# How good (or bad) was the P-38, really?



## NTGray (Jul 28, 2021)

I have some questions about the P-38, and I’m inviting comments.

I’ve always considered the Lightning a super cool craft, both because of the way it looks and performs and because it was one of the earliest products of Kelly Johnson’s team at Lockheed which would become known as the Skunk Works. It was the first combat airplane to achieve 400 mph in level flight. And even though it came out _before _the P-40 and the P-39, both of those planes ceased production in 1944, but the Lightning was good enough to be produced throughout the entire war.

But only fairly recently have I been reading much about its mediocre reputation in the European theater of operations. Seems that a lot of American and British pilots and generals didn’t think highly of it, and some German pilots considered it an “easy kill” even though others counted it a worthy and dangerous foe. I know it was popular and successful in the Pacific theater, but now I’m wondering if any of that success was because the Japanese flying forces had already been gravely weakened by 1943 through loss of good pilots, even _before_ the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. (Perhaps the Turkey Shoot was the _result_ of the deterioration of Japanese air power, rather than the _cause_ of it, as has often been suggested?)

Anyway, how good (or bad) was the P-38, really?

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## Peter Gunn (Jul 28, 2021)

I would attribute the P-38's success in the Pacific to it being clearly superior to anything the Japanese were fielding, not to the loss of veteran Japanese pilots. They still had plenty of good ones in 1943.

Against the Luftwaffe it did OK, different theater, different enemy, different environment all around for the most part. In the Pacific it was around ~80+MPH faster than the IJN/IJA fighters it was stacked up against. Most marques of the Bf-109 and Fw-190 were faster and could dive better, but it was still a dangerous foe in the right hands such as Robin Olds.

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## pbehn (Jul 28, 2021)

Until you have something better its hard to criticise it. It was very versatile and later models with powered ailerons and extended range were good aircraft.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 28, 2021)

Good discussion on one of my favorite aircraft. I will put out a disclaimer, I am a bit of a fanboy but do recognize this aircraft's shortcomings. I worked at Lockheed's Burbank facility in some of the same buildings where P-38s were produced and worked with people who built and flew them. I think it's an understatement to say that the P-38 ushered in a whole new dimension in aerial combat when it was first designed, primarily in it's speed, range and operating altitude and all the issues that come along with operating a then super advanced aircraft in a new environment. I think the biggest drawback of the aircraft lied with the operator as it went into service. There was not a dedicated training path for high performance twin engine aircraft, let alone the P-38. This combined to the complexity of the aircraft, let alone the compressibility issue let to many accidents, especially with green pilots. I do know that some of the better P-38 pilots who survived getting checked out in the aircraft managed to get several hundred hours in aircraft like the B-25 or A-20. 

As mentioned many times on here, I heard Kelly Johnson speak about the P-38, Lockheed thought they would never produce more than 70 aircraft, but that abruptly changed.

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## NTGray (Jul 28, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> There was not a dedicated training path for high performance twin engine aircraft, let alone the P-38. This combined to the complexity of the aircraft, let alone the compressibility issue let to many accidents, especially with green pilots. I do know that some of the better P-38 pilots who survived getting checked out in the aircraft managed to get several hundred hours in aircraft like the B-25 or A-20.


Yeah, some of what I read talked about that complexity, to the point that if a P-38 got jumped, the pilot had to do so many different things to prepare to fight that he could get shot down while he was still flipping switches.
And the compressibility problem. . .it seems that the -38 was faster than anything else in level flight (and could out-turn the Me's and FW's), but the German planes could dive faster and had a better roll rate.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 28, 2021)

The P-38 had a wingspan of 52 feet, so it really was in the league of the "Zerstorers" aka "Heavy Fighters" like the Bf110 and KI-45, so it's prowess as a dog-fighter was not going to be on the level of a Bf109, A6M or Fw190.

Instead, it was an energy fighter, using it's speed to overwhelm it's adversary.
In the Pacific particularly, the A6M (and KI-43) was a fantastic turning fighter - at low speeds. Once the Zero was forced to fight the P-38 on it's terms, the Zero was at a huge disadvantage.
In the ETO, the Luftwaffe's tactics tended to retain higher energy in confrontations, reducing the P-38's advantage to a degree.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 28, 2021)

NTGray said:


> Yeah, some of what I read talked about that complexity, to the point that if a P-38 got jumped, the pilot had to do so many different things to prepare to fight that he could get shot down while he was still flipping switches.


IMO, that was an exaggeration. Sure it was a complex aircraft, it had 2 engines! Two of everything! And you train for this. Compare the P-38's cockpit to the Beaufighter, Mosquito, Bf110 and Ki-45. Lot's of switches and gauges but you'll find a lot of this stuff was located in the same or similar places


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## GregP (Jul 28, 2021)

When the P-38 comes up, we need to keep several things in mind.
1) There was no "operational fighter training."
2) The early P-38s were mis-jetted for European fuel.
3) The P-38 was literally almost unheated until the electric heater was installed.
4) The Allison had a couple of early faults.

Suppose a newbie P-38 pilot was cruising along in his mint P-38 and got attacked from ambush. He needed to"
a) Turn on his gunsight.
b) Pull both throttles back a bit ...
c) Bring up the rpm to full (3,000 rpm) on both prop controls.
d) Throttle up to military power on both throttles.

By this time, he was already hit or shot down.

P-38 pilots learned the hard way to come into a suspected area of combat encounters ready for combat.

I have beaten the fuel issue to death in here before. It wasn't an issue later, but it WAS when the P-38 first got to Europe. European fuels didn't have the same aromatic mixture at first, so the American airplane were not properly jetted for it. After a standard formulation was agreed to, it wasn't an issue any longer. The exact timeframe is somewhat unclear.

The early Allisons had very smooth intake tracks, and the air-fuel mixture tended to separate and the flow was not even to all cylinders. Adding turbulators in the intake track solved this problem.

Early (and likely medium) P-38 pilots were VERY COLD on missions because the heater used hot air from an exhaust shroud and, by the time it got to the cockpit, it wasn't warm anymore. A good story was told when Lockheed sent Tony Levier over to England to demo the P-38 for the combat pilots. He did a good demo, and one of the combat pilots was overheard to say, "That's a pretty good show! I'd like to see him do that after being at 25,000 feet for three hours! He'd be frozen, like we are!"

So, the early P-38s had a few issues that were worked out. But no combat training can only be cured by exposure to combat and sound tactics. I'm pretty sure that later P-38 pilots were MUCH better trained but, by that time, most of the few P-38s left in the ETO were recce birds. The rest were in the Med and PTO.

It's worth remembering that the top two US pilots (Bong and McGuire) of the war, if you take combat record as an indicator, flew P-38s, not P-51s or F6Fs.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 28, 2021)

My understanding is that the engines had trouble with the high cold air in ETO, whereas in SWPac, with fights lower in the atmosphere, the issue wasn't nearly so problematic. Mach issues were reduced as a result.

The plane itself, as noted above, was a burner and not a turner (at least until the flaps were added to later models). BnZ worked well against Japanese planes and doctrine, not so much against LW planes and doctrine. Hard to dive out of trouble against LW bounces.

It's one of my favorite WWII airplanes precisely because it was so _outré_. It's both beautiful and ridiculous in appearance, but was formidably fast, formidably armed, and just plain weird.

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## nuuumannn (Jul 28, 2021)

This'll be interesting. I have a fondness for the P-38, but I know very little about it. It sure does look sexy though.





P-38 




DSC_0559

So, how does it compare to the P-39?

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 28, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> My understanding is that the engines had trouble with the high cold air in ETO, whereas in SWPac, with fights lower in the atmosphere, the issue wasn't nearly so problematic. Mach issues were reduced as a result.
> 
> The plane itself, as noted above, was a burner and not a turner (at least until the flaps were added to later models). BnZ worked well against Japanese planes and doctrine, not so much against LW planes and doctrine. Hard to dive out of trouble against LW bounces.
> 
> It's one of my favorite WWII airplanes precisely because it was so _outré_. It's both beautiful and ridiculous in appearance, but was formidably fast, formidably armed, and just plain weird.


Mach issues were an issue everywhere. Ken Sparks, one of the early top P-38 drivers in the SWP with 11 victory credits was killed in a P-38 as it went into a terminal dive over Muroc AFB (Edwards) 1944.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 28, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Mach issues were an issue everywhere. Ken Sparks, one of the early top P-38 drivers in the SWP with 11 victory credits was killed in a P-38 as it went into a terminal dive over Muroc AFB (Edwards) 1944.



Understood. The P-47 also lost a few tails to the issue, if I remember rightly. The fact that Mach limits, and associated flutter in a dive, are easier to hit higher up was a learning experience for everyone.

That being said, your point above about the P-38 being groundbreaking is apt, in that it was also the first plane to experience these issues (to my knowledge), and forced the engineers to work a little more. This gave us more knowledge ... at a price.

Doesn't change my love for the plane, quirky as it was.

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## 33k in the air (Jul 28, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> The plane itself, as noted above, was a burner and not a turner (at least until the flaps were added to later models).



Here is an interesting passage from John A. Tilley, who flew the P-38 in the 457th Fighter Group in the Pacific theater. It starts with him remarking on how in training the instructors warned him not to engage in a turning fight with a Japanese fighter, and then telling of an encounter in which one moment he was behind a Zero and the next it was coming at him head-on. Then he says:

_"Alright, so how come I got my second kill by turning a full 360-degree circle to the left, at low speeds and on the deck with an Oscar? Primarily I think it happened because the Jap and I both believed he could out turn me. I never would have tried to stay with him if there hadn't been 12 of us and only two of them. I figured I could always holler for help if I got in a jam. And I'm sure the Jap figured his usual tight turn was his best bet when he didn't have enough air under him for a split-S. Miracle of miracles, the big old P-38 actually turned inside the nimble little Oscar. I was on the deck, in a vertical bank, the airspeed under 90 mph, and the yoke was bucking and shuddering in my hands. That turn was nothing more nor less than a controlled stall. But without torque (good old counter-rotating engines) I didn't worry about 'snapping' out of control into a spin, as with a single engine aircraft, so I was able to pull enough lead for my guns to hit him hard."_

The above appears on page 47 of _The Great Book of World War II Airplanes_ (multiple authors).

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## Shortround6 (Jul 28, 2021)

nuuumannn said:


> So, how does it compare to the P-39?


Well, if we take out the nose armor............. 

The Red Bull plane is certainly pretty (and more functional) than most WW II P-38s.
But it uses a combination of parts (pointy nose nacelles) ram air inlets more like a P-40s or P-51
No turbos. Radiator housings are from which model? 

A lot more useful on the airshow circuit. 

WW II P-38s went from 1150-1225hp engines to 1600-1700hp in War Emergency and used 3 different turbos from the P-38E to the P-38J/L/M. 

A lot of room for variations in performance.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 28, 2021)

33k in the air said:


> Here is an interesting passage from John A. Tilley, who flew the P-38 in the 457th Fighter Group in the Pacific theater. It starts with him remarking on how in training the instructors warned him not to engage in a turning fight with a Japanese fighter, and then telling of an encounter in which one moment he was behind a Zero and the next it was coming at him head-on. Then he says:
> 
> _"Alright, so how come I got my second kill by turning a full 360-degree circle to the left, at low speeds and on the deck with an Oscar? Primarily I think it happened because the Jap and I both believed he could out turn me. I never would have tried to stay with him if there hadn't been 12 of us and only two of them. I figured I could always holler for help if I got in a jam. And I'm sure the Jap figured his usual tight turn was his best bet when he didn't have enough air under him for a split-S. Miracle of miracles, the big old P-38 actually turned inside the nimble little Oscar. I was on the deck, in a vertical bank, the airspeed under 90 mph, and the yoke was bucking and shuddering in my hands. That turn was nothing more nor less than a controlled stall. But without torque (good old counter-rotating engines) I didn't worry about 'snapping' out of control into a spin, as with a single engine aircraft, so I was able to pull enough lead for my guns to hit him hard."_
> 
> The above appears on page 47 of _The Great Book of World War II Airplanes_ (multiple authors).



!2 on 2 certainly makes the tactic less chancy. Throw a little high yo-yo in while the enemy's got his head swiveling, yeah, you've got the power for it.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 28, 2021)

33k in the air said:


> Here is an interesting passage from John A. Tilley, who flew the P-38 in the 457th Fighter Group in the Pacific theater. It starts with him remarking on how in training the instructors warned him not to engage in a turning fight with a Japanese fighter, and then telling of an encounter in which one moment he was behind a Zero and the next it was coming at him head-on. Then he says:
> 
> _"Alright, so how come I got my second kill by turning a full 360-degree circle to the left, at low speeds and on the deck with an Oscar? Primarily I think it happened because the Jap and I both believed he could out turn me. I never would have tried to stay with him if there hadn't been 12 of us and only two of them. I figured I could always holler for help if I got in a jam. And I'm sure the Jap figured his usual tight turn was his best bet when he didn't have enough air under him for a split-S. Miracle of miracles, the big old P-38 actually turned inside the nimble little Oscar. I was on the deck, in a vertical bank, the airspeed under 90 mph, and the yoke was bucking and shuddering in my hands. That turn was nothing more nor less than a controlled stall. But without torque (good old counter-rotating engines) I didn't worry about 'snapping' out of control into a spin, as with a single engine aircraft, so I was able to pull enough lead for my guns to hit him hard."_
> 
> The above appears on page 47 of _The Great Book of World War II Airplanes_ (multiple authors).

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 28, 2021)

nuuumannn said:


> So, how does it compare to the P-39?


 I see where you're going!

Actually many top P-38 PTO aces had time in P-39s and some did quite well in them. Tom Lynch, Tom McGuire, Jack Jones, Donald McGee to name a few. Actually the P-39 did hold it's own to a point (as I said many times before) but it was limited in range and altitude performance. When the P-38 arrived in numbers the whole face of the battle changed, several memorable air battles took place at the end of December 1942 when Bong, Lynch, and Sparks scored multiple kills as the P-38 flew it's first combat missions. At that point the writing was on the wall.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 28, 2021)

Rightly or wrongly the USAAC viewed the P-38 as their premier fighter in 1942 and early 1943. 
A lot of confusion surrounds in use in the ETO as at least two groups were declared operational and 3rd was working up in England in the fall of 1942. 
However both operational groups were sent to North Africa for Operation Torch and the 3rd group gave up their planes and some of their pilots as replacements. 
This is from memory and may be off a bit.
The P-38s completed just over 300 sorties in Europe in the fall 1942 and would not show up in Europe again (operationally) until the fall of 1943. 
There may have been some recon versions. 

P-38s fought all over the Pacific and in NA and Italy in late 1942 and through the first 3/4s of 1943 before they returned to to England.

Some of their troubles have to be seen in that light. Darn little experience in B-17 bomber escort in European winters until many months after the P-51B entered production.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 28, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I see where you're going!
> 
> Actually many top P-38 PTO aces had time in P-39s and some did quite well in them. Tom Lynch, Tom McGuire, Jack Jones, Donald McGee to name a few. Actually the P-39 did hold it's own to a point (as I said many times before) but it was limited in range and altitude performance. When the P-38 arrived in numbers the whole face of the battle changed, several memorable air battles took place at the end of December 1942 when Bong, Lynch, and Sparks scored multiple kills as the P-38 flew it's first combat missions. At that point the writing was on the wall.



And those American pilots who'd fought hard in the -39 now had the relative luxury of a P-38, I think. A school-of-hard-knocks thing the way I see it; if you can survive fighting the Japanese in an Airacobra, you'll probably do well in a Lightning.

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## 33k in the air (Jul 29, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> !2 on 2 certainly makes the tactic less chancy. Throw a little high yo-yo in while the enemy's got his head swiveling, yeah, you've got the power for it.



I though the reference to the lack of torque being an advantage an interesting one. I also recall reading somewhere how differential power application to the engines could also help tighten turns.

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## Sisu (Jul 29, 2021)

But what a great shape...

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 29, 2021)

33k in the air said:


> I though the reference to the lack of torque being an advantage an interesting one. I also recall reading somewhere how differential power application to the engines could also help tighten turns.



While I understand the concept of differential powering, using that in the moment of combat ... phew. 

I do get the balanced torque effect, but jockeying two throttles against each other, that's some crazy schtuff there.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 29, 2021)

33k in the air said:


> I though the reference to the lack of torque being an advantage an interesting one. I also recall reading somewhere how differential power application to the engines could also help tighten turns.


I don't recall that being used in combat with the P-38, though I've read many accounts of bombers having to resort to that procedure in order to steer their ship after catastrophic damage.
In order to manipulate the P-38's engines indepently, the throttle quadrant had to be uncoupled and then each throttle maneuvered in order to perform the needed move(s) - that is a rather complex procedure in the heat of battle.

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## Ascent (Jul 29, 2021)

I think everyone is used to it's shape now but looking closely at it and really thinking about it , it really was quite different to anything out there, a product of the experimentation of the late 30's which produced some quite far out designs.


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## BiffF15 (Jul 29, 2021)

Sisu said:


> But what a great shape...


The lead 38 in that shot is Lefty Garners, now seen on YouTube as the Red Bull Lightning.

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## BiffF15 (Jul 29, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> I don't recall that being used in combat with the P-38, though I've read many accounts of bombers having to resort to that procedure in order to steer their ship after catastrophic damage.
> In order to manipulate the P-38's engines indepently, the throttle quadrant had to be uncoupled and then each throttle maneuvered in order to perform the needed move(s) - that is a rather complex procedure in the heat of battle.



I've read of guys doing it in the P-38 to "tighten the turn". I would have to have one explain what they "think" was happening. As for splitting throttles in combat, it was almost a standard procedure amongst the experienced guys in the Eagle. There was only a few times we would do it, but the yawing you can get is impressive from your adversaries point of view (SE fighters can't do it obviously, so it's not in their fight mindset).

If you have seen a SE plane do a "hammer head" at an airshow, think about a twin doing the same maneuver. The difference being the twin can pull one back and use the split thrust to pirouette for a more controlled pure vertical turn. There are other places to use it, but the caution is you are pulling power off when you do it, and there are few times in my experience that it's smart to accomplish that when offensive in a slow speed fight.

Cheers,
Biff

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## Shortround6 (Jul 29, 2021)

Is the plane actually turning (changing direction of flight) or is it skewing/yawing (changing orientation to the direction of flight?) or perhaps a bit of both?

I don't fly so just asking. 
It might be useful for a quick snap shot?


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## BiffF15 (Jul 29, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> Is the plane actually turning (changing direction of flight) or is it skewing/yawing (changing orientation to the direction of flight?) or perhaps a bit of both?
> 
> I don't fly so just asking.
> It might be useful for a quick snap shot?


Short answer is both. In the case of a pirouette, the plane goes straight, or almost straight up, gets slow on speed, then you pull the inside motor back inducing a strong enough yaw to rotate the plane from pointing up to pointing down. The key is when to pull, how much, and when to push it back up. Pull too soon, and there isn’t enough yaw to induce the rotation, too late and you are starting to tail slide and the airflow is wrong such that again, you can’t induce the yawing moment for the desired outcome.

If your opponent is in a more horizontal turn, and you find yourself inside his turn circle (inside his turn) but with your nose well above the horizon, it can be an option. It also allows for rotating ones axis such that you reorient your lift vector (think of lift vector as to where you are pulling your nose) to come down inside his turn into an offensive position.

I’m guessing here but think the tighten the turn comments could actually be the initial turn in to a fight. In a twin, when you lose an engine, especially at a high power setting there is a yaw and a roll towards the dead engine. The 38 was initially a “slower roller” due to all the mass you need to move via ailerons (think engine mass / weight outside the centerline of the plane / prior to boosted flight controls). I’m thinking that the guys who pulled power to tighten the turn were actually using it only to start the roll, then pushing the the power back up as they started the pull portion of the “turn”. Pulling power would / could have been accompanied with a bit of rudder into the pulled engine to help induce the rolling motion. Pulling power on one engine while in a turn will not make a smaller turn circle.

Also in one of the above posts there was comments by a 38 driver regarding not being worried about the stall quite so much as he had no torque issues. In an Eagle, in that position (stick aft against the seat pan to hold the nose up), you can then use either throttle modulation or rudder input, or both, to get your nose and flight path to track in a given direction. It would have been an option for the Lightning guy as well.

The snapshot answer is yes. Sometimes you are unable to “fly” your nose to where you want it. In some cases, you can get your nose to move via yaw (induced by rudders, throttle modulation, or both) into a position to employ weapons. The difference between a snap and a tracking kill in training is the number of rounds you get on a guy, and where on his plane (assuming you got hits from the snap shot). In combat if you get hits in the right place (cockpit or other vital areas) very few rounds are required. Also if you get hits on your jet in real life, your chances of making a gross error go up exponentially. In training you can can sometimes induce an error on your opponent allowing you and entry / kill you might otherwise not have gotten.

Cheers,
Biff

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 29, 2021)

33k in the air said:


> I though the reference to the lack of torque being an advantage an interesting one. I also recall reading somewhere how differential power application to the engines could also help tighten turns.


Supposedly the more experienced pilots did this in combat to great effect!

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## drgondog (Jul 29, 2021)

I think your question requires discussions of which P-38? Like many other fine aircraft, the P-38 definitely morphed from 'high performance with major criticisms' along the way to an end product that could be named in the pantheon of great airplanes of the period.

For me, the P-38 from YP-38 through mid-block P-38E, while formidable based on speed and operational ceiling - they were more along the line of prototype/early production airframes with much unknown regarding how to transform from Interceptor (intended role) to General Purpose Fighter.

The Introduction of Pylons and plumbing kits (Late P-38E); to production maneuvering flaps and more reliable engines and turbos (F/G/H) but limited by Intercooler design to ~1000 Hp; to the Transition block P-38J-5/-10 and early J-15s which improved an solved Intercooler re-design and added 55gal LE tanks and introduced improvements in cockpit ergonomics and late block cockpit heating and improved fuel management; to the J-15 through L in which the dive flaps/boosted ailerons and the final Intercooler/turbo improvements that finally yielded full performance potential of the P-38.

ALL had compressibility issues due to airfoil selection, even though the dive flap introduced in the J-15 alleviated the dive control management issues (P-47 also and solved the same way).

The second block (P-38F/G/H acquitted itself well and was probably the most desired Fighter by AAF combat commands due to speed and range and load capability - but they did not operate reliably or well in the extreme cold of high altitude operations in the ETO. For this reason, 8th AF abandoned the P-38 in favor of the P-51B/D. The last block was formidable in the hands of mediocre and skilled pilot familiar with twin engine ops.

One question that you should ask is "why didn't the P-38J/L assume role of Long Range escort in Pacific operations against Japan? One of the answers that occurred to me - unproven - is that the operating 'best cruise' speed for LR escort for the Allisons was lower than both the P-51D and the B-29 Cruise speeds. 

All were very complex to maintain, had longer training requirements, were much more expensive to buy and operate than P-51/P-39/P-40. It was easy to spot, it was relatively complex to spool from Cruise to Combat settings, visibility to rear below the horizontal plane of the wing was more obscure that the S/E fighters. Before introduction of dive flap it was easy to evade in a dive. Before boosted ailerons it was easily out-rolled - an attribute more important than turn, but also out-turned by most S/E fighters (despite much touted differential throttles - which was best for yaw management in a high bank, rather than turn?). 

Biff could school me in this - but I wonder how the analogy of a twin engine fighter with thrust vectors close to C/L correlate to P-38 thrust vectors. I shudder in my feeble mind cutting low engine in LH turn to try to tighten the turn. Hold my beer!

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 29, 2021)

drgondog said:


> ALL had compressibility issues due to airfoil selection, even though the dive flap introduced in the J-15 alleviated the dive control management issues (P-47 also and solved the same way).


Great info Bill! Amazing how the P-38 has always been the "compressibility whipping boy" but how so many forget (or never knew) how other aircraft had the same issue.

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## BiffF15 (Jul 29, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Biff could school me in this - but I wonder how the analogy of a twin engine fighter with thrust vectors close to C/L correlate to P-38 thrust vectors. I shudder in my feeble mind cutting low engine in LH turn to try to tighten the turn. Hold my beer!



Bill,

The P-38 is a non-centerline bird while the Eagle is, or was (I think this changed) considered CL thrust. The reason the Eagle is considered CL is due to the engine out min control speed being well below the actual flown approach speed (engine out). However, while fighting you can get below that speed and easily influence nose movement through adverse yaw / power management. The Eagle has a Yaw Rate Warning Tone, that beeps above a certain rate of yaw IAW the rate of yaw. More yaw, the faster it beeps. A F-15C model guy transitioned to an E model and subsequently had an accident. It came to light that he was using the yaw rate warning tone as an indicator of max performing the jet and the community stopped that. Or thought they did. Before I left the jet 3 beeps were allowed, up from none for awhile. 

When offensive, but without enough nose authority to get a guy under the pipper, there is sometimes an option to yaw the plane enough to get the adversary under, or close enough to your nose to employ weapons. When established in a hard or max performance turn, any reduction in power, whether in a SE or a multi, will not help you turn better.

There are other times you can or would do this, but don’t want to compromise those who still fly it by letting the bad guys know everything we can do.

My examples are extreme cases. If you watch a SE air show performer, in an Extra / Sukhoi go straight up, then pin wheel turn to go down that is known as a pirouette. Most SE piston fighters don’t do this normally (although I’ve seen it done in a Mustang at low altitude in 356FG markings called Jagersvelt or something along those lines). This is predominantly due to what I think is rudder authority. If you can go straight up in a piston, you will have full or close to it right rudder. When you get to the top you swap rudder and go left (only choice in this instance). In a Eagle, you can go either direction, just like a Lightning. The Hornets FBW flight controls can do this automatically if the pilot asks it to.

While this is a slightly exploded view of split throttle operations, I think the P-38 guys who talked about it did it only with the roll portion (setting his lift vector) of a turn.

Cheers,
Biff

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## Shortround6 (Jul 30, 2021)

Thank you for your replies. 
I was thinking about this on a long drive yesterday about your comment for initiating the roll/turn. 
You could very well be right as I cannot figure out how once the plane is turning at even a 2 G turn rate and the plane is banked at 60 degrees how throttling back one engine helps. 

In a 60 degree bank cutting the "inner" (lower) engine doesn't seem like it is going to do much except perhaps lower the nose of the aircraft?
Any turn with a steeper bank angle is just going to make things worse? 
Keeping the "inner" (lower) engine at full throttle and cutting the outer/upper engine doesn't seem like it would affect the turn rate either. It might momentarily cause the nose to point higher as the plane skews but the turn rate is now controlled by the elevators isn't it? 

Point is, as I see it, (nonpilot) that the rudders and "skewing/yawing" the plane with the throttles aren't going to do much for turn rate once the bank angle gets close to 45 degrees. 

Am I missing something?
If throttling back on one engine causes that side of the airplane to dip as the plane starts to roll to that side I can understand getting to the desired bank angle a bit quicker.


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## special ed (Jul 30, 2021)

Is there any mention of P-38 pilots using the dive flaps as combat flaps to pitch up the nose in a turn.


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## BiffF15 (Jul 30, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> Thank you for your replies.
> I was thinking about this on a long drive yesterday about your comment for initiating the roll/turn.
> You could very well be right as I cannot figure out how once the plane is turning at even a 2 G turn rate and the plane is banked at 60 degrees how throttling back one engine helps.


*The only thing I can conclude is pulling back and engine helps to initiate the roll (in the P-38). Every "twin" I have flown rolls into the dead engine, or less powerful engine as a result of asymmetric thrust. Aircraft (not the F-16/22/35) have a single speed called Corner Velocity (CV). That is the speed you can pull back on the stick hard, hit max G allowable and max degrees per second of turn. If you are above this speed you will over G, or be limited by max G, before hitting max rate, if you are below this speed you will not hit either max G or rate. In the Eagle we would start a max performance turn above this speed, being very cautious to not over G. Once at or below this speed, if desired, one could bring the stick back to the seat pan thereby "max performing" the jet. In both the Eagles case, and with WW2 fighters, pulling the power above CV is done to control the size of your circle (big difference in the Eagle) but once close you accept the larger to only slightly larger circle size in return for a longer pull at highest / higher G. *


Shortround6 said:


> In a 60 degree bank cutting the "inner" (lower) engine doesn't seem like it is going to do much except perhaps lower the nose of the aircraft?


*Correct.*


Shortround6 said:


> Any turn with a steeper bank angle is just going to make things worse?
> Keeping the "inner" (lower) engine at full throttle and cutting the outer/upper engine doesn't seem like it would affect the turn rate either. It might momentarily cause the nose to point higher as the plane skews but the turn rate is now controlled by the elevators isn't it?


*Your first question assumes level flight (I think). In a fight the only time it's level is when at the floor. P39 Expert thought the fight would stay up high so his fuel flow numbers would work. That works if the enemy complies, which doesn't often happen. The vast majority of turning fights I have ever done go down. Usually in a spiral, with the nose of each aircraft below the horizon, as if following the threads of a giant bolt down towards the ground.

If you are at or below CV, you don't pull the power to turn better. You may pull it to "tighten the turn" which means decrease the size of your turn circle. Tighten the turn, tighten down, are both examples of bleeding off or cashing in airspeed in order to do something else. The tighten down can be used when offensive to help bring your nose to bear, or when defensive to cause an overshoot (a guy to go outside your turn circle / be unable to bring his nose to bear).

Yes, the turn when established, is controlled primarily by the elevators, but the rudders or ailerons also come into play. As does thrust / power. If you roll to 135 degrees of bank and pull, your nose will go well below the horizon, eventually bottom out, then track back up. Sort of a banana shaped, starting at and coming back to the horizon. To keep the bank in, one must do small continued input of roll.*


Shortround6 said:


> Point is, as I see it, (nonpilot) that the rudders and "skewing/yawing" the plane with the throttles aren't going to do much for turn rate once the bank angle gets close to 45 degrees.
> 
> Am I missing something?
> If throttling back on one engine causes that side of the airplane to dip as the plane starts to roll to that side I can understand getting to the desired bank angle a bit quicker.


*You are missing nothing. The skewing / yawing does nothing once in the turn to help the turn regardless of bank. The throttling back, in my opine, is done only to help initiate the roll but PRIOR to the pull.

Cheers,
Biff
PS: Sorry for the format, best I could do under the circumstances.*

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## Shortround6 (Jul 30, 2021)

special ed said:


> Is there any mention of P-38 pilots using the dive flaps as combat flaps to pitch up the nose in a turn.


The late P-38s had two flaps or perhaps better stated as one set of flaps and a set of spoilers. 






The "dive flap" is what is being pointed to and I doubt it is going to affect the pitch of the plane very much.

From the P-38F on the landing flaps could be lowered 8 degrees as "combat" flaps to increase wing area and lift.

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## special ed (Jul 30, 2021)

Thanks


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 30, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> The late P-38s had two flaps or perhaps better stated as one set of flaps and a set of spoilers.
> 
> View attachment 634751
> 
> ...


Milo Burcham with Bong. I met Milo Burcham Jr., briefly worked with him, spitting image of his dad

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## eagledad (Jul 30, 2021)

Greetings Special Ed

In *Fighter Tactics of the Aces*, John Loisel, an ace of the 475th Fighter Group, mentioned how some pilots were lowering their dive flaps after rolling into a turn, in the mistaken belief that the flaps would pull the nose of the aircraft through their target quicker. So it appears it was tried, but was probably not effective.

Eagledad

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## special ed (Jul 31, 2021)

Many thanks Eagledad. That seems to spark a memory. I probably read it many years ago and like so much else becomes blurred together.


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## Greyman (Jul 31, 2021)

Some opinions from P-38F pilots' experiences in the Med (from Shores' works):

_It was a poor aircraft at altitude in the fighter versus fighter role, and was most uncomfortable for the pilot due to the extreme cold. However in my opinion the P-38 could out-perform any single-engined fighter at 10,000 feet or below, particularly in a right turn. Until we learned to fly the line-abreast and four-ship finger formation, the Germans had a distinct advantage. Being the first Americans in combat, basically the combat tactical formations had to be developed. The formations that we evolved withstood the test by learning the hard way – experience ..._

_The Bf 109G and the Focke-Wulf were the only two single-engined fighters I encountered, and were in my opinion the best single-engined airplanes in the war. However, the P-38 could easily outmanoeuvre them at low altitude, particularly in a turn to the right. The German fighter pilots were extremely aggressive and well-trained, they were superior to any of the American forces in the beginning._

Colonel Ervin C. Ethell


_I flew the Lightning in the Tunisian campaign. As to the aircraft I would have preferred to fly, I think it was not as good as the Spitfire in fighting the Bf 109 and FW 190. I say this because the Luftwaffe in Tunisia was very experienced and highly qualified. ... The 109s and 190s would always be above us when we came into the target area and would dive through us firing as they came. The P-38 was difficult to whip into a fast turn and the guys with the biggest muscles in their legs could do the job best. Once you were able to turn into the 109s, they would roll over and go straight down and the P-38 could not follow because of the compressibility problem on the horizontal stabilizer and elevator. This meant the 109 and 190 were home free. Now the Spitfire and Kittyhawk could whip around into a turn very fast; being single-engined fighters, they were very manoeuvrable and could outturn the 109 and 190. Also they could dive straight down and pull out of the dive whenever they chose. The P-38 didn't have anything it could really do much better than the German fighters._

_Once you were into a turn, you could hold your own at most altitudes. The speed was just about touch and go, firepower was excellent, and you never minded meeting them head-on, but performance-wise, the P-38 didn't have any one attribute that was outstanding._

Captain Ralph J. Watson


_At the beginning of the campaign I preferred the Spitfire, although I had only three hours in the bird. I realized later the advantages of the P-38 which I flew on operations. These advantages were the longer range, twin-engined capability, and the real asset – firepower. ..._

_The 109 was the outstanding fighter in their inventory. The 20mm cannon gave them a great advantage at long range. Our P-38 cannon seldom worked (at least in my squadron). The turning rate was greater for the 109, so we did not try to turn with them. In a dive or a zoom we had a slight advantage. They almost always had the advantage of altitude._

Lieutenant Jack G. Walker


_Of the fighter types available to the Allies I preferred to fly the P-38 Lightning. For the missions we were flying in support of long-range bombing raids and fighter sweeps across the Mediterranean, we needed range, speed, and reliability. The P-38 being a twin-engined aircraft with considerable range gave us the vehicle we needed. I flew the Spitfire some, and although it was ideal for short-range combat in the immediate vicinity of the airfield and was able to turn rapidly, it was too limited in range for our use._

_The Kittyhawk was just about outdated by the time we were utilizing it in Tunisia. It, too, was limited in range and did not manoeuvre any better than the P-38 in turns. It did not have the acceleration and climb capabilities. ...

I considered the Bf 109 and FW 190 approximately equal to our own aircraft insofar as turn capability and armament, but we had greater range as well as higher concentration of firepower in a small area, i.e. four .50in plus one 20mm all firing straight forward in the nose of the P-38. I also flew against the Macchi 200 and we seemed to have a considerable advantage over those aircraft. I would compare that aircraft and that series of aircraft with our P-40._

Captain Ernest K. Osher

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## eagledad (Jul 31, 2021)

More Comments by P-38 pilots

Lt Col Mark Hubbard CO 20 FG said \"The P38 will out turn any enemy fighter in the air up to 20k .....when the enemy attacks we out turn him..\"

Major Herbert Johnson CO 77FS 20 FG \" We can definitely turn inside any German aircraft...Due to the beautiful stall characteristics of the P38.... If jumped o the deck, the best evasive manouvre is a tight level turn. you can turn much tighter without the danger of spinning in..........\

Captain Maurice McLary 55Fs/20 FG wrote \" anyone flying a P38 should have no fear of any enemy aircraft -even dog-fighting a single-engined fighter at a decent altitude. I consider anything below 20,000 a decent altitude for a P38 \"

Captain Merle B Nichols 79 FS/20 FG wrote \"We, with our type of aircraft like them below 25,000ft and if possible at 20,000 ft\"

Above from VIII Fighter Command At War \"Long Reach\" Official training document. (see Osprey reprint).

Col Oliver Taylor, commander of the 14th​ fighter group in Italy during the first half of 1944 had the following to say about the P-38 his group flew: (as recounted in “P-38 Lightning” by Jeff Ethell)

Bad Points:

Ease of Handling: It required at least twice as much flying time, perhaps more to achieve the level of skill which was necessary to realize the full capability of he ship compared with a single engine fighter. Only after about 150 to 200 hours could a man hope to be an expert _but when he reached that point he could be unbeatable in a 38._ (Italics added by me)

Vertical Dives: The 38 could not be controlled in a vertical dive if allowed to build up speed, and that happened awfully damned fast, with speed rapidly building up thereafter until something came apart. The (Axis) knew this well.

Distinctive silhouette: The (Axis), on seeing a lone plane off in the distance would generally leave it be unless he had absolutely nothing else in prospect at the moment. On seeing the unique P-38 silhouette, however, there would be no doubt at all and after it he would go knowing that it would not be a waste of time.

Good Points:

Stability: The plane could be turned into a tight turn, essentially right at the stall point, without snapping out or dropping. The counter rotating props eliminated any torque problems when passing through a range of speeds…..

Maneuverability: Generally we found that the 38 could out-maneuvered anything, friend or foe, between 18,000 and 31,000 feet (5490-9450 meters). Below 18,000 it was sort of a toss-up except that very near the ground we could run (the Axis) right into the dirt, since he apparently couldn’t get quite such a fast pull-out response as we could.

Range: a 500 mile (800km) distant target was easily reached allowing for 30 to 45 minutes for possible diversions….

Single Engine Flight: The 38 was just as controllable turning into as away from a dead engine.

Engine Configuration: Aside from having another engine to bring you home in case one is lost, the two-engine arrangement provided exceptionally good visibility forward for the pilot and provided protection from flanking enemy fire , especially during low-level strafing runs.

Rugged Construction: The 38 could take a phenomenal amount of beating up and still make it home. One was hit by an ME-109, one wing of the 109 having slashed along the inside of the right boom, carrying away the inside cooler and slicing the horizontal stabilizer/elevator assembly in two. The 109 lost its wing and crashed. The 38 flew 300 miles (480km) on one engine to belly land …at base. (the pilot was Lt Thomas W Smith, 37th​ squadron; the mission took place on Jan 16, 1944. Something similar happen to Jack Ilfrey a pilot in the 20th​ Group on May 24, 1944)

Ease of Maintenance: …The general feeling seemed to be that both the P-38 and the Allison engines were very easy to maintain…..

Some German opinions, however I have no source for these so any corrections or sources would be appreciated.

*Horst Petzschler of JG 3:*
" ... The P-38 had its positive attributes which we respected. At higher altitudes it was faster and could out-turn both the Focke-Wulf 190 and the Messerschmitt 109. It was faster in a dive, but this was probably due to it being a heavier aircraft. Our instructors stressed that American pilots were well-trained and very aggressive ... Veteran pilots told us to exploit its weaknesses like the blind spot presented by its odd configuration below and behind its tail, which allowed us to sneak up on it. It was observed that when the P-38 went into an extremely steep dive at high speed it could not recover ... its biggest drawback was that it could be easily identified from long distances. It looked like our own Fw 189 Owl. Many Lightnings were left in their aluminum finish and this made them easily identifiable, but we figured this was done to increase their speed.
Leutnant Anton 'Toni' Hafner was one of the veteran pilots I flew with, scoring 204 aerial victories before he was killed in October 1944. Toni said that the P-38 was a hard fighter to combat and was equal to the Me 109 in maneuverability ... "

*Willi Reschke of JG 301:*
"... On 7 January 1945 ... we ran into three P-38 Lightnings east of Herzberg. We knew this type of escort fighter well from our days in Austria, but we had not yet encountered them in the Berlin area. There followed a brief dogfight and I hit one of the P-38s with a burst from my guns. The enemy fighter dived away immediately and disappeared. As the other P-38s were still in front we were unable to pursue the machine I had fired at. Actually this ended the engagement, for all we could do is admire the P-38s rate of climb. We simply couldn't keep up in our Fw 109 A-8s ..."

In May 1944, Horst Petzschler was shot down by a USAAF P-38 after a dramatic 15-minute chase from 24,000 feet down to the deck. (I make note of this only because of the circumstances). When Petzschler attacked a group B-17s, a trio of Lightnings latched onto his tail. He tried to escape using the best known advice; a steep high-speed dive. However, the P-38s stayed in hot pursuit all the way down, close enough to see their guns blazing as he looked back. After Petzschler pulled out of the dive and leveled off, the P-38s gradually gained on him despite the fact that his Daimler-Benz engine was working fine and "purring like a kitten" as he put it. As the tracers flashed past his cockpit, Petzschler's Me 109 was hit by gunfire in the wings and coolant system. His altitude was too low to bail out, so he crash-landed north of Berlin.

More to follow if I have time.

Eagledad

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## eagledad (Jul 31, 2021)

Some more information from German point of view

'The Luftwaffe fighter force.The view from the cockpit' by Adolf Galland et al, edited by david C. Isby ISBN 1-85367-327-7

under chapter 30 'GAF opinions of allied aircraft'

Interigation of Generalleutnant Galland,Generalfeldmarschel Milch,Oberstleutnant Bar,Generalmajor Hitschhold, and Leutnant Neuman at kaufbeuren Germany 2nd september 1945.

'The Lightning (P38) This aircraft was very fast and had a good rate of climb below 20,000 feet. Visibility backwards , downwards and over the engines was very poor.It was considered a good strafer due to its armament ,visibilty,speed and silent motors.Its main drawback were its *vulnerability and lack of maneuverability*.On the deck, it could out-run the me.109 and fw190.*German fighters would always attack the P38s in preference to other allied escort fighters*.'

'The thunderbolt (P47) This aircraft was exceptionally fast in a dive, *but could be outdistanced at the start of the dive by the Me109*.It would absorb *many cannon hits* and still fly.'

'The mustang (P51) This was the best American fighter because of its long range,climb and dive characteristics, fire power and maneuverability.*It was very vulnerbale to cannon fire*.It would *break up during very violent dives and maneuvers*.'

'The warhawk(P40) This aircraft was inferior as a modern fighter.The models with only *4x50 cal MGs were considered to be too lightly armed*.It was slow and could not *dive* or climb.Its best quality was that it could outturn the me109 and fw190 below 12,000 feet.'

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 31, 2021)

Great info Eagledad! I think was the main point to drive home;

"Bad Points:

*Ease of Handling: It required at least twice as much flying time, perhaps more to achieve the level of skill which was necessary to realize the full capability of he ship compared with a single engine fighter*. Only after about 150 to 200 hours could a man hope to be an expert _but when he reached that point he could be unbeatable in a 38._ (Italics added by me)"

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## eagledad (Jul 31, 2021)

Further comments

Hub Zemeke was CO of 56th​ FG and later the 474th​ FG CO. He flew the P-38. P-47 and P-51 in combat. His comments follow below

“Though this aircraft had some virtues, for me it was the poorest of the three US Army Air Corp fighters in the European Theater. The fact that the extreme cold at altitude affected its performance hardly endeared it to me. ….. The second factor that detracted from the combat capability of the P-38nwasthat it was limited to a maximum diving speed of 375mph indicated. ….. Now the above statements should not lead one to conclude that the P-38 had no good features, it did! As a gun platform it was as steady as a shooting stand. ….”

Above from Mustang A Documentary History by Jeff Ethell pg 70.

Zemeke’s favorite air to air fighter aircraft of the 3 according to the book was the P-51.

Robin Olds wrote

The P-38 was a wonderful fighter in many respects ….. It was fast, easy to fly … and would turn with the best of them, providing you had an exceedingly strong right arm, It was honest in most respects, giving ample stall warning under all flight conditions and easy to recover if you ignored it.”

479th​ Fighter Group ‘Riddle’s Raiders’ by John Stanaway pg 66.

Yet, as much as Old’s loved the P-38 (being the first fighter he fought in), he loved the P-51 even more.

Finally, William Leverette, a P-38 ace with 11 victories (including claims for 7 Ju 87’s in one mission) was not overly fond of the P-38, because he found it tiring to fly!

P-38 Lighting Aces of the ETO/MTO John Stanaway, pg 4 (Description of painting on cover)

Eagledad

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## eagledad (Jul 31, 2021)

Flyboy

Agree with you. It puts Art Heiden's comments on twin engine training and fighter pilot training for the P-38 in general in perspective. I believe both the 367th FG and 370th FG trained stateside in aircraft that were not P-38's. (367th on P-39's and 370th on P-47's) That is a pretty tough way for a pilot to build 250 hrs in a P-38 before combat.

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 1, 2021)

NTGray said:


> I have some questions about the P-38, and I’m inviting comments.
> 
> I’ve always considered the Lightning a super cool craft, both because of the way it looks and performs and because it was one of the earliest products of Kelly Johnson’s team at Lockheed which would become known as the Skunk Works. It was the first combat airplane to achieve 400 mph in level flight. And even though it came out _before _the P-40 and the P-39, both of those planes ceased production in 1944, but the Lightning was good enough to be produced throughout the entire war.
> 
> ...















Just note that the report states the Fw190 being compared with here is de-rated (i.e boost lowered to ~1.3ata) - so once BMW got their engines sorted out the Fw190 would be about 15>20mph faster than the one tested here.

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## PAT303 (Aug 1, 2021)

I think the biggest problem with the P38 is that by the time it was sorted out it didn't do anything the P51 and P47 were already doing, and they were established fighters.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 1, 2021)

PAT303 said:


> I think the biggest problem with the P38 is that by the time it was sorted out it didn't do anything the P51 and P47 were already doing, and they were established fighters.


Not necessarily true - the P-38's issues were continually addressed and improved. Later model P-38Js and Ls were great performers and in some areas out performed both the P-51 and P-47. It was more expensive to operate and required more pilot training but remained the premier AAF fighter in the PTO until the the Mustang started to arrive in numbers later in the war.

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## Aeroweanie (Aug 2, 2021)

I thought Snowygrouch was going to beat me to it. HIs book makes clear (I've read it cover to cover) that the original P-38 models had a really poor intercooler design that was finally improved on the P-38J. In addition, it really needed the equivalent of the Fw 190's _Kommandogerät_ as there were too many controls to be adjusted to properly control the engines, props and turbochargers.

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## drgondog (Aug 2, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Not necessarily true - the P-38's issues were continually addressed and improved. Later model P-38Js and Ls were great performers and in some areas out performed both the P-51 and P-47. It was more expensive to operate and required more pilot training but remained the premier AAF fighter in the PTO until the the Mustang started to arrive in numbers later in the war.


I agree with the basic premise. Warts and all, it was the 'best all round fighter' deployed by AAF through late 1943. The issues encountered in ETO were largely absent in Pacific and MTO based on lower altitude mission profile for most escort escort. Kelly Johnson put his finger on the two most important operational deficiencies - namely the intercooler design through H and the continued issues through J-15 which limited horsepower delivery to 1000+HP until solved - and they were inter-related with engine detonation, oil cooling and turbo.. The second issue that was introduced and never fully solved was the compressibility/controllability issues of the wing and wing/fuselage design. The Dive flap introduced by J-25 along with boosted ailerons finally introduced the 'reality to the potential' in late 1944 but only enabled full control in the .6M dive. It could not keep up with P-51/47 or Fw 190/Bf 109 in a dive.

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 2, 2021)

Aeroweanie said:


> I thought Snowygrouch was going to beat me to it. HIs book makes clear (I've read it cover to cover) that the original P-38 models had a really poor intercooler design that was finally improved on the P-38J. In addition, it really needed the equivalent of the Fw 190's _Kommandogerät_ as there were too many controls to be adjusted to properly control the engines, props and turbochargers.


I`d just like to clarify, there was nothing at all wrong with the original intercooler design. Its just that if you use the leading edge of the wing as your intercooler, you
leave yourself only an incredibly expensive and difficult route to increase its cooling capacity. Since this inevitably happened as everyones engines got progressively more powerful as time went, on, it was more a case than accidentally designed-in-obsolescence, than anything else. If you have the coolers in pods or just a traditional heat exchanger of some sort, its always a lot easier to make it deeper, or change the duct geometry or improve the exchanger fin density etc. It was just an extremely inflexible design, with no upgrade path - but it would have been fine at the engine outputs originally envisaged.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 2, 2021)

According the Vees for Victory the XP-38 had V-1710-11/15 engines that were rated at 1150hp for take-off and 1000hp at 25,000ft (misprint?) 
The YP-38s though the P-38Es had V-1710-27/29s rated at 1150hp for take-off and 1150hp at 25,000ft. if the 1000hp at 25,000ft is correct then the problem of too small an intercooler may be starting to show up or perhaps Lockheed did allow for a bit of growth. 
The P-38F & G had 1325hp engines for both take-off and at 25,000ft (officially) and here is where the not enough intercooling starts to show up. The engines may not have actually been able to reach the "official" rated power at altitude. 
The P-38 H introduced the 1425hp engines and the intercooler really was inadequate. 
AS noted by others the J model saw the change in intercooler design. Allowing for a 35-45% increase in power (and airflow requirements) may have required a very special crystal ball. 
P-38 was being designed as 100/100 octane fuel was just being introduced. Believing that in just 2-3 years fuel would be available that would support a 30% increase in power output from the same sized engines turning the same rpm might have seemed a bit too far fetched.


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## P-39 Expert (Aug 3, 2021)

1943 P-38 had plenty of faults (intercoolers, low mach number, cockpit heat, high maintenance, high cost etc) but it did have range. 1943 P-47 was probably a better, more survivable weapon with it's own faults (climb, turn) but it did not have range.

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## K5083 (Aug 3, 2021)

A word about 'European/British fuel'. It was the same fuel as used in every other allied aircraft. It was not drilled in Europe or England, it came across the Atlantic in tankers. It was used by the other three US turbocharged aircraft. Nothing wrong with the fuel.

P-38s in the ETO had a claim/loss ratio of 1:1. P-47s 4:1 and P-51s about the same. When groups traded in their Lightnings for Mustangs their kill/loss went up by four times instantly. But never mind, it was the fifth-best American fighter. It cost more than the others and did no better. Not a terrible flop, not too bad at all, just not really up to the myth.


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## K5083 (Aug 3, 2021)

As far as range is concerned, that's true. But the P-38 had a six-week advantage in deployment over the P-51B, during which time few long-range missions were carried out by the Eighth., recovering from second Schweinfurt. The impression you get of the P-38 holding the line on its own for a long time is wrong, check it.

Somewhere I have a spreadsheet comparing the group performances during Big Week. I think it's a fair comparison during a time three groups had P-38s and had time to work on the training and bugs. I'll post it later after I make some sense out of it.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 3, 2021)

In late 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the best US fighter. In early 1943 to mid 1943 the F4U and P-47 began to show up in enough numbers to challenge it and/or push it to 3rd place. Late 1943 P-38s (in service, not at the factory) were the ones with problems in Europe and P-47s were struggling with range. Late 1943 is when the F6Fs show up. Very late/early 1944 has the P-38Js (or not first model Js) show up with some problems fixed but it also is when the P-51Bs show up, P-47s are also getting better (new props, water injection, better/more drop tanks) spring/summer of 1944 has the later P-38Js showing up with even more of the problems solved but with the P-51Ds just barely appearing. 
The F6F pretty much stagnated for quite a while, it also took a while for any big changes to happen to the F4U (like for the F4U-4 to show up).

While ranking of the top 5 didn't change from week to week there could have been quite a bit of shuffling for the bottom 4 places after the P-51s showed up depending on which month and which models you are comparing.

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## drgondog (Aug 3, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> 1943 P-38 had plenty of faults (intercoolers, low mach number, cockpit heat, high maintenance, high cost etc) but it did have range. 1943 P-47 was probably a better, more survivable weapon with it's own faults (climb, turn) but it did not have range.


The P-47C and D had more combat radius than any P-39 model. 

The P-47 and P-38 both out-turned P-39 above 25K (probably lower). In case you were unaware (highly probable) HP Available over HP Required is crucial at altitude - both the P-38 and P-47 were at full HP at 25K. The P-39 not so much. Additionally the combined high wing loading and low power at altitude made the difference between stall and top speed much lower than P-47 and P-38.

The low P-38 Critical Mach number was only important (vs P-39 or say Fw 190) in a dive, as the P-38 was a lot faster than any P-39 at all altitudes. The lack of heating was important flaw for P-38 - but irrelevant for P-39 because it didn't operate at P-38 ceilings.

Summary - for AAF Combat Doctrine, the P-39 served zero role other than short range low/medium altitude interceptor - or close air support. The P-40 was better at CAS and the P-39 never served the AAF as 'Interceptor' save for short period at Greenland. The 37mm, in the rare times it fired twice in succession, was effective against light armor. The guys I knew that flew the P-400 and -39 preferred the P-400 20mm.

In early1943 the AAF made a decision that for battlefield attack, the P-51 (A-36, P-51A, P-51B) were tasked and the P-38/F4 were tasked to perform Recon. The decision to replace the P-39 and P-40 in those roles was made in 1943 and both were scheduled for full retirement in early 1944.

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## drgondog (Aug 3, 2021)

K5083 said:


> A word about 'European/British fuel'. It was the same fuel as used in every other allied aircraft. It was not drilled in Europe or England, it came across the Atlantic in tankers. It was used by the other three US turbocharged aircraft. Nothing wrong with the fuel.
> 
> P-38s in the ETO had a claim/loss ratio of 1:1. P-47s 4:1 and P-51s about the same. When groups traded in their Lightnings for Mustangs their kill/loss went up by four times instantly. But never mind, it was the fifth-best American fighter. It cost more than the others and did no better. Not a terrible flop, not too bad at all, just not really up to the myth.


I did a lot of research on my first book on this specific topic and refined it for second book. I looked at ALL VIII FC MACRs as well as 8th AF VCB, USAF 85, and Olynyks data in order to mark transition from aircraft type (i.e 4th FG from Spitfire through 4/1/43, P-47 through Big Week and 2-27-44, P-51 thereafter).

The MACR's could ever be 100% definitive as several 'last seen' comments vs 'shot don by enemy fighters' exist - reducing the judgment to a.) was enemy aircraft likely encountered, or b.) no enemy encounter viewed in the area. Post VE Day pilot interviews atatched to MACRS cleared some up but in general I put these in "other (weather/mechanical) or 'lost in aerial combat. There was high correlation in Miller's Fighter Units and Pilots of the 8th AF running details.

That said the air to air VC results for VIII FC were:
P-38 266 VC, 101 Losses 2.6:1
P-47 1567 VC, 214 Losses 7.3:1
P-51 3341 VC, 324 Losses 10.3:1

I'm working on MTO and SWP/CBI where the source data is nowhere close to ETO - But the P-38 air to air ratio was significantly better. Given that F6F and F4U were excellent fighters - the P-38 was unmatched for LR escort and air dominance in SWP as land based fighter.

Recall that as good as the F4U and F6F were, they couldn't perform even as well as pre-P-38J in ETO escort role - just didn't have even the combat radius of the P-47.

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## drgondog (Aug 3, 2021)

K5083 said:


> As far as range is concerned, that's true. But the P-38 had a six-week advantage in deployment over the P-51B, during which time few long-range missions were carried out by the Eighth., recovering from second Schweinfurt. The impression you get of the P-38 holding the line on its own for a long time is wrong, check it.
> 
> Somewhere I have a spreadsheet comparing the group performances during Big Week. I think it's a fair comparison during a time three groups had P-38s and had time to work on the training and bugs. I'll post it later after I make some sense out of it.


the 364th wasn't operational until March 2nd, so only two P-38 FG, two P-51B (354/357) but 363rd got into ops on 2-24. In all nine -47 (incl. 9th AF) were in Big Week Full time.

I have old numbers for 2-20 through 2-25. Source VIII VCB and USAF 85. Both sources agree, including the error noted below.
P-38 8 VC
P-47 78 VC
P-51 64.5

The 0.5 credited to 354FG Bob Stephens on 24 Feb was theoretically shared with 20th FG, but full VC (Morris) was awarded to 20th FG on the 24th. So, 1.5 VC over 1.0 Me 110 was recorded. Error in reconciliation process between 8th and 9th AF.

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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

In the ETO the P-38 was the starting pitcher in long range escort missions. The Mustang was the relief pitcher and came in after the Luftwaffe was on it's last legs because the escorted bombers had devastated their factories etc. The Lightning fought the best of the best while outnumber while the P-51 fought rookies and were allowed to do fighter sweeps hence their record of more kills. 

The P-38 has been systematically denigrated to cover up the deadly errors of the Bomber Mafia.

