# USA combat aircraft



## The Basket (Jan 21, 2017)

Why didn't the USA have a comparable aircraft in full production to the Spitfire/109 in the 1930s? It's odd that we critical to the Italians or Russians of Japanese for been behind but the Americans were also behind too.


----------



## mikewint (Jan 21, 2017)

The answer is that in the interwar years, the U.S. Congress and public were very isolationist, and the United States was not the same sort of world leader it is today. That change came under Franklin Roosevelt, who orchestrated the largest military build-up in world history.
Prior to WWII the 174,000-man U.S. Army ranked nineteenth in size in the world, behind Portugal and only slightly ahead of Bulgaria. Its half-strength divisions were scattered among numerous posts, its equipment obsolete, and it relied heavily on the horse.
As for the air forces, following the armistice, demobilization of the Air Service was rapid and thorough. At the end of WWI the Air Service possessed 185 aero squadrons; 44 aero construction; 114 aero supply, 11 aero replacement, and 150 spruce production squadrons; 86 balloon companies; six balloon group headquarters; 15 construction companies; 55 photographic sections; and a few miscellaneous units. By Nov. 22, 1919, all had been demobilized except one aero construction, one aero replacement, and 22 aero squadrons, 32 balloon companies, 15 photographic sections, and a few miscellaneous units. Between Nov.11, 1918 and June 30, 1920, officer strength plummeted from 19,189 to 1,168, and enlisted strength dropped from 178,149 to 8,428.
So while the United States had participated only marginally in the First World War, the experience was sufficiently costly that Americans turned the country decidedly inward in the 1920s. We disarmed our military forces and swiftly dismantled the nation’s war machinery. The United States Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and rejected membership in the nascent League of Nations. Congress in 1922 effectively closed the American market to foreign vendors with the Fordney-McCumber Tariff, among the highest in United States history, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff eight years later. Washington also insisted that the Europeans repay the entirety of the loans extended to them by the US Treasury during the war. And in 1924 the republic for the first time in its history imposed a strict limit on the number of immigrants who could annually enter the country. Among those eventually excluded (though none could yet know it) were thousands of Jewish would-be fugitives from Nazi persecution. Militarily, diplomatically, commercially, financially, even morally, Americans thus turned their backs on the outside world. 

Then came the Great Depression. By 1932, some thirteen million Americans were out of work, one out of every four able and willing workers in the country. Given the demography of the labor force and prevailing cultural norms that kept most women—and virtually all married women—out of the wage-paying economy, a 25 percent unemployment rate meant that, for all practical purposes, every fourth household in America had no breadwinner.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 22, 2017)

One has to be very careful of timing when making some of these comparisons.
For instance the Spitfire only made it into production in 1938 (ordered in 1936) and By Dec 1938 was only equipping two squadrons. Neither of which was declared operation until 1939. Things did improve rapidly at that point. Although the first 70-80 had fixed pitch props? 
The 109 While in production much, much earlier was pretty much in the Jumo 210 phase. 
In 1938 there were around a Dozen 109s built with DB 601 engines, depends on how you count prototypes or test aircraft. 10 109E-0s, a couple of 109E-1s (used for testing) perhaps a few 109E-3s (also used for testing) and a few prototypes. Yes they did build around 850 109Es in the first 8 months of 1939.
US had ordered 524 P-40s in April of 1939. Back in July of 1937 they had ordered 210 P-36As and combat between P-36As and 109C/Ds with their 700hp Jumo 210s might have proved interesting?

And the difference between the the US and Italians, Russians, Japanese is that the US had better engines already in the works which allowed for better aircraft to come on line quicker. The Wright R-2600 was going into small scale production with 163 built in 1939 (small numbers in 1938 = 39 engines) and work had started on the R-2800 in March of 1937. Work had actually started earlier on an 18 cylinder R-2600 but when P & W found out about the Wright R-2600 they upped the displacement. 
It can take around 3 years to go from design to 5th production engine if things go well for the US. 

Mikewint has painted a very vivid picture of the US economy of the times and I would add that once again, many of us do not take geography into account. The US needs for aircraft were different than the European needs. With only Canada and Mexico on our borders, the need for strong armies or air forces just wasn't a high priority as opposed to a strong Navy. Stop the attackers before they made land fall. Any war game scenarios about invasions usually had foreign power "X" sailing across the Atlantic and seizing a Caribbean Island as a staging point before continuing on to mainland America. The actual ability of aircraft in the first 1/2 of the 1930s to operate at even Caribbean to US distances was nil. 

B-17s created quite a stir (and political fall out) when they "intercepted" the Ocean Liner Rex in May 1938.
Interception of the Rex - Wikipedia

The US was not thinking about expeditionary forces to other continents for most of the 1930s.


----------



## The Basket (Jan 22, 2017)

In other aspects of aviation...Certainly civilian and bombers and larger aircraft in general the USA had a big advantage.


----------



## Glider (Jan 22, 2017)

mikewint said:


> Congress in 1922 effectively closed the American market to foreign vendors with the Fordney-McCumber Tariff, among the highest in United States history, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff eight years later. Washington also insisted that the Europeans repay the entirety of the loans extended to them by the US Treasury during the war. And in 1924 the republic for the first time in its history imposed a strict limit on the number of immigrants who could annually enter the country. Militarily, diplomatically, commercially, financially, even morally, Americans thus turned their backs on the outside world.


Does this sound horribly familiar?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 22, 2017)

I agree that the US was lagging, and that the main reason for that gap can be traced to Us isolationism. Something we are about to witness again I fear.

What were the causes and what were the characteristics of isolationism?

After World War I the US attempted to become less involved in world affairs.

"The US refused to join the League of Nations. Although President Wilson pushed hard for US membership, opposition in the US Senate was significant. Americans, after learning of the destruction and cost of World War I, did not want the United States to become entangled in another European conflict which could lead to another devastating war. Americans viewed the nations of Europe as conflict prone and likely to become involved in internal and external disputes which could draw in the United States into another war which really had little to do with American interests.

The US closed the doors to immigration during the 1920's. Early on the US had excluded Chinese, Japanese, and other Asians, but later the US began to exclude even Europeans, particularly eastern and southern Europeans.

Why did the US, a nation of immigrants, suddenly turn against immigration?

Answers: 1) anti-European feelings after WWI; 2) organized labor believed cheap immigrant labor forced down wages; 3) railroads and basic industries were well developed by 1920's and industrialists no longer felt the need for masses of unskilled workers; 4) more established Americans descended from northern Europe felt recent immigrants from eastern and southern Europe could never be truly American, and they also saw them as inferior; 5) radical political movement and ideologies such as socialism, communism, and anarchism were viewed as European in origin and as potential threats to political stability in the United States.

Immigration Laws:

1) Quota Act of 1921 – limited immigration from each country to 3 % of total number who had immigrated in 1910 and set a yearly limit of 350,000

2) The 1924 quota reduced the quota to 2%, the base year changed from 1910 to 1890. This discriminated against eastern and southern Europeans because many had come to the US after 1890

3) National Origins Act of 1929 – the base year was moved to 1920, but total number was set at 150,000

The War of Tariffs:

America set high tariffs on imports to keep out foreign products. This raised prices for American consumers because cheaper foreign products were kept out of the US market. It also took away an essential market (the US) from many European and Latin American countries. People in these countries lost their jobs as factories were unable to sell their products to the US, and farmers began to accumulate huge surpluses. Eventually foreign nations responded by raising their own tariffs and excluding American manufactured and farm products from foreign markets.

War Debts Unpaid:

The nations of Europe had accumulated huge debts during World War I when they had borrowed massive sums of money from the US to buy war goods. By 1918 the total amount owed to the US was about $10 billion. The US lowered interest rates on loans when Europeans faced difficulties in repaying, but high tariffs in the US prevented Europeans from earning the dollars they needed to pay off the loans.

The European Allies looked to war reparations from Germany as the solution to their debt problems. In 1921 a Reparations Commissions fixed the total amount of German reparations at $33 billion. Germany however was in the middle of an economic crises with high unemployment and hyper-inflation and was completely unable to pay the reparations. Germany attempted to borrow money from European and US banks to pay the reparations, but their were limits to what the Germans could borrow. By 1930 Germany was totally unable to make any other reparation payments.

A Legacy of Bitterness:

European allies claimed that they had done most of the fighting and had suffered the most during the war, and that consequently, the US should cancel all war debts. The US claimed that as much as 1/3 of the loans had been made after the armistice and that therefore the Europeans should have to pay. In the end most of the war debts and most of Germany's reparations remained unpaid. Nonetheless, the US's unsuccessful attempt to collect the war debts increased Europe's resentment against the US. Also, the Allies' unsuccessful attempt to collect reparations from the Germans contributed to a feeling of bitterness among the German people that contributed to the rise of Hitler in the early 1930's 

American relations with Latin America in the early 1900's had been characterized by US intervention to protect American investments and lives, and to uphold the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe doctrine which said the US had the right to act as a police officer of the Western Hemisphere. The Latin Americans resented US military intervention and the influence of American business on their economies and governments. American critics of US policy called it "dollar diplomacy" while Latin American critics called it "Yankee imperialism."

