went rather high.

Yes, the Lancs during the Augsburg raid didn’t have fighter escort, they relied on low-lever flying and diversion raids by 2 Group to keep LW fighters away of the Lancs but that back-fired.

Juha


----------



## drgondog (Jul 17, 2011)

jim said:


> German controllers were bad. Despite the special equipment carried by formations leaders aircrafts were unable to help their pilots . Countless cases. Alleid superiority in electronics was so total
> P51s would have suffered without the bombers simply because they would be the target and LW would choose how and when to engange them. In equal combat P51 is not superior to the Bf109 with MW50
> The alleis because of the ULTRA knew exactly the place ,composition and strength of each gruppe So could design their flight plans to make even harder for the germans to concntrate their forces


 
Perhaps you can evaluate the following:

From August 1943 through January 1944 the 8th AF sustained intolerable losses to th LW. The LW sustained relatively light losses against the unescorted bombers.

From February 1944 through April 1944 the 8th AF sustained important, but sustainable losses from the LW. The LW experienced unsustainable losses during that period of time. During May, 1944 the 8th and 15th AF mounted the campaign against German and Czechoslovakia Oil/Chemical targets and continued the destruction of Ploesti by the 15th. 

The difference?

Three long range Fighter Groups at the beginning of January 1944 capable of going to Schweinfurt.

Six long range Fighter Groups at the end of March, 1944 capable of going to Munich.

Eight long range Fighter Groups at the end of April, 1944 capable of going to Brux and Posnan.

No other US or RAF Fighter Groups going past Kassel.

LW lost an average of 800 pilots per month during that period - when they did not lose 800 pilots in the West and Germany in 1943.

The LW was defeated over Germany, the Oil campaign was a success, further straining LW future reserves and operations

1.) The LW had more s/e (109/190) fighters available to place anywhere they wished and planned. The 8th AF fighters had to spread their available escorts among three separate bomb divisions of approximately 200-350 bombers each to generally spread out targets. So, if the controllers were good that particular day and wished to place only 1/3 of available day fighters (~150) on one box of bombers they would have worst case of one US Fighter Group of 30-40 effective Mustangs to defeat or fly past to get to the bombers, with perhaps another 30-40 fifteen miles (8-10 minutes) away for help.

2. According to you the LW fighters, the Me 109G-6 and Fw 190A-7 and A-8s were equivalent to the Mustang and had they decided to engage the fighters instead of the bombers the LW Fighter arm would 'easily deal with the Mustang'.

In spite of your rationale that the German Controllers were useless, the controllers could as often as not guess where the target would be and direct the Gruppe's to an altitude advantage.

But -
1. The bomber losses dropped below 1943 Schweinfurt losses on every mission except March 6 and April 29, 1944 - despite twice as many s/e and t/e fighters in Luftflotte Reich in May,1944 as in May 1943.
2. The average loss rate to German Fighters went from 10+ percent for deep penetrations with long range escort to less than 5% and trending to 2% in May.
3. The loss rate of the outnumbered US long range escorts was below that of the P-47 loss rate in air to air combat.

So - despite the focus on Bombers, and despite your claim that the German Fighter Command could easily deal with the Mustang had they chose to do so - the German air force was trounced, the bomber losses plunged, the outnumbered escorts hunted the LW everywhere in Germany ripping the heart out of the LW.

Were the German fighter pilots so inferior during this period that even with as 'good or better' fighters they were unable to remotely come close to 1:1 in air to air combat when engaging the Mustang (which was in the range of 8:1 air to air over 109/190s).

Were they superior in skill but lacking in tactics?

Were their fighters neither superior or as capable? 

Or???


----------



## Glider (Jul 17, 2011)

Juha
I have no idea as to the loss rates for the Luftwaffe bombers or fighters for the BOB, its something that I have often wondered about. The rough numbers I can find but not the loss ratio.
If you can point me in any direction I would appreciate it, I admit to expecting it to be in the 8% area but that is a guess.


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

Hello Glider
I don't recall any source and I don't have now time to try to dig out one, that's why I asked if you have the rates. 8% might be near, at least it sounds familiar. Maybe Njaco have the relevant info.

Juha


----------



## Glider (Jul 17, 2011)

I have been digging around and found the largest daylight Bomber Command (not just no 2 group) action that I can identify. The details and results I hope you find interesting

24th July Target Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
There were five stages to the attack

Brest
1) 3 Fortresses bombing from 30,000 ft no losses 
2) 18 Hampdens escorted by 3 squadrons of Spitfires 2 Hampdens lost
3) 79 wellingtons unescorted daylight raid 10 Wellingtons lost

Cherbourg (Diversion)
36 Blenheim escorted by Spitfires no losses

La Pallice (Scharnhorst)
15 Halifax's unescorted daylight raid 5 lost

Fighter defence was described as being stronger and more prolonged than expected. The Spitfire escort certainly worked and the Wellingtons and Halifax's paid the price. What would have happened if the escort had been given to the Wellingtons and Halifax's no one will know, but without escort they were sent on a death ride and I would have expected more of the them to have been shot down. Germany threw eveything they had into the air to protect those ships and a strong defense must have been expected.
To make matters worse the Germans would have been warned as Sterlings did an unescorted daylight raid the day before losing one bomber to fighters

I don't know the split of losses between the Fighters and Flak. I do know that the RAF claimed 15 fighters from the bombers and escort. I appreciate that this was an over estimate but if anyone has the real figures it would be interesting.


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

Hello
La Pallice was probably too far away for fighter escort at the time, maybe even Brest was so far away, that there was only fighter bases for only 3 Spitfire sqns close enough for effective escort work.

Juha

ADDUM, at least the Halifaxes hit Scharnhorst, IIRC one stick of 5 1000lb AP bombs hit Scharnhorst but none of those exploded, anyway Scharnhorst shipped some 3500tons of water and had to return to Brest for repairs.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

Hi Juha

In reference to your last post to me, perhaps we are talking about two different time periods, with regards to fighter committments and losses sustained. I am talking about the 1941 through to the early 1942 period. In terms of fighters scrambled, it was not uncommon for FC to scramble upwards of 20 squadrons over England when a rhubarb or a Circus was planned, however never more than 6 squadrons of fighters ever crossed the ccoast, and never more than 4 squadrons (possibly 5) were attached as direct escort to the decoy forces. In the whole of 1941, only 17 squadrons of fighters ever committed forces to cross the channel in that entire year, and of these no more than 6 (possibly 7) were committed at any single time. So when you mention 18 squadrons to escort 5 or 6 blenheims, this is a gross misrepresentation of the facts, or is referring to a time period outside of 1941. 18 squadrons may have been scrambled to support the Blenheims, but no more than 6 squadrons ever crossed the channel to engage the Germans. If it refers to 1941, it it is probable that Price is referring to the numbers of fighters scrambled, not the numbers that crossed the french coastline.

Moreover, to entice the germans up, the antics of the RAF were really quite unnerving. There were never more than 8 staffeln available along the French coast, and the LW was far too canny to scramble if the odds were against them. Only if they believed that they had a numerical advantage, or at least comparability would they commit to battle. The usual makeup of the RAF incursions was to escort the blenheims with 2 or 3 squadrons, watch for the JGs to react. The RAF would have 3 or 4 squadrons of fighters come in behind the decoy force, mixed in with the scrambled fighters over England. Whilst the LW would engage the forward elements it was the forward groups responsibility to try and hold them until the cavalry arrived. too much cavalry and the germans would turn tail if they felt the numbers were too far against them. 

With regard to losses, I notice you are referring to BC losses when you start mentioning losses of 6 or 7%. But again, this is misrpresenting the facts. The vast majority of BC losses were against targets in Germany itself, where indeed it was the case the British were suffering heavy losses (for not much gain either). But in the daylight operations over france it was the exact opposite. Losses never exceeded 1.75% per month. and of these the overwhelming percentage were from flak. German fighters in France were never the major sources of losses to British Bombers engaged in daylight operations. Again, that applies to 1941, in the latter part of 1942 there was an increase, but never to the catastrophic levels of the Night Bombers in the latter part of 1941.

With regard to shipping losses to the RAF in the Channel, well, if the losses in the whole British home waters is anything to go by, then in 1940, the british lost 1.5m tons to all causes, in 1941 714000 tons, and in 1942 less than 214000 tons. This was mostly to causes other than aircraft, for example, in the whole of 1941, only 74000 tons of shipping was lost to air attack in Home waters, and I know that the majority of these were in the north sea. German efforts at coastal shipping in the channel are so low as to be counted as zero. Moreover their inability to impede British military traffic in the channel is amply demonstrated by their lack of reaction to the invasion at Dieppe. The reaction of their fighters is well known and deserves respect, but where were the KGs????Why werent they reacting???. Answer is because they couldnt. Too few, out of position and with no prospect of success


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 17, 2011)

I just returned a book to the library which detailed 200 Spits escorting 18 Blenheims and an equally large number escorting a single Stirling , amongst the comments were JE Johnson calling the raids a waste in not so many words along with other others who commented along the same sort of line. This info was from the Official History of the RCAF


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
now the Circus No 62, flew on 7 Aug 41, according to Price’s book, 6 Spit sqns operated as close escort and escort cover forces, 3 Spit sqns as the top cover, so 9 Spit sqns escorted the bombers, and 6 other Spit sqns acted as the Target Support Force and the 2 Hurricane sqns plus 3 more Spit sqns as the Withdrawal Cover Force. The LW fighter activity concentrated against the latter, so IMHO it is clear that all 20 fighter sqns operated over France, or do you think that Jagdflieger concentrated against the fighters that flew over southern England and that was late summer 41. I gave my source, I wonder what is your source to the claim that max 7 sqns were committed at any single time.

In fact tactical advantage was enough for LW, one can see that even from FC combat reports, 20-30 LW fighters attacking part of the escorts or even a Schwarm or Rotte making a fast attack on bombers through the close escort.

You can find the composition of RAF escorts in the above mentioned book or 1942 system from Price’s Late Marque Spitfire Aces.

On BC losses, I referred to the day operations losses and I doubt that many of them were flew against targets in Germany, 2 Group flew a few against Western Germany targets but I doubt that there were many flown by the medium/heavy bombers of the BC. And if you check the Chorley’s BC Losses 1941 for the 24 Jul 41 attacks mentioned by Glider above in the message #391, you’ll see that fighters played a major part in the bomber losses suffered on that day.

Juha


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 17, 2011)

parsifal said:


> With regard to losses, I notice you are referring to BC losses when you start mentioning losses of 6 or 7%. But again, this is misrpresenting the facts. The vast majority of BC losses were against targets in Germany itself, where indeed it was the case the British were suffering heavy losses (for not much gain either). .



No, Juha is 100% right about losses. loss of Bomber Command and Fighter command do not fit into your thesis, so you throw it away, but it happen. 1941 was for 6,5% loss rate for Bomber Command day operations. Few missions flown, losses big.

1941 was worst year for loss rate. Hooton writes:

"The British suffered badly during 1941: FC daytime loss rate was around 2%, while BC (largely 2 Group was 7,68%, excluding anti-shipping operations, with ominous increases during the last quarter. From 14 June 1941 until end of year, FC lost 411 aircraft over the Channel, 14 during the last "Circus", and although pilots claimed 731 victories, the Jagdgruppen lost only 103... by contrast, the Jagdruppen loss rate was less than 1%".



> But in the daylight operations over france it was the exact opposite. Losses never exceeded 1.75% per month.



Really? Loss rate of Bomber Command, day operation only, 1941.

January	4,2 %
February	3,2 % 
March	2,5 %
April	4,4 % 
May	8,4 %
June	4,7 % 
July	11,8 % 
August	8,5 %
September	5,7 % 
October	13 %
November	0 %
December	4,6 %

See: BC Operational Stats



> and of these the overwhelming percentage were from flak. German fighters in France were never the major sources of losses to British Bombers engaged in daylight operations.



Story is nice, but I do not trust after above "correction" of "facts" by your part.



> Again, that applies to 1941, in the latter part of 1942 there was an increase, but never to the catastrophic levels of the Night Bombers in the latter part of 1941.



Fact - you like that word much.. so here is for you. Compile from table. BC Operational Stats

Bomber Command in number, night, 1941. 26841 sortie, 709 missing, 332 crashed, loss rate 3,87%
Bomber Command in number, day, 1941. 3507 sortie, 202 missing, 26 crashed, loss rate 6,50%

Short story - BC day bombing in 1941 was decribeable two words: insignificant. Costly.



> With regard to shipping losses to the RAF in the Channel, well, if the losses in the whole British home waters is anything to go by...



Why would they? Loss of British shipping else place from air do not count?



