# Patton v Rommel....



## Lucky13 (Aug 24, 2009)

Who was the better tactician?


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## imalko (Aug 24, 2009)

I would say Rommel. He achieved impressive results in African campaign only to be outnumbered in the end. During all that time he had to cope with lack of men and materials. Patton never had that kind of problems...


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## Thorlifter (Aug 24, 2009)

I'd have to agree with Imalko for the exact same reasons. Had Rommel received men and material the way Montgomery and Patton did, it would have been quite different.


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## Glider (Aug 24, 2009)

I also have to go with Rommel, Patton had huge advantages in men and supplies when he made his advances, Rommel was normally at a disadvantage when he made his strikes.


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## B-17engineer (Aug 24, 2009)

I think it's unanimous so far, I say Rommel. As all of them said, if he got the supplies he needed it would've been a much different out come, in my opinion, in North Africa. While commanding his Africa Korp his tactical awareness could change a possible defeat into a stunning victory. Since he didn't have numbers after the battle of Alam Halfa he had to attack because the allies would've had numerical superiority, the Afrika Korps days were numbered. Hitler (made yet another bad decision) to over rule Rommel's decision, Rommel started lacking supplies he needed to keep his Korp going. 

Don't get me wrong though Patton was a great tactician himself! Both men were well respected by there troops.

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## renrich (Aug 24, 2009)

I would go with Rommel also


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## RabidAlien (Aug 24, 2009)

Rommel's tactics vs. Patton's are like comparing a rapier to a halberd. Both have pointy ends, but one is made for feints and slashing and quick maneuvers, whereas the other is made for heavy-handed power-blasting through the defenses. Given equal supplies/men/material, I think that Rommel would've driven circles around Patton...but once Patton hit, hard, then all bets would be off. I guess, with the might of the US industrial machine behind him, Patton never really had to stretch his creativity as far as Rommel did. Who knows what would've happened if the situation had been reversed? We might be calling Patton the "Desert Fox" and praising his ingenuity and ability to keep running a machine that was continually shutting down on him.

With history as it stands, I'm goin with Rommel.


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## syscom3 (Aug 24, 2009)

Patton for me.

He seemed to have a knack at understanding on how to integrate all the facets of modern mechanized army ... armor, air and artillery. I would say that because he had so much men and material to work with, he accomplished things Rommel never did.

We know what Patton did with it, but we can only speculate on what Rommel *COULD* have done. And thats a huge difference.

And why would you suppose Rommel could have "run rings" around patton? Id say that Rommel would have made one flanking movement and then would be in one heck of a fight that he couldnt extricate himself from.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 24, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> And why would you suppose Rommel could have "run rings" around patton? Id say that Rommel would have made one flanking movement and then would be in one heck of a fight that he couldnt extricate himself from.



Why would you say that? I think that is only speculating as well.

As for me, my mind is not made up yet on this. I think both had their strong points and weaknesses. What is sad is that these two great Generals never had the chance to work together.


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## Coors9 (Aug 24, 2009)

I luv them both. Old ivory handle's was no slouch just the same. He couldn't help that he was well equipped. Too close to call in my opinion.


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## syscom3 (Aug 24, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Why would you say that? I think that is only speculating as well.
> 
> As for me, my mind is not made up yet on this. I think both had their strong points and weaknesses. What is sad is that these two great Generals never had the chance to work together.



I based my opinion on how Patton fought at the Ardennes. He was of the mindset of "theres the enemy, go engage him and dont let go untill they have been destroyed". I also based it on how he pushed the 3rd army through France after their breakthrough in Normandy. Hes like a combination of Robert E Lee and Ulysses S Grant.


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## Marcel (Aug 24, 2009)

I tend to agree with sys here, as I believe Rommel is a bit overrated. He usually made risky gambles which could have cost him (as it later did). But he had a bit of luck, helped by the incompetence of his British adversaries at the time, which all gave him some success in the beginning. But it didn't last. When the British sorted things out, they fought him back quite successfully.
I'm not sure if Patton was such a brilliant general, but having to choose here, I would pick him if only for his spirit and attitude. But remember, this is only my opinion.


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## B-17engineer (Aug 24, 2009)

It could've been a whole different game if Hitler hadn't overruled his decisions. That's something to take into consideration.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Aug 24, 2009)

I think Rommel was more creative with his planning, but Patton was plenty aggresive and wouldn't stop until he completed his objectives. Hard to say, I'm a fan of both.


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## Juha (Aug 24, 2009)

A couple notices on Rommel
Firstly how much of his successes in NA was in fact because of German Army’s combined arm doctrine was clearly better than that used by Commonwealth forces there in 41-42, especially latter's tank tactcs still included too much cavalry charge mentality? So Rommel had qualifiedly superior instrument.
How much of the German successes in NA were in fact result of the tactical brilliance of Ludwig Crüwell the CG of DAK from Sept 41 to May 42?
And on Rommel’s supply problems. Much of it was self-made. First of all he wanted frequently info on exact position of his supply convoys, on radio. British intelligence much have loved the man. He made the finding of the convoys so much easier. Secondly, he decided to use much of his heavy flak in front lines. They made great job in A/T work but because of that his supply harbours and supply depots had weaker AA protection. British decided otherwise and kept their heavy AA protecting rear areas. Both decisions had their pros and cons but one cannot complain too much that enemy a/c sunk his supply vessels in harbours if one had moved most of AA guns away.

Juha


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## diddyriddick (Aug 24, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Why would you say that? I think that is only speculating as well.
> 
> As for me, my mind is not made up yet on this. I think both had their strong points and weaknesses. What is sad is that these two great Generals never had the chance to work together.



But do you really think they could have worked together, Adler? Two colossal egos.


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## Messy1 (Aug 24, 2009)

Who do you think is the more over rated of the two? Did Patton ever have to deal with low supplies to the point where we would get a good idea on how he would perform in this situation?


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## glennasher (Aug 24, 2009)

Patton DID run out of fuel in the push towards Germany, the fuel went to Montgomery instead, for Market-Garden, I think it was. He was very upset that Monty got the fuel instead of 3rd Army and him. Later on, he got more fuel, but not when he wanted it. I think they were both overrated, the US had a lot of good generals, Patton had the most publicity, and Rommel not only had the German press on his side, but the British press machine as well.


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## Glider (Aug 24, 2009)

If a General had to face either Rommel or Patton my guess would be that they would rather face Patton. This may sound odd but with his eagerness to get to grips with the enemy, to strike hard and kill it probably made him more predictable

Personally I wouldn't fancy facing either of them


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 24, 2009)

Both were great commanders, have great respect for these two men. I would take either to lead my armies. 

Tough call, but since my father was in Patton's Third Army, I guess I might lean toward GSP. 

And both were head and shoulders above Monty.

TO

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## comiso90 (Aug 24, 2009)

No clear winner.... they both performed admirably with what they had. If there was an edge, it would go to Rommel simply because he was in the fight earlier and gets more points for innovation.

.


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## pbfoot (Aug 24, 2009)

ToughOmbre said:


> Both were great commanders, have great respect for these two men. I would take either to lead my armies.
> 
> Tough call, but since my father was in Patton's Third Army, I guess I might lean toward GSP.
> 
> ...


Although Montgomery was no prize I think Patton was a legend in his own mind.

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## syscom3 (Aug 24, 2009)

comiso90 said:


> No clear winner.... they both performed admirably with what they had. If there was an edge, it would go to Rommel simply because he was in the fight earlier and gets more points for innovation.
> 
> .



And just what did he "innovate" that was competely unique and better than what other pre-war generals thought up?

And so what if he was in the fight sooner? Patton gets many more points for controlling an army that had a lot more firepower and logistics capabilities than their German counterparts had. Did Rommel command an army (similar in size as the 3rd Army) that stormed across France? Did Rommel ever fight an offensive battle in winter like the 3rd army in the Battle of the Bulge?

We know what Patton did with the forces at his disposal. Its pure conjecture what Rommel would have done if he had similar forces.

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## B-17engineer (Aug 24, 2009)

Patton and Rommel both had equal aggressiveness. This showed when Rommel conducted an offensive against *Better equip British soldiers * . When you judge take this into perspective, Rommel had to fight with:

A weak Italian Ally 
Smaller numbers than the allies
Not nearly the amount of supplies he needed.

Even facing these issues he managed to pull off stunning victories.

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## B-17engineer (Aug 24, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> Did Rommel ever fight an offensive battle in winter like the 3rd army in the Battle of the Bulge?



He couldn't, he was dead.

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## syscom3 (Aug 24, 2009)

B-17engineer said:


> He couldn't, he was dead.



And we will never know if he could do it. With Patton we do know it as factual information.

Score 1 for Patton.

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## B-17engineer (Aug 24, 2009)

You are right. If Hitler hadn't been someone to overrule his general, who knew more about planning a battle or defending an area of importance than he would have ever known, the world may have seen a different outcome in North Africa.

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## parsifal (Aug 24, 2009)

Patton had strengths that ought not be scofed at. He pulled an army that had been thoroughly defeated and put it back together. His ideas on armoured brekthrough were very progressive.

However, he was not as well developed in thinking as Rommel in terms of the all arms concepts, plus Rommel got an awful lot out of inferior troops (the italians). Conversely, Rommels logistics capabilities were limited, to put it mildly.

Both Generals were also fairly limited when it came to fighting as part of a coalition....both tended to worry only about their own "fronts". Compared to a Mountbatten or a Macarthur, there was no comparison, both these guys were rank amateurs, and in the case of Rommel, very much the product of the system that trained him.... 

Its not as clear cut as people think....

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## comiso90 (Aug 24, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> And just what did he "innovate" that was competely unique and better than what other pre-war generals thought up?
> 
> And so what if he was in the fight sooner? Patton gets many more points for controlling an army that had a lot more firepower and logistics capabilities than their German counterparts had. Did Rommel command an army (similar in size as the 3rd Army) that stormed across France? Did Rommel ever fight an offensive battle in winter like the 3rd army in the Battle of the Bulge?
> 
> We know what Patton did with the forces at his disposal. Its pure conjecture what Rommel would have done if he had similar forces.



The whole thing is conjecture... so? That's the point. Do you presume to know the "only" truth.