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## drgondog (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> In the ETO the P-38 was the starting pitcher in long range escort missions. The Mustang was the relief pitcher and came in after the Luftwaffe was on it's last legs because the escorted bombers had devastated their factories etc. The Lightning fought the best of the best while outnumber while the P-51 fought rookies and were allowed to do fighter sweeps hence their record of more kills.
> 
> The P-38 has been systematically denigrated to cover up the deadly errors of the Bomber Mafia.


??? So the LW was on its last legs in fall 1943? The factories were devastated? Schweinfurt and Regensburg were laid to rest and German industry shut down in fall 1943?

Hairog, we missed your introduction to our merry band of idiots that hold somewhat different views of the battle for control of German airspace before D-Day? 

Can you elaborate more for those of us that obviously have no clue?

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> 1943 P-38 had plenty of faults (intercoolers, low mach number, cockpit heat, high maintenance, high cost etc) but it did have range. 1943 P-47 was probably a better, more survivable weapon with it's own faults (climb, turn) but it did not have range.


To say the maintenance and high cost was a major problem in 1943 is an exaggeration as during that time the US was fighting the war with almost an open checkbook. As mentioned many times, General George Kenny couldn't get enough P-38s and had to briefly settle for P-47 because P-38s weren't available. Despite the intercooler and compressibility issues, the 1943 P-38G and Hs were still able to carry the fight, especially in the PTO where it's record speaks for itself. Lockheed LISTENED to it's customer and noted issues were addressed in the J and L.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

Gents - lets keep the banter to a minimum please.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2021)

German industry was anything but on it's "last legs" by 1943 - their aircraft production in 1944 saw the highest numbers produced, more than any point since they started preparing for war in the 1930's.

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> In the ETO the P-38 was the starting pitcher in long range escort missions. The Mustang was the relief pitcher and came in after the Luftwaffe was on it's last legs because the escorted bombers had devastated their factories etc. The Lightning fought the best of the best while outnumber while the P-51 fought rookies and were allowed to do fighter sweeps hence their record of more kills.
> 
> The P-38 has been systematically denigrated to cover up the deadly errors of the Bomber Mafia.



Someone has been watching too much "Gregs Aeroplanes" youtube channel... 🤦‍♂️

Either that or you have made an excellent satire post, in which case 10/10 points.

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## Peter Gunn (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> In the ETO the P-38 was the starting pitcher in long range escort missions. The Mustang was the relief pitcher and came in after the Luftwaffe was on it's last legs because the escorted bombers had devastated their factories etc. The Lightning fought the best of the best while outnumber while the P-51 fought rookies and were allowed to do fighter sweeps hence their record of more kills.
> 
> The P-38 has been systematically denigrated to cover up the deadly errors of the Bomber Mafia.


I haven't laughed so hard since the P-39 thread.

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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

Sporting analogies can be taken too far, since a pitcher holds liquid, a relief pitcher conjures up a very negative image outside of the baseball world. The combined bomber offensive cant be boiled down (OMG I am doing it now) to a catch phrase and a single chart. Other charts show other sides of a discussion and as far as I know the US and UK had 4 pitchers on the field of play during the match, three of them improved dramatically while the game was taking place. This was a remarkable effort because the day before they were all told they wouldnt be needed in a game of hockey.

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## SaparotRob (Aug 3, 2021)

drgondog said:


> ??? So the LW was on its last legs in fall 1943? The factories were devastated? Schweinfurt and Regensburg were laid to rest and German industry shut down in fall 1943?
> 
> Hairog, we missed your introduction to our merry band of idiots that hold somewhat different views of the battle for control of German airspace before D-Day?
> 
> Can you elaborate more for those of us that obviously have no clue?


Hey! I’m not merry!

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## SaparotRob (Aug 3, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> German industry was anything but on it's "last legs" by 1943 - their aircraft production in 1944 saw the highest numbers produced, more than any point since they started preparing for war in the 1930's.


Even I know that.

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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> German industry was anything but on it's "last legs" by 1943 - their aircraft production in 1944 saw the highest numbers produced, more than any point since they started preparing for war in the 1930's.



Annual figures can be somewhat deceptive. Monthly figures are more useful. On a monthly basis, German armaments production, as measured by Speer's armaments index, peaked in July of 1944 and fell off rapidly after that.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2021)

33k in the air said:


> Annual figures can be somewhat deceptive. Monthly figures are more useful. On a monthly basis, German armaments production, as measured by Speer's armaments index, peaked in July of 1944 and fell off rapidly after that.


Fair enough.
However, if we compile aircraft produced (all types) each month and then add those twelve months together for that particular year, then we have an annual sum of numbers.

Like so:
1939: 1,928
1940: 7,829
1941: 9,422
1942: 12,822
1943: 20,599
1944: 35,076
1945: 7,052

Now, considering Germany was "on it's last legs" in 1943, the numbers for 1944 (regardless when production "fell off") still showed a higher production number than the year prior.
And an interesting side-note: Germany managed to produce almost as many aircraft in the four months of 1945 as were produced in the twelve months of 1940.

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## Ovod (Aug 3, 2021)

Germany also produced almost 19,000 armoured fighting vehicles (tanks, SPGs, etc) in 1944 - almost as much as the US did in the same year.

German armored fighting vehicle production during World War II - Wikipedia
American armored fighting vehicle production during World War II - Wikipedia

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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> In the ETO the P-38 was the starting pitcher in long range escort missions. The Mustang was the relief pitcher and came in after the Luftwaffe was on it's last legs because the escorted bombers had devastated their factories etc. The Lightning fought the best of the best while outnumber while the P-51 fought rookies and were allowed to do fighter sweeps hence their record of more kills.
> 
> The P-38 has been systematically denigrated to cover up the deadly errors of the Bomber Mafia.


Such statistics are subject to the "lies, damned lies and statistics rule". On the Schweinfurt Regensburg raid it could be argued that the LW shot down as many aircraft as they possibly could at the time. So sending twice as many bombers would reduce the percentage losses by half. This was in part the basis of day and night time bombing campaigns. Without considering how many bombers were used and what they were doing the chart means little.

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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

Sorry, I thought the chart and the quote below it were pretty easy to comprehend. I'll dumb it down from now on. 

Another apology is in order. I should have specified the Petroleum industry. If you don't have fuel you can't train new pilots. 

I suggest that you read my post again but slowly this time. 

I never said that the Luftwaffe was on it's last legs in the fall of 1943. Again I refer to the chart and quote below it. The Luftwaffe was defeated between September 1943 when the P-38 was flying the large majority of long range escort missions and *March of 1944. *

In the time period under discussion, the P-38 flew 6338 long range escort sorties, while the P-51 racked up 4722, but only 736 with the 8th. The remainder of 2688 were with the 9th Air Force. 

Look at the chart again and you will see that the bomber losses dropped immediately after the P-38 was allowed to join the fight despite Hap Arnold attempts at sabotage by not allowing the introduction of external fuel tanks. Hap Arnold did many great things but he really screwed the pooch concerning bomber escorts. To cover his tracks, the myths about the Lightning's role in the ETO have erroneously and constantly been repeated.

Once the P-38 started escorting the bombers the losses plummeted and the bombers were free to drop bombs on the fuel production sites. Losses went from an unsustainable over 7% to a war winning 2.25%. The P-38 did it's job to perfection and the bombers did the rest. 

As to escaping a P-38, say you got too close to the bombers and the Lightnings started to engage. No problem you say and just dive away. That dive took you out of the fight as you would be unable to again get into position to attack as the bombers flew on. Who won that fight? Who fulfilled it's mission?
The attacker was suppose to shoot down the bombers. Instead it ran. The P-38s, though out their period of long range escort. were wedded to the bombers and had strict order to stay with them. The had no opportunity to chase fleeing fighters. If they had their kill numbers would have soared. 
The escaping 109/190 starts his dive and pulls away from the P-38 until 25,000 feet. Then he is in deep shit because the p-38 starts to reel him in and he can do nothing to escape. The Lightning can out turn him, out climb him, out dive him and has the height advantage.

The P-51 was allowed to finish the job and chase the enemy to his base, if need be and shoot him down as he tries to land.

The Lockheed engineers invented numerous improvements to simplify and automate many of the critical functions. One combined 4 functions into one control lever. They were all rejected by the powers that be for various reasons mostly concerning the possibility of slowing down production. Again Lockheed provided numerous solutions that would have prevented any slow up and they were again rejected. 

Hap and the rest of the Bomber Mafia wanted the Lightning to succeed but also wanted to keep quiet the fact that they had one of the best escorts available from day one. Despite numerous warnings and examples from the Spanish Civil war, they sent unescorted bombers and their crews to their destruction. In order to keep their career's alive, they had to play down the P-38 and it's obvious capabilities and contributions. They had to claim that the Lightning was not doing the job so they had no capable aircraft until the P-51. The facts prove otherwise and the *escorted *bombers got through.

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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> Sorry, I thought the chart and the quote below it were pretty easy to comprehend. I'll dumb it down from now on.
> Look at the chart again


I fear this is not going to end well. You look at the chart again and tell me how many bombers were in operation, not a percentage of losses. 1 bomber lost from a flight of 10 is 10%, 10 bombers lost from 1,000 is 1%.


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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

The chart and percentage of loss means a great deal. The difference of 7 vs 3% loss rate saved the daylight bombing campaign. Do the math, you had virtually no chance of flying 25 missions and surviving with 7% losses. Moral was in the toilet because the bomber crews could do the math.


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## ClayO (Aug 3, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> I don't recall that being used in combat with the P-38, though I've read many accounts of bombers having to resort to that procedure in order to steer their ship after catastrophic damage.
> In order to manipulate the P-38's engines indepently, the throttle quadrant had to be uncoupled and then each throttle maneuvered in order to perform the needed move(s) - that is a rather complex procedure in the heat of battle.


I remember watching a show on the Military History Channel (I don't remember which one) where a P-38 pilot (I don't remember who) was diving with a FW-190 on his tail; when his altitude got low enough to force him to level off, he used differential thrust and crossed controls to put the airplane into a skid; as the FW-190 shot past him, he straightened his plane out, applied full throttle and shot the FW-190 down. I remember wondering if he had practiced that maneuver, came up with it on the spot, or maybe had time to think of it during the dive? Any way you look at it, it was a helluva piece of flying.

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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> The chart and percentage of loss means a great deal. The difference of 7 vs 3% loss rate saved the daylight bombing campaign. Do the math, you had virtually no chance of flying 25 missions and surviving with 7% losses. Moral was in the toilet because the bomber crews could do the math.


When did the US forces start bombing missions only with P-38s as escorts? That is without Spitfires, P-47s and P-51s?


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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

Long Range Bombing Missions. Please think before you post.


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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> Long Range Bombing Missions. Please think before you post.


I am thinking, a long range bombing mission required four sometimes more waves of escorts for input and withdrawal. In the early days the fist and last legs were done by Spitfires, then P-47s and frequently a mix of all 4 types. I am not an expert on the subject, I have just been reading posts by people who are, so I suggest you cool your heels.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

Folks - again, stop the banter and insults, I'd hate to close this thread down!


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## Snowygrouch (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> Long Range Bombing Missions. Please think before you post.


Thats a brave request considering the contents of your last few posts...

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 3, 2021)

Incidentally, I just found this nice set of stats 15mins ago. Just rattled then into EXCEL so they show up better.

Genuinely shocked at a couple of them. Very surprised how cheap a P-51 is, and also although I knew the
P-47 was expensive, its nearly twice a P-51 in cost. P-38 pretty expensive, although on a "per engine"
basis its probably not too bad. (Bombers I just left in because its a nice reference, although a bit off topic
for this thread I suppose).







(Source = page 134 of this)

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> Incidentally, I just found this nice set of stats 15mins ago. Just rattled then into EXCEL so they show up better.
> 
> Genuinely shocked at a couple of them. Very surprised how cheap a P-51 is, and also although I knew the
> P-47 was expensive, its nearly twice a P-51 in cost. P-38 pretty expensive, although on a "per engine"
> ...



Do the costs shown include Government Furnished Equipment? (Engines, turbosuperchargers, radio and radar equipment)


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## Snowygrouch (Aug 3, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Do the costs shown include Government Furnished Equipment? (Engines, turbosuperchargers, radio and radar equipment)


I dont know !

Let me have a look.... I hope it tells us somewhere.... *5mins elapses*

Umm ok this is what it says, I hope you understand it, as I`m not sure I do...

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> I dont know !
> 
> Let me have a look.... I hope it tells us somewhere.... *5mins elapses*
> 
> ...


It seems it generally includes GFE. Mod centers may install equipment specific to an operator at a designated location. The last paragraph basically says (to my understanding) the prices shown have included cost reductions for future deliveries (probably based on quantities ordered)


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## Snowygrouch (Aug 3, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> It seems it generally includes GFE. Mod centers may install equipment specific to an operator at a designated location. The last paragraph basically says (to my understanding) the prices shown have included cost reductions for future deliveries (probably based on quantities ordered)


Ok, so I`ve done a more complete graph, instead of averaging it, this shows how the cost varied as time went on. P-38 has a pretty decent downward cost progression (which is I suppose exactly what you`d expect), but conversly, the P-63 got MORE expensive as time went on, and the P-51 is pretty much flat.

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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

When a B-24 costs around 8 times what a fighter costs and there were 18,000+ made, its pretty clear the cost of a fighter didn't weigh much on anyone's minds.

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 3, 2021)

pbehn said:


> When a B-24 costs around 8 times what a fighter costs and there were 18,000+ made, its pretty clear the cost of a fighter didn't weigh much on anyone's minds.


Hmm well I know what you mean, but I dont think they key factor here is where the money comes from (I`m inferring that`s what you were meaning ?), but that the cost naturally represents resources, materials, labour, factory space, time, engines, and so on.

I think if you added up all the resources for fighters it would not be that different to the heavy bombers, of which only two types were really made in volume. So I still think
the factors behind that "cost" would have been very important. It probably also gives you a pretty solid metric on relative manufacturing time as well - which I`m sure
more or less tells you how many you can make in a certain time period.


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## PAT303 (Aug 3, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Not necessarily true - the P-38's issues were continually addressed and improved. Later model P-38Js and Ls were great performers and in some areas out performed both the P-51 and P-47. It was more expensive to operate and required more pilot training but remained the premier AAF fighter in the PTO until the the Mustang started to arrive in numbers later in the war.


I'm not disagreeing with you but even with the continuous development it didn't do anything in theater aircraft weren't already doing with less problems such as pilot training maintenance etc. The other thing is the P38 is a big target,

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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> Hmm well I know what you mean, but I dont think they key factor here is where the money comes from (I`m inferring that`s what you were meaning ?), but that the cost naturally represents resources, materials, labour, factory space, time, engines, and so on.
> 
> I think if you added up all the resources for fighters it would not be that different to the heavy bombers, of which only two types were really made in volume. So I still think
> the factors behind that "cost" would have been very important. It probably also gives you a pretty solid metric on relative manufacturing time as well - which I`m sure
> more or less tells you how many you can make in a certain time period.


There are many ways to look at costs. After the raids on Schweinfurt and others without escort the calculations were finally changed. Without the fighter escorts you cant carry out a bombing offensive without crippling losses of planes and crews that cost much more.


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## PAT303 (Aug 3, 2021)

ClayO said:


> I remember watching a show on the Military History Channel (I don't remember which one) where a P-38 pilot (I don't remember who) was diving with a FW-190 on his tail; when his altitude got low enough to force him to level off, he used differential thrust and crossed controls to put the airplane into a skid; as the FW-190 shot past him, he straightened his plane out, applied full throttle and shot the FW-190 down. I remember wondering if he had practiced that maneuver, came up with it on the spot, or maybe had time to think of it during the dive? Any way you look at it, it was a helluva piece of flying.


I remember a post on here somewhere where a P38 pilot did that in a mock dogfight with a Spitfire and almost flew into the ground.

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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Now, considering Germany was "on it's last legs" in 1943, the numbers for 1944 (regardless when production "fell off") still showed a higher production number than the year prior.



I agree with the main point you are making, that Germany was certainly not on its last legs in 1943. But it is better illustrated by monthly figures in my view.

The armaments index figures from Speer's ministry included values for specific industries, e.g. aircraft, armoured vehicles, explosives, etc. These are reproduced in Adam Tooze's _The Wages of Destruction_. If my main computer was working, I'd post up some graphs of that data for the specific categories. Alas, that computer continues to rebuff my attempts at reconciliation . . .


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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> The Luftwaffe was defeated between September 1943 when the P-38 was flying the large majority of long range escort missions and *March of 1944. *



You can substantiate this claim by providing the monthly number of U.S. operational fighter types, the monthly number of kill claims by the fighter groups flying each U.S. fighter type, the monthly figures for Luftwaffe operational fighters by type (e.g. day or night), and the monthly figures for Luftwaffe losses by type, for the period from June 1943 through June 1944.

That should indicate which months had the most impact.

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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> The Luftwaffe was defeated between September 1943 when the P-38 was flying the large majority of long range escort missions and *March of 1944. *



It turns out Williamson Murray's _Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945_ can be read at Hyperwar. Reproduced below are Luftwaffe fighter pilot losses by month as given in Murray's book.

343 = Sept. 1943
339 = Oct. 1943
245 = Nov. 1943
252 = Dec. 1943
292 = Jan. 1944
434 = Feb. 1944
511 = Mar. 1944
447 = Apr. 1944
578 = May 1944

One-third more pilots were lost in the four months spanning February through May (1,970) that were lost in the five months from September through January (1,471).

I definitely suggest reading through Williamson's work.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

PAT303 said:


> I'm not disagreeing with you but even with the continuous development it didn't do anything in theater aircraft weren't already doing with less problems such as pilot training maintenance etc. The other thing is the P38 is a big target,
> View attachment 636243


Maybe in the ETO but not in the Pacific where it was the preferred AAF until the P-51 arrived. Being a bit target didn't matter in the PTO


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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

From Wiki concerning "Big Week" where types are mentioned Big Week - Wikipedia

20 Feb 44 Missions one and three above are escorted by *94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51 Mustangs;* they claim 61-7-37 Luftwaffe aircraft; one P-38 Lightning, two P-47 Thunderbolts and one P-51 Mustangs are lost, two P-47 Thunderbolts are damaged beyond repair and 4 other aircraft are damaged; casualties are 4 MIA. German losses amount to 10 Messerschmitt Bf 110s destroyed and three damaged with 10 killed and seven wounded. Total losses included 74 Bf 110s, Fw 190s and Bf 109s and a further 29 damaged.[12]​

21 Feb 44 
Escort for Mission 228 is provided by *69 P-38s, 542 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 68 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s*; the P-38s claim 0-1-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 19-3-14 Luftwaffe aircraft, two P-47s are lost, two are damaged beyond repair, three are damaged and two pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 14-1-4 Luftwaffe aircraft, three P-51s are lost and the pilots are MIA. German losses were 30 Bf 109s and Fw 190s, 24 pilots killed and seven wounded.[13]​

22 Feb 44 
These missions are escorted by *67 P-38s, 535 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s, and 57 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s;* the P-38s claim 1 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair and 6 are damaged; the P-47s claim 39-6-15[_clarification needed_]​ Luftwaffe aircraft, 8 P-47s are lost and 12 damaged, 8 pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 19-1-10 Luftwaffe aircraft, 3 P-51s are lost and 3 damaged, 3 pilots are MIA.

24 Feb 44 
Escort is provided by *81 P-38s, 94 P-47s and 22 P-51s; *1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-51s claim a single German aircraft on the ground.

25 Feb 44
Escort is provided by *73 P-38s, 687 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 139 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s*; the P-38s claim 1-2-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 13-2-10 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-47 is lost and 6 damaged, 1 pilot is MIA; the P-51s claim 12-0-3 Luftwaffe aircraft, 2 P-51s are lost and 1 damaged beyond repair, 2 pilots are MIA.

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## wuzak (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> The chart and percentage of loss means a great deal. The difference of 7 vs 3% loss rate saved the daylight bombing campaign. Do the math, you had virtually no chance of flying 25 missions and surviving with 7% losses. Moral was in the toilet because the bomber crews could do the math.



In escorted raids deep into Germany early in 1944 the number of bombers lost per mission were very similar to those on the unescorted (well, only partially escorted) Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission and second Schweinfurt raid - around 60-80. The difference was that in 1943 there were ~300 - 350 bombers on those missions, in 1944 there were as much as 1,000, sometimes more.

Also note that after the second Schweinfurt raid the bomber strength took time to replenish, and when they were at full strength the weather often proved a very big obstacle, meaning that the 8th AF didn't fly as many missions in the second half of 1943 as they might otherwise.

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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

wuzak said:


> In escorted raids deep into Germany early in 1944 the number of bombers lost per mission were very similar to those on the unescorted (well, only partially escorted) Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission and second Schweinfurt raid - around 60-80. The difference was that in 1943 there were ~300 - 350 bombers on those missions, in 1944 there were as much as 1,000, sometimes more.
> 
> Also note that after the second Schweinfurt raid the bomber strength took time to replenish, and when they were at full strength the weather often proved a very big obstacle, meaning that the 8th AF didn't fly as many missions in the second half of 1943 as they might otherwise.


Something I read recently, you cant do deep penetration raids all year round, there isnt enough daylight in the depths of winter or darkness at the height of summer. (just an aside)

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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

Your right Pbehn. The Spits and Jugs did the shorter part of the missions and the Lightning ran the rest. Before the Lightning was let loose the Luffees would just wait at the edge of the P-47 and Spits range and form up ahead of the bomber stream. They would hit when the bombers were unescorted. Using rockets, special up-gunned 190s and the 110s.

I don't believe the true costs were figured in. The P-38 returned itself and it pilot at a rate of 2 to 1 over other fighters. I would suggest that if you take in the cost of retooling, building new or retrofitting old factories, training mechanics, assembly line workers, finding subcontractors and training them. The cost of a lost pilot had huge ramifications in moral and support for the war at home not to mention the cost of the hours spent on training them to fly. Then there is the moral of the pilots them selves. If you had a plane with two engines that could out perform all other fighters, I know what my choice would be.

Keep in mind there was a disinformation campaign designed to hide the truth about the ETO. The myths that were concocted are repeated over and over again.

Here's a few: 

The 51 had a longer range than the 38. Myth that needs b be corrected. At least 3 escort missions were flown by the P-38 from Manado to the oil fields at Balikpapan, a distance of 2200 miles. The first mission included quite a dog fight that lasted a good 30minutes and used up a lot of fuel. The end result was 36 Japanese fighters destroyed. The longest mission flown by a pilot in a P-38 was a photo recon mission and flew a staggering 4650 miles and was in the air 23 hrs. 

"One-third more pilots were lost in the four months spanning February through May (1,970) that were lost in the five months from September through January (1,471)."

If you believe the Luftwaffe was defeated because of air to air combat then you are sadly mistaken. It was defeated because it could no longer protect its, fuel sources, train its pilots, land or take off or even park its planes in safety. That's what killed the Luftwaffe not individual combat. 
During the time periods mentioned the Luftwaffe was down to ill trained rookies. They were cannon fodder. They could barely fly straight and the Mustang were free to follow them home. 

Myth that needs busting: The P-38 was too hard to fly for the average pilot. Lockheed engineers were constantly offering solutions to the Air Force brass. These solutions were well designed and if most were adopted would have made the P-38 a dream to fly comparable to the P-51. So why weren’t they adopted?

Most if, not all were rejected by either the War Production Board or the USAF as being unnecessary. One that was developed by the Lockheed engineers was a small addon that replace 4 critical functions into one lever. The complexity of the controls could have been mitigated by a large margin, but there were darker forces at work.

"On Nov 26 the 8th was back at Bremen and suffered fairly high losses (25, but only 5 percent of the total bombers compared to about 20 percent at Schweinfurt when unescorted). Only seven were lost to fighters, however. As a result of actions combating these three raids the German air force lost 21 percent of its entire fighter force in the west. This is astounding and is in a significant part attributable to operations of the P-38--sorting in in fairly small numbers. If 45 P-38s could have such an influence, what would have been the effect of 200?"

"The TRUE maximum speed of a P-38L was not the much published 414 mph. This reflects Military Power, not War Emergency Power. In WEP, a clean P-38L could exceed 440 mph. The P-38J with its lower rated engines could pull speeds in the low to mid 420's."

"The P-38 was the only fighter in the ETO that could be flown into an accelerated stall at 1,000 ft. without fear of torque-rolling into an unrecoverable attitude. Nothing in the ETO could stay with a P-38 down in the tree tops. Absolutely nothing."

"The P-38L could out-climb the P-51D and Fw-190D by better than 30%."

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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

Wuzak,
Are you suggesting that the vast majority of the AAF, RAF, Luftwaffe high command were idiots for using the Loss Percentage number in all their major decisions?


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## wuzak (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> If you believe the Luftwaffe was defeated because of air to air combat then you are sadly mistaken. It was defeated because it could no longer protect its, fuel sources, train its pilots, land or take off or even park its planes in safety. That's what killed the Luftwaffe not individual combat.
> During the time periods mentioned the Luftwaffe was down to ill trained rookies. They were cannon fodder. They could barely fly straight and the Mustang were free to follow them home.



The Oil Plan didn't (officially) start until after D-Day.
The Transportation Plan started in early 1944 for the lead up to D-Day.

These were the campaigns that stopped the fuel supplies.

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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

Pbehn,
As I stated earlier. On long range escort missions, the P-38 were always wedded to the bombers and were not allowed to take the fight to the enemy. This meant in addition to not getting all the kills that the other fighters got during the same period, they were constantly getting bounced. In addition they were frequently outnumbered and a significant number of missions the ratio was as high as 10-1. Yet the bombers got through. 

Shooting down rookies did not win the air war in the ETO. Preventing them from becoming trained before the P-51 took over, did.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2021)

The Luftwaffe didn't use the WGr.21 until summer of '43 and those were in limited numbers.
The R4M didn't appear until 1944 and was more often used in ground attack than air-to-air.


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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> Your right Pbehn. The Spits and Jugs did the shorter part of the missions and the Lightning ran the rest. Before the Lightning was let loose the Luffees would just wait at the edge of the P-47 and Spits range and form up ahead of the bomber stream. They would hit when the bombers were unescorted. Using rockets, special up-gunned 190s and the 110s.
> 
> I don't believe the true costs were figured in. The P-38 returned itself and it pilot at a rate of 2 to 1 over other fighters. I would suggest that if you take in the cost of retooling, building new or retrofitting old factories, training mechanics, assembly line workers, finding subcontractors and training them. The cost of a lost pilot had huge ramifications in moral and support for the war at home not to mention the cost of the hours spent on training them to fly. Then there is the moral of the pilots them selves. If you had a plane with two engines that could out perform all other fighters, I know what my choice would be.
> 
> ...


Do you have anything to back any of this up?


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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> The 51 had a longer range than the 38. Myth that needs b be corrected. At least 3 escort missions were flown by the P-38 from Manado to the oil fields at Balikpapan, a distance of 2200 miles. The first mission included quite a dog fight that lasted a good 30minutes and used up a lot of fuel.



Mission profiles flown in the Pacific were completely different than in Europe. They are not directly comparable.
Missions in the Pacific involved much time cruising over empty ocean with no chance of being bounced by enemy fighters; over Europe, over land, enemies could be lurking at any point along the mission.

If you are going to cite the P-38's range in the Pacific, then you should also be citing the P-51's longer range in the Pacific. (And the P-47's.)



Hairog said:


> If you believe the Luftwaffe was defeated because of air to air combat then you are sadly mistaken. It was defeated because it could no longer protect its, fuel sources, train its pilots, land or take off or even park its planes in safety. That's what killed the Luftwaffe not individual combat.



It was defeated because it lost a war of attrition: it lost pilots faster than the training programs could produce replacements. Multiple factors contributed to that inability to replace losses.

Losing 1,970 pilots over four months is going to have a major impact considering the Luftwaffe's starting point.



Hairog said:


> During the time periods mentioned the Luftwaffe was down to ill trained rookies. They were cannon fodder. They could barely fly straight and the Mustang were free to follow them home.



[citations missing]

I, on the other hand, will provide citations. Tables and graphs from Williamson Murray's _Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945_.

Flying Hours in British, American, and German Training Programs
German Fuel Production
Frontline Strength and Operational Ready Rate, German Fighter Force, August-December 1943
German Fighter Losses, Jan.-June 1944
German Production of New Fighters, June-Dec. 1943



Hairog said:


> "On Nov 26 the 8th was back at Bremen and suffered fairly high losses (25, but only 5 percent of the total bombers compared to about 20 percent at Schweinfurt when unescorted). Only seven were lost to fighters, however. As a result of actions combating these three raids the German air force lost 21 percent of its entire fighter force in the west. This is astounding and is in a significant part attributable to operations of the P-38--sorting in in fairly small numbers. If 45 P-38s could have such an influence, what would have been the effect of 200?"
> 
> "The TRUE maximum speed of a P-38L was not the much published 414 mph. This reflects Military Power, not War Emergency Power. In WEP, a clean P-38L could exceed 440 mph. The P-38J with its lower rated engines could pull speeds in the low to mid 420's."
> 
> ...



[citations missing]

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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> Shooting down rookies did not win the air war in the ETO. Preventing them from becoming trained before the P-51 took over, did.


Why didnt they shoot down the LW aces who were claiming bombers destroyed throughout the period, were rookies bouncing P-38s? I posted the numbers of escorts used in Big Week that is Feb 1944, the P-47 was by far the most numerous then the P-38 in slightly higher numbers than the P-51 but P-51s scored higher than P-38s.


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## Milosh (Aug 3, 2021)

I read someplace that because of its distinctive shape the Luftwaffe tended to stay away from the P-38. 

There was occurrences where P-47s and P-51s formed up on Bf109s and Fw190s and the opposite.


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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

"The Oil Plan didn't (officially) start until after D-Day."

Officially, that's a big qualifier.


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## Milosh (Aug 3, 2021)

Oil campaign chronology of World War II​





Oil campaign chronology of World War II - Wikipedia







en.wikipedia.org


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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Why didnt they shoot down the LW aces who were claiming bombers destroyed throughout the period, were rookies bouncing P-38s? I posted the numbers of escorts used in Big Week that is Feb 1944, the P-47 was by far the most numerous then the P-38 in slightly higher numbers than the P-51 but P-51s scored higher than P-38s.



Serviceable fighters in the 8th Air Force on the evening of March 6, 1944, as given in _Target Berlin_ by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price.

130 P-38s
415 P-47s
109 P-51s

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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> On long range escort missions, the P-38 were always wedded to the bombers and were not allowed to take the fight to the enemy.



This was policy enacted by Gen. Eaker. When Gen. Doolittle took over at the end of 1943, this policy was rescinded and its place fighters were to aggressively attack German fighters wherever they could be found.

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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> "The Oil Plan didn't (officially) start until after D-Day."
> 
> Officially, that's a big qualifier.



Quoting from Murray's _Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945_:


> Unexpectedly high stocks captured in Italy in 1943 also helped in early 1944.35​ In fact, over the winter of 1943-44, the Germans built up aircraft fuel reserves for the first time since 1941. From a reserve of 33,786 tons in November 1943, the special reserve had grown to 119,738 tons by May 1944. Its existence provided a substantial cushion in meeting the fuel crisis of the early summer.36​ The Germans had found the failure of Allied bombing to strike the synthetic oil industry inexplicable. Writing to Speer in March 1944, Keitel's staff thought it possible that enemy air forces would attack the oil industry to achieve a quick end to the war.37​ In April, a _Luftwaffe_ staff officer was more direct. Considering that the major German refineries and fuel plants lay within "the zone threatened by air attack," he found it extraordinary that enemy airpower had not struck the oil industry--a target that would jeopardize the _Reich's_ entire war effort.38​​

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## Thumpalumpacus (Aug 3, 2021)

The LW's fighters weren't well and truly defeated until Gen Doolittle cut them loose from bombers in early 1944 [ETA: 33k beat me to the point, good lookin' out]. As noted above, P-38s didn't play a big part in that process, simply as a matter of numbers.

I'm also unsure whether the P-38 could "outfly" the German fighters. To be sure, it had some advantages, and some weaknesses, and in the end was a dangerous fighter for anyone to mess with. But crediting them with breaking the LW's fighter arm is not really supported from what I've read. The testimony of German pilots speaks to this end.


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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2021)

33k in the air said:


> Serviceable fighters in the 8th Air Force on the evening of March 6, 1944, as given in _Target Berlin_ by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price.
> 
> 130 P-38s
> 415 P-47s
> 109 P-51s


The Wiki link I posted earlier said that US fighter serviceability dropped during big week from 72 to 65%. I dont have a dog in the fight, I cant see how a case can be made for any of the three doing it on its own, all three were needed at the time, even if the P-51 was the best of them, no one would wait until all squadrons had them.

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## wuzak (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> "The Oil Plan didn't (officially) start until after D-Day."
> 
> Officially, that's a big qualifier.



Spaatz was allowed to attack oil targets when transportation targets were not available due to weather conditions or other issues.

Before D-Day there were only a few raids on oil targets by the 8th AF in the ETO.

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## wuzak (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> As I stated earlier. On long range escort missions, the P-38 were always wedded to the bombers and were not allowed to take the fight to the enemy. This meant in addition to not getting all the kills that the other fighters got during the same period, they were constantly getting bounced. In addition they were frequently outnumbered and a significant number of missions the ratio was as high as 10-1. Yet the bombers got through.



The bombers also got through when unescorted. No 8th AF raid was turned back because of enemy action.

The losses on unescorted missions were unsustainable, but that didn't stop them reaching their targets.


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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

wuzak said:


> Spaatz was allowed to attack oil targets when transportation targets were not available due to weather conditions or other issues.



Murray, _Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945

On March 5, Spaatz suggested that his forces attack the Reich's oil supplies and refineries instead of Western Europe's transportation system. Such an offensive would, he claimed, cause a 50 percent reduction in gasoline supplies within six months.12​ The upshot was a compromise. While Tedder and Eisenhower backed Leigh-Mallory's emphasis on the transportation plan, Spaatz placed active Luftwaffe units as well as the German aircraft industry at the top of Eighth's priority list. Nevertheless, he agreed to use his heavy bombers to attack the transportation network as a "secondary objective."13​ Although the directive to the bomber commands said nothing about oil, the Luftwaffe's designation as the main objective allowed Spaatz sufficient latitude to go after the synthetic fuel industry in mid-May. Out of the 80 most important transportation targets, Bomber Command attacked 39, Eighth Air Force 23, and Allied Tactical Air Forces in Britain 18. Thus, Spaatz's forces played an important role in the offensive against enemy transportation systems.__14_​


_On May 12, 1944, Spaatz released Doolittle's Eighth Air Force from invasion preparations to attack oil targets. From England, 935 B-17's and B-24's sortied against synthetic oil plants at Zwickau, Merseburg-Leuna, Brux, Lutzkendorf, Bohlen, Zeitz, and Chemnitz.39​ Allied bombers and escorting fighters encountered severe fighter opposition and a moderate response from flak batteries. Eighth lost 46 bombers (43 B-17's and 3 B-24's) and 12 fighters (5 P-47's and 7 P-51's). German losses were also heavy. Twenty-eight German pilots died with 26 injured.40​ The results, while encouraging from the Allied perspective, were not decisive. The great Leuna plant, although damaged, lost only 18 percent of preattack capacity. Speer, nevertheless, was enormously worried and warned Hitler: "The enemy has struck us at one of our weakest points. If they persist at it this time, we will soon no longer have any fuel production worth mentioning. Our one hope is that the other side has an air force general staff as scatterbrained as ours!"__41_​​

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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

"Why didnt they shoot down the LW aces who were claiming bombers destroyed throughout the period, were rookies bouncing P-38s?"

Oh my... Do you know how the leading ace of WW2 got his kills? 
"Hartmann's instinct was to select an easy target or withdraw and seek a more favorable situation.[18]​ Once the attack was over, the rule was to vacate the area; survival was paramount. Another attack could be executed if the pilot could re-enter the combat zone with the advantage.[36]​ "

I suggest that many of the bomber kills were stragglers, tail end Charlies, already damaged by flak etc. From many a high scoring pilot's stories, I suggest that they avoided a bomber stream that had escorts and they found another target or were chased away. Again who wins the battle in the long run? Is it the pilots who complete their mission or the ones who shoot down the most planes. 

As stated the pilots that our rookie flyers were fighting against were the best of the best and those rookies, flying the P-38 won. By the time the P-51 took over in March 1944, those pilots were gone. Galland was visiting one of his best units and discovered that the commander had the most combat hours. He had 60. 

"I posted the numbers of escorts used in Big Week that is Feb 1944, the P-47 was by far the most numerous then the P-38 in slightly higher numbers than the P-51 but P-51s scored higher than P-38s."

And I posted that the P-47 was the short range escort and did a fine job. The Jug is denigrated almost as much as the P-38.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> "The TRUE maximum speed of a P-38L was not the much published 414 mph. This reflects Military Power, not War Emergency Power. In WEP, a clean P-38L could exceed 440 mph. The P-38J with its lower rated engines could pull speeds in the low to mid 420's."


In the early 1990s I was told similar by none other than Tony LeVier.

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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

Yet the myth continues on.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2021)

pbehn said:


> The Wiki link I posted earlier said that US fighter serviceability dropped during big week from 72 to 65%. I dont have a dog in the fight, I cant see how a case can be made for any of the three doing it on its own, all three were needed at the time, even if the P-51 was the best of them, no one would wait until all squadrons had them.


And the RAF provided Spitfires to escort when possible, of course depending on the target/range.


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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

The quote at the bottom of the chart I posted is from the conclusion of the oft mentioned Murray. He states the the Luftwaffe was defeated as an effective fighting force during the period of September 43 through March 44.


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## eagledad (Aug 3, 2021)

Gentlemen,

The P-51 did have a longer range than the P-38. Check out the tactical planning charts for the P-51D and P-38J-25/L found at


WWII Aircraft Performance


As an aside, reviewing my late uncle's mission list (he was a ball turret gunner out of Italy 9/44-11/44), all of his really deep missions (deep being determined by time in the air), he mentions being escorted exclusively by P-51's.

As for the P-38's speed, I an sure one of the other forum members can explain why that claim is suspect. Remember, many of the high-perfomance racers at Reno are P-51's. There is a reason for that.

As for out-flying German interceptors, according to the Mighty Eighth War Manual, by Roger Freeman, page 79, the P-38's tried to induce the German aircraft into horizontal combat instead of vertical combat. Please feel free to review the comments in post 42.

IMHO what hurt the P-38 the most was its distinctive shape. Leonard Carson, top scoring Mustang ace of the 357th FG said "Whichever pilot saw the other one first had the winning edge." An Allied or Axis pilot who saw a radial or inline-engined aircraft at a distance did not know if it was friend or foe. They had to close the distance for proper identification before they decided what to do. There was no problem of identification if the aircraft in the distance was twin-engined and twin boomed. As said by many German pilots, the distinctive shape allowed them to attack or disengage, depending on the situation. 

My .03 cents worth (Inflation)

Eagledad

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## Hairog (Aug 3, 2021)

You know someone is not too confident of their own answers and questions when they start asking for references. I'm tire of playing Wack a Mole for tonight. I got better things to do. If you want to look up all my facts and figures you just go right ahead. I'm not presenting a doctoral thesis. I was just trying to correct a concentrated effort by some self serving members of the totally and tragically wrong Bomber Mafia to cover to cover their asses and to denigrate the most strategically important American fighter of WW2. 

Thunderbolt by Warren Bodie

The Lockheed P-38 by ditto

The 56th Fighter Group in WW2 by William Hess

JG26 by Donald Caldwell

Luftwaffe Fighter Aces by Mark Spick

1000 Destroyed by Grover Hall

An Escort of P-38s by John Mullins

Carl Spaatz Master of Air Power by David Mets*

The Luftwaffe War Diaries by Cajus Bekker*

The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design by Robert Ball

Courage and Air Warfare by Mark Wells

America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing by Richard Hallion*

Big Week by Glenn Infield

The Luftwaffe by Williamson Murray*

To Command the Sky by Stephen McFarland and Wesley Newton*

Peter Three Eight by John Stanaway

The Lockheed P-38 Lightning" By Warren M. Bodie. ISBN 0-9629359-0-5, published by Wideing Publications

Republic's P-47 Thunderbolt, From Seversky to Victory." also published by Widewing Books






Der Gabelschwanz Teufel - Assessing the Lockheed P-38 Lightning


Technical Report APA-TR-2010-1201; Title: Der Gabelschwanz Teufel - Assessing the Lockheed P-38 Lightning; Abstract: Technical and historical analysis of Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighter aircraft; Published:October, 1992; Updated: 1999, 2010.



www.ausairpower.net







The P-38 (C.C. Jordan; MakinKid; CDB100620)





https://www.456fis.org/P-38K.htm











The Amazing Lockheed P-38 Lightning, Best Plane of WW2?


With its radical yet impressive design, the Lockheed P-38 Lightning was a graceful fighter aircraft that epitomized a new level of craftsmanship in




www.warhistoryonline.com













17 Things You Never Knew About The P-38 Lightning


It was controversial, intimidating, and set countless records in WWII. Check out these 17 little known facts about the P-38 Lightning.




www.boldmethod.com












P-38 Lightning vs P-51 Mustang: Which was the Better Fighter?


If ther p-38s were being assigned the 'bomber escort ' role, whilst the P-51s were being assigned the Free ranging, fighter killing role, that would be consistent with most airforces. The aircraft with the lesser ability to take on enemy fighters would be assigned the role of final defence, to...



ww2aircraft.net







P-38F Tactical Trials








Aviation Personnel Fatalities in World War II


Related Resources: US Navy Personnel in World War II: Service and Casualty Statistics World War II Casualties




www.history.navy.mil













Did the P-51 Mustang Defeat the Luftwaffe? | R-bloggers


14 October 1943 - 291 US Army Air Force (USAAF) heavy bombers took off from England to attack a Ball Bearing factory in the heart of Germany. The goal was to destroy the Nazi war machine’s fighting ability and means of war production. As the bomb...




www.r-bloggers.com







https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/StatDigest/aafsd-2.html#t54








P-51 problems...


Interesting reading...I ´ve found it while browsing on net... The Merlin P-51 had a lot of teething problems, but, for some reason, they are largely overlooked. It had problems with the canopy frosting over, with jamming guns, with the engine cooling system and the engine itself--and with...



ww2aircraft.net


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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2021)

Quite the dissertation for someone who has better things to do...

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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> You know someone is not too confident of their own answers and questions when they start asking for references. I'm tire of playing Wack a Mole for tonight. I got better things to do. If you want to look up all my facts and figures you just go right ahead.



Your claims, your burden of proof.

If you can't be bothered to have your references handy when making a claim, that failing is yours.

ETA: This is especially true if you are going against the prevailing point of view on a matter. You set yourself a higher hill to climb, and thus more specific supporting material is going to be needed.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

eagledad said:


> As for the P-38's speed, I an sure one of the other forum members can explain why that claim is suspect. Remember, many of the high-perfomance racers at Reno are P-51's. There is a reason for that.


Apples and oranges - first, there were plenty of P-51s to go around when the races at Reno started in the 60s, many more than P-38s. The P-51 will still have the speed advantage but it's also about being able to *accelerate* out of the chute and hold a course line for 6 laps without cutting a pylon. This is where I believe the P-38 would be at a disadvantage.; I don't think it has "the smash" to take a Mustang on the outside. Then consider you're running a twin, lots of work to keep it competitive. Hell, I'd think I'd take a P-39 or P-63 over a P-38 to run at Reno!!!

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## 33k in the air (Aug 3, 2021)

Hairog said:


> The quote at the bottom of the chart I posted is from the conclusion of the oft mentioned Murray. He states the the Luftwaffe was defeated as an effective fighting force during the period of September 43 through March 44.



Murray, _Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945_, page 302:

What is almost incomprehensible is the fact that the Germans paid so little attention to the attrition that had occurred in France and over Britain. Not until the _Wehrmacht_ was deep in the Soviet Union did Göring finally authorize Milch to bring order to the aircraft industry. By that time, it was too late. British production programs had a two-year head start, while the American programs were at least a year ahead. If that handicap were not enough, Milch faced a constant, uphill battle to persuade the general staff to accept as a necessity the production increases that he proposed. That failure to gear German aircraft production to a worst case analysis of what Anglo-American industry might turn out cost the _Luftwaffe_ the air war in 1943 and 1944. One cannot stress enough that administrative, strategic, and productive decisions in the 1940 to 1941 time frame insured the permanent inferiority of Germany's air effort throughout the remainder of the war. The basis of those decisions lay in an overestimation of the _Reich's_ strength and a contemptuous arrogance that dismissed the Russians as subhumans and the Americans as capable of building only radios and refrigerators. Disdainful of their enemies and proud of their victories, the Germans were sure that their technological expertise and military competence could master any threat.

Page 317:

The _Luftwaffe_ losses in the summer and early fall likewise forced the Germans to rethink their strategy. The threat to the armament industries, particularly the aircraft industry, and the extent of losses in the Mediterranean, on the eastern front, and over the _Reich,_ gave the Germans no choice but to reorder their priorities. They had to cut air commitments in the Mediterranean and in the east to provide more fighters for defense of the homeland. But Hitler was unwilling in 1943 to reorder his production priorities completely and to give unqualified emphasis to building fighters. This undoubtedly made the task of the American strategic air forces easier when the Eighth returned to the offensive. The great air battle was not a painless struggle as bomber losses through April 1944 indicate. But the combination of long-range escorts, with an overwhelming productive advantage, enabled Eighth to swamp Germany's defenders. The Americans, with their sustained pressure, shattered the _Luftwaffe's_ fighter force to the point where they were no longer a serious factor in the air war. By the time of the Normandy invasion, the Americans had won general air superiority over Europe, while attacks on the synthetic fuel industry insured that the _Luftwaffe_ would not recover. Not only did it no longer have the necessary fuel but there was no hope to train new pilots in the numbers needed to meet the daylight threat.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Apples and oranges - first, there were plenty of P-51s to go around when the races at Reno started in the 60s, many more than P-38s. The P-51 will still have the speed advantage but it's also about being able to *accelerate* out of the chute and hold a course line for 6 laps without cutting a pylon. This is where I believe the P-38 would be at a disadvantage.; I don't think it has "the smash" to take a Mustang on the outside. Then consider you're running a twin, lots of work to keep it competitive. Hell, I'd think I'd take a P-39 or P-63 over a P-38 to run at Reno!!!


Lefty used to run a P-38 at the Reno Air Races.


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## eagledad (Aug 3, 2021)

FlyboyJ

I defer to your judgement on speeds at Reno . as I understand that you have had the privilege to attend and work at the races However. ln looking at the Tactical Planning Charts, the tests of the P-38, P-47, and P-51 versus the A6M5, and the test of the P-51B vs P-38J in Ethell's book on the Mustang, the P-38 is always slower. I have a copy of the graph from Dr Kopp's first version of his P-38 Paper which was supplied to him by Lockheed which does show the 440 speed and have attached it below.

FWIW

Eagledad

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Lefty used to run a P-38 at the Reno Air Races.


He did and it was more of a novelty than anything else. P-38s were also run in in the post war years with less than stellar results. Gary Levitz ran a clipped wing 38 in the early 70s as well.

It's one thing to boom and zoom in combat, it's a whole other ballgame going around in circles for 5 laps full throttle.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2021)

eagledad said:


> FlyboyJ
> 
> I defer to your judgement on speeds at Reno . as I understand that you have had the privilege to attend and work at the races However. ln looking at the Tactical Planning Charts, the tests of the P-38, P-47, and P-51 versus the A6M5, and the test of the P-51B vs P-38J in Ethell's book on the Mustang, the P-38 is always slower. I have a copy of the graph from Dr Kopp's first version of his P-38 Paper which was supplied to him by Lockheed which does show the 440 speed and have attached it below.
> 
> ...


Not disagreeing. Many sources will show the P-38 slower however I think there might have been a wink and handshake attempt not to encourage additional speed from an aircraft that had compressibility issues, even though those issues were addressed in the later versions, and this is just my oppinion.

See my last post about P-38s running at Reno (and other course events). You need to have the speed and acceleration around a course while holding a line in a continual turn. IMO the best aircraft that did that were the P-51, Bearcat and P-39/P-63.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 4, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> He did and it was more of a novelty than anything else. P-38s were also run in in the post war years with less than stellar results. Gary Levitz ran a clipped wing 38 in the early 70s as well.
> 
> It's one thing to boom and zoom in combat, it's a whole other ballgame going around in circles for 5 laps full throttle.


Just pointing out that contrary to our P-38 Expert (God...why does that sound familiar??), there were other types that showed at Reno (and Cleveland).
Yak-9, Spitfire, F8F, Fw190, dh Mosquito, P-47 and so on have competed in the past, but the P-51 had the numbers and spare parts to make it a preeminent competitor.

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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 4, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Gary Levitz ran a clipped wing 38 in the early 70s as well.


I saw him win a race in that plane at Miami (new Tamiami) in 1972.

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## 33k in the air (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> At least 3 escort missions were flown by the P-38 from Manado to the oil fields at Balikpapan, a distance of 2200 miles. The first mission included quite a dog fight that lasted a good 30 minutes and used up a lot of fuel. The end result was 36 Japanese fighters destroyed.



Quoting from _Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter _(USAF Historical Study No. 136)
p.251-253 of the PDF
(emphasis added)
__________________

On the 10th [of October], 16 P-47's of the 35th Group and 18 P-38's of the 8th and 49th Groups, flying from Morotai, escorted 125 B-24's to Balikpapan, some 845 miles, where the target was one of the largest oil refineries serving the Japanese. The mission called for the P-47's to range ahead and sweep the area on an "offensive escort," while the P-38's lingered behind. Nearing the target, the P-47's encountered approximately 40 enemy planes, and in the ensuing combat 9 enemy aircraft were destroyed, and 4 others probably destroyed in action between Balikpapan and Manggar airdrome . . .

On the second mission, some 100 Liberators dropped 125 tons of bombs on the same target. Fifteen P-47's of the 35th Group and 29 P-38's of the 8th, 49th, and 475th Groups took part in the escort. The P-47's, repeating their performance of four days before, were again the "offensive escort", and again saw most of the day's fighter action. Their opposition numbered between 35 and 40 enemy fighters. In the ensuing combat the Thunderbolts claimed 19 planes and probably destroyed 3 more. P-38 escort, in addition, brought the combined score to 35 destroyed and 5 probables . . .

The success of these missions resulted from much preliminary planning and experimentation. *To provide escort over such a long distance, it had been necessary to increase fighter range beyond that of normal operations.* Engineers experimented with internal and external gasoline tanks, collected cruising data, and worked out endurance charts. Before these missions took place, the fighters, including late model P-47's and P-38J's with leading edge wing tanks, were equipped with jettisonable tanks. External tanks of 310- and 165-gallon capacity were available in limited quantities. Two 310-gallon tanks constituted an overload for the fighters, even if enough had been readily available to equip all the planes. Two 165-gallon tanks were not sufficient. Consequently, each plane received one 310-gallon tank under one wing and and one 165-gallon tank under the other. This arrangement, combined with the technique of cruise control, permitted the fighters to reach their target and return with some fuel to spare. The fighters for these missions staged out of Morotai after a hasty extension of the runway.
__________________

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> Pbehn,
> As I stated earlier. On long range escort missions, the P-38 were always wedded to the bombers and were not allowed to take the fight to the enemy. This meant in addition to not getting all the kills that the other fighters got during the same period, they were constantly getting bounced. In addition they were frequently outnumbered and a significant number of missions the ratio was as high as 10-1. Yet the bombers got through.
> 
> Shooting down rookies did not win the air war in the ETO. Preventing them from becoming trained before the P-51 took over, did.



SOURCES>


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## Snowygrouch (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> You know someone is not too confident of their own answers and questions when they start asking for references. I'm tire of playing Wack a Mole for tonight. I got better things to do. If you want to look up all my facts and figures you just go right ahead. I'm not presenting a doctoral thesis. I was just trying to correct a concentrated effort by some self serving members of the totally and tragically wrong Bomber Mafia to cover to cover their asses and to denigrate the most strategically important American fighter of WW2.
> 
> Thunderbolt by Warren Bodie
> 
> ...




Umm, no, its because they know you`re almost certainly wrong and understandably expect you to have data which supports your assertions.

Which is why you`ve posted a huge list of "stuff" (none of which is archival, naturally) and NO page numbers. Knowing of course, that nobody will go and
read it all on the off chance that somewhere they`ll "Happen" across some writing which might support the various wildly innacurate claims you`ve made.

When someone asks me "sources" they`ll get page numbers, and if required, a screenshot of the actual paragraph.

If you dont have that, dont expect anyone to take you seriously. This is a "forum", for chat, but if you want to make wild claims, dont expect us to all just say "oh, ok." without evidence.

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## pbehn (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> "Why didnt they shoot down the LW aces who were claiming bombers destroyed throughout the period, were rookies bouncing P-38s?"
> 
> Oh my... Do you know how the leading ace of WW2 got his kills?
> "Hartmann's instinct was to select an easy target or withdraw and seek a more favorable situation.[18]​ Once the attack was over, the rule was to vacate the area; survival was paramount. Another attack could be executed if the pilot could re-enter the combat zone with the advantage.[36]​ "
> ...


How does a straggler become a straggler?


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## pbehn (Aug 4, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> And the RAF provided Spitfires to escort when possible, of course depending on the target/range.


I know, I mentioned them in an earlier post. I think they were used for withdrawal quite late in the piece.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> The Luftwaffe was defeated between September 1943 when the P-38 was flying the large majority of long range escort missions and *March of 1944.*




From AHT, other sources may vary.

55th Fighter group goes operational in England *Oct 15th 1943

What long range missions were flown in Sept? *

By Oct 21st the 55th had flown some fighter sweeps and limited bomber escort missions with many mechanical difficulties.

"Nov 3rd '43 P-38s of the 55th Fighter Group escort bombers to Wilhelmshaven, Germany and see initial combat, shooting down 3 planes without loss to themselves."

So P-38s didn't cross the border into Germany until NOV?
They shot down no planes in Oct in addition to shooting down no planes in Sept?
Nov 5th the 55th escorts bombers to Munster.
Nov 13th, the 55th escorts bombers to Bremen
Nov 29th the 55th and a few planes from the 20th escort bombers to Bremen again.

Not looking good so far, I may very well be missing missions, but the *LONG RANGE *escort missions seem to be 20-50 miles over the Dutch border. 

No LONG RANGE missions in in 1943? 

P-38s did for long range missions later but claiming they did much work at all in 1943 (compared to the P-47s) in the ETO is false The 2nd fighter group of P-38s went operational After the First group of P-51a went operational. 

Dec 13th 43 the 354th fighter group sends 46 P-51s to Kiel Germany using 75 gallon drop tanks, the 55th FG sends P-38s also using 75 gallon drop tanks. 
The 20th fighter group doesn't become operational as a group(flies a mission as a group, individual squadrons had flown missions) until Dec 28th.

We are to believe that the P-38, equipping one fighter group smashed the Luftwaffe before the P-51 showed up? 

As shown by others the P-38 made up just a bit more of the escorts compared to the P-51 from Jan through March with the P-47s making up by far the majority of the fighters used.

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## Peter Gunn (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> You know someone is not too confident of their own answers and questions when they start asking for references. I'm tire of playing Wack a Mole for tonight. I got better things to do. If you want to look up all my facts and figures you just go right ahead. I'm not presenting a doctoral thesis. I was just trying to correct a concentrated effort by some self serving members of the totally and tragically wrong Bomber Mafia to cover to cover their asses and to denigrate the most strategically important American fighter of WW2.
> 
> Thunderbolt by Warren Bodie
> 
> ...



I suggest you expand your reading, start here as these might enlighten you a bit, although the way you vehemently deny historical facts I'm skeptical of the outcome.

Amazon product


and

Amazon product

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## SaparotRob (Aug 4, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Apples and oranges - first, there were plenty of P-51s to go around when the races at Reno started in the 60s, many more than P-38s. The P-51 will still have the speed advantage but it's also about being able to *accelerate* out of the chute and hold a course line for 6 laps without cutting a pylon. This is where I believe the P-38 would be at a disadvantage.; I don't think it has "the smash" to take a Mustang on the outside. Then consider you're running a twin, lots of work to keep it competitive. Hell, I'd think I'd take a P-39 or P-63 over a P-38 to run at Reno!!!


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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> "The Oil Plan didn't (officially) start until after D-Day."
> 
> Officially, that's a big qualifier.


How about looking to sources of 8th AF missions, followed by RAF, beginning May 12, 1944. You should acquire Mighty Eighth War Diary by Freeman, Actual knowledge based on facts should help remove the many misconceptions you bring here. Oh, that is the 'official start date of the 'Oil Plan' execution.