> Moreover their inability to impede British military traffic in the channel is amply demonstrated by their lack of reaction to the invasion at Dieppe. The reaction of their fighters is well known and deserves respect, but where were the KGs????Why werent they reacting???. Answer is because they couldnt. Too few, out of position and with no prospect of success


 
You begin to enter fantasy land... you begun to write story for yourself, about air superiority.. for while, u used books.. parts you like. then, imagination only. No KG at Dieppe? Real? In truth, 28 out of 48 German aircraft lost at Dieppe were German bombers, most of them to KG of Do 217... explain now.


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 17, 2011)

drgondog said:


> But -
> 1. The bomber losses dropped below 1943 Schweinfurt losses on every mission except March 6 and April 29, 1944 - despite twice as many s/e and t/e fighters in Luftflotte Reich in May,1944 as in May 1943.
> 2. The average loss rate to German Fighters went from 10+ percent for deep penetrations with long range escort to less than 5% and trending to 2% in May.
> 3. The loss rate of the outnumbered US long range escorts was below that of the P-47 loss rate in air to air combat.
> ...


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

Glider said:


> I have been digging around and found the largest daylight Bomber Command (not just no 2 group) action that I can identify. The details and results I hope you find interesting
> 
> 24th July Target Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
> There were five stages to the attack
> ...


 
Hello Glider
I checked from a couple sources and the reason for only 3 Spitfire sqns escorting the main attacks was simply that there were only 3 Spitfire sqns available because of Brest was too far away to standard 1941 Spitfire and only 3 sqns (Nos 66, 118 and 152 Sqns) were equipped with Mk IIAs with a fixed 40 gal fuel tank under the port wing, which was the only version available with enough range.

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> now the Circus No 62, flew on 7 Aug 41, according to Price’s book, 6 Spit sqns operated as close escort and escort cover forces, 3 Spit sqns as the top cover, so 9 Spit sqns escorted the bombers, and 6 other Spit sqns acted as the Target Support Force and the 2 Hurricane sqns plus 3 more Spit sqns as the Withdrawal Cover Force. The LW fighter activity concentrated against the latter, so IMHO it is clear that all 20 fighter sqns operated over France, or do you think that Jagdflieger concentrated against the fighters that flew over southern England and that was late summer 41. I gave my source, I wonder what is your source to the claim that max 7 sqns were committed at any single time.
> 
> In fact tactical advantage was enough for LW, one can see that even from FC combat reports, 20-30 LW fighters attacking part of the escorts or even a Schwarm or Rotte making a fast attack on bombers through the close escort.
> ...



No, the top cover was part of the 6 squadron close escort. If Price says that there were nine squadrons, he is wrong. 

The target support force never left English skies that day. The withdrawal force was drawn out over the channel as it covered the withdrawal and as you say the was not a lot of resistance to the main force, because it was too strong (my interpretation) 

My sources include

Foreman
Galland
Rawlings JR (RAF Fighter Squadrons)
Richards Saunders (Royal Air Force 1939-45)
Webster C and Franklin N (The Air offensives against Germany)


Also had some access 20 years agao to :

Squadron Operations Records Books AIR27 series
Group Operations Books AIR 25 series
Fighter Command and Casualties AIR16 961 

An example of the details contained in these records is available at this online address:

1941


----------



## davparlr (Jul 17, 2011)

jim said:


> Mr Davabir , i simply disagree. Flight Performance comparison has been made many times in the past .Everyone has his opinion Just explain me only this. How is possible a heavier aircraft wtih 1600ps ,with low drug wing ("laminar flow"), outclimb and out turn a smaller,lighter ,1700-1800ps aircraft?(Which additionaly have a bigger displacemenmt engine)


I must reexamine my comparison of the P-51B at 67” boost. I have mixed data on climb, most of which comes from Kurfurst and is in German and I am inept at that. There are some charts showing the Bf-106G-1 having very good climb that is significant (over 300 ft/min better) below 20k. However the airspeed advantage still lies significantly with the P-51B with a typical 30 mph advantage. To illustrate this speed difference, imagine driving down the highway at 100 km/hr (60 mph) and a car goes by you at a 148 km/hr (90 mph). I think you would say, Wow, that guy is going fast! As far as comparing the P-51B and the P-51D climb with 75” boost compared to the Bf-109G-14, see these charts. The first is a USAAF test report from Spitfireperformance, and the other is from Kurfurst site. A note here, at 75” Hg, the Merlin engine is generating over 1800 hp.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/p51b-44-1-climb.jpg

http://www.kurfurst.org/Performance_tests/109G14_PBLeistungen/files/PBG14_ROC_SNplusMW50.jpg




> Anyway P51 as a whole package was superb and i understand the proud of the american people about it.
> Anyway i do consider P51 superb weapon system



While I do consider the early and more prevalent Bf-109 versions to be outclassed by the P-51, the later models, like the G-10 were quite formidable. One episode of “Dogfight” interviewed an AAF pilot who was disdainful of the Bf-109 but ran into one he could not shake and had to resort to a snap stall technique to lose him. On recovery he said he did not go looking for that plane again. It was probably a G-10.



tante ju said:


> I agree with Jim. This is usual discussion - data I saw suggest P-51 type had advantage in speed over medium altitude, 109G-6 or G-14 with 605A, 605AM. Means high alitude over. Generally in speed but not in climb, or turn. This favours 109.


 
See above post.



> P-51B is good performance, but not mature type - problem with vision, too light guns



The P-51B with its four 50s was a deadly machine, not to be toyed with. Some pilots preferred it to the D. Also, the Malcolm hood significantly increased outside visibility. The Bf-109 was no role model in pilot visibility.



> Case is different with high altititude AS or D type engine - this is G-6/AS, G-14/AS G-10 or K-4 type. All equal to P-51 at altitude.


This is true for the K, but is not true for the others. See previous charts for climb and these charts for speed. The P-51 is significantly better in aerodynamic efficiency. The Bf-109G-14 with a 1800 hp A-S engine is capable of 347 mph at SL. The P-51B with a 1500 hp engine (67” Hg) is capable of 360 mph. The P-51D with an 1800 hp engine (75” Hg) is capable of over 380 mph at SL. Only the Bf-109 K at 377 mph performs similar to the P-51.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/p51b-speed-wf.jpg


http://www.kurfurst.org/Performance_tests/109K_PBLeistungen/files/5026-18_DCSonder_MW_geschw.jpg 



> 109K also slightly better in speed etc. At altitude, climb better, turn better. It is question of engine.


This is true, it was indeed a very formidable plane although short legged. However it was way too late in coming to the game and contemporary Allied aircraft, like the P-51H was already on the back burner.



> General - speed characteristics of both types excellent


Only the Bf-109K, The others were not so excellent.


> Both types excellent for purpose, equal in combat.


This is probably true with accomplished pilots. With typical pilots, the P-51 had more tools in its arsenal, except for the Bf-109K.





> Was not 2000 HP at 81", but that RAF only, USAAF 72"? A bit over 67".. (1700 HP)?



75” of boost was approve for the P-51 in April, 1944. 

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/75inch-clearance-v-1650-7.jpg

Combat reports confirm this was used. You may recognize the name on the second entry.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/combat-reports/353-hinchey-14nov44.jpg

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/combat-reports/357-yeager-6nov44.jpg


----------



## Njaco (Jul 17, 2011)

> Story is nice, but I do not trust after above "correction" of "facts" by your part.





> You begin to enter fantasy land...





> Fact - you like that word much.. so here is for you.



*Stop the sarcasm or your stay here will be short.*



> Short story - BC day bombing in 1941 was decribeable two words: insignificant. Costly.


Why would you say 'insignifigant'? I think at this time period, BC FC were going on the offensive so soon after th BoB and were learning how to "Give it to them back". Maybe there wasn't any tangible, physical success but the experience gained was immense.


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2011)

parsifal said:


> No, the top cover was part of the 6 squadron close escort. If Price says that there were nine squadrons, he is wrong.
> 
> The target support force never left English skies that day. The withdrawal force was drawn out over the channel as it covered the withdrawal and as you say the was not a lot of resistance to the main force, because it was too strong (my interpretation)
> 
> ...



Hello Parsifal
Based on what, Price names the sqns, Nos 71, 111, 222, 452, 485 and 602 Sqns flew close escort and escort cover for the bombers, Biggin Hill Wing (72, 92 and 609) formed the top cover force and so on. So which 3 sqns did not participate according to your sources. And why the Target Support Force (Hornchurch and Tangmere Wings) didn’t do what it was supposed to do? IMHO it’s very difficult to give target support while flying over England while the target was in France. And how could Bader, the leader of the TANGMERE Wing report contacts with 109s over the target (Lille) and how the Wing's only loss, FltLt Draper from 41Sqn, got captured if the Wing stayed over England? And for sure during Circus 96 the Target Support Force did what its name implied, ie gave support over the target area.

One example for 5 Wings covering ½ sqn of Blenheims.
Circus 81 19 August 1941 called also "Leg Operation"
Target the Gosnay Power Station in France
Bombers 6 Blenheims of No. 2 Group, Bomber Command
Escort Wing - 41, 610 and 616 Squadrons (Tangmere)
Escort Cover Wing - 452, 485 and 602 Squadrons (Kenley)
Target Support Wings - 306, 308 and 315 Squadrons (Northolt) and 403, 603 and 611 Squadrons (Hornchurch)
Rear Support Wing - 72, 92 and 609 Squadrons (Biggin Hill)

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Jul 18, 2011)

Tante

The losses you are quoting for daylight operations are for all BC operations. Many of these ops were unescorte raids into areas other than western Europe (treating germany as central europe and scandinavia as NorthernEurope ). Just as an example, to use that April 1941 month again, 167 sorties and a total of 15 daylight bomber losses. I know of at least 32 of those sorties. they occure on 8 april, one near brest, one near the frisian islands, and one off Bergen. Brest operations. two small vessels sunk, 2 enemy aircraft (Bf109s) confirmed lost (from german records) no loss to the Blenheims. They were escorted, incidentally. Secons mission, by 1.5 squadrons, intercepted by Bf110s, 2 a/c lost for 1 Bf 110 damaged. Last mission off Bergen by a squadron strength formation lost another Blenheim to an Me 110. Many more losses outside the operational area than you think. The majority were over hard targets in or near Germany.

I'll stand corrected about the bomber sorties over Dieppe, any ideas on how many allied ships were hit or damaged as a result of this activity? 

I never claimed that the operations over France by 2 gp were massive. yet they were strong enough for the KM to abandon their forward positions at Brest, and for all three major warships stationed there to take serious damage. Are you saying this was insignificant, because for Britain, it was vital these ship remain imobile, evidently this paid off in May with the loss of the Bismarck. i consider these to all critical outcomes for the war. We can only speculate what might have happened if Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been ready to sortie in May.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 18, 2011)

Hi Juha

We are getting boggred down with the details i guess. Maybee you are right....maybe there were more fighters being poured into the fight than I thought, which certainly explains the increased losses in the latter parrt of 1941. We will have to just accept disagreement on the numbers i think. 

What is of more interst to me is that if you are correct, and the RAF could put all those aircraft over France and suffer the loss of 400 aircraft in that six month period, in enemy airspace, then how can this not be seen as air superiority....th ability to place ones own forces over enemy controlled territory, do what was wanted to be done, and then return with tolerable losses.

By comparison, LW suffered nearly as many losses (280ish) in one month of operations in the first half of 1941 as the british did over the whole of france in the second half of 1941. It matters not that the two situations have differnt numbers involved, the difference is, the british had gained complete control of their airspace, the germans after may did not. These are trhe sole measures that apply to whether a force has air superiority or not, not whether their flyers are elite, or what one side does with their advantage....just whether they have that advantage. 

Remember what sparked this debate some pages back....whether or not the RAF had won air superiority over western europe (as opposed to central europe) or not. I still think its is pretty clear that they had gained such advantage.


----------



## Glider (Jul 18, 2011)

Tante
The average loss ratio for all bomber command in 1941 on daylight raids was 6.5% (from the Bomber Command Stats). As has been pointed out correctly those are all BC raids wherever they went and a lot were unescorted to Germany in small numbers. 

For no 2 Group there is no doubt that 4,900 sorties were made over N Europe and losses were:-
95 - Flak
39 - Fighters
16 - Battle accidents
61 - Unknown

Loss ratio approx 4.3%

Details from No 2 Group page 470

Now however you slice the cake or want to comment, there is no doubt that fighters were not the major risk, flak was. One of the major tasks for No 2 Group was anti ship strikes, always a dangerous job for any airforce, it was called Project Channel Stop. If you want a good book on the subject read the book of the same name. Flak was deadly, fighters hardly get a mention.

The basic truths were:-
a) Flak was the major threat
b) The RAF chose when and where to attack, they dictated the action and had control of the air
c) Unescorted raids beyond the Channel Coast paid a heavy price.


----------



## Juha (Jul 18, 2011)

Hello Glider
IIRC Theo Boiten in his book Blenheim Strike gives an impression that in fact 109s were a real risk to the 2Group Blenheims during those shipping strikes against coastal convoys and ports after Germans got themselves organized. Of course also German flak was murderous.

