# RN going with 15' or 16' for KGV BB - pros cons?



## tomo pauk (Dec 12, 2012)

The Royal Navy went, for several reasons, for 14 in guns for their King George V battle ships. What would be the benefits, apart from obvious (better range shell power, going with more or less modified existing guns)? What would be the drawbacks? How many bigger guns would be the ship of that size able to carry, without compromising the other important 'ingredients' (protection, speed etc) of the class?

MODERATORS: this is definitely a wrong subforum for this topic, please remove it to the ww2 one


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## vinnye (Dec 12, 2012)

The RN may have been better advised going for 9 x 15 inch guns in 3 triple mounts. The quad guns on all of the KGV class ships caused problems in service. In some cases half of the available guns were not in service due to mechanical / safety issues!
Not really what you want when facing up to the Bismark!
The 16 inch gun route was considered but stability was thought to be an issue with the B gun osition during a broadside.
This may not actually have transpired to be the issue envised as the US navy used triples to good effect!


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## Shortround6 (Dec 12, 2012)

The British could design a ship that wouldn't flip firing 9 guns broadside. They had already done so with Nelson and Rodney. Their main armament rotating weight (not the barbettes and stationary equipment) were about 400 tons (10%) heavier than the main armament rotating weight of the KGVs. Without giving up something else (protection or propulsion) such a ship would have come out somewhat heavier and exceeded treaty limits. It is not _JUST_ the weight of the armament but the bigger hull to float it and more armor to protect the bigger hull and so on. 
Most "35,000" ton battleships exceeded the 35,000 tons, some by about 1600-1800 tons and some by 7,000 tons and that is at the "Washington" displacement (no fuel, little feed water, and limited ammunition).

British had no modern 15in gun in the works and it takes as long or longer to design and build the guns and mountings as it does the rest of the ship, a reason the British canceled the Lion class ( 9 X 16 In in triple turrets) and built the Vanguard (8 X 15 in in twin turrets) using left over guns and mountings from WW I ships. Four turrets means a longer hull than three turrets. 

Any new large size gun mounting has problems and the level of experience needed is not helped by small numbers of mountings. Many British sailors had experience with the 15in dual over quite a few years, A lot fewer had experience in Nelson and Rodney despite 12 years of service. Experience with the 14 in mountings was non-existent in 1940. 

During WW I somebody claimed that a dreadnought gun mounting was the most sophisticated piece of engineering in the world. A power driven moving mass of 800 tons or more (WW I, WW II mounts could go 1400 tons easy with the 18in mounts of the Yamoto going around 2500tons) with elevating guns of 80 tons or more, controllable to a fine degree and fitted with shell and propelling charge elevators, power rammers, ventilation systems and communications systems. 

For long range gunnery you need a certain minimum number of guns too. 4 guns was generally considered the minimum salvo for accurate ranging, With a time of flight of to longer ranges taking longer than the time needed to load the guns many navies liked to use 1/2 salvos, spitting the guns or turrets in 1/2 (or 4/5 for 9 gun ships) to speed up the initial salvos and get on target quicker. Anything less than 8 guns was not considered a good "investment" Repulse and Renown being leftovers of Jackie Fisher.


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## davebender (Dec 12, 2012)

RN triple turrets on Nelson class battleships had problems. RN quad turrets on KGV class battleships were little short of a design disaster. Why not stick with the reliable twin turret armed with proven 15" main guns? 

Mk II twin turret.
Same as HMS Hood. This model turret had various improvements over Mk I turret fitted to QE class battleships.

15"/45 naval rifle.
Updated version of the tried and true WWI era weapon.


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## VBF-13 (Dec 12, 2012)

From a ballistics standpoint the bigger the gun the more alteration in the ballistics of the projectiles in each successive firing of the gun. That's due, in part, to the immense heat developed by the rapid firing as well as to the wear and tear and chemical deposits left in the bore as the projectiles go through. In short, the bigger the guns, the more maintenance required, and the more trips to port to have the guns overhauled. In fact, at times, the guns were even taken out of the turrets, and replaced with others with fresh linings. I know the USN held extra guns in readiness, for just that purpose. I'd imagine the RN did, too. But, that'd be another consideration, I'd think.


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## davebender (Dec 12, 2012)

> bigger the gun the more alteration in the ballistics of the projectiles in each successive firing of the gun.


How many dreadnoughts fired enough main gun rounds to wear out the barrel? I suspect not many.

Army artillery and AA guns are an entirely different matter. It was common for those type weapons to fire thousands of rounds during a year of combat.


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## norab (Dec 12, 2012)

davebender said:


> How many dreadnoughts fired enough main gun rounds to wear out the barrel? I suspect not many.
> 
> Army artillery and AA guns are an entirely different matter. It was common for those type weapons to fire thousands of rounds during a year of combat.



perhaps more than you would think. Here are the numbers for the The USN big guns
"Barrel life—the approximate number of rounds a gun could fire before needing to be relined or replaced—was 395 shells when using AP, increasing to 2,860 for practice rounds. By comparison, the 12"/50 caliber Mark 8 gun of the Alaska large cruisers had a barrel life of 344 shots, while the 16"/50 caliber Mark 7 gun fitted in the Iowa-class battleships had a barrel life of 290 rounds"


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## pinsog (Dec 12, 2012)

norab said:


> perhaps more than you would think. Here are the numbers for the The USN big guns
> "Barrel life—the approximate number of rounds a gun could fire before needing to be relined or replaced—was 395 shells when using AP, increasing to 2,860 for practice rounds. By comparison, the 12"/50 caliber Mark 8 gun of the Alaska large cruisers had a barrel life of 344 shots, while the 16"/50 caliber Mark 7 gun fitted in the Iowa-class battleships had a barrel life of 290 rounds"



How many 16 inch rounds did an Iowa class battleship carry on board?


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## norab (Dec 12, 2012)

As configured for WWII and Korea, just over 1200 16" projectiles


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## Shortround6 (Dec 12, 2012)

Powders changed over the years, Some WW I battleships had barrel lives of under 300 rounds, in some case close to 200 rounds. With magazine capacities of around 100-120 rpg that doesn't give a lot of leeway for gunnery practice. General practice was to re-gun (or reline) at about 1/2 the "expected" barrel life. Going into battle with a 1/2 worn and _knowing_ that it will exceed it's expected life before the magazines are empty is not good. More modern powders helped. Lower velocity/lighter charges for HE shore bombardment rounds helped an awful lot. 

If a battleship didn't wear out it's guns in 8-10 years of peacetime duty it probably wasn't getting enough practice/training to do it's job in war time. 

Campbell's lists 335 EFC (effective full charge) as the life of the 15in gun. 

The 15in British was 42 calibers in length. There was no 45 cal length gun. 

New mountings for the old gun/design probable would have had the same problems as the 16 in or 14 in mounts. The guns themselves were not the real problems but the shell and powder hoists and safety interlocks.


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## VBF-13 (Dec 12, 2012)

For what it's worth, Navy Yard in Bremerton WA, battleship with worn out gun linings being refitted with new 14" guns (credits: _Battle Stations_, Wise Co., NY, 1946)...


