# Fall 1942. What if Tiger I placed into large scale production?



## davebender (Oct 4, 2013)

*Production cost of Sherman Tank.*
$70,000. Federal Machine. Total production of 540 vehicles.
$67,000. Initial price for large scale production @ GM.
$34,000. Late war price for large scale production @ Chrysler.
.....Price drops about 50% with large scale production. More or less typical when compared to other weapon programs.

*Tiger I production.*
78. 1942.
649. 1943.
623. 1944.
.....Tiger I tank never entered large scale production.
.....RM250,000 is price most often quoted for Tiger I.

55 ton Tiger I entered production during 1942. Germany had only a single large scale tank plant at the time. Nibelungenwerk was designed to produce 360 armored vehicles per month up to 70 tons in size.

What if 1942 Germany tooled their only large scale tank plant to produce Tiger Is rather then Panzer IV? 1943 production of Tiger I would be over 3,000 vehicles rather then the historical 649. Production cost per vehicle should drop to about RM130,000 if Tiger I follows normal production cost curve. 

Much as I love the Panther tank, it wouldn't be needed in this scenario. Instead Germany just needs to build a second tank factory for mass production of 24 ton Panzer IVH. This second factory should not be as expensive to build and operate if materials handling equipment is limited to vehicles up to 35 tons in size.


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## Denniss (Oct 6, 2013)

What are you smoking?
Nibelungenwerk was able to produce 186 Pz IV in 42 + 1381 of them in 43. Even without the Ferdinands there was not even the smallest chance of churning out even 1000 Tiger in 43.

BTW Henschel+Wegmann production was 76-647-629 from 8/42 to 8/44. In the first 5 months 1944 they were able to churn out ~100 Tiger per month while also slowly starting the Tiger II. 250k RM was the price of the basic Tiger I without Weapons, radio, optics and other stuff, price as of 2/43.


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## davebender (Oct 7, 2013)

That's good to know. 

PzKpfw VI TIGER I
Germany produced 114 Tiger I through the end of January 1943. Production rate had not even reached 40 tanks per month. So RM 250,000 is obviously a price for vehicles which were not in large scale production. Rather like the 540 Sherman tanks produced by Federal Machine Corporation which cost twice as much as Sherman tanks in mass production at Detroit Tank Arsenal.


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## Juha (Oct 8, 2013)

Hello Dave
the problem was that Tiger was designed as a heavy tank, read a limited production vehicle, so in it there were technical solutions which suited to a limited production vehicle but not for a MBT, e.g. its final drive solution, the same system would have solved Panther's final drive problems but Germany didn't have enough suitable machine tools to produce enough of them for a MBT only a much more limited scale as for Tiger. If one had wanted significantly more Tigers he would have had to redesign it.


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## davebender (Oct 8, 2013)

Most of what I've read about Tiger I design suggests it was rather simple. 

Hull was essentially just square Panzer III / Panzer IV hull scaled up so it should have been less expensive then the high tech Panther hull with angled sides.

Chassis was little different from Panther chassis. Superior final drive assembly might cost a bit more but that's hardly a deal breaker. 

Armor was best in the world at that time. IMO that's the one area which must change for mass production. Tiger I armor quality would become similar to Panzer III / Panzer IV / Panther. That's not a deal breaker as "normal" German tank armor was still pretty good.

Prior to mid 1944 the Allies had hardly any weapon which could kill a Tiger I. Considering how effective the tank was I think it would be a bargain even if Nibelungenwerk produced only half as many Tiger I as Panzer IV.


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## Njaco (Oct 8, 2013)

Why would anyone want to? I don't think the Tiger I fit into what was needed. Taking a page from the Allies production, wouldn't it be more effective to just build the Mk Iv/StuG and leave the Tiger to die on paper? It was numbers that won the war, not quality.


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## Juha (Oct 8, 2013)

Hello Dave
as I wrote Germany didn't have enough machine tools to produce many more final drives which used epicyclic gearing or planetary gearing, used in Tiger. That was why they didn't use this type of final drive in Panther as originally intended and pay the price what followed from using second best option in Panthers. Read Walther Spielberger's books. Nothing to do with hull, chassis or armour.

Juha


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## parsifal (Oct 8, 2013)

Reducing numbers by adopting an expensive, difficult to produce type like the Tiger wasa counterproductive to german needs. Guderian considered the MkIV to be the mainstay of German Panzer forces. Rommel favoured a complete abandonment of turretted tanks in favour of ATG production, both towed and SPG varieties. An 88mm gun, with gun carriage and prime mover included cost about RM 12.5K. A Stug III cost about RM48K from memory. These cannot be comapared in any way to foreign manufacture because of the artificial pegging undertaken by all command economies (Russians, who are in the same boat, claim the T-34 cost just $12K USD to produce).

Tiger used the most advanced optics, gun, drive systems, engines and comms. That produced a technically excellent tank, that was also a total bomb because of its cost blowouts. In 1942 the everage unit cost of a tiger was RM750K per copy. Speer thought them a total waste of money, and he was complety right. Guderian knew they were at best a distraction, and never treally supported them. Rommel had tried to apply qualioty over quantioity in NA and lost. All these men knew the Tiger philosophy was a total loser for the Germans. They needed cheap, easy to produce, mass produced weapons in the last three years of the war, not profligate extravagances like the Tiger.


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## DonL (Oct 8, 2013)

Don't forget the explosion of logistics and supply (spare parts and all sorts of liquids, especially fuel) for the Tiger I.
Also the possibility to recover a damaged or immobil tank. The Tiger I was simply overstrain the Wehrmacht from logistics, servicing and supply!
This overstaining would be much more worse at any longer offensive mission.
Keep in mind that the Tiger I came to the battlefield as the Wehrmacht was mainly at the defensive role.

As a single tank at the battlefield it was formidable, with all other aspects like production, numbers of production, logistics and supply it was nothing then a waste of time, material, a lot of money and development time.


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## Juha (Oct 8, 2013)

Hello Don
I agree all you wrote but still IMHO Tiger was acceptable as an heavy tank. It was a special weapon, not a standard one and made a big psychological impact to its enemies and was effective tank in 43 - the first half of 44. IMHO the bigger mistake for Germans was Panther, a jump from 25tons MTB to 45tons was too big to logistics and supply and recovery. And its powertrain and suspension were too weak at first, just when Germany would have needed reliable MTB, when Germans got its flaws but the final drive corrected it was already too late. 30-35tons MTB would have been a correct answer and that was what Germans at first tried to get.

Juha


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## davebender (Oct 9, 2013)

I agree and I think 1942 Heer would agree. 

Germany had several heavy tank design studies from 1937 onward. As of 1941 none had been funded to completion which gives a pretty good idea as to where they stood on the Heer priority list. And then politics intervened.