Juha


----------



## Juha (Jul 18, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
As I have wrote FAF could attack all targets it wanted in the Karelian Isthmus during the big Soviet strategic attack during Summer 44 even if greatly outnumbered by VVS and VVS KBF without any of the escorted bombers lost to Soviet fighters even if escorts were size of 10-20 Bf 109Gs. And that was achieved with very light fighter losses and with clearly positive loss rate vs VVS fighters. So in that sense we did clearly better than RAF over France in 41-42. Still we don’t claim that FAF had air superiority over the Isthmus, only brief local air superiorities over targets and around the FAF bombers.

I don’t see that RAF had “th ability to place ones own forces over enemy controlled territory, do what was wanted to be done, and then return with tolerable losses” over France in daytime, only over the narrow northern and NW coastal regions of France inside the limited range of the standard Spitfire and even so with clearly negative fighter vs fighter loss rate in 41 and at least most of 42. Outside the range of Spitfire daytime losses of RAF over France tended to be forbiddingly high, so after a short while Stirlings and Halifaxes were withdrawn from daylight ops.

Juha


----------



## Tante Ju (Jul 18, 2011)

Glider said:


> Tante
> The average loss ratio for all bomber command in 1941 on daylight raids was 6.5% (from the Bomber Command Stats). As has been pointed out correctly those are all BC raids wherever they went and a lot were unescorted to Germany in small numbers.



In light of day? In 1941.. sorry.. difficult to believe there were BC bombers in daylight over Germany, save of course - odd ones. Hooton writes: BC (largely 2 Group) was 7,68%, excluding anti-shipping operations. So difference is 6,5 vs 7,68, but latter is without anti shipping operations, so perhaps that one was less costly.



> For no 2 Group there is no doubt that 4,900 sorties were made over N Europe and losses were:-
> 95 - Flak
> 39 - Fighters
> 16 - Battle accidents
> ...



Thank you for book recommendation! Sorry to say I disagree about flak being major threat, this downplay role of fighter. Sure, on face it shows - flak greatest cause. But there is also: 61 unknown. I think it is more likely fighter. Few certain lost to struck by lightning, engine fault, hit telephone wire etc. but these will be few in number. I would say 39 known lost to fighter, + 50-60 _probably_ lost to fighter. We should look at German claim, but I have no time now. However later I will post link.

Regarding b) There's much truth to that. But I do not think they controlled air. Certain - they were capable of more than in 1940, but that controll depend much on "goodwill" of Germans. I think that get ignored is that major difference in situation between 1940 Battle and 1941 is: 

a, German raid bigger in size in 1940
b, RAF had really no choice wheter to defend or not.. target were vital. In 1941 the RAF target were not vital to German, so they could ignore. So there is bit of false feel of "command" of air. Really that "command" begun when Luftwaffe was transferred east, decision made entirely regardless of RAF; and "command" lasted until German considered RAF target important enough to step in. So perhaps - intermittent air superiority is best word?

I always had feeling - Britain Air staff a bit clueless in 1941.. what to do? What now? So they come up idea of baiting raids, essence target to destroy German aircraft. It did not make much sense I believe, and most historian seem to agree, still better than sit in British isles and do nothing. But I also think it was very costly, for meagre result - some experience about how to get nose bloodied (already experience of 1940 France, so why repeat?) and some propaganda value - "RAF is attacking"!


----------



## Glider (Jul 18, 2011)

I have no idea as to the unknown causes. I do know that in 1943 74% of unknown was estimated to be flak and accidents the majority of the rest, but that was in 1943.
When you know that fighters cause approx 26% of the known causes for losses I do think its a big assumption to assign all of the rest to fighters. If I had to guess then it would be in a similar proportion to the known causes. 
Accidents happen, I read of one raid where two aircraft were brought down and twenty two others were damaged by bird strikes. Exceptional I agree but they do happen. Throw in damage, mechanical problems, navigation mistakes, inexperience, bad weather and accidents do happen.

I do agree that RAF high Command were poor for most of the war. For instance I agree that using three wings to escort 3 Sterlings or 6 Blenheims is a waste of time. Why not use three squadrons then the Germans will have to fight as 40 ish Sterlings/Halifax's/Wellingtons will do a lot of damage and no doubt the losses would be proportionately less.


----------



## Juha (Jul 18, 2011)

I also think that RAF high command was a bit lost in 41-42, there was nothing wrong to use 5 Wings of escort fighters, but the bomber component should have been something like 3-6 sqns of Wimpys. Wimpy Mk IIIs were almost as fast as Blenheim Mk IVs but carried a decent bomb load and had better defensive armament but were cheaper than the heavies. Stirling was another possibility, as fast as Wellington Mk III, carried a good bomb load and had slightly better defensive armament, expensive but not as good as night bomber as Halifax but more maneuverable. Lack of ceiling wasn’t an handicap in the role of escorted day bomber attacking precision targets like armament factories, depots, airfields etc in France. After all Spits Mk IIs and Vs were less outperformed at low and medium altitudes than at high altitudes by 109s and 190s.

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Jul 18, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> As I have wrote FAF could attack all targets it wanted in the Karelian Isthmus during the big Soviet strategic attack during Summer 44 even if greatly outnumbered by VVS and VVS KBF without any of the escorted bombers lost to Soviet fighters even if escorts were size of 10-20 Bf 109Gs. And that was achieved with very light fighter losses and with clearly positive loss rate vs VVS fighters. So in that sense we did clearly better than RAF over France in 41-42. Still we don’t claim that FAF had air superiority over the Isthmus, only brief local air superiorities over targets and around the FAF bombers.
> 
> I don’t see that RAF had “th ability to place ones own forces over enemy controlled territory, do what was wanted to be done, and then return with tolerable losses” over France in daytime, only over the narrow northern and NW coastal regions of France inside the limited range of the standard Spitfire and even so with clearly negative fighter vs fighter loss rate in 41 and at least most of 42. Outside the range of Spitfire daytime losses of RAF over France tended to be forbiddingly high, so after a short while Stirlings and Halifaxes were withdrawn from daylight ops.
> ...




Hi Juha


I am glad you raised this as an example because it helps illustrate some of the complexities of determining air superiority. Tante says that its "my thesis", which kinda brings a smile to my face. I wish it were "my thesis", in actuality its standard 2nd year OTS strategic studies course material for any staff officer.....anyway, enough rambling, lets get down to analyzing the theory....incidentally if the assumptions I make about FAF air warfare theory are incorect, please feel free to correct me. I dont pretend to know FAF strategy all that well.

I am assuming that FAF were based on those of Germany by 1944. German air theory was never about gaining total air superiority(in the way the Americans and tyhe british were seeking in 1944), it was always about getting air superiority over the battlefield, and its immediate surroundings. In other words a far more tactical application of airpower. They could then use relatively cheap to produce ground attack aircraft like the Ju87 to deliver pinpoint attacks onto the battlefield. Medium bombers were used to hit enemy airfields and logistics to isolate the enemy formations, deny them of effective air support. Fighters were used to keep any surviving enemy Divebombers/Ground attack aircaft away from the battlefield, and to engage enemy fighters where needed to achieve those objectives. The strategic goal of all that was to win battles on the ground, to assist the ground forces in taking and holding ground. Destroying the enemy air force was an integral, and essential part of thqat strategy 

Soviet theories on air power on the other hand did not see the destruction of enemy airpower as essential, just nioce to have. These concepts were developed during the war, and recognized certain limitations that the Soviets laboured under in their war with Germany. The Russians never really mastered the qualitative advantage of the german fighter arm, but at some point they realized the achilles heel of the german system.......limited numbers. It was not really necessary to clear the skies of German Fighters, because there were not enough of them to make any real difference to the outcome of the battle. They got better at their trade, to be sure...better pilots, better machines, better doctrine, all of which improved the exchange rate, but they could never get to the situation where their fighters could drive the germans completely from the sky. So they adapted the theory to suit thei capabilities. Soviet doctrine after 1942 was never about destruction of the enemy air force. Soviets were never interested in achieving air superiority in the sense we understand it. They were not interested in racking up huge tallies of enemy fighters or indeed strike aircraft. These were all bonuses, to be sure, but the real prize for them was in providing direct assistance to their ground forces, assisting the advance. All other finer points of airpower were subordinated to that one goal. Soviet fighters were there to firstly harass and break up enemy bombers, and lessen their impact on the battle. They were there to also make sure their own bombers were able to complete their mission. Survival of the Soviet bombers after completion of the mission was an optional extra, not essential.

Now, equipped with a somewhat rudimentary knowledge of Soviet airpower theory, ask your self the question again about whether the Soviets gained air superiority, or whether the Finns (or the germans on the east front generally) were at all successful in achieving either an air auperiority air parity or even an air denial strategy on the eastern front??? The answer has to be no in every case. The Finns shot down a lot of Soviet aircraft, but did this make any difference??? not even a minute of difference. Did they succeed in halting the Soviet Ground offensive. No, not a bit. Did Finn bombers stop any offensives. I dont doubt they carried out some impressive ground support missions, but they stopped nothing as far as I can see. Did the Soviets provide effective ground support to their attacking armies in '44? Not sure, but I think so.

So on that basis who achieved their missions and who did not. Finns achieved none of their missions, Soviets achieved all of theirs. Reason was massive numbers but also effective doctrine and strategy to concentrate effort at the right points and extract maximum benefit oit of their airpower, something sadly missing from their application of airpower in 1939-42.


----------



## Juha (Jul 18, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
the FAF doctrine, if there was any clear one, is a rather complicated question. Before 1939 there was in higher echelon some flirting with douhetism, the head of FAF was a colonel (later promoted to GenMaj.) transferred from field artillery to command the FAF, he was a good organizer but influenced by his staff because of his lack of experience in air force questions and the “bomber boys” had his ear. Now with 18 Blenheims the idea of douhetism was naïve. The Winter War forced the high command to accept that for a very small air force which main potential enemy was a superpower, fighters were the main a/c type.

Now the main tasks of Finnish air defence (the FAF and AA artillery) were;

To protect Finland proper
IMHO in that Finns succeeded fairly well, mostly because of AAA, SU tried to force Finns out of war by massive air attacks against Helsinki and some other cities by ADD (the strategic arm of the VVS) in early 44 but the attacks failed to inflict massive damage, in fact damages were surprisingly light, thanks to effective AAA.

To help Navy to keep sealines open
also in this FAF succeeded fairly well, war-booty SB-2s of LLv 6 succeeded to sank and damage some Soviet subs, HLeLv 34 succeeded fairly well with AAA to protect Kotka and Hamina (important harbours) against Soviet air attacks in 43-44, Kotka was also important because of it was the northern base of KM ships guarding the submarine net across the Gulf of Finland which bottled Soviet subs in the Kronstadt area 43-44 and so kept them away to the essential sea routes.

To give as good protection to the ground forces as possible
IMHO FAF did that rather well when one thinks resources available.

To give adequate recon info to the High Command and to the ground forces. 
IMHO FAF did that fairly well but there were some lapses even if the main reason for the main plunder of Finnish intelligence, the lack of adequate warning on the Soviet Summer 44 offensive was more result of failure of inner workings of High Command and of apathy of the HQ of IV Corps.

To support the ground forces
IMHO FAF did that fairly well, again when what was possible for a small AF against a superpower, but could have been a bit more effective without a couple badly planned/executed bombing raid in 42 and 43 which produced unnecessary losses to the weak bomber force without hurting SU much. 

It was not duty of FAF to stop a major Soviet ground attack, it was clearly beyond its resources. That was the duty of infantry and artillery with the help of small technical arms (AF, armour, combat engineers etc)
And nobody at least above the rank of lieutenant thought that FAF could shot down so many Soviet planes that VVS would give up its attacks. 

On air superiority over France, see my message #407

Juha


----------



## Glider (Jul 18, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> In light of day? In 1941.. sorry.. difficult to believe there were BC bombers in daylight over Germany, save of course - odd ones. Hooton writes: BC (largely 2 Group) was 7,68%, excluding anti-shipping operations. So difference is 6,5 vs 7,68, but latter is without anti shipping operations, so perhaps that one was less costly.


 
I am getting confused over the sources you are quoting. You quoted the BC stats web page that I double checked with my copy of the Bomber Command Diary and 6.5% was the loss ratio figure from the site and the book. The Bomber Command book includes No 2 Group which at that time was part of BC.
The No 2 Group figures I have quoted and can be checked from the book which I have also quoted. 

I don't know about Hooton but where he gets 7.8% is a mystery. The most expensive period I can find is November 1941 to 22 Feb 1942 when losses reached 7.4% on Daylight raids. July to 10th November the loss rate was 7.1%, March to July it was 4.0% and finally Oct 1940 to March 1941 the loss ratio was only 1.6% 

I strongly suggest you get a copy of The Bomber Command War Diaries.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 18, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> View attachment 173424



Not sure of your point with that chart TJ... if you are using it to illustrate 8th AF FC over Germany, vs total 8th FC, then you continuously miss the point of the discussion and really miss the point on the order of battle for 8th FC.

