# Hypothetical Scenario: Java 1942



## Vassili Zaitzev (May 1, 2012)

Hello everybody-

I was talking with Parsifal via PM about how the outcome of Java Sea could be different. While wargaming is above my experience, I wish to start a discussion on the topic. I have a basic understanding of the battle, and how Doorman was stopped several times attempting to intercept the invasion convoy.

I guess I can make this a two pronged question: 1. Historically, could the ABDA have done anything different to change the outcome? 2. This would be a what if scenario. For example: If HMS Hood was not destroyed at the Denmark Straits, survived up till '42, and was sent along with HMS Exeter to the Far East, what impact would she have made? (A little warning: From what I gather for wargames, if one side can change their parameters, so can the other. So if HMS Hood is included for the ABDA, than the IJN can include other forces, say the Kirishima?) 

Have fun guys! Mind the size of the images.

I'm sure a lot of you are familiar with the battle, but I'll include a few links and a map.
Battle of the Java Sea - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Java Sea Battle, February 1942
The Battle of the Java Sea: February 27, 1942, by Vincent P. O'Hara


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## davebender (May 3, 2012)

Winning the battle means sinking Imperial Japanese Army transports before they can land troops.
Japanese warships should be mostly avoided until after the transports are sunk.
Intelligence is the key if you want to slip between IJA transports and their IJN escort. You might also employ a decoy. 

Attack at night. 
Sacrifice a couple cruisers for the IJN to chase (and probably kill).
After the IJN (hopefully) take the cruiser bait every available ABDA destroyer falls on the IJA transport fleet. Don't piddle around. Use torpedoes for quick results. Any transports still floating after torpedoes are gone get killed with gunfire. After transports are sunk the mission is over. ABDA ships including any surviving cruisers from the decoy force should flee into the darkness at flank speed. There is nothing to be gained by fighting IJN warships.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (May 3, 2012)

Interesting scenario. I wonder though if the American torpedoes would be effective, the early ones had a tendency to be duds.


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## davebender (May 3, 2012)

ABDA cannot do anything to change that situation. Just fire all torpedoes and let the chips fall where they may. If torpedoes don't get the job done then gunfire will.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (May 3, 2012)

Guess your right. I just wonder if the DD's can take care of the transport fleet before the IJN neutralize the cruiser diversion. Still, sinking even a fraction of the invasion fleet is better than the historical outcome.


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## davebender (May 3, 2012)

> wonder if the DD's can take care of the transport fleet before the IJN neutralize the cruiser diversion


It doesn't take much to sink a transport. Not even with 4" guns like the USN flush deck DDs had. And they certainly cannot run away from a destroyer.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (May 3, 2012)

Point taken.


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## davebender (May 3, 2012)

U.S. Navy, 7.12.1941
Submarines and aircraft aside, they had 13 destroyers and two cruisers. Plenty for attacking a transport fleet but you cannot piddle them away. They must be held in readiness outside enemy air range and wait for a troop transport fleet to appear. Then you attack with the entire Asiatic Fleet. A more aggressive Asiatic Fleet commander might have attempted this in the Philippines.

H.M. Australian Squadron, RAN, 8.12.41
Australia had a significant fleet too. 5 cruisers and 4 destroyers. The same strategy applies. You cannot piddle them away escorting the RN around Malaya. The RN ought to know how to fight a naval battle and assemble a balanced fleet. They shouldn't need Australian help.

The entire Australian fleet should be held back in the vicinity of Borneo or the East Indies, waiting for a chance to attack IJA troop transports en masse.


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## renrich (May 29, 2012)

If Hood had been present in the Java Sea, she would have been sunk just like Repulse and POW. ABDA was hopelessly outclassed in every way and was doomed.


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## davebender (May 29, 2012)

ABDA was well equipped for sinking IJA troop transports and that's how amphibious invasions are defeated.


