# German war production without war with West



## wiking85 (Aug 20, 2013)

What would the German economy be able to produce without being at war with the Western Allies (no blockade, bombing, or Uboat war)? Let's say that Germany is only at war with the USSR, so can trade with the rest of the world after conquering France and cutting a deal with Britain. Let's assume that Japan still attacks Britain and the US, so that these powers are distracted and aren't involved in undermining the Germans via supporting the Soviets.

So German (and Axis Europe) vs. the USSR. What would production look like from 1941 on assuming German and Britain end their war by March 1941? I've read that historically the Germans were spending as much a 40-50% of the their defense spending on air defense by 1944, though this seems really high to me. From 1942 on the Germans built 1000+ Uboats, while also spending huge resources on the V-1, 2, and 3 programs. By 1943 over 50% of the Luftwaffe was fighting the Western Allies, which left the Soviets with a rapidly diminishing aerial threat before Kursk. Large resources were spent on defenses against Britain and the US in the Atlantic Wall and in Africa/Italy. Also Albert Speer estimated that Allied bombing cost Germany at least 33% of its output in 1944, which I'm not sure if he's counting the penalties caused by dispersal of production, cost of under ground factory construction, and transportation disruption.
Even just the material losses of the bombing campaign were severe for the Germans:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_the_Reich


> *Casualties and losses*
> at least 15,430 aircraft in combat[Note 2]
> Est. 18,000 aircraft through bombing[3]
> 97 submarines[4]
> ...



Even singular campaigns were pretty brutal:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Hamburg_in_World_War_II#Aftermath


> Operation Gomorrah killed 42,600 people, left 37,000 wounded and caused some one million German civilians to flee the city.[3] The city's labour force was reduced permanently by ten percent.[3] Approximately 3,000 aircraft were deployed, 9,000 tons of bombs were dropped and over 250,000 homes and houses were destroyed. No subsequent city raid shook Germany as did that on Hamburg; documents show that German officials were thoroughly alarmed and there is some indication from later Allied interrogations of Nazi officials that Hitler stated that further raids of similar weight would force Germany out of the war. The industrial losses were severe, Hamburg never recovered to full production, only doing so in essential armaments industries (in which maximum effort was made).[11] Figures given by German sources indicate that 183 large factories were destroyed out of 524 in the city and 4,118 smaller factories out of 9,068 were destroyed. Other losses included damage to or destruction of 580 industrial concerns and armaments works, 299 of which were important enough to be listed by name. Local transport systems were completely disrupted and did not return to normal for some time. Dwellings destroyed amounted to 214,350 out of 414,500.[12] Hamburg was hit by air raids another 69 times before the end of World War II.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr


> In his study of the German war economy, Adam Tooze stated that during the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command severely disrupted German production. Steel production fell by 200,000 tons. The armaments industry was facing a steel shortfall of 400,000 tons. After doubling production in 1942, production of steel increased only by 20 percent in 1943. Hitler and Speer were forced to cut planned increases in production. This disruption caused resulted in the Zulieferungskrise (sub-components crisis). The increase of aircraft production for the Luftwaffe also came to an abrupt halt. Monthly production failed to increase between July 1943 and March 1944. "Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks".[22]
> 
> At Essen after more than 3,000 sorties and the loss of 138 aircraft, the "Krupps works...and the town...itself contained large areas of devastation"[4] Krupps never restarted locomotive production after the second March raid.[4]
> 
> Operation Chastise caused some temporary effect on industrial production, through the disruption of the water supply and hydroelectric power. The Eder Valley dam "had nothing whatsoever" to do with supplying the Ruhr Area.[23] A backup pumping system had already been put in place for the Ruhr, and Speer's Organisation Todt rapidly mobilized repairs, taking workers from the construction of the Atlantic Wall. The destruction of the Sorpe dam would have caused significantly more damage but since it was a stronger design less likely to be breached it was effectively a secondary target.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_(RAF_campaign)


> These raids caused immense devastation and loss of life in Berlin. The 22 November 1943 raid killed 2,000 Berliners and rendered 175,000 homeless. The following night 1,000 were killed and 100,000 made homeless. During December and January regular raids killed hundreds of people each night and rendered between 20,000 and 80,000 homeless each time.[15] Laurenz Demps figured the losses. He evaluated (1) the damage reports of the Berlin police commissioner (Polizeipräsident) issued after each air raid with descriptions of losses and damages indicated by houses, and distributed to 100–50 organisations and administrations busy with rescue, repair, planning etc., (2) the reports of the main bureau for air raid protection (Hauptluftschutzstelle) of the city of Berlin, issued again in more than 100 copies in altering frequency, each summarising losses and damages by a number of air raids, (3) the war diary of the air raid warning command (Luftwarnkommando, Wako Berlin), a branch of the German air force (Luftwaffe), and (4) various sources on specific damages. According to Demps a total of 7,480 were killed (with an additional 2,194 missing), 17,092 injured and 817,730 made homeless.[16] According to Reinhard Rürup, nearly 4,000 were killed, 10,000 injured and 450,000 made homeless.[4]
> 
> The effect of smoke and dust in the air from the bombing and long periods spent in shelters gave rise to symptoms that were called "cellar influenza".[17]


This last one resulted in the massive Flaktürme, which were massive resource sinks:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flak_tower

Flak-Turm - Weapons and Warfare


> The building’s sheer size was not only the result of the Nazis’ passion for monumental architecture. It was in essence an enormous static gun platform – and it fairly bristled with weaponry. At each of its four corners, there was a heavy-calibre anti-aircraft gun. The 128mm ‘Dora’ flak gun was one of the largest produced during the war, and weighing in at over 25 tonnes – with a further 25-tonne recoil force – it required a substantial structure to support it. In addition, guns of lesser calibres, such as the 20mm Vierling, or four-barrelled ‘quad’ weapon, were located elsewhere on the roof.


The cost of the massive AA guns like the 128mm cannon were extensive.

Without all of these expenses, what could they have produced to fight just the USSR? Could they equip their allies in Europe better? Could they have developed enough of an aerial threat to force Russia to divert resources to aerial defense? What does 1000 less Uboats mean in terms of other weapons production? How about tens of thousands of less AAA weapons? Does this mean the Axis could gain fire superiority in terms of increased artillery output?


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## GregP (Aug 20, 2013)

Without the war with the UK and USA, the Germans would be free to concentrate their forces on the Soviet Front. I’m thinking they would have used a Blitzkreig attack to push forward and then consolidate. Then another push forward and consolidation. The Soviet Union would not have had time to move their aircraft factories and would likely have lost the war before they could rebound from the carnage or even invent the T-34 tank. So there would not BE any Il-2’s, La-5/7’s, Yak’s or MiG’s. Maybe no Tu-2, Pe-2 either. Only the outdated Soviet planes available at the start of the war.

When the Soviet advance started, the Luftwaffe shot down obsolete Soviet fighters in swarms and if not for the war in the west, probably could have sustained the offensive long enough to conquer Moscow. Soviet leadership, while very good in 1944 – 1945, was sorely lacking in the dark days of 1941 – 1942, thanks to Stalin’s insistence on unquestioning obedience without individual initiative. You will find it difficult to find a meek follower who then turns into a leader when required. If he takes one step too far, he’s shot by his own people.

Also, if not for the Western Front, the Graff Spee, Bismark, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, etc. would have been available to support any action near the Russian coast, and the Russian Navy wasn’t up to stopping these ships.

I predict a German win if there is no Western Front to occupy Germany’s attention with damage to the homeland on a daily basis. I am NOT saying the Soviets would not pull back, regroup, and wage a guerilla war or put up at least SOME fight that might win back some of the lost territory, but they probably could not have stopped the Germans if the German supply chain had not broken down. Without a Western Front, the supply chain would probably have been intact.

Of course, not having a Western Front would also mean the Nazis didn’t start death camps. If not, they MIGHT have been able to avoid war with the West. I seriously doubt Hitler’s ability to not start a Western War, given his real-life track record. But, if he HAD been, then it is also likely that Rommel would have been in charge of the armor since he would not have participated in the attempt on Hitler’s life. Germany with her best leaders and no war in the west would have been dificult to stop.

Whether or not they could HOLD it is another matter, but they surely would have beaten the Soviet Union alone. They might have prevailed in the West, too, if they had simply left the Soviet Union alone and waited until taking the UK before going into the Med and Africa.

Winning the Battle of Britain is not out of the question, but getting across the English channel with men and equipment in the ships they had might be stretching it a bit (the Royal Navy would surely agree). But they COULD have taken France and the rest of Europe and defeated attempts to push them back from that if they had not invaded in the East.

All in all, Hitler wasn't too far from being able to accomplish his goals if he had been smart enough not to go for them all at the same time. Luckily, he was a Corporal instead of a German Officer in WWII or ne might have known that. Officers were required to study military history, strategy and tactics. We can all thank our lucky stars he never did. He almost succeeded anyway.

I, for one, am grateful for the British resolve and the unrelenting resitance by the Soviets. Without both, it well might have gone the oither way in Europe.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 20, 2013)

GregP said:


> Of course, not having a Western Front would also mean the Nazis didn’t start death camps. If not, they MIGHT have been able to avoid war with the West. I seriously doubt Hitler’s ability to not start a Western War, given his real-life track record. But, if he HAD been, then it is also likely that Rommel would have been in charge of the armor since he would not have participated in the attempt on Hitler’s life. Germany with her best leaders and no war in the west would have been dificult to stop.



I fail to see how the lack of a war with the west would mean no death camps. The extermination camps ( Auschwitz, Sobibor, Treblinka,) themselves were in the eastern territories, and the vast majority of the victims murdered in them came from the eastern territories. Plus almost all of murders carried out by the Einsatzgruppen before the death camps were fully functional were in the eastern territories.


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## GregP (Aug 20, 2013)

I didn't mean to say it would mean no death camps all by itself. I intended to convey that no death camps might allow Germany to not get into a western war. 

If they started the death camps anyway, then war with the west was going to follow even if other things were acceptable without war. At that time, as it is today, news of millions of deaths by execution would generate a war if for no other reason. So, to stay OUT of a western war, the death camps would necessarily have been eliminated. Not saying some persecution might not have been tolerable, but mass executions would simply not have gone unanswered.

I'm not going to debate the death camp timeline or the camps themselves. Only foregoing those attrocities would allow for no western war. That's as far as I'm willing to go with it, and it's only my opinion, not a fact in the real world. Peace, Tom. I should have been more clear with my writing above that it was only one condition for no war with the west, not a cause-and-effect item.


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## silence (Aug 20, 2013)

GregP said:


> Also, if not for the Western Front, the Graff Spee, Bismark, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, etc. would have been available to support any action near the Russian coast, and the Russian Navy wasn’t up to stopping these ships.



As well, all the time, effort, material, and manpower (manufacturing and military) needed for the U-boat campaign could have been redirected towards the Heer. Raeder might have gotten his first two H-class BBS as well as the Graf Zeppelin. German ground and air forces might be as much as 25% stronger - maybe even more. Etc...

With the German surface forces released the Soviets might have been compelled to complete the Sovetsky Soyuz-class battleships, diverting their own resources. There are no lend-lease trucks nor food for the Red Army (I feel these are by far the most important things provided by the West.)

However, I do think the death camps would have come, and I don't believe the West would have gone to war over them. The West turned away too many people trying to escape Nazi Germany pre-war and all but ignored the camps. I am of the personal opinion that the excuses for not at least bombing the camp rail yards ring hollow: they after all did a pretty good job of tearing up the French rail lines prior to Normandy. Buna-werke (Auschwitz III) and Monowitz (Auschwitz II) were both bombed, as were other factories and oil refineries nearby.


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## Juha (Aug 20, 2013)

Hello Greg
Soviet Union had some 500 T-34s and some 900 KVs when Germany attacked on 22 Jun 41, so T-34 was already invented as was Il-2 and Pe-2. And of course the modern Yak-1s, MiG-3s and LaGG-3s.

A task force incl Tirpitz was stationed in Baltic Sea during the summer 41, so the main difference there would have been more KM DDs, TBs, minesweepers and MTBs there. KM would not have risked more of its heavy units there than in reality because of the minefields and subs there.

And I also find it hard to understand what was the connection between the Western Front and the death camps.

Juha


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## tyrodtom (Aug 20, 2013)

Without Britain , France and the Dutch engaged in a war in Europe, I don't think the Japanese would have ever dared to engage the 3 of them, plus the USA, in Asia.


Plus there's always the question of how Germany gets to Russia without going thru Poland , and setting off the war ?
Poland and Germany allies ? Not likely.
France and Britain ignoring their treaties with Poland ? Maybe.


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## Gixxerman (Aug 20, 2013)

*spoiler for anyone who has not read Robert Harris's book 'Fatherland'*
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In Robert Harris' book 'Fatherland' the tales runs that the UK come to terms and Germany fights Russia to the point of taking Moscow Leningrad (St. Petersburg).
They go on to exterminate many more millions but the war never quite ends.

The USA whilst not formally at war with Germany supply support the remaining Russia - why would the USA see a dominant Nazi Germany as anything other than a threat?
(Just as the US helped the Chinese continue when Japan looked dominant there.)
The Russians continue to bleed German forces significantly.

I suspect this is all very likely.
There is also the interesting prospect of German youth wider society coming to realise what happened to the 'undesirables' the effects this would later have. 

Napoleon's venture shows that a 'win' over western Russia may not afterall equate to a true victory.


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## GregP (Aug 20, 2013)

Hi Juha,

No war with the west in the 1940's means the conditions in the German-occupied countries would be acceptable. The extermination of millions of people is not acceptable to us. It's that simple. 

Some in here think that might not be enough for us to declare war. I think otherwise and it's a giant "what if" that will not be answered until someone else tries to exterminate millions. We'll see when and if, won't we? I sincerely hope it never happens again and so we'll never have a definitive answer. That would be the best eventuality.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 20, 2013)

If Germany and Russia were at each other's theoats in 1941, this would most likely mean that the Stalin-Ribbenttop pact has already sealed Poland's fate...the Sudentanland and Austria were occupied and the Axis alliance was intact.

The question is, did Italy continue to pull of it's failed conquest of African territory which eventually drew German and British assets into the African fray?

As far as Russia was concerned, even with U.S. support, Russia was in a dangerous situation with Germany fighting a single-front war. The Kreigsmarine probably wouldn't have the U-Boat fleet as we know it, because there wasn't the urgency of stopping the (now nonexistant) British convoys of this scenario.

However, the DKM heavy surface ships would have wrought havoc in the Baltic or if brought into the Black Sea since they weren't (in this scenario) challenged by the Royal Navy.

Add to that, the ability to successfully exchange goods with Japan now, since most of the shipments by German or Italian subs would be able to safely make it to Japanese ports un-molested by Allied warships.


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## Juha (Aug 20, 2013)

IMHO Kmer Rouge did and what happened , it was up to Vietnam to topple them.

Juha


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 20, 2013)

FOLKS - KEEP THE POLITICS OUT OF THIS PLEASE!!!!!


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## Juha (Aug 20, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> ...However, the DKM heavy surface ships would have wrought havoc in the Baltic or if brought into the Black Sea since they weren't (in this scenario) challenged by the Royal Navy...



Again, KM didn't use its available heavy units in 1941 actively so even with more units available I think the situation would have remained same. From Wiki:

"In September 1941 Germany formed the provisional Baltenflotte, which consisted of the battleship Tirpitz, cruisers Admiral Scheer, Emden, Köln, Leipzig and Nürnberg, destroyers Z25, Z26, Z27 and the 2nd torpedo boat squadron. It had been tasked with destroying the Soviet Baltic Fleet should it try to escape to neutral Sweden. As this did not happen, and aerial reconnaissance showed severe damage to the remaining ships of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the Baltenflotte was disbanded before October 1941."

Baltic suited well for mine warfare not for heavy units operations.

Juha


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## GrauGeist (Aug 20, 2013)

Good point, Juha, so then they would have been free to support the Crimean campaign if needed


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## wiking85 (Aug 20, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Good point, Juha, so then they would have been free to support the Crimean campaign if needed


How, the Turks weren't about to let warships traverse the Dardanelles.


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## silence (Aug 20, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> FOLKS - KEEP THE POLITICS OUT OF THIS PLEASE!!!!!



Ok, all, let's just focus on the scenario as presented and not what would be required to make it feasible.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 20, 2013)

silence said:


> Ok, all, let's just focus on the scenario as presented and not what would be required to make it feasible.


Please do....


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 20, 2013)

"...How, the Turks weren't about to let warships traverse the Dardanelles."

Would neutral Turkey go to war with Germany over the KM forced penetration of the Dardanelles. A heavy German fleet in the Black Sea would have been a huge plus ..


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## GrauGeist (Aug 20, 2013)

Turkey had a neutrality agrrement and even a trade agreement with Germany and the Germans honored that agreement. The Germans had access to the Black Sea...


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## wiking85 (Aug 20, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Turkey had a neutrality agrrement and even a trade agreement with Germany and the Germans honored that agreement. The Germans had access to the Black Sea...


With non-warships. Historically no Axis warships were allowed use of the Dardanelles. Merchant shipping was fine by treaty.


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## Balljoint (Aug 20, 2013)

If Hitler hadn’t declared war on the US after Pearl Harbor as per his treaty with Japan, something close to this what-if might just have happened. Roosevelt might have had a very tough time getting the US into Europe with a shooting war already on his plate. England was about bled dry. Stalin and Hitler would have been the last powers standing in Europe.


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## pattle (Aug 20, 2013)

I think a lot of this would depend on how and why Britain and Germany stop fighting. In 1940 the only way Britain was going to surrender would have been following a successful invasion. I don't believe at all that the Germans could have achieved a successful invasion of Britain but if they had of done it would have cost them so many men and machines that they simply would have been just way to weak to attack Russia in 1941, in a invasion of Britain victory as much as defeat would have cost the Germans their ability to invade Russia.
Germany was in a position where at best it could not afford to knock Britain out of the war by force and at worst was just not able to. Yet if Germany was to attack Russia it could not afford to divide it's forces and fight a war on two fronts, so Germany had to think of a way of getting Britain out of the war and to secure it's western flank without weakening it's own forces.
The only way I can see this being achieved is if Germany had offered the French and British terms so good that they could not refuse them in 1940. This I think this could only have been possible at the very point where it became clear that France would fall. I am going completely into fiction of course as this is a fictional what if scenario but perhaps if the Germans had agreed to withdraw it's troops from Norway, France and the Low Country's and to give home rule to the remaining part of Poland that fell outside of Germany's pre 1918 border in exchange for oil producing parts of the Dutch and French Empires in addition to Alsace and the recognition of the restoration of it's other pre 1918 borders including those lands contained within Poland, this then should have been enough to tempt Britain and France into a peace treaty. Any such peace treaty would of course of have been conditional that it include both Britain and France and that France reduce it's forces to a size where they were only capable of defence.
Should this treaty have been agreed then it may have included an agreement with Britain to mutually guarantee Germanys newly acquired former Dutch colonies in Indonesia and also British colonies in the same region against Japanese attack. 
Should this have been agreed to by all parties then the question of Russian occupied Poland would have remained open as would the future of Japanese ambitions in the far east. The Japanese in this situation may then have felt it wiser to align itself with Germany against Russia rather than attack the USA.

If nobody has taken this as credible then I hope they have at least had a good laugh at it.
The only thing I stick by is that whatever happens in order for the Germans to successfully invade Russia they need to preserve their forces while at the same time reaching peace with Britain, for the Germans an uneasy peace would be better than nothing, but the easier the peace with Britain the freer the hand with Russia.


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## davebender (Aug 20, 2013)

Are you suggesting no Lend-Lease economic assistance for Soviet Union? 
No RN or USN to keep Arctic sea lane open to imports? 
No joint British / Soviet invasion of Iran to establish a second main supply route via Persian Gulf?
No British / American occupation of Iceland as hub for convoys heading to Soviet Union?
No use of Loch Ewe as hub for convoys heading to Soviet Union?
No British attacks to keep German navy suppressed?
No German army and air fleet tied down in Balkans?
No Italian / German army and air fleet tied down in North Africa?
No German army and air units tied down in France?

Soviet Union will be destroyed four months after German led anti-communist coalition invade.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 20, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> With non-warships. Historically no Axis warships were allowed use of the Dardanelles. Merchant shipping was fine by treaty.


Romanian, Italian and German warships did in fact engage Soviet naval forces in the Black Sea...

germans transported U-Boats and Schnellboots by rail to Axis ports, the Italians had access and Romania has Black Sea ports...bottom line, historically, the Axis did operate there and engaged Soviets surface vessels. Andwith this current scenario, I am sure the Germans could have renegotiated terms with the Turks.


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## wiking85 (Aug 20, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Romanian, Italian and German warships did in fact engage Soviet naval forces in the Black Sea...
> 
> germans transported U-Boats and Schnellboots by rail to Axis ports, the Italians had access and Romania has Black Sea ports...bottom line, historically, the Axis did operate there and engaged Soviets surface vessels. Andwith this current scenario, I am sure the Germans could have renegotiated terms with the Turks.


I didn't say Axis warships didn't operate in the Black Sea, but rather that they didn't use the Dardanelles to get there. The Romanians were already there, the Germans used the Danube to ship in ships. The Italians to my knowledge did not arrive via the Dardanelles; if you have some proof that the Turks allowed them to move their warships into the Black Sea via the Dardanelles, I would very much like to see it.


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## davebender (Aug 20, 2013)

Let me expound on that.

Russia seized provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi at gunpoint during 1877 to 1878. Turkey wanted them back.

