# Earlier/better/more Sea Hurricane: pros cons



## tomo pauk (Jan 15, 2016)

A discussion about one of IMO under-rated carrier fighters. What would FAA gained with what is proposed in the title, and what would be the shortcomings?


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## Shortround6 (Jan 16, 2016)

Kind of depends on what modifications are allowed and when. 
Summer of 1940 is about the earliest a viable Sea Hurricane could show up without a major change in procurement and or procedures. 
Getting a Hurricane off a flight deck with a fixed pitch prop and 6lbs of boost seems rather hazardous on a regular basis. 
2 pitch prop as a minimum and 100 oct fuel (12lb boost) seems sort of an operational minimum to me. 
Then you run into the operations problem/s. 
Yes the Hurricane performs much better than the Fulmar but British carriers had rather restricted aircraft capacity. I beleive the Ark Royal was the _only _high capacity (over 50) aircraft carrier the British had in the first few years of the war. 
The Fulmar carries around double the ammo and has around twice the Endurance of a Hurricane (without drop tanks) so you need more (but not twice the number) of Hurricanes to perform the same number of CAP missions per day. Hurricane has no secondary role as a recon plane or "scout" and Hurricanes trying to escort even Swordfish on a Strike might be a bit lacking in range. 

How soon you could get constant speed props is a question. Getting Merlin XX engines ( or changing history a bit and using Merlin X engines and 2 pitch props) may allow drop tanks to be used from the carrier decks. 
By the Summer of 1941 a much better Sea Hurricane could have been provided than the MK Ib. A Navalized MK II was certainly possible instead of waiting until Dec of 1942.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 16, 2016)

My idea is to have Sea Hurricane in service un lieu of either Sea Gladiator and/or the Roc for the starters; yes, I know the engines are different. The Sea Hurricane with Merlin VIII should have no problems taking off from the carrier? Though the speed would be lacking above 10000 ft. The Fulmar I gets purchased as historically.
By late 1940/early 1941 indeed a much better engine is needed, and there are several options for that - Merlin XX, or 30, even the Mk.XII, or the overboosted Mk.III as used historically.
With 2 x 45 gal drop tanks, the fuel is some 180 imp gals, vs. Fulmar 215 with a 60 gal DT.


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## stona (Jan 16, 2016)

The first 6 Sea Hurricanes came from the second Hawker production block (Hawker at Brooklands and Kingston) and deliveries commenced at the end of September 1940. These would have been Merlin III powered?
There were supposed to be another 27 Sea Hurricanes produced in the first Gloster produced block, deliveries commenced in November 1939, but 19 of them were converted to Hurricane IIs an re-serialled.
Therein lies a clue. Hurricane production was needed elsewhere and Sea Hurricanes became very much a secondary consideration in 1939/40 to providing the RAF with its most numerous fighter.
At this time Hawker could produce just two aircraft per day, Gloster produced three per day. There was simply not the capacity to produce the navalised version at this time.
Interestingly aircraft, many of which had served in the BoB, from the third Hawker production block, were later converted to Sea Hurricanes, others went to Russia in late 1941.
It wasn't until the third Gloster production block, delivered between July 1940 and August 1941 that a substantial number of Sea Hurricanes was produced, a total of 139 from a block of 1,700.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 16, 2016)

In 1937, the RN/FAA can say 'no, we actually don't want the Roc, since the (Sea) Hurricane will provide twice the firepower and extra 70-100 mph, along with far better rate of climb', so Boulton Paul, for example, produces Sea Hurricanes instead of Roc.
Similar scenario can be laid down for Hurricane supplanting the Sea Gladiator.


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## stona (Jan 16, 2016)

They could try to say no, but that's not how the system worked. The Air Ministry decided what got built and where rather than the RN or FAA.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 16, 2016)

I'm fine with that - so the Air Ministry decides that Sea Hurricane is a better thing than Roc and/or Sea Gladiator and things proceed accordingly.


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## stona (Jan 16, 2016)

The name Air Ministry gives a one word clue...POLITICS

Reactions: Agree Agree:
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## stona (Jan 17, 2016)

I'm off the phone now and on the computer, which is rather easier to use 

I agree that in theory the Sea Hurricanes might have been manufactured at Blackburn, though Gloster would likely have increased its Hurricane production to meet existing orders in lieu of the Sea Gladiator. We know that Hurricane production kept up with losses, except for two or three months, throughout 1940, but there was no way of knowing at the time that this could be maintained. The Air Ministry and RAF would have wanted every Hurricane they could get their hands on. It was the backbone of Fighter Command and it was Fighter Command, not the Navy, that was fighting the BoB. Neither was it evident in 1940 that the battle would not be resumed as the weather improved in the spring of 1941.

Many manufacturers were compelled to sub contract to others as a war time expedient. We nearly had a situation, too awful to contemplate, in which A.V.Roe would have manufactured the Halifax for Handley Page meaning we would have had thousands more of a second rate bomber and none of the best British four engine bomber of the war!

I think a more fundamental problem is that the naval types you are proposing to cancel in favour of the Sea Hurricane were built to very different specifications. The Roc was built as a turret fighter at a time when everyone thought that these were a terrific idea. It turned out not to be such a great idea, but too late.
The Sea Gladiator was not really a bad aircraft, it was just surpassed by a new generation of fighters as it came into service. I can see the attraction for operation of small carriers. It's a small aircraft which more or less takes off by itself in a decent breeze 

In order to convert production to more Sea Hurricanes a decision would have to have been made before the war. The Navy would have had to have decided that the Roc (for example) didn't meet its requirements (which it did) and entered negotiations with the Ministry before production started. Without the benefit of hindsight it is impossible to see how this might have happened.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 17, 2016)

The Roc was produced at Boulton Paul, making easier it to cancel and produce (Sea) Hurricanes there.
Indeed it would require a pre-war decision for en earlier start.



stona said:


> ...though Gloster would likely have increased its Hurricane production to meet existing orders in lieu of the Sea Gladiator.



Glad you think this way 



stona said:


> The Roc was built as a turret fighter at *a time when everyone thought that these were a terrific idea.* It turned out not to be such a great idea, but too late.



No, the turret fighter was not regarded by everyone as a terrific idea.
Eg. a cannon-armed fighter, the cannon being between 20-40 mm, was regared as a great idea by everyone.


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## stona (Jan 17, 2016)

Whether or not cannon armament was regarded as a good idea, or a practical ,depends on the time period. In the mid 1930s this was not the case for the Air Staff. As Verney wrote in May 1935.

_"As I understand it the view of the Air Staff is that the fighter's opportunities will be so fleeting that nothing but the maximum rate of fire in a minimum time is worth having. "_

This was the prevalent view which led to the 8 gun fighter. Rate of fire won out over weight of fire. It's why the first service Marks of Spitfire and Hurricane were armed with eight rifle calibre machine guns.
Verney was still interested in the 37mm COW gun at this time with a view to increasing the range of the attack, the idea being that the machine guns would be used once the range had closed sufficiently. This was a dead end.

Sorley had written.

_"The choice lay between the .303 gun, the .5 inch and the a new 20mm Hispano-Suiza cannon, which was of great attraction to the French and other Continental countries. The .5 inch was newly developed and very heavy and was, in fact, a small cannon, and the Hispano was supersensitive to rigidity of mounting and was difficult to mount in aeroplane wings."_

Dowding wasn't impressed with the 20mm cannon and wasn't keen to have it fitted to his Spitfires. He wrote to Sholto-Douglas in 1938,

_"There has been a lot of talk about the efficiency of the 20mm cannon and I have seen no proof this gun will give decisive results. We ought to have carried out the most careful experiments to prove its value before we adopt it. If this was not done I shall wake up in a year's time and be told I am committed to have 15 squadrons of something with a 20mm cannon; whereas I can tell you now I don't want any and so perhaps save a large sum of money."_

It wasn't until very late 1938/early 1939 that cannon armament was mocked up on a Spitfire. By this time many, by no means all, were starting to believe that it was indeed a good idea. Despite this the first installations were, again in Dowding's words _'unreliable'._ It wasn't until late 1940 that a reasonable compromise of mixed armament would prove successful.

Whilst cannon armament was never off the agenda the impetus to get it fitted to Fighter Command's interceptors only came from combat experience. Earlier the problem had been to lift the cannon armament in a single engine type. The twin Whirlwind was the only high performance fighter to do this in 1940 and everyone was waiting for the single engine, cannon armed, 'Hawker Fighter' to arrive. That became the Typhoon, but well known difficulties delayed its introduction until after a solution to the problem of cannon armed Spitfires (and Hurricanes) had been found.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 17, 2016)

Under 'everybody' I meant 'other air forces/services' - Germans, French, USAAC, Soviets, Poles (with P.24), Czech, with Japanese Navy catching up with cannon-armed fighter(s).
I know well why the 8 gun Hurricanes & Spitfires were produced, the 4 gun in any turret won't come close in RoF, or indeed the weight of fire. Especially for bomber-busting applications many air forces/services were geared towards.


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## stona (Jan 17, 2016)

All with hindsight. 
The principal reason some types were produced in numbers (Battle and Defiant being two of them) was economics. Light Bombers like the Battle were the most numerous bombers in all pre-war production plans (L, War Potential, Harrogate) and only declined with the 1940 Hennessy Plan. 
The Defiant was a relatively cheap way of increasing fighter numbers, it only used one engine for a start. Hurricane production was still relatively slow in 1938 as the war loomed, Spitfire production didn't start until mid 1938 and then competed with the beautiful Walrus and Stranraer flying boats. It is very important not telescope history when looking back
These aircraft appeared good value for money, until it transpired that they were next to useless in their intended roles.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 17, 2016)

No, not with the hindsight, but rather simple maths.
One engine to propel the 8 gun battery offers much better bang for buck than one engine to propel 4 gun battery. Two crew memebres needed to be trained to battle the enemy while having the said 'half battery' is a far less worthy thing than just one crew member to be trained to battle the enemy with 'full battery'. 
Add the greater price to purchase a fleet of non-turreted fighters, plus the performance penalty - the hindsight has nothing to do with it.

Economics of, say, 10000+ HP engine power to carry 15000 lbs (ten Battles, 10 pilots needed, overload condition) vs. same total power to carry 25000 lbs (five Hampdens, 5 pilots needed, overload condition) is non existent.


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## stona (Jan 17, 2016)

The economics is about making up the numbers for Fighter Command, not about crew numbers and armament. Any aircraft on Fighter Command's inventory, including the Defiants and Blenheims, made the numbers look good to parliament and its committees which had to be coerced into stumping up the cash for the RAF's expansion.
Hurricane production was slowly accelerating through 1938 as Spitfire production got underway. The Defiant was expected to get underway only slightly after the Spitfire. In fact this did not happen and deliveries didn't even start until late (November/December?) 1939. I'd have to look up an exact date. On the positive side this meant that not so many were built, only about 1,000, and they did prove useful in other roles.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 17, 2016)

I'm not trying to lower the numbers for the Fighter Command, but to have more fighter produced, especially Hurricanes, both 'normal' and 'Sea'. If Boulton Paul churns only (Sea) Hurricanes, and none of turret fighter, it is a major gain for the RAF & FAA - 1500 of those vs. 1200 of the 2 types of turret fighters combined?
The 1000+ Defiants that were built is not 'only' nor 'not so many', in the light of 'we need any Hurricane and Spitfire we can get, as of yesterday'.


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## stona (Jan 17, 2016)

But the Defiants were intended to be built as a stop gap until others could be built. Nobody thought there was anything wrong with the turret fighter concept until No. 264 Sqn started working them up in early 1940, and even these reservations were ignored. It wasn't until May 1940 when Defiants tangled with Bf 109s that the flaw in the plan became evident. Again you are using hindsight. The Defiant was supposed to intercept *unescorted bombers*, it actually did this successfully over Dunkirk. Nobody* foresaw* the presence of the Luftwaffe's single seat fighters escorting its bombers over SE England in the summer of 1940. It's easy for us to see them *looking back*!

