# What is the best of these four Dive Bombers?



## SamPZLP.7 (Feb 26, 2012)

There is the Stuka, Skua, Val, or the Dauntless


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## syscom3 (Feb 26, 2012)

The Dauntless of course!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 26, 2012)

Dauntless, 4 Sure! 4 its basic performance, historical importance, effectiveness throughout the war, even in the presence of strong fighter opposition. It was upgradable to enhance its capability (through 6 marks, although the last -6 came too late) . An eminently tough aircraft to deflect from its unholy purpose.


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## davebender (Feb 29, 2012)

- Best bombing accuracy. 
- Automatic pull out system. This may have contributed to accuracy. Pilots knew the aircraft would recover from a dive even if they blacked out or were injured by ground fire. So they could chance diving right to the limit of aircraft capability.
- No dangerous flight characteristics. Operates well from primative airfields.
- Very reliable
- Largest bomb load.
- Best armor protection.
- Tied with SBD for greatest max speed.
- Equally capable at ground attack by placing gun pods on underwing hardpoints.
- Probably the least expensive of the bunch. 131,175 RM / $52,470.

The Ju-87 looked ugly and obsolescent but it wasn't. Neither is the modern day A-10. When ground troops are in need of air support these are the aircraft they prefer.


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## T Bolt (Feb 29, 2012)

The North American A-36 Apache should be on the list. From everything I've read it was a very effective dive bomber and could defend it's self because it was in effect a Mustang. The only reason it didn't do more, or was not as well known was that very few of them were Built (500) due to North American switching production of the P-51 from the Allison to the Merlin.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 1, 2012)

T Bolt said:


> The North American A-36 Apache should be on the list. From everything I've read it was a very effective dive bomber and could defend it's self because it was in effect a Mustang. The only reason it didn't do more, or was not as well known was that very few of them were Built (500) due to North American switching production of the P-51 from the Allison to the Merlin.



Hard to argue with a dive bomber that can defend itself, carry about 80% of the payload of an SBD with a similar combat radius. But can it land on a postage stamp floating in the middle of the great watery desert  

I recall seeing a photo of a P-51 rigged for carrier landings so perhaps it would have been possible. I expect there would have been some penalty to such a capabiity retrofit.


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## T Bolt (Mar 1, 2012)

Carrier trials on CV-38 Shangri-La on Nov 15, 1944. All went well, but the maximum arrester cable speed (90mph) and the stall speed of the Mustang (82mph) were too close for safety.


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## davebender (Mar 1, 2012)

An A-36 carrying a 2,000 lb bomb cannot defend itself any better then a Ju-87D carrying a 1,000 kg bomb. All bombers carrying a payload require fighter escort.


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## renrich (Mar 1, 2012)

If you are going to open up the field and include the A36, then why not the Corsair. It could dive more steeply than the SBD and was almost as accurate and it would run rings around the others.


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## davebender (Mar 1, 2012)

The 4 aircraft in the poll were all in service before the end of 1941. So I assume 1941 to be the cut off date.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 1, 2012)

davebender said:


> An A-36 carrying a 2,000 lb bomb cannot defend itself any better then a Ju-87D carrying a 1,000 kg bomb. All bombers carrying a payload require fighter escort.



Dive bombers tend to be most vulnerable after dropping their bombs during their retirement from the target. I would expect the JU-87, the Val or Skua to be more vulnerable than either an SBD or an A-36 during all phases of an attack. Definitely less vulnerable than any of the fighter bombers that came to the fore in the war's latter stages.

From what I've seen looking, at published specs, the A-36 couldn't carry a 2,000 pound bomb. Whatever it was carrying, I wouldn't expect any dive bomber to defend itself very well before it dropped its payload. A relatively high target approach speed would make the A-36 (Or F4U or F6F) a bit less vulnerable, while the aft-facing flex-guns are the SBD's (or JU-87's) insurance during both phases of an attack. The speed, manueverability, and forward facing armament of the A-36 would seem to be helpful for defense during the retirement phase of an attack.


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## davebender (Mar 1, 2012)

It also makes weapons delivery less accurate. That's why really good CAS aircraft such as the Ju-87D and A-10 fly slowly and rely on heavy armor for protection against ground fire.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 1, 2012)

_Target approach speed _as in _*the high altitude horizontal run toward the target *_not the _*dive down onto the targe*_t which of course involves deployment of the dive flaps to slow the airspeed.


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

Most level bombers and dive bombers cruised at 160 to 180mph with a typical bomb load. What was the economical cruise speed of an A-36 when carrying at least 1,000 lbs of ordnance?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 2, 2012)

You know, Dave, that's a really good question!  

I may have been projecting a bias based on experience here.  In the modern era, an acceleration to a higher _target approach speed _above that of the_ economic cruise _is normal. For example, a target approach speed (dirty) from the _*Initial Point*_, may be some 50-60 knots faster than that of the economic cruise phase and last for perhaps the last 25-50 miles (4-8 ) minutes of flight to the target. Quite honestly, I don't know what a typical attack speed profile was in WW 2. I just assumed whatever it was, that final approach to the target would be faster for an A-36 than any of the other (Non-fighter bomber type) aircraft listed. It's one thing to do this over land assuming the ground is visible and a pilot has ground reference points to always know the location of the target. It's quite another for a naval dive bomber (could be any of the 4 dedicated dive bomber's listed) which is searching for its target somewhere on the big blue (assuming no ASV-type RADAR for target detection). In that case, the _target approach speed _may not have increased at all until the _push over point_.  

You've asked the economical cruise for an A-36. All I can find is what's listed on the web: _a cruising speed of 250 mph_. _*America's 100,000*_ doesn't really provide much that I could find in a quick look on the A-36. I'd be surprised if it were quite that high but I suppose it could be. Would there be a final sprint to the target? I suppose over land there would be, but over water? Dunno! I am hoping somebody here has a better answer.


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

The Mosquito was one of the fastest bombers of WWII. Two 500 lb bombs is a relatively light bomb load. Mission cruise speed varied (i.e. speeding up over most dangerous areas) but average cruise speed for the entire mission (including trip home without bombs) was 283 mph.

I'd be surprised if an A-36 could achieve an average cruise speed anywhere near that fast while carrying two 500 lb bombs. And that's not even a heavy bomb load. Ju-87Ds routinely carried 1,000 kg.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 2, 2012)

I didn't remember correctly my own (35 years past) experience. It wasn't 50-60 knots it was an acceleration to over 100 knots faster than cruise!  The lower speed was in training flights... Not a good example of *train how you fight* and f_*ight how you train*_. But my poor memory is probably because I never bombed an actual target, only did training missions.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

A-36 was able to reach 225 miles with 2 x 500 lbs bombs. The max speed with 2 x 500 lbs bombs was 298 mph @ 5000 ft , WEP setting. The P-51* with 2 x 500 lbs bombs was to cruise at 220 mph. (data from 'Mustang' by Jeffrey Ethell)
So the A-36 was not cruising any better than that; if it uses military or WEP, it's obviously not cruising.

*clarification: P-51B/C/D


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 2, 2012)

davebender said:


> The Mosquito was one of the fastest bombers of WWII. Two 500 lb bombs is a relatively light bomb load. Mission cruise speed varied (i.e. speeding up over most dangerous areas) but average cruise speed for the entire mission (including trip home without bombs) was 283 mph.



That's interesting. I always think its helpful to refer to actual operational examples whenever possible, even if it's not necessarily directly related. 



tomo pauk said:


> A-36 was able to reach 225 miles with 2 x 500 lbs bombs. The max speed with 2 x 500 lbs bombs was 298 mph @ 5000 ft , WEP setting. The P-51* with 2 x 500 lbs bombs was to cruise at 220 mph. (data from 'Mustang' by Jeffrey Ethell)
> So the A-36 was not cruising any better than that; if it uses military or WEP, it's obviously not cruising.
> 
> *clarification: P-51B/C/D



Thanks Tomo, I was hoping somebody would come back with an answer.


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## DBII (Mar 2, 2012)

So no one will defend the little VAL? Sorry, I do not have any sources with me. I read that it was a terror early in the war and it destoried more tonnage than any other plane. Ok fo ahead and start throwing rocks at me 

DBII


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

Typical bomb load was only 250 kg and the Val dive bomber was poorly protected against ground fire. It could bomb accurately but why bother if you cannot carry at least 1,000 lbs on a typical mission? Rudel destroyed a Soviet battleship at Leningrad during 1941 with a 1,000 kg bomb. That 250 kg Japanese bomb would have bounced off the deck armor. 

What would happen during 1942 if IJN dive bombers carried 1,000 kg bombs?
- Coral Sea.
CV Yorktown suffered significant damage (required drydock) from a 250 kg bomb. A 1,000 kg bomb might sink Yorktown. Even if it didn't the damage would be much worse causing it to miss the Battle of Midway.

