# The Do-335



## Haztoys (Jul 5, 2008)

Would the Do-335 German fighter have worked out as a good fighter if the timing and there had been more of them ...Or......???


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## Soren (Jul 5, 2008)

Perhaps, but it would've proven more capable in the destroyer role, leaving the role of fighter to the true fighters, the Me-262 Ta-152.


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## Flyboy2 (Jul 5, 2008)

I think it would have been a little heavy, kinda like the P-38. However, i think it would have been an amazing bomber destroyer!


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## Velius (Jul 6, 2008)

There were plans of installing jet engines in the later versions. I wonder how their performance would've differed? I agree with Flyboy2 in the bomber destroyer role and I think it would've done well as a fighter-bomber.


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## HoHun (Jul 6, 2008)

Hi Haztoys,

>Would the Do-335 German fighter have worked out as a good fighter if the timing and there had been more of them ...Or......???

Here is a thread on the Do 335 which includes a performance to the Ta 152:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/do-335-vs-ta-152-a-9057-2.html#post333382

(Post #46 in that thread, in case the link doesn't you exactly to the destination as it properly should.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## davparlr (Jul 7, 2008)

Soren said:


> Perhaps, but it would've proven more capable in the destroyer role, leaving the role of fighter to the true fighters, the Me-262 Ta-152.



Correct. If Germany had spent the time and money on the real weapon advantage they had, the Me-262, instead on the almost useless weapons such as the Do-335, the V-1, the V-2, etc., etc., they would have been far more formidable.



Flyboy2 said:


> I think it would have been a little heavy, kinda like the P-38. However, i think it would have been an amazing bomber destroyer!



I think the aircraft was too heavy to be effective against possible escort fighters it could have been pitted against at bomber altitudes of 25 to 35k (B-17/29). The P-47M, which was selected as the best allied fighter above 25k ft. by the Joint Fighter Conference, was available and was slightly slower at 25k but much faster as altitude went from 25-35k ft, had more power available (2800hp to 32.5k, 2600hp at 35k) and almost 6000 lbs less airframe weight, giving a much better wing loading and power loading at these altitudes. Therefore, it would have been faster, much more nimble, and accelerated better. In addition, it had a higher ceiling. At these bomber altitudes, the Do-335 would have been at a disadvantage. So, see comment above.


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 7, 2008)

I think as a mainstay bomber interceptor it was a waste of ressources. Ta 152 and Me 262 together fulfilled all the needs except for maybe range, which was less of a concern for Germany at the time.

It would've been great as a multi-role aircraft though: Reconaissance, fast-bomber and in limited numbers as "destroyer".


> Correct. If Germany had spent the time and money on the real weapon advantage they had, the Me-262, instead on the almost useless weapons such as the Do-335, the V-1, the V-2, etc., etc., they would have been far more formidable.


This is always brought up when it comes to these superweapons, but it's hard to say how relevant it really was. V1/V2 was a whole different league than jet or prop fighters: The knowledge it took to develop isn't interchangeable with the resources needed to develop piston or jet engines, the fuel they burned was made from potatoes (I heard). Sure they were much too high on the Reich's prio list, but overall I don't think it made the tremendous (negative) impact many assume.

The Do 335 development was continued as a fallback for the Ta 152, which imo was very sensible (esp. considering they used different engines) and mirrors the development practice of nearly all the airforces at the time (and probably today). And it's not like you could just switch a factory and it's workers from DB 603 to jet engine production in a matter of days.


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## Flyboy2 (Jul 7, 2008)

The Ta-152 was also a more practical aircraft. It was just a development of an already proven and effective aircraft. I don't know if the Do-335 was the wonder aircraft. It seems as though the engine arrangement would have been overly complicated. It actually kind of reminds me of the P-39


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## HoHun (Jul 7, 2008)

Hi Krazykraut,

>This is always brought up when it comes to these superweapons, but it's hard to say how relevant it really was. V1/V2 was a whole different league than jet or prop fighters: The knowledge it took to develop isn't interchangeable with the resources needed to develop piston or jet engines, the fuel they burned was made from potatoes (I heard). 

Actually the V1 and V2 were quite different in that respect. The V1 was a cheap, easily mass-produced and not very advanced weapon, while the V2 was expensive high technology.

Ironically Milch considered the V1 a great success, and the V2 a critical failure. The V1 launch sites made a major strategical target for the Allied bombers, soaking up sorties that without their existence would have hit the German economy. (And as far as the Germans were concerned, they were convinced that strategic bombing worked.) Of course Milch had exaggerated expectations regarding the effectiveness of the V1 against its targets, but just for the decoy and flak trap value it had, he already considered it a success.

The V2 on the other hand he saw as a competitor to the Luftwaffe when it came to the allocation of critically needed resources. In his opinion, the V2 was a great waste of manpower and materials that would have better been used to strengthen the Luftwaffe's conventional fighter force.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 7, 2008)

The V-2 also took away possibilities of SAM development.


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## Kurfürst (Jul 7, 2008)

kool kitty89 said:


> The V-2 also took away possibilities of SAM development.



Huh...? It actually lead to them, see Wasserfall... from this POV, the V-2 technology opened completely new technologies, which on the long term would have been the solution to Allied heavy bombers. The Wasserfall was close to being a usable weapon by the wars end. 

As for the Do 335, it was IMHO how the whole Zestörer should have started. That plane would have been the ultimate Zestörer and multirole aircraft, equally useful for defensive (interception) and offensive (fast bomber or recon) roles. The Ta 152 o.t.o.h. was a very special weapon for high altitude and little good for anything else - a luxury in that situation IMHO.


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## parsifal (Jul 7, 2008)

The wasted R&D efforts in the third reich was endemic to the very regime. Nazi germany was run rather like a series of semi autonomous feifdoms, rather than a major nation geared for a major war. this was the fundamental difference with the allies. The allies were far better organized when it came to use of resources, including R&D resources. In Germany, because of the fractured efforts, lack of overseeing infrastructure (except the suppressive organizations like the gestapo) the lack of accountability, the R&D and production efforts were always going to be disjointed and haphazard. Trying to argue that they should have concentrated on this project or that, is like trying to make a lion go vegetarian....it is just impossible, except if the regimne were changed, if the regime were changed, peace would break out


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## HoHun (Jul 7, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>The wasted R&D efforts in the third reich was endemic to the very regime.

Roger that. The creation of poorly defined, overlapping responsibilities was a way of implementing the "divide and rule" principle because the competing factions would need the support of those higher up in the hierarchy to win in the turf wars that inevitably ensued.

However, it's my impression that the incompetence of the German institutions is often exaggerated because it makes a better story. Just think of the "Ural-Bomber" that was in fact canceled by General Wever himself before his accidental death, and rightly so because it would have resulted in a heavy bomber with poorer performance and payload than the Short Stirling ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Jul 7, 2008)

I agree Henning that the innefficiencies of the Nazi system should not be overstated. The proof that the german R&D efforts bore fruit are everywhere. German equipment was superior to Allied, or Soviet in very many ways, so it would be innaccurate to try and portray the effort as totally without fruit. However, the Nazis were just unable to target their resources to anywhere near the same degree as the Allies. There was nothing comparable to the JCS in the German camp, nothing even to compare to the General Board (of the US armed forces)> basically someone would think of a bright idea, convince one of the power barons, and off they would go, spending money and research RM, like they were in limitless supply.

It did not stop there. Say the RLM, or the Heer issued a specification for a new piece of equipment. There would be a spec issued, and contracts issued to the successful tender, just like every other western country. But unique to the German system was this belief that the losing tender should get some order for some of his equipment, to compensate that company for all the hard work they had put into their design development!!!! Why have a tender process at all, if there is actually no real loser!. This contributed enromously to German standardisation (and hence logistic) problems throughout the war. I know this appears to be a little off-topic, but the Dornier/Fockewulf/Messerschmitt/Heinkel solutions presented at the end of the war in the forms of the various designs (D 335, Ta 152, Me262, He 162) repesented a gross multiplication of effort that germany could simply not afford. If the Me 262 was the best of the bunch (as i believe it was), why were other designs accepted and allowed to enter production and service at the same time.....why wasnt Heinkel, for example, producing 262 components, instead of building yet another type to just screw up the front line logistics for the fighting forces. The allies had this multiplication of effort as well, but they were in a better position to enjoy this sort of frippery, and even though they did double up, it was nowhere near to the extent that the germans did the same thing.....


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 8, 2008)

The He-162 used large amounts of plywood and a different engine than the Me-262. Its components could to a large degree be built by small dispersed workshops and only final assembly had to be done in the factory. There was ALL the reason to produce it.

The Ta-152 was a piston engined plane. That alone was reason enough to produce it. The complete switch to Me-262 production you suggest would've left the piston engine production capacity unused and would leave a lot of pilots with their outdated Bf-109 G-6s or without any plane at all. Like mentioned above: you can't just take the machinery and workforce for piston engines and switch them to jet engines.

Do-335: It again used a different engine than the Ta-152 (H). It wasn't exactly pushed hard by the RLM and can be considered a fallback (like mentioned before) to the Ta-152.


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## parsifal (Jul 8, 2008)

So essentially what you are saying is that the German aeronautical industry was in such a sorry state that it was unable to produce a single type that could fulfill all the fighter needs facing Germany in the latter half of the war. 

I dont believe that, but is is a sorry apology to try and argue that all four types were needed, and justified. It continues the same sort of warped logic that drove the actual wartime Nazi procurement machine. What was needed, in all facets of the hardware procurement machine, was standardization, and a return to some sort of sanity in the produce ability of the items for all the armed forces. People like Speer harped on this theme, again and again, but were overruled by the Hitlerian lackeys at every turn. Speer for example held up the Sherman tank as the shining example of production sanity, and then compared it to the sorry state of Germany's own efforts, where production always seemed to be ignored for bigger and better machines, to the point of the ridiculous. Consider this....in AFV production, the Germans were considering the production of at least two monster tanks that I know of (one of which was the Maus) which whilst technological marvels, bore no resemblance to Germany's actual wartime needs. And here we are, continuing that myth, that false economy, by trying to argue that four different fighters were needed to fulfill the same function

Bah, humbug I say.....


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## davparlr (Jul 8, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Krazykraut,
> 
> Actually the V1 and V2 were quite different in that respect. The V1 was a cheap, easily mass-produced and not very advanced weapon, while the V2 was expensive high technology.
> 
> ...



On further thought, this makes perfect sense. Both the V1 and V2 were worthless military weapons of WWII bound for greatness in later generations. However, the simplicity of the V1 made this weapon prolific and ingenious, and the complexity of the V2, wasteful.


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 8, 2008)

parsifal said:


> So essentially what you are saying is that the German aeronautical industry was in such a sorry state that it was unable to produce a single type that could fulfill all the fighter needs facing Germany in the latter half of the war.


Obviously this is not at all what I was saying  What's with all the polemics, no offense but it's pretty obvious that you want to see this in the most negative light possible. Show me the airforce that was stupid enough to bet all its money on a single fighter development at any time in the war? RAF? USAAF? VVS? There is none. Not then, not today.

Just look at what happened when you bet all your money on a single horse: The Me-210. 

And the most important point with all this: Besides the Ta-152 and the He-162 none was supposed to enter large scale production any time soon. So basically you have:
- one late piston fighter
- one rather expensive jet (due to the fact that design started and ended in less pressing conditions)
- one cheap jet that could be built in huge numbers in short time under worst conditions

Still sound megalomaniac?



> I dont believe that, but is is a sorry apology to try and argue that all four types were needed, and justified. It continues the same sort of warped logic that drove the actual wartime Nazi procurement machine. What was needed, in all facets of the hardware procurement machine, was standardization, and a return to some sort of sanity in the produce ability of the items for all the armed forces. People like Speer harped on this theme, again and again, but were overruled by the Hitlerian lackeys at every turn. Speer for example held up the Sherman tank as the shining example of production sanity, and then compared it to the sorry state of Germany's own efforts, where production always seemed to be ignored for bigger and better machines, to the point of the ridiculous. Consider this....in AFV production, the Germans were considering the production of at least two monster tanks that I know of (one of which was the Maus) which whilst technological marvels, bore no resemblance to Germany's actual wartime needs. And here we are, continuing that myth, that false economy, by trying to argue that four different fighters were needed to fulfill the same function
> 
> Bah, humbug I say.....


Nothing of this has to do with the fighter designs in question though.

As usually history is written by the victors. If the war turned out the other way we would be discussing why oh why there was the P-80 AND the Airacomet, the Meteor AND Vampire, the P-47M AND the XP-72, the F8F AND the F4U, the F9F, the B-29 AND the B-32 and probably a dozen other designs I don't remember.

The fact remains: At no point in the war did Germany have considerably more fighter designs in the air or in the pipes than any of its adversaries.


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## Kurfürst (Jul 8, 2008)

parsifal said:


> So essentially what you are saying is that the German aeronautical industry was in such a sorry state that it was unable to produce a single type that could fulfill all the fighter needs facing Germany in the latter half of the war.
> 
> I dont believe that, but is is a sorry apology to try and argue that all four types were needed, and justified. It continues the same sort of warped logic that drove the actual wartime Nazi procurement machine. What was needed, in all facets of the hardware procurement machine, was standardization, and a return to some sort of sanity in the produce ability of the items for all the armed forces.



Hmm.

Gladiator
Hurricane
Whirlwind
Spitfire
Typhoon 
Tempest
Meteor
Vampire

All for the same role.

P-36
P-38
P-39
P-40
P-47
P-51
P-63
P-80
F4F
F6F
F8F
F4U

All for the same role.

I did not count but it appears to be more than just four.



> People like Speer harped on this theme, again and again, but were overruled by the Hitlerian lackeys at every turn.



[/QUOTE] Speer for example held up the Sherman tank as the shining example of production sanity,[/QUOTE]

Hmm. 

The Sherman alone had 3 types of suspension, 3 types of hull, 5 types of different guns with different ammunition and IIRC 4 types of different powerplants were used. One of them was actually five powerplants bolted together into 'one' engine' - save that it had five carburrattors, five water pumps etc. - five times of everything!

In comparison, 98% of German tanks in the second half of the war - when the Sherman appeared - used two (broadly similiar in construction) powerplants: the HL 120 and HL 210/230 series. Any German workshop was familiar with any of them. Same basic components, mostly. 

I would say that German AFV production was far more standardized - a couple of basic chassis and two powerplants were found almost all of their tanks.



> and then compared it to the sorry state of Germany's own efforts, where production always seemed to be ignored for bigger and better machines, to the point of the ridiculous.



That is simply not true.



> Consider this....in AFV production, the Germans were considering the production of at least two monster tanks that I know of (one of which was the Maus) which whilst technological marvels, bore no resemblance to Germany's actual wartime needs.



Like if the Allies and Soviets didn't have a couple of ridiculus super-heavy tank projects - Tortoise, the American T-28, the Soviets had a whole series of completely dumb super heavy tank projects around 1940. Oversized KV-series, as I recall.


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## HoHun (Jul 8, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>If the Me 262 was the best of the bunch (as i believe it was), why were other designs accepted and allowed to enter production and service at the same time.....why wasnt Heinkel, for example, producing 262 components

Well, the RLM decided the Luftwaffe needed a cheap fighter, and pressed on with it. Not only Willy Messerschmitt, but also Kurt Tank who had no stakes in this pointed out that the single-engine fighter did not make sense, and while the Heinkel works provided a position paper outlining the expected advantages, I have to say that with the benefit of hindsight, Willy Messerschmitt's and Kurt Tank's more pessimistic stance was entirely justified, and Heinkel did not deliver on their promise. I'll admit that the He 162 was an astonishing little high-performance aircraft, but the Me 262 simply was the better fighter. The effort for getting another jet fighter into production outweighed the resource savings from that jet fighter's lower material demands, and the He 162 didn't have as much development potential as the Me 262 just because it was a very small aircraft.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Soren (Jul 8, 2008)

> I agree Henning that the innefficiencies of the Nazi system should not be overstated. The proof that the german R&D efforts bore fruit are everywhere. German equipment was superior to Allied, or Soviet in very many ways, so it would be innaccurate to try and portray the effort as totally without fruit. However, the Nazis were just unable to target their resources to anywhere near the same degree as the Allies. There was nothing comparable to the JCS in the German camp, nothing even to compare to the General Board (of the US armed forces)> basically someone would think of a bright idea, convince one of the power barons, and off they would go, spending money and research RM, like they were in limitless supply.



Barons ? Parsifal you seem to have a bit of a skewed view on this.

There was a board which needed be convinced if a new design or area of research was to be granted funding from the nation treasure chest, there werent any Barons needing to be convinced though. The aircraft companies had to convince the RLM first of all, and then Hitler for final approval. Hitler was the one who caused most of the problems, delaying crucial projects, funding completely unnecessary projects (The MAUS) and assigning new material the wrong roles such as with the Me262 which was designed purely to be a fighter but despite this was delegated the role of ground attack a/c by Hitler - you'd have to be on drugs to make some of the decisions Hitler did, and as we know he was.

