# Operational Differences: RAF Bomber Command & SAC



## Zipper730 (Apr 15, 2017)

I'm curious about the period between 1953 and 1968: The British first started fielding nuclear weapons in 1953, and the Korean War ended at this time, and in 1968, RAF Bomber Command became Strike Command.

Provided it's not classified or in some way an OPSEC violation: I'm curious how SAC and Bomber Command compared in terms of training, tour-length, fixation on safety, and provision for innovation.

SAC, for example encouraged little innovation at lower levels (squadron to air-wing level), employing heavy reliance on tactics being standardized. Everything was centralized out of Omaha such as targeting and planning, and overseas commanders ranging from squadron commanders, wing commanders, to numbered Air-Force units being little more than administrators, basically ensuring all the orders from Omaha are followed (in WWII, there were many operational commanders that had massive latitude to do things as they saw fit such as the 8th Air Force, the 15th Air Force, the 20th and 21st Air Force, as well as the 5th and 15th Air Force. The 5th and 15th even had depots to build their own drop-tanks).

There was also a fixation on safety, which limited effective training: Did these problems apply with RAF Bomber Command during these periods?


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## Zipper730 (Jul 3, 2017)

I'm just curious because SAC seemed to be highly dysfunctional by Vietnam and yet RAF Bomber Command seemed to have no difficulties...

I could be wrong of course


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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

Vietnam was a conventional war, SAC was a nuclear strike force. Sort of out of their element a little, they had to do some relearning, something no military establishment seems too good at.
When you're carrying nuclear weapons, you can't afford to have a causal attitude toward safety, SAC had enough close calls with nukes as it was.
The RAF surely had fewer incidents, maybe even none. Not much out there on Bomber Command's almost incidents with nukes . But they were only carrying a fraction of the number that SAC was carrying day after day.
And other than the very short Falklands war, what conventional war did the post WW2 RAF Bomber Command participate in ?

Sounds like a sort of apple to oranges comparison .

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## buffnut453 (Jul 3, 2017)

Well, there were the Avro Lincolns of Bomber Command that operated during the Malayan Emergency where they flew over 3,000 sorties over 7.5 years and dropping 500,000lb of bombs. Still nowhere near as much as the USAF in Vietnam...but hardly trivial, methinks.

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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

Was there even the remotest possibility that there might be any aerial opposition to those RAF Lincolns,or AA ?

I was never in SAC, but I was in TAC and stationed at a SAC base Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C., 
You wouldn't have to be present during many of their alerts, and witness their minimum interval take offs to see that they weren't overly concerned about safety.
Though they could be quite anal on following SOPs exactly, no excuses accepted .

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## buffnut453 (Jul 3, 2017)

Probably not much...perhaps some AAA. But that's not the question you asked. You asked if Bomber Command participated in any fighting and, yes, it did.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

I learn something every day on this forum, I knew the RAF used fighters to bomb insurgents in the Malay Emergency, but wasn't aware they used bombers as big as the Lincoln also. I wasn't trying to belittle the RAF.

The USAF's nuclear goofs got a lot of attention .
If the RAF had any incidents, they're not as well known.


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## Zipper730 (Jul 3, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> Vietnam was a conventional war, SAC was a nuclear strike force. Sort of out of their element a little, they had to do some relearning, something no military establishment seems too good at.


Technically, I was under the impression that (on paper at least) SAC's job was strategic bombing of either conventional and nuclear (once nukes became small enough for all bombers to carry, it was effectively a nuke force, but...)


> When you're carrying nuclear weapons, you can't afford to have a causal attitude toward safety


I wasn't talking about safely maintaining the nukes. That makes logical sense.


> You wouldn't have to be present during many of their alerts, and witness their minimum interval take offs to see that they weren't overly concerned about safety.
> Though they could be quite anal on following SOPs exactly, no excuses accepted .


That's the problem -- everything was almost scripted. 

Combat is chaotic and while it requires a battle-plan, any plan that is so excessively procedural there's little room for creativity, and to make it worse, almost all the planning was done up top with little planning at the squadron, wing, or numbered air-force units, it was pretty much all whipped up at SAC central.

I'm curious if Bomber Command was as anal and scripted so to speak


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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

You should realize to get a SAC base's alert bombers and tankers off the ground in a minimum time and not have a debacle requires a lot of practice, or a script.

A ballistic missile on it's way doesn't care if you're improvising or following SOPs.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 3, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> I learn something every day on this forum, I knew the RAF used fighters to bomb insurgents in the Malay Emergency, but wasn't aware they used bombers as big as the Lincoln also. I wasn't trying to belittle the RAF.



The Malayan Incident was pretty complex from an air participation perspective. We had Beaufighters, Brigands, Hornets and Venoms providing CAS with Lincolns and Canberras doing heavy bombing. There were also Mosquitos and, IIRC, Spitfires flying PR missions and Dakotas flying psyops equipped with loudspeakers playing messages to Communist groups hidden in the jungle). Whirlwinds were also used to airlift troops into remote jungle clearings and, along with Dragonfly helos, for casevac. In many respects, it was the Vietnam War in miniature, albeit without the air-to-air or SAM threat present in the latter conflict. This was due, in no small part, by the lack of an overland border between Malaysia and a supporting Communist nation (unlike Vietnam and China).

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## Zipper730 (Jul 3, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> You should realize to get a SAC base's alert bombers and tankers off the ground in a minimum time and not have a debacle requires a lot of practice, or a script.


True, but the range of tactics the crews were proficient in seemed rather limited. 

It would also appear that innovation was mostly left to those at the top: I'm not sure how this compared to Post-War Bomber Command, but in WWII, the Groups seemed to be almost individual fiefdoms, and in the heirarchy, seemed to rank somewhere between an air-group, and a numbered air-force. 

With SAC, the tactics pretty much were made almost totally at SAC central, not at the numbered AF units, or the air-wing level.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

I think you're putting the fault for SAC's less than successful use in the Vietnam war on the wrong people.

The crews, like most every other military in the world, followed the orders of those appointed to command them.
Whether they would have been proficient or not in other tactics is only guesswork on your part.

To blame the crews is doing them a grave injustice.


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## Robert Porter (Jul 3, 2017)

Keep in mind there was a lot more to SAC than bombers or missiles. While I was in from 1978 - 1982 our weapons storage areas often held Army nukes and even Navy nukes. We were tasked with not only maintaining the security of those weapons but also the transfer of said weapons to theater commanders as needed. Moving nukes across the country to and from weapons manufacturers sites and the various weapons storage areas as well as the missile field was a very demanding procedure. Warheads had a shelf life so they were often removed and replaced with newer or refurbished weapons. In addition to all of this there was a huge set of systems, codes, procedures, and processes around handling launch codes, access codes, transportation codes and convoys etc. 