It's not a simple as just telling BP or whoever to stop producing one type and to start another. During the changeover production will be lost. In 1940 the Air Ministry was not prepared to accept any loss of production. This was the argument used, principally against Harris, to continue the production of the Halifax (and Stirling). Harris was prepared to accept fewer, better, bombers but those over his head were not. The same would have happened in 1940 had, say, Dowding started agitating for more Hurricanes at the expense of other types already in production.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 17, 2016)

I never 'introduced' the fall of France in this discussion, with all of it's consequences. 
A 4-gun Defiant, let alone Roc, is a loosing proposal against an 8-gun Hurricane in the bomber destroyer role. It is the maths, not hindsight, even before we start listing other quaities the Hurricane had over the Defiant, let alone before we introduce the Spitfire here.
Also, I don't know why you invoke 1940 here, I've stated several times that a decision need to be made in 1937 or thereabout to make effect in 1940.


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## Greyman (Jan 17, 2016)

stona said:


> Nobody thought there was anything wrong with the turret fighter concept ...



I have no information myself, but I'd be willing to bet a million dollars there were plenty of officers/officials that were very much against the turret fighter.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 17, 2016)

> I have no information myself, but I'd be willing to bet a million dollars there were plenty of officers/officials that were very much against the turret fighter.



That's a little difficult to justify; the power operated turret was considered by the heads of the RAF as the last word in accurate weapon aiming and defence pre-WW2, hence the Defiant and Roc (although BP didn't want to build the Roc, having submitted their own naval design to have it quashed in favour of the decidedly inferior Blackburn machine. BP's head, J.D.North was not very happy at all about the decision, apparently).

Regarding how highly favoured turrets were, Ludlow-Hewitt C-in-C Bomber Command, Tedder and Sholto Douglas wanted the DH.98 Mosquito to be built with a power operated tail turret and it was in this form that the go ahead to procure it was made - it was only after Liptrot had agreed to a night fighter variant, to which a spec was written specifically for the Mossie, that an order came through for production - GdeH was pressing on with the unarmed 'concept demonstrator' despite the turret armed aircraft; Freeman stepped in in favour of this. So, tall and short of it was that the power operated turret as a defensive weapon was an advanced concept, so high up in official circles, it was the way to go, and the concept of a turret armed fighter fit in with what was considered advanced at the time- the primary bomber contracts, B.12/36 and P.13/36 specified turrets - that is, until the shooting started.

Perhaps bringing BP into the mix might make more sense if the firm was allowed to build its own naval fighters; there was a variant of the Defiant proposed as a carrier fighter, the P.85 Sea Defiant _without_ a turret and fitted with forward firing guns. Alec Brew in his book The Defiant File argues that had the P.85 been built instead of the Roc, the FAA would have had an effective single seat fighter that would have meant there was no need for the Fulmar, Sea Gladiator _or_ the Sea Hurricane.

I see what you are trying to do Tomo; in an ideal world an earlier Sea Hurricane could have been a benefit as the war progressed, certainly in the Mediterranean. The big problem the RN was faced with was a shortage of aircraft of any type - there simply weren't enough Fulmars, Gladiators or Skuas to go round and I doubt that would have changed had the Sea Hurricane entered service earlier. One issue that might have had to have changed was that the Sea Hurricane didn't have a folding wing. This would have been a benefit in the small spaces of British carriers.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 17, 2016)

While replacing the "Roc" with something better (that means most anything) is a popular notion it actually changes very little since the Roc was only built to the tune 136 aircraft and it was decided to use it for target towing and other 2nd line (or 3rd line) duties before the shooting even started. Due to a shortage of aircraft it was issued to a few squadrons for combat use. Please note that there were few, if any, all Roc squadrons. They were usually used by mixed squadrons, one or more flights using another type of aircraft (many times the Skua). It only went to sea (issued to squadrons on an AIrcraft carrier) for a few weeks during the Norwegian campaign on the Ark Royal. It may have failed to engage any German aircraft at this time. Either lack of opportunity or lack of performance being the cause/s. It did engage and succeed in shooting down one German aircraft at the time of Dunkirk but these aircraft were from a shore based squadron.

In 1937-39 (and later) the British were short of nearly everything, engines, propellers, .303 Browning guns, decent incendiary ammunition and so on.
If you want 120-130 additional Hurricanes you need 120-130 more Merlins from somewhere. They won't come from Roc production.
120-130 fewer Defiant's? 120-130 fewer Fairey Battles? (nice idea the last, but it means if you build 120 Sea Hurricanes in 1939 you have 8 to 10 fewer squadrons in Bomber Command To send to France or use for other things until more bombers can be built or bought. Bomber (and fighter) squadrons can transition from one aircraft to another much, much faster than creating them out of thin air (even if you have men sitting in replacement pools). It takes time for men to work together as a team and getting the ground crew functioning as a team is just as important as training the aircrew.

If you are short of .303 Brownings then while it is easy to say that an 8 gun fighter is superior to a 4 gun fighter but gets a bit more complicated when you are comparing 60 eight gun fighters to 120 4 gun fighters. Or you build the eight gun fighters and only put 4 guns in each one and hope the shooting doesn't start until the supply situation improves.

The Airframe factories built pretty much just the airframes, not only the engines/props but the landing gear and brakes came from outside suppliers. Even hydraulic pistons for flaps may come from outside suppliers. Very often too many such parts were already in the supply line when the test flights (or first operational flights) revealed a particular design was less than promised ( and a _lot less _than what was wanted) but stopping production left piles of unused, very expensive specially made parts/component assembles that _cannot _be used on the alternative design/s.

They Roc, in all probability should never have built in the numbers it was, But the alternative to the Roc was more Skua's, not Hurricanes. Same or similar engine/prop, much of the fuselage and wings were the same, Similar or identical landing gear. 

As far as the Sea Gladiator goes, only 60 were built for the RN, another 22-38 (accounts differ) were transferred and modified from RAF stocks (or contracts). The First Sea Gladiator II (RN contract) was delivered in Dec of 1938. Sea Gladiator IIs used a metal _fixed pitch _3 blade propeller. No help there for a 'super' Sea Hurricane. During the war several Gladiators were fitted with Mercury engines from Blenheims and their associated 2 pitch props. 

The RN only had 7 carriers in operation when the war broke out and that includes the Argus (converted pre WW I Ocean Liner, 20 knots, 18 air craft), the Eagle ( converted Pre WW I battleship hull, 24 kts 21-30 aircraft) and the Hermes (ordered in 1917 as the first ship _designed _as an aircraft carrier, 25 knots, 20 aircraft) 
Only the Ark Royal was less than 15 years old.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 18, 2016)

The FAA procured 136 of 4-gun Rocs and then decided to barely deploy them, perhaps it is better to have ~100 Sea Hurricanes not just produced, but actually deployed. If you have a small number of decks, each housing a small number of aircraft, a good bet would be to have excellent types aboard? 
The <200 of Rocs and Sea Gladiators produced are a big number when talking about FAA procurements before ww2 started.

3200+ of Battles and Defiants were produced, Hawker also produced 200 Henleys, all 3400+ before 1941. Toss in the Hurricanes and Spitfires produced, plus Fulmars and Merlin-powered Whitleys - looks to me that Merlin production was excellent even in the darkest days of 1940.

Again - for all the changes to take effect in 1940, the decision must be laid down in ~1937.


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## stona (Jan 18, 2016)

The concept of a turret fighter was very popular in British RAF and Air Ministry circles in the 1930s. At a meeting of 1938, for which I have seen an extract of the minutes somewhere, but can't find them, it was being proposed to replace fixed gun fighters at home and abroad, with turret fighters, in the next three years. The fixed gun fighter was deemed only to have an advantage over the turret fighter in home defence because no defensive armament was required. Note the year 1938! This makes it rather unlikely that any turret fighter programme would have be cancelled a year before this.

The first concerns about the performance of a turret fighter, in this case the Defiant, that I can find were raised in January 1940. That's why I raised 1940. It's the earliest date that anyone started to doubt the concept and therefore the earliest date that even a chance of a change of priority regarding the types might arise.

The cancellation of any turret fighter programme in 1937 (the first Defiant flew for the first time on 11th August that year) is pure 'what iffery' and bears no relation to historic events. You can't expect an entire concept, popular and backed by senior figures at the Air Ministry and RAF, to be cancelled before the principal prototype has even been assessed. Again that would require the vision of hindsight, to understand just how badly the concept was to fail. In an alternate history it might have done quite well, attacking unescorted Luftwaffe bombers, but that too is 'what iffery'.

With hindsight it would make sense to never develop any turret fighters at all, I think we agree on that. The problem is that given the prevalent views of the time there was never the will or opportunity to do this.
Whether the production capacity released had the turret fighters been cancelled might have been used to produce more aircraft, Sea Hurricanes or others, for the Navy is another difficult issue. I suspect that given priorities in 1939/40 that it is the RAF which would have benefited.

I'd be very interested to know whether the Navy expressed an earlier interest in the Sea Hurricane. Naval aviation seems to have been largely neglected and misunderstood by most senior officers at the Admiralty. Had they been offered such an aircraft would they have been interested? Ultimately they might have been cajoled into taking it, but that's a different scenario.
Did any naval commander ever write to his bosses saying that he needed Sea Hurricanes? Was it ever even mooted at the Admiralty? If you don't ask, particularly when there are competing demands from other Services, you don't get.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Jan 18, 2016)

Admiralty policy at the beginning of WW2 was that AA gunnery would protect its ships and therefore the Fleet Air Arm did not require interceptor fighters for Fleet Defence against air attack.
The first time this policy was questioned, by Churchill, was when Ark Royal, accompanied by the Home Fleet, sailed into the North Sea and was 'near missed' (according to Crosley) by the Luftwaffe. We are already past 1937 by several years. It was too late for Churchill to alter the composition of the Fleet Air Arm immediately, to provide interceptor fighters. All he could do was suggest that the Fleet's AA gunners be provided with more realistic, faster, practice targets. 
By 1942/3 it was agreed that AA gunnery was really a last resort against a skilful air attack and that fighters operated from carriers with radar direction combined with strikes against adjacent enemy air fields or carriers was the only sure defence. The Pacific war provides absolute proof of this.
For the decision to provide the RN with interceptor fighters and radar control in 1937, at least five years earlier, to have been made would have required more than hindsight. It would have required a TARDIS. It would also have needed a fundamental change in RN doctrine and procurement plans, which is probably less likely than finding Dr Who and borrowing that TARDIS.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 18, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> The FAA procured 136 of 4-gun Rocs and then decided to barely deploy them, perhaps it is better to have ~100 Sea Hurricanes not just produced, but actually deployed. If you have a small number of decks, each housing a small number of aircraft, a good bet would be to have excellent types aboard?
> The <200 of Rocs and Sea Gladiators produced are a big number when talking about FAA procurements before ww2 started.
> 
> 3200+ of Battles and Defiants were produced, Hawker also produced 200 Henleys, all 3400+ before 1941. Toss in the Hurricanes and Spitfires produced, plus Fulmars and Merlin-powered Whitleys - looks to me that Merlin production was excellent even in the darkest days of 1940.



The point I was trying to make is that in 1938-39 Merlin production was pretty well spoken for and that the RAF was trying to add many more squadrons as fast as they could. As always timing is everything or darn close.

From Wiki. 

RR Derby: 
The existing Rolls-Royce facilities at Osmaston, Derby were not suitable for large-scale engine production although the floor space had been increased by some 25% between 1935 and 1939; 

RR Crewe:
To meet the increasing demand for Merlin engines, Rolls-Royce started building work on a new factory at Crewe in May 1938, with engines leaving the factory in 1939..... Production at Crewe was originally planned to use unskilled labour and sub-contractors with which Hives felt there would be no particular difficulty, but the number of required sub-contracted parts such as crankshafts, camshafts and cylinder liners eventually fell short and the factory was expanded to manufacture these parts "in house"
..Initially the local authority promised to build 1,000 new houses to accommodate the workforce by the end of 1938, but by February 1939 it had only awarded a contract for 100. Hives was incensed by this complacency and threatened to move the whole operation.........

RR Glasgow:
This government-funded and -operated factory was built at Hillington starting in June 1939 with workers moving into the premises in October, one month after the outbreak of war, the factory becoming fully occupied by September 1940.....Unlike the Derby and Crewe plants which relied significantly on external subcontractors, it produced almost all the Merlin's components itself.[70] Engines began to leave the production line in November 1940, and by June 1941 monthly output had reached 200, increasing to more than 400 per month by March 1942.

Ford at Tafford Park:
....building work on a new factory was started in May 1940 on a 118-acre (48 ha) site. Built with two distinct sections to minimise potential bomb damage, it was completed in May 1941 and bombed in the same month.

