# Could the B-36 been ready by 1945?



## Golladay (Mar 6, 2009)

I have recently finish Stuart Slade's "The Big One," in which 3,000 B-36s destroy Nazi Germany under a hail of over 200 nuclear bombs.

Now I'll admit the design specs were issued in 1941. But I am not so certain the delays in testing the air frame were the real cause for it not getting a prototype flying by 1943 as Mr. Slade claims and more to do with the fact the Pratt Whitney R-4360 Wasp Major radial piston engines were a pain in the arse to get working properly.

IIRC the engines to be used with the B-36 suffered from oil leakage, overheating, and catastrophic fires. These problems weren't fixed till after the war.

So is it even remotely possible by throwing resources at the problem, to get the B-36 operational by 1945.

Even without nukes, a B-36 dropping 72,000 to 80,000 pounds of bombs is not something to laugh at.


----------



## evangilder (Mar 6, 2009)

3000 B-36s dropping over 200 nuclear bombs? That is really far fetched for me. I highly doubt that the B-36 could have been ready before the war's end due to the teething problems. Even if they had resolved them, I don't think they could have churned out 3,000 of them. 200 nuclear bombs would have not been possible at the time either. The Manhattan project was about as accelerated as it could be just to get the first two over Japan when they did.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2009)

There were a lot of other internal systems that had to go through a maturing synthesis for the size of the aircraft, and experience gained during WW2 was part of that. Hydraulic systems, brakes, defensive armament, pressurization systems, and as stated, propulsion had to all come together to make this design successful and even with trial and error experience gained during WW2. The technology was there in the mid 40s, it needed to be fined tuned. I doubt we would could of seen the B-36 in its combat ready form any earlier.


----------



## syscom3 (Mar 6, 2009)

I will agree with Evans.

Producing that many nukes in such a short time was "impossible".

Now its possible (very, very remotely) a few hundred B36's could have been produced by the end of 1945, but that would have been at the cost of producing the B29.


----------



## fly boy (Mar 6, 2009)

Golladay said:


> I have recently finish Stuart Slade's "The Big One," in which 3,000 B-36s destroy Nazi Germany under a hail of over 200 nuclear bombs.



that would destory the whole area 200 nukes set off around germany the rads from all of that would have killed a lot of us too


----------



## timshatz (Mar 6, 2009)

fly boy said:


> the rads from all of that would have killed a lot of us too



Probably not. The prevaling winds go east, towards the Soviet Union. Not good news for them. On top of that, the downwind contamination wasn't as great on the early nukes, dirty though they were, as on the later, thermonukes. 

Especially if they were air bursts, which Hiroshima and Nagasaki were.


----------



## SoD Stitch (Mar 6, 2009)

IMHO, it would've meant diverting all of the resources that were being used to construct the B-29 instead to build the B-36; I doubt the B-36 would've been done by the end of the War. In fact, it's entirely possible that by NOT building the B-29, and building the B-36 instead, that we would not have had the capability of dropping an A-bomb on Japan until 1946, thereby lengthening the War and, possibly, having to undertake a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands in late '45. I think we chose the correct course of action by going ahead with the B-29, and putting the B-36 on the "back burner" until the late '40's.


----------



## Golladay (Mar 6, 2009)

evangilder said:


> 3000 B-36s dropping over 200 nuclear bombs? That is really far fetched for me. I highly doubt that the B-36 could have been ready before the war's end due to the teething problems. Even if they had resolved them, I don't think they could have churned out 3,000 of them. 200 nuclear bombs would have not been possible at the time either. The Manhattan project was about as accelerated as it could be just to get the first two over Japan when they did.



The B-36 I can not really comment on as I can not find a full technical and development history for the the Pratt Whitney R-4360 Wasp Major radial piston engines.

The Bomb production, however, according the Stuart the U.S. was just starting to ramp up to building 10 bombs a month when the war ended and thus decided to shut the production down and redo the entire line, thus resuming in 1947.

In the "Big One" the U.S. doesn't shut down the line, so that by 1947 it has over 200 nuclear bombs to drop on Germany.

Not really knowing about Oak Ridges production stats I can not determine whether he was telling the truth.


----------



## davparlr (Mar 6, 2009)

I think that, with top priority given in 1941, it would have been available for WWII. Priority was significantly reduced when it was switched to the B-32 with the capture of the Marianas in the Pacific. The question is how much more effective it would have been in Europe. Probably not much since the B-29 was never scheduled for Europe. Also, it presences might have spurred Germany to accerate the fighter version of the Me-262, which would have been a major threat to the B-36. However, the Me-262 would be flying at close to their ceiling, whereas defensive fighters, the P-47M/Ns, would have altitude advantage to use in defense. The Ta-152 would also have been a threat, but much less so since, although they would have the high ground, would have to fight off a beehive of faster P-47M/Ns at this altitude.

I doubt if an earlier introduction of the B-36 would have had any significant impact on WWII.


----------



## evangilder (Mar 6, 2009)

It's hard to imagine the war in Europe dragging out 2 more years than it did.


----------



## Golladay (Mar 6, 2009)

SoD Stitch said:


> IMHO, it would've meant diverting all of the resources that were being used to construct the B-29 instead to build the B-36; I doubt the B-36 would've been done by the end of the War. In fact, it's entirely possible that by NOT building the B-29, and building the B-36 instead, *that we would not have had the capability of dropping an A-bomb on Japan until 1946, thereby lengthening the War *



A myth that refuses to die.

There would have been no invasion of Japan. It is an Island nation that has to import all its raw materials and most of its food.

By 1944 with the seizure of the Marianna Islands we had won. Submarines could now stop all oil shipments to the Home Islands and mine the harbors, as well as prevent any meaningful resupply or recovery of IJA forces in China. 

There was no need to send bombers over Japan or take Iwo Jima, the Philippines, Okinawa, or even Ie Shima. Naval power could have and did roam at will around the Home Islands blasting the crap out of the main Japanese population areas.

Japan either would have starved to death or surrender. The Bomber Barons wanted their air campaign to validate their ideals of war so that continued and they needed the Marines to seize Iwo Jima.

MacArthur wanted the Philippines and wanted more glory so he pushed for an invasion of Japan. The Navy was pretty much winning the argument against invasion when the A-Bomb showed up and clinched it.


