# Most hated Axis interceptor for American bomber crews



## Jerry W. Loper (Mar 9, 2015)

Not including jets and rockets like the Messerschmitt 262 and 163, what German and Japanese (and any other Axis) interceptors did American bomber crews hate to see the most?


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## gjs238 (Mar 9, 2015)

Wonder if there is a difference between what interceptor was _most effective_ and the one(s) the crews _hated the most_.


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## Jerry W. Loper (Mar 9, 2015)

Maybe not. For all I know, the bomber crews might have dreaded Bf 110 or Me 410 twin-engine fighters with rockets more than Bf 109s or FW 190s, since the fact that twin-engine fighters were easy meat for Allied fighters wouldn't matter to bomber crews.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 9, 2015)

I think they may have hated flak the most.

At least some of them could shoot back at the fighters, but there was little you could do about flak except sit and take it.

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## stona (Mar 9, 2015)

tyrodtom said:


> I think they may have hated flak the most.



I agree with that. For the USAAF operating by day the chances of being shot down by a fighter or by flak varied, in the last year or so of the war they were about even. However, a bomber was very much more likely to be damaged by flak. For example between June and August 1944, when escorts had become proficient and the Jagdwaffe was on the verge of defeat, the 8th AF lost 341 aircraft to flak but suffered 10,972 damaged by flak. Throughout the campaign far more aircraft were damaged by flak than by fighters. Inevitably aircrew members were also much more likely to be wounded by flak and of course, unlike fighters for the most part, flak was highly visible, causing a psychological effect which is what your question is really about.
Flak scared airmen, and they were statistically right to be disconcerted. It also substantially and consistently reduced bombing accuracy, something fighters could rarely achieve.
Cheers
Steve


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## drgondog (Mar 9, 2015)

stona said:


> Flak scared airmen, and they were statistically right to be disconcerted. It also substantially and consistently reduced bombing accuracy, something fighters could rarely achieve.
> Cheers
> Steve



Steve - I don't have much of a problem with most of your opinion but disagree the 'reduced bombing accuracy' part. The lead bombardiers had control from the IP to the bombs away point. I would bet anything in the world that if a 12 O'clock attack by fighters was boring in, compared to flak, the he would be a lot more 'distracted' by the fighters.

Regarding the original question of this thread - I would be inclined to say FW 190 as the single German fighter that was most dreaded from 1942 through late 1944. Certainly the 110/410 was effective when unmolested by fighters (rare after February 1944) and the Me 262 (few and marginally effective despite their great performance and firepower).

In 1945 the Me 262 was the single threat that our fighters did not have a great answer for when they showed up and attacked - but they were insignificant compared to the toll extracted by the FW 190 first, Bf 109 second (with 20mm gondolas and 30 mm cannon)


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## stona (Mar 9, 2015)

drgondog said:


> Steve - I don't have much of a problem with most of your opinion but disagree the 'reduced bombing accuracy' part. The lead bombardiers had control from the IP to the bombs away point. I would bet anything in the world that if a 12 O'clock attack by fighters was boring in, compared to flak, the he would be a lot more 'distracted' by the fighters.



Not according to reports by both the 8th and 15th Air Forces and the USSBS as well as a Bomber Command ORS report  

Specifically it led to repeated calls for bombers not to attempt evasive action during the bomb run, and that included the lead aircraft which was/were specifically targeted by German flak. Fighters could of course disrupt a bomb run, but flak did it more consistently.

The USSBS actually makes a statistical estimate of the adverse effect on bombing accuracy of flak, but my copy is at home and I'm not. Westermann's conclusions are based on those reports and luckily I have a digital copy of his opus.












Returning to the original question, I wonder how accurately the average air gunner could distinguish between the Luftwaffe's two principle single engine interceptors under combat stress and with limited time. They often showed themselves unable to distinguish between friendly and hostile fighters. As a general rule they fired at anything that looked like it might be attempting to point its nose at them.

Steve


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## drgondog (Mar 9, 2015)

Steve - your extract referring to "COLONEL' Lemay is the source for Lemay developing the Lead Crew method which was instituted in early 1943, along with AFC autopilot slaved to the bombsight to take the control away from the pilot.

His last assignment as Colonel was CO of the 305BG, ending May 1943

Lemay also decided (correctly) that the mean accuracy of German 88 and 122 mm flak guns had a low probability of a hit and rammed home the necessity of maintaining Tight formations to defend against the primary threat - LW fighters. He is the inventor of the Box/Staggered/Overlap combat formations, Lead Crew and forced adaptation to the AFC autopilot slaving bombsight to flight controls


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## drgondog (Mar 9, 2015)

As to distinguishing the fighter type - true the 8th AF recognition skills were not exceptional but to answer your question, there were more beam attacks than head on - and it wasn't like only the tail gunner had a view. B-17 formations placed the bombers left, right, high. low - and sometimes behind an attacking fighter, giving many observer a 'view' of the problem. Same for even a head on attack but far less time to identify - but still visible to many eyes to recount during de-briefing after a mission.


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## stona (Mar 9, 2015)

drgondog said:


> Lemay also decided (correctly) that the mean accuracy of German 88 and 122 mm flak guns had a low probability of a hit and rammed home the necessity of maintaining Tight formations to defend against the primary threat - LW fighters. He is the inventor of the Box/Staggered/Overlap combat formations, Lead Crew and forced adaptation to the AFC autopilot slaving bombsight to flight controls



All true, but it was a problem for the USAAF which he and others had to fight hard to eliminate. Bomber Command never solved the problem, in fact Bennett once scornfully accused half of Bomber Command's main force crews of not using their bomb sights at all.

In 1943 Lemay was right. The quote is from shortly after he took over 3rd Air Division (September 1943?). I think he had developed his 'combat box' system earlier. Fighters destroyed bombers at a rate of 2.9 to 1 compared to flak. It shouldn't be forgotten that flak damaged nearly 10,000 bombers in this year a ratio of 9.3 to 1 in its favour. Also many flak damaged bombers were destroyed subsequently by fighters (and claimed by them) though accurate figures are impossible to find.
Later in the war the ratios for destroyed bombers became much nearer parity. Better flak and better escorted formations facing fewer good Luftwaffe units.

Cheers

Steve


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## bobbysocks (Mar 9, 2015)

flak was generally isolated over targets. so while intense it was relatively brief. fighters could attack anywhere along the hundreds of miles to and from the target....and especially if the bomber was wounded and fell behind the group. flak was indirect fire that they could climb and decend to escape....fighters were aiming their fire. i would be more fearful of someone with their eyes and sites on me.


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## stona (Mar 9, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> flak was indirect fire that they could climb and decend to escape.



No, they couldn't, particularly on the bomb run which given the 'computational' ability of sights like the Norden, was quite long. The approach to the target was also where flak was likely to be concentrated. As evidenced in the Luftwaffe's 1943 manual issued to the flak arm the lead aircraft of US formations were specifically targeted. It's point number 3 in the instructions. Most flak was not 'barrier' flak.

Cheers

Steve


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## bobbysocks (Mar 9, 2015)

you are right on the bomb run itself they had to fly straight and level... but at other times or up to that point they were able to take some evasive action. let me see if i can find the after action reports where pilots talked about it,,,,


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## stona (Mar 9, 2015)

Flak intelligence was taken very seriously indeed and flak units were 'tracked and mapped'. All RAF and 8th AF formations were updated daily. Generally formations were routed to avoid flak concentrations, though obviously they became unavoidable at and around the target.
Cheers
Steve

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## GrauGeist (Mar 9, 2015)

The Me262 should be noted in there as one of the Axis interceptors that caused a great deal of apprehension amongst the bomber crews.

While it never showed in any great numbers and it certainly didn't change the bombing strategy, it's presence was feared because of it's speed and the terrible destruction it could produce.

I recall speaking to a 25-mission B-24 tail-gunner during one of Aluminum Overcast's visits here in Redding. He had mentioned his encounters with Luftwaffe aircraft and he also mentioned the flak they had to endure. He even mentioned seeing a Me163 Komet attack on one mission: which did no damage to the formation, but was amazed at it's sight.

But when he spoke of encounters with the Me262, he actually had to stop a few times, because he was getting choked up when he recounted the horrible damage it did to his aircraft and his crewmates.


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## drgondog (Mar 9, 2015)

After LeMay influenced 1st BD tactics, the other two fell in line. Steve is correct that routes were planned to avoid the major concentrations of flak and also correct that the major concentrations were around important cities - making certain that a gauntlet would be run. The bombers did Not take evasive action from the IP to the target simply because formation integrity through bombs away had to be maintained.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 9, 2015)

found this in a google e book....


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## bobbysocks (Mar 9, 2015)

same book...and he isnt the only bomber pilot i have read that stated this....


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## stona (Mar 9, 2015)

I've always liked this image, captured over Schweinfurt, 24th February 1944.