Excellent production in Sept of 1940 was by no means a sure thing in 1938 or early 1939. Engine production per month may have been 1/4-1/3 per month in summer/fall of 1939 what it was in the fall of 1940. 
If you want Squadrons at sea (trained squadrons) in the spring of 1940 the planes (at least the first few dozen) would have to leave the factory/s by the end of 1939 in order to give the squadrons time to train/work up. 

In Sept 1939 total British aircraft carrier capacity was under 260 planes between the 7 carriers. The Illustrious class, 4 laid down in 1937, would have been replacements for 3-4 of the earlier carriers if the war had not broken out until several years later, not additions to bring the carrier total to 11. The British were looking for multi-role aircraft for their carriers, not specialist aircraft. 

You also have to consider what would have happened if war had broken out sooner. The Roc was late but Several squadrons still Had Hawker Nimrods on Strength in early part of 1939. And by the way, the Nimrod could carry four 20lb bombs which, while pathetic by 1940 standards, was pretty impressive in 1932 and rather useful for attacking wooden pirate ships in the China sea. 
Bomb load of a 1939 Sea Hurricane with a fixed pitch prop would have been ?????


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## tomo pauk (Jan 18, 2016)

stona said:


> Admiralty policy at the beginning of WW2 was that AA gunnery would protect its ships and therefore the Fleet Air Arm did not require interceptor fighters for Fleet Defence against air attack.



Admirality went for FAA got Skuas to serve also as fighters, they/Air Ministry/RN/whoever purchased Roc and Fulmar, Sea Gladiator, so I'd say that Admirality's policy envolved fighters very much for Fleet defense.



> The first time this policy was questioned, by Churchill, was when Ark Royal, accompanied by the Home Fleet, sailed into the North Sea and was 'near missed' (according to Crosley) by the Luftwaffe. We are already past 1937 by several years. It was too late for Churchill to alter the composition of the Fleet Air Arm immediately, to provide interceptor fighters. All he could do was suggest that the Fleet's AA gunners be provided with more realistic, faster, practice targets.
> By 1942/3 it was agreed that AA gunnery was really a last resort against a skilful air attack and that fighters operated from carriers with radar direction combined with strikes against adjacent enemy air fields or carriers was the only sure defence. The Pacific war provides absolute proof of this.



Again, no need to wait for 1940 and Churchill, let alone 1943 and outcomes of Pacific battles - instead of non-performers with half a weapon battery, negotiate the purchase a performer with full battery, before the war.



> For the decision to provide the RN with interceptor fighters and radar control in 1937, at least five years earlier, to have been made would have required more than hindsight. It would have required a TARDIS. It would also have needed a fundamental change in RN doctrine and procurement plans, which is probably less likely than finding Dr Who and borrowing that TARDIS.
> Cheers
> Steve



I'm not sure why involving TARDIS here? To tell the Admirality that 320+ mph is better than 220-250 mph, or that 8 guns is better than 4 guns? To tell them that one crew member is easier to train and replace than two crew members, for doing the same job?
'Hurricane + no radar' is far a better proposal than 'Gladiator + no radar', that got involved here also for no reason.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 18, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> The point I was trying to make is that in 1938-39 Merlin production was pretty well spoken for and that the RAF was trying to add many more squadrons as fast as they could. As always timing is everything or darn close.
> .....
> Excellent production in Sept of 1940 was by no means a sure thing in 1938 or early 1939. Engine production per month may have been 1/4-1/3 per month in summer/fall of 1939 what it was in the fall of 1940.
> If you want Squadrons at sea (trained squadrons) in the spring of 1940 the planes (at least the first few dozen) would have to leave the factory/s by the end of 1939 in order to give the squadrons time to train/work up.
> ...



Thanks for the Merlin production overwiev. I agree that it would need to have them in service by late 1939 in order to have them in combat by Spring of 1940.
Since Sea Gadiator and Roc were capable to carry zero bombs, the bomb-less Sea Hurricane is no worse than either. If the war broke sooner, that also means that those two 'performers' are non factors.


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## stona (Jan 18, 2016)

The Roc was still really a bomber, or would you fit racks and brakes to your fleet defence fighter? It could still carry bombs, you could say it was a proto-fighter bomber . The Roc had more in common with it's dive bomber brother the Skua than a modern fighter, indeed it was cleared for 70 degree dive bombing. It's typical under wing load was to be 250lb SAP bombs(for use against shipping) or 100lb anti submarine bombs. It didn't have any wing armament. To understand the enthusiasm for the Roc and other turret fighters an appreciation of the WW1 concept of 'no allowance shooting', what we would call zero deflection, on expected fighter tactics is required. The thinking behind the Roc's design was heavily influenced by the Royal Navy's belief that the fleet at sea would be able to defend itself from air attack by anti-aircraft fire. The Navy invested considerable amounts in this policy; building and converting a whole range of "anti-aircraft cruisers" that were designed to put up an impenetrable barrage of AA, as I alluded to above.
Thinking in the 1930s was confused. The chance of air-to-air interception was nigh on impossible given the increasingly short times between hostile formations being visually spotted and when they mounted their attacks. Until seaborne radar gave early warning (and in 1937 you would need that TARDIS again) this is a valid point
At one point the Air Ministry became convinced that there was no point for fighters being aboard aircraft aboard carriers at all. This was compounded by the newly independent RAF assuring anyone who would listen that it could provide ground-based fighter cover, wherever the fleet was deployed, this was optimistic to put it mildly.
There was serious consideration given to equipping the carriers only with strike types. The need for some form of defensive fighters was eventually conceded, resulting in the Roc but the bombing capability of the Roc was retained, reflecting the general attitude and confused thinking which would remain in to the late 1930s.

Now we need to clarify the timeline.
The Fulmar was developed as a fighter from another light bomber, the P4/34, not yet the Battle. It was a response to the failure of the Roc. It was developed under an emergency programme. It first flew on 4 January 1940 and was delivered to its first squadron in May. Within two months it had replaced the Roc and the Rocs hardly saw any action during the war, unlike the Fulmars.
According to the FAA website, "Only one Roc was reported to have been involved in combat between 1939-1945, this was when on 21 June 1940 a Roc flown by Sub Lt AVM Day and NA 1 F Berry from 801 squadron took part in an attack on a gunnery battery at Cap Blanc Nez, near Calais. The aircraft was shot down smoking by HA fire and both of the crew killed."
The RN specification was for a fighter carrying eight .303 machine guns but with a six-hour endurance at 138 mph for patrol duties or three hours at 175 mph for escort duties. The need for a single 250lb bomb was also stipulated. The Fulmar I could reach 265mph at 7500ft (on a good day!). The four-hours and 45 minute endurance was adequate and the .303 guns were fed by trays containing 750 rounds per gun. Hurricanes only carried 334. A Sea Hurricane could not have matched most of these requirements. It is often forgotten that though the Fulmar was heavy it was also strong and capable of a 400+mph dive. Careful positioning of patrols by fighter direction officers often enabled Fulmars to use an altitude advantage to make diving attacks on enemy formations. In pre-radar days the Sea Hurricane would not have had the endurance to mount CAPs over the fleet, and could never have made any interceptions.The conversion of the P4/34 was expected to procede quickly, but it was delays in this that led to the order for the Sea Gladiators, they remain a red herring in this discussion and were only ever intended as a stop gap between the Roc and Fulmar..
The Fulmar was never expected to meet enemy fighters, shades of the Defiant here. It actually did okay against the opposition it was planned to meet, like the Italian torpedo bombers in the Mediterranean. By the time it was finally withdrawn in 1943 the Fulmar had been credited with 122 victories. It had also produced nine FAA aces for the loss in air to air combat of just 16 of its own.

The Navy never anticipated the need for a high performance fighter to act as fleet defence until it was too late. Unfortunately the war did not pan out as the planners had intended. What it got, in double quick time, was the Fulmar which exceeded or met its own requirements.

Cheers

Steve

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## parsifal (Jan 18, 2016)

The RN had more than its share of misconceptions that held back its aircraft development, plus there were underlying and bitter rivalries that would prevent access to the high performance RAF designs for several years.

Oe of the biggest misconceptions was that for navigation reasons single seat fighters could not be used in over water situations. the second, related to this was that the RN had to accept multi roles for their aircraft, and for its fighters their primary role was recon. It was not until after April 1940 that the idea that a fighter could provide air defence over the fleet was accepted. another big misconception was that high performance fighters could not operate from the heaving deck of a carrier.

This last misconception came crashing down after Norway. During the evacuation in June, despite the RAF pilots flying hurricanes around Narvik having no carrier quals, poor weather, and flying hurricanes with no arrester gear or other navalised equipment, these guys bravely and successfully landed all the still operational hurricanes onto the deck of HMS Glorious. it was a massive eye opener for the RN, immediately blowing away some of the more ridiculous prejudices that until then had stood in the way of the Sea hurricanes. thereafter the RN moved as fast as it could, but around this time it was the old foe, the RAF that dug in and for a while refused to provide the necessary resources for the conversions....

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## nuuumannn (Jan 18, 2016)

> The first concerns about the performance of a turret fighter, in this case the Defiant, that I can find were raised in January 1940. That's why I raised 1940. It's the earliest date that anyone started to doubt the concept and therefore the earliest date that even a chance of a change of priority regarding the types might arise.



True, Steve. The Defiant's and any other turret fighters' real weakness was in its forward speed, but then again, as a bomber destroyer it didn't need to be able to catch up with single seaters. Interestingly enough despite reservations with the concept and 264 Sqn's redesignation as a night fighter unit at the end of August 1940, the Air Ministry wasn't finished with the turret fighter and F.18/40, dated 31st October 1940 for a fixed gun, two-seat night fighter was amended on 9 December to include a power operated turret. The only hardware to come from this, apart from a de Havilland Mosquito gun turret mock up on the prototype, was a couple of Beaufighters, which were fitted with a Boulton Paul turret. Beaufighter V R2274 actually saw active service with 406 Sqn and was taken on patrol on 4 September 1941. Trials were unsuccessful as it was found that the turret armed Beaufighter was slower than the Defiants it was meant to replace.



> The FAA procured 136 of 4-gun Rocs and then decided to barely deploy them, perhaps it is better to have ~100 Sea Hurricanes not just produced, but actually deployed.



The question to be asked here is, why get Boulton Paul to build Sea Hurricanes instead of Rocs (the Rocs' tail sections were built by General Aircraft) when BP could build the Sea Defiant, which was to use jigs and components from a type that was already in production in its own factory, thus speeding up the production process and getting the aircraft into service earlier. Actual Defiant production was held up because of the turret delays, so air frames were rolling off the production line with no turrets. Because the Sea Defiant had fixed forward firing guns, this wouldn't be an issue.


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## stona (Jan 19, 2016)

When the Rocs were ordered, they were not intended as an out and out fleet defence fighter. They were a horrible compromise and it seems to have been acknowledged by 1938 when a secondary role, in which they would be handed over en masse to the RAF for use as trainers was suggested. Only 133, excluding prototypes, were ordered (compared with 600 Fulmars).
It was this realisation that the Roc was unlikely to prove useful as a combat aircraft that led to the emergency programme to develop the Fulmar, and the stop gap conversion of the Gladiator. Once the penny dropped there was simply no time to develop a completely new carrier aircraft. The Hurricane was completely unsuited to naval operations in any of the required naval roles, reconnaissance, strike/escort of strike aircraft or, later, fleet defence. This would explain why the Navy had no interest in it in the 1930s. It's lack of endurance meant that until radar control systems had matured it couldn't be used in the role in which it would eventually prove useful, fleet defence.
Finally, the Sea Hurricane in the wildest 'what ifs' could only ever have been a substitute for the Fulmar, not the Roc, and any attempt to take Hurricanes out of the hands of the RAF at the time of the Battle of France, as the Fulmars were being delivered, was doomed to fail.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 19, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> ....
> The question to be asked here is,* why get Boulton Paul to build Sea Hurricanes instead of Rocs* (the Rocs' tail sections were built by General Aircraft) when BP could build the Sea Defiant, which was to use jigs and components from a type that was already in production in its own factory, thus speeding up the production process and getting the aircraft into service earlier. Actual Defiant production was held up because of the turret delays, so air frames were rolling off the production line with no turrets. Because the Sea Defiant had fixed forward firing guns, this wouldn't be an issue.



