# Should The Allies Have Bypassed Italy?



## stug3 (May 27, 2012)

Would the war have been shortened and less overall casualties suffered? Would substantial German forces have still been required to control northern Italy and prevent Rome from falling under the influence of antifascist factions? Though it would have allowed the Allies to accumulate men material in England for the cross channel invasion sooner, it would also have left considerable German assets free to reinforce France or attempt to stem the turning tide in the East.
Gen. Marshall the US JCS realised by mid 1943 that The Germans had bitten off more than they could chew in the USSR and thus being pushed westward, the western Allies should just get on with it in France and really put the squeeze on them. But Churchill wanted Rome and pursuaded FDR that invading Italy would tie down enough German forces to relieve pressure on Russia and reduce their numbers in France. It also eventually put considerable industrial targets in range of Allied bombers operating from central Italy. If they would have been able to take the north it would have given the allies other invasion options too. (e.g. southern France)

I have to admit that Ive never been able to decide my own definitive opinion on an answer for this question, but have always been fascinated by it.


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## michaelmaltby (May 27, 2012)

Stalin wanted an_ active land front_ from the Allies .... Stalin wanted sacrifice and blood commisurate with his own peoples'.

I trust Churchill's judgement on most matters ... 

MM


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## Shortround6 (May 27, 2012)

This is a great "what if" because so much is up in the air. While the Italian Invasion did divert allied resources, the Normandy Invasion used a lot more resources than the Italian Invasion did. A Summer of 1943 Invasion of France means much less air support, less bombing of German infrastructure, less experienced Allied (American officers) and so on. The next Question is what is the actual "window" in which a cross channel invasion can take place? That is, how bad is the weather in winter so that it prohibits an invasion in the Winter/late Fall/early Spring months?

From Wiki: two harbours codenamed Mulberry "A" and "B" were constructed at Omaha Beach and Arromanches, respectively. However, a large storm on 19 June destroyed the American harbour at Omaha, leaving only the British harbour which came to be known as Port Winston at Arromanches. While the harbour at Omaha was destroyed sooner than expected (due to it not being securely anchored to the sea bed, a result of incorrect and hasty assembly by the Americans), Port Winston saw heavy use for 8 months—despite being designed to last only 3 months. In the 10 months after D-Day, it was used to land over 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles, and 4 million tonnes of supplies providing much needed reinforcements in France.[5][6] In response to this longer than planned use the Phoenix breakwater was reinforced with the addition of extra specially strengthened caisson:

Getting ashore isn't the problem, staying ashore is.

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## stug3 (May 27, 2012)

Even without invading Italy, afaik the Allies werent even thinking about a cross channel invasion before Spring 1944.


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## Freebird (May 27, 2012)

stug3 said:


> Would the war have been shortened and less overall casualties suffered?



No



stug3 said:


> Would substantial German forces have still been required to control northern Italy and prevent Rome from falling under the influence of antifascist factions?



No
Without any attack on Italy proper, Mussolini is still in power and the Germans don't need to send anything to Italy, and the anti-fascists have minimal effect.

The surrender of Italy had a far, far larger effect than just requiring Germany to garrison Italy. The Italians had large garrisons in the Balkans, Greece, Rhodes, and other Mediterranean holdings, which forced Germany to withdraw units from other fronts to replace the Italians.

Also, Italy has a significant air naval presence in the Med, which is lost with the surrender.




> But Churchill wanted Rome and pursuaded FDR that invading Italy would tie down enough German forces to relieve pressure on Russia and reduce their numbers in France.



Churchill wasn't after Rome - his goal was to fight the war the most efficient way, and to aid the Soviets as much as possible.
A 1943 landing in France by 8 or 10 divisions that is crushed by the Axis does nothing to help the Soviets, in fact it is _*worse*_. Hitler realizes the Allies have "shot their clip" so to speak, and would not be able to try a second time in 1943, so he can withdraw Western Front units to send to the East.



stug3 said:


> Though it would have allowed the Allies to accumulate men material in England for the cross channel invasion sooner, it would also have left considerable German assets free to reinforce France or attempt to stem the turning tide in the East.
> Gen. Marshall the US JCS realised by mid 1943 that The Germans had bitten off more than they could chew in the USSR and thus being pushed westward, the western Allies should just get on with it in France and really put the squeeze on them.



With all due respect to Marshall and his skills as an administrator, he wasn't a great strategic military genius, and his 1942 push for "Sledgehammer" was another example of misplaced enthusiasm for a bad idea.


Keep in mind that the Allies were bottled up in Normandy in 1944, when they had far stronger ground air forces, and German forces are weaker as they face increasing pressure in the East. By June 1944 the Soviets are halfway through the "Year of the 10 Victories", while in July/August 1943 the battle of Kursk was not completed.

When the Allies broke out following Cobra/Goodwood, there were about 22 Allied divisions on the continent. In 1943, the Allies would be lucky to have 12 - 14 divisions landed in France (and maybe not even that)

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## stug3 (May 27, 2012)

Its well documented and common knowledge that Churchill wanted Rome to show the world that the star of European Fascism was a descendant star.


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## Freebird (May 28, 2012)

The short answer is this: The Allies almost certainly do not have enough strength or supplies to sustain a landing in France in 1943.

Here's a table of the cargo buildup in the UK







There is a slow buildup during 1942, until about Sept/Oct, when there is a rapid drain of resources - needed to support the USAAF major expansion, and the needs of "Torch". It's not until about July of 1943 that huge increase in US shipping tonnage again builds up substantial stocks in the UK.

Considering that durin the spring/summer 1943 the UK had a severe shortage of imports arriving (British Import Crisis), there is no way that the Allies could bring in enough supplies to land enough divisions to make a landing in France. 

British Import Crisis


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## stug3 (May 28, 2012)

stug3 said:


> Even without invading Italy, afaik the Allies werent even thinking about a cross channel invasion before Spring 1944.



yer preachin to the choir freebird.


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## Freebird (May 28, 2012)

stug3 said:


> Even without invading Italy, afaik the Allies werent even thinking about a cross channel invasion before Spring 1944.



Actually the US (Marshall Stimson) were lobbying hard for a French landing in 1942 (Sledgehammer) or 1943 (Roundup) 



stug3 said:


> Its well documented and common knowledge that Churchill wanted Rome to show the world that the star of European Fascism was a descendant star.



That wasn't the main purpose of the 'Mediterranean Strategy" though, it was done to reduce the strain on Allied shipping and to tie down Axis forces that could otherwise have been used in the Soviet Union


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## renrich (May 29, 2012)

The US wanted a cross channel invasion long before 1944, even as early as 1942. They were hopelessly optimistic. That invasion would have probably failed anytime before 1944. The Italian Campaign was mishandled mostly by the US but it did tie down a lot of German forces and it allowed the eastern front action to chew up a lot of Axis power and the time involved allowed for the build up of US forces along with combat experience learned. Even with all those factors Overlord was not a sure thing.

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## s1chris (May 29, 2012)

I have to say no the Allies should not have bypassed Italy. Obviously the time which was taken to carry out the invasion of Italy in and not the French coast gave extra time to the intense allied bombing campaign to weaken the Nazi war machine. By defeating Italy first it also rulled out any chance of Germany being reinforced from the South by the Italian troops and air force etc if we had of attempted a cross channel invasion first. 

Let's not also forget the valuable raw materials that the allies had access to once Italy had surrendered. After all Italy was still supplying Britain with materials even when the Axis had declared war and it was only after a lot of pressure from Hitler that this ceased.

As history has proven wether it was the right or wrong decision we achieved the desired end result. Who knows what could have happened?

Chris

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## stug3 (May 29, 2012)

I dont think Italy could have given significant aid to Germany after 1943 anyway. If the Fascists had prevented Badoglio from removing Mussolini or had retaken control of the government, they would still have had serious partisan opposition if not outright civil war to deal with. This scenario supposes the absence of an adequate German military presence in the north due to requirement elsewhere of course. 
Also the Allies could have used bases on Sicily, Sardinia or Corsica to keep Italian naval air forces in check.


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## drgondog (May 29, 2012)

I'm not sure the lessons learned during the Italian campaign was worth the assets we tied down (vs Germans), nor do I think the Italians would have been effective beyond the Med, nor do I think that Kesselering would have been a threat across the Med back to the Suez.

The better question is what could the Allies do, earlier? Sicily and Africa was a warm up for the US and they tested the LW to the point that combined with RAF Desert Force, they controlled the air (and the Med).

I believe that a cross channel invasion before control of the air was very risky.. but had the Allies Not invaded Italy and stopped at Sicily, kesserling is still compelled to keep a sizable force at hand in the Rome area.

So, possibly the extra fresh assets would have been of enormous leverage by invading southern France in April/combined with Normandy two months earlier when the West wall was less re-inforced. Logistically, the Germans are not in a good position to re-inforce either Russia OR France from Italy. Their natural inclination would have been to re-inforce East which ultimately would have been good for the West.

1.) weaker German west wall, but stronger in airpower during April than June
2.) greater US/Brit strength at Normandy and Southern France based on experience gained at Sicily and North Africa.
3.) Inexperience not a major factor as US D-Day Divisions were extracted from Africa/Sicily or direct from US. 36th Div, 82nd AB, 45 Div with Sicily blooding and no Salerno to Anzio BLEEDING would have been a plus.
4.) Patton maybe survives discrace at Sicily for slapping incident and becomes a leader either in Southern France or Normandy. 
5.) No Italian bases for 15th AF. All primary tactical airpower support would have to be from USN/RN Carriers for Southern France until beacheads secured and Allies push inland.

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## Freebird (May 29, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I dont think Italy could have given significant aid to Germany after 1943 anyway. .



They certainly would, Italian occupation forces in Greece the Balkans frees up 10 - 20 German divisions for activity elsewhere.



drgondog said:


> I'm not sure the lessons learned during the Italian campaign was worth the assets we tied down (vs Germans), nor do I think the Italians would have been effective beyond the Med, nor do I think that Kesselering would have been a threat across the Med back to the Suez.
> 
> The better question is what could the Allies do, earlier? Sicily and Africa was a warm up for the US and they tested the LW to the point that combined with RAF Desert Force, they controlled the air (and the Med).
> 
> ...



I'm not quite sure what you mean - Anvil in April instead of Aug 1944? 

Problem is, by having the US ( British) basically sit idle in the second half of 1943 while the Soviets fought alone was politically completely unacceptable to FDR who had promised action to Stalin




> Logistically, the Germans are not in a good position to re-inforce either Russia OR France from Italy. Their natural inclination would have been to re-inforce East which ultimately would have been good for the West.



The intent at the time was to help the Russians by engaging Axis forces.

If the Allies don't invade mainland Italy, then they don't sign the armistice.

These are just a few of the German divisions tied down in Italy or the Balkans, not counting Heer infantry divisions.

1st Panzer division is in France until June 1943, sent to Italy in July, then to Greece after the Italian surrender.
11th SS Panzergrenadier division formed in summer 1943, then sent to the Balkans after Italy surrenders 
14th SS mountain division trained in France in the Spring/Summer 1943, sent to Italy following Italian surrender
24th Panzer was reformed in France in Mar 1943, then sent to Italy in September following the Italian surrender
26th Panzer was formed in 1942, in Amiens France from Oct 1942, then withdrawn and sent to Italy after "Avalanche"


Again, keep in mind that the choice to go into Italy or sit idle for the rest of 1943 has to be made BEFORE the results of the German 1943 summer offensive (ie Kursk) are known.
While Germany did suffer a defeat at Stalingrad, Manstein defeats the Soviets again at Kharkov in the spring of 1943, so it's not entirely clear which way the Eastern front war is going.
Meanwhile Stalin Soviet ambassadors are giving dire warnings to FDR about an imminent catastrophe (ie - unless the Westrn Allies relieve the pressure by opening a second front.)

Nor can the leadership predict the way the war in Italy will go without a crystal ball, had the command not made a few bad choices (Mark Clark letting the 11th Army escape) they could have been much more succesful with fewer casualties

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## Vincenzo (May 29, 2012)

freebird said:


> If the Allies don't invade mainland Italy, then they don't sign the armistice.


although the signing of the armistice came the same day of the landing in Calabria, the firm was only the final stage and the surrender was indipendent from invasion (even if a invasion was supposed shortly)


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## stug3 (May 29, 2012)

freebird said:


> They certainly would, Italian occupation forces in Greece the Balkans frees up 10 - 20 German divisions for activity elsewhere.


 

But without the presence of German forces, are the antifascist factions strong enough that the Fascists need those troops in Italy to maintain control? Once they realize no invasion will occur, dont the Fascists consider their chances of regaining or staying (if they have prevented Mussolini from being removed) in power to be much better?


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## merlin (May 30, 2012)

Invade Italy yes, but with lesser objectives - avoid the 'bony' west coast of the 'leg' of Italy and concentrated on the east coast, and the hills. Once the Airfield complex is seized at Foggia and a security zone north of it - relax. The Germans have to be strong just in case of amphibious assault elsewhere in the Adriatic.
Rome - that was Clark's fixation!


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## davebender (May 30, 2012)

Sicily was a relatively quick and low cost operation which more or less secured the central Med. So you might as well grab it using forces already sitting in North Africa. But I would leave Southern Italy alone.

From Sicily you could land in Southern France during September 1943. Safer then landing in Northern France yet it's guaranteed to tie down a bunch of German army divisions. It also applies diplomatic pressure to force Spain and Portugal to quit trading with Germany.


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## Freebird (May 30, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> although the signing of the armistice came the same day of the landing in Calabria, the firm was only the final stage and the surrender was indipendent from invasion (even if a invasion was supposed shortly)



The problem was that the Italian government wanted an assurance of an Allied landing before they would surrender, as they feared German retaliation occupation.
My understanding of the negotiations is that without a landing promised there would be no armistice, but if Italian sources say otherwise I would be interested to find oot



stug3 said:


> But without the presence of German forces, are the antifascist factions strong enough that the Fascists need those troops in Italy to maintain control?



Pretty unlikely, as it was after the armistice that antipartisans expanded operations.
There were still a good number of Italian troops police in italy Proper, so it's unlikely that they would need to recall the Alpini from the Balkans.

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## Vincenzo (May 30, 2012)

freebird said:


> The problem was that the Italian government wanted an assurance of an Allied landing before they would surrender, as they feared German retaliation occupation.
> My understanding of the negotiations is that without a landing promised there would be no armistice, but if Italian sources say otherwise I would be interested to find oot




the landing was required from italians, also a para landing on Roma


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## davebender (May 30, 2012)

> Italian government wanted an assurance of an Allied landing before they would surrender


Italy may change their mind eventually if Allied armies occupy Sicily and Southern France. But it doesn't matter either way. Italy can be bypassed for the remainder of the war.


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## gjs238 (Jun 3, 2012)

Italy turned out not to be "the soft underbelly of the axis" that Churchill promised.


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## davebender (Jun 5, 2012)

Anyone who has spent a couple months in the army knows that mountains are ideal defensive terrain. Not to mention experience fighting uphill at Gallipoli and in the mountains of 1940 Norway.

PM Churchill undoubtedly had reasons for wanting to land in 1943 Italy but I don't think he expected an easy victory. That was just political posturing.


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## stug3 (Jun 5, 2012)

Churchill, Gallipoli-


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 6, 2012)

"... PM Churchill undoubtedly had reasons for wanting to land in 1943 Italy but I don't think he expected an easy victory ..."

Italy provided among other features, close access to Yugoslavia and the partisan army there. It was Churchill, let's remember, who threw his support and resources behind Tito. Churchill knew it was vital (for the west) to weigh in on the fate of the Balkans -- and try and slightly counter-balance Russia's influence.

No one is lauding Gallipoli .....

MM


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## davebender (Jun 6, 2012)

Just to make things clear....
Yugoslavia had two large guerrilla forces plus a bunch of smaller independent forces.
.....Chetniks. Legitimate organization led by former officers of the Yugoslav army.
.....Partisans. Military arm of the Yugoslav Communist Party. 
Britain supported Chetniks at first as they were the legitimate organization. Support shifted to communists during September 1943 as part of diplomatic effort to please Stalin. 

By summer 1943 guerrilla forces had largely been driven out of northern and eastern Yugoslavia. Night supply flights can reach SW Yugoslavia from airfields in Sicily. It's easier still from southern Italy but you don't commit a half million troops just to make partisan supply operations easier.

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## tyrodtom (Jun 6, 2012)

davebender said:


> Support shifted to communists during September 1943 as part of diplomatic effort to please Stalin.


 There you go again dave. The support was shifted to Tito and his partisans because the Chetniks had shifted to collaborating with the Germans and Italins, and was more concerned with ethnic cleansing, and fighting the partisans, than fighting invaders.


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## parsifal (Jun 6, 2012)

The invasion of italy was a factor in the surrender of italy. mussolini had been arrested in July, following Husky. The new italian regime under Bagdoglio continued to mouth support for Germany whilst undertaking secret peace talks with the allies. The Italians would not surrender until given assurances of Allied help, which meant an invasion. They wanted times and places, bviously the allies refused, but they were given an assurance of an invasion sometime. The failure of the allies to undertake an airdrop into Rome meant the germans had the opportunity to arrest and depose the key members of the new government and force those that did escape into a hurried exile. This detracted from the legitimacy of the bagdoglio govt, and contributed to the fissure that occurred in the country.

