# Curtiss-Wright: Loss of Don Berlin and downfall (1 Viewer)



## gjs238 (Jun 27, 2015)

Don Berlin left Curtiss in December 1941.
Was that a large reason for the fall of Curtiss?


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## GregP (Jun 27, 2015)

Straight out of Wiki. Perhaps Google the subject?

From 1941 to 1943, the Curtiss Aeronautical plant in Lockland, Ohio produced aircraft engines under wartime contract destined for installation in U.S. Army Air Forces aircraft. Wright officials at Lockland insisted on high engine production levels, resulting in a significant percentage of engines that did not meet Army Air Forces (AAF) inspection standards. These defective engines were nevertheless approved by inspectors for shipment and installation in U.S. military aircraft. After investigation, it was later revealed that Wright company officials at Lockland had conspired with civilian technical advisers and Army inspection officers to approve substandard or defective aircraft engines for military use.Army Air Forces technical adviser Charles W. Bond was dismissed by the Army in 1943 for "gross irregularities in inspection procedure."Bond would later testify that he had been "wined and dined" by Wright company officials; one of those occasions was the night before Bond fired four AAF engine inspectors another AAF inspector had described as "troublemakers."In 1944, three Army officers, Lt. Col. Frank Constantine Greulich of Detroit, former chief inspection officer for the material command, Major Walter A. Ryan of Detroit, former central states inspection officer, and Major William Bruckmann, a former Cincinnati brewer and resident Army inspections officer at the Wright plant in Lockland were charged with neglect of duty, conspiracy, and giving false testimony in a general court martial. All three men were later convicted of neglect of duty.[12] The story of defective engines had reached investigators working for Sen. Harry Truman's congressional investigative board, the Truman Commission, after several Wright aircraft assembly workers informed on the company; they would later testify under oath before Congress. Arthur Miller's play All My Sons is based on this incident.

Also, not direct from Wiki, the last Curtiss designs were not very good. The end of the line was XF-87 Blackhawk. It performed acceptably except for being a bit slower than desired. Orders were placed for 57 but were cancelled in favor of the Northrop F-89 Scorpion.

After that, Curtiss-Wright stayed in business, and still IS in business, but opted out of the aircraft industry in favor of control systems, among other things. Today Curtiss-Wright is diversified and is in a lot of markets including commerical aerospace, oil gas, defense, nuclear power generation, and industrial control and supplies. They make a LOT of products.

As a former electrical engineer, I can say I used a lot of Curtiss-Wright products in my designs, mostly sensors. Some held up to measuring the pressure inside closed-bomb explosions, among other tasks, and gave good results and long service life relative to other sensors I tried.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 27, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Don Berlin left Curtiss in December 1941.
> Was that a large reason for the fall of Curtiss?



Curtiss had a number of Divisions and design teams. 

Simple map/graphic from Sept 1941.







In the 1930s Curtiss-Wright was the largest aircraft corporation in the US. One designer could not be responsible for the success or failure of a corporation the size of Curtiss. That would be like saying that Reginald Mitchell was responsible for not only Supermarine but for all of Vickers.


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## gjs238 (Jun 27, 2015)

GregP said:


> Also, not direct from Wiki, the last Curtiss designs were not very good. The end of the line was XF-87 Blackhawk. It performer acceptably except for being a bit slower than desired. Orders were palced for 57 but were cancelled in favor of the Northrop F-89 Scorpion.



From Wikipedia:
_The loss of the contract was fatal to the company; the Curtiss-Wright Corporation closed down its aviation division, selling its assets to North American Aviation._


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## Shortround6 (Jun 27, 2015)

The last _successful_ Curtiss design may have been the Seahawk;






Unfortunately post war it had to compete with the Helicopter.

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## Capt. Vick (Jun 27, 2015)

Let us not forget Don Berlin was the chief driving force behind the XP-75 Eagle.

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## GregP (Jun 27, 2015)

My mistake ... I thought I had included tthat fact and hadn't ... good catch Cappy. He helped guide Curtiss-Wright into successful business diversity in the Aerospace industry away from airframes, and the P-75 wasn't exactly a crowning achievment.


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## Koopernic (Jun 28, 2015)

My understanding is that after the war Curtiss-Wright ended up under new CEO with a strong sales background. Curtiss-Wright made a great living out of producing and selling R-3350 and its tradional products. The company however chronically underinvested in R+D and did not develop many new products. They did licence some British jet engines such as the Sapphire but kludged the transfer over to American standards, materials etc, taking a long time.

I'm an engineer myself and actually tend to think accountants often make good CEO as they understand systems, investment and how an organisation functions as a living organ. I also have no problems with anyone with strong sales ability. Who wouldn't want to be a John Leahey or John Wojick cutting 12 billion dollar deals with Emirates for A350 and B777X. 

What happened to CW was what happens to a great many companies that underinvest in maintenance and or product development. There is a price to pay and too often if you are only focused on the months sales figures or monthly production stats you will find yourself in a deep hole you may not be able to dig yourself out of.

I suspect that after what seems dozens of attempted failed desgings to replace P-40 and compete with the P-47 and P-51 perhaps the concept of R+D lost favour in the company.

They did try and make a come back in aviation with wankel rotary engines with stratified charge technology. With the new double tips seals developed by Mazda the Rotary is now a long lasting engine.


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## GregP (Jun 28, 2015)

I used to race the 12A and 13B, and THEY were long-lasting engines, too. When the other SCCA guys were wrenching on their piston engines, we were waxing the car, and relaxing. The wankels rarely broke. I did lunch one when the spark plug end brok off inside the combustion chamber ... Made it around the lap on one rotor with associated grinding noises.


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## pbehn (Jun 28, 2015)

Maybe when people produce maps of your empire you are too big for your boots and attract a few powerful jealous enemies. just sayin/


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## gjs238 (Jun 28, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Maybe when people produce maps of your empire you are too big for your boots and attract a few powerful jealous enemies. just sayin/



Map or target?


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## gjs238 (Jun 28, 2015)

GregP said:


> <SNIP> He helped guide Curtiss-Wright into successful business diversity in the Aerospace industry away from airframes<SNIP>



Don Berlin was no longer at CW when it closed down its aviation division and sold its assets to North American Aviation.

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtiss-Wright_XF-87_Blackhawk:
_The Curtiss-Wright XF-87 Blackhawk (previously designated the XP-87) was a prototype American all-weather jet fighter interceptor and the company's last aircraft project.[2] Designed as a replacement for the World War II–era propeller-driven P-61 Black Widow night/interceptor aircraft, the XF-87 lost in government procurement competition to the Northrop F-89 Scorpion. *The loss of the contract was fatal to the company; the Curtiss-Wright Corporation closed down its aviation division, selling its assets to North American Aviation.*_


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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Maybe when people produce maps of your empire you are too big for your boots and attract a few powerful jealous enemies. just sayin/



The "jealous enemy" was United Aircraft, which was made up of Pratt Whitney, Hamilton standard props, Vought aircraft and Sikorsky at the time. Pre 1934 the corporation had included Boeing, Stearman, what would become United Air Lines and perhaps a few smaller outfits.


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## gjs238 (Jun 28, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The "jealous enemy" was United Aircraft, which was made up of Pratt Whitney, Hamilton standard props, Vought aircraft and Sikorsky at the time. Pre 1934 the corporation had included Boeing, Stearman, what would become United Air Lines and perhaps a few smaller outfits.



With all those resources to bear, too bad United Aircraft couldn't have developed and fielded the F4U sooner.


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## pbehn (Jun 28, 2015)

gis and SR I have no real knowledge on this I was only referring to the map in post no 3. If produced by Curtiss it looks boastful and if produced by another it looks like envy.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> With all those resources to bear, too bad United Aircraft couldn't have developed and fielded the F4U sooner.



Not sure the F4U was going to get developed any sooner that it was. The first _production_ F4F-3 with a two stage supercharger flew in Feb 1940, roughly 4 months before the first flight of the F4U. There was only one prototype and it crashed in July of 1940 but was rebuilt in 4 months. Hundreds of changes are made between prototype and first production model. Navy Issues a letter of intent to buy Feb 3, 1941 but does't place (sign?) actual contract for 534 planes until June 30th,1941. By Dec 1941 both Brewster and Goodyear have been brought in as extra sources but the first F4U is still 7 months from being flown. 

P W only built 6 of the two stage R-2800 engines in 1941 and went from building 13 single stage R-2800s in Jan to over 160 in Dec. They built 509 of the two stage R-1830s in 1941 and 285 of them were in the last 3 months. P W almost doubled theri production of R-1830s in 1941 over what it was in 1940. 

What should Aircraft _stopped_ work on in order to put more effort into the F4U?


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## gjs238 (Jun 28, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Not sure the F4U was going to get developed any sooner that it was. The first _production_ F4F-3 with a two stage supercharger flew in Feb 1940, roughly 4 months before the first flight of the F4U. There was only one prototype and it crashed in July of 1940 but was rebuilt in 4 months. Hundreds of changes are made between prototype and first production model. Navy Issues a letter of intent to buy Feb 3, 1941 but does't place (sign?) actual contract for 534 planes until June 30th,1941. By Dec 1941 both Brewster and Goodyear have been brought in as extra sources but the first F4U is still 7 months from being flown.
> 
> P W only built 6 of the two stage R-2800 engines in 1941 and went from building 13 single stage R-2800s in Jan to over 160 in Dec. They built 509 of the two stage R-1830s in 1941 and 285 of them were in the last 3 months. P W almost doubled theri production of R-1830s in 1941 over what it was in 1940.
> 
> What should Aircraft _stopped_ work on in order to put more effort into the F4U?



I think in another F4U thread it was mentioned how small Vought was (engineers, draftsmen, production facilities, etc.)
Reading that, the implication seemed to me that Vought had come up with a great design, but lacked the oomph of the larger companies for speedier development.
So pick one of the planes from the "cancel this or that" thread and imagine those resources being added to F4U development.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2015)

Vought had been building aircraft for the Navy since the early 20s. 

The trouble is that there just weren't that many "large" companies in 1938-41. Just about every company was expanding as fast as possible. P W quadrupled their floor space in just a few years. Other companies showed similar growth. 

Boeing might have had some spare capacity (they built A-20s for the British under sub contract to Douglas) but it is around 2400 miles from Stratford to the Boeing Plant. 

many of the companies in the "cancel this or that" thread had built under 200 planes in their history (some had built under 2 dozen) in the spring of 1940. 

Chance-Vought did manage to crank out 579 Kingfisher observation planes in 1940-41. The Naval Aircraft factory took over production and built 300 more planes. 

Things were not happening in a vacuum or bubble and diverting resources from one project to another could have wide ranging consequences. Kingfishers may seem like an unimportant plane or something that could be pushed aside for the more important/glamorous big fighter but the intended supplement/replacement for the Kingfisher was the Curtiss Seamew. It was such a failure that the Navy went to the extreme of pulling the older Curtiss Seagull biplanes out of storage and issuing them rather than continue using the Seamew. Cutting Kingfisher production to work on the Corsair and _planning_ to make up the difference with Seamews could have left the Navy in a real bind.


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## gjs238 (Jun 28, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Vought had been building aircraft for the Navy since the early 20s.
> 
> The trouble is that there just weren't that many "large" companies in 1938-41. Just about every company was expanding as fast as possible. P W quadrupled their floor space in just a few years. Other companies showed similar growth.
> 
> ...



The idea wasn't to divert Vought resources, but to divert other resources into Vought, the F4U specifically.
I get what you're saying - divert from the wrong project and you could unravel the threads that bind the space–time continuum.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 28, 2015)

The F4U might have gotten fielded a bit sooner if more compromises had been made on a non-carrier-capable variant for the USMC and/or USAAF (or possibly for export). It should have been a bit lighter as well.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 29, 2015)

Or maybe not, Since it was designed as a carrier plane to begin with. The handling problems might have been easier to sort out or ignore in a land based fighter but I am not sure how much those held up initial production. 

Making it lighter means redesigning (redoing the stress calculations) for the parts involved in carrier landings. Not just the tail hook and attachment points but the landing gear and attachment areas of the wing taking the higher vertical impact velocities. Goodyear made something like 1000 Corsairs _without_ not only tail hooks but with fixed wings for the Marine Corp. they may not have lightened up much of anything however. No details seem to have surfaced about any difference in performance. 

Since it started as a carrier plane, throwing out thousands of man hours in engineering work and redoing the wing/landing gear,etc was not likely to speed up things.


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## gjs238 (Jun 29, 2015)

From Wikipedia, which is always suspect:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vought_F4U_Corsair
_After mock-up inspection in February 1939, construction of the XF4U-1 powered by an XR-2800-4 prototype of the Pratt Whitney Double Wasp twin-row, 18-cylinder radial engine, rated at 1,805 hp (1,346 kW) went ahead quickly, as the very first airframe ever to have a Double Wasp engine fitted for flight._
_First flight	29 May 1940_

Despite the above, the F4U initial development seems a bit protracted.


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## gjs238 (Jun 29, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Or maybe not, Since it was designed as a carrier plane to begin with. The handling problems might have been easier to sort out or ignore in a land based fighter but I am not sure how much those held up initial production.
> 
> Making it lighter means redesigning (redoing the stress calculations) for the parts involved in carrier landings. Not just the tail hook and attachment points but the landing gear and attachment areas of the wing taking the higher vertical impact velocities. Goodyear made something like 1000 Corsairs _without_ not only tail hooks but with fixed wings for the Marine Corp. they may not have lightened up much of anything however. No details seem to have surfaced about any difference in performance.
> 
> Since it started as a carrier plane, throwing out thousands of man hours in engineering work and redoing the wing/landing gear,etc was not likely to speed up things.



Just a fanciful thought, if the F4U was originally designed to Army stress limits, wonder how it would have performed.


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## GregP (Jun 29, 2015)

Just as a matter of accuracy gjs, the Corsair was not developed by United Aircraft. It was developed by Chance-Vought. By the time the plans were drawn up, it was Vought-Sikorsky. It still today is not part of United Aircraft.

It started out as Lewis and Vought Aircraft, then Chance-Vought, then Vought-Sikorsky, then LTV aerospace (LTV meaning Ling-Temco-Vought), then Vought Aircraft Companies. Today it is Vought AIrcraft Industries.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 29, 2015)

From: vought heritage

"On July 1, 1954 the Vought Division separated from United Aircraft and became an independent corporation, Chance Vought Aircraft Inc., with C. J. McCarthy as Chairman of the Board and Fred Detweiler as president."

But saying United Aircraft developed the Corsair is like saying General Motors developed the Corvette. 

and to put construction into perspective; "During the decade the Corporation developed more than forty airplane designs of which 777 were produced from 1930 through 1939 and 1,327 were produced in the 1940’s for a total of 2,104 airplanes."

Decade being 1930-1940. The "forty" designs may very well include small variations or different models. Like XOS2U-1 OS2U-1 OS2U-2 OS2U-3

Once they decided to go for six .50 cal guns (398Lbs) with close to 400rpg(702lbs) , the 361 gallons of fuel and the R-2800 two stage engine you were going to wind up with a big airplane. A few hundred pounds out of a 12,000lb airplane isn't going to change performance a whole lot. Heck, leaving 100 rounds of ammo for every .50 cal gun would save about 180lbs.


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## GregP (Jun 29, 2015)

All I can say is the original planes we have are Vought-Silorsky. They are for an F4U-1.

Nothing in the documentation mentions United AIrcraft. The only companies represented by the documents are Chance-Vought and Vought-Sikorsky.

However, I see in checking that Unitied Aircraft WAS in there.

Mea cupla.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 30, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Making it lighter means redesigning (redoing the stress calculations) for the parts involved in carrier landings. Not just the tail hook and attachment points but the landing gear and attachment areas of the wing taking the higher vertical impact velocities. Goodyear made something like 1000 Corsairs _without_ not only tail hooks but with fixed wings for the Marine Corp. they may not have lightened up much of anything however. No details seem to have surfaced about any difference in performance.
> 
> Since it started as a carrier plane, throwing out thousands of man hours in engineering work and redoing the wing/landing gear,etc was not likely to speed up things.


I'd more meant changes that involved mostly omitting Navy-specific components and shifting around some of the remaining (non-structural) parts to address for CoG changes if needed.

Granted, that would have made more sense had it not been designed with wing folding from the start, more like the F2A or F4F-3.


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## GregP (Jun 30, 2015)

Two rather curious features on the Corsair are two tabs on the elevators and some models with a split rudder. The elevators had both a trim tab and a servo tab right next to one another. The Goodyear R-4360-powered Corsairs had a split rudder and the lower, small rudder was connected to the flaps. Interesting features on a fighter of the time.

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## kool kitty89 (Jun 30, 2015)

GregP said:


> Two rather curious features on the Corsair are two tabs on the levators and some models with a split rudder. The elevators had both a trim tab and a servo tab right next to one another. The Goodyear R-4360-powered Corsairs had a split rudder and the lower, small rudder was connected to the flaps. Interesting features on a fighter of the time.


Don't forget the ailerons too, definitely an interesting feature for the time and helpful in improving roll rate, especially at high speeds.

The P-38 could have used servo ('boost') tabs on its ailerons, at least prior to the hydraulically boosted models. (ironically it was tested with servo tabs on the elevator, but those just proved to overstress the airframe in critial mach dives -much like using the trim tab too aggressively for emergency recovery)


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## Koopernic (Jul 1, 2015)

GregP said:


> Two rather curious features on the Corsair are two tabs on the elevators and some models with a split rudder. The elevators had both a trim tab and a servo tab right next to one another. The Goodyear R-4360-powered Corsairs had a split rudder and the lower, small rudder was connected to the flaps. Interesting features on a fighter of the time.



This kind of advanced control rigging is what was incorporated into aircraft years latter, often could be done economically in fly By Wire.

What was the idea of the rudder to flap cross coupling? I presume that when the rudder was deflected not only would it produce yaw but a roll in the opposite direction that was counteracted by the flap opposite to the rudder deflection. Either that or the intention was to allow rudder turns with properly co ordinated banks.

Who does the control rigging for your museum?


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## GregP (Jul 1, 2015)

The R-4360 made a ridiculous amount of torque and the flap-rudder coupling was installed to ensure the pilot had sufficient rudder travel when flying at approach speed at approach power. With the coupling the rudder behaved much more like an R-2800-powered Corsair. The R-4360 very effectively discouraged abrupt power changes at pattern speeds as the aircraft would torque-roll with ease. But if you flew the engine (and aircraft) smoothly, it behaved and was predictable.


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## Balljoint (Jul 2, 2015)

GregP said:


> The R-4360 made a ridiculous amount of torque and the flap-rudder coupling was installed to ensure the pilot had sufficient rudder travel when flying at approach speed at approach power. With the coupling the rudder behaved much more like an R-2800-powered Corsair. The R-4360 very effectively discouraged abrupt power changes at pattern speeds as the aircraft would torque-roll with ease. But if you flew the engine (and aircraft) smoothly, it behaved and was predictable.



As I recall the bad outcome examples were a missed arresting cable situation. Trickling rather than pouring the coals must take a bit of discipline. The successful go-arounds tend not to be shown much.

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## GregP (Jul 2, 2015)

Not sure why, but go arounds, or bolters, really don't seem to be shown much. You CAN find videos of them since the Navy saves everything, but they tend to want to focus on hitting the numbner two wire. The thinking seems to be, "if you hit the two wire and the hook bounces over it, you stop on the number 3 or 4 wire or go around. If you don't hit the two wire, work on your approach skills until you DO hit the two wire normally."

Most of the accident videos I have watched have concentrated on unusual situations such as having the hook slip off the wire while still under go-around power or some other aircraft malfunction. They like to show the ones where the pilot miraculously survives.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 3, 2015)

A bit off topic, but with all the discussion of the F4U in a Curtiss-related thread it makes me wonder: might it have been more worthwhile for Curtiss to take up development of a land-based Corsair derivative for the USAAF rather than invest so much into the XP-60 program? Somewhat in line with the earlier suggestion of a land-only F4U derivative possibly being a bit faster to service than the F4U-1 was.


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## GregP (Jul 3, 2015)

Seems like it might have resulted in a better product for Curtiss.

