# Dieppe Raid, worst lost of Allied Battles?



## ArrowZero (Sep 4, 2007)

I want to know if this battle that was a disaster and killed many Canadian, British and some American soldiers, if it was the worst battle that the Allied lost. I heard about it, is it true that the people who organized this Raid already knew about the German defences and they knew that was going to happen, but they wanted to test German Defence? Most of the soldiers send to Dieppe were Canadian...


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## mosquitoman (Sep 4, 2007)

I twas a "reconaissance-in-force" to find out what invading a port would be like.
The biggest lost battle by the Allies IMO would be Crete simply because it would have been ideal as an air base to aid Malta hassling the Mediterranean convoys.


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## ToughOmbre (Sep 4, 2007)

Worst? Hardly. 

Singapore, Bataan, Corregidor quickly come to mind.

TO


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## mosquitoman (Sep 4, 2007)

Okay, i got it wrong, worst defeat in the West.


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## ArrowZero (Sep 4, 2007)

mosquitoman said:


> I twas a "reconaissance-in-force" to find out what invading a port would be like.
> QUOTE]
> 
> By "reconaissance-in-force" you mean they send soldiers to be killed just to test the defences for another invading mission


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## timshatz (Sep 4, 2007)

Think Singapore was the worst of the three. Bataan and Corregidor fell after long sieges. Defense of Singapore just fell apart.


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## pbfoot (Sep 4, 2007)

Ithink you should argue the Dieppe raid on this thread
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/greatest-military-blunder-wwii-8012.html


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## klidedarked (Sep 5, 2007)

well, actually i think dieppe raid should be consider as one of the biggest lost battle cause what i have heard, dieppe raid was a huge disaster on the canadian division, well, i think the allies didn´t expected what happened...


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## ArrowZero (Sep 5, 2007)

Well, actually the generals knew about the German defences at the beach, they just want to test it...but with soldiers that lost their lives. It was unfair that they send soldiers, that they didn't knew about the defences,to be killed just to see German defence. This operation was a disaster, not the worst, but it help that later they could be more organized in their invasions.


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## Medvedya (Sep 5, 2007)

It was largely Mountbattens fault - he was the Chief of Combined Operations and although told by Montgomery it was a no go, he ploughed along with it anyway, using his influence with Churchill to make it happen. 

So - nobody, and most importantly British intelligence knew it was going to happen until it was too late to stop. The rest, is history.

He was a reckless ass, which would have been fine were it his own head he was putting in harms way but it wasn't - it was nearly 3000 Canucks who paid the price for his folly. 

The final insult to this was that when it was over, instead of visiting the pitfully few wounded who made it back he goes instead to meet his pal Noel Coward who was filming 'In Which We Serve' a film loosely based about Mountbatten and the time he lost HMS Kelly at Crete - again through his recklessness.


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## ArrowZero (Sep 6, 2007)

So Montgomery knew it will be a disaster and Mountbattens didn't listen to him? ... He should have been more organized , because there were a lot of German defence there, and not a lot of cover for soldiers. The soldiers were killed almost as soon a they ran on the beach by the Germans machine guns and morters.
This helped for the organization of D-day in 1944?


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## Concorde247 (Sep 6, 2007)

Montgomery certainly wasnt perfect either, his ego kept getting in the way, you only have to look at what happened at Arnhem to see that. He chose to ignore the good intel from the dutch resistance of there being two SS panzer divisions stationed at arnhem for some R&R, he sent lightly armed paratroops up against them! what chance did they have? The drop zones were too far away from the bridge for any realistic chance of being held. when some troops did get to the bridge They held out far longer than they had been told that they had to 30 corp couldnt break through to them for fear of losing all their tanks to the anti tank guns!!

Throughout the whole market garden campaign of the bridges to be captured, Arnhem was the main prize which would allow the allies to break through cross the rhine into germany capturing the nazi factories in the Rhur, thus ending the war a lot quicker. It wasnt to be, a lot of good men died needlessly.

The Dieppe raid was a failure, but valuable lessons were learned were put into practice for the D-day landings in 1944


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## Maharg (Sep 7, 2007)

Dieppe was a demonstration to show the yanks that proper preperation and planing was needed before Europe could be freeded from the oppresion they were suffering.
The way I read it, as soon as the US forces arrived in England they wanted to invade the Continent.
No, no, no, said the Poms, we need to prepair more, and the German Army is really good at what they do. For example watch this.....hence Dieppe.

They used up the 'Colonials' in this case the Canadians.

All the best.
Graham.


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## Negative Creep (Sep 7, 2007)

Would Dunkirk count? There is an aura which has grown around the whole event, but at the end of the day, it was still a heavy defeat and resulted in the loss of almost all heavy equipment


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 9, 2007)

A nice History Channel documentry about the attack against Dieppe.

Dangerous.Missions.8of8.Attack.On.Dieppe.avi - Google Video


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Sep 11, 2007)

Well, only comfort is that the Canadians didn't have to take Omaha Beach on D-Day.


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## Freebird (Feb 6, 2008)

Medvedya said:


> It was largely Mountbattens fault - he was the Chief of Combined Operations and although told by Montgomery it was a no go, he ploughed along with it anyway, using his influence with Churchill to make it happen.
> 
> So - nobody, and most importantly British intelligence knew it was going to happen until it was too late to stop. The rest, is history.
> 
> ...



You're right, he was an ass, it was only because he was cousin of the King that he got away with it.

The commander of the air forces (Leigh-Mallory) also comes across very poorly in the whole affair.



Maharg said:


> Dieppe was a demonstration to show the yanks that proper preperation and planing was needed before Europe could be freeded from the oppresion they were suffering.
> The way I read it, as soon as the US forces arrived in England they wanted to invade the Continent.
> No, no, no, said the Poms, we need to prepare more, and the German Army is really good at what they do. For example watch this.....hence Dieppe.
> 
> ...



very astute analysis Graham.


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## drgondog (Feb 12, 2008)

From a US perspective, Corregidor then Kasserine Pass are up there. I agree Singapore for Commonwealth.

Close behind (for me) was Operation Market Garden and Anzio and Huertgen Forest for waste/unfulfilled expectations, total waste of manpower and focus. Had any of these succeeded as planned they would be hailed as great victories.

Then there is Bloody Pelalau - why??

No, Dieppe is nowhere on my horizon for 'worst debacle' for Allies and we have not touched Russia or Africa before the tide was turned.


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## orion549 (Feb 18, 2008)

Soundbreaker Welch? said:


> Well, only comfort is that the Canadians didn't have to take Omaha Beach on D-Day.



As disrespectful as it might be, I had a good laugh at that one. But yes, it's not the worst of the war, it's just the worst the Canadians were mostly involved in, that's why we hear more about Dieppe up here than we even hear about Juno.