By the early 1930's however relations with Latin America had improved as Coolidge and Hoover worked hard to develop friendlier relations. The State Department declared the Monroe doctrine would no longer be used to justify US intervention in Latin American domestic affairs, and Latin American nations encouraged US investment and gave greater protection to these investments.

Although Harding and Coolidge recommended that the US join the World Court, the Senate was influenced by Americans fears of getting entangled in European alliances and affairs and refused to join the World Court.

The US worked with Great Britain and Japan to establish a naval holiday and a 53 ratio for capital ships (battleships and heavy cruisers) to help stop the naval armaments race in Asia. France and Italy would have fleets of equal size with a ratio of 1:.75 in this Five Power Treaty.

In the Four Power Pact, Japan, Great Britain, the US and France agreed to respect one another's rights in the Pacific and consult in a case of aggression.

In the Nine-Power Treaty nine powers with interests in Asia agreed to maintain the Open Door Policy for China and guarantee the territorial integrity of China.

The Kellog-Briand Pact or the Pact of Paris, attempted to outlaw war and was accepted by 62 nations. This was the idea of 1928 US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand. The pact was called "wishful thinking" since each country added its own reservations, not one outlawed a war of self defense (and most countries claim each war is a war of self-defense), and the document said nothing about enforcement.

The Peace structure began to crumble when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 in an effort to wipe out "foreign" influence from the Far East. Japan violated the Open Door Policy, the Covenant of the League of Nations which it had signed, the Nine Power Treaty, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Nonetheless, neither the US nor the League of Nations did anything to stop Japan beyond making statements of protest. Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and made preparations to invade and conquer China and Southeast Asia.

Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany realized that they too could begin programs of aggression after 1933 without facing any real danger from the crumbling world peace structure".

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 22, 2017)

The US may have been behind in actual military purchases but was not behind in technical innovations or design. Even in fighters.






*First flight* 20 March 1932
Loser in the competition




*First flight* July 1932
and




*First flight* January 1934 although developed from




First flight in 1931

Continued

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 22, 2017)

For Biplanes you had the Grumman FF-1




All metal fuselage, enclosed cockpit retracting landing gear first flight 29 December 1931.
evolved into 




first flight 18 October 1933.
Rival Curtiss was not being left behind. 




first flight in 1933

Now just how innovative or advanced were the Arado 65 and 68 or the He 51 in comparison? 
The Italian CR 32?
The Japanese Ki 10?
The French *Blériot SPAD S.510?*
Even the Dewoitine D.500/D.501 does not look all that advanced;




Prototype first flew on 18 June 1932


----------



## The Basket (Jan 23, 2017)

If one looks at the attacks on December 1941, the main American defensive fighter is the Curtiss P-40B which even been kind is not as good as the latest British or German fighter.
I'm not even going to mention the Buffalo.
In my view, the perceived weakness of the USA in 1941 led directly to Pearl Harbour. Had the Japanese had the full understanding that they are about to open the gates to their own hell then they may have acted different. Although knowing about Japan in 1940s probably not.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 23, 2017)

You may want to revise your view. The P-40C had been out of production for 8 months at the time of Pearl Harbor, let alone the P-40B which went out of production 1-2 months earlier. Curtis was cranking out around 150 P-40s a month in the spring of 1941. There were only 131 P-40Bs built. Production shifted to the P-40D in July and the P-40E in August. Curtiss was building around 250 P-40s a month in the fall of 1941, granted a large number were for the British. 

Not mentioning the Buffalo the way you did also shows that your perception is off. There were 509 Buffaloes built, 346 of them for export. USN got 163. Of those 9 were delivered in Dec 1941 and 1 in Jan 1942 to close out the order. AS of the end of November 1941 there were just over 400 F4Fs built. 

BTW there were 748 P-39s built as of the end of Nov 1941 and 154 P-38s and 70 P-51 Mustangs (British contract).

I would also say that taking a "snap shot" of a particular day or even month and trying to draw conclusions about the state of a countries level of technical advancement can lead to some real errors. One country or another rarely (try never) held the lead for years on end. They often swapped back and forth. Sometimes more than once a year. 

You may also want to consider the P-47 in your view. It takes time to bring a plane into service. Sept 1940 saw 733 production P-47B&C models placed on order, May saw the first flight of the XP-47B, Oct 1941 sees an order for 850 P-47Ds, First production P-47B is rolled out the door Dec 21, 1941 but needs changes (perils of ordering of the drawing board). Yes it takes quite a while to get the P-47 into squadron use but then it is one of the largest, heaviest and most complicated fighters in existence at the time, a distinction it shares with the P-38. I am sure we can all see how backwards the US was in fighter design in 1941 (sarcasm).

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## pinehilljoe (Jan 23, 2017)

Glider said:


> Does this sound horribly familiar?



please this is the one forum i can escape to and not be blasted with contemporary politics

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## The Basket (Jan 23, 2017)

Highlighting the P-47 shows more sarcasm 
So let's see...Was the P-47 ready for Pearl Harbour? No.
Invasion of Russia? No
Battle of Britain? No.
As you said in 1941 had plenty of designs plenty of prototypes and aircraft in production but which aircraft were actually in combat December 1941 when the Japanese attacked? 
Or at Midway in 1942? Wildcats and Buffalo's? 
America was behind and yes they caught up. But behind they were.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 23, 2017)

Hmmm, 
let's flip things shall we. 
Was the KI43 ready for Pearl Harbor? yes
Invasion of Russia? Ah....No
Battle of Britain? again NO. 

Since the US was only in combat for 3 weeks in 1941 it seems you can pick and choose which aircraft you want to count.
I would note that the much of the RAF's combat in 1941 was borne by Hurricanes in P-40s. Not because the British were _behind _in design or development but because they _choose _not to deploy their best fighter to other theaters and kept thenm at home for home defense. Yet the US is criticized for slow development by keeping it's best fighters at home and sending the 2nd string to the far flung outposts? 
Granted some of them, like the P-38 weren't really ready for combat but then few American squadrons were regardless of type of fighter due to lack of experience. 

Harping on the Buffalo shows you don't understand what was going on. Jan 27th 1942 saw VF-2 fly their Buffaloes of the Lexington and hand them over to the Marines. VF-2 was reequipped with F4F-3A wildcats. VF-2 was the last Navy squadron to use the Buffalo from a carrier and in fact had been the ONLY Navy squadron equipped with Buffaloes since Sept of 1941 if not before. Yes the Marines got one squadron worth of Buffaloes but then the Marines in 30s and early 40s tended to get leftovers from the Army and Navy. 

Please remember that getting new aircraft from the factories to combat zones took weeks longer for the Americans than it did for just about anybody else. 

You claim the F4F was Behind. First service use of a mechanical two speed supercharger. Beat R-R by over a year. Production F4F-3s going to a service squadron about 12-13 months before the prototype MK IX Spitfire flies. Four gun F4F carries almost exactly the same weight of guns and ammo as a Spitfire with two belt feed 20mm guns and four .303. F4F carries 44% more internal fuel.
They won't do each others jobs or at least, sure didn't start out that way. The F4F dead ended well before the Spitfire but was still a useful airplane into 1944 which is more than can be said for many fighters that first flew in 1938 or a bit after.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## BLine22 (Jan 23, 2017)

The P-40 may have been lacking in comparison to the Spitfire and BF-109 but is competitive against any other fighter in the world at the beginning of 1942. The F4F as a naval fighter proved it could compete against the Zero using the proper tactics. In other areas the U.S. already had the B-17, B-25, B-26, A-20, TBF, SBD, and C-47.


----------



## The Basket (Jan 24, 2017)

Ok....
So did the USA in 1940 have a fighter that matched the latest 109 Emil in performance and production and numbers in service?
If the answer is no then America is behind. Simple as that.


----------



## Robert Porter (Jan 24, 2017)

From my own understanding of history and having been married to a Brit I have to say most Eurpoeans do not compare apples to apples as we say. In England, Germany, Italy etc when an aircraft rolled off the assembly line it could be delivered to an operational unit the next day. The US thankfully saw little if any combat on or near our shores barring U-Boat attacks and some minor invasions in the Aleutian islands, with the notable exception of Pearl Harbor which is near as far from mainland US as England itself. So for aircraft produced here in our factories we were often faced with months of lead time, especially in the 41 and 42 timeframe to get the produced aircraft to a theater of operations. 

