# Which was more important to war Malta vs Guadalcanal



## pbfoot (Nov 16, 2008)

Both Malta and Guadalcanal occured at approximately the same time frame , both were lacking supplies ,suffering from disease, facing numerically larger forces with better equipment


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## syscom3 (Nov 16, 2008)

I would say that Guadalcanal had a larger impact on the Japanese, in terms of attrition.

But then an axis controlled Malta would have shut down the Med to the allies.

A draw for me!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 16, 2008)

I agree with sys on this.

Besides both were important for there perspective theaters.


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## parsifal (Nov 16, 2008)

one has to consider the implications of an allied loss of each island. In the case of Malta, the Axis would have been able to achieve a more secure supply line to North Africa. This may have led to the loss of the Delta, and beyond that any number of alternate strategies......conquest of the Middle East (and its oil), isolation and possible invasion of the Caucasus from the South, possible Turkey adoping a more pro-Axis stance, possible invasion of India...U-Boats in the Indian Ocean.

Guadacanal was much more limited in its possibilities.....the Japanese may have been able to complete the conquest of NG....and possibly Fiji and Noumea. This would have made Aust a difficult springboard for the US countroffensive, but conversely would have made the Japanese supply lines even more tenuous...

So on balance, my opinion is that Malta is probably the more imprtant of the two, because of the potential flow on effects....a victory at Malta had the potential to alter the overall course of the war, whereas its difficult to see a defeat at Guadacanal doing the same. Of course this depends on what happens after those respective battles.


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## timshatz (Nov 17, 2008)

Would go with Guadalcanal on this one. But it's close. 

Malta interdicted the flow of supplies from Europe to Africa. And while the war in Africa was important (much more so to the allies than to the axis), it was not crucial. Guadalcanal should not have been crucial, but the attritional campaign that occured there (along with the battles in New Guniea) essentially gutted the Japanese airforces (both IJN and IJA) as well as doing severe damage to the IJN Surface and Air fleets. Further, it confirmed Australia would not be invaded by Japan. 

In both cases, the battles fought in both theatres were the first major offensives for the Allies. The difference between the two was Germany could and did operate quite well with out forces she lost in Africa while Guadalcanal (and New Gunea) was too costly for Japan. 

For Malta to be on the same plane as Guadalcanal, it would have to have happened on the actual mainland of Europe, not in the periphery as Africa was. 

'Cause when you're talking about Malta, your really talking about Africa. Whereas when you talk about Guadalcanal, you're talking about Australia/NZ. The Allies could lose large chunks of Africa and it would be no big deal. But losing AUS/NZ would've been far more damaging to the Allies.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Nov 19, 2008)

I think the Japanese shouldn't have clung to their islands like they did. They lost a lot of manpower for not much benefit. At least they should have moved all their forces onto maybe two islands, like Okinawa or maybe Iwo Jima. They way they could still defend the homeland and have had some control of the Pacific. 

But the way they kept allowing themselves to be slaughtered off each island, was just to devasting to their numbers, and their morale. 

But I suppose the Japanese generally had good morale. For them dying wasn't some thing to avoid at all costs. Their mentality was to hold on to each island, never let it go, (because that would be a dishonor,) until they were wiped out. 

So I guess I will say Guadalcanal, even though it didn't have to be for the Japanese. They could have retreated and regrouped on another fortified island instead of losing their Navy and planes and manpower.


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## syscom3 (Nov 19, 2008)

But for Malta, if the RN decides the risk to run convoys through the med is so great, what happens to the logistics for the allies? The resources from the Middle East now need to go around Africa, and completed weapons of war will need to go through the same route.


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## timshatz (Nov 19, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> But for Malta, if the RN decides the risk to run convoys through the med is so great, what happens to the logistics for the allies? The resources from the Middle East now need to go around Africa, and completed weapons of war will need to go through the same route.




For a considerable part of the war, into '43, didn't the Brits have to run convoys around the horn anyway? I don't think Malta was much of a base to cover their convoys as it was to attack German and Italian assets. 

By the time the Med became something of an Allied lake (around 1944), it's importance was greatly reduced as a theatre of war. 

Now if the Germans had taken over the Atlantic side of French North Africa and used it to interdict sea lanes to England, then the Brits would've been in deep do-do.


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## syscom3 (Nov 19, 2008)

Good point.

One thing I wonder though, given the distance between Egypt and Tunisa, wasnt the Afrika Korps more dependant on its logistics from what can be unloaded at Tobruk?

A Malta in Axis hands might not be the do all to end all as it seems.