Just like Vimy Ridge wasn't one of the greatest victories of WWI, but that's another battle we hear about a lot about up here. Quite frankly I'm surprised we don't learn more about the battle of Amiens here for it's historical relevance. Although maybe they've changed that, it's been almost 10 years since I've taken a high school Canadian History course. Although they never seem to add things, just take things away.


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## Freebird (Feb 19, 2008)

drgondog said:


> From a US perspective, Corregidor then Kasserine Pass are up there. I agree Singapore for Commonwealth.
> 
> Close behind (for me) was Operation Market Garden and Anzio and Huertgen Forest for waste/unfulfilled expectations, total waste of manpower and focus. Had any of these succeeded as planned they would be hailed as great victories.
> 
> ...



Singapore, mainly a lack of preparation, {and the far east was starved for reinforcements in '40 '41}

But as you say Market Garden would have been a great victory if it worked, but *what would Dieppe have acomplished if it had succeeded brilliantly?* Merely to point out to the Germans the parts of the Atlantic Wall that needed improving.


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## Kiwikid (Feb 22, 2008)

The Westkappelle landings which my father was part of (operation Cindarella) in 1944 were said to be the bloodiest battle for the Allies in Europe. Ironically it was mostly Canadians again who were landed at Walcheren island.


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## pbfoot (Feb 22, 2008)

Kiwikid said:


> The Westkappelle landings which my father was part of (operation Cindarella) in 1944 were said to be the bloodiest battle for the Allies in Europe. Ironically it was mostly Canadians again who were landed at Walcheren island.


Probably the worst terrain in the ETO to attack dug in troops , fighting on those dykes


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## Ramirezzz (Feb 23, 2008)

Dieppe as the worst battle in the west? It was a relatively small scale and limited recce operation although with a catastrophic outcome
I would say Sedan fall of France in general


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## k9kiwi (Feb 26, 2008)

It was a testing ground.

For equipment, strategy and manpower necessary to arrive, establish a beach head, and prove the ability to hold it.

Nothing more, nothing less.

The idea of landing slow moving infantry type tanks (Churchills) onto a steep shingle beach with a rampart sea wall is ludicrous in the extreme as a viable concept.

The same (referring to earlier posts) as Omaha beach not making use of the "funny" tanks because they were a British invention. The only ones they used were launched too far out and the majority swamped before the shore line.

Dieppe had shown the need for armour on the beach head in an ETO operation was imperative, and without it the toll would be high.

It also showed the need for improved Infantry Landing Craft to allow more troops to de-bus faster and swamp the incoming fire.

As well as improved co-ordinated communications between shore-sea and shore-air.

So many lessons, such little time.


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## orion549 (Feb 27, 2008)

Actually, the reason the tanks at Omaha all sank was because the current was stonger in that location, and as the tank drivers turned to compensate they turned the wider canvas wall to the waves and they collapsed. It kind of was related to the fact they launched early (which I think they were told not to launch, but didn't get the transmission) because if they hadn't, they wouldn't have been swept so far to the east that they had the tanks in the wrong position.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 15, 2009)

British newsreel of the battle:

British Pathe - COMBINED OPERATIONS


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## RabidAlien (Sep 16, 2009)

In the book "A Man Called Intrepid", the Dieppe Raid was set to cover another raid a little further down the beach: a German radar installation. The Allies needed to know how good the German radar was at the time, to help determine bombing raids and such. With Dieppe going on, any damage to the installation (to disguise stolen parts) could be attributed to raid damage. If Dieppe hadn't happened at the same time, the Germans would know the Allies were interested in their radars. Not saying that this in any way makes Dieppe less of a bloodbath, but knowing that the radar issue probably saved countless Allied flyers/crews gives it more of a morbidly noble flavor.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 16, 2009)

There's plenty of blame to go around on Dieppe - including the Canadian Government. 

MM
Toronto


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## Bernhart (Sep 17, 2009)

Canadians also suffered heavy losses on juno beach up to 50% of the first wave were casualties


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## Freebird (Sep 26, 2009)

k9kiwi said:


> It was a testing ground.
> 
> For equipment, strategy and manpower necessary to arrive, establish a beach head, and prove the ability to hold it.
> 
> ...




This kind of testing was not needed, the could use similar British beaches to test it.


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## davebender (Sep 26, 2009)

Dunkirk gets my vote. British propaganda says the BEF was saved at Dunkirk. In actuality the 3 BEF army corps were destroyed as combat units.
2,472 out of 2,794 total artillery pieces lost. (I assume this number includes AT and AA guns)
63.879 out of 66,618 total motor vehicles lost.


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## CharlesBronson (Oct 25, 2010)

Allied footage of the operation jubille.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=28hKTmzHyqE_


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## buffnut453 (Oct 25, 2010)

davebender said:


> Dunkirk gets my vote. British propaganda says the BEF was saved at Dunkirk. In actuality the 3 BEF army corps were destroyed as combat units.
> 2,472 out of 2,794 total artillery pieces lost. (I assume this number includes AT and AA guns)
> 63.879 out of 66,618 total motor vehicles lost.




Huh??? Sorry, Dave, but I don't get it. The British Army did indeed lose a large amount of heavy equipment (it's bloody hard to evacuate heavy equipment) but the keypoint is more than 300,000 troops (of which roughly one-third were French) were successfully evacuated. Think about it - almost one third of a million men in just a few weeks. It was nothing short of miraculous! And, no, you don't win wars by retreating...but it remains one of the pivotal events of WWII. It was a stunning achievement. I guess I'm just a glutton for propaganda!


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## Freebird (Dec 26, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Huh??? Sorry, Dave, but I don't get it. The British Army did indeed lose a large amount of heavy equipment (it's bloody hard to evacuate heavy equipment) but the keypoint is more than 300,000 troops (of which roughly one-third were French) were successfully evacuated. Think about it - almost one third of a million men in just a few weeks. It was nothing short of miraculous! And, no, you don't win wars by retreating...but it remains one of the pivotal events of WWII. It was a stunning achievement. I guess I'm just a glutton for propaganda!



Not Dunkirk, but "Fall Gelb" is a strong candidate for worst Allied loss, with the Allied forces outnumbering the Germans. there is no way that a well equipped defender should have been routed like that

.


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## Njaco (Dec 26, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Huh??? Sorry, Dave, but I don't get it. The British Army did indeed lose a large amount of heavy equipment (it's bloody hard to evacuate heavy equipment) but the keypoint is more than 300,000 troops (of which roughly one-third were French) were successfully evacuated. Think about it - almost one third of a million men in just a few weeks. It was nothing short of miraculous! And, no, you don't win wars by retreating...but it remains one of the pivotal events of WWII. It was a stunning achievement. I guess I'm just a glutton for propaganda!



Very good book on the subject is "Dunkirk" by Walter Lord (he of "Night to Remember" fame) and he does his usual throrough minute by minute account of the action.


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## parsifal (Dec 26, 2010)

freebird said:


> This kind of testing was not needed, the could use similar British beaches to test it.