All that being said, I believe as someone above pointed out technical leadership passed back and forth throughout the war years and beyond. However it is extremely difficult in the early years of the war to compare aircraft that were operational since the US was a long way away from most of the areas aircraft were operated in combat. We often had aircraft on a par with anything else but could not get them to the front lines in sufficient numbers quickly. Hence the appearance of the US "lagging" behind.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## buffnut453 (Jan 24, 2017)

Robert,

You're forgetting the requirement the British had to supply aircraft to the outposts of Empire. Egypt, Libya, Palestine, Iraq, Malaya/Singapore, Burma, India, eastern Africa, South Africa...and that's without even mentioning Australia, Canada, New Zealand. Viewing British defence issues in 1939-1941 as purely a European problem doesn't match reality - the Brits had many of the problems that America had in 1941 trying to distribute new aircraft to the front line but with the added problem of actually fighting a war while doing it (and trying to aid other nations, like Greece, that were resisting fascist aggression).

Germany and France had similar, but less broad, issues. The Luftwaffe had to supply aircraft to wherever there was fighting, largely driven by Hitler's constant appetite to escalate the war irrespective of whether Germany had the resources to accomplish his objectives. Even France had to support north Africa, Syria and other colonies like French Indo-China.

Personally, I don't think America was far behind other nations from a technological standpoint. The bigger lag was in rearmament at the scale necessary for a full-blown conflict. The European nations began that process in the latter half of the 1930s but America truly only started kicking into gear 2 years after the invasion of Poland. That said, once the sleeping giant was roused, it became an unstoppable force bringing both quantity and quality to the war that the Axis powers were unable to counter.

Just my two penn'orth.

Cheers,
Mark

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 24, 2017)

In all fairness, the USN and USAAC had not been engaged in any military conflicts while the rest of the world had been at war for several years - thus the pilot experience, which would be the determining factor in U.S. fighters at the onset (F2A versus IJN/IJA types, for example) is what proved to be the biggest liability - not the equipment.
The other contributing factor to the U.S. "lagging behind", was that it was not at war.

Japan opened that can of worms and compare the U.S. inventory between December 1941 and December 1942. Or better still, make that comparison between two year's time for an even bigger contrast. Tell me what other nation on earth managed to leap forward from a stand-still to outproducing all other nations combined in such a short time?

And as has been mentioned before, the U.S. isolationist policies coupled with slowly emerging from the Great Depression put a limit on the military. The U.S. did possess several types that were very competitive with it's contemporaries as of 1939, and while development progress was slow for reasons I just mentioned, there were still some very potent fighters coming down the line.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 24, 2017)

The Basket said:


> Ok....
> So did the USA in 1940 have a fighter that matched the latest 109 Emil in performance and production and numbers in service?
> If the answer is no then America is behind. Simple as that.



P-40.
778 copies produced in 1940. 357 mph ( link )


----------



## Robert Porter (Jan 24, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> Robert,
> 
> You're forgetting the requirement the British had to supply aircraft to the outposts of Empire. Egypt, Libya, Palestine, Iraq, Malaya/Singapore, Burma, India, eastern Africa, South Africa...and that's without even mentioning Australia, Canada, New Zealand. Viewing British defence issues in 1939-1941 as purely a European problem doesn't match reality - the Brits had many of the problems that America had in 1941 trying to distribute new aircraft to the front line but with the added problem of actually fighting a war while doing it (and trying to aid other nations, like Greece, that were resisting fascist aggression).
> 
> ...


I agree that there were needs to move aircraft by other nations great distances, but I was responding to the statement re: the Battle of Britain timeframe. And while other countries had to move some aircraft long distance the US had to move ALL aircraft a long way as well as aircrews, support crews, entire spares inventory and the entire base infrastructure in most cases. Aside from the US, only Japan moved men and material that far in large numbers. North Africa is close for the RAF compared to the US moving men and material to European or Pacific fronts or Africa. What seems to escape Europeans about distances is for instance the distance for the RAF to move equipment from say London to Egypt is LESS than the distance for the US to move equipment from our west coast to shipping ports on our own east coast. Then they faced an even longer journey to get to their respective combat operational areas. Not saying that all combat aircraft were produced on our west coast just illustrating the point.

So I honestly think that fact is often overlooked and undervalued when folks speak of the US lagging, not to mention due to our isolationism, right or wrong it was there, we were kicked rather quickly into the affray long after the other parties had been in open combat. As Japan's Yamamoto supposedly pointed out, the "Sleeping Giant" was awake and pretty much ticked off. I think our production record alone during WW2 is second to no others. 

I guess what I am trying to say is I am slightly offended when I hear comparisons like this between pre war US and even early war US and our Allies and the Axis who in most cases were at war since 1939 or earlier. The technology gap was not as portrayed but certainly the ability to bring that technology to bear in a meaningful sense and numbers was there.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## buffnut453 (Jan 24, 2017)

Robert,

I have some sympathy with the position you're taking, and I agree that the vastness of the US has to be experienced to be understood (same is true for Australia, though, and it's far more desolate). Your point about North Africa is valid...but please remember that during the Battle of Britain timeframe, aside from the North African Campaign, there was also fighting in East Africa from June 1940 to November 1941 not to mention operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean, including the Taranto Raid. Also India, Burma, Malaya and Singapore are a lot further away from the UK than North Africa, and all those places were reinforced during the same timeframe. 

To claim that the US and Japan were the only countries to move large numbers of men globally is simply not correct. Yes, the British used large numbers of soldiers from the Empire but they were not necessarily locally deployed. For example, Indian troops were deployed to Iraq, North Africa, East Africa and Malaya/Singapore, again during the period of the Battle of Britain and shortly thereafter. The Gurkhas served in Italy and Greece, as well as North Africa MalBritish troops served globally, too. The logistical and administrative challenges were massive, not least dealing with numerous different languages rather than the relative linguistic homogeneity of the US military. This is not "America bashing". I'm simply pointing out that the US wasn't the only nation with global reach during WWII, even early on in the summer of 1940.

My point about lack of numbers being the primary US lag is, I think, still valid notwithstanding the causal factors of interwar isolationism and the impact of the Great Depression. The latter was not a problem unique to America. It also impacted the rest of the world, particularly those countries, like the UK, that were recovering from the First World War. The UK was particularly hard hit in core "heavy" industries like coal mining, steel making and ship building. The textile industry also suffered. Despite all these issues, the UK did rearm in the latter quarter of the 1930s but largely because she had to. America had more breathing space but, even so, wasn't truly prepared for war when it came in December 1941.

Kind regards,
Mark


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 24, 2017)

There seems to be some confusion as to lagging behind in design or technical ability or in production, let alone rushing the newest and best thousands of miles from the factories or supply centers. 
Some countries were ahead in some areas and some in other areas. 

Picking one or two aircraft at a particular point in time and disregarding some of the things that made them good aircraft or something that might make them a whole lot less valuable to another country doesn't paint an accurate picture.
To avoid picking on the Germans I will pick on the British. At one point the Spitfire was the fastest fighter in the world. Late 1938/39. Does this mean it was the most advanced? It was severely handicapped on climb by it's fixed pitch prop. Going back to the Germans, the 109s, after the first small batches, used a prop licenced from the backwards, lagging Americans. 
Design and development cover a range of things like structures, airfoils, lift devices, landing gear, and more. 
Try to figure out if one airplane can do the others full job (range/endurance/feild length,etc) before declaring plane x is more advanced than plane y.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Jan 24, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> Robert,
> 
> I have some sympathy with the position you're taking, and I agree that the vastness of the US has to be experienced to be understood (same is true for Australia, though, and it's far more desolate). Your point about North Africa is valid...but please remember that during the Battle of Britain timeframe, aside from the North African Campaign, there was also fighting in East Africa from June 1940 to November 1941 not to mention operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean, including the Taranto Raid. Also India, Burma, Malaya and Singapore are a lot further away from the UK than North Africa, and all those places were reinforced during the same timeframe.
> 
> ...


You are quite correct, nor was I trying to bash the U.K. deployment of men and material. But in terms of sheer numbers I think the American involvement, especially in Asia and the Pacific rapidly outstripped anything the allies were able to bring to bear. My point being I suppose that from a standing start the US began fighting a global war with combatants already fully engaged and on a war time footing for production and recruiting and training. To say that we were not on a par at the very start of the war considering these facts and the sheer distances involved is mildly offensive at the least. We did have aircraft as pointed out that were at parity to a large extent at the same times. They were not actively involved in fighting except for a very small group in China, but they were actively involved in short order.


----------



## buffnut453 (Jan 24, 2017)

Probably more accurate to say America entered a global war and was forced to adapt to that circumstance. That America did so says much about the latent capacity, both numerical and qualitative, inherent in both industry and capacity. However, we shouldn't kid ourselves that it happened overnight. For example, the 8th Air Force only commenced regular operations on 17 August 1942 which is a long time, relatively speaking, after America entered the war. Again, I'm not dinging...simply pointing out that we shouldn't gloss over the huge logistical, recruiting, training and equipment challenges that had to be overcome, all of which imposed lag on delivering combat effect. Certainly, things happened faster in the Pacific Theater but that was, in part, because America had been preparing for the war against Japan, hence the positioning of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and the reinforcing of the Philippines.