Fall 1941.
Chancellor Hitler demands that heavy tank design be given a higher priority. 
Porsche was given contract to build chassis.
Krupp was given contract to build turret.
Main gun would be based on performance of 8.8cm/56 flak cannon. However it was a new design.

February 1942.
Albert Speer appointed Armaments Minister.
This appointment was based on Hitler's favor. Speer had no industrial mass production experience.

March 1942.
Inexperienced or not even Speer could see that wartime Germany had a serious shortage of copper. The Porsche Tiger tank chassis used gasoline generators and electric drive, a propulsion system Ferdinand Porsche favored going back at least to 1910. The electric drive system worked but copper usage was prohibitive. 

Henschel was instructed to enlarge their existing VK3601(H) test chassis for use by the new Tiger tank. Because this was a rush job there was no time to design a modern hull with sloped armor. Henschel simply enlarged the existing Panzer IV hull and provided a turret ring sized to fit Krupp turrets already on order for the Porsche Tiger. Amazingly enough the resulting vehicle was excellent with a relatively short teething period. During 1943 the Tiger I was highly effective against both soft and hard targets while being almost immune to Allied anti-tank weapons.

Tiger I was based on political rather then military considerations yet it worked well. Who would have thought such a thing was possible? 


If the choice were mine to make.....
VK3601(H) chassis was excellent and it was about the right size for a WWII era MBT.
6.05 meters long x 3.14 meters wide. Slightly larger then T-34 chassis but suspension was much better.

Historically VK3601(H) was never fitted with a hull. If hull design had been ordered concurrent with chassis design there would be plenty of time to do it right. Make a modern hull with sloped armor. The resulting vehicle would look similar to historical Panther tank but a bit smaller. 

Since armor is sloped 60mm on front and 45mm on sides should be adequate until 1944. This will keep the tank relatively light. Maybe 35 tons overall. Keeping the vehicle light will go a long way towards solving that troublesome final drive problem.

Turret and 7.5cm/48 cannon from Panzer IVG will work just fine early on. However turret drive should be hydraulic, similar to Tiger and Panther. This saves copper and works better. Germany can design an improved turret with 7.5cm/70 cannon when time permits. 

Build this VK3601(H) based tank like hot rolls ILO Panzer III, Panzer IV, Panzer V and Panzer VI. It's the only tank Germany needs.


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## parsifal (Oct 9, 2013)

The VK3601 and the slightly earlier VK3001 would be a better proposition than the Tiger, only because they are slightly smaller. They appear to be good designs, but I am unconvinced they were designed for mass production, and thats what the germans needed to do....an easily produced, cheap, mobile gun platform able to mount at least 75mm. Both Sherman and T-34 fit these criteria perfectly I dont know that either the VK3001 of the 3601 would.

The characteristics of the VK 3601, which was not ready even as a prototype until late 1941 were as follows 


Armour
Front Turret: 100/10
Front Superstructure: 100/8
Front Hull: 100 60/23 60
Side Turret: 80/0
Side Superstructure: 60/0
Side Hull: 60/0
Rear Turret: 80/0
Rear Superstructure: 60/0
Rear Hull: 80/0
Turret Top / Bottom: 26/90
Superstructure Top / Bottom: 26/90
Hull Top / Bottom: 26/90
Gun Mantlet: 100/0

Armamement
KWK L42 75mm gun
2 x 7.92mm MG

Engine 550 HP Maybach Diesel

Comms
Same as Tiger 

Range

(not known, but) Less than the MkIV, more than the Tiger....say 100 miles

Operationally, in common with most german prototypes, some of the VK3601s ended up being used operationally as were two of the VK3001 prototypes. AFAIK, two of the VK 3001 were modified to carry the massive 128cm ATG. 

From August of 1941 to March of 1942, Rheinmetall-Borsig and Henschel produced two prototypes, which were troop tested in Russia in mid 1942. Both prototypes performed successfully but the development of this project was cancelled in favour of Tiger I. As mentioned one of the the Selbstfahrlafette 12.8cm saw service with 521st schwere Panzerjaeger Abteilung and a second one with 2nd Panzer Division as late as July of 1942. One of two prototypes (from 2nd Panzer Division) was destroyed in combat, while other one (from 521st sPzJagAbt with 22 kills rings painted on the gun barrel) was captured intact in January of 1943 in Stalingrad area. It was shown at the captured equipment exhibitions in Moscow's Gorky Park in 1943 and 1944. Vehicles were named "Max" and "Moritz" after characters in Busch's classic children's story. Today, the one captured by the Red Army can be seen in the Museum of Armored Forces in Kubinka.

Assuming the example lost in July had no kills (maybe it did, but there is no record of it doing so that I can find), the exchange rate of these two specially modified prototypes was 11:1. At that time, the overall German exchange rate against the Russians was around 18:1. Later in the war it dropped to around 4 or 5:1 from about the first half of 1944. From memory (Ill stand corrected on this), the exchange rate at Kursk was about 7:1. Like all these "uber tanks" they dont translate to much higher exchange rates in combat compared to the Panzer IIIs and IVs that continued to be the mainstays throughour 1943. Thats why, programs like the Tiger are a proven failure....they are no better at surviving, than smaller, lighter, more numerous mediums. Whilst individually they had good kill rates, because there is less of them per dollar spent, overall they have considerably worse kill rates to the smaller, cheaper, more numerous mediums. What they did do was grab headlines and require an inordinate amount of stalking to kill. Because they lacked range, the usual fate of these heavy tanks is that they were "lost, abandoned, ran out of fuel"..... 


It can be validly suggested that both the VK 3001 and 3601 were adaptable and workable types, no doubt, but to me it is just a variation to a known failed theme. Its still the quality argument, albeit a little more rational, as that which inspired the Tiger. nowhere can i find descriptions or appraisals of the type as being simplified, or more produceable than either existing types or those that were eventually adopted. Panther by comparison, whilst having numerous technical difficulties, is noted for being easier to produce than the Tiger, and much cheaper (and I still think even the panther was over ambitious) . I dont see that ever mentioned in relation to the VK 3601. The conclusion I draw from that is that it was not designed for ease of construction like the T-34 or the Sherman, or indeed the panther.


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## DonL (Oct 9, 2013)

> * Chancellor *Hitler demands that heavy tank design be given a higher priority.



I will ask you immediately to edit your post for this name calling, or I will go havoc on you, and it is to me totaly equal if I will be banned or not!

Adolf Hitler was never a Chancellor, he called himself Führer (he was a dictator)and to compare him with Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder or Angela Merkel (which were or are all chancellor of the BRD) is to me, as a german, the most worst insult!
So edit your post immediately!


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## JtD (Oct 10, 2013)

Actually, he was chancellor.


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## parsifal (Oct 10, 2013)

I get DonLs indignation and i agree with him. He was elected as Chancellor in 1933, but he almost immediately declared a state of emergency and combined the positions of prewsident and chancllor into one poition. He then ivoked his emergency powerws, suspended the Reichstag and ruled by decree for the remainder of his life.

