# Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge



## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

For quite some time, the the bomb raids were the only instrument available for Allies to bring the war to Germany. However, those raids whole Combined bomber offensive is criticized sometimes. So how would you conduct it, both during day night, with equipment historically available?


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## HubertCumberdale (Mar 2, 2012)

Put far more resources into precise strikes at essential infrastructure using mosquitoes _a al_ 2nd TAF.

Electricity and fuel would be good places to hit.

Once I have H2S/Oboe/Gee/Window etc. I'd equip every 4 engine heavy with it and use them to do them same. At night. 

Once I have Merlin Mustangs - just what they did do.


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## wuzak (Mar 2, 2012)

Definitely concentrate on more Mosquitos to give precision attacks. Use Lanc for the odd attack against targets that require heavy bombs - like the dams raid.

Try to get the USAAF to follow the lead and use Mossies - if enough available. Change the mix of B, PR, NF and FB versions to help get teh bomber numbers up.

Attack oil and the transport system.

Develop a successor to the Mosquito. Either the Super Mosquito with twin Sabres, or the Hawker P.1005 high speed bomber, also with Sabres. Look for alternative engines - V-3420 possibly.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

Was it feasible for RAF to successfully attack POL targets, electricity infrastructure, transportation system in 1941-43?
What would USAAF be doing between late 1942 - late 1943?


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

Amen.

RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Army Air Corps expended huge quantities of resources that did nothing except crater fields. Improving bomber accuracy should be solved early on. If solution(s) cannot be found then it's pointless for Britain to spend 12.19% of their military budget on RAF Bomber Command.

Dare I suggest RAF Bomber Command consider dive bombing as a quick means to achieve a ten fold increase in weapons delivery accuracy?


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## stona (Mar 2, 2012)

If I was Harris with the tools he had available to him at the time I'd pretty much do the same thing at least up until early 1944.
Steve


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## Readie (Mar 2, 2012)

stona said:


> If I was Harris with the tools he had available to him at the time I'd pretty much do the same thing at least up until early 1944.
> Steve



I agree, flatten the lot and continue to wage 'total war' till the Axis powers surrendered.
Its the only way. 'Do unto others before they do unto you'
John


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## pbfoot (Mar 2, 2012)

IMHO Harris was aptly named the Butcher who harkens memories of Haig , why didn't he follow the plans laid out pre war for attacking POL , the dummy couldn't or better yet would not transfer any 4 engine aircraft (long range) to protect convoys even though the UK was under severe pressure from U boats . It was the USAAF that took the bull by the horns and attacked the POL and Harris was dragged unwillinly along as a result of direct orders which he did his best to circumvent


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## stona (Mar 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> IMHO Harris was aptly named the Butcher who harkens memories of Haig , why didn't he follow the plans laid out pre war for attacking POL ,



He was not named "The Butcher" he was nick named "Butch" something quite different. Popular history and real history may differ but the names don't.

I think it is fair to say that the performance of Haig has been reappraised more rationally as that war passes from living memory.

Harris didn't attack the targets laid out in pre-war strategies because it quickly became evident that Bomber Command couldn't find let alone hit such targets even by day. When daylight bombing was quickly seen to be impossible they had even less chance of hitting them by night. Even later in the war there were cases of bombers attacking cities dozens of kilometres from the intended target. A substantial number attacked Schweinfurt instead of Nuremberg on the night of that famous raid. If they couldn't find and bomb the correct city what chance did they have of hitting a petro chemical plant?

This was the basis for area bombing which the RAF,particularly in the right conditions,became very good at. That's why I would have done the same thing. With the tools available it was the only way of carrying the fight to Germany. I will not apologise for the tactics of Bomber Command. At least we are finally to have a fitting memorial to the men of Bomber Command in Green Park.

Harris did what service chiefs do and fought to get the aircraft he thought he needed for his service. He obviously argued persuasively.During the Battle of the Atlantic I wonder just how the extra aircraft would have found these U-Boats with the technology available. The battle was in any case won without them which at least justifies Harris' stance even if I have some reservations with the aid of hindsight.

The attacks you mention (the USAAF taking the bull by the horns) are presumaby the late war efforts after the USAAF had learnt its own hard lessons. 
Harris still didn't believe,even by 1944/5,that Bomber Command could hit such targets accurately,even by day. In this he was shown to be mistaken. When he did finally unleash Bomber Command on targets in support of Overlord it was very effective indeed. Five years of development in technology and tactics paid off. The targets were also geographically close.

Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

The know-how of pin-point attack was present in the UK as early as 1940, and it was conducted with success. 
As for 'battle was won anyway' argument, there was always victories and victories.


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## pbfoot (Mar 2, 2012)

I'm sorry I disagree the Bomber Command offensive was the Paschendaele of the air no other words, stubborn old men with no clue squandering lives. Its not right to muddle on with peoples lives.
"Harris insisted that patolling the sea lanes was a complete waste of time and effort .Citing the records of 502 sqn flying Whitley bombers over a 6 month period he pointed out that on 144 sorties only 6 subs had been spotted 4 had been attacked and 1 possibly 2 sunk .Harris could not resist the observation that this meant 250 flying hours per sighting . in his note to Portal he scoffed at the Admiralty and the ineffectiveness this proved. Portal was able to prevent any of the new Halifax bombers from going to Coastal Command"
Just muddling on .


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## Readie (Mar 2, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> The know-how of pin-point attack was present in the UK as early as 1940, and it was conducted with success.
> As for 'battle was won anyway' argument, there was always victories and victories.



Yes and No. We had the 'area bombing' experience during the Blitz. The bigger the bomber and the more bombers you have to greater the blunt blows you can deliver. How many Colognes / Dresdens could the Nazi's taken before admitting defeat?
John


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## Readie (Mar 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I'm sorry I disagree the Bomber Command offensive was the Paschendaele of the air no other words, stubborn old men with no clue squandering lives. Its not right to muddle on with peoples lives



Do you also include the USAAF bomber offensive in your post?
Its fashionable to deride Harris and the bomber offensive, I'm not sure quite why but, there you have it.
John


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## pbfoot (Mar 2, 2012)

Readie said:


> Yes and No. We had the 'area bombing' experience during the Blitz. The bigger the bomber and the more bombers you have to greater the blunt blows you can deliver. How many Colognes / Dresdens could the Nazi's taken before admitting defeat?
> John


apparently more then Harris thought they would,


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

Readie said:


> Yes and No. We had the 'area bombing' experience during the Blitz. The bigger the bomber and the more bombers you have to greater the blunt blows you can deliver. How many Colognes / Dresdens could the Nazi's taken before admitting defeat?
> John



Sorry for not making myself 100% clear. When I say that know-how for pin-point night attacks was present in the UK, it's a part of UK's armed forces that I'm pointing into. Namely, FAA was able to deliver a devastating blow to Italian navy by making a night strike. 
On the other hand, that idea that BC/RAF would adopt some trick from FAA stands a snowball-in-hell chance.

pbfoot addressed the Cologne/Dresden question.


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## stona (Mar 2, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> The know-how of pin-point attack was present in the UK as early as 1940, and it was conducted with success.



When and where?
I don't mean low penetration attacks in daylight by specialised units on buildings in Denmark or France flying Mosquitos.I don't mean specialised attacks like "Chastise" on the Ruhr dams,no force could take that kind of loss for such a meagre return on a regular basis.
I mean attacks that could carry the war to Germany and disrupt their production. I don't care if this is done by destroying the factories or dehousing and killing the work force and their families. I'm fighting a war for the survival of my nation and if that means I have to kill every living German I'll try to do it.

The toll on the men of bomber command and their USAAF colleagues was high. You can't single out Harris for your vitriol,US commanders accepted high casualities too. They believed then and I believe now that they made a valuable contribution to winning the war. Of course mistakes were made but fighting a war costs lives. In Bomber Command it cost some of the best. 

Cheers
Steve


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## pbfoot (Mar 2, 2012)

Readie said:


> Do you also include the USAAF bomber offensive in your post?
> Its fashionable to deride Harris and the bomber offensive, I'm not sure quite why but, there you have it.
> John


Not that they were they were anymore accurate with their precision area bombing they did go after the POL which was a RAF objective since day one but neglected by Harris . Harris/Haig are of the same mold muddle on .


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## stona (Mar 2, 2012)

A few old bi-planes attacking a fleet at anchor,sinking a battleship and damaging a couple more and a heavy cruiser is not particularly relevant when trying to navigate hundreds of miles accross hostile air space and deliver a significant blow to a nations military-industrial complex.

What on earth makes you think that the RAF would be reluctant to learn from the FAA and vice-versa. Not that the RAF had much use for torpedo bombing in its war against German production. They traded pilots and other personnel on a regular basis.

Cheers
Steve


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## Readie (Mar 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> apparently more then Harris thought they would,



They is the initial resistance I suppose but, eventually the bomber offensive would have ground the Nazi's down.
No country could withstand the 24/7 incendiary firestorms and Harris knew that could win the war.
Hitler could hide in his bunker while Germany burnt.
Rather like Nero !

There are unsavoury aspects to total war but, we should get blindsided by the hand wringers. Harris did what he felt he needed to do and should be a hero.

John


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## stona (Mar 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Not that they were they were anymore accurate with their precision area bombing they did go after the POL .



So they cratered fields whilst we cratered German cities.

Steve


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## Hop (Mar 2, 2012)

> Once I have H2S/Oboe/Gee/Window etc. I'd equip every 4 engine heavy with it and use them to do them same. At night.



H2S and Gee were fitted to most bombers but they were navigation aids than bomb aimers. They weren't capable of precision attacks.

Oboe could only control 1 bomber at a time so was only useful for pathfinders or very small attacks. It also had a limited range.



> IMHO Harris was aptly named the Butcher who harkens memories of Haig , why didn't he follow the plans laid out pre war for attacking POL



Oil was BC's number one target for some time in 1940 and 1941. It was abandoned as a target because experience showed attacks were having no effect. When Harris took command of BC in 1942 there was no question of him making oil a target again. He had to adhere to the priorities set out for him by his commanders.



> the dummy couldn't or better yet would not transfer any 4 engine aircraft (long range) to protect convoys



Harris was head of BC, not Coastal Command. Allocation of resources to various commands was not part of his job, that was decided at a higher level.

Harris did, of course, expend major effort on minelaying. From 1,055 mines laid in 1941, BC greatly increased the effort under Harris with 9,574 laid in 1942, 13,834 in 1943. 


The truth is BC didn't have the accuracy for large scale precision attacks until early 1944. They spent the first half of the year supporting the invasion, the second half of the year they carried out many precision attacks, day and night.

There isn't really much that could sensibly be changed with hindsight. The battle of Berlin was clearly a mistake, but apart from that, BC did pretty much the best it could with the technology that was available at the time.


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

You don't win a war by committing atrocities. It makes no difference if British atrocities are revenge for enemy atrocities.

An effective strategic bombing campaign against Germany means methodically destroying every large factory in the Ruhr Valley and keeping them from being repaired. That requires accurate navigation and the ability to bomb factory size targets despite smog and heavy AA fire.


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## Readie (Mar 2, 2012)

davebender said:


> You don't win a war by committing atrocities. It makes no difference if British atrocities are revenge for enemy atrocities.
> 
> An effective strategic bombing campaign against Germany means methodically destroying every large factory in the Ruhr Valley and keeping them from being repaired. That requires accurate navigation and the ability to bomb factory size targets despite smog and heavy AA fire.



Atrocities Dave? Blimey...
The concept of 'total war' means attacking every aspect of the enemy. De-housing, de-industrialising, de-infrastructuring and not stopping till the enemy surrenders.
Nazi Germany would not stop and we could not stop them with one hand tied behind our backs by having a faint heart.
John


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## pbfoot (Mar 2, 2012)

davebender said:


> You don't win a war by committing atrocities. It makes no difference if British atrocities are revenge for enemy atrocities.
> 
> An effective strategic bombing campaign against Germany means methodically destroying every large factory in the Ruhr Valley and keeping them from being repaired. That requires accurate navigation and the ability to bomb factory size targets despite smog and heavy AA fire.


it wasn't an atrocity anymore then the 8th af was an atrocity with its bombing they just had a far better publicist


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

I agree. Both were atrocities and neither contributed much towards winning the war. We need to methodically destroy factories in the Ruhr Valley if we want to put Germany out of commission.


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

IMO of course. 

*Me-410 Light Bomber.*





- Small crew size (2 men) who are well protected against light flak.
- Generous size fuel tanks (2,420 liters) provide plenty of range.
- Relatively high cruise speed with payload to shorten time over the most dangerous regions.
- 1,000 kg bomb load which is accurate enough to hit a factory size building.
.....In practical terms this would be a modified Mosquito. If RAF specifications require these capabilities then that's how the British light bomber would be designed. Adding dive brakes, a dive bomber sight and additional armor to the historical Mosquito light bomber should work. And build it out of the aluminum historically used to make heavy bombers.




*Fw-187 long range escort fighter.*




- Plenty of internal fuel (1,100 liters increasing to 1,300 liters for the Fw-187D).
- Excellent aerial performance.
- Plenty of firepower.
What more could a fighter pilot ask for?

Britain has a couple options here.
1. Mustang airframe with Merlin engine. 
2. Write Westland Whirlwind specifications so it resembles the Fw-187. Specifically it needs more internal fuel and should be powered by Merlin engines.
.....Critical altitude for the engine(s) would be about 15,000 feet as that's where the bombers will start before diving into the Ruhr Valley.

Make no mistake about it, RAF Bomber Command will still lose plenty of aircraft to both flak and German fighter aircraft. But those losses won't be in vain if Ruhr Valley factories are turned into rubble heaps.


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## pbfoot (Mar 2, 2012)

I believe that Bomber Command needed someone that was not part of the "old muddlers Network" . I suggest Norris Cole might have been more effective then Bumbler Harris


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

Any opinions what the USAAF should be doing different, particularly in pre-1944 time frame?


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Any opinions what the USAAF should be doing different, particularly in pre-1944 time frame?


 
Didn't they started to focus in the Axis oil refineries rather late in the war?


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

The same thing as Britain. We need a bomber with the range, accuracy and crew protection to hit a factory building. Plus a long range escort fighter.

A modified A-26 could serve as the bomber. Add dive brakes and a dive bomber sight to improve weapons delivery accuracy. The crew must have good armor protection.

Either the F4U or a Mustang with Merlin engine will provide fighter escort.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

The A-26 is pretty much out of the picture, since it's too late in fray. I' was asking what would you do different...



> ...with equipment historically available


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

It doesn't need to be too late. Engines are the critical component and the R2800 engine was in mass production during 1942. 

Axe the historical 1938 B-24 bomber specification. Instead the modified A-26 specification gets written during 1938. That should get the modified A-26 into service during 1942.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

Sorry for being such a pain in the ar$e, you need to play the best with the cards you have, not to pick new ones


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## pbfoot (Mar 2, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Any opinions what the USAAF should be doing different, particularly in pre-1944 time frame?


It would have been nice to see an aircraft with a higher useful bombload but then you end up with a British Bomber with no ceiling or defensive armament


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> It would have been nice to see an aircraft with a higher useful bombload but then you end up with a British Bomber with no ceiling or defensive armament



Depends on the specifications of such aircraft. The B-29 could pick 9 tons for long range missions, in comparison with roughly 2 for the B-17 and B-24.


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## davebender (Mar 2, 2012)

Without the A-26 the A-20 was our best light bomber. But internal fuel capacity was far too low for long distance bombing. 

Ju 88H-1
Perhaps the A-20 fuselage could be stretched to increase fuel capacity like Junkers did with the Ju-88H. Otherwise I'm out of ideas as our other twin engine bombers were just smaller versions of the B-17. Slow, very large aircrew and unsuitable for angle bombing to improve weapons delivery accuracy.


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

What about the Mosquito as a precision bombing aircraft for the RAF instead of the heavies?


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## HubertCumberdale (Mar 3, 2012)

*Harris did what he felt he needed to do and should be a hero.*

While I reject the 'monster' tag for Harris, I don't think he qualifies as a hero either. He quite deliberately transformed the doctrine of area bombing into dogma, largely, I think, to justify his own messianic boast that area bombing would win the war on its own. It didn't. It couldn't.

*I suggest Norris Cole might have been more effective then Bumbler Harris*

He may have been, but its unfair to call Harris a bumbler (or Haig for that matter). Harris was a very effective general officer. His only shortcoming was as above, a messianic belief in his own dogma. If there was a shortcoming, it was Portal's, for not having a grip of his subordinate.

And pardon the derail - but this notion about Haig being a bumbling old fool is nonsense too. The British did not suffer disproportionate losses in WWI and bearing in mind that for quite a time, Haig was the first and only British general in history to lead an army that was the senior partner in a general European war, then the worst we can say of him is that he was no worse than the best of his contemporaries. Nor were the casualty rates historically unprecedented. In napoleonic battles, casualty rates of _25% of the entire army_ were common enough for a single day's battle and instances of entire battalions being virtually annihilated were not unknown (The Buffs at Albuera for example) What was different was the scale of operations. At Waterloo, the Coalition suffered 48,000 casualties out of a total strength of 73,000. Compare this to the first day of Somme, infamous in British history as a day of slaughter, where 57,000 casualties were taken out of a total strength of around 500,000!

Its also a fact that by 1918, under Haig, the British army was competent in integrated all-arms operations encompassing infantry, artillery, armour and air-power. Under Haig, the British army had the first and only Tank Corp. It had a machine gun corp. It was supported by the largest air force in the world. The artillery corps grew 50 fold. The engineer corps grews 200 fold. 

This hardly the handy work of the almost cartoon stereotype bumbling cavalry idiot that most people seem to think Haig was.

Derail over.


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## Readie (Mar 3, 2012)

HubertCumberdale said:


> *Harris did what he felt he needed to do and should be a hero.*
> 
> While I reject the 'monster' tag for Harris, I don't think he qualifies as a hero either. He quite deliberately transformed the doctrine of area bombing into dogma, largely, I think, to justify his own messianic boast that area bombing would win the war on its own. It didn't. It couldn't.




Churchill Harris were men of war not peace.
The allied area bombing campaign was a key feature in the final victory in 1945.
The only reason that Harris's claim has been questioned is that he lacked the ability to completely annihilate the enemy in the same way as the American went on to annihilate the Japanese.
Had Harris had the A bomb..well..who knows.
John


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## stona (Mar 3, 2012)

HubertCumberdale said:


> *Harris did what he felt he needed to do and should be a hero.*
> 
> While I reject the 'monster' tag for Harris, I don't think he qualifies as a hero either. He quite deliberately transformed the doctrine of area bombing into dogma, largely, I think, to justify his own messianic boast that area bombing would win the war on its own. It didn't. It couldn't.
> 
> ...



I couldn't have put it better myself,thanks

Cheers
Steve


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## wuzak (Mar 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> IMO of course.
> 
> *Me-410 Light Bomber.*
> View attachment 194711
> ...


 
The Mosquito was the answer....and was available from 1942. It could have been available as a bomber ingreater numbers had it not been needed for other duties (PR, NF, FB).

For Mosquitos the answer wasn't dive bombing, but low altitude attacks. I'd suggest that as early as possible a Mosquito LB IX with Merlin 66 (low altitude 2 stage engines) should be made. When higher octane fuels became available the M66 was capable of 2000hp at low altitude. 

The Mosquito was difficult for the Luftwaffe to intercept in the 1942/43 timeframe. Add the extra power of the Merlin 66 and it becomes even harder.

Since the production of Lancasters is reduced, Packards can make more 60-series engines for Spitfires, Mustangs and Mosquitos.

On the idea of long range escorts, the Mustang arrived later than the B.IX/PR.IX Mosquito. Mustangs couldn't close escort Mossies anyway - it would compromise the range of both aircraft (one going slower than desired, the other going faster). Better to give them some freedom, and send them ahead of the bombers.

I don't think aluminium Mosquitos would necessarily be an improvement over the historical wooden ones. They would probably be heavier, and draggier. Better to use that to build another type of fast bomber - maybe a slightly larger one, with a larger bomb bay and more powerful engines.


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## rochie (Mar 3, 2012)

i'm just glad the war started in 1941 as if it started any earlier, say 1939 or so then us inept brits would never have hung on long enough for every one else to come to the rescue !


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 3, 2012)

We all know from recent history that *democracies *can't win unpopular wars - Viet Nam, Iraq2, .... that trend was already building during the Korean UN-Sponsored, US-led 'Police Action' .

I believe that the Night Raids by the UK-Commonwealth Air Force undoubtedly took a ghastly toll - the Butcher's Bill - but - these raids were POPULAR with the home audience in Britain - and in the contributing 'colonies'  .... abroad. The planes went out - night after night - invisible but heard. And in the wee small hours they straggled home - engines smoking, controls shot out - bringing back their dead and wounded. 

And then the _Americans_ came  - and _more_ planes - visible now (Aluminum Overcast) - formed up and flew out - and the survivors came back On a Wing and a Prayer.

Bomber Harris took a stand on the Nazis and the Air War and he lead from that stand. Like it or not.

I don't think it was a pleasant job.

Thoughtfully,

MM


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## stona (Mar 3, 2012)

wuzak said:


> The Mosquito was the answer....and was available from 1942.



Which may have been fine from 1942 had the war not started (for the British) three years earlier. The philosophy behind the procurement of four engined 'heavies' was already long established by 1942. Switching mid stream would have led to the sort of debacle that plagued the RLM/Luftwaffe. 
It's interesting to see the promotion of a twin engined medium bomber for the RAF whilst the absence of a heavy strategic bomber in the Luftwaffe inventory is frequently bemoaned.
Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Mar 3, 2012)

Bombing the Gussstahlfabrik from an altitude of 3,000 feet is a lot different from flying a Pathfinder Mosquito at 30,000 feet. The "Wooden Wonder" will be exposed to large quantities of radar directed 2cm and 3.7cm light flak. The crew need armor protection similiar to the Me-410 if they are to survive long enough to drop their bombs.


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## pbfoot (Mar 3, 2012)

HubertCumberdale said:


> *Harris did what he felt he needed to do and should be a hero.*
> 
> While I reject the 'monster' tag for Harris, I don't think he qualifies as a hero either. He quite deliberately transformed the doctrine of area bombing into dogma, largely, I think, to justify his own messianic boast that area bombing would win the war on its own. It didn't. It couldn't.
> 
> ...


Which armies under whose command using their stratagies delivered the knockout punches in 1918?


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## pbfoot (Mar 3, 2012)

rochie said:


> i'm just glad the war started in 1941 as if it started any earlier, say 1939 or so then us inept brits would never have hung on long enough for every one else to come to the rescue !


you had the channel as your friend and enough of the crap that Britain stood all alone


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## stona (Mar 3, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> you had the channel as your friend



But as previously explained it was the RAF not the Channel that kept Britain in the war. It is arguable that without that stretch of water Britain might have been forced to terms sooner,we'll never know.

Bizarrely this very evening I shall be boarding a train and passing under the Channel in a matter of minutes!

The Channel was certainly Germany's friend from say mid 1943 onwards.

Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Mar 3, 2012)

> Bizarrely this very evening I shall be boarding a train and passing under the Channel in a matter of minutes!


Beware of military age French men passing in the opposite direction.


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## Readie (Mar 3, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> We all know from recent history that *democracies *can't win unpopular wars - Viet Nam, Iraq2, .... that trend was already building during the Korean UN-Sponsored, US-led 'Police Action' .
> MM



An interesting point Michael. The UN could claim some victories like Yugoslavia whether these were 'wars' per se is another matter.

The British public's reaction to the Falklands was very telling.

John


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## Readie (Mar 3, 2012)

stona said:


> Bizarrely this very evening I shall be boarding a train and passing under the Channel in a matter of minutes!
> Cheers
> Steve



Its a weird journey under such an historic piece of water in an engineering marvel.
I used to work at Coquelles and travel daily through the Chunnel. I have never lost my fascination for it.

John


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 3, 2012)

"... Its a weird journey under such an historic piece of water in an engineering marvel."

Follow the chalk ... 

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 3, 2012)

"... The British public's reaction to the Falklands was very telling."

How would you describe that reaction, John. We just hear about Rock Stars and Movie Stars reaction ... 

Say more on this, please

MM


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## Readie (Mar 3, 2012)

Something else Herman got wrong 

John


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## Readie (Mar 3, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... The British public's reaction to the Falklands was very telling."
> 
> How would you describe that reaction, John. We just hear about Rock Stars and Movie Stars reaction ...
> 
> ...



Michael, I am the first to admit that the British can be a rather odd lot and there is a warlike gene in our make up. I am currently studying the history of England ( not Britain) to understand why the Romans, Danes and the bloody Normans have left us like with this legacy.
When Mrs Thatcher ( I must say that I cordially detest the woman) decided that 'we' were going to get the Falklands back from the Argies I was amazed at the general publics reaction. Bearing in mind that the country was as near to civil war as in Cromwellian times the disaffected youth wanted to lash out at someone or something. The Irish were playing up with bombs and the trade unions were in full war cry...I expect that you know all this.
I was living in North Kent at the time at a lot (if not all) the young men were demanding to sign up, go and fight, invade Argentina and anyone else who got in the way....their biggest fear was that the 'war' would be over before they had a chance to fight...

The media did an excellent job in whipping up the masses. So, the Falklands was a 'popular war', although the casualties caused an intake of breath among the calmer citizens.

Thatcher won another term on the back of this and seemed to think that she had the peoples mandate to continue her policies. I could say more but the no politics thing on this forum prevent this.

So, is the current war on terror popular? it is. Would it take another London bus bombing etc to wind up the rest of the population? Yes, we are poised for an attack in the Olympic year.

I wonder if the bovine public do what the media tells them to do...we are assaulted 24/7 on line, in the news, newspapers etc etc.

John


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## Readie (Mar 3, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... Its a weird journey under such an historic piece of water in an engineering marvel."
> 
> Follow the chalk ...
> 
> MM



I though the meeting of the British French tunnellers was an historic event and quite surprising given the French penchant for doing swerves at the last minute...


