# Worst Piston engined Bomber of World War Two



## nuuumannn (Jul 10, 2012)

Taking Greg's idea into a new thread entirely.

LWS Zubr, Blackburn Botha, He 177...

Anyone else?


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## Tankworks (Jul 10, 2012)

(if we are talking multi engine?)Blenhiem, it peaked just pre-war.


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## Trilisser (Jul 10, 2012)

No way Blenheim! IMHO the worst bomber should be one having really terrible performance, even more terrible handling and so on.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 10, 2012)

Avro Manchester, AW Albemarle, Handley Page H.P.53 Hereford, Nakajima Ki-49?, Kawasaki Ki-48, Amiot 143?, 

That is for starters


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## Shortround6 (Jul 10, 2012)

The Blenheim did at least perform combat missions for several years, in part because expected replacements didn't work. Had they worked the Blenheim would have been phased out much sooner and perhaps with more of it's reputation intact?


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## buffnut453 (Jul 10, 2012)

Amiot 143
Potez 540
Farman F222

Can anyone detect a pattern here...???


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## nuuumannn (Jul 10, 2012)

Ahh, Hereford, most certainly; forgot that one. Manchester I'm gonna debate, but not right now...

I'd also add the Handley Page Halifax Mk.I to the list.


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## parsifal (Jul 10, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Amiot 143
> Potez 540
> Farman F222
> 
> Can anyone detect a pattern here...???



AM 143 were actually a pretty good design, when first designed in 1931. The Potez 540 was built to meet a 1932 specification. The farman was the spring chicken of the crowd, being designed 1933-4, and produced from 1935.

For their time, there was nothing wronmg with these aircraft, in fact they were quite advanced. the problem was the industry that produced them


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## buffnut453 (Jul 10, 2012)

Hi Parsifal,

My tongue was somewhat in my cheek. I think the main problem is they were still in service in 1940. That, to me, is pretty criminal.

Cheers,
B-N


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## baclightning (Jul 11, 2012)

I know it didn't see combat, but considering that 771 were built, the Brewster Buccaneer/Bermuda deserves consideration...


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Hi Parsifal,
> 
> My tongue was somewhat in my cheek. I think the main problem is they were still in service in 1940. That, to me, is pretty criminal.
> 
> ...



Exactly. French approached aircraft production until 1939 like they were works of art, handcrafted slow laborious expensive processes that damned the FAF to being a second rate force when called upon to defend their country. In terms of their bombers, if you exclude army co-operation biplane types, they possessed less than 300 bombers in May 1940. Now thats criminal.......


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## Vincenzo (Jul 11, 2012)

AdlA orbat 10 may '40 Armée de l'Air, Ordre de bataille au 10 mai 1940


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## Shortround6 (Jul 11, 2012)

The Amiot 143 may have been an OK airplane but adoption and continued use leave a lot of blame for some officials to shoulder. Look at the time line for the Martin B-10 bomber. 10 YB-10s under took a trip to Alaska over 6 months before the first production AM 143 flew. The AM 143 was obsolete before the first one was delivered. At least the Potez 540 was on secondary duties by WW II. 

The Brewster Buccaneer/Bermuda certainly deserves consideration in the single engine category.


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## R Pope (Jul 11, 2012)

How about the Breda 88? On a hot day it could only attack targets that were in the direction they were pointing at liftoff, because they couldn't get enough altitude to dare trying to bank!


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2012)

I would nominate the following by nationality

Germany
Until its problems were eventually sorted out with the mark 5 sub category,He177

Britain
Avro Manchester

France
Bloch 131


US
Cleveland, Buccaneer or Vindicator 


Soviet
Probably the old Ant-20 Maxim gorky

japan
Probably the Ki49


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## GregP (Jul 11, 2012)

That's the spirit RPope!

It would have helped if the crew had weighed anchor before attempting takeoff. Since they didn't they actually plowed many a field, albeit in a single row. The average pilot was unable to use the aircraft for its intended use!

The LWS-6 Zubr is also a very strong candidate if it weren't for the fact that they discovered their error before they made more than 17 Zubrs. It was ugly enough that even the first person who looked upon its completed form became ill and swooned out of the hangar. That SHOULD have been warning eough, but it went unheeded until they completed 17 airframes. Nobody halted the work order so work continued ...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 11, 2012)

R Pope said:


> How about the Breda 88? On a hot day it could only attack targets that were in the direction they were pointing at liftoff, because they couldn't get enough altitude to dare trying to bank!


The Breda 88 was considered a fighter bomber and was mentioned on the worse fighter thread. It would probably qualify here as well.


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## davebender (Jul 11, 2012)

> Germany
> Until its problems were eventually sorted out with the mark 5 sub category,He177



Heinkel He 177 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> Starting with the He 177 A-3/R2, a modified engine nacelle with a new engine, the Daimler-Benz DB 610 which consisted of a pair of Daimler-Benz DB 605's, was used to eliminate the tendency for engine fires.[20] With the introduction of the DB 610 came several improvements including the relocation of the engine oil tank, the lengthening of the engine mountings by 20 cm (8 in), the complete redesign of the exhaust system which also facilitated the installation of exhaust dampers for night missions, and the setting of a power limitation on the engines which resulted in greater reliability
> 
> *He 177 A-3*
> Sixteenth and subsequent aircraft powered by DB 610 A/B engines.



130 x He-177A1.
15 x He-177A3 powered by DB606 engines.
.....145 total He-177 production aircraft with faulty engines.
.....949 total He-177 production aircraft (He-177A3 and He-177A5) powered by reliable engines.

How many B-29s and Manchester/Lancaster bombers were produced before engine problems were sorted out? If rated by the same standard as the He-177 then B-29s and Lancasters should also be on the worst bomber list.


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## nuuumannn (Jul 11, 2012)

I have to say that it's no surprise that the Manchester is here, since, aside from its well known issues with the Vulture engines, it also suffered problems with its electrics and hydraulics. Despite these faults, by the time the later models of the Mk.I and the Mk.III appeared these issues had been resolved, according to a book on RR engines I have. 

Because of its poor serviceability record, by late 1940 the Air Ministry had already confined the type to the scrap heap and progress on the Manchester Mk.III continued; it was this aeroplane that changed the course of the type's troubled history. The Mk.III being renamed to detract from the stigma of the Manchester. Chadwick had always intended that a version of the Manchester be built with four engines, so the Mk.III wasn't just as a result of the failure of the Mk.I. In effect, the Lancaster's airframe was (almost) identical to the Manchester; the only difference being the centre section. Tooling up to build the Lanc was comparatively easy and was carried out rather rapidly as a result.

I guess you guys are right for including the Manchester, but part of me thinks it shouldn't be here because of the Lancaster. It was a very advanced aeroplane on roll out for the first time and was put into production and service before its issues were sorted, it also spawned the Lancaster, (which didn't have engine issues, Dave) which was essentially a Manchester with a bigger wing and four engines.

As for the Halifax Mk.I; underpowered, dangerously poor handling, too slow, faulty undercarriage... the list goes on.


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## nuuumannn (Jul 11, 2012)

> If rated by the same standard as the He-177 then B-29s and Lancasters should also be on the worst bomber list.



I have to sympathise with you a bit here, Dave, since the big problems of the He 177 were eventually ironed out, but I guess because of its protracted and difficult development and limited use it differs from the Lancaster and the B-29, although the B-29 had a pretty long and troubled gestation, but the end result was a striking aircraft with excellent performance; not to forget its use during the war. You could say that with the B-29 the end justifies the means, but you couldn't with the He 177.

It shares with the Manchester/Lancaster a troubled gestation too, but the Lanc/Manchester Mk.III was free of the issues that plagued the Mk.I and it had an enviable combat record, something that the He 177 could never have had as a heavy bomber in the Luftwaffe.

The biggest problem with the He 177 was that it was German.


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## andy2012 (Jul 11, 2012)

The TBD Devastator should make the list as well.


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## Tankworks (Jul 11, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The Blenheim did at least perform combat missions for several years, in part because expected replacements didn't work. Had they worked the Blenheim would have been phased out much sooner and perhaps with more of it's reputation intact?


Agreed!


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## davebender (Jul 11, 2012)

> You could say that with the B-29 the end justifies the means, but you couldn't with the He 177.


Why do you say that? 

I'm under the impression the He-177 was the primary German maritime patrol aircraft during the final 18 months of WWII. What aircraft would fill this role if the He-177 weren't available?


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2012)

davebender said:


> Why do you say that?
> 
> I'm under the impression the He-177 was the primary German maritime patrol aircraft during the final 18 months of WWII. What aircraft would fill this role if the He-177 weren't available?



Probably the Do217. Even with the kinks ironed out, it (the He177) some sort of upgraded Dornier over the He 177, which was persevered with as much for political reasons as any. 

It did eventually turn into a servicieable a/c, but I dont think it can ever be described as an outstanding success 

Herer is a link to a site that gives some details of its service career. Of the 1000 or so produced, probably not more than 200 were ever used for sustained operations. Close to 900 were captured at the end of the war, most having never left the factory where they had been made.....

http://www.aviastar.org/gallery/234.html


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## Shortround6 (Jul 11, 2012)

andy2012 said:


> The TBD Devastator should make the list as well.



The Devastator makes the list because it was 3-4 years old when it went into combat, literally, not just a 4 year old design but the planes that were in combat in 1942 had come out of the factory in 1937-38. There was no MK II or "B" version so we don't know how a version with 40% more power, double the guns, armor and self sealing tanks would have done. 

Yes, it was the "worst" US torpedo bomber or "worst" US single engine bomber but due to it's age and not any inherent defect/s.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 11, 2012)

Something to think on when working on these "worst lists". 

The Devastator according to "wiki" " Devastator, which flew for the first time on 15 April 1935, marked a large number of "firsts" for the U.S. Navy.[3] It was the first widely-used carrier-based monoplane as well as the first all-metal naval aircraft, the first with a totally-enclosed cockpit, the first with power-actuated (hydraulically) folding wings; it is fair to say that the TBD was revolutionary.[4] A semi-retractable undercarriage was fitted, with the wheels designed to protrude 10 in (250 mm) below the wings to permit a "wheels-up" landing with only minimal damage." 

It used an 850hp version of the R-1830 engine. As noted above the Navy never ordered a MK II version so there were NO improvements from the 1937-38 production model. Judged against it's "contemporaries" How bad was it? The Nakajima B5N first flew about 20 months _after_ the Devastator and the Versions in front line service in 1941-42 had been fitted with a more powerful engine than the first production version.

On the other hand the Martin B-10 had made more than a few twin engine bombers obsolete over night. From Joe B's web site " In a demonstration of their reliability and efficiency, ten YB-10s undertook a survey flight to Alaska in July of 1934."
The Amiot 143 didn't enter service until one year later, July of 1935. While there may have been nothing wrong with it as a flying machine (handled well, didn't fall apart in the air or on landing, etc) it was obsolete on the day the first delivery was made. That it was still in first line service almost 5 years later (even as a _night_ bomber) is a mark against the French aircraft procurement system. 

Then you have something Like the Botha. Ordered off the Drawing board, (with the Air Ministry specifying which engine it was to use) it was so under powered that not only couldn't it be used as a combat service aircraft, it was actually judged too dangerous to continue using as a _TRAINER_.

IMHO while each aircraft could be considered as a "worst" in some category or fashion they demonstrate 3 _different_ kinds of _WORST._


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## model299 (Jul 12, 2012)

GregP said:


> The LWS-6 Zubr is also a very strong candidate if it weren't for the fact that they discovered their error before they made more than 17 Zubrs. It was ugly enough that even the first person who looked upon its completed form became ill and swooned out of the hangar. That SHOULD have been warning eough, but it went unheeded until they completed 17 airframes. Nobody halted the work order so work continued ...



This didn't ring a bell for me so I went looking for it.



Woof! That is one hideous looking BUTT-UGLY airplane! The source I found (Virtual Aircraft Museum) said the prototype fell apart in mid-air _"unfortunately while carrying prospective Romanian purchasers."_

It also said the survivors were put to work by the Luftwaffe as unarmed trainers. The trainees must have wondered what their transgressions were to be assigned to these things.


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## renrich (Jul 12, 2012)

I agree that the TBD should have a chance to make the list but if it does why not have the Swordfish (Stringbag) on the list.


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## stona (Jul 12, 2012)

renrich said:


> I agree that the TBD should have a chance to make the list but if it does why not have the Swordfish (Stringbag) on the list.



I wouldn't have either on the list. Both did what they were supposed to do,initially.
The Swordfish was very successful but of course never had its Midway.

If you include them then,on the same grounds,you could make a case for the Ju 87 which most would not consider a "bad" bomber. Without air superiority however.......

Steve


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 12, 2012)

I think there is a big difference between a poorly designed aircraft ( Ba.88 ) and a well designed aircraft that was made obsolete by other aircraft (TBD).


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## parsifal (Jul 12, 2012)

renrich said:


> I agree that the TBD should have a chance to make the list but if it does why not have the Swordfish (Stringbag) on the list.



The stringbag has abilities and records of service not attributable to thee TBD. Swordfish were responsible for the sinking of 4 BBs, abour 250000 tons of shipping and many submarines. The Swordfish, was able to operate in rough conditions because of its flyin charaacteristics. from an early point n its career, it was fitted wih ASV radar. This made the swordfish the single most successful carrier borne torpedo bomber in the allied inverntory. 

Criticisms of the Devastator are unjustified. Comparing the devastator to the Swordfish will only add to american embarrasment


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## Shortround6 (Jul 12, 2012)

I would note that there were only 139 Devastators ever made and due to operational accidents just over 100 still in service (?) on Dec 7 1941. There were almost 2400 Swordfish manufactured, I would certainly hope that over 2300 planes caused more damage to the enemy than about 100 planes


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Comparing the devastator to the Swordfish will only add to american embarrasment



OUCH!


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## Tante Ju (Jul 13, 2012)

Swordfish was obsolate and was only possible to operate it because complete lack of aerial opposition... its not really smart to compare its record to USN light bomber in the Pacific which faced arguably the best trained pilots in what was arguebly the best, or at least amongst the top naval fighters of the era.

How well the Swordfish fared under similar circumstance, ie. naval force with proper screen of smaller ships _and_ air cover was well demonstrated during operation cerberus.. all were shot down and had not any success.


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

Swordfish operating against effective daylight fighter cover, are going to be shot out of the sky. Those six swordfish that attacked in the channel that day, were meant to be protected by 2 squadrons of RAF fighters. Both fighter squadrons failed to rendevous. 

Against 80+ fighters, what bomber in daylight, with just six available, is going to survive much less successfully complete their mission?

Against lesser odds, the Swordfish was reaonably successful in daylight, witness the results achieved off Norway in 1940. Albacores, their near cousin were also able to fight and survive by daylight in 1942, when provided with fighter cover. They were able to achieve a measure of success around the pedestal convoy and in offensive operations against the Tirpitz. Swordfish achieved similar results off Cape Spartivento in 1940, with enemy fighters present 

However, both the the Albacore and the Swordfish were not daylight attack aircraft. Their crews, and the aircraft fitout were designed for night strikes, and in this they excelled. Here, their low performance actually helped them complete their primary nmission....put torpedoes into ships. Because they were slow, they were also stable and accurate, and this was why they were there. Swordfish (and Albacores) were also passable as Divebombers, again because they were so slow they could control their dives


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## baclightning (Jul 13, 2012)

I don't think there's a better example of a disparity between an aircraft's "paper" performance, and actual accomplichments than you get with the Swordfish. Was it obsolete? Yes. Did it have a fantastic war record? Certainly.

It was the Jamie Moyer of WW2 aircraft - old, slow, and with accomplishments far greater than would seem possible just by looking at it. 

The Swordfish had the good fortune of rarely facing modern fighters. But the fact is that any torpedo bomber of WW2, including the much more modern Grumman TBF and Nakajima B5N, had a maximum speed of about 100 mph less than that of contemporary fighters, and a torpedo bomber keeping a steady course on its firing run would be easy prey. While the Swordfish was slow, its handling qualities were second to none, and that was a key factor to its success, especially in its ability to take-off and land from small ships such as the escort carriers and MAC ships that were so crucial in winning the Battle of the Atlantic.

Taranto and the Bismarck attack were the high water marks of the Swordfish’s career, obviously, but it was used in a huge variety of roles, and in many places, from the heat of the Middle East to the frigid cold of the Arctic convoys. 830 Squadron, FAA, operating from Malta in 1940/41, destroyed 450,000 tons of Axis shipping in nine months, with the high total being 98,000 tons in one month. That's one squadron - no more than 27 aircraft. The Swordfish, after being equipped with radar, became the first aircraft to sink a submarine at night. Fitted with rockets, it became the first to sink an enemy submarine using that weapon. In May 1944, Swordfish operating from HMS Fencer sunk three U-Boats within 48 hours. In September 1944, Swordfish from HMS Vindex sunk four U-Boats in one voyage. During the war, the Swordfish served with 25 first-line FAA squadrons, 22 second-line squadrons, and 11 catapult flights. In addition, two RAF squadrons used them for mine-laying and even level bombing. 

Those are real accomplishments, and made a real contribution to the Allies winning the war. 

Here are a few quotes about the aircraft:

"Incredible as it may seem, the ancient Stringbag was ultimately responsible for the destruction of a greater tonnage of hostile shipping than any other type of Allied aircraft."

- _The Fairey Swordfish Mks. I-IV_, by Ian G. Stott

“Future historians are likely to find it difficult to justify the reputation of the Fairey Swordfish and to explain the reasons for its overall operational success. Here was what would later have been described as a strike aircraft of a design based largely on a specification which had been issued in 1930, and was virtually obsolescent before it went into service – yet was still in successful use nearly ten years later and after more than five years of highly competitive warfare between technologically advanced nations. This relic of the biplane era – an anachronism even before the outbreak of war in September 1939 – continued to operate successfully in a wide variety of roles until May 1945, and outlived, in Fleet Air Arm service, its intended replacement, the Fairey Albacore. The Swordfish was responsible, so the records say, for the destruction of a greater tonnage of hostile shipping than any other aircraft used by the Allied forces.”

- _Fairey Aircraft Since 1915_, by H.A. Taylor

"The Top Torpedo-Bomber of World War II

1. Fairey Swordfish
2. Grumman Avenger
3. Nakajima Kate
4. Nakajima Jill

"The Swordfish was responsible for history's first successful air attack against a capital ship, and it virtually crippled the Italian fleet at Taranto in an epic night attack in late 1940, thus altering the balance of sea power in the Mediterranean. It also hunted and destroyed the German battleship Bismarck. But it was as an antisubmarine hunter-killer in the crucial Battle of Atlantic that the Swordfish excelled, operating from escort carriers and MACs day and night, in foul weather and fair, year after long year...

"...I did a lot of thinking before placing the obsolete Swordfish biplane before the more modern Avenger monoplane. Analysis of the facts shows that the Swordfish, in action well before the Avenger, obtained better torpedo results, and suffered fewer losses."

- _Duels in the Sky - World War II Naval Aircraft in Combat_, by Capt. Eric Brown


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## davebender (Jul 13, 2012)

IMO that hardly qualifies as a mass production aircraft. If not for Devastator participation in the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway it would be no more then a footnote in aviation history. Like the Me-109T which was produced in even smaller numbers and never fought a battle from an aircraft carrier flight deck.


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## davebender (Jul 13, 2012)

> Incredible as it may seem, the ancient Stringbag was ultimately responsible for the destruction of a greater tonnage of hostile shipping than any other type of Allied aircraft.


How many tons of shipping were sunk by aerial mines? I'm under the impression that's what finally crippled the Japanese economy during 1945.


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## renrich (Jul 13, 2012)

Eric Brown's comparison of the Swordfish versus the TBF or Kate is baloney just like much of his writing comparing combat aircraft. If the Swordfish had equipped the American VT squadrons at Midway and Coral Sea with the American torpedoes, they would probably been even less successful than they were. The Swordfish could not even get into the battle compared to the Kate and the Avenger because of its low speed and lack of range. It was a disgrace that the RN, with it's tradition and experience, sent it's CVs to sea with the British designed shipboard AC that they had. And it is a tribute to the RN personnel that they accomplished what they did with such shoddy equipment.


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## razor1uk (Jul 13, 2012)

I think I'll go with the Breda 88, as the Zubr looks like the love child of a Blenheim, an undersized Martin B-10 and someones 'homebrew'. - but it does seem more flyable via its wing area twin engines than the little(r) Breda looks like it should but seemingly didn't without struggle.

I can imagine some pilots ficticuosly saying later..

"This isa good aeroplane. It can go afast for its engine, it can carry some bombies too, it can carry enough fuel for me to see your wife, but it can only do two if its not warm weather, if you wanta do three thngs, well then..."


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## davebender (Jul 13, 2012)

British Torpedoes of World War II
IMO the only good thing about the Stringbag was the reliable 18" Mark XII aerial torpedo it carried. Design the USN TBF torpedo bomber to carry the British torpedo and you'd have a war winning weapons system.


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## baclightning (Jul 13, 2012)

renrich said:


> Eric Brown's comparison of the Swordfish versus the TBF or Kate is baloney just like much of his writing comparing combat aircraft. If the Swordfish had equipped the American VT squadrons at Midway and Coral Sea with the American torpedoes, they would probably been even less successful than they were. The Swordfish could not even get into the battle compared to the Kate and the Avenger because of its low speed and lack of range. It was a disgrace that the RN, with it's tradition and experience, sent it's CVs to sea with the British designed shipboard AC that they had. And it is a tribute to the RN personnel that they accomplished what they did with such shoddy equipment.



Actually, I respect Eric Brown's opinions about aircraft more than anyone else who has ever written about them. I simply can't ignore the amount of experience he has. I don't know if I'd agree with his opinion in this particular case, but I certainly respect what he has to say.


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## boeing299 (Jul 13, 2012)

Vought SB2U Vindicator


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## RCAFson (Jul 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> British Torpedoes of World War II
> IMO the only good thing about the Stringbag was the reliable 18" Mark XII aerial torpedo it carried. Design the USN TBF torpedo bomber to carry the British torpedo and you'd have a war winning weapons system.



The Swordfish could operate in weather that would ground the TBF, and unlike the TBF, the Swordfish was fully stressed for dive bombing, however the RN realized that the Swordfish was obsolete even in 1939, and by 1940 the plan was to fully replace it with the Albacore, and by 1942 with the Barracuda. However, I don't think that there's any doubt that the Swordfish was far superior to the lamentable TBD. Initially engine problems with the Taurus delayed the Albacore, and then after France fell, RN FAA procurement plans and priorities got shot to hell.

Heck, some USN skippers even called for the Swordfish to replace some of their TBFs:
_



Interestingly, in his comments on the new
aircraft composition, Captain Short (of USS Bogue) suggested that four
slower type aircraft, such as the Swordfish, be
substituted for three 'TBF-is: "The Swordfish, for
instance, can be operated in weather which precludes
the landing and take-off (except by catapult) of the
TBF. They could be used for night operations and
rough water work when the employment of the heavy
and faster TBF would be unduly hazardous in this class
of vessel. Further, a slow aircraft at night would prove
more effective in spotting submarines than a fast
one''(76) The suggestion was not followed.

Click to expand...

_
From Black May:
http://books.google.ca/books?id=fj0...Bw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q= swordfish&f=false


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## RCAFson (Jul 13, 2012)

renrich said:


> Eric Brown's comparison of the Swordfish versus the TBF or Kate is baloney just like much of his writing comparing combat aircraft. If the Swordfish had equipped the American VT squadrons at Midway and Coral Sea with the American torpedoes, they would probably been even less successful than they were. The Swordfish could not even get into the battle compared to the Kate and the Avenger because of its low speed and lack of range. It was a disgrace that the RN, with it's tradition and experience, sent it's CVs to sea with the British designed shipboard AC that they had. And it is a tribute to the RN personnel that they accomplished what they did with such shoddy equipment.



The Swordfish had better range than the TBD, cruised at very similar speeds and was just about as fast at sea level, plus it could dive bomb and release its torpedo after diving in to attack. Take a look at this memo:






"_Prior to the production of the of the B-26...the fastest torpedo carrying plane in the US services made about 130 knots..."_ This tells us that by mid 1942 the TBD was far slower than most people realize. The Swordfish would have been a distinct improvement over the TBD, while the Albacore was much better yet.


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## davebender (Jul 13, 2012)

That's no surprise. I'd rather have a Stringbag with torpedoes that work then a TBF with torpedoes that are likely to malfunction.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Swordfish could operate in weather that would ground the TBF


Can you be specific? Back in WW2 instrument flying was based on an artificial horizon, gyro compass, turn and bank indicator, Vertical speed indicator, a clock with a second hand and possibly an ADF. Later in the war some aircraft were fitted with a localizer that worked off of LF tones, so tell me what makes the Swordfish any better of an IMC aircraft than the TBF if equipped with the same or similar equipment????


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## RCAFson (Jul 13, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Can you be specific? Back in WW2 instrument flying was based on an artificial horizon, gyro compass, turn and bank indicator, Vertical speed indicator, a clock with a second hand and possibly an ADF. Later in the war some aircraft were fitted with a localizer that worked off of LF tones, so tell me what makes the Swordfish any better of an IMC aircraft than the TBF if equipped with the same or similar equipment????



Sorry. I added a quote to my original post to illustrate my point, so I'll post it again here:
_



Interestingly, in his comments on the new
aircraft composition, Captain Short (of USS Bogue) suggested that four
slower type aircraft, such as the Swordfish, be
substituted for three 'TBF-is: "The Swordfish, for
instance, can be operated in weather which precludes
the landing and take-off (except by catapult) of the
TBF. They could be used for night operations and
rough water work when the employment of the heavy
and faster TBF would be unduly hazardous in this class
of vessel. Further, a slow aircraft at night would prove
more effective in spotting submarines than a fast
one''(76) The suggestion was not followed.

Click to expand...

_
From Black May:
Black May: The Epic Story of the Allies' Defeat of the German U-Boats in May ... - Michael Gannon - Google Books


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2012)

Now I can agree with that.


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

renrich said:


> Eric Brown's comparison of the Swordfish versus the TBF or Kate is baloney just like much of his writing comparing combat aircraft. If the Swordfish had equipped the American VT squadrons at Midway and Coral Sea with the American torpedoes, they would probably been even less successful than they were. The Swordfish could not even get into the battle compared to the Kate and the Avenger because of its low speed and lack of range. It was a disgrace that the RN, with it's tradition and experience, sent it's CVs to sea with the British designed shipboard AC that they had. And it is a tribute to the RN personnel that they accomplished what they did with such shoddy equipment.




The Stringbag did not suit US operational techniques or training, so from a USN perspective you are absolutely right. But from the RN operational techniques and training pov they were exactly what was needed. 

If the USN had gone down the pathway of the RN they would have had several years to prepre their crews and equip their aircraft with the Swordfish. They would have gone into battle, with the most accurate torpedo squadrons in the worls, equipped with ASV radar and fully night capable. At Midway they would not have attacked by day, they would have been looking to launch their torpedo strikes by night, leaving the day strikes to the F4Fs and SBDs. They would not be using the slow and innaccurate Bliss Levitt torpedoes that they did, but the much faster and more accurate whitehead torpedoes. 

To give you some idea of the potency of that combination, at taranto 13 totpedoes were launched......11 hit their target. Against the Bismarck 9 torpedoes were launched, either 2 or three hit their target, in pitch black conditions, flying in a heavy gale.

The problem with the swordfish solution is that to get the best out of it, you need elite crews....guys who can hit things with their ordinance. Its very difficult to mass produce this sort of experience. Against the japanese, the kind of small elite forces available to the RN might not suit the sort of war the USN was envisaging. Still having a niche capability such as could be offered by the Swordfish may have given the USN the ability to reduce their losses whilst maintaining the same loss rates or better against the Japanese....in other words improving the exhange rates As an example, at Coral Sea, instead of retreating each day after night fall, the Americans might have been able to follow up their day strikes with deadly night torpedo attacks. Its an idea at least worth lookig at.

And the Stringbags capabilities in 1941-2 were unique in carrier borne aviation. The USN in 1942 did not possess functional ASV radar issued on a more or less standard basis. The Swordfish at that time came more or less standard wit ASV radar (I sound like a used car salesman....all I need to say it is fited standard with a cigarette lighter and CD player, and we are set....),


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> IMO that hardly qualifies as a mass production aircraft. If not for Devastator participation in the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway it would be no more then a footnote in aviation history. Like the Me-109T which was produced in even smaller numbers and never fought a battle from an aircraft carrier flight deck.



For the USN at that time, this was a large production run. The TBD was always going to be frontline material given that position in the US production system.


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## renrich (Jul 13, 2012)

The suggestion was not followed because it made no sense. Saying the Stringbag was superior to the Avenger because it was slower is tantamount to saying the US Model 1808 Musket was superior to the US Model 1961 Springfield Rifle Musket during The War of Northern Aggression because it was a smoothbore and faster to load. The TBD was around 68 MPH faster than the Swordfish and the crew did not get wet when it rained. I call those significant advantages.


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> British Torpedoes of World War II
> IMO the only good thing about the Stringbag was the reliable 18" Mark XII aerial torpedo it carried. Design the USN TBF torpedo bomber to carry the British torpedo and you'd have a war winning weapons system.



Possibly, though doubtful that they would be as accurate as the Swordfish. The Swordfish's apparent weakness (its slow speed) was also one of its greatest strengths. It was so slow, it could hardly miss. Almost as many Battleships were sunk or disabled at Taranto, with just 13 attack aircraft, as were sunk or disabled at pearl, where there were almost 5 times the number of torpoedoes fired. The Japanese had no problems with their torpedoes, and they were attacking in daylight, in a very low flak environment....yet could only manage a fraction of the accuracy the FAA crews achieved at Taranto. Your explanation of the Swordfish's success (being solely its torpedo) does not stack up when you look at all the facts.


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

renrich said:


> The suggestion was not followed because it made no sense. Saying the Stringbag was superior to the Avenger because it was slower is tantamount to saying the US Model 1808 Musket was superior to the US Model 1961 Springfield Rifle Musket during The War of Northern Aggression because it was a smoothbore and faster to load. The TBD was around 68 MPH faster than the Swordfish and the crew did not get wet when it rained. I call those significant advantages.



They are advantages, in certain situations, however the Swordfish was able to operate in conditions and to a level of accuracy not available to the TBD crews. To work on your analogy, rifle muskets arent much use, if they were less accurate or couldnt be used in the conditions presented. If an aircraft cannot fly, or lacks the accuracy of its rival, it is less capable

As for getting wet, well, I dont think that mattered all that much. It would have been nice to give some creature comforts to the crews, but they got by, just the same.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 13, 2012)

In some cases the Swordfish was like a baseball pitcher throwing a knuckleball or a change up...


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## baclightning (Jul 13, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> In some cases the Swordfish was like a baseball pitcher throwing a knuckleball or a change up...



As I commented, post #36, "It was the Jamie Moyer of WW2 aircraft..."


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## renrich (Jul 13, 2012)

How can anyone think that a slow torpedo plane was more effective than a fast torpedo plane? The TBD had to go in slow because the US torpedos could not be dropped if the plane was going fast. They also could not be dropped from very high off the water. The Japanese torpedo could be dropped both from higher off the water and at higher speeds. The TBDs were slow while carrying a torpedo because of drag but so was the Stringbag. The Kate and later the Avenger were much faster which helped them get into position to launch when the targets were maneuvering to avoid them. The longer it took for the VT to get into position to drop the torpedo, the longer the VT was exposed to AA and fighter interference. The String bag might be doing 90-100 mph when delivering the torpedo since clean it could only do 138 mph. The TBD could do around 206 mph clean at best altitude but cruised with a torpedo at around 115 knots and it had to driop the torpedo at around 105 mph. Most of the TBDs at Midway never dropped their torpedos because the Zekes or AA got them first. Going in slow does not help accuracy if your torpedo is designed to be dropped at high speeds and from high altitude (relatively.)

The Japanese aerial torpedoes used at PH, Coral Sea and Midway could be launched at speeds up to 260 knots. The String bag or TBD couldn't go that fast with a torpedo aboard with a tailwind and in a dive.


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## renrich (Jul 13, 2012)

The rifled musket was absolutely much more accurate than the smoothbore and also much more effective at longer ranges. The Japanese reported that the flak at PH was surprisingly heavy and started up very fast. The Taranto raid does not compare to the Japanese torpedo attacks in the Pacific.


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

> How can anyone think that a slow torpedo plane was more effective than a fast torpedo plane?



Because the aircraft speed is not the only issue. Its also how accurate the torpedo can be delivered, and for whatever reason, the Swordfish was THE most accurate torpedo delivery system available to any of the combatants. The only thing I can think of that makes it different are the speed of the aircraft, and the quality of the crews 



> The TBD had to go in slow because the US torpedos could not be dropped if the plane was going fast


. 

And the Swordfish had to go slow because thats as fast as they could go. In the right situations this did not hinder their survivability, and also seems to have helped in their rough weather abilities. 



> They also could not be dropped from very high off the water. The Japanese torpedo could be dropped both from higher off the water and at higher speeds.