But that WAS back in the day when attitudes and actions were WAY different from what they are today.. Suppose Curtiss had, somehow, drammatically improved the Corsair. How willing would Vought have been to cut in changes made by a competitor? Allison's stand on backfire screens was that they weren't needed once you learned how to start an Allison ... and they weren't. The OBVIOUS soluton would have been to fit backfire screens to engines on stands and then teach the pilots and crew cheifs to start them correctly ... but they never even did THAT.

Makes me wonder about the problem-solving ability of the society back then.

But then I remember all the stuff that was discovered or created and I KNOW they could solve VERY difficult problems. But it wasn't a mutual benefit type of thing. It was "solve it for OUR company and everyone else can suck wind." And, given the conditions of the time, that was probably best at the time. Seemed to work out in the end.

I recall that Brewster never made "improvements" to the Corsair and Goodyear did, so the problem-solving and design ability of Goodyear were pretty good. Nobody else came up with an R-4360-powered Corsair that was actually lighter than some R-2800-powered models when at operational weights.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 3, 2015)

I am at all sure where the great delay in the F4U comes from. The Navy ordered the production model in quantity in the summer of 1941. it went into service in the late winter of 1942/43. The Army ordered 700 P-47s off the drawing board in the fall of 1940. roughly 9 months before the production order for the Corsair. The P-47 went into combat service _after_ the F4U.
Not sure where any major change in performance is going to come from, 5-8mph from leaving of the tail hook? Or 2-3mh? The hook boom retracted behind doors and their was only a small notch in the bottom of the fuselage were the actual hook was. Deleting it would certainly aid maintenance but isn't going to affect speed much at all. just about everything else is changing the weight/thickness of structural components. A LOT of engineering work to save how many pounds? 
AS for Curtiss. They were fooling around with more different aircraft programs, by far, than any other US aircraft maker. Did they have any spare engineers to fool around with the Corsair?
Would you want them to? See Curtiss SB2C. Not exactly a quick program. See the Seamew. See Curtiss production of the P-47.


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## GregP (Jul 3, 2015)

Curtiss had plenty of resources if they had been assigned to make the Corsair and NOT build P-40s. It's a matter of resource trade-off. I don't know that they could have done anything different, but any significant leap in performance wiould come with airframe or powerplant changes, or maybe anohter propeller, or a combination.

The F4U-1 started out at about 417 mph top speed but the F4U-4 could hit 446 mph. The F4U-1 had an initial climb rate of 3,250 fpm and the F4U-4 had an initial climb rate of 4,170 fpm.

So Vought found some performance gains in the airframe. Curtiss might have found more .. or not, had they been concentrating on it. Can't say ... it's a "what-if."


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 3, 2015)

GregP said:


> I recall that Brewster never made "improvements" to the Corsair and Goodyear did, so the problem-solving and design ability of Goodyear were pretty good. Nobody else came up with an R-4360-powered Corsair that was actually lighter than some R-2800-powered models when at operational weights.


Had Brewster engineers attempted such, I doubt it would have gone over well given their consistent problems seemed to be more on the manufacturing end or a combination of that and miscommunication between the engineering and manufacturing divisions of the company (or ... poor management and communication all around). I'd imagine 'improvements' could be made specific to compromises that might allow better ability to achieve reasonable quality output in spite of manufacturing infrastructure issues but THAT would require engineers that understood the detailed problems/limitations involved (specific to Brewster manufacturing) ... so again, not really happening.

It really seems like Brewster might have been best off with most manufacturing farmed out to second sources (Government controlled or otherwise) and focus what resources they did have on addressing at least some of the management issues and maintaining/improving engineering and R&D abilities with less emphasis on expanding in-house production output. (quality control and volume production scaling problems on the manufacturing end seem to be most of what killed the F2A as an effective military aircraft ... thinking that would /improve/ with something like the Corsair seems close to insane)





GregP said:


> Curtiss had plenty of resources if they had been assigned to make the Corsair and NOT build P-40s. It's a matter of resource trade-off. I don't know that they could have done anything different, but any significant leap in performance wiould come with airframe or powerplant changes, or maybe anohter propeller, or a combination.


You really wouldn't want to compromise initial P-40 production ... at very least not the Tomohawk. The period where the XP-46 was being considered along with the parallel development of the P-40D would seem like more when possible modification, testing, and tooling for F4U production might begin.

Even if we assume Curtiss could get a derivative of the F4U airframe into production fairly quickly, there's still the issue of engine availability (compared to the P-40's V-1710 at the same time). Resorting to single-stage R-2800s or even R-2600s might have been practical to some extent or at least for still producing a fighter (and potential fighter-bomber) superior to the P-40 itself. (especially for export orders where application of inferior powerplants was more typical) Not sure if Curtiss's connection to Wright would create any bias for using the R-2600 either.



> The F4U-1 started out at about 417 mph top speed but the F4U-4 could hit 446 mph. The F4U-1 had an initial climb rate of 3,250 fpm and the F4U-4 had an initial climb rate of 4,170 fpm.
> 
> So Vought found some performance gains in the airframe. Curtiss might have found more .. or not, had they been concentrating on it. Can't say ... it's a "what-if."


It wouldn't even need to be a 'better' Corsair either, just a similar one or possibly a simplified one if anything (perhaps adapted to better optimize for Curtiss manufacturing) but something still significantly more potent than what Curtiss had been producing otherwise.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 3, 2015)

I believe part of the performance increase in the -4 was due to a new engine. Curtis could pound on the sheet metal all they wanted. Until P&W builds the "C" series -18 engine with 100-150 more hp military power (let alone wep) at most altitudes I wouldn't expect a big performance jump.


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## gjs238 (Jul 3, 2015)

Curtiss could have built P-51's, forget about P-47's.


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## GregP (Jul 3, 2015)

The P-47 was every bit the fighter the P-51 was. It had different strengths and weaknesses, but it was formidable. After the paddle-bladed prop came out, it was definitely the better performer of the two above 25,000 - 30,000 feet.

When I mentioned having Curtiss concentrate on other projects, I was assuming that would come after the P-40 was getting a bit dated. So my suggestion would not have affected early P-40 production. But I'm not sure they would have gotten to the "N" model before I would have asked them to pursue other avenues of endeavor.

I'd have disbanded Brewster or had their engineers assigned to other companies. Their internal quality control was laughable.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 4, 2015)

GregP said:


> I'd have disbanded Brewster or had their engineers assigned to other companies. Their internal quality control was laughable.


Yeah, had the Navy (or any branch of the US Government) investigated the situation sooner they'd probably have taken more drastic action. Brewster seemed to manage small scale production well enough, but was in no shape to expand that infrastructure (be it trying to force higher volumes out of their small initial facilities or trying to manage expanding to new plants) and aside from being outright disbanded/liquidated, it might have just made sense to keep them mainly as an engineering consulting firm with only limited manufacturing abilities. (enough to prototype their own aircraft in a timely manner and make small production runs, perhaps still handling export orders)

Having the Naval Aircraft Factory take over production of the F2A like it had the SBA/SBN might have changed the story of the Buffalo. (unless the Navy DID attempt that and Brewster wasn't forthcoming for a license, but that seems unlikely even with Brewster's level of management woes)

Expanding the Naval Aircraft Factory's capacity would have been a much better investment than expanding Brewster orders and expecting them to be capable of managing expansion.

That or encouraged/compelled a merger/buyout of Brewster by Grumman. (or another manufacturer, but Grumman seems the obvious choice not just as the major USN aircraft producer, but also given the relatively close proximity of Brewster and Grumman headquarters)






As for a Curtiss Corsair, if it could have been put into mass production in a reasonable amount of time, it should at least have made a superior fighter and fighter-bomber than the P-40 of the same time period as well as a better fighter-bomber/dive bomber than the A-36 or A-31. ( 'better' in the all around operational effectiveness sense at least, not necessarily in pure bombing accuracy -compared to the A-31 or raw top speed -compared to the A-36 at low altitude )

Perhaps one of the few notable 'improvements' Curtiss might (or should) have added would be bomb racks and possible drop tank plumbing. (also potentially replacing the unprotected wing tanks with self sealing fuel cells -likely of somewhat reduced capacity)

Any model intended for high altitude combat would obviously need to retain the 2-stage R-2800, but for low/medium altitude fighter/bomber or intruder work or low/medium altitude patrol, interceptor, or escort duties, single stage 2-speed R-2800 or R-2600 powered variants should have still been serviceable and useful.


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## GregP (Jul 4, 2015)

I'd have stopped production of "low-altitude" engines and concentrated on 2-stage or 1-stage+turbo units. Anytime a "low altitude" fighter needs to go high and fight, it can't. A high-atitude plane CAN funtion well down low. There is some justification for a low-altitude plane if there is air superiority but, otherwise, I can't really think of one in the ETO.

In the PTO, CBI, and maybe MTO ... maybe not ... there was some room for lower-altitude capability planes.

By "planes," I mean fighters. Why field a P-39 / P-40 when you can field a plane with altitude capability? If that's all you HAVE, use it, then start making better ones and deploying them to replace the single-stage units. Maybe even have a wholesale swap out and return the older airframes to be upgraded in the powerplant department.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 4, 2015)

GregP said:


> In the PTO, CBI, and maybe MTO ... maybe not ... there was some room for lower-altitude capability planes.


The MTO would be where the low-altitude optimized 7.48:1 supercharged Allison powered A-36s were allocated ... as fighter bombers in the ETO, they'd probably have done better to stick witht he 8.8 supercharger of the Mustang I/Ia. (maybe the 9.6:1 engines even)

But we're not just talking about single-speed superchargers, but 2-speed ones, so the comparison becomes more akin to the Merlin XX powered Hurricane II and P-40F/L depending on the 2-speed R-2800s and R-2600s in question. (some were tuned for lower critical altitudes than the Merlin XX, though that would still have the advantage when higher take-off power is needed while still having high gear for at least medium altitude capability -unlike the A-36 or Sptifire LF Mk.V)

I might be mistaken, but Wright also seemed to get better performance out of their single supercharger stages than P&W did. The R-1820 seemed to have an edge over the 1830 there (unless I'm mistaken and it was only the single SPEED R-1830s that fared worse), but then also the R-1820's development fared better than the R-2600's. (and the R-2600 never seemed to mate with turbochargers well for some reason)

Cranking out more 2-stage R-2800s would be ideal, though.


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## GregP (Jul 4, 2015)

I like both the 1820 and the 1830 myself. But almost everyone has their preferences. Mostly it falls down to what is in the plane you fly ... these days you wouldn't be swapping engines unless more than one was approved for the airframe. Some ARE approaved for multiple types. The Bt-13 / 15 comes to mind. One was a Wright and one was a Pratt.

As long s I'm "what-iffing," I might as well ask Allison to design an integral, 2-stage supercharger, and to leave room for speed changes if indicated in testing. Can't leave ANYTHING alone, huh?


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 4, 2015)

GregP said:


> I like both the 1820 and the 1830 myself. But almost everyone has their preferences. Mostly it falls down to what is in the plane you fly ... these days you wouldn't be swapping engines unless more than one was approved for the airframe. Some ARE approaved for multiple types. The Bt-13 / 15 comes to mind. One was a Wright and one was a Pratt.


With the Wildcat the switch between the two wasn't particularly messy either given the already large fuselage diameter, and the early Wildcats and Martlets downgraded to single-stage engines seem to have fared better on the R-1820s than 1830s (or at least close enough to make the increased cowling diameter inconsequential). And obviously the more powerful R-1820 of the FM-2 proved a net prerformance gain, especially in acceleration and climb.

It's not like the case of the Curtiss Hawk 75 where the performance margin of the R-1820 on some export models made it obvious that the altitude performance outstripped the added drag (and quite noticeably bulkier nose on that rather skinny fusealage). The F2A was never tested with an 1820, but given it's smaller size, I wonder if it would have benefited more than the Wildcat did. (in spite of its stubby, barrel shaped fuselage, it's still actually slimmer than the Wildcat, rather obvious by the fact that the F2A's engine cowling is very nearly the widest point on the entire aircraft, while the F4F clearly bulges out in the middle considerably further even on the Cyclone powered models)


But as to the 1830 vs 1820 argument, the 1820 was a much older design that saw near complete re-designs several times in its life (retaining little more than cylinder dimensions) while the 1830 was both newer and not stretched as far in development (perhaps in part due to the R-2000 taking over for higher power needs -granted, one could see the R-2000 as as much an evolution of the 1830 as later 1820s were of their predecessors). Given the diameter advantage, it's still odd Grumman went from R-1535 to R-1820 rather than R-1830. (including possibly the simpler single stage 1830s if weight was a serious problem -possible given the originally intended small engines)



> As long s I'm "what-iffing," I might as well ask Allison to design an integral, 2-stage supercharger, and to leave room for speed changes if indicated in testing. Can't leave ANYTHING alone, huh?


Well, most of my suggestions were actually downgrades to the basic F4U-1 configuration in the event that airframe production capacity exceeded 2-stage R-2800 production volumes and/or for export models. (akin to what happened to the export Buffaloes and Wildcats/Martlets) Plus the single-stage engines would cut costs (especially the 2600) and at least slightly close the gap further between the much cheaper P-40 itself. (even if the P-40 was obviously less capable in range, load hauling ability, and sheer performance, the added value alone doesn't always sell that well ... especially when you've got both the military and congress to work through, not to mention foreign buyers -or lend-lease production)

Pushing R-2600 powered Corsairs off to lend-lease might make the most sense.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 4, 2015)

OK, R-2600 powered F4U?
When?
Why?
Lend-lease to who and when?

The 1700hp R-2600 doesn't really show up much different than the 1850hp R-2800. So you don't really pick up anything in timing. The R-2600 is bigger in diameter. The Corsair was designed for an 1850hp engine minimum but two stage so it had good power at 18-22,000 ft. Cutting the power by 10% at even the lower altitudes means you have lighten the plane up by 1100-1200lbs to get near the same climb. Compared to service F4Us you are talking 15% less take off power, 400hp less at 10-14,000ft and with aux supercharger in high gear the F4U-1 had about 600hp more than the R-2600B did at around 22,000ft.
Even if you go for the low altitude ground pounder, the R-2600 gives up too much and it never got a WEP rating or water injection. Please compare the R-2600 power at 12,000ft to the Allison, then figure in the added weight, the added drag and then see what real advantage the plane would have over a P-40. Unless you stay really, really low AND have good escorts flying top cover, this doesn't look like a good option.


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## Koopernic (Jul 6, 2015)

I like the idea of the P-75. Its possibilities as a long range fighter bomber able to drag heavy loads such as torpedos, bombs, large rockets ultra long distance and replace aircraft such as the B-25, B-26 were probably not appreciated. It would be self escorting and thus highly efficient. It would have been better than the P-51 in over water missions.

Such matters weren't appreciated then.

A Naval style microwave radar on the wing, a second crew member would increase its versatility both as a night fighter and as a night time bomber and torpedo bomber against shipping.

Big is beautiful.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 6, 2015)

> It would be self escorting and thus highly efficient. It would have been better than the P-51 in over water missions



There really isn't any such thing as "self escorting". You _can_ use one squadron of fighter "X" to _escort_ another squadron of fighter "X" carrying bombs though. If our _long range fighter bomber_ has to drop it's bombs to defend itself then it is a mission kill for the defenders, no bombs dropped on the intended mission target. Mission has to be flown again the next time weather permits. Assuming it is not a shipping target and the the target is now out of range. 

Competition in the bomber category wasn't so much the B-25 and B-26 but the A-26. Sure you _can_ replace a twin engine bomber plane of a certain age with a newer twin engine "fighter-bomber" and get most of the range/payload but bumping a bomber that uses the same knowledge (aerodynamics and structure) is going to be a bit tougher.

Often big is beautiful, Grumman F7F first flew within 2 weeks of the first P-75 and the first P-75 looked like a dogs breakfast.


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## GregP (Jul 6, 2015)

If Big is beautiful, I really like the Boeing XF8B-1, 1st flight in 1944.

Imagine 1,000 of those headed anywhere with bad intentions.

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## kool kitty89 (Jul 6, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> I like the idea of the P-75. Its possibilities as a long range fighter bomber able to drag heavy loads such as torpedos, bombs, large rockets ultra long distance and replace aircraft such as the B-25, B-26 were probably not appreciated. It would be self escorting and thus highly efficient. It would have been better than the P-51 in over water missions.
> 
> Such matters weren't appreciated then.
> 
> ...


Wouldn't much of that also be applicable for the P-38, including the night fighter role?

And self-escorting is a bit of an odd issue: without dedicated escorts, you'd be forced to release bombs and drop tanks in order to properly evade or engage interceptors, effective for pilot and aircraft survival, not so good for operational effectiveness.

Now if you mean self-escorting in that the same model planes could be configured for both bomber and escort dueties and bombed-up fighter-bombers could be escorted by other aircraft of the same type, that would make more sense while allowing the ratio or fighters to bombers vary from mission to mission and save on both fuel and bomb resources. (with the added benefit of the 'bombers' STILL having the option to drop their load early and fight or run just as well as the escorts)


The P-51, P-47, and F4U would have some potential there too, but the P-51 would have issues carrying a drop tank and bomb due to shifting weight issues as fuel is consumed so most likely would only use internal fuel. The P-47 and F4U have more options for ordinance, and the F4U in particular has its bomb/tank racks all on the centerline to minimize weight shifts more like the P-38.

The P-38 still has the advantage of being able to carry a massive 300 US gal drop tank along with an additional 1600 or 2000 lb bomb (depending on the model).


The P-38 also should have been able to be adapted to carrying anti-tank and anti-material cannons in the nose. The M4/M10 of the P-39/P-63 would be useful against some 'soft' but heavy targets without the performance penalty or inaccuracy that wing-mounted rockets posed and the higher powered M9 37 mm cannon should be possible to fit as well and useful against some armor. (beyond what the hispano was already capable of)


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## Koopernic (Jul 7, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Wouldn't much of that also be applicable for the P-38, including the night fighter role?
> 
> And self-escorting is a bit of an odd issue: without dedicated escorts, you'd be forced to release bombs and drop tanks in order to properly evade or engage interceptors, effective for pilot and aircraft survival, not so good for operational effectiveness.





Shortround6 said:


> There really isn't any such thing as "self escorting". You _can_ use one squadron of fighter "X" to _escort_ another squadron of fighter "X" carrying bombs though.



The problem with fighter bombers based on say the Me 109, Spitfire P40 is that these aircraft were too small to carry a bomb load that was worthwhile without loosing performance; speed and range. They don't have range to begin with.

A Fisher P-75 or Boeing XF8B-1 has range, even with bombs. They are also not going to slow down much with a load. 

When the Luftwaffe worked out their bomb shackles they had a fighter in the Fw 190G that could haul a bomb to a target deep in enemy territory 1000km away and return. Speed loss was about 50km/hr which was almost restored with C3 einspritziung. They used the aircraft with blind bombing systems and it was only a moderately sized fighter. 

As for the Big fighters such as the P-75 and XF8B-1
1 Long range even with bombs, same as medium bomber.
2 Speed loss limited to such a degree that interception was unlikely anyway (compare that to slowly having 6 men in a medium bomber try to fight this way in their way in and then out again) so a mission kill is unlikely.
3 Can start to carry sophisticated devices for instance radar on the wing to find and 'blind' attack enemy aircraft and enemy shipping with bombs and torpedos.
4 blind bombing systems such as Oboe, Gee-H, Micro-H allow a single engine aircraft to level bomb.
5 Electronic navigation to help the pilot find his way home.
6 such large aircraft could carry a second man if necessary.

The final nail in the coffin for medium bombers was the development of toss bombing sights. 

Bombing of targets behind enemy lines was possible with such aircraft but I saw them more as replacing medium bombers rather than strategic bombers.

These were all coming in toward the end of WW2 had the big aircraft been available sooner the systems would have been developed sooner. The P-75 didn't have to wait for a R-4360.

There is no such thing as a medium bomber anymore. There are F-15E doing that job.


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## Milosh (Jul 7, 2015)

A 500SC and 2 300l. drop tanks resulted in a speed loss of 50mph to 56mph, not 50kph, depending on the ETC rack used.