- Eastern Solomons.
CV Enterprise hit with three 250 kg bombs which caused serious damage. Three 1,000 kg bombs would almost certainly have put Enterprise on the bottom of the Coral Sea.

- Santa Cruz.
CV Enterprise hit with two 250 kg bombs. Make then 1,000 kg bombs and CV Enterprise would be in serious trouble.

BB South Dakota was hit by a single 250 kg bomb which bounced off the deck armor. A 1,000 kg bomb would have penetrated. Then it's a matter of luck which compartment the bomb is in when it explodes. In any case South Dakota will have significant damage.

CLAA San Juan was hit by a single 250 kg bomb which caused moderate damage. A light cruiser isn't heavily armored so a 1,000 kg bomb is going to hurt. 

Of course the effects are cumulative. If CV Yorktown is sunk or seriously damaged at Coral Sea the USN might not defend Midway. If the USN defend Midway with only two CVs Japan might win the battle.

If the USN doesn't win at Midway there probably won't be a Guadalcanal invasion until CV Essex enters service during 1943.


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## T Bolt (Mar 2, 2012)

The battle of Midway was so close that anything could have swung it. A single pilot tripping and breaking his wrist a day before the battle could have changed the outcome.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 2, 2012)

T Bolt said:


> The battle of Midway was so close that anything could have swung it. A single pilot tripping and breaking his wrist a day before the battle could have changed the outcome.



Certainly true, there was so much luck that contributed to the USN victory that it's unfortunately become a matter of habit to ignore the very professional nearly flawless job done by the Yorktown, including it's leadership, her airwing and her crew. The performance of her CAP was excellent. Her dive bombers were superb, flying directly to the target, scoring heavily and returning home with minimal loss. Her damage control teams were outstanding. Her torpedo bombers performed very well considering the handicap of the obsolescent aircraft they flew and of course Thach's TBD escort also performed superbly despite being under strength. (At the last minute, Fletcher pulled two of his weave-trained F4F escorts and assigned them to CAP; perhaps his only mistake in the battle.) Without Fletcher and his Task Force 17, the battle would surely have been lost even with the luck. But winning the battle certainly took luck. There was bad luck enough for both sides but it seems to me, that the really significant lucky breaks were enjoyed by the USN.


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## SamPZLP.7 (Mar 3, 2012)

I would say the Stuka because of its combat experience, not its performence.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 3, 2012)

I'll be devil's advocate and raise the flag for the IJN dive bomber (even though the RNZAF also used the Dauntless, so I'm actually torn between the two types). It might not have had a very big bomb load, but what it did carry was used most effectively. This according to Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War by Rene Francillon: "..the aircraft received considerable success during the first ten months of the war and sank more Allied shipping than any other single type of Axis aircraft." "They achieved fame during the campaign in the Indian Ocean when the D3A1s placed respectively 87 percent and 82 percent of their bombs on target during attacks on the cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire and the carrier Hermes." Not bad for 250 kg load each.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 3, 2012)

Part of what made the Val so deadly wasn't only the quality of the aircraft, it was the quality and variety of the bombs used. Their bombs came as a mixed bag of HE, AP and SAP the latter two of which could burrow deep into the bowels of a ship and do some serious damage.Although it must be said, IJN Bombs were frequently found to be duds. 

During the early carrier battles in 1942, USN SBDs put HE 1,000 pounders into Japanese flight decks on a regular basis without sinking them which suggests a strong case for the survivability of US carriers under similar assault. At Coral Sea, The Shokaku was hit by 3 thousand pounder HE Bombs, and steamed back to Japan with a propulsion plant essentially intact. At Santa Cruz, Shokaku was again hit but this time by 4  1,000 pounder HE Bombs with essentially the same result. On both occasions the Shokaku's flight deck was wrecked and put out of the battle but she survived. Hiryu suffered a similar fate at Midway. But, considering the difficulty of conducting salvage deep in enemy territory under constant threat of air attack, Hiryu was sufficiently damaged to warrant being scuttled. Recall that on each ocasion the IJN was able to plant one or more 250 pound Bombs of any variety into a US Carrier, the ship was able to resume flight operations and continue fighting within hours of the hits. In contrast, at Santa Cruz, Zuiho was hit by one 500 pound HE Bomb delivered by a scouting SBD on armed search and was put out of the fight. 

On the other hand, I would expect a near miss by a 250 kg to be less damaging than one by an HE thousand pounder.

A thousand pounder hit would certainly be a very bad day under the best of circumstances but wouldn't necessarily mean the sinking of a full sized fleet carrier unless it was in the vulnerable state of conducting flight operations when it hit.

Later in the war, Aichi D4Y3 Judy's were carrying 500 kg bombs.


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## renrich (Mar 3, 2012)

Just think what might have happened at Midway if the Hornet had had an effective air group? That wild goose chase of the Doolittle Raid may have been a lucky break for the Japanese.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 3, 2012)

Without Doolitle raid, would there be the Midway battle? (not that I claim it would not, just asking)


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## nuuumannn (Mar 3, 2012)

> Later in the war, Aichi D4Y3 Judys were carrying 500 kg bombs.



Probably the best purpose built dive bomber of the war.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 3, 2012)

renrich said:


> Just think what might have happened at Midway if the Hornet had had an effective air group? That wild goose chase of the Doolittle Raid may have been a lucky break for the Japanese.



Or if the Hornet had had a different air group commander or a different _admiral select_ on the Hornet's bridge! One who could follow orders? Nimitz seemed to endorse the old adage that _every dog deserves two bites_. I guess that was Mitscher's first (and only?) bite.

From wikipedia:

"Mitscher captained [the Hornet] during the Battle of Midway 4 to June 6, but _*his air group's performance in that crucial engagement ranged from disappointing to outright disastrous*_. On the eve of the Battle of Midway, Mitscher, with the support of his Air Group Commander, CDR Stanhope C. Ring, denied fighter air cover to the Hornet's torpedo squadron, led by LCDR John C. Waldron. Mitscher then ordered the strike group to fly a course of 265 degrees true (instead of the 234 degrees of the enemies last sighting). This resulted in most of the air group never sighting the enemy. Waldron's Torpedo Eight squadron, because Waldron disobeyed orders and flew course 240 degrees, flew directly to the enemy carrier group's location. Torpedo Eight was the first carrier squadron to be in position to attack and, unescorted by fighters, was obliterated by Japanese Zeros.... The Hornet strike force following the orders of CDR Ring was unable to find the enemy, and eventually headed back toward either the Hornet, or Midway Island, to land and refuel. All ten fighters in the formation ran out of fuel and ditched at sea. Several dive bombers also had to ditch on their approach to the Midway base. Except for Torpedo Eight, none of the Hornet's strike force played any role on the first day of the Battle of Midway."

The mistakes at Midway apparently did not harm the career of either Mitscher or Ring. Ring was the son of a Navy Commodore, and retired as a Vice Admiral. Apparently the only admiral whose career suffered was that of Fletcher, the admiral whose early decisions secured the victory. A victory that his successor Spruance preserved. 



tomo pauk said:


> Without Doolitle raid, would there be the Midway battle? (not that I claim it would not, just asking)



IIRC, the Midway operation was being considered and preparations were underway but there was some significant dispute about the Eastward strategy embodied by the Midway operation (I assume with the IJA), which was silenced by the Doolittle Raid.


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## renrich (Mar 4, 2012)

I think that the Doolittle stunt caused the Japanese to plan the Midway attack is a myth cooked up by apologists for that Raid. The Japanese were much smarter than that. The fact is that FDR liked the idea essentially for political reasons. The war was going badly and the administration wanted something positive to bolster the president's image. A big gamble which they were lucky to get away with except for the cost at Coral Sea and Midway. You can bet that Nimitz would have not gone along if he had any choice.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 4, 2012)

I think the Doolittle raid played more a validating than a motivating role in the decision to attempt to take Midway. Yamamoto knew he had to take out the USN carriers in order to hobble the USN's options going forward in the Pacific. His plan to do it (Midway) was simply ill conceived in a number of ways. It could have gone very different had he chosen fist instead of fingers and kept his eye on the main objective (the USN carriers). (Is that Clauswitz I am quoting? I should be careful in who I quote, so as avoid the impression I know what I'm talking about  )


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## davebender (Mar 4, 2012)

Without the Doolittle publicity stunt the USN would have 4 CVs at Coral Sea rather then two. Instead of a propaganda victory we might achieve a real victory by sinking the two newest and most capable Japanese aircraft carriers. We might also have gotten the IJA amphibious force after overwhelming their naval escort.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 5, 2012)

renrich said:


> I think that the Doolittle stunt caused the Japanese to plan the Midway attack is a myth cooked up by apologists for that Raid. The Japanese were much smarter than that. The fact is that FDR liked the idea essentially for political reasons. The war was going badly and the administration wanted something positive to bolster the president's image. A big gamble which they were lucky to get away with except for the cost at Coral Sea and Midway. You can bet that Nimitz would have not gone along if he had any choice.