Yes, i agree. I would concede that in every repect, Japanese torpedoes were the best in the world. Their crews were also reportedly second to none. yet, they did not achieve results as good as those achieved by the Swordfish. 



> The TBDs were slow while carrying a torpedo because of drag but so was the Stringbag. The Kate and later the Avenger were much faster which helped them get into position to launch when the targets were maneuvering to avoid them. The longer it took for the VT to get into position to drop the torpedo, the longer the VT was exposed to AA and fighter interference.




Being slow does not seem to have affected the Stringbags accuracy or survivability provided they operated at night, which no-one else could do accurately at that time. Both the kate and the Avenger should have been more survivable by day (but statistically were not, neither were they as good in rough weather, reportedly) and certainly never achieved the same level of accuracy as the stringbag. Maddening as that might be, it IS the case


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

> The Japanese reported that the flak at PH was surprisingly heavy and started up very fast. The Taranto raid does not compare to the Japanese torpedo attacks in the Pacific.



Why not. The Swordfish crews reported that flak at Taranto was also very heavy. And flak was non existent at pearl for the opening minutes of the raid, when most of the hits were achieved. How do you explain the Swordfish achieving accuracy rates of over 90% compared to the Kates at Pearl being about 20%. Sure, y9ou might argue that the flak was heavier (which I dont agree with) but that still cannot explain an accuracy level more than 4 times as great by the Stringbag.

And Taranto was not an isolated case, its just the best documented and most well known. There was a reason why the stringbag was the weapon of choice in ASW warfare.....they were the most accurate delivery system against targets (subs) that were the hardest to hit of any naval target


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## RCAFson (Jul 13, 2012)

renrich said:


> How can anyone think that a slow torpedo plane was more effective than a fast torpedo plane? The TBD had to go in slow because the US torpedos could not be dropped if the plane was going fast. They also could not be dropped from very high off the water. The Japanese torpedo could be dropped both from higher off the water and at higher speeds. The TBDs were slow while carrying a torpedo because of drag but so was the Stringbag. The Kate and later the Avenger were much faster which helped them get into position to launch when the targets were maneuvering to avoid them. The longer it took for the VT to get into position to drop the torpedo, the longer the VT was exposed to AA and fighter interference. The String bag might be doing 90-100 mph when delivering the torpedo since clean it could only do 138 mph. The TBD could do around 206 mph clean at best altitude but cruised with a torpedo at around 115 knots and it had to driop the torpedo at around 105 mph. Most of the TBDs at Midway never dropped their torpedos because the Zekes or AA got them first. Going in slow does not help accuracy if your torpedo is designed to be dropped at high speeds and from high altitude (relatively.)
> 
> The Japanese aerial torpedoes used at PH, Coral Sea and Midway could be launched at speeds up to 260 knots. The String bag or TBD couldn't go that fast with a torpedo aboard with a tailwind and in a dive.



The RN's standard torpedo bomber, by May 1942, was the Albacore, and it was overdue for replacement with the Barracuda.

RN torpedo bomber tactics called for approaching the target at medium altitude, then executing a very steep dive, with the aircraft leveling off at drop altitude, lining up on the target, releasing the torpedo and then evasive maneuvers to avoid flack. There is a very good probability that even a Swordfish would be traveling faster at release than the lumbering TBD, which, by mid 1942 was extremely overweight, and even the newest aircraft were about 3 years old. 

The RN Mk XII torpedo was progressively strengthened to allow drops at up to 270 knots. The Mk XV which was introduced in 42-43 started life with 250-270 knot drop speeds.


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## renrich (Jul 13, 2012)

The USN could and did use the same tactic of approaching at higher altitudes and then diving to the altitude to deliver the torpedo. However one disadvantage of that tactic which the Swordfish seldom encountered was that if the enemy CAP caught the VTs at higher altitudes they were much more vulnerable to VF attack than if they were down next to the water. of course the American torpedoes could not be dropped at high speeds. Amazing that the RN had good torpedoes and not very good ship board AC ( until they got American ones) I believe the RN CVs deployed to the PTO in 1945 ( against the USN's wishes) mostly carried TBMs or Fs as their VTs.


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

renrich said:


> The USN could and did use the same tactic of approaching at higher altitudes and then diving to the altitude to deliver the torpedo. However one disadvantage of that tactic which the Swordfish seldom encountered was that if the enemy CAP caught the VTs at higher altitudes they were much more vulnerable to VF attack than if they were down next to the water. of course the American torpedoes could not be dropped at high speeds. Amazing that the RN had good torpedoes and not very good ship board AC ( until they got American ones) I believe the RN CVs deployed to the PTO in 1945 ( against the USN's wishes) mostly carried TBMs or Fs as their VTs.



The change to US equipment occurred for a number of reasons. Chief among them was the better range of the Us equipment and bett4er spares availability. but also throughout 1942 the RN abandoned its highly specialized night capable training in favour of the mass produced pilot training schemes. These mass produced pilots had a number of critical shortcomings that rendered the Swordfish et al less than optimum. Chief among them was the lost specialist skills to operate effectively at night. 

As a daylight aircraft, the Swordfish lacked the performance and the range to be competitive.

However it is also not quite true that the RN preferred US types over British types, is not true. In the ETO, the fleet carriers once they converted to a day strike force, prefrerred the firefly, barracuda and corsair as their main strike aircraft. In the PTO they did use the Avenger, but not as a torpedo bomber. by the time the BPF deployed to the PTO, the Avenger was being used almost exclusively as a level bomber.

After the war, the CW navies tended to abandon US equipment. in Korea, the principal equipment used by the RN and RAN were fireflies, and furies with some seafire 47s thrown in. by Korea they had even abandoned the corsair, due to its poor deck handling characteristics (on the CVLs)


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## baclightning (Jul 13, 2012)

parsifal said:


> However it is also not quite true that the RN preferred US types over British types, is not true. In the ETO, the fleet carriers once they converted to a day strike force, prefrerred the firefly, barracuda and corsair as their main strike aircraft. In the PTO they did use the Avenger, but not as a torpedo bomber. by the time the BPF deployed to the PTO, the Avenger was being used almost exclusively as a level bomber.



Barracudas were used by the RN Fleet carriers in the Pacific only though October 1944; after that date, they were replaced in the TBR Wings by Avengers, and didn't return until the four Light Fleet Carriers were employed in the last few weeks of the war. After the operation against the Nicobar Islands on October 19, 1944, the Barracudas embarked on _Indomitable_, the last Barracudas active on carriers in the theater, were put into storage at RNAS Coimbatore, India.


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## RCAFson (Jul 13, 2012)

renrich said:


> The USN could and did use the same tactic of approaching at higher altitudes and then diving to the altitude to deliver the torpedo. However one disadvantage of that tactic which the Swordfish seldom encountered was that if the enemy CAP caught the VTs at higher altitudes they were much more vulnerable to VF attack than if they were down next to the water. of course the American torpedoes could not be dropped at high speeds. Amazing that the RN had good torpedoes and not very good ship board AC ( until they got American ones) I believe the RN CVs deployed to the PTO in 1945 ( against the USN's wishes) mostly carried TBMs or Fs as their VTs.



The USN VTs didn't use the same tactics, because they couldn't, as neither the TBD or TBF, was stressed for diving bombing. All RN VTs from the Swordfish onward were fully stressed for divebombing and could make classical, near vertical dives, while carrying a torpedo, a tactic which greatly reduced vulnerability to AA, while even fighters have a hard time staying with a relatively slow moving, but vertically diving aircraft:



> "Somewhere in Scotland a British FAA pilot dived me for nearly two miles, at an angle near 75degs and a speed of about 385 mph, as my final observing lesson in torpedo bombing..." http://books.google.ca/books?id=p-2...r_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fleet air arm 385&f=false



The Swordfish and Albacore could approach or exceed, 200 knots while diving to make a torpedo attack. Only the USN SB2C could use these tactics, but apparently,AFAIK, despite calls to replace the TBM with the SB2C entirely, the SB2C was never used for torpedo bomber attacks:



> It is therefore recommended that as soon as certain modifications are incorporated in the bomb bay of the SB2C type (probably SB2C-5) which permit carrying of 1-2000lb bomb and improved torpedo bracing that all TBF type planes be replaced with SB2C type. This plane can then do all that the TBF can, safer and faster except for carrying a large number of small bombs or excess personnel....
> Enterprise (CV-6) Action Report - 31 October 1944 - Page 40 - WWII Archives


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## Trilisser (Jul 13, 2012)

Quite an interesting comment on the serviceability of the SB2C, so often maligned!


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## davebender (Jul 13, 2012)

During WWII that means being able to take off, navigate and land in the dark with a reasonable chance of success. ASV, H2S, etc. might put you in the ball park but it's not accurate enough to put bombs on a moving ship (or even an anchored ship).

WWII era night maritime attacks were normally conducted using parachute flares. That's standard WWI era technology which any aircraft could employ. Just as the RN did at Taranto and the Luftwaffe did at Bari.


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## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> During WWII that means being able to take off, navigate and land in the dark with a reasonable chance of success. ASV, H2S, etc. might put you in the ball park but it's not accurate enough to put bombs on a moving ship (or even an anchored ship).
> 
> WWII era night maritime attacks were normally conducted using parachute flares. That's standard WWI era technology which any aircraft could employ. Just as the RN did at Taranto and the Luftwaffe did at Bari.


True for most types, but not the swordfish. Swordfish got 1/3 of their torpedoes launched into the bismarck, in the dead of night and to boot, in conditions that few other aircraft could fly. neither was this an isolated incident. literally tens of thousands of tons of Axis shipping was sunk by swordfish operating at night.

Taranto was undertaken with flares as you say, and there is no denying the effectiveness of bari. however the majority of the damage at bari was caused by exploding ammunition and gas ships, not the LW bombs. And the Luftwaffe hit Bari with more than 90 a/c, and achieved about 10% hits. that is good, but hardly comparable to the 90%+ hits achieved against the italian ships at taranto 

This capability was shared with no-one during the war.


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## renrich (Jul 14, 2012)

RCAF, If you don't believe the TBD, much less the TBF did not use the dive in to torpedo altitude, please read Lundstrom. They may not have dived at 75 degrees but a TBF in a shallow dive would be going faster than a Sword fish with a torpedo on board. As Michael has pointed out the TBF by wars end was not being used as a torpedo plane but rather a bomber and they often were glide bombing at rather steep angles. I have personally seen on the Naval Aerial Bombarment Range on Padre Island in 1953 TBFs (TBMs) diving at rather steep angles. By the way, the Avenger was the first FAA aircraft to attack the Japanese mainland in 1945.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 14, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The USN VTs didn't use the same tactics, because they couldn't, *as neither the TBD or TBF, was stressed for diving bombing. All RN VTs from the Swordfish onward were fully stressed for divebombing*


 
And this is identified where?



RCAFson said:


> The Swordfish and Albacore could approach or exceed, 200 knots while diving to make a torpedo attack.


 And the VNE of these aircraft with a bombload are?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 14, 2012)

parsifal said:


> True for most types, but not the swordfish. Swordfish got 1/3 of their torpedoes launched into the bismarck, in the dead of night and to boot, *in conditions that few other aircraft could fly*. neither was this an isolated incident. literally tens of thousands of tons of Axis shipping was sunk by swordfish operating at night.



This had nothing to do with the aircraft. The Swordfish had no special ability that would enable it to fly at night any better than any other naval aircraft of the period. This was an OPERATOR choice (kudos to the airmen who flew them) and excluding the use of radar.


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## nuuumannn (Jul 14, 2012)

> they often were glide bombing at rather steep angles.



The RNZAF used the Avenger as a dive bomber in WW2. One of its many uses was dropping fuel oil on Japanese crops.


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## Oreo (Jul 14, 2012)

Easy to single out the Battle as a bad bomber, but I have to wonder if the He 177 might qualify as a worse bomber yet. Also, the B-18 was pretty bad, so bad it almost never made it into aerial combat. But the He 177, from every account I read was more dangerous to its own crew as it was to the enemy. Even after they got a lot of the bugs worked out. Only Hans Lerche seemed to like it and believe in it, but he was a highly qualified test pilot.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 14, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The RN's standard torpedo bomber, by May 1942, was the Albacore, and it was overdue for replacement with the Barracuda.
> 
> RN torpedo bomber tactics called for approaching the target at medium altitude, then executing a very steep dive, with the aircraft leveling off at drop altitude, lining up on the target, releasing the torpedo and then evasive maneuvers to avoid flack.* There is a very good probability that even a Swordfish would be traveling faster at release than the lumbering TBD*, which, by mid 1942 was extremely overweight, and even the newest aircraft were about 3 years old.
> 
> The RN Mk XII torpedo was progressively strengthened to allow drops at up to 270 knots. The Mk XV which was introduced in 42-43 started life with 250-270 knot drop speeds.



I guess your opinion?

The TBD was limited to a torpedo run of 110 mph because of the crappy torpedo being used at the time. I'd like to see *documented* evidence that the Swordfish used a diving attack during Taranto or the Bismark raid. The aircraft had a top speed of 140 mph. With a torpedo, I doubt you'll see more than 100 mph. 

Bottom line - the Stringbag helped take out the Bismark and wrecked the Italian fleet and she did it at speeds were we have driven our cars almost as fast.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 14, 2012)

Oreo said:


> B-18 was pretty bad, so bad it almost never made it into aerial combat.


The B-18 was used as an AWS plaform and it served well sinking several submarines. Operationally there was nothing wrong with the aircraft, by WW2 it was just obsolete.


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## davebender (Jul 14, 2012)

During my younger days I've driven faster then a Stringbag on a torpedo run. Learn something new every day. 8)


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## Shortround6 (Jul 14, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The B-18 was used as an AWS plaform and it served well sinking several submarines. Operationally there was nothing wrong with the aircraft, by WW2 it was just obsolete.



The B-18 was based off the DC-2 airliner. The US had the _luxury_ of entering the war late so that some of it's 1934-37 designs were on the way out in Dec of 1941 and new designs were already being issued to units. Aside from a few units that were caught in the Philippines and Hawaii there was no need to deploy older aircraft to overseas combat zones. The B-18 was inferior to the B-17 but then a plane with two Wright Cyclone 9s is going to be deficient in range and payload to a plane that uses _FOUR_ Wright Cyclone 9s.

British chose Lockheed Hudsons over the B-18 because they were faster and had a better power to weight ratio. The British were interested in field performance also. The Hudson was a smaller airplane with a smaller bomb load that could use the same Wright Cyclone 9s or P&W Twin Wasps.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 14, 2012)

agree...


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2012)

> This had nothing to do with the aircraft. The Swordfish had no special ability that would enable it to fly at night any better than any other naval aircraft of the period. This was an OPERATOR choice (kudos to the airmen who flew them) and excluding the use of radar


.


All this talk about the Swordfish being able to operate at 100 knots, or 138 knots, fails to understand the secret of the Sworfish's success. The Swordfish was not succesful because of its speed. it was successful because of its lack of speed. and nowhere is that more impoprtant than understanding why it could operate in conditions at sea that would ground mist other aircraft. 

Your right that it was not especially designed for rough weather flying, yet the design was such that it was well suited to such conditions. 

The Swordfish was a large biplane, which for various reasons worked to its advantage in rough weather. Because it is single-engined it tends to look deceptively small from a distance and on photographs. By all accounts, Its fabric-covered metal construction was exceptionally sturdy, which is borne out by its low loss rates to non-operational causes. It was also given a good reputation viz reliability, but lacked refinement. The biplane wing had ailerons on both lower and upper planes, and leading edge slats on the upper wing, which gave it exceptional levels of control in high winds. For the take-off, the ailerons could be dropped 8 degrees to increase lift which again assisted it in rough weather when the fligt deckk might be wildly heaving and twisting. This coupled with the fact that approach speeds could be as low as 30 knots, made it the ideal rough weather aircraft. For storage on carriers, the wing folded backwards. In cold weather the open cockpit was uncomfortable, especially for the rear gunner. The wing struts, the robust fixed landing gear, and the generous size of wings and tail produced high drag, and the single 690hp Pegasus IIIM3 engine gave the aircraft a very modest performance. But it was reliable, which was especially important for the lonely night patrols over the arctic seas that were to be the task of the Swordfish. And its low performance and very low operating speeds coupled with its great strength and low loadings made it ideal for arctic condition. not by designm, as you rightly point out, but evident nevertheless.

The other aspect about the Swordfish that made it the ideal night strike and roiugh weather aircraft of its time is less measurable, but evident from all that i have read about the aircraft. By all accounts, the Swordfish was extremely easy to fly and easy to land on a carrier deck, a quality that would become very important for night operations on the small decks of escort carriers, and in the generally rough Atlantic and Arctic conditions. Although the Swordfish was stable around all axes, it could make remarkably short turns. It could also be dived vertically to very close to the sea surface, and then make an abrupt pull-out. Very little speed built up in the dive, and very liitle sppeed was needed to achieve lift. Therefore the Swordfish was not necessarily an easy prey for a fighter, but it was during the long, slow and straight run that was required to launch a torpedo, and operate in poor conditions and/or conditions of low visibility. These abailities stood it in god stead when operating in the ASW role....the Swordfish was the first aircraft to sink a U-Boat at sea, on the 24 November 1941, sinking U-454 off Tangiers ( based on the survivor statements, the U-Boat was surpised at being stalked by an aircraft that approached it from astern, as a closure rate of less than 50 knots) 


The swordfish was the preferred kit in rough conditions. if you look at the operations north of the arctic circle (specifically the Murmansk runs), it was only ever undertaken by RN carriers, and the preferred strike aircraft was always the Swordfish even over other British types, for reasons relating substantially to the avove. The RN used all manner of aircraft types in the far north, both American and of British origin, but the real rough stuff that required constant flying in all conditions was almost exclusively done by Swordfish.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> During my younger days I've driven faster then a Stringbag on a torpedo run. Learn something new every day. 8)



That would a maximum approach speed. During the attack on the Bism,arck, the approach speed was under 80 MPH. Approach speeds could be as low as 50mph. That was both its weakness and its great strength. Slow Sppeed equals great accuracy. it also can mean great vulnerability. Thats provided the enemy6 can get the aircrafts six with either AA and/or fighters....something not as easy as one would imagine. a high speed pass on a Swordfish is neither required, nor is it desirable.


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## Oreo (Jul 14, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The B-18 was used as an AWS plaform and it served well sinking several submarines. Operationally there was nothing wrong with the aircraft, by WW2 it was just obsolete.



True. I suppose it was as reasonable an aircraft as the He 111 or wellington. It could have had some of the upgrades those two got along the way. It would have been relatively easy to convert it to self-sealing tanks, combat armor, more powerful engines, and better armament. I can see a B-18 armed with a Martin dorsal turret, B-26-like low waist gun positions, and a swivel-mounted .50 caliber mount in the nose. Then again, the B-23 was a development of the B-18 that took some of these thoughts into consideration, and they didn't think it was good enough for combat either, even though it had a tail position. The B-23 might have made a decent back-water bomber, given a Martin DT, twin tail guns, and flexible .50's in the waist and nose. My book gives it a moderate range of 1455 miles, but seems like there are always ways to improve range. I guess the B-25 and B-26 were able to do all the same things and more in a smaller package, probably cheaper, surely less aluminum. Curiously, its performance, weight, and bombload specs were similar or superior to the late-war B-25J. Of course the B-25J had much heavier armament and five years worth of improved systems. Available in 1940, the B-23 could have been a worthwhile bomber for any air force, especially with a few easy improvements, such as heavier armament.

But alas, poor Douglas could not make what the Army considered to be a good multi-engined bomber for use during the war. Its B-18, B-19, and B-23 just didn't cut the mustard. Of course the A-20 and A-26 count, and were excellent planes in their own right. I guess the 85-100' wingspan twin was an awkward size and considered unnecessary when smaller and larger aircraft were available. And they decided the giant B-19 wasn't workable.

So-- yes, I still guess I go with the Greif as the worst.


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## RCAFson (Jul 14, 2012)

renrich said:


> RCAF, If you don't believe the TBD, much less the TBF did not use the dive in to torpedo altitude, please read Lundstrom. They may not have dived at 75 degrees but a TBF in a shallow dive would be going faster than a Sword fish with a torpedo on board. As Michael has pointed out the TBF by wars end was not being used as a torpedo plane but rather a bomber and they often were glide bombing at rather steep angles. I have personally seen on the Naval Aerial Bombarment Range on Padre Island in 1953 TBFs (TBMs) diving at rather steep angles. By the way, the Avenger was the first FAA aircraft to attack the Japanese mainland in 1945.



There's a big difference between a relatively shallow dive, and a near vertical dive as used in dive bombing. The former is easily followed by fighters and flak (predicted fire) gunners, while the latter is next to impossible for both fighters and flak to follow. It isn't that the Swordfish or Albacore would be moving faster than a TBF, but that they would be following a course that made it much more difficult to intercept or shoot down via flak. The other problem for both the TBD and TBF, was that in the early war years they could not drop at high speed, and so they would have to level off some ways from the target, even from a shallow dive, to bleed speed prior to the drop.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 14, 2012)

Oreo said:


> But alas, poor Douglas could not make what the Army considered to be a good multi-engined bomber for use during the war. Its B-18, B-19, and B-23 just didn't cut the mustard.


Actually they gave the army exactly what they asked for at the time. By the time the war started these aircraft were obsolete, based on a procurement specification that was obsolete


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## Oreo (Jul 14, 2012)

The B-18 was a somewhat commercial success for Douglas when it was produced. The B-23 was lost work, and the B-19 was a LOT of lost work.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

Oreo said:


> The B-18 was a somewhat commercial success for Douglas when it was produced. *The B-23 was lost work, and the B-19 was a LOT of lost work.*


Not really. The B-19 was turned into a test bed and basis for a lot of systems used on later aircraft, Douglas wanted to cancel the program but the army had them press on. The aircraft was used as a cargo plane before it was scrapped.

The B-23 was another plane that did what it was supposed to do, it was just obsolete when it entered service. It was produced in small numbers and used as a trainer. Considering the era these aircraft were conceived they were, in retrospect hardly a waste of time,


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## Oreo (Jul 15, 2012)

When a company goes to the trouble to develop a plane, it is with the intention of selling MANY of them. Otherwise, it isn't worth their time. I didn't mean that nothing good came of their work, but the small handful of B-23's was precious small financial compensation for the trouble they went to to redesign it from the B-18, and the B-19 was only a single aircraft. Maybe the Army compensated Douglas plenty for their work on the B-19, but it was Boeing and Convair that reaped the benefit of the experience gained with the B-19. I must admit, it would have been fun to see what could have been done with a few more B-19's if the development had worked out on a hastier schedule. As slow as they were, though, I have a feeling the results would be predictable, once the opposing fighters learned not to start shooting from 5 miles away....


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

Oreo said:


> When a company goes to the trouble to develop a plane, it is with the intention of selling MANY of them.


Not necessarily true. In the case of government contracts, the contractor, in this case Douglas either bids or is asked to bid on a contract based on a procurement specification. Most WW2 aircraft were the result of a contract solicitation, not a contractor just building and aircraft because they "think" they'll sell a lot of them...

A manufacturer many want to secure a certain production number to ensure their development and production costs are absorbed, but in the case of a government contract, that cost would be absorbed in each unit based on what the government orders.



Oreo said:


> I didn't mean that nothing good came of their work, but the small handful of B-23's was precious small financial compensation for the trouble they went to to redesign it from the B-18, and the B-19 was only a single aircraft.


Do you have evidence of that? 


Oreo said:


> Maybe the Army compensated Douglas plenty for their work on the B-19, but it was Boeing and Convair that reaped the benefit of the experience gained with the B-19.


Again do you have proof of that? I see nothing anywhere to show that Boeing or Convair benefited from the B-19 and was given either proprietary or government owned technology.


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## baclightning (Jul 15, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I guess your opinion?
> 
> The TBD was limited to a torpedo run of 110 mph because of the crappy torpedo being used at the time. I'd like to see *documented* evidence that the Swordfish used a diving attack during Taranto or the Bismark raid. The aircraft had a top speed of 140 mph. With a torpedo, I doubt you'll see more than 100 mph.
> 
> Bottom line - the Stringbag helped take out the Bismark and wrecked the Italian fleet and she did it at speeds were we have driven our cars almost as fast.



Commander Charles Lamb, in his book _To War in a Stringbag_, has an excellent description of the type of attacks used in the Taranto raid, and he should know - he flew in it. He says that eleven of the 20 Swordfish were armed with torpedos, and that the remainder each had six 250-lb bombs (except for his aircraft, which was the flare-dropper). The two attacked differently; the torpedo-carrying Swordfish came in at low level, "flying into the harbour only a few feet above sea level", and the bomb-carrying Swordfish were used as dive-bombers, using what he describes as "vertical dives." But he's quite clear that all of the torpedo-carrying aircraft came in at very low level; indeed he says that the Swordfish of Torrence-Smith "bounced off the water as he came through the harbour entrance."


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

baclightning said:


> Commander Charles Lamb, in his book _To War in a Stringbag_, has an excellent description of the type of attacks used in the Taranto raid, and he should know - he flew in it. He says that eleven of the 20 Swordfish were armed with torpedos, and that the remainder each had six 250-lb bombs (except for his aircraft, which was the flare-dropper). The two attacked differently; the torpedo-carrying Swordfish came in at low level, "flying into the harbour only a few feet above sea level", and the bomb-carrying Swordfish were used as dive-bombers, using what he describes as "vertical dives." But he's quite clear that all of the torpedo-carrying aircraft came in at very low level; indeed he says that the Swordfish of Torrence-Smith "bounced off the water as he came through the harbour entrance."


The Swordfish was able to be taken into a vertical dive and would get up to about 200 knots, this accordig to a quote from Terence Horsley in "Find, Fix and Strike." This doesn't necessarily men the Swordfish was a bonafide dive bomber but it doesn't mean the aircraft wasn't capable of dive bombing, the same holds true for the Avenger. Within the Avenger's flight manual there is a note to "avoid prolonged vertical dives" but some operators did perform dive bombing with the aircraft. Point being, even if the aircraft (Stringbag) was "dived" while carrying a torpedo it wasn't going to maintain that airspeed for long once it pulled out from the dive and also had engine limitations that slow the aircraft down (see the Pilot's Notes). Again as stated earlier, the Stringbag's normal torpedo run was done at about 90 knots, I doubt any faster.



RCAFson said:


> they would be following a course that made it much more difficult to intercept or shoot down via flak.



Only during the dive - one the aircraft pulled out airspeed bled off quickly and that's where slower aircraft that were able to perform dive bombing had a disadvantage and was also vulnerable to flak.

Folks - I think it's clear to say that the Stringbag WAS NOT one of the worse piston engine bombers of WW2


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## renrich (Jul 15, 2012)

To begin with the SBD, one of the better dive bombers in WW2, did it's diving at around 75 degrees. That is a far cry from verticle. The Corsair could actually successfully dive more steeply. 80 degrees. I don't believe the Swordfish was ever dived on purpose vertically, 90 degrees. I expect that 75 degrees felt like 90 degrees. The TBMs I observed and there were many of them over a couple of days looked to be diving at around 45 degrees. Some pulled out pretty close to the ground and some quite a bit higher. We speculated that the high pullouts were married

A big negative for the TBD and even more negative for the Stringbag, IMO, was their slow cruise speed with a torpedo. The TBD cruised at about 110 MPH with a torp. The escort fighters either had to match that speed or do S turns. The S turns wasted a lot of fuel and if they matched the TBD speed they were at a severe disadvantage if jumped by enemy fighters. The F4F needed about 130 MPH in order to begin to maneuver well. Imagine a Martlet trying to escort Stringbags at 90-100 mph.


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2012)

> A big negative for the TBD and even more negative for the Stringbag, IMO, was their slow cruise speed with a torpedo. The TBD cruised at about 110 MPH with a torp. The escort fighters either had to match that speed or do S turns. The S turns wasted a lot of fuel and if they matched the TBD speed they were at a severe disadvantage if jumped by enemy fighters. The F4F needed about 130 MPH in order to begin to maneuver well. Imagine a Martlet trying to escort Stringbags at 90-100 mph.



For the Swordfish, it was only a negative if operated in a hostile environment during daylight hours. it seldom was. It was as accurate by night as it was by day ue to the very thing you are not acknowledging....its slow speed. , as its service results clearly show. It had no need to operate in the daylight in enemy controlled skies. When operating at night they were seldom escorted, though the Fulmars had no trouble escorting them when the need did arise. 

If the TBD had been able to operate effectively at night, and carry a torpedo that worked, we would be singing its prasies as much as the Swordfish. It had neither capability, and this gap in capability damned it to oblivion. 

At the cruise speed for the Swordfish (which wasnt 100mph with a torpedoe, it was 80 mph, in calm conditions....in any sort of headwind it could be as low as 50mp) it had to rely on its ability to dive and relative manouverability through all axes to try and escape. About the worst thing an attacker could do was make a high speed pass at them. They needed to throttle back, line up the Swordfish and blow him out of the sky. Anything else hardly ever worked. And it took its opponents more than a little time to work that out


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## renrich (Jul 15, 2012)

Actually, the TBD did good service in the early part of the war during the Marshall Islands raids, the raid on Lae, Salamaua (SP) and at Coral Sea where some of the torps worked. It gets it's bad rep because of Midway where it had no fighter help and it did no worse than many of the Attackers from Midway who had no fighter escort either. The TBD really only suffers when compared to Kate and TBF which were later designs. I am taking it off my worst list!


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## beitou (Jul 15, 2012)

What are the esteemed members views of the Battle. I know it faired badly in France in 1940 yet if you look at its specs it does not seem to be such a bad single engined bomber, why the failure in France and does this put it amongst the worst bombers of the war?


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## Oreo (Jul 15, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Not necessarily true. In the case of government contracts, the contractor, in this case Douglas either bids or is asked to bid on a contract based on a procurement specification. Most WW2 aircraft were the result of a contract solicitation, not a contractor just building and aircraft because they "think" they'll sell a lot of them...
> 
> A manufacturer many want to secure a certain production number to ensure their development and production costs are absorbed, but in the case of a government contract, that cost would be absorbed in each unit based on what the government orders.
> 
> ...



The evidence is self-evident. The benefit they got was seeing that the ultra-large aircraft idea was feasible to build-- as well what problems were encountered. It is a lot easier to build a machine when you can see that it has already been done. The Boeing and Convair engineers may never have been privy to the minutia of data employed and interpreted by Douglas, but from a general sense they could see what worked and what didn't. The B-29 and B-36 projects were no doubt far less fretful undertakings than they would have been if they were charting brand new territory. The B-19 proved several things were valid, including the tricycle undercarriage on a mega-plane, it showed that a large aircraft could be built stiff and strong enough to survive routine flight procedures, and it pointed out that any large aircraft, to be effective, needed to be properly powered, which it was not. These generalities point the way forward for all design teams that are aware of them.

As far as whether it was worth it or not, Any design team designing anything, is only worthwhile to a corporation if they produce designs that result in products that can be sold at a profit. A single item, like the B-19, can be profitable if they receive enough money for the single prototype. However, merely paying for the design team and making a profit off their time (and the team of assemblers, and the raw materials, and the factory space, etc) is normally not enough. To be truly profitable, companies built around factories must also be able to BUILD and SELL multiple production units, since the real money is usually in production, not in design. (I do realize it is possible for this to be the other way around, and in some countries, such as the Soviet Union, design bureaus and production centers were unrelated).

Now, thankfully for Douglas, they evidently had one of the most productive and capable design teams around, just based on the shear number of designs they came up with during the 1930's and 40's. A quick look shows no fewer than 6 highly successful high-production designs during that time-frame, as well as several lower-production aircraft as well, and numerous prototypes. Boeing, on the other hand, tended to concentrate on one design at a time and exhaustively develop each type into a highly-honed quality instrument. Either way, the production was able to bring in the needed funds for both companies, which continued to be successful for many years. And Douglas even grabbed some of Boeing's pie by building B-17's in their factory. It all turned out well in the end.


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## Oreo (Jul 15, 2012)

beitou said:


> What are the esteemed members views of the Battle. I know it faired badly in France in 1940 yet if you look at its specs it does not seem to be such a bad single engined bomber, why the failure in France and does this put it amongst the worst bombers of the war?



In terms of results, I would have to say it was one of the worst. But as we are showing, sometimes the circumstances an aircraft type is serving under have a far greater affect on the outcome than the aircraft itself. It is quite possible that, if the Battle had been employed more prudently, it may have done better. Night operations, for instance. As it was, the British and French forces at that time and place suffered from many circumstantial illnesses, not the least of which was poor organization and leadership. Being a liquid-cooled engine with no protection for the radiator, you can't expect the sort of resilience you might get out of a Dauntless or Swordfish with an air-cooled engine. The Stuka, a plane of similar characteristics, was also vulnerable to fighter attack. The Stuka continued on until very late in the war on the Russian front, however, and when it was prudently deployed it had an acceptable loss rate. The Battle might possibly have been improved, but evidently British officials decided to use other types they had available rather than further develop the Battle. It was quite large for a single-engine type, which made it more difficult to improve performance substantially by adding a more powerful engine. Perhaps if they had done something radical, like installing a Bristol Hercules, and fitting self-sealing fuel tanks and armor, they could have also increased its defensive (and offensive ) armament and come up with a premature weaker shadow of the future AD Skyraider. But would that have been worthwhile? Maybe not, when other types such as the Beaufighter, Mosquito, Whirlwind, Boston, Typhoon, and so on were in the works.