This was at climb and combat power.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 7, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> The problem with fighter bombers based on say the Me 109, Spitfire P40 is that these aircraft were too small to carry a bomb load that was worthwhile without loosing performance; speed and range. They don't have range to begin with.



True but then they weren't part of the discussion to begin with. P-40 was never "official" tested with large bomb loads. large being relative but their are photos of them carrying six 250lb bombs. The Last "N"s were rated for three 500lb bombs and there are reports of them using 1000lb bombs in Italy. Given a long runway a late model P-40 might be able to carry two 500lb bombs and a drop tank. 



> A Fisher P-75 or Boeing XF8B-1 has range, even with bombs. They are also not going to slow down much with a load.



1/2 right. The Boeing XF8B-1 could carry at least a couple of bombs _inside_. Put a couple of drop tanks on the outside for the early part of the mission and you might get an impressive range (beware of some internet ranges, being a Navy plane a lot of the range figures are for around 190mph at low altitude.) XP-75 was only rated for a pair of 500lb bombs. Granted it might not have taken much work to increase that but an internal bay was out. Engines and fuel taking up most of the volume near the the CG. The more "stuff" you hang outside the worse the performance gets. 




> As for the Big fighters such as the P-75 and XF8B-1
> 1 Long range even with bombs, same as medium bomber.
> 2 Speed loss limited to such a degree that interception was unlikely anyway (compare that to slowly having 6 men medium their way in and then out again) so a mission kill is unlikely.
> 3 Can start to carry sophisticated devices for instance radar on the wing to find and 'blind' attack enemy aircraft and enemy shipping with bombs and torpedos.
> ...



The Big fighter being able to carry the same bomb load as far as an _equivalent_ medium bomber takes a bit of swallowing. Or more than a bit. Being able to come close to previous generation bombers is lot more believable but then you are comparing planes in service world wide in 1942 to planes that would NOT have entered squadron service until mid/late 1945 at best. Try comparing the "BIG" fighter to the A-26 or the B-42.







3750 pounds over a range of 1850 miles (?). It would hold four 2000lb bombs inside. 



> The final nail in the coffin for medium bombers was the development of toss bombing sights.



That nail took until the early to mid 50s even begin to be a reliable method. 




> These were all coming in toward the end of WW2 had the big aircraft been available sooner the systems would have been developed sooner. The P-75 didn't have to wait for a R-4360.



No, it had to wait for a V-3420 with two stage supercharger when Allison was having trouble building V-1710s with two stage superchargers. One of the P-75As was bailed back to Allison under a no payment contract for further engine development work _after_ The P-75 contract was canceled so perhaps it's performance figures should be taken with a few grains of salt. 



> There is no such thing as a medium bomber anymore. There are F-15E doing that job.



This rather confuses the march of progress. AN F-15E weighs empty only about 400lbs less than a Martin B-26 at mean weight. One might also consider that the B-47E bomber only had about 75% of the installed power of an F-15E.
One might also want to consider the actual bomb loads, speed and radius of a B-66B with only a bit more power than 1/3 the power of an F-15E and being about 30 years older. One also wonders what Ed Heinemann and Douglas could have done with engines that weighed about 75% of the engines used in the B-66 while giving about 40% more thrust _without afterburner_ and with better fuel consumption. 

Comparing airplanes of different generations/types and claiming that they way they are used now shows what could have done then (30-40 years before) ignores a whole lot of things.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 7, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> The problem with fighter bombers based on say the Me 109, Spitfire P40 is that these aircraft were too small to carry a bomb load that was worthwhile without loosing performance; speed and range. They don't have range to begin with.
> 
> A Fisher P-75 or Boeing XF8B-1 has range, even with bombs. They are also not going to slow down much with a load.
> 
> When the Luftwaffe worked out their bomb shackles they had a fighter in the Fw 190G that could haul a bomb to a target deep in enemy territory 1000km away and return. Speed loss was about 50km/hr which was almost restored with C3 einspritziung. They used the aircraft with blind bombing systems and it was a moderately sized fighter.


The Bf 109, P-39, P-40, Typhoon, and Fw 190 were all less capable fighter-bombers than the likes of the P-47 and F4U in terms of combination of performance, load, and range (the Tempest and Fury might be more competitive but still shorter legged on the whole and I'm not entirely sure where the F6F might fit in).

The P-38 takes the load+range capabilities a bit further and the F7F further still while both were adaptable to nightfighter roles too. (similar for the De Havilland Hornet as well)

The Fw 187 might have developed into something along the same lines as well, likely more akin to the P-38 than the later F7F (or Hornet).

The Me 410, Ar 240, and Mosquito as bombers/fighter-bombers seem to fit in more of an odd middleground there as none was really capable of performing day fighter duties, unlike the P-38. (granted, the Hornet and F7F were no longer capable day fighters by the time they actually saw combat, but as late WWII aircraft they were more competitive even during the transition to early jets) 




Shortround6 said:


> OK, R-2600 powered F4U?
> 
> Even if you go for the low altitude ground pounder, the R-2600 gives up too much and it never got a WEP rating or water injection. Please compare the R-2600 power at 12,000ft to the Allison, then figure in the added weight, the added drag and then see what real advantage the plane would have over a P-40. Unless you stay really, really low AND have good escorts flying top cover, this doesn't look like a good option.


I was thinking in terms of both the British and Soviet lend-lease P-40 deliveries in the event sufficient R-2800 production wasn't initially available. Admittedly, this seems unlikely (in as far as Corsair production outstripping R-2800 production). The 1850 hp single-stage R-2800 would seem a more realistic alternate choice there. I was admittedly also thinking in comparison to the R-2600 powered P-36/P-40 derivative and the Corsair airframe being better suited to the engine in terms of existing dimensions, aerodynamics, and fuel capacity. (and potential external load carrying capacity)

I guess there's still probably more useful places for R-2600s at the time though, at least if you assume both A-20s, B-25s, A-31s, SB2As, and SB2Cs are all more effective bombers and attack aircraft all around than R-2600 powered Corsair derivatives in their respective roles. (or, rather in the SB2A's case, just better allotted to one of those other R-2600 powered aircraft ... likely the same for the A-31, and also admittedly some of those used older engines before the Corsair would likely see service -or be more crippled by the 1600 hp limitation- ... or wilder ideas like trying to cram those 1939/40 vintage R-2600s into F4F or P-36 airframes)

I suppose the P-36 airframe mated to an R-2600 might make a semi-decent early war fighter-bomber in the sense the Jabo Fw 190s later did, but it really seems like the size and capacity of the F4U (and dive bombing capability) would make more sense in the attack role. (other than that, it's just the existing R-2600 powered bombers that would be better for those roles ... the question was more whether the F4U might manage better than SOME of those as well as SOME roles the Allison powered P-40 performed historically while possibly being a bit faster flying/climbing/turning/rolling than the existing P-40E)


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## Shortround6 (Jul 7, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> I suppose the P-36 airframe mated to an R-2600 might make a semi-decent early war fighter-bomber in the sense the Jabo Fw 190s later did, but it really seems like the size and capacity of the F4U (and dive bombing capability) would make more sense in the attack role. (other than that, it's just the existing R-2600 powered bombers that would be better for those roles ... the question was more whether the F4U might manage better than SOME of those as well as SOME roles the Allison powered P-40 performed historically while possibly being a bit faster flying/climbing/turning/rolling than the existing P-40E)



The P-40 seems to get a bit maligned at times. Yes it was a bit underpowered and a bit overweight but it actually wasn't too bad drag wise. It was within 10-15mph of a Spitfire V at 20,000ft when powered by a Merlin, the extra 1000lbs of weight are what killed the climb and altitude performance. 
Sticking a high drag radial on the airframe _unless_ you can come up with an installation close to the FW 190s isn't going to help much because you are just sucking up a lot of the extra power fighting the extra drag. 

A P-40F was 'supposed' to do 350mph at 12,800ft in low blower. A P-40E was supposed to be good for about 340mph. A F4U-1 was 'supposed' to do about 360mph at 13,000ft using 1650hp (normal or max continuous rating) it would go faster using Military power. The 1700hp for take-off R-2600 was only good for about 1400hp at 13,000ft at Military rating. Cut 250hp from the Corsair and see the speed drop. You _might_ get a bomb truck out of it but you no longer have a fighter after the bombs are gone, at least not a very good one. You have the same problem as the P-40, too much weight for not enough engine. Even if you can lighten up the Corsair by 1000lbs or so by using the lighter R-2600, a smaller prop and less fuel you then have a 10,200lb plane with a 1400hp engine at 13,000ft while the real F4U-1 had 1800-1850hp up to about 18,000ft for its 11,200lb weight. The P-40E had 1100hp or so for 8000lbs. Power to weight winds up within a few % and the R-2600 Corsair is well behind the curve on drag compared to a P-40E. 

If you are going to be slow and climb like crap you might as well bite the bullet and stick the rear gunner in.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 8, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> A P-40F was 'supposed' to do 350mph at 12,800ft in low blower. A P-40E was supposed to be good for about 340mph. A F4U-1 was 'supposed' to do about 360mph at 13,000ft using 1650hp (normal or max continuous rating) it would go faster using Military power. The 1700hp for take-off R-2600 was only good for about 1400hp at 13,000ft at Military rating. Cut 250hp from the Corsair and see the speed drop. You _might_ get a bomb truck out of it but you no longer have a fighter after the bombs are gone, at least not a very good one. You have the same problem as the P-40, too much weight for not enough engine. Even if you can lighten up the Corsair by 1000lbs or so by using the lighter R-2600, a smaller prop and less fuel you then have a 10,200lb plane with a 1400hp engine at 13,000ft while the real F4U-1 had 1800-1850hp up to about 18,000ft for its 11,200lb weight. The P-40E had 1100hp or so for 8000lbs. Power to weight winds up within a few % and the R-2600 Corsair is well behind the curve on drag compared to a P-40E.


Hmm, yes, and what might be gained in (maybe) better wing loading/higher lift airfoil compared to the P-40 would tend to be a loss in dive and zoom climb performance. (the higher weight of the standard F4U-1 would be an advantage there too given weight = thrust in a dive) 



> If you are going to be slow and climb like crap you might as well bite the bullet and stick the rear gunner in.


And at that point, adapting the likes of the SBD to use an R-2600 would probably make more sense. (and an R-2600 powered land or carrier based F4F should perform better than the similarly powered F4U too -and match far better to the engine than the P-36's slim/low drag frame and smaller wing)

The P-36 airframe really was best mated to a V-12 engine ... putting as much effort into low drag radiator/oil cooler configurations on the P-40 as they had radial cowlings on the XP-42 probably would have been one of the better investments Curtis could have made. (compared to British fighters, the delay in WEP ratings hurt low/middle altitude performance a good deal too -including V-1650-1 WEP)


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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2015)

Grumman had studied (two different design numbers at least) putting a R-2600 in the F4F, they came to the conclusion it needed a new airfame. 

One problem you have with a lot of these "stick the R-2600 in it" schemes is that the US did not have a 4 bladed propeller in production during the _planing_ stages of some of these schemes. They got one with the B-26 but there must have been some reason the F4U used that huge 3 bladed prop and they jumped though all the hoops with the bent wing to help fit it. Now maybe you don't _need_ the big diameter prop if you stay at low level where the air is thick but you don't use a prop designed for 11-1200hp on a 1600-1700hp engine either. You not only get a heavier prop but the bigger diameter will call for longer landing gear which means.........
F4Fs had trouble taxiing as it was. 
SBD's seemed to lag a bit behind on getting the latest R-1820s. Sticking and extra 600lbs of dry engine in the nose might not be that easy either.

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## kool kitty89 (Jul 9, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Grumman had studied (two different design numbers at least) putting a R-2600 in the F4F, they came to the conclusion it needed a new airfame.
> 
> One problem you have with a lot of these "stick the R-2600 in it" schemes is that the US did not have a 4 bladed propeller in production during the _planing_ stages of some of these schemes. They got one with the B-26 but there must have been some reason the F4U used that huge 3 bladed prop and they jumped though all the hoops with the bent wing to help fit it. Now maybe you don't _need_ the big diameter prop if you stay at low level where the air is thick but you don't use a prop designed for 11-1200hp on a 1600-1700hp engine either. You not only get a heavier prop but the bigger diameter will call for longer landing gear which means.........
> F4Fs had trouble taxiing as it was.


Indeed, I dug up the old discussion on R-2600 powered fighters and saw the extensive details on all that, particularly between your and Tomo's posts. The Wildcat does indeed have a bunch of limitations that would be made worse with the R-2600 installed (particularly those related to the landing gear: track, length, supension, and retraction mechanisms) For the R-2600 to be properly utilized it would mean more or less a similar progression in development that the F6F later saw. The only problem there is that didn't go beyond paper until 1941 and didn't fly until 1942 at which point the 2-stage R-2800 was the obvious choice for mass production.

An earlier Hellcat of sorts might have actually made sense to bring into service with the R-2600 had its design and testing started 2-3 years earlier, allowing an R-2600 powered Hellcat to enter production around the same time as the F4F-4 did historically. (possibly earlier if they'd foregone the F4F-3 entirely and started on the Hellcat -or equivalent new airframe- back in 1937/38, but then you'd need the F2A to hold the fort in the interim and for smaller/escort carrier use, and that too might have worked out fine if not limited to using Brewster manufacturing; adapting it to the 2-stage R-1830 would help make the F2A more useful as well)

I suppose that would be the point too: the R-2600 only really makes sense for a purpose-built fighter optimized for it AND developed early enough to take advantage in the initial development and mass production leads (of the 1600 and 1700 HP models) over the R-2800. So the Corsair doesn't really make sense there either ... rather odd the Hellcat still ended up targeting the 2600 in '41/42 for that matter.

As a final note on the Wildcat: the only other possibly useful engine might have been the R-2000 but that would be in the similar vein as the R-1820 the FM-2 already used historically, not really available any sooner though smaller in diameter and more power without water injection. That and introducing a powered landing gear retraction mechanism. (given the torque required for that manual crank, it seems like introducing a small electric motor to drive it would be pretty straightforward and simplify take-off and landing procedures)
That and there's an argument that the performance loss between the F4F-3 and F4F-4 wasn't worth the added utility gained from the modifications.



Also, as far as Curtiss aircraft are concerned: the 2-stage R-1820 would probably be the only real competitor to the V-1710 in terms of P-36/P-40 developments. (and with the conventional P-36 cowling, would be slower than the P-40 below 15000 ft, dive worse, but maybe climb and turn a little better -we've been over the trade-offs here before though) Definitely more interesting than an R-2600 powered P-36 derivative at very least.


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## gjs238 (Jul 9, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> <SNIP> the US did not have a 4 bladed propeller in production during the _planing_ stages of some of these schemes. They got one with the B-26 but there must have been some reason the F4U used that huge 3 bladed prop and they jumped though all the hoops with the bent wing to help fit it. Now maybe you don't _need_ the big diameter prop if you stay at low level where the air is thick but you don't use a prop designed for 11-1200hp on a 1600-1700hp engine either. You not only get a heavier prop but the bigger diameter will call for longer landing gear which means.........



How did the F6F deal with this issue?


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 9, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> How did the F6F deal with this issue?


Longer landing gear. Not very practical to add on the F4F. The bent wing on the F4U allowed shorter landing gear that could double as dive breaks. I think the P-47 may have had less prop clearance than either the F4U or F6F.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2015)

F6F just used big landing gear  

Grumman used the retract into-the-fuselage gear on the Wildcat. They used an outward retracting gear (of considerable size) on the Avenger and then used Boeing style rearward retracting gear on the Hellcat. Like big P-40 gear (Curtiss paid royalties to Boeing). P-47 used landing gear that retracted 9" in length _as_ it retracted into the wing to have room for the gun bays and it used a smaller diameter prop than the navy planes. The F6F also had the biggest wing of the 3. According to AHT the F6F used a prop 3 in smaller than the F4U and had about 1.6in less clearance. For all three it was a juggling act to fit the landing gear into the wing and leave room for the gun bays and on the Navy planes the wing fold. 

The thing is ALL 3 of the fighters designed to use these big radials were designed to use the engines and propellers from the start. They weren't trying to shoe-horn a 1600-1700hp engine with an 11-11.5 ft prop into an airframe designed for a 11-1200hp engine (and the Curtiss P-36 started with a 900hp engine) and a 9.5-10ft prop. AS four blade props became more common they could be used to fit higher powered engines into existing planes (P-51 for one) but that is just a bit too late for most/all of the R-2600 powered fighters in Dec of 1941 schemes.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Longer landing gear. Not very practical to add on the F4F. The bent wing on the F4U allowed shorter landing gear that could double as dive breaks. I think the P-47 may have had less prop clearance than either the F4U or F6F.



Correct, From what I could find in AHT the P-47 had a fraction over 4in, The F6F had a bit over 7 in and the F4U had 9in.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 9, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Correct, From what I could find in AHT the P-47 had a fraction over 4in, The F6F had a bit over 7 in and the F4U had 9in.


Wikipedia throws out a 6 inch clearance figure for the P-47 for what that's worth. (at a guess the 6 vs 4 inches could be differences between the toothpick and paddle props)

The 3-bladed XF6F-1 seems like it has a bit more clearance than the 3 or 4-blade R-2800 powered versions, but it might be an optical illusion.

http://static.thisdayinaviation.com...at-Bu.-No.-02981-left-front-quarter-large.jpg

vs

http://greec.free.fr/word/Monographie_Hellcat/Grumman F6F HELLCAT_fichiers/image002.jpg
http://www.afwing.com/images/f6f/xf6f-3.jpg

vs 

http://static.thisdayinaviation.com...d-11-May-1944.jpg.pagespeed.ic.sUdujQVtMo.jpg

vs 

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/XF6F-6_Hellcat_NAN9-88.JPG


I couldn't find any XF6F-1 pictures in a blade-down position to make it more obvious.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 11, 2015)

Not really on topic but given the P&W engine supercharger talks in here and not thinking it's complex enough to merit starting a new thread and I keep forgetting to ask for clarification when it comes up but:

The 'neutral' setting in the auxiliary supercharger stage on P&W engines (or at least R-1830 and R-2800), when set to neutral does the aux stage also get bypassed by some sort of valve in the intake manifold or is it left in series with the freewheeling impeller putting some degree of drag (and possibly throttle lag) on the intake airflow? The latter seems the simpler and more likely case and probably has similar aerodynamic impact as a swirl-type throttle inlet but more like having the guide vanes stuck at some fixed position. (so limiting the critical altitude for the take-off/neutral position but not really decreasing peak power like a throttle plate or kink in the intake manifold would -similar peak power but at a somewhat reduced critical altitude)

If it's really close to the behavior of a swirl throttle, it might actually increase take-off power by reducing the critical altitude for the integral supercharger. (allowing throttle plates in the carb inlet to be closer to full open on take-off)


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## Shortround6 (Jul 11, 2015)

I am not sure about the the one on the Wildcat but the F4U used doors in the ducts to bypass the Auxiliary stage and provide "RAM" air to the carb on the engine supercharger. The F6F did NOT and air _always_ went through the auxiliary supercharger and intercooler. 

Since the early F4U could only hold take off power of 2000hp to around 15-1600ft (Yes hundreds, not thousands) I would say that the supercharger on the engine was pretty much optimized for sea level take off as it was. 

For a power at altitude chart see: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4u/02155-level.jpg


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 11, 2015)

Perhaps the Corsair's arrangement saw its greatest gains in terms of cruise performance with somewhat better specific fuel consumption due to ram and lack of suction losses. (in conditions of wide-open throttle in neutral gear)

The Corsair's higher speed might mean a bit more gain from ram airflow as well.


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## GregP (Jul 12, 2015)

Navy fighters HAD to have more clearance since they were landing on carriers. The full stroke of the gear was going to be used most of the time with some oaccasional slight leaning forward of the nose until the arrester wire stopped the nose-over with tsnsion.

Standard Navy requirments for shipborne aircraft of the time with conventional landing gear.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 12, 2015)

Quite true. The problem starts to come in when people here in the forum want to take an existing fighter with clearance "X" and "simply" stuff in a much larger engine which needs a bigger prop which will reduce clearance to "0" or negative numbers. To get the clearance back you need longer landing (or bigger wheels or....?).