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## timshatz (Nov 19, 2008)

Definitely agree that Tobruk was a very important logistical base for the Afrika Corp. Without it, they are looking at a good 200-300 miles to Benghazi, probably the next major port for use by the AK. 

I took a look at a google map on the subject and it shows that Malta, while not in the direct line of the route from either port to Italy, it was definitely close enough to be a major problem. I would also guess the attacks coming from the Desert Air Force and sub forces from Gibraltar and Alexandria were major factors in cutting supplies. Seems worth the risk to get rid of Malta. It is almost begging to be picked off. 

Here's a link to the map. 

Tobruk Map | Libya Google Satellite Maps


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## syscom3 (Nov 20, 2008)

But just exactly how important was Malta to the AK in its battles in eastern Libya and Egypt?

I dont see how Malta adds much to the logistical equation for that area. Benghazi and Triploi were the key logistical points. But, I will concede that a Malta in axis hands makes an allied victory in North Africa more bloody and to take longer.

Now for Guadalcanal ..... I see its importance as inflicting losses on the IJN from which it couldnt recover. Plus a Guadalcanal victory did end the Japanese push southwards, and gave the allies a fine base of operations form which to move northwards against Rabaul.


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## pbfoot (Nov 20, 2008)

The Axis were loosing 50% of their Afrika Corps supplies to Malta based aircraft thats a whole lot of capability .


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## syscom3 (Nov 20, 2008)

pbfoot said:


> The Axis were loosing 50% of their Afrika Corps supplies to Malta based aircraft thats a whole lot of capability .



That is a lot. But did it really impact the AK's ability to fight way out in Egypt?


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> That is a lot. But did it really impact the AK's ability to fight way out in Egypt?



Short answer is yes....the limits on supply and logistic support that could be provided to the axis frontline forces limited their capabilities. The axis also could not send in the forces they needed or wanted to the western desert. in the case of ground units this was because they could not be supplied properly, and because most of the bodies and equipment that made up such formations were being decimated. in the case of the air units, vast numbers of RA and LW units were tied down to trying to suppress the island, with decreasing success

Allied wartime strategy clearly identifies the european axis as the principal enemy, with the potential to cause an upset. Japanese lacked that capability. Whether Guadacanal happened or not was immaterial to the final outcome, even in the context of the PTO alone. If Guadacanal didnt happen, the US would have returned in 1944 anyway, whilst the attrition rates for Japan would have gobbled up the reserves saved by not fighting Guadacanal in a matter of months.

guadacanal is one of the most overblown, overrated battles of the war, achieving that status because it was being fought by, you guessed it, American troops... battles at least as important (and many would consider of greater importance) were being fought elsewhere at this time by non-American forces and not receiving the same recognition. Malta just happens to be one of them. Malta WAS the key to the Med, whosoever controlled it dictated the outcome of the battle in Africa, and hence, the battles likley to develop as a result


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## Maestro (Nov 20, 2008)

I think I'll have to go with Malta.

My knowledge of the PTO is rather limited, but what I know is that the Japanese material/manpower lost at Guadalcanal would have been lost anyway in latter battles, due to the way the Japanese were fighting.

While WWII was also (in a way) a war for petrol. Because without petrol, boats, planes and tanks won't go anywhere ! For that reason, you _had_ to keep control over... erhm... oil fields (is that the right English word ?) in North Africa.

So Malta was a good thing for the RAF as they could maintain a kind of air superiority there.


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## syscom3 (Nov 20, 2008)

Parsifal, your comments about Guadalcanal .... I'll just say they're so far out in left field, you're among a small insignificant minority to have that view.

But for Malta, remember the logistics strain on fighting armored warfare in the desert. Just because you can get 50% more supplies to Tunisia, doesn't necessarily mean a significant amount can get to the AK that was out on the eastern fringes of the theater.

Consider that the more supplies you need to transport, means the more support troops you need, and the more supplies you need to bring along just to support them. And consider the fuel requirement for the supply troops has to be a round trip number. Its an exponential increase in the tonnage needed to support both the tooth and the tail. The allies learned that lesson in Sept/Oct 1944 in France!

So I don't really see a significant increase in power for the AK unless it is just defending Tunisia.


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2008)

I came out with the disparaging remarks about Guadacanal because it was just one of the battles of attrition being undertaken at that time against the Japanese. There were similar battles being fought in China, Burma, New Guinea, and under the oceans of the japanese empire, as well as the mining and sabotage efforts throughout Southeast asia, by groups like Sparrowforce and the Darwin Wing that were having every bit as debilitating effect as Guadacanal (well, more or less.....). 