The missile sites, (I worked on the Minute Man system) were also hugely complex and dispersed. Getting men and material to and from those facilities across civilian roads safely and securely was a logistical nightmare at times. A typical LCF hosted several security response teams, facilities maintenance, roving technical teams tasked with maintaining the missile sites and LCF as well as vehicles, and mundane tasks such as cooking and telephone service people, and people to mow the lawns and shovel or plow snow. 

SAC took operational and day to day security very seriously, at least while I was in, no one team or group was ever allowed access to a weapon on their own. Usually at least two separate groups were required to authenticate to gain access. No Lone Zones were enforced at gunpoint and warnings were not, officially, given. (I learned how to communicate a great deal in a forced cough or clearing of my throat.) Prominent Use of Deadly Force Authorized signs were everywhere. 

Just as an example, while traveling civilian roads we were of course subject to civilian laws, at least when not accompanying an actual weapon. But, if we were detained or arrested we were expressly forbidden to surrender our arms to civilian authority. More than one Security Response Team found itself in a local lockup fully armed awaiting someone from base to arrive. Some of the towns and areas where missiles were deployed did not look favorably on the USAF making them a high priority target. This resulted in sometimes strained relationships with local law enforcement.

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## Zipper730 (Jul 3, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> I think you're putting the fault for SAC's less than successful use in the Vietnam war on the wrong people.
> 
> The crews, like most every other military in the world, followed the orders of those appointed to command them.


Hey... I'm not dumping on the crews: I'm criticizing the policy.




Robert Porter said:


> Keep in mind there was a lot more to SAC than bombers or missiles. While I was in from 1978 - 1982 our weapons storage areas often held Army nukes and even Navy nukes.


Really? I would have thought that would have been solely the USN or US Army's responsibility...


> Warheads had a shelf life so they were often removed and replaced with newer or refurbished weapons.


Yeah, I remember somebody making a comment about a 25 year service life.


> SAC took operational and day to day security very seriously, at least while I was in, no one team or group was ever allowed access to a weapon on their own. Usually at least two separate groups were required to authenticate to gain access. No Lone Zones were enforced at gunpoint and warnings were not, officially, given. (I learned how to communicate a great deal in a forced cough or clearing of my throat.) Prominent Use of Deadly Force Authorized signs were everywhere.


Makes enough sense.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

When at Seymour Johnson, the bomb dump I worked in was adjacent to the SAC nuclear storage area, almost shared a fence with them, but there was a space of about 10 feet between fence lines. But being so close, even our bomb dump was a No Lone Zone too..

The nuclear shapes were stored in our storage area though. 
Nuclear shapes were dummy nuclear bombs, inert, but the same size, weight, and balance as the real deal. Used for practice loading, and handling by the SAC crews. They were never touched by us, just the slightest flaw on their immaculate white paint would indicate somebody messed up during the loading or handling. Asses would get chewed, at the minimum, and the shape would be stripped and repainted by the guilty. They'd use our air compressor, spray guns, and maintenance bay. One time I saw a Cpt. in the repainting crew.

If they were that particular with those inert training shapes, I would think they could give new meaning to anal when they were handling the real thing.

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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> True, but the range of tactics the crews were proficient in seemed rather limited.
> 
> .


I considered that to be a criticism of the crews.


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## Zipper730 (Jul 3, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> I considered that to be a criticism of the crews.


Only because they weren't trained right. That's a policy matter...


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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

What tactics were they not proficient in ?


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## Zipper730 (Jul 3, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> What tactics were they not proficient in ?


They seemed to use a fairly narrow range of maneuvers from what I remember reading. The Avro Vulcan crews seemed to better mix it up, though I could be wrong about range of maneuvers.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 3, 2017)

Your answer tells us nothing.
Could you be a little more specific, more details.


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## stona (Jul 4, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> The USAF's nuclear goofs got a lot of attention .
> If the RAF had any incidents, they're not as well known.



In the case of the RAF the information is probably locked away marked 'Secret' for the next 100 years at least. Freedom of information here isn't quite what it is in the US 
Cheers
Steve

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## Robert Porter (Jul 4, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Really? I would have thought that would have been solely the USN or US Army's responsibility...


The policy of who controlled the weapons was under constant review and change. But as SAC had extensive facilities for safe and secure storage they tended to handle weapons for all branches. Mostly overseas, but even here in the states. Not all weapons of course, as some were always forward deployed. It was and is US policy to not ever acknowledge if a weapon is forward deployed or not. Has caused issues with port visits by US vessels that are capable of deploying special weapons.


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## Robert Porter (Jul 4, 2017)

Zipper I would be interested in what procedures you felt US crews were undertrained in or where we failed to "mix it up". The number and type of scenarios that were routinely trained for was pretty extensive as I recall, especially for flight line crews and air crews. Missile crews were rather more constrained as the mission there was fairly well defined, at least the strategic side, the tactical side of course also had an extensive play list to consider that was a lot more variable.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 4, 2017)

Comparing the maneuvers the 200,000 lb. Vulcan could do with what the 488,000 lbs. B-52 could manage would fit into my definition of a apples to oranges comparison.

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## Robert Porter (Jul 4, 2017)

Agreed, not to mention in the timeframe Zipper was questioning the B-58 Hustler was active. But I truly do not understand what basis he was using for comparison? Each Air Force had different planes, and in most cases different mission criteria. An aircraft attacking the USSR from the US would be configured very differently than even the same aircraft flying from the UK.


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## stona (Jul 4, 2017)

The two forces operated entirely different systems, mainly due to geography. If we could establish the hours for which aircraft of the two forces had flown carrying nuclear weapons, the UK number would be vanishingly small compared to that for the US

As far as accidents go, and this is not really my field, I am unaware of the British government ever admitting to an accident involving a nuclear weapon, whether in the hands of the RAF or Navy. The US has had thousands of operational nuclear devices in it's arsenal at a given time, the British probably less than 200 (and that number may be a bit high), so statistically we are far less likely to have encountered problems.

Cheers

Steve


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## Zipper730 (Jul 5, 2017)

stona said:


> In the case of the RAF the information is probably locked away marked 'Secret' for the next 100 years at least. Freedom of information here isn't quite what it is in the US


I had a hunch that was the case, though I figured it was around 60-70 years.