Italy was never fully supported by the americans and was always starved of resources by them. It eventually became a major sink hole for the german occupying more than 40 divisions at one point. Thats almost as much as the whole of the westwall. There is absolutely no doubt that the forces the americans did commit provided valubale combat experience for their elite divisions. The italian front became a swinging door for the allies, as green personnel were constantly fed into and then back out of the battle. some entire formations were shipped in and then out, but even those formations that remained were constantly having personnel exchanged. The British lacked the manpower to be effective, and nobody except the free french had any real idea on mountain warfare.

Still it was worth it. italy was the first front to surrender in 1945. Invasion of italy opened the mediterranean as a major sea route for the allies, and materially contributed to the build up of shipping that in turn allowed the overlord strategy to be more successful. Not invading Italy would not have allowed any significant diversion of forces from the southern front, or committment in france, as it would have exposed north Africa and the ME TO generally to re-invasion by the Germans. knocking italy out of the war removed 60-70 divisions of the Italian Army from Axis inventory. The germans had to find major forces to replace the italians in garrison in Greece, the Aegean, France, Italy, Corsica and Sardinia. The invasion of Sicily and the imminent threat to italy had a major effect on the course of the Kursk battle and the subsequent soviet counteroffensives. And the murderous treatment meted out by the germans on their erstwhile allies made every one of their remaining allies a net liability to them. After italy was raped by the Germans, nobody trusted the germans any more. 

The allied committment in Italy was never going to win the war in Italy. But it was still a valuable stepping stone in the road to victory, and ultimately represented good value for the investment made.....


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 6, 2012)

".... Support shifted to communists during September 1943 as part of diplomatic effort to please Stalin. "

Churchill did NOT send James Fitzroy MacLean to Yugoslavia to appease or placate Stalin. He sent him to determine which partisan force was worth supporting .... i.e. in the business of killing Germans at whatever cost (in reprisals).

Eastern Approaches - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The final and longest section of the book covers Maclean's time in and around Yugoslavia, from the late summer of 1943 to the formation of the united government in March 1945. The Yugoslav front, also known as the Yugoslav People's Liberation War, had become important to the Allies by 1943, although the Partisans had been fighting for two years without any help. He lived closely with Tito and his troops and had the ear of Churchill, and as such his recommendations shaped the Allies' policy towards Yugoslavia."

Beside that, there was an interesting small-ship naval war going on in the Adriatic across from the east coast of Italy ....

MM

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## stug3 (Jun 6, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Not invading Italy would not have allowed any significant diversion of forces from the southern front, or committment in france, as it would have exposed north Africa and the ME TO generally to re-invasion by the Germans.



There's no way in hell the Germans had any resources to "re-invade" North Africa or anywhere else of consequence when it was becoming increasingly clear what was happening in the USSR and what was going to be happening in the west.


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## Freebird (Jun 6, 2012)

gjs238 said:


> Italy turned out not to be "the soft underbelly of the axis" that Churchill promised.


 
On the contrary, it did indeed prove to be very soft - *politically *soft.



davebender said:


> Anyone who has spent a couple months in the army knows that mountains are ideal defensive terrain. Not to mention experience fighting uphill at Gallipoli and in the mountains of 1940 Norway.



On the other hand, the long narrow penninsula of Italy allows the attacker to land amphibiously and outflank defensive lines, provided that the attacker has the will to do so.



davebender said:


> PM Churchill undoubtedly had reasons for wanting to land in 1943 Italy.



The reason was to knock Italy out of the war and tie up the maximum number of Axis forces - in which it succeeded very well



parsifal said:


> The invasion of italy was a factor in the surrender of italy. mussolini had been arrested in July, following Husky. The new italian regime under Bagdoglio continued to mouth support for Germany whilst undertaking secret peace talks with the allies. The Italians would not surrender until given assurances of Allied help, which meant an invasion....
> 
> The allied committment in Italy was never going to win the war in Italy. But it was still a valuable stepping stone in the road to victory, and ultimately represented good value for the investment made.....



An excellent post Parsifal


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## parsifal (Jun 6, 2012)

stug3 said:


> There's no way in hell the Germans had any resources to "re-invade" North Africa or anywhere else of consequence when it was becoming increasingly clear what was happening in the USSR and what was going to be happening in the west.



Not mainataining the pressure, and removing the troops needed to protect the newly liberated territories would have absolutely given the germans back the initiative and with that, the ability to take whatever action they cared to adopt. not invading italy may well have tipped the balance at kursk, which in turn may well have forced the russians to the negotiating table. There are all manner of possibilities arising from a failure to force the surrender of italy. The balnce of power in 1943 was still quite close....less than 6 months before the Germans were still attacking and on the offensive


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## davebender (Jun 7, 2012)

Check your dates.

Sicily was invaded during July 1943 and caused the Kursk offensive to be curtailed. This is well documented by David Glantz.

Italy was invaded during September 1943. The Italian invasions (Salerno and 8th Army) had no effect on Russian front operations.


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## parsifal (Jun 7, 2012)

davebender said:


> Check your dates.
> 
> Sicily was invaded during July 1943 and caused the Kursk offensive to be curtailed. This is well documented by David Glantz.
> 
> Italy was invaded during September 1943. The Italian invasions (Salerno and 8th Army) had no effect on Russian front operations.



check your geography. last time i looked, sicily was part of Italy. Sicily was invaded 11July, and 1SS Corps was withdrawn 21 July (I think). After the arrest of Mussolini the Germans were also forced to commence withsrawing other less well known formations into the garrison area of the Balkans, Italy and southern France, to be ready to implement Alaric 

The whole situation in italy (and that includes Sicily and Sardinia) had a significant effect on force structures for AGS

Moreover Kursk did not end in July. For the russians, their counteroffensive, still part of the Kursk operation, did not end until november, when they moved to their 'winter storm" operations.


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## davebender (Jun 7, 2012)

Disarming the Italian military tied down considerably more German units during the fall of 1943 then U.S. and British ground forces.

*October 1943.* Data from "The Day of Battle" by Rick Atkinson.
163 German divisions fighting the Soviet Union.
34 German divisions in France.
9 German divisions in Northern Italy (i.e. disarming Italian military).
8 German divisions in Southern Italy opposing U.S. and British invasions.
?? German divisions disarming Italian military in Balkans. I suspect this was quite a few. Plus airpower to defeat British invasion of Aegean Islands.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 9, 2012)

Don't bypass Italy, bypass Mark Clark instead.

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## davebender (Jun 9, 2012)

July 1943. We had enough amphibious assault ships in Europe to simultaneously land 7 combat divisions.

The U.S. Army lands at Normandy with 4 divisions plus 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. Followed by additional divisions as fast as they can be shuttled from England. Air cover provided by P-38s and the new P-47 operating from English air bases. Naval fire support provided by a dozen USN battleships.

The British 8th Army invades Sicily from Tunisia with 3 divisions plus an airborne division. Followed by additional divisions as fast as they can be shuttled from Tunisia or Malta. Air cover provided by Spitfires based on Malta. Naval fire support provided by a dozen RN battleships.

Optional.
Halt 1943 offensive operations in the Pacific. That will free up about two divisions worth of amphibious transports for employment in Europe. The Normandy invasion could be 5 divisions (i.e. same as 1944 historical). British 8th Army could land 4 divisions on Sicily.


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## stug3 (Jun 9, 2012)

davebender said:


> July 1943-Optional.
> Halt 1943 offensive operations in the Pacific. That will free up about two divisions worth of amphibious transports for employment in Europe. The Normandy invasion could be 5 divisions (i.e. same as 1944 historical). British 8th Army could land 4 divisions on Sicily.



If the American public had gotten wind of this "option", they would have exerted massive resistance by means of political pressure on congress FDR. Revenge against Japan occupied the national psyche and was its overwhelming goal and priority. Pretty sure Australia New Zealand would have been greatly disturbed also since Japan still had a considerable presence in the Solomons at that time. Not to mention how it would affect the CBI too.


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## davebender (Jun 9, 2012)

Let's try an even better option.

December 1941.
The U.S. Army has 37 combat divisions with plans to expand to 59 divisions during 1942.

Point of Departure.
U.S. Army Chief of Staff realizes all these combat divisions are useless unless they can be landed on a hostile shore. He orders the Army to procure amphibious transport for 1 division each month for the next 15 months. By the summer of 1943 the U.S. Army will have amphibious transport adequate for 5 divisions in the Pacific and 10 divisions in Europe. That allows the USA to take the fight to the enemy NLT summer 1943 and shipping will not be a bottleneck. 

WWII era amphibious transports were converted merchant ships so they weren't terribly expensive. A Liberty Ship costs about $ 2 million. You can purchase about 50 for the price of a single battleship and the USN was purchasing battleships like they were going out of style.
2 x North Carolina class.
4 x South Dakota class
6 x Iowa class (two were cancelled after partial completion.)
5 x Montana class were ordered but cancelled before construction started.
6 x Alaska class battle cruisers. 3 laid down. 2 completed.


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## drgondog (Jun 11, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Don't bypass Italy, bypass Mark Clark instead.



God knows that Mark Clark is held with the same esteem as Grant and the post war carpetbaggers here in Texas.


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## davebender (Jun 11, 2012)

> Mark Clark is held with the same esteem as Grant and the post war carpetbaggers here in Texas.


36th Infantry Division officers requested and got a Congressional investigation into Gen. Clark's competence. 

Unfortunately we had few really good generals during WWII and there were worse people then Gen. Clark. How would you like to invade Italy with Gen. MacArthur in command?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 11, 2012)

Actually I think that in that case, MacArthur, in the words of Capt. Jack Aubrey, might have been the lesser of the two weevils. When he had been granted all the resources his gigantic ego demanded, he seemed to have gotten the job done, but that perception may be based on Mac's own PR machine. With him, I don't know what's real and what is myth. From reading Atkinson's Day of Battle, I feel I have a better handle on Clark's shortcomings and judge many would have been better suited to the command. Lucian Truscott for one. I suspect there were other less well known and most important, less well connected. 

Our military has a history of being not so much a meritocracy as it is a nepotocracy and too often, an ineptocracy in its leadership and selection thereof. 

MacArthur's leadership and that of his subordinates is epitomized by one instance that occurred during January, 1942. With roughly one full squadron of P-40 fighters (18 aircraft) surviving of his original four by January 3, he decided to send half to Del Monte Field on Mindanao, a flight of 530+ miles *without drop tanks*. Miraculously, 6 of the 9 aircraft arrived safely. One aborted and two crashed killing one and injuring the other of the pilots. The survivors operated there under very unfavorable conditions and even poorer leadership than they had enjoyed on Bataan if that's possible. Around January 20, the Bataan leadership decided it had made a mistake and recalled 4 of the remaining 5 P-40 aircraft at Del Monte A/F! Fortunately, it had been discovered that intermediate air fields were still in allied hands and available for refueling stops. One of the returning aircraft crashed at sea due to mechanical failure a common occurrence on such long transits. Thus, 5 of the 9 aircraft were lost to the Bataan forces without making a single contribution to the defense of the peninsula.


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## davebender (Jun 11, 2012)

It appears to me our army didn't become a fully professional force until the 1980s. That's why I hesitate to judge WWII American officers such as Gen Clark too harshly. If Gen. Clark had been a German or Japanese officer he would have benefitted from better training throughout his military career and therefore been better prepared to lead an army into battle.

Gen. MacArthur is the exception to the rule. IMO someone with no military training at all but a bit of common sense could have done a better job at OMAGC and USAFFE. Political skills were his only skills.


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## parsifal (Jun 11, 2012)

> It appears to me our army didn't become a fully professional force until the 1980s. That's why I hesitate to judge WWII American officers such as Gen Clark too harshly. If Gen. Clark had been a German or Japanese officer he would have benefitted from better training throughout his military career and therefore been better prepared to lead an army into battle.



If clark had been a german or japanese commander, he would have been far more battlefield focussed and far less campaign focussed. His problem in fact was that he suffered that other peculiarly German trait....not knowing how to fight as a member of a coalitiion. his deliberate disobeying of Alexanders orders in not bypassing Rome committed the Allies to another 6 months of fighting on the Trasimene line. Smacks remarkably like Rommel disobeying the italian High Command who wanted a halt after the capture of Tobruk, to allow for the capture of Malta. It always amazes me.....Clark disobeyed his boss, and is branded incompetent....Rommel disobeys his boss, routinely went political , still lost, and in the end lost more material than Clark ever even commanded, and yet, Rommel is a military genius....apparently.

And then we have the german treatment of their allies. If the relationship between the british and the Americans was at times, under stress, the relationship between the germans and their allies was nothing short of diabolical.

Its a good thing that Allied officers learnt how to fight to achieve higher strategic objectives, using all the resources at their diisposal. A much broader and deeper usage of resources than the german leadership ever managed to achieve....and Mac was at the forefront of that combined arms concept. The allied leadership was uninspired on the battlefield. that remained a German dominated field of expertise. The German method failed because it was far too narrow and blind to all the wider strategic issues and possibilities. case in point....Rommel was mostly defeasted because of his poor understanding of logistics....his head of supply was a lowly Major......

All the armies of the world had strengths asnd weakness, and the US was no different. It was no less proficient, just different


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 11, 2012)

davebender said:


> Gen. MacArthur is the exception to the rule. IMO someone with no military training at all but a bit of common sense could have done a better job at OMAGC and USAFFE. _*Political skills were his only skills.*_



OMAGC?


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## stug3 (Jun 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The allied leadership was uninspired on the battlefield. that remained a German dominated field of expertise.



wow, talk about over-generalization. I dont think I need to list all the names that disprove that statement. ridiculous.

Im no fan of MacArthur, but you have to give him credit for Inchon in 1950.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2012)

It is an overgeneralization, i agree, but for every allied genius on the battlefield, there were probably 10 german genius's. it is also an overgeneralization to say that the germans always failed to "get it" in the non-battlefield issues. 

But as general observations , the point I am making does hold true. Allied leadership on the battlefield was not inspired, german leadership was. Off the battlefield, German leadership was at best adequate but usually fell far short of allied capability.


An example of mediocre battelfield leadership was Eisenhower. He never quite got the need to concentrate resources to achieve decisive brekthroughs. Eisenhower very much took the safe road, attacking at a measured pace, across a broad front. this minimised risks, but ensured that the germans were pushed back, rather than encircled and destroyed. As a battle strategist Eisenhower was at best mediocre. As a campaign general, he was near perfect. he handled difficult people, managed difficult logistics issues, averted the worst political interventions, never lost sight of the greater military objectives, never allowed the expeditionary forces to be placed into too much hurt. You could seldom ask for a better general from the pov of the campaign. 

Moreover this battlefield advantage for the germans remained an advatage for them at nearly all level odf command. The Germans produced some very good small and medium level leaders, but their military establishedment was inherently narrow in focus and conservative, and this, in the end was their undoing. germany would have been defeated militarily regardless of Hitlers interference. he just sped up the process 

The poinmt i was trying to make is that on the battlefield, the Germans remained very dangerous and very capable. Neither the Germans of the Americans (or anyone else) were totally devoid of abilities outside their national focus. There were good german supply officers. there were good British Tank commanders. It was a question of what each nationality tended to be good at rather than laying down a blanket rule. 

Nothing wrong with mac....i think he was a good leader


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## stug3 (Jun 12, 2012)

I can accept your criticism of Eisenhower even though I disagree with it. There were numerous political logistical variable factors he had to deal with to maintain Allied progress. Some of your other opinions are downright asinine to the point of being insultingl.

_but for every allied genius on the battlefield, there were probably 10 german genius's_ RIDICULOUS

_Moreover this battlefield advantage for the germans remained an advatage for them at nearly all level odf command._- RIDICULOUS, and how would you know anyway?


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2012)

[


> I can accept your criticism of Eisenhower even though I disagree with it. There were numerous political logistical variable factors he had to deal with to maintain Allied progress. Some of your other opinions are downright asinine to the point of being insultingl.



Apologies if you find the opinions expressed in my post asinine and insulting. I cant please all the people all the time I guess. 



> _but for every allied genius on the battlefield, there were probably 10 german genius's_ RIDICULOUS
> 
> _Moreover this battlefield advantage for the germans remained an advatage for them at nearly all level odf command._- RIDICULOUS, and how would you know anyway?



It doesnt help your case to just blurt out that you think the statement ridiculous. You really need to post some counter position, and then back it up with some solid supporting material. unless all you are looking for is to get into a pissing contest, which doesnt help promote your opinion my friend.

As for "how would I know anyway?". Well, Im not old enough to have been there (but are you), neither do I have any friends ofr family that were there. But my strategic Studies lecturere at the academy was a captain in the 11 armoured. You could say i am failrly familiar with the material. As a starting reference, have you read "Brute Force" by Ellis? I dont agree with everything he says, but he does give a pretty good critique of allied command and leadership issues. Shelby Stantons US Army in WWII is a really good one volume reference on the US Army. Not sure if you are all that interested in the British Army or the CW. For the German Army there are numerous books on the subject, but just a few could be include Samuel Mitchams "The German Army Of WWII, or Major Gens Alfred Toppes small book on "Desert Warfare - The German experience and Methodologies"

As an officer in the military, we studied the various training and command methodologies used in WWII. For battlefield command and control, German Kriegspiel and command systems were by far the most thorough and effective. There are others in this place far more familiar than I, but I do have enough knowledge to acknowldege a good system when I see it. and from a good system comes good people.


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## stug3 (Jun 12, 2012)

_It doesnt help your case to just blurt out that you think the statement ridiculous. You really need to post some counter position, and then back it up with some solid supporting material._

Counter position to what? blanket generalizations that are obviously false? 10 German warrior geniuses for every dumb Allied brute who (unfortunately for you) was lucky enough to have better air support more "stuff" in general?