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## renrich (May 29, 2012)

The only way that ABDA was going to have any success against invasion forces was at night and the IJN was the master of the night at that time. ABDA was well equipped with nothing. The ships were worn out and outclassed. The men were worn out. Many of the weapons either did not work or were outclassed. The leadership was poor and the communications were hopeless. There were shortages of everything and ABDA did not control the air or ground. The Boise was just dad gummed lucky to hit a rock. Other than that, they were in good shape. They had a little success at Balikpapan but that was a pinprick against the IJN. My uncle swapped out with another petty officer who wanted to go to the Asiatic Fleet and that fellow wound up on the Houston and my uncle went to the Salt Lake City. Guess who survived the war?


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## renrich (May 29, 2012)

The DDs four inch guns would have a dickens of a time trying to sink a cargo ship. When submarines used to surface and try to sink a ship with their deck guns, it would take many rounds to get the job done. The DDs could not do it at night because they could not see to shoot and in the daylight they could not hang around long enough to get the job done. The US torpedoes mostly did not work and they were in short supply also.


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## davebender (May 29, 2012)

The real problem. 

The IJN were not supermen. They had good leaders who knew how to train ship crew. With good leadership ABDA could fight at night also.


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## renrich (May 30, 2012)

If you read up on the Pacific war you realise that the USN did not get proficient at night surface engagements until well into 1943 and even then they had many mix ups because of the teething problems with radar. My uncle in Salt Lake City was in the Battle of Cape Esperance which was after the disaster at Savo Island. Cape Esperance was, more or less, an American victory. After the American cruisers opened fire at close range on the IJN ships the US flagship ordered them to cease fire because it was thought we were firing on our own DDs. Some of the cruisers complied but my uncle said Salt Lake City did not comply because they knew they were firing on IJN ships. My uncle was the CGM in charge of the 5 inch/38s and they were firing as fast as they could becuse they had crossed the T of the Japanese. My other uncle was a CGM on Chicago at Savo Island. Chicago was the only Allied CA that survived although heavily damaged. He said they were totally surprised and had no idea the Japanese were about until Chicago was hit with a torpedo. The IJN were pretty close to being supermen when it came to night surface engagements for the first couple of years in the war.

The leadership of ABDA was Dutch and the Allied "fleet" was a scratch group with little or no experience working together. There were language problems and signals problems. The Allies had very little knowledge about IJN torpedo doctrine and night fighting ability. It was a fiasco waiting to happen and it did. It would have made little difference if the Allied force had been homogeneous and all one nationality at that stage of the war. At Coral Sea and Midway, the US commanders were smart enough to know they wanted nothing to do with the IJN in a night surface engagement. They had little choice later at Guadalcanal.

Was reading a book a number of years ago about the Java campaign and it told the story of Houston getting ready to leave the harbor at Surabaya (sp?) for what turned out to be the Battle Of the Java Sea. A British CA, either Exeter or an Aussie CL, Perth ( I think it was Perth) had her band lined up on the fantail as they steamed out of harbor. The band was playing " A Hunting We Will Go" That account brought tears to my eyes (and still does) to think about what was in store for our sailors.


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## Freebird (May 30, 2012)

Vassili Zaitzev said:


> Hello everybody-
> 
> I was talking with Parsifal via PM about how the outcome of Java Sea could be different. While wargaming is above my experience, I wish to start a discussion on the topic. I have a basic understanding of the battle, and how Doorman was stopped several times attempting to intercept the invasion convoy.
> 
> I guess I can make this a two pronged question: 1. Historically, could the ABDA have done anything different to change the outcome? 2. This would be a what if scenario. For example: If HMS Hood was not destroyed at the Denmark Straits, survived up till '42, and was sent along with HMS Exeter to the Far East, what impact would she have made?



A more plausible scenario might be if the Prince of Wales Repulse are withdrawn as soon as Japan attacks, and sent (along with HMS Hermes perhaps) as cornerstone of "ABDA". 
Perhaps as part of a deception plan they take a well publicized short trip up to Hawaii in late Dec to put in an appearance and have Japan think that they are part of the West Coast fleet. 
PoW is a new ship and has a modern radar set.

Another option is if the Allies deploy some radar equipped naval strike aircraft.


Great maps BTW!