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## RCAFson (Jul 15, 2012)

renrich said:


> Actually, the TBD did good service in the early part of the war during the Marshall Islands raids, the raid on Lae, Salamaua (SP) and at Coral Sea where some of the torps worked. It gets it's bad rep because of Midway where it had no fighter help and it did no worse than many of the Attackers from Midway who had no fighter escort either. The TBD really only suffers when compared to Kate and TBF which were later designs. I am taking it off my worst list!



The TBD suffers in comparison to any other torpedo bomber. It had neither the range or versatility of the Swordfish, while the Albacore was probably faster all round. TBDs in actual service were much slower than their pre-war specs as the memo I posted earlier states.


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## RCAFson (Jul 15, 2012)

renrich said:


> To begin with the SBD, one of the better dive bombers in WW2, did it's diving at around 75 degrees. That is a far cry from verticle. The Corsair could actually successfully dive more steeply. 80 degrees. I don't believe the Swordfish was ever dived on purpose vertically, 90 degrees. I expect that 75 degrees felt like 90 degrees. The TBMs I observed and there were many of them over a couple of days looked to be diving at around 45 degrees. Some pulled out pretty close to the ground and some quite a bit higher. We speculated that the high pullouts were married



Take a look at:
http://www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1940s/1948/feb48.pdf
page 7 (PDF page 9):
_" ...As every naval avaiator knows the TBM was not designed as a dive bomber. It was designed as a torpedo and horizintal bomber. As a result the maximum permissable speeds and G forces are considerably less than those applicable to any other currently operated carrier aircraft..."_

The article notes 48 fatal TBM accidents in 30 months, all apparently while doing practice bomb runs.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

parsifal said:


> If the TBD had been able to operate effectively at night, and carry a torpedo that worked, we would be singing its prasies as much as the Swordfish. It had neither capability, and this gap in capability damned it to oblivion.


It was an operator's choice NOT to operate the TBD at night, again the Swordfish had no unique feature (except the huevos of the pilot) that enabled it to be operated at night. It had desirable features that made it easier to land and take off from a carrier but outside of that everything else is null


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## Shortround6 (Jul 15, 2012)

Oreo said:


> And Douglas even grabbed some of Boeing's pie by building B-17's in their factory. It all turned out well in the end.



Turn about was fair play. Boeing had built Douglas DB-7s for export in 1940 when the US wasn't keeping the Boeing factory full with B-17 orders and Douglas was building up it's own production capabilities. 

Boeing had also built the XB-15 which had a bigger wing span and a _LOT_ more wing area than the B-29. And the B314 Clipper flying boat. And was working on the XPBB Sea Ranger flying boat whose wing shows a few similarities to the B-29 wing.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

Oreo said:


> The evidence is self-evident. The benefit they got was seeing that the ultra-large aircraft idea was feasible to build-- as well what problems were encountered.


That was known to Convair and Boeing before the B-19. Look into the Boeing B-15. Convair (Consolidated) was also building the largest aircraft of the day in the late 1930s


Oreo said:


> It is a lot easier to build a machine when you can see that it has already been done. The Boeing and Convair engineers may never have been privy to the minutia of data employed and interpreted by Douglas, but from a general sense they could see what worked and what didn't. The B-29 and B-36 projects were no doubt far less fretful undertakings than they would have been if they were charting brand new territory. The B-19 proved several things were valid, including the tricycle undercarriage on a mega-plane, it showed that a large aircraft could be built stiff and strong enough to survive routine flight procedures, and it pointed out that any large aircraft, to be effective, needed to be properly powered, which it was not. These generalities point the way forward for all design teams that are aware of them.


While all true this still does not really prove that either Boeing or Consolidated really benefited from the B-19 program. The real benefit from the program went to engineering and procurement folks at Wright Patterson AFB as it gave a prelude of what they would be in for during a wartime engineering and procurement capacity.


Oreo said:


> As far as whether it was worth it or not, Any design team designing anything, is only worthwhile to a corporation if they produce designs that result in products that can be sold at a profit. A single item, like the B-19, can be profitable if they receive enough money for the single prototype. However, merely paying for the design team and making a profit off their time (and the team of assemblers, and the raw materials, and the factory space, etc) is normally not enough. To be truly profitable, companies built around factories must also be able to BUILD and SELL multiple production units, *since the real money is usually in production, not in design*. (I do realize it is possible for this to be the other way around, and in some countries, such as the Soviet Union, design bureaus and production centers were unrelated).


Not really true, it depends upon what is being designed and how it is being deployed. Perfect example is Lockheed and the U-2/ TR-1 and SR-71 programs. There weren't a lot of units built but they were paid for the R&D that went into these aircraft - The same later for the F-117A and B-2 -some thing I know "a little about as I worked on both programs.



Oreo said:


> Now, thankfully for Douglas, they evidently had one of the most productive and capable design teams around, just based on the shear number of designs they came up with during the 1930's and 40's. A quick look shows no fewer than 6 highly successful high-production designs during that time-frame, as well as several lower-production aircraft as well, and numerous prototypes.* Boeing, on the other hand, tended to concentrate on one design at a time *and exhaustively develop each type into a highly-honed quality instrument. Either way, the production was able to bring in the needed funds for both companies, which continued to be successful for many years. And Douglas even grabbed some of Boeing's pie by building B-17's in their factory. It all turned out well in the end.


Hmmmm - you're basing that on??? The only reason why Boeing didn't have the many coals in the fire during WW2 is because what they had was huge, so huge that they had to "farm out" B-17 production to Douglas and Vega. Douglas didn't "grab" anything, the pie was given to them based on wartime need, and Vega was given the same opportunity.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Take a look at:
> http://www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1940s/1948/feb48.pdf
> page 7 (PDF page 9):
> _" ...As every naval avaiator knows the TBM was not designed as a dive bomber. It was designed as a torpedo and horizintal bomber. As a result the maximum permissable speeds and G forces are considerably less than those applicable to any other currently operated carrier aircraft..."_
> ...



It doesn't mean that it never prohibited from doing any dive bombing. I think P26 or 28 of the flight manual states something to the effect that "prolonged" vertical dives were prohibited. But again, it was not designed as a pure dive bomber


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## Shortround6 (Jul 15, 2012)

beitou said:


> What are the esteemed members views of the Battle. I know it faired badly in France in 1940 yet if you look at its specs it does not seem to be such a bad single engined bomber, why the failure in France and does this put it amongst the worst bombers of the war?



As has been mention before in this thread and others the Battle was misused due to a lack of other aircraft. It was not designed or purchased with the intent of using it as a tactical bomber. In the first few years of it's deployment the crews were not practicing the tactical mission. It was a _ strategic_ bomber. It had a 3 man crew, pilot, navigator/bomb aimer who crawled into a tunnel under underneath the pilot and use a bomb sight through a window in the bottom of the plane ( much like the TBD when used as a level bomber.) and radio operator/rear gunner. The bomb load was carried INSIDE the wing. Two 250lb bombs side by side in each wing root. 1000lbs total but it could not carry 500lb or 1000lb bombs. It could carry the 1000lb load further than any other singe engine bomber of the time (except perhaps the Wellesy).
It had never been intended for low level attacks or diving attacks. It's large size was due to need for the fuel for the long range, the crew space and the ever present British requirements for the ability to use short grass fields.


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## renrich (Jul 15, 2012)

Range Swordfish-546 miles, Vmax-138 mph
Range TBD-716 miles, Vmax-206 mph


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

renrich said:


> Range Swordfish-546 miles, Vmax-138 mph
> Range TBD-716 miles, Vmax-206 mph


 
do you mean vne 206 mph?


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> It was an operator's choice NOT to operate the TBD at night, again the Swordfish had no unique feature (except the huevos of the pilot) that enabled it to be operated at night. It had desirable features that made it easier to land and take off from a carrier but outside of that everything else is null



Kind of true, but not fully so. And in this case a half correct statement is as bad or worse than an incorrect statement. The shortcomings in performance of the Swordfish was realized prewar in the RN, and that, combined with the miserable allocation of pilots and pilot training for the FAA, convinced the RN that it had to adapt the force and the equipment to suit those limitations. They adapted the force so that it could operate at night. That is not something you can achieve in a short space of time. Sure a big part of that was training, but the aircraft themselves had to modified in a number of ways to optimise that capability. Things like flame damped exhausts, even the cockpit lighting was altered to assist the night capability. But the big change was the development of ASV radar. The FAA was a major sponsor of that development fopr the specific purpose of fitting them to their strike aircraft. There was never such ugency in the USN. 

All of the capabilities were available as possibilities for the USN, that part of your statement is correct and I am certainly not saying that it wasnt possible to adapt US aircraft in the same or more ways as the Swordfish, but neither is it true to say the Swordfish was not modified to suit its night capability.

Lastly, dismissing (or suggesting as not that important) the great deck handling capabilities and low attrition rates is something I fundamentally disagree with. The USN found to its great cost that you cant just decide to put people and aircraft into the air at night without the propert equipment and training. They lost scores of aircraft hopelessly lost and poor deck performers, in many engagements that left aircraft airborne at night. Best example, look at what happened to the USN counterstrikes at the 1st mob flt June 1944.

The RN simply could not afford anything like that sort of atrition. They could not afford to lose even 5 or six pilots in a single engagement for avoidable reasons. For the whole of 1939, the FAA received the grand total of 16 additional pilots. Every single pilot counted, there was just no room for unnecessary attrition. The Swordfish delivered on that score.....it could operate at night, had such pleasant flying and deck handling characteristics as to ensure avoidable losses were minimised. There were many reasons why Swordfish crews loved their mounts, and their safety and reliability was one of them. And they certainly never thought of themselves as the "poor relations" of the TBD squadrons. And their operational results prove in spades that their quiet confidence in their equipment was more than justified.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 15, 2012)

While I agree with a lot of what you say the 2nd to the last sentence needs a lot of swallowing. "And they certainly never thought of themselves as the "poor relations" of the TBD squadrons". There were how many TBD squadrons? four? and just how often did the Swordfish and TBD squadrons operate together or even see each other that the Swordfish pilots knew what a TBD could or couldn't aside from what they read in a magazine? 

The TBD probably wasn't as good as the Swordfish in many of it's missions. Crap weather anti-sub patrols from small carriers. Neither plane was designed for that role. It is just that the biplane turned out to be better at that. 

100 operational TBDs is too few to really tell how good or how bad it really was. They did some good work for the first 6 months but without reopening the production line (foolish with the TBF already being planed in 1940) it's days were numbered no matter how well it did. 

The Biplane wasn't magic or else the Albacore would have had a better record. Apparently in an attempt to improve the Swordfish they designed out some of the very things that made the Swordfish so useful.


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2012)

I agree the wording of my statement was poor. Throughout this whole debate I have been very careful not to denigrate the TBD (because I dont think it deserves it) , or any other US type, Just to state the capabilities of the aircraft concerned. Thats not been the case with the American contributors to this debate. And it is very apparent that many of them "dont get it" about the Swordfish, because its range was limited, and its performance in terms of straight line speed was also poor. 

The facts are these for the Swordfish. It had strengthsd that were subtle, but real enough, and that made it not only a good aircraft, it was a great aircraft as history well shows. The types' strengths were used to great advantage, because its operational usage was adapted to suit those strengths. That made its crews supremely confident and successful. The types hidden strengths and the crew confidence fed off each other, the result was a synergy that resulted in the sum of the parts being greater than the powers of each part individually.

You cannot say the same about the TBD. if anything, from an American perspective the TBD outperfomed the Swordfish, and its crews were probably as well trained as those in the FAA (just that they were not trained in certain areas). The TBDs superior performance was not enough to make any difference to its survivability (compared to the Swordfish). But that extra turn of speed still affected its accuracy as a weapon system (IMO, judging from the operational results) . Moreover, and most importantly, the owners of the TBD did not recognize the shortcomings of the type and failed to adapt its use to suit, because they believed the TBD was "good enough" to operate by day, which by 1940 it was not . So, all things brought together, the TBD wound up being basically a liability to the USN. Not due to any fault of the type....it was one of the better carrier borne torpedo bombers of the late 30's, but because its shortcomings were not recognized and the usage not adapted to suit those shortcomings.


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 15, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I agree the wording of my statement was poor. Throughout this whole debate I have been very careful not to denigrate the TBD (because I dont think it deserves it) , or any other US type, Just to state the capabilities of the aircraft concerned. Thats not been the case with the American contributors to this debate. And it is very apparent that many of them "dont get it" about the Swordfish, because its range was limited, and its performance in terms of straight line speed was also poor.
> 
> The facts are these for the Swordfish. It had strengthsd that were subtle, but real enough, and that made it not only a good aircraft, it was a great aircraft as history well shows. The types' strengths were used to great advantage, because its operational usage was adapted to suit those strengths. That made its crews supremely confident and successful. The types hidden strengths and the crew confidence fed off each other, the result was a synergy that resulted in the sum of the parts being greater than the powers of each part individually.
> 
> You cannot say the same about the TBD. if anything, from an American perspective the TBD outperfomed the Swordfish, and its crews were probably as well trained as those in the FAA (just that they were not trained in certain areas). The TBDs superior performance was not enough to make any difference to its survivability (compared to the Swordfish). But that extra turn of speed still affected its accuracy as a weapon system (IMO, judging from the operational results) . Moreover, and most importantly, the owners of the TBD did not recognize the shortcomings of the type and failed to adapt its use to suit, because they believed the TBD was "good enough" to operate by day, which by 1940 it was not . So, all things brought together, the TBD wound up being basically a liability to the USN. Not due to any fault of the type....it was one of the better carrier borne torpedo bombers of the late 30's, but because its shortcomings were not recognized and the usage not adapted to suit those shortcomings.



Well said!


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## RCAFson (Jul 15, 2012)

renrich said:


> Range Swordfish-546 miles, Vmax-138 mph
> Range TBD-716 miles, Vmax-206 mph



The memo I posted earlier tells us the approximate Vmax @ SL speed of the TBD:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...ston-engined-bomber-world-war-two-torp228.jpg
or about 130 knots and this is repeated by 2nd source:

In TBD Units Tillman quotes a TBD pilot:

_"The VT-3 officer also realised that the TBD's greatest failing- poor speed - would work in favour of the defenders. *A low level approach would permit no more than 130 knots airspeed*, whereas a shallow descent from altitude could manage 180 knots or perhaps better, thus reducing exposure time to enemy fighters and antiaircraft guns."_ p 52

and range:
"_...Torpedo crews advised against launching TBD more than 160 miles from the target and favour 150 miles..._" p65


The Swordfish had an internal fuel capacity of 168 Imperial gallons (IG) and the ability to accept an internal 60IG tank (used at Taranto) and/or an external 69 IG tank. The TBD had an internal capacity of 150IG (180USG). 

Sorry, but no way did the TBD ever have more range than the Swordfish, and you are quoting ranges based upon two different sets of criteria, operational ranges for the Swordfish and theoretical ranges for a pre-war TBD.

The Albacore had 193 IG of internal fuel and could also accept an internal auxiliary fuel tank and/or an external 106IG tank for a total fuel capacity of nearly 400IG and had much better range than the TBD,


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## RCAFson (Jul 15, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The Biplane wasn't magic or else the Albacore would have had a better record. Apparently in an attempt to improve the Swordfish they designed out some of the very things that made the Swordfish so useful.



The Abacore got a bad rep because of the Taurus II engine problems, but there was only 800 Albacores ever built and they were used very extensively and successfully. There's no doubt that biplanes were of limited use as frontline aircraft during much of WW2, but the Albacore was an all round better aircraft than the Swordfish and far superior to the TBD, IMHO. The Albacore was phased out because the Barracuda took its place on the production lines, while the Swordfish was built in separate factories, but IMHO, the Albacore would have done even better as an ASW aircraft than the Swordfish because of its better range, enclosed cockpit and superior performance.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Kind of true, but not fully so. And in this case a half correct statement is as bad or worse than an incorrect statement. The shortcomings in performance of the Swordfish was realized prewar in the RN, and that, combined with the miserable allocation of pilots and pilot training for the FAA, convinced the RN that it had to adapt the force and the equipment to suit those limitations. They adapted the force so that it could operate at night. That is not something you can achieve in a short space of time. Sure a big part of that was training, but the aircraft themselves had to modified in a number of ways to optimise that capability. Things like flame damped exhausts, even the cockpit lighting was altered to assist the night capability. But the big change was the development of ASV radar. The FAA was a major sponsor of that development fopr the specific purpose of fitting them to their strike aircraft. There was never such ugency in the USN.
> 
> All of the capabilities were available as possibilities for the USN, that part of your statement is correct and I am certainly not saying that it wasnt possible to adapt US aircraft in the same or more ways as the Swordfish, but neither is it true to say the Swordfish was not modified to suit its night capability.
> 
> ...



Parsifal, while I could agree with the majority of what you posted, you're reading too much into this. Bottom line - once you depart the deck and flying in soup, it's all relative. Back then you're using a map and 4 or 5 instruments to sustain flight and it doesn't matter if you're in a Stringbag, TBD or TBM . One aircraft may offer some advantages over an other (example - stringbag lands at 50/60 knots but has a 15 knot crosswind limitation). Based on what was available back then, there isn't too much more you're going to do to enhance IMC performance. Flame damped exhausts, even the cockpit lighting isn't helping much trying to stay straight and level in 1/4 mile visibility with rain water pouring on you! The RN CHOSE to let loose the Stringbag in some really foul weather. Other aircraft "would have and could have" done the same given the technology and the need of the day. For every advantage the Stringbag had in operating in IMC, I could come up with and equal amount of disadvantages - and this could be said with any other aircraft of the era flying off a carrier into IMC conditions, not taking anything away from the stringbag or any other carrier aircraft.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The memo I posted earlier tells us the approximate Vmax @ SL speed of the TBD


Vmax @ SL speed with a torpedo. The Vmax sea level speed of the TBD was about 205 mph.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 15, 2012)

parsifal said:


> You cannot say the same about the TBD. if anything, from an American perspective the TBD outperfomed the Swordfish, and its crews were probably as well trained as those in the FAA (just that they were not trained in certain areas). The TBDs superior performance was not enough to make any difference to its survivability (compared to the Swordfish). But that extra turn of speed still affected its accuracy as a weapon system (IMO, judging from the operational results) . Moreover, and most importantly, the owners of the TBD did not recognize the shortcomings of the type and failed to adapt its use to suit, because they believed the TBD was "good enough" to operate by day, which by 1940 it was not . So, all things brought together, the TBD wound up being basically a liability to the USN. Not due to any fault of the type....it was one of the better carrier borne torpedo bombers of the late 30's, but because its shortcomings were not recognized and the usage not adapted to suit those shortcomings.



There are some aircraft that performed in combat well out of proportion to their "book" performance figures and other aircraft that had combat results well below what their "book" figures would indicate. The Swordfish is a prime example of performing way out of proportion to it's "numbers".

I don't really believe the the difference between a dropping speed of 110 knots and one of 80-90 knots is going to make that big a difference, compared to dropping at 200kts plus. or dropping from hundreds of feet up. Tell me the Swordfishes slow drop speed made it more accurate than a B-26 and I would readily believe you or some of the late war drop limits. 

The problem with trying to evaluate the TBD on operational results is the lousy American torpedo. The TBD may (or may not) have gotten more hits than we know of but the defective detonators may have kept them from going off. Given the small number of torpedoes actually launched by TBDs on operations even a pair of "duds" makes a significant difference to it's "effectiveness". 

Nobody's single engine torpedo bombers could operate by day without fighter escort and even most twin engine torpedo bombers couldn't do it. The difference isn't so much the difference between day and night attacks as it is the difference between escorted attacks and un-escorted attacks. The RN may have gone for the night attack with the knowledge that their carrier groups didn't have enough fighters to escort the torpedo bombers in daylight. Or that an escort of Skuas wasn't going to be good enough to keep enemy fighters off the torpedo bombers no matter how well the Skua may have done against twin engine bombers in defending the carrier. 

I think the US Navy recognize the shortcomings of the type, rather than order more in 1938 or 39 on March 25, 1939 the Navy asked manufacturers for proposals for the replacement of the TBD. Requirements included a top speed of 300mph with normal fuel load, range of not less than 1000 miles while carrying a torpedo or three 500lb bombs, service ceiling not less than 30,000ft, take off distances and landing speeds with torpedo and either full or half fuel were specified along with max dimensions and max folded width. Now maybe they went the wrong way and should have specifying a 140mph biplane but this specification lead to 13 different design proposals from six manufacturers which were eventually whittled down to three and then finally to the Grumman Avenger. By the time the Avenger went into service it could not conduct a successful Daylight strike without escorts ( but neither could a B-17).


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## Shortround6 (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Swordfish had an internal fuel capacity of 168 Imperial gallons (IG) and the ability to accept an internal 60IG tank (used at Taranto) and/or an external 69 IG tank. The TBD had an internal capacity of 150IG (180USG).
> 
> Sorry, but no way did the TBD ever have more range than the Swordfish, and you are quoting ranges based upon two different sets of criteria, operational ranges for the Swordfish and theoretical ranges for a pre-war TBD.
> 
> The Albacore had 193 IG of internal fuel and could also accept an internal auxiliary fuel tank and/or an external 106IG tank for a total fuel capacity of nearly 400IG and had much better range than the TBD,



Can we look at the range thing a bit closer? That "internal 60IG tank (used at Taranto)" replaced the rear gunner did it not? The external 69 IG tank went where? under the fuselage in place of the torpedo? 

I can see where they add some capability to the Swordfish but it's not all beer an sausages is it? to get the extra range you either carry no torpedo or you leave the rear gunner home and hope you don't get attacked. Makes the night attack thing even more understandable if you can't even shoot back at any attackers in daylight.


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## davparlr (Jul 16, 2012)

parsifal said:


> If the USN had gone down the pathway of the RN they would have had several years to prepre their crews and equip their aircraft with the Swordfish. They would have gone into battle, with the most accurate torpedo squadrons in the worls, equipped with ASV radar and fully night capable. At Midway they would not have attacked by day, they would have been looking to launch their torpedo strikes by night, leaving the day strikes to the F4Fs and SBDs. They would not be using the slow and innaccurate Bliss Levitt torpedoes that they did, but the much faster and more accurate whitehead torpedoes.


According to “The First Team”, the Japanese position was not identified until 0552, 4 June at a good 200 miles away. Night time combat for torpedo bombers would not have been possible.



> To give you some idea of the potency of that combination, at taranto 13 totpedoes were launched......11 hit their target. Against the Bismarck 9 torpedoes were launched, either 2 or three hit their target, in pitch black conditions, flying in a heavy gale.


I could only find 5 or 6 hitting out of 11 dropped and damaging or sinking three battleships or about 55% success. I could find no other ships hit by torpedos.


> As an example, at Coral Sea, instead of retreating each day after night fall, the Americans might have been able to follow up their day strikes with deadly night torpedo attacks. Its an idea at least worth lookig at.


The Navy was not about to risk a night battle with the Japanese with 66% of their entire Pacific carrier force while torpedo planes were out looking for ships to hit. When on reconnaissance I don’t think they carried torpedoes, at least they didn’t when looking for the Bismarck. This was even more true at Midway.


> Possibly, though doubtful that they would be as accurate as the Swordfish. The Swordfish's apparent weakness (its slow speed) was also one of its greatest strengths. It was so slow, it could hardly miss. Almost as many Battleships were sunk or disabled at Taranto, with just 13 attack aircraft, as were sunk or disabled at pearl, where there were almost 5 times the number of torpoedoes fired. The Japanese had no problems with their torpedoes, and they were attacking in daylight, in a very low flak environment....yet could only manage a fraction of the accuracy the FAA crews achieved at Taranto. Your explanation of the Swordfish's success (being solely its torpedo) does not stack up when you look at all the facts.


According to “At Dawn We Slept”, eight battleships were damaged or sank at Pearl Harbor, not including the training ship Utah, however, at Pearl Harbor other ships were targeted and hit and several ships were hit more than once. All in all, according to the book, there were 19 torpedo strikes on targeted warships out of 36 torpedoes launched, or 53% success rate, or about the same as at Taranto.




> True for most types, but not the swordfish. Swordfish got 1/3 of their torpedoes launched into the bismarck, in the dead of night and to boot, in conditions that few other aircraft could fly. neither was this an isolated incident. literally tens of thousands of tons of Axis shipping was sunk by swordfish operating at night.


A couple of errors seem to appear here. First, the first strike of Swordfish had one hit on the Bismarck out of nine dropped. The second strike had two hits out of an unknown number of drops. So, only if the second drop consisted of only two torpedoes will your 1/3 number be true. I suspect it is not. Second, while the weather was indeed terrible, it was not dead of night, being about 2100 hrs. Wikipedia shows a picture of a Swordfish returning to the Ark Royal and it is clearly not pitch dark.
German battleship Bismarck - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Oreo (Jul 16, 2012)

@ FlybojJ

"_Not really true, it depends upon what is being designed and how it is being deployed. Perfect example is Lockheed and the U-2/ TR-1 and SR-71 programs. There weren't a lot of units built but they were paid for the R&D that went into these aircraft - The same later for the F-117A and B-2 -some thing I know "a little about as I worked on both programs._ "

Ok, I concede this point. But the money really has to be there in a case like that. Increasingly in modern times, this may be the case, compared to in the past, as military forces world-wide go for quality in small numbers versus adequacy in large numbers.

"_Hmmmm - you're basing that on??? The only reason why Boeing didn't have the many coals in the fire during WW2 is because what they had was huge, so huge that they had to "farm out" B-17 production to Douglas and Vega. Douglas didn't "grab" anything, the pie was given to them based on wartime need, and Vega was given the same opportunity._"

With all due respect, I think you are splitting hairs with me here. All I am saying is that Douglas's approach was different from Boeing's, and I am basing that from looking at what they designed and built. Douglas built some very good stuff, but they were much more prolific designers than Boeing. That is, they produced a larger number of new designs in the same amount of time. Designs that made it out the door in prototype and/or production examples. Boeing had a very short list by comparison, but everything Boeing considered to be a production machine was fairly well excellent for its time of manufacture. Even Boeing's prototypes that flew but did not receive production contracts, appear to be solid designs, such as the XF8B and XPBB. Douglas, on the other hand, delivered some disappointments along the way in addition to its successes. Now if you would like me to footnote and annotate everything I say, then. . . . . .


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2012)

> According to “The First Team”, the Japanese position was not identified until 0552, 4 June at a good 200 miles away. Night time combat for torpedo bombers would not have been possible.



Swordfish were launched at taranto at a range of 170 miles, and the round trip was over 400 miles. Extrapolating for the Midway operation, the TBDs with at least a 100 extra range (apparently), it should be theoretically possible to hold the range and close to a launch point in the evening. Alternatively, launch the SBDs and hold the (in reality nonexistent) night capable torpedo bombers until evening to clean up any cripples.

In any event I dont buy the argument that sacrificing the TBDs was necessary to pull the Zeroes away from McCluskys VBs 



> I could only find 5 or 6 hitting out of 11 dropped and damaging or sinking three battleships or about 55% success. I could find no other ships hit by torpedos.



Correct, except that you forgot the two aircraft that were shot down, and whilst launching, did so outside range. these torpedoes are believed to have bottomed. I should have checked however. Depending on whether you want to include or exclude the two aircraft lost, you have either 55% or 66%. It is still a record either way...earlier in July three swordfish armed with torpedoes managed to sink 4 ships, including a moored sub, with three torpedoes. Thats a hit rate of 125%.

You might also want to consider the raid on Dakar by Hermes. July 1940, 4 torps launch (2 with contact pistols, 2 with magnetic exploders, set to run 38 feet (too low) , 3 on track, wto with magnetic exploders detonated early, on with contact pistolknocked a hole in the side 24feet by 16 feet (from memory. effectively sank the richelieu 9for a year). Thats an accuracy rate of 75%. 



> The Navy was not about to risk a night battle with the Japanese with 66% of their entire Pacific carrier force while torpedo planes were out looking for ships to hit. When on reconnaissance I don’t think they carried torpedoes, at least they didn’t when looking for the Bismarck. This was even more true at Midway.



The USN lacked the night fighting skills for their surface units as wll as their carrier groups i will concede. If they had such skils, they would not have been as reluctant to try a night strike , as you point out. In April 1942, Somerville had been confronted with a similar situation. His was a hopeless fight, but he demonstrated the theory in spades....advance by night, retreat by day. Naguma was never going to fall for that in the bay of bengal, because the April raids were just that...a raid. At Midway the Japanese had to complete a mission....this made their movement forward mandatory. The Americans could approach the battle problem with a much greater level of certainty. same situation applied to Cortal Sea. 

Incorrect. The British launched swordfish fully armed as reconnaisance machines during the Bismarck operation, and USN SBDs routinely undertook similar armed recons for all the major battles in 1942 




> According to “At Dawn We Slept”, eight battleships were damaged or sank at Pearl Harbor, not including the training ship Utah, however, at Pearl Harbor other ships were targeted and hit and several ships were hit more than once. All in all, according to the book, there were 19 torpedo strikes on targeted warships out of 36 torpedoes launched, or 53% success rate, or about the same as at Taranto.



The torpedo hits were Arizona (1), Nevada (1) California (2), Utah 92), West Virginia (7), Oklahoma (4), Helena (1), Raleigh (1). That is a total of 19 hits, undertaken in daylight, with little or no flak (the torps were the first ordinance to be launched in the first wave, a deliberate decision by the japanese. The British launched their torpedoes in two waves, 6 with the first wave, and 5 in the second. Two were shot down. There were 41 barrage ballons protecting the harbour and 4200 meters of torpedo netting (they needed 11800m to do the job properly). And the British came by night, in heavy flak conditions. 




> A couple of errors seem to appear here. First, the first strike of Swordfish had one hit on the Bismarck out of nine dropped. The second strike had two hits out of an unknown number of drops. So, only if the second drop consisted of only two torpedoes will your 1/3 number be true. I suspect it is not. Second, while the weather was indeed terrible, it was not dead of night, being about 2100 hrs. Wikipedia shows a picture of a Swordfish returning to the Ark Royal and it is clearly not pitch dark.
> German battleship Bismarck - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


[/QUOTE]
Sorry bu not correct. according to John Assmussen, ("Bismarck - the fatal torpedo hit"), whilst there is dispute about that last strike (by 15 a/c, 9 launches) it appears most likley that there were three hits in the second strike. There were no hits by the first strike....none were launched at the bismarck, as the Brits mistook Sheffield as the german ship. 

Asmussen writes

"The different sources about the history of the Bismarck are disagree about what actually happened during the last air attack against the Bismarck. The outcome of my research seems to state the fact that: 
1. Accounts differ as to the number of torpedo hits (two or three) and the order in which they occured. 
2. All the sources agree that Bismarck turned to port when the fatal torpedo came towards her. 
3. The Bismarck's rudder indicator indicated that the rudder was jammed either 12° or 15° to port. They disagree about that too".

I believe that Bismarck was hit three times by those nine a/c in that last strike 

Nav weapons says that there were only 2 hits, but describe the conditions as "The second torpedo attack, this time on Bismarck herself, was made at sunset in unbearable weather conditions, Force 9, with heavy cloud cover and waves 25-40 feet high". Elsewhere the visibility conditions were described as very poor. It was a night attack, believe me

Finally, I suggest that you read your sources before posting them. Not that wiki is great, but relevantly, from the article you posted it says......"The attack went in, in almost darkness, at around 21:00 but once again the Swordfish torpedo bombers found Bismarck with their ASV II radar"


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Can we look at the range thing a bit closer? That "internal 60IG tank (used at Taranto)" replaced the rear gunner did it not? The external 69 IG tank went where? under the fuselage in place of the torpedo?
> 
> I can see where they add some capability to the Swordfish but it's not all beer an sausages is it? to get the extra range you either carry no torpedo or you leave the rear gunner home and hope you don't get attacked. Makes the night attack thing even more understandable if you can't even shoot back at any attackers in daylight.



No, the extra internal tank replaces the observer, not the rear gunner, and the Swordfish (and Albacore) was a combined dive bomber/torpedo bomber/recon and ASW aircraft, so leaving the torpedo behind does not preclude offensive operations since the underwing hard points are still usable.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

Oreo said:


> With all due respect, *I think you are splitting hairs with me here. *All I am saying is that Douglas's approach was different from Boeing's, and I am basing that from looking at what they designed and built. Douglas built some very good stuff, but they were much more prolific designers than Boeing. That is, they produced a larger number of new designs in the same amount of time. Designs that made it out the door in prototype and/or production examples. Boeing had a very short list by comparison, but everything Boeing considered to be a production machine was fairly well excellent for its time of manufacture. Even Boeing's prototypes that flew but did not receive production contracts, appear to be solid designs, such as the XF8B and XPBB. Douglas, on the other hand, delivered some disappointments along the way in addition to its successes. *Now if you would like me to footnote and annotate everything I say, then*. . . . . .