----------



## Golladay (Mar 6, 2009)

evangilder said:


> It's hard to imagine the war in Europe dragging out 2 more years than it did.



Well according to the book Halifax seized power and allowed the Germans to put bases on Britain and didn't notice the Germans were placing Tanks on said bases  

In 1942 the Germans take over Britain, the Royal Navy sails to Canada, Hitler declares war on the U.S. to get the Royal Navy back.

America deploys an Army to the Soviet Union which is now under the rule of Zhukov and known as Russia.

The fighting is inconclusive so the U.S. decides to sentence roughly 1.5 million American Servicemen to death in order to deceive the Germans into thinking the War is a low altitude war.

In 1945 they launch a B-29 raid that is a disaster, but gets valuable radar pictures(?), and decides instead of using nukes as they roll off the assembly line or build lots of tactical airpower to simply overwhelm German Air Defenses, they are going to build large numbers of B-36Ds and Es, stockpile over 200 nukes and release them in a big blow.

To help out the Illusion, they spam Essex Carriers and CVEs and raid Europe to keep the Germans concentrated on low altitude combat.

When the B-36s finally arrive in 1947 with six turning and four burning, very few are intercepted and according to Mr. Slade even the Ta-152H proves unable to make the intercept of a B-36.

The story is horribly written and you'll be doing this  most of the time, but unless you are into nuke porn it is pure trash.


----------



## syscom3 (Mar 6, 2009)

Golladay said:


> ......The Bomb production, however, according the Stuart the U.S. was just starting to ramp up to building 10 bombs a month when the war ended and thus decided to shut the production down and redo the entire line, thus resuming in 1947....QUOTE]
> 
> Source please. 10 bombs a month was out of the realm of possibilies untill the end of the 40's. Maybe 10 per year, but not 10 per month.


----------



## syscom3 (Mar 6, 2009)

Golladay said:


> A myth that refuses to die.
> 
> There would have been no invasion of Japan. It is an Island nation that has to import all its raw materials and most of its food.
> 
> ...




Interesting view of history you have there.

Most of the mining of Japan was done by B29's. And it was B29's that burned the urban core out of Japan.

Untill Okinawa was taken, any naval attacks on Japan would have been infrequent, not sustained and small in tonnage delivered.

Japan was not going to be knocked out of the war by blockading, but by invasion or the transportation bombing campaign planned for Sept 1945.

In the end victory was achieved by the navy stopping the flow of war material to Japan and the B29's shattering its infrastructure.


----------



## timshatz (Mar 6, 2009)

Golladay, while I agree the Japanese had essentially lost the war after the taking of the Marianas, it does not mean the actions of the Allied forces after that were based in self interest. The same arguement could've been made about Imperial Germany after the Von Schlieffen Plan failed in September of 1914. But the thing had to be played out. Same with the Japanese and the Pacific War.

The US military fought the war based on War Plan Orange. The only two points to the plan that weren't at least considered were the Kamikaze and the Atom Bomb. Beyond that, the war went, more or less, to plan. The end game of that plan was the Invasion of Japan. For all concerned, it is a good thing that invasion never happened.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2009)

Golladay said:


> There was no need to send bombers over Japan or take Iwo Jima, the Philippines, Okinawa, or even Ie Shima. Naval power could have and did roam at will around the Home Islands blasting the crap out of the main Japanese population areas.


There were elements of the Japanese war machine that could not be reached by naval power alone and the DUAL effort was a necessity. Despite the naval blockades the starvation of Japan would have taken at least another year and there was still leadership within the Japanese military who will not willing to surrender, no matter what - until they saw that mushroom cloud and their emperor told them to finally surrender.

David Jablownski's book "Wings of Fire" documents the members of the Japanese military who wanted to continue to fight no matter what.


----------



## timshatz (Mar 6, 2009)

Other good books on the end of the Pacific War:
"Retribution" by Max Hastings
"Tenozan" 
"Downfall" by Richard B Franks

Those are three of the best offhand. There are hundreds of books. Some good, some pretty bad. But the backround and details found in those books gives a very good idea of the end of the Pacific War. It is utterly amazing to me, after reading about it for 30 years, that is did not end in the same orgy of blood and fire that signified the end of the Third Riech.


----------



## JoeB (Mar 6, 2009)

Golladay said:


> A myth that refuses to die.
> 
> 1. There would have been no invasion of Japan. It is an Island nation that has to import all its raw materials and most of its food.
> 
> ...


That's the overblown argument seen on web boards so often that refuses to die.  

1. One way or another Japan would have lost, that much is true. And starved within perhaps a year after the summer of '45.

2. But here's where it gets overblown. 
a correct but didn't mean absolute defeat
b wrong, subs didn't mine Japanese harbors, the massive mining campaign against Japan in 1945 was mainly by B-29's. Sub use of mines was always limited by the sub's own vulnerability to defensive mines in any water shallow enough for its own mines to be effective. US subs conducted a relative handful of minelaying patrols 
c. wrong for similar reason, the main sea link from Japan to Asian mainland (for coal and food imports, resupply of the Army in China) was via the Sea of Japan to Korean ports, behind defensive minefields mainly safe from US subs, with exceptions of a few high risk patrols in 1943, discontinued because of losses, and then again from June *45* when mine detecting sonars became available. The Sea of Japan links were only seriousl stressed by summer '45 mainly by B-29 mining plus direct aerial attack (USAAF/USN) by a/c based in Philippines and Okinawa.

3. US carrier task forces didn't attack Japan directly until Feb '45, and carrier raids v Japan had limited impact. Subs had a much bigger impact, though they weren't what mainly cut off Japan from *food*.

4. There was a legitimate moral obligation of the US as colonial power to free the Philippines ASAP, besides any personal reasons by MacArthur.

The big factor left out, as often, is the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and Korea in August '45. That and the A-bombs were what made Japan's prospects hopeless enough for there to be a surrender (though as mentioned, there was a near coup to prevent it even then). Up to then they had a slim hope to somehow maintain sea links across the Sea of Japan to feed the country and hunker down until the Americans tired of the whole thing, though the hope was fading (again mainly from air attacks cutting off Korea from Japan). Those two events snuffed out that hope completely: the Americans might literally exterminate the country with the new weapon, and anyway with Manchuria/Korea in Soviet hands Japan was, for the first time, truly isolated and surely destined for large scale starvation. Those were new events in the summer of '45. The Mariana's defeat pointed in that direction, but the war would have gone on far longer if the US had stopped seizing actual territory after summer '44; quite possibly ending with the Soviets occupying Japan.