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## Siegfried (Mar 3, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> What about the Mosquito as a precision bombing aircraft for the RAF instead of the heavies?



Quite feasable, though it would need to be converted to metal (as some were) due to limmits in high quality timber supplies. This would allow a daylight offensive in many cases. While the Mosquitos would also eventually need escorts I feel their attrition would be vastly less than the slow 4 engined bombers that were so easy to intercept and spent so long in transit. 

Two Mosquito, 4 crew could deliver about as much load as a Lancaster and they could likely do it in daylight with the enormous increase in accuracy that allowed. Some Mosquitos conducted 2 missions per night, merely changing over crews: a result of their high speed.

Lindemann however was determined to carpet bomb and helped engineer that outcome. It likely prevented development of alternatives.


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## Milosh (Mar 3, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Quite feasable, though it would need to be converted to metal (as some were) due to limmits in high quality timber supplies. This would allow a daylight offensive in many cases. While the Mosquitos would also eventually need escorts I feel their attrition would be vastly less than the slow 4 engined bombers that were so easy to intercept and spent so long in transit.
> 
> Two Mosquito, 4 crew could deliver about as much load as a Lancaster and they could likely do it in daylight with the enormous increase in accuracy that allowed.
> 
> Lindemann however was determined to carpet bomb and helped engineer that outcome. It likely prevented development of alternatives.



First time I heard of any Mossies converted to metal. Details please.

A metal Mossie would be heavier than a wood one.


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## wuzak (Mar 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> Bombing the Gussstahlfabrik from an altitude of 3,000 feet is a lot different from flying a Pathfinder Mosquito at 30,000 feet. The "Wooden Wonder" will be exposed to large quantities of radar directed 2cm and 3.7cm light flak. The crew need armor protection similiar to the Me-410 if they are to survive long enough to drop their bombs.
> View attachment 194773



Why would they bomb from 3000ft?

When Mosquitos bombed from low level they bombed quite a bit lower than 3000ft - sometimes as low as 50ft.

Mosquito B.IVs often bombed from low level during daylight before being shifted to PFF duties. The loss rates were often high (17%) but that was not a great statistic since usually there were only small numbers sent on raids (like 6, 1 loss in 6 = 17%).

I would think that radar directed flak would struggle at lower levels to track the target when it was moving at high speed.

The real threat for Mosquitos on low level raids was s/e fighters. In 1942/43, at least, the Mossies were fast enough that they could run away until the fighters lost interest/ran out of fuel.

From Wiki:


> March 2/3, 1943
> 
> Krupp
> 
> 6 RAF Mosquitos to the Ruhr without loss. The aircraft which bombed Essen scored direct hits in the middle of the main Krupp factory.



No mention as to whether this was a low level or high level raid, however. Nor if it was day or night, but 6 Mossies alone in early 1943 would suggest daylight bombing to me.

Bombing of Essen in World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## wuzak (Mar 3, 2012)

stona said:


> Which may have been fine from 1942 had the war not started (for the British) three years earlier. The philosophy behind the procurement of four engined 'heavies' was already long established by 1942. Switching mid stream would have led to the sort of debacle that plagued the RLM/Luftwaffe.
> It's interesting to see the promotion of a twin engined medium bomber for the RAF whilst the absence of a heavy strategic bomber in the Luftwaffe inventory is frequently bemoaned.
> Cheers
> Steve


 
Of this I am aware.

Prior to 1942 I would see the RAF conducting the war as it historically did - with Wellingtons, Blenheims, Hampdens, Whitleys, etc. There would only be a small period where the Halifax, Lancaster and Stirling would be in use as the primary strategic bombers, thereafter the performance of the Mosquito would make a change in policy. After all, the Lancaster and Mosquito bombers became operational within a month or two of each other.

It would take time to change production orders. I would suggest that Halifaxes and Lancasters could be converted for use by Coastal Command, some retained by Bomber Command for heavy lifting duties. Dump the Stirling. We just need an alternative metal aircraft to fill the factories.

The difference between the twin engined Mosquito and the Luftwaffe mediums was speed. The Luftwaffe mediums could carry about as much as a B-17 typically carried, at about the same speed, but with much less defensive armament.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 3, 2012)

If the light flak was not in 'loop' with the radar, that flak is not radar directed. Ie. if the gunner receives data about the target, but still must make a visual aiming at a correct target, during the night, he is unlikely to hit anything. More so if the target is approaching at 200-300 ft of altitude.
Take it from a trained AAA gunner with 11 months of training - it was damn hard to score hits by manualy-operated AAA in broad daylight.


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## davebender (Mar 3, 2012)

Smog may be the deciding factor for bomber altitude in the Ruhr Valley. From what I've read it was pretty bad back when everyone burned coal. Bombers must dive low enough so they can target individual factory buildings through the smog. 

Try not to hit factory chimneys when they suddenly appear out of the haze.


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## wuzak (Mar 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> Smog may be the deciding factor for bomber altitude in the Ruhr Valley. From what I've read it was pretty bad back when everyone burned coal. Bombers must dive low enough so they can target individual factory buildings through the smog.
> 
> Try not to hit factory chimneys when they suddenly appear out of the haze.


 
Low level Mosquito attacks were measured inhundreds of feet, and could be as low as 50 ft.

When they attacked the Philips factory in 1942 they had to climb over the city walls/buildings.


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## davebender (Mar 3, 2012)

That's great for weapons delivery accuracy but you will be flying through your own bomb shrapnel.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 3, 2012)

There are bomb fuses with delays for low level missions, but if they hit something very hard, it'll crush the fuse and go off on contact anyway.


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## Siegfried (Mar 4, 2012)

Readie said:


> When Mrs Thatcher ( I must say that I cordially detest the woman) decided that 'we' were going to get the Falklands back from the Argies I was amazed at the general publics reaction. John



I was in Australia at the time and it is quite possible from there to see the mood in Britain through the media and newspaper articles and opinion pieces. It is clear to me that the British (mostly in cooperation with the US) intelligence opperates very effectively through the planting of news stories etc. Usually this takes the form of plausible atrocity stories or dodgy intelligence. We saw that with the Gulf War 1 "baby incubator scandal" where 300 Kuwatti babies were supposedly litterally thrown out in order to take the incubators back to Iraq.

During the Malvinas/Falklands war I recall seeing all sorts of nasty propaganda getting through about the character of Argentinians that extended well beyond the character of the "junta" including the fact that Argentinians were supposed to prefer Sodomy with their prostitutes. Published in a left leaning broadsheet called the Sydney Morning Herald. *Atrocity propaganda is the key.* Some of this comes out through another British element of culture/character; the obsession with orderly adherance to the law. Witness the trouble Tony Blair got into for his very silly dossier about Weapons of Mass destruction. Misleading parliament is of course a very serious matter in the Westminister system in the UK as well as Australia and resignations will occur. Of course when such things have been exposed they press move on due to some other distraction and all we end up with is a resignation or two but no more. It is followed by a thick ghost written memoir and about a million dollars income in the US lecture circuit.

Humans are a hierachial social animal, inherantly co-operative as well as competitive. They have no problems organising themselves into a war like status if they feel threatened or think something untoward is happening. Massacres of Irish in the 16th century happened as a result of rumours of them commiting atrocities on English/Scottish settlers etc.

It's clear that Britain in the 1970s/1980s was in a state of severe economic decline. The exact causes I can't really discern but one problem was was the industrial relations system and I would say a class warfare memmory (not without reason). Doing work in Britain was extremely difficult by some standards due to demarcation disputes and a lot of silly rules. I can recount some stories if you like contrasting how difficult it could be in the UK to get work done effiently. I'm not saying the UK was impossible; skill levels were there and there was no corruption and a friendly crate of beer could often get things done.

Thatcher had a funny hybrid liberarian conservative ideology. I certainly sorted out the silly union issues but it would seem she laid waste to too many other things in the country. Witness her destruction of academoc tenure, which in effect destroyed more conservative tensureships (the real threatened academic) than supposed left ones.

Faced with a sense of loss of pride and place thrashing the dreadfull Argies would have been affirming.


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## Readie (Mar 4, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Thatcher had a funny hybrid liberarian conservative ideology. I certainly sorted out the silly union issues but it would seem she laid waste to too many other things in the country. Faced with a sense of loss of pride and place thrashing the dreadfull Argies would have been affirming.



A lot of truth in your post Siegfried. 
Mrs T the unions were on a collision course and, much that it grieves me to admit it, she won.
Its taken 30 years but, the Union movement is finding its feet again and our expectations are more realistic in today's economy.
However,Thatcher's calculated destruction of long standing industry and turning South Wales, the north the midlands of England into a wasteland was the act of a social criminal.
Why would anyone in their right mind shut industry that you did not need to, lay off 1000's of workers and not offer to replace the old industry with new ones?
Embracing the 'dog eat dog' yuppie culture was very Thatcher, very '80's greedy corrupt.
In the end it was a bubble that burst as it was based on nothing.

The British have always reacted strongly to disobedience, look at the Empire in India for examples. I would be less than honest if I pretended that we behaved well 
As you say, 'thrashing the Argies' made Thatcher feel like Churchill.....
Now we have that wet behind the ears Cameron strutting his stuff as well.

As for Blair. He lied in Parliament, plain and simple. He is doomed to the bin of history as a fraud. His 'special relationship' with G W Bush is another bone of contention. Maybe the British are less forgiving than the Australians.

What is the matter with these people?

John


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 4, 2012)

".... Witness her destruction of academic tenure, which in effect destroyed more conservative tenureships (the real threatened academic) than supposed left ones.

Faced with a sense of loss of pride and place thrashing the dreadful Argies would have been affirming."

A great post, Siegfried , and an honest reply, John,  .. though as an 'outsider in '70's Britain' like Sig, I found the whole country unworkable (constantly paralyzed in one sector or another). And Mrs. Thatcher went after the 'unworkability' of Britain like a mad woman spring cleaning. I skipped though _those_ years visiting-working in GB purely by accident. And found myself re-doing working UK visits after Mrs. Thatcher was gone (but John Major was PM). It was clear to my eyes that GB had undergone a REVOLUTION. It was more _American_ (in the best and the worst sense of the word .... . There was energy in the people I was exposed to at work but there was also an awful cynicism - and - John you're right - _greed_.

Having said that, I think my feelings may be closer to Siegfried's on this.

British and American societies are great - and _have persevered in staying great_- because they maintain the capacity to turn themselves around from time to time - as needed. Britain's History has thrown up some pretty 'catalytic' leaders -- Elizabeth I, Oliver Cromwell, Henry VIII, King Wm of Orange .... and ... Margaret Thatcher's regime was just such a transformational incident in British History as any of the above. Babies get thrown out with bathwater in such times.

But the opposite - at extreme - was the UK before Mrs. Thatcher. The Tools Down ...socialist ... "I'm entitled to my entitlements" schtick that turns a right minded, motivated, hard working human being into a 'hive' creature with a 'contract'.

I go north to the bush every weekend, year 'round, because I like to watch 'nature' at work ... . And the more I watch and the older I get, the more I am convinced that nature's way is best - over the long run. And human-kind with our organization, and our 'beliefs' ..... the more human-kind strays from the natural .. the more _neurotic_ we become as a species. Look around ... twitter indeed.

Siegfried .... you referenced the Anglo-Alliance's capacity for 'propaganda' .... the well-placed story . 'Truthiness'. In WW2 the BBC was the voice of 'truth' to occupied Europe and the Free World. The BBC (and the government of the time) knew that (1) their broadcasts had to be 'truthful' or those on the ground in Nazis Land wouldn't listen; and (2) never believe your own propaganda. 

It's a formula that works .... unfortunately with today's media-social-media-mass media .... society has lost sight of number (2). Save the polar bears! Save the seals! Global warming! We all going to die ....! 

Indeed.

Chairs,

MM


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## Readie (Mar 4, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> greed[/I].
> MM



The cynicism level is at an all time high here Michael.

Ones view of Thatcher tends to be generational and she certaintly is a 'love hate' character.
The unions attitude is grounded in generations of poor pay, conditions, appalling H&S, lay offs and ill treatment. The British unions are no different to USA unions in that respect.
The sullen workforce that Thatcher took on has gone and no one wants a return to the strike bound society of the 1970's.
Having said that, Cameron has taken everyone on everyone with cuts, a reduction in the standard of living and blackmailing the youngsters into jobs that pay little more than the 'job seekers allowance' while the older ones now work till they are 68.
All I say to Cameron is that Thatcher came unstuck with her Poll Tax and Cameron will come unstuck with his NHS 'reforms'.
Blair came unstuck with Iraq.

The one thing that bedevils the USA and Britain is that everyone hates their benefactors in the end.
Gratitude is a myth.

Its interesting to have an honest debate with people abroad about their perceptions of Britain.

John


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## Hop (Mar 4, 2012)

> However,Thatcher's calculated destruction of long standing industry and turning South Wales, the north the midlands of England into a wasteland was the act of a social criminal.
> Why would anyone in their right mind shut industry that you did not need to, lay off 1000's of workers and not offer to replace the old industry with new ones?



Thatcher didn't.

What Thatcher did was end the Labour practice of borrowing huge amounts of money to prop up employment in state owned industries. That practice was good for Labour, because it allowed them to claim they were keeping unemployment down. It was good for workers in the short term, because it kept them in work. It was a disaster for the country in the long term because it destroyed vast areas of British industry which weren't allowed to modernise and compete internationally.

By 1979 British Leyland required twice as many man hours to build a car as Volkswagen or Ford Europe. British Steel required twice the man hours to produce a ton of steel as the German producers. BEcause it was forced to buy British coal to support the coal industry, the CEGB charged British people the highest electricity prices in western Europe.

British industry had suffered a lost 15 years since 1964. Where other countries modernised and improved, Britain stood still. The best selling car built by a British company in 1964 was the Mini. In 1979, with other countries producing much more modern cars, the Mini was still BL's best seller. There hadn't been the investment in modern designs that would enable BL to compete in the 80s.

When Thatcher gradually removed the support for those industries they were simply too far behind the opposition to survive without radical restructuring. In some cases that worked. British Steel, for example, shed a large part of the work force but modernised and kept production at a similar level. Brand led companises, like the car industry, were simply too far behind to compete.

As to replacing old failed industry with new ones, that's exactly what happened. UK car production was 1,500,000 in 1973, by 1979 it had declined to 1,050,000, but by 1990 it was up to 1,300,000 and by 1997 1,650,000. Sadly manufacturing actually declined under the last Labour government, even before the recession hit. Production was down to 1,500,000 in 2007, it fell below 1 million in 2009.

UK manufacturing output as a whole actually rose rapidly between 1979 and 1997. From an index level of 83 in 1979 to 92 in 1990, 96 in 1997, despite 2 world recessions in the same period. Under the last Labour government manufacturing production flatlined, it reached a peak of 101 in 2007, then fell in the recession to 87.

So the Tories saw a rise in output of 16% in 17 years despite 2 world recessions, and despite inheriting an extremely outdated manufacturing sector reliant on state aid to survive. Labour saw a decline in output of 6.25% in 13 years, with only 1 recession during that period (all figures inflation adjusted, of course).



> In the end it was a bubble that burst as it was based on nothing.



On the contrary. In 1997 the British economy was doing extremely well. It was admired internationally. When Gordon Brown entered the Treasury in 1997 he was briefed by a civil servant on the state of the economy. The civil servant told him he had inherited "fantastically good" figures from his predecessor. When Labour left government in 2010 the chief secretary to the Treasury, Liam Byrne, left behind a short note to his successor: "Dear chief secretary, I'm afraid to tell you there's no money left"

Do not confuse the economic success of the Tory years (including manufacturing) with the abject failure of the last government, who's greatest "achievement" was to borrow vast amounts of money to spend on public services we could not even afford at the height of the boom.

Labour in the 60s and 70s borrowed money to prop up employment in state owned industries. Labour in the noughties borrowed money to prop up employment in public services. Both caused vast damage to the country, both left behind a debt legacy, damaged industry and a country that has to make massive cuts simply to get back to stability.



> But the opposite - at extreme - was the UK before Mrs. Thatcher. The Tools Down ...socialist ... "I'm entitled to my entitlements" schtick that turns a right minded, motivated, hard working human being into a 'hive' creature with a 'contract'.



Sadly the last bout of Labour government has brought that back. One of the big stories of the last couple of weeks in Britain has been about unemployed people being "forced" to do short work experience placements with companies. If they don't stick it out for the few weeks of the placement they risked losing benefits. This, according to some of the people involved and the left who organised a massive campaign, is completely wrong. They are outraged that people may be forced to work in return for benefits they are "entitled" to.

There has been another huge campaign against a new government policy of limiting housing benefit payments to a maximum of £400 per week (about $700). There are currently people living in houses costing more than £1 million, with the state paying their rent. The left have argued bitterly that these people will have to move, and their children may even be forced to move school. They believe they are _entitled_ to have thousands of pounds a week in state benefits to enable them to live in houses very few taxpayers could afford to live in themselves.


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## pbfoot (Mar 4, 2012)

Its kinda funny a lot of union activists in the 60-80s in Canada were Brits ,
moving along the Brit unions were god awful ...no welded armour because the riveteers union were worried about their jobs , there were more stikes in IIRC 43 44 then in 37 38 . In 1940 the UK had over a million unemployed ! How can that be when you are supposedly fighting for survival in Canada it was under 1% . Interesting fact were you aware that the foreign office and ministry of warproduction did not even open for business until 11am in 1940 , I giess they didn't know there was a war on


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## Readie (Mar 4, 2012)

Hop said:


> Thatcher didn't.
> 
> What Thatcher did was end the Labour practice of borrowing huge amounts of money to prop up employment in state owned industries. That practice was good for Labour, because it allowed them to claim they were keeping unemployment down. It was good for workers in the short term, because it kept them in work. It was a disaster for the country in the long term because it destroyed vast areas of British industry which weren't allowed to modernise and compete internationally.
> 
> By 1979 British Leyland required twice as many man hours to build a car as Volkswagen or Ford Europe. British Steel required twice the man hours to produce a ton of steel as the German producers. BEcause it was forced to buy British coal to support the coal industry, the CEGB charged British people the highest electricity prices in western Europe.



Thatcher did Hop,
Any responsible government will support and develop the countries industry not just destroy it. There is more at stake than political dogma.
BL was a clever engineering firm that made better cars than Ford's cynically recycled white bread motors. I admit that industrial relations were poor but, it would be wrong to totally blame the unions.The working conditions were unacceptable.
The French have kept there car industry close to their chests and the French tend to drive French cars by and large. Who benefits? The French. Who benefitted from BL's dismantling and closure? The French, Germans, Koreans and so on. Not the British.
The British motorcycle industry reappeared like a Phoenix and how Triumph have gone from strength to strength. BL could have done the same given the opportunity.
Thatcher shut the coal mines, why? How does the importation of foreign coal help us? Thatcher laid waste to our industry and caused untold damage to the areas that relied on them. Some area's still have not recovered all these years later. I do not subscribe to the CEGB charges theory.
Thatcher shut down British Steel. A disgrace as Sheffield steel was renown world wide.Again with no reason other than to make her point.
Thatcher shut our ship building industry. Belfast the Clyde are still wastelands and monuments to political idiocy.
I could go on...
Modernisation was needed of course, most of our infrastructure was knackered after two world wars and in desperate need of renewal.
Now we have the situation where our tube trains are built in Germany, we go to Korea for ships, the 'scrappage scheme' only benefitted the Koreans and China makes everything else.
Thatcher took us as near to civil war as we have been since the Norman conquest.
I would hope that Cameron has learnt something but, somehow I doubt it.
John


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## Readie (Mar 4, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Its kinda funny a lot of union activists in the 60-80s in Canada were Brits ,
> moving along the Brit unions were god awful ...no welded armour because the riveteers union were worried about their jobs , there were more stikes in IIRC 43 44 then in 37 38 . In 1940 the UK had over a million unemployed ! How can that be when you are supposedly fighting for survival in Canada it was under 1% . Interesting fact were you aware that the foreign office and ministry of warproduction did not even open for business until 11am in 1940 , I giess they didn't know there was a war on



The British Unions were products of circumstances here, especially the inter war depression years. The Canadians must have wanted their expertise other wise why would they have allowed settlement?

John


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## pbfoot (Mar 4, 2012)

Readie said:


> A disgrace as Sheffield steel was renown world wide.Again with no reason other than to make her point.


Did it improve post war ?in fact you imported more steel then you made and the armour you did produce was of low grade no where near as good as the Germans


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## pbfoot (Mar 4, 2012)

Readie said:


> The British Unions were products of circumstances here, especially the inter war depression years. The Canadians must have wanted their expertise other wise why would they have allowed settlement?
> 
> John


Cuz we let everyone in , you can be blind with one arm and aids and we would've taken you back then


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## Readie (Mar 4, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Cuz we let everyone in , you can be blind with one arm and aids and we would've taken you back then




Bit like GB in 2012 then Neil 
John


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## Readie (Mar 4, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Did it improve post war ?in fact you imported more steel then you made and the armour you did produce was of low grade no where near as good as the Germans



I was thinking of things more productive than armour.
We have always imported steel and combined with our own production was the best balance
John


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## Siegfried (Mar 4, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> There are bomb fuses with delays for low level missions, but if they hit something very hard, it'll crush the fuse and go off on contact anyway.



Not really, it's likely that in a ligh case bomb that the explosives will spill out and the detonation fail or be severely weakened.


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## Siegfried (Mar 4, 2012)

Milosh said:


> First time I heard of any Mossies converted to metal. Details please.
> 
> A metal Mossie would be heavier than a wood one.



Well sort of aluminium mosquito but I wager it would've worked apart from the R-1830 engines:







I.Ae. 24 Calquin


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## tyrodtom (Mar 4, 2012)

You're out of your area of knowledge Siegfried. I was a munitions speacialist for 5 of the 8 years I was in the Army and USAF.
In allied munitions , one of the two fuses was in the front, ( not all bombs, but most) If they hit very hard objects, such as a very large rock, bridge abutment, etc. a delayed action bomb, or even a unarmed fused bomb could detonate instantly, because it crushes the fuse and bypasses the delay, or safety, before the bomb casing itself would experience the streeses of a hard impact. Delay fuses were common in WW2, but only used when absolutly necessary, and only on preplanned low level missions, But they weren't generally preferred because of their known problems and the fact that they would be deep underground when they exploded and maybe not inflict the damage needed.

A better system for low level attacks is delayed fall bombs, with high drag pop-out tail sections, or parachutes. Something only tried with smaller bombs in WW2, but in modern weapons about any size drop munitions has a slow fall option.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 4, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Well sort of aluminium mosquito but I wager it would've worked apart from the R-1830 engines:
> View attachment 194937
> 
> 
> ...


 Wrong, the Calquin was wood also, and fabric.


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## Readie (Mar 4, 2012)

I.Ae. 24 Calquin - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

An interesting plane and wiki article.
John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 4, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> You're out of your area of knowledge Siegfried. I was a munitions speacialist for 5 of the 8 years I was in the Army and USAF.
> In allied munitions , one of the two fuses was in the front, ( not all bombs, but most) If they hit very hard objects, such as a very large rock, bridge abutment, etc. a delayed action bomb, or even a unarmed fused bomb could detonate instantly, because it crushes the fuse and bypasses the delay, or safety, before the bomb casing itself would experience the streeses of a hard impact. Delay fuses were common in WW2, but only used when absolutly necessary, and only on preplanned low level missions, But they weren't generally preferred because of their known problems and the fact that they would be deep underground when they exploded and maybe not inflict the damage needed.
> 
> A better system for low level attacks is delayed fall bombs, with high drag pop-out tail sections, or parachutes. Something only tried with smaller bombs in WW2, but in modern weapons about any size drop munitions has a slow fall option.



500 lb bombs with parachutes were used, too. 
Called 'parademo' - parachute equipped, demolition purpose bomb. Usually dropped by 5th Airforce's B-25s A-20s in Asia/Pacific during tree-top attacks.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 4, 2012)

Hop said:


> In 1997 the British economy was doing extremely well. It was admired internationally. When Gordon Brown entered the Treasury in 1997 he was briefed by a civil servant on the state of the economy. The civil servant told him he had inherited "fantastically good" figures from his predecessor.



Actually this is a tory myth.
Public borrowing was accelerating at a (then) record rate.
The numbers were nothing like as impressive as tory mythology would claim.
Hence for the first 2 years following their 1997 election win Labours' sticking to the pitiably low public spending increases the tory party had claimed they would have stuck to (but which were in fact merely a politicval tactic they expected nobody to have to adhere to, least of all themselves - which they knew was unlikely in the extreme given the climate against them)



Hop said:


> When Labour left government in 2010 the chief secretary to the Treasury, Liam Byrne, left behind a short note to his successor: "Dear chief secretary, I'm afraid to tell you there's no money left"



......and how many times does it have to be pointed out this this was a joke?
Albeit one in poor taste but nevertheless



Hop said:


> Do not confuse the economic success of the Tory years (including manufacturing) with the abject failure of the last government, who's greatest "achievement" was to borrow vast amounts of money to spend on public services we could not even afford at the height of the boom.



More tory nonsense.

Relative to the whole post-war period Labour's record on public borrowing from 1997 - 2009 was (the exception being 2010 thanks to the global financial disaster the international financiers brought us all) actually very good. 
It is true that the UK - like most first world countries - ran a deficit but it was actually moderate perfectly manageable......until the financiers wrecked everything - something that was a direct consequence of the tory ideology of financial deregulation. 

I'll stop now as this is neither the time nor the place but for those who want the facts this is the British public borrowing record.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 4, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> 500 lb bombs with parachutes were used, too.
> Called 'parademo' - parachute equipped, demolition purpose bomb. Usually dropped by 5th Airforce's B-25s A-20s in Asia/Pacific during tree-top attacks.