It shows many things not always easy to appreciate. First the amount of space inside the bomber formations. These were close formations, all supporting each other as Lemay intended, but not close in terms of an air display!
Secondly you can imagine how difficult it would be to manoeuvre any one element whilst maintaining its own formation, let alone retaining mutual support for and of its neighbours, something vital for defence against fighters.
Thirdly the density and accuracy of the flak barrage is easy to see.

Cheers

Steve

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## bobbysocks (Mar 9, 2015)

what was the ratio of losses ( flak to EA ) on the bomber groups for the schweinfurt raids?


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## BiffF15 (Mar 9, 2015)

Q: What was the most hated Axis interceptor for American bomber crews?

A: The one shooting at you!

In all seriousness I honestly think it would be the above and or specific units. The Abbeville Boys, JG xx, etc., whomever had the current worst reputation. I could imagine that the crews would be familiar with the units / colors of the adversaries on their various legs and would know them by sight and or reputation.

Cheers,
Biff


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## stona (Mar 10, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> what was the ratio of losses ( flak to EA ) on the bomber groups for the schweinfurt raids?



This was vary much a victory for the fighters. On August 17th fighters shot down 46 bombers, plus a further eight already damaged by flak. Flak accounted for only 5, but almost exactly a third of all returning bombers had received some flak damage.

Don't underestimate flak. During the war in Europe flak accounted for 5,400 USAAF combat losses compared with 4,300 shot down by fighters. Between December 1942 and April 1945 flak also damaged an incredible 54,539 aircraft, more than 20% of all sorties dispatched.

Cheers

Steve


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## fubar57 (Mar 10, 2015)

What was the number of shells fired per kill? I read it was around 10,000, but that seems quite high. Or would it include every type of flak gun , not just the 88.

Geo


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## Elmas (Mar 10, 2015)

But were the bomber crews actually able to recognise with some reliability the different tipes of LW fighters?
Not that they were not trained about the matter, of course, but to recognise a fighter in an engagement that lasts a few seconds, with the fighter that is trying to kill you and that is trying to show the less of his silhouette, possibly up sun, should not have been an easy task.


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## Koopernic (Mar 10, 2015)

The Fw 190 was almost certainly the most effective.

It had 4 x 20mm canon. An exploding 20mm round being fired at one at a total rate of around 2600 rounds per minute (about 45 rounds per second, inclusive of losses due to synchronisation) is no light matter.

The Pair of 13.2mm guns were also powerful: higher rate of fire than 0.5 Browning albeit somewhat lower velocity it still put holes in objects that were immune to 7mm rounds.

In terms of armament this may be the most powerful standard fighter of WW2.

The 50mm armoured windscreen could survive 0.5 inch rounds. The engine protected the pilot and the fuel tank.

The oil cooler was hidden behind a 6mm, latter 10mm, armoured ring that also protected the BMW801 cylinder heads as well as the oil cooler. The oil cooler was a double reverse flow type device pressure fed from the fan.

Versions with extra armour and a pair of 30mm guns in the outer stations could easily destroy a bomber with only 3 rounds, they would certainly survive approaching a bomber to point blank range and then might, "might" be shot down but the pilot would certainly survive and would make a controlled exit only well after the bomber was destroyed.

The Service ceiling was a respectable 37,000ft though its performance began to drop of after 20,000ft-22,000ft, its one weakness. A more advanced version of the BMW801 engine, the 801F, which offered 2400hp(2600 with MW50) added a 3 speed as opposed to 2 speed supercharger and might have changed this. The 4 speed, two stage, intercooled BMW801R would have only fitted the Ta 152B due to its great length.

Certainly without their turbochargers to take the fight to over 25000ft and escorts USAAF bombers would have simply not survived.


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## Wayne Little (Mar 10, 2015)

Don't think I would want an Fw190A-8 carrying 20 and 30mm cannons getting too close to me....


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## drgondog (Mar 10, 2015)

BiffF15 said:


> Q: What was the most hated Axis interceptor for American bomber crews?
> 
> A: The one shooting at you!
> 
> ...


Biff, in the early days when JG2 and JG26 were the prime defenders from LuftFlotte 3 (Kanalfront) the distinctive yellow patch under some FW 190 cowls - but the reality is that all aggressive fighters were at one time or another described as Abbevillie Boys (one of the airfields hosting II./JG 26 units through early 1943


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## Totalize (Mar 10, 2015)

When you see gun camera footage of German 20mm or 30mm rounds impacting a B17 its looks absolutely terrifying. Each one causes a minor explosion with parts of the plane often flying off as the rounds impact. There's one where some of the rounds go right into the belly turret/ball gun of a B17. Wouldn't want to view that station afterward if the B-17 made back to its airfield. Messy not to mention the guy's aircrew having to see it.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 10, 2015)

i dont discount flak at all. shooting flak you do not have the chance to lose any of your personnel, you may not shoot an ac down but damage it enough to ground it for awhile meaning one less bomber in the air, there is a psycological effect on aircrews that experience it....however it does cost you a lot in deployment of manpower. researching this a little over the past couple of days i ran across something that said the germans did not have a very good proximity fuse...compared to those of the allies. if they had our losses would have been much greater. i do not know how true that statement is but supposedly it cites a usaaf report ( but no link to the report )

WWII flak (CDB100620)


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## fubar57 (Mar 10, 2015)

Nice little article, brings the number of shells fired/kill down quite a lot. Thanks.

Geo


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## stona (Mar 11, 2015)

drgondog said:


> Steve - I don't have much of a problem with most of your opinion but disagree the 'reduced bombing accuracy' part. The lead bombardiers had control from the IP to the bombs away point. I would bet anything in the world that if a 12 O'clock attack by fighters was boring in, compared to flak, the he would be a lot more 'distracted' by the fighters.



I failed to mention the most obvious way that flak reduced bombing accuracy (quite apart from making the bombers manoeuvre evasively) and that is of course forcing them to fly higher. The higher the bombers flew the less accurately they bombed.


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## drgondog (Mar 11, 2015)

stona said:


> I failed to mention the most obvious way that flak reduced bombing accuracy (quite apart from making the bombers manoeuvre evasively) and that is of course forcing them to fly higher. The higher the bombers flew the less accurately they bombed.



That would be true - except that the B-17 and B-24 bombed at same altitudes - roughly 25000 feet at 8AF operations initiation and the B-17 maintained that general altitude into late 1944. But the B-24s dropped to 22-20000 feet. In the fall of 1944 and into spring 1945 when many of the missions dropped below 20,000 feet for the bombers.

The disparate speeds and handling qualities between the bombers drove the different doctrines as the B-24 was about 20Kts faster and difficult to maintain tight formations above 22000 feet.

If you are drawing a contrast against daylight RAF doctrine with Bomber Command the 8th did fly higher - but didn't change due to flak. What they 'changed' was to order the crews to Not fly evasive maneuvers from the IP to the target.


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## stona (Mar 11, 2015)

The reason they bombed from those altitudes was flak. The USAAF decided to do so based on over confidence in its bomb sight. It felt it could still bomb accurately from a supposedly safe altitude. This was more of an issue for the USAAF which continued a pretence of 'precision' bombing right up to the point when it started bombing through cloud on radar, than for the RAF which had developed tactics to compensate for a lack of accuracy. 

Late in the war the quality of heavy flak in particular started to decrease. By late 1944 only about 40% of the 1.2 million personnel in the flak arm were regular Luftwaffe personnel and the level of training had decreased. Even earlier, when Overlord took place, flak resources were moved to confront allied forces in France. Flak units were moved to protect the oil industry in reaction to the allied campaign against it with more success. This is the experience of one man, just a small cog in the gearbox of an enormous machine, attacking an oil target.







In response to the original question, flying that 13 miles, straight and level with no possibility of any evasive action, must have been one of the most difficult things to do. Crews certainly hated it.

But the extra defences came from somewhere, another target, and it was usually a city, had less protection. In July 1944 the decision was taken to concentrate flak in centres of gravity around the most important targets. If you were not attacking one of these (deemed so by the Germans, not the USAAF or RAF) you would likely encounter much lighter defences. For example 500 heavy flak guns were moved from the protection of industry to the protection of communications and transport routs. Eventually a flak belt extended the length of the Rhine!

Hitler' gamble in the Ardennes alone cost the Luftwaffe 100 heavy flak batteries, 110 light flak batteries and 16 search light batteries.

In September 1944 the 8th Air Force reported an increase in flak losses and damage, probably due to the concentration of flak around _its_ targets. As soon as late October it was reporting a "sharp decrease" in flak losses. This can be attributed to problems with gun laying radar (both less effective and shortages), a shortage of ammunition, less well trained gun crews and of course poor autumn weather. A corner had been turned at the end of 1944. The flak arm, like just about everything else in Nazi Germany, was on the verge of defeat. Soon the RAF would be bombing, in daylight, from 12,000 ft.

Cheers

Steve

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## Milosh (Mar 11, 2015)

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf

see Table 159

Total losses were almost the same number, EA 2,452, AA 2,439

The Table also shows monthly losses.

From July 1944 losses due to AA had increased to more than losses due to EA.