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## davebender (Dec 13, 2012)

Britain 15/45 (38.1 cm) Mark II
15"/45 was planned for the KGV class. So I've got to assume that's what they would get if the RN opts for 15" main guns.


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## krieghund (Dec 15, 2012)

Germany was pretty much in the same boat. They improved the WWI pattern with the 15"/47cal but the Bismarck was merely an improved Bayern design but the citadel was still too high above the waterline and the deck armor was not as thick or as well protected as her contemporaries. Of course by WWII the battleship was past its day with the advent of air power.

Of course there is still to be something with a battleship at hand....just kicked the aliens ass off of Hawaii!!!


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## Tante Ju (Dec 15, 2012)

Bismarck class had nothing to do with the Bayern...


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## krieghund (Dec 15, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Bismarck class had nothing to do with the Bayern...



Did you mean that the other way round? anyway my source for my comment is from "Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 1905-1970: Historical Development of the Capital Ship" by Siegfried Breyer


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## fastmongrel (Dec 15, 2012)

davebender said:


> RN triple turrets on Nelson class battleships had problems. RN quad turrets on KGV class battleships were little short of a design disaster. Why not stick with the reliable twin turret armed with proven 15" main guns?



The triple 16" mounts did have problems for the first ten years of service shortage of money prolonged the fault busting but had the bugs worked out by 1939 and they proved reliable but didnt quite live up to the original designs with regard to rate of fire due to the loading cycle not allowing single tube reloads. 

The 14" mounts were initially unreliable basically because they were a brand new design rushed into service. HMS Prince of Wales went into battle without a proper work up because an air raid had damaged her at the dockyard during fitting out and before the Battle of Denmark Strait she had carried out one partially succesful practice shoot and had a notably green crew. Bismark had carried out approx 6 months of shoots by the time she went to the bottom, if POW had not been damaged she would have had the same work up and she might have done more than just sign Bismarks death warrant. In 1943 against Scharnhorst HMS Duke of York showed good reliability considering she was pounding into a force 11 gale with every boiler lit and the ship pitching 40 foot. By 1945 the mounts were reliable with HMS Howe showing excellent reliability during shore bombardment missions off Okinawa. The 14" guns were always reliable it was the interlocks and shot hoists proving troublesome, accuracy was reckoned to be exceptionally good. 

The 15"/42 was probably the best all round heavy gun and mount combination ever to go to sea but by 1939 it was past its best. With hindsight we can see that a KGV built with the 15/42 would have been better in 1941 but expecting the RN to fit Grannies teeth to a new battlewagon isnt going to happen it would be like fitting Vickers .303s to a Spitfire.


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## mike siggins (Dec 15, 2012)

i read somwhere the italy had one of the best heavy ship gun of the war


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## mike siggins (Dec 15, 2012)

not that they got used to there full potential


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## davebender (Dec 15, 2012)

By 1945 USN torpedoes were reliable too. That doesn't help during 1941 when weapon reliability was a matter of life or death for British and American military personnel.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 15, 2012)

davebender said:


> By 1945 USN torpedoes were reliable too. That doesn't help during 1941 when weapon reliability was a matter of life or death for British and American military personnel.



The 14" mounts were reliable earlier than 1945 you have selectively quoted. In 1941 POW managed to fire 96 of a possible 132 rounds, Bismark fired 93 out of a possible 104 or 112 depending on source. With no gunnery records from Bismark surviving no one can be sure.

KGV which had had a longer (though still too short) work up had problems but only iirc after firing half broadsides without problem for 47 minutes. 

In 43 DOY managed an 80% firing rate in conditions that meant 1540 pound shells were jumping out of the hoists. We dont know what Scharnhorst managed in the same conditions but from RN records she certainly wasnt firing at a higher rate per tube.

In 45 Howe fired at shore targets so it is not comparable to the earlier actions but she managed to better the rate of any US vessel firing at the same time. This of course means nothing as all complex machines have good and bad days on another day a US vessel might have bettered Howe for % of succesful firings.

In 3 ship v ship actions the KGV class 14" mounts were 2 for 0 not bad for a design disaster.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 15, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> <snip>
> 
> The 15"/42 was probably the best all round heavy gun and mount combination ever to go to sea but by 1939 it was past its best. With hindsight we can see that a KGV built with the 15/42 would have been better in 1941 but expecting the RN to fit Grannies teeth to a new battlewagon isnt going to happen it would be like fitting Vickers .303s to a Spitfire.



Hi, fast,

Would we consider the KGV's 14in to be superior to the 15''/42 in firepower (ie. without taking reliability into equation)? 

For general audience: was the 4x2 15in battleship feasible, to sport same size/weight, levels of speed and protection as the historical KGV?


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## fastmongrel (Dec 15, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Hi, fast,
> 
> Would we consider the KGV's 14in to be superior to the 15''/42 in firepower (ie. without taking reliability into equation)?



In real terms there probably wasnt a great deal between the 2 shells terminal performance. Both were good penetrators and both had a good HE content. The 14" was more accurate and lighter simply because the tube was a more modern design. To the people who were receiving the shells it was probably a 49/51 thing ie too close to call in real terms. However if I was the one at the pointy end of heavy fire I would definitley want to be in the 14" equipped vessel. The 15" as good as it was was 2 generations behind the 14" and no modernisation is going to close the gap, the 14" was possibly the safest mount of WWII in fact possibly too safe as it was often the interlocks that caused the problems. The RN knew the 15" wasnt up to scratch witness the changes made in HMS Vanguard to try and rectify the situation. The changes to the mounts ended up causing more problems than they solved and Vanguard never reached the reliability of the modernised 15" mounts in the Queen Elizabeth class. In fact post war the KGVs were more reliable than Vanguard so the alt history favourite of putting 15s onto the KGVs might not have worked. From wiki _The 15-inch turrets had been designed when the customary practice was to place the magazine above the shell room and it was not cost-effective to modify the ammunition hoists to accommodate the opposite arrangement adopted after the Battle of Jutland demonstrated the dangers of exposing the magazines to long-range gunfire. The ship was provided with a powder-handling room above the shell room to mimic the arrangement that turret's hoists were designed to handle, and another set of hoists moved the propellant charges from the magazines to the powder-handling room. _



> For general audience: was the 4x2 15in battleship feasible, to sport same size/weight, levels of speed and protection as the historical KGV?



No the 4 mount design would have come out longer and heavier with less protection than the 3 mount design. Speed wouldnt have changed I believe as the longer finer waterline would counter the greater weight. The extra 60 feet of length iirc would have cost 2 inches of deck armour (to counteract the high up weight of C mount and the aft director which would need to be 2 decks higher than in the 14" ship) and a shallower torpedo defence, also the 5.25 battery would have had to be mounted closer together and a deck lower to counter blast from C mount. The only way to get the same protection in the 4 mount was to break the Washington treaty big time and that wasnt politically or economically possible when the design was sealed in 1936.