That is not the actions of a man performaing as a chancellor. Its is the actions of a man wanting complete control, and prepreed to act with utter ruthlessness to get it. thats not the actions of a chancellor, and its insulting to refer to him as such. I get that he was elected as chancellor but he never acted as a chancellor. Despot and dictator, yes, leader, or Chancellor, never. It was the great lie that got him into power in the first place.


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## JtD (Oct 10, 2013)

It was one of his official titles. It's odd to see it used, but how many "Kings" or "Presidents" or "Emperors" do you want to get insulted over?

FWIW - wiki's list of German chancellors prior to 1949. Good luck with picking the part of history you find acceptable. 
Reichskanzler


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## DonL (Oct 10, 2013)

Thank you Parsifal, I agree with you word for word and your post is right to the point.
To call him Chancellor is to deny the takeover and try to relativize or imply, that he was a normal politican or elder statesman.
That's nonsens.


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## Lucky13 (Oct 12, 2013)

What would it have done for the Tiger, if the they had adopted the same drive, wheel system as the Russians, the Christie and have it run on diesel instead, would it have made it easier to produce and more reliable?


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## GrauGeist (Oct 12, 2013)

Don't forget that the Skoda works was a huge source of Panzers and as far as an economical, mass produced tank in the Wehrmacht inventory goes, the Stug was a formidable battlefield asset...reliable, deadly, easy to maintain and inexpensive to produce.

Even without a traversing turret, it was dangerous and accounted for a large numbers of Allied armor destroyed on the battlefield.


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## Juha (Oct 12, 2013)

Lucky13 said:


> What would it have done for the Tiger, if the they had adopted the same drive, wheel system as the Russians, the Christie and have it run on diesel instead, would it have made it easier to produce and more reliable?



First of all, Christie suspension was not suitable for a heavy tank. Diesel or gasoline engine, its more upto how good/reliable the engine was.

Juha


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## davebender (Oct 12, 2013)

Heer and U.S. Army evaluation of T-34 both agree on that point. Probably Russia also as they replaced Christie suspension with torsion bars.


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## davebender (Oct 12, 2013)

German armored fighting vehicle production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
What makes you say that? Skoda tank production was no better then Tiger I or Panzer II. Average of about 50 vehicles per month.

Hetzer was only exception to the rule. Germany expanded Skoda production facilities during 1944 specifically for that armored vehicle. Why Germany didn't expand Skoda production five years earlier (i.e. during 1939) is a mystery to me.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 13, 2013)

Look at the link you posted and observe Skoda's consistancy...they were churning out a steady line of the 38(t) chassied panzers

Skoda didn't just sit around knocking out 50 tanks of a single type each month between 1939 and 1945 and call it good, they were a major source of vehicles, AFV and panzers.

Below is a list (far from complete) to give an idea of thier production numbers. Bear in mind that the dates will be overlapping as the production reflected Wehrmacht's criteria.

*PzKfw 35(t)* - 424 units, 1935-1938 (with 219 units confiscated March 1939)

*PzKfw 38(t)*:
. 150 units (Ausf A) May-November 1939
. 325 units (Ausf B, C, D) January-November 1940
. 525 units (Ausf E, F) November 1940-October 1941
. 90 units (Ausf S) May-December 1941
. 321 units (Ausf G) October 1941-June 1942
PzKfw 38(t) total: 1,411 1939-1942

PzKfw 38(t) purpose built (SP) carriers:
*Marder III w/7.62cm PaK36(r) (Sdkfz 139)* 344 units, April-October 1942 (plus 19 conversions)
*Marder III w/7.5cm PaK40/3 Ausf H (Sdkfz 138)* 242 units, November 1942-April 1943 (plus 175 conversions)
*Marder III w/7.5cm PaK40/3 Ausf M (Sdkfz 138)* 975 units, April 1943-May 1944
*Grille (Cricket) 15cm Ausf H (Sdkfz 138/1)* 90 units, February-April 1943
*Grille (Cricket) 15cm Ausf K (Sdkfz 138/1)* 282 units, April-June 1943 October 1943-September 1944
*Flakpanzer Ausf L (Sdkfz 140)* 140 units, November 1943-Februray 1944 (plus 1 conversion)
*Hetzer 15cm Infantariegeschutes 33/2 (Sf)* 24 units, December 1944 onwards (plus 6 conversions)
SP carrier total: 2,097 1942-1944

Additionally,
*Munitionspanzer Ausf K (Sdkfz 138)* 102 units, January-May 1944
*Armored Recon w/2cm KwK38 or 7.5cm KwK38 L/24 (Aufklarer auf Fgst)* 52 units, February-March 1944
*Hetzer w/7.5cm PaK39* 2,584 units, April 1944-May 1945 (includes 20 flammpanzer conversions)
*Hetzer Bergepanzer (recovery vehicle)* 106 units, October 1944-May 1945
Additional units total: 2,844

So our grand total for the 38(t) all types built would be *6,571* between 1939 and 1945

This figure doesn't include the repair works and the upfitting/modifications that was going on at the same time as noted earlier. Add to this the wheeled and tracked vehicles (10 different types) that they were producing for transport and construction, as well as specialty vehicles like airfield support equipment.


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## Lucky13 (Oct 13, 2013)

Juha said:


> First of all, Christie suspension was not suitable for a heavy tank. Diesel or gasoline engine, its more upto how good/reliable the engine was.
> 
> Juha


 


davebender said:


> Heer and U.S. Army evaluation of T-34 both agree on that point. Probably Russia also as they replaced Christie suspension with torsion bars.



How about the same system as the KV's that seem to have worked ok, or?

Would changing the engines in the panzers, from petrol to diesel, made them more, or less, reliable?
Wouldn't that have made them less prone to freeze in cold weather, less chance to catch fire etc.?
But then again, were they of a sound design in the first place?


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## Denniss (Oct 13, 2013)

The LT-38 was neither a Skoda design nor did they build LT-38s - all they produced from summer 44 was the Jagdpanzer 38. The LT-38 was a CKD/BMM design and they built the majority of them. They even build 25-33% of the LT-35 if I remember right.

AFAIR Diesel engines had more vibrations and easier to hear from distance. Also Diesel flocks-out at cold temperatures without additives or a small amount of petrol mixed inside. The KV suspension was torsion bar as well and used (in modified form) for the IS series


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## davebender (Oct 13, 2013)

> changing the engines in the panzers, from petrol to diesel, made them more, or less, reliable?


How many reliable diesel powered tanks were built during WWII? Certainly not anything produced in Soviet Union and that goes double for notoriously unreliable T-34/76.

Not that I have anything against diesel engines per se. I think Heer missed the boat by not using 400hp diesel which Daimler-Benz designed and tested successfully for Panzer III and Panzer IV. However German gasoline engines got the job done in a reliable and inexpensive manner.