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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> "Why didnt they shoot down the LW aces who were claiming bombers destroyed throughout the period, were rookies bouncing P-38s?"
> 
> Oh my... Do you know how the leading ace of WW2 got his kills?
> "Hartmann's instinct was to select an easy target or withdraw and seek a more favorable situation.[18]​ Once the attack was over, the rule was to vacate the area; survival was paramount. Another attack could be executed if the pilot could re-enter the combat zone with the advantage.[36]​ "


*You should look to JG2 Kommodore Egon Meyer's introduction of company front attacks in November 1942, with Galland modification to stay at altitude to fly through, turn, re-group, fly ahead, turn and attack again.

You should also take note that of all the LW experten, Hartmann was least when discussing tactics to attack a B-17 formation.*


Hairog said:


> As stated the pilots that our rookie flyers were fighting against were the best of the best and those rookies, flying the P-38 won. By the time the P-51 took over in March 1944, those pilots were gone. Galland was visiting one of his best units and discovered that the commander had the most combat hours. He had 60.


Total P-38 VCs in ETO through 1943 ----->29; P-51B ------>8
Total P-38 VCs in ETO from August 1942 through March 1944 ===> 90.5; P-51B/C===> 383

By your logic, the scourge of the LW Day Fighter force was P-38? Care to discuss actual data? Source USAF 85, Dr. Olynyk, Bill Marshall ad Lowell Ford "P-51B Mustang; North American's Bastard Stepchild that saved 8th AF" pg 295.

BTW, through D-Day (8th and 9th AF VCs) for all combat ops:
*P-38:170 P-47:911 P-51:1,157 Where do you suppose LW pilot attrition came from?*



Hairog said:


> "I posted the numbers of escorts used in Big Week that is Feb 1944, the P-47 was by far the most numerous then the P-38 in slightly higher numbers than the P-51 but P-51s scored higher than P-38s."
> 
> And I posted that the P-47 was the short range escort and did a fine job. The Jug is denigrated almost as much as the P-38.


Nobody is 'denigrating either the P-38 or P-47 importance. The results achieved by Mustangs over P-38 and P-47 were due to combined long(er) range and superior performance vs Bf 109 and Fw 190.

As to your repeated denigration of bomber mafia reputation, particularly with expect to rational thought? Who did you have in mind? Name names and cite facts?

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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> Pbehn,
> As I stated earlier. On long range escort missions, the P-38 were always wedded to the bombers and were not allowed to take the fight to the enemy. This meant in addition to not getting all the kills that the other fighters got during the same period, they were constantly getting bounced. In addition they were frequently outnumbered and a significant number of missions the ratio was as high as 10-1. Yet the bombers got through.


Sigh. P-38FG and P51FG few EXACTLY the same mission profile for escort. The numbers of actual LR escorts AVAILABLE (P-38 vs P-51) dictated that a few fighters covered a BD to their targets. They, and actually P-47FGs also, by the nature of the relay system of escort from Landfall to Target, made ANY fighter group prey to a larger concentrated attack by LW.

Neither P-38 nor P-47 nor P-51 equipped fighter groups were 'constrained' to close escort after Doolittle issued 'seek and destroy LW' order. Lack of aggressive leadership at Group CO level was as big a factor as any for individual group scoring. The P-38 had different handicaps of a.) being very easy to identify (for attack or defense), b.) severe diving control issues, c.) extremely numbing cold cockpit and d.) major issues with Intercooler/oil cooler/turbo issues at high altitude. FYI the top P-38 ETO ace was James Morris 20th FG - with 7.33, and he was shot down by a Me 410.

You didn't list Boylon's USAF Study 136 Long Range Escort Fighter. If you want a single best sourced compendium - you should try it.



Hairog said:


> Shooting down rookies did not win the air war in the ETO. Preventing them from becoming trained before the P-51 took over, did.


29 total victory credits through 1943 is hardly 'attrition' of LW rookie OR experienced pilots. And BTW many were twin engine fighters.

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## pbehn (Aug 4, 2021)

drgondog said:


> By your logic, the scourge of the LW Day Fighter force was P-38? Care to discuss actual data? Source USAF 85, Dr. Olynyk, Bill Marshall ad Lowell Ford "P-51B Mustang; North American's Bastard Stepchild that saved 8th AF" pg 295.


I saw what you did there, full marks Sir. However two of Hairog's sources are threads on this forum which you have posted in so I suppose its only fair.

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## unkated (Aug 4, 2021)

Ascent said:


> I think everyone is used to it's shape now but looking closely at it and really thinking about it , it really was quite different to anything out there, a product of the experimentation of the late 30's which produced some quite far out designs.


The shape is similar to the Fokker G.I Faucheur and the Swedish J-21a.

However, the G.I was slower, with less power (730-830 hp per engine) and there were not enough of them available in 1940, so it stopped making a name for itself. . 

The J-21 had a single engine and a pusher prop and was not tested in combat.

Uncle Ted


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## 33k in the air (Aug 4, 2021)

drgondog said:


> You should acquire Mighty Eighth War Diary by Freeman



I was going to mention that as a highly useful reference.

It's a pity there isn't a reference of similar detail and thoroughness available for the 9th, 12th, and 15th Air Forces.

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## Snautzer01 (Aug 4, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Apples and oranges - first, there were plenty of P-51s to go around when the races at Reno started in the 60s, many more than P-38s. The P-51 will still have the speed advantage but it's also about being able to *accelerate* out of the chute and hold a course line for 6 laps without cutting a pylon. This is where I believe the P-38 would be at a disadvantage.; I don't think it has "the smash" to take a Mustang on the outside. Then consider you're running a twin, lots of work to keep it competitive. Hell, I'd think I'd take a P-39 or P-63 over a P-38 to run at Reno!!!


As a side step. I put up a few racers p-39 p-63 in my ebay threads. Did not do too badly it seems. And indeed not many p-38 i can find racing. A bunch made it as executive fun planes it seems.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 4, 2021)

Snautzer01 said:


> As a side step. I put up a few racers p-39 p-63 in my ebay threads. Did not do too badly it seems. And indeed not many p-38 i can find racing. A bunch made it as executive fun planes it seems.


The best I think a P-38 did in a major pylon race was the 1946 Thompson Trophy where one took 2nd place behind a highly modified P-39 flown by Tex Johnson (Tony LeVier was flying the P-38)

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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> You know someone is not too confident of their own answers and questions when they start asking for references. I'm tire of playing Wack a Mole for tonight. I got better things to do. If you want to look up all my facts and figures you just go right ahead. I'm not presenting a doctoral thesis. I was just trying to correct a concentrated effort by some self serving members of the totally and tragically wrong Bomber Mafia to cover to cover their asses and to denigrate the most strategically important American fighter of WW2.



Hairog - the reason people ask questions about sources is to validate a.) that what you said was backed up the opinions/facts presented by sources. Your list below failed to lead anyone to the salient fact you wish to validate. There is a huge gulf between Doctoral Thesis and simply being accepted as a rational presenter of opinions based on facts - but so far you haven't met the low bar standard;

A clue - Warren Bodie is a reliable source for both P-38 and P-47 but he simply falls short when P-51's creep into his discussions (or the P-38K


Hairog said:


> Thunderbolt by Warren Bodie
> 
> The Lockheed P-38 by ditto



For Really important observation by Kelly Johnson regarding Strengths and Weaknesses of P-38, please turn to pg 257 of The Lockheed P-38. Recognize that when Johnson cites in Good column, Boosted Ailerons and Compressibility Control Flap, he is referring to two vital features which were not introduced until after all P-38J's were re-assigned to MTO and 9th AF in ETO - September/October 1944... four years after first crash due to compressibility. Then look to the 15 Ba Points to see if any of the postings here make sense to you. 


Hairog said:


> The 56th Fighter Group in WW2 by William Hess
> 
> JG26 by Donald Caldwell
> 
> ...



I don't know what point you were making about virtues of P-38 in ETO with the above 'playlist' but you won't find much in Caldwell's JG 26 or Hall's 1000 Destroyed or Hess' 56th FG or Carl Spaatz Master of Airpower - but on the latter point Davis' Carl A Spaatz - and the Air War in Europe is far better researched and foot noted. Perhaps you should get a copy and seek expert opinions regarding the AAF best fighter, pg 64, 316 good places to start.

Using same reference, note comment on pg 312 that "half the losses (ETO) were due to engine malfunctions" ref 113 (Freemans Mighty Eighth War Diary pp 183, 297; Kelsey's Dragon Teeth pp 134-135. I would also draw your attention to pretty good Combat Radius charts on pp-362-363. 


Hairog said:


> The Luftwaffe War Diaries by Cajus Bekker*
> 
> The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design by Robert Ball
> 
> ...



Care to extract facts that you believe support Any thesis you have presented? Looks like something you tossed to the peasants.



Hairog said:


> The Luftwaffe by Williamson Murray*
> 
> To Command the Sky by Stephen McFarland and Wesley Newton*


Finally a reference of significance. You might have quoted the decision by Gen Barney Giles in summer 1943 that the Mustang was to be the preferred fighter in ETO pp 137-138 and the discussions on Spaatz/Leigh-Mallory and Arnold-Portal spats to gain control of the P-51B for ETO/8th AF.



Hairog said:


> Peter Three Eight by John Stanaway
> 
> The Lockheed P-38 Lightning" By Warren M. Bodie. ISBN 0-9629359-0-5, published by Wideing Publications



Perhaps unfair to point out that Bodie was obsessed with explaining that dummies like Spaatz, Arnold, Doolittle favored the P-51B - despite its 'newness' in operations - when any moron could see that the P-38s was receiving a bum rap. To that point, on this forum I responded to an article that Cory Jordan (Widewing) wrote that you cited below. It covers most of the salient points:


Hairog said:


> P-51 problems...
> 
> 
> Interesting reading...I ´ve found it while browsing on net... The Merlin P-51 had a lot of teething problems, but, for some reason, they are largely overlooked. It had problems with the canopy frosting over, with jamming guns, with the engine cooling system and the engine itself--and with...
> ...



*"You suppose he (CC Jordan) didn't like the Mustang? as much as the P-38? LoL. Too many things to comment on within one reply.

As with any persons' perspective about the dastardly Mustang there is a kernel of truth but this narrative is riddled with exaggerations.

First, when the 51B-1 came to ETO in November, 1944 it was the first production model and it did have issues. Don Blakeslee led the first Pioneer Mustang combat mission and did make that comment on Dec 1, 1943. However, He was the same guy that begged Kepner to give him the Mustangs that the 355th FG had just received, so that he could lead the 4th on the first Berlin missions. When Kepner pointed out that his 4th was not yet checked out in them, Blakeslee promised they would qualify on the way to Berlin.. which is kind of what they did, having flown their first two missions before that with most pilots having less than 1 hour in the 51.

Secondly, in all the 8th AF transitions (i.e 4th, 355th) from P-47 to P-51 the ground crews were working double duty keeping the 47s operational while learning the 51. Not so, the P-47 and P-38 Groups (except 4th which converted from Spit) The B-1's were experiencing all the problems named from radio interferences with mags, to heating issues in cockpit to gun jams and had an occasional tail and wing lost, wheel drops in high G pullout and even faulty heat treatment of engine bolts. This was a real problem for about 60 days.

On the other side, the 4th scored more in two weeks of missions with the P-51 in March than they scored in December, January and February in P-47s.

Contrast that to P-38 effectiveness, and the 4th scored more in the first two weeks of March than all the P-38 scores in the 20th AND 55th period to date!

The abort rate was slightly higher for the Mustangs in first three months of ETO Ops than either the P-38s or P-47s. One reason is they were flying six-seven hours instead of 2-4 hour mission. The 8th AF was sorting out the new P-47C which had a host of gestation problems in April-July 1943 and the P-38 was a nightmare!

To the structural issues. Problem number one. USAAF dive maneuver tactics of dive with rudder and aileron use for evasion put lateral loads on the Mustang w/Merlin that was not accounted for in the tail design from original spec for XP-51/Allison. Beefed up horizontal stabilizer and main spar on the rudder, add reverse rudder Boost tab - problem solved... but still an 8g design/12 G ultimate at 8000 pound GW - over stress that and you are still dead -as with every other fighter..

Wheel uplock failure on High G pullout - leading to ripping off wing with huge drag loads in pull out. Re-design Wheel lock uplock kit - problem solved.

Cg problems with full 85 gallon fuse tank. Change SOP to burn 25 gallons down to 60 gallons before switching to external wing tanks. Problem Solved.

The P-51 gives excellent warning to a stall, but not a lengthy one, when running out of airspeed - or extreme rudder deflection in low speed/High G flight. Learn your airplane and behave accordingly - problem solved.

4 Gun slanted mount guns jamming. Better QC during ammo linking/belting process/install drive motor and improve gun heating - problem Mostly solved but six gun vertical mount solved the problem.

and so on"*

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## Snautzer01 (Aug 4, 2021)

Hairog said:


> "Why didnt they shoot down the LW aces who were claiming bombers destroyed throughout the period, were rookies bouncing P-38s?"
> 
> Oh my... Do you know how the leading ace of WW2 got his kills?
> "Hartmann's instinct was to select an easy target or withdraw and seek a more favorable situation.[18]​ Once the attack was over, the rule was to vacate the area; survival was paramount. Another attack could be executed if the pilot could re-enter the combat zone with the advantage.[36]​ "
> ...


Hartmann has a very bad rep claims vs archive. Even when considered that in the fight not all can be clear. Erich Hartmann's individual victories researched - Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum

i,g, 
227. 30.05.1944 12:25 P-39 - possible - P-39 of 438 IAP, lt. K. V. Myaskov, baled out
228. 30.05.1944 15:38 P-39 - possible - P-39 of 508 IAP
229. 31.05.1944 19:05 P-39 - overclaim
230. 31.05.1944 19:08 P-39 - overclaim
231. 31.05.1944 19:13 P-39 - overclaim
232. 01.06.1944 12:31 LaGG - overclaim
233. 01.06.1944 12:38 LaGG - overclaim
234. 01.06.1944 15:20 LaGG - possible but unlikely - P-39 of 438 IAP, m. lt. N. T. Motuzko, MIA
235. 01.06.1944 15:30 LaGG - overclaim
236. 01.06.1944 15:32 P-39 - overclaim
237. 01.06.1944 15:35 P-39 - overclaim
238. 02.06.1944 18:10 P-39 - overclaim
239. 02.06.1944 18:15 P-39 - overclaim
240. 03.06.1944 14:30 P-39 - overclaim
241. 03.06.1944 14:33 P-39 - overclaim
242. 03.06.1944 15:00 LaGG - overclaim
243. 03.06.1944 17:17 LaGG - overclaim
244. 04.06.1944 16:10 P-39 - overclaim
245. 04.06.1944 16:25 LaGG - overclaim
246. 04.06.1944 18:13 P-39 - overclaim
247. 04.06.1944 18:23 P-39 - overclaim
248. 04.06.1944 18:53 P-39 - possible, damaged - P-39 of 16 GIAP, m. lt. G. G. Statsenko, slightly injured
249. 04.06.1944 19:15 P-39 - overclaim
250. 04.06.1944 19:18 P-39 - overclaim
251. 05.06.1944 14:12 P-39 - P-39 of 100 GIAP, m. lt. N. I. Zaytsev, survived (?)
252. 05.06.1944 14:19 P-39 - overclaim
253. 05.06.1944 16:15 LaGG - possible - La-5 of 240 IAP
254. 05.06.1944 19:07 LaGG - possible - La-5 of 240 IAP, m. lt. E. A. Karpov, survived
255. 05.06.1944 19:35 P-39 - overclaim
256. 05.06.1944 19:40 P-39 - overclaim
257. 06.06.1944 16:25 LaGG - overclaim
258. 06.06.1944 16:30 LaGG - overclaim
259. 06.06.1944 20:15 P-39 - possible but unlikely - P-39 of 438 IAP, m. lt. A. I. Sopin, survived
260. 06.06.1944 20:25 P-39 - overclaim

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 4, 2021)

There have been several researchers who have looked into Hartmann's claims and depending who you speak to it can be as high as 45% accurate! People take offense to this as we've been somewhat programed to believe that Hartmann was the GOAT, but as we are now able to more accurately verify combat records Hartmann may not be the highest scoring fighter pilot of all time, like it or not.

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## BiffF15 (Aug 4, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> There have been several researchers who have looked into Hartmann's claims and depending who you speak to it can be as high as 45% off! People take offense to this as we've been somewhat programed to believe that Hartmann was the GOAT, but as we are now able to more accurately verify combat records Hartmann may not be the highest scoring fighter pilot of all time, like it or not.


Is it just me or is there a lot of P-39 claims…

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## GrauGeist (Aug 4, 2021)

BiffF15 said:


> Is it just me or is there a lot of P-39 claims…


And not a single P-38 in the lot...

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## 33k in the air (Aug 4, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> People take offense to this as we've been somewhat programed to believe that Hartmann was the GOAT . . .



I'm old enough to remember when being the goat was a bad thing . . .

I guess capitalization really does matter! GOAT vs. goat.


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## pbehn (Aug 4, 2021)

If those were his only overclaims that is much less than the average.


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## Snautzer01 (Aug 4, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> There have been several researchers who have looked into Hartmann's claims and depending who you speak to it can be as high as 45% accurate! People take offense to this as we've been somewhat programed to believe that Hartmann was the GOAT, but as we are now able to more accurately verify combat records Hartmann may not be the highest scoring fighter pilot of all time, like it or not.


He was not. The thought that the german claiming systeem was airtight has been proven wrong many times. Plse read the link. It is no wonder Hartmann was not popular during ww2 and after 45 in his new job. There is a reason he was not made a general post war i think.

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## wuzak (Aug 4, 2021)

drgondog said:


> How about looking to sources of 8th AF missions, followed by RAF, beginning May 12, 1944. You should acquire Mighty Eighth War Diary by Freeman, Actual knowledge based on facts should help remove the many misconceptions you bring here. Oh, that is the 'official start date of the 'Oil Plan' execution.



I'm afraid that was my mistake Bill. It was I that said that the Oil Plan officially started after D-Day, going from my (faulty) memory.

However, it still disproves his claim that in 1944 the P-51 encountered novice pilots who couldn't train due to lack of fuel because the supply was destroyed.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 4, 2021)

Snautzer01 said:


> He was not. The thought that the german claiming systeem was airtight has been proven wrong many times. Plse read the link. It is no wonder Hartmann was not popular during ww2 and after 45 in his new job. There is a reason he was not made a general post war i think.


Agree - I knew one former F-104 driver who knew him during the 60s, said he was a great pilot but not a pleasant person at times.


pbehn said:


> If those were his only overclaims that is much less than the average.


They weren't - there are several researchers (who have no agendas) who put his actual score between 120 and 130. As stated, 45% accurate!

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## Conslaw (Aug 4, 2021)

I don't know why it is hard for P-38 fans to accept the fact that, though the P-38 thrived in the Pacific and in North Africa/Mediterranean, it did not thrive with the 8th Air Force over Western Europe. They also seem to resent that it just so happens that the P-51B was perfectly suited for the escort role the P-38H&J weren't. 

It's also true that the commanders in the 8th Air Force could have taken measures to make both the P-38 and the P-47 more effective escorts earlier. The P-47 could have had droptanks earlier. General Kenney managed to get good droptanks to his Thunderbolts in New Guinea well before the P-47s in England got them. It also doesn't seem that the 8th Air Force had their "A-team" working to solve the engine performance and cabin heating problems that marred early P-38 operations in the theater.

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## pbehn (Aug 4, 2021)

I am still working on the math. If you count up all you have at the start thats 100% isnt it? And if you count what you have at the end that's 100%. So everyone starts and finishes with 100% and so its a draw?


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 4, 2021)

Conslaw said:


> I don't know why it is hard for P-38 fans to accept the fact that, though the P-38 thrived in the Pacific and in North Africa/Mediterranean, it did not thrive with the 8th Air Force over Western Europe. They also seem to resent that it just so happens that the P-51B was perfectly suited for the escort role the P-38H&J weren't.


Well I'll tell you there's no resentment from this P-38 fan, the P-51B was the better weapon for the job, period! If there was no P-51, could latter model P-47s and P-38s fulfilled the role? IMO yes but at a greater cost in manpower, time and equipment. A big "what if." I think the only thing I resent were the "twin engine fighter haters" who didn't understand, want to deal with or accept the complexity of the P-38 or the extra time it took for training and made unjustified excuses

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## Thumpalumpacus (Aug 4, 2021)

Conslaw said:


> I don't know why it is hard for P-38 fans to accept the fact that, though the P-38 thrived in the Pacific and in North Africa/Mediterranean, it did not thrive with the 8th Air Force over Western Europe. They also seem to resent that it just so happens that the P-51B was perfectly suited for the escort role the P-38H&J weren't.



As noted above, I'm a fan of the P-38; but just like any weapon, the environment you use it in has a say in how effective it may be, and I think the flight conditions pertaining in ETO escort simply weren't great for the P-38; long times at high altitude hampered both engine and pilot, and of course the dive issues while defending bombers at 25k are more present.

Combat in MTO/PTO was lower-altitude than ETO, generally speaking, and that tended to mitigate the P-38's weaknesses, I think. I'm under little illusion about the P-38 in ETO, myself. 

Again noted above, the German pilots' opinions of the plane speak as much or more about it in that theater; you can trust the enemy to tell the truth about your airplane, to their commanders, or to their diaries; and the P-38 didn't garner much respect from -190 or -109 drivers until caught in coffin-corner.

I'm sure glad the -51 matured into such a great plane. I don't see that as a slag against the Lightning.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 4, 2021)

Conslaw said:


> It also doesn't seem that the 8th Air Force had their "A-team" working to solve the engine performance and cabin heating problems that marred early P-38 operations in the theater.


They may have had the "Z" team, part of the problems with P-38Js in early operations was that the intercooler worked _too_ good. 

That was combined with the pilots being instructed to "cruise" in a manor that was at odds with the way both Allison and Lockheed said the plane should be flown. 

The Army was telling the pilots to cruise at high rpm and low boost (small throttle opening) so the engine would already be turning high rpm if the plane/formation was "bounced" and they could get to full power quicker. This was wrong on several points.

1. With the new "J" intercoolers the intake charge was over-cooled. With this throttle opening and propeller governor setting/s the turbo was closer to idle than full speed and turbo did not heat the intake charge much before it went through the intercooler. Result was fuel puddling in the intake manifolds and some of the heavy aromatics separating out. This caused all kinds of trouble when the throttles were slammed open to engage the enemy. 

2. This technique didn't help throttle response all that much. It took a while for the turbo to reach full speed. The throttle/s may have been wide open but with the turbos still building up speed the manifold pressure was not what was wanted or needed. 

3. This technique used more fuel for the same amount of power to the prop than running low rpm and high boost. Higher engine rpm means higher losses to internal friction for the same power to the prop. 

The P-38 should have been "cruised" at low RPM and high boost. The Turbo would have been turning at closer to combat rpm and when the throttles were opened high manifold pressure (and high power for a given rpm) would have been available. The engines would have used less power to friction and used less fuel per hour giving longer range. 
The intake charge would have been hotter and caused fewer problems with the fuel/air mixture being too cold. 

This was part of what Tony Levier instructed P-38 pilots on when he went to Europe in 1944. 

Wouldn't have solved the cockpit heat problem though.  

That could have been solved by taking a few bean counters out behind the garden shed and whacking them upside the head with a large tree limb. 
Saving the cost of a 2nd generator on a 100,000 dollar airplane that used as much electricity as the P-38 was pretty stupid. If the engine with the generator on the single generator versions went down the pilot was racing the depleting battery to get home and in a plane with electric propellers that is not a good thing.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Aug 4, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> They may have had the "Z" team, part of the problems with P-38Js in early operations was that the intercooler worked _too_ good.
> 
> That was combined with the pilots being instructed to "cruise" in a manor that was at odds with the way both Allison and Lockheed said the plane should be flown.
> 
> ...



ShortRound shot the full course here, especially about the bean counters!

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## nuuumannn (Aug 4, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> 'm sure glad the -51 matured into such a great plane. I don't see that as a slag against the Lightning.



Eggs-actly, as has been said in another thread, just because what's being introduced is better than what went before, it doesn't diminish what went before's impact, regardless of the issues suffered by the P-38. It was the aircraft for the job at the time, along with the P-47, and, dare I say it, like the P-39 in the PTO, despite its shortcomings did the job it had to until something better came along.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 5, 2021)

Same can be said for the F4F, it held the line until newer types became available.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> That could have been solved by taking a few bean counters out behind the garden shed and whacking them upside the head with a large tree limb.
> Saving the cost of a 2nd generator on a 100,000 dollar airplane that used as much electricity as the P-38 was pretty stupid. If the engine with the generator on the single generator versions went down the pilot was racing the depleting battery to get home and in a plane with electric propellers that is not a good thing.


Spot on about the bean counters and the lack of a 2nd generator.

Expanding the picture a bit - this and other issues like the poor heater system are sometimes directed by the government or accepted at the beginning of a contract. * I'll continually repeat myself, Lockheed (and probably the AAC) never envisioned to build more than 70 P-38s (INTERCEPTORS) let alone to be used as a bomber escort 25,000' over Germany almost 4 years after the first flight.* Once the wheels of a government aircraft production contract is in motion it can be "mating elephants" to get the most obvious and simple items changed (and after 80 years things haven't changed much). Additionally it seems that many P-38 detractors think that Lockheed had the final say on certain equipment that went on the aircraft (like the engines, turbosuperchargers, radios and even landing gear, all "Government Furnished Equipment" or GFE). This can also be said about other aircraft being produced during the same period. I don't know how quickly deficiencies got turned around but there was a laundry list of modifications that Lockheed wanted to make to the aircraft through out it's production life but couldn't without government approval. Again, *the manufacturer doesn't always have the final say in production changes despite designing the aircraft!!!* On the other side of this I think no one wanted to risk shutting down the production line or delaying deliveries and in the middle of this you had those "bean counters" not helping things.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Aug 5, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Same can be said for the F4F, it held the line until newer types became available.





nuuumannn said:


> Eggs-actly, as has been said in another thread, just because what's being introduced is better than what went before, it doesn't diminish what went before's impact, regardless of the issues suffered by the P-38. It was the aircraft for the job at the time, along with the P-47, and, dare I say it, like the P-39 in the PTO, despite its shortcomings did the job it had to until something better came along.



_You dance with the gal you brought_ is how we say it down here. The Lockheed wasn't a clear winner, but had significant advantages if the pilot worked 'em, much like the -47. And just alike, it had weaknesses enemy pilots could exploit.

Truth be told, I just like the idea of sitting behind four hot fifties and a twenty, with a crazy grin on my face.

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## nuuumannn (Aug 5, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> You dance with the gal you brought


I like it... Gonna use it...

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## GrauGeist (Aug 5, 2021)

In the 80's, we street racers had a similar saying:
"Run whatcha brung"

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## 33k in the air (Aug 5, 2021)

Does anyone have more info on the P-38L, I think it was, which was modified into a superstrafer? The 20mm cannon was replaced by four .50-cal. MGs, bringing the total in the nose to eight. It also carried a Douglas gun pod under each wing.

There is a photo or two of this modification, but I've not come across any details on the project.

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## Stig1207 (Aug 5, 2021)

Conslaw said:


> I don't know why it is hard for P-38 fans to accept the fact that, though the P-38 thrived in the Pacific and in North Africa/Mediterranean, it did not thrive with the 8th Air Force over Western Europe.


There is a another aspect in why some fighter aircraft thrived in other theatres, other than different operating conditions and procedures. The rate of overclaiming was not the same across different theatres and different periods of the war. Higher in the MTO / PTO (and ETO pre '44), than ETO '44 where and when it became much more accurate for the Western Allies.

The record is going to look better for aircraft and units in theatres where victory credits are 2 or more compared to enemy losses vs those in a theatre where vc's are near 1-1.

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## Ascent (Aug 5, 2021)

The trouble is, people think of it as a zero sum game, if you're praising A, then it means you think B is bad.

You see similar in small arms. I like the Bren gun, it suited the British doctrine and was a good reliable weapon. Some would take that to mean I think the MG34/42 is therefore inferior.

No, it just means I think the Bren is a good weapon that suited the British and nothing else.

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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 5, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> In the 80's, we street racers had a similar saying:
> "Run whatcha brung"


In the 60s, we ice trialers, autocrossers, and hillclimbers had the same mantra.

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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 5, 2021)

Conslaw said:


> I don't know why it is hard for P-38 fans to accept the fact that, though the P-38 thrived in the Pacific and in North Africa/Mediterranean, it did not thrive with the 8th Air Force over Western Europe.


I don't think anybody involved in the design and manufacture of the P38 ever truly anticipated the conditions it would encounter in the winter at 30,000 feet over northern Europe for 6-8 hours per sortie.

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 5, 2021)

I was recently told with utter incredulity that someone has been going around claiming that the P-38 captured 90% of all PR photos taken over WW2 europe.

Some digging found this was from Wikipedia, who in turn cite the Lockheed Martin website, who in turn (apparently not having used their own archives at all?)
cite thre books and a LIFE Magazine article for their official P-38 webpage.









The P-38: When Lightning Strikes


A new American fighter, the P-38 Lightning, peeled down from the skies over Iceland on August14, 1942. True to its name, it was akin to a force of nature: fast, unforeseen, and immensely powerful.




www.lockheedmartin.com





I began to have very serious doubts about the scholarly integrity of the webpage within the first few sentences:

"Within six months, as the P-38 showed its versatility in North Africa, a lone hysterical German pilot surrendered to soldiers at an Allied camp near Tunisia, pointing up to the sky and repeating one phrase—_“der Gableschwanz Teufl”_—over and over."

(this is total nonsense, as has been thoroughly proven to be so on this very forum).

Anyway... this webpage also says:

"P-38 ... as a reconnaissance aircraft, obtained 90 percent of the aerial film captured over Europe"

I found this statistically immensely unlikely, even if the F5 had five cameras fitted.

So I emailed the National Collection of Aerial Photography (incidentally here in Scotland, amazingly), who gave me the following information today:

"That amounts to 22,372 missions of which 18805 are RAF-flown, and 3567 are USAAF-flown. We do not have a frame count available for each sortie, so these figures can only give an indication of the split in effort...This includes missions flown from the UK, Allied-occupied Europe, Italy, Gibraltar and North Africa."

They have 5.5million frames, but state some were shredded, so as he says, these figures are only useful as a relative split. not absolute numbers.

Therefore, even if EVERY single USAAF mission used the P-38, and if ALL of those were the F5 with five cameras, and if ALL the RAF PR aircraft only had ONE camera,
thats still less than the RAF total number of frames taken (naturally this assumes for this very broad point that all aircraft took about the same number of
frames per mission, per camera, which I`m sure isnt true as you`ll have all sorts of different mission parameters).

For Lockheed`s website to be correct, we not only have to skew the data as above, but we then still have to somehow multiply the P-38 images taken
by NINE times.

I like many, strongly suspect that the truth is that the P-38 took 90% of all images over Europe as taken by the USAAF.

I also asked the National Collection of Aerial Photography about the USAAF split in PR aircraft used, who replied:

"At a superficial level, most US-flown sorties in Europe would have employed the F-4/F-5 variant of the P-38"

Lockheed cite the following sources for their webpage, sadly I do not have all of these so cannot say if indeed any of them
actually say 90% of ALL PR missions over Europe or just USAAF ? Can anyone come up with anything further.

Certainly from the response I had from NCAP, the Lockheed claim seems statistically very unlikely.

(These are the sources that Lockheed Martin used to write their webpage, of which I`ve only read Stanaways book)

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## wuzak (Aug 5, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> I was recently told with utter incredulity that someone has been going around claiming that the P-38 captured 90% of all PR photos taken over WW2 europe.



Heard that claim on a video by Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles, though he seems to be quoting the Lockheed-Martin site.


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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 5, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> I was recently told with utter incredulity that someone has been going around claiming that the P-38 captured 90% of all PR photos taken over WW2 europe.
> 
> Some digging found this was from Wikipedia, who in turn cite the Lockheed Martin website, who in turn (apparently not having used their own archives at all?)
> cite four books for their official P-38 webpage.


Probably some young contract web developer hired to do the website with no clue how to access Lockheed's archives or even that such things exist. With all the mergers and reshuffles, could be a lot of those archives misplaced or discarded.
A young new hire maintenance helper at the airline was detailed to go through the the stuff stashed along one of the mezzanine decks in the hangar and throw out the trash and organize the rest. I happened to see him headed out to the dumpster lugging an ugly water-damaged cardboard box that piqued my curiosity. Turned out it was all the old maintenance logs for the granddaddy of our fleet, a 1957 Fokker F27, that was currently running a RR Dart engine on the right side that dated all the way back to 1948 and had a four digit serial number. That engine was running on its fifth airframe, had been reconfigured into five different dash numbers over its life, and had the superseded data plates strung together on a wire ring in the box. Needless to say, that box never made it to the dumpster. Excrement occurs.

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## SaparotRob (Aug 5, 2021)

Out of curiosity, which plane was the Allied PR champ? I'm thinking Spitfire although perhaps the Mosquito might hold the title.


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## special ed (Aug 5, 2021)

Life Magazine was prone to exaggeration in the war years, especially early years, as a morale booster for the home folks.


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2021)

Conslaw said:


> I don't know why it is hard for P-38 fans to accept the fact that, though the P-38 thrived in the Pacific and in North Africa/Mediterranean, it did not thrive with the 8th Air Force over Western Europe. They also seem to resent that it just so happens that the P-51B was perfectly suited for the escort role the P-38H&J weren't.
> 
> It's also true that the commanders in the 8th Air Force could have taken measures to make both the P-38 and the P-47 more effective escorts earlier. The P-47 could have had droptanks earlier. General Kenney managed to get good droptanks to his Thunderbolts in New Guinea well before the P-47s in England got them. It also doesn't seem that the 8th Air Force had their "A-team" working to solve the engine performance and cabin heating problems that marred early P-38 operations in the theater.


Difficult to explain in short answer. Politics, Bureaucracies and incompetence played a role. Inexperience played a role. Lack of foresight played a role.
Some *Edits *below for context:

1. IMO, while Eaker inherited Monk Hunter (Spaatz pick) to run VIII FC. Hunter, like Spaatz, and like Eaker served in AAC when heavy bombardment matured into high altitude fast attack and operating above existing Pursuit designs - in the late 1930s. Their vision of future escort was that of Destroyer protecting cargo convoys - fence out threats but always remain close. _That said, the conundrum was the belief that only twin engine aircraft were perceived feasible for long range escort - but concept remained through XP-75_. The VIII Service Command in 1942 was staffed by combat rookies trying to learn from RAF (when they occasionally listened). The problems experienced with P-47C and P-38F led Service Command to form an Air Technical Services department in late 1942- with shining star Maj Cass Hough. That said, Hunter did place a request to Brits to produce 75 and 110 gallon tanks (Jan/Feb 1943) but either Hunter or Eaker failed to manage the process - even if Air Services was ultimately responsible.

2. Pre-war, the use of auxiliary external fuel was solely for ferry - combat use was specifically codified as 'verboten'. The directive to 'change our thinking' was driven by Arnold in January 1942 in his Fighter Conference to drive Fighter Range and Performance but operational pursuit aircraft in AAF inventory were only P-38, 39 and 40. _MC was nudged in March but only the 60 and 75 gal steel combat tanks were even in test in summer of 1942. The 110 and150 had not started testing. Prior to the Fighter Conference Kelsey and Johnson collaborated to provide extended range for the F-4, specifically in December 1941. Additionally Lockheed designed a 150 and 300 gal steel Ferry tank._

The Mustang was not in the inventory but Edgar Schmued/NAA execs were not beholden to AAF Materiel Command restrictions and designed Low Level Attack Pursuit (A-36) with dual purpose external racks and internal plumbing. _The A-36 Design Specification stipulated dual fuel/bomb pylon in Dec 1941_. External bomb racks were designed and tested quietly with tacit approval by AAF-MC on P-38E as kits in December 1941 and production article in P-38F. Neither NAA nor Lockheed design provided for pressurization system for external tanks but the plumbing was designed for both to accommodate 15,000 feet.

3. Wright Field tested for performance - not operational suitability. Eglin Field was just emerging in the role of operational suitability. B-17s, B-24s, P-38s and P-47s entering combat operations in 1942/early 1943 had not been suitably tested at high altitude - nor had AAF-MC as yet delivered on either the 60 or 75 gallon combat tank. Only Ferry tanks were being produced - in limited quantities. The P-47C was delivered without the center keel/bomb rack capable of carrying both bomb and fuel tanks - but neither 38 or 47 had pressurization systems to feed from external tank to engine. 

Contrast versus A-36 and P-51A which inherited many constructive requirements from RAF on NA 73/83 and 91 prior to first flight of NA-73X in October 1940. NOTE NO BUREAUCRATIC interference from AAF-MC - "not invented here'. The pressurization was solved by Cass Hough, followed by production insertion on P51B-5 in Nov 1943. But neither P-38J nor P47D had production article until approx March-April 1944.

Not all the issues regarding LR escort modifications were caused by MC. AAF MC proposed (Jan 1943) to Lockheed and Republic that they modify the P-38/47 to carry more external ferry tank fuel, but also that P-47 be equipped to employ wing racks _and plumbing_ for ferry tanks. Lockheed complied quickly but Republic failed to produce the wing mods until April 1944. When General Barney Giles pressed Lockheed, NAA, Bell, Curtiss and Republic to add more internal fuel - July 7, 1943 - NAA tested first fuselage fuel tank on July 18, Lockheed in September, but Republic took until the D-25 _was delivered in ETO FGs in May 1944_ to add 70 gallons to fuselage tankage.

While the P-51B proceeded with AAF-MC blessings it was NEVER contemplated by either MC or AAF-HQ as anything but a continuation of A-36, P-51A and General Saville - Chief Air Defense - was The decision maker for combat allocations dutifully assigned ALL Mustangs to TAC. _To this day it is inexplicable that Eaker agreed to let the P-51B got to 2nd TAC without a fight - it took Spaatz, Arnold and Eisenhower face to face with Portal to extract from Leigh-Mallory.,_

4. Too many folks point to Kenney as example of early deployment of external tanks on P-47 and ask why not for VIII AF? The answer is pretty simple. The SWP with long flights over water were essentially 'unmolested' en-route and 180 degrees from ETO threat experience, where our fighters were under threat 26 miles (or thereabouts) from England. Applying Kenney Doctrine to ETO would have resulted in a lot of 'crispy' P-47s IMO. Cass Hough was every bit as capable as Pappy Gunn.

5. As to VIII Air Technical Services not having 'A team' to solve Major P-38 design flaws for operating at high altitudes? Unfair. Kelly Johnson was very aware in 1942 of the limitations of wing installed intercoolers_ to support HP > 1000Hp_ - but Lockheed engineers and MC engineers/procurement did not receive a whiff of the major high altitude issues confronting operational P-38s in ETO until late 1942. Recall that all ETO P-38s were shipped to Africa before cold weather set in in ETO. Also, for the Eaker 'haters', he was bitter about having his planned, requested and approved priority for P-38 as first choice escorts pulled from him two months after first combat ops. You can directly trace losses during Big Week through Schweinfurt to the absence of P-38 escort - warts and all.


Additionally, Allison was delivering better engines with more HP than the Intercoolers on E/F/G/H could support - and the early J was a disaster as far as high altitude engine/intercooler/turbo powerplant operations. VIII ATS did not have the Depot capacity to re-engineer the P-38 Powerplant configuration - also not in their job jar. They succeeded admirably in modifying existing P-47C/D with pylon wing/fuel feed but took more elapsed time for single mod than production of 30+ P-47s in the US.

Shortround covered the major issues clearly and exhaustively above.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 5, 2021)

On the subject of PR types, Saint-Exupery was flying a French F-5B when he went MIA in 1944.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2021)

33k in the air said:


> Does anyone have more info on the P-38L, I think it was, which was modified into a superstrafer? The 20mm cannon was replaced by four .50-cal. MGs, bringing the total in the nose to eight. It also carried a Douglas gun pod under each wing.
> 
> There is a photo or two of this modification, but I've not come across any details on the project.


From Wiki;

_The *P-38L* was the most numerous variant of the Lightning, with 3,923 built, 113 by Consolidated-Vultee in their Nashville plant. It entered service with the USAAF in June 1944, in time to support the Allied invasion of France on D-Day. Lockheed production of the Lightning was distinguished by a suffix consisting of a production block number followed by "LO," for example "P-38L-1-LO", while Consolidated-Vultee production was distinguished by a block number followed by "VN," for example "P-38L-5-VN."

The P-38L was the first Lightning fitted with zero-length rocket launchers. Seven high velocity aircraft rockets (HVARs) on pylons beneath each wing, and later, five rockets on each wing on "Christmas tree" launch racks which added 1,365 lb (619 kg) to the aircraft. The P-38L also had strengthened stores pylons to allow carriage of 2,000 lb (900 kg) bombs or 300 US gal (1,100 l) drop tanks._


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## Snowygrouch (Aug 5, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> Out of curiosity, which plane was the Allied PR champ? I'm thinking Spitfire although perhaps the Mosquito might hold the title.


I dont know, but in order to clear up the P-38 PR percentage question, I`m trying to trawl some archives to find some post war "Historical Review" documents, which do exist for some other notable operational areas of the war. If they dont exist, it comes down to adding up mission stats from monthly reports, which would be months of work...and such records
always tend to have huge gaps. I`ll let you know if I find out anything on Spitfire/Mossie PR ratios (not on this thread though!)


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> From Wiki;
> 
> _The *P-38L* was the most numerous variant of the Lightning, with 3,923 built, 113 by Consolidated-Vultee in their Nashville plant. It entered service with the USAAF in June 1944, in time to support the Allied invasion of France on D-Day. Lockheed production of the Lightning was distinguished by a suffix consisting of a production block number followed by "LO," for example "P-38L-1-LO", while Consolidated-Vultee production was distinguished by a block number followed by "VN," for example "P-38L-5-VN."
> 
> The P-38L was the first Lightning fitted with zero-length rocket launchers. Seven high velocity aircraft rockets (HVARs) on pylons beneath each wing, and later, five rockets on each wing on "Christmas tree" launch racks which added 1,365 lb (619 kg) to the aircraft. The P-38L also had strengthened stores pylons to allow carriage of 2,000 lb (900 kg) bombs or 300 US gal (1,100 l) drop tanks._


Joe - I'm shocked but suspect that WiKi is wrong. From all the operations details I have reviewed, for sure not even the J-25 went operational in VIII FC through September 1944 when 479th converted to P-51s. Robin remembers that one J-25 was on the base in mid September for familiarization but he stated that he didn't fly it (that one). IIRC The 474th flew the L in November 1944.

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## VintageIron (Aug 5, 2021)

Were any engines other than Allison ever fitted to the P-38? I wonder what a pair of Rolls-Royce/Packard Merlins would have been like performance wise compared to the Allison's.


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## wuzak (Aug 5, 2021)

VintageIron said:


> Were any engines other than Allison ever fitted to the P-38? I wonder what a pair of Rolls-Royce/Packard Merlins would have been like performance wise compared to the Allison's.



The IV-1430 was fitted to the XP-49, which was essentially an "improved" P-38. I believe it even had the same wing.

Does that count?

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2021)

VintageIron said:


> Were any engines other than Allison ever fitted to the P-38? I wonder what a pair of Rolls-Royce/Packard Merlins would have been like performance wise compared to the Allison's.


See this thread...






THE MYSTICAL MERLIN POWERED P-38


This has been an on-going discussion on this forum since I first joined. Many have talked about a proposal undertaken by Lockheed to see the feasibility of installing a Merlin XX into a P-38 airframe. In 1982 I attended a Lockheed Management Club dinner where Kelly Johnson was the guest...



ww2aircraft.net


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Joe - I'm shocked but suspect that WiKi is wrong. From all the operations details I have reviewed, for sure not even the J-25 went operational in VIII FC through September 1944 when 479th converted to P-51s. Robin remembers that one J-25 was on the base in mid September for familiarization but he stated that he didn't fly it (that one). IIRC The 474th flew the L in November 1944.


I remember your comments about Robin with regards to this a few months ago.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> I was recently told with utter incredulity that someone has been going around claiming that the P-38 captured 90% of all PR photos taken over WW2 europe.
> 
> Some digging found this was from Wikipedia, who in turn cite the Lockheed Martin website, who in turn (apparently not having used their own archives at all?)
> cite thre books and a LIFE Magazine article for their official P-38 webpage.
> ...


Calum, as always great information. It's quite obvious that this claim by LM is not true, my guess is some mis-informed intern in their PA department somewhere in Georgia or Fort Worth put this statement out. Now could it be said that the P-38 captured 90% of all *USAAF* PR photos taken over WW2 Europe?

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## Shortround6 (Aug 5, 2021)

VintageIron said:


> Were any engines other than Allison ever fitted to the P-38? I wonder what a pair of Rolls-Royce/Packard Merlins would have been like performance wise compared to the Allison's.


No, except as noted for the XP-49. 

There were 3 design studies at different times using different Merlins and Allisons and of differing depth/detail. 

The Allison used high compression in the cylinders and got marginally better fuel consumption. Trading exhaust thrust for the losses in powering the turbo also have advantages in cruise at high altitudes for the Allison (if flown correctly) so the decisions factored in both range and projected engine availability in addition to just speed and climb. 
The decision was usually that difference in performance (on paper) wasn't worth disrupting supply chains/production.

I believe the 1st study compared the Merlin XX/Packard V-1650-1 to the V-1710-F2 used in the YP-38s. 
Another study was done in 1942 between the Merlin 61 and the V-1710-F17 using core type intercoolers which did not show up in service for another year.
A late war study compared a V-1710G (up to 3400rpm) to an advanced Merlin capable of 2000hp in War Emergency. 
This onw was done after the P-38K was turned down to avoid production disruption /delays and both planes in the study would have used different reduction gears, larger propellers and needed the changed thrust line of the XP-38K.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 5, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Calum, as always great information. It's quite obvious that this claim by LM is not true, my guess is some mis-informed intern in their PA department somewhere in Georgia or Fort Worth put this statement out. Now could it be said that the P-38 captured 90% of all *USAAF* PR photos taken over WW2 Europe?


 That would be doubtful even perhaps possible?
It might very well have been true for a certain year or for the theater up until a certain date?
There were about 90 Allison powered F-6 A&B recon planes, and another 90 F-6C (P-51B & C) built. details are not always firm.
They did build/convert around 136 P-51Ds to F-6Ds but that was not until the fall of 1944. The F-6K is too late. 
Not at all knowledgeable about what the light/medium bombers were doing or if photos taken on bombing missions for damage assessment count as PR photos.

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 5, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Calum, as always great information. It's quite obvious that this claim by LM is not true, my guess is some mis-informed intern in their PA department somewhere in Georgia or Fort Worth put this statement out. Now could it be said that the P-38 captured 90% of all *USAAF* PR photos taken over WW2 Europe?



Good question, to be honest I`d say thats at least plausible, but other than that email from the archive saying that the "majority" of USAAF photos were P-38 I have no data.

It seems to be a common pattern for corporate websites to have really bad webpage data for their historic aircraft, the BAE Systems website in the UK had a page for the
Hawker Typhoon, in which they said it was brought in as a ground attack aircraft to replace the Hurricane. I had to email them with copies of the "RAF Type History File", clearly showing it was envisaged as a total replacement for both the Spitfire and Hurricane, it was never supposed to be a ground attack aircraft at all (not when it was being designed).






Hawker Typhoon


Fighter and heavily-armed ground attack aircraft designed around the Napier Sabre engine.




www.baesystems.com





Anyway, they fixed all the things that were wrong, and its now not bad. But I dont think the people making these webpages are historians or specialists, they certainly
were not at BAE systems (however I give them full credit, they replied straight away and DID fix all the errors)

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## pbehn (Aug 5, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> Out of curiosity, which plane was the Allied PR champ? I'm thinking Spitfire although perhaps the Mosquito might hold the title.


Difficult to say, apart from the dedicated unarmed PR spitfires there were many converted fighters performing a similar role to the Mustangs which generally had a camera too. By October 1942 there were 5 Mosquito PR squadrons. What is impossible to believe is that the total effort by all RAF and USA types that werent P-38s amounted to just 10% of the total. It isnt supported by the history of RAF Medmenham (later _Allied Central Interpretation Unit_ (ACIU)) RAF Medmenham - Wikipedia

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## Conslaw (Aug 5, 2021)

PAT303 said:


> I remember a post on here somewhere where a P38 pilot did that in a mock dogfight with a Spitfire and almost flew into the ground.


Especially with the maneuvering flaps and boosted ailerons of the later P-38Ls, the P-38 was a very maneuverable plane in the hands of an expert. An expert could use differential thrust and could induce torque on either side. The workload of flying the plane in an ordinary fashion was hard enough for a low-hour pilot though, and the vast majority of pilots couldn't take advantage of the unique aspects of the plane.

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## eagledad (Aug 5, 2021)

Gentlemen,

In the Mighty Eight War Manual, by Roger Freeman, page 186, Freeman wrote “In late July 1944, the first P-38L’s arrived in the UK. … When this model became available for combat units in August, only the 479th​ Group retained fighter P-38’s in 8th​ Air Force and replacements it received were mostly low-hours P-38J’s turned in by the units recently converted to P-51’s.”

If Freeman is correct (and I have no reason to doubt him) there is no chance the the L model was available for D-Day. IMHO, I would be surprised to find that any of the 8th's Fighter Groups took the L into combat. Corrections always welcomed.

Eagledad

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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2021)

eagledad said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> In the Mighty Eight War Manual, by Roger Freeman, page 186, Freeman wrote “In late July 1944, the first P-38L’s arrived in the UK. … When this model became available for combat units in August, only the 479th​ Group retained fighter P-38’s in 8th​ Air Force and replacements it received were mostly low-hours P-38J’s turned in by the units recently converted to P-51’s.”
> 
> ...


Freeman was correct - but according to Robin Olds - that an L never darkened the doors of the 479th, only J-25. That is not to say Olds' memory was impeccable or that an L did not arrive in the ETO as only the 479th remained unconverted to P-51s of the former 8thAF P-38 FG. The J-15 and newer were in very high demand in MTO and the 1st, 14th and 82nd had just received J-15s in late June/July (from 8thAF and States). Not that I have all the data, but my first definitive L in combat ops was 474th in 9th AF in October.

Now for caveats. Olds sez J-15, MACRs say J-15s and J-10s for 479th, 55th and 364th. In Stanaway's History of the 479th FG, page 67, he states "There is no evidence that to suggest that 479th ever received a P-38J-25 subtype" - but curiously presents color plates of P-38L-1's for which there are no photos.. The IARCs of the P-38J-25 and Subs show arrival in late July but no disposition to 8th AF from Langford Lodge.

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## wuzak (Aug 6, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> View attachment 636477



Was not the Typhoon developed alongside the Tornado from the start?

The F18/37 fighter had 2 variants - one with the Rolls-Royce Vulture (the Tornado) and one with the Sabre (the Typhoon). Though they were largely the same, there were detail differences around the mounting of the engine.

The Tornado dies with the axing of the Vulture, but a couple of prototypes continued on, one having a Bristol Centaurus installed, another trialling counter-rotating propellers using the Vulture.

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 6, 2021)

wuzak said:


> Was not the Typhoon developed alongside the Tornado from the start?
> 
> The F18/37 fighter had 2 variants - one with the Rolls-Royce Vulture (the Tornado) and one with the Sabre (the Typhoon). Though they were largely the same, there were detail differences around the mounting of the engine.
> 
> The Tornado dies with the axing of the Vulture, but a couple of prototypes continued on, one having a Bristol Centaurus installed, another trialling counter-rotating propellers using the Vulture.


It depends what you read, some spec documents suggest yes, but, having read the small print (below) I think those have been "tidied" somewhat. (the early formal
spec documents have only the numeric designation. no "name" at all). I have taken the view that the two snippets below show that the first time either type
was actually named was first the Tornado, and 2nd the Typhoon.












Camm says he started work (before tenders went out) independantly, in late 1936 on a Hurricane replacement, he claims the first time he was aware of the Sabre was about Feb 1937. It was (he says) only later that the Air Ministry actually came up with a spec, and issued tenders. 

Ooops sorry mods weve drifted off-course...

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## Just Schmidt (Aug 8, 2021)

BiffF15 said:


> Is it just me or is there a lot of P-39 claims…


I also thought he looks a little like eine pee neun und dreißig experte.

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## drgondog (Aug 9, 2021)

Not sure if this is piling on - but the letter from Arnold to his Chief, Air Staff Barney Giles was written as he (Arnold) was heading for the hospital after second heart attack.

"*This brings to mind very clearly the absolute necessity for building a fighter airplane that can go in and out with the bombers. Moreover, this fighter has to go into Germany. Perhaps we can modify some existing type to do the job. The P-38 has been doing a fine job from North Africa in escorting our B-17s 400 hundred miles or so. Whether this airplane can furnish the same escort against the GAF [German Air Force] on the Western Front is debatable.
*
_*Our fighter people in the UK claim they can’t stay with the bombers because they are too slow [in cruise mode] and because they [the fighter escort] must have top speed by the time they hit the bombers. The P-38 is not notable for great acceleration, so perhaps it too will not be able to meet the FW’s and 109’s. About six months remains before deep penetrations of Germany begin. Within this next six months, you have got to get a fighter that can protect our bombers. Whether you use an existing type or have to start from scratch is your problem. Get to work on this right way because in January, ’44, I want a fighter escort for our bombers from the UK into Germany".*_

Note: Important facts:
1. Written before July losses during Blitz Week and just before Eaker's subsequent appeal for both P-38s and Mustangs.
2. Performance testing of first P-51B-1 by NAA in May 1943 by Chilton were not only being reviewed AAF Materiel Command, but via 'back channel' to Arnold. When flown in 'Fighter Condition' w/o racks the P-51B-1 attained average of 450mph TAS at 29000 feet.
Perhaps more notable is long time Mustang 'barrier' MG Oliver Echols Chief Materiel Command went to Hucknall in August 1943. Do we suppose 'someone' lit a fire under him? Priorities for both NAA Mustang program and Packard 1650-3 were issued about the same time. Co-incidence? Note that Echols was never promoted again and went to Northrup in 1945. 
3. Republic had responded to Giles earlier pleas for more internal fuel by stating that increasing fuel either in wing or fuselage was a major redesign effort requiring 8-12 months before production articles could be delivered. Note: The final production drawing for 70 gallon auxiliary fuselage tank for P-47D-25 was dated December 1943. The P-38J LE Kit drawing was dated August 1943. 
4. Lockheed and NAA responded more favorably with preliminary study to install a fuselage tank behind cockpit (both) but P-38 design had more unfavorable CG issues. NAA, with experience of extra 54 gallons in gun/ammo bay rejected the diminished armament as a non starter - and showed MC that adding 18 gallons in leading edge was not very practical and held fast on the aft fuselage tank of 85 gal max (MC desired 200).
5. The NAA prototype test was in July, flown by Chilton - then repeated by Col Bradley to confirm. The Production dwgs were completed in August and first kits issued in October 1943 for P-51B-1, -5 and C-1. Both Lockheed and NAA kits arrived in US and ETO Depots late October. 

Unsure what Arnold's sources for cited P-38 escort issues might have been - but they were spot on for highly contested airspace with equivalent performance fighters. Both MTO and SWP escort missions were more benign in nature due to large over water routes and safe (relatively) use of ferry tanks.

The sources for the above were largely extracted from well-sourced "Development of Long Range Escort", Study 136, by Boylon - and my own sourcing of NARA an USAFHRC file.

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## DrumBob (Aug 10, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> My understanding is that the engines had trouble with the high cold air in ETO, whereas in SWPac, with fights lower in the atmosphere, the issue wasn't nearly so problematic. Mach issues were reduced as a result.
> 
> This is what I always understood. The aircraft did much better in warmer climates.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 10, 2021)

The P-38s problems with cold air over Europe were of somewhat short duration.
They were something of a self own to.

The early P-38s like the F and the G, while cockpit temp was miserable, didn't have the problems with the engines in cold air temps. In fact their intercoolers were too small and couldn't over the cool the air at high cruise settings or at least not as much as the P-38Js could. Off course these P-38s were never used in the ETO except for a few brief "fly over France" training missions before they were sent to North Africa. Nobody really knows how well (or poorly) they would have done. 