 I've heard of the parafrags and up to 250 lb bombs retarted by parachutes, but I didn't know they'd dropped 500 lb para retarted bombs in WW2.
That in conjuction with a front fuze extension makes for a deadly combination for lightly protected targets . The original daisy cutters.


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## Hop (Mar 4, 2012)

> Any responsible government will support and develop the countries industry not just destroy it.



Thatcher's government did support and develop British industry. That's why output increased substantially during her time in office.

British industry thrived under the Tories, it declined under the last Labour government.



> BL was a clever engineering firm that made better cars than Ford's cynically recycled white bread motors.



Look at the BL lineup in 1979 and show me the good cars.

The Mini was a great design in the 60s. It was too old for the 80s. The Ital was just a restyled Marina, a car already 9 years old. The Allegro was 6 years old with no replacement in sight.

The only new design BL was producing was the SD1, and that was plagued by build problems. Its European launch had been killed by strikes just before the car went on sale in European markets, so that dealers didn't even have demonstrators to show the public.



> The French have kept there car industry close to their chests and the French tend to drive French cars by and large. Who benefits? The French. Who benefitted from BL's dismantling and closure? The French, Germans, Koreans and so on. Not the British.



Of course we didn't, that's why it's such a pity BL was destroyed in the 60s and 70s. But make no mistake, there was no way back for BL by 1979. Cars are sold by brand identity, BL had acquired a reputation for outdated design and extremely poor build quality. And behind the scenes their high costs meant there was never any money to invest, and union domination meant they couldn't reduce costs.



> The British motorcycle industry reappeared like a Phoenix and how Triumph have gone from strength to strength. BL could have done the same given the opportunity.



Motorbikes are a small niche. It costs millions to develop a motorbike, billions for a mass market car. BL simply didn't have the money. Government money disappeared in to the bottomless pit of union wage demands.

The British car industry died in the 70s. BL entered 1980 as a junior partner to Honda, using Honda's money and technology to develop models that BL built more expensively and with lower quality.

Growth in car industry output by value (constant prices):

1960 - 64
Germany 8.1%
UK 5.6%
France 5.5%

1964 - 69
Germany 6.5%
UK 2.2%
France 9.1%

1969 - 73
Germany 4.8%
UK 0.4%
France 7.4%

1973 - 78
Germany 2.5%
UK -2.4%
France 3.1%

What happened to the British car industry was a national disaster, but it happened long before Thatcher came to power.



> Thatcher shut the coal mines, why? How does the importation of foreign coal help us?



The coal mines shut because they were too expensive to run. If you force everyone in the country to pay higher electricity prices to subsidise coal mines, it puts higher costs on British industry and consumers. Consumers have less money to spend on things they want, industry has less money to invest.



> I do not subscribe to the CEGB charges theory.



It's not a theory, it's fact. Britain had the most expensive electricity in western Europe in the 70s. By the 90s we had the cheapest. (We are still second cheapest, behind France).



> Thatcher shut down British Steel.



British Steel was still going strong in 1997. UK steel production was 17 million tons in 1979, it was still 17 million tons in 1997. (Along with the rest of UK manufacturing, it fell substantially under the last government)

What Thatcher did was modernise British Steel. Jobs were lost, production maintained.



> Thatcher shut our ship building industry. Belfast the Clyde are still wastelands and monuments to political idiocy.



The decline in shipbuilding also preceded Thatcher. In 1963 the UK produced 17.52% of the world total shipping. By 1980 that was down to 3.3% In terms of tonnage, 1,096,000 in 1963, 427,000 in 1980.



> Now we have the situation where our tube trains are built in Germany, we go to Korea for ships, the 'scrappage scheme' only benefitted the Koreans and China makes everything else.



That's a good summary _now_. But that's after 13 years of Labour government. 13 years in which manufacturing output declined sharply.


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## Siegfried (Mar 4, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> You're out of your area of knowledge Siegfried. I was a munitions speacialist for 5 of the 8 years I was in the Army and USAF.
> In allied munitions , one of the two fuses was in the front, ( not all bombs, but most) If they hit very hard objects, such as a very large rock, bridge abutment, etc. a delayed action bomb, or even a unarmed fused bomb could detonate instantly, because it crushes the fuse and bypasses the delay, or safety, before the bomb casing itself would experience the streeses of a hard impact. Delay fuses were common in WW2, but only used when absolutly necessary, and only on preplanned low level missions, But they weren't generally preferred because of their known problems and the fact that they would be deep underground when they exploded and maybe not inflict the damage needed.
> 
> A better system for low level attacks is delayed fall bombs, with high drag pop-out tail sections, or parachutes. Something only tried with smaller bombs in WW2, but in modern weapons about any size drop munitions has a slow fall option.



I think you should have invoked you 'professionalism' and been specific enough to state that you were talking of a duel fuze system: nose contact plus time delay.

I suspect that you are not all that familiar with WW2 munitions. Nose contact fuzes are considered a safety hazard and avoided unless absolutely neccessary because even a light impact can activate it. Deceleration fuses, which can be instantaneous or time delay are much safer.


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## Hop (Mar 4, 2012)

> Actually this is a tory myth.
> Public borrowing was accelerating at a (then) record rate.
> The numbers were nothing like as impressive as tory mythology would claim.



No, public borrowing was contracting, after the rise following the early 90s recession.

UK public borrowing was in surplus at the end of the 80s. The figures for the 90s percentage of GDP per financial year:

1989/90 - -0.19
1990/91 - 1.01
1991/92 - 3.73
1992/93 - 7.44
1993/94 - 7.67
1994/95 - 6.15
1995/96 - 4.67
1996/97 - 3.42
1997/98 - 0.68
1998/99 - -0.5
1999/00 - -1.64

Labour took over in 1997 when the budget was heading back in to the black at a very rapid rate. 



> Hence for the first 2 years following their 1997 election win Labours' sticking to the pitiably low public spending increases the tory party had claimed they would have stuck to (but which were in fact merely a politicval tactic they expected nobody to have to adhere to, least of all themselves - which they knew was unlikely in the extreme given the climate against them)



Those were the spending increases the Tories had already been following since the early 90s recession, which is why borrowing was falling so fast.

The great tragedy for Britain, of course, is that if Labour had stuck to those increases we would have a surplus now. Instead we face cuts on a scale we've never seen before in modern times.



> ......and how many times does it have to be pointed out this this was a joke?
> Albeit one in poor taste but nevertheless



It might have been meant as a joke, sadly it was also true. A budget deficit of over 11% of GDP, higher than any major western economy. There really was no more money left, borrowing was at astronomical levels, and the incoming government had to make massive cuts to stave off bankruptcy.



> Relative to the whole post-war period Labour's record on public borrowing from 1997 - 2009 was (the exception being 2010 thanks to the global financial disaster the international financiers brought us all) actually very good.



No, it was terrible *because they borrowed during a boom*.

If you are borrowing because you can't make ends meet in the good times, what happens when the bad times come? Labour borrowed when they should have been saving.

Look at it another way. The Tories repayed 1.3% of GDP in 1989. The early 90s recession then caused borrowing to rise to 7.67% of GDP. That's a spread of 9% of GDP.

Labour entered the last recession with the deficit at 2.5% of GDP. That then rose to 11.5% during the recession, again a spread of 9%.

We were in such a bad position because we were already spending far more than the economy could afford before the recession began, despite the booming tax take from bonuses, house sales, vat etc.

If we had entered the recession with a 3% surplus, borrowing would only have risen to 6% of GDP in the recession. That we could have managed.



> It is true that the UK - like most first world countries - ran a deficit



The successful countries got their deficits under control during the noughties. Germany, Sweden, Canada etc all reduced the size of the government over the period. They are doing rather well now. Labour greatly increased the size of the state, and borrowed accordingly, which is why Britain is in such a mess.



> but it was actually moderate perfectly manageable......until the financiers wrecked everything



You mean the borrowing during the boom years was affordable as long as the boom continued?

If you borrow to finance spending in the good years, and borrow a lot more in the bad years, when do you stop borrowing? When do you ever get around to repaying? 



> something that was a direct consequence of the tory ideology of financial deregulation.



But it wasn't, was it? It was the Edinburgh and Northern banks, under Gordon Brown's new FSA regulatory scheme, that went bust. Not the traditional banks in the City, but those in the Labour heartlands, run by bankers who were close friends of Brown. Crony Capitalism at its finest.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 4, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> I think you should have invoked you 'professionalism' and been specific enough to state that you were talking of a duel fuze system: nose contact plus time delay.
> 
> I suspect that you are not all that familiar with WW2 munitions. Nose contact fuzes are considered a safety hazard and avoided unless absolutely neccessary because even a light impact can activate it. Deceleration fuses, which can be instantaneous or time delay are much safer.[/QUOTE
> We were still using some WW2 bombs and about all the fuzes were WW2 developed fuzes, even in the more modern bombs in the late 60's in Thailand, we had no jets at NKP.
> ...


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## Milosh (Mar 4, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> I think you should have invoked you 'professionalism' and been specific enough to state that you were talking of a duel fuze system: nose contact plus time delay.
> 
> I suspect that you are not all that familiar with WW2 munitions. Nose contact fuzes are considered a safety hazard and avoided unless absolutely neccessary because even a light impact can activate it. Deceleration fuses, which can be instantaneous or time delay are much safer.



I guess they were necessary on American bomb then.


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## Ratsel (Mar 4, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> For quite some time, the the bomb raids were the only instrument available for Allies to bring the war to Germany. However, those raids whole Combined bomber offensive is criticized sometimes. So how would you conduct it, both during day night, with equipment historically available?


Exactly as History played out. I don't think 'more of this, less of that' would have made much difference. There was only one strategy to beat Germany.. not including the 'Nuclear solution'.


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## Freebird (Mar 5, 2012)

stona said:


> This was the basis for area bombing which the RAF,particularly in the right conditions,became very good at. That's why I would have done the same thing. With the tools available it was the only way of carrying the fight to Germany. I will not apologise for the tactics of Bomber Command.Harris did what service chiefs do and fought to get the aircraft he thought he needed for his service. He obviously argued persuasively.During the Battle of the Atlantic I wonder just how the extra aircraft would have found these U-Boats with the technology available. The battle was in any case won without them which at least justifies Harris' stance even if I have some reservations with the aid of hindsight.



The problem was that we WEREN'T taking the fight to German cities in 1941, we were taking the fight to German cows (farms etc)
The Butt report showed very clearly that less than 5% of the bombers could get within a couple of miles.

They would have been better to use the bombers in other theaters, or for ASW (as pbfoot noted)
It was also the stubborn isnsistance by Portal, Harris et all that everything must be sacrificed to keep up the bombing effort at maximum that damaged the war effort.

Suppose that instead of using the resources to build 50 or 60 heavy bombers in 1941, you built 250 hurricanes and sent them to Malaya, it would have made a huge difference.
Would the subtration of 60 bombers make much difference to Bomber command? Would they even notice?




pbfoot said:


> I'm sorry I disagree the Bomber Command offensive was the Paschendaele of the air no other words, stubborn old men with no clue squandering lives. Its not right to muddle on with peoples lives.


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## Glider (Mar 5, 2012)

Its also worth thinking of the difference 50 heavy bombers would have made in the Battle of the Atlantic during 1941-2


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## Gixxerman (Mar 5, 2012)

Hop
Your amusingly biased and cherry-picked party political assertions really are out incredibly of place here.
Too few know even fewer care about your personal political opinions choice of how you interpret political events, for that is all this is.

I suggest you do your silly narrow party-political preaching somewhere where someone might be interested, this certainly isn't the place for it, the Telegraph Daily Mail websites are still free even if Rupert has paywalled his. 

(although as the 1960's TSR2 the then Labour Gov case shows, for some in the UK, party politics and defence often interlink......and similarly there is rank hypocrisy and bias, as the tory Duncan Sandys gets completely ignored by the tory fanclub). 



Hop said:


> It was the Edinburgh and Northern banks, under Gordon Brown's new FSA regulatory scheme, that went bust. Not the traditional banks in the City, but those in the Labour heartlands, run by bankers who were close friends of Brown.



I will address this one as it is part of a laughably ridiculous myth some of those on the right are trying to establish in the US UK at the moment.

Bad mortgage debt (in the UK USA) is but a drop in the ocean compared to the losses the financial sector's madness lumbered the rest of us with.
The US mortgage market was around $10.5 trillion in total in 2008 - and bear in mind most of that is not at all 'toxic' debt.
The British mortgage market much lower amounts. Obviously.
Northern Rock's nationalisation cost about £87 billion, for instance.

This contrasts to the real problem, derivatives and the insane practice of 'collateralized debt' in layer upon layer.
Estimated in 2008 to be about $1,150 trillion. 

All the bad mortgage market did was reveal the Emperor's clothes.
They are not the cause of the problem......and in fact had they been we could have had a couple of years adjusting a shallow recession to get over it carried on without the (still) possible global slump hanging over us all.

It's not often one can recommend a film to inform oneself about these events but the Matt Damon narrated 'Inside Job' of 2010 is a very good starting point demonstrates just how absurd this attempt to pretend the financial crisis was born out the mortgage market loans going to those who could ill afford them is. 

....and if you want to play British party-politics the tory party have done nothing but press for even greater deregulation all along (the joke being that even the feeble attempts at regulation were criticised as 'control freakery' 'Stalinism' by them their friends in the press here).
As late as 2007/8 tory policy was calling for even further deregulation in the UK (including the British mortgage market).

You also seem determined to ignore the international aspect of this in your party political nonsense.
I actually have no great love of the British Labour party (afterall they carried on in many aspects with the tory economic policies that created this mess) but I do find the this sort of one-eyed devotion you seem to have for the tory party rather quaint.

The fact is and with very few exceptions all political careers end in failure all Govs disappoint.

Now.........can we get back to talking about WW2 aeroplanes?


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## fastmongrel (Mar 5, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> Now.........can we get back to talking about WW2 aeroplanes?



PLEASE or take it to a politics forum. British politics is for British people to talk about down the pub anywhere else particulary on a forum where British people are in a minority is just rude.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 5, 2012)

Alright...

This thread is about the Bomber Offensive vs. Germany, not the British Govt. and Economy in 1997. 

Get this back on topic now, or the thread is closed.

Next person that throws out an insult as well, will take a weeks vacation. This is getting really old. If you can't say it without insulting someone, then go and play someplace else!!

I am not going to point fingers, those of you that are throwing out insults because you don't care for someones post, know who you are. That goes for any thread. It carries over, from here on out!


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## tomo pauk (Mar 5, 2012)

Perhaps someone can chime in with an assessment how well the Spit VIII would've fared as bomber escort for 1943, ETO?


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 5, 2012)

All this talk of 50 bombers diverted to the North Atlantic here and 50 more morphed into Hurricanes there .......

The North Atlantic campaign wasn't _visible_ (the rations were, I grant) to the British public ... and certainly Singapore was off the map visibility wise ... unlike hammering Germany -- German cows, German shitters, German worker-housing blocks -- Germany-the-enemy, night after night.

You armchair strategists don't get it  -- in democracies, policy has to have public appeal to be long-term successful.

Ask yourself one question: As the night air war persisted, did RAF-Commonwealth bomber command get any better (technology, aircraft, weapons, results, bombing options, etc.) ...? If the answer is no -- then the campaign was a F.U. and should have been stopped. But, if the answer is "yes" even a qualified "yes" then Harris and the Government of the time were correct to stay the course - because - it was popular with the public. They were sacrificing at home night and day but the Germans were going to pay - and pay dearly. (Twice in one generation, indeed!)
.
We - Cold War and Post Cold War folks are spoiled. We are used to seeing constant vigilance (think 24-7 SAC), constant rehearsal and then occasional precise, covert, surgical strikes ..... ideal military strategy and deployment .... we are NOT used to seeing (and can't accept) prolonged pounding away in the dark ... with seemingly mindless losses. Well - WW1 was certainly that, and if PBFoot is right - that Bomber Command was Paschendaele - you can see the origins of the sacrifice. (Personally, I don't accept that comparison ). 

As the Germans moved to night bombing of the U.K. the RAF could have introduced the night intruder into the German bomber air patterns at landing and take-off ...
as an alternative to night bombing, But with what aircraft and crew .... Defiants? Beaufighters? I don't think so, That mission had to wait for the Mosquito to hatch .

RAF did what it had to do and I - for one - accept that. POLITICS PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN WARFARE (In democracies).

MM


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## Readie (Mar 5, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> All this talk of 50 bombers diverted to the North Atlantic here and 50 more morphed into Hurricanes there .......
> 
> The North Atlantic campaign wasn't _visible_ (the rations were, I grant) to the British public ... and certainly Singapore was off the map visibility wise ... unlike hammering Germany -- German cows, German shitters, German worker-housing blocks -- Germany-the-enemy, night after night.
> 
> ...



Well said Michael.
The British public wanted revenge. That is a powerfull motivater and sacrifices are acceptable.
John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 5, 2012)

British soldiers wanted less german tanks, british pilots wanted less LW planes Flak, british sailors wanted less subs. All of which required fuel. Was there a way to satisfy both civilians servicemen, to conduct a bombing campaign that can actually flatten a factory or a hydrogenation plant as early as, say, 1942?


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## Readie (Mar 5, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> British soldiers wanted less german tanks, british pilots wanted less LW planes Flak, british sailors wanted less subs. All of which required fuel. Was there a way to satisfy both civilians servicemen, to conduct a bombing campaign that can actually flatten a factory or a hydrogenation plant as early as, say, 1942?



There was a finite supply of fuel in 1942. Churchill and his commanders chose the most effective use of all resources to wage war.
We tend to forget the human cost as well as inanimate objects of war.
There only so many people available to fight and once they have gone that's pretty much game over.
If Harris was right, the rate of attrition of German lives with the firestorms and 1000 bomer raids would have had an impact on Germany's ability to continue with the war.

This civilian lives issue must have been in mind when the V2 / V1's were planned and also, perhaps, with the A bomb too.

John


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## Ratsel (Mar 5, 2012)

I think the Germans could defend themselves very well during 1942, no matter how many RAF bombers were thrown at them. Germany's biggest mistake was attacking Russia, without that front to worry about lets say, it would have been a fatal outcome for the RAF. IMO.


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## davebender (Mar 5, 2012)

I have been giving this some thought. 

If an enemy nation sends light bombers into the Ruhr Germany will waste no time installing smoke generators to augment existing smog. Visibility will be about 10 feet. Next time a light bomber dives into the Ruhr enemy aircrew won't be able to see their own wingtips. Targeting individual factory buildings would be impossible.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 5, 2012)

There are a lot of things that could have been done differently, however one also has to look at the scale of the operations. With something like 50% of all bombs dropped in Europe being dropped in 1944 the chances of even a major change in 1940-41-42 using anything like the existing forces causing a major change (affecting the war by months) is pretty slim. Certainly British losses could have been reduced for the same effect, or even a few more plants taken out of operation for weeks at a time but the bomber forces involved we too small to make the need repeat raids to stop factories from being repaired/ rebuilt. It took a long time to realize that bombed factories, on both sides, were not permanently destroyed and could be rebuilt in weeks if not months. Supermarines South Hampton factory could have been rebuilt, but it also could have been bombed again almost as easily. The British accepted the delay in production in dispersing the factory as a way to guard against future bomb raids. 

Harris does have a lot to answer for but the British bombing effort in 1941-42 was but a pale indicator of what it would be in 1944 and different target selection, different tactics, or different training cannot change that.


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## Readie (Mar 5, 2012)

I'm at a slight loss as to why Harris has anything to answer for?
He was a man of the moment like all great commanders in history.
John


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## Gixxerman (Mar 5, 2012)

I have to agree with John here.
I also find the bombing of civillians horrific and every other adjective for horrified appalled you care to list........ but given the tech of the day and the thinking of the time * and the actions of the major adversary to that point* it is perfectly understandable why Harris the British Gov pursued the bombing campaign, despite the horrific costs to both civillians those crews involved.

Germany thought it was fair to behave in this way and also believed all the stuff about breaking the populations' morale etc.

Even at the end I have every sympathy with those who look in horror at the cost to German civillians when it appeared the war was already long won.
Again a 'but'......but hindsight is a wondeful thing when the German leadership was continually talking about surprise revenge weapons of incredible power (and unveiling using some in that last year) and the allies knowing what they knew about their own race for the A-bomb (and knowing that they could not possibly know the absolute and total picture of the German program......which it has to be remembered they knew for sure existed) then I am not surprised they kept on hammering away relentlessly until the thing was done.

The fault and any questions to be answered for reside entirely with the political leadership of Germany, it was entirely thanks to thier actions that that dreadful catastrophe fell upon the German people.

We certainly know that regardless of the original restraint it didn't take long so that when the boot was on the other foot the German leadership had no qualms about hammering the non-combatant civillian populace as hard as their means allowed.
I have no doubt that a nazi Germany equpped with a similar heavy bomber force the fuel to operate it at the level the British Americans operated theirs would have been at least as ruthless and probably a heck of a lot more so.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 5, 2012)

Bomber command "hogged" a fair amount of British production at times without a corresponding impact in effect.

Pre war bomber command had first call on 2 speed supercharged engines and on adjustable/constant speed propellers.
The insistence on every bomber being used to bomb cow pastures in europe vs a few squadrons used for anti-sub patrols has already been mentioned. Anti sub work is very hard to measure as success is not measured by subs sunk but by cargo ships not sunk. It is like trying to prove a negative. While 20-40 cargo ships not sunk in the Atlantic won't end the war 6 months sooner, The aircraft, fuel and crews may have been better employed doing that than futzing about over Europe trying to find targets. How many planes/crews do you need to perfect navigation and bombing technique before you really gear up?
Granted a 500 bomber raid sounds much better in the papers than "patrol plane caused sub to submerge and miss convoy, maybe".
Going to a higher cruise speed for many of the missions flown would have hardly affected bomb load for many targets and yet save many bomber crews as the higher resulting speeds would have increased the difficulty of German interceptions. 
Trading ammo for bomb load would have improved target results for little or no change in aircraft losses. A Lancaster carried some thing over ONE full minute of firing time worth of ammo for the rear turret. Better target result means fewer aircraft ( and air crew) needed and lost per 1000 tons dropped. 
Better training earlier or admitting that some targets were beyond effective range, effective in the sense that closer targets mean less time for the navigation to go completely in the toilet.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 5, 2012)

On the money there 

Any options for the USAAF for 1943? Maybe RAF could chip in, during daylight that is?


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## Readie (Mar 5, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Maybe RAF could chip in, during daylight that is?



Who came first the RAF or USAAF? 
The Wellington was bombing long before the Americans arrived.
John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 5, 2012)

No need to cut sentences out of context - I was trying to picture the RAF units going really deep, maybe as deep as Ruhr, in 1943, daylight. At least I'm not the one that does not believe that USAAF single-handendly destroyed the LW


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## Readie (Mar 5, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> No need to cut sentences out of context - I was trying to picture the RAF units going really deep, maybe as deep as Ruhr, in 1943, daylight. At least I'm not the one that does not believe that USAAF single-handendly destroyed the LW



Why? Night raids were chosen for very good reasons.
What could a raid in daylight achieve over a night raid?
Maybe I'm missing your point Tomo...
John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 5, 2012)

Maybe the raids could've made a mess out of, say, hydrogenation plants so next month less LW planes can take off - so LW is in fuel crisis in late 1943, 'stead in late 1944? Or maybe devastation of railroad junctions so the coal cannot be moved from mines towards wherever it's to go?
Attacking particular factories was not RAF's night bomber's forte in 1943, or at least one could gather that picture in this thread - night raids were chosen back in 1940/41 in order to protect bombers, with side effect that bombing accuracy plummeted. 

So my point is that maybe RAF could use Spit VIIIs, Mossies etc to, say, harm badly the LW, so the USAAF has a better chance to hit something from the 1st sentence. Perhaps you might answer my question about Spit VIII?


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## Siegfried (Mar 5, 2012)

Outside of the range of Oboe the RAF was only able to hit city centers, the rare exception being on moonlit nights, which were rather good for the nightfighters. A serious hit on refineries would be beyond its abilities in 1943. The accuracy was measured in miles. Once the area bombardment directive was issued more refined navigation that could accuratly hit at long ranges was given low priority, one such system used oboe like transponders from orbiting aircraft. Nor did the RAF move to improve their bombers so that they might survive during the day. In 1943 still had what was the best FLAK gun laying radar till then Wurzburg was only elipsed by SCR-584 in Feb 1944 so a bomber would need to be able to fly high or fast during the day.

In anycase, the refineries were being left alone untill just before d-day as the german response would soon make them relatively invulnerable.


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## pbfoot (Mar 5, 2012)

If BC could organize the Dams raids, Amiens , Copenhagen and other precision raids why were they unable to organize more precision raids rather then massacres like the Nueremberg fiasco and the Battle of Berlin which if given a close look appears to be very near a defeat . IIRC was there not a lo level daylight raid using Lancs in 42 into Germany that was close to being caualty free. Out of curiosity I`ve heard that very few Aussies were leaders of Squadrons why is that


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## wuzak (Mar 5, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> If BC could organize the Dams raids, Amiens , Copenhagen and other precision raids why were they unable to organize more precision raids rather then massacres like the Nueremberg fiasco and the Battle of Berlin which if given a close look appears to be very near a defeat . IIRC was there not a lo level daylight raid using Lancs in 42 into Germany that was close to being caualty free. Out of curiosity I`ve heard that very few Aussies were leaders of Squadrons why is that



Hmm, how many low level daylight ops did Lancs perform? I would venture a guess at NONE!

Mossies did a few low level daylight ops in 1942 without casualty. If we fast forward to January 1943 there were two low level operations to Berlin by Mosquitos. One broke up a speech by Goering, another a rally with Goebbels. The first raid was casualty free, teh second suffered one loss (3 aircraft in each raid).


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## pbfoot (Mar 5, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Hmm, how many low level daylight ops did Lancs perform? I would venture a guess at NONE!