Much is made about the attrition that the Japanese air forces suffered over Guadacanal in that five months of fighting. My understanding is that about 1000 aircrew were lost in the battle, along with about 20 destroyers, and some capital ships, and about 20000 men were lost, mostly to disease (I cannot check the details right now). This sounds impressive, and certainly the most serious of the losses, the losses to the Destroyers, were not repeated by anyone else. However, the Japanese losses in aircrew on a monthly basis had been nosediving since well before Guadacanal (read Yamamotos report to the Chief Of Staff in May 1942....already he was complaining about the losses being suffered. I am not saying these attritional losses were not important. What I am saying is that guadacanal was not the key to that attrition.....if US efforts had been put into the mainland of New Guinea, for example, along a single axis instead of following this dumbars* strategy cooked up by the Joint Chiefs to satisfy the competing egos of Macarthur on the one hand, and Uncle Ernie on the other. The old adage of splitting your forces would seem to apply in this case, and for that reason i see Guadacanal as not being the pivotal point leading to victory your populist American histories paint them to be. rather, i see it as a stark example of the failure of the Allied command system to contain and unify its command structures and keep the personailies of its leadership under control....

Consider this, if guadacanal had not occurred, the Japanese would have carried forward in an attempt to undertake their "Fijian" strategy. The Americans. The next step in their advance was espiritu santo, as I recall. If 1st marine Div had been held back in waiting for that event, the result would have been the same....if the Japanese had been allowed to advance to Noumea, the slaughter would have been even greater.

Bottom line is that guadacanal was not that important as a place, or a battle, because there were a dozen other "guadacanals" waiting to happen if the japanese pressed on with their plans. to me Guadacanal represents a failure in the allied leadership, but particualrly the American leadership, because it was more to do with competing egos than complimentary or optimal strategy. 

Compare that with Malta...Not only was Malta the only geographical place in the Med where such a strategy of Interdiction could be implemented, if the strategy was not implemented, the Allies were likley to be overwhelmed in the Theatre, with who knows what consequences


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## HoHun (Nov 21, 2008)

Hi Syscom,

>But for Malta, remember the logistics strain on fighting armored warfare in the desert. Just because you can get 50% more supplies to Tunisia, doesn't necessarily mean a significant amount can get to the AK that was out on the eastern fringes of the theater.

Malta not only strangled the supply in quantity, but also in quality. Ultra enabled the British to concentrate on the convoys or individual ships that made the biggest difference - they did not just strike ships at random, but could take out a large proportion of the high-value targets in well-aimed blows.

This gave the attacks conducted from Malta an impact much greater than what one would assume from the plain tonnage figures.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 21, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> But for Malta, remember the logistics strain on fighting armored warfare in the desert. Just because you can get 50% more supplies to Tunisia, doesn't necessarily mean a significant amount can get to the AK that was out on the eastern fringes of the theater.
> 
> Consider that the more supplies you need to transport, means the more support troops you need, and the more supplies you need to bring along just to support them. And consider the fuel requirement for the supply troops has to be a round trip number. Its an exponential increase in the tonnage needed to support both the tooth and the tail. The allies learned that lesson in Sept/Oct 1944 in France!




In the end it would still degrade the AK capability, even far out in Egypt. Think about. 50% less supplies is still 50% less supplies.

Would you rather have more or less supplies?


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## renrich (Nov 21, 2008)

Very few oil fields in North Africa at that time. In fact, not that much production in the Middle East. Most of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from US. The Germans best chance for enhancing their oil supplies was in the southern part of the Soviet Union. I don't believe that those issues lessen the importance of Malta, the unsinkable aircraft carrier. I doubt the US Navy or Marines or IJN thought the Guadalcanal Campaign was overrated. It was a cesspool for both sides.


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## syscom3 (Nov 21, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> In the end it would still degrade the AK capability, even far out in Egypt. Think about. 50% less supplies is still 50% less supplies.
> 
> Would you rather have more or less supplies?



Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?

I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.


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## syscom3 (Nov 21, 2008)

> I came out with the disparaging remarks about Guadacanal because it was just one of the battles of attrition being undertaken at that time against the Japanese. There were similar battles being fought in China, Burma, New Guinea, and under the oceans of the japanese empire, as well as the mining and sabotage efforts throughout Southeast asia, by groups like Sparrowforce and the Darwin Wing that were having every bit as debilitating effect as Guadacanal



The key to defeating Japan rested solely on the defeat of her maritime forces. 