Splitting hairs and footnotes - I am doing that because it seems much of what you have to say is based on your opinion rather than fact and do understand if you haven't figured it out by now that many of the members who participate on this site indulge discussion with fact and documented credible evidence (and more times than most provide references for it) and when it’s not given are usually called on it...

Now with that said, you made a statement *"Douglas's approach was different from Boeing's, and I am basing that from looking at what they designed and built. Douglas built some very good stuff, but they were much more prolific designers than Boeing"*, what are you basing that on? Douglas built a larger variety of military aircraft in the post WW2 years based on being awarded contracts based on a solicitation from the government. Ed Heinemann and his team just didn't sit around and decide to come up with aircraft to build - they did so based on the government requiring specific aircraft. For example (all from Wiki Sources);

"The Skyhawk was designed by Douglas Aircraft's Ed Heinemann in response *to a U.S. Navy call *for a jet-powered attack aircraft to replace the older Douglas AD Skyraider (later redesignated A-1 Skyraider)."

"The piston-engined Skyraider was designed during World War II to meet *US Naval requirements for a carrier-based, single-seat, long-range, high performance dive/torpedo bomber, to follow-on from earlier types such as the Helldiver and Avenger"*

"In January 1948, the *Chief of Naval Operations issued a requirement to develop a long-range, carrier-based attack plane *that could deliver a 10,000 lb (4,536 kg) bomb load or a nuclear weapon" (A3D requirement)

"*US Air Force involvement in the Korean War highlighted an urgent need for a high performance day/night tactical bomber. *To speed the availability of such an aircraft it was planned to procure a land-based version of the A3D Skywarrior then being developed for the US Navy. To this end *Douglas was given a contract for five pre-production Douglas RB-66A *all-weather/night photo-reconnaissance aircraft"

I could dig further and come with specifics about the exact contracts and specifications…

During the post war years and especially after the Korean War there was a boom in military aircraft procurement. Usually the government asked for paper proposals and the government would widdle down the list until 2 or 3 finalists were accepted. At that point each one had to come off with a prototype and a fly-off occurred with winner take all. Sometimes the contractor was paid for their prototype.

During this period Boeing was very busy with the B-47 and B-52 as well as preparing their assault into the commercial aircraft industry. More than likely some of the solicitations that Douglas went after were probably sent to Boeing and they were returned "NO BID" mainly because Boeing was busy with other programs (B-47, B-52 Bomarc, KC-97, KC-50 conversion, KC-135). As a matter of fact Boeing was so busy during this period some of the B-47 production was subcontracted to Lockheed.

You want to say Douglas "were much more prolific designers than Boeing," well that wasn't because Boeing wasn't capable, it was what the government was offering and what companies were able *or wanted to *bid on.

Now you gave the example of the Boeing XF8B – here’s a statement from Wiki regarding this aircraft, its cancellation and Boeing’s path in the post war years…

“Although testing of the promising XF8B concept continued into 1946 by the USAAF and 1947 by the US Navy, the end of *the war in the Pacific and changing postwar strategy required that Boeing concentrate on building large land-based bombers and transports.”*

So you see, this is the way it really works. I’ve worked for Lockheed, Boeing and was a contractor with McDonnell Douglas and several other smaller aviation related defense contractors and been through this process and worked with people in my early years who worked on some of the aircraft spoken about here. Military aircraft design, especially in the post was based on a requirement driven by the government and there was very little “private ventures” being offered up because of the risk of losing money.

So with that this said, you are entitled to your opinions based on what you have read in books or seen on TV documentaries, be advised however that some of us have been employed in this environment and seen firsthand how aircraft manufacturers work and compete with each other as well as the way the government picks and chooses who will build what.


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## renrich (Jul 16, 2012)

Comparing the combat environment against the Italian Navy in the Med at Taranto and the IJN at Midway is ridiculous. To begin with the harbor at Taranto was at a known position. The IJN fleet location was not exactly known and was moving to boot. To launch a night attack with VTs from a carrier against the IJN at that stage of the war, regardless of training would have been idiotic. The VTs at Midway were not sacrificed on purpose for the VBs. There was supposed to be a coordinated attack but the USN forces really botched up the strikes and were fortunate to achieve the results they did.

The attack at Taranto was a magnificent display of seamanship and airmanship by the RN and the FAA but battle against the Italian armed forces and battle against the IJN were two different things. The primary reason that Fletcher withdrew at Coral Sea was that his air groups were pretty heavily attrited and his fuel situation was poor. Even if he had had a squadron of night trained pilots armed with the Stringbag and reliable torps he would have made the correct decision and retired. 

An aside is that much is being made of the Swordfish's relative ease of operation from CVs and probably rightly so but the "Turkey" (Avenger) although a really big AC was noted for being an easy AC to operate from a carrier. Some were even used in the night fighter role and many were used from CVE decks.


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

renrich said:


> Comparing the combat environment against the Italian Navy in the Med at Taranto and the IJN at Midway is ridiculous. To begin with the harbor at Taranto was at a known position. The IJN fleet location was not exactly known and was moving to boot. To launch a night attack with VTs from a carrier against the IJN at that stage of the war, regardless of training would have been idiotic. The VTs at Midway were not sacrificed on purpose for the VBs. There was supposed to be a coordinated attack but the USN forces really botched up the strikes and were fortunate to achieve the results they did.
> 
> The attack at Taranto was a magnificent display of seamanship and airmanship by the RN and the FAA but battle against the Italian armed forces and battle against the IJN were two different things. The primary reason that Fletcher withdrew at Coral Sea was that his air groups were pretty heavily attrited and his fuel situation was poor. Even if he had had a squadron of night trained pilots armed with the Stringbag and reliable torps he would have made the correct decision and retired.
> 
> An aside is that much is being made of the Swordfish's relative ease of operation from CVs and probably rightly so but the "Turkey" (Avenger) although a really big AC was noted for being an easy AC to operate from a carrier. Some were even used in the night fighter role and many were used from CVE decks.


 
Why are you continuing to compare the Swordfish with the TBD and TBF and ignoring the Albacore? The Albacore was the RN's frontline torpedo bomber in mid 1942, although the Swordfish had not been fully phased out of CV service it was certainly supposed to have been. In April 1942, Somerville with 2 RN CVs, attempted a night Albacore strike against 5 IJN CVs, in the Indian Ocean, while at Midway it was a case of 3 USN CVs versus 4 IJN CVs. The strike was thwarted by IJN CAP shooting down an ASV Albacore, just at sunset, otherwise the Albacore would have maintained contact and the strike would have gone ahead. With another CV Somerville could have had more scouts out and had a high probability of launching a sucessful night torpedo strike. 

I'm not sure that the TBF was considered easy to operate from CVs:



> The TBF plane, because of its size and weight, is at present a serious potential liability on board aircraft carriers. Too large a number can reduce flight and hangar deck flexibility and slow up flight deck operations at crucial times. A TBF crash on deck can be handled only after long delay and this might well be fatal under certain conditions. It is recommended that the total number of TBF planes in a carrier of the ENTERPRISE type be limited to 12, resultant space being used for fighters and scout bombers, and that crane tractors capable of hoisting a TBF be provided immediately for all carriers operating this type of plane. The latter recommendation is of urgent importance.
> Action Report: 24 August 1942



And this USN report recommends night torpedo attack training:


> The limitations in the use of torpedo planes, which have repeatedly been set forth in reports of previous actions, were again amply demonstrated. Although the attack of the enemy torpedo squadron (probably 18 planes) against the ENTERPRISE was executed with obvious skill and great determination, only about nine planes reached a proper release point, and no hits were made. The harassing effect on the Japanese pilots of the extremely heavy and accurate fire of the combined task force and the maneuvers of the ship in combing the wakes of the torpedoes launched were the prime factors in nullifying the attack. The results of the attacks of our own torpedo planes, while not nil, were disappointing. It has been proven time and again that the probability of success of a torpedo plane attack in good visibility against a formation properly defended by fighters and anti-aircraft fire is small and out of all proportion to the losses in planes and men. The conclusion is obvious - that in the present state of the art, torpedo plane operations should if practicable be limited to attacks delivered under conditions of low visibility or in mopping up operations after the defensive power of the enemy formation has been reduced. Thus limited, the torpedo plane is not as valuable, plane for plane, in day operations as is the dive bomber. Accordingly, it is recommended that for the present, the air groups of our large carriers include not more than twelve torpedo planes. *Only when torpedo squadron personnel are fully trained and planes are equipped for all aspects of night operations will torpedo planes reach their full effectiveness.* We should not abandon them for carrier use; after all, they were the decisive factor in the HORNET attack.
> Action Report: 26 October 1942



We can also see how using a shallow dive prior to torpedo release, as per IJN and USN training was extremely hazardous, hence the RN decision to use a dive bomb approach prior to torpedo release for daylight attacks, which was only possible because RN torpedo bombers were stressed for dive bombing as well.


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

Albacore versus TBD speeds:

These charts imply a 164 knot speed for the TBD, with torpedo, at SL, and 169 knots clean at SL:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...98-sbd-discussed-flight-data-tbd-1-charts.pdf
yet we know that by 1942, TBD speeds at SL with a torpedo were about 130 knots, and thus is seems likely that clean speed at SL was probably in the range of 135 knots. Maximum speed of an Albacore/Taurus II and 4 underwing deoth cahrges was 140 knots (160 mph) at 4800ft and 150 knots (172) mph clean at the same altitude. Max speed at SL was bout 10 knots less, IIRC.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 16, 2012)

Where did the 35knots of speed go?

Old engines in need of overhaul?
Out of true airframes?
Dirty or poor finish on aircraft?
Charts based on 15 degree C day and tropical conditions sucked power and lift? 

130kts was close to 60% power cruising speed?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> RN torpedo bombers were stressed for dive bombing as well.



The Swordfish WAS NOT specifically "stressed" for dive bombing. An Air Ministry engineer may have determined that the Swordfish could do dive bombing if needed. Air Ministry specification, S.15/33 defined the need for a spotter-recon aircraft, the torpedo role was added at a later date. When the prototype first flew in 1934 the pre-WW2 dive bombing concept (or fad) really didn’t start to fancy military planners, so tell us, where in the Pilot's Notes or any other data does it specify the Swordfish was "stressed" for dive bombing? 

I think you're exaggerating on how much of a dive the Swordfish entered when using this tactic, especially when carrying a torpedo.

"Swordfish torpedo doctrine called for an approach at 5,000 ft (1,500 m) followed by a dive to torpedo release altitude of 18 ft (5.5 m)." (Emmott, Norman W. "Airborne Torpedoes"). It was mentioned earlier that the aircraft would barely reach 200 mph in a dive and had a Vne of just over 200 mph, and that would be in a clean configuration. Performing this with a torpedo would have to be done with limitations on the airframe (the airframe is limited to low G maneuvers) and engine as there is a 2350 rpm limitation (from the pilot’s notes). So even though there is evidence to support your claim about “dive bombing” I doubt the Swordfish carried it out in the tradition of say an SBD or Val.


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Where did the 35knots of speed go?
> 
> Old engines in need of overhaul?
> Out of true airframes?
> ...



probably all of the above plus extra weight added for armour, avionics and more guns.

The crusing speeds were also far slower at Midway than the charts would imply:


> 7. Torpedo 8, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds...
> Battle of Midway: USS Hornet Action Report


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Albacore versus TBD speeds:
> 
> These charts imply a 164 knot speed for the TBD, with torpedo, at SL, and 169 knots clean at SL.



Did you plug in temperature? If you didn't you're reading the chart wrong. Follow the chart at SL on a "standard day" and it shows about 181 knots = 208 mph.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The crusing speeds were also far slower at Midway than the charts would imply:



The full reference from the link you posted states;

"7. Torpedo 8, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds *while the remainder of the group flew at 110 knots*, climbing to 19,000 feet."

It does not specify why...


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The full reference from the link you posted states;
> 
> "7. Torpedo 8, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds *while the remainder of the group flew at 110 knots*, climbing to 19,000 feet."
> 
> It does not specify why...


 
The remainder of the "group" was VB and VF squadrons (SBDs and F4F-4s).


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The remainder of the "group" was VB and VF squadrons (SBDs and F4F-4s).



Still no indication why - HOWEVER, if you look on the link you posted to the TBD charts you'll find a fuel consumption chart. 100 knots = 115 mph, so they are crusing on the low end of the chart which would make sense as they needed to extend their range, something I think all Midway carrier aircraft did.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 16, 2012)

I am not a pilot but it would seem to me that if I was "lost" I would throttle back to a minimum fuel consumption speed _while I figured out where I was._

While action reports do help us separate some book figures from reality we also have to aware of how or why a particular action report may differ from the book figures. One or two action reports with extenuating circumstances (lost?) do not make the manual or book figures invalid.


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The Swordfish WAS NOT specifically "stressed" for dive bombing. An Air Ministry engineer may have determined that the Swordfish could do dive bombing if needed. Air Ministry specification, S.15/33 defined the need for a spotter-recon aircraft, the torpedo role was added at a later date. When the prototype first flew in 1934 the pre-WW2 dive bombing concept (or fad) really didn’t start to fancy military planners, so tell us, where in the Pilot's Notes or any other data does it specify the Swordfish was "stressed" for dive bombing?
> 
> I think you're exaggerating on how much of a dive the Swordfish entered when using this tactic, especially when carrying a torpedo.
> 
> "Swordfish torpedo doctrine called for an approach at 5,000 ft (1,500 m) followed by a dive to torpedo release altitude of 18 ft (5.5 m)." (Emmott, Norman W. "Airborne Torpedoes"). It was mentioned earlier that the aircraft would barely reach 200 mph in a dive and had a Vne of just over 200 mph, and that would be in a clean configuration. Performing this with a torpedo would have to be done with limitations on the airframe (the airframe is limited to low G maneuvers) and engine as there is a 2350 rpm limitation (from the pilot’s notes). So even though there is evidence to support your claim about “dive bombing” I doubt the Swordfish carried it out in the tradition of say an SBD or Val.



Air warfare an International Encyclopedia, p214:


> Fairey Swordfish
> Britsh dive-bomber and torpedo bomber. Regarded as obselete at the beginning of WWII, the Swordfish nevertheless went on to serve in the FAA and the RAF until the end of hostilites. The reason for such longevity was its superb handling, especially during landing, torpedo attack runs and dive-bombing.



If you were a torpedo bomber pilot and you had a choice of a long shallow dive, which made you a superb target or a very steep, high speed dive, where you were very hard to hit, which would you chose? Why wouldn't a Swordfish or Albacore pilot use an approach that optimized his chances for success and survival?

Wings of the Navy, p15-16:


> It was hardly neccessary to trim the Swordfish into a dive and 200 knots (371km/h) could be clocked if the neccessary considerable altitude was available; the control forces changing little under these conditions, and dives at torpedo carrying weight to the maximum permitted engine RPM did not produce vibration or flutter. The Swordfish remained stable in all axes - manaouvering precislely in the vertical plane, and it was popularly supposed - although I admit that I never personally confirmed the supposition - that the ideal method of dive bombing was to fly immediately above the target and then turn the Swordfish over to the near-vertical, diving until the target could be seen above the upper wing..."
> 
> ....5min combat rating of 750 hp at 2525rpm...(p 18 )



The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor - Page 103


> The table on the next page compares the Fairey Swordfish, used for both dive-bombing and torpedo work, with the Val and the Kate. The Val was a specialized dive-bomber, whereas the Kate was designed for both torpedo dropping and ...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> I am not a pilot but it would seem to me that if I was "lost" I would throttle back to a minimum fuel consumption speed _while I figured out where I was._


And lean your mixture!

"Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" in that order...


Shortround6 said:


> While action reports do help us separate some book figures from reality we also have to aware of how or why a particular action report may differ from the book figures. One or two action reports with extenuating circumstances (lost?) do not make the manual or book figures invalid.


 Yep - and many times one could figure out why a combat report didn't match what "the book" or "chart" said. Range is always a good one. Many people forget that many times when entering a combat area, aircraft were never flown in a straight line with perfect cruising configurations. Many times a flight will zigzag, climb, descend and make gentle turns on a course enabling themselves not to be set up as a stationary target and also enabling scanning for the enemy.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Air warfare an International Encyclopedia, p214:
> 
> 
> If you were a torpedo bomber pilot and you had a choice of a long shallow dive, which made you a superb target or a very steep, high speed dive, where you were very hard to hit, which would you chose? Why wouldn't a Swordfish or Albacore pilot use an approach that optimized his chances for success and survival?



Again, show me WHERE it says the Swordfish was specifically "Stressed" for divebombing?


RCAFson said:


> Wings of the Navy, p15-16:
> It was hardly neccessary to trim the Swordfish into a dive and 200 knots (371km/h) could be clocked if the neccessary *considerable altitude was available*; the control forces changing little under these conditions, and dives at *torpedo carrying weight to the maximum permitted engine RPM *


I mentioned the 200 knot dive on post 89 - it was indicated in the book by Terence Horsley in "Find, Fix and Strike." 
That does not mean you're diving with a torpedo at 200 knots


RCAFson said:


> The table on the next page compares the Fairey Swordfish, used for both dive-bombing and torpedo work, with the Val and the Kate. The Val was a specialized dive-bomber, whereas the Kate was designed for both torpedo dropping and ...
> The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor - Page 103


Again it proves? There is no argument that the Swordfish was able to dive bomb but it did have limitations. There is no evidence that during its design or inital deployment it was specifically "stressed for dive bombing." Again, it was able to divebomb agree, with limitations


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> If you were a torpedo bomber pilot and you had a choice of a long shallow dive, which made you a superb target or a very steep, high speed dive, where you were very hard to hit, which would you chose? Why wouldn't a Swordfish or Albacore pilot use an approach that optimized his chances for success and survival?


 
I would choose what the aircraft was capable of doing and what I was trained to do. Try doing something different and most of the time you would not have to be worrying about being a superb target...


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Still no indication why - HOWEVER, if you look on the link you posted to the TBD charts you'll find a fuel consumption chart. 100 knots = 115 mph, so they are crusing on the low end of the chart which would make sense as they needed to extend their range, something I think all Midway carrier aircraft did.



The fuel consumption chart is in knots, and the minimum speed, while carrying a torpedo, is about 105 knots, according to the chart and the chart shows 4.2 AMPG, and we know that fuel consumption, by 1942, was much higher than this.


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The full reference from the link you posted states;
> 
> "7. Torpedo 8, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds *while the remainder of the group flew at 110 knots*, climbing to 19,000 feet."
> 
> It does not specify why...



Without knowing, I would guess the reason would be to increase the endurance of the type. Less speed = longer in the air, and since the USN was not exactly sure of the position of the IJNs carriers, it made sense to keep the birds airborne for as long as possible


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The fuel consumption chart is in knots, and the minimum speed, while carrying a torpedo, is about 105 knots, according to the chart and the chart shows 4.2 AMPG, and we know that fuel consumption, by 1942, was much higher than this.


We do? Show us!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Without knowing, I would guess the reason would be to increase the endurance of the type. Less speed + longer in the air, and since the USN was not exactly sure of the position of the IJNs carriers, it made sense to keep the birds airborne for as long as possible


Exactly!


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## Shortround6 (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The fuel consumption chart is in knots, and the minimum speed, while carrying a torpedo, is about 105 knots, according to the chart and the chart shows 4.2 AMPG, and we know that fuel consumption, by 1942, was much higher than this.



Maybe the TBDs were refitted with armor and self sealing tanks, do you have a reference for this?

What extra avionics? didn't they come with radios to begin with? 

What extra guns? did some get twin .30s in the rear gunner station instead of a single?


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## VBF-13 (Jul 16, 2012)

Torpedo Squadron Eight actually made several hits on four of the carriers. They were shot down to the last plane because of their necessarily low and flat approaches required to effectively release their torpedoes. That made them easy targets for the carriers' guns. The SBDs, zeroing-in on their open brake flaps, were able to then utilize that momentum to swing back upward and get out of there. I forget the citation for this, but it might be one of Vice-Admiral Fletcher's accounts. I remember it from long ago, folks, sorry. At any rate, it makes sense.


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2012)

> Comparing the combat environment against the Italian Navy in the Med at Taranto and the IJN at Midway is ridiculous. To begin with the harbor at Taranto was at a known position. The IJN fleet location was not exactly known and was moving to boot. To launch a night attack with VTs from a carrier against the IJN at that stage of the war, regardless of training would have been idiotic.




There is no comparison between the two operations, I agree, however each had its own set of problems no less daunting for the respective combatants. Whilst taranto was a known location, the location of the italian fleet was not. In fact it was an amazing strole of good luck that the italians remained in the harbour since they knew the strike was coming. They miscalculated the timing of the strike (believing it would not arrive until morning , believed the harbour defences would hold (particulalry the barrage ballons and netting would prevent an effective strike, and underestimated the range of the Swordfish. 

And in any event Swordfish crews on repeated occasions demonstrated in spades that they could locate, attack and sink targets whose position was not known, moving. And they did it at night. They never did it against the Japanese carrier forces, mostly because they were given very little opportunity to try, but on the one occasion they (the FAA) did try, they came pretty close to pulling the stunt off. 

You have not explained why attempting a night strike would be "idiotic". I would suggest that merely reveals set and predictable thinking. Thinking outside the box, the preconceived ideas on how a war should be fought "properly" is as bad or worse as British officers refusing to use the 3.7 in AA gun as an ATG, because "thats not what an AA gun does" . In my opinion, its not idiotic, because very similar missions could and were undertaken throughout the war....in the finish, by everybody, including the USN. The difference is that the RN perfected the techniques before anybody else and were the best at it. Why is it impossible to think that the USN could not have achieved similar resulta if they had similar training. They certainly seemed pr3etty adept at the role with their "Black Cat" operations. Are you saying there was something preventing the adaptation of USN equipment for night capability. something in the US training regime that prevented them from acquiring the necessary skills. I certainly am not. I believe it was entirely possible, though there was nothing in the US inventory that measured up to quite the standard set by the Swordfish as far as night capability was concerned, their equipment can be considered "good enough" for night operations in clear and still night conditions. 



> The VTs at Midway were not sacrificed on purpose for the VBs. There was supposed to be a coordinated attack but the USN forces really botched up the strikes and were fortunate to achieve the results they did.



Certainly botching and luck played their part in the outcome at Midway. But i would add that it was also due to the intiative and heroism of the USN pilots, as well as ther skill, the stupidity of the japanese in certain respects, and also the failure of the equipment, specifically the TBD performance, that dictated the outcome




> The attack at Taranto was a magnificent display of seamanship and airmanship by the RN and the FAA but battle against the Italian armed forces and battle against the IJN were two different things. The primary reason that Fletcher withdrew at Coral Sea was that his air groups were pretty heavily attrited and his fuel situation was poor. Even if he had had a squadron of night trained pilots armed with the Stringbag and reliable torps he would have made the correct decision and retired.



I agree, except that there is more than one way to skin a cat. For a start with a night capable force, there was absolutely no need to get his TG so banged up as it was. The Japanese had absolutely no defence to night capability at that time. If the Carriers could be located and kept at range in the day(greater than 240 miles for the japanese strike aircraft), during the night Fletcher coul;d have turned his force around , launched at that range (240 miles) and be closing the range with his ships whilst his aircraft were enroute and eturning. His TG would have had about four hours at night to close, whilst the strike hit the japanese and returned. The round trip in that scenario is about 360 miles (240 out, 120 back) ....well within both the TBD and Swordfish capabilities. Provided the strike connects, the Japanese are going to be in no position to retaliate the next morning, and fletcher could have been home in time for tea, with barely a scratch. If the strike fails to connect, the Americans are in a world of hurt, but not really any worse off than they were historically 




> An aside is that much is being made of the Swordfish's relative ease of operation from CVs and probably rightly so but the "Turkey" (Avenger) although a really big AC was noted for being an easy AC to operate from a carrier. Some were even used in the night fighter role and many were used from CVE decks


.

I agree,but the Swordfish was the dedicated ASW and patrol aircraft in the arctic. There was a reason for that, and the main reason it outlived its successor. there simply was no other aircraft of its time that could match it in poor conditions. Why? It certainaly wasnt designed with that in mind. Just that its low speeds and pleasant handling made it a lower risk in heavy conditions


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> We do? Show us!



I posted a quote earlier showing that TBD crews felt their maximum radius was 150-160nm.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I posted a quote earlier showing that TBD crews felt their maximum radius was 150-160nm.


You quote TBD Units 

"...Torpedo crews advised against launching TBD more than 160 miles from the target and favour 150 miles..." p65

No indication that fuel consumption was higher in 1942 for face value. You're going to have to do better than that.

I could tell you however that if you calculate out the TBD's advertised range of 435 miles and subtract 320 miles, you had 115 miles. Turn that into "reserves" that gave you an hour if you cruised that 115 mph. Do the same with 300 miles and that gave you 135 miles, about an hour and a half. To me that sounds more like aviators who wanted a little more fuel reserves than being worried about operating at their operational radius. Also consider weather, headwinds, finding the enemy ect...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Torpedo Squadron Eight actually made several hits on four of the carriers. They were shot down to the last plane because of their necessarily low and flat approaches required to effectively release their torpedoes. That made them easy targets for the carriers' guns. The SBDs, zeroing-in on their open brake flaps, were able to then utilize that momentum to swing back upward and get out of there. I forget the citation for this, but it might be one of Vice-Admiral Fletcher's accounts. I remember it from long ago, folks, sorry. At any rate, it makes sense.



Not true about the hits...

"Every plane from VT-8 was quickly shot down and only one crewman survived – Ensign George Gay. Moreover, not one torpedo hit its mark and our initial attack had tragically failed."

U.S. Fleet Forces Command Blog: The Battle of Midway – 70 Years


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Maybe the TBDs were refitted with armor and self sealing tanks, do you have a reference for this?
> 
> What extra avionics? didn't they come with radios to begin with?
> 
> What extra guns? did some get twin .30s in the rear gunner station instead of a single?



The TBD was introduced in 1937 and I assume that USN avionics would have changed over time, and with increased weight and increased capability.

The TBD is a poorly documented aircraft but I found this post:


> In addition, the NACA airfoil used for the TBD-1 main plane (the characteristic thick wing) were specifically used by Douglas engineers to meet the Navy's 1934 specifications dealing with lifting and carrying requirement (Mk. XIII torpedo or 2,000 lb. of bombs), and was not a wing that permitted high speed flight. This is illustrated by the aircraft's very low Vne (or never exceed speed) of merely 208. Relevant is the fact that performance and operational data shows that when fully loaded with a Mk. XIII torpedo, 2 men, pilot and radioman/gunner armor, 180 gallons of fuel and other miscellaneous equipment [the conditions used by Torpedo 8 at Midway and 900 lb. over the maximum gross weight]), and at high cruise power settings of +/- 80-85% power, the aircraft could barely maintain 110-115 knots at 2,000 feet. Therefore, putting the vibration issue aside, if a new airfoil was not used, the power requirements to improve performance, even slightly, would have been enormous and to some extend, counterproductive.
> 
> Miguel Vasconcelos
> 
> ...



I know that this is a pretty poor reference but it all makes sense when the earlier references to a TBD loaded speed of 130 knots at SL is considered. Something had to have happened to decrease the aircraft's performance. 

TBD Devastator Units of the US Navy makes several references to several squadrons having twin .30 Mgs added in lieu of the the original single.


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> You quote TBD Units
> 
> "...Torpedo crews advised against launching TBD more than 160 miles from the target and favour 150 miles..." p65
> 
> No indication that fuel consumption was higher in 1942 for face value. You're going to have to do better than that.



Max speed with a torpedo = 130 knots in 1942 yet the fuel consumption chart indicates a max IAS of ~167 knots with a torpedo. Something very drastic happened to slow the TBD by over 30 knots at full throttle and we can be fairly certain that it would have a similar effect on lower speed cruises, and would increase the amount of power and fuel that the aircraft needed to use to cruise, even at 100 knots.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Max speed with a torpedo = 130 knots in 1942 yet the fuel consumption chart indicates a max IAS of ~167 knots with a torpedo. Something very drastic happened to slow the TBD by over 30 knots at full throttle and we can be fairly certain that it would have a similar effect on lower speed cruises, and would increase the amount of power and fuel that the aircraft needed to use to cruise, even at 100 knots.



I edited my last post. Have you ever flown over the middle of an ocean? Ever hear of "headwinds? 30 knots are very common....


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I edited my last post. Have you ever flown over the middle of an ocean? Ever hear of "headwinds? 30 knots are very common....



I posted a memo from the Chief of the Bureau of ordnance:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...ston-engined-bomber-world-war-two-torp228.jpg

which gives us a pretty good idea that headwinds are not a factor in the TBDs lowered performance.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I posted a memo from the Chief of the Bureau of ordnance:
> 
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...ston-engined-bomber-world-war-two-torp228.jpg
> 
> which gives us a pretty good idea that headwinds are not a factor in the TBDs lowered performance.



Of course it's not going to say anything - that is something calculated at the time you fly. You brought up the fact that crews wanted to launch 10 miles closer to target. Based on the flight manuals original numbers, that would have given crews an extra 30 minutes in the air (as I earlier pointed out). Also be aware that if the use of this torpedo affected aircraft performance that greatly, there would have been a change to the flight manual.

I'm looking for a FM manual reference right now...


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## VBF-13 (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Not true about the hits...
> 
> "Every plane from VT-8 was quickly shot down and only one crewman survived – Ensign George Gay. Moreover, not one torpedo hit its mark and our initial attack had tragically failed."
> 
> U.S. Fleet Forces Command Blog: The Battle of Midway – 70 Years


Give me time, I have several sources in mind I want to check on this. It's not everyday I find myself having to contradict an Admiral. Just getting off work. I shall return...


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## RCAFson (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Of course it's not going to say anything - that is something calculated at the time you fly. You brought up the fact that crews wanted to launch 10 miles closer to target. Based on the flight manuals original numbers, that would have given crews an extra 30 minutes in the air (as I earlier pointed out). Also be aware that if the use of this torpedo affected aircraft performance that greatly, there would have been a change to the flight manual.
> 
> I'm looking for a FM manual reference right now...



Here's some more info showing a ~130 knots speed:





Tillman, U. S. Navy Dive and Torpedo Bombers of World War II, p58.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Give me time, I have several sources in mind I want to check on this. It's not everyday I find myself having to contradict an Admiral. Just getting off work. I shall return...


Well unless Ensign Gay made admiral, there are dozen of reports, books articles ect., stating 100% that VT-8 did not hit anything during Midway.


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 16, 2012)

I'm with Joe on this one. _A Dawn Like Thunder - The True Story of Torpedo Squadron Eight_ by Robert Mrazek which is probably the definitive book on the squadron states there were no hits made as well. Most of the data in the book was pulled from the official log of the unit.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Here's some more info showing a ~130 knots speed:
> View attachment 206525
> 
> Tillman, U. S. Navy Dive and Torpedo Bombers of World War II, p58.



An opinion from a former TBD driver. I'll assume those numbers are full power.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Well unless Ensign Gay made admiral [...]


I was referring to the Admiral who authored the post in the blog referencing Ensign Gay's account. I can understand why you may have thought I was referring to Ensign Gay, though.

OK, Fletcher was there, 3-6 June 1942, as was Ensign Gay, and this is his account. I'll even say why it makes sense to me. That torpedo squadron was the first wave on that task force and these fleet-class carriers are hard to miss with a torpedo coming off the belly of a plane flying that low to the water. This account could be wrong, and I'll acknowledge it's not the popular account. At any rate, here it is...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

Nope - Ole Fletch was dead wrong! All torps from Torpedo 8 missed their mark, this confirmed many times over after the war, but I'll look into this a bit more


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 16, 2012)

I never concern myself with popularity of something, I prefer the facts and data.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 16, 2012)

It's hard for me to shake this as I've always thought it. You know how that is. But I'm here to learn from you folks. Oh, heck, so I'll try real hard this time!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 16, 2012)

"Without a fighter escort, all 15 TBD Devastators of VT-8 were shot down by hordes of Zeros before they could inflict a hit. The suicidal mission was described by one writer as "equivalent to a stone thrown into a group of pigeons." VT-6 followed Waldron's lead but met a similar fate, without a single torpedo finding its mark. Most of their Mark 13 aircraft torpedoes traveled beneath the targets, and their detonators failed to explode or simply fell apart in the water. (It would take U.S. Navy experts several months to correct the defects in the Mark 13, during which time scores of airmen would lose their lives in vain.)"

Ten Minutes at Midway

From wiki

"The squadron did not destroy any enemy aircraft with their defensive rear .30-caliber machine guns, nor did they damage any of the Japanese carriers."

VT-8 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## VBF-13 (Jul 16, 2012)

FLYBOYJ, look out your window. Do you see that young boy going by on his bicycle with that cellphone stuck in his ear? Fifteen minutes ago he posted the start-up instructions for a Boeing 747 on Wikipedia. 

OK, OK, you talked me into it!