And as for technology;

One of the reasons Germany was ahead technology wise was because of a huge investment in this area since the beginning of the 19th century and up until the end of WW2. Germany litterally became the worlds center of technology from then on, people coming from across the world to be taught and study in German universities. By the early - mid 20th century Germany boasted over half the worlds Nobel prizes. That coupled with the German culture of perfectionism is what kept the Germans ahead technology wise until the end, but was on the other hand also in part the reason for its defeat as it meant more cost time needed for every product.


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## pbfoot (Jul 8, 2008)

IMHO one factor missing when talking about wonder weapons was the free labour that was provided by unwilling guests of the Reich if thwy had to pay scale wages for these projects far less of them would have achieved fruition


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 8, 2008)

Kurfürst said:


> Huh...? It actually lead to them, see Wasserfall... from this POV, the V-2 technology opened completely new technologies, which on the long term would have been the solution to Allied heavy bombers. The Wasserfall was close to being a usable weapon by the wars end.



I meant the prefrence toward the V-2 was a hinderance on Wasserfall development and deployment.


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## Soren (Jul 8, 2008)

Not sure how much it payed off though, considering the excrutiating amounts of quality checks they made on such places. I mean it must have cost quite abit in time money for all those check ups. Ofcourse there were the simple production facilities where sabotage was very difficult and dangerous to attempt (Always was dangerous), and here it probably did pay off with slave labour as opposed to employing payed workers.


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## davparlr (Jul 8, 2008)

KrazyKraut said:


> As usually history is written by the victors. If the war turned out the other way we would be discussing why oh why there was the P-80 AND the Airacomet, the Meteor AND Vampire, the P-47M AND the XP-72, the F8F AND the F4U, the F9F, the B-29 AND the B-32 and probably a dozen other designs I don't remember.
> 
> The fact remains: At no point in the war did Germany have considerably more fighter designs in the air or in the pipes than any of its adversaries.



In 1944, the Allies had unlimited amounts of metals, fuel, manufacturing facilities, and workers, which allowed the luxury of variety. However, in spite of this luxury, they still made Sherman tanks, P-51s, P-47s, F4Fs, etc. because they knew production would win the war. The Germans, on the other hand, by 1944, was starting to generate shortages in just about all aspects of military support. When they really needed to simplify and produce, they continued to look at technology to save them.


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## parsifal (Jul 9, 2008)

The Germans suffered from a badly disjointed procurement program, I am surprised that we are even having to debate this issue. Speer himself commented on it voraciously. 

As for the comments about the multiplicity of allied types, I would point out that all the major types had been developed, or were at a significant stage of development before the formation of the joint chiefs, and the associated joint procurement machines.

I am not saying that the Germans did not achieve outstanding results with their wartime research, nor am I saying that production efforts were not impressive. What I am doing is to quote German sources, like Speer and Guderian and even Rommel, who all pointed to the poorly managed support machine that backed up the fighting forces at the front. Speer was critical of the non-standardization, and the non-accountability of the procurement machine. Guderian was critical of the bigger and heavier AFVs that came after 1943, Rommel wanted to scale back on AFV production altogether, and concentrate on ATGs and SPG production instead. All of these eminent German commentators are saying basically the same thing....the support and procurement machine of the German armed forces was badly managed. I would go even further and argue that of all the major powers Germany's procurement machine was about the worst run. And evidence of that is in the poor showing of certain vital statistics. The one that comes to mind is the AFV production, something like 25000, compared to over 85000 in the US. And Germany had a two year head start over the US, and enjoyed an economy that was about 40% as strong as the US productive capacity. On that basis they should have produced over 35000 units. Even the British, with only 17% of US productive capacity, managed to produce more AFVs than the Germans. In soft skinned vehicles, the Germans produced just over 300000 units, compared to over 2 million US. They should have been able to build about 800000. Why could they not? Partly because of resource shortages, partly because of bombing, but overwhelmingly because of poorly managed programs. Too many types, too elaborate types, production and component manufacture not thought out properly. A whole litany of failures that was the direct product of the Nazi system


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## Kurfürst (Jul 9, 2008)

parsifal said:


> And evidence of that is in the poor showing of certain vital statistics. The one that comes to mind is the AFV production, something like 25000, compared to over 85000 in the US.
> And Germany had a two year head start over the US, and enjoyed an economy that was about 40% as strong as the US productive capacity. On that basis they should have produced over 35000 units.



Careful with statistics, they are full of traps. For example the '25000 AFV' figure is really comparing tanks only, but in Germany apprx. the same number of assault guns and similiar were produced as well. Tanks _and AGs_ amounted ca. 50 000.



> Why could they not? Partly because of resource shortages, partly because of bombing, but overwhelmingly because of poorly managed programs. Too many types, too elaborate types, production and component manufacture not thought out properly. A whole litany of failures that was the direct product of the Nazi system



I would not say so, evidenced by the statistics the Germans simply intentially had one of their hands behind their back until 1943, when Goebbels announced the Totaler Krieg programme. Until then, and even after in some respects, Germany was running a peacetime economy. But after 1943, the figures suddenly go crazy. The other countries, which Germany defeated previously or were on the verge of defeat, mobilised their economy already, of course, but this makes a poor comparison.

They should have mobilized the economy in early 1942, after the first failures on the Russian front; there have been plans for this, but eventually the top brass has changed their mind and needed Stalingrad and Tunisia to happen to shake them up. You cant really blame them for not mobilizing before 1942, after all, it seemed to everybody back then they are winning the war even with a limited mobilisation of the economy. There is no point in waging a war at the cost of ruining the economy, see the UK`s example on that.


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 9, 2008)

davparlr said:


> In 1944, the Allies had unlimited amounts of metals, fuel, manufacturing facilities, and workers, which allowed the luxury of variety. However, in spite of this luxury, they still made Sherman tanks, P-51s, P-47s, F4Fs, etc. because they knew production would win the war. The Germans, on the other hand, by 1944, was starting to generate shortages in just about all aspects of military support. When they really needed to simplify and produce, they continued to look at technology to save them.


Which is exactly why you have a He-162: Cheap, non-critical, resources, dispersed production. And it's not like the Germans "started to generate shortages" they were forced upon them and they had to respond. Which they did by basically focusing on a single piston fighter for further development and said jet fighter combo. As a matter of fact, of the He-162 a few hundred were available when the war ended. But not the fuel or the pilots to fly them.

Regarding production: In 1944 fighter production was at its peak in Germany, besides the detoriating situation and it increased until the collapse. All this thanks to standardization efforts and production optimization conducted by RLM and industry. And it showed: Take the Einheitstriebwerk for example: Effectively, it allowed Tank to build the Ta-152 with different engine than he had originally thought of. Without the need for any serious re-designs. 

That efforts were made to keep the lead over Allied jets for example goes without saying. But these were drafts, drawings and wind tunnel models. They didn't interfere with the existing production.


> The Germans suffered from a badly disjointed procurement program, I am surprised that we are even having to debate this issue. Speer himself commented on it voraciously.


The Germans suffered mostly from direct interference by high ranking party members into procurement. The thing is, branch by branch procurement was different and as was interference. You make vast generalizations over the whole military and assume because of obvious and well know mistakes, flaws must be present in every branch and every procurement process. More specifically you applied your logic to the case of the late war fighter developments in question, which simply doesn't hold.


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## The Basket (Jul 9, 2008)

The V1 was a huge success as a weapon.

It did the job that was asked of it.

Dirt cheap and diverted rescouces away from other fronts.

The Allied air force lost hundreds of aircraft and men and used up fuel to destroy these things.

Paid for itself bigstyle.

Killed 6,148 people which is hardly a small figure. Yeah. top weapon.

Didin't win the war but no German weapon did.


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## parsifal (Jul 9, 2008)

*Which is exactly why you have a He-162: Cheap, non-critical, resources, dispersed production*. 

As Henning has pointed out, the problems associated with the introduction of yet another type to the LW inventory more than offset any savings in strategic materials that is might represent. Its a false economy that even the most elementary economic analysis will clearly demonstrate. I suggest you read Professor Overy's analysis on the management of the wartime economies as a starting point

*And it's not like the Germans "started to generate shortages" they were forced upon them and they had to respond. *

Ah, yes they did. To name just a few examples, pre-war, stocks of strategic materials were deliberately run down to dangerous levels, to enable more money to be spent in other areas, including non-military areas, like the beautification of Berlin. The Germans also made conscious decisions throughout the war to build "whole units" and not provide adequate spares for many major items of equipment. There were never enough spare engines, never enough gearboxes (and the like) for any items, including aircraft. The reason is, basically, to impress the Nazi leadership, Goring in particular, who were not interested in serviceability rates, as much as total units produced. 

*Which they did by basically focusing on a single piston fighter for further development and said jet fighter combo. As a matter of fact, of the He-162 a few hundred were available when the war ended. But not the fuel or the pilots to fly them.*

Which does nothing to explain why there were at least two jet designs, and four prop designs that I know of, other than to create procurement madness and confusion

*Regarding production: In 1944 fighter production was at its peak in Germany, besides the deteriorating situation and it increased until the collapse. All this thanks to standardization efforts and production optimization conducted by RLM and industry. And it showed: Take the Einheitstriebwerk for example: Effectively, it allowed Tank to build the Ta-152 with different engine than he had originally thought of. Without the need for any serious re-designs*. 

Yes, producing planes without spares, without fuel, and without pilots is an eminently sensible management of resources.......Even without too much allied interference the Germans managed to back themselves into a complete muddle, and sorry state of mismanagement. The Germans produced in excess of 40000 fighters in 1944, from memory, and just 8500 pilots to fly them. Even without allied interference with their petro chemical industry, there was an upper limit of about 5000 fighters that could be kept fueled and ready in 1944. In the Allied air forces, a P-51 had an average shelf life of 9 months (without combat attrition). So for the Germans, without combat attrition, if they have a similar shelf life, one could expect to maintain that force structure of 5000 with no more than 7000 fighters from the factories. On top of that, there is of course combat attrition, which for the Germans was running at about 1500 aircraft per month. That means to replace losses from combat, and maintain your maximum 5000 strong they would need another 15000 aircraft, roughly. All up, the Germans would have needed about 22000 aircraft to maintain their 5000 aircraft. They cant go past the 5000 mark, unless they find a way to increase pilot output, and fuel outputs. Neither of these were contemplated in the 1944 economic plans. So the result of this impressive production effort, was a whole bunch of useless airframes, sitting around airfields, waiting to be destroyed by the allies. Good management...yeah right. 

*That efforts were made to keep the lead over Allied jets for example goes without saying. But these were drafts, drawings and wind tunnel models. They didn't interfere with the existing production.*

What about the efforts needed to set up the production lines. You make it sound that design resources are free and grow on trees for nothing. It cost six million dollars in the sixties for the Coca Cola company to design the ring pull opener, and they obviously saw that as a valuable piece of design work, because it is a fully patented system. if you statement was correct, people wouldn't worry about patents, because it costs nothing, according to you, to develop a new design. You have got to be kidding...... yourself, mostly

*The Germans suffered mostly from direct interference by high ranking party members into procurement. The thing is, branch by branch procurement was different and as was interference. You make vast generalizations over the whole military and assume because of obvious and well know mistakes, flaws must be present in every branch and every procurement process. More specifically you applied your logic to the case of the late war fighter developments in question, which simply doesn't hold*.


I would agree to this extent, the problem stemmed from the upper management echelons mostly, but their influence was such that all the good work done by the lesser managers at the middle and lower echelons was basically more than canceled out. The problem was at the top, but it was a massive, and overwhelming problem.

In terms of the late war errors, there were plenty of examples to demonstrate poor management, starting with Hitlers interference in the Me 262, moving to Goering's obsession with production numbers, at the expense of serviceability, moving to the proliferation of multiple types, which flies in the face of standardization principals. Then we can move onto the fact that the LW production program was not matched by any corresponding effort in fuel production, or to the numbers of pilots that might be needed,,,,,,,etc etc, The list goes on and on


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 10, 2008)

So in essence you just switched your point from "Germany had too many designs to produce" to "Germany produced too many planes" Really it's you who's kidding himself.

If you got detailed information about servicability rates, or more specifically: how often LW pilots found themselves grounded because of too few servicable planes (lack of fuel excluded), please post that.

Then of course you take post-war, partially civil programs which have absolutely nothing to do with the "total war" time production of the planes and the period in question, but you generalize them over the whole war anyway. Totally baseless of course.

And you continue by making nil points about how production for future fighter designs had to be set up... despite the fact that none of them made it past prototype stage and most not even that far. So there was no production set up for them in any way and their influence ,positive or negative, is NONEXISTANT. But hey let's take everything to push an agenda.




> Yes, producing planes without spares, without fuel, and without pilots is an eminently sensible management of resources.......Even without too much allied interference the Germans managed to back themselves into a complete muddle, and sorry state of mismanagement. The Germans produced in excess of 40000 fighters in 1944, from memory, and just 8500 pilots to fly them. Even without allied interference with their petro chemical industry, there was an upper limit of about 5000 fighters that could be kept fueled and ready in 1944. In the Allied air forces, a P-51 had an average shelf life of 9 months (without combat attrition). So for the Germans, without combat attrition, if they have a similar shelf life, one could expect to maintain that force structure of 5000 with no more than 7000 fighters from the factories. On top of that, there is of course combat attrition, which for the Germans was running at about 1500 aircraft per month. That means to replace losses from combat, and maintain your maximum 5000 strong they would need another 15000 aircraft, roughly. All up, the Germans would have needed about 22000 aircraft to maintain their 5000 aircraft. They cant go past the 5000 mark, unless they find a way to increase pilot output, and fuel outputs. Neither of these were contemplated in the 1944 economic plans. So the result of this impressive production effort, was a whole bunch of useless airframes, sitting around airfields, waiting to be destroyed by the allies. Good management...yeah right.


My numbers are very different (Christer Bergstroem):

7500 Fw 190s
13,000 Me 109s
~5000 further fighters (incl. prototypes, night fighters and jet fighters)

So all in all ~25500 or, in other words, only ~16% more than the number you assume needed. A number which is very questionable since it didn't include night fighters nor the fact that German non-combat attrition was probably worse than that of Western Allies in '44.



> Which does nothing to explain why there were at least two jet designs, and four prop designs that I know of, other than to create procurement madness and confusion


Already explained like three times now. You on the other hand have yet to provide any explanation why Allied countries also had two or more jet fighters in the pipes as well as two or more piston fighters, if that was what was so wrong about RLM procurement.


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## parsifal (Jul 10, 2008)

*So in essence you just switched your point from "Germany had too many designs to produce" to "Germany produced too many planes" Really it's you who's kidding himself.

If you got detailed information about servicability rates, or more specifically: how often LW pilots found themselves grounded because of too few servicable planes (lack of fuel excluded), please post that.

Then of course you take post-war, partially civil programs which have absolutely nothing to do with the "total war" time production of the planes and the period in question, but you generalize them over the whole war anyway. Totally baseless of course.

And you continue by making nil points about how production for future fighter designs had to be set up... despite the fact that none of them made it past prototype stage and most not even that far. So there was no production set up for them in any way and their influence ,positive or negative, is NONEXISTANT. But hey let's take everything to push an agenda.*
*7500 Fw 190s
13,000 Me 109s
~5000 further fighters (incl. prototypes, night fighters and jet fighters)

So all in all ~25500 or, in other words, only ~16% more than the number you assume needed. A number which is very questionable since it didn't include night fighters nor the fact that German non-combat attrition was probably worse than that of Western Allies in '44.*

I did actually check properly, after your reply, and found the actual production of Fighters was 24654 in total. So I have over-estimated the total fighter production. However, it seems that the force structure they were supporting was also over-estimated

In January the Luftwaffe possessed 3400 a/c in their frontline formations, of which approximately 2200 were fighters or fighter bombers. In late 1944, the frontline LW was 4700 a/c, of which just under 3000 were in the fighter. So the LW fighter forces hovered in that period from between 2000 to 3000 in that period

And the table of losses supports my earlier contention, that the LW concentrated too much on the production of whole units, at the expense of serviceability. In 1944, the Jagdwaffe lost 13854 aircraft from all sources, but received 24654 new airframes. There was never a shortage of aircraft, but the reserve of aircraft could neve be used, because the pilots received, just 8500, and the fuel received, (total receipt in 1943 were 7.9 million tons, in 1944 it was projected that Germany would receive something like 8.1 million tons, but in the end, as a result of the losses of Ploesti, and the US bombing campaign, the Germans only received about 5.5 million tons). Luftwaffe oil receipts were in proportion to the total amounts received, so on that basis, the maximum expansion for the Jagdgruppen could have been from 2200 to just 2250 planes in the force structure. Instead, the Jagdgruppen were receiving enough fighters to support a force structure of over 3900. They failed however, to provide either the pilots, the fuel, or the spares to support such a change in the force structure. This is a clear and unrefutable indictment of LW management. They failed to manage their expansion in a way that would maximise the number of aircraft in the air. If they had produced less airframes, and spent the saved resources on increased fuel production, spare parts and pilot training, they would have achieved a higher sortie rate and possed a higher frontline fighter force than they actually did. Instead, they ended up with a whoile lot of unlflyable airframes on the ground, that were never able to contribut materially to the Reichs defences. 

With regard to Operational rates, well it was abysmal, to put it mildly.