Short answer, no, it had to be proven that direct assault of a German held port was not feasible. Also, that specialised armoured support was a great advantage to assaulting defencded positions. They also needed to probe the dfences to test reaction timers and the effectiveness of the fire support plan. 

Its easy with the benefit of perfect hindsight to say "oh this could have been worked out on the4 sand table"....it cant. 

Dieppe was a necessary evil needed to work out a number of critical issues in the cross channel plans. Far from a defeat, it was a victory, of sorts, because it enabled changes to be made in the plans for the normaqndy crossings.

The last great amphibious landings undertaken by the British against a heavily defended target had been Gallipoli, and this had been a disaster.....the attacks in the Solomons were the only other major amphibious operation up to that time, and this had not been against a well defended beachhead, or a defended port. It had to be determined what was possible, and waht was needed, and the Canadians courageously showed waht needed to be discovered. I think the battle was an exemplary example of the Canadian dogged determination and courage under fire. And more to the point, it saved many more lives than it lost, through the knowledge gained that day and in the subsequent analysis.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 26, 2010)

Great post Parsifal. I undertook several "staff rides" to the Dieppe beaches when I was an instructor several years ago. We would travel on the ferry to Dieppe so we could see the entire beach frontage almost as it appeared to the invading British forces in 1942. We'd visit all the beaches, including Lovatt's successful attack on Green Beach, with presentations on what happened there. We also looked at the parachute landing grounds and wrapped up our tour by visiting and laying a wreath at a military cemetary. It was always a very moving experience for me. It is a tragedy that so many brave lads died to prove the impossibility of assaulting a heavily-defended port. However, many lessons were learned relating to intelligence, deception and the operational art of beach landings.


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## JoeB (Dec 26, 2010)

freebird said:


> Not Dunkirk, but "Fall Gelb" is a strong candidate for worst Allied loss, with the Allied forces outnumbering the Germans. there is no way that a well equipped defender should have been routed like that
> 
> .


I agree, if speaking of Western Allies the Battles of Neth/Belg/France aka Fall Gelb, dwarfed Dieppe as a disaster. Dunkirk itself wasn't an Allied defeat but a salvaging of more than could be expected, once the overall campaign of which it was part had deteriorated to that point. The expected outcome once the British (and part of French) force was hemmed into the Dunkirk bridgebead was loss of almost all their heavy equipment (as happened) *plus* virtually all their men as POW's (which was avoided).

If you include the Soviets, then their defeats as a whole in both 1941 and srping '42 campaign surpassed the Battle of France in losses of men and equipment, but OTOH the Germans did not achieve their operational objectives in either of those campaigns (and were seriously mauled themselves, especially in the fall phase of '42 campaign), whereas they did in their offensive into Benelux/France (though failed to achieve their ultimate strategic objective of knocking all their major opponents out of the war, again in part because the British retained at least most of their army personnel at Dunkirk).

The 1940 campaign was one of the greatest victory/defeats for the respective sides in military history, and could easily have resulted in a situation where Germany's worst outcome was stalemate with Britain while dominating Western Europe indefinitely, with a very realistic chance of forcing Britain into an accomodation eventually. Only Hitler's later collossal mistake of attacking the Soviets makes the 1940 campaign in France less of a landmark in history than it might have been.

Joe


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 27, 2010)

We have a good idea what the Allies learned from Dieppe:

- can't attack an urban port
- beware of rocky beaches
- tanks can be problematic
- don't let officers go ashore with "plans"
- don't handcuff enemy prisoners
- surprise is hard to achieve
- etc. etc

My question is: what did the Germans learn from Dieppe?

My guess is: not much. They had to feel pretty smug about their defense. And THAT in itself may have spelled problems later on - in June '44.

Thoughts on this ....?

MM


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## BombTaxi (Dec 28, 2010)

Personally, I consider Dieppe a necessary rehearsal for D-Day. Without the lessons learned through combat at Dieppe, D-Day would have been much bloodier and may even have failed. We tend to forget that even including the horrendous losses on Omaha beach, the overall Allied loss on D-Day was relatively light when the operation is considered as a daylight assault against fixed defences over a broad front. Without Dieppe, and also the landing ops carried out by the US in the Pacific up to that date, the tally could have been far heavier. And while the 'Funnies' were not an unqualified success, Dieppe and D-Day were important developmental steps for vehicle types that are still in use today. 

Worst Allied loss of the war is probably Fall Gelb, or Barbarossa on the Eastern front. Dieppe, in terms of casualties, and strategic impact, is really a very minor setback in the wider picture. A tragedy for sure, but not a point where the outcome of the war hung in the balance.


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## timshatz (Dec 28, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> Worst Allied loss of the war is probably Fall Gelb, or Barbarossa on the Eastern front. Dieppe, in terms of casualties, and strategic impact, is really a very minor setback in the wider picture. A tragedy for sure, but not a point where the outcome of the war hung in the balance.



Agree with Bomb Taxi on this one. Dieppe was not critical to anything but the planning for Overlord. Learned what not to do (important part of learning what TO DO). Very helpful in that realm.

Worst loss has to be on the Eastern Front in terms of total losses. Almost anything in the first 6 months of the war resulted in stupendous losses to the Soviets. Only Russia could absorb such losses and keep going. 

In terms of affecting the course of the war, strategically, that is harder: 

Crete, mentioned already, is a good one (Lost the island and lost the advantage in Africa), 

Singapore, not so much, that place was gonna fall no matter what happened.

Battle of France is a good one. Fight the Germans to a standstill in 1940 and the whole war is different. 

Dessert war is more about logistics than anything else. Longer the lines of supply, the harder it is to get enough combat power to keep the advances going. 

I guess I'd go with the Battle of France. Loss of France and the evacuation of forces from the Continent gave Germany the leisure to expand the war as she wanted and removed a major threat in France.


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## davebender (Dec 28, 2010)

After a bit more thought I vote for French 1st Army Group. The BEF was only a portion of the huge Army Group destroyed in Belgium during May 1940. Germany must have bagged at least 50 Allied divisions in this fight which lasted only about two weeks. The cream of the British and French armies were among the destroyed divisions.

1st French Army.
2nd French Army.
7th French Army.
9th French Army.
BEF.
Belgium Army.


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## BombTaxi (Dec 29, 2010)

Dave,

I'm still struggling with the notion that the BEF was 'destroyed' in 1940. True, they left all of their armour, artillery and MT behind. This was only a problem if Hitler was imminently going to invade England. As we have discussed many times here, the German war machine was not capable of doing so at this point. The most vital _materiel_ element of the British force, i.e the fighter component of the Advanced Air Striking Force, was withdrawn without undue loss and participated successfully in the next major engagement with the Germans.

The most vital element of the BEF 'full stop', i.e the combat-hardened men who would form the nucleus of a victorious British army, were bought off largely intact, along with a substantial number of French troops who would flight alongside them. 

The BEF was defeated. But given the facts stated above, how can you justify your claim that it was destroyed?


