# Who Really Destroyed the Luftwaffe?



## steve51 (Nov 12, 2010)

Gentlemen,

I've begun reading a book that claims the USAAF defeated the Luftwaffe, a task that no other Allied AF was capable of. The author argues that the RAF was only able to achieve temporary, local air superiority beyond England, and that the Red Air Force was even less effective at superiority. Only the USAAF had the ability to destroy the GAF. Any thoughts?

Amazon.com: Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe: The U.S. Army Air Forces Against Germany in World War II (9780811706599): Jay A. Stout: Books


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## tail end charlie (Nov 12, 2010)

steve51 said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> I've begun reading a book that claims the USAAF defeated the Luftwaffe, a task that no other Allied AF was capable of. The author argues that the RAF was only able to achieve temporary, local air superiority beyond England, and that the Red Air Force was even less effective at superiority. Only the USAAF had the ability to destroy the GAF. Any thoughts?
> 
> Amazon.com: Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe: The U.S. Army Air Forces Against Germany in World War II (9780811706599): Jay A. Stout: Books



just count up the total aircraft produced by Germany and the totals lost in each theatre....Simples


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## timshatz (Nov 12, 2010)

They were the first force to put a persistant group of aircraft over the Luftwaffe's home fields. It forced the LW Dayfighter force to deal with them in a way they really hadn't had to before the USAAF showed up. In that respect, there is a nugget of truth to the arguement.

But the Luftwaffe had a bigger problem which directly contributed to it's downfall. It was fighting 3 Major Air Forces (Soviet, British and American) at the same time. This was at the same time they were also fighting attendent armies to those air forces. The stress that put on the resources was unsustainable. No way they could handle all the threats at once (which is one of the reasons the German Military won in the beggining of the war, it handled threats successively). 

The USAAF might've been the Air Force that first put a presence in the Luftwaffe's world that they could not ignore (unlike fighting over France or occupied Eastern Europe), but sooner or later, the Soviets, the British would've made it to Germany and done the same thing.

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## vikingBerserker (Nov 12, 2010)

Yea, I have to agree with that. I think the LW would have been very hard pressed facing the RAF and Soviets alone and would not have been able to hold out in the end.


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## drgondog (Nov 12, 2010)

There is a level of 'truth' that the USAAF was the dominant force which destroyed the Luftwaffe day fighter arm, certainly during the period oft referred to as The Battle Over Germany. Beyond that discussion you should pose the definition of 'destroyed'

What is true is that the battles between the 8th and 15th AF versus the Luftwaffe Fighter Arm from May 1943 to May 1945 were the most destructive to Germany in context of pilots lost, aircraft destroyed and damaged. The losses incurred by the German Fighter arm had a twofold effect - first it chewed up the Luftwaffe as the Luftwaffe desparately withdrew pilots from the East and South to try to stop daylight bombing and, second, the transfer of units to Germany significantly impaired German daylight air operations over USSR.


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## mikewint (Nov 12, 2010)

I'm with TEC, it all comes down to production and manpower availability. You can shoot down 10 of my planes and i make 20 during the same period. Same with German tanks, some of the best ever produced but they sit back let the Russians surprise then with the T-34 then try to play catchup. And the US makes 20 Shermans to every Tiger. Goering didn't help matter either as he also watched the Lutwaffe go from the most advanced AF with the best planes ever downward. So who killed the luftwaffe, simple: Hitler and his meglomania

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## davebender (Nov 12, 2010)

The Luftwaffe was critically damaged by Anglo-American ground forces that over ran France during the summer of 1944. This eliminated the Luftwaffe aerial buffer zone and allowed Allied fighter-bombers to maintain standing patrols over German airfields.


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## Erich (Nov 12, 2010)

it was the total might of both RAF BC and USAF bombing commands ................ period with A/C and fuels you have nothing but a wurst fest


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## davebender (Nov 12, 2010)

You have a lot more faith in WWII era heavy bombers then I do.

Personally I think Germany could have been defeated just as quickly (and perhaps more so) if there had been no British and U.S. heavy bombers at all.


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## Colin1 (Nov 12, 2010)

There's a strong argument for the USAAF
that implies no demerit to the RAF whatsoever. I'm not sure how the 8th was finally represented at its zenith but it was planned for 60 combat groups, around 35 bomber groups, 12 fighter groups and the remainder transport and reconnaissance. Yet if total 8th AF strength was added to all other USAAF assets not stationed on continental US soil, they still only represented under 40% of total USAAF strength. 

The RAF mirrored the USAAF technically with a general level of parity but it could not emulate the manpower juggernaut that the US could bring to bear.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 12, 2010)

davebender said:


> You have a lot more faith in WWII era heavy bombers then I do.
> 
> Personally I think Germany could have been defeated just as quickly (and perhaps more so) if there had been no British and U.S. heavy bombers at all.



But you believe the Germans should have built NO Surface Navy in order to build large numbers of 4 engine, long range bombers/patrol planes?


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## Maximowitz (Nov 12, 2010)

Um... anyone think this thread has been created to attract interest to a certain authors book? He's been plugging it on every aviation forum I'm a member of - with results varying from polite curiosity to downright hilarity.


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## steve51 (Nov 12, 2010)

Maxinowitz,

Please believe me that I have no affiliation with this author. If I did I would have mentioned it. I acquired the book yesterday and I'm simply curious what all of you think about the author's main assertion. 

davebender,

Interesting comment, sir. So you believe that the GAF would have been destroyed in a tactical environment after the invasion of France? That's an interesting what if. You may be correct. GAF losses were very heavy during Normandy.


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## Crimea_River (Nov 12, 2010)

Feeding frenzy in action....


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## Erich (Nov 12, 2010)

Steve

allow me to ask you this, does the author cover any Luftwaffe pilot accounts ? reason is if not then it is just another book on the 8th AF fighters been driven by the numerous photos that have appeared more so the last 15 years of the internet...... the pilots have been interviewed many times by many authors besides the plethora of now existing 8th and 15th AF fighter histories several being revamped and re-released the last 10 years. 

if this is the very case the book will not sell, the audience in this day want both sides of the story, and personally I would too reason why in my future volume on JG 301 I bringing both sides to bear as much as possible. 1945 there is too much chaos especially in the form of informative text concerning the Lw.


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## steve51 (Nov 13, 2010)

Erich,

I have only read about a third of the book and there has been quotes from Gunther Rall and Hans Philipp. The book is primarily about the doctrine, tactics and equipment of the Americans and most quotes are from Americans. I don't expect that there will be many comments from Germans.

I share your concern about hearing from both sides. I have only recently begun to seriously read about WW2 and Korean War aviation and I have acquired books by Mombeeck, Jessen, Prien, Resehke, Shores and Cull, although I haven't read them all yet. I'm also finding this forum to be invaluable.


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## billswagger (Nov 13, 2010)

davebender said:


> You have a lot more faith in WWII era heavy bombers then I do.
> 
> Personally I think Germany could have been defeated just as quickly (and perhaps more so) if there had been no British and U.S. heavy bombers at all.



I would think the bombing of ball bearing factories and oil supplies would put a big dent in the ability to resupply or maintain an air force. 

Overall, i don't think there is one specific reason the Luftwaffe were so easily defeated. 
I do think that the USAAF fighters were able to do more than the British fighters because of range. 
They could fly higher and faster, and further over enemy territory, something that the Germans had not had to deal with up until 1943. 

It was more than air force, because obviously the advancement of the front caused the Germans to lose airfields which would make it easier to patrol airspace. 

Once the USAAF was able to set up air patrols over Western Europe it was much more difficult for the Luftwaffe to regain air supremacy. 
Their fighters were needed to cover assets in Germany, and attempts to fly over enemy territory would be limited by range and altitude. 
The Germans were using more modern technology, such as rockets and jets to make attacks on Allied targets, but the bulk of the fighter force was incapable of competing with the USAAF CAP. 

Bill


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## parsifal (Nov 13, 2010)

I agree with Erich. You cannot attribute victory to one single air force, or oner single campaign. 


However it extremely disingenous to try and claim the USAAF was solely, or even predominantly responsible for the victory. If the RAF had not engaged the LW in rather unequal combats over France in 1941 and 42, the LW would have had a safe haven in which to train pilots, build reservesw, and generally prepare for what was to come. The US had virtually no fighters in the entire ETO until the very end of 1942, and throughout 1943, the numbers remained pitifully weak. Under those circumstances the LW, free from all pressure from the west, would have been able to concentrate reserves on the eastern front, blunt the Soviet counteroffenseives, and stand a much better chance of halting the Soviet advances in that theatre.

In the west, aside from the tactical operations undertaken almost single handedly by the RAF until well into 1943 (with their attendant attritional effects on the almost irreplaceable experten pilots that gave the LW such a marked advantage in these battles) , there was of course the RAF Bomber offensive. This was sending 1000 bombers over germany and mounting the most devastatiing raids on Axis cities until the advent of the A-bomb and the Night bombing incendiary raids over Japan in 1945. At the time this was happening, the US was not even engaged. its first heavy bomber raids were not until August 1942, and then with strengths of around 12 aircraft per raid. Even in 1943, the average size of the big raids were less than 200 aircraft for the US and 785 for each RAF raid. Without these night bomber efforts, the LW could have roughly doubled its day fighter forces in 1943. There were roughly 600 Night fighters in 1943, to about 500 Day fighters at that same time. I fail to see how, in 1943 at least, the major effort was being made by the USAAF. In 1944, it was a different story, but 1944 would never have occurred without the heavy price paid in lives and money made by the British and the russians up to that time.


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## davebender (Nov 13, 2010)

I didn't say that. WWII Germany must have coast defense forces like K class CL-minelayers, FTBs and minesweepers.

Nor did I suggest the Luftwaffe should build large numbers of heavy bombers. My proposed Fw-191C would be a NAVAL aircraft (even if nominally still part of the Luftwaffe high command). The German equivalent of the USN PB4Y-1.


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## al49 (Nov 13, 2010)

Hi,
I personally think that Luftwaffe (as well as the whole Germany) was defeated by one single man: Adolf Hitler.

Besides some tactical mistakes like insisting to use the Me 262 as a bomber, the biggest mistake he did was to attack Russia.
Not only he had one more enemy and a huge one, but he deprived the Luftwaffe of one advantage the other always had: the capability to train pilots and build aircraft in safe locations.
Beside the heavy bombing, German industry was able to build thousand of aeroplanes even in 1944 but training pilots wasn't as easy. Reading the life of Erich Hartmann I understood that during the last years of the war, pilots were sent against allied bombers and fighters with only 80 hours of training and many were killed not by hostile fire but by insufficient training.
Alberto


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## tail end charlie (Nov 13, 2010)

In this discussion almost no account is made of the loses on the eastern front, if you are serious about history and not just serious about supporting your own military please take into account the losses of the LW on the eastern front.

Russian fighter production almost matched the LW, by the end of the war russian fighters were a match for the LW to pretend that Russia had no effect in the air war in WWII is completely re writing history

The raids on Rumanian refineries may have had an effect on Nazi oil supplies but not quite as much as the Red army overrunning Rumania for example


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## Colin1 (Nov 13, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> In this discussion almost no account is made of the loses on the eastern front, if you are serious about history and not just serious about supporting your own military please take into account the losses of the LW on the eastern front.
> 
> Russian fighter production almost matched the LW, by the end of the war russian fighters were a match for the LW to pretend that Russia had no effect in the air war in WWII is completely re writing history
> 
> The raids on Rumanian refineries may have had an effect on Nazi oil supplies but not quite as much as the Red army overrunning Rumania for example


Errr, hang on
I don't think lack of discussion on the Eastern Front warrants any questionable remarks about our historical diligence, nobody is 'pretending that the Soviet Union had no effect in the air war in WWII' and to surmise that we're 'rewriting history' as a result is laughable.

Soviet fighter production matched German fighter production when? Bearing in mind that the VVS practically ceased to exist 48 hours after Barbarossa kicked off along with access to production facilities?

The air war in the east was a different beast to that in the ETO, the Germans certainly thought so, transferring units out of the Soviet Union to counter the 8th AF. There was virtually no strategic air element to the Soviets thrust into Germany, they steamrollered the Wehrmacht out of the east on the ground, supported by tactical aerial ground support vehicles. One of the defining differences, in my opinion, is that even in retreat, the Luftwaffe could still pick the odd fight on their own terms whereas strategic bombing in the west, the initiative was held solely by the Allies - 'we're bombing target x so you better send something up and defend it'.

All you have highlighted in your last statement is that strategic bombing functions as an asset or production incapacitator, it takes boots on the ground to provide area denial.

Feel free to discuss your views on why you think it was the Soviets who killed the Luftwaffe.


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## Milosh (Nov 13, 2010)

One needs to look on this site, http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

It gives the Lw losses from Sept '43 to Oct '44 on the east and West Fronts.

_ 1. During the period in question, a constant 21-24% of the Luftwaffe's day fighters were based in the East - but only 12-14% of the Luftwaffe day fighter "losses" occurred in this theater.

2. During this period, a constant 75-78% of the day fighters were based in the West. The turnover was enormous: 14,720 aircraft were "lost", while operational strength averaged 1364.

3. During this period, 2294 day fighters were "lost" in the East; the ratio of western "losses" to eastern "losses" was thus 14,720/2294 = 6.4 to one.

4. During this period, a constant 43-46% of all of the Luftwaffe's operational aircraft were based in the East. It should be noted that these included entire categories (for example, battlefield recce, battle planes, dive bombers) that were used exclusively in the East, because they couldn't survive in the West..

5. During this period, a total of 8600 operational aircraft were "lost" in the East, while 27,060 were "lost" in the West; the ratio of western "losses" to eastern "losses" was thus 27,060/8600 = 3.41 to one. _


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## davparlr (Nov 13, 2010)

al49 said:


> Hi,
> I personally think that Luftwaffe (as well as the whole Germany) was defeated by one single man: Adolf Hitler.
> 
> 
> Alberto



Yes, he made two fatal mistakes. One, he invaded a country with unlimited manpower, and, two, declared war on a country with unlimited materiel.


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## parsifal (Nov 14, 2010)

Milosh said:


> One needs to look on this site, http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm
> 
> It gives the Lw losses from Sept '43 to Oct '44 on the east and West Fronts.
> 
> ...



Hi Milosh

The war in the East ought not be judged on the numbers of fighters lost. Shooting down German fighters was identified after the debacle in 1941 as the least productive and least important role for the VVS. The VVS was not wiped out in 1941, although its strength and capability was sorely tested.

The eastern fron was a hard front to operate in, because of the extreme weather, the doggedness of the Soviets, and the primitive facilities onhand. This is the only way to explain why, after just two months fighting in 1941, the LW was down to less than 1000 operational aircraft, out of a force availability of over 3000. According to Hayward (The Luftwaffe in the East, and the defeat at Stalingrad) from 1942, the Germans were lucky to have 70% operational rates and rarely could count on more than 50% in Summer, and 30% in winter. Attritional rates (losses to noncombat causes) were about 3 to 4 times that in the west. 

Finally, recent research seems to suggest that the supposed massacres of VVS pilots are largely spurious. Certainly the exchange rate was bad, but not so bad as to be considered catastrophic


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## Juha (Nov 14, 2010)

Don’t forget MTO
LW losses in MTO were clearly higher than in Eastern Front in Oct 42 (324 vs 200 ), Nov 42 (595 vs 224 ), Apr 43 (572 vs 238 ), July 43 (711 vs 558 ) and in Sept 43 (503 vs 338 ) and almost same in Dec 42, in Mar, May, June, Oct and Nov 43.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Nov 14, 2010)

Wouldnt it be fair to say that the cream of Luftwaffe aircrew had been lost by the time the Mighty 8th got into gear over Germany in 44. Not meaning in anyway to denigrate the USAAF and its aircrews but the quality of the Luftwaffe had been badly degraded by other airforces by then. 

In my opinion its possible to say that the 8th finished the job started by others but it wasnt responsible for the whole job.


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## drgondog (Nov 14, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> Wouldnt it be fair to say that the cream of Luftwaffe aircrew had been lost by the time the Mighty 8th got into gear over Germany in 44. Not meaning in anyway to denigrate the USAAF and its aircrews but the quality of the Luftwaffe had been badly degraded by other airforces by then.
> 
> In my opinion its possible to say that the 8th finished the job started by others but it wasnt responsible for the whole job.



Those are fair statements


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## steve51 (Nov 14, 2010)

Gentlemen,

It seems that several of you believe that as the war actually unfolded historically, the engagements of the bombing campaign were the 'straw that broke the camels back', but that the same result would have resulted tactically eventually. That sounds perfectly reasonable, but what of the anti-oil bombing. It's my understanding that lack of oil was a large factor in training standards in the GAF going down.


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## drgondog (Nov 14, 2010)

steve51 said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> It seems that several of you believe that as the war actually unfolded historically, the engagements of the bombing campaign were the 'straw that broke the camels back', but that the same result would have resulted tactically eventually. That sounds perfectly reasonable, but what of the anti-oil bombing. It's my understanding that lack of oil was a large factor in training standards in the GAF going down.



The ability to effectively destroy critical targets deep in Germany required precision bombing, good visibility and good fighter escort. In my opinion the RAF could possibly have achieved the same result at night but, my opinion also theorizes that many more sorties would have been required to match results achieved by good daylight bombing.

The net of the discussion is that the USAAF could not sustain the losses incurred between August 1943 (both 8th AF at Schweinfurt/Regensburg AND 12th AF at Ploesti) and October 1943. To continue deep raids the USAAF needed an escort fighter capable of escorting the bombers over their respective targets along a line from Posnan to Vienna. 

Speer said daylight attacks on the Oil/Chemical refineries were THE key strategic initiatives by USAAF and RAF.

Ergo, to bomb deep into Germany, with accuracy possible by precision bombing, with acceptable losses - required the destruction of the Luftwaffe day fighter capability to inflict heavy casualties. 

One may now quibble over terminology regarding 'destroyed', seriously hurt, crippled, rendered impotent, etc, etc.

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## Colin1 (Nov 14, 2010)

parsifal said:


> The war in the East ought not be judged on the numbers of fighters lost. Shooting down German fighters was identified after the debacle in 1941 as the least productive and least important role for the VVS.
> 
> The VVS was not wiped out in 1941, although its strength and capability was sorely tested


Hi Parsifal
in terms of the thread title, I thought Milosh's post was spot on and if the resurgent VVS weren't shooting at Luftwaffe fighters then, once again wrt the thread title, it wasn't the Soviet Union that destroyed the Luftwaffe.

The VVS may not have been wiped out, but in attempting to guarantee air cover for the retreating Soviet ground forces, they gave the Luftwaffe an unprecedented freedom of movement in deciding how they would deploy their own assets.

The VVS is very difficult organisation to paint a picture of in terms of order of battle. Information is available on strengths at Barbarossa's kick-off and also for the period from June to December 1941. The information is reasonably accurate at divisional level with information such as total numbers and types of aircraft in the military districts. It becomes more hit and miss at regimental level, with information on strengths varying considerably. In some cases the information is almost non-existent.

Trying to piece the picture together of the VVS pre-Barbarossa is a bit of a jigsaw puzzle with alot of missing pieces, it requires a great deal of cross-referencing to build only a reasonably accurate picture of the entire VVS on 22nd June 1941.

Figures for serviceable aircraft should be treated with caution. The terms 'serviceable' and 'operational' consistently blur in available material. The other aspect is the political situation in the Soviet Union at the time of the invasion. Certain death followed any and every officer in the VVS that hadn't already been purged by Stalin, who showed either:

- a defeatist attitude
- excessive initiative in fixing the serviceability issues of grounded aircraft

VVS reports for June 1941 show an average of 80-95% serviceability and could therefore be considered operational. There is little reason to doubt that these figures were based on overly optimistic VVS commander assessments, in the period prior to the invasion, from officers who wished to avoid the defeatist label. For a start, the figures are higher than most Luftwaffe units where the latter were generally equipped with much newer aircraft and had just achieved a very high state of readiness in preparation for the invasion. Additionally, most Luftwaffe units were well supported by experienced and well trained ground crews who maintained a high serviceability rate - a resource sorely lacking in VVS units at this time.

On top of this, the Soviets didn't decommission older aircraft on the arrival of newer types, they just kept them on strength; many VVS units flew a/c whose heyday was the 1920-30 period.

From general accounts of the numbers of VVS aircraft that were involved in combat, it seems that the serviceability rates quoted by the VVS were optimistic to the point of being exaggerated and misleading. This is also evidenced by the number of captured VVS aircraft on airfields that were overrun, that were not destroyed in attacks but were abandoned because the ground crews could not get them serviceable in order to fly them out.

VVS-Leningrad had on strength 1,319 fighter aircraft of which only 223 were the latest and most modern VVS fighters ie MiG-3s, LaGG-3s and Yak-1s. This district largely escaped the brunt of Barbarossa, Leningrad obviously being of some strategic importance to the Soviets but facing them was only a small Luftflotte 5 and the Ilmavoimat which totalled something in the region of over 200 single-engined fighters. Not sure of the exact figure.

Despite not being exposed to the initial onslaught of the invasion, VVS-KA Northern Front still lost over 370 a/c in the month immediately following the invasion. VVS-KA Northern Front managed to contribute 700-800 combat a/c to VVS-Northwestern Zone which could be added to their surviving 100-odd a/c. 

I don't know the types or serviceability of VVS-KA's contribution once in theatre but if I had to guess..

Figures for the first day of Barbarossa are in the region of 2,000 combat aircraft lost by the VVS and around 4,000 for the first week. The Luftwaffe had air superiority over all 3 sectors of the front and would keep it until the end of the same year whilst what remained of the VVS covered the retreating Soviet ground forces.

I would venture that the VVS were more than sorely tested.


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## steve51 (Nov 14, 2010)

Colin 1,

Excellent, informative post. Thanks. It's a shame that in many cases, precise information seems to be lacking for the VVS.

drgondog,

It probably is more accurate to say that the GAF was rendered impotent and not destroyed. They continued to fly right to the end.


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## Lucky13 (Nov 14, 2010)

Another thing that I think also helped, was the Germans fixation(?) with giant, sometimes useless machines! How many Ju 52 can they have done instead for the Me 321/323, those huge guns like Thor, Odin etc, made the He 177 into a proper 4 engined bomber from the beginning instead for that with two coupled engines etc., etc...


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## Erich (Nov 14, 2010)

the lack of the LW in 1945 stemmed from the orders down to be sent to the Ost front for the final Battles of Berlin on 15 January 1945. there were very few gruppen left in Reich for day time defense ops as the jagdgruppen could not even put equivalent of full strength staffels in the air due to lack of fuels, pilots and A/c were not in short supply, needed fuel/oil reserves were. As I stated earlier the US/British combined bombing efforts had done there job from air to ground


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## syscom3 (Nov 14, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> Wouldnt it be fair to say that the cream of Luftwaffe aircrew had been lost by the time the Mighty 8th got into gear over Germany in 44. Not meaning in anyway to denigrate the USAAF and its aircrews but the quality of the Luftwaffe had been badly degraded by other airforces by then.
> 
> In my opinion its possible to say that the 8th finished the job started by others but it wasnt responsible for the whole job.



The 8th AF destroyed the bulk of the LW simply by the fact they hunted them deep into Germany. The LW still had a lot of good pilots. And they could refit and rearm at will untill there was no place to run.

The RAF couldn't do it with the fighters they had on hand. And the successes in the Med and Russia were peripheral.


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 14, 2010)

When I saw: "Mustangs over Berlin ..... ". Not to misrepresent the importance of Mosquitos or Lancasters over Berlin, but Mustangs over Berlin symbolized the final tightening of the air superiority screws. And they were USAAF Mustangs.

MM


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## HealzDevo (Nov 14, 2010)

Honestly I think it was a combination of all those factors. The war against Russia, Britain and the USA at once. Russia was slowly winning ground covering its own forces. The USA and Britain were bombing all hell out the German Factories, Airfields, Towns and Refineries. The Luftwaffe were having problems gathering enough fuel to run their aircraft. In addition what fuel they did have was being used to keep fighters and tanks supplied to fight. Therefore there was no margin for problems there. German production of fighters was already suffering at this stage. The Me-109 was still being used as a front-line fighter despite the fact that it was less than good compared with other German fighters such as the FW-190 and the TA-152 that were coming on line at that stage. Me-109 production was kept up despite its problems because the Germans needed to pump out the fighters fast. Jet Fighters were fast but they had too many problems to really be effective as front-line stoppers for bombers. 

Indeed the German mistake was that when they went against Britain, there really was not a very good heavy bomber that could really drop enough bombs from a single aircraft to really make that sort of trip really worthwhile. 

We know the Germans had the idea of the He-177 Grief on the drawing board that could have been a really effective bomber if designed properly but that was really where it stayed to a large extent. What was designed was not really what Germany needed at that time. The Americans at this stage did have the B-17 and only later started using B-29s and later developing a really heavy bomber in the B-36 Peacemaker.