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## davebender (May 30, 2012)

You go to war with the leaders you promoted during peacetime. If peacetime promotion choices were largely based on politics rather then professional ability then your armed forces get hammered at the start of the next war. Without better leadership an ABDA victory would be largely a matter of luck rather then different strategy.


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## renrich (May 30, 2012)

No matter how much luck ABDA had they were doomed. The USN was no more afflicted by poor leadership because of politics than any other navy. On December 7, 1941, the US had a relatively small navy although a massive expansion was under way. The USN had not really fought a war since 1898, the Spanish American War. They had three fleet carriers in the Pacific. Two BBs fit to operate with carriers but none in the Pacific, (all others were too slow) A total of 24 cruisers in the Pacific but 6 of those were obsolete and of little use. There were three more fleet carriers fit for the Pacific but they were in the Atlantic. The 8 BBs at PH were useless as far as modern warfare ( carrier based air strikes) were concerned. The Asiatic Fleet consisted of one CA, one modern CL and an outmoded CL. These ships already counted above. They also had a few ancient S boats ( subs) and some four stack DDs. They were vastly outnumbered by the Japanese. The USN was just learning about the use of radar. The USN had many outstanding naval officers, Nimitz, Fletcher, Halsey, Spruance, King, Leahey and many in aviation like Thach and Flatley. However the USN, like all the other navies except for Japan had not developed the massive, coordinated carrier air strike, the torpedo doctrine and the surface night warfare. The IJN had overall the most modern navy in the world with the most modern shipboard aircraft. They had the most lethal torpedoes in the world. They were far in advance of the other navies in those areas. However, their submarine training and doctrine was lacking.

The USN learned on the job and learned fast. The IJN turned out to be not very adaptable but was ultimately doomed by the massive industrial capacity of the US and by Japan's own puny ( relatively) industrial capacity.


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## Freebird (May 31, 2012)

renrich said:


> No matter how much luck ABDA had they were doomed.
> 
> The USN learned on the job and learned fast. The IJN turned out to be not very adaptable but was ultimately doomed by the massive industrial capacity of the US and by Japan's own puny ( relatively) industrial capacity.



I tend to agree with Renrich, given the ad-hoc nature of ABDA it would be tough for them to do much better.

On the other hand, talks between US UK about how to arrange a joint defence of the Pacific (ie ABDA) *before* war broke out could have been very helpful


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## renrich (May 31, 2012)

The problem the US and the UK faced in the Pacific regardless of how much pre planning they did and regardless of their knowledge that Japan was getting ready to start something was that the Allies had limited resources. The UK was stretched thin coping with Germany and Italy and the US voters were largely asleep and the US was unready for war. On December 7, the USN had fully as much naval power in the Atlantic as they did the Pacific and the carrier air groups were having great difficulty scraping up enough "modern" AC to outfit the carriers. It is truly amazing how far behind the US was for fighting a modern war. It is also truly amazing how fast they learned and how fast they caught up. As mentioned above, the IJN, on December 7, probably had the best, overall, navy in the world. But they were like a football team with the best eleven offensive players in the world, a not very good defensive eleven and no depth at all.

To me, what is an interesting question is what would have happened if the Japanese had only attacked the colonial powers possessions and left the US alone. If Japan leaves the US alone, I question whether FDR could have cajoled Congress into interfering in the Pacific at least initially. Hitler would probably not have declared war on the US and the UK would more or less been on it's own against Germany and Japan until the US woke up.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 9, 2012)

I have to agree with renrich that the Boise was lucky to hit a rock and get away to fight another day, but I expect it might have given a pretty good account of itself had it remained in theater. Its 15 rapid firing 6 inch rifles pumping out 150 AP HE rpm might have been almost as much a perceptual shock to the IJN as their Long Lance was to the USN although probably not as effective in the damage it could inflict on an armored vessel. Evidently, at Cape Esperence, the Boise and her sister Helena provided just that kind of shock in late '42. I would guess the Boise RADAR suite did not yet include the enabling SG. But aparently it possessed a first generation Fire Control RADAR (which it apparently used for navigation as well as FC) and ammo that was much superior to that aboard the other US ships, based on the entries in this forum: 

Pacific War 1941-1945: Asiatic Fleet AA weapons


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## davebender (Jun 9, 2012)

Everything I have read suggests the 1941 USN was considerably larger then the 1941 IJN. We also had more military shipping in the Pacific plus more army divisions and USAAC units available for immediate deployment.