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## Lucky13 (Oct 13, 2013)

davebender said:


> How many reliable diesel powered tanks were built during WWII? Certainly not anything produced in Soviet Union and that goes double for notoriously unreliable T-34/76.



I always thought that the T-34 was reliable, with its diesel engine...


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## davebender (Oct 13, 2013)

1942 U.S. Army Ordnance evaluation of T-34.
Evaluation of The T-34 and KV Tanks By Engineers of the Aberdeen Proving Grounds - ENGLISH.BATTLEFIELD.RU - ENGLISH.BATTLEFIELD.RU
T-34 medium tank after driving 343 km, became completely disabled and that could not be fixed.

permeability to water of the lower hull during a water crossings, as well as the upper hull during a rain. In a heavy rain lots of water flows through chinks/cracks, which leads to the disabling of the electrical equipment and even the ammunition.

electrical mechanism for rotating the turret is very bad.

deficiencies in our tracks from their viewpoint results from the lightness of their construction. They can easily be damaged by small-calibre and mortar rounds. The pins are extremely poorly tempered and made of a poor steel. As a result, they quickly wear and the track often breaks

deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The *Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device*  Soviet quality is an oxymoron. 

On the T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any way meet American standards for such mechanisms.

Side friction clutches Out of a doubt, very poor

technology for tempering the armor plating should be changed

Replace the existing transmission of outdated design


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## parsifal (Oct 14, 2013)

Lucky13 said:


> I always thought that the T-34 was reliable, with its diesel engine...



And you would be right. Davebender, as usual is misquoting and misusing the US report from Aberdeen.

The Soviets had their man at Abedeen, and in response they produced their own 650 page report on why the Aberdeen report was totally bogus. The following is a summary from Archive Awareness

"In 1943, a T-34 and a KV-1 (the #11302 mentioned earlier) were sent to the Aberdeen proving grounds in the United States to undergo testing, and see what technical solutions from these tanks can be of use to the Americans, and what can be done to improve their designs. While the report from these tests is not widely available, another document is: a translation of the summary of the tests obtained by a GRU agent at Aberdeen. This text, especially when taken out of context, provides a very scathing, and generally incorrect view of T-34 and KV tanks. Here are a collection of documents elaborating on this information".

"Comments on the evaluation of T-34 and KV tanks by workers of the Aberdeen proving grounds in the USA, representatives of companies, officers, and commission members.

I. Tank condition

According to information received from the Americans, the T-34, after traveling 343 km, was disabled by the breakdown of the V-2 diesel engine. The Americans are of the opinion that this was caused by a poor air filter on the diesel engine.

The T-34 sent to America had an air filter of the "Pomon" type. This filter was installed on T-34 and BT tanks. If properly cleaned and supplied with oil (in exceptionally dusty environments, this must be done once every 2-3 hours), the Pomon filter guarantees normal engine operation with 79.6% air purity at air dustiness of 1 gram per cubic meter. The filter at Aberdeen was not cleaned [Note: the filter was also not oiled. The Americans wonder why the filter is called "oily" by the Soviets in their impressions], which led to uncharacteristic engine wear.

Starting with 1942, all T-34 tanks have an improved Cyclone filter, which provides 99.4% air purity at air dustiness of 1 gram per cubic meter. This filter also needs cleaning and oiling every 3-4 hours.

IS tanks in development will have an improved air filter, providing 100% air purity at air dustiness of 3 grams per cubic meter, and can operate without cleaning for 8 hours. This filter is designated "Multicyclone".

II. Armour

The Americans insist that the T-34 and KV tanks' plates are hardened shallowly, and most of the armour is soft steel. They suggest that we change the hardening technology, which will increase the armour's resistance to impacts. This opinion has no basis in reality, and was likely caused by poor analysis of the armour.

The armour of the sent T-34 tank consisted of 8S steel. All T-34s are armoured this way. This steel is hardened to high hardness (2.8-3.15 mm on the Brinell scale). The KV tank's armour was medium hardness (3.35-3.6 mm on the Brinell scale).

The Americans take the same approach as us, hardening armour of medium thickness to high hardness and armour over 40 mm thick to medium hardness. Our armour provides greater resistance to impact compared to American armour.

German heavy tanks have armour of medium hardness.

Currently, we are in the process of producing high hardness armour for IS tanks.

Perhaps, when commenting on the tanks' armour, the Americans meant that heavy tanks should have armour of high hardness.

III. Hull.

The Americans found that the tank takes on water when crossing rivers, and the hatches leak during rain. The hulls of our tanks are sufficiently watertight to cross rivers. However, the top hatches are insufficiently watertight.

IV. Turret.

The Americans consider the crampedness of our turrets a weakness. The T-34 we sent had a welded turret. New cast turrets are roomier than old welded turrets. New IS and T-43 tanks have larger turrets, due to the enlarged turret ring. The electric turret rotation mechanisms are indeed insufficiently reliable. A hydraulic turret rotation mechanism is currently in development, similar to American ones. This mechanism is very reliable and comfortable to use.

V. Armament.

It is necessary to admit that the muzzle velocity of our medium tank gun F-34 is insufficient, and is lower than that of the American 3" gun. However, the muzzle velocity of the American 75 mm gun on the M3 Medium and M4A2 tanks is also insufficient.

VI. Tracks.

During testing at Aberdeen, tracks of the T-34 tore. The track pins, instead of being guided by the guide, get caught on it and bend. This could potentially be caused by an insufficiently wide guide, or defects of the track metal. On currently produced T-34s, tracks are of much higher quality, the guide has been lengthened, and there are additional guides on the sides of the hull.

VII. Suspension.

The Americans do not like our spring suspension, based on their work with Christie tanks. [Note: the impressions of the suspension are from Christie tanks only, since the T-34 only traveled a very limited distance under the Americans' supervision. The suspension of the T-34 was different from the suspension of Christie or BT tanks]. We consider the reliability of the T-34's suspension adequate, but the T-43 is being developed with a torsion bar suspension.

VIII. Engine.

The T-34 tank has a 15 hp ST-700 electric starter. The KV has two 6 hp starters, 12 hp in total. Currently, both the KV and T-34 are built with a ST-700 starter.
A high power tank starter was first developed here. The Americans have much weaker starters. For some reason, they evaluate our starters as weak.
The ST-700 starter has a series of defects, making its reliability unsatisfactory to us. The IS tank is being developed with an electro-inertial starter of higher reliability.

IX. Transmission.

The KV and T-34 transmissions were a result of continued development of the Christie transmission. This transmission is currently obsolete.

The Americans have a poor opinion of the KV and T-34 gearboxes. They assumed that we copied their A-23 gearbox that was built 15-20 years ago by an American company. This same company built gearboxes for Christie tanks in 1929-1930.

The T-34 and KV gearboxes use a cross-bar and a bevel gear and pinion, transmitting the rotation from the motor. Perhaps the blueprints for our gearbox are similar to the A-23 ones.