If Britain and USA are out of the equation Turkey will almost certainly want a piece of the action to get their stolen territory returned. Germany won't need to negotiate very hard to obtain naval access to Black Sea....


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## GregP (Aug 20, 2013)

Sounds like WAY too much has to go both differently and just right for it to be a realistic scenario for me to consider.


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## Gixxerman (Aug 20, 2013)

davebender said:


> Soviet Union will be destroyed four months after German led anti-communist coalition invade.



The Soviet Union might well fall (I think it would)....to be replaced by a more traditional Russian nationalist Gov.
I do not think that would be an easy push-over, particularly if receiving outside support.


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## wiking85 (Aug 20, 2013)

davebender said:


> Let me expound on that.
> 
> Russia seized provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi at gunpoint during 1877 to 1878. Turkey wanted them back.
> 
> If Britain and USA are out of the equation Turkey will almost certainly want a piece of the action to get their stolen territory returned. Germany won't need to negotiate very hard to obtain naval access to Black Sea....



Turkey would be like Spain IMHO: it would only jump in once the USSR seems to be about to fall. Letting warships use the Dardanelles is pretty much going to be viewed as a DoW on the USSR, so it would only happen when Turkey is ready for war, which wouldn't be until the USSR was ready to fall apart.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 20, 2013)

Germany and Turkey had a neutrality agreement as well as a trade agreement. In the event that Germany wanted to expand on access to the Black Sea with capital ships I am sure they could have been more persuasive.

In the event that Turkey wouldn't agree to that, Hitler had a way of...shall we say "diplomacy".

Remember, Germany and Russia had a neutrality pact, too...


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## davebender (Aug 20, 2013)

I don't see the comparison.

Spain has just completed a ruinous civil war. They are economically devastated. Furthermore Spain has no territorial dispute with Russia / Soviet Union.


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## wiking85 (Aug 20, 2013)

davebender said:


> I don't see the comparison.
> 
> Spain has just completed a ruinous civil war. They are economically devastated. Furthermore Spain has no territorial dispute with Russia / Soviet Union.



Turkey was devastated repeatedly in the late 19th and early 20th century, so wasn't eager to jump into the next war after the experiences of WW1 and the invasions of the 1920s. IIRC Turkey's PM at the time said of WW2: "At least I didn't create any orphans".


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## davebender (Aug 20, 2013)

I agree. 

However a chance to recover three provinces from Russia with little risk would be too good an opportunity to miss. If Turkey doesn't claim them they will probably end up as independent states aligned with Germany.


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## wiking85 (Aug 20, 2013)

Getting back on track, what could Germany produce without the pressures of the war with the Western powers?


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## silence (Aug 20, 2013)

Just about everything and be able to do so in relative peace. No RN blockade of overseas trade could also improve the quantity of scare imports. You might see reliable jet engines in '43 as well as "tougher" drive chains for Tigers and Panthers. Prob a lot more my damaged brain can't think of right now....


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## davebender (Aug 20, 2013)

> what could Germany produce without the pressures of the war with the Western powers?


Same stuff they produced historically except the entire German field army and Luftwaffe bomber force goes east. Plus at least three Me-110 geschwader performing ground attack rather then operating as night fighters. Plus an additional field army supplied by Italy and at least one field army supplied by Turkey. Plus the German airborne corps and transport aircraft historically used up invading Crete. Logistical units and supplies which historically supported these units in west would of course go east with their parent units.

More then enough to destroy Soviet Union in a single campaign season.


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## Gixxerman (Aug 21, 2013)

davebender said:


> More then enough to destroy Soviet Union in a single campaign season.



Sounds far too close to that nonsense about (to paraphrase) 'only having to kick the door in and the whole rotten edifice will come down'.

Germany tried in 41 and failed and again in 42 and failed (long before the bombing ramped up), yes U-boat production consumed resources but under the already laid out plans much of that would happen anyway assuming the UK was potentially an opponent in any war until late 1939.
Similarly the superior T-34 would have appeared in this scenario (and the tank factories out of the LW's reach were happening anyway).

German production levels were woeful and given the Nazi leadership's historic reluctance to go over to a 'total war economy' (until it was far too late, if it ever would have made much difference given their opponents) and their fixation on quick victories (the effect on R&D are obvious) why should that change even if the war in the west is avoided?
If they stick to how they ran things in reality (and I see no reason to change that) Germany would still be frittering resources and time away on a zillion 1 projects with gross duplication, the negative often highly ignorant interference of Nazi politics personalities and no sane coordination to avoid it.
Throw in the leadership's desire to keep the German populace content by not going over to a 'total war economy' and not allowing the armed forces to consume so many resources and this easy victory is in my view a pipe dream (and an highly questionable one at that).

It's also worth pointing out that with no war in the west German armed forces do not learn some of the lessons they did apply successfully in 41 42.

This 'what if...' has so many caveats that ignore the nature of the situation in Germany as to be frankly absurd in my view.


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## Jenisch (Aug 21, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> Similarly the superior T-34 would have appeared in this scenario



I would say that the Panzer IV with the "longer barrel" was comparable if not better than the T-34-76 in technical aspects. BTW: I'm curious about which grow the German tank production and employment could have reach without the war with the West.



> German production levels were woeful and given the Nazi leadership's historic reluctance to go over to a 'total war economy'



Actually they were pushing for it since the war started, but the results only appeared later. Read Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction.

As for the proposed scenario: assuming an Aglo-German peace in 1940, followed by Germany invading the USSR in '41 as historically, would result in the first two years of war being somewhat as historically. I will not comment beyond this.


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## GregP (Aug 21, 2013)

Interesting point, Gixxerman. I may or may not agree in the end, but you make some valid points that should be discussed. My feeling has LONG been that if the Germans could have ramped up production, they WOULD have when they had the chance during the "Phony War" and any other delays. That they didn't tells me they had not evaluated the threats very realistically.

That said, if there had not been a western war, what WOULD have made them knuckle down and BUILD more stuff? Bombing didn't do it. Maybe a quick-but-not-decisive defeat would have. 

I can't say. The leadership was not rational and Hitler thought he could overwhelm anything. He couldn't all at the same time, as many leaders in the past have found out. At least the USA fought a holding action in the Pacific until the ETO was won and THEN concentrated on Japan. That might not have been optimum, but it WAS possible. Doing both might not have been at the same time.


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## Gixxerman (Aug 21, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> I would say that the Panzer IV with the "longer barrel" was comparable if not better than the T-34-76 in technical aspects.



Do you mean the late Pz IV Ausf Ausf F with the KwK 40 L/43 gun or the G with the KwK 40 L/48 gun? The first is a mid 1942 version and the latter is a mid 1943 version, Jenisch?
Either way production numbers are unimpressive, wiki lists less than 800 E, F, F2 G in 1941 (with reference) and 880 for 1942 (without) and against T 34 numbers are all in my view.



GregP said:


> Interesting point, Gixxerman.



Thanks Greg.



GregP said:


> The leadership was not rational



This is where so much of Germany's trouble lie in my view.
All that 'national socialist spirit/will' cobblers....and an obsession with ruthlessly competing personal ambitions being allowed to cloud judgement waste time resources when there ought to have been (at some senior level) a clear (or at least attempted) over-view deciding where cooperation and combined resource management was necessary given the strategic objectives.
It was there at the top and was encouraged it appears to work all the way through to the management of the various companies supplying their war effort.

TBH so much appears to have been done on the hoof or whim - and I accept Germany is far from alone in this - but they seem to have made it into an art of how not to do things.
I hate to stereotype but it seems very much at odds with the usual disciplined, thoughtful, analytical and logical German approach we see today.


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## Jabberwocky (Aug 21, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> I would say that the Panzer IV with the "longer barrel" was comparable if not better than the T-34-76 in technical aspects.



Yes, but the long barrel PZ IVs (Ausf F2/Ausf G with the L/43 75 mm cannon) appeared in direct response to German experiences of encountering the T-34 on the battlefield. The original prototype had the 50 mm L/60 cannon, but the 75 mm was rapidly redesigned to allow it to be shoehorned into the new turret.

The long barrel Pz IV was certainly superior in some respects, including the main armament, targeting optics, radios, general layout, turret arrangements and crew ergonomics. 

However, it lagged the T-34 in armour protection and general mobility - two of the three key areas of armour performance - and the L/43 was only marginally superior to the 7.62 cm gun. The underlying design elements of the T-34 - wide stance, sloped heavy armour, powerful deisel engine, heavy cannon from the outset - were better than that of the Pz IV, but it was let down by a lack of attention to detail and a rush to get it into service. The T-34, by the assesment of the Germans themselves - see commentary by Guderian and von Kleist - was the finest tank in the world in 1941.

If you want to make an ideal tank for 1941, you'd probably take the armour scheme and general arrangement of the T-34, give it a more spacious three-man turret with better hatches and vision arrangements and marry it to German running gear and German interior design and then build it in German factories.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

The Pz IV's biggest advantages were it optics and its five-man crew (T-34/76 only had four).

You're still going to see the Panther and the Tiger as responses to Soviet tanks as well as the more ludicrous armor developments like the Ferdinand. There will still surely be a lack of recovery vehicles. There might be no MG42; there won't be a Sturmgewehr. There's no tank losses in France, so there's more of them. I suspect the T-34 and KVs are going to be at least as big of a shock as they were historically.

Without Britain there's no Balkans campaign, so Barbarossa can start much earlier. No need for a DAK so you can also throw Rommel into the mix if you'd like, along with JG 2, 26, 27, and I/JG 77. There's no partisan war in the Balkans either.

There's no LW losses in France or Britain; this means the 3000 LW losses won't happen; you'll have a larger, better trained LW, if not as experienced. You're still gonna see 109Fs and Gs (though the latter may not get so bloated) and FW 190s. Prob no jets, though, nor nightfighters, etc except as private ventures. Minimal radar development. No Doras or Ta-152s. LW development will prob be at a pre-war kind of pace - at least until the La-5s start showing up. The RLM put a halt on any new projects that couldn't be realized in a year or less.

There's no Crete so you have the Fallshirmjaeger at full strength. No occupation of Western Europe means more troops available, which may well result in better sealing off of encircled Red Army troops.

On the other side, the Soviet Union is in the same starting position as it was historically, and there will be no benefit from lend-lease, so no fleets of trucks (greatly hurting Red Army mobility) and no Spam or wheat to feed the troops.

Germany will NOT have the benefit of the lessons learned in the Battle of France, but I suspect their performance will be similar at least to the end of '41.

What is most interesting (to me, anyway) is that Grofaz will NOT have the ego boost that the Battle of France gave him, so he just may not interfere as much - at least in the early stages.

The Germans will have more time, men, and equipment to throw into Barbarossa, so the USSR is going to be hurt even worse than historically. 

BUT, if the USSR can manage to hold on and learn as they did historically, they'll provide the German leadership with more time and opportunities to screw things up. AH started out pretty hands off but eventually became the worst sort of micro manager. Stalin took the opposite path. Its a question of how much time there will be for the evil twins morph into their historical late-war selves.

Oh, and the USSR won't get the gold braid for their officers' uniforms.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> If you want to make an ideal tank for 1941, you'd probably take the armour scheme and general arrangement of the T-34, give it a more spacious three-man turret with better hatches and vision arrangements and marry it to German running gear and German interior design and then build it in German factories.



Sounds like a Panther. I'd throw in a diesel engine, too.


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## wiking85 (Aug 21, 2013)

silence said:


> There might be no MG42; there won't be a Sturmgewehr.


Why not?




silence said:


> Prob no jets, though,


Again, why not?



silence said:


> nor nightfighters, etc except as private ventures.


There were night actions on the Eastern Front, the Soviets had night bombers and night fighters, both things that the LW would need to fight.



silence said:


> Minimal radar development.


Why? The Soviets didn't have an air force? Historically the Germans used radar extensively on the Eastern Front, though in the more mobile variety than fixed stations because of the mobile front lines. Pre-war the Germans developed radar seriously. The war in the West didn't change that trajectory, so its absence wouldn't mean it would suddenly ratchet downward. In fact the Germans would have need for night time guidance bombing and defense against Soviet night and day attacks from the air, not to mention jamming of Soviet radar.



silence said:


> No Doras or Ta-152s.


Depends on whether the Germans adopt higher level bombing that needed escorting. The Soviets had high altitude fighters. Also it would be interesting to see the way the Me109 and Fw190 would evolve with only the need for lower altitude fighting (no slow G series for the Me109? perhaps the FW190A series actually speeds up instead of getting loaded down with heavier anti-bomber weaponry).



silence said:


> LW development will prob be at a pre-war kind of pace - at least until the La-5s start showing up. The RLM put a halt on any new projects that couldn't be realized in a year or less.


The LW developed pretty rapidly pre-war, so that's not much different from what the historical pace was during wartime. Also the LA-5 showed up in 1942, so that's not a lot of time before the LW picks up the pace if they stick to your prediction.



silence said:


> There's no Crete so you have the Fallshirmjaeger at full strength. No occupation of Western Europe means more troops available, which may well result in better sealing off of encircled Red Army troops.


Also no disaster in Holland or losses in Norway, so the FJ are still a surprise. They weren't publicly revealed until the Norwegian campaign.




silence said:


> Germany will NOT have the benefit of the lessons learned in the Battle of France, but I suspect their performance will be similar at least to the end of '41.


AFAIK the most important lessons were mostly learned in Poland, with France just honing the weapon further. 




silence said:


> What is most interesting (to me, anyway) is that Grofaz will NOT have the ego boost that the Battle of France gave him, so he just may not interfere as much - at least in the early stages.


That's important too.




silence said:


> BUT, if the USSR can manage to hold on and learn as they did historically, they'll provide the German leadership with more time and opportunities to screw things up. AH started out pretty hands off but eventually became the worst sort of micro manager. Stalin took the opposite path. Its a question of how much time there will be for the evil twins morph into their historical late-war selves.


Funny that people ignore Stalin's meddling in the war early on, which led to a lot of disasters. Both Hitler and Stalin were hands off when things went well, but in bad times they interfered. So if the Soviets are doing worse, would Stalin lay off his generals?


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## stona (Aug 21, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> yes U-boat production consumed resources but under the already laid out plans much of that would happen anyway assuming the UK was potentially an opponent in any war until late 1939.



Britain was not a potential opponent before 1938. This isn't the thread for this but the earliest expression of Hitler's foreign policy toward Britain would be the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement. 

Admiral Boehme considered it an effort to clear the air with Britain writing "there never was a more generous offer made, nor more honestly meant."
He did not consider Plan Z a threat to Britain as it would provide Germany with ten large battleships by 1948, still less than Britain's_ current_ fourteen. It was the French who had started building their Dunkerque class in 1933.

Admiral Schulze wrote that the 1935 treaty was "cordially welcomed, both by me and by practically the whole corps of German naval officers."

Vice Admiral Helmuth Heye wrote that the KM was "forbidden until shortly before the war to carry on studies and make plans in case of a war with England."

Because of Germany's geographical situation both Grand Admiral Doenitz and Vice Admiral Eberhardt Weichold conceded at the time that Germany's rearmament programme should concentrate on land forces and that the "great naval powers" [Doenitz] were not considered potential enemies. By "great naval powers" he meant Britain, Italy, Japan and maybe the USA.

Hitler's thinking was much influenced by Vice Admiral Wegener's "Seestrategie des Welkrieges". It makes it clear that there was no point in competing with the British.

"The Germans were so impressed with the tactical superiority of the British fleet that they did not understand that strategically the relative size of fleets plays no part."

Had German attitudes to Britain been different in the mid thirties those U-Boat plans might have been very different.

Sorry for the digression. Planning for a war with Britain didn't divert resources because it was not done seriously until shortly before the war.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Aug 21, 2013)

stona said:


> Snip



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Z


> Plan Z was the name given to the planned re-equipment and expansion of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) ordered by Adolf Hitler on January 27, 1939.[1] The plan called for a Kriegsmarine of
> 
> 10 battleships
> 4 aircraft carriers
> ...



This is pretty extensive building with an aim toward challenging the Western Powers for control of the North Sea. Without the British being the main focus after Germany conquers Poland in 1939 and with Germany gearing up for war against the USSR while also mobilizing the German economy for said war by 1941/42, the focus on the building up of the fleet is going to take a back seat to building for the LW and Heer for a war in the East. The battleships are a long term project and there's likely to be only a few steps made in that direction until Poland is overrun and the USSR becomes the main focus. 

Of course the West remaining neutral and letting Germany focus on the East is but one scenario, which is actually not the one I outlined in the OP. In fact I was proposing that Germany still fights the West in 1940-41, but peace is made by March 1941 with Britain, giving Germany a free hand on the continent. We can discuss both scenarios and their validity, but if we run with my OP scenario then there will be naval build up in 1939-1941 and then the German economy has to reorient itself for a ground and air war.


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## stona (Aug 21, 2013)

Well Wikipedia is wrong about the time frame, as several German Admirals are on the record stating the proposed ten battleships were not all expected before 1948. The proposed fleet was not to challenge the naval power of the UK, at least not according to pre war German naval doctrine. Protection of sea communications was better achieved through politics than extensive, and expensive, naval rearmament. Admiral Schultze claimed that Germany recognised that Britain's imperial requirements obliged her to maintain "a considerably stronger navy."
Initially the German fleet was developed to compete with those of her continental neighbours.

Yet another Admiral, this is Theodore Kranke.
"The Fuhrer was always emphasising the fact that war with England was politically out of the question, as there was no grounds for conflict, hence the naval treaty"

Post war Admiral Hans Meyer who had commanded Tirpitz wrote.
"It was beyond question that Hitler never wished a quarrel with England."

Germany's main naval concern in the 1930s seems to have been to protect her vital iron ore routes across the Baltic and it is for this reason that vessels under 600 tons were excluded from the 1935 agreement.

This is all a bit off topic 

Steve


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## GrauGeist (Aug 21, 2013)

silence said:


> Without Britain there's no Balkans campaign, so Barbarossa can start much earlier. No need for a DAK so you can also throw Rommel into the mix if you'd like, along with JG 2, 26, 27, and I/JG 77. There's no partisan war in the Balkans either.


That's assuming that Italy's invasion of Greece and Albania goes well AND assuming Italy's land-grab in Africa goes well...

Such a huge *IF* there, but I will lay money on events unfolding as they did actually happen...



silence said:


> *Prob no jets, though*, nor nightfighters, etc except as private ventures. Minimal radar development. No Doras or Ta-152s. LW development will prob be at a pre-war kind of pace - at least until the La-5s start showing up. The RLM put a halt on any new projects that couldn't be realized in a year or less.


The jet program was underway before the war and the first combat jet flew just a few months after the Battle of France and almost a year before the invasion of Russia, so why not? Without pressure on resources from the west, development could have progressed along a much different path.

Radar showed it's value and would most likely continue to be refined just like any other advanced military hardware of it's time.




wiking85 said:


> *The Soviets had high altitude fighters*. Also it would be interesting to see the way the Me109 and Fw190 would evolve with only the need for lower altitude fighting (no slow G series for the Me109? perhaps the FW190A series actually speeds up instead of getting loaded down with heavier anti-bomber weaponry).


Not like the British or Americans. Actually, very few Soviet fighters, with the exception of the MiG-1, MiG-3 and La-5, were effective at altitudes above 35,000 feet and several could not acheive 35,000+.
Historically, the airware of the Eastern front was fought at lower altitudes and there's probably no reason why the airware would be any different in this scenario...


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## wiking85 (Aug 21, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Not like the British or Americans. Actually, very few Soviet fighters, with the exception of the MiG-1, MiG-3 and La-5, were effective at altitudes above 35,000 feet and several could not acheive 35,000+.
> Historically, the airware of the Eastern front was fought at lower altitudes and there's probably no reason why the airware would be any different in this scenario...


The Soviets didn't need to produce the types that could fly high historically. They had the Su-1/3 which did not enter production because of the lack of need. The Mig 3 was designed for fighting above 30,000 feet and actually performed worse at the typical altitudes during the fighting on the Eastern Front in 1941-45. With the Germans just focusing on the Soviets, they are more likely to actually produce a viable strategic bomber at some point (historically the four propellor He177B was ready for production in 1944 but cancelled due to the need for more fighters and the lack of fuel caused by allied bombing), which will mean the Soviets will have to have fighters capable of flying up to meet them at their likely altitudes that will be in excess of 25,000 feet to avoid AAA. 

With more resources for offensive aircraft the LW is bound to engage in strategic bombing, so that will take place above 20,000 feet for the reasons above.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 21, 2013)

even with out the west doing anything...i dont see germany being able to take the ussr in less than 10 years if ever. weather and terrain would have probably made it into yearly campaigns. the zealot like mindset of the soviet leadership would have fought to the bitter end with stick and stones if that was all they had. germany's only hope was to hit fast and hard to capture the soviet government before they could escape east. the vast expanse of the land is in itself a defense....unless germany would have been satisfied with the western 1/3 of the country. german supply lines within a few years would have been so long and thin ( 500 to a thousand miles long ) disrupting them would be extrememly easy. they might be able to own it but they would never have been able to subdue it.


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## wiking85 (Aug 21, 2013)

stona said:


> Well Wikipedia is wrong about the time frame, as several German Admirals are on the record stating the proposed ten battleships were not all expected before 1948. The proposed fleet was not to challenge the naval power of the UK, at least not according to pre war German naval doctrine. Protection of sea communications was better achieved through politics than extensive, and expensive, naval rearmament. Admiral Schultze claimed that Germany recognised that Britain's imperial requirements obliged her to maintain "a considerably stronger navy."
> Initially the German fleet was developed to compete with those of her continental neighbours.
> 
> Yet another Admiral, this is Theodore Kranke.
> ...