----------



## Robert Porter (Jan 24, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> Probably more accurate to say America entered a global war and was forced to adapt to that circumstance. That America did so says much about the latent capacity, both numerical and qualitative, inherent in both industry and capacity. However, we shouldn't kid ourselves that it happened overnight. For example, the 8th Air Force only commenced regular operations on 17 August 1942 which is a long time, relatively speaking, after America entered the war. Again, I'm not dinging...simply pointing out that we shouldn't gloss over the huge logistical, recruiting, training and equipment challenges that had to be overcome, all of which imposed lag on delivering combat effect. Certainly, things happened faster in the Pacific Theater but that was, in part, because America had been preparing for the war against Japan, hence the positioning of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and the reinforcing of the Philippines.


I agree entirely, that was my point, written more clearly by you than me and thanks! It most certainly did not happen overnight, hence comparing and contrasting combat aircraft at an early stage of the war (for the US) was illogical and flawed. It took years to ramp up production and then get the produced aircraft to multiple fronts and deployed, not to mention training thousands of pilots from scratch, especially when one considers the horrific loss rate of bomber crews when the 8th did enter the war in large numbers. It was not a case of any lag in technology, nor was it even lack of ability. It was simply the lag induced by ramping production up and switching from building cars to tanks and planes. Then moving all that hardware to where it was needed. 

We were somewhat aided in the fact that while not actively fighting in the early stages we were supplying massive amounts of material and consumables such as oil to our future allies (and unfortunately to some of our future enemies) prior to entering the war itself. So to some degree planning was well under way prior to our entering the hostilities as a combatant. Manufacturing had already ramped up prior to Pearl Harbor and went literally into overdrive after.


----------



## mikewint (Jan 24, 2017)

With regard to the "neutrality" of the US prior to Pearl let's call it semi-neutral...
Five weeks before Pearl Harbor, the German U-boat U-522 torpedoed and sank the American destroyer USS Reuben James in the North Atlantic. The American vessel was steaming from Newfoundland towards Iceland on Oct. 31 1941 when the British convoy she was escorting came under attack by a pack of German subs. Just before dawn, the Reuben James was hit near the forward magazine by a torpedo. The ensuing blast tore the bow section right off the World War One Clemson-class destroyer. She sunk in minutes, taking 115 of her crew down with her. Forty-four survived the attack.

Two weeks prior to the incident, another American destroyer operating from Reykjavik, Iceland, suffered damage from a German torpedo. On Oct. 17, the USS Kearny along with two other vessels left their anchorage to assist a squadron of Canadian warships struggling to defend a convoy from a concerted U-boat attack. In the ensuing action, the U-568 fired on the Kearny’s starboard side, damaging the vessel and killing 11 crewmen. The ship limped back to port for repairs.

A month before the Kearny incident, a shore party from the U.S. Coast Guard vessel Northland knocked out an unmanned German weather station located on Greenland. It would be the first time in the war that American forces destroyed German military equipment. In April of 1941, the Northland very nearly was sunk. While patrolling off Greenland, the cutter strayed within six miles of the German battleship Bismarck. The British mistook the American vessel as an enemy escort and came dangerously close to firing on her.

The U.S. Navy’s first clash with the Kriegsmarine occurred in April of 1941 when the USS Niblack attacked a Nazi U-boat off the coast of Iceland. After departing its base in Newfoundland as part of a mission that would see American troops occupy the mid-Atlantic island nation, the Niblack broke from formation to respond to a distress call from a torpedoed Dutch cargo vessel. While bringing aboard survivors, sonar operators aboard the warship detected an unidentified submarine moving in for the kill. The Niblack attacked the sub with depth charges. Although the weapons failed to damage the U-boat, the encounter represented America’s first hostile action of the Second World War.

The first American military death of the Second World War didn’t happen at sea, but during the Battle of Dombas, Norway in April of 1940. Following an unsuccessful airborne assault, the German high command ordered bombers to level the city. A military attaché with the American consulate was killed during the raid. Capt. Robert Losey, a U.S. Army meteorological officer, died while evacuating American diplomats and their staff to a railway tunnel.

Japan’s first blow against the United States fell a full four years before Pearl Harbor and two years prior the outbreak of war in Europe. In late 1937, the U.S. Navy gunboat Panay was moored in Nanking harbor. Although Japan was at war in China at the time, the United States was officially neutral. Despite this, the 190-foot-long vessel was strafed and bombed by Japanese bi-planes for two hours on the afternoon of Dec. 12. A dozen Imperial fighters attacked even though the vessel flew several U.S. flags and had an enormous stars and stripes painted on the ship’s deck. The USS Panay sank in the Yangtze River with the loss of three crew members. Forty-five were injured in the attack. Japan apologized for the incident and paid the United States $2 million, but relations between the two powers were strained after the bombing.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Jan 24, 2017)

While the US was late to WWII, once war was declared the US effort was massive:
According to the AAF Statistical Digest, in less than four years (December 1941- August 1945), the US Army Air Forces lost 14,903 pilots, aircrew and assorted personnel plus 13,873 airplanes — inside the continental United States. They were the result of 52,651 aircraft accidents (6,039 involving fatalities) in 45 months.
That’s an average of 1,170 aircraft accidents per month—- nearly 40 a day. (Less than one accident in four resulted in totaled aircraft, however.)
Almost 1,000 Army planes disappeared en route from the US to the war zones. Once there it get even worse, 43,581 aircraft were lost overseas including 22,948 on combat missions (18,418 against the Western Axis) and 20,633 attributed to non-combat causes overseas.
In a single 376 plane raid in August 1943, 60 B-17s were shot down. That was a 16 percent loss rate and meant 600 empty bunks in England. In 1942-43 it was statistically impossible for bomber crews to complete a 25-mission tour over Europe .
Pacific theatre losses were far less (4,530 in combat) owing to smaller forces committed. The worst B-29 mission, against Tokyo on May 25, 1945, cost 26 Superfortresses or 5.6 percent of the 464 dispatched from the Marianas .
On average, 6,600 American servicemen died per month during WWII, about 220 a day. By the end of the war, over 40,000 airmen were killed in combat theatres and another 18,000 wounded. Some 12,000 missing men were declared dead, including a number “liberated” by the Soviets but never returned. More than 41,000 were captured, half of the 5,400 held by the Japanese died in captivity, compared with one-tenth in German hands. Total combat casualties were pegged at 121,867.
US manpower made up the deficit. The AAF’s peak strength was reached in 1944 with 2,372,000 personnel, nearly twice the previous year’s figure.
While the manpower losses were huge, so were production totals. From 1941 through 1945, American industry delivered more than 276,000 military aircraft. That number was enough not only for US Army, Navy and Marine Corps, but for allies as diverse as Britain , Australia, China and Russia . In fact, from 1943 onward, America produced more planes than Britain and Russia combined. And more than Germany and Japan together during 1941-45.
The Axis powers also took massive losses. Through much of 1944, the Luftwaffe sustained uncontrolled hemorrhaging, reaching 25 percent of aircrews and 40 planes a month. And in late 1944 into 1945, nearly half the pilots in Japanese squadrons had flown fewer than 200 hours. The disparity of two years before had been completely reversed.
As to combat training, most US crews went to war with absolute minimums of training. Some fighter pilots entered combat in 1942 with less than one hour in their assigned aircraft.
The 357th Fighter Group (often known as The Yoxford Boys) went to England in late 1943 having trained on P-39s. The group never saw a Mustang until shortly before its first combat mission. A high-time P-51 pilot had 30 hours in type. Many had fewer than five hours. Some had one hour.
With arrival of new aircraft, many combat units transitioned in combat. The attitude was, “They all have a stick and a throttle. Go fly `em.” When the famed 4th Fighter Group converted from P-47s to P-51s in February 1944, there was no time to stand down for an orderly transition. The Group commander, Col. Donald Blakeslee, said, “You can learn to fly `51s on the way to the target.
A future P-47 ace said, “I was sent to England to die.” He was not alone. Some fighter pilots left on their first combat mission with one previous flight in the aircraft. Meanwhile, many bomber crews were still learning their trade: of Jimmy Doolittle’s 15 pilots on the April 1942 Tokyo raid, only five had won their wings before 1941. All but one of the 16 copilots were less than a year out of flight school.
In WWII flying safety took a back seat to combat. The AAF’s worst accident rate was recorded by the A-36 Invader version of the P-51: a staggering 274 accidents per 100,000 flying hours. Next worst were the P-39 at 245, the P-40 at 188, and the P-38 at 139. All were Allison powered.
Bomber wrecks were fewer but more expensive. The B-17 and B-24 averaged 30 and 35 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, respectively. Compare that to more recent times, from 1980 to 2000 the Air Force’s major mishap rate was less than 2.
The B-29 was even worse at 40; the world’s most sophisticated, most capable and most expensive bomber was too urgently needed to stand down for mere safety reasons. The AAF set a reasonably high standard for B-29 pilots, but the desired figures were seldom attained.
The original cadre of the 58th Bomb Wing was to have 400 hours of multi-engine time, but there were not enough experienced pilots to meet the criterion. Only ten percent had overseas experience. Conversely, when a $2.1 billion B-2 crashed in 2008, the Air Force initiated a two-month “safety pause” rather than declare a “stand down”, let alone grounding.
The B-29 was no better for maintenance. Though the R3350 was known as a complicated, troublesome power-plant, no more than half the mechanics had previous experience with the Duplex Cyclone.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Jan 24, 2017)