It is Sea Hurricane's thread, that's why 
But I agree that a Sea Defiant, presumably a single seater with 8-12 guns would be a very useful fighter.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 19, 2016)

Was there any action/battle the RN Carriers took part in or fought in 1939 or 1940 where swapping the existing fighters for an early Sea Hurricane would have made _any _difference to the outcome?

RN Carriers tended to be deployed singly in the early part of the war. Not in groups although pairs were sometimes used on certain operations. Given the size of the air groups having 12 serviceable fighters might be a luxury. 

Ark Royal had by far the largest air group; From Wiki:


72 (designed)
50–60 (actual)
1939–40: 26 × Fairey Swordfish, 24 ×Blackburn Skuas
1940–41: 30 × Fairey Swordfish, 12 × Blackburn Skuas, 12 × Fairey Fulmars
1941: 36 × Fairey Swordfish, 18 × Fairey Fulmars

Balance that against the Eagle's air group in Feb 1941 in the Med when she provided the air defense for the RN units operating in the western Med after the Illustrious was damaged. ----
 the ship carried nine Fairey Fulmars of 805 Squadron, five Sea Gladiators and six Swordfish. By Feb 1942 and after many travels, operations and a refit she got *four *Sea Hurricanes in her air group, however the size of the elevators on the Eagle meant the Hurricanes had to stay on deck as with their non folding wings they were too big to be taken below.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 19, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Was there any action/battle the RN Carriers took part in or fought in 1939 or 1940 where swapping the existing fighters for an early Sea Hurricane would have made _any _difference to the outcome?



Certaily not in 1939, perhaps in 1940, certainly in 1941-42.



Shortround6 said:


> the ship carried nine Fairey Fulmars of 805 Squadron, five Sea Gladiators and six Swordfish. By Feb 1942 and after many travels, operations and a refit she got *four *Sea Hurricanes in her air group, however the size of the elevators on the Eagle meant the Hurricanes had to stay on deck as with their non folding wings they were too big to be taken below.



With Sea Hurricanes in the design pipeline from, say, 1938, it is not a great stretch to have folding wing Sea Hurricane by 1942, if not 1941.


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## stona (Jan 19, 2016)

The first Sea Hurricanes were delivered to the RN in early 1941 and were operational with No. 880 Sqn by March so your time line is now bearing some resemblance to reality.
Of the 440 Sea Hurricanes delivered to the RN, 380 were conversions from RAF Hurricanes which were no longer needed by that Service.
The first Hurricanes to go to sea were in all senses disposable. A Hurricane with a wing fold is more pie in the sky. The vast majority were rather simple conversions which a wing folding mechanism is not. It was the Spitfire that eventually got that in the form of a Seafire III. I'm no fan of the Seafire, but in the air it was a much more capable aircraft than any version of the Hurricane, which is why it started to replace them as soon as it became available.
Oddly the last Sea Hurricanes in the RN inventory were returned to the RAF shortly after the war! They hadn't been operational for about 18 months by then.
Cheers
Steve


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## Timppa (Jan 19, 2016)

How about licence built F2A-1 from 1940 with:
- Reinforced landing gear
- Seat armor
- R-1820-40 (F2A-2) engine

IMO much better than early Sea Hurricanes


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## stona (Jan 19, 2016)

For the RN, had it been looking for a fleet defence fighter early enough, this would make theoretical sense. It certainly comes closer to the requirements than a Hurricane.
Whether it would ever have been possible to build them under license in the UK is another question. I'm not sure it would have been possible, they would have been purchased to British specifications, and soon all those surplus Hurricanes were available. Some Sea Hurricane conversions were originally built in 1938.
Later the British were none too happy with the version of the 'Buffalo' they purchased although your guys seem to have done okay with theirs 
I'd have to read up on the different versions, but from memory the export versions for Britain were heavier, to meet British specifications, and less powerful.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 19, 2016)

A bigger help to the RN carriers would have been better policy and tactics. 

Courageous was lost to a U-boat, the very thing she was supposed to hunting. Using fleet carriers with a few destroyers as escort as anti sub patrols given the sensors and weapons of 1939 was, shall we say in understatement, stupid. 

Glorious was lost returning from Norway when she ran into the German battlecruisers. Only two destroyers for "escort" and *NO planes * in the air for recon even though the weather was good. She did have several flyable planes on board. Seems somebody forgot what one of the basic duties of an aircraft carrier was. 

Not sure what a modified Defiant brings to the table. Slightly smaller wing and slightly heavier airframe than the Hurricane= higher stall speed. Adding more armament than the Hurricane carried just makes things worse. There is a reason the Fulmar had 342 sq ft of wing. Fulmars acted as long range spotters during the Bismark chase, something the Sea Hurricane or Sea Defiant could not do.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 19, 2016)

Timppa said:


> How about licence built F2A-1 from 1940 with:
> - Reinforced landing gear
> - Seat armor
> - R-1820-40 (F2A-2) engine
> ...



You might want to add self sealing tanks..........and so starts the Weight spiral 

Engine in the F2A-2 added at least 100lbs and required a new propeller. The F2A-1 used an engine without reduction gear to the prop. F2A-2 used a reduction gear and a larger slower turning prop.


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## parsifal (Jan 19, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Was there any action/battle the RN Carriers took part in or fought in 1939 or 1940 where swapping the existing fighters for an early Sea Hurricane would have made _any _difference to the outcome?
> 
> RN Carriers tended to be deployed singly in the early part of the war. Not in groups although pairs were sometimes used on certain operations. Given the size of the air groups having 12 serviceable fighters might be a luxury.


 
Actually it might. Including some that they could not fight because they did not have an adequate "high performance" fighter to protect the fleet. This wasnt the pacific, 12 fighters over the fleet was a huge number for the RN, and would be decisive in most of the fights they had to fight. EAGLE, for example, went to war in June 1940, with just 3 ex RAF Gladiators hastily lashed up so that they could be called "Sea Gladiators". ILLUSTRIOUS entered the MTO with no fighters, then before Taranto received either 6 or 8 Fulmars, among the first to be operated from a carrier. These pitifully weak fighter complements were enough until October to provide a credible threat to the high level bombers of the RA, until more credible fighter components to the CAGs started to become available . But as the months rolled by the RN learned that fighters were in fact critical to the fleet defence problem and complements steadily ramped up as new deliveries, and more importantly, pilots, became available. Without adequate fighter components, the carriers after January could not operate safely in enemy dominated waters. Malta at that time was the key. Without control of Malta, North Africa was probably untenable, without North Afrtica, though they didnt realize it at the time the western allies stood to lose some very vital interests 

Over ILLUSTRIOUS in the following January, there were just 2 Fulmars in position over the fleet, out of a 4 plane standing patrol. The other two had been allowed to go off on a wild goose chase, pursuing now unimportant pair of SM 79s that had been deployed ahead of FKX for the specific purpose of drawing off the CAP. 5 more were on the deck, and were scrambled 4 mins before the first bombs were dropped. The first hits were registered on the carrier 6 minutes after scramble had been ordered, but the Fukmars from any of these sources never made it to the attacking heights of the stukas. The Stukas were pushing into their dives from a tight clover formation at 10000 feet, basically peeling off one at a time down to 7000 feet to get the speed up levelling off for a few seconds to get the aiming point corrected, before re-entering their divesat virtually point blank height. They were pulling out of their dives after bomb release at heights as low as 1500 ft. Of the 6 Fulmars that got airborne and into the fight (1 didnt make it off the deck and 2 others were just too late), only one could make any attacks at the 7000 ft aiming height, none could attack at the 10000 height, the rest were bottom feeders attacking the stukas either in the dive or just after it. 

With a climb rate of just 1200 feet per min, the Fulmars did not have a good day. Exchange the Fulmars for Hurricanes, and I think the situation will be different. Top speed will be about 50 mph greater, and climb rate about 800 ft per min higher. In that same situation , the initial standing patrol, all four of them can be at the 10000 feet approach height, and be engaging for about 2 mins. This might be long enough for the bottom feeders to gain height, to engage at the 7000 feet aiming waypoint, and give the last 2 fighters time to at least do something to the tail of the attack. 

This is just one incident, I cangive repeat examples all through 1941 in which the Sea Hurricane, if it had been deployed in numbers, and with wing folding would have made a measurable difference to RN operations. Unquestionably so.


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## stona (Jan 19, 2016)

The RN had Sea Hurricanes in 1941, it just didn't have them where they were needed. I'm not sure some of the timings for the attack on Illustrious quite add up. Though Cunningham had an hours warning of the attack by intercepted radio traffic he could hardly have sent Hurricanes, with such limited endurance, up to perform standing patrols.

10.06. 5 Fulmars take of from Illustrious and climb to 14,000ft. About an hour later they drive of a group of Italian aircraft that approach in a half hearted way.

12.00 1 Fulmar returns to Illustrious with combat damage, 2 have expended all their ammunition and will shortly allight, 2 have expended half their ammunition.

12.20 a pair of SM 79s fly in low causing Illustrious to swing out of line to comb torpedo tracks. The remaining 2 Fulmars pursue them towards Sicily.

12.28 Sub flight of Fulmars is ranged, ready on deck, scheduled to take off at 12.35

12.30 Radar reports of an enemy formation reach Boyd, Lyster and Cunningham.

12.34 Cunningham orders Illustrious to alter course and fly off her aircraft. The first is off by 12.35

12.36 A large group of aircraft is sighted of Illustrious' port quarter and both her and the fleet's AA batteries commence firing. At this point the Fulmars (or your Sea Hurricanes) are just taking off or have just taken off.

12.38 First bomb strikes Illustrious,

The rest, as they say, is history.
Many accounts say that the attack lasted for one hour, but from the time the first bomb struck Illustrious at 12.28 and the fourth, from the second wave of attacks (the one that hit the Fulmar on the after lift which then collapsed onto the hangar deck below) at 12.40 only 12 minutes had elapsed.
It was only the third wave of attackers that were finally engaged by the Fulmars which had been on deck 16 minutes earlier and they certainly weren't at 20,000ft! They were described as being 'still below the last wave of Stukas' but their pilots ' drove their machines against [the Ju 87s] disrupting the precision of the final part of the German assault.'.

Had Sea Hurricanes rather than Fulmars taken off at around 12.35 I can't see how they could have done much against the first attack, nor the second, either. From first radar report of the enemy formation to first bomb striking Illustrious was just 8 minutes.

Cheers

Steve

I've just read that Captain Boyd considered launching those Fulmars at 12.28, a full seven minutes early. He didn't because he had standing orders from Cunningham expressly forbidding him from turning into the wind on his own initiative. He needed the express permission of the C-in-C and this would be forthcoming at 12.35 automatically. Seven minutes is not a lot, but significant. On such small things do the outcome of battles depend.


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## parsifal (Jan 19, 2016)

Times wise I don't really have any disagreement, though there are differences of detail. We are both reading the same report, so the broad facts seem similar enough to me. I should point out that there are actually three contemporary reports relating to the attacks that day, none of them fully correlate and Boyds timing does seem a little off when compared to the more contemporary reports of the time. Boyds report was not finalised until 11 days after the attacks, so he was working from quite old memories by then.

Its the interpretation of that data that makes it interesting.

The important question in the context of this discussion is whether Sea Hurricanes instead of Fulmars might have done better. it depends if they could get into action or not. The first hits were indeed at 12:38 (according to Boyd, about 2 mins later according to the other contemporary reports), and the fact they achieved so many hits in such a short space of time is revealing in itself, and the very point of it. They achieved that many because the fleet at that moment was defenceless. Exactly where each of the elements of the CAP were is revealing and telling of this situation. There were already 4 in the standing patrol at 12:34, and another 5 were scrambled once Cunningham gave the order to do so. Of these 4, 2 had chased the SM-79s too far, expended their ammunition and were returning to the carrier. These were the only guys to get into action against the Ju87s at the heights above 7000 ft, and then only to make threatening passes because they were out of ammo.

the others, as you say had only 4 mins to gain the height they needed, and at 1200 ft per min, that puts them at a maximum height of 3600 ft before the first bombs were dropping and a maximum theoretical altitude of 7200 feet at the end of that critical 12 mins,

Exchange the Fulmar for hurricane MkIs using the climb data I got from this site.....Hurricane Mk I Performance

and in theory at least those hurricanes could be at 5000 feet in 1.89 mins and 10000 feet in 3.63 mins... That means that in theory at least the hurricanes could have reached the form up height of the Ju87s, and be engaging from some distance from the carrier (because of the greater speed of the mount) than the fulmar equipped unit could ever hope for.