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 12, 2015)

I seem to recall the ferried P-47s that were carrier launched had to use catapults in a 3-point take-off configuration. I think P-40s managed conventional deck take-offs well enough for ferrying, but landing would obviously be another story. (tail-hook issues aside, there's the beating the gear has to take and the tire pressure limits for carrier deck impacts)


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## GregP (Jul 13, 2015)

Or leave the prop diameter the same and go to wider chord blades or more blades.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 13, 2015)

In the case of a switch from the R-1830 to R-2600, using more blades or wider chord blades (or both) would still leave the problem of the larger diameter engine cowling obscuring several inches more of the prop blades. I'm sure good cowling design minimizing thrust losses would be important here, but I'd think there'd still be some losses in any case. Admittedly, you'd be in a similar situation for the R-1820 (albeit less extreme given the shorter engine and lesser cooling airflow requirements) but in either case this may be a bigger concern than raw drag added to the airframe from increased frontal area. (particularly on aircraft with bulky fuselages already considerably wider than the engine/cowling diameter -unlike the Fw 190 or P-36)


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## Shortround6 (Jul 13, 2015)

In a perfect world the available props would always match the needs of every engine and airframe combination. The real world wasn't quite so accommodating. The availability of 4 and 5 blade props lagged behind the need at times. The same with wide cord blades. The engine makers got ahead of the prop makers at times. The engine maker often only had to make a few different models of the same engine (at one time). The prop maker had to make enough different prop hub and blade combinations to suit the same engine for fighters to bombers and transports. 

The Lockheed Ventura never got a 4 bladed prop. It did get some rather wide cord 3 blade ones to suit it's limited space for propellers. 











But it was somewhat later in timing than many/most of the R-2600 fighter proposals. Venturas were also noted for being rather fast at low altitudes. Speed at altitude wasn't as marked. 

" Two Pratt Whitney R-2800-31 rated at 2000 hp for takeoff, 1600 hp at 11,900 feet. Performance: Maximum speed 322 mph at 13,800 feet, 296 mph at sea level." for a PV-1. 
Due to the engine or perhaps the props had something to do with it? A 12ft prop has around 43% more 'area' than a 10 ft prop. What works well at sea level doesn't work so well as the air thins out.

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## GregP (Jul 13, 2015)

True. but Navy Patrol planes didn't need great altitude performance since they were searching for small targets in the ocean and if they got too high, they coundn't see much detail. So it wasn't much of a factor. I am under the impression that most of the Lockheed twins were not used at high altitudes, but that could just be my impression and unrelated to actual use. I never specifically looked into them much since I was always more interested in fighters and bombers in large-scale use.

Had they needed the altitude performance, however, everything you said would have and does come into play. Natrually, there were obviously some higher altitude uses for them and I was speaking of the most common uses of the Lockheeds, not an absolute rule. Some people out there always assume absolute rules and war makes them seldom true.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 13, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Due to the engine or perhaps the props had something to do with it? A 12ft prop has around 43% more 'area' than a 10 ft prop. What works well at sea level doesn't work so well as the air thins out.


The same was true for part of the reasoning for adding the broader chord props to the P-38K (better thrust at high altitude, though I suspect better low speed thrust/climb performance at all altitudes would also be relevant).

High speed drag vs thrust on larger area propellers varies a good deal as well as was seen with the variety of paddle props tested on the P-47. P-47 Performance Tests A 20 inch prop diameter (10 inch radius/ground clearance) range in the props tested there too.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 13, 2015)

The Lockheed twins went through quite a history of change. They started as the Lockheed 14 Super Electra with 875hp 9 cylinder P&W Hornets or 900hp Cyclones. They crept up to 1100-1200hp twin wasps or Cyclones and got a Fuselage stretch to become the Lockheed 18 Lodestar. A few were built as B-37s with 1700hp R-2600s but the majority of the contract was switched to R-2800 engines. PV-2 got a bigger wing but it was outboard of the engine nacelles. Ultimate performer was the Howard 500 executive transport with post war 2500hp R-2800CB engines, prop hubs from F4U-4s (according to wiki) and prop blades (cut ?) and spinners from DC-6s. The Howard 500 shared only certain parts with the Lockheeds. 





Even the slightly older Howard Super Venturas got landing gear from the PV-2 Harpoons to handle the higher weight. 

Weight _empty_ had doubled, from 10,750lbs for an Early 14 with Cyclone 9s to 23,000lbs for the Howard 500 ( which had a pressurized fuselage and new, wet wings). The change took almost 20 years. Granted that could be speeded up some but stuffing 1700-2000hp engines into planes originally built for 900-1100hp engines does take a bit of doing.


The Navy got away with the 3 bladed props and they worked pretty well for what the Navy wanted/used the PV-1/PV-2 for. But a small diameter 3 bladed prop with narrow blades in 1941/early 1942 probably wouldn't have given the performance the advocates of an early R-2600 powered fighter are looking for.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 13, 2015)

The P-47 tests are also a good example of showing prop changes having the biggest impact on rate of climb at all altitudes (and would likewise apply to take-off performance), so even aircraft or engines not needed or suited for high altitude propeller performance would still have concerns for large prop areas and good efficiencies at low level in as far as low speed thrust for take-off, climb, and sustained turn performance.

Besides, if you want high altitude performance in the F4F, the 2-stage R-1830 was going to be the better bet in 1940 anyway. (the likes of the F2A's R-1820-40 might fare better too given the power/thrust to weight in play compared to R-2600s available at the time or even the later B series -I haven't seen full details on the R-1820-40, but it seems to have somewhat higher critical altitudes than the R-1820s used on the Martlets, maybe closer to the FM-2's R-1820-56 without water injection; still more frontal area and less power than the 2-stage R-1830 though)

The R-2600 would have better fit a USN fighter somewhat smaller/lighter than the Corsair or F6F-3 optimized for the larger engine and aimed at combat below 16,000 ft. (also early enough to actually make the R-2600 attractive and necessarily considering both the older/lighter/less powerful A series engines as well as potential 1700 hp B series variants -and possibly R-2800 powered developments) Sticking any R-2600 into a direct F4F-derived airframe would probably end up with something worse than the F4F-3, and going back to the drawing board was the only sensible solution. (my remaining point is simply that Grumman could have done so much earlier than the XF6F-1 being built in 1942, potentially as a direct follow-on to the XF4F-2 -developing an outright successor replacement for the F2A rather than developing the F4F into a viable competitor -of course, Grumman was also putting resources into the XF5F in the same late 1930s time period)


Anyway, none of this really applies to Curtiss given they didn't have a major stake in the carrier borne fighter arena.


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## GregP (Jul 14, 2015)

Here's one that got an engine MUCH larger than designed for. I don't have the test flight results, but it looks good on paper ... sort of ...






Looks like it got a very expensive polish job, too! I bet THAT took awhile ... of course, now you can see it from 100 miles away in the sun! The engine-out performance suffered, though.

I wonder which way that center wheel retracts.

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## Elmas (Jul 14, 2015)

GregP said:


> Here's one that got an engine MUCH larger than designed for. I don't have the test flight results, but it looks good on paper ... sort of ...
> 
> View attachment 296724
> 
> ...



Yes, but this model of B29 was expecially developed for dive-bombing.....


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## GregP (Jul 14, 2015)

That's very good!

I hadn't even considered dive bombing. Maybe it's the fastest bomber with a propeller ever built since it only has the drag of one engine. But the Reynolds number is 911.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 14, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Anyway, none of this really applies to Curtiss given they didn't have a major stake in the carrier borne fighter arena.



True but the P-36 used a prop not much bigger than 10ft and had 8 3/4in clearance. A number of people have suggested a P-36 with the R-2600 while "waiting" for the R-2800 powered planes. Without wide cord blades it really wasn't going to be practical. The wide cord blades showed up. But by the time they did the R-2800 powered planes were in production. 

As for Don Berlin and Curtiss: a few quotes form Joe Baughers web page on the XP-55. 

"The Curtiss XP-55 Ascender was another response to Circular Proposal R-40C, which was issued on November 27, 1939. It called for a fighter that would be much more effective than any extant--with a top speed, rate of climb, maneuverability, armament, and pilot visibility, all of which would be far superior to those of any existing fighter."

"The Curtiss entry, designated CW-24 by the company, was perhaps the most unconventional of the four finalists. It was to be one of the last projects supervised by Donovan Berlin before he left the Curtiss company to go over to Fisher to work on the P-75.... Curtiss proposed to use the new and untried Pratt Whitney X-1800-A3G (H-2600) liquid-cooled engine, mounted behind the pilot's cockpit and driving a pusher propeller. Project maximum speed was no less than 507 mph"

"On June 22, 1940, the Curtiss-Wright company received an Army contract for preliminary engineering data and a powered wind tunnel model. The designation P-55 was reserved for the project."

Due to the army's doubts about the project the full scale flying model was built with low powered engine (275hp) and the project was delayed. Cancellation of the intended engine didn't help either. At any rate " On July 10, 1942, a USAAF contract was issued for three prototypes under the designation XP-55." and finally "It made its first test flight on July 19, 1943" 

By this time Don Berlin had been gone from Curtiss for over a year. 

Several things can be drawn from this time line. One was that Don Berlin's leaving from Curtiss had little to do with the down fall of the company. Another is that in 1939/1940 the Army wasn't interested in more "interim" fighters, it already had the P-39 and P-40 as interim fighters to tide them over until the P-38 and P-47 got going. They were interested in, and funding, a _new generation_ of fighters. ALL of which fell fell on their asses, leaving them with improved P-38s, P-47s and the outsider the P-51.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 14, 2015)

I guess I was wrong, I thought the XP-55 got called the Assender because of the engine in the rear, but maybe there was a little double meaning there, it fell on it's ass too.

I know it's official name was Ascender, but we know how people are.

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## kool kitty89 (Jul 14, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> True but the P-36 used a prop not much bigger than 10ft and had 8 3/4in clearance. A number of people have suggested a P-36 with the R-2600 while "waiting" for the R-2800 powered planes. Without wide cord blades it really wasn't going to be practical. The wide cord blades showed up. But by the time they did the R-2800 powered planes were in production.


A dedicated R-2600 (probably with provisions to be adapted to the R-2800) powered fighter would have made more sense from a land-based fighter perspective too, but adapting the P-36 airframe has a ton of disadvantages. The V-1710 and R-1830 (particularly the 2-stage version) would seem the best potential new developments to go with in the 1939-1941 timeframe.

Developing a dedicated big-radial 1600-2000 HP class engine optimized airframe in leu of the initial XP-46 and XP-60 developments might have had more merit though. (the P-36/P-40 airframe already having fairly good drag characteristics and being well suited to the smaller engines while something totally new would much better match the characteristics of those larger engines -plus the ongoing cowling studies on the XP-42 could be fed into that work sooner than it eventually was on the delayed/troubled XP-60 program)



> Several things can be drawn from this time line. One was that Don Berlin's leaving from Curtiss had little to do with the down fall of the company. Another is that in 1939/1940 the Army wasn't interested in more "interim" fighters, it already had the P-39 and P-40 as interim fighters to tide them over until the P-38 and P-47 got going. They were interested in, and funding, a _new generation_ of fighters. ALL of which fell fell on their asses, leaving them with improved P-38s, P-47s and the outsider the P-51.


There was also Bell's XP-52 and XP-59 projects canceled in part to divert resources to the XP-59A jet project. That design seems like it might have been less troublesome than the likes of the XP-56 and XP-55 but certainly could have just ended up one more failure. The more conventional P-63 of course fell behind the P-51's development and failed to address any sorts of long-range requirements. (the XP-59 still seems interesting in that it might have actually converted well to the J33 later in development -size and pusher arrangement of the R-2800 would seem to fit well if the tailplane was repositioned, Vampire/Venom style, and perhaps made for interesting competition to the XP-80 project)

The number of projects upset more by pie in the sky engine developments (or lack thereof) certainly didn't help matters either. Hell, the number of designs held back by targeting the Army's pet XI-1430 is insane.


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## gjs238 (Jul 14, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Several things can be drawn from this time line. *One was that Don Berlin's leaving from Curtiss had little to do with the down fall of the company.* <SNIP>



Do you infer that Curtiss was doing very well before and after Don Berlin left and that his exit had no effect?
Or do you mean that Curtiss was already sliding downhill well prior to Don's exit?


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## GregP (Jul 14, 2015)

Curtiss and Bell had the much same problems.

Most of the Curtiss designs were remarkably like the P-36 up to and including the XP-46 and even the XP-60 was similar but adapted to a radial. They never seemed to come up with something fresh.

Bell's designs were remarkably similar to one another. The Airacuda, Airacobra, King Cobra, and the XP-59A were all very similar airrames structurally and in terms of a lot of other characteristics.

When you have a family of planes, each of which is a bit disappointing in the level of performance versus the competition, it's time for a fresh approach, not a mild redesign. North american's approach was to say, "We can do better than a P-40 with the same engine." and they did. It was the XP-51.

The P-47 was evolutionary from the P-35, but with each evolution the performance increased. Ultimately the P-47N was one of the fastest planes of WWII.

The last P-40 was about as fast as the first one. The XP-40 averaged 315 mph in original form and after NACA wind tunnel tests, was cleaned up to make 366 mph. The P-40E made 360 mph with armament at best altitude. The P-40N went 378 mph at best altitude. It started out as a mediocre performer and stayed that way all through it's career.

The XP-47B made 412 mph at 25,800 feet. The P-47N made 460 mph at 30,000 feet. It started out a s a tough plane down low that could take punishment and a great performer up high. It stayed that way all through it's career.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 14, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Do you infer that Curtiss was doing very well before and after Don Berlin left and that his exit had no effect?
> Or do you mean that Curtiss was already sliding downhill well prior to Don's exit?




It is hard to tell. Don Berlin was at the Buffalo plant for the Hawk 75/P-36/P-40/P-46. Not sure which plant built the XP-55. ST. Lewis was responsible for the C-46. He had nothing to do with the Helldiver as far as I know, perhaps he should have. You also had the Seamew which finally got replace with the Seahawk (577 built). He had nothing to do with either the engine division or the propeller division. _Perhaps_ he could have come up with another winning design to pull Curtiss out of the dumps but Curtiss worked on more different programs by far than any other American aircraft company. Curtiss certainly tried hard to give the customers what they wanted. Perhaps they should have said no a bit more often. 

Wiki says " Curtiss-Wright failed to make the transition to design and production of jet aircraft, despite several attempts. _During the war, the company had expended only small amounts on aircraft research and development, instead concentrating on incremental improvements in conventional aircraft already in wartime production._ This was especially true in the first two years of the war. Curtiss' failure to research and develop more advanced wing and airframe designs provided an opening for North American, Bell, Lockheed, Northrop, and other U.S. aircraft manufacturers to submit newer and more advanced aircraft designs"

Italics by me. However for Army fighters after the P-36/P-40 you had the XP-46, the XP-53, The XP-55, the XP-60 Series and the XP-62. The last using a turbo-charged R-3350 with contra rotating props and a pressure cabin.






Curtiss also tried two fighters for the Navy. the XF14C





and the mixed power XF15





Now perhaps is was Curtiss's lack of research into airfoils or structure that caused these projects to fail or perhaps it was changing requirements (neither the Japanese or the Germans were able field large numbers of high flying aircraft using pressure cabins). A number of Curtiss projects required modification or revision when the originally planed engines failed to make it to production. 

Curtiss also built two different single engine/single seat attack aircraft for the Navy at the end of the war, the first in completion with the Skyraider. 





This was NOT a Helldiver with a new engine and the rear gunner left out 

the point is that Curtiss was NOT cruising along fat, dumb and happy making slightly improved P-40s and then wondering how the world passed them by. The P-40 might have represented 1/4 to 1/3 of the aircraft divisions revenue during WW II. While the failure to secure a successor to the P-40 was certainly important it might not have been fatal to the company if they had secured contracts for other types of aircraft.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 14, 2015)

GregP said:


> Curtiss and Bell had the much same problems.
> 
> Most of the Curtiss designs were remarkably like the P-36 up to and including the XP-46 and even the XP-60 was similar but adapted to a radial. They never seemed to come up with something fresh.
> 
> Bell's designs were remarkably similar to one another. The Airacuda, Airacobra, King Cobra, and the XP-59A were all very similar airrames structurally and in terms of a lot of other characteristics.


Bell had a good deal different problems, and the Aracuda had most of the same problems as the Kampfzerstorer concept. (had Bell aimed more at a heavy fighter/interceptor like an early predecessor to the P-38, it likely would have been a different story -hell, even aiming at mounting twin M4 cannons in the nose should have been more realistic than those manually-loaded pods ... 15 round link belts like the early P-38s used, I believe a more compact arrangement than the 30 round endless loop type belts used on the P-39)

Aerodynamically, the P-39 was rather sound, but slow improvements in the V-1710 (both slow approval for WEP and slow development of models with improved performance) hurt a good bit and the P-40 had similar problems. (imagine the Spitfire and Bf 109 if they'd ended up stuck with updated variations of the Merlin III and DB 601A in 1943 with basically the same superchargers and consistently lagging formal WEP ratings -the British consistently gave the Merlin WEP ratings vastly sooner than the USAAC/AAF did with the V-1710 or V-1650 ... or several radial engines) The 109 and Spitfire would also have both been in trouble with weight gains from USAAC minimal structural requirements.

Stick the Merlin XX in the P-40 at the same time as the Hurricane II gets it in Britain and throw in the +12 lbs boost rating and see how it compares in 1941. Throw in the 2-stage merlin at the same time the Spitfire IX gets it and see what happens. Do the same for the P-39. (or do the same for the P-51 and you'd have it in production with the Merlin 61 alongside the Spitfire IX ... or totally displacing the latter in production) -or have the USAAF pour funding into Allison for more aggressive engine development and testing for maximum power ratings, detonation limits on varying fuel grades, maximum allowable RPM, intake manifold efficiency, single stage supercharger performance, multi-stage supercharger performance, water injection, and intercooler designs. 

The P-39 had issues with an overly sensitive CoG and difficult maintenance with some components, but those were the big issues. (armament could/should have been modified and range was already better than what the P-63A ended up with due to its intentionally REDUCED fuel capacity as an interceptor ... the P-63 might have given the P-51 more a run for its money had it been designed from the outside to be a long-range/escort fighter)

The P-59 ended up with a conservative design limited by its intended nature as a safe, foolproof engine testbed as well as lack of access to high-speed wind tunnels for testing. In the end it seems to have suffered from the same primary limitation as the Gloster Meteor: serious drag and overall aerodynamic problems related primarily with the engine nacelles. (low critical mach number, high transonic drag, directional snaking, and buffeting; the large, 14% thickness:chord wing wasn't the main source of the drag problems and certainly not the limiting mach factor: the wing should have fared similarly well to the Vampires and probably moderately worse than the Meteor's; unlike the Meteor, the P-59 never got redesigned, streamlined long-chord engine nacelles/ducting though they did get boundary layer bleed plates somewhat similar to the P-80 at the intake/fuselage interface -the large wing also shared the same issue of underutilization of internal space as the P-63, lots of volume with huge potential for internal fuel tankage, but mostly left empty and occupied by structural ribs rather than weapons or fuel cells)

It's also a bit like the Spitfire situation: the Meteor had tons of R&D poured into it with many modifications to make it perform better rather than just abandoning it in favor of the Vampire early on (which probably would have developed more quickly had the Air Ministry poured funding and high priority on it like they had the Gloster/Whittle/Rolls Royce projects).

To its credit the P-59 program DID end up with an exemplary safety record compared to Gloster or Lockheed's jet programs.


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## GregP (Jul 15, 2015)

Curtiss WAS cruising along with little in the way of new designs. The XP-46 and XP-60 were basically extended P-40 designs. So was the XP-62. The family resemblance is way too strong. It looks like an overgrown P-36, and the P-40 was just a liquid-cooled P-36. To me the XBTC looks like another itteration, albeit with a different wing shape.

Let's say Shortround and I don't see this the same. Now THERE's a surpise, huh?

Either way, they didn't make the cut, so it's no big deal. They didn't make the cut because their products didn't perform. The XF-87 Blackhawk was just another in a long line of underwhelming designs. It didn't even LOOK modern, at least to me. At least the P-40 looked the part when it came out.