Currently, a superior gearbox is used on the KV with 8 speeds (the one sent to the Americans had 5). T-34s built by the Kirov and #174 factories use a new 5-speed gearbox (the one sent to the Americans had 4). Quality of the gears in the gearbox is significantly increased.

X. Friction clutch

The Americans consider friction clutches obsolete. Apparently, even American tank companies no longer use them. They suggest that we replace them with double differentials, like they have on their tanks.

We also consider friction clutches obsolete. IS tanks are being developed with a planet gear, which makes the tank more maneuverable and reliable. All further transmission related work is aimed at transmissions of the planet gear type. This transmission is superior to the American one, which consists of a gearbox of the tractor-automobile type and a double differential.

Additionally, American tractors still use friction clutches. For example, these can be found on American Alice-Chalmers, Caterpillar, and International tanks currently being supplied to the USSR.

As for friction clutches on the KV and T-34, they work reliably, provided they are taken care of.

XI. Overall impressions.

The Americans remark that the tank is produced crudely, absent-mindedly, and with undeveloped technology of certain parts and devices. Significant progress has been made in upgrading the quality of produced tanks. However, mechanisms of American tanks are superior to domestic ones in cosmetic finish and performance.

Overall, Americans comment that their tanks are superior in maneuverability, firepower, speed, ease of use and maintenance, and reliability of construction. While American tanks are simpler to use, but ours have superior combat performance. The combination of armour, armament, and maneuverability is significantly more optimal than the Americans', which is proven by combat application."


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## parsifal (Oct 14, 2013)

Part II

CAMD RF 38-11355-1712

Since the above commentary makes it seem like the Americans hated everything about the T-34 and KV, here are the good parts they found:

"The shape of the tanks is loved by all, without exception. The T-34 is especially favoured. Consensus is that the T-34's shape is the best of all vehicles known in America.
...
Ammunition rack placement is very well liked.
...
The F-34 gun is very good. It is simple, reliable, and easy to service.
...
Consensus: the gun sights are the best in the world. Incomparable to any currently known worldwide or currently developed in America.
...
The Americans love the idea of steel tracks.
...
The suspension on the KV is excellent.
...
The diesel engine is light and excellent. The idea of using diesel engines has previously come up, but the Navy uses all diesel motors produced in the USA, and therefore the Army lacks the ability to use diesel tanks.
...
Both of our tanks can deal with sloping terrain better than any American tank.
...
Small size of radio stations and their placement inside the tank is good.
...
...overall tank construction is well though out...
"

Additionally, from the "Minutes of the meeting on the question of the evaluation of T-34 and KV tanks by Americans", CAMD RF 38-11355-360

"Major-General Ogurtsov speaks:
"The Americans provide incorrect data for muzzle velocity of the guns...they claim that their gun has Vo of 5700 ft/sec, or 1730 m/sec, which seems very unlikely, even given all of its advantages.""

You may notice that the T-43 is mentioned a number of times in this report. Development of the T-43 was cancelled, but many solutions from the project were used on other tanks, such as the T-34-85 and T-44.

By the way, if you ever do come across a full report, give me a shout. I'm very interested in reading it. You'll know it when you see it, it's 650 pages.


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## silence (Oct 14, 2013)

"Consensus: the gun sights are the best in the world. Incomparable to any currently known worldwide or currently developed in America." ?????

"Small size of radio stations and their placement inside the tank is good." ??? (outside of command tanks, what radios?)

Medium hard armor (assuming they mean homogeneous here) actually is better for well-sloped surfaces, like the T-34. It deflects shots better than high hardness (again, assuming they mean face hardened), which is designed to damage or break a shell and is used on more vertical surfaces (like, say, a Tiger I).

Small turrets? yes, for 2-man turrets. For three-man (T-34/85, T-43, IS) you'd naturally need a bigger turret.

It seems like a lot of the Soviet responses are on the order of "newer production is better" or "newer tanks in development are better," which - to me - begs the question: why, then, did the Soviets send older tanks? I think its reasonable to expect that these older tanks would not be as good as the newer. Blanket statements about newer production and models mean nothing if they cannot be evaluated; all the US had to work with was what the Soviets provided. I can't tell you what an Aston Martin drives like because I've never (<sigh>) been behind the wheel of one.

Interesting report. I'd love to read the original as well - when I have time, which should happen in 3-4 years.


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## Denniss (Oct 14, 2013)

The air filter construction seems strange with the need for that much cleaning/oiling. Did the other nations use a similar system or were they more advanced?


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## parsifal (Oct 14, 2013)

silence said:


> "Consensus: the gun sights are the best in the world. Incomparable to any currently known worldwide or currently developed in America." ?????
> 
> "Small size of radio stations and their placement inside the tank is good." ??? (outside of command tanks, what radios?)
> 
> ...




The comments about the gun sights and the radio communications are those that were made in the Aberdeen test report. it just shows what a total crock the US report actually was.

There were huge QA issues with the earlier T-34s. those made in 1941 went into battle with a mallet as standard issue, to hit the side of the gearbox plate to help get the gearbox into reverse. The transmissions were particulalry poor.

by 1943, these problems were largely solved, and the reliability of the T34s were such as to be able to run up up to 1000 kms on the one set of tracks. This was several orders of magnitude better than any of the german tanks they faced (but not so better than a Sherman, admittedly). During the advance in 1941 the average life expectancy of the light German tanks was about 250 kms. Conditions in the Soviet Union were very tough, for all combatants. 

To me it makes perfect sense that the Soviets would not send their very latest and best. The Soviets viewed Allied motives with the deepest suspicion, why would they waste sending a perfectly up to date model for testing with an "ally" viewed as less than useless to them (the Soviets). In 1943 the Soviets were still fighting for survival,, and whilst british committment was commendable and noted by the Soviets, the US was yet to make any significant contribution to the war (when viewed through Soviet eyes). the Americans had nearly lost the war in the Atlantic, had not committed any substantive air forces in the ETO, had committed about 3 divs to the landings inm North Africa, had reneged on the second cross channel front, all at a time when the Soviets were fighting to stay alive. More than half of lend lease for the Soviets at that stage was coming from the British and Commonwealth nations. Big things were on the move in the US, but it was yet to translate to anything meaningful.....How might you think they (the Soviets) would react to American request for a brand new T-34????


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## GrauGeist (Oct 14, 2013)

In a nutshell, if the T-34 was such a pile of crap, why did the Germans react to it with such urgency with new-threat upgrades to thier own Panzer program?

The hallmark of a weapon system can be judged by how much effort an opponent will go to counter it...


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## silence (Oct 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The comments about the gun sights and the radio communications are those that were made in the Aberdeen test report. it just shows what a total crock the US report actually was.
> 
> There were huge QA issues with the earlier T-34s. those made in 1941 went into battle with a mallet as standard issue, to hit the side of the gearbox plate to help get the gearbox into reverse. The transmissions were particulalry poor.
> 
> ...