No worries, this is a pertinent OT. Hitler didn't view the British as an enemy until Munich, then they were a major concern. Plan Z was decided on and announced after Munich and Hitler renounced the Anglo-German naval treaty soon after (some 4 months after Plan Z made the AGNA moot).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-German_Naval_Agreement#Impact


> By the late 1930s, Hitler's disillusionment with Britain led to German foreign policy taking increasing anti-British course.[67] An important sign of Hitler's changed perceptions about Britain was his decision in January 1939 to give first priority to the Kriegsmarine in relates in the allocation of money, skilled workers, and raw materials and to launch the Plan Z to build a colossal Kriegsmarine of 10 battleships, 16 "pocket battleships", 8 aircraft carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 36 light cruisers, and 249 U-boats by 1944 to crush the Royal Navy.[68] Since the fleet envisioned in the Z Plan was considerably larger than that allowed by the 35:100 ratio in the A.G.N.A, the Z Plan made it inevitable that Germany would renounce the A.G.N.A. Over the winter of 1938-39, the fact that it became increasing clear to London that the Germans no longer intended to abide by the A.G.N.A played a role in straining Anglo-German relations.[69] Reports received in October 1938 that the Germans were considering denouncing the A.G.N.A were used by Lord Halifax in Cabinet discussions for the need for a tough policy with the Reich.[70] The German statement of December 9, 1938 that they intended to build to 100% ratio allowed in submarines by the A.G.N.A. plus to build to the limits in heavy cruisers led to speech by Chamberlain before the correspondents of the German News Agency in London warning of the "futility of ambition, if ambition leads to the desire for domination".[71] At the same time, Lord Halifax informed Herbert von Dirksen, the German Ambassador to Britain that his government viewed the talks to discuss the details of the German building escalation as a test-case for German sincerity.[72] When the talks began in Berlin on December 30, 1938, the Germans took an obdurate approach, leading London to conclude that the Germans did not wish for the talks to succeed.[73]






> In response to the British "guarantee" of Poland of March 31, 1939, Hitler, who was enraged by the British move, stated "I shall brew them a devil's drink".[74] In a speech in Wilhelmshaven for the launch of the Admiral Tirpitz battleship, Hitler threatened to denounce the A.G.N.A. if the British persisted with their "encirclement" policy as represented by the "guarantee" of Polish independence.[74] On April 28, 1939 Hitler denounced the A.G.N.A.[74] To provide an excuse for the denunciation of the A.G.N.A, and to prevent the emergence of a new naval treaty, the Germans began refusing to share information about their shipbuilding,and thus left the British with the choice of either accepting the unilateral German move or rejecting it, thereby providing the Germans with the excuse to denounce the treaty.[75] At a Cabinet meeting on May 3, 1939, the First Lord of Admiralty, Lord Stanhope stated that "at the present time Germany was building ships as fast as she could but that she would not be able to exceed the 35 per cent ratio before 1942 or 1943".[75] Chatfield who by this time was serving as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence commented that Hitler had "persuaded himself" that Britain had provided the Reich with a "free hand" in Eastern Europe in exchange for the A.G.N.A.[75] Chamberlain stated that Britain had never given such an understanding to Germany, and commented that he first learned of Hitler's belief in such an implied bargain during his meeting with the Führer at the Berchtesgaden summit in September 1938.[75] In a later paper to the Cabinet, Chatfield stated "that we might say that we now understood Herr Hitler had in 1935 thought that we had given him a free hand in Eastern and Central Europe in return for his acceptance of the 100:35 ratio, but that as we could not accept the correctness of this view it might be better that the 1935 arrangements should be abrogated".[76] In the end, the British reply to the German move was a diplomatic note vigorously disputing the German claim that Britain was attempting to "encircle" Germany with hostile alliances.[76] The German denunciation of the A.G.N.A. together with reports of increased German shipbuilding in June 1939 caused by the Z Plan played a significant part in persuading the Chamberlain government of the need to "contain" Germany by building a "Peace front" of states in both Western and Eastern Europe, and of increasing the perception within the Chamberlain government in 1939 that German policies were a threat to Great Britain.[77]


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## wiking85 (Aug 21, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> even with out the west doing anything...i dont see germany being able to take the ussr in less than 10 years if ever. weather and terrain would have probably made it into yearly campaigns. the zealot like mindset of the soviet leadership would have fought to the bitter end with stick and stones if that was all they had. germany's only hope was to hit fast and hard to capture the soviet government before they could escape east. the vast expanse of the land is in itself a defense....unless germany would have been satisfied with the western 1/3 of the country. german supply lines within a few years would have been so long and thin ( 500 to a thousand miles long ) disrupting them would be extrememly easy. they might be able to own it but they would never have been able to subdue it.


At some point Soviet leadership is going to be removed by a ed populace if the Germans are able to make the war too costly. Food and starvation will be a major concern at some point, as without the fields of Ukraine the USSR doesn't produce enough to feed itself and foreign exchange only holds out so long to mitigate the shortfalls.


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## stona (Aug 21, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> At some point Soviet leadership is going to be removed by a ed populace if the Germans are able to make the war too costly.



Unfortunately one of the results of Nazi, racist, ideology in territories occupied by the Germans was that they repressed and murdered the population more efficiently than even the Soviet system had. The Germans were welcomed as liberators in some areas (Belorus, Ukraine, which are large areas) but it didn't take them long to blow that chance. There's nothing like a "Fuhrerbefehl" or few "Einsatzgruppen" to concentrate the opposition.
Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Aug 21, 2013)

Historically the Soviet Union held on during 1941 because Germany didn't quite have enough military assets to finish them off in a single campaign season and Anglo-American assistance started arriving during August 1941. Neither condition applies in this scenario. Anti communist coalition invasion force should be at least a third larger and there will be no Anglo-American economic assistance.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 21, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> At some point Soviet leadership is going to be removed by a ed populace if the Germans are able to make the war too costly. Food and starvation will be a major concern at some point, as without the fields of Ukraine the USSR doesn't produce enough to feed itself and foreign exchange only holds out so long to mitigate the shortfalls.



if we were talking about a western country i would wholeheartely agree with you. the average person in the us or the uk/cw would have picked up a ball bat or pitchfork and started cleaning house themselves. but the mindset of the average soviet was a lot different. if on d-day ike would have rallied the troops and gave them a clip with 5 rounds of ammo in it and told them they can get a gun off of fallen comrade....i doubt d-day would have happened. i actually doubt ike would have gotten out of there alive! yet that kind of scenario was repeated in the eastern war....and while we hear of attempts to kill hitler by the germans...how many stories do we hear about the attempts to kill stalin?


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## bobbysocks (Aug 21, 2013)

davebender said:


> Historically the Soviet Union held on during 1941 because Germany didn't quite have enough military assets to finish them off in a single campaign season and Anglo-American assistance started arriving during August 1941. Neither condition applies in this scenario. Anti communist coalition invasion force should be at least a third larger and there will be no Anglo-American economic assistance.



they ( soviets ) held on to the western contested area...not just held on to existance. they had thousands of miles to retreat and all the time in the world. look at the size of the land.....the military assets needed to not only conquer but hold and subdue it are astronimical. guerrilla warfare would have put the war of attrition in the soviet favor. it might have taken 40 years but in the end they would have won the war ( germany pulling out ) by making it either too costly or the causing german population to demand change. i site the history of afghanistan...china...vietnam as prime examples.


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## stona (Aug 21, 2013)

A woman in a food queue in Berlin in 1944 once compared the Nazi state to a snake, when urging her neighbour to stop talking about "the camps". "Tread on its tail and it will bite you" she said. The Soviet state, like any totalitarian state, was the same. Tread on its tail and it may well bite you.Cut off its head and it will die. Then anything is possible.
Cheers
Steve


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## GrauGeist (Aug 21, 2013)

stona said:


> Unfortunately one of the results of Nazi, racist, ideology in territories occupied by the Germans was that they repressed and murdered the population more efficiently than even the Soviet system had.* The Germans were welcomed as liberators in some areas (Belorus, Ukraine, which are large areas) *but it didn't take them long to blow that chance. There's nothing like a "Fuhrerbefehl" or few "Einsatzgruppen" to concentrate the opposition.
> Cheers
> Steve


Totally agree...

Had Hitler insisted on a "winning hearts and minds" of the occupied territories during his push to Moscow instead of fostering his hatred, the people would have swelled the German's ranks with determined people that wanted to be free of Stalin and his crowd. He already had the White Russians as a special fighting unit.

That was surely an opportunity lost.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> if we were talking about a western country i would wholeheartely agree with you. the average person in the us or the uk/cw would have picked up a ball bat or pitchfork and started cleaning house themselves. but the mindset of the average soviet was a lot different. if on d-day ike would have rallied the troops and gave them a clip with 5 rounds of ammo in it and told them they can get a gun off of fallen comrade....i doubt d-day would have happened. i actually doubt ike would have gotten out of there alive! yet that kind of scenario was repeated in the eastern war....and while we hear of attempts to kill hitler by the germans...how many stories do we hear about the attempts to kill stalin?



Stalin's fear was the Politburo (sp?). At one point early in Barbarossa he was deathly afraid that he was going to be arrested. As far as "encouraging the troops", remember that the NKVD squads were right behind the regulars ready to shoot anyone who did anything other than try to fight: the Red Army soldiers faced certain death from their own or the possibility of death from the Germans.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

stona said:


> Unfortunately one of the results of Nazi, racist, ideology in territories occupied by the Germans was that they repressed and murdered the population more efficiently than even the Soviet system had. The Germans were welcomed as liberators in some areas (Belorus, Ukraine, which are large areas) but it didn't take them long to blow that chance. There's nothing like a "Fuhrerbefehl" or few "Einsatzgruppen" to concentrate the opposition.
> Cheers
> Steve



The citizens in the Baltic states were more than happy to help the Germans with this - or even do it themselves, especially in Latvia. My parents had an exchange student from Latvia for a year in the early 90s, several years after the collapse: my God, her hate for the Russians was downright frightening.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

davebender said:


> Historically the Soviet Union held on during 1941 because Germany didn't quite have enough military assets to finish them off in a single campaign season and Anglo-American assistance started arriving during August 1941. Neither condition applies in this scenario. Anti communist coalition invasion force should be at least a third larger and there will be no Anglo-American economic assistance.



Plus they'd have at least an extra month to work with. Move everything up a month: suddenly the September halt is an August halt, Typhoon now starts in September, and the Germans take Khimki - 5 miles from Moscow, 20 miles from the Kremlin - November 1 instead of December 1. The winter hell of 41-42 didn't really kick into full gear until late November. All this assumes that the larger force the Germans have in this scenario will advance no faster than the historical force.

The question then becomes: with the loss of Moscow, does the USSR collapse? Even if no, they just lost their communications and transport center, the brain of the USSR if you will, making anything they try after that much more difficult.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

stona said:


> A woman in a food queue in Berlin in 1944 once compared the Nazi state to a snake, when urging her neighbour to stop talking about "the camps". "Tread on its tail and it will bite you" she said. The Soviet state, like any totalitarian state, was the same. Tread on its tail and it may well bite you.Cut off its head and it will die. Then anything is possible.
> Cheers
> Steve



Berliners were also saying that Hitler did in fact keep one of his promises: that if he were elected in 10 years you wouldn't recognize Berlin (or was it Germany? either way, you get the point).


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 21, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Totally agree...
> 
> Had Hitler insisted on a "winning hearts and minds" of the occupied territories during his push to Moscow instead of fostering his hatred, the people would have swelled the German's ranks with determined people that wanted to be free of Stalin and his crowd. He already had the White Russians as a special fighting unit.
> 
> That was surely an opportunity lost.



He couldn't. I always recommend that people read Mein Kampf, a turgid read indeed, but essential in understanding Hitler's mindset. Basically everything he wrote he did (or tried to do).

In his mind the 'East' was like the US's 'West'. A land full of 'savages' (or inferior people) to be cleared for Germans. Their role was to die, get out the way with the (few) survivors becoming uneducated slave labour, etc (usually worked until they died, though some would be allowed to live to give German women plenty of servants and the new settlers labour).

He was urged by some NAZI leaders to exactly what you suggest, but he was having no truck with that. 
In his mind: "how can you ally yourself with sub-humans that are in the way, sitting on land that people of good Germanic stock should have'?

So it was never going to happen. And here is the scary thing, the death program, as unimaginably horrific that actually happened, was just a warm up for the real event after they beat the USSR. The Slavs were going to go.

Could they have beaten the USSR with a different strategy? Maybe, but personally I think it would have required a joint attack with Japan and even then it could have gone on for years before a result.
But another strategy was not going to happen as long as Hitler lived.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Why not?
> 
> 
> 
> ...




All good points. I was simply speculating and limiting my time period to the end of '42. I suspect that the events developing from your scenario would be over by then and things will have turned to issues of occupation rather than conquest.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 21, 2013)

silence said:


> Stalin's fear was the Politburo (sp?). At one point early in Barbarossa he was deathly afraid that he was going to be arrested. As far as "encouraging the troops", remember that the NKVD squads were right behind the regulars ready to shoot anyone who did anything other than try to fight: the Red Army soldiers faced certain death from their own or the possibility of death from the Germans.



stalin was paranoid pure and simple. he purged the ranks of the military ( of many officers who were loyal to him and the party ) and hunted down and assinated his political rivals. just because he was afraid doesnt mean the threat was real. i would be interested to hear of any real plots against him....they could be there...just never heard of them.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> He couldn't. I always recommend that people read Mein Kampf, a turgid read indeed, but essential in understanding Hitler's mindset. Basically everything he wrote he did (or tried to do).
> 
> In his mind the 'East' was like the US's 'West'. A land full of 'savages' (or inferior people) to be cleared for Germans. Their role was to die, get out the way with the (few) survivors becoming uneducated slave labour, etc (usually worked until they died, though some would be allowed to live to give German women plenty of servants and the new settlers labour).
> 
> ...




Even those allowed to be slaves would probably be sterilized. The one big effect, I think, if Japan gets involved in '41, is that you're not going to see the Siberian troops reinforce Moscow: Stalin wouldn't release them until he was sure Japan was staying out, and as it was they just barely got there in time.


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## silence (Aug 21, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> stalin was paranoid pure and simple. he purged the ranks of the military ( of many officers who were loyal to him and the party ) and hunted down and assinated his political rivals. just because he was afraid doesnt mean the threat was real. i would be interested to hear of any real plots against him....they could be there...just never heard of them.



I don't know of any, but I think there had to be some kind of foundation for his fear. I don't think this came out of his paranoia, but rather out of real fear, and if he thought it was possible then it probably was. I think we'd really have to delve into his mind to find out. and that is one place that I for one have no desire to visit.


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## pattle (Aug 21, 2013)

There would have been little guerrilla action against the Germans because unlike in Afganistan the Germans were going to just kill everybody on sight. 
The Japanese wanted oil and that meant war with either Russia or the USA and opinions were divided within Japan over which way to go, history proved that Japan starting a war with America was a very bad idea. I'm pretty sure the Japanese were not anywhere close to being well equipped enough to tackle the Russian's and their supply lines would have been long. The Japanese would have needed to accept that their part in a joint German Japanese war with Russia was only going to be to draw the Russians off the Germans and not a glorious advance.


I don't know how important the German capture of Moscow would have been, perhaps it would have been symbolic and more of a trophy than anything else.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 21, 2013)

silence said:


> I don't know of any, but I think there had to be some kind of foundation for his fear. I don't think this came out of his paranoia, but rather out of real fear, and if he thought it was possible then it probably was. I think we'd really have to delve into his mind to find out. and that is one place that I for one have no desire to visit.


Stalin's purges before the Soviets went to war cost him dearly in the series of wars with Finland. After the dismal performance of the Red army against the Finns, he again "thinned" the ranks costing him even more experianced leaders.

By the time the Germans rolled across the Soviet frontier, Stalin was in serious trouble as far as seasoned leaders in his military is concerned.


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 21, 2013)

pattle said:


> There would have been little guerrilla action against the Germans because unlike in Afganistan the Germans were going to just kill everybody on sight.



Plenty of that in the Balkans and they were totally ruthless there too. And behind German lines in the East, partisans as we call them now, did a lot of damage. 
Problem is that that level of ruthlessness becomes counter productive, because people will fight, if you are going to die anyway, or you have lost all your family, might as well take some with you.

The Soviets were about as ruthless as you can get in Afghanistan, still lost and no one accused the British of being 'nice' there too in the past .. again still lost. 
And it is a Western myth that somehow we keep losing because we are 'too nice' or something like that.
History has shown that Western countries can (and have often been) just as ruthless as any dictatorship. Britain, Holland, France, US, et al.
Read about against the Boers for example, the old saying goes, you don't get the biggest empire the World has ever seen by being 'nice'. The Boers made a strategic mistake of leaving their families where the British could get at them.

Problem is that the force multiplier has closed permanently. You could do that sort of stuff putting rifles (etc) up against spears. But the AK-47 (and a moderate skill with explosives and the like) closed the gap enough to where a battle of attrition happens, which means you will lose, if by nothing else economically (you will run out of money before they run out of people). The colonial days have long disappeared, unfortunately a lot of people have not woken up to that fact.

You might be able to pull it off if you use nukes and gas, trouble is what do you win? Can't exactly use the land for a long time.


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## wiking85 (Aug 21, 2013)

silence said:


> Even those allowed to be slaves would probably be sterilized. The one big effect, I think, if Japan gets involved in '41, is that you're not going to see the Siberian troops reinforce Moscow: Stalin wouldn't release them until he was sure Japan was staying out, and as it was they just barely got there in time.



IIRC 30 million people were supposed to be spared and used as slaves for the German settlers, which suggests they wouldn't be sterilized, rather used as chattel slaves like in the US prior to the Civil War.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalplan_Ost#Phases_of_the_plan_and_its_implementation



OldSkeptic said:


> You might be able to pull it off if you use nukes and gas, trouble is what do you win? Can't exactly use the land for a long time.


Nerve gas disperses quickly:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarin#Degradation_and_shelf_life


> At high pH, sarin decomposes rapidly to nontoxic phosphonic acid derivatives.[10][11]
> 
> Sarin degrades after a period of several weeks to several months. The shelf life can be shortened by impurities in precursor materials. According to the CIA, some Iraqi sarin had a shelf life of only a few weeks, owing mostly to impure precursors.[12]


It was derived from DDT a pesticide; these don't leave the ground toxic, otherwise the food its used on would be poison. So the Germans could use nerve gases against partisans and not have to worry about poisoning the ground; one good rain or use in swampy areas would break the residue down into non-toxic derivatives.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 21, 2013)

pattle said:


> There would have been little guerrilla action against the Germans because unlike in Afganistan the Germans were going to just kill everybody on sight.



that would be the only way they even had a chance to succeed....BUT that also brings in a couple other problems....and other strategies. the west is out of the picture at this point. i doubt they would sit back for very long if there was wholesale genicide. yes we can argue that it was happening to a fair degree....to certain ethnic groups and races...but not to the entire population. i dont see that ( genicide of the entire pop as viable). the "better" alternative would be to round them up and put them into large camps as forced labor. but again, i think you would end up with another warsaw ghetto scenario being replayed. if i were the leader and knew my country was going to be over run and nothing i could do would stop it. all the people would be taught how to make explosives, guns, and the guerrilla tactics. i would then give them supplies to bury and tell them to welcome the germans in with open arms and nazi flags waving. be diligent servants of the reich by day....slit their throats at night.


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## pattle (Aug 21, 2013)

Oldskeptic I don't disagree with all you said, but the Nazi way of dealing with things was to round up all the people you don't like and kill them all. The Nazis unlike the Russians in Afganistan, the Americans in Vietnam or the British Empire did not have native populations in their future plans, they were not to be controlled they were to be made extinct, had the Russians of surrendered that would have been the next job of the German troops. This is not about losing wars because you are to nice to people this is a completely different concept where the argument over how much force should be used to control a population is simply not there because the plan was to depopulate these countries by killing all who were there. There would be no attempt to separate the Partisans from the farmers like in Afganistan, all would die as simple as that. It would take time yes, but the Nazis had won the war and so they had the time.


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## wiking85 (Aug 21, 2013)

pattle said:


> Oldskeptic I don't disagree with all you said, but the Nazi way of dealing with things was to round up all the people you don't like and kill them all. The Nazis unlike the Russians in Afganistan, the Americans in Vietnam or the British Empire did not have native populations in their future plans, they were not to be controlled they were to be made extinct, had the Russians of surrendered that would have been the next job of the German troops. This is not about losing wars because you are to nice to people this is a completely different concept where the argument over how much force should be used to control a population is simply not there because the plan was to depopulate these countries by killing all who were there. There would be no attempt to separate the Partisans from the farmers like in Afganistan, all would die as simple as that. It would take time yes, but the Nazis had won the war and so they had the time.


Remember though that the Germans, or should I say the Nazi leadership, planned on executing Generalplan Ost over a 25-30 year time frame. There are limits to what their army could achieve or would put up with in terms of a lengthy partisan war, especially as Himmler's plan hinged on 'warrior farmers' to settle the East and fight as part of the defense force to protect against the Soviet incursions plans from beyond the AA line. It was at best a pipe dream that would very likely to play out in reality, as historically it was only talked about among a small cabal of the SS leadership and was not known to the Wehrmacht. There is a limit to what the non-Nazi armed forces could tolerate and I doubt that a 30 extermination campaign, along side settlement of warrior colonists (who would be that crazy???), and the kidnapping of Slavic children of 'aryan appearance' for absorption into the German gene pool is not exactly what even the most hardened German soldier would long tolerate without the pressures of a world war in which Germany was losing suppressing moral concerns about the behavior of the German military in the East. Also its not like the anti-Nazi officers would stop trying to kill Hitler and they might succeed here too, especially if the German military got fed up with the Eastern Campaign. Contrary to popular history not all Germans were blood thirsty killing machines that would tolerate extended periods of atrocity participation; the Einsatzgruppen had a very high alcoholism and suicide rate after all, which is a major reason that their mass extermination activities were replaced by concentration camp murder.