According to Murray, who quotes the war diary of JG 53, the following is typical of the serviceability of the LW Fighters over the Reich in 1944

_The laconic reports of II Gruppe/JG 53 indicate what happened to that unit in the months of May and August. In the former month the unit reported:

(A) Operations took place on thirteen days. Twenty-one scrambles, fifteen of which resulted in combats.

(B) Average aircraft strength thirty-four; average serviceability twenty.

(C) Fifty-three aircraft lost or damaged. Of these: (1) extent: thirty-four 100%, three over 60%, nine over 35%, seven under 35%, (2) reason: thirty-three through Allied action, four [through] technical faults, sixteen owing [to] servicing faults. . . .

(D) Personnel losses—Killed or injured: seven killed, five missing, three wounded (two bailed out), seven injured (of whom five bailed out). Two more injured not through Allied action. Seventeen parachute jumps, two jumped with wounds, two jumped twice without injury.29_

Quote:
*Which does nothing to explain why there were at least two jet designs, and four prop designs that I know of, other than to create procurement madness and confusion 

Already explained like three times now. *

And people have pointed out to you, including myself, the false economy and poor logic behind your explanation. The luftwaffe would have vastly improved its operational rates (which were appalling, incidentally, by 1944 they were down to an average daily availability of about 50-65% of total force structure. This was in part, because of the fuel situation, in part because of previous battle damage, but also because of a shortage of spare parts (I dont think cannabilzing the spare airframes was permitted either)). Planes were grounded because ther were too many different types in service, and too few spare available to keep them airworthy). 

*You on the other hand have yet to provide any explanation why Allied countries also had two or more jet fighters in the pipes as well as two or more piston fighters, if that was what was so wrong about RLM *


We can discuss that a bit later, and compare the allied sortie rates, operational status etc, but for now I thought we were commenting on the Luftwaffe, and it overall poor level of management, of which the decision to produce the Do-335 is a part


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 11, 2008)

> And the table of losses supports my earlier contention, that the LW concentrated too much on the production of whole units, at the expense of serviceability. In 1944, the Jagdwaffe lost 13854 aircraft from all sources, but received 24654 new airframes. There was never a shortage of aircraft, but the reserve of aircraft could neve be used, because the pilots received, just 8500, and the fuel received, (total receipt in 1943 were 7.9 million tons, in 1944 it was projected that Germany would receive something like 8.1 million tons, but in the end, as a result of the losses of Ploesti, and the US bombing campaign, the Germans only received about 5.5 million tons). Luftwaffe oil receipts were in proportion to the total amounts received, so on that basis, the maximum expansion for the Jagdgruppen could have been from 2200 to just 2250 planes in the force structure. Instead, the Jagdgruppen were receiving enough fighters to support a force structure of over 3900. They failed however, to provide either the pilots, the fuel, or the spares to support such a change in the force structure. This is a clear and unrefutable indictment of LW management. They failed to manage their expansion in a way that would maximise the number of aircraft in the air. If they had produced less airframes, and spent the saved resources on increased fuel production, spare parts and pilot training, they would have achieved a higher sortie rate and possed a higher frontline fighter force than they actually did. Instead, they ended up with a whoile lot of unlflyable airframes on the ground, that were never able to contribut materially to the Reichs defences.


Operational fighter losses on westerm front in '44 were ~11,000 alone iirc (don't have the book present now but will check later this evening) and the rest of your numbers... well I have no source ready and I'm not going to take your word for it after the 40,000 stuff before. You are also completely ignoring that a large number of your new planes are in fact rebuilds.
As for operational aircraft. You are not suggesting that 1944 Germany had any chance of reaching operational rates comparable to that of e.g. USAAF, are you? There are a lot of influence factors in this equation that IMO are so apparent: Fighter sweeps by P-47s and P-51s or bombing runs, inexperienced LW pilots, lack of personnel. Yet you assume it was all due to lack of spare parts due to too much fighter production (not too little, that was your argumentation before ), but you fail to show any evidence of this actually being the case here.



> The laconic reports of II Gruppe/JG 53 indicate what happened to that unit in the months of May and August. In the former month the unit reported:
> 
> (A) Operations took place on thirteen days. Twenty-one scrambles, fifteen of which resulted in combats.
> 
> ...


So where did it say it was due to lack of spare parts? Especially interesting how only four losses were attributed to technical faults.
Also you should adjust the non-combat attrition in your equation if this is representative of overall LW losses.


> And people have pointed out to you, including myself, the false economy and poor logic behind your explanation. The luftwaffe would have vastly improved its operational rates (which were appalling, incidentally, by 1944 they were down to an average daily availability of about 50-65% of total force structure. This was in part, because of the fuel situation, in part because of previous battle damage, but also because of a shortage of spare parts (I dont think cannabilzing the spare airframes was permitted either)). Planes were grounded because ther were too many different types in service, and too few spare available to keep them airworthy).


So many adjectives... and your proof that this is attributable to the He-162 is where? In your mind. 



> We can discuss that a bit later, and compare the allied sortie rates, operational status etc, but for now I thought we were commenting on the Luftwaffe, and it overall poor level of management, of which the decision to produce the Do-335 is a part


Yeah, when it comes to facts instead of wild guesses and missing links in the chain of reasoning we can of course discuss that a bit later.


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2008)

*Operational fighter losses on westerm front in '44 were ~11,000 alone iirc (don't have the book present now but will check later this evening) and the rest of your numbers... well I have no source ready and I'm not going to take your word for it after the 40,000 stuff before. You are also completely ignoring that a large number of your new planes are in fact rebuilds*.

You recall wrong. You may wish to have a look at the following

http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Attrition and the Luetwaffe


*As for operational aircraft. You are not suggesting that 1944 Germany had any chance of reaching operational rates comparable to that of e.g. USAAF, are you? There are a lot of influence factors in this equation that IMO are so apparent: Fighter sweeps by P-47s and P-51s or bombing runs, inexperienced LW pilots, lack of personnel. Yet you assume it was all due to lack of spare parts due to too much fighter production (not too little, that was your argumentation before ), but you fail to show any evidence of this actually being the case here.*

Actually, my argument was that the Luftwaffe suffered poor management, not just that it suffered from a lack of spares. I never said, or implied that it produced too few fighters....It overproduced fighters, that would never fly because of a lack of fuel, and a lack of pilots, and suffered a very low sortie rate, partly because of a lack of spares. The lack of fuel would have occurred, even if a single bomb had not been dropped on the german oil refineries. The average fighter availability for the day fighter force was 1364 in 1944, over the reich, yet the germans , with only 2% more fuel were producing aircraft that envisaged a near 200% increase in the force structure. mathematically, this is impossible, as is getting 8500 pilots to fly 25000 airframes, given that an average pilot is only going to survive 1.7 shoot downs.

*So where did it say it was due to lack of spare parts? Especially interesting how only four losses were attributed to technical faults.
Also you should adjust the non-combat attrition in your equation if this is representative of overall LW losses.*

Try reading the article again. Actually its 20 lost, due to technical and servicing faults. What do you think a servicing fault might be????


*So many adjectives... and your proof that this is attributable to the He-162 is where? In your mind. *

Ah, we are yet to see a single shred of supporting evidence for your case, so it does seem a bit rich to say my posts are full of adjectives. If you check back on the posts, you will find not a single statistic to support your own assertions. its all lights and mirrors. I dont know what they teach in germany, but it certainly does not look much like brains to me. 

Introducing additinal types only adds to the servicing difficulties of a force already suffering from a poor sercicieability record. It should be obvious that having more than one type is poor practice. Perhaps we should ask the question in reverse, what evidence is there for you to make the claim that adding to the number of types was a good thing. Conventional wisdom says that it is not, but you seem to have a theory that it is (beneficial) to operational serviceability. I am intersted to know how you can show that.....


*Yeah, when it comes to facts instead of wild guesses and missing links in the chain of reasoning we can of course discuss that a bit later.[/QUOTE]*

I am more than happy to discuss the allied efforts, but can you explain to me, what connection this might have to the thread??? We are supposed to be arguing the benefits of the Do-335. I say it was an example of poor LW management, you then want to argue the failures of the allies, how does that relate to the Do-335?????


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 12, 2008)

I'm well aware of Murphy's article. You forgot to mention btw, that he nowhere in his article mentions a lack of spares and any mentionable impact of that on overall fighter availability. Since his article is directly aimed at attrition and serviceability that makes you wonder, no? Servicing faults have a wide range of causes. And damaged due to servicing faults does not sound like grounded due to lack of spares to me.

Once again all you show is circumstantial evidence, which can be attributed to a wide range of reasons.
*Ah, we are yet to see a single shred of supporting evidence for your case, so it does seem a bit rich to say my posts are full of adjectives. If you check back on the posts, you will find not a single statistic to support your own assertions. its all lights and mirrors. I dont know what they teach in germany, but it certainly does not look much like brains to me.* Certainly manners, unlike in Australia apparently. So what kind of statistic do you want to have?
*Introducing additinal types only adds to the servicing difficulties of a force already suffering from a poor sercicieability record. It should be obvious that having more than one type is poor practice. Perhaps we should ask the question in reverse, what evidence is there for you to make the claim that adding to the number of types was a good thing. Conventional wisdom says that it is not, but you seem to have a theory that it is (beneficial) to operational serviceability. I am intersted to know how you can show that.....
*The evidence is obviously that a pilot in a jet fighter will be more capable than one in a Bf-109 G-6.
*
I am more than happy to discuss the allied efforts, but can you explain to me, what connection this might have to the thread??? We are supposed to be arguing the benefits of the Do-335. I say it was an example of poor LW management, you then want to argue the failures of the allies, how does that relate to the Do-335?????*Very easy: You accuse the LW of gross mismanagement while Allied practice was very comparable. What little is left can be attributed to a certain degree of desperation from late '44 on. Much more so than by a overall faulty procurement program like you constantly accuse.


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## Milos Sijacki (Jul 12, 2008)

I think that it would have been a really good interceptor.


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 12, 2008)

It might have finally given the LW a good long range escort, but it came way to late for that. As an interceptor the Me-262 offered more imo.


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## Soren (Jul 12, 2008)

The Ta-152H-1 already had the range needed for escort missions and was on top of that the best piston engined fighter in the air. 

The Do-335 probably would've been an excellent nightfighter, fighter-bomber and bomber destroyer, but as a fighter its use was limited as Germany already possessed the two best figher a/c in the world at that point, both of which were far more capable in the role (The best no less).


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## drgondog (Jul 12, 2008)

Soren said:


> The Ta-152H-1 already had the range needed for escort missions and was on top of that the best piston engined fighter in the air.
> 
> The Do-335 probably would've been an excellent nightfighter, fighter-bomber and bomber destroyer, but as a fighter its use was limited as Germany already possessed the two best figher a/c in the world at that point, both of which were far more capable in the role (The best no less).



I agree. Period. 

The Do 335 in my opinion was a waste of further development $$, used two engines instead of one and worst of all, had no value I can think of approaching the Me 262 in any of those roles.

It was faster than a 51B/D, Tempest, Spit XIV and P-47M - but a lot of 262s were shot down by those allied fighters and the Do 335 was only marginally faster - which does not much good if you are spotted entering a high density escort zone.

As good as the Ta 152 was, I see no reason that even it was produced in competition w/262. From my perspective the LW should have settled on the Fw 190 series and Me 262 from early 1944, forward. The Fw 190D-19 and D-12 were sufficently close to the Ta 152.. If you think about it, there was no significant value in a piston engine fighter with such great performance at 35-45,000 feet. The battles were at 28-15,000 feet.

As Parsifal pointed out, once Speer shifted production priorities to fighters in early 1944, German industry produced far more fighters than they had pilots to fly them, and the pilots were getting shot down in droves because of bad leadership/tactics and their a/c were not at or sufficiently greater performance levels than the escort fighters.

IMO - There was only one hope of defeating daylight strategic ops in time and that was a bomber destroyer with far greater performance than the P-51B in March/April 1944 before the Oil campaign started and before the Invasion.


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## Soren (Jul 12, 2008)

> It was faster than a 51B/D, Tempest, Spit XIV and P-47M - but a lot of 262s were shot down by those allied fighters and the Do 335 was only marginally faster



Remember that (IIRC) some ~90% of all Me-262's shot to pieces by Allied fighters were so when either trying to land or take off, or whilst just sitting still on the ground, VERY few were shot down in actual combat. And the few 262's which did get shot down in combat were so when entering a shallow turn to get back at the bombers, allowing diving escorts to get that vital split second burst needed. However once the Me-262 got airborne it was pretty much unbeatable, and when used purely as a fighter it demonstrated this in a big fashion, acquiring itself probably the highest Kill/loss ratio against other fighters of any a/c of WW2. 


Now the Do-335 wouldn't have had the same weaknesses as the Me-262 and would've to the contrary been more vulnerable in the air and not so much when trying to land or take off, which isn't a plus btw.

Also as you rightly point out the Do-335 was only marginally faster than the fastest Allied fighters, and again like you said in a high density escort zone that would've meant only one thing, a lot of Do-335's shot down. The Do-335 simply didn't feature the performance advantage needed to gain an edge over the overwhelming numbers of escorts present.

The Do-335 is to me as-well a waste of funds, but only because there already were aircraft a lot better in all of its possible roles, and not because it was bad design of any sort. In short it was outdated the moment it left the drawing board...


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## parsifal (Jul 12, 2008)

I agree. The LW had two very potent fighters in the 262 and the Ta 152. Other companies should have been used to manufacture components of these two planes rather than complicate the logustic network, by introducing yet another model to the inventory, and one not as good as those already in the works


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## drgondog (Jul 12, 2008)

Soren said:


> Remember that (IIRC) some ~90% of all Me-262's shot to pieces by Allied fighters were so when either trying to land or take off, or whilst just sitting still on the ground, VERY few were shot down in actual combat.
> 
> *Soren - I'm not sure that is true with respect to all air to air scores. Of the 6-1-2 air shot down by 355th/2SF none were downed in the pattern, although one damaged at altitude blew up at low altitude. No Mustang losses to 262's in the 355th or 2SF.
> 
> ...



Soren - I agree all your points except the one I can't find reliable data on - namely those shot down in landing pattern versus 'other conditions' - as 90%.

Many of the other 262 awards I have researched were a result of the 262 entering a heavy escort 'density' and one or more fighters got a medium to long range burst taking out an engine - then chasing and closing.


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## parsifal (Jul 12, 2008)

*B]I'm well aware of Murphy's article. You forgot to mention btw, that he nowhere in his article mentions a lack of spares and any mentionable impact of that on overall fighter availability. Since his article is directly aimed at attrition and serviceability that makes you wonder, no? Servicing faults have a wide range of causes. And damaged due to servicing faults does not sound like grounded due to lack of spares to me*.[/B]

Suggest that you read his book, along with with Joel Haywards "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers Defeat In the East". These will make very clear the poor showing of the LW in the logistics area


*Once again all you show is circumstantial evidence, which can be attributed to a wide range of reasons*.

I disgree that its circumstantial. These guys clearly demonstrate some really basic and fundamental errors in the LW procurement machine, which are not palatable for you. If you have evidence that proives superior leaderships, or superior management, than bring it forward. 

For the record, the failure of the LW was multi dimensional. They produced too many fighters, not enough fuel, not enough pilots, and not enough sparea. This was not a late war phenomena. It was the reult of decisions and usage of the LW stretching right back to the beginning of the war

* Certainly manners, unlike in Australia apparently. So what kind of statistic do you want to have?*
Manners are given to those that deserve it. You try a little civility, yourself, and you will be quite surprised.

Now the statistics i want to see from you are those that establish that having more operational types is a good management decision. It would also not go astray for you to be able to show that there were not too many fighters produced, that the german petro-chemical industry was going to keep the increased output of fighters being built airborne, and that the numbers of pilots were adequate, and properly trained. In other words, all the ingredients that go into making a workable air force operating at peak efficiency were there, in just the right balance. If you can produce evidence to prove that, then maybe you will be given the respect you are now demanding 

*The evidence is obviously that a pilot in a jet fighter will be more capable than one in a Bf-109 G-6.*

That is true, but only if he can get airborne, and if there are enough of the jets to make a differnce. If there are a lot of jets grounded because of developmental problems (which the 262 had experienced in spades, and which were just about ironed out by 1945, By comparison, the teething troubles of the He 162 were only just getting started, because the 162 was a design that was 2 years behind the 262). And all of these problems are made worse by introducing an additional type(s) rather than concentrating on more well developed, and basically proven designs like the 262. 

*Very easy: You accuse the LW of gross mismanagement while Allied practice was very comparable. What little is left can be attributed to a certain degree of desperation from late '44 on. Much more so than by a overall faulty procurement program like you constantly accuse.*


The allied model has nothing to do with the thread, however, for the record, the allies had plenty of problems and managerial issues. The worst one I can think of are the unescorted deep penetration raids into Germany in 1943. 

But the difference between the allies and the germans is that the allied structure worked well enough to ensure victory. And this did not come automatically. Germany was not outfought, but it was very convincingly outmanaged especially in the air war


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## Soren (Jul 12, 2008)

Bill,

I can't be specific about the Me262's kill/loss ratio for the same reason (Incomplete LW records), but I'm relying mostly on what vets and the books tell me. According to my research by far the majority of Me-262's were shot down while trying to land, and Galland wanted to form a protective squadron for that very reason. There really were VERY few incidents of Me-262'a shot down in combat, and of the few who were, most were when trying to turn on back to attack the bombers for a second attack run, allowing diving escorts to get a split second burst.