Ren, 

I agree that the assertion that the Doolittle Raid precipitated the Midway battle is a myth that falls before the history. However, I must admit that my initial reaction to your post was to cry, "Heretic!" Burn him! Burn the Heretic!  But then of course I thought about it.  I've never questioned it before, no doubt because the whole idea is so sexy on the surface. Launch B-25's from a carrier to take a jab at the Japanese for Pearl Harbor... Jimmy Doolittle has always appeared to me to be a heroic, larger-than-life, visionary (although evidently Ike didn't think so) and I would tend to accept on faith the wisdom and worth of anything of which he was a part. The raid was such a daring, and unexpected move that it is irresistable (for me at least) to admire. Of course the raid had little if any real military value, but what shot in the arm! That's all it ever seemed to me. An answer to the oft quoted post-Pearl Harbor question "Where is our navy?" The Phillipines situation was becoming ever more dire. Bataan's fall was imminent (to be followed by Corregidor a month later) and I am sure there was a desparate search for ways to soften the blow to the public. So, unable to put myself in the position of J.Q. Public after the Pearl Harbor attack and the continuing bad news issuing from the PI, it seemed to me to be a much needed moral boost on the home front. I am sure it did wonders for Roosevelt's popularity or perhaps more important, that of his party. I would expect that given there were 2 more years to the next presidential election (and campaigns started later back then), the raid wasn't staged _purely_ for political gain, which is _not _to say that FDR's potential political gain wasn't an important consideration, but only if it worked. If it turned out to be a blunder of epic proporations (loss of a carrier and or loss of all or most of the crews, and especially Doolittle) and was made public. It could have seriously harmed his presidency and public moral. 

It certainly retarded the Hornet's development as a potent carrier threat. I think that the biggest price paid (aside from its poor performance at Midway) was the absence of the Hornet from the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. (Not its absence from Coral Sea in May, which I don't think was going to happen for other reasons, see below) However, with hindsight, its hard to ignore the fact that if Roosevelt had simply waited 2 months he'd have gotten far better news than the Tokyo bombing from the results at Midway and I can imagine a more advantageous outcome if the Hornet had been a more effective Midway participant. So in the end, I have to agree there is a good case to be made for the Doolittle raid being a politically motivated blunder.  Is there time to put out the fire and free Ren from the stake? 



davebender said:


> Without the Doolittle publicity stunt the USN would have 4 CVs at Coral Sea rather then two. Instead of a propaganda victory we might achieve a real victory by sinking the two newest and most capable Japanese aircraft carriers. We might also have gotten the IJA amphibious force after overwhelming their naval escort.



Dave, I think the Navy was still wedded to keeping a carrier task force nearer Pearl and its idea of supporting operations was to keep carrier groups about 1-2 days apart. At lease that's the impression I got from reading Lundstom's Fletcher book. The Navy didn't really begin to concentrate carriers (greater than 2 to in a tactical formation) until Midway when it's hand was forced and even there there were two separate and separated groups. CINCPAC did move Enterprise and Yorktown closer to the Coral Sea (near Ocean and Nauru Islands IIRC) after the raid but IIRC that was done to forestall an anticipated IJN invasion. I don't think serious consideration was given to such a move until USN losses were known and the IJN's not yet understood. I am not at home so I can't check my references, but that's the way I remember it.


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## drgondog (Mar 5, 2012)

davebender said:


> An A-36 carrying a 2,000 lb bomb cannot defend itself any better then a Ju-87D carrying a 1,000 kg bomb. All bombers carrying a payload require fighter escort.



A Stuka jettisoning its bombload versus a A-36 jettisoning its bombload - is still a Stuka? A-36s didn't have, nor did they need, escort.


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## cimmex (Mar 5, 2012)

I don’t think a A-36 can deliver the bomb load in a steep dive, so it is no dive bomber.
cimmex


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## Shortround6 (Mar 5, 2012)

It had dive brakes so somebody expected to deliver bombs in a steep dive.


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## R Leonard (Mar 5, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> . . . Thach's TBD escort also performed superbly despite being under strength. (At the last minute, Fletcher pulled two of his weave-trained F4F escorts and assigned them to CAP; perhaps his only mistake in the battle.)



Not to be overly picky, but there was no other “pure” VF-3 section - that is where both pilots were actually from VF-3 as opposed to one or the other or both coming from VF-42 - from which Thach could have possibly drawn a beam defense trained section. 

In Thach’s first division, he and his wingman Dibb were familiar with the tactic. I believe his third section, Cheek and Sheedy were familiar though to a lesser degree, Cheek was checked out for sure, but Sheedy had not long been in VF-3 so how much practice he may have had is problematical. I’d note in their action (Cheek and Sheedy, that is) they were operating as an unsupported section and did not themselves employ the beam defense when attacked. Thach’s second section, Macomber and Bassett, were both from VF-42 and had not been exposed to, much less practiced in, the beam defense concept.

Those who flew fighters of Yorktown at Midway, Thach included, were very clear in that there was no familiarization, even on paper, with his beam defense on the trip out. The VF-42 pilots, in particular, had absolutely no training or any other familiarization with the beam defense.

There was only one other section in the whole squadron - third section of third division - which even had a section leader from VF-3 (Barnes with VF-42’s Tootle as wing). Thach, himself, was the only VF-3 division leader; the other three division leaders were from VF-42. Of the 12 sections within the squadron’s four divisions, 9 had section leaders from VF-42.

VF-3 organization at Midway:
Rank/Name | Parent Squadron | Bu# | Side# 

*1st Division*
LCDR JS Thach | VF-3 | 5171 | 1 
ENS RA M Dibb | VF-3 | 5170 | 2
LTJG BT Macomber | VF-42 | 5169 | 3​ENS ER Bassett | VF-42 | 5168 || 4​MACH TF Cheek | VF-3 | 5167 | 5​ENS DC Sheedy | VF-3 | 5165 | 6​

*2nd Division*
LTJG RG Crommelin | VF-42 | 5152 | 7 
ENS JB Bain | VF-42 | 5151 | 8
ENS RL Wright | VF-42 | 5150 | 9​ENS GF Markham | VF-3 | 5149 | 10​LTJG ES McCuskey | VF-42 | 5148 | 11​ENS MK Bright | VF-3 | 5147 | 12​

*3rd Division*
LTJG WN Leonard | VF-42 | 5244 | 13
ENS JP Adams || VF-42 | 5245 | 14
LTJG WA Haas | VF-42 | 5144 | 15​ENS GA Hopper | VF-42 | 5143 | 16​MACH DC Barnes | VF-3 | 5142 | 17​ENS MC Tootle IV | VF-42 | 5080 | 18​

*4th Division*
LTJG AJ Brassfield | VF-42 | 5066 | 19 
ENS HB Gibbs | VF-42 | 5049 | 20
LTJG ED Mattson | VF-42 | 5153 | 21​ENS HA Bass | VF-3 | 5050 | 22​LTJG WS Woollen | VF-42 | 5093 | 23​LTJG WW Barnes Jr | VF-42 | 5239 | 24​

Thus, 33% of the VF-3 pilots flying in the battle were VF-3 and 67% VF-42. 75% of Division leaders and 75% of section leaders were VF-42. But, despite the preponderance of VF-42 pilots, generally, and specifically in leadership positions (not surprising as VF-42 was the most combat experienced VF squadron in the fleet) the squadron was VF-3 and commanded by Thach. [That, by the way, should not be construed in any way, shape or form as a criticism.] Of course, most all these assignments of specific pilots to specific aircraft went out the window when action loomed. One took what was in the line-up for one’s division. In the battle, only four pilots actually flew the planes to which they were nominally assigned. Everyone else flew “someone else’s” airplane. 

Also, what happened in terms of the make up of TBD escort was that Thach wanted to augment his 1st Division with an additional section from one of the other three . . . it was the Buckmaster, Arnold, Armstrong, and Pedersen planning group who scotched that idea, not Fletcher.

Regards

R


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 5, 2012)

cimmex said:


> I don’t think a A-36 can deliver the bomb load in a steep dive, so it is no dive bomber.
> cimmex



Define "steep dive."

_"The A-36A proved to be a potent weapon; it could be put into a *vertical dive *at 12,000 ft (3,658 m), deploying its dive brakes, limiting the dive speed to 390 mph (628 km/h). Pilots soon recognized that extending the dive brakes after "peel-off" led to some unequal extension of the brakes due to varying hydraulic pressure, setting up an invariable slight roll which impeded aiming. Proper technique soon cured this anomaly and, subsequently, pilots achieved extremely consistent results."_

Gruenhagen, Robert W. Mustang: The Story of the P-51 Mustang Page 61
_
"The dive brakes were operated hydraulically and located on the top and bottom of each wing outboard of the guns. Plan was that they limit the dive speed to 250 mph but in practice the angle of dive was reduced to *70 degrees* because the high stress of pull-out from a higher angle."_

The P-51 Mustang Variants: A-36 -MustangsMustangs


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## DBII (Mar 5, 2012)

Nice thread guys. 