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 29, 2010)

If you live to fight another day, are you "destroyed" ...? 

MM


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## imalko (Dec 29, 2010)

I believe Dave's point is this... BEF was destroyed as effective fighting unit at Dunkirk. Yes, those 300.000 men were not all killed or captured, but lost all of their armament and equipment during the evacuation.

"Live to fight another day..." Yes, they did, but what if that "another day" had come in summer 1940. I took a long time to re-equip and rearm those troops. Had the Germans been able to invade UK in 1940 I doubt that those 300.000 unarmed men would counted much for the defense.


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## BombTaxi (Dec 29, 2010)

So, as I said, the whole concept of 'destruction' of the BEF depends on there being a credible risk to the British Isles after Dunkirk. BoB notwithstanding, there was no credible threat of invasion at any time after Dunkirk and therefore the loss of equipment is a militarily moot point, although the need to rearm obviously delayed the redeployment of the army into other theatres.


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## davebender (Dec 29, 2010)

A military unit without equipment has been rendered combat ineffective. From a military perspective it has been destroyed, no matter how many or few personnel casualties were sustained.


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## BombTaxi (Dec 29, 2010)

I think you quoted me slightly out of context there 

What I'm getting at is that the BEF could have continued to resist - but it did not need to, and therefore the fact that it had lost all of it's heavy equipment was , in that sense, irrelevant. The loss of the AASF fighters or the total destruction of the Home Fleet by some means would have been a far more serious blow as this would actually have made a German landing technically feasible, although not physically possible. 

You make it sound as if the BEF lost every tank and gun the British posessed. This is not the case. While the equipment still in the UK was old and inferior, it could still have been used to resist a German landing, had such a thing been physically possible. In any case, the Army was the third and last line of defence against invasion, and neither the Navy or RAF had suffered substantial losses in combat which would prevent them from defeating a German invasion before it was launched. Further resources could be, and were, withdrawn from Norway to bolster the UK's defences. In an extreme case, Britain could have abandoned East Africa to save the home islands. I think the case that Britain was teetering on the brink of disaster after Dunkirk is propaganda designed to exaggerate Britain's success in the BoB, and I think the idea that the remnants of the BEF were totally combat ineffective is also an exaggeration. While they would have offered a relatively weak resistance to any hypothetical German landing, they would have resisted nevertheless, with the weapons available to them.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 29, 2010)

Also bear in mind the vast majority of the BEF were PBI (poor bloody infantry) which didn't have much heavy equipment. Most of the Dunkirk evacuees literally could have been handed a new .303 rifle as they disembarked in the UK.


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## timshatz (Dec 29, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Also bear in mind the vast majority of the BEF were PBI (poor bloody infantry) which didn't have much heavy equipment. Most of the Dunkirk evacuees literally could have been handed a new .303 rifle as they disembarked in the UK.



Read a story about recollections of Dunkirk. One was of a woman who lived outside the Ports where the British soliders returned (in England) after the evacuations. She lived near a railway line and remembers Soliders throwing away their rifles as the trains went by. 

Maybe not destroyed, but very demoralized.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 29, 2010)

There is destroyed and there is destroyed. 
An army that has been forced to retreat in haste and over/through obstacles (rivers, the channel, mountains, jungle) has been destroyed as a military force ONLY UNTIL it can re-equip/reorganize. 
An army that has had to surrender is totally destroyed and needs to be replaced. While 200,000 men may have been a drop in the Bucket to the Russians, it was no such thing to the British or even the Germans. 
A lot of the heavy weapons left behind in France were obsolete WW I left overs or items that wound up relegated to training status in just a few more months any anyway. Maltida I's, light tank MK VI's, some old and obsolete heavy artillery. The only real critical thing left behind were the 2pdr AT guns, the shortage of which, combined with some panzerphobia, kept the 2pdr in production for too long when they should have switched over to the 6pdr.


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## parsifal (Dec 29, 2010)

A military victory isnt always the clear defeat of an enemy opponent. It can be a subtle affair, where the avoidance of total defeat is all that can be reasonably expected.
in the case of Dunkirk, the Germans had already won their victory, effectively, and all that remained was the capture of the Britih forces trapped in the pocket. Dunkirk was a victory, because it was a plan, successfully completed, that managed to avoid that outcome. In this the British had managed to to achieve their objective....to save as many of the personnel as possible. In fact, they greatly exceeded all expectations. It had been planned that when the operation began that perhaps 25000 men might be saved. When it ended, 330000 men had been rescued. The loss of the equipment was never a major issue for the British, it was not their objective to save this.

From the enemy perspective it was also a defeat. The stated German objective had been the total destruction of the pocket, and the death or capture of its personnel. They failed to achieve their stated objectives

Once the decision had been reached to effect an evacuation, the plan and its execution were done brilliantly. The on ground situation as of 26 May, when the operation began saw the british strung out some distance from the beaches. The withdrawal to the beach head was executed brilliantly and flawlessly, and managed to absorb the major shock of the Belgian surrender two days later......an event carried out without warning by the King of Belgium. The holding actions at Boulogne and Calais, from the 19 May to the 26May were criticasl to the defence of Dunkirk, and were the events principally responsible for the German defeat, whose objectives at that point had been the immediate and early capture of all the channel ports, so as to prevent the evacuation that eventually developed. As Churchill stated, in his cable to the commander of the defending force (principally 30 Brigade, under Brigadier Nicholson), although it arrived too late to be received...."Every hour that you continue to exist is of critical importance to the BEF....Government has therefore decided that you must continue to fight . Have the greatest possible admiration for your splendid stand. Evacuation will not (repeat not) take place".....but even this was not fully observed, as two small motor yachts (the Conidaw and the Gulzar) managed to sneak in and rescue about 200 survivors after the surrender, right under the noses of the Germans......Calais had cost the BEF 3500 men, but had gained 3 precious days for the defence lines behind Gravelines to be organized, and the evacautuion from Dunkirk to be commenced. Churchill later wrote "Calais was the crux to our success. Many other causes might have prevented the deliverance of Dunkirk, but it is certain that the three days gained by the defence Calais enabled the Gravelines line to be held and thereby enable the withdrawal to be carried out.


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## drgondog (Dec 29, 2010)

michaelmaltby said:


> We have a good idea what the Allies learned from Dieppe:
> 
> - can't attack an urban port
> - beware of rocky beaches
> ...



Rommel certainly did not display over confidence as demonstrated from his infrastructure investments as well as flooding and mining likely airborne DZ's.

Had he been on-site during the opening hours and had access to 10th Panzer as a mobile reserve - it could have been very bad. The weather was bad enough that daylight movement would have been feasible. 

Another aspect of placing Rommel in tactical command of the 'west wall' is that he was one of few German High Command that had a healthy respect for US troops and equipment. He had no illusions that his troopers had the individual 'strength of 10' that Hitler and Goering and other seemed to harbor.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 29, 2010)

"... Rommel certainly did not display over confidence as demonstrated from his infrastructure investments as well as flooding and mining likely airborne DZ's."