As for the two Me-262's who challenged the P-51's you talk about, well the most common mistake by rookie 262 pilots was to think that the Me-262 could dogfight the piston engined fighters at low speeds on equal terms - it couldn't, the jet engines didn't provide enough acceleration at slow speeds. Experienced pilots however knew that maintaining speed was the key, and that high G turns, zoom climbs and dives was the effective way of tackling the piston engined fighters. Esp. a high G turn with the nose pointing slightly down was effective, as this enhanced the Me-262's already large advantage in speed retention in tight turns. But in short the key was to stay fast and take advantage of the Me-262's superior handling and acceleration at high speeds.


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 14, 2008)

parsifal said:


> I disgree that its circumstantial.


"Circumstantial evidence is a collection of facts that, when considered together, can be used to infer a conclusion about something unknown."
Sounds very fitting to me.


> These guys clearly demonstrate some really basic and fundamental errors in the LW procurement machine, which are not palatable for you. If you have evidence that proives superior leaderships, or superior management, than bring it forward.


For example the industry and the RLM actually managed to have every 4th Bf-109 be of the latest K-model when the war ended, an achievement considering the type flew for the first time in late '44.

On the other side of the channel the RAF struggled two times to get the latest Spitfire into widespread service. How often is it said that the introduction of the Mk.IX eliminated the advantage of the Fw-190, but a lot of squadrons still operated on outdated Mk.Vs for a long time afterwards. The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter. And not to even mention the various subtypes of high-mid-low altitude engines and clipped-long-50cal-cannon-303cal wings throughout the Spitfires history: a logistical nightmare. Then there's the Bristol Centaurus. Arguably one of the worst cases of a missed opportunity in fighter development: The engine was mature by late 1942, yet it never powered any operational WW2 fighter. The Tempest II was seen as superior to the V but a very faulty planning with manufacturers switching back and forth doomed what could've been the best radial-engined fighter of WWII to a footnote. All this is directly attributable to a mismanaged fighter procurement.

I say directly attributable because regarding Germany you like to ignore a few things:

Germany fought on three high intensity theatres, one of them being very dynamical in the sense switching back and forth between various airfields. German squadrons had to fly several times the number of sorties per day than the Western Allies had to. Germany was on the defense in the West thus had to react, whereas the Western Allies had the initiative and could plan and forecast their replacements much easier. Not to mention that their major fighter force was conveniently placed within a radius of a few hundred miles and not scattered throughout entire Europe.

All these things contribute to the logistical situation a lot more than the He-162 ever could.



> Now the statistics i want to see from you are those that establish that having more operational types is a good management decision.


According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100. So a roughly 4-5:1 ratio. Every other German plane of that period (all props) PROBABLY had a ratio of 1:1 or worse. So every prop plane replaced by a jet meant statistically a steep increase in effectiveness and efficiency.



> It would also not go astray for you to be able to show that there were not too many fighters produced, that the german petro-chemical industry was going to keep the increased output of fighters being built airborne, and that the numbers of pilots were adequate, and properly trained.


None of this was within reach of the aircraft producing industry. You might aswell argue the RLM was responsible for starting the war altogether. Since we are talking about production capacity, what would you suggest would've been a better project to spend this capacity on except fighters? More wonder weapons? 


> That is true, but only if he can get airborne, and if there are enough of the jets to make a differnce. If there are a lot of jets grounded because of developmental problems (which the 262 had experienced in spades, and which were just about ironed out by 1945, By comparison, the teething troubles of the He 162 were only just getting started, because the 162 was a design that was 2 years behind the 262). And all of these problems are made worse by introducing an additional type(s) rather than concentrating on more well developed, and basically proven designs like the 262.


Source? The problems of the He-162 were largely solved and the plane was ready for war. Not only the German pilots say so, this is also mirrored by Eric Brown for example.

The Me-262 serial production was ~1200 from january (?) '44 until april '45. Meaning 75 aircraft per month. Despite the worst possible conditions under which an aircraft could've ever been designed and developed, around 330 He-162s were completed from february to april 1945: or around 110 per month.

German metal manufacturing capacity was absolutely exhausted, the wood industry wasn't. The He-162 used one BMW 003, the Me-262 used two Jumo 004. I want to see the author who seriously claims ditching the He-162 would've increased Me-262 production significantly.


> The allied model has nothing to do with the thread,


Oh yes it does. Because "poor management" is relative. So without a relation that statement is useless. We've been argueing this back and forth for several pages now and you still haven't provided any answer to the two most significant, objective and undisputable facts regarding the whole procurement subject:

Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in production?
Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in serious development?



> But the difference between the allies and the germans is that the allied structure worked well enough to ensure victory. And this did not come automatically. Germany was not outfought, but it was very convincingly outmanaged especially in the air war


The difference between the Allies and Germany is that Germany had brought himself into an impossible strategical situation when it declared war on the two largest industrial nations in the world. For the Luftwaffe this meant it had to fight against at least 2,5 times its own capacity. THAT determined the outcome.


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## Juha (Jul 14, 2008)

KraztKraut
Quote: “The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter.”

What had more Spit XIVs changed? IIRC British army wasn’t badly hindered by LW in ETO or in MTO in 1944-45 and I cannot recall many German daytime air attacks on UK in 44-5. On the other hand Heer often complained the lack of air support and unhindered Allied air attacks against it. It was Germans who asked: “Where are our fighters?” not British. Conclusion, RAF had enough air-superiority fighters, LW didn’t have. So RAF didn’t have urgent need for more Spit XIVs.

Clipped or long wing was not a logistical question it was a simple conversion. 0.5 vs .303 was a question of availability which shows how hard pressed UK economy was during the war.

Quote:” Germany fought on three high intensity theatres.”

Now Eastern Front was almost entirely Germany-Soviet show, but against whom Germany fought in ETO and MTO? So Allied had those fronts to worry about and Germany being in centre it had clearly easier to move units between those 2 theatres than Allies. And allies had one major theatre, or actually two very far away, PTO and CBI.

Quote: “According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100”

Actually Wikipedia says “509 claimed Allied kills” which is different thing than 509 kills. Claims and real things are not the same.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2008)

"*Circumstantial evidence is a collection of facts that, when considered together, can be used to infer a conclusion about something unknown."
Sounds pretty much just like that.
For example the industry and the RLM actually managed to have every 4th Bf-109 be of the latest K-model when the war ended, an achievement considering the type flew for the first time in late '44*.

Good management is not about the promotion of one or two of the variables. Its about the management of the whole. the bringing together of all resources relevant to a given system that will enable the maximum to be extracted from that system. Thats why it is necessary to bring together all the diverse pieces of the puzzle, to understand the whole. You can call it a collection of circumstantial evidence if you like, but if you know anythjing about good management, then you would understnad the principles of Total Quality Management, a little better than you do. Its not about just one part, its about all the parts and thats why its necessary to look at a diverse range of issues, so as to understand the whole

The allies won, not just because they were the greatest economic and manpower sources of the time. They won because they had the management structures in place to ensure that the available resources were delivered in the right balance, and at the right times to ensure victory. The allies, for example knew that at some point numbers were important. they knew that they needed a high aircraft availability, they knew that they needed the pilots to fly the vast number of machines they were producing.

At the beginning of 1944, the Germans still commanded something in the order of 25% of the worlds industrial potential. They commanded the most experienced and tactically well led ground and air forces in the world. yet they failed miserably in the battle with the allies. And as i said, it was not a given that the allies were always going to win the battle. though by 1944, victory was indeed slipping from Germany's grasp. But this was because the Germans had led the ball slip from their fingers, , whilst the Allies had never lost sight of their goals.

Lets compare the German efforts to those of the Allies just for th year 1944

Overy advises that in 1938, the Germans controlled 28% of the worlds industrial potential By 1944 the USS BS estimates that the German economy had been degraded in performance by about 10% so that it was down to 25% due to the effects of the war, including bombing (on the one hand they had suffered losses in manpower, but on the other they could utilize the resources of the occupied territories. The fact that they tended to misuse these resources was again a function of German mismanagement. Still the potential and contribution of the occupied territories cannot be denied. The Citroen motor company, for example, built over 40000 military vehicles for the wehrmacht, more than 10% of total vehicle production for the Germans). Taking into account the additions and subtractions of the war, the USS BS estimates that at the beginning of 1944, the Germans still commanded more than 25% of the worlds military industrial potential. With this approximate 25% capability, they were able, for their air force, able to achieve the following

25000 fighters
8500 pilots
a theoretical (ie, before bombing) oil production of 8.1 million tons of oil
Operational readiness was running at about 45% at the beginning of 1944, but by the end it was down to less than 30%, although by that stage, allied actions were having a big effect. Axis losses were running at about 6-8 times those suffered by the allies at the end of 1944. From January through to May 1944, the crucial period, they were running at approximately 4 losses for every allied loss

These results were more or less inevitable, however the question is whether or not the Germans could have done better or lasted longer than they did....

By comparison, just to look at the USAAF, with access to about 40% of the worlds industrial potential produced the following

38873 fighters
38500 pilots
approximately 80000000 tons of petroleum products

The UK , with about 12% of the worlds military potential, produced the following

10700 fighters
17900 pilots
Approximately 24000000 tons of petroleum products from her middle eastern refineries (Iraq and Saudi Arabia mostly).

Therefore, with 52% of the worlds economic power, compared to to Germany's 25%, the allies, if they had only been as efficient as the Germans, would have produced in very rough terms 2.1 times everything. In fact they produced

1.99 times the aircraft
6.5 times the pilots
12.8 times the fuel


Now, as you can see, the Germans achieved a proportional parity in terms of numbers produced (however, the allies were also spending a much larger proportion on strike aircraft) but the Germans got the proportions of oil fuel and pilots needed completely wrong. They also suffered abysmal sortie rates, even before the fuel famine from bombing took effect, which as Murray points out, was at least partly due to a low serviceability rate (which was due to shortages in spares parts, despite your denials) 

So, in my opinion, the decisions made in 1942-3, concerning the proportion of resources for pilots, spare parts, and new airframes was completely misunderstood and misread by the Germans, and led to a force structure, whereby the number of airframes produced did not correlate to the available pilots, nor to the projected availability of fuel. 

Why is it that the Allies were able to get the proportion so right, and the Germans so wrong. Most historians agree it was because the Allies planned for a long war from the start, and put far more resources into the "tail" of their force structure....more trainers, vast resources into pilot training. Very detailed analysis of combat tactics, and where the enemy was weakest (backed up by very good Signal intelligence). But above all, once the battle was properly joined, the Allies, from the very top down, adopted a proper management structure, exemplified by the joint Chiefs Of Staff, which was never emulated by the Germans. Every major decision, every war aim, every operation, every strategy was passed by the joint chiefs, to whom not even Winston, or Roosevelt could bypass, try as they might. There was nothing comparable to this organization in the German camp, and its poor strategic direction and management of its resources showed as a result of that lack of co-ordination. 


*On the other side of the channel the RAF struggled two times to get the latest Spitfire into widespread service. How often is it said that the introduction of the Mk.IX eliminated the advantage of the Fw-190, but a lot of squadrons still operated on outdated Mk.Vs for a long time after wards. The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter. And not to even mention the various subtypes of high-mid-low altitude engines and clipped-long-50cal-cannon-303cal wings throughout the Spitfires history: a logistical nightmare and directly attributable to procurement.*

The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements. The allies as a whole realized that more than anything, the air war was a war of numbers. They maintained some high quality units, and equipment, but at the end of the day, the allies realized that they needed the numbers more than anything. new technology is a "nice to have" advantage, but at the end of the day it s the number of aircraft that you can consistently put into the air that counts the most. The allies realized this. They also realized they needed to maintain quality, and did this as well. In the end, the numbers won. And this was not just a straight comparison of industrial potential, as the quick analysis done above hints at. It was more than that. It was because the strategic leadership of the western allies was so far superior to that which existed in Germany that mattered as well. target war




I* say directly attributable because regarding Germany you like to ignore a few things:

Germany fought on three high intensity theatres, one of them being very dynamical in the sense switching back and forth between various airfields*. 

Thats interesting. You forget that the western allies were fighting a war on a truly global scale, far more so than the Germans. For the British, and the commonwealth, there were major fronts in the med, Burma, the SW pacific. There were massive material commitments to the Soviet Union to be met. In the Atlantic, the British were fighting a truly life and death struggle for survival, that soaked up a huge percentage of her resources.

For the US there were commitments also in the med, and SW PAC, as well as the central pacific. Even more so than the British, the US had lend lease commitments (which soaked up more than 17% of her productive capacity). The Germans had the priceless advantage of fighting from interior lines (which you perversely try to portray here as some kind of disadvantage, which shows a profound lack of understanding of military strategy) , which was something not available to the Allies. if the Germans could wrest the initiative for even a short while, they could have concentrated on one front, and caused an upset in the balance in that theatre. It was only through the most horrendous determination and dogged pressing home of the attacks that the allies were able to maintain the vital initiative. truly


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 14, 2008)

What did the Tempest change? What did the P-51H, P-47M/N or the P-80 change in WW2. Next to nothing. Yet they were all still introduced at a point when the war was basically won. So there must've been a need afterall.

And I'm very aware that kills aren't claims, it was obviously only an illustration of the relative effectiveness of the old and new fighters.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2008)

*German squadrons had to fly several times the number of sorties per day than the Western Allies had to*. 

This is utter crap. The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans. Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later. Whereas the Allied were achieving operational readiness rates of better than 80% most of the time, German operation rates of less than 50%. Stop sprouting bull crap to support your arguments. I will spot it from a mile away

*Germany was on the defense in the West thus had to react, whereas the Western Allies had the initiative and could plan and forecast their replacements much easier. *

This is true, but it had gotten to that point for reasons that included poor strategic direction, and overuse of her air forces in support of operations that had stretched them to breaking point, particularly over Stalingrad, and Tunisia. the Germans had arrived at their point of military bankruptcy as much by their own hand as by the efforts of the allies. Yet another example of poor management of resources

*Not to mention that their major fighter force was conveniently placed within a radius of a few hundred miles and not scattered throughout entire Europe.*

The allies were not just concentrated on one front, they had global commitments. It was the Germans who were concentrated in open area by the latter part of 1943. From mid 1943 onward, the were virtually no LW fighters in the Med, and only 24% of the total force on the eastern front. nearly all the others (about 70%) were concentrated in the Reich defences. By contrast, only 33 of the 97 (IIRC) fighter groups available to the US were concentrated in England at the beginning of 1944, and this number was the same at the end of 1944.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2008)

*All these things contribute to the logistical situation a lot more than the He-162 ever could.*


No, adding the he 162 was a technological success, but a managerial disaster. The type should never have been produced. instead the Germans should have concentrated on producing the 262, and possibly the Ta152, or the 109K (whichever is more producible, take your pick). introducing another aircraft to the already inefficient factories was going to slow delivery rates down, not speed them up. Operational rates were going to suffer, not improve, because of the he 162, because it was an additional, and new type which inevitably was going to suffer a high grounding rate as these problems were being ironed out. 

*According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100. So a roughly 4-5:1 ratio. Every other German plane of that period (all props) PROBABLY had a ratio of 1:1 or worse. So every prop plane replaced by a jet meant statistically a steep increase in effectiveness and efficiency.*

So long as it could get airborne. The problem is in the operational rates. I dont know if the 500 wiki quotes is accurate or not, but i do know the 262 suffered a very low operational rate until 1945, when it slowly began to pick up in readiness levels. And it was way ahead of the He162 in this regard. What would have happened, if the war had dragged on, would be a whole lot of resources diverted away from the 262 (either pilots, or fuel, or factory space, or a combination of all of thee above) for no immediate gain. The result would be an actual drop in the operational rates for the LW. 


*None of this was within reach of the aircraft producing industry. You might as well argue the RLM was responsible for starting the war altogether. Since we are talking about production capacity, what would you suggest would've been a better project to spend this capacity on except fighters? More wonder weapons?* 

No, a better mix of required resources to get the maximum force into the air, and able to fight more effectively. Also an equivalent of the Joint Chiefs, ao as to manage Germany's economic, training/re[placement, and front line needs more effectively, rather than having a series of disjointed, and un-coordinated efforts being run more or less independent of the other. 


*Source? The problems of the He-162 were largely solved and the plane was ready for war. Not only the German pilots say so, this is also mirrored by Eric Brown for example.*

"Axis Aircraft Of WWII", David Mondey, Chancellor press 2002

"Despite its rapid development, many problems persisted that remained unsolved by the end of the war...." So there is at least one source that challenges your assertion that it was combat ready. It was not fully ready, and suffered very low (even by the LW standards) operational readiness rates as a result

*The Me-262 serial production was ~1200 from January (?) '44 until April '45. Meaning 75 aircraft per month. Despite the worst possible conditions under which an aircraft could've ever been designed and developed, around 330 were completed from February to april 1945: or around 110 per month.*

Err no, this is not true. Actual production figures for completed units was 116, of which just over 50 had been delivered, all with problems, and a further 880 in various incomplete stages of production. Mondey says that the lines had been brought to a standstill, because of structural problems in the wing and undercarriage. Some aircraft had to be sent back to the factory to exchange the original 30mm cannon for 20mm types, because the airframe was unable to absorb the recoil of the 30mm guns. There were several failures in operational types with the undercarriage literally tearing away, and the wooden construction caused problems on the leading edges at high speeds. Sounds like a whole lot of solvable, but nevertheless developmental problems to me. 