_*other pre-war generals thought up?*_

You cant compare practical application with theory. If you are using "what pre war generals thought up" as a barometer than how come every General wasn't as good a Patton or Rommel? 
Being first .... and demonstrating success is tremendous...

As stated in my first post
All things considered... I believe they are equal... if pressed for an edge, Rommel gets it. 

.


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 24, 2009)

pbfoot said:


> Although Montgomery was no prize I think Patton was a legend in his own mind.



Must have also been a legend in the minds of the German Army. 

And what he did to relieve the 101st at Bastogne cannot be overlooked. 

BTW, would take Rommel over Monty any day.

TO


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## parsifal (Aug 24, 2009)

ToughOmbre said:


> BTW, would take Rommel over Monty any day.
> 
> TO



Rommel was a tactical genius, but was limited as an army commander. Monty was limited as a tactical commander (with the exception of his defensive efforts at Alam Halfa), yet he was a superior operational commander to Rommel. He knew exactly what was required to get the best out of the troops under his command. That this required a measured, uninspired approach was a product of his situation....he knew the capabilities of his troops and the dangerous ability of Rommel as a mobile warfare opponent. 

Why tempt fate by engaging in a type of warfare that your opponent is renowned for? Isnt it better to avoid that sort of battle, and fight the battle on terms that you (the commanding general) are able to manage. Monty was a master of the set piece battle, Rommel was not. Rommel was the master of the mobile battle, Monty was not. 

So, given that Monty fought nearly al his battles as set piece battles (the exception being Arnhem) and that these battles resulted in far less casualties than those fought by Rommel, why do you think Rommel is better than Monty?

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## Juha (Aug 25, 2009)

I agree with Parsifal. After 1st Alamein battle, what very spectacular Rommel did other than roughing totally green US army at Kesserine. The retreat from El Alamein to Tunisia was successful but the attack at Alam Halfa was typical Rommel, Attack against southern flank of Commonwealth line and then try to drive north to the coast. At Mededine March 43 again his attack against battle hardened Commonwealth troops only produced massive panzer losses without any meaningful gains. 
Rommel was very energic, as seen before D-Day in France and well versed to German combined arm tactics but as British had noticed already in Norway in spring 1940, Germans were very good in combat. Rommel was very aggressive and at the beginning that worked well but when the Commonwealth troops learned more on tactics the results became more mixed and still later Rommel time to time only lost valuable assets without reasonable gains.
And he seems to have ignore the fact that Germany's forces were overstretched and Germany needed to husband them carefully. So he seems to not fully understand under which constrictions his superiors worked and overstretched also his own forces. After all NA was a side show and the amount of supplies Italian navy could deliver to NA was limited. 

Juha


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 25, 2009)

diddyriddick said:


> But do you really think they could have worked together, Adler? Two colossal egos.



I would like to they could. Rommel's tactics with Patton's aggressiveness. I think it would have been amazing to watch.

Obviously it is not real, but check out the books Fox on the Rhine (there is a 2nd one but I can not remember what it is called).


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## Lucky13 (Aug 25, 2009)

Had to check to make sure that I remembered right.... 

_*"Ghost Division" / "Phantom Division" under Erwin Rommel*
The 7th Panzer Division moved with great speed through France and covered vast distance. During the Battle of France, the 7th Panzer Division earned the name of the Gespensterdivision (German:"Ghost/Phantom Division") because of this speed and because nobody seemed to know where it was, not even the German High Command. Rommel had a "lead from the front" attitude and would sometimes cut communications with High Command if wished not to be disturbed. His behavior showed confidence in the blitzkrieg concept; his success and favor with Hitler would prevent repercussions from his insubordination to the High Command. Nevertheless, Rommel was criticized by staff for being difficult to contact and locate. Rommel described the French Campaign in his letters to his wife as "a lightning Tour de France".


Timeline - 7th Panzer Division in Belgium and France
12 May 1940 - 7th Panzer Division reaches Dinant.
13 May 1940 - Crosses River Meuse after heavy fighting.
15 May 1940 - Reaches Philippeville and continues Westward passing Avesnes and Le Cateau.
21 May 1940 - Reaches Arras where counter attacked by 2 British Tank Regiments. British tank advance stopped by feared Flak 88 "Tank Killers".
5 June 1940 - Positioned near Abbeville.
8 June 1940 - Reaches outskirts of Rouen.
10 June 1940 - Reaches English Channel West of Dieppe.
17 June 1940 - Reaches Southern outskirts of Cherbourg.
19 June 1940 - Garrison of Cherbourg surrenders to Rommel.
25 June 1940 - Fighting ends for 7th Panzer Division in France._


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## Marcel (Aug 25, 2009)

One of the biggest faults Rommel had was his tendency to attack further than he could reach, without regarding the supply lines. Quite often he stretched his supply lines to the limit and beyond, which is one of the reasons that he eventually lost. Someone mentioning that Montgomery being far worse than Rommel should remember that Montgomery commanded the forces that beat Rommel.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 25, 2009)

Marcel said:


> One of the biggest faults Rommel had was his tendency to attack further than he could reach, without regarding the supply lines. Quite often he stretched his supply lines to the limit and beyond, which is one of the reasons that he eventually lost.



That is absolutely true. That is why I wonder how he would have fared if he had seemingly unlimited supplies as some of his contemporaries had.

The same time, I wonder how Patton would have fared if he had the supply problems that Rommel had.


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 25, 2009)

I had to go with Patton, he has always been my favorite.

It's interesting that both Patton's Rommel's biggest failures were on the political front.


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 26, 2009)

parsifal said:


> So, given that Monty fought nearly al his battles as set piece battles (the exception being Arnhem) and that these battles resulted in far less casualties than those fought by Rommel, why do you think Rommel is better than Monty?



Not to get too off topic but I don't think that casualties suffered by Rommel was a function of Monty's superior leadership. Overwelming resources, men and materiel. I must admit that I am pre-disposed to not be a fan of over-caustious, non-aggressive commanders like Monty.

No one is saying that Monty did not enjoy success, certainly he did. But Caen, Arnhem and his reluctance to engage in the Ardennes colors my judgement of the man.

Patton would probably be the first to admit that he was a prima donna, not sure that Monty would.

TO


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2009)

Monty was an insufferable Prima Donna, I'll agree with that.

But I still think you are being too hard on him in your appraisal of him as a commander. The battles you mention, Caen, Arnhem and the Ardennes is not taking into account the restrictions he was fighting under.

In the case of the Ardennes and Caen, I dont think there were two more different battles fought by the same person in the whole war. Caen was a battle of attrition, but a battle in which the the british could not afford to lose many men. Quite simply by 1944, ther were no more replacements for the british army, every man lost was not coming back. The British were breaking up formations to keep their frontline units in fighting shape, so they traded firepower for manouvre, in order to save lives. They literally pounded Caen to rubble with the heavy bombers, and the artillery bombardment. The armour was relatively cheap in terms of lives, and only as a last resort was the Infantry thrown into the battle. And none of this was designed to actually achieve a direct breakthrough....it was all designed to draw the German armoured reserves away from the American sector, wher the breakthrough was being planned. The strategy worked brilliantly to be honest, as the success of "Cobra" attests to. It was the classic Monty style set piece battle, with 34000 casualties of which 18000 were unrecoverable. German losses were approximately twice that number. Considering the quality of the german opposition, I would say that was a credible result.

At Arnhem, monty, having been stung by the publicity he had received about being over cautious, threw caution to the wind, and adopted what was perhaps the most audacious allied plan of the entire war. He very nearly pulled it off. He was unlucky in that two SS Divisions just happened to be refitting near to the objective, and because the drop zones for the arnhem assault forces were simply too far away from the objective. If these problems had been overcome, the war really would have been over by Christmas. It was always a gamble, Monty admitted that himself, as it turned out it was a failure (but what a glorious failure).

At Ardennes, Monty took no chances. Having witnessed the collapse of the French in 1940, I believe he acted completely justifiably by placing his reserves in a position to immediately stall any German attempt to interfere with Allied logistics networks. If this was done at the cost of American lives in the breakout zone, then so be it. A greater priority existed here, the defence of the logistic system. Monty was 110% correct to act as he did here, even if that does ruffle American feathers to say that.


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 26, 2009)

I admit that I'm hard on Monty. As I stated, he certainly did have successes, but still vastly overrated. 

And to say that Monty was a "thorn" in the side of Ike was putting it lightly.

The following is from the Eisenhower Memorial Commission website, American perspective to be sure, but accurate IMO.....

P.S. Last word on Monty. I won't go off topic from Rommel vs Patton again. 

*Ike and Monty – Command Collisions* 

The task of creating the tremendous war coalition of allies for the purpose of invading Nazi-occupied Europe was a matter requiring the cooperation of many governments. But the task of managing the combat operations of that coalition was up to a single individual, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ike went to great lengths to hold the coalition together. He worked hard to maintain cordial relations with his subordinate commanders as he exercised his duties as Supreme Commander. But Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery of Great Britain created a series of contentious incidents that finally developed into a direct command collision with Ike near the end of the war. The situation came very close to ripping the alliance asunder. 

Both Ike and Monty came from humble origins and earned their way to the top of their respective hierarchies. But there the similarities ended. With his warm smile and optimistic demeanor, Eisenhower welcomed frank discussion and was often willing to accommodate and even compromise in the interest of allied unity. *Monty, on the other hand, was stubborn, rebarbative, and prone to self-aggrandizement at the slightest opportunity. Nothing induced Monty to compromise. Even Churchill once used the word “insufferable” when referring to Montgomery.*

Though Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of the Allied forces invading Normandy in 1944, Montgomery had temporary command of allied ground troops for the duration of the assault on the beaches. After the beaches were secure and Ike’s headquarters had been established in Normandy, Monty would command all British and Canadian ground forces and Bradley would command the American armies. Montgomery and Bradley were to be co-equals under Eisenhower.

After the D-Day successes, the British government promoted Montgomery to field marshal (a non-existent rank in the U.S. Army). In the eyes of the Brits, this put Monty senior to Bradley and made permanent his status as commander of all allied ground forces on the continent. Thus, when Eisenhower moved his headquarters to Normandy — whereupon his jurisdiction was limited to command of British and Canadian ground forces — the British press and Montgomery bitterly expressed their displeasure at Monty having been “demoted.” In fact Monty had not been demoted and had known long in advance that his role would revert to equality with Bradley after the invasion succeeded. This knowledge, however, didn’t dissuade Monty from publicly agreeing with the British press and demanding that Eisenhower turn over all ground command to him. Ike stuck to the original plan.