Don't get me wrong here, I like the P-40 and really believe the XP-40Q could have gone into production a LOT sooner than it actually flew. But Curtiss wasn't apparently interested in quantum leaps in performance or they would have been working on developments a LOT sooner.

Curtiss killed themselves with an unbroken line of adequate but not good-performing aircraft. Don Berlin left Curtiss, according to his son, when he wasn't allowed to "develop" the P-40 into a better fighter. His son does a very good presentation that generates a lot of questions. I've seen him at the Planes of Fame, but there were a LOT of people asking questions and we volunteers know that the public comes first. When questions were over we went out and flew our P-40N for the crowd.

Grumman didn't operate that way. They were working on the Hellcat when the Wildcat was into early deliveries and only made minor tweaks when the Koga Zero was found on Akutan Island, were working on the Bearcat a bit after delivering Hellcats and also had the Tigercat in work at the same time. Both flew and got into service before the war's end even if not MUCH before. They were at the top of their game right up through the F-14 Tomcat ... which didn't prevent them from being gobbled up in a corporate grab.

It's almost like the future we see in the original Rollerball movie, where the big corporations rule the world. Not quite ... but we seem to be headed that way.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 15, 2015)

My point was that the P-40/P-36 was ALREADY a design in the same class as the Bf 109 and Spitfire with some advantages and disadvantages. (the main disadvantage of the airframe itself being weight: namely a result of the more stringent American structural standards -including the USAAC's 12G ultimate specification; the larger fuel capacity added to that as well) On top of that, service P-40s had to make do with moderately to significantly less power at all altitudes than their European contemporaries. (the closest case was probably comparing the P-40/B/C to the Spitfire Mk.I and Bf 109E where the V-1710-33 wasn't far behind and the P-40 had a better ram air intake than the 109 or spitfire -and possibly better engine streamlining)

The Spitfire and 109 would have gone nowhere without consistent and substantial engine upgrades: the P-40 never got those (XP-40Q aside). The engine the P-40N was fielding in 1943 had generally poorer all-around performance than what the Spitfire Mk.V had fielded over 2 years earlier while the preceding P-40F hadn't entered service in any number until around the time the 2-stage Merlin powered Spitfire IX was already entering service. Prior to that the P-40D and E were stuck with worse performance than the preceding B and C due to weight and drag increases with only modest 110 HP mil power increase up to a lower critical altitude and no added performance at altitude. (the larger radiator and stronger reduction gears did allow for a good deal more maximum power without overheating or stripping gears but until official WEP rating that was only possible through overboosting engines out of spec -had the 54" Hg manifold pressure WEP rating been cleared back in 1941, the P-40D/E and P-39D might have gained stronger reputations for performance at low altitude)


Given the Army's stance on engine development and particularly the state of affairs with the V-1710, Curtiss really would have been better off targeting other engines entirely when moving forward towards a P-40 successor or possibly aiming on a twin engine V-1710 powered aircraft (potential better to the P-38 ) given the bulk/drag of a turbo installation on a single-engine aircraft wasn't really worthwhile with the V-1710. (might as well go radial there and save some weight/cooling complexity if you're going to be stuck with turbo and intercooler bulk either way)

They could have tried a more streamlined turbocharged R-1830 big radials really seemed the best bet in 1939/40 though and at the time that would mean the R-2600 and R-2800 both ... not R-3350 unless Wright had drastically shifted development resources sooner. Had the XP-46 project focused on either a new airframe or a heavily modified P-36 descended airframe (likely with little/no direct compatibility but perhaps some features to make switching the production lines more efficient) optimized for the R-2600 or R-2800 it might have been more compelling compared to their own competing P-40D evolution while potentially taking advantage of their ongoing research into improved radial engine streamlining in the XP-42. (which didn't re-emerge until much ado and fiddling with the many faces of the XP-60) I'd throw the R-2180 in there too for potential next-generation radial fighter engines, but that one was a dud in hindsight. (for the time, considering that along with the R-2600 in the 1939/1940 timeframe seems perfectly reasonable though, with the R-2800 still further off)



The only other thing that hasn't really come up is a turbocharged P-36 taking advantage of the slimmer, cleaner airframe than the P-43, but the intercooler+turbo ducting might end up making that a wash anyway. (the 2-stage R-1830 still seems like a better trade-off there, particularly with the lingering turbocharger troubles present early-war)


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## GregP (Jul 15, 2015)

You are correct above. The P-40 wasn't a bad plane, and I like it. It never got the engine it deserved. The Allison is a GREAT engine and did NOT suffer from lack of development. It suffered from lack of power increases coincident with the development. Many different models had the same ratings, but reliability and longevity were increased.

It made a good 1100 - 1200 HP for a long time and later got to 1,325 - 1,600 HP. People were actually USING it at 75" MAP and getting good power, but only in the Soviet Union and China with some of the guys in the AVG, such as General (Ret.) Davey Allison (no relation to the engine company at all). He said he demonstrated the P-40 at 75" MAP regularly. In the standard USAAF, people mostly stayed within the factory limits.

So it didn't get a power increase of substantial note until late in the game. It is VERY interesting to me that all the racing Merlins that win at Reno are using Allison G-series rods. They aren't really Merlins anyway since they have aftermarket rods, pistons, sometimes valves, cams, mags, ADI, and other assorted improvements. But the base engine is a Merlin and it is a damned GOOD base engine.

The Allison CAN make power and CAN turn WAY faster than 3,000 rpm. The tractor pull guys turn them at 4,600 rpm and they don't break .... but it's for a short time. Aircraft engines have to run for the entire mission. So ... a P-40 pilot COULD turn it faster ... up to about 3,600 rpm ... at which point he would be close to stretching and maybe losing the prop due to breakage, not to mention possible sonic issues. Had the Allison been cleared to 3,400 rpm in normal service with an attendant gearing change to account for prop speed, the power would have ratcheted upward a bit.

Yes, I know it didn't in widespread use, but it DID in occasional use. Therefore I feel it could have been power-bumped if the company had only DONE it. Alas, history has spoken and they didn't.

Had they thrown a 2,100 HP, 2-stage Merlin into one with NO other changes, it would go from 360 mph to 426 mph with nothing other than the power increase at the same altitude and faster up higher. Change the aerodynamics a bit and give it a better prop (necessary) and the top speed may have been quite competitive with the great fighters of the war. It could NOT have done any harm for the climb rate either.

But ... Curtiss soldiered on with the P-40 staying with the Allison at stock power levels. They MAY have been directed that way, but the possibilities for improvement in the airframe were always there and include airfoil as well as other changes in the design to make it better.

I'll say the P-40 never did get it's requisite amount of development and the XP-40Q series of 3 planes were only a teaser of what might have been had the management at Curtiss had their collective heads out of their collective rumps.

I do NOT know the contemporary political situation and so have no real insight into what went on during the decision-making meetings at Curtiss ... but they were rather obviously not in the company's best interests in the end.

They also would have HAD to abandon the Curtiss Electric 3-blade prop for a better unit ... but that's another post.


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## Balljoint (Jul 15, 2015)

The P-40 was a bit altitude and power challenged as well as heavy. But the robust standards did give it good dive acceleration and superior roll performance. Through the early China and desert campaigns these attributes –with the appropriate tactics- gave it the ability to best the best of the opposition. With certain pilots, this seems to be true also in the Soviet theater.

To Curtiss’s discredit, it, as well as Bell, politicked during the original design against a bulkier, more cumbersome properly boosted Allison for fear of it compromising their sleek designs. 15,000 was thought to be more than adequate.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 15, 2015)

Balljoint said:


> The P-40 was a bit altitude and power challenged as well as heavy. But the robust standards did give it good dive acceleration and superior roll performance. Through the early China and desert campaigns these attributes –with the appropriate tactics- gave it the ability to best the best of the opposition. With certain pilots, this seems to be true also in the Soviet theater.


It was more the aerodynamics of the control surfaces that allowed better high-speed control rather than structural limits.



> To Curtiss’s discredit, it, as well as Bell, politicked during the original design against a bulkier, more cumbersome properly boosted Allison for fear of it compromising their sleek designs. 15,000 was thought to be more than adequate.


It was the USAAC that refused to fun Allison's supercharger development and was initially even reluctant to introduce the 8.8:1 medium altitude supercharger gearing. (rather than only producing the low-altitude/turbocharger optimized 7.48:1 gearing)

Had they had full support and funding from the start, the issues with the 9.6:1 gear should have been worked out much sooner and the auxiliary supercharger stage would have been introduced much sooner as well. (the intake kinks might have been avoided or fixed as well ... partially ignored due to being less significant with turbocharging and low added compression provided by the 7.48:1 impeller speed -the intake bottleneck became a bigger issue with the 8.8:1 and especially 9.6:1 superchargers, though perhaps not meaning as much for the 2-stage variants)









GregP said:


> It made a good 1100 - 1200 HP for a long time and later got to 1,325 - 1,600 HP. People were actually USING it at 75" MAP and getting good power, but only in the Soviet Union and China with some of the guys in the AVG, such as General (Ret.) Davey Allison (no relation to the engine company at all). He said he demonstrated the P-40 at 75" MAP regularly. In the standard USAAF, people mostly stayed within the factory limits.


Commonwealth use in North Africa and possibly the PTO noted use of overboost as well, but this was in the context of the P-40E and K and in the 66-70" boost range, with the latter only possible at sea level. 60-66" at low level seemed to be the more useful limit though I believe Allison formally limited the -73 of the P-40K to 60" and 56" on the older -39. It just took several years to get those official ratings. If the USAAC/AAF had been under the same pressure as the RAF from 1939 onward, it might have changed things somewhat but even pre-war the USAAC had tended towards more conservative design constraints.

As I've mentioned before, I'm not sure how 75" manifold pressure would be possible without significant overrev and ram at SL with the 8.8:1 supercharger ratio and would lead to detonation if attempted on the 9.6:1 engines unless they were rev limited to maybe somewhere around 2800 RPM. (approximately the same supercharger speed as an 8.8:1 engine pushed to 3200 rpm)

I believe the Tomohawk's V-1710-33 was limited mainly by the reduction gear strength (overboosting tending to cause stripped gears), the later -39 limited mostly by the crankshaft (overboosting tending to cause failures there), and I'm not sure if the stronger crankshaft of the -73 was still the limiting factor or not.

The most consistent power gains in the V-1710's operational life appear to be with the P-38, though even there not pushed into WEP ratings nearly as rapidly as British engines tended towards. (I'm also unsure if Allison's eventual 2000 HP 75" MAP clearance for the P-38L using 100/150 fuel ever extended to USAAF operational clearance)


As far as the USAAF goes it SHOULD be noted that the V-1650-1 lacked a WEP rating as well and didn't formally adopt the high emergency boost employed operationally by the Hurricane II. (or similarly on the Spitfire V's Merlin 45) The P-40F and L should have been faster than the M and N even with a bit of added weight (less dramatic when the P-40N was loaded down with full armament and fuel load unlike the stripped-down initial production configuration). The P-40F also should have had more power down low in WEP than the P-40E or K, at least complying with the official 56/60" manifold pressure limits.


All that said, even with the added conservative margins for safety, with more funding for exhaustive testing and R&D (and actual interest in extended supercharger designs beyond turbo installation back before the V-1710 even entered mass production) the engine should have competed far better and should have been a better investment than most or all of the Army's hyper-engine projects. (especially the XI-1430)



> The Allison CAN make power and CAN turn WAY faster than 3,000 rpm. The tractor pull guys turn them at 4,600 rpm and they don't break .... but it's for a short time. Aircraft engines have to run for the entire mission. So ... a P-40 pilot COULD turn it faster ... up to about 3,600 rpm ... at which point he would be close to stretching and maybe losing the prop due to breakage, not to mention possible sonic issues. Had the Allison been cleared to 3,400 rpm in normal service with an attendant gearing change to account for prop speed, the power would have ratcheted upward a bit.


Is any of that done with the F series engines that lacked the additional counter weighing on the crankshaft? (I think it was the G series that introduced 3200 RPM take-off)

I have seen pilot and (I believe) engineer or possibly mechanic/crew chief notes from RAF operations noting the smoother running of the V-1710 compared to the merlin and ability to run smoothly at lower RPM for more efficient cruise. I have no idea how well it would have coped with heavy abuse being officially cleared for emergency use, but I do wonder how far the engines might have been pushed if rated as aggressively as the RAF/Rolls Royce seemed to. (how far might the C series have been pushed if it had been in the same situation as the Merlin III in the BoB?)



> Had they thrown a 2,100 HP, 2-stage Merlin into one with NO other changes, it would go from 360 mph to 426 mph with nothing other than the power increase at the same altitude and faster up higher. Change the aerodynamics a bit and give it a better prop (necessary) and the top speed may have been quite competitive with the great fighters of the war. It could NOT have done any harm for the climb rate either.


Given the P-40 had both more space for fuel from the start and a larger margin for structural strength along with good aerodynamic qualities, I'd even argue it would have seen significantly greater gains than the Spitfire's engine evolution. (it'd stay a heavier plane, but the gradual weight creep would likely make up a smaller percentage of overall aircraft weight leaving the 1945 P-40 and Spitfire variants much closer in overall weight than the 1940 ones)

The P-51 just ended up better in nearly every way than the P-40, so it made such comparisons superfluous. (though I'd still argue a P-40 derivative might have been a better use of those war-time 2-stage allison engines than the P-63, more useful for the USAAF at least -ie something the USAAF might actually find operationally useful -shorter ranged than the P-51 but still decently ranged compared to the P-36 and with the added centerline hardpoint over the P-51 to make it more flexible as a fighter-bomber -also a 



> They also would have HAD to abandon the Curtiss Electric 3-blade prop for a better unit ... but that's another post.


The P-39 actually got 4-blade props on some of the later production models but seemed to cope poorly with the added torque ... not good on a plane with finicky spin characteristics. The P-40 might have handled it better, though. (being a heavier and generally more stable aircraft)


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## GregP (Jul 15, 2015)

Ho Kool Kitty,

I worked at an Allison shop for about 2 years and it is VERY possible, standing still on the ground, mounted to the back of a Ford truck, with a Hamilton Standard club prop. Gen (Ret) Davey Allison came by several times and told us how he sold Chenault on the P-40. It involved demonstrating it at 75" MAP. When you did that, the P-40 sort of "woke up" and flew just great, according to General Allison.

Gen. Allison mentioned 3,400 rpm as his demo setting. He passed away about 3 weeks after his visit and we were glad we had an Allison ready for test that we could let him start up and help break in. Out break-ins were generally about 4 - 8 hours at 1,200 - 2,700 rpm and idle up to about 48" or so. 

But Joe has a left-turn demo unit that he keeps for airshows that is all broken in. We ran it at the General's setting and it was pulling the Ford F-350 dually truck backwards with the wheels locked and we quickly backed off rather than chase the truck. Fortunately, if wasn't moving very fast, but the front wheel did start to come off the ground. When one did and it started moving it was time to back off.

We laughed about that for weeks. My only complaint was that I ws the one who had to reset the club prop's six blades for left hand rotation ... but that was a small price to pay for the show.


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## gjs238 (Jul 15, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Don Berlin left Curtiss in December 1941.
> Was that a large reason for the fall of Curtiss?





GregP said:


> Don Berlin left Curtiss, according to his son, when he wasn't allowed to "develop" the P-40 into a better fighter. His son does a very good presentation that generates a lot of questions. I've seen him at the Planes of Fame, but there were a LOT of people asking questions and we volunteers know that the public comes first. When questions were over we went out and flew our P-40N for the crowd.



Interesting, good reply to the initial query.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 15, 2015)

To some extent Curtiss went to the Casino and and rolled snake eyes several times in a row. 

I am not sure how much of the P-36/40 carried over into the P-46. The P-46 was 1/12 feet shorter, had 3 feet less wingspan (and it was not clipped on the ends), had a kinked leading edge to accommodate the the inward retracting landing gear and had slats outboard in front of the ailerons. the fuselage .50 cal guns were mounted a bit above where the Early P-51 fuselage guns were mounted and not on top like a P-40. That is due to the reduction gear. The Light weight prototype is _supposed_ to have reached 410mph (or at least gotten close) while the fully equipped prototype dropped to 355mph. Something doesn't seem quite right there. Few, if any,fighters lost 50mph going form unarmed prototype to full service equipment. 10-30mph yes but 50-55mph? Either the 410mph was wrong or the 355mph was wrong, or something was very wrong with the prototype. Army lost interest, in part due to the armed prototype flying in Sept of 1941 and the World situation was such that the Army couldn't afford the loss in production a change over from the P-40 to the P-46 would have entailed. The Army didn't have several months to test fly the XP-46 and figure out where some of the speed went ( the increase in weight is usually blamed but most aircraft could take that kind of additional load without slowing down anywhere near that much). That was the first roll of the dice. 
The second roll was the XP-53. Keep the P-40 fuselage (unlike the P-46) and stick a laminar flow wing on it. Unfortunately Curtiss tried to cthe deck a bit by picking the Army's fair haired wonder boy engine, The Continental XIV-1430. This doomed not only the XP-53 but every other plane that was intended to use it. To be fair the 275 sq ft wing needed more power than the Allison was giving at the time. I don't know if it was Curtiss or the Army that came up with the idea of _eight_ .50 cal guns in the wings. If you want Thunderbolt armament you need a close to Thunderbolt sized plane to carry it. 
The 3rd dice roll was the XP-55 and we know how that turned out. It's Allison engine was the 2nd choice (if not 3rd) after the P W 24 Cylinder H-2600 sleeve valve was canceled and perhaps a brief flirtation with the Continental XIV-1430. Even if the got the unorthodox aerodynamics to work they were down hundreds of horsepower over the intended engine/s. Many of the programs overlapped.
The 4th roll of the dice was the XP-60. Replace the Continental engine in the XP-53 with a single stage Merlin and keep the 275sq ft laminar flow wing. The Army goes for this one in mid Nov 1940. Only a couple of months after ordering the R-2800 powered P-47 off the drawing board. Inspite of using inward retracting gear it actually flies 11 days before the armed XP-46. Here is where things get a bit strange. Using a Merlin that was _supposedly_ not making full rated power the XP-60 is _supposed_ to have gone 387mph at 22,000ft which means it was 20-25mph *faster* than a production P-40F using the same model engine. Unfortunately the XP-60 was about 5-600lbs heavier than a P-40F and almost 1000lbs heavier than a P-40E (and had 16% more wing area) so the climb performance and ceiling were a bit lacking. Weight was due in part to the eight .50 cal armament. Army requirement or Curtiss trying to equal Republic? 
Army then goes into a bout of self doubt and rapid changes of mind (everything but wearing a hair shirt under their uniforms) as they decide the XP-60 needs more power in the form of a turbo-charged Allison, and orders 1950 of them, then within weeks decides the Allison, even with turbo isn't powerful enough. Before they can reach a decision the Japanese hit Pearl Harbor the production question puts the lid on the P-60's coffin ( Build P-40s which aren't quite good enough or build nothing while we sort o the P-60?). The Coffin lid isn't nailed shut as the army cancels the production order but orders 3 more prototypes, one with a GE Turbo Allison, one with a Wright turbo charger on an Allison and one with the Chrysler V-16. The original XP-60 was pretty much a P-40E/F with a new wing. These 3 prototypes were pretty much the XP-60 wing with new fuselages. With our great hindsight it is not surprising that the wright turbo came to nothing and the Chrysler V-16 took much longer to reach flight status than planned. Both airframes got P W R-2800 radials while armament was cut to six guns and then four guns in an effort to get the weight under control. 

Now _maybe_ if Curtiss had used a smaller laminar flow wing with only 4 guns on the P-40 Fuselage they might have gotten a plane closer in performance to the Mustang and had production models flying in the summer of 1942. 

Curtiss double up on their bets and kept rolling the dice with the XP-62 and the Navy fighter. The Army issued the specification that lead to the XP-62 in Jan of 1941. Curtiss submitted their proposal in April of 1941. Army spec call for *eight* 20mm cannon or *TWELVE* .50 cal guns. Between the Pressure cabin, the R-3350 engine the counter rotating propellers, the 420 sq ft wing (an A-20 had 465sq ft) and the guns/fuel the plane wound up about 1 _ton_ heavier than a P-47. 