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## pattle (Aug 21, 2013)

Well its just my opinion, and you have to remember that only in modern values is it unacceptable to murder and enslave whole races and destroy civilisations. It was once accepted and expected as the social norm to do all these things and people were people then as much as they are now.


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 22, 2013)

Yes and we in so many countries have a long and shameful history of that.

But I always maintain that the availability of cheap guns, especially of the automatic variety and communications has changed that permanently. It is no longer possible to completely overpower small groups one at a time, the traditional way of doing this (the British were masters of that). That is kill them with zero casualties. News travels too fast and even if you take out one group, another will be warned. Sheer fear will create coalitions between even long time enemies. Cheap guns (and explosives) means it is no longer a zero cost pastime, as the perpetrator will take at least some casualties.

Now while humans (or at least a significantly large enough minority) seem able to quite happily slaughter other people if there is no cost or risk, even small losses tend to diminish the ardour for slaughter considerably. Quite quickly costs build up since you need ever more resources to achieve your aim.

From the Western history side we also don't have our great ally ... diseases to sweep away huge numbers at no cost any longer.

Plus there are just so many people now. Wiping out a an isolated village of a couple of hundred is one thing, killing thousands, let alone millions is quite another.


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## stona (Aug 22, 2013)

silence said:


> The citizens in the Baltic states were more than happy to help the Germans with this - or even do it themselves, especially in Latvia. My parents had an exchange student from Latvia for a year in the early 90s, several years after the collapse: my God, her hate for the Russians was downright frightening.



In Nazi terms, a different racial group. It absolute nonsense of course, the racial ideology was manipulated to suit political aims on several occasions. Look at the hoops Himmler jumped through to prove the Japanese "Aryan"......whatever that was supposed to mean.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Aug 22, 2013)

Where's the idea that the Nazis planned to eliminate the Slavs and other "untermenschen" come from? Certainly not Mein Kamf. Calling it a turgid read is being very kind, but I have ploughed through it. There were fairly unpleasant plans for them but they were needed. All the world's historical empire's had benefited from slave labour in one form or another and the Third Reich was to be no different. These people were to be expendable but not to be eliminated. The Soviet political class was to go (as Pol Pot tried in Kampuchea) in an effort to eradicate (or uproot, eliminate.....ausrotten) Bolshevism. Obviously the Jewish population and certain other groups were also to go, but not everyone. The rest would be a sustainable resource of slave labour.

Hitler admired the way that the British managed to retain control of India, but it was done by enlisting Indians to run the Raj on behalf of the British. Maharajah's sent their sons to Oxford and Cambridge for a "proper" education. Somehow I can't see the Nazis adopting such a system in their eastern conquests. They were poisoned by their own ideology.

Cheers

Steve


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 22, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> It was at best a pipe dream that would very likely to play out in reality, as historically it was only talked about among a small cabal of the SS leadership and was not known to the Wehrmacht. There is a limit to what the non-Nazi armed forces could tolerate and I doubt that a 30 extermination campaign, along side settlement of warrior colonists (who would be that crazy???), and the kidnapping of Slavic children of 'aryan appearance' for absorption into the German gene pool is not exactly what even the most hardened German soldier would long tolerate without the pressures of a world war in which Germany was losing suppressing moral concerns about the behavior of the German military in the East. Also its not like the anti-Nazi officers would stop trying to kill Hitler and they might succeed here too ....



Very true. You know when you read this stuff (and it only needs to be done once to get the historical context, repeated reading would turn your brain to mush and it is hard not to laugh or chuck ...both??...at various parts) it is absolute ga-ga land stuff.
You then understand why they went to war so unprepared, carrying all that fantasy baggage and why they did what did.

You know they were lucky (the rest of us were unlucky) that they had the great German Army. If the NAZI's had inherited (say) the French army their mad dreams would have died very quickly.
Yes they built it up, but all its training, tactics, mission command, et al were all from past efforts, in sheer military competence the finest army in the World, bar none. 
Seldom equaled (the UK 8th Army at its best was about the closest), but never bettered overall.

Agree about the majority of Germans, some estimates are that 10% of the population are sociopaths, or at least potential ones. I suspect less than that, plus significant differences between countries, early age brain damage from the environment (lead may be a major factor) or lack of food or accidents or diseases seems to be an issue ... except at senior management levels of course..... 
So your killers (and torturers, etc) have to be taken out of that pool of non-empathetic people. 

Ordinary people can't keep it up, oh in the heat of the moment .. or at a distance (say flying over at 30,000ft) ... or being stirred up in a mob they can. 
But face to face, day after day, week after week .... turns normal people into gibbering wrecks after a while.

Humans are social creatures, to do that they have to have empathy (mirroring as some call it) in face to face encounters.
To give a personal example, I remember meeting a guy in the early 70's, just back from Vietnam and doing a holiday tour. Got drunk in the pub one night and (I think he was desperate to talk about it all) told me some of things he saw and did. One in particular I'll never forget. It's burned into my brain I can picture it today ... and I was just told about it! God knows how he has coped. I have always hoped that he made it ok, such a nice guy, but he'd be carrying quite a burden.

But that is a fairly standard empathetic response, it is burned into my brain, not so much because the actual event was so bad for me, but because of the obvious incredible emotional pain he expressed at the time. 


Part of the absurdity of the mad NAZI dream was to create a society of non-empathetic people, ie a population of sociopaths, like this 'warrior farmer' nonsense. No society can function like that, chaos would be a mild description.

As for those reading this and thinking 'this has nothing to do with military stuff'. Not true, the best armed forces have very tight bonds between their people and deliberately foster them. 
An army of sociopaths would be thumped by an equivalent one composed of normal people. Teamwork and trust is the key, if everyone is a sociopath then that is impossible.

In WW2 terms you can contrast the German army against the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe *was a *NAZI organisation and, as such, treated its people terribly and was chaotic, which contributed greatly to its collapse. 
Even in the worst days the German Army made sure its troops got rests and breaks (along with their teammates) training, et al. They fostered team loyalty. British did too.
The Luftwaffe never did, fight until death. Their 'great aces' were just the extreme end of a Pareto curve, heck there was even a Lancaster that survived more than 100 missions ... long tail statistics is like that. Technically it is the statistics of survival analysis.

No need to comment on what was the most effective German fighting organisation.


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## Tante Ju (Aug 22, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> As for those reading this and thinking 'this has nothing to do with military stuff'. Not true, the best armed forces have very tight bonds between their people and deliberately foster them.



The Sacred Band of Thebes comes to mind.


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## pattle (Aug 22, 2013)

Of the nearly 6 million Russian prisoners of war held by Germany between a half and two thirds of them died in captivity, from recollection the majority of these died through starvation, epidemic and exposure to the elements. During the German occupation of Crete there was a policy that for every German soldier killed a number of civilians would be killed as a reprisal, the number varied. At times German forces would seal off an area, destroy every village and kill everyone found within that area, a favourite way of killing large amounts of people at once was to lock them in buildings and burn them down. There were no SS units present in Crete, this was done by the German army. 
I understand that this thread is basically asking whether forum members believe that Germany and it's Allies could have defeated Russia in a situation where Russia stood alone against them. I can't see how this situation would ever have occurred but if it had then I believe that Germany would of beaten Russia and have occupied all the lands that they were interested in and that any opposition within those lands would have resulted in the extermination of the population. Like with the Russian prisoners of war starvation, epidemic and exposure to the elements would likely have played as bigger part in these peoples deaths as direct killing. I think this because this was how he Nazis did things wherever they were. There are lands further east in the old USSR that were part of the Russian Empire but not themselves Russian, because these were poor countries with little to offer Germany then probably they would have been left to their own devices so long as they caused no trouble.


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## wiking85 (Aug 22, 2013)

pattle said:


> I understand that this thread is basically asking whether forum members believe that Germany and it's Allies could have defeated Russia in a situation where Russia stood alone against them. I can't see how this situation would ever have occurred but if it had then I believe that Germany would of beaten Russia and have occupied all the lands that they were interested in and that any opposition within those lands would have resulted in the extermination of the population. Like with the Russian prisoners of war starvation, epidemic and exposure to the elements would likely have played as bigger part in these peoples deaths as direct killing. I think this because this was how he Nazis did things wherever they were. There are lands further east in the old USSR that were part of the Russian Empire but not themselves Russian, because these were poor countries with little to offer Germany then probably they would have been left to their own devices so long as they caused no trouble.


Yeah, we've strayed very far OT. The thread is about production, not even the outcome of a potential Axis vs. USSR showdown. Unlike Dave Bender, I think the campaign would be a long one, so long term production comes into play; what could Germany produce without the pressures of wars on other fronts? That means no Uboat war, no need for home aerial defense production (beyond the minimum), no diversion of resources to other theaters like Africa (does anyone have information about what equipment and how many men were sent to Africa from 1941-43?), and no bombing campaign disrupting production. There are of course political issues in this, like whether Germany would have enough money to purchase from abroad and how the West would react. But fundamentally this thread is about production output at its core, not politics.


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## silence (Aug 22, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Yeah, we've strayed very far OT. The thread is about production, not even the outcome of a potential Axis vs. USSR showdown. Unlike Dave Bender, I think the campaign would be a long one, so long term production comes into play; what could Germany produce without the pressures of wars on other fronts? That means no Uboat war, no need for home aerial defense production (beyond the minimum), no diversion of resources to other theaters like Africa (does anyone have information about what equipment and how many men were sent to Africa from 1941-43?), and no bombing campaign disrupting production. There are of course political issues in this, like whether Germany would have enough money to purchase from abroad and how the West would react. But fundamentally this thread is about production output at its core, not politics.



The North Africa campaign cost the Germans roughly 150,000 killed and captured (all highly trained and experienced). I'm not finding a breakdown of Axis material losses by nationality but in total there were approx 800 planes, 6,200 guns (including lots of 88s), 2500 tanks (mainly Pz II-IV, and - IIRC - a Tiger heavy battalion, along with Italian armor), and 70,000 other vehicles.

Good call on the political issues.


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## wiking85 (Aug 22, 2013)

silence said:


> The North Africa campaign cost the Germans roughly 150,000 killed and captured (all highly trained and experienced). I'm not finding a breakdown of Axis material losses by nationality but in total there were approx 800 planes, 6,200 guns (including lots of 88s), 2500 tanks (mainly Pz II-IV, and - IIRC - a Tiger heavy battalion, along with Italian armor), and 70,000 other vehicles.
> 
> Good call on the political issues.



Thanks! I thought that Germany sent a disproportionate share of its trucks to the North African theater, which had a negative impact on the Eastern Front. Any idea how much was lost during shipping to Allied naval attacks?


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## pattle (Aug 22, 2013)

The Germans used lots of captured British lorries in North Africa, I have no idea how many but it was enough for them often to be common in pictures. The Germans should have made more winter clothes, I read somewhere that there was plenty of captured French winter clothing that could have been issued but wasn't. The Germans actually cancelled armament programmes rather than started new ones in 1941, this was because they wanted to produce more of what they were already making rather than use their resources on new stuff. So what would have happened did happen, they just carried on with old designs and no winter clothes because they expected to have the whole thing wrapped up before winter


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## bbear (Aug 22, 2013)

What I get from this thread is:
Firstly that industrial capacity in Germany including its potential to grow was unaffected by war in the west in the early years.
Secondly that besides not having to make good the losses in the west in the OTL the size and character of production in the scenario are nevertheless indeterminate.

It seems to me that we keep bumping up against some variant of the background question of how would the strategies and political positions and therefore military dispositions of all nations have changed if Britain sued for peace in 1940. And that appears to be a problem in a way that any single military 'what if' does not (for example what if Italy did not invade Greece or in North Africa).

So tentatively maybe a WW2 in which no country 'defied and survived' is such a completely different item that nothing can be said for sure - even about such an apparently independent thing like industrial production. Not even up, down or about the same without a whole cloud of subsidiary what ifs being fixed first. That's how the very expert statements here look to me so far.

If so, if the answer to the thread is indeterminate, that's weak evidence that events in Downing Street/Parliament,the UK and CW in April May 1940 were crucial. Churchill or Halifax basically. And that was a close enough contest to make the scenario very realistic. And an example of a very good and productive 'what if'. 

Or none of those things? I've been wrong many times before.


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## stona (Aug 22, 2013)

bbear said:


> If so, if the answer to the thread is indeterminate, that's weak evidence that events in Downing Street/Parliament,the UK and CW in April May 1940 were crucial.



A lot of Germans thought that the those events were crucial, at least they said so post war. Germany was forced to fight on two fronts and these German commanders felt that had they had a freehand in the East, with Britain in a state of "armed neutrality" following negotiations, they would have defeated the Soviet Union in 1941/2.

Cheers

Steve


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## silence (Aug 22, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Thanks! I thought that Germany sent a disproportionate share of its trucks to the North African theater, which had a negative impact on the Eastern Front. Any idea how much was lost during shipping to Allied naval attacks?



Christos military and intelligence corner: ULTRA intelligence and Rommel’s convoys


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## wiking85 (Aug 22, 2013)

silence said:


> Christos military and intelligence corner: ULTRA intelligence and Rommel’s convoys



Nearly 250,000 vehicles and spare sent in 1941 and 1942. Not sure if that's tons of equipment or what, but still indicates a pretty large number of vehicles that would have been useful in the East. That's also a hell of a lot of fuel too (+250k tons of fuel for 1941).


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## stona (Aug 27, 2013)

I'm reviving this because I was looking into the production of the Jumo 004 and came across some relevant figures related to the allied (RAF/USAAF) bombing of the various Junkers plants.

Junkers estimated that allied bombing cost the company 300,000,000 RM in damage. To put that in perspective the company was capitalised to the tune of 240,000,000 RM in 1941. That is a substantial loss.

During 1944 alone 540 machine tools were destroyed (something that the "anti-bombers" say is not possible) and a further 1,500 damaged but repairable.

The details of lost production and plants off line for days, weeks, and rarely months makes for depressing reading. It is difficult to quantify exactly what effect this had on production of aircraft (more than 30,000 between 1933 and 1945) or aero engines (more than 82,000 between 1939 and 1945) but to imagine it had no effect is ridiculous. Those numbers could have been substantially larger.

Junkers is not alone. Other sectors and companies within the aviation industry were also bombed.

There were also indirect effects. Facilities were dispersed or forced underground. The head of Junkers' aero engine development division reported that the results of moving the Kothen and Magdeburg workshops into the underground tunnels at Nordhausen was "great confusion." An estimated three months output was lost between May and August 1944. 

The question, as Overy posed it, is, how much more would Germany have produced had there been no bombing? Without a war in the West all this would have been avoided.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Aug 27, 2013)

stona said:


> I'm reviving this because I was looking into the production of the Jumo 004 and came across some relevant figures related to the allied (RAF/USAAF) bombing of the various Junkers plants.
> 
> Junkers estimated that allied bombing cost the company 300,000,000 RM in damage. To put that in perspective the company was capitalised to the tune of 240,000,000 RM in 1941. That is a substantial loss.
> 
> ...



Not to mention the effects on transportation; German production wasn't centralized like the Soviets or US was, so relied heavily on prompt shipping of components from subcontractors to the assembly centers throughout the Reich. The disruption of the rail networks, especially in 1944, badly degraded efficiency in production, so that even as all the producers had their parts ready, final produce assembly was just not happening in a timely fashion. Add in the bombing of factories and all that entailed, resources spent on dispersal of production (including into underground facilities), building up of underground factories or repairing bomb damage, etc. and its pretty clear that from 1943 on with the Battle of the Ruhr German production was being seriously disrupted.


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## stona (Aug 27, 2013)

Yes indeed.
It's just that I read posts about the RAF "bouncing rubble" about and wonder if the posters have ever actually examined the available data. I only posted again in this thread because I stumbled across the data when looking for, in the words of Monty Python, something completely different!
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Aug 27, 2013)

stona said:


> Yes indeed.
> It's just that I read posts about the RAF "bouncing rubble" about and wonder if the posters have ever actually examined the available data. I only posted again in this thread because I stumbled across the data when looking for, in the words of Monty Python, something completely different!
> Cheers
> Steve


I'd like to continue the discussion, so feel free to post again if you'd like.
I think there are some serious misconceptions around the strategic bombing campaign stemming from the failure to live up to the, perhaps apocryphal, claim of being able to win the war on its own and the serious moral issues of bombing civilians, killing hundreds of thousands in the process. So people who have a bone to pick over the morality of it or the cost of it to the attacker generally seem to denigrate the effort and its results, in effect throwing the baby out with the proverbial bathwater. I think, as you suggest, the war would have been much more costly if the Germans were allowed to produce uninterrupted by bombing by the Western Allies, something the Soviets would have found out if they fought the war by themselves.


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## parsifal (Aug 28, 2013)

I havent read the entire thread, so apologies in advance guys. I just wanted to make an opening point.....German Army Divisions have been caculated they spent up to 80% of their combat time on the Eastern Front. Its a bit of a furphy to claim significantly higher equipment levels or manpower evels with no western front.

However, if there is no western front at all (no air, ground or naval war) then large amounts of German military production used for air defence and maritime warfare would be released. If they can swing the manpower issue somehow, the Soviets are in BIG trouble

If the Soviets dont receive much help from the west, in terms of aid, their manpower levels and equipment falls through the floor.

If you assume greater lend lease, a continued maritime war and air war in the west, Germany would actually be in worse shape


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## bbear (Aug 28, 2013)

I see now (I think I do) what we're getting at.

Is it ok if I interpret the question as what if a defensive posture persisted in the west until DDay and only tactical use of air power in offence (no commando raids, no strategic bombing)? What level would German production have been and how would she use it?

That would help me to eliminate all the political imponderables involved in a British peace deal in March 1941 as I read the thread (would Italy behave better as an axis partner, would Spain, Portugal, Sweden remain neutral, would lend-lease to GB continue, how would GB rearm, what kind of a deal would be made with the soviets, a Japan first strategy?.....).

Is that a smaller Furphy/Water Cooler/Scutlebutt conjecture?


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## stona (Aug 28, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> So people who have a bone to pick over the morality of it or the cost of it to the attacker generally seem to denigrate the effort and its results,



This is human nature. Two and a half thousand years ago Euripides wrote "The Trojan Women", a play about how we all barbarise ourselves in the pursuit of our ends through war. It was set in Troy, but the contemporary audience would have had no doubt that it alluded to much more recent events in the Peloponnesian War, particularly the actions of the Athenian expedition to the island of Melos.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Aug 28, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I havent read the entire thread, so apologies in advance guys. I just wanted to make an opening point.....German Army Divisions have been caculated they spent up to 80% of their combat time on the Eastern Front. Its a bit of a furphy to claim significantly higher equipment levels or manpower evels with no western front.
> 
> However, if there is no western front at all (no air, ground or naval war) then large amounts of German military production used for air defence and maritime warfare would be released. If they can swing the manpower issue somehow, the Soviets are in BIG trouble
> 
> ...



With no war in the West, there is undoubtedly more equipment for the East; I suggest you read even the last two pages about what bombing cost the German economy, let alone the diversion of resources into the V-weapons program and the Uboats (and their subpens). Manpower-wise, yes, the Germans put the majority of their soldiers into the East, but still by 1944 there were well over 1 million soldiers fighting on other fronts that would have been useful in the East. The Italian manpower used in Africa would have been useful in the East too, not to mention having them fight past 1943. Plus with greater German production the Axis allies in Europe could actually get excess equipment beyond what German troops were using. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Front_(World_War_II)
This shows +800k German casualties in the West from 1941-1945, not including Italy, Africa, or the Balkans.

</title> </head> <body bgcolor="#f5f5f5" text="#000000" link="#2f4f4f" alink="#2f4f4f" vlink="#2f4f4f"> <script type="text/javascript"> ////// Compete ///////////////////// __compete_code = '667f89f26d96c30e99728fe6a608804d'; (function () { var s = d
According to this by 1944 there were only 40% of German troops on the Eastern Front (all services), with only 57% of divisions and 45% of aircraft. 
Not sure if that counts the enormous amount of manpower diverted to air defense by 1944.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_African_Campaign
Just in terms of casualties and not total manpower committed, Africa cost Germany about 150,000 men and tons of equipment that I'm not going to list by line item.
It cost Italy over 350,000 men.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Campaign_(World_War_II)
Italy cost the Axis nearly 600,000 casualties total, most were German. In terms of manpower, I bet that there was close to 1 million men deployed to Italy at some point. 

In terms of men, the other fronts cost Germany serious casualties, not to mention just sheer numbers of men deployed that were not available for the Eastern Front. It also distorted equipment production in directions other than optimizing weapon systems for the fighting on the Eastern Front; without the West the Axis could have focused their manpower and production solely on things that would hurt the Soviets, rather than various systems to fight a variety of enemies on a variety of fronts.



bbear said:


> I see now (I think I do) what we're getting at.
> 
> Is it ok if I interpret the question as what if a defensive posture persisted in the west until DDay and only tactical use of air power in offence (no commando raids, no strategic bombing)? What level would German production have been and how would she use it?
> 
> ...


 No, the scenario you are proposing is pretty far from the one I am suggesting here. Its still interesting and has some overlap, but is still separate from what I'm getting at.