Joe


----------



## Golladay (Mar 6, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> There were elements of the Japanese war machine that could not be reached by naval power alone and the DUAL effort was a necessity.



Perhaps, however, once the Navy Surface Fleet began raiding, there was nothing the Japanese could do to stop them as their surface fleet was sunk or out of fuel. The USN was more than capable of replenishing at sea, and had figured out how to combat the Kamikazes. 


> Despite the naval blockades the starvation of Japan would have taken at least another year



They were already starving as we just about blew every rail junction and rolling stock to hell.



> and there was still leadership within the Japanese military who will not willing to surrender, no matter what - until they saw that mushroom cloud and their emperor told them to finally surrender.



Mainly because of that stupid unconditional surrender policy. The Japanese offered a few times, quite reasonable terms for their surrender. They should have been accepted and Japan anchored in the Kuriles could then be used as a buffer and Ally against Stalin.

Hell if I had run the war these are the terms I would have given. 

1. All fighting to cease.

2. Japanese forces to withdraw to Home Islands.

3. Kingdom of Korea to be reestablished. (The Crown Prince of Korea was in Hiroshima, that is until we killed him.)

4. Japan to renounce the claim on the mandates awarded by the League of Nations.

5. The Generals are to atone for their failure(ie: commit suicide)

6. The Emperor is to ascend to Heaven(ie: commit suicide, no sense letting him get away with his crimes.)

7. The Crown Prince will ascend to the Throne under the Regency of General MacArthur.

8. Resumption of trade.

With these terms, I can mitigate quite a few damn problems, such as Korea, Soviet stepping stones into Japan, while giving the U.S. choke points against the Soviet Union.


----------



## timshatz (Mar 6, 2009)

The Japanese offered the Allies terms in July of 1945 (I am not making this up) in response to their "Unconditional Surrender". Their terms were:

1. Emperor stays on the thrown
2. No occupation of the home islands
3. Japanese troops come home from other lands in Japanese hulled ships (that is the one that amazes me because there weren't that many left)
4. Japan has it's own war trials. 

The Allies refused these terms out of hand. They had seen Imperial Germany do the same thing in 1918 and were not about to have the war start again in 1965 due to a screwball peace treaty. They did counter with allowing the Emperor to stay on the throne. But the rest of it wasn't going to happen.

Which brings up an interesting point about the Allies. I'm of the opinion that the Unconditional Surrender aspect was intentional to keep the coalition together. There can be no doubt the enemy has lost when he surrenders unconditionally. But when there is an Armistice (WW1, First Gulf War, Korea, ect) you get a situation where the war really doesn't end. And the coaltion that started out usually folds due to political pressures. 

It may've been that Roosevelt had that in his mind when he said that at Casablance. Probably spent a couple of days listening to political haggling, realized this could be a real threat to the success of the whole project and set the terms for the final success.


----------



## davebender (Mar 6, 2009)

If Axis forces remain in control of Petasmo (Finland) then there will be plenty of nickel for the production of high temperature steel. That should accelerate German jet engine production by at least a year. Turbochargers for piston engines also.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2009)

Golladay said:


> Perhaps, however, once the Navy Surface Fleet began raiding, there was nothing the Japanese could do to stop them as their surface fleet was sunk or out of fuel. The USN was more than capable of replenishing at sea, and had figured out how to combat the Kamikazes.


But what about operations inland?


Golladay said:


> They were already starving as we just about blew every rail junction and rolling stock to hell.


By July 1945 they still had a million man army as well as 8,000 combat aircraft, mind you not all full MC, but they were there and were still puttin up a fight.




Golladay said:


> Mainly because of that stupid unconditional surrender policy.


It had nothing to do with the surrender terms.

BushidÅ - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


----------



## Golladay (Mar 6, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> Source please. 10 bombs a month was out of the realm of possibilies untill the end of the 40's. Maybe 10 per year, but not 10 per month.



Its Stuart's claim not mine, in any case he claimed on his FAQ before it disappeared that America OTL discontinued its production after the war to redesign it production facilities. Without doing that, several planned and building reactors would have been built and completed, boosting production to ten bombs a month. 

I have no clue if that is even true as Stuart Slade rarely cites anything and responds to queries with silence or strawmans.

Despite that, I can confirm he is a licensed engineer and employed by the U.S. Military as a defense contractor.

Take it for what it is worth. Though the orignal intent of this thread was to focus on the B-36 development problems.

"Sigh" Well too late to get this back on track.


----------



## delcyros (Mar 6, 2009)

timshatz said:


> It may've been that Roosevelt had that in his mind when he said that at Casablance. Probably spent a couple of days listening to political haggling, realized this could be a real threat to the success of the whole project and set the terms for the final success.



Possible. But the "unconditional surrender" was one of the larger stupidities made by Roosevelt Churchill. The concept that an opposing nation (wheter nazi or not was considered equal!) was not anymore considered as a negotiating partner ignored the existence of those Germans who were opposed to the Nazi regime (Rommel, Stauffenberg) and hence also the possibility of a political peace of Germany which had rid itselfe of the nazis. It effectively deleted most anti-nazi opposition in Germany when opposition begun to increase significantly. Goebbels found it easy to exploit this blunder. Most soldiers and officers who didn´t liked the nazi leadership were driven into them in order to defend the future population as Goebbels told them. A conditional surrender would most likely have shortened the war by half a year with the nazi routed by increasing military and social opposition to Hitler and the nazi party.
A lot of lives on both sides of the Atlantic would have been saved.


----------



## Golladay (Mar 6, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> But what about operations inland?



I assume you mean Home Islands? In which case Naval Air Power can certainly go inland and attack targets of opportunity. 



> By July 1945 they still had a million man army as well as 8,000 combat aircraft, mind you not all full MC, but they were there and were still puttin up a fight.



Mostly in China, the Chinese were starting to win the battles at this point and said million man army in China was cut off from retreat. China's problem, not ours. Cold, but I am a cold blooded strategist.