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## Kryten (Dec 16, 2012)

davebender said:


> By 1945 USN torpedoes were reliable too. That doesn't help during 1941 when weapon reliability was a matter of life or death for British and American military personnel.



they were reliable long before 1945, Duke of York disabled the Scharnhorst in 43!
Prince of Wales was a brand new ship with no workup as previously noted, that had as much to do with her reliability issues in the Denmark Straight as any teething trouble with the design, she even had civillian workmen aboard during the battle!


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## Tante Ju (Dec 16, 2012)

Kryten said:


> they were reliable long before 1945, Duke of York disabled the Scharnhorst in 43!



Yes but seems still not quite optimal.

"Many, if not most, of these problems had been corrected by 1943. During the early part of her action against Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943, HMS Duke of York scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. However, HMS Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems."

From: Britain 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII


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## fastmongrel (Dec 17, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Yes but seems still not quite optimal.
> 
> "Many, if not most, of these problems had been corrected by 1943. During the early part of her action against Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943, HMS Duke of York scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. However, HMS Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems."
> 
> From: Britain 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII



The battle of the North Cape was fought in appalling weather, weather so bad a large cruiser like HMS Belfast was only able to reach 24 knots and still suffered storm damage. Duke of York was sailing at top speed into a Sou Westerly gale pitching 40 plus feet rolling 20 plus degrees shipping water over the bows, had all pumps working to clear water getting into the gun mounts and was at action stations for 10 1/2 hours, at shooting stations for 3 and a 1/2 hours and *only* managed to fire 77 salvos of which 52 were straddles. 

We dont have Scharnhorsts records so we cant know how many failed to fire she suffered but under the same conditions as DoY she didnt manage to fire much faster even though theoretically she had a firing rate twice as fast as DoY. I imagine Sch-t had similar problems with 700 pound AP shells jumping out of hoists and crews getting tired and resulting in errors. 

That both DoY and Sch-t managed to fight in such bad weather is astonishing that DoY managed to shoot 70% of possible shots is astonishing. 

If anyone can find an action fought under similar conditions by similar units where the ships managed to fire better than 70% then we can talk about reliability.


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## vinnye (Dec 22, 2012)

I just found this on a website -
HMS Rodney, British battleship, WW2

RODNEY fired two types of salvo, the outer guns of A and X plus the inner gun of B in a five gun salvo followed by the inner guns of A and Y and the outer guns of B in a four gun salvo and this is how she initially engaged the German ship. The reason for this pattern of firing was an attempt to limit self inflicted damage form the blast of her own guns.
RODNEY’s first two salvos were over, her third was a straddle. 

At 0901 hours RODNEY fired her fourth salvo, two shells missed and two were hits. At least one of the shells hit in the vicinity of Bruno turret completely disabling it and partially disabling Anton; also the explosion tore upwards through the bridge killing many on the bridge. 
At 0849 hours BISMARCK returned fire from her Anton and Bruno turrets, the only ones that could bear, on RODNEY. The first three salvos were short, straddle and over. One of BISMARCK’s shells exploded in the water off the port bow and the force of the explosion jammed her port torpedo tube doors.
At 0854 hours the heavy cruiser NORFOLK opened fire on BISMARCK at a range of 18,000 yards.
At 0916 hours RODNEY fired the first of twelve torpedoes from her starboard tube at the BISMARCK, this was the first time a battleship had fired a torpedo at another battleship. All the torpedoes except possibly one missed. 
At 0918 hours RODNEY closed to 8,000 yards.
At 0927 hours BISMARCK fired her last shells from her forward turrets.
At about 0930 hours a 16in shell from RODNEY penetrated BISMARCK’s deck armour and exploded in the port engine room killing most of the crew and putting the engine room out of action.
At 0930 hours RODNEY closed to 6,000 yards to compensate for the failure of her fire control equipment.
At 0931 hours a 16in hit from RODNEY hit Dora turret, which was then abandoned by its crew due to smoke and gas. At the same time Caesar turret fired the last of her shells This hit and the exhausting of ammunition for Caesar turret, ended fire from BISMARCK’s after turrets.


seems like Rodneys 16 inch guns were pretty effective!


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## fastmongrel (Dec 22, 2012)

vinnye said:


> I just found this on a website -
> HMS Rodney, British battleship, WW2
> 
> RODNEY fired two types of salvo, the outer guns of A and X plus the inner gun of B in a five gun salvo followed by the inner guns of A and Y and the outer guns of B in a four gun salvo and this is how she initially engaged the German ship. The reason for this pattern of firing was an attempt to limit self inflicted damage form the blast of her own guns.



According to Naval Weapons of WWII by John Campbell the 5 and 4 salvo sequence was used because the shell bogies which carried the shells from the magazine to the loading rammers were interconnected and all 3 barrels had to be loaded at the same time or cease firing whilst loading 1 or 2 barrels. Firing all 3 barrels in full broadsides caused dispersion of the shells and also caused blast damage as you said. The shell bogies were connected to interlocks so that no flashtight door or scuttle in the rotating mount or magazine could possibly be open whilst firing or loading cordite. 

Some RN officers thought the USN took risks with propellant safety to increase rate of fire. Equally USN officers thought the RN was too careful citing the better shock and fire safety of modern propellants.


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## vinnye (Dec 22, 2012)

The 14 inch guns of KGV were not as reliable during this action ;

At 0847 Rodney opened fire...at a gun range of 23500 yards, followed by King George V one minute later at 24,600 yards...[96] Initially she [KGV] did well achieving 1.7 salvoes per minute while employing radar control but she began to suffer severe problems from 0920 onward [Note: KGV had opened fire at 0848 and fired for about 25 minutes at 1.7 salvoes per minute until 0913, when the type 284 radar broke down, but with no recorded loss of 14 inch gun output until 0920.[97]]. KGV recorded 14 straddles out of 34 salvoes fired from 0853 to 0913, when using her type 284 radar for ranging and spotting.[98] 'A' turret was completely out of action for 30 minutes [From 0920[99]], after firing about 23 rounds per gun, due to a jam between the fixed and revolving structure in the shell room and Y turret was out of action for 7 minutes due to drill errors. . . Both guns in B turret, guns 2 and 4 in A turret and gun 2 in Y turret were put out of action by jams and remained so until after the action – 5 guns out of 10! There were a multitude of other problems with mechanical failures and drill errors that caused delays and missed salvos. There were also some misfires – one gun (3 of A turret) misfired twice and was out of action for 30 minutes before it was considered safe to open the breech.

—John Roberts, The Final Action[97]


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## DonL (Dec 22, 2012)

> At about 0930 hours a 16in shell from RODNEY penetrated BISMARCK’s deck armour and exploded in the port engine room killing most of the crew and putting the engine room out of action



This is physical not possible. A shell from 8000 to 6000 yards fired at Bismarck can't hit the deck armor from angle of fall.
Also I have never heared of this hit. BS citadell (superstructure under the main deck) wasn't penetrated at the end fight.