Hmm bad guess ? how about July 11 1942 33 lancs attack sub pens in Danzig they lost 2 mind you the approach to the target was at dusk


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## Glider (Mar 5, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Hmm, how many low level daylight ops did Lancs perform? I would venture a guess at NONE!



I am trying to find the exact date but in 1943 there was one with 90+ Lancs which had no losses


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## mhuxt (Mar 6, 2012)

Augsburg springs to mind, though casualties were heavy - IIRC LW fighters chanced across the Lancs on return from an attempted interception of a USAAF incursion.

Edit, sorry was a diversionary RAF raid on Cherbourg:

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/augsburg.html


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## mhuxt (Mar 6, 2012)

Glider said:


> I am trying to find the exact date but in 1943 there was one with 90+ Lancs which had no losses


 
You're thinking of the Le Creusot raid, 17 October 1942.


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## wuzak (Mar 6, 2012)

I stand corrected.

Does seem a lot like suicide though....


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## pbfoot (Mar 6, 2012)

wuzak said:


> I stand corrected.
> 
> Does seem a lot like suicide though....


Some of the loss rates for night missions approached 10% if you include aircraft written off after landing , thats a lot of young guys gone with little visible results . It harkens to remember that the photo flash was used to ensure guys were dropping bombs on target rather then North Sea and then stooging around waiting to return with stream


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## Readie (Mar 6, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Some of the loss rates for night missions approached 10% if you include aircraft written off after landing , thats a lot of young guys gone with little visible results ...



True Neil, that also applies to the early Royal Marine Commando raids in WW2 while the bosses were learning the craft.
John


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## Readie (Mar 6, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Perhaps someone can chime in with an assessment how well the Spit VIII would've fared as bomber escort for 1943, ETO?



Tomo,

1,657 Mk VIIIs were produced in all, so although it never replaced the Mx IX in Britain and Northern Europe it was still a major version of the Spitfire. It was produced in three versions. The F.VIII using the 1,560 hp Merlin 61 was the standard fighter model. The HF.VIII used a 1,655hp Merlin 70 and was a high altitude fighter and the LF.VIII used the 1,705 hp Merlin 66 and was officially a low altitude fighter, although its best altitude was not that much lower than for the F.

The success of the Mk IX reduced the importance of the Mk VIII. Although the first production model was completed in November 1942, it took until June 1943 for the first squadron to be equipped with the model. One reason for the delay was that it had been decided to use the Mk VIII in the Mediterranean and Far East, and so the first squadron to use it was No. 145, based on Malta. By the summer of 1943 the crisis in the Mediterranean was in the past, and the Mk VIII saw most of its service during the invasion of Italy, often in a ground attack role.

Spitfire History

Towards the end of August 1942, the Luftwaffe began launching high-level bombing raids against England. A unit called the Höhenkampfkommando der Versuchsstelle für Höhenflüge, equipped with a small number of Junkers Ju 86R bombers, was able to bomb England from above 40,000 ft without impediment from RAF fighters, or from anti-aircraft guns. On one such attack on 28 August a single bomb dropped on Bristol killed 48 people and injured another 46. To counter the threat, the "High Altitude Flight" was formed at RAF Northolt; this unit used a pair of Spitfire Mk Vcs which were converted into IXs by Rolls-Royce at the Hucknall plant. These were stripped of everything not required for the role of high-level interception, lightening them by 450 lb each. On 12 September 1942 Flying Officer Emanuel Galitzine, flying BS273, successfully intercepted a Ju 86R piloted by Fw Horst Götz and commanded by Leutnant Erich Sommer above Southampton at 41,000 ft. The ensuing battle went up to 43,000 ft and was the highest air battle of the war. However, problems were caused by the freezing air at that altitude and the combat was not decisive: the port cannon suffered a jam and, whenever the pilot fired a burst, the aircraft would slew and fall out of the sky. The bomber escaped safely with just one hit to its port wing, but having found it to be vulnerable to the RAF at high altitudes, the Luftwaffe launched no further high-altitude attacks against England.

As the American strategic (B-17 and B-24) and medium (B-26 and A-20) bombing campaigns gathered momentum in mid-1943, the need for fighter escort meant much of Fighter Command's Spitfire force was utilised in this role while the U.S. fighter groups worked up to operational status.[83] The limited combat radius of the Spitfire, however, meant the RAF support operations were limited to the North Sea-coastal regions of Belgium and north-western France and across the English Channel to Normandy. As the battle intensified over occupied Europe, USAAF fighters like the P-47, P-38 and, from early 1944, P-51 bore the brunt of bomber protection. Spitfire IX squadrons had to bide their time until the invasion of Europe before fully engaging the Luftwaffe's Jagdwaffe.


Tomo,

The Spitfire was not really suitable as a long range bomber escort fighter. It played a role in the defence of Britain and was a stop gap until the Mustang arrived.
As the war progressed and range ( of the lack of it) was not so much of an issue the Spitfire joined in.

John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2012)

I appreciate your work, John. Unfortunately, it does not give a single reason why the Spit VIII was a lousy choice to bring the war even more to the Germans, or Germany proper.

I've done some superficial search in order to find out more about Spitfire VIII fuel quantity. There was 120 imp gals of fuel internally and 90 gals in single dropable tank, ferry range being 1265 miles ( http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit8performance-n.jpg ). That would mean just under 350 miles of combat range; P-51D was capable for 375 miles on 269 us gal (215 imp gal, but all internal). The capability comparable with P-47 with 305 + 75 us gals (= 340 miles, from July 1943) - meaning that Spitfire, even without rear hull tanks was capable to escort bombers to Ruhr. 

If some kind soul has good data about when the rear hull tanks were issued for Spitfires, it would be cool to post it


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## Milosh (Mar 6, 2012)

tomo, Spitfires were used to escort American heavy bombers. They escorted them on the outward leg and picked them up on their return. This allowed more American fighters to do the escorting at the longer ranges, which some people seem to forget.

The Spitfire VIII was sent to the MTO and to SEA where the longer range was required more.


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## Glider (Mar 6, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> If some kind soul has good data about when the rear hull tanks were issued for Spitfires, it would be cool to post it



As requested, its a bit rough but I think you can make it out


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2012)

Thanks, I'm aware that Spit VIIIs were (exclusively?) sent abroad, and that UK-based Spits were protecting the bombers near the UK. Maybe it was a mistake to not produce more of those?
My point is that longer-ranged Spits would've escorted them as far as Ruhr/Bremen/Strassburg, playing a far more important role. The US escorts were really few in numbers and capability in 1943, and that's the time I'm interested more than about 1944 - when the USAAF had far better more escorts themselves.

Thanks, Glider 
That Would be July 9th 1944, not Sept 7th?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2012)

Taken from another froum (many familiar people there  ):

http://warbirdsforum.com/showthread.php?t=1962

Basically, with a 75 imp gals in rear hull tank, plus a 45 imp gals externally, economic power settings, flying around 1000 ft, the endurance of the Spit was 5 hours.


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## Glider (Mar 6, 2012)

It would be 7th September, the UK use ddmmyy.

This might be of interest, agan rough but you can make it out


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## Siegfried (Mar 7, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Taken from another froum (many familiar people there  ):
> 
> http://warbirdsforum.com/showthread.php?t=1962
> 
> Basically, with a 75 imp gals in rear hull tank, plus a 45 imp gals externally, economic power settings, flying around 1000 ft, the endurance of the Spit was 5 hours.




The rear hull tank was essentially unusable except for ferrying it created such serious stabillity issues, much worse than the P-51 tail tank. Worse if engaged by German fighters it could not be jettisoned given the handling issues most of it would need to be burned off first; this then leaves the aircraft with full drop tanks which themselves need to be jetisoned immediatly upon being engaged by the enemy. Any gain in range would be small and compromised by the need to burn tail fuel first and then The Spitifre IX actually had LESS range than the Me 109G (both at maxium cruise). Really, an Me 109G with a 66 gallon drop tank could ferry about the same distance, a result of fuel efficiency in the DB605 I believe.

Spitfire VIII and Mk XIV etc received leading edge wing tanks, I believe of 12.5 gallons per wing. Latter F.22 (with and entirely new wing) managed an addition 6 gallons there. The VIII certainly had more range but ended up in the Paciffic where its range was essentiall; the XIV needed the extra fuel to compensate for the thirsty Grifffon.

The 5 hour endurance of the Spitfire is also almost totally useless in combat situation. It was a supermarine publicity stunt by Mutt Sommers.


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## Glider (Mar 7, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The rear hull tank was essentially unusable except for ferrying it created such serious stabillity issues, much worse than the P-51 tail tank. Worse if engaged by German fighters it could not be jettisoned given the handling issues most of it would need to be burned off first; this then leaves the aircraft with full drop tanks which themselves need to be jetisoned immediatly upon being engaged by the enemy. Any gain in range would be small and compromised by the need to burn tail fuel first and then The Spitifre IX actually had LESS range than the Me 109G (both at maxium cruise). Really, an Me 109G with a 66 gallon drop tank could ferry about the same distance, a result of fuel efficiency in the DB605 I believe.


I don't see how this differs from the Mustang which also had a rear tank that had to be used first and was left with the drop tanks that had to be dropped on first contact Am I right in saying that this is the same as the PR Spits which didn't have a problem with the internal tanks.


> The 5 hour endurance of the Spitfire is also almost totally useless in combat situation. It was a supermarine publicity stunt by Mutt Sommers.


It might have been a stunt to some degree but both the UK and the USA made modifications to the Spit with similar results but the UK changes had less reliance on the drop tanks, so it also proved a point.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2012)

Glider, many thanks for you input, a very constructive indeed  The date format is then as used here.

Hi, SIgrfried,
Glider has covered the rear tank (actually _tanks_, lower with 33 imp gals, upper with 41 or 33 gals) endurance questions. 
I was advocating for the Spit VIII anyway, the fuel of 120 imp gals internally had no problem being augmented by one or both rear hull tanks, so we arrive at 153 - 194 imp gals ( 191 - 242 us gals - hello, P-51). A premier all-around fighter for 1943?


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## Readie (Mar 7, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Glider, many thanks for you input, a very constructive indeed  The date format is then as used here.
> 
> Hi, SIgrfried,
> Glider has covered the rear tank (actually _tanks_, lower with 33 imp gals, upper with 41 or 33 gals) endurance questions.
> I was advocating for the Spit VIII anyway, the fuel of 120 imp gals internally had no problem being augmented by one or both rear hull tanks, so we arrive at 153 - 194 imp gals ( 191 - 242 us gals - hello, P-51). A premier all-around fighter for 1943?



Many say that the Mk8 was the best Spitfire Tomo.
Others say the Mk9
and so on.
Each mark had pros and cons like other fighters that were used throughout WW2.

The only Spitfire that had true long range was the PR version. Berlin and back.

John


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## Hop (Mar 7, 2012)

> The rear hull tank was essentially unusable except for ferrying it created such serious stabillity issues, much worse than the P-51 tail tank.



The RAF seem to have considered the stability issues to be better than the P-51. From the Spitfire IX manual:



> Aerobatics are not permitted when carrying any external stores (except the 30 gallon "blister" drop tank) nor when the rear fuselage tanks contain more than 30 gallons of fuel, and are not recommended when the rear fuselage tanks contain any fuel



From the RAF Mustang III manual:



> When carrying bombs or drop tanks, or with fuel in fuselage tank, aerobatics are prohibited



Post war the Spitfires needed special permission to use their rear fuselage tanks. The RAF removed the Mustang rear fuselage tanks completely.



> Thanks, I'm aware that Spit VIIIs were (exclusively?) sent abroad, and that UK-based Spits were protecting the bombers near the UK. Maybe it was a mistake to not produce more of those?
> My point is that longer-ranged Spits would've escorted them as far as Ruhr/Bremen/Strassburg, playing a far more important role. The US escorts were really few in numbers and capability in 1943, and that's the time I'm interested more than about 1944 - when the USAAF had far better more escorts themselves.



The problem with earlier long range escorts is that the requirement wasn't really there until 1943. It wasn't until February 1943 that the USAAF began studying drop tanks for combat use. Orders weren't placed until September 1943. 

In July 1943 Arnold sent a representative to US fighter manufacturers to ask them to put more fuel tanks in their aircraft. It took until March 1944 for Republic to modify P-47 production lines.

In other words, it wasn't until the US doctrine of self defending bombers was clearly seen to fail that the US started demanding more range. If the US didn't see the need until so late, how would the RAF, who were busy escorting mediums and fighter bombers to targets in France?

Producing anything in war time means not producing something else. Switching Spitfire IX production to Spitfire VIIIs would have meant disruption and less Spitfires produced. Without the clear requirement, it wasn't going to happen.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2012)

Hi, John,

In my eyes the Spit VIII is a more usable plane than Spit XI, while the other capabilities are almost identical. Hence the Spit VIII is a better one 

Hi, Hop,

The thread is titled 'you are in charge', and usage of real, existing equipment is encouraged. That means that a person in charge will not adhere to the self-defending bomber mantra , but try and introduce some real escort. 
The Spit VIII was already being produced, no great novelties there. But even the Spit IX with one rear tank can compete, let alone with both.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2012)

I'll make a pause on Spit, and move on with US planes.

For P-47 to carry some extra fuel, the plane need to carry drop tank(s). The P-47s in early 1943 were not carrying the real drop tank; the 210 gal tanks were for ferry purposes. The biggest drop tank that can fit under hull seem to be the 108 us gal one, 90 gal imp. That gives the escort range of 375 miles. 

The P-38 is a tricky bird here. The Gs and Hs should not exceed the 25000 ft if we want both pilots and engines to function properly, so it's too bad that theoretical capabilities are not so easy to turn into the practical ones. We have the needed range, though. So why not attach a bomb under one wing, a 150/165 gal tank under another, and send it to bomb something? The next step is to send them with 300 gals under a wing, bomb under another.

P-51A has the range, but the performance is lower at high altitude than of the other premier fighters. I'm thinking to bomb them up, too 

So basically the P-47s and Spitfires would've been flying a 'classic' escort, or more accurately the fighter sweep, trying to engage LW at 25-30000 ft (in case those are scrambled timely; if not, even better). The P-38s and P-51As would've try and bomb supress the LW ground assets in Low countries France, so the defenders have hard time during take-off landing. The Spitfires without long-range capabilities would've provided top cover, the strike package should ideally ingress at 20000 ft+ and then make shallow dive turn to attack LW assets from generally Eastern direction. Of course, such a scenario will be changed some time , in order to prevent being predictable.


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## Readie (Mar 7, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Hi, John,
> 
> In my eyes the Spit VIII is a more usable plane than Spit XI, while the other capabilities are almost identical. Hence the Spit VIII is a better one
> .



Hello Tomo,
Before you move on to the USA planes..

I would venture to suggest that the 1X was, in Johnny Johnsons's words, 'the best of them all' and in his hands the most succesfull.

Supermarine Spitfire Mk. IX in Detail

Spitfire History

John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2012)

Fine machine, the IX 
Too bad that it dawned some 20 months too late to people at RAF/AM that a Spitfire with some legs would've been very usable for ETO.


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## Glider (Mar 7, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Fine machine, the IX
> Too bad that it dawned some 20 months too late to people at RAF/AM that a Spitfire with some legs would've been very usable for ETO.


That sums it up perfectly. The amusing thing is that the mock up had a larger fuel tank. It was reduced in size for production as Supermarine were concerned about the extra weight that the RAF wanted to install iro 8 mg#s instead of 4. I forget the size it wasn't huge but it was a bit bigger


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## Readie (Mar 7, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Fine machine, the IX
> Too bad that it dawned some 20 months too late to people at RAF/AM that a Spitfire with some legs would've been very usable for ETO.




_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txeKZE4_kHg_

The Spitfire IX is the direct result of the nasty surprise" the RAF received in the fall of 1941, when a strange radial engined fighter began to appear in the German units on the Channel coast. In the summer of 1942, the RAF was given the "gift" of a brand new Fw-190A-3 when its pilot mistook RAF Pembrey on the southern coast of the Bristol Channel for a German airfield on the south coast of the English Channel; extensive tests were undertaken with the captured Focke-Wulf and the Spitfire V, which revealed that the only area where the Spit V outshone the Focke-Wulf was in turning radius. As Al Deere said upon discovering this: "Turning doesn't win battles!"

Fortunately for the RAF, at about the time that the Fw-190 first began to appear in the Fall of 1941, the first Spitfire with a Merlin-60 series engine took to the air. The Merlin 60 series had a two-stage supercharger, with an intercooler between the two stages, which gave maximum power of the superb Merlin engine well above 20,000 ft., which heretofore had been about the maximum operating altitude of the Spitfire with full power. The plan was to produce the Spitfire VII and VIII, with airframes suitably strengthened to take the excess power, but their appearance in squadron strength was over a year away.

Tests demonstrated that a beefed-up Spitfire V airframe could absorb the extra power successfully, and this modification would put Merlin 60-powered Spitfires into the Squadrons by the summer of 1942. Even at that, it was almost too late. The Spitfire IX first appeared in time to fly top cover over the Dieppe Raid with 64 Squadron in August 1942, but it was not until the fall of 1943 that the front line squadrons of Fighter Command could finally say good-bye to the Spitfire V.

Enjoy the clips Tomo.

John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2012)

Thanks, Glider John. IIRC there was a space for a 95 imp gal between pilot engine, but the pre-war specification was being fulfilled with 85 gals, so they went for the lower tankage?

John, if you just scroll down the bottom of the spitperformance page you've posted, there is a link for a cross section of the Spit with rear hull tanks, Shortround6 brought it to (not only) mine attention some time ago.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 7, 2012)

Readie said:


> but it was not until the fall of 1943 that the front line squadrons of Fighter Command could finally say good-bye to the Spitfire V.



a few Squadron used V also in early '44 just thinking 611th, 64th that were based also a Coltishall and i think this is frontline


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## pbfoot (Mar 7, 2012)

I believe trying to modify the Spit for escort duties is beyond the realm of reality , if it could`ve been done it would have. I go back to the point is what could BC do better and that is precision daylight raids . Could you invision working in concert with the USAAF whereby you just swamp the defences let the USAAF do the long work with their proper escorts and let BC stick closer to home hitting those targets with escorts they are capable of without silly losses . I don`t believe anyone can say that if you wanted a precision raid it would not be the USAAF. This is not say the USAAF was worse but that Bomber command and 2TAF thought more outside the box . An example in my mind would let the 8th take off and start their mission followed closely by a BC mission using the same general routing but a target closer to home as to utilise the Spit Escorts . The LW would be presented with a problem which mission to concentrate on and force division of their forces in a more piecemeal fashion. Can one imagine 3000 heavy and medium bombers and the same number of escorts swarming the airspace .


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2012)

I do like the idea of multi thousand bomber raid 



> I believe trying to modify the Spit for escort duties is beyond the realm of reality , if it could`ve been done it would have.



Why do you think so?


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## Readie (Mar 7, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I believe trying to modify the Spit for escort duties is beyond the realm of reality , if it could`ve been done it would have.



The Spitfire was used for escort duties, just not all the way to Berlin or deepest Germany.
As the war got nearer Germany the Spitfire had a more obvious role.

John


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## pbfoot (Mar 7, 2012)

Well guys if you must insist on making the Spit for long range escort I believe it might be better to wait until they could lash a PT6A-68C in the nose change the skinning to carbon graphite etc. It just wasn`t the aircraft that it was going to occur to . I`d like be like Brad Pitt but it ain`t gonna happen


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2012)

I'd like too, but lack the hair 

Back to the Spit, there was a simple expedient to attach two rear tanks (as told earlier in the thread), boosting fuel quantity by either 66 or 75 imp gals (62 or 72 actually usable). That makes 147-182 gals, all internal, for 1943 Spits (depending whether the leading edge tanks are installed); 1944 Mustangs had 215 imp gals, 149 gals in 1943. The dropable tank was good for further 90 gals. All of that gives the combat range of 370-400 miles (P-51 was capable of combat range of 375 miles with 215 imp gals, all internal) . 
Unfortunately, it was not until Sept 1944 that orders were issued for such tanks (check out the data kindly provided by Glider, in previous page). So the capability of the plane was there, it just dawned too late to the people making decisions.


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## pbfoot (Mar 7, 2012)

With all these people with supposedly playing as allies using teamwork , not the guys seeing who got the most or best press,. Could you just imagine an Allied Bodenplatte late 43 early 44 , 
Amother scenario would be hammer German radar which should be possible (RAF acknowlegdedit existence in 41) ,its not like they were mobile ...followed by a Bodenplatte . Lets see all these Mossies and B26's take out the radar and then followup with the pasting of any chosen target or set of targets in the Reich .


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

Good idea about attacking the radars. Not just that a wrecked radar net gives a hard time for defenders to scramble, it also hampers the Flak units. Any radar that is on-line is something akin to a flashlight in the moonless night if the attacker is properly equipped, and RAF other interested in the UK certainly were by 1942 on.


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## Juha (Mar 8, 2012)

Hello Glider
thanks for the photos on docus! I can see that the second is from AIR 19/286, would you be so kind and give the date of that minute and the archival signum of the folder from which the first docu is and its heading.

TIA
Juha


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## Juha (Mar 8, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> ... Really, an Me 109G with a 66 gallon drop tank could ferry about the same distance, a result of fuel efficiency in the DB605 I believe.



I still wonder why Germans didn't use that claimed ferry range, at least not often. In all 109 pilot memoirs I can recall, when they ferrier 109s to the east they did it by rather short stages. Same to Finns when they ferried 109s to Finland. And when 11./JG 2 with its 109G-1s were transferred from Normandy to Tunisia via Sicily in early Nov 42, it didn't flew to Southern France and then across the Med to Sicily, not even via Sardinia to Sicily. No, it first went to Mannheim and even that was impossible without a refilling stop at Rheims. From Mannheim to München, then to Treviso-Jesi-Bari-Reggio di Calabria-Trapani-Comiso-Pantelleria. It departed on 4 Nov 42 and arrived to Sicily on 8 Nov. To me that didn't show specially good ferry range.



Siegfried said:


> ... The 5 hour endurance of the Spitfire is also almost totally useless in combat situation. It was a supermarine publicity stunt by Mutt Sommers.



Now Mk VIIs flew a few long range escort missions in ETO, the longest I'm aware took 3h 50min and Mk VIIIs flew long range escort missions in Pacific, the longest I'm aware was 4h 30min long, so it had some practical use.

Juha


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## pbfoot (Mar 8, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Good idea about attacking the radars. Not just that a wrecked radar net gives a hard time for defenders to scramble, it also hampers the Flak units. Any radar that is on-line is something akin to a flashlight in the moonless night if the attacker is properly equipped, and RAF other interested in the UK certainly were by 1942 on.


I'm not aware of any such attacks on LW radar , the Allies must have been aware of the value of such targets so why were they neglected .


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

Never said the major-scale were conducted, not even the minor-scale ones. Just agreed that I like th idea.
As for why allies did not bothered to destroy the radars supporting infrastructure, well, the whole target policy deserves it's own thread, if not the site about that.


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## stona (Mar 8, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> If BC could organize the Dams raids, Amiens , Copenhagen and other precision raids why were they unable to organize more precision raids rather then massacres like the Nueremberg fiasco and the Battle of Berlin which if given a close look appears to be very near a defeat . IIRC was there not a lo level daylight raid using Lancs in 42 into Germany that was close to being caualty free. Out of curiosity I`ve heard that very few Aussies were leaders of Squadrons why is that



Way back in this thread I made the point that low penetration light,specialised raids like Amiens and Copenhagen are utterly irrelevant to the conduct of a bombing campaign designrd to destroy and dislocate an enemies production capability.
As for the dams raid,delivering a few mines to destroy two dams for a minimum return at an enormous cost was,sadly, a propaganda victory and nothing more.That's why the photo reconnaissance photos of one of the destroyed dams (Mohne?) appeared in the British press so rapidly. No air force could sustain that level of loss on regular operations. 
Bennet of pathfinder fame should be an Australian well known to anybody interested in the bombing campaign and he was not the only prominent Australian airman.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbfoot (Mar 8, 2012)

stona said:


> Way back in this thread I made the point that low penetration light,specialised raids like Amiens and Copenhagen are utterly irrelevant to the conduct of a bombing campaign designrd to destroy and dislocate an enemies production capability.
> As for the dams raid,delivering a few mines to destroy two dams for a minimum return at an enormous cost was,sadly, a propaganda victory and nothing more.That's why the photo reconnaissance photos of one of the destroyed dams (Mohne?) appeared in the British press so rapidly. No air force could sustain that level of loss on regular operations.
> Bennet of pathfinder fame should be an Australian well known to anybody interested in the bombing campaign and he was not the only prominent Australian airman.
> Cheers
> Steve


Mr Bennett deserves far more credit for his pioneering of Ferry Command , as for losses was the Battle of Belin sustainable no not by a long shot nor were the results worth it . Why not go after the snakes head of the LW attack where they are , if you seriously bombed the snot out of the airfields you would at least impare the ability to fly the aircraft simply by knocking off the skilled trades that kept them airborne rather then fake victories like the Battle of Berlin. IIRC no Aussies other then Bennett were in charge of either Wings or Groups


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## Hop (Mar 8, 2012)

> I'm not aware of any such attacks on LW radar , the Allies must have been aware of the value of such targets so why were they neglected .



From the Australian archives:



> The weakness of German aerial reconnaissance gave the Allies great
> freedom in preparing for their cross-Channel invasion, but it was appre-
> ciated that tactical surprise could not be gained unless the impressiv e
> enemy radar network was seriously damaged . Accordingly air attack was
> ...