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## bbear (Aug 28, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> No, the scenario you are proposing is pretty far from the one I am suggesting here. Its still interesting and has some overlap, but is still separate from what I'm getting at.



Ok, thanks for the correction. I'll keep reading and say no more.


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## wiking85 (Aug 28, 2013)

bbear said:


> Ok, thanks for the correction. I'll keep reading and say no more.


No, please feel free to contribute.


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## parsifal (Aug 28, 2013)

The only scenario where the germans come out worse, is if there is greater support for the USSR from the West. more food in particular. If that occurs, the Soviets can match German increased mapower levels and equipment levels by the Germans. If the Allies retain some kind of pressure or threat in the west, the Germans are in serious trouble.

However, if there is no elevation of support for the Soviets, and/or no retention of threat from the west, then the pendulum swings heavily in favour of the Germans. If they get, for example another million men on the eastern front without counterbalance from the Soviets, especially in 1942, then the Soviets are likley to collapse. Its that simple really


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## GrauGeist (Aug 29, 2013)

parsifal said:


> *The only scenario where the germans come out worse*


As long as Hitler remains in charge, all scenarios are doomed...

His shining example during the invasion of Russia, was striking towards Stalingrad simply for the sake of capturing Uncle Joe's namesake, instead of focusing on Moscow and other objectives that actually hurt the Red army.


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## bbear (Aug 29, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> No, please feel free to contribute.



Ok, I'll take a junior shot at it: 

No matter what Germany produces or how much of it or whether there is lend lease or not - or whether all the forces released in the west are used in the east or demobilised. Barbarossa is doomed to fail, pretty much as in the OTL and the more forces used in the east and the further they encroach territory the worse (better) their eventual defeat becomes.

An army cannot advance beyond the rate determined by it's resupply. And resupply in Barbarossa/ the steppes is largely determined by railway capacity (because truck convoys can't operate long distance on Russian dirt roads in the autumn or winter and cant haul the heavy stuff at speed at any time).

The germans had a plan of logistic support based on rail, there were some invalid assumptions, they couldn't be compensated for, the best that could be done was done and still the offensive came up short of objectives in distance and left some red army units intact around Moscow. It had to - no other result is possible. Moeltke had a rule of thumb about combat distance from a railhead. Hitler of hubris ignored it, October rains put the frontline troops beyond the effective range of the trucks to resupply them from the railheads. Winter effectively further extended the supply distance in terms of tons delivered per hour. The Siberian armies arrived (on Russian locos : which burnt Russian brown? coal and were winter proof, german precision engineered locos, not so much...) 

÷ïåîîáñ ìéôåòáôõòá --[ ÷ÏÅÎÎÁÑ ÉÓÔÏÒÉÑ ]-- Stolfi R. H. S. Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted

David M. Glantz, Barbarossa de-railed (no I haven't read it all)


In summary: Technically : railways, 5' gauge, blown bridges, 'scorched earth' marshalling yards, conversion speeds, Baltic states used standard gauge, double tracking, scheduling, signalling, partisans, Luftwaffe not configured for strategic use etc. Supply lines are a bottle neck in the east throughout the period so production is less important.

Actually, tentatively: I tend to agree with Grau Geist. The reason behind the reason appears to be Hitlers arrogance /paranoid delusion borne of easy victory in the west. That plus docile tenacity turned to unexpected fury in the Soviet peoples, plus the unexpected strength in depth of the Red Army despite the worst Stalin could do ... 


Now shoot me down please.


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## stona (Aug 29, 2013)

bbear said:


> Now shoot me down please.



The assumption therefore is that had the major Soviet European cities, including Moscow, fallen in 1941 and the Soviet leadership been forced to flee or been destroyed that the remnants of the Soviet Union would have continued to fight. I'm not sure that that was possible economically, never mind politically.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Aug 29, 2013)

bbear said:


> Ok, I'll take a junior shot at it:
> 
> No matter what Germany produces or how much of it or whether there is lend lease or not - or whether all the forces released in the west are used in the east or demobilised. Barbarossa is doomed to fail, pretty much as in the OTL and the more forces used in the east and the further they encroach territory the worse (better) their eventual defeat becomes.
> 
> ...



i agree that Barbarossa was very unlikely to succeed, but it could have gone better than historically with more forces. Its not outside the realm of possibility for Leningrad and Murmansk to fall with greater air support and more mobile infantry (paratroopers and the Afrika Korps). 
The question is what happens after the initial invasion stalls. Grau Geist seriously misunderstands what Case Blue was all about and what happened with Stalingrad if he thinks that Hitler just went after it because it was had Stalin's name; in fact going after Moscow was worse due to Soviet reserves being concentrated on it in 1942. 

In the long term the Soviets are going to suffer a lot more (1943 and on) than historically, as the Axis has a lot more men and equipment, not to mention supplies to throw into the Eastern Front. The Italians will send many more men and won't exit the war in 1943; Stalingrad is almost guaranteed not to play out the same way here. At the worst case scenario the Axis is going to get a peace of exhaustion and at best they will cause the Soviet state to implode by inflicting so much damage on the Soviet armed forces and economy that they cannot cope with continued war. Of course the most likely scenario is somewhere in between that leaves Axis forces with major territorial gains and the USSR badly hobbled, but still a threat.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 29, 2013)

On the contrary, I understand Hitler's intentions very well.

If you look at the summer (1942) campaign objectives, you will see that the intention was to take out the industrial centers and block the Volga supply route, thus limiting much needed material from reaching the Red army by way of the Caspian and creating a strong southern salient.

*Then in July, Hitler re-wrote the objectives in the campaign to include the capture of Stalingrad, making it a priority*.

This was the tactical mistake that became the turning point of the eastern front. You can delve into the smaller details, such as his insistance on dividing Army Group South into two units, pulling units from the seige of Sebastopol which caused serious delays in Case Blue's start, etc etc...but the bottom line is that HAD Hitler followed the plan as laid out, Stalingrad would have been cut off entirely by Army Group South and eventually capitulated.

Instead, thanks to Hitler's ego, Stalingrad became a sucking chest wound to the Wehrmacht and the tipping point to the war in the East.


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## wiking85 (Aug 29, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> On the contrary, I understand Hitler's intentions very well.
> 
> If you look at the summer (1942) campaign objectives, you will see that the intention was to take out the industrial centers and block the Volga supply route, thus limiting much needed material from reaching the Red army by way of the Caspian and creating a strong southern salient.
> 
> ...


What about seizing the oil fields of the Caucasus and using Stalingrad as a defensive position to hold the flank of the Caucasian advance???
The reason that Stalingrad took on such importance was that it threatened the advance to the south, as the Soviets having a toe hold on the other bank of the Volga gave them the ability to cut off the mobile units advancing against Baku.


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## wiking85 (Aug 29, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> On the contrary, I understand Hitler's intentions very well.
> 
> If you look at the summer (1942) campaign objectives, you will see that the intention was to take out the industrial centers and block the Volga supply route, thus limiting much needed material from reaching the Red army by way of the Caspian and creating a strong southern salient.
> 
> ...


What about seizing the oil fields of the Caucasus and using Stalingrad as a defensive position to hold the flank of the Caucasian advance???
The reason that Stalingrad took on such importance was that it threatened the advance to the south, as the Soviets having a toe hold on the other bank of the Volga gave them the ability to cut off the mobile units advancing against Baku.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 29, 2013)

And, had Army Group South Followed the original plan, flanking Stalingrad and cut off the Volga and capturing key centers during thier advance (in full unit strength as planned), then Stalingrad would have strangled slowly...nothing in, nothing out.

The Red Army was given an advantage because Army Group South was divided. Note that key infantry units were no longer accompanied by Panzer support as they had been diverted per Hitler's orders during his revision. The Wehrmacht's initial successes lulled Hitler into thinking the Red Army would break at the Wehrmacht's advances in a divided capacity. It was dellusional thinking along those lines that seriously weakened the German's effectiveness.

The Wehrmacht's successes were due to mobile infantry being supported by armor and mobile artillery. Remove any one of the key components and you've created a handicap.


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## silence (Aug 29, 2013)

To clarify:

The goals for the '42 summer campaign were to hold the center, capture Leningrad and link up with the Finns, and capture the Caucasus oil fields.

Early on AG South was split into Army Groups A and B under Fuehrer Directive 45. A was to drive on the Caucasus and capture the oil fields, while B was to Guard A's northern flank and establish a defensive line on the Volga in the general vicinity of Stalingrad. With the splitting of AG South and the subsequent transfer of Fourth Panzer Army from B to A, B's progress slowed to almost a stroll.

However, it wasn't until late September - about two weeks after actually entering the city - when 6th Army raised a flag over Gov't buildings in the city that Paulus was ordered by Groefaz to take the city at any cost.

On the other side, Stalin was determined to fight to the death for the city from the outset.

Enter Chuikov and his brilliant defense, which decided this clash of monster egos.

Really, both wiking85 and GrauGeist are correct


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## bbear (Aug 29, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> i agree that Barbarossa was very unlikely to succeed, but it could have gone better than historically with more forces. Its not outside the realm of possibility for Leningrad and Murmansk to fall with greater air support and more mobile infantry (paratroopers and the Afrika Korps).
> .



No (smile), more forces do no good unless you can resupply them. And with an inherited Soviet rail system, with only steppe sandy soil to bear weight, under reconstruction in 1941 or under partisan attack there after, feeding a dirt road system or any distance in a bombed out city you cannot shift enough tons in winter to keep your elite high tech forces supplied at any distance from a railway. The more you use motorised divisions the worse it gets, because they need fuel and spare parts. Horse fodder and man food on the other hand can be obtained locally.

Look at the casualty statistics, every winter when german forces are perforce immobile and defensive - casualties go up - just an eyeball impression you understand.

A lesson hard learned in WW1, thrown away in WW2: no matter how grand your breakout may be it will fizzle out and be vulnerable to counter attack if you cannot supply it. Barbarossa had to stall before Moscow, the Archangel - Astrakhan objective was impossible. 

No matter what promising or crucial stage the offensive is at in the end of August if you don't spend September falling back on whatever rail head there may be to establish a well supplied defensive line before the first big rains of autumn your hi-tech, resource hungry, elite forces are vulnerable and likely to become more so as winter sets in the more forces you field the more resupply they need the more vulnerable they become.

Red Army peasants with terrible locos and tough little ponies on the other hand can keep an offensive of sorts supplied right through the winter, and shove 100 miles forward from Moscow in winter 1941/42 for example. If my memory and reading materials serve me well.


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## wiking85 (Aug 29, 2013)

bbear said:


> No (smile), more forces do no good unless you can resupply them. And with an inherited Soviet rail system, with only steppe sandy soil to bear weight, under reconstruction in 1941 or under partisan attack there after, feeding a dirt road system or any distance in a bombed out city you cannot shift enough tons in winter to keep your elite high tech forces supplied at any distance from a railway. The more you use motorised divisions the worse it gets, because they need fuel and spare parts. Horse fodder and man food on the other hand can be obtained locally.
> 
> Look at the casualty statistics, every winter when german forces are perforce immobile and defensive - casualties go up - just an eyeball impression you understand.
> 
> ...



Without other fronts to supply there will be more locomotives, not to mention the Italian merchant marine can use the Dardanelles to ship in more goods through the Black Sea. IOTL it was occupied supplying the Axis in North Africa. Also the Germans used a lot of river barges, so supply issues weren't a major issue outside AG-S after 1942. The problem with the Axis advance into the Caucasus was that they couldn't use the Black Sea to ship in supplies thanks to the Soviet Black Seas fleet, which by 1943 was largely a non-factor in the Black Sea due to maintenance issues surrounding the loss of repair facilities in the Crimea. If the Axis can keep the pressure on near Leningrad, which it could supply thanks to Baltic Seas shipping and the ports of Riga and Tallinn enabling very short supply lines for the units of AG-N and Center, then they can use the extra forces. More German LW units, armor, artillery, rockets, and infantry and be supported over and above the OTL numbers thanks to these short Baltic supply lines. So the Germans could conceivably take Leningrad in 1942 or at least inflict much heavier losses to the Soviets than IOTL thanks to greater firepower near the front. The fall of Leningrad would mean an even greater easing of supply lines for the Axis forces in the North and free up the Finns for other efforts, including taking Murmansk. 

Axis History Forum • German logistics in the east


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## pattle (Aug 29, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Yeah, we've strayed very far OT. The thread is about production, not even the outcome of a potential Axis vs. USSR showdown. Unlike Dave Bender, I think the campaign would be a long one, so long term production comes into play; what could Germany produce without the pressures of wars on other fronts? That means no Uboat war, no need for home aerial defense production (beyond the minimum), no diversion of resources to other theaters like Africa (does anyone have information about what equipment and how many men were sent to Africa from 1941-43?), and no bombing campaign disrupting production. There are of course political issues in this, like whether Germany would have enough money to purchase from abroad and how the West would react. But fundamentally this thread is about production output at its core, not politics.


#

Looks like we have strayed off thread again.
I think the question should really have been, would not having to fight a war in the west have given Germany victory in 1941?


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## wiking85 (Aug 31, 2013)

pattle said:


> #
> 
> Looks like we have strayed off thread again.
> I think the question should really have been, would not having to fight a war in the west have given Germany victory in 1941?



Its OT, but still a pertinent question.
As to what the OP question was, that's perhaps the first question, as it sets up my question, but the implicit assumption for this thread is that the Germans don't knock out the Soviets in 1941, so the war drags on and production numbers become relevant.


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## stona (Aug 31, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> but the implicit assumption for this thread is that the Germans don't knock out the Soviets in 1941, so the war drags on and production numbers become relevant.



Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow 
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Aug 31, 2013)

stona said:


> Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
> Cheers
> Steve



I did state that the war in the West happens, but Britain drops out by March 1941. 
Still, if there was not a war with the West over Poland, what would their reaction be in 1941 when the invasion of the USSR happens?


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## wiking85 (Aug 31, 2013)

stona said:


> Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
> Cheers
> Steve



I did state that the war in the West happens, but Britain drops out by March 1941. 
Still, if there was not a war with the West over Poland, what would their reaction be in 1941 when the invasion of the USSR happens?


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## Gixxerman (Aug 31, 2013)

Isn't the point of Stalingrad, however misguided badly done, that Germany thought it would be one way (perhaps the one way) of forcing Stalin to fight at a time when Germany knew (despite the losses to date) that the Russians had become quite skilled at withdrawing too quickly for the German forces to decisively defeat destroy?

Without a war in the west the primary point (to me at least) still stands; Germany is still simply not equipped to tackle the Russian war and as history shows even some fast heavy defeats did not knock Russia out of the war.
The delusion that it could be done quickly was proved to be so.
I'd also say that without a war in the west Germany would most likely go to war with Russia even worse equipped (in terms of armour especially) than it was.

In my view the most likely outcome is similar to what happened with perhaps Moscow and/or Leningrad taken, Stalin his gang deposed probably shot with an emergency Russian nationalist, probably military, Gov coming into being Russia still recovers comes together to grind down (although over more time) German arms.
The most significant parts of Russia's industrial base are simply out of the LW's reach they have nothing (credible) to do much about it, nor are they likely to for a long time.

Germany is still likely to think it is all over (given the crazy proven hubris of the leadership) with some fast and impressive victories so I do not see wonder-weapons coming on any quicker time-table....and when they do, eventually, it is likely to be much the same story with much wasted effort gross duplication, a badly run affair encouraged by the nature of the German state's leadership of the time.
Similarly I do not see the Hitler gang prepared to consolidate when supply lines become over-stretched in my opinion they are most likely to go repeating the same mistakes, just at places with different names.

Most of all neither can I see any way that the USA and British (inc Empire) just stand idly by whilst this happens without assisting the Russians.
A cold-war with the west being highly probable in my view.

But we all have our opinions.


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## wiking85 (Aug 31, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> Isn't the point of Stalingrad, however misguided badly done, that Germany thought it would be one way (perhaps the one way) of forcing Stalin to fight at a time when Germany knew (despite the losses to date) that the Russians had become quite skilled at withdrawing too quickly for the German forces to decisively defeat destroy?
> 
> Without a war in the west the primary point (to me at least) still stands; Germany is still simply not equipped to tackle the Russian war and as history shows even some fast heavy defeats did not knock Russia out of the war.
> The delusion that it could be done quickly was proved to be so.
> ...



Of course with no need to fight the West in 1940, if we run with that scenario, then the Germans can invade in 1940, which is prior to the T-34 and the German tanks of 1940 were a match for the Soviet models prior to the T-34. Also in 1940 the Soviets have just suffered from the serious drubbing of the Winter War and their army is very badly positioned for an invasion; the Molotov line is even less ready for war and the Stalin line has been dismantled, the Soviets have no new equipment in production, and they have just been badly disorganized by their losses in Finland. So an invasion in 1940 is going to be pretty rough on the Soviets, though I doubt a war winner.

Edit:
Also if the Germans are planning to fight the Soviets in 1940, they wouldn't blockade aid to Finland via the Baltic like they historically did. They drags on the Winter War to the point that the Germans could invade in May or June. Perhaps the Western Allies even are allowed to transit the Baltic and aid the Finns, at which point Germany hops in the war to lead a 'crusade' against Communism, which is Stalin's nightmare scenario.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aftermath_of_the_Winter_War


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## Gixxerman (Aug 31, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Of course with no need to fight the West in 1940, if we run with that scenario, then the Germans can invade in 1940, which is prior to the T-34 and the German tanks of 1940 were a match for the Soviet models prior to the T-34.



I wouldn't like to go up against KV - 1's in a PzKpfw II or III.
That the KV - 1 was earlier than the T - 34 illustrates that T - 34 was just around the corner (it had much the same gun) whatever the timing of a German attack.
Lessons were learned in 38 39 against Japan in the east the KV - 1 was tested in the 'Winter War'.
In my opinion T - 34 is going to be a part of any prospective early (or similar to history) war and without a war in the west, I think in those scenarios Germany is in for an even bigger shock when it does appear.

After early '38 British opinion (despite the very fresh memories of WW1) has swung firmly against appeasement is for standing up to Hitler's gang, even if it meant war.
I cannot see this reversing to the point where a cold war at least does not come into being.
Similarly I cannot imagine the USA sitting by to do nothing as Germany creates a 'Greater Germany' out of central eastern Europe with Russia included supposedly 'up to the Urals'.

In some respects it is easy to see why the anti-communist crusade idea never got off the ground in the west.
For all the strides made catching up Russia was still far behind the USA UK (inc Empire), a modern Germany with all those resources all that land would be a very different dangerous prospect....and whose to say ideas like the Orient plan to take the ME oil link with the Japanese in India wouldn't have been undertaken later?
The Nazi gang only had themselves to blame that nobody believed they would ever be a safe bet.


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## pattle (Aug 31, 2013)

stona said:


> Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
> Cheers
> Steve


I didn't read it that way either, my assumption was the same as yours.


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## pattle (Aug 31, 2013)

I think it took all three, Britain, USA and USSR to beat Germany. Without Britain no D DAY, no lend lease or other aid to the USSR, and the Med and the middle east with it's oil fields presumably under German control. Without the USSR no massive human sacrifice to destroy the German forces and without the USA neither the man power to challenge the Germans in the West or the arms to challenge the Germans in the East. The Germans took some beating.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 31, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> ...Most of all neither can I see any way that the USA and British (inc Empire) just stand idly by whilst this happens without assisting the Russians...



Why not, eveybody stood by and watched Poland get carved up. Tell me which nations rushed in to aid Finland when the Soviet Union was beating on thier door. And the list goes on.

If Britain was not at war with Germany then the United States would have most likely followed it's neutral path (which was a strong sentiment among the U.S. population until Pearl Harbor)


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## merlin (Sep 1, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> I did state that the war in the West happens, but Britain drops out by March 1941.
> Still, if there was not a war with the West over Poland, what would their reaction be in 1941 when the invasion of the USSR happens?



If Britain had 'dropped out' in March '41 (and it's hard to think why), then on the one hand there's little time for the German's to take advantage of it straight away - the benefits would be delayed. Though, also little time to change things for the Russians.
The concept of 'Lend Lease' is already established - so the US may carry that over to Russia - via the Far East.
The gains for Germany are huge - even if Hess had succeeded in May - only minor R R garrison forces in the West, no North-African adventure to supply, and keep supplied, more able to use French plants e.g. Renault. Indeed the French may want to cosy up to Hitler to be No 2 to Germany, and to maintain their borders as much as possible - so this could lead to French forces in the East!
Also, I don't see fuel as being so much of an issue - no blockade in the west, indeed it could be part of the deal with Britain.

Alternatively, if (e.g. not with Churchill) the 'deal' was done before the Battle-of-Britain - then the Lw would be in better shape, US industrialists would go to Germany. But Russia would wonder if you've won the war, why don't you de-mobilise!!


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## parsifal (Sep 2, 2013)

If britain does make some kind of peace with the germans, I dont think an invasaion of the USSR is even likely. Hitler invaded Russia for a complex raft of reasons, some ideological, some to result of what he saw as realpolitik. His warped idea of rational policy was that the elimination of the last possible ally of britain would force the British to the negotiating table. Eliminate Britain before June 1941, and there is no rationale for further agression to Russia. Germany is likly to postpone, or cancel any overt aggressive moves to the Soviets. 

We then need to decide or estimate to what extent hitler was driven by political dogma, and how much he was driven by "realpolitik"....