P-38s didn't fly ETO high altitude escort missions until the late fall of 1943. 2nd fighter Group in the ETO didn't become operational until Dec of 1943. 16-17 months after the P-38 combat victories in Alaska. and about 16 months after the first few P-38s go into action on Guadalcanal.

By late 1943 Allison was fitting new intake manifolds to help solve the problem at the factory and starting to ship replacement manifolds for either field replacement or replacement at overhaul centers. Some of the "problem" had been anticipated with a change in the allowable fuel formulations in winter of 1942/43 and work had been being done to help solve it during the spring, summer and fall. They had anticipated some problems with both P-39s and P-40s but in practice they didn't have much, if any, trouble.

A change in flying technique in which the engines were run slower but used higher boost pressures also kept the intake temperature higher and that solved some of the problems.
This last took until the summer of 1944 to really implement as the AAC was flying the P-38 _against_ the instructions of_ both Allison and Lockheed._

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## drgondog (Aug 10, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> The P-38s problems with cold air over Europe were of somewhat short duration.
> They were something of a self own to.
> 
> The early P-38s like the F and the G, while cockpit temp was miserable, didn't have the problems with the engines in cold air temps. In fact their intercoolers were too small and couldn't over the cool the air at high cruise settings or at least not as much as the P-38Js could. Off course these P-38s were never used in the ETO except for a few brief "fly over France" training missions before they were sent to North Africa. Nobody really knows how well (or poorly) they would have done.
> ...


You (knew) meant "P-38s" not "P-39s" and 20th FG as 2nd P-38 FG operational two months after 55th FG on October 15th 943.

To add - the 1st went operational with P-38G/F on August 29,1942. Fighter Sweep at unknown altitude. First escort mission aborted on 29 September. First complete escort 2 October to Meaulte, last to Lille on 9 October.
14th FG went operational on15 October - an escort to Le Havre and flew last (escort) on 25 October. The 82nd FG was training but yanked with 1st, 14th and 31st and 52nd in late October through November 1942.

As you noted the Intercooler design in LE was not capable of supporting more than 1000+ Hp for anything but take-off and brief cycles at MP. Kelley noted that as the reason for the new P-38J design. That said, the issues associated with 'over cooling in the early P-38J' were not reported in the P-38F/G/H for the reasons you cited.

I'm pretty sure LaVier's visit in Spring 1944 was the key to overturning the stupid AAF-ATS operating procedures for long range cruise - and implemented in March/April 1944. 

No P-38 escort/fighter Sweep in ETO again until 15 October 1943, 55th FG Sweep over Dutch coast.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 10, 2021)

Thanks for the P-39 correction. 

I was going from memory on LaVier's visit so thanks again for the correction. 

I would also note that the fuel available in 1942 and perhaps early 1943 in many theaters did not have the cold temperature problems the later fuel did. (and not all batches of the later fuel had the problem either) 

Allowable lead was increased and higher percentages of heavy aromatics were allowed. It was these heavy aromatics that were separating out.

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## Escuadrilla Azul (Aug 11, 2021)

wuzak said:


> The bombers also got through when unescorted. No 8th AF raid was turned back because of enemy action.
> 
> The losses on unescorted missions were unsustainable, but that didn't stop them reaching their targets.


Donald Caldwell in "Day Fighter in Defense of the Reich" says that there was one 8 AF raid turned back due to enemy action. It was on March 8th 1943 in a B-24 attack on Rouen railyards.

BTW, as someone noted before (sorry, can't remember who was), the P-38 faced different quality of enemy pilots in ETO/MTO and PTO so it could had have an influence in how it was perceived: not so good vs stellar.

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## P-39 Expert (Aug 11, 2021)

Escuadrilla Azul said:


> Donald Caldwell in "Day Fighter in Defense of the Reich" says that there was one 8 AF raid turned back due to enemy action. It was on March 8th 1943 in a B-24 attack on Rouen railyards.
> 
> BTW, as someone noted before (sorry, can't remember who was), the P-38 faced different quality of enemy pilots in ETO/MTO and PTO so it could had have an influence in how it was perceived: not so good vs stellar.
> View attachment 637466


Absolutely the quality of opponent was better in the ETO than the PTO, and better early on than later on in both theaters.


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## drgondog (Aug 11, 2021)

Escuadrilla Azul said:


> Donald Caldwell in "Day Fighter in Defense of the Reich" says that there was one 8 AF raid turned back due to enemy action. It was on March 8th 1943 in a B-24 attack on Rouen railyards.
> 
> BTW, as someone noted before (sorry, can't remember who was), the P-38 faced different quality of enemy pilots in ETO/MTO and PTO so it could had have an influence in how it was perceived: not so good vs stellar.
> View attachment 637466





Escuadrilla Azul said:


> Donald Caldwell in "Day Fighter in Defense of the Reich" says that there was one 8 AF raid turned back due to enemy action. It was on March 8th 1943 in a B-24 attack on Rouen railyards.
> 
> BTW, as someone noted before (sorry, can't remember who was), the P-38 faced different quality of enemy pilots in ETO/MTO and PTO so it could had have an influence in how it was perceived: not so good vs stellar.
> View attachment 637466


Don accepted the account at face value. In the VIII BC mission report the 44th BG lost 2 lead crew in the head on attack shortly after the IP and bomb run - and the rest of the 44th proceeded to the target with the 93rd BG in trail. According to both BG mission reports the M/Y at Rouen was bombed. The account in DFinDOR was extracted from JG26 War Diary account. The 93rd BG, also attacking Rouen M/Y, bombed successfully - so how may we conclude that the "8th AF was turned back"?

Also in 44th BG mission report was acknowledgement that bombing was 'lousy' as the trailing B-24s behind the two downed lead a/c were prepared to 'bomb on lead' and were unprepared to bomb individually.

Another question for the thoughtful, "If the 44th BG was completely devastated and breaking up formations to escape - how weren't many more B-24s claimed by JG 26"?

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## drgondog (Aug 11, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Absolutely the quality of opponent was better in the ETO than the PTO, and better early on than later on in both theaters.


And yet, only ONE ace had 5 victory credits in the P-39 - in the SWP at Guadalcanal? Further, in defense of the poor P-39 record - the IJN pilots they flew against in 1942 were outstanding. That said the P-40 was far more successful air to air in all Theatres save Soviet Union.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> *Absolutely the quality of opponent was better in the ETO* than the PTO, and better early on than later on in both theaters.


The same enemy was faced in the MTO, no mention there.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 11, 2021)

The Allied air forces (Navy/Army) in the New Guinea/Guadalcanal area were up against the Tinian Air Group between March and November '41 - hardly low quality pilots...

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## pbehn (Aug 11, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The same enemy was faced in the MTO, no mention there.


Confuses the hell out of me, it took me the same time to drive to Zwickau as it did to Turin.

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## Escuadrilla Azul (Aug 11, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Don accepted the account at face value. In the VIII BC mission report the 44th BG lost 2 lead crew in the head on attack shortly after the IP and bomb run - and the rest of the 44th proceeded to the target with the 93rd BG in trail. According to both BG mission reports the M/Y at Rouen was bombed. The account in DFinDOR was extracted from JG26 War Diary account. The 93rd BG, also attacking Rouen M/Y, bombed successfully - so how may we conclude that the "8th AF was turned back"?
> 
> Also in 44th BG mission report was acknowledgement that bombing was 'lousy' as the trailing B-24s behind the two downed lead a/c were prepared to 'bomb on lead' and were unprepared to bomb individually.
> 
> Another question for the thoughtful, "If the 44th BG was completely devastated and breaking up formations to escape - how weren't many more B-24s claimed by JG 26"?


Thanks for the correction. Always learn some thing new in this forum.

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## Escuadrilla Azul (Aug 11, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Allied air forces (Navy/Army) in the New Guinea/Guadalcanal area were up against the Tinian Air Group between March and November '41 - hardly low quality pilots...


The P-38 debuted in december 1942 and, IIRC, from "Fire in the Sky" and by your post, the best JNAF pilots were already dead or out of those operational areas.

BTW, the opposition been better in ETO/MTO doesn't mean that in the PTO was bad.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2021)

Escuadrilla Azul said:


> *The P-38 debuted in december 1942 and, IIRC, from "Fire in the Sky" and by your post,* *the best JNAF pilots were already dead or out of those operational areas.*
> 
> BTW, the opposition been better in ETO/MTO doesn't mean that in the PTO was bad.


The initial P-38 combat were against both JAAF and IJN units There were still plenty of good pilots flying against the first P-38 units in the SWP

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## GrauGeist (Aug 11, 2021)

The Tinian Air Group was moved home (to Japan) in November '42, being replaced by the veteran 6th Air Group (redesignated 204th Air Group).

So yes, the P-38 arrived after the TAG was reassigned, but the level of experience was equalled by the replacement Air Group.

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## drgondog (Aug 11, 2021)

Escuadrilla Azul said:


> Thanks for the correction. Always learn some thing new in this forum.


Not really 'correcting' as I just pointed out that the JG 26 claim was 'odd' as two Bomb Groups were together and both bombed Rouen according to 8th AF mission reports.


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## pbehn (Aug 11, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Not really 'correcting' as I just pointed out that the JG 26 claim was 'odd' as two Bomb Groups were together and both bombed Rouen according to 8th AF mission reports.


Was there/ could there have been a diversion, as per Mission 1 on 17 Aug 1942? Six B-17s flew up the coast while twelve went to Rouen?


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## Escuadrilla Azul (Aug 11, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Tinian Air Group was moved home (to Japan) in November '42, being replaced by the veteran 6th Air Group (redesignated 204th Air Group).
> 
> So yes, the P-38 arrived after the TAG was reassigned, but the level of experience was equalled by the replacement Air Group.


Well, 6th Kokutai was partially deployed to Rabaul on August 21st 1942 and sustained losses prior to been renamed 204th in November 1st and suffered some 20 pilots lost in the remaning months of 1942.

With an intended strenght of 60 fighters, an educated guess of some 80 pilots in the roster I think won't be too unreal to asume, so a 25% loss in pilot strenght in two months will be pretty noticiable, specially given the previous losses as 6th Kokutai and the japanese tendency to use veteran pilots in operations, having rookie pilots few ocasions to gain experience, widening the gap between 1st class pilots and rookies.

So yes, TAG was replaced by a veteran unit. But the pilot quality was the same? I doubt it.

EDIT: info for 6th/204 th Kokutai from "JNAF Fighters units and their aces 1932-1945" from Hata, Izawa and Shores.



FLYBOYJ said:


> The initial P-38 combat were against both JAAF and IJN units There were still plenty of good pilots flying against the first P-38 units in the SWP


Yes, missed the JAAF involvement in late 1942, thanks.



drgondog said:


> Don accepted the account at face value. In the VIII BC mission report the 44th BG lost 2 lead crew in the head on attack shortly after the IP and bomb run - and the rest of the 44th proceeded to the target with the 93rd BG in trail. According to both BG mission reports the M/Y at Rouen was bombed. The account in DFinDOR was extracted from JG26 War Diary account. The 93rd BG, also attacking Rouen M/Y, bombed successfully - so how may we conclude that the "8th AF was turned back"?
> 
> Also in 44th BG mission report was acknowledgement that bombing was 'lousy' as the trailing B-24s behind the two downed lead a/c were prepared to 'bomb on lead' and were unprepared to bomb individually.
> 
> Another question for the thoughtful, "If the 44th BG was completely devastated and breaking up formations to escape - how weren't many more B-24s claimed by JG 26"?


Not sure how can it be in a War Diary (that was meant to be written the day of the events or a couple after at most) that it was the only time during a struggle that lasted for nearly 3 years (and 2 of them after the day of the attack) and involved other units of the Jadgwaffe all over western and central Europe.

After reading the Narrative of the 44th BG, to me is clear that this BG was diverted from it's original bomb run and wasn't able to bomb the primary target.

BTW, 2 planes shot down over enemy territory and one more crashed in UK from a total of 16 attacking planes is a 18'75% loss rate in an escorted raid all the way to the target.

Excerpt from the web 8th Air Force Operations Home






Pdf doc extracted from the web HOME

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## P-39 Expert (Aug 11, 2021)

drgondog said:


> And yet, only ONE ace had 5 victory credits in the P-39 - in the SWP at Guadalcanal? Further, in defense of the poor P-39 record - the IJN pilots they flew against in 1942 were outstanding. That said the P-40 was far more successful air to air in all Theatres save Soviet Union.


Lots of eventual aces got their first victory(s) in P-39s. Japanese pilot quality was at their peak during this period. Plenty of aces in Russia. P-40s were good planes with top cover. Tough, maneuverable with heavy firepower.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Aug 11, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Lots of eventual aces got their first victory(s) in P-39s. Japanese pilot quality was at their peak during this period. Plenty of aces in Russia. P-40s were good planes with top cover. Tough, maneuverable with heavy firepower.



There's a thread for this already, no?

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## P-39 Expert (Aug 11, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> There's a thread for this already, no?


I replied to a comment.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 11, 2021)

Escuadrilla Azul said:


> Well, 6th Kokutai was partially deployed to Rabaul on August 21st 1942 and sustained losses prior to been renamed 204th in November 1st and suffered some 20 pilots lost in the remaning months of 1942.
> 
> With an intended strenght of 60 fighters, an educated guess of some 80 pilots in the roster I think won't be too unreal to asume, so a 25% loss in pilot strenght in two months will be pretty noticiable, specially given the previous losses as 6th Kokutai and the japanese tendency to use veteran pilots in operations, having rookie pilots few ocasions to gain experience, widening the gap between 1st class pilots and rookies.
> 
> ...


You were aware, perhaps, that the "loss of 20 pilots" on 1 November was when the Tinian Air Group (who numbered 20 pilots at the time) was transferred back to Japan from Rabaul?

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Lots of eventual aces got their first victory(s) in P-39s. Japanese pilot quality was at their peak during this period. Plenty of aces in Russia. P-40s were good planes with top cover. Tough, maneuverable with heavy firepower.


That they did and they held the line, more out of pilot skill rather than the performance of their machines, but the US was not going to maintain aerial superiority with a 1:1.5 or 1:2 kill ratio (depending who you reference). For the sake of repeating myself, all that changed the last week of December 1942

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## Thumpalumpacus (Aug 11, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> I replied to a comment.



I know how to read, yes. Did I blame you? No. 

The correct reply is, "I've got a thread for this discussion", accompanied by a link to it.

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## Escuadrilla Azul (Aug 11, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> You were aware, perhaps, that the "loss of 20 pilots" on 1 November was when the Tinian Air Group (who numbered 20 pilots at the time) was transferred back to Japan from Rabaul?


Perhaps I expresed badly. 204th Kokutai lost 9 pilots in combat and 11 in in accidents between November 1st, when It was renamed, and December 31st.

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## drgondog (Aug 11, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Lots of eventual aces got their first victory(s) in P-39s. Japanese pilot quality was at their peak during this period. Plenty of aces in Russia. P-40s were good planes with top cover. Tough, maneuverable with heavy firepower.


P-40s WERE top cover for P-39s.

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## drgondog (Aug 11, 2021)

Escuadrilla Azul said:


> Well, 6th Kokutai was partially deployed to Rabaul on August 21st 1942 and sustained losses prior to been renamed 204th in November 1st and suffered some 20 pilots lost in the remaning months of 1942.
> 
> With an intended strenght of 60 fighters, an educated guess of some 80 pilots in the roster I think won't be too unreal to asume, so a 25% loss in pilot strenght in two months will be pretty noticiable, specially given the previous losses as 6th Kokutai and the japanese tendency to use veteran pilots in operations, having rookie pilots few ocasions to gain experience, widening the gap between 1st class pilots and rookies.
> 
> ...


This is interesting - unfortunately my storage of 8th AF Mission Summary Reports are archived in storage. First comment. I have no reason to believe or disbelieve the above narrative but will note that it is not in the format of the Group Intelligence reports sent to 8th AF HQ. From memory, admittedly poor at my age. the Mission Reports even that early had evolved to a short synopsis of the Landfall. IP time, ToT, Rally Point Time and Landfall out with a paragraph to describe notable events (similar to the above narrative). Also included in all Mission summaries by BG and FG were statistics of # dispatched, # effective (dispatched less early returns) and summary data regarding Lost, Damaged/written Off, Damaged, KIA, WIA as well as claims for E/A destroyed.

Those mission Summaries were at the heart of Roger Freeman's Mighty Eighth War Diary (as well as my own book covering the P-51B). You can see that those details are documented in M8WD.


I haven't checked the 93rd BG website (if it exists) for similar renditions.


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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 12, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> That would be doubtful even perhaps possible?
> It might very well have been true for a certain year or for the theater up until a certain date?
> There were about 90 Allison powered F-6 A&B recon planes, and another 90 F-6C (P-51B & C) built. details are not always firm.
> They did build/convert around 136 P-51Ds to F-6Ds but that was not until the fall of 1944. The F-6K is too late.
> Not at all knowledgeable about what the light/medium bombers were doing or if photos taken on bombing missions for damage assessment count as PR photos.


Table 88 of the AAF Statistical Digest lists numbers of PR aircraft in theaters vs Germany. Typically the F4/5 are less than 1/2 of the total numbers of 1st line PR aircraft. There are a couple of months where it was greater than 1/2. The numbers of F6s are greater than the numbers you quote reaching 205 in May 1944. The 8th AF also had Spitfires and Mosquitoes. Elliot Roosevelt pushed hard for Mosquitoes which he felt were the best reconn platform.

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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 12, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> On the subject of PR types, Saint-Exupery was flying a French F-5B when he went MIA in 1944.


As was the legendary Adrian Warburton .


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2021)

Reluctant Poster said:


> Table 88 of the AAF Statistical Digest lists numbers of PR aircraft in theaters vs Germany. Typically the F4/5 are less than 1/2 of the total numbers of 1st line PR aircraft. There are a couple of months where it was greater than 1/2. The numbers of F6s are greater than the numbers you quote reaching 196 in May 1944. The 8th AF also had Spitfires and Mosquitoes.* Elliot Roosevelt pushed hard for Mosquitoes which he felt were the best reconn platform.*


General Arnold presented drawings of the Mosquito to 6 manufacturers, one responded with comments. If there was really a serious note to procure (more) or produce Mosquitoes by the AAF, someone "would have" put out a solicitation with a dollar amount to manufacturers.

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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 12, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> General Arnold presented drawings of the Mosquito to 6 manufacturers, one responded with comments. If there was really a serious note to procure (more) or produce Mosquitoes by the AAF, someone "would have" put out a solicitation with a dollar amount to manufacturers.


The USAAF did get 100 PR XVIs out of 400 produced.


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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 12, 2021)

eagledad said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> In the Mighty Eight War Manual, by Roger Freeman, page 186, Freeman wrote “In late July 1944, the first P-38L’s arrived in the UK. … When this model became available for combat units in August, only the 479th​ Group retained fighter P-38’s in 8th​ Air Force and replacements it received were mostly low-hours P-38J’s turned in by the units recently converted to P-51’s.”
> 
> ...





drgondog said:


> Difficult to explain in short answer. Politics, Bureaucracies and incompetence played a role. Inexperience played a role. Lack of foresight played a role.
> Some *Edits *below for context:
> 
> 1. IMO, while Eaker inherited Monk Hunter (Spaatz pick) to run VIII FC. Hunter, like Spaatz, and like Eaker served in AAC when heavy bombardment matured into high altitude fast attack and operating above existing Pursuit designs - in the late 1930s. Their vision of future escort was that of Destroyer protecting cargo convoys - fence out threats but always remain close. _That said, the conundrum was the belief that only twin engine aircraft were perceived feasible for long range escort - but concept remained through XP-75_. The VIII Service Command in 1942 was staffed by combat rookies trying to learn from RAF (when they occasionally listened). The problems experienced with P-47C and P-38F led Service Command to form an Air Technical Services department in late 1942- with shining star Maj Cass Hough. That said, Hunter did place a request to Brits to produce 75 and 110 gallon tanks (Jan/Feb 1943) but either Hunter or Eaker failed to manage the process - even if Air Services was ultimately responsible.
> ...


The initial P51Bs were actually delivered to the RAF. The 354th flew their first missions in P51s repossessed from the RAF. There was a major breakdown in communication in the USAAF chain of command.


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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 12, 2021)

eagledad said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> In the Mighty Eight War Manual, by Roger Freeman, page 186, Freeman wrote “In late July 1944, the first P-38L’s arrived in the UK. … When this model became available for combat units in August, only the 479th​ Group retained fighter P-38’s in 8th​ Air Force and replacements it received were mostly low-hours P-38J’s turned in by the units recently converted to P-51’s.”
> 
> ...


According to Bodie P38 L s didn’t come off the assembly line until July 1944. I would be surprised if any showed up in the UK before August

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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 12, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Difficult to say, apart from the dedicated unarmed PR spitfires there were many converted fighters performing a similar role to the Mustangs which generally had a camera too. By October 1942 there were 5 Mosquito PR squadrons. What is impossible to believe is that the total effort by all RAF and USA types that werent P-38s amounted to just 10% of the total. It isnt supported by the history of RAF Medmenham (later _Allied Central Interpretation Unit_ (ACIU)) RAF Medmenham - Wikipedia


Targeting the Reich is an excellent study of PR in WWII.






Targeting the Third Reich


<strong>Winner: Air Force Historical Foundation Award</strong><br><br>When large formations of Allied four-engine bombers finally flew over Europe, it marked the beginning of the end for the Third Reich. Their relentless hammering of Germany—totalin




kansaspress.ku.edu




A read of this makes it plainly obvious that the US was very much the junior partner. the majority of photos were taken by the RAF.
If you include the large numbers of RAF Mustangs used in photo reconnaissance the P51 easily out distances the P38.
There were a more PR Spitfires produced than PR Mosquitoes. It was in service from the beginning to the end of WWII it has to be the PR champion.

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## drgondog (Aug 12, 2021)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The L
> 
> The initial P51Bs were actually delivered to the RAF. The 354th flew their first missions in P51s repossessed from the RAF. There was a major breakdown in communication in the USAAF chain of command.


Not quite 'false', but the RAF did 'Reverse Lend Lease' many of the early FZ series (early P-51B-5) beginning late in December and many of the P-51B/C-1 destined for RAF (many FX/FB series) were diverted to 354th and 357th FG before delivery to RAF per agreement between Portal and Arnold. The early transfer dates of record from RAF inventory to 9th AF were last week of December 1943.

Also crucial is that Arnold suspended P-51B/C destined for F-6C in October/November 1943 to accelerate deliveries to 354, 357 and 363 FGs.

The major screw up (IMO) was that HQ, specifically Gen Saville, Chief - Air Defense Directorate, had been given the authority to allocate ALL fighter/pursuit/attack aircraft (until Arnold stepped in). In May 1943, he issued orders that all Mustangs (A-36, P-51A and B/C) replace P-39/P40 and that most P-51B go to 9th AF. Recall, there was no 'HQ - LR Escort Directorate' to fight such narrow allocations.

Saville was an early P-38 supporter - for good reasons and I haven't quite figured out whether Saville and Echols were joined in any animosity toward NAA. I do know that palace politics at the Pentagon was in full sway in spring 1943. The Brits were pioneering excellent Close Air Support/Interdiction tactics in Africa, 8th AF was starting to emerge as a trained and effective Air army in the ETO, The ETO/MTO/CBI and SWP were crying for P-38s and the 1st P-51B was just staring flight tests as they awaited Packard 1650-3 deliveries to the engineless production batch emerging at Inglewood.

In May/June 1943 Eaker was not yet alarmed at mission loss rates, and still comfortable that sufficient inventory of 600+ B-17s and B-24s to execute the Plan. That said, he was under severe pressure to increase numbers of missions - to at least approach Harris/BC - and Arnold was also increasingly critical of Eaker's staff quality. He (Eaker) didn't become vocal about fighting for P-51B allocation until late June and definitely raised the decibel level after Blitz Week. When Arnold was sufficiently recovered he went to Great Britain to pressure more allocation of RAF FC to support 8th AF.

Recognize that in his mind, that included 2nd TAC/9th AF as well in one big 'lump' . Leigh-Mallory had just told Spaatz/Eaker to pound sand re: Support from 9th AF P-47D and P-51B FG's.

Yes, 'politics' was in full bloom.

Recall that AAF/AAC was Still part of US Army and many Air Force senior officers were aware that Army was still a very important Customer.

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## Peter Gunn (Aug 12, 2021)

I'm still at a loss as to why some still say Japan had lost all their veteran/good pilots by the end of *1942*, which totally denigrates what the P-38 accomplished.

To me that's no different than the nonsense that the P-51 just "mopped up" a bunch of trainees in *1944* in the ETO.

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## SaparotRob (Aug 12, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> I'm still at a loss as to why some still say Japan had lost all their veteran/good pilots by the end of *1942*, which totally denigrates what the P-38 accomplished.
> 
> To me that's no different than the nonsense that the P-51 just "mopped up" a bunch of trainees in *1944* in the ETO.


An unconscious bias that denigrates other aircraft to “improve“ the plane they really like?

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## pbehn (Aug 12, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> An unconscious bias that denigrates other aircraft to “improve“ the plane they really like?


Ah but the P-38 built up a mountain of photos 10 times bigger than all other mountains combined.

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## SaparotRob (Aug 12, 2021)

It’s better to look good than to fly good!

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## GrauGeist (Aug 12, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> I'm still at a loss as to why some still say Japan had lost all their veteran/good pilots by the end of *1942*, which totally denigrates what the P-38 accomplished.
> 
> To me that's no different than the nonsense that the P-51 just "mopped up" a bunch of trainees in *1944* in the ETO.


The Allies lost a considerable number of pilots between 1943 - 1945 in both theaters.

Those must have been some seriously determined trainees...

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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 12, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> General Arnold presented drawings of the Mosquito to 6 manufacturers, one responded with comments. If there was really a serious note to procure (more) or produce Mosquitoes by the AAF, someone "would have" put out a solicitation with a dollar amount to manufacturers.


The comments by Beech were not worthy of a high school assignment. 
“It appears that this aircraft has sacrificed serviceability, structural strength, ease of construction and flying characteristics in an attempt to use construction material which is not suitable for the manufacture of efficient aircraft.” Obviously a predetermined result..


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2021)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The comments by Beech were not worthy of a high school assignment.
> “It appears that this aircraft has sacrificed serviceability, structural strength, ease of construction and flying characteristics in an attempt to use construction material which is not suitable for the manufacture of efficient aircraft.” Obviously a predetermined result..


You're right - they gave an opinion about a competitor's product. How do expect them to act? Now if the AAC approached them with a contract (*$*) to produce the aircraft I think the tone might have been different.

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## pbehn (Aug 12, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Allies lost a considerable number of pilots between 1943 - 1945 in both theaters.
> 
> Those must have been some seriously determined trainees...


There is a linguistic leap that frequently gets made, once you have lost some experienced pilots you only have trainees left. The allies also "lost" a lot of pilots by promoting them to training roles, with a view to making their inexperienced "trainees" much more effective with a better chance of survival from their first mission.

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## Snowygrouch (Aug 12, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> You're right - they gave an opinion about a competitor's product. How do expect them to act? Now if the AAC approached them with a contract (*$*) to produce the aircraft I think the tone might have been different.


On a similar vein, some of the British were upset about the Mustang`s performance compared to the Spitfire with exactly the same engine, when the performance predictions of the Merlin Mustang came in, a lot of British just refused to believe it, and that was a plane the British ordered !







Later when the real Merlin Mustangs DID go about 25mph faster at almost all altitudes than the Spit IX, much eating of words occured, so I can well imagine that if you are asked to give a view on the performance of a plane you have *not* ordered, unless you have the morals of a saint, you`re just going to find a way to hate it.

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## drgondog (Aug 12, 2021)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The comments by Beech were not worthy of a high school assignment.
> “It appears that this aircraft has sacrificed serviceability, structural strength, ease of construction and flying characteristics in an attempt to use construction material which is not suitable for the manufacture of efficient aircraft.” Obviously a predetermined result..


Translated "We don't know a.) how to build it, b.) how to hire and train the staff, or c.) How to price it. Go away."

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## pbehn (Aug 12, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> On a similar vein, some of the British were upset about the Mustang`s performance compared to the Spitfire with exactly the same engine, when the performance predictions of the Merlin Mustang came in, a lot of British just refused to believe it, and that was a plane the British ordered !
> 
> View attachment 637684
> 
> ...


Perhaps because they were looking for "A" reason not for a lot of reasons adding up to a total. You can see sleekness and good fit and finish, you cant see the more advanced aerodynamic things like laminar type wings and low cooling drag/ Meredith effect. However I am sure if they asked someone at de Havilland they could have given some pointers.

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## pbehn (Aug 12, 2021)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The comments by Beech were not worthy of a high school assignment.
> “It appears that this aircraft has sacrificed serviceability, structural strength, ease of construction and *flying characteristics* in an attempt to use construction material which is not suitable for the manufacture of efficient aircraft.” Obviously a predetermined result..


It defies logic unless they didnt actually know its flying characteristics. When introduced it was one of the fastest planes in the world in service. Every high speed aircraft makes compromises and sacrifices

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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 12, 2021)

pbehn said:


> It defies logic unless they didnt actually know its flying characteristics. When introduced it was one of the fastest planes in the world in service. Every high speed aircraft makes compromises and sacrifices


I betcha Walter and Olive Ann had their eyes firmly on the postwar market and saw the future in monocoque stressed akin aluminum construction, and thought plywood artwork (which they didn't have the setup or workforce skills to do) would be a post-Mosquito dead end in the US market. They already had the C45/Beech18, from which they would evolve, building block fashion, an entire hierarchy of business aircraft. Even the 1900s I flew had beefed up Beech18 wing center sections.

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## pbehn (Aug 12, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I betcha Walter and Olive Ann had their eyes firmly on the postwar market and saw the future in monocoque stressed akin aluminum construction, and thought plywood artwork (which they didn't have the setup or workforce skills to do) would be a post- Mosquito dead end in the US market. They already had the C45/Beech18, from which they would evolve, building block fashion, an entire hierarchy of business aircraft. Even the 1900s I flew had beefed up Beech18 wing center sections.


I agree, but to quote "flying characteristics" in the argument doesnt add up. Before and after the Mosquito there were aeroplanes that were really fast that were absolutely lethal, someone did actually land a Mosquito on a carrier and it became a carrier borne aircraft so its characteristics couldnt have been that bad.


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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 12, 2021)

pbehn said:


> I agree, but to quote "flying characteristics" in the argument doesnt add up. Before and after the Mosquito there were aeroplanes that were really fast that were absolutely lethal, someone did actually land a Mosquito on a carrier and it became a carrier borne aircraft so its characteristics couldnt have been that bad.


Well, the Beech family were never above exhibiting NIH syndrome.

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## pbehn (Aug 12, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Well, the Beech family were never above exhibiting NIH syndrome.


All sides are capable of that, they could have chosen better wording to make it less obvious. I could offer the counter argument that the Mosquito was a completely uncompromising design saying "there you have it make of it what you want". The British were forced to make bombs smaller to fit, and make electronics more compact, and introduce navigational and other electronic aids to assist a two man crew which became standard post war.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2021)

Beechcraft YC-43 
Steel tube fuselage heavily faired with wood. Wing with wooden spars and ribs, leading edge was sheet metal, everything covered in Fabric. 
The US ordered a total of 270 during the war in addition to impressing most of the existing civilian versions. 

Why Beech said what they did I have no idea, but they were making a mostly wooden, high performance cabin airplane (over 200mph with a 450hp engine) during the late 30s and all through WW II in addition to the all metal Beech 18 twin. 

Beech might have been one of the better US companies to under take a Wooden Mosquito project. 
785 Beech 17s were built pre-war, during the war and post war (about 20?)

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## GrauGeist (Aug 12, 2021)

Cessna didn't seem intetested in the Mosquito, either and they had the know-how to make one if they wanted.

Their T-50 was constructed much the same as the Mossie.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Aug 12, 2021)

pbehn said:


> All sides are capable of that, they could have chosen better wording to make it less obvious. I could offer the counter argument that the Mosquito was a completely uncompromising design saying "there you have it make of it what you want". The British were forced to make bombs smaller to fit, and make electronics more compact, and introduce navigational and other electronic aids to assist a two man crew which became standard post war.



When you have good methods, you design the right tool; when you have good tools, you rejigger your methods. The Mossie was one hell of a tool and of course if you need a compromise you'll do it with bomb-shapes and whatnot.


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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 12, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> View attachment 637706
> 
> Beechcraft YC-43
> Steel tube fuselage heavily faired with wood. Wing with wooden spars and ribs, leading edge was sheet metal, everything covered in Fabric.
> ...


The Beech 17 didn't have much in the way of compound curved sheet plywood structure, which is an art of its own, especially in a stressed skin design like the Mosquito. And it clearly wasn't the wave of the future in the US. I would have made the same decision.

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## Greyman (Aug 12, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> Later when the real Merlin Mustangs DID go about 25mph faster at almost all altitudes than the Spit IX, much eating of words occured, so I can well imagine that if you are asked to give a view on the performance of a plane you have *not* ordered, unless you have the morals of a saint, you`re just going to find a way to hate it.



The things North American has to put up with ...

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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 13, 2021)

Greyman said:


> The things North American has to put up with ...
> 
> View attachment 637717


They ended up borrowing over 400.

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## Trilisser (Aug 13, 2021)

Fellas, given that the P-38 is my favourite, I might be biased plus that being in haste, have read only the first 2 pages here. But, a few notes:

1. It is quite odd to claim that the P-38 was much more complicated to handle. Not exactly so. I encourage to take a look at the P-38J/L pilot manual vs. F6F-5 manual. In combat, a P-38 pilot needs to control throttles, rpm and mixture. Since in combat the mixture has to be auto-rich, that can be forgotten. All cooling flaps are automatic, as are the turbochargers (no need to operate turbos via a separate control). In the case of the Hellcat, the pilot needs to handle throttle, rpm, cowl flaps, intercooler flaps, oil cooler flaps and supercharger lever (3 positions). So, which is actually the more complicated to handle?

2. Complicated maintenance. Was it much more complicated than the P-47? The British AFDU report states that the routine maintenance is very easy with excellent access to armament, engines etc. (except for radio). 

3. The very same report speaks very positively about its manoeuvreability, despite the very high wing-loading. 

4. Critical Mach number. Yes, definitely much lower than that of the Mustang. But, compare to the much-praised F8F and then, the difference isn't that great.

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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 13, 2021)

Trilisser said:


> Fellas, given that the P-38 is my favourite, I might be biased plus that being in haste, have read only the first 2 pages here. But, a few notes:
> 
> 1. It is quite odd to claim that the P-38 was much more complicated to handle. Not exactly so. I encourage to take a look at the P-38J/L pilot manual vs. F6F-5 manual. In combat, a P-38 pilot needs to control throttles, rpm and mixture. Since in combat the mixture has to be auto-rich, that can be forgotten. All cooling flaps are automatic, as are the turbochargers (no need to operate turbos via a separate control). In the case of the Hellcat, the pilot needs to handle throttle, rpm, cowl flaps, intercooler flaps, oil cooler flaps and supercharger lever (3 positions). So, which is actually the more complicated to handle?
> 
> ...


It was more complicated to handle than the Merlin P 51 but that can be said for all American engines.
According to Freeman the 8th AF photo recon Spitfires had much greater availability than the F5s, which would indicate simpler maintainance.
It would be interesting to compare availability and abort rates between the P38 and P51.


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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 13, 2021)

NTGray said:


> I have some questions about the P-38, and I’m inviting comments.
> 
> I’ve always considered the Lightning a super cool craft, both because of the way it looks and performs and because it was one of the earliest products of Kelly Johnson’s team at Lockheed which would become known as the Skunk Works. It was the first combat airplane to achieve 400 mph in level flight. And even though it came out _before _the P-40 and the P-39, both of thoseubiuos in its claim of 400 mph. The often quoted 413 mph was a paper number calculated by Hubert based on all sorts of dubious asunptions. b planes ceased production in 1944, but the Lightning was good enough to be produced throughout the entire war.
> 
> ...


The claim that the P38 was the first aircraft to achieve 400 Mph in level flight is not true. The prototype was never properly tested before its ill fated flight which was also dubious in its claims of 400 mph. The often quoted 413 was a paper calculation by Hibbert including a lot of unlikely assumptions. See Bodie.
Also note that the cooling system was 1/2 the size of the Y series making sustained high speed flight impossible.

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## Trilisser (Aug 13, 2021)

By the way, there is an American report on Mike's site in which it is mentioned that British fighters (Spitfire and Hurricane) were much simpler to fly than American contemporaries thanks to automatic controls. There seems to have been a great reluctance among Americans towards automatic controls as can be noted from the Report of Joint Fighter Conference 1944.


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## Trilisser (Aug 13, 2021)

It is quite logical that the P-51 was easier to maintain than the P-38, but a fairer comparison is the P-47. Reports on Mike's site suggest that the were problems with the sealing of the induction piping on the 38.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2021)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The claim that the P38 was the first aircraft to achieve 400 Mph in level flight is not true. The prototype was never properly tested before its ill fated flight which was also dubious in its claims of 400 mph. The often quoted 413 was a paper calculation by Hibbert including a lot of unlikely assumptions. See Bodie.
> Also note that the cooling system was 1/2 the size of the Y series making sustained high speed flight impossible.


It wasn't the first aircraft to go over 400 MPH, it was the first *COMBAT aircraft* (1939) to go over 400 MPH, this achieved during it's coast to coast run, but more than likely the times the aircraft achieved this was with a tail wind.

The prototype Corsair did the same in 1940

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## pbehn (Aug 13, 2021)

On 10 February 1938 a Hurricane Mk 1, assisted by a very strong tailwind, flew from Turnhouse, Edinburgh to Northolt in 48 minutes at an average indicated air speed of 408.75 mph, earning its pilot Squadron Leader John W Gillan the soubriquet ‘Downwind Gillan’.

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## pbehn (Aug 13, 2021)

Trilisser said:


> By the way, there is an American report on Mike's site in which it is mentioned that British fighters (Spitfire and Hurricane) were much simpler to fly than American contemporaries thanks to automatic controls. There seems to have been a great reluctance among Americans towards automatic controls as can be noted from the Report of Joint Fighter Conference 1944.


Putting a Spitfire Mk XIV and a Hurricane MkI in the same flyability group is a bit of a stretch.


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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 13, 2021)

pbehn said:


> On 10 February 1938 a Hurricane Mk 1, assisted by a very strong tailwind, flew from Turnhouse, Edinburgh to Northolt in 48 minutes at an average indicated air speed of 408.75 mph, earning its pilot Squadron Leader John W Gillan the soubriquet ‘Downwind Gillan’.


Ooops! A tailwind isn't going to affect your Indicated Air Speed, and I have a hard time imagining ANY Hurricane INDICATING that much speed. Ground speed of 408 I can readily believe. I can remember cold winter nights BUF -> ALB or BUF -> BOS at FL250 indicating 230, truing 250+, and showing 400 on the DME, thanks to the jetstream.

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## pbehn (Aug 13, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Ooops! A tailwind isn't going to affect your Indicated Air Speed, and I have a hard time imagine ANY Hurricane INDICATING that much speed. Ground speed of 408 I can readily believe. I can remember cold winter nights BUF -> ALB or BUF -> BOS at FL250 indicating 230, truing 250+, and showing 400 on the DME, thanks to the jetstream.


I took it from here RAF Legends: the Hawker Hurricane Turnhouse is near Edinburgh and Northolt is near London, they are approx 400 miles apart.


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## Trilisser (Aug 13, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Putting a Spitfire Mk XIV and a Hurricane MkI in the same flyability group is a bit of a stretch.


The Spitfire mark was an early one in the test.


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## pbehn (Aug 13, 2021)

Trilisser said:


> The Spitfire mark was an early one in the test.


I havnt seen it do you have a link? The first P-39s and P-40s just werent sorted machines. While the P-38 was a twin fighter and the P-47 was a 2000+ HP beast.


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## Greg Boeser (Aug 14, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> I'm still at a loss as to why some still say Japan had lost all their veteran/good pilots by the end of *1942*, which totally denigrates what the P-38 accomplished.
> 
> To me that's no different than the nonsense that the P-51 just "mopped up" a bunch of trainees in *1944* in the ETO.


The problem the Japanese found themselves with at the end of 1942 was their training infrastructure could not keep up with attrition.

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## Reluctant Poster (Aug 14, 2021)

Greg Boeser said:


> The problem the Japanese found themselves with at the end of 1942 was their training infrastructure could not keep up with attrition.


The Japanese knew going in that they couldn’t possibly win a war of attrition with the US no matter what they did. They basically put all their chips in at the beginning with the hope that the US would negoiate a peace treaty. An extremely aggressive strategy was their only chance hence the emphasis on the immediate needs, the long term is bleak no matter what. If the Japanese have to start escorting convoys and training large numbers of pilots they have already lost the war.

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## Trilisser (Aug 14, 2021)

Pbehn: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/PHQ-M-19-1307-A.pdf

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## pbehn (Aug 14, 2021)

Trilisser said:


> Pbehn: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/PHQ-M-19-1307-A.pdf


Thanks. If you put @ in front of a user name it triggers a mentioned you notification like this 
T
 Trilisser

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## P-39 Expert (Aug 16, 2021)

drgondog said:


> P-40s WERE top cover for P-39s.


Hardly.


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## drgondog (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Hardly.


Read the after mission reports of 18th and 49th FG in SWP and 325th in MTO in support of P-400/P-39 strikes.

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## Peter Gunn (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Hardly.




Starting at the 1:05 mark approximately to the 3:00 mark, although I don't agree that Wildcats were faster.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 16, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> Starting at the 1:05 mark approximately to the 3:00 mark, although I don't agree that Wildcats were faster.



"P-400s had no oxygen equipment." Removed with the IFF and "excessive" armor!


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## P-39 Expert (Aug 16, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Read the after mission reports of 18th and 49th FG in SWP and 325th in MTO in support of P-400/P-39 strikes.


P-40s were escorting P-39s because they were attacking tanks with their cannon. P-39 altitude performance was always better than contemporary P-40 performance. P-39 was 750lbs lighter with the same engine. The single stage Merlin P-40 had just about the same performance as a -36/-63 engined P-39 and a lot less performance than a P-39N. In no universe did contemporary P-40 performance match the P-39. Period.

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## fubar57 (Aug 16, 2021)



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## pbehn (Aug 16, 2021)

fubar57 said:


> View attachment 638198​


It was a good answer, but to a different question.

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## P-39 Expert (Aug 16, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> "P-400s had no oxygen equipment." Removed with the IFF and "excessive" armor!


Seriously??? The oxygen equipment was not removed, it was British specified equipment and incompatible with what the Marines had at Guadalcanal. So they had no oxygen. As far as the F4F being faster see the chart below. The P-39 was 40mph faster at altitude and climbed the same on normal power as the F4F did on combat power. The 1942 P-39 on combat power (blue dots) climbed 600fpm (27%) faster at 20000' than the F4F. The F4F could not touch a 1942 P-39, period.

Now the Marine pilots were better trained, especially in combating the IJN. And they had oxygen. And they weren't carrying drop tanks. But an F4F was no match for any 7650lb P-39.


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## fubar57 (Aug 16, 2021)

So much for this *P-38 *thread

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## drgondog (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> P-40s were escorting P-39s because they were attacking tanks with their cannon. P-39 altitude performance was always better than contemporary P-40 performance. P-39 was 750lbs lighter with the same engine. The single stage Merlin P-40 had just about the same performance as a -36/-63 engined P-39 and a lot less performance than a P-39N. In no universe did contemporary P-40 performance match the P-39. Period.


The P-40L (w/1650-1) in use in those missions had much better high altitude (i.e 20K), and better bomb load capability, and P-39 less capable of defending itself. 

Not many tanks in use by Japanese Army and the tanks in use by Germans weren't overly concerned with the 37mm.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Seriously??? The oxygen equipment was not removed, it was British specified equipment and incompatible with what the Marines had at Guadalcanal. So they had no oxygen. As far as the F4F being faster see the chart below. The P-39 was 40mph faster at altitude and climbed the same on normal power as the F4F did on combat power. The 1942 P-39 on combat power (blue dots) climbed 600fpm (27%) faster at 20000' than the F4F. The F4F could not touch a 1942 P-39, period.
> 
> Now the Marine pilots were better trained, especially in combating the IJN. And they had oxygen. And they weren't carrying drop tanks. But an F4F was no match for any 7650lb P-39.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Seriously??? The oxygen equipment was not removed, it was British specified equipment and incompatible with what the Marines had at Guadalcanal.


Marines??? You mean what the *AAF* had at Guadalcanal. It was a Marine base but the aircraft belonged to and were maintained by AAF personnel. I guess your "expertise" in knowing the difference between the armed services is apparent.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> Seriously??? The oxygen equipment was not removed, it was British specified equipment and incompatible with what the Marines had at Guadalcanal. So they had no oxygen. As far as the F4F being faster see the chart below. The P-39 was 40mph faster at altitude and climbed the same on normal power as the F4F did on combat power. The 1942 P-39 on combat power (blue dots) climbed 600fpm (27%) faster at 20000' than the F4F. The F4F could not touch a 1942 P-39, period.
> 
> Now the Marine pilots were better trained, especially in combating the IJN. And they had oxygen. And they weren't carrying drop tanks. But an F4F was no match for any 7650lb P-39.


Now please refrain from any more P-39 nonsense on this thread, you can Blab all you want on the P-39 thread

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## 33k in the air (Aug 16, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Marines??? You mean what the *AAF* had at Guadalcanal. It was a Marine base but the aircraft belonged to and were maintained by AAF personnel. I guess your "expertise" in knowing the difference between the armed services is apparent.



Come now, when you've seen one armed service, you've seen them all, right?

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## P-39 Expert (Aug 16, 2021)

drgondog said:


> The P-40L (w/1650-1) in use in those missions had much better high altitude (i.e 20K), and better bomb load capability, and P-39 less capable of defending itself.
> 
> Not many tanks in use by Japanese Army and the tanks in use by Germans weren't overly concerned with the 37mm.





FLYBOYJ said:


> Marines??? You mean what the *AAF* had at Guadalcanal. It was a Marine base but the aircraft belonged to and were maintained by AAF personnel. I guess your "expertise" in knowing the difference between the armed services is apparent.


So why no oxygen?


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## pbehn (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> So why no oxygen?


Why no P-38? There is a thread for P-39 stuff.

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## Greg Boeser (Aug 16, 2021)

Damn, Now I've got to buy another book.
P-39s in MTO used primarily as CAS with P-40s or Spitfires as top cover. P-38s were busy escorting B-17s, B-25s and B-26s


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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> So why no oxygen?


Because the P400s were originally built for the Brits and had British style oxygen systems which were incompatible with American equipment.

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## special ed (Aug 16, 2021)

I resisted the answer to this because I would have told him the answer would be on the P-39 thread. The answer about the British oxy fittings is in a book about Guadalcanal.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 16, 2021)

P-39 Expert said:


> So why no oxygen?


Well if you read the pilot's manual as well as a bunch of other primary flight training information, you'll find that a standard for the use of oxygen is at 12,000' (might be as low as 10,000 feet in some theaters) and it seems the P-400s were operationally limited to that altitude and below, so now you can figure out more reasons why. Now that you know this fact this will be the last response you'll get from me on this thread and all your other posts regarding P-39 dribble on this thread will either be moved or deleted.

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## Peter Gunn (Aug 17, 2021)

One thing I never seem to see addressed is the generator on the P-38, much is made of the two engine reliability but if you lost the engine that had the generator...

I remember reading a P-38 pilot's story over New Guinea where that happened, his tale of baling out and meeting friendly and many unfriendly natives was quite a story.

He was cursing both Lockheed and the AAF for not putting generators on both engines, so which model (if any) finally got two generators?

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> One thing I never seem to see addressed is the generator on the P-38, much is made of the two engine reliability but if you lost the engine that had the generator...
> 
> I remember reading a P-38 pilot's story over New Guinea where that happened, his tale of baling out and meeting friendly and many unfriendly natives was quite a story.
> 
> He was cursing both Lockheed and the AAF for not putting generators on both engines, so which model (if any) finally got two generators?


Some issues -

You lose a generator, you lose power to the electrical system, the engines receive their ignition power through magnetos and will keep running (as long as you have fuel) despite the status of the generator, so there has to be more to the story


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## Peter Gunn (Aug 17, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Some issues -
> 
> You lose a generator, you lose power to the electrical system, the engines receive their ignition power through magnetos and will keep running (as long as you have fuel) despite the status of the generator, so there has to be more to the story


I believe there was more to it like you say, if memory serves the electric props were giving issue, I'll try to track down the story, I do remember ignition was not an issue as you say but I don't _think_ it was a fuel problem either.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> I believe there was more to it like you say, if memory serves the electric props were giving issue, I'll try to track down the story, I do remember ignition was not an issue as you say but I don't _think_ it was a fuel problem either.


Now if the electric props lose power they will go into low pitch (IIRC) and remain there, not the most economical way to fly in both speed and fuel consumption.

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## drgondog (Aug 17, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> One thing I never seem to see addressed is the generator on the P-38, much is made of the two engine reliability but if you lost the engine that had the generator...
> 
> I remember reading a P-38 pilot's story over New Guinea where that happened, his tale of baling out and meeting friendly and many unfriendly natives was quite a story.
> 
> He was cursing both Lockheed and the AAF for not putting generators on both engines, so which model (if any) finally got two generators?


P-38J-15 (second block IIRC), along with improved fuel management and improved cockpit ergonomics.

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## pbehn (Aug 17, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Now if the electric props lose power they will go into low pitch (IIRC) and remain there, not the most economical way to fly in both speed and fuel consumption.


I think S/R described all the things that had to be done before the battery drained, like feathering props etc.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

pbehn said:


> I think S/R described all the things that had to be done before the battery drained, like feathering props etc.


Well you don't feather the props if your engines are still running, as stated, the Mags will provide ignition spark. I don't have a P-38 flight manual in front of me right now but I'm almost certain that if you lost electrical power the props would automatically go into low pitch


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## pbehn (Aug 17, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Well you don't feather the props if your engines are still running, as stated, the Mags will provide ignition spark. I don't have a P-38 flight manual in front of me right now but I'm almost certain that if you lost electrical power the props would automatically go into low pitch


I thought the discussion was about losing one engine, the one that produces electrical power?


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

pbehn said:


> I thought the discussion was about losing one engine, the one that produces electrical power?


Yes, if you lost your left engine (early P-38s) you would lose electrical power, so yes, feather that engine, but the right engine would go into low pitch when all the power drains from the battery.

If both engines were running ok but the generator fails (which did happen) then both props go into low pitch when there is no electrical power. I got to my manual and it says under emergency procedures that there is a "fixed pitch" setting (propeller selector switch), betting dollars to donuts that would be low pitch.

The key would be not to use battery power until absolutely necessary

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## fubar57 (Aug 17, 2021)

What does all this have to do with the god-like P-39?

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## pbehn (Aug 17, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Yes, if you lost your left engine (early P-38s) you would lose electrical power, so yes, feather that engine, but the right engine would go into low pitch when all the power drains from the battery.
> 
> If both engines were running ok but the generator fails (which did happen) then both props go into low pitch when there is no electrical power. I got to my manual and it says under emergency procedures that there is a "fixed pitch" setting (propeller selector switch), betting dollars to donuts that would be low pitch.
> 
> The key would be not to use battery power until absolutely necessary


Just did a search on S/Rs posts. There were a lot of systems that relied on electricity, like aux fuel pumps, oil cooling as well as the obvious like lights and radio, a real challenge to conserve battery life especially at night.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

fubar57 said:


> What does all this have to do with the god-like P-39?


Nothing! Thank God!

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Just did a search on S/Rs posts. There were a lot of systems that relied on electricity, like aux fuel pumps, oil cooling as well as the obvious like lights and radio, a real challenge to conserve battery life especially at night.


It is a challenge - 

But you don't need any of that to maintain basic flight. The key is to get to a place to land as soon as possible and at that time use your battery and use only what's necessary. Believe it or not little has changed for electrical power failures in recip aircraft since WW2. 

I've had an electrical failure in a small aircraft. When I saw my ammeter discharging I turned off all electrical power until I make it back to my home airport, luckily I was in class G airspace and didn't need to talk on the radio until I was close to home.

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## SaparotRob (Aug 17, 2021)

Great post!

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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 17, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> One thing I never seem to see addressed is the generator on the P-38, much is made of the two engine reliability but if you lost the engine that had the generator...





FLYBOYJ said:


> Some issues -
> 
> You lose a generator, you lose power to the electrical system, the engines receive their ignition power through magnetos and will keep running (as long as you have fuel) despite the status of the generator, so there has to be more to the story


Your magnetos will keep your plugs sparking, but you'll lose control of your props. They will freeze at whatever pitch they're in at the moment, and you'll be flying a fixed pitch airplane, so be ready to switch to a different set of throttle reflexes. (Unless, of course, you are lucky enough to be flying one of the models equipped with hydromatic props!) 
Your propulsive efficiency will suffer badly, and you won't be able to achieve full power without overspeeding your engines, or, depending on what airspeed and power setting you were at when your props froze, you may not be able to achieve redline RPM at all, seriously limiting your available horsepower and probably overtorquing your engines.
If you're engaged in combat and have dropped your tanks, you better disengage immediately, head for home, and check your survival equipment, because you'll probably be swimming. Your MPG with fixed pitch props will suffer badly. Add to that, no radios, no electronic navigation (RDF), no armament firing or dropping circuits, and you're in for more fun than a barrel of monkees!
WHAT IDIOT specified that setup?? I did several training flights in a 150 HP Apache with one generator on the right engine and one hydraulic pump on the left. Either engine out in IMC with a sharp, proficient pilot was a barely survivable situation; with your average complacent pilot, a recipe for disaster. The manual hydraulic pump required repeatedly bending forward and turning your head, both lethal moves when flying on the gages. Vertigo city! I never ever worked up a sweat in the air like I did in that Pigache.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Your magnetos will keep your plugs sparking, but you'll lose control of your props. *They will freeze at whatever pitch they're in at the moment, *and you'll be flying a fixed pitch airplane, so be ready to switch to a different set of throttle reflexes. (Unless, of course, you are lucky enough to be flying one of the models equipped with hydromatic props!)
> Your propulsive efficiency will suffer badly, and you won't be able to achieve full power without overspeeding your engines, or, depending on what airspeed and power setting you were at when your props froze, you may not be able to achieve redline RPM at all, seriously limiting your available horsepower and probably overtorquing your engines.
> If you're engaged in combat and have dropped your tanks, you better disengage immediately, head for home, and check your survival equipment, because you'll probably be swimming. Your MPG with fixed pitch props will suffer badly. Add to that, no radios, no electronic navigation (RDF), no armament firing or dropping circuits, and you're in for more fun than a barrel of monkees!
> WHAT IDIOT specified that setup?? I did several training flights in a 150 HP Apache with one generator on the right engine and one hydraulic pump on the left. Either engine out in IMC with a sharp, proficient pilot was a barely survivable situation; with your average complacent pilot, a recipe for disaster. I never ever worked up a sweat in the air like I did in that Pigache.


Great info Wes but depending what type of propeller system will determine what pitch setting the prop will go into when power is lost (if we a talking an electric prop). I'm pretty certain on the P-38, the prop will go into low pitch.

150 HP Apache! LOL! I was offered "cheap" multi engine instruction in one many years ago, I declined!


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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 17, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Great info Wes but depending what type of propeller system will determine what pitch setting the prop will go into when power is lost (if we a talking an electric prop). I'm pretty certain on the P-38, the prop will go into low pitch.


Guess I need to do some more research. What I was taught in A&P school was that the prop's gearing between drive motor and pitch change ring had so much mechanical advantage that aerodynamic and centrifugal loads couldn't budge the motor from its frozen position. My instructor was an 8th AF mechanic in War II, and the odd mix of planes his outfit maintained included a couple marks of PR Lightnings, and he said they would freeze at whatever pitch they were at. Also pilots focused on combat or escaping pursuit would often not notice a generator failure until their props start misbehaving and the radios go dead. By then it's a bit late. I saw no reason to doubt his word.

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## Peter Gunn (Aug 17, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Now if the electric props lose power they will go into low pitch (IIRC) and remain there, not the most economical way to fly in both speed and fuel consumption.


Bullseye! I can't find the story at the moment but that's the issue, he couldn't control his electric props and was unable to keep his Lightning airborne.