Neither was there a hit through the belt and slopes nor through the main armor deck (what was impossible through the very short distance)


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## jim (Dec 22, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> The battle of the North Cape was fought in appalling weather, weather so bad a large cruiser like HMS Belfast was only able to reach 24 knots and still suffered storm damage. Duke of York was sailing at top speed into a Sou Westerly gale pitching 40 plus feet rolling 20 plus degrees shipping water over the bows, had all pumps working to clear water getting into the gun mounts and was at action stations for 10 1/2 hours, at shooting stations for 3 and a 1/2 hours and *only* managed to fire 77 salvos of which 52 were straddles.
> 
> We dont have Scharnhorsts records so we cant know how many failed to fire she suffered but under the same conditions as DoY she didnt manage to fire much faster even though theoretically she had a firing rate twice as fast as DoY. I imagine Sch-t had similar problems with 700 pound AP shells jumping out of hoists and crews getting tired and resulting in errors.
> 
> ...


 HOW IS POSSIBLE TO COMPARE DoY conditions of fire with that of S? S was under attack by many ships,was taking damage by many ships, damaged by previus fight, with her main radar destroyed ,with a useless and dangerous commander, and under the threat of DDs . Also had lost Anton turret immediately. She had to run and was running. Only occasionaly was turing south to fire her guns. 
And you use her rate of fire on such conditions to justify DoY s rate of fire? Unbelievable


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## fastmongrel (Dec 22, 2012)

jim said:


> HOW IS POSSIBLE TO COMPARE DoY conditions of fire with that of S? S was under attack by many ships,was taking damage by many ships, damaged by previus fight, with her main radar destroyed ,with a useless and dangerous commander, and under the threat of DDs . Also had lost Anton turret immediately. She had to run and was running. Only occasionaly was turing south to fire her guns.
> And you use her rate of fire on such conditions to justify DoY s rate of fire? Unbelievable



I did not use anything other than the weather to justify DoYs or Schts rate of fire and I am particulary annoyed that you attack me without even apparently reading what I wrote. If English isnt your first language then that is understandable if English is your first language then you are simply trolling. Scharnhorst fought bravely and I respect the memory of her crew, Captain Hintze and Adm Bey. I do not know which particular person you are referring to as useless and dangerous, if either Bey or Hintze made mistakes then so be it no one is perfect. Your attack on a man who died at his post doing his best is revolting and you obviously have no understanding of the action nor any understanding of the pressure of command when facing superior forces and given an impossible mission by a lunatic Charlie Chaplin impersonator who obviously understood even less than you do of naval combat.

Go away do some reading about the action and Beys responses to circumstances. Then you can come back and we can discuss the Battle of the North Cape. However I wont discuss with you the conduct of men whom Adm Fraser eulogised, saying after the battle to the crew of DoY "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today"


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## DonL (Dec 23, 2012)

> I did not use anything other than the weather to justify DoYs or Schts rate of fire and I am particulary annoyed that you attack me without even apparently reading what I wrote. If English isnt your first language then that is understandable if English is your first language then you are simply trolling. Scharnhorst fought bravely and I respect the memory of her crew, Captain Hintze and Adm Bey. I do not know which particular person you are referring to as useless and dangerous, if either Bey or Hintze made mistakes then so be it no one is perfect. Your attack on a man who died at his post doing his best is revolting and you obviously have no understanding of the action nor any understanding of the pressure of command when facing superior forces and given an impossible mission by a lunatic Charlie Chaplin impersonator who obviously understood even less than you do of naval combat.
> 
> Go away do some reading about the action and Beys responses to circumstances. Then you can come back and we can discuss the Battle of the North Cape. However I wont discuss with you the conduct of men whom Adm Fraser eulogised, saying after the battle to the crew of DoY "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today"



I think you are very offended.

Jim wanted to point out that SH had other circumstances than DoY!

With the second salvo from DoY turrent Anton and Bruno were out of action, turrent Bruno joined again action very late in the fight (17.30-17.45).
Also I think what Jim wanted to point out, were the many mistakes of Admiral Bey!

He was a man from the Destroyers and wasn't very experienced with BB's.
The remove of the Destroyers, with the simultaneously balackout of the main radar set (from Norfolk) and the very agressive performance to the convoy from SH were very heavy mistakes.
Also the moving under switch off the remaining radar sets, with the result that DoY could manage to move to SH undiscovered till 11000 yards was a very major mistake! 

After a successful fight it is very easy to say the enemy fought gentle, but to my opinion the Battle of North Cap was nothing but luck and a very bad performance from the commanding german Admiral! Luck through the lucky hit with the second salvo and the disableing of two turrents and the disableing of the machenary at 18.20 through a normal breakdown! That's strictly my personal opinion, but till now nobody could confirm or prove that SH's machinary was disabled through a hit from DoY.

Admiral Bey had done very big mistakes and SH wasn't fighting under the same circumstances then DoY, that was to my opinion, what was Jim wanted to say and this are very hard and proved facts!


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## jim (Dec 23, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> I did not use anything other than the weather to justify DoYs or Schts rate of fire and I am particulary annoyed that you attack me without even apparently reading what I wrote. If English isnt your first language then that is understandable if English is your first language then you are simply trolling. Scharnhorst fought bravely and I respect the memory of her crew, Captain Hintze and Adm Bey. I do not know which particular person you are referring to as useless and dangerous, if either Bey or Hintze made mistakes then so be it no one is perfect. Your attack on a man who died at his post doing his best is revolting and you obviously have no understanding of the action nor any understanding of the pressure of command when facing superior forces and given an impossible mission by a lunatic Charlie Chaplin impersonator who obviously understood even less than you do of naval combat.
> 
> Go away do some reading about the action and Beys responses to circumstances. Then you can come back and we can discuss the Battle of the North Cape. However I wont discuss with you the conduct of men whom Adm Fraser eulogised, saying after the battle to the crew of DoY "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today"


 
You used S rof as point of reference for DoY rate of fire
I imagine you do know that Bey was commanding the german DDs at Narvik . As for the 26/12/1943 Scharnhorst (my favourite capital ship) fought bravely to the end but not skillfully. Bey s terrible mistakes during the entire operation are subject of teaching in naval academy s . Actually it s questionable if ANY of its orders was correct. He was even worse than Lutjens. If S had even an average level of command would never sunk on that particular action.
As for the english s admiral comment about S, by saying good things about its victim further gloryfeid his victory.
If he had ANY respect for S crew ,instead of eulogising them, would be better to pick them up from the frozen seas . They deid a torturing death with the english DDs ,fully of respect for them, over their heads.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 23, 2012)

DonL said:


> Jim wanted to point out that SH had other circumstances than DoY!



A fair comment and thank you for making it but did he have to attack me personally whilst doing it. It is possible to make your point of view without being offensive, it is also possible to put your point of view over without taking someone elses comments out of context.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 23, 2012)

jim said:


> You used S rof as point of reference for DoY rate of fire



I am only going to answer that one comment because I think the rest of your disgraceful post is not worthy of comment. I did not Use Scharnhorst as a point of reference I pointed out that the sea conditions meant that Scharnhorstt was probably suffering similar failures to fire. We do not know and never will unless a diver finds the gunnery logs how many rounds that were fired, how many failures to fire and how many salvoes were fired.

I have never served at sea but I did serve in the Army as tank crew most of that time as a gun loader and I have close personal experience of how hard it is to do your job whilst the surface you are standing on is pitching, yawing and rolling. Fortunately I never had to do my job whilst someone fired supersonic pointed lumps of metal at me.