This certainly doesn't look like a company putzing along building slight variations of the P-36/40 to me. It does look like a company a little _too_ desperate for work (or too confident in their own abilities?) to tell the customer that what they want isn't possible and to scale back their fantasy aircraft to reality. 

Curtiss in 1939-42 was also building SNC trainers, the AT-9 twin engine trainer,the C-46 (working on the unlamented C-76, another blow to the Curtiss reputation) The Helldiver and the Seamew. The last four aircraft probably did more to Curtiss's reputation and long term prospects than any of the "failed" fighters.


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## Graeme (Jul 16, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Don Berlin left Curtiss in December 1941.
> Was that a large reason for the fall of Curtiss?



According to one author (Joe Mizrahi - Wings. Volume 25 No.2) Donald Berlin's (described as a difficult man to work with) departure from Curtiss was not the reason for the fall of Curtiss. Curtiss was falling slowly well before this due to administrative problems...

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## GregP (Jul 16, 2015)

Yeah, what HE said above.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 16, 2015)

Graeme said:


> According to one author (Joe Mizrahi - Wings. Volume 25 No.2) Donald Berlin's (described as a difficult man to work with) departure from Curtiss was not the reason for the fall of Curtiss. Curtiss was falling slowly well before this due to administrative problems...



Author has a rather strange view of business. Yes the O-52 was useless for modern warfare but then so were a number of it's contemporaries. If the customer says that is the airplane he wants, was it up to Curtiss to say "NO, you are wrong, we won't build it" ? That type of aircraft had been being built for years, the Douglas O-38 was built in greater numbers than the P-26 fighter. 





Douglas went on to build several parasol monoplane "observation planes" totaling around 120-130 aircraft. 

Their replacement, North American O-47





was purchased in greater numbers than the P-36 by the USAAC. 

Germans bought HS 126s by the Hundreds. 





and we have beaten the Lysander to death 

French were build twin engine aircraft for this role and yet Curtiss is supposed to have either convinced the Army they were wrong and turned down the contract or given the money back after building the planes? 

Wiki has a rather different story about the SBC-4 dive bombers. Regardless of wither the navy returned the planes to Curtiss as "outmoded", and please remember that the Navy was operating biplane Grumman F3F fighters from carriers over a year later, or wither this was a ruse to get _some_ combat planes to France in a Hurry the Martinique "thing" is a bit twisted in the Article. The planes were loaded on the aircraft carrier Bearn along with 21 Hawk 75s?P-36s (?) 25 Stinson 105s and 5 Brewster Buffaloes for Belgium. (numbers vary slightly in different accounts). France fell while the Bearn was enroute and it sailed to Martinique. Martinique sided with Vichy France as did the crew of the Bearn. Both the US and the British kept "watch" on Martinique at times (British had two cruisers on watch from July until Nov of 1940). 
Now was Curtiss supposed to give the money back? and to who? The US government or the Vichy government who had possession of the planes or to the "Free French". How was sit the fault of Curtiss that the planes wound up in Martinique? Should _every_ manufacturer of war goods only been paid for items that made it to the intended destination and just forfeited any money for planes, tanks, trucks, ammo, blankets sunk by U-boats or bombers in route? 

Yes Curtiss took on too many projects but then it was the Army and Navy handing them out. The British Air Ministry sometimes passed on giving 3rd or 4th contracts to some firms _because_ the Ministry judged the Firm/s in question didn't have enough capacity to build them in a timely manner. Of course the US Army gave money to Preston Tucker too


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## Graeme (Jul 16, 2015)

Good information there! 



Shortround6 said:


> If the customer says that is the airplane he wants, was it up to Curtiss to say "NO, you are wrong, we won't build it" ?



I got the impression from the article, maybe I'm wrong, that Curtiss was in a rut design wise and accepting orders for obsolete aircraft which they were happy to oblige and encourage. All fine and good - but then the war abruptly ends and they lose massive contracts. Another author, Peter M Bowers, points out that Curtiss was particularly hard hit because they never planned for a postwar market, in particular, civil aircraft.

Got another scan, this time from an article on the XF-87. Would it be fair to say that the USAF by 1948 had little respect for the Curtiss management?


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## Shortround6 (Jul 16, 2015)

I think the reverse is actually true. Curtiss was accepting orders for "New" aircraft that took too long to develop and too often didn't perform as promised. This kind of "company performance" makes it hard for the customers to keep placing orders on faith. 

I don't know if the O-52 performed as promised or not. But it wasn't Curtiss's fault the basic specification was out of date. Curtiss _was_ responsible for a lot of the SB2C Helldivers initial woes and long development. Curtiss took on the job of designing a wooden transport aircraft (the C-76) that came out over weight, under performing and tended to come apart in flight. The saga of the Seamew and it's "replacement" by older Seagulls taken from depots and 2nd line units certainly didn't help Curtiss's reputation. Wartime C-46s had a tendency to blow up in flight. Post war civil conversions got vented wing roots/wings to vent spilled fuel. Why that took years to fix is a bit of a mystery. 
While some of the Curtiss fighter projects were certainly of advanced concept _at the time they *started*_ they took too long and under-performed when done. Curtiss refused to tell customer that the intended payload was simply too much ? (eight 20mm cannon?).
By 1946-47 Curtiss simply had a rather dismal track record. Stuffing up being a second source for the P-47 didn't help.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 16, 2015)

GregP said:


> Ho Kool Kitty,
> 
> I worked at an Allison shop for about 2 years and it is VERY possible, standing still on the ground, mounted to the back of a Ford truck, with a Hamilton Standard club prop. Gen (Ret) Davey Allison came by several times and told us how he sold Chenault on the P-40. It involved demonstrating it at 75" MAP. When you did that, the P-40 sort of "woke up" and flew just great, according to General Allison.
> 
> Gen. Allison mentioned 3,400 rpm as his demo setting. He passed away about 3 weeks after his visit and we were glad we had an Allison ready for test that we could let him start up and help break in. Out break-ins were generally about 4 - 8 hours at 1,200 - 2.700 rpm and idle upo to about 48" or so.


If that was a V-1710-33 pushed to 3400 rpm on standard 100 octane fuel and 75" MAP, that would seriously imply the detonation limits with that supercharger weren't as extreme as Allison's documentation later implied with the 9.6:1 engines. A 7.48:1 ratio engine would be running too slow at 3400 RPM to push 75" at SL, but maybe there's more context here or it was an 8.1:1 supercharger used? That or the 75" MAP and 3400 RPM runs weren't used in conjunction. 

Pushing 3200 RPM at 75" MAP without ram would result in something close to 1800 HP at SL with the -33 going by the chart on Peril's site (and approximating the 3200 RPM curve). I could see that sort of strain being used for demonstration purposes, but if the AVG ever used that as emergency power on their P-40Bs it's no wonder they stripped reduction gears and burned through engines. There's obviously a ton of middle ground between the conservative military rating used by the USAAF and full-out overrev AND overboosting especially on those early engines.

With that sort of engine abuse, those P-40s would have been screaming at low altitude, though and should have smoked Spitfire Mk.Is and IIs in WEP ... or Mk.Vs for that matter. (might have nearly matched Spitfire Vs in altitude performance with that overrev -plus the P-40B being substantially lighter than later models) Using overrev only at altitude would have been a lot easier on the engines too.

If it genuinely had been acceptable to overrev the engines for WEP as routine, then the 8.8:1 supercharger ratio wouldn't have been that big of a limit either and both the backfire screens and kink/bottleneck in the intake manifold would have been bigger priorities for supercharger efficiency improvements.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 16, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> I think the reverse is actually true. Curtiss was accepting orders for "New" aircraft that took too long to develop and too often didn't perform as promised. This kind of "company performance" makes it hard for the customers to keep placing orders on faith.
> 
> I don't know if the O-52 performed as promised or not. But it wasn't Curtiss's fault the basic specification was out of date. Curtiss _was_ responsible for a lot of the SB2C Helldivers initial woes and long development. Curtiss took on the job of designing a wooden transport aircraft (the C-76) that came out over weight, under performing and tended to come apart in flight. The saga of the Seamew and it's "replacement" by older Seagulls taken from depots and 2nd line units certainly didn't help Curtiss's reputation. Wartime C-46s had a tendency to blow up in flight. Post war civil conversions got vented wing roots/wings to vent spilled fuel. Why that took years to fix is a bit of a mystery.
> While some of the Curtiss fighter projects were certainly of advanced concept _at the time they *started*_ they took too long and under-performed when done. Curtiss refused to tell customer that the intended payload was simply too much ? (eight 20mm cannon?).
> By 1946-47 Curtiss simply had a rather dismal track record. Stuffing up being a second source for the P-47 didn't help.


It seems like Curtiss didn't know when to say 'no' or 'stop' or 'this concept needs a lot of changes' ... taking on too many projects and many with questionable specifications, and just going along with it rather than focusing more aggressively on fewer projects and being more selective in which projects got pursued. (and being willing to also do more than just decline taking on some new projects but also having a greater willingness to rationalize some of the questionable requirements; being more proactive and innovative rather than just trying to take on impractical if not impossible design requests) Putting more resources into curing the problems with the C-46 would be among that same redistribution of resources.

Problems with fighter development were a bit different there though as some of those requirements were less unrealistic or were independent projects started by Curtiss in the first place. The more consistent problem there seems to be the engines selected and either Curtiss or the USAAF consistently making problematic choices that underperformed or had to be replaced and cause further delays. 

Had they focused heavily on a fighter optimized around a big radial engine as the followon to the P-36/P-40/P-40 development programs they might had something much more workable much sooner. Switching between the likes of R-2600 and R-2800 with or without turbochargers would have been a lot less hectic than the number of engine changes and compromises and redesigns the XP-46/60 programs saw and the XP-55 likely would have fared better if designed around the R-2600 or R-2800 from the start. (the XP-46 had been largely a new aircraft as it was, so putting the same engineering effort into a machine built around those radial engines would have made plenty of sense)


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## GregP (Jul 16, 2015)

Ah yes, I see the error of my ways. We never have produce a -33. All our Allisons were -89 series or above since all the people ordering them wanted the relaibility and power of late models. We DID supply one early engine case with -100 Series internals, including 12-counterweight crankshaft, but that was by direct owner order. We basically made E, F, and G engines with the accent being on E and F. The only people who seem to want the G series wanted to go racing and usually want the rods.

We were hoping to find someone who wanted to go racing with a 3,000 HP Allison and we could supply the engine, but we weren't going to fund the entire project ourselves including airframe. The shop was an engine shop, not an airframe shop ... we supplied engines and sometimes propellers and propeller hubs and custom engine services, such as fixing the screw-ups from other ALlison shops. at least that one is a good business!

Love the O-47 shot above and am working on one mow and for the next several years. It needs a lot of TLC and newly-fabricated parts to get back in the air.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 16, 2015)

GregP said:


> Ah yes, I see the error of my ways. We nver have produce a -33. All our Allisons were -90 series or above since all the people ordering them wasnt the relaibility and pwoer of late models. We DID supply one erraly engien case with -100 Serie sinternals, including 12-counterweight crankshaft, but that was by direct owner order. We basically made E, F, and G engines with the accent being on E and F. The only people who seem to want the G series wasnt to go racing and usually want the rods.
> 
> We were hoping to find someone who wanted to go racing with a 3,000 HP Allison and we could supply the engine, but we wern't going to fund the entire project ourselves including airframe. The shop was an engine shop, not an airframe shop ... we supplied engines and sometimes propellers and propeller hubs and custom engine services, such as fixing the screw-ups from other ALlison shops. at least that one is a good business!


My mention of the -33 (or C series Allisons in general) was regarding the demonstration(s) to Chennault and AVG operations with P-40Bs (and Cs). I don't think they got any -39 (F3R) powered P-40Ds or Es until after the Flying Tigers transition to USAAF command, but I could see them using 'unconventional' engine procedures there as well.

Of course, comparing early and late F (or E) series engines would show changes too, but not the same dramatic change in reduction gear design.


If we had similar information on V-1650 or Rolls Royce Merlin engine abuse, it'd be easier to get a picture of how much potential the V-1710 had for more heavily stressed emergency power than the USAAF or Allison officially rated it. (I want to say I recall mention of the Merlin being less tolerant of overrevving than the Allison, but I'm not sure)


I do specifically recall references to the AVG had engine failures in both the reduction gears and thrust bearings (both specific to P-40B/C operations)


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## Shortround6 (Jul 16, 2015)

According to "Vee's for Victory" there were 4 'different' crankshafts used in the Allisons. The first 3 look identical, at least from a distance. I don't work on them so there may be minor visual clues. The first were 'plain' crankshafts which I believe the C-33s got. The next version was shot peened, different surface texture? much improved fatigue life. I don't know when it was introduced. Then they nitrided the crankshafts in addition to the shot peening. This allowed for another major increase in fatigue life. 

Each step allowed for roughly an unlimited life at a stress level that the preceeding step would only tolerate for a very short period of time. Nitriding was introduced in early 1942 and allowed about a 70% increase over the old plain steel (not shot peened) Crankshaft in stress levels for the crankshaft with both cranks operating at a level that they could sustain for an unlimited duration. Also in 1942 the casting method for the engine blocks changed. The new method required about 10% fewer operations to manufacture ( casting was closer to finished dimensions), weighed a bit less and was stronger. There may have been changes in the vibration damping system between the "C"s and the later engines. Or between certain models of the later engines.

The "C" series engines, according to the book, were rated at an overspeed of 3600rpm. The "E" and "F" engines were rated at 4100rpm for overspeed when _introduced_ and the "G" series with the 12 counter weight crank was rated was rated _in excess_ of 4400rpm. 
This was not theory. As part of the engine type test the engine had to survive running at that speed for 30 seconds and do it a number of times during the duration of the test, usually a minimum of 10 times, depending on contract. 

Now what happened in the field could be way different and what an individual pilot did either in pursuit of an enemy nearly in his sights or when trying to save his own life could be different also. 
However, trying to operate "C" series engines at power levels used by "E" "F" engines, while possible short term, was at a lot higher risk and definitely shorter engine life, let alone the reduction gear problem. 

The US Air Corp had the problem of rating engines for combat use with the factory 3000-8,000 miles away from the front lines. Spare engines and spare parts for even an in theater overhaul shop had to be transported those distances. They had to trade off short term performance gains of the aircraft vs blown engines, making men fly planes with engines in questionable condition, not having enough planes in service to fly the desired number of missions in a day and so on. Which more hazardous to a pilots life, not being allowed to use WEP settings and flying in a 12 plane formation to meet the enemy or being allowed to use WEP settings and having an 8-9 plane formation to meet the same number of enemy aircraft? 
Maybe they did get it little wrong, maybe they got it a lot wrong.


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## GregP (Jul 17, 2015)

Gen. ALlison DID abuse the crap out of early Allisons and he got away with it. We stayed away from the early engines because the parts are VERY scarce and the market is nothing. Over the last 15 - 20 years they have built up only about 3 - 5 early Allisons when the parts could be located and were OK for flight use. They went into meticulous restorations and they even specified pal-nuts on the cases! I know one went into a beautiful, polished P-40C that went to Europe and sometimes flies at Duxford.

Joe has about 125 E or F Allisons ready for overhaul and could build as many as about 12 - 15 G models if anyone ordered them. They have heavier cases and heavier internals and many parts are NOT interchangeable with E and F series engines. He also has one PT boat Allison complete with flywheel and V-Drive adapter and two or three Auxiliary superchargers like used on the P-63s as well as several remote nose cases and driveshafts as used on the P-39 and P-63, ready for overhaul. Any of these can be built up right or left hand turn ... it is a simple change when buiding one but horrible to CHANGE one. You basically have to disassemble the entire engine to swap rotation but it is quite minor to build it up from parts for either direction of rotation. The only really DIFFERENT parts are idler gears and the distributor wiring harness. The rest of the parts just swap ends and turn the other way in the case. You also need a left-hand turn starter and starter cog. Everything else is the same ... except, of course, you DO need a left-hand propeller and spinner for your aircraft to actually fly it.

Joe did one left-hand engine for Paul Allen's Il-2 and another for a MiG-3 flying in Russia. He is doing more for the Russians. The only other aircraft that uses a left-turn Allison is the P-38 and the world flying population is only 6 or 7 at this time ... soon to be one or two more, depending on schedule. So the market for them is limited at best. Almost all are right-hand units.

Here is a shot of the O-47 I am working on:







And here is the current state of the starboard stub wing leading edge:






These were some 4 months ago. I'll get some more Saturday for an update. You can see I've circled some holes on the left rib where earlier volunteers drilled them off quite incorrectly and we'll have to repair that.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 17, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The "C" series engines, according to the book, were rated at an overspeed of 3600rpm. The "E" and "F" engines were rated at 4100rpm for overspeed when _introduced_ and the "G" series with the 12 counter weight crank was rated was rated _in excess_ of 4400rpm.
> This was not theory. As part of the engine type test the engine had to survive running at that speed for 30 seconds and do it a number of times during the duration of the test, usually a minimum of 10 times, depending on contract.


Is there information on any similar testing requirements for the Merlin? (Packard or Rolls Royce) 



> Now what happened in the field could be way different and what an individual pilot did either in pursuit of an enemy nearly in his sights or when trying to save his own life could be different also.
> However, trying to operate "C" series engines at power levels used by "E" "F" engines, while possible short term, was at a lot higher risk and definitely shorter engine life, let alone the reduction gear problem.


Indeed and it seems likely that the AVG abused their engines beyond what would have been practical in broader USAAC (or RAF/Commonwealth) use and probably beyond the sort of stressing Merlins were pressed into during the BoB.

It's the relatively modest increase in military power rating from the C to E/F that's more puzzling along with operating RPM limits remaining the same 2600 and 3000 RPM. The conservative ratings applied to the C series engines seem a good deal more merited though I wonder if the more sensitive nature of those early engines contributed to the USAAF's conservative rating of later models. (aside from AVG operations, I'm not aware of specific high levels of abuse of engines in early P-40s but if there were such wider spread problems, I could see overreacting with too strict/conservative procedures applied to the later models would make some sense)

Either way, they'd have needed specific testing for various alternate WEP settings before formally adopting them for combat and that would mean more funding/resources for expedited and exhaustive engine testing specific to high power levels and high manifold pressures (or just high RPM) for more extended periods.

Increased maximum RPM while not under excessive load (say with power levels within the existing military power ranges) used exclusively at/above the critical altitude would be another area for testing. Somewhat like was allowed for some DB 601 models to improve altitude performance.



> The US Air Corp had the problem of rating engines for combat use with the factory 3000-8,000 miles away from the front lines. Spare engines and spare parts for even an in theater overhaul shop had to be transported those distances. They had to trade off short term performance gains of the aircraft vs blown engines, making men fly planes with engines in questionable condition, not having enough planes in service to fly the desired number of missions in a day and so on. Which more hazardous to a pilots life, not being allowed to use WEP settings and flying in a 12 plane formation to meet the enemy or being allowed to use WEP settings and having an 8-9 plane formation to meet the same number of enemy aircraft?


That would certainly be a big difference in context compared to the Merlin, and I suppose even the Packard Merlins would have much more immediate access to parts and extensive maintenance resources in the ETO than the V-1710 would. (in the PTO it would be another story though and the same would apply to any RAF fighters outside of the ETO)

In any case, having more testing data available for planning purposes even if officially not recommended or outright restricted in use by the USAAF would be more useful than individual fighter groups, squadrons or even individual pilots resorting to experimenting on their own.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 18, 2015)

GregP said:


> Gen. ALlison DID abuse the crap out of early Allisons and he got away with it. We stayed away from the early engines because the parts are VERY scarce and the market is nothing. Over the last 15 - 20 years they have built up only about 3 - 5 early Allisons when the parts could be located and were OK for flight use. They went into meticulous restorations and they even specified pal-nuts on the cases! I know one went into a beautiful, polished P-40C that went to Europe and sometimes flies at Duxford.