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## fubar57 (Aug 17, 2021)

​


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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 17, 2021)

fubar57 said:


> ​


Even a bingo profile probably won't get you home on your remaining fuel if your props are stuck in low pitch. Your engines have also probably endured a serious overspeed when the props went south.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Guess I need to do some more research. What I was taught in A&P school was that the prop's gearing between drive motor and pitch change ring had so much mechanical advantage that aerodynamic and centrifugal loads couldn't budge the motor from its frozen position. My instructor was an 8th AF mechanic in War II, and the odd mix of planes his outfit maintained included a couple marks of PR Lightnings, and he said they would freeze at whatever pitch they were at. Also pilots focused on combat or escaping pursuit would often not notice a generator failure until their props start misbehaving and the radios go dead. By then it's a bit late. I saw no reason to doubt his word.


Agree but again I know it depends on the prop set up. Some hydromatic props with counterweights will definitely go "flat" with pressure loss I think most found on larger multi engine aircraft will lock in place. My A&P school was about 90% WW2 vets, one guy was a B-25 driver who flew in the SWP. The school I went to was located right across the street from LAX and IIRC was an actual AAF training center run by North American which was right down the street.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

Whats left of my old A&P school today - we used to have about 4 or 5 test cells in the rear of the building.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2021)

Not sure about fuel pumps, you did need electric power to adjust props. Pilot may have had enough battery to feather the prop on the dead engine and go to cruise pitch, radio's suck power. Some pilots flying on battery turned off cockpit lighting and shut off radio intermittently.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

Shortround6 said:


> Not sure about fuel pumps, you did need electric power to adjust props. Pilot may have had enough battery to feather the prop on the dead engine and go to cruise pitch, radio's suck power. Some pilots flying on battery turned off cockpit lighting and shut off radio intermittently.


The boost pumps were normally used during take off and landing IIRC, the "normal" fuel pumps were engine driven again IIRC


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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 17, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Some hydromatic props with counterweights will definitely go "flat" with pressure loss


It's all semantics, but I was taught that what you're describing above is called a "single acting hydraulic counterweight" propeller, whereas "Hydromatic" is a UA trademark applying exclusively to double acting hydraulic props of their manufacture. According to my instructor, MR. Hamm, in the late 30s and early 40s, United Aircraft guarded their patent jealously (Wright Brothers style) and tried to corner the worldwide market for double acting hydraulic propellers, exhorbitantly charging for access to them and leaving the market wide open to undercutting by Curtiss Electric. You don't think ol' Hambone might have been a little prejudiced, do you? He sure seemed to have had it in for Curtiss. He came to the school from the prop shop at defunct Mohawk Airlines, which was all Hydromatic.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 17, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> It's all semantics, but I was taught that what you're describing above is called a "single acting hydraulic counterweight" propeller, whereas "Hydromatic" is a UA trademark applying exclusively to double acting hydraulic props of their manufacture. According to my instructor, MR. Hamm, in the late 30s and early 40s, United Aircraft guarded their patent jealously (Wright Brothers style) and tried to corner the worldwide market for double acting hydraulic propellers, exhorbitantly charging for access to them and leaving the market wide open to undercutting by Curtiss Electric. You don't think ol' Hambone might have been a little prejudiced, do you? He sure seemed to have had it in for Curtiss. He came to the school from the prop shop at defunct Mohawk Airlines, which was all Hydromatic.


Kind of funny - over 40 years ago I now remember a teacher saying the same thing about UA


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## warbird51 (Aug 19, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> Bullseye! I can't find the story at the moment but that's the issue, he couldn't control his electric





XBe02Drvr said:


> It's all semantics, but I was taught that what you're describing above is called a "single acting hydraulic counterweight" propeller, whereas "Hydromatic" is a UA trademark applying exclusively to double acting hydraulic props of their manufacture. According to my instructor, MR. Hamm, in the late 30s and early 40s, United Aircraft guarded their patent jealously (Wright Brothers style) and tried to corner the worldwide market for double acting hydraulic propellers, exhorbitantly charging for access to them and leaving the market wide open to undercutting by Curtiss Electric. You don't think ol' Hambone might have been a little prejudiced, do you? He sure seemed to have had it in for Curtiss. He came to the school from the prop shop at defunct Mohawk Airlines, which was all Hydromatic.


If the Curtiss Electric propeller loses electrical power, the prop will stay in the pitch setting it was when the power failed. It will not change pitch.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 19, 2021)

warbird51 said:


> If the Curtiss Electric propeller loses electrical power, the prop will stay in the pitch setting it was when the power failed. It will not change pitch.


Thanks for the clarification, I'll stand to be corrected. I went through several old text books and manuals and couldn't find this, do you have a reference?

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## warbird51 (Aug 19, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Thanks for the clarification, I'll stand to be corrected. I went through several old text books and manuals and couldn't find this, do you have a reference?


I have worked on P-40’s and was crew chief on a FM2 Wildcat with Curtiss Electric props. The manuals went with the Wildcat when the owner sold it 3 years ago

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## Peter Gunn (Aug 19, 2021)

warbird51 said:


> If the Curtiss Electric propeller loses electrical power, the prop will stay in the pitch setting it was when the power failed. It will not change pitch.


I'll take your words as fact no problem, it remains that he blamed the generator failing for the loss of the aircraft and I _thought_ I remembered it as the prop controls.

What else could it have caused for him to have to bale? Really wish I could hunt down the story, it was on one of those old first gen type websites with lot's of text.


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## Greg Boeser (Aug 19, 2021)

Explain then the rash of runaway propellers experienced by the Martin B-26? The official explanation was that low battery power caused the prop controls to malfunction. 
One pilot offered up a counter explanation, suggesting that the prop controls somehow got shorted when the throttle was firewalled. He survived such an overspeed on takeoff by easing the throttles back until proper prop response returned.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 19, 2021)

Greg Boeser said:


> Explain then the rash of runaway propellers experienced by the Martin B-26? The official explanation was that low battery power caused the prop controls to malfunction.
> One pilot offered up a counter explanation, suggesting that the prop controls somehow got shorted when the throttle was firewalled. He survived such an overspeed on takeoff by easing the throttles back until proper prop response returned.



That's why I'm remembering for some reason these electric props going into flat pitch during a power failure but it would make more sense for the propeller to remain at the last setting prior to electrical failure (as mentioned by Warbird51)

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## warbird51 (Aug 19, 2021)

Greg Boeser said:


> Explain then the rash of runaway propellers experienced by the Martin B-26? The official explanation was that low battery power caused the prop controls to malfunction.
> One pilot offered up a counter explanation, suggesting that the prop controls somehow got shorted when the throttle was firewalled. He survived such an overspeed on takeoff by easing the throttles back until proper prop response returned.


If there is a


Greg Boeser said:


> Explain then the rash of runaway propellers experienced by the Martin B-26? The official explanation was that low battery power caused the prop controls to malfunction.
> One pilot offered up a counter explanation, suggesting that the prop controls somehow got shorted when the throttle was firewalled. He survived such an overspeed on takeoff by easing the throttles back until proper prop response returned.


I was referring to loss of electrical power. If you have a short in the circuit then the short can cause the prop to move in either direction. Heck we washed the Wildcat once and water got into the contacts where the motor mates to the hub and when we started the engine to dry the engine off, the prop moved to high pitch (low rpm). Dried off the contacts, prop worked fine

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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 19, 2021)

Greg Boeser said:


> Explain then the rash of runaway propellers experienced by the Martin B-26? The official explanation was that low battery power caused the prop controls to malfunction.


Think about how a constant speed propeller behaves when it's working properly. Ready for takeoff, brakes set, throttles coming up, prop (at full increase) is on its low pitch stops. As RPM approaches redline, governor increases pitch slightly to provide enough rotational drag to stop the RPM rise at redline.
Now, cleared for takeoff, brakes released, plane rolls forward, and with increasing forward relative wind, rotational drag decreases slightly and engine torque tries to spin the prop faster. How do you suppose the governor prevents this? You got it, it increases prop pitch to increase rotational drag back to the value that matches engine torque. As aircraft accelerates and forward relative wind increases, prop pitch has to keep increasing to keep RPM in check.
Now what happens if the prop stops responding to the governor as the aircraft accelerates through forty knots? Once again, you got it. Runaway! The faster the aircraft goes the faster the engine will spin. The only way to prevent engine disintegration is to reduce throttle, which quite likely will not support flight.
Another possible scenario, not related to electrical failure, is failure of a slipring or brush that transfers electrical power to the prop from the engine. If the "increase pitch" contact fails, the prop can only move in the "decrease pitch" direction, meaning that the constant "increase"-"decrease" commands that go on all the time become a ratcheting "decrease"-"decrease" series of responses, allowing engine torque to overwhelm propeller rotational drag and run wild.
Hope this has helped.

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## SaparotRob (Aug 20, 2021)

It helped me.

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## pbehn (Sep 29, 2021)

D
 denny
some good info on this thread.


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## IdahoRenegade (Oct 12, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> My understanding is that the engines had trouble with the high cold air in ETO, whereas in SWPac, with fights lower in the atmosphere, the issue wasn't nearly so problematic. Mach issues were reduced as a result.
> 
> The plane itself, as noted above, was a burner and not a turner (at least until the flaps were added to later models). BnZ worked well against Japanese planes and doctrine, not so much against LW planes and doctrine. Hard to dive out of trouble against LW bounces.
> 
> It's one of my favorite WWII airplanes precisely because it was so _outré_. It's both beautiful and ridiculous in appearance, but was formidably fast, formidably armed, and just plain weird.


In Europe, much of the engine problems came from poor training/operation, as directed by early "on-site" commanders, the opposite of the direction of Lockheed and Allision. Specifically operating the engines at low-boost and high-rpm in cruise conditions. This does a couple of things-both bad. First, by virtue of being in low-boost, you aren't seeing much compression heating of the intake air. This means the engines are ingesting very cold air (50 below zero IIRC at upwards of 30k feet). The high-rpm condition means that you are sucking in LOTS of super-cold air. Both lead to a cold engine, cold, very thick, viscous oil that doesn't circulate properly, leading to engine failures. These same issues also lead to a cold intake manifold track, increasing the problem of fuel droplets dropping out of the intake mixture and condensing on the intake manifold. Think of taking your car, throwing it in 1st gear, and driving down the highway on a really, really cold winter morning.

"until flaps were added on later models". I think you mean boosted ailerons, which came about on the J-25-LO and all L models. These gave the P-38 one of the highest (perhaps the highest) roll rates of any WWII fighter AT HIGH SPEEDS (350mph or above). Without boost, most ailerons could not be fully deflected at high speed by the pilot. Now, you might be talking about the dive recovery flaps-these did not help turn rate from what I understand, but rather shifted the center of lift allowing for recovery from a "compressibility dive". The "standard" fowler flaps also had a "maneuver" setting on most models (IIRC starting with the F, someone correct me if I'm wrong). The flaps could be partially extended for extra lift and a tighter turn radius. I might be wrong about this, but I think the '38 actually had one of the tightest turning radii of allied or European fighters of the war (again, correct me if wrong). Where it lacked was a slow initial roll rate (lots of moment of inertia in the roll axis). But in pitch, it was always very good, from what I've read, and in a sustained turn.

Part of the problem in the ETO was that the '38 was introduced there in late-ish '43. Well, actually it was introduced in early-mid '42, then every one was shipped to N. Africa, leaving none in the ETO. It was then thrown into the long-range escort mission very shortly thereafter. With raw pilots with little training or experience. Add to that, we had a crapload of '47s (let alone Spits) available, but few '38s-and once past the range of the others-the ONLY plane in the fight was the '38. Meaning that, early on anyway, they often fought heavily outnumbered. With inexperienced pilots. Bad operating doctrine (tied to close escort with the bombers). Improper engine operating doctrine as mentioned above. With ground crews with limited experience with the type. And with questionable commanders. In comparison, the '47 was introduced much more gradually, with far more time for pilots to gain experience, and against a far less prepared, defended Europe. And in much higher numbers.

Not to say the aircraft didn't have some deficiencies (what aircraft didn't?). The "mach limit" (compressibility) issue was identified early (like 1940-41 time frame). Johnson and others at Lockheed begged to get the plane into a high-speed wind tunnel to identify the problem and formulate a solution. But the operators of those tunnels were supposedly afraid of breaking them...after a long delay it took an order from Hap Arnold to make it happen. But by then orders were flowing in, the plane was badly needed (remember, until December of '43, it was our ONLY long range, high performance, high altitude fighter) and there was resistance to making design changes and delaying deliveries. IMO one of the biggest mistakes of the war was not setting up other plants to build the '38. That would have made cutting in design changes much easier.

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## P-39 Expert (Oct 13, 2021)

The P-38 had lots of problems, but it did have range. The P-47 had fewer problems, but not much range. Neither plane was the solution.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 13, 2021)

To note the P-38 cockpit heating was a problem.

Is there any information the P-38 consistently fought heavily outnumbered in the late 1943/early 1944 period, since that would mean a significant percentage towards a majority of the Luftwaffe's fighter sorties were consistently hitting the P-38 formations instead of the bombers or other fighters. Interceptors including the twin engined Me410 etc. which were part of the force in the time period. Luftflotte Reich held 814 single and 198 twin engined day fighters in late May 1944, numbers that had been largely going up since 1943 even as pilot quality went down.

P-38 strength in 8th Air Force Fighter Groups, various dates in 1944.

4-Jan-44 124
11-Jan-44 130
17-Jan-44 164
25-Jan-44 212
1-Feb-44 239
8-Feb-44 180
15-Feb-44 129
29-Feb-44 170
6-Mar-44 229
14-Mar-44 268
21-Mar-44 258
28-Mar-44 262
4-Apr-44 276
11-Apr-44 269
18-Apr-44 257
25-Apr-44 256
2-May-44 255
9-May-44 245
16-May-44 283
30-May-44 276
6-Jun-44 288
13-Jun-44 318
20-Jun-44 302
27-Jun-44 290
4-Jul-44 283
11-Jul-44 269
18-Jul-44 237
1-Aug-44 109
8-Aug-44 85
15-Aug-44 77
22-Aug-44 74
12-Sep-44 50
19-Sep-44 50
10-Oct-44 21
25-Oct-44 5
7-Nov-44 1

Using Joe Baugher's web site, data is model, first month of series production.

J-1 Jan-43 (3 built then, the other 7 in June)
J-5 Aug-43 (restart of J production)
J-10 Oct-43
J-15 Dec-43 (wing leading edge fuel tanks as standard)
J-20 May-44
J-25 Jun-44 (last 210 J production, dive flaps, boosted ailerons)
L-1 Jun-44
L-5 Oct-44 (final L block number)

The US fighter evaluation in 1944, turning, best was the FM-2 at 100 units, the P-51D-15 was 5th at 179, the P-38L 205, the P-47D-30 206. 1G, no flaps.

Quote,

The -25 mainly fixed Lockheed's flight control issues. Allegedly the intake problem overstressed Allison's small engineering team. The behavior of liquid / gas mixtures under extreme conditions is the core of "rocket science" and it was very rare knowledge back then, before computers enabled Computational Fluid Dynamics.



The P-38 Lightning


"To be more specific, the foremost problem was the temperature of the compressed air from the turbosupercharger entering the carburetor. High carburetor air temperature (CAT for short) can cause all kinds of engine problems including detonation, which can lead to catastrophic engine failure. Allison recommended a CAT of no more than 45 degrees C."

"As it turned out high CAT was one of the major problems limiting P-38 performance through the P-38H. The root cause was, of course, the limited cooling ability of the wing leading edge intercoolers found in all early P-38s. They were a very clever design, inducing almost no aerodynamic drag, but they were designed for the 1000 hp Allisons of the late 1930s. By 1943 Military power was up to 1425 bhp and War Emergency Power was 1600 bhp. The increased power required higher induction pressure, which through compression by the superchargers heated the air by several hundred degrees. There is no way that the simple intercoolers could keep CAT below 45 degrees C. when operating at high power at altitude."

CAT wasn't the only problem though. The centrifuge effect of the compressor and the temperature variations in the plumbing could separate out the heavier octane enhancing additives and worsen the destructive detonation. The scientists who really understood this stuff were elsewhere separating Uranium.

The planes performed better in the warmer Med and Pacific so that's where they went. Doolittle and Spaatz made the decision to use the available and very suitable Mustang instead of waiting past D-Day for large numbers of a better P-38 in a paper that I haven't been able to find online. This gives an excerpt:



http://www.amazon.com/forum/military%20history?cdForum=Fx5TS2W4P5EMS6&cdPage=2&cdSort=oldest&cdThread=TxZW9V919NXLHM


" A lot of this had to do with its poor intake manifold design, something that Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, who had a PhD in aviation science from MIT, pointed out in a report on the P-38's problems, written to Carl Spaatz in the spring of 1944."

"Doolittle specifically singled out the intake system of the V-1710 as a problem - the tetraethyl lead was somehow separating out with the uneven distribution which caused repeated problems with detonation in certain cylinders in the V-1710s (i.e., they would blow up and catch fire in flight - kinda nasty for the pilots, eh?)."

***"Doolittle's letter to Spaatz is about as clear cut of an explanation of the problems of the V-1710 - turbosupercharger combo at high altitude in Europe as any I've ever found. It's the smoking gun that answers the question of why the P-38 was pulled from almost all combat duty in Europe, remaining only as a photo-reconnaissance plane."***

The dive brake modification shows how long it could take to field a fix on that plane.

Fred Colvin's writing on war production illuminates the difficulty of finding the proper curvature for efficient turbocharger and jet engine compressor blades. Unable to calculate it, the scientists were demanding that the shop produce a variety of exotic and difficult-to-machine mathematical spirals to determine by experiment what was best.



http://people.math.umass.edu/~tevelev/475_2014/beittel.pdf


"However the Archimedean spiral is used in a variety of applications. One such interesting application is in scroll compressors."

End quote

Early 8th AF escort operations,

P-38 operations with the 8th AF started on 15 October 1943. The P-51 started escort operations in December 1943.

First escort mission, 20 October, 39 P-38, no kill claims, 321 P-47, 6 kill claims. No USAAF fighters MIA.

table is date / number of P-38 / P-38 kill claims / P-38 MIA // number of P-47 / number of P-47 kill claims / P-47 MIA. Bomber escort missions only

3 November / 45 / 3 / 0 // 333 / 11 / 2
5 November / 47 / 5 / 0 // 336 / 13 / 4
7 November / 0 / 0 / 0 // 283 / 1 / 0
11 November / 59 / 0 / 0 // 342 / 8 / 2
13 November / 45 / 7 / 7 // 345 / 3 / 3
19 November / 0 / 0 /0 // 288 / 0 / 0
26 November / 28 / 0 / 0 // 353 / 36 / 4
29 November / 38 / 2 / 7 // 314 / 13 / 9
30 November / 20 / 0 / 1 // 327 / 0 / 5
1 December / 42 / 0 / 5 // 374 / 20 / 2

The third set of figures is for P-51

5 December / 34 / 0 / 0 // 266 / 0 / 1 // 36 / 0 / 0
11 December / 31 / 0 / 0 // 313 / 20 / 3 // 44 / 0 / 1
13 December / 31 / 1 / 0 // 322 / 0 / 1 // 41 / 0 / 1
16 December / 31 / 0 / 0 // 131 / 1 / 1 // 39 / 1 / 0
20 December / 26 / 0 / 0 // 418 / 16 / 2 // 47 / 3 / 4
22 December / 40 / 0 / 2 // 448 / 9 / 2 // 28 / 6 / 0
24 December / 40 / 0 / 0 // 459 / 0 / 0 // 42 / 0 / 0
30 December / 79 / 0 / 0 // 463 / 8 / 11 // 41 / 0 / 2
31 December / 74 / 3 / 1 // 441 / 4 / 2 // 33 / 2 / 1

Totals, P-38 749 sorties, 21 kill claims, 23 MIA, P-47 6,877 sorties, 169 kill claims, 54 MIA, P-51 351 sorties, 12 kill claims, 9 MIA.

The first 8th Air Force mission using P-38J models of any type seems to have been on 28 December 1943. The 8th AF loss lists note H-5 losses to November 1943 to early January 1944, J-5 losses early January to September 1944, J-10 losses early January to June, J-15 mid April to September. No J-25. The ETO first P-38 group to have J-25 or L model was the 479th in August 1944, they were given 2 and found the dive flap system unreliable and so had the aircraft replaced with non dive flapped models. In October 1943 the USAAF in Britain had 105 P-38 and 159 P-51, in November it was 188 to 231, in December 380 to 266. In January 1944 it was 637 P-38 to 543 P-51, in February 669 to 699 and the P-51 stayed ahead for the rest of the war. These figures includes reserves

The following time line is 1943 to 1944, mainly from Air War Europa by Eric Hammel.

20th December The first freelance fighter mission is flown when the bombers turn up 30 minutes late and the 55th fighter group "puts into action a plan much discussed by fighter pilots - ranging ahead of the bombers as they converge on the bomber path. The 55th fighter group scores no victories on this day, but its new tactic gets the attention of VIII fighter command and there ensures a healthy debate that, in the end, will free the fighters from the outmoded close-escort doctrine of the day." Window is first used on this day as well. Some 491 fighters were used as escorts for 546 bombers, 12 of which were pathfinders.

6th January Doolittle gained command

7th January Phased escort tactics used, fighters fly to rendezvous points to relieve other fighters rather than a formation of fighters stays with a formation of bombers for the entire mission, 571 fighters for 502 bombers.

11th January the first officially sanctioned test of freelance fighter tactics, where fighter formations range ahead and to the side of the bomber formation hoping to catch Luftwaffe fighters as they are forming up, 592 fighters for 663 bombers. The USAAF mounts 2 raids that day, the one with the freelance experiment, to Oschersleben and Halberstadt, has the Oschersleben bomber formation hit hard by fighters and flak, losing 34 from 177 bombers despatched, the Halberstadt formation loses 8 from 114 despatched. The 221 escorting fighters for these two formations claim 29 kills for 3 fighters lost, 11 of the kills by the freelance fighters. Only the 56th fighter group freelances, with two formations of 36 and 48 fighters respectively. All the bombers were B-17s.

The second raid that day, to Brunswick, was largely reduced to targets of opportunity and lost 16 B-17s and 2 B-24s.

Of the 58 to 62 B-17s lost that day (sources vary again), including write offs, some 44 were lost to enemy fighters, 8 to flak, 2 to "battle damage" and 5 "operational" losses, according to my counts.

So the initial experiment would have a mixed report, the freelance fighters did above average but the bombers were clearly exposed to significant fighter attack.

21st January 56th fighter group turn in the first strafing kill claims, it is not until late March that strafing becomes a significant source of kill claims. In April according to the USAAF statistical digest fighters will lodge 418 kills in the air and 527 on the ground, versus 469 in the air and 76 on the ground in March.

24th January the first attempt at having fighters patrol an area for a time, not stick with a particular bomber formation, abandoned due to weather problems.

Ignoring 1942, when the first 8th Air Force P-38 group flew its first mission mid October 1943, there were 7 P-47 groups flying missions. The second P-38 group flew it first mission at the end of December. The third group flew its first mission in early March 1944, by which stage the 8th had 2 operational P-51 groups and was borrowing the 9th AF ones. In late May it was 4 P-38 to 7 P-51, by end July it was 1 P-38 to 10 P-51 groups flying missions.

8th AF P-38 units,
The 20th FG claimed 76 kills November 1943 to June 1944,
the 55th FG claimed 79 kills November 1943 to June 1944,
the 364th 35.5 kills March to June 1944,
the 479th 70 kills June to October 1944.

So around 260 kill claims. USAAF ETO fighters made 2,706 kill claims November 1943 to June 1944.

In terms of failed to return the 8th lost something like 257 P-38 November 1943 to October 1944.

Using the USAAF unit history and the USAAF kill claims lists I make the P-38 groups in the ETO as

20th sent 8/43 1st kill claims 11/43 converted to P-51 7/44 scored 90 out of wartime total of 209.5 kill claims in P-38s.
55th sent 8/43, 1st kill 11/43 P-51 7/44 106 of 303.5 kills in P-38s.
364th sent 1/44 1st kill 3/44 P-51 7/44 35.5 of 263 kills in P-38s.
367th sent 3/44 1st kill 6/44 P-51 3/45 74 of 85 kills in P-38s
370th sent 1/44 1st kill 5/44 P-51 2/45 37 of 38 kills in P-38s
474th sent 2/44 1st kill 7/44, 95 kill claims, only ETO P-38 group in May 1945.
479th sent 4/44 1st kill 6/44 P-51 11/44 75 of 154 kills in P-38s.

Note the kill claim breakdowns are based on everything up to and including the month of conversion counted as P-38 kills. Of the 7 groups 4 scored more kills after conversion to P-51. The P-38 arrived in the 8th Air Force around 7 weeks before the P-51 (or 9 bomber escort missions) and like the early P-51 had less internal fuel than later models. While until the second P-38 group flew combat at the end of the month there were more P-51 on escort than P-38 in December.

The 8th Air Force P-38 immediately hit a series of mechanical problems that had not been obvious in other theatres, the combat performance was also a problem. Even so as can be seen the P-38 strength in the 8th Air Force stayed high until July 1944. It was 2 groups at the end of 1943, 3 in early March 1944, 4 end May 1944, down to 1 by end July, to zero mid September, all moving to the P-51. Meantime it should be noted the 8th transitioned some P-47 groups earlier, it had 9 P-47 groups end January 1944, and that was down to 4 by mid May, 3 more P-47 groups converted in the final quarter of 1944. So it was not a case of the P-38 were removed first, rather it was 5 P-47, 4 P-38 then 3 P-47. A brake on the transition speed was the lack of P-51 which caused one 9th Air Force P-51 group to switch to P-47 for a while.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Oct 13, 2021)

IdahoRenegade said:


> In Europe, much of the engine problems came from poor training/operation, as directed by early "on-site" commanders, the opposite of the direction of Lockheed and Allision. Specifically operating the engines at low-boost and high-rpm in cruise conditions. This does a couple of things-both bad. First, by virtue of being in low-boost, you aren't seeing much compression heating of the intake air. This means the engines are ingesting very cold air (50 below zero IIRC at upwards of 30k feet). The high-rpm condition means that you are sucking in LOTS of super-cold air. Both lead to a cold engine, cold, very thick, viscous oil that doesn't circulate properly, leading to engine failures. These same issues also lead to a cold intake manifold track, increasing the problem of fuel droplets dropping out of the intake mixture and condensing on the intake manifold. Think of taking your car, throwing it in 1st gear, and driving down the highway on a really, really cold winter morning.
> 
> "until flaps were added on later models". I think you mean boosted ailerons, which came about on the J-25-LO and all L models. These gave the P-38 one of the highest (perhaps the highest) roll rates of any WWII fighter AT HIGH SPEEDS (350mph or above). Without boost, most ailerons could not be fully deflected at high speed by the pilot. Now, you might be talking about the dive recovery flaps-these did not help turn rate from what I understand, but rather shifted the center of lift allowing for recovery from a "compressibility dive". The "standard" fowler flaps also had a "maneuver" setting on most models (IIRC starting with the F, someone correct me if I'm wrong). The flaps could be partially extended for extra lift and a tighter turn radius. I might be wrong about this, but I think the '38 actually had one of the tightest turning radii of allied or European fighters of the war (again, correct me if wrong). Where it lacked was a slow initial roll rate (lots of moment of inertia in the roll axis). But in pitch, it was always very good, from what I've read, and in a sustained turn.
> 
> ...



Thank you very much for such a detailed and informative post. And you're dead-right, I brain-farted in conflating the boosted ailerons and dive-flaps. I knew the difference, but my fingers were typing in fourth gear while my brain was in second. At any rate, your correction and distinction between the two systems is much appreciated.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 13, 2021)

While Luftflotte Reich had a considerable number of single and double engined fighters, the Allies had to cross through Luftflotte 3's territory to reach German proper and depending on Allied targets in southern Germany, may have also been within Luftflotte 2's reach as well.


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## drgondog (Oct 16, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> To note the P-38 cockpit heating was a problem.
> 
> Is there any information the P-38 consistently fought heavily outnumbered in the late 1943/early 1944 period, since that would mean a significant percentage towards a majority of the Luftwaffe's fighter sorties were consistently hitting the P-38 formations instead of the bombers or other fighters. Interceptors including the twin engined Me410 etc. which were part of the force in the time period. Luftflotte Reich held 814 single and 198 twin engined day fighters in late May 1944, numbers that had been largely going up since 1943 even as pilot quality went down.
> 
> ...


A lot of compiled and presented data, but left me wondering what your primary message is?

A few notes occurred to me as I agreed with most data you presented.
1. The 'relay' system per se began in June 1943, when VIII FC differentiated Ramrod (Escort) to target and introduced Penetration, Target and Withdrawal to further refine the 'relay' leg as the VIII began build up of P-47C and early D equipped Fighter Groups. Target support was a dream for east Netherlands and Belgium and France and west Germany - until the introduction of the 200 gal ferry tank on the C/L bomb rack in late July. 
2. The quantity of 8th AF fighter types was an interesting disclosure, but like many similar statistical presentations framing discussions of Escort and Combat, only the operational numbers dispatched, effectives and MIA and Damaged enable clarity at the point of the spear on a monthly basis. For example, the 55th FG went operational as a complete FG. In early November one squadron of 20th FG (77th) went operational attached to the 55th FG until 20th went operational. The 55th and 79th also flew in early December until the complete 20FG made its first mission on 28 December, 1943.

To this point, there were approximately 70-80 (average) P-38s each at 20th and 55th FG, plus 7 Recon, plus 495 FTG through December into January 1944, plus more P-38s arriving for the 364th FG training - but only 70 were available for operations out of the 124 you cited for Jan 4. 70 dispatched, not including aborts for two complete operational P-38 Fighter Groups. So, the tabular strength of VIII AF on a daily basis was roughly 50% more than could actually be sent into combat.

The dive flap kits began installation in June/July for the P-38-10 and J-15. The P-38J-25 at 479th FG was indeed there for familiarization in late August, but the J-10/J-15s had the dive flap mods applied, as well as installed 2nd generators to augment cockpit heating. The 479th had a very capable P-38J-10/-J-15 in combat operations in September 1944.

Your comment that 'while there were 2 P-38 FG in December 1943 an only one P-51 FG, the P-51 had more on escort' is true - but only because the P-51B had fewer aborts than the 55th FG through the first 20th FG op on 28 December.

While I respect Eric Hammel, I never extract a statement as accepted truth without other sources. The comment that the first use of chaff/window on Dec 20th kinda overlooks the Hamburg strikes in Blitz Week July 1943? His comments on first use of Relay System I addressed above.

The use of the noun "Freelance' is overused in the Hammel renditions. Assigned Sweeps in front of a Task Force became a common tactic when enough fighters were available to assign at least 1 escort FG tethered to a BD and free up other P-51/P-38 FG to Sweep Target ahead of the Bomb Groups.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 17, 2021)

Somehow quoting does not seem to work for me. The point of my original message was here is the data, make up your own mind.

When it comes to the monthly summaries the 8th Air Force uses Heavy Bomber Support sorties, they start in April 1943 where the only date fighters and bombers flew on the same day was the 17th, 115 Bombers to Bremen, 81 fighters to Blankenburg/Bruges/Flushing, another 59 fighters as part of Circus 285, attacking a power station at Zeebrugge, two other circus operations were run that day, one before and one after the Zeebrugge operation, to targets in France, plus 2 Rodeos, 455 RAF+USAAF offensive fighter sorties, 3 fighters lost, 2 damaged. So if the 8th Air Force fighter sorties to Zeebrugge at least are counted as heavy bomber support so must be the RAF ones. My understanding is during 1943 the RAF began acting as insertion and withdrawal cover given the Spitfire's shorter range. Also over the course of the war the 9th Air Force flew 12,950 effective heavy bomber escort sorties, at a loss rate of 7.75 per thousand credit sorties, versus 4.22 when escorting medium bombers. At some point someone makes a decision sorties on the day are either too far away or at too different a time to count as heavy bomber support. I do suspect the 17 April Circus 285 sorties are really medium bomber support but stuck into the only bomber support column available in the report.

By definition until the 28 July 1943 mission all 8th AF fighter cover for missions to Germany was either insertion, withdrawal or support. Relay as defined by Hammel is the tactic of fighters flying independently to a sector then patrolling it as the bombers pass through. The 8th AF had 3 operational P-47 groups from 13 April to 12 August 1943, gaining a fourth that day, whatever fighter tactics change was made in June and July 1943 it was not due to extra US fighters, it would have been nudged by the RAF reporting from the various operations over France that bomber raids attracted Luftwaffe fighters, versus fighter only operations to similar areas, plus the US bomber losses.

The 8ths "Heavy Bomber support" sorties were from April to December 1943 were 
119, 603, 697, 1,284, 1,496, 1,758, 2,513, 4,110, 4,811 versus
407, 1,676, 1,225, 1,042, 759, 1,462, 760, 337, 254 other fighter sorties, versus
353, 1,217, 1,128, 1,609, 1,653, 2,088, 1,911, 2,483, 4,730 heavy bomber sorties

I agree the total strength in the units is not the same as the number available to be sent or even the number willing to be sent in a given day. If we are going to use available for combat, then operational crews need to be addressed, not just aircraft, April 1944 8th Air Force daily average for the month, 1st Line tactical aircraft, fighters, 1,305 assigned to air force, 1,060 on hand with tactical units, 784 fully operational, crews, 1,279 assigned, 953 available, effective combat strength of fighter force 775. Or if you like P-38 July 1944, 1 operational group, 82 aircraft on station, 67 fully operational, 113 crews, 89 fully operational, effective strength 67. There is also combat experience, as of 21 December 1943 only 29.2% of the P-38 pilots had 21 to 60 hours and they were the most experienced, versus 61.5% of P-47 pilots who had at least 21 hours.

I gave 2 months worth of data which gave the number sent and lost but apparently the number of effective sorties needs to be added? My December 1943 figures are 386 P-38 sorties to 351 P-51. I did not make any comment about "more on escort". Simply put in late 1943/early 1944 the relative numbers of P-38 and P-51 fluctuated as new groups arrived. The point of the P-38 strength data was to show how long the 8th Air Force kept operating the P-38 and how some P-47 groups were converted first. It was also as the only Luftwaffe strength figure included was also a total strength. I am still in search of the evidence the P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered.

In terms of numbers E R Hooton has the sortie totals by the USAAF escort fighters to Germany versus Jagdkorps I (which controlled the fighters defending Germany) day fighter sorties
month USAAF / Luftwaffe
10/43 3,033 / 3,840
11/43 2,800 / 2,531
12/43 4,926 / 1,153
01/44 6,187 / 3,315
02/44 9,914 / 4,242
03/44 13,584 / 3,672
04/44 14,811 / 4,505

The 8th notes its 1944 attrition rate as 25.1% for P-38 (January to October), 19.9% P-47, 20.7% for the P-51 based on authorised group strength of 75 aircraft.

According to the 8th Air Force January to May 1944 inclusive heavy bomber support made up 86.6% P-38, 91.3% P-47 and 90.7% of P-51 sorties dispatched (excluding unused spares), this sortie definition applies to the following figures
January to May 1944, 10,568 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 9,148 heavy bomber support.
June 1944, 7,345 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 2,757 heavy bomber support. (P-47 7,358/3,861, P-51 10,447/6,958)
July 1944, 3,704 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 2,927 heavy bomber support
August 1944, 1,382 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 815 heavy bomber support
September 1944, 683 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 348 heavy bomber support

Little difference in employment until post Overlord. A total of 26 P-38 sorties sent in October, all heavy bomber support. As of this month the 8th Air Force reports its P-38 units had claimed 264 kills in the air since August 1942 versus 358 losses on operations, versus 1,469 P-47 kills and 644 losses and 1,783 P-51 kills and 887 losses. 

The P-38 without dive flaps was restricted to mach 0.65, the flaps raised the effective dive speed by around 20 mph but made recovery safer. Mach tuck began at about mach 0.74. It is my understanding with its good acceleration and climb but poor diving ability, the Luftwaffe pilots tended to worry more about P-38 below them than above.

I pulled the original data from a number of messages which had been using Air War Europa by Eric Hammel, the messages made it clear the book was about US air operations in Europe, Richard Davis agrees the first use of window by the 8th AF was on 20 December 1943, which would also be the first daylight use. It was me that did not explicitly put in first day or first US, I thought it was obvious.

When did "assigned sweeps" become a common tactic, the 8th had more than one fighter group per bomb wing/division as of mid August 1943, with the wings renamed divisions on 13 September 1943. And how does this tie into the idea of the fighter groups having A, B and even C formations?

A final point, it seems the heavy bomber groups were all given strength increases between around November 1943 and June 1944, the average bombers per group rising from the high 30s to the mid/low 60s. So this happened over the six months after the decision to increase the size of a group.

However the fighter groups are another story. By early 1944 they were certainly authorised to have the larger size but reality was, on average, they stayed at the old strength until later in 1944, no real change in strength per group before July 1944, they hover around the old strength of 75. The number of operational fighters per group does jump from the high 50s/low 60s to the high 60s in October 1944 implying the groups were finally able to increase their size. (December 1944 the 14 P-51 groups had 1,185 aircraft on station) Around a year after the increase had been authorised. I know the 9th AF fighter groups were complaining they were short of aircraft, so presumably the same applies to the 8th, especially given the desire to convert to P-51s.

So the figures are saying the average 8th AF fighter group was no bigger in mid 1944 than in mid 1943 but the bomber groups were around 50% larger. And note there were extra operational strength boosts for the bombers due to better supplies of spare parts and replacement aircraft. It also helps explain the anxieties of the 8th AF command about fighter numbers, the number of bomber groups looked the same but there were more bombers to escort.

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## tonycat77 (Oct 17, 2021)

Was the armament deemed sufficient?
Probably against JP aircraft, but 4x.50mm and a 20mm doesn't feel like much in europe, or was it enough because the center position increased accuracy?
Did pilots use the engines to create diferential thrust to increase their instant turn rate?
I like the stall in the p-38, the plane doesn't swing to one side due to torque like a single engine does, was that used a lot? (i know of that p-38 tale against a ki-43 by using that)


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## GrauGeist (Oct 18, 2021)

tonycat77 said:


> Was the armament deemed sufficient?
> Probably against JP aircraft, but 4x.50mm and a 20mm doesn't feel like much in europe, or was it enough because the center position increased accuracy?
> Did pilots use the engines to create diferential thrust to increase their instant turn rate?
> I like the stall in the p-38, the plane doesn't swing to one side due to torque like a single engine does, was that used a lot? (i know of that p-38 tale against a ki-43 by using that)


Considering that in the early years of the war, the standard armamament of European fighters was .30 caliber (.303, 7.92mm, etc.), the P-38 was heavily armed.
And to add to that, the P-38 was firing from the centerline, so no convergence as well as RoF not being interrupted by firing through a propellor arc.

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## XBe02Drvr (Oct 18, 2021)

tonycat77 said:


> Did pilots use the engines to create diferential thrust to increase their instant turn rate?


If you think about it, this doesn't make a lot of sense. In a high G turn the aerodynamics are practically identical to a sharp pull up or a dive recovery. The plane is in a near vertical bank pulling into the lift vector, or UP from the pilot's perspective. In this case differential thrust simply means less than maximum total thrust available, and you need all the thrust you can get to minimize energy decay. The only possible advantage of differential thrust might be to enhance the P38's notoriously sluggish roll rate and get it established in the high G turn quicker. But once established, both engines should go to WEP.

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## drgondog (Oct 18, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Somehow quoting does not seem to work for me. The point of my original message was here is the data, make up your own mind.



What (or which) point are you trying to make?


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> When it comes to the monthly summaries the 8th Air Force uses Heavy Bomber Support sorties, they start in April 1943 where the only date fighters and bombers flew on the same day was the 17th, 115 Bombers to Bremen, 81 fighters to Blankenburg/Bruges/Flushing, another 59 fighters as part of Circus 285, attacking a power station at Zeebrugge, two other circus operations were run that day, one before and one after the Zeebrugge operation, to targets in France, plus 2 Rodeos, 455 RAF+USAAF offensive fighter sorties, 3 fighters lost, 2 damaged. So if the 8th Air Force fighter sorties to Zeebrugge at least are counted as heavy bomber support so must be the RAF ones. My understanding is during 1943 the RAF began acting as insertion and withdrawal cover given the Spitfire's shorter range. Also over the course of the war the 9th Air Force flew 12,950 effective heavy bomber escort sorties, at a loss rate of 7.75 per thousand credit sorties, versus 4.22 when escorting medium bombers. At some point someone makes a decision sorties on the day are either too far away or at too different a time to count as heavy bomber support. I do suspect the 17 April Circus 285 sorties are really medium bomber support but stuck into the only bomber support column available in the report.



8th AF 3rd BW (B-26 Marauder) initiated combat operations in mid-May, 1943. Virtually all Fighter operations of VIII FC were a.) Sweeps, or b.) Patrols in April/May and June with occasional (and defined) Penetration or Withdrawal Escort Support of bombers (1st, 2nd and 4th BW (Heavy Bombers) and 3rd BW (Medium - B-26 only - Bombers beginning in May. What is your point?


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> By definition until the 28 July 1943 mission all 8th AF fighter cover for missions to Germany was either insertion, withdrawal or support. Relay as defined by Hammel is the tactic of fighters flying independently to a sector then patrolling it as the bombers pass through. The 8th AF had 3 operational P-47 groups from 13 April to 12 August 1943, gaining a fourth that day, whatever fighter tactics change was made in June and July 1943 it was not due to extra US fighters, it would have been nudged by the RAF reporting from the various operations over France that bomber raids attracted Luftwaffe fighters, versus fighter only operations to similar areas, plus the US bomber losses.


The dominant named 'action' noun for VIII FC during until June was Sweep and Patrol, with occasional Penetration and Withdrawal Support (Escort vs Patrol or Sweep) in which a defined R/V to meet and provide Escort as 'attached' close escort could be characterized - it was Not to loiter at a R/V as the bomber task forces traveled through. The tactic of continuous escort of a box of bombers, created the variations for high and side coverage inwhich fighters had to 'Ess' to stay with their assigned box. Why/what is the point that fighter tactics changed by 'nudges' from RAF? For context, the entire VIII BC attack strength in mid 1943 was less than one BD in 1944. 



Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> The 8ths "Heavy Bomber support" sorties were from April to December 1943 were
> 119, 603, 697, 1,284, 1,496, 1,758, 2,513, 4,110, 4,811 versus
> 407, 1,676, 1,225, 1,042, 759, 1,462, 760, 337, 254 other fighter sorties, versus
> 353, 1,217, 1,128, 1,609, 1,653, 2,088, 1,911, 2,483, 4,730 heavy bomber sorties


So, ??? as you pointed out, the 8th AF began VIII FC with the 4th in fall 1942, added operations from 56th and 78th FG in April, 353rd in August, 352nd and 355th in September and 55th FG in October - and so on as the 356th, and the rest of what would be VIII and IX FC were added through May 1944 when operational control of IX FC reverted back from detached for VIII BC pre-D Day to 9th AF for TAC.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> I agree the total strength in the units is not the same as the number available to be sent or even the number willing to be sent in a given day. If we are going to use available for combat, then operational crews need to be addressed, not just aircraft, April 1944 8th Air Force daily average for the month, 1st Line tactical aircraft, fighters, 1,305 assigned to air force, 1,060 on hand with tactical units, 784 fully operational, crews, 1,279 assigned, 953 available, effective combat strength of fighter force 775. Or if you like P-38 July 1944, 1 operational group, 82 aircraft on station, 67 fully operational, 113 crews, 89 fully operational, effective strength 67. There is also combat experience, as of 21 December 1943 only 29.2% of the P-38 pilots had 21 to 60 hours and they were the most experienced, versus 61.5% of P-47 pilots who had at least 21 hours.


The 'number available' were largely dispatched on every mission performed by VIII and IX FC in escort operations conducted to protect VIII BC - with the occsaional odd Sweeps and Dive bombing attacks 1943/1944 through D-Day. Your point? It was RARE that any operational FG maintained 'available' near the level 'Authorized and Issued'. Organizationally VIII and IX FC staffed ~10 pilots per flight and 20-25 Fighters per squadron. As you parse Dispatched versus Effective you will easily see the number of aborts or MIA due to mechanical failure, weather, etc. Your Point?


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> I gave 2 months worth of data which gave the number sent and lost but apparently the number of effective sorties needs to be added? My December 1943 figures are 386 P-38 sorties to 351 P-51. I did not make any comment about "more on escort". Simply put in late 1943/early 1944 the relative numbers of P-38 and P-51 fluctuated as new groups arrived. The point of the P-38 strength data was to show how long the 8th Air Force kept operating the P-38 and how some P-47 groups were converted first. It was also as the only Luftwaffe strength figure included was also a total strength. I am still in search of the evidence the P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered.


The P-38 experience could only be characterized as 'heavily outnumbered in combat operations' as the same when one single squadron of P-47s or P-51s were locally outnumbered. When only one P38, or P-47 or P-51 FG was performing Target Escort in any period late 1943 through D-Day, it could easily be outnumbered by Gruppe level attack force. Not necessarily outfought - but outnumbered in a cubic mile volume. 


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> In terms of numbers E R Hooton has the sortie totals by the USAAF escort fighters to Germany versus Jagdkorps I (which controlled the fighters defending Germany) day fighter sorties
> month USAAF / Luftwaffe
> 10/43 3,033 / 3,840
> 11/43 2,800 / 2,531
> ...


Sigh. Dig out the number of sorties of AAF fighters that never encountered resistance during Penetration or Withdrawal by the bulk of the LW Day Fighters - because the Jagdkorp tactics were to reserve most attacking forces outside the range of Spitfire and P47. You should reflect that the relay system broken into Penetration, Target and Withdrawal escort legs to bring all VIII/IX P-47 assets into play for LF 3 and other western deployed JGs, as the P-51/P-38 performed deep penetration attacks on heavily defended targets


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> When did "assigned sweeps" become a common tactic, the 8th had more than one fighter group per bomb wing/division as of mid August 1943, with the wings renamed divisions on 13 September 1943. And how does this tie into the idea of the fighter groups having A, B and even C formations?


In October/November 1942. General Monk Hunter was enamored with Sweeps and Patrols - the LW generally ignored them. The effect of 'one FG per BD' in 1943 was more or less meaningless as target escort was impossible from West Germany and deeper due to inadequate P-47 range. The concept and execution of A and B groups of reinforced squadron 20-30 ships each began in Fall 1944 - entirely due to increased Actual TO&E as production from US augmented the Fighter groups. If you study the 8th AF in detail, you will note that A-Z was no enough to uniquely assign squadron codes - hence the introduction of 'underscore' on the specific a/c code.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> A final point, it seems the heavy bomber groups were all given strength increases between around November 1943 and June 1944, the average bombers per group rising from the high 30s to the mid/low 60s. So this happened over the six months after the decision to increase the size of a group.


In early 1943 each squadron of a BG could put up 6-9 bombers per squadron, 20-36 per Group attack for MaximumEffort. Reduced Group level attacks weren't because the squadron operational strength was only 6-9 B-17/B-24 (except after heavy losses), it was because usually only 3 BS would be tasked to go on a given day - and rest the 4th.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> However the fighter groups are another story. By early 1944 they were certainly authorised to have the larger size but reality was, on average, they stayed at the old strength until later in 1944, no real change in strength per group before July 1944, they hover around the old strength of 75. The number of operational fighters per group does jump from the high 50s/low 60s to the high 60s in October 1944 implying the groups were finally able to increase their size. (December 1944 the 14 P-51 groups had 1,185 aircraft on station) Around a year after the increase had been authorised. I know the 9th AF fighter groups were complaining they were short of aircraft, so presumably the same applies to the 8th, especially given the desire to convert to P-51s.
> 
> So the figures are saying the average 8th AF fighter group was no bigger in mid 1944 than in mid 1943 but the bomber groups were around 50% larger. And note there were extra operational strength boosts for the bombers due to better supplies of spare parts and replacement aircraft. It also helps explain the anxieties of the 8th AF command about fighter numbers, the number of bomber groups looked the same but there were more bombers to escort.


Generally true, see my comments above

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## tomo pauk (Oct 18, 2021)

tonycat77 said:


> Was the armament deemed sufficient?
> Probably against JP aircraft, but 4x.50mm and a 20mm doesn't feel like much in europe, or was it enough because the center position increased accuracy?



It is more about 'what kind of target we're shooting at', rather than 'how much of firepower enemy counterpart has'? In other words - it does not matter that Fw 190 has 4 cannons or no canons, since it's cannons are no _defence_ at all even against 4 HMGs (as proven by P-51B, even aganst the Bf 110s). Granted, the .50s on the P-51Bs were harder hitting than the .50s in 1939, or even in 1942.
The 20mm Hispano was supposed to be worth of 3 HMGs, making the P-38 having the equivalent of 7 HMGs; US .50s were among the most powerful .50s in 1944-45.



GrauGeist said:


> Considering that in the early years of the war, the standard armamament of European fighters was .30 caliber (.303, 7.92mm, etc.), the P-38 was heavily armed.
> And to add to that, the P-38 was firing from the centerline, so no convergence as well as RoF not being interrupted by firing through a propellor arc.



Convergence probably mattered, since a good shooter and/or good pilot will have all of his weapons hitting the target in the same time.
P-38 was not around in the early years of the war, though. Even then a lot of European fighters have had one or two 20mm cannons. By the time the P-38 was flying in a shooting war (from Summer of 1942 on), British fighters and Fw 190s have had one or two pairs of cannons aboard, with or without one or two pairs of LMGs to help out. 
Granted, the Bf 109, Italian and Soviet fighters (bar La-5) were lighter armed on aggregate.

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## Greg Boeser (Oct 18, 2021)

3rd BW flew two missions in May '43. Unescorted and at low level. None returned from second mission. Entire Marauder force was then pulled from operations to retrain for medium altitude bombing. Operations resumed in mid-July, heavily escorted by RAF Spitfires.

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## Dash119 (Oct 18, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Whats left of my old A&P school today - we used to have about 4 or 5 test cells in the rear of the building.
> 
> View attachment 638282
> 
> ...




 FLYBOYJ
,

What was the name of that school. I think that was the one I went to in 1980 for about six weeks...


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 18, 2021)

Dash119 said:


> FLYBOYJ
> ,
> 
> What was the name of that school. I think that was the one I went to in 1980 for about six weeks...


West Los Angeles Airport College Center


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## Dash119 (Oct 18, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> West Los Angeles Airport College Center


Yeah, that didn't sound familiar. Google search refreshed my memory, it was Northrop University, which was also very close to LAX, and is now closed.


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 18, 2021)

Dash119 said:


> Yeah, that didn't sound familiar. Google search refreshed my memory, it was Northrop University, which was also very close to LAX, and is now closed.


Yep, our crosstown rivals. Their A&P program was 18 months and a faster pace, the tuition was a few thousand back then. The school I went to was 6 months longer and if I recall paid about $500 over the 24 month period for books, tuition and various fees.


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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 19, 2021)

One day my quote will work. The point of my message was here is the data, make up your own mind. Since the reply is "what point" please provide what additional information is required, in sentence or two without adjectives or adverbs.

" Virtually all Fighter operations of VIII FC were a.) Sweeps, or b.) Patrols in April/May and June"
The posted statistics make that clear. Why substitute "virtually" when the actual data is available? Then later query why the figures are posted at all? Apparently the fact some P-38 groups arrived in 1944 is the problem with the figures?

"The dominant named 'action' noun for VIII FC during until June was Sweep and Patrol, with occasional Penetration and Withdrawal Support (Escort vs Patrol or Sweep)"
Who exactly is saying the US did relay fighter escort tactics in 1943? It was in 1944.

"Why/what is the point that fighter tactics changed by 'nudges' from RAF?"
Because the RAF experience from 1942 and into 1943, those number 2 group attacks and then the USAAF ones, was the best place to find Luftwaffe fighters was near allied bombers. Not the near separate war the US fighters and bombers were doing into mid 1943.

"For context, the entire VIII BC attack strength in mid 1943 was less than one BD in 1944"
This has what to do with the tactics employed in 1943? One of the under reported factors in the bomber air war was the USAAF attacks in the November 1943 to February 1944 period were very important, they denied the Jagdwaffe its usual winter lull, rest and re-equip. Combined with the major increase in effort towards the end of 1943 as the B-24 groups returned from the Mediterranean and new groups arrived. So 12,577 tons of bombs dropped in December 1943, versus 10,962 tons dropped August 1942 to end June 1943.

So I agree the total strength in the units is not the same as the number available to be sent or even the number willing to be sent in a given day and get a reply "your point?" Should I have disagreed?

"The P-38 experience could only be characterized as 'heavily outnumbered in combat operations' as the same when one single squadron of P-47s or P-51s were locally outnumbered. When only one P38, or P-47 or P-51 FG was performing Target Escort in any period late 1943 through D-Day, it could easily be outnumbered by Gruppe level attack force. Not necessarily outfought - but outnumbered in a cubic mile volume. "
I notice the change to out numbered in combat operations. The first most obvious point is why a cubic mile of space, given the fighters were moving around 5 miles per minute? Surely the space limit must vary with visibility, from 10/10 cloud to CAVU. Next comes the implied idea those Luftwaffe gruppes launched 30+ aircraft consistently, and even then needed several to "heavily outnumber" a US fighter group formation. Then comes the implied idea those Luftwaffe fighters were after the escort when their main mission was the bombers. Given bomber density that cubic mile could see the Luftwaffe outnumbered by US aircraft.

A pair of fighters bouncing a squadron, one firing pass and then sensible withdrawal is also fighting heavily out numbered.

"Sigh. Dig out the number of sorties of AAF fighters that never encountered resistance..."
There is no point until we do the same for the Luftwaffe units, especially in winter given the lack of instrument flying training, things like Luftwaffe fighters launched but recalled given new information on the target I want to compare like with like, not every sortie in the air on one side and a fraction of those sorties on the other.

"In October/November 1942. General Monk Hunter was enamored with Sweeps and Patrols "
The figures quoted say this continued until mid 1943. I was assuming assigned sweep was the designation of the 1944 tactic but clearly not.

"The concept and execution of A and B groups of reinforced squadron 20-30 ships each began in Fall 1944 "
Should this be Northern Spring 1944?

"If you study the 8th AF in detail, you will note that A-Z was no enough to uniquely assign squadron codes - hence the introduction of 'underscore' on the specific a/c code. "
Bomber Command three flight squadrons, either a bar or a small 2 added. I have noted the average strength figures meant the fighter groups were generally under 26 aircraft per squadron until mid/late 1944.

"Generally true, see my comments above"
actually the comments say nothing about average USAAF group strength movements.

So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered", instead there is compare numbers in a cubic mile, it must have happened, but no idea on how often and whether the Luftwaffe fighters were after the P-38 or even noticed them, just as long as they are proximate enough it counts, any US bombers in the area do not count.
For what it is worth it looks like during 1943 on average the Luftwaffe lost two fighters shot down by the bombers per three 8th Air Force heavy bomber the fighters shot down, in early 1944, after a general up gunning, the ratio was 1 fighter to 2 bombers, the USAAF bombers were quite dangerous, then add all the damaged Luftwaffe fighters and that impact on a strained maintenance and spare parts system.

Did you know in December 1943, with 1,153 defensive sorties versus 4,926 US fighter and 3,552 bomber sorties, the Luftflotte Reich fought consistently heavily outnumbered, over 7 to 1 in the airspace over Germany?

Did you know the US 2nd Armoured Division fought consistently outnumbered, given at D day there was something like 10 panzer divisions present in OB West?

I am still in search of the evidence the P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered, not transited an arbitrary volume of airspace the same time as a number of Luftwaffe fighters, but actually found themselves engaged during a mission by formations of Luftwaffe fighters intent on attacking or forced to attack the P-38.

324 P-38 escort sorties in November 1943, 2,531 defensive, at say 3 to 1 for consistently heavily outnumbered the Luftflotte Reich was devoting nearly 40% of its defensive effort to consistently attacking P-38 formations.
386 P-38 escort sorties in December 1943, 1,153 defensive sorties, for 3 to 1 Luftflotte Reich spent the month attacking P-38 formations.