As the war in Western Europe progressed Monty continually demanded to be appointed overall ground commander. Ike politely ignored the demands, but it became increasingly difficult for him to deal with Montgomery on major issues. The Combined Chiefs of Staff of Britain and America had approved, and never changed, Eisenhower’s basic “broad front” war strategy, but Monty continuously badgered Ike to abandon the broad front strategy and attack with a single overpowering “narrow” thrust into Germany. Of course, Monty’s demands always included himself as commander of the spear-like thrust. 

Finally, Ike agreed to let Monty try his single thrust theory and approved his plan to drive 60 miles straight through Holland and enter Germany over the Arnhem Bridge. Eisenhower stopped the advance along the rest of the front and diverted the fuel and supplies to Montgomery for the attack. He also assigned two American paratroop divisions to assist the British forces. *Historian Carlo D’Este later characterized Monty’s plan as, “…the most ill-conceived major operation of World War II.” After he lost the battle, Monty did his best to shift the blame to Eisenhower.*

The final command collision happened after the Battle of the Bulge. On December 16, 1944 the German army launched a surprise attack into the American-held forests of the Ardennes along the German borders of Belgium and Luxembourg. The Wehrmacht employed 500,000 soldiers and 1,400 tanks to split the allied forces all the way to the Muse River thereby driving a huge bulge into the American lines. The bloody conflict lasted until the end of January when the American armies pushed the Germans back to their starting point. During the relentless fighting over 19,000 American and 100,000 German soldiers were killed. The British dead amounted to just over 200. It was, by any measure, the largest and deadliest American Army battle of the war. It was also a decisive American victory and the German army never again launched an offensive. 

*Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery’s role in the Battle of the Bulge was to defend the northern shoulder of the Bulge throughout the conflict. He did it almost wholly with American divisions that Eisenhower temporarily transferred to his command early in the battle. While Montgomery held his position, American forces under Bradley and Patton attacked and eventually prevailed.*

*Towards the end of battle, Montgomery held a press conference, broadcast throughout Britain by the BBC, in which he announced that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans. The British press used banner headlines to report that Monty had rescued the Americans from certain defeat.* 

The American commanders were livid. *Thoroughly embarrassed by Montgomery, Winston Churchill rose in the House of Commons to say that American soldiers won the battle and British forces played only a minor role.* But nothing could be done to diminish the British media’s adulation of Montgomery.

Picking the absolute worst time to further upset the supreme allied commander, Montgomery sent Eisenhower another letter demanding that he be promoted to ground-force commander of all allied forces facing Germany. He had finally pushed Ike beyond his limit of endurance with respect to such blatant insubordination. Montgomery’s press conference, the resulting British press reports, and the letter demanding promotion all combined to blatantly suggest to the world that Ike could not handle battle command. 

Eisenhower convened a staff meeting at his headquarters, which Monty’s Chief of Staff Major General Francis de Guingand attended, and announced that he was relieving Montgomery of command. Ike circulated a cable he would send the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting Monty’s removal from office. Unlike his boss, Freddie de Guingand fully recognized that Montgomery would lose in any open confrontation and implored Ike to give him 24 hours to sort out the situation with Montgomery. Reluctantly, Ike agreed.

General de Guingand immediately flew to Montgomery’s headquarters in Brussels and informed him that he would be replaced. It had not dawned on Monty that he had finally pushed Eisenhower too far and that he would lose his command. A chagrined Montgomery sat down and penned a letter to Eisenhower which he began with “Dear Ike” and ended with the words, “Very distressed that my letter may have upset you and I would ask you to tear it up. Your very devoted subordinate, Monty.”

Eisenhower relented and did not send his cable. The crisis that might have split the alliance was over and Montgomery made no more public demands to be promoted. *Nothing, however, would ever reduce the ill-will Monty had spread throughout the U.S. command by demeaning the battle quality of the American soldier.*

TO


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## renrich (Aug 26, 2009)

A comparison of Rommel and Patton reminds me a little of comparing Lee and Grant. Lee and Rommel both were usually outnumbered and had limited resources, while Patton and Grant knew they had practically unlimited men and materiel. Lee and Rommel had to rely on audacity and the elan of their troops( in Rommel's case, part of his troops in North Africa) and knew that time was against them and favored the enemy. Both of them were hamstrung by mobility problems. Lee by animals and fodder, Rommel by supplies(gasoline) and lack of air control. Patton and Grant mostly did not have that problem. Lee and Rommel had to make chicken salad out of chicken feathers, Grant and Patton, the opposite.


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## Messy1 (Aug 26, 2009)

Great post TO. I was unaware of much of that. Thanks for the info.


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 26, 2009)

Messy1 said:


> Great post TO. I was unaware of much of that. Thanks for the info.



You're Welcome Messy!

TO


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 26, 2009)

renrich said:


> A comparison of Rommel and Patton reminds me a little of comparing Lee and Grant. Lee and Rommel both were usually outnumbered and had limited resources, while Patton and Grant knew they had practically unlimited men and materiel. Lee and Rommel had to rely on audacity and the elan of their troops( in Rommel's case, part of his troops in North Africa) and knew that time was against them and favored the enemy. Both of them were hamstrung by mobility problems. Lee by animals and fodder, Rommel by supplies(gasoline) and lack of air control. Patton and Grant mostly did not have that problem. Lee and Rommel had to make chicken salad out of chicken feathers, Grant and Patton, the opposite.



Good analogy ren!

TO


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## Lucky13 (Aug 26, 2009)

Great stuff guys! Never mind going off topic! I don't think that you can discuss Patton, Rommel and not mention Montgomery....
Have often wondered how far Rommel would have gone with the proper assist in troops, tanks, aircraft etc. etc.


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## Messy1 (Aug 26, 2009)

I will not pretend that although Patton maybe my favorite, that he did not have his negatives and quite simply could be a pain in the arse just like Montgomery could.


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## m kenny (Aug 26, 2009)

ToughOmbre said:


> Towards the end of battle, Montgomery held a press conference, broadcast throughout Britain by the BBC, in which he announced that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans. The British press used banner headlines to report that Monty had rescued the Americans from certain defeat.....................
> 
> Nothing, however, would ever reduce the ill-will Monty had spread throughout the U.S. command by demeaning the battle quality of the American soldier.



Monty's press confrence:

_ Teamwork Stopped Huns: Monty 

By the Associated Press.

Twenty-first army group headquarters, Jan. 8—Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery Sunday said Allied team work and* especially the inherent “courage and good fighting quality” of American troops* has halted the German drive into Belgium.

The battle is “far from over,” he asserted, but the Germans “have been halted, then sealed off, and we are now in the process of writing them off,” with the initiative in Allied hands.

At his first press conference in months, the colorful Briton, commanding four armies north of the German bulge told how Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt’s thrust developed, and how he moved to meet it.

Time and again he stressed that* above all it was the fighting ability of American doughboys and their “tenacity in battle that makes a great soldier” that has really saved the situation* by the stands at St. Vith, Bastogne, and south of Monschau.

*He singled out two American armored divisions, the 2d and 7th, and two United States airborne division, the 82d and 101st, and the 106th infantry as doing a great job. He also lauded the United States 7th corps, and praised Gen. Dwight Eisenhower’s leadership.*

“What was Von Rundstedt trying to achieve? I don’t know,” Marshal Montgomery said in an hour-long talk. “The only guide we have is his order of the day which told his soldiers they must go all out on this last big effort.
“One must admit that he has dealt a sharp blow and he has sent us reeling back, but we recovered and he has been unable to gain any great advantage. He has therefore failed in his strategic purpose, unless the prize is smaller than his men were told.

“Von Rundstedt attacked on December 16,” he said. “He obtained a tactical surprise. He drove a deep wedge into the center of the 1st army and split American forces in two. The situation loomed as if it might become awkward. The Germans had broken right through the spot and were heading for the Meuse.

“As soon as I saw what was happening, I took certain steps myself to insure that* if the Germans got to the Meuse* they could certainly not get over that river. And I carried out certain movements so as to provide balanced dispositions to meet the* threatened* danger.”

Marshal Montgomery at the time had command only of the British 2d and Canadian 1st armies, and on his own he shifted some troops south to meet the threat.

“Then the situation began to deteriorate,* but the whole Allied team rallied to meet the danger.* National considerations were thrown overboard; General Eisenhower placed me in command of the whole northern front.”

“I employed the whole* available *power of the British group of armies. This power was brought into play very gradually and in such a way that it would not interfere with American lines of communications. Finally it was put into battle with a bang, and today British divisions are fighting hard on the right flank of the United States 1st army . . This is a fine Allied picture.

“We have halted the Germans, sealed them off, and are now writing them off. German divisions have suffered heavily, but I say this about a battle. It is a very great mistake to think it is over. The worst parts are over, but a great deal more must be done.

“There are two main reasons why Von Rundstedt was sealed off from achieving what he was after, *The first of these is the good fighting qualities of the United States soldier*, and the second is Allied teamwork.

*“I formed a very high opinion of the American soldier in Italy and Sicily,*” Marshal Montgomery continued earnestly. “I have spent my life with the British soldier and I love the British soldier, *but I have formed a great affection for the American soldier, who is a very brave fighting man who has that tenacity in battle which makes a great soldier.*

*“He is basically responsible for stopping Von Rundstedt from what he set out to do.* “He held out at Elsenborn there south of Monschau (the 1st, 2d, 99th and 30th infantry divisions) when the great blow hit him and he stopped those SS panzer divisions.

“At St. Vith many United States troops were cut off and isolated but in little groups they fought and held on to those vital road junctions, forcing the Germans to halt.* It was a very fine performance that the 7th armored division and the 106th infantry division borne division at Bastogne which put up a great performance.*

“On December 20-21, I consulted General Hodges (Lieut. Gen. Courtney Hodges, United States 1st army commander) and suggested we must get those fine fighting men out of the St. Vith area and back in our lines

“The 82d American airborne division moved forward and got in contact with these elements and we pulled them back behind our lines. Then we ordered the 82d back to better positions but they did not want to come and they protested, but I assured them they had accomplished their mission and could withdraw with honor.