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## stona (Mar 11, 2015)

Milosh said:


> http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf
> 
> From July 1944 losses due to AA had increased to more than losses due to EA.




As noted by the 8th AF. This was due to the declining operational efficiency of the Luftwaffe (many raids were not opposed by the Jagdwaffe) and the concentration of flak around the targets that the USAAF in particular was targeting. There was less flak to go around, but the Germans were very good at putting it where it was needed. It was only in early 1945 when any movement became almost impossible due to a lack of fuel.

As I said above, it wasn't until the end of that year (1944) that due to a combination of many reasons the flak started to become less effective. It could still inflict some very nasty surprises. For example the 15th AF, flying in support of the Soviets in the Balkans were forced to fly lower to accurately hit their smaller targets (bridges, transport hubs, airfields etc) suffered high losses to flak, particularly B-24s, in the last four months of 1944.

It should also not to be forgotten that until the end German technology moved forward. Operational tests with the 'doppelzunder' fuse (contact and timed) in the defence of Munich achieved a shell to shoot down ration of 370:1 which was a massive improvement on the then average 4,500:1. The trials were very limited, but an improvement was clearly possible. Right at the end of the war preliminary combat trials with the two operational 'Kulmbach' gun laying radars further reduced this to 300:1, the same caveat applies, the trials were very limited.
Luckily it was too little too late...again.

Cheers

Steve

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## bobbysocks (Mar 11, 2015)

now wouldnt they vary the altitude of the bomb runs for each mission? using the same altitude everytime is suicide! the aa batteries wouldnt have to adjust at all. a few thousand feet difference each time would make the flak crews waste a couple salvos to home in.


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## stona (Mar 11, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> now wouldnt they vary the altitude of the bomb runs for each mission? using the same altitude everytime is suicide! the aa batteries wouldnt have to adjust at all. a few thousand feet difference each time would make the flak crews waste a couple salvos to home in.



I'm sure they did. The flak established the bombers altitude by radar and for US formations this could often be confirmed visually too, depending on cloud. It wasn't difficult to accurately calculate the altitude of the incoming bombers, the crews didn't have to estimate it.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Mar 11, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> now wouldnt they vary the altitude of the bomb runs for each mission? using the same altitude everytime is suicide! the aa batteries wouldnt have to adjust at all. a few thousand feet difference each time would make the flak crews waste a couple salvos to home in.



This web site gives the mission details for all the missions flown by the 303rd BG.
303rd Bomb Group (H) - Molesworth, England


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## stona (Mar 11, 2015)

A quick scan reveals bombing altitudes against German targets varying between 18,000ft and 25,000ft. I did notice a raid against a target in Norway on which the bombing height was only 11,000ft, but the opposition appeared to be one flak boat moored in a fjord, not exactly Schweinfurt or Berlin! Some were a little higher (27,000ft)

The bombing heights tally well with typical Luftwaffe fighter interception reports, the vast majority reporting the bombers between 6,000m and 8,000m.

Cheers

Steve

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## beitou (Mar 11, 2015)

Were the Germans aware that the US used a master bomber and if so was that plane identifiable and targeted by either flak or fighters?


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## stona (Mar 11, 2015)

beitou said:


> Were the Germans aware that the US used a master bomber and if so was that plane identifiable and targeted by either flak or fighters?



Master bomber was a Bomber Command position, an experienced officer who would orbit the target adjusting the marking by the various 'backers up' and in some cases (as at Dresden) ordering the marking of positions outside the original sector to be bombed for second or subsequent Main Force waves, if he considered that the first waves had already achieved the missions primary objective. There is no point in throwing more incendiaries into an inferno, nor blowing up rubble.
A good master bomber could turn a potential disaster into a successful raid (as at Peenemunde).

The Americans employed lead ships, on whose cue all the others in their formation bombed. The Germans were aware of this and flak definitely targeted the leading aircraft in the US formations. I said above, it was point number 3 in a 1943 flak manual.
I doubt the fighters had such a luxury, generally attacking whichever aircraft they could get a good firing position on.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Mar 11, 2015)

stona said:


> A quick scan reveals bombing altitudes against German targets varying between 18,000ft and 25,000ft. I did notice a raid against a target in Norway on which the bombing height was only 11,000ft, but the opposition appeared to be one flak boat moored in a fjord, not exactly Schweinfurt or Berlin! Some were a little higher (27,000ft)
> 
> The bombing heights tally well with typical Luftwaffe fighter interception reports, the vast majority reporting the bombers between 6,000m and 8,000m.
> 
> ...


I read about a mosquito attack, I think on a target in Norway, where the bombers entered into a shallow dive to throw off the predicted flack, not really an option to a bomber group but they were aware of the predicted flak.


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## gjs238 (Mar 12, 2015)

drgondog said:


> That would be true - except that the B-17 and B-24 bombed at same altitudes - roughly 25000 feet at 8AF operations initiation and the B-17 maintained that general altitude into late 1944. But the B-24s dropped to 22-20000 feet. In the fall of 1944 and into spring 1945 when many of the missions dropped below 20,000 feet for the bombers.
> 
> The disparate speeds and handling qualities between the bombers drove the different doctrines as the B-24 was about 20Kts faster and difficult to maintain tight formations above 22000 feet.
> 
> If you are drawing a contrast against daylight RAF doctrine with Bomber Command the 8th did fly higher - but didn't change due to flak. What they 'changed' was to order the crews to Not fly evasive maneuvers from the IP to the target.



Why the altitude drops?


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## gjs238 (Mar 12, 2015)

stona said:


> Soon the RAF would be bombing, in daylight, from 12,000 ft.



Could you elaborate more on the RAF switch or move to daylight bombing and at such low altitude?


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## gjs238 (Mar 12, 2015)

stona said:


> The reason they bombed from those altitudes was flak. The USAAF decided to do so based on over confidence in its bomb sight. It felt it could still bomb accurately from a supposedly safe altitude. This was more of an issue for the USAAF which continued a pretence of 'precision' bombing right up to the point when it started bombing through cloud on radar, than for the RAF which had developed tactics to compensate for a lack of accuracy.
> 
> Late in the war the quality of heavy flak in particular started to decrease. By late 1944 only about 40% of the 1.2 million personnel in the flak arm were regular Luftwaffe personnel and the level of training had decreased. Even earlier, when Overlord took place, flak resources were moved to confront allied forces in France. Flak units were moved to protect the oil industry in reaction to the allied campaign against it with more success. This is the experience of one man, just a small cog in the gearbox of an enormous machine, attacking an oil target.
> 
> ...



Is it possible (or fair to say) that US bombing efforts drew flak away from UK bombing efforts?


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## gjs238 (Mar 12, 2015)

stona said:


> The Americans employed lead ships, on whose cue all the others in their formation bombed. The Germans were aware of this and flak definitely targeted the leading aircraft in the US formations. I said above, it was point number 3 in a 1943 flak manual.
> I doubt the fighters had such a luxury, generally attacking whichever aircraft they could get a good firing position on.



Did only the lead ships employ Nordon bombsights or did all bombers use them?
If the latter, didn't bombing on cue from a lead ship negate somewhat negate the Nordon bombsight?


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## wuzak (Mar 12, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Did only the lead ships employ Nordon bombsights or did all bombers use them?
> If the latter, didn't bombing on cue from a lead ship negate somewhat negate the Nordon bombsight?



I think that a few crews had the Norden, but the bulk did not.

There were a few back up lead bombers in case the lead bomber was lost.

The reason for dropping on cue from the leader was that it enabled the bombers to remain in formation and maximise their defensive fire against fighters. It also reduced the time the formation remained over target. 

The Norden required a long straight run up to the target. If every bomber had to go through the procedure they woudl be over the target much longer.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 13, 2015)

wuzak said:


> I think that a few crews had the Norden, but the bulk did not.
> 
> There were a few back up lead bombers in case the lead bomber was lost.
> 
> ...


The Norden was standard equipment in all the U.S. bombers as it's tachometric design and auto-pilot features were better than the older Vector type sights.


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## Airframes (Mar 13, 2015)

Not quite true Dave - some models of the B-24 were fitted with the Sperry gyro sight, a piece of equipment which many considered superior to the Norden. Also, as mentioned above, when a 'lead bomber' (plus reserves) was employed, the majority of the rest of the formation had the Norden (or Sperry) removed, with the Bombardiers in these aircraft releasing their bombs on cue from the Togglier in the lead ship.

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## GrauGeist (Mar 13, 2015)

Interesting, Terry, as I understood each ship's bombardier used the bombsight targeting data, releasing on the lead ship's que. Not just dumping "en masse".

As far as the Sperry goes, the Army cancelled the Sperry in '43 because they felt that the Norden-M series was far superior.


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## stona (Mar 13, 2015)

The drop in altitude was to improve accuracy. The RAF was bombing targets in daylight in 1945 from low altitude to increase its accuracy and because it could. There was no fighter opposition (the Luftwaffe had virtually ceased to exist, thanks mainly to the efforts of the USAAF) and the targets were not heavily protected by flak.