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## Hop (Mar 8, 2012)

And from the official history of the RAF:



> It was, of course, essential to paralyse the radar cover on the western front which the enemy had, with great thoroughness, established from Norway to the Spanish border. The closest concentration of radar stations was in north-west France and in the Low Countries. The system he followed was similar to that brought to so high a state of efficiency in Great Britain and was made up of a coastal chain supported by a number of inland stations. Between Dunkirk and Brest there were sixty-six radar stations of various kinds. To attack them all, even with the formidable air strength available to the Allies, was hardly possible and it was therefore decided to combine assault by air with radio counter-measures. The staff for this purpose was set up on 15th May under the direction of Air Vice-Marshal V. H. Tait, Director of Signals in the Air Ministry. They gave advice to the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief on everything connected with radio counter-measures and one of their chief duties was the choice of targets most suitable for direct air attack. Installations able to report on the movement of shipping or used to control the fire of batteries, or set up in areas where they might interfere with the landing of our airborne forces, were the most suitable targets. As a further precaution, for every radar post attacked in the lodgment areas two were attacked outside them. The attacks were postponed as long as possible so that the enemy should not be able to improvise equipment to cover the gaps in the radar chain which might be created. They did not, therefore, begin until 10th May, when the aircraft reporting stations were bombed. These installations if hit, could not be easily repaired, and because of the narrowness of their beam were hard to jam. A week later the attacks on night fighter control stations and on the stations controlling the fire of coastal batteries were begun. During the week before 'D Day', a series of attacks on forty-two radar sites, most of them provided with more than one type of equipment, was carried out, and in the last three days, six sites chosen by the Navy and six by the Air Force were given special attention.
> 
> The assaults were delivered for the most part by the Typhoon and Spitfire Squadrons of Nos. 83 and 84 Groups. The targets were very heavily defended by light flak and to attack them 'demanded great skill and daring'. The losses in aircraft and pilots were very heavy. Of the many assaults made, Leigh-Mallory in his despatch selected three as worthy of special mention. There was that of 2nd June carried out by eighteen rocket firing Typhoons of Nos. 198 and 609 Squadrons on the Dieppe/Caudecôte station, used for night fighter control and the control of coastal batteries. For the loss of one Typhoon, the station was put out of action. There was the attack on the 4th June on the station at Cap d'Antifer by twenty-three Spitfires of Nos. 441, 442 and 443 Squadrons Royal Canadian Air Force. They secured nine direct hits with 500 pound bombs and destroyed the 'chimney' and the giant Würzburg installations. There was finally the attack on the day before 'D Day' on the Jobourg station near the Cap de la Hague, attacked by Typhoons of Nos. 174, 175 and 245 Squadrons, firing rockets. It was equally successful.
> 
> ...



The RAF also introduced a radar receiver fitted to Typhoon aircraft to enable them to locate enemy radar stations. The programme was called "Abdullah" but it doesn't seem to have been a great success, probably because of the technical limitations.

The preferred way of dealing with enemy radar seems to have been jamming. That's probably because radar stations were small targets, very numerous, and fairly easy to replace.


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## pbfoot (Mar 8, 2012)

Ok so they attacked it for D Day prep why not earlier , say 43 and keep on hitting them , if they spent one day a month attacking all the radars , could the Germanns keep up repairs particulaly if while the radar was degraded they attacked POL and Transport


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

Thanks for the contribution, Hop.
I guess jamming involves far less risk, but on the other hand the destroyed radar site cannot be replaced/rebuilt so easily. As said in the excerpt:



> Thus large stretches of the Channel coast, as the vital day approached, were desolate of radar cover. By 'D Day', *not more than eighteen per cent*. of the enemy radar apparatus in north-west France was in operation, *and for long periods of the fateful previous night, only five per cent*.



IIRC Germans themselves were in dire straits as far as electronic production was case, for second half of war, maybe someone could shed some light on that? Even the copper was in short supply?

To continue, with radar sites (those in N. France and Low countries) properly 'visited' in early 1943, both by RAF and USAAF, would've made LW defenders, both Flak, day and night fighters far less of a threat for the 'invaders'.


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## pbfoot (Mar 8, 2012)

It seems that the heavies with their "precision capability" could and did knock down radars . I can invision visiting all the radar sites known in a one day Bodenplatte
to me its seems a natural thing to do kind of like using a capapult in days gone by to breech castle walls . There is no way that the LW could counter all the raids


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## Hop (Mar 8, 2012)

> Between Dunkirk and Brest there were sixty-six radar stations. To attack them all, even with the formidable air strength available to the Allies, was hardly possible and it was therefore decided to combine assault by air with radio counter-measures.



My take on it is that they didn't attack the radar stations until just before D Day because they could be replaced too easily. According to Wiki, the Germans produced more than 1,000 Freya sets and more than 4,000 Würzburgs.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

The 1000 Freyas (early warning type) means that it took 3 days to produce 2 sets, give or take. IMO that number can be hardly enough to replace the destroyed ones, once the dedicated campaign starts. Without Freyas, Wurzburgs (fire control type) lack the early warning, same thing for fighter units. With heavy bombers dropping heavy bombs, trained radar crews are also in jeopardy. The radar aerials are far better targets for day attacks than tanks or guns. 
The allies were in much better position to replace their bombers than Germans their radars, ratio being perhaps 10:1.


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## pbfoot (Mar 8, 2012)

If you took out even a couple of Freyas you would cause grief I imagine there were only so many teams with skills to survey and place units , it not just a matter of plopping them down on a piece of dirt . You'd need a well prepared surface with lots of surveying a nice level pad not even including commuications to what ever was central command . I'm sure they required APU's etc , testing labs etc . IMHO it 2was a missed opportunity


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## Hop (Mar 8, 2012)

At the time the RAF and USAAF decided jamming and spoofing was the main way to combat German radar. They couldn't have committed to that effort without at least considering simply bombing German radar sites. I think it's difficult for us to second guess them with far less information than they had available.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

There is no need for second guesses, since both Brits Yanks knew, rather early in the war, that radars are the key part for any air force defending something. Particularly Brits had the 1st hand experience from BoB. 
A spoofed and jammed radar needs such a treatment for every aerial attack vs. German held Europe, maybe 3 times within 24 hours (one for night bombers, other for USAAF, 3rd for RAF's Typhoons Spits)? A destroyed radar does not. Since the Ultra was reading many of the German messages, the big, radiating radar aerials were not that secret.


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## Siegfried (Mar 8, 2012)

Both Freya's and Wurzburgs could be bunkered and toughened against attackers. Freya's were bunkered by building them within sandbagged brick walls so that only the antena protruded or they could be recessed. This protected the opperators and the electronics. They could be and often were defended by light FLAK and it could be guaranteed that they would be able to take some attackers with them. A direct diving attack or a direct hit with bombs would be required. The attacker would need to get close. 

The small Wurzburg-D were a little harder to protect however the giant Wurzburg Riesse were quite difficult but even these could be.









Left Freya (one of many types of Freya)
right Wurzburg-D with conical scanning 0.3 degree accuracy (0.5 in horizonal plane near ground) range accuracy 25m capable of 45 knautical miles range both search and FLAK direction.




Flakleit-G was an tunable 81cm system derived from seatakt. It could search for both sea and aerial targets, could height find and direct blind fire against both sea and land targets. As can be seen it is well protected. Several hundred built for the Germany navy tasked with guarding harbour areas. I is said to have been the most accurate German radar when directing against aircraft: better than 0.1 degrees.










The naval gun fire directing radar Scheer also used thye same attena as Wurzburg Riesse.





The radars on with on top of the tall towers are Kurmark and Kurplatz by the Lorentz company, a good radar produced only in the dozens of each type due to some degree of shortsighteness.

The Telefiunken Wurzburg-D could be mounted atop this Lorentz designed tower so that the controls. crew, electronics could be safely bunkered. The radar was known as FuSE 63 Mainz. In this guise it came with improved circuitry to increase tracking accuracy. About 50 produced and in service late 41 or early 42.

An even more advanced version was FuSE 64 Mannheim with more power, more accuracy and automatic range gate tracking.

The larger Wurzburg Riesse was in fact an expedient solution to directing FLAK, however the grearter range it provided an excuse to misuse it to direct night fighters.

Ansbach was a Wurzburg type radar that used the electronics of the 3m Wurzburg (same as 7.4m Wurzburg-Riesse) but a 5m antena that was remote controlled so aid concealment and bunkering. The next generation of German radars was to opperate at 25cm using technology developed independant of the magnetron. The program was suspended due to too few engineers after a few prototypes were built by Lorentz and Telefunken in about 1942. The program was resurrected when the British Magnetron was recovered.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

If you take a look at the excerpts Hop kindly provided, the determined campaign against the radar sites was quite successful, despite the measures of protection.


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## pbfoot (Mar 8, 2012)

Some might be surprised to realize that the site of the radar is very important , obviously on some higher point without obstuctions , it requires a fair amount of surveying , then all the communications required its no small task and would require a lot of skill sets . It just isn't plop it down and plug it in especially for "heavy radar" . Just imagine the amount of land lines specific to the unit a SAGE type enviroment can't have those pesky resistance chopping down telephone poles.


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## Siegfried (Mar 8, 2012)

Juha said:


> I still wonder why Germans didn't use that claimed ferry range, at least not often. In all 109 pilot memoirs I can recall, when they ferrier 109s to the east they did it by rather short stages. Same to Finns when they ferried 109s to Finland. And when 11./JG 2 with its 109G-1s were transferred from Normandy to Tunisia via Sicily in early Nov 42, it didn't flew to Southern France and then across the Med to Sicily, not even via Sardinia to Sicily. No, it first went to Mannheim and even that was impossible without a refilling stop at Rheims. From Mannheim to München, then to Treviso-Jesi-Bari-Reggio di Calabria-Trapani-Comiso-Pantelleria. It departed on 4 Nov 42 and arrived to Sicily on 8 Nov. To me that didn't show specially good ferry range.
> 
> Now Mk VIIs flew a few long range escort missions in ETO, the longest I'm aware took 3h 50min and Mk VIIIs flew long range escort missions in Pacific, the longest I'm aware was 4h 30min long, so it had some practical use.
> 
> Juha



The range of an Me 109G was as follows (approximate)
1 High speed cruise (about 320 knots) 390 miles
2 High speed cruise with 66 gallon drop tank about 600 miles.
3 Economic cruise with drop tank about 1000 miles.

The range without drop tanks is actually slightly better than the Spitfire IX at similar speeds. The Germans only seemed to use single 66 gallon drop tanks. Recon Me 109's could carry 3 of these.

Long single hop ferry flights conducted at slow speed were probably dangerous from the point of interception and possibly dangerous from the point of view of navigation errors. A 5 hour flight would be little fun and most fatiquing.


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## Siegfried (Mar 8, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Some might be surprised to realize that the site of the radar is very important , obviously on some higher point without obstuctions , it requires a fair amount of surveying , then all the communications required its no small task and would require a lot of skill sets . It just isn't plop it down and plug it in especially for "heavy radar" . Just imagine the amount of land lines specific to the unit a SAGE type enviroment can't have those pesky resistance chopping down telephone poles.



The best site for non microwave radar is actually in a shallow bowl of land. The 'perimeter' of the bowl creates some clutter but all clutter is beyond that is blocked by the perimeter of the bowl. 

German radars could use decimetric (50cm) links to provide remote PPI displays and communication links, they were in fact widely used. 

Partisan attacks on radars would be a very poor use of their lives. They need to stick to reconaisance and at most blocking trains. Cutting telephone lines was a strategy to force more traffic onto the air and then be vulnerable to code breaking, however I believe the 50cm links were too directional for that.


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## pbfoot (Mar 8, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The best site for non microwave radar is actually in a shallow bowl of land. The 'perimter' of the bowl creates some clutter but all clutter is beyond that is blocked by the perimter of the bowl.
> 
> German radars could use decimetric (50cm) links to provide remote PPI displays and communication links, they were in fact widely used.
> 
> Partisan attacks on radars would be a very poor use of their lives. They need to stick to reconaisance and at most blocking trains. Cutting telephone lines was a strategy to force more traffic onto the air and then be vulnerable to code breaking, however I believe the 50cm links were too directional for that.


Should let NORAD in on that secret for all these years theve been putting heavy radar on top of hills , maybe though they may not have the brains of the germans . Have you ever worked or better yet seen a radar. I ve seen and worked on several types mind you not heavy just ASR and PAR but for light radar could pick up a target at 200 miles , or in the case of PAR watch a guy pedal a bicycle at a few miles
and as for remotre PPI and comm links what did they use if not land lines ,


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## Juha (Mar 9, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The range of an Me 109G was as follows (approximate)
> 1 High speed cruise (about 320 knots) 390 miles
> 2 High speed cruise with 66 gallon drop tank about 600 miles.
> 3 Economic cruise with drop tank about 1000 miles.



The problem with economic cruise speed was that according to Finns cruising at speeds of 450km/h TAS or slower fouled the plugs and carbon monoxide seeped into the cockpit. Or more accurately "flooding of carbon monoxide into the cockpit." So not very practical for longer periods.




Siegfried said:


> The range without drop tanks is actually slightly better than the Spitfire IX at similar speeds. The Germans only seemed to use single 66 gallon drop tanks. Recon Me 109's could carry 3 of these.



Now most of us agree that standard Spit Mk IX was rather short-legged fighter. So to have a slightly longer range than it wasn't very big achivement. And did LW use recon 109s with 3 300l drop tanks? I'm aware only that normal recon 109Gs could carry one 300l drop tank and the special LR recon 109Gs could carry and carried 2 300l DTs, one under each wing.



Siegfried said:


> Long single hop ferry flights conducted at slow speed were probably dangerous from the point of interception and possibly dangerous from the point of view of navigation errors. A 5 hour flight would be little fun and most fatiquing.



Now the ferry flights to Finland and to southern part of the Eastern Front were flown over Axis controlled areas and VVS didn't usually conduct LR fighter sweeps in 43, so interception risk was minimal there, and IMHO not very high in early Nov 42 N of Sicily. And Mannheim is a bit under 500km from Poix, but even that distance meant a refuelling stop and Rheims for 11./JG 2. So it seems that at least 11./JG 2 didn't use the economic cruise. And landings and t/os were/are the most dangerous parts of flying, difficult to see why maximize their number.

Juha


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## Siegfried (Mar 9, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Should let NORAD in on that secret for all these years theve been putting heavy radar on top of hills , maybe though they may not have the brains of the germans .



I doubt they were quite up there with Kunhold, von Wilsen. Refinement is easy after others have done the inventing.




pbfoot said:


> Should let NORAD in on that secret for all these years theve been putting heavy radar on top of hills (SNIP) I ve seen and worked on several types mind you not heavy just ASR and PAR but for light radar could pick up a target at 200 miles , or in the case of PAR watch a guy pedal a bicycle at a few miles
> and as for remotre PPI and comm links what did they use if not land lines ,



Note, I did specify "non microwave radar". With a narrow beam microwave radars, or those with excetionally large antena can avoid ground clutter by simply stearing clear of it though the clutter will still appear when the beam is seeking low flying targets.

Pulse Doppler helps as well.

The need to site metric radars in slight depressions was eventually learned by all sides; the Germans probably among the first as they were using mobile Freya's in inland areas ahead of others.


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## wuzak (Mar 9, 2012)

stona said:


> Way back in this thread I made the point that low penetration light,specialised raids like Amiens and Copenhagen are utterly irrelevant to the conduct of a bombing campaign designrd to destroy and dislocate an enemies production capability.



Those raids had very specific objectives, nothing to do with the bombing campaign at large.

However, those raids demonstrated accuracy well beyond the normal operations of Bomber Command and the 8th AF. Look at Schweinfurt - 80 direct hits on the target buildings. With 100% accuracy that would require 20 Mosquitos. But since we can't count on 100% accuracy we can use 40 Mosquitos - comapred to 300+ B-17s. It would be a more efficient use of resources. 




stona said:


> As for the dams raid,delivering a few mines to destroy two dams for a minimum return at an enormous cost was,sadly, a propaganda victory and nothing more.That's why the photo reconnaissance photos of one of the destroyed dams (Mohne?) appeared in the British press so rapidly. No air force could sustain that level of loss on regular operations.



Again a small raid, not sure that the cost could be described as "enormous".

As for the returns, that is disputed by many, but here are some effects of the Dams raids (from Stephen Flower, _A Hell of a Bomb_).

Eleven factories were destroyed, 114 damaged from the Möhne dam alone. Some rail lines were cut by flooding or damage to bridges. Many other bridges were swept away. Very importantly large areas of agricultural land were rendered useless for food production, and some stocks of food were lost. That land would not be arable for many months.

Another effect of the dams raid was that all the dams in Germany would now be defended heavily. Taking resources away from other areas. 20,000+ workers were moved into the area for cleanup and repair efforts. Many of these had been working on the atlantic wall. According to Speer up to 1/3 of the workers on the Atlantic wall left becuase they feared they would be sent to Germany. This required a policy change.

By early 1944 the Möhne dam was near full capacity, but due to the fears of another attack the level was reduced so that the capacity was half, and the water pressure (affects the power that can be generated) reduced.

The Kriegsmarine developed mines that would explode if low flying aircraft were to fly over. 5 rows of these were installed in the lake. Smake screens were installed, extra towers erected, more torpedo netting and deflection booms added. Chain mail was suspended on the air side of the Möhne to protect against rocket propelled bombs. 

Some 2500 men were involved in the defences at the Möhne Dam, and saw little action in th remaining period of the war.

The Eder Dam repairs were not completed until 1947, so it could not reach full capacity until then.

The Germans also used a captured Upkeep to develop their own bomb, and even a smaller rocket propelled version that coud be carried by an Fw190 - none of which were ever used.

Some damage - like that to generating facilities - was repaired or compensated for quickly. 

Overall I would say the direct damage caused may not have had great effect, but the flow on effects were significant.

Besides, in what other raid of 19 bombers were 11 factories destroyed and 114 damaged?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 9, 2012)

Well said, Wuzak.

I wonder if any of the air forces was using clockworks in part of their bombs, randomly timed, in order to make repairs of a bombed site a risky business?


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## wuzak (Mar 9, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Well said, Wuzak.
> 
> I wonder if any of the air forces was using clockworks in part of their bombs, randomly timed, in order to make repairs of a bombed site a risky business?



I believe BC sometimes used long delay fuses in order to do just that.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 9, 2012)

It may have been a common practice by many countries.


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## stona (Mar 9, 2012)

Those nineteen bombers (which left the UK) did not achieve the level of dislocation envisaged by the planners,this was later blamed on the failiure to destroy the Sorpe dam,something probably impossible with the "Upkeep" mine in any case. The British over estimation of the damage caused led to another familiar failing,that of not following up with further conventional raids to prevent the rapid repair to the dams and associated infrastructure.
You actually failed to mention the biggest problem caused to German production (according to the Germans) which was the loss of hydro electric power from the generating stations associated with the dams and even this was partially restored in a couple of weeks.
The RAF lost EIGHT of the NINETEEN highly trained crews on the raid,a completely unsustainable percentage and a poor return on a magnificent and heroic
investment.
Actually lowering the water level in the lake behind a dam does not automatically reduce the capacity of the generating station downstream. The Germans were back to full power from the dams by the end of June about six weeks after the raid.
Cheers
Steve


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## tyrodtom (Mar 9, 2012)

Every AF had bomb fuzes with delays of up to almost a week, with anti-disturbance features that would set the bomb off if anyone moved the bomb, or attempted to remove the fuze.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 9, 2012)

Did RAF ever tried to use the delayed-action (clockwork equipped) bombs to mark the target for the subsequent raid? Say, 10 bombs to detonate 3 nights later, flames appropriately colored?


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## stona (Mar 9, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> It may have been a common practice by many countries.



Indeed,the Luftwaffe dropped thousands of "delayed action" bombs on us. They were also fitted with anti handling devices to make defusing them more difficult. The clockwork mechanisms were jammed by pumping in saline solutions to stop them a hair raising procedure. Drilling holes around the fuse pocket of a weapon fitted with an anti handling device,let alone withdrawing the fuse,would not have a happy outcome.
Cheers
Steve


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## Readie (Mar 9, 2012)

stona said:


> Indeed,the Luftwaffe dropped thousands of "delayed action" bombs on us. They were also fitted with anti handling devices to make defusing them more difficult. The clockwork mechanisms were jammed by pumping in saline solutions to stop them a hair raising procedure. Drilling holes around the fuse pocket of a weapon fitted with an anti handling device,let alone withdrawing the fuse,would not have a happy outcome.
> Cheers
> Steve



We're still digging them up in Plymouth.
John


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## wuzak (Mar 9, 2012)

stona said:


> Those nineteen bombers (which left the UK) did not achieve the level of dislocation envisaged by the planners,this was later blamed on the failiure to destroy the Sorpe dam,something probably impossible with the "Upkeep" mine in any case. The British over estimation of the damage caused led to another familiar failing,that of not following up with further conventional raids to prevent the rapid repair to the dams and associated infrastructure.
> You actually failed to mention the biggest problem caused to German production (according to the Germans) which was the loss of hydro electric power from the generating stations associated with the dams and even this was partially restored in a couple of weeks.
> The RAF lost EIGHT of the NINETEEN highly trained crews on the raid,a completely unsustainable percentage and a poor return on a magnificent and heroic
> investment.
> ...



According to Flowers the loss of power to industry was almost immediatlely covered by redirecting power from other sources, and reducing the power available to the general public.

The repairs on the Möhne didn't start until July. And it didn't reach full capacity until the following year. The restoration of hydro power was due to a network of pipes that could direct water from other sources to the generating plant.

Hydro power relies on pressure head. The higher the water the higher the pressure head (measured in metres) the more potential energy is available. Reducing the level of the lake has an effect on the potential power that can be generated.

I think you are concentrating on the direct results. The indirect effects of the raids were widespread and lasting. One was to delay/slow the construction of the Atlantic wall. Without the raid more of that may have been completed and D-day would have been even tougher.

I'm not sure that the RAF planners expected anything from the raids. The certainly knew that breaching the Sorpe wa sunlikely with Upkeep but they attacked it anyway. They even used a different technique for the Sorpe - flying parallel to the dam wall and drop the unspinning Upkeep on the top.

Many RAF raids in 1943, and probably after, definitely before, lost 8 or more highly trained crew for even less results. Note that the 617 crews weren't the elite crews as portrayed in the film. They were normal bomber crews who did some extra mission specific training.


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## Siegfried (Mar 9, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> If you take a look at the excerpts Hop kindly provided, the determined campaign against the radar sites was quite successful, despite the measures of protection.



These assualts were conducted just prior to the Normandy landings. They were an exceptional all out effort and costly in terms of losses of fighter bomber or required heavy investment eg 100+ heavy bombers.

Had these attacks, which were expensive in terms of losses, commenced earlier the German response would have fairly quickly nullified the allied campaigne and compromised the effect of an assault on radar sights prior to the invasion. The allied effort was a once of effort too support d-day and I would argue could only be justified in terms of supporting the invasion.

The very long range early warning radars such as "Wassermann" (a phased array height finding radar) were several stories high obviously hard to conceal and also to protect from say blast or rocket hits though the electronics and contol room could be protected. They were also well protected by anti aircraft defenses and it is likely that a few of the attackers would not be gong home with their collegues. In all probabillity smaller, concealed radars would take over much of the functioning of these larger radars. There was very thick bomb proof concret at the base of these and the crews and electronic were well protected from even a direct hit.










Mummut (Mammoth) ultra early warning radar and left the tall structure is the Wassermann (Aquarious) height finding early warning radar (300km) probably the best in the world till mid 1944) Advances in power output meant much smaller radars could do the job from 1944 onwards though the height finding function was not there which was based on phased array beam opperation in the vertical plane. These were all based on Freya technology.


As it was the problems of German radar at the time were primarily that they simply didn't have electricity due to fuel shortages: few were opperating. Much of the allied work on deception and jamming was superflous, though we are still told how clever their deceptions and jamming was there is evidence to suggest that many of the radars were just plain switched off.

Had these assualts commenced earlier in 1942 say the German initial response would simply have been to increase FLAK protecton, bunker the radar better and maybe conceal it better and make more fake/decoys. 

After the Bruneval raid in which an outmoded Wurzburg-A was captured the Luftwaffe became somewhat paranoid and excessively guarded their installations which tended to make them prominent in aerial reconaisance.

The second line of response would be to make the radars themselves easier to conceal and bunker. Placing the Wurzburg aerial atop a hydraulically errected tower to make the "Mainz" radar was slightly inconvenient due to the need to provide remote control power drives to point the antena but it make the radar more comfortable for the opperators and provided more options for concealment, protection. I was relatively easy to produced and would have been no impediment to make in the thousands.

If you google "FuSE 63 Mainz" you will see some copyright pics on axis history forum.

Another response would have been to compell the Luftwaffe to demand smaller more concleable antena, this might have the fortunate side effect of promoting the German 25cm and 5cm microwave work which would be the only way to provide that. Martini would have grabbed at any opportunity to find a reason to continue work. The radar would have been known as "Mannheim K" and could have replaced the giant Wurzburgs and provided much better jamming resistance due to a narrower beam. It was based on planar disk triodes alredy in production.

In 1944 German radar was progressing rapidly. The fairly low outputs of Freya were reaching 400kW, then 1MW and even 1.5MW. The effect was to allow the large "Mammut" style and to a lessor textent Wassermann radars to be replaced with smaller one that also had much greater jam resitance and could provide easy backup.

Ansbach was a remote aerial to help protect the crew. There was even a version of Wuraburg/Mannheim that had seperate transmit and receive antenas so that the expensive and valuable electronics were seperate from the transmitting aerial while the crew were in a remote cabin. If there was an attempt to home on the radar only a fairly basic and small aerial could be found and destroyed.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 9, 2012)

Good call about the water height as the main 'asset' of the dam, wuzak, I've remembering the lessons from my high school (electrotechnics/electroenergetics, spent 4 years there). IIRC the most of the hydro-power in the USA comes from Columbia river area, since the dams can be tall there.



Siegfried said:


> These assualts were conducted just prior to the Normandy landings. They were a unique all out effort and costly in terms of losses of fighter bomber or required heavy investment eg 100+ heavy bombers.