As for the Aircraft, they were mostly grounded due to a lack of AvGas. Rotating patrols and picket lines of Destroyers and Frigates will mitigate the kamikaze threat.



> It had nothing to do with the surrender terms.
> 
> BushidÅ - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


[/QUOTE]

 

What did you think my surrender terms did. It required no admittance of wrong doing, and no subjugation. This overlooks the fact that the Japanese were trying to surrender.

Key to working with the Japanese Militarist is not to use the word Surrender, that is what I did, I offered peace, not a surrender proposal. It also gives me access to the remaining Japanese Military which I can use against the Soviets should it come down to it.


----------



## JoeB (Mar 6, 2009)

timshatz said:


> The Allies refused these terms out of hand. They had seen Imperial Germany do the same thing in 1918 and were not about to have the war start again in 1965 due to a screwball peace treaty.


Excellent point, based on the then recent example of WWI leads to WWII in Europe, offering terms to Japan looks like a very bad deal. 

And the people saying that post Mariana's conquests weren't necessary are reallying trying to have it both ways. They say Japan was [totally] defeatable by a very distant blockade (1500 miles for Mariana's to Japan) and non-Iwo Jima supported B-29 operations (but some mining by B-29's absolutely required Iwo as staging base, Iwo was a 'nice to have' for missions against the Tokyo area, but required to reach some other places). But then they talk about offering Japan terms. In fact a US reluctance to press forward from the Marianas would have made Japan all the less likely to accept terms, as well as delaying total defeat by perhaps years if that course was pursued instead (without nuking), depending a lot when the Soviets decided to take over Manchuria, Korea and possibly Japan. The Japanese were absolutely not ready to accept terms, any ones the US could also accept, in summer '44, had just decided their own govt wasn't doing a good job handling the war (fall of the Tojo cabinet). Germany accepted terms in 1918 with Allied armies closing in on its borders over land.

As for Korea, whether or not that's a major factor I don't know, but there would have been no 'Kingdom of Korea' with a 1918 style settlement with Japan, but a DPRK on the whole peninsula, within a few years anyway.

Joe


----------



## syscom3 (Mar 6, 2009)

> I have no clue if that is even true as Stuart Slade rarely cites anything and responds to queries with silence or strawmans.



I think we can ignore his claims then.


----------



## timshatz (Mar 6, 2009)

delcyros said:


> Possible. But the "unconditional surrender" was one of the larger stupidities made by Roosevelt Churchill. The concept that an opposing nation (wheter nazi or not was considered equal!) was not anymore considered as a negotiating partner ignored the existence of those Germans who were opposed to the Nazi regime (Rommel, Stauffenberg) and hence also the possibility of a political peace of Germany which had rid itselfe of the nazis. It effectively deleted most anti-nazi opposition in Germany when opposition begun to increase significantly. Goebbels found it easy to exploit this blunder. Most soldiers and officers who didn´t liked the nazi leadership were driven into them in order to defend the future population as Goebbels told them. A conditional surrender would most likely have shortened the war by half a year with the nazi routed by increasing military and social opposition to Hitler and the nazi party.
> A lot of lives on both sides of the Atlantic would have been saved.



Delc, I'm not sure the Allies would've accepted anything but and unconditional surrender (or something very similar). In this point, I think the problem is less the Western Allies willingness to accept a new government than the Soviet desire to see an end to what it viewed as a threat to it's existence. While the Western Allies might've stopped to talk, the Soviets wouldn't. After losing millions and being invaded, doubtless they saw a Nazi as a German and a German as a Nazi. In short, what's the difference. 

I agree that Unconditional Surrender was a gift to Goebbels and he exploited it totally. Further, any potential contact for a negotiated peace was crushed by this declaration. But I don't believe the Allies would've stopped fighting or accepted a negotiated settlement if it destroyed the coalition of nations fighting the Nazis. And to stop fighting would've played to the very paranoia inflicting Stalin. He would've seen the Western Allies in league (defacto rightly or wrongly) with Nazi Germany. Unconditional Surrender might've been part of a sop to Stalin for not getting the Second Front going in 1943. 

Actually, the more you think about it, it does create an interesting alternative history for WW2 in Europe. What if Hitler is murdered and the Nazi regime overthrown in 1943, before the battle of Kursk? Maybe a bomb in Hitler's plane kills him. What if a negotiated settlement is accepted by the Western Allies, but not the Soviets? 

Far fetched, but an interesting thought.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2009)

Golladay said:


> I assume you mean Home Islands? In which case Naval Air Power can certainly go inland and attack targets of opportunity.


Not to the extent necessary to cripple the Japanese war machine, and the B-29 did that quite well. 



Golladay said:


> Mostly in China, the Chinese were starting to win the battles at this point and said million man army in China was cut off from retreat. China's problem, not ours. Cold, but I am a cold blooded strategist.


Your opinion and history dictated otherwise


Golladay said:


> As for the Aircraft, they were mostly grounded due to a lack of AvGas. Rotating patrols and picket lines of Destroyers and Frigates will mitigate the kamikaze threat.


Again, quite wrong. There were plenty of intercepts and shoot downs of American aircraft up till August 1945 - we have chapters of recorded actions by the Japanese shooting down P-51s and B-29. Although diminished, the Japanese were still able to field a fighting force 



Golladay said:


> What did you think my surrender terms did. It required no admittance of wrong doing, and no subjugation. This overlooks the fact that the Japanese were trying to surrender.


"Your" surrender terms - hypothetical and you're assuming that the Japanese military wouldn't of seen through that.


Golladay said:


> Key to working with the Japanese Militarist is not to use the word Surrender, that is what I did, I offered peace, not a surrender proposal. It also gives me access to the remaining Japanese Military which I can use against the Soviets should it come down to it.


Again, you're talking hypothetical, I'm not.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2009)

delcyros said:


> Possible. But the "unconditional surrender" was one of the larger stupidities made by Roosevelt Churchill. The concept that an opposing nation (wheter nazi or not was considered equal!) was not anymore considered as a negotiating partner ignored the existence of those Germans who were opposed to the Nazi regime (Rommel, Stauffenberg) and hence also the possibility of a political peace of Germany which had rid itselfe of the nazis. It effectively deleted most anti-nazi opposition in Germany when opposition begun to increase significantly. Goebbels found it easy to exploit this blunder. Most soldiers and officers who didn´t liked the nazi leadership were driven into them in order to defend the future population as Goebbels told them. A conditional surrender would most likely have shortened the war by half a year with the nazi routed by increasing military and social opposition to Hitler and the nazi party.
> A lot of lives on both sides of the Atlantic would have been saved.