Is it possible to say that the USAAF drew flak away from RAF targets? It's an interesting proposition. As the flak concentrated on targets that the Germans deemed vital (like oil and transportation) units were moved from city defences around the Reich. It was the USAAF that concentrated on the various specific efforts against such targets, though when Harris was forced to join in Bomber Command did an outstanding job, much to his surprise.
I think, without having looked up specific figures and examples (yet), that a case might be made that Bomber Command faced lighter opposition as it flew by night against _some_ of its area targets than it might otherwise have done had the Allied strategy, combined with the successful invasion, not forced the Luftwaffe to make the decision to deploy its flak to defend the Reich's vital resources rather than its civilian population. Some of the cities devastated in the last months of the war were not high on Bomber Command's list and would not have been expected by the Germans to suffer such a fate.

It shouldn't be forgotten that both air forces flew in the campaigns against these 'vital' targets, though Bomber Command's leadership was much less enthusiastic about doing so. USAAF commanders were generally less enthusiastic about what amounted to city raids, though the criteria for bombing a city (even as a secondary target) included a list of things which might be deemed 'military', even a small town would likely have some of them. 

I have somewhere a list of flak protecting Dresden when that city suffered its apocalypse, and I believe from memory that it had been substantially reduced in the months before the raid...but I'd need to check.

Cheers

Steve


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## mhuxt (Mar 13, 2015)

I believe you're correct about Dresden's flak having been shifted, but from memory it had been shifted east, not to the oil refineries. The front wasn't far away in February.

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## stona (Mar 13, 2015)

mhuxt said:


> I believe you're correct about Dresden's flak having been shifted, but from memory it had been shifted east, not to the oil refineries. The front wasn't far away in February.



That sounds right, unfortunately I won't be home for another week to check 

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Mar 13, 2015)

From the 'dailies' of the 323rd B.S. (what we might call an ORB.)

"7 thru 10 Jan. 1944: Mission to Ludwigshaven, Germany: On the 7th, the mission was not "scrubbed". Eight of our ships made it to Ludwigshaven, Germany and back without any serious difficulty. Major John C. Bishop, Squadron Commander, and Captain John T. Gladstone, Squadron Operations Officer, led the group in ship #639 "The Careful Virgin" which has made an enviable record as a ship. *It is equipped with all the accessories that make it a lead ship and seems to be the one that Major Bishop usually flies when he leads." *

My bold.

That equipment included the bomb sight not fitted to others in the squadron. They bombed 'on cue' which was one contribution to a less concentrated bomb pattern. At 200mph an aircraft covers about 100 yards in a second.

From someone who was there :


_"I was a gunner who flew 35 mission with the 8th Air Force back a few years ago...I had the opinion then and still do that the Norden Bomb Sight was not as good as it was touted to be....
I know on several occasion we dropped bombs that came no where near their targets...We even took a shot at the Remagen Bridge and missed completely...I always wondered why on many missions there was a lead ship with a bombardier who targeted the target and when his ship dropped its bombs, the rest of the flight would do likewise... the bombardier hit the toggle switch when he saw the lead ships bombs drop and that is about all..."_

He's being unfair to the Norden which was as good as any bomb sight of the period, but he does explain the practice of dropping on the cue of the lead ship(s).

Cheers

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 13, 2015)

"Later in the war when long range fighters and 2 years of pounding had all but made the Luftwaffe non-existent, the bombardier was replaced with a toggler. Where the bombardier was a commissioned officer, the togglers were enlisted men. When a toggler was on the aircraft, it did not carry a Norden Bombsight. When the toggler saw the lead plane drop his bombs, he would toggle the bombs to drop out of his aircraft"

B-17 Flying Fortress--Queen of the Skies

"What is a Bombardier? What is a Togglier?
A crew bombardier was trained in all the technical phases of the "dropping the bombs" task. It was his job to operate the bomb sight in his plane to drop the bombs on a target. 

However, when it was decreed by 8th AF headquarters that all 36 planes in a Squadron formation would drop their bombs simultaneously, only the bombardier in the lead plane ran a bomb sight and functioned as a true bombardier. All the other 35 planes dropped when he did. The job of the bombardier in all the other 35 planes then was just to trip the bomb release switch in his own plane when the lead dropped his bombs. This method/technique was intended to concentrate the bomb pattern for maximum destruction. So, when there were personnel shortages, some enlisted crew members were selected to sit in the bombardier's position and timely trip the switch when the lead plane dropped his bombs. That job was called a togglier, sometimes spelled toggleier, a combination of toggle + ier."


FAQs about Army Air Force Terms in WWII

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## gjs238 (Mar 13, 2015)

stona said:


> He's being unfair to the Norden which was as good as any bomb sight of the period, but he does explain the practice of dropping on the cue of the lead ship(s).



Perhaps it's not that he's being unfair, maybe he just didn't buy into all the hype about the Norden.


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## stona (Mar 13, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Perhaps it's not that he's being unfair, maybe he just didn't buy into all the hype about the Norden.



Or didn't understand that it was a primitive electro-mechanical computer to which SISO applied just as surely as it does to the machine I'm typing on now 

If you programmed it wrongly or with the wrong information it could not possibly resolve the calculations correctly and the bombs would miss, potentially by a wide margin.

Cheers

Steve

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## gjs238 (Mar 13, 2015)

FLYBOYJ said:


> "Later in the war when long range fighters and 2 years of pounding had all but made the Luftwaffe non-existent, the bombardier was replaced with a toggler. Where the bombardier was a commissioned officer, the togglers were enlisted men. When a toggler was on the aircraft, it did not carry a Norden Bombsight. When the toggler saw the lead plane drop his bombs, he would toggle the bombs to drop out of his aircraft"
> 
> B-17 Flying Fortress--Queen of the Skies
> 
> ...



Wonder if the bombing results/effectiveness actually differed between the two methods.
It would seem that the bombs from the planes rearmost in the group would fall short?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 13, 2015)

A good bombardier might take that into account.
How big/long is the formation?
What is the average reaction time of the togglers?
Aim a little over to center the group's pattern.
Width of formation helping with lateral errors.


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## stona (Mar 13, 2015)

At least one British ORS report believed that the reason USAAF bomb patterns were more dispersed and the average radial error was _slightly_ larger than those achieved by Bomber Command on its late war daylight missions was because of the use of one bombardier per flight, everyone else releasing on his cue. This runs exactly contrary to the original reason for the adoption of the system by the Americans. You pay your money and you take your pick.
Cheers
Steve

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## gjs238 (Mar 13, 2015)

Steve - what techniques did BC use when they switched back to daylight bombing?


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## gjs238 (Mar 13, 2015)

Wonder if the US bomber formations just got too large and unwieldy.
To a point, growing formations in size to compensate for poor accuracy seems to make sense.
But then growing them to a size that reduces accuracy seems counter-intuitive.
I don't know if I'm articulating this well, but something just seems "off" about this technique.


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## pbehn (Mar 13, 2015)

Was an issue here the security surrounding the Norden sight. They were kept under lock and key with security as if they were nuclear isotopes. The US didnt want the British to see the Norden sight I am sure they didn't want the Germans to either,.


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## pbehn (Mar 13, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Steve - what techniques did BC use when they switched back to daylight bombing?



They sank the Tirpitz for Hors D'oeuvres, sorry couldnt resist.
The British had been bombing in daylight but not on deep penetration raids into Germany. Harris was frustrated with the way he was projected when BC had eliminated the Tirpitz and most of the extremely well protected concrete U Boat pens V3 sites etc.


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## gjs238 (Mar 13, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Was an issue here the security surrounding the Norden sight. They were kept under lock and key with security as if they were nuclear isotopes. The US didnt want the British to see the Norden sight I am sure they didn't want the Germans to either,.



I thought we had a thread here where it was said that some of the German bombsights performed better than the Norden?


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## Milosh (Mar 13, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Wonder if the US bomber formations just got too large and unwieldy.
> To a point, growing formations in size to compensate for poor accuracy seems to make sense.
> But then growing them to a size that reduces accuracy seems counter-intuitive.
> I don't know if I'm articulating this well, but something just seems "off" about this technique.



Nice Wiki article
Combat box - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Milosh (Mar 13, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> I thought we had a thread here where it was said that some of the German bombsights performed better than the Norden?



There is a story that info stolen before the war on the Norden was used to develop the German Loft 7 bomb sight.


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## pbehn (Mar 13, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> I thought we had a thread here where it was said that some of the German bombsights performed better than the Norden?



That may be the case, hitting a battleship with a single massive bomb shows the British sights weren't shoddy either. I remember seeing a programme about the US bombardiers, after each mission the sight was removed and placed under lock an key in a restricted security area. The US didnt know the ins and outs of German design but felt they had a technical edge and wanted to protect it. I am sure by the end of the war the Germans had more norden sights than they could wave a stick at.