*“I take my hat off willingly to such men.”*

Discussing Allied teamwork, Marshal Montgomery said, “It was to me a remarkable thing how in the time of danger the Allied team rallied together. This thing of Allied solidarity is terribly important. Teamwork wins battles and battle victories win wars.

“On our team the captain is General Ike.* I am devoted to him. We are great friends.* We are all in this fight together and we must not allow any wedges to be driven between us. As an illustration of our friendship, the other day my plane was damaged, and I asked Ike for another, and he sent his own at once.”
In questions after the conference, Marshal Montgomery said the Germans still were “fine soldiers” and formidable enemies. He cited the January 1 attack of the Luftwaffe on Allied airfields as an example of German potentialities, saying “the enemy pulled a fast one on us.” 
But this does not mean the German has air superiority, he continued, and “the biggest terror of the German soldier is our air force. On good days they shoot up everything behind the German lines.” 
The field marshal, in contrast with his press conferences last summer, declined to go into any predictions as to how long the war would last, or to estimate German capabilities.
But “in the balance, I don’t see how Von Rundstedt has gained very much.” he said_




Can anyone point to where Monty can be said to be_* 'demeaning the battle quality of the American soldier'*_ or claiming he *'rescued the Americans from certain defeat'*


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## Marcel (Aug 26, 2009)

Lucky13 said:


> Have often wondered how far Rommel would have gone with the proper assist in troops, tanks, aircraft etc. etc.


He would probably run out of ammunition and fuel after first outrunning his supply troops.


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## comiso90 (Aug 26, 2009)

Nice post m kenny but i wonder how much of those words/thought s were actually Monty's. By that time in the war, the military PR machine was finely tuned. It is certain that Monty was briefed on what to say and what to stress... or at least how to spin it. Not just for the sake of the Allied morale but so that Germans perceived nothing but total unity and solidarity in the Anglo - American alliance.

Press conferences are prepared events


.


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## m kenny (Aug 26, 2009)

If he was dismissive of US troops and their abilities then where can we see it? As far as I am aware no one has ever posted any 'speech' where he makes disparaging remarks-everyone just 'knows' he said it and takes it as fact without ever seeing the proof.


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 26, 2009)

m kenny said:


> If he was dismissive of US troops and their abilities then where can we see it? As far as I am aware no one has ever posted any 'speech' where he makes disparaging remarks-everyone just 'knows' he said it and takes it as fact without ever seeing the proof.



You cite *one* press conference (source?) and that "proves" Monty was a team player? Hardly. As comiso stated, press conferences are "spin" events. 

TO


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## Juha (Aug 26, 2009)

Hello TO
Quote:” During the relentless fighting over 19,000 American and 100,000 German soldiers were killed. The British dead amounted to just over 200.”

Now the figures I have seen all stated, that Germans lost max 100,000 soldiiers, if LW losses were included, and that is total losses (KIA, MIA, DOW. WIA and POW), not only those who died, which was naturally much lower figure.

Quote:” Historian Carlo D’Este later characterized Monty’s plan as, “…the most ill-conceived major operation of World War II.”

IMHO that reveals much more on D’Este than on the quality of Market-Garden plan. Do you think that that plan was worse than the German attack plan in Ardennes in Dec 44, the plan of Himmler’s counter attack in Pommeria in early 45 which collapsed during its first day, or the plan of the last relief attack towards Budapest, which ended to collapse of German front in Hungary, one could go on but here 3 for the beginning. The plan of Market-Garden has many errors but D’Este seems to be even more anti-Monty than I have thought.

Juha


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## imalko (Aug 26, 2009)

I have to refresh my knowledge about Market-Garden operation, but I seem to recall about reading somewhere that planers received reports from Dutch resistance about presence of two Waffen SS divisions in the Arnhem area. This was apparently confirmed by aerial recconaisance, but the planers chose to disregard this information!?


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## Juha (Aug 26, 2009)

IIRC correctly Allied got the word on presence of thanks in the area, maybe some PR photos when a PR Spit was sent to check the info, which was suspected to be partly wrong, "to civilians every AFV looks like a tank" was the opinion of many intelligence officers. Even pictures were suspected, "were those combat ready or only wrecks"

Now the both SS-divs were badly depleted and in reality significant part of armour in near vicinity of Arnheim were ex French Char Bs which didn't achieve much against para's. IIRC much of the effective armour used against paras arrived farer away but the armoured cars of one of the SSPzAufklAbtn in the area effectively slowed down para's advance towards Arnheim bridges. Also the SS NCO school in the area was a bad surprise.

Juha


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## m kenny (Aug 26, 2009)

ToughOmbre said:


> You cite *one* press conference (source?) and that "proves" Monty was a team player? Hardly. As comiso stated, press conferences are "spin" events.



And you cite *none* to back your claims.
I have put up the Associated Press version of the press conference. Until such time as another confrence is posted confirming the disparagement then there is no case to answer.


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## renrich (Aug 26, 2009)

I read an auto biography of Monty once, long ago, and he stated the three greatest influences on his life were his father, Churchill and Eisenhower. Perhaps ingratiation(is that a word?) but that is what he said. Another point which should be remembered about Monty was that he knew the Brits were running out of manpower and the British public were very sensitive to casualty rates. The bloodletting in WW1 was never far from the minds of the Brits which was undestandable.


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## comiso90 (Aug 26, 2009)

m kenny said:


> . Until such time as another confrence is posted confirming the disparagement then there is no case to answer.



There is no basis for your assertion. It is not valid evidence.

As stated before.. press conferences are useless.. they are PR tools of the media.

Do you really believe everything that is said when someone calls a Press Conference? 

I'm not saying you're incorrect about Monty but it is definitely is wrong to quote what comes out of a press conference and use it as evidence of someones true opinion.

You could be 100% correct but I'd believe memoirs or statements by his contemporaries first. 


.


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## B-17engineer (Aug 26, 2009)

"Some officers criticized for Montgomery's lack of aggressiveness for not counter-attacking when the Axis forces backed off in defeat, but the victory nevertheless began to build his reputation as an able commander. Montgomery later argued that his troops were not ready to go on an offensive at that time. He would only launch his men on an offensive when he was sure that victory was certain, and that victory would have to be decisive."

Bernard Montgomery | World War II Database


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## Glider (Aug 26, 2009)

B-17engineer;549662 Montgomery later argued that his troops were not ready to go on an offensive at that time. He would only launch his men on an offensive when he was sure that victory was certain said:


> Bernard Montgomery | World War II Database[/url]



When the enemy are on the back foot as they were after Alamein it could be argued that by only launching his men in pursuit when he was sure of victory you will ensure that the victory would not be decisive.


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## m kenny (Aug 26, 2009)

comiso90 said:


> There is no basis for your assertion. It is not valid evidence.
> 
> As stated before.. press conferences are useless.. they are PR tools of the media.



Let me get this straight.
The original claim states:

_"Towards the end of battle, Montgomery held* a press conference,* broadcast throughout Britain by the BBC, in which he announced that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans. The British press used banner headlines to report that Monty had rescued the Americans from certain defeat_

and it is accepted as gospel. The claims said to have been made at this *press confrence* are considered good enough to condem Monty for: 

_"announcing that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans._....
and _demeaning the battle quality of the American soldier"_

However when I post a US report of this *press confrence* it is now claimed that:

_"Do you really believe everything that is said when someone calls a Press Conference_


Double standards at work here.
I ask again where is the transcript of the press conference where Monty disparaged the American soldier? 




comiso90 said:


> You could be 100% correct but I'd believe memoirs or statements by his contemporaries first.



But only if they reflect badly on Monty?


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## B-17engineer (Aug 26, 2009)

True but if you have an enemy, who has just been terribly defeated and are still trying to figure out what just happened, doesn't make sense to go in pursuit?


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## comiso90 (Aug 26, 2009)

m kenny said:


> Let me get this straight.
> The original claim states:
> 
> _"Towards the end of battle, Montgomery held* a press conference,* broadcast throughout Britain by the BBC, in which he announced that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans. The British press used banner headlines to report that Monty had rescued the Americans from certain defeat_
> ...



No...IMO all press conferences are suspect no matter who gives them or who they reflect upon ... your comments are heated and passionate... Im not saying i disagree with you. Only your source.

Instead of pointing out that the original claim is bunk cause its from a press conference, you counter it with more bunk, another press conference, and cite it as evidence.

I think it's kinda a funny... an attempt to be academic by quoting staged press conferences... the press conferences aren't even worth bringing up unless the topic is about Public Relations and the Military.

.


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## syscom3 (Aug 26, 2009)

Glider said:


> When the enemy are on the back foot as they were after Alamein it could be argued that by only launching his men in pursuit when he was sure of victory you will ensure that the victory would not be decisive.



But was the British Army capable of going on the attack after the battle? They took some heavy losses too. Sometimes, its better not to bite off more than you can chew.


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## m kenny (Aug 26, 2009)

comiso90 said:


> Instead of pointing out that the original claim is bunk cause its from a press conference, you counter it with more bunk, another press conference, and cite it as evidence.



The claims Monty dispraged US soldiers at the press confrence is widely believed. However transcripts or a newspaper article confirming this slander has NEVER been sourced or referenced.
I then post the AP reporters version of the press confrence. It is clear that far from criticising US soldiers Monty praised their performance.
Contrast the lack of a single source for the 'slur' claims and the lengthy record of the praise given. 






comiso90 said:


> I think it's kinda a funny... an attempt to be academic by quoting staged press conferences... the press conferences aren't even worth bringing up unless the topic is about Public Relations and the Military.


The AP press report directly contradicts the claim that:

*Towards the end of battle, Montgomery held a press conference, broadcast throughout Britain by the BBC, in which he announced that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans. The British press used banner headlines to report that Monty had rescued the Americans from certain defeat. *

It is obvious the claims that Monty criticised the US soldier are bogus.

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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2009)

Yes

The original claims that Monty disparaged the Americans is based on an alleged press confernce, which no-one has ever produced any evidence of. Evidence does exist, however of press releases by Monty that actually praise the efforts of the Americans in containing and defeating the German offensive.