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## stona (Sep 2, 2013)

Can't agree with that I'm afraid. Hitler was driven by ideology. Anyone who has waded through the turgid prose of Mein Kamf will see that the expansion to the East for the German Volk was one of the foundation stones of Nazi ideology. The exploitation of the resources _and people _ of Eastern Europe is explicit in the text as is the desire to eliminate Bolshevism which was perceived as being exported from the USSR, polluting the rest of Europe with its communist/Jewish ideology.
Whether this move would have occurred in 1941 is another question, but the idea that Germany attacked the USSR in order to eliminate Britain's only remaining ally is I think false. Hitler liked to talk at anyone who would listen and I have never read an account of him suggesting that the USSR should be dealt with to remove an ally of Britain. Most seem to agree that he almost lost interest in the British problem as he concentrated on his real ideological objectives in the East. Britain's real remaining ally in everything but name was the USA, not the USSR, and Hitler couldn't attack them. 
What help did the USSR furnish to the UK in 1939/40? Certainly not destroyers, aircraft, the weapons and means to stay in the fight.
Cheers
Steve


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## Tante Ju (Sep 2, 2013)

I agree with stone. There was not much question that Hitler saw German "living space" to be possible in East, opposed to Kaisers colonial expansion policy. So the "where" was decide, but the "when" was not set in stone, nor particularly eagerly waited by Hitler. The decision was very reluctantly made in late 1940 when Stalin's expansionist plans threatened vital German interests and critical materials in Finland, Turkey, Ruminia Bulgaria.


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## stona (Sep 2, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> There was not much question that Hitler saw German "living space" to be possible in East, opposed to Kaisers colonial expansion policy.



Yes. He said and wrote both explicitly on several occasions, making it quite clear that his idea of "lebensraum" was in Europe, not in African or other colonial acquisitions.
These were explicitly European territories to be settled by the German race who would then exploit the people and resources of the territories to their own ends. Lebensraum itself was not a Nazi concept but the racist ideology associated with Hitler's view of an expanded Reich, tainted by his own jaundiced view of history, certainly was.
Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 2, 2013)

Hitler was definately NOT driven by ideology.

He was two things. He was firstly an unashamed opportunist. He tended to follow the path of least resistance. If something looked easy or cheap to obtain, you can be fairly certain Hitler would be nosing around trying to steal a cheap feed. Its a common claim he was driven by ideology, but there is nothing in his wartime experiences to support that he was. if he was driven by ideology, he would never have signed a non aggression pact with the russians, would never have entered into a pact with the Japanese, would not have become an ally with the Finns, and would not have entered any sort of alliance with the Slovaks or the other "inferior" races. He was a blatant opportunitist, through and through. Its what gave him his early victories, and what cost him the war. Short sighted opportunism does not produce coherent, co-ordinated war strategy, and thats precisely the trap the Germans fell onto, as they lurched from one "opportunity" to the next, based on nothing more than a whim here or there of the fuhrer. Hitlers (and the Germans generally) shallow and short sighted conduct of their war is in sharp contrast to the measured, well thought out strategies of the allies. even the Russians were better at formulating long term strategies, based on ideological goals than the Germans ever were with their short term will of the wisp war conduct...

The second element of hitlers character was his inveterate risk taking. He was a gambler, a bluff merchant. If he could bully, cajole, surprise, or lie his way to success, he would take that road anytime to actually undertaking the hard slog, or adopting a measured, well thought out series of steps to achieve a higher purpose. This goes to why, even in the most desperate of situations, hitler would never trust anybody, even his most closest of associates. he firmly believed in telling people only a small part of the big picture. this severelly hampered the ability of his military staffs to plan and execute long term strategies in anything like a considered way. if Hitler was wedded to a long term ideology, he would never have believed in the gamble as a valid way of conducting war. 

People who take Mein Kampf seriously are deluding themselves, and give Hitler a respectability he simply does not deserve. Mein Kampf is a veritable jumble sale of mixed up ideas, party slogans and downright lies, all designed to work on German nationalistic emotions, and most basic of instincts. hitler did not really believe it himself. And he didnt really ever follow its maxims all that faithfully or closely either.

There were several events that I can see that turned hitler east. the first was the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States in 1940. Hitler always considered these regions to be German spheres of influence. When the Russian invaded them, Hitler saw it as a breach of trust. Hitler asnd the word trust in the same sentence...now theres a contradiction....

Next, at various conferences in 1940 with the Russians, the germans had suggested a move southward, into Turkey, Iran and the middle East. This was consistently evaded by the Russians. the russians, who were driven by ideology, wanted to establish an eastern European sphere of influence, which brought them into direct conflict with germany, who wanted the same thing. This gave the prospect of war with Russia and germany a certain amount of inevitability, but it was never ideogical for the germans, at least in the sense you guys are suggesting. With Britain subdued, there is no longer the imperative for Hitler to move east, and he may well have dropped it as an issue, thereby avoing conflict with the Russians. Unlikley to be avoided, but worth noting at least. 

Lastly, however, it was the inability to bring Britain to the peace table that drove Hitler to attack the Russians. This without a doubt was his ,main reason for planning the attack (as hitlers directives clearly show) he locked himself away, toward the latter part of the BoB, and realized (with some truth I think). that the British were attempting to build alliance to contain and defeat Germany. Hitler rightly recognized that the last continental ally for Britiain had to be the Russians. Read his directives for Barbarossa, it almost word for word uses this as his reasoning for attacking the russian, that is, to deny the british any ability to build an alliance to contain Germany as they had done against Napoleon . .


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## stona (Sep 2, 2013)

Do you honestly believe that had Britain come to terms with Germany in late 1940 then Hitler would not have attacked the Soviet Union shortly thereafter?

Have you actually read Mein Kamf or looked at the threads in German society and culture that informed it? I agree that it is a jumbled and sometimes confused work, but it is hardly original.
A great thinker Hitler was not.

I've just re-read Fuhrer Directive No. 21 and can't find anyway of interpreting it as you suggest above. By No.32 Hitler is planning how to prosecute the war against Britain, and possibly the USA, following the defeat of the USSR. 

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Sep 2, 2013)

stona said:


> Do you honestly believe that had Britain come to terms with Germany in late 1940 then Hitler would not have attacked the Soviet Union shortly thereafter?
> 
> Have you actually read Mein Kamf or looked at the threads in German society and culture that informed it? I agree that it is a jumbled and sometimes confused work, but it is hardly original.
> A great thinker Hitler was not.
> ...



forget Mein Kampf, his second book that he decided not to publish because it gave away too much of his future plans is much more a blue print of his later behavior than anything:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zweites_Buch


> After the Nazi Party's poor showing in the 1928 elections, Hitler decided that the public did not fully understand his ideas. He retired to Munich and began dictating a sequel to Mein Kampf focusing on foreign policy, expanding on that book's ideas.
> 
> Moreover, Hitler attacked Stresemann for his goal of restoring Germany to its pre-1914 position. In Hitler's view, merely overthrowing the Treaty of Versailles and restoring Germany to its pre-1914 borders was only a temporary solution. In Zweites Buch, Hitler stated his belief that Germany's real problem was the lack of sufficient Lebensraum ("Living space") for the German people. In Hitler's view, only states with large amounts of Lebensraum were successful. *In Zweites Buch, Hitler announced that overthrowing the "shackles" of Versailles would be only the first step in a Nazi foreign policy, whose ultimate objective was to obtain the desired Lebensraum in the territory of Russia.*
> 
> ...



PDF of the book:
http://www.nazi.org.uk/political pdfs/HitlerSecondBook.pdf

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Führer_Directive_21


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## parsifal (Sep 2, 2013)

stona said:


> Do you honestly believe that had Britain come to terms with Germany in late 1940 then Hitler would not have attacked the Soviet Union shortly thereafter?
> 
> Have you actually read Mein Kamf or looked at the threads in German society and culture that informed it? I agree that it is a jumbled and sometimes confused work, but it is hardly original.
> A great thinker Hitler was not.
> ...




we dont know.

However in a letter to Mussolini dated 21 June 1941, hitler lays out his case to a man whom he trusted more than any other. In that letter he wrote

"The situation: England has lost this war. With the right of the drowning person, she grasps at every straw which, in her imagination, might serve as a sheet anchor. Nevertheless, some of her hopes are naturally not without a certain logic. England has thus far always conducted her wars with help from the Continent. The destruction of France—fact, the elimination of all west-European positions—directing the glances of the British warmongers continually to the place from which they tried to start the war: to Soviet Russia. 

Both countries, Soviet Russia and England, are equally interested in a Europe fallen into ruin, rendered prostrate by a long war. Behind these two countries stands the North American Union goading them on and watchfully waiting. Since the liquidation of Poland, there is evident in Soviet Russia a consistent trend, which, even if cleverly and cautiously, is nevertheless reverting firmly to the old Bolshevist tendency to expansion of the Soviet State. The prolongation of the war necessary for this purpose is to be achieved by tying up German forces in the East, so that—particularly in the air—the German Command can no longer vouch for a large-scale attack in the West. I declared to you only recently...."

Further on, he makes his reasons for attacfking the Soviets even clearer

"The situation in England itself is bad; the provision of food and raw materials is growing steadily more difficult. The martial spirit to make war, after all, lives only on hopes. These hopes are based solely on two assumptions: Russia and America. We have no chance of eliminating America. But it does lie in our power to exclude Russia. The elimination of Russia means, at the same time, a tremendous relief for Japan in East Asia, and thereby the possibility of a much stronger threat to American activities through Japanese intervention". 


HITLER'S EXPLANATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION, JUNE 21, 1941


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## pattle (Sep 2, 2013)

It doesn't matter so much what Hitler said because Hitler was not trust worthy, and for the same reason it doesn't matter what pacts he signed either. Anything that was signed by Hitler wasn't worth the paper it was written on, we know this for a fact and I shouldn't need to give examples. I don't know how it is possible to believe that Hitler did not have ideals when you consider what he did to the Jews and others, Hitler clearly had racist ideals that were put into action in the form of genocide. I consider this to be the inescapable truth from what actually happened. Hitler did not believe in fair play or honesty and lying was after all the least of his crimes.


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## parsifal (Sep 2, 2013)

Hitler ended his June 21 letter to Mussolini as follows

"In conclusion, let me say one more thing, Duce. Since struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free. The partnership with the Soviet Union, in spite of the complete sincerity of the efforts to bring about a final conciliation, was nevertheless often very irksome to me, for in some way or other it seemed to me to be a break with my whole origin, my concepts, and my former obligations. I am happy now to be relieved of these mental agonies". 

Im not saying that Hitler did not have ideologies, but it is one thing to have ideologies, and another to be "ideological" in your approach to your international relations and national decision making. Hitlers last statement clearly identifies his natural distaste of the Soviets. no argument there. It also clearly shows that he was quite prepred to sacrifice those "ideals" when necessity required. And this shows him to be what he was, an opportunist and a gambler, and not an idealist. I believe Hitler when he says that he had made real efforts to reach an accommodation with the Soviets. The fact that his accommodation of the Soviets, and what he was prepreed to give tham did not suit the Soviets, seems to have escaped him... I also believe him when at least part of his decision to attack the Soviets was driven by his desire to isolate the British.

There is circumstantial evidence to support this opinion that hitler was driven to attacking the USSR by Britains intransigence. One of his right hand men, Hess, flew to Britain in May 1941, with the intention of trying to make peace with them. A complete miscalculation, i agree, but why would Hess take such a risk and defy his leader so badly. I think because he (Hess) feared the coming attack on the Russians, or wanted the "natural ally" (Britain) to join the Germans in the coming attack. Make peace with the British, and one of the main reasons for such a risky attack (Hitler himself recognized its risks....his speech about "all we have to do is kick the door in" was largely propaganda for the consumption by his wavering soldiers). Remove that reason by making peace, and you remove the reason for the attack, or at worst, gain a valuable ally with which to completely crush the Soviets.


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## DonL (Sep 2, 2013)

Parsifal we have here in germany a lot of historians who have researched countless of archived sources.

Hitler spoke the first time of his war goals 1937 and 1938 in a smal circle of military leaders were the UDSSR was explicit mentioned as primary goal.
Finaly Hitler decided to invade the UDSSR *beginning August 1940 before BoB *, he gave the order the general staff to work the plan and take all preparation for supply and infrastructure work. Also he canceled the reduction of the Heer from 150 to 120 Divisions, which was declared and ordered at August 1940 before BoB!

To all my sources and what I have read the UDSSR was the primary goal of Hitlers "war goals" from the beginning. The war against Polen, France and Britain was a revenge war and primary to get the german people on his side for a war or a general war and to make them "war spirit". To my understanding and interpretation it was only a interstation of the way to the east.


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## parsifal (Sep 2, 2013)

which again presupposes he was working to a masterplamn, which he was not. In 1937, Hitler had vague and confused ideas of attacking the Soviets eventually. He believed he would be joined in this crusade by massive alliances in Europe against the Soviets. He also believed the British would behave rationally and come to an agreement with him once their position was isolated. He in fact was confronted with a quite different situation; stirrings of the old containment alliances of the first world war. The old Triple Entente. This was months or years away, so to circumvent it, Hitler pursued and achieved a non-agression and partition agreement with the Soviets, along with a genuine treaty of economic co-operation. Hitler was not pursuing an ideological or long range plan, he was making it up as he went along in fact. At the beginning of the Soviet/German pact, there were genuine efforts to reach rapprochement with the Soviets, but Soviet duplicity, mostly the occupation of the Baltic States, and the aggression into the vital Rumainia border areas, soured such relations. Hitler is on record to Mussolini as saying he was influenced by continued British resistance. These are not interpretations of issues, they are basic known facts. What we make of those facts is up to us, but trying to deny they exist, or reqwrite them to suit a different view is simply trying to rewrite history


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## DonL (Sep 2, 2013)

This is no agression, I respect your opinion but I think that Hitler had a general plan, which was not stringent and quite opportunist, but at the end of it the goal was the war with the UDSSR and Stalin.

One of the younger and well-known german historians is:
Sönke Neitzel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Sönke Neitzel

I have studied at the same time at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz not directly history, but I know him, we have talked about this issue and also about a lot of his military historian work and I highly respect him and he has also the opinion, that Hitler had a defuse general plan with the war against the UDSSR at a primary goal at the end.

But everyone has an other interpretation.


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## parsifal (Sep 3, 2013)

I do respect what you are saying DonL, and i would be wrong to suggest there is not some truth to your position. He had wanted to deal with the Soviets since Mein Kampf. The question is, was that a specific plan, or a general sentiment, and further, how can we exlain these obvious, documented, deviations from his origiinal ideas. He went through a phase where he wanted to be friewnds with the Soviets, but his nbatural dislike of them soon pushed him an entirely direction. 

By early 1941, perhaps earlier, he had specific plans on how to attack them. What drove him to change from wanting a "friendly" relationship to wanting to destroy his big eastern neighbour. Certainly his pre-disposittion (his ideology if you like) had something to do with it. But I think there was more...And there is evidence to support me on that.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 3, 2013)

An observation here:
If Hitler had been intending to attack Russia early on, he surely would have forbidden the Soviets from purchasing German aircraft like the He100 from Heinkel.


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## stona (Sep 3, 2013)

I suspect that Hitler wrote to Mussolini exactly what Mussolini wanted to read. Comments like those need to be taken in the context of Italy's position vis a vis the British in the Mediterranean. None of the Nazi leadership had a very good grasp of foreign affairs. I don't believe that Hitler or any of his panjandrum had the faintest inkling of the real relationship between Britain and the USSR in the late 1930s.
I'd also like to see some evidence that Britain was working for this alliance with the USSR.
They sent William Seeds, a man about to retire as ambassador in 1939. His diplomatic career hardly set the world alight. He'd spent a good chunk of the 1930s in what was _then_ the diplomatic backwater of Brazil. 
It wasn't until 1940 that Stafford Cripps, a man of Marxist, socialist leanings, who might at least be able to negotiate with Stalin took up the post. He was successful, but only after the attack on the USSR. It is important to remember that before the Germans tore up the various bi-partite treaties with the USSR, the Soviets were constrained by them in their relationships with the other powers like France and Britain. 
It wasn't until 1942, after the Soviets were in the war that Clark Kerr was sent. He was a very experienced, heavyweight, and nowadays under rated diplomat who capitalised on Cripps' earlier work and finally got things moving. By this time of course both Britain and the USSR had a common enemy. He stayed until 1946. 
There's not much evidence in British cabinet papers etc that any great efforts were being made to forge an economic/military alliance with the USSR before 1941/2. Hardly surprising given the USSR's relationship with Nazi Germany.
There is a lot of evidence of efforts to involve the USA, including very frequent contacts at all levels, right up to the top.
Cheers
Steve


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## bbear (Sep 3, 2013)

I listened to the Hitler/Mannenheim recording of the meeting in 1942. If it's not a hoax there's one thing I notice - Hitler is reading from a script. Not word for word, but a choreographed sequence of 'bullet points' leading up to something, some request or proposal (the recording is cut short). And it's a poor sales pitch (not rambling, just poor). And the choice of 'talk em to death' presentation is a bad one. I'm no diplomat, but whatever Hitler is proposing is not what Hitler thinks is a good move for the other party. And he's trying to conceal it. And he's no good at the concealment.

If that's a fair sample of his interpersonal communications style overall - I'd tentatively say that Hitler may just be a 'Ham'. A phoney, and not even good at being phoney. Perhaps not a long term strategist, nor an opportunist, not an idealist or a pragmatist - just not a statesman or leader of any kind, out of his depth. Some of the rest of his behaviour might explained by his attempts to cover up the fact. 

That's a big conclusion on slim evidence, but then: I am a ham at research. Takes one to know one perhaps.


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## stona (Sep 3, 2013)

Hitler is not reading a script in that meeting. Nobody who was present has ever suggested that. He may have had notes, but that would not be his usual style.

Of interest to this thread, bearing in mind that this was a pitch to the Finns, is not the justification for early set backs (our weapons don't work in winter, the Italians are a great misfortune etc) but Hitler's attitude to Molotov and the USSR. 

Hitler is clear that he would have liked to attack the USSR in 1940 after meeting with Molotov as he suspected that the Soviets intended to attack Romania leaving Germany helpless in 1941. He argues that this is why he played for time in 1940, as he moved his forces East. Hitler clearly states that no attack on the USSR was possible before the "spring of 1941" and that Romanian oil was of paramount importance to Germany. The potential loss of Romania and subsequent lack of oil he describes as "my big worry/concern."

It is absolutely clear, from his own mouth, that at least from 1940 Hitler was planning for, and intended to, attack the USSR. At no point during this monologue does he even mention Britain. He does mention the "bloody fighting" in the desert which is dividing his forces. This of course was caused by British and Commonwealth forces.

Cheers
Steve


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## pattle (Sep 3, 2013)

Parsifal. I thought that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was basically a carve up of Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany and to the best of my knowledge both sides mostly kept to the terms of this carve up. Stalin don't forget had a grievance with the West for their involvement in Russia after the First World War, the West had sent an army to Russia to fight against the Bolsheviks.


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## stona (Sep 3, 2013)

pattle said:


> Stalin don't forget had a grievance with the West for their involvement in Russia after the First World War,



True, though diplomatic relations were restored in 1924.

Cheers

Steve


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## bbear (Sep 3, 2013)

I didn't mean to imply a written script or notes. But it does appear to be rehearsed, learned, non-spontaneous. 

In any commercial dealings I've had with 'partners', often suppliers who like to call themselves partners, there is a clash of interests so interpersonal trust is vital. I'd expect a proposal about an important matter to be openly labelled as such, and put formally to all representatives. If you make use of personal contact to 'sound out' the reaction, you are asking for a confidence to be borne. That's not a thing you do with junior staff present as in this case. For Pete's sake it was in a car, anyone might hear - and did.

For the same reason you never 'schmooze' a true partner, never abuse casual contact - it's disrespectful. 

And if you are going to schmooze - at least do it well. Any one who dominates the conversation to put an argument under cover of casual talk is duplicitous and hasn't mastered the brief sufficiently to deal with an open exchange.

All in all if any suppliers rep treated me that way i'd know straight off to disbelieve everything they said and not touch with ten-foot pole. But I'm only a ham so I must be wrong.


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## stona (Sep 3, 2013)

I don't think that it's a matter of right or wrong 

I do think it's a bit risky to apply our norms to a personality as dysfunctional as Hitler's. The monologue he inflicted on Mannerheim is pretty typical of the sort of ramblings he inflicted on his acolytes, as recorded (in shorthand) in his table talks.

Here's his plan for Russia and the Baltic states.

"We'll take the southern part of the Ukraine, especially the Crimea, and make it an exclusively German colony. There'll be no harm in pushing out the population that's there now. The 
German colonist will be the soldier-peasant, and for that I'll take professional soldiers, whatever their line may have been previously. In this way we shall dispose, moreover, of a body of courageous N.C.O.'s, whenever we need them. In future we shall have a standing army of a million and a half to two million men. With the discharge of soldiers after twelve years of service, we shall have thirty to forty thousand men to do what we like with every year. For those of them who are sons of peasants, the Reich will put at their disposal a completely equipped farm. The soil costs us nothing, we have only the house to build. The peasant's son will already have paid for it by his twelve years' service. During the last two years he will already be equipping himself for agriculture. One single condition will be imposed upon him: that he may not marry a townswoman, but a countrywoman who, as far as possible, will not have begun to live in a town with him. These soldier-peasants will be given arms, so that at the slightest danger they can be at their posts when we summon them. That's how the ancient Austria used to keep its Eastern peoples under control. By the same token, the soldier-peasant will make a perfect school teacher. The N.C.O. is an ideal teacher for the little country boy. In any case, this N.C.O. will make a better teacher than our present teacher will make an officer !
Thus we shall again find in the countryside the blessing of numerous families. Whereas the present law of rural inheritance dispossesses the younger sons, in future every peasant's son will be sure of having his patch of ground. And thirty to forty thousand peasants a year — that's enormous !
In the Baltic States, we'll be able to accept as colonists some Dutch, some Norwegians — and even, by individual arrangement, some Swedes."