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## gjs238 (Mar 13, 2015)

Milosh said:


> Nice Wiki article
> Combat box - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



It seems they spent most of their time jiggering around between different formations to avoid flak and deal with interceptors.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 13, 2015)

Milosh said:


> There is a story that info stolen before the war on the Norden was used to develop the German Loft 7 bomb sight.



Spy Story

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## stona (Mar 14, 2015)

All Bomber Command's bombers carried a sight and bombardier. Most bombers used a Mk XIV bomb sight a version of which (T1) was manufactured for the British by Sperry in the US. In August 1943 the SABS MkIIa was developed and this was the 'precision' sight used by 617 squadron on its attacks on the Tirpitz and similar targets. Less than 1,000 of these were produced.

In early 1945 squadrons equipped with the Mk XIV achieved an average radial error of 195 yards, comparable to the Norden. The SABS gave an error of only 125 yards, better than the Norden which might explain why the RAF declined the Norden when it was offered, late war, by the Americans.

Cheers

Steve

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## gjs238 (Mar 14, 2015)

stona said:


> All Bomber Command's bombers carried a sight and bombardier. Most bombers used a Mk XIV bomb sight a version of which (T1) was manufactured for the British by Sperry in the US.
> 
> *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_XIV_bomb_sight
> This was a vector bombsight.*
> ...



Good stuff


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## gjs238 (Mar 14, 2015)

stona said:


> Or didn't understand that it was a primitive electro-mechanical computer to which SISO applied just as surely as it does to the machine I'm typing on now
> 
> If you programmed it wrongly or with the wrong information it could not possibly resolve the calculations correctly and the bombs would miss, potentially by a wide margin.
> 
> ...



From Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norden_bombsight

_In practice it was not possible to achieve this level of accuracy in combat conditions, with the average CEP in 1943 being 370 metres (1,200 ft). Both the Navy and Air Forces had to give up on the idea of pinpoint attacks during the war. The Navy turned to dive bombing and skip bombing to attack ships, while the Air Forces developed the lead bomber concept to improve accuracy. *Nevertheless, the Norden's reputation as a pin-point device lived on, due in no small part to Norden's own advertising of the device after secrecy was reduced during the war.*_


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## stona (Mar 14, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Is it possible (or fair to say) that US bombing efforts drew flak away from UK bombing efforts?



I've just been going through some of Harris' comments about German defences. He wrote, after the war, that German air defences_ "crumbled to pieces"_ in September 1944. In the last three months of 1944 flak downed an average of just 18 aircraft a month and the night fighter force 31.
There are many reasons for this but the redeployment of flak batteries may very well be one of them. In the case of the night fighter force it was a lack of experienced crews (1,295 night fighter aircrew were lost that year) and a lack of fuel (only 50 of the night fighter wing's nearly 1,000 aircraft were allowed to operate on most nights at the end of 1944).
You could argue that just as Bomber Command was on the verge of being able to resume daylight bombing due to the defeat of the Luftwaffe by their American colleagues it had finally managed to wrest control of the night skies from the Germans. You could also say that the Germans had given it up.
Cheers
Steve

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## Jabberwocky (Mar 14, 2015)

Derailing the flow of the conversation here, but I'd like to bring this vaguely back towards the original topic.

I don't know which fighter US crews hated, or even which of the main German fighters was more effective. 

However, there is a US document that is a post-war analysis of German gun-cam footage on attacks on the US heavies. It shows that the FW 190 was *VASTLY* more dangerous on any give attack run that any other piston or rocket powered fighter. Me-262s weren't considered - but the document covers the Bf 109, Me 110, Me 410 and Me 163, from what I can recall. 

I'm sure its still available online - I've posted it here a few times myself over the year - but I don't have it handy at the moment (old computer died about three or four months ago). 

From what I remember, for any given attack run, the FW 190 was much more likely to hit a heavy bomber, put many more rounds on target when it did hit and their attack runs were more likely to start fires on a bomber.

FW 190 pilots opened fire closer to bombers, made longer attack runs firing a lot more rounds and broke of their attacks closer to the bombers than any other German fighter type. 

Depending on the attack profile (front, rear, sides ect), I seem to recall the Fw 190 put anywhere from two to six times as many rounds on target per attack run as the Bf 109. 

Did that make it a more effective fighter? Yes, and perhaps no.

What's missing from this picture is a key piece of information - attacks per sortie per aircraft type. If a Bf 109 was much more likely to penetrate the escorts and make an attack, then it claws back much of the deficit to the FW 190. Given the FW 190's engine shortcomings above 24,000 ft, the Bf 109 might be a much more effective fighter at higher attitudes.

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## stona (Mar 15, 2015)

Jabberwocky said:


> FW 190 pilots opened fire closer to bombers, made longer attack runs firing a lot more rounds and broke of their attacks closer to the bombers than any other German fighter type.
> 
> Depending on the attack profile (front, rear, sides ect), I seem to recall the Fw 190 put anywhere from two to six times as many rounds on target per attack run as the Bf 109.



I'd love to see an explanation of this. 
With the exception of the 'Sturmgruppen' who did develop their own tactics, only possible due to the heavy armour their aircraft carried, all Fw 190, Bf 109 and other fighter pilots went to the same training schools, learnt the same tactics, and operated aircraft with broadly overall similar armament. There is an argument that the Bf 109s centreline cannon was part of a better armament arrangement than that of the Fw 190s.

The number of hits on target would be related to some extent to the fighter's armament, but much more to the ability of the pilot and there is no evidence that Fw 190 pilots were any better than Bf 109 pilots. The heavy 'Sturm Jager' interceptors probably did pose a greater threat than other fighters (including other Fw 190s) but they were also easy meat for the US escorting fighters.

A US bomber was probably more likely to be attacked by an Fw 190 (though I've not seen any statistical evidence for this) as often the Bf 109 units flew high cover for them for the same reason as the RAF tried, unsuccessfully, to have the Spitfire do for the Hurricane during the BoB. 

I think the question was answered some time ago. The most hated or feared interceptor was the one pointing its nose at you. Flak had a more insidious, psychological, effect.

Cheers

Steve


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## Koopernic (Mar 15, 2015)

Milosh said:


> There is a story that info stolen before the war on the Norden was used to develop the German Loft 7 bomb sight.



The designer of the Lotfe 7 was interrogated and in American Raiders Book by Wolfgang W.E. Samuel he said he only saw the plans after the Lotfe 7 was in service in 1942. The Germans did obtain Norden plans by espionage in an amateurish, wasteful and foolish operation that compromised an asset.

The ideas go back to,the Royal Navies Dreyer table, it's even more elaborate Pollen table and the USN own superb ford range keeper. The Germans had their own computers on ships as well such as the Bismarck K37 system.

There was nothing special or mysterious about the Norden. It used computational techniques used in naval gun fire, FLAK predictors and torpedo computers that go back to WW1. Certainly the U.S. stole a march on other nations by developing such a system for aircraft use many years earlier and then basing doctrine around it. The Germans had caught up by 1941 and by 1942 when the Lotfe 7 was in fairly wide use.

The Lotfe 7C the Germans used differed in having the computer and tracking optics integrated in one device making it more compact and easier to keep calibrated. It probably suited their smaller aircraft better. The bomb aimer sighted through a short periscope. You can see a flat piece of glass eg on the ventral gun bondola of the Ju 88 and other German bombers. I doubt it was more accurate but it supposedly had the slight advantage of being able to track at much greater angles thereby establishing actual ground speed earlier. There was a Lotfe 8 that was under priority development at the end of war, don't know what it added. The Norden eventually received attachments to allow bombing in shallow dives.

The Norden was an outstanding bomb sight. If there was no cloud cover results could be outstanding.

To,an extent it was an outstanding moral booster and piece of propaganda. 

The British generally did not use these kinds of sights because what they required was tracking the ground or target to establish wind drift which is no so practical at night.

Nevertheless their own version, the SABS Mk 2 worked well enough. When they hit the stationary Tirpitz with it in late 1944 from medium altitude it was actually a trivial target at around 900ft by 100ft (about 5% to 0.6%) for the altitudes in question.


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## mhuxt (Mar 15, 2015)

Had a quick check of the "Dresden flak had been transferred" thing. Frederick Taylor, Goetz Bergander, David Irving all say the city's heavy batteries had been transferred away by the time of the raid. (I know, I know, Irving, but he also cites the OKL order that stripped the batteries from Dresden and from other cities.)

Taylor points out that the batteries had also been transferred away from Chemnitz, giving the lie to the claims that the flak left Dresden because it was so unindustrialised as to be patently not worth attacking - Chemnitz was quite the opposite. He also notes that the flak defences of the Brux refinery had also been reduced from 260 to 160 guns during the same period. It seems much of the flak not only went to the eastern front, but also to Berlin and to the Ruhr.