And the factis that he used US troops to contain the northern arm of the salient because these were the troops on hand at the time. Other tropps (which happened to be British, or Canadian...I forget which) were pulled out of the line and made ready as a reserve force, just in case the Germans did make a breakthrough. This was entirely the correct thing to do. Monty was making provision in case of an adverse contingency....you cannot do better than that. Instead of running around the battlefield by trying to steal the headlines by crossing demarcation lines and trying to fight battles tasked by the supreme commander to be other peoples battles, he did the right thing and prepred for a possible breakthrough. This was the correct thing militarily and politically for him to follow, yet here we are still castigating him, for what, doing the right thing by the look of it.....


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## Glider (Aug 27, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> But was the British Ar,y capable of going on the attack after the battle? They took some heavy losses too. Sometimes, its better not to bite off more than you can chew.



A fair question but when you have defeated the enemy in battle, have total control of the air AND have the exact knowledge of the enemy's tank numbers, oil status from enigma, its almost criminal to follow up. Had Monty let them the British troops would have been able to follow up, they had done it before and could do it again.

Can you imagine Patton letting them go?

That said I would rather have Monty lead the actual battle, it was a set piece situation which he was good at, but let Patton lead the rout of the german forces which is what it would have turned into, as that was his forte.


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## Amsel (Aug 28, 2009)

Generaloberst Guderian was quite critical of Rommel's handling of the preparations to oppose the allied invasion of France, and tried to talk Rommel out of his blunderous utilization of the Panzer units on the Atlantic front. Guderian even tried to get Hitler to intervene but Hitler refused to "intervene with a Fieldmarschal's plans". Guderian wrote that "above all, history must not be twisted for the greater good of Rommel".


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 28, 2009)

Didn't Rommel suffer some type of nervous breakdown in/after Africa?


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## Henk (Aug 31, 2009)

Both of them was great at what they did, but I would have to say Rommel, he also saw where the Allied forces would attack France at D-day, but once again he had to make do with what he had. Patton could inspire his troops to do things that other people would have thought was impossible and they had a lot of respect for him.

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 26, 2018)

Lucky13 said:


> Who was the better tactician?


Patton-- he knew the value of co-ordination of air support to all the group-based units in his Army group: armor, artillery, infantry, engineers, and the HQ group- Patton relied on intelligence his G-3 Col. Oscar Koch had predicted the German Dec. attack (1944) back in Oct.-- Rommel did not have the G-3 sector in the same depth of information (US could read the Ultra messages)-and Patton knew how to use intel to his advantage. But on a scale of 1 to 10, Patton gets a 9.5, Rommel an 8-IMO anyway.


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 26, 2018)

parsifal said:


> Patton had strengths that ought not be scofed at. He pulled an army that had been thoroughly defeated and put it back together. His ideas on armoured brekthrough were very progressive.
> 
> However, he was not as well developed in thinking as Rommel in terms of the all arms concepts, plus Rommel got an awful lot out of inferior troops (the italians). Conversely, Rommels logistics capabilities were limited, to put it mildly.
> 
> ...


MacArthur vs. Patton--Well, Patton was never pulled out of a TO by FDR-as was Mac-- Patton was side-lined by Ike-after the slappings in Sicily--and strange, the German OKH Offizers could not understand that action by Ike-- in their command experiences, slapping an enlisted man was not unusual, if needed to restore disciple to the command. In our Armed Forces, that has always been a grey area-- Boot camp discipline, with a DI or other senior Non Com "shaping up a raw recruit"-- usually not done in open sight.

Both Mac and Patton had huge egos- as did Wm. Halsey, Gen. Mark Clark, "Monty" and,on the German side, FM Albert Kessering, RM Herman Goering, etc. But Patton knew how to keep that ego under check when the circumstances dictated, and no General on the Allied side spent more time visiting field hospitals, decorating the wounded, praying with the men who were dying, than did George Patton.


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 26, 2018)

m kenny said:


> Monty's press confrence:
> 
> _ Teamwork Stopped Huns: Monty
> 
> ...


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 26, 2018)

Gerd von Rundstedt-- possibly Karl is a second name, along with Gerd. Not 100% sure, and this does NOT detract one bit from the detail in your post about "Monty"! Ego nonwithstanding, he got his assignments completed, and praised the Allies for winning the war in Europe.


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 26, 2018)

Messy1 said:


> Who do you think is the more over rated of the two? Did Patton ever have to deal with low supplies to the point where we would get a good idea on how he would perform in this situation?


In Carlo D'Este's great book: "Patton, A Genius For War" he details how Patton's troops obtained gasoline for their tank advances to the Siegfried line--Ike had cut off the gasoline supply to Patton's Third Army, in order to support Montgomery's "Market Garden" operation. Great reading, shows how "creative" Patton's troops were in a combat scenario- IMO, way better than the troops commanded by either Mark Clark or Omar Bradley.


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## mikewint (Jan 26, 2018)

Patton, like Rommel is one of my favorite figures in WWII. Like ever human who has ever live he had strengths and weaknesses.
In the strength column, Patton was audacious, understood the power of combined arms better than any army commander in Europe (the 9th Air Force was a tactical air force and he used them extensively) and had a clear view of what it meant to win. Additionally, he was an ardent anti-Communist and was not confused about what the Soviets would do with the territories they captured and said so repeatedly.
He had fought the Germans in WW1 so he had had first hand experience in combat—unlike many other army commanders, he’d been wounded in action. He knew the mind of the German military and had a healthy respect for his foes abilities while despising fascism and Nazism and being very open about the joy of killing them.
His tactics emphasized violent action and speed to exploit any opportunity. His standing orders were to attack and force the enemy to react to his plans rather than the reverse.

In the negative column, Patton didn’t know how to keep his mouth shut. He was his own favorite general and said so. Bradley was jealous of Patton’s success and notoriety and was a bit of a schemer, so anytime Patton said or did something outrageous (which was frequently) Bradley saw to it that he profited from Georgie’s mistakes.
Patton also never really grasped the idea of logistics. He understood it of course but he was much more interested in the point of the spear, not the heavy lifting required to get the fuel and ammo and rations to the front. He left that to others with varying degrees of success.
Finally, Patton had advanced about as far as his skillset would allow. A lot like Robert E. Lee in a way. Patton, like Lee, was an inspiring commander and his troops (contrary to the movie) thought highly of him. They knew as soldiers that speed is life in a combat zone. But Patton, like Lee again, was out of his depth commanding an entire army.


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## redcoat (May 8, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> In Carlo D'Este's great book: "Patton, A Genius For War" he details how Patton's troops obtained gasoline for their tank advances to the Siegfried line--Ike had cut off the gasoline supply to Patton's Third Army, in order to support Montgomery's "Market Garden" operation. Great reading, shows how "creative" Patton's troops were in a combat scenario- IMO, way better than the troops commanded by either Mark Clark or Omar Bradley.


Actually Market Garden was a response to the fuel shortage, not the cause of it.
US units were already running out of fuel due to the 'broad front' advance ordered by Ike, Market Garden was ordered because it was a way to keep the advance going without placing too much further strain on the fuel supplies in France.

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## billrunnels (May 8, 2018)

Patton was a "Can Do" type General. He was known for leading his army, not directing it.

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (May 8, 2018)

redcoat said:


> Actually Market Garden was a response to the fuel shortage, not the cause of it.
> US units were already running out of fuel due to the 'broad front' advance ordered by Ike, Market Garden was ordered because it was a way to keep the advance going without placing too much further strain on the fuel supplies in France.


Market Garden most likely cost the Allies, with Bernard Montgomery's flawed plan, more in wasted fuel, than had Ike dis-approved "Monty's OP"-- and gave Patton's 3rd. Army the fuel and ammo to punch through the Seigfreid Line and on into Berlin- As "Monty" proved in Africa, Sicily and later after D-Day with his slow paced and possibly over-cautious advancement through the German lines, his delays gave the Germans an opportunity to retreat and re-group and counter-attack.

There are many reasons why Market Garden was flawed "out of the box": among them are: Lack of common radio frequencies between the American, British and Polish units- airborne, infantry, engineers and armored- complete disregard for the Dutch underground and resistance units that had spotted masses of Panzer units in the area, and had tried to warn the Allies of that threat- Language differences, especially with the Polish airborne units-lack of
co-ordinated air cover, and proper pre-drop scouting of the drop zones-= It was mainly a daylight drop time frame, giving the Germans a "heads-up" as to where Monty's units were coming from-giving them time to prepare, including setting demo charges on the vital bridges the Allies needed to capture--

But in his role as a "peace-maker", I am sure Ike felt he had to do something to contain the resentment that had grown between Patton and Montgomery, from the Sicilian campaign onward. Two different styles of leadership, two different results- Look at the record of the 3rd Army's record advancement in Germany in 1944 up to May 1945- and Patton's sole prediction of the Winter Attack Dec 1944- "The Battle of the Bulge" and how his Army was prepared to move into Bastogne on short notice- whereas Monty was still pulling his thumb out of his arsehole-- Read "War As I Knew It" Patton's Diary from Africa until VE Day, and later-- He details all this and has data and statistics from every battle his Army encountered along the way to victory.

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## parsifal (May 9, 2018)

My adaptation of ;

Allyn Vannoy*; *Battle of the Scheldt Estuary

(Battle of the Scheldt Estuary)

Part I
Operation Market Garden was not primarily concerned with solving the fuel crisis after the breakout from Normandy. But neither was it primarily the result of monty’s vanity. Rather it was his response to the insistent calls by the americans, led by Bradley mostly, for the british to find a way of capturing the port of Antwerp intact and quickly. German defence was far too skillful for that to ever happen, and Market Garden, a distraction in reality to the main task of clearing the port of antwrp and its approach was a rather desperate response to get things moving in response to the rather shrill demands of SHAEF. 

As the Allied armies advanced across Western Europe in the summer of 1944, the First Canadian Army undertook the task of clearing the coastal areas and opening the Channel ports. Fighting on the left flank of the Allied forces, the Canadians pushed rapidly eastward through France toward Belgium. The II Canadian Corps reached Ostend, Bruges, and Ghent in the middle of September.