The attacks were being made in 3-Squadron size (RAF's wing), and 100+ heavy bombers is hardly an all-out effort. Actually, many of the sites were attcked by Spitfires.



> Had these attacks, which were expensive in terms of losses, commenced earlier the German response would have fairly quickly nullified the allied campaigne. The allied effort was a once of effort too support d-day and I would argue could only be justified in terms of supporting the invasion.



They were not expensive, as it can be read in the Hop's excerpts. What Germans could do to protect the radars, while avoiding that does not show on another field of their military activity? That such raids were not made in 1943, but in 1944 is a mistake of Allied high comanders.



> The very long range early warning radars such as "Wassermann" (a phased array height finding radar) were several stories high obviously hard to conceal and also to protect from say blast or rocket hits though the electronics and contol room could be protected. They were also well protected by anti aircraft defenses and it is likely that a few of the attackers would not be gong home with their collegues. In all probabillity smaller, concealed radars would take over much of the functioning of these larger radars. There was very thick bomb proof concret at the base of these and the crews and electronic were well protected from even a direct hit.
> 
> Mummut (Mammoth) ultra early warning radar and left the tall structure is the Wassermann (Aquarious) height finding early warning radar (300km) probably the best in the world till mid 1944) Advances in power output meant much smaller radars could do the job from 1944 onwards though the height finding function was not there



Thanks for the info about the radars. That bombers would be less numerous going home than going to the radars is nothing new, the losses were dealt and received in daily basis anyway. As for concealing a radiating radar, isn't that an oxymoron?



> As it was the problems of German radar at the time were primarily that they simply didn't have electricity due to fuel shortages: few were opperating. Much of the allied work on deception and jamming was superflous, though we are still told how clever their deceptions and jamming was there is evidence to suggest that many of the radars were just plain switched off.



Were those radars being switched off after the jamming started, or before? What time frame would that be?



> Had these assualts commenced earlier in 1942 say the German initial response would simply have been to increase FLAK protecton, bunker the radar better and maybe conceal it better and make more fake/decoys.



I was proposing early summer of 1943 as a begining of an all-out offensive, 1st step being an attack at radar sites. After a week or two, the offensive would went to another targets, radars revisited as needed. The Germany was hardly in position to install more of it's units around radars (unless it withdraws them from somewhere else), and the ETO was pretty much full of Flak anyway.



> After the Bruneval raid in which an outmoded Wurzburg-A was captured the Luftwaffe became somewhat paranoid and excessively guarded their installations which tended to make them prominent in aerial reconaisance.
> 
> The second line of response would be to make the radars themselves easier to conceal and bunker. Placing the Wurzburg aerial atop a hydraulically errected tower to make the "Mainz" radar was slightly inconvenient due to the need to provide remote control power drives to point the antena but it make the radar more comfortable for the opperators and provided more options for concealment, protection. I was relatively easy to produced and would have been no impediment to make in the thousands.



The erected tower would have hard time vs. an incoming Typhoon firing the rockets. If the aerial is really secured, it doesn't do it's work. Of course, the heavy bombs would've made the site as good as Moon's surface in order to kill the radar. The more complicated radar auxiliary equipment, the easier is to kill it and more expensive to replace, esp. for a country playing a rough null-sum game.



> Another response would have been fore the Luftwaffe to demand smaller more concleable antena, this might have the fortunate side effect of promoting the German 25cm and 5cm microwave work which would be the only way to provide that. Martini would have grabbed at any opportunity to find a reason to continue work.



Some other things need to happen - that people high up really act as they should, and that producers have machines, manpower and material to carry out the work. Maybe easy thing to do in 1939, but not from mid 1943 on? The radars produced would need trained men to install operate them - not the easies task in the light of many of operators technicians ... harmed in previous attacks. 



> In 1944 German radar was progressing rapidly. The fairly low outputs of Freya were reaching 400kW, then 1MW and even 1.5MW. The effect was to allow the large "Mammut" style and to a lessor textent Wassermann radars to be replaced with smaller one that also had much greater jam resitance and could provide easy backup.
> 
> Ansabach was a remote aerial to help protect the crew. There was even a version of Wuraburg/Mannheim that had seperate transmit and receive antenas so that the expensive and valuable electronics were seperate from the transmitting aerial while the crew were in a remote cabin. If there was an attempt to home on the radar only a fairly basic and small aerial could be found and destroyed.



Thanks for the input, it would be nice to have a good thread about the radars. 
On topic, the advances in German radar technology in 1944 would mean little with air defences crack open from Autumn of 1943, with cumulative effects of bomber campaign vs. other targets.


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## pbfoot (Mar 9, 2012)

Please Seigfird , the Germans were a tough foe but not supermen like you are inferring , yeah they had some good stuff but not any where near enough of the people needed to run it unless you pick the kiddies from the HJ , radar , oil transportation and communication and you guys would be looking for guys trained to send smoke signals to the transportation crew which would have to saddle their horses to get there. The Germans were cooked in late 43 just to dumb to know it


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## Ratsel (Mar 10, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> ...The Germans were cooked in late 43 just to dumb to know it


"_The Germans were cooked in late 43 just *to dumb *to know it _"


Nice generalization. Myself and family members who are German, and grew up during WWII Germany, fought in WWII Germany, and braved the aftermath of WWII Germany wouldn't appreciate that comment.

Alot of Germans knew that the goose was cooked in late 1943 (actually much earlier then that). But they had a duty to do and FAITH that somehow it would end soon. SO please, refrain from generalizing the German people. Or, at least be more specific of which Germans.

Most Kind Regards.


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## pbfoot (Mar 10, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> "_The Germans were cooked in late 43 just *to dumb *to know it _"
> 
> 
> Nice generalization. Myself and family members who are German, and grew up during WWII Germany, fought in WWII Germany, and braved the aftermath of WWII Germany wouldn't appreciate that comment.
> ...


I had lots of family in WW2 , most with RCAF but several infanteers one who walked the length of Italy and then NW Europe , the Germans were good troops but didn't realize that when you are going backwards all the time you are losing ,


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## Siegfried (Mar 10, 2012)

The note that German coastal radars were shutdown due to fuel shortages for their generators is noted in books by Fritz Trenkle on German radar. I have the book but not with me. I think only 2 of the 58 radars in and around the Normandy coast were opperational. Hardly any at all.

Continuing to fight beyond 1943 etc made a total sense. The allies demanded total and unconditional surrender which meant show trials and executions of Germany's leadership of undefined extent. What would one expect them to do?

The genocidal Morgentau plan was being promoted by Harry Morgentau and I suppose the equivalent of the AIPAC of its day the committee for the Prevention of WW3. Dr Goebells made much of this and who was on it when he became aware of it. Henry Stimson, the US secretary of State (he decided the atomic bomb targets, Kobe was spared because he honeymooned there) described it as "* A Cartheginian Peace*." Ex US president Herbert Hoover also opposed it. Carthage was the city that Hanibal came from. The Romans executed all of the people in it and the country and raised the city. This is what Stimson was refering to when he used the measured term *"Cartheginian Peace". *It is unequivical. Roosevelt by then was then physically and psychologically sick according to those around him and laughing and agreeing with Stalin, one of the architects of the genocidal Holdamoor. Churchill was disagreeable but pressed to go along for the sake of more lend lease and loans. On top of that it seems Nazi attempts to negotiate something was it seems ignored. Fighting on in the face of these indications made perfect sense. You would be deliberatly self deceptive to not see this is no basis for a surrender of any kind. No nation would surrender in these terms. The Morgentau plan was almost executed and its opponents in the USA and UK barely avoided its implimentation. Germans had become aware of it. Many Germans, yes many were Nazis though not as in the hollywood stereotype that many would think, consciously sacrificed their lives fighting for their nation for the people, the family, sibblings, to avoid what they quite reasonably anticipated and expected would be anhilation. By sacrifice I don't mean getting involved in combat and taking a chance when a situation was dire; I mean consciosly taking actions that were almost certain death. In the circumstances fighting on was rational.

I found three atricles
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/736/1/Campaign_Harsh_Peace_History.pdf
Books: Vengeance v. Vision - TIME

*I also don't see that 1943 was the end for Nazi Germany.* We can make such judgement today only in hindsight. A number of things might have changed; the code breaking that had compromised the German war effort from the disclosure of Eagle day during the battle of Britain through to the parachute drop zones in crete as well as shiping and supply flight toutes to Nth Africa and so much more might have been secured. It might even have shifted the Normandy invasion. A device called UKWD (Umkehr Waltze D) or rewirable rotor reflector was issued in 1943 and could have if it had been widely issued closed down Blecheley parks code breaking. The Me 262 Jet fighter was at one point expected in 1943 and there was no P-51B yet, the US 8th airforce was bloodied in its air raids.

I would also add that by 1943 the allied Jamming effort against German radar was not yet effective.

There is no doubt that by 1943 the German radar effort was feeling overwhelmed for lack of resources, promissing radar prototypes had to be culled from development for instance to concentrate on improvement on basic types while skilled technical staff ended up in Military service.

However German radar development efforts had anticpated the possibillity of a concerted anti radar attack strategy by allies and they came up with the following solutions.

*1 Placement of the parabolic aerial on a stand that allows the radar 'trailer' to be bunkered below ground. The radar FuSE 63 Mainze was on of these radar of which about 58 were produced between late 1941 and mid 1942.

Presuming that a 3m aerial, partially camaglauged could be hit let alone even seen easly is fantastical. Rocket firing typhoons had a mininal chance to hit a tank or bunker in combate conditions.

2 Opperating the aerial by remote control so that the crew and the bulk of the expensive electronics were well away from the danger zone.

3 seperating the transmission and reception aerial to create a bistatic radar to confound attempts at radar homming. (Itself compicated to all but the most sophsiticated equipment due to automatic frequency changing comming in 1943)

4 Measures such as dummy radars and concealment.*
All of these radars were built and tested. They were not made of difficult technology. It was merely decided that these measures were not neccesary.

Attacking radars deep inland, in the Reich itself, is also unlikely to work, at least untill after the Normandy landings.

This means that the only radar vulnerable are large early warning radars such as Mammut and Wassermann. The electronics and crews were deep underground in bomb proof concrete. This only leaves the aerials vulnerable; the FLAK around them was obviously going to be of a high order. Large Wurzburgs, deep in the Reich, are also vulnerable but in reality also protected targets likely to take a price.

The smaller radars are much easier to conceal and protect. Even if a large early warning radar is attacked and put out of action, its likely to be the aerial only, smaller more easily concealed radars will provide a substantial backup.

As far as a jamming effort agains German radar in *1942 or even early 1943 forget it.* The technology didn't exist and such an clumsy effort would merely have redoubled and informed the already under way German anti jamming effort.

The key failure of German radar was the abandonment of microwave work in late 1942 against considerable opposition from within. These radars would have opperated at 25cm instead of 50cm and at 120kW power instead of 8kW. They were based around a ceramic disk triode called the Telefunken LD60 already in existence at that time, the technology could be pushed down to 20kw and 9cm. There was another effort based around 5cm tunable magnetrons. The effect of the shorter wavelength is to sharpen the beam which in the case of a halving of wavelength would allow a reduction by a factor of 4 in the amount of jamming energy intercepted while the power would burn through jamming. Instead German radars were to be based on existing frquencies and a 20 fold increase in transmission power along with more refined anti-jamming circuits. Technically the Germans did catch up by the end of 1944, they managed to deliver about 100 microwave radars, however any large scale deliveries and opperations were prevented by the collapsing manufacturing sector and allied armies post Normandy.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2012)

It would be cool if the name calling politics are left out of this thread. Thank you.

In oder for all of these measures (after the radars are hit on the large scale) to be made, Germans need men, to install the material, without interference by Allied planes. In order to have all of these changes for their radars, they need items designed, produced, transported. In the same time, the defending fighters need to scramble on short order to combat the invaders (since the radar coverage is lacking). That should put them into disadvantage, inducing more losses than it would be so if they have had time to climb to 30-35000 ft and then to dive at their prey. Even the mid-altitude fighters (Spit XII, Typhoon, P-51A) are not in disadvantage now. In the same time, the bombers can make more damage.
I'd like to repeat again that the radar sites would've been 'visited' again, in order to prevent repair of destroyed sites and installment of new ones. Allies can afford to trade, say, 2 planes lost per radar destroyed (they would save even more because German fighter force is lacking good overview at situation), but that ratio is Germans cannot sustain that tempo.
With Germans loosing 5 ground radars per day, after the initial anti-radar onslaught, the production is ill able to keep up with the losses.


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## Siegfried (Mar 10, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks for the input, it would be nice to have a good thread about the radars.
> On topic, the advances in German radar technology in 1944 would mean little with air defences crack open from Autumn of 1943, with cumulative effects of bomber campaign vs. other targets.



The very large German radar effort was to an extent fumbelled by betting on shorter wars at points and just insufficient prioritisation. It needed a much more massive prioritisation.

1944 is probably too late to turn the course of the war with better radar but more advanced sets in 1943 might have made a big difference.

Radars with high tracking and range accuracy that are relatively jam resistant can greatly increase the success of FLAK, at least at moderate altitudes (say 15000ft) where shell dispersion is not too broad. The most sophisticated German gun laying radar of the war was "Mannheim FuSE 64" Ausf 2 (issue 2) which could *automatically* track a target to withing 6m range and could track it in bearing by 0.15 degrees. It opperated at Wurzburg frequencies of around 50cm, had a 3m dish, could pass tracking data straight into the FLAK predictor. Wurzburg only offered 25m-40m accuracy at 0.3 dgrees, except for the larger Riesse versions. The radar was opperational in early 1943 without auto tracking and latter in the year with. Had the German microwave effort continued Mannheim would have been issued as Mannheim K opperating at 25cm probably in early 1944.

A concerted jamming effort using 'windows' degraded the accuracy of these radars. A variety of solutions restored the functionality of the radar the most effective were systems based around coherant pulse doppler. However the systems worked poorly with frequency changin methods. The reason for this was that after the danger of "Duppel" was established by German experiments so much secrecy was applied no effective counter measures were coherantly applied. The pulse doppler solution came out of secondary radars work designed to detect low flying aircraft in clutter. So it comprimised other jamming methods such as frequency changing. Hence the combination of "Windows" and Noise Jamming seriously degraded German radar.

Hence it would seem that the effort was managed somewhat poorly and so the German effort denied itself radars opperating at twice the frequency with well intergrated anti-jamming methods against both tin-foil and noise jamming. A version of Manheim K called FuMO 231 Euklid survived due to German navy demands for a FLAK gun laying radar for its destroyers but it progressed slowley due to it being a minimal effort. It might have been installed in a destroyer at the end of the war but the destroyer was never launched. Euklid worked very well and handled sea clutter very well as well.

There was also a German proximity fuse effort, they were actually succesfully launching shells. Had it not been suspended in 1940 it might have been opperational around 1943 as the allied fuse was. It used a type of tube called a 'cold gas thyratron' already tough from being used in time delay fuses in German bombs.

It's often small, seemingly inconsequential actions, that can have big impacts latter on. The failure to pursue anti windows circuits and the low prioroty given to the proximity fuse certainly had that effect. Accurate jam resistant radars combined with proximity fused ammunition changes things. Of course we have the benefit of hindsight.

AFAIKT proximity fuses trebble FLAK effectiveness. Wurzburg, when it wasn't being jammed certainly greatly increased FLAK effectivensss as well. I suppose Allied bomber losses to FLAK would be around 5% instead of 1% had the German anti-jamming effort worked better and had they issued a proximity fuse.


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## pbfoot (Mar 10, 2012)

What I'm inferring is the same Tomo , with planned attack on LW Radars the Germans would have been forced to mount standing air patrols \etc. I do believe you need to look up the siting of radars , its all well and good that they were able to communicate to flak , command and the such but its a spider web of wires and such which could have easily been knocked out by anyone with a chainsaw , I do not believe they had satellite communications or data links , you make it sound so easy to plop down a radar and hook up the communications well it isn't . You need designated phone links and the such and if you take the phone links away you cause grief. It would be far easier to "carpet bomb " a radar site from altitude and losses would be IMHO slim to nil . The Germans were smart but not as smart as you think. Its easy to figure out where radar is by simply triangulating the various radio wave emitted by the units even near misses would upset the delicate gear and it was delicate.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 11, 2012)

Being doing some reading about the Spit, so here it goes:
According to the Pilot's notes for the Spit VA, VB and VC, the plane was carrying, under the 'long range' guise, 29 imp gals in rear hull tank, in the same time the 170 imp gals drop tank was there, and it was droppable*. So, by late 1942, all the ingredients for the Escort Spitfire were there.

*though I like more the 90 gals, seem more ... practical


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## stona (Mar 11, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Many RAF raids in 1943, and probably after, definitely before, lost 8 or more highly trained crew for even less results. Note that the 617 crews weren't the elite crews as portrayed in the film. They were normal bomber crews who did some extra mission specific training.



But not eight out of nineteen,that kind of percentage loss is totally unsustainable in any kind of ongoing operation. It's bad enough in a one off like "Chastise" but the idea that this was repeatable over and over again as part of some kind of specialised campaign would have been too much for Bomber Command to swallow. Those young airmen famously had a roughly 50:50 chance of surviving a 30 mission tour of duty with Bomber Command but barely better odds on a single mission? 

617 Squadron were not a selected elite but all members of any WWII bomber crew,including the air gunners,were highly and expensively trained. Bomber Command took the best from both Britain and the entire Commonwealth/Empire and invested a lot of time and treasure in them.

Cheers
Steve


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## wuzak (Mar 11, 2012)

stona said:


> But not eight out of nineteen,that kind of percentage loss is totally unsustainable in any kind of ongoing operation. It's bad enough in a one off like "Chastise" but the idea that this was repeatable over and over again as part of some kind of specialised campaign would have been too much for Bomber Command to swallow. Those young airmen famously had a roughly 50:50 chance of surviving a 30 mission tour of duty with Bomber Command but barely better odds on a single mission?
> 
> 617 Squadron were not a selected elite but all members of any WWII bomber crew,including the air gunners,were highly and expensively trained. Bomber Command took the best from both Britain and the entire Commonwealth/Empire and invested a lot of time and treasure in them.
> 
> ...



Sure the loss of 8/19 is unsustainable, but it was a special mission so a higher loss rate is to be expected. 

The USAAF 8th AF lost 7 aircraft the following day, from 152 attacking aircraft. On the face of it much more acceptable losses. But what did they achieve?

They attacked U-boat pens at Bordeaux and Lorient, and the port facilities in Lorient. They carried 375 ton of bombs compared to 68 by 617. I know that, in general, 8th AF bombing of sub pens caused little impact on the German war effort. The Dams raid impacted the war far more, both directly and indirectly.


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## pbfoot (Mar 11, 2012)

Bomber Command squandered the opportunity with the Sub Pens because they didn't them attack until they had been completed.


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## wuzak (Mar 11, 2012)

Looking at Mhuxt's excelent spreadhseets on the bombing campaign, it looks as though there were very few losses in the days either side of the Dams raid. Maybe the raids were "safe" and didn't risk large losses.


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## wuzak (Mar 11, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Bomber Command squandered the opportunity with the Sub Pens because they didn't them attack until they had been completed.



Did theyhave the wherewithall to actually do anything about it when they were being constructed?


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## pbfoot (Mar 11, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Did theyhave the wherewithall to actually do anything about it when they were being constructed?


Yeap I'll give more info when tomorrow


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## tomo pauk (Mar 12, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Looking at Mhuxt's excelent spreadhseets on the bombing campaign, it looks as though there were very few losses in the days either side of the Dams raid. Maybe the raids were "safe" and didn't risk large losses.



Are the spreadsheets available on-line?


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## mhuxt (Mar 12, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Are the spreadsheets available on-line?


 
Pretty sure I posted them here tomo, though IIRC they were graphs (?)

Will see if I can find them on photobucket again.

I see the site supports posts in zip format, might be able to stick the whole things up as zip, disguising the .xls files inside.


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## mhuxt (Mar 12, 2012)

I think they might have been these:


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## stona (Mar 12, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Sure the loss of 8/19 is unsustainable, but it was a special mission so a higher loss rate is to be expected.



Why so? Other specialised raids did not suffer such huge losses, the Lancasters involved in attacking the Tirpitz ("Catechism") did not. Even the Mosquitos attacking Amiens ("Jericho") lost only 2 of the 13 who actually got their. At Copenhagen ("Carthage") things didn't go so well overall,particularly if you were a Danish schoolchild,but they still only lost 4 of 18(?) Escort losses not included.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 12, 2012)

Thank you very much, mhuxt 
Good idea to put all the xls into a folder and then to zip them, so they could be posted here..


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## pbfoot (Mar 12, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Did theyhave the wherewithall to actually do anything about it when they were being constructed?


From page 413 "the Right of the Line RAF in the European Air War 1939-45" 
"Work had begun as early as January 1941on the building of massive bomb proof Uboat shelters at Brest, Lorient,St Nazaire and L Pallice excavations for these were carried out between Jan and April and more excavations for further groups of pens in July and August > all thgis had been duly observed and its progress monitored month by month by Photo Reconnaissance . It was the sight of these massive preparations which alarmed Coastal Command and prompted Jouberts requests They had this further point
""The foundation work done behind caissions which kept the sea water out was highly vunerable to blast bombing and the subsequent erection was susceptible to grave delays by air attack until the massive roof was in place after which bombing became useless . At this stage (july41) few roofs were in position and much foundation work was still in at the vunerable stage . By January 42 the pens at Brest and Lorient and the majority of those at St Nazaire and La Pallice had passed the stage at which interference from bombing was likeley"" 
To surmise what is written prior and after this article is that Bomber Command thought the U boat menace was overblown and that the bombers would be better used in hitting the facilities where the materials of war were being made
I repeat by previous statement that Harris was the second coming of Haig


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## Hop (Mar 12, 2012)

In 1941 the head of Bomber Command was Richard Peirse. Harris didn't take over until February 1942. 

Even Peirse did not have the power to decide targeting priorities. That was decided at the highest levels, between the air staff and the war cabinet. From March to July 1941 the number 1 priority for Bomber Command was to aid in the battle against U boats and Luftwaffe maritime aircraft.

From The Bomber Command War Diaries:



> The Prime Minister issued a simple instruction. For the next four months, Bomber Command's main operational effort was to be directed against those targets which housed the sources of the threats to British shipping.
> 
> The Air Ministry passed on these orders to Bomber Command in a directive dated 9 March 1941. The initial emphasis was on the U-Boat and long-range aircraft threats. The directive repeated Churchill's own words: 'We must take the offensive against the U-boat and the Focke-Wulf wherever we can and whenever we can. The U-boat at sea must be hunted, the U boat in the building yard or in dock must be bombed. The Focke-Wulf, and other bombers employed against our shipping, must be attacked in the air and in their nests. There was a list of targets: Kiel, with three U boat shipbuilding yards. Hamburg, with two yards, Bremen and Vegesack, each with one yard; the cities of Mannheim and Augsburg with their marine diesel engine factories (Augsbrug was soon removed from the list because of its extreme range for the approaching shorter nights,): Dessau and Bremen again with aircraft factories,; Lorient, St Nazaire and Bordeaux with their U boat bases,; the Focke Wulf Kondor airfields at Stavanger in Norway and Merignax near Bordeaux. The Air Ministry did secure one concession; Sir Richard Peirse was allowed to devote a proportion of the operational effort on the old oil targets.





> Sir Richard Peirse was not happy to be taken off the strategic bombing of Germany just when he felt that his force was on the verge of potential success in the improving weather of spring



Harris was Pierse's successor as head of Bomber Command. The head of Bomber Command did not make policy. That was decided by politicians with input from the heads of the forces, ie it was decided several levels above the head of Bomber Command. And Harris was not even head of BC when these decisions were taken.

Of course from July 1941 the priority changed again. The biggest threat was now that the Germans would defeat the Soviets, the priority was for BC to disrupt transport within Germany.

Again from The Bomber Command War Diaries:



> During the moon period of each month, the bombers were to be sent to a ring of targets around the Ruhr - Hamm, Osnabruck, Soest, Schwerte, Cologne, Duisburg and Dusseldorf - the destruction of whose railway installations should isolate the Ruhr and prevent war materials being moved from that large industrial area to Germany's fighting fronts. Inland waterway targets were also listed. On nights with no moon the bombers were directed to attack the general city areas of Cologne, Dusseldorf and Duisburg which, all being situated on the distinctive Rhine, should be the easiest targets to find on dark nights.



and 



> The only minor diversion from raids on Germany was the requirement to pay occasional visits to U Boat bases in France and to the German warships in Brest Harbour



It's easy to make an argument for attacking this or that target. The problem at the time is there were so many valuable targets and so few bombers to attack them. There was also very little experience about what worked and what didn't, and how much bombing was required to have a decisive effect.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 12, 2012)

Will you please stop insulting Haig!


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## wuzak (Mar 12, 2012)

And what aircraft were available at the time?

Certainly there were no Lancasters available in 1941.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 12, 2012)

Dunno how/if the web site (World War 2 Bombers ) is a relaible source, but here it goes:



> In July 1941 Bomber Command had 732 operational bombers. There were 253 Wellington, 40 Halifax, and 24 Stirling bombers, but the other 415 bombers were of types which were phased out by 1943



The 'other 415 bombers' should be Whitleys and Hampden, at least most of them?