DBII


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## renrich (Mar 5, 2012)

The puzzle to me is that by accounts the A36 was a more than competent dive bomber with the great attribute of being able to turn into a potent fighter after delivering it's bomb. It used a Allison engine which should not have been in short supply. Why was not the A36 continually produced and deployed thoughout the whole war?


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## buffnut453 (Mar 5, 2012)

Because the USAAF wasn't particularly interested in dive bombers of any flavour.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 5, 2012)

R Leonard said:


> Not to be overly picky, but there was no other “pure” VF-3 section - that is where both pilots were actually from VF-3 as opposed to one or the other or both coming from VF-42 - from which Thach could have possibly drawn a beam defense trained section.
> 
> In Thach’s first division, he and his wingman Dibb were familiar with the tactic. I believe his third section, Cheek and Sheedy were familiar though to a lesser degree, Cheek was checked out for sure, but Sheedy had not long been in VF-3 so how much practice he may have had is problematical. I’d note in their action (Cheek and Sheedy, that is) they were operating as an unsupported section and did not themselves employ the beam defense when attacked. Thach’s second section, Macomber and Bassett, were both from VF-42 and had not been exposed to, much less practiced in, the beam defense concept.
> 
> ...



R. Thanks much for the clarification, and especially for the detailed description of the VF division and section organization. I recalled, from Lundstrom's FJF bio, that someone in authority had scotched the plan for 8 VF escorts and thought it was FJF. It seems to me that Lundstrom's text is a bit misleading in this regard. Page 250:

"_Fletcher reluctantly determined about 0825 not to commit his entire strike....and also reduced Thach's fighter escort from eight to six Wildcats. ... Thach was livid at the change. His experimental defense tactics ... required multiples of four planes._" Lundstrom continues: "_Racing up to air plot...Thach was all set to argue with Arnold until he learned the orders came from above...._" 

However prior to these statements, Lundstrom has made clear that FJF deferred most aviation issues to his fine staff, as you point out: Arnold, Pederson, Buckmaster and Armstrong. So, your account makes more sense to me and Lundstrom's wording may be simply an abreviation for the actual chain of consultation and resolution once the decision was made (presumably by FJF) to withhold a portion of the Yorktown's airwing, pending discovery of the remaining IJN carriers. 

From Lundstrom's text, I got the impression that Thach was frustrated (or as stated: livid) at the change and assumed from the wording it was because he hoped to employ the weave. In *First Team* IIRC, Lundstrom reports that Thach hadn't really had time to effectively brief, let alone train, the VF-42 contingent on the Beam defense tactic so if he did indeed intend to use it with another section, his options appear from your organizational table to have been fairly limited! I still find it extraordinary that Dibb with only modest experience in the tactic picked it up so fast under the pressure of combat.

I always have to be mindful in reading any history that, to some extent, the historian may be providing his interpretation of facts that may have been related to him or her by someone who (ideally) experienced them. In this case, I would guess, based on Lundstrom's _*First Team*_ acknowledgements section that all his work in this field has benefited enormously from his contact with your dad. To whom, along with so many of his generation, we all owe a debt of gratitude.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2012)

renrich said:


> The puzzle to me is that by accounts the A36 was a more than competent dive bomber with the great attribute of being able to turn into a potent fighter after delivering it's bomb. It used a Allison engine which should not have been in short supply. Why was not the A36 continually produced and deployed thoughout the whole war?



I'd venture to say that USAAF was, as the war advanced, was more keen to make themselves an independent arm of the military (to be on level with Navy and Army themselves), and the NAA production of fighters was much more along those lines than the NAA production of Army-support (=tactical) bombers.


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## davebender (Mar 6, 2012)

What accounts?

I've read plenty of first hand accounts where Vals, SBDs and Ju-87s placed bombs on target with great accuracy. If you have similiar historical data for the A-36 then please post it. I have yet to read a single account of an A-36 hitting a bridge, ship or bunker with a 500+ lb bomb.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2012)

davebender said:


> What accounts?
> 
> I've read plenty of first hand accounts where Vals, SBDs and Ju-87s placed bombs on target with great accuracy. If you have similiar historical data for the A-36 then please post it. I have yet to read a single account of an A-36 hitting a bridge, ship or bunker with a 500+ lb bomb.



Nonsense

The A-36 was well liked by it's pilots. I've met at least 2 pilots who flew them and they seemed to to like them and they seemed to be an effective weapon.

http://www.charlies-web.com/WWII_med/A-36 Article.html

_"The effectiveness of the A-36 as a ground attack aircraft was demonstrated on 5 June 1944. In a well planned attack on the large, well defended rail depot and ammo dump at Orte, Italy, Lieutenant Ross C. Watson lead a flight of four A-36s through a heavy overcast on the approach to the target. Watson's A-36s scored several hits under intense anti-aircraft fire while Lt. Watson's aircraft was hit and damaged by ground fire. Under continuing heavy ground fire. Lt. Watson pressed home his attack and destroyed the ammo dump before making an emergency landing at an advanced Allied airfield"_

Gruenhagen, Robert W. Mustang: The Story of the P-51 Mustang Page 63 (from wiki)


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## cimmex (Mar 6, 2012)

Did the A-36 had a dive bomb sight?
regards
cimmex


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2012)

cimmex said:


> Did the A-36 had a dive bomb sight?
> regards
> mini



No it didn'thave a "dedicated" dive bomb sight, it didn't need one.


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## davebender (Mar 6, 2012)

Several hits with what type weapon?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 6, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> http://www.charlies-web.com/WWII_med/A-36 Article.html



Thanks J, This short article has some pretty interesting information on the A-36 as a dive bomber. Glad I read it now and wish I'd read it earlier in this thread... 

One thing about the Val: I recall reading (Lundstrom) that on a number of occasions a few Vals in an attack would dump their loads and engage defending fighters Mano a Mano, while their companions would attempt to press the attack home. This apparently was USAAF reaction to defending fighters. Drop and run or drop and fight-air-to-air).

I don't recall reading whether SBDs ever dropped a weapon to engage fighters or retreat, They seemed to get through to the target under most situations. I don't know much about the operational employment history of the Ju-87 and how it faired in the face of determined fighter opposition. I conclude the Val possessed enough manuverability to pose a threat to a careless fighter and the SBD was just plain tough to shoot down. Its twin fifties and twin 30s evidently able to keep any opposition at bay and possessing as it did, plenty of armor to survive when it couldn't keep defending fighters at bay.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2012)

davebender said:


> Several hits with what type weapon?


The common A-36A load out I would assume either 2 500 or 2 250 pound bombs


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## davebender (Mar 6, 2012)

That's just the problem. 

We don't need to make such assumptions for the Val, SBD and Ju-87. Historical accounts by people like Rudel tell us exactly what type bombs were dropped on certain targets. Why don't we have similiar historical combat accounts for the A-36?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 6, 2012)

davebender said:


> That's just the problem. We don't need to make such assumptions for the Val, SBD and Ju-87. Historical accounts by people like Rudel tell us exactly what type bombs were dropped on certain targets. Why don't we have similiar historical combat accounts for the A-36?



I expect they were just too few in number and applied in theaters where they couldn't make a game changing contribution that would bring them acclaim. 

Here is a book devoted to their activity:

A-36; North American A-36; Dive Bombers the Apache;

Also, descriptions of the combat in the MTO can be found here at the website previously posted by FlyboyJ:

http://www.charlies-web.com/WWII_med/index.html

From: 

North American A-36A Apache (Mustang)

"The A-36 was a successful aircraft. The type flew over 23,000 combat missions, dropping 8,000 tons of bombs, and claiming 84 enemy aircraft in aerial combat. Only 177 A-36s were lost to enemy action, a loss ration of under 1%, very impressive for a ground attack aircraft. This is particularly impressive when one remembers that the P-51 later earned a reputation for being vulnerable to ground fire in Korea."


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 6, 2012)

From: 

North American A-36 Mustang

"The first A-36A flew on September 21, 1942. *Deliveries of the A-36A were completed by the following March*. The _*A-36A equipped the 27th and 86th Fighter Bomber Groups based in Sicily and in Italy.*_ They initially were painted in olive-drab and light-gray finish and were painted with yellow wing bands and yellow circles around the national insignia. Both of these Groups arrived in North Africa in April of 1943 just after the end of the Tunisian campaign. They saw their first action during aerial attacks on the island of Pantelleria, with the first sortie being flown on June 6, 1943. The A-36A was involved in the taking of Monte Cassino, and participated in the sinking of the Italian liner Conte di Savoia.

_*The only other A-36 user was the 311th Fighter Bomber Group, based in India. It saw extensive use in the China-Burma-India theatre*_.