CBI was a sideshow in that capacity.

NG wore down the IJA, but not the IJN. Plus it wasnt untill middle 1943 that the 5th AF began to make its force felt in the SW Pacific.

Darwin was in the periphery, contributing little in the scheme of things.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 21, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?
> 
> I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.



Why coudn't it?


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## Amsel (Nov 21, 2008)

Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.


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## Freebird (Nov 22, 2008)

Amsel said:


> Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.



Huh? A victory by the Japanese at Guadal doesn't mean that the US is in any more danger. The question is which battle was more important, not which Axis power was a bigger threat



pbfoot said:


> The Axis were loosing 50% of their Afrika Corps supplies to Malta based aircraft thats a whole lot of capability .



And even more to the subs DD's based on Malta



syscom3 said:


> That is a lot. But did it really impact the AK's ability to fight way out in Egypt?



It had a huge impact, the British basically strangled the Axis supply line in NA. By summer 1942, the British aircraft in the Med were deliberatly looking for Axis oilers because they knew how important it was.



syscom3 said:


> Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?
> 
> Yes. Malta was the key to holding North Africa
> 
> I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.



Without the pressure on the Axis supply lines from Malta they could have brought supplies to ports farther in, to Bengazhi or Tobruk, both in German control in summer '42



renrich said:


> Very few oil fields in North Africa at that time. In fact, not that much production in the Middle East. Most of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from US.


 Most of the petroleum used in *Western Europe* came from the US. The primary supply for the Desert Army for Russia were the MidEast oilfields, from the refinery at Abadan. The Allies didn't have enough ships to send oil around the Cape from the USA. There were also 2 pipelines going from the Persian Gulf through Jordan, to the Med in Palestine


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## Marcel (Nov 22, 2008)

Amsel said:


> Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.



Hmm, yeah, maybe for you Americans, then...


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## Juha (Nov 22, 2008)

Hello Syscom
Afrika Korps main supply harbours were Tripoli and Benghazi. Tunisia didn't play a role before Torch, Vichy French didn't like Italians. Land transport was a problem, that was why Tobruk with its rather limited harbour capacity was so important. The lost supply had very significant impact on Rommel's operations at times, was it the number of AFVs anf other vehicles or the amount of fuel available.

Juha


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## renrich (Nov 22, 2008)

Just to put it in perspective, my reference shows that six sevenths of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from the US.


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## syscom3 (Nov 22, 2008)

If what Juha says is correct, then allied ships and aircraft based in Egypt could have done just as good a job of hitting axis ships off of Cyrenica as the ones based on Malta.


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> The key to defeating Japan rested solely on the defeat of her maritime forces.
> 
> CBI was a sideshow in that capacity.
> 
> ...



I would clarify that a little by saying the key to defeating Japan lay solely in eating up her slender reserves, whether they be the tying down of field formations so as to avert a concentration of effort at the decisive point, the destruction of oil production facilities, the loss of merchant shipping, the destruction of aircrew and aircraft, or the sinking of frontline ships. Sinking the frontline ships was, incidentally the least important aspect of winning the war against Japan. She was defeated because her merchant marines were decimated, because she could not concentrate on any one theatre with her ground forces, and because she lost control of the air. The loss of efficiency in her navy, industry and the loss of ships outright all came about as a result of that.

Your justification and dismissal of places like the CBI and NG only makes sense from an American perspective. Americans are notoriously bad at grasping the concept of the indirect approach, and the position and opinions you are adopting are a classic microcosm of that. CBI and NG were important because , in the case of the former they sucked out vital ground troops, attrited air assets, and soaked up vital supply. NG was important because it was here that the bulk of the Japanese land forces were tied down and defeated (and in any event your assertion that naval forces of the IJN were not being attritioned on this front is patently incorrect anyway, most notably losses occurred at Milne Bay, off Buna, and later, with the assistance of your 5th Air Force, in the Bismarck Sea ). Meanwhile, from as early as March 1942, increasing pressure was being applied to the Japanese air assets in Rabaul, by mixed formations of RAAF and 5AF formations, that prevented them from ever bringing their full force of air units to bear on the SoPac forces . Intreresting that you refer to NG as a sideshow, since it occupied the attentions of more than 60% of the allied ground AND air forces in the SWPA/SoPac until the latter part of 1943 (Australia contributing something more than 500000 troops to the theatre to approximately 150000 US). The Japanese forces on Guadacanal never exceeded 20000, yet by the end of 1942 the Australians, and Eichelbergers formations were engaging twice that number . In the Darwin TO, the US and Australian formations were tying down more than 550 A/C at any given moment, from August 1942 on (and incidentally were contributing far more in shipping losses to the Japanese through the aerial mining camapigns throughout SE Asia). if the Japanese had had the opportunity to concentrate these forces off Guadacanal as well as the air formations they were forced to divert to the NG front, the outcome on Guadacanal would have been different.