Sorry to tell ya, but every time I think of dead nazis, it gives me a warm, fuzzy feeling inside. Thanks for ruining an interesting thread with bs.


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## davebender (Jun 12, 2012)

Office of the Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines

Commonwealth of the Philippines - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Philippines was a Commonwealth during 1935 to 1946. This was an interim step before complete independence.

The OMAGC commander (i.e. MacArthur) was head of the Philippine Army with the rank of Field Marshal. The 10 Philippine Army divisions which fought Japan during 1941 and early 1942 were his creation. Ike was his assistant during 1935 to 1939.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 12, 2012)

davebender said:


> Office of the Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines
> 
> Commonwealth of the Philippines - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> The Philippines was a Commonwealth during 1935 to 1946. This was an interim step before complete independence.
> ...



Thanks Dave. Also, thanks Pars. While perhaps your generalizations are a bit overstated (hyperbole?), I think *in general*, you have characterized the situation pretty well. To be fair, While not overly familiar with axis leadership, I suspect there weren't many instances when the higher echelon of axis leadership relieved effective field commanders because they were fearful of a public backlash or for questionable acts committed in the heat of battle which nevertheless got the job done. As examples: Patton, Terry Allen, Fletcher, Gil Hoover. I suspect there are more, perhaps even on both sides but I just don't know axis leadership history that well. Would Doenitz or Raeder have dismissed combat veteran and proven winner Norman Scott in favor of untried Dan Callahan on the basis of a few weeks seniority? Is it possible the much hated axis was as much or more of a meritocracy than allied forces? I don't know, but it seems to me that politics played more of a negative role in allied leadership decisions than is typically appreciated at least in the popular mind. We seem to quickly forget the mistakes and celebrate the victories and ascribe them to the loudest advocates of a mythical point of view. For example: the sacrifice of the TBD's at Midway to allow the SBD's to attack unopposed and so win the battle. The ultimate naval aviation myth.
Generalizing: victory is a poor teacher, defeat a superb one.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2012)

> Counter position to what? blanket generalizations that are obviously false?



Why are they false. what evidence do you have to support your claim



> 10 German warrior geniuses for every dumb Allied brute who (unfortunately for you) was lucky enough to have better air support more "stuff" in general?



The point i was making was that the Germans were ,in general, better battlefield commanders. that was their strength. Admittedly a generalization, but a valid one, backed up by some pretty solid material. I never said the allies were dumb brutes. In fact I was at pains to point out their stregths...which in essence were the ability to look at broader strategic capabilities and constraints. the allies were very good at that. I fail to see how that is inferring the allies were "dumb brutes"

As for _(unfortunately for you) was lucky enough to have better air support more "stuff" in general_ where on earth do you get the notion that I am some kind of Nazi sympathiser or german apologist. Stick around awhile, and you might get a better picture of what I stand for. Askl a few other members what I do and what i believe. you could not be further from the truth. 



> Sorry to tell ya, but every time I think of dead nazis, it gives me a warm, fuzzy feeling inside.



I have no sympathy for them either. We werent talking about Nazis, we were talking about German military leadership. not all of them were Nazis. Some were just dedicated soldiers that happened to be controlled by the Nazis



> Thanks for ruining an interesting thread with bs.



Why BS. The original comment was made about the limits on American leaders, and how poor they were. I didnt say that. i responded and refuted it to be honest. You decided you didnt like giving the germans any credit for their abilitie whatsoever. If you want to argue that, be my guest, but dont attack me as the person who derided US battlefield experiece in this thread. Check back on the posts, and you will see I was the one defending it.

Just because your thread is not following the course you wanted, doesnt make it not relevant or un-interesting (uninteresting to you perhaps but not for the majority). Why are we talking about US military experience, and how does that relate to the topic? Because the US Army in 1943 lacked for nothing except one precious commodity....experience. and it got some of that experience in the italian campaign.


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## Njaco (Jun 12, 2012)

Stug, stop with the sarcasm and the name-calling.

It seems that Parsifal gave an opinion (which another member accepted and understood) and he asked that if you disagree, you make your point. Calling someone asinine and ridiculus is not a way to do that.

OT, I've always thought that Kesselring was one of the best generals that Germany had - especially in Italy.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 12, 2012)

Njaco said:


> OT, I've always thought that Kesselring was one of the best generals that Germany had - especially in Italy.



Unfortunately for allied forces...


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2012)

> Also, thanks Pars. While perhaps your generalizations are a bit overstated (hyperbole?), I think *in general*, you have characterized the situation pretty well.



Thanks, and of course there is generalization in my comments, but Im not going to write detailed critique on US army leadership in a place like this 



> To be fair, While not overly familiar with axis leadership, I suspect there weren't many instances when the higher echelon of axis leadership relieved effective field commanders because they were fearful of a public backlash or for questionable acts committed in the heat of battle which nevertheless got the job done. As examples: Patton, Terry Allen, Fletcher, Gil Hoover.



I would say that if anythig Nazi leadership suffered more from political intervention than the allies. Perhaps the military shuffles were more for military reasons, but the interference was definately political in nature. hitler was not a professional soldier, though he was the head of the military (you could say the same things about Roosevelt as commander in chief and Churchill as the first Lord and then MOD). The meddling and intervention from Hitler is legendary....dismissal of Raeder, dismissal of Guderian, Von Bock, Rommel, to name just a few.....


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 12, 2012)

After I wrote my post I realized the IJN also had problems of that sort and the Reich almost certainly must have had such as you point out. At one point in the Guadacanal campaign, Yamamoto evidently felt he had cause to fire Tanaka and did boot probably the finest destroyer admiral in the war.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2012)

> OT, I've always thought that Kesselring was one of the best generals that Germany had - especially in Italy.



Dont agree that its OT....

German Commanders in Italy 

The following brief biographies of the chief German commanders in Italy have been compiled mainly from personal files held by the German Military Documents Section of the United States War Department, Washington: also 1 Source: General Siegfried Westphal: The German Army in the West, pp. v and 211, and finally the NZ official history.


"Lieutenant-General Ernst Baade was an old enemy of 2 NZ Division from North Africa, where he commanded a regiment in 1942. He was one of the outstanding German divisional commanders in Italy – a dashing, independent soldier, one of the ‘bad boys’ of the German Army, who had ideas of his own and often acted with little regard for orders and regulations. He commanded a corps in 1945, and was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross for the defensive victory at Cassino on 18 February 1944.

Lieutenant-General Richard Heidrich was a machine-gun company commander in the First World War. He fought against the New Zealand Division on Crete as commander of 3 Parachute Regiment. Awarded the Oak Leaves with Swords for the defence of Cassino. He commanded 1 Parachute Corps in late 1944. A very keen, ambitious, strict soldier, and a most aggressive commander in action.

General Traugott Herr was an outstanding commander of formations of all sizes, from a company to an army; he always earned the highest praise for his steadiness, ability and energy, despite being permanently handicapped by the effects of a head wound. Described as ‘a fine man and an exemplary soldier, full of character’.

Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring had a continuous record of service since 1904. He served mainly in artillery field commands and General Staff positions until 1936, when he transferred to the Luftwaffe. Commanded an air fleet in Poland, in the Low Countries, in the Battle of Britain, and in Russia in 1941, and was in charge of all German Army formations in Italy in 1943. An orthodox, sound strategist, but not brilliant – General Alexander thought him much better than the more impetuous Rommel. A master of battlefield tactics and very tenacious. One of the last high-ranking officers to keep on fighting in May 1945. He was sentenced to death (later commuted to life imprisonment) for being a party to the shooting of over 300 Italian civilian hostages in the Ardeatine catacombs near Rome. He was released from prison in October 1952 after an operation, ‘as an act of clemency’.

General Joachim Lemelsen began his career as an artillery officer before the First World War, transferred to the General Staff in 1918, and served later in artillery, infantry and panzer formations, gaining a wide knowledge of all arms. Commanded a panzer division in 1940, a corps until 1943, then an army. He gained high praise for his leadership of the Fourteenth Army in 1944.

General Smilo Freiherr von Luettwitz was a cavalryman who transferred to the panzer troops. He was one of the best divisional commanders in Italy until July 1944, then was promoted quickly through a corps to an army command, but failed as an army commander and was relegated to a corps again in 1945. He always had a reputation for leading from in front.

General der Panzertruppen F. von Senger und Etterlin was born in Baden in 1892 and was at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar shortly before the First World War, in which he fought as a junior artillery officer. After the war he became a regular officer, transferring to the cavalry, and in 1940 commanded a motorised brigade which took Le Havre and Cherbourg. After service on the Italo-French Armistice Commission in 1940–42, he commanded a panzer division in Russia, but returned west to command the German troops in Sicily during the Allied invasion and then in Corsica. He fought the battles of Cassino with 14 Panzer Corps and took part in the retreat through Italy. In April–May 1945 he led the German commission which negotiated the surrender of the German forces in Italy at Fifth Army Headquarters.

General Siegfried Westphal joined the German Army at the end of the First World War and spent much of his career as a staff officer. Before the Second World War he was in the Operations Section of the Army General Staff and in the early months of the war served as First General Officer of a division in the West. On the fall of France he was made a member of the Franco-German Armistice Commission, but in mid-1941 he went to Africa, where he became Chief of Staff to Field-Marshal Rommel. In 1943 and 1944 he was successively Chief of the Operations Section and Chief of Staff to Kesselring in Italy. His war service ended on the western front as Chief of Staff to the Commanders-in-Chief West (first Field-Marshal Rundstedt and later Kesselring).1 Kesselring thought highly of his abilities, writing (in his Memoirs, p. 260): ‘I could not have wished for a better Chief of Staff…. He knew my idiosyncrasies as I knew his’.

Colonel-General Heinrich-Gottfried von Vietinghoff fought on the eastern and western fronts in the First World War and commanded a panzer division in Poland and a corps in France in 1940. He served in Russia in 1941–42, commanding Ninth Army ‘well and confidently … in very critical defensive battles’. He won praise from Kesselring for his conduct of the defence in Italy while in command of Tenth Army. As Commander-in-Chief South-West he negotiated the surrender of the German forces in Italy in May 1945.

Lieutenant-General Gustav Heisterman von Ziehlberg held a General Staff position at GHQ for several years prior to 1943, when he was transferred to a field command. He commanded 65 Division from its formation. He was described as an ‘upright, friendly, warm-hearted man with plenty of guts and optimism’. He lost an arm as a result of his wound at the Sangro, but five months later was back commanding a division in Russia. Suspected of implication in the anti-Hitler plot of July 1944, he was tried and shot in January 1945.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2012)

Dupuy Institute have undertaken a number of empirical studies to try and quantify various combat relationships between the Germans and their opponents. One study I have seen gives their battlefield leadership advantage as 2.63 in 1942, falling to 1.35 in late 1944. This concept of attempting to quantify the advantage was further explored by Simulations Inc, a military simulation think tank working for the US. 

The number is meant to be an indication of the general advatage (oops, theres that word again) enjoyed by the germans over their opponents, including the effects of their small unit leaders. 2.63 means that it takes 2.63 allied soldiers to equal 1 German soldier, and so on

These quantum models have been criticised, including me, but they are still a valid tool in trying to get a general understanding of this issue.

A pretty good discussion both for and against can be found at the end of this link

Professor Michael Licari: assessment of WW2 performance and criticism of QJM - The Dupuy Institute Forum


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2012)

From the same website, there have been a number of discussions about CEVs (Combat Effectiveness Values). I think the discussion between Niklas Zetterling (yes, THE Niklas Zetterling) and Chris Lawrence is very interesting, and makes reference to Zeterlings book which dealt with this subject though the focus was the Eastern Front....

German combat figures - The Dupuy Institute Forum


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## parsifal (Jun 13, 2012)

Getting back onto what was achieved by invading italy, if nothing else, it bagged a reasonable casualty list from the Axis. Already we have seen that the invasion of Sicily (part of italy) and the mainland caused (or contributed to) the dissolution of all the italian Army, and that this had an effect on the numbers of german garrison troops needed to replace them.

But what of the actual losses incurred? The following gives a pretty good account of what was achieved from a US perspective

PO VALLEY 1945


Relevantly, in its conclusion it says 

"For the Allied armies in Italy, the Po Valley offensive climaxed the long and bloody Italian campaign. When the spring offensive opened, it initially appeared that its course might continue the pattern of the previous months and battles in Italy, becoming another slow, arduous advance over rugged terrain, in poor weather, against a determined, well-entrenched, and skillful enemy. However, by April 1945 the superbly led and combat-hardened Allied 15th Army Group, a truly multinational force, enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority on the ground and in the air. On the other side, Axis forces had been worn down by years of combat on many fronts; they were plagued by poor political leadership at the top as well as shortages of nearly everything needed to wage a successful defensive war. By April 1945 factors such as terrain, weather, combat experience, and able military leadership, that had for months allowed the Axis to trade space for time in Italy could no longer compensate for the simple lack of manpower, air support, and materiel. By the end of the first two weeks of the campaign both sides realized that the end of the war in Italy was in sight, and that all the Allies needed to complete the destruction of Axis forces was the skillful application of overwhelming pressure, a feat largely accomplished within ten days, by 2 May 1945. 

By the time of the cease-fire in Italy, the U.S. Fifth Army had been in continuous combat for 602 days, well over twenty months, far longer than any U. S. field army during World War II. During the entire Italian campaign, Allied losses had exceeded 312,000, of which 60 percent, or about 189,000, were sustained by Fifth Army units. Of the total losses, 31,886 were killed, including 19,475 Americans, the remainder of the dead being British and Commonwealth troops, Brazilians, Poles, Frenchmen, free Italians, and members of the Jewish brigade. German losses in Italy were estimated at over 434,600, including 48,000 killed in action and over 214,000 missing, the majority of the latter presumed dead. 

What had started as a limited Allied assault on the "soft underbelly of Europe" in mid-1943, an invasion to tie down Axis forces and push Italy from the war, by 1944 had become a full operational theater of its own, involving upwards of five hundred thousand Allied troops at its peak. Although considered a sideshow from mid-1944 on, the soldiers involved in the Italian campaign succeeded in the vast majority of the goals which the Allied high command had set for them. From the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 until the final Axis surrender just south of the Alps in May 1945, the Allied armies in Italy had battled north over one thousand miles of mountainous terrain, through inclement weather, against a capable and determined enemy. Only the overwhelming Allied materiel and manpower resources and the countless heroic acts of hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers in small unit actions of a type unique to the war in Italy overcame the Axis forces. Primarily, the Allied soldiers' determination and aggressive spirit forced Germany to divert considerable men and materiel from other, more significant fronts in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to halt the Allied drive north".


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## DonL (Jun 13, 2012)

You can also add:

Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 from Martin van Creveld.

Amazon.com: Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (9780313233333): Martin van Creveld: Books

It is a little more provocative but to my opinion is based on science and very methodic.
I don't agree with all but a very good book.


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## parsifal (Jun 13, 2012)

It looks like a very good analysis. i am going to try and get a hold of a copy.

When you break this issue down, I think we are led inevitably to the superiority of german leadership. There is not a lot of difference in the quality of material, though that may be disputed for certain items like Tiger tanks and the like. Numerous studies have shown that in fact the qualitative advantages of these items of kit are only a partial answer to explaining German Battlefield superiority. Having a Tiger tank in your kitbag will only give you an advantage if you know how to use it.

If my position is accepted, namely, that the germans were not good or outstanding at issues which i have called "strategic" issues (eg supply) but excel at battlefield management, and one also accepts that the quality of german equipment can only provide a partial answer to their superiority, there are only a few other options we can consider to try and explain that advantage

I would suggest the folowing to consider:

1) At the beginning of the war better tactical organization and doctrine, particulalry with regard to the armour/Infantry/artillery/airpower mix

2) At the beginning of the war, manpower that was better trained and organized. German Infantry was man for man better than all opponents at the beginning of the war. However as the war progressed and casualty rates went up the quality of German manpower, and the level it was trained to did fall significantly

3) As mentioned above, on a selective basis German equipment at the beginning of the war was superior in many fields. In my opinion they held advantages in machine guns, mortars, field artillery, Corps level artillery, communications, some small arms, half tracks. For tanks they generally had advantages, except for armoured protetion . as the war progressed, they tended to lose most of these advantages except perhaps in Tank development. 

4) The Germans spent more time training their officers than anyone, including their NCOs, and this proved to be the rock on which the German Army held itself together through its darkest ordeals. Moreover this advantage was retained for most of the war. This advantage goes at least back to the Weimar days, under Von Seekt, when a very large of the Versaille army was officers or NCOs.

The weaknesses of the german army were related to an inordinate preoccupation on direct support....a coconcentration on the immediate battle rather than looking at the overall campaigns. relatively few german officers worried about anything other than their immediate commands. this is in marked contrast to the better allied commanders. There were exceptions to this, of course, but it sometimes explains why the germans would act as they did. 

Despite their rather magnificant late war defensive efforts, the germans actually were a bit lacking in defensive thinking. on orders from Hitler, defensive training....how to retreat, as opposed to headlong flight, was removed from the training manuals before the war. Hitler believed such preprations to be "defeatist". The result was that many german soldiers tended to fight until they could no longer fight, and then just run headlong from the enemy. This tended to create situations that led to inordinate losses once the formation was in the process of being overwhelmed. There were exceptions, such as Rommels masterly withdrawal from Alamein. But this was an exception, and it wasnt helped by hitlers often insane "stand fast" orders.