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## davebender (Jun 9, 2012)

26 July 1941. USA begins a massive military expansion in the Philippines.
4 heavy bomber groups and 5 divisions of long range submarines were to be main offensive components of this military expansion.

Japan attacked during December 1941 to forestall the U.S. military build up. If they don't attack the USA they won't attack at all.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 9, 2012)

davebender said:


> Everything I have read suggests the 1941 USN was considerably larger then the 1941 IJN. We also had more military shipping in the Pacific plus more army divisions and _*USAAC units available for immediate deployment.*_



Dave, the thing about those USAAC units, as the debacles in the PI and Java revealed, is that they looked better in their numbers than in their actual quality. The pilots were terribly raw many having only a few hours in type. The units that got to the PI in early '41 were reported to have suffered from a very low quality standard of training according to the more seasoned flyers already there. The FEAF units had to institute a program of training that absorbed much time and resources and detracted from the time spent to prepare for the imminent war. Combat style training only began in the Fall and was curtailed by the lack of 50 cal. ammunition and other operational essentials. The problem with jammed guns which became epidemic was not revealed until actual combat in part because the training regimine was carefully correographed and the HMG weren't used in training. Personnel were sent to the PI and Australia on the long voyage ahead of their aircraft and so became supernumeraries upon arrival instead of pilots in training with grounded time becoming weeks. In the PI I believe it was months. The heavy non-combat related losses in Australia and Java and the terrible early non-combat related attrition of the FEAF in the PI, as well as the losses suffered in combat were the result. 

IMO, the rush to build the FEAF not only precipitated the Japanese attack, in some significant ways, it crippled the ability of the US to respond effectively in defense of the PI when the IJ attack occurred.


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## davebender (Jun 9, 2012)

> IMO, the rush to build the FEAF not only precipitated the Japanese attack, in some significant ways, it crippled the ability of the US to respond effectively in defense of the PI when the IJ attack occurred.


President FDR more or less admitted as much to his inner circle after the Pearl Harbor attack. I don't have the historical statement in front of me but it was to the effect that if FDR had known how poorly prepared defenses were in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor he would have continued serious diplomatic talks with Japan for a few more months before creating USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces Far East. FEAF was the aerial component of USAFFE.)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 9, 2012)

davebender said:


> President FDR more or less admitted as much to his inner circle after the Pearl Harbor attack. I don't have the historical statement in front of me but it was to the effect that if FDR had known how poorly prepared defenses were in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor he would have continued serious diplomatic talks with Japan for a few more months before creating USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces Far East. FEAF was the aerial component of USAFFE.)



Very interesting Dave!


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## davebender (Jun 9, 2012)

Normally major nations get what they want as long as they don't demand too much from the little guys. Push too hard against a weaker nation and you get war.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> President FDR more or less admitted as much to his inner circle after the Pearl Harbor attack. I don't have the historical statement in front of me but it was to the effect that if FDR had known how poorly prepared defenses were in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor he would have continued serious diplomatic talks with Japan for a few more months before creating USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces Far East. FEAF was the aerial component of USAFFE.)



I find this observation to be very interesting. I wonder, if there wasn't a strategy that took into account the upreparedness of the USA, the forward deployment of its unprepared forces as well as the situation in the PI and neighboring areas of conflict that could have possibly forestalled the Japanese tide and given the allies a very different war to fight. In other words, don't focus on the outcome of any particular battle but of the entire early war campaign. I think there might have been one, but it's a stretch, especially given the short time involved and the political realities of the pre-Pac war countries Australia, Britain and the USA.

Sounds like a new thread. I'll post it later unless someone beats me to it. This retiree has to get back to work.