January 1 1944 - P-47 equipped (4th, 56th, 78th 352nd, 353rd, 355th, 356th, 359th) ----> limited range 330+ sorties max; P-38 equipped (20th, 55th); P-51 (354th on loand from 9th AF) -----> max 140 sorties w/no early returns past Frankfurt/Koblenz

April 1 1944 - P-47 equipped (56, 78, 352, 353, 356, 359, 361) -----> limited range 400+ sorties max; P-38 equipped (20, 55, 364); P-51 (354, 4, 355, 357)---> maximum 300 sorties w/no early returns (German)

May 1, 1944 - P-47 (56, 78, 353, 356, 361) ----> 220+ short range sorties; P-38 (20, 55, 364); P-51 (4, 339, 352, 355, 357, 359) ----> 450+ sorties into deep penetrations

So, the discussion is Long Range escort against the Luftflotte Reich out of range of the P-47 FG's


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 18, 2011)

Glider said:


> I am getting confused over the sources you are quoting. You quoted the BC stats web page that I double checked with my copy of the Bomber Command Diary and 6.5% was the loss ratio figure from the site and the book. The Bomber Command book includes No 2 Group which at that time was part of BC.
> The No 2 Group figures I have quoted and can be checked from the book which I have also quoted.
> 
> I don't know about Hooton but where he gets 7.8% is a mystery. The most expensive period I can find is November 1941 to 22 Feb 1942 when losses reached 7.4% on Daylight raids. July to 10th November the loss rate was 7.1%, March to July it was 4.0% and finally Oct 1940 to March 1941 the loss ratio was only 1.6%
> ...


From what I've gleaned from reading is many times that aircraft that returned from a mission damaged were struck of charge as unrepairable but were not added to losses for a mission .


----------



## parsifal (Jul 18, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> From what I've gleaned from reading is many times that aircraft that returned from a mission damaged were struck of charge as unrepairable but were not added to losses for a mission .


 

That is not a uniquely RAF issue. Many aircraft from all sides made it home, only to never fly again. Many others came home with a wounded or killed crewmember. It raises the question "when is a loss a loss?" Always take reported losses with a grain of salt, from all sides


----------



## jim (Jul 18, 2011)

davparlr said:


> I must reexamine my comparison of the P-51B at 67” boost. I have mixed data on climb, most of which comes from Kurfurst and is in German and I am inept at that. There are some charts showing the Bf-106G-1 having very good climb that is significant (over 300 ft/min better) below 20k. However the airspeed advantage still lies significantly with the P-51B with a typical 30 mph advantage. To illustrate this speed difference, imagine driving down the highway at 100 km/hr (60 mph) and a car goes by you at a 148 km/hr (90 mph). I think you would say, Wow, that guy is going fast! As far as comparing the P-51B and the P-51D climb with 75” boost compared to the Bf-109G-14, see these charts. The first is a USAAF test report from Spitfireperformance, and the other is from Kurfurst site. A note here, at 75” Hg, the Merlin engine is generating over 1800 hp.
> 
> Mr davparir
> I dont have to imagine cars passing by me. In my mildly modifeid 2004 FZS 1000 (FZ1 in America) of 285 km/h top speed no car passes me . Not even Ferraris 455 of 300+ km/h . Why? Because the greater accelaration of the bike ends the duel before the top speeds are reached. Of couse if the Ferrari surprise me, with a speed advantage then things are difficult.
> During the search for the modification of my bikes internal combustion engine i saw again that is easy to overboost an engine. It s easy to produce numbers . What is difficult is to improve the engine in a useful way.


----------



## jim (Jul 18, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Perhaps you can evaluate the following:
> 
> From August 1943 through January 1944 the 8th AF sustained intolerable losses to th LW. The LW sustained relatively light losses against the unescorted bombers.
> 
> ...


 Mr Drgondog
You are great source of information , Senior Member, respectable person but PLEASE dont put in my mouth words that i never said.
I never said G6 was equal to P51. I wrote Mw50 equiped Bf109 were not iferior
I never said FW190A7, early A8 were equal to P51. In fact i wrote BMW 801 was useless in high altitude
I never said controllers were useless , i wrote that they were bad.
I never said that Jagdwaffe could deal easily with the mustung. I wrote it would be a scenario similar with spits in 41/42 over France. It was not easy. But the conditions allowed Jagdwaffe to have positive results. But in 43/44 with the Bombers slaughtering women and children HAD to enange the bombers ,they did in a wrong way and suffered the consequences.
German pilots were certainly inferior, in that period. American rookies were entering combat with over 400hrs flying experience (please give the exact number) using the oceans of fuel rubbed by the countries of Latin America.
Even if controllers were succesful in "guessing" the target, i mentioned a great number of reasons that made concentrations dificult. 
If i undertood correctly in your post you suggest that typical scenario was 40 P51s jumped by 150 huns , counter attacking destroying 40-50 ,if lost any it was due Flak, malfuction ,"unknown reason",or wish of the pilot to visit Swiss . Super race of pilots.The presence of 500 bombers carrying indicantaries was unimportant to you.
outnumbered escorts? No Outnumbered LW ?yes The fact that some day units had to share their aircrafts with night fighter units sounds like an airforce with excess of aircraft?
My answer to your questions is tactics.The main reason was tactics. But why didnt you asked Mr Galland,you have met him i believe. He was so popular in America.
It s the first time i did not enjoy reading one of your posts. I feel its a good time this conversation to end. I withdraw.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 18, 2011)

cause he won't like the answer Adolf Galland would have givin him, or Gunther Rall Horst Petzschler for that matter.

" the Luftwaffe was outnumbered "

American Industrial might made sure of that. but he'll continue calling me full of crap, and slap the face of Galland,
Rall, Petzschler, and most others for even sugesting it. becouse I'm directly quoting from them, and he calls me a liar,
ergo, they are all liars.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 18, 2011)

Tell me jim and P-40K, was the RAF outnumbered by the Lw during the BoB?


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 18, 2011)

ahhh the BoB. no idea, were they? I do know, being on an Island, with advance warning radar costal patrols
and with the LW fighters have very limited time on fuel: advantage RAF.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 18, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> ahhh the BoB. no idea, were they? I do know, being on an Island, with advance warning radar costal patrols
> and with the LW fighters have very limited time on fuel: advantage RAF.


 
That is not what I asked.

But since you mentioned radar and patrols, did not the Germans not also have these?


----------



## parsifal (Jul 18, 2011)

Glider said:


> Tante
> The average loss ratio for all bomber command in 1941 on daylight raids was 6.5% (from the Bomber Command Stats). As has been pointed out correctly those are all BC raids wherever they went and a lot were unescorted to Germany in small numbers.
> 
> For no 2 Group there is no doubt that 4,900 sorties were made over N Europe and losses were:-
> ...



Hi Glider 

Some intersting observations ther, that I largely concure with. With regard to flak losses I have a book that largely concurs with what you are saying. The book is Edward B Westermann, Flak - German Anti-aircraft Defenses 1939-45 , Univerity Of Kansas 2001

The book contains the best analysis of German Flak defences that I know of, and contains an absolute motza of information. It points out that in the first half of 1941 the Germans began to introduce radar direction and fire control for some of their AA batteries, and this greatly improved its performance. My figures are for the whole of BC, not just 2 Gp. They indicate that in January to the end of April 1941, they expended 2.886 million rounds of ammunition, to bring down a total of 144 aircraft. Average expenditure per kill was 26500 rounds per kill. Further, at page 115 Westermann says" In the 1st half of 1941, flak forces achieved the majority of shootdowns over the occupied territories. The flak forces in the occupied territories including Norway, accounted 115 of the 144 aircraft destroyed in combat, or 79% of nthe total". Westermann goes on to state "The success of the air defence located in the occupoied western territories resulted from the high concentrations of search lights, flak gun batteries, and the beginnings of radar guidance."

Further on it states "Despite the preponderance of shoot downs in the west, flask guns in germany proper were also having an effect, accounting for 40% of overall losses suffered over Germany. A comparison of the success the flak units during the day and night reveals that flak forces brought down 35% of British aircraft during the day, and 65% during the night."

Several Pages on he makes further observations as to the disproportionate losses to flak. After noting the generally poor weather conditions that plagued air operations for both sides jan-March, Westermann notes "German night fighters at the time were particularly affected in effectiveness by poor instrument flying training, which affected their performance in poor visibility conditions."

In the summer of 1941, the proportion of losses to flak dropped (if losses to the VVS are excluded...if they are included, flak continued to be the major cause of enemy aircraft shoot downs). In June/ July/August, the Shoot downs of Allied Aircraft accounted for 58/121/144 of the total losses suffered. When you consider that BC lost 98/146/156 losses for these months and perhaps 50 fighters for each month, the rough percentages of aircraft lost to flak are still about 58% of total RAF losses, the effectiveness of LW "command of the air" comes into very sharp focus.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 18, 2011)

I answered. I said I don't know. maybe you can aswer it for me? total Military aircraft in Britian vs what the LW sent
across the channel.

radar and patrols the LW had indeed.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 18, 2011)

You are both very funny guys - as to meeting Galland and Rall; yes. As to candid conversation - yes. I respect both of them enormously. We had these same discussions and when the context was set properly, they agreed my points about the first six months of 1944. You two on the other hand get hysterical when the same conditions are outlined, the facts are available, but somehow it is all about American liars?

As to the reasons for the defeat in 1944 of the air battle over Germany both stated the following key reasons for the rapid deterioration of the situation over Germany?

1. They both believed the war was lost in late 1943 to early 1944.
2. They both believed the German high command was stupid in their insistance on 'bombers first' which changed only during the Invasion when the position to regain air superiority was long gone.
3. Galland insisted on converting the German Fighter arm to concentrate on the Fw 190 and the Me 262.
4. Galland believed in the Big Blow and it was even tried on a smaller scale in November 1944
5. They both believed the Mustang was the key factor to 'accelerate the downfall of the German air force defense capabilities against daylight bomber force. Dolpho was kind enough to write a letter describing the impact of the Mustang on the operations fortunes of his command. I reproduced it in both of my books.
6. They both believed that the primary reason the Luftwaffe could only repeat limitied successes of summer/fall 1943 is that the advantage of attacking unescorted bombers AND BEING ABLE TO STAY IN CONTACT with the bombers except for a very short period before escorts would engage.
7. The LW psychologically fell prey to 'flight versus fight' and completely transferred the initiative to smaller forces of fighters. This was absolutely contrary to every other theatre at the time. 

Yes, the Luftwaffe was greatly outnumbered, as the AVG was in China, or USAF over the Yalu (but not US vs N.Korea and China with relative airpower) or LW against VVS. What is debated here with neither of you listening is the operational situation from Berlin to Leipzig to Schweinfurt to Munich - where the Luftwaffe was systematically defeated by 8th AF long range escorts against locally superior LW day fighter forces. It is painful to see you cling to a hope that all the heros you have were only defeated by 'hordes of US fighters that could not defeat the LW unless the odds were 10:1 or greater"

The 8th AF lost approximately 650+ Mustangs to LW in the ETO. Those are known air to air, possible air to air in which German Fighters were present, missing for unknown cause/no radio contact nor bad weather present, or lost crash landing due to damage caused in a fight - which I extracted from EVERY Missing Aircrew Report filed by the 8th AF in the ETO. 

You both, on the other hand are masters of slurs, innuendo, sarcasm - but fact poor in this dialogue. 

You won't deal with facts or context and the recent posting of 8th AF daily sorties versus having the knowledge that mosy 8th AF fighters in December 1943 were short range P-47s - Not the small force spread thin over 100 miles of bomber stream. You won't bother plotting the strengths of the deployments of the LuftFlotte Reich day fighters and easily conclude that more than 50% could easily be deployed, assembled, and flow to a single location -and easily outnumber any US concentration of escorts avaiable to resist a concentrated attack.

If your feelings are hurt, deal with it. Everybody on this board is an adult.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 18, 2011)

Milosh said:


> Tell me jim and P-40K, was the RAF outnumbered by the Lw during the BoB?



It certainly was. Fighter strengths are reasonably well known. Bomber strengths are less well known because British bombers did not play any role in the BoB. Which makes the reply you received quite redundant. 

However, for the record the bommber command possed the following forces at the end of June 1940.

Bomber Command 30 June 1940

No 2 Group West Raynham(18,101), Wattisham (107,110), Bodney (21) Watton (82) Wyton (40,57), Alconbury (15), Horsham St Faith (114,139). 11 squadrons, all equiped with Blenheim IV, but only 6 squadrons declared operational.

No 3 Group Feltwell(37,75NZ)Newmarket (99) Mildenhall (149)Stradishall (214), Marham (38,115) Honington (9). Total 8 squadrons, 7 operational. Equiped with the Wellington 1A, 1C.