Very true, Dd. 

MM


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## RabidAlien (Dec 29, 2010)

Rommel was also working (or trying to) with a shortage of supplies such as mines and concrete and steel for his bunkers (not a solid enough wall in his opinion), _Ost _battalions (not quite as motivated as the average German grunt), as well as a very short timeline: he'd only been on the Atlantic Wall for, what, 6 months? Had he started a year in advance, the outcome of Overlord may very well have been entirely different. The battle for Omaha was a close thing, as it was.


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## Jabberwocky (Jan 10, 2011)

davebender said:


> Dunkirk gets my vote. British propaganda says the BEF was saved at Dunkirk. In actuality the 3 BEF army corps were destroyed as combat units.
> 2,472 out of 2,794 total artillery pieces lost. (I assume this number includes AT and AA guns)
> 63.879 out of 66,618 total motor vehicles lost.



Where are those figures from? The soliders saved during the Dunkirk evacuation were reorganised and rearmed over a period of about 4-5 months over the summer/fall of 1940. The notion that the BEF returned to an England bereft of equipment to rearm them is a fallacy. 

The British summary of assets and losses post Dunkirk (06-Jun-1940) gives 1,346 artillery pieces lost, and another 607 AT guns lost (including 109 25 mms), for a total of 1953 'tubes' lost. 615 tanks (including 331 Mk IV light tanks) were also lost.

At the same time, the survey of equipment in the UK shows stocks of 1066 artillery pieces and 333 AT guns, as well at 688 tanks (including 408 light tanks).

The forces saved from the BEF can be broadly said to have been re-armed by late Sep-1940, although there were still heavy shortages of artillery (field/medium guns were at just 35-55% of establishment) and AT guns and heavy mortars.

2 pounders were at just a quarter of establishment by the end of Aug-1940 and around 30% of establishment at the end of Sep-1940. To ease the problem, the British Army re-organised its AT batteries into 3 x 16 instead of the earlier 4 x 12. However, many units in 1940 were unofficially adjusted, with either 3 x 12 or even 4 X 8 2 pounders. 

That said, the BEF had also been down on AT gun establishment too: about 20% of BEF AT batteries were equipped with the 25 mm Hotchkiss AT gun. 

British production in Jun-1940 was enough to equip about 1.5 divisions per month. By the end of August, this was up to enough to equip about 2 divisions per month.


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## BombTaxi (Jan 11, 2011)

I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;

Pearl Harbor - the carriers survived, but US losses in other surface units, personnel, and aircraft were heavy and required significant investment to repair. Obviously, these lost assets could not be deployed to assist the fight against the Japanese advance in early 1942.

PQ-17 - a needless waste of lives and resources, IMHO, in a convoy that could (and should) have been saved.

The Channel Dash - The British missed a brilliant chance to knock the two most powerful survivor of the Kriegsmarine out of the war, and avert the danger of another PQ-17 type disaster. Inexcusable given the level of British control over the Channel.

Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.


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## Jabberwocky (Jan 11, 2011)

BombTaxi said:


> I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;
> 
> Pearl Harbor - the carriers survived, but US losses in other surface units, personnel, and aircraft were heavy and required significant investment to repair. Obviously, these lost assets could not be deployed to assist the fight against the Japanese advance in early 1942.
> 
> ...



The Battle of France - France essentially eliminated as an independent combatant, the Low Countries occupied, Britain thrown off the continent at great expense to her Army. Allies suffer around 1/3 of a million casualties to the 100-120,000 of Germany.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 11, 2011)

BombTaxi said:


> Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.



The tactical loss of Force Z came at the end of a long stream of more strategic failures, key of which was the fallacy of being able to reinforce Singapore if Britain was engaged in a European conflict. To be fair, Force Z was supposed to include the carrier HMS Indomitable but she was damaged when she ran aground leaving the already unbalanced Force Z without organic airpower and highly vulnerable. Then there was the shocking miscommunication between Phillips and AHQFE regarding the provision of air power. It was a confluence of events but had massive strategic impact. I still wonder whether Japan would have pursued its invasion plans had a portion of the US Pacific Fleet sortied to Singapore and hooked up with Force Z in late Nov 41.


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## parsifal (Jan 11, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> The tactical loss of Force Z came at the end of a long stream of more strategic failures, key of which was the fallacy of being able to reinforce Singapore if Britain was engaged in a European conflict. To be fair, Force Z was supposed to include the carrier HMS Hermes but she was damaged leaving the already unbalanced Force Z without organic airpower and highly vulnerable. Then there was the shocking miscommunication between Phillips and AHQFE regarding the provision of air power. It was a confluence of events but had massive strategic impact. I still wonder whether Japan would have pursued its invasion plans had a portion of the US Pacific Fleet sortied to Singapore and hooked up with Force Z in late Nov 41.



Actually the carrier was the Indomitable, and she hit an uncharted rock enroute.


The defeat of Force Z was part of a much bigger malaise affecting the Far eastern Commands at this time, and in many ways the myths that drove it continue to garner traction to this day.....the japanese fought even worse than the italians....the most modern aircraft available to the japanese were the old A2Ns....if they did win a battle it only because they cheated....aircraft unfit for service in Europe would be more than adequate to deal with anything the Japanese possessed, less than 200 aircraft were sufficient to defend the maly barrier....that kind of thinking


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## parsifal (Jan 11, 2011)

The biggest single defeat for the CW forces in terms of losses and long term effects has to be the loss of Singapore. More than any other single event, it influenced the nature of the post world.

The longest retreat overland was Burma...the worst naval defeat was probably one of the unkown convoy battles....ther were many several times worse than PQ-17.

For the Americans, the worst naval defeat is probably Pearl, the worst air defeat, in the PI, the worst land defeat also the PI, except if you dont count the filipino forces as US...in which case probably their defeat on the Rapido in Italy in 1943 is probably the worst.

For the Russians, the worst land defeat is probably Kiev 1941, worst air defeat was probably the comprehensive drubbing they copped over Sevastopol in 1942, worst naval defeat is possibly the loss of the Battleship Marat


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## buffnut453 (Jan 11, 2011)

Interesting points Parsifal, although I think the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe had a significant impact on the postwar world.

In terms of battles that ought to have been won, I think perhaps Crete is one of the biggies. The precipitate withdrawal from the hills surrounding Maleme Airfield effectively lost the entire island for the Allies.

Interestingly, I don't think the Battle of Britain has been mentioned. Whilst I'm not suggesting that Germany would have mounted a hostile invasion of the British Isles, failure of Fighter Command over Southeast England would have exposed London and forced the evacuation of much of the government and would greatly increase the pressure on Churchill's cabinet to sue for peace. Thus the failure of the Luftwaffe to defeat Fighter Command had major consequences for the rest of the war by forcing Hitler to fight a 2-front war and ultimately providing the launchpad for the liberation of Europe.