After Allied forces landed in France on D-Day, June 6, the British Second Army pushed forward into the Low Countries and captured Brussels and Antwerp, the latter with its excellent port facilities intact. But the British advance halted with the Germans still controlling the Scheldt Estuary. By September 15, it had become urgent for the Allies to open Antwerp to shipping in order to ease logistical burdens on their supply lines, which now stretched hundreds of miles back into Normandy.

American General Omar Bradley urged Eisenhower to pressure the British. “_All plans for future operations always lead back to the fact that in order to supply an operation of any size beyond the Rhine, the port of Antwerp is essential_.” Eisenhower agreed, telling Montgomery: “_I insist upon the importance of Antwerp. As I have told you I am prepared to give you everything for the capture of the approaches to Antwerp, including all the air forces and anything else you can support_.”

British XXX Corps, after taking Antwerp, could have easily driven the additional 20 miles north and cut off German positions along the inlet to the port. The estuary itself was lined with German forces, including heavy coastal batteries on Walcheren Island that prevented Allied ships from approaching the Scheldt. During the first three weeks of September, however, the German XV Army withdrew, pulling off something of a miracle by extricating nearly 86,000 troops from possible encirclement south of the estuary, using boats and rafts to evacuate them northward across the Scheldt.

The Allies did nothing to open the port of Antwerp during September, instead allocating most of their resources to Operation Market Garden, an ambitious plan to mount a lightning thrust into the heart of the German homeland. This is the evidence of the folly of market garden in the context of solving the supply crisis. XXX Corps failed to reach 1 abn div and the Polish Bde before heavy counterattacks by German armored units threatened annihilation. Market Garden was a glorious failure.

There is evidence that monty was hoping to draw away from the scheldt german reserves. Simultaneous to the XXX corps flying columns to Arnhem, I Cdn XXXX completed the clearing of French and Belgian Channel ports by October 1. The force, under the temporary command of Lt. Gen. Guy Simonds, included the II Cdn XXX, the I Pol Arm XX, and the Br 49th and 52nd Inf XXs. After Market Garden failed, Monty usual stubbornness receded somewhat and he was inclined to listen to American advice. The I Cdn XXXX was dispatched to bring the Scheldt Estuary under its control. But the remaining German defenders were prepared as always to fight an effective delaying action. Complicated by waterlogged terrain, the ensuing Battle of the Scheldt would prove to be an especially grueling (and slow) campaign.

North of the estuary lay the island of South Beveland, which was joined to the mainland by a narrow isthmus. Beyond South Beveland, to the west, was the island of Walcheren, a fortified German stronghold. Much of the area was below sea level, comprising polder land that had been reclaimed from the sea. Large raised embankments kept the waters from flooding the low-lying land. The German defenders skillfully exploited these conditions. In addition, the Germans constructed bunkers in the steep rear slopes of the dikes and located much-feared Nebelwerfer rocket launchers immediately behind them.

The plan for opening the Scheldt Estuary involved a succession of operations. The first task was to clear the eastern approaches to the Scheldt River north of Antwerp as far as the village of Woensdrecht. This would isolate the German forces on South Beveland from the Dutch mainland. Next step was to eliminate German positions north of the Leopold Canal and south of the estuary—the so-called Breskens Pocket. The capture of 19-mile-long South Beveland was to follow. The final phase of ground combat would be the capture of Walcheren Island, after which Royal Navy minesweepers could undertake operations to clear German mines from the waterway and enable Allied supply ships to pass safely through the estuary to Antwerp.


As a prelude to the coming battle, the Pol 1st Arm XX advanced northeast from Ghent in late September. Against stiffening resistance the division reached the coast on September 20, occupying the town of Terneuzen and clearing the south bank of the Scheldt east to Antwerp. On September 21, the 4th Cdn Arm XX moved nth roughly along the line of the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal, with orders to clear the south shore of the Scheldt around the town of Breskens. The division advanced from a hard-won bridgehead over the Ghent Canal at Moerbrugge, becoming the first Allied troops to confront the formidable obstacle of the Leopold and Dérivation de la Lys Canals.

The Algonquin Regt of the 10th Inf Bde, mounted a night attack across the Leopold Canal on the Belgian-Dutch border in the vicinity of Moekerke, but the assault force was nearly wiped out in a German counterattack. Those who survived swam back to the Belgian side of the canal and were placed in reserve.

“Black Friday”

The Germans placed a priority on holding Woensdrecht, thus controlling access to South Beveland and Walcheren Island. Ge 346 Inf XX, under General Erich Diestel (replaced on October 16 by General Walter Steinmuller), was in line nth of Antwerp. The division had taken a beating during Operation Goodwood on July 18, coming under intense aerial bombardment. It then had avoided encirclement in the Falaise pocket, retreating across France and Belgium into Holland with only a few howitzers and 2,500 men. The division had since received some replacements I believe. Elements of Sturmgeschütz Bde 280, equipped with heavy assault guns, provided support for the division.

OKW ordered the Army reserve, 85 Inf XX, to bar access to Walcheren by holding Woensdrecht. The division consisted of remnants of two grenadier regts, elements of Para Regts 2 and 6, and Training and Replacement Regiment Hermann Göring. It was reinforced by remnants of Army Assault Gun Brigades 244 and 667. The Germans had established positions on the little available high ground, Woensdrecht ridge and the railway dike passing through Beveland to Walcheren Island. German guns and paratroopers had dug in along the top of the dike road.

On October 2, the 2nd Cdn XX began its advance north from Antwerp to clear the choke point of the South Beveland peninsula. For the first four days the div made good progress, advancing nine miles to capture Putte, with the base of the peninsula just five miles distant. The 4th Cdn Arm XX moved up to cover 2nd Cdn XX’s eastern flank, freeing forces for a renewed drive toward the base of the peninsula. During the next 10 days, the Cdns managed to secure a tenuous foothold on the peninsula west of Woensdrecht.


For the Cdns, attacking the German positions with understrength infantry Bdes, a squadron of tanks, and artillery regiments that had to ration ammunition was not an inviting prospect. The operation, code-named Angus, called for 5th Bde to employ one Bn to seize the railway embankment, with two others passing through to seal off the route to Walcheren Island. The first phase of the assault was to be undertaken by the understrength Black Watch in a daylight assault.

Heavy casualties resulted as the Canadians attacked over open, flooded ground. Driving rain, booby traps, and enemy land mines made the advance even more difficult. For the Black Watch, October 13, became known as “Black Friday,” the second-worst single-day disaster in the history of the regt. In an unsuccessful assault on a topographical feature known ominously as “the Coffin,” 56 Black Watch soldiers were killed and another 27 were taken prisoner. All four company commanders were killed, and one company of 90 men was reduced to just four survivors.

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## parsifal (May 9, 2018)

Part II


Preparing For Operation Switchback

After the debacle of Black Friday, Canadian commanders decided that a night attack was needed. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry was selected to assault Woensdrecht on October 16. The unit was blessed with seasoned company commanders and veteran noncommissioned officers, and the attack had the support of three field and two medium artillery regiments. By noon on October 17, the Royal Hamilton Infantry had captured the village and the high ground beyond, but German defenders launched repeated counterattacks. Bitter fighting raged for five days, costing the Royal Hamiltons 21 killed and 146 wounded. The Canadians held on to their hard-won gains.

While Simonds concentrated his forces at the neck of the South Beveland peninsula, the 4th Cdn Arm XX moved north and took Bergen-op-Zoom on the Dutch shoreline, further protecting the flank of the 2nd XX. To the south of the Scheldt, German Ge 64 Inf XX held a 25-mile sector that ran west along the Leopold Canal from the Braakman Inlet to the historic town of Zeebrugge. The division, formed as an emergency measure after the collapse of German forces in Normandy, consisted mainly of men on leave from the Eastern Front. Thrown into the line in August 1944, it fought in the subsequent battle for the Albert Canal and was isolated when the XV Army was forced to withdraw.

On October 2, the German division commander, General Kurt Eberding, with 2,350 infantry plus 8,500 support and service personnel and six coastal artillery pieces, prepared to meet the Canadian assault. The Germans had deliberately breached the dikes, and the ensuing flooding channeled the Canadian advance onto the area’s few raised dike roads and polder land.

The next day, Maj. Gen. D.C. Spry’s 3rd Cdn Inf XX initiated the second phase of the Scheldt campaign, code-named Operation Switchback, to reduce the Breskens Pocket. The Div encountered tenacious German resistance as it fought to cross the Leopold Canal. It was decided that the best place for an assault would be immediately east of where the Leopold and Dérivation de la Lys Canals split—a narrow strip of dry ground only a few hundred yards wide at its base beyond the Leopold Canal. The plan was for the Canadians to cross the canal, drive straight north to the coast, eliminate the key German gun battery at Cadzand, capture the port of Breskens, and move east, eliminating German gun batteries there.

On the night of October 5, the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regt of the 8th Bde brought forward canvas assault boats, carrying them over the fields and placing them along the slope of the dike to their front. When the signal came, they could grab the assault boats, carry them over the top of the dike, and throw them into the water.

Operation Switchback Begins

The next morning the assault commenced, with the 3rd Div’s 7th Bde, along with the North Shore Regt, making the initial assault across the canal near the town of Eede. German positions in the area included concrete bunkers reinforced with logs, with good fields of fire across the canal. Roads leading north from the rear of the German positions were covered by machine-gun fire.

The assault of the 7th Bde was supported by artillery and Wasp troop carriers, which were equipped with flamethrowers to deliver a barrage of flame across the Leopold Canal. With screaming Germans lit up like torches running into the trees on the opposite shore, the attackers scrambled up the steep banks and launched their assault boats.

Only half of the troops made it to the far side and established two precarious footholds. The Germans, dug in on the rear slope, managed to recover from the shock of the flamethrowers and counterattacked repeatedly for the next 48 hours, but they were unable to drive the Canadians from their vulnerable bridgeheads. The Canadian infantry soon discovered that they could not dig foxholes more than a foot deep before the holes filled with water. Adding to their problems, close air support was hampered by poor weather. By October 9, however the gap between the bridgeheads had been closed.