Mondey completes his assessment of the type with these words "An unusual design, with numerous unsolved developmental problems. The He 162 was a foolhardy and ill-considered attempt to address Germany's air defence problems. 


*The difference between the Allies and Germany is that Germany had brought himself into an impossible strategical situation when it declared war on the two largest industrial nations in the world. For the Luftwaffe this meant it had to fight against at least 2,5 times its own capacity. THAT determined the outcome*.

It was only part of Germany's problem. The Germans exacerbated this allied advantage by misusing their own resources, and mis-ordering there priorities. If they had managed their resources more intelligently, the result would have been the same, but the Germans would not have been massacred quite so quickly as they were.


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## Juha (Jul 14, 2008)

KrazyKraut
just becouse they had also Tempest they didn't have urgent need for more Mk XIVs. And if there had been urgent need for more XIVs easy way to increase production would have been cut back Firefly production. The other fighter which was powered by Griffon.


Juha


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 14, 2008)

Since this consumes way too much of my time now I will ignore your second attempt at insulting and belittling and repeat what I believe to be the most important questions regarding procurement management:

Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in production?
Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in serious development?


> This is utter crap. The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans. Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later. Whereas the Allied were achieving operational readiness rates of better than 80% most of the time, German operation rates of less than 50%.


This is true for late 1943 and onwards but can be attributed easily to the bombing campaigns on infrastructure that were stepping up. And unlike most Western pilots the Germans had usually been in constant fighting since they were drafted and as a result there was no rotation which seriously effected combat readiness of the pilots themselves. 


> This is true, but it had gotten to that point for reasons that included poor strategic direction, and overuse of her air forces in support of operations that had stretched them to breaking point, particularly over Stalingrad, and Tunisia. the Germans had arrived at their point of military bankruptcy as much by their own hand as by the efforts of the allies. Yet another example of poor management of resources


Yes _strategic direction_ was flawed, not fighter procurement. 


> The allies were not just concentrated on one front, they had global commitments. It was the Germans who were concentrated in open area by the latter part of 1943. From mid 1943 onward, the were virtually no LW fighters in the Med, and only 24% of the total force on the eastern front. nearly all the others (about 70%) were concentrated in the Reich defences. By contrast, only 33 of the 97 (IIRC) fighter groups available to the US were concentrated in England at the beginning of 1944, and this number was the same at the end of 1944.


Yep, I misjudged the proportions. But let's get this straight: How large were the individual fighter strengths of RAF, USAAF and LW on the channel front in mid 43 and early and late '44?


> No, adding the he 162 was a technological success, but a managerial disaster. The type should never have been produced. instead the Germans should have concentrated on producing the 262, and possibly the Ta152, or the 109K (whichever is more producible, take your pick). introducing another aircraft to the already inefficient factories was going to slow delivery rates down, not speed them up. Operational rates were going to suffer, not improve, because of the he 162, because it was an additional, and new type which inevitably was going to suffer a high grounding rate as these problems were being ironed out.


What in the end matters is not whether it is a technological or managerial success, but whether it's an operational success. In the end it of course wasn't as it was introduced when the war was long lost. The decision to produce and introduce it was nevertheless the right one as what little resources could've been saved in the metal industry would've never led to significantly more Me-262s. While if the war had been for some reason prolonged it could've replaced a large portion of outdated piston fighters much faster than the Me-262. Regarding the logistical situation you have the induced complication of another type vs. the reduced complication of a much simpler aircraft than the Me-262.


> "Despite its rapid development, many problems persisted that remained unsolved by the end of the war...." So there is at least one source that challenges your assertion that it was combat ready. It was not fully ready, and suffered very low (even by the LW standards) operational readiness rates as a result


One opinion that is in contrast to what the pilots who actually flew the type say.


> Err no, this is not true. Actual production figures for completed units was 116, of which just over 50 had been delivered, all with problems, and a further 880 in various incomplete stages of production.


I disagree with those numbers as more than 40 were delivered to Erp.Grp. 162 alone. Not that it really matters. The point was, that the He 162 was much faster and cheaper to produce than the Me-262. Enough to outfit a considerable part of JG 1 only weeks after production started.


> The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements. The allies as a whole realized that more than anything, the air war was a war of numbers.


I am not disdainful of them, I merely pointed out that they were very far from logistically easy to handle.


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

Parsifal said:


> "An unusual design, with numerous unsolved developmental problems. The He 162 was a foolhardy and ill-considered attempt to address Germany's air defence problems. "



Care to name some of these "developmental problems" ?? I for one know of NONE. And British test pilots were only impressed with the bird, Eric Brown for one loved to just fly around in it for fun.

The He-162 program suffered from having to do with substitute materials because of lack of the proper materials, nothing was wrong with the design at all, it was an excellent design infact, and when properly built it proved excellent.


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## drgondog (Jul 14, 2008)

Juha said:


> KraztKraut
> Quote: “The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter.”
> 
> What had more Spit XIVs changed? IIRC British army wasn’t badly hindered by LW in ETO or in MTO in 1944-45 and I cannot recall many German daytime air attacks on UK in 44-5. On the other hand Heer often complained the lack of air support and unhindered Allied air attacks against it. It was Germans who asked: “Where are our fighters?” not British. Conclusion, RAF had enough air-superiority fighters, LW didn’t have. So RAF didn’t have urgent need for more Spit XIVs.
> ...



I agree Juha - The 8th AF FC awarded 105+ Me 262 kills alone. We know even awards are different from claims but I suspect the LW lost a lot more 262s in the air than 100 to the combined 8th/9th/15th FC, BC and RAF. We will never know because of the incomplete LW records and the imprecision of the claim/award processes.


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## drgondog (Jul 14, 2008)

KrazyKraut said:


> What did the Tempest change? What did the P-51H, P-47M/N or the P-80 change in WW2. Next to nothing. Yet they were all still introduced at a point when the war was basically won. So there must've been a need afterall.
> 
> And I'm very aware that kills aren't claims, it was obviously only an illustration of the relative effectiveness of the old and new fighters.



Of course there was a perceived need when the contracts for design and production were awarded for all of the above aircraft. Had the war in Europe not drawn to a conclusin in May - all would have been deployed there as next gen capability to counter new German capability.

In fact all of them would have been used as front line fighters had the Atomic bomb not been available.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2008)

B]


KrazyKraut said:


> Since this consumes way too much of my time now I will ignore your second attempt at insulting and belittling and repeat what I believe to be the most important questions regarding procurement management:
> 
> Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in production?
> Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in serious development?


[/B]
Once the allies wereat war (and not just britain alone), the allies did not produce new or additional fighters. Lets have a brief look at the main types for SE Fighters
First Flights
Hurricane I 11.35
Hurricane II: 6.40 (same basic airframe and engine...evolutionary development, no great dislocation to production)
Spitfire: 6.36, progressive improvements to airframe, armament and engine until MkXII

Spitfire (griffon Engine) Active in 1944 (major redesign of airframe and engine)
Typhoon: 10.39, Not operational until 5.41
Tempest: 9.42. A new design, to take advantage of the new Centaurus engine, for which development had begun pre-war

In the case of the british, therefore, ther were two designs that could be considered as "new" after the entry of the US. The Griffon engined Spits still made use of the spitfire airframe, and so was not a complete redesign. The Tempest, was a complete new design but was taking advantage of existing last generation engine technology.

Then of course ther was the meteor, which was a complete new design, but undertstandable due to its revolutionary nature.

Then there are the Americans



The main types that enterd, or were in production were

Hawk series, P-36, p-40, 
Bell P-39
P-47
P-51

All of these airframes were developed prior to the entry of the US to the war

Then there were the carrier types, 

F4F
F6F
F4U
Bearcat

The bearcat was a new development, the hellcat, and the F4U were both developed substantially pre-war

Now we need to look at the Axis and the new designs that were introduced

I believe the following were in production, or substantially under development pre-war

Me 109, FW 190, CR 32, CR 42, MC 200, G-050
I consider the following types to be wartime new designs

FW 190D, Ta 152, Do 335, Me 109K, Me 262, He 162, G-55, MC202, RE 2005
So comparing the two principal European Axis, to the two principal European Allies, the and disregarding the carier types (which were mainly for the pacific), one arrives at 6 allied types of pre-war vintage, to 6 Axis

In terms of the post US entry types, I would concede 6 main types introduced by the allies to at least 9 by the european axis, all of which, incidentally were used by the germans

Moreover, the allies had the economic muscle to afford this kind of diversity, whereas the Axis did not 


So the short answer is that the allied fighter development was done on a much less lavish scale than that of the axis, and where possible tried to to use pre-existing technology. The great many marks and line changes, whilst disruptive to production, were not nearly so bad as the introduction of a whole new type


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren said:


> Care to name some of these "developmental problems" ?? I for one know of NONE. And British test pilots were only impressed with the bird, Eric Brown for one loved to just fly around in it for fun.
> 
> The He-162 program suffered from having to do with substitute materials because of lack of the proper materials, nothing was wrong with the design at all, it was an excellent design infact, and when properly built it proved excellent.



There is nothing wrong with the design. But it suffered from problems in the undercarriage, in the armament, and in the laminate on the leading edges, which in the production types hasd a tendency to lift at high speeds. 

There is a difference between design faults, and development faults. Development faults could be a QA problem in the production line, it could be a shortage in a certain component. It could be an unseen design issue. The fact that 880 (with a further 60 not yet accepted) had been halted on the lines because of various faults is strong evidence of developmental issues. by comparison the 262 had largely overcome its development propblems that had cause such delays in 1944


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## drgondog (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren said:


> Care to name some of these "developmental problems" ?? I for one know of NONE. And British test pilots were only impressed with the bird, Eric Brown for one loved to just fly around in it for fun.
> 
> The He-162 program suffered from having to do with substitute materials because of lack of the proper materials, nothing was wrong with the design at all, it was an excellent design infact, and when properly built it proved excellent.



The glue was a problem, it had stability issues with pronounced dutch roll, it had to substitute 20mm for the Mk108 30's because of recoil caused structural failure. IIRC the vertical stabilizer had to be redesigned and 'droop tips' were added to assist in low speed stability..

It was a remarkable fighter which probably would not have encountered those problems (except perhaps the dutch roll) had the development process not been under such tight time constraints. Nevertheless the above problems resulted in design and manufacturing changes, which in turn slowed operation deployment.

If you reflect on the gestation of the Mustang as an example, the first flight tests revealed no problems requiring immediate design and manufacturing changes although changes to lower radiator intake geometry was made later to eliminate the turbulent flow rumble at high speeds, and still later the rudder strake, the gear uplocks, horizontal stabilizer incidence, were changed after the B/C/D were in production three years later after a major engine mod performance boost imposed unanticipated structural issues.

So, it smells like a close enough approximation of development issues for the He 162.


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## Juha (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren
"nothing was wrong with the design at all"
Now the flight time was very short and the engine blocked the view behind. At least the second was probably unavoidable because of very short design time but a problem anyway. And from an amateur viewpoint the fuselage wing junction seemed to be less than ideal probably leading to unnecessary high local air speeds at the lower wing/fuselage joint. 

French seemed to think that He 162 was very nice plane for pleasure flying with very light controls but at least some ex fighter pilots suspected that it would become difficult to control if one made harsh combat manouevres.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

Again the problems with the He-162 were caused because of a lack of proper materials Bill. 

The wing design issue was solved with the droop tips as a quick fix, had there been enough time an increase in dihedral would've been made instead but the droop tips fixed the problem nonetheless. 

In short the wing is the only thing which recieved a minor modification vs the original design blueprints, all other problems were caused by shortages in the right materials.

As for the glue, this was solved as-well with a new mix.


Now regarding the Me-262, around 100 were destroyed by Allied a/c true, but not all in the air. And as for the LW claims, well they were undoubtedly higher, the 509 figure is confirmed kills as far as I can tell. But Erich knows more about this so he's the man to ask.


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## KrazyKraut (Jul 14, 2008)

parsifal said:


> B][/B]
> Once the allies wereat war (and not just britain alone), the allies did not produce new or additional fighters. Lets have a brief look at the main types for SE Fighters
> First Flights
> Hurricane I 11.35
> ...


Except you a) blatantly "forgot" a few types, b) arbitrarily designate German fighters as "new" which are no more or less so than several Allied developments which you of course chose to see as "one" and c) try to cover up the indifference by including Italy

I will try to make a fair production comparison between RAF and LW based on daytime, landbased fighters with significant production numbers only. I will exclude conversions from bombers as I'm unsure about their overall significance in daytime operations and I think give or take they don't distort the numbers too much. Additionally I will exclude land-lease aircraft which would of course increase the RAF numbers significantly:

RAF 1940: Hurricane, Spitfire, Defiant, Beaufighter (limited) (4)
LW 1940: Bf 109, Bf 110 (2)

RAF 1941: Hurricane, Spitfire, Typhoon, Beaufighter (limited) (4)
LW 1941: Bf 109, Fw 190, Bf 110, Me 210 (very limited) (4)

RAF 1942: Hurricane, Spitfire, Typhoon, Beaufighter (limited) (5)
LW 1942: Bf 109, Fw 190, Bf 110, Me 210 (very limited) (4)

RAF 1943: Hurricane, Spitfire, Typhoon, Beaufighter, Tempest (very limited) (5)
LW 1943: Bf 109, Fw 190, Bf 110, Me 210/410 (4)

RAF 1944: Hurricane, Spitfire, Typhoon, Tempest (limited and mostly nightfighters), Beaufighter, Meteor (6)
LW 1944: Bf 109, Fw 190, Ta 152 (extremely limited), Bf 110 (very limited and mostly nightfighters), Me 262, Me 163, Me 410 (7)

RAF 1945: Spitfire, Typhoon, Tempest, Beaufighter, Meteor (5)
LW 1945: Bf 109, Fw 190, Ta 152, Me 262, He 162 (5)

So that'd be 4-4-5-5-6-5 vs. 2-4-4-4-7-5 for 1940-1945.

There's probably some I forgot. I will get to developments later.


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

Juha said:


> but at least some ex fighter pilots suspected that it would become difficult to control if one made harsh combat manouevres.
> Juha



Well not the British test pilots. Eric Brown mentions that he loved throwing the He-162 into tight turns and that it was extremely maneuverable in all flight regimes. The only issue, and it was minor according to Brown, was the overly responsive rudder, but this was no problem what'so'ever as long as you knew about it - Some unfortunate French pilot didn't know about it and pushed the rudder to hard causing the aft fuselage structure to fail.


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## drgondog (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren said:


> Again the problems with the He-162 were caused because of a lack of proper materials Bill.
> 
> So you are saying a different rudder was not designed and installed, that the airplane did not have a serious dutch roll that they tried to fix by changinging the static margin and droop tips?
> 
> ...



The contention of 'award to actual loss' will always be a mystery but the 8th AF records are better than the LW records in this regard for both awards and losses.

The 105 awards is an actual count of the air to air claims (more than 105)reduced to awards, but there were far more destroyed on the ground. The 355th had 18 on one mission in 1944. 

I am also fully aware than many burning Me 262s in combat film were in reality repaired so I won't dive down a rathole on what the count actually was in either category. 

As Joe B. has mentioned, and I agree, getting grips on actual award/losses is very difficult. In just my research on April 24, 1944 and November 26, 1944 the LW awards for both bombers and fighter categories were 2x actaul losses of 8th AF for those days.. ditto May 12 - so it raised many question in my own mind about LW claim/award processes when they had the easiest job of all for most claims - go look and see what you find 'there'... as the wreckage of everything but an atomized aircraft should leave a trace.

I know now that many aircraft claimed by US fighters as 'destroyed' following a crash landing under fire was actually and frequently not in the LW rolls as destroyed if it was assessed as 60% for an example and later repaired.


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## Juha (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren
Quote: "the 509 figure is confirmed kills as far as I can tell"

IIRC LW confirmation process broke down around Dec 44, not many claims were officially confirmed after that by the complicated confirmation process, so who confirmed the 509 Me 262 kills?

Now none of the French crashed because of after fuselage failure, one of the British/Commonwealth pilot did , Flt Lt Marks, according to Brown.

From Brown:" On the whole the result was surprisingly good, but the little humped monster with its engine on its back was tricky to fly, showing marginal stability, a strong tendency to side-slip, and an eagerness to spin." And "from the stability and control point of view, one of the finest aircraft I had ever flow." but "with its pygmy size and very limited range, was an impracticable proposition." So surprisingly good when one looks the situation in which it was created but far from perfect combat a/c.


Juha


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

Juha the Me-262 was in service long before Dec 44, so the confirmed kills would be from that period.