Luckily for all of us, and despite all the innefficiencies in their armies, the KMT and CCP in China managed to tie up 37 of the 52 Divs available to the Japanese (and proportions remained more or less like that as the numbers of Divs increased. Without the CBI, China would have folded, and instead of 20000 men of the IJA, you would have faced 200000 on places like Guadacanal. Sure they would have starved, but this was never an issue for the IJA.

And certainly, Macarthur would not agree with you. Macs great contribution to military strategy was his understanding of attritional warfare, and the importance of the indirect approach. His island hopping and bypassing of japanese strongpoints is testament that at the end he understood how to defeat the Japanese...isolate them, then go round the.. but isolating them was achieved by a combination of naval supremacy, tonnage warfare, air suppression, and tying down of reserves. without all of these ingredients 9and more, your victory would not have been possible. guadacanal was a part of that, an important part, but it was not the pivotal point in the whole equation in which all other aspects are un-important.


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## Juha (Nov 22, 2008)

Hello Syscom
Quote:"then allied ships and aircraft based in Egypt could have done just as good a job of hitting axis ships off of Cyrenica as the ones based on Malta."

Yes, but those from Malta were much better situated to
a) attack supply routes between Italy and Tripoli
b) attack supply routes between Italy and Benghazi up to near the coast of Cyrenica. In fact when Germans were able to use Benghazi they occupied at least most of Cyrenica and so anti-shipping sorties from Egypt had to make a large detour out of sea before entering over Bay of Sirte.

Juha


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2008)

freebird said:


> Huh? A victory by the Japanese at Guadal doesn't mean that the US is in any more danger. The question is which battle was more important, not which Axis power was a bigger threat
> 
> 
> 
> ...





Off topic, but for the Alamein buildup, the British were required to divert over 1000 ships via the cape, and this was just the hardware and army thingys. Foodstuffs and a lot of ammunition came from Australia and India, mostly

If the axis had been able to support the additional 3 divs they wanted to send after the fall of tobruk, there would never have been an Alamein. It would have been an Ala-massacre..... Rommel would have been sitting in Cairo eating dates by October, and probably pushing on into Palestine, Syria and Iraq, with every likelihood the Turks joining the Axis once the British influence had been removed from the scene, and they found themselves surrounded by Axis forces


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## Amsel (Nov 22, 2008)

freebird said:


> Huh? A victory by the Japanese at Guadal doesn't mean that the US is in any more danger. The question is which battle was more important, not which Axis power was a bigger threat
> 
> 
> 
> ...



O.K. then Malta? Can I change my answer?

I have a different perspective on the war then perhaps the gentlemen from other allied countries but I respect your opinions and they are probably right. Both of my grandfathers fought the Japanese at Iwo Jima and elsewhere. The feeling I get from my family members was that there was much fear at the time about the Japanese intentions. At Guadalcanal the allies were able to defeat the Japanese using combined arms in a significant way thus culminating in the eventual defeat of Japan. Before the campaign the Japanese had the initiative but after they could only defend. It was the turning point of WW2 for Americans.


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## syscom3 (Nov 22, 2008)

Parsifal:

The IJN didn’t have the sealift necessary to effectively support large numbers of forces scattered over such a vast amount of area as the central and west Pacific. No matter how many troops were committed to China and Burma, to say in theory that could have been moved to NG or the atolls is just that .... "in theory". In reality, they just couldn’t be supplied to be effective, and in many cases, the small islands could only hold a certain number of troops before it got so crowded to be indefensible. And you also forget about the huge qualitative advantage the USN had over the IJN in the island hopping campaigns across the Central Pacific, supported by fast carrier battle groups.

And stop with this nonsense about “the indirect approach”. It was decisively proven that the route to victory was the dash across the Pacific from Tarawa ending in the Mariana’s. No doubt the battles in the Solomons and NG sped things up, but in reality, the USN would never have been stopped by the IJN (after late 1943), the IJA or the Japanese airpower. In fact, the war was essentially won in the summer of 1944, regardless of what happened in NG or the CBI.

Wargame the Pacific war all you want, and one thing always comes to light. It doesn’t matter how many troops and airplanes the Japanese have in CBI, NEI, NG and the Aleutions, the USN strategy will win every single time.