Several sources list the A-36 as not being particularly effective during combat. It seems that this is not strictly correct. Although losses during low-level attacks were rather high, the A-36 was actually a good dive bomber and it was a stable and effective ground strafer. The engine was very quiet, and it was often possible for an A-36 to get nearly on top of an enemy before he realized that an attack was imminent. _*Dive bombing was usually initiated from an altitude of 10,000 feet to 12,000 feet, with bombing speed held to around 300 mph by the dive brakes. The bombs were dropped at an altitude of 3000 feet, and pullout was at approximately 1500 feet. *_The A-36 was fairly rugged and easy to maintain in the field. The A-36 could consistently stay within 20 feet of the deck and could easily maneuver around trees, buildings, and other obstacles while strafing. The A-36A was able to take a considerable amount of battle damage and still return to base. Nevertheless, a total of 177 A-36As were lost in action.

The A-36s did not see very much air-to-air combat, since it was optimized for low-altitude operations and lost its effectiveness above 10,000 feet altitude. It was generally believed that the A-36 was no match for the Messerschmitt Bf 109 at high altitudes, and that it was therefore best for A-36 pilots to avoid such encounters if at all possible. If air-to-air combat was unavoidable, it was thought best to force the battle down to altitudes below 8000 feet, where maximum advantage could be taken of the A-36A's excellent low-altitude performance. Although it was not a fighter, _*the A-36 claimed 101 enemy aircraft destroyed in air-to-air combat. One of the pilots of the 27th Fighter Bomber Group, Lt Michael T. Russo, became the only ace in the Allison-engined Mustang, although several other of his colleagues did score victories as well*_."

A more detailed description of dive bombing with an A-36 is found at:

http://www.aviation-history.com/north-american/a36.html

The four aircraft listed in the poll were all employed to especially good effect as naval dive bombers. While the A-36 evidently enjoyed some success in that role, it was apparently one ship not a target that brought the aircraft or the mission a lot of notoriety.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 6, 2012)

davebender said:


> That's just the problem.
> 
> We don't need to make such assumptions for the Val, SBD and Ju-87. Historical accounts by people like Rudel tell us exactly what type bombs were dropped on certain targets. Why don't we have similiar historical combat accounts for the A-36?


We do, see above...

Nice info Old Crow, beat me to the punch.

The USAAF was loosing interest in dive bombing by the time the A-36 came on scene, it think that fact was pretty obvious. The A-36 compared to any of the above is like comparing a sun dial to real clock. It's evident that the A-36 had a very good if not better combat record within it's short career and I'm sure Rudel would have enjoyed flying one.


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## davebender (Mar 7, 2012)

Japanese Aichi D3A and D4A dive-bombers (D Llewellyn James)


> D3A was produced in only relatively small numbers - 478 of the D3A1 and 816 of the more streamlined D3A2.


478 is 22 fewer then the number of A-36 dive bombers produced.

The D3A2 entered service during the fall of 1942. The 478 D3A1 Val dive bombers fought in battles like Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea and Midway. I've never seen anyone suggest the 478 D3A1 dive bombers were just too few in number to make a significant impact in these battles.

I'd be surprised if the Luftwaffe had more then 400 operational Ju-87s at any time prior to 1941. I've never seen anyone suggest Ju-87s were just too few in number to make a significant impact during 1939 and 1940.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 7, 2012)

...t_oo few in number_ and a_*pplied in theaters where they couldn't make a game changing contribution that would bring them acclaim*_. 

Recognition or notoriety may come from the contribution an aircraft makes in a critical battle (Spifire and Hurricane in the BoB) or through the bulk numbers employed perhaps like the P-40 whose contribution or success was probably less than would be indicated by the numbers employed. The A-36 might have been deployed in action at critical points, *or* it might have achieved some greater recognition by shear weight of numbers. A-36 numbers were as you point out, similar to the Val. 

But with far fewer Vals than the total produced applied at historic moments. Consider the number of Vals compared to the time frame and disposition. The actual amount particpating in the critical battles of the Pacific wasn't even close to the full 478 D3A1 Vals produced. There were probably less than about 120 present at Pearl Harbor, roughly three dozen at Coral Sea, about six dozen at Midway and perhaps about five dozen in the Indian Ocean. Compare the small Val numbers employed to the toll in significant hits on high value targets and its clear that it isn't so much the _*relative *_production numbers and quality of the dive bomber that is important in assessing its worth as the opportunity to do vital damage. The Stuka, Val and Dauntless all had opportunities that the A-36 did not enjoy. They certainly made good use of those moments. I expect that given an equally critical moment, the A-36 would have aquitted itself with equal or greater success _*as a dive bomber*_.


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## renrich (Mar 7, 2012)

SBD2s had twin 30s in the engine cowling. Later models had the twin fifties. The Val was a formidable dogfighter because it could really turn. The smart pilot did not get in a tail chase with it. The A36 was to the AAF as the Corsair was to the USN and Marines.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2012)

IIRC there was a statement that a well flown SB2C was able to out-turn the P-47, simply proving the point that a fighter (tailored for high speed) should never enter the turning fight with a plane designed to fly well at low speed. I have no doubt that Val, SBD or SB2C would've out-turned P-51, -47 and Tempest. But maybe not Zero or Oscar, or some good biplane?


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## Readie (Mar 7, 2012)

A question.
Was the Avenger used as a dive bomber?
John


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 7, 2012)

This may not be a totally fair comparison but let's consider the relative numbers of dive bomber production over the runs of each aircraft relative to total aircraft production of fighters and bombers. This might give us an idea of the relative importance of dive bombing in each venue:

USAAF: combined A-36 + A-24 production (500+ 953)/140,000 ~ 1.04 %

USN: combined (SBD SB2C) Production ~ (5936+7140)/60,000 ~ 21.83 %

US combined Total 14,529/198,000 ~ 7.33 % 

Japan combined Total (D3Y D4Y) 3,300 / 45,500 ~ 7.25 %

IJN Combined (D3Y D4Y) / 16,657 ~ 19.81 %

UK FAA Skua: (190/3,981) ~ 4.77 %

Luftwaffe Total JU-87 5009 / 74,000 ~ 6.77 %

These estimates may indicate the emphasis of dive bombing in the navies of Japan and the US but also the overall importance of dive bombing in a national priority scheme. In this the US, Japan and Germany are fairly close while the UK trails. The USAAF clearly had little relative interest in dive bombing as the normalized number of USAAF dive bombers is smaller than those of the UK considering ONLY the Skua as a representative example! I mean, in relative terms, there were fewer A-36's in the USAAF than there were Skuas in the FAA!

Very generally speaking, the USAAF was developing as a culture focused on strategic bombing and tended to regard anything not directly related to completing that mission successfully as something of a distraction. Battlefield Interdiction behind enemy lines was certainly an important mission but close air support at the front line tended to receive a greater emphasis in the USMC and USN. Of course the A-10, AC-47 and C-130 spectre gunships came out of the Vietnam experience and is now a more an integral part of the modern USAF if not necessarily seen as a prime career path. In this, I am speaking from conversations held with a relative who is retired USAF Col. Pilot with a career split between TACAIR and SAC.

What I think is an interesting question given the existence of the A-36 and its apparent quality is why none were employed by Kenney in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Theater?


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## renrich (Mar 7, 2012)

The Avenger was not used as a dive bomber.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 7, 2012)

Readie said:


> A question.
> Was the Avenger used as a dive bomber?
> John



yep and reputed to be a pretty good one. After Midway there wasn't much left of the USN's trained torpedo bombing corps. Only about one full carrier's torpedo squadron (VT) remained spread between a number of squadron fragments (including VT-5, VT-6 and VT-8 ) IIRC, the air groups of the Wasp and Ranger consisted of two scout-bombing squadrons and two fighter squadrons and no VT squadron. The USN also had a crap torpedo so it was not particularly useful. As I understand it, for those reasons, many TBF sortees were flown with 4 500 lb bombs instead of torpedos).


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 7, 2012)

renrich said:


> The Avenger was not used as a dive bomber.



Ooops... Didn't see your post Rich. I was under the impression that the TBF was used as a dive bomber to attack the Chikuma at Santa Cruz. I'll check that.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 7, 2012)

You'll love this! I have a video showing the TBF used as a Dive bomber: Check it out: It's VERY convincing! 


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXnnyLOF87w_

I did find this reference which convinced me, no matter how good it may have been, it shouldn't be used as a dive bomber, at least its not a method I would have liked... 

from: The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: TBF Avenger, U.S. Carrier Torpedo Bomber

...it was discovered to be a surprisingly effective dive bomber _*if the landing gear were lowered to act as dive brakes*_. 

without dive brakes (which I should have picked that up immediately), I wouldn't expect it to be much of a dive bomber and wouldn't have wanted to deploy my landing gear in combat under virtually any circumstances! 