As for the He-162, as I recall a Frenchman crashed and died because of structural failure to either the aft fuselage or stablizer. But it could've been an Englishman as-well, I don't have my books or notes with me as I'm on vacation.


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

drgondog said:


> The contention of 'award to actual loss' will always be a mystery but the 8th AF records are better than the LW records in this regard for both awards and losses.
> 
> The 105 awards is an actual count of the air to air claims (more than 105)reduced to awards, but there were far more destroyed on the ground. The 355th had 18 on one mission in 1944.
> 
> ...



Claims were about as overblown by both sides, that's why the confirmation procedure was there, and the LW had the strictest here. It sometimes took up to a year for a kill to be confirmed, a pretty long wait...

Btw, any new progress with the spreadsheets Bill ?


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## Juha (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren
"Juha the Me-262 was in service long before Dec 44, so the confirmed kills would be from that period."

Nope, checked Foreman's and Harvey's The Me-262 Combat Diary, not the most up-today book but anyway a good indicator, only 59 claims by Me262 pilots up to 31.12.44.

Juha

BTW, happy vacation!


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## Kurfürst (Jul 14, 2008)

parsifal said:


> The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements.



Incredibly doubtful. Especially as the RAF was barely even up in the air to go against the Luftwaffe after 1940.. Its enough to take a look at the claims made by the 2nd TAF in the second half of 1944, which was supposed to be the vanguard of British efforts in the air (and in practice the only actual one, given the typical short range of RAF fighters operating from Britain). While the 2nd TAF was _claiming_ 50, perhaps 100 or 150 aircraft a month, and perhaps actually destroying a half or third of that, the USAAF and Luftwaffe waged a literal _Materialschlacht_ in the air with unprecedented amounts of aircraft lost on both sides.



parsifal said:


> The allies as a whole realized that more than anything, the air war was a war of numbers. They maintained some high quality units, and equipment, but at the end of the day, the allies realized that they needed the numbers more than anything.



Its difficult to see why are you are switching the subject to the 'Allies'. The subject was specifically the RAF lack of modern (fighter) equipment through the war.

The USAAF, and the VVS or the Luftwaffe for that matter had appearantly little problem in either capability or will getting the most modern equipment to the frontlines; Mustangs become widespread relatively fast. OTOH, the RAF appears to have been tradiationally incapable of matching enemy equipment quality _in numbers_.

Unless you wish to tell me that someone in Britain was in charge of these matters went funny in the head and willfully ensured that they would get Hurricanes instead of Spitfires in 1940, Mark V Spits instead of Mk IXs in 1942-43, Mark IX Spits and Typhoons instead of XIVs and Tempests in 1944 etc..



> new technology is a "nice to have" advantage, but at the end of the day it s the number of aircraft that you can consistently put into the air that counts the most. The allies realized this. They also realized they needed to maintain quality, and did this as well.



Its starting to look like a pink rosy dream and you even start to contradict yourself. First you argue that 'the Allies' wanted the numbers game, and that they regarded quality as a sort of secondary issue; then you argue they maintained quality as well after all.



> The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans.



Verifiable source please. 



> Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later.



That is a very interesting claim. Lets take a look at April 1944. That's early 1944.











> Whereas the Allied were achieving operational readiness rates of better than 80% most of the time, German operation rates of less than 50%. Stop sprouting bull crap to support your arguments. I will spot it from a mile away



Speaking of, I call bull crap on this, provide the source please.

Overall it seems to me you put up some rosy pink glasses with superglue. Claim after claim is made by you, some very dubious, but it is not supported with facts or anything.

Its simply fiction. You have a pre-conceived idea, and just blend the facts around it.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 14, 2008)

KrazyKraut said:


> Except you a) blatantly "forgot" a few types



Including the P-38!


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## drgondog (Jul 14, 2008)

If Dr Price is to be believed, he has the following for May, 1944 for LuftFlotte Reich

Unit Total Serviceable
JG1 135 58
JG3 144 44
JG5 87 72
JG11 101 55
JG27 118 86
JG53 31 14
JG 54 23 8
JG300 90 67
JG301 25 21
JG302 27 11
JG400 10 0
JG104 4 4
JG 106 5 3
JG 108 12 6
---- ----
782 449

According to Dr Price the 'serviceable to available' S/E day fighter ratio was 57%... the NJG totals were 807 and 374 respectively for 46% operational availability on 31 May, 1944 for LuftFlotte Reich Fighter strength.

I don't have any conclusings but would not be suprised that pilot availability was one of the root causes - not parts.


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## drgondog (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren said:


> Claims were about as overblown by both sides, that's why the confirmation procedure was there, and the LW had the strictest here. It sometimes took up to a year for a kill to be confirmed, a pretty long wait...
> 
> Btw, any new progress with the spreadsheets Bill ?



Yep - I made the changes to add inputs of a.) density at a specific altitude, b.) Bhp as recorded in flight tests for that altitude and c.) reference full ammo load and pilot weight as one factor and a fuel load as another. I will probably start comparing results to Gene's spreadsheets in a day or so. 

I am debating adding to propeller thrust losses due to decreasing density altitude - I found an interesting 'rule of thumb' from a P&W Handbook I haven't looked at for 35 years but it is an approximation and it would apply to all the fighters at a given altitude across the board.. so in comparisons it should have no bearing in the outcome.

Gene's models are solely for Sea Level performance where SQRT(RHOalt/RHOsl) =1. 

At 25,000 feet it = .6698.. This is only important if I wish to compare EAS for a 51 at 25000 feet against EAS for an 109G6 at SL.. but I do want that capability later.

More about this later

Ordinarily I would agree on LW claims process - at least through 1943 and for ETO. JG 77 and 27 claims in Africa are hugely suspect in many instances in MTO. But, if Tony Woods tables with referenced film are examples of LW awards processes for even early 1944 I have serious doubts that the process was as rigorous from early1944 forward based on detailed research of Allied losses for perhaps 20 specific days ranging from February 20-25 during Big Week. 

The figures I have gotten from Drs Prien, Mueller and Caldwell are agreeing very well with Luftwaffe loss records by type loss - and 8th AF FC awards. The issue is that the bombers definitely got some of the fighters lost and it is difficult to estimate the percentage. At zero percent attributed to bombers the variations are small and grow as you assume increasing percentages going to the bombers.

I literally have looked at all (~98%) the 8th AF FC MACR's available from NARA for the last 20 years and feel that I have a very good insight on 8th FC loss by category. The stuff I sent you last fall is being updated as I am well on the way to finish a month by month compilation including the types of a/c 'awarded' as kills by 8thAFVCB.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2008)

*I don't have any conclusions but would not be surprised that pilot availability was one of the root causes - not parts*.


I see this thread has gone absolutelybonkas, now that we are questioning German competency.

I agree with the above statement to the extent that the major limiter was pilots, followed later in 1944, by fuel shortages. However I do have sources to back up my claim about spares.

"Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-45" Professor Williason Murray, Air University Press (University Of Ohio), 1983, Page 14

_Goring's and Hitlers fascination with numbers also served to distort the maintenance and supply problem. The number of aero engines held in reserve never exceeded 4-5% of total production. The reason for this situation was Goring's refusal to follow recommendations made repeatedly by OKLto devote at least 20-30% of production to spare parts, to provide adequate inventories (of spares). Instead the Germans assigned production almost exclusively to first line strength, because the outlook of the top leadership was a fascination with numbers, and not serviceability. This practice continued throughout the war. as a result the Luftwaffe was chronically short of spare parts, with a significant and direct negative impact on readiness rates._

Joel Haywards book reinforces this point of view. He points out that whilst readiness rates might be high at the beginning of a campaign, that serviceability fell away very rapidly in any sort of sustained operation. This was because there were just not the spares available to keep the air fleets at a high state of readiness for long. The reports from JG53 indicate that at the beginning of 1944, more 20 of its aircraft were unavailable due to "servicing difficulties" or "technical faults" So, I believe there is clear evidence to support the claim that the Luftwaffe mismanaged its logistic tail by failing to build or maintain an adequate inventory of spare parts.


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## drgondog (Jul 14, 2008)

parsifal said:


> *I don't have any conclusions but would not be surprised that pilot availability was one of the root causes - not parts*.
> 
> 
> I see this thread has gone absolutelybonkas, now that we are questioning German competency.
> ...



entirely possible - but with such a low operations availability it seems like a lot of 'spares and hanger queens' were available to offset spare parts logistics.


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## Juha (Jul 15, 2008)

Drgondog
IIRC LW kept record besides plane availability also pilot/aircrew capalities, ie how many pilots/aircrew there were in unit, how many of them were fully combat capable and how many were only limitedly combat capable, ie needed more training/experience to be fully effective combat pilot/aircrew.

So IMHO plane serviceably depended on availability of spares and on availability of enough mechanics and other service people. Also at least the Finnish AF suffered of lack of special tools for their Me 109Gs which significantly delayed maintenance work.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Jul 15, 2008)

drgondog said:


> If Dr Price is to be believed, he has the following for May, 1944 for LuftFlotte Reich
> 
> Unit Total Serviceable
> JG1 135 58
> ...



However if you look at the _entire Luftwaffe_, rather than just Luftflotte Reich, which was undergoing its most severe period of combat with the USAAF at the time, servicabilty rates were around 70%. Its also rather important whether these servicibility statistics refer to the status in the morning, before the battles, or were taken in the evening, when a lot of planes were around with a couple of holes in them, unservicable, but overall only having light damage that would repaired by the morning.

As such of the statistics above are misleading.

For example, JG3 has 144 present, 44 servicable. 

But in my edition of Price it is also noted that the IV (Sturm) Gruppe of JG 3 was under re-organisation, and it had 54 aircraft but only one servicable - so certainly IV/JG 3 (with its 1,8% servicibility) are going to lower the readiness statistics of JG 3 as a whole.

Dig a little deeper and you will find that _at the start of May_ 1944 IV/JG 3 had only Bf 109G-6s. During the month it lost some of them, and transferred most of the rest to other units. In the same month the Gruppe received some 64 FW 190A-7 and A-8, most brand new.
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, IV./JG3

In brief, during May the IV/JG 3 Gruppe was doing its transition from the Bf 109G to FW 190A which explains why its servicibility was so low.


Similiarly, II/JG 27, III/ZG 26, II/ZG 76, I/JG 400 was undergoing re-organisation at the time. Looking for example I/JG 400, which was just formed officially a few months ago as a Me 163, was only starting receiving its radically different aircraft in May 1944.
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, I./JG400

Murray literally shines in making stupid conclusions from insufficent evidence, so unless he can offer so sort of verifiable source for his claims about lack of spare parts, I do not care about his comments much. They are far too often found to completely baseless and faulty in their analysis.

Phrases like 'Goring's and Hitlers fascination' certainly do not raise his credibility, as it only addresses the reader`s emotions but not his mind. Stuff like 'Instead the Germans assigned production almost exclusively to first line strength' is also funny and it is easy to disprove.

For example, just a quick check from the number available to me, in June 1943 the Germans produced 672 new Bf 109Gs; they issued 388 to frontline daylight fighter units. Some obviously went to recce units, for which I have no figures (yet), but overall those were only a fraction of Tagjagd`s size, so I doubt we are talking about more than a few dozen issued at best.

To switch to 1944, during March the Germans 859 new production fighters (FW 190, Bf 109 etc), and 387 from repair centres to the _Tagjagd_; in the same month, 804 new Bf 109s and 573 FW 190s were produced.

Yet Murray claims there were not enough spares.. it would seem to me that there were always plentiful of whole _replacement aircraft_ around, which would appear to be a much more straightforward means of increasing servicibility than to perform repairs of damaged aircraft on site. The Germans appear to have relied a lot more on their home industry to perform repairs than Murray seems to realize. Of course Murray must be thinking in terms of the USAAF, where such, thousands of miles from the states, would be very difficult to perform and local repairs would the way to go.


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2008)

Murray is only considered one of the foremost experts in the world on the Luftwaffe 

He is supported by Hayward in his work, "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers defeat in the East", in which he also shows the The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics. Hayward reports that the operational readiness rate for the Luftwaffe reached a peak in June 1942, on the southern front, of 70%, but this had plunged to less than 31% by the time of Stalingrad. By March it had staged a partial recovery to 45%, and some further improvement again by the time of Kursk (IIRC it had climbed to something over 50%), From there on, the readiness rate continued to drop, until by the end of the war, almost the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had become non-operational (not due to spares, mostly to the fuel situation by then).

Ellis reports that by the end of June 1941, the readiness rate of the frontline aircraft had fallen to about 1000 A/C, or around 44%

Finally there are some interviews of actual veterans, the following of which is an example

_The interview has been made possible by the kind assistance and enthusiasm of his son, Uwe Wiedemann, who relayed my questions to his father and conducted the actual interview. 
The subject, Hans Wiedemann, served in the Luftwaffe, primarily with 4./ Ln.Rgt. Afrika, III./Stuka Geschw. 3 and Stab StG3. He also served for a time with Stuka Geschwader 2. 
Hans attained the the rank of Obergefreiter in North Africa, later Corporal, and saw active service with the RAD and Luftwaffe for the full duration of the war (1939-45). He served in North Africa between March 1941 and May 1943 as a radio (wireless) operator. 
Hans was stationed at various airfields within Libya, Egypt and Tunisia such as Tmimi, Martuba, Derna, Barce, En Nofilia, Agedabia, El Daba, Bir el Abd, El Quasaba, Gabes and Tunis. 
In May 1943 he was one of the few lucky ones to be evacuated by air from Tunisia to Sicily. From here he participated in the gradual retreat movements northward through Italy until he finally surrendered to US Infantry in the Dolomites, Northern Italy in May 1945. 

Which units did you serve with in North Africa? 

Well, with the III./StG 3, II./StG 2, I./ StG 3 Ju 88 Aufklarer (Reconnaisance). With the Ju 88 we had first tries of some night-fighter training, leading the aircraft from ground by radio. My Stamm- Einheit (basic-unit) still was the 4./ Ln.Abt. Afrika until the end of 1942, when I was with the Ln.Rgt. Tunis ( 9./ Horch (reconnaisance)). On the 2nd May 1943 I was put under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring and could escape to Marsala/Sicily with a "Siebel-Fahre" (a special armoured type of pontoon ferry). 

Was the supply of fuel and spare parts a major problem? 

Supply of spare parts and fuel really was a major problem! 

_
Producing whole units instead of producing adequate spares is a most innefficient way of maintaining readiness.  aircraft, like any complex machine, will have certain pieces of equipment that fail more regularly than others. usually these areas of systemic failure will occur in the engine. Producing an entire airframe, so that you can have a spare engine is a most innefficient way of repairing an airframe. The best and most production efficient way to manage this problem is to maintain a relatively high reserve of engines (so as to return the airframe to service quickly), and then further, to maintain a higher than average stock of engine parts that are shown the most likley to fail. Say, for example the crankshafts are shown to need replacement after say 50 hours, but that the average engine life is 500 hours. It would make sense to produce 10 crankshafts for every one engine, rather than produce 10 separate engines, or worse, produce 10 complete airframes , just so the crankshaft can be replaced every 50 hours. Effectively, under the latter scenario, you will have 10 airframes sitting around, doing nothing, in order to keep just one airframe flying. That is hardly good management, and very likely to lead to a low operational readiness rate. And yet, this is precisely how the Luftwaffe was managed throughout most of the war. 


Are all of these people unreliable as well???


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## Juha (Jul 15, 2008)

Hello Kurfürst
there is one significant omission in Your analyse, the SGs, which were very significant user of FW 190s and in May 44 LW had something like 1050 serviceable sinle-engined fighters and some 550 serviceable ground-attack planes, almost all of the latter were FW 190s.

Juha


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## drgondog (Jul 15, 2008)

kurfurst - I really don't have a problem with your primary points as the LW did, prior to D-Day ship a/c back to central locations for upgrades and repairs. 

That strategy became less successful as more fighters were leaving the bombers following relief from escort and shooting up rail and barge traffic on the way home. This same tactic placed strains on Speers very sound decentralization of his a/c industry to lessen effect of strategic bombing.

Having said that a casual look at LufFlotte 3 on the Kanal front shows 357 on hand and 209 available S/E and T/E fighters for JG2, JG26, ZG1,NJG4,NJG5 and NJG6 - also about 58% at the end of May 31. A casual look at LF4 shows a much higher percentage 'availability' than the England facing JG's, ditto LF5 and 6.

I would speculate that the LW did not have the eqivalent Service Groups located close to airfields - which did the wing changes, major sheet metal or assembly replacements, etc. But I do not know.

Implication is a lot of sheet metal repair, new wings etc, not spark plugs, radios and engines... as well as a shortage of pilots to fly perfectly good ships.

BTW as I look at 8th AF strength in fighters I frequently see 60-70% available, sometimes less, between Feb and end of April, as the Mustang was ironing out issues with radios, mags, coolant leaks, etc. 

In June there were severe strains on the ground crews because of Invasion activity but the availability was high (>70%) and pilots often flew two and sometimes three sorties per day in Area Patrols and Fighter Bomber missions.


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## Kurfürst (Jul 15, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Murray is only considered one of the foremost experts in the world on the Luftwaffe



By whom...? 