I will never criticise any man for his decisions taken whilst under combat conditions no matter the colour of the flag he fights under, the colour of his skin nor the colour of his politics.


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## Tante Ju (Dec 23, 2012)

Fair comments from all partipants IMHO.

I do not see though many reason to bash Bey. Yes, different decisions could have been taken, but that's very much with the benefit of hindsight. Bey for example could have no idea of the disposition of the DoY task force, and I find it hard to particularly blame him for maintaining radio and radar silence. He wanted to disengage and loose his pursuants, and he probably knew very well that his radar would give away his position far beyond the range it would pick up contacts. The Germans had fairly effective naval passive systems, and assumed (probably right) that the enemy task force has such too. Come to think of it, Bismarck's passive sets were capable of picking up the pursuing PoW's radar signals even by when the PoW had already lost contact. If he had switched on radar he might as well turned on all searchlights and put a big sign on the bridge saying 'Here I am, come catch me'..

I wonder though if Scharnhorst passive sonars had picked up anything though before DoY made radar contact.


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## jim (Dec 23, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Fair comments from all partipants IMHO.
> 
> I do not see though many reason to bash Bey. Yes, different decisions could have been taken, but that's very much with the benefit of hindsight. Bey for example could have no idea of the disposition of the DoY task force, and I find it hard to particularly blame him for maintaining radio and radar silence. He wanted to disengage and loose his pursuants, and he probably knew very well that his radar would give away his position far beyond the range it would pick up contacts. The Germans had fairly effective naval passive systems, and assumed (probably right) that the enemy task force has such too. Come to think of it, Bismarck's passive sets were capable of picking up the pursuing PoW's radar signals even by when the PoW had already lost contact. If he had switched on radar he might as well turned on all searchlights and put a big sign on the bridge saying 'Here I am, come catch me'..
> 
> I wonder though if Scharnhorst passive sonars had picked up anything though before DoY made radar contact.


 
Mr Tante Ju
I have huge respect for your opinion. However on this case :
Bey had exchanged fire with british forces twice that day. so he knew that the english knew his presence. Additionaly it would be very logical to assume that the cruisers were shadowing him. So the radar silence was pointless. Or at least he should turned it on for brief periods. HE SHOULD suspect that a british battleship was somewhere , or at least take precaution measures against susch a possibility.His passive recievers were giving him strong radar activity Also he should turned into the weather in order to lose the cruisers .
Early that day had allowed the cruisers to pass him at just 12000 and position themselfs between him and the convoy because of his radar silence. Again his passive recievers were giving him strong radar emmisions. Besides ,while he refused radar use, had no problem to use the radio which is easier to be located
The above and much much more is not my critisism.This battle has been widely analyzed and Bey convicted by professional naval officers.
The first one that heavily critised him was his supreme commander Donitz


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## jim (Dec 23, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Fair comments from all partipants IMHO.
> 
> I do not see though many reason to bash Bey. Yes, different decisions could have been taken, but that's very much with the benefit of hindsight. Bey for example could have no idea of the disposition of the DoY task force, and I find it hard to particularly blame him for maintaining radio and radar silence. He wanted to disengage and loose his pursuants, and he probably knew very well that his radar would give away his position far beyond the range it would pick up contacts. The Germans had fairly effective naval passive systems, and assumed (probably right) that the enemy task force has such too. Come to think of it, Bismarck's passive sets were capable of picking up the pursuing PoW's radar signals even by when the PoW had already lost contact. If he had switched on radar he might as well turned on all searchlights and put a big sign on the bridge saying 'Here I am, come catch me'..
> 
> I wonder though if Scharnhorst passive sonars had picked up anything though before DoY made radar contact.


 
Mr Tante Ju
I have huge respect for your opinion. However on this case :
Bey had exchanged fire with british forces twice that day. so he knew that the english knew his presence. Additionaly it would be very logical to assume that the cruisers were shadowing him. So the radar silence was pointless. Or at least he should turned it on for brief periods. HE SHOULD suspect that a british battleship was somewhere , or at least take precaution measures against susch a possibility.His passive recievers were giving him strong radar activity Also he should turned into the weather in order to lose the cruisers .
Early that day had allowed the cruisers to pass him at just 12000 and position themselfs between him and the convoy because of his radar silence. Again his passive recievers were giving him strong radar emmisions. Besides ,while he refused radar use, had no problem to use the radio which is easier to be located
The above and much much more is not my critisism.This battle has been widely analyzed and Bey convicted by professional naval officers.
The first one that heavily critised him was his supreme commander Donitz


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## delcyros (Dec 24, 2012)

Some quick notes as I am running short in time.

[A] Somebody suggested that BIMSARCK has something to do with the BADEN design. This is probably correct, but only for the kitchen, whiches layout in design is similar to that of BADEN. Otherwise, both vessels have a very different design history and very different capabilities. The similarities are superficial only, and Breyer (where did he said this?) is incorrect. Otherwise one could also say that MARYLAND is a warmed over SOUTH CAROLINA or VANGUARD is a warmed over REVENGE class. All these statements are incorrect. If You browse the board, You will find more on that.

* British 14" and 15" APC projectiles had roughly identic capabilities with regard to armour penetration. Differences of the manufacturer are important for both designs, though. Until late 1944, projectiles were dissimilar, depending on the manufacturer and often were found to be defective when striking face hardened armour (shattering at velocities, where they should theoretically penetrate). The issue is not trivial, basically a repeat of RN ww1 experience with shatter problem of their armour piercing period. Eventually, these defects were overcome.

[C] Britain in the interwar period had a political interest to keep armament races limited. This was the principal reason to adopt the 14in design. The UK industrial gun making industry had been thoroughfully destroyed in the twenties (most manufacturer went bancrupt) and production and designing capabilities are poor by the mid 30´s. A 15in armed BB is possible but would likely take longer to construct and test as the ship would have to get bigger. The UK produced a very credible armour protection for their new, fast BB´s (abandoning their average protected ww1 schemes). Time however, is a critical component in the defense of the North Atlantic, it doesn´t buy You anything if You can have ships ready in 1943, You need to have them aviable in 1940 and 1941. That beeing said, the RN was well provided for with the KGV´s and made good use out of them.*


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## nuuumannn (Dec 24, 2012)

I though I might chime in now all the excitement has died down. I'm surprised no one has mentioned the Lion Class battleships, which were intended on being 16" gun versions of the KGVs. Construction of the name ship and the Temeraire was actually started, but was never completed and the remains scrapped. Machinery and so forth were to be the same as the KGVs, but main armament was to be 9 X 16" in three turrets that were to be of the same structural design as the KGVs.

There was even an idea to complete the Lion as a battleship carrier, with a carrier deck aft and main armament forward and island superstructure to one side. 