A more realistic what if outcome is that the Hurricanes reach the 7000 ft final aiming altitude an start to engage the Stukas from that point. A big part of the stukas success that day is that the main body could circle from a safe height without interference whilst one stuka at a time descended to the 7000 foot height, took time to line up, and then delivered each attack with absolute precision. Put even a few hurricanes at either of those altitudes, and the attack is going to be completely disrupted. Unquestionably. 

This very outcome was achieved 9 days later whilst ILLUSTRIOUS lay helpless in Malta harbour. 43 stukas attacked her, coming in at a height that was above the effective height of the flak curtain that was by that time in place around the carrier. The Ju-87s again attacked the ILLUSTRIOUS, the only difference being that this time the carrier was stationary (a plus for the attackers), had better flak defence (a big plus for the defenders, but it should be noted the flak was ineffective at the heights that the attacks were carried out), weather was better for the attackers...... and just 6 Hurricanes (and 3 Fulmars) that were in position and ready to defend the carrier. At least 10 ju87s were shot out of the sky, and the attackers were limited to a single hit, reflecting the greatly diminished accuracy of the bombers. Maybe these results were affected by sheer dumb luck, but at least the possibility that the hurricanes made a difference on that second occasion needs to be considered. For me, it is proof enough, just a few well placed fighters can be critical in the defence of the fleet, not because of the number of enemy destroyed, but because of the effect on bombing accuracy. Of course the density of the flak also has an effect in this equation.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 19, 2016)

> It is Sea Hurricane's thread, that's why



Ah, and here's me thinking we were discussing alternative scenarios to what actually happened. Despite the thread being about Sea Hurricanes, I still think that BP building Sea Defiants instead of Rocs would have been a more satisfactory outcome, for the reasons stated that the Hurricane was less suitable as a carrier aeroplane and the Sea Defiant, in whatever form it took would have been purpose built, would have been able to be deployed more quickly etc, etc, but since this is a Sea Hurricane thread, Tomo...


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## tomo pauk (Jan 19, 2016)

Don't get angry at me, I thought that title gave a rough bearing that Sea Hurricane is the main topic 
Could you please post why the Sea Defiant would be a better choice than the Sea Hurricane?


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## nuuumannn (Jan 19, 2016)

I'm not getting angry, Tomo; chill, brother.

To answer your question, I already have answered your question. let's say BP built the Sea Defiant instead of the Roc, it would have been in production and service before the Sea Hurricane, that is, if the decision to build Sea Hurricanes was made at the same time, so two alternate timelines running simultaneously here, because it was based on an existing design already in production in the same building using (some of) the same jigs, which also means getting it into production and service quicker since drawings were already made. The Sea Hurricane was not a proposition at all before the outbreak of war and therefore much would have had to be done to modify the basic design to be a workable naval fighter; it wouldn't simply be a stopgap as the real Sea Hurricane was.

And, as I pointed out, the argument has been already stated that if the Sea Defiant had gone into service, there would have been no need for either the Fulmar or the Sea Hurricane, as the FAA would have already had a single seat fighter/interceptor that had performance that could match its land based contemporaries.

Smile Tomo.

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## RCAFson (Jan 19, 2016)

Great website on FAA aircraft development and RN armoured carriers:

Fairey Fulmar: Development

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## nuuumannn (Jan 19, 2016)

Very interesting page, RCAFson; a goodie.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 19, 2016)

Thank you.


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## parsifal (Jan 19, 2016)

This article also seems relevant to this debate,

Hawker Sea Hurricane: Development

and doesn't paint the hurricane as a ship borne fighter in great terms I might add. It had severe limits, relating mostly to the limits on its endurance and poor deck handling and visibility characteristics

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## RCAFson (Jan 19, 2016)

A problem with the article on the Sea Hurricane is that it compares the HSH IB with the early Martlet which was lighter and had better endurance than the service version Martlet II or IV. In fact the HSH endurance was not that much worse than a Martlet II/IV and it considerably outperformed it. The HSH 1A (catapult fighter) lost only 1 pilot in 8 launches. From what I can determine the HSH IB had a better serviceability rate than the Martlet and was probably safer to land on than the Martlet. HMS Avenger, an escort carrier operated the HSH IB with an excellent safety record, even in Arctic conditions, so the HSH had to have very good deck landing performance.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

That's a good couple of articles. Unfortunately for the original proposition for the early adoption of Sea Hurricanes they reinforce the view that they were not even considered for carrier operations until 1940.

As far as interception of incoming attacks on the fleet, this depends very largely on detection ranges of the radar available at the time. I think we all agree that unlike a Fulmar a Hurricane lacked the endurance to perform standing patrols over the fleet and would have to be launched to meet an attack as an interceptor. Detection ranges, in practical use, were really not very good. They depended on many factors but the 30-50 miles theoretically possible seems practically to have been closer to 20-30 miles, giving 10 minutes warning on a good day. I seem to remember _Valiant_ reporting radar contacts at 43 miles on one occassion, but can't find the reference.

The real problem is getting fighters, any fighters, into the correct position in good time. This can be done by flying standing patrols over the fleet, requiring endurance, or by early detection, requiring good radar, command and control and a high performance interceptor. The RN had understandably gone for the former option in 1939/40. A couple of years later the latter became more viable.

Fighters could also be at the right place at the right time, largely by luck.
The undoubted ability of a few well positioned fighter to disrupt an attack was demonstrated on the day of the initial attack. _Illustrious _was making 18 knots towards Malta when, at about 16.00hrs Fliegerkorps X had another go. She was attacked by fifteen Ju 87s escorted by five Bf 110s.The attackers were intercepted by _Illustrious'_ own Fulmars who were fortuitously returning, refuelled and rearmed from Malta. Five Ju 87s were shot down but the one bomb that did hit the ship, close to an earlier hit on the after lift, very nearly did for her. At 17.30 Boyd seriously considered flooding the ships magazines following reports that the newly started fires were out of control and the pumps burnt out. He didn't and the ship did make Malta 4-5 hours later.

Cheers

Steve
.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

Thank you very much for the link.

The problem of small amount of fuel can be easily adressed by addinng 2 x 45 gal tanks, like historically used by Hurricanes. Relocating the radiator system from belly to under the reduction gear means it won't be sticking out that much down (thus making ditching characteristics acceptable); Hawker already has experience with Henley how to do it. 
Since the Hurricane II received another 4 Brownings (obviously with ammo), increase of ammo for 8 Brownings to 500 rpg does not look like a long shot.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 20, 2016)

The Martlet isnt the panacea some think it was the FAA had problems with early Martlets. The landing gear was too bouncy and needed work on it I presume better dampers or re-shimmed dampers to slow the rebound also I am sure I have read somewhere that the tail weaved from side to side when taking off or landing and the tailwheel needed modifying. This plus no folding wings, outdated gunsights and jam prone guns means the Martlet isnt ready for sea service till mid 41 at the very earliest. Its only in 42 the FAA gets properly sorted Martlets.

I find it baffling that so many people think you just get a crowbar open the crate, wheel out a factory fresh plane that none of the pilots or crew have ever seen before fill it with fuel and ammo and get straight into action. You might as well save time, shoot the pilot and set fire to the plane for all the good it will do in action.

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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

Normal loaded weight for a Hurricane I with a Merlin II was 6,218 lb (Merlin II went up to 6,447 with a Rotol propeller). The aircraft overload weight, tropicalised (Rotol again) with the extra 44 gallon tanks etc was 7,490 lb, over 1,000lb extra.
For the Sea Hurricanes Is the normal loaded weights were, IA 6,589lb, IB 7,410 lb, IC 7,605 lb. They are heavier to start with. I don't have figures handy for these aircraft overload weights, but a tropicalised IC weighed in at a hefty 8,210 pounds, an extra 600lb or so, which may give a clue.
The Fulmar weighed in at around 10,000lb IIRC.
It would be ill advised to compare the performance of the regular RAF operated Hurricanes with the Sea Hurricanes operated by the Navy. Rate of climb is critical in fleet defence and the laws of physics dictate that a similar aircraft with the same engine will climb slower when it is heavier.
Having the 44 gallon tanks under wing must have impacted top speed (already reduced in the Sea Hurricane) and manoeuvrability, but I haven't looked up the figures.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

The Sea Hurricane I featured Merlin III engines in all iterations. A great engine prior 1941, but not the best what was available from mid-1940 on. The Merlin XII is in production, from early 1941 the Merlin 45 and Merlin 30, that is before we consider the 2-speed supercharged Merlin XX that was installed in (Sea) Hurricane II.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 20, 2016)

We are back to timing, a better Sea Hurricane in the summer of 1940 or in the summer of 1941 or in the summer of 1942? 
Making the RN wait until 1942 for both 20mm cannon and Merlin XX engines was borderline criminal, and no, boosting Merlin IIIs to 16lbs wasn't really the answer. 
However that does't mean Hurricanes dunning on 87 octane and using fixed pitch props were suitable in 1939 either. 
The Merlin III, while allowed higher combat boost, was never cleared for the higher rpm and boost for max cruise and for climb that the later engines were. In combat you may have to do what you have to do, but running CAP patrols day in and day out when you are days (hundreds of miles) from spare aircraft, spare engines, and spare parts is not the time to be abusing engines. 
There is no technical reason Hurricane IIs could not have been used in 1941.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

Sea Hurricane in 1940 falls under 'earlier' catergory - Merlin III, fixed pitch prop replaced by 2-pitch and/or constant speed prop as availability allows. Once the better prop is there, take advantage of drop tank development from RAF.
By Summer of 1941 there is indedd no reason for not to have the better Sea Hurricane, including a better engine and maybe a relocated radiator (should also add a bit of speed), and by 1942 the folding wing version, with upped ammo count.



Shortround6 said:


> Making the RN wait until 1942 for both 20mm cannon and Merlin XX engines was borderline criminal, and no, boosting Merlin IIIs to 16lbs wasn't really the answer....
> There is no technical reason Hurricane IIs could not have been used in 1941.



Agreed all the way.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

A minor point, but the 44 gallon tanks were not drop tanks but auxiliary tanks. They were in fact factory fitted, though I would bet they could be removed in service.
Drop tanks were also made, but might not be a terribly practical idea given the limited size and space on most RN carriers.
This is a nice series of films


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBugc28Eqj0_

.







This screen grab, showing the tanks is from reel 3 (of 4)

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 20, 2016)

You do have to careful with the drop tank thing. 

as an illustration because I don't have the Hurricane numbers look at the P-40E. 

http://zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/P-40/P-40TOCLC.pdf

Adding 600lbs (8%) to the P-40 increased the take-off run by 100ft with a 40mph head wind (fleet carrier) and 150ft at 20mph (escort carrier/converted merchant ship), increasing another 600lbs (7.4%) added another 150ft with 40mph head wind and 200ft with a 20mph head wind. Or a roughly 16% increase in weight added 54% to the take-off run with a 20mph head wind. 
Please note that the performance numbers are for 0 degrees Celsius and/or 0 degrees F. which may work for arctic convoys or the north Atlantic in winter. The Med in summer is going to be a whole different story. 

Again this is just for illustration sake to show that adding 10% to weight doesn't change the take-off by 10% but a whole lot more. I will note that the chart is in 50ft increments so things _might_ not be as bad as they appear (but then they might be worse?) 

The Hurricane may very well be able to do it after it gets the Merlin XX engine, but drop tanks and earlier versions of the Merlin may be a bit doubtful. Using Merlin VIII or Merlin 30 engines (Fulmar engines) may get you off the deck but then saddles your Sea Hurricane with one of the same problem as the Fulmar, crap performance over 16,000ft (or a bit higher in the lighter Hurricane).