Another way is looking at the admittedly incomplete Luftwaffe claims on days of heavy P-38 losses, since heavily outnumbered must mean say 3 gruppen claiming kills per 25 P-38 sorties. P-38 losses and Luftwaffe claims

13 November 1943, 45 sent (55th) 7 lost, plus 2 write offs, I/JG1 claimed 1, II/JG1 claimed 5, III/JG1 claimed 1, I/JG11 claimed 1, II/JG11 claimed 3, II/ZG26 claimed 2, JGr26 claimed 1

29 November 1943, 38 sent (55th), 8 or 9 lost, 5/JG3 claimed 2, III/JG1 claimed 7.

5 January 1944, 70 P-38 sent (20th, 55th), 7 lost (3 from 20th, 4 from 55th), 1 Luftwaffe claim by II/NJG3

31 January 1944 (Fighter bomber mission) 47 P-38 sent (55th), 6 lost, 1 write off, I/JG1 claimed 4, III/JG3 claimed 3.

11 February 1944, 82 sent (20th, 55th), 8 lost (all from 20th), I/NJG102 claimed 1, II/JG2 claimed 1, II/JG3 claimed 4, II/JG26 claimed 2, III/JG26 claimed 2, II/ZG26 claimed 2

15 April 1944, sweeps and strafes, 132 P-38 sent (20th, 55th, 364th), 11 lost (3 from 55th, 8 from 364th), I/JG11 claimed 4, III/JG11 claimed 7, II/JG51 claimed 4.


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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 21, 2021)

The claimed kill rates should reflect, on average, the amount of combat seen, similar for loss rates but these are also dependent on ability to take damage and how far from friendly territory the damage occurs. Drawing from the 8th Air Force Monthly reports in US Archives Record Group 18 Entry 7 box 5682, January to May 1944 inclusive,
10,568 P-38 sorties, mostly escort but 264.6 tons of bombs dropped, 202 lost on operations, 135 kills claimed in the air
32,366 P-47 sorties, mostly escort but 353.9 tons of bombs dropped, 227 lost on operations, 732 kills claimed in the air
13,013 P-51 sorties, mostly escort but 106.4 tons of bombs dropped, 245 lost on operations, 832 kills claimed in the air
P-38 losses include 8 accidents and 41 write offs, P-47 losses include 12 accidents and 32 write offs, P-51 losses include 13 accidents and 21 write offs.

So in losses per sortie, for every 1 P-47 lost, 2.68 P-51 and 2.73 P-38 were lost
In kills claimed per sortie, for every 1 by a P-38, 1.77 P-47 and 5.01 P-51.

Using AIR 22/371 in those 5 months the USAAF fighters used 98,688 cannon rounds and 20,827,439 0.50 inch rounds. Given P-38 150 rounds 20mm, 2,000 0.50 inch, P-47 3,400 rounds 0.50 inch, P-51 1,200 rounds 0.50 inch about 6.2% of the 20mm and 14.2% of the 0.50 inch ammunition carried was used.

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## drgondog (Oct 23, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> The claimed kill rates should reflect, on average, the amount of combat seen, similar for loss rates but these are also dependent on ability to take damage and how far from friendly territory the damage occurs. Drawing from the 8th Air Force Monthly reports in US Archives Record Group 18 Entry 7 box 5682, January to May 1944 inclusive,
> 10,568 P-38 sorties, mostly escort but 264.6 tons of bombs dropped, 202 lost on operations, 135 kills claimed in the air
> 32,366 P-47 sorties, mostly escort but 353.9 tons of bombs dropped, 227 lost on operations, 732 kills claimed in the air
> 13,013 P-51 sorties, mostly escort but 106.4 tons of bombs dropped, 245 lost on operations, 832 kills claimed in the air
> ...


So, pull your statistical detail and throw in a.) average range per sortie, b.) Number of heavily defended airfields attacked, c.) Number of German aircraft destroyed in air and on ground, d.) number of LW attacks n bombers defended - by each aircraft type..


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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 23, 2021)

Interesting project.
"a.) average range per sortie"
Requires individual US unit histories, is greatest distance from base good enough or must the data be route miles, to take into account the various course changes?

"b.) Number of heavily defended airfields attacked"
as per (a) plus the definition of heavily defended, do the defences include any airborne Luftwaffe fighters or just flak, in which case how many flak guns of what calibre what distance from the airfield defines heavily, this will also require Wehrmacht records given all three branches of the military had AA units and at a daily level given the changes over the 5 months. Plus whether the guns were actually capable of firing that day. Which brings up the next point, what if surprise is achieved and few to none of the flak guns engage?

"c.) Number of German aircraft destroyed in air and on ground, "
Air has already given, destroyed on ground see below.

"d.) number of LW attacks n bombers defended - by each aircraft type."
This will firstly require Luftwaffe records, to eliminate US fighter encounters with home bound Luftwaffe units and other units not tasked with bomber attacks. Then comes the definition of defended, is it simply be every other encounter, like for example bouncing Luftwaffe fighters tens of miles from any US bomber formation, given there were always the missed interceptions, or must the bombers be within a certain distance, if so, what? The latter will require US bomber formation records, not just the fighter ones. Do the US fighters need to do some shooting or simply be near the Luftwaffe units? Do we need Luftwaffe records indicating the Luftwaffe fighters avoided the US bombers because of US fighter attack or simply presence?

I might be able to arrange for archive visits or alternatively for copies of the relevant records to be made, which will probably take longer The US will probably take a week or more of copying and then a couple of months or more of analysis depending on whether it is just fighter units and maximum distance or more detail is required, the German records considerably longer given the number of units involved. How do you wish to pay the people for their research time? An upfront deposit will be required given the amount of work. Paying for a scoping study to obtain a more solid budget is recommended, senior researchers cost more then junior but are more likely to have some records already copied and analysed. Are the researchers allowed to publish the results?

Destroyed on ground, January to May 1944, P-38 66, P-47 195, P-51 500, or on a per sortie basis, for every 1 P-47 claim, 1.66 P-38 claims, 11.64 P-51 claims. Put it another way destroyed on the ground was 21% of P-47 kill claims, 33% of P-38 and 38% of P-51. January to May 1944.

So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered", just requests for lots more data, indicating the claim lacks evidence.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 23, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Interesting project.
> "a.) average range per sortie"
> Requires individual US unit histories, is greatest distance from base good enough or must the data be route miles, to take into account the various course changes?
> 
> ...


Just curious, but what are the ETO stats of the P-38, P-47 and P-51 between September 1943 and 1 January 1944?


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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 25, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Just curious, but what are the ETO stats of the P-38, P-47 and P-51 between September 1943 and 1 January 1944?


Ah, reply, not quote button. After checking, almost all the 8th AF 1943 data I have is under fighters, not individual types, I suggest consulting Mighty Eighth War Diary or perhaps the Eighth Air Force Museum. P-38 started operations on 15 October 1943.

According to the Mighty Eighth War Diary, despatched P-38 sorties, 36 on 15th October, 39 on 16th, 35 on 17th, 33 on 18th, 37 on 19th, all sweeps, no claims, 1 MIA on the 18th, 39 escort sorties on 20th, 42 sweep sorties on 22nd, 48 sweep sorties on 24th, no claims or losses. The next problem/opportunity is officially the early P-51 operations were by units of the Ninth Air Force.

8th AF fighter operations, by month September to December 1943, note this report has different sortie definitions to the monthly reports. Only in air claims made.

September 3,220 total sorties less spares and abandoned operations, 2,945 effective/credit sorties, 1,758 heavy bomber support, 1,462 strafing/bombing/sweeps, 14 fighters MIA all P-47, claims 41 destroyed, 2 probable, 8 damaged. Rounds expended per enemy aircraft destroyed 1,767. Flying hours per operational sortie 2.1
October 3,273 total sorties less spares and abandoned operations, 2,971 effective/credit sorties, 2,513 heavy bomber support, 760 strafing/bombing/sweeps, 10 fighters MIA (9-P-47, 1 P-38, plus 4 P-47 Category E), claims 73 destroyed, 11 probable, 40 damaged. Rounds expended per enemy aircraft destroyed 1,933. Flying hours per operational sortie 2.2
November 1943, 4,447 total sorties less spares and abandoned operations, 3,955 effective/credit sorties, 4,110 heavy bomber support, 337 strafing/bombing/sweeps, 67 sorties dropped 16.8 tons of bombs (68x500 pound HE), 55 fighters MIA (35-P-47, 18 P-38 (which adds to 53, seems that is the correct total), plus 7 P-47 and 4 P-38 Category E), claims 104 destroyed, 27 probable, 57 damaged. Rounds expended per enemy aircraft destroyed 2,228. Flying hours per operational sortie 2.5
December 1943, 5,065 total sorties less spares and abandoned operations, 4,519 effective/credit sorties, 4,811 heavy bomber support, 254 strafing/bombing/sweeps, 42 sorties dropped 10.5 tons of bombs (42x500 pound HE, 5x120 pound frag.), 31 fighters MIA (25-P-47, 6 P-38, plus 2 P-47 and 5 P-38 Category E), claims 82 destroyed, 14 probable, 35 damaged. Rounds expended per enemy aircraft destroyed 2,307. Flying hours per operational sortie 2.7

Ninth Air Force, P-51 December 1943, 415 total sorties, 325 effective/credit sorties, 7 fighters MIA, claims 9 destroyed, 2 probable, 13 damaged, 961 operational flying hours. No P-38 or P-47 sorties. For the period 16 October 1943 to 8 May 1945 9th AF fighters, escort of heavy bombers, 14,105 sorties, 13,156 credit, 12,590 effective, 102 MIA or category E, making up 5.1% of total credit sortie effort.

Putting aside the 1942 operations of the 1st, 31st and 55th fighter groups, in operationally declared order, 8th AF fighter groups, official dates
March 1943, 4th FG from Spitfire to P-47, to P-51 on 26th February 1944.
8 April 1943, 56th FG P-47 operational
8 April 1943, 78th FG P-47 operational, to P-51 on 21 December 1944.
12 August 1943, 353rd FG P-47 operational, to P-51 30 September 1944.
9 September 1943, 352nd FG P-47 operational, to P-51 7 April 1944.
9 September 1943, 355th FG P-47 operational, to P-51 3 March 1944.
15 October 1943, 356th FG P-47 operational, to P-51 on 6 November 1944
15 October 1943, 55th FG P-38 operational, to P-51 on 14 July 1944
13 December 1943, 359th FG P-47 operational, to P-51 on 4 May 1944
28 December 1943, 20th FG P-38 operational, to P-51 on 17 July 1944
20 December 1943, 358th FG P-47 operational, exchanged for 9th AF 357th FG P-51 2 February 1944.
21 January 1944, 361st FG P-47 operational, to P-51 on 12 May 1944
10 February 1944, 357th FG P-51 flies first 8th AF mission
3 March 1944, 364th FG P-38 operational, to P-51 on 28 July 1944
30 April 1944, 339th FG P-51 operational
26 May 1944, 479th FG P-38 operational, to P-51 on 27 September 1944

Of the 5,222 kill claims in the air by 8th AF fighters, 1,948 Fw190, 2,535.5 Bf109, 185 Bf110, 130 Me262, 82 Ju-88 and 74 Me410 were the top six, ignoring the 146 "other and unknown" category. The first low level strafing attack was carried out on 25 February 1944.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 25, 2021)

My point of the specific time period of September 1943 to 1 January 1944 was to point out that the P-38 was dominant in statistics because it was the primary USAAF fighter in the ETO at that time.

As the transition to the P-47 and P-51 in 1944 took place, the P-38's statistics would have tapered off as it was being replaced.

So if one were so inclined, they could make the case that the P-47's performance was poor when compared to the P-38's between 9/43 and 1/44 - just as one could use the numbers to say the P-38's performance was poor when compared to the P-47/P-51 between 1/44 and 12/44.

Numbers are great, context is even better...

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 25, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> My point of the specific time period of September 1943 to 1 January 1944 was to point out that the P-38 was dominant in statistics because it was the primary USAAF fighter in the ETO at that time.


If the above is P-38, not P-47 what does dominant in the statistics mean? It cannot be sorties or kill claims. Operational 8th AF fighter groups, end of month
August 1943, 4 P-47
September 1943, 6 P-47
October 1943, 7 P-47, 1 P-38, 12.5% P-38
November 1943, 7 P-47, 1 P-38, 12.5% P-38
December 1943, 9 P-47, 2 P-28, 18.2% P-38
January 1944, 10 P-47, 2 P-38, 20% P-38
February 1944, 8 P-47, 2 P-38, 2 P-51, 16.7% P-38
March 1944, 7 P-47, 3 P-51, 3 P-38, 23.1% P-38
April 1944, 6 P-47, 5 P-51, 3 P-38, 21.4% P-38
May 1944, 4 P-47, 7 P-51, 4 P-38, 26.7% P-38
June 1944, 4 P-47, 7 P-51, 4 P-38, 26.7% P-38
July 1944, 4 P-47, 10 P-51, 1 P-38, 7.7% P-38
August 1944, 4 P-47, 10 P-51, 1 P-38, 7.7% P-38
September 1944, 3 P-47, 12 P-51

Meantime end February 1944 the 9th air force had 2 P-51 and 3 P-47 groups., it had 2 P-51 and 8 P-47 groups before its first P-38 group in April 1944, as of end May it was 18 Fighter Groups 2 P-51, 13 P-47, 3 P-38, in time order the P-38 were numbers 11, 13 and 17.

Seen the Richard Davis 8th AF raids list, every raid, including targets of opportunity etc. They show the 8th pulling back to stay more within escort range in the final third (or more) of 1943 and definitely after second Schweinfurt, which meant at the time largely P-47 range, at the same time winter cut the daylight hours available, making longer distance raids problematical. The P-38 and P-51 enabled the 8th to go deeper.


GrauGeist said:


> As the transition to the P-47 and P-51 in 1944 took place, the P-38's statistics would have tapered off as it was being replaced.


Using ETO as the criteria the P-38 contribution was holding at 20 or so or under percent for much of the first half of 1944, 18% end 1943, 21% end May 1944. The above shows the reduction in 8th AF P-38, the 9th took until 1945 before two if its P-38 groups were converted, 1 each to P-47 and P-51. I deliberately chose January to May as that was the period where the 8th's fighter groups were mostly tasked with escort at about the same percentage of effort for each type.


GrauGeist said:


> So if one were so inclined, they could make the case that the P-47's performance was poor when compared to the P-38's between 9/43 and 1/44 - just as one could use the numbers to say the P-38's performance was poor when compared to the P-47/P-51 between 1/44 and 12/44.
> 
> Numbers are great, context is even better...


Please do be the one so inclined to make such a comparison, the P-38 stayed a minority of USAAF fighter sorties and an even smaller minority of kill claims, so what criteria are used to show P-38 superiority? And it would need to be October to December 1943, given no P-38 in September.

Slogans can sound great, data enables even better conclusions.

For those who wonder about an early D-Day, the 9th AF fighter sorties for the first half of 1944 go 370, 1,966, 5,080, 7,914, 21,074, 29,990, the 9th AF fighter units cut their arrival times quite close. The 8th's fighters were not as late, 6,615, 9,012, 11,349, 14,242, 15,745, 25,463. Total USAAF fighter sorties with January set to 1 become, 1, 1.6, 2.4, 3.2, 5.3, 7.9.

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## drgondog (Oct 25, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> If the above is P-38, not P-47 what does dominant in the statistics mean? It cannot be sorties or kill claims. Operational 8th AF fighter groups, end of month
> August 1943, 4 P-47
> September 1943, 6 P-47
> October 1943, 7 P-47, 1 P-38, 12.5% P-38
> ...


For the life of me I have zero idea what you wish to prove?
IF P-38 sucked air to air is your message, you perhaps could conclude that through May, but if you look at 479th FG May through September 1944, you would be stumped if you try to explain its VERY high Victory Credit to loss ratio - air to air..

If the P-38 had the worst Effective vs Deployed ratio, a plot of aborts/losses without enemy action, take your accumulated data and make a stab at it just using Take Off vs Return to Base absent combat action and plot it month by month and compare similarly versus P-47 and P-51 from April 1943 and December 1943 through September 1944.

If the P-38 lagged in productivity vs P-51 in Ground Destruction of LW aircraft, - show it month to month in the form of a plot as a f(sorties). Conversely if you wish to assert (either way) regarding LW destroyed on the ground vs losses due to strafing - collect the data, cite your sources and plot the data into tangible and visual format.

You stated "*Slogans can sound great, data enables even better conclusions*". Data without context only confuses any message you are trying to make.

I could belabor the point regarding context and communication but will just comment that your presentations are a steady stream of statistics that never seem to be framed to answer a question or assert/postulate a claim that you wish to make..

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## GreenKnight121 (Oct 25, 2021)

drgondog said:


> For the life of me I have zero idea what you wish to prove?
> 
> .....
> 
> I could belabor the point regarding context and communication but will just comment that your presentations are a steady stream of statistics that never seem to be framed to answer a question or assert/postulate a claim that you wish to make..



As he has stated repeatedly...
HE IS NOT TRYING TO MAKE A POINT!!!!!!!

He is presenting data for YOU (and the rest of us) to use to evaluate your (our) positions and opinions, to determine whether you (us) is/are full of it or on-target with your (our) positions and opinions.

Why is that so hard for you to comprehend?


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## pbehn (Oct 25, 2021)

GreenKnight121 said:


> As he has stated repeatedly...
> HE IS NOT TRYING TO MAKE A POINT!!!!!!!
> 
> He is presenting data for YOU (and the rest of us) to use to evaluate your (our) positions and opinions, to determine whether you (us) is/are full of it or on-target with your (our) positions and opinions.
> ...


Because context is everything. for example mission 226 on 20 Feb 1944 had 94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 P-51 Mustangs. From Wiki
The 668 P-47 could only take the B-17s to the German border and back, the 94 P-38s and 73 P-51s had to take the bombers from the German border to the target and back. More P-47s would have been no use at all, just giving more domination of where they were already dominant. It was the P-38 and P-51 which allowed the US strategy to progress and initially at least the important statistic was bombers lost not enemy fighters shot down. Big Week - Wikipedia


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## GrauGeist (Oct 25, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Because context is everything. for example mission 226 on 20 Feb 1944 had 94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 P-51 Mustangs. From Wiki
> The 668 P-47 could only take the B-17s to the German border and back, the 94 P-38s and 73 P-51s had to take the bombers from the German border to the target and back. More P-47s would have been no use at all, just giving more domination of where they were already dominant. It was the P-38 and P-51 which allowed the US strategy to progress and initially at least the important statistic was bombers lost not enemy fighters shot down. Big Week - Wikipedia


Keep in mind that no one is trying to make a point, aparently...


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## tommayer (Oct 25, 2021)

NTGray said:


> I have some questions about the P-38, and I’m inviting comments.
> 
> I’ve always considered the Lightning a super cool craft, both because of the way it looks and performs and because it was one of the earliest products of Kelly Johnson’s team at Lockheed which would become known as the Skunk Works. It was the first combat airplane to achieve 400 mph in level flight. And even though it came out _before _the P-40 and the P-39, both of those planes ceased production in 1944, but the Lightning was good enough to be produced throughout the entire war.
> 
> ...


Suggest you go to Greg's Airplanes etc on YouTube. Watch his 38 vids. I suspect his assessments of the 38 are as good as we're going to get at this remove.


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## drgondog (Oct 25, 2021)

GreenKnight121 said:


> As he has stated repeatedly...
> HE IS NOT TRYING TO MAKE A POINT!!!!!!!
> 
> He is presenting data for YOU (and the rest of us) to use to evaluate your (our) positions and opinions, to determine whether you (us) is/are full of it or on-target with your (our) positions and opinions.
> ...


Simply because presenting data with no content is like looking at binary code for a JCL desck. So, now as a champion of 'data makes your day', what POINT do you comprehend or opinion that You wish to opine based on the dump?

Autists and Asperger's syndrome afflicted folks also put out incoherent streams of consciousness.


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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 26, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Because context is everything. for example mission 226 on 20 Feb 1944 had 94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 P-51 Mustangs. From Wiki
> The 668 P-47 could only take the B-17s to the German border and back, the 94 P-38s and 73 P-51s had to take the bombers from the German border to the target and back. More P-47s would have been no use at all, just giving more domination of where they were already dominant. It was the P-38 and P-51 which allowed the US strategy to progress and initially at least the important statistic was bombers lost not enemy fighters shot down. Big Week - Wikipedia


So context,

20 February 1944, Mighty Eighth War Diary

Mission 226
3BD 314 B-17 to Tutow Airfield, Tutow/Coordinates 53.9181° N, 13.2416° E, 6 B-17 lost, 1 Cat E 15 kills claimed, no escort.
1BD 417 B-17 to Leipzig area targets, 7 B-17 lost, 1 Cat E, 14 kills claimed
2BD 272 B-24 to Brunswick area targets, 8 B-24 lost, 3 Cat E, 36 kills claimed.

According to the Osborne list 17 B-17 lost, 6 to enemy aircraft, 4 to flak, 1 to fighter and flak, 2 to battle damage, 2 on operations, 2 not on operations.
B-24 loss list has 9 to fighters, 4 to flak and fighters, 1 crashed.

Richard Davis list
Target hit \ type \ bombing method (DR Dead reckoning) \ attacking

Rostock \ P & I/A \ H2X \ 138
Leipzig \ I/A \ Vis \ 22
Stassfurt \ I/A \ Vis \ 16
Leipzig/Mockau \ A/Iasy Me 109 \ Vis \ 129
Gotha \ A/Iasy Me 110 \ H2X \ 89
Tutow \ A/Iasy FW 190 \ Vis/DR \ 100
Helmstedt \ I/A \ Vis \ 59
Leipzig/Heiterblick \ A/Icomp \ Vis \ 57
Brunswick/Wilhelmitor \ A/Icomp Me 110 \ Vis \ 40
Stralsund \ I/A \ Vis/DR \ 40
Bernburg \ A/Iasy Ju 88 \ Vis \ 37
Brunswick/Neupetritor \ A/Icomp \ Vis \ 33
Oschersleben \ A/Iasy FW 190 \ Vis \ 34
Misc., Ge \ T/O \ Vis \ 25
Leipzig/Heiterblick \ A/Icomp \ Vis \ 17
Oschersleben \ I/A \ Vis \ 13
Leipzig/Englesdorf \ M/Y \ Vis \ 14
Brunswick \ M/Y \ Vis \ 12
Hettstedt \ T/O \ Vis \ 12
Neuenhaus \ T/O \ Vis \ 1
Ramsche \ T/O \ Vis \ 1

The more scattered the bombing and the more H2X and DR the worse the weather. T/O target of opportunity.

Escorts
94 P-38, 20th and 55th FG, 7 kill claims, 1 lost, 20th encountered enemy aircraft and unable to make contact with bombers, 55th FG no claims or losses.
668 P-47, from 11 groups (including 2 from 9th AF), 36 kills claimed, 2 lost, 2 Category E
73 P-51, 354th and 357th FG, 18 kills claimed, 1 lost.

In addition Ramrod 567 Withdrawal cover for 8th AF heavy bombers, 1 Spitfire lost (Another Ramrod was escorted B-26 to bomb airfields in Holland as a diversion, maybe around 50 fighter sorties total for both operations)

There were also other allied air operations.

Luftflotte 3 reported 2 Fw190 lost on operations, Reich 30 Bf109, 8 Fw190, 15 Bf110 and 3 Me410.

56th FG reported combat Minden/Steinhuder, so west of Hanover.
4th FG reported combats at Koblenz
355nd FG reported combats at Bonn, Seigen and Marienburg.
352nd FG reported combats Blankenheim, and over Belgium and France.
78FG combat west of Liege.

Wiki has an interesting idea of where the German border is.

108 gallon drop tanks first used on 27 September 1943, enabling P-47 to make Emden from Britain. P-47 radius of action with the tank rated at 325 miles.
150 gallon flat fuel tanks available in February 1944, P-47 radius of action to 375 miles with 1 tank, 550 miles with 2.

Cambridge to Brunswick around 430 miles, German border reached at about 280 miles.
Cambridge to Leipzig around 525 miles, German border reached at about 260 miles.
(Distances read from a map, so allow a margin for error)


drgondog said:


> but if you look at 479th FG May through September 1944, you would be stumped if you try to explain its VERY high Victory Credit to loss ratio - air to air..


So I am to go away and find the data, it will not be supplied, definition of VERY high is? Using the online US kill claims, 479th FG monthly May to September, 0, 1, 4, 19, 42. Of the September 1944 kills 27 on the 26th and 13 on the 28th. So 2 combats and the 8th AF says the group officially changed to P-51 on the 27th, but all of the 26th and 28th claims were made by P-38 pilots? The citation the 479th received for the 26th says combat near Munster, Mighty Eighth War Diary says the P-38 were on Market Garden support in Holland.


drgondog said:


> If the P-38 lagged in productivity vs P-51 in Ground Destruction of LW aircraft, - show it month to month in the form of a plot as a f(sorties). Conversely if you wish to assert (either way) regarding LW destroyed on the ground vs losses due to strafing - collect the data, cite your sources and plot the data into tangible and visual format.


So the destroyed on ground figures are requested, supplied, complaints of too much data are followed by more data is required and it should be presented graphically. After all I collected the data, cited the sources, put it into a tangible format, claims per sortie sent and am told not good enough.

Fighter ground claims are listed under the headings aircraft, locomotives, oil tank cars, trains, goods and other rail wagons, armored vehicles and tanks, flak towers and gun positions, motor trucks, other vehicles, tug boats and barges and freighters, rail stations and facilities, radio and power stations, oil storage tanks, hangars and miscellaneous buildings. Destroyed and damaged. It is not like the 8th assigned airfield or other specific targets to a specific fighter type. The aircraft come with a by fighter type breakdown, the others do not.


drgondog said:


> Autists and Asperger's syndrome afflicted folks also put out incoherent streams of consciousness.


"Like people with autism, people with Asperger's syndrome have a dreadful time understanding what is going on, socially. They do not always pay attention to the social scene in which they find themselves, and even when they do, they are often not able to make sense of what they see, or to respond appropriately."

So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered", just requests for lots more data, indicating the claim lacks evidence.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 26, 2021)

I'd like to thank to the contributors to this thread. Including the new member 
G
 Geoffrey Sinclair
.

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## pbehn (Oct 26, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Wiki has an interesting idea of where the German border is.
> 
> 108 gallon drop tanks first used on 27 September 1943, enabling P-47 to make Emden from Britain. P-47 radius of action with the tank rated at 325 miles.
> 150 gallon flat fuel tanks available in February *1944, P-47 radius of action to 375 miles with 1 tank, 550 miles with 2*.
> ...


It was me that stated the German border because thats how far P-47s took the B-17s on the Schweinfurt raids. I know where these places are because I worked there for 9 years, I used take my wife shopping in Braunschweig and Hanover..

Now with regard to your post, if the text in bold is correct there was no need for any P-38s or P-51s on any raid to The Braunschweig area, so what were they doing?

Increasing external fuel doesnt hugely increase range, internal fuel does that and the P-47 consumed circa 100 gals/hr on cruise 300 gals hr in combat.

Issuing a tank for use isnt the same as having production in UK of 1000s per day 668 P-47s require 1336 drop tanks for a days work.

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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 26, 2021)

OK folks - please tone down the rhetoric. Thank you!


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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 26, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Now with regard to your post, if the text in bold is correct there was no need for any P-38s or P-51s on any raid to The Braunschweig area, so what were they doing?


I am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.

The 8th mounted 3 raids on 20 February 1944, one completely unescorted, as well something like the equivalent of around half a US Group of RAF Spitfires was used as part of the withdrawal cover. Also the 8th was borrowing 9th AF groups, which in the end created problems because it denied those units training and experience in fighter bomber operations. The answer seems obvious, the US was short of fighters, it needed all it could obtain. As expected the P-47 were doing the shorter range cover, the P-38 and P-51 the longer range, but shorter range was still tens of miles into Germany, not to Germany. I have no evidence P-47 went all the way to Braunschweig, any with the 150 gallon tank could get most of the way.

The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank.


pbehn said:


> Issuing a tank for use isnt the same as having production in UK of 1000s per day 668 P-47s require 1336 drop tanks for a days work.


As far as I am aware non paper external tanks were often held onto unless hostile aircraft were encountered, at least before the idea of strafing targets on the way home became general practice.

Roger Freeman states the 150 gallon steel tank actually held 165 gallons and was made in both Britain and the US, no idea on US supply numbers.

Ministry of Aircraft Production, monthly Statistical Bulletin, drop tank production for US fighters, January to May 1944
US 108 gallon paper, 8,465, 9,494, 13,758, 12,677, 16,740
US 108 gallon metal, 3,292, 3,257, 4,238, 3,001, 3,897
US 150 gallon metal, 0, 420, 2,280, 3,450, 5,865


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## drgondog (Oct 26, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> So context,


That was like reading a phone book.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Wiki has an interesting idea of where the German border is.


July 28th 1943 -The 4th and 56th and 78th FG used the 205 gal Ferry "Tub" tank and the 4th FG managed to penetrate to Emmerich, GY and attack a mixed force of 109s and 109s east of Rotterdam on the way back from R/V to find the returning bombers from either Kassel or Oschersleben - to score 9-1-5 for one loss.

The 'So What' was July was the first time for VIII FC to penetrate German border - not September..


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> 108 gallon drop tanks first used on 27 September 1943, enabling P-47 to make Emden from Britain. P-47 radius of action with the tank rated at 325 miles.
> 150 gallon flat fuel tanks available in February 1944, P-47 radius of action to 375 miles with 1 tank, 550 miles with 2.


P-47D never had 550 mi Combat Radius until the P-47D-25 first entered combat operations in flight level strength mid May 1944 - and only then with a.) wing pylons, b. 2x 108 Gal externals and c.) with 370 gallons of internal fuel (from 305), could the P-47D get close to Berlin/Leipzig. The P-47C/D prior to P-47D-15, were modified with Depot mod wing changes to achieve Hamburg, Brunswick, Stuttgart at 400-425m CR. The Group level force of equivalent D-16s weren't flying to Brunswick/Stuttgart radii until the end of March.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Cambridge to Brunswick around 430 miles, German border reached at about 280 miles.
> Cambridge to Leipzig around 525 miles, German border reached at about 260 miles.
> (Distances read from a map, so allow a margin for error)





Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> So I am to go away and find the data, it will not be supplied, definition of VERY high is? Using the online US kill claims, 479th FG monthly May to September, 0, 1, 4, 19, 42. Of the September 1944 kills 27 on the 26th and 13 on the 28th. So 2 combats and the 8th AF says the group officially changed to P-51 on the 27th, but all of the 26th and 28th claims were made by P-38 pilots? The citation the 479th received for the 26th says combat near Munster, Mighty Eighth War Diary says the P-38 were on Market Garden support in Holland.


Your data for late September was for a mixed force of P-51 and P-38 beginning with 9-26.

479th FG destroyed (per VIII FC Victory Credits Board dated 9/45), for P-38J, from May 1944 through September 30th 1944 (last mixed P-38/P-51 mission) were credited with 32 air for the loss of 4 air to air, a ratio of 8:1. By contrast, the 4FG for the same 6.5 56FG 10.9, 78FG 6.9:1, 353rd 7.9:1, 355th 8.5:1, 356th 5.7:1, 359FG 6.8:1, 339th FG 9.1, 352FG 12.3, 357FG 10:1. W/O belaboring the higher ratios of 339th, 352nd, 355th, 357th than 479th P-38 record, the other four flew most of their missions in P-51.

Other P-38 Groups, extracting only P-38 (like 479th above) 20th 3.8:1, 55th 2.4:1 364th 1.8:1 - all others except 56th (P-47), 339th (P51) and 357th (P-51) flew with mixed types. Additionally the 479th achieved 122 for loss of 7 in P-51 for 17:4 ratio.

My Point? Not all P-38 combat records sucked. Equally - ALL air to air ratios of the groups flying P-38s soared when they converted to P-51. ALL scored from 12:1 to 19:1 air to air after converting.




Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> So the destroyed on ground figures are requested, supplied, complaints of too much data are followed by more data is required and it should be presented graphically. After all I collected the data, cited the sources, put it into a tangible format, claims per sortie sent and am told not good enough.


Sorry about that. Prior data dumps were like dumpster diving when one doesn't know what to looks for.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Fighter ground claims are listed under the headings aircraft, locomotives, oil tank cars, trains, goods and other rail wagons, armored vehicles and tanks, flak towers and gun positions, motor trucks, other vehicles, tug boats and barges and freighters, rail stations and facilities, radio and power stations, oil storage tanks, hangars and miscellaneous buildings. Destroyed and damaged. It is not like the 8th assigned airfield or other specific targets to a specific fighter type. The aircraft come with a by fighter type breakdown, the others do not.


I believe that one of the points is that one can't reach macro conclusions without essential data to parse, analyze and arrive at conclusions? I am well aware of the limitations of available data - I have devoted 40 years to gathering and parsing and gathering more and parsing more to arrive at postulates, claims base on facts but not 100% sourced, and qualified opinions.

One point I will make - air to air ratios are imprecise. For credits you have to rely on accredited sources, which in turn are arrived at via 'best efforts given witness statements and combat film (ETO Process) so USAF 85, Frank Olynyk and USAFHRC are the 'go to' for VCs. Losses by Type are an entirely different task. I looked at some 1400-1500 MACRs to arrive at "Studied Opinions' regarding a lass that was not witnessed, environments when last seen, etc to sort air/Flak, weather, mechanical categories - with guaranteed mistakes on individual cases for VIII FC.

So What? Take my 'facts' presented above with the caveats presented.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> "Like people with autism, people with Asperger's syndrome have a dreadful time understanding what is going on, socially. They do not always pay attention to the social scene in which they find themselves, and even when they do, they are often not able to make sense of what they see, or to respond appropriately."
> 
> So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered", just requests for lots more data, indicating the claim lacks evidence.



If you are looking to me for comfort or rebuttal re: "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered". I explained the nature of air combat as it applied generally to 'local air superiority' of an attacking LW force. There are far too many Mission Summary and Encounter Reports in which an AAF FG encountered a force two or three times their size in a cubic mile of space - That was the Nature of LW tactics. Attack when little or no fighter escort was present, avoid when Group level fighters escorted in local volume.

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## drgondog (Oct 26, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> I am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.
> 
> The 8th mounted 3 raids on 20 February 1944, one completely unescorted, as well something like the equivalent of around half a US Group of RAF Spitfires was used as part of the withdrawal cover. Also the 8th was borrowing 9th AF groups, which in the end created problems because it denied those units training and experience in fighter bomber operations. The answer seems obvious, the US was short of fighters, it needed all it could obtain. As expected the P-47 were doing the shorter range cover, the P-38 and P-51 the longer range, but shorter range was still tens of miles into Germany, not to Germany. I have no evidence P-47 went all the way to Braunschweig, any with the 150 gallon tank could get most of the way.
> 
> ...





Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> I am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.
> 
> The 8th mounted 3 raids on 20 February 1944, one completely unescorted, as well something like the equivalent of around half a US Group of RAF Spitfires was used as part of the withdrawal cover. Also the 8th was borrowing 9th AF groups, which in the end created problems because it denied those units training and experience in fighter bomber operations. The answer seems obvious, the US was short of fighters, it needed all it could obtain. As expected the P-47 were doing the shorter range cover, the P-38 and P-51 the longer range, but shorter range was still tens of miles into Germany, not to Germany. I have no evidence P-47 went all the way to Braunschweig, any with the 150 gallon tank could get most of the way.


Expressed another way, the destruction of the Luftwaffe by USSTAF (8th and 15th AF) took first priority prior to Overlord - and subsequently got what Spaatz demanded to achieve the expected result. The 9th AF XI FC did not 'loan' their Fighter Groups - they were ordered to subordinate
their P-47s,then P-51s and finally their P-38s - over Leigh Mallory's strenuous objections. Thus they were not 'loaned' they were assigned to operate under 8th AF HQ through end of May.
Look to March 29th strike at Brunswick. The 56th had fighters in Brunswick 'area' during Penetration Suport/Sweep and victory credits east of Hanover. Scored at Kassel, Kiel, Celle, (~same radius) before actual scores at Brunswick, between February 24th and May 8. Certainly all of those VC's were flown with P-47C/D prior to introduction of -15 in very late March in squadron quantity. Those would have been Depot modified for Plumbing, strengthened wings for 1000 pound (2xBomb or 2x165 gal (150 effective self sealed) loads. The -25 arrived in Mid May to operations. 



Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank.


I'm sorry, the first ID loss date I have for a -15RA MIA is 42-76449 - 360FS/353FG near Dummer Lake. April 11, 1944. 
D-15RA #1 was 42-76119. Which Block serial are you using? 
Not true that only belly tanks could be carried prior to -15RA/RE delivery to ETO as noted above. Depot Mod pylon/plumbing equipped P-47C through D-11 used 108 on pylons, and C/L in February 1944. The P-47D-6RA was first type released with strong wing and pylon as production feature - but no wing plumbing.


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## pbehn (Oct 26, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> I am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.


I believe the thought process is called subtraction, you stated the range of the P-47 and the distance to Leipzig which is within your stated range, if the P-47 had the range to reach Hanover at the end of Jan 1944 then some of the 800 P-47s used for example on 20 Feb would have gone all the way to the target. But you know this because you state "The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank." Drgondog has expanded on this in his post.



Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> The 8th mounted 3 raids on 20 February 1944, one completely unescorted,


Yes it was unescorted because at the time it couldnt be escorted. The raid was to the Rostock area but specifically Tutow airfield, on the coast directly north of Berlin. This was to put pressure on the LW, previous raids had seen the LW send aircraft from places like Tutow, that particular raid was to show they had to defend all Germany at all times or allow a free hit. This site describes Big Week as the apogee of the P-47 with regard to bomber escort P-47 Thunderbolt with the USAAF – European Theatre of Operations. The P-38 was better than the P-47 and the P-51B C D were better than both. So the P-47 was gradually replaced by both initially and then the P-38 was also replaced by the P-51. All three were improved in their lives but the basic difference remained, improving the range of the P-47 just gave bigger shoulders for the other two to stand on.


The USA wasnt short of fighters, it was short of fighters that could do the job it wanted to.

Quoting data for each type through out the war doesnt really show the true situation.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 27, 2021)

pbehn said:


> I believe the thought process is called subtraction, you stated the range of the P-47 and the distance to Leipzig which is within your stated range, if the P-47 had the range to reach Hanover at the end of Jan 1944 then some of the 800 P-47s used for example on 20 Feb would have gone all the way to the target. But you know this because you state "The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank."


So I stated the Roger Freeman reported combat radius with 1 and 2 150/165 gallon drop tanks and the assumption was made I was assuming some P-47 on 20 February 1944 were in fact carrying two tanks, clearly I should not have included the 2 tank data. Though I listed where the P-47 saw combat, which were clearly (well) west of both Leipzig and Braunschweig, with the point of the data was to show the wiki P-47 only to the German border idea was incorrect.


pbehn said:


> This site describes Big Week as the apogee of the P-47 with regard to bomber escort P-47 Thunderbolt with the USAAF – European Theatre of Operations.


I have posted a couple of times now the change over of the equipment of 8th AF fighter groups, what does the site add?


pbehn said:


> The P-38 was better than the P-47 and the P-51B C D were better than both.


If the objective was destruction of the Luftwaffe then the P-38 was not better than the P-47, given the number of kill claims lodged, even as a percentage of sorties. If the objective was to allow day bombers to strike at more distant targets with acceptable losses then the P-38 was better at least until mid 1944, after which the P-51 took over anyway.


pbehn said:


> The USA wasnt short of fighters, it was short of fighters that could do the job it wanted to. Quoting data for each type through out the war doesnt really show the true situation.


Given what I have read about the 9th Air Force being continually short of fighters, including the need for 1 P-51 group to convert to P-47 for a while in late 1944, the shortage of fighters was present. Then comes the 9th AF units being used for long range escort meant those units had less ability to prepare for their main purpose, the support of the armies, something that showed up post D-Day. Not just doing strikes but training with the ground forces and learning the new army support doctrine coming from the Mediterranean.

Can you please show me where I quoted data throughout the war. I chose January to May 1944 as that was the period the 8th Air Force generally used its fighters in a similar way, mostly escort, and presented the results. June 1944 on shows more diversification as far as I can tell.


drgondog said:


> That was like reading a phone book.
> 
> July 28th 1943 -The 4th and 56th and 78th FG used the 205 gal Ferry "Tub" tank and the 4th FG managed to penetrate to Emmerich, GY and attack a mixed force of 109s and 109s east of Rotterdam on the way back from R/V to find the returning bombers from either Kassel or Oschersleben - to score 9-1-5 for one loss.
> 
> The 'So What' was July was the first time for VIII FC to penetrate German border - not September..


First a complaint about presenting data, then comes the too little data. I noted the first use of the 108 gallon fuel tank in September, but did not include a history of 8th AF external fuel tanks from first combat use in July 1943, the part filled 200 gallon ferry tanks, such information will be added if I do not include it.


drgondog said:


> P-47D never had 550 mi Combat Radius until the P-47D-25 first entered combat operations in flight level strength mid May 1944 (snip)
> 
> 479th FG destroyed (per VIII FC Victory Credits Board dated 9/45), for P-38J, from May 1944 through September 30th 1944 (last mixed P-38/P-51 mission) were credited with 32 air for the loss of 4 air to air, a ratio of 8:1. By contrast, the 4FG for the same 6.5 56FG 10.9, 78FG 6.9:1, 353rd 7.9:1, 355th 8.5:1, 356th 5.7:1, 359FG 6.8:1, 339th FG 9.1, 352FG 12.3, 357FG 10:1. W/O belaboring the higher ratios of 339th, 352nd, 355th, 357th than 479th P-38 record, the other four flew most of their missions in P-51.
> 
> ...


Good to see confirmation of the P-47 with twin 150/165 gallon tanks combat radius.

First the dismissal of the longer range P-47 as not available until effectively post May 1944 or at least post February, then the data on how good the P-38 was as an air superiority fighter based on post May 1944 results. If the online listings are correct the 479th logged 24 kill claims on 11 different dates 22 June to 28 August 1944, with 6 of the dates for 1 kill. Another 8 claims out of the 40 on 26 and 28 September, with the results on the 26th being considered exceptional enough to warrant a citation. Then for example had the 25 August combat with 7 kills claimed not taken place the ratio would be 25 to 4, something over 6 to 1, similar for 1 more P-38 loss. 

For the same time period, 4FG 132 kill claims, 56FG 172, 78FG 87.5, 353rd 107, 355th 123, 356th 57, 359FG 110, 339th FG 144, 352FG 213, 357FG 232.5. Which makes even the 356th about twice as robust an indicator of performance as an air superiority fighter. Given all the tactical variables involved in air combat the idea 32 kill claims versus 4 losses over 13 combat days, 6 of which were for 1 claim supports almost any claim is incorrect, beyond such figures could occur.

Using the USAAF Statistical Digest ETO fighters claimed 2,610 kills in the time period.


drgondog said:


> If you are looking to me for comfort or rebuttal re: "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered".


No, just marking it as proven false. The outnumbered P-38 comment was one reason I decided to post some data. My statement was noting the reality.


drgondog said:


> Expressed another way, the destruction of the Luftwaffe by USSTAF (8th and 15th AF) took first priority prior to Overlord - and subsequently got what Spaatz demanded to achieve the expected result. The 9th AF XI FC did not 'loan' their Fighter Groups - they were ordered to subordinate their P-47s,then P-51s and finally their P-38s - over Leigh Mallory's strenuous objections. Thus they were not 'loaned' they were assigned to operate under 8th AF HQ through end of May.


Pointblank directive of 14 June 1943 was a target list, which the air forces were working to, each in their own way. The conclusion as of late 1943 was the Luftwaffe day fighter force needed to be negated in order to continue day bombing. Whether that was lots of escorts near the bombers or allowing other tactics giving the escort fighters more operational flexibility became the topic of debate. Doolittle made it clear hunting Luftwaffe fighters was the priority.

The 9th AF deserves a place in the list of units given what its fighters were doing, while the 15th AF was facing limited Luftwaffe units plus axis allied forces and suffering for a time a higher bomber loss rate than the 8th. So who ordered the 9th to subordinate their fighter units to 8th AF? I use borrow as that is the term I remember from one of the air war histories. Along with the disagreement over Eisenhower gaining control of the heavy bombers and then what the bomber commanders pitched as their best way to do invasion support, often involving targets in Germany.

SHAEF gained control of Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force on 27 March 1944, staying that way until 16 September. The 17 April SHAEF directive noted priorities of Luftwaffe, particularly fighters, and Luftwaffe facilities and rail communications, particularly in France. I presume this is where the USAAF first priority destruction of Luftwaffe comes from. The destruction of the Luftwaffe would need to include the bomber, night fighter, reconnaissance and ground attack arms as well as the day fighters and in fact the day fighter force largely grew in numeric terms in 1944 and average equipment performance. What it did suffer was a major drop in pilot quality in the first 5 to 6 months of 1944 and it kept going down.

On 2 May the 15th was cleared to go after Ploesti, versus the April raids where the target was officially the Ploesti marshalling yards which were surrounded by the refineries, but attacked with terrible accuracy, many missing the yards and ending up on the oil refineries.

6 June the priorities were rail, army support, V weapons, Luftwaffe airfields and factories, with oil, E and U-boat pens added.

Bombing efforts January to June 1944, percentage of effort against targets in Germany, Bomber Command // 8th Air Force

Jan 89.1% // 70.1%
Feb 98.2% // 71.2%
Mar 71.0% // 69.6%
Apr 41.8% // 61.3%
May 22.6% // 55.2%
Jun 8.5% // 22.5%

Most of the rest of the effort was to targets in France, including V-1 launch sites.


drgondog said:


> I'm sorry, the first ID loss date I have for a -15RA MIA is 42-76449 - 360FS/353FG near Dummer Lake. April 11, 1944.
> D-15RA #1 was 42-76119. Which Block serial are you using?
> Not true that only belly tanks could be carried prior to -15RA/RE delivery to ETO as noted above. Depot Mod pylon/plumbing equipped P-47C through D-11 used 108 on pylons, and C/L in February 1944. The P-47D-6RA was first type released with strong wing and pylon as production feature - but no wing plumbing.


Interesting given 42-76449 is listed as a D-20. 8th AF P-47D-15 losses to 10 April 1944 from the loss list I have

21 January 1944, 42-75658, MACR 1849, Sqn 61 Gp 56
22 February 1944, 42-75647, MACR, 2671, Sqn 351 Gp 353
22 February 1944, 42-75653, MACR, 2673, Sqn 351 Gp 353
22 February 1944, 42-75814, MACR, 2701, Sqn 376 Gp 361
4 March 1944, 42-75850, MACR, 2793, Sqn 351 Gp 353
6 March 1944, 42-75635, MACR, 2714, Sqn 377 Gp 362
8 March 1944, 42-75672, MACR, 2734, Sqn 379 Gp 362
8 March 1944, 42-75697, MACR, 2844, Sqn 62 Gp 56
27 March 1944, 42-76249, MACR, 3443, Sqn 63 Gp 56

Model designation Army Aircraft, 11th Edition, January 1945.
The D-4-RA has redesigned main and auxiliary fuel tanks, G-9 booster pumps for external tanks, bomb shackles for 75 to 150 gallon external belly tank, elimination of provisions for 200 gallon belly tank.
D-6-RE Same as P-47D-5-RE except as follows: Redesigned preheater and access door; frameless gunsight; carburettor air thermometer covered in Spec. AN-GG-I-552, Dwg, AN5790-6, in lieu of the Type F-8 thermometer.
D-5, 7, 10 and 11 no mention of wing racks.
D-15-RA combat wing tank, pressurised fuel system for external tanks.
D-15-RE same as D-10-RE except for a lightened canopy, jettisonable in flight.
D-16-RE same as D-15-RA except type A-13 turbo regulator instead of A-17.

Roger Freeman says wing racks on the D-15.

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## drgondog (Oct 27, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> If the objective was destruction of the Luftwaffe then the P-38 was not better than the P-47, given the number of kill claims lodged, even as a percentage of sorties. If the objective was to allow day bombers to strike at more distant targets with acceptable losses then the P-38 was better at least until mid 1944, after which the P-51 took over anyway.


Agree. And the first goal stated by Ira Eaker when he requested (appealed) both P-38s and P-51s in June 1943 from Arnold. The destruction of the Luftwaffe as number one priority for 8th AF emerged in January 1944 and prosecuted by Doolittle.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Given what I have read about the 9th Air Force being continually short of fighters, including the need for 1 P-51 group to convert to P-47 for a while in late 1944, the shortage of fighters was present. Then comes the 9th AF units being used for long range escort meant those units had less ability to prepare for their main purpose, the support of the armies, something that showed up post D-Day. Not just doing strikes but training with the ground forces and learning the new army support doctrine coming from the Mediterranean.



You might have made the wrong assumption, Re: 9th AF "continually being short of fighters". How does converting the 354FG from end of November to beginning of Feb 1945 to P-47D illustrate that point? The 9th AF TAC doctrine chose P-47 over P-51 and P-38 and 367th (P-38) converted for the duration. The 354FG prevailed in their desire to return to the P-51 as contrast to being changed due to lack of P-47s. As to not having enough time to train with ground forces and learning the army support doctrine coming from the MTO? Lessons from Desert Air Force were integrated in training in US in early 1943 for all the FG's (including 354/357 and 363FG equipped with first P-39 then P-51B). If somebody like Brereton or Quesada stated such, then it should be considered. 


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> For the same time period, 4FG 132 kill claims, 56FG 172, 78FG 87.5, 353rd 107, 355th 123, 356th 57, 359FG 110, 339th FG 144, 352FG 213, 357FG 232.5. Which makes even the 356th about twice as robust an indicator of performance as an air superiority fighter. Given all the tactical variables involved in air combat the idea 32 kill claims versus 4 losses over 13 combat days, 6 of which were for 1 claim supports almost any claim is incorrect, beyond such figures could occur.


If you say so. The 479th made major strides in P-38 air to air ratios under Zemke, when most of the 32 air to air victories occurred - a stark contrast in ratios to 20th, 55th, and 364th FG comparable success. When you dwell in data without context, subtle information can be overlooked.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Using the USAAF Statistical Digest ETO fighters claimed 2,610 kills in the time period.


Leaving IX FC out of the discussion for the moment (with 354FG by far the dominant contributor ) Using USAF Study 85 and Dr. Frank Olynyk's and USAFHRC, the total number of Victory Credits for VIII FC from January 1944 through May 1944 was 2041 Victory Credits. P-38H/J (141), P-47C/D (752), P-51B/C (1,146).

So, what? Obviously that despite near comparable ranges the Mustang was far superior to Lightning in context of destruction of LW in context of total results - either in per sortie or per fighter group. Ditto Thunderbolt save 56th FG.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> No, just marking it as proven false. The outnumbered P-38 comment was one reason I decided to post some data. My statement was noting the reality.


I'm not sure that you understand that in 'reality', at the point of attack, the LW could put up a fighter intercept on either weakly defended escorted bombers with fewer fighters in that volume - or attack a single box of bombers with only a squadron in immediate vicinity. So, typically (vs Rarely) all types (P-38, P-47 and P-51) could be outnumbered. So, what? The 'deficiency' of results for the P-38 in context of air to air victories wasn't 'being outnumbered' because they were no different in this respect. The differences were a.) easy to see and consequently plan an attack, b.) out dive for evasion purposes, and c.) complex cockpit operations causing engine/turbo failures - not experienced by P-51 or P-47 fighter groups.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Pointblank directive of 14 June 1943 was a target list, which the air forces were working to, each in their own way. The conclusion as of late 1943 was the Luftwaffe day fighter force needed to be negated in order to continue day bombing. Whether that was lots of escorts near the bombers or allowing other tactics giving the escort fighters more operational flexibility became the topic of debate. Doolittle made it clear hunting Luftwaffe fighters was the priority.


General Lawrence Kuter alerted Arnold on October 29th, 1943 that intelligence reports indicated that Pointblank goal achievement was impossible prior to D-Day without major shift in priority. The result was issuance of priority focus on LW industry and Day Fighter Force resulting in Doolittle 'destroy in air and ground' orders and planning for Big Week. The destruction of day LW threat to D-Day beach heads was considered 'essential'. Continuing 'day bombing' was considered essential to draw the LW into a war of attrition.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> The 9th AF deserves a place in the list of units given what its fighters were doing, while the 15th AF was facing limited Luftwaffe units plus axis allied forces and suffering for a time a higher bomber loss rate than the 8th. So who ordered the 9th to subordinate their fighter units to 8th AF? I use borrow as that is the term I remember from one of the air war histories. Along with the disagreement over Eisenhower gaining control of the heavy bombers and then what the bomber commanders pitched as their best way to do invasion support, often involving targets in Germany.


Spaatz via Arnold, prevailed on Portal the necessity of 'all hands on deck' to highest 8th/15th AF (USSTAF) priority - namely destruction on LW prior to D-Day. The pissing contest with Leigh-Mallory was 'won' by Spaatz and 8th AF collected IX FC TDY until invasion, beginning December 1, 1943 when 354th started combat ops, followed by trade of 357FG Mustangs for 358FG P-47s as well as diverting the inbound 363rd P-51B FG. Later disagreements did not always go Spaatz's way during Oil Campaign when Eisenhower ordered 8th AF toward more D-Day support objectives,


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> SHAEF gained control of Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force on 27 March 1944, staying that way until 16 September. The 17 April SHAEF directive noted priorities of Luftwaffe, particularly fighters, and Luftwaffe facilities and rail communications, particularly in France. I presume this is where the USAAF first priority destruction of Luftwaffe comes from. The destruction of the Luftwaffe would need to include the bomber, night fighter, reconnaissance and ground attack arms as well as the day fighters and in fact the day fighter force largely grew in numeric terms in 1944 and average equipment performance. What it did suffer was a major drop in pilot quality in the first 5 to 6 months of 1944 and it kept going down.


See above for 'first priority date' via Kuter memo to Arnold Oct 29th 1943. The asset reduction for aircraft other than day fighters was focused on industry base for airframes, engines and repair facilities - as well as Oil/Chemical plants on May 12.

"On 2 May the 15th was cleared to go after Ploesti, versus the April raids where the target was officially the Ploesti marshalling yards which were surrounded by the refineries, but attacked with terrible accuracy, many missing the yards and ending up on the oil refineries."

"Cleared" only has context when a) that considering Ploesti Refinery was attacked by Halverson on the way to India and on August 1 1943 Tidal Wave attack. The reason to delay renewing Ploesti Oil targets and drive at M/Y was to assist Red Army. The 8th and 15th only began concentrated attacks on Refining and Chemical industry in May by plan. The May 5, 6, 18th Ploesti strikes were M/, as well as April 5th, 15th, 24th.

Point? So what?



Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Interesting given 42-76449 is listed as a D-20. 8th AF P-47D-15 losses to 10 April 1944 from the loss list I have
> 
> 21 January 1944, 42-75658, MACR 1849, Sqn 61 Gp 56
> 22 February 1944, 42-75647, MACR, 2671, Sqn 351 Gp 353
> ...


You are correct, I used Bodie instead of John Andrade "US Military Aircraft Designation and Series". So, he result is that the data I used wa for the 3rd block of P-47D-RE (and also looked to -15-RE for which there were no losses) which began at 42-75615, ending at 42-76384 with 254 P-47D-16-RE imbedded in 2nd Block.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> The D-4-RA has redesigned main and auxiliary fuel tanks, G-9 booster pumps for external tanks, bomb shackles for 75 to 150 gallon external belly tank, elimination of provisions for 200 gallon belly tank.
> D-6-RE Same as P-47D-5-RE except as follows: Redesigned preheater and access door; frameless gunsight; carburettor air thermometer covered in Spec. AN-GG-I-552, Dwg, AN5790-6, in lieu of the Type F-8 thermometer.


According to Bodie, the D-5-RE incorporated the wing structural improvements, and fixed external tank system for 165 gallon tanks to ferry to UK were jury rigged for several airframes. Curious regarding wing structural beef up for earlier blocks as they should be necessary for 500 # bomb or 108 gal combat tanks. Simply stated, the factory may have approved the pylon weight for earlier models given sufficient margins for max stress conditions on critical load paths.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> D-5, 7, 10 and 11 no mention of wing racks.
> D-15-RA combat wing tank, pressurised fuel system for external tanks.
> D-15-RE same as D-10-RE except for a lightened canopy, jettisonable in flight.
> D-16-RE same as D-15-RA except type A-13 turbo regulator instead of A-17.
> ...


Freeman states wing pylons for -15 but Depot mods were made to -5 and subsequent (IIRC Burtonwood) to introduce the Pylon and plumbing. External combat tanks were slaved from instrument vacuum system. I have not found records of wing rack/pylon mods for P-47C through D-2.

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## nuuumannn (Oct 27, 2021)

GreenKnight121 said:


> As he has stated repeatedly...
> HE IS NOT TRYING TO MAKE A POINT!!!!!!!



Why don't you tell us what you really think...