> The two forces operated entirely different systems, mainly due to geography.


When you say different systems, I assume you mean the way things were done?


> If we could establish the hours for which aircraft of the two forces had flown carrying nuclear weapons, the UK number would be vanishingly small compared to that for the US


Makes sense, especially prior to 1968...



Robert Porter said:


> The policy of who controlled the weapons was under constant review and change. But as SAC had extensive facilities for safe and secure storage they tended to handle weapons for all branches. Mostly overseas, but even here in the states.


Fascinating


> Has caused issues with port visits by US vessels that are capable of deploying special weapons.


Like that case where a nuke fell off an A-4 in Japanese waters.


> Zipper I would be interested in what procedures you felt US crews were undertrained in or where we failed to "mix it up".


It seemed tactics were dictated from the top. Not from the squadron or wing level.



tyrodtom said:


> Comparing the maneuvers the 200,000 lb. Vulcan could do with what the 488,000 lbs. B-52 could manage would fit into my definition of a apples to oranges comparison.


That wasn't the point, the Vulcan was way more nimble. What I was getting at was the crews seemed to have more latitude to create and implement tactics.


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## Robert Porter (Jul 5, 2017)

As far as disputed port calls went, at various times New Zealand and Japan among others demanded to know if Navy vessels coming to their ports carried nuclear weapons aboard. The US refused to confirm or deny the presence of such weapons on any vessel in accordance with policy. It resulted in certain countries/ports being out of bounds for port calls now and then.

As far as tactics being developed from the top, yes they are. However like any other first rate service suggestions from any valid source were taken into consideration and sometimes incorporated. But no nuclear capable country would want "loose canon's" deciding on the spur of the moment how to implement tactics with such weapons. At the same time each aircraft commander was of course given considerable latitude on how to achieve their mission once committed. So I again fail to understand what you were referring to. 

The US is usually known among foreign services as the service with the most latitude in even day to day operations. RAF and RN forces when touring American counterparts often remarked on the lack of strict discipline and protocol etc. Conversely American staff, especially Navy, were often surprised at the rigor with which British vessels were run, not to mention the availability of alcohol for crew onboard.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2017)

I would note that aircraft in the 1950s and 60s were much more complex and often operating closer to the edge in even "routine flying"
than most WW II aircraft. Really low level high speed flight can shorten an airframes life expectancy by a factor of 10. Most Squadron or wing pilots/officers don't have access to the factory engineering studies and the culture had progressed well beyond the flog it until it breaks in squadron service , way too many planes and pilots had been lost in the late 40s and early 50s for that type of nonsense to continue. Squadron pilots are not test pilots. 

Flying low level at 600mph is a lot more dangerous than flying at 350-400mph at the same altitudes simply due to obstacles showing up much quicker. 

_Innovations in tactics _(maneuver limits, speed at altitude/mach limits) need to be checked with the manufacturers and national test agencies rather than adopted by individual squadrons. Jets tend not to dead stick land very well so blowing up engines was also frowned upon. 
F-84 from the other thread had a landing speed/approach speed of 160mph compared to a Mustangs 120mph. later jets got even worse. 
Big bombers are expensive, and it is shear coincidence/good luck that the B-52 was adaptable to low level flying. The wing flex allowed for low level flight at a G level in cockpit that some other bombers could not match although at the cost of high airframe fatigue. Some bombers with stiffer wings had a much rougher ride in the cockpit on the same mission and the crews would suffer too much from fatigue to reliably complete the mission.

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## pbehn (Jul 5, 2017)

Further to SRs excellent post I would add that the issues of fatigue on airframes was relatively new. Ultrasonic testing, dye penetrant testing of new and in service parts was being developed as was cyclical testing of materials. The people designing the aircraft were finding out what they could do and how long they could last. The terminology used by SR is post war, I have not read about wing flex and its effects on Lancaster aircrews, The Americans and British ran into these problems in less time than many have been contributing to this forum.

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## Zipper730 (Jul 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I would note that aircraft in the 1950s and 60s were much more complex and often operating closer to the edge in even "routine flying" than most WW II aircraft.


They were often more difficult to fly...


> _Innovations in tactics _(maneuver limits, speed at altitude/mach limits) need to be checked with the manufacturers and national test agencies rather than adopted by individual squadrons.


Yes, but provided the pilots are provided with the known limits, they can create tactics within them...


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## tyrodtom (Jul 5, 2017)

Where do you get the information that tactics were decided at the squadron, or wing level by the RAF ? Even during WW2 ?

Tactics might be suggested at squadron, or wing level, but are decided at higher, probably the highest level, British or American.

When you've got a lot of targets, and a lot of aircraft to control, coming from a lot of different locations, you have to have a centralized command, otherwise you'll have some hitting the same target, or flight paths to and from interfering .
Then with modern aircraft you got the added complication of aerial refueling, to and from the target, by tanker aircraft stationed maybe at other bases other than the aircraft themselves.

One B-52 could carry 70,000 lbs of conventional bombs, in other words just one 3 plane cell of B-52s drops over 100 tons of bombs. Do you think a squadron commander can just call up San Francisco, and order another ship load of bombs ?

I remember how hard we worked just keeping up with what a A1, and A-26s could go through at NKP, 50 truck convoys to unload and store every week when things were busy. I hate to think what the guys at Guam and Sattahip were going through to keep those B-52s supplied.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> They were often more difficult to fly...
> Yes, but provided the pilots are provided with the known limits, they can create tactics within them...


They were provided with known (or approved) limits. they are in the flight manuals. what was unknown was the fatigue problems with low level flight on airframe life. The Bumpy ride at low level showed up real quick and high wing load aircraft were much smoother at low level as a generalization. The B-52s flexible wing did help smooth things out better than a large delta wing. B-58 was small compared to Avro Vulcan. It took awhile for the idea that could NOT evade missiles by flying a little faster and little higher to really sink in and low level attacks to become the preferred method.

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## Robert Porter (Jul 5, 2017)

Zipper I have to say you are leaving me baffled. What makes you think pilots don't innovate tactics within their envelopes? An aircraft commander on a war mission would of course innovate as necessary to accomplish his assigned mission. This has been true as long as man has flown. American pilots were not under some kind of constraint system other than get it done. If that meant flying upside down at street level they would. Silly example I know but I truly am not understanding where or even what you are alluding to?