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## parsifal (Nov 14, 2010)

_in terms of the thread title, I thought Milosh's post was spot on and if the resurgent VVS weren't shooting at Luftwaffe fighters then, once again wrt the thread title, it wasn't the Soviet Union that destroyed the Luftwaffe._

It was a good post, but there are some important issues with the numbers. The source of this research, it should be noted was an east german defector dating back to the 70's with a real axe to grind against the Soviets. His numbers have since been pretty much totally discredited. Having said that, the VVS cannot be credited with the lions share of Luftwaffe fighter combat losses. The combat attrition being suffered by the JGs on the western front far outweighed those on the eastern front. But what tips the balance was the other losses being suffered in the east.....non-combat losses, bomber losses, transport losses, you name it. Just looking at attirional losses momentarily, in the west, average monthly non-combat losses in the LW on western front were consistently about 7% throughout the first half of the war, but still managed to heavily outweigh combat losses. Thats based on analyses by Foreman and Murray, that shows conclusively that non-combat related loses were far more serious than combat losses.

But the noncombat attirional losses in the westpaled in significance compared to those suffered in the East. During the summer months it hovered around the 16-21% per month mark, in poor weather, particulalry when the ground forces were being put under pressure, LW accident rates could reach as high as 50% per month. This is what made the eastern front almost as deadly to the LW as it was to the ground formations...the near constant state of emergency, coupled with the poor logistics, and extremely primitive conditions made it a virtual deathtrap for the LW. On top of that, once the Soviets regained the initiative, ther were the losses to unserviceable aircraft unable evacuate ahead of the Soviet spearheds. 


_The VVS may not have been wiped out, but in attempting to guarantee air cover for the retreating Soviet ground forces, they gave the Luftwaffe an unprecedented freedom of movement in deciding how they would deploy their own assets._

In the context of 1941 and most of 1942, this is quite true, except that LW loss rate continued to be very heavy, not so much because of Soviet success in the air, but moreso because the LW, fromn the very beginning was forced to act as a mobile fire brigade, supporting the hard pressed ground formations, trying to compensate for the lack of proper artillery support in the forward areas, and later to support the the thinning infantry formations by providing the necessary firepower to them. These were as a rule not controlled, measured activities. more often then not they were desperate affairs, flown in the most appalling weather conditions, in machines no longer really fit to fly. The dire situations on the ground demanded desperate expedients by the Luftwaffe, and they paid for that in elevated attirional loss rates. I suggest you read Hayward, who quotes and paraphrases LF-4s war diary extensively. 


_The VVS is very difficult organisation to paint a picture of in terms of order of battle. Information is available on strengths at Barbarossa's kick-off and also for the period from June to December 1941. The information is reasonably accurate at divisional level with information such as total numbers and types of aircraft in the military districts. It becomes more hit and miss at regimental level, with information on strengths varying considerably. In some cases the information is almost non-existent._

Pretty much agree, except that Russian sources in the last few years have been freed up considerably. Hayward and Sweeting both have pretty good information on which to base their analyses, as do several Russian authors. Ther is no doubt that by western standards, the information is a bit hit and miss, but ther is enough out there to pretty much debunk the immediate post war accounts on which much of your theories appear to be based. These accounts almost exclusively drew upon German sources, which were put together by the US military following interrogations prior to 1952. As post action de-briefings, they were pretty thorough but like all airforces, the claims of kills are almost certainloy overblown. In the absence of any real Soviet counter information, these claims were accepted in the west, more or less in their entirety. Small wonder that so much innaccuracy has crept into the western idea of the fighting on the eastern front.


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## parsifal (Nov 14, 2010)

Reply Part II

_Trying to piece the picture together of the VVS pre-Barbarossa is a bit of a jigsaw puzzle with alot of missing pieces, it requires a great deal of cross-referencing to build only a reasonably accurate picture of the entire VVS on 22nd June 1941.

Agreed 

VVS reports for June 1941 show an average of 80-95% serviceability and could therefore be considered operational. There is little reason to doubt that these figures were based on overly optimistic VVS commander assessments, in the period prior to the invasion, from officers who wished to avoid the defeatist label. For a start, the figures are higher than most Luftwaffe units where the latter were generally equipped with much newer aircraft and had just achieved a very high state of readiness in preparation for the invasion. Additionally, most Luftwaffe units were well supported by experienced and well trained ground crews who maintained a high serviceability rate - a resource sorely lacking in VVS units at this time._

Sorry but whilst some of the points here are true enough, most of it is sheer fantasy. Its true that the LW was newer, highly experienced, and with a high operational rate at the beginning of the battle, however replacements of both men and materiel were virtually non-existent. This made the force highly susceptible to attirional losses, and cursed the LW with low operational rates after just the first few weeks of the campaign. This sad situation continued for the rest of the war on the eastern front. Hayward reports that the highest operational rate of the war after 1941 was in June 1942, for LF-4, when an operational rate of 73% was achieved. By the time of the Stalingrad encirclement, operational rates were down to less than 40% 

The Germans had great difficulty firstly in getting reserves of pilots, engines, and other spare parts to begin with.....then they had the added problem of getting those commodities to the front. For example, prior to Typhoon, AGC needed as its basic supply requirements, something like 18 trains per day (or maybe per week....I forget). They were getting something like 2. The Luftwaffe was in exactly the same mess. Moreover, as the Germans advanced deeper and deeper into enemy territory, not only was their logistics situation stretched further and further, the facitlies on which they relied were increasingly primitive, thanks to the effects of the scorched earth policies, and just the inherent lack of facilties in the first place. 

There is no doubt in my view about the low operational rates in the Soviet Air Force at the beginning of the war. Their operational strength was about 4000 aircraft, the numbers of "operational" operational aircraft was much lower than that. However, the Soviets also easily had the largest reserves of machines and pilots in the world at that time. They had over 16000 airframes in reserve, and I forget how many pilots, but a lot..... They needed all of them, because by years end they had pretty much lost the lot. However having huge reserves meant that operational rates could be kept relatively high, as is pointed out by Nagorski and Sweeting. 

Assisting in this process was that whereas the germans were operating on extended lines on rough strips mostly, with few or no support facilities, the Soviets were falling back toward their urban centres and supply sources, the battle for Moscow was fought by the Soviets operating from well constructed concrete runways and huge supporting elements. When they moved forward from these facilities, Soviet operational rates plummetted. This happened repeatedly in the war, which explains why they were so meticulous before their offensives to get airfielss constructed and the supply system working as well as they could get it. 

_On top of this, the Soviets didn't decommission older aircraft on the arrival of newer types, they just kept them on strength; many VVS units flew a/c whose heyday was the 1920-30 period._

Which did have the advantage in the winter of keepnig operational rates high. Soviet aircraft were known for their simplicity and generally rugged construction. This meant that whereas German types ceased to be flyable in poor conditions, Soviet aircraft kept flying. There is of course a limit to how far this point can be taken, but its a factor often overlooked, so worth mentioning IMO. 

_From general accounts of the numbers of VVS aircraft that were involved in combat, it seems that the serviceability rates quoted by the VVS were optimistic to the point of being exaggerated and misleading. This is also evidenced by the number of captured VVS aircraft on airfields that were overrun, that were not destroyed in attacks but were abandoned because the ground crews could not get them serviceable in order to fly them out_.


Care to name a source for this......in fact the modus operandi of the German forces was that they tended to encirdle Soviet forces rather than "overrun" them. Given Stalins "no retreat" orders, it becomes understandable why so many aircraft were captured more or less intact. On top of that the Soviets for weeks suffered a kind of paralysis in their command structures, which led to numerous muddles, mix-up and sheer stuff ups. Not that this gets out of the fact that large numbers of aircraft were captured intact, but it simply debunks the idea that large numbers of these A/C were unserviceable. No doubt a proportion of themn were U/S, but not all.... 

_VVS-Leningrad had on strength 1,319 fighter aircraft of which only 223 were the latest and most modern VVS fighters ie MiG-3S, LaGG-3s and Yak-1s. This district largely escaped the brunt of Barbarossa, Leningrad obviously being of some strategic importance to the Soviets but facing them was only a small Luftflotte 5 and the Ilmavoimat which totalled something in the region of over 200 single-engined fighters. Not sure of the exact figure._

Err, how can you say that, the Leningrad Special Military District extended all the way tp the Estonian border. Moreover the Baltic MD, which was the the fronline formation, drew nearly all of its units from the LMD, with many of those units since identified as being still part of the LMD. AGN was on their back within days, with most of the battles fought by AGN undertaken in the approaches to Leningrad itself. Many of the formations nominally attached to the L eningrad MD were in action more or less from the very beginning of the war. And this fails to take into account the losses suffered at the hands of the FAF. 

_Despite not being exposed to the initial onslaught of the invasion, VVS-KA Northern Front still lost over 370 a/c in the month immediately following the invasion. VVS-KA Northern Front managed to contribute 700-800 combat a/c to VVS-Northwestern Zone which could be added to their surviving 100-odd a/c. _

See explanation above. Simply wrong and untrue

_I don't know the types or serviceability of VVS-KA's contribution once in theatre but if I had to guess..

Figures for the first day of Barbarossa are in the region of 2,000 combat aircraft lost by the VVS and around 4,000 for the first week. The Luftwaffe had air superiority over all 3 sectors of the front and would keep it until the end of the same year whilst what remained of the VVS covered the retreating Soviet ground forces._


In fact Soviet losses on the first day are quite well known. They amounted to just over 1100 aircraft, to which a further 800 were lost in the first week. By the end of the year Soviet aircraft losses are believed to be a staggering 16000 a/c. German losses in that same period, to all causes (not just the highly selective and in fact innaccurate numbers quoted in Miloshes earlier post) were well over 2000 aircraft. Its true that the LW maintained air superiority throughout the summer of 1941, across the entire front, but in 1942 they did not. Similar to the measure adopted for the Heer, in fact what they were forced to do was to strip out units from the two northern groups, and call on their allies, so as to gain local superiority on the critical southern sector. This is clearly shown in Haywards account Of LF-4s prepration for Fall Blau. The Germans tried to repeat this trick over Kursk in the following year, but failed 

_I would venture that the VVS were more than sorely tested._

I can agree with that, but as were the LW, and ultimately the VVS survived, and won, whilst the LW did not survive, and lost. There can be no escaping that basic fundamental


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## Juha (Nov 15, 2010)

Hello Syscom
maybe Med and Russia were peripheral but the LW size AF could not keep its qualitative standards when it was loosing 600-824 combat a/c per month in June – Aug 42, 538-524 a/c in Sept – Oct and 819-774 a/c in Nov-Dec 42 in those peripherals. In Jan-Nov 43Monthly losses in those peripherals dropped under 500 per month only in June 43 (484) and in Nov 43 (376) but were over 1000 in July 43 (1269) and over 800 in Apr (810) and Sept 43 (841). Only in Nov 43 were LW losses in West and in Air Defence Reich higher than those in those peripheral.

Juha


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## riacrato (Nov 15, 2010)

Lucky13 said:


> Another thing that I think also helped, was the Germans fixation(?) with giant, sometimes useless machines! How many Ju 52 can they have done instead for the Me 321/323, those huge guns like Thor, Odin etc, made the He 177 into a proper 4 engined bomber from the beginning instead for that with two coupled engines etc., etc...


A Ju 52 cannot haul what a Me 321/Me 323 can. The Me 321 were specially designed for heavy cargo drops to be used alongside normal gliders. I don't think any other transport of the day could ship in a medium tank or a heavy AAA + halftrack. As such they did what they were intended to. In the course of the war they were probably used for duties were it may have been wiser to use Ju 52s, but that doesn't make them worthless imo. The huge guns like the Karl were specialized siege weapons and arguably did their job too, e.g. at Sevastopol. Neither of these were ever intended for the same purposes as normal transports or normal field cannons. In my opinion the negative effects these systems had on the German war economy is a bit hard to quantify and could very well be exaggregated.

The He 177 is a different story. It is too bad for the LW that they tried to make their coupled-engines thingy work instead of going the less stubborn but ultimately successful way the RAF went with the Manchester.


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## Colin1 (Nov 15, 2010)

riacrato said:


> A Ju 52 cannot haul what a Me 321/Me 323 can. The Me 321 were specially designed for heavy cargo drops to be used alongside normal gliders. I don't think any other transport of the day could ship in a medium tank or a heavy AAA + halftrack. As such they did what they were intended to. In the course of the war they were probably used for duties were it may have been wiser to use Ju 52s, but that doesn't make them worthless imo


The Me323 
proved itself invaluable to the Germans, they pioneered the first steps of a key capability prized by first rate militaries today - airportability. Moving decisive platforms, even modest armour pieces, quickly to a situation where the enemy could not was a big step forward in flexibility and response.

They were also extremely difficult to shoot down, absorbing considerable levels of punishment - unless they were transporting fuel. The Germans however, learned the hard way that they simply couldn't operate (survive) without air superiority or at least a vigorous friendly presence in-theatre, any more than C-130s could today.


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## tail end charlie (Nov 15, 2010)

Not only did the LW run out of fuel pilots and planes the whole of Germany ran out of fuel men and machines. As regards oil while raids on refineries and depots helped I would say over running the eastern oilfields did more. The LW was on the back foot after the BoB, not to say it didnt advance but it didnt advance at the pace of the collective opposition. The total number of 109s and 190s is impressive until compared to the total number of hurricanes spitfires kittyhawks hawks mustangs lightenings thunderbolts wildcats yaks and migs as well as a plethora of antiquated planes which were outclassed but still caused losses. 

Once Germany didnt knock out Britain and then didnt knock out Russia it was just in increasingly rapid collapse. Who knocked out the Luftwaffe? The combined industrial production design effort and manpower of the allies.


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## Erich (Nov 15, 2010)

geez................ this is a myth tail end.

the LW had plenty of craft and man power, the fuels were non-existant. this is easily seen in late 1945 and after war photos of which many books have been published showing the A/C sitting on the tarmacs and grass fields just waiting to be used or in this case to be plundered and bulldozed ans smashed into scrap.

I go by it again for the third time this thread it was a combined effort by BC and the US air arm to destroy the mechanics behind the LW secondly to pounce on the LW or more like as the US pilots hierarchy would have it, bring the LW on of course they already knew what they were up against with the very sensitive listening devices they had all through Germany. The coup de Grace was Bodenplatte and the real waste of life for the Tagdjagd, the LW General staff thinking up this one all should of been shot.


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## tail end charlie (Nov 15, 2010)

michaelmaltby said:


> When I saw: "Mustangs over Berlin ..... ". Not to misrepresent the importance of Mosquitos or Lancasters over Berlin, but Mustangs over Berlin symbolized the final tightening of the air superiority screws. And they were USAAF Mustangs.
> 
> MM



The quote is from Goering perhaps the most incompetent leader to serve any force throughout a war. If he had been really perceptive he would have said "when I was appointed as head of the Luftwaffe, the Luftwaffe quickly realised the game was up.

If the LW had been lead by military men of vision and expertise instead of party affiliations things probably would have been a lot more difficult, thankfully it wasnt.


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## tail end charlie (Nov 15, 2010)

Erich said:


> geez................ this is a myth tail end.
> 
> the LW had plenty of craft and man power, the fuels were non-existant. this is easily seen in late 1945 and after war photos of which many books have been published showing the A/C sitting on the tarmacs and grass fields just waiting to be used or in this case to be plundered and bulldozed ans smashed into scrap.
> 
> I go by it again for the third time this thread it was a combined effort by BC and the US air arm to destroy the mechanics behind the LW secondly to pounce on the LW or more like as the US pilots hierarchy would have it, bring the LW on of course they already knew what they were up against with the very sensitive listening devices they had all through Germany. The coup de Grace was Bodenplatte and the real waste of life for the Tagdjagd, the LW General staff thinking up this one all should of been shot.



Well accounts vary Erich. I have read that by 1944 the LW couldnt maintain seviceability because of transport the planes didnt have spares or ammunition or pilots or fuel or a combination of the whole lot. By the later stages of the war planes fighting the Russians in the east were also under attack by Mustangs from the west, it was a collapse.

I agree on the role of BC and US air arm but the role of the eastern front mediterranean africa and a whole lot more eventually bled the LW and the whole german regime to death IMO.


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## Erich (Nov 15, 2010)

the machines were idle any LW pilot/crew during 1945 will tell you that they pulled their own hair out as they could do nothing with the limited fuels that were on hand. the LW night fighter force could not muster more than 3-4 aircraft instead of a full compliment of 15 night fighters of a staffel as the fuel was no more. not even the big cheese aces got up that much to defend German skies except they were about the only ones that did. the opinions do not vary the photos and first had accounts state this. Multiple moves during the spring of 45 for the jet and prop driven units broke up the complete cop-hesion of all the day time fighter forces due to the Allied bombings and the steam roller effect the Soviets had in eastern Germany except for Ost Preußia where the Soviets were bled terribly for every inch of ground taken


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 15, 2010)

"... perhaps the most incompetent leader to serve any force throughout a war." I agree. But he was an interesting, conflicted, greedy, vain fellow who, nonetheless, knew good airplanes when he saw them.

I threw the quote into this discussion because the Mustang was a game-changer over Germany because of its great legs , and rugged construction. 

The Soviet Airforce (IMHO ) was _not_ a huge factor in the wearing out of the LW. Between Stalingrad and N. Africa they lost most of their heavy lift capacity. Air power was not - nor could have been (given the tank reserves the Soviets committed) - a deciding factor at Kursk. Now talking armour - yes - the Soviets tore the guts out of German armoured forces. But in the air there was no Kursk - at least not in the east. And Bodenplatt was a huge disaster - but with the failure in The Bulge, Bodenplatt really didn't matter much - except for the scarce pilots that 'command' threw away.

The back story is really fuel and pilots. Germany ran out of both before they exhausted production of 1st line aircraft.
And when you look at production numbers from 1943 going forward - the back story is (1) night fighters and (2) Jabo's.

Mustangs over Berlin, not Yaks or Sturmaviks .... .

MM


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## Erich (Nov 15, 2010)

again Bull sh** you guys read too many mythical accounts about lack of pilots. young they were and not necessarily with more than 5 missions under their belt but there were plenty of them. the stupid and useless Sonderkommanado Elbe in april of 45 and Bienstock proves this, many youth pilots ready to give them selves up on the death throes of the Reich

the Soviets drew off the LW day units as I stated earlier back in January of 45 those that could of helped take on the US bombing campaign further had the eastern front escaped never had happened but now I am on a what-if. The Soviets helped out more than you guys know if the LW was still on an even par with the Ost front enemy


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## tail end charlie (Nov 15, 2010)

Erich said:


> again Bull sh** you guys read too many mythical accounts about lack of pilots. young they were and not necessarily with more than 5 missions under their belt but there were plenty of them. the stupid and useless Sonderkommanado Elbe in april of 45 and Bienstock proves this, many youth pilots ready to give them selves up on the death throes of the Reich
> 
> the Soviets drew off the LW day units as I stated earlier back in January of 45 those that could of helped take on the US bombing campaign further had the eastern front escaped never had happened but now I am on a what-if. The Soviets helped out more than you guys know if the LW was still on an even par with the Ost front enemy



I have also read about the use of the hitler youth whose youthful aggression would make up for lack of training, it generally meant you lose a plane and a pilot but some were trained to ram anyway so wernt expected to return. Apart from that you seem to be making the same point about soviet contribution being underestimated


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## drgondog (Nov 15, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> The quote is from Goering perhaps the most incompetent leader to serve any force throughout a war. If he had been really perceptive he would have said "when I was appointed as head of the Luftwaffe, the Luftwaffe quickly realised the game was up.
> 
> If the LW had been lead by military men of vision and expertise instead of party affiliations things probably would have been a lot more difficult, thankfully it wasnt.



TEC - you have some interesting notions about incompetence of LW versus an implied 'brilliance' of Allied leaders.

Simply, the LW was the finest air force in the world through perhaps 1942 and into 1943 with the RAF as a debatable contemporary. The US had talent, manufacturing, quantity and was building what would be the greatest AF in the world.

What the RAF could not do is defeat the Luftwaffe in the air. They brought the war to deep Germany but the strategic value was not sufficient to offset the bleeding they suffered while they helped the US get their feet under them.

What the Russians coould not do was a.) defeat the LW in the air and obtain complete air supririty, or b.) inflict damage to the German industrial base - so they did it the old fashion way and suffered 20,000,000 dead to gain inch by bloody inch on the ground.

What the US DID do is kill the LW over Germany, wrest complete control of the air all the way to Berlin, and pound Germany at will by D-Day. D-Day was a ho hum as far as any annoyance that the LW presented to assist the Wermacht in turning the Allies back. That was NOT the case in December 1943.

Winning the war a a joint effort by ALL the Allies at far greater expense in men and material to the Allies, but winning the battle of air superiority over Germany lay on the shoulders of the 8th AF as the 'dominant' cause - not the sole cause.


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## drgondog (Nov 15, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> I have also read about the use of the hitler youth whose youthful aggression would make up for lack of training, it generally meant you lose a plane and a pilot but some were trained to ram anyway so wernt expected to return. Apart from that you seem to be making the same point about soviet contribution being underestimated



TEC - I am curious regarding the depth of your knowledge and historical grasp... what would you consider your strong points regarding WWII history and what could you share with us regarding your literary research? Which books would you say are the foundation for your understanding of the evolution of airpower from say, 1934 to 1939 or 1939 to 1943 or 1944?


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## tail end charlie (Nov 15, 2010)

drgondog said:


> TEC - you have some interesting notions about incompetence of LW versus an implied 'brilliance' of Allied leaders.
> 
> Simply, the LW was the finest air force in the world through perhaps 1942 and into 1943 with the RAF as a debatable contemporary. The US had talent, manufacturing, quantity and was building what would be the greatest AF in the world.



Georings only WWII achievement was an art collection that was the envy of the world.

The achievements of the LW were prodigeous but that was in spite of not because of Goering, at every step where he actually intervened he made a **** up mainly because he hadnt a clue and little interest in what was actually happening. The LW was beaten at the BoB despite many advantages especially in numbers and machines so how did it progress to be the best in the world 2 yrs later. Until the end of the war their bomber force hardly changed, their fighters benefitted from the 190 

Goering as the head of the LW didnt use intelligence the intelligence just told him what he wanted to hear. He didnt develop radar any where near quickly enough even though germany had a head start.. As a political as well as military leader he didnt ensure new models were produced early enough and in sufficient quantity. When Adler tag was cancelled Germany as a whole should have ramped up production massively but this wasnt done until 1944 until it was too late.

Personally I think Hitler and Goering believed their own propaganda until it was obvious they were losing then they withdrew to their bunkers pretending it wasnt happening by 1945 Hitler was going gaga and Goering wasnt far behind. however since he was waging war with in effect 2 continents and several european countries I doubt that a tactical genius would have made a difference to the outcome.


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## tail end charlie (Nov 15, 2010)

drgondog said:


> TEC - I am curious regarding the depth of your knowledge and historical grasp... what would you consider your strong points regarding WWII history and what could you share with us regarding your literary research? Which books would you say are the foundation for your understanding of the evolution of airpower from say, 1934 to 1939 or 1939 to 1943 or 1944?



Drgondog

it isnt the sort of research that comes up with a theory that BC and the US air force destroyed german aircraft manufacturing but that germany still had easily enough planes in 1945. Germany collapsed in 1945 that collapse started as soon as Barbarossa faltered. 

Neither does it credit air raids for depriving germany of oil when the Soviets over ran the eastern oil fields or consider that the biggest threat facing germany in 1944/45 was from the air when the Soviet army had broken through german lines in the east. Everyones grasp of history is different.

As for development of air power, air power went hand in hand with aero engine development and the ability to mass produce as far as I can see. Most forces went down blind alleys as far as bombing is concerned based on interwar theories about the bomber always getting through and destruction of civilian moral.


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## drgondog (Nov 15, 2010)

Back to the question I posed to you.. what is your body of carefully read sources which lead you to your conclusions?


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## drgondog (Nov 15, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Drgondog
> 
> it isnt the sort of research that comes up with a theory that BC and the US air force destroyed german aircraft manufacturing but that germany still had easily enough planes in 1945. Germany collapsed in 1945 that collapse started as soon as Barbarossa faltered.
> 
> ...



How about AERODYNAMICS in which a fighter like the P-51 had only 2/3 of the flat plate drag of the Me 109? How about a design which (by accident of mating the right engine to the airframe) enabled a fighter over Berlin with the same or better performance of its prime antagonists (Fw 190 and Me 109)

How about presenting a dual threat (B-17 and B-24) capable of precision bombing on key strategic targets if one could only keep that threat from being eliminated by the LW? You think the ability of the USSR to mass produce at near the same rate as the US meant anything over Regensburg or Leipzg or Misburg or Merseburg or Brux or Posnan? I submit the answer is 'No'.


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## Jabberwocky (Nov 15, 2010)

I think it can be fairly strongly argued that the USAAF did more to destroy the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force than either the RAF or the VVS. I also believe that it was the sole force in the world at the time with the technical capabilities to project airpower in daylight at very long range.

However, it is the height of folly to argue that the USAAF should be given credit as the force that destroyed the Luftwaffe. Like the destruction of the German ground forces, it was a true collaborative effort.

The destruction of Germany’s wartime airforce is vastly more complex than just he equation of aircraft destroyed in the daylight skies over France and Germany in late 1943 and early to mid-1944, when the USAAF did its most damage to the Luftwaffe. 