Could you guarantee that most officers would of accepted a conditional surrender? Hindsight is 20/20 and if I was Churchill or Roosevelt I would not have wanted to take that chance.

As far as the other side of the world - The Japanese would not of accepted a conditional surrender.


----------



## delcyros (Mar 7, 2009)

German officers would lay down their arms, as they did historically if ordered to do so. It´s not even necessary to negotiate a deal. The prospect alone would have lead to much increased innerparty differences along with opposition in within the upper and middle military leadership (think of Galland vs Goering, f.e.). There would be less effective concentration of german defensive efforts, a weakening of command structure by inner fightings and finally even the ordinary soldier would not fight laconically like they did historically. That would have shortened the war by a good margin even without a deal.
The Casablanca requirements furtherly stalled all bomber command hopes to win the war with air power alone. Area bombing against population centres does ONLY work if the prospet for negotiations is kept open (e.g. France, Belgium, Netherlands in 1940) it does work NEVER if negotiations are not considered and then even hardens the defenders willpower.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 7, 2009)

delcyros said:


> German officers would lay down their arms, as they did historically if ordered to do so.


I think we know that many would have, but the few that would of kept fighting were the ones on the minds of the allied leaders IMO. There was an insurgency after WW2, perhaps the unconditional surrender strengthened it but I believe it was planned prior to the surrender.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 8, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I think we know that many would have, but the few that would of kept fighting were the ones on the minds of the allied leaders IMO. There was an insurgency after WW2, perhaps the unconditional surrender strengthened it but I believe it was planned prior to the surrender.



The SS would be the ones that would not lay down their arms. These hardliners would certainly continue to fight.

The majority of the Wehrmacht would have obeyed and the average German soldier (we all know about the discipline standards in the German military) would have obeyed the officers as well.

I do however agree that a conditional surrender was not an option. Not with everything that happened in WW2. The tens of millions of victims alone make this impossible.


----------



## timshatz (Mar 8, 2009)

Guys, I don't think the Wermacht was in the position to dictate the terms of the surrender. As the Israeli's are fond of saying, when the Fox is chasing the Rabitt, it is not up to the Rabitt to call a time out. By early 1943, the option to dictate terms to anyone was questionable at best. By early 1944 it was futile. And in 1942, it just wasn't going to happen. 

The problem was not the Western Allies. You can always get a democracy talking. The problem was the Soviets/Russians. They weren't going to quit. Totalitiarian states don't care what the people think. 27 million dead for the Soviets and they kept fighting to the collapse in of the Nazis. Those kind of losses were inconcievable for a western nation. 

When the Nazi's attacked the Soviet Union, it was a fight to the death. Neither one would negotiate if they got a position of strength, only weakness (that one is straight out of Mao's Little Red Book but it is relevant to the Nazis and Soviets). 

When it came to the ground war, in a sense, the Western Allies (who the Germans might've negotiated with if the Nazis were overthrown) were along for the ride.


----------



## syscom3 (Mar 9, 2009)

As for the B36, there were some serious teething problems that had to be identified and fixed during actual flight testing.

Regardless of how many resources the AAF could have thrown at an accelerated flight program, it would take time to uncover them all.

I maintain that the B36 would never be operational in 1945.

Sometimes, you just cant push technology any faster than it historically unfolded.


----------



## davebender (Mar 9, 2009)

That works both ways. You can make a deal with Stalin that cannot be made with the USA. Like splitting Poland down the middle during August 1939. Or offering Greece to Russia during August 1944 as an incentive to make peace.


----------



## timshatz (Mar 9, 2009)

davebender said:


> That works both ways. You can make a deal with Stalin that cannot be made with the USA. Like splitting Poland down the middle during August 1939. Or offering Greece to Russia during August 1944 as an incentive to make peace.



I'm with you on the totalitarian states carving up Poland. They saw an opportunity and they took it. 

But I have a lot of trouble believing Stalin would stop the Red Army, when it was on the offensive and driving into Germany, if the Nazis offered him Greece? He keeps going and he gets all of Eastern Europe (almost Greece as well) and rids himself of his greatest threat (Hitler and the Nazis). 

Can't see it.


----------



## davebender (Mar 9, 2009)

He might prior to June 1944. After Operation Bagration Germany doesn't have much left to bargain with.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 9, 2009)

And even if the B-36 came around in 1945 (drumroll) WHERE IS IT GOING TO TAKE OFF AND LAND FROM!!!!!


----------



## syscom3 (Mar 9, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And even if the B-36 came around in 1945 (drumroll) WHERE IS IT GOING TO TAKE OFF AND LAND FROM!!!!!



Good point. The first generation B36's had such a heavy foorprint, no airfields had taxiways and runways strong enough to support them.


----------



## johnbr (Mar 10, 2009)

And it was also underpowered when they killed the Lycoming XR-7755. What it need was the Northrop Turbodyne.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 10, 2009)

The R-7755 would have put out about 700 HP more than the 4360. It would have helped but probably not made a big difference.


----------



## renrich (Mar 10, 2009)

Tim, I don't think your scenario of an overthrow of Hitler and an armistice with US and Britain and the Soviets continuing the war is that far fetched. Unless I am mistaken it was FDR who insisted on unconditional surrender and that Churchill would have accepted some type of terms with a non Hitler led Germany. Remember, Britain was beginning to scrape the bottom of the manpower barrel and the trench warfare of WW1 was a recurring nightmare to them. I believe that Del is correct that if the German High Command had thought that terms other than unconditional surrender had been available, a concerted and probably successful effort to overthrow Hitler would have taken place.


----------



## timshatz (Mar 10, 2009)

Ren, agreed. It is possible. The problem with the scenario is that it doesn't end the war, it just reshuffles the deck. At best. 

At that point, the SU will doubtless see the Western Allies as traitors and possible enemies. I would assume the terms of such a peace would be the German Armies returning to German soil. That means France and the Low Countries are defacto liberated. 