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## Robert Porter (Jul 5, 2017)

Also please keep in mind, nuclear strikes were not done in formation. It was a very different mission than those over Vietnam or earlier in WW2 or Korea. Nuclear strikes were often single or at most two ship strikes at a specific series of targets. The attacking aircraft dispersed to hit multiple targets. Also tactics were constantly changing as perceived threats changed. High level was largely abandoned in favor of low level nape of the earth attacks. Especially after Colman's U2 was shot down.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 5, 2017)

F.G. Powers U2 was shot down over Russia, And R. Anderson's U2 was shot down over Cuba.

Who's Colman ?


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## Robert Porter (Jul 5, 2017)

LOL I have no idea where I pulled Colman from I meant Powers!


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## tyrodtom (Jul 5, 2017)

I think there's a Coleman in the U2 rock group .

Francis Gary Powers was from my hometown .


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## buffnut453 (Jul 5, 2017)

There are tactics, there are techniques and there are procedures. The handling of nuclear weapons fell entirely into the latter category for entirely logical safety reasons - you want the handling of such weapons to be entirely repeatable and auditable. Tactics are an entirely different issue and the operational delivery of such weapons falls firmly into that category. Please let's not mix apples and oranges...or if we are, can we add strawberries and make a nice fruit salad?


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## tyrodtom (Jul 5, 2017)

What exactly do you mean by tactics Zipper730 ?
The speed you approach the target ? Altitude ? Drop height ? Direction you approach from ? Weapon dropped ? Supporting aircraft ? Target selection ? What ?

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## wuzak (Jul 6, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> What exactly do you mean by tactics Zipper730 ?
> The speed you approach the target ? Altitude ? Drop height ? Direction you approach from ? Weapon dropped ? Supporting aircraft ? Target selection ? What ?



What music should be played in the cockpit. 

I believe the general system was a rotation between the various crew members as to whose turn it was to pick.


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## Robert Porter (Jul 6, 2017)

wuzak said:


> What music should be played in the cockpit.
> 
> I believe the general system was a rotation between the various crew members as to whose turn it was to pick.


Ah yes, well in that case Zipper is correct, the RAF had a much larger selection of inflight music than the USAF. It was not until the late 90's with the release of Pandora that the USAF reached parity with the RAF on that score.

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## buffnut453 (Jul 6, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> Ah yes, well in that case Zipper is correct, the RAF had a much larger selection of inflight music than the USAF. It was not until the late 90's with the release of Pandora that the USAF reached parity with the RAF on that score.



Not only a larger selection, but better quality too...Beatles, The Who, Rolling Stones, Bowie. 

Also, was there a moratorium within the USAF on SAC crews playing country music? I mean, really, as if dropping nukes wasn't depressing enough...

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## fubar57 (Jul 6, 2017)

As long as it wasn't, "♪When Johnny Come Marching Home♫"....*that outta keep you guys busy for a while*

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## pbehn (Jul 6, 2017)

Bomber command pilots and navigators had a huge degree of latitude up to the meeting point of the mission, after that the protection of all depended on the bomber stream. Some flew and circled in the North sea others flew over Wales their only requirement was to be at a certain place at a certain time and altitude.


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## Zipper730 (Jul 7, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> Where do you get the information that tactics were decided at the squadron, or wing level by the RAF?


It seemed that the Group level seemed to decide the tactics and weapons delivery methods in WWII with the RAF (at least Bomber Command). The bombing methods were often quite different.

For example 5 Group would usually use a sector-bombing (at least that's what I think it's called) whereby entire squadrons (and presumably whole formations) would basically use the baseline heading chosen from a reference point and alter their course a certain number of degrees (with the idea that each airplane is about 2 degrees apart from every other) producing a 32 degree wide fan of devastation.


> Tactics might be suggested at squadron, or wing level, but are decided at higher, probably the highest level, British or American.


Even if the range of tactics are dictated from the highest levels, SAC didn't appear to be all that receptive to this -- it seemed by in large that LeMay picked people (admittedly those he felt were best) and got them all together in Omaha and had them dictating tactics and plans from there.

While there were certainly people at the numbered AF units that were quite capable and creative, almost everything seemed to come down the line from SAC HQ, and not going up from any of the following levels: Squadron, Air Wing, Air Division, Numbered Air Force.


> When you've got a lot of targets, and a lot of aircraft to control, coming from a lot of different locations, you have to have a centralized command, otherwise you'll have some hitting the same target, or flight paths to and from interfering.


Which is useful for basically one type of mission

SIOP: An all out annihilating strike on much of the enemy nation, and possibly several, all at once, or at least within a few hours; then a few more strikes over the next few days to just wipe out whatever is left.

This type of attack would be fine from SAC HQ because of the massive scope of the operations, the need for precise timing, and things of that sort: It would still be foolish to not encourage creativity at the squadron, air-wing, air-division, and numbered AF levels. They are under no obligation to accept the ideas, but it would be foolish to not listen to at least the ideas that have some merit, whether it be a Major or Lieutenant Colonel who commands a squadron, to Colonel in charge of an Air Wing, to a General Officer in charge of a numbered AF.

Even strategic bombing doesn't require that degree: This is generally a theater level operation (say Pacific, South Pacific, Northern Europe), and usually can be controlled at the numbered AF level. A good leader delegates without micromanaging, particularly if he has competent subordinates.


> One B-52 could carry 70,000 lbs of conventional bombs, in other words just one 3 plane cell of B-52s drops over 100 tons of bombs.


When did payload increase to 70,000 pounds? The Big Belly allowed 84 x 500 pounds of bombs (42000), and 24 x 750 pounds (18000) of bombs... where did the other 10,000 go?


> What exactly do you mean by tactics Zipper730 ?
> The speed you approach the target ? Altitude ? Drop height ? Direction you approach from ? Weapon dropped ? Supporting aircraft ? Target selection ? What ?


Mostly the types of maneuvers used: There's almost never one good maneuver because if it's done over and over again, it becomes procedure. Even the D-21 drone could use 1 of 8 different pre-programmed maneuvers if engaged (it would respond when it was locked on to).



Shortround6 said:


> They were provided with known (or approved) limits.


Of course, but there should be a degree of ability, depending on mission (some missions have to be flown with extreme exactitude, others depend on flexibility and adaptability) to adapt on the fly.

The problem with approved limits is the degree to which they compare with the actual plane's capability: The RAF for example told the Vulcan crews there was a normal airspeed it was safe to fly at down-low, but there was a "one off" speed, which basically means "we did this at least once before the wings came off, so only do this one if you're going to die anyway because you might if you do it".


> what was unknown was the fatigue problems with low level flight on airframe life.


I assume they came up with rules of thumb right?