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## renrich (Jul 16, 2012)

Probably the definitive book on Midway is "Shattered Sword." The book is largely based on Japanese records many heretofore unused. The next best reference is probably "The First Team" by Lundstrom who is referenced often in "Shattered Sword." According to those sources none of the US VTs at Midway got a hit. Many never even got to launch the torps. If one has not read Lundstrom and "Shattered Sword" one is behind the curve and relatively uninformed.

When carrier launched strikes by both sides in daylight have great difficulty or even fail to locate the opposite side's ships how does it work that a night attack especially by AC that can barely go faster than a carrier at flank speed can succeed? At Coral Sea the IJN was behind a weather front that greatly hindered the US AC in finding them.

However I have at long last become convinced that the Stringbag was a war winning AC. I now wonder why the RN did not dust off HMS Victory. Victory would have been a superb stealth warship because her radar signature would be almost negligible since she was mostly wood. Her slow speed would have increased the accuracy of her guns. The Italians would have never detected her approach because she was so quiet and even if they detected her they would have thought they were seeing a mirage.. She could have gallivanted around the Med for months without being replenished which was a weak point of the RN. The FAA might have even cleared her spar deck and launched Swordfishs from her. Just kidding


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2012)

> When carrier launched strikes by both sides in daylight have great difficulty or even fail to locate the opposite side's ships how does it work that a night attack especially by AC that can barely go faster than a carrier at flank speed can succeed? At Coral Sea the IJN was behind a weather front that greatly hindered the US AC in finding them.



For a night strike to work against a moving target, the carier needed a daylight position of last known course and speed of the target. This happened to also be a necessary requirement for the raid into ports. Later, from 1941, the Brits had several aircraft in the squadron fitted with ASVII or ASVIII radar. ASV II had a range of over 40 km unde3r the right conditions for a normal warship....against a small target like a U-Boat conning tower, it was much less relaible (ASV II was better) and range was a maximum of about 10 km. Against TF, the search a/c might have a range of 20-40km. Thats almost as good as a visual search. Since the Swordfish was rated as a TSR (Torpedo/Spotter/Recon) a/c, this might be seen as the recce element of its mission.

Radar could not really assist in the actual attack. Normally a squadron of 12-15 a/c might have 2-3 flare droppers, who also usually carried 3 or 4 250lb bombs. They were the pathfinders, and whilst there was an enormous variation in how they went about their jobs, typically they would climb to about 7000 feet and then drop the magnesium flares in a stick "downwind" of the ship, so that if there was any moonlight or dusklight, such light was coming over the top of the target so that it projected silhouette and therby increased its visibility, whilst at the same time decreasing the visibility of the main attack force. You could classify this part of the mission as the "Spotter" commponent of the TSR. The flare droppers would then try and co-ordinate their attacks with the main force, the torpedo bombers, by carrying out divebombing attacks against the target. If they were lucky and achieved a hit, it would hopefully cause a fire(s) on the ship, illuminating the target even more.

The Torpedo echelons were trained to close the range to 1000 yards or less and attack in waves, usually consisting of pairs or sometimes three aircraft flights. For a torpedo bomber thats virtually point blank range. The Ark Royals Swordfish closed to about 710 yards when they attacked the Bismarck, with the banking aircraft probably passing to within 300 yards of the battleship as they turned away. By the time the torps had completed their runs to the battleship, she was almost presenting her stern fully on to the attack, presenting as narrow a target as she could. Its a testament to the accuracy and stability of that squadron hit the rudder....a virtual bulls eye.

The probelem for the Bismarck, is that by turning away she did two things. Firstly she presented her rudder and screws to the attack, which were the only real vulnerable bits of the hull. secondly the rear flak batteries were being directed by an inferiro director that could not cope with the low speed of the attackers. 

Bismarck is the most famous atack carried out at night, but there were literally hundreds of such attacks. The Axis was losing an average of 50000 tons of shipping a month, a lot of it was sunk by Swordfish equipped squadrons. Nuch was also sunk by Beaforts, also operating at night using the same basic techniques. Swordfish are credited with sinking well over 250000 tons of shipping in these night attacks, and with the sinking of at least 22.5 enemy subs, and probably as many as 40. Many of those were done at night and in poor weather, beginning with U-451 in November 1941. The first U-Boat sinking by a Swordfish in daylight was in April 1940, when U-64 was sunk by a Swordfish from Furious (I think it was Furious) 

This all takes a well trained crew, and an aircraft set up for the purpose. Because operating at night in the late 30's and early 40's was an inherently dangerous activity, you dont want a particualalry twitchy High Performance a/c....you want docility and relaibility. The Swordfish had this in spades. I dont see why the TBD could not have done a similar job....its just that the USN over-estimated the types survivability in daylight and dismissed too quickly the potentialities of night strike The Americans could have trained their TBD crews



> However I have at long last become convinced that the Stringbag was a war winning AC. I now wonder why the RN did not dust off HMS Victory. Victory would have been a superb stealth warship because her radar signature would be almost negligible since she was mostly wood. Her slow speed would have increased the accuracy of her guns. The Italians would have never detected her approach because she was so quiet and even if they detected her they would have thought they were seeing a mirage.. She could have gallivanted around the Med for months without being replenished which was a weak point of the RN. The FAA might have even cleared her spar deck and launched Swordfishs from her. Just kidding



Cheeky....I am sure that if Cunningham had been asked he would have found a use for the old ship.....


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2012)

Might be appropriate to post some information on ASV radar, which was such an integral part of the Stringbags success

This is not my work, it comes straignt from the U-Boat net site. For some reason it fails to mention when the various radars were fitted to the Stringbag.....I do know that they (ASVIIs) were fitted to some aircraft from the beginning of 1941.

The USN had access to radar via the tizard mission from 1940. they had at least as much time to acquaint themselves with its potentialities from that time, which was aas longas the RN had for most of its formations. It embraced radar for its warships very strongly, but virtually ignored airborne radars until 1942, and were not in a position to use it for carrier aircraft really until 1944. The question begs....why????


British ASV radars

prepared by Emmanuel Gustin

Early Experiments
ASV Mk.I 

When radar was developed in Britain in the late 1930s it was clear that any airborne radar had to be vastly different from the gigantic "Chain Home" radar masts that gave early warning to Britain's fighter defense. A dipole antenna operates best when its length is half the wavelength of the radar beam, and to direct the beam in any direction a large array of dipoles is required. Obviously, the number and length of the dipoles would be very limited in an airborne installation. However, at that time there was no sufficiently powerful source of short waves. To be useful, an airborne radar also needed to have a short minimum range, that is, it had to guide the aircraft close enough for its crew to see the target. This could be achieved by using shorter pulses than land radars.

There was little difference, at that time, between the development of AI (airborne intercept, i.e. radar for nightfighter) and ASV (airborne surface vessel, radar for maritime patrol aircraft). In 1938 and 1939, ASV radar had the higher priority.

On 17 August 1937, the very first British airborne radar was flown. Based on the Western Electric 316A valve, it generated 100 Watts of power at a wavelength of 1.25 meters, and was later improved by increasing the wavelength to 1.5 meters. Installed in Avro Anson K6260, this radar proved that it was capable of tracking the aircraft carrier HMS Courageous, the battleship HMS Rodney, and the cruiser HMS Southampton, in weather conditions that would have made conventional reconnaissance impossible. It even detected aircraft taking off from HMS Courageous.

The radar was not yet ready for service, however. Development was delayed by what Dr E.G. "Taffy" Bowen, head of the airborne radar group, described as "totally inadequate resources and virtually no administrative back-up." Finally, two antenna configurations were developed for ASV radar. One used a dipole transmitting antenna with a reflector to give a broad beam in the forward direction. The two receiving antennas were on the aircraft's wings, and their polar diagrams overlapped. The direction of the target was determined by comparing the signals from the two receivers, displayed together on a cathode-ray tube, one to the left of the (vertical) baseline and the other to the right. If the target was on the right then the right receiver gave the stronger signal. The vertical timebase indicated the distance to the target. This system gave a range of 10 miles on a 1000 ton ship, and up to 40 miles on a coastline with steep cliffs. 

This was introduced as the first ASV radar (Mk.I), and installed on the Hudsons of Coastal Command. By the end of 1940 it was fitted in 24 Hudsons and 25 Sunderlands. About 200 sets were produced. Experience with it was not very good. The radar was unreliable and new equipment, and the manufacturing standard of many components left a lot to be desired. The problems of maintenance and training were enormous. Its usefulness and popularity were increased by Sqdn. Ldr. Lugg, who installed a 1.5 meter beacon at Leuchars. ASV Mk.I then was, at least, useful navigation equipment.

ASV Mk.I was not intended to detect submarines, but after an enquiry from admiral Somerville in late 1939 test were conducted with one of the Hudsons of No.220 Sqdn and the submarine L 27. It was demonstrated that, flying at 1000 feet, the submarine could be detected at 3 miles, broadside on, and this under experimental conditions --- that means that the crew of the Hudson knew exactly where the submarine was. Further tests revealed that when flying at 6000 feet, the range was increased to 6 miles. 

A notable improvement was achieved with what called Long Range ASV. LRASV was based on the second antenna configuration developed. It was a sideways-looking system. The transmitter was an array of ten dipoles, installed in five (later reduced to four) pairs on top of the fuselage of the aircraft. The receiving antennas were Sterba arrays, fitted to the sides of the fuselage. Because the transmitter array was a dipole array 18 feet long and the two receivers were arrays 12 feet long, a much better resolution and range could be achieved. The first installation was on a Whitley bomber, in late 1939. LRASV had a range 2.5 times better than the forward-looking system; it could detect submarines at 10 to 15 miles. 

ASV Mk.II 

Developed at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough in early 1940, ASV Mk.II differed from Mk.I mainly because it was properly engineered, and therefore much more reliable. Although called a 1.5m radar, it actually used 1.7m (176MHz). Range was up to 36 miles. The minimum range was about a mile. Several thousand sets were built, and installed in Hudsons, Sunderlands, Wellingtons, Beauforts, Warwicks, Whitleys, Liberators, and other Coastal Command aircraft. ASV Mk.II was used with both the forward-looking and the sideways-looking LRASV configuration, production being divided approximately equal. Only the LRASV was useful against submarines.

The first success was recorded on 30 November 1940, when a Whitley Mk.VI equipped with ASV damaged U-71 in the Bay of Biscay. By mid-1941 the ASV radar had increased daytime attacks on U-boats by 20%, and made nightly attacks possible.

However, night attacks were generally ineffective, for the simple reason that the aircraft crew could not see the submarine. The radar guided them to a mile of the submarine, but not closer. On 21 December 1941 an ASV-equipped Swordfish made the first successful night attack on an U-boat, but such remained exceptions.

ASV Mk.III

By late 1942, the U-boats carried "Metox", a simple radio receiver, which enabled them to detect the ASV Mk.II radar. This reduced the efficiency of the ASV equipped aircraft considerably, and shipping losses increased again. 

The history of ASV Mk.III is rather complicated. Because of personal conflicts, the original group that had developed airborne radar was dispersed. A new team was formed, tasked with the development of centimetric AI radar for nightfighters. The big advantage of a centimetric radar is that the beam can be directed accurately by a relatively small paraboloid reflector. This offered better range and resolution and eliminated the strong ground returns, which were unavoidable with the broad beams of the 1.5 meter radar sets. Centimetric radar was made possible by the development, by J.T. Randall and H.A.H. Boot, of the cavity magnetron. The first was tested on 21 February 1940. By June 1940, GEC had produced the first sealed magnetrons, suitable for use in aircraft.

Development concentrated on AI for nightfighthers, but in the autumn of 1940 the 10cm radar attracted naval interest, represented by Captain B.R. Willett and C.E. Horton. It was demonstrated to them that the ground-based, experimental radar equipment could track ships. On 11 November tests were conducted with the submarine HMS Usk, which was tracked at 7 miles. Some time was spent refining the equipment and defining the antennas, until a cylindrical paroboloid section was chosen for shipboard installations. By March 1941, a fully engineered 10cm radar was on board of the corvette HMS Orchis, and on 16 November 1941 the sinking of U-433 near Gibraltar was attributed to the "Type 271" 10cm radar. By May 1942, 236 ships carried centimetric radar. 

Meanwhile, the development of centimetric AI had continued, and in March 1942 it entered operational service. Known as AI Mk.VII, this was a remarkable achievement, and by August 1942 a fully-engineered production model followed, AI Mk.VIII. Tests against submarines had been conducted in April 1941, against HMS Sea Lion, and in August, against HMS Sokol. The radar was effective, but development of the ASV version was slow, much slower than that of AI radar, and the first experimental, centimetric ASV radar was not test flown before December 1941. By the summer of 1942 this so-called ASVS radar was being productionized by Ferranti. But then, on 30 September 1942, Ferranti was told to halt the work. Work on ASVS was stopped, much to the dismay of Coastal Command.


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2012)

part ii

The reason for this decision was that at the same time, H2S ground-mapping radar was under development for Bomber Command. The two systems had many similarities, and H2S was closer to production. The first test of a ground-mapping centimetric radar had been made on 1 November 1941, and was impressively succesful. A more practical system was flying in a Halifax on 17 March 1942, and immediately attracted the attention of a endless parade of high-ranking officers. This culminated in meeting on Downing Street 10 on 3 July, where Churchill insisted that he wanted 200 sets operational by mid-October. At that time, there was no working H2S radar at all, because the Halifax had crashed. There were still considerable problems in designing the H2S scanner, and it had not yet been resolved whether a cavity magnetron or a klystron would be used to generate the microwave power. The klystron provided insufficient power, but the use of the cavity magnetron meant that it would certainly fall in German hands. By 15 July, it had been decided to use the magnetron anyway. Development was enhanced by the valuable support of Sir Robert Renwick, appointed by Churchill to oversee H2S development, and by Group Captain D.C.T. Bennet, commander of No.8 Group, the "Pathfinder Force" of Bomber Command. By September, a version was ready for service trials. At the end of 1942, 24 bombers, Halifaxes and Stirlings, carried H2S.

Of course H2S Mk.I had been designed for four-engined bombers flying at 20,000 feet, and a hasty demonstration over sea was an annoying failure. Obviously, the system needed to be redesigned for operations at 2,000 feet. This did little to improve the attitude of Coastal Command towards this new radar system, which already suffered from being "not invented here". To some extent to irritation of Coastal Command was justified: There were to be fierce conflicts with Bomber Command over the allocation of radar equipment to H2S and ASV.

In any case, Coastal Command was not going to get any of the four-engined "heavies", so the first installation was made in a twin-engined Wellington bomber. The radar was installled in the nose, with the size of the scanner reflector reduced to 28 inches. This gave a 60 degree field of view in front of the aircraft. The display was the now familiar PPI (Plan Position Indicator), which presented a 'map view' of the relative positions. Coastal Command was still less than eager to support the system, and this slowed development. On 1 March 1943 a Wellington of No.172 Sqdn flew the first patrol over the Bay of Biscay. On 17 March they saw their first U-boat at 9 miles, but the Leigh light failed and the first attack was made on the next day. At the end of March 13 sightings had been made.

By May, Coastal Command detected and attacked most U-boats in the Bay of Biscay. U-boat sightings improved dramatically, and shipping losses decreased drastically, from 400,000 to 100,000 tons per month. Doenitz ordered his submarines to stay on the surface and fight it out with aircraft, but he lost 56 U-boats in April and May. Doenitz reported that the situation had become "impossible". This "temporary setback" was significant enough to be mentioned in a speech by Hitler. This result had actually been achieved by a handful of aircraft equipped with ASV Mk.III.

Meanwhile in the USA, a 10cm ASV radar called DMS-1000 had been developed by the Radiation Laboratory. It was installed in Liberators, but although the first one arrived in the UK in March 1942, it still lacked the Leigh light. The Liberator was used operationally in early 1943, and by the summer the Liberators were closing the "Atlantic gap". Everywhere in the Atlantic, U-boats could now be attacked by ASV-equipped aircraft. 

ASV Mk.VI

The British anticipated that the Germans would develop a warning detector for the 10cm ASV, as they had done for the 1.5 meter ASV. (They indeed did, the Naxos system, but it appeared three months after the first use of centimetric ASV radar. It seems that during the interrogation of a captured British officer, the Germans were told that the British were actually detecting the weak emissions of Metox. As this was technically possible, it was believed.)

Therefore ASV Mk.VI was developed. It was more powerful than Mk.III, but it had an attenuator (called Vixen) fitted. The idea was to reduce the power once the U-boat had been detected, so that the operator of any detection device would be fooled into believing that the aircraft was flying away, or at least not coming closer. Development of Mk.VI was once again slowed down by administrative obstructions. On 23 October 1943 Air Marshall Sir John Slessor, then head of Coastal Command, heard about this. Slessor was convinced that the Germans already had a detector for the 10cm radar (they had), and he reacted by writing a very angry letter in which called for disciplinary action, and used terms such as "crass stupidity" and "congenital idiot". Despite whispers about Slessor's imminent court-martial, this managed to create some activity in the Air Ministry. (Coastal Command lost the fight to get the 3cm ASV Mk.VII, however. All 3cm equipment was allocated to Bomber Command.)

There was also ASV Mk.VIA, which allowed the aircraft to lock onto the U-boat and aim its Leigh light directly at it. But this was not ready before the summer of 1944. The even more developed ASV MK.VIB made blind bombing possible.

ASV Mk.VII

The Mk.VII system was a development of a 3cm H2S system. This too was planned in anticipation of a German detector for 10cm waves. However, Bomber Command refused to accept any reduction in its deliveries of the 3cm H2S. When an agreement was reached to release some 3cm radars to Coastal Command, the commander of Bomber Command, A. Harris, telephoned Churchill and managed to reverse the decision. As a consequence, ASV Mk.VII had a low priority, and this decreased even more when the defeat of the U-boats became clear and the ports on the French coast were taken by Allied forces. 

But in October 1944, the Allied became aware of two worrying developments: The appearance of a new class of U-boats, and the fitting of the "Schnorkel" to U-boats. The latter was virtually undetectable by 10cm ASV radar. In a meeting on 22 November, it was decided that developments of the 3cm ASV radar offered the best hopes, although experiments with 1.25cm radars were also conducted. The work was undertaken both in Britain, under the aegis of B.J. O'Kane, and in the USA, where the US Navy started the aptly called "Project Hawkeye" in the Radiation Laboratory of the MIT. However, the tests were not concluded before the end of the war.

ASV Mk.XI

The ASV Mk.XI was a centrimetric radar intended for the TBR (torpedo bomber and reconnaissance) aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, the component of the Royal Navy that operated carrier aircraft. It was also known known as ASVX and therefore it sometimes has been called, erroneously, ASV Mk.X.

ASV Mk.XI could be fitted between the main wheel legs of a Fairey Swordfish. In addition to the bulky radome, a Leigh light could be fitted. The radome made the the carrying of torpedoes or large depth charges impossible, so when the target was a ship the Swordfish was accompanied by other aircraft without radar. Against submarines, the radar-equipped Swordfish Mk.III was armed with eight rockets on underwing launches, and also carried flares to illuminate any U-boat it found. Fired at 600 yards, the rockets easily penetrated a submarine's hull.

This radar was also carried by the Fairey Barracuda Mk.III.

ASV Mk.XI had a maximum range of about 60km against ships, and in good conditions and at low altitude (2000 feet) it could detect a surfaced submarine at about 20km. But it could detect a schnorkel only in very calm seas and at distances below 8km. It gave bearings with an accuracy of about 2 degrees.


Sources
•Avionics -- The Story and technology of aviation electronics
Bill Gunston, published by Patrick Stephens Limited, 1990. 
•Boffin -- A Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar, Radio
Astronomy and Quantum Optics
R Hanbury Brown, published by Adam Hilger, 1991.
•Echoes of War -- The Story of H2S Radar
Sir Bernard Lovell, published by Adam Hilger, 1991. 
•Wings of the Navy
Capt. Eric Brown, published by Pilot Press, 1980.
•Across the Ether
Stephen Pope, in Aeroplane Monthly, June 1995.
-> Article includes pictures of aircraft with ASV radar and a picture of the Leigh light.
•Brian Wood sent us information on the ASV Mk.XI radar from the original manual.


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## RCAFson (Jul 17, 2012)

parsifal said:


> This all takes a well trained crew, and an aircraft set up for the purpose. Because operating at night in the late 30's and early 40's was an inherently dangerous activity, you dont want a particualalry twitchy High Performance a/c....you want docility and relaibility. The Swordfish had this in spades. I dont see why the TBD could not have done a similar job....its just that the USN over-estimated the types survivability in daylight and dismissed too quickly the potentialities of night strike The Americans could have trained their TBD crews



The TBD was grossly overweight, underpowered and consequently had very poor range because the engine had to be run at high throttle settings to stay airborne. Adding ASV radar would have been nearly impossible and ultimately pointless because of the poor range. A Swordfish weighed about 8500lb, had 775hp and had 607 sq ft of wing area so it had lots of lifting capacity. The Albacore weighed about 10,500lb, had 1100hp and 623 sq ft of wing area. The TBD weighed 10,000lb+ (maybe as much as 11,000lb), had 900hp but only 422 sq ft of wing area or about the same as a Barracuda which weighed 14000lb but had 1640hp, and the Barracuda was considered underpowered!


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## Oreo (Jul 17, 2012)

FlyboyJ, I really appreciate your vast experience, knowledge, and insight. It is obvious that you know far more than I do about a lot of things. But an objective look at this (see below) post of yours in combination with what I have said here, I think, only shows that your well-documented reply corroborates the "opinions" that I put forth myself. I can't prove your motives for wishing to drag this on into such a spectacle, but it sure does cause me to speculate. I will keep those speculations to myself, however, since they are not documented. Please understand that a person who does not have the background you have, can still come to some accurate conclusions by parsing what little data he does have in a different way. To explain this, I will point out how you stated that the military designs are brought about by government design requirements, not corporate initiative. The fact is, I never said, or tried to imply, that the various companies dreamed up these designs on their own "just because" or without having a military specification issued to them. I was pointing out how Boeing chose to ignore most of these specification requirements and only concentrate on a very few of them and make them very excellent, whereas Douglas evidently jumped at a greater percentage of them. Boeing's choice not to bid on them is a difference from Douglas, which is exactly what I was saying. The reason Douglas was a more prolific designing company was because they chose to bid on more proposals. So when I pointed out this difference, I don't know why you took up the cause as if I were some sort of blasphemous enemy, when in fact, your lengthy reply just brought much more evidence (which I do not have at my fingertips, but you do) that I was right. So thank you for explaining my position in more intricate detail, and adding a perspective that I could never provide to corroborate what I had already concluded. 




FLYBOYJ said:


> Splitting hairs and footnotes - I am doing that because it seems much of what you have to say is based on your opinion rather than fact and do understand if you haven't figured it out by now that many of the members who participate on this site indulge discussion with fact and documented credible evidence (and more times than most provide references for it) and when it’s not given are usually called on it...
> 
> Now with that said, you made a statement *"Douglas's approach was different from Boeing's, and I am basing that from looking at what they designed and built. Douglas built some very good stuff, but they were much more prolific designers than Boeing"*, what are you basing that on? Douglas built a larger variety of military aircraft in the post WW2 years based on being awarded contracts based on a solicitation from the government. Ed Heinemann and his team just didn't sit around and decide to come up with aircraft to build - they did so based on the government requiring specific aircraft. For example (all from Wiki Sources);
> 
> ...


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## Oreo (Jul 17, 2012)

So--- have we concluded yet what the worst bomber of WWII was?


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## parsifal (Jul 17, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The TBD was grossly overweight, underpowered and consequently had very poor range because the engine had to be run at high throttle settings to stay airborne. Adding ASV radar would have been nearly impossible and ultimately pointless because of the poor range. A Swordfish weighed about 8500lb, had 775hp and had 607 sq ft of wing area so it had lots of lifting capacity. The Albacore weighed about 10,500lb, had 1100hp and 623 sq ft of wing area. The TBD weighed 10,000lb+ (maybe as much as 11,000lb), had 900hp but only 422 sq ft of wing area or about the same as a Barracuda which weighed 14000lb but had 1640hp, and the Barracuda was considered underpowered!



That reduces the ability of the type, but it would not have excluded the type from Night Operations. I dont know about the range issue, but if the type could carry a 1764 lb torpedo , I am certain it could carry a couple of hundred pounds of electronic gear instead. this is not that different to the Stringbag. Its ASV equipped units did not carry a torpedo, neither did they carry the heavy depth charges needed to hurt U-Boats. They usually carried a reduced bombload, rockets, and/or flares. 

I cant see too much different to the TBD. Range issue aside, which I havent really bought into (limited range was a weaknes of the Swordfish as well), I cant see why a 15 plane squadron could not have 2 or 3 radar equiped a/c, and 2 or 3 flare droppers (maybe the same 2 or 3 a/c with the remainder carrying the torpedo ordinance. That reduces the overall firepower of the squadron (from 15 down to 9 or 12), in theory, but at least the squadrons would have a chance of hitting their targets. Not as good as the Swordfish, not as good as a high performance daylight VT, but a lot better than getting whole squadrons shot down for nothing......


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 17, 2012)

Oreo said:


> . So when I pointed out this difference, I don't know why you took up the cause *as if I were some sort of blasphemous enemy*, when in fact, your lengthy reply just brought much more evidence (which I do not have at my fingertips, but you do) that I was right. So thank you for explaining my position in more intricate detail, and adding a perspective that I could never provide to corroborate what I had already concluded.


Not a blasphemous enemy, just someone who was a little misinformed about a few things, perhaps too many Osprey books but ok, if you say so... 

So--- have we concluded yet what the worst bomber of WWII was?


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## Njaco (Jul 17, 2012)

Brewster SBN-1


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## nuuumannn (Jul 17, 2012)

Not the Swordfish 

I'll see your Brewster and raise you a Blackburn Botha.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 17, 2012)

The TBD has to be on at least the top 3. In its defense it was obsolete by the time the US entered the war...

Despite being obsolete, the Swordfish does not belong on this list DESPITE also being obsolete at the start of the war. It performed well up to what I consider it's swan song during the Channel Dash in Feb 1942 but I think that raid showed that either the Swordfish or TBD were sitting ducks without escorts if enemy fighters were present. The Swordfish, in some of its more popular raids (Bismarck and Taranto) did not have to deal with fighter opposition, where the TBD, in its swan song was completely mauled.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 17, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> Not the Swordfish
> 
> I'll see your Brewster and raise you a Blackburn Botha.



_THAT_ Brewster may be too old and produced in too few numbers to qualify. It's successor, the Brewster SB2A Buccaneer/Bermuda gets neither pass and is a true front runner. A fly off between the Buccaneer and Botha?


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## davparlr (Jul 17, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Swordfish were launched at taranto at a range of 170 miles, and the round trip was over 400 miles. Extrapolating for the Midway operation, the TBDs with at least a 100 extra range (apparently), it should be theoretically possible to hold the range and close to a launch point in the evening. Alternatively, launch the SBDs and hold the (in reality nonexistent) night capable torpedo bombers until evening to clean up any cripples.


This would most likely been fatal and Fletcher would never have done this. The Japanese plan for Midway was to entice the American carriers out to fight and were looking for the carriers. If they had found the American fleet first, it would have been annihilated. The American plan was to surprise the Japanese and attack first. Fletcher could not afford to have his fleet operating in a patrol area of the Japanese for any longer than necessary. As it was, they were fortunate to be missed by the Japanese patrols. The carriers were mobile were difficult enough to find in the daylight, would have been near impossible at night.

Midway was successful only because all of the dominoes fell right. Any variations would probably result in disaster for the US



> In any event I dont buy the argument that sacrificing the TBDs was necessary to pull the Zeroes away from McCluskys VBs


It wasn’t planned that way.





> Correct, except that you forgot the two aircraft that were shot down, and whilst launching, did so outside range


Information I have found was that Lt. Commander Williamson successfully launched his torpedo against the Conte di Cavour before being shot down. 


> these torpedoes are believed to have bottomed. I should have checked however. Depending on whether you want to include or exclude the two aircraft lost, you have either 55% or 66%. It is still a record either way...earlier in July three swordfish armed with torpedoes managed to sink 4 ships, including a moored sub, with three torpedoes. Thats a hit rate of 125%.


According to “The Royal Navy in World War II”, out of ten torpedo drops, six were successful , or 60%. 



> You might also want to consider the raid on Dakar by Hermes. July 1940, 4 torps launch (2 with contact pistols, 2 with magnetic exploders, set to run 38 feet (too low) , 3 on track, wto with magnetic exploders detonated early, on with contact pistolknocked a hole in the side 24feet by 16 feet (from memory. effectively sank the richelieu 9for a year). Thats an accuracy rate of 75%.


Too small a sample to arrive at a trend.



> At Midway the Japanese had to complete a mission....this made their movement forward mandatory. The Americans could approach the battle problem with a much greater level of certainty. same situation applied to Cortal Sea.


The mission of the Japanese at Midway was to draw the Americans into a fight and destroy them. This was what they were prepared to do. Had they detected the carriers before the launch or, even knew of their existence, the outcome would most likely been quite different.



> Incorrect. The British launched swordfish fully armed as reconnaisance machines during the Bismarck operation, and USN SBDs routinely undertook similar armed recons for all the major battles in 1942


According to Wikipedia, 


> Ark Royal's Swordfish were already searching nearby when the Catalina found her. Several torpedo bombers also located the battleship, about 60 nmi (110 km; 69 mi) away from Ark Royal. Somerville ordered an attack as soon as the Swordfish returned and were rearmed with torpedoes.


For search missions I would guess added fuel would be more important than having a 2000 lb torpedo.



> (the torps were the first ordinance to be launched in the first wave, a deliberate decision by the japanese.


It was the plan, however, from “At Dawn We Slept”


> Although he knew Takahashi had erred, he had no choice but to lead his torpedomen to the target as quickly as possible. However, Takahashi was well on his way. Thus, it happened that bombs instead of torpedoes struck the initial blow.





> Sorry bu not correct. according to John Assmussen, ("Bismarck - the fatal torpedo hit"), whilst there is dispute about that last strike (by 15 a/c, 9 launches) it appears most likley that there were three hits in the second strike. There were no hits by the first strike....none were launched at the bismarck, as the Brits mistook Sheffield as the german ship.


Okay, so of the first strike, 9 torpedoes were dropped, all missed their targets, even the ones that targeted the British ship. On the second strike, of 9 torpedoes dropped, three hit their target. So, for the entire strike on Bismarck, 18 torpedoes were dropped and three struck their targets, even the ones that targeted the British ship, or 17%. I agree that reports vary.

If we add up all the drops verses success listed in this site, we get at Taranto, 10 and 6, attack on sub, 3 and 3, Dakar, 4 and 3, Bismarck, 18 and 3, for a total of 35 torpedoes dropped with 15 strikes or 43%. Attacks against moored targets shows, 17 dropped with 12 hits for 70 % but the sample is very small. While this is good, I think the sample is way too small to show superiority of the swordfish over the Japanese.

Interesting enough, according to “Shattered Sword”, thought unsuccessful, the most effective torpedo planes at Midway was the four B-26s with three getting close enough to launch torpedoes, one staffed the Akagi, one struck the island of the Akagi and crashed only missing Nagumo by 10 ft and two making it back to Midway, although well shot up.


> The Japanese found the B-26s speedy and difficult to bring down”.


 With a lot ifs, these planes could have changed things at Midway. If they had good torpedoes, if they had trained Navy or Army pilots, and if they had twenty aircraft or so, they could have caused havoc to the Japanese carriers.



> Finally, I suggest that you read your sources before posting them. Not that wiki is great, but relevantly, from the article you posted it says......"The attack went in, in almost darkness, at around 21:00 but once again the Swordfish torpedo bombers found Bismarck with their ASV II radar"


Actually, I did not have to check sources. The attack occurred around 2100 hours May 26. A check with sunset at 48 degrees north shows it to be about 2050. It is well known for those who live in the North latitudes that twilight last a long time during this period of time. It was not a night attack. Visibility was poor however and radar was needed. The photo at wiki shows it not to be dark, if the photo is correct.



> There is no comparison between the two operations, I agree, however each had its own set of problems no less daunting for the respective combatants. Whilst taranto was a known location, the location of the italian fleet was not. In fact it was an amazing strole of good luck that the italians remained in the harbour since they knew the strike was coming.


This has nothing to do with the difficulty of hitting targets, only having targets to hit.



> And in any event Swordfish crews on repeated occasions demonstrated in spades that they could locate, attack and sink targets whose position was not known, moving. And they did it at night.


I don’t think the Bismarck falls into this category. They did locate it by radar but I believe they had directions from the Sheffield.

Other reports was that night intercept of the ASV Mk II was mostly ineffective.
British ASV Radars - Technical pages - Fighting the U-boats - uboat.net



> However, night attacks were generally ineffective, for the simple reason that the aircraft crew could not see the submarine. The radar guided them to a mile of the submarine, but not closer. On 21 December 1941 an ASV-equipped Swordfish made the first successful night attack on an U-boat, but such remained exceptions.





> You have not explained why attempting a night strike would be "idiotic". I would suggest that merely reveals set and predictable thinking.