Is it the end of Lend Lease to the Soviets? I don't see the Western Allies joining Germany against the SU but would they give passive support if Germany (and this is stretching it but what the hell) suddenly becomes a democracy and is asking for help in fighting the SU (doubt it but the question would come up)? Would they extend Lend Lease to Germany? Would they allow the shipment and receiving of warstuffs to Germany through Baltic Ports? Through other European ports? 

What about Eastern Europe? What about the Poles? They were the ones this whole thing started out over. Do the Germans leave Poland? If so, the SU would move in right away. Hungry and Rummania, what about them? 

I'm getting a headache.

In a way, "Unconditional Surrender" made life a lot simpler.


----------



## Demetrious (Mar 10, 2009)

Golladay said:


> A myth that refuses to die.
> 
> There would have been no invasion of Japan. It is an Island nation that has to import all its raw materials and most of its food.



I haven't read the entire thread, so forgive me if I echo somebody else, but you are correct in saying that Japan would have been starved out quite effectively. Not by submarines, however- by B-29s mining the waters of Japan from the air. The aerial mine-laying operation, in the last months of the war, destroyed something like 90% of all Japanese merchant shipping in an incredibly brief amount of time. It was just barely behind the atom bomb in effectiveness at ending the war.

EDIT: I see I DID echo somebody else, but I'll add that the problem with relying on the starvation technique would likely have- because of the influence of the hardliners in the Japanese Army- resulted in something like near genocide. The possibility of the entire island starving before it surrendered was quite real.


----------



## renrich (Mar 10, 2009)

I think that a scenario like we are discussing would require a complete change of attitude by FDR. His concern about communism and the SU was not nearly as great as Churchill's. If FDR had changed, a negotiated settlement would have to at least have included Germany having to retreat from all it's conquests along with reparations and would probably have left a confrontation between the SU and the US and Britain which was what happened anyway. Does make one's head spin with all the ramifications.


----------



## Graeme (Mar 10, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> Sometimes, you just cant push technology any faster than it historically unfolded.



That's the way I see it. Even the basic question of the layout and the number of powerplants wasn't finally resolved by Convair until *late November 1941*. Up until then it was this...







FLYBOYJ said:


> And even if the B-36 came around in 1945 (drumroll) WHERE IS IT GOING TO TAKE OFF AND LAND FROM!!!!!



I've read that even in the USA there were only three runways capable of supporting it (22 inch thick concrete) but no names were mentioned. Fort Worth would be one? And the other two?


----------



## drgondog (Mar 10, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> As for the B36, there were some serious teething problems that had to be identified and fixed during actual flight testing.
> 
> Regardless of how many resources the AAF could have thrown at an accelerated flight program, it would take time to uncover them all.
> 
> ...



I've researched it in past lives and agree your points. 

Although the 4360 didn't even bench test until 1944, there were other problems that needed to be solved in the combined system integration. It had a priority and the first prototype flew about when it was possible to do so given the gestation problems of the XB-36.

In my opinion it would have reached initial stages of production in early 1946 and been delivered with a lot of basic change orders stacking up. 

Also - I am not sure that the B-36A/B (or B-35) could have reached design operational altitudes >40K with a 10,000 pound A-Bomb and still make 8,000 miles in 1946 on a reliable basis for operations. 

Arguably, perhaps only one in 5 have to get through on a 1 way trip so this isn't a big concern in a death struggle.

Last, but not least - why assume that Germans don't have great (and extended) air defense capabilities west of UK if unmolested by US and RAF in 1943/1944 over Europe... or nuclear capability via surface launched V1 (large scale) combined with type 400 like sub development.

BS suppositions from my persepctive.


----------



## Bill G. (Mar 10, 2009)

Graeme said:


> I've read that even in the USA there were only three runways capable of supporting it (22 inch thick concrete) but no names were mentioned. Fort Worth would be one? And the other two?



You are correct. The early B-36's had a single wheel main landing gear. The three bases were Fort Worth, Eglin AFB Florida, and Travis AFB California.

Here is a picture of me (6' 4") standing next to a single wheel landing gear at the Air Force Museum. 

Bill G.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 10, 2009)

Don't forget Lindberg Field in San Diego


----------



## Bill G. (Mar 10, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Don't forget Lindberg Field in San Diego



What I typed is from the book, "Convair B-36 Peacemaker, A Photo Chronicle" by Meyers K. Jacobsen. The data was found on page 17.

There were other fields that could handle the B-36 in an emergency. Many other fields became safe with the four wheel main landing gear.

Bill G.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 10, 2009)

The XC-99 was flown out of Lindberg so I would think it could handle a B-36


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rtVzztv0Hw_


----------



## Bill G. (Mar 10, 2009)

Maybe it could???

The XC-99 started with the single wheel main gear, but was modified so it too had the four wheel main landing gear.

The book shows the first flight from Lindberg Field in a picture. I don't know if Lindberg Field could handle the XC-99 at maximum weight.

The only XC-99 is now at the National Museum of the Air Force in Dayton, Ohio being restored for display. It will take many years to be ready to display. The problem is where will they put it? The three large hangers are full. And after all the time and money to restore the XC-99, it would be a shame to just put it back out in the weather again.

Bill G.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 10, 2009)

Let's hope some benefactor springs for another hangar!


----------



## syscom3 (Mar 10, 2009)

There's also the issue of training the pilots. The B29 was far simpler compared to the B36, and that program couldn't even get aircraft and personnel trained to minimum standards until early 1944. 

And this scenario is going to have bombers this big and complex available in mass production *WITH* trained aircrews and ground support in 1945?


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 10, 2009)

B-29 Cockpit





B-36 Cockpit






B-29 Flight engineer station






B-36 Flight Engineer's station (1/3 view)


----------



## davparlr (Mar 10, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> As for the B36, there were some serious teething problems that had to be identified and fixed during actual flight testing.
> 
> Regardless of how many resources the AAF could have thrown at an accelerated flight program, it would take time to uncover them all.
> 
> ...



I don't agree. Technically, other than size, the B-36 was no more advanced than the B-29, and size engineering was well understood by this time. While it required engine development with the associated problems, the B-36 engine did not seem to have significantly more problems than the B-29 engines, maybe less. The B-29 prototype was ordered Sep 40, the B-36, Nov 41. First flight of the B-29 was Sep 41. If the B-36 had been given the equivalent of priority as the B-29, it is not unreasonable for it to fly early 43. Combat ops in late spring, early summer 45 also is not be unreasonable.