Totally agree about Soviet suspicions; kinda figured that's was why they didn't provide the latest models. Still, the pragmatist in me feels that some of these latest examples had fallen into German hands as a matter of course, so it seems strange that while your enemy has samples of your best you refuse them to your ally. But, then, a paranoid state sees the world in a ... different way.

I also wonder how much of a role US doctrine - you know, the one that told the Army that tanks didn't fight tanks but TDs did instead - played a part, rather than evaluating the T-34 on its own merits?

As far as the gunsights, the US was describing the Soviet gunsights as the best in the world? Makes me wonder what they were smoking - and puts the US optics in a very bad light. (Ever try telling a US BB fan that American optics were anything less than wonderful? Unless you're looking to be on the receiving end of a vicious diatribe, don't!!)

Anyway, GrauGeist said it perfectly.


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## davebender (Oct 14, 2013)

> if the T-34 was such a pile of crap, why did the Germans react to it with such urgency


What urgency would you be referring to?

7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.

Panzer III remained armed with 5cm main gun rather then lengthening chassis so it could be armed with 7.5cm high velocity cannon. 

Panzer IV production was not significantly increased until 1943. Until then production did not exceed 1,000 vehicles per year (i.e. less then 100 per month average).

Henschel Vk3001(H) and Vk3601(H) chassis were more or less ready to go during 1941. Heer was in no hurry to add vehicle hull and turret then rush the new medium tank into production. In fact neither vehicle ever had a complete prototype (chassis + hull + turret).

Tiger tank was never placed into large scale production.

Ju-87D was an effective tank killer using cluster munitions or under wing cannon. Ju-87 production did not drastically increase and the first cannon armed variants didn't appear until 1943.

Hs.129 was an effective tank killer and development was completed during 1941. However only 221 produced during 1942.


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## tyrodtom (Oct 14, 2013)

davebender said:


> What urgency would you be referring to?
> 
> 7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.
> 
> ...



That sounds like a list of some of the reasons why the 3rd Reich lost the war on the eastern front.


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## Juha (Oct 14, 2013)

davebender said:


> What urgency would you be referring to?
> 
> 7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.



Marders were conversions, you cannot convert more than you have chassises to convert



davebender said:


> Panzer III remained armed with 5cm main gun rather then lengthening chassis so it could be armed with 7.5cm high velocity cannon.



After stop-gap uparmoured long-barrel 50mm versions the production was run down to allow more StuG IIIs, which surprise-surprise were up-gunned with long-barrel 75mm, to be produced and last version was armed with short-barrel 7.5cm L/24 gun for fire-support work, I wonder why, was that because the old 7.5cm L/24 tank, Pz IV, was for some reason, what that might have been, upgunned with a long 7.5cm gun



davebender said:


> Panzer IV production was not significantly increased until 1943. Until then production did not exceed 1,000 vehicles per year (i.e. less then 100 per month average).



But surprisingly Pz IV was hurriedly upgunned with a long 7.5cm cannon.



davebender said:


> ...Tiger tank was never placed into large scale production...



Again, Germany could not began large-scale mass production of Tigers because of lack of suitable machine tools.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 14, 2013)

Oh here we go...

So in your world, Dave, the Wehrmacht could care less about the T-34 and didn't even acknowledge it existed.

The reality was that the Ju87D(field mod)/G and Hs129 operated at risk as the Luftwaffe lost air supremacy in spite of thier anti-armor effectiveness.

In 1941, the Wehrmacht was shocked when they encountered the T-34. Up to that point, they had been enjoying great success over the BT series Soviet tanks. At that time, there wasn't sufficeint numbers of Wehrmacht armor that were equipped with the PaK38, which was the only real effective weapon they had to stop the T-34, and that was only at dangerously close ranges.
The bulk of German armor was the PzKfw II, III, IV and 38(t) at that time and all were vulnerable to the T-34.

The PzKfw V (Panther) was a response to the T-34, being designed based on that threat and being put into production and reaching the battlefield by 1943, getting it's baptism of fire at Kursk.

In the case of the King Tiger, the idea of a heavy tank had been considered for some time (since late 30's) but with the advent of the T-34, it became aparent one was needed. The King Tiger was designed with the T-34 in mind, as a battlefield supremacy objective and also reached the battlefield in 1943.

I won't go into deep details regarding those, as it's been exhaustively discussed already and I don't want to hijack the thread...but there it is...the T-34 forced a new-threat upgrade with German armor.


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## silence (Oct 14, 2013)

davebender said:


> What urgency would you be referring to?
> 
> 7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.
> 
> ...



The T-34 and KV-1 were the reasons the 3601 morphed into the 4501 which after the start of Barbarossa morphed to accommodate even heavier armor and the 88 - the only gun at the time of Barbarossa the German had which could reliably take out a KV-1, and also the reason the 3601 never went into production. Thus a 30-ton pre-war design morphed into a 45-ton wartime design (May '41) and then finally ended up a 56-ton wartime production model.

The Panther was designed as a direct counter to the T-34 encountered first in June '41. The designs were completed by April '42, with a prototype being built by Sept. Production started in Nov/Dec '42, slowly at first because of a lack of machine tools. It was also rushed into production, with well-cataloged results. Less than 18 mo from start-of-design to production is very fast for a tank; the 3601 design work started in '37.

PzIV production was not significantly increased but it was significantly up-gunned with first the 75L43 and then the 75L48.

The Stuka G didn't hit the front line until mid '43, and was a direct result of troubles with the development of the Hs 129B-3 - which the RLM wanted to replace - and the desire to get another tank-killer in the field ASAP.

The entire Marder series was slapped together to also help counter the T-34 and KV-1.

The "urgency" reaction was in the up-gunning, up-armoring, and the new tank design, not in raw numbers. Note that after encountering somewhat superior French and British tanks in France and NA, the Wehrmacht did little to improve their kit; it took the T-34 to bring about significant and rapid improvement in the capabilities of German armor.


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## silence (Oct 14, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Oh here we go...
> 
> So in your world, Dave, the Wehrmacht could care less about the T-34 and didn't even acknowledge it existed.
> 
> ...



You beat me to the punch! (But it wasn't the King Tiger that was designed with the T-34 in mind, it was the Tiger I!)


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## DonL (Oct 14, 2013)

davebender said:


> What urgency would you be referring to?
> 
> 7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.
> 
> ...



Mr. Bender is making claims which are truly lies!

As Juha posted the Marder series was a conversion of different chassis with captured 7,62cm barrels.
The Panzer III was equipped as immediate action to the arrival of the T34 (August 1941) with the long 5cm L60 barrel.
The claim the Panzer III could be equipped with a long barrel 7,5cm through lengthening the chassis is a lie. The problem wasn't the chassis, the problem was the turret, because the original turret was to small and the bore diameter for a bigger turret wasn't existing.