Lion class battleship - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## vinnye (Dec 24, 2012)

The Lion would have been a decent Battleship - having good speed, firepower and protection - but it was decided to go ahead with the design too late. By the time they were starting to build the first of six, the aircraft carrier has superceded the battlewaggon as the ship to have to project power.
Having said that the RN gave it one last attempt with HMS Vanguard - she was the oly one of her class because we were bancrupt!
It is interesting to note that she reverted back to 8 x 15 inch armament and not 14 or 16 inch in triples or quads!


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## nuuumannn (Dec 24, 2012)

Yep, Vinnye, it sure would have; with it in mind you have to wonder about the wisdom of producing the KGVs, but I guess the British followed the treaties a lot closer than the other signatories and came up with the KGVs - from what I've read a better class of fighting ship than they are often given credit for since the end of the war. I remember reading that in 1942 someone in the admiralty wrote that there was some satisfaction with the ships and despite problems with the turrets to begin with there was no reason why the ships should not continue in service for years to come...


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## fastmongrel (Dec 24, 2012)

vinnye said:


> Having said that the RN gave it one last attempt with HMS Vanguard - she was the oly one of her class because we were bancrupt!
> It is interesting to note that she reverted back to 8 x 15 inch armament and not 14 or 16 inch in triples or quads!



Vanguard was only intended to be a single ship class. She was designed because spare 15" mounts were available and the Admiralty wanted a fast carrier escort for the far east. The mounts take longer to build than the hull so it was thought to be a quick and cheap way to get a battleship in service by early 44. As it was the building went slowly as priorities changed and the Admiralty realised battleships were not needed as much as carriers and cruisers. Also the work to rebuild the mounts and hoists to make them meet modern safety standards took a longer time than expected. 

As it was Vanguard never became a particulary good ship for the money she had stability problems, weight problems, propellor problems and she rarely sailed with the rear magazines loaded, the gun mounts gave a lot of trouble and never got the work needed to bring them up to the standard of the KGVs which had got over there initial problems and ended up reliable. She was a good looking ship though and its a crying shame that neither she nor one of the KGVs wasnt preserved.


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## nuuumannn (Dec 24, 2012)

Yep, Fastmongrel, a shame none of Britain's big gun ships were saved. Top of my list would have been _Dreadnought_, _Warspite_ and _Furious_, being the very first carrier. Now all I have to do is go to Texas and visit the _Texas_.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 25, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> Yep, Fastmongrel, a shame none of Britain's big gun ships were saved. Top of my list would have been _Dreadnought_, _Warspite_ and _Furious_, being the very first carrier. Now all I have to do is go to Texas and visit the _Texas_.



Warspite was considered for preservation and should have been with such a record but the pounding she took in 2 wars meant that by 45 she would have needed a complete rebuild to keep her afloat. Britain didnt have the money at the time and we were desperate for steel.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 28, 2012)

2 of Vanguards 15" guns at the breakers yard Faslane


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## vinnye (Dec 29, 2012)

Adhereance to treaties was something Great Britain was keen on - it meant that we would not be caught up in an arms race we could not compete in never mind win!
The USA also adhered to the treaties - meaning that such ships as the 1920's South Dakota class battle ship was cancelled. Although she was not fast, she was designed to be tough and had 12 x 16 inch armament - pretty potent in my opinion!

I comletly agree abought Great Britain not having any Capital ships as museum pieces - Warspite should have been saves and A KGV also.
We do have HMS Belfast - but compared to a battlewaggon she is small fry!


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## delcyros (Dec 29, 2012)

All nations tried to adhere the Treaties in principle - be it that they accepted a certain and limiting main gun calibre or a limiting number of vessels for each class. In detail, however, all nations broke the Treaties. For a long time I believed that at the very least, the NELSON class would be Treaty compatible in detail. It´s not. They turned out to be overweight because the naval architects choose to violate the definition of standart displacement as formulated in the Treaties and didn´t counted water liquid in the NELSON´s TDS to the displacement in stand.
Raven Roberts commented about this in their book.
That beeing said, the level of overweights for BB´s is different (the US and french beeing the most innovative in interpretation of the definitions, the italiens, german and japanese often didn´t even attempted to honor the qualitative limits) but none of the BB´s laid down after end of ww1 actually is within the detailed limits or Treaty compliant. Still, I do think that in principle, contracting powers agreed to the general limits imposed by the Treaties.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 29, 2012)

Well, there is going over by 10% or under and there is going over by 20%. 

How much is honest mistake and how much is gross incompetence or gross violation?


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## beitou (Dec 29, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Warspite was considered for preservation and should have been with such a record but the pounding she took in 2 wars meant that by 45 she would have needed a complete rebuild to keep her afloat. Britain didnt have the money at the time and we were desperate for steel.


 
Has there ever been a better name for a ship than Warspite. Her name alone should have been enough to have her preserved. I was hoping one of the new RN carriers would Warspite rather than the predicable QE and PoW


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## delcyros (Dec 29, 2012)

> Well, there is going over by 10% or under and there is going over by 20%.


Who ever was under?

I don´t think it is right to assume there was a qualification demarcation at -say 11.7% over (or whatever number You may like) allowed by the Treaty. There simply was no such over-allowance. The fact that some design buereaus went into deep trouble to find any justification to misinterprete the treaty texts (which are very clearly laid out, as only boiler reserve feed water and fuel weight are to be substracted from max. displacement, anything else counts) is a clear indication of the intent of violating. They were fully aware that that´s not right.
However, that´s not a violation in principle, it´s a violation in detail, which has been reckoned with by all contracting powers.

The reported official displacement of NORTH CAROLINA class BB, f.e. was a Treaty comliant 34,000 ts stand. (well into the sixties) The BuShip figures, which were not published then listed them already at 36,600ts stand but even those were calculated according to the General Boards interpretation of standart displacement, which in it´s own was in violation to the Treaties (it was never negotiated let alone be accepted by other contractors). The actual standart displacement (Friedman, US battleships. An illustrated Design History, p.278, Tab.12.3) if You susbtract reserve feed water (=350t acc. to Raven Roberts) and fuel oil (=5,500t according to Friedman) from the designed deep displacement (=44,800ts acc. to Friedman) was 38,950ts, roughly 5000 ts or 15% more than officially reported and nearly 4000ts over the limit of the Treaties (later in ww2, these vessels picked up more weight and displacement and eventually ended all with a displacement well over 40,000ts stand). This remains to be a mild case of violation. Other examples (see LITTORIO or BISMARCK) are worse. Still, they along with others adhered to the Treaties in principle -not in detail. YAMATO didn´t, but didn´t need to as Japan retired from the Treaty.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 29, 2012)

All the post treaties "full" BBs were completed after the war broke so none was "actually" cheating 
the alone new BBs completed before of war the D&S and G&S were within the treaties limit


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## Juha (Dec 29, 2012)

delcyros said:


> All nations tried to adhere the Treaties in principle - be it that they accepted a certain and limiting main gun calibre or a limiting number of vessels for each class. In detail, however, all nations broke the Treaties. For a long time I believed that at the very least, the NELSON class would be Treaty compatible in detail. It´s not. They turned out to be overweight because the naval architects choose to violate the definition of standart displacement as formulated in the Treaties and didn´t counted water liquid in the NELSON´s TDS to the displacement in stand.
> Raven Roberts commented about this in their book...