As for the allied forces in Darwin, they were so few in number, all they did was let the Japanese know they were there …. And that’s about it.


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## renrich (Nov 22, 2008)

The options the Allies had in the summer of 1942 if they were going to take the war to the Japanese were, as McArthur wanted to do, attack and occupy Rabaul or take Tulagi. McArthur to take Rabaul would have had to utilise all the USN's strength in the Pacific, all four carriers. King did not trust McArthur with those assets, perhaps rightly so. The less ambitious undertaking was to take Tulagi and the airfield on Guadalcanal which would soon be complete. Those four carriers would only be available for four days and Fletcher must husband them carefully. The campaign was fought on a shoestring and it was a meatgrinder for both sides. The IJN lost two BBs and many lesser units. The Allies lost two carriers and many lesser units. The IJN also lost many seasoned pilots where as the Allies honed their amphibious operations and carrier operations. The Japanese were truly on the defense from summer 1942 on. To me the CBI was the sideshow. The Japanese were never going to conquer and occupy China or India. The operations there were mainly for public relations IMO.


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Parsifal:
> 
> The IJN didn’t have the sealift necessary to effectively support large numbers of forces scattered over such a vast amount of area as the central and west Pacific. No matter how many troops were committed to China and Burma, to say in theory that could have been moved to NG or the atolls is just that .... "in theory". In reality, they just couldn’t be supplied to be effective, and in many cases, the small islands could only hold a certain number of troops before it got so crowded to be indefensible. And you also forget about the huge qualitative advantage the USN had over the IJN in the island hopping campaigns across the Central Pacific, supported by fast carrier battle groups.
> 
> ...




Ah, the Japanese did have sufficient sealift to get their troops to the Pacific outposts, although the losses to their Merchant Shipping by 1944 made this movement of troops difficult, and the effct of those troops transitory....it was too late by then. 

In 1942, the Pacific Theatre had something in the order of 5 divisions along the Pacific flank, including the South Seas. By 1944 this had expanded to over 20 Divs, and by 1945 to over 30. So history straight away blows your argument about insufficient sealift to the weeds.....the Japanese in 1944 were moving far greater numbers of troops than you credit them.....if this relocation had occurred in 1942, the US forces attacking them would have suffered catastrophic losses to their force structure, and would have been forced to halt their counterattack. This would have given the japanese exactly what they needed...time to regain their balance.

The Japanese troop trasfers arrived too late, and as you say the naval supremacy by that stage was biting very deep. however, in 1942 when it mattered, what would have been the result for the US ground forces...... in Saipan where your vaunted "direct" approach was displayed in all its brutish dumbness, there were more casualties than had been experienced in more than two years of fighting in the SWpac. At Iwo the toll on US forces was even higher, whilst at Okinawa the losses were beginning to actually hurt the US military. Now whilst the outcome was never in doubt (that was a given from the first day of the war), the question begs as to whether the "direct" approach adopted by King and his cronies was the optimal strategy, and secondly, if those losses had been sustained earlier when it mattered, whether ther would have been a halt to the US counteroffensive. I think it would, and I think the result would have been a delay in the eventual collapse. 

In the air the same effect applies. The biggest problem for theJapanese in their air forces was a lack of depth, and an inability to concentrate. At the beginning of the war there were about 2000 a/c in both air forces. After the conquests, there were so many garrsoning committments, that the ability for the Japanese to concentrate their forces at the decisive points, like Guadacanal was very difficult. Their ability to rotate forces, such as was US policy, was impossible. Japan needed all forces in the frontline, all of the time...there was no possibility to rotate the forces (even if the Japanese had been disposed to that strategy). Remove the threats from Darwin (which again I repeat was undertaking a very successful mining campaign in SE Asia, with greater losses to shipping than ever occurred on you so-called "main front"), the CBI and China, and instead of being confronted with approximately 500 in the Gilberts, you will be confronted with approxmately 2500....the US fast carriers would have been fast alright....fast sinking that is . 

Your critique of the fast carriers and their effect is flawed. It was their mobility, and their ability to concentrate in sections of the front, destroying the opposition in detail, and then disappearing before the enemy had the chance to concentrate that made them powerful (another example of the "indirect" approach which you are rejecting) that made them so powerful. When forced to slug it out with the Japanese, such as at Okinawa, where it was all too late, the losses for the US carriers began to rise (something like 700 lossesout of a force structure of about 2000)


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## renrich (Nov 23, 2008)

Japan was a maritime power just as Britain is. The only thing necessary to defeat Japan was to defeat it's navy and supporting air power and thus wrench control of the seas from it. It's armies on the mainland in Asia were then irrelevant. The Guadalcanal campaign was a major step in that process. Midway was the beginning of the end for Japan, Guadalcanal was the end of the beginning.