Beyond a shadow of a doubt the US had withdrawn from the international community and isolationism ruled. As far as the US public were concerned the Great Depression was all it could handle and Europe's problems were Europe's problems. There was no interest or need for a first class Air Corps or Army though the need for sea power did fare better.
Prior to 1939 the Air Corps, like the rest of the U.S. Army, had suffered the neglect which was then the usual lot of our armed forces in peacetime. Although the Air Corps Act of 1926 had established a maximum strength of 1,800 serviceable planes for the Army, to be attained in 5 years, the number actually on hand 10 years later was only 946.1 In June 1936, Congress accepted the recommendations of the latest of the many boards which periodically examined the mission and needs of the Air Corps and sanctioned a maximum Air Corps strength of 2,320 planes, which the Air Corps hoped to attain by 30 June 1940. As a result of this legislation, congressional appropriations for the Air Corps during fiscal years 1937-39 were almost double those of the preceding three years, reaching over $70,000,000 in 1939, as compared with barely $30,000,000 in 1935. But in the face of events in Europe and the Far East it became apparent to many people, and especially to President Roosevelt, that much more would be required. On 30 June 1938, the year in which the President launched a new program of expansion, our total Army air strength was only 1,401 planes, of which fewer than 900, many of them obsolescent, could be classed as combat planes. The existence of a comparable situation in the Navy had been noted in time to make a 3,000-plane program a significant feature of the Naval Expansion Act of May 1938. By fall it had become apparent that the Air Corps too must be re-equipped and greatly expanded.
Of all the models of aircraft on hand in the Air Corps in September 1939, only one--the B-17--actually flew as a first-line plane during World War II. In 1939 the B-18 was the standard bombardment plane, the A-17 the standard attack plane, and the P-36 the standard fighter; almost 700 of the 800 first-line combat aircraft of the Air Corps consisted of these three models. By the time of America's entry into the war two years later, all of them would be obsolete.
The Air Corps planes had been described by President Roosevelt in January 1939 as "antiquated weapons." The latest model of the P-36 had an operating speed of 270 miles per hour, a ceiling of 32,000 feet, and a maximum armament of three .30-caliber and one .50-caliber machine guns. The chief British fighters--the Spitfire and the Hurricane--were both far ahead of the P-36 in performance. The Spitfire had an operating speed of 312 miles per hour, a ceiling of 35,000 feet, and an armament of eight .303-caliber machine guns. The Me-109, had an operating speed of 298 miles per hour, a service ceiling of 36,000 feet, and it carried two machine guns and two 20-mm. guns. The contrast was all the more significant because the P-36 was at the height of its performance potential in 1939, while the German and British fighters were still capable of further developments and would show significant improvement in performance during the course of the war.
In its attack bombers, the United States was even more outclassed. The German Heinkel 111, Dornier 17, Junkers 87, and especially the Junkers 88, were all superior to the American attack bombers. The highly over-rated Ju-87, a single-engine monoplane, the dread Stuuka dive bomber in 1940, had a maximum speed of 245 miles per hour and a cruising speed just under 200 miles. The Ju-88 had a top speed of nearly 300 miles per hour and a cruising speed of 260. It could carry a bomb load of 2,200 pounds and was armed with three machine guns. The American A-17, by contrast, was a single-engine monoplane with a maximum speed of 220 miles per hour and a cruising speed of 170; it carried five .30-caliber machine guns and a normal bomb load of 654 pounds. It had a service ceiling of 19,400 feet.
Only in the field of heavy bombers did the Air Corps hold first rank. The B-17 was superior to the Focke-Wulf of the Germans and the Manchester of the British, but in September 1939 the Air Corps had only twenty-three (including three experimental B-17A's) Flying Fortresses.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jan 24, 2017)

From what I have read, the Hawk 75 (US P-36) was more agile than the Spitfires & Bf-109s of the time.

I think there were other aircraft the US Operated in September 39 that also saw front line service. The Douglas Devastator comes to mind as well as the Curtiss P-36.


----------



## buffnut453 (Jan 24, 2017)

Great posts Mike. Can't argue with any of it. We often forget the number of aircraft and personnel lost in training accidents. By modern standards, the "acceptable" training loss rate in peacetime was extremely high . Adding wartime imperatives (eg cutting training hours and pushing personnel through the system as fast as possible) and the training loss rate was bound to increase. It was a mindset that continued long after the war was over. The story goes that the minimum size of a conversion course onto Meteors in the postwar period was 8 pilots because it was expected that 2 of them would likely be killed in training and there was a need for 6 pallbearers. Dunno how true it is but given the wartime loss rates, 2 per course probably seemed pretty tame.


----------



## Robert Porter (Jan 24, 2017)

I had no concept of the number of aircraft and personnel losses in training and non combat related accidents. That is truly terrible in any time frame. I know in my own training we lost 2 guys to training accidents and thought that was horrific. But that was from an entire training squadron. My particular flight suffered no fatalities and few injuries in training. Unless you consider loss of dignity an injury, in that case we were at 100%! I never realized how effective the english language is as a tool to terrify and belittle until I met my first T.I.


----------



## Glider (Jan 24, 2017)

pinehilljoe said:


> please this is the one forum i can escape to and not be blasted with contemporary politics


Your right and I was wrong, apologies to one and all

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Friendly Friendly:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Graeme (Jan 24, 2017)

parsifal said:


> The US refused to join the League of Nations. Although President Wilson pushed hard for US membership, opposition in the US Senate was significant



Thread-drift. But I thought this interesting. Author Andrew Roberts (History of the English Speaking Peoples since 1900) puts a lot of the blame for the failure on Wilson himself...

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## The Basket (Jan 24, 2017)

P-40 doesnt have the performance of a 109 Emil or Spitfire.
When was the first P-40s delivered? June 1940?
The French ordered P-40s but war was over for them before getting a single one. 
So not ready for battle of Britain.
So in real terms the only modern performance fighter available for combat in numbers made by USA in 1940 which was readily available was the P-36 or Hawk 75.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 24, 2017)

P-40s were not in combat until 1941, with the Desert air force, however its predecessor, the hawk 75 was in action from the first day of the war, writing a glorious chapter in an otherwise dismal effort by the allies in France


The French Hawks were in action from almost the first day that the war began in Europe. On September 8, 1939, the Groupe de Chasse II/4, operating Hawk 75As succeeded in destroying two Messerschmitt Bf 109Es, the first Allied aerial victories of World War 2. The Hawk 75A served with Armee de l'Air Groupes de Chasse III/2, I/4, II/4, I/5 and II/5, these units claiming 230 confirmed kills and 80 "probables", as against losses totaling only 29 aircraft destroyed in aerial combat. Not bad for an aircraft not considered front line material. French Hawks gave better than they got. The Hawk 75A was neither as fast nor as well-armed as the Messerschmitt Bf 109E, but it was more maneuverable and could take more punishment. The leading French ace of 1939/40 was Lt Marin La Meslee, who scored 20 "kills" while flying the Hawk.

Only 291 Hawk 75A fighters were actually taken on strength by the Armee de l'Air before the collapse of French resistance, but a number were lost en route to French ports.


After the collapse of French resistance, those Armee de l'Air Hawks which had not escaped to unoccupied French territory or flown to England were taken over by the Luftwaffe. Some of the Armee de l'Air Hawk 75As were captured while still in their delivery crates. These were transported to Germany, whey they were overhauled and assembled by the Espenlaub Flugzeugbau, fitted with German instrumentation, and then sold to Finland. Finland received 36 former Armee de l'Air Hawk 75A-1s, A-2s and A-3s, along with eight former Norwegian Hawk 75A-6s. These Finnish Hawks participated in the war on the Axis side when Finland entered the war against the Soviet Union on June 25, 1941 and by all accounts acquitted themselves excellently. These Hawks gave a good account of themselves in Finnish service, and some Hawks remained in service in Finland until 1948.


After the Armistice, Armee de l'Air Groupes de Chasse I/4 and I/5 continued flying their Hawks with the Vichy Air Force, the former unit based at Dakar and the latter at Rabat. These Vichy Hawk 75As were to fight against other American planes when the Allies made the Operation Torch landings in North Africa in November 1942. In an air battle between these Hawks and carrier-based Grumman F4F Wildcats, 10 Vichy planes were shot down versus the loss of seven Wildcats. This is one of the few occasions during the Second World War in which American-built planes fought against each other.