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## Vincenzo (Mar 12, 2012)

just try to check for squadron
455th Hampden
408th Hampden
405th Wellington
311th Wellington
305th Wellington
304th Wellington
301st Wellington
300th Wellington
226th Blenheim
218th Wellington
214th Wellington
207th Hampden
150th Wellington
149th Wellington
144th Hampden
142nd Wellington
139th Blenheim
115th Wellington
114th Blenheim
110th Blenheim
107th Blenheim
106th Hampden
105th Blenheim
104th Wellington
103rd Wellington
102nd Whitley
101st Wellington

99th Wellington
97th Hampden
90th Fortress
88th Boston
83rd Hampden
82nd Blenheim
78th Whitley
77th Whitley
76th Halifax
75th Wellington
61st Manchester
58th Whitley
57th Wellington
51st Whitley
50th Hampden
49th Hampden
44th Hampden
40th Wellington
35th Halifax
21st Blenheim
18th Blenheim
15th Blenheim
12th Wellington
10th Whitley
9th Wellington
7th Sterling


from rafcommands


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## pbfoot (Mar 12, 2012)

Hop said:


> It's easy to make an argument for attacking this or that target. The problem at the time is there were so many valuable targets and so few bombers to attack them. There was also very little experience about what worked and what didn't, and how much bombing was required to have a decisive effect.


You gotta start some where and what they were attacking was a poor choice. Remember the UK was hungry and needed supplies of all sorts so its seems to me it would be a priority to safeguard your lines of communications . 
"in a letter to the CAS dated 4 july among proposals for coooperation between 3 RAF Commands in the sea war (Joubert)put forward the suggestion that Bomber Command should take each U-Boat operating base in turn and reduce it to the condition of Plymouth had been left in after the recent 5 days raids by the LW. Sir Philip prviously sant a draft of this letter to the AOC -in_Bomber Command who had replied that he was firmly convinced that a better employment of his limited force was on objectives in Germany and. though he realised that his bombing effort must be deflected from their primary role in order to attck the major naval units in Brest he could not agree to include the U boat Biscay bases > These views were accepted by the CAS"
Muddlers and if you think that I'm pointing at the Brits for muddlers we had the best muddler of all in WW1 Sam Hughes the man that put himself in for 2 VCs in the Boer War


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## Gixxerman (Mar 12, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> You gotta start some where and what they were attacking was a poor choice.



Perhaps but we have to remember that hindsight is a wonderful thing.

Back then many if not most still believed (even on the British side when you might have thought the recent BoB experience would have educated the powers that be otherwise) that you could destroy a populations will to fight erode the popular support of the Gov in charge.
All it took was just enough concentrated effort......and when that didn't do it it became a matter of enough occasions of concentrated effort ought to do it and so on and so forth.
The 1930's 'bomber will always get through' (and attendant ideas about the total collapse of of society etc etc) were deeply engrained.

IIRC Speer (or was it Goring?) is quoted as saying that they wouldn't have been able to take many more Hamburg type raids.
It turned out to be untrue but it does illustrate the hold that sort of thinking had on all sides, at least in the western European theatre.


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## pbfoot (Mar 12, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> Perhaps but we have to remember that hindsight is a wonderful thing.
> 
> Back then many if not most still believed (even on the British side when you might have thought the recent BoB experience would have educated the powers that be otherwise) that you could destroy a populations will to fight erode the popular support of the Gov in charge.
> .


I agree but it quickly became apparent during thr BoB that it didn't work unless you are of a mind that the Germans didn't have the same fortuitude as the Brits


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## Gixxerman (Mar 13, 2012)

Absolutely not pbfoot. 
I am merely saying that wheneach side had very recent good reason experience to drop those ideas neither were able to do so.
The old certainties can take a very long time to fall away.
Hence my comment about hindsight.
These were not pig-headed stupid people, just people of their time (proved by the fact that it applies to both sides).


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## tomo pauk (Mar 13, 2012)

Sure enough, we here can use the hindsight. 
What about the planners of the ww2 era? The British knew that the only way the Germans threatened them in WWI was via the submarines. That is despite the fact the subs had to travel far greater distances to position themselves west of Ireland. What should be expected now, with French coast providing the Germans with better locations for their subs? 
The Brits also have had the 1st hand experience that even a major bomber offensive is not likely to bring a strong defender to sue for peace. When take a look into geography, the LW was far closer to it's intended targets, than it was the case for air forces operating from UK vs. German-held Europe. So the campaign aimed against those bases doesn't seem to me as one based on hindsight from 21st century.
BTW, the sub bases pens in construction would've been far better targets than those deep inland, both during the day (esp. after April 1941, when LW shifts most of their assets East MTO), and during the night (easier to navigate, plus some flares dropping FAA-style). Being on the French shore line makes the bombers far less within the envelope of Flak fighters.
It would also forces LW to make some 'interesting' choices - if they want to defend the bases better, some of the fighters need to be recalled from East MTO, while the Flak forces need some re-shuffling. If the Germans decide to abandon the bases/pens there, that's a major blow for their operations.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 13, 2012)

I'm not so sure it was so cut dried as that tomo pauk.

I just don't see how the RAF could do it with the tools available in '41.
In daylight they would be cut to pieces and at night they cannot hope to have the accuracy the then (medium) bomber force would require.
They are a long way off of the 1000 bomber type raid that could saturate the (fairly small) area with bombs.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 13, 2012)

I've quoted the source giving the number of 732 bombers for the RAF in mid 1941. Seem to me as a force quite able to saturate the target. 
The navigation is far easier than what was needed to find something in Germany proper, with the coastline aiding the attacker. 
As for daylight attack, historically RAF was mounting the daylight attacks with strong fighter forces, but small bomber forces, managing to achieve the upper hand in Channel around, within the range of it's fighters of course. Germans aided there by relocating the bulk of their forces into East MTO by Spring/Summer of 1941. So the 200 LW fighters would be defending against the, say, 600 bombers plus 500-600 fighters? Tough luck, Luftwaffe, this time you need to attack the bombers, not to pick when to fight and when not.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 13, 2012)

What was lacking was the doctrine to allow the "integration" of the forces. The distance from Plymouth to Brest is about the same as from Ipswich to Rotterdam. It wouldn't have taken much of a drop tank or auxiliary Tank for Spitfires to escort bombers in daylight to Brest. I believe the British were fooling around with Auxiliary tanks on the MK II Spitfire.
Brest is also rather isolated being either as far west as Plymouth if not a shade further. It is further from Brest to Amiens than it is from Plymouth to Norwich. 

The "tools" in the form of technology existed. The opportunity existed. What did not exist was the doctrine, planning and training to allow for such combined operations. Rhubarbs and such not withstanding. Using 4-6 bombers as "bait" to try to lure the Germans Up for a fighter battle is not the same as using large numbers of bombers and fighters with different cruise speeds and altitudes to actual try to bomb a target to destruction with the fighters acting as a true escort rather than the primary force with a few attached bombers damaging whatever they happened to hit.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 13, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> I've quoted the source giving the number of 732 bombers for the RAF in mid 1941. Seem to me as a force quite able to saturate the target.



Fair point......but how many of those 732 would be servicable at any one time?

I agree a coastal target should be a help in navigation but even so given the errors lack of accuracy I have my doubts that sufficient damage could be achieved in the short window of opportunity.
I could also imagine several LW units being pulled back (especially given the apparant easy victories at the start of the Russian campaign) for the necessary 6mths or so needed to get the U-boat pens to a state of construction where the bombing became ineffective.

On a side note, I remember being told some time ago that the Germans used a special type of conrete mix for those pens and that the concrete actually became stronger over time, does anyone know if this is just myth or true?

Shortround6 makes a good point too, the RAF bomber force was far from trained for this sort of massed raid we're imagining.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 13, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> On a side note, I remember being told some time ago that the Germans used a special type of conrete mix for those pens and that the concrete actually became stronger over time, does anyone know if this is just myth or true.


 That's true with all concrete. I gets about 90% of it's full strenght in about 30 days, when properly cured, and gets stronger the older it gets , if properly cared for.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 13, 2012)

Hi, Gixx,
I've already suggested 600 bombers doing the raid(s), therefore allowing for non-serviceable ones, in the same post you quote 
As for damage, we can take a look at what amount of damage the BC was dealing to the Germans prior the de-housing campaign. Despite all the risk to the bomber crews and the investment in bombing force, the night bombers were not able to hit anything of importance prior that. The window of opportunity for day attacks can span between May 1941 (Germans cut on day fighters in West) to maybe Nov 1941 (bad weather sets in). The pens were in function from Feb 1942 historically? 
With any fighter unit withdrawn back to ETO, Germans are worse off in the East or MTO. Great for Allied cause.
The night bombing also required substantial training, so the training for daylight attacks does not seem such an issue. It's a question of doctrine and will at high levels, far more than the question of training the bomber crews. But even the night bombing of the construction sites puts Germans into disadvantage - their defenses (Flak, NFs) lack radars in 1941.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 13, 2012)

Thanks for that tyrodtom.



tomo pauk said:


> Hi, Gixx,
> I've already suggested 600 bombers doing the raid(s), therefore allowing for non-serviceable ones, in the same post you quote



Indeed you did, ooops, my mistake. 

It's an interesting 'what if....' idea but I stil think the 'pull' of the old bomber ideology was much too strong.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 13, 2012)

Well, this is a 'what if' thread


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## pbfoot (Mar 13, 2012)

Please recall that a few of the raids that the USAAF cut their teeth were bombing such targets as Lorient , I firmly believe that Bomber Command became fixated particularly on area bombing with no thoughts of other opportunities the higher ups were area bombing junkies .Its a repeat of WW1 lions led by donkeys to quote some German general .


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## fastmongrel (Mar 13, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> .Its a repeat of WW1 lions led by donkeys to quote some German general .



That quote was attributed to Gen Ludendorff by the british historian Alan Clarke. He later admitted he had made it up and in fact the phrase was first used during the Franco/Prussian War by the Times "the French were lions led by jackasses" It was also used about the Russian contingent during the Boxer Rebellion.


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## Readie (Mar 14, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I firmly believe that Bomber Command became fixated particularly on area bombing with no thoughts of other opportunities the higher ups were area bombing junkies .Its a repeat of WW1 lions led by donkeys to quote some German general .



Not sure about that Neil....BC completed other raids apart from 'area bombing' 
The 'area bombing' idea was(is) a legimate way of waging war. 
That is not to say that I do not recognise and deplore the huge human cost on both sides but, nevertheless 'total war' is just that. Flatten as much as you can and keep going till the job's done.
In the context of the time we are discussing it was hardely suprising that BC carried on with Churchill and the British Commonwealth people's blessing. 
In fact I would say that I'm suprised that more area bombing was not done just to make a point to Hitler that his Third Reich was not as invunerable as he and Goering liked to boast.
As ever the ordinary people got in the way..but, that has always been the case throughout history.
We have no immediate prospect of liberating our European allies by force other than grinding down the German war machine and German people as a prelude to an invasion.

Now,what would you do? 


John


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## fastmongrel (Mar 14, 2012)

Well said Readie we from our comfortable 21st C perspective have no knowledge of what people went through. The desire to hit back is legitimate and understandable. 

Also the knockers never come up with any other sensible way of increasing accuracy and effectiveness. To imply that commanders of the time were stupid and sent there men to die for no good resaon is a grave insult to people who at the time with the best available equipment and knowledge did there best. To suggest as somebody did on this forum that BC should have divebombed heavily defended targets with heavy bombers just shows how moronic some people are. It would have been simpler, kinder and more effective to shoot the crews in the back of the head before they took off rather than let them die as there burning aircraft hit the ground.

Harris is often blamed for sticking to targets that were not efficent ways of taking the war to Germany. This is an insult to Harris he was not involved in strategic decisions he was given a list of targets by politicians and told to attack them in the most effective manner possible. The fact that those same politicians then hung him out to dry after the war and made him a scapegoat is not his fault and undeserved for a man who did his duty.


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

I'm sorry I must be incorrect Harris was an absolute genius , just like Haig full of consideration for his men and on top of the game . Thats why the RCAF wanted work with the USAAF when Tiger Force was planned .
Why did this wonderful leader of men rarely show up to any of the units that flew missions, its no different then Haig ordering his troops into battle and never seeing the frontline . I guess the statement of Lions led by Donkies cannot be attributed to a German officer but if the shoe fits wear it


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## Readie (Mar 14, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Well said Readie we from our comfortable 21st C perspective have no knowledge of what people went through. The desire to hit back is legitimate and understandable.
> 
> Also the knockers never come up with any other sensible way of increasing accuracy and effectiveness. To imply that commanders of the time were stupid and sent there men to die for no good resaon is a grave insult to people who at the time with the best available equipment and knowledge did there best. To suggest as somebody did on this forum that BC should have divebombed heavily defended targets with heavy bombers just shows how moronic some people are. It would have been simpler, kinder and more effective to shoot the crews in the back of the head before they took off rather than let them die as there burning aircraft hit the ground.
> 
> Harris is often blamed for sticking to targets that were not efficent ways of taking the war to Germany. This is an insult to Harris he was not involved in strategic decisions he was given a list of targets by politicians and told to attack them in the most effective manner possible. The fact that those same politicians then hung him out to dry after the war and made him a scapegoat is not his fault and undeserved for a man who did his duty.



Well said FM, it is very easy to criticise but, offer no other solutions to the issues faced at the time.
We can only surmise from our parents / grandparents the feelings at the time and from what we read.
To me Harris was a man of the time, just like Churchill and the other leaders who did whatever was necessary to try and win the war.
Harris's treatment after VE day was despicable and I find the denigration of him and BC offensive.

John


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

Readie said:


> Well said FM, it is very easy to criticise but, offer no other solutions to the issues faced at the time.
> We can only surmise from our parents / grandparents the feelings at the time and from what we read.
> To me Harris was a man of the time, just like Churchill and the other leaders who did whatever was necessary to try and win the war.
> Harris's treatment after VE day was despicable and I find the denigration of him and BC offensive.
> ...


There is no denigration of the guys that flew the missions nor of the guys that serviced the aircraft, but look at the guy he wouldn't spare any bombers to strike the invasion area of Dieppe even though he had 50+ squadrons of fighters that would have flown escort because he was worried how it would effect his 1000 bomber raid on Cologne , oh I forgot they could bomb but only at night . BTW Dieppe was the 1st place the P51 had a kill over the LW , maybe if there was more he would have had some confidence


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## Readie (Mar 14, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> There is no denigration of the guys that flew the missions nor of the guys that serviced the aircraft, but look at the guy he wouldn't spare any bombers to strike the invasion area of Dieppe even though he had 50+ squadrons of fighters that would have flown escort because he was worried how it would effect his 1000 bomber raid on Cologne , oh I forgot they could bomb but only at night . BTW Dieppe was the 1st place the P51 had a kill over the LW , maybe if there was more he would have had some confidence




I should have said that I included all members of BC Neil.

Harris made an operational decision and the 1000 Cologne bomber raid was a priority.
Why the dig about night bombing?
Why not use the cover of darkness? Most Commando raids in WW2 were undertaken at night.
The P51 was a vital tool in the box , again you are judging with hindsight.

John


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

Readie said:


> I should have said that I included all members of BC Neil.
> 
> Harris made an operational decision and the 1000 Cologne bomber raid was a priority.
> Why the dig about night bombing?
> ...


The dig about night bombing is that Harris said he'd send heavies over for Dieppe only under the cover of darkness and as for using darkness ask Mr Mountbatten the raid was originally planned using heavies and RN Battleships . Funny thing is that mayber Harris was right because Fighter Command was sure handed it's ass on a platter that day despite the fact the 50 sqn of "Spits" flew up to 4 sorties that day


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## Readie (Mar 14, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> The dig about night bombing is that Harris said he'd send heavies over for Dieppe only under the cover of darkness and as for using darkness ask Mr Mountbatten the raid was originally planned using heavies and RN Battleships . Funny thing is that mayber Harris was right because Fighter Command was sure handed it ass on a platter that day despite the fact the 50 sqn of "Spits" flew up to 4 sorties that day



Bombers moon and the cover of darkness are always preferred.
I'm sorry but, I don't understand what you mean about 'handed it ass on a platter'...
John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 14, 2012)

RAF can use 20/20 hindsight already in 1941. 
They knew very well that a bomber raid, numbering in hundreds of bombers, if a force that can bring devastation. They also knew that bombers are cold meat for fighters if no escort is provided. They also knew that LW from May 1941, while potent force, could not be deployed in all of three war theaters in great numbers, unlike the RAF forces. How far fetched is for Brits to just draw a bottom line and see that, from that time, they are more than able to overwhelm the Germans in ETO? After all, the RAF was mounting for better part of 1941 and 1942 (and later) offensive fighter sorties, with trickles of bombers acting as bait. Germans were in position to choose whether to fight (when judged the LW can gain upper hand), or to decline fight (when judged RAF would bring in an overwhelming force). 
With 600 bombers attacking German installations, the LW is no more in position to decline fight - they MUST scramble and attack the bombers. Right what the RAF wants them to do. RAF can afford trade a bomber and a fighter per every fighter Germans loose. Can the 200-250 strong German fighter force withstand that vs. 1100+ RAF bombers and fighters? I doubt they could, even with such a favorable kill ration, even with half of downed German pilots fighting another day.


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## fastmongrel (Mar 14, 2012)

Who in there right mind would use heavy bombers to attack Dieppe during a raid. What possible reason would there be to use them at night or in daytime. Even in 1944 heavies probably killed as many allied soldiers as they did German when they were used for infantry support in Normandy. You waste a strategic asset on a Commando raid that will have zero effect on the current war effort. 

As for the critiscism of Haig that is a construct of marxist historians that infested British universities of the 60s and 70s. If you believe the claptrap spouted 50 years after the event by people with an agenda thats fine by me but dont ignore the facts and use marxist/leninist class warfare ideology in its place. The 1st World war was not a class struggle and no general on either side killed men for no good reason. Tactics take years to be learnt and possibly the British Army took longer to learn them than the German army. Thats simply a fact that the British army since the Crimean war had been used as a colonial police force and had developed tactics to suit. German armies had more experience of large scale manouvere battles but they didnt noticeably do better than the British generals by the end of the conflict. By 1918 the British armed forces were well equipped and flexible and able to dominate a battle field you dont get like that by ignoring the situation and marching men to there deaths. More recent history books tell a different story of the war a good one to start with would be Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the Great War Cassell Military Paperbacks: Amazon.co.uk: Gordon Corrigan: Books. Not a perfect book and I disagree with some of his reasonings but overall a good primer on WWI and the British, he doesnt pull punches and lambasts the stupid like a good army man.

Haig and Harris made mistakes probably more than most but then they had to keep sending young men to there deaths that unfortunately is what generals have to do in the attempt to clear up the mess created by politicians. If you want to criticise Haig then also criticise Ludendorff he was responsible for millions of Germans deaths many of them wasted in bone headed attacks by infantry against machine guns and artillery. Criticise Foch for sending infantry men against machine guns criticise any general.


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

Readie said:


> Bombers moon and the cover of darkness are always preferred.
> I'm sorry but, I don't understand what you mean about 'handed it ass on a platter'...
> John


handed it's ass on a platter =beat 
b


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Who in there right mind would use heavy bombers to attack Dieppe during a raid. What possible reason would there be to use them at night or in daytime. Even in 1944 heavies probably killed as many allied soldiers as they did German when they were used for infantry support in Normandy. You waste a strategic asset on a Commando raid that will have zero effect on the current war effort.
> 
> As for the critiscism of Haig that is a construct of marxist historians that infested British universities of the 60s and 70s. If you believe the claptrap spouted 50 years after the event by people with an agenda thats fine by me but dont ignore the facts and use marxist/leninist class warfare ideology in its place. The 1st World war was not a class struggle and no general on either side killed men for no good reason. Tactics take years to be learnt and possibly the British Army took longer to learn them than the German army. Thats simply a fact that the British army since the Crimean war had been used as a colonial police force and had developed tactics to suit. German armies had more experience of large scale manouvere battles but they didnt noticeably do better than the British generals by the end of the conflict. By 1918 the British armed forces were well equipped and flexible and able to dominate a battle field you dont get like that by ignoring the situation and marching men to there deaths. More recent history books tell a different story of the war a good one to start with would be Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the Great War Cassell Military Paperbacks: Amazon.co.uk: Gordon Corrigan: Books. Not a perfect book and I disagree with some of his reasonings but overall a good primer on WWI and the British, he doesnt pull punches and lambasts the stupid like a good army man.
> 
> Haig and Harris made mistakes probably more than most but then they had to keep sending young men to there deaths that unfortunately is what generals have to do in the attempt to clear up the mess created by politicians. If you want to criticise Haig then also criticise Ludendorff he was responsible for millions of Germans deaths many of them wasted in bone headed attacks by infantry against machine guns and artillery. Criticise Foch for sending infantry men against machine guns criticise any general.


Read some history from off shore
Our the Canadian PM grabbed Lloyd George by the lapels over the waste of men caused by Haig after being briefed by Currie .
And as for the British forces being in the prime in 1918 it was the Aussies and Canadians that did the bull work the BEF plain and simple . The Brit Generals still hadn't figured it out with the exception of Byng


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## fastmongrel (Mar 14, 2012)

Try reading a history that is not trying to sell you something. I have read histories from the German, French and US perspective. Give it a go you will be surprised at what people from non english speaking countries think of WWI. A lot of information comes from a 180 degree direction to that of the English speaking histories. 

As for Sir Robert Borden grabbing Lloyd-George by the lapels, oh come on that one isnt going to float. Arthur Currie and Lloyd George were friends and political allies against Haig.


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Try reading a history that is not trying to sell you something. I have read histories from the German, French and US perspective. Give it a go you will be surprised at what people from non english speaking countries think of WWI. A lot of information comes from a 180 degree direction to that of the English speaking histories.
> 
> As for Sir Robert Borden grabbing Lloyd-George by the lapels, oh come on that one isnt going to float. Arthur Currie and Lloyd George were friends and political allies against Haig.


Try one with a Canadian or Australian perspective , 
"Now Currie was telleing Borden similar stories not about young officers but the imcompetence of British Commanders > borden was shocked . he took Curries criticisms to the Imperial War Cabinet and in an uncharecteristiclly forthright declaration hammered home his bill of indictments . Three days before the German counteroffensive began that spring , British Intelligence had assured the command that there would be no offensive There had been "conspicuos failures to remove incompetent officers " in the British Forces . Talented young leaders faced a wall of opposition from the professionals who refused to promote them above the rank of Brig General.
Looking directly at Lloyd George Borden declared "Prime Minister I want to tell you if there is a repitition of the Battle of Passchendaele not one Canadian soldier will leave the shores of Canada so long as long as the Canadian people trust the government of their country to me "
Bordens blunt actions were unprecedented and it is said he strode across the floor siezed Lloyd George by the lapels of his frock coat and shook him.


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## Readie (Mar 14, 2012)

Big issues to cover here...
WW1 to WW2 fought by our forefathers for reasons that only they really understand.
The world was a different place then and old loyalties die hard.
John


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

I guess the point is nothing changed IMHO between the 1st and second wars in the British commanders


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## Readie (Mar 14, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I guess the point is nothing changed IMHO between the 1st and second wars in the British commanders



Sorry, I don't agree Neil. 
Everyone learnt lessons in WW1, some had to re-learnt in WW2 that's true.But, that applies to all sides.
Why do you have such a down on British commanders?
John


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

Readie said:


> Sorry, I don't agree Neil.
> Everyone learnt lessons in WW1, some had to re-learnt in WW2 that's true.But, that applies to all sides.
> Why do you have such a down on British commanders?
> John


Don't know anything about the Navy so no comment, but I do believe the Public school boys in the UK were not up to anyones snuff and let their superiority complex blind them to what was evident to all others . For example how many RAF types were on the staff of Gort circa the Invasion of France . 
My friends Dad was in front lines in Italy recounted how some Brit officers were checking out the line and were continuing into "no mans land" they tried to stop them but because they were Canadians they were not obviously in the picture so the guys said have a nice trip they were all killed or captured. my friends Dad thought it was pretty funny


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## Readie (Mar 15, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Don't know anything about the Navy so no comment, but I do believe the Public school boys in the UK were not up to anyones snuff and let their superiority complex blind them to what was evident to all others . For example how many RAF types were on the staff of Gort circa the Invasion of France .
> My friends Dad was in front lines in Italy recounted how some Brit officers were checking out the line and were continuing into "no mans land" they tried to stop them but because they were Canadians they were not obviously in the picture so the guys said have a nice trip they were all killed or captured. my friends Dad thought it was pretty funny



Neil. My Dad in the British Army in the Italian campaign ,wounded and captured by the German army after a over ambitious British led attack.
BBC - History - World Wars: World War Two: The Battle of Monte Cassino
Please read this link and you may like to reconsider your 'pretty funny' remark.
John


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## pbfoot (Mar 15, 2012)

I`ve worked a number of years in the RCAF and had a position like being a fly on the wall the only NCO in a position dealing with officers only , I`ve had the opportunity to work with officers from numerous nations many times on a one to one basis . Almost every nations military officers treated me with respect example . I`d say `morning Sir`and they`d reply G`morning neil hows it going-or something akin except the RAF types and it was always like you were something distasteful on their shoe . It wasn`t like I wanted to be their friend and hang out or ask their daughter out it was a simple courtesy. This was in the 70`s and 80`s and I sure hope things have changed . Now the RAF nco types were the best and a more competent crew one could not ask for


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## stona (Mar 15, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I do believe the Public school boys in the UK were not up to anyones snuff and let their superiority complex blind them to what was evident to all others .