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## parsifal (Nov 23, 2008)

renrich said:


> Japan was a maritime power just as Britain is. The only thing necessary to defeat Japan was to defeat it's navy and supporting air power and thus wrench control of the seas from it. It's armies on the mainland in Asia were then irrelevant. The Guadalcanal campaign was a major step in that process. Midway was the beginning of the end for Japan, Guadalcanal was the end of the beginning.



On that basis, it should not have been necessary to take any of the Japanese island outposts, and the whole of the Guadacanal camapign, and all the other island battles were pointless .....sorry, but I just see that as illogical, to say nothing of being disrespectful about the cost in lives that was paid to take them

In fact the defeat of Japan was a combination of factors, tied up with what the textbooks call "sea control" and "sea denial". Intrinsically linked to those concepts is the war of attrition that had to be constantly waged so as to prevent the Japanese from developing meaningful reserves. this is why it was important to keep suppressing and hammering away at the so-called bypassed outposts...if they were given a chance to recover, they would repair the facilities, restock the supplies, fly in new units, and wreak havoc on the allied rear area communications. If the peripheral areas were allowed to go quiet, the vast air and land garrisons that the Japanese were forced to maintain in these areas, would have been allowed to redeploy to the main axes of advance. If the ground troops had been able to be released.....the US three or four divs they were able to project in 1942-3 would have been facing 20 or 30 Japanese divs, battle hardened, and at that time fully the equal of the green American formations 

The reason the island outposts were important was that they allowed land based air to influence the sea battle. If the Japanese had been able to concentrate their air power they may have caused greater losses, and forced the Americans to stall their advance. if they got time, the Japanese might have staged a partial recovery.

Now that the reason for taking the islands is perhaps clearer , the other big issue that goes with island battles was the cost in manpower that goes with taking them. If the cost had been any higher than it was in 1942, the Americans could not have replaced their Infantry losses, and would not have been able to press on to the next phase of their offensive. This would have given the Japanese time to fortify their positions, train and build new air groups....and the cycle becomes ever more vicious and costly as this process gets repeated and repeated etc...


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## pbfoot (Nov 23, 2008)

One thing being overlooked is the fact that Malta led to Italy being a non factor or it removed one of the legs from the Axis . If Malta had fallen Italy more then likely would have stuck it out a lot longer , the Italian Navy would have been able to hold the Med and there would not have been a soft under belly


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## syscom3 (Nov 23, 2008)

I will have to agree Malta was more important in dictating the conduct of the battle in the MTO. Just the delay of the allies in retaking North Africa by a just a few months would have changed the whole strategy of the war in that theater.

For Guadalcanal, even if Japan had won the battle of Guadalcanal, it was a situation of "I won and now I cant do anything".


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## Glider (Nov 23, 2008)

I went for Malta, just. 
If the USA had lost Guadalcanal then it certainly would have been a major setback but the Japanese didn't have the capacity to win the war. The end result would have been the same. They lacked building capacity and resources.
If the Allies had lost Malta then its almost certain that we would have lost the Middle East, Germany would have had secure fuel supplies, greatly assisting the attack in Russia. Plus the Italians who were just starting to get quality front line aircraft would have been valuable allies and of course their Navy would have been freed up for the Atlantic Battles. 
In short Germany had a lot to gain as a result of the capture of Malta, strategically, economically and politically. Japan would have gained time but thats about all.


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## renrich (Nov 23, 2008)

The original plan to recapture Tulagi was to use it as a step forward in the task to capture Rabaul which threatened the supply lines from the US to Australia and NZ. When it was learned that the Japanese were building an airfield on Guadalcanal, some 560 miles further south than Rabaul, it became imperative to invade the Solomons. Firstly, you deny them the fine harbor at Tulagi which they were using as a seaplane base. Secondly, you deny them the airfield and gain an airfield to project land based air power. Thirdly, you come to grips with the enemy and attrite his naval and air power. Seems like the Allies had little choice in the matter.


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## Freebird (Nov 23, 2008)

renrich said:


> Just to put it in perspective, my reference shows that six sevenths of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from the US.



Without context your quote is difficult to factor. The reference to "The Allies" presumably means the Western Allies, as the Soviets never released there petroleum production figures. 