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## stug3 (Jun 14, 2012)

_German Battlefield superiority_





_German Battlefield superiority_




_German Battlefield superiority_




_German Battlefield superiority_




_German Battlefield superiority_




_German Battlefield superiority_


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## parsifal (Jun 14, 2012)

How does this series of photos strengthen or prove your case? We all know that at the end of the war there were many German prisoners taken. Its a flippant and irrlevant statistic really. It could be just as flippantly countered by pointing out that the germans took many millions more prisoners, including Americans during the war. 

Overall the allies proved superior to the Heer....superior in numbers, superior in strategy, superior in logistics. they never proved superior in battle, except on some rather famous occasions, like Tobruk and Bastogne. On the field of battle the germans retained a superiority over the allies almost to the very end.

Photos of prisoners doesnt prove anything, except that you are very p*ssed off and want to get into an argument. Why not try and read some of the material that has been suggested by me and others, perhaps find some other material that you think might help your position or improve your understanding. Then reach a considered informed conclusion, and post your opinions (or not, as you want). I will be the first to defend you from some of the trolls that inhabit this place and will pounce on you, but only if you come up with a reasoned, respectful argument that has some chance of being reasonable


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## stug3 (Jun 14, 2012)

parsifal said:


> they never proved superior in battle, except on some rather famous occasions, like Tobruk and Bastogne. On the field of battle the germans retained a superiority over the allies almost to the very end.
> 
> Photos of prisoners doesnt prove anything, except that you are very p*ssed off and want to get into an argument.



Im not pissed off and am not trying to argue, Im just amazed at your delusion. You're a great practitioner of Hitler's "The Bigger The Lie..." theory, how you expect anyone to believe it is beyond me. The truth about _German Battlefield superiority_ is right there in all those pictures.


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## DonL (Jun 14, 2012)

@ stug3



> Im just amazed at your delusion. You're a great practitioner of Hitler's "The Bigger The Lie..." theory, how you expect anyone to believe it is beyond me. The truth about German Battlefield superiority is right there in all those pictures.



You are real funny guy and realy you have not neither any single clue about parsifal nor the issue we are talking about.

The Dupuy Institute is from the USA
Home Page

and Trevor Nevitt Dupuy was a Colonel of the United States Army.
Trevor N. Dupuy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Also my book reference was a *studie directly ordered from the Pentagon* which was later published as book and Martin van Creveld has lectured at the Administration Academy of the US Marine Corps and the US Naval War College. 

So you will find *many* US militarys with absolut the same opinion as parsifal and me too.
All this studies are from the USA for the US military. We will see if you get this!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 14, 2012)

Gentlemen, play nice - cyber space is not very plesent this time of year! I will ban and lock this thread if the BS continues


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## DonL (Jun 14, 2012)

@ FLYBOYJ

Sorry but to say, here in this forum, parsifal is a great practitioner of Hitler's "The Bigger The Lie..." theory, is realy to be absurd!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 14, 2012)

Don, I am not tolerating comments from you or anyone else, GET BACK ON TOPIC OR LEAVE!!! - MY LAST WARNING!!!!!


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## parsifal (Jun 14, 2012)

stug3 said:


> Im not pissed off and am not trying to argue, Im just amazed at your delusion. You're a great practitioner of Hitler's "The Bigger The Lie..." theory, how you expect anyone to believe it is beyond me. The truth about _German Battlefield superiority_ is right there in all those pictures.



Do you think that at the time of the Sicily and italian invasions, the US army had sufficient experience to taker on the German army on the central western european plains in a straight up fight. 

Compare the level of experience possessed by the US Army in 1943 to the level of experience posesed by the germans in 1943. Essentially the US was a green, inexpereienced force that needed a "controlled" limited exposure to the enemy....taking them on in limited numbers, and if possible not against the very best that they (the germans) could put into the field. To a degree the italian front offered that. 

You may accuse me of delusion but how do you explain away the referenced material like Dupuy and Zetterling, as wll as that other source DonL has made available. are these guys all Nazi sympathisers and delusional as well. I can assure you my friend, I am no Hitlerite no German sympathiser and I am not delusional (at least not in relation to this subject.

Instead of trying to whip up a confrontation, how about you post something of substance to support your position, and add to the debate, rather than just some silly photos. Talk about asinine and ridiculous. 

Strange for me and DonL to be arguing on the same side... rather a nice change dont you think DonL?


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 14, 2012)

"... Strange for me and DonL to be arguing on the same side... rather a nice change dont you think DonL?"

Yes it is .... let's have more of it.

MM


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## DonL (Jun 14, 2012)

Indeed!

But it is not the first time we are the same opinion!
I think we both had a bad start because we are perhaps both full of spirits, but I have learned that I can learn one thing or an other from you and personal comments didn't help anybody.

So let's change arguments if we are not the same opinion!

At this issues I'm totaly with you, also with your other analyses about the Wehrmacht.
But I think we should discuss the logistic and strategic issue more intense because my opinion isn't this harsh as yours, but I will present my arguments, probably in an other thread.


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## stug3 (Jun 14, 2012)

I'll respond if the moderator says its ok, I dont want to get this thread locked.


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## parsifal (Jun 14, 2012)

> At this issues I'm totaly with you, also with your other analyses about the Wehrmacht.
> But I think we should discuss the logistic and strategic issue more intense because my opinion isn't this harsh as yours, but I will present my arguments, probably in an other thread.




Normandy is probably the best place to look at this issue. In straight up battles the Heer fought very effectively. In total numbers there was not that much difference between the two protagonists, but a number of factors conspired to ensure that the Germans were always at a strategic disadvantage. They lacked the mobility (caused somewhat by the effects of allied airpower, also a shortage of MT) to shift their forces around to meet new threats posed by the allies. By these means the allies were able to achieve local superiorities of 6 or 7 to 1 at the points of breakthrough even though overall, they did not have much of a numerical advantage. The big factor affecting the resective armys' performances was the re-supply rate. everything from replacement vehicles,to artillery, even rations, was cheese and chalk. Ther allies might lose 30 tanks in a battle, and within hours have replacements. Replacements for the germans was a sometimes, if ever occurrence in places like Normandy. They (the germans) could never afford to expend resources like ammunition or fuel to anything like the level that the allies could afford. this just didnt happen.....in fact in theory, the allies should have been the ones with shortages to contend with, since they were the ones relying on extemporised resupply. But the reverse was true. sure, to an extent, a large extent, that was simply due to resources, but it also had to do with inadequate arrangements and forecasts by the germans. a lot of that lack of resources can be traced back to hitlers assumptions about the war being of short duration. this in turn is indicative of germany's poor strategic appraisals of their situations.

The same sorts of conclusions can be made in italy, but because the terrain was bad (or good, depending on the pov) and because the front was more static, the obviousness of these shortcomings are less apparent. But they were still there...Germany was after 1942 fighting a "poor mans war" with inadequate resources of all kinds....


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## parsifal (Jun 14, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I'll respond if the moderator says its ok, I dont want to get this thread locked.



You wont get into any trouble if you cut the abuse and remain focussed on topic. Make statements about the issues, back it up with something useful and we will all be happy


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## Njaco (Jun 14, 2012)

Stug, you have the freedom to respond if its a counter-point and On-Topic. We just ask that your argument is not based on photos taken totally out of contex.

As for the topic, the Allies had to take Italy for:

1) Stretch German resources ( a third front if you will)
2) Gain bomber bases from which to attack German supplies, especially the production areas that were out of reach of the 8th AF - like PLoesti.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 14, 2012)

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tsNsnxYcSLY_

MM


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## parsifal (Jun 15, 2012)

aha found it at last....conclusive evidence of the superiority of Allied arms!!!!


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0V3SqxUomwk_


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2GQri9RDJI_

or my favourite...


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IglUmgYGxLM_


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 17, 2012)

I think we killed the thread, Parsifal ....


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 17, 2012)

stug3 said:


> Sorry to tell ya, but every time I think of dead nazis, it gives me a warm, fuzzy feeling inside. Thanks for ruining an interesting thread with bs.



Thank you for ruining this thread with your insulting banter.

If you don't like the thread move on, and go someplace else.

Now, as the other mods have stated, quit the BS!


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## parsifal (Jun 17, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> I think we killed the thread, Parsifal ....



yes perhaps. Just the same, I rather see both pieces that we submitted as illustrating very effectively why, despite their superior leadership and training, the Germans could never defeat us.....no sense of humour I think....


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 17, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I'll respond if the moderator says its ok, I dont want to get this thread locked.



Just act like an adult and dont insult people. Simple as that.


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## parsifal (Jun 17, 2012)

so what was the advantage of the italian campaign. Before I start, I should preface by saying the Sicilian campaign is part of the Italian campaign in my book....

ill try and be brief in my summary

1) Retain Initiaitive on the southern front

2) Eliminate italy from the war, massive loss of garrison forces across the whole MTO

3) Diversion of forces from Russia at a critical time

4) Provide a limited front within allied capabilities of the time...allows real fire exposure for inexperienced units and commanders. 

5) Tie down German manpower.

6) Force the Germans into roughly handling their most important ally....sours relations with all other allies and even the neutrals. 

7) Frees up a loty of shipping for the allies by re-opening the mewd and suez routes


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 17, 2012)

"... no sense of humour, I think"

Parsifal, we might definitely wish that were true, and, I admit, different cultures have different "senses of humour" but Germany - specifically Berlin in 1931 - was very funny, and dark:


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8P80A8vy9I_

Now - back on topic - the rescue of Mussolini by Otto Scarface Skorzeny - to keep Italy in the Axis .

MM


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## Njaco (Jun 17, 2012)

Parsifal, you made my point and much better than I did. Italy (MTO/Southern Front) was VERY important to the total Allied war effort for exactly the reasons you gave.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 17, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... _*no sense of humour*_, I think"
> 
> Parsifal, we might definitely wish that were true, and, I admit, different cultures have different "senses of humour" but Germany - specifically Berlin in 1931 - was very funny, and dark:
> 
> ...




Ever read the Gunner Asch series of books by Hans Helmut Kirst? I thought they were very funny as a teen. Of course I didn't realize then that the guy was an officer in the wehrmacht, a WWII vet and a member of the Nazi party. read 'em all. Maybe will again some day.


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## parsifal (Jun 24, 2012)

I rather think somebody got their bat and ball and went home........

Trying to breath life back into this discussion (because it is a good one), what other options were available to the Allies in 1943 in the ETO other than invading Italy. Does anyone think the Allies had the strength and capability to undertake a cross channel invasion. One possibility might have been simply to invade Corsica, Sicily and Sardinia, as well as perhaps mount a more serious effort in the Aegean....taking back Crete and Rhodes (and from there, threatening Ploesti from the air) . All of these strategies are probably do-able, and do have certain advantages, but are they as optimal as hitting the italian peninsula directly???


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 24, 2012)

Thinking out loud, the thing about the italian peninsula that makes me flinch at invasion is its defensibilty. If Malta was a knife held at the throat of the axis North African oil supply, then Italy was a knife at the throat of allied Mediterranean ambitions and operations and a guard at the door to its alternate Romanian oil supplies, No? The Aegean litoral geogaphy also seems to me to be even more fraught with potential difficulties than that of Italy. Seems like a bad place to become bogged down and even if successful, how does it help the greater war effort aside from Bombing Romanian oil fields which is admittedly important. I mean with Italy you take down one leg of the tripartite alliance (albeit the least stable) as well as draw army units some distance from the Russian front.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 24, 2012)

How much of Italy do you have to take to open the Mediterranean Sea to Allied shipping? 

At least Sicily, and then either part of Southern Italy or Sardinia or both? 

Taking Sardinia uses up the remaining anvib operation in the summer of 1943 (mostly). Denies Axis airbases and gains allied ones but doesn't really take Italy out of the war. Forces on Sardinia can'r really go anywhere without another operation.

For those who don't know already Options are explained further here : HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Salerno to Cassino [Chapter 1]


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 24, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I rather think somebody got their bat and ball and went home........
> 
> Trying to breath life back into this discussion (because it is a good one), what other options were available to the Allies in 1943 in the ETO other than invading Italy. Does anyone think the Allies had the strength and capability to undertake a cross channel invasion. One possibility might have been simply to invade Corsica, Sicily and Sardinia, as well as perhaps mount a more serious effort in the Aegean....taking back Crete and Rhodes (and from there, threatening Ploesti from the air) . All of these strategies are probably do-able, and do have certain advantages, but are they as optimal as hitting the italian peninsula directly???



That is what happens when you were not taught manners...

Thanks for trying to get it back on track. It was a good and interesting discussion.

And to answer your question above, no I do not see any other options. My personal belief is that it was a necessary step to take. Most importantly it did open another front, and that front did tie up German forces and equipment. Basically I agree that if anything at all it helps weaken the Axis.


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## Njaco (Jun 24, 2012)

What if the Allies "split the difference" and invaded Sicily for Operation Torch instead of NA?


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## Shortround6 (Jun 24, 2012)

Way too risky. Trying to invade Sicily with the Axis having air bases on both sides of the Mediterranean exposes the the transports way too much. Some air support was being flown from NA for the Sicily landings ( bombers and P-38s) which you would also have to do without.


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## parsifal (Jun 24, 2012)

There were also not enough trained ground troops. The US was able to field less than a Corps Strength of trained formations to begin with, whilst the Brits were beginning to suffer shortages of manpower. The landings were undertaken well outside effective strike range of the LW, and for good reason. Just three months before, during the pedestal convoys, the RN had fought with great difficulty just 6 of the 14 merchant ships of the convoy. In doing that the RN had lost a carrier outright, had another moderately damaged with only 2 remaning. Two cruisers and a destroyer had been lost, and a further two cruisers damaged. The convoy had been attacked by 600 aircraft. They had been defended by just 70 fighters. 

The Joint Chiefs were greatly concerned about committment of raw untested troops against the Wehrmacht. It was believed they were not really up to the task, and subsequent events tend to support that. it was felt at the time of the landings that the Vichy French might not provide as stiff a resitance and may even defect to join the allies, if the invasion was seen as being a mostly American undertaking. This also proved correct, and in fact the Vichy response entraged Hitler to the point of him basically collapsing the Vichy regime and occupying its territory


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## Juha (Jun 27, 2012)

Not bothering to read the most of the long thread I would say that Sicily and Southern Italy up to N of Naples and of course the securing of Foggia area air bases would have been enough plus occupation of Sardinia after Germans withdrawn from there.

Juha


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## Njaco (Jun 27, 2012)

Juha said:


> Not bothering to read the most of the long thread I would say that Sicily and Southern Italy up to N of Naples and of course the securing of Foggia area air bases would have been enough plus occupation of Sardinia after Germans withdrawn from there.
> 
> Juha



But what importance did the Allies have for invading these areas? Could they have let Italy alone and concentrated on a second front in Western Europe?


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## Juha (Jun 27, 2012)

Hello Njaco
Sicily and Southern Italy meant fairly secure Med for convoys. Foggia was very important to strategic bombing campaign, targets in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Schlesia and Southern Poland were clearly easier to reach from there than from England and targets in Hungary and Romania became in reach. Also possibility to support partisans in Yugoslavia and in Northern Greece opened. There were important armament industry for ex. around Wien, and of course the oil targets around Ploesti and Wien and for ex at Blechhammer.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jun 27, 2012)

Hi Juha

What do you envisage happening after the capture of these rather peripheral areas. Do the allies just stop in Southern italy, allow the germans to consolidate in Northern italy and build a secure base from which to defend and possibly counterattack. Do the italian fascists be allowed the security of holding the capital, consolidating their position in Northern italy and building a power base from which to raise a new army to support the Germans and the overall defence of italy.

This strategy is actually more costly for the allies, not in casualties, but in garrison troops. The more the allies leave italy alone as a Theatre, the more secure it becomes for the axis, and the better and more effective a build up they can make. These additional forces can either be used to increas ethe pressure on the allies in italy (and hence force the allies to commit more troops there) or transfer those additional resources elsewhere to put additional pressure elsewhere. Garrison troops for either sidfe are a waste of time, but even more so for the allies with their limited numbers of frontline formations.


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## Juha (Jun 27, 2012)

Hello Parsifal
a couple points
IMHO facists were not very popular in Northern Italy, so it would have been fairly difficult to raise substatial italian forfes loyal to Mussolini and anyway Germans didn't trust much to "their" italians in 43-44. I recall only one substatial attack by Mussolini's army after summer 43,a brigade or division size fairly successful attack against Co-Belligent troops. I doubt that italians would have been very effective against British, US or French troops. Germans from Autumn 43 onwards suffered permanent lack of troops so I doubt that they would have eager to commit substantial troops and try to kick the Allied forces out especially because of Allied naval superiority much of german ground troops would have been tied to coastal defence along central Italy's long coastline as they were most of the time in real world. Of course substantial Allied forces would have tied in Southern Italy but less than historically because usually one needs less troops in defence than in attack especially when their flanks were secured by naval superiority and air superiority would have minimize the possibility of surprises. And air superiority would have made it difficult for Germans to amass enough material for an all-out attack. 

Juha


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## Vincenzo (Jun 27, 2012)

afaik the larger and probably alone operation of ENR was the partecipation at german offensive Unternehmen Wintergewitter and the allied units were US and indians


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 27, 2012)

Out of curiosity, Juha, how many Italians were lost in the East - fighting for the Germans - by December, 1942 ...?

Italians know that fish rot from the head down ... 

MM


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## Juha (Jun 27, 2012)

Hello Vincenzo
You are right, the Almond and Buffalo Soldiers aka 92nd Div case

Juha


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## Juha (Jun 27, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> Out of curiosity, Juha, how many Italians were lost in the East - fighting for the Germans - by December, 1942 ...?
> 
> Italians know that fish rot from the head down ...
> 
> MM



Hello Michael
I cannot remember but Italian 8th Army suffered heavy losses, Wiki probably knows.