Of course idiotic. The Japanese had almost 140 ships that could be located over maybe a third of a million square miles of sea. On the first night there were no position reports of the Japanese fleet. You would be searching for four ships out of 140 some odd Japanese ship with 40 aircraft flying at a hundred miles and hour with a 38 mile range radar. I don’t think I have to calculate the probabilities of the success of that effort to show it won’t work. 



> I agree, except that there is more than one way to skin a cat. For a start with a night capable force, there was absolutely no need to get his TG so banged up as it was. The Japanese had absolutely no defence to night capability at that time. If the Carriers could be located and kept at range in the day(greater than 240 miles for the japanese strike aircraft)


How? This was not an unprotected battleship but several powerful fleets that included carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc. with on-going air patrols to locate American ships. I don’t think there was radar available on cruisers at this time. This would be very difficult. If the American carriers were discovered, the Japanese would close quickly and dispense with the American fleet per plan.


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## davparlr (Jul 17, 2012)

Parsifal said:


> ]during the night Fletcher coul;d have turned his force around , launched at that range (240 miles) and be closing the range with his ships whilst his aircraft were enroute and eturning. His TG would have had about four hours at night to close, whilst the strike hit the japanese and returned. The round trip in that scenario is about 360 miles (240 out, 120 back) ....well within both the TBD and Swordfish capabilities. Provided the strike connects, the Japanese are going to be in no position to retaliate the next morning, and fletcher could have been home in time for tea, with barely a scratch. If the strike fails to connect, the Americans are in a world of hurt, but not really any worse off than they were historically


They would most likely be at the bottom of the sea.


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## RCAFson (Jul 18, 2012)

davparlr said:


> Other reports was that night intercept of the ASV Mk II was mostly ineffective.
> British ASV Radars - Technical pages - Fighting the U-boats - uboat.net
> 
> 
> ...



I don't quite understand the fascination with the Swordfish, which predated the TBD in service, and it was no longer the FAA's premier frontline torpedo bomber. From July 1941 onward, the Albacore gradually took over that role. During April 1942 Somerville's carriers carried the Albacore in Indian Ocean, with only the CVE Hermes retaining Swordfish. 

ASV II radar was never designed to be able to attack a small target like a sub, and had difficulty detecting them in rough weather or when they were trimmed down. OTOH, ASVII could detect ships easily and a "38 mile range means that each Albacore (or Swordfish) could sweep out a 76 mile swath on the outbound/return legs of search pattern. Ten Albacores could search a 380 mile by 300 mile area in 3 hours at night. Unfortunately Somerville didn't have that many and his night search was unsuccessful, especially as 1 ASV Albacore was lost at sunset and another damaged. Standard FAA procedure was to use flares to illuminate targets on moonless nights, and then attack with bombs or torpedoes.


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## Oreo (Jul 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Not a blasphemous enemy, just someone who was a little misinformed about a few things, perhaps too many Osprey books but ok, if you say so...
> 
> *LOL-- sometimes it's hard to find good info. . . . getting better at it. . .*
> 
> So--- have we concluded yet what the worst bomber of WWII was?



I still say He 177. I don't have the "hard evidence" to back it up, but from the several accounts I have read (some of which were not in Osprey Books), it would seem that it was more dangerous to its crew than to its enemies-- or if not actually so, then nearly so. Either way, based on the losses and scarcity of meaningful accomplishments by the (more or less) 1,000 built, I would have to guess (without more evidence than Osprey, et. al, can provide) that the He 177 may have been a severe waste of resources to the Luftwaffe. . . . then again I could be wrong-- maybe I've been brainwashed into thinking this way by Osprey. . . . .


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## parsifal (Jul 18, 2012)

davparlr said:


> They would most likely be at the bottom of the sea.



I dont agree. You can consider this a reply to the other half truths contained in your response.

Starting firstly with your claims about the bismarck attack. They were carried out after sunset, thats a night attack. i would agree that they could be classified as a dusk attack, if the visibility conditions were better than they were, but they were "attorcious" (those are not my words, they are the words of the official after action report). Ark Royal was undertaking the launches "in the green" (ie with waves crashing over her bow) as early as 1900, the time of the first strike. By that time she had abandoneed all safety precautions to get the second strike airborne. She was no longer zig zagging (and in fact had been spotted by U-554 who fortunately was out of torpedoes). Cloud cover was heavy (several thousand feet thick) and as as low as 2000feet and described in the report as 100% at the time of launch , but was lower than that over the target....perhaps 1000 feet. Strike leader Moffat had wanted to drop down below cloud cover once the strike had located the target by ASV radar at 7000 feet (just above the clouds) and reform the squadron elements for a co-ordinated attack but this proved impossoible because of the very poor visibility. Each element had to attack separately and visibility below the cloud cover was impeding the dusk light and was down to about 1000 yds (horizontal) maximum. There was not sufficient height below the cloud cover to drop flares. A torpedo attack is a highly technical exercise requiring accurate estimates of course speed and the amount of helm being applied. All of these things were severely hampered by the low visibility and sea state, which goes some way to explaining why the attacks wre pressed home to point blank range. Winds were by that stage more than 50 knots, and and wave heights in excess of 40 feet high. I am reasonably sure that the elements approached the target with ASV radars still switched on down to a couple of 1000 feet. 

The fatal torpedo hit was achieved at 2105, some 15 mins after sundown. Call the visibility condition good if you like, rely on an unreferenced photo if you like, but the attack on the bismarck was a night strike, undertaken in the most difficult of condition. 


Including the missed strikes is statistically flawed. I never said or suggested that this be done. It represents a differenrt subset to consider, as do the other examples. The conditions, training and circumstances are bound to be different in each case, so trying to put them althogether is only good for propaganda purposes. What we can say, is that on one occasikon we had a 60% hit rate, on another occasion we had a 125% hit rate, on another occasion we had a 75% hit, on another occasion we had a 0% hit rate, and and on another occasion we had a 33% hit rate. These separate events cannot, and should not be lumped togetherm, because that tells us nothing, 

As for the claim that ships are somehow harder targets at sea, I would dispute that. Where do ships go for protection....if they think they can avoid detection they are better off at sea. if they think they have been detected, they are better off in harbour, with the harbour defences up. How else can the survival of the Tirpitz be explained except that they were heaviliy protected by the harbour defences. if the harbour defences are down, suh as at Pearl, yes, it is a mistake to hide in port. At Taranto the defences were not down, they were just inadequate 


Next, your reference to the unreliability of British ASV radar. Ive already posted those articles, and know them very well. They are written by a U-Boat expert, and are referencing radar fixes of U-Boats. I can only repeat my earlier advice, you really should read the articles . Relevantly it says

In relation to ASV I (developed in 1938-9, as an experimental version:

"ASV Mk.I was not intended to detect submarines, but after an enquiry from admiral Somerville in late 1939 test were conducted with one of the Hudsons of No.220 Sqdn and the submarine L 27. It was demonstrated that, flying at 1000 feet, the submarine could be detected at 3 miles, broadside on, and this under experimental conditions --- that means that the crew of the Hudson knew exactly where the submarine was. Further tests revealed that when flying at 6000 feet, the range was increased to 6 miles. 

A notable improvement was achieved with what called Long Range ASV. LRASV was based on the second antenna configuration developed. It was a sideways-looking system. The transmitter was an array of ten dipoles, installed in five (later reduced to four) pairs on top of the fuselage of the aircraft. The receiving antennas were Sterba arrays, fitted to the sides of the fuselage. Because the transmitter array was a dipole array 18 feet long and the two receivers were arrays 12 feet long, a much better resolution and range could be achieved. The first installation was on a Whitley bomber, in late 1939. LRASV had a range 2.5 times better than the forward-looking system; it could detect submarines at 10 to 15 miles". 

In relation to ASV II which was the type in use at the time of the Bismarck attack

"However, night attacks were generally ineffective, for the simple reason that the aircraft crew could not see the submarine. The radar guided them to a mile of the submarine, but not closer. On 21 December 1941 an ASV-equipped Swordfish made the first successful night attack on an U-boat, but such remained exceptions".

Notice that this comment is directed specifically at the ability of ASV II to achieve sinkings of submarines. i dont know what your experience level is, but a submarine is a lot smaller than a Battleship, or even a merchantman. Ther was no actual problem with the detection (even of the submarine), more the execution of the attack. ASVII could only take you to within a mile or so of the target, after that visual means had to be used to complete the attack. against a submerging or partially submerged submarine, that was a tall ask (though as an aside , in the context of a convoy battle, knowing where the submarine is is as important as actually sinking it, and forcing the submarine to submerge will reduce losses to roughly 1/4 of those if aircover is not there). In the context of a surface ship, ASVII had no significant reliability problems, and no significant operational difficulties, and in many respects, could see further than visual spotting in most conditions (which makes your claim that the USN carriers were in mortal danger if they advanced at night even more absurd.

The allies did not have an effective ASW air search radar until ASV III, and the near simultaneous introduction of the air launched depth charge, in October 1942.

As for your other comments about likely loss of the American Carriers if they were using night strike capability, hardly. Thats your opinion, and you are perfectly entitled to it, but a developed night strike capability for aircraft already of no use in daytime strike, isnt going to make one bit of difference to risks the USNs day strike battles incur. if anything they would greatly help them. Having a credible night search capability would have allowed them to range and have ready daytime strikes at first light, and beat the Japanese to the draw every time. And this was half the battle....who gets in first is the person who locates the enemy first. If the position of the enemy has been plotted and observed all night, there is no blind spot each morning....the Americans can just go ahead and launch, and be home for scones and tea, or in your case flapjacks and coffee I guess ..... Its going to give them added capability to strike at night, not interfere with their operational doctrine (in fact it would greatly help them) . If they want to close and duke it out in daylight as they did at Midway, they can still do that with no real loss in daylight capability (since the TBDs added nothing to the daylight capability anyway) . If they want to launch their TBDs so as to approach at night, they are going to reduce losses on their TBD squadrons, and place greater threat on the Japanese carriers, and pricelessly, maintain a knowledge of the Japanese position which greatly assists achieving first strike capability. Ther is no greater risk to their carriers. The claim that somehow the Japanese surface forces could ambush their carriers and sink them is a total furphy. They would never catch them for a start, and secondly would need to fight their way through the screening forces even if they did., Somerville at least explored the posibilities of this approach in the preceding April, and I have personally been involved in excercises and operations where the carriers advanced toward the enemy at night. with adequate escort (which the US forces had), the risks to carriers is very slight indeed, provided night ASV equipped searchers are used to mainatin the position of the enemy throughout the night from the last known position the previous day.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 18, 2012)

In hindsight it may have been possible to have done the job on the carriers at Midway at night in just the SBDs, provided we could locate the carriers, and provided those pilots were instrument-rated. I know at least later in the War the pilots were trained on just that, instruments, and night dive-bombing. Still, I'll agree, a lot of practical problems, and I don't think I'd have taken the chance on committing my pilots and maintenance crews on an operation like that, personally, especially when I think of what was at stake.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 18, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> In hindsight it may have been possible to have done the job on the carriers at Midway at night in just the SBDs, provided we could locate the carriers, and provided those pilots were instrument-rated. I know at least later in the War the pilots were trained on just that, instruments, and night dive-bombing. Still, I'll agree, a lot of practical problems, and I don't think I'd have taken the chance on committing my pilots and maintenance crews on an operation like that, personally, especially when I think of what was at stake.


You don't have to be instrument rated to fly at night but I believe all naval aviatiors of the period did have instrument training. Flying instruments in those days were very basic and there were few nav aids used for IMC verctoring and landing.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> You don't have to be instrument rated to fly at night but I believe all naval aviatiors of the period did have instrument training. Flying instruments in those days were very basic and there were few nav aids used for IMC verctoring and landing.


I wasn't sure of their qualifications at that early stage in the War. After all, it was only a few days short of six months for us. Still, I'm thinking, these aren't heavy bombers, for example, flying level, but virtual acrobats, compared to those. Without any daylight reckoning they're going to need to lean on their instruments just to be sure of their attitude, when, for example, they come out of a dive, or otherwise get disoriented. They set a rudder or elevator wrong because they can't see and their inner-ear tells them they're right-side-up while in fact they're up-side-down, they go right into the ocean. Getting there, at night, I'll agree, they're OK. After all, both sides have launched carrier planes, before, at night.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 18, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> I wasn't sure of their qualifications at that early stage in the War. After all, it was only a few days short of six months for us. Still, I'm thinking, these aren't heavy bombers, for example, flying level, but virtual acrobats, compared to those. Without any daylight reckoning they're going to need to lean on their instruments just to be sure of their attitude, when, for example, they come out of a dive, or otherwise get disoriented. They set a rudder or elevator wrong because they can't see and their inner-ear tells them they're right-side-up while in fact they're up-side-down, they go right into the ocean. Getting there, at night, I'll agree, they're OK. After all, both sides have launched carrier planes, before, at night.


 Flying instruments for the most part is the same whether you're in a heavy bomber or in a SBD. For just staying level you're relying on airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator and altimeter, add a compass in there and you have direction, add a directional gyro and that's even better. Understand that a trained pilot will recognize when they are about to enter instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and begins what's called an "instrument scan" when they stop looking outside the cockpit and just affix their eyes on their instruments, ignoring their "inner ear" as you put it. While doing this they better be aware of what's around them (mainly mountains) and one would hope that no one is attempting aerobatics in IMC conditions, although during combat, a different story. A pilot should be trained to realize when they are disorientated and start using their instruments to get re-orinetated.

There's a lot more to this but I do know that during WW2 pilots received enough intrument training to hopefully keep them out of trouble. I do know later in the war there was expanded training. Bill (Drangondog) may have some input on this.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Flying instruments for the most part is the same whether you're in a heavy bomber or in a SBD. For just staying level you're relying on airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator and altimeter, add a compass in there and you have direction, add a directional gyro and that's even better. Understand that a trained pilot will recognize when they are about to enter instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and begins what's called an "instrument scan" when they stop looking outside the cockpit and just affix their eyes on their instruments, ignoring their "inner ear" as you put it. While doing this they better be aware of what's around them (mainly mountains) and one would hope that no one is attempting aerobatics in IMC conditions, although during combat, a different story. A pilot should be trained to realize when they are disorientated and start using their instruments to get re-orinetated.
> 
> There's a lot more to this but I do know that during WW2 pilots received enough intrument training to hopefully keep them out of trouble. I do know later in the war there was expanded training. Bill (Drangondog) may have some input on this.


That sounds pretty good to me. I would be interested in hearing more on the qualifications of these early pilots, though, just to be able to determine whether a night run at Midway would have been "on the table," so to speak.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 18, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> That sounds pretty good to me. I would be interested in hearing more on the qualifications of these early pilots, though, just to be able to determine whether a night run at Midway would have been "on the table," so to speak.


The book "First Team, Pacific Naval Combat History, Pearl Harbor to Midway" States that the Advance Carrier Training Groups on both coasts in 1941 had a 75 hour sylabus that covered tactics, navigation, gunnery, bombing, carrier landings, carrier qualification, night flying and instruments. Appendix 1 page 454, 455. It doesn't specify how much time was allocated in each area. I'm sure the pilots who flew at Midway "would have" been able to to do a night run provided they had a lit carrier to come back to (another story).


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## VBF-13 (Jul 18, 2012)

That would seem to answer it. There's nothing relative to the pilots that would disqualify such a run. I'd do think it would be harder for them to manage, though, everything else being equal. For that matter, are you or is anybody aware of any such night runs off carriers? I'm having a little brain cramp on that at the moment.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 18, 2012)

Surely some missions took off in the early morning dark, so as to arrive over the target at first light ?

Then they could return in daylight.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 18, 2012)

Heck, they left before sun-up for Pearl. Tyrodtom, I'm not having that much of a brain cramp! 

Engagements at night. I'm just having trouble recalling any.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 18, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> That would seem to answer it. There's nothing relative to the pilots that would disqualify such a run. I'd do think it would be harder for them to manage, though, everything else being equal. For that matter, are *you or is anybody aware of any such night runs off carriers*? I'm having a little brain cramp on that at the moment.


Oh yes....

_During the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19th, Hellcat pilots from HORNET destroyed enemy aircraft with no losses in what came to be known as the "Marianas Turkey Shoot". The following afternoon, a TBM from Wasp (CV-18 ) spotted the retiring Japanese fleet and a strike was immediately launched. Pilots from HORNET were the first to attack, scoring lethal hits on Zuikaku-class carrier. *It was long after dark when the returning aircraft arrived over the Task Force. All were critically low on fuel, many badly shot up and their pilots wounded. From flag plot aboard Lexington (CV-16), Admiral Mark Mitscher gave his famous order to "turn on the lights", thus risking the submarine threat, but allowing the exhausted aviators to find carrier decks upon which to land.*_

HORNET IN WORLD WAR II - Aircraft Carrier USS Hornet Museum


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## parsifal (Jul 18, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> In hindsight it may have been possible to have done the job on the carriers at Midway at night in just the SBDs, provided we could locate the carriers, and provided those pilots were instrument-rated. I know at least later in the War the pilots were trained on just that, instruments, and night dive-bombing. Still, I'll agree, a lot of practical problems, and I don't think I'd have taken the chance on committing my pilots and maintenance crews on an operation like that, personally, especially when I think of what was at stake.



If you have just SBDs there is not the same need to convert to night capability. The dauntless was still able in 1942-3 to operate in daylight, the TBD was not. This is about finding a useful role for the TBDs, which just happens to also act as a force multiplier for the whole carrier group.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 18, 2012)

The Brits did a lot of carrier night ops, here's one from USN;

Carrier Division Seven


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## VBF-13 (Jul 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ, thanks for those links. I've seen pictures of the Hellcats taking off for the Marianas at night but never thought to look into whether they engaged at night. That link on the Enterprise is all news to me, and it shouldn't be, as some of my Dad's flight squadron were on the Saratoga in 1945!


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## RCAFson (Jul 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Again, show me WHERE it says the Swordfish was specifically "Stressed" for divebombing?
> 
> I mentioned the 200 knot dive on post 89 - it was indicated in the book by Terence Horsley in "Find, Fix and Strike."
> That does not mean you're diving with a torpedo at 200 knots
> ...



I found this book in a 2nd hand store:



> The remarkable qualities of the Swordfish were the product of
> the genius of Marcel Lobelle, the chief designer of Fairey Aviation
> Company. In 1933 the Admiralty asked Sir Richard Fairey to
> design an aircraft which would fulfil every naval requirement except
> ...


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## parsifal (Jul 18, 2012)

David Brown, in his book "Carrier Operations In WWII - Vol II - The Pacific Navies" makes a comment relating to Night Operations. he is referring to the IJNs carrier raids into the Indian Ocean in April 1942. He says "Admiral Somerville had just one strong card: the RN had developed night operations to a degree unknown in either the US or Japanese Navies. Night landings were regularly practised, the cordination of strikes, and ASV radar was installed into a high proportion of his Albacore strike aircraft Crews were proficient in its use for both search and attack. Attacks involved location by radar, and also used target illumination and moonlight or dusk light for target illumination. With this advantage Somerville intended to remain out of reach of the Japanese by day, closing by night, to launch airborne searches with radar equipped aircraft. Daylight movements of the IJN were to be monitored by Catalinas based in Ceylon. Once located, torpedo strikes were to be launched by the carriers".

Somerville was untroubled by the prospect of being intercepted by the japanese at night. He detached his "slow division"....most of his fleet, to be well outside the engagement area for most of the fight.

Implicit in all of this is that whilst US aircrew might have some of the skills necessary to fly at night, they had not the full suite of skills, the experience, the equipment (particulalry the ASV radar, fitted to their carrier birds) or the doctrine to adopt such a strategy. My opinion is that if, in 1939 or 40 they had specifically designated their TBD squadrons as "night strike" squadrons, they would have given those formations the opportunity and the motivation to train their personnel, and modify their equipment, to complete that mission. With a force of aircraft night capable on each CAG carrying TBDs, it might have opened the eyes of the US carrier admirals to the possibilities of night operations. Even if that was limited to maintaining searches at night it would have left the USN in a far stronger position than it was historically, because if it could maintain contact with the japanese fleet during darkness. 

My suggestion does not reduce the day capability of the US Carriers, does not increase their vulnerability, and gets a lot more value out of their TBDs than was historically achieved. I would go so far as to say that if the TBDs had been used in that way, we would be singing a different song about them than we are....


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 18, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I found this book in a 2nd hand store:
> 
> The remarkable qualities of the Swordfish were the product of
> the genius of Marcel Lobelle, the chief designer of Fairey Aviation
> ...



Keep looking in bookstores - I don't buy it and I'll tell you why. You keep bringing up "stressed for dive bombing," but there is NO evidence from the AM that this was part of the original specification. The Swordfish's pilot's notes under limitations specifically says that "light" G loads are acceptable. Light G loads? +3.5 1.5 for normal for civilian aircraft +6 -3 for aerobatic aircraft, probably a tad more for the stringbag. Compare the airframe loading with say the Albacore whose original AM specification called for dive bombing. Check to see what other bonafide dive bombers were stressed for. As far as the Swordfish*, divebombing was not part of it's original design, there is nothing to show it was "stressed" for divebombing but it did accomplish the task regardless.*I even have question about the quote;

_"In 1933 the Admiralty asked Sir Richard Fairey to
design an aircraft which would fulfil every naval requirement except
the air defence of the Fleet. They listed six for a start: reconnaiss-
ance, at sea and over the land; shadowing, by day and night;
'spotting' the fall of shot from ship's guns; convoy escort duties,
such as anti-submarine searches and attack; torpedo and dive-
bombing attacks against shipping; minelaying - and the carrying
of other heavy loads - which in the Second World War varied from
searchlights to rockets, plus depth-charges, bombs and flares."_

From wiki and several other sources...

_The Swordfish was based on a Fairey Private Venture (PV) design; a proposed solution to the Air Ministry requirements for a spotter-reconnaissance plane, spotter referring to observing the fall of a warship's gunfire. *A subsequent Air Ministry Specification S.15/33, added the torpedo bomber role*. The "Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance" prototype TSR II (the PV was the TSR I) first flew on 17 April 1934. It was a large biplane with a metal frame covered in fabric, and utilized folding wings as a space-saving feature for aircraft carrier use. An order was placed in 1935 and the aircraft entered service in 1936 with the Fleet Air Arm (then part of the RAF), replacing the Seal in the torpedo bomber role._

I give you a B+ for persistence


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 18, 2012)

_"*The Swordfish started out in 1933 as a private venture by Fairey Aviation Company Limited, in the form of the three-seat "Torpedo Spotter Reconnaissance I (TSR.I)" *aircraft, developed by a team under Marcel Lobelle, a Belgian who was Fairey's chief designer. The TSR.I was a biplane of frame-and-fabric construction, powered by a Bristol Pegasus IIM nine-cylinder air-cooled radial engine with 475 kW (635 HP). The TSR.I first flew in March 1933, and was put through a successful series of tests. Unfortunately, in September of that year, during spin tests the prototype failed to recover from a flat spin that took it into the ground. The pilot was able to bail out, if with some difficulty, but the aircraft was destroyed. 

*The TSR.I had seemed promising enough to justify further work, and when the British Air Ministry issued Specification "S.15/33", requesting a carrier-based torpedo bomber and scout aircraft,* Fairey built a second prototype, the "TSR.II", which first flew on 17 April 1934. The new aircraft included an uprated Pegasus IIIM3 engine, providing 515 kW (690 HP); aerodynamic changes to improve spin handling; a longer fuselage; plus slightly swept back wings to compensate for the longer fuselage and shift in center of gravity. 

Land trials went well, and in November 1934 the TSR.II was fitted with floats for sea trials, which culminated in catapult launch and recovery by the battle cruiser HMS REPULSE. The floats were then traded back to landing wheels for final evaluation. The Air Ministry was suitably impressed and placed an order for three pre-production machines. 

The first of the three pre-production aircraft, with the type now named the "Swordfish", was flown on 31 December 1935. The last of the three was fitted with floats for service trials on water. The three prototypes were followed by a production order for 68 Swordfish "Mark I" aircraft." _


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## RCAFson (Jul 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Keep looking in bookstores - I don't buy it and I'll tell you why. You keep bringing up "stressed for dive bombing," but there is NO evidence from the AM that this was part of the original specification. The Swordfish's pilot's notes under limitations specifically says that "light" G loads are acceptable. Light G loads? +3.5 1.5 for normal for civilian aircraft +6 -3 for aerobatic aircraft, probably a tad more for the stringbag. Compare the airframe loading with say the Albacore whose original AM specification called for dive bombing. Check to see what other bonafide dive bombers were stressed for. As far as the Swordfish*, divebombing was not part of it's original design, there is nothing to show it was "stressed" for divebombing but it did accomplish the task regardless.*I even have question about the quote;


 
I found the July 1993 pilot's notes for the Swordfish II at Scribd, but I'm pretty certain these are for the existing Swordfish and reflect restrictions imposed upon a 50 year old airframe and sound impossibly low for a combat aircraft. I have purchased Swordfish flight manuals from WW2, but it will be a day or so before I can download them.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 18, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I found the July 1993 pilot's notes for the Swordfish II at Scribd, but I'm pretty certain these are for the existing Swordfish and reflect restrictions imposed upon a 50 year old airframe and sound impossibly low for a combat aircraft. I have purchased Swordfish flight manuals from WW2, but it will be a day or so before I can download them.


Those 1993 pilots notes from Scribd are duplicate from earlier ones I seen. I believe you're going to find that more than likely that there isn't going to be a full blown flight manual, but pilot's notes as you just found; I'm not British bashing here but compared to US manuals are pretty sparse with some information.


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## parsifal (Jul 18, 2012)

> Information I have found was that Lt. Commander Williamson successfully launched his torpedo against the Conte di Cavour before being shot down.
> 
> According to “The Royal Navy in World War II”, out of ten torpedo drops, six were successful , or 60%.




I would like to respond to this, because its incorrect

Record of hits at Taranto 
1st Wave (6 a/c carrying torps, 5 a/c carrying bombs and/or flares)

At 11:14 PM, the Italian battleship Cavour is struck by a Royal Navy torpedo delivered via Swordfish L4A. L4A is later downed by anti-aircraft fire, though both crew members survive

(1 hit)

At 11:15 PM, the Italian vessel Doria is struck twice by torpedoes in her forward section.
(2 hits)

11:15 PM The Italian ship Littorio is struck by a torpedo along her starboard side. Swordfish L4M follows with another strike to the same side.
(2 hits) 

Unknown A Swordfish torpedo meant for the Vittorio Veneto fails to reach its mark, exploding harmlessly on the sea floor.
(1 miss)

2nd Wave 5 a/c carrying torps, 5 a/c carrying bombs and/or flares
At 11:35 PM, the second wave of Royal Navy torpedo-laden aircraft moves into position.

The Libeccio is hit by a Royal Navy torpedo but the munition fails to explode. (some sources claim this is from an aircraft in the4 1st wave
(1 hit)

Two signal aircraft attack the oil depot at Taranto but fail to produce much damage. It is unknown how many bomb hits were achieved with these aircraft, but they divert 8 of the 60 (odd) bombs dropped away from the ships in harbour.

(time uncertain) The Italian battleship Caio Duilio is struck at her bow by a Royal Navy torpedo 
(1 hit) 

At 1:01 AM, The sinking Littorio is struck by another torpedo
(1 hit) 


At 1:01 AM, The sinking Littorio is struck by another torpedo
(1 hit) 


At approximately 1:05AM Swordfish E4H is downed by enemy anti-aircraft fire, killing her co-pilot.

Swordfish E5H misses her mark against the Vittorio Veneto.

(1 miss)


For the 1st wave, thats 5 hits out of 6 launches, or 83%. For the second wave, it was 4 hits out of 5 launches, but one fish failing to detonate. Thats a hit rate of 80%. If you want to use faulty statistical analysis (although possibly acceptable in this case, as the events and the circumstances do appear similar) we have an average hit rate of 81.7%. One of the Torpedo Bombers was shot down, but it achieved a launch and a hit. 

I am less sure aboiut the bombers. There were 10 bombers, 4 of them were also acting as flare droppers. The dedicated bombers were each carrying 6 x 250lb bombs, whilst the flare droppers were carrying 4 x 250lb bombs. Two of the bombers attacked the oil storage farms, achieved an unknown number of hits, but failed to inflict serious damage. one of the bombers attacking the ships was shot down before it could reach drop position. I calculate from all that that 34 bombs were dropped on the ships. Ive read that there were nine bomb hits on the ships (cant confirm yet, will cross check sources tonite. The bombs were delivered using steep controlled dives with the aircraft not exceeding 180 knots in their dives. 9 hits out of 34 releases is a bomb hit rate of about 26%.

There was a reason why torpedo bombing was preferred over divebombing by the Swordfish.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> If you have just SBDs there is not the same need to convert to night capability. The dauntless was still able in 1942-3 to operate in daylight, the TBD was not. This is about finding a useful role for the TBDs, which just happens to also act as a force multiplier for the whole carrier group.


Let's back up a minute. If I'm not mistaken the Hornet sent some Avengers out there that were chopped to pieces, as well. These torpedo bombers were flying into the mouth of hell (apologies to Tennyson) without any cover. That was the grave mistake. By the time they leveled off their dives and got ready for business they were sitting ducks that low to the water. And these planes just don't zip up and away like dive-bombers. It didn't matter how old or new or fast or slow they were or what their range was. Once they got there, they were up against too much, both from the ships and the fighters. 

Second issue, a night deployment. I don't even know, even had they been so equipped, what an unescorted torpedo-bombing hop against a five carrier task force would have accomplished any different than in daylight. Maybe an element of surprise going for it? I don't know. I can certainly envision the IJN looking at their radar screen at night, and going, "What the heck!" But beyond that, it's encountering the same firepower, only it can't find its targets as well. And some advantage that would appear to be.


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## Oreo (Jul 19, 2012)

So have we decided if the TBD, Swordfish, or something else, was the worst piston-engined bomber?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 19, 2012)

Oreo said:


> So have we decided if the TBD, Swordfish, or something else, was the worst piston-engined bomber?


I think its safe to say the TBD is on the short list, the Swordfish isn't


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

> Let's back up a minute. If I'm not mistaken the Hornet sent some Avengers out there that were chopped to pieces, as well. These torpedo bombers were flying into the mouth of hell (apologies to Tennyson) without any cover. That was the grave mistake. By the time they leveled off their dives and got ready for business they were sitting ducks that low to the water. And these planes just don't zip up and away like dive-bombers. It didn't matter how old or new or fast or slow they were or what their range was. Once they got there, they were up against too much, both from the ships and the fighters.



I dont disagree that torpedo bombers were vulnerable whilst in their final approach, but the allies judged later in the war that divebombing was an even more hazardous undertaking.......the aircraft had to fly in at an ideal height to be shot at, peel off and fall straight out of the sky at a prefdetermined angle along a predictable path, with the pilot struggling against G forces and a (usually) unresponsive aircraft. Truth is, everybody found divebombing and torpedo bombing hazardous work. Midway was not an especially hostile environment. 



> Second issue, a night deployment. I don't even know, even had they been so equipped, what an unescorted torpedo-bombing hop against a five carrier task force would have accomplished any different than in daylight. Maybe an element of surprise going for it? I don't know. I can certainly envision the IJN looking at their radar screen at night, and going, "What the heck!" But beyond that, it's encountering the same firepower, only it can't find its targets as well. And some advantage that would appear to be


.

The advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. For a start, there were no fighters no CAP to contend with, and it was the CAP that destroyed the VTs at Midway. Even if the Japanese had tried to respond to an approaching VT, they would simply have blundered about in the dark, not able to vector or direct their CAP properly. There was no Japanese radar in 1942, much less Radar intergrated into their air defence arrangements. They had no RDF to direct their fighters, and no radar assisted gunnery, which significantly downgrades the effectiveness of their 25mm batteries which all relied on sight for targetting. 

As for loss of accuracy, for properly trained crews, such penalty simply does not exist. ive just finished posting hits at taranto establishing that the hit ratio was about 80%. Over the Bismark it was about 35%, whilst at other times in night conditions it varied to a high of 125% down to zero. Accuracy is all over the place, but nowhere is there a consistent pattern that accuracy suffers if the attacks are made at nighht by properly trained crews. Only if your crews and equipments are not sufficiently trained does this become an issue. and thats the problem. But, if the USN had proper aircraft conversions, ASV fitted and crews and tactics worked out beforehand, I dont see any reason why they couldnt expect at least something back for theirt efforts in the TBDs. as its stands, as day bombers, they got nothing except a whole bunch of dead heroes. Even if you dont want to accept that potentially there is no penalty for night trained crews, how can it be argued that getting all your aircraft shot down for nothing is better than say 1 or 2 hits from a fully trained squadron. And neither was this failure an isolated incident. US VTs were spectacularly unsucessful throughout most of the war, mostly because of the crappy torpedo they were given,, but also because of the outmoded tactics that they insisted on clinging to. They had good equipment (eventually). and still they got virtually nothing back from them. Lucky for the USN they had an absolute winner in their divebomber, otherwise they would have been in a world of hurt.


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## davparlr (Jul 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I would like to respond to this, because its incorrect


What is the source of your information?