> The Bumpy ride at low level showed up real quick and high wing load aircraft were much smoother at low level as a generalization.


The F-105 and F-104 are great examples of this


> It took awhile for the idea that could NOT evade missiles by flying a little faster and little higher to really sink in and low level attacks to become the preferred method.


Truthfully, it's a bit more complicated than that: There seemed to be some people at SAC even in the early 1960's that seemed to be okay with high-level attacks. I'm guessing some felt the SA-2 was the ultimate weapon from which there was no escape, and others felt (or knew) that it had limits of various sorts and that it was possible to use ECM to shake them loose.

I'm not sure exactly who knew what and when, but when it came to secrecy and classification, it was crazy how much usable intelligence they would just sit on: Data that was often available in WWII (we often knew where fighter-planes were forming up, so we sent fighters over to bust them up as they were in the process of forming up) was used more liberally... you don't have to tell people the methods of collection (that would be kind of stupid actually), you just have to tell them what they need to know to execute their mission.

What's the point in collecting all this intelligence if you have no plan to ever use it?



Robert Porter said:


> Zipper I have to say you are leaving me baffled. What makes you think pilots don't innovate tactics within their envelopes? An aircraft commander on a war mission would of course innovate as necessary to accomplish his assigned mission.


I guess there are some statements about SAC that aren't entirely flattering. One would hope they would be good at quick adaptation on the fly.


> Also please keep in mind, nuclear strikes were not done in formation. It was a very different mission than those over Vietnam or earlier in WW2 or Korea.


That I'm aware of. One major problem with SAC was that they were so geared for nuclear war that they were not equipped for anything else.

Early on, that wasn't as big a deal as nuclear weapons were huge and only a few bomber types could carry them (B-29, B-50, B-36, B-47, and the B-45 was technically supposed to, but couldn't), which was mostly from 1945 to Korea. This meant that conventional bombing was going to be an inevitability to some extent.

During the Korean War era, the bombs got smaller, and it wasn't long that pretty much every single aircraft in the inventory could carry them. This pretty much meant that conventional bombing could be argued as not being important (clearly not entirely accurate), and the USAF operated on the attitude that they'd never fight a conventional war again (even though the guys in TAC were fully expecting to fight conventional and nuclear wars). 

The New Look Policy also called for an overwhelming response: Though it would seem that politicians and the USAF top brass saw things differently.

Politicians Saw

If USSR rolls into Berlin, a massive battle would start, that if not arrested immediately, would turn into a nuclear exchange.
If the USSR is seen lining up huge amounts of bombers on the air-fields: We either will launch our bombers first to bomb them back to the stone-age, or reserve the right to do so.
If the enemy does use a nuke on us or any of our allies: We will bomb them back to the stone age
USAF Top Brass Saw

If the USSR does anything that indicates aggression: We bomb them back to the stone age
If the USSR does anything aggressive: Regardless of the infraction, we will bomb them back to the stone-age (unless our dumb-ass politicians stop us).
Admittedly, I suppose one could simply accuse the USAF of taking the term "overwhelming response" very very literally: Considering the doctrine that the USAF operated under (which was based on Giulio Douhet, and was heavily predicated on the notion of a first strike -- probably on reason why they failed to realize how effective fighters would be against them), it should not have been a surprise. 

Probably important to ensure that you make sure your own guys understand the difference between listed and actual policy (even if you have to tell them in secret meetings in secret locations).


> Also tactics were constantly changing as perceived threats changed. High level was largely abandoned in favor of low level nape of the earth attacks.


Actually all the way into 1962, there were tests done to evaluate penetrating up high. The idea involved what was called a "basketweave" attack. If I recall, it involved massive amounts of aircraft using a multitude of dog-legs and course-changes, along with ECM, chaffing (along with the assistance of specialized jammer aircraft), to just overwhelm enemy air-defenses.

It seems that a major flaw in the USAF developments prior to Vietnam was the failure to develop in a practical way, anti-radiation missiles. This is from somebody I know online, though I was provided sources to comb through myself (designation-systems.net)

The USAF developed an ARM called the GAM-67 Crossbow: It was based on a drone, and was subsonic.
While the USAF developed a more advanced drone and ARM, the USN developed the ASM-N-8 Corvus
The Corvus was supersonic, was 950 pounds lighter, 13-inches smaller in diameter, a little over 4 feet shorter in length, and almost 7'8" shorter in span: The weight and dimensions would have made it adaptable to a larger range of aircraft, and while it's range was shorter (175 nm vs 260-300 nm) than the GAM-67, the range is still outside that of the SA-2 (as well as the SA-5 Griffon, an ABM concept, and the SA-5 Gammon, though marginally: The range of both is around 300 km or 161.74 nm).
The USAF asserted control over long-ranged weapon systems (which it was technically authorized to do); then decided that it didn't need the missile (which was stupid) as the missile was already undergoing testing.
The USAF admittedly did plan to develop more bombers in the form of the XB-68, which never materialized...


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## tyrodtom (Jul 7, 2017)

The B-52, H or G had a 70,000 payload capacity, but not enough room even with external racks for 70,000 lbs of 500 and 750 bombs.

But the rest of that 10,000 lbs could easily been taken up by the racks added for all those small bombs.
But you don't normally drop the racks, unless you've got a hung bomb.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 7, 2017)

Zipper 730 you post as if SAC was one unchanging military organization .
It's older than the USAF. The SAC of the late 40's and early 50's is different from the SAC of later 50's, 60's , 70's and so on.
Curtis Lemay had a heavy influence on SAC, though he was only at it's head from 1948-57, and then USAF COS from 61-65, but his influence probably lasted far beyond that. 

You seem to be centering on SAC less than fully successful use in Vietnam, though it's use late in the war almost surely encouraged the North Vietnamese they'd better negotiate a peace with us.
That worked for us, but not so well for the South Vietnamese.

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## Zipper730 (Jul 7, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> The B-52, H or G had a 70,000 payload capacity, but not enough room even with external racks for 70,000 lbs of 500 and 750 bombs.


If I recall, the -G's originally had a much smaller load (13,500 internal, 18,000 external): This might have been increased with time. I don't know about the -H. I did make a basic estimate on payload and drop-tanks and got a number over 70,000 for that to work.


> Zipper 730 you post as if SAC was one unchanging military organization .


Well, I'm glad somebody got what I was trying to say!


> It's older than the USAF.


Correct, it was started in 1946 and was during the final days of the USAAF.


> The SAC of the late 40's and early 50's is different from the SAC of later 50's, 60's, 70's and so on.