Juha


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 27, 2012)

Wiki says ... 

".... In July 1941, some 62,000 Italian troops of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia, or CSIR) left for the Eastern Front to aid in the German invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa).
In July 1942, the Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito) expanded the CSIR to a full army of about 200,000 men known as the Italian Army in Russia (Armata Italiana in Russia, or ARMIR). The ARMIR was also known as the "Italian 8th Army."
From August 1942-February 1943, the Italian 8th Army took part in the Battle of Stalingrad. At Stalingrad, the 8th Army suffered heavy losses (some 20,000 dead and 64,000 captured) when the Soviets isolated the German forces in Stalingrad by attacking the over-stretched Hungarian, Romanian, and Italian forces protecting the German's flanks.
By the summer of 1943, Rome had withdrawn the remnants of these troops to Italy. Many of the Italian POWs captured in the Soviet Union died in captivity due to the harsh conditions in the Soviet prison camps..."

MM


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## parsifal (Jun 27, 2012)

> IMHO facists were not very popular in Northern Italy, so it would have been fairly difficult to raise substatial italian forfes loyal to Mussolini and anyway Germans didn't trust much to "their" italians in 43-44. I recall only one substatial attack by Mussolini's army after summer 43,a brigade or division size fairly successful attack against Co-Belligent troops. I doubt that italians would have been very effective against British, US or French troops.




I agree that the Saro Republic was intensely unpopular, in part because the italians believed it would not stand, and in part because the Germans, under intense pressure from the allies took drastic and violent action to suppress the resistance against them. Remove that pressure and the Saro Republic gains a bit of breathing space. Moreover, the pressure from the germans on the italian people would also be likely to decrease. 

As it was the Italians raised about 8 divs under the Saro Reppublic. They were badly equipped, but did reasonably well against the allies


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## Vincenzo (Jun 28, 2012)

AFAIK ENR raised only 4 divisions (on 2 rgt)

p.s. is Salò http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salò


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## canaanchamp (Jul 1, 2012)

Nice link to the import crisis. Very thorough


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## Tankworks (Jul 2, 2012)

I think it was a political decision; and the rose coloured lens saw the Italians joining the allied cause and chucking out the Germans. With that scenario things looked really good for the Italian invasion. I would have thought that an invasion, if possible, closer to the top end of the boot would have been better served.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 2, 2012)

The further up the boot the greater the danger of being cut off from supplies. Everything is going to come by sea but but putting your landing site/s supply points in areas dominated by enemy air power and hundreds of miles from friendly land based air is risky. It also gives scope to enemy submarines and MTBs _IF_ not all surrender to the Allies.


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## parsifal (Jul 2, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The further up the boot the greater the danger of being cut off from supplies. Everything is going to come by sea but but putting your landing site/s supply points in areas dominated by enemy air power and hundreds of miles from friendly land based air is risky. It also gives scope to enemy submarines and MTBs _IF_ not all surrender to the Allies.



Precisely, and very well put....

Salerno was selected as the landing point because it was within range of Spitfires based in Sicily. spitfires at theat time were the dominant fighter type in both the CW and the US air forces.

Further, the attack at Salerno was thought ideal because it gave ready support to the assault also taking place at Messina and permitted the port of Taranto to be threatened whilst also placing the assault within striking range of the important city of Naples and byond that, Rome. 

The allies had hoped that the italians would be able to resist for longer than they did, and that this resistance would give the allies the opportunity to push through the mountains south of Rome. This of course was not to be, and for ten months the allies became mired in a vicious static assault battle at Cassino 

The allies had considered landings north of Rome but had rejecte them primarily because air cover could not be effectively provided. It was a wise decision. Despite having lost air superiority in the TO, the Germans mounted some very effective aerial attacks on the allied invasion TFs as wll as the now retreating Italian fleet. It does not take much aerial intervention to disrupt amphibious assaults, provided they can be delivered at the right moment


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## parsifal (Jul 2, 2012)

ADMIRAL MEZEVIRIS, The naval war of the Mediterranean 1939-1945The Allied landing at Salerno, Athens 1961


"_the purpose of the landing at Salerno was the seizure of the port of Naples and the nearby airports, as well as the creation of a bridgehead along a front of some 40 miles. When the landing was executed, the Germans had already disarmed the Italian armies and had taken over the defense. The execution of the operation proved very difficult; at some point of time the situation became critical for the Allies.

The landing started at dawn of September 9 and initially met important resistance. At around sunset of that day resistance was provisionally bent, as the Germans withdrew. The German gun batteries from the surrounding hills dominated the landing shores and the Germans were quickly assembling troops to counterattack. The guns of the allied ships were supporting the landing, but the Germans used against them the new powerful weapon that was also used for the sinking of RN ROMA, the new teleguided missiles launched by airplanes. On the morning of September 11, from a short range hit of such a missile the American cruiser USS PHILADELPHIA suffered serious damages and shortly afterwards the sister ship USS SAVANNAH was very seriously hit and had to sail to Malta for provisional repairs.

The night of September 11-12, the Germans started a series of counterattacks trying to interpose between the American armies in the South and the British in the North. Because it was not easy for the allies to deploy artillery on the narrow strips of land that they had seized, the ships supported with heavy fire the troops that landed, being themselves targets of heavy of heavy bombing by the German air force. Enemy air planes hit in the morning of September 13, 2 British floating hospitals, one of which sunk with heavy human losses. In the evening of that same day, the cruiser HMS UGANDA was also hit by the Germans, but succeeded reaching Malta.

On the night of September 13, the Germans came as close as 3 miles from the beach and succeeded to come between the landing shores of the Allies. The next day the Americans withdrew even more and the military situation became quite critical. Vice Admiral Hewitt, Commander of the allied landing forces, requested the execution of heavy bombing from the air and with heavy guns behind the enemy positions. 

The British battleships HMS WARSPITE and HMS VALIANT from the covering naval force were immediately dispatched and on September 15 executed bombings with their heavy guns up to a distance of 20,000 meters, while at the same time all the remaining available ships were also firing.

In parallel, since the previous day, all the available allied air forces of the Mediterranean were attacking the German concentrations, causing serious losses and havoc, while the successful fire of the naval artillery impeded the dispatch of reinforcements. Thus, on 16th the situation had stabilized and the Allies succeeded to repeat their attack. For one more time, the importance of the ships’ artillery for the support of amphibious operations had become evident. 

This precious contribution of the battleships to the improvement of the military situation on the shore caused a serious loss to the British. On the evening of September 16, a teleguided missile from the air hit the HMS WARSPITE and caused her very serious damages and heavy losses of life. All the boiler rooms were inundated; the ship was towed to Malta following an adventurous trip through the Messina Strait. Repairs lasted a very long time and were not yet over in June 1944, when the ship took part to the landing in Normandy. 

The allied advance continued and after fierce battles the advanced divisions were entering Naples on the morning of October 2, 1943; the Germans, before withdrawing, had completely destroyed the port. The Allies, however, succeeded an important achievement restoring in a really short time one of the largest supply bases of the army.

In the meantime, the Allies had undertaken the seizure of Sardinia and Corsica. In Sardinia they were 2 Italian divisions that right after the armistice joined the side of the Allies, while the German troops left Corsica. Since September 17, the Allies had at their disposal the airports of the island that were useful for the surveillance of the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Western Mediterranean.

In Corsica, on the other hand, where 40,000 Italian troops and about 12,000 Germans were present, the Germans resisted. French military forces and a French naval force of 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers and 3 submarines were used for the seizure of the island. These forces, collaborating with the Italian, had completed by October 4 the seizure of the island; the airports and the naval base of Bastia were very useful for the Allies, as base of operations for small naval forces.

In October 1943, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, who led the allied naval war in the Mediterranean for almost 3 years and who in the most difficult moments had developed characteristics worthy of the best traditions of the British Navy, was named First Sea Lord of the Admiralty._"


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## parsifal (Jul 2, 2012)

The Invasion of the Italian Mainland (from the above source).

"_Naples was the original target, but was out of range for fighter aircraft based in Sicily and very difficult to assault. Allied planners therefore decided on Operation AVALANCHE, the first landing in Italy, at Salerno, fifty miles south of Naples, within fighter range and relatively lightly defended. First, however, German forces in Calabria, the toe of the Italian boot, would have to be confronted.

At 0430 on 3 September 1943, British and Canadian troops of the Eighth Army under General Bernard Montgomery executed Operation BAYTOWN, crossing the Strait of Messina into Calabria.

The Badoglio government, in response to an Allied ultimatum, signed a secret armistice agreement on 3 September, the day of the BAYTOWN landings. On 8 September 1943, formal announcement of the Italian surrender was made. The Germans quickly disarmed the Italians and took control of the defense of the Italian peninsula. Hitler gave Field Marshal Albert Kesselring responsibility for defending southern Italy.

On 9 September, in a hastily planned operation named SLAPSTICK, with the collaboration of the Italians, 3,600 men of the British 1st Paratroop Division landed unopposed at the port of Taranto in the Italian heel.

BAYTOWN went smoothly. Supported by a secure chain of supply, and capitalizing on German withdrawals, Eighth Army slowly cleared the toe of the Italian boot and by 14 September was moving up the Italian east coast. The Salerno landing, on 9 September, in conjunction with the Italian capitulation, drew German forces northward away from Eighth Army.


The main effort in the invasion of the Italian mainland was Operation AVALANCHE, at Salerno, where the US Fifth Army under General Mark W. Clark came ashore. Fifth Army was composed of the U.S. VI Corps, the British X Corps and the US 82nd Airborne Division, a total of about nine divisions. The plan called for Clark's Fifth Army to come ashore and eventually link up with Montgomery's British Eighth Army advancing north from BAYTOWN. Its primary objectives were to seize the port of Naples to ensure resupply, and to cut across to the east coast, trapping the Axis troops further south.
In the early morning hours of 9 September, the approximately 450 ships of Operation AVALANCHE assembled off the Salerno coast. Elements had sailed from Sicily and from Tripoli, Oran, and Bizerte in North Africa, some at sea as early as 5 and 6 September. To achieve surprise, there was no preliminary naval or aerial bombardment.
U.S. Rangers hit the beach unopposed at 0310, twenty minutes in advance of the main assault force, moving quickly inland to seize their objectives. British Commandos captured the town of Salerno against light opposition. The British X Corps landed under a heavy naval bombardment, meeting significant opposition as its soldiers fought their way inland. The untested men of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division came ashore at 0330 without supporting fire, hoping to surprise the Germans. Although the leading elements took heavy casualties, all six waves of the 36th Division assault element were on the beach by 0610. The Americans encountered small but intense resistance as they fought their way off the beaches. German Luftwaffe attacks against the beachhead were driven off by dawn as Allied aircraft from Sicily and supporting carriers appeared_".


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## parsifal (Jul 2, 2012)

"_Concluding the Campaign in Southern Italy.

With the Salerno beachhead fully secure, the Fifth Army could begin to attack northwards. The Allies gathered their strength in anticipation of the attack toward Naples. From 9 September through 1 October, 190,000 troops, 30,000 vehicles, and 120,000 tons of supplies came ashore across the Salerno beach. The remainder of the British 7th Armoured Division, the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, and the last of General Ridgway's 82d Airborne Division disembarked along with the supplies which would facilitate the attack northward.

The Eighth Army had been making quick progress from the 'toe' in the face of German delaying actions. It united its front with the Fifth Army on 16 September, and captured the airfields near Foggia, on the east coast, on 27 September. These would give the Allied air forces the ability to strike new targets in France, Germany and the Balkans. The Fifth Army captured Naples on 1 October (the first major European city to be liberated during WW II), and reached the line of the Volturno River on October 6th. This provided a natural barrier, securing Naples, the Campainian Plain and the vital airfields on it from counterattack. Meanwhile the British Eighth Army had advanced to a line from Larino to Campobasso. The whole of southern Italy was now in Allied hands, and the drive northward could begin.
The capture of Naples and the Foggia airfield formally ended Operation AVALANCHE. The Allies suffered approximately 12,500 casualties (2,000 killed, 7,000 wounded, and 3,500 missing). Foggia, captured intact, would soon be used by Allied bombers.

The Italian Campaign After the Invasion of Southern Italy.

The Germans staged a fighting withdrawal and settled into a strong defensive position at the Winter Line, a set of three defensive perimeters of interlocking bunkers and fortifications that sealed off southern Italy. The formidable and sophisticated defensive belt of interlocking positions on the high ground along the Italian peninsula's narrowest point stopped the Allied advance. Both the west coast route and the Route 6 central mountain route blocked by the Germans. In late 1943, after a fierce battle at San Pietro, a stalemate developed that would not be broken until after the battles of Monte Cassino and the breakout from Anzio_".


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## stug3 (Jul 4, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Salerno was selected as the landing point because it was within range of Spitfires based in Sicily. spitfires at theat time were the dominant fighter type in both the CW and the US air forces.



I disagree, I think the P-40 was the most numerous (and therefore dominant) type being utilized by the Allies in the MTO by 1943.


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## DonL (Jul 4, 2012)

This isn't correct!

From many books and researched confirmed kills from lost lists the P40 was clearly outclassed from the Bf 109F and G and the FW 190!

The Spitfire was the a/c fighter of the allies which won back air superiority!
The spitfire was by far the most important fighter a/c at the Mediterranean at 1942/43

Quote from Glider: 


> In the various books that I have read when comparing the P40 against the 109G and Fw 190, the VVS considered the P40 to be outclassed as did the RAF, the USAAF and most importantly the Germans.
> I have yet to find any allied fighter pilot who said that they considered the P40 to be a match for the German fighters.
> 
> In one book 'Fighters Over Tunisia?' there were a number of interviews with allied pilots and IIRC they rated the fighters as first Spit IX, second Spit V and P38, third P40 and last Hurricane and P39.
> All the books on the ME agree that allied losses dropped as soon as the first SPits arrived as the P40/Hurricnae combination wasn't up to the German fighters



Quote from Vincenzo:


> P-40 get bad result v/s 109 in NA, Nikademus posted from Shore's books: P-40 (US&allies) losses vs 109: 522, 109 losses vs P-40 (US&allies): 206


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2012)

"most numerous (and therefore dominant)" are not actually the same thing. 

I haven't looked at the numbers, P-40s may very well have been the most numerous _type_ but many of their missions were as fighter bombers with the emphasis on "bombers". They were being given top cover (or being _escorted_) by other fighters, like the Spitfires. 

If the P-40s are _NOT_ being _USED_ as fighters then it is hard to say that they are the "dominant" type regardless of numbers.


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## stug3 (Jul 5, 2012)

DonL said:


> The Spitfire was the a/c fighter of the allies which won back air superiority!
> The spitfire was by far the most important fighter a/c at the Mediterranean at 1942/43



I think the fact that so many more units were equipped with the P-40 than the Spit or any other type is exactly why it would be considered the most "dominant" used by the Allies. I didnt say it was better than other types used in MTO. The Allies gained and kept air superiority mostly due to the numerical advantage in aircraft pilots they employed in the theater. 

Also, to suggest that TAS missions dont count as, or arent as important as CAP or top cover is wrong imo. I think TAS was the most important asset of a fighter in the MTO and the main reason why the P-40 was used successfully until adequate numbers of better types became available.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 5, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I think the fact that so many more units were equipped with the P-40 than the Spit or any other type is exactly why it would be considered the most "dominant" used by the Allies. I didnt say it was better than other types used in MTO. The Allies gained and kept air superiority mostly due to the numerical advantage in aircraft pilots they employed in the theater.
> 
> Also, to suggest that TAS missions dont count as, or arent as important as CAP or top cover is wrong imo. I think TAS was the most important asset of a fighter in the MTO and the main reason why the P-40 was used successfully until adequate numbers of better types became available.



Stug, 

With all due respect to yourself and the considerable knowledge of the posters on this topic and the data cited here, one of the factors that I think may creep in to influence american perceptions is the long standing "absent-history" of the USAAF widespread use of the Spitfire as the primary air to air weapon in England and during the early campaigns in the MTO, through I'd guess about spring or mid-1943. I think its been pointed out elsewhere that Ike's aerial escort typically consisted of american flown spits. I know many friends who consider themselves knowledgable about WW2 aviation matters are surprised to learn how many USAAF fighter groups (I believe 2 or 3? in NA) were equipped with Spitfires. IIUC, while there was a transition to US Built aircraft through 1943, I believe there was still a significant component of the USAAF and RAF spitfires flying air superiority missions during the later Italian campaign. 

from: http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/uncle-sams-spitfires.html

"Uncle Sam’s Spitfires had written a little-known chapter in US fighter history. Though _*the USAAF used over 600 Spitfires *_during the war, the aircraft was never given a US designation, and _*little publicity was given to the exploits of the 31st and 52nd Fighter Groups*_ – nothing like what they would get in the summer of 1944 during the wild air battles over Ploesti when they flew Mustangs. This is most likely a good example of the US military’s overall dislike of having to admit to using “NIH” (Not Invented Here) equipment."

Purported to be a USAAF flown spit photo during Salerno landing (September, 1943)

http://www.ww2incolor.com/us-air-force/life_276.html

Just saying...


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2012)

stug3 said:


> The Allies gained and kept air superiority mostly due to the numerical advantage in aircraft pilots they employed in the theater.