No 4 Group Dishforth (51), Linton on Ouse (5*8*) Topcliffe (10), Driffield (77) Cottam (102), York (7*8*). 6 squadrons, 5 operational. Equiped with Whitley IV, IVA, V.

No 5 Group Hemswell (61,144) Scampton (49,83) Waddington (44,50), Finningley (106) 7 Squadrons, 6 operational. Equiped with Hampdon aircraft.

No 1 group was the battle group - and had been detached to be part of the Advanced Air Striking Force. at the start of the war it had 10 operational squadrons of Battles, 0 operational.

Overall, Bomber command had 42 squadrons in June 1940, of which 18 were not operational. Of course total aircraft numbers will be much larger, and included types involved in advanced training and conversion, and would include other and subsequently obsolete types. But in terms of operational strengths there were about 300 bombers ready for operations.

Even with operational bombers thrown in the mix (for what reason I cannot think why), the RAF was outnumbered, and significantly so 

From Bomber Command 1936-1968 - Ken Delve.


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 18, 2011)

' _You both, on the other hand are masters of slurs, innuendo, sarcasm - but fact poor in this dialogue _'

sarcasm yes, slurs no. 

but to be CRYSTAL CLEAR. I do listen, and we are always talking about after D-day. the only problem
I have, was with those who insist the LW wasn't outnumbered during the specified time.

facts, well thats a subjective term. it seems to me that ANYTIME a Allied document differs from a German
account, that the Allied document should be taken as golden gospil. not true. whats the old saying.. " its the
victors who write the history ". 

it dosn't matter how many LW docs show 1 thing vs a piece of allied paper showing otherwise. that scrap of paper
wins.. every time.. therefore, no need to argue it. 

so in conclusion.. what are 'facts'. is it one side or the other? or somewhere in between? thanks.



' _If your feelings are hurt, deal with it. Everybody on this board is an adult._'
missed this one. my feelings never get hurt. I never hit the report button, unlike some
others. lol.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 18, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> American Industrial might made sure of that. but he'll continue calling me full of crap, and slap the face of Galland,
> Rall, Petzschler, and most others for even sugesting it. becouse I'm directly quoting from them, and he calls me a liar,
> ergo, they are all liars.



1. Why the hell do you have to keep putting fuel on the fire???!!!

2. *NO ONE* HAS CALLED YOU A PIECE OF CRAP OR A LIAR!

3. I am sick and tired of this. As I said there is no more warnings. Did I, or did I not say that the next time I log on there better not be any of this childish bullshit?

Not a single person here attacks you personally and then you go off and spout your mouth with such stupid posts that do nothing but take away from the discussion. Why do you ignore me and the other moderating staff? 

I think it is time for people to take vacations. This is for everyone on both sides of the argument. Note to P-40K: I am not singling you out here, read the words "both sides of the argument". Therefore don't get your panties in a wad about being singled out. 

Either way I am tired of this. I am now going to take action, since several of you enjoy ignoring what the mods have to say.

Parsifal and Bill: You need to quit putting fuel on the fire as well. Choose your words a bit more wisely. This is all getting very very tiresome. I am getting a headache from all this "He said, she said bullshit".


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 18, 2011)

bite me... done... bye.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 18, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> bite me... done... bye.



Gladly...

Anyone else? Please everyone just quit the childish bullshit. We have asked you all on many occasions to please quit it. We have shown more than enough patience, and it is growing very very old.


----------



## Glider (Jul 18, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> From what I've gleaned from reading is many times that aircraft that returned from a mission damaged were struck of charge as unrepairable but were not added to losses for a mission .


 
I have been looking into this in more detail and can confirm that the figures I have posted EXCLUDE aircraft that crashed either on take off or on return for whatever reason. However there is another section in the book that DOES GIVE these details, unfortunately the breakdown isn't by year but it does point out that a number of these aircraft would have been returned to use after repair. No allowance has been made re repaired aircraft so we can work on the basis that these are the worse case scenario.

They are called Operational Crashes and defined as aircraft that have crashed in the UK while outward or inward bound on operational missions for whatever reason. During the entire war 1,368 bombers were lost in this manner adding 0.35% to the overall loss ratio and they do say that in the first half of the war the ratio was 1.05% and in the second half of the war it was down to 0.2%. Logic tells me that there was a sliding scale so I suggest that we have found the difference between 6.5% and 7.8% for 1941.

Can I thank everyone for their patience, I should have seen this earlier but to be fair its a big book 800+ pages of small print and a lot of detail.


----------



## davparlr (Jul 18, 2011)

jim said:


> davparlr said:
> 
> 
> > Mr davparir
> ...


----------



## parsifal (Jul 18, 2011)

Hi Glider

Was curious, what is the book that you are referring to?


----------



## Glider (Jul 19, 2011)

The Bomber Command War Diaries by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt. Second Hand copies can be bought on Amazon.

Every day of the war is looked at giving the number of bombers sent out their type and the losses. Often they compare the claims with the official German records for the towns so you often get a fair idea as to the damage caused and there are about 80 pages of statistics.


----------



## pbfoot (Jul 19, 2011)

Glider said:


> The Bomber Command War Diaries by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt. Second Hand copies can be bought on Amazon.
> 
> Every day of the war is looked at giving the number of bombers sent out their type and the losses. Often they compare the claims with the official German records for the towns so you often get a fair idea as to the damage caused and there are about 80 pages of statistics.


Out of curiosity is there any mention of the Part XV Squadrons. Part XV Squadrons were those Squadrons made up of Commonwealth crews . The RCAF in particular the RAAF and RNZAF wanted Squadrons manned solely by crews of like nationalities with any excess allowed to be used by RAF .
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_XV_squadrons


----------



## Glider (Jul 19, 2011)

Yes it has the stats by squadron and No 6 (Canadian) Group. For example 75 (New Zealand) Squadron 

Formed April 1940 and served in 3 Group for the whole war.

Based at Feltwell, Mildenhall, Newmarket and Mepal

Raids Flown
Wellingtons 291 bombing raids, 24 minelaying, 4 leaflet 1 Photo Recce
Sterlings 103 bombing, 107 minelaying
Lancasters 190 bombing, 18 minelaying, 1 leaflet

Losses
Wellingtons - 2,540 sorties, 74 lost 2.9%
Sterlings - 1,736 sorties 72 lost 4.1%
Lancaster 3,741, 47 lost 1.3%

8 Lancasters lost in Operational Crashes

plus other details. You get the picture, a lot of detail


----------



## P-40K-5 (Jul 19, 2011)

very small example, *this is only for Jg 11*. let alone every other Staffel in any particular unit in the Western Front. can go on and on for miles about how during the whole of 1944 that the Luftwaffe was severely outnumbered ~

_January 5th, 1944:

*245* heavies escorted by *70 *P-38 and *41* P-51 to strike at Kiel
Stab and II./JG 11 attacked. downed three B-24 and nine P-38. no loss of their own.


February 3rd, 1944:

*724* heavies covered by* 632 *fighters were dispatched to Emden and Wilhelmshaven.
formation attacked by III./JG 11. Engaged and out numbered by P-47 and despite their
efforts, did not get through to the heavies. downed three P-47 while losing three.


February 10th, 1944:

*169* heavies screened by *466* fighters. II./JG 11 took off from airfield at Wunsdorf.
downed two B-17. losing seven of their own. later III.JG 11 intercepted same formation.
killed eleven aircraft and lost six. estimates were that the Germans were ounumbered
20:1***.

February 11th, 1944:

*223* heavies covered by* 606 *fighters bombed frankfurt. II./JG 11 intercepted.
in ferocious combat downed three fighters. lost 3 Bf109's. at 12:33pm I./JG 11 intercepted
same formation. downed one B-17. lost two aircraft.

February 20th, 1944:

*1000* heavies and* 835 *fighters were dispatched into Germany. heavies were intercepted by JG 11
pilots. Only six 3./JG 11 machines attacked the arriving armada. downed two heavies and
lost five of their own. the remaining a/c of the unit were refuled and were airborne again at 
12:45pm. 10 heavies downed, no loss of their own._

moral of the story here is that once hundreds of escorting fighters for the heavies were deployed,
the LW losses started to mount. not becouse of susposed Allied superior aircraft, but becouse
the heavies were the #1 priority, and they had to fight there way through the fighters to get to the
heavies. the allied fighter escorts were at an extreme advantage.

I would post actual #'s availble to *JG 11*. but some insist on looking at the aircraft alloted #'s, which is vastly different.

***includes elements of JG1 Jg53.


----------



## Juha (Jul 19, 2011)

Hello P-40
what's your point, JG 11 wasn't the only unit engaging these raids? For ex. on 10 Feb. LW sent 303 a/c to intercept the raid but because of bad weather only 231 made contact with the raiders.

Juha


----------



## Kryten (Jul 19, 2011)

Post #437 does seem to imply JG11 were fighting this battle single handedly?
It also implies that all these aircraft were in one big gaggle, feb 20th being a prime example, this force would have had to be operating over a considerable area and over an equally important matter of time frame, the notion of localised superiority by concentrating on one element is also ignored!


----------



## Milosh (Jul 19, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> very small example, *this is only for Jg 11*. let alone every other Staffel in any particular unit in the Western Front. can go on and on for miles about how during the whole of 1944 that the Luftwaffe was severely outnumbered ~
> 
> _January 5th, 1944:
> 
> ...



from The USAAF in WWII


----------



## Njaco (Jul 19, 2011)

Too bad he's been banned. I would have loved to know what pop-up book he was using as a reference.


----------



## bobbysocks (Jul 19, 2011)

LW against 632 fighters .... downed three P-47 while losing three 

Germans were ounumbered 20:1*.... killed eleven aircraft and lost six

LW against 606 fighters .... in ferocious combat downed three fighters. lost 3 Bf109's

LW against 835 fighters ... downed two heavies and lost five of their own. at 12:45pm. 10 heavies downed, no loss of their own.

these numbers dont make any sense at all. out numbered 20:1 and you and you win the engagement by almost 2:1???!!! 11 vs 6??!! yeah, ok. "ferocious" combat against 606 allied fighters and you only lose 3??? mid air collisons would have killed more than that. against 835 fighters and you lose 5 vs 2 and then win 10 vs 0?? end of day total 5 loses to 12 victories??!! seems the more outnumbered they were the better they fought and less they lost. i need to know again how being "outnumbered" was a detriment to the LW with this data? there may have been fighters in the air but they were not in the area of engagement or there was some horrible shooting going on!

thought he was banned yesterday?? seems he can still post like he did today.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 20, 2011)

The ban setting was accidently set for 1 day instead of permanent. It has been correctly set to permanent now.


----------



## pinsog (Jul 20, 2011)

February 10th, 1944:

169 heavies screened by 466 fighters. II./JG 11 took off from airfield at Wunsdorf.
downed two B-17. losing seven of their own. later III.JG 11 intercepted same formation.
killed eleven aircraft and lost six. estimates were that the Germans were ounumbered
20:1*.

To bad P40K was banned, I was waiting to hear why the vaunted Luftwaffe would attempt to intercept 635 aircraft with only 32 fighters. Seems like a good way to lose the war.


----------



## Juha (Jul 20, 2011)

Hello Pinsog
look my message #438 to see the real numbers, My source is Prien's and Stemmer's history of II./JG 3.

Juha


----------



## Nikademus (Jul 20, 2011)

bobbysocks said:


> these numbers dont make any sense at all. out numbered 20:1 and you and you win the engagement by almost 2:1???!!! 11 vs 6??!! yeah, ok. "ferocious" combat against 606 allied fighters and you only lose 3??? mid air collisons would have killed more than that. against 835 fighters and you lose 5 vs 2 and then win 10 vs 0?? end of day total 5 loses to 12 victories??!! seems the more outnumbered they were the better they fought and less they lost. i need to know again how being "outnumbered" was a detriment to the LW with this data? there may have been fighters in the air but they were not in the area of engagement or there was some horrible shooting going on!



To be fair, there's alot of variability involved so making conclusions off a few given data examples can be a dangerous thing. If this thread....which has morphed mysteriously  from 109 landing gear issues into who had the better airforce, has proven one thing, its that data can be used to support just about any argument.

There have been alot of incidents where a small outnumbered force of fighters has come away with a positive kill ratio, the Germans made an artform of it over North Africa using 2 plane Rottes. At the same time however, bringing more planes to a tactical battle can and sometimes does have an impact, if other variables play out right and the pilots can maximize their assets and get shots in and overwhelm the oppositiion.