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## pbehn (Oct 27, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Given what I have read about the 9th Air Force being continually short of fighters, including the need for 1 P-51 group to convert to P-47 for a while in late 1944, the shortage of fighters was present. Then comes the 9th AF units being used for long range escort meant those units had less ability to prepare for their main purpose, the support of the armies, something that showed up post D-Day. Not just doing strikes but training with the ground forces and learning the new army support doctrine coming from the Mediterranean.



You cannot state that the 9th Airforce was continually short of fighters without some risk of terminological inexcatitude. The 9th airforce wasnt a nation state and it had aircraft assigned to it. What you describe and Drgondog expanded upon is a force maximising the capabilities of what they had in an embarrassment of riches. Allow me first to explain my thought processes, as this is important.

The RAF had no shortage at all in 1938 because they werent at war. They did have a huge shortage in the summer of 1940 because they were at war and France had fallen leaving 500 single engined fighters and pilots massively outnumbered.

In a training accident over Yorkshire after the war a Wellington was involved in a collision, a teenage boy from the Air Training Corps and an instructor were in the back of the aircraft with one parachute, the instructor put the parachute on the boy and pushed him out. That is a real shortage.

In Saudi Arabia I met a minor royal (there are literally thousands of them) He boasted and did have seven cars, one for every day of the week. Then he crashed his Lambo. He couldnt wait to repair the Lambo because his friends were ripping the pi$$ so he bought another one, which meant his friends joking about him saving a car for the leap year. That is a shortage completely in someone's head.

I posted "The USA wasnt short of fighters, it was short of fighters that could do the job it wanted to." This was true from the summer of 1942 to the end of the war in my opinion. 

By late 1944
P-47 The first use of P-47s for air sea rescue was with 5th Air sea rescue squadron on 1 May 1944. circa 200 were given to the Russians and 830 given to the RAF mainly for use in the far east not against an aerial threat but because it was better at ground attack than a Hurricane. P-47s were used on "diver patrol" missions" to shoot down V1 flying bombs.

P-51 Apart from those issued to USA air force squadrons many P-51 BCDK were given to the RAF, but that was on a lease lend basis that they could be called upon to support daylight bomber activity. There were 855 P-51/C and 876 P-51 DK types. There were around 200 F6 versions of the P-51 used for photo recon in many theatres away from the bombing effort from the UK. A Mustang Mk IV (P-51) was used for target marking by 617 squadron against V weapon launch sites. At least 1 P-51 had the rear tank taken out and a seat put in to allow generals and journalists a better view of what was happening after France was liberated.

Now, with reference to Goerings position in late 1944. Mosquitos were being used to check on the weather. P-51s, P-38s, Spitfires and Mosquitos were being used to take pictures. P-47s were being given away and used for AS rescue. P-39s and P-40s were being used in USA as advanced trainers. The allies were capable of launching raids of 1000 four engined bombers by day or night supported by hundreds of escorts. How does the 9th Airforce shortage compare to his. LW missions were becoming so rare that when they launched Bodenplatte on 1st Jan 1945 German ground troops just assumed an aircraft flying was the enemy and shot them down, a situation that had existed since just after D-Day.

To summarise any shortage that the 9th Airforce or any other allied airforce thought they had in late 1944 was obviously inside their own head.

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## GregP (Oct 27, 2021)

With reference to post #370, they didn't hold onto paper tanks. They were not going to last through the mission or, if they did, they were not reusable. The gasoline slowly ate through the sealer they coated the paper with and they were basically slowly leaking by about half to three quarters of the mission duration. At least, that's what some of the pilots who gave presentations every month at the Planes of Fame Museum said.

I wasn't there, but I seriously doubt they were saving paper tanks.

Steel drop tanks, sure, if possible.

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## GregP (Oct 27, 2021)

Reference post # 326, FlyboyJ. Some years back the Planes of Fame had a Hurricane, a Spitfire IX, and a Grumman F4F (painted in British colors), both on loan from a private party in Texas. The party had a Spitfire III commissioned and it got the final tuning and test flights at Fighter Rebuilders in Chino. Some time later, they sent a 4-ship formation from Chino to Texas. Everyone was worried about the very-young Spitfire III, but it flew flawlessly. The Martet lost the prop (a Curtiss Electric) and it stayed in cruise pitch for the rest of the flight until they touched down in Tucson where it was repaired (new brushes). Not really an emergency as it turned out. 

So, there is some evidence that the Curtiss Electric prop stays where it is if power is lost.

Cheers.

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## wuzak (Oct 28, 2021)

GregP said:


> The party had a Spitfire III commissioned and it got the final tuning and test flights at Fighter Rebuilders in Chino.



Spitfire III?

Any information on that build?


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## GregP (Oct 28, 2021)

Went to a private party in Texas. PM sent.


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## wuzak (Oct 28, 2021)

GregP said:


> Went to a private party in Texas. PM sent.



I mean what sort of specs does it have? Such as engine type.


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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 28, 2021)

drgondog said:


> How does converting the 354FG from end of November to beginning of Feb 1945 to P-47D illustrate that point? (SNIP). As to not having enough time to train with ground forces and learning the army support doctrine coming from the MTO? Lessons from Desert Air Force were integrated in training in US in early 1943 for all the FG's (including 354/357 and 363FG equipped with first P-39 then P-51B). If somebody like Brereton or Quesada stated such, then it should be considered.


For the 9th AF see below. For the doctrine used, start with FM 31–35 of 1942, Kutner in May 1943 noted its need for update. Then came FM 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power, issued July 21, 1943, AAF headquarters' interpretation of experiences in North Africa. So not early 1943. But the US Army did not really accept the new manual and FM 31–35 would be the one later revised to incorporate wartime experiences. Then comes the reports of the USAAF staff in Britain not being interested in close air support.

The late 1942 and early 1943 ideas had been updated/superceded, for a start to early 1943 had seen little USAAF experience in such operations. It was not just the USAAF, the RAF in Britain was also behind in doctrine, not surprising. And yes, given the arrival times of the army units, the air units and the doctrines they had been trained with, the bomber escort requirements and the available training facilities there was not enough training time.


drgondog said:


> The 479th made major strides in P-38 air to air ratios under Zemke, when most of the 32 air to air victories occurred - a stark contrast in ratios to 20th, 55th, and 364th FG comparable success. When you dwell in data without context, subtle information can be overlooked.


June to August 1944, 479th FG, 434 sqn 18 kills, 435 sqn 2 kills, 436 sqn 4 kills. Given this data is taken as proof of major strides for a group it would say for a squadron. Or drill down further and discover Robin Olds claimed 5 kills out of the 24, so probably adding evidence of the gap between the exceptional combat pilot and the others. It actually says nothing about the P-38 given the variables involved, more about fitting data to a conclusion.


drgondog said:


> I'm not sure that you understand that in 'reality', at the point of attack, the LW could put up a fighter intercept on either weakly defended escorted bombers with fewer fighters in that volume - or attack a single box of bombers with only a squadron in immediate vicinity. So, typically (vs Rarely) all types (P-38, P-47 and P-51) could be outnumbered.


At the point of attack. So the size of the formation is reduced from group down to squadron or flight or section, a time is marked, a immediate distance decided and yes the formation is outnumbered. Meantime the other side can chose a different time and/or distance and declare they were the ones outnumbered in the immediate vicinity. In fact anyone can confidently use the method to show almost air combat saw both sides outnumbered.


drgondog said:


> General Lawrence Kuter alerted Arnold on October 29th, 1943 that intelligence reports indicated that Pointblank goal achievement was impossible prior to D-Day without major shift in priority. The result was issuance of priority focus on LW industry and Day Fighter Force resulting in Doolittle 'destroy in air and ground' orders and planning for Big Week. The destruction of day LW threat to D-Day beach heads was considered 'essential'. Continuing 'day bombing' was considered essential to draw the LW into a war of attrition.
> 
> Spaatz via Arnold, prevailed on Portal the necessity of 'all hands on deck' to highest 8th/15th AF (USSTAF) priority - namely destruction on LW prior to D-Day. The pissing contest with Leigh-Mallory was 'won' by Spaatz and 8th AF collected IX FC TDY until invasion, beginning December 1, 1943 when 354th started combat ops, followed by trade of 357FG Mustangs for 358FG P-47s as well as diverting the inbound 363rd P-51B FG. Later disagreements did not always go Spaatz's way during Oil Campaign when Eisenhower ordered 8th AF toward more D-Day support objectives,


It is always good to look at what an all out effort actually came down to, firstly the main anti rail and anti Luftwaffe targets, a/f airfields, bomb tonnages.

8th Air Force, bomb tonnages \\ 15th Air Force (ignoring m/y and A/f) 
Month \ Total \ air ind. \ m/y \ a/f \\ total \ air ind.
Oct-43 \ 4708.5 \ 703.7 \ 437.3 \ 90.3 \\ \ 
Nov-43 \ 6416.8 \ 209.5 \ 901.4 \ 11 \\ 2629.2 \ 329
Dec-43 \ 11734.5 \ 0 \ 952.2 \ 873.4 \\ 4210.2 \ 100
Jan-44 \ 11679.2 \ 2150.6 \ 1865.6 \ 463.5 \\ 9716.9 \ 591
Feb-44 \ 18339.4 \ 3924.6 \ 1811.9 \ 2734.2 \\ 6321.1 \ 1407.4
Mar-44 \ 21046.6 \ 3533.1 \ 995.6 \ 5439.4 \\ 9833.6 \ 242
Apr-44 \ 24931.3 \ 6226.1 \ 2278.9 \ 7001.6 \\ 19404.1 \ 4256.9
May-44 \ 36006.6 \ 3278.6 \ 10019.1 \ 6722.8 \\ 27918.6 \ 2425.6

8th AF number 1 target for month, October 1943 Industrial Areas 1,695 tons, November Port Areas 3,336.8 tons, December Port Areas 3,344.5 tons
January 1944 V-1 sites 2,516.2 tons, February, March and April 1944 airfields, May 1944 Marshalling Yards. Not quite the all out attack on the Luftwaffe.

9th AF fighters, 
14,105 airborne, 13,168 credit, 12,590 effective heavy bomber escort sorties for the war
15,745 airborne, 14,751 credit, 14,460 effective sorties by end April 1944.
Given the number of escort sorties done May 1944 and later by the 9th AF the 8th AF did not have the 9th AF fighters to D-day.


drgondog said:


> "On 2 May the 15th was cleared to go after Ploesti, versus the April raids where the target was officially the Ploesti marshalling yards which were surrounded by the refineries, but attacked with terrible accuracy, many missing the yards and ending up on the oil refineries."
> 
> "Cleared" only has context when a) that considering Ploesti Refinery was attacked by Halverson on the way to India and on August 1 1943 Tidal Wave attack. The reason to delay renewing Ploesti Oil targets and drive at M/Y was to assist Red Army. The 8th and 15th only began concentrated attacks on Refining and Chemical industry in May by plan. The May 5, 6, 18th Ploesti strikes were M/, as well as April 5th, 15th, 24th.
> 
> Point? So what?


So once again I do not put all the history, in this case the pre May 1944 USAAF attacks on Ploesti, so they are listed as relevant context, not "phone book". On 2 May 1944 the 15th attacked targets in Italy, on 5 May the targets were (O/R Oil refinery), aiming method, number of attacking bombers.

Ploesti \ M/Y \ Vis \ 33
Ploesti \ M/Y \ Vis \ 213
Podgorica \ T/T \ Vis \ 117
Ploesti/Telaejen \ O/PumpSt \ Vis \ 63
Ploesti \ M/Y \ H2X \ 74
Turnu Severin \ I/A \ Vis \ 39
Ploesti/Telaejen \ O/PumpSt \ H2X \ 36
Ploesti/Lumina \ O/R \ Vis \ 36
Ploesti/Astra Romano \ O/R \ Vis \ 33
Ploesti/Concordia Vega \ O/R \ Vis \ 30

Now for context, the USAAF General Spaatz wanted to bomb oil targets but was prevented until May 1944, one way he found to get around the prohibition in April 1944 was to attack a marshalling yard that just happened to be near surrounded by oil refineries with deliberately dispersed bomb patterns. I presume having given a name now further context along the lines of General Spaatz was born on.... is required, except it is phone book when written by others.

Plus there were no 6 May 1944 strikes on Ploesti by the heavy bombers, while on the 18th the targets were Ploesti/Romano Americano, Ploesti/Redeventa, Ploesti/Concordia Vega, Ploesti/Dacia Romano, refineries.


drgondog said:


> According to Bodie, the D-5-RE incorporated the wing structural improvements, and fixed external tank system for 165 gallon tanks to ferry to UK were jury rigged for several airframes. Curious regarding wing structural beef up for earlier blocks as they should be necessary for 500 # bomb or 108 gal combat tanks. Simply stated, the factory may have approved the pylon weight for earlier models given sufficient margins for max stress conditions on critical load paths.
> 
> Freeman states wing pylons for -15 but Depot mods were made to -5 and subsequent (IIRC Burtonwood) to introduce the Pylon and plumbing. External combat tanks were slaved from instrument vacuum system. I have not found records of wing rack/pylon mods for P-47C through D-2.



I have no data on whether the P-47D-5 had wing structural improvements that enabled later modification or whether the modifications were made using things like spare wings, I also have no evidence any US single seat fighter flew the ferry fight route to Britain. Ironically a US modified Spitfire did, part of an effort to convince the RAF to build such a version, the RAF found reasons why it could not be done.



pbehn said:


> You cannot state that the 9th Airforce was continually short of fighters without some risk of terminological inexcatitude. The 9th airforce wasnt a nation state and it had aircraft assigned to it. What you describe and Drgondog expanded upon is a force maximising the capabilities of what they had in an embarrassment of riches.


I work from the concept of authorised strength and in WWII US Aircraft terms start with the allocation between countries, after which the air forces then allocated aircraft, all of this according to projected production and requirements, which of course meant the plans always under or over shot. The allocations to the USSR were effectively fixed once made. The supply chain from the US meant it would take a long time to correct any major imbalances and often meant an over shoot of too much becoming too little or the other way around.

We now know what happened, we know Hitler's ideas saw Me262 allocated to bomber units ahead of fighter ones, making the Me262 very much a near end war fighter in terms of numbers deployed, not something like JG7 would be around in late 1944 and therefore have to calculate what sort of fighter force would be needed to continue to attack Germany with acceptable losses against numbers of an aircraft that had a higher performance and much more fuel available than the regular Luftwaffe fighters.

Having been given their allocations the commanders then planned operations that required those resources, they were entitled to expect that level of support.

Allied air sea rescue in Europe went into contested airspace, hence the need for fighters, and I assume there is no chance their P-47 were considered second line at the time? Given this discussion is nominally about the P-38 it is probably more useful to point out the 120 F-4 and 380 F-5 as they were delivered in 1942/43, the 299 F-6 began production in November 1944 and if you take February 1945 as the cut off date for available for Europe, 126 had been accepted. Which means before that there were a number of P-51 converted to reconnaissance versions, or at least used in reconnaissance units. The 9th AF reported it received 81 F-6 from new units, 54 from conversions, 84 as replacements and 75 from other sources. It ran what it calls F-6 sorties from December 1943, and P-51 reconnaissance from August 1944. These units needed their high performance machines given where they were operating. Inglewood built 1,988 P-51B and 6,502 D, Dallas 1,750 C, 1,454 D and 1,337 K. The P-47 allocation to the RAF meant the Hurricane production line could be shut down.

USAAF P-47 are credited with 15 V-1 including 1 by a search and rescue squadron, as far as I am aware these were opportunistic, the USAAF did not fly any P-47 diver patrols, similar for the 14 P-51 claims, the P-61 units shot down 10 V-1, they did fly patrols.

Innovations by the air force meant they could fly more often in bad weather. As far as the 9th AF was concerned it had to help a US Army short of artillery ammunition and tanks for much of the campaign in France. Ever read the US supply histories? The habit of simply discarding empty jerricans had a lot to do with where the US Army stopped in 1944. The army problems increased the calls for air power.

The first definition of shortage is not at authorised strength, the second is not having the strength to do what you actually need to do and then what you want to do, with of course need and want being subjective. I do not know whether there is evidence in US Army histories along the lines of "no air support, attack was therefore more costly" along with lack of aircraft as the reason, then there is the what if of applying more air power.

I do know the 9th air force was authorised to have 25% more pilots than aircraft in the units and that from June 1944 to April 1945 the aircraft on hand figure was less than the authorised one and from July 1944 to February 1945 the air force had 80 to 90% of its authorised fighter strength. So yes the 9th Air Force had a shortage or would a pilot over supply be a more prefered description? The following is monthly averages

Month / Authorised / On hand / In units / operational / pilots available (for operations)
Dec-43 / 38 / 66 / 66 / 62 / 104
Jan-44 / 96  / 144 / 92 / 62 / 86
Feb-44 / 307 / 463 / 261 / 184 / 251
Mar-44 / 595 / 760 / 528 / 371 / 398
Apr-44 / 854 / 1428 / 681 / 546 / 562
May-44 / 1536 / 1686 / 1349 / 995 / 1213
Jun-44 / 1642 / 1591 / 1385 / 1129 / 1595
Jul-44 / 1728 / 1462 / 1218 / 906 / 1643
Aug-44 / 1718 / 1524 / 1189 / 953 / 1585
Sep-44 / 1668 / 1502 / 1190 / 968 / 1681
Oct-44 / 1735 / 1515 / 1199 / 965 / 1729
Nov-44 / 1473 / 1351 / 996 / 830 / 1594
Dec-44 / 1436 / 1315 / 938 / 782 / 1499
Jan-45 / 1436 / 1129 / 821 / 685 / 1405
Feb-45 / 1484 / 1207 / 922 / 785 / 1391
Mar-45 / 1536 / 1420 / 1086 / 969 / 1488
Apr-45 / 1536 / 1505 / 1137 / 1027 / 1575
May-45 / 1341 / 1694 / 1306 / 1150 / 1832

The withdrawal of the Luftwaffe from near the front line was a big help to the 9th AF, it could cut down on things like bomber escort sorties, crowd airfields and so on, at the same time the Army really wanted more help.

For the record the British imported the first 2 P-47 in January 1944, then another 2 in April with imports continuing until the end of the war. Interestingly ofthe 825 recorded as arriving 353 were May to August 1944 out of 604 for the year, another 89 in January 1945. So an initial allocation then more attrition replacement.

Over in P-51 land the first RAF Merlin Mustangs arrived in September 1943, the 272 that arrived by the end of 1943 showing how big the RAF allocation had been, another 113 arrived in January and February. The US of course was taking losses but it had 266 P-51 in Britain end 1943 and 699 end February 1944. The numbers reflecting how much more the RAF wanted the P-51 versus the USAAF in the first half of 1943. The RAF allocations were cut.


pbehn said:


> To summarise any shortage that the 9th Airforce or any other allied airforce thought they had in late 1944 was obviously inside their own head.


I assume this conclusion has the full support of 12th Army Group command?


GregP said:


> With reference to post #370, they didn't hold onto paper tanks. They were not going to last through the mission or, if they did, they were not reusable. The gasoline slowly ate through the sealer they coated the paper with and they were basically slowly leaking by about half to three quarters of the mission duration. At least, that's what some of the pilots who gave presentations every month at the Planes of Fame Museum said. I wasn't there, but I seriously doubt they were saving paper tanks. Steel drop tanks, sure, if possible.


Is the above meant to be a version of "I agree" or even once the paper tanks were filled they had a short life, whether taken into the air or not?

Since you have joined the discussion your definition of primary source material is?


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 28, 2021)

GregP said:


> Reference post # 326, FlyboyJ. Some years back the Planes of Fame had a Hurricane, a Spitfire IX, and a Grumman F4F (painted in British colors), both on loan from a private party in Texas. The party had a Spitfire III commissioned and it got the final tuning and test flights at Fighter Rebuilders in Chino. Some time later, they sent a 4-ship formation from Chino to Texas. Everyone was worried about the very-young Spitfire III, but it flew flawlessly. The Martet lost the prop (a Curtiss Electric) and it stayed in cruise pitch for the rest of the flight until they touched down in Tucson where it was repaired (new brushes). Not really an emergency as it turned out.
> 
> So, there is some evidence that the Curtiss Electric prop stays where it is if power is lost.
> 
> Cheers.


Yes - been established - for some reason my feeble memory had me believing it went into low pitch


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## Peter Gunn (Oct 28, 2021)

Wow.

LOTS of data here, hats off to 
G
 Geoffrey Sinclair
for all the work and 

 drgondog
as well. I only have one question because I can't seem to discern from reading this thread. Are you 
G
 Geoffrey Sinclair
saying the P-38 was outnumbered more often or are you disputing it? I have no agenda and it's just my reading comprehension is low today, so not trying to argue just wanted some clarification. Also, welcome to the forum. 

As for 

 drgondog
you still owe me a book pal.

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## drgondog (Oct 28, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> For the 9th AF see below. For the doctrine used, start with FM 31–35 of 1942, Kutner in May 1943 noted its need for update. Then came FM 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power, issued July 21, 1943, AAF headquarters' interpretation of experiences in North Africa. So not early 1943. But the US Army did not really accept the new manual and FM 31–35 would be the one later revised to incorporate wartime experiences. Then comes the reports of the USAAF staff in Britain not being interested in close air support.


Too much - Prior to General Lawrence KUTER Asst CO Air Staff Plans authoring FM100-20, which was Signed by Gen Marshall on July 28, 1943, Kuter was Advisor toe CG VIII BC (Eaker) in 1942, then CO (Acting) Allied Air Support Command January, 1943. Air Vice Marshall Coningham CO Northwest African Tactical Air Forces authored a report regarding deployment of tactical air, including interdiction, CAS and TAC-R which was issued December 1942. Kuter approved/recommended Coningham Report to AAF-HQ - although his FM 100-20 primary focus was that "Air Superiority was Essential for the success of any major land operation", and "Control Must Be Exercised Through Control by Air Force Commander" - Directly contradicting FM 31-35 "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces" issued 4-42. From Spaatz and The Air War in Europe, page 215, "In practice FM 100-20 did no significantly change the method of air-ground support established by the US Army in Tunisia, because thanks to Spaatz, Tedder, Coningham and Eisenhower, they were already being used." 

In summary, Brereton as CO of 9th AF in North Africa was already a veteran and disciple of 31-5 and 100-20 in ETO and any slight changes would have been instituted in July (latest) vi Air Training Command for the future P-38, P-47 and P-51 FG headed for England

Doctrine following Coningham's report began changing in Jan 1943 1943 excluding communication protocols already in place for (American )North African Tactical Airforce for both observation and P-39/P-40/Hurricane ops experience. Not everyone awaits from 'words on High" in the form of a Field Manual. 

Repeat- Kuter's FM-100 was pointing to air superiority - not Close Air Support - doctrine. 
Kuter was influential in the back-channel actions to see that the first deployment of P-51B was to ETO, then was the 'horse whisper' in Arnold's ear, when Eaker and Asst Sec War Lovett's letter to 'prioritize Long Range Escort' delivery to ETO' in June 1943. Eaker specifically requested delivery of P-38 and P-51B, but was asleep at the wheel when General Saville allocate ALL Mustangs (A36, P-51, P-51A, P-51B) to TAC globally. Arnold was first to step in and request that the Mustang III delivered and scheduled to be delivered be turned back over to US in England, Spaatz channeled direct control to 8th AF until end of May 

Note - to state that USAAF staff in 8th AF (vs USAAF staff in Britain) not being interested in CAS is correct. Their job was to destroy the Luftwaffe prior to the Invasion. 



Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> The withdrawal of the Luftwaffe from near the front line was a big help to the 9th AF, it could cut down on things like bomber escort sorties, crowd airfields and so on, at the same time the Army really wanted more help.
> For the record the British imported the first 2 P-47 in January 1944, then another 2 in April with imports continuing until the end of the war. Interestingly ofthe 825 recorded as arriving 353 were May to August 1944 out of 604 for the year, another 89 in January 1945. So an initial allocation then more attrition replacement.


Luftflotte 3 did NOT move from 'near front lines' depending on your definition of 'near'. They did not remove themselves until after Bodenplatte, approximately 8 months after 9th AF/IX FC ceased operations under 8th AF.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Over in P-51 land the first RAF Merlin Mustangs arrived in September 1943, the 272 that arrived by the end of 1943 showing how big the RAF allocation had been, another 113 arrived in January and February. The US of course was taking losses but it had 266 P-51 in Britain end 1943 and 699 end February 1944. The numbers reflecting how much more the RAF wanted the P-51 versus the USAAF in the first half of 1943. The RAF allocations were cut.


Your point is? I haven't looked at P-51C yet but approximately 1400 P-51B-1 and B-5 and C-1 were delivered by NAA in 1943. Until December 1943 ALL had been dedicated to AAF TAC, TAC-R and Training Command plus RAF. Arnold stepped and ordered that te P-51B/C be primarily directed to 8th AF and to cease conversion to F-6 until spring 1944. 


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> I assume this conclusion has the full support of 12th Army Group command?
> 
> Is the above meant to be a version of "I agree" or even once the paper tanks were filled they had a short life, whether taken into the air or not?
> 
> Since you have joined the discussion your definition of primary source material is?


8th and 9th AF directed 'retain steel tanks if possible; in 1943 and drop empty impregnated 108gal if still full of fuel (rare - but frequent for Early Returns.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 28, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> I also have no evidence any US single seat fighter flew the ferry fight route to Britain.


Lefty Gardner's P-38 "Glacier Girl" was one such aircraft recovered from the "North Atlantic Ferry Route" (Greenland).

The route initially began in New Hampshire at Grenier AAB, then shortly after in Maine at Presque Isle AFB and Dow Field.

Then on to Newfoundland at Stephenville AB and RCAF Station Gander.

Next was RCAF Station Goose Bay in Labrador.

The next leg was over Greenland with Bluie West 1, Bluie West 8 and Bluie East 2.

After Greenland, was Meeks Field, Patterson Field and RAF Reykjavik in Iceland.

The next stop was RAF Vagar on the Faroe Islands.

Then on to Prestwick Airport in Scotland.

Next was RAF Nutts Corner in North Ireland and RAF Valley in Wales.

Lastly, came RAF St. Mawgan in England.

Plenty of evidence of single engine and multi-engined types making the journey, including the flight of P-38s and their guide B-17 that were forced down in Greenland, with one P-38 eventually being recovered and restored.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 28, 2021)

P-47s did it, too, each with two 165 gal tanks under the wings. F. Dean notes such occurrence in August of 1943. Extra tanks have had also additional shackles, too, that connected the tanks with wing, so whole contraption was rather firm.

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## Dash119 (Oct 28, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Lefty Gardner's P-38 "Glacier Girl" was one such aircraft recovered from the "North Atlantic Ferry Route" (Greenland).
> 
> The route initially began in New Hampshire at Grenier AAB, then shortly after in Maine at Presque Isle AFB and Dow Field.
> 
> ...


Glacier Girl was not Lefty Gardner's P-38, it was the one you mentioned at the end of your post as being recovered in Greenland. Lefty Gardner's P-38 is now the highly polished Red Bull P-38.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 28, 2021)

Dash119 said:


> Glacier Girl was not Lefty Gardner's P-38, it was the one you mentioned at the end of your post as being recovered in Greenland. Lefty Gardner's P-38 is now the highly polished Red Bull P-38.


Yeah, you're right...been a long day (so far), not sure why Lefty's name popped into my head instead of Rodney's.


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## drgondog (Oct 28, 2021)

tomo pauk said:


> P-47s did it, too, each with two 165 gal tanks under the wings. F. Dean notes such occurrence in August of 1943. Extra tanks have had also additional shackles, too, that connected the tanks with wing, so whole contraption was rather firm.


IIRC - those were the aforementioned P-47-5 or -6 with first wing mod and specially rigged 165gallon Ferry Tanks -


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## pbehn (Oct 28, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Allied air sea rescue in Europe went into contested airspace, hence the need for fighters, and I assume there is no chance their P-47 were considered second line at the time? Given this discussion is nominally about the P-38 it is probably more useful to point out the 120 F-4 and 380 F-5 as they were delivered in 1942/43, the 299 F-6 began production in November 1944 and if you take February 1945 as the cut off date for available for Europe, 126 had been accepted. Which means before that there were a number of P-51 converted to reconnaissance versions, or at least used in reconnaissance units. The 9th AF reported it received 81 F-6 from new units, 54 from conversions, 84 as replacements and 75 from other sources. It ran what it calls F-6 sorties from December 1943, and P-51 reconnaissance from August 1944. These units needed their high performance machines given where they were operating. Inglewood built 1,988 P-51B and 6,502 D, Dallas 1,750 C, 1,454 D and 1,337 K. The P-47 allocation to the RAF meant the Hurricane production line could be shut down.
> 
> USAAF P-47 are credited with 15 V-1 including 1 by a search and rescue squadron, as far as I am aware these were opportunistic, the USAAF did not fly any P-47 diver patrols, similar for the 14 P-51 claims, the P-61 units shot down 10 V-1, they did fly patrols.




Well Wikipedia states that P-47s were used they had armour and guns removed and engines boosted, perhaps not as part of Operation Diver because that was an RAF operation. Still if the P-47 wasnt part of any planned interception, imagine how many P-47s you need to have floating over the English Channel to come across enough V1s to shoot 15 of them down Goering would be livid. You have missed my point completely. For the F6 issue this site North American F-6 Mustang states 
The F-6A was the first version of the Mustang to see active service with the USAAF, flying its first missions from Tunisia with the 154th Observation Squadron in April 1943. The RAF also used a number of their Mustangs at photographic reconnaissance aircraft. 

Imagine what Herman would think of that? Of course it can be argued that the need for a long range escort had not been accepted in April 1943 but Herman never had the option of dedicating such a plane to such a unit from the start of the war

The first use of the Spitfire in actual operations was in PR. The first use of the P-38 was in PR. The first and main use by the British of the Mustang Mk I was tactical recon which is PR and ground attack. The first use of the Mosquito was in PR. The use of the highest performing planes to take pictures was a luxury Goering never had, it points to the disparity in strength. To do it, not only do you need the high performance aircraft not needed to do something else you also need thousands of people to look after the cameras, the the film and pictures and do the interpretation and then the reports.

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## Greg Boeser (Oct 28, 2021)

The Bf-109, Bf-110, Fw-190 all were all built with recon variants.


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## Snowygrouch (Oct 28, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Well Wikipedia states that P-47s were used they had armour and guns removed and engines boosted, perhaps not as part of Operation Diver because that was an RAF operation. Still if the P-47 wasnt part of any planned interception, imagine how many P-47s you need to have floating over the English Channel to come across enough V1s to shoot 15 of them down Goering would be livid. You have missed my point completely. For the F6 issue this site North American F-6 Mustang states
> The F-6A was the first version of the Mustang to see active service with the USAAF, flying its first missions from Tunisia with the 154th Observation Squadron in April 1943. The RAF also used a number of their Mustangs at photographic reconnaissance aircraft.
> 
> Imagine what Herman would think of that? Of course it can be argued that the need for a long range escort had not been accepted in April 1943 but Herman never had the option of dedicating such a plane to such a unit from the start of the war
> ...



The RAF had a peak of 1700 at their main photograph interpretation site in WW2, a very large number of whom
were US personell.



RAF Medmenham - Regiment History, War & Military Records & Archives



The Luftwaffe actually did a pretty good job of PR work, and many of the vast number of pictures they took are available today:






Search | NCAP - National Collection of Aerial Photography







ncap.org.uk

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## GrauGeist (Oct 28, 2021)

The Germans were also known to use certain types of preproduction aircraft for recon, like the Ar240 and Do335.

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## pbehn (Oct 28, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> The first definition of shortage is not at authorised strength, the second is not having the strength to do what you actually need to do and then what you want to do, with of course need and want being subjective. I do not know whether there is evidence in US Army histories along the lines of "no air support, attack was therefore more costly" along with lack of aircraft as the reason, then there is the what if of applying more air power.
> 
> I do know the 9th air force was authorised to have 25% more pilots than aircraft in the units and that from June 1944 to April 1945 the aircraft on hand figure was less than the authorised one and from July 1944 to February 1945 the air force had 80 to 90% of its authorised fighter strength. So yes the 9th Air Force had a shortage or would a pilot over supply be a more prefered description?


Your method of calculation for strength shows a permanent built in shortage, and since this method of calculation results in the force under discussion being short of aircraft after the surrender in May 1945 if ever I meet 12th Army group command in another life I will buy a round of drinks and congratulate them on their sense of humour.


Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Month / Authorised / On hand / In units / operational / pilots available (for operations)
> Dec-44 / 1436 / 1315 / 938 / 782 / 1499
> Jan-45 / 1436 / 1129 / 821 / 685 / 1405


 These monthly averages show clearly that by the end of 1944 the 9th Airforce completely outnumbered the whole of the Luftwaffe, not only numerically by a huge margin but also in quality by an equally huge margin while still supposedly claiming to be short. In the LW pilots didnt generally get rested or moved upstairs or sent to clobber colleges or training schools after a certain number of missions or hours. Bodenplatte was a failure for many reasons, one of many reasons was because most pilots were very low hours and poorly trained however some were very high hours and very well trained aces. The low hours pilots would not get on your list of 1405-1499 pilots in the 9th Airforce, the Geswadercommodore and 5 group commanders plus 14 squadron leaders who were lost on Bodenplatte would have been accepted into the 9th but some of them would have been running it.



Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Over in P-51 land the first RAF Merlin Mustangs arrived in September 1943, the 272 that arrived by the end of 1943 showing how big the RAF allocation had been, another 113 arrived in January and February. The US of course was taking losses but it had 266 P-51 in Britain end 1943 and 699 end February 1944. The numbers reflecting how much more the RAF wanted the P-51 versus the USAAF in the first half of 1943. The RAF allocations were cut.
> 
> I assume this conclusion has the full support of 12th Army Group command?


With all the discussion of who wanted to do what, with what and to whom, please bear in mind that the USAF was limited in 1943 because the airfields it wanted to use were still under construction. Also the people to support this effort were still being trained and transported across the Atlantic.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 28, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Germans were also known to use certain types of preproduction aircraft for recon, like the Ar240 and Do335.



Yup, the Germans were a lot more organised and devoted much more to photo recon than any other major air force at the outbreak of WW2. The Germans via the Luftwaffe and the Intelligence service had a wide range of recon aircraft. The prototypes were largely used by an independent OKW that answered to Canaris in the Intelligence section and was headed by a fella called Rohweil, who corralled whatever he could and managed to get his hands on a motley fleet of types throughout the war, including those prototypes.

The Brits make much of Sidney Cotton the Australian's role in photographing German airfields and military sites with his Lockheed? Well, this guy Rohweil talked Lufthansa into doing the same and their He 111s, Do 17s and even Junkers W 33s had hidden cameras behind sliding hatches through which a large number of images were taken of French and other European military establishments, as well as British ones. Rohweil also had access to Do 17 and Ju 86 recon birds and so forth as well, in the Ju 86 powered by the Jumo 207s he had a very high altitude platform.



pbehn said:


> The first use of the Spitfire in actual operations was in PR.



Over on the continent, yes, but not with the RAF at home, the Spitfire first entered service and was first used as an interceptor. Its first action in WW2 was shooting down a Hurricane days after war was declared.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 29, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Too much - Prior to General Lawrence KUTER Asst CO Air Staff Plans authoring FM100-20, which was Signed by Gen Marshall on July 28, 1943, Kuter was Advisor toe CG VIII BC (Eaker) in 1942, then CO (Acting) Allied Air Support Command January, 1943. (SNIP)
> 
> In summary, Brereton as CO of 9th AF in North Africa was already a veteran and disciple of 31-5 and 100-20 in ETO and any slight changes would have been instituted in July (latest) vi Air Training Command for the future P-38, P-47 and P-51 FG headed for England
> 
> Doctrine following Coningham's report began changing in Jan 1943 1943 excluding communication protocols already in place for (American )North African Tactical Airforce for both observation and P-39/P-40/Hurricane ops experience. Not everyone awaits from 'words on High" in the form of a Field Manual.


I am not talking about what the forces in Tunisia did, rather what doctrine the units in North America were being trained under. That required FM 100-20 but that document was undermined by the ground forces not really accepting it. The claim was early 1943 for doctrine changes, now at least it is mid 1943, then comes the reality of the system actually absorbing the new ideas and passing them onto personnel who had been training using the old doctrine, order, counter order sort of stuff for a while. The result, coupled with arrival times in Britain, the bomber escort missions, available training facilities and the result was undertrained units. The RAF had even better access to the doctrine, but also found plenty of the home based units were still undertrained. The usual gap between experience of doing something versus being told this is how you do it. Word from on high is required to change a system training large numbers of personnel.


drgondog said:


> Repeat- Kuter's FM-100 was pointing to air superiority - not Close Air Support - doctrine.


Actually the officers not interested in close air support were part of 9th AF. And please show where I said anything about the "point" of the new doctrine.


drgondog said:


> Luftflotte 3 did NOT move from 'near front lines' depending on your definition of 'near'. They did not remove themselves until after Bodenplatte, approximately 8 months after 9th AF/IX FC ceased operations under 8th AF.


I should have written things better, Luftflotte 3 was bombed away from the front lines, as 1944 went on there was a Luftwaffe withdrawal from operations near the front lines, the airfields were being hit too much, the losses too great, as a result allied air operations near the front line rarely saw Luftwaffe fighters post July/August 1944, hence why the 9th was able to reduce bomber escorts, which would have helped make up for the shortage of fighters.

I looked at the whole of war statistics and it seems 1 fighter escort was provided for every 5 twin engined bomber sorties the 9th AF flew, plus any RAF escorts. The USAAF Statistical digest notes 93 losses of Medium and Light bombers to enemy aircraft in the ETO in 1944, 35 in May/June and 42 in December, the latter mostly relating to 23 December.


drgondog said:


> Your point is? I haven't looked at P-51C yet but approximately 1400 P-51B-1 and B-5 and C-1 were delivered by NAA in 1943. Until December 1943 ALL had been dedicated to AAF TAC, TAC-R and Training Command plus RAF. Arnold stepped and ordered that te P-51B/C be primarily directed to 8th AF and to cease conversion to F-6 until spring 1944.


I suggest reading more, instead of continually telling people you are not able to follow things. The idea was since P-47 and P-51 were being allocated to other forces the 9th AF could not therefore, by definition, be short of aircraft. After the RAF P-47 import figures I was showing how initially the RAF imports of P-51 was matching the USAAF, reflecting on where the Mustangs were going, the fact the USAAF had allocated its P-51 to the 9th AF was a separate and well known issue, as was the abrupt changes in allocations.

1943 acceptances, 310 P-51, 1,233 P-51B, 177 P-51C and 358 A-36A, I could give the breakdown by version and month but that is probably considered phone book.

Now a correction I meant to say single engined, not single seater fighter ferried by air fro the US to overseas commands.


tomo pauk said:


> P-47s did it, too, each with two 165 gal tanks under the wings. F. Dean notes such occurrence in August of 1943.


Thanks for the pointer to the entry in Dean. Looks like the one flight is given two entries, August, then August 25.

US ARMY SERVICE FORCES statistics, Appendix G USAAF aircraft shipped overseas says 29,146 fighters sent overseas by ship and 1,258 by air, yearly breakdown of by air being 433 in 1942, 396 in 1943, 61 in 1944 and 368 January to August 1945, given the number of P-38 known to be sent by air the single engine types went by sea except for some experiments or possible late war P-51 flights in the Pacific, and it is clear plenty of P-38 went by sea.


pbehn said:


> Well Wikipedia states that P-47s were used they had armour and guns removed and engines boosted, perhaps not as part of Operation Diver because that was an RAF operation. Still if the P-47 wasnt part of any planned interception, imagine how many P-47s you need to have floating over the English Channel to come across enough V1s to shoot 15 of them down Goering would be livid.


Try Diver Diver Diver by Brian Cull, complete lists of air claims against V-1, the day to day diary indicates USAAF pilots were largely seeing V-1 when on other operations, including hanging around the channel, plus in the early days a few deliberate patrols. So who authorised the aircraft modifications and sorties, on what days in what areas? Given it was quite clear early the USAAF would normally stay out of the operation.

The British Official History notes 12 June to 5 September 1944 9,017 V-1 launches, about 400 of these from aircraft, with 6,725 observed by the defences and 3,463 V-1 destroyed. So 86 days, average of over 100 launches per day. I do not have to imagine how many P-47 were floating over the channel, the answer is
P-47 in and outbound to France, or on training missions had their chances given the number of V-1.

As for the history of war production pages I tend to use them for spot the error games. Only the F-6D and K were produced, any other Mustang reconnaissance versions were converted.


pbehn said:


> You have missed my point completely. For the F6 issue this site North American F-6 Mustang states
> The F-6A was the first version of the Mustang to see active service with the USAAF, flying its first missions from Tunisia with the 154th Observation Squadron in April 1943. The RAF also used a number of their Mustangs at photographic reconnaissance aircraft.


The point came across as 9th AF cannot have shortages as other units were receiving aircraft, P-47 and P-51, the RAF Mustangs in PR work were the Allison engined ones in 1944 anyway.


pbehn said:


> Your method of calculation for strength shows a permanent built in shortage, and since this method of calculation results in the force under discussion being short of aircraft after the surrender in May 1945 if ever I meet 12th Army group command in another life I will buy a round of drinks and congratulate them on their sense of humour.


Look at the figures again, for 1945, January deficiency 307, February 277, March 116, April 31, May surplus 353. As 1945 wore on the USAAF was actually bringing the 9th AF up to authorised strength. By the way the figures were copied from the official 9th AF report, I did not calculate them.


pbehn said:


> These monthly averages show clearly that by the end of 1944 the 9th Airforce completely outnumbered the whole of the Luftwaffe


Alfred Price, Luftwaffe Operational Units aircraft strength, 31 May 1944 4,928 (719 transports), 10 January 1945 4,566 (269 transports), 9 April 1945 3,331 (10 transports)
9th AF Bomber, fighter and reconnaissance aircraft on hand, averages for month May 1944 2,613, June 1944 2,763, January 1945 2,429, April 1945 2,862, but you really need to compare the Luftwaffe strengths with the respective US "in tactical units" figures 2,327, 2,424, 1,760, 2,111

Certainly the US had much better trained aircrew on average. Now why exactly is there a need to compare a USAAF formation meant to do tactical work to total enemy aircraft strength? More relevant to the 9th AF is the increase from 13 US Army divisions in the field end June 1944 to 61 end March 1945, including a couple meant for the Pacific but diverted because of the Ardennes offensive, plus numerous non divisional units, all of whom would like air support, to be provided by the 9th plus some units transferred from the 12th AF, with the 6th Army Group being paired with the French/US 1st Tactical Air Force, 12th AG with 9th AF. Plus the US Army had artillery ammunition and tank shortages plus those extra units and the 9th AF was under authorised strength.


Peter Gunn said:


> Are you
> G
> Geoffrey Sinclair
> saying the P-38 was outnumbered more often or are you disputing it?


Start with the way in western Europe all the aircraft usually had working radios and could call for help while the fighters were cruising at 5 to 6 miles a minute. Assume the target formation is circling near the ground and all other aircraft are on intercept courses at a steady 6 miles per minute and have 60 seconds to intercept, that means any formations within a volume of 450 cubic miles could make it. Go to altitude and that increases.

So first question to what distance are the aircraft counted? At what point in the encounter? For how long? Do both sides have to shoot at each other or it is only if one side fires? One classic bounce firing pass and away against a larger formation counts as fighting outnumbered? If your formation encounters multiple enemy formations spaced out at over say half an hour whose total numbers are greater than yours have you fought outnumbered? Your formation encounters a larger enemy formation that takes no interest in you? Do any friendly non fighter aircraft present get counted? Hostile non fighter aircraft?

As you move around over the course of several minutes trying to engage or being engaged you can be the outnumbered or the one doing the outnumbering, until as so many have reported you suddenly find yourself alone in an apparently empty sky, with ultimate air supremacy of 1 to 0 or infinity to 1 odds.

The claim was the P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered, not occasionally, to do that you need to select times and distances accordingly. The P-38 certainly did not fight consistently heavily outnumbered unless such a selection is made.

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## Peter Gunn (Oct 29, 2021)

Apropos of nothing but an observation on my part, or rather opinion.

Not knocking the Thunderbolt but I'd rather cruise to and from targets with something that actually got reasonable fuel usage. I was never impressed with the "long range" P-47 just because they stuffed an imperial sh!t ton more fuel into it. What I personally like is the ability of a Mustang to go further on the same amount (or less) fuel and still have the performance, I forget the gph for a P-51 at cruise but 100gph for the Jug is a pretty hefty number, not to mention the 300gph at combat settings.

I guess in the end it really doesn't matter except to me, burning less fuel to accomplish the mission seems not only more logical to me but saves fuel for more or future missions.

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## pbehn (Oct 29, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Try Diver Diver Diver by Brian Cull, complete lists of air claims against V-1, the day to day diary indicates USAAF pilots were largely seeing V-1 when on other operations, including hanging around the channel, *plus in the early days a few deliberate patrols*. So who authorised the aircraft modifications and sorties, on what days in what areas? Given it was quite clear early the USAAF would normally stay out of the operation.
> 
> The British Official History notes 12 June to 5 September 1944 9,017 V-1 launches, about 400 of these from aircraft, with 6,725 observed by the defences and 3,463 V-1 destroyed. So 86 days, average of over 100 launches per day. I do not have to imagine how many P-47 were floating over the channel, the answer is
> P-47 in and outbound to France, or on training missions had their chances given the number of V-1.
> ...


I said that P-47s were involved in anti V1 diver operations and you have just confirmed it, thankyou. The USA had a strategic interest in countering the V1 in case it turned up somewhere else and to this end they had the luxury of developing the M version. I am well aware of the numbers but if you think training flights just happened in the corridors where V1s were being sent and squadrons just happened to see V1s and be at the correct altitude and speed to attack one, then I beg to differ. If you are flying towards France you are aborting your mission, if you are flying from France they are coming from behind. In any case it doesnt change the point I was making, that the USA even by May 1944 had a huge surplus of planes and pilots, if you really wanted to make Herman's day, just tell him that an Air Sea rescue plane took a few minutes off the day job to shoot down a V1.

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## pbehn (Oct 29, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Alfred Price, Luftwaffe Operational Units aircraft strength, 31 May 1944 4,928 (719 transports), 10 January 1945 4,566 (269 transports), 9 April 1945 3,331 (10 transports)
> 9th AF Bomber, fighter and reconnaissance aircraft on hand, averages for month May 1944 2,613, June 1944 2,763, January 1945 2,429, April 1945 2,862, but you really need to compare the Luftwaffe strengths with the respective US "in tactical units" figures 2,327, 2,424, 1,760, 2,111
> 
> Certainly the US had much better trained aircrew on average. Now why exactly is there a need to compare a USAAF formation meant to do tactical work to total enemy aircraft strength? More relevant to the 9th AF is the increase from 13 US Army divisions in the field end June 1944 to 61 end March 1945, including a couple meant for the Pacific but diverted because of the Ardennes offensive, plus numerous non divisional units, all of whom would like air support, to be provided by the 9th plus some units transferred from the 12th AF, with the 6th Army Group being paired with the French/US 1st Tactical Air Force, 12th AG with 9th AF. Plus the US Army had artillery ammunition and tank shortages plus those extra units and the 9th AF was under authorised strength.


The reason I was comparing the 9th airforce to the whole of the L/W was because the 9th Airforce both before and after Operation Bodenplatte outnumbered the LW in every way. Any discussion of shortages in the 9th Airforce in the period December 1944 to January 1945 is utterly absurd. Same with shortages of tanks and ammunition, US and allied forces had huge numbers of both, not having them exactly where you want isnt a shortage it is a logistics problem and logistics has won many battles and wars.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 30, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Still if the P-47 wasnt part of any planned interception, imagine how many P-47s you need to have floating over the English Channel to come across enough V1s to shoot 15 of them down Goering would be livid.
> 
> 
> pbehn said:
> ...


Actually you were trying to imply the USAAF had so many surplus P-47 they could sent lots on V-1 patrols, now comes the attempt to change the claim.


pbehn said:


> I am well aware of the numbers.


If that was correct the claims would not be made, including the one about the 9th AF being short of aircraft in May 1945.


pbehn said:


> if you think training flights just happened in the corridors where V1s were being sent and squadrons just happened to see V1s and be at the correct altitude and speed to attack one, then I beg to differ. If you are flying towards France you are aborting your mission, if you are flying from France they are coming from behind.


Alternatively I can read the Diver book and note where the pilot's own words are used to describe what they were doing. Apart from encounters that resulted in shoot downs it is clear there was bending of the rules for things like training if only to see what the V-1 looked like. Is the idea the US fighter units withdrawing from France did not keep a look out behind? As an aside 9th AF P-47 flew 475,052 hours on operations, 134,029 hours on training, November 1943 to May 1945.


pbehn said:


> In any case it doesnt change the point I was making, that the USA even by May 1944 had a huge surplus of planes and pilots,


So now it is time to change the claim, go from fighters to planes and pilots. So essentially as of end April 1944 the US could have shut down pilot training and aircraft production, the 105,794 aircraft the USAAF Statistical Digest says were built May 1944 to August 1945 inclusive were totally unnecessary? Were the 42,964 USAAF crews that graduated May 1944 to August 1944, out of 80,744 trained since 1942 (15,424 fighter crews out of 36,795)? USAAF Statistical Digest, table 52. Or does huge surplus not cover the remainder of the war requirements, including replacements for tour expired personnel? After all 7,176 out of 10,297 P-47 and 1,789 out of 2,360 P-51 pilots graduated in May 1944 or later. The 9th AF had 1,769 fighter pilots killed, missing or wounded.

The USAAF had 9,459 heavy bombers end April 1944 and 8,839 losses May 1944 to end August 1945. Medium bombers 4,399 on hand, 4,288 losses


pbehn said:


> The reason I was comparing the 9th airforce to the whole of the L/W was because the 9th Airforce both before and after Operation Bodenplatte outnumbered the LW in every way.


Except in the records of the 9th AF and Luftwaffe quartermaster of course and by anyone else who can count. To come to the conclusion either the size of the 9th is doubled or more, or the size of the Luftwaffe is halved or more. Then comes the idea a force dedicated to tactical support of a growing army field force should have its capacity measured by how well it outnumbers the enemy air force, not how well it can fill air support requirements. Still given the 9th AF is reported to be outnumbering the Luftwaffe by itself, and the 8th AF easily outnumbered the 9th AF, by around 2 to 1 at times post June 1944, then throw in the RAF, those P-38s must have been fighting a well outnumbered enemy, And even if there were indeed more Luftwaffe fighters near some P-38 over Germany just count all those P-38 in the US, France and Britain and there is no shortage of P-38 over Germany.

The RAF Air Historical Branch used the captured Luftwaffe Quartermaster records to create Translation VII/107 Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables August 1938 to April 1945. Available not only in most good archives (AIR 20/7706 in UK) but given the report's circulation no doubt in other repositories, I have not checked if a copy is available on the web. The tables start off weekly but move to 3 times per month. These records are clearly where Alfred Price was drawing some data from. However Price seems to be only using strength in operational units, the tables are all units except training ones, so below is date, Price, AHB VII/107

31 May 1944 4,928 (719 transports), 6,967 (934 transports)
10 January 1945 4,566 (269 transports), 6,936 (488 transports)
9 April 1945, 3,331 (10 transports), (13 April) 5,072 (no transport, twin engined fighter or fighter bomber figures reported)


pbehn said:


> Any discussion of shortages in the 9th Airforce in the period December 1944 to January 1945 is utterly absurd. Same with shortages of tanks and ammunition, US and allied forces had huge numbers of both, not having them exactly where you want isnt a shortage it is a logistics problem and logistics has won many battles and wars.


So now a new time period 2 months, why exactly was that time period chosen? 

Your appreciation is very Washington of you, in the disputes over supplies to the ETO Washington would at times include those in the US allocated to the ETO.

Interesting logic that if someone else has the item desired even a hemisphere away followed by a unilateral the declaration they obviously do not need it therefore there cannot be a shortage. Piled on top of this is we won therefore we had enough, ignoring the trade off between sending a machine or shell versus a person. Your boat might be leaking but you have no problem, plenty of pumps and plugs are available around the world.

Extracts from US Army supply histories.

On 15th of August 1944 there are no reserves of Shermans, tanks earmarked as replacements for units arriving later are issued.

End September 1944 First army was down to 85% of authorised tanks and so reorganised its tank units, 2nd and 3rd armoured gave up 32 Shermans, the other armoured divisions 18, tank battalions gave up 4 Shermans. Some 50 to 60% of the trucks in the Omaha beach port area are not working. Some of the provisional truck battalions raised to cope with the emergency are by now nicknamed Truck Destroyer Battalions.

By the end of November 1944 there are 3,344 tanks in theatre versus the authorised strength of 3,409 plus 937 in reserve. By now there are German PoWs in French coal mines and logging camps.

During December 1944 US forces in Italy will release 150 tanks for the forces in France and 21st Army group will transfer 351 Shermans to US forces. The
US cancels further shipments of Shermans to the British until the US tank situation in Europe is corrected, probably around April 1945, rather than attempt to transfer more of the British reserves, the Shermans from 21st Army Group are considered transferred, not loaned

So I suppose the US Army decided ex British meant they could plug into British roadside assistance? The Italian Shermans were the sports model?

During February 1945 the armies were back to full Sherman tank strength 5,255, plus 179 in reserve, there were another 940 in the "theatre pipelines", this was still 721 tanks short of authorised strength. 

The theatre had upped ammunition requirements in January 1944, then in March and again in May. Washington agreed to try and meet the requirements but noted predicted shortages by D+30 in most major types with some of these shortages persisting to D+60. The problem was the US had cut ammunition production in 1943, even closing plants in the winter of 1943/44, in response to the accumulation of excess stocks in North Africa in early 1943, it would take time to wind the production system back up again. In January 1944 the watchwords were retrenchment and no over production. Ammunition plants were shut down or switched to things like fertiliser, synthetic rubber and avgas production. In March 1944 increases in 240 mm howitzer ammunition were authorised, in April this was extended to the 8 inch and 155mm gun and howitzers and the 4.5 inch gun. In May the War Department authorised expansions in medium artillery production, guns and ammunition and assigned the highest priority to additional ammunition manufacturing capability, but this would for the most part take until 1945 to increase production. Heavy artillery ammunition production was to be doubled in 7 months and tripled in 13 months. In June and July substantial increases in bomb production were added to the expansion plan, later including Tallboy and Grand Slam bombs. Plants that had been shut down a few months or even weeks before had to be reopened. Positions in plants were opened to women for the first time to overcome the labour shortages. The heavy artillery expansion program required new facilities costing around $203,000,000.

Ammunition variation was a problem that needed careful attention. Mass produced ammunition at multiple plants often has different ballistic qualities within but especially between batches, "lots". It is best to keep the lots together. The greater the uncertainty over relative performance the greater the safety margins needed, and the harder it was to pre register artillery. It took until the third quarter of 1944 to largely eliminate lots being split up by the transport system.

Almost no heavy artillery ammunition was shipped to Europe between October 1943 and June 1944, despite the theatre being around 20% below authorised levels in May. Light and Medium artillery ammunition shipments had also been effectively stopped between January and May 1944, despite the theatre having 75% or authorised levels in May.

On 21st September 1944 First army replies to a request on ammunition consumption by pointing out it has never been supplied at the authorised rate and so the army is not able to determine whether the rate is adequate.

22nd November 1944 Eisenhower transmits Bradley's response to the ammunition situation word for word to Marshall. The 12th Army group could attack until 15th December exhausting most reserves, the lack of 105 and 155mm howitzer ammunition would force static operations assuming no enemy attacks.

During November 21st Army group releases 100 25 pounders and 60 days ammunition supply to 12th Army group, they are divided up amongst the three US armies. The loan is renewed for another 60 days in January. This comes at a time when British consumption of 25 pounder ammunition exceeds supply by around 1.5 million rounds per month.

The US army decided the 25 pounder was superior?

Also the US forces in Europe are using in 10 days the ammunition expected to last 35 days, and more mortar shells in a day than used in a month in North Africa. 
The significant lack of 8 inch ammunition means less than half the guns in theatre are used in action in 1945.

17 August 1944, to give an idea of the shipping situation a ship, presumably loaded with medical supplies arrives in Europe on this day, it finally begins unloading on 10th December.

During November 1944 the supply system deliberately creates, or rather, deliberately does not fix a cigarette shortage. Authorised US army stocks of winter clothing in the UK go to zero, units in the UK are directed to return overcoats and arctics so they can be sent to the front line troops.