They gained and kept air superiority by using Spitfires and P-38s as air superiority fighters. 



stug3 said:


> Also, to suggest that TAS missions dont count as, or arent as important as CAP or top cover is wrong imo. I think TAS was the most important asset of a fighter in the MTO and the main reason why the P-40 was used successfully until adequate numbers of better types became available.



I don't think it is being said that TAS missions don't count or were not important. But TAS was NOT the most important asset of a fighter in the MTO (or even most other theaters). Think about it. Did P-40s squadrons fly "top cover" without bombs while other P-40 squadrons did the bombing or did P-40s do the bombing while other fighter types fly top cover for them? If the fighters "assigned" to top cover cannot protect the TAS aircraft then the TAS mission is defeated. To defeat the TAS mission it is not _ necessary _ to shoot down a single TAS aircraft, merely get them to jettison their bombs short of the target. 

The P-40 was a very useful TAS aircraft which is the reason it was kept in use but without support (escort) by other fighter types it could not perform it's TAS mission.


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## stug3 (Jul 5, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> They gained and kept air superiority by using Spitfires and P-38s as air superiority fighters.



I dont think there were nearly as many units equipped with Spitfires and P-38s as there were P-40s. P-40 units learned what to do what not to do when taking on various enemy types.





Shortround6 said:


> But TAS was NOT the most important asset of a fighter in the MTO (or even most other theaters).



I disagree



Shortround6 said:


> Did P-40s squadrons fly "top cover" without bombs while other P-40 squadrons did the bombing



Yes, I think this was most often the case. One unit within the squadron would fly cover for another unit designated to do the bombing. 




Shortround6 said:


> or did P-40s do the bombing while other fighter types fly top cover for them?



Im sure this was a fairly common occurrance also.




Shortround6 said:


> If the fighters "assigned" to top cover cannot protect the TAS aircraft then the TAS mission is defeated.
> The P-40 was a very useful TAS aircraft which is the reason it was kept in use but without support (escort) by other fighter types it could not perform it's TAS mission.



Its a well documented fact that P-40 units were quite capable of successfully defending themselves or attacking enemy formations. Experience taught them what they could and could not get away with when taking on different enemy types just as it did in the PTO CBI with F4Fs, etc.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I dont think there were nearly as many units equipped with Spitfires and P-38s as there were P-40s. P-40 units learned what to do what not to do when taking on various enemy types.



One of the things they learned to do was stay low and let somebody else fight at higher altitudes. 



stug3 said:


> I disagree



The Most important jobs for a fighter unit were to stop enemy recon planes and enemy bombers from executing their own TAS missions. Next was making sure friendly bomber units could complete their missions as much as possible. It doesn't do much for the war effort if twin engine bombers that can carry 1000-3000lb bomb loads are sitting on air fields while "fighters" are attacking the enemy with 250-500lb bomb loads. If you have enough fighters to stop a fair percentage of the enemy missions _AND_ escort your own tactical bombers to keep the enemy form shooting down too many of them _THEN_ the fighters can play TAS or CAS to their hearts content. 



stug3 said:


> Its a well documented fact that P-40 units were quite capable of successfully defending themselves or attacking enemy formations. Experience taught them what they could and could not get away with when taking on different enemy types just as it did in the PTO CBI with F4Fs, etc.



I think you are missing the point here. P-40s were capable of "defending themselves" but only by dropping the bombs (just like any other fighter bomber) which means the CAS strike is defeated until the P-40s (or another squadron/group) can rearm and try the mission again. having a better performing fighter fly as "top cover" means the enemy does not get to bounce from above or has to tangle with the top cover first and the TAS planes may get to actually bomb the target that day. 

you may want to try seeing which enemy formations the P-40s attacked. Bombers and transports or Bf 109s at altitude? Flying at low level and letting the enemy fly above you doesn't usually work real well. It gives the initiative to the enemy. You cannot attack him, ( by the time you climb he is gone if he wants to be) but he can decide to attack you ( has the advantage of diving down) or _not_ if it looks the the numbers are wrong or there is another disadvantage. Letting the enemy pick and choose the fights is a sure way to have a less then favorable kill to loss ratio. The P-40 could not force the fight as well as the Spitfire and P-38. Doesn't mean it didn't do good work or couldn't defend itself but defending itself is not defending bombers or intercepting enemy missions.


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## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I disagree, I think the P-40 was the most numerous (and therefore dominant) type being utilized by the Allies in the MTO by 1943.


I dot think that is correct actually

Mediterranean Air Command (MAC) (part I)
September 3, 1943
Northwest African Air Force (NAAF)
Northwest African Strategic Air Force (NASAF)
No. 205 Group RAF
No. 231 Wing RAF
No. 37 Squadron (20 Wellingtons X)
No. 70 Squadron (20 Wellingtons III/X)
No. 236 Wing RAF
No. 40 Squadron (20 Wellingtons III/X)
No. 104 Squadron (20 Wellingtons III/X)
No. 330 Wing RAF
No. 142 Squadron (20 Wellingtons III/X)
No. 150 Squadron (20 Wellingtons III/X)
No. 331 Wing RAF
No. 420 Squadron RCAF (20 Wellingtons X)
No. 424 Squadron RCAF (20 Wellingtons X)
No. 425 Squadron RCAF (20 Wellingtons X)
5th Heavy Bombardment Wing (USAAF)
97th Heavy Bombardment Group
340th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
341st Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
342nd Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
414th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
301st Heavy Bombardment Group
32nd Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
352nd Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
353rd Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
419th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
90th Heavy Bombardment Group
346th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
347th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
348th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
416th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
2nd Heavy Bombardment Group
20th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
49th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
96th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
429th Bombardment Squadron (12 B-17 Fortresses)
47th Medium Bombardment Wing (USAAF)
310th Medium Bombardment Group
379th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
380th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
381st Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
428th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
321st Medium Bombardment Group
445th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
446th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
447th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
448th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
82nd Fighter Group
95th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
96th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
97th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
42nd Medium Bombardment Wing (USAAF)
17th Medium Bombardment Group
34th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
37th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
95th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
432nd Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
319th Medium Bombardment Group
437th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
438th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
439th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
440th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
320th Medium Bombardment Group
441st Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
442nd Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
443rd Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
444th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-26 Marauders)
1st Fighter Group
27th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
71st Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
94th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
14th Fighter Group
37th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
48th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
49th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
325th Fighter Group
317th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
318th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
319th Fighter Squadron (25 P-38 Lightnings)
Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF)
Northwest African Tactical Bomber Force (NATBF)
8e Groupement
I/11 Squadron FFAF (15 LeO 5)
II/23 Squadron FFAF (15 LeO 5)
I/25 Squadron FFAF (15 LeO 5)
No. 3 Wing SAAF
No. 12 Squadron SAAF (24 Bostons)
No. 24 Squadron SAAF (24 Bostons)
No. 21 Squadron SAAF (24 Baltimores)
No. 232 Wing RAF
No. 55 Squadron RAF (24 Baltimores)
No. 223 Squadron RAF (24 Baltimores)
No. 326 Wing RAF
No. 18 Squadron RAF (16 Bostons)
No. 114 Squadron RAF (16 Bostons)
47th Light Bombardment Group USAAF
84th Bombardment Squadron (13 A-20 Havocs)
85th Bombardment Squadron (13 A-20 Havocs)
86th Bombardment Squadron (13 A-20 Havocs)
97th Bombardment Squadron (13 A-20 Havocs)
12th Medium Bombardment Group USAAF
81st Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
82nd Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
83rd Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
434th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
340th Medium Bombardment Group USAAF
486th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
487th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
488th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
489th Bombardment Squadron (13 B-25 Mitchells)
XII Air Support Command (USAAF)
27th Fighter-Bomber Group
522nd Fighter Squadron (13 A-36A Invaders)
523rd Fighter Squadron (13 A-36A Invaders)
524th Fighter Squadron (13 A-36A Invaders)
31st Fighter Group
307th Fighter Squadron (25 Spitfires V/IX)
308th Fighter Squadron (25 Spitfires V/IX)
309th Fighter Squadron (25 Spitfires V/IX)
33rd Fighter Group
58th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40 Warhawks)
59th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40 Warhawks)
60th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40 Warhawks)
99th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40 Warhawks) det.
111th Tactical Recon. Squadron (18 P-51 Mustangs) det.
86th Fighter-Bomber Group
525th Fighter Squadron (25 A-36A Apaches/Invaders/Mustangs)
526th Fighter Squadron (25 A-36A Apaches/Invaders/Mustangs)
527th Fighter Squadron (25 A-36A Apaches/Invaders/Mustangs)
Desert Air Force
No. 60 Squadron SAAF (P-38 Lightnings/Mosquitos)
No. 241 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes/Spitfires)
No. 211 Group RAF
No. 7 Wing RAF
No. 2 Squadron SAAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 4 Squadron SAAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
57th Fighter Group USAAF
64th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40F Warhawks)
65th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40F Warhawks)
66th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40F Warhawks)
79th Fighter Group USAAF
85th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40F Warhawks)
86th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40F Warhawks)
87th Fighter Squadron (25 P-40F Warhawks)
No. 239 Wing RAF
No. 1 Squadron SAAF (16 Spitfires V/VIII)
No. 92 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires)
No. 145 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/VIII)
No. 417 Squadron RCAF (16 Spitfires VIII)
No. 601 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VB/VIII)
No. 285 Wing RAF
No. 40 Squadron SAAF (16 Spitfires)
No. 225 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires)
No. 1437 Flight RAF (6 P-51 Mustangs)
No. 322 Wing RAF
No. 81 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 152 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 154 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 242 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 324 Wing RAF
No. 43 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 72 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 232 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 111 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VB/C/IX)
No. 243 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VB/C/IX)
No. 600 Squadron RAF (16 Beaufighters)
Northwest African Coastal Air Force (NACAF)
No. 36 Squadron RAF (20 Wellingtons)
No. 500 Squadron RAF (16 Hudsons)
No. 624 Squadron RAF (14 Halifaxes, 2 Venturas)
73rd Squadron USN (12 PBY Catalinas)
92nd Squadron USN (12 PBY Catalinas)
81st Fighter Group USAAF
91st Fighter Squadron (25 P-39 Airacobras)
92nd Fighter Squadron (25 P-39 Airacobras)
93rd Fighter Squadron (25 P-39 Airacobras)
63rd Fighter Wing
350th Fighter Group USAAF
345th Fighter Squadron (25 P-39 Airacobras)
346th Fighter Squadron (25 P-39 Airacobras)
347th Fighter Squadron (25 P-39 Airacobras)
414th Nightfighter Squadron USAAF (12 Beaufighters VIF)
415th Nightfighter Squadron USAAF (12 Beaufighters VIF)
416th Nightfighter Squadron USAAF (12 Beaufighters VIF)
417th Nightfighter Squadron USAAF (12 Beaufighters VIF)
No. 153 Squadron RAF (12 Beaufighters VIF)
No. 242 Group RAF
No. 813 Squadron FAA (12 Swordfishes)
No. 323 Wing RAF
No. 32 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 73 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC)
No. 253 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC)
No. 87 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes II/Spitfires IX)
No. 219 Squadron RAF (16 Beaufighters VIF)
No. 325 Wing RAF
No. 272 Squadron RAF (16 Beaufighters)
No. 603 Squadron RAF (16 Beaufighters)
No. 604 Squadron RAF (16 Hudsons)
No. 614 Squadron RAF (16 Blenheims)
No. 328 Wing RAF
No. 13 Squadron RAF (16 Blenheims V)
No. 14 Squadron RAF (16 B-26 Mauraders)
No. 39 Squadron RAF (16 Beaufighters IX)
No. 47 Squadron, RAF (16 Beaufighters IX)
No. 52 Squadron, RAF (16 Beaufighters VIF)
No. 255 Squadron, RAF (16 Wellingtons)
No. 458 Squadron, RAAF (16 Wellingtons)
No. 608 Squadron, RAF (16 Hudsons)


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## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

MAC (part II)

62nd Fighter Wing
52nd Fighter Group USAAF
2nd Fighter Squadron (25 Spitfires)
4th Fighter Squadron (25 Spitfires)
5th Fighter Squadron (25 Spitfires)
2688th Headquarters (Anti-Submarine Patrols) USAAF
1st Anti-Submarine Squadron (12 B-24 Liberators)
2nd Anti-Submarine Squadron (12 B-24 Liberators)
2689th Headquarters
41 Squadron FFAF (12 Walruses)
I/3 Squadron FFAF (20 Spitfires VC)
II/7 Squadron FFAF (20 Spitfires VC)
I/4 Squadron FFAF (25 P-39 Airacobras)
I/5 Squadron FFAF (25 P-39 Airacobras)
III/6 Squadron FFAF (25 P-39 Airacobras)
II/5 Squadron FFAF (25 P-40 Kittyhawks)
Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (NAPRW)
682nd Squadron RAF (12 Spitfires VB)
II/33 Squadron FFAF (6 P-38 Lightnings F-5A)
3rd Photographic Reconnaissance Group (USAAF)
12th Reconnaissance Squadron
15th Reconnaissance Squadron
23rd Reconnaissance Squadron
(39 P-38 F-5A Lightnings and 4 B-17 Fortresses)
Northwest African Troop Carrier Command (NATCC)
5th Troop Carrier Wing USAAF
60th Troop Carrier Group
10th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
11th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
12th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
28th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
62nd Troop Carrier Group
4th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
7th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
8th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
51st Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
64th Troop Carrier Group
16th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
17th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
18th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
35th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
52nd Troop Carrier Wing
61st Troop Carrier Group USAAF
14th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
15th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
53rd Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
59th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
313th Troop Carrier Group USAAF
29th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
47th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
48th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
49th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
315th Troop Carrier Group (from US 8th Air force)
34th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
43rd Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
316th Troop Carrier Group USAAF
36th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
44th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
45th Troop Carrier Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
No. 38 Wing RAF
No. 296 Squadron RAF (26 Albermarles)
No. 651 Squadron RAF (12 Austers)
No. 654 Squadron RAF (12 Austers)
Air Observation Post
Malta Command
No. 23 Squadron RAF (16 Mosquitos)
No. 108 Squadron RAF (16 Beauforts)
No. 256 Squadron RAF (6 Mosquitos)
No. 815 Squadron FAA (9 Albacores)
No. 826 Squadron FAA (9 Albacores)
Malta Wing RAF
No. 126 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 249 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 1435 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 185 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 229 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VC/IX)
No. 248 Wing RAF
No. 69 Squadron (16 Baltimores)
No. 221 Squadron (20 Wellingtons)
Middle East Air Command
HQ RAF Middle East
No. 680 Squadron RAF (12 Spitfires)
No. 216 Group RAF
No. 173 Squadron RAF (33 C-60 Lodestars, Fairchilds, et al)
No. 216 Squadron RAF (16 C-47 Dakotas)
No. 267 Squadron RAF (16 C-47 Dakotas)
No. 249 Wing RAF
No. 28 Squadron SAAF (16 Dakotas, Ansons, Wellingtons)
No. 117 Squadron RAF (16 C-47 Dakotas)
No. 162 Squadron RAF (16 Wellingtons/Blenheims)
A.H.Q. Levant
No. 209 Group RAF
No. 127 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes/Spitfires)
No. 227 Squadron RAF 16 Beaufighters VIC)
No. 213 Group RAF
2259th Wing RAF (commanded by Air Defenses, Eastern Med.)
A.H.Q. East Africa
No. 877 Squadron FAA (12 Hurricanes II)
No. 246 Wing RAF
No. 209 Squadron RAF (6 PBY Catalinas I/IB/IIA)
No. 250 Squadron RAF (6 PBY Catalinas IB)
No. 262 Squadron RAF (6 PBY Catalinas IB)
No. 230 Squadron RAF (6 Sunderlands III)
No. 248 Wing RAF
No. 265 Squadron (6 PBY Catalinas IB)
A.H.Q. Iraq Persia
No. 215 Group RAF
Defense Force (Abadan)(6 Hurricanes IIA)
No. 208 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes)
No. 244 Squadron RAF (16 Blenheims)
No. 140 Squadron RAF (6 PBY Catalinas IB)
H.Q. British Forces Aden
No. 8 Squadron RAF (16 Blehneims)
No. 1 Flight RAF (6 PBY Catalinas I)
9th Air Force (USAAF)
37th Squadron (13 C-47 Skytrains)
98th Heavy Bombardment Group
343rd Bombardment Squadron (8 B-24 Liberators)
344th Bombardment Squadron (8 B-24 Liberators)
345th Bombardment Squadron (8 B-24 Liberators)
346th Bombardment Squadron (8 B-24 Liberators)
376th Heavy Bombardment Group (from NASAF September 13, 1943)
512th Bombardment Squadron (8 B-24 Liberators)
513th Bombardment Squadron (8 B-24 Liberators)
514th Bombardment Squadron (8 B-24 Liberators)
515th Bombardment Squadron (8 B-24 Liberators)
No. 240 Wing RAF
No. 178 Squadron, RAF (16 Halifaxes/B-24 Liberators)
No. 462 Squadron RAAF (16 Halifaxes)
Air Defenses, Eastern Mediterranean
No. 259 Wing RAF
No. 46 Squadron (Beauforts)
No. 208 Squadron (18 Hurricanes IIA/B)
No. 210 Group RAF
No. 3 Squadron SAAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 33 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 215 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 274 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 212 Group RAF
No. 7 Squadron SAAF (16 Spitfires VC)
No. 80 Squadron SAAF (16 Spitfires VC)
No. 41 Squadron SAAF (16 Hurricanes IIB)
No. 94 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 123 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 134 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes IIB)
No. 174 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 89 Squadron RAF (16 Beaufighters)
No. 108 Squadron RAF (Beaufighters)
No. 14 Squadron RAF (14 Halifaxes II)
No. 237 Rhodesian Squadron (18 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 219 Group RAF
No. 46 Squadron RAF (16 Beaufighters VIF)
No. 74 Squadron RAF (16 Spitfires VB/VC)
No. 238 Squadron RAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 335 Hellenic Squadron (16 Hurricanes IIB)
No. 336 Hellenic Squadron (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 451 Squadron RAAF (16 Hurricanes IIC)
No. 201 Group RAF
No. 13 Hellenic Squadron (16 Blenheims V)
No. 15 Squadron SAAF (24 Baltimores)
No. 454 Squadron SAAF (16 Baltimores)
No. 459 Squadron SAAF (16 Hudsons IIIA/V/VI)
No. 238 Wing RAF
No. 16 Squadron SAAF (24 Beauforts)
No. 245 Wing RAF
No. 1 G.R.U. (3 Wellingtons I/IC)
No. 247 Wing RAF
No. 38 Squadron RAF (20 Wellingtons)
No. 203 Squadron RAF (16 Baltimores)
No. 252 Squadron RAF (16 Beaufighters
Notes:
det. = detachment
FAA = Fleet Air Arm (Royal Navy)
FFAF = Free French Air Force
Hellenic refers to Greek Air Force
RAF = Royal Air Force
RAAF = Royal Australian Air Force
RCAF = Royal Canadian Air Force
Rhodesian refers to Rhodesian Air Force
SAAF = South African Air Force
USAAF = United States Army Air Force
G.R.U. = General Reconnaissance Unit
Extracted and edited from:
C.J.C. Molony, F.C. Flynn, H.L. Davies, and T.P. Gleave, The Mediterranean and
the Middle East, Vol. V, The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, 3rd
September 1943 to 31st March 1944, London: HMSO, 1973.