Consider theses factors:


The pilot and aircraft losses against the RAF and VVS that the Luftwaffe sustained prior to the large scale attacks by the USAAF.
The pilot and aircraft losses that the Luftwaffe sustained fighting against the RAF and USAAF over North Africa, the Mediterranean and Italy.
The Luftwaffe resources that were deployed to combat the RAF at night and the VVS on the Eastern Front. 
The loss in effectiveness the USAAF would suffer if it was also required to play a territory defence role and did not have the support of the RAF.

Operating from the UK and central Italy, the USAAF did something that no other airforce could do: operated long-range, escorted daylight bomber missions into Germany proper. 

Did this decisively attrit the Luftwaffe? Yes, of course it did.
Would it have been possible without the contributions of the RAF and VVS? Impossible to say, but the result is much less clear cut, without the cumulative impact of all those other battles the Luftwaffe was also being forced to fight.


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## HealzDevo (Nov 15, 2010)

As I understand Tail End Charlie it was the constant pressure of being bombarded and harrassed by the Allied Production Day after Day, as well as the lack of fuel that led to the Luftwaffe defeat. As I said in my post, the main front-line fighter in 1944-1945 was the Me-109 which though it had been improved in ways was still suffering from its age. The Spitfire however, in between Marks some of those Marks are actually more like Minor Variants in terms of design changes. The Me-109 was only being kept in production because the Germans had skill at producing it and could produce it in larger numbers than other fighters. In terms of numbers however, larger numbers of Allied Fighters were being turned out. With Oilfields destroyed or occuppied by the opposition and refinieries and chains of supply similarly dealt with, it was very hard to see the Germans being able to pull a victory out of the hat.


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## Hop (Nov 16, 2010)

From A History of the VIII USAAF Fighter Command by Lt Col Waldo H Heinrichs, intelligence officer, 66th fighter wing. I believe it shows the position up to August 1944.


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## bobbysocks (Nov 16, 2010)

are these stats from air to air combat or does it include reported ground kills as well? the deep penetrations into germany opened the underbelly of the LW. many aerodromes that were inaccessable before were straffed and a substancial number of ac were destroyed or damaged by long range fighter escorts. hitler/georing used this tatic at the beginning of the battle of britian reaching as far into britian as they could and inflicted heavy losses on the RAF. had they continued this and not switched to bombing london is a source of debate as to if the RAF could staved off the attack much longer. this was also the purpose and aim to bodenplatte...to catch allied ac with their pants down and planes on the ground, inflict crushing damage. now the shoe was on the other foot and due to this the LW had to resort to hiding airbases or otherwise trying to camouflaging them. see the map from capt. r. schimanski showing how they were doing it. this was from a mar 2, 45 bomber escort s.e. of magdeburg. the LW lost 24 planes 11 destroyed, 13 damaged on this airfield alone without bringing down one enemy ac. now you may think 24 planes a drop in the bucket in comparison but this was only from 1 FG on 1 day. i have not added up the figures but i believe the number of LW ac caught on the ground and destroyed or damaged would be considerable. because of this i am inclined to believe the claim of no fuel. if you could put an ac into the air when a known threat is close you would be foolish not to. at the very least to reposition them away potential danger. the issue wasnt if the LW had pilots but the quality of those pilots. i know, the same could have been said about the RAF in the BoB. one spitfire pilot interviewed said the training was cut from 4 weeks to 2 weeks then they were in the air in combat. I would venture to say though that the training of LW recruits was severly hampered by the lack of fuel. why would you waste a valuable fuel on training when that same fuel could be used to bring down a bomber.


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## Nikademus (Nov 16, 2010)

steve51 said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> I've begun reading a book that claims the USAAF defeated the Luftwaffe, a task that no other Allied AF was capable of. The author argues that the RAF was only able to achieve temporary, local air superiority beyond England, and that the Red Air Force was even less effective at superiority. Only the USAAF had the ability to destroy the GAF. Any thoughts?



Sounds like a must-miss book.


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## tail end charlie (Nov 16, 2010)

michaelmaltby said:


> When I saw: "Mustangs over Berlin ..... ". Not to misrepresent the importance of Mosquitos or Lancasters over Berlin, but Mustangs over Berlin symbolized the final tightening of the air superiority screws. And they were USAAF Mustangs.
> 
> MM



Again MM that is a famous quote about Goering he produced many famous quotes.

firstly you should not call him Goering but Mayer because thats what he said his name would be if ever Berlin was bombed


secondly his quote about the mosquito was same as the mustang in principle (the english are geniuses the Germans are nincompoops etc) Goering as head of the Luftwaffe did nothing to advance the luftwaffe he just lambasted his servicemen when they couldnt deliver what he had promised. H even accusing the LW of cowardice when they suffered massive losses in unescorted daylight bombing. Now any one who says he was a brilliant leader should consider why the USAAF stopped unescorted daylight raids I dont remember reading anything about cowardice or incometence. But then maybe I am not so well "researched".

Berlin was bombed by four (merlin) engined lancasters it was bombed by twin (merlin) engined mosquitos, it didnt take a leap of genious to think that a single (merlin) engined plane would appear over Berlin but hey thats what happened and the people who didnt forsee the obvious are held up as great military leaders so that the people that beat them can bask in more glory.


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## Colin1 (Nov 16, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Again MM that is a famous quote about Goering he produced many famous quotes.
> *Can you give us some of his others?*
> 
> Goering as head of the Luftwaffe did nothing to advance the luftwaffe he just lambasted his servicemen when they couldnt deliver what he had promised.
> ...


_*I hope you're not planning to continue like this. Your contributions to threads are often glib, lacking depth, data, insight or thought provocation and sometimes relevance, contributing little or nothing of value to the debate, you were merely asked to present your credentials, which to date you haven't*_


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## tail end charlie (Nov 16, 2010)

drgondog said:


> Back to the question I posed to you.. what is your body of carefully read sources which lead you to your conclusions?



What is your body of carefully read sources? well what are yours I took History at GSE and CSE level at sixteen years old My project for the CSE grade was on operation Barberossa and its aftermath, I read history books from my early teens untll now and I have also worked in Russia China Germany France Italy and Japan. Do you challenge everybody who doesnt agree with you to produce a reference list. From my conversations in RUSSIA the russians consider the Americans COWARDS who used the situation to weaken RUSSIA and Europe to emerrge as the valiant victor while Russians died in their thousands.

Since you are a hound for statistics you produce this statistic how many russians died fighting germany between America deciding that they were suffering "unsustainable losses" in daylight bombing of Germany and their resumption of the campaign. When you have the total then compare it to the loses the USA suffered, the USA and the USAAF dont look quite so heroic in those terms.


Consider this, since you prefess to know the facts, in the daylight raiding campaign in 1943 there was no reason for the USAAF to stop bombing because from their certified claims they were already wiping the LW from the sky the losses were high but compared to the claims they were massive victories in any terms. SO WHY DID THEY STOP and since they did stop inspite of the official statistics PROVING they were winning everything else quoted from official unoficial and personal accounts is PURE ...B U L L T I H S


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## Colin1 (Nov 16, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> From my conversations in RUSSIA the russians consider the Americans COWARDS who used the situation to weaken RUSSIA and Europe to emerrge as the valiant victor while Russians died in their thousands.
> *Can I ask you with your GCE in History how informed an opinion you think that is? For example, if I suggested that it was the Stalinist purges that weakened the Soviet Union and the Soviet High Command's insistence on going into suspended animation in the face of repeated warnings over the imminent invasion, is it possible that the Russians you conversed with might be spewing anti-western/capitalist claptrap?*
> 
> Since you are a hound for statistics you produce this statistic how many russians died fighting germany between America deciding that they were suffering "unsustainable losses" in daylight bombing of Germany and their resumption of the campaign. When you have the total then compare it to the loses the USA suffered, the USA and the USAAF dont look quite so heroic in those terms.
> ...


*An hysterical, incoherent ramble; can you verify ANYTHING you just said there?*


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 16, 2010)

Alright guys, keep it civil! 

I will not say this again!


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## tail end charlie (Nov 16, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> _*I hope you're not planning to continue like this. Your contributions to threads are often glib, lacking depth, data, insight or thought provocation and sometimes relevance, contributing little or nothing of value to the debate, you were merely asked to present your credentials, which to date you haven't*_



Goerings quotes are almost as famaus as Hitlers (read a book or better still speak to a German)

in addition he was known by his subordinates as the plumber because of the metal he carried about (self awarded medals)

The debate as you call it is singularly one sided, the call for me to "produce my credentials" which sounds like an elizabethan challenge to a duel seems to stem from comments about Goering who was a BUFFOON if you can show any evidence that he wasnt a BUFFOON then please do so and I will put your comments below a picture of him with all his medals wearing his pink boots and carrying his battle of britain victory baton.

Quotes from Goering (actually shortened paraphrases because I am working in France and dont keep books from the library)

call me mayer (If ever any one bombs Berlin)

The english are geniuses we are nincomppops (mosquitos over Berlin)

The game is up (Mustangs over Berlin)

I will sweep the RAF from the skies in 2, 4 6 weeks (which quote do you want)

You are cowards (when they didnt sweep the RAF from the skies)

perhaps the best " Dont waste time attacking Radar stations it has no effect"


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## syscom3 (Nov 16, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Sounds like a must-miss book.




Any comments about the AAF roaming the skys of Germany while the Spitfires were only over Holland?


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## steve51 (Nov 16, 2010)

Nikademus,

I have since finished the book and agree with you. Many other books, like 'The Road To Big Week' by Hammel, cover the same ground much better.


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## tail end charlie (Nov 16, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> *An hysterical, incoherent ramble; can you verify ANYTHING you just said there?*



I was talking about losses that is statistics I didnt mention heroism I repeat how many soviets died between America stopping the campaign it agreed with the soviet union and the resumption of daylight raids? The agreement as I understand it was to wage WAR the Americans stopped waging WAR do to politically inconvenient losses. Now before you launch into another round of personal abuse you show how many soviets died between the START of the bombing camapagn by the USAAF and its cessation in 1943 and how many soviets died between the cessassion and the resumption in 1944. Look at a map of the territory held by Germany between those dates.


"Produce your credentials".........Stand and deliver your money or your life or was it "Stan its your Liver, your kidneys are alright"


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## tail end charlie (Nov 16, 2010)

Can I ask you with your GCE in History how informed an opinion you think that is? For example, if I suggested that it was the Stalinist purges that weakened the Soviet Union and the Soviet High Command's insistence on going into suspended animation in the face of repeated warnings over the imminent invasion, is it possible that the Russians you conversed with might be spewing anti-western/capitalist claptrap?

COLIN you are really starting to nark me to put it lighly I gained an O level in History but a CSE was unusually considered to be a higher qualification because you had to submit a project which I did and gained a grade 1 qualification I am sorry I cannot at the age of 50 produce my "credentials" but that is how long I have been reading on these subjects.

The Rusiians I met were in the same business as I am not in any way politically orientated they strangely dont agree that 1000 russians isnt worth one american or british serviceman you may say they are indoctrinated I would say youve got a point.


Since you are a hound for statistics you produce this statistic how many russians died fighting germany between America deciding that they were suffering "unsustainable losses" in daylight bombing of Germany and their resumption of the campaign. When you have the total then compare it to the loses the USA suffered, the USA and the USAAF dont look quite so heroic in those terms.
I don't understand the connection between losses and heroism. See above for the Soviet Union's own contribution to their calamitous situation in the second half of 1941. The USAAF would have reconsidered deep penetration daylight bombing whether Germany had brought the Soviet Union into the war or not.


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## riacrato (Nov 16, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> Goering oversaw and supervised the modernisation and expansion of the Luftwaffe into the force that entered WWII



Very true and often overlooked. Under his leadership the LW developed from basically non-existance into the most powerful airforce in continental Europe and arguably in the whole world. In six years. His later failures overshadow this achievement.


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## parsifal (Nov 16, 2010)

Erich said:


> again Bull sh** you guys read too many mythical accounts about lack of pilots. young they were and not necessarily with more than 5 missions under their belt but there were plenty of them. the stupid and useless Sonderkommanado Elbe in april of 45 and Bienstock proves this, many youth pilots ready to give them selves up on the death throes of the Reich
> 
> the Soviets drew off the LW day units as I stated earlier back in January of 45 those that could of helped take on the US bombing campaign further had the eastern front escaped never had happened but now I am on a what-if. The Soviets helped out more than you guys know if the LW was still on an even par with the Ost front enemy



You hit the nail on the head, as usual, erich, but the munchkins are just not listening


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## bobbysocks (Nov 16, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> What is your body of carefully read sources? well what are yours I took History at GSE and CSE level at sixteen years old My project for the CSE grade was on operation Barberossa and its aftermath, I read history books from my early teens untll now and I have also worked in Russia China Germany France Italy and Japan. Do you challenge everybody who doesnt agree with you to produce a reference list. From my conversations in RUSSIA the russians consider the Americans COWARDS who used the situation to weaken RUSSIA and Europe to emerrge as the valiant victor while Russians *died in their thousands.*




i am not trying to be a smart @$$ here but whose fault is that? neither churchill or fdr ordered the russian troops to do that. uncle joe was more than willing to throw his own people into the fray as fodder. that was the communist line of doctrine...which was witnessed from there up into vietnam. from the communist manifesto on down from lenin to mao, to minh...the ends justififed the means. and there was a blatant disregard for the individual and their well being. they had no thoughts of calculated risk...it was damn the torpedos send in another 100,000. just because you do not throw organized suicide assaults at the enemy in the attempt to overwhelm them by sheer numbers is not cowardace.



tail end charlie said:


> Since you are a hound for statistics you produce this statistic how many russians died fighting germany between America deciding that they were suffering "unsustainable losses" in daylight bombing of Germany and their resumption of the campaign. When you have the total then compare it to the loses the USA suffered, the USA and the USAAF dont look quite so heroic in those terms.



same answer as above. who but uncle joe would throw his troops into a well defended position with nothing but 5 rounds of ammunition and tell them to find a rifle off of the first dead man in front of you? and the officers told to shoot anyone who turns around. i dont know if i see this as heroic act or even tactically sound! how can you compare anything to this. who was the bigger buffoon the person who ordered something like this or georing? that was a sheer waste of mankind in an duel of pride between to leaders.

by the latter stages of the war hitler was listening to no one and everyone was trying CYA tactics to keep their heads. so i am sure a lot was said..promised...because of that.

i think you are getting too wound up over this and getting close to crossing a line ...you might want to have a beer or something, man.

think i am going to take my own advice after i pull the rip cord.... cheers all.


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## tail end charlie (Nov 16, 2010)

parsifal said:


> You hit the nail on the head, as usual, erich, but the munchkins are just not listening



Er what nail on what head? This munchkin sees the germans close to their own capital with a huge enemy land and air force force while the western allies are launching bombers from far away. As a munchkin to a smurf which to you is the most threatening, bearing in mind the Soviets were avenging the attrocities commited in the east.

The smurfs dont seem to want to answer simple munchkin questions. Like exactly how many men planes tanks and guns did the Russians and Germans lose when between the date the americans stopped daylight bombing raids under the combined bomber offensive (Agreed by the US President) and its resumption. However more importantly how much territory did the Soviets re calim and how much oil production did they deny Germany. 

show me you credentials


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## tail end charlie (Nov 16, 2010)

bobbysocks said:


> i am not trying to be a smart @$$ here but whose fault is that? neither churchill or fdr ordered the russian troops to do that. uncle joe was more than willing to throw his own people into the fray as fodder. that was the communist line of doctrine...which was witnessed from there up into vietnam. from the communist manifesto on down from lenin to mao, to minh...the ends justififed the means. and there was a blatant disregard for the individual and their well being. they had no thoughts of calculated risk...it was damn the torpedos send in another 100,000. just because you do not throw organized suicide assaults at the enemy in the attempt to overwhelm them by sheer numbers is not cowardace.


Since you are a hound for statistics you produce this statistic how many russians died fighting germany between America deciding that they were suffering "unsustainable losses" in daylight bombing of Germany and their resumption of the campaign. When you have the total then compare it to the loses the USA suffered, the USA and the USAAF dont look quite so heroic in those terms.[/QUOTE]

same answer as above. who but uncle joe would throw his troops into a well defended position with nothing but 5 rounds of ammunition and tell them to find a rifle off of the first dead man in front of you? and the officers told to shoot anyone who turns around. i dont know if i see this as heroic act or even tactically sound! how can you compare anything to this. who was the bigger buffoon the person who ordered something like this or georing? that was a sheer waste of mankind in an duel of pride between to leaders.

by the latter stages of the war hitler was listening to no one and everyone was trying CYA tactics to keep their heads. so i am sure a lot was said..promised...because of that.

i think you are getting too wound up over this and getting close to crossing a line ...you might want to have a beer or something, man.[/QUOTE]


All true Bobby but when you stop fighting because you are taking losses less than your allies are but you cant accept them because of what the folks back home will say, well people make judegements.........sorry if any thing I say makes you feel I need a beer, personaly people taking credit for others sacrifice makes me more than a little queasy. 

Stalin didnt declare war but eventually by the most brutal means achieved victory for his side. Goering lost despite starting the conflict he was the leader of the LW not a corporal handing out ammunition.The LW was armed and developed by technical military people but when the politicians got hold of it the leaders/pilots took the blame for failures and goering took the credit for success.


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## Erich (Nov 16, 2010)

well am not sure Steve was planning for his thread to go OT but it has as per usual sadly

time to close it for good


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 16, 2010)

Very true Erich. I think its time for the little boys and girls to re-group here. Last warning. 

Charlie - put a lid on it, you're really pissing me off.


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## bobbysocks (Nov 16, 2010)

deleted by me....was all off topic. respect and regards to all

bobby


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## parsifal (Nov 16, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Er what nail on what head? This munchkin sees the germans close to their own capital with a huge enemy land and air force force while the western allies are launching bombers from far away. As a munchkin to a smurf which to you is the most threatening, bearing in mind the Soviets were avenging the attrocities commited in the east.
> 
> The smurfs dont seem to want to answer simple munchkin questions. Like exactly how many men planes tanks and guns did the Russians and Germans lose when between the date the americans stopped daylight bombing raids under the combined bomber offensive (Agreed by the US President) and its resumption. However more importantly how much territory did the Soviets re calim and how much oil production did they deny Germany.
> 
> show me you credentials





calm down...... your post is not all that relevant to the point i was making....my point is this....the soviets had significant effect in the defeat of the lw. so too did the allies, including the raf.

but this basic truth is simply not regestering at the moment with some participants.

erichs other points....that ther were plenty of planes and pilots is true as well, and i note erich acknoeledges the inexperience of those pilots, and the lack of fuel for the lw as major factors in the final defeat. he also acknowledges that in '45 many units were needed in the east, and hence could not properly meet the us daylight bomber threats

my crentials are that i have two degrees in this area, i lectured in strategic studies at the military academy, and have published a number of simulations on this subject. Wargames if you like. I have relatives that fought for both sides and am uniquely positioned to make observations on the war.


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## Matt308 (Nov 16, 2010)

Okay enough posturing. We all can claim some credentials to prove positive that our posts have God's provenance.

Enough gents. Anymore and this thread is going to have the Portcullis of Doom decend upon it all.


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## lesofprimus (Nov 17, 2010)

There are waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaay too many accounts of Luftwaffe pilots sittin on their asses with no fuel for the planes they could be flying to say there was any sort of pilot shortage....

Now, to say that there was a short supply of well trained and highly motivated pilots would be hitting the nail on the head...


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## buffnut453 (Nov 17, 2010)

Wasn't part of the problem that, unlike the RAF and USAAF, the Luftwaffe didn't rotate their operational pilots back home to be instructors? This resulted in some LW aces achieving incredible numbers of kills but it also resulted in increased mental strain from constantly being in combat. It also meant that new pilots weren't benefitting from the operational experience of these aces. I could be way off mark - the LW isn't one of my pet areas of interest - but if they did keep pilots on ops then inevitably the level of combat experience across the force would decline over time as these combat veterans died in crashes, combat etc.


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## Nikademus (Nov 17, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> Any comments about the AAF roaming the skys of Germany while the Spitfires were only over Holland?




Just one......that the pilots 'roaming' the skies of their respective combat theaters are just as deserving of their share of the props for defeating Germany and it's Luftwaffe as the fighter pilots of the 8th.


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## Nikademus (Nov 17, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Wasn't part of the problem that, unlike the RAF and USAAF, the Luftwaffe didn't rotate their operational pilots back home to be instructors? This resulted in some LW aces achieving incredible numbers of kills but it also resulted in increased mental strain from constantly being in combat. It also meant that new pilots weren't benefitting from the operational experience of these aces. .



Yes. Germany's manpower situation did not allow them the luxery of fixed pilot rotation. While this was not the case in every situation, in general, Luftwaffe pilots fought on until killed or wounded. The resulting situation whereby some units/forces would have an extremely experienced core of 'Experten' was at times detrimental to the development of up and coming pilots as they took a backseat as support for these crack men while they cranked up their scores. Attrition eventually killed many of the experts as well. VVS pilots faced a similar situation. With one's country on the line, they too did not have the luxery of a "tour of duty" They fought until wounded or killed, many in anominity.


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## Nikademus (Nov 17, 2010)

on a lighter note.....i'm finding Gamble's "Fortress Rabaul" to be an enjoyable read. It's helped fill in some holes on the early fighting so far...events not covered in detail in other works, such as RAAF No. 75 Squadron's efforts at Port Morosby and the early USAAF raids against Rabaul itself. Even on the well covered events, such as O'Hare's award winning run during the aborted Lexington raid, the author's writing style injects a freshness to the battle while giving equal props to both sides for their professionalism and bravery. 

I'm only wincing so far at the price i paid for a hardback version. Should have bought it online but it was an impulse buy, having eyed it for several weeks without biting.


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## GrauGeist (Nov 17, 2010)

The answer here, to the question "Who really destroyed the Luftwaffe" would be "They all did"...

It was the determination and multi-front air war that ground the Luftwaffe into the ground...literally.

People will (and are) argue that one air force did all this, and that air force did that, but it was the fact that the German leadership expanded thier war into a multi-front disaster that thier resources and manpower could not sustain.

While the Luftwaffe and thier allies put up a tremendous fight, the sheer weight of numbers of the RAF, USAAF and Soviets along with thier allies combined, finished the Germans off.

Yes, the USAAF's combined bomber/fighter offensive hurt Germany, but the early bleeding by the determined RAF dealt Germany a blow that was felt for the rest of the war. The meat grinder of the Ost Front was a slow hemmorage to the Luftwaffe, committing vast resources of the German war machine.

So in the end, it wasn't any single Allied airforce that won the war, it was a concerted effort, no matter how small the role, that took down the Luftwaffe...


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## steve51 (Nov 17, 2010)

Gentlemen,

The debate on this thread has been very informative for me. Thank you to all who have posted.


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## pbfoot (Nov 17, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> Any comments about the AAF roaming the skys of Germany while the Spitfires were only over Holland?



yep who was doing the escorting for the AAF B26's over Holland


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## tail end charlie (Nov 17, 2010)

GrauGeist said:


> The answer here, to the question "Who really destroyed the Luftwaffe" would be "They all did"...
> 
> It was the determination and multi-front air war that ground the Luftwaffe into the ground...literally.
> 
> ...



Graugeist I couldnt say any more


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 17, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Flyboy the Pax Americana has pissed me off completely
> 
> It seems that you can prove a few bombing raids on Rumanian refineries has more effect on oil production than the re occupation of Rumania and ditto for the whole of eastern europe.
> 
> ...



I'm not - but what I am going to tell you is to chill and stay on topic and not turn this tread into a half/assed bashing and ranting session. End of discussion.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 17, 2010)

I suggest that this gets back on topic. What the hell does "The Great Satan" have to do with how the hell destroyed the Luftwaffe. I think someone needs to get their panties out of a wad and get back on topic.

Is that okay with you Charlie?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 17, 2010)

I again ask what the hell does this have to do with the topic?

Last warning...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 17, 2010)

Alright why the **** is everyone ignoring the Mods when they say to get back on topic?


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## Colin1 (Nov 17, 2010)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Alright why the **** is everyone ignoring the Mods when they say to get back on topic?


Yep
sorry Chris, you might want to pull my last post, no sense in inflaming the issue


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## lesofprimus (Nov 17, 2010)

Thats a pretty damn good fu*kin question Chris....


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## fastmongrel (Nov 17, 2010)

I think it was woodworm that destroyed the Luftwaffe. The terrible Black Forest woodworm infestation of 1941 prevented Goering building 50,000 Moskito fighter bombers that would have swept the allied airforces from the sky in 1944. 

All hail the woodworm 

Of course you know it was British woodworm that did the real damage US woodworm were just to slow and short ranged.

The above makes just as much sense as some of the other b*ll*cks being spouted on this topic


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 17, 2010)

Charlie - if your next post is off subject, I'm kicking you into cyberspace. Everyone else - you you're not going to stay on topic I'm locking down this thread!!!!!!


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 17, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> I think it was woodworm that destroyed the Luftwaffe. The terrible Black Forest woodworm infestation of 1941 prevented Goering building 50,000 Moskito fighter bombers that would have swept the allied airforces from the sky in 1944.
> 
> All hail the woodworm
> 
> ...