P-40s were also used extensively before the entry of the US. Known in the RAF as the Tomahawk, the first Tomahawk fighter to see combat belonged to the No. 112 Squadron of the British Royal Air Force over North Africa; they noted the Tomahawk fighters' ability to absorb battle damage. On 29 Aug 1941, Australian pilot Clive Caldwell was engaged by two German Bf 109 fighters, including one piloted by hit by ace Werner Schroer; Caldwell downed Schroer and forced the wingman to disengage by heavily damaging his fighter, then made it safely back to base with damage from over 100 7.9mm bullets and five 20mm cannon shells.


In June 1941, there was a notable combat for Tomahawk fighters when with 9 Tommahawks from No. 3 Squadron RAAF attacked 16 German Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers escorted by 6 Bf 109 fighters. The RAAF Tomahawks would shoot down four Ju 87 and one Bf 109 aircraft for no loss.


In general, Tomahawks were able to fly competively against the 109E subtype, but struggled somewhat against the newer 109 F.

Reactions: Like Like:
4 | Like List reactions


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 25, 2017)

The Basket said:


> P-40 doesnt have the performance of a 109 Emil or Spitfire.



The 357 mph speed figure is equaly worth in USA, UK or Germany, if I'm not mistaking it badly.



> When was the first P-40s delivered? June 1940?
> The French ordered P-40s but war was over for them before getting a single one.
> So not ready for battle of Britain.
> So in real terms the only modern performance fighter available for combat in numbers made by USA in 1940 which was readily available was the P-36 or Hawk 75.



Why did you moved the goal post? In the post # 15 you asked:
_"So did the USA in 1940 have a fighter that matched the latest 109 Emil in performance and production and numbers in service?
If the answer is no then America is behind. Simple as that."_

What America has or has not in 1940 has no bearing on BoB or what French ordered or not. Any month in 1940 is still in 1940, whether it is October or May.
So yes - USA have had a fighter in 1940 that vould match the performance of 109 Emil, and it was in volume production and in service.


----------



## The Basket (Jan 25, 2017)

109 had better altitude ceiling and climb so did the P-40 match the 109? No.
So the P-40 not been available for French export is very important...To the French.


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 25, 2017)

France was not USA.
Rate of climb for the 109 Emil is at ~2650 fpm per graph on this web page (scroll down a bit) up until ~12000 ft, while the P-40 makes 3080 fpm (same pdf as previously linked to). Emil is better above 15000 ft.


----------



## swampyankee (Jan 25, 2017)

Do remember that the P-40 did quite well against the Luftwaffe. See P-40 and Zero (read past the first few paragraphs).


I think many USAAF and USN aircraft were under-rated. I'm sure that no Lufftwaffe pilot would underestimate a decently flown Hellcat or Corsair twice.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 25, 2017)

I'm quite happy to accept that the 109 was superior to any US fighter but its advantages were far from decisive, and its weaknesses were.

The 109 in my opinion enjoyed the edge in terms of firepower and climb. it had problems in a high speed dive, and was not particularly outstanding in turn. Early marks until the E4 were not armoured . Against the Allison Ponwered p-40 the DB601 gave huge benefits at altitude, but much less so low down.

Its glaring weaknesses were range and endurance. With only 60 rpg for main armament and an effective combat radius of about 120 miles, it suffered and was unable to complete its vital purposes in the BoB.

If the Luftwaffe had been magically able to exchange some of its Me109s for H-75 A4 or better, or the armoured versions of the P-40c, it would have had to accept downgraded overall performance and firepower in exchange for range and better ammunition supplies. obviously its a matter of opinion but my thoughts on this are that the Luftwaffe with an SE fighter with better range and ammunition supply and better able to take punishment, for at least some of its fighter forces, would have been in better shape to challenge the RAF.

So, I would describe the LW SE fighter as superior technically to the US but inferior to them from an operational needs point of view.

I should probably also point out that the 109 was not the entire suite of LW development. They had streams of development for every other type, and in these areas I don't think they were enjoying much of a lead at all.

Where the LW could be argued as being ahead were in the fields of rocket and jet propulsion and probably even electronics, at least until the tech exchanges with the UK.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2017)

The Basket said:


> Why didn't the USA have a comparable aircraft in full production to the Spitfire/109 in the 1930s? It's odd that we critical to the Italians or Russians of Japanese for been behind but the Americans were also behind too.




A lot of this has been answered. The US was not ordering aircraft in large numbers until 1939 and 1940. The order for 210 P-36As on July 7th 1937 was the largest aircraft order the US had placed since WW I. This was due, as has been mentioned, due to finances, lack of enemies or potential enemies within flying range, and a simple lack of squadrons to put them. Much like the British and French (and even the Germans) the number of existing squadrons was nowhere near the number of squadrons in existence in 1939/40 or 1941. 

Key words here _seem _to be in full production and then the term 1930s seems to be a bit flexible. 310 Spitfires were ordered on June 3 1936 yet the first production plane was flown May 15th 1938. Which is actually _AFTER _the first production P-36 was delivered. Curtiss taking a year less than Supermarine to get into production. Granted the first P-36s had a number of problems, however the Germans were building 109s with Jumo 210 engines with carburetors for most of 1938 so while the Spitfire, even with fixed pitch prop enjoyed a healthy speed advantage (climb was much less marked) over the P-36 the Bf 109C/D did not. 
The US also had the 2nd string P-35.

However the US was not satisfied with either of these planes and had announced a fighter design competition for Jan 1939. 
Entries included Lockheed XP-38, the Bell XP-39, the Seversky/Republic XP-41 (AP-2) and XP-43 (AP-4), and four planes from Curtiss, the H75R, XP-37, XP-40 and XP-42. Nor all aircraft were ready in time.

Now to show just how "backwards" the US was at the time, the XP-38, XP-39, Seversky AP-4 and XP-37 all had turbo superchargers.
The Seversky AP-2 and H75R both had 2 stage supercharged P & W R-1830 radials an early version of the engine used in the F4F. 
The XP-42 was a P-36 with an extension shaft and a long pointy nose on the radial engine. 
The P-40 was chosen as the low risk, fast into production option. 
But how many other nations could even assemble two different turbo charged planes and two different mechanical 2 stage supercharged planes ( the XP-38 and XP-39 were no shows) on the same airfield at the same time? 
The Seversky AP-4 was ordered into production as the P-43 and the first production aircraft was delivered in Aug of 1940. 

Now one reason the US planes _lagged behind _the Spitfire and 109 in performace in 1940 was that they were designed to fly almost twice as far. The P-36 holding 160 US gallons inside although not rated for combat with the rear tank holding fuel. The P-35 and P-43 were fitted with integral tanks (which did leak) holding even more fuel. P-40s even with self sealing fuel tanks held over 140 US gallons inside. 
SO the Spitfire and 109E couldn't meet US range requirements. Physical size of the US demanding greater range. 
The US planes also carried more ammo per gun than the British Fighters and the P-40B&C could keep firing the cowl .50s long, long after the 109E-3 ran out of cannon shells. 

Please remember that fighter Vs Fighter combat was only part of the duties. Fighter Vs bombers was also expected and fighters with large ammo supplies _could_ engage more targets. Perhaps not often but multiple intercepts were done.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2017)

parsifal said:


> Against the Allison Ponwered p-40 the DB601 gave huge benefits at altitude, but much less so low down.



I agree with everything but this. Yes the 109 had huge benefits at altitude but it had much more to do with the 109 being much lighter than any real attribute of the DB601 engine.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## The Basket (Jan 26, 2017)

A few clear ups
I certainly believe that the USA could have flown a first class fighter prototype in 1935 or 36 but didn't because of the reasons specified.
My premise is that because of delays the main defensive fighter in December 1941 at Pearl and Philippines was the P-40. 
My other premise is again the best American fghter that the French bought or could buy was the Hawk 75.
As mentioned the P-40 was reasonably competitive against the Emil but so was the Hurricane.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Jan 26, 2017)

The P-40 was heavier than the Bf109, was as nearly as fast or faster on the same power, was reputed to have better handling, had better maneuverability under some flight conditions, demonstrated at least comparable success in combat against the Bf109, but the US plane is the dog? And German designers were infinitely better and smarter?