The flooded polder land beyond the dike made maneuvering extremely difficult. Any movement along the roads leading north came under intense enemy fire. After six days of fighting, the Canadian commanders, having suffered nearly 600 casualties, realized that they needed to find another way to get to the coast. Orders were given to withdraw. Meanwhile, the 9th Inf Bde mounted an amphibious attack on the coastal side of the pocket, sweeping west of the mile-wide Braakman Inlet. The bde used Terrapin and Buffalo amphibious vehicles, crewed by the British 5th and 6th Assault Regts of the Royal Engineers, to carry them across the mouth of the inlet to land in the vicinity of Hoofdplaat and exert pressure from two directions on the German defenders along the inlet. Mortars laid down a heavy smoke screen as the Canadians made their way across marshland and over dikes.

The Canadians took the German defenders by surprise and quickly established a bridgehead. Once again, the Germans recovered quickly and counterattacked with ferocity, but they were slowly forced back. General Spry moved his remaining force, the 8th Bde, into the bridgehead. Attacking west, the Canadians took Biervliet and Hoofdplaat on the coast. Seeing the eastern flank of their defenses unhinged, the Germans withdrew to a second line of defense that ran from Breskens along the Sluis Canal to Zeebrugge. Meanwhile, RAF Bomber Command mounted heavy strikes against German gun batteries at Breskens and Flushing


Cornering the Germans on Walcheren

The second phase of Operation Switchback started on October 21 with a successful assault on Breskens. The 9th Bde cleared German troops from the towns of Schoondijke, Oostburg and Zuidzande. The coastal bastion of Fort Frederik Hendrik held out for three more days before its garrison surrendered. Cadzand, where the Germans had their largest gun emplacement along the southern side of the Scheldt, fell on October 27. The 3rd XX completed Operation Switchback two days later, overwhelming the last German resistance in the Belgian coastal towns of Knocke and Zeebrugge, swt of the pocket. Some 29 days of fighting had cost the Canadian division 2,077 casualties. During the fighting, some remnants of Ge 64 Inf XXmanaged to escape north across the estuary to South Beveland.

With the Breskens Pocket cleared, the Allies could now use it as a staging area for the attack on Walcheren. Amphibious vehicles landed at the port of Breskens, and the Allies positioned supporting artillery in the low-lying area to the south. The 2nd Div began its westward advance down the Sth Beveland peninsula from its hard-earned gains at Woensdrecht. After a heavy artillery bombardment, 4th Cdn Inf Bde began to fight its way west. By dawn the following day, it had advanced 3 miles to capture Rilland. Throughout the remainder of the day, the brigade closed on the town of Krabbendijke. The Canadians hoped to advance rapidly, bypassing opposition and seizing bridgeheads over the Beveland ship canal, which bisected the peninsula, but they were slowed by mines, mud, and strong enemy defenses.

In support, other Allied forces launched Operation Vitality II to outflank German defenses at the eastern end of the peninsula. A Royal Navy landing craft, supplemented by Buffalo and Terrapin amphibious vehicles, carried elements of the Br 52nd Inf XX across the Scheldt. Sailing from Terneuzen, the amphibians of the 1st Assault Bde, Royal Engineers, advanced 8 miles across the estuary to Sth Beveland, west of the ship canal. Spearheaded by amphibious DD Shermans from the Staffordshire Yeomanry, the force established a beachhead near Hoedekenskerke.

On October 26, the 6th Cdn Inf Bde began a frontal attack on the canal head in assault boats. Engineers were able to bridge the canal along the main east-west road. By October 29, the Canadians had captured the town of Goes and linked up with the 52nd Div. With the canal line cleared, German resistance crumbled on South Beveland. Remnants of some German units managed to withdraw to Walcheren Island. The final phase of the Battle of the Scheldt was about to begin.

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## parsifal (May 9, 2018)

Part III


The Defenses of Walcheren

The German defenses on Walcheren Is were very strong, with heavy coastal batteries posted on the western and southern coasts. The coastline itself had been fortified against amphibious assaults, and a landward-facing defensive perimeter had been built around the town of Vlissingen to defend its port facilities should an Allied landing on Walcheren succeed. The only land approach was the Sloeda, or Walcheren, Causeway—a thin strip of ground a few yards wide joining South Beveland to Walcheren Island over the Sloe Channel. The causeway was little more than a raised two-lane road. To make matters even more difficult for attackers, the flats that surrounded the causeway were too saturated with sea water for movement on foot or in vehicles, but were too shallow for assault boats. The defenses had been attacked by Bomber Command and 2nd Tactical Air Force in September, but poor weather and heavy antiaircraft fire had reduced the effectiveness of the air strikes.

Walcheren Island was garrisoned by 70 inf XX. The unit was a “white bread” or magen (stomach) division made up of men with special dietary needs. Some were recovering from stomach wounds, others had digestive problems such as ulcers and could not tolerate the normal, heavy German flour. The Germans had grouped the sufferers together in August 1944 and assigned the division to safeguard the Dutch coast at Zeeland. Despite their shortcomings, the ailing soldiers performed surprisingly well. Also on Walcheren Island were naval personnel of the 202nd Marine Artillery Bn.

Gaining a Foothold

To weaken the German defenses, Allied bombers mounted five separate attacks involving some 494 sorties against the island’s perimeter dike. The bombing breached the dike in four places, and the sea poured into the interior of the low-lying island, flooding four-fifths of the area. Between October 28 and 30, BC mounted a further 745 sorties against German defenses, dropping more than 4,000 tons of bombs and destroying 11 of the enemy’s 28 artillery btys.

The island was to be attacked from three directions—from the east, across the Scheldt from the south, and by sea from the west. It was hoped that the German defenders would not be able to respond effectively to these multiple assaults. The 2nd Cdn XX’s already bloodied 5th Bde attacked the causeway from South Beveland on October 31. The initial attack by the Black Watch was rebuffed. The Calgary Highlanders then sent a company, which was also stopped halfway down the causeway.

An attack by the Highlanders on the morning of November 1 managed to gain a precarious foothold, but a subsequent German counterattack drove the Cdns back onto the causeway. A day of fighting followed, with the Highlanders relieved by Le Regiment de Maisonneuve, which struggled to maintain the bridgehead. The “Maisies” withdrew onto the causeway on November 2 and were relieved by a bn of the Glasgow Highlanders of the Br 52nd XX.

On November 3, other lowland units crossed the Sloe Channel south of the causeway in boats to outflank the German defenses. Within 24 hours the division had established a sizable bridgehead along the island’s unflooded eastern fringes.

Capturing Flushing

The second element of the assault on the island began shortly after midnight on November 1, as landing craft and amphibious vehicles, part of Force T, departed Ostend and headed northeast. Carrying troops from 4th Special Service Brigade under Brig. Gen. G.W. Leicester, Royal Marines, the landing force was to launch an amphibious assault on the westernmost point of Walcheren at Westkapelle.

Meanwhile, the third assault component, with landing craft and amphibious vehicles, under cover from a bombardment of artillery around Breskens, departed Breskens for Flushing—code-named “Uncle Beach.” This was Operation Infatuate I and consisted mainly of infantry of the British 155th Infantry Brigade—4th and 5th Battalions, King’s Own Scottish Borderers; 7/9 Battalion, Royal Scots; and the No. 4 Commando. At 5:40 am, the commandos assaulted the heart of Flushing’s harbor area, with troops of the 4th King’s Own Scottish Borderers landing at 7:30. Within the town, Dutch resistance groups also began to attack German positions supported by artillery and Typhoon fighter-bombers. British troops, along with French commandos, gradually fought their way through the town.

The next day, the Allied troops pushed their way to the northern edge of Flushing, again aided by artillery and Typhoons. That night the 7/9 Royal Scots attacked the Hotel Britannia, a center of German resistance southwest of the town. Despite finding themselves wading through water five feet deep in the dark, the Royal Scots pressed home the attack. When the 600 defenders surrendered around noon on November 3, Flushing was finally cleared of enemy forces.

The Assault on Westkapelle

The force destined for Westkapelle—Operation Infatuate II—had moved northeast during the early hours of November 1. At 8 am, the German coastal batteries engaged the landing force, with the battleship HMS Warspite and the monitors HMS Roberts and Erebus returning fire. At 8:45, Allied artillery from Breskens added its weight to the bombardment.

During the approach to the beaches, at least one LCT was disabled and a rocket support launch was hit and set off an amazing fireworks display that damaged several other craft. Lt. Col. J.B. Hillsman of the 8th Surgical Unit observed the sinking of one of his unit’s craft. “We were getting close in now and the landing craft tank in front of us turned out of line to further back,” Hillsman recalled. “As it passed us, it struck a sea mine. There was tremendous explosion and the ship was hurled into the air. It settled rapidly. Men jumped into the sea. Some were picked up by the following craft. Others floated face down in their life belts.”

The first assault troops of the 4th Special Service Brigade landed at 9:59 am. Within 30 minutes, the bulk of No. 41 (Royal Marines) Commando was ashore, as were elements from No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando, which consisted mainly of Belgian and Norwegian troops, and No. 48 (Royal Marines) Commando, supported by specialized armored vehicles—amphibious transports, mine-clearing tanks, and bulldozers—of the 79th Armored Division. These forces landed at Red and White Beaches, respectively, located to the north and south of the breached dike just to the south of Westkapelle.

To ensure that the landing would be successful, 27 armed landing craft of the Support Squadron Eastern Flank engaged the German batteries in the area, seeking to divert their fire from the assault troops. They achieved hard-won success, but only seven of the craft survived undamaged and another 370 casualties was suffered by the squadron’s sailors and marines.

During that morning, the commandos fought their way through Westkapelle in the face of fierce resistance. Subsequently, No. 41 Commando advanced north along the narrow, unflooded coastal strip toward Domburg, which was secured before dusk. Meanwhile, No. 48 Commando had advanced southeast toward Zoutelande, with No. 47 Commando landing later that day. By nightfall, the 4th Brigade had secured a six-mile strip of coast and now had three complete Commandos, plus two French troops of No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando ashore.

The Campaign’s Last Stages

On the morning of November 2, No. 48 Commando captured Zoutelande, taking 150 prisoners in the process. Two days later No. 47 Commando linked up with No. 4 Commando advancing northwest from Flushing. Three days later, the 11th Royal Tank Regiment, along with the Royal Scots, advanced northeast through the island’s flooded interior to Middelburg, using their remaining 11 operational Buffaloes. Simultaneously, the 5th’s Calgary Highlanders struck west from the bridgehead secured on the unflooded eastern flank of Walcheren by the 52nd Division. The German defenders were taken by some surprise. General Daser, the German commander, was reported to be considering surrendering, but only to an armored force.