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## gjs238 (Mar 15, 2015)

mhuxt said:


> Had a quick check of the "Dresden flak had been transferred" thing. Frederick Taylor, Goetz Bergander, David Irving all say the city's heavy batteries had been transferred away by the time of the raid. (I know, I know, Irving, but he also cites the OKL order that stripped the batteries from Dresden and from other cities.)
> 
> Taylor points out that the batteries had also been transferred away from Chemnitz, giving the lie to the claims that the flak left Dresden because it was so unindustrialised as to be patently not worth attacking - Chemnitz was quite the opposite. He also notes that the flak defences of the Brux refinery had also been reduced from 260 to 160 guns during the same period. It seems much of the flak not only went to the eastern front, but also to Berlin and to the Ruhr.



Now the question is, were the Allies aware of this via Ultra and/or other methods?


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## mhuxt (Mar 16, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Now the question is, were the Allies aware of this via Ultra and/or other methods?



Without wishing to start a slanging match / go too OT, it's an interesting question, though I suppose they would have been aware of the nightfighters at the Dresden airfield (Klotze?). The fact the latter were kept on the ground wasn't down to any action taken by the RAF. Also, didn't the USAAF come under attack from Fws on the following day's raid?


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## drgondog (Mar 16, 2015)

Stona - flak may have been more of a concern during the last days of the war in the ETO/MTO for some bomber crewmen - simply because the ability for German fighters other than 262s to penetrate the US escort was very rare.. but not for 1942 through 1944.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 16, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Was an issue here the security surrounding the Norden sight. They were kept under lock and key with security as if they were nuclear isotopes. *The US didnt want the British to see the Norden sight *I am sure they didn't want the Germans to either,.



iirc FDR gave the green light to share the norden with the soviets before he did the RAF. the us was trying to negotiate for bomber bases in the ussr. the soviets kept delaying the project but asked for the everything under the sky to show us good faith. one of the ( many ) things they asked for and got was the norden. in fact they rarely said no to uncle joe for some dumb reason. in the end the deal for bases proved a fiasco and should have been an eye opener for the us in regards to soviet strategy and tactics. 

back to the norden and bombing...did the lead of EACH bomber box initate the drop? if they all dropped on the mark of the very first bomber the bomds would drop several miles behind the lead. they would have to either have their own lead bomber or drop their load at a set number of seconds ( minutes ) after the lead so it could be concentrated instead of spread all over the countryside. what was the procedure if you were several flights behind the lead?

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## stona (Mar 16, 2015)

drgondog said:


> Stona - flak may have been more of a concern during the last days of the war in the ETO/MTO for some bomber crewmen - simply because the ability for German fighters other than 262s to penetrate the US escort was very rare.. but not for 1942 through 1944.



The USAAF was hardly active in 1942, the first mission wasn't until August 17th when 12 B-17s attacked Rouen. It wasn't until 27th January 1943 that a German target was attempted and that was Wilhelmshaven, not exactly a deep penetration raid. Nonetheless, as soon as heavily defended targets were attacked flak became a major factor and a major cause of losses and damage to 8th AF bombers. The statistics back this up.

As the 8th AF prepared to enter the fray in Europe it had only to look at the British figures for the last four months of 1941. Bomber Command was losing about 100 aircraft a month to flak, a substantial majority on soon to be abandoned daylight sorties. The Americans ignored these figures at their peril.

In August 1942, the month the 8th AF began its campaign in Europe, the RAF lost 48 aircraft to fighters and 36 to flak. The following month the figures were 36 and 55. This does not support the contention that flak was not a concern from 1942-44. 
The men who, on August 1st 1943, a year into the campaign, flew against the oil targets at Ploesti losing 54 of the 166 attacking aircraft, at least 41 to the flak, would agree.

Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Mar 16, 2015)

mhuxt said:


> Had a quick check of the "Dresden flak had been transferred" thing. Frederick Taylor, Goetz Bergander, David Irving all say the city's heavy batteries had been transferred away by the time of the raid. (I know, I know, Irving, but he also cites the OKL order that stripped the batteries from Dresden and from other cities.)



It's not surprising. In the last eight months of the war the Luftwaffe transferred 555 heavy and 175 medium/light flak batteries to the fighting fronts. In the period around the Dresden raids, between the end of January and February 6th 1945, the Luftwaffe transferred 327 heavy and 110 medium/light batteries to the eastern front alone. This represented 21% of the heavy and 16% of the medium/light guns protecting the Reich. At the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 whole areas of Germany were denuded of their ground based air defences to bolster the fighting fronts. It must be one reason that Harris noted the Luftwaffe's defences crumbling in the last three months of 1944.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Mar 16, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> iirc FDR gave the green light to share the norden with the soviets before he did the RAF. the us was trying to negotiate for bomber bases in the ussr. the soviets kept delaying the project but asked for the everything under the sky to show us good faith. one of the ( many ) things they asked for and got was the norden. in fact they rarely said no to uncle joe for some dumb reason. in the end the deal for bases proved a fiasco and should have been an eye opener for the us in regards to soviet strategy and tactics.



Ugg.
Amazing how when not in use, the US removed the Norden bombsights from the ships and kept them locked under guard, and the bombardiers were to destroy the bombsight if they landed/crashed in enemy territory.

Did the Soviets go through all that trouble with the Nordens they were entrusted with?


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 16, 2015)

_"Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side."_

Operation Frantic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Soviets probebly didn't see a Norden until mid/late 1944.

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## gjs238 (Mar 16, 2015)

FLYBOYJ said:


> _"Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side."_
> 
> Operation Frantic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> The Soviets probebly didn't see a Norden until mid/late 1944.



Hmm, maybe at that point in the game, perhaps Ambassador Harriman ought to have said:


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## stona (Mar 17, 2015)

Mmmmm! From Hansard, a record of the school boy antics of our venerable House of Commons.


_" Mr. Donner asked the Minister of Supply when the decision to sell the Rolls Royce Nene jet engine to the U.S.S.R. was taken; how many such engines have been sold to the U.S.S.R. and, separately, to Czechoslovakia or any other country under Soviet influence; at what price they were sold; and whether it is intended to make any further deliveries to these countries. 

§ Mr. Piratin 
On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker, I wish to ask your guidance with regard to the expression ‘to Czechoslovakia or any other country under Soviet influence,’ which is an imputation that that country is under Soviet influence. In view of the fact that we are constantly told by the Clerk at the Table that any statement contained in a Question must be a statement of fact, is the expression used in this Question in Order? 

§ Mr. Speaker 
I should have thought it was a statement of fact, and is, therefore, in Order. 

§ Major Guy Lloyd 
Further to that point of Order. Would it not have been much more accurate had the words "dominance and domination" been used instead of "influence"? 

§ Mr. Piratin 
The next time I wish to put down a Question about Greece, a number of which have been rejected by the Clerk at the Table—will it be in Order if I use the expression: "Greece under the domination of Britain and America"? 

§ Mr. Speaker 
Certainly not, because that is not a fact. 

§ Mr. Piratin 
Further to that point of Order—— 

§ Mr. Speaker 
This is not a point of Order but merely a political argument, which I think ought to stop. 

§ Mr. Piratin 
With great respect, Sir—— 

§ Mr. Speaker 
It is not a point of Order and I will not have it pursued. 

§ The Minister of Supply (Mr. G. R. Strauss) 
Messrs. Rolls Royce were given permission in September, 1946, to sell 10 Nene engines to Russia and in March, 1947, to sell a further 15. None has been sold to Czechoslovakia or to any other country which could be described as under Soviet influence. No further sales are contemplated. The selling price of the engines was fixed under a commercial contract. 

§ Mr. Donner 
But does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the sale of this particular engine to Russia saved that country years of research; and how does he justify that sale? 

§ Mr. Strauss 
As the hon. Member is probably aware, none of these engines was on the secret list. 

§ Sir Waldron Smithers 
In view of the rising tide of Communism, will the right hon. Gentleman give an undertaking that no more munitions of war of any kind will be sold, but all will be kept for defence purposes? Will he give that undertaking? 

§ Mr. Strauss 
That is a very broad question. As I said in reply to the Question put down, no further sales of this engine are contemplated. 

§ Sir W. Smithers 
I asked about all munitions of war. 

§ Mr. Edgar Granville 
Did I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that these engines were not on the secret list at the time of the sale? 

§ Mr. Strauss 
Yes, Sir. 

§ Commander Noble asked the Minister of Supply how many British jet engines have been supplied to the U.S.S.R.; and in which years. 

§ Mr. G. R. Strauss 
Fifty-five jet engines were supplied to the U.S.S.R. during 1947. 

§ Commander Noble 
Can the Minister say, in view of his statement that no further sales are contemplated the reason for this change of policy? 

§ Mr. Strauss 
One of the reasons is that we have not completed our inquiries. 

§ Mr. Blackburn 
Will my right hon. Friend make it quite plain that, so long as the present cold war continues, we have no intention whatsoever of supplying any kind of warlike materials either to the Soviet Union or to any of her satellites? 

§ Mr. Speaker 
This Question asks how many engines have been supplied, not about the cold war. "_

And we're worried about a bomb sight!