A number of sources (web pages) show attacks by about 8-12 bomb-toting TBFs on two IJN cruisers (Chikuma and Suzuya) at Santa Cruz with about 1 hit from all the ordnance released. Doesn't suggest a dive bombing attack let alone a successful or accurate one.

Late entry: Consulted Lundstrom who records these TBF attacks as by_ glide bombing_....


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

The dive bombing enabled by landing gear in lowered position was done by F4U. So why not for the Avenger, too, if it proved non problematic?


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## Wildcat (Mar 8, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> What I think is an interesting question given the existence of the A-36 and its apparent quality is why none were employed by Kenney in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Theater?



I can't see Kenney employing the A-36, seeing as it was he who ordered the RAAF Vengeance wing out of New Guinea despite those units operating successfully with the type.


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## buffnut453 (Mar 8, 2012)

Agreed, both the USAAF and RAF were unenthusiastic about the dive bomber as a concept throughout the war. The Vengeance certainly proved its worth and yet it was removed from front-line operations and replaced by other types (eg one RAAF Vengeance unit, I think it was 25 Sqn, converted to Liberators - hardly similar roles).


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## Readie (Mar 8, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> You'll love this! I have a video showing the TBF used as a Dive bomber: Check it out: It's VERY convincing!
> 
> 
> _View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXnnyLOF87w_
> ...






Still a bit confused guys...was the Avenger used operationally as a 'dive bomber'?

The articles I have read seem to indicate it _could_ have been but, don't say if it was in action so's to speak.
I see that none other than G W Bush was an Avenger pilot in WW2.
John


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## davebender (Mar 8, 2012)

Once the bombs were gone a Ju-87 could probably out-turn a Spitfire. That doesn't make the Ju-87 a great fighter aircraft.

Dive bombers are relatively easy to kill if proper tactics are employed. Trying to out turn a dive bomber @ 150 mph is simply throwning away your fighter aircraft advantages of speed, acceleration and climb.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

Isn't that what I've said?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 8, 2012)

Readie said:


> Still a bit confused guys...was the Avenger used operationally as a 'dive bomber'?
> 
> The articles I have read seem to indicate it _could_ have been but, don't say if it was in action so's to speak.
> I see that none other than G W Bush was an Avenger pilot in WW2.
> John



As far as I can gather, Renrich was correct, the TBF was not employed as a dive bomber (at least typically). My statement that it was, is suspect, since I have only been able to find a couple of references to its *potential* use as a dive bomber but no instances of its actual use. I thought the best possibility might be chichi jima, but haven't found any verification of that. The use of the landing gear as a dive break is mentioned on a number of sites and I can assure you that Grumman iron works would be capable of producing landing gear assemblies with that kind of strength, so perhaps it was occasionally used in that manner.

Would I want to do it? Personnally, I don't like the idea. Let the F4U studs adopt that tactic. Evidently the F4U Main gear doors (purpose designed?) acting as ersatz dive breaks:

http://forums.ubi.com/archive/index.php/t-186248.html

with F4U dive methodology described in this forum in a lengthy post reproduced from FAA test pilot Capt Eric Brown's _*Wings of the Navy*_. 

Scrivner's _*TBF/TBM Avenger in action*_ Series pub states that a weapon delivery on a moving vessel was to attack in a 30-45 degree _*dive *_to a release point at 500 ft or less altitude. An intervalometer was used to release the bombs (presumably a stick of 4 x 500 pounders) in a string 60-75 feet apart.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 8, 2012)

davebender said:


> Once the bombs were gone a Ju-87 could probably out-turn a Spitfire. That doesn't make the Ju-87 a great fighter aircraft.



At speed - I doubt it...


davebender said:


> Dive bombers are relatively easy to kill if proper tactics are employed.


The same could be said for any bomb laden single engine aircraft


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 8, 2012)

Wildcat said:


> I can't see Kenney employing the A-36, seeing as it was he who ordered the RAAF Vengeance wing out of New Guinea despite those units operating successfully with the type.



This really is a bit of a mystery. Why would Kenney be so dead set against a proven antishipping technology/technique in a theater that ahould have provided a target rich environment?


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## T Bolt (Mar 8, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> This really is a bit of a mystery. Why would Kenney be so dead set against a proven antishipping technology/technique in a theater that ahould have provided a target rich environment?


A commending general's unreasonable hatred for a particular aircraft is nothing new here.. Doolittle hated the B-24 so much that he had all of them removed from the 8th Air Force, most going to the 15th in Italy.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 8, 2012)

This is doubly interesting because both Kenney and Doolittle were reputed to be among the most technically savvy generals! What did they know about these aircraft (B-24 / A-35) or the dive bombing technique that turned them off to them/it? Do you have a reference for Doolittle's antipathy to the Liberator? I'd like to read more on that. B-24 and PB4Y has always been a favorite of mine, but don't know much about them other than some very favorable operational accounts


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 8, 2012)

Raid on Chichi Jima, Possibly an excerpt or interview releated to or from Bradley's _*Flyboys*_:

A Strike on Chichi Jima in Sea Forum

The pilot(s) talk of _*dives *_without further elaboration. 

One TBM suffered significant damage due to a collision with another Avenger damaged and ultimately destroyed by AAA. This one evidently made it back but ditched near its carrier! Check out the fusalage aft of the turret. It's been damaged too and the aircraft folded up on water impact. Pilot (only one aboard) survived. 

Grumman Iron works indeed:


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 8, 2012)

Air Power Development Centre

"Lieutenant General George Kenney, grounded its three squadrons of Vultee Vengeance dive-bombers in No 10 Operational Group on this day. The Vengeance units formed half the operational strength of 10 Group, a new mobile force formed by the RAAF to keep up with its American allies as they advanced north-west through New Guinea. Kenney, however, considered the US-built Vengeance to be a failed and inefficient type, and was unwilling to have them taking up space on overcrowded airfields in the forward area. T_*he Vengeances had only taken part in operations for a few weeks when he ordered them out of New Guinea*_." 

This sounds like he just wanted longer-ranged, higher-payload B-24s and didn't have ramp space for both types. But there must have been more to it. The fact that these aircraft weren't even USAAF owned and only in operation for a brief time smacks of some sort of attendent political issue.


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## Wildcat (Mar 8, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Air Power Development Centre
> 
> "Lieutenant General George Kenney, grounded its three squadrons of Vultee Vengeance dive-bombers in No 10 Operational Group on this day. The Vengeance units formed half the operational strength of 10 Group, a new mobile force formed by the RAAF to keep up with its American allies as they advanced north-west through New Guinea. Kenney, however, considered the US-built Vengeance to be a failed and inefficient type, and was unwilling to have them taking up space on overcrowded airfields in the forward area. T_*he Vengeances had only taken part in operations for a few weeks when he ordered them out of New Guinea*_."
> 
> This sounds like he just wanted longer-ranged, higher-payload B-24s and didn't have ramp space for both types. But there must have been more to it. The fact that these aircraft weren't even USAAF owned and only in operation for a brief time smacks of some sort of attendent political issue.



How Kenney came to the conclusion that the Vengeance was ineffective is a mystery to me, and I dare say to the RAAF leaders of 77 Wing also. To say that the news came as a shock to them would be an understatment. No.24 squadron had been flying dive bombing missions over both New Britain and New Guinea for a full 6 months prior to this, losing not a single aircraft to enemy fighters and possibly 3 to AA fire (all force landed on return to base with engine problems). As for accurately putting bombs on difficult targets hiden in mountainous jungles, the Vengeance had no equal in New Guinea, certainly more suited to the role than the P-38 which is often quoted as being the aircraft the Vengeances were making room for on the "overcrowded" airfields.


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## R Leonard (Mar 8, 2012)

I think we need to be a little clearer on terminology. In the WWII timeframe the USN identified four different air attack profiles
1. dive bombing​2. glide bombing​3. horizontal bombing at level flight​4. low-level bombing at minimum altitudes​
Dive bombing was defined as occurring at angles of attack ranging from 90° down to 60°. If you were to look at the major “real” dive bombers from the war years (SBD, D3A, Ju87, SB2C and so on) you would quick note that they all have common features, among which was that they carried their primary ordnance center-lined and they all employed bomb displacement gear to swing said ordnance when released clear of the propeller arc. Bomb displacement gear was developed in the late 1920s when it was determined that a steep angle dive and release could present some unpleasant results if the ordnance were to come in contact with a spinning propeller. This unhappy fact was in conflict with the greater accuracy, not to mention certain foiling of defensive fire solutions, one could achieve with near vertical angles of attack and a center-line carrying of the ordnance. Thus the displacement gear would swing the bomb clear in an arc and producing a known trajectory pattern for which one could account in one’s sighting picture. The other handy piece of equipment was a dive brake of some kind, not so much to slow the aircraft, but to provide stabilization during the ordnance delivery. This was found in various forms on the major dive bomber players; its absence was a noticeable performance limiter in others such as the SB2U.