As for small casualties.....small losses are the norm. Excessive casualties are exceptions. The major factor i singled out that increased the average kill rate per skirmish was not numbers but the firepower of the planes. This is especially evident in my opinion from reading the day to day accounts from Shores 2nd TAF book. The cannon armed and .50cal armed fighters doubled the average kill rate from 1-2 planes to 3-5 in many cases. That seems like not alot but over time, it adds up...esp if one factors in wounded and killed pilots. Therein lay the demise of both the Japanese and German airforces.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 20, 2011)

The point P40K (and Jim and Tante Ju) repeatedly ignored or did not understand)
1. A large bomber force takes off at 30+ different locations, assemble over the individual Wing splashers, assemble the wings in order behind the leading wing of a Task Force. Ditto for Second and Third (and maybe Fourth and Fifth depending on how many target clusters the 8th is going after that day.
2. The entire huge string (if everbody on schedule, no snafus, no local bad weather) then moves from a rotating, climbing stream into a long trail of combat boxes and proceeds over the Channel
3. Approximately 4 to 5 Thunderbolt groups take off at different times depending on where their Penetration escort position is. The lead escort group will catch up and form up around the lead box of say the First Task Force, and another one will catch up to trailing box of First Task Force, and so one for the remaining three FG's. By the time they cross into France or Holland these four to five Groups are escorting 400-600 bombers (Feb 1944). The two Mustang groups and two Lightning groups are just now warming up and ready to take off.
4. The 4 long range escort groups cross the channel and at high cruise head for their assigned positions with the 1st and 2nd TF, leaving the 3rd uncovered, or assign two groups to cover the 1st and one each for 2nd and 3rd TF.
5. The long range target escorts may catch up and R/V with the 5 P-47 groups where the 47s have to turn back. Now we have a situation where only four escort groups are covering 70 miles of bomber stream, and split up as the individual Task forces head fro a different target.
6. The Withdrawal Support of say 4 remaining P-47 groups of the 8th take off and head for a Withdrawal R/V point near Munster.
7. The long range escorts break escort, most times before R/V with the Withdrawal support P-47s in place due to low fuel. If they had a fight near the target the escort from target to R/V may have few to zero P-51/P-38 escort remaining.

This is what it means. 13 Fighter Groups (12 8th 10 P-47 plus two P-38, 1 9th AF (354th FG) P-51 Mustangs) were sent, but no more than 48x5 (Penetration Support) took off and escorted the bombers for any one leg. Attrition rate 20-30% leaving 48x5x.8=~ 192 fighters (effectives) from England to Munster, 48x4x.7 = 135 (effectives)from Munster to Schweinfurt/Regensburg/Augsburg, and back toward withdrawal R/V, where they Might make rendezvous with the 4 Withdrawal Support P-47 Groups (48x5x.8=~ 153 effectives).

Headline says "600 8th AF bombers, escorted by 624 (13x48 with no discussion of the early return of 164Fighters) attack Regensburg, Schweinfurt and Augsburg".

JG 11 attacks How Many fighters? Pick any spot along a 70 mile volume of airspace and JG 11 will find a Maximim of *one fighter Group(reduced in size due to early returns) *

That is what the 8th AF day to day operations looked like, while shifting P-47 Group strength down as Mustang strength grew.

Near the end of the war Mustang strength grew to permit one half (7 groups) to escort the 3 Task forces from the Channel to the Targets, and one half (7 Mustang and one P-47) from the taget back to the Channel.

Still an average of TWO fighter Groups per 25-30 mile long string of bombers at any one time.

Do the math about the probability of directing a large force of German fighters to a space not well defended numerically.


----------



## pinsog (Jul 20, 2011)

Excellent description of what a deep penetration raid looks like

I mean, seriously, if there were just 32 fighters to intercept a raid like that, wouldn't you just put 466 fighters and 169 bombers onto the single airfield holding the entire Luftwaffe and wipe out the entire German airforce in a single raid? 

Anyway, could we please bring P40K back and let him reply to these questions? I'd like to read his reply out of shear morbid curiosity.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 20, 2011)

you will not get any satisfaction from that Im afraid


----------



## pinsog (Jul 20, 2011)

Parsifal, you are right. Funny thing was, he was very intelligent on some things, but totally irrational on others.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 21, 2011)

He is no longer here and can not defend himself. Out of fairness, lets not talk about him...


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 21, 2011)

pinsog said:


> February 10th, 1944:
> 
> 169 heavies screened by 466 fighters. II./JG 11 took off from airfield at Wunsdorf.
> downed two B-17. losing seven of their own. later III.JG 11 intercepted same formation.
> ...


----------



## pinsog (Jul 21, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> He is no longer here and can not defend himself. Out of fairness, lets not talk about him...



Agreed. I shouldn't have said that, not very cool. I apologize.


----------



## davparlr (Jul 21, 2011)

This site seemed to evolve into bomber/fighter discussions. Was there any kind consciences, general or otherwise, on the Bf-109 landing gear configuration, or is it just one of those things that will be argued about ad infinitum?


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 21, 2011)

There has been some interesting discussion here and I'd hate to break it off but at the same time let's not forget the original topic of this thread. I am "requesting" that some of these topics be moved to new threads and you guys can hammer away, but at the same time I do not want to interfere with the flow of information seen here.

Now with that said, a question for the masses and getting this thread somewhat back on topic - with all this talk about the -109s landing gear and difficulty in take offs/ landing, has there been any comparison to the I-16? Any numbers about takeoff and landing accidents from the VVS? (I know this info probably doesn't exist). From pilot reports "then and now" that aircraft was supposed to be a bear to handle and I have heard on many occasions that if can fly an I-16 you can fly anything.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 21, 2011)

The thread sort of spun off onto a tangent or tangents. For what its worth, before we got sidetracked, we could not find any conclusive evidence that made the Bf 109 especially prone to accidents, much less that the cause of that accident rate was due to the undercart. We did find some evidence of the LW generally suffering a higher attrition rate due to noncombat issues, but as to the cause of that higher accident rate (or indeed, even if it exists) there was a lot of heated discussion.

Clearly, an aircraft with a narrower track landing gear is goinfg to have a less stable CG than a wide tracked aircraft. Then again having widely spaced gear is going to place stresses from the weight of the aircraft at a distance from one of its weak points....the point where the wings attach to fuselage. I would have thought also that wide tracked aircraft are a little less manouverable whilst on the ground. So its hard to knoiw whether a narrow tracked aircraft is a nett liability on the ground, or a nett benefit


----------



## Kryten (Jul 21, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> There has been some interesting discussion here and I'd hate to break it off but at the same time let's not forget the original topic of this thread. I am "requesting" that some of these topics be moved to new threads and you guys can hammer away, but at the same time I do not want to interfere with the flow of information seen here.
> 
> Now with that said, a question for the masses and getting this thread somewhat back on topic - with all this talk about the -109s landing gear and difficulty in take offs/ landing, has there been any comparison to the I-16? Any numbers about takeoff and landing accidents from the VVS? (I know this info probably doesn't exist). From pilot reports "then and now" that aircraft was supposed to be a bear to handle and I have heard on many occasions that if can fly an I-16 you can fly anything.



How about the FM2/F4 seriese, they had a quite narrow gear and were carrier borne to boot, we all know about the Seafires issues so how did the Grumman cope?


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 21, 2011)

davparlr said:


> This site seemed to evolve into bomber/fighter discussions. Was there any kind consciences, general or otherwise, on the Bf-109 landing gear configuration, or is it just one of those things that will be argued about ad infinitum?



Probably just keep arguing, while one or more sources may have pointed a finger at one basic cause the more likely truth is that the 109 did suffer a large number of landing and take off accidents. With out good numbers for other fighters it is a little hard to tell if it's accident rate was barely higher than some of it's contemporaries or vastly higher. And if it is significantly higher how much is attributable to the the toe in, how much to narrow track, how much to the landing speed, how much to the CG and ground looping, how much to the fact you can't open the canopy in flight to improve the view in poor weather (how good the the little clear view panel was might be subject to question). Other aircraft didn't have the best ground handling going either, apparently Wildcats were tippy enough to dig in wing tips while taxing under certain conditions. 
I would guess that 109s were harder to land than many other fighters with some variation between models. Locking tail wheels helped. Increased weight didn't, and so on. Not all 109s landed the same, just as not all Spitfires or other planes that under went extensive changes landed the same. Throw in lower standards of training as the war went on the accident totals could get rather shocking.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 21, 2011)

Kryten said:


> How about the FM2/F4 seriese, they had a quite narrow gear and were carrier borne to boot, we all know about the Seafires issues so how did the Grumman cope?



It had problems, soft struts could allow a lot of lean which combined with engine torque, cross winds and other problems could allow wing tips to dig in while taxiing. Arresting hooks pretty much stop ground looping in carrier landings though


----------



## Readie (Jul 21, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Probably just keep arguing, while one or more sources may have pointed a finger at one basic cause the more likely truth is that the 109 did suffer a large number of landing and take off accidents. With out good numbers for other fighters it is a little hard to tell if it's accident rate was barely higher than some of it's contemporaries or vastly higher. And if it is significantly higher how much is attributable to the the toe in, how much to narrow track, how much to the landing speed, how much to the CG and ground looping, how much to the fact you can't open the canopy in flight to improve the view in poor weather (how good the the little clear view panel was might be subject to question). Other aircraft didn't have the best ground handling going either, apparently Wildcats were tippy enough to dig in wing tips while taxing under certain conditions.
> I would guess that 109s were harder to land than many other fighters with some variation between models. Locking tail wheels helped. Increased weight didn't, and so on. Not all 109s landed the same, just as not all Spitfires or other planes that under went extensive changes landed the same. Throw in lower standards of training as the war went on the accident totals could get rather shocking.




On the money there Shortround. Planes don't crash themselves.Pilot training and the quality of 109's getting poorer as WW2 progressed must have played a part.
Cheers
John


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 21, 2011)

Kryten said:


> How about the FM2/F4 seriese, they had a quite narrow gear and were carrier borne to boot, we all know about the Seafires issues so how did the Grumman cope?


 Never heard too much about the Wildcat being hard to taxi, takeoff or land. Eric knows piltos who currently fly an FM2, maybe we can get some current info on this aircraft.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 21, 2011)

Just going by what is in "America's Hundred Thousand" Page 483. 

I am sure a lot of these planes had their own idiosyncrasies, which to a pilot versed in them, are not major problems.


----------



## Milosh (Jul 21, 2011)

I can't be specific but the P-40 was not a docile lady when landing and taking off. (just some old memories of what I have read)


----------



## Glider (Jul 21, 2011)

I know the RAF undertook some extra testing of the P40's landing due to rumours they had heard from the USA about how difficult they could be to land. They found the rumours totally without foundation.


----------



## renrich (Jul 21, 2011)

Bill Leonard described his F4F anti ground loop technique. He was commanding, I think, some F4Fs flying from Henderson Field. Based on what he said and Dean's book the F4F was a bit of a problem on field landings but well suited to carrier ops.


----------



## bobbysocks (Jul 22, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> To be fair, there's alot of variability involved so making conclusions off a few given data examples can be a dangerous thing. If this thread....which has morphed mysteriously  from 109 landing gear issues into who had the better airforce, has proven one thing, its that data can be used to support just about any argument.
> 
> There have been alot of incidents where a small outnumbered force of fighters has come away with a positive kill ratio, the Germans made an artform of it over North Africa using 2 plane Rottes. At the same time however, bringing more planes to a tactical battle can and sometimes does have an impact, if other variables play out right and the pilots can maximize their assets and get shots in and overwhelm the oppositiion.
> 
> As for small casualties.....small losses are the norm. Excessive casualties are exceptions. The major factor i singled out that increased the average kill rate per skirmish was not numbers but the firepower of the planes. This is especially evident in my opinion from reading the day to day accounts from Shores 2nd TAF book. The cannon armed and .50cal armed fighters doubled the average kill rate from 1-2 planes to 3-5 in many cases. That seems like not alot but over time, it adds up...esp if one factors in wounded and killed pilots. Therein lay the demise of both the Japanese and German airforces.



trust me i understand that. basically THAT was my point. Drgondog explained it all very well. to say you had 600 fighters didnt mean that the LW encountered every one of those 600 planes. some escorts may ( and probably ) didnt see any action at all. those LW fighters may have actually had a short instance of local air superiority...by that i mean they may have been able to attack a box or section that had absolutely no fighter support. of course that would have changed as escorts rushed to that area. also you have to remember the LW tactics. they didnt stay in one place too long....saddle up behind a b17 and blast away as long as they were on the boxes or formation. that would have put them in the sites of the other bomber gunners. they came in, made their run, dove off, regrouped away from the bombers and did it all over again. long and short to just quote numbers gives a false impression of reality.

as for the P40 being hard to land. it couldnt have been too bad because it was the advanced trainer for fighter pilots ( later on 43ish thru 45). i have heard of more being lost in the florida swamps that landing accidents. ( as a matter of fact there are pieces of 3 p40s that were pulled from the swamps on ebay). it the last plane they flew in training before entering combat groups and where most of their gunnery skills were practiced. from there they get hours in the particular fighter they were assigned to overseas with their assigned group. i do know one of the tricks they liked to pull in the P40 ...which came from a well known ace....was to hit the retract for the gear while going down the runway. the weight of the plane would keep the gear down but once sufficient pressure was released the gear would retract....rather quickly. this practice was forbidden....but cadets still did it from time to time.