----------



## davparlr (Mar 10, 2009)

drgondog said:


> I've researched it in past lives and agree your points.
> 
> Although the 4360 didn't even bench test until 1944, there were other problems that needed to be solved in the combined system integration. It had a priority and the first prototype flew about when it was possible to do so given the gestation problems of the XB-36.



I have sources that said the XP-72 flew with the 4360 on 2 Feb, 44.

Also, concrete can be laid quite fast in wartime.


----------



## renrich (Mar 11, 2009)

The B36 was operational before the Korean War, I think, and yet the B29s and B50s were used in that war. Were we saving the B36 for the SU?


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 11, 2009)

renrich said:


> The B36 was operational before the Korean War, I think, and yet the B29s and B50s were used in that war. Were we saving the B36 for the SU?


The B-29 was used in actual bombing missions but I do believe a few RB-50s were deployed.


----------



## drgondog (Mar 11, 2009)

davparlr said:


> I have sources that said the XP-72 flew with the 4360 on 2 Feb, 44.
> 
> Also, concrete can be laid quite fast in wartime.



You are right Dave. I found several sources pointing to 4360 in Productio from 1944-1955 and bench test occurred in late 1942.


----------



## JoeB (Mar 11, 2009)

renrich said:


> The B36 was operational before the Korean War, I think, and yet the B29s and B50s were used in that war. Were we saving the B36 for the SU?


The B-36 became really operational only during the Korean War. In March 1951 the Far East Air Force actually proposed to SAC to run some B-36bombing missions from CONUS to NK, adding to their effort and providing training. SAC (LeMay) declined citing only 36 operational B-36's in SAC as of then, and they suffered from limited availability of spares for their R-4360's, so much that even main nuclear mission training was being limited to keep enough of a spares reserve for emergency (all out nuclear) war plans. The letter is reproduced in "The George E. Stratemeyer Korean War Diary" (Stratemeyer was CO of FEAF).

The issue did not come up again AFAIK, but by fall 1951 all B-29 bombing missions in MiG Alley had been shifted to night, because of losses to MiG's. B-36's wouldn't have been even as capable in that mission profile, unless fitted with SHORAN radio nav/bombing systems, which FEAF did in a crash program for all the B-29's in Korea; previously only a few per group were so fitted.

As mentioned, the 91st Strategic Recon Sdn got a detachment of (at first) 3 RB-50G's (alongside its main equipment of RB-29's plus RB-45's, etc) from 1952 and used them over Korea (at night). I've seen reference to specific missions of theirs over NK in declassed 'secret' docs. That was alongside general recon missions in Far East by the same unit: one of them, 47-145, was shot down along the Soviet far east coast July 29, 1953, two days after the Korean armistice. 

The 91st also got a detachment of RB-36D's in 1952, but I've never seen any reference to flights by them over NK in declassified sources. They were probably only used around/over other Communist countries, though missions over NK during the war can't be ruled out.

But no B-50 bombers served in Korea. SAC lent 5 B-29 groups to the Far East Air Force for Korean ops at the beginning of the war, 19th, 98th, 307st, 22nd and 92nd. After they ran out of industrial targets in NK in October 1950 (and there were quite a few, industry built by the Japanese safe from US bombing in WWII) the 22nd and 92nd went home, and the other 3 remained the B-29 force even after Chinese entry into the war, the rest of the way.

Joe


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 11, 2009)

JoeB said:


> As mentioned, the 91st Strategic Recon Sdn got a detachment of (at first) 3 RB-50G's (alongside its main equipment of RB-29's plus RB-45's, etc) from 1952 and used them over Korea (at night). I've seen reference to specific missions of theirs over NK in declassed 'secret' docs. That was alongside general recon missions in Far East by the same unit: one of them, 47-145, was shot down along the Soviet far east coast July 29, 1953, two days after the Korean armistice.


My uncle might of been flying one of them.






I posted this previously, but prior to his death he spoke about B-50 ferret operations duraing and after the Korean War. Here's something else interesting.

_"I would like to get in touch with John Foy above. I have been trying to prove B-50A combat in the Korean War for years. My father sitting in the engineer seat was wounded (no purple heart of course) and the weaponeer was killed in a fighter engagement in Dec. 51 over N.E. Korea (Think it must have been PLAAF-- I don't think I'd be here if it was an MiG 15.) I had spent some time at the archive at Maxwell AFB and found in 64th BS of the 43rd BW history that the unit was on rotation to ADVON (Yokota and Tachikawa)from Andersen During Dec 1951. One crew used 2500 rounds on the night of Dec 18th..The planes were rigged with racks for 500 pound bombs but were dropping only one or two bombs (or canisters?) at a time????? Curiously Col. Catton, commander of SAC X-ray was visiting that day. When I asked for the Special Weapons records that would explain what was going on, some poker faced gentlemen came downstairs and informed me that those records were still classified and "would not be declassified."

My dad's plane was engaged at 26,000 feet and he says the target was "Yang Dam Po" or something that sounds like that.

I realize the B-29s started having problems with fighters in early Dec. '51 and had to change tactics, but WHY would we risk our only secret "silverplate" to go out over Korea( Manchuria or Soviet airspace for that matter) to drop one or two bombs???

My theories:

1.Biological warfare tests (a war plan for Soviet penetration for atomic attack and bio warfare attack on the way out was approved in October 1951.) While the 2nd bomb bay of the B-50 usually contained a fuel bladder, it was still a functional bay that could be used for some lightweight load.

2. Release of the classified files would reveal US had atomic weapons based in Japan prior to our admission of 1954 deployment. ( Initiators and pits were kept at Yokota during these deployments from Andersen.)

3. These missions may have been CIA missions to drop parcels to partisans in support of sabotage and commando efforts.

Any other theories?
[email protected]
Mike Randall
P.O. 31143
Honolulu, HI 96820
USA"_

Boeing B-50 - bomber

My uncle had similar stories and eluded that the B-50 he was flying in actually dropped bombs. He also told me about a "shoot out" coming out of Vladivostok where F-86s came in and took on pursuing MiGs.