Such WW2 dive bombing attacks as defined by and executed by the USN (90° down to 60°) fell easily in the realm of the SBD and the SB2C, both of which were equipped with said bomb displacement gear and dive brakes. A dive bombing attack, correctly executed, especially when in the 75° plus angles of attack range was very difficult to defend against from either directed AA fire or even from a CAP. (The SB2U, again, was a whole different ballgame in spite of the presence of displacement gear but without a dive brake.)

Glide bombing was defined as occurring at angles of attack ranging from 55° down to 30°. Glide bombing by attack, as opposed to fighter, aircraft was where one could expect to find torpedo-bombers as no displacement gear is required. The TBF, then, was not a “dive bomber” nor was it used for dive bombing attacks as defined by the USN. There are two issues here, the construction of the aircraft and doctrine, the second being somewhat driven by the first. 

If you look at the TBF/TBM you can see that the ordnance is carried internally in a closed bomb bay. The airplane did not have displacement gear and so, with the combined factors of internal storage and simple drop mechanism, glide bombing the best the type could do. Quite frankly, a discussion centered on lowering ones landing gear to reduce diving speed, and thus facilitate a dive bombing profile, is so much nonsense . . . no displacement gear equals no dive bombing.

The TBF/TBM could most certainly execute a glide bombing attack and, especially as worthy targets for torpedoes went away, quite often did. Glide bomb, however, remained a very dangerous way of doing business. Although one keeps one’s speed up, it requires a straight in approach on a target which, if shooting back, is straight into the optimal angle of defensive fires. This is similar to the torpedo attack profile which was not known for happy outcomes. Note the results with VMSB-241 at Midway, in the aforementioned SB2U (the non-dive bombing dive bomber) . . . losses not as bad as VT-8 (det), VT-8, VT-6 or VT-3, but certainly bad enough, and mostly due to over-exposure. The only advantage over the torpedo approach was speed, the more the better. 

Horizontal level bombing is usually, and correctly, thought of as being in the province of the multi-engine bomber - more often than not carried out at some altitude above the expected effective AA fire. What is often forgotten is that the TBF/TBMs were equipped with Norden bomb sights (after all, the Norden bomb sight was developed for the USN long before the USAAF ever got their hands on one). But what should be remembered is that the USN was well aware that level bombing of moving ships was pretty much an exercise in futility. Level bombing by TBF/TBMs was pretty much limited to shore targets and usually from those higher altitudes. At the end of the war it was not unusual to see flights of TBMs unloading their ordnance on stationary targets such as the ferry docks at Hakodate on Hokkaido while the dive bombers and fighter-bombers went after the ferries themselves. Interestingly, in the last month of combat operation by the fast carriers of TF-38, not a single torpedo was dropped. TBMs were exclusively bomb haulers, almost exclusively in the level bombing profile, and SUBCAP depth bomb carriers.

Low level bombing was originally the preferred method for fighters, back to the days of F4Fs carrying itty-bitty bombs. Some early fighter squadrons, VF-42 and VF-3 come to mind, dispensed with the idea entirely and removed the bomb racks from under the wings of their aircraft. No racks, no low level bombing. All that said, the advent of the rocket for low level attacks reopened the field to just about anyone who wanted to play. All the active carrier aircraft by the end of the war, F6F, F4U, FM-2, TBM, TBF, SB2C carried and dispensed rockets with great abandon at maritime and land targets. One F6F driver even was able to down a Japanese airplane with a rocket. Napalm was another interesting capability brought increased usage of low level bombing in support of ground forces.

And then there were the variations on a theme. Fighters such as the F6F and F4U, by the end of the war were known for their bomb hauling ability. It is oft bandied about that these fighters, when not performing more glamorous fighter type shooting up the bad guys’ airplanes duties or even those pesky, and much more common, low level attacks, executed dive bombing attacks. Well, yes . . . and no. A more correct description was a very steep glide bombing profile or, perhaps, a not so steep dive bombing attack. The truth to the matter was these attacks were usually conducted at attack angle ranging from about 40° up to around 65°, on rare occasion up as high as 70°. Note that this profile neatly straddles the high end of the glide profile, the 5° demarcation between glide and dive profile and into the low end of the dive profile. While still facing the potential problem of traveling through some prime defensive fire terrain, the speeds at which such attacks could be executed paid off more for the attacker then the angle of approach did for the defender . . . not to mention that Japanese AA fire had its, ummm, problems, which only got worse as time went on. Bombs on these types were usually carried somewhat off center and attached to underside pylons. This method provided a separation factor which allowed them to enter the attack profile nether area somewhere between the glide bombing and dive bombing profiles. It was certainly not, popular tales to the contrary, a common practice to lower landing gear in the F4U, nor the F6F for that matter, when delivering any bomb attack. It should be remembered that speed was the name of the game, more speed meant less time under fire. The inconvenient fact arguing against such an odd practice was that there were limits to the speeds at which one should or could lower one’s landing gear, specifically pointed out the respective pilot’s manuals. In neither of the manuals is there any discussion of lowering landing gear in a dive profile; in fact, for example, the F4U manual warns against EXCEEDING 375 kts in a dive when carrying ordnance. The gunsight in these fighters could be used to arrive at the correct release point for the weight of bomb carried at the speed the airplane was travelling; there was no need to slow down, nor any desire to do so. Generally, attacks by these fighter attacks would be generally classed as low-level and glide bombing attacks were one to adhere to the doctrinal definitions . . . if a true dive-bombing attack profile was called for, there were dedicated aircraft for that purpose and fighters were better used for AA suppression.

A big part of the problem in discussing dive bombing and USN aircraft is correct use of the terminology. Dive bombing has a very specific meaning and does not mean simply some degrees off the horizontal. By the USN’s own definitions, the TBF/TBM was a glide bomber, not a dive bomber. 

Rich


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 8, 2012)

Rich,

Thank you for taking the time to post this extensive and eloquent treatise on bombing. I suspect I wasn't the only one here diligently searching the web for exactly the concise tutorial you've provided us here!

Bravo! 

Late entry: Based on the above, it would seem:

Vultee A-31/35 Vengeance: Equipped with dive brakes, delivered ordnance in a high angle dive (>70 degrees) using dive brakes, centerline, internal bomb releases using an extending bomb bay crutch to move ordnance clear of the prop arc. Conclusion: A proper dive bomber. 

North American A-36 Apache: Equipped with dive brakes, wing mounted bombs (clear of the prop arc at release), delivered ordnance in a high angle dive (>70 degrees) using dive breaks: Conclusion: a proper dive bomber, perhaps slightly handicapped by off-center-line stores position.

As Rich points out above, the TBF/M and F4U, would appear not to be proper _dive bombers _for a couple of design and weapon delivery shortcomings.

I remain curious about Kenney's apparent distaste for dive bombers and dive bombing


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## T Bolt (Mar 8, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> This is doubly interesting because both Kenney and Doolittle were reputed to be among the most technically savvy generals! What did they know about these aircraft (B-24 / A-35) or the dive bombing technique that turned them off to them/it? Do you have a reference for Doolittle's antipathy to the Liberator? I'd like to read more on that. B-24 and PB4Y has always been a favorite of mine, but don't know much about them other than some very favorable operational accounts


I read it in a book 12+ years ago but don't remember which one. I'll have a look around and see if I can find it. The other source of the info was my father. He was with the 490th bomb Group, 8th Air Force and when I quoted what I had read to him about Doolittle, he went off on Doolittle using very colorful language. Apparently he too knew that Doolittle was the cause of the B-24s being moved to the 15th Air Force. My fathers colorful language was due to the fact that he was moved to Italy along with the Liberators and went from being quartered in a cozy heated quonset hut to living in a tent.


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## davebender (Mar 8, 2012)

Interesting material but it fails to discuss the most important point.

A bombers purpose is to put bombs on target. That's what counts, not delivery angle or tonnage dropped which misses the target. What was TBF accuracy when "Glide Bombing"? What was SB2C accuracy when "Dive Bombing"? If the TBF can place bombs within 30 meters of a target I don't care if it's flying upside down when bombs are released. 

The standard for comparison.
HyperWar: The Battle of Britain--A German Perspective


> Ju87B-1 (the model in service in 1939-1940), "was to prove effective in the hands of expert pilots, who, in dives of eighty degrees to within 2,300 feet from the ground, could *deliver a bomb with an accuracy of less than thirty yards*. Even average pilots could achieve a twenty-five percent success rate in hitting their targets



Badass of the Week: Hans-Ulrich Rudel
Rudel claims (in "Stuka Pilot") he could always hit within 10 meters of the target when flying a Ju-87. It's a good thing for us Germany didn't find a way to clone him.