 I think you meant "wormwood" (Rev 8:11)


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## bobbysocks (Nov 17, 2010)

i think yuo meant you...sorry i married an english teacher.


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## evangilder (Nov 17, 2010)

This thread will go back to being in topic and civil, or it will be closed and I will be sending people packing. This is the one and only warning I will give.


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## bobbysocks (Nov 17, 2010)

steve51 said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> I've begun reading a book that claims the USAAF defeated the Luftwaffe, a task that no other Allied AF was capable of. The author argues that the RAF was only able to achieve temporary, local air superiority beyond England, and that the Red Air Force was even less effective at superiority. Only the USAAF had the ability to destroy the GAF. Any thoughts?



i can see what he is driving at and i would have to say in my uneducated estimation that yes there is a ring of truth to the first part but he is embellishing the second part. let me explain...prior to D-Day...the LW planes could only penetrate so far into the UK and the USSR...and visa versa ( for the most part..not talking lancs and mossies etc.). so there was basically a corridor so many miles wide on each front where ac were constantly engaging each other in attempts to interdict incoming ac from raids. beyond that corridor was "safe ground"...bases where ac could be staged with out much fear of attack or damage. AGAIN, i do know both sides had bombers that could reach further...but if you go to those areas due to fuel constraints the e/a would have to break off and head home. both of those corridors required a vast amount of ac committed to their defense. in essence squadrons were pinned there no matter what. the long range bombing with fighter escort added another dimension to the war by eliminating germany's "safe ground". in ortherwords...no where to run..no where to hide. the LW had to field ac to meet the bombers but were engaged by the fighter escort...who then found fields and destroyed ac on the ground. all the while...the LW couldnt pull back or abandon those corridors. after D-day and with he russian offensive on the east those corridors closed in on themselves towards berlin...giving raf and soviet deeper penetrations into german. so while the author claims local superiority..yes...within those corridors. but they they also pinned 50%? of LW resources? the LW was essentially fighting on 3 fronts...the west, east, and right over their heads. divide and conquer...no one allied nation can claim they were the straw that broke the camels back...it was the whole bail of hay that did.


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 17, 2010)

bobbysocks said:


> i think yuo meant you...sorry i married an english teacher.



I corrected it - and I think you meant "I" in lieu of "i". Your wife would be ashamed!


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## parsifal (Nov 18, 2010)

I just hope that the thread stays open. There are some very good bits of information coming in, despite the occasional derailing and off track comments


I agree with Graugeists post, incidentally.....a very accurate summation, and not just a politically correct one


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## syscom3 (Nov 18, 2010)

pbfoot said:


> yep who was doing the escorting for the AAF B26's over Holland



And who was escorting the bombers over Berlin or Vienna? The LW could refuse to fight over Holland, but couldn't ignore the fight right over their own heads.


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## renrich (Nov 18, 2010)

To me, a question like "who destroyed the LW" needs to be looked at from a point of view that all contributed, as Graugeist has already observed. A question like "who destroyed the Wehrmacht" might, at first glance be answered by "the Red Army" since the battles on the Eastern Front had the most casualties. However, as an example, the ultimate defeat of the Afrika Korps in NA, although the numbers involved were much smaller, played a big role in destroying the Wehrmacht, beginning with the desperate Battle of El Alamein and culminating with the surrender of around 275000 German troops at Tunis. If those 275000 troops and their arms had been available on the Eastern Front would the outcome have changed. But should not some of the credit for defeating Rommel go to the RN and RAF for interdicting his supply lines? Could the Red Army have enjoyed the success they had on the Eastern Front without the Lend Lease efforts of Great Britain and the US? The point is, IMO, it is almost impossible to answer a broad question like this one by pin pointing a single entity because of all the factors involved.


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## syscom3 (Nov 18, 2010)

renrich, the LW was a viable military organization (for defense) untill the AAF began operations anywhere within the Reichs borders. At that point the AAF effectively destroyed the LW. 

Whether it was through lack of POL's, or getting shotdown by escorting P38's, P47's or P51's; it doesnt matter. It was the AAF that delivered the body blows that sent the LW reeling.


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## parsifal (Nov 18, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> renrich, the LW was a viable military organization (for defense) untill the AAF began operations anywhere within the Reichs borders. At that point the AAF effectively destroyed the LW.
> 
> Whether it was through lack of POL's, or getting shotdown by escorting P38's, P47's or P51's; it doesnt matter. It was the AAF that delivered the body blows that sent the LW reeling.



The AAF delivered the death blow....well the daytime component at least, all the preparatory work had been done by others Without that preparation, the LW would have been too powerful to take on, even by the Americans


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## Glider (Nov 18, 2010)

renrich said:


> To me, a question like "who destroyed the LW" needs to be looked at from a point of view that all contributed, as Graugeist has already observed. A question like "who destroyed the Wehrmacht" might, at first glance be answered by "the Red Army" since the battles on the Eastern Front had the most casualties. However, as an example, the ultimate defeat of the Afrika Korps in NA, although the numbers involved were much smaller, played a big role in destroying the Wehrmacht, beginning with the desperate Battle of El Alamein and culminating with the surrender of around 275000 German troops at Tunis. If those 275000 troops and their arms had been available on the Eastern Front would the outcome have changed. But should not some of the credit for defeating Rommel go to the RN and RAF for interdicting his supply lines? Could the Red Army have enjoyed the success they had on the Eastern Front without the Lend Lease efforts of Great Britain and the US? The point is, IMO, it is almost impossible to answer a broad question like this one by pin pointing a single entity because of all the factors involved.



I think that this is the best posting on the topic. Germany was overstretched by actions of its own choosing and was worn down by heavy losses which it couldn't replace. No one air force or country can or should take the credit for destroying any part of the German war machine.

Parsifal has it right when he states that the USAAF finished off the day component, Russia also must take the credit for the losses on the Eastern Front where considerable forces were maintained, it was part of the preparation. I think its fair to say that the USAAF does take the credit for ensuring that the Luftwaffe had no where to hide, ensuring that there were no safe bases to operate or recuperate from.

Syscom also has it partly right when he said '_the LW was a viable military organization (for defense) untill the AAF began operations anywhere within the Reichs borders. At that point the AAF effectively destroyed the LW. 

Whether it was through lack of POL's, or getting shotdown by escorting P38's, P47's or P51's; it doesnt matter. It was the AAF that delivered the body blows that sent the LW reeling_'.

I say partly in that the Luftwaffe didn't have a viable organisation for defence when the USAAF started daylight raids. What Germany did was quickly develop such a defence, but only by taking the forces from other fronts. Think how many Luftwaffe aircraft were in France on D Day.

Germany survived and produced the arms it did by robbing Peter to pay Paul but by 1944 Peter was almost broke. I read an interesting fact the other day. In April 1944 the German army had approx 250,000 fewer trucks than in April 1942. All the effort went into producing weapons. Result, in Russia large areas of the front had their trucks taken away and replaced by horses, while the trucks went to more active parts of the front. You can imagine what that did to the supply situation.


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## skipperbob (Nov 22, 2010)

I find it a little ironic about the change in strategy by 8th AF. Dedicated to the destruction of German industry by bombing with 8th Fighter Command's main purpose being to protect the bombers, in early 1944 the mission was changed to destroy the LW in the air and on the ground, effectively using the bombers as bait to draw up German fighters to defend key targets. It was an extremely effective strategy and in just three months the Americans gained air supremacy over Europe, crippling the LW.


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## davebender (Nov 22, 2010)

> in early 1944 the mission was changed to destroy the LW in the air and on the ground, effectively using the bombers as bait to draw up German fighters to defend key targets. It was an extremely effective strategy and in just three months the Americans gained air supremacy over Europe, crippling the LW.


I think you are wrong. Germany maintained aerial superiority over Central Europe until the fall of 1944. During the Spring of 1944 8th Air Force gained aerial superiority (not supremacy) only over N.W. France.


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## drgondog (Nov 22, 2010)

davebender said:


> I think you are wrong. Germany maintained aerial superiority over Central Europe until the fall of 1944. During the Spring of 1944 8th Air Force gained aerial superiority (not supremacy) only over N.W. France.



The 8th had two days from January 1,1944 through the end of the war when it lost ~10% of the attacking force - March 6 and April 29 raids on Berlin. The latter because the LW controllers found an entire BD off course and without escort, and another with only one Group covering them - and shot down 69. Contrast to 60 out of 228 on October 14, 1943.

After April 29, the LW managed to punish one or two BG's severly when the controllers found a gap in coverage and exploited it. May 12, July 27, Sept 27 and Nov 26 come to mind. In each case a large force of LW day fighters were skillfully directed to a single bomb wing over a 200 mile stretch.

On D-Day, the LW was defenseless over the beach head and remained ineffectual throughout the rest of the war over Allied battlefield in the west. Contrast that to Ost front with far fewer fighters than LuftFlotte Reich and LuftFlotte 3 in the west.

The LW lost 3178 s/e day fighters over Germany in the Jan-May 1944 timeframe when only the 8th FC (and mostly only Mustangs) were shooting them down over central and east/southeast Germany.

What is your definition of 'superiority' or supremacy?


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## drgondog (Nov 22, 2010)

skipperbob said:


> I find it a little ironic about the change in strategy by 8th AF. Dedicated to the destruction of German industry by bombing with 8th Fighter Command's main purpose being to protect the bombers, in early 1944 the mission was changed to destroy the LW in the air and on the ground, effectively using the bombers as bait to draw up German fighters to defend key targets. It was an extremely effective strategy and in just three months the Americans gained air supremacy over Europe, crippling the LW.



I agree. Having said that I found some of the documentaries, which conveyed a sense of irresponsibility on the part of the escort fighters to go after the LW and leave the bombers un-escorted, simply false or grossly mis represented. 

The 8th FC still had the imperative 'protect the bombers' and developed tactics to send 'parcels' in the form of flights, then sections, then squadrons to engage depending on the size of the attacking LW forces. SOME instances did occur when a sizeable chunk of one group were lured away, only to have a second gaggle attack that local spot - with grave consequences.

Those were isolated. When the LW scored big on a bomb group it wasn't usually because a Fighter Group CO made a mistake - it was because of a combined BG off course or time, or a FG being late for RV or simply because the LW controller found a gap in the planned coverage.

The latter occurred (gap in coverage) frequently when only a few groups of long range escorts were available for target escort (Dec 1943 through April 1944). In that interval the 8th AF grew from three fighter Groups capable of target escort in Central Germany (354th, 20th and 55th FG) to (Mustangs - 354th, 355th, 357th, 4th and 352nd, Lightnings (20th, 55th and 364th).

At the end of April 1944, the 8th FC had ~ 2 Groups per 50 miles of bomber stream to protect the bombers. The 8th (and 9th) AF Jugs were relegated to Penetration and Withdrawal support to and from say, Frankfurt.

That is pretty thin when a LW controller could direct 100-300 day fighters into a concentrated area.


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## davebender (Nov 23, 2010)

> On D-Day, the LW was defenseless over the beach head and remained ineffectual throughout the rest of the war over Allied battlefield in the west.


I agree. But that has nothing to do with aerial superiority over Germany. You are talking about aerial superiority over Italy and France.


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## drgondog (Nov 23, 2010)

davebender said:


> I agree. But that has nothing to do with aerial superiority over Germany. You are talking about aerial superiority over Italy and France.



Begging the question - how do You define 'aerial superiority'??


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## bobbysocks (Nov 23, 2010)

i would say the germans had air control over their skies during the daylight up until around feb/mar 44. the raf had stopped daylight raids and flew sorties at night...the usaaf suspended daylight bombing as was suggested in oct 43 after some devistating losses. so the lw had put up enough of a deterant to prevent allied daylight bombing and make them alter their strategy. but after the introduction of long rang escorts...control dwindled for the german side. the lw with no safe haven and increasing fuel problems were bled horribly. the allies didnt have either of those issues. as more and more LR FGs were added, bases introduced into france and belgium that bleeding went up exponentially. if your enemy can put up 600 to 1000 plane raids over your territory consistantly and at will and all your efforts do nothing to make them cease...you have lost overall air superiority.


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## drgondog (Nov 23, 2010)

bobbysocks said:


> i would say the germans had air control over their skies during the daylight up until around feb/mar 44. the raf had stopped daylight raids and flew sorties at night...the usaaf suspended daylight bombing as was suggested in oct 43 after some devistating losses. so the lw had put up enough of a deterant to prevent allied daylight bombing and make them alter their strategy. but after the introduction of long rang escorts...control dwindled for the german side. the lw with no safe haven and increasing fuel problems were bled horribly. the allies didnt have either of those issues. as more and more LR FGs were added, bases introduced into france and belgium that bleeding went up exponentially. if your enemy can put up 600 to 1000 plane raids over your territory consistantly and at will and all your efforts do nothing to make them cease...you have lost overall air superiority.



BobbyS - I would say you are correct. 

A further insight might be that ONLY the USAAF was conducting daily, large scale daylight raids from Britain and Italy over every corner of Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia and Austria. There was no ability of the LW or USSR or GB to achieve such massive strikes on strategic targets over their enemy airspace, nor could they continue to deal unacceptable losses. When the latter occurred the LW was never able to slow the USAAF down.

That period was January through May, 1944

Even when the LW was dealing blows so punishing that daylight strategic bombing was being questioned, the 8th AF was never turned back by the LW... but from January through April what used to be sanctuary to take off, form and strike en masse became impossible.

Contrary to DaveB assertion, the LW lost complete control of any point over Germany/Czechoslovakia/Poland/Austria where they could deny the 8th and 15th AF their objectives... objectives which were prohibitive in Fall 1943, were easily attacked with reasonable to low losses from mid May to the end of the war. They lost control over Holland and France in the Fall of 1943 when 8th and 9th and RAF dominated.

Speer was brilliant in distributing his manufacturing base but he couldn't relocate his Chemical/Petroleum refining points and couldn't defend them from persistent and destructive attacks - and the RAF DID contribute in this initiative, despite Harris' objections.


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## davebender (Nov 23, 2010)

Friendly aircraft can operate without a strong fighter escort. Enemy aircraft must have a strong fighter escort or else they get slaughtered.


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## bobbysocks (Nov 23, 2010)

bombers and fighter escorts would we all know make contrails. a 1000 plane raid would have stretched out across the horizon and would have appeared like a white blanket was being pulled across the sky. can you imagine what the german civilian must have felt when they saw that...knowing it was heading towards them?


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## parsifal (Nov 23, 2010)

What is being described here is air supremacy, which was not achieved until the the lw was grounded. This only occurred in the final months of the war.

There are normally thought to be three levels of control of the air. Air supremacy is the highest, meaning there is complete control of the skies. Air superiority is the next highest, which is being in a more favorable position than the opponent. It is defined in the NATO Glossary as "That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces." Air parity is the lowest level of control, meaning control of the skies only above friendly troop positions.

Air parity, tending towards air superiority had been achieved over the germans by early 1942. This can be stated because whereas the allies were able to penetrate german controlled airspace with increasing regularity and ease, the same could not be said for german intrusions into allied airspace. german raids over allied controled airspace became virtually impossible from the end of 1942 onward, though they did occur. Only in restricted areas, or areas limited in size were the germans able to claim air parity. 

On the Eastern front, the germans had lost general air superiority by the end of 1941, though they were able to achieve local air aupeiority over key sectors by concentrating their air resources over that sector, for limited periods. By the end of 1942, their ability to gain local air supriority had disappeared, in a general sense they had lost air superiority, even in localised situations they could no longer claim air superiority....they could only claim air parity over parts of the front. After Kursk, even that disappeared, and from August 1943, the russians could claim air superiority over the Germans, even though the germans were still quite able to inflict heavy losses on them. The Germans could not deny the Russians from achieving all that they needed to do in the air, whilst they themselves lacked the bomber strengths to have any measurable effect on operations themselves.

In the early months of 1944, the germans on the western front even lost the ability to gain local air superiority around the bomber formations, with the introduction of LR fighter escorts as part of the US bombing campaign. It took some months longer for the night campaign to catch up, and total air superiority at night was never attained. However, even at night, the LW was never better than air parity status, from June 1944 onward, with the beginning of Mosquito sweeps, equipped with AI MkX


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## drgondog (Nov 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> Friendly aircraft can operate without a strong fighter escort. Enemy aircraft must have a strong fighter escort or else they get slaughtered.



Interesting definition. The converse of that is that despite fighter escort, the defending force has air superiority and that whether the attacking force is escorted or not, the defending force prevails.

That circumstance existed through the Fall of 1944, in which escort fighters were only available for ingress and egress to and from, but not over, Germany.

By your definition, Germany had air superiority to the end of the war as they were capable of 'slaughtering' Allied airpower over Germany absent Allied fighters. Is that your thesis?


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## davebender (Nov 24, 2010)

> By your definition, Germany had air superiority to the end of the war as they were capable of 'slaughtering' Allied airpower over Germany absent Allied fighters.


I don't think that's true. By the fall of 1944 the Luftwaffe was critically short of aviation gasoline and Allied fighter-Bomber sweeps over German airfields were a daily occurance. Under such circumstances the training of new German pilots was all but impossible and even trained pilots had operations greatly constrained. The Luftwaffe could occasionally hit back hard but those occasions became increasingly fewer and less effective.


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## riacrato (Nov 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> There are normally thought to be three levels of control of the air. Air supremacy is the highest, meaning there is complete control of the skies. Air superiority is the next highest, which is being in a more favorable position than the opponent. It is defined in the NATO Glossary as "That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces." Air parity is the lowest level of control, meaning control of the skies only above friendly troop positions.
> 
> Air parity, tending towards air superiority had been achieved over the germans by early 1942. This can be stated because whereas the allies were able to penetrate german controlled airspace with increasing regularity and ease, the same could not be said for german intrusions into allied airspace. german raids over allied controled airspace became virtually impossible from the end of 1942 onward, though they did occur. Only in restricted areas, or areas limited in size were the germans able to claim air parity.


Which territory? I don't think anyone is denying that the Allies had air superiority or supremacy over GB. Continental Europe is a whole different matter.

There were no allied troops in Germany, the Netherlamds, Belgium or France in 1942 and so there was no movement to be denied and no targets to raid. Eventhough simplistic, davebender's definition is interesting and does the situation more justice in my opinion. The LW forces could still operate freely in 1942 and most of 1943, whereas Allied forces needed strong escorts to avoid prohibitive losses. That changed in 1944 even over airspace where there were still no Allied ground troops.


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## drgondog (Nov 24, 2010)

riacrato said:


> Which territory? I don't think anyone is denying that the Allies had air superiority or supremacy over GB. Continental Europe is a whole different matter.
> 
> There were no allied troops in Germany, the Netherlamds, Belgium or France in 1942 and so there was no movement to be denied and no targets to raid. Eventhough simplistic, davebender's definition is interesting and does the situation more justice in my opinion. The LW forces could still operate freely in 1942 and most of 1943, whereas Allied forces needed strong escorts to avoid prohibitive losses. That changed in 1944 even over airspace where there were still no Allied ground troops.



Who asserts that the LW could operate freely over Germany - anywhere in Germany - without being challenged during daylight hours.. starting in January 1944 when Doolittle issued the directive to attack the LW anywhere, in the air and on the ground. 1942 and most of 1943 is not the focus of the debate.

Galland makes no such assertion, in fact states the contrary, that the LW could not even safely assemble or take off or land in the Spring and Summer of 1944. That is not to say they could not take off, assemble or land - just not with disregard for 8th AF long range fighters. The LW had no ability to deny the RN or USN operations anywhere they chose to operate anywhere in the West. The LW was powerless over the Invasion front, The LW was powerless in daylight ops anywhere over Germany. In short, the LW did not even have Parity.

For the record Dave asserts that the Allies did not have air superiority over Central Europe until the Fall 1944... I must must admit confusion regarding Dave's assertion that the LW could deny the USAAF from roaming anywhere at will and do anything they wished from March, 1944 through the end of the war... 

or conversely that the LW could achieve its own objectives over its own airspace against the USAAF - much less deny the USAAF from attaining theirs.

Somewhere in that scenario is a kernel of agreed 'air superiority'.


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## riacrato (Nov 24, 2010)

I don't agree with Dave in his assessment as to when air superiority to whatever degree went to the Allies over Western Europe, I merely disagreed with "Air parity, tending towards air superiority had been achieved over the germans by *early 1942*", at least if this is to mean "everywhere" over Continental Europe.


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## drgondog (Nov 24, 2010)

riacrato said:


> I don't agree with Dave in his assessment as to when air superiority to whatever degree went to the Allies over Western Europe, I merely disagreed with "Air parity, tending towards air superiority had been achieved over the germans by *early 1942*", at least if this is to mean "everywhere" over Continental Europe.



I agree with you. 

Parity over the English Channel, if it occurred at all by 1943, is only because the Luftwaffe had more pressing allocations elsewhere. There was no reason to beef up the Kanal Front based on any established threat by the Allies during daylight. 

8th AF was flying what could best be described as 'raids' on a less than 100 bomber scale over targets in France until January 1943, when they finally went to Wilhemshaven for first attack on Germany..


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## parsifal (Nov 24, 2010)

The definition I gave is textbook stuff. In the context of a strategic bombing campaign, where the locations of troop concentrations is secondary to the location of the strikes formations, the troop concentration concept should be substituted with bomber formations. 

Now, I say that air parity had been reached, tending toward air superiority, because by 1942, the LW was no longer in a position to mount massed raids over enemy controlled territory, whereas the allies were able to mount substantial attacks over german controlled territory with tolerable losses. Abeit at night for the deep penetration stuff, but even this capability had been denied (substantially) to the germans over allied controlled territory. 

This part of the equation only amounts to air parity, since in 1942, as you rightly point out, the germans still controlled large portions of their air spaces (to the point of excercising air supremacy over those portions of their airspace), at least during the daylight hours. However, the fact that they had withdrawn, (and this was forced on them, by mounting losses in their battles over france principally) from defending parts of their territory, in particular, over NW France, by 1942, suggests that this air parity was tending toward Allied superiority. all the allies needed from that point was to develop the fighter aircraft with the legs to reach into the traditional areas of german controlled airspace, to complete the dominance over the LW....enter the mustang. 

This is consistent with what actually happened. The Germans did not wake up one morning in early 1944 and suddenly find they had lost control of the skies over their own country. It was a process years in the making, with contributory effect found all the way back to 1940, and beyond. Actions by the RAF and the VVS in 1942, affected in a direct and tangible way, outcomes observed in 1944. Without those actions , the outcome in 1944 would have been completely different


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## drgondog (Nov 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> The definition I gave is textbook stuff. In the context of a strategic bombing campaign, where the locations of troop concentrations is secondary to the location of the strikes formations, the troop concentration concept should be substituted with bomber formations.
> 
> Now, I say that air parity had been reached, tending toward air superiority, because by 1942, the LW was no longer in a position to mount massed raids over enemy controlled territory, whereas the allies were able to mount substantial attacks over german controlled territory with tolerable losses. Abeit at night for the deep penetration stuff, but even this capability had been denied (substantially) to the germans over allied controlled territory.
> 
> ...



I agree your points. No question regarding the process beginning as far back as BoB and all the struggles in Africa and Mediterranean. Having said that, the LW was resource constrained and after the BoB picked and chose different tactical/strategic points in time to 'get serious'

One thing to remember about Kanal Front. It wasn't really reinforced with JG2 and JG26 more or less a constant from 1942 onward. 

From my perspective, the LW deemed the airspace over Holland and France as a 'Parity' region, and when the 8th came into play, they were the tripwire to initiate the battle with the reserves beyond the German border. 

I believe the only real important targets were sub pens like St Nazaire and Lille, etc and the 8th never did much against the pens themselves - even the 2,000 pound bombs were inadequate - so the LW never considered the 8th to be big enough of a threat to contest every mile over France all the time.

What received substantial reinforcement was LuftFlotte Reich. The LW stripped Ost and Sud to pour reinforcements into Germany as the threat of daylight bombing became more real and entirely up to destruction of conventional manufacturing and refining centers..


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## stona (Nov 27, 2010)

davebender said:


> You have a lot more faith in WWII era heavy bombers then I do.
> 
> Personally I think Germany could have been defeated just as quickly (and perhaps more so) if there had been no British and U.S. heavy bombers at all.



That's a moot point. You could argue that the diversion of resources and aircraft to a strategic bomber force,whose efficacity is certainly debatable,damned nearly lost us the war. The Battle of the Atlantic was a far closer run thing than it needed to be as a result.
Steve


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## drgondog (Nov 27, 2010)

stona said:


> That's a moot point. You could argue that the diversion of resources and aircraft to a strategic bomber force,whose efficacity is certainly debatable,damned nearly lost us the war. The Battle of the Atlantic was a far closer run thing than it needed to be as a result.
> Steve



Steve - what is the point you are making?

If the value and impact of the strategic bomber force was not high, why did the LW expend so much resource, including stripping the East and South of fighter resources to try to stop them?


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2010)

Extensive studies were made after the war on the impact of strategic bombing. The most famous of them was of course the USSBS. Some have argued these studies are essentially apologies for the time and effort put into , but this seems a very big pill to swallow. The simple fact that the Germans poured so much effort into trying to stop the bombers suggests such conspiracy arguments ring very hollow. 