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 22, 2011)

bobbysocks said:


> i do know one of the tricks they liked to pull in the P40 ...which came from a well known ace....was to hit the retract for the gear while going down the runway. the weight of the plane would keep the gear down but once sufficient pressure was released the gear would retract....rather quickly. this practice was forbidden....but cadets still did it from time to time.



That would have been amusing if you hit a bump halfway through your take off run


----------



## bobbysocks (Jul 24, 2011)

i am sure it lead to a lot of 'tipped" props and scraped tails. 

i did find what i was looking for concerning the LW pilots talking about landing ( and general handling) the 109. BUT they really dont point to the gear being the culprit...mainly inexperience.

From: Heinz Knoke, "I Flew for the Fuhrer", Corgi Books 1967.

It is estimated that 10% of 109s were destroyed in landing and take-off accidents, as well as many pilots, but despite its vices it was the favoured mount of most of the major aces of the Luftwaffe.



"The JG26 War Diary: Volume 2 1943-5", P.290

"12th October 1940: I had hoped for a posting to an operational unit this month. Unfortunately, training is far behind schedule because of the bad autumn weather.

We have a rough time in training here also. There have been one or two fatal accidents every week for the past six week in our Course alone. Today Sergeant Schmidt crashed and was killed. He was one of our section of five.

We have spent several days on theoretical conversion training before flying the Messerschmitt 109, which is difficult to handle and dangerous at first. We can now go through every movement in our sleep.

This morning we brought out the first 109 and were ready to fly. Sergeant Schmidt was chosen as the first of us, by drawing lots. He took off without difficulty, which was something, as the aircraft will only too readily crash on take-off if one is not careful. A premature attempt to climb will cause it to whip over into a spin, swiftly and surely. I have seen that happen hundreds of times and it frequently means the death of the pilot.

Schmidt came in to land after making one circuit; but he misjudged the speed, which was higher than that to which he was accustomed, and so he overshot the runway. He came round again and the same thing happened. He began to worry; for Sergeant Schmidt had obviously lost his nerve. He was coming in and making a final turn before flattening out to touch down, when the aircraft suddenly stalled because of insufficient speed and spun out of control, crashing into the ground and exploding a few hundred feet short of the end of the runway. We all raced like madmen over to the scene of the crash. I was the first to arrive. Schmidt had been thrown clear and was lying several feet away from the flaming wreckage. He was screaming like an animal, covered in blood. I stooped down over the body of my comrade and saw that both legs were missing. I held his head. The scream were driving me insane. Blood poured over my hands. I have never felt so helpless in my life. The screaming finally stopped and became an even more terrible silence. Then Kuhl and the others arrived but by that time Schmidt was dead.

Major von Kornatzky ordered training to be resumed forthwith and less than an hour later the next 109 was brought out. This time it was my turn.

I went into the hangar and washed the blood off my hands. Then the mechanics tightened up my safety belt and I was taxiing off to the take-off point. My heart was madly thumping. Not even the deafening roar of the engine was loud enough to drown out of my ears the lingering screams of my comrade as he lay there dying like an animal. I was no sooner airborne than I noticed the stains on my flying-suit. They were great dark blood-stains and I was frightened. It was a horrible, paralysing fear. I could only be thankful there was no-one present to see how terrified I was.

I circled the field for several minutes and gradually recovered from the panic. At last I was sufficiently calm to come in for a landing. Everything was alright. I took off immediately and landed again. And a third time.

Tears were still in my eyes when I pushed open the canopy and removed my helmet. When I jumped down from the wing I found I could not control the shaking of my knees.

Suddenly I saw Kornatzky standing in front of me. Steely blue eyes seemed to be boring right through me.

"Were you frightened?"
"Yes, sir."
"Better get used to it if you hope to go on operations."

That really hurt. I was so ashamed I wished the ground would swallow me up.


now i will see if i can find exactly who was famous for that p 40 take off stunt...


----------



## Njaco (Jul 25, 2011)

Bobby, are you sure thats from "The JG26 War Diary: Volume 2 1943-5", P.290??? If the book covers 1943-45 why would there be something about 1940? And I have Caldwell's book and can find no personal diary such as this. Maybe its still part of Heinz Knoke's diary?


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jul 25, 2011)

Wherever it's from - it's a great quote. Thanks. 

MM


----------



## bobbysocks (Jul 25, 2011)

no i cant guarentee it was from the book. I do not own it. i grabbed that quote from an online source for another project i had where the source wasnt as important. i apologize. it very well could be knoke. guess i will have to research the quote now...lol.

actually did a little reseach and found another site that quote it as being from the same book as the first quote:

Heinz Knoke, "I Flew for the Fuhrer", Corgi Books 1967.

it also lists this site:

http://www.heinzknokewebsite.com/My-Site/Main_Lilo.htm 

but i am unable to pull this site up from this computer at work.


----------



## Lighthunmust (Sep 25, 2011)

It has been two months since anyone posted to this thread. The following is posted with the hope it is useful to the members, moderators, and administrators in making this thread and forum more beneficial to all. 

STATISTICS:

This thread was created on 7-5-11 and received posts for 20 days until 7-25-11

This thread contains 471 posts from 42 forum members on 32 pages.

35% of the posts were made by 3 members: Parsifal, P-40K-5, and Tante Ju

36% of the posts were made by 8 members: Flyboyj, Milosh, Njaco, drgondog, Glider, Shortround 6, Juha, and Mustang nut

29% of posts were made by 31 additional members.

OPINION:

My opinion as creator of this thread is that the topic and goal of the thread can be succinctly described as: A compilation of citations of a specific claim about the landing gear of the Bf109 to create a chronology back to the first claimant, and discussion of who is making these claims and where. It is my opinion that any other discussion is off topic, irrelevant, and counterproductive to the topic and goal of the thread. 

Moderators informed me any post about the Bf109 landing gear was on topic. 

STATISTICS:

Number of posts that are not about the Bf109 landing gear - I don’t know, I got tired of counting, categorizing, and attempting to coherently list them because there are so many of them. There are many pages of consecutive off topic posts. Several members made posts that indicate I am not the only person to notice so many off topic posts. I estimate that at least 50% of posts are not about what the moderators implied was the thread topic. It was very easy to determine that 98% of posts are not about what the thread creator believed was the topic.

OPINION:

Having at least 50% of 471 posts being off topic is very inefficient at providing information on a thread’s topic. Having 98% of 471 posts off topic is a mockery of the thread creators attempt to find specific information. 

After requesting help from the moderators to keep the thread on topic, I received a PM from a moderator asking me “Have you ever thought that even these so called “irrelevant” posts (which are all meaningful, interesting and pertaining to the topic) might lead around to what you are looking for?” Before creating this thread I did consider this, and more importantly I considered the following:

1. How in so many threads some members find a way to start what I call a “Bf109/Luftwaffe versus Everything Argument”, and how quickly these arguments fill the thread with massive lists of data and sources of which the validity is never adequately determined or agreed upon.

2. The fact that these “Bf109/Luftwaffe versus Everything Arguments” frequently result in members losing their tempers, making hostile comments, and occasionally getting banned.

3. How a thread’s parameters could be established to be so neutral that all members would stay on topic so that a “Bf109/Luftwaffe versus Everything Argument”, members losing their tempers, hostile comments, and members being banned would not occur.

STATISTICS:

Number of posts that led to what the thread creator is “looking for” - 0

Number of members that made hostile comments due to an “Bf109/Luftwaffe versus Everything Argument” and were banned - 1

OPINION:

This thread became in many ways much like what P-40K-5 predicted in post #90: “....its gonna turn into a pissing match about #'s, #'s, #'s.”

This thread is filled ad nauseam with the same old stuff: Bf109/Luftwaffe versus Everything, the Bf109 is the greatest thing since bread, the P-51 Mustang is better because it is the greatest thing since “sliced” bread, massive lists of data and references that cannot be agree upon, etc. None of this provided the information the thread was attempting to elicit. What happen in this thread is the classic example of a researcher failing to prevent an obfuscating mass of irrelevant information making it impossible to find the answer to a simple question. 

Beginning with Post #2 made by P-40K-5 the thread began to move toward what I have described in the preceding paragraph. Having much experience with P-40K-5 doing this, my exasperation resulted in a sarcastic objection, a dry humor reference to one of P-40K-5’s self-descriptive comments from another thread, and a polite thank you for future cooperation. What is ironic and unfortunate is that 428 postings later P-40K-5 was banned by a moderator after he made a hostile comment directly attributable to losing his temper in yet another “Bf109/Luftwaffe versus Everything Argument.”


----------



## Lighthunmust (Sep 25, 2011)

After several other members made postings I considered off topic and my requests that members stay on topic were ineffective; I contacted the moderators with my objection. I did this by following these instructions found in this website’s “FAQ” tab:

“You will find 'Report' links in many places throughout the board. These links allow you to alert the board staff to anything which you find to be offensive, objectionable (emphasis added) or illegal.”

I used the “Report” link twice. I found it objectionable that postings to the thread were off topic and would cause what eventually occurred in the thread. I was not objecting because I disagreed with members opinions, only where they were making them. My reports were simple and polite requests for help keeping the thread on topic.

The problem with this landing gear claim is it is simple, succinct, symmetrical (33% of 33,000) and sometimes perpetuated by famous and well respected individuals in the Aviation Community. Most people will accept it on face value, and are not going to take the time to consider a refutation of this claim consisting of opinions and arcane data provided by relatively non-famous individuals using alias on an internet forum. What non-famous individuals need for a refutation is a simple, succinct, and near unassailably true statement they can used the next time someone, no matter how famous, attempts to perpetuate this claim. It better have devastating logic that is easy to comprehend if you are going to refute the statements of aviation heavy weights like Captain Eric Brown test pilot and holder of the record for most Aircraft types flown, Corky Meyer the famous Grumman Aircraft test pilot and President and CEO of Grumman American, and General Johannes Steinhoff the 176 victory ace and former Chief of Staff of the post-war Luftwaffe. A statement like this:

“Mr. (insert name) is the first person to make this claim in (insert name of book/magazine), on (insert date). His conclusions leading to this statement were based on the following methodology (insert summary of methodology). Unfortunately his methodology was very flawed and his conclusions inaccurate. It is not known how much the gear design contributed to losses and may never be known. The claim that 33% of 33,000 ME109s were lost due to landing gear design is not creditable.”

STATISTICS:

There were 471 posts to the thread by 42 individuals without the fame of Brown, Meyer, or Steinhoff.

Number of individuals that respect the aviation related opinions of Brown, Meyer, and Steinhoff - Millions


----------



## Lighthunmust (Sep 25, 2011)

OPINIONS:

“Excuse me for missing that. I guess trying to read over every post here on this forum is not possible...” - DerAdlerIstGelandet in post #15

I think this is probably true of all moderators and one of the reasons why the moderators are more reactive and punitive than proactive and preventative on this forum.

“This is a forum for open discussion.” - DerAdlerIstGelandet in post #44

It has always been my understanding that even an “open discussion” is enclosed by a purposeful consideration of a topic and is only open in that anyone can participate. Without this enclosure a discussion becomes purposeless conversation meandering from topic to topic. Most discussions have formally or informally recognized discussion leaders that endeavor to keep comments relevant to the topic. 

“How about you let us play moderator?” - DerAdlerIstGelandet in post #34

DerAdlerIstGelandet’s question implies I was usurping the authority of a moderator. I thought I was behaving as an informal discussion leader in a thread I created. I attempted to keep the thread on topic with requests for cooperation that contained clarifying explanations of the information the thread was attempting to elicit and that new threads be created to discuss what I considered off topic information. I did not issue orders, censor anyone, or make warnings; all of which are the exclusive privileges of a moderator. 

I made errors in crafting the starting post of this thread. The intent and goal of the thread could have been described with better clarity and brevity. I do not think I am the first person or the last person who will make this error. My additional posts to correct this error could have been made with greater finesse in language and greater patience.

SUGGESTIONS:

1. Support my new thread so the Bf109/Luftwaffe fans and everybody else have a good chance to get that near unassailable statement I mentioned.

2. Perhaps the moderators should allow the creators of threads to act as informal discussion leaders endeavoring to get members to keep posts relevant (on topic). As long as the informal discussion leader did not engage in personal attack and political commentary this may be beneficial in reducing the incidence of moderators being reactive and punitive.

3. When a member requests help from a moderator with a thread they started, a polite reply requesting an explanation may be more beneficial to the forum than a rush to judgement and summary condemnation.