Also the figure of "WW2 petroleum use" presumably includes all of WWII up to 1945, the oil needs of the later Pacific war were huge compared to the earlier 1942 needs. {think B-29 MPG fleet ops 5,000 miles from base}

Does your figure is 6/7 includes *ALL* petroleum used for all purposes {including domestic} in the Allied countries? That might be the case, as the US domestic use {private industrial} was huge compared to the UK or USSR which had critical shortages of oil and used more coal. I could believe the {western} "Allies" did could get about 85% of oil from the US for use in Europe, but almost all of the oil needs for the Desert war, Indian Ocean theater for Russia came from British refineries in the Persian Gulf in 1942. The Allies had a critical shortage of ships, so they didn't send oil from the US to the MidEast theater, nor could they send British oil from the MidEast around the Cape to Europe.

Another factor - the British refinery in Abadan {Persian Gulf} was a major supplier of "AvGas" used in the Desert Army sent to the Soviets, how would the air battles be affected if the Allies USSR didn't have AvGas? {and if the Axis did?} 



Amsel said:


> O.K. then Malta? Can I change my answer?
> 
> I have a different perspective on the war then perhaps the gentlemen from other allied countries but I respect your opinions and they are probably right. Both of my grandfathers fought the Japanese at Iwo Jima and elsewhere. The feeling I get from my family members was that there was much fear at the time about the Japanese intentions. At Guadalcanal the allies were able to defeat the Japanese using combined arms in a significant way thus culminating in the eventual defeat of Japan. Before the campaign the Japanese had the initiative but after they could only defend. It was the turning point of WW2 for Americans.



My Grandfather fought for the British in the Med, so it's understandable that our perspective are different.

The biggest difference in my mind is that even had the US lost at Guadalcanal, there were other islands in the further west that could be defended. {San Cristobal, Santa Cruz in the Solomons, New Hebridies, New Caledonia etc} Also the fact that by summer '42 the Japanese didn't have the ships of maritime transport to seriously threaten Eastern Australia or New Zealand, let alone the Western USA.

On the other hand, if the British lose Malta there is no other Allied base between Gibraltar and Alexandria, the Axis would be able to send supplies to Rommel with much fewer losses. 



syscom3 said:


> Parsifal:
> 
> The IJN didn’t have the sealift necessary to effectively support large numbers of forces scattered over such a vast amount of area as the central and west Pacific. No matter how many troops were committed to China and Burma, to say in theory that could have been moved to NG or the atolls is just that .... "in theory". In reality, they just couldn’t be supplied to be effective, and in many cases, the small islands could only hold a certain number of troops before it got so crowded to be indefensible.
> 
> Wargame the Pacific war all you want, and one thing always comes to light. It doesn’t matter how many troops and airplanes the Japanese have in CBI, NEI, NG and the Aleutions, the USN strategy will win every single time.



Pretty accurate Syscom, by the Japanese not trying to interrupt the US buildup in the Pacific, they were almost in a no-win situation by summer '42. Midway was end of any realistic chance for victory. {as posted in the other Pacific thread} 



renrich said:


> The Japanese were truly on the defense from summer 1942 on.



Yup.



renrich said:


> Japan was a maritime power just as Britain is. The only thing necessary to defeat Japan was to defeat it's navy and supporting air power and thus wrench control of the seas from it. It's armies on the mainland in Asia were then irrelevant. The Guadalcanal campaign was a major step in that process. Midway was the beginning of the end for Japan, Guadalcanal was the end of the beginning.



The question is how important was Guadalcanal, and how critical would be it's loss? 

If the US had lost there in mid '42, I think it would just be a minor setback, which the Japanese didn't have the ability to exploit


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## renrich (Nov 23, 2008)

My reference, "The Prize," by Daniel Yergin states that in 1940 the US was producing almost two thirds of the world's oil supplies and he also states that the US supplied six sevenths of the oil consumed by the US and it's allies in WW2. I presume that includes the Soviets. In 1945, the US produced 4694.9 thousand barrels of oil/day. Russia-408.1 and Iran Persia-357.6. Of course the US domestic consumption of oil was much higher than the other combatants, just like today. There again the US was producing more of everything than anyone else, just like today and consumed a lot of energy. As an aside, there have only been a few hundred oil wells drilled in Saudi Arabia. In Texas, more than a million have been drilled. Would not it be informative to get all the enviro-wackos together and take them on a tour of the Texas oil fields to show how little the environment has been harmed both on and off shore.


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 6, 2008)

Malta. What Parsifal said.


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