The biggest lie of Mr. Bender are the numbers and descriptions of the Panzer IV.
The production of the Panzer IV was 1941 481, 1942 994, 1943 3014. As you can see the production of the Panzer IV increased from 1941 to 1942 at 100%. But this are not the decisive numbers, because next to the immediate action of the Panzer III 5cm L60 barrel, an advertisement of a long barreld PanzerIV was given Oktober/November 1941 and the first production was March 1942 of a long barrel Panzer IV F2. The production numbers of the Panzer IV F2 and G from March 1942 to March 1943 were 1700 tanks.
So everybody can see as the long barrel Panzer IV was in production the numbers were immediately increased. At* March 1942 *the Panzer IV was the MBT of the Wehrmacht and the most produced tank.

Also the claim about the VK 3001H and the VK 3601 is a lie! 
The VK 3001H had no single advantage to a long barrel Panzer IV and wasn't at any time 1941 production ready!
The VK 3601H was the dirct forerunner of the Tiger I, but with a conical 7,5 cm gun, this gun couldn't be produced through tungsten shortness.
So the chassis of the 3601H must be enlarged to have the bore diameter for the larger Tiger I turret with the 8,8 cm gun.

The development of the Tiger I had *nothing* to do with the T 34 because *the final advertisement of the Tiger I was may 1941*, long before the T 34 was ever seen.

Edit:



> The T-34 and KV-1 were the reasons the 3601 morphed into the 4501 which after the start of Barbarossa morphed to accommodate even heavier armor and the 88 - the only gun at the time of Barbarossa the German had which could reliably take out a KV-1, and also the reason the 3601 never went into production. Thus a 30-ton pre-war design morphed into a 45-ton wartime design (May '41) and then finally ended up a 56-ton wartime production model.



This claim is incorrect!


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## silence (Oct 14, 2013)

DonL said:


> The development of the Tiger I had *nothing* to do with the T 34 because *the final advertisement of the Tiger I was may 1941*, long before the T 34 was ever seen.
> 
> Edit:
> 
> ...



May '41 is when design submissions for a 45-ton tank were requested from Henschel and Porsche. Henschel provided two prototypes, both being improved 3601s. These became the VK 4501(H) H1 (88L56) and H2 (75L70). The actual ordering of the 45 ton was done after the start of Barbarossa and as a result of first encounters with the T-34 and KV-1. Henschel continued development, decided to focus on the H1, and the final result - the Tiger prototype - was approved for production in July '42.

The original designs for the 4501 were scheduled to be completed by June '42. The encounters with the Russian tanks resulted in a sudden ordering for the functional prototypes - not just the design work - to be ready by April '42. The T-34 and KV-1 drastically increased the design, development, and deployment of the Tiger. Without these two tanks, DD&D would have continued at a much more leisurely pace and the end result may well have been a lighter (45-ton) Tiger with a 75L70. The Russian tanks drove the DD&D of the Tiger.

So while Barbarossa was not the direct impetus for the 4501, it was the impetus for the 4501 becoming the Tiger and - more importantly - for it being deployed perhaps a year ahead of the original schedule of May 26 '41.

And "lie" is a harsh word to use. Please just note that the information is incorrect and provide your corrections and leave it at that.


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## parsifal (Oct 14, 2013)

Yep, DonL is right, the tiger was being finalised as a design well before the t-34 was even known about. That is not to say however that the new Soviet tank did not have a profound effect on German thinking and procurement, after it was encountered. Guderian set up a special commission in November 1941, which led to the accelarated introduction of the tiger, and the development of the panther as the main battle type. The germans did toy with making a straight copy of the t-34, but for reasons relating mostly to national pride, decided against such abject copying 

Contrary to the popular histories, T-34s were concentrated into a few formarions at the beginning of the war. Among the 22 or so mechanized corps deployed in western russia in June 1941, four formations were well equipped with the new Tank; on the day of German invasion, about 70% of the total T-34 and KV tanks produced at that time were deployed in the 6th, 4th, 8th, and 15th MC. The 6th MC operated in Białystok area, and all of the others in the Soviet Ukraine. All of their engagements with German tanks happened during or just before the Battle of Brody (1941). At the beginning of the war, there were 1590 T-34s on strength whilst the Germans had 1190 tanks with 50mm armamanet ofr larger.

In the opening days of the campaign, the 15th MC destroyed 43 German tanks for the loss of 13 KV, 6 T-34, and 32 BT tanks from 22 to 26 June 1941. The 8th MC lost up to 95% of tanks fiercely fighting in Dubno area between 26 June and 1 July 1941

Tank-to-tank battles were rare at the beginning of operation Barbarossa as Germans did not seek them; they preferred to bypass the Soviet armor when possible. The two stand-out formations, 4th and 6th MC, lost almost all of T-34 and KV tanks during movement, not coming under any German effective direct attack. Both corps tried to assemble counterattacks against German infantry (not against panzers), but the counterattacks had no impact and were barely noticeable. Same pertained to the 15th MC after 26 June.

In the first two weeks of invasion, the Soviet Union suffered the loss of most of its T-34 and KV tanks, as well as the loss of most of the older tanks (over 80% of losses were not combat related): 

By 12 July 1941, the 4th MC had 45 new tanks out of the original 414.
By 27 June 1941, the 6th MC had ceased to exist having lost all 450 new tanks.
By 7 July 1941, the 8th MC had 43 tanks (both old and new) out of original 899.
By 7 July 1941, the 15th MC had 66 tanks (both old and new) out of original 749.

On one hand, these corps had within weeks lost most of their T-34 and KV tanks, but on the other hand, German reports did not note such a massive elimination in combat. Quite the contrary, Wehrmacht after action repports noted their high battlefield effectiveness. The number of non-combat losses was unprecedented (and a repeat of what happened to the tigers 2 years later).

In the first weeks of the invasion, the main German anti-tank weapon was the 3.7 cm Pak 36 gun. The new 5 cm Pak 38 gun had just begun to enter service in small numbers, with a maximum of two guns per infantry regiment. Both types were practically useless against the T-34.

German tanks of the time used similar types of guns, ineffective against the armor of new Soviet tanks. Generally the T-34 clearly outclassed the existing Panzer III and Panzer IV medium tanks.

Attempts to destroy the T-34 and KV tanks concentrated on first immobilising them by firing at their tracks and then by tackling them with field artillery, anti-aircraft guns, or by blowing them up at close range by shaped charge grenades.

At the insistence of General Heinz Guderian, a special Panzerkommision arrived on 20 November 1941 on the Eastern Front to assess the T-34. To respond to the Soviet tanks, the Germans were forced to accelarate the intorduction of new, heavier designs such as the Panther and Tiger, which in turn forced upgrades to the Soviet, United States and British tank fleets. The T-34 was awatershed design that fundamentally altered many facets of tank design forever. Saying it was rubbish is really laughable, except that people believe as a serious argument.