How about this: the Luftwaffe started WW2 with a better grasp of air combat tactics than the RAF and the Commonwealth and maintained that edge in tactical skills until at least the defeat of Italy and the grinding down of the Luftwaffe in the aerial equivalent of trench warfare, not with markedly superior aircraft. I think it's accurate to say that the P-40 was not markedly inferior to the Bf109, and that the next generation of USAAF and RAF fighters were better than the Messerschmidt and the FW190. There wasn't enough combat to directly compare the USN aircraft to the Bf109 or the FW190, but I don't believe any Luftwaffe fighter pilot would chortle with joy after meeting a Corsair or Hellcat in combat.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 26, 2017)

The Basket said:


> A few clear ups
> I certainly believe that the USA could have flown a first class fighter prototype in 1935 or 36 but didn't because of the reasons specified.
> My premise is that because of delays the main defensive fighter in December 1941 at Pearl and Philippines was the P-40.
> My other premise is again the best American fghter that the French bought or could buy was the Hawk 75.
> As mentioned the P-40 was reasonably competitive against the Emil but so was the Hurricane.



The US was flying "first class fighter prototype*s* in 1935 or 36" they were the P-35 and P-36. The first P-36 (or Hawk 75) flew in May of 1935 which is 10 months before the Spitfires first flight and 6 months before the Hurricanes first flight. It was the same month the the first flight of a 109 was made. Both the Hawk and Bf 109 flew with engines that would not see production aircraft. The Germans, having no suitable engine of their own used a British Kestrel. The 3rd Bf 109 prototype doesn't fly until May of 1936, in part because there are no Jumo 210 engines available to power it.during this time the Hawk 75 went through about 4 engine changes. 

The very first Hawk 75 prototype, in addition to multiple engine changes, was converted to the first XP-37 prototype with Turbo-charged Allison engine. It first flew in April of 1937. the XP-40 airframe was the 10th P-36 off the production line so where the idea that the US wasn't able to design "first class" fighters come from is puzzling. 

The main obstacle for _*any* _country trying to design a first class fighter from 1935 to 1938-39 was the lack of *first class* engines.
The Jumo 210 may have been a very nice engine but it was in the same class as the Kestrel, a 20 liter engine just wasn't big enough. 
The Merlin had a lot of teething troubles and the British radials were too small and too old in design concept or couldn't be made in production quantities (sleeve valves). 
The French Hispano engine was also too old in concept and while it did OK  in the 30s it was about to slam into a wall, development wise.
Radials the size of the R-1830 if limited to 87-92 octane fuel weren't going to provide the power needed either (this takes out the Italians and Japanese).
The Germans were able to shoehorn the DB 601 engine into the small 109 airframe and were able to get the 20mm guns in the wing to work by late 1939 so they just squeaked in. It sure wasn't good planning or development as it took until the spring of 1941 to get the through the prop hub gun to work which had been part of the original requirement back in 1934. The requirement had been for a fighter with _either _two machine guns in the cowl or one cannon firing through the prop hub. 

One could also note that the Hawk 75 was as good or better than anything the French were building at the time of purchase and that the Dewoitine D.520 only _started _to enter squadron service in Jan 1940.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## The Basket (Jan 26, 2017)

Trap here is which 109 which P40.
One could say yeah the Emil and the P40 is competitive. Mention the Friedrich and that's a can of worms.
The French also could have done better and they paid the price. But the point has to be told that the RAF did not use the P-40 as a first line fighter on home soil.


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 26, 2017)

Friedrich is not Emil. RAF use of P-40 having no bearing on US use of P-40.
Why moving the goal post again?


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 26, 2017)

Mentioning the Friedrich does open whopping can of super worms. 
The Friedrich's that had wings and tails fall-off? 
The Friedrich was eventually turned into a first class fighter but it took a while. It also a case of jack up the canopy and slide a new fighter underneath, lower the canopy and and announce the new "model" of fighter. Some what of an exaggeration but you had a new spinner covering a new propeller which was hooked up to a new version of the DB 601 engine which was covered by a new cowl and used (after a few prototype/early production series) a new air intake and was cooled by a new radiator installation which was installed in...._you guessed it...._the new wingIII which often broke so it had to have a reinforced spar and heavier wing skinning, changes to slats and ailerons were also made in addition to the wing tips. The rake of the landing gear was also changed. Vertical fin was changed as was the rudder and the horizontal stabilizer lost the bracing struts (a mistake?) and were moved lower. 
Performance was much enhanced but the cut in armament, especially on the early ones is something of a problem. What do the Germans do? use the "F"s against British fighters and keep squadrons of "E"s around to intercept bombers?
Sixty 20mm shells per plane is hardly bomber killing armament in 1940/41. Sure they shot down some but how many planes escaped because the German pilots ran out of ammo? The 15mm gun was something of an improvement but was biased more to fighter combat than bomber interceptions. The high MV aiding defection shooting but the low HE content lowered the damage per hit. 
Shortages of the new engine also meant that the early Friedrich while an improvement on teh 109E weren't up to full potential. 

The French could only have done better by developing a new engine starting in 1934 or so and moving to better fuel in time for the Spring of 1940. No amount of minor fiddling around with the Hispano engine was going to make it competitive in 1940 with 87 octane fuel.


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 26, 2017)

Yes, the Germans made improvements in the Bf109 (several times) to keep it competitive with the Allied fighters. And they were able to pull that off and did manage to keep the Bf109 in the fight until the end of the war - after a great deal of effort and expense.

But instead of the U.S. relying on the hopes that they could constantly and successfully improve the P-40, they introduced newer and better types. So as the P-40's competitive edge was waning, newer types were being developed and introduced. The British were doing the same.

As it stands, the P-40 was the primary horse the U.S. had to put in the race and it performed well. It also has the distinction of being one of the few fighters of WWII that served at one time or another on every front and everywhere it went, it's presence was felt by the enemy.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 26, 2017)

And what is amazing is that the P-40 was _never intended _to be the main fighter of the US Army. It was intended as an *interim* fighter to equip the US Army squadrons with while the Army and manufacturers worked on the planes the Army really wanted. The P-38, P-39 and P-43/P-44. However the Army's crystal ball had more than one crack in it and some of these planes took longer to get in service than the Army planed on and early combat reports cast a lot of doubt on the suitability of some of them. The P-44 wasn't enough of an advance over the P-43 to be worth pursuing (assuming it would come into service in late 1941/early 1942) so it was dropped and Republic shifted to the P-47B. P & W was probably not sorry to see the last of the R-2180 as it took resources away from the R-2800. 
The US also deferred delivery of a number of P-40s so the French/British orders could be completed quicker, the US Production slots being moved further to the rear of queue. This meant the US was slower to get the P-40 into widespread use in US squadrons but not that the US was slow in developing the fighter.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Jan 26, 2017)

I think that the initial question of this post has been answered many times. The US was not a continental or world power in the 1930s and was totally disinterested in becoming one. Maintaining a standing army and air corps was a low priority to a country mired in the Great Depression. Isolationist America was only interested in maintaining its ocean separation from the battles in Europe and Asia. Thus the Navy fared somewhat better. The Douglas TBD Devastator is a prime example of this mind set. It was ordered in 1934, it first flew in 1935 and entered service in 1937. At that point, it was the most advanced aircraft flying for the Navy and possibly for any navy in the world. However, the fast pace of aircraft development, driven by the exigencies of war combat in Europe and Asia, quickly caught up with it. By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the TBD was already outdated. Its performance at Midway, i.e.: the 41 Devastators launched during the battle produced zero torpedo hits and only six survived to return to their carriers, tells how badly they were outclassed. Now before anyone jumps in here, yes I am well aware of the fact that some of those zero hits can be attributed to the many well-documented defects in the US Mark 13 torpedo, the fact still remains that the aircraft was immediately withdrawn from frontline service after Midway and was replaced by the Grumman TBF Avenger.
*The P-40*
The P-40 design was a modification of the previous Curtiss P-36 Hawk which reduced development time and enabled a rapid entry into production and operational service. It was the third most-produced American fighter with 13,738 having been built. The P-40's lack of a two-speed supercharger made it inferior to Luftwaffe fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109 or the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 in high-altitude combat and thus it was rarely used in operations in Northwest Europe. However, in the Pacific Theater the P-40's performance at high altitudes was not as important. In the Pacific the P-40 performed surprisingly well as an air superiority fighter, at times suffering severe losses but also taking a very heavy toll of enemy aircraft. The P-40 was the Sherman tank of the air. It was easy and cheap to manufacture. These pluses kept it in production as a ground-attack aircraft long after it was obsolete as a fighter.
The P-40 was very agile at low and medium altitudes but suffered due to lack of power at higher altitudes as has already been noted. At medium and high speeds it was one of the tightest turning early monoplane designs of the war, and it could out turn most opponents. At low speeds the lightweight Zeros and Oscars could and did out-turn the P-40 but, the fastest model P-40 could outrun the fastest model Zeke by at least 30 mph and no model Zero could outrun its contemporary P-40 rival. The P-40's dive speed was also better. The normal dive limit speed for a P-40 was 480 mph and sometimes exceeded 500 mph. This proved especially useful using the hit and run tactics pioneered during the war. The structural integrity of the P-40's airframe could stand over 9 G's, far better then the frail Zeke. The Curtiss fighter also had pilot armor and self-sealing fuel tanks, standard for all U.S. fighters. 
The P-40s ability to absorb punishment was amazing: Clive Caldwell, Australia's top-scoring ace with 28 1/2 victories and the leading P-40 ace with 20 1/2 of these victories was flying top cover for supply planes inbound for Tobruk when two Bf-109's led by the 114-victory ace Werner Schroer ambushed him. The German planes punched 108 machine gun bullets and five 20mm shells into Caldwell’s P-40, damaging its instrument panel, controls, tail, wings, and wounding Caldwell in the back, shoulder and leg. Instead of crashing to the ground, the Tomahawk managed to stay airborne and instead of attempting to escape, Caldwell turned into his attackers and returned fire. He shot down Schroer's wingman, unnerving Schroer to the point that he ran for home. The Australian ace made it home.
In Italy the 325th fighter group on 1 July 1943 sent 22 P-40s to make a fighter sweep over southern Italy. Forty Bf-109s surprised the P-40s, engaging them at moderate altitude where the P-40 performed best. After an intense dogfight the Germans lost half their force while only one P-40 failed to come back.
A similar event took place on the 30th of the same month in which 20 P-40s were bounced by thirty-five 109s. The Germans limped home after losing 21 of their own while the P-40s came through with only one loss. The Germans lost 135 aircraft (ninety-six of which were 109s) to the pilots of the 325th fighter group’s P-40s while shooting down only seventeen P-40s.
In China, actually Burma, Chennault’s AVG (American Volunteer Group) better known as the “Flying Tigers” amassed a staggering total. They began combat operations on 20 December 1941 and recorded an unprecedented 70 to 1 kill ratio, 296 (although some sources say 286) enemy aircraft confirmed and an additional 153 probable for a loss of only 12 planes and 3 pilots in air combat. The tactics of The Flying Tigers were the key to its astounding record. The early warning net (a primitive yet effective network of spotters and radio operators set up to report enemy aircraft) would report the position, direction, and estimated altitude of incoming Japanese aircraft. The Flying Tigers would climb above the enemies' altitude on an intercepting course. On sighting the Japanese they would dive on them at high speed and slash through their formation, guns blazing. After the attack the Tigers would use the speed from the dive to exit the combat zone and climb for another pass. It was essentially a drive-by shooting.
This method of fighting did not go over well with the Chinese and British flyers in the area. British pilots seen diving away from combat would be court-martialed and Chinese pilots seen doing the same would be shot. However, as the Flying Tigers' success mounted other units adopted their tactics.
In short the P-40 was not a great aircraft but it had many advantages and if flown in its best performance envelope could and did match any Axis aircraft.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 26, 2017)