Cheers

Steve

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## drgondog (Mar 17, 2015)

stona said:


> The USAAF was hardly active in 1942, the first mission wasn't until August 17th when 12 B-17s attacked Rouen. It wasn't until 27th January 1943 that a German target was attempted and that was Wilhelmshaven, not exactly a deep penetration raid. Nonetheless, as soon as heavily defended targets were attacked flak became a major factor and a major cause of losses and damage to 8th AF bombers. The statistics back this up.
> 
> *Steve - strictly speaking the first 8th AF raid was AAF pilots flying RAF Bostons on an attack and both for them and the May 1943 introduction to B-26 combat ops would agree.
> 
> ...



If you look to August 17, October 10, October 14, 1943 - then Jan 29; Feb 22, 25; March 6, 8; April 13, 15, 24, 29, then May 8, 12, 19, 24, 27, 28, 29; June 20,21; July 7,21; Sept 11, 12, 27; Oct : Nov 26, 30; All High value targets, all heavily defended by both LW and AAA the losses to LW were 30 or more. The number of missions in which the loss totals for 8th BC between 20-29 are slightly more than the 28 named above.

However, missions to the same targets absent LW attacks were in the 0-4 range for losses and you would have to parse mid air collisions, weather related issues, mechanical failures against solely flak related and confirmed by MACR.

Flak was certainly respected, but you could assert that the attitude about flak is that 'it was impersonal', 'when your number is up - its up', 'it was scary' - but Fighters were personal, visibly and frequently deadly, and until US escorts intervened, persistent and relentless.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 17, 2015)

FLYBOYJ said:


> _"Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side."_
> 
> Operation Frantic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> The Soviets probebly didn't see a Norden until mid/late 1944.



i do not know when they got it. i assumed it was prior to the commencement of the frantic operations. it was in the book the poltava affair which my wife has long since hid beside the holy grail and the arc of the covenant in one of her cleaning whirlwinds. i will see if i can dig up more on it....

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## GrauGeist (Mar 17, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> i do not know when they got it. i assumed it was prior to the commencement of the frantic operations. it was in the book the poltava affair which my wife has long since hid beside the holy grail and the arc of the covenant in one of her cleaning whirlwinds. i will see if i can dig up more on it....


Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...


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## Glider (Mar 17, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> The designer of the Lotfe 7 was interrogated and in American Raiders Book by Wolfgang W.E. Samuel he said he only saw the plans after the Lotfe 7 was in service in 1942. The Germans did obtain Norden plans by espionage in an amateurish, wasteful and foolish operation that compromised an asset.


The Germans obtained the design for the Norden as it was being designed and had a complete working example before it was issued to the USAAF. It was tested against the German designs but the improvement was deemed insufficient to change their home grown designs.

The espionage was undertaken by an amateur but was not wasteful or foolish and didn't compromise an asset as he wasn't trained by the Germans.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 17, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...



i agree it is probably moot. all the same it still P!$$es me off that we would make a deal with stalin....all the while withholding it from churchill and the brits. if i am going to pick which of my allies i am going to be more open with and share technology in the spirit of cooperation and comradery its not going to be the soviets! then again maybe that is why i am not a politician.


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## gjs238 (Mar 17, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...



Yes, but the bombardiers were sworn to ensure that the Norden bombsight was destroyed.


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## gjs238 (Mar 17, 2015)

Glider said:


> The Germans obtained the design for the Norden as it was being designed *and had a complete working example* before it was issued to the USAAF. It was tested against the German designs but the improvement was deemed insufficient to change their home grown designs.
> 
> The espionage was undertaken by an amateur but was not wasteful or foolish and didn't compromise an asset as he wasn't trained by the Germans.



Where did the complete working example come from?
Did the Germans fabricate it from plans or acquire a US built one?


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 17, 2015)

I don't believe the German copy worked...


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## GrauGeist (Mar 17, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Yes, but the bombardiers were sworn to ensure that the Norden bombsight was destroyed.


Our crews were landing in what they thought was friendly, allied controlled territory. They had no idea that they would be interned and their aircraft confiscated.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 17, 2015)

are you sure that wasnt briefed well in advance? wasnt that one of the reasons they didnt go to russia on the doolittle raids? they wanted to keep soviet neutrality with japan to keep the lend lease shipping lanes open?

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## Glider (Mar 17, 2015)

The person responsible for the leaking of the secret for the Norden bombsight was Hermann Lang a German who moved to the USA in 1927. He worked as an inspector in the design studio and had access to some of the blueprints. He simply took them home and copied them. As he didn't have access to all the design drawings at any one time,, to get a full copy of the design took some time but eventually he did pass all the blueprints to the German authorities. 
It was built and test flown by the Germans and the summary was 'Flight testing of the apparatus showed that the principle realized in it worked satisfactorily for bombing'. However they were never able to match the accuracy claimed by the USAAF.

With hindsight I am not surprised about this as claims by many US manufacturers of all types of aviation material tended to be lacking in accuracy and high in anticipation.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 17, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> are you sure that wasnt briefed well in advance? wasnt that one of the reasons they didnt go to russia on the doolittle raids? they wanted to keep soviet neutrality with japan to keep the lend lease shipping lanes open?


The B-25 had no choice, it was either land there, land in Japanese occupied territory or ditch at sea. Fortunately, the 20 cent bombsight wasn't a high security item.

One of the B-29 bombers crashed in Soviet territory after the crew had bailed out, the other three landed for various reasons. However, the B-24s, B-17s not to mention RAF bombers in the ETO weren't in danger of violating the neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan...


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 17, 2015)

Glider said:


> The person responsible for the leaking of the secret for the Norden bombsight was Hermann Lang a German who moved to the USA in 1927. He worked as an inspector in the design studio and had access to some of the blueprints. He simply took them home and copied them. As he didn't have access to all the design drawings at any one time,, to get a full copy of the design took some time but eventually he did pass all the blueprints to the German authorities.
> It was built and test flown by the Germans and the summary was 'Flight testing of the apparatus showed that the principle realized in it worked satisfactorily for bombing'. However they were never able to match the accuracy claimed by the USAAF.



I think that was because they couldn't duplicate certain parts, they did not have all the blueprints needed.


Glider said:


> With hindsight I am not surprised about this as claims by many US manufacturers of all types of aviation material tended to be lacking in accuracy and high in anticipation.


I'm sure North American's marketing department were guilty of that when the P-51 was created...


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## pbehn (Mar 17, 2015)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I'm sure North American's marketing department were guilty of that when the P-51 was created...



The Mustang performed as it was supposed to being better than the P40 , I believe that P51 was assigned to Merlin engined variants of the Mustang in use by the US military.

If the P40 performed as some of its advertising blurb suggested the the LW would have surrendered in 1940.


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## gjs238 (Mar 17, 2015)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I think that was because they couldn't duplicate certain parts, they did not have all the blueprints needed.
> I'm sure North American's marketing department were guilty of that when the P-51 was created...



Duck and cover! I see some F-35 retalitation coming in!

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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 17, 2015)

pbehn said:


> The Mustang performed as it was supposed to being better than the P40 , I believe that P51 was assigned to Merlin engined variants of the Mustang in use by the US military.


 All true but still good for marketing


pbehn said:


> If the P40 performed as some of its advertising blurb suggested the the LW would have surrendered in 1940.


1939


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## GrauGeist (Mar 17, 2015)

Glider said:


> ...With hindsight I am not surprised about this as claims by many US manufacturers of all types of aviation material tended to be lacking in accuracy and high in anticipation.


What aircraft company didn't announce optimistic performance figures?

The U.S. manufacturers weren't the only ones...there's plenty of examples from every nation that produced an aircraft and tried to sell it to their government (or foreign governments too, for that matter)

I cannot think of any company that boasted "hey, our aircraft is a pile of crap and cannot fight it's way out of a wet paper bag!"

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## Koopernic (Mar 18, 2015)

Glider said:


> The person responsible for the leaking of the secret for the Norden bombsight was Hermann Lang a German who moved to the USA in 1927. He worked as an inspector in the design studio and had access to some of the blueprints. He simply took them home and copied them. As he didn't have access to all the design drawings at any one time,to get a full copy of the design took some time but eventually he did pass all the blueprints to the German authorities.
> It was built and test flown by the Germans and the summary was 'Flight testing of the apparatus showed that the principle realized in it worked satisfactorily for bombing'. However they were never able to match the accuracy claimed by the USAAF.
> 
> With hindsight I am not surprised about this as claims by many US manufacturers of all types of aviation material tended to be lacking in accuracy and high in anticipation.



The Germans were at that time one of the worlds most advanced manufacturing nations, they were capable of precision work. There is little doubt in my mind that they had the ability to both copy and replicate the manufacture of the Norden as well as come up with their own version according to their own independent design.