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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

stona said:


> A minor point, but the 44 gallon tanks were not drop tanks but auxiliary tanks. They were in fact factory fitted, though I would bet they could be removed in service.
> Drop tanks were also made, but might not be a terribly practical idea given the limited size and space on most RN carriers.
> This is a nice series of films



Thanks for the films.
The 44 gal tanks, that I've never mentoined as a good idea to extend the range of Sea Hurricanes, were indeed fixed, the 45 gal ones were drop tanks. Saying that there was a limited space to house the drop tanks reminds me of saying that there was not enough of space on American carriers to house the water-glycol mixture  
Though the Fulmar also used drop tanks.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> You do have to careful with the drop tank thing.
> 
> as an illustration because I don't have the Hurricane numbers look at the P-40E.



Check this out, found at the Sea Hurricane page at 'armoredcarriers' site: Sea Hurricane data sheet. It needs 520 yds to clear 50 ft obstacle, at max weight that includes 2x45 gal DTs, do wind over deck. With 20 kt wind, 400 ft, with 30 kt wind t is 270 ft (obvioulsy no obstacle).



> The Hurricane may very well be able to do it after it gets the Merlin XX engine, but drop tanks and earlier versions of the Merlin may be a bit doubtful. Using Merlin VIII or Merlin 30 engines (Fulmar engines) may get you off the deck but then saddles your Sea Hurricane with one of the same problem as the Fulmar, crap performance over 16,000ft (or a bit higher in the lighter Hurricane).



The Merlin XII or 45 wouldn't look too shabby either, take off power is greater by 300 HP vs. Merlin III.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

American carriers were a lot bigger than RN carriers. All the arguments I've seen against the storing of Glycol, including space, are unconvincing.

The Fulmar II could carry a 60 gallon *auxiliary tank*. The pilot's notes describe it as such and the fuel system diagram represents the tank in broken lines with the qualification 'if fitted'. It was a self sealing tank and, according to the notes, it was possible to jettison this tank _in an emergency._ It was* NOT a drop tank*, and there was no need to store a supply of these tanks on the carrier. The tank, if fitted, was part of the aircraft.
In any case you'll struggle to find a picture of a Fulmar carrying the auxiliary tank. It had 4+ hours endurance on internal fuel and the extra that the auxiliary supply would give doesn't often seem to have been deemed necessary. I've never seen a picture of a Fulmar carrying an extra tank in the Mediterranean, but will happily be corrected.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

I know that Americans have had mostly bigger carriers, but then a force of, say, 10 Sea Hurricanes will need half of drop tanks that were needed for 20 F4F-4s.
The Hurricane with 2 drop tanks will have range of 1030 miles, plus allowance of 22 gals, vs. Fulmar of 830 miles (on internal 155 gals only?).


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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

Can you find a picture of a Sea Hurricane with drop tanks? I've found a few with 44 gallon auxiliaries fitted. I'm not suggesting that they didn't use drop tanks, they clearly did, but when and where? I don't know, but would be interested to find out.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

Clarification of Marks. A Sea Hurricane 1A was not a deck landing version, but the type used off the CAM-ships. It could be catapulted, spools were fitted, but otherwise it had a standard fuselage and no tail hook.

The IB was the first to feature the strengthened rear fuselage and tail hook. P5187, a Canadian built Mk I (Mark X) had already been converted to IA specification and became the prototype IB. It was converted in March 1941. You won't get any carrier capable Sea Hurricanes until after this date. In fact things moved quickly and 120 IBs had been completed by October 1941. They were in service by the end of the year.

About 100 I Bs were converted to cannon armed ICs but the aircraft was heavy and with Merlin III power the top speed fell below 300mph at 15,000ft. Still better than the Fulmar  The ICs entered service in January 1942.
The Admiralty liked the idea of some Merlin XX powered Sea Hurricanes and in March 1942 conversion of 70 Hurricane IICs to Sea Hurricane IICs began.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

The droppable 45 gal tanks are listed in the sheet I've posted the link in the post #61, dated 22nd April 1942.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

Yes, I think the drop tanks were fitted to the Mk IIs. They used the same rack as bombs. It's confusing because a lot of aircraft were upgraded sometimes without fully reaching the specifications for a newer Mark. 
For example, according to Mason again, IB also covers a small number of Hurricane IIAs and IIBs and some Canadian Sea Hurricane Xs, XIs and XIIs with both eight and twelve gun wings. A Sea Hurricane IB is defined by him as "any Hurricane which possessed an arrester hook and whose gun armament did not protrude forward of the wing leading edge." 

Interestingly in the scrabble to produce those first Hurricane IBs only already existing 'low hours' Sea Hurricane IAs and all sorts of vintages of Hurricane Is were converted. The Air Ministry, even in mid 1941, was not prepared to offset new aircraft for conversion, which might result in delays on the production lines for RAF Hurricanes.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

The drop tanks were already on the Merlin III-powered Sea Hurricane (ie. Mk.I); the S.H. Mk.II was the one with Merlin XX.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 20, 2016)

I think the max weight for the take-off runs listed were max clean, that is condition (a) 7,015lbs.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

Pilots notes for the Hurricane II (all versions) and IV contain instructions for fixed auxiliary tanks and drop tanks. The Hurricane I notes make no mention of either (just the two 33 gallon main tanks and the 28 gallon reserve for a 94 gallon total).
It was probably one of those conversions that didn't bring the specifications up to a newer Mark. The Hurricane I and thereby Sea Hurricane IA were not supposed to be plumbed for drop tanks, neither did they normally have the wing racks fitted. Some IBs must have carried some kind of external tank as some were flown up the Takoradi air bridge to the Western Desert.

Here's the fuel system diagram for the Hurricane I. How many were upgraded I don't know.







And here's the two diagrams for the Hurricane II and IV covering auxiliary and drop tanks.

Reactions: Like Like:
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## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> I think the max weight for the take-off runs listed were max clean, that is condition (a) 7,015lbs.



Yes, indeed, I was wrong to state it was for condition with DTs.


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## RCAFson (Jan 20, 2016)

stona said:


> American carriers were a lot bigger than RN carriers. All the arguments I've seen against the storing of Glycol, including space, are unconvincing.
> 
> The Fulmar II could carry a 60 gallon *auxiliary tank*. The pilot's notes describe it as such and the fuel system diagram represents the tank in broken lines with the qualification 'if fitted'. It was a self sealing tank and, according to the notes, it was possible to jettison this tank _in an emergency._ It was* NOT a drop tank*, and there was no need to store a supply of these tanks on the carrier. The tank, if fitted, was part of the aircraft.
> In any case you'll struggle to find a picture of a Fulmar carrying the auxiliary tank. It had 4+ hours endurance on internal fuel and the extra that the auxiliary supply would give doesn't often seem to have been deemed necessary. I've never seen a picture of a Fulmar carrying an extra tank in the Mediterranean, but will happily be corrected.
> ...



The pilot's notes state that the external tank had little effect on performance when empty so it usually wasn't necessary to jettison it. The Secret Years states that range trials with the external tank were conducted in October 1941 (gave 1100m miles total).


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## stona (Jan 20, 2016)

Yep, 1,100 miles for the Merlin III and the extra tanks. For the Sea Hurricane IIC with a Merlin XX this was slightly less at 908 miles and for the tropical version 895 miles. 

I've also discovered that a Hurricane I (trop) was fitted with the plumbing for auxiliary tanks. It might explain why it was not such a difficult conversion to do the same for those Sea Hurricane IAs and IBs based on the Hurricane I with a Merlin III engine, as per the data sheet provided by Tomo.

Cheers

Steve


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## RCAFson (Jan 20, 2016)

IIRC, some HSH 1A catapult fighters were fitted with fixed external tanks.


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## stona (Jan 21, 2016)

I assume you mean those operating from the CAM ships (Catapult Aircraft Merchantman) for which they were designed? They were disposable one use aircraft launched against shadowing aircraft, usually. No need for great range. Though some did make it to land, usually in Russia, after launch, most ended up in the sea.
Again, I've been through as many references for these as I have and haven't found one with auxiliary tanks fitted, but would happily be corrected. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence .
I wonder if they could get off those catapults with the extra weight and drag? I don't know. I've seen footage of test launches from a land based catapult system and to say it looks touch and go would be right. The catapult is elevated, to simulate the deck height of a ship, which is just as well as the aircraft definitely sinks before accelerating away.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 21, 2016)

Hopefully the CAM ship turned into the wind and tried to wind up to full speed before the plane was launched? 
Ground test _might _have been a worst case scenario?


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## stona (Jan 21, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Hopefully the CAM ship turned into the wind and tried to wind up to full speed before the plane was launched?
> Ground test _might _have been a worst case scenario?



You'd hope so! The 'Hurricats' were very seldom launched. They did destroy six or seven enemy aircraft in the roughly two years they were operated.

I have absolutely zero data on the ground test that was filmed, weight, type or condition of aircraft, let alone the prevailing conditions.

Cheers

Steve


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## RCAFson (Jan 21, 2016)

stona said:


> You'd hope so! The 'Hurricats' were very seldom launched. They did destroy six or seven enemy aircraft in the roughly two years they were operated.
> 
> I have absolutely zero data on the ground test that was filmed, weight, type or condition of aircraft, let alone the prevailing conditions.
> 
> ...



The first CAM ship catapult fighters were Fairy Fulmars and they weighed 2000lb more than a HSH1B with two 45IG DTs, so the catapults would have no trouble launching a HSH1A with two 45IG tanks. 

McKinstry, Hurricane, states that from Autumn 1941 2 x 45IG DTs were available to the HSH1A. 

Most HSH1A launches were fairly close to Allied or neutral land masses, especially in the western approaches where Condor attacks were most common, and several HSH1As did land after making their attacks.


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## stona (Jan 22, 2016)

Comparing all up weights of different types on launch is not relevant. The Fulmar was intended to take off (from a carrier deck) at that weight. The Hurricane with full fuel, ammunition and the addition of catapult spools and drop tanks would be in an overloaded state. It was designed to take off from grass aerodromes.
Whilst I don't deny the possibility that the tanks were used, I've not found any evidence for their use. I'd be interested to establish with certainty whether they were used, or not

Most launches is still not many. As far as I can tell CAM ship Hurricanes flew nine combat sorties in their period of operation. I know of one pilot who made it to an airfield in Russia 'on fumes' rather than ditching or abandoning his aircraft. I still haven't found the total number of launches, but it was very low.
If anyone has a copy of Barker's old Hurricat book it probably has the answer. Mine seems to have gone AWOL 

Cheers

Steve


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## Timppa (Jan 22, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> You might want to add self sealing tanks..........and so starts the Weight spiral
> 
> Engine in the F2A-2 added at least 100lbs and required a new propeller. The F2A-1 used an engine without reduction gear to the prop. F2A-2 used a reduction gear and a larger slower turning prop.



No self sealing integral tanks. It is said it was impossible to seal them . (I don't buy that btw)
Still better than Hurricane/Spitfire main tanks, that roasted pilots when hit.


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## stona (Jan 22, 2016)

A lot of Hurricane pilots thought that it was the 33 gallon main wing tanks rather than the tank behind the engine/in front of the instrument panel that was responsible for Hurricane burns. If one, or both, wing tanks were ignited, as soon as the hood was opened the flames were drawn into the cockpit like a blast furnace. The tank behind the engine, which was initially not self sealing, was regarded as far less vulnerable than the wing tanks. Nonetheless an urgent programme was undertaken to treat the smaller tank on all Hurricanes.

If I remember correctly it was only one of the two tanks behind the engine on the Spitfire I and V which got the Linatex treatment, not sure about later Marks and can't check at the moment.

Unfortunately all WW2 era fighters burnt rather well, some just burnt the pilot better than others.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 22, 2016)

Timppa said:


> No self sealing integral tanks. It is said it was impossible to seal them . (I don't buy that btw).


 If not impossible then darn difficult or darn near impossible to repair _IF _hit. 98% of the rest of WW II aircraft used fuel tanks that could be removed from the aircraft and worked on outside ( or replaced with spare tanks while damaged tanks were repaired and returned to store). If your fuel tank/s _ARE _the main wing spar (or fore and aft walls are the main spars) then working on bullet holes gets a lot harder. The factory _may_ be able to put a sealant/liner in the space but repairs in the field would call for dismantling the wing spar assembly. Buffalo construction was such that the fuselage sat on top of the wing ( it doesn't look that but is true.) which was built in one piece. Landing gear and a filler plug went under the wing to fill in the space. 