Joe, comments?


----------



## renrich (Mar 11, 2009)

Thanks for the good info. During the summer of 1952, I was hanging sheetrock in a housing project along side of Kelly Field in San Antonio. They were bringing burn casualties from Korea in the XC99 to Kelly Field and then on to BAMC. Quite a sight watching that sucker land and take off.


----------



## JoeB (Mar 11, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> _
> 1. My father sitting in the engineer seat was wounded (no purple heart of course) and the weaponeer was killed in a fighter engagement in Dec. 51 over N.E. Korea (Think it must have been PLAAF-- I don't think I'd be here if it was an MiG 15.) I had spent some time at the archive at Maxwell AFB and found in 64th BS of the 43rd BW history that the unit was on rotation to ADVON (Yokota and Tachikawa)from Andersen During Dec 1951. One crew used 2500 rounds on the night of Dec 18th..The planes were rigged with racks for 500 pound bombs but were dropping only one or two bombs (or canisters?) at a time?????
> 
> 2. My uncle had similar stories and eluded that the B-50 he was flying in actually dropped bombs.
> _


_
1. Interesting but a little vague as to what he looked up that might fit things his dad said v details of what his dad definitely said (for example 64th BS just fits his dad's account, or he knew for sure that was his dad's unit?, same with the date). 

December 1951 was shortly after B-29's began night-only operations over NK. The Soviet 351st Fighter Regiment was attempting to intercept with their La-11's. As we discussed a previous time the La-11's success v B-29's was limited to damaging a pair Dec 23/24 1951, they found the going easier against B-26's of which they downed a few during 1951-52. There were no PLAAF night units over NK at that time according to the Chinese. There were many US reports throughout the war of night encounters that don't match Soviet accounts, presumably North Korean a/c, but those tended to be encountered in the southern half of NK, and never hit anything as far as US accounts (it's possible they explain some disappearances of US a/c, but the NK's have never claimed it, whereas they do give juiced up propaganda versions of all their real day victories early in the war). Enemy a/c were seldom encountered either day or night in NE NK, unless a US a/c had actually strayed across the border into the USSR, or very close. 

I don't know of any incidents December 18, though that doesn't mean it didn't happen, of course. But even if a/c, like 91st SRS's, were on missions of higher classification than 'secret' they are often referred to in 'secret' level summaries, wrt to stuff like MiG or AA encounters, so basic threat knowledge could be spread around for everyone's benefit, and the mission just described as 'classified mission'.

2. That was true of some 91st SRS RB-50 missions I know of, they are listed with the particular a/c in the FEAF Consolidated Mission Summaries, just given as 'classified mission'. But sometimes RB missions are described in more detail. For example when RB-29 44-62217 was shot down on the NK/China border Jan 13 1953 (came down in China, surviving crew not released until 1955) it was described at 'secret' level as leaflet drop mission, so might explain 'few bombs' in case of RB type a/c of 91st SRS. The more classified missions probably included attempted support of anti-Communist partisans or inserted spies. The RB-50G lost July 29 1953 near the USSR was carrying an 'unamed Russian' who was lost along with all but one of the USAF crew.

Joe_


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 11, 2009)

Thanks for the info Joe - I wish my uncle was still alive. His accounts became known to me (and the rest of my family) when I told him about magazine articles about Soviet Korean War pilots and encounters with "ferrets." We always had a suspicion he was doing something like this but was tight lipped until Soviet accounts became public.

I hope to see my cousin soon and he might have some more details about my uncle's activities.


----------



## syscom3 (Mar 12, 2009)

I just looked over the design and production results for the B29 and extrapolated them for the B36.

The B29 contract was signed in Sept 1940. But it wasn't until the end of Dec 1943 for a whopping total of 92 B29's to have been accepted by the AAF. That's 39 months of time.

Now the B-36 contract was signed in November 1941. Add 39 months to that and you get a similar production figure of 92 aircraft built by the end of Feb 1945.

But then that figure has to be de-rated considerably due to it being such a massive aircraft and complex bomber for its time (The B29 was a generational leap, the B-36 was a magnitude leap forward).

Any way you try to spin it, the B-36 was so big that the production rates of the aircraft were going to be low. The four B29 plants did not reach sustained individual double digit production monthly production rates until August 1944 (and it wasn't until Dec 1944 for three of them to have a production rate of one per day). And this was historically the single most important aviation project the AAF had in WW2. There's no use in saying "throw more resources at it", because there were no more resources to use!

How can anyone argue that here was an airplane that was nearly twice as big as the B29, and these hypothetical B36 plants were going to be completely ramped up for production by 1945?

Not only that, the historical experience with the production of the B29's shows that there were so many modifications being ordered, many B29's that were built and accepted, were simply flown to modification centers for several weeks to bring it up to "current" spec.

Whats makes anyone think otherwise this would not happen to the B36? In fact it probably be even worse due to its immense weight and extremely complex systems.

If you look at these issues, there's no other conclusion that can be reached that although the B36 could have easily flown by 1945, there would only be a few of them 
available for actual missions. And it wouldn't have been till well into 1946 that enough of them could be used in a "bomb wing" mission.


----------



## davparlr (Mar 14, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> If you look at these issues, there's no other conclusion that can be reached that although the B36 could have easily flown by 1945, there would only be a few of them
> available for actual missions. And it wouldn't have been till well into 1946 that enough of them could be used in a "bomb wing" mission.



The magnitude leap forward was only in size, which was not high risk. The high technology risk for the B-36 was the same for the B-29, pressurization, engine development, and remote controlled defensive weapons system. Consolidated did have more difficulties in solving these problems on the B-32 than Boeing had on the B-29. However, lessons learned and technology transfer would have helped the B-36 development. Size alone was not a major risk. Large aircraft with more than four engines were built before and during the war. The Germans flew the Blohm Voss BV 238V1, which was a six engine aircraft, 75% the size of the B-36, in August 1943. Logistics and production quantity would certainly be impacted.

I think that, had Britain succumbed to German demands early in the war, the emphasis would have changed dramatically and the B-36 would have become priority one in aircraft design. With the change in priority from B-32 to B-36, I think it is quite reasonable to assume the B-36 would have been flying operational missions in 1945 in rapidly increasing quantity.


----------