What the war showed was that strategic bombing could not win the war outright. In this respect it did not live up to the fantastic claims made prewar. It still achieved a lot, and despite the losses suffered, meted out far greater destruction than it received.

In the case of Britain the alternative.... a continental land based strategy based on a mass ground army, was simply not a feasible option. Even as it stood, with just 13 divisions in the frontline in Europe in 19844, the British suffered such acute manpower shortages, that wholsale unit disbandments were the norm rather than the exception. This explains a lot behind Monty's caution....every man lost was a man lost for good, with little possibility fore replacement. Britiain determiined from the outbreak of the war that she simply could not field a mass army, and suffer the same casualty rates as had been sustained 20 years earlier. The 55000 aircrew lost during WWII pale into insignificance compared to the 2 million casualties suffered in the battlefields of France. The British lacked the resources to do that, AND fight a modern war of machines and production. They rightly chose the development of a strategic bomber force, to hit the germans in the only way possible. They courted, and succeeded in forming a grand alliance with the Russians and the Americans, to defeat evil.


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## drgondog (Nov 27, 2010)

That was a very good summary..


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## fastmongrel (Nov 27, 2010)

drgondog said:


> That was a very good summary..



I agree that was very well put Parsifal. I wonder what the 20/20 hindsight brigade who criticise the British bombing strategy in WWII think Britain should have done to strike back at the German economy and help Russia.


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## BombTaxi (Nov 27, 2010)

Great summary Parsifal. You have also demonstrated that WW1 was an anomaly in British policy - the first and only time the UK fielded a mass conscript army in the Continental style, rather than acting as the financial and political hub of a coalition, as it had done in nearly every European war since the 1700s. The experiment shattered Britain, perhaps irreparably. As a result, it was demographically, politically and financially impossible to repeat the policy. Hence the development of the bomber arm as a relatively much cheaper means of force projection than either the mass army or the dreadnought-era battlefleet, which in any case had been rendered illegal by the Washington and London treaties. Looking at it with the same eyes as the 20/20 brigade, I see Britain having no other viable choice for projecting power onto the Continent after 1919...


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## Civettone (Nov 27, 2010)

The problem with the Luftwaffe or even with Germany in WW2 was IDEOLOGY. Nazi leaders like Goering believed that training was of inferior importance. A German pilot needed courage and fighting spirit. That would overcome every obstacle. And Germans are in essence superior fighters than all other races. Or so they thought. 
They needed a reality check but all that happened was the guy with the funny mustache giving orders and the rest of the bunch following them as much as they could even if it was counterproductive.

Kris


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## BombTaxi (Nov 27, 2010)

Kris, I think your comments hold true for the latter stages of the war, where Germany was suffering from crippling manpower shortages. But German pilots early in the war, like their counterparts in the other belligerent nations were very highly trained. While the Nazi leadership and it's apparatchiks may have trumpeted the virtues of the Aryan warrior, the commanders of the armed forces, for the most part, understood that excellently trained and motivated men with top-class equipment are what win wars. In this they were simply continuing a tradition going right back to the Prussian armed forces. It was also reflected in the German approach to war-fighting. Blitzkrieg was not a philosophy based on elan and Aryan vigour, but an extremely carefully thought-out means to bring overwhelming force to bear at critical points. You need trained thinkers, not zealous berserkers, to make that work.


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## drgondog (Nov 27, 2010)

For Tail End Charlie -

Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..

The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk


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## tomo pauk (Nov 27, 2010)

I know it was aimed for TEC, but...
In aggregate (from quotes from that forum), mighty bombing campaigns from 1943 on (night) 1944 (around-a-clock) on were causes for lost at BoB, Moscow, Alamein, Stalingrad, Tunis, Sicily, Kursk, Ukraine... Plus, not telling Western investigators that Soviets contributed single iota to defeat Germany is quite telling. 

No wonder they lost the war.


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## Matt308 (Nov 27, 2010)

drgondog said:


> That was a very good summary..



Parsifal, that was truly elegant. And certainly explains the war doctrine of modern engagements. Well done.


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## BombTaxi (Nov 27, 2010)

drgondog said:


> For Tail End Charlie -
> 
> Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..
> 
> The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk



Like other posters, I smell a rat in the total absence of any mention of the Soviets role in defeating Germany. While I am supporter of the strategic bombing campaigns, they alone did not win the war. The USSR invading Germany and seizing it's capital won the war...

However, the Western allies did totally shatter the LW. Of that there is no doubt.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2010)

No air campaign, whethe3r it be "tactical", strategic", army support, or aeronaval in nature can win wars, or take territory. But winning the air caqmpaign makes things possible. 

If the strategic bombing campaign had not occurred, I doubt the Soviets could have taken Berlin. If the allies had not won air supremacy in the west, Normandy would have probably ended in defeat.

The air campaigns were crucial to the outcome of the war IMO


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

parsifal said:


> ...
> 
> If the strategic bombing campaign had not occurred, I doubt the Soviets could have taken Berlin. If the allies had not won air supremacy in the west, Normandy would have probably ended in defeat.
> 
> The air campaigns were crucial to the outcome of the war IMO



If the W. allies skipped all strategic bombing campaign, they would've fielded cca 90 000 (90K) medium bombers more, if we take 1:2 ratio for exchange between 4-engined and 2-engined bomber. (USA produced 30K of B-17s B-24s, while UK produced 15K of 4-eng bombers). 
With 1/3rd of those 90K going for West, East and Pacific fronts each, I take it Axis forces would've been swamped even more than they were historically.


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## Juha (Nov 28, 2010)

Hello Tomo
in your scenario Allieds would have to had train a twice as many multi-engine pilots and navigators than they historically had.

Juha


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

Lancaster required 5 'brains' to operate (from Wiki: pilot, flight engineer, navigator, bomb aimer, wireless operator). Mosquito required 2.
B-17 required 6 'brains' to operate, while US mediums required from one to four.

So the man-power exchange is positive in my eyes.


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## Juha (Nov 28, 2010)

Hello Tomo
I was thinking B-24 vs B-26 (IIRC 2 pilots, navigator, vs 2 pilots, navigator/radio operator) if we thing those whose training was the most expensive.
and Lanc vs Wimpy (pilot, navigator, flight engineer(?) vs pilot, navigator)
IMHO Mossie was a light bomber

Full crews 7-10 vs 7 and 7 vs 5-6
Juha


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> Lancaster required 5 'brains' to operate (from Wiki: pilot, flight engineer, navigator, bomb aimer, wireless operator). Mosquito required 2.
> B-17 required 6 'brains' to operate, while US mediums required from one to four.
> 
> So the man-power exchange is positive in my eyes.



Not quite so positive. Even the "brains" were not interchangeable. Many, but not all, US navigators and bomb aimers were men who had 'washed out' of flight school. 
And you still need to double the size of of your flight schools to do the training. 
US mediums weren't quite a 1:2 exchange in manufacturing effort, at least not in engines. B-17 were powered by four 9 cylinder engines. B-26s were powered by two 18 cylinder engines. 
It might still take until 1944 to really start swamping the Axis with numbers and in the mean time all those AA guns have been distributed closer to the front. 

Could the Allied Strategic bombing campaign have been done smarter or more effective?
Certainly. 
Should it have been abandoned, or never started, altogether?


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello Tomo
> I was thinking B-24 vs B-26 (IIRC 2 pilots, navigator, vs 2 pilots, navigator/radio operator) if we thing those whose training was the most expensive.
> and Lanc vs Wimpy (pilot, navigator, flight engineer(?) vs pilot, navigator)
> IMHO Mossie was a light bomber
> ...



USA produced many other 2-engine bomber types that used far less crew (A-20, Martin 167 187). Sure enough, both Boeing Consolidated would've came out with 2-engine plane to be produced in lieu of -17 -24.

Mossie was light if we count the weight, medium if we count engines, and heavy if we count the capabilities 
No Grand Slam though 8)


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> Not quite so positive. Even the "brains" were not interchangeable. Many, but not all, US navigators and bomb aimers were men who had 'washed out' of flight school.
> And you still need to double the size of of your flight schools to do the training.
> US mediums weren't quite a 1:2 exchange in manufacturing effort, at least not in engines. B-17 were powered by four 9 cylinder engines. B-26s were powered by two 18 cylinder engines.
> It might still take until 1944 to really start swamping the Axis with numbers and in the mean time all those AA guns have been distributed closer to the front.
> ...



Of course the brains were not interchangable, but, with focus going to train medium bomber crews, both UK USA would've cater for crews fot those bombers.
As for the ratio between bomber types, think it would be easy for Boeing Con to produce 2-engine jobs. Or to produce turboed version of Martin A-22, or turboed version of A-20A, or to produce P-38 with Twin Wasp instead of Allison onboard.
As for those (German) AAA that is now nearer to the front, the 60 000 of new bombers would cater for those.

As for strategic bombing campaign - it served the purpose of aiding defeating Axis. But (always a but), the Germans it's allies were driven home many miles experiences many bitter defeats before the campaign put the dent to their capabilities.


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## drgondog (Nov 28, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> Like other posters, I smell a rat in the total absence of any mention of the Soviets role in defeating Germany. While I am supporter of the strategic bombing campaigns, they alone did not win the war. The USSR invading Germany and seizing it's capital won the war...
> 
> However, the Western allies did totally shatter the LW. Of that there is no doubt.



@TP and BT - of course. The 'selected quotes' were extracted and represent a microcosm of opinions. 

I doubt that the US (and certainly Britain and Commonwealth after WWI) would have willingly sustained the casualties that Sovs took to defeat Germany in the East. The East was the meat grinder for the Wermacht and the West was the meatgrinder for the LW.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> USA produced many other 2-engine bomber types that used far less crew (A-20, Martin 167 187). Sure enough, both Boeing Consolidated would've came out with 2-engine plane to be produced in lieu of -17 -24.



The A-20s were sorely lacking in range, and had the same problem as a Hampden, if the pilot was hit there was no way for another crewman to take over the controls, even to hold the plane steady for other crewmen to get out.
Yes the rear seater had a stick but I think it was normally stowed? and he couldn't see squat.

Maryland was a nice plane for it's time and did a lot of good reconnaissance work, but lets face it, it was a Blenheim on steroids. It also had the same problem as above. 

Baltimore was more of the same, short range, limited bomb load. 
It could have been developed but why?
B-25 with the same engines could go further and carry more bombs.
Using 6-8 men in two aircraft to carry the same bomb load to a target as 6-10 men in a single aircraft isn't really saving a whole lot.


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## parsifal (Nov 28, 2010)

Hi TP

The other thing that bedevils this alternate scenario of yours is the non-combat attrition effects. In wartime it is simply not possible to sit passively by. Your forces need to remain active....to train, patrol command the airspace over friendly territory. That last mentioned excecise in the case of the british required that they at least push the Germans back over North Western France, which was the major achievement of the RAF against the LW in 1941, allbeit at a pretty heavy cost.


The point is that even in times of light engagement, aircraft are lost at a pretty alarming rate. During the so-called "phoney war" of 1939-40 the German bomber forces were losing between 4 and 7% of the force structure every month. Similar loss rates applied to the allied air forces, though it appears to have dropped as the war progressed. Therefore, if you are trying to maintain a force structure of 90000 aircraft in your frontline airforce, you are going to be losing about 7000 aorcraft per month. No country can sustain that level of attritional losses.

If the allies had done nothing from say 1942, with an estimated aircraft delivery rate of about 1800 aircraft per month (disregarding trainers aircraft retained in the US and the like), and a monthly attritional rate of 7%, they might have a force structure of 24000 aircraft, instead of the 20000 they actually fielded. 

Conversely, the Germans, who maintained a force structure of around 5000 aircraft for the latter part of the war, lost a much greater percentage of their new production to enemy action. release the pressure on them , a number of things begin to happen...Firstly, they get time to train their piloits properly, secondly, they gain the ability to stockpile their oil, and thirdly, because a much bigger percentage of their aircraft were historically shot down, rather than just fall out of the sky, their force structure begins to grow, and astronomically. If the germans are assumed to have an effective delivery rate of 1000 machines per month, and they too are suffering atrition of 7%, then froma force of 5000 in 1942, one can expect the LW to have reached a strength of around 14200 aircraft by the end of 1943....in other words the ratio of forces actually tips in favour of the germans, from 4 or 5 to 1 against them in the real campaign, to about 1.6 to 1 in this hypothetical.

Relieving the pressure on a weaker force only benefits the weaker force


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## jim (Nov 28, 2010)

drgondog said:


> For Tail End Charlie -
> 
> Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..
> 
> The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk



All these leaders heald key positions and had very good opinions for their sectors of responsibility ( Georing excluded) but they could not see the whole picture. The historic fan of today with acces to many sources has a clearer view. The bombing attacks was obviously a problem but Germany (and Luftwaffe) were already from 1942 in a no win situation . Going in full war economy effort only in 1941 the 1942 defeats came as a result of lack of numbers. Rommel was defeated in Alamein after superb defensive figthting (1-10) only because he did not posses 50 more tanks to counter attack the last British attack. The Staligrand hapenned because lack of german units forced the use of the incapable Rumanians to cover the sides of 6th armee 
Jg27 was fighting alone for 2 years in North Africa. Jg2,JG26,JG1 faced the entire UK based alleid forces. Jg5 in Norway was fighting a two front war. In the east after 1941 Jafdwaffe was also terribly outnumberd.
The crushing defeat og Germany in intelligence/espinage war was a decive factor. Ultra was the main reason of the U boats defeat, Rommels supply convoys destruction, Rommels movements and strength, Luftwaffe movements, strength,new eqeuipment etc. Even the soviets managed to steal the Zitadelle s plan (Battle of Kursk)
Finally Germany was in fuel crisis already from 1942,long before the US bombing. In 1943 was critical, the bomber offensive of 1944 just made the situation desperate.Look at the global map the acces that germany had in oil fields and compare it to the alleis acces.Even without bombing germany could not compete . I could add in this category raw materials: magnesium,chromium,nikelium, rubber ,tungsten and many others.
Germany and Luftwaffe were defeated by the combined overhelming numbers of the alleis .( Soviet Union managed to move many factories but only could feed its population after the ukrane loss , because of the Americans. Raw materials were provided as well and ready weapons was valuable in 1942-43-specially modern aircrafs.In no way can claim that defeated germany or Luftwaffe alone.)


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> Of course the brains were not interchangable, but, with focus going to train medium bomber crews, both UK USA would've cater for crews fot those bombers.


It is a lot easier to train gunners than pilots. for twice the number of bomber pilots you need (assuming you can recruit/draft enough pilots) twice the number of primary trainers, twice the number of basic trainers, twice the number of advanced trainers and twice the number of multi engine trainers. Plus instructors plus extra fuel for all those training planes. You also need the extra navagator/bomb aimers. 
These people are not all that easy to get in large numbers. Just like in the army not every soldier could be turned into an artilleryman or even a tanker. 
Sure just about any strong back could shove a shell in the breech but how many people could read the maps, survey the firing positions, apply the atmospheric corrections to the trajectory tables and all the rest of the math stuff that gunners do for a successful shoot?
There was a more limited pool of qualified candidates than you might believe. 


tomo pauk said:


> As for the ratio between bomber types, think it would be easy for Boeing Con to produce 2-engine jobs. Or to produce turboed version of Martin A-22, or turboed version of A-20A, or to produce P-38 with Twin Wasp instead of Allison onboard.


Boeing and Con could have produced 2 engine planes (although a few thousand B-24s for maritime patrol and long distance cargo would still have been useful) but this would have had to have been decided in 1939-40. It also means the Pacific would have been much more difficult. Mission distances there being much longer, Little 'strategic bombing' in the European sense being done there until the B-29 showed up. Bombing enemy naval bases and such being more grand tactical. 
It doesn't matter how many twin engine bombers you have, with or with-out turbos, if they can't reach the target they are useless. 

Aside from taking pictures, what does a turboed A-22 do? since we know (now) that the higher the altitude the worse the accuracy trying to use large numbers of high flying planes with 2,000lb bomb loads isn't going to give very good results. 
Turboing the A-20 also gets you what? a very fast bomber at high altitude with a small internal bomb load and not much greater range, especially if you use the power. 
A twin wasp P-38 is a real joke. Less power, more drag. a real recipe for success?


tomo pauk said:


> As for those (German) AAA that is now nearer to the front, the 60 000 of new bombers would cater for those.



or would the anti-aircraft guns cater to the bombers? Trading bombers for dug in AA guns doesn't seem to be a good economic balance. Especially if you are leaving the gun and ammunition factories total unhindered to make good their losses.


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## Juha (Nov 28, 2010)

Hello Tomo
IMO B-25, B-26 and Wimpy were real mediums, Mossie was a light bomber and Boston, now as its USAAF designation shows was a attack. ie a light bomber, Maryland was designed to same specs as Boston but lost to Douglas entry, so it was also a light bomber and Baltimore was updated version of Maryland

Juha


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

Indeed, Mossie was called light bomber by RAF, and I may agree that A-20 -22 were light bombers, but then how we should call Japanese 2-engined bombers? IIRC JApanese called them heavy bombers? 
The same thing at tanks - Italians called 25 ton tank heavy (_pesante_), Germans called 48 ton a medium one.
Back to bombers - if we go by the usage, Mossie is hardly light bomber, since it was used along with heavy bombers...

Stuff for a new thread


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Hi TP
> 
> The other thing that bedevils this alternate scenario of yours is the non-combat attrition effects. In wartime it is simply not possible to sit passively by. Your forces need to remain active....to train, patrol command the airspace over friendly territory. That last mentioned excecise in the case of the british required that they at least push the Germans back over North Western France, which was the major achievement of the RAF against the LW in 1941, allbeit at a pretty heavy cost.
> 
> ...



I don't advice that we simply scratch the 45 000 4-engine bombers, but that we build 90 000 2-engined. With 60 000 of those engaged vs. Germany and it's European allies it would be hardly relieving the pressure against them.
Eg. B-17 was produced in 4000 copies before 1943 - so 7000-8000 2-engined planes could've been produced AND put into usage well before eg. invasion of Sicily. Almost same number of B-24s, for the same math - making cca 15 000 new 2-engined bombers to pound Sicily, Kursk, France, the atolls etc


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> Indeed, Mossie was called light bomber by RAF, and I may agree that A-20 -22 were light bombers, but then how we should call Japanese 2-engined bombers? IIRC JApanese called them heavy bombers?
> The same thing at tanks - Italians called 25 ton tank heavy (_pesante_), Germans called 48 ton a medium one.
> Back to bombers - if we go by the usage, Mossie is hardly light bomber, since it was used along with heavy bombers...
> 
> Stuff for a new thread



Timing, comparisons to other aircraft in inventory, and usage all affect the category.

The Whitley is said to be Britain's first Modern (post WW I?) Heavy bomber. According to some sources the was a clause in a treaty banning bombers over a certain weight. The treaty expired and the Whitley was the first bomber designed to exceed that weight. By the time the war starts 4 engine bombers are on the drawing board even if not in service so what category does the Whitley belong in? 

As far as the Japanese (and other countries) go, there were plenty of single engine 'bombers' being built/used. Japanese had both the Ki-30 and Ki-32 in use in China. Anything with two engines for them is almost an automatic medium bomber. 

or maybe they just called the light and heavy and had no medium category?

Same with tanks. Progress was so quick that somebodies 1938 medium tank was a light tank by 1942. 

As far as the Mossie goes, just because you fly it along side of heavy bombers on the same night/mission doesn't mean it is a heavy bomber. 
Heavy bombers carrying double to triple the bomb load.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> It is a lot easier to train gunners than pilots. for twice the number of bomber pilots you need (assuming you can recruit/draft enough pilots) twice the number of primary trainers, twice the number of basic trainers, twice the number of advanced trainers and twice the number of multi engine trainers. Plus instructors plus extra fuel for all those training planes. You also need the extra navagator/bomb aimers.
> These people are not all that easy to get in large numbers. Just like in the army not every soldier could be turned into an artilleryman or even a tanker.
> Sure just about any strong back could shove a shell in the breech but how many people could read the maps, survey the firing positions, apply the atmospheric corrections to the trajectory tables and all the rest of the math stuff that gunners do for a successful shoot?
> There was a more limited pool of qualified candidates than you might believe.



I know that not every man can fly an aircraft, let alone to fly it efficiently in presence of enemy fire. But, if 2 men (pilot + navigator/bombardier) can fly Mosquito during night and make their presence important over German-held Europe, and live to tell about that, then there is no doubt that US could've fielded something similar. 



> Boeing and Con could have produced 2 engine planes (although a few thousand B-24s for maritime patrol and long distance cargo would still have been useful) but this would have had to have been decided in 1939-40. *It also means the Pacific would have been much more difficult.* Mission distances there being much longer, Little 'strategic bombing' in the European sense being done there until the B-29 showed up. Bombing enemy naval bases and such being more grand tactical.



IIRC the main complain from General Kenney was that he lacked bombers, not that ones he commanded were of short range. 



> It doesn't matter how many twin engine bombers you have, with or with-out turbos, if they can't reach the target they are useless.



The targets are located just after the front line.



> Aside from taking pictures, what does a turboed A-22 do? since we know (now) that the higher the altitude the worse the accuracy trying to use large numbers of high flying planes with 2,000lb bomb loads isn't going to give very good results.
> Turboing the A-20 also gets you what? a very fast bomber at high altitude with a small internal bomb load and not much greater range, especially if you use the power.



Trying to use planes to get in fast and at high alt, make shallow dive and pepper enemy from lower altitude would've worked just fine.



> A twin wasp P-38 is a real joke. Less power, more drag. a real recipe for success?



2 x 1200 HP, zero issues, more survivability.




> or would the anti-aircraft guns cater to the bombers? Trading bombers for dug in AA guns doesn't seem to be a good economic balance.



Germans have had tens of thousands AAA pieces by 1943 and further, yet that did not stop Allies to use their air forces to a devastating effect. 



> Especially if you are leaving the gun and ammunition factories total unhindered to make good their losses.



By what time the effects of strategic bombing were taking dent to the AAA it's ammo factories?


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> Eg. B-17 was produced in 4000 copies before 1943 - so 7000-8000 2-engined planes could've been produced AND put into usage well before eg. invasion of Sicily. Almost same number of B-24s, for the same math - making cca 15 000 new 2-engined bombers to pound Sicily, Kursk, France, the atolls etc



You can't pound the atolls if you can't reach them. Pounding Sicily doesn't really do anything except get you into a pure war of attrition. It has little or no worth to the Axis, unless I am missing something like mines or oil fields?
I am not sure if the Germans really care if you pound France. aside from the U-boat ports and few factories around Paris you are once again in a war of attrition which the Germans can decide to participate in or not and they decide at what level. 

And as before, even if you are going to pound these closer targets do you use 2 planes carrying 3,000lbs of bombs or one 4 engine plane carrying 6,000lbs? 
How do you KNOW 2-3 years beforehand what the ranges to the desired targets are so you can produce the desired bombers and if you build ALL twin engined planes how much flexibility do you loose? the ability 2-3 years down the road to choose alternative targets.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

In other words, the bombers would lack targets in Europe/Med, within their reach? Then we are in disagreement 



> How do you KNOW 2-3 years beforehand what the ranges to the desired targets are so you can produce the desired bombers and if you build ALL twin engined planes how much flexibility do you loose? the ability 2-3 years down the road to choose alternative targets.



The military theorists have had many ideas for the upcoming wars, from grand strategies down to what rifle caliber would be ideal. Many times the failed, either partially or completely. 
We talk about a past war.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> I know that not every man can fly an aircraft, let alone to fly it efficiently in presence of enemy fire. But, if 2 men (pilot + navigator/bombardier) can fly Mosquito during night and make their presence important over German-held Europe, and live to tell about that, then there is no doubt that US could've fielded something similar.



that doesn't follow. Yes, the US could have done something similar but could the US and Britain fielded ENOUGH MORE such two man teams to make up for the thousands of heavy bombers carrying roughly twice the payload you propose taking out of service?




tomo pauk said:


> IIRC the main complain from General Kenney was that he lacked bombers, not that ones he commanded were of short range.



And what was his mix of bombers? All A-20s or did he have longer range bombers available? 




tomo pauk said:


> The targets are located just after the front line.


Where is the front line in the Pacific?

As an example in 1941 in the Philippians the B-17s had the ability to fly to Formosa and bomb the Japanese airfields with 4,000lb loads anywhere on the island. They didn't but A-20s in the same position would have been able to reach only 1/2 of Formosa while carrying 1000lb loads. 
Are enemy airfields that are supporting planes bombing your ships, troops and airfields in the front line?




tomo pauk said:


> Trying to use planes to get in fast and at high alt, make shallow dive and pepper enemy from lower altitude would've worked just fine.



Why don't we salt them too or use other spices?

The original idea of the turbo charged aircraft was to fly higher than the effective ceiling of the AA guns. Granted the higher speed and changing altitude complicates the firing control solution but giving the guns more time to fire and allowing more guns to shoot at you doesn't seem the best way to go about it. If you are not bombing by night you have to out dive the fighters. If you are bombing by night accuracy is going to suck. 
this technique seems to be fine for nuisance raids but for actually doing a lot of damage per airplane it doesn't have that great a record. Your bomb aimer (if you are even using one) has that much less time to acquire the target and do his job. 




tomo pauk said:


> 2 x 1200 HP, zero issues, more survivability.