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## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

As can be sen from the preceding two posts, if the numbers are added up, the dominant type in the MAC, both quantitatively and qualitatively was the spitfire....hands down


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## stug3 (Jul 5, 2012)

parsifal said:


> As can be sen from the preceding two posts, if the numbers are added up, the dominant type in the MAC, both quantitatively and qualitatively was the spitfire....hands down



I think those lists would be in a constant state of flux due to attrition, unit substitutions, introduction of new types (for the Allies anyway), etc.


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## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I think those lists would be in a constant state of flux due to attrition, unit substitutions, introduction of new types (for the Allies anyway), etc.



Agreed, but the numbers are as at 8 September 1943....the day before the invasion. Planning for "Avalanche"would have begun after "Husky"....July 1943, so there is a two month window whereby force structures might have changed. given that the Brit forces were more or less static by then, whilst the USAAC formations were the expanding ones, and that Kittyhawks were not increasing in number in the CW (the RAAF for example in 1943 was exchanging its Kittyhawks for Mustang IIIs) one might reasonably surmise there were a lesser number of Kittyhawks/P-40s and warhawks at the beginning of July than there were by early september. Perhaps not, but in any event the numbers are not going to change too dramatically


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## drgondog (Jul 11, 2012)

parsifal said:


> "_Concluding the Campaign in Southern Italy.
> 
> With the Salerno beachhead fully secure, the Fifth Army could begin to attack northwards. The Allies gathered their strength in anticipation of the attack toward Naples. From 9 September through 1 October, 190,000 troops, 30,000 vehicles, and 120,000 tons of supplies came ashore across the Salerno beach. The remainder of the British 7th Armoured Division, the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, and the last of General Ridgway's 82d Airborne Division disembarked along with the supplies which would facilitate the attack northward.
> 
> ...



The historian didn't quite have the 82nd AB contribution in perspective or fact..

82nd Airborne Division During WW II - Campaigns - Italy

Parsifal - my beloved 504PIR/82nd Airborne Div 3rd Bat landed with elements of the 325th and 3rd Rangers - but 1st and 2nd Bat 504PIR dropped onto Salerno at night.. the did not come by 'cruise ship' accomodations.

From the history

"September 12th 1943 marked a turning point for the Allied forces. Savage fighting had erupted and raged all day. The dead and wounded began to pile up as the Allied front crumbled in places and units were cut off, overrun, and wiped out. By night fall the Germans had advanced to within 6 miles of the shore at all points. 

By September 13th 1943, General Mark Clark's Fifth Army had held tenaciously to the Salerno beachhead for four days but needed immediate assistance otherwise they were in danger of being pushed backed into the sea. Realizing the precariousness of his situation General Clark sent a message to Major General Ridgway requesting a drop that night.

Immediately, a plan was conceived to drop the 504th PIR several miles from the embattled beachhead. Pathfinders would drop in first to mark the DZ by setting ablaze cans filled with sand and gasoline arranged in the shape of a "T".

Meanwhile, on standby at airfields in Sicily, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 504th were alerted, issued chutes, and loaded on aircraft without knowledge of their destination. Receiving their briefing aboard the plane, the men were told that the 5th Army beachhead was in danger and they were needed to jump in behind friendly lines. Flying in columns of battalions, they exited over the barrels of gasoline-soaked sand that formed the flaming "T" in the center of the drop zone. The regiment assembled quickly and moved to the sounds of cannon and small arms fire within the hour. The plan worked nearly flawlessly with the exception of one company that landed ten miles off target. By dawn, all the units of the 504th were firmly set in defensive positions. The next night the 505th PIR led by Colonel Gavin arrived in a similar manner.

The days that followed were, in the words of General Mark Clark, Commander of the 5th Army, "responsible for saving the Salerno beachhead." As the 504th (minus 3rd Battalion) took the high ground at Altavilla, the enemy counterattacked and the Commander of 6th Corps, General Dawley, suggested the unit withdraw. Epitomizing the determined spirit of the Regiment, Colonel Tucker vehemently replied, "Retreat, Hell! -- Send me my other battalion!" The 3rd Battalion then rejoined the 504th, the enemy was repulsed, and the Salerno beachhead was saved. 

The operation secured the flanks of the 5th Army, allowing it to break out of the coastal plain and drive on to Naples. On 1 October 1943, the 504th became the first infantry unit to enter Naples, which it subsequently garrisoned. The operation was not only a success, but it also stands as one of history’s greatest examples of the mobility of the airborne unit: within only eight hours of notification, the 504th developed and disseminated its tactical plan, prepared for combat, loaded aircraft and jumped onto its assigned drop zone to engage the enemy and turn the tide of battle."

The lads (2nd Bat) next assignment was to walk ashore and together with the 1st Special Service Force entrenched on the Mussolini Canal at Anzio. The rest of the 82nd went to England to regroup, re-equip and prepare for the Invasion drop - which 2nd Bat missed.


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## renrich (Jul 11, 2012)

The first American infantry to land in force on the mainland in Europe ( Salerno) during WW2 was the T Patchers, the 36th Division, a Texas National Guard division. Go get em Texas!


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## Vincenzo (Jul 11, 2012)

for the USAAF Statistical digest airplanes on Hand in MTO 
(end of august '43)
338 B-17, 115 B-24, 398 B-25, 270 B-26, 137 A-20, 362 P-38, 290 P-39, 625 P-40, 231 P-51, 43 Night Fighters, 188 Other Fighters, 51 F-45, 22 F-6, 30 Other Recces


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2012)

Hi vincenzo

That list surely must be US types in the USAAC. otherwise there is not a single british a/c serving in the TO as at August 1943.


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## Vincenzo (Jul 11, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Hi vincenzo
> 
> That list surely must be US types in the USAAC. otherwise there is not a single british a/c serving in the TO as at August 1943.



i don't think so. Other Fightes i think are Spitfires, and is probable that in Night Fighters there were the Beaufighters...


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## drgondog (Jul 11, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> for the USAAF Statistical digest airplanes on Hand in MTO
> (end of august '43)
> 338 B-17, 115 B-24, 398 B-25, 270 B-26, 137 A-20, 362 P-38, 290 P-39, 625 P-40, 231 P-51, 43 Night Fighters, 188 Other Fighters, 51 F-45, 22 F-6, 30 Other Recces



Taking stock of just a few groups in the MTO. Both the 31st and 52nd FG flew Spits until May 1944 when they converted to Mustangs. They never flew P-40s 

The 27th and 81st flew A-36s until Oct 43, then used P-40s as replacements until they converted to P-47s in Feb 1944...

The 1st, 14th and 82nd flew P-38s during entire war.

The 57th FG, 79th FG and 99th FS (part of 332nd later but flew with 324th at this time) flew P-40s, the 324th FG flew P-40's, the 325th flew P-40s and the 57th flew P-40s, 

both 332 and 325 converted to 51s in April June 1944. The other P-40 groups converted to P-47's

By my count there were 7 groups flying P-38s (3) A-36's (2), and Spit IX's (2) to 4 Fg's flying P-40's.. still trying to remember which groups were flying P-39's after 1942 and can only come up with French and Commonwealth fighter units - yet Statistical Digest cites 290 P-39s??? or 231 P-51s ?? with only the 27th and 82nd flying them (A-36) ? 

The number for P-51s (231) is close to all the operational USAAF P-51A count world wide in combat (MTO and CBI). If the 'other' count includes A-36 (not P-51, not F-6) plus Spitfires at only 188 then the P-40 count has to be World wide USAAF.


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## drgondog (Jul 11, 2012)

Said a different way - 290 P-39s and 625 P-40's in the USAAF - MTO is more fighters than all of the 9th and 12 AF combined in Aug 1943 (equal to 12 FG's) - which means the P-38's, A-36's Spitfires (of the 1, 14, 82, 27, 82, 52 and 31FG) may have been mistakenly assigned to the Desert AF and never flew for US.

PS I missed the 33rd and 81st - primarily because I forgot they went to CBI After Salerno - the 81st were flying P-38 but the 33rd was flying P-40.

Parsifal - your list had 325th fling P-38s but that is not factual. They started with P-40 and converted to P-47s starting in late August, 1943 - then briefly in P-47s starting Feb 1944, then Mustangs in May 1944.


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## Vincenzo (Jul 11, 2012)

Drgdong 
i think that number for P-51 include also A-36, there is no A-36 seperate entry in the table.
I try to check FG in MTO (i hope i don't wrong some)
1st P-38
14th P-38
27th A-36
31st Spit
33rd P-40
52nd Spit
57th P-40
79th P-40
81st P-39
82nd P-38
86th A-36 (i'had writed P-40 but was a wrong entry as in the sum the A-36 FG are 2)
324th P-40
325th P-40
350th P-39

so 14 FG, 3 with 38, 2 with Spit, 2 with A-36, 2 with 39, 5 with 40

ever for the same time end august '43


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2012)

I dont see how all this navel gazing and uesswork is more accurate than an extract from a published source that gives strenghts, type and availability for both the US and brit/CW nations on a squadron by squadron basis. The figures are already there...why are w re-inventing the wheel here.


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2012)

drgondog said:


> The historian didn't quite have the 82nd AB contribution in perspective or fact..
> 
> 82nd Airborne Division During WW II - Campaigns - Italy
> 
> ...




Hi Dg

I accept that those elements stated as coming ashore across the beach in fact were airdropped...however your critique goes a lot further than that, and seems to claim that these several battalions of airborne troops were responsible for saving the entire beachhead. Just not the case, though ther4 is no denying that the arrival of the 82nd did a lot to help the American sector. The arrival of the British Commandoes had similar effects in the British sector. 

However the arrival of these forces, whilst of imense help, were not the tipping points that saved the landings. No single event in the immediate history surrounding the Salerno landings can claim that. no single unit can claim that either...

Significant events that saved the allies, include, the intervention of the support forces, centred around HMS Warspite and Valiant, but also including direct gunfire suport by the Destroyers attached to providing direect oncall fire support to individual battalions. This sytem had been first used in Husky, and had been responsible for saving the Americans at Gela, once again it proved vital to the US forces at Salerno. 

The eventual landing of artillery on the beaches


The concentrated efforts of the allied air forces that provided an unrelenting level of CAS to the beleagured ground forces.

The developing threat to the Germans position caused by the steadily advanacing elements of the 8th Army, coming up from Taranto mand Reggio to the South, forcing the germans to pull back and decrease the pressure on the Allied front lines. 

The gradually improving level of organization within the committed allied ground formations


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## Vincenzo (Jul 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I dont see how all this navel gazing and uesswork is more accurate than an extract from a published source that gives strenghts, type and availability for both the US and brit/CW nations on a squadron by squadron basis. The figures are already there...why are w re-inventing the wheel here.



your source give 
1, 14, 82, 325 FG on the 38
31, 52 FG on the Spit
27, 86 FG on the A-36
81, 350 FG on the 39
33, 57, 79 FG on the 40

in red the difference with my source "Air force combat units of World War II"
i have also a 324th FG with the 40 but checking best this group was not operative at time (back in operation the 30th october)
the 325th FG never used the 38, at time (august) used the P-40 but was reequipped from late september and back in iperation the 14th december with the 47

for my source (the statistical digest) the strenght of FG was 111-126 planes (incluse reserves) as february '45


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## merlin (Jul 12, 2012)

Juha said:


> Hello Njaco
> Sicily and Southern Italy meant fairly secure Med for convoys. Foggia was very important to strategic bombing campaign, targets in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Schlesia and Southern Poland were clearly easier to reach from there than from England and targets in Hungary and Romania became in reach. Also possibility to support partisans in Yugoslavia and in Northern Greece opened. There were important armament industry for ex. around Wien, and of course the oil targets around Ploesti and Wien and for ex at Blechhammer.
> 
> Juha


 
Yes, I largely agree - I did post earlier (no one disagreed). This gives a minimum requirement for the Allis in Italy, if the Germans want to retreat further fine, but it may be of greater benefit to use the resources elsewhere or at least to threaten elsewhere.
It gives more potential to have an earlier Anvil, who knows, perhaps Normandy late summer '43!! The main objective with the italian campaign, was to reduce shipping by going safely through the Med., knock Italy out of the war, force the Germans to spread their forces away from north-west France, and provide bases for the air-war - all done at this point.
For the sake of keeping forces active - and then go through Cassino, doesn't seem good use of resources!


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## drgondog (Jul 12, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> Drgdong
> i think that number for P-51 include also A-36, there is no A-36 seperate entry in the table.
> I try to check FG in MTO (i hope i don't wrong some)
> 1st P-38
> ...



This is the list I have, after cross checking. Note, however that 2 P-39 groups would be ~ 150 in count and five P-40 groups would be ~ 375 or roughly half the count of the USAAF Statistical Digest which was my point regarding the high number (290/625) respectively for MTO counts? The squadron totals for the Fighter Groups listed in Parsifal's reference (~25 per squadron) would be about right at peak strength in summer 1943. At peak strength each squadron would have about 35-40 pilots and Group HQ would have 4 (Gp CO, Deputy, Ops and Asst Ops Officers). The Group pilots would be flying a/c allocated to squadron - even if specifically assigned to them.

Additionally, the 324th was in combat ops from late 1942 and still on the 12th AF TO&E even though they were re-training from July through October 30, 1943.. so they must be counted in the list of MTO P-40's.


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## drgondog (Jul 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Hi Dg
> 
> I accept that those elements stated as coming ashore across the beach in fact were airdropped...however your critique goes a lot further than that, and seems to claim that these several battalions of airborne troops were responsible for saving the entire beachhead. Just not the case, though ther4 is no denying that the arrival of the 82nd did a lot to help the American sector. The arrival of the British Commandoes had similar effects in the British sector.
> 
> ...


Parsifal - I agree All your points. 

Having said that, Mark Clark - the force commander - is the source of the observation and comment regarding 1st and 2nd Battalion night drop and subsequent actions on the 13th and 14th pertaining to stopping the German advance to the sea..

Right or wrong, the 504 and 505 PIR impact is also cited in the US Army Tactical studies as the key pivotal contribution in preventing total disaster during the critical opening days of the Salerno invasion.


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## Vincenzo (Jul 12, 2012)

drgodong i've already noted thar 324th was not operative (post 137) but i think they had their planes.
so just for fun 
hand planes for group
P-40 groups: 125
P-38 groups: 121
P-39 groups: 145
A-36 groups: 116
Spit groups: 94

this incluse obviously not only reseves at group lvl but also reserves at higher lvl (if there were idk), Spit are lower probably because is a foreign plane.


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## drgondog (Jul 12, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> drgodong i've already noted thar 324th was not operative (post 137) but i think they had their planes.
> so just for fun
> hand planes for group
> P-40 groups: 125
> ...



Vincenzo - The Fighter Groups' had only 20-26 operational fighters on the average and sometimes less due to combat attrition, and only at the 24-26 level consistently in 1944. The US order of battle was 16 plane squadrons in combat, 3 squadrons per mission, plus spares to fill in for early returns. 

From late 1943 through September, 1944 the average number of fighters per group was 48-52 per mission (60 for max effort, if available). When 60 a/c were available, the tradition of dispatching an A and B Group, each comprised of One full squadron plus fill in flights from the third squadron flying with A and B. In that way (and generally for 1945 - never 1943) each A and B group might have 5 to six flights of four. In 1945 each fighter group in MTO and ETO were up to full TO&E strength of 25-26 fighters each for 75-76 flying in total for a split A and B effort. The latter was Very Rare. When that many were available two missions were often assigned.


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## drgondog (Jul 12, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> drgodong i've already noted thar 324th was not operative (post 137) but i think they had their planes.
> so just for fun
> hand planes for group
> P-40 groups: 125
> ...