Those public school boys also comprised the regimental subalterns. That's the way society was back then. They may not have been up to your snuff but they were statistically five times more likely to be killed in action than the men that they led,from the front.
I've spoken to many old soldiers and read many memoirs,letters etc and have never seen one instance of an old soldier who described the death of another soldier,even the enemy, as"funny". Maybe I need to meet a few more Canadians.
You can't just keep making your ill informed generalisations. It is close to trolling. 
You seem to be under the impression that the British army of 1914-18 was something like the army of the previous centuries when comissions were bought and one of the priveledges of class was leadership. The sale of comissions stopped in 1871. 
The armies of all sides,with the possible exception of the US, on the Western Front in 1918 far more resembled the armies that would take the field in 1939/40 than they did their predecessors of 1914. How exactly did your incompetent public school boys achieve this?
By the way Douglas Haig attended Clifton College in Bristol which whilst being strictly speaking a public school operated a model quite unlike other more famous and elite schools at that time. You might like to do a little research into that. This may have caused problems with Eton educated Buller for example.
Haig was also a graduate of Camberley Staff College. French wasn't a public school boy at all having been educated at a naval academy.
Cheers
Steve (getting bored with this)


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## pbfoot (Mar 15, 2012)

Ok obviously I`ve hit a chord about the competence of British Leaders in the wars and will retract all statements and say I was mistaken they obviously were the cream of the crop and on top of their game at all times and obviously just had bad luck 
I think I`ll go smoke one now


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## stona (Mar 15, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Ok obviously I`ve hit a chord about the competence of British Leaders in the wars and will retract all statements and say I was mistaken they obviously were the cream of the crop and on top of their game at all times and obviously just had bad luck
> I think I`ll go smoke one now


Your response does not address any of the facts I have presented to you. Are you not open to debate?
All I'm asking you to do is set aside your prejudices and look at the facts. You will find incompetence and genius, triumph and tragedy,bravery and stupidity. Noone has suggested that mistakes were not made,but they were certainly learnt from. Open your eyes and you will find a far richer and interesting history than one seen through a lens comprised of prejudice and assumption. 
Steve


Steve


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## Readie (Mar 15, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I`ve worked a number of years in the RCAF and had a position like being a fly on the wall the only NCO in a position dealing with officers only , I`ve had the opportunity to work with officers from numerous nations many times on a one to one basis . Almost every nations military officers treated me with respect example . I`d say `morning Sir`and they`d reply G`morning neil hows it going-or something akin except the RAF types and it was always like you were something distasteful on their shoe . It wasn`t like I wanted to be their friend and hang out or ask their daughter out it was a simple courtesy. This was in the 70`s and 80`s and I sure hope things have changed . Now the RAF nco types were the best and a more competent crew one could not ask for



What exactly has this got to do with your posts about British casualties being 'pretty funny' ?

John


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## Readie (Mar 15, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Ok obviously I`ve hit a chord about the competence of British Leaders in the wars and will retract all statements and say I was mistaken they obviously were the cream of the crop and on top of their game at all times and obviously just had bad luck
> I think I`ll go smoke one now



If you care to read the link I have already posted you'll see that all commanders are subject to being criticised for their battlefield decisions.

John


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## pbfoot (Mar 15, 2012)

Readie said:


> What exactly has this got to do with your posts about British casualties being 'pretty funny' ?
> 
> John


It wasn`t my quote it was a deceased gentleman that was wounded 3 times was in most battles the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment fought in from Sicily to NorthWest Europe , he was drunk (not a common occurence) had never talked of his expieriences before it was him and I relayed his comments albeit not verbatim , but the gist was if these turkeys were that dumb why should he risk his ass to save them . I saw your link about Cassino this guy was also there as well as Ortona , my uncle was also at Cassino , so I`m not unfamiliar with thte scrap.
I'm not grunt but I'm guessing trenches were not used much in Italy mor like fight positions 20 -30 yars apart I would guess , if you see some guys strolling around at the front line and you yell stop, halt ,sniper or something , is it your job to go out and tackle the fool and risk your butt , its possible it was an exposed position that my friends dad and fellow squad members knew about and the interloper didn't and why risk your ass . I'm sure they tried and I'll wager the language was colourful 
Once again I was mistaken and the Brit leaders were all that and more , if I look in the dictionary under excellent military leaders I`m sure there will be pics of Haig and Harris


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## Siegfried (Mar 15, 2012)

Readie said:


> Not sure about that Neil....BC completed other raids apart from 'area bombing'
> The 'area bombing' idea was(is) a legimate way of waging war.
> John



Technically no. The Hague conventions, the only conventions in force, did not mention bombardment by aircraft but they did specifically preclude bombardment by ballon.


Extrapolating from artillery bombardment and officer is allowed to bombard a city under Siege after making appropriate offers of surrender. During the bombardment he must take care to avoid civilian casualties or damage to such buildings as churches. On that basis the Luftwaffe was probably OK since it had spent 2 days attempting to brocker a surrender, the besieging army faced serious casualties as they stormed or entered the city and they had to keep moving participate in the Battle of France.

During the 1920s the US government proposed to extend to conventions to aerial bombardment and to preclude bombardment of factories if those factories were near housing. The additions did not precede as it was felt that housing would deliberatly be built near factories to take advantage of this zone of immunity.

Area bombardment is now clearly criminal. Any pilot undertaking a mission and caiusing colleteral casualties is liable to potential criminal prosecution if he did not use weapons of adaquet reliabillity and accuracy to reasonably avoid collateral damage.

The Area Bombardment campaign was cleary driven over the edge by Lindemann, who was described as having a pathological hatred of Germans. Many opposed him and proposed alternative strategies but Lindemann had the ear of Churchill and provided more than enough critical mass to get his way. Alternatives would have involved better aircraft either faster or better armed or effective navigation systems. Oboe ( a technical triumph), the one system that had sufficient accuracy (but not range) for instance barely had sufficient support to get through development. A system using orbing aircraft and Oboe like techniques to provide over the horizon blind bombing had very little effort put into it. We never saw a Lancaster with two stage engines and better armour and armament. 

Very few of the alternatives were ever developed once Lindemann had gotten his way.

Harris was at worst a mere minion though it is extraordinary that he seem to lack balance in therms of wild hogging of resources such as microwave radars and 1000 bomber propaganda stunts nevertheless I appreciate his honesty.


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## pbfoot (Mar 15, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Technically no. The Hague conventions, the only conventions in force, did not mention bombardment by aircraft but they did specifically preclude bombardment by ballon.
> 
> 
> Extrapolating from artillery bombardment and officer is allowed to bombard a city under Siege after making appropriate offers of surrender. During the bombardment he must take care to avoid civilian casualties or damage to such buildings as churches. On that basis the Luftwaffe was probably OK since it had spent 2 days attempting to brocker a surrender, the besieging army faced serious casualties as they stormed or entered the city and they had to keep moving participate in the Battle of France.
> ...


Really the first aerial bomabardment of civilians was by the Germans using Dirigables or Gothas, a new one I read about today was the JU52's overflying Warsaw with groundcrew *shovelling *incendaries out the door 
"The Germans launch “Operation Coast” against Warsaw, an air attack on the city consisting of 400 bombers, mostly He 111s and Do 17s, dive-bombers, and ground-attack units, supported by 30 Ju 52s in the bombing role, dropping incendiary bombs. The latter drop 72 tons of incendiary bombs on Warsaw, spreading fires, havoc, and destruction. A Polish officer’s wife, Jadwiga Sosnkowska, who later escapes to the West, remembers a year later, “that dreadful night,” when she was assisting at one of the city’s hospitals.


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## Siegfried (Mar 15, 2012)

stona said:


> Those public school boys also comprised the regimental subalterns. That's the way society was back then. They may not have been up to your snuff but they were statistically five times more likely to be killed in action than the men that they led,from the front.
> I've spoken to many old soldiers and read many memoirs,letters etc and have never seen one instance of an old soldier who described the death of another soldier,even the enemy, as"funny". Maybe I need to meet a few more Canadians.
> You can't just keep making your ill informed generalisations. It is close to trolling.
> You seem to be under the impression that the British army of 1914-18 was something like the army of the previous centuries when comissions were bought and one of the priveledges of class was leadership. The sale of comissions stopped in 1871.
> ...



I think while Stona is being a little harsh you have rose coloured glasses. The officers of the British army were still an elite group when the war started, still steeped in priveledge and inclined to see some of their troops as expendable freaks. This was a British army to paid young girls to hand out chicken feathers to young often school age boys (some of whom ended up shot by firing squad when they 'deserted', that executed shell shocked lower class outsiders as cowards. Officers didn't get executed though I think a few Canadians (who weren't part of the old boy netowrk were). Khemal Attaturk diaries describe how he observed Australian Officers beating Australian troops at gun point to force them over the edge. All quite different from the "ANZAC" legend of an all volunteer army. Now wonder these men couldn't talk about things after the war. The Australians also desecreated turkish graves.


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## wuzak (Mar 15, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> We never saw a Lancaster with two stage engines and better armour and armament.



No,because they renamed the two stage engined Lancaster _Lincoln_.


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## Readie (Mar 16, 2012)

Siefried, you didn't mention the area bombing of British cities by the LW. The subsequent allied bomber offensive against the axis powers was part of the plan to defeat them.
'total war' was declared and the gloves came off.

I have said before that the casualties were appalling and a raid like Dresden is akin to a nuclear attack.

Did the end justify the means? 

I would have to say 'yes' but, with reluctance.

John


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## Hop (Mar 16, 2012)

> "in a letter to the CAS dated 4 july among proposals for coooperation between 3 RAF Commands in the sea war (Joubert)put forward the suggestion that Bomber Command should take each U-Boat operating base in turn and reduce it to the condition of Plymouth had been left in after the recent 5 days raids by the LW.



I think a description of what happened to Plymouth will highlight the difficulty of Bomber Command doing the same to German naval facilities in France.

From The Night Blitz by John Ray:



> Over 5 nights - 21, 22, 23, 28 and 29 April - 641 bomber sorties crossed Plymouth and Devonport. They rained down 772 tons of high explosives and UXBs, accompanied by parachute mines, and scattered 139,000 incendiaries on the city and nearby naval base.





> In stark terms, the centres of both Plymouth and Devonport were eradicated, with a few shells of buildings left standing.





> That notwithstanding, the dockyards were not brought to a halt: their work, and production in shipyards, was affected only temporarily. At Devonport Dockyard the damage was less severe than many had anticipated and "within five months the establishment was back to 90 percent of its efficiency". On 2 May, when Churchill visited the dockyard he 'walked four miles, along quays, through workshops, over ships' which would have been impossible if they had been totally out of action.





> And yet great travail was caused by the stress laid on the local population, and on civilian services set up to cater for their needs. During the five nights nearly 600 people were killed and another 450 seriously hurt. In addition, the destruction of thousands of homes, when added to those destroyed during the March raids, provided problems of unforeseen complexity for local authorities. The provision of Rest Centres, finding accommodation for 40,000 homeless and and supplying food 'when only 10 percent of the city's food distribution facilities remain' became acute problems.



As at Coventry, damage to the city itself was more serious, and caused more disruption, than damage to military targets. 

Bomber Command couldn't do the same to German U boat bases in France for 2 reasons. First, they could not simply area bomb French cities.

Second, Plymouth naval base relied on civilian and military workers who lived, with their families, in Plymouth. That was not true to anything like the same extent for German submarine bases in France.

In Plymouth the authorities had to make rescuing, feeding and housing the civilian population their number one priority. The German occupation authorities in France would certainly make repairing the naval facilities their number one priority, and leave the French civilians to their own devices. Indeed, the more misery the French suffered, the greater the propaganda victory for the Germans.


Incidentally, for those arguing Bomber Command should have made a higher priority of the naval battle, here are the operations BC flew on the nights Plymouth was being so heavily area bombed:

21 April - 61 aircraft to Cologne
21 April - 24 aircraft to oil storage depot at Rotterdam
21 April - 9 aircraft minelaying off Brest
21 April - 36 Blenheims to Le Harve power station and anti shipping patrols. The power station attack was called off, all aircraft attacked shipping
22 April - 14 aircraft coastal sweep off Norway
23 April - 26 aircraft bombing Brest
23 April - 6 aircraft minelaying off Brest
23 April - 37 aircraft on sweeps off Belgian, Dutch and French coasts
28 April - 10 aircraft attacks on targets in Germany
28 April - 6 aircraft sweep of Channel for enemy shipping
29 April - 25 aircraft bombing Brest
29 April - 5 aircraft minelaying off La Rochelle
29 April - 39 aircraft anti shipping sweeps

That's 71 aircraft against targets in Germany, 24 against oil targets, over 200 against German shipping.


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## Hop (Mar 16, 2012)

> Extrapolating from artillery bombardment and officer is allowed to bombard a city under Siege after making appropriate offers of surrender. During the bombardment he must take care to avoid civilian casualties or damage to such buildings as churches.



That's not really what the Hague conventions said. The relevant part from the land warfare rules:

Art. 25. The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.

Art. 26. The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities.

Art. 27. In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.

Note that bombardment of *undefended* towns was prohibited. In terms of attacks on defended targets, any requirement to spare specific buildings is mitigated with "as far as possible".

Of even more relevance are the laws on bombardment by naval forces:

THE BOMBARDMENT OF UNDEFENDED PORTS, TOWNS, VILLAGES, DWELLINGS, OR BUILDINGS

Article 1. The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden.
A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour. 

2. Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war ' matériel, ' workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbour, are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons followed by a reasonable time of waiting, if all other means are impossible, and when the local authorities have not themselves destroyed them within the time fixed.
He incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a bombardment under such circumstances.
If for military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no delay can be allowed the enemy, it is understood that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good, as in the case given in paragraph l, and that the commander shall take all due measures in order that the town may suffer as little harm as possible.

Again note the protection for "undefended" towns. Note however that the rules allowed immediate action to bombard even an undefended town to destroy military and industrial targets, and that the commander must only ensure "as little harm as possible".




> The Area Bombardment campaign was cleary driven over the edge by Lindemann, who was described as having a pathological hatred of Germans.



The British area bombardment campaign was clearly based on that carried out by the Germans on Britain. Until a week after the start of the Blitz on London British bombers were restricted to attacks on precisely identified military targets. The first British area attack of the war wasn't carried out until mid December, a month after the attack on Coventry, and all the planning talked of replicating the effects of the German attack. 

Read the description of the damage to Plymouth and Devonport above. That was what drove British area bombing. Not just a desire to hit back, but a recognition that damage to a town as a whole greatly reduced industrial output at all the factories in that town.


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## Readie (Mar 16, 2012)

Read the description of the damage to Plymouth and Devonport above. That was what drove British area bombing. Not just a desire to hit back, but a recognition that damage to a town as a whole greatly reduced industrial output at all the factories in that town.

Good post Hop.
There were 'bomb site car parks' ie where buildings were destroyed and not replaced up the early 1970's in Plymouth.

it is also true to say that while the LW did a great deal of damage to Plymouth, the post war developers finished the job and did more demolition to make way for the new city centre...
John


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## stona (Mar 16, 2012)

Readie said:


> it is also true to say that while the LW did a great deal of damage to Plymouth, the post war developers finished the job and did more demolition to make way for the new city centre...
> John



Same in Birmingham.
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Apr 5, 2012)

Spurred by the discussion at the another thread:

We can take a look at the German RAF forces of the 1941-42.
The bulk of the LW fighters was, for maybe 8 months in 1941, comprised from the Bf-109F-1/F-2 fighters. There were some E-7s, plus maybe a small number of the F-0s. Out of those, the Friedrichs are good match for Spit V (109 a tad faster, Spit should offer a bigger punch, providing the cannons are installed), the E-7 less so. The next 109, the E-4, is being produced from June (July?) 1941, the DB-601E not allowed to make power on Notleistung setting. The clearance for Notleistung was issued between February and April 1942; the high speed on that setting is quoted to be from 635 to 670 km/h (faster than more powerful 109G-2 on Notleistung??), obviously slower with Steig Kampfleistung (prior Feb 1942 maximum). 
The another plane entering the service is the Fw-190. 1st with the BMW-801C engine (the high speed figure as low as 590 km/h can be found (Notleistung banned?), anybody have better data?), than, with the 801D engine (installed/retrofitted in part of the A-2s and A-3s produced, installed in all A-4s). While the Notleistung was reduced (ban in effect from March 1942 - Oct 1942), the speed should still be at least 390 mph (410 from oct 1942, on full Notleistung). Such 190s have the edge over Spit V, in effect from start of 1942 (= introduction of the 801D).
The answer, in 1942, is the Spitfire Mk.IX, not allowing the LW to have a large performance edge*. At least not until the G-2 appears, but before the engine restrictions of the new DB-605A kick in. We are almost in the winter of 1942, though - the air battles are not that intense as in other 3 seasons.

*The Typhoon is still as gentle as boiled egg, in rare case everything works it's an useful airplane. At the low level the RAF can use the Mustang I, but those were historically part of the army cooperation units. Hurricanes need to be applied with care.

I'll venture to make a conclusion re. qualitative balance: in fighters. The RAF and LW are pretty evenly matched for all of the 1941. RAF lags behind from 1st half of the 1942 (introduction of the 801D powered Fw-190s, ban lifted on Notleistung for the Bf-109F-4). RAF's answer to this was the introduction of Spit IX, but the Mk Vs would remain dominant in service almost until 1944 - on aggregate the LW has the performance edge.

About quantitative balance: the opponents are evenly matched before the Germany turns East (April of 1941 vs. Yu and Greece, June 1941 vs Soviets), also some LW units go to the MTO in 1941. Luftwaffe can put maybe up to 200 SE fighters in the air after that, in ETO. So, in the second half of 1941 the time is ripe for a RAF daylight bomber offensive - it can outnumber the LW in fighters to maybe 3:1, and has some 730 bombers available (even if that makes only 600 operational). It can use the Coastal command Beaufighters Hampdens to further stretch LW thin. If Germans decide to relocate some fighter units from East and/or MTO, their forces there have less fighter protection, both bombers Heer. 
As I've said before: this time on, the LW cannot choose what air battles to fight, and what ones to avoid at ETO - they need to try kill those hundreds of bombers, making possible for RAF fighters to challenge LW with definite advantage in numbers. Even trading a fighter and a bomber for a LW fighter makes RAF a winner.


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## Vincenzo (Apr 5, 2012)

Friedrich-4 was superior to Spit V in '41/2, 635 km/h @ FTH was the speed in Climb&Combat power. The F-4 go in combat almost from june '41, also if at time was very small fraction of jagdwaffe (8%), the emil were around 1/3 of jagdwaffe strenght in late june but almost half had N engine so no long away in performance to Spit V.
in late december '41 the emil were less 1/4 of strenght, around half F-4, around 1/8 anton

The anton-1 cruising a 590 km/h at 5 km at 2300 rpm 1.15 ata so max speed at 2550 rpm 1.30 ata is more, not many away from that of follower version


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## tomo pauk (Apr 6, 2012)

You are right, vicenzo, the 635 km/h is indeed achieved at Climb combat power. Thanks for clearing the BMW-801C issue. 
So, the RAF must act quickly (maybe the best time being right after Op Barbarossa is started, making sure LW has a better part of it's fighter force deployed vs. SU?) and in full force (FC, BC, Coastal command bombers), in order to overwhelm the defenders, while not allowing the Germans to field the F-4s in good numbers. The targets being airbases, submarine pens in construction, fuel facilities, war material depots, marshaling yards, even venturing into Germany proper, to make themselves less predictable.


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## Vincenzo (Apr 6, 2012)

daylight bomber in german proper i think it's a massacre for the bomber crews, AAchen is around 350 km from England, of this ~250 over enemy territory, Bremerhaven flying over sea is almost 500 km from England, there are many trouble for the escort capacity


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## tomo pauk (Apr 6, 2012)

The attacks on the targets in Germany should be made on random intervals, so the defenders have hard time to make meaningful predictions preparations. The main attacks should be LW bases in N. France Low Countries, sub pens under construction, and other valuable targets in those parts of W. Europe. 
BTW, here is an account from a 1941 bomb raid vs. targets in Germany, from parsifal:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/1941-best-airframe-single-engined-fighter-32273-7.html#post885593


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## Vincenzo (Apr 6, 2012)

for attacking 2 targets 400 km from england with 54 Blenheim, they used 24 bombers for diversion and 485 fighters for escort (main and diversion). they losses 12 Blenheim over 20% of attack force and 10 fighters they clamed destruction of targets and 4+5+10 enemy fighters. Foreman confirm 11 enemy planes (idk the book of Foreman and idk if he check german report). I don't see this as a successfull operation almost is not replicable in large scala.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 6, 2012)

How good a defence the LW can put up into air with RAF venturing into German-held Europe on daily basis, with some 1300 planes (BC, FC, while suitable types from CC attack coastal targets)? They have 200 SE fighters on-hand there, plus maybe 50 TE fighters after Op Barbarossa is started. The 1st targets being air bases (plus radars, once those are in function).

The raids that cost RAF one bomber and one fighter, for each fighter LW looses is far more sustainable for RAF in second half of 1941, than it's the case for LW.


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## Vincenzo (Apr 6, 2012)

i've many doubt on lw losses cited in that mission FC heavy overclaimed in '41 so it's very strange that lw actual losses are more of claimed sure destroyed, probably the actual losses were 1 or 2 planes or this day was very lucky for FC but other days were much badest


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## tomo pauk (Apr 7, 2012)

RAF indeed suffered some big losses, that's why I've started the thread about the RAF LW losses in 1941-42. 

IMO the way of 'baiting' LW into combat was very wrong - really small number of bombers, with big number of fighters waiting for the LW to show up. Once the LW understood the game, they reasoned that small number of bombers is hardly to make any damage, if they attack from high altitudes. If the bombers fly lower, the Flak can do the damage to them. So LW decided it can sit on the ground while such a bombing 'raid' is under way. In case LW ground controllers assume that it would be worthwhile to attack the RAF while over NE Europe, they can direct the fighters to the most favorable position (achieving local superiority, thus enabling them to make plenty of kills vs. small number of own losses). IIRC many of the RAF fighters wer claimed by light Flak, too.
With 600 bombers being the 'bait' (attacking 1st the targets I've listed in the above posts), LW cannot choose to sit down. They need to scramble and try their best to destroy as much of them as possible - RAF has LW fighters right where they want them. Not a great prospect for the LW, since they will be significantly outnumbered for last 7 months of 1941 (vs. UK-based fighters, not to mention vs. all that RAF can throw there) and on.


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## Vincenzo (Apr 7, 2012)

FC outnumbered lw fighters if they combat over channel but it they combat over Cologne or over Hamburg?


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## tomo pauk (Apr 7, 2012)

Of course, the RAF was not able to go there prior 1944. 
I'm trying to make feasible ways of attacking (and destroying) land-based German assets by RAF, while inflicting as much casualties as possible on LW. The Germans would be forced to increase the expanses even more than they did historically, cutting somewhere else (= beneficially for the Allied war effort). 
The RAF tried to destroy land-based German assets mostly by BC night offensive. The efforts were unfruitful, forcing the BC to adopt the notorious dehoussing, in second half of 1942. The day bombing should allow for more precise bombing, the targets being closer to the UK will mean less navigational errors (compounded by fact the bombing is during the daylight). 
RAF's FC should have better chances of destroying the LW Noorth-West of Ardenes-Paris-Brest line (where those two JGs were located), even if losses are as high as historically at the beginning (June 1941). The greatest losses for the LW should be the pilots, far less replaceable than planes. With LW fighting in the high altitude(trying to kill bombers), there is less of the need to go down, meaning less losses by Flak.
With more war material destroyed there (plus the U-boat pens, under construction, attacked frequently), the Germans will have to relocate the war material (fighters, Flak) from East or MTO to the West, easing the pressure from those two fronts.

(sorry if I'm too repetitive  )


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## yulzari (Apr 10, 2012)

One less obvious type of target I would cover would be the high tech wood glue producers. The RAF did knock out the two primary ones but more by luck than planning. If left intact the German aero industry has the option of wood instead of aluminium.We can note the structural failures of the Ta154 and He 162 due to having to use poor performance glues. Of course this would still leave the Luftwaffe with the problem of finding fuel for the aeroplanes, wooden or metal. It was the loss of territory supplying oil and the invasion of France putting tactical attacks on transport into range that crippled the Luftwaffe. Perhaps others can point to similar opportunities for strategic surgery?


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## tomo pauk (Apr 11, 2012)

Chemical industry was supplying German/Axis war effort by producing the fuel, ammonia, fertilizers, artificial rubber etc. With the chemical plants destroyed, or heavily damaged, the German war machine becomes immobile hungry, lacking explosives for their shells warheads. The hunger would act towards civil population as devastatingly as the infamous 'dehoussing' (I hate when civilians suffer, but I'm realist, too). 
Attack on submarine pens by some kind of bouncing bomb (akin to the dam-busters' weapon) could provide quite a shock there.


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## wuzak (Apr 11, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Attack on submarine pens by some kind of bouncing bomb (akin to the dam-busters' weapon) could provide quite a shock there.



I believe that was considered as a further use for Upkeep. I will check later.


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## pbfoot (Apr 11, 2012)

The pens could have been bombed prior to the tops being enclosed but as mentioned before it was a higher priority to pay back


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## wuzak (Apr 11, 2012)

It wasn't Upkeep but Highball which was considered to attack U-boat pens:



> Of the five Biscay ports that had U-boat pens, only Brest was considered assailable by Highball. Direct hits on several pens would be necessary which would not be possible unless a large force was used. Even then the attackers would be dependent on maintaining surprise until the last moment. Each port's defences were strong and it was doubtful if even a few aircraft could reach their targets. There were also two locks at Saint-Nazaire and one at La Pallice through which teh U-boats had to pass, butthose presented the same problems as the canal ones [strong opposition, high accuracy required, multiple locl gates need to be destroyed to make it worthwhile].



Flower, _A Hell of a Bomb_.


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## CobberKane (Apr 11, 2012)

The British persevered with area-bombing because by 1943-44 they had a huge force of four engine bombers that were suitable for nothing else. In the early part of the war they had tried precision daylight bombing and found their bombers had neither the technology to deliver their payloads accurately enough or the defensive capability to survive fighter attacks. So they tried precision night bombing and everything was going great until a review discovered that only one in five bombs fell within five miles of the designated target. By this time Britain had dedicated about 20% of it’s wartime economy to building bombers so failure was not an option. Lacking any way to improve bombing accuracy to the required level, Bomber Command took the alternative route and selected bigger targets – cities. 
USAAF experience pretty much followed the same path. Certainly bombing accuracy improved markedly during the war, but never to anything like the degree required to attain the USAAF ambition of taking out factories in the midst of cities. By the standards of the time, dropping most bombs within a kilometre of the target would have been considered excellent accuracy. American strategists grew to accept that hitting