And it was the successes of the Commonwealth pilots flying the Kittyhawk in North Africa that forced the Luftwaffe to accelerate the transition of their units from the Bf109E to the Bf109F. Especially after several of their Experten were downed.


----------



## buffnut453 (Jan 26, 2017)

Mike,

I think you need to check your sources and differentiate between claims and actual losses. For example, the event on 30 July 1943 was nowhere near as one-sided and the numerical advantage was with the P-40s.

In reality, there were 36 P-40s from the 325th FG (20 from 317th Fighter Squadron and 16 from the 319th Fighter Squadron). The Luftwaffe serviceability report for 29 July reported a total of 25 serviceable Me109s available (there were only 34 present in total according to the orbat) so there couldn't have been 35 Bf109s in the sky during the engagement. The Luftwaffe serviceability report for 29 July 1943 is as follows:
II / JG51 had 5 Bf109s of which 2 were serviceable 
III / JG77 had 29 Bf109s, 23 of which were serviceable

Only JG77 was involved in this engagement - JG51 didn't fly on 30 July (no surprise since they only had 2 serviceable aircraft). One aircraft of JG77 was engaged in a reconnaissance mission away from the area of the combat with the 325th (it, too, was shot down but by other Allied fighters) leaving a max of 22 Bf109s for the engagement with the 325th.

The 325th FG flew the sweep from 08:00 to 11:05, and made claims from 09:45 to 10:15. Final claims tally was:
- 21 Bf 109s destroyed
- 3 Bf 109s probably destroyed
- 1 Mc. 202 probably destroyed
- 3 Bf 109s damaged

III/JG 77 scrambled from Chilivani at 09:25. Four Bf109s from the Gruppe were shot down, with one pilot killed and three wounded. A first-hand account from Eduard Isken mentions the presence of Lightnings as well. III / JG77 pilots claimed five P-40s shot down between 09:40 and 10:10.

Only one of the 36 American aircraft involved was lost on this mission, and none were damaged. Lt. Bob Sederberg failed to return, and was taken prisoner.

Clearly, the P-40s came off better in the fight but even if the entire Gruppe strength was involved, they were still at a 39% numerical disadvantage. For the record, the sole MC202 claimed as Probably Destroyed was mis-identification. No Italian fighters reported engagements on this date in the vicinity.

Sorry for the pedantry but I think it's better to compare apples to apples in this type of discussion.

Cheers,
Mark

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Jan 26, 2017)

No problem Mark, only have the one source and wrote what it stated. Always liked the P-40 and it was deadly IF flown within its envelope


----------



## The Basket (Jan 27, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> Friedrich is not Emil. RAF use of P-40 having no bearing on US use of P-40.
> Why moving the goal post again?


One aspect that I forget when talking about the P-40 is the use of the shark mouth nose art.
The P-40 is vastly superior to the Zero or 109 in this regard.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 27, 2017)

The Basket said:


> One aspect that I forget when talking about the P-40 is the use of the shark mouth nose art.
> The P-40 is vastly superior to the Zero or 109 in this regard.


Not necessarily...


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jan 27, 2017)

Yea, I have to vote for the P-40 on that one.


----------



## buffnut453 (Jan 27, 2017)

mikewint said:


> No problem Mark, only have the one source and wrote what it stated. Always liked the P-40 and it was deadly IF flown within its envelope



I like the P-40 too. I do feel it's an underrated aircraft. Like any moderately competitive combat aircraft, when flown to optimize its strengths and shield its weaknesses it could, indeed, be deadly. Get it in its element with proficient pilots and it performed well. Put it in a role for which it isn't suited (like high altitude) and it won't succeed. No different for any other airframe in that regard...with the possible exception of the P-51 which is like that annoying kid at school who gets straight 'A's, is the starting QB, is so handsome that he gets all the girls...AND he's a nice chap to boot.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Jan 27, 2017)

During the summer of 1941, No. 112 Squadron RAF, which had lost all its Gloster Gladiators in Greece the previous spring, was re-equipped with Tomahawks (British name for the P-40). Its pilots took one look at their sleek new mounts and decided that the P-40’s cowling would make an ideal place to paint the squadron badge, a black cat. The results, however, looked more fishlike than feline, and soon a variety of shark mouths were being applied to the Tomahawks and, later, to the deeper-jowled Kittyhawks. For some reason, British authorities did not discourage No. 112 Squadron’s flamboyant liveries. The P-40 shark mouth would soon be adopted in other units and other air forces.


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 27, 2017)

In the photo I posted above, this is a Bf109D of II./JGr176 (later II./ZG76), which had Sharkmouth schemes on their aircraft starting from late 1938 onward. They were well known for their Sharkmouth schemes, especially after the Gruppe converted to the Bf110, keeping the scheme.

This was perhaps the first instance of Sharkmouths being a uniform scheme in any Air Force unit.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Jan 27, 2017)

Dave, can track it further back than that. Shark mouths on aircraft date at least as early as World War I, which is the first occurrence mentioned in my sources. While I think it is safe to say that the American Flying Tigers during World War II brought the style to the peak of prominence, the first recorded use was in fact German around 1916, found on a Roland C.II, flown by Ritter von Schliech, although it is a pretty lame rendering, compared to later versions, as it is really just a black line roughly comparable to a mouth. It seems to have been popular with the Roland C.II, and a number of the aircraft carried it, as well as a more robust, 'teethed' version on some as well.

At roughly the same time, at least one British aircraft used the Sharkmouth design, one of the butt-ugly Maurice Farmans, serving with the Royal Naval Air Service in the Med. This is the 'teethed' style. It doesn't seem clear who the pilot was, but apparently he was the only one who did it to his aircraft, and it wasn't found on other machines from the Wing. A few examples can also be found here and there of French and American uses, but again, it wasn't that widespread.


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 27, 2017)

Sharkmouths from WWI were an individual application, it wasn't a group scheme until JGr126 (ZG26) applied them as a unit.

The sharkmouth did pop up on a few Roland C.II (Wahlfisch) types, but again, it wasn't a standard unit scheme.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## The Basket (Jan 28, 2017)

That strangest P-40 I ever did see.
That undercarriage just far too narrow. Why would they change from the P-36? Shows that Americans made a mistake. And why are the techs in German uniforms? Fancy dress? And when did the P40 have 2 bladed prop? 
The exhaust stubs are far too low. When did the Allison go inverted?

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------