Vs what? Up to 2 X 1600Hp in later P-38s. B-24s had zero issues with their engines? Some P-38 issues were with the turbo controls, those go away if you keep the same turbos but change engines? Some early P-38s were lost because only one engine had a generator. Loose that engine the electric controlled props screw up. if you don't fit dual generators to your R-1830 powered plane you haven't solved that problem. I could go on but perhaps this should have thread of it's own? 





tomo pauk said:


> Germans have had tens of thousands AAA pieces by 1943 and further, yet that did not stop Allies to use their air forces to a devastating effect.


Many of those tens of thousands were 20mm and 37mm were they not? 
Not much good against high flyers but just the ticket for those diving attacks




tomo pauk said:


> By what time the effects of strategic bombing were taking dent to the AAA it's ammo factories?



We don't really know do we?

We do know when production actually dropped but we don't know when production didn't increase as much as it might have without bombing. 

As an example the Supermarine factory at Southampton was destroyed in a bombing raid but production of Spitfires didn't actually drop because the new factory at Castle Bromwich was coming on line at the time. If the Southampton factory hadn't been hit how many more Spitfires would have built in the few months after the raid? 

Because production of Spitfires didn't actually decrease does that mean the Southampton raid was totally useless?


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> In other words, the bombers would lack targets in Europe/Med, within their reach? Then we are in disagreement



They lack targets that would force the Luftwaffe to fight to defend them. Giving the advantage to the Luftwaffe.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2010)

I doubt that Luftwaffe would be sitting aside while enemy air forces are tearing apart German units installations. Including LW airbases.


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## Civettone (Nov 30, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> Kris, I think your comments hold true for the latter stages of the war, where Germany was suffering from crippling manpower shortages. But German pilots early in the war, like their counterparts in the other belligerent nations were very highly trained. While the Nazi leadership and it's apparatchiks may have trumpeted the virtues of the Aryan warrior, the commanders of the armed forces, for the most part, understood that excellently trained and motivated men with top-class equipment are what win wars. In this they were simply continuing a tradition going right back to the Prussian armed forces. It was also reflected in the German approach to war-fighting. Blitzkrieg was not a philosophy based on elan and Aryan vigour, but an extremely carefully thought-out means to bring overwhelming force to bear at critical points. You need trained thinkers, not zealous berserkers, to make that work.


That is only partially true. Especially the Blitzkrieg principle is really not that innovative. 
But I am glad you know that the German early-war pilot was not better than his allied or axis counterpart. In fact, already in the beginning of the war training was cut short or suspended because of political orders higher up. Tactics were however superior. 

The German military of the early war years was not that formidable as often portrayed. It was succesful because of allied shortcomings. One can read several accounts of Germans in battle who were dumb struck by allied mistakes. This went on until 1942 in the West and until the very end in the East.

And one more thing, the commanders may have known that training was essential. But as soon as a nazi leader gave an order, it was followed. And most of these orders were idiotic by nature. 

One can only wonder what a German WW1 leadership could have achieved in WW2.
Kris


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## Civettone (Nov 30, 2010)

parsifal said:


> In the case of Britain the alternative.... a continental land based strategy based on a mass ground army, was simply not a feasible option. Even as it stood, with just 13 divisions in the frontline in Europe in 19844, the British suffered such acute manpower shortages, that wholsale unit disbandments were the norm rather than the exception. This explains a lot behind Monty's caution....every man lost was a man lost for good, with little possibility fore replacement. Britiain determiined from the outbreak of the war that she simply could not field a mass army, and suffer the same casualty rates as had been sustained 20 years earlier. The 55000 aircrew lost during WWII pale into insignificance compared to the 2 million casualties suffered in the battlefields of France. The British lacked the resources to do that, AND fight a modern war of machines and production. They rightly chose the development of a strategic bomber force, to hit the germans in the only way possible. They courted, and succeeded in forming a grand alliance with the Russians and the Americans, to defeat evil.


I think you are mistaking. 
The British disbanded units which had suffered losses and combined them together with new recruits into new units. Meanwhile Germans would simply withdraw a badly mauled unit and put replacements in them. Heck, even totally lost units (hell, even the 6th Armee) were recreated. 
The British decision to focus on strategic bombing was taken BEFORE Douhet's publication. They were planning a 1000 bomber raid on Germany in 1919! As often is the case, decisions are reactions to what the opposite comes up with. Why did the Germans focus on tanks? Because they were caught with their pants down back in WW1. Likewise, the British reacted heavily on the Zeppelin raids which completely terrorized them, as incredible this may sound today. The damage done was very limited compared to what happened in 1940. 
And final point, the British had 48 million inhabitants while Germany had 80 million. It is only natural that you would try to stretch your manpower resources. So of course you would equip your divisions with as much artillery and tanks as your industry could produce. Only natural and no point to make huge psycho-social explanations about it.

Kris


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## BikerBabe (Nov 30, 2010)

The Allies and the russians??? *blonde look*


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 30, 2010)

"... The Allies and the russians??? "

Out of the mouths of Babes .... 

MM


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## tail end charlie (Nov 30, 2010)

drgondog said:


> For Tail End Charlie -
> 
> Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..
> 
> The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk



There are many quotes there from people under interrogation.

consider Goerings quotes. 

He was the head of the Luftwaffe and second in command of the German Millitary.

In 1944 he had seen Germany kicked out of Africa, kicked out of the mediterranian, lose the battle of the Atlantic, advance to Moscow Leningrad and Stalingrad and the Caucasus but seize nothing and then retreat he was on the brink of losing Belaruss and Rumania but what really really gripped his mind was a mustang over Berlin. 

On the eastern front Germany lost approximately 5 million men killed and a similar number wounded taken prisoner a vast number of tanks self propelled guns and a fantastic number of trucks and supplies but what gripped Goering was a single engined fighter. Germany lost the war in europe as soon as they failed to take Britain or Russia at the first go, what followed was the inevitable demise throuh lack of resources.

Hitler and Goering and most of their cohorts never realised the war they were in. Even in the battle of Britain the RAF was able to replace losses quicker than the LF and what did Hitler do? pick a fight with Russia.

The LW completely destroyed the soviet airforce during Barberrossa and throughout the eastern war had considerable success but it didnt actually matter because Russia was out producing Germany in tanks guns and aeroplanes.

As far as the oil plan goes, Russia won the first battle when it stopped germany reaching the Caucasus, Germany was always short of fuel. While advancing they had to stop to re supply but while retreating they lost huge reserves of fuel. (I learned that on my CSE history project)

You ask for my credentials, what books I have read, well I have read a lot. I am in France at present and the latest book which I brought with me is "Lancaster" by Leo McKinstry. It is described by the daily telegraph as "excellent". Describing the bombing campaign it goes into the far end of a smelly fart about the various merits of daylight and night time bombing about targets and aims and achievements but it rarely mentions the war in the east.
It is clearly against Harris and clearly for the Oil and Transport plan.
One line does mention the war in the east which says planned raids by lancasters on Belaruss were shelved when it was over run by the Russians. No doubt if the raids took place they would have been a triumph for the "oil plan" but since the country was over run by the Russians it doesnt count.
This is typical of post war history there are no "facts" just a miasma of numbers, in the same book it states the latest survey of deaths at Dresden (in 2004) were 18,000 whereas I have read other accounts that state upto 75,000. I dont know how anyone can investigate such an event so long after but hey, he was getting paid. I presume the figures he produced satisfied his sponsors, previous sponsors wanted high numbers lately the fashion is to lower them.

Germany started to run severely short of oil when they were really on the back foot after Kurk the situation became critical when they lost Belaruss and oil supplies dried up completely when Rumania was overrun. The Luftwaffe played very little part in this

A similar attitude exists for the transport plan. The bombing campaign claims 2,400 locomotives destroyed. The French resistance claim they destroyed 1,800. Congratulations all round except when you add the two together and then accept there were still locomotives in service you wonder what else was in the marshalling yards except locomotives. I have never ever read how you destroy a marshalling yard any way it is a piece of flat land with pieces of steel laid on it, any "destroyed" marshalling yard can be back in service within a week at maximum.


Re write history at your own peril Hitler committed suicide and the war in Europe ended when Berlin fell to the Soviet Army not to an airforce the LW was by that time irrelevant. The Pacific war ended when the emperor ordered the military to stop fighting and surrender, if Japan had a fruit cake like Hitler in charge then the USA may have had to keep bombing until the early 1950s.


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## Milosh (Nov 30, 2010)

I would say it would take more than a few days to repairs this damage.


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## syscom3 (Dec 1, 2010)

Milosh said:


> I would say it would take more than a few days to repairs this damage.



Actually, the Germans were able to repair rail line damage quite quickly [in Germany proper].

The destruction or damage of the engines caused the most grief, but that was only temporary. At most that method only introduced inefficiencies into their industrial and manufacturing production.


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## Milosh (Dec 1, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> Actually, the Germans were able to repair rail line damage quite quickly [in Germany proper].
> 
> The destruction or damage of the engines caused the most grief, but that was only temporary. At most that method only introduced inefficiencies into their industrial and manufacturing production.



Rail lines are not marshaling yards.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 1, 2010)

"... if Japan had a fruit cake like Hitler in charge then the USA may have had to keep bombing until the early 1950s."

That's true. Good to have you back in the schoolyard TEC .

MM


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## Nikademus (Dec 1, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Germany started to run severely short of oil when they were really on the back foot after Kurk the situation became critical when they lost Belaruss and oil supplies dried up completely when Rumania was overrun. The Luftwaffe played very little part in this



Even sooner according to David Glantz. As early as Oct 41, the German economy and war machine began falling short of it's petroleum needs, forcing them to pressure the Romanians to increase their contributions. Capturing the oil reserves of the Soviet Union was the major goal of Case Blau. (target region contained 80% of USSR's oil output).


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## bobbysocks (Dec 1, 2010)

originally quoted by TEC..."if Japan had a fruit cake like Hitler in charge then the USA may have had to keep bombing until the early 1950s. "

if bombing was done with nothing but conventional ordnance perhaps. but i dont think it would have gone that long. a year .....or two maybe. the duration would have depended upon how fast A-bombs could be produced and that would have depended the resources needed to do that. i do not know what the us abilities were at that time. but if the us would have been able to produce them sufficiently to any degree i believe curtis lemay's axiom of "bombing them back to the stone age" would have been the adopted strategy resulting in a fewer allied losses but a tremendous loss of japanese lives. and then russia would have jumped in at the very end to claim their piece of the prize.


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## pbfoot (Dec 1, 2010)

Just some musing on this topic I don't deny fpr a moment that the USAAF delivered the knockout blow to the LW in 44 but it not the same LW as it was from 39-43 . The LW IMHO had been getting weaker and weaker not in aircraft but in the skill sets of its aircrew . 5 years of combat against Fighter Command , Red AF , Bomber Command , Coastal Command had to have taken a major toll .


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## Milosh (Dec 1, 2010)

> The Pacific war ended when the emperor ordered the military to stop fighting and surrender, if Japan had a fruit cake like Hitler in charge then the USA may have had to keep bombing until the early 1950s.



Not likely as the Japanese were being hit harder, and suffered more, than the Germans.

USSBS - Pacific

United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)


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## HealzDevo (Dec 1, 2010)

Totally possible, as Japan is a series of islands with a lot of natural fortresses which would have kept out invasion. As for the atomic bomb, until the Los Alamos test it wasn't even sure that it would work. Nobody knew or could predict the effects. Even today we are still learning about that particular genie...


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## drgondog (Dec 1, 2010)

pbfoot said:


> Just some musing on this topic I don't deny fpr a moment that the USAAF delivered the knockout blow to the LW in 44 but it not the same LW as it was from 39-43 . The LW IMHO had been getting weaker and weaker not in aircraft but in the skill sets of its aircrew . 5 years of combat against Fighter Command , Red AF , Bomber Command , Coastal Command had to have taken a major toll .



We tend to think of LW as only German fighter pilots and forget that the Finns and Hungarians and Rumanians and Italians furnished a lot of skilled pilots - enabling the LW to re shuffle the deck from East, North and South to battle the Allies over Germany (mostly USAAF).


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## drgondog (Dec 1, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> There are many quotes there from people under interrogation.
> 
> consider Goerings quotes.
> 
> ...



I'm not re-writing anything. Point out any factual errors in my comments and i will ponder my miscues.


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## Vacca (Dec 2, 2010)

I believe the war would have ended much sooner (despite Hitler's blunders earlier on, and even his massive blunder in attacking Russia) if Japan had opted to go with the original plan of attacking Russia jointly, instead of independently attacking America. While the US would probably still have entered the war at some stage (Roosevelt was looking for a way in), a two sided attack on Russia would have decimated that country in short order and might even have led to the US being defeated (if they had entered under those circumstances).


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## Gixxerman (Dec 2, 2010)

Milosh said:


> I would say it would take more than a few days to repairs this damage.



I've often wondered just what they did do with that sort of damage and how the hell do you fix it quickly?
I've recently been reading that the large bombs used in the mix have an effect on the ground making it mushy and ruin it's normal ability to take load/weight and the ground has to be reinforced and packed down to return to a usable state.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 2, 2010)

Gixxerman said:


> I've often wondered just what they did do with that sort of damage and how the hell do you fix it quickly?
> I've recently been reading that the large bombs used in the mix have an effect on the ground making it mushy and ruin it's normal ability to take load/weight and the ground has to be reinforced and packed down to return to a usable state.



You can temporarily fill craters and replace the rails but your right the ground needs to be consolidated for it to be a proper job. Probably what they did was throw as much rubble in to the crater as they could and top it off with ballast. Then as the fill settled they would have to add to and repack the ballast under the rails to try and keep the rails level. This could go on for months and need repacking daily depending on traffic frequency and speed, speed is the real damager to rail beds. Fixing damage to rails can be repaired surprisingly quickly but needs large quantities of men and materials, the faster the fix the more remedial work required.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 2, 2010)

@Vacca: "... a two sided attack on Russia would have decimated that country in short order ..."

I wouldn't be too sure of that if I were you .

Stalin didn't call up his reserves from Siberia until the thrust began to diminish in front of Moscow. They were seasoned troops out there - fresh off of Zhukov's successful campaign June-Sept '39. They would love to have tackled the Japanese again .

If Japan had _waited_ until the Siberian troops were committed to Moscow, and _then _attacked Russia - they would have been attacking in December-January '41-'42. Hardly campaigning weather in Siberia.

Japan was totally bush-whacked by the USSR in 1939 - they had no idea how impressive Soviet industrial capability was - and they weren't looking for a Round Two. On the other hand, they thought that the USA might "stagger" after Dec 7, '42. Wrong again.

MM


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## tomo pauk (Dec 2, 2010)

Engaging Russia while still having to pacifise China would be a major task for Japan. Plus, it would mean IJN being mostly inactive - not something IJN brass would want.


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## syscom3 (Dec 2, 2010)

Milosh said:


> Rail lines are not marshaling yards.



"rail lines" means everything inclusive to rail transport.

The German method of repair was simple and fast. Bring in as many forced laborers as required to fill in the craters and fix the main lines coming into the rail yards. Then fix the other tracks as needed.

That picture you provided, could have had the main lines in operation within a day, and the whole thing repaired within a few days more.


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## Milosh (Dec 3, 2010)

_Although prior to September 1944, there had been sporadic attacks on the German transportation system, no serious deterioration in its ability to handle traffic was identified by the Survey. The vastly heavier attacks in September and October 1944 on marshalling yards, bridges, lines, and on train movements, produced a serious disruption in traffic over all of western Germany. Freight car loadings, which were approximately 900,000 cars for the Reich as a whole in the week ending August 19 fell to 700,000 cars in the last week of October. There was some recovery in early November, but thereafter they declined erratically to 550,000 cars in the week ending December 23 and to 214,000 cars during the week ending March 3. Thereafter the disorganization was so great that no useful statistics were kept._

USSBS

It would seem the Germans couldn't keep up with repairing the damage.


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## BombTaxi (Dec 3, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> "rail lines" means everything inclusive to rail transport.
> 
> The German method of repair was simple and fast. Bring in as many forced laborers as required to fill in the craters and fix the main lines coming into the rail yards. Then fix the other tracks as needed.
> 
> That picture you provided, could have had the main lines in operation within a day, and the whole thing repaired within a few days more.



Hmm... The rail lines are smashed. The city streets are blocked with rubble and craters. How do you bring the labourers in? How do you remove the smashed railcars and locomotives? How long does it take to level the ground again? Where do you get the specialists to supervise the work? How, once the tracks are fixed, do you replace the lost locos and cars? And what happens to traffic that needs to use the route while the damage is being repaired?

I think a few days is both naive and overly simplistic...


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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2010)

Vacca said:


> I believe the war would have ended much sooner (despite Hitler's blunders earlier on, and even his massive blunder in attacking Russia) if Japan had opted to go with the original plan of attacking Russia jointly, instead of independently attacking America. While the US would probably still have entered the war at some stage (Roosevelt was looking for a way in), a two sided attack on Russia would have decimated that country in short order and might even have led to the US being defeated (if they had entered under those circumstances).



Why do you think this would be possible? The only way japan could muster enough logistic support to even consider attacking the Russians in Siberia, would be to undertake an extensive withdrawal from China. They might coneivably pull out of mainland China,retaining control of Manchuria. This would free up some ground troops, but it would also mean allowing the Chinese the ability to recover their lost territories, and gain access to the all important seaports. The Japanese would need to draw on all their air resources, which means the allies would be free to re-equip the rejuvenated Chinese. The Japaese would go to war, conceivably in 1941, with the germans, with about 20 divs in their offensive. Their first order of priority would be to capture Vladivostock, which in 1941 was one of the most thoroughly fortified positions in the world. They would be battling approximately twice as many russians as themselves, who had already shown themselves to be superior to the Japanese in ground fighting in 1939....these are not your untrained chaff, they are the Siberians....the toughest soldiers on earth at that time, and subsequaently able to defeat the Germans at Moscow. The best troopps on earth, in fortified positions, and outnumbering their opponents, who have the added disadvantage of attacking....you do the math.


Still confident that the japanese can defeat the Soviets in the far East????


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## riacrato (Dec 3, 2010)

Best troops on earth? I think it takes a bit more than being "tough" to qualify.


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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2010)

riacrato said:


> Best troops on earth? I think it takes a bit more than being "tough" to qualify.



They defeated the cream of the German army whom prior to that point had carried just about every action in their favour. The only exception I can think are the Australians at Tobruk.

Your right though, it takes more than toughness to be the best soldiers. Evidently the the Siberians possessed whatever it took to achieve that


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## riacrato (Dec 3, 2010)

"They" were hardly the only Soviet force participating. But I get the picture:

Germany has 2nd largest GDP = Germany must've been able to build more tanks than USSR
Defeating certain Wehrmacht units = best troop on earth

Your way of getting a point across is gross oversimplifications and now you add macho-talk to it, have fun with that.


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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2010)

riacrato said:


> "They" were hardly the only Soviet force participating. But I get the picture:
> 
> Germany has 2nd largest GDP = Germany must've been able to build more tanks than USSR
> Defeating certain Wehrmacht units = best troop on earth
> ...



Basically you are getting the picture. Napoleon once said simplicity is the mother of military success. Trying to cloud issues with irrelevant details is a convenient way of avoiding the truth I would suggest.

These are the facts...germany possessed one of the largest economies in the world at that time, and still does. She has enjoyed that position in the world stage since approximately 1880.

The Germans possessed the strongest miliary force in 1939, except perhaps at sea, not because their troops were the toughest on the block, or necessarily the best trained, but really a combination of factors....equipment, doctine, espit de corps, leadership etc. They were not defeated until the Australians, and then the Russians did so. 

The Russian victory, led by the Siberians (but supported by other formations, admittedly....inthis regard you are correct, but so too were the germans supported by Italians, hungarians etc) trumped this combination by tough soldiers, well led, and equipped for the purpose and deployed with victory in their nostrils. They also had weather on their side, and advantages in numbers, but these were circumstances worked to advantage because the army using them had engineered the circumstances to their advantage, just as they had done, using different natural events, in 1939, against the Japanse. Good soldiering means using all your strengths, and all the advantages, not just believing your own proapganda about how good you are. complain all you like, the label "best troops in the world" is a combination of factors, and the Russian Siberians can validly lay claim to that title in 1941. The Germans cannot.


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## syscom3 (Dec 3, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> Hmm... The rail lines are smashed. The city streets are blocked with rubble and craters. How do you bring the labourers in? How do you remove the smashed railcars and locomotives? How long does it take to level the ground again? Where do you get the specialists to supervise the work? How, once the tracks are fixed, do you replace the lost locos and cars? And what happens to traffic that needs to use the route while the damage is being repaired?
> 
> I think a few days is both naive and overly simplistic...



Bring the laborers in on the undamaged tracks coming into the city. Give them shovels and some threats. And watch how well they can clear things up. And a couple of bulldozers can fill in the craters without difficulty.

Specialists are needed? Why do you suppose the Germans did not have specialists?

Replacing lost rail cars and loco's? The Germans never were short of them considering they had stolen all they could need from the occupied territories.

As for the damaged rail stock needing to be removed; nothing sophisticated about using cranes to move them out of the way as the mains are repaired. Done all the time with derailed rail cars in peacetime.

And the transport system being shutdown while repairs are needed? You can reroute the trains, but that entails adding traffic to an already congested network. That causes inefficiencies. But it only lasts a few days so its not a crippling type of loss.


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## Civettone (Dec 4, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Why do you think this would be possible? The only way japan could muster enough logistic support to even consider attacking the Russians in Siberia, would be to undertake an extensive withdrawal from China. They might coneivably pull out of mainland China,retaining control of Manchuria. This would free up some ground troops, but it would also mean allowing the Chinese the ability to recover their lost territories, and gain access to the all important seaports. The Japanese would need to draw on all their air resources, which means the allies would be free to re-equip the rejuvenated Chinese. The Japaese would go to war, conceivably in 1941, with the germans, with about 20 divs in their offensive. Their first order of priority would be to capture Vladivostock, which in 1941 was one of the most thoroughly fortified positions in the world. They would be battling approximately twice as many russians as themselves, who had already shown themselves to be superior to the Japanese in ground fighting in 1939....these are not your untrained chaff, they are the Siberians....the toughest soldiers on earth at that time, and subsequaently able to defeat the Germans at Moscow. The best troopps on earth, in fortified positions, and outnumbering their opponents, who have the added disadvantage of attacking....you do the math.
> 
> 
> Still confident that the japanese can defeat the Soviets in the far East????


How horribly simplistic? In 1939 the Russians had a 2:1 superiority in manpower. In 1942 the Japanese had a 2:1 average. 
Just look at a map please ... 8) Cut the railroads near Mongolia and you have the Vladivostok peninsula by the balls. Then you can take the northern Kuris island and start exploiting the oil fields there.

Kris


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## parsifal (Dec 4, 2010)

Civettone said:


> How horribly simplistic? In 1939 the Russians had a 2:1 superiority in manpower. In 1942 the Japanese had a 2:1 average.
> Just look at a map please ... 8) Cut the railroads near Mongolia and you have the Vladivostok peninsula by the balls. Then you can take the northern Kuris island and start exploiting the oil fields there.
> 
> Kris



Cutting the transsiberian railway would have virtually no effect. Vladisvostock was the base of the far eastern military district, and was supplied for something like 5 years for a garrison of ovewr 200000 men. It was fully supported by the Industrial combines of the Far Eastern Command....such as the great tank factories at Kharbarovsk.

Cutting the rail line is no easy feat either. The majority of the border on the northern flank of Manchiria, had the obstacle of the Amur River, several mountain ranges and and swamps. The japanese might be able to march to the line, then what????? Thery are faced with forces from the east and the west, a river that is one of the major rivers of the world, and unbridged. The Japanese wo0uld be unsupplied, cut off and isolated. they would be fighting an enmy superior in strength and well supplied. It doesnt need to be anything other than simplistic to work out what happens there.

As for being outnumbered....untrue. The Russians were able to pull out a force of around 50 Divs in December 1941, and still retain a modicum of forces in the far East to keep an eye on the japanese. Im not sure how many troops were retained in the far east after Typhoon, but I have read somewhere it was of the order of 200K troops. From June to December 1941, the Russians probably had in the order of 80-100 Divs, against which the Japanese might be able to field 20 or 25. 

Bush bashing across the trackless wasteands to "cut the trans-siberian railway would have achieved nothing. The rail line was not a supply line...the region was an autonomous military district. It would have just hastened the defeat of the Japanese even quicker. 

nearly fs shared border


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## Shortround6 (Dec 4, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> Bring the laborers in on the undamaged tracks coming into the city. Give them shovels and some threats. And watch how well they can clear things up. And a couple of bulldozers can fill in the craters without difficulty.



Bring in laborers instead of food for the people already there? Instead of parts or raw materials for the factories that are left? Bring in anything takes up space on the rails that you need to "by pass" the damaged marshaling yard.



syscom3 said:


> Specialists are needed? Why do you suppose the Germans did not have specialists?