I was referring to post 137, then made the comment that they not only had their planes during 're-training' but would have been included in the Statistical Digest - and still, the Statistical Digest had to completely overstate the strength of P-40s in MTO for all the reasons we discussed. No TO&E in MTO in 1943 was staffed at more than 25-26 fighters because the full production had not yet been sent to all the theatres - and all the Allies - around the world.


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## Vincenzo (Jul 12, 2012)

the question is not how many fighters were autorized in mission for a FG, this can be also 50 but you need reserves and the numbers give that all models had "overstrenght" as is right.
example in november there were 7 P-47 FGs in ETO with 1005 fighters as 31st october, so 144 for group (the alone 38 group had 105).

the statistical digest not overstated the P-40 give us the actual numbers, and if all days operational P-40 squadrons were understrenght this more true for the spit squadrons, see that had less spit in reserve


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## drgondog (Jul 12, 2012)

As of October 31 1943 there were 4, 56, 78, 352, 353, 355, 356, 358 Groups, plus 495th Fighter Training Group were in England by October. The 361, 362 were in England in November. That would be 9 P-47 FG's plus one Training Group by October 31. 

You may perform divisions into the Digest numbers but no single Fighter Group had more than 75 aircraft on hand in 1943 and most of 1944.

Specifically, and for example, the 355th FG had 67 P-47s on hand on October 31, 1943 and had 56 on hand November 15. That is directly from the Engineering section of the Group History. The drop in Inventory reflects the losses (11) of Nov 5, 7, 13 and 15 - mostly weather and fuel related - but not One replacement aircraft arrived before the afternoon of the 17th of November.

If you want to think more about this, ask your self why the use of a 'bar' underscoring the squadron code was so rare in 1943 in Any squadron? Simply because there were no more aircraft than letters in the *Alphabet*. 

The squadron codes were (in case of 354FS/355FG) WR-A through WR-Z with various gaps in between. There were special and unusual circumstances for a WR-A to exist because it was rare to have A through Z in operation with no gaps for a replecement ship. For example when WR-B was shot down there might not be another replacement for weeks in 1943. When the replacement ship arrived it would be coded usually to fill in the loss and be assigned the same crew chief and pilot(s). 

If your theory was correct there would be many duplicate squadron codes with an 'underscore' to identify as different from the original squadron code.

Your theory is Not correct with respect to Group inventory. Having said that, there were many P-47s being assempled from recent surface ship shipments which had not received necessary ETO modifications to radios, fuel tank pylons, water injection mods, etc and as they emerged from assy and modification centers they were shipped to individual bases as replacements


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## parsifal (Jul 12, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> for the USAAF Statistical digest airplanes on Hand in MTO
> (end of august '43)
> 338 B-17, 115 B-24, 398 B-25, 270 B-26, 137 A-20, 362 P-38, 290 P-39, 625 P-40, 231 P-51, 43 Night Fighters, 188 Other Fighters, 51 F-45, 22 F-6, 30 Other Recces



It seems then that the P-40, was in fact very close in numbers to the Spite. There is not nearly the difference I had assumed, though the Kittyhawk/P-40 numbers are still less than the Spits, when the committments of all the allies are looked at. 

Again, relying on: C.J.C. Molony, F.C. Flynn, H.L. Davies, and T.P. Gleave, The Mediterranean and
the Middle East, Vol. V, The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, 3rd
September 1943 to 31st March 1944, London: HMSO, 1973. 

and also Ellis's book on the MTO


...I arrive at a total of 2339 a/c not including those attached to the USAAC, divided as follows

522 Spit, 348 Hurri, 188 Beafighter, 75 Aircobra, 25 Kittyhawk, 22 Mosquito, 6 Lightning, 283 Well, 144 Baltimore,, 80 Boston, 72 Blen, 64 Dakota, 64 Hudson, 54 Catalina, 46 Halifax, 45 LeO45, 38 Bft, 33 Lodestar, 26Albamarle, 24 Auster, 18, Albacore, 16 Marauder, 12 Sworfish, 12 Walrus, 6 Liberator, 2 Ventura, 104 "Other" 


Adding up the total numbers of fighters for both US and non US formations, that gives the following

368 P-38/Lightning, 365 P-39/Aircobra, 650 P-40/Kittyhawk, 231 P-51, 231 "Night Fighters"/Beafighter, 710 "other Fighters" (USAAC Spits mostly)/Spits, 51 F4/5, 22F6, 348 Hurri 22 Mosquito. Thats a total fighter force of 2767 a/c


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## Vincenzo (Jul 12, 2012)

Drgodong
4, 56, 78, 352, 353, 355, 356, 358 this are 8 (i take 7 because i've read my already did list for operational FG on novemebr '43, and 358th was not operational), 495th is a training unit they are not counted in mto so neither in eto. 1005/8=126 arouns the same of P-40 in mto. 
the point is not the planes available in a FG is that plane in theater for a FG.

p.s Parsifal it's too late for reply to you, sorry


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## Vincenzo (Jul 13, 2012)

parsifal said:


> It seems then that the P-40, was in fact very close in numbers to the Spite. There is not nearly the difference I had assumed, though the Kittyhawk/P-40 numbers are still less than the Spits, when the committments of all the allies are looked at.
> 
> Again, relying on: C.J.C. Molony, F.C. Flynn, H.L. Davies, and T.P. Gleave, The Mediterranean and
> the Middle East, Vol. V, The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, 3rd
> ...



i've some doubt in your number
the airacobra afaik were not used in MTO from RAF (for true just see a limited use in 601st squadron in nwe). 25 Kittyhawk are too few AFAIK there were 112th, 250th, 260th and 450th squadrons flying with Kitty III. For final sum i think that british Lightning were recces.


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## drgondog (Jul 13, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> Drgodong
> 4, 56, 78, 352, 353, 355, 356, 358 this are 8 (i take 7 because i've read my already did list for operational FG on novemebr '43, and 358th was not operational), 495th is a training unit they are not counted in mto so neither in eto. 1005/8=126 arouns the same of P-40 in mto.
> the point is not the planes available in a FG is that plane in theater for a FG.
> 
> p.s Parsifal it's too late for reply to you, sorry



Vincenzo - Whether the 358 was operational (it wasn't) in October 1943 - it (and its full compliment of operational P-47s) was in England at the time of the 'quoted' inventory. If you wish to count only operational P-47s in the 1000+ range you have to slide forward to March through May, 1944 when most of the 9th AF groups became 'operational'.

If I recall, the question was how many P-40's in MTO, and now P-47s in ETO? The 495th had P-47s. The 358 FG had P-47s. In England. In ETO.

None of the Fighter Groups in the MTO or ETO had more than an average of 75 fighters on their respective base and more often less because of operational losses.

Your taking the numbers you extracted from Statistical Digest and dividing by number of 'active' groups to obtain a mathmatecally sound average has no relevance to the USAAF standard TO&E for Bomb and Fighter Groups, nor to the historical reality of actual numbers contained within each Group.

Therefore, for the Statistical Digest to be accurate, there must have been at least half the entire force in depots, sitting idly and waiting to be withdrawn to provide replacements. Using the October 31, 1943 data you supplied (and using my count to give you the benefit of the doubt), there were a maximum of 9 times 75 P-47s assigned to existing Fighter organizations in the ETO (all of 8th And 9th AF) - 75x9=675 which is 330 P-47 'somewhere' in England that were sitting idle. Nearly 50% of the 'operational' units. 

And BTW the 495th FTG standard compliment was about 16-20 P-47s at that time - not 75 - as it was to provide training for new pilots in ETO procedures, not fly combat missions. So the reality from your data is that 2/3 of the stated P-47s were assigned, and 1/3 'not assigned' when the 8th AF was desperate to get fighters in the air over Holland and France. 

Not likely. For similar reasons the USAAF - MTO didn't have 50% of their P-40's sitting idle.


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## Vincenzo (Jul 13, 2012)

drgodong you don't understand me sorry. i repeat i'm not discuting how many aircraft had a FG, just show that is no strange that in mto there were 125 P-40 for each group, the theater need reserves. You can check the statistical digest yourself, table 90 for mto and table 89 for eto.
for 358th i've admit and explain my wrong, there were 8 FG with 47 plus a training unit with '47 (and i repeat we had not counted the trainig units in mto so for apples for aplles we need sdon't count it in nwe) so 126 P-47 pro quota for FG same of 125 pro quota for the P-40 in mto.
This is my last reply at your pointless istance


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## drgondog (Jul 13, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> drgodong you don't understand me sorry. i repeat i'm not discuting how many aircraft had a FG, just show that is no strange that in mto there were 125 P-40 for each group, the theater need reserves. You can check the statistical digest yourself, table 90 for mto and table 89 for eto.
> for 358th i've admit and explain my wrong, there were 8 FG with 47 plus a training unit with '47 (and i repeat we had not counted the trainig units in mto so for apples for aplles we need sdon't count it in nwe) so 126 P-47 pro quota for FG same of 125 pro quota for the P-40 in mto.
> This is my last reply at your pointless istance



Lol - thank you !! You are clueless on any basis of average fighter group inventory for USAAF. That is my sole and only point. Parsifal's count except for his source missing the 324th Fg and designating P-38s to the 335th - was correct. All in, it was an impressive and DETAILED accounting of the operational strength of All aircraft in the MTO.

The Statistical Digest regarding GROSS In Theatre fighter strength could Only be correct if there was a huge and un-assigned inventory in centralized depots approaching 50-60% of their 'in theatre count' of any fighter count you extracted from the source. If you believe the Digest is correct, then you must find an additional location and count for a large number of unassigned/non operational fighters in each category. I could be convinced of depot strength of significance - but I do not yet believe it to be 50% of op strength.

Good luck on that, but I would be delighted if you could shed light on something I don't know, or know how to find, about USAAF ETO data. Your P-47 analogy was absurd on the calculated strength of the existing fighter groups.


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## Vincenzo (Jul 13, 2012)

Check best parsifal count there were errors also for the british (example there were none Kittyhawk unit), and show on paper strenght of unit. 
My analogy is right but it is not for calculating the strenght of FG. 
Sure i believe to Statistical Digest and not your strange idea that a theater non need reserves.


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## stug3 (Jul 13, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I disagree, I think the P-40 was the most numerous (and therefore dominant) type being utilized by the Allies in the MTO by 1943.



I stand by my assertion- throughout 1943, more Allied fighter groups (American, UK, SAAF) in the MTO were equipped with P-40s than any other type. I havent seen any evidence proving otherwise.


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> i've some doubt in your number
> the airacobra afaik were not used in MTO from RAF (for true just see a limited use in 601st squadron in nwe). 25 Kittyhawk are too few AFAIK there were 112th, 250th, 260th and 450th squadrons flying with Kitty III. For final sum i think that british Lightning were recces.



Hi vincenzo

The Aircobras mentioned in my reference were not RAF controlled. They were being flown by the Free french Air force, specifically

I/4 Squadron FFAF (25 P-39 Airacobras)
I/5 Squadron FFAF (25 P-39 Airacobras)
III/6 Squadron FFAF (25 P-39 Airacobras)


I found it rather odd that there were so few Kittyhawks in the RAF inventory as well. i will try some alternative sources to cross check


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

stug3 said:


> I stand by my assertion- throughout 1943, more Allied fighter groups (American, UK, SAAF) in the MTO were equipped with P-40s than any other type. I havent seen any evidence proving otherwise.



What have you got to back up your claim....we all have assertions, as you can see, now we have to produce the evidence o support those opinions....


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## Vincenzo (Jul 13, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Hi vincenzo
> 
> The Aircobras mentioned in my reference were not RAF controlled. They were being flown by the Free french Air force, specifically
> 
> ...



Sorry i've not undersdand that total include the french, so include also the south africains?


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## Vincenzo (Jul 13, 2012)

just for info
French fighter unit in MTO
GC 1/4 P-39
GC 1/5 P-39
GC 2/3 D 520
GC 2/5 P-40
GC 2/9 D 520
GC 3/6 P-39
GC 2/7 Spit V
GC 1/3 Spit V&IX
GC 1/7 Spit V (activè from 16th september)
GC 1/2 D 520


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## Vincenzo (Jul 13, 2012)

SAAF fighter unit in MTO
1st Spit VIII&IX
2nd Spit V
3rd Hurri II
4th Spit V
5th Kitty III
7th Spit V
40th Spit IX
41st Hurri II


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> Sorry i've not undersdand that total include the french, so include also the south africains?



The list posted claims that it includes all nationalities under MAC (Med aircraft command). There appear to be some obvious gaps, however. Tere were, from memory 6 RAAF squadrons for example, the fighter squdrons of which were equipped with either P-51s or P-40s at that time (September 1943). I should be able to look that up and check


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## Vincenzo (Jul 13, 2012)

i've already did a list with RAF fighter squadrons (incluse XV article unit) in mto as september '43 unlucky is not here i post it when i back to home (need 4 hours maybe), remember there were 44 F/FBsquadrons single engined and 10 with twin engined (9 + a det). Most common sure the Spit probably more that half os S/E F squadrons. 
for not article XV RAAF squadron i remember the 3rd with Kitty at time


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> just for info
> French fighter unit in MTO
> GC 1/4 P-39
> GC 1/5 P-39
> ...



According to the list i posted (Molony et al) the following FF units were under MAC control

8 Groupement
1/11 (15 LEO45), II/23 (15 LEO45), 1/25 (15 LEO45)

2689th HQ
41st (12 Walruses), I/3 (20 spit VC as of 8/9/43), II/7 (20 spit VC), I/4 (25 P-39), I/5 (25 P-39), III/6 (25 P-39), II/5 (25 P-40). Thje D 520 equipped units were not under command, but you have not listed the bomber or seaplane units

Molony (et al) has the following SAAF units included in their inventory (I am almost certain that Molony has mistakenly included RAAF units as SAAF sqns, since the squadron and Gp numbers match) 

No 3 Wing SAAF
No 12, 24 and 21 Sqns (48 Bostons and 24 Baltimores)

Attached to DAF
60 (P-38/Mosq), 

No 7 Wing (RAF)
2, 4 (32 Spit Vc/IX)

No 239 Wing (RAF)
No 1, 40 (32 Spit V/VIII)

No 210 Wing (RAF)
No 3 (16 Hurr IIC)

No 212 Wing (RAF)
No 7, 80, 41 (32 Spit Vc, 16 Hurri IIB) 

No 201 Wing (RAF)
No 15 (24 Baltimores) , 454, 459 (32 Hudson) 

No 238 Wing (RAF)
No 16 (24 Beaforts)


I wanted to cross check the numbers of RAF squadrons with my other source (Ellis. Ellis's list is for December so there are bound to be slight differences. However the two sources are remarkably similar, which sugests both are accurate. 

Ellis lists a total of 100 RAF squadrons (49 fighter) in the MTO as at December. molony lists 102 (52 fighter) . I think however Ellis does not include those units protecting Iran, East africa and the similar.


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## drgondog (Jul 13, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> Check best parsifal count there were errors also for the british (example there were none Kittyhawk unit), and show on paper strenght of unit.
> My analogy is right but it is not for calculating the strenght of FG.
> 
> *But you insisted on linking your 'calculations' to operational fighter group inventory - therefore your analogy was and is incorrect*
> ...



In no way did I state that a Theatre did not 'need' reserves. When you could not account for the high number of in theatre aircraft being allocated to 7 (or 9) P-47 Fighter Groups, I demonstrated that the 'reserve' level was 50%+ of the actual inventory assigned to each (and collectively) ETO P-47 Group.

I then acknowledged that a significant number Could be inventory... but you can not extract and believeable number by citing the Statistical Digest data for October 31, 1943.

Where is the source or detail to substantiate some 500 to 350 'reserve P-47s' in England (depending on whether your 'FG count is correct - or mine is)?

Any RAF or FF units in your roll up? Nope. Was UK a staging point to fly or transport P-47s to the MTO? Nope. So given the data where do you think all those P-47s were hiding?


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## Vincenzo (Jul 13, 2012)

Parsifal i've not confirmation for a 80th Squadron in SAAF. i've indicated only fighter unit (the discussion was on Spitfire dominance as allied fighter).
RAF squadron F/FB 
6th Hurri IV
32nd Spit V&IX
33rd Hurri II
43rd Spit V&IX
72nd Sp V&IX
73rd Spit V
74th Spit V
80th Spit V&IX
81st Spit V&IX
87th Hurri II Spit V
92nd Sp V&VIII
93rd Sp V&IX
94th Hurri II Spit V
111th Spit V&IX
112th Kitty III
123rd Hurri II Spit V&IX
126th Spit V&IX
127th Hurri II Spit V
134th Hurri II
145th Sp V&VIII&IX
154th Sp V&IX
185th Sp V&IX
208th Hurri II
213th Hurri II
225th Spit V
229th Spit V
232nd Spit V&IX
237th Hurri II
238th Spit V
241st Hurri II
242nd Spit V&IX
243rd Spit V&IX
249th Spit V&IX
250th Kitty III
253rd Spit V&IX
260th Kitty III
274th Hurri II
335th Hurri II
336th Hurri II
417th Hurri II Spit V&VIII
450th Kitty III
451st Hurri II Spit V
601st Spit V&VIII
1435th Spit V&IX
46th Beaufighter
89th Beaufighter
152nd Beaufighter
219th Beaufighter
252nd Beaufighter
255th Beaufighter
600th Beaufighter
603rd Beaufighter
23rd Mosquito
256th (det) Mosquito

44 SE Squadron 24 with Spit, 10 with Hurri, 4 with Kitty and 6 with Hurri&Spit
9+1det TE Squadron 8 with Beaufighter, 1+1det with Mosquito (this are not all NF unit)


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