That reeks of ideology rather than practical opportunism to me! So does this, which is self explanatory.

"The reason why I'm not worrying about the struggle on the Eastern Front is that everything that happens there is developing in the way that I've always thought desirable. At the out break of the first World War, many people thought we ought to look towards the mineral riches of the West, the raw materials of the colonies, and the gold. For my part, I always thought that having the sun in the East was the essential thing for us, and to-day I have no reason to modify my point of view." 

Racial ideology.

"We must no longer allow Germans to emigrate to America. On the contrary, we must attract the Norwegians, the Swedes, the Danes and the Dutch into our Eastern territories. They'll become members of the German Reich. Our duty is methodically to pursue a racial policy. We're compelled to do so, if only to combat the degeneration which is beginning to threaten us by reason of unions that in a way are consanguineous.
As for the Swiss, we can use them, at the best, as hotelkeepers."

He had views on Britain and the USA too, displaying his usual fine grasp of foreign affairs.

"England and America will one day have a war with one another, which will be waged with the greatest hatred imaginable. One of the two countries will have to disappear."

In fact the USA won without a fight 

I would suggest that a racist ideology was the foundation on which Nazism was built and informed Hitler's actions throughout the life of the national socialist government in Germany and WW2.

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Sep 3, 2013)

Its historic romanticism, a mix of viking nobility of the Rus and german settlers of the middle ages, dipped into a sauce of the Aryan Man's Burden.


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## stona (Sep 3, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Its historic romanticism, a mix of viking nobility of the Rus and german settlers of the middle ages, dipped into a sauce of the Aryan Man's Burden.



It's an ideology built on racist mumbo-jumbo. But given that it comes from the mouth of the man who controlled Germany and her armed forces, it is extremely dangerous mumbo-jumbo, and a lot of people (not just Germans) bought into it.
There are a substantial number of young people today, in Europe and elsewhere, who buy into this sort of nonsense. We should know better.
Cheers
Steve


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## bbear (Sep 3, 2013)

"I don't think that it's a matter of right or wrong 

I do think it's a bit risky to apply our norms to a personality as dysfunctional as Hitler's. " Thanks for that, steve - I take it seriously.

We may also be at risk of being off topic. 

So bearing in mind: Nazi ideology, Hitlers diplomatic (lack of) finesse and leadership style, Russian winter, Stalingrad, logistics and everything else: What would be the effect on German production of a peace in the West concluded in March 1941? (just an offer you understand


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## stona (Sep 3, 2013)

Just been reading a bit more of Hitler's table talk. I haven't ploughed through it all for several years.

Here's what he said on 17th September 1941.

"Last year I needed great spiritual strength to take the decision to attack Bolshevism.
I had to foresee that Stalin might pass over to the attack in the course of 1941. It was therefore necessary to get started without delay, in order not to be forestalled — and that wasn't possible before June."

There in a nut shell are both the ideological and pragmatic reasons why the USSR had just been invaded. The talk concluded by a nice elucidation of the driving ideology.

"The struggle for the hegemony of the world will be decided in favour of Europe by the possession of the Russian space. Thus Europe will be an impregnable fortress, safe from all threat of blockade. All this opens up economic vistas which, one may think, will incline the most liberal of the Western democrats towards the New Order."

And

"It's not a mere chance that the inventor of anarchism was a Russian. Unless other peoples, beginning with the Vikings, had imported some rudiments of organisation into Russian 
humanity, the Russians would still be living like rabbits. One cannot change rabbits into bees or ants. These insects have the faculty of living in a state of society — but rabbits haven't."

Ideology. A little later.

"It's absurd to try to suppose that the frontier between the two separate worlds of Europe and Asia is marked by a chain of not very high mountains — and the long chain of the Urals is no more than that. One might just as well decree that the frontier is marked by one of the great Russian rivers. No, geographically Asia penetrates into Europe without any sharp break.
The real frontier is the one that separates the Germanic world from the Slav world. It's our duty to place it where we want it to be." 

"It's inconceivable that a higher people should painfully exist on a soil too narrow for it, whilst amorphous masses, which contribute nothing to civilisation, occupy infinite tracts of a 
soil that is one of the richest in the world. We painfully wrest a few metres from the sea, we torment ourselves cultivating marshes — and in the Ukraine an inexhaustibly fertile soil, with a thickness, in places, often metres of humus, lies waiting for us."


Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 3, 2013)

> I suspect that Hitler wrote to Mussolini exactly what Mussolini wanted to read. Comments like those need to be taken in the context of Italy's position vis a vis the British in the Mediterranean.



Theres no evidence to suggest that Hitler was not making honest comments to Mussolini either. And plenty of circumstantial evidence to say that he was being up front. if he was trying to win over or sooth the italians by that letter, it was a terrible miscalculation. many in the italian leadership never forgave the germans for their duplicity and disingenuous treatment of the italians (even Mussolini was insulted by it, though he was so beholden to hitler by then that his displeasure counted for nothing really) over the russian invasion. From Italy's POV it was a disaster on many levels, not least because it completely jeapardised their oil and grain imports from the Soviets. 




> None of the Nazi leadership had a very good grasp of foreign affairs. I don't believe that Hitler or any of his panjandrum had the faintest inkling of the real relationship between Britain and the USSR in the late 1930s.




This is also completely irelevant. Nazi decisions were seldom based on hard facts. hitler repeatedly and disastrously would rely on his "intuition" and "instincts" to guide his decisions about a whole range of issues. What was important isnt what was true, or what Hitler knew. It was what he believed, even if (as was often the case) such beliefs bordered on the delusional



> I'd also like to see some evidence that Britain was working for this alliance with the USSR.



Why. its completely irrelevant what they were actually working on, or how successful they were. After the Soviet betrayal in 1939, relations between Britain and Russia were icy, to say the least. Thats not the issue. the issue was how hitler, and his cronies perceived the continued British resistance, and why they remained so intransigent and defiant. Hitlers letter to Mussolini provides a lot of evidence as to what hitler was thinking, and whilst that may be an inconvenient truth for those of us who choose to believe that Hitler was following some grand strategic plan, its a bit hard to try and subvert what many perceive of irefutable evidence to the contrary.

Despite the frozen relationship, Britain gave repeated warnings to the russians of the impending invasion, as far as british intelligence knew about it, and without compromising ULTRA. Stalin, like all the warnings he received, ignored these pieces of advice. There was no formal entente with the Russians until June 1942, but in reality the first British aid convoys started from september 1941 from memory. this is not the actions of a Britain indifferent to making some kind of collective security arrangement with the russians. if they didnt care, they wouldnt have bothered talking to them at all. but they did, and Hitler must have known at least some of those goings on i am sure. Being the paranoid delusional man that he was, what sort of conspiracy thinking would the following have on Hitler

1) Absolute defiance and intransigence by the British
2) Long term economic destruction frombombing and the blockade
3) Deep suspicion of a possible Soviet-British entente. 

Hitler knew he had to deal with either Britain or russia to dominate Europe. He convinced himself that he couldnt control the British, was disdainful of the Soviets, and saw German strength in its land capability. these are the factors that drove hom toward an attack on the Russians, not some long term grand scheme that he had had since 1919. 

We need to take a look at Soviet relations in the interwar year to gain some understanding as to why this notion that hitler "always wanted to attack the Soviets" is the total crock that it is. 

The young Soviet Union struggled with foreign relations, being the first communist-run country in the world. The old great powers were not pleased to see the established world order rocked by an ideology claiming to be the harbinger of a world revolution. Indeed, many had actively opposed the very establishment of Soviet rule by meddling in the Russian Civil War. Slowly the international community had to accept, however, that the Soviet Union was there to stay. By 1933, France, Germany, Great Britain and Japan, along with many other countries had recognized the Soviet government and established diplomatic ties. On November 16, 1933, even the United States joined the list. Thus, by the 1930s, Soviet Russia was not quite the international pariah that it had been. And one of its earliest friends had been, you guessed it, germany, including the Nazis 

In the immediate post war period after Versaille, the main enemy of the Soviets was in fact France. Franco-Soviet relations were initially hostile because the USSR officially opposed the World War I peace settlement of 1919 that France emphatically championed. While the Soviet Union was interested in conquering territories in Eastern Europe, France was determined to protect the fledgling nations there. This led to a rosy German–Soviet relationship in the 1920s. However, Adolf Hitler's foreign policy centered on a massive seizure of Eastern European though not directly or overtly Russian lands for Germany's own ends, and this caused a natural souring of Soviet-German relations. When Hitler pulled out of the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1933, the threat hit home to both the USSR and France. Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov reversed Soviet policy regarding the Paris Peace Settlement, leading to a Franco-Soviet rapprochement. In May 1935, the USSR concluded pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia; the Comintern was also instructed to form a united front with leftist parties against the forces of Fascism. The pact was undermined, however, by strong ideological hostility to the Soviet Union and the Comintern's new front in France, Poland's refusal to permit the Red Army on its soil, France's defensive military strategy, and a continuing Soviet interest in patching up relations with Germany all left the Soviets quite isolated. Germany under Hitler were keen to also seek rapprochment with the Soviets, as Hitlers immediate aims were not overtly aggressive toward the Soviets. He had other fish to fry....

The Soviet Union also supplied military aid to the Republicans in Spain, but held back somewhat, mostly to retain a reasonable relationship with the germans. Its support of the government also gave the Republicans a Communist taint in the eyes of anti-Bolsheviks in the UK and France, weakening the calls for Anglo-French intervention in the war.

Hitler actually feared the Soviets at this time, and in his own version of containment the Nazi government promulgated an Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan and later Italy and various Eastern European countries (such as Hungary), ostensibly to suppress Communist activity but more realistically to forge an alliance against the USSR. This shows the clear intent of the germans to forge a mass alliance against the Soviets,but Germany's own aggression and transgressiopns completely destroyed that idea beyond the abject german lackey states of eastern europe 

When Nazi Germany entered Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union's agreement with Czechoslovakia failed to amount to anything because of Poland and Romania's refusals to permit a Soviet intervention. Things were not going too well for the Russians in foreign relations, not least because getting into bed with the Russians was distinctly unheathy for their partners. Despite this on April 17, 1939, Stalin suggested a revived military alliance with the UK and France. The Anglo-French military mission sent in August, however, failed to impress Soviet officials; it was sent by a slow ocean-going ship and consisted of low-ranking officers who gave only vague details about their militaries.

However, this is all evidence that alliance between the west (which by late 1940 was reduced to just Britain and her empire) was a possibility if the right circumstances existed. this had to be known to the Germans, and given their experiences in WWI had to have been a significant influence in their decision to liquidate the USSR. However if such risk no longer existed because of a British capitulation, there is every reason to suggest the Germans would demoobilise (as they did partially after France) and not get into another or further wars for the time being.


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## stona (Sep 3, 2013)

So the British and Soviets were not working on any kind of anti-Nazi alliance by your own admission.
Why should we imagine that Hitler thought they were. There is absolutely zero evidence in any off the German documents issued around "Barbarossa" or in anything Hitler said at the time or thereafter that eliminating the USSR as a potential ally of Britain informed his decision to attack the USSR in any meaningful way. It may have been a beneficial side effect of that decision, had things turned out differently, but was not an ideological or even military consideration at the time. Britain comes up more often than just about any other single topic in the table talk, but never in that context.

Incidentally the views expressed to Mussolini are very different to his private view of Italy's capabilities. A state he thought only "half fascist."

His position regarding Britain was always equivocal and also driven by his ideology. You cannot understand Hitler if you are not prepared to take a rather unpleasant trip into his mind.

"It's a queer business, how England slipped into the war. The man who managed it was Churchill, that puppet of the Jewry that pulls the strings. Next to him, the bumptious Eden, a money-grubbing clown; the Jew who was Minister for War, Hore-Belisha; then the Eminence grise of the Foreign Office — and after that some other Jews and business men. With these last, it often happens that the size of their fortune is in inverse ratio to the size of their brains. Before the war even began, somebody managed to persuade them it would last at least three years, and would therefore be a good investment for them. The people, which has the privilege of possessing such a government, was not asked for its opinion."

"We must persist in our assertion that we are waging war, not on the British people, but on the small clique who rule them."

Hitler seriously believed that the loss of Singapore to the Japanese might make the British seek peace with him as a rather convoluted means of saving India.

The idea that Hitler's aggression in the East was not driven by ideological imperatives is as much nonsense as to imagine that the same ideology did not colour his attitude to the British.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 3, 2013)

> So the British and Soviets were not working on any kind of anti-Nazi alliance by your own admission.
> Why should we imagine that Hitler thought they were.




Because thats what he said he believed was happening



> There is absolutely zero evidence in any off the German documents issued around "Barbarossa" or in anything Hitler said at the time or thereafter that eliminating the USSR as a potential ally of Britain informed his decision to attack the USSR in any meaningful way. It may have been a beneficial side effect of that decision, had things turned out differently, but was not an ideological or even military consideration at the time. Britain comes up more often than just about any other single topic in the table talk, but never in that context.




That is just plain wrong. Ive already mentioned the letter to Mussolini. I know i have seen statements from other authors mentioning conversations to that very end

The statements you have quoted regarding Hitlers view of the British was said when. if you have a look, you will find it occurred after the British refusals to surrender. It actually very neatly buttresses the notion of his "realization" that the British were hanging onto some hope some belief that somebody or some country(s) would come to their aid. From that point it was a short walk for Hitler to conclude he had to remove that hope. as he said to mussolini, "we cant do anything about the US, but we can get rid of the Russians!" A precise fit to his bitter comments about the British leadership.




> The idea that Hitler's aggression in the East was not driven by ideological imperatives is as much nonsense as to imagine that the same ideology did not colour his attitude to the British.



This conveniently ignores the rapprochement that occurred between Hitler and the Soviets, and the natural gravitation of Germany and Russia in the interwar period as two pariah states. They worked closely together. And hitler worked the opportunities rather than working to any dogma. He had a natural distaste of the Russians, similar to the British distaste of Japan in their alliance with the Japanese. still worke in both cases, and just because you dont like someone, doesnt mean you are going to attack them. What turned Hitler East did involve his prejudices to a minor extent, but more than that, it was his frustration with the British,, which you have so accurately documented, plus what he perceivfed as Russian betrayals in day to day dealings. Remove the British, and at least 50% of the reason for attacking the Soviets in the first place is gone. Moreover, the actions of the Germans immediately following the fall of france reveals what they wanted to do. They started to demobilise the army, in the belief it was all over. They started to return to a peacetime economic base. this is not the actions of a country gearing up for an ideological struggle with a country with the largest army in the world. Its the mark of a country whose leadership believes that they have won, its over, and they can all go home now. How do you think Hitler is going to react when robbed of that "victory". Not very rationally I can tell you.
And his opinions on the loss of Singapore just reveal his character as Hitler the gambler. He believed that the fall of Singapore might force a peace settleent, in the same vein a believing his terror weapons would force a change of fortunes in the west, or that the 262 should be used as a bomber, or that in 1945 there were two armies pushing east to relieve berlin and turn the whole war in the east around, from utter derfeat to victory at the last second. These are all crackpot ideas that very strongly buttress the notion that Britain was the key to his invasion of the SU


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## bobbysocks (Sep 3, 2013)

i dont know. i think you are trying to put rational thoughts into the mind of an irrational man. sure there was a method to his madness but he still was mad. i believe he would have attacked the soviet union no matter if there was a BoB or not. from what i recall he hated communists as much as he hated certain ethnic groups and saw them as a serious threat. the fact that he worked with them was typical hitler strategy.....give me that and i will ask for no more ( repeat 5 or 6 times ). he was a pathological liar and conniver. if he had no designs on the ussr he would have kept them as allies or encouraged them to remain neutral when he found himself in a war with the west. stalin could have made money like a bandit selling him oil and other raw materials. of all the theories thrown around in this forum the notion that hitler would not have attacked the ussr if he had been able to broker some sort of peace with the uk is the hardest one i have found to swallow because i believe he thought with the fall of france he would be able to work a deal with the uk. i believe he would have been perfectly happy not fighting britian and would have persued his goals in the east. he made comments to galland that he didnt want a war with the uk....then again, like i said he was a compusive liar...so???


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## bob44 (Sep 3, 2013)

> Hitler knew he had to deal with either Britain or russia to dominate Europe. He convinced himself that he couldnt control the British, was disdainful of the Soviets, and saw German strength in its land capability. these are the factors that drove hom toward an attack on the Russians, not some long term grand scheme that he had had since 1919.
> 
> We need to take a look at Soviet relations in the interwar year to gain some understanding as to why this notion that hitler "always wanted to attack the Soviets" is the total crock that it is.



This is incredible.
And does rewrite an important piece of history as we have come to know it.
Very interesting. And I do not buy it.


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## DonL (Sep 3, 2013)

Parsifal,

please can you explain why Heydrich got the personal order from Hitler to manipulate the german secret service dossier of Marshal Tuchatschewski at 1936 and also this maipulated dossier with a bunch of lies about Tuchatschewski was sended above the CSSR goverment to Stalin?

How is this possible if Hitler has no intention to weakening the UDSSR and in this case the Red Army?


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## stona (Sep 4, 2013)

I've had enough of this now.
I will just say that if you want to believe that Hitler attacked the USSR to deprive Britain of an ally that's fine. Me, I'll go with what he, the OKW and every other contemporary account says. His primary strategic objective was to secure Germany's oil supply for the future. Other resources were secondary. 
His ideological motivation which cannot be overestimated was to draw the border between "civilised" Germanic Europe and its culture and a barbaric Asia and its savage hordes where he wanted it, creating room for the Germanic races which were unable to expand in their current territories. He had a vision of a perpetual war on this frontier which would serve to keep the Germanised European races strong.
Hitler's attitude towards the British from 1933 until 1945 was amazingly consistent for a man possessed of what we might kindly call an erratic personality. In his words the British were a "small branch" or "twig" (depending on translator) of the Germanic tree.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 4, 2013)

> I've had enough of this now.




i notice you do that a lot......particualry when you are not agreed with. Get over yourself




> I will just say that if you want to believe that Hitler attacked the USSR to deprive Britain of an ally that's fine. Me, I'll go with what he, the OKW and every other contemporary account says.




No. They dont, not all of them. And the contemporary accounts are anything but consistent. There weree occasions when he did say things like "Okay, now the west is neutralized, I can get on with the really important tasak of subduing the Russians. other times he overrulled administrative objections to exceed the treaty obligations he had to sweeten the Russians. And other times he spoke openly of the need to isolate the English. 

This is what Nagorski (reproduced in Wiki) had to say on the matter

"The Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact in August 1939, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, shortly before the German invasion of Poland that triggered the Second World War, which was followed by the Soviet invasion of that country. A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union on the division of the border states between their respective "spheres of influence". The Soviet Union and Germany would split Poland if an invasion were to occur, and Latvia, Estonia and Finland were defined as falling within the German sphere of influence.

The pact surprised the world because of the parties' mutual hostility and their conflicting ideologies. Ideolgy at that stage however was of little or no significance. both sides were driven by expedience. As a result of the pact, Germany and the Soviet Union had strong diplomatic relations and an important economic relationship. The countries entered a trade pact in 1940, in which the Soviets received German military and industrial equipment in exchange for raw materials, such as oil or wheat, to help Germany circumvent a British blockade. The relations were so good between the countries that the terms of the econimic relationship were exceeded. 

Despite the parties' ongoing relations, each side remained suspicious of the other's intentions, which for the germans increased greatky after the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States. After Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan and Italy, it began negotiations about a potential Soviet entry into the pact and possible entry into the war. After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12–14 November, Germany presented a proposed written agreement for a Soviet entry into the Axis. The Soviet Union offered a written counterproposal agreement on 25 November 1940, to which Germany did not respond. Russian procrastination raised hitlers suspicions of British duplicity. As both sides began colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, conflict appeared more likely, although they signed a border and commercial agreement addressing several open issues in January 1941. Germany broke the pact by starting Operation Barbarossa; a decision that led to Germany losing the war.

The situation in Europe by May/June 1941, at the end of the Balkans Campaign and immediately before Operation BarbarossaJoseph Stalin's reputation contributed both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and their faith in success. In the late 1930s, many competent and experienced military officers were killed in the Great Purge, leaving the Red Army weakened and leaderless. The Nazis often emphasized the Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with propaganda. German propaganda claimed the Red Army was preparing to attack them, and their own invasion was thus presented as a pre-emptive strike [my note; there is actually some truth to that as recent ex-soviet archives are revealing].

In the summer of 1940, when German raw materials crises and a potential collision with the Soviet Union over territory in the Balkans arose, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union looked increasingly like Hitler's only solution. While no concrete plans were yet made, Hitler told one of his generals in June that the victories in western Europe "finally freed his hands for his important real task: the showdown with Bolshevism", although German generals told Hitler that occupying Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation." The Führer anticipated additional benefits. (These benefits can be sumarised as follows):

1) When the Soviet Union was defeated, the labor shortage in German industry could be relieved by demobilization of many soldiers.
2) Ukraine would be a reliable source of agricultural products.
3) Having the Soviet Union as a source of forced labor under German rule would vastly improve Germany's geostrategic position.
4) *Defeat of the Soviet Union would further isolate the Allies, especially the United Kingdom.*[my emphasis]
5) The German economy needed more oil - controlling the Baku Oilfields would achieve this; as Albert Speer, the German Minister for Armaments and War Production, later said in his post-war interrogation, "the need for oil certainly was a prime motive" in the decision to invade.