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## Glider (Jan 11, 2011)

BombTaxi said:


> I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;
> 
> Pearl Harbor - the carriers survived, but US losses in other surface units, personnel, and aircraft were heavy and required significant investment to repair. Obviously, these lost assets could not be deployed to assist the fight against the Japanese advance in early 1942.


A few years ago I went to a discussion on Pearl Harbour at the RUSI. What was interesting was that if you worked on the assumption that the Japanese attacked as and around the time they did. Then the best outcome for the USA was exactly what happened. 
The worst outcome was if the USA had received about a days warning and the US Fleet had sailed. If this had happened then the vast majority of the major vessels in the US Fleet would have been sunk and the loss of life much much higher. The reason for the loss would be that the US Fleet would not have had a co ordinated plan, the vessels wouldn't have had their full war compliment of men and equipment and the ships not worked up to a war time peak of efficiency. Japanese losses would have been higher but the price more than worth it.
If the attack had happened a short while later the carriers would have been in harbour, the loss of ships would have been similar to a battle at sea but the loss of life considerably less than a naval battle.
As it was, the vast majority of the equipment lost was old and like the British Army after Dunkirk, the loss of life while tragic was minimised and the surviving men formed a core for the later expansion of the US Navy. 


> PQ-17 - a needless waste of lives and resources, IMHO, in a convoy that could (and should) have been saved.


Without an escort carrier PQ 17 was always going to suffer very heavy losses.



> The Channel Dash - The British missed a brilliant chance to knock the two most powerful survivor of the Kriegsmarine out of the war, and avert the danger of another PQ-17 type disaster. Inexcusable given the level of British control over the Channel.


True to a point but at the end of the operation both vessels were damaged by mines so it wasn't a total disaster



> Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.



Totally agree with you, absolute waste.


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## timshatz (Jan 12, 2011)

Glider, good and accurate post about Pearl Harbor. The way it turned out was about as good as it could have gone for the US. Unfortunate to say it, but the defeat was not a crushing one. It just changed the focus of the war from a Battleship driven Naval War to an Aircraft driven one. It was going to happen anyway, but it happened faster this way.

One thought I'd had about Pearl Harbor was what if the Japanese, instead of the midget sub attack, had scheduled a liner to sail into Pearl Harbor on that date and started the attack by sinking it in the mouth of the harbor. 20K ton liner jammed in the narrows would shut up the Pacific Fleet (something like what was tried at Zeebrugge in WW1). It could've been bombed out of existance and followed up by a bombardment by the BBs of the Japanese attack force. Would've left Pearl wide open to a Japanese invasion and that would've done huge damage to the Allied war effort. 

Always though the Japanese just didn't go far enough at Pearl. Also thought it wouldn't have made any difference in the end. 

Agree with the perspective on PQ17 and Force Z. But, in the scheme of things, relatively minor affairs in comparison to Pearl Harbor or Dunkirk.


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## RabidAlien (Jan 12, 2011)

Am I remembering correctly, that Yamamoto recalled the 4th wave, targeted at the oil fields outside of Pearl, and the ammo dumps up at Ft. Shafter? I've always wondered how much longer the war would've dragged on, had the fleet returned to the devastation, plus no fuel/ammo.


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## Freebird (Jan 14, 2011)

BombTaxi said:


> So, as I said, the whole concept of 'destruction' of the BEF depends on there being a credible risk to the British Isles after Dunkirk. BoB notwithstanding, there was no credible threat of invasion at any time after Dunkirk and therefore the loss of equipment is a militarily moot point, although the need to rearm obviously delayed the redeployment of the army into other theatres.



Well....
Actually the Germans could have possibly tried an Airborne invasion,
1.) Had the British not evacuated as many as they did, or
2.) had they know how weak the British army really was.

(They couldn't believe that the British would be so crazy as to send the bulk of their army to France, and therefore estimated the UK ground forces to be almost double of what there actually were  ) 



davebender said:


> A military unit without equipment has been rendered combat ineffective. From a military perspective it has been destroyed, no matter how many or few personnel casualties were sustained.



They key equipment was artillery, as the German's lack of ability to transport tanks in quantity cross channel meant that the shortage of AT wasn't critical.
Lack of military transport could be made up by civilian vehicles. 
There was enough artillery to support the forces needed to repel an invasion. 



BombTaxi said:


> I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;
> 
> The Channel Dash - The British missed a brilliant chance to knock the two most powerful survivor of the Kriegsmarine out of the war, and avert the danger of another PQ-17 type disaster. Inexcusable given the level of British control over the Channel.



The British did NOT control the channel at that point, Feb 1942, the German BC's stayed close enough to France to have complete air cover provided. It was also during the Fighter Command "bad times" from the fall of '41 to the summer of '42 when the British Spit V's were shown to be considerably outclassed by the newly arrived FW 190's. ("channel Dash" the RAF lost twice as many aircraft as the Germans, terrible ratios during "Jubilee") 

As it turned out, it wasn't really a victory for the Kriegsmarine, the ships had been a constant threat on the French coast, but after the "Dash" they ceased to be a threat. Prince Eugen was torpedoed 10 days after the Dash, knocked out of action for a year. Gneisenau was also bombed in Feb '42, and never again returned to active service.



BombTaxi said:


> Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.



Actually the institution (The Admiralty) DID understand the need to have a carrier operating with Force Z, but were overruled by the Minister of Defence, who was responsible for quite a few bad plans during the war.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2011)

freebird said:


> Actually the institution (The Admiralty) DID understand the need to have a carrier operating with Force Z, but were overruled by the Minister of Defence, who was responsible for quite a few bad plans during the war.



Freebird,

The intent was to provide Force Z with carrier support in the form of HMS Indomitable but she was damaged when she ran aground in the Caribbean. A fallback plan to use HMS Hermes instead of Indomitable was scuppered because she was too slow. The argument between Churchill and the Admiralty was over the despatch of Force Z (Churchill wanted it, the Admiralty didn't) not the actual composition of the force.


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## parsifal (Jan 14, 2011)

Admiralty plans relating to the Far East centered arounfd a build up of the slow battleships at Ceylon, with a gradual upgrading of these ships in terms of their traqining and their AA capabilities, mostly. The Admiralty was loathe to adopt a forward defence strategy and was loathe to commit much in the way of carriers and very reluctant to commit fast battleships.

The general idea, as far as i can tell, is that the RN wqas going to base its defence around a fleet in being principal. It was believed that Singapore would hold, and could be re-supplied by sea.

Admiralty plans were more conservative than Churchills ideas,, but based on similar faulty assumptions about Japanese capabilities and in the end just as flawed as Churchills. The reality was that the British could not mount an effective defence in the far East, and prosecute the war in the far East, even defensively.

After the loss of the Prince Of Wales and the Repulsive, the british pretty much adopted the Admiralty plan, which the Japanese tore through with ease in April 1942. Truth was, with the forces aavailable and the forces the British were wiling to commit, there was no solution to the problem.