4. No individual should use insulting language that DerAdlerIstGelandet mentions in post #34 as a reason for closing a thread, and for which DerAdlerIstGelandet banned P-40K-5. Using this type of language completely subverts and contradicts point #4 found here:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/basic/few-ground-rules-new-folks-7159.html

In the “Which side would you fly for?” thread moderator Njaco wisely commented about what insults do: “You will not call other members names or insult them in such a way. When you start to attack the member, you lose all credibility in your argument”. My opinion is that individuals using the type of insulting language found in posts #27, #30, and #32 from behind the barricade of a keyboard and at the safe distance of the internet do more damage to their credibility and reputation than they inflict on the person they are insulting. This is especially true when they have the punitive power to permanently silence an insulted individual who replies in an appropriate way.

5. Speaking truth to power when you know the potential consequences demonstrates you have a spine and stones.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2011)

OH brother, here we go again...

Sorry but this thread was on topic. All threads will go a little off topic, but if pertains to the thread we let it continue. 

That is what forums are for and about.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 25, 2011)

Three points I would like to make.

1. This is the internet. I would like know what the statistics are when someone Googles "pole barn' and how many RELEVANT website returns one gets? This is an OPEN forum where, while it may be distracting for some, thread topics may go off track alittle, as long as its civil. Which brings me to point number 2...

2. The "Report' Button is to report violations of the conduct and rules of the board. Insulting other member, insulting someone's service, etc. It is NOT because threads may wander at times and the thread originator is pissy.

3. And I would be very careful trying to expose supposed flaws with the Moderators or Admins. If you have a problem, use the PM feature - don't air it in public.


----------



## evangilder (Sep 25, 2011)

I have said it before, I will say it again. Pick a fight with a moderator or an administrator and you will lose. Enough of this ridiculous analysis of what posts are relevant or not. If the information is not here for you to find in the manner that you wish for, you are more than welcome to go somewhere else or start your own forum. But I will NOT sit idly by while you snipe at the people who try to keep this place as organized and civil as they can. All of the staff are _volunteers_, who do it for only the love of aviation. 

One more snipe at ANY of the staff here, and you are history. This is you only warning.


----------



## Lighthunmust (Sep 25, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Three points I would like to make.
> 
> 1. This is the internet. I would like know what the statistics are when someone Googles "pole barn' and how many RELEVANT website returns one gets? This is an OPEN forum where, while it may be distracting for some, thread topics may go off track alittle, as long as its civil. Which brings me to point number 2...
> 
> ...



1. I know I am only a guest on the property of other people. I am making polite suggestions, not demands. I am not using the type of language directed at me in this thread. I am not exposing anything, I am politely commenting on what some members are very much aware of. 

2. I understand how the "Report" button is intended to be used. Perhaps your #2 should be included in the FAQ statement to more clearly define use. I suggest deleting the word "pissy" as it is counterproductive.

3. I have already sent a polite PM to some of the moderators. I don't think it insolent to suggest in public that moderators who intend to insult members "don't air it in public". 

4. I hope the moderators have as thick a skin as they expect members to have.

5. Moderators should lead by example.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2011)

If you have problems with the moderating staff, please send them a PM. Do not send that PM to other members of the forum, nor should you share PMs from moderators with other members of the forum. They are *Private Messages*

Enough said...


----------



## Matt308 (Sep 25, 2011)

Lightunmust, I see nothing good in your future on this forum.


----------



## razor1uk (Sep 25, 2011)

There's a few nice pics and 109 rebuild info here; although mostly not concerning the topic of U/C - tis' a pity the pic of the starboardside cowling has disappeared in the last 6 months...
Bf 109 In Detail - Part One

Air-con is needed in this here thread, if it gets hotter we'll drown in run-off sweat...


----------



## Njaco (Sep 25, 2011)

Lighthunmust said:


> 2. I understand how the "Report" button is intended to be used. Perhaps your #2 should be included in the FAQ statement to more clearly define use. I suggest deleting the word "pissy" as it is counterproductive.



Sure, no problem.....

agitated, all torn up, apprehensive, broken up, bummed out, confused, disconcerted, dismayed, disordered, disquieted, distressed, dragged, frantic, grieved, hurt, ill, overwrought, psyched out, rattled, ruffled, shocked, shook up, sick, troubled, unglued, unsettled, unzipped, worried.

pick one.

We all have thick skins. But we have very thin skins when it comes to others telling us how to run the forum, such as thread content or insulting other members and Moderators.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 26, 2011)

Wellcome LM

I would like to apologize to you for hijacking your thread. I can honestly say however, that I never really "got" what it was that you were looking for.

Some observations.

This is a forum. There will always be quite a bit of deviation from the thread topic, especially if people dont understand what it is that was actually being sought in the first place.

The internet is a little like the wild west. It can be rough at times. There are people that come here with no good intention. There are people that are so diametrically opposed in their POVs that conflict is bound to happen. this thread was a prime example of that. I wish that threads could be better controlled as to how they play out, but its hard to achieve that.

I acknowledge that we didnt get to where and what you wanted but I disagree that it was wasted effort. Thats impossible to gauge to be honest. There were a lot of people that read these posted comments, and quite possibly learned something. I'd certainly like to think that.

Dont fight with the Mods its unhealthy. They do a great job IMO. Sometimes you just have to let go of the steering wheel and let the thing go its own way for a while. Just be cool if you can man!!!

Once again, I apologise for the mess I helped create out of this thread


----------



## Lighthunmust (Sep 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Wellcome LM
> 
> I would like to apologize to you for hijacking your thread. I can honestly say however, that I never really "got" what it was that you were looking for.
> 
> ...




Parsifal,

No apology is necessary, but thank you for the first kind words of dialog today. No apology is necessary from any member who posted what I thought to be off topic. Despite what some may think I was never angry or offended that members were posting what in my opinion were off topic posts highjacking the thread. These posts only caused frustration, disappointment, and worry from the irony that despite writing a starting thread designed to avoid what happened in this thread it started happening immediately. All feelings of offense were trivial in comparison and from other factors. I don’t think the moderators are bad guys. I think they usually do a great job and I certainly have some understanding of the difficulties of doing what they do. 

I think it is sort of funny I keep seeing people referring to the Internet as like “The Wild West”. I live in what was once “The Wild West”, Tombstone is only a short drive away. An Indian Reservation is within walking distance. Many of us in Arizona carry guns on a daily basis. If you do any serious study about “The Wild West” you will quickly realize that the Internet is far wilder. What people do on the Internet would get you shot in “The Wild West”. There were no where near as many gunfights and people getting shot in “The Wild West” as there are conflicts on the Internet. “The Wild West” was actually peaceful in comparison. People understood there were potentially strong reactions to how they spoke.

Thank you for the friendly advice about letting go of the steering wheel . I already made this decision about the new “Citation” thread. I figure I have done all I can to point the way down the path and the members can choose to stay on it. From what I have seen most are going off the path. At least I tried.

Once again, no one needs to apologize for posts I thought were off topic. I think I had unrealistic expectations of what was possible in this thread. I sincerely wish that the history of this thread is beneficial to future activity on this forum. Any suggestions I made were made with good intentions.


----------



## GregP (Sep 27, 2011)

Perhaps this has been posted, but I didn't read the 29+ pages of posts. If so, please excuse.

Famous Fighters of the Second World War, Willaim Green, 1962, page 11:

"However, the tendency to swing on takeoff and landing, that had first manifested itself during tests with the early protoypes, continued to plague the Bf 109E and contributed substantially to the Luftwaffe's high accident rate, some 1,500 Bf 109 fighters being lost between the beginning of the war and the autumn of 1941 in accidents caused by unintentional swings. Only after the tailwheel had been fitted with a locking device which operated when the throttle was fully opened did the tendency to swing lessen."

Doesn't cover the entire war, but lends credence to a high accident rate, at least up until autumn of 1941. There was a lot of war after that and I haven't run across figures to cover the rest of the war yet.

Best regards, - Greg


----------



## Njaco (Sep 27, 2011)

Greg, I believe that is exactly what Steve was looking for - some written word about the landing gear in an attempt to establish when this 'myth' started. Excellent!


----------



## Milosh (Sep 27, 2011)

It started a few years before that, in 1957, when the Green book was first published.


----------



## GregP (Sep 27, 2011)

My copy is 1962, and I have heard everywhere from 11,000 down to 900, all unsubstantiated. I even saw a magazine article where the author stated the real loss figure for takeoff / landing was 5%, but he didn't quote a source for his "real loss figure!" So ... it is unsubstantiated.

I'll keep looking because I, too, am interested in this subject.

An aside, this 11,000 figure might be a myth, but it also might not be. Until we can establish a figure, we don;t really know, do we? 

Maybe the conditions (mud) exacerbated the tendency due to lack of traction? I cannot speak of it with any real knowledge except to say I want to get to the bottom of it, too. I will refrain from speculation.


----------



## GregP (Sep 27, 2011)

My copy is 1962, and I have heard everywhere from 11,000 down to 900, all unsubstantiated. I even saw a magazine article where the author stated the real loss figure for takeoff / landing was 5%, but he didn't quote a source for his "real loss figure!" So ... it is unsubstantiated.

I'll keep looking because I, too, am interested in this subject.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 27, 2011)

You can get fairly accurate samples of the overall accident rates for me 109s, but its difficult to find the causes for that accident rates.

But this is not what Steve was looking for. he was looking for the sources of the claims that the accident rate was affected by gear failures, to the extent of 33% of all losses.


----------



## GregP (Sep 28, 2011)

I don't think they had thousands of gear failures ... they had a lot of takeoff and landing accidents resulting from a tendency to swing one way or the other (mostly to port) directionally when taking off or landing. 

The Hispano Ha.1112 we are restoring (Planes of Fame) had a failed starboard landing gear and associated bits because it swung to port on landing due to brake failure when filiming the movie "Pearl Harbor" in the year 2000. 11 years later and we are just getting it back together! it is back on the gear and ready for engine installation ... if we get some new wheels ... maybe next week? Close, at any rate. We already have the tires and tubes ... and the wings / engine mount are on. We are just waiting for the new outer wheel discs to be machined. The first set didn't fit! CNC is accurate only when priogrammed correctly ...

I could be wrong ...


----------



## fastmongrel (Sep 28, 2011)

Ooops run out of runway


----------



## Shortround6 (Sep 28, 2011)

GregP said:


> I don't think they had thousands of gear failures ... they had a lot of takeoff and landing accidents resulting from a tendency to swing one way or the other (mostly to port) directionally when taking off or landing.
> 
> I could be wrong ...




You may be quite right or at least on track. There may have been thousands of landing and take-off accidents, after all how do you loose aircraft?

Shot down? 

Shot up on runway? 

Crashed due to engine failure (which can happen on take-off landing) 

Pilot error?

Take-off and landing accidents? 

Now out of the take-off and landing accidents, of which there are many, how many are due to landing gear failures?

How many are due to the design/layout of the landing gear? causing a great tendency to ground loop or other problems.

How many were due to some other factor? Plane ran into large stationary object because of poor view.

Unless we keep to one definition there is going to be much confusion in what we are looking for.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 28, 2011)

GregP said:


> I don't think they had thousands of gear failures ... they had a lot of takeoff and landing accidents resulting from a tendency to swing one way or the other (mostly to port) directionally when taking off or landing.
> 
> *The Hispano Ha.1112 we are restoring *(Planes of Fame) had a failed starboard landing gear and associated bits because it swung to port on landing due to brake failure when filiming the movie "Pearl Harbor" in the year 2000. 11 years later and we are just getting it back together! it is back on the gear and ready for engine installation ... if we get some new wheels ... maybe next week? Close, at any rate. We already have the tires and tubes ... and the wings / engine mount are on. We are just waiting for the new outer wheel discs to be machined. The first set didn't fit! CNC is accurate only when priogrammed correctly ...
> 
> I could be wrong ...



IIRC, I just read that those post-war 109s didn't have the proper engines and were substituted - usually with a very powerul engine and larger prop blades which really brought out the swing. Brake failures were common and the collapse of LGs.


----------



## Lighthunmust (Sep 28, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Unless we keep to one definition there is going to be much confusion in what we are looking for.


----------



## GregP (Sep 28, 2011)

Our (Planes of Fame) Hispano Ha.1112 has P-39 inner wheel halves and disc brakes fitted, with Messerschmitt outer wheel halves. Together they make a good Messerschmitt wheel with good, modern brakes. The "brake failure" was a ruptured hydraulic brake line ... in the air, probably too tight a radius in a bend and a lot of years of vibration. 

So, when Steve Hinton landed he was straight and in coorinated flight, but had no right brake. The aicraft got down to about 35 knots and started a slow swing to the left. With no right brake, and with full right rudder, the groundloop slowly developed and folded the starboard gear.

We repaired the gear mount, the wing where it was damaged, fitted a new engine mount, and generally overhauled a lot of things. Every time we took something aprat, we found something else that needed attention. We also fitted new canopy panels all around. Now we are waiting on some long-lead parts (one part being a cut-down and recontoured DC-3 prop).

It is a long way toward being ready to fly, but we still, have a way to go.


----------