Well SAC from 1946-1948 was different from SAC of 1948-1972...


> Curtis Lemay had a heavy influence on SAC, though he was only at it's head from 1948-57, and then USAF COS from 61-65, but his influence probably lasted far beyond that.


Yes, ironically LeMay's impact on SAC was due to it's lack of functionality from 1946-1948: I'm not sure why it got so dysfunctional, other than General Kenney pushing for the creation of the USAF.

Still, you'd be under the assumption that he'd put his second in command in charge while he was in front of Congress.


> You seem to be centering on SAC less than fully successful use in Vietnam


It showed the most obvious problems with SAC. At least in Korea, SAC had to hand over it's bombers to the Far East Air Forces.


> though it's use late in the war almost surely encouraged the North Vietnamese they'd better negotiate a peace with us.


Yes it did, but ironically, [url="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/08/12/george-will-confirms-nixons-vietnam-treason"]it wasn't necessary[/URL]: He short-circuited a cease-fire negotiation back in 1968 to get into office.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 7, 2017)

It's foolish to imply any organization doesn't change over time. 
No group of people working together stays the same.

The USAF changed in the 4 years I was in it from 65-69. The US Army changed even more from 69 -73 .
I've worked with groups of people over 60 years, they all change.

But SAC stayed the same ! 
Nope, not buying that argument.


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## Zipper730 (Jul 7, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> It's foolish to imply any organization doesn't change over time.
> No group of people working together stays the same.


Okay, but they didn't change very much.

It seemed the following all changed more

US Army
USAF: Tactical Air Command
US Naval Aviation
USAF Overseas Commands


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## parsifal (Jul 7, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> The RAF surely had fewer incidents, maybe even none. Not much out there on Bomber Command's almost incidents with nukes . But they were only carrying a fraction of the number that SAC was carrying day after day.
> And other than the very short Falklands war, what conventional war did the post WW2 RAF Bomber Command participate in ?
> 
> Sounds like a sort of apple to oranges comparison .


no, the british 9and presumably its air force has been engaged in near continuous warfare since 1945. 

*Greek Civil War** (1944-1947)--*British forces became involved in the early stages of the Greek Civil War when they liberated Greece from German occupation toward the end of 1944. As the Germans withdrew, competing Greek factions fought for control. The British sided with the re-established Greek government against the Communist rebels. Due to financial pressures and their own need to recover from World War Two, Britain announced a withdrawal of forces in 1947. The Greek Civil War continued until 1949, with the United States taking over the role of protector for the government. British combat involvement primarily took place in 1944 and 1945.

*Palestine*- *(1945-1948)*-Following World War Two, Jewish forces in Palestine battled both the British troops occupying Palestine, and the local Palestinian Arab militias for control of the country.

*War in Vietnam (1945-1946)*- Codenamed Operation Masterdom by the British, and also known as the Southern Resistance War by the Vietnamese. this short, but violent conflict pitted British, Indian, French, and Japanese troops agaisnt the local communist guerrillas who had resisted the Japanese, called the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh resisted the return of their French rulers and the British and Indian troops who protected them. The Japanese troops, who were still in Vietnam waiting to be sent home, were drafted by the Western Allies to help fight the communists. British combat lasted about six months, from when they arrived in Saigon in September, 1945, until they turned things over to French forces and withdrew in March, 1946.

*Indonesian Revolution (1945-1946)*- Similar to the situation in Vietnam, British troops were tasked with re-occupying Japanese-held Indonesia until the Dutch colonial administration could resume rule. The nationalist Indonesian forces resisted a return to colonial rule, and launched attacks against British, Dutch and Japanese troops (who, like in Vietnam, had been drafted into service by the Allies). British forces withdrew when the Dutch were able to return in force. British involement in this Indonesian war was from late September, 1945, until November, 1946.

*Malayan Emergency*-*(1948-1960)*-British forces battled local communist guerrillas in Malaya.

*Korean War*-*(1950-1953)*-The UK joined in the American-led UN effort to defend South Korea from North Korea and China.

*Anglo-Egyptian War of 1951-1952 (1951-1952)--*Egyptian guerrillas, aided by the government carried out a campaign against British forces stationed at the Suez Canal and against other symbols of Britain and the West. On January 25, 1952, British troops retaliated against Egypt by attacking an Egyptian police station, killing 50 and wounding 100. The conflict ended with a change in the Egyptian government and the eventual withdrawal of British troops. This conflict led to Britain's involvment in the 1956 Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. (see below)

*Mau Mau Insurgency*-*(1952-1956)*-Kenyan guerrilla war against British rule.

*Cyprus Emergency*--*(1955-1959)*- Guerrilla war by the Greek Cypriot militant group, the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), to force the withdrawal of British from Cyprus. The primary goal of the rebels was to unite Greek-majority Cyprus with Greece. Britain, which had controlled or ruled Cyprus since 1878, granted independence to Cyprus in 1960.

*Suez/Sinai War **(1956)- *This war has never officially ended, though ceasefire agreements are in place and holding

*Muscat and Oman Intervention (1957-1959)--*British troops aid the goverment of Muscat and Oman (now known simply as Oman), against rebels. British troops withdrew after a successful campaign. This war is also know as the Jebel Akhdar War.

*Jordan Intervention (1958)--*Britain airlifted troops to Jordan in response to a request for aid from the Jordanian king. King Hussein felt threatened by the recent union of Syria and Egypt, as well as the violent revolution in Iraq in which the Iraq king, a member of Hussein's family, was brutally murdered. After the situation calmed down, British troops left Jordan.

*Brunei Revolt*-*(December,* *1962*)-Britain had been in negotiations with t Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to form a new Malaysian Federation as British rule in these areas was ending. Indonesia opposed Brunei (and Sabah and Sarawak--all of whom were in the northern part of Borneo/Kalimantan Island-Indonesia controlled the bulk of the island) from joining this federation, and pro-Indonesian rebels launched a rebellion in Brune in in 1962. British forces defeated the rebels.

*Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation* (1963-1966)-Indonesia launched a guerrilla war against Malaysia (the new nation comprised of Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak) to take control of the northern portion of Borneo. British forces supported the Malaysians. Australia and New Zealand also participated in the war against Indonesia.

*Ugandan Army Mutiny (1964)--*The army of Uganda, which had recently become independent of Britain, mutinied against the government of President Milton Obote in January of 1964. Unable to control the situation, Obote called for help from British forces who put down the revolt.