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## Jabberwocky (Mar 8, 2012)

Chris Bellamy’s ‘_The evolution of modern land warfare: theory and practice_’ says that a Ju-87 “in a dive could put 25% of their bombs in a 50 metre diameter circle”. (Pg 85)

There is no doubt that a Ju-87 COULD deliver a bomb in a 30 yard circle, but I don’t believe that figure is properly reflective of the CEP of the Stuka in combat.


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## Jabberwocky (Mar 8, 2012)

Some more information, gleaned from another forum:

"A study on of fighter-bomber attacks on bridges over the Savio River in Italy during the spring of 1944 found a sharp drop-off in bombing accuracy directly correlated with the intensity of flak fire. With no flak, P-47s could put half of their bombs within 180 feet of their target and required 30 bombs to score one hit. With medium flak, accuracy dropped to 300 feet, requiring 84 bombs per hit; with heavy flak, it was 420 feet and 164 bombs."

"Later research found that it took an average of 3,500 bombs or 800 rockets to get a single tank hit. ... After the Normandy fighting, the Operational Research Section of Montgomery's 21st Army Group combed the battlefield and examined 301 tanks and self propelled guns left by the retreating Germans. Only 10 were found to have been hit by air-to-ground rockets. On close examination, many of the vehicles proved undamaged." 

_Air Power_, Stephen Budiansky

So Stuka CEP: 25% within 164 ft, but no indication of whether this is opposed or unopposed
P-47 CEP: 50% within 180 feet unopposed, 50% within 300 feet to medium flak opposition, 50% within 420 feet to heavy flak opposition

I'm downloading USAF study 163 at the moment, might be some more answers in there.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 8, 2012)

Flight Deck Width dimensions: 

6/4/42: IJN Soryu: 85.3 ft
6/4/42: USS Yorktown, CV-5: 86. ft (although I have seen flight deck width quotes up to 114 ft)
1/10/41: HMS Illustrious: 95 ft.

The targets are all manuevering at about 30 knots when hit by multiple bombs carried by respectively:

*Douglas SBD Dauntless* (9 aircraft) (3 hits)
*Aichi Type 99 D3A 'Val'* (7 aircraft) (3 hits)
*Junkers Ju-87 * (10 aircraft) (6 hits) revised to: (30 aircraft) (6 hits)

(wikipedia claimed 10 Ju-87s accoounted for the 6 hots...)
In all three cases, the aircraft were flown by essentially experienced crews with the USN's VB-3 perhaps slightly less well tuned compared to Fliegrcorps X and the Hiryu's Kanbaku unit but I suspect there was really little difference in the general skill level of the three units. (VB-3's commanding officer, Max Leslie had a malfunction that resulted in loss of his bomb so his particular expertise was lost in this attack)

It seems to me that the results are similar enough to suggest an essentially common high level of skill on the part of the three prime practitioners of this particular trade: USN, IJN and Luftwaffe, as well as a fair degree of parity in the accuracy of each platform. Which aircraft would I want to be in? A Grumman A-6 Intruder thank you very much... but failing that, I'd say without a doubt or hesitation, a Douglas SBD Dauntless.

Late revision: Reading Ian Cameron's _*Wings of the Morning *_he states _*30 Stukas*_ bombed the _*Illustrious*_ and scored the _*6 hits*_ that tore up the RN Carrier. That suggests no essential difference in the performance of the three nation's flyers or that Flieger Corps X's flyers and JU-87s may have been slightly less effective. However, the Illustrious enjoyed little to no CAP defense while the 7 Vals were the survivors of a murderous interception by a dozen of Yorktown's veteran composite VF-3/-42 squadron. Three months later the HMS Ark Royal was faced with a similar attack and escaped essentially unharmed. She was defended by about 7 _*Fulmars*_ which collectively fought off a raid by some 18 Ju-87 and ~9 Me-110 escorts. Another _*4 Fulmars*_ appear to have fought off a similar sized formation. Fliegercorps X had apparently suffered grievous losses in the interim and its effectiveness was seriously degraded.


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## renrich (Mar 9, 2012)

Many thanks, Rich, for your so clear post about the definition of dive bombing. From "Corsair" by Barrett Tillman, pages 79, 80, 81. Credit for the field mod which created the Corsair dive bomber is generally given to VMF-111 which delivered bombs to Mille in the Marshalls. "Thus began the F4U's unplanned career as a dive bomber."

Without going into all the details( because my typing is so laborious and poor) the Marines were bombing gun implacements which required a lot of accuracy. The standard of accuracy was called the CEP( Circle of Error Probability) The CEP of the SBD was estimated at 175 feet, the Corsair's at 195 feet. The Marines found that lowering the wheels of the Corsairs helped control the speed in a dive. Bombing a 25 foot circle, SBDs could expect to obtain 1.4 per cent hits, the Corsair 1.1 per cent. Attacking a 250 foot circle the SBDs recorded 75.1 per cent while Corsairs scored 68.2 per cent. "Unlike the SBD, which best performed in a 70 degree dive, experimentation showed the F4U could bomb at angles up to 85 degrees."

I always wondered how the Corsair was able to dive bomb with out the gear to extend the bomb away from the prop. I have no doubt that as Rich mentioned the Corsair was not routinely used as a steep angle dive bomber.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 9, 2012)

renrich said:


> Bombing a 25 foot circle, SBDs could expect to obtain 1.4 per cent hits, the Corsair 1.1 per cent. Attacking a 250 foot circle the SBDs recorded 75.1 per cent while Corsairs scored 68.2 per cent. "Unlike the SBD, which best performed in a 70 degree dive, experimentation showed the F4U could bomb at angles up to 85 degrees." I have no doubt that as Rich mentioned the Corsair was not routinely used as a steep angle dive bomber.



Ok Ren, I'll give you that the F4U was very accurate as a _*dive bomber poseur*_ but was it a *proper *dive bomber  More to the point if you were an SBD and had a daughter would you let her marry an F4U?


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## buffnut453 (Mar 9, 2012)

Dunno but if you were a TBM and your daughter married an F4U, would their kids look like this?







Of course they'd have to emigrate...presumably for embarrassing the TBM and F4U families...sounds like a Shakespeare play!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 9, 2012)

Without a doubt   But whereever would they go?

I think there are the makings of a _new and different_ thread in this dialogue. Or to quote: _Monty Python's Flying Circus:_ "_*And now for something completely different!*_"


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## renrich (Mar 9, 2012)

Actually, the Corsair was originally designed to be a bomber as well as a fighter. The XF4U had bomb compartments in the wings which is where the guns wound up reposing.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 9, 2012)

Uh, I believe that was for small bombs to be dropped on enemy bomber formations?

Not quite the same thing


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 9, 2012)

renrich said:


> Actually, the Corsair was originally designed to be a bomber as well as a fighter. The XF4U had bomb compartments in the wings which is where the guns wound up reposing.



That's an astonishing revelation for an aircraft essentially designed in 1938! I would imagine it to represent one of the earliest conceptualization of the modern _*fighter bomber*_ of which I am aware! 

From Wikipedia: 

"In February 1938 the U.S. Navy Bureau of Aeronautics published two requests for proposal for twin-engined and single-engined fighters. For the single-engined fighter the Navy requested the maximum obtainable speed, and a stalling speed not higher than 70 miles per hour (110 km/h). A range of 1,000 miles (1,600 km) was specified.[8] _The fighter had to carry four guns, or three with increased ammunition_. _*Provision had to be made for anti-aircraft bombs to be carried in the wing*_. These small bombs would, according to thinking in the 1930s, be dropped on enemy aircraft formations."

Whatever the motivation for its design, it certainly wildly exceeded such a primitive inceptual notion as a bomb-dropping interceptor. For Vought, perhaps it wasn't the large conceptual stretch I had imagined. Apparently, the Vought F3U (2-place biplane fighter predecessor of the F4U fighter) evolved into a dive bomber: the biplane SBU itself the predecessor of the SB2U Vindicator! IIRC, the RN FAA also looked at the SB2U to complement(?) its Skua fighter-dive bombers including 4 forward firing wing mounted RCMG.
It would appear the FAA regarded it as less capable or desirable than its own roughly equivalently powered Fairey Swordfish!


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## Readie (Mar 9, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> As far as I can gather, Renrich was correct, the TBF was not employed as a dive bomber (at least typically). My statement that it was, is suspect, since I have only been able to find a couple of references to its *potential* use as a dive bomber but no instances of its actual use. I thought the best possibility might be chichi jima, but haven't found any verification of that. The use of the landing gear as a dive break is mentioned on a number of sites and I can assure you that Grumman iron works would be capable of producing landing gear assemblies with that kind of strength, so perhaps it was occasionally used in that manner.
> 
> Would I want to do it? Personnally, I don't like the idea. Let the F4U studs adopt that tactic. Evidently the F4U Main gear doors (purpose designed?) acting as ersatz dive breaks:
> 
> ...



Thanks Mal
John


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 9, 2012)

I must say, Rich Leonard really clarified the situation wrt to the TBF for me with credit for an assist to renrich.


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