British used some combination of horsehair and rubber applied to the outside of the tank areas for sealing on their Buffaloes. . How satisfactory this was and whither it covered ALL surfaces is subject to question. Top and bottom of the spar fuel tanks were the wing skins I believe. Putting a 'coating' on the outside spar surfaces (front and rear ) requires getting access to the interior of the wing, as does coating the solid ribs that formed the ends of the tank. Doable with a lot of work. Not sure what applying a strip of rubberized horse hair to the top and bottom of the wing would do the drag? 

Perhaps there was a layer metal bridging the front and rear spar that was not the Wing surface? but then how much room ws there for the sealing material?


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## RCAFson (Jan 22, 2016)

stona said:


> Comparing all up weights of different types on launch is not relevant. The Fulmar was intended to take off (from a carrier deck) at that weight. The Hurricane with full fuel, ammunition and the addition of catapult spools and drop tanks would be in an overloaded state. It was designed to take off from grass aerodromes.
> Whilst I don't deny the possibility that the tanks were used, I've not found any evidence for their use. I'd be interested to establish with certainty whether they were used, or not
> 
> Most launches is still not many. As far as I can tell CAM ship Hurricanes flew nine combat sorties in their period of operation. I know of one pilot who made it to an airfield in Russia 'on fumes' rather than ditching or abandoning his aircraft. I still haven't found the total number of launches, but it was very low.
> ...



HH1/IIs flew off of carriers to Malta and elsewhere with 2 x 45IG tanks. Assuming that the external tanks are stressed for catapult launching the HSH1A had sufficient power and lift to do the rest.


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## RCAFson (Jan 22, 2016)

Timppa said:


> No self sealing integral tanks. It is said it was impossible to seal them . (I don't buy that btw)
> Still better than Hurricane/Spitfire main tanks, that roasted pilots when hit.



The F2A-3 had 80USG SS tanks, with the other tanks being unprotected. The drawback was another increase in weight which the LG couldn't really handle.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 22, 2016)

Thank you, the F2A-3 had a total of 5 fuel tanks. One 40 gallon in the belly, one 20 gallon in the leading edge of each wing. These three tanks were self sealing. The two original 80 gallon tanks, one on each side in the wing spar were not made self sealing. One tank was kept in normal use because it had the fuel reserve outlet and piping and the the fuel return inlet and piping and keeping the original set up made for fewer changes. the other tank was "kept" (you couldn't really get rid of it) but the fuel filler was normally sealed and was only filled under orders of the squadron commander or air group commander.
Normal fuel capacity was thus the same 160 gallons it had always been except 1/2 was carried in protected tanks and 80 gallons extra could be carried in overload condition.

Fuel system weight went from 27.6lbs (weight of pipes and fittings, weight of integral tanks is counted in the structure) on a Finnish 239 to 289lbs on the F2A-3. (weight of new tanks, pipes and fittings).

Hard to believe either Brewster or the Navy would had accepted a 260lb weight increase in empty weight if there had been a decent way to seal the original fuel tanks. Or the rather bizarre arrangement where the "reserve" fuel (25 gallons) was in an unprotected tank. 

BTW The Brewster's original tanks were in the 'center' section of the wing, only few inches between them if diagrams are to be believed. Rear spar/back of tank was about even with the rudder pedals and depending on rugged construction to prevent blowing fire back into the cockpit.


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## stona (Jan 23, 2016)

RCAFson said:


> HH1/IIs flew off of carriers to Malta and elsewhere with 2 x 45IG tanks. Assuming that the external tanks are stressed for catapult launching the HSH1A had sufficient power and lift to do the rest.



Yes they did but my argument is essentially this. The Hurricane I fuel system did not allow for auxiliary or drop tanks. The Hurricanes initially converted to IA specifications like those to be used from CAM ships were all Hurricane Is and underwent a fairly simple conversion amounting to the fixing of catapult spools, a head rest and in some cases a few (5) hinged access panels to allow a supporting structure (not the catapult) to be fitted to the two wing spars (4 panels) and fuselage (1 panel). There is no evidence that I have found that the fuel system was modified at this time. CAM ship Hurricanes were not expected to need range and the standard operating procedure was for the aircraft to be abandoned after launch. Only 35 ships were converted so the vast majority of conversions never found their way onto a CAM ship. Most found there way onto the various small carriers that entered service and the CAM ships were phased out. At this point many of the IAs underwent substantial modifications to stress them for carrier landings, fit the A frame and in many cases remove the catapult spools. This seems a much more likely time to make modifications to the fuel system, not least because increased range for carrier operated aircraft which are expected to return to the carrier is now an important advantage.
Again, I don't know that CAM ship Hurricanes never operated with drop tanks but I've never seen any evidence that they did and I don't see an operational necessity for them to have been so equipped.
I shall search for that Hurricat book over the weekend. It may have some useful information, particularly regarding the number of CAM ship Hurricanes actually launched. If that number remains low or in single figures I'd bet that none carried any auxiliary fuel.
Even those IBs used during Pedestal don't seem to have been routinely fitted with auxiliary/drop tanks. None of the pictures of Victorious' Hurricanes, taken at this time, show tanks.
Hurricane Is could be fitted with tanks, the first few to arrive on Malta had flown down through France.I have a picture of one which had a landing accident at Marignane (Marseilles) on 8th June 1940 and it clearly still has ferry tanks attached. The remaining Hurricanes continued to Tunisia where problems with 'auxiliary fuel pumps' were reported.
An aircraft from the second delivery was photographed standing on its nose at Ussel on 18th June 1940 and also has ferry tanks attached. Interestingly, even this early, it also has a Vokes filter fitted.
The early deliveries by sea may not have required any extra fuel. For example the 'Operation Hurry' delivery was launched from Argus' just just 380 miles from Luqua which should have been well within range. Nonetheless one Hurricane (Sgt. Robinson) ran out of fuel and crash landed. Robinson blamed a faulty fuel gauge. These were all tropicalised aircraft and could have carried auxiliary tanks anyway.
Cheers
Steve


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## Timppa (Jan 23, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> If not impossible then darn difficult or darn near impossible to repair _IF _hit. 98% of the rest of WW II aircraft used fuel tanks that could be removed from the aircraft and worked on outside ( or replaced with spare tanks while damaged tanks were repaired and returned to store).



Actually I was thinking inserting rubber bladder tanks inside the integral fuel cells.
Nitpickers say it is not integral any more. Yes it is not, but it is now protected.
I wonder why Vought engineers voluntarily cut the internal fuel capacity of the F4U from 361 to 237 US gallons by simply omitting this space.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 23, 2016)

Assuming you can get the bladder inside the wing spar box and get the ribs and top and bottom skins on without damaging the fuel bladder (blind riveting?) at the factory you have a major repair problem. 
unprotected tank takes a simple bullet hit. Repair can/might be a patch or patches on the entry and exit holes. A piece of sheet metal, some sealant and a few rivets and you are done. 
A hole in the fuel bladder may (worst case) require taking the wing out of the plane. Opening a big enough hole in the top or bottom to get the old bladder out and installing the new one. reinstalling the wing skin you took off, and then putting the wing back in the airplane. The Brewster factory lowered the fuselage onto the complete wing with an overhead crane, field repairs might be done differently?


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## tomo pauk (Jan 24, 2016)

Timppa said:


> ...
> I wonder why Vought engineers voluntarily cut the internal fuel capacity of the F4U from 361 to 237 US gallons by simply omitting this space.



That was probaby done due the installation of a drop tank, usualy of 175 gals - so there was a small, 'interim' series of Corsairs, that featured both drop tanks and wing tanks. Not long after, Corsair carried 2 drop tanks in the F4F-4 variant (there was also option of one drop tank being self-sealing), and post-war 3 drop tanks were feasible.
Wing tanks were reinstated with Super Corsair, where they were slef-sealing, reduced in capacity.


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## Glider (Jan 24, 2016)

Apologies for being away and coming to this rather late in the day. The availability of a naval hurricane in 1939 was viable as there was spare capacity in the production. Certainly it wouldn't have been as good as an enhanced hurricane with drop tanks and a more powerful engine but there can be little doubt that it would be more effective than the Sea Gladiator.
With the lessons learnt and fed back into the development who knows what might have been developed, maybe a single seat fighter instead of the two seat Firefly.
The impact on the war would also have been interesting. A Naval Mk 1 Sea Hurricane could easily have made all the difference in the Invasion of Norway where the Luftwaffe were on operating without the support of the Me109 due to the range.


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## stona (Jan 24, 2016)

I'm not sure how much excess production capacity existed in 1939. At the outbreak of war the RAF had 280 of the original order on charge, 133 were at maintenance units, training units or test establishments. The remainder of the order for 600, _28 of which had still not been completed_, were either already written off, were under repair or had been exported.
In any case as nobody in 1939 at the Admiralty had the slightest interest in the Hurricane in 1938/9 it was never even considered. I find it very unlikely that any production would have been diverted away from the RAF after the Munich crisis, which almost exactly covers the year before the outbreak of the war. It should be remembered that these early production aircraft started life with fabric wings, a Merlin II and a fixed pitch Watts propeller.
Cheers
Steve


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## RCAFson (Jan 24, 2016)

The earliest mention that I can find for proposed use of Sea Hurricanes is Jan 1940.


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## Glider (Jan 24, 2016)

Hawker were producing a number of Hurricanes for export which could have been used for the RN, had the will (and need) been identified. The RAF wouldn't have had to lose any deliveries.
Its one of those questions which we will never know the answer too, if the RN were happy to order Sea Gladiators in 1939 why on earth didn't they try a version of the Hurricane.
I understood the thread to be about the early development/deployment of the Sea Hurricane and the difference it would have made. In my view the difference would have been very significant to early days of the war and the invasion of Norway which as it was almost became a major disaster for Germany. Without control of the air Germany would almost certainly have failed as they certainly didn't control the sea.


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## Juha (Jan 24, 2016)

IMHO a radiator under mid-fuselage makes a plane a good diver in the case of emergency landing onto water and so is very bad for pilot's health. So probably the FAA wasn't very keen to utilise Hurricane as a carrier fighter at first. Only after combats proved that the RN's reliance on AA as the main defence against air attacks was misplaced and the need of higher performance fighter was driven in Sea Hurricane became a serious option.

Also Bf 110 was usually more or less equal with Hurricane and so the LW had a longer range antidose than Bf 109E to it.


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## stona (Jan 25, 2016)

Glider said:


> Hawker were producing a number of Hurricanes for export which could have been used for the RN, had the will (and need) been identified. The RAF wouldn't have had to lose any deliveries.



The Hurricanes exported were diverted from RAF deliveries. It was the refusal to make such diversions which led to Canada initially being refused any Hurricanes when she first asked for them in 1937. Later, around the time of Munich a year later, the Air Ministry was much keener to allow the Canadians to have Hurricanes as the prospect of fully trained Hurricane squadrons available in the Commonwealth was now much more attractive.
Exports to other countries, whilst very small in number, again made a political statement. It was a means to bolster nations threatened by the developing storm clouds, a modern form of St George's Cavalry. It is no accident that the first export order for Yugoslavia came after the Italo-Albanian agreement that made the Yugoslavs suddenly nervous. The next order for South Africa falls into a similar category to the Canadians (none of the seven Hurricanes sent survived to see the beginning of the war). The Romanian order was part of Britain's futile efforts to strengthen the 'Balkan Entente' against increasing German pressure. The unfulfilled Persian and the Turkish orders were both part of Britain's plans to strengthen relations with friendly nations in the eastern Mediterranean in support of her strategic interests. The last minute Belgian and Polish orders surely need no explanation.
The export of these aircraft was made for sound political reasons and I don't see how the Admiralty could have hijacked them for its purposes, even had it wanted them.
Whilst it is true that Hurricane production was good enough that by the spring of 1939 the aircraft were going into training pools and other non front line units, the dividend that this would pay in 1940 should not be underestimated. There were more pilots trained on the type than there otherwise would have been, vital at a time when the OTUs were failing to produce enough replacement pilots.
At the outbreak of war Fighter Command had 16 fully operational Hurricane squadrons. Even when we add the 7 Spitfire squadrons and assorted squadrons of Blenheims, Gladiators etc it was well still well short of Dowding's hoped for 52.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 25, 2016)

Hawker produced 200 Henleys before ww2 started, those were never used as combat aircraft. There is quite a bit of slack to use in order to bolster the early production of Hurricanes.