I would certainly not call someone so who

a, had done zero research in Germany and had appearantly very little understanding or willingness to understand how the Luftwaffe would operate during the war, instead he dispays the typical Anglo-Saxon reasoning that _since we did it this way, and they did it in another way, they must be wrong_. We`ve seen this nonsene with the four-engined bomber thing how many times exactly..? _Well HELLO THERE, they were not the ones flying from Britain to Germany over France, so where is exactly the same pressing need?_

b, uses demagogue arguements like _'the Luftwaffe lost the equivalents of two air forces by 1942'_ etc., then going into how this eroded the quality, somehow forgetting about the fact that all the other air forces went through this as well. An equivalent of the RAF`s Fighter Command was, for example, wiped out during the mere four months in the Battle of Britain - but of course it received replacements, and maintained the numbers. Yet somehow, Murray speaks of losses that if it would be some kind of demagogue 'proof' of the loss of quality, and naturally, it only effected the Luftwaffe... bah!

From what I`ve seen, Murray is very popular in certain circles, because he lends authority to bashing agendas.



parsifal said:


> He is supported by Hayward in his work, "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers defeat in the East", in which he also shows the The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics.



Having problems with logistics (which is fairly normal IMHO in any army of the size on campaign), and being run by retards is not quite the same thing.



parsifal said:


> Hayward reports that the operational readiness rate for the Luftwaffe reached a peak in June 1942, on the southern front, of 70%, but this had plunged to less than 31% by the time of Stalingrad. By March it had staged a partial recovery to 45%, and some further improvement again by the time of Kursk (IIRC it had climbed to something over 50%),



Hayward apparently picks certain periods of low serviceability rates, at certain times and certain locations to support his conception, instead of providing an overall picture how serviceability went through the war. 

Cherry picking, however, is not convincing. To make some use of such figures, we would need to at least how many of these were non-operational because of 

a, lack of spares
b, lack of maintenance personnel capacity
c, lack of transportation capacity
d, what was the duration of serviceability (ie. unserviceable for the duration of a night is fairly normal, the crew simply needs time to make the repairs)
e, what was the cause, heavy enemy action that naturally creates bottlenecks in the servicing chain or natural wear?

Without knowledge of the reasons, especially if we do not know the duration of serviceability and the cause, no valid conclusions can be drawn.

_Guesses_ can be made with a high probability of error.



> From there on, the readiness rate continued to drop, until by the end of the war, almost the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had become non-operational (not due to spares, mostly to the fuel situation by then).



That`s a remarkable funny fiction, in view of the reported sorties flew over the Eastern front by Luftwaffe`s non-operational phantom planes. IIRC 10 000 or so _fighter_ sorties were flown in the East in February 1945 alone. Over Berlin in April, a very high number of sorties (a few thousend _a day_, from memory) were flown.

I guess *IF* _Hayward_ makes such a blatantly stupid claim that towards the wars end the Luftwaffe was non-operational on the East, I guess his book can go straight onto the lower shelf of the 'Fiction' shelf in remote book stores.



parsifal said:


> Ellis reports that by the end of June 1941, the readiness rate of the frontline aircraft had fallen to about 1000 A/C, or around 44%



Oh well I can cherry pick low serviceability rates too.

For example, Typhoon Squadrons can be showed at a service rate of 5 to 10 (five to ten) percent in late 1944 at 1-2-3 serviceable Typhoons per Squadron.

Do you think it was lack of spares, too...?



parsifal said:


> Finally there are some interviews of actual veterans, the following of which is an example
> 
> _The interview has been made possible by the kind assistance and enthusiasm of his son, Uwe Wiedemann, who relayed my questions to his father and conducted the actual interview.
> The subject, Hans Wiedemann, served in the Luftwaffe, primarily with 4./ Ln.Rgt. Afrika, III./Stuka Geschw. 3 and Stab StG3. He also served for a time with Stuka Geschwader 2.
> ...


_

I don`t think I need to detail why I find this a lame sweaty attempt. Keywords: lack of source, lack of details, lack of insight onto the whole picture we are discussion (the Luftwaffe, not the well-being 4th Staffel of Stukageschwader 3 in Africa). 

Yet I still have to wonder how the Luftwaffe, despite your claims, maneged to keep up on avarage 60-70% servicibility with its fighter units late in the war, despite the railways, roads being regularly attack by medium bombers and fighter bombers, the airfields strafed by escorts and bombed by heavies.



parsifal said:



Producing whole units instead of producing adequate spares...

Click to expand...


*PROVE first there were no adequate spares before you try to present it as a fact.*



parsifal said:



is a most innefficient way of maintaining readiness. aircraft, like any complex machine, will have certain pieces of equipment that fail more regularly than others. usually these areas of systemic failure will occur in the engine. Producing an entire airframe, so that you can have a spare engine is a most innefficient way of repairing an airframe. The best and most production efficient way to manage this problem is to maintain a relatively high reserve of engines (so as to return the airframe to service quickly), and then further, to maintain a higher than average stock of engine parts that are shown the most likley to fail. Say, for example the crankshafts are shown to need replacement after say 50 hours, but that the average engine life is 500 hours. It would make sense to produce 10 crankshafts for every one engine, rather than produce 10 separate engines, or worse, produce 10 complete airframes , just so the crankshaft can be replaced every 50 hours. Effectively, under the latter scenario, you will have 10 airframes sitting around, doing nothing, in order to keep just one airframe flying.

Click to expand...


That is all well, but what does it have to do with the subject?



parsifal said:



That is hardly good management, and very likely to lead to a low operational readiness rate. 
And yet, this is precisely how the Luftwaffe was managed throughout most of the war.

Click to expand...


Oh I see now. You describe a fiction, born a few minutes ago in your mind, and then say that this is how exactly it happened 60 years ago. No supportive evidence, nothing. 

Because you want it to have been happening that way, because you argued earlier it did, then it must have happened that way.

Is that it?

*PROVE first there was low operational readiness rate through the war before you try to present it as a fact.
of evidence offered.*

Produce the evidence. This means numbers on spares, verifiable sources behind your claims. 




Are all of these people unreliable as well???

Click to expand...


You do know the analogue between opinions and a-holes, that everyone has them, these people included? The problem being, until proven, it just that, an opinion. So prove them. The burden of proof is on you, you make the claims here._


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## Kurfürst (Jul 15, 2008)

Juha said:


> Hello Kurfürst
> there is one significant omission in Your analyse, the SGs, which were very significant user of FW 190s and in May 44 LW had something like 1050 serviceable sinle-engined fighters and some 550 serviceable ground-attack planes, almost all of the latter were FW 190s.
> 
> Juha



The reason being I did not take a look at the SGs, being not my particular interest; HoHun`s XLS table can be used to gather such data, but I noticed some - IT/excell related - errors in it and I do not trust if the details of losses, shipments etc. is reported correctly.

However, I have no reason to believe the trend was different with 190s than with 109s; in the case of the latters, simply a lot more 109 were built every month than issued. Thus I see no problem with spares/reserves. 

It might be interesting to do a detailed study on 190s as well, but, I am not inclined to do so because of ill-supported theories that emerge every now and then, especially if they appear to be dogmatic; and, my available time is not endless either. 

Besides anyone can do it in his free time if he is interested, and then share the results. All the material is available on the internet (USSBS and ww2.dk). It only needs processed.


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## Soren (Jul 15, 2008)

Bill,

AFAIK all Gene's comparisons were at a height of 10,000 ft, not at SL.

But when do you reckon we'll be ready to compare a/c ?


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## drgondog (Jul 15, 2008)

Soren said:


> Bill,
> 
> AFAIK all Gene's comparisons were at a height of 10,000 ft, not at SL.
> 
> ...



No earlier than a.) first of next week, and b.) when we have reliable Bhp as f(altitude).. Williams has such for the 51B/D and for the 51B both for 1650-3 and 1650-7 as well as 75" and 67" Hg for several critical altitudes - but not a single chart.

We will need to same data as input to develop the Thrust Hp at each of those altitudes.


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## Soren (Jul 15, 2008)

Roger. I've got the charts for the Jumo 213A E and the Jumo 004B-1 if you can add jet fighters to the chart ? I think Kurfürst has the charts for the DB605 versions.

Do you have charts for the RR Merlin and the PW R-2800 ? I think I have the BMW-801 charts needed, or Gene has them.


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## Juha (Jul 15, 2008)

Kurfürst
Quote: "To switch to 1944, during March the Germans 859 new production fighters (FW 190, Bf 109 etc), and 387 from repair centres to the Tagjagd; in the same month, 804 new Bf 109s and 573 FW 190s were produced."


my point was, that IIRC monthly production figures I have seen on Fw190 didn't separated ground attack and fighter versions, so without knowing how many of FWs went to SGs one cannot say was there any significant increase on reserve a/c. Secondly, at least almost all of those 109G6s which arrived to Finland in 1944 had some substandard parts which had to be replaced in VL (State Aircraft Factory) before they could be passed to combat units. That indicates bottlenecs in production at least from mid-44 onwards, some planes even lacked radios etc fundamental parts for a combat plane.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2008)

Joel S A Hayward
(Source Wiki)

Joel S.A. Hayward (born 1964), is a New Zealand military historian and analyst who has worked in the United Kingdom since 2004. He is best known for his published works on the use of air power by the German military during World War II, his 2003 biography of Horatio Lord Nelson, and a controversy over his 1993 M.A. thesis on the historiography of Holocaust denial in which it was charged that he was a Holocaust denier. Hayward is Head of Air Power Studies at King's College London and, as of 1 April 2007, is Dean of the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell. In August 2007 the Royal Air Force appointed him a Director of the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies.[1][2] He holds fellowships from the United States Air Force and the Federal Government of Germany.[1]

Hayward went on to pursue a Ph.D. degree, also at University of Canterbury, again under the supervision of Dr. Vincent Orange.[11] He initially considered to enroll for the Ph.D. with a biography of well-known Holocaust denier David Irving as a dissertion topic, apparently at Irving's suggestion,[12] but instead embarked on a study of German air operations during World War II.[11] In 1994, the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, located within the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, awarded him a research scholarship to conduct research for his dissertation in its archives; he subsequently received a research fellowship from the Federal Government of Germany which enabled him to conduct doctoral research in the German Military Archives in Freiburg, Germany.[13]

Hayward was awarded a Ph.D. in 1996. His thesis, Seeking the Philosopher's Stone: Luftwaffe Operations during Hitler's Drive to the East, 1942–1943[14] became the basis for his first book,[11] Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-1943.,[15] which was published in 1998.


Academic and professional career

Massey University
In June 1996 Hayward joined the History Department at Massey University (Palmerston North Campus) as a Lecturer in Defence and Strategic Studies,[16] receiving promotion to Senior Lecturer in August 1999.[4] He specialized in the theoretical and conceptual aspects of modern warfare, airpower, joint doctrines, and manoeuvre warfare.[16] He continued in that position until June 2002.[2]

While at Massey, Hayward in 1999 was organizer of New Zealand's largest defence conference, held 21-22 August at Massey University's Turitea campus. The conference, entitled "Coalitions and Conflict — The Transition of Warfare 1899 to 1999 and Beyond," focused on coalition warfare and was jointly hosted by Massey University and the New Zealand Army's Military Studies Institute.[17] Hayward was conference convenor of Massey's third annual defence conference in August 2000, again co-hosted by the New Zealand Army, with discussion focusing on the trend towards integrating the three armed services (army, air force, and navy) under unified command.[18] Hayward also acted as editor of the conference proceedings, which took its title from the conference's theme, Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and Its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force.[19]

From 1997 to 2004 he was also lecturer at the Officer Cadet School of the New Zealand Army[2], where he taught general military history from Alexander the Great to the Balkan War,[16] and at the Command and Staff College of the Royal New Zealand Air Force,[2] where he taught airpower history and doctrine and supervised advanced research in military history.[16] During the same period he also taught strategic thought at the Royal New Zealand Naval College.[16][2] He also wrote academic articles for general military and military history publications.[16]

This is a selected bibliography of peer-reviewed articles.

(1995). "Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941–42." The Journal of Strategic Studies 18(4): 94-135. December 1995. Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 441–482. 
(1997). "Stalingrad: An Examination of Hitler’s Decision to Airlift." Airpower Journal 11(1): 21–37. Spring 1997. Also published by the U.S. Air Force in a Portuguese translation as "Estalingrado: Um Exame da Decisão de Hitler a Respeito do Transporte Aéreo." 
(1997). "The German Use of Airpower at Kharkov, May 1942." Air Power History 44(2): 18–29. Summer 1997. 
(1997). "Von Richthofen's 'giant fire-magic': The Luftwaffe's Contribution to the Battle of Kerch, 1942." The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10(2): 97–124. June 1997. 
(1998). "A Case Study in Effective Command: An Analysis of Field Marshal Richthofen's Character and Career." New Zealand Army Journal 18: 7–18. January 1998. 
(1999). "NATO's War in the Balkans: A Preliminary Analysis." New Zealand Army Journal 21: 1–17. July 1999. 
(1999). "A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean Campaign of 1942." The Journal of Strategic Studies 22(4): 103–130. December 1999. Also in German translation as "Eine Fallstudie früher integrierter Kriegführung: Eine Analyse des Krimfeldzuges der Wehrmacht im Jahre 1942." Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 483–510. 
(2000). "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production." The Journal of Military History 64(3): 769–794. July 2000. Also in Spanish translation as "Demasiado Poco, Demasiado Tarde: Un Análisis del Fracaso de Hitler en Agos-to de 1942 de Dañar la Producción Pe-trolífera Soviética." Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 511–536. 
(2001). "Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm." Defence Studies 1(2): 15–37. Summer 2001. 
(2002). "Prayers Before Battle: The Spiritual Utterances of Three Great Commanders." US Army Chaplaincy Journal (Winter-Spring 2002), pp. 32-40. 
(2002). "Current and Future Command Challenges for New Zealand Defence Force Personnel." Australian Defence Force Journal 155: 39–45. July/August 2002. 

Monographs
(2000). Adolf Hitler and Joint Warfare. Military Studies Institute Working Papers Series No. 2/2000. Military Studies Institute, New Zealand Defence Force. (44 pp.) 

Books

Military history
(1998). Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-1943. Modern War Studies series. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700611460. 
(2000). (edited). A Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force. Massey University, Centre for Defence Studies. 
(2003). For God and Glory: Lord Nelson and His Way of War. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591143519. 
(2003). (edited with Glyn Harper). Born to Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders. Auckland: Exisle Publishing. ISBN 0908988338. 
(2006). Stalingrad. Pen Sword Battleground series. London: Millennium. ISBN 1844154742


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2008)

Dr W Murray

Source 
(Dr. Williamson Murray - Strategic Studies Institute)

Dr. Williamson Murray

Position: External Researcher WILLIAMSON MURRAY is currently professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University. He has served as the Harold Johnson Professor of Military History at the United States Army War College. Dr. Murray is also the author and editor of a number of major works, the most recent of which is A War to Be Won, Fighting the Second World War, published by Harvard University Press.


Source 2
( Source watch) 


Williamson Murray
From SourceWatch
Dr. Williamson Murray (Wick Murray) is Professor Emeritus (History) at Ohio State University (Retired) and Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).[1]


U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century / Hart-Rudman Commission Study Group Member[2]: "Dr. Williamson Murray, Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History, Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College

EDUCATION

B.A. Yale University, (1963) 
M.A. Yale University, (1971) 
Ph.D. Yale University, (1975) 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - HIGHLIGHTS

Charles Lindbergh Professor, Air and Space Museum, 1997-1998 
Horner Professor of Military Theory, Marine Corps University, 1995-1997 
Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics, 1994-1995 
Professor Emeritus, Ohio State University, 1995 
Secretary of the Navy Fellow, Naval War College, 1991-1992 
Professor of History, Ohio State University, 1977-1995 
Maintenance Officer, 314th TAL Wing, South East Asia, 1968-1969 
HONORS AND AFFILIATIONS

Long Committee on Professional Military Education, 1989-1990 
Second Andrew D. White Prize in European History, Yale University, 1963 

From the Naval War College Review, Spring 2001: "Dr. Murray received his Ph.D. (after service in the U.S. Air Force) in military-diplomatic history at Yale University. He has taught at Yale, at the Air, Army, and Naval War Colleges, the U.S. Military Academy, Marine Corps University, the London School of Economics, the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, and Ohio State University, of which he is a professor emeritus. He is currently a consultant at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Arlington, Virginia. His numerous books include Air War, 1914-1945 (1999) and a number of works in collaboration with Allan Millett, including, most recently, A War to Be Won: Fighting World War II (1999)."