Nowhere do i see any mention of ideology.......though ideology was the accelarant that sped the confict up 




> His primary strategic objective was to secure Germany's oil supply for the future.


No, it was one of them



> Other resources were secondary.


According to Nagorski, it was perhaps theleast important reason



> His ideological motivation which cannot be overestimated was to draw the border between "civilised" Germanic Europe and its culture and a barbaric Asia and its savage hordes where he wanted it,



That is a popular reason often cited, but not in any of his stated reasons for invasion. It is part of Mein Kampf, but there was so much water under the bridge between Mein Kampf and 22 June 1941, as to render its contents largely irrelevant. In between the two, the USSR very nearly joined the Axis 



> creating room for the Germanic races which were unable to expand in their current territories. He had a vision of a perpetual war on this frontier which would serve to keep the Germanised European races strong.



blah blah blah. this was the grind milled out of Mein Kampf. It was not what he said in the lead up to invasion. He again said it after war broke out, no doubt to gee up the troops and scare the bejeezuz out of the Russians 



> Hitler's attitude towards the British from 1933 until 1945 was amazingly consistent for a man possessed of what we might kindly call an erratic personality. In his words the British were a "small branch" or "twig" (depending on translator) of the Germanic tree.



I disagree. Hitler expected the british to fold after the fall of france, and wanted the even expecte the British to join him in alliance. he was perturbed when they didnt, and whipped himself into a frenzy when they did not seek teerms for surrender. From there it was all downhill in the British-German relations.

By comparison, in 1933-5 relations between the two countries, Churchill excepted, were quite cordial. "Hitler was a man we could do busines with, and such.....


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## stona (Sep 4, 2013)

Blimey.

I can't be arsed to deal with all this, I think we should agree to differ.

The oil supply thing features not just in his monologue with Mannerheim, but in several table talks and other instructions, including Fuhrer conferences relevant to Barbarossa and various memoirs and essays written post war by Wermacht commanders.

The Asian hordes thing was not quoted from Mein Kamf but from a table talk in 1941. He expressed the same views from Mein Kamf until the end of the war. Nazism was a racist ideology based on this sort of nonsense, not a political system.

Attitude to the British? Read the table talks. I have an edition edited by Hugh Trevor Roper but it must be readily available.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 4, 2013)

DonL said:


> Parsifal,
> 
> please can you explain why Heydrich got the personal order from Hitler to manipulate the german secret service dossier of Marshal Tuchatschewski at 1936 and also this maipulated dossier with a bunch of lies about Tuchatschewski was sended above the CSSR goverment to Stalin?
> 
> How is this possible if Hitler has no intention to weakening the UDSSR and in this case the Red Army?



Because it is by no means clear or consistent. If it was an ideological issue, it would have consistency. Nelrich Ulrich and Freeze wrote in 1997 on Page 95 of their paper


For example....


"In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts to reestablish closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chiefly sought to repay debts from earlier trade with raw materials, while Germany sought to rearm, and the countries signed a credit agreement in 1935." 

The facts are that German Soviet relations see sawed throughout the 1920's and 30's from close to icy, to less close, then very close and finally to eventual war. There was no rythm or reason to any of this.....it was driven by expediency from both sides. The ideologoes of both sides made rapprochement for both sides more difficult, but it did not dictate or make certainb they were going to war at any stage. Six months before Barbarossa, both sides were seriously considering making war as allies, six months later and they were at each others throats.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 4, 2013)

I see this is starting to go down the drain. Play nice. The offending parties will go the way of the dodo bird. None of you are immune, and enough warnings have been given over the years, that you should know how to behave. Don't ignore...


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## wiking85 (Sep 4, 2013)

Let's assume that the Germans would have attacked the USSR no matter what if Britain was out of the war. Let's also assume the war lasts beyond the initial campaign, but the Germans do better in 1941, perhaps taking Murmansk and or Leningrad, but logistics keep Moscow out of Germany's grasp. In late 1941 the US extends Lend-Lease to the USSR, giving greater aid than historically to help make up for the losses of Murmansk/Leningrad. Persia and Siberia are the only supply routes, with the Siberian route only able to ship non-contraband war materials due to Japanese inspection of shipping into and out of Vladivostok (until 1944). Japan stays neutral. Germany and the Axis have access to world markets and have reparations in the form of raw materials from the Belgian, Dutch, and French colonial empires. German industry is able to recruit labor from abroad and can try and recruit soldiers from anti-communist groups abroad and the German diaspora. Spain and Portugal send more soldiers and airmen than they historically did, rotating men through the 'Blue Divisions' to train their army and air forces. France also generates tens of thousands of recruits for the German military (historically IIRC over 20,000 served). The Italians are also able to furnish many more men, aircraft, and other equipment for the east, as the Allies have returned the Italian POWs and there is not other active front for the Italian military. 

So this is the scenario, what does production look like for the Axis?


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## wiking85 (Sep 4, 2013)

Let's assume that the Germans would have attacked the USSR no matter what if Britain was out of the war. Let's also assume the war lasts beyond the initial campaign, but the Germans do better in 1941, perhaps taking Murmansk and or Leningrad, but logistics keep Moscow out of Germany's grasp. In late 1941 the US extends Lend-Lease to the USSR, giving greater aid than historically to help make up for the losses of Murmansk/Leningrad. Persia and Siberia are the only supply routes, with the Siberian route only able to ship non-contraband war materials due to Japanese inspection of shipping into and out of Vladivostok (until 1944). Japan stays neutral. Germany and the Axis have access to world markets and have reparations in the form of raw materials from the Belgian, Dutch, and French colonial empires. German industry is able to recruit labor from abroad and can try and recruit soldiers from anti-communist groups abroad and the German diaspora. Spain and Portugal send more soldiers and airmen than they historically did, rotating men through the 'Blue Divisions' to train their army and air forces. France also generates tens of thousands of recruits for the German military (historically IIRC over 20,000 served). The Italians are also able to furnish many more men, aircraft, and other equipment for the east, as the Allies have returned the Italian POWs and there is not other active front for the Italian military. 

So this is the scenario, what does production look like for the Axis?


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## silence (Sep 5, 2013)

Unless Germany goes to a total war industrial footing earlier than historic, there probably won't be much more than a minor increase in quantity.

OTOH, due to access to raw materials world-wide, quality should go up. The new tanks (Tigers and Panthers) should be more reliable due to access to better machine tools and raw materials. Likewise engine reliability and power should go up - maybe the TK-11 turbocharger (and others) can be developed.

There's no need for a U-boat campaign, so more material is available for "other" production, whether the Z-plan, AFVs, trucks, whatever. If there's no Z-plan, then there's the ability to produce more AFV armor (and maintain quality). The freed-up steel could also go towards production of more train rails for use in the East.

Since the occupation of Western Europe and Scandinavia ends, the trained manpower pool available to fight (both Heer and Luftwaffe) in the USSR is much larger. Therefore there's not as much need to recruit labor from Germany's own factories so there's less need to use slave labor in "defense" industry (maybe farming and making pots and pans and such), which should help improve quality and output.

Other Axis powers will also have access to these raw materials, so the effect on their industries should be similar (e.g. Hungary might be able to make more licensed 109s).

I'm undoubtedly missing a bunch of stuff, too.

As an aside, there will (obviously) be more benefits than just better production, but they're beyond the scope of wiking85's revised scenario.


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## pattle (Sep 5, 2013)

I am not sure if the Italians would have wanted to fight. I don't say this disrespectfully about the Italians I say this because from what I understand many Italians by this time had seriously begun to question the war. The Italians had been dragged by their nuts through the brambles to many times by Mussolini and were starting to come to their senses. The Germans would have needed to of made sure that the good Italian soldiers such as the Alpini were properly equipped, supplied and used in mountains rather than in trenches on the steppe.


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## Gixxerman (Sep 5, 2013)

stona said:


> The Asian hordes thing...



Just thought I'd mention it but I don't think this is a particularly Nazi/Hitler thing, like the demonization of the Jewish people in Europe it goes back a long way (to the Mongols?) was probably widely held.


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## bbear (Sep 5, 2013)

Thanks Viking 85: the specifics in the scenario may allow for an estimate to be made of production needs:

according to an internet source - group centre needed 13,000 tons a day on the offensive . That figure is from the plan I think, not the actual amount delivered...

To spare your agony, doing the obvious scale up and subtract this, add that, apply fudge factors ,,.for an attack force of 7 million men - it comes to about 70,000 tons a day of production averaged over the year (which I know will be wrong, but I tried). Just for operations.

To replace the 'scorched earth' infrastructure you may need a lot more (Rail, ties, signals,,,,,,, or road levelling ballast, diggers.. in any case bridging materials.....) if you want a 300 mile advance per year that would be approximately 2 million tons more. Plus the replacement rate of the motor pool and stock, plus tools, motor parts, fuel for the transports.... another 3million perhaps

So the production for immediate war work is : very approximately, 30milion tons per year as a planned amount for a force of 7 million men - cut to size for the force you envisage. 

With a GDP of 900million dollars equivalent to pay for it.... 30$ a ton, hmmm... Can Hitler afford to invade?


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## wiking85 (Sep 5, 2013)

bbear said:


> Thanks Viking 85: the specifics in the scenario may allow for an estimate to be made of production needs:
> 
> according to an internet source - group centre needed 13,000 tons a day on the offensive . That figure is from the plan I think, not the actual amount delivered...
> 
> ...



Allied and Axis GDP
Where did you get the GDP of $900 million for Germany? The modern equivalent of the German economy in 1941 was $412 Billion not including Austria, Italy, or conquered France. The USSR by contrast only had $359 Billion (down from their 1940 peak of $412 Billion) thanks to the massive losses during to Axis invasion.


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## bbear (Sep 5, 2013)

900 million : I guessed 

based on 3 independent guesses
$338milion of 'Moscow gold' - from republican spain in the civil war, kept in Paris, and
two trainloads of art works from Leningrad which will now be spoils of war
a guess at euro-axis civil economy GDP
another guess from the internet

it might be $450bn in modern terms : another guess

Sorry to have distracted you.


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## silence (Sep 5, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> Just thought I'd mention it but I don't think this is a particularly Nazi/Hitler thing, like the demonization of the Jewish people in Europe it goes back a long way (to the Mongols?) was probably widely held.



Very true: just read Shakespeare's "Merchant Of Venice"


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## Tante Ju (Sep 6, 2013)

silence said:


> Very true: just read Shakespeare's "Merchant Of Venice"


 
Or the Young Lions by Irwin Shaw, or The Naked and the Dead by Mailler. Racism/Anti-Semitism was pretty much normal in the 1930s society.


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## bbear (Sep 7, 2013)

I'm sorry for that last post of mine - it was, of course, wrong. I can't work backwards from current operational requirements to determine how much production is needed and therefore how much there will be. That's wishful thinking, darn. And I used guess work to illustrate (tut tut, very bad) and now I'll have to do more guessing to explain/redress the last lot of guesses: gulp. ?

It would the other way round, wouldn't it? - the current production there is and what stocks there are in store will determine what operations there can be and what risks will be involved? 

I came to my senses when I realised : parts of a tank might (ie I'm moderately confidently guessing) have been in the ground or forest or ocean a year ago (I mean before the mining/lumber-jacking/fishing or what have you : primary extraction I think they call it) . And the labour situation would be determined by policy ( mobilisation/de-mobilisation,involvement of women in the workforce for examples). And the money situation too, is also a policy matter. And policy doesn't get made or take effect over night (I'm guessing again).

If so, then in three months (March '41 to June '41) re-distribution of existing goods and troops to a state of readiness and in location perhaps? I can believe that an armament minister might intervene to facilitate one final assembly line at the expense of another. But that might be the limit - at a guess.

For Barbarossa I think there would only be as much or as many goods as in the OTL And future years production would depend on many other variables (that's the last guess)

I'm back in the fog of uncertainty again. At least that means I'll shut up.


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## wiking85 (Sep 7, 2013)

The issue of using OTL stock figures is that the Germans will have the other stocks that were committed to other theaters in June 1941 AND what was spent from March 1941 on in those theaters that would not be here. Also there is the added benefit of having access to world markets, as having a limited resource base in blockaded Europe in OTL limited maximum output. Plus not Europe can add to the Axis war machine, as Adam Tooze noted in 'Wage of Destruction' France and occupied Europe de-modernized due to lack of fuel and other resources, which ground their production and economies to a halt. Also without the British keeping resistance going in Europe the rest of Europe is more likely to fall in line with the new order, as there is no hope for liberation, so will furnish less resistance, even potentially passive resistance, requiring less commitment of occupation resources and may even generate more soldiers and workers for the Axis war effort once they get locked into the Axis economies. 

Still, even if we ignore the benefits to production that comes from peace, even just using the resources saves in the Balkans, North Africa, Mediterranean, Middle East, and over Britain/the Atlantic in April-June 1941 will result in a major increase in resources for Barbarossa over OTL. Saving on Uboat production, Uboat base production, increased AAA defenses (including the FLAK towers which were started in late 1940), and air assets that only make sense for operations against Britain will also mean that in the April-June 1941 period there are more raw materials and skilled labor for Barbarossa production. IOTL Uboats took up a lot of high quality steel and copper, not to mention what torpedoes, deck gun and AAA shells, naval mines, etc. This could all be turned into material for the army instead.
Before you mention production capacity, remember that there was a labor shortage in 1941 and German factories were mostly running only one shift, as they had yet to embrace slave labor, so didn't have the extra hands to run machines 24 hours. Taking the material and skilled labor from naval construction of all sorts and from air-naval production would mean these get funneled into the under utilized capacity of existing Heer and Luftwaffe factories.


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2013)

> Let's assume that the Germans would have attacked the USSR no matter what if Britain was out of the war


. 

Okay fair enough



> Let's also assume the war lasts beyond the initial campaign, but the Germans do better in 1941, perhaps taking Murmansk and or Leningrad, but logistics keep Moscow out of Germany's grasp. In late 1941 the US extends Lend-Lease to the USSR, giving greater aid than historically to help make up for the losses of Murmansk/Leningrad. Persia and Siberia are the only supply routes, with the Siberian route only able to ship non-contraband war materials due to Japanese inspection of shipping into and out of Vladivostok (until 1944).



This is a very dangerous scenario for the Russian. Until 1944, about 80% of lend Lease was actually supplied in British ships using British equipment, ofr British Lend lease equipmenht. For example roughly 2500 Hurricanes were supplied to a few hundred P-40s. Moreover, until September 1942, there was no Persioan supply route, and it was well into 1944 before The rail links were upgraded to take any significant levels of supply. Well into 1943, the lions share of Lend Lease was delivered through Murmansk. Capture murmansk in 1941 and Soviet Russia is basically totally isoalted. There was no significant supply via the far east because of the limits of the transSiberian line and the Alaskan Air Bridge was not yet in place. 



> Germany and the Axis have access to world markets and have reparations in the form of raw materials from the Belgian, Dutch, and French colonial empires.



This is also very significant, and greatly increases Axis production capability. Before the war, the germans commanded the second most powerful economy in the world. As a ratio of estimated GDP, the Allied to Axis ratio was 2.38:1 in 1938. By 1941 there had been a degree of catch up, with the ratio 1.75:1;with the British removed from the equation this ratio fundamentally changese. German and italian GDP, just based on historical production gives them the advantage of 1.56:1 in their favour. However the british blockade at this time is estimated to have degraded the german economy because of denail to world markets, to the tune of about 20%, so the estimated Axis GDP to Soviet GDP is about 1.71:1. But even this is still insufficient, or is underestimating Axis resources. French GDP in 1939 was about $190 million per year, whilst that of the rest of occupied Europe was roughly $100 million per annum . by 1941 these economies had all slumped to a subsistence level, basically additing nothing to Axis war potential. Overwhelmingly this arose because of the denial to world markets and overseas imports. It is reasonable to estimate occupied Europe at least doubling the German contribution to the Axis war effort. That would increase Axis to Soviet GDP to at least 3.5:1. Soviet GDP would however slump with the loss of Murmansk, and Soviet manpower availability would drop, in my estimation, in 1941-2, by around 35%, due to the need to maintain grain self sufficiency. 

Its virtually impossible for the Soviets to be seen as a survivable nation in that scenario. 



> German industry is able to recruit labor from abroad and can try and recruit soldiers from anti-communist groups abroad and the German diaspora. Spain and Portugal send more soldiers and airmen than they historically did, rotating men through the 'Blue Divisions' to train their army and air forces.




Spain would have joined the Axis in October 1941 on the conditions outlined in the following article

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=mYumqnXEqW&dl


It ius immediately apparent that it was a physical impossibility for Spain to increase its committment without the capture of Gibraltar, which brings us back to the issue of British belligernecy. it also means the destruction of Vichy, which rules out any support from the French. Finally it wasd conditional to massive injections of aid and raw materials, which Germany could afford neither. 




> France also generates tens of thousands of recruits for the German military (historically IIRC over 20,000 served). The Italians are also able to furnish many more men, aircraft, and other equipment for the east, as the Allies have returned the Italian POWs and there is not other active front for the Italian military.
> 
> So this is the scenario, what does production look like for the Axis?




In this scenario, the war will not last longer than 3 months, despite the rider you have tried to apply. Axis to Soviet ratio of GDP will be in the order of 5 to 6 to 1.

An easy and obvious outcome to predict.


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## bobbysocks (Sep 10, 2013)

parsifal said:


> .
> 
> 
> 
> This is a very dangerous scenario for the Russian. Until 1944, about 80% of lend Lease was actually supplied in British ships using British equipment, ofr British Lend lease equipmenht. For example roughly 2500 Hurricanes were supplied to a few hundred P-40s. Moreover, until September 1942, there was no Persioan supply route, and it was well into 1944 before The rail links were upgraded to take any significant levels of supply. Well into 1943, the lions share of Lend Lease was delivered through Murmansk. Capture murmansk in 1941 and Soviet Russia is basically totally isoalted. There was no significant supply via the far east because of the limits of the transSiberian line and the Alaskan Air Bridge was not yet in place.



i was under the impression that the first load of LL items were bombs while still sitting on the dock at murmansk and that immediately afterwards they were delivered to vladivostok by us and other allied ships flying under the russian flag.


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 10, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> i was under the impression that the first load of LL items were bombs while still sitting on the dock at murmansk and that immediately afterwards they were delivered to vladivostok by us and other allied ships flying under the russian flag.


 
The Lend Lease Act wasn't extended to the Soviet Union until October 1941.

By this time, the British had completed two convoys to Murmansk and werre preparing a third. 

The 1941 convoys were mostly a British affair.


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## parsifal (Sep 11, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> i was under the impression that the first load of LL items were bombs while still sitting on the dock at murmansk and that immediately afterwards they were delivered to vladivostok by us and other allied ships flying under the russian flag.



I have over stated the British contribution, but the general gist of what Iam saying for the forst three months is correct.

In the period June to September 1941, a total of 167000 tons of various supplies were shipped to the SU, of which 146000 were of British or Canadian origin. Only 14000 tons were from the US. Of that, approximately 151000 tons were shipped via Murmansk, and none of that shipped to the east was ever shipped or used on the active theatre. 

A very similar situation was repeated in the last quarter of 1941. 

In total for 1941,360K tons were shipped to Russia, with about 90% of cargoes arriving via the northern ports. 

Where I am wrong is in 1942 and after. Once the US got into the war, thre was a fundamental shift in the US effort, moreover, the efforts of 1942 dwarfed the mostly British 1941 effort. Until the end of June, an additional 1.42 million tons was shipped, of which 1.18 million was shipped through Murmansk. The US ships accounted for just over 60% of the transport and US goods accounted for all but 150K tons. 

For 1942, 2.4 million tons were shipped, of which 24% were via the south, 25.6% were via the Far East and 50.4% were via Murmansk. 

For 1943, 4.8 million tons were shipped, well over 90% was by now of US origin, and well over 70% of the transport also of US origin. RN provided the lions share opf the escort and security. 31.5% went via the southern route, 47.8% via the Far East, and 20.7% via the northern ports. 

in 1944 there was another quantum shift. For the Far East, imports slumped to 35.8% of total shipments. The Persian Gulf, now with a massive railway upgrade to support it, rocketed to 45.2% and the northern route slightly decreased as an overall percentage to 19%. Total shipments now amounted to 7.7 million tons

For 1945, until September, 3.7 Million tons were shipped, of which 7.8% were via the Persian Gulf, 18.5% via the newly re-opened Black Sea route, 4.3% via new ports in the arctic, 18.5% via Murmansk and Archangel and 50.9% from the Far eastern ports. 

Not included in these totals are 1 million tons of POLS supplied directly from the British controlled oil wells around Abadan


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## Jenisch (Sep 11, 2013)

Did Russia Really Go It Alone? How Lend-Lease Helped the Soviets Defeat the Germans


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## parsifal (Sep 11, 2013)

Its hard to know the precise contribution Lend Leaser had on the Soviet war making capability, but is certainly more than their post war accounts claim. 

Germany overran about 35% of Soviet industry in the offensive phase of her war, and a similar proportion of the Soviet population. Millions were captured, and millions were executed. Soviet GDP was about 2/3 that of Germany at the beginning of the war (estimates do vary on that), so the Russians fought their war with about half the financilal resources of the Germans. But you cannot make direct comparisons like that unfortunately. Key raw industrial indicators like steel production, copper production, and the like, sugggest a closer correlation.

Lend lease certainly delivered critical equipment, in particular MT aircraft and tanks, but perhaps even more critically were the deliveries of railway equipment, including rolling stock and prime movers, and the supply of foodstuffs (which released vast numbers of men for military purposes).

Its very hard to put a quantified figure on that contribution, but I think it was critical. The Germans certainly thought so


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