Neat! I wasn't aware there were any Tomahawks left in flying condition. (or airworthy C series engines for that matter)



> Any of these can be built up right or left hand turn ... it is a simple change when buiding one but horrible to CHANGE one. You basically have to disassemble the entire engine to swap rotation but it is quite minor to build it up from parts for either direction of rotation.


Sounds like something better to do with an engine that's already due for a tear-down and rebuild. (kill two birds with one stone)





And Shortround, in regards to V-1710 logistics in the field, wouldn't it make sense to supply spare components to depots in Britian servicing Merlins? (the idea of full licensed production in the UK also came to mind, but that seems to make little sense given the engine production rationalization established in 1939, but dedicating enough resources to allow servicing/repair/rebuild of V-1710s seems more sensible) Unless, of course, that's what already happened historically.

The PTO would still be more problematic, though perhaps licensed production of the V-1710 would be attractive in Australia? They seemed to favor licensing American designs over British ones (mostly radial engines) and having that resource in the South Pacific might be useful even if still a great distance from most of the front lines. (much closer than the Continental US, though, let alone Allison/GM facilities) V-1710 powered aircraft were more critical for the PTO than ETO in general and having access to that engine might also make for more useful options in Australia's indigenous fighter project compared to their attempts using the single-stage R-1830. (a straight up license for the Allison engined P-51 might have made the most sense given the timing involved too, and given the existing relationship between NA and CAC and the Mustang Mk.I was in production before development of the Boomerang had even started)


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## Shortround6 (Jul 18, 2015)

Overhaul shops/facilities were established for a number of different types of engines in combat theater areas. You still needed to get the parts to these facilities and you needed a fair number of spare engines to keep the planes flying while the engines were being overhauled. A general rule of thumb was you needed about 50% more engines as spares than were installed in the aircraft. All this adds to the logistic 'foot print'. The Chinese 'purchased' 50 spare engines for the 100 P-40s for the Flying Tigers. How many made it to the forward fields may differ. 
Overhaul/repair shops not only worked on engines that had used up their "service life" but worked on battle damaged and crash damaged engines. Some planes were rather notorious for nosing over and hitting their props which frequently required the engine being pulled and sent to the shop for repair of the propshaft/gears/nose casing. Often a 'look' at the crankshaft was needed. The 'look' might mean pulling the crankshaft and checking the runout to see if it was bent. 

Australia did more than their fair share during the war but according to one source (wiki) had a population of about 7 million in 1940. Less than the population of New York city. There was a definite limit to what they could do. They did work up to some rather sophisticated designs but that took time/experience. Expecting 1944/5 production ability in 1942 may be asking too much. Australia's ability to manufacture machine tools, jigs and fixtures in large quantities was probably somewhat lacking.


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## gjs238 (Jul 18, 2015)

Graeme said:


> According to one author (Joe Mizrahi - Wings. Volume 25 No.2) Donald Berlin's (described as a difficult man to work with) departure from Curtiss was not the reason for the fall of Curtiss. Curtiss was falling slowly well before this due to administrative problems...
> 
> View attachment 296859



Thanks for the scan! Great reply to the initial query.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 19, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Australia did more than their fair share during the war but according to one source (wiki) had a population of about 7 million in 1940. Less than the population of New York city. There was a definite limit to what they could do. They did work up to some rather sophisticated designs but that took time/experience. Expecting 1944/5 production ability in 1942 may be asking too much. Australia's ability to manufacture machine tools, jigs and fixtures in large quantities was probably somewhat lacking.


I'd also been mistaken in thinking CAC had the R-2800 and/or R-2600 in licensed production at some point. It seems the R-1340 and R-1830 were the only war-time engines they had in production for warplanes and those were likely easier to manufacture than the V-1710 by a good margin.

With the mixed aluminum and steel tube (and fabric) construction, the NA-16 derivatives seem pretty sensible as well. The Boomerang project likely would have been more useful had development started earlier or if CAC had started with NA's NA-50 or NA-68 designs and progressed from there. (it would have been more useful than trying to engineer a competitor to the Beaufort in the Woomera, that and probably just sticking with some number of .303 Brownings for the armament, no fiddling with reverse engineering the Hispano -a .50 M2 license might have made sense but the smaller/lighter would probably be easier to fit into the airframe space/weight/recoil wise and already available)


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## Zipper730 (Mar 25, 2020)

Though there's a lot of discussion about the departure of Donovan Berlin, nobody seems to discuss WHY he left...



Graeme said:


> Curtiss was falling slowly well before this due to administrative problems...


So their attitude was: I will never go hungry again, so if they give me a contract, I'll book it no matter what?

Ralph Damon was the CEO from what periods?


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## drgondog (Mar 25, 2020)

After the P-40 there were zero positive airframe designs under Berlin's leadership. The XP-46 was oversold and under-delivered and the XP-60 series were of indifferent design. The XP-75 was arguably the worst design of all but he had a partner in Col and then General Oliver Echols who kept Curtiss, then GM/XP-75 in the biz when NAA/Mustang was being ignored.

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## Admiral Beez (Mar 25, 2020)

gjs238 said:


> Don Berlin left Curtiss in December 1941.
> Was that a large reason for the fall of Curtiss?


This made me think of Supermarine after RJ Mitchell died. Went from Spitfire to the rubbish Attacker, Swift and Scimitar.


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## swampyankee (Mar 25, 2020)

gjs238 said:


> Don Berlin left Curtiss in December 1941.
> Was that a large reason for the fall of Curtiss?





Admiral Beez said:


> This made me think of Supermarine after RJ Mitchell died. Went from Spitfire to the rubbish Attacker, Swift and Scimitar.



Bluntly, both these cases indicate serious management and cultural problems in these companies. No company should let itself be put into a position where the departure of any single employee, no matter highly placed, puts a company on a serious downslide.

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## Admiral Beez (Mar 25, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> Bluntly, both these cases indicate serious management and cultural problems in these companies. No company should let itself be put into a position where the departure of any single employee, no matter highly placed, puts a company on a serious downslide.


Sounds like Apple after Jobs died. We can argue that Jobs didn’t bring much innovation to his product categories, but there’s no question Apple’s massive success financially was due to Jobs. Now that he’s gone, everything there that wasn’t invented by Jobs seems to be crap.


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## pinehilljoe (Mar 25, 2020)

Grumman is another example. In some ways Grumman was at the top of its game in the Mid/Late 60s. Aircraft developed on contracts won in the 60s would fill Carrier Wings composed of F-14s, E-2s, A-6s, they designed, built and performed flight operations for the Lunar Module an incredible contract. Leroy Grumman left the company in 1966, by '94 they were not in the phone book. 

Tom Kelly was the Proposal Manager then Chief Engineer of the LEM, his Book Moon Lander offers a good view of Grumman in the 60s. He wrote when Grumman lost the Space Shuttle to North American Rockwell it was the beginning of the end of Grumman.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 26, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> This made me think of Supermarine after RJ Mitchell died.



Sorry Admiral, so much wrong with this staement. It wasn't Mitchell that charted the development of the Spitfire throughout its career, it was Joe Smith, who made the decisions behind putting the Merlin 45 into the Spit II to create the V, then the Merlin 61 into the V to create the IX, then the Griffon into the Spit IV prototype to create the XII, then the Griffon 60 series into the VIII to create the XIV. All these were smart decisions that kept the type at the front line throughout the war. In fact under Smith you could say this is how a pre-war design _should_ have undergone development to remain relevant.

As for the Spiteful-Attacker-Swift-Scimitar line, can't really put that to one single personnel change. The Spiteful was an exceptional fighter destined to become irrelevant due to jet engines, then the Attacker was a half hearted attempt at a jet by mating the Spiteful/Seafang wing with a new jet fuselage, which gave it lower performance than the MiG-15 with the same engine despite being smaller and lighter. The Swift was just plain bad designing; the woeful state of the early Avon certainly didn't help, but it suffered from aerodynamic and mechanical flaws during its development. The Scimitar evolved from a twin-engined fighter development, which should have been something of a winner for Supermarine, that the Scimitar evolved into a twin-engined carrier based bomber was not because the initial design was flawed, but because they couldn't interest the Air Ministry in what it had to offer. That it suffered aerodynamically as the Swift did can be put down to the same reasons as the Swift - not enough R&D at the wind tunnel end.

Again, the departure of Mitchell had no impact on any of this though; Smith masterfully commanded the Spitfire through the war, there was no reason to believe that post-war the Supermarine design office wouldn't be able to match its success, just like Berlin's departure on the fate of Curtiss.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Sorry Admiral, so much wrong with this staement. It wasn't Mitchell that charted the development of the Spitfire throughout its career, it was Joe Smith, who made the decisions behind putting the Merlin 45 into the Spit II to create the V, then the Merlin 61 into the V to create the IX, then the Griffon into the Spit IV prototype to create the XII, then the Griffon 60 series into the VIII to create the XIV. All these were smart decisions that kept the type at the front line throughout the war. In fact under Smith you could say this is how a pre-war design _should_ have undergone development to remain relevant.



It didn't require a genius to install Merlin 45 in the Spitfire II - it was basically the same engine as the Merlin XII. That Spitfire was conductive to receive installation of ever-heavier and more powerful engines is a testament to the excellence of the basic design, and for that we can credit far more Mitchell than Smith. Mitchell also designed the Supermarine racers, the Spitfire was not a thing of just 'getting lucky'.
We can also give credit to Beverly Shenstone here, the creator of the wing of Spitfire.



> As for the Spiteful-Attacker-Swift-Scimitar line, can't really put that to one single personnel change. The Spiteful was an exceptional fighter destined to become irrelevant due to jet engines, then the Attacker was a half hearted attempt at a jet by mating the Spiteful/Seafang wing with a new jet fuselage, which gave it lower performance than the MiG-15 with the same engine despite being smaller and lighter. The Swift was just plain bad designing; the woeful state of the early Avon certainly didn't help, but it suffered from aerodynamic and mechanical flaws during its development. The Scimitar evolved from a twin-engined fighter development, which should have been something of a winner for Supermarine, that the Scimitar evolved into a twin-engined carrier based bomber was not because the initial design was flawed, but because they couldn't interest the Air Ministry in what it had to offer. That it suffered aerodynamically as the Swift did can be put down to the same reasons as the Swift - not enough R&D at the wind tunnel end.
> 
> Again, the departure of Mitchell had no impact on any of this though; Smith masterfully commanded the Spitfire through the war, there was no reason to believe that post-war the Supermarine design office wouldn't be able to match its success, just like Berlin's departure on the fate of Curtiss.



The proof is in the pudding - unlike with Spitfire, in post-Mitchell years the Supermarine design office didn't make an over-average airframe for a combat aircraft.

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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2020)

Many of these companies made a few turkeys along the way. At certain times however they may have been working on multiple designs and one turkey (or two) at the same time there was a success wasn't enough to pull the company down. At other times the orders were not so plentiful and more was riding on each design, a single turkey at such a critical time could spell disaster (or a short string of turkeys).
In the "jet age" things get more complicated as the success or failure of a plane depended on things outside of the airframe makers control. The US Navy doomed a number of planes to mediocrity or worse by insisting on Westinghouse engines for example. Or issuing requirements for planes to use Missle XX which turned out to not work very well. Or an electronics system/suite that took years to get right. 
British aerospace was in a poor position during and after WW II due to a lack of engineers (and support like wind tunnels) as planes rapidly grew in complexity. 

Curtiss _may_ have diluted their talent pool by trying to do too many projects at once. Or been the victim of bad luck in the form of bad timing. 
Curtiss got involved with several projects involving pressure cockpits and single engine fighters powered by R-3350s with contra rotating propellers that took longer than usual to get to flying status. 
Poor management may not have given proper guidance to the design teams. Or bid on too many projects at once.


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## Zipper730 (Mar 26, 2020)

drgondog said:


> The XP-46 was oversold and under-delivered and the XP-60 series were of indifferent design.


Why did the P-46 have so much problems? It seemed to deliver such little performance? As for the P-53/60 and XP-62, I'm curious what went wrong.


> The XP-75 was arguably the worst design of all


It was strange...



swampyankee said:


> Bluntly, both these cases indicate serious management and cultural problems in these companies.


What problems dogged Supermarine?


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## swampyankee (Mar 26, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> Why did the P-46 have so much problems? It seemed to deliver such little performance? As for the P-53/60 and XP-62, I'm curious what went wrong.
> It was strange...
> 
> What problems dogged Supermarine?



If a _single_ employee leaves a large company, it shouldn't go downhill as a result; doing so indicates (imho) a basic flaw in corporate governance*. A previous poster had said that this happened after Mitchell's death at Supermarine.

-----------

* Companies can be remarkably stupid about this. A number of years ago, a company I worked with had all three of its experts in gyrodynamics retire simultaneously (I carpooled with an HR manager). This was a quite rare and necessary type of expertise; the company higher-ups thought these guys could be replaced by a quick newspaper ad, in a couple of weeks: they were just engineers, weren't they? It ended up taking close to a year, while spending a lot of money on consultants.


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## Zipper730 (Mar 26, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> If a _single_ employee leaves a large company, it shouldn't go downhill as a result


I was just curious what problems affected Supermarine.


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## drgondog (Mar 26, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> Why did the P-46 have so much problems? It seemed to deliver such little performance? As for the P-53/60 and XP-62, I'm curious what went wrong.
> It was strange...
> 
> What problems dogged Supermarine?


Drag is the curse of performance. P-40, P-46, P-60 cursed by excess drag - wing and fuselage.


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## Elmas (Mar 26, 2020)

More or less ( I have not the book in my hands) when Geoffrey Quill tested P-39 was amazed by the handling on the ground due to his tricycle landing gear: " I could not understand why a factory like Vickers, with a tradition in oleopneumatics, did not implement a tricycle landing gear in the Attacker, that I had strongly suggested..." states in his memories.
A great airplane designer must be a sort of an artist: he must _know_, not with reasoning or study or calculus, but with some sort of "_intuition_".


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2020)

drgondog said:


> Drag is the curse of performance. P-40, P-46, P-60 cursed by excess drag - wing and fuselage.



The P-40 is not as bad as many people think. At least compared to it's contemporaries. Which the P-51 was not, being started about 6 years after the Hawk 75/P-36.
The P-46 is a real puzzle as it is no faster, using the same engine, as the P-40D/E despite being smaller and lighter. Something (or more likely many little somethings) were creating a lot of drag. 
The P-60 Saga also has a lot of drag, but perhaps not as much as we suppose if published performance is to be believed as one prototype using the same engine as a P-40F was a bit faster than the P-40F while using a larger wing and weighing more. However having less drag than the P-40 in the fall of 1941 was no longer good enough.


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## Admiral Beez (Mar 26, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I was just curious what problems affected Supermarine.


Their 1929 acquisition by Vickers seems to be the beginning of their downfall, with the precipice being the 1937 death of Mitchell and the 1938 reorg of Supermarine into Vickers-Armstrongs (Aircraft) Ltd. From then onwards, any new Supermarine aircraft designs were dogs.

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## wuzak (Mar 26, 2020)

Shortround6 said:


> The P-46 is a real puzzle as it is no faster, using the same engine, as the P-40D/E despite being smaller and lighter. Something (or more likely many little somethings) were creating a lot of drag.



I believe the XP-46 was no faster without military equipment than the P-40D was with.

Maybe the ventral radiator had something to do with the poor performance. The XP-40 had a ventral radiator before it was quickly moved under the nose. Perhaps Curtiss didn't have a good handle on radiator placement and design.




Shortround6 said:


> The P-60 Saga also has a lot of drag, but perhaps not as much as we suppose if published performance is to be believed as one prototype using the same engine as a P-40F was a bit faster than the P-40F while using a larger wing and weighing more. However having less drag than the P-40 in the fall of 1941 was no longer good enough.



The timing is also interesting - the XP-60 flew before the XP-46. What was required was a rapidly moving target.


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## wuzak (Mar 26, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> Why did the P-46 have so much problems? It seemed to deliver such little performance? As for the P-53/60 and XP-62, I'm curious



The XP-53 failed because its engine never materialised and was a turd (I-1430).

Two XP-53s were ordered. One was re-purposed as the XP-60 (the USAAC/F wanting to see the Merlin engine in an airframe with laminar flow wings) and the other was completed as a static test frame for the XP-60 program. No XP-53 flew.

The XP-60 was converted later into the XP-60D with 2 stage Merlin. I do not know what performance that possessed.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 26, 2020)

tomo pauk said:


> It didn't require a genius to install Merlin 45 in the Spitfire II - it was basically the same engine as the Merlin XII. That Spitfire was conductive to receive installation of ever-heavier and more powerful engines is a testament to the excellence of the basic design, and for that we can credit far more Mitchell than Smith. Mitchell also designed the Supermarine racers, the Spitfire was not a thing of just 'getting lucky'.
> We can also give credit to Beverly Shenstone here, the creator of the wing of Spitfire.



That's a little of an oversimplification given the history of the type, and no, it didn't take _a_ genius, it took a whole team of individuals, some of which were geniusses, the Air Ministry and Rolls-Royce, so yeah, you're partially right, but the point is that under Smith the Spitfire evolved in a completely different direction to how Mitchellplanned it, in hasty response to wartime needs. Sure, there is no saying it wouldn't have under Mitchell, but let's not diminish Smith's enormous contribution (and Shenstone's and Quill's and soooo many others - it takes a whole design team, as you know) to the Spitfire's evolution, with flippant and inaccurate staements.

As for the post-war contribution of Supermarine, again, quite a few missteps, which I highlighted. That still does nothing to diminish what Smith achieved, which is the point. Mitchell's death did _not_ bring about a downfall of sorts for Supermarine; Smith and everyone else at Supermarine who was active during the war would disagree entirely.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2020)

wuzak said:


> I believe the XP-46 was no faster without military equipment than the P-40D was with.


 *IF* the accounts can be believed the XP-46A managed 410mph and flew months ahead of the XP-60. However the XP-60 flew a few weeks ahead of the XP-46, confused yet?
The XP-46A was plane stripped of all military equipment in an effort to get an airframe into the air for testing. This was done so thoroughly that it could not even be properly ballasted for tests as there was no way to fasten the ballast in place. The XP-46 was equipped with all military equipment and was completed at a somewhat leisurely pace. Unfortunately the performance was also rather leisurely. 355mph at 12,200ft at 7,081lbs (gross weight was 7,432lbs with full internal fuel and armament) however with a bullet proof windscreen and gun ports open for firing speed was 348.5mph. 6.5 minutes to 15,200ft didn't help it's cause. 

I don't know if the XP-46A actually hit 410mph or if that was an estimated speed. 55mph seems to be a rather large difference for military equipment?

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## Zipper730 (Mar 26, 2020)

drgondog said:


> Drag is the curse of performance. P-40, P-46, P-60 cursed by excess drag - wing and fuselage.


The P-40 still performed pretty well: Able to reach around 340-370 mph @ 13000-15000'. That wasn't actually bad, as it actually outperformed the Hurricane Mk.I, possibly the Mk.II's at those altitudes. Considering the performance could be achieved at those lower altitudes, that could also imply the plane was cleaner than the Hurricanes. 



Elmas said:


> More or less ( I have not the book in my hands) when Geoffrey Quill tested P-39 was amazed by the handling on the ground due to his tricycle landing gear: " I could not understand why a factory like Vickers, with a tradition in oleopneumatics, did not implement a tricycle landing gear in the Attacker, that I had strongly suggested..." states in his memories.


If I recall, they were starting out with a propeller design that they decided to modify into a jet-fighter. That said, it is strange that they would ignore suggestions to put a tricycle-gear in.



Shortround6 said:


> The P-46 is a real puzzle as it is no faster, using the same engine, as the P-40D/E despite being smaller and lighter.


I'm not sure what produced the increase in drag. The only thing I could think of was the belly radiator design, it seemed that Curtiss couldn't quite get that one right, though Donovan Berlin might have gotten that right on the XP-75 (he got everything else wrong, but...)



Admiral Beez said:


> Their 1929 acquisition by Vickers seems to be the beginning of their downfall, with the precipice being the 1937 death of Mitchell and the 1938 reorg of Supermarine into Vickers-Armstrongs (Aircraft) Ltd. From then onwards, any new Supermarine aircraft designs were dogs.


What was wrong with Vickers? They produced many top-notch aircraft including the Vickers Wellington, and some other proposals.