*Dhofar Rebellion* (1962-1976)-Marxist rebels, aided by the new South Yemen government, battled the Omani government forces in the western region of Dhofar. British air and ground forces aided the Omani government defeat the rebels.

*Aden Conflict*-(1964-1967) -Rebels in the British-ruled part of Yemen known as Aden waged a guerrilla war against the British and associated Yemeni forces. Following the British withdrawal, the new nation of South Yemen was formed.

*The Conflict in Northern Ireland** (1969-1998)* a ceasefire remains and is currently holding but the war has never officially ended

*The Falkland Islands War (1982)* A substantial armed military presence has remained in this part of the world as the Argentinians remain disgruntled about the outcome 

*Gulf War ** (1991)-*British, U.S., French, and other Allied nations joined together to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Also known in the West as the First Iraq War.

*No-Fly Zone War* (1991-2003)-Following the Gulf War of 1991, British and American warplanes enforced a "No-Fly Zone" in both northern and southern Iraq to prevent Iraqi government air strikes against Kurdish and Shiite forces. This resulted in nearly constant air strikes by the Allies against Iraqi military targets. As the launching of the 2003 invasion of Iraq approached, the British and U.S. forces increasingly used the No-Fly Zone status as a means of degrading Iraqi defenses leading up to the invasion.

*Bosnian War (1992-1996)*- British forces, as part of NATO, engaged in combat operations and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia during the protracted Yugoslav civil wars.

*Kosovo War* *(1999)*-British forces, as part of NATO, engaged in combat operations and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo during the protracted Yugoslav civil wars.

*British military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil Wa*r (2000-2002)-British forces intervened in the Sierra Leone Civil War and helped government forces end the war. British troops remained in Sierra Leone for several more years to ensure the peacea and train government forces.

*Afghanistan War** (2001-2014)*-British troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2014, though the war there continues.

*Iraq War** (2003-2009)-*British troops were withdrawn from combat in Iraq in 2009, though U.S. troops remained until 2011.

*Libyan War **(2011)-*British air and naval forces joined in a coalition to aid Libyan rebels against the government of Muammar Khadaffy. British special forces played a role on the g

*ISIS War (2014-Present)-*Upon a request for military assistance, the UK, along with several other Western nations (U.S., France, Canada, etc.) began military operations against the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) forces in Iraq. 



British forces have not really enjoyed any peace since 1939)

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## Robert Porter (Jul 8, 2017)

Zipper SAC was constantly innovating and changing. For one thing it was and is well known that "settled" tactics don't work mostly due to the ability of our potential enemies to observe and prepare counters. Secondly technology, especially military technology, does not stand still. As new technologies develop including ECM, Radar and Guidance, stand off weapons systems like cruise missiles and on and on, tactics needed to be adjusted or entirely scrapped. And they were. SAC was an organic beastie that grew and changed frequently. It's ineffective use was not inherent in SAC but rather the political bosses that dictated uses. 

As far as the USAAF command mentality, especially within SAC, the very nature of SAC was a weapon of last resort. SAC was meant as a deterrent, part of the nuclear triad, it was used for other purposes but not well used. Again these were political decisions not military ones. So yes it was meant to deliver an overwhelming strike in retaliation during a nuclear exchange. I am sure you understand the inherent thoughts around the MAD policy. It was assumed by SAC crews, both bomber and missile, that if we were ever called to use our weapons, there would be no bases to return to and no place to run. When I was in we knew that if the missiles launched we had less than 10 minutes to live. There is nowhere safe to go to in 10 minutes. 

Because of this, it was the fervent desire of every member of SAC that I worked with or for that we would never be called upon to actually perform the duties we had been designed and trained for. Truly it was well understood that if we did deploy, then we had failed in our primary duty as a deterrent force. Because of this belief we were constantly evolving and innovating at every level, top down, and bottom to top. So your contention that SAC was somehow static is plainly false, I lived it. Second your contention that SAC was a top down tactics organization is also false on its face. There were constant seminars and other methods for innovation to be brought forward to command as well as constant updates and changes in tactics coming from command. 

We also constantly amassed and digested intelligence on potential adversaries and their changing capabilities, these changes and developments triggered responsive changes in our tactics. So I have to ask, are you just baiting us for responses? No one that worked within any military organization would ever claim perfection, but the perception you seem to be putting forward from unnamed sources truly seems to be an outsider looking in with no real day to day operational experience.

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## tyrodtom (Jul 8, 2017)

I thought the subject was SAC and RAF Strike command during the early cold war, not all British aerial components post WW2 to now.


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## stona (Jul 8, 2017)

parsifal said:


> British forces have not really enjoyed any peace since 1939)



And have suffered about 3,500 fatal casualties to members on active service in those post war conflicts.

Cheers

Steve

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## parsifal (Jul 8, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> I thought the subject was SAC and RAF Strike command during the early cold war, not all British aerial components post WW2 to now.


and I'm sure the debate will centre on that. I was just correcting one of the background issues raised as a possible reason for low accident rates was their non-involvement in conflicts


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## wuzak (Jul 8, 2017)

parsifal said:


> British forces have not really enjoyed any peace since 1939)



Have US Forces (since 1941) ?


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## fubar57 (Jul 8, 2017)

1976-78?

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## Robert Porter (Jul 8, 2017)

1977 - 78, 1976 had some upset in Korea where several servicemen died.


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## parsifal (Jul 9, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Have US Forces (since 1941) ?


Dunno. probably not. Moreover, some of the conflicts the US got involved in are major affairs ....like Vietnam


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## Reegor (Jul 28, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> Zipper SAC was constantly innovating and changing. For one thing it was and is well known that "settled" tactics don't work mostly due to the ability of our potential enemies to observe and prepare counters. Secondly technology, especially military technology, does not stand still. As new technologies develop including ECM, Radar and Guidance, stand off weapons systems like cruise missiles and on and on, tactics needed to be adjusted or entirely scrapped. And they were. SAC was an organic beastie that grew and changed frequently. It's ineffective use was not inherent in SAC but rather the political bosses that dictated uses.



I researched this recently for a book. My conclusions FWIW was that SAC was very innovative, but it was all centralized. (in the 50s) In the VN war, the SAC generals were promoted to run the entire USAF, and they continued with their centralized command style in managing the USAF fighter pilots who were the ones bombing N. Vietnam. This caused considerable friction and complaints, increased casualties, and reduced effectiveness. (Senior leadership did not agree, which is why they kept doing it.) 
Even during the B-52 Christmas (?) bombings, there were complaints from the B-52 crews that poor tactics were being forced on them from Omaha, such as all AC ingressing and exiting the target on the same vectors. See _Flying from the Black Hole: The B-52 Navigator-Bombardiers of Vietnam _for this analysis.