On 27th November supply stocks of cigarettes are down to 3 days with the armies and none in the rear areas. There is the anticipated reaction, with visiting congress members becoming involved. The supply people promise to send more cigarettes as soon as the winter clothing is shipped to the units. Apparently as an extreme example one ship containing 1,200,000 blankets had been docked 7 times at Le Havre without being unloaded. Winter clothing is airlifted from the ports to the armies, bypassing the intermediate depots. With winter gear in short supply the US buys 300,000 blankets from Spain originally made for the German army. Portugal sells large numbers of blankets, towels and so on to the US. "front line troops fought through a large part of the winter inadequately clothed".

During February 1945 a proposal to raise 25 gasoline supply companies using German PoWs with US officers is approved. By the end of April there were 260,000 German PoWs used as labourers on the continent. 

During March 1945 US Army men in sedentary jobs will be ordered to take 10% cut in rations because of the food situation. Articles appear in the French press about the food situation including a claim the allies are taking the food. The actual balance is 280,000 tons in aid versus purchase of 70,000 tons. 

At Liege is the company Fabrique Nationale des Armes de Guerre, which holds the Browning patents, enabling it to manufacture much US army equipment. Also at Liege is Englebert and Company, for tyre manufacture, recap and repair, initially aided by 50 tons of Buna (synthetic rubber) and 2 tons of natural rubber captured at Malmedy. Belgian industry will supply around 1,000 different types of items before the war is over. This includes 200 complete 60 mm mortars and modifications to 60 and 81 mm mortars.

French industry will also be used. Early September First army Ordnance section negotiates a contract with Gnome-Rhone to overhaul tank engines, starting with 200 unserviceable engines brought to France, due to a lack of overhaul capacity in England. After a test batch the company does all 200 engines by late September, and provides 1st Army with its only replacement engines in 4 months of campaigning. This supply is very welcome given over 200 engines had already been sent to England for rebuilding and another 170 awaited the journey. Third Army follows the precedent and also sends tank engines to Gnome-Rhone. A lack of spare parts prevents a full overhaul of most engines leading to a high failure rate until parts can be provided for full overhauls.

November 1944, In the 5 months since D-day 1st Army has received 562 truck engines, including 400 it had given back to COMZ in July, versus the planned 4,000 engines. Engines are so precious they are sent back under armed guard at times, the one to be reconditioned not released until a good engine is presented.


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## Snowygrouch (Oct 30, 2021)

Ok, we`ve reached the stage of "Portugal sells blankets", and "cigarette shortages" in a thread about the P-38.

I`ve long since given up trying to work out what on earth is even being discussed here.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 30, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> Ok, we`ve reached the stage of "Portugal sells blankets", and "cigarette shortages" in a thread about the P-38. I`ve long since given up trying to work out what on earth is even being discussed here.


Toss away everything after "Extracts from US Army supply histories." That is just examples of the problems the US had in supplying field forces caused the inevitable attempts to forecast the future from inadequate data, compounded by the time it took to confirm any problems, undertake corrective action and then ship the stuff to where it was wanted. The US had never supplied army groups in the field for example and had little WWII data to work from. The Overlord plan had the allies reaching the German border and therefore the winter snow lines a year after the landings, so in summer, but the border was reached in early Autumn. Just note the reduction in the expected number of army heavy weapons would have an impact on the amount and type of air support requested.

The thing that had my attention in the Army supplies message was how quickly even the USAAF in a quite favourable situation would lose strength if the supply of aircraft was turned off.

As for the rest I think one strand goes like the 9th AF could not be short of aircraft because the US system was not short of aircraft, not only that but the 9th alone outnumbered the entire Luftwaffe, which means with the 8th, 15th and 12th AF the USAAF must have outnumbered the Luftwaffe between 5 and 10 to 1, on the other side is the USAAF fighters over Germany usually fought outnumbered, at least on escort duties. Also from November 1943 to May 1944 the USAAF went all out attacking the Luftwaffe, except that does not quite fit with the 8th AF targets attacked, they certainly did a lot, but such targets were under half of the bombs dropped and the day raids could not really hurt most arms of the Luftwaffe.

By the way there were the expected big air battles caused by Operation Overlord, in terms of allied fighter kill claims, for the RAF June and July 1944 are the fourth and fifth highest months, after May, August and September 1940. For the USAAF fighters in the European Theater of Operations, June 1944 is sixth and July 1944 tenth in terms of air to air kill claims. The top 5 are, in order, December, May, September, August and November 1944, or to end July 1944 June and July 1944 were numbers 2 and 6. What had changed was the decrease in skill/training of the average Luftwaffe day fighter pilot, which made the allied task that much easier and the great increase in available allied airpower, both numbers and experience as lower casualty rates meant the average allied airman had more missions completed than previously.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 30, 2021)

What a superfluous dissertation to a simple comment...

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## SaparotRob (Oct 30, 2021)

The bacon is for “superfluous “.

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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 30, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> USAAF fighters over Germany usually fought outnumbered, at least on escort duties.


To include P-38s, right?

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## GregP (Oct 30, 2021)

wuzak said:


> I mean what sort of specs does it have? Such as engine type.


Merlin, configured with early exhaust outlets. There aren't enough Merlins around to get EXACTLY the right dash number, so they built a good one and configure it to look like the correct engine.


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## GregP (Oct 30, 2021)

This is beginning to look like a quartermaster annual report from the Department of Redundancy Department.

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## Greg Boeser (Oct 30, 2021)

Wow. That's a lot of info, Geoff. Thanks for the big picture overview. Lots of good information on the overall supply situation. Stuff that gets overlooked in the typical "which was better?" discussion. While the focus of this thread seems to be on the FGs equipped with P-38s from late '43 in NW Europe, people seem to ignore the experiences of the early groups sent to North Africa. Early losses there in the 1st and 14th FGs forced the USAAF to strip the UK based 78th FG of all its P-38s and most of the pilots. The group subsequently re-equipping with P-47s before it could become operational. Likewise, the 82nd, arriving in North Africa slightly later, had half their strength stripped to bolster the 1st and 14th.

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## Snowygrouch (Oct 30, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> By the way there were the expected big air battles caused by Operation Overlord, in terms of allied fighter kill claims, for the RAF June and July 1944 are the fourth and fifth highest months, after May, August and September 1940. For the USAAF fighters in the European Theater of Operations, June 1944 is sixth and July 1944 tenth in terms of air to air kill claims. The top 5 are, in order, December, May, September, August and November 1944, or to end July 1944 June and July 1944 were numbers 2 and 6. What had changed was the decrease in skill/training of the average Luftwaffe day fighter pilot, which made the allied task that much easier and the great increase in available allied airpower, both numbers and experience as lower casualty rates meant the average allied airman had more missions completed than previously.



Luftwaffe training hours changed throughout the war, but there was actually not a dramatic reduction until July 1944 onwards.








If you read Leigh Mallory`s Overlord Diary, you can see that it was basically a damp squib, none of the expected huge air battles in direct opposition to the ground invasion occured in the aftermath of the invasion.

D-Day +1






D-Day +4





D-Day +6






D-Day +23






Having said all that, its still a mystery to me what on earth any of this has to do with P-38`s....

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## Dimlee (Oct 30, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> Ok, we`ve reached the stage of "Portugal sells blankets", and "cigarette shortages" in a thread about the P-38.
> 
> I`ve long since given up trying to work out what on earth is even being discussed here.


They said there were problems with cockpit heating so P-38s did need some blankets.

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## Greg Boeser (Oct 30, 2021)

🤔


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## pbehn (Oct 30, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Actually you were trying to imply the USAAF had so many surplus P-47 they could sent lots on V-1 patrols, now comes the attempt to change the claim.
> 
> If that was correct the claims would not be made, including the one about the 9th AF being short of aircraft in May 1945.
> 
> Alternatively I can read the Diver book and note where the pilot's own words are used to describe what they were doing. Apart from encounters that resulted in shoot downs it is clear there was bending of the rules for things like training if only to see what the V-1 looked like. Is the idea the US fighter units withdrawing from France did not keep a look out behind? As an aside 9th AF P-47 flew 475,052 hours on operations, 134,029 hours on training, November 1943 to May 1945.


I wasnt trying to imply anything. I specifically stated that. Not only were P-47s being used for Air/Sea rescue, and informal diver missions they were being used for sight seeing flights or diversions to see things to tell the grand children in later years, thanks for the information. You can add to your aside of 134,029 hours spent on training the historical fact that a majority of operations performed prior to D-Day in ground attack on northern France apart from the Normandy beaches were part of a diversion to mislead the Germans that the landing area would be somewhere else than the Normandy beaches. This with an aircraft far superior to anything Goering had for high altitude combat apart from the 262.


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## pbehn (Oct 30, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> 1. So now it is time to change the claim, go from fighters to planes and pilots. So essentially as of end April 1944 the US could have shut down pilot training and aircraft production, the 105,794 aircraft the USAAF Statistical Digest says were built May 1944 to August 1945 inclusive were totally unnecessary? Were the 42,964 USAAF crews that graduated May 1944 to August 1944, out of 80,744 trained since 1942 (15,424 fighter crews out of 36,795)? USAAF Statistical Digest, table 52. Or does huge surplus not cover the remainder of the war requirements, including replacements for tour expired personnel? After all 7,176 out of 10,297 P-47 and 1,789 out of 2,360 P-51 pilots graduated in May 1944 or later. The 9th AF had 1,769 fighter pilots killed, missing or wounded.
> 
> 2 The USAAF had 9,459 heavy bombers end April 1944 and 8,839 losses May 1944 to end August 1945. Medium bombers 4,399 on hand, 4,288 losses
> 
> 3 Except in the records of the 9th AF and Luftwaffe quartermaster of course and by anyone else who can count. To come to the conclusion either the size of the 9th is doubled or more, or the size of the Luftwaffe is halved or more. Then comes the idea a force dedicated to tactical support of a growing army field force should have its capacity measured by how well it outnumbers the enemy air force, not how well it can fill air support requirements. Still given the 9th AF is reported to be outnumbering the Luftwaffe by itself, and the 8th AF easily outnumbered the 9th AF, by around 2 to 1 at times post June 1944, then throw in the RAF, those P-38s must have been fighting a well outnumbered enemy, And even if there were indeed more Luftwaffe fighters near some P-38 over Germany just count all those P-38 in the US, France and Britain and there is no shortage of P-38 over Germany.


1 I didnt say that you did. Only pilots with full training plus approx 200 hours on front line type and experience actually matter in a fighter battle. Tour expired pilots were my point, Goering didnt have the concept of tour expired pilots. 

2 Goering didnt have many heavy bombers by May 1944 many of his medium bombers were also lost in the Baby Blitz. Operation Steinbock 524 bombers used 324 lost including 46 He 177s. 

3 Coupled with your later comment "So now a new time period 2 months, why exactly was that time period chosen?" Well you provided the information so why wouldnt I quote it, compare your quoted quartermasters report to how many aircraft with trained and mainly untrained pilots were involved in Operation Bodenplatte, which took place in the middle of your quoted figures. Numbers vary but losses were around 250 and that wiped out the LW as an effective fighting force according to Galland and most other pilots of the period and historians of the subject, but then, they werent quartermasters

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## pbehn (Oct 30, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> On 15th of August 1944 there are no reserves of Shermans, tanks earmarked as replacements for units arriving later are issued.
> 
> End September 1944 First army was down to 85% of authorised tanks and so reorganised its tank units, 2nd and 3rd armoured gave up 32 Shermans, the other armoured divisions 18, tank battalions gave up 4 Shermans. Some 50 to 60% of the trucks in the Omaha beach port area are not working. Some of the provisional truck battalions raised to cope with the emergency are by now nicknamed Truck Destroyer Battalions.


Any discussion of shortage of tanks in USA forces, UK forces or Russian forces at the end of September 1944 is just laugh out loud funny, you obviously have access to a wealth of information but the conclusions you come to are just hilarious.


Now, what about the P-38?

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## ThomasP (Oct 30, 2021)

"Truck Destroyer Battalions" LOL Thank you for that, I had never heard that expression before.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 31, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> To include P-38s, right?


Sure, it is a well known fact all air forces fought outnumbered most of the time and even at the same time at the same and different places, while they were really competing in the best paint job and unit emblem events.


GregP said:


> This is beginning to look like a quartermaster annual report from the Department of Redundancy Department.


And the definition of a primary source document for this redundant redundancy is? Does it have to be issued from the main or spare redundancy department?


Snowygrouch said:


> Luftwaffe training hours changed throughout the war, but there was actually not a dramatic reduction until July 1944 onwards.
> 
> If you read Leigh Mallory`s Overlord Diary, you can see that it was basically a damp squib, none of the expected huge air battles in direct opposition to the ground invasion occured in the aftermath of the invasion.
> 
> D-Day +1, D-Day +4, D-Day +6, D-Day +23


Nice stuff, firstly are the Leigh-Mallory diaries available online?

Yes, the well known training hours diagram but training is only one part of what you need. The way the Jagdwaffe lost so much collective experience in the first 5 months of 1944 is not relevant? Also the idea there was this big drop in Luftwaffe training hours in July 1944 which requires interpreting the diagram literally so all three air forces apparently did these (big) training hour movements at the same time, up or down. No gradual declines or increases being masked by the time periods being averaged.

And reports to 12 June are supposed to be enough to respond to data from June and July? The again well known reality it took time for the Luftwaffe to move and then the discovery of how bad the airfield and supply situation was in France. In any case as Williamson Murray reports by 11 June 5 Gruppen had been sent back to Germany because of the losses they had taken. Also Leigh-Mallory did not have control of all allied fighters present.

If this is the definition of huge go ahead, it does mean "Big Week" did not see any big air battles, rather like June/July 1944 it was a series of combats that collectively added up to a big result. So Big week becomes "Lots of little battles week" that added up to something big. After all USAAF fighters claimed 341 kills in the air and 1 on the ground in February 1944, versus 470 and 148 in June and 407 and 153 in July. If the idea is the June and July battle results are not big, then assuming they are "Medium Month" then the USAAF had "Little Week" in February to keep things consistent with fighter kill claims. The RAF went from around 81 claims in the air and 11 on the ground in February to 316 in the air and 3 on the ground in June and 322 in the air in July, using the Fighter Command War Diaries. So collectively allied fighters in the ETO claimed the destruction of 434 Luftwaffe aircraft in February, 937 in June and 882 in July. Luftwaffe losses in the early part of 1944 were bad, those starting in June while trying to hold the allied summer offensives on three fronts were even worse. The USAAF thinks it lost 243 aircraft to enemy aircraft, out of 292 losses in February 1944, 284 out of 904 for June, 150 out of 712 for July. Fighter Command War Diaries notes 74 aircrafct lost on operations in February, 374 June and 240 in August.

Did Leigh-Mallory discontinue bombing of Luftwaffe airfields, along with a significant drop in fighter cover for his operations, given the lack of Luftwaffe? The 9th AF October 1943 to May 1945 devoted a bit over 14% of its total fighter sorties to escorting fighter bombers, area patrols or sweeps. By end June Leigh-Mallory is denigrating the USAAF attack on Luftwaffe strategy and actually making it clear the heavy bombers should be doing more tactical support, as per his ideas.

I noted the allied fighter kill claims and the amount of air combat they represent, the fact allied airpower kept the Luftwaffe unable to mount effective operations is clear, they did that by destroying the enemy in the air and on the ground throughout the time period. Given the results I consider the battles to be big as per definitions like Big Week.


Snowygrouch said:


> Having said all that, its still a mystery to me what on earth any of this has to do with P-38`s....


Peripheral, more so given the convoy cover sorties P-38 did, it is more about noting that while the Luftwaffe lost heavily January to May 1944, that did not stop a major effort against the invasion, with the earlier Luftwaffe losses going a long way in stopping effective opposition, along with the systematic strikes on airfields in range. Sort of like the story of the 2 fighters strafing the D-day beaches versus the other under 100 Luftwaffe sorties that day, plus more at night., with plenty of people going with 2 sorties total for the day.



pbehn said:


> I wasnt trying to imply anything. I specifically stated that. Not only were P-47s being used for Air/Sea rescue, and informal diver missions they were being used for sight seeing flights or diversions to see things to tell the grand children in later years, thanks for the information. You can add to your aside of 134,029 hours spent on training the historical fact that a majority of operations performed prior to D-Day in ground attack on northern France apart from the Normandy beaches were part of a diversion to mislead the Germans that the landing area would be somewhere else than the Normandy beaches. This with an aircraft far superior to anything Goering had for high altitude combat apart from the 262.


Actually implying as can be seen the ideas were lots of P-47s on V-1 patrols or attempting to shoot down V-1 meant the 9th AF did not have a shortage. Is the idea the USAAF had such poor flying discipline that there was enough of such bending of the rules it had a noticeable impact on performance?

So unable to back up the latest claim time to change subject to the well known allied air strategy to keep the Germans guessing where the invasion was, not only that but ground attack operations were done using aircraft with superior high altitude performance, without thinking that through and asking where were the specific low altitude performers. All the USAAF fighters in France in 1944 and most of the RAF ones were all optimised to perform best at 20,000 feet or higher, yet those doing support operations rarely flew much above 10,000 or so feet, the reality of the air forces had to work with what they had which was from decisions made years previously. By the way the V weapons bombings come into play, note where the sites were and how bombing many of them contributed to the deception.


pbehn said:


> 1 I didnt say that you did. Only pilots with full training plus approx 200 hours on front line type and experience actually matter in a fighter battle. Tour expired pilots were my point, Goering didnt have the concept of tour expired pilots.
> 
> 2 Goering didnt have many heavy bombers by May 1944 many of his medium bombers were also lost in the Baby Blitz. Operation Steinbock 524 bombers used 324 lost including 46 He 177s.
> 
> 3 Coupled with your later comment "So now a new time period 2 months, why exactly was that time period chosen?" Well you provided the information so why wouldnt I quote it, compare your quoted quartermasters report to how many aircraft with trained and mainly untrained pilots were involved in Operation Bodenplatte, which took place in the middle of your quoted figures. Numbers vary but losses were around 250 and that wiped out the LW as an effective fighting force according to Galland and most other pilots of the period and historians of the subject, but then, they werent quartermasters


The claim was the USAAF had a big pilot and aircraft surplus in May 1944 which is clearly wrong and this is the response. So the Luftwaffe lost many pilots on 1 January 1945 means the quartermaster strength records during the war are wrong. Above we have the Luftwaffe ineffective in June 1944, now it is January 1945. And once again it is good to know loss of Luftwaffe day fighter pilots meant the entire Luftwaffe was gone.

Where was the comparison with the quartermaster report?

The attempts to convince the world people disagreeing are really agreeing does explain how really wrong strength figures can be used along with insisting they are correct. Plus fleeing forward to another topic until everyone ends up back at the start. It has more to do with exploring the mental defences against unliked news.

The wiped out effective fighting force in the air are credited with 446 USAAF ETO losses in air in something over 4 months in 1945, versus 877 in 1943, the MTO figures were 1,264 in 1943 and 34 in 1945. So 1943 losses of 2,141 including some to axis allied forces versus 480 in about third of the year in 1945.


pbehn said:


> Any discussion of shortage of tanks in USA forces, UK forces or Russian forces at the end of September 1944 is just laugh out loud funny, you obviously have access to a wealth of information but the conclusions you come to are just hilarious.


In general creating laughter makes the world a little better, unless the laughter is the shrill, desperate, hysterical or defence against reality type. If conclusions are very wrong it is easy for many people to provide the actual facts, not opinions or verbiage using the standard various ways humans dismiss news they dislike or disagree with.

As to what happens next it would depend on whether claims keep being made that the state and size of the US Army in France had no impact on the 9th Air Force. Or whether aircraft strengths are incorrectly stated. Or the concept of shortage required it to be system wide, not unit specific. And strengths based on the total size of the enemy, not the mission the unit has.

Introducing the supply stuff helps identify those who are really interested in the topic compared with those with a casual interest. So Patton's drive across France has a lot more interest versus as the US Army leaves Normandy it leaves behind over 2 million jerricans, scattered about the area, think of them being able to do at least 1 trip mid July to end August 1944, and what that could mean to the ability of the army to over run territory instead of having to fight for it later.


pbehn said:


> Now, what about the P-38?


Is this an invitation to provide the detailed breakdown of 9th AF P-38 operations? Or is that classified as too much data? Or to much real data to be met with please look over there instead, or imaginings of what was going on? The detailed strength figures will totally refute the claim the 9th AF was bigger than the Luftwaffe for a start.


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## pbehn (Oct 31, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> 1. Actually implying as can be seen the ideas were lots of P-47s on V-1 patrols or attempting to shoot down V-1 meant the 9th AF did not have a shortage. Is the idea the USAAF had such poor flying discipline that there was enough of such bending of the rules it had a noticeable impact on performance?
> 
> 2 So unable to back up the latest claim time to change subject to the well known allied air strategy to keep the Germans guessing where the invasion was, not only that but ground attack operations were done using aircraft with superior high altitude performance, without thinking that through and asking where were the specific low altitude performers. All the USAAF fighters in France in 1944 and most of the RAF ones were all optimised to perform best at 20,000 feet or higher, yet those doing support operations rarely flew much above 10,000 or so feet, the reality of the air forces had to work with what they had which was from decisions made years previously. *By the way the V weapons bombings come into play, note where the sites were and how bombing many of them contributed to the deception.*
> 
> 3 The claim was the USAAF had a big pilot and aircraft surplus in May 1944 which is clearly wrong and this is the response. So the Luftwaffe lost many pilots on 1 January 1945 means the quartermaster strength records during the war are wrong. Above we have the Luftwaffe ineffective in June 1944, now it is January 1945. And once again it is good to know loss of Luftwaffe day fighter pilots meant the entire Luftwaffe was gone.


1. It was you who said they were trying to catch a look. In fact the guys were probably well meaning in their intentions, but its very easy for two or more pilots to converge on something like a V1 and not see each other until they are about to have a collision.

2. If the deception plan was so well known how is it not known by you that it was before D-Day. The first V1 launches were from the Pas de Calais on 12 June, then the south coast on London on 15/16 June after which Eisenhower prioritized attacks on launch sites. 

3 Relative to the LF they had an abundance of riches in all things, the allies could put more heavy bombers in the air than Germany ever built any day they chose and then do the same the next day.


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## drgondog (Oct 31, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Toss away everything after "Extracts from US Army supply histories." That is just examples of the problems the US had in supplying field forces caused the inevitable attempts to forecast the future from inadequate data, compounded by the time it took to confirm any problems, undertake corrective action and then ship the stuff to where it was wanted. The US had never supplied army groups in the field for example and had little WWII data to work from. The Overlord plan had the allies reaching the German border and therefore the winter snow lines a year after the landings, so in summer, but the border was reached in early Autumn. Just note the reduction in the expected number of army heavy weapons would have an impact on the amount and type of air support requested.
> 
> The thing that had my attention in the Army supplies message was how quickly even the USAAF in a quite favourable situation would lose strength if the supply of aircraft was turned off.
> 
> ...


I tried - but my eyes glazed over the repeated phone book recitals. Boring at best.

BTW to your assertion that 'the P-38 was never outnumbered' I suggest that a macro level your statement is untrue from from 1942 to near V-E Day when compared to LW Day Fighter Arm in ETO and MTO. Silly, Yes? Then peel it down to October 15 1943 or two for December through February 1944. One then two P-38 FG Vs LW Day fighter mix of Bf 109, Fw 190 and Bf 110? Yes? December 1943 More LW units have transferred to West and continue through May 1944, but total P-38 ETO strength rises to 6 (4 8th AF/2 9th AF) then declines to one by end of1944. Has the P-38 unit total achieved parity? Is the question of outnumber/outnumbered in question for Macro view? How about micro? Can you cite instances of major concentrations of P-38s being deployed against inferior LW foces? Take the MTO - three total P-38 FG from November 1942 through VE Day. Same questions.


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## Snowygrouch (Oct 31, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Nice stuff, firstly are the Leigh-Mallory diaries available online?


No, you need to get them at Kew, although they`re actually fairly dull (not dissimlar to Mallory, in fact - although "some people" (me) would probably
refer to him more as a backstabbing ****).

The graph is obviously a simplified representation to give the broad comparative story, but if you do want the particulars the
accompanying text is required, along with the germany-only graph, which is available on microfilm from the USAAF Historical Branch.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Oct 31, 2021)

pbehn said:


> 1. It was you who said they were trying to catch a look. In fact the guys were probably well meaning in their intentions, but its very easy for two or more pilots to converge on something like a V1 and not see each other until they are about to have a collision.
> 
> 2. If the deception plan was so well known how is it not known by you that it was before D-Day. The first V1 launches were from the Pas de Calais on 12 June, then the south coast on London on 15/16 June after which Eisenhower prioritized attacks on launch sites.
> 
> 3 Relative to the LF they had an abundance of riches in all things, the allies could put more heavy bombers in the air than Germany ever built any day they chose and then do the same the next day.


So the answer to the number of P-47 pilots went for V-1 look and that effect is no idea. I gather the long range mind reading skills are all part of an act to amaze the audience that someone can get so much so wrong in such little time. I point out the pre D-day V weapons strikes were useful as part of the deception plan and get told I did not know of the plan. Then comes the we had lots, they didn't, case closed, change of subject.

8th and 9th short tons, BC long tons of bombs on V weapon sites. first column for each force is V weapon strike tonnage, next is total tonnage for the month. No data for 9th AF in 1943, or 2nd TAF and Fighter Command. 8th AF 1st strike Watten 27 August 1943, Bomber Command Foret D'Eperleques on 30th. For those who want to get an idea of what really happened, the big jump was Bomber Command switching. Note the priority in the first 5 months of 1944 based on percentage of effort against the target class for the day bombers.

Month / 8th / 8th total / 9th / 9th total / BC / BC total
Aug-43 / 366 / 3524.2 / 0 / 0 / 2072 / 20149
Sep-43 / 116 / 5482.7 / 0 / 0 / 153 / 14855
Oct-43 / 0 / 4708.5 / ? / 427.05 / 0 / 13773
Nov-43 / 0 / 6416.8 / ? / 1571.65 / 0 / 14495
Dec-43 / 1461.3 / 11734.5 / ? / 1474.58 / 346 / 11802
Jan-44 / 2732.9 / 11679.2 / 1497 / 1546 / 1482 / 18428
Feb-44 / 2997.7 / 18339.4 / 1822.8 / 3368.9 / 9 / 12054
Mar-44 / 2369.4 / 21046.6 / 1268.95 / 5219.08 / 14  / 27698
Apr-44 / 3943.3 / 24931.3 / 2625.151 / 10213.18 / 7 / 33496
May-44 / 2628.5 / 36006.6 / 1241.606 / 17905.12 / 5 / 37252
Jun-44 / 5072.4 / 58271 / 2045.174 / 23059.02 / 15907 / 57267
Jul-44 / 3854.8 / 45212 / 190.25 / 15574.375 / 24292 / 57615
Aug-44 / 2550.8 / 47979.2 / 0 / 0 / 19376 / 65855
Sep-44 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 859 / 52587

I believe the now standard sign off is P-38?

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## pbehn (Oct 31, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> So the answer to the number of P-47 pilots went for V-1 look and that effect is no idea. I gather the long range mind reading skills are all part of an act to amaze the audience that someone can get so much so wrong in such little time. I point out the pre D-day V weapons strikes were useful as part of the deception plan and get told I did not know of the plan. Then comes the we had lots, they didn't, case closed, change of subject.
> 
> 8th and 9th short tons, BC long tons of bombs on V weapon sites. first column for each force is V weapon strike tonnage, next is total tonnage for the month. No data for 9th AF in 1943, or 2nd TAF and Fighter Command. 8th AF 1st strike Watten 27 August 1943, Bomber Command Foret D'Eperleques on 30th. For those who want to get an idea of what really happened, the big jump was Bomber Command switching. Note the priority in the first 5 months of 1944 based on percentage of effort against the target class for the day bombers.
> 
> ...


Pre D-Day V1 weapons strikes? There werent any, V1s werent deployed until after D-Day. Would you like some assistance getting down from that high horse or are you happy up there. I have had enough of this high and mighty nonsense.

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## EwenS (Oct 31, 2021)

pbehn said:


> Pre D-Day V1 weapons strikes? There werent any, V1s werent deployed until after D-Day. Would you like some assistance getting down from that high horse or are you happy up there. I have had enough of this high and mighty nonsense.


By 24 Nov 1943 96 V1 launch sites (the so called "ski sites") had been identified between Calais and Cherbourg. These sites, and others discovered later, were targetted by everything from fighter bombers up to heavy bombers under the codename OPeration Crossbow starting Dec 1943.








Operation Crossbow - Wikipedia







en.wikipedia.org

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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 31, 2021)

drgondog said:


> The P-38 experience could only be characterized as 'heavily outnumbered in combat operations'





Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered"





Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> USAAF fighters over Germany usually fought outnumbered, at least on escort duties.





FLYBOYJ said:


> To include P-38s, right?





Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> Sure, it is a well known fact all air forces fought outnumbered most of the time and even at the same time at the same and different places, while they were really competing in the best paint job and unit emblem events.



You made my Day!

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## Reluctant Poster (Oct 31, 2021)

Snowygrouch said:


> No, you need to get them at Kew, although they`re actually fairly dull (not dissimlar to Mallory, in fact - although "some people" (me) would probably
> refer to him more as a backstabbing ****).
> 
> The graph is obviously a simplified representation to give the broad comparative story, but if you do want the particulars the
> ...


The take away from this graph isn't that the total number of hours decreased, its the big drop in hours flying the actual aircraft used in combat. Training took a big hit with the invasion of Russia. Hours in type was cut in half.

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## Snowygrouch (Oct 31, 2021)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The take away from this graph isn't that the total number of hours decreased, its the big drop in hours flying the actual aircraft used in combat. Training took a big hit with the invasion of Russia. Hours in type was cut in half.


Yes, the fuel shortages meant it was increasingly impossible to fly pilots in front line military aircraft, which needed either B4 or C3 fuel, so they got more and more hours in trainer-types which used very low grade fuels like "A3" training grade, which was about 80 octane.

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## Deleted member 79357 (Oct 31, 2021)

Going to cause trouble with this one but; If the P-38 was superior and could out turn anything in 1945 then why did the F-5C (ie stripped P-38)'s need fighter escort when the Luftwaffe pretty much did not want to play after December 1944.

The P-38 did have the nasty habit of biting it's pilots, a lot of experienced pilots were lost when the aircraft got away from them (Lockheed had several test pilots killed)


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 31, 2021)

Tervuren said:


> Going to cause trouble with this one but; If the P-38 was superior and could out turn anything in 1945 then why did the F-5C (ie stripped P-38)'s need fighter escort when the Luftwaffe pretty much did not want to play after December 1944.


You'll only cause trouble if you don't have a source for your comments. Where did anyone say "the P-38 was superior and could out turn anything in 1945?" (Besides Ben Rich in the book "Skunk Works"). Can you provide specific references where F-5Cs were sent on escorted missions?


Tervuren said:


> The P-38 did have the nasty habit of biting it's pilots, a lot of experienced pilots were lost when the aircraft got away from them (Lockheed had several test pilots killed)


Your statement is pretty broad - Several Lockheed test pilots and later AAF pilots were killed due to compresibility, a phenomena never encountered prior to the P-38 (and something that other aircraft dealt with as well to include the P-47). There were numerous accidents in the P-38 due to lack of twin engine training prior to the US entering the war. This has been covered on this forum many times in the past.

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## pbehn (Oct 31, 2021)

Tervuren said:


> Going to cause trouble with this one but; If the P-38 was superior and could out turn anything in 1945 then why did the F-5C (ie stripped P-38)'s need fighter escort when the Luftwaffe pretty much did not want to play after December 1944.
> 
> The P-38 did have the nasty habit of biting it's pilots, a lot of experienced pilots were lost when the aircraft got away from them (Lockheed had several test pilots killed)


Wasnt part of the stripping, taking out the guns?

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## drgondog (Oct 31, 2021)

Tervuren said:


> Going to cause trouble with this one but; If the P-38 was superior and could out turn anything in 1945 then why did the F-5C (ie stripped P-38)'s need fighter escort when the Luftwaffe pretty much did not want to play after December 1944.
> 
> The P-38 did have the nasty habit of biting it's pilots, a lot of experienced pilots were lost when the aircraft got away from them (Lockheed had several test pilots killed)


You don't seem fazed by Tourett's syndrome, but both Mosquito and P-38 recon had escort for deep targets Most of the time. The LW reacted to recon penetration as a high priority mission, continuing to 'play' until after April 25th 1945 when 8th AF stood down combat ops in ETO.

As to losing a 'lot of experienced pilots' define Lot, define Experienced and present fact based argument? I'm actually consumed by indifference regarding your scholarship - but prove me wrong.

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## pbehn (Oct 31, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Both Mosquito and P-38 recon had escort for deep targets Most of the time.


For some reason people think a PR mission meant clicking an instamatic camera in the general direction of something. The cameras were fixed so the plane had to be in an exact orientation to what was being photographed. Like a short bomb run, and impossible to do in a single seat aircraft if you are being buzzed by some nasty chap with guns.

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## pbehn (Oct 31, 2021)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The take away from this graph isn't that the total number of hours decreased, its the big drop in hours flying the actual aircraft used in combat. Training took a big hit with the invasion of Russia. Hours in type was cut in half.


This was shown up in Operation Steinbock the baby blitz. In some cases only 10% of planes got to the target that was frequently London. Many losses were simply that, pilots got lost. Night and instrument flying wasnt part of the bomber crews skills any more neither was pathfinding operations. No where near what they managed in 1940/41.

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## DKoor (Oct 31, 2021)

Well, I just jumped in this conversation even tho I haven't really participated in aviation forum discussions for quite a while. It popped on my mail news and I figured I'd share at least some of my thoughts. Many things I forgot over the years. 
However, when talking about this plane vs that plane it more often than not goes by how and what for were those used in actual combat. 
If games like IL-2 were anything to go by, I could easily say that I won't be mixing P-38 in dogfight much unless I'm in clear advantage. I like P-38, always have, I find it to be unusual and even romantic warbird (if such thing can exist) 🙂. 

It may have fare well in the Pacific, and I'm certain that good pilots were making difference there using its speed even vs Ki-44 alike, in ETO you really couldn't employ same tactics. 
German fighters were both fast and agile. I am subjective, but I find Bf-109 to be simply better in dogfight on equal terms. Fw's are different story. 
Anyhow here is one of my ancient dogfights in IL-2 popular server WarClouds;


I made it long, long ago so pardon me for not being flashy, up to date with current videos 😁.

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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 31, 2021)

DKoor said:


> If games like IL-2 were anything to go by


They aren't -

NEXT!

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## pbehn (Oct 31, 2021)

EwenS said:


> By 24 Nov 1943 96 V1 launch sites (the so called "ski sites") had been identified between Calais and Cherbourg. These sites, and others discovered later, were targetted by everything from fighter bombers up to heavy bombers under the codename OPeration Crossbow starting Dec 1943.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


My original point was that the allies and especially the USA had a massive surplus of combat aircraft and pilots during the period, not only P-47s but all others. Your link details the huge forces mainly strategic that were diverted to Crossbow in the lead up to and after D-Day. This made no difference to D-Day which had as close to complete air superiority as anyone could have dreamed about. It made no difference to operations in Italy, the fall of Rome on June 5th was overshadowed in the news by D-Day itself. The invasion of Southern France still went ahead on August 15. Spaatz, Harris and others may have disagreed about the best way to tackle things but even diverting the massive resources detailed in the link didnt make any difference to any strategic objective and I doubt anyone in Germany actually noticed.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 31, 2021)

drgondog said:


> You don't seem fazed by Tourett's syndrome, but both Mosquito and P-38 recon had escort for deep targets Most of the time. The LW reacted to recon penetration as a high priority mission, continuing to 'play' until after April 25th 1945 when 8th AF stood down combat ops in ETO.
> 
> As to losing a 'lot of experienced pilots' define Lot, define Experienced and present fact based argument? I'm actually consumed by indifference regarding your scholarship - but prove me wrong.



You won't get an answer from him now, he's been banned; his ebullient personality shone through a little too brightly for us to comprehend...

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## wuzak (Oct 31, 2021)

drgondog said:


> both Mosquito and P-38 recon had escort for deep targets Most of the time.



Mainly in USAAF service?

RAF long range PR aircraft (Mosquito and Spitfire) tended to operate alone.


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## SaparotRob (Oct 31, 2021)

nuuumannn said:


> You won't get an answer from him now, he's been banned; his ebullient personality shone through a little too brightly for us to comprehend...


What? I don't understand.

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## pbehn (Oct 31, 2021)

wuzak said:


> Mainly in USAAF service?
> 
> RAF long range PR aircraft (Mosquito and Spitfire) tended to operate alone.


There is an account on the Mosquito website of a PR Mosquito from the RAF being escorted by two P-51s and being attacked by an Me262 going to Ploesti. One action doesnt prove anything but the high cruise speed of a Mosquito made it almost impossible for piston engined fighters to be vectored to intercept, i was relatively easy for a 262


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## GrauGeist (Oct 31, 2021)

The first combat mission undertaken by an Me262 was an intercept on a Mossie flying a recon mission near Munich.

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## Snowygrouch (Nov 1, 2021)

pbehn said:


> There is an account on the Mosquito website of a PR Mosquito from the RAF being escorted by two P-51s and being attacked by an Me262 going to Ploesti. One action doesnt prove anything but the high cruise speed of a Mosquito made it almost impossible for piston engined fighters to be vectored to intercept, i was relatively easy for a 262


Supplied below merely for interest, is from microfilm at Kew archives, AIR-51/364, hence the very poor quality. The only obvious disclaimer here is that you dont tend to get written encouter reports from people who WERE actualy shot down. So this just servces to show it was not a forgone conclusion that just because you get intercepted by a 262 that you`re finished.

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## drgondog (Nov 1, 2021)

pbehn said:


> There is an account on the Mosquito website of a PR Mosquito from the RAF being escorted by two P-51s and being attacked by an Me262 going to Ploesti. One action doesnt prove anything but the high cruise speed of a Mosquito made it almost impossible for piston engined fighters to be vectored to intercept, i was relatively easy for a 262


The 355th had several missions escorting the AAF Mosquitos and P-38 F4s on recon runs. Mentioned that the Mossie simply ran away (51s on cruise) on theway back.

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## Geoffrey Sinclair (Nov 1, 2021)

drgondog said:


> BTW to your assertion that 'the P-38 was never outnumbered'


No need to go further as I did not make the statement. As for the idea of doing the research I refer to message 355 under this topic, with the note that since such detailed analysis will probably be called boring there will be few takers, it will be best to do it yourself.


Tervuren said:


> If the P-38 was superior and could out turn anything in 1945 then why did the F-5C (ie stripped P-38)'s need fighter escort when the Luftwaffe pretty much did not want to play after December 1944.
> 
> The P-38 did have the nasty habit of biting it's pilots, a lot of experienced pilots were lost when the aircraft got away from them (Lockheed had several test pilots killed)


The escorts were due to the appearance of the Me262. I have no records of P-38 having whatever "nasty habits", though it paid a price for being one of the first US aircraft to hit high mach number problems.

The case against the F-4 and 5 usually quotes the 8th AF use. Roger Freeman notes it informed the British in December 1943 the F-5 they had were not up to standard, the Spitfire XI being faster, longer ranged and able to fly higher. The Spitfires were also estimated to take 1/3 the maintenance time. Also the US was after Mosquitoes in early 1943 as they rated them again better than the F-4 and F-5, including the fact the Mosquito could carry a 36 inch camera. The 8th AF ended up using 145 Mosquitoes, mostly mark XVI. Note the F-4 and 5 continued to be used but the 8th preferred the other types for the longer range missions, as well the F-4 and 5 continued in use with other US forces.

Until the Me262 were in service allied long range PR went unescorted. From a quick look it maybe the 8th AF started escorting its reconnaissance aircraft on 24 December 1944 but it could be earlier. Not sure when or how often the RAF provided PR escorts.


pbehn said:


> Pre D-Day V1 weapons strikes? There werent any, V1s werent deployed until after D-Day. Would you like some assistance getting down from that high horse or are you happy up there. I have had enough of this high and mighty nonsense.


So the wrong claim.


pbehn said:


> My original point was that the allies and especially the USA had a massive surplus of combat aircraft and pilots during the period


And when pointed out it is wrong, Operation Crossbow, time to change the subject.

First recorded Me262 encounter was on 26 July 1944 a 544 squadron Mosquito PR XVI, MM273, one of eight sorties the squadron flew that day, was attacked near Munich by an Me262 which made some six firing passes. The Mosquito lost its attacker in 16,000 foot cloud over the Tyrol. It landed at Fermo in Italy, the Me262 pilot claimed a kill.

Ekdo 262, based in Germany claimed 3 Mosquito, 2 Spitfire, 1 B-17 and 1 Lightning to end August 1944, Ploesti fell on 1 September. No indication any Me262 were deployed to the Balkans before then.

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## pbehn (Nov 1, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> 1 And when pointed out it is wrong, Operation Crossbow, time to change the subject.
> 
> 2 First recorded Me262 encounter was on 26 July 1944 a 544 squadron Mosquito PR XVI, MM273, one of eight sorties the squadron flew that day, was attacked near Munich by an Me262 which made some six firing passes. The Mosquito lost its attacker in 16,000 foot cloud over the Tyrol. It landed at Fermo in Italy, the Me262 pilot claimed a kill.
> 
> Ekdo 262, based in Germany claimed 3 Mosquito, 2 Spitfire, 1 B-17 and 1 Lightning to end August 1944, Ploesti fell on 1 September. No indication any Me262 were deployed to the Balkans before then.


1 Because you say so? The claim is utterly preposterous. My uncle was on a Liberty flak ship for two months during Overlord spotting for the US gunners, he got a commendation from the captain for the one 20 minute action he was involved in, he saw two LW planes near the ship during the whole invasion.








The Crippling Losses of the Luftwaffe During Operation Overlord


The attainment of air superiority over the Normandy landing area and hinterland was an essential prerequisite for the Allied Invasion in June...




www.historyhit.com




The planned dispatch of German fighter reinforcements to Normandy duly took place after the landings, encompassing 17 _Jagdgruppen_ in addition to 6 already there (c. 800 machines altogether).

The Allies fielded 3,467 heavy bombers, 1,645 medium-light bombers, and 5,409 fighters and fighter-bombers over Normandy, and on D-Day itself flew 14,674 operational sorties (losses = 113, mainly to flak) as against 319 _Luftwaffe_ sorties.

2 already posted.

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## GrauGeist (Nov 1, 2021)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:


> No indication any Me262 were deployed to the Balkans before then.


No Me262 units were based outside of Germany during the war.
This includes:
JV44
JG7
10./NJG11
KG(j)6
KG(j)51
KG(j)54
EJG2
EKdo 262
Kdo Nowotny
KDO Welter

The He162 units were also based in Germany:
EKDO 162
I./JG1

The exception would be the Ar234 and Me163 units.

The Ar234 operated from Norway, France and Belgium with III./KG76 before retreating to German proper.

JG400 operated the Me163 briefly from the Netherlands before moving to Brandis.

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## Dimlee (Nov 1, 2021)

DKoor said:


> Well, I just jumped in this conversation even tho I haven't really participated in aviation forum discussions for quite a while. It popped on my mail news and I figured I'd share at least some of my thoughts. Many things I forgot over the years.
> However, when talking about this plane vs that plane it more often than not goes by how and what for were those used in actual combat.
> If games like IL-2 were anything to go by, I could easily say that I won't be mixing P-38 in dogfight much unless I'm in clear advantage. I like P-38, always have, I find it to be unusual and even romantic warbird (if such thing can exist) 🙂.
> 
> ...



Good fight. I wanted to click the "like" and then realised that I did that before. Probably years ago.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 2, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The exception would be the Ar234 and Me163 units.
> 
> The Ar234 operated from Norway, France and Belgium with III./KG76 before retreating to German proper.


if i remember right the Ar-234 operated also from Italy


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## Peter Gunn (Nov 2, 2021)

drgondog said:


> The 355th had several missions escorting the AAF Mosquitos and P-38 F4s on recon runs. Mentioned that the Mossie simply ran away (51s on cruise) on theway back.


By "ran away (51s on cruise)" I assume that the Mustangs were not really trying to keep up on the way home then?


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## drgondog (Nov 2, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> By "ran away (51s on cruise)" I assume that the Mustangs were not really trying to keep up on the way home then?


The Mosquito fast cruise was higher than Mustang when both were light. Not known whether the 358FS P-51s still had external tanks attached on return.

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## Peter Gunn (Nov 2, 2021)

drgondog said:


> The Mosquito fast cruise was higher than Mustang when both were light. Not known whether the 358FS P-51s still had external tanks attached on return.


I figured it was something like that, thanks.

You know, the more time I spend here the more I realize how little I actually know, I used to consider myself pretty knowledgeable on WWII aviation but when I start reading what you guys post I think it best to remain the snarky little kid in the back of the class and keep my trap shut.

It could easily bring on bouts of depression if I think about it too much.

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## SaparotRob (Nov 2, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> I figured it was something like that, thanks.
> 
> You know, the more time I spend here the more I realize how little I actually know, I used to consider myself pretty knowledgeable on WWII aviation but when I start reading what you guys post I think it best to remain the snarky little kid in the back of the class and keep my trap shut.
> 
> It could easily bring on bouts of depression if I think about it too much.


You’re preaching to the choir. Amen, brother.

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## pbehn (Nov 2, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> By "ran away (51s on cruise)" I assume that the Mustangs were not really trying to keep up on the way home then?


I dont think the difference was performance, because the P-51 was faster. The difference was internal and external fuel. A PR Mosquito in UK had about 700 gals internal fuel, or 350 per engine. The P-51 had 245 gals. External tanks on a P-51 were needed just to equal up the fuel and that increases drag, the Mosquito could also carry external tanks and drop tanks. 

So on cruise the P-51 pilot was looking for most economical cruise speed while the Mosquito could go for Max continuous. 

Later model PR Mosquitos sent to the far east had 1,192 gals internal fuel with 2 x 200 gal drop tanks, as close to a flying bowser as you can get.

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## drgondog (Nov 2, 2021)

pbehn said:


> I dont think the difference was performance, because the P-51 was faster. The difference was internal and external fuel. A PR Mosquito in UK had about 700 gals internal fuel, or 350 per engine. The P-51 had 245 gals. External tanks on a P-51 were needed just to equal up the fuel and that increases drag, the Mosquito could also carry external tanks and drop tanks.
> 
> So on cruise the P-51 pilot was looking for most economical cruise speed while the Mosquito could go for Max continuous.
> 
> Later model PR Mosquitos sent to the far east had 1,192 gals internal fuel with 2 x 200 gal drop tanks, as close to a flying bowser as you can get.


Yes, The L/D max for the P-51 for clean Mustang is higher than Mosquito. As you note, the internal fuel is the key.

As you note the difference in Max Continuous Cruise speed at 25,000 for a clean Mosquito is much higher than a P-51D w/2x110 gal tanks as the Mustang clean scoots at ~402mph TAS, but reduces to ~355mph TAS at 46"/3000 rpm and fuel flow of ~ 100gph. For optimal range to Berlin or greater, the Mustang cruis settings are at 32"/2250RPM for 281mph TAS and 57gph. Once tanks are punched, the optimal cruise settings for range are 29"/2050RPM at 303mph TAS.

I haven't researched PR Mosquito settings but with that much more internal fuel per engine - it had a lot of latitude to cruise in the 390 to 400mph range - not optimal but plenty of range.

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## pbehn (Nov 2, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Yes, The L/D max for the P-51 for clean Mustang is higher than Mosquito. As you note, the internal fuel is the key.
> 
> As you note the difference in Max Continuous Cruise speed at 25,000 for a clean Mosquito is much higher than a P-51D w/2x110 gal tanks as the Mustang clean scoots at ~402mph TAS, but reduces to ~355mph TAS at 46"/3000 rpm and fuel flow of ~ 100gph. For optimal range to Berlin or greater, the Mustang cruis settings are at 32"/2250RPM for 281mph TAS and 57gph. Once tanks are punched, the optimal cruise settings for range are 29"/2050RPM at 303mph TAS.
> 
> I haven't researched PR Mosquito settings but with that much more internal fuel per engine - it had a lot of latitude to cruise in the 390 to 400mph range - not optimal but plenty of range.


The account German Jet Encounters Say that the Mosquito had to throttle back 3 times as it was running ahead o the escort. I presume the effect of the fuel burn was more on the P-51s than the Mosquito. That would be an interesting exercise for students who know much more than me. As far as the PR crew are concerned an escort must have been a comfort unless it slowed them down enough to make interceptions much more likely, then it becomes like a turret.

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## Dimlee (Nov 2, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Ar234 operated from Norway, France and Belgium with III./KG76 before retreating to German proper.


Also from Grove, Denmark where three a/c were captured by the British. And Italy (already mentioned by Vincenzo).

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## Dimlee (Nov 2, 2021)

Vincenzo said:


> if i remember right the Ar-234 operated also from Italy


Kommando Sommer, based in Campoformido. 
Since the thread is about P-38, it makes sense to mention that Erich Sommer himself tried to attack F-5 Lightning in his Ar 234 armed with 2xMG151/20.

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## wuzak (Nov 2, 2021)

drgondog said:


> Yes, The L/D max for the P-51 for clean Mustang is higher than Mosquito. As you note, the internal fuel is the key.
> 
> As you note the difference in Max Continuous Cruise speed at 25,000 for a clean Mosquito is much higher than a P-51D w/2x110 gal tanks as the Mustang clean scoots at ~402mph TAS, but reduces to ~355mph TAS at 46"/3000 rpm and fuel flow of ~ 100gph. For optimal range to Berlin or greater, the Mustang cruis settings are at 32"/2250RPM for 281mph TAS and 57gph. Once tanks are punched, the optimal cruise settings for range are 29"/2050RPM at 303mph TAS.
> 
> I haven't researched PR Mosquito settings but with that much more internal fuel per engine - it had a lot of latitude to cruise in the 390 to 400mph range - not optimal but plenty of range.



The problem for the Mustang was not lack of cruise speed but lack of fuel?

Max continuous cruise for late Merlins was 2,650rpm with +7psi boost,. Adjust speed by rpm.

From the Operation Performance Notes for Mosquito Mks VIII, IX and XVI:






Recommended Economical cruising. Interestingly the home journey is at a lower speed. 






Maximum continuous cruising


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## drgondog (Nov 2, 2021)

wuzak said:


> The problem for the Mustang was not lack of cruise speed but lack of fuel?
> 
> Max continuous cruise for late Merlins was 2,650rpm with +7psi boost,. Adjust speed by rpm.
> 
> ...


Only in context of flying matching cuise speeds with PR Mossie.


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## pbehn (Nov 2, 2021)

How good or bad was the P-38 really?
Well it was in service before the USA entered the war and 10,000 were made so forget any comparison with late war or didnt even enter the conflict wonder weapons that did nothing at all.

It wasnt as good as a P-51 as a long range escort ,,,, so second to the best long range escort of the era in something vital to the whole USA and allied strategy.
It wasnt as good in MRCA roles as the Mosquito like PR, night fighter light bomber ,,,,, so second to the best in that category.

There are various states of "goodness" I cant see any case to be made for it being bad, without it, the allies are fighting a different war.

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## wuzak (Nov 2, 2021)

pbehn said:


> How good or bad was the P-38 really?



When it was good, it was very good, but when it was bad, it was better!

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## ThomasP (Nov 2, 2021)



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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 2, 2021)

pbehn said:


> How good or bad was the P-38 really?
> Well it was in service before the USA entered the war and 10,000 were made so forget any comparison with late war or didnt even enter the conflict wonder weapons that did nothing at all.
> 
> It wasnt as good as a P-51 as a long range escort ,,,, so second to the best long range escort of the era in something vital to the whole USA and allied strategy.
> ...


To add - it wasn't designed to fulfill either role

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## RichardSuhkoi (Jan 12, 2022)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Think about how a constant speed propeller behaves when it's working properly. Ready for takeoff, brakes set, throttles coming up, prop (at full increase) is on its low pitch stops. As RPM approaches redline, governor increases pitch slightly to provide enough rotational drag to stop the RPM rise at redline.
> Now, cleared for takeoff, brakes released, plane rolls forward, and with increasing forward relative wind, rotational drag decreases slightly and engine torque tries to spin the prop faster. How do you suppose the governor prevents this? You got it, it increases prop pitch to increase rotational drag back to the value that matches engine torque. As aircraft accelerates and forward relative wind increases, prop pitch has to keep increasing to keep RPM in check.
> Now what happens if the prop stops responding to the governor as the aircraft accelerates through forty knots? Once again, you got it. Runaway! The faster the aircraft goes the faster the engine will spin. The only way to prevent engine disintegration is to reduce throttle, which quite likely will not support flight.
> Another possible scenario, not related to electrical failure, is failure of a slipring or brush that transfers electrical power to the prop from the engine. If the "increase pitch" contact fails, the prop can only move in the "decrease pitch" direction, meaning that the constant "increase"-"decrease" commands that go on all the time become a ratcheting "decrease"-"decrease" series of responses, allowing engine torque to overwhelm propeller rotational drag and run wild.
> Hope this has helped.


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## RichardSuhkoi (Jan 12, 2022)

What little I know of the Curtiss Electric is that they had a backup electrical supply to improve reliability at least on some models. Also, massive redundancy on brushes with 6 fat brushes per slip ring. I’m sure the design intent was to fail fixed. But also the vibration is high and all those moving contacts you need to inspect this stuff regularly. Hydro props too- the servo seals can blow a leak and you pump out oil, that’s why these often have a pitch lock fail safe device.

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## IdahoRenegade (Jan 30, 2022)

Snowygrouch said:


> I`d just like to clarify, there was nothing at all wrong with the original intercooler design. Its just that if you use the leading edge of the wing as your intercooler, you
> leave yourself only an incredibly expensive and difficult route to increase its cooling capacity. Since this inevitably happened as everyones engines got progressively more powerful as time went, on, it was more a case than accidentally designed-in-obsolescence, than anything else. If you have the coolers in pods or just a traditional heat exchanger of some sort, its always a lot easier to make it deeper, or change the duct geometry or improve the exchanger fin density etc. It was just an extremely inflexible design, with no upgrade path - but it would have been fine at the engine outputs originally envisaged.


All very true. The wing leading edge design was selected because it did something no other intercooler approach did-it added no drag. Later model (J and L) aircraft got significantly more powerful engines, and could run them at higher power levels longer while maintaining CAT. But with the chin, core type intercoolers came additional drag, meaning the later aircraft were only slightly faster. I'm not sure about this but I would question if they were less fuel efficient as well. Granted, taking the intercoolers out of the wing leading edges freed up space for additional fuel tanks.

I always wondered if the '38 would have benefited from liquid to air intercoolers rather than air-air. It might have been possible to integrate liquid cooling passages with the leading edge skin and increase cooling, again without the increase in drag. Depends on the limitation was-was it getting heat out of the charge air and into the wing-skin or from the skin to atmosphere. Probably more susceptible to battle damage.

Some experiments were done with running later engines, 38H in particular, with the leading edge intercoolers, and allowing them to operate at higher CAT. I think Kelsey and Lavier (sp?) were involved with this, could be wrong. End result, they could run at much higher CAT than the AAC/F would allow them to, without observed problems.

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## wuzak (Jan 30, 2022)

IdahoRenegade said:


> All very true. The wing leading edge design was selected because it did something no other intercooler approach did-it added no drag. Later model (J and L) aircraft got significantly more powerful engines, and could run them at higher power levels longer while maintaining CAT. But with the chin, core type intercoolers came additional drag, meaning the later aircraft were only slightly faster. I'm not sure about this but I would question if they were less fuel efficient as well. Granted, taking the intercoolers out of the wing leading edges freed up space for additional fuel tanks.
> 
> I always wondered if the '38 would have benefited from liquid to air intercoolers rather than air-air. It might have been possible to integrate liquid cooling passages with the leading edge skin and increase cooling, again without the increase in drag. Depends on the limitation was-was it getting heat out of the charge air and into the wing-skin or from the skin to atmosphere. Probably more susceptible to battle damage.



A liquid-air intercooler may have required a smaller chin for the radiator than the air-air intercooler did. The benefit would be simplified routing of the intake air.

Not sure that running liquid coolant in leading edge surface radiators would have given much benefit over the earlier intercooler system.

The downside, compared to the J/L, is not being able to run extra fuel in a leading edge fuel tank.

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