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## davebender (Jun 14, 2012)

> I wonder, if there wasn't a strategy that took into account the upreparedness of the USA, the forward deployment of its unprepared forces as well as the situation in the PI and neighboring areas of conflict that could have possibly forestalled the Japanese tide and given the allies a very different war to fight. In other words, don't focus on the outcome of any particular battle but of the entire early war campaign.


You are thinking way too hard. 

Japanese strategy was to dominate China by bribing or coercing local warlords. That strategy worked until 1928 when the KMT booted the pro-Japanese warlord out of Beijing and established a weak national government. China still had plenty of warlords but they acknowledged the KMT as the national government.

Japan invaded China in the vicinity of Shanghai 28 January 1932. The battle raged until 4 March 1932. Before it was over both sides (Japan and KMT China) committed 5 infantry divisions plus a bunch of separate smaller units. Two of the Chinese divisions were German trained and they fought hard. However the remaining Chinese units were typical warlord organizations and couldn't stand up to a professional Japanese army backed by armor and airpower. The U.S. Government took a hard diplomatic stance (which Britain refused to support). Japan eventually backed down and withdrew from the Shanghai area while keeping Manchuria which they had occupied 6 months earlier. 

After the Shanghai diplomatic crisis Japan and the USA were barely on speaking terms for the remainder of the 1930s. It probably didn't help that the USA violated the 1923 naval agreement when we fortified Corregidore Island. Moving the USN Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor probably didn't help either.

During 1937 a border clash escalated into full blown war between Japan and KMT China. By the end of 1939 Japan controlled all the Chinese seaports. However KMT China still had a rail line to the French controlled seaport at Hai Phong (Vietnam). As long as this rail line remained open KMT China had a viable supply line to the outside world. Japan couldn't do anything about it unless they wanted to fight France in addition to China. 

Britain solved the Hai Phong problem when they stabbed France in the back at Mers el Kebir. France could no longer use her navy. To make matters worse a substantial amount of war material which France had purchased in the USA was diverted to Britain. France no longer had the ability to reinforce IndoChina and apparently no longer had any diplomatic friends. That left France no choice but to accept Japanese military bases in Vietnam and permanent closure of the rail line to China.

Japan miscalculated. The USA apparently had no problem with Britain stabbing France in the back but they weren't going to tolerate Japan doing the same thing. Especially when the Japanese action was also a death blow to China. Relations between Japan and the USA went from cool to frigid. Japan refused to leave IndoChina so the USA made plans to base heavy bombers and long range submarines in the Philippines. A big stick to add clout to American diplomacy. Japan would have been smart to back down but apparently there weren't many smart politicians in 1941 Japan.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 27, 2013)

Seems odd to revive an old thread, but I noticed the 71st anniversary is today. Found a lecture on youtube I think you all might enjoy. I'll post a few pictures as well.

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LQcdWS7ce0_

Rear Admiral Karel Doorman






HNLMS _De Ruyter_- Doormans Flagship





HNLMS _Java_





HMS _Exeter_


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 27, 2013)

A few more pictures. 

USS _Houston_





HMAS _Perth_





HNLMS _Kortenaer_- same class as HNLMS _Witte de With_, another Netherlands destroyer





HMS _Electra_- same class as HMS _Encounter_





HMS _Jupiter_





USS _Alden_: Same Clemson-class Destroyers as USS _John D. Edwards_, _John D. Ford_, and _Paul Jones_


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 27, 2013)

Should be last batch of pictures for tonight. Right now it's all concerning ABDA. I'd like to include some photos on the Japanese side, but that will have to wait until tomorrow. If I have time tommorrow and Friday, I will include photos of the Second Battle of the Java Sea, DesDivs 58s flight through the Bali Strait, and the Battle of Sunda Strait. 

One of few pictures I could find of the battle, looks like HMS _Exeter_, might not be from the 27th if given the comments from the forum.





A little overview map I found, gives context to locations.