The loss of the two BBs off the malaysian coast was only avoidable, if the british were prepred to abandon the whole of the Far east and retreat back to India. As Churchill well realized, this was politically and militarily unnacceptable. Hence, he was prepred to risk these high value ships, in an effort to contain Japanese agression as far forward as posible. What the British underestimated (not just Churchill, but the whole command) was the effectiveness of the japanese air arm. It outnumbered the CW by a considerable margin, in terms of local supariority, and enjoyed huge training advantages. The efficiency of the Japanese air forces had not been anticipated. For that matter the efficiency of all arms of the Japanese military had been underestimated....It had been expected that Singapore could hold out for at least 6 months....time enough for releif convoys to be organized....in the event it took less than two months...and the speed of the Japanese advance had been completely un-anticiapated.


In just the same way as it is wrong to blamer Hitler for all the failings of the german armed forces, it is equally wrong to blame Churchill for the British failings in East Asia. He had other fish to fry, and did an excellent job overall, in my opinion.


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## michaelmaltby (Jan 14, 2011)

Parsifal - would it be fair to say that the British underestimated Japan's capabilities more than the US had?

MM


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## timshatz (Jan 14, 2011)

MM, don't know if the US or Brits really underestimated the Japanese that much. I think the General Staffs of both Countries knew the Japanese would rampage for about a year (maybe the British knew it more than the US), at the very least, the Japanese would be very hard to stop in the first year with both the US and British forces facing Germany. 

The US were trying to build up their Pacific forces, especially in the Phillipines, but that was a long way from where they wanted to be.


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## rgallant (Jan 14, 2011)

I think it was as much prejudice as under estimation which amounted, to the same thing. I have never understood the US prejudice against the Chinese and by extension the Japanese.

They both considered them threat and yet assumed that their technology was far behind their own. When you add that to the Japanese fighting the Chinese and doing fairly well, they would tend to assume that was a result of the Chinese incompetence.

Considering the British involvement, with the Japanese prior to WW II you would think they would had a better understanding of the ability of the Japanese.

Perhaps the simplest explanation is an unwillingness to accept that the day of the battleship and by extension the great ship to ship battles was over. After all the military's of any country are not known for being novel and forward thinking, it is the nature of an organizations who's top most members tend to be older and more set in their ways.

Up to the point of Pearl Harbour and beyond there had not been very many huge successful air strikes against surface navies. So the various Navies had no reason to assume anything would be significantly different.


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## BombTaxi (Jan 14, 2011)

On the contrary RG, the Allies should have had a very clear idea of the power of aircraft against ships after the RN's strike on Taranto, over a year before Pearl Harbor, and the FAA's action against Bismarck earlier in 1941.

I'm sure there was an element of genuine racial bias against the Japanese in both British and American thinking, but neither side had any excuse for thinking the Japanese were incompetent as they had a solid combat record stretching back nearly 40 years prior to WW2. I think there was a ceratain degree of hubris among both the Americans, who thought their fleet would secure certain victory, and the British, who felt Singapore was impregnable and would provide a home for their own battle fleet.


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## rgallant (Jan 14, 2011)

Bismark and Taranto, speak to my point about few successful attacks against major surface units. Although the Bismark was damaged by the torpedo attacks she was not destroyed, nor was her primary armament effected. And in the end she was sunk by surface action not aircraft.

Taranto although it was a great success, especially considering the type of aircraft used, was not overwhelming. 3 battleships damaged, 2 of which were repaired and a destroyer. This during a night raid.

The thing to remember the Italians were still a viable fighting force after this attack.

So the grand takeaway for these events is that aircraft can damage heavy naval units, but it takes a heavy naval unit to finish the job. In reality not the correct conclusion but strictly looking at the outcomes a viable one.

Add that to all navies being run by people who believed that battleships were king of the seas, and could only be countered by battleships and you can see why they were blindsided.


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## Freebird (Jan 14, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> Freebird,
> 
> The intent was to provide Force Z with carrier support in the form of HMS Indomitable but she was damaged when she ran aground in the Caribbean. A fallback plan to use HMS Hermes instead of Indomitable was scuppered because she was too slow. The argument between Churchill and the Admiralty was over the despatch of Force Z (Churchill wanted it, the Admiralty didn't) not the actual composition of the force.



The Hermes wasn't too slow, at 25 knots she was few knots slower than the PoW's 28 knots, or the Repulse's 29 knots. Had she been following Force Z she would have been within 25 - 50 miles, or about 5 - 10 minutes flight time. The Admiralty *did* have a plan to send a proper fleet, but Churchill insisted on the rather foolish idea of sending the PoW to scare the Japanese, as he boasted that the PoW could "Catch and Kill any Japanese ship"
However you are also correct, the Admiralty thought it was a daft idea, and it turned out that they were correct.



parsifal said:


> Admiralty plans relating to the Far East centered arounfd a build up of the slow battleships at Ceylon, with a gradual upgrading of these ships in terms of their traqining and their AA capabilities, mostly. The Admiralty was loathe to adopt a forward defence strategy and was loathe to commit much in the way of carriers and very reluctant to commit fast battleships.



correct. And rather pointless it turned out to be.



> The general idea, as far as i can tell, is that the RN wqas going to base its defence around a fleet in being principal. It was believed that Singapore would hold, and could be re-supplied by sea.



Could have and should have held on. The Admiralty plan was sound, but they didn't count on the whole thing falling apart.




parsifal said:


> Admiralty plans were more conservative than Churchills ideas,, but based on similar faulty assumptions about Japanese capabilities and in the end just as flawed as Churchills. The reality was that the British could not mount an effective defence in the far East, and prosecute the war in the far East, even defensively.


No I don't agree. The Americans British dropped the ball, but the tools were there.



parsifal said:


> After the loss of the Prince Of Wales and the Repulsive, the british pretty much adopted the Admiralty plan, which the Japanese tore through with ease in April 1942. Truth was, with the forces aavailable and the forces the British were wiling to commit, there was no solution to the problem.



If the PoW Repulse had been withdrawn right after Pearl, they would have made a huge difference in "Java Sea" which was fought by Japanese cruisers *without* air support



parsifal said:


> The loss of the two BBs off the malaysian coast was only avoidable, if the British were prepred to abandon the whole of the Far east and retreat back to India.



Not at all. The 2 ships could have formed the backbone of a ABDA fleet with a couple of US carriers.



parsifal said:


> As Churchill well realized, this was politically and militarily unnacceptable. Hence, he was prepred to risk these high value ships, in an effort to contain Japanese agression as far forward as posible.



He was dithering about what to do, and when the order to withdraw was finally sent the two ships had already been lost




parsifal said:


> What the British underestimated (not just Churchill, but the whole command) was the effectiveness of the japanese air arm. It outnumbered the CW by a considerable margin, in terms of local supariority, and enjoyed huge training advantages. The efficiency of the Japanese air forces had not been anticipated. For that matter the efficiency of all arms of the Japanese military had been underestimated.