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## wuzak (Mar 27, 2020)

> The performance of the XP-60 was disappointing as well, with a top speed of only 387 mph at 22,000 feet. It took 7.3 minutes to reach an altitude of 15,000 feet, and service ceiling of 29,000 feet. Some of the reason for the disappointing performance was due to the wing surface not being finished to the degree of smoothness required for the laminar flow wing. Another factor was the fact that the Merlin {Rolls-Royce Merlin 28} engine did not deliver the guaranteed output.



Curtiss P-60

That may explain the poor performance of the XP-60, as well as having a large wing:



> Empty weight was 7008 pounds, gross weight was 9277 pounds, and maximum takeoff weight was 9700 pounds. Dimensions were wingspan 45 feet 5 1/4 inches, length 33 feet 7 1/2 inches, height 12 feet 4 inches, and wing area 275 square feet.



*Note that the wing area given was the same for the XP-60 as for later versions with smaller span.


Compare that to the P-51A:


> Weights: 6433 lbs empty, 8600 lbs normal loaded, and 10,600 lbs maximum loaded. Dimensions: Wingspan was *37* feet 0 1/4 inches, length was 32 feet 2 1/2 inches, height was 8 feet 8 inches, and wing area was 233 square feet.



The page has the wing span as 27ft, but it clearly was 37ft.

North American P-51A Mustang 


And the P-47C


> Weights were 9900 pounds empty, 13,500 pounds normal loaded, 14,925 pounds maximum. Wingspan was 40 feet 9 5/16 inches, length was 36 feet 1 3/16 inches, height was 14 feet 3 5/16 inches, and wing area was 300 square feet.



Republic P-47C Thunderbolt


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## Zipper730 (Mar 27, 2020)

wuzak said:


> That may explain the poor performance of the XP-60, as well as having a large wing


So it had gotten too big and heavy, as well as the wings not being designed to adequate tolerances. I guess North American had a greater attention to detail than Curtiss did -- they also managed to make the belly-radiator work, where Curtiss couldn't pull it off.

Considering the wing-area figures are listed the same as the XP-60, this plane probably had larger wings?


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## Admiral Beez (Mar 27, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> What was wrong with Vickers? They produced many top-notch aircraft including the Vickers Wellington, and some other proposals.


It’s a good question. On fighters, Vickers seemed to be behind the curve. At the same time their Supermarine subsidiary was flying the Spitfire prototype in 1936, the mother company’s Vickers Venom first took flight.

How can the same company make this....







....and this? I hope Smith didn’t pen this one.


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## Peter Gunn (Mar 27, 2020)

Well there's always market driven reasons... 






and...

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## Kevin J (Mar 27, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> It’s a good question. On fighters, Vickers seemed to be behind the curve. At the same time their Supermarine subsidiary was flying the Spitfire prototype in 1936, the mother company’s Vickers Venom first took flight.
> 
> How can the same company make this....
> 
> ...


The Venom would have whooped a lot of Japanese arses.


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## swampyankee (Mar 27, 2020)

Peter Gunn said:


> Well there's always market driven reasons...
> 
> View attachment 575134
> 
> ...



Yes, a useful, four-passenger vehicle and a very expensive toy one. 

Engineering is very much a team activity, and the reports of the critical nature of Don Berlin or Reginald Mitchell are either evidence of poor management practices within the companies or of a very shallow talent pool. What engineers like Berlin or Mitchell should have been doing is managing projects and making sure that they had talented people in their teams. Clarence Johnson and Edward Heinemann probably did this better than almost any other managers in the aircraft business. Berlin and Mitchell didn't.

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## Shortround6 (Mar 27, 2020)

Clarence Johnson and Edward Heinemann didn't start out as "managers". At what point they became managers I don't know. At what point they transitioned from just another engineer to design leader on a project to overseeing several projects took a number of years. Upper management at times was responsible for letting them take an idea and running with it. 
Yes, once the initial concept/rough design is figured out then a team should be assembled and "leader" be relieved of detail work. 
British were at a disadvantage in there was a general shortage of engineers. At times it wasn't a question of picking the best and brightest but just getting enough people to move a project forward. Design offices often didn't have enough draftsmen let alone real real engineers. 
Not to pick on the British too much, the Book "The Engines of Pratt & Whitney: a technical history" by Jack Connors has one engineer remembering that the P&W supercharger design dept had 5 men in it before WW II after P & W decided to build their own superchargers and stop buying designs/parts from GE. I wonder how many were in that dept in 1945?

What if's that say P & W (or insert another company) should have just done XXXX overlook this part.


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## swampyankee (Mar 27, 2020)

Shortround6 said:


> Clarence Johnson and Edward Heinemann didn't start out as "managers". At what point they became managers I don't know. At what point they transitioned from just another engineer to design leader on a project to overseeing several projects took a number of years. Upper management at times was responsible for letting them take an idea and running with it.



One would hope it took some time. While management is a skill many engineers don't ever get (one of the senior managers at my last aerospace employer had his _secretary rate his direct reports, who were all engineering managers_, because he couldn't be bothered), engineering managers are rarely hired in as such right out of school. 


Shortround6 said:


> Yes, once the initial concept/rough design is figured out then a team should be assembled and "leader" be relieved of detail work.
> British were at a disadvantage in there was a general shortage of engineers. At times it wasn't a question of picking the best and brightest but just getting enough people to move a project forward. Design offices often didn't have enough draftsmen let alone real real engineers.


 Alas, true. An article I read about the V-bomber development stated that the UK had fewer engineers working on all the V-bombers than Boeing had working on B-47 hydraulics. I'm not sure I believe that; I suspect that there is a problem with job titles, which don't necessarily correspond between two US companies, let alone US and UK companies. 


Shortround6 said:


> Not to pick on the British too much, the Book "The Engines of Pratt & Whitney: a technical history" by Jack Connors has one engineer remembering that the P&W supercharger design dept had 5 men in it before WW II after P & W decided to build their own superchargers and stop buying designs/parts from GE. I wonder how many were in that dept in 1945?
> 
> What if's that say P & W (or insert another company) should have just done XXXX overlook this part.



As a recovering aeronautical engineer, I'm actually pretty cognizant of how few engineers may be working in a given specialty at even a large company: we had one engineer, who dealt with all the anti-ice systems when I was at HSD; she worked about half-time on anti-ice systems and about half-time on gearing. While she would get other engineers (frequently me) assigned to anti-ice or gears (anti-ice was fun; I like heat transfer), she was basically the only engineer on either. Different countries had (it's much less today) significant differences in engineering education. Continental Europe, starting with France, had formal, university-level education for engineers before the US, and I think the US did before the UK; one of the benefits of this is that university-trained engineers are likely to be more capable of moving to different specialties (my engineering career included gas turbine engine testing, structural fatigue analysis, aerodynamics, thermodynamic modeling of gas turbine engines and aircraft environmental control systems, low-observables analysis, and writing data reduction software).

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## Reluctant Poster (Mar 27, 2020)

kool kitty89 said:


> Neat! I wasn't aware there were any Tomahawks left in flying condition. (or airworthy C series engines for that matter)
> 
> 
> Sounds like something better to do with an engine that's already due for a tear-down and rebuild. (kill two birds with one stone)
> ...





swampyankee said:


> One would hope it took some time. While management is a skill many engineers don't ever get (one of the senior managers at my last aerospace employer had his _secretary rate his direct reports, who were all engineering managers_, because he couldn't be bothered), engineering managers are rarely hired in as such right out of school.
> 
> Alas, true. An article I read about the V-bomber development stated that the UK had fewer engineers working on all the V-bombers than Boeing had working on B-47 hydraulics. I'm not sure I believe that; I suspect that there is a problem with job titles, which don't necessarily correspond between two US companies, let alone US and UK companies.
> 
> ...


The claim that Boeing had more engineers working on hydraulics came from Bill Gunston in Bombers of the West.


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## pinehilljoe (Mar 27, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> One would hope it took some time. While management is a skill many engineers don't ever get (one of the senior managers at my last aerospace employer had his _secretary rate his direct reports, who were all engineering managers_, because he couldn't be bothered), engineering managers are rarely hired in as such right out of school.
> 
> Alas, true. An article I read about the V-bomber development stated that the UK had fewer engineers working on all the V-bombers than Boeing had working on B-47 hydraulics. I'm not sure I believe that; I suspect that there is a problem with job titles, which don't necessarily correspond between two US companies, let alone US and UK companies.
> 
> ...



I thought it was only the companies Ive worked at. Ive spent my career in aerospace. Many of the disciplines are one deep or if they are more than one deep there is one grey beard that makes the project come together.


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## swampyankee (Mar 27, 2020)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The claim that Boeing had more engineers working on hydraulics came from Bill Gunston in Bombers of the West.



That rings a bell.....
I still don't entirely believe it.


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## swampyankee (Mar 27, 2020)

pinehilljoe said:


> I thought it was only the companies Ive worked at. Ive spent my career in aerospace. Many of the disciplines are one deep or if they are more than one deep there is one grey beard that makes the project come together.



I think most of the higher level engineers (not engineering managers, but high level technical people) in the industry know each other by reputation. Overall, it's pretty small community: one of the engineers I once worked near (she was in structures) was Nicole Piasecki, Frank's daughter; another was the son of Chuck Keys, a chief engineer from Boeing, a third was one of the test engineers who did the fatigue testing on the Comet. When I worked in the biz I could probably get a message hand-delivered with no more than three steps to just about any active aeronautical engineer in the West.

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## jetcal1 (Mar 28, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> I think most of the higher level engineers (not engineering managers, but high level technical people) in the industry know each other by reputation. Overall, it's pretty small community: one of the engineers I once worked near (she was in structures) was Nicole Piasecki, Frank's daughter; another was the son of Chuck Keys, a chief engineer from Boeing, a third was one of the test engineers who did the fatigue testing on the Comet. When I worked in the biz I could probably get a message hand-delivered with no more than three steps to just about any active aeronautical engineer in the West.


Large industry, small community. Reputation is everything.


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## Reluctant Poster (Mar 28, 2020)

Curtiss Wright had far more problems than the loss of Donald Berlin. The attached copy of the Truman Committee Report makes fascinating reading. and it doesn't even address the disastrous development of the R-3350.

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## Admiral Beez (Mar 28, 2020)

When it comes to failed US aeronautical firms it’s not Curtiss that comes to mind. I think of Brewster and maybe Vultee.

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## swampyankee (Mar 28, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> When it comes to failed US aeronautical firms it’s not Curtiss that comes to mind. I think of Brewster and maybe Vultee.


Well, Curtiss still exists.

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## Kevin J (Mar 29, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> When it comes to failed US aeronautical firms it’s not Curtiss that comes to mind. I think of Brewster and maybe Vultee.


If you look at all the projects that Curtiss had, perhaps it's not surprising that they eventually failed. They did have some major winners though, the Commando, Seahawk, Warhawk and Helldiver


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## Reluctant Poster (Mar 29, 2020)

Kevin J said:


> If you look at all the projects that Curtiss had, perhaps it's not surprising that they eventually failed. They did have some major winners though, the Commando, Seahawk, Warhawk and Helldiver


I would not consider the Commado to be a major winner with its propensity to explode in mid air which took too a long time to cure. The Helldiver was far from a winner.


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## swampyankee (Mar 29, 2020)

The P-40 Hawk series were under-rated aircraft, for certain, but there were far too many problems with the C-46 and the SB2C Helldiver to call them "great successes," and the Seahawk was possibly the best aircraft ever designed for the scouting role that was already moribund in 1944, at least in the USN and RN (they had carriers). For the other roles, _e.g._, SAR, a bit more space for rescuees would likely be more useful than a quite few knots in airspeed.

Curtiss's troubles were far more systemic than the presence or absence of Don Berlin (who, one should add, did not do spectacularly well with, say, the P-75).


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## wuzak (Mar 29, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> The P-40 Hawk series were under-rated aircraft,



I would have thought the same, but reading threads in here has now convinced my otherwise.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 29, 2020)

He is often listed as having something to do with the XP-55.

Most biographies have him leaving Curtiss in Dec of 1941 but Wiki is rather conflicted about this.

"During World War II, Berlin was Chief Engineer and the head of design at Curtiss-Wright. "
"A number of experimental programs were begun during this period, including the revolutionary Curtiss-Wright XP-55 Ascender that never achieved production status"
"Although designed by George A. Page Jr., Berlin oversaw the design of the Curtiss C-46 Commando "
" He also supervised the development of the Curtiss SB2C Helldiver, designed by Raymond C. Blaylock, the company's last major production aircraft series "

If he left at the end of 1941 then he was head of design for only about 1/3 of the war counting the starting as the invasion of Poland.

While design work and concept of the XP-55 started in 1940 and a flying scale model was built at company expense the US Army didn't order a full sized prototype until July of 1942, 6-7 months after Don Berlin had left Curtiss? It doesn't fly until July 1943, a year and half after he left Curtiss? 

The story about the C-46 Commando cries out for clarification. The CW-20 was built in St. Louis Missouri which is a fair distance from Buffalo NY. Not impossible, merely difficult. Work started in 1937. However after a number of changes production started slowly, very slowly, on two production examples were complete as of Dec 7th 1941. Don Belrin leaves curtiss the same month? By Nov 1943 743 changes had been made to production models. This is from Wiki so corrections welcome.

As for the SB2C, again form Wiki "The first prototype made its maiden flight on *18 December 1940*.[9] It crashed on 8 February 1941 when its engine failed on approach, but Curtiss was asked to rebuild it. The fuselage was lengthened and a larger tail was fitted, while an autopilot was fitted to help the poor stability. The revised prototype flew again on* 20 October 1941*, but was destroyed when its wing failed during diving tests on* 21 December 1941*. 

The Helldiver doesn't enter combat until Nov 1943, nearly 2 years after Don Berlin left Curtiss and after 880 modifications had been mad to the design. 

It is very difficult to reconcile these different accounts, even with Mr Berlin working for Curtiss on a consulting basis while he worked on the P-75 project. 
And what company the size of Curtiss-Wright is going to depend on a chief designer or supervisor working part time for them on a number f projects while he works for another company full time on an aircraft design for the full time company?

Maybe wiki has it wrong and left Curtiss later?

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## Zipper730 (Mar 30, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> When it comes to failed US aeronautical firms it’s not Curtiss that comes to mind. I think of Brewster and maybe Vultee.


What went wrong with Vultee?


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## swampyankee (Mar 30, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> What went wrong with Vultee?



It was bought by Consolidated, forming CONsolidated Vultee AIRcraft. Vultee only existed as an independent company from 1939 to 1943. 

Curtiss-Wright does still exist, with a total revenue of about 2.5 billion USD/year, and 9,000 employees. During WW2, it peaked out at about 180,000. For comparison, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft's (as part of United Aircraft) workforce peaked at about 40,000 during WW2, and is about 38,000 today (as part of United Technologies and Raytheon). 

C-W's engine side also had some pretty serious issues during WW2, including significant quality control shortcomings.


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## Zipper730 (Mar 30, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> It was bought by Consolidated, forming CONsolidated Vultee AIRcraft. Vultee only existed as an independent company from 1939 to 1943.


No, I meant why? Why did they get bought out?


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## BobB (Dec 3, 2020)

pinehilljoe said:


> Grumman is another example. In some ways Grumman was at the top of its game in the Mid/Late 60s. Aircraft developed on contracts won in the 60s would fill Carrier Wings composed of F-14s, E-2s, A-6s, they designed, built and performed flight operations for the Lunar Module an incredible contract. Leroy Grumman left the company in 1966, by '94 they were not in the phone book.
> 
> Tom Kelly was the Proposal Manager then Chief Engineer of the LEM, his Book Moon Lander offers a good view of Grumman in the 60s. He wrote when Grumman lost the Space Shuttle to North American Rockwell it was the beginning of the end of Grumman.


One writer suggested that when Grumman started working for NASA, NASA didn't like their work culture and insisted that they do things the NASA way. Leroy may have been lucky to leave in 1966. https://dra.american.edu/islandora/object/thesesdissertations:109/datastream/PDF/view

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## GregP (Dec 3, 2020)

Hey gjs238, with respect to post #12, Don Berlin returned to Curtiss-Wright in 1963 and, as I said earlier than post #12, helped guide them into the sensor business.

Not harping or criticising, just saying Don DID help guide Curtiss-Wright into the post-aircraft business, albeit way after WWII.


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## Zipper730 (Dec 4, 2020)

BobB said:


> One writer suggested that when Grumman started working for NASA, NASA didn't like their work culture and insisted that they do things the NASA way. Leroy may have been lucky to leave in 1966. https://dra.american.edu/islandora/object/thesesdissertations:109/datastream/PDF/view


They seemed to have a remarkable work ethic.


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## BarnOwlLover (Nov 16, 2022)

I know that I'm late to the party with this, but as far as the Curtiss XP-46 underperforming, could it be just that it was too underpowered for the weight of the aircraft. It weighed (fully equipped) about the same as a Spitfire IX, but only had 1150 hp, instead of the Spitfire IX that had (depending on Merlin fitted) 1550+-1700 hp. I think that power to weight had a lot to answer for there.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 17, 2022)

Speed is mostly depending on power vs. drag. Heavy aircraft were fast if the p/d ratio was good, talk P-51. Rate of climb is very dependant on weight vs. power installed, so we have the slower Spitfire IX out-climbing the heavy Merlin Mustang; American fighters tended to be heavier than European fighters.
XP-46 was reasonably fast for the power installed, but not fast enough to justify the switch from the in-production P-40 to the P-46. We don't know enough about the RoC, we also don't know enough about the aircraft condition during the tests (presence of protection, radios, guns, ammo, ballast?)
Yes, the non-turbo V-1710 was getting well behind the curve by second half of 1940.


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## wuzak (Nov 17, 2022)

BarnOwlLover said:


> I know that I'm late to the party with this, but as far as the Curtiss XP-46 underperforming, could it be just that it was too underpowered for the weight of the aircraft. It weighed (fully equipped) about the same as a Spitfire IX, but only had 1150 hp, instead of the Spitfire IX that had (depending on Merlin fitted) 1550+-1700 hp. I think that power to weight had a lot to answer for there.



The XP-46 was about the same weight as the P-40B and slightly less than the P-40C, its near contemporaries.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 17, 2022)

tomo pauk said:


> XP-46 was reasonably fast for the power installed, but not fast enough to justify the switch from the in-production P-40 to the P-46. We don't know enough about the RoC, we also don't know enough about the aircraft condition during the tests (presence of protection, radios, guns, ammo, ballast?)





wuzak said:


> The XP-46 was about the same weight as the P-40B and slightly less than the P-40C, its near contemporaries.


Part of the problem is that the two prototypes differed considerably in weight. And apparently in drag although that is seldom addressed. That or the figures for the XP-46A are the _estimated target_ figures. 
The XP-46 is supposed to have been good for 355mph at 12,200ft but speed with BP glass and gun muzzles uncovered was 348.5mph. 
Initial climb was 2200fpm 
Climb to 5,000ft was 2.1 minutes
Climb to 10,000ft was 4.0 minutes
Climb to 15,200 ft was 6.5 minutes. 

The XP-46 was the armed/equipped version. How well equipped? 
The XP-46A was the unarmed stripper version which flew first. 
It turned out they could not ballast the the XP-46A to the required weights as they could not figure out how to fasten the ballast weights in the desired areas.

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## GregP (Nov 19, 2022)

gjs238 said:


> Don Berlin was no longer at CW when it closed down its aviation division and sold its assets to North American Aviation.
> 
> From Curtiss-Wright XF-87 Blackhawk - Wikipedia:
> _The Curtiss-Wright XF-87 Blackhawk (previously designated the XP-87) was a prototype American all-weather jet fighter interceptor and the company's last aircraft project.[2] Designed as a replacement for the World War II–era propeller-driven P-61 Black Widow night/interceptor aircraft, the XF-87 lost in government procurement competition to the Northrop F-89 Scorpion. *The loss of the contract was fatal to the company; the Curtiss-Wright Corporation closed down its aviation division, selling its assets to North American Aviation.*_



Don Berlin returned to Curtiss-Wright in 1963 and helped them into a business other than aviation.


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