The following sources show either five or six torpedoes hitting their target, one indicates a battleship was struck when the primary target was missed. The first source is the UK national archives site, the second source is the US Navy War College site, both reputable. The last one is rather detailed.
Taranto : Battles : History : Royal Navy
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/...k-at-Taranto,-The--Tactical-Success,-Operatio
The Royal Navy in World War II - Robert Jackson - Google Books


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## davparlr (Jul 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I dont agree. You can consider this a reply to the other half truths contained in your response.


I do not like being called someone that posts half truths, especially from someone who has posted the following
1.


> To give you some idea of the potency of that combination, at taranto 13 totpedoes were launched......11 hit their target.


When in reality out of 10 drops, only 6 hit. 
2.


> Against the Bismarck 9 torpedoes were launched, either 2 or three hit their target,


Apparently there were as many as 18 torpedoes launched by Swordfish against the Bismarck or a ship thought to be the Bismarck that day and only three struck. Some failures, however, were probably due to torpedo failure. Counting missed hits is statistically correct.
3.


> in pitch black conditions


When the attack was over at 2105 hours, it was only 15 minutes after sunset and into a 30-40 minute twilight period. Maybe someone who lives around 48 degrees north (Seattle) could go outside at 9:05 PM and make pirep (pilot report) on how bright the” pitch black” night is. I even had a reference to a pix showing a returning Swordfish in a not so dark sky. I went outside about 10 minutes after sunset and it was not pitch dark, in fact I have played sports at that light level. In LA, twilight does not last very long.
4.


> , flying in a heavy gale.


Which is correct and I never disagreed but you followed up with this
5.


> Call the visibility condition good if you like,


What I had said this, “. It was not a night attack. *Visibility was poor however and radar was needed*.” So I never said visibility was good.
The weather was indeed miserable and visibility poor and it is a tribute to the Swordfish crew that they were able to fly much less execute the mission. It must also be noted that the first strike failed to establish tracking of the Bismarck and required help from the Sheffield to reestablish contact.
6.


> (the torps were the first ordinance to be launched in the first wave, a deliberate decision by the japanese.


By error, the bombers were the first to attack at Pearl Harbor.

Before making snide remarks of other posters, you may want to verify you own information.

You comment about the Swordfish being better able to attack at night or in bad weather is only partially correct. A good handling stable aircraft is of benefit a night, however in the bad weather present at the Bismarck, the plane would have been a bear to control. Low wing loading, slow aircraft are highly susceptible to strong, gusting winds. In a low altitude situation, high wing loading is greatly preferred for stability, making the attack on the Bismarck all the more impressive.


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## pbfoot (Jul 19, 2012)

Hands down the Manchester


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 19, 2012)

davparlr said:


> You comment about the Swordfish being better able to attack at night or in bad weather is only partially correct. A good handling stable aircraft is of benefit a night, however in the bad weather present at the Bismarck, the plane would have been a bear to control. Low wing loading, slow aircraft are highly susceptible to strong, gusting winds. In a low altitude situation, high wing loading is greatly preferred for stability, making the attack on the Bismarck all the more impressive.


 Sums it up right there


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Those 1993 pilots notes from Scribd are duplicate from earlier ones I seen. I believe you're going to find that more than likely that there isn't going to be a full blown flight manual, but pilot's notes as you just found; I'm not British bashing here but compared to US manuals are pretty sparse with some information.



Ok here's an excerpt from the WW2 Swordfish manual:







"Vne = 206 knots and the manual states that *the aircraft is designed for maneuvers appropriate to a torpedo-divebomber* and training aircraft." 

I got the Albacore manual as well, and by way of comparison, it's Vne = 215 knots.


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## renrich (Jul 19, 2012)

No Avengers were launched or were present on the Hornet at Midway. Some were launched from the island without fighter escort and only one came back, badly damaged. They were piloted by a portion of VT8 which had been deleted from VT8 on the Hornet.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 19, 2012)

renrich said:


> No Avengers were launched or were present on the Hornet at Midway. Some were launched from the island without fighter escort and only one came back, badly damaged. They were piloted by a portion of VT8 which had been deleted from VT8 on the Hornet.


Renrich, the Avengers didn't come out on the Hornet, they missed that. But I believe they were launched from it once they made it out there from Pearl. Anyway, that's collateral to the reason I mentioned them, which was to point out, they, too, were in that fight, and yet didn't fare any better than the Devastators did, and, for the same reason, no support flying into that task force's "home turf" (in a manner of speaking). 

PS: Parsifal, your reply is much longer, I'll get to it later; busy right now...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Ok here's an excerpt from the WW2 Swordfish manual:
> View attachment 206689
> 
> 
> ...


*

At what speed? At what G limitations? If you fly abrupt maneuvers at or close to Vne you can do structural damage to the aircraft, especially if flying through turbulent air - examine what "maneuvering speed" is on an aircraft. (In modern times it's the green arc on an airspeed indicator).

You also fail to point out the very next sentence, "Spinning and aerobatics are not permitted." Hmmmmm - if you can't do aerobatics which at a minimum may place anywhere from +3 - 5 positive Gs on the aircraft to -1.5 - 3 negative Gs how can you say this aircraft is "stressed for dive-bombing?" How many Gs are being pulled on a dedicated dive bomber when it pulls out of a dive?

From memory and check me if you like...

Stuka 6gs
SBD 5gs
SB2C 5gs (in Tillman's book an SB2C pilot claims 11Gs)
Skua 5gs



BTW, any pitch maneuver over 30 degrees is considered aerobatic - what's the angle of a vertical dive? 

Again - where does anything you post say the aircraft was "stressed" for dive-bombing? What's the date of this publication written by the MA who would authorize such maneuvers in the first place???*


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## davparlr (Jul 19, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Renrich, the Avengers didn't come out on the Hornet, they missed that. But I believe they were launched from it once they made it out there from Pearl. Anyway, that's collateral to the reason I mentioned them, which was to point out, they, too, were in that fight, and yet didn't fare any better than the Devastators did, and, for the same reason, no support flying into that task force's "home turf" (in a manner of speaking).
> 
> PS: Parsifal, your reply is much longer, I'll get to it later; busy right now...


 
The Avengers in the fight were all launched from Midway. They shot down one zero!


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## VBF-13 (Jul 19, 2012)

davparlr said:


> The Avengers in the fight were all launched from Midway. They shot down one zero!


OK, I'll buy that. But so what? My point is they were there and they didn't fare any better than the Devastators in the task they were put to and for the same reason.


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> At what speed? At what G limitations? If you fly abrupt maneuvers at or close to Vne you can do structural damage to the aircraft, especially if flying through turbulent air - examine what "maneuvering speed" is on an aircraft. (In modern times it's the green arc on an airspeed indicator).
> 
> You also fail to point out the very next sentence, *"Spinning and aerobatics are not permitted." *Hmmmmm - if you can't do aerobatics which at a minimum may place anywhere from +3 - 5 positive Gs on the aircraft to -1.5 - 3 negative Gs how can you say this aircraft is "stressed for dive-bombing?" How many Gs are being pulled on a dedicated dive bomber when it pulls out of a dive?
> 
> ...



I actually downloaded the manuals for the Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda (they had a special for all 3) and aerobatics and spins are prohibited in those as well.
The Barracuda manual states:
_"49. Flying Limitations
(i) The aircraft is designed for manoeuvers appropriate to a torpedo and dive-bomber, and spinning and aerobatics are not permitted."
_

The TBM-3 manual also states that spins and aerobatics are prohibited:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...1942949-grumman-eastern-tbm-manual-tbm-3-.pdf 
See pages 35-36.

There are numerous accounts of the Swordfish being able to dive vertically, or near vertically with and without torpedoes and bombs and its pilot's notes state that it is a Torpedo-divebomber. I think I've provided enough data to prove that the authours making these statements, such as Charles lamb, War in a Stringbag, and Brown, Wings of the navy are not lying.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I actually downloaded the manuals for the Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda (they had a special for all 3) and aerobatics and spins are prohibited in those as well.
> The Barracuda manual states:
> _"49. Flying Limitations
> (i) The aircraft is designed for manoeuvers appropriate to a torpedo and dive-bomber, and spinning and aerobatics are not permitted."
> _


And I think you'll find that the Albacore and Barracuda were also stress higher and had "Dive Bombing" as a SPECIFIC part of their design specification.


RCAFson said:


> The TBM-3 manual also states that spins and aerobatics are prohibited:
> 
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...1942949-grumman-eastern-tbm-manual-tbm-3-.pdf
> See pages 35-36.


And this is related how??? The P-39 flight manual says you can't spin it either! 


RCAFson said:


> There are numerous accounts of the Swordfish being able to dive vertically, or near vertically with and without torpedoes and bombs and its pilot's notes state that it is a Torpedo-divebomber. I think I've provided enough data to prove that the authours making these statements, such as Charles lamb, War in a Stringbag, and Brown, Wings of the navy are not lying.



If you say so - you're original statement was the aircraft was* "stressed for dive-bombing." *There is no doubt that it did bomb vertically. There is NO evidence that at its design it was "stressed for dive-bombing" as it was a primary function. I showed you the original specifications the aircraft was designed to. It was an aircraft that could do dive bombing (no faster than 200 knots and probably no more G loading than 3 or 4gs) but there is no evidence the aircraft had any dive bombing stress factor built into it way back in 1933. The fact that it was capable of doing dive bombing "just came out that way." Compare it with other aircraft I listed that were dive bombers in performace (dive speeds, equipment, G loading) in the true sense of the word, well that's another story


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

> What is the source of your information?


I used a number of sources some on line and some in print. Here is the link to one of the the online sources 

Operation Judgement - the Attack on Taranto Timeline


The chief printed sources are

Kemp Lcdr (RN) "Fleet Air Arm At Taranto" London Hebert Jenkins 1954

(Kemp participated in Operation Judgement)

Bragadin Cdr Marc Antonio (Italian Navy) "The Italian Navy In WWII" (Annapolis 1957)

Bragadin is one of the more or les official historians of the italian Navy


Norman Polmar, "Aircraft Carriers in WWII Vol II", McDonald Co 1966


This is the detail of the actual attacks that I found in Kemps book . It differs from the online source, but ther is some doubt about the number of hits obtained. 

Individual attacks
(Part I of II)

The first wave

L4A (815) Lt-Cdr. Williamson (Commander) and Lt. Scarlett. (Torpedo) 
Arriving at 22.50, they flew over San Pietro Island at 4,000ft, making a slow decent, and flying almost straight across the bay through the Tarantola balloon barrage before launching their torpedo which passed between the destroyer Fulmine and the Lampo striking the Conte di Cavour between the bridge and B turret. Turning away after the attack, they either dipped a wing tip in the water, or were struck by fire from the Fulmine, or both. The result being they crashed into the sea, survived, rescued and taken prisoner.

L4C (815) Sub-Lt. Sparke and Sub-Lt. Neale (Torpedo)
They flew at 4,000ft over San Pietro Island and started to dive. The aircraft was down on the water about half way across the Mar Grande and crossed the Tarantola breakwater. Unable to identify the Littorio, the Cavour was seen and attacked at a range of 700 yards. The torpedo missed its target.

L4R (815) Sub-Lt. Macaulay and Sub-Lt. Wray (Torpedo)
They followed the same approach route taken by the previous aircraft, and again the target was the Cavour which they attacked from 600 yards. The torpedo missed its target.

[Note: At 23:15, aboard the Doria, the crew witnessed two explosions which were mistaken for bombs, but they were probably caused by the torpedoes of L4C and L4R exploding upon contact with the bottom.]

L4K (815) Lt. Kemp and Sub-Lt. Bailey (Torpedo)
They came in from the west, north of San Pietro Island at a height of 4,000ft. Passing north of the cruisers and their balloons they flattened out on a line for the Littorio. The torpedo was dropped at 23.18 from 1,000 yards and struck the ship on her starboard bow.

L4M (815) Lt. Swayne and Sub-Lt. Buscall (Torpedo)
Having become detached from the leader they waited off the harbour for 15 minutes for the arrival of the other aircraft. When the first flare was seen, they came in at 1,000 feet over the westerly breakwater. Flying easterly across the Mar Grande and losing height until reaching the end of the Tarantola breakwater they made a sharp turn to port so as to approach the Littorio from the east. The torpedo was dropped at about 22.15 from 400 yards and they continued passing directly over the ship. The torpedo struck the Littorio abaft the funnels on the port quarter. 

E4F (813) Lt. Maund and Sub-Lt. Bull (Torpedo)The last of the torpedo bombers came in over Rondinella Point, north of the cruisers and launched its torpedo from 1,300 yards at the Vittorio Veneto, but the torpedo exploded upon contact with the bottom. 

L4P (815) Lt. Kiggell and Lt. Janvrin (16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
Their objective was to drop flares along the eastern shore and bomb any convenient target. They came in at 7,000ft over San Vito at 22.58 flying NE and commenced dropping a line of eight flares at half mile intervals from near the point where the Tarantola breakwater meets land. After the flares had been dropped, they turned to starboard looking for a target, and made a dive bombing attack on the most southerly oil storage depot. No results were observed. 

L5B (819) Lt. Lamb and Lt. Grieve(16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
They were the stand by flare droppers. Coming in astern of L4P (Kiggell and Janvrin), they saw that the first flares appeared to be illuminating satisfactorily, so no more flares were dropped. They then bombed the same oil storage tanks, but again no results were observed.

E5A(824) Capt. Patch and Lt. Goodwin ( 6x250lb bombs)
Their task was to bomb the line of cruisers and destroyers moored against the quay side on the south of the Mar Piccolo. They came in at 8,500 feet over San Pietro Island at 23.06, crossed the Mar Grande and the canal and to the middle of the western portion of the Mar Piccolo. Two minutes later the target was identified and a dive bombing attack was made from 1,500 feet obliquely across two cruisers from N.W. to S.E. at 23.15. The Libeccio was hit but the bombs failed to explode.

L4L (815) Sub-Lt. Sarra; Sub-Lt. Bowker (6x250lb bombs)
Their initial objective was to attack the cruisers and destroyers in the Mar Piccolo. But coming in at 8,000ft over the western mainland and diving to 1,500 feet over the Mar Piccolo, they were unable to identify the target. Continuing along the southern shore of the Mar Piccolo they attacked the seaplane base from 500ft. They achieved several hits causing an explosion and fire in a hangar. 

L4H (815) Sub-Lt. Forde and Sub-Lt. Mardel (6x250lb bombs)
They were separated from the leader and arrived as the first flare was dropped and came in east of Cape San Vito. On reaching te Mar Piccolo they turned, and flying at 1,500ft from NE to SW, delivered their attack on two cruisers. The first bomb hit the water short of the target but the remainder hit the cruiser although no immediate results were observed. Intense A.A. fire from the cruisers moored in the Mar Piccolo was met throughout the dive. They were uncertain whether their bombs had released and circled the western basin of the Mar Piccolo and repeated the attack. 

E5Q (824) Lt. Murray and Sub-Lt. Paine (6x250lb bombs)
They came in east of Cape San Vito when the attack was already in progress and the flares were dropping. They continued until the eastern end of the Mar Piccolo was reached and turning to port flew along the southern shore. Their objective was the cruisers and destroyers, which they attacked from 3,000ft, the bombs dropping in a line running from E to W. commencing by the most eastern jetty and extending across four of the destroyers to the most westerly cruiser in the line, hitting the Libeccio but the bomb failed to detonate.

With their individual tasks completed, the last aircraft left Taranto 23.35, landing on Illustrious 01.55.


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

Part II of II

The Second Strike

The second wave of nine aircraft started flying off at 21.28 and 8 aircraft were off by 21.34. L5F (Clifford, Going) was accidentally damaged before take off in a collision with L5Q and had to be struck down to the hangar for repairs to the wing fabric. It was eventually flown off at 21.58.

At 22.05, L5Q (Morford, Green), lost its external overload tank when it became detached, forcing the aircraft to return to the carrier which fired on it as it was not expected, but landed safely. That left only eight Swordfish to take part in the second strike.

At 22.50 the Squadron commenced to climb and at 23.15 when 60 miles away sighted flares and antiaircraft fire from Taranto, which continued until at 23.50. When the northwest shore of the Gulf of Taranto was sighted, the Squadron turned to the north-east at 8,000ft and detached the flare droppers at 23.55.

Lieutenant-Commander Hale’s plan was for the all his torpedo bombers to approach from the NW at high altitude. They were to pass north of Rondinella Point and, skirting the cruisers to the north, fly over the balloons, turn southwards and dive quickly to sea level and attack the battleships from the north, as this gave them overlapping targets and a greater chance of hitting something.

Individual attacks

L5A (819) Lt-Cdr. Hale (Commander) and Lt. Carline (Torpedo)
They came in a mile north of Rondinella Point at 5,000ft, glided down over the commercial basin, and steering directly for the Littorio, dropped their torpedo from about 700 yards. [See note after L5K.] 

E4H (813) Lt. Bayly and Lt. Slaughter (Torpedo)
As they approached, they were hit by intense AA fire and crashed into the harbour killing both crew. The body of Sub Lieutenant Bayly was found and buried with full military honours, while the body of Lieutenant Slaughter was never found. They were the only aircrew fatalities during the course of the entire raid.

L5H(819) Lt. Lee and Sub-Lt. Jones (Torpedo)
They came in astern of L5A (Hale and Carline) over Rondinella Point, gliding down to a point south of the canal, dropping their torpedo from about 800 yards at the Duilio, striking the ship on the starboard side. 

L5K(819) Lt. Torrens-Spence and Lt. Sutton (Torpedo)Following the Flight Leader L5A (Hale and Carline), they came in over Rondinella Point, and glided down to a point south of the canal. Their torpedo was aimed at the Littorio but failed to release at first attempt, so they held their course, tried again and finally released the torpedo manually from 700 yards.

[Note: What is certain is that a torpedo from either L5A or L5K struck the Littorio on its starboard side. But what is not known is who to credit with the hit, as they both launched their torpedoes from similar positions at about the same time.]

E5H (824) Lt. Wellham and Lt. Humphreys (Torpedo)
They came in over Rondinella Point, over Mar Piccolo, and the Town of Taranto, and turned to starboard to the centre of the Mar Grande. Diving to attack, the aircraft was hit by AA fire causing severe aileron damage, putting the aircraft temporarily out of control. Regaining partial control, the torpedo was dropped from about 500 yards aimed at the Vittorio Veneto which missed. After which they received further wing damage from AA fire and, heavily damaged, limped back to Illustrious.

L5B (819) Lt. Hamilton and Sub-Lt. Weeks (16 flares and 4x250lb bombs) 
They came in over Cape San Vito at 7,500 feet, and dived to 5,000 feet, dropping a line of flares at intervals of 15 seconds to the eastward of the harbour. After dropping all flares successfully, they delivered a dive bombing attack from 2,500ft on the oil storage depot, starting a small fire. 

L4F(815) Lt. Skelton and Sub-Lt. Perkins (16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
Their approach was similar to L5B (Hamilton and Weeks) except that the flares were dropped south-east of the harbour, from between 6,500 feet and 5,000 feet. They then bombed the oil storage depot without apparent success.

L5F(819) Lt. Clifford and Lt. Going (6x250lb bombs)
Due to their flight deck collision with L5Q, they started 25 minutes late and arrived at Taranto when the second attack was already in progress. They came in over the land about 5 miles east of the harbour entrance, and steered straight over the dockyard to the far side of the Mar Piccolo. Turning to port an attack was made from 2,500 feet along the line of cruisers and destroyers from west to east. A stick of bombs was dropped across the cruisers Trento and Miraglia. One bomb hit the Trento causing minor damage, but failing to explode. 

L5Q (819) Lt. Morford and Sub-Lt. Green (6x250lb bombs)
They developed trouble with the auxiliary tank shortly after take-off and took no further part in the operation.


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

> I do not like being called someone that posts half truths, especially from someone who has posted the following



Neither do I


The rest of your reply is pure personal attack. i dont respond to those


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 19, 2012)

Gentelmen - play nice. There is a lot of good info here, let's keep it running....


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

Hello RCAFson
thanks for the pages from Stringbag Pilot's Manual.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

LWS Zubr, Blackburn Botha and Ba. 88, all were total failures.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

Hello Parsifal
Thanks for the Taranto info

Juha


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## renrich (Jul 19, 2012)

VBF13, NO Avengers were launched from any carrier at Midway. The left over pilots from Hornet's VT8 ferried the Avengers ( six I think but I am not going to look it up) from PH out to Midway. Some of VT8 that was left after Midway wound up later at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal and when they ran out of airplanes, they were given 03s and sent to the line.


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 19, 2012)

Six is correct: 4 were shot down and 1 crashed on the way back leaving one extremely shot up one left with a dead gunner landing back at Midway.


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## Oreo (Jul 19, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Hands down the Manchester


 Even worse than the He 177?


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## Oreo (Jul 19, 2012)

Bombers that had some inherent problems include:

Manchester
He 177
Botha
Fw 200C


Bombers that appear to have been inadequate in some of the rolls they were used for include:
Battle
TBD
Blenheim
Ju 87
Ventura
Hampden
G3M
G4M
Br 20


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## razor1uk (Jul 19, 2012)

I think that considering the availilable data, that both the TBD and Swordfish cannot be considered as the no.1 worst, as not only has there been demonsrated much data about them and there proponants for the worst, many of which, them or ourselves have chimed in upon this; akin to when you feel like your triing to defend something opinionatedly heartfelt that come hell or divebombing, we woulsn't shift..) that there are others that are likelier one worse than either of those.

As a urine taker, mmm just for the pidgeons since the worst bomber developed in thread towards torpedo bombers....

the Fairley Battle? Su-2? Br.64? IL-2T?...


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

> If you say so - you're original statement was the aircraft was* "stressed for dive-bombing." *There is no doubt that it did bomb vertically. There is NO evidence that at its design it was "stressed for dive-bombing" as it was a primary function. I showed you the original specifications the aircraft was designed to. It was an aircraft that could do dive bombing (no faster than 200 knots and probably no more G loading than 3 or 4gs) but there is no evidence the aircraft had any dive bombing stress factor built into it way back in 1933. The fact that it was capable of doing dive bombing "just came out that way." Compare it with other aircraft I listed that were dive bombers in performace (dive speeds, equipment, G loading) in the true sense of the word, well that's another story



I have to agree, Swordfish were not designed as divebombers. 

Swordfish however did prove to be remarkably strong. as you say, there are numerous sources that attest to its ability to dive bomb. Moreover, such attacks are documented as being verital, or near vertical. Some have described these attacks as more "floating" down rather than a "power dive" because the rate of descent was that gentle. Ther was no problem in fitting roskets and metal blast shields to the undersides of the wings for the Mk II and later. Whilst its a bit dangerous to generalise an often used method of attack against submarines was to track the sub above the cloud cover, tracking the sub by radar, dive down through the cloud , drop flares, and launch a rapid rocket firing attack. These tactics (and others no doubt) delivers at least 22 kills for the swordfish with at least another 16 probables. Operating from 14 escort carriers, thats an impressive tally, and attests to the basic styrength of the aircraft.

One thing further worth noting, the Swordfish was not a small aircraft. I dont know how much difference that makes, but it certainly w as no breeze driven waif at the mercy of the wind and rain . Its operational record shows that. No other carrier borne strike aircraft operated on a regular basis north of the arctic circle. that in itself tells a lot about how it handled rough conditions. It had a high reputation for operating wll in difficult conditions


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I have to agree, Swordfish were not designed as divebombers.
> 
> Swordfish however did prove to be remarkably strong. as you say, there are numerous sources that attest to its ability to dive bomb. Moreover, such attacks are documented as being verital, or near vertical. *Some have described these attacks as more "floating" down rather than a "power dive" because the rate of descent was that gentle*. Ther was no problem in fitting roskets and metal blast shields to the undersides of the wings for the Mk II and later. Whilst its a bit dangerous to generalise an often used method of attack against submarines was to track the sub above the cloud cover, tracking the sub by radar, dive down through the cloud , drop flares, and launch a rapid rocket firing attack. These tactics (and others no doubt) delivers at least 22 kills for the swordfish with at least another 16 probables. Operating from 14 escort carriers, thats an impressive tally, and attests to the basic styrength of the aircraft.
> 
> One thing further worth noting, the Swordfish was not a small aircraft. I dont know how much difference that makes, but it certainly w as no breeze driven waif at the mercy of the wind and rain . Its operational record shows that. No other carrier borne strike aircraft operated on a regular basis north of the arctic circle. that in itself tells a lot about how it handled rough conditions. It had a high reputation for operating wll in difficult conditions



In researching over the past several days about this subject, it seems it took "a lot" to even get the Swordfish up to 200 MPH in a dive. Some where I read one pilot stated he needed 12,000 feet for a 200 MPH dive, don't know if that was his personal experience or the norm. The engine had RPM limitations in the dive and just the nature of this aircraft caused it to really slow up when pulling out of a dive (guy wires, fixed landing gear, etc.) There isn't much found in RAF or RN pilot's notes about maneuvering speeds at various weights, but I'll bet dollars to donuts that you're going to start bending the Swordfish if you push it beyond 4Gs.

In dive bombing with the Swordfish, you're not looking at the traditional screaming power dive and high G pull up.....

The slow landing speed made it perfect in foul weather providing you didn't have to deal with variable winds as it only had a 15 knot cross wing component (the same as a Cessna 172!) at the same time it was probably miserable coming aboard ship in an open cockpit


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## razor1uk (Jul 19, 2012)

While an open cockpit can unsuredly be miserable, considering that is splittinghairs as the basis fore or against if nothings else, is following approved 'just' nationalism eh, it could be also be seen as a reason for it, if being the decideing factor yes?

Surely there are one or two others that could be considered worse for the number one spot for Worst WW2 Bomber (when did it saiy Dive Bomber or Naval Dive Bomber) gvivng a lack of evidence, not wheught for it...?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 19, 2012)

razor1uk said:


> While an open cockpit can unsuredly be miserable, considering that is splittinghairs as the basis fore or against if nothings else, is following approved 'just' nationalism eh, it could be also be seen as a reason for it, if being the decideing factor* yes*?



NO. I think no one said anything about this aircraft being on the worse list because of that, and when you're freezing your balls off, I think nationalism isn't even thought of!

BTW, I'll say it again - the Swordfish doesn't belong on this list...


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## VBF-13 (Jul 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I dont disagree that torpedo bombers were vulnerable whilst in their final approach, but the allies judged later in the war that divebombing was an even more hazardous undertaking.......the aircraft had to fly in at an ideal height to be shot at, peel off and fall straight out of the sky at a prefdetermined angle along a predictable path, with the pilot struggling against G forces and a (usually) unresponsive aircraft. Truth is, everybody found divebombing and torpedo bombing hazardous work. Midway was not an especially hostile environment.
> 
> The advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. For a start, there were no fighters no CAP to contend with, and it was the CAP that destroyed the VTs at Midway. Even if the Japanese had tried to respond to an approaching VT, they would simply have blundered about in the dark, not able to vector or direct their CAP properly. There was no Japanese radar in 1942, much less Radar intergrated into their air defence arrangements. They had no RDF to direct their fighters, and no radar assisted gunnery, which significantly downgrades the effectiveness of their 25mm batteries which all relied on sight for targetting.
> 
> As for loss of accuracy, for properly trained crews, such penalty simply does not exist. ive just finished posting hits at taranto establishing that the hit ratio was about 80%. Over the Bismark it was about 35%, whilst at other times in night conditions it varied to a high of 125% down to zero. Accuracy is all over the place, but nowhere is there a consistent pattern that accuracy suffers if the attacks are made at nighht by properly trained crews. Only if your crews and equipments are not sufficiently trained does this become an issue. and thats the problem. But, if the USN had proper aircraft conversions, ASV fitted and crews and tactics worked out beforehand, I dont see any reason why they couldnt expect at least something back for theirt efforts in the TBDs. as its stands, as day bombers, they got nothing except a whole bunch of dead heroes. Even if you dont want to accept that potentially there is no penalty for night trained crews, how can it be argued that getting all your aircraft shot down for nothing is better than say 1 or 2 hits from a fully trained squadron. And neither was this failure an isolated incident. US VTs were spectacularly unsucessful throughout most of the war, mostly because of the crappy torpedo they were given,, but also because of the outmoded tactics that they insisted on clinging to. They had good equipment (eventually). and still they got virtually nothing back from them. Lucky for the USN they had an absolute winner in their divebomber, otherwise they would have been in a world of hurt.


OK, look, I'll tell you right out, I'm not persuaded the Devastators (or, for that matter, the Avengers) failed because they were ill-equipped for the task at hand. They failed because they went in there alone. Your Swordfishes wouldn't have fared any better had they gone in there alone. Those aircraft were the most vulnerable when they were about to deploy their weapons. They needed cover when flying into enemy firepower to occupy and distract that firepower from them, otherwise they were sitting ducks for it.

On the SBDs. The Navy practiced dive-bombing in those literally through the end of the War. Those pilots would score hits on die markers in the Gulf and Atlantic out of bases like NAS Opalaka day and night. You’re right about the predetermined angle and that was monitored from the base and went into those pilots’ scores. Struggling against G-forces? Sure they were. Coming out of their dives they temporarily blacked out. They expected that and drilled with that expectation. Unresponsive aircraft? Really? Tell that to that task force they sent back to Japan looking like a wet dog that got kicked out of the house for chewing on a shoe. Truth is dive-bombing is hazardous work? Sure it is. This was war.

On your last paragraph, you're in a little over my head. I'm not knocking your torpedo-bombers, as they do sound as though they were much better endowed than ours. To throw off the failure of an unescorted squadron of torpedo-bombers to get off a hit on a task force like that, however, on the theory the torpedos they were carrying were substandard, or on inferior tactics, or on an unsuitability for daylight operations, whatever, is, I find, truly fascinating, I'm sorry to have to tell you that.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 19, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> OK, look, I'll tell you right out, I'm not persuaded the Devastators (or, for that matter, the Avengers) failed because they were ill-equipped for the task at hand. They failed because they went in there alone. Your Swordfishes wouldn't have fared any better had they gone in there alone. Those aircraft were the most vulnerable when they were about to deploy their weapons. They needed cover when flying into enemy firepower to occupy and distract that firepower from them, otherwise they were sitting ducks for it.


You're probably correct but what made matters worse was our crappy torpedoes. Remember the discussion about VT-8 scoring 4 hits on Japanese carriers? If I remember correctly all 4 torpedoes actually ran below the carriers due to their detonators possibly being destroyed when they were dropped. Interesting scenarios; would be what would have happened if VT-8 had better torpedoes at Midway or if Swordfishes had US torpedoes at Taranto!!!


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## VBF-13 (Jul 19, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> You're probably correct but what made matters worse was our crappy torpedoes. Remember the discussion about VT-8 scoring 4 hits on Japanese carriers? If I remember correctly all 4 torpedoes actually ran below the carriers due to their detonators possibly being destroyed when they were dropped. Interesting scenarios; would be what would have happened if VT-8 had better torpedoes at Midway or if Swordfishes had US torpedoes at Taranto!!!


They dropped them before they were in position, that would be my guess. They had no choice, really. They were like ducks flying into a shooting gallery.

PS: One of you boys start the threads on the torpedoes, I'll lurk and learn in them.


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

> OK, look, I'll tell you right out, I'm not persuaded the Devastators (or, for that matter, the Avengers) failed because they were ill-equipped for the task at hand. They failed because they went in there alone. Your Swordfishes wouldn't have fared any better had they gone in there alone. Those aircraft were the most vulnerable when they were about to deploy their weapons. They needed cover when flying into enemy firepower to occupy and distract that firepower from them, otherwise they were sitting ducks for it.



Swordfish, if attacking in daylight unescorted would have been slaughtered, just like the TBFs and the TBDs. Im not arguing that. Im saying that as part of a night capable weapon system, with adequate torpedoes, properly trained crews, a doctrine and procedure for attacks at night, and an aircraft suited to night operations, they didnt need to be escorted, and had a high probabilty of succeeding. If we assume a similar number of Swordfish in place of the TBDs over the target at night how amny torpedoes might we expect being put into the Japanese carriers?. Anything from 0 to 12, depending on the luck and situation. Lets assume about 30-40% success, that means 3 or 4 topedo hits. 



> On your last paragraph, you're in a little over my head. I'm not knocking your torpedo-bombers, as they do sound as though they were much better endowed than ours. To throw off the failure of an unescorted squadron of torpedo-bombers to get off a hit on a task force like that, however, on the theory the torpedos they were carrying were substandard, or on inferior tactics, or on an unsuitability for daylight operations, whatever, is, I find, truly fascinating, I'm sorry to have to tell you that.



The Swordfish was not a wonder weapon, but it was suited to the role that it was put. And it enjoyed considerable success. Its apparent weaknesses (it slow speed) helped to also make it an accurate delivery system. i am not denying its basic obsolesence. I am disputing that use of slightly more high performance aircraft in daylight conditions was suicide, and that far more could have been derived from those aircraft (the TBDs) if they had been trained and used at night, using the same tactics as the Swordfish crews.