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## DonL (Oct 14, 2013)

> And "lie" is a harsh word to use. Please just note that the information is incorrect and provide your corrections and leave it at that.



At normal circumstances I fully agree, but we have discussed this issue with Mr. Bender *several* times.
He is fully aware that from primary sources and the work from Mr. Walter Spielberger (something like bibels about the tanks of the Wehrmacht in german language), the Panzer III had problems with his turrets and the bore diameter of the turrets for a long barrel. 7,5cm gun.
Also after Mr. Bender's claims the VK 3001H was 1941 production ready and killed from Albert Speer, both claims are totaly incorrect and also this was discussed several times.
Also Mr. Bender claimed that the Panzer IV was designed from the beginning as a weapon carrier and not a tank.

He has his very own world of the development of german tanks.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/tanks-europe-1944-45-a-33460.html#post922855
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/tanks-europe-1944-45-a-33460.html#post923357
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/german-afv-pictures-1181-10.html#post974605

As you can see the issue was more then one time discussed and to repeat over and over claims that are incorrect, how will you name this?

Edit to parsifal



> The germans did toy with making a straight copy of the t-34, but for reasons relating mostly to national pride, decided against such abject copying



To Mr. Spielberger this is incorrect.
There are two *main* reasons against this project

1. The germans had not the ability to produce the T34 engine through the lack of aluminium. There was not enough aluminium for the LW and a mass produced tank engine. And a german grey iron block and cylinder head would have weight about 1300-1400kg.
Also there was a big question if such a german engine will match to the original T34 engine room and the logistic problem of the mixed supply of petrol and diesel for tank divisions..
2. The second reason was clearly the silhouette of such a german copy and the danger on the battlefield through mistaken identities and the confusion of the own troops.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 14, 2013)

DonL said:


> 2. The second reason was clearly the silhouette of such a german copy and the danger of the battlefield through mistaken identities and the confusion of the own troops.


I've read several stories how later German armor was mistaken for a T-34 by Russian solders during the winters on the eastern front...


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## parsifal (Oct 14, 2013)

_The germans did toy with making a straight copy of the t-34, but for reasons relating mostly to national pride, decided against such abject copying _




> To Mr. Spielberger this is incorrect.
> There are two main reasons against this project
> 
> 1. The germans had not the ability to produce the T34 engine through the lack of aluminium. There was not enough aluminium for the LW and a mass produced tank engine. And a german grey iron block and cylinder head would have weight about 1300-1400kg.
> ...




I dont have a copy of Spielberger, so ill have to accept what you say. However, the germans could have reverse engineereed the T-34 and exchanged the aluminium engine blocks with something more suited to the Germans, im sure. There definately was talk of a straight copy of the T-34, but it was dropped pretty quickly


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## DonL (Oct 14, 2013)

Parsifal,

it wasn't all that easy, the engine was a real problem and the germans weren't also happy with the T 34/76 turret, which was in reality a major flaw.
They wanted their 7,5cm L70 gun.
So the reeingineering wasn't small more a big one.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 14, 2013)

The sloping armor of the T-34 was not a lesson lost on the Germans, it was taken very seriously.

The Germans also used captured T-34s, designated PzKfw T-34(r), mostly the T-34/76 though there were much fewer T-34/85 captured and used from 1943 onwards.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 14, 2013)

DonL said:


> Mr. Bender is making claims which are truly lies!
> 
> As Juha posted the Marder series was a conversion of different chassis with captured 7,62cm barrels.
> The Panzer III was equipped as immediate action to the arrival of the T34 (August 1941) with the long 5cm L60 barrel.
> ...



How about we stop using the word Lies and change it to "information is not correct" or "Inaccurate". You can get your point across without being an ass...



silence said:


> And "lie" is a harsh word to use. Please just note that the information is incorrect and provide your corrections and leave it at that.



Smart. Listen to this man DonL.


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## silence (Oct 14, 2013)

DonL said:


> Parsifal,
> 
> it wasn't all that easy, the engine was a real problem and the germans weren't also happy with the T 34/76 turret, which was in reality a major flaw.



Yep. The 34/76 had a two man turret with commander doubling as gunner (I think). The Germans wanted to keep their three-man turret design so that the commander could focus on commanding and the gunner on gunning. And the early "MickeyMouse" turret hatch design - which was hinged towards the front - was just horrid. It looks kinda like the commander almost had to climb out to get a good view of what was ahead.

With all its flaws, though, it was perhaps the most revolutionary tank every produced.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 14, 2013)

The Germans actually referred to the Soviet turret as the "Mickey Mouse" because the hatches resembled Mickey Mouse's ears when they were open.

Most were sent to Riga for reworking to upgrade to Wehrmacht specs


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## silence (Oct 14, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> The sloping armor of the T-34 was not a lesson lost on the Germans, it was taken very seriously.
> 
> The Germans also used captured T-34s, designated PzKfw T-34(r), mostly the T-34/76 though there were much fewer T-34/85 captured and used from 1943 onwards.



What's interesting about this is that many ships in both the Kaiser's fleet and the RN of WWI had internal scarps as backups to the main armor belt (although these scarps were nothing like what went on the Scharnhorst and Bismarck class). If the T-34 was indeed the first major tank to use sloped armor (and I have no idea if it was or was not), you have to wonder why this naval feature was not incorporated on tanks earlier.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 15, 2013)

If you want to get right down to it, the first instance of sloped armor plating used in warfare would have been the Confederate States Navy's CSS Virginia (referred to sometimes by the original name: USS Merrimack)

The German school of thought was similiar to other circles where a fortified Glacis and mobility would keep the tank out of harm's way...even though there were examples of how this theory was outdated from lessons learned over the years. Though in all fairness, the French were the first to use it during the first World War.

You can clearly see the line of influence the T-34 had on the Panzer school of thought by looking at the pre-1941 designs: PzKfw I, II, III, IV - Tiger, StuG, etc. and post 1941: Panther, Tiger, Jagdpanzer and Hetzer.

And other countries were quick to adapt, too...so the credit for this "modern" revolution goes to Mikhail Koshkin of the Kharkov Locomotive factory that designed and built the T-34.


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## Denniss (Oct 15, 2013)

Some corrections to some statements:
Both Marder II and III started as vonversions of existing chassis but were later produced using new chassis (actually more new than conversions).
Panzer IV F2/G production was actually 1927 until June 43, plus ~2930 H and ~3150 J
Panzer III problem was indeed the diameter of the turret ring, adapting it for a larger diameter was like a complete redesign.
StuG III production in 42 was 792 of which ~700 had long guns.
Experience in France 1940 helped the Wehrmacht to speed-up the 5cm-equipped Panzer III production as the 3.7cm was clearly ineffective.

BTW first use of sloped armor in Germany was on the 221/231 armored cars and the 250/251 half tracks


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