Hello Delcyros
what exactly R&R commented? It is years when I read the book (British BBs or something like that) but I recall that they only noted the fact that liquid that made TDS effective wasn't counted in Nelsons' stand. displacement. My copy of R&R book is in attic but according to Brown's Nelson to Vanguard p. 196 Washington Treaty Standard Displacement was - the ship fully equipped for war but excluding oil fuel, reserve feed water and other liquids. And based on this clause both RN and USN thought they could conceal the use of water-filled spaces in torpedo protection.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Dec 29, 2012)

I always find it odd that the RN and the USN are held to different standards than other navies. Just because the RN and USN designers were clever enough to use what was a loophole obviously not thought of by the Washington treaty writers that means they are cheating. 

As has been mentioned none of the pre war designs was completed under Washington rules so it didnt matter that they had gained weight during construction but at least the USN and RN designs were close to the rules when they were on the drawing board.


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## delcyros (Dec 29, 2012)

Treaty text:



> Article V
> 
> No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.
> (...)
> ...



Thus, constructing of any vessel which is going to exceed 35,000 tons standart is a violation. The date of commissioning is not referred to in article V, construction is important. Juha, You will notice that the Treaty text explicitely means fully equipped with all liquids (even stores or fresh water!) except two aspects which have been explicitely mentioned as exception: Fuel oil and reserve feed water. I made a mistake with Raven Roberts. I have to point out that John Jordan made the point that British violated the Washington Naval Conference treaty in how they calculated the weight of the armor scheme in the NelRods according to John Jordan in his book Warships after Washington. Jordan notes on pp.75 and 80 that the British failed to include the water protection scheme into the final displacement. Everyone tried to cut corners in the treaties.


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## RCAFson (Dec 29, 2012)

delcyros said:


> Treaty text:
> 
> 
> 
> Thus, constructing of any vessel which is going to exceed 35,000 tons standart is a violation. The date of commissioning is not referred to in article V, construction is important. Juha, You will notice that the Treaty text explicitely means fully equipped with all liquids (even stores or fresh water!) except two aspects which have been explicitely mentioned as exception: Fuel oil and reserve feed water. I made a mistake with Raven Roberts. I have to point out that John Jordan made the point that British violated the Washington Naval Conference treaty in how they calculated the weight of the armor scheme in the NelRods according to John Jordan in his book Warships after Washington. Jordan notes on pp.75 and 80 that the British failed to include the water protection scheme into the final displacement. Everyone tried to cut corners in the treaties.



All German, British and American battleships, AFAIK, built under the treaty used water in their hull to augment and/or replace fuel oil in their torpedo defense systems since they had to be kept full or nearly full of liquids to work properly. - so doing so was not a violation of the treaty.


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## delcyros (Dec 29, 2012)

This is not correct. All equipment store or liquid to be intended to be carried in wartime has to be weighted in for standart displacement. TDS water is not fuel oil, nor is it reserve feed water. Keep also in mind, that TDS water was not just to replace fuel oil but it often- as in the case with the NELRODS- had to be carried additionally. If it only would have been replacing fuel oil it would be weight neutral. However, it´s not but a designed liquid factor in the ship´s wartime displacement state. The Treaties only accepted these two exceptions: Fuel oil and reserve feed water. TDS liquid is neither of those.


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## RCAFson (Dec 29, 2012)

delcyros said:


> This is not correct. *All equipment store or liquid to be intended to be carried in wartime has to be weighted in for standart displacement*. TDS water is not fuel oil, nor is it reserve feed water. Keep also in mind, that TDS water was not just to replace fuel oil but it often- as in the case with the NELRODS- had to be carried additionally. If it only would have been replacing fuel oil it would be weight neutral. However, it´s not but a designed liquid factor in the ship´s wartime displacement state. The Treaties only accepted these two exceptions: Fuel oil and reserve feed water. TDS liquid is neither of those.


 
Sorry, but your logic is faulty. Bismarck's TDS, for example, was non functional if not liquid loaded, therefore, all liquids carried in the TDS, by your logic should be included in the standard displacement - but none of the naval powers did.


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## delcyros (Dec 29, 2012)

The non-fuel oil, non-reserve feed water liquid in BISMARCK´s TDS (all liquid) has to be counted as standart displacement. This is entirely correct.

BISMARCK´s designed deep displacement was
50,935 metric t.
now we substract only what the Treaty allows to substract:
- 7814 metr. t ship fuel oil
- 373 metr. t. reserve feed water

= 42,748 metr. t. stand. displacement (= 42,075 tons standart)


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## Tante Ju (Dec 29, 2012)

Given that Germany was not a signatory of the Washington Treaty, and merely gave a very generic hint in the AGNA about naval limitations, the whole discussion about it's displacement vs the Washington Treaty is moot... quite simply they did not apply to Bismarck or any other KM ship. Prior to that the Versailles Treaty applied, which the Panzershiffe more or less satisfied (in an ingeniously violating manner that is).


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## delcyros (Dec 29, 2012)

Not only AGNA but also the five powers delaration bound Germany to the qualitative limits -in principle- which also affected other marine powers, and thus the WNT. However, while other nations had worked out the details Germany and Britain had not yet settled on them and agreed upon principially equal rights. Thus, there can be no doubt that Germany cannot exceed the qualitative limits imposed to Britain. In return, this means that there can be no doubt that BISMARCK was heavily overweight in it´s actual displacement.

So where other vessels, too. D&S may not have violated the qualitative limits but due to their much lower official displacement, France was about to violate the general limits outlined in the Treaty. Britain did that with it´s aircraft carriers, too.


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## RCAFson (Dec 29, 2012)

delcyros said:


> The non-fuel oil, non-reserve feed water liquid in BISMARCK´s TDS (all liquid) has to be counted as standart displacement. This is entirely correct.
> 
> BISMARCK´s designed deep displacement was
> 50,935 metric t.
> ...



You'd be correct if Bismarck had a propulsion system that didn't actually burn fuel, since she would then never need to replace the used fuel with sea water to maintain the effectiveness of the TDS. By your interpretation of the treaty, replacing oil fuel with seawater would be a treaty violation, since at that point the ship would exceed her treaty displacement, by adding protection not permitted under the treaty.


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## Tante Ju (Dec 29, 2012)

delcyros said:


> Thus, there can be no doubt that Germany cannot exceed the qualitative limits imposed to Britain. In return, this means that there can be no doubt that BISMARCK was heavily overweight in it´s actual displacement.



No, as I have pointed Germany has not ratified any such tonnage limits and thus those limits did not apply to her. AGNA specificed a % of the British total tonnage, and that this total tonnage shall be used proportionately for the various classes of ships. It merely held a very vague about any specific limitation, namely, that German shall 'favour' such. There's a good reason in diplomacy when such words are used, instead of the very specific agreement about total tonnage. It clearly means that such agreement about naval tonnage limitation per ship class was not agreed upon, but a sense of goodwill exist between the parties.