The big advantage of 'espionage' on the Norden was not leaning how it worked (that is relatively easy) nor is even learning how it was designed (the precision manufacture is very hard and one doesn't learn much from blue prints or stolen copies but the Germans were one of the few nations that had this level of ability). The advantage is simply learning what the Norden did and that the Americans had done it. That would be enough to inspire them to do the same. Knowing what the Norden was capable of is also helpful in understanding likely USAAF strategies and tactics. The designer of the Lotfe 7 even says he never saw a Norden till 1942 so its likely the Germans were heading in this direction anyway. There were whole departments in the armed services and defence ministries purely dedicated to developing gyroscopes and 'fire control'. The Germans set up a company to develop gyroscope technology called "Kresielgeraet" in the early 30s and they were extremely influential developing stabilisers for the German Navy, V2 guidance systems and essentially boot strapping the Soviet industry at the time of Nazi communist Collaboration.

After 1941 when the Germans started deploying the Loftfe 7 any secrecy on the Norden was probably completely wasted maybe only carried out as standard operation procedure. You maintain secrecy from the point of view of general discipline and policy, to create a culture of security. There may be greater secrets to maintain and banging on about the Norden creates a smoke screen. By 1942 even the Soviets had a wind corrected bomb sight in service.

For instance if the USA lost a F-14 Tomcat to the Ayotollah Khomeni or the then USSR in the 1970s/80s inspecting the Titanium wing box that made this aircraft possible doesn't matter at all unless you actually have someone able to fabricate that structure.

What is most interesting about the Norden, the Ford Range Keeper, the Mk 54 fire control system on US ships 5" turrets, the M7 director on AAA is the US was investing in fire control technology and it was ready and widely deployed by the time war broke out. Most of it I attribute to the US Navy. For instance it was the Navy that instigated the Norden. It failed only occasionally (eg US torpedos). The Germans and Japanese both turned out to have better optical technology but optical technology was not as decisive as radar linked into the fire control.

It's worth looking at how these computing bombsite came about.

Immagine the problem of a battle ship trying to hit another battleship 30km away. Its the same problems for AAA, torpedos etc.

The target ship is tracked optically in bearing and the range using a coincidence or stereoscopic range finder. The coordinates are now available as polar coordinates represented as shaft turns and are converted to Cartesian via trigonometric cams.

Mechanical computation is done as follows: addition and subtraction via differentials (as in a car) trigonometry and ballistics data via cams, multiplication/division via log/antilog cams and subtraction/addition.

Once in Cartesian coordinates tacho generators or mechanical subtraction measures the speed of the target. This data is then used to set up another computing element that can 'synthesise' the future position of the target given any time. Another section of the computer uses ballistics cams to estimate the flight time of the projectile for a given range. An estimate is made of where the projectile and target meet and if they don't the differences is fed through a couple of times until a solution was reached.

Another element was keeping track of the ship a separate system tracks the direction, speed and position of the ship. (One reason the Bismarck gunnery degraded is that with its rudder jammed the tracking system which relied on rudder position data didn't work)

The problem was the same for firing a big naval guns, firing a AAA gun with a burst time, firing a torpedo and also dropping a bomb via the Nordern, Lotfe 7 or SABS II.

You tracked the target to establish your relative movement against his.

I would assume that neither of these sights required 'tracking', it was optional. The wind drift could be entered manually in which case the long run up to target that the Norden was notorious for wouldn't be required.


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## stona (Mar 18, 2015)

mhuxt said:


> Had a quick check of the "Dresden flak had been transferred" thing. Frederick Taylor, Goetz Bergander, David Irving all say the city's heavy batteries had been transferred away by the time of the raid. (I know, I know, Irving, but he also cites the OKL order that stripped the batteries from Dresden and from other cities.)



If I could recommend one book to read about the raids on Dresden it would be Taylor's, though he is heavily influenced by Bergander. Bergander gives probably the most balanced German view of what happened, and he was there.

_"Even in war, the ends must relate to the means. Here, the means seemed wildly out of proportion to the ends. I will not say that Dresden should not have been bombed - it was a rail centre, and thus an important target. I will not say Dresden was an exceptional case as compared to other German cities. But I do not understand why it had to be done on such a huge scale. The only answer, I suppose, is that the allied policy of bombing had developed a dynamic of its own."_

He is entirely correct. In fact the allied bomber commanders were largely operating independently of their higher commands/SHAEF.

The attitude of the allied commanders must be remembered. Chester Hansen (an aide to Bradley) recalled a conversation among America's top soldiers in which Bradley suggested

_"...that it would be good to fight the Germans all the way to Berlin, to teach them the lesson of death or destruction they have carried to the world. Everyone is in hearty assent. I suggested to Bull [G-3 at SHAEF] that we bomb each town in our path, but 'Pinky' protested that this was not our way of waging war. Patton promptly declared that if it was necessary to have military objectives to bomb, he would declare every switchboard in every town a military objective. The need for harsh treatment of Germany is now more apparent than ever."_

These views were here expressed by American commanders, but they would have been absolutely shared by their British counterparts. Operation Clarion, a little remembered foot note to the aerial campaign launched in February 1945, would show how far the allies would go.

When these operations were carried out Nazi Germany and its people were still doing all they could to kill British and American people, together with millions of captive people, with all the means at their disposal. Max Hastings has written.

_"Some Germans today brand the bombing of their cities a war crime. This seems an incautious use of words. It is possible to deplore Harris' excesses without accepting that they should be judged in such emotive language. For all its follies and bloody misjudgements, the strategic air offensive was a military operation designed to hasten the collapse of Germany's ability to make war. It stopped as soon as Hitler's people ceased to fight. Most of Germany's massacres, by contrast, were carried out against defenceless people who possessed not the slightest power to injure Hitler's empire. They were murdered for ideological reasons, devoid of military purpose."_

He highlights an important distinction.

Steve

Edit: Clarion officially targeted German transport infrastructure, but it hit people who had never been bombed or strafed before. Many thousands of German civilians were killed. Even some involved in the planning, who had no sympathy for the Germans, had reservations. General Eaker feared that the operation, which was explicitly terroristic and designed to demonstrate the ability of the allies to strike at will in every corner of the Reich would demonstrate to the Germans that
_"we are the barbarians they say we are, for it would be perfectly obvious to them that this is primarily a large scale assault on civilians, as, in fact, it of course will be."_
General Arnold wrote a pencil note on a copy of the proposal for Clarion
_"This is the same old baby killing plan of the get rich quick psychological boys, dressed up in a new kimono."_
The operation went ahead anyway.

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## Glider (Mar 18, 2015)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I think that was because they couldn't duplicate certain parts, they did not have all the blueprints needed.
> I'm sure North American's marketing department were guilty of that when the P-51 was created...


They did have all the blueprints as he wasn't captured until much later in the war. As for my comment re the marketing, the B17C was supposed to be operational in the USAAF but when the RAF tried them there were a considerable number of basic problems and the P39 was a similar story.

As for the claimed accuracy of the Norden, if anyone ever did hit a pickle barrel from whatever height was claimed I will eat my hat.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2015)

Glider said:


> They did have all the blueprints as he wasn't captured until much later in the war.



I read somewhere that the Germans did not have access to the manufacture of certain components, therefore their "working model' never functioned as well as a regular production model.


Glider said:


> As for my comment re the marketing, the B17C was supposed to be operational in the USAAF but when the RAF tried them there were a considerable number of basic problems and the P39 was a similar story.


 For the B-17C, I think for what planners (and marketing folks) "thought" what high altitude air war would be, they believed the B-17C was "combat ready." As far as the P-39? Agree.


Glider said:


> As for the claimed accuracy of the Norden, if anyone ever did hit a pickle barrel from whatever height was claimed I will eat my hat.



Maybe a very large swimming pool. https://video.search.yahoo.com/vide...8ntk8t&age=1407021508&fr2=p:s,v:v&fr=sfp&tt=b


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## stona (Mar 19, 2015)

If you drop enough bombs then statistically one of them will hit that pickle barrel. It's why the huge strategic bombing forces were developed. Now a couple of bombers (along with all the other aircraft to protect them and supress defences) can be sent with guided munitions and be sure of hitting that power station/warehouse/factory/Chinese embassy/civil air raid shelter/armoured vehicle/sniper/'insurgent' on a motor cycle etc. Most collateral damage is due to intelligence and targeting failures rather than the inaccuracy of the ordnance. Of course an iron bomb today is just as inaccurate as an iron bomb seventy years ago; navigation has improved.
Cheers
Steve

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## stona (Mar 22, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Wonder if the bombing results/effectiveness actually differed between the two methods.
> It would seem that the bombs from the planes rearmost in the group would fall short?



The results certainly did differ. I've been looking into this because the British seem to have believed that the American system (bombing on the cue of the leader) gave a less concentrated pattern. American research contradicts this and shows why the USAAFs adopted the system.
Below is the most pertinent page from the October 1943 report of the 8th AF's Operational Research Section.






It was on this data that the decision to use a system of bombing on a lead ship was taken, and this became the standard practice for US Air Forces operating in the ETO, when attacking in formation. The reason for the substantial increase in accuracy were less clear, but the ORS took an educated guess at it anyway.






It is worth pointing out that even in the best case, getting about 1 in 4 bombs within 1000' of the aiming point, is not exactly dropping into a pickle barrel. Cases where no bombs fell within 1000' are discarded from this study 

Cheers

Steve

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