 The Germans had them, they just didn't have enough of them. Nobody did. Specialist were in short supply trying to maintain the rail systems as it was without large scale bomb damage. 
Track wears with use, roadbeds washout or settle in normal use. Wartime, heavy traffic accelerates the wear and settling. The specialists (with their unskilled helpers/laborers) are stretched thin trying to maintain what they have without it being blown up. 


syscom3 said:


> Replacing lost rail cars and loco's? The Germans never were short of them considering they had stolen all they could need from the occupied territories.


 Since even the US was short of rail cars and locomotives during war I don't think the Germans had anywhere near enough. And the "stolen" locomotives and rolling stock were needed in the areas of Europe they originated in as long as the Germans held those areas. As they were pushed back and the area shrank they might get some benefit but again, These locomotives and rolling stock needed maintenance, they wore out and needed repairs and refits. Foreign equipment, being non-standard (just like all the captured trucks) presented a challenge to keep running. 


syscom3 said:


> As for the damaged rail stock needing to be removed; nothing sophisticated about using cranes to move them out of the way as the mains are repaired. Done all the time with derailed rail cars in peacetime.


You are right, it is not sophisticated, but again, the peace time need for cranes and operators and riggers for derailments is a tiny fraction of the what is needed for a marshalling yard that was the target of a major bombing raid. How many 100 ton and above cranes do you think any major rail route had on hand before the war? 
How many heavy cranes do you think got built after the war started?
You also have to repair the rails as you go. You have to repair the rails/roadbed to get the crane/s to the first big object to be moved, move it, repair the next few dozen or hundred yards of track, move the crane, move the next car or cars or locomotive, repair more track, move crane again and repeat, over and over. Most peacetime derailments only involve a few cars or a dozen, not hundreds. Most peacetime derailments leave a parallel undamaged track for the cranes to work from. 



syscom3 said:


> And the transport system being shutdown while repairs are needed? You can reroute the trains, but that entails adding traffic to an already congested network. That causes inefficiencies. But it only lasts a few days so its not a crippling type of loss.



This is true if it is a mainline piece of track that is cut. It is easy to repair and there are usually alternate routes. Marshaling yards are another story. They are hubs where many lines meet. Alternate routes may require many hours of addition travel time. Marshalling yards are also were trains are formed up or broken up for movement. A train may come in from point "A" with 50 cars carrying 10 different types of cargo bound for 12 different locations. The marshalling yard is where this train and others like are broken up and reformed so the cars destined for point "B" are all put in one train and all the cars for point "C" are put in another train and so on. Rerouting around the destroyed yard doesn't get the distribution done and leads to major disruption in the efficiency of the railway in that area. 

Both the American and British rail systems were in worse physical shape in 1945 than they were in 1939 in both railbed/rails/bridges and in rolling stock/motive power. While total capacity had increased the infrastructure had not been maintained to prewar standards and much of the rolling stock/motive power was on borrowed time. 
That is without being bombed.


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## Civettone (Dec 4, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Cutting the transsiberian railway would have virtually no effect. Vladisvostock was the base of the far eastern military district, and was supplied for something like 5 years for a garrison of ovewr 200000 men. It was fully supported by the Industrial combines of the Far Eastern Command....such as the great tank factories at Kharbarovsk.
> 
> Cutting the rail line is no easy feat either. The majority of the border on the northern flank of Manchiria, had the obstacle of the Amur River, several mountain ranges and and swamps. The japanese might be able to march to the line, then what????? Thery are faced with forces from the east and the west, a river that is one of the major rivers of the world, and unbridged. The Japanese wo0uld be unsupplied, cut off and isolated. they would be fighting an enmy superior in strength and well supplied. It doesnt need to be anything other than simplistic to work out what happens there.
> 
> ...


Parsifal, you have a wrong idea about the Russian military in the Far East during the war. The Russians were on the brink of collapse in 1941 and they stripped the forces in the East to fight the Germans. The divisions were paper divisions, usually at regiment strength and equiped with no modern tanks, no heavy artillery and other obsolete weapons. Sure, you can keep all the forces there but then there is nothing left to stop the Germans in the West.

Again, the Japanese were outnumbered 2:1 at Khalkin Gol and they inflicted more casualties than they received. The total Japanese defeat is not backed up by the casualty numbers. The Soviets suffered horrible losses even with a Japanese army surrounded! And in 1941/1942 the Japanese would outnumber the Soviets 2:1. Do the math 

_Stavka directives #170149 and #170150 issued 16 march 1942 for the Far East fronts clearly show what kind of war Soviet Command expected in the case of Japanese attack. Far East troops should do their best to wear down Japanese in fortified regions during first 7-10 days of war,"defend at all costs" several key positions deep in the soviet territory until reinforcements arrive._
This clearly shows that the Japanese were expected to penetrate deep into Soviet territory. This also means that the railroads would also be cut. And how can you expect to receive reinforcements when the railroads are cut?

Kris


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## parsifal (Dec 4, 2010)

Civettone said:


> Parsifal, you have a wrong idea about the Russian military in the Far East during the war. The Russians were on the brink of collapse in 1941 and they stripped the forces in the East to fight the Germans. The divisions were paper divisions, usually at regiment strength and equiped with no modern tanks, no heavy artillery and other obsolete weapons. Sure, you can keep all the forces there but then there is nothing left to stop the Germans in the West.
> 
> Again, the Japanese were outnumbered 2:1 at Khalkin Gol and they inflicted more casualties than they received. The total Japanese defeat is not backed up by the casualty numbers. The Soviets suffered horrible losses even with a Japanese army surrounded! And in 1941/1942 the Japanese would outnumber the Soviets 2:1. Do the math
> 
> ...




Hi Kris

The hypothetical posed the question that Japan attack Russia instead of independantly attacking the western allies. The assumption here is that Japan not sign the non-agressiuon pact, or break it, and that they attack in concert with the Germans in June 1941.

Throughout 1941, the Soviets maintained a strong military presence in the Far East, until they were absolutely sure that the Japanese were not going to attack. Once they did work out they were not under threat, Zhukov and his army, were trasported to the west. This was a movement of approximately 300000 men and their equipment, it took approximately 3 months to complete (available rolling stock was the main reason for the slower movement of troops in 1941 compared to 1945, plus in 1945 it was only a movement of personnel that occurred, the troops transferred in '45 were re-equipped from local factories). 

However it is wrong to suggest that the defences were completely denuded after the movements to the west in the last quarter of 1941. 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts immediately raised levies to replace those troops that had been transferred. The records I have show the Soviet Far eastern forces at about 1.2 million men, dropping to 0.9 by November, and then returning to just over 1 million men in the first quarter of 1942. thereafter the figures remained remarkably static, though I am fairly certain that the properly trained elements would on a routine basis be shipped west. There were fluctuating numbers of aircraft, but a typical figure was around 2500 aircraft at any given time, except in the fall and winter of 1941 and early 1942, when it was about a thord of that total. 

The reason that such strong forces were maintained in the east was primarily because Stalin was paranoid about a two front war, (and hence the existence of the Stavka directives you refer to....issued incidentally at a time the far Eastern Garrisons were at their weakest....esentially "what do we do until the forces are replaced???" You omit some important supplements from these directives, incidentally, about how and the timing of the raising of those replacements), and as a consequence, never let his force levels in that theatr drop too low. There was never any time when the Japanese forces achieved a 2:1 majority, I'd like to know your source for that claim for verification. Mine is principally a book I have called "The Soviet War Against Japan" It may be argued that if they could reinforce Manchuria from China they would reach a 2:1 advantage, but it never happened historically. 

By early 1945, before the big transfer of personnel occured there were just over a million troops in the Far East, organized into 32 Rifle Divs, 12 Infantry Brigades, 8 Tank Brigades two Tank and one Mech Corps. Against this number the japanese had 1.2 million men, organized into 40 Inf, 7 Cav 23 Independant brigades and 2 armoured brigades. The Japanese maintained a force of about 1200 aircraft throughout the war, though again they would temporaily increase this by another 500-1000 if China were abandoned.

Your claims about Khalkin Gol do not accord to my main sources. In this case I rely on the book "Dirty Little Secrets of WW 2" by Dunningan and Nofi
and an article writen by a colleague of theirs, Richard Berg some years earlier in "Strategy Tactics"According to these sources, the Soviets were initially outnumbered by about 3:1 by the attacking Japanese, However as the Soviets poured additional troops into the battle, the balance did tip in their favour, such that in the finish about 70000 men were used to encircle 40000 Japanese troops. What isnt included in this is that the Japanese were pouring another 3 divs into the battle, or about an additional 50-60000 men. For an offensive operation, an advantager of 3:1 is the normal advantage needed. The Soviets when on the defensive were outnumbered about 3:1, and when on the attack, they outnumbered the Japanese by about 70/40. Thats not even 2:1, and well short of the idel 3:1 generally regarded as necessaary for an offensive. 

In terms of casualties, there is no evidence I know of that the Soviets were slaughtered. The sources I quoted report total Japanese caulaties at 18000 killed or wounded, with another 3000 captured. Total casualties were therefore about 22000 Japanese. On the Soviet side, there were 23000 casualties, killed or wounded (8000 dead, 15000 wounded) . Soviets taken prisoner were never reported, but if we assume a similar or lesser number to the japanese (on the basis that the Soviets maintained resistance and were not forced to surrender), Soviet losses are likely to be in the order of 25000. Thats hardly a one sided massacre. In the air, the Soviets appear to have achieved pretty credible reults as well, far from the usual one sided massacres claimed in most western accounts (which are exclusively based on Japanese claims). 

One thing worth noting is that with no attack on the west the Far east will receive unfettered reinfocement and re-supply from the allies. Japan historically was scrupulous in not attacking Rusian flagged Lend lease ships headed for Vladivostock. In this scenario, i think it reasonable to assume they would observe the same to neutral allied shipping, given the Japanese had not attacked the allies as originally posed


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## Civettone (Dec 4, 2010)

Parsifal, I was already under the impression you were believing this kind of data. I have seen it too but it is Soviet propaganda. Recent research has shown that the figures were inflated. Official Soviet figures are 1.2 million soldiers. In reality 350.000 would have been closer to the truth.

And you are nitpicking on Khalkin Gol. Or you didnt't understand what I said. So one more time, the Soviets outnumbered the Japanese 2:1 (or 70k vs 40k as you said) but still, the Russians received more losses than the Japanese. That's even more impressive if one considers that a Japanese army was encircled and 'destroyed'. With Soviets down from 1.2 million to 350.000 one can consider that the Japanese would have been a lot more succesful.

Also be careful when using the 3:1 advantage, this is mainly an American (or Anglosax) premise which is overly simplistic. Most major military victories in history did not follow this 3:1 ratio. 

Lastly, I think we were talking about how the Japanese would invade Russia instead of attacking the US. That doesn't mean they would attack on June 22. In fact, that would have been illogical given the German-Japanese cooperation. The Japs were not informed until very late, probably because of security reasons. The Japanese would have to decide to attack the SU after June 22, probably after seeing the immense German successes in the first weeks. This would mean that the Russians would already be hard pressed when the Japanese attack them in their rear. 

And the Germans attacked any ship that supplied England. I don't see any reason why the Japanese wouldn't. In fact, given the complete Japanese naval superiority, it could simply stop, inspect and send back any ship coming into Russian waters. Just look at what Israel does with ships heading to Gaza.

Kris


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2010)

Hi Kris

You'll need to quote your sources if you want your claims of Soviet propagandsa to be taken seriously. Saying "Oh thats just Soviet propaganda....new research shows it to be false!!" is fine but you need to back that up. The claim lacks any veracity without sources, and can only be treated with a large amount of disbelief until it can be verified. Ive given you my sources, which you appear to dismiss, without even bothering to check them. I would suggest you need to provide some basis for the claims you make, in order to be taken seriously. The sources I have quoted are fairly recent, and are usually pretty reliable. There are other sources that tend to back that up as well.

I dont think I am nitpicking by corecting your statements about the force ratios. In the first place, it was the Soviets who were outnumbered, which tipped gradually in favour of the Soviets to around 70/40. thats still not 2:1, its 1.75:1, also it takes no account of the reserves the Japanese were preparing to send into the fight. There is nothing in your post to suggest that these figures are incorrect or overblown, and i put it to you that Soviets were conducting an offensive with the slenderest of margins in numerical advantage. that they won is, at least in part due, to the superiority of the army engaged. This was not your typical Soviet chaff, it was the best of the best, and it showed in the results.

Now, saying the 3:1 advantage is an American idea is just plain wrong. It actually originates from German sources (suggest you read Clausewitz to understand its origins). It was adopted by the Americans and the british after their experiences in WWI. It is standard material in most modern officer training manuals, and is not a uniquely American, or Anglosaxon concept at all. It was used by the French army, the German army, the italians, even the japanese (though they often ignored it), In fact 3:1 represents a rather low advantage in numbers. Generally to be successful at 3:1, there has to be some kind of force multiplier at work, like airpower, or mobility. For the German offensives in 1941, for example, they used mobility and speed to achieve typical local numerical advantages of about 6:1, plus their all arms integration and air power at the Schwerpunkt to deliver the decisive blows. During the Soviet counteroffensivesm of 1944, though the overall front advantage might be 4:1 (for example), they would usually aim for much higher concentrations or advantantages along the MLA. So an advantage of only 1.75:1 is cutting it very fine....IMO they had to be relying on some other Force multiplier to tip the balance. I think they relied on their superior armour, their supewrior artillery, and their superior Infantry to win the battle. 


So far as attacking neutral shipping, well thats one difference between the Japanese and the Germans. The germans would not hesitate to attack neutral shipping, the japanese never did. Unless the Japanese leopard is about to grow new spots, why would they behave any differently to the way they did historically. they never attacked neutral shipping entering Vladivostock (indeed, they showed a partial aversion to attacking any shipping at all really) , even when that shipping was obviously allied in reality. In this case it would be allied, but the allies to the japanese in this scenario I assume are neutral (unless you want to explore a two fron war scenario for the japanese). I think the japanese would be scrupulous in not attacking allied shipping because they would be afraid of triggering war with the "neutral" allies


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## tango35 (Dec 5, 2010)

steve51 said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> I've begun reading a book that claims the USAAF defeated the Luftwaffe, a task that no other Allied AF was capable of. The author argues that the RAF was only able to achieve temporary, local air superiority beyond England, and that the Red Air Force was even less effective at superiority. Only the USAAF had the ability to destroy the GAF. Any thoughts?
> 
> Amazon.com: Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe: The U.S. Army Air Forces Against Germany in World War II (9780811706599): Jay A. Stout: Books



To bring the thread back to the beginning :


The Luftwaffe was destroyed by allied airforces, that right; but much earlier the roots to her destrution were made by the german high command it self.
1st : The Luftwaffe especially Göring waited too long to bring a 2nd and better fighter ( Fw 190), and minimized the progress on jet technology 
2nd : Neglecting the Radar technology 
3rd : Changing through BoB the targets from airfields to cities
4th : Waiting too long to evacuate industries like oil, etc. in the underground 



Thomas


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## drgondog (Dec 5, 2010)

tango35 said:


> To bring the thread back to the beginning :
> 
> 
> The Luftwaffe was destroyed by allied airforces, that right; but much earlier the roots to her destrution were made by the german high command it self.
> ...



Thomas - thoughtful reply, but focused on actions that 'could have been taken if only we could see into the future".

Other similar discoveries 'could have been made early"
1. Speer warned Hitler and Goering that the Americans had far greater potential from a production perspective than Germany and that it was unwise to think of American Industry as only razor blades, automobiles and Hollywood movies.

2. The German High Command had no reason to fear that air superiority over Germany would be seriously challenged, particularly in daylight - and only the USAAF held to a doctrine that a Strategic Bombing force could destroy an opponents industrial capacity.

3. The German High Command believed the war would be over in the East by 1942 and England would either sue for peace or be starved out by U-Boats.

Ergo, no reason for a quantum leap in interceptor technology, no reason to continuously build and rebuild the German Fighter Force, no reason to consider allocating more precious materials (human included) toward 'Defense'.

Had Germany re-considered the wisdom of attacking the USSR, or considered the possibility of a long war - I believe they would have first secured the middle east oil fields rather than piecemeal forces to Afrika Corps and then struck for the Soviet oil fields.

But they didn't do that. They also failed to secure air superiority over England, North Africa, The Med. Conversely the RAF could not achieve air superiority over the Continent and neither could the Soviets. Thus, Stalemate in the air war and consequently high risk to attempt an invasion from the West. 

Until the 8th and 12th and 15th AF, bloodied and hurt, took the air war to Germany, took the losses, changed strategy from un-escorted heavy bombers in daylight to deploy a high performance Brit/American 'hybrid' fighter which was the equal of anything the LW had to oppose them.

Make no mistake that a commitment to the Lightning instead of the Mustang might have achieved enough destruction of the LW by June to make the Invasion a success - but that is another speculation.

(The P-38, given its priorities in the MTO and PTO was not allocated in sufficient numbers to provide target escort in Spring 1944. The 8th AF received its full allotment with the fourth and final P-38 (479th FG) in May, 1944. Far too few and too late to make a difference. Additionally the size of the P-38, its inability to chase and catch the Fw 190 and Me 109 in a dive (until ~ June, 1944) would mean many more surviving LW fighter pilots in air to air combat. The P-47 didn't get the range to be effective over middle and eastern Germany until ~ September. Net result is that the LW could more or less successfuly prosecute its strategy of avoiding US fighters and contine to hit the bombers hard over most of the critical oil and chemical refineries. Quite possibly the 8th and 15th AF would have suffered too many casualties to be politically acceptable)


In my opinion the introduction of the Mustang had two major results.

First, the P-51, combined with a large pool of fresh but experienced fighter pilots in the 8th AF, enabled a wholesale mauling of the LuftFlotte Reich single and twin engine day fighter force. This included replacements which were stripped from Ost and Sud to try to stem daylight Strategic bombing. 

Second, the footprint of the Mustangs, as well as the strategy of dropping to the deck and shooting up targets of opportunity (Rail, Barges, Airfields) placed a strain on Luftwaffe re-supply to airfields, stripped available aircraft from the operational rosters, and strained rail transport logistics. The amplified control of the air by all Allied fighter forces from France to the Netherlands set the table for complete control of daytime logistics and troop movements when the Normandy campaign started. 

Third, the threat of the strategic oil campaign was so dire that the LW had to commit to stopping it - forcing the LW to engage the Mustangs whether they wanted to or not. A losing proposition given the resources continuing to pour into ETO from America and the increasing dire air situation in the East as a result of re-inforcing LuftFlotte Reich.

I agree your points - but suggest they are more to the point of why the Luftwaffe was never as strong or technologically superior as they needed to be to maintain air superiority over an as unyet forecast threat.

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## pbfoot (Dec 5, 2010)

drgondog said:


> But they didn't do that. They also failed to secure air superiority over England, North Africa, The Med. Conversely the RAF could not achieve air superiority over the Continent and neither could the Soviets. Thus, Stalemate in the air war and consequently high risk to attempt an invasion from the West.
> 
> .


I respect your stance but disagree about the fact that Fighter Command and 2 TAF would not be able to control the skies over a channel beachhead . IMHO the LW picked and chose when a where to fight a cross channel invasion would have made that a moot point and the LW would have been forced out and into combat . Obviously neutering the LW over Germany was a better option . Portal should shoulder a huge part of the blame in respect to the fact Fighter Command lacked long range fighters as he insisited that it was impossible to have range to go hand in hand with agility and speed


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## drgondog (Dec 5, 2010)

pbfoot said:


> I respect your stance but disagree about the fact that Fighter Command and 2 TAF would not be able to control the skies over a channel beachhead . IMHO the LW picked and chose when a where to fight a cross channel invasion would have made that a moot point and the LW would have been forced out and into combat . Obviously neutering the LW over Germany was a better option . Portal should shoulder a huge part of the blame in respect to the fact Fighter Command lacked long range fighters as he insisited that it was impossible to have range to go hand in hand with agility and speed



We may be quibbling - but - RAF did not control the skies over Dieppe, nor IMO did RAF at any time prior to Normandy have the resources to defeat and maintain control over the Beach head in the face of an undiminished Luftwaffe reserve available from Germany. I agree this is only my opinion and I respect yours.

Ditto the combined TAC and Fighter Command and 8th and 9th AF - particulary in attempting to protect the shipping and movement of supplies from ship to shore - as well as securing the Allies freedom of movement during the day.

Agree on Portal. The real issue circa December 1943- January,1944 is the RAF (and LW) were approaching exhaustion - ditto USAAF Daylight Strategic Force. Several punchdrunk fighters nearing exhaustion and trying to persevere in the face of incredible losses. Further, RAF and USAAF were facing only JG2 and JG26 on the Channel - with far more fighters in reserve east of France and Holland.

In the West only the US had the reserves of fresh faces (troopers and airmen)and the US was approaching a 'pain point' even with what looked like inexhaustable resources. The bond drives in the US had reached a point of maxing out and the war was becoming almost too expensive to continue at the current pace.


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## Civettone (Dec 5, 2010)

Wow, Parsifal, that is great. Simply saying my comments lack any veracity because I didnt provide sources. 
Anyway, hstart with this Axis History Forum • View topic - Soviet Far East
(I just hope you won't dismiss it as just an internet source)

And your ratio comments are completely misplaced. You are confused about the meaning of the 3:1 superiority. You give examples of how locally a superiority has to be formed to break through the enemy lines, Schwerpunkt as the Germans called it. That is the correct way. But then you want to apply it to overall forces in an offensive. That just doesn't make sense: just look at overall forces in all major battles in WW2. Hardly ever such superiority. 70k vs 40k is actually quite high. 
I often read about this misuse of the 3:1 ratio in American (and British?) opinions/posts.

And about neutral shipping, you are also not thinking it through, sorry for saying. The Japanese were not at war with the Russians and had no cause to attack neutral ships supplying the Russians. In fact, there was little neutral ships to destroy in Japanese controlled territory: what would those ships supply as the entire area was occupied by the Japanese. The German situation is completely different: neutral ships were supplying Britain who the Germans were at war with. 

Kris


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## Nikademus (Dec 5, 2010)

A Japanese attack on Russia during 41 could very well been the straw that would have broken the USSR's back. Nomanhan is often viewed as a one sided a$$ kicking that permenantly put the Japanese off in regards to the Russians but this is untrue. In terms of total casualties they gave as good as they got. Whilst garnaring a grudging respect for the Russians, the Kw. Army was anything but not wanting a rematch, only this time not primarily involving a single green division based on a new triangular structure of organization.

Though the hokushin faction (Go-North) was ultimately defeated by the nanshin faction by 8/41 (Go-South), the Japanese did begin mobilization and begin implementing a phased plan to stage a major offensive.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2010)

Civettone said:


> Wow, Parsifal, that is great. Simply saying my comments lack any veracity because I didnt provide sources.
> Anyway, hstart with this Axis History Forum • View topic - Soviet Far East
> (I just hope you won't dismiss it as just an internet source)
> 
> ...



Hi Kris

Wow Kris!!! You do understand the need to prove your statements dont you. I dont mean to lecture you, but this is basic debating criteria, my friend.....your comments do lack veracity when you make claims and dont back them up. If you dont back up your statements, you can say anything, but dont expect me to accept them.....

Please correct me if Im wrong, but your position appears to be based on the posting by a particular individual of that forum. If not, please cut and paste the relevant excerpts, with acknowledgment of who said it so we can look a little closer. For the moment, because you omitted (or just decided not ) to do this, you are going to have to put up with my own inadequate analysis

Well its a start, and no Im not going to dismiss it just because its an Internet source. But lets be clear about this, this is an extract from a forum site, not properly referenced, nor have you undertaken any indepth analysis of your source. Not a good start, or indicatigve of a a thorough investigation....

The guy you are appearing to rely on as your main source is not "official source" is it, nor is he even quoting official sources, is he......

Further, this guy repeatedly states in his post that it is exceptionally difficult to pin down numbers. But what really makes me smell a rat , and a dead one at that, is that he is not even quoting manpower figures for the Far Eastern Fronts at al, and when he does quote figures, he appears to be looking at front line strengths only. You do realize that dont you????

The Zabaikalsky Military District was the area east of Baikal, basically to the northwest of manchuria, and on the far side of the Black Mountains. It was not part of the Far Eastern Military District. The poster fails to answer these questions in anything like a competent way IMO. 

Here is a link to a site which I think approaches a level of competency. It provides some details of troop strengths and gives a lot of detail on the military fortifications. Just glancing at the extent of fortification, one is drawn to the inescapeable conclusion that your guy is blowing it out certain parts of his anatomy, to be brutal about it. Look at the Link, determine the extent of the frontage, and then count the number of gun emplacements strongpoints....the Russians called these agglomerations "fortified regions" or "fortified zones". The numbers of troops needed to man a region or a zone might vary from 10000 to about 30000 men typically. Judging by the sheer scale of the works put into place, i would wager that many of these regions manned at least 30000 men. This was a scale of fortification that rivalled the maginot line, except that whereas the French Fortifications were about 140 km, this line was 1400 km. The French needed a minimum of 200000 men to man their dfences....how many more do you think they needed to man their Siberian defences?

Fort 35 - USSR Far East fortification

Relevantly this site I have provided you says this about manning levels. 