There is no denying the crappiness of US torpedoes, though this was rectified by early 1944. US VYs still did not enjoy a high success rate even with decent torps, against an enemy that by that stage was clearly on the ropes. Even without torps, having a fully night capable squadron on each carrier would have been a help, not a hindrance to US daylight strikes. It would have allowed tracking of the enemy day or night and thereby greatly increased the utility of the USN CVs


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> You're probably correct but what made matters worse was our crappy torpedoes. Remember the discussion about VT-8 scoring 4 hits on Japanese carriers? If I remember correctly all 4 torpedoes actually ran below the carriers due to their detonators possibly being destroyed when they were dropped. Interesting scenarios; would be what would have happened if VT-8 had better torpedoes at Midway or if Swordfishes had US torpedoes at Taranto!!!




Thats not as easy as it sounds. The USN did issue certificates of serviceability (i forget the correct phrqasing) for their torpedoes. One has to assume that if launched with sufficient care, and if properly serviced, they could hold their depth properly and explode when the trigger was detonated. If that assumption is correct, and given the slower speed of the swordfish there is at least an arguablke case that a Swordfish armed with a bliss evitt might have gotten a better result. Perhaps not as well....I am not an expert on US torpedoes....


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## davparlr (Jul 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> This is the detail of the actual attacks that I found in Kemps book . It differs from the online source, but ther is some doubt about the number of hits obtained.
> 
> Individual attacks
> (Part I of II)
> ...






parsifal said:


> Part II of II
> 
> The Second Strike


 
This has the best detail I have seen and is pretty consistent with the sources I listed with 10 torpedoes launched, most sources I read said 11, but one crashed before launch, and 5 hits. Of course torpedoes into the mud tend to sway the percentage of accuracy, however the problem also existed with the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. All in all, it appears to me that the two attacks were similarly successful. It is just too bad that US Naval command did not study this attack as the Japanese Naval command did.


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## davparlr (Jul 20, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Flying instruments for the most part is the same whether you're in a heavy bomber or in a SBD. For just staying level you're relying on airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator and altimeter, add a compass in there and you have direction, add a directional gyro and that's even better. Understand that a trained pilot will recognize when they are about to enter instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and begins what's called an "instrument scan" when they stop looking outside the cockpit and just affix their eyes on their instruments, ignoring their "inner ear" as you put it. While doing this they better be aware of what's around them (mainly mountains) and one would hope that no one is attempting aerobatics in IMC conditions, although during combat, a different story. A pilot should be trained to realize when they are disorientated and start using their instruments to get re-orinetated.
> 
> There's a lot more to this but I do know that during WW2 pilots received enough intrument training to hopefully keep them out of trouble. I do know later in the war there was expanded training. Bill (Drangondog) may have some input on this.


In primary instrument training in the AF, we were told, on losing attitude information to fly "needle, ball, and airspeed", using turn indicator. The needle told you if you were in a turn and how much of one, the ball told you if you were in a slip, and increasing airspeed told you that you were in a descent and decreasing airspeed told you that you were in a climb. We only studied this and did not practice it.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 20, 2012)

davparlr said:


> In primary instrument training in the AF, we were told, on losing attitude information to fly "needle, ball, and airspeed", using turn indicator. The needle told you if you were in a turn and how much of one, the ball told you if you were in a slip, and increasing airspeed told you that you were in a descent and decreasing airspeed told you that you were in a climb. We only studied this and did not practice it.



AF Manual 51-37


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## parsifal (Jul 20, 2012)

davparlr said:


> This has the best detail I have seen and is pretty consistent with the sources I listed with 10 torpedoes launched, most sources I read said 11, but one crashed before launch, and 5 hits. Of course torpedoes into the mud tend to sway the percentage of accuracy, however the problem also existed with the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. All in all, it appears to me that the two attacks were similarly successful. It is just too bad that US Naval command did not study this attack as the Japanese Naval command did.



The difficulty is that the source material is sometimes inconsistent. The timeline link I originally posted gives three more hits, i dont think that is very credible. Bragadin says that the Libeccio was hit by a dud torpedo, and that an additional hit was achieved on the littorio (but was also a dud). This was the single hit for two aircraft listed by kemp i think. Polmar says that libeccio was hit by a dud torpedo and not a dud bomb the same as Bragadin. 

So, we have a choice. we can accept kemps account, and impressive eye witnes account that says 5 hits, we can accept bragadins account whose navy it was that was on the receiving end, and count 7 hits, or we can accept polmars account, a well respected historian on carrier operations, and settle for 6 hits (1 dud); Finally, we can get really funky and accept the online source that lists 8 hits (2 duds)

Nothing is ever simple or straight forward in life


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## VBF-13 (Jul 20, 2012)

davparlr said:


> In primary instrument training in the AF, we were told, on losing attitude information to fly "needle, ball, and airspeed", using turn indicator. The needle told you if you were in a turn and how much of one, the ball told you if you were in a slip, and increasing airspeed told you that you were in a descent and decreasing airspeed told you that you were in a climb. We only studied this and did not practice it.


At NAS Norfolk the Air Force administered the Night Vision Training (Evelyn Trainer) Program for the Naval Aviators in the Atlantic Fleet. At least, in late 1944, that's how it was. I mention that only because when I searched it on Google I was surprised to find more women named "Evelyn Trainer" than any historical data on it.

And, OK, I'll admit it, I thought we could all use the laugh. 

PS: Now get off your cans and give me some "Likes" for this!


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## VBF-13 (Jul 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Swordfish, if attacking in daylight unescorted would have been slaughtered, just like the TBFs and the TBDs. Im not arguing that. Im saying that as part of a night capable weapon system, with adequate torpedoes, properly trained crews, a doctrine and procedure for attacks at night, and an aircraft suited to night operations, they didnt need to be escorted, and had a high probabilty of succeeding. If we assume a similar number of Swordfish in place of the TBDs over the target at night how amny torpedoes might we expect being put into the Japanese carriers?. Anything from 0 to 12, depending on the luck and situation. Lets assume about 30-40% success, that means 3 or 4 topedo hits.
> 
> The Swordfish was not a wonder weapon, but it was suited to the role that it was put. And it enjoyed considerable success. Its apparent weaknesses (it slow speed) helped to also make it an accurate delivery system. i am not denying its basic obsolesence. I am disputing that use of slightly more high performance aircraft in daylight conditions was suicide, and that far more could have been derived from those aircraft (the TBDs) if they had been trained and used at night, using the same tactics as the Swordfish crews.
> 
> There is no denying the crappiness of US torpedoes, though this was rectified by early 1944. US VYs still did not enjoy a high success rate even with decent torps, against an enemy that by that stage was clearly on the ropes. Even without torps, having a fully night capable squadron on each carrier would have been a help, not a hindrance to US daylight strikes. It would have allowed tracking of the enemy day or night and thereby greatly increased the utility of the USN CVs


I have nothing to add, here, really. That is to say, you put it that way, I know specifically where you were going with this, now, and we're on the same page.


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## davparlr (Jul 20, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> AF Manual 51-37


 
YES, that's it! I was trying to remember. I probably have one around here somewhere. Old age is a terrible thing.


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## davparlr (Jul 20, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The slow landing speed made it perfect in foul weather providing you didn't have to deal with variable winds as it only had a 15 knot cross wing component (the same as a Cessna 172!) at the same time it was probably miserable coming aboard ship in an open cockpit



Probably the biggest problem was trying to catch up with the carrier on approach!


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## parsifal (Jul 20, 2012)

US Mk13 Aerial Torpedoes:

These were the only aerial torpedoes built by the USN durung the war, but there were about nine different marks that steadily improved the reliability of this weapon as the war progressed.

The following is an excerpt from Nav wapons that gives a prety good indication as to why the USN had so much trouble with torps at the start. They only had 156 new torps at the startt of the war, the reserve stocks dated back to a design developed in 1915!!!!!

"_Finally, in 1938 the Mark 13 became the first specifically-designed aircraft torpedo accepted into service in the USN. This became the most common US airborne torpedo of World War II. Markedly different from airborne torpedoes of other navies in that it was short and fat vs. short and thin. Also different in its relatively low speed and long range. A total of 17,000 were produced during World War II.

A total of 156 Mark 13 Mod 0 torpedoes were produced which was enough to provide two loads for each of the four 18-plane torpedo squadrons assigned to the pre-war carrier fleet plus a dozen spares. Mod 0 differed from later mods by having a rail-type tail in which the propellers were in front of the rudders. This was the only US torpedo to ever have this feature. The Newport Torpedo Station was unhappy with arrangement for reasons unknown and the Mod 1 entered service in 1940 with a conventional propeller arrangement, as can be seen in the photographs above. Unfortunately and unlike the Mod 0, the Mod 1 proved to be an unreliable weapon, with only one of ten torpedoes dropped by VT-6 during an exercise in July 1941 having a hot, straight and normal run. Of the others, four sank and could not be recovered while the other five experienced erratic runs. 

*These problems continued into the early war years, with a mid-1943 analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots found that 36 percent ran cold (did not start), 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total exceeds 100 percent as many torpedoes had more than one defect. The early models were further handicapped by the need to drop them low and slow - typically 50 feet (15 m) and 110 knots - which made the torpedo planes carrying them vulnerable to attack. *

These problems were greatly reduced by the latter years of the war. Torpedoes had fin stabilizers, nose drag rings and tail shroud rings added, all of which worked to slow the torpedo after it was dropped so that it struck the water nose-first and at an acceptable speed. These improved the drop characteristics such that the recommended aircraft maximum launch parameters were increased to a height of 2,400 feet (730 m) and a speed of 410 knots. 

A lanyard was attached to the tail of the torpedo. When dropped, the lanyard tripped a starting lever, but a water trip delay valve prevented the combustion flask from lighting off until the torpedo had entered the water. When dropped at 150 knots or more, the torpedo would enter the water at an angle of between 26 and 30 degrees. The water needed to be at least 150 feet deep (45 m) and the torpedo assumed its preset running depth after water travel of 300 yards (275 m). The exploder mechanism was armed after water travel of 200 yards (180 m). Depth could be set up to 50 feet (15 m). 

The addition of the nose drag ring improved aerodynamic performance by stabilizing the torpedo in flight and reduced air speed by about 40 percent. It also acted as a shock absorber when the torpedo struck the water. The tail shroud ring improved the water run by reducing hooks and broaches and by eliminating much of the water roll which had characterized the earlier Mark 13s. Hot, straight and normal runs now approached 100 percent. To speed availability of the much improved torpedo, the Bureau of Ordnance had tail assemblies built with the shroud ring attached and then shipped these to the fleet for upgrading the existing inventory. By the fall of 1944, the modified torpedo was in general use by the front-line carrier units which were enthusiastic in their praise. On one occasion in early 1945, six torpedoes were dropped from altitudes between 5,000 and 7,000 feet (1,500 to 2,100 m). Five out of the six were observed to make their runs hot, straight and normal. By the end of the war, the USN considered the Mark 13 to be the best aircraft torpedo produced by any nation and it remained in service until 1951. 

The Mark 13 has the distinction of having been the last torpedo used by by the US Navy in combat and the world's last use of aerial torpedoes in combat (as of December 2010). On 1 May 1951, following the failure of conventional aerial attacks with bombs, the Navy decided to use torpedoes against the sluice gates of the Hwachon Dam, located on the Pukham River just north of the 38th parallel. The dam waters were being used by the North Koreans to aid their own troop movements and hinder those of the Allies. USS Princeton CV-37 sent five AD-4 and three AD-4N Skyraiders into action and these planes each launched a single Mark 13 torpedo against the dam. One torpedo was a dud and another ran erratic, but the other six blew open the flood gates, successfully ending the North Korean control of the river water. 

Modifications 

Mod 1 - Improved tail, strengthened propellers, rudders moved in front of the propellers 
Mod 2 - 40 knot experimental torpedo, development cancelled 
Mod 2A - Mod 2 converted to 33.5 knots, water trip delay valve added to delay firing until water entry to prevent turbine runaway when dropped from over 300 feet (910 m) 
Mod 3 - External gyro setting added 
Mod 4 - Experimental Model; 50 produced with strengthened after body 
Mod 5 - Addition of water trip to Mod 1 
Mod 6 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 2A 
Mod 7 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 3 
Mod 8 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 4 
Mod 9 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 5 
Mod 10 - Strengthened after body, shroud ring, suspension beam, gyro angle eliminated 
Mod 11 - Mod 6 modified to accommodate suspension beam 
Mod 12 - Mod 7 modified to accommodate suspension beam 
Mod 13 - Mod 9 modified to accommodate suspension beam 

Success during World War II 

From "US Naval Weapons" by Norman Friedman: "A review of war experience showed a total of 1,287 attacks [this count only includes those launched by carrier-borne aircraft, other US Navy aircraft launched another 150 torpedoes - TD], of which 40 percent (514) resulted in hits, including 50 percent hits on battleships and carriers (322 attacks, including Midway), 31 percent on destroyers (179 attacks), and 41 percent (out of 445 attacks) on merchant ships." Although not mentioned by Dr. Friedman, at least eight Japanese cruisers were struck by aircraft torpedoes during the war. This hit percentage is much too high, but illustrates the over claiming that was typical of all nation's pilots during the war_".


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## parsifal (Jul 20, 2012)

Having a brief look at British aerial torpedoes, the Mark XII was the main type for the first half of the war

The RN reports that its airborne launches during the war achieved a hit rate of about 33.5%. The actual stats re as follws

Naval Aircraft 609(total fired) 167(certain hits) 37 (probable Hits) 33.5 (overall percentage Certain and probable) 

Source: Nav weapons

Nav weapons says these numbers are almost certainly far too high, the same as the USN hit claims. However, if they are optimistic, then they bring into sharp focus the prospect that the Swordfish was an effective delivery system. Polmar says that overall the carrier borne Swordfish crews achieved hit rates of above 40% generally. He doesnt name his source, and I dont know if his figures are at all comparable to the Nvaweapons stats. However, if they are, then the Swordfish crews as a group are well above the average achieved by all aircraft using torps


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## Njaco (Jul 20, 2012)

Oreo said:


> Bombers that had some inherent problems include:
> 
> Manchester
> He 177
> ...



Ok, I'll give you that the He 177 had some engines problems because of the unique design and that the Fw 200 had a poor back ( maybe because it was designed as an airliner!!??) 

But the Ju-87 inadequate for its role??? The only thing the Ju-87 lacked was adequate air cover while performing its duties which has nothing to do with its design. The Stuka was one of the best it not the best, dive bomber of the war. Far more accurate than alot of others available. And I might add that it would appear that most dive bombers had this problem as the last few pages discussing Midway would show.


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## RCAFson (Jul 20, 2012)

Njaco said:


> But the Ju-87 inadequate for its role??? The only thing the Ju-87 lacked was adequate air cover while performing its duties which has nothing to do with its design.



I think the same argument could be made about the Fairey Battle.


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 20, 2012)

I think when it comes to what they were designed to do, most of the aircraft listed could do them. Certain ones however seemed to be a complete failure such as the Ba.88 IMO this one wins hands down for this title.


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## Oreo (Jul 21, 2012)

Njaco said:


> Ok, I'll give you that the He 177 had some engines problems because of the unique design and that the Fw 200 had a poor back ( maybe because it was designed as an airliner!!??)
> 
> *But the Ju-87 inadequate for its role???* The *only thing the Ju-87 lacked was adequate air cover* while performing its duties which has nothing to do with its design. The Stuka was *one of the best it not the best, dive bomber *of the war. Far more accurate than alot of others available. And I might add that it would appear that most dive bombers had this problem as the last few pages discussing Midway would show.



Ok, not trying to pick a fight with you, but did you not notice what I said? I did not specifically say the Ju 87 was inadequate in its roll. I listed it as one of the "Bombers that *appear* to have been inadequate in *some of the rolls they were used for*"

"appear" is not the same as "is". I stated it that way for the very reason that I was not saying that the aircraft absolutely were inadequate. Only that they have a reputation for being inadequate. Now, there were some bombers, at some times of the war, that were quite able to defend themselves *fairly* well from the fighter opposition they faced. B-29's over Japan, early Mosquitos over Germany, and so on. Other than those few instances, nearly any bomber would be vulnerable if not escorted by sufficient quantities and qualities of fighters. Even B-17's over the Reich. So in this case, it could just be that the Ju 87 was a perfectly good plane as long as it didn't have fighter opposition. Hmm. Having said that, I have an *opinion* that the SBD was a better dive bomber than the Ju 87 because of better survivability (though I lack the empirical data to back up my opinion), better survivability both against enemy fighters and surface fire. The SBD seemed to be relatively well able to stand up for itself, and whoever had the idea of using liquid cooled engines in a surface attack aircraft ought to have their head examined. Nobody in WWII, to my knowledge, ever managed to armor those radiators to make them invulnerable. It would have been an extreme engineering challenge to do so, I'm sure, and I've read that even the Il-2 did not have an armored radiator. Correct me if I'm wrong. It is far easier to just make an engine that doesn't use a radiator.

Ok, ducking for cover.


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## nuuumannn (Jul 21, 2012)

Bombers that had some inherent problems include:



> Manchester
> He 177
> Botha
> Fw 200C



You could add Halifax Mk I to that list. And I agree with Chris on the Ju 87. Itss use as a dive bomber prior to the Battle of Britain showed just how effective a weapon it was - ALL dive bombers were vulnerable to enemy fighters, but the combat records of the likes of the Ju 87, Dauntless, D3A Val speak for themselves. The Stuka doesn't deserve to be here.



> I think the same argument could be made about the Fairey Battle.



To a certain degree; the concept to which it was built was heavily flawed, which resulted in its high loss rate.

The Manchester's not as bad as the He 177 - The Manchester III became known as the Lancaster, but the airframe was essentially the same apart from the centre section. Chadwick had always planned for a four engined Manchester.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 21, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> To a certain degree; the concept to which it was built was heavily flawed, which resulted in its high loss rate.



Not only was the original concept heavily flawed, the Battle was never used for the original concept. Using a strategic bomber as a tactical bomber usually didn't work well and when they don't have escorts it usually gets even worse.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 21, 2012)

Agreed with Chris and nuuumannn. The Ju 87 does not belong on the list. Any dive bomber (Dauntless included) would be on the receiving end of a Turkey Shoot without aircover. That does not change the fact that it was more than adequate for its intended role.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 21, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> ALL dive bombers were vulnerable to enemy fighters, but the combat records of the likes of the Ju 87, Dauntless, D3A Val speak for themselves.


And there you have it. Hard to pin anything on the aircraft when it's distracted from doing its job.


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## RCAFson (Jul 21, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Not only was the original concept heavily flawed, the Battle was never used for the original concept. Using a strategic bomber as a tactical bomber usually didn't work well and when they don't have escorts it usually gets even worse.



It was designed as a tactical strike aircraft.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 21, 2012)

No, it was not. 

It started as a "light weight" bomber when there was some talk of an international treaty limiting the weight of bombers. In the early and mid 30s no "tactical strike aircraft" needed a range of 1000 miles. 

The British had plenty of experience with fighters with 20lb bombs, Brisfits, De Havalind aircraft and the Hawker Hind series doing "tactical strikes" and "policing the empire" (dropping bombs on Afghan tribesmen) to know the difference between a tactical bomber and a strategic bomber. The Tactical strike aircraft was the Lysander.


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## RCAFson (Jul 21, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> No, it was not.
> 
> It started as a "light weight" bomber when there was some talk of an international treaty limiting the weight of bombers. In the early and mid 30s no "tactical strike aircraft" needed a range of 1000 miles.
> 
> The British had plenty of experience with fighters with 20lb bombs, Brisfits, De Havalind aircraft and the Hawker Hind series doing "tactical strikes" and "policing the empire" (dropping bombs on Afghan tribesmen) to know the difference between a tactical bomber and a strategic bomber. The Tactical strike aircraft was the Lysander.





> The original Fairey Battle was designed to Specification P.27/32 as a two-seat day bomber, to replace the ageing Hawker Hart and Hind biplane bombers, and to act as an insurance policy in case heavier bombers were banned by the 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference.[2]
> from wikipedia


 Fairey Aircraft Since 1915 states the same.

The primary mission was tactical strikes, and the secondary mission was strategic bombing using high level horizontal bombing.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 21, 2012)

Somebody spent a little too much money on the "insurance policy" and not enough on the primary mission then. 

Specification P.4/34 (Feb 1934 and over two years before the Battle first flies) called for a light bomber capable of tactical support. It was to be fully stressed for dive recovery with a full bomb load. This Specification lead to the Hawker Henley and the Fairey P.4/34 (which was developed into the Fulmar)which had 7 ft less wing span than the Battle, 2 ft less fuselage, 1/2 the bomb load, one less crewman, less range and nearly 1 ton lower take off weight using the same engine. The P.4/34 flew 10 months after the Battle but 6 months before a production Battle joined a service squadron. 
If they really wanted a tactical bomber they should have known the Battle wasn't it and it certainly looks like they knew it from the issuing of specification P.4/34 

The Lysander had double the gun armament for strafing/flak suppression and could carry a pair of 250lb bombs or a number of light bombs. It would have fared no better than the Battles if given the same missions but it was the "army cooperation" aircraft of the time. 

The RAF had been running a "game" on the treasury and army. They were claiming that the army didn't need any new heavy artillery because the RAF and it's aircraft could do the same job as the heavy artillery so the RAF should get the money instead. The Army didn't get any new heavy artillery ( or even much for medium artillery) but the RAF didn't spend any of the money ( or darn little) on tactical bombers. They spent it on long range bombers ( I still hold that the Battle's 1000 mile range was not a tactical need) and on the eve of WW II had to admit that they could not, in fact support the army which lead to a rather mad scramble for heavy artillery and some rather patchwork/stopgap designs.

>edit. One description of the Battle gives a fuel capacity of 212 IMP gallons (254 US gallons/963liters) in two 106 Imp gallon tanks which is a rather ridiculous amount of fuel for a 1000hp tactical bomber. The early DB-7 only had 270 US gallons for a PAIR of P&W R-1830s.<


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## Oreo (Jul 21, 2012)

Maybe the Battle should be moved up to the top part of my list with the Manchester, He 177, Fw200C, and Botha. However, I shouldn't have put the Botha there because at least the RAF had enough sense to keep it out of combat. The Luftwaffe also had sense enough not to throw the He 70 at the RAF, or the He 70 might be on our list, too. At least the He 70 was not originally designed as a bomber, and the Luftwaffe evidently didn't gamble a whole lot on it, as the RAF did with the Battle. I don't know a whole lot about the He 70, but it seems to have quite a few similarities to the Battle, except that it was not thrown into the fray in WWII (only Spain). If anything, it seems to have been even less capable than the Battle, just looking at the specs.

Most any bomber is vulnerable to fighters unless it is faster than them at the altitude at which it operates, or unless there are no fighters capable of bringing it down in its mode of operation (night bombing, for instance). But some bombers are still more vulnerable than others, just based on their construction, features, armament, and maneuverability, with or without bombload. Then you add in operational hazards, official tactical restraints, crew experience and psychology, and the quality of the fighters and pilots intercepting them, and you are approaching the total formula. Often it isn't a matter of bad aircraft but rather, bad management.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 22, 2012)

Oreo said:


> Then you add in operational hazards, official tactical restraints, crew experience and psychology, and the quality of the fighters and pilots intercepting them, and you are approaching the total formula. Often it isn't a matter of bad aircraft but rather, bad management.


I'll let you in on a little secret about our pilots which I doubt will ever make it into Wikipedia. When my Dad was towing targets for the bombers in his FM2 in Kaneohe the off-duty pilots were encouraged to check out the available planes for short hops to keep their skills sharpened. One day an F4U from another base came in for an emergency landing with the Hawaiian police hot on its tail and telephone wires wrapped around one of its wings. The police got no further than the gate, where they were promptly stopped by the guards, and turned back. The pilot probably got a good balling-out, too. But, everybody knew what was going on. They'd dive at the Hawaiian sailboats and rock them with the prop-wash on the way up. While I'm not suggesting the Navy encouraged stunts like that much less trying to fly under telephone wires, they did encourage a degree of risk-taking. Of course, nobody called it that, they called it something like "aircraft familiarization." But, the point was, these pilots were encouraged to know the limits of their aircraft, and that's how they did it, by taking chances. All to say, it would be a mistake to underestimate the degree of skill of these pilots. Especially by the time they were on those carriers, they could operate their aircraft like they were riding a bicycle. And, that's the truth.


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## Njaco (Jul 22, 2012)

> Ok, not trying to pick a fight with you, but did you not notice what I said? I did not specifically say the Ju 87 was inadequate in its roll. I listed it as one of the "Bombers that appear to have been inadequate in some of the rolls they were used for"



No fight needed and I may have been a bit animated but it was on your list of "appear inadequate" and I was giving my reasons.


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## Oreo (Jul 22, 2012)

Njaco said:


> No fight needed and I may have been a bit animated but it was on your list of "appear inadequate" and I was giving my reasons.



You seem to be a nice guy. I will put forth a new opinion that the best five dive bombers of the war included the Ju 87.

I still advocate that, everything else being equal, radial engines were better to take into combat than inlines. If you go into combat with liquid-cooled engine, you better not get a stray bullet in your radiator. Taking the dive-bomber's likelihood of coming into contact with intense surface fire, I would much rather take my chances with a radial than an inline.

Now, as for the dive and torpedo bomber melee that some of you people have been engaging in, I don't know a whole lot about all these things, but for my two cents, I once had an opportunity to speak at length with a former USN pilot who had flown both the SBD and SB2C in combat, and he told me that he much preferred the SBD because it dived at a slower speed and was more controllable. He indicated that if he were in his dive in an SBD, he would be near vertical, and if he needed to make a course correction in mid-dive, it was a simple matter of a flick to the ailerons, and he would be back on target. He said with the SB2C, the dive was too fast and too hard to control to make much adjustment. I can't remember what or whether he said about the SB2C's dive angle.

Anyway, I visited him with my dad, circa 1992, at his home in New Hampshire. I don't know what has become of him since then, whether he is still alive or not, or what his name is. He had the distinction of flying the two dive bomber types, as well as the F6F in combat, and one other type which I can't remember for sure, but I think was the TBM. He flew the F2A during training at Pensacola. He was an extensive modeler, especially with flying models. He had dozens, maybe even 100 or more, completed flying models in his house, which was set up as a private museum. One B-26 model had to have been at least 6 feet wide. He had literally hundreds of unopened balsa kits in his attic. I wish I could remember his name. Anyway, we spent several hours with him, and it was a most rewarding day.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 22, 2012)

You bring up an interesting point. It is hard to judge the _actual_ effectiveness of some of these aircraft because of the many variables. 

For instance while the liquid cooled engine of the JU 87 is a mark against it we do not really _know_ how it did it dive for ease of control and accuracy _compared_ to the SBD and SB2C. I would imagine it is much closer to the SBD than the SB2C. 

So I do we figure number of bombs on target for number of aircraft lost? The Ju 87 may have more planes lost for the same number of sorties but the Ju 87 may need fewer sorties for the same number of bombs on target than an SB2C. 

Another thing that makes comparisons difficult is that the SB2C didn't enter combat use until the Ju 87 was being phased out as a dive bomber. The last versions built being supplied without dive brakes for use as night bombers.


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## Oreo (Jul 23, 2012)

Not to mention typical targets and theaters of operation were different for the two types. By the time the SB2C arrived on scene, the air war in the Pacific was improving for the Allies, and the pressures of 1942 were diminishing. Not so for the Ju 87 crews at the time the SB2C arrived. Things were waxing worse and worse for the LW on the Eastern Front, and the mental pressure was intense. In the Pacific, the SB2C usually enjoyed air superiority thanks to the F6F and F4U, which goes a long way.

I am sure that, when unmolested, the Ju 87 was very very good at plunking bombs on little targets. And the SB2C was usually not molested, except by surface fire.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 23, 2012)

Oreo said:


> I once had an opportunity to speak at length with a former USN pilot who had flown both the SBD and SB2C in combat, and he told me that he much preferred the SBD because it dived at a slower speed and was more controllable. He indicated that if he were in his dive in an SBD, he would be near vertical, and if he needed to make a course correction in mid-dive, it was a simple matter of a flick to the ailerons, and he would be back on target.


If you boys will forgive me, I'd just like to confirm this. Oreo, you're dead right. While these planes had their ideal angles for their dives, in situations less than ideal, they were, in fact, known to come in on "near vertical" dives. They had that capacity by virtue of their perforated brake flaps, which also enabled their virtual pin-point accuracy. 

And, these planes were fast. They weren't nicknamed the "Speedy D" for nothing.


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## JoeB (Jul 23, 2012)

The divebomber was an effective concept in particular uses, like striking ships definitely, and also in *some* contexts and situations of land warfare. The 'light single (or very light twin)' bomber was OTOH a questionable concept in any situation by the 1940's. Such a/c in general didn't naturally bomb as accurately as divebombers, didn't carry a big bomb load like a bigger twin or even later fighter bombers, and were completely up sh*t's creek v. significant enemy fighter opposition if lacking very strong friendly fighter support. Against an enemy with little or no air arm and limited flak, and subject to being pressured and harassed in mobile warfare, it might work OK. It's not just or particularly the Fairey Battle, same could be said for the Japanese Type 97 Light Bomber (eventually codenamed 'Ann'): good harasser v basically fighterless Chinese and Fil-American ground forces in mobile phases of campaigns, but lacked much hitting power or accuracy v a target like Corregidor compared to a true divebomber (though it looked like one more than the Battle did), and just out of luck in theaters where Japanese fighters didn't dominate.

A typical (Ju-87, SBD, Type 99) divebomber had the same vulnerability problems, but the small CEP of divebombing was highly useful against certain targets (ships, bridges, gun emplacements in certain cases, etc) for which there was no direct substitute (though other ways to get those missions done eventually) and it could drop small bombs and weakly strafe as a harasser of ground forces lacking air cover or extensive flak and moving in the open, just as well as a light bomber could.

The SBD/A-24 and Type 99 ended up in certain situations where their vulneraility to fighters thwarted them as completely as Ju-87's, just not as numerous occasions. We've been through this many times; perhaps at the margin the SBD and/or Type 99 had some advantage in this respect due to better agility, some episodes of those a/c escaping or even turning the tables on fighter attackers are hard to imagine Ju-87's replicating, but they would still probably have been toast in many or most of the cases where Ju-87's suffered heavily to opposing fighters.

Joe


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2012)

> The 'light single (or very light twin)' bomber was OTOH a questionable concept in any situation by the 1940's. Such a/c in general didn't naturally bomb as accurately as divebombers, didn't carry a big bomb load like a bigger twin or even later fighter bombers, and were completely up sh*t's creek v. significant enemy fighter opposition if lacking very strong friendly fighter support.




I would agree with this in many situations, but there are enough exceptions to make it an untrue statement. Though not limited to one type, I would use the Mosquito as the best example of the exception that completely shatters the rule. It was a light bomber, seldom escorted, highly accurate, and un-interceptbale (well, almost....). 

The Russians approached this problem in a different way. Their Light bomber "sturmovik" losses were never light, but neither were they (the losses) ever a problem to them after 1943. They could produce so many of them, and attack in so many places simulataneoulsy as to make any losses they incurred, even against a competent and cohesive defence irrelevant. 

The allies approached battlefield co-operation somewhat differently. Dedicated ground attack/divebombers tend to be accurate but vulnerable. Fighter bombersd are essentially fighters being used as light bombers, yet they have a (generally) lower attrition rate compared to their specialised cousins. This is because they have the performance after they drop the ordinance to get out of trouble


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## Oreo (Jul 24, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> If you boys will forgive me, I'd just like to confirm this. Oreo, you're dead right. While these planes had their ideal angles for their dives, in situations less than ideal, they were, in fact, known to come in on "near vertical" dives. They had that capacity by virtue of their perforated brake flaps, which also enabled their virtual pin-point accuracy.



 Even a blind squirrel. . . . finds a hex nut every once in a while. I better get ready to be wrong a few more times, since I don't get to be confirmed right very often!


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## VBF-13 (Jul 24, 2012)

Just stay in there and pitch, you're doing fine. 8)


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## JoeB (Jul 24, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I would agree with this in many situations, but there are enough exceptions to make it an untrue statement. Though not limited to one type, I would use the Mosquito as the best example of the exception that completely shatters the rule.
> 
> Their Light bomber "sturmovik" losses were never light, but neither were they (the losses) ever a problem to them after 1943.


I wouldn't include either of those planes in the type I'm thinking of. The Mosquito could be put in all kinds of categories and be an exception in each one, it's actually hard to characterize, and the Il-2/10 are a different concept. I'm thinking of a/c like the Battle, Type 97 Light, the Type 99 Light Twin (Lily), some bigger US Army O-series a/c which didn't end up seeing combat in WWII but were contemporary, some French very light twins, etc. They were a/c not much if at all superior in size speed and load to contemporary purpose built divebombers... but couldn't dive bomb, which about sums up why they weren't so capable.

I wasn't really thinking of the A-20/26 either, which I suppose could be called light bombers, but basically had the characteristics of the USAAF mediums in a slighly scaled down package, and were used that way.

Joe


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2012)

Id agree completely then, withthat clarification in mind joe


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