That's the very point of the concept of sovereignty and international treaties - since there is no supreme power over nations, they are only bound by treaties if they want to be bound by them, and can withdraw at any point. In short, you are clearly reaching. If you really believe you have a point, please point out the article of whatever agreement that would bound Germany (or the USSR for that matter) to any naval limitation.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 29, 2012)

I think that saying that since the ships were _completed_ after the war broke out means that the countries weren't cheating is a copout. 

Ships of the same class (plans or blueprints) could vary by several hundred tons even in cruisers depending on the yard building the ships. Turning paper ships into real ones often meant mistakes were made, especially considering that at times many of the items going into the ships were "paper", the actual weight of the items were not known as they had not been built yet. Quite a few airplanes came out overweight compared to original estimates and there are a lot fewer parts in an airplane than in a 500-700 ft long ship. 

However being off by around 20% isn't an innocent mistake or trying to _shave_ a little too close to the limit. It is a blatant cheat and did _NOT_ come from _additions_ in the last year of construction. It is like trying to say you planned a ten story building and added two stories at the last minute. Your structural framing wouldn't be strong enough and your pre-ordered elevators wouldn't reach all floors. 
It takes as long or longer to build the engines, main armament and armor plate as it does the hull structure and minor parts. Adding 4-7,000 tons more _STUFF_ to a 35,000 ton ship in the last 25% or less of it's construction time would make for a very, very unsatisfactory ship. 

Some countries may have tried to follow the limits (or at least stay close enough to be somewhat believable) while others made announcements of weights that were blatant lies. At least one naval architect is supposed to have said when questioned as to why he could not come up with all the features of a foreign ship on it's legend displacement that he could do it _IF_ he was allowed to lie about the displacement as much as the foreign designers/government were lying. 

There are/were rough formulas for figuring what size ship you need for a given weight of armor or armament and unless your machinery was in a totally different league than everybody else they could make a good guess at to what eh machinery weight was. 

The treaty was a good idea but there was little or no way to actually verify it let alone enforce it (go to war over an overweight ship?) so a lot of winking and nudging was done over some of the announced weights. The actual _enforcement_ would be to abandon the treaty and go to unrestricted building which few, if any, of the countries wanted to do as none of them could actually afford such an _open_ arms race.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 29, 2012)

The Germans may not have been _bound_ by the Washington treaties but a public announcement that they were building 40,000-42,000 ton ships would have meet with much disapproval in the international community and a probable response from England to effect of canceling the later KG Vs in favor of something like the Lion class. Germany _WAS_ bound by their agreement to 35% of the British fleet by _tonnage_ and under rating their ships allowed them to build more ships before hitting the total tonnage limit.


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## Juha (Dec 29, 2012)

Hello Delcyros
thanks for the WNT text, Brown was clearly wrong. IIRC there is some explanation to British behavior in R&R but I should check the book before commenting more. I'll climb to my attic and take a look into the book when I'll have spare time.

Juha


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## Aozora (Dec 29, 2012)

Some interesting technical information on BB guns and armour can be found  here, plus there's a comparison  here. Bound to be some debates...


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## Juha (Jan 5, 2013)

Hello
I took a look in R R Brtish BBs
All weights are English ton (1016kg)
After being inclined on 19th March 1927 Nelson's displacement was estimed at 33,313 tons. Allowing for the addition of 4 multiple pom-poms in place of the singles, and 2 a/c and their equipment, increased this figure to 33,413 tons. The standard displacements of the two ships were published, therefore, as 33,500 tons for Nelson and 33,900 tons for Rodney. The water in TDS, when buoyancy spaces were flooded, weighted 2,870 tons so with it the Nelson's standard displ. was 36,283 English tons/ 36,864 metric tons. 

Juha

ADDUM Except for exercises and compartment testing, the buoyancy spaces were to be flooded in wartime only.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 5, 2013)

Juha said:


> Hello
> I took a look in R R Brtish BBs
> All weights are English ton (1016kg)
> After being inclined on 19th March 1927 Nelson's displacement was estimed at 33,313 tons. Allowing for the addition of 4 multiple pom-poms in place of the singles, and 2 a/c and their equipment, increased this figure to 33,413 tons. The standard displacements of the two ships were published, therefore, as 33,500 tons for Nelson and 33,900 tons for Rodney. The water in TDS, when buoyancy spaces were flooded, weighted 2,870 tons so with it the Nelson's standard displ. was 36,283 English tons/ 35,712 metric tons.
> ...



36283 long tons are not 35712 metric tons... just have you inverted the conversion?


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## fastmongrel (Jan 5, 2013)

Vincenzo is right Juha your pencil must be broken 36283 long tons is 36863 tonnes


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## Vincenzo (Jan 5, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> You'd be correct if Bismarck had a propulsion system that didn't actually burn fuel, since she would then never need to replace the used fuel with sea water to maintain the effectiveness of the TDS. By your interpretation of the treaty, replacing oil fuel with seawater would be a treaty violation, since at that point the ship would exceed her treaty displacement, by adding protection not permitted under the treaty.



no the replace not violate the treaty, in the ready for sea condition the ship has fuel in the TDS


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## vinnye (Jan 6, 2013)

I am pretty sure that a Wiki article said that during tests, the 16 inch shells performance was disappointing compared to the higher velocity 14 inch.


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## vinnye (Jan 6, 2013)

Found the article -
Background
The choice of calibre was limited by the Second London Naval Treaty, an extension of the Washington Naval Treaty which set limits on the size armament and number of battleships constructed by the major powers. After disappointing experiences with the combination of high velocity but relatively light shell in the BL 16 inch /45 naval gun of the Nelson class battleships, the British reverted to the combination of lower velocities and (relatively) heavier shells in this weapon.

Design
These built-up guns were constructed using a non wire wound radial expansion design which was an advance on previous British practice with a longer barrel life and better accuracy. Unfortunately, the choice of mountings was for quadruple turrets, and in practice these developed a reputation as being unreliable with the turrets jamming during battle. However, it has been argued that these jams were typically caused by errors in drill, either due to lack of gun crew training, as was the case when the newly commissioned Prince of Wales engaged the Bismarck in the Battle of the Denmark Strait (1941), or due to crew fatigue resulting from the prolonged nature of the engagement, as was the case when King George V engaged Bismarck in 1941, and Duke of York engaged Scharnhorst in the Battle of North Cape (1943).


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## fastmongrel (Jan 6, 2013)

vinnye said:


> I am pretty sure that a Wiki article said that during tests, the 16 inch shells performance was disappointing compared to the higher velocity 14 inch.



There were designs for a heavier 16" shell for the NelRods but it never got manufactured. It was planned to weigh 2,250 pounds and have a muzzle velocity of 2,575 fps but the work needed to get the 16" mounts reliable and then work on the newer 14" gun plus a lack of spare money meant it was never a priority.


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## RCAFson (Jan 6, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> no the replace not violate the treaty, in the ready for sea condition the ship has fuel in the TDS


 
It doesn't violate the treaty because water protection wasn't included in treaty weight calculations.

In the ready for sea condition Nelson has no water in the water protection compartments.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 6, 2013)

The treaty include all the weight in the ready to sea condition except feed water and fuel.
If Nelson sail w/o water in the compartments is right this water is not weight for the treaty


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