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## Robert Porter (Jul 28, 2017)

Hence why my comment about the fact SAC was ill used in the Vietnam era, the organization by definition was Strategic not Tactical, and Vietnam was certainly a tactical engagement. It was military politics at its worse, mostly fostered by the Johnson administration. That President was the worst sitting President in terms of War policy in modern times. Some of the decisions made at Johnson's desk haunted military policy for decades. However that was policy, not innovation. Innovation in all military branches is a necessity or we are doomed as the British so often learned, to fight the last war all over again.


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## Zipper730 (Jul 30, 2017)

parsifal said:


> no, the british 9and presumably its air force has been engaged in near continuous warfare since 1945.


So because of the recurrent conflict, they never adopted that whole "safety is paramount to complete the mission" crap and focused on "this is what you gotta do in combat to live"?


Robert Porter said:


> As far as the USAAF command mentality, especially within SAC, the very nature of SAC was a weapon of last resort.


As a nuclear-deterrent from 1946 on? 

Because in those days not all bombers could even carry nuclear-bombs (B-29's, B-36's, B-47's and B-50's could; the B-45's couldn't), and there were a number of non-nuclear bombs ready for use on the bomber force ranging from ordinary sized bombs, to the tallboy, and grand slam, as well as the cloud-maker.


> SAC was meant as a deterrent, part of the nuclear triad


The nuclear-triad didn't seem to apply until either the late 1950's or early 1960's...


> Again these were political decisions not military ones.


Bombers are useful for both conventional and nuclear missions, and truthfully there are interdiction missions that bombers seem adequately suited for.


> So yes it was meant to deliver an overwhelming strike in retaliation during a nuclear exchange.


Which is more similar to Global Strike command of modern day: The problem is that bombers could be farmed out to other organizations, such as theater commands for a variety of different uses.


> I am sure you understand the inherent thoughts around the MAD policy.


Mutual extinction...


> When I was in we knew that if the missiles launched we had less than 10 minutes to live. There is nowhere safe to go to in 10 minutes.


Yeah...


> Because of this, it was the fervent desire of every member of SAC that I worked with or for that we would never be called upon to actually perform the duties we had been designed and trained for.


That's good!


> Second your contention that SAC was a top down tactics organization is also false on its face. There were constant seminars and other methods for innovation to be brought forward to command


So it was possible for tactics to be submitted up the line from squadron, to wing, to air-division, to numbered air force unit, to command HQ?


Reegor said:


> I researched this recently for a book. My conclusions FWIW was that SAC was very innovative, but it was all centralized. (in the 50s)


That's the vibe I got: When did this change?


> the SAC generals were promoted to run the entire USAF, and they continued with their centralized command style in managing the USAF fighter pilots who were the ones bombing N. Vietnam.


Also known as "SACumcizing"


> Even during the B-52 Christmas (?) bombings, there were complaints from the B-52 crews that poor tactics were being forced on them from Omaha, such as all AC ingressing and exiting the target on the same vectors.


Yeah, that might have cost the bulk of the losses...


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## fubar57 (Jul 30, 2017)

LMAO!!!!!!

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## pbehn (Jul 30, 2017)

fubar57 said:


> LMAO!!!!!!


You are laughing, my eyes hurt.

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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2017)

My comment was in response to the assumption that the british have not been in combat much since 1945, and therefore the operational pressures on their forces are less, and hence a reduced amount of risk taking. The british may be more averse to taking risks, but not because they have had less exposure to warfare than the Americans....


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## Zipper730 (Jul 13, 2019)

While this post is old, I'm curious if I was right about the RAF's Bomber Command Groups (i.e. 5 Group) having a degree of autonomy in implementing tactics and plans as in WWII? Or was everything dictated from Bomber Command as in the USAF's Strategic Air Command?


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## Zipper730 (Jul 24, 2019)

Just to be clear, I'm not asking about specific tactics, specific weapons, even specific routes, simply the degree of autonomy that was allowed at the RAF Group Level, or if everything was controlled at Bomber Command's level only?


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## Zipper730 (Jun 12, 2020)

A
 Admiral Beez
, 
G
 Glider


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## swampyankee (Jun 12, 2020)

parsifal said:


> My comment was in response to the assumption that the british have not been in combat much since 1945, and therefore the operational pressures on their forces are less, and hence a reduced amount of risk taking. The british may be more averse to taking risks, but not because they have had less exposure to warfare than the Americans....



When you leave out Suez, Malaya, rebellions in East Africa, peacekeeping during the Trobles, and the Falklands campaign, there's not much left


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## Glider (Jun 12, 2020)

The Autonomy of the different groups was normally limited apart from where they had a specific specialised role. A good example being No 2 Group which was always separate from the rest of bomber command. Pathfinder units were grouped in No 8 Group which you could say were different but invariably operated in conjunction with the Main Force.
To a degree this was counterbalanced by flexibility to change tactics for specific actions where separate squadrons had a lot of autonomy. Examples being 617 and the often overlooked 9 Squadron. The tactics used by these units were very different and were combined in No 5 Group which effectively had two roles, the normal night raids and the specialised units.

The second question is British Forces being risk adverse. Again you could say that the main Army was risk adverse but our manpower was limited and the horrors of WW1 were still in everyone's mind. Again this was often counterbalanced by experimental tactics/units. LRDG, Chindits, SAS, Commando's, the tactical use of snipers are but a few and no doubt members could give more examples.

In todays armed forces they are so small you simply cannot afford to take outrageous risks, but again the special forces are considered as good as the best. There are other exceptions in particular the Nuclear Attack Submarines. RN captains are generally recognised as being the best anywhere. The Perisher course they have to pass is fearsome and the tasks they have to undertake are the stuff of folklore. Personal favourite was an exercise where the had to find and track a USN boomer sub. At the end of the exercise the captain of the RN Boat presented the USN captain a photo of his submarine outlined against the surface. Naturally this came as a big surprise as they had believed that they were undetected.


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## Zipper730 (May 6, 2021)

Glider said:


> The Autonomy of the different groups was normally limited apart from where they had a specific specialised role. A good example being No 2 Group which was always separate from the rest of bomber command. Pathfinder units were grouped in No 8 Group which you could say were different but invariably operated in conjunction with the Main Force.


Yes, but that was in WWII. I'm curious what the policies were during the Cold War times, particularly from 1948 to 1972.


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