"_It is well known that the German aggression that commenced on 22 June 1941 led the Soviet Union to the edge of catastrophe. The troops of the Western Special and later the Kievsky Special Military Districts were nearly broken and the situation with the troops of the former Odessky, Baltic and Leningradsky Military Districts were not significantly better. The most economically developed territories in the European part of the country were lost. The sources from which the Soviet Union might quickly replace the losses of troops and arms were the Far Eastern and Zabaikalsky Fronts. However, the threat of Japanese aggression forced the USSR to keep these troops in place. Only in the Autumn of 1941 when the Germans nearly took Moscow were *five rifle and two tank divisions *transferred from the Far Eastern Front to the combat theatre (one additional tank division was delivered in July). These well-trained troops played a very important role in the defeat of the German troops on the approaches to Moscow. To replace the troops transferred to the combat theatre, the Commander of the Far Eastern Front General of Army I P Apanasenko formed new units based on the very limited local manpower resources. A significant source of these recruits were prisoners of the Gulag, while by Apanasenko's orders they were taken even from Kolyma despite the protests of the local NKVD leaders.122 *In this way the troop strength in the Far East was maintained.* The second crisis on the Soviet-German front, namely the battle of Stalingrad in July 1942 again required the rapid transfer of eight rifle divisions and three rifle brigades to the European part of the country. These troops played an important role during the fight for Stalingrad and on other parts of the front. Despite the fact that the transfer of these troops also was compensated for by the formation of new units, the overall troop strength decreased slightly. *Nevertheless, during entire period of the war the strength of the Soviet troops in the Far East was close to that of the Japanese forces and was even slightly larger *123.. After the defeat of the German forces near Stalingrad, the threat of Japanese aggression significantly decreased in 1943 and General of Army I R Apanasenko was transferred to the Active Army in the position of Deputy Commander of the Voronezhsky Front and was soon killed during the Kharkov-Belgorod Operation. His place was taken by the former commander of the Kalininsky Front, General M A Purkaev."_

Frankly, I would prefer this source over the claims made by your friend. The simple visual material suggest strongly higher manning levels than he is prepared to admit. He makes factual errors about basic facts like military districts that demonstrate to me he does not know what he is talking about, despite saying he is russian (I even question that given the language and tone of this posts. I suspect he might be latvian or estonian, or similar to be honest) 


With regard to this 3:1 superiority issue, no i am not misusing it. The key to understanding this is mobility. The Germans actually attacked the Russian with an inferior number of troops, but because of their superior mobility were able to concentrate where needed. Same situation applies to the Allies. For the relatively static armies of the Russians and the Japanese, this was not possible, or at least, not as possible. 

Why is the 3:1 ratio relevant? Because in theory it allows a 1:1 ratio in the assault forces, enough men to maintain an artillery/suppressive fire advantage, plus enough men to expoit a breakthrough and pursue the defeated enemy. Its not a misuse of the theory. Again, I suggest you read its author, Von Clausewits, before dismissing it as bunkum, or trying to come up with some new formula that is all your own....

The reason the neutral shipping issue was raised, was because of your assertion the port or the region would be isolated if the rail line was cut. I firstly question that the line could be cut, but in the second instance, even if it was, the far east would receive oodles of supply from the neutral allied shipping. I dont think the Japanse would attack neutral allied shipping. I understqand what your saying about the destination being to a combatant (in this case the Russians), but during the war, the Japanese would not even attack Nowegian or Greek flagged shipping for the allies (source: The Japanese Submarine Force and WWII, Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida, Bluejacket Books 2002)

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## michaelmaltby (Dec 5, 2010)

Nomonhan: The War Between Japan and Russia, June - September 1939, by Alvin Cookes


This is written from the Japanese perspective and what Parsifal writes is pretty close to what Cookes writes.

".... Parsifal, you have a wrong idea about the Russian military in the Far East during the war. The Russians were on the brink of collapse in 1941 and they stripped the forces in the East to fight the Germans. The divisions were paper divisions, usually at regiment strength and equiped with no modern tanks, no heavy artillery and other obsolete weapons. Sure, you can keep all the forces there but then there is nothing left to stop the Germans in the West.

" .... Again, the Japanese were outnumbered 2:1 at Khalkin Gol and they inflicted more casualties than they received. The total Japanese defeat is not backed up by the casualty numbers. The Soviets suffered horrible losses even with a Japanese army surrounded! And in 1941/1942 the Japanese would outnumber the Soviets 2:1. Do the math. ..."

The Soviets (and the Russians 1904-05) don't do MATH in those situations. Casualties simply didn't matter - to either side.

But to give you an idea of how "incompetent" the Soviets were - they had all the positions the Japanese occupied targeted for artillery coordinates long *BEFORE *the Japanese invaded across the river.

The Japanese had no idea how many POW's the Russians took and held. In Japan the families were just told that the son or father was dead. And the few Japanese prisoners that were "exchanged" for Russians were led into a room with a desk and a revolver and advised to "end it" for honor's sake.

That little war was no "lucky break" for the Russians. .

MM


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## VG-33 (Dec 17, 2010)

Kris[/QUOTE]



Civettone said:


> Parsifal, I was already under the impression you were believing this kind of data. I have seen it too but it is Soviet propaganda. Recent research has shown that the figures were inflated. Official Soviet figures are 1.2 million soldiers. In reality 350.000 would have been closer to the truth.


I don't know about soviet propaganda, I can just advice you to not read the Pravda anymore. But looking at accounts, avaible on some russian sites and forums (as Vif2 in 2007), the weakest point for the DalniVostochni Front was reached on november 1941, with 912 000 or 938 000 soldiers depending on sources. By internal documents. And not 350 000 taken from your imagination.

The DVF feeded (also by accounts available on the net) Front Line armies with 2500 tanks, 3-4000 canons and mortars, 250 000 regular men and 100 000 soldiers of independent "march companies". But it was *from June 41 to March 1945.* For 1941th year it was for about 110 -135 000 men, only.

But on the same time, mobilising population from 15 to 55 years old Apanasenko intergrated in DVF some 200 000 "auxiliaries" he had to feed, train and dress for cruel siberian winter. So total force did not diminished but increased.
About 323 000 mobilsed young men in early 1942 in Moscow, Gorki and Wladimir region were in the way to reinforce internal districts for formations; tank, artillery, paras. More than 200 000 of them served in the "march companies" in the meanwhile on DVF. They replaced "auxiliaries" from spring, on that inactive front. Once formed, went in FL units and were replaced by others.

In All DVF send experienced soldiers, recieved youg ones to teach, but global number was alawys maintained, even increased. 






> And you are nitpicking on Khalkin Gol. Or you didnt't understand what I said. So one more time, the Soviets outnumbered the Japanese 2:1 (or 70k vs 40k as you said) but still, the Russians received more losses than the Japanese. That's even more impressive if one considers that a Japanese army was encircled and 'destroyed'. With Soviets down from 1.2 million to 350.000 one can consider that the Japanese would have been a lot more succesful.



I don't share your supposals about Khalkin -Gol. After the end of the battle from his memors general Grigorenko, the famous dissident (miliary engineering) had to burn 10 -12 000 dead japanese bodies, afterbattle. Soviet soldiers being properly beared were not concerned. From Gén. reading Yakovlev the tank commander from his own side, it was to be done with his own (rare) fuel stocks. And he had also quoted that number. The fact is more than enough corroborated.






> Lastly, I think we were talking about how the Japanese would invade Russia instead of attacking the US. That doesn't mean they would attack on June 22. In fact, that would have been illogical given the German-Japanese cooperation. The Japs were not informed until very late, probably because of security reasons. The Japanese would have to decide to attack the SU after June 22, probably after seeing the immense German successes in the first weeks. This would mean that the Russians would already be hard pressed when the Japanese attack them in their rear.
> 
> 
> Kris



I have red some stupid posts, never at that level. Just take a train and see what siberia look like on soviet (russian) boarders. It's 2-3 inab/km², some primary swampy forest you couldn't progress more than 300-500 meters an hour with roten dead trees everywhere, even with no ennemy opposition, no heavy bag, + 40°C in summer with mosquitos pearcing through 1 cm thick boots, - 60°C in winter. In that condition a single "Dersuu Zala"* would decimate an entire japanese company within 1 or 2 days...

Image it even wilder , 70 years before

*A siberian hunter from Nenets tribe...

I will stop here, don't see other interest. Moreover it's oftopic

With no regards but with advices. Think a little before posting from time to time, travel, read books, pariculary in geography...How is it possible to stay such... ignorant?



> This clearly shows that the Japanese were expected to penetrate deep into Soviet territory. This also means that the railroads would also be cut. And how can you expect to receive reinforcements when the railroads are cut?


Yes and they would walk through it simply like in the Schwartzwald forest or Fontainebleau royal wood paths?


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 17, 2010)

VG-33 said:


> I have red some stupid posts, never at that level.





VG-33 said:


> Think a little before posting from time to time, travel, read books, pariculary in geography...How is it possible to stay such... ignorant?





HEY DIPSHIT - THIS JUST GOT YOU A MONTH IN NEVER NEVER LAND. IF YOU WANT TO BE AN ASS I SUGGEST GOING TO A GAY BATHHOUSE!


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## parsifal (Dec 19, 2010)

Another thing I forgot to mention about this Far eastern option are the limitations on Japanese artillery. I think any battle in this area would be primarily an artillery battle, and in particular would require lots of heavy artillery to silence the Russian forts. Japanese artillery, in my opinion was generally good at the lighter types, but less good, and far less numerous, at the hevy calibre end of the equation. One only has to look at their efforts on Corregidor to realize they were not particuarly good at heavy artillery shoots


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## BikerBabe (Dec 22, 2010)

Who really destroyed the Luftwaffe?

Hmmm, where were Jan at the time???


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## bobbysocks (Dec 22, 2010)

BikerBabe said:


> Who really destroyed the Luftwaffe?
> 
> Hmmm, where were Jan at the time???



probably falling off his chair and spilling a cuppa all over the attack plans...


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## jayastout (Jan 2, 2017)

Wow.

I know this thread is a gajillion years old, but I only just now stumbled across it. I'm the author of the book (_The Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe_) that the OP referenced. I recognize that the title is a bit simplistic--and antogonistic to some--but it's tough to put qualifiers into a title. And the book does indeed mention the contributions of the the RAF and the Soviets, and in fact declares that the RAF might well have saved the West during the BoB. 

Certainly the victory over the Luftwaffe was a shared one.

But, for the reasons outlined in the book, and stated by some here, I stand by my assertion that it was the USAAF that forced the Luftwaffe's hand and struck the killing blows. Were it not for the USAAF, the Luftwaffe would have remained a formidable force for much, much longer.

Happy New Year to all.

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## Crimea_River (Jan 2, 2017)

This dog's been asleep for 6 years. Time to let go me thinks. Happy New Year to you too.

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## BiffF15 (Jan 5, 2017)

jayastout said:


> Wow.
> 
> I know this thread is a gajillion years old, but I only just now stumbled across it. I'm the author of the book (_The Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe_) that the OP referenced. I recognize that the title is a bit simplistic--and antogonistic to some--but it's tough to put qualifiers into a title. And the book does indeed mention the contributions of the the RAF and the Soviets, and in fact declares that the RAF might well have saved the West during the BoB.
> 
> ...



Jay,

Welcome aboard. There are some very interesting topics / discussions in here and look forward to your contributions.

We might have done some DACT along the way. I flew at Eglin from 1992-1997 (60th & 58th FS, F-15C), then Jacksonville from 1997-2009 (125thFW, F-15A).

By the way I enjoyed both Blue Noses and The Men Who Killed the LF!

Cheers,
Biff


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## parsifal (Jan 5, 2017)

Ive said this so many times before. Whenever these old threads come up and I see some of the things we have said in the heat of the moment it make me want to tear my keyboard out of the socket sometimes.

I need to work on my communication skills. Im not backing away from where I ended up in this discussion, but Im disappointed with myself about the way I said it.

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## The Basket (Jan 6, 2017)

Er....
So the Luftwaffe was destroyed by the Americans in 1944?
I would call that a very controversial subject!


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## stona (Jan 6, 2017)

The discussion has been moot since Milosh gave the relevant statistics waaaaay back in post #23.

The destruction of the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force was the one unequivocal victory of the combined bombing offensive, and it was almost entirely an American one. It was largely the USAAF that defeated the Luftwaffe, and had their been no losses in the East the USAAF would still have defeated the Luftwaffe, the figures speak for themselves. It really is as simple as that.

Cheers

Steve

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## Glider (Jan 6, 2017)

I haven't looked at the data in sufficient detail to make any personal conclusions but when looking at the stats in posting 23 there is a large question mark over the German Loss figures, which is.

_Unfortunately, Groehler obtained his "losses" by combining operational and non-operational "total losses" and "damaged" - a very strange thing to do, unless this helped him prove his thesis. According to other data in the original article, the "losses" in this table are about twice the "operational losses", but there are not enough data in the latter category to tabulate. There are other peculiarities - Groehler put the Balkans in the west, and we had to follow suit - but we take what we can get. Assuming that all his loss numbers are off by roughly the same proportion, conclusions based on comparisons should be valid, but to emphasize Groehler's dubious practice we'll put quotes around his "losses"._

The end result is of course the same but it looks as if the Luftwaffe held their own until the end of 43 and it wasn't until 44 when control was lost

In reality its my belief that the Luftwaffe lost because they never had the resources to fight on two fronts and both front played their part in the victory


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## parsifal (Jan 7, 2017)

If the americans were solely responsible for the destruction of the LW, I think the war would have panned out completely differently.

we have to do some navel gazing here, but one scenario is continued co-operation between the soviets and a bowing out of the war by the british and the commonwealth, probably after the fall of france. Japan and the US lock horns as historical in the far east, and general war breaks out between the Axis and the US in early 1942.......

No US build up in the UK, but the US does implement a variant of its rainbow war plans. First, occupation of Iceland and Greenland., followed by an invasion of Vichy by mid 1943.

What then from there. in that scenario and what is likely to follow, my money is on the LW and Germany. the US lacks the manpower, the means and the experience to pull this off by themselves.

You guys get the general idea I think

Claiming the US won this single handedly is a total crock .

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## Glider (Jan 7, 2017)

Its fair to say that without the RAF bomber offensive Germany whould have been able to divert huge technical and personnel resources from night fighting to the daytime air war, and without the Russian front ditto.

The 8th Airforce coampaign was effectively beaten in 1943 and it wasn't until 1944 that they really started to take control. Had the Luftwaffe been strengthened by the additional resources outlined above the task would have been much harder and taken longer. Maybe time enough to get the 262's available in numbers and then life would have got interesting. 

I concur with Parsifal, all air arms played their part in the victory.


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## swampyankee (Jan 7, 2017)

The destruction of the Luftwaffe was very much a joint effort, and I'm not sure that it's possible to separate strategic bombing, ground forces, naval blockade, and tactical air power. It's also insultingly jingoistic and completely false to assign the defeat to any single service, be it the USAAF, the RAF, or VVS. 

However, without strategic bombing it's likely that German production would have been greater, and that the Luftwaffe could have placed almost its entire effort on tactical air support and its strategic bombing campaign, which would have meant that the Soviets would have had more difficulties in their ground war against the Germany and its allies in Eastern Europe. Field and anti-tank artillery would have been produced instead of heavy flak guns, Germany had finite resources. Every aircraft and flak gun used for defense against bombers meant fewer tactical aircraft and field guns at the battlefront. And every dead factory worker was unavailable for anything. Every extra firefighter to put out fires, every EOD person, every tonne of concrete and steel used for shelters, meant that something wasn't available at the battlefront.

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## parsifal (Jan 8, 2017)

I think it needs to be acknowledged that the lions share of the killing was done by USAAF in 1944, but the circumstances that made that bonanza possible was beyond the means of the US forces acting alone, to successfully achieve. The LW lost in 1944 because of a vicious and sustained campaign of attrition that had been waged prior to that often with one sided losses against those who opposed them. The forces able to be put into the sky by the LW in 1944 over Germany were forces that had been bled white of experience, reserves, fuel and spares in the years leading up to that point. the of 1944..

Also, the actual numbers shot down by the 8th AF by US fighter forces is quite limited, and not of itself capable of causing the collapse of the LW per se. Something like 3500 air victories by the USAAF in 1944, is not enough to seriously challenge the LW on its own, which received something in the order of 35000 new deliveries in that year. Counting a/c caught on the ground because they lacked the fuel to fly cannot be solely, or even mostly assigned to US forces. Counting LW a/c on the ground due to lack of spares fails to appreciate the absolute sink hole the east front was for spare parts due to the harsh operating conditions is still not giving a realistic understanding to the reasons behind the US victory 


Take away the supporting elements that preceded the killing days and you take away the advantages held by the US that made it all possible.

not acknowledging the huge efforts poured into the flak arm, more than 80% of which was brought about by the efforts of the RAF before the USAAC was even on the scene is another failure of logic that escapes me. Resourcs not spent on the flak arm are resources that could have been spent elsewhere

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## stona (Jan 8, 2017)

The original question was 'Who destroyed the Luftwaffe?' The answer, supported by a lot of data, is the US 8th Air Force. Of course it could not have done it alone, numerous campaigns by several nations all combined in helping to bleed Germany to death. Many factors led to the situation in which the Luftwaffe was found ripe for destruction, but it was the USAAF that did the destroying.
Cheers
Steve

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## Fighterguy (Jan 8, 2017)

mikewint said:


> I'm with TEC, it all comes down to production and manpower availability. You can shoot down 10 of my planes and i make 20 during the same period. Same with German tanks, some of the best ever produced but they sit back let the Russians surprise then with the T-34 then try to play catchup. And the US makes 20 Shermans to every Tiger. Goering didn't help matter either as he also watched the Lutwaffe go from the most advanced AF with the best planes ever downward. So who killed the luftwaffe, simple: Hitler and his meglomania



I was thinking the same thing. The Luftwaffe had to deal with too much political in-fighting and various entities vying for prestige within the regime. None of their leaders fully understood airpower theory and application, or if they did, didn't implement it. Hitler demonstrated a two dimensional thought process with ill defined goals and objectives (that's a polite way to say he was a moody bitch.). The German thought process seemed to revolve around pride and prestige over objective based doctrine. Refusal to allow a retreat from untenable positions or reposition forces to obtain greater mass, just to save face, was very counter productive. The miss-allocation of resources to build wonder and vengeance weapons caused proven weapons systems to suffer shortages. They beat themselves as much as the Allies did.


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## stona (Jan 9, 2017)

[QUOTE="Fighterguy, post: 1307896, member: 71364" None of their leaders fully understood airpower theory and application, or if they did, didn't implement it. .[/QUOTE]

Tell that to the air forces that were destroyed in the successful Blitzkriegs of 1939/40 !

Cheers

Steve

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## drgondog (Jan 9, 2017)

It is clearly not plausible to suggest the USAAF independently 'destroyed the LW'. It is plausible that the USAAF was the meat grinder that inflicted the greatest damage (by far) in 1944 in both aircraft destroyed, pilots killed and critical industry crippled (Oil/Chemicals to be specific). The secondary impact was to cause the diversion of critical artillery and crews to AAA instead of anti-tank capability in the East.

The Mission of the 8th AF in early 1944 was to destroy the aircraft, pilots and industrial capability to support the LW, as part of Pointblank. It is arguable that the industrial capability to support aviation assets was not a complete success but it is a fact that Germany was only able to maintain and actually grow aircraft deliveries during 1944 only by diverting critical resources to aircraft production in the attempt to blunt the Combined Bomber Offensive - at the expense of other critical needs for those resources.

It was successful at systematically killing the experienced day fighter capability to inflict unacceptable losses on USSAFE, kill the experienced pilots and crews diverted from OST and SUD fronts into the Defense of the Reich, reduce the effective capability of the LW below critical mass to oppose Normandy Campaign. Defense of the Invasion front was an ALLIED effort but LW incapable of breaking through day or night to attack shipping, or for all intents and purposes, inflict CAS damage to Allied ground forces.

To an earlier point that had the RAF not been engaged in the Combined Bomber Offensive, the LW would have been able to divert the night fighting assets to attack the 8th during the day... Actually, IMO it would have just hastened to complete destruction of conventional twin engine fighter assets. The introduction of the P-51 and P-38 with 55 gallon Leading edge fuel tanks removed a.) capability of t/e fighters to assemble and attack B-17s and B-24s beyond escort range and b.) seek sanctuary beyond range of airfield suppression by the Mustangs. Effectively March 1944 was the end of sending t/e fighters anywhere without top cover by Bf 109 escort and that proved wholly unsatisfactory as there was no 'top cover' for the top cover. June/July was the end of Me 410s and 110s and Ju 88s use as daylight bomber Destroyers.


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## stona (Jan 9, 2017)

The Luftwaffe DID divert its night fighters to oppose the 8th Air Force during the day, that's a measure of German desperation in the face of the onslaught. It had exactly the effect you suggest it would, and left Bomber Command almost unopposed by night fighters in the latter stages of its campaign. Harris noted that by late 1944 (post September),
_"...the efficiency of the German fighter defence was seriously reduced. In spite of the reduced area which they now had to defend, they were unable, except on rare occasions, to carry out route interception and could only send fighters to the target area at the last moment."_
Again, there were many factors reducing the effectiveness of the German night fighter force, but the frittering away of highly qualified crews (as all night fighter crews were compared to most of their day time contemporaries) in day time operations against the USAAF was certainly one of them.
Cheers
Steve


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## Glider (Jan 9, 2017)

stona said:


> The Luftwaffe DID divert its night fighters to oppose the 8th Air Force during the day, that's a measure of German desperation in the face of the onslaught. It had exactly the effect you suggest it would, and left Bomber Command almost unopposed by night fighters in the latter stages of its campaign. Harris noted that by late 1944 (post September),
> _"...the efficiency of the German fighter defence was seriously reduced. In spite of the reduced area which they now had to defend, they were unable, except on rare occasions, to carry out route interception and could only send fighters to the target area at the last moment."_
> Again, there were many factors reducing the effectiveness of the German night fighter force, but the frittering away of highly qualified crews (as all night fighter crews were compared to most of their day time contemporaries) in day time operations against the USAAF was certainly one of them.
> Cheers
> Steve


I know they did but I was thinking more strategically. If the RAF threat hadn't been there then how many more 109's and 190's could have been built. How many more ( or how much better trained) would the Luftwaffe pilots because as you rightly say, a NF pilot takes a lot more training than others. How many scientists and engineers who works on the many radar and other electronic warfare devices would have been freed up to help with other hi tech developments


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## yulzari (Jan 9, 2017)

I think only fair to mention that the Luftwaffe lost a lot of aeroplanes in the East without USAAF and only rare RAF involvement.

Another point is that day fighters are more likely to have to face defensive fire and/or escorting fighter fire and so get shot down. Night fighters, until late in the war, were more at the mercy of darkness and gravity than defensive fire but are much more expensive to make and need better trained air crews.

The Luftwaffe was destroyed by sheer numbers of all opponents and short term planning that failed to invest in quality training and finally joint bombing and Soviet advances cutting off fuel. Like most accidents it was not just one thing that was the cause but the whole combination without one of which the result would have greatly differed. Had the Luftwaffe been able to concentrate only upon day fighters the USAAF would have lost their air war. Had they concentrated only upon night fighters the same would apply to the RAF. Had they been able to concentrate only upon the East then they could have held their own over Soviet air power. But not all three. Possibly not even two of three and once they concentrated on quality air frames and not quality air crew it was doomed.


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## MycroftHolmes (Jan 9, 2017)

Stona wrote:



> The Luftwaffe DID divert its night fighters to oppose the 8th Air Force during the day, that's a measure of German desperation in the face of the onslaught. It had exactly the effect you suggest it would, and left Bomber Command almost unopposed by night fighters in the latter stages of its campaign.



That's completely wrong. Relatively few night-fighters were shot down during the day, while the Wilde Sau units suffered cataclysmic losses against Bomber Command at night. This was posted long ago on Google Groups (I think by Gavin Bailey).



> JG301 claimed 87 kills for the death or serious injury of 58 pilots between September 1943 and March 1944. JG 302 lost 43 pilots killed for only 70 claims between November 1943 and March 1944. On 16th March 1944, after suffering an estimated 45% losses (according to LW itself) on Wild Boar operations against Bomber Command, the three Wild Boar
> fighter units were disbanded due to the crushing weight of attrition they faced on operations against Bomber Command, and were instead transferred to face the USAAF day raids.
> 
> Equally, between 15 September 1943 and 31 January 1944, the night-fighter strength of 1 Jagdkorps in Germany declined from 339 aircraft and crews to 179 aircraft and crews.
> Normally, the claim is made that the USAAF daylight raids inflicted a punishing rate of attrition on the LW nightfighter force. Well, not if we study the LW records. For example, 11./NJG.2 lost 72 aircraft on operations during the war - 37 to accident, weather, flak, etc; 14 to return fire from RAF bombers, 13 to RAF intruders, 2 in close proximity to exploding bombers they had attacked, but only 3 to allied fighters in daylight and 3 to return fire from USAAF bombers . Coupling these two facts together, we can see that the RAF night offensive was actually performing more complimentary attrition of day fighter resources than the USAAF daylight offensive was performing on night fighter resources.


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