As it was impossible to reach the water-logged town with tanks, a calculated gamble was made to drive amphibious Buffaloes into Middelburg. Faced with the heavy Allied armament, Daser relented, and in the hours that followed the small British force found itself guarding a much larger number of disarmed Germans. Later that day, Veere, in the northeastern corner of the island, surrendered to the 158th Brigade, but enemy forces continued to hold out along the northern coast. By November 7, however, No. 41 Commando and French Commandos overwhelmed the last pocket of enemy resistance.

In the final stage of operations to open Antwerp, a large-scale minesweeping operation of the estuary—Operation Calendar—was undertaken from November 3 to 25, collecting 267 mines. Thus cleared, the first Allied ship, the Canadian-built freighter Fort Cataraqui, arrived in Antwerp on November 28. The Battle of the Scheldt Estuary was over.

2.4 Million Tons of Matériel

In the course of five weeks of often savage fighting, the First Canadian Army took 41,043 Germans prisoner, while suffering 12,873 casualties, 6,367 of whom were Canadians; the remainder were from British and Polish units. The 2nd Canadian Division alone lost 3,650 men in 33 days of intense battle across the isthmus and west to Walcheren Island. The importance of the port was made apparent when the Germans selected it as a key objective in the coming winter offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge. According to one estimate, the two-month delay in opening Antwerp cost the Allies some 2.4 million tons of additional matériel—supplies that were sorely missed during the autumn fighting across northern France and Germany.

So Why did I reproduce this narrative?

I produced this account to show that the need to clear the Antwerp approaches, whilst vital to Allied logistics, and something that both the british and the US commands strongly advocated was a difficult and long drawn out process. The failed Market Garden operation was an attempt to avoid the campaign, by forcing a withdrawal from the position. It further far too ambitiously carried with it expectations of knocking Germany out of the war with far less demands on the supply network than the current broad front advance was causing at that time


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## redcoat (May 10, 2018)

Monty was so slow his forces could only manage an advance of 250 miles in four days after the breakout from Normandy, and 750 miles in ten days after El Alamein.


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## Freebird (May 10, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> > Patton
> 
> 
> the German OKW considered him to be the best field commander the Allies had in the entire ETO--



A magnificent accomplishment, unfortunately it's a fabrication made up by his biographer and a couple of other post-war boosters, but the truth is that the Germans didn't pay that much attention to him during WWII.
Patton was certainly hard driving and was proficient at armoured warfare tactics, but the idea that they were obsessed with Patton or in awe of him during WWII isn't backed up by any evidence.

http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm



> “The Germans did not track Patton’s movements as the key to allied intentions. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists.” Hence their intelligence efforts were much more focused on people like Montgomery and Eisenhower, because this was the level on which strategic decisions were made.
> 
> A myth that began in the minds of American generals during the war carried over into the mainstream understanding of the European war. But believing it to be true does not make it so.
> 
> Harry Yeide


Hoover Institute -The German View of Patton

 
*ARCHIVES: THE MYTH OF GERMANY’S OBSESSION WITH PATTON*

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (May 10, 2018)

freebird said:


> A magnificent accomplishment, unfortunately it's a fabrication made up by his biographer and a couple of other post-war boosters, but the truth is that the Germans didn't pay that much attention to him during WWII.
> Patton was certainly hard driving and was proficient at armoured warfare tactics, but the idea that they were obsessed with Patton or in awe of him during WWII isn't backed up by any evidence.
> 
> http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm
> ...


T


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (May 10, 2018)

redcoat said:


> Monty was so slow his forces could only manage an advance of 250 miles in four days after the breakout from Normandy, and 750 miles in ten days after El Alamein.


And how long did Monty's troops attempt to take Caen? About a month.. Monty's approach to advancing was from a superior weight in numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and logistical support in depth- He like to have a 14 to 1 advantage in those factors before he would advance-not always possible in a fluid attack--


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (May 10, 2018)

freebird said:


> A magnificent accomplishment, unfortunately it's a fabrication made up by his biographer and a couple of other post-war boosters, but the truth is that the Germans didn't pay that much attention to him during WWII.
> Patton was certainly hard driving and was proficient at armoured warfare tactics, but the idea that they were obsessed with Patton or in awe of him during WWII isn't backed up by any evidence.
> 
> http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm
> ...


Ladislas Farago was about as accurate a biographer of George S. Patton Jr. as Carlos Baker was of Ernest Hemingway- When you are trying to describe the man, with all his flaws and his virtues as well, and you become emotionally enraptured with the myth that often exists with a "larger than life" personage, and impartial biography becomes a nebulous thing.


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## Glider (May 10, 2018)

Obviously its only a personal view but as a defender or in a situation where the enemy had similar resources and air cover I believe that Patton would have failed and failed significantly. His approach would have put his troops at serious risk when facing a well dug in organised defence as practised by the Russians or a more flexible organised defence as practised by he Germans.

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## parsifal (May 10, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> And how long did Monty's troops attempt to take Caen? About a month.. Monty's approach to advancing was from a superior weight in numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and logistical support in depth- He like to have a 14 to 1 advantage in those factors before he would advance-not always possible in a fluid attack--



Though originally a D-Day objective, it took Allied forces around seven weeks to finally liberate the city. Due to the ferocity of the fighting, much of Caen was destroyed and had to be rebuilt after the war. Though Operation Goodwood failed to achieve a breakout, it did hold German forces in place for Operation Cobra, it should also be acknowledged that this was not the primary objective at that time 9there is admittedly debate about that). A static line battle was the intent, with the primary idea being the attrition of the Wehrmachts mobile forces in Normandy. This was the primary directive for Monty’s command, fully endorsed by SHAEF and the Americans. Monty described it as a need to draw the German mobile forces, and “write them down”, which he achieved in spades. And he had to do this without taking significant casualties himself. This was due to the acute manpower shortages that were by then afflicting the british forces.

Delayed until July 25, Cobra saw American forces knock a gap in the German lines and reach open country to the south. This operation benefitted greatly from the battle of attrition that had been fought for Caen. In no small part due to the pounding their frontline formations had taken in the battle for Caen the Americans achieved the breakout that led to the encirclement at Falaise. Panzer Lehr for example went into battle with less than 5000 effectives having suffered over 3000 casualties to the end of June alone, nearly all of them around Caen, after entering the battles against the british with more than 13000 men.

At st Lo, the Americans pivoted east, and moved to encircle German forces in Normandy as Dempsey from monty’s 21 AG mounted a new advance with the goal of trapping the enemy around Falaise. Lucky for the allies, monty had used overwhelming numbers in his battles, thereby reducing allied casualties and retaining full offensive capabilities for his forces when the time came to actually contribute to the breakout. Beginning on August 14, Allied forces sought to close the falaise pocket and destroy the German Army in France. Though nearly 100,000 Germans escaped the pocket before it was closed on August 22, around 50,000 were captured and 10,000 killed. Having won the Battle of Normandy, Allied forces advanced freely to the Seine River reaching it on August 25. In no small measure, allied abilities to mount such an effective explpoitation was due to monty’s precision and caution in the earlier battles and his stubborn resistance to succumb to the temptation of fighting a battle of manoeuvre for which his temperament, and the psyche of the forces he commanded were ill prepredered to carry out.

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## swampyankee (May 10, 2018)

In BH Liddell-Hart's book of interviews with German generals, Montgomery was described as ponderous but unstoppable, like an elephant. 

In regard to Patton, John Eisenhower described him as a "master of pursuit," best in a fluid offensive battle.

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## redcoat (May 11, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> And how long did Monty's troops attempt to take Caen? About a month.. Monty's approach to advancing was from a superior weight in numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and logistical support in depth- He like to have a 14 to 1 advantage in those factors before he would advance-not always possible in a fluid attack--


 Are you aware that Monty was the Allied Ground commander in Normandy in this period, he was in charge of all the ground forces including the Americans. The general tasked with taking Caen was Dempsey and the reason he didn’t take it on the first day was because the troops heading towards the city were counter attacked by 21st Panzer Division, the British stopped the counter attack, inflicting heavy losses on the German’s but it stopped the advance towards the city and over the next couple of days the German’s reinforced the area with several more divisions including a couple of panzer divisions.

ps: Please can you tell me when Monty ever had a 14 to 1 advantage over the German’s.


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (May 11, 2018)

redcoat said:


> Are you aware that Monty was the Allied Ground commander in Normandy in this period, he was in charge of all the ground forces including the Americans. The general tasked with taking Caen was Dempsey and the reason he didn’t take it on the first day was because the troops heading towards the city were counter attacked by 21st Panzer Division, the British stopped the counter attack, inflicting heavy losses on the German’s but it stopped the advance towards the city and over the next couple of days the German’s reinforced the area with several more divisions including a couple of panzer divisions.
> 
> ps: Please can you tell me when Monty ever had a 14 to 1 advantage over the German’s.


Montgomery never had that numerical advantage over the German forces.. Your version differs from that of Patton somewhat, taken from his diary "War As I Knew It"-- but one point you raised in your informative post goes to the heart of the issue- Patton despised the fact that Ike, as Supreme Commander ETO, favored Monty, both as AGC at Normandy, and later when Ike by-passed Patton's plan to invade Germany, and instead, gave Monty the "green light" for the flawed Market Garden Op..- The rumored 14 to 1 ratio theory was never espoused by Monty- it was attributed to him by Patton, who always favored an attack mode, never a defensive holding to buy time to build up troops and supplies before advancing into the enemy's positions.

To be fair, neither Monty's nor Patton's plan might have succeeded in freeing the vital Scheldt Estuary and opening the port of Antwerp to Allied Supply movement, to support the inevitable Allied push into Germany-- Even Hitler must have realized how vital was Antwerp to the Allied Forces, as his "Oktober Sturm" final push, 16 Dec/1944 involved a Blitzkreig strike towards Belgium through the Ardennes, and then towards Antwerp--

Had that attack been successful for the Germans, the final end of the ETO conflict may have been delayed, at least on the Western front- There was nothing that Hitler and the OKW could do to stem the Russian tidal wave heading towards Berlin from the East--and I think even Der Fuhrer may well have realized that fact..

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