I believe that's all of the pictures for now. While I enjoy posting contemporary paintings to visualize, I unfortunately couldn't find any for Java Sea. I'll update with pictures of the Japanese perspective, along with everything else. I'm heading up for a weekend to Vermont, and the place I'm staying at does not have internet, so I may finish up next week.


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## Bernhart (Feb 28, 2013)

My great uncle died on one of the dutch ships, actually listed as missing in action


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 28, 2013)

Bernhart said:


> My great uncle died on one of the dutch ships, actually listed as missing in action



Sorry to hear about that Bernhart.  to your uncle.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 28, 2013)

Here you guys go. Not many pictures as I'd like, but I got a late start. 

Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi- Commander of Eastern Covering Group





HIJMS _Nachi_- Takagis flagship(I believe), same _Myōkō_-class as _Haguro_


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 5, 2013)

Feel a little bad for not updating until now, but I hope to make it up. 

HIJMS _Naka_, same Sendai-Class light cruiser as _Jintsu_





HIJMS _Yudachi_- same Shiratsuyu-class destroyer as _Samidare _,_Murasame_, _Harusame_, _Yamakaze_, _Kawakaze_





HIJMS _Asagumo_- same Asashio-class destroyer as _Minegumo_





HIJMS _Yukikaze_- same Kagerō-class destroyer as _Hatsukaze_, _Tokitsukaze_, _Amatsukaze_, 





HIJMS _Sazanami_- same clase of Fubuki-class destroyer as _Ushio_.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 7, 2013)

I'm really behind with the updates, but as promised, here is Sunda Strait.

Overview of Sunda Strait





HMAS _Perth_- colored photo from Untitled Document





Captain Hector Waller of HMAS _Perth_, artist is Joshua Smith





Another picture of USS _Houston _at Darwin in February 1942, from Untitled Document





Captain Albert Rooks of _Houston_, from the Navy's Department website.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 8, 2013)

Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita, commanding the 7th Cruiser Division.





HIJMS _Mogami_, same class of ships as _Mikuma_, part of the 7th Division. 





HIJMS _Natori_, flagship of Rear Admiral Kenzaburo Hara, screening the Japanese 16th Armys transports with the 5th and 11th Destroyer Divisions.





A track chart of the battle.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 8, 2013)

A few more pictures before I move onto the Bali Strait

A contemporary painting of Sunda Strait, looks like the _Houston_. Could not find out who the artist was.





Another painting of the _Houston_, again could not find who the artist was.





Painting of HMAS _Perth_ by Dennis Adams





A memorial to the men of _Perth _and _Houston_, from Rockingham memorial Park in Australia if Wikipedia is accurate.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 8, 2013)

This section will be a bit more lean than the others, since Bali Strait amounted to nothing more than two Destroyer Divisions exchanging shots for a short period. I'm a little confused as to why a lot of sources place the four DDs as DesDiv58. According to Winslows "The Fleet the Gods Forgot",_ Paul Jones_ and _John D. Ford_ were a part of DesDiv59, while _Alden _and _John D. Edwards_ were part of DesDiv57. I can only assume that there is an error in the research, or they were formed into DesDiv58 due to losses.

A quick summary of the action in Bali Strait. Order of Battle - Java Aftermath - 1 March 1942

A more detailed report, from US Naval Intelligence. The Java Sea Campaign

A track chart of Bali Strait, taken from the link above.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 8, 2013)

Last set of pictures, coinciding with the last major naval battle of the Java campaign. 

Another picture of HMS _Exeter_, last remaining heavyweight near Java. 





HMS _Encounter_, Prewar





USS _Pope_


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 8, 2013)

Kinda lied, last set of pictures for March 1st, 1942. 

Painting of _Exeter_, _Encounter_, and _Pope_ in a running fight, shortly before the cruiser is hit. It's from maritime artist James A. Flood. 






Exeter under attack, I'm unsure of its authenticity. 





Final moments of _Exeter_ 





This is actually the final picture of the USS _Edsall_, sunk the same day south of Java.





This concludes my contribution.


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## Wildcat (Mar 8, 2013)

An excellent tribute!  That picture of the Pope under attack is incredable.


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