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## stona (Jan 25, 2016)

Only if you cancel something else. The Air Ministry was happy with the output of Hurricanes in the lead up to the war so why would it want to increase it? If there was one type it wanted more of that was the Spitfire. Had the Admiralty sought some conversions in 1938, certainly before the Munich crisis, it might have been able to get them, at least for assessment. The unavoidable fact is that the Admiralty didn't express any interest in the Hurricane until after the war had started at a time when it had no chance of getting any number offset from new production and away from the RAF. This was still the case two years later. The first truly navalised Sea Hurricane was converted from a Sea Hurricane IA, itself converted from an early Canadian built Hurricane I (X) in March *1941.*
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 25, 2016)

stona said:


> *Only if you cancel something else.* The Air Ministry was happy with the output of Hurricanes in the lead up to the war so why would it want to increase it? If there was one type it wanted more of that was the Spitfire. Had the Admiralty sought some conversions in 1938, certainly before the Munich crisis, it might have been able to get them, at least for assessment.* The unavoidable fact is that the Admiralty didn't express any interest in the Hurricane until after the war had started* ...



Cancel the Henley, Roc, Sea Gladiator, or a combination 
The bolded part says it all - the early Sea Hurricane needs a request from the Admirality, not something technical, in order to happen.


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## stona (Jan 25, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> the early Sea Hurricane needs a request from the Admirality, not something technical, in order to happen.



Well we agree 100% on that. It certainly could have been done. The issues of the Royal Navy's attitude to it's aerial arm have already been discussed. Had some far sighted (for the time) senior and influential officer seen the need for a pure fleet defence fighter and been able to get away from the multi role specifications that the Admiralty kept issuing early enough, then a carrier operated Sea Hurricane would have been a possibility in 1940 but only IF his view had prevailed and IF the Air Ministry could have been convinced to divert some of its premier fighter production away from the RAF and to the RN.
Since historically the Navy didn't see a need for such a fighter, or any fighter until it was very nearly too late, the Fulmar actually did a pretty good job for what it was, it is unlikely that anyone in the Air Ministry would have seen such a need. I am even more confident of the reaction of the RAF/Fighter Command to the proposal that it give up any of its allotted production to the RN. It would have kicked up a stink. The RAF suffered from a serious 'little brother' complex which poisoned its relations with the Army in the prewar and early war years, it could have been much worse with the Senior Service.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2016)

Actually it needs the allocation of constant speed propellers (or at the very least 2 pitch propellers).
Aeroplane...Weight​lb...Airscrew....Take-off run'yds' zero flap...Distance to clear 50 ft ​L.2026.........6316..........Rotol...................240....................................420
......"............6750............."......................280....................................465
L.1547.........6363......2-pitch metal............280....................................480
......"............6040....Wooden fixed pitch.....370....................................580​
Please note that improved propellers affected the ground run to the greatest extent with climb out to 50 ft after wheels left the ground only changing by 14% from least to most. Also of note is that the increase in weight of 434lbs increased the take off run by over 11% using the Rotol prop. Adding several hundred pounds (arresting gear, dingy, etc) to the 2 blade fixed pitch version just makes things worse.
For comparison the Gladiator took 165yds (2 bade prop) to 220 yds (3 blade metal fixed) for a take off run and only 150 yds when using a Mercury VIII engine with 3 blade metal prop.
The fact that the early Hurricanes had fabric covered wings is of no real importance ( SO did the Gladiators) except in regards to dive performance. Better than the Gladiator but not as good as later Hurricanes.

Please note that Bomber Command was getting just about all the "good" propellers until the fall of 1939. Didn't matter how bad the plane actually was, It got at least a two pitch prop, otherwise it wouldn't have made it off the majority of RAF airfields.
Henley was, in theory, the support bomber for the army, A victim of conflicting doctrines. Should the RAF support the Army by strikes near or at the front lines or by deeper strikes or strikes against enemy factories (cutting supplies at the source). Doctrine had shifted back to the deep strikes/factories by the time The Henleys were coming out the factory door. Of course it was also too late for the Army to get new long range artillery at this point, too.
Getting a Sea Hurricane in 1939 or very early 1940 requires right choices ( and few, if any, wrong ones) being made as far back as 1936/ early 1937 as far as doctrine and force structure.
The RAF got a few things right, but it got a lot wrong and doctrine doesn't mean much without proper tactics and training let alone proper aircraft.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2016)

stona said:


> ........ I am even more confident of the reaction of the RAF/Fighter Command to the proposal that it give up any of its allotted production to the RN. It would have kicked up a stink. The RAF suffered from a serious 'little brother' complex which poisoned its relations with the Army in the prewar and early war years, it could have been much worse with the Senior Service.



Pretty much in agreement here. The RAF wanted to be seen as an equal service to the other two and not an auxiliary to either or both. To do that it needed to present itself as a _war winning_ force in it's own right and not simply as a defensive force ( although that became it's most important mission in 1940/41) or "eyes" for another service or as substitute coastal artillery or army field artillery. _EVERY _aircraft built to perform one of those missions was plane (or parts) *NOT* being used for the primary goal of establishing the RAF as a service *equal* in footing to the Army and Navy.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 25, 2016)

All of the 136 Rocs got the variable-pitch prop?

edi: so did 60 Sea Gladiators?


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## stona (Jan 25, 2016)

The propeller is important but we are in the world of 'what iffery'. 
The first two pitch, three blade de Havilland (Hamilton) propeller was fitted to a Hurricane in August 1938. The Rotol variable pitch propeller with its CSU couldn't be fitted to a Merlin II powered aircraft and anyway the Air Ministry insisted that the original order for 600 aircraft be completed as specified with the Watts fixed pitch propellers. 
Any costs associated with developing the Rotol driven aircraft would have to be borne by the manufacturer(s). Hawker managed to acquire a damaged ex No. 56 Sqn aircraft for a nominal fee and in cooperation with Rolls Royce and Rotol a Merlin III, CSU and variable pitch propeller were fitted. This aircraft was commercially registered as G-AFKX and was flying in January 1939. 
Once again, if decisions had been taken earlier, then Hurricanes, or Sea Hurricanes, with CSUs and variable pitch propellers COULD have been available much sooner than they were historically.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 25, 2016)

The Merlin I and II onboard the Battle were fitted with either 2-pitch or CS prop, so no what-iffery here.


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## stona (Jan 25, 2016)

The 'what iffery' would be the Air Ministry financing the early adoption of variable pitch propellers rather than leaving it, as was historically the case, to the manufacturers. Had Hawker not developed the system in G-AFKX, an aircraft which they were obliged to buy back from the Air Ministry (with all AM equipment removed) then one wonders if the conversions would have been quite so easy when rushed through in 1940. Hawker had tried and tested the system at their own expense. It was still August 1940 before all Hurricanes in Fighter Command had been converted.
If the Hurricanes fighting in the BoB just about got their CSUs and propellers in the summer of 1940 what chance would the imaginary Sea Hurricanes have in 1939?

The Merlin II did not have the "universal airscrew shaft" and couldn't drive the hydraulically operated pitch control of the variable pitch propellers. It obviously didn't have a CSU bolted on the from either. The conversion could be made but it was rather more complicated and took longer. A hydraulic pump had to be fitted and driven from the engine and various other pipes and controls fitted. The Merlin III was a simpler conversion and was designed to be fitted with propellers from de Havilland, Hamilton Standard, Watts, Rotol and Fairey Reed that I know of, probably others too.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> All of the 136 Rocs got the variable-pitch prop?
> 
> edi: so did 60 Sea Gladiators?



Rocs were lucky they got 2 pitch props.

I believe the Sea Galdiators had fixed pitch props, they were metal and 3 bladed but fixed pitched. At least one of the ones on Malta (and possibly more) was/were were fitted with engine/s and
prop/s from/or intended for Blenheims. Obviously this well after they were built. One or more Gladiators in other theaters (including Finland) _may _have gotten the Blenheim engine/propeller. The Blenheim engine having the correct prop shaft and pump to operate the 2 pitch prop.

I would note that what the British _should have been fitting _to multi engine aircraft were not only constant speed props but ones that were capable of being fully feathered. With the two pitch prop should one engine fail or be damaged the pilot was supposed to set the prop to course pitch (if the plane was more than a few thousand feet high and flying at more than 150-160mph it already was in course pitch) and apply and engine/prop brake to keep the spinning prop from further wrecking the engine. Obviously a prop in course pitch has a lot more drag than one that is fully feathered. Also note that not all constant speed props had the range of motion to be fully feathering. 

I believe something like 22 air lines around the world were using fully feathering props by the end of 1938 so this was hardly secret of rare technology.


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## stona (Jan 25, 2016)

The DH/Hamilton two pitch propeller wasn't hydraulically operated. It was a relatively simple conversion from a fixed pitch propeller, assuming that the propeller shaft was compatible.
Cheers
Steve


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## RCAFson (Jan 25, 2016)

stona said:


> Well we agree 100% on that. It certainly could have been done. The issues of the Royal Navy's attitude to it's aerial arm have already been discussed. Had some far sighted (for the time) senior and influential officer seen the need for a pure fleet defence fighter and been able to get away from the multi role specifications that the Admiralty kept issuing early enough, then a carrier operated Sea Hurricane would have been a possibility in 1940 but only IF his view had prevailed and IF the Air Ministry could have been convinced to divert some of its premier fighter production away from the RAF and to the RN.
> Since historically the Navy didn't see a need for such a fighter, or any fighter until it was very nearly too late, the Fulmar actually did a pretty good job for what it was, it is unlikely that anyone in the Air Ministry would have seen such a need. I am even more confident of the reaction of the RAF/Fighter Command to the proposal that it give up any of its allotted production to the RN. It would have kicked up a stink. The RAF suffered from a serious 'little brother' complex which poisoned its relations with the Army in the prewar and early war years, it could have been much worse with the Senior Service.
> Cheers
> Steve


What is the Sea Gladiator if not a pure fleet defence fighter?.


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## stona (Jan 26, 2016)

The Sea Gladiator was ordered as a stop gap until the Fulmar could be rushed through. It was a compromise that didn't meet the requirements (for long range escort of strike aircraft, reconnaissance etc) that the Fulmar would. The contract for 60 new built Sea Gladiators, as opposed to the earlier conversions,of which I think 38 were completed, wasn't signed until early 1939
It was ordered when the penny finally dropped at the Admiralty that a fighter capable of defending the fleet was going to be needed and that the Roc wasn't capable, hence the idea of transferring the lot of them to the RAF as trainers. The Munich crisis of late 1938 seems to have concentrated minds in all three Services.

The RN had 54 Sea Gladiators (12 were the 'interim', there's a clue, partially navalised, converted version) in service at the outbreak of the war.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Jan 27, 2016)

I have spent some time over the weekend investigating the exploits of the 'Hurricats'. A total of eight operational missions were flown by Hurricanes from CAM ships between 1/11/41 and 27/7/43. Three other operational missions were flown by Hurricanes from the Fighter Catapult Ship (FCS) _Maplin. _These ships more normally operated Fulmars.

By the end of October 1941 _Maplin _was the only surviving FCS, now equipped with 3 Hurricanes. No operational launch had yet been made from a CAM ship. The first operational launch was made by George Varley from _Empire Foam _on 1st November.

I have now read accounts from surviving pilots or other officers of all the Hurricane missions, length and duration of mission etc and am 100% certain that they were all undertaken with the normal interior fuel load.
Accounts often refer to endurance and available fuel and it seems to have been a common or standard procedure to burn off fuel, if it wasn't already exhausted, before abandoning the aircraft or,rarely, attempting to ditch. Once airborne, even when an initial interception failed, the pilots and FCOs were always keen to keep the fighter up for as long as possible and chase down other contacts*. *This is understandable given the 'one shot' nature of the mission.
The absence of evidence for external tanks on all the photographs is, in this case, evidence of absence.

Many other launches were made at the end of voyages (118 by May '42 without mishap) which dispels another myth, that the aircraft were craned onto quays or barges for service and re-use.

I've sifted this from the only two references I have (both were elusive, stored in the attic).'The Catafighters and Merchant Aircraft Carriers' by Kenneth Poolman and 'The Hurricats' by Ralph Barker.
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 29, 2016)

I wonder if the FAA could have asked for the 200 spare Henleys. They seem to have been better performing than a Fulmar though not sure if fitting 8 guns and a folding wing would have been an easy job


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