The admiralty were well aware of Japanese capabilities, which is why they didn't want to risk these valuable ships in a pointless show of force.



parsifal said:


> In just the same way as it is wrong to blamer Hitler for all the failings of the german armed forces, it is equally wrong to blame Churchill for the British failings in East Asia. He had other fish to fry, and did an excellent job overall, in my opinion.



No, I'm putting the blame for the Force z debacle squarely on his shoulders. It was his plan, and pushed forward over Admiralty objections.


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## parsifal (Jan 14, 2011)

Hi FB

The points you are making are valid, but the conclusions you draw from those "basic statistics" are wrong. Essentially what you are doing is an argument similar to something I saw some years ago, that said, the germans won WWII because their losses were lower.....

Whilst the Admiralty, and Churchill had seen the reports on Japanese capabilities, I very much doubt they believed them, or at the very least took them seriously enough. In 1940 there were reports that the Italians were competent at night fighting. Some parts of the Admiralty believed them, but operational commanders like ABC did not. In war there are always conflicting intell reports....the trick is in knowing what is true and what isnt. The most recent faux pas in intell has to be that which absolutely and positively confirmed the Iraqis possessed WMDs......


In the case of the japanese prior to December 1941, there were reports about how skilled and how well equipped they were, but I dont believe anyone....not just Churchill, took them seriously enough....

Now your supposition that a withdrawal of Fce Z to Java would have made a big difference....well we will never know for sure....i'll concede that, but I have participated in so many simulations of that particular scenario, and it hardly ever turns out well for the allies. The basic mistake you are making in your calculations is that whereas the allies are permitted to make variations to their plans and force structure, the japanese are not. Whereas the Japanese are being strait jacketed into acting historically, the allies are given a free hand to react in the best way to the historical threat. Trouble is, for every action there is usually a reaction....if the allies have battleships in their line up, you can rest assured the Japanese will bring up their battlewagons as well, and even more likely, deploy their carriers to the battle zone as well. In the simulations I have played along these lines, the allied defeat is usually even greater than historical when they play the "last stand at Java" variant. There is usually no escape for an even larger proportion of the allied fleet.

Churchills insistence on sending the ships to singas was a calculated risk, and a bad one in the finish, but there was no other alternative, realistically that I could see prior to 1941. Deployment into the NEI was not an option at that point because of Dutch attitudes to the japanese....It was really a case of either abandoning the far East, or trying the frighten the Japanese with a big stick. The bluff failed, miserably as it turned out, but no-one believed or anticviapted the total loss of ships at sea as actually happened. In this regard, British experiences had actually worked against them. Though they had the taranto experiences and the Bismarck affair to go by, in point of fact, up to that point no ship bigger than a light cruiser had been lost outright to airpower, and in situations where sea control was allied, or even disputed, the British had managed to get damaged ships out of trouble....aka the Illustrious exerience in January 1941. If Bismarck had been a British ship, she would have survived the aerial attack, because support ships would have been on hand to get her back to port....I am certain the same assumptions were being made by the british in their Far eastern calculations.....the trouble with this thinking of course was that the seas in the Far east at that point werent even disputed, they were completely controlled by the Japanese, though nobody on the allied side was prepared to concede that at that point, least of all Churchill and the Admiralty


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2011)

freebird said:


> No, I'm putting the blame for the Force z debacle squarely on his shoulders. It was his plan, and pushed forward over Admiralty objections.



So Adm Phillips' refusal to contact Singapore and seek air support after he knew Force Z had been spotted had nothing to do with the loss of PoW and Repulse?


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## Freebird (Jan 17, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> So Adm Phillips' refusal to contact Singapore and seek air support after he knew Force Z had been spotted had nothing to do with the loss of PoW and Repulse?



Yes, indeed, that was a major tactical mistake. Without a doubt, had he radioed for help (breaking strict orders for radio silence) as soon as they were spotted, the two ship would probably have survived. However the fact remains that the mission was a fool's errand in the first place. 



parsifal said:


> Hi FB
> Now your supposition that a withdrawal of Fce Z to Java would have made a big difference....well we will never know for sure....i'll concede that, but I have participated in so many simulations of that particular scenario, and it hardly ever turns out well for the allies. The basic mistake you are making in your calculations is that whereas the allies are permitted to make variations to their plans and force structure, the japanese are not.
> Whereas the Japanese are being strait jacketed into acting historically, the allies are given a free hand to react in the best way to the historical threat.



After they got the news about the Pearl Harbour attack, the ships should have been withdrawn.



> Churchills insistence on sending the ships to singas was a calculated risk, and a bad one in the finish, but there was no other alternative, realistically that I could see prior to 1941.



If they were determined to send Force Z, they should have at least had the Hermes with 18 SeaHurri (or even Fulmars) as escort.

What they should have done was to provide Malaya with a better balanced defence.

In any event, I don't want to drag this thread offTop with a long debate about Singapore, so I'll post on the other thread. better to reply to me there. 8)

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...rcraft-singapore-make-difference-25590-2.html


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## ivanotter (Jan 22, 2011)

Here is a slightly different take on the french 1940 campaign.

According to Len Deighton (Blitzkrieg), the Germans *lost* the French campaign.

The entire concept was intended to destroy (as in gone) BEF and the french army.

It was not accomplished despite tactical victory. BEF and a good part of the french army sailed away to fight another day. A strategic defeat.

It is of course possible to speculate about the outcome if Germany had managed to trap the entire BEF, No evacuation, etc. 300,000+ troops as POW's, etc. Would Churchill's government have fallen? suing for peace? 

I think we must distinguish between strategic and tactical issues. 

Ivan


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## Glider (Jan 22, 2011)

Freebird
The only suggestion I would make is that once they heard the news re Pearl Harbour they should have been sent to join the US fleet. They would have been of assistance if only as additional escorts to the US carriers until the USA could get their fleet back together again.
Both ships were pretty fast and despite the headline top speeds being slower than the US Carriers, their cruising speeds would have been similar. If nothing else they would have taken some of the heat out of the attacks by the Japanese aircraft..


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## Freebird (Jan 22, 2011)

Glider said:


> Freebird
> The only suggestion I would make is that once they heard the news re Pearl Harbour they should have been sent to join the US fleet. They would have been of assistance if only as additional escorts to the US carriers until the USA could get their fleet back together again.
> Both ships were pretty fast and despite the headline top speeds being slower than the US Carriers, their cruising speeds would have been similar. If nothing else they would have taken some of the heat out of the attacks by the Japanese aircraft..



Indeed, that was my thought too.
Or send the PoW to the Med to replace the Queen E. that knocked would be out of action for 18 months by the Italian frogmen.

There is no doubt that the loss of 3 battleships in Nov/Dec (with 2 more crippled) prompted the British to rush the Anson Howe into service. The Allies would have been better served if the British had concentrated instead on finishing the Implacables ASAP


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