(Note: Professor Emeritus means One who is retired but retains an honorary title corresponding to that held immediately before retirement). It is usually reserved for academics who are held in particulalry high esteem or regard by his peers


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2008)

John Ellis

Could not find a concise biography on this author, however here is an intersting link on his general outlook. In summary he has been criticised as being far too pro-Axis in his outlook, but obviously not enough for some

Anyway, here is the link
Military History Online


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2008)

From the above three posts, I believe that the sources I have relied upon are fair and balanced. It is not up to me to provide further proof at this stage. It is incumbent on people to accept, or reject the information contained in those sources, as they see fit. If they wish to totally reject the information presented it is incumbent up[on them to present better source material, and not throw a neo-nazi style hysterical fit on line, just because that information challenges their pre-conceived ideas. Neither is it incumbent upon me to provide additional information to further support my case. Quite the opposite. I amintain that my sources are credible, and conclusive, despite being secondary, and historical, rather than primary, and scientific, in their presentation. The authors all have credible qualifications to comment. It is now up to their opponents to prepre,a ns present their counter arguments, backed up by whatever information they can scrape together, or see fit


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## Kurfürst (Jul 16, 2008)

After 3 pages of parroting the same dogma, we still do not have any evidence presented about the alleged lack of spares and mismanagement etc., instead we got two wiki-level quotes applying to our respect for authority instead of reason, bizarrely followed by the almost standard, but universally applicable, retarded accusation with Nazism, then some odd argument why the one making the dogmatic claim does not have to prove it at all.

The matter has been concluded IMHO. It appears neither the original poster nor the two _unquestionable_ authorities he calls upon to support to dogma has anything to offer as evidence.

It is of course also possible that Hayward, with whom I am not familiar with, is only used selectively to support the dogma, and the way he is being quoted here by some is not representing Hayward`s actual opinions.

_'All of that would not be surprising, considering that earlier the same poster made the following ridiculous statements'_

_'The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements.'_

The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans.

_'Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later.'_

Statements for which verifiable source was asked for, and just like in the case of claims about lack of spares, none were given. Instead, a jump was made to the next claim at lightspeed.

If nothing else, the agenda is clearly identifiable.


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2008)

May I ask what your credentials are? You have managed to denigrate a professor Emeritus, a professor specializing in military and who currently works, in part for the german Government, and an eminent author, in the space of less than a paragraph, and provided not a single shred of evidence to support your own outrageous claims. Your arrogance approaches, perhaps even exceeds that of the original peacocks that call themselves nazis. I cansee it as entirely credible that you would support the burning of books, the disenfranchisement of anyone who opposed you, and blaming and persecuting innocent minorities to support your position. 

Let it be known that I have plenty of evidence to support my claims, and have supported some of them already, with quotes and observations by peoiple who have been acknowledged as experts almost univerally. Your dismisal of them is laughable, as are your outrageous claims, unles you have anything plausoible, and verifiable to back them up. I am not going to produce any evidence for you to so arrogantly an in such an aryan manner dismiss them without feeling the need to justify your own laughable and outrageous position yourself.

In other words, either put up, shut up, or expect the very worst


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## Kurfürst (Jul 16, 2008)

Outrageous claims, such as...?

As for your direct, open, repeated and uncalled accusations with nazism which severely violates the rules of civilized discussion and the very fundamental rules of this particular discussion board, I shall let it be dealt with by the moderation team here, hopefully with similarly severe means.


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## Kurfürst (Jul 16, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Murray is only considered one of the foremost experts in the world on the Luftwaffe
> *
> He is supported by Hayward in his work,* "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers defeat in the East", in which he also shows the The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics. Hayward reports that the operational readiness rate for *the Luftwaffe reached a peak in June 1942, on the southern front, of 70%*, but this had plunged to less than *31% by the time of Stalingrad.* By March it had staged a partial recovery to 45%, and some further improvement again by the time of Kursk (IIRC it had climbed to something over 50%), From there on, the readiness rate continued to drop, until by the end of the war, almost the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had become non-operational (not due to spares, mostly to the fuel situation by then).



To provide perspective on dogmatic arguements, and how they are 'supported'. 

It is claimed that Hayward 'supports' Murray. Naturally it is the addition of parsifal that that this support is in proving (parsifal's claim) about 'The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics.'. 

It is little surprise to find, that Hayward, who 'supports' Murray's (read: parsifal's) is merely quoting some statistics provided by Murray - compare the similarity.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=66807&stc=1&d=1216201598

The picture painted by Murray is in contrast with the way it is painted by parsifal: during the winter of 41/42, the servicibility reached an all time low of 39% on avarage; less with bombers, and a bit higher with fighters at 44%. Considering the circumstances of the period this is not particularly surprising. Despite the allaged 'lack of spares', this somehow reached the typical wartime avarage of 69% (75% fighters, 66% bombers) by June. The remainder of the year, in direct contrast to parsifal`s extreme claim of 31%, had a minimum servicibility of 59% and up to 65%, ie. quite steady servicibility rates with minor variations, as opposed to the winter of 1941: the Luftwaffe`s supply chain was now established in Russia.

It would appear that those statistics were also manipulated by parsifal, and then some cinematic license was taken to the story, and the blanket claim was added that it just got worse later in the war (already disproved by checking against serviceability figures provided by Price, showing higher serviceability rates in mid-1944 than in the East, probably due to less severe air combat activity, despite the more difficult logistical situation compared to the West). 

The name of Murray was borrowed to lend authority, despite Murray not making such claims himself: checking the Murray-quote posted earlier in this thread, dealing with 'Gorings fascination with numbers', claimed to have been applied to the entire war; in reality, it is found in one of the first chapters of Murray`s book, describing the pre-1939 birth and development of the Luftwaffe..

This is nothing else than wanton misrepresentation, lately peppered with _ad hominem_ iattack, that are persifal's _Ersätz_-arguments.


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2008)

Still no credential I see, I don’t think that you have any, including any brains, morals, manners, or education

Outrageous claims by Kurfurst….lets have a look at just few from this thread alone. 

_I would say that German AFV production was far more standardized - a couple of basic chassis and two powerplants were found almost all of their tanks_Sources, supporting information, oh I forgot we are talking about things german, we don’t need to do that do we

_Its difficult to see why are you are switching the subject to the 'Allies'. The subject was specifically the RAF lack of modern (fighter) equipment through the war._
Incorrect. My position was this…the Do335 was unnecessary, and an example of poor German management of their resources. German technical research was impressive, and produced some amazing pieces of equipment, but failed to be co-ordinated. The examples I quoted was the relative overproduction of fighters, the relative underproduction of pilots, the total lack of co-ordination with oil output and force projections for the luftwaffe, and finally, the lack of spare parts production, which exacerbated the relative lack of sustainability in german operations, and their relatively low serviceability rates, particulalry after 1942. The reaction of you, and your mate the Idiot Gerry was to try and attack the british, for some reason, as if that was relevant to the thread, or in some way vindicated german stuff ups 

_They should have mobilized the economy in early 1942, after the first failures on the Russian front; there have been plans for this, but eventually the top brass has changed their mind and needed Stalingrad and Tunisia to happen to shake them up. You cant really blame them for not mobilizing before 1942, after all, it seemed to everybody back then they are winning the war even with a limited mobilisation of the economy. There is no point in waging a war at the cost of ruining the economy, see the UK`s example on that._

This is breathtakingly innaccurate summary of why the germans did not mobilize earlier, and a patently outrageous claim to make. Anybody with any academic training would immediately realize that this sort of comment needs to be supported with expert opinion, but this is evidently not required if it is a german propaganda piece

_Especially as the RAF was barely even up in the air to go against the Luftwaffe after 1940_.


Any evidence thought necessary to make such an outrageous claim, no of course not, because there isnt any, is there. Just more Kurfurst Bullshit

_However if you look at the entire Luftwaffe, rather than just Luftflotte Reich, which was undergoing its most severe period of combat with the USAAF at the time, servicabilty rates were around 70%. Its also rather important whether these servicibility statistics refer to the status in the morning, before the battles, or were taken in the evening, when a lot of planes were around with a couple of holes in them, unservicable, but overall only having light damage that would repaired by the morning.

As such of the statistics above are misleading._
You then launch into an apology based mostly on fantasy and irrelevant fictions, and DON’T tackle the issue at all. None of the credible sources that are available support the claim of serviceability rates of 70%, an absolutely outrageous claim, but one that just effortlessly rolls of your tongue. Anybody else would feel it necessary to very carefully document suchg a claim, but not you….we others are exepected to just accept such lies as gospel truth…yeah right 

Phrases like 'Goring's and Hitlers fascination' certainly do not raise his credibility, as it only addresses the reader`s emotions but not his mind. _Stuff like 'Instead the Germans assigned production almost exclusively to first line strength' is also funny and it is easy to disprove_

It would perhaps help if you actually read a little, like Murray for example, because if you did, you would see he has some very credible sources. You then launched into an unsubtantiated claim about the numbers of aircraft produced, and truied to claim that whole units wa more efficient than having a proper spares reserve, obviously ignorant of the fact that OKL itself had repeatedly recommended that the spares reserves be built up, for precisely the reasons explained in Murray. You decide that Gorings approach was superior to that of his own air staff. Increadibly stupid, and totally lacking in any sort of understanding of the problem

_Yet Murray claims there were not enough spares.. it would seem to me that there were always plentiful of whole replacement aircraft around, which would appear to be a much more straightforward means of increasing servicibility than to perform repairs of damaged aircraft on site_.

If you read a little more widely, and were a little better informed, you would know that Murray is referring to comments that originated from the german air staff, not making any opinionated observations. But then, that doesn’t matter, does it. I suspect, that anyone, including german, that make disparaging remarks against the glorious third reich is going to attract your ire. 

_Hayward apparently picks certain periods of low serviceability rates, at certain times and certain locations to support his conception, instead of providing an overall picture how serviceability went through the war. 

Cherry picking, however, is not convincing. _
You obviously have not read Hayward either. I suggest you learn to read, then once you have mastered that, actually read the books first before making any comments about them. If you did, you would know that Hayward has quite detailed accounts of serviceabilty rates, is quite pro-german in his biases, and certaihnly does not cherry pick. There is some cherry picking going on here, but its neither of these gentlemen

_That`s a remarkable funny fiction, in view of the reported sorties flew over the Eastern front by Luftwaffe`s non-operational phantom planes. IIRC 10 000 or so fighter sorties were flown in the East in February 1945 alone. Over Berlin in April, a very high number of sorties (a few thousend a day, from memory) were flown.

I guess *IF* Hayward makes such a blatantly stupid claim that towards the wars end the Luftwaffe was non-operational on the East, I guess his book can go straight onto the lower shelf of the 'Fiction' shelf in remote book stores._
Not a shred of evidence to support this outrageous claim, particularly since no other source would support this. You yet again feel no great need to support a statement that most would find quite ridiculous

_Yet I still have to wonder how the Luftwaffe, despite your claims, maneged to keep up on avarage 60-70% servicibility with its fighter units late in the war, despite the railways, roads being regularly attack by medium bombers and fighter bombers, the airfields strafed by escorts and bombed by heavies._

What about a source??/ This is a claim most people would see as quite outrageous, and certainly deserving of some supporting information. But yet again, you blithely believe you are a member of the master race, and don’t need to worry about such petty things as factual support


_Oh I see now. You describe a fiction, born a few minutes ago in your mind, and then say that this is how exactly it happened 60 years ago. No supportive evidence, nothing_. 

_Because you want it to have been happening that way, because you argued earlier it did, then it must have happened that way._

Didn’t seem to register that I had produced three separate sources, which you chose to discredit, without having actually read them first, and then even had the temerity to poo bah an actual veterans observations. And all of this without any evidence of your own. It was me who had provided any supporting argument, it was you, yet you attempt to post the fiction that I had personally dreamt the case against you all by myself, when in fact the case was presented from three sources, to which you provided not the slightest rebuttal in evidence, just bullshit opinion

_The burden of proof is on you, you make the claims here_

Well, actually, if you had any education, and could actually read, you would know that I had presented a case, and some supporting evidence. You would also realize that in order to rebutt those arguments, you should start presenting some supporting evidence of your own. But this fails to register for you does it, because of your lack of education and knowledge. All you can see are the swastikas marching through your head, and the glory days of the third reich, as the cheers of the crowd sweep you away

_The matter has been concluded IMHO. It appears neither the original poster nor the two unquestionable authorities he calls upon to support to dogma has anything to offer as evidence.

It is of course also possible that Hayward, with whom I am not familiar with, is only used selectively to support the dogma, and the way he is being quoted here by some is not representing Hayward`s actual opinions_.

Yet again youo pass judgement on creditable secondary sources, without having actually read them. Evidence is evidence. If you have better, produce it. These guys are considered creditable and authoritative, yet you continue to dismiss them, without havuing read them, and worse, without bothering to produce reduttal authority yourself.

There is one thing we do agree on, though the end point is vastly different. I agree with you the matter is concluded IMO. Evidence has been presented from internationally recognized and well respected sources, to support my position. Not one piece of evidence in rebuttal has been presesented by yourself to oppose that, making you look incredibly stupid, dogmatic, and very ill informed


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## lesofprimus (Jul 16, 2008)

Enough is enough guys.... Stop with the personal attacks and stick to the facts... 

And no more Nazi calling!!!!


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## Kurfürst (Jul 16, 2008)

I like when people claiming silly things discredit themselves, and I do not even have to move my little finger.


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2008)

24 hours ago you had not read either source, now all of a sudden you are purporting to quote them. The link you provided is not an extract from Hayward, I will check to see if it is from Murray, but I doubt it. And the numbers you quote as coming from Hayward are not from Hayward. If you are going to quote him like that, quote4 page numbers, and I will check whether you are telling yet more porkies. To read and absorb either of the quoted references, it would take at least a week for each. yet youo are suddenly an expert on both of them in less than twenty four hours...amazing, from someone i consider to barely literate further more


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## lesofprimus (Jul 16, 2008)

At least he's putting up some sources Kurfurst.... Urs are what exactly?? Some of Parsifals beiefs may be off some, but the shoe fits on both of ur feet.....

Act civilized guys, enough personal attacks...


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2008)

I am prepred to back off from the personal attacks, but this has got to be a level playing field. I am absolutely tired of being abused, assaulted because i dont follow a pr-german line. If people disagree with the arguments i have presented, let come at me with considered argument, not racist f*cking bullshit. Finally I have gotten my temper going, and wont back off unless this happens for the other side as well. Close the thread and warn or ban me if youo must, but this crap has got to stop


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## lesofprimus (Jul 16, 2008)

> not racist f*cking bullshit.


I did not see this... Could u please quote it for me Parsifal... If that is the case, Im gonna get pissed....


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2008)

Sorry, i lost my temper, and wasnt making much sense. No racist stuff, but plenty of personal attacks, and real put downs. i resisted for a while, then broke, and started to open up myself.

I dont mind heated debate, and try not to denigrate people,. If a person puts up n uncorroborated opinion, Im okay with that, usually, but when the replies are derogatory, AND unsupported, I get P*ssed. eventually.

Im no saint, and am not afraid to take whatever is going to ber dished out, but i absolutely hate bullying inall of its forms, and do have my limits. 

If this guy wants to present his counter argument in a balanced, non-derogatory way, perhaps I will learn something, which is why I am here. If not, then the thread is going to be closed for sure, and other things are going to happen. I am offering a chance to get back on thread, with some decorum, and respect. If not...well, I dont know what will happen


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## Kurfürst (Jul 16, 2008)

lesofprimus said:


> At least he's putting up some sources Kurfurst....



From what I can make out of the mix of garbage and verbal insults, he merely repeats the same since the begining of the thread about the lack of spares, 'absymal sortie rates' etc. etc., none of which has been supported so far by anything, in fact contested by Groehler, Janda, Poruba, Price, even Murray etc. while being very generous of titles such as nazi, illitarate, racist, etc. that normally leads to straight banning on civilised boards.

He makes a couple of vague references to Murray and others, hiding behind their authority, but as shown above, those opinions attributed to Murray are wishful.

I have asked him several times now to provide source to some of his previous statements, none come, the only response coming from that direction is a mix of curses and nazi-calling, mixed with a mantra that he had already provided a 'vast amount of sources' and/or he does not have provide any, for some obscure reason.



> Urs are what exactly??



For what, exactly? Forgive me I don`t bother to reply line-by-line to the lame hysterics above, I don`t see much point in engaging in what I consider a waste of time. 

If you ask what sources I have used so far, the figures come from Groehler, Murray, Price, Janda, Poruba, Shores, and the available transcripts of German unit strenght and serviceability reports from the war from the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, either from primary or secondary sources, while some of the facts I mentioned like German AFV chassis are self-evident with even the most basic research (I don`t think we have to into lenght, that, for example, the Panzer III and IV used the same engine, or that the StuG III/IV, Jagdpanzer IV, Hummel, StuH 42, Brummbär etc. used either the III or IV chassis, and the same engine of course. It is evident.) our excited friend appearantly missed to do, probably being too busy with pumping up more bile, being in a dire lack of other qualities.



> Some of Parsifals beiefs may be off some, but the shoe fits on both of ur feet.....



I do not think I have described anyone else in this thread 

illiterate,
a nazi,
uneducated
wishul for extermination of races,
wishful of burning of books,
bullshit-opinioned,
with swastikas marching through his head,
incredibly stupid,
very ill informed,
Idiot Gerry
liar
racist

and all sorts of other nice things. Parsifal on the other hand did, and it is not the first time he expresses his dislike of others challenging his opinion in such ugly manner, all in one post.

So I am in great doubt if any of us disagreeing with parsifal would really wear the same shoe.


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## evangilder (Jul 16, 2008)

Alright, enough is enough. I am closing this thread. Both of you guys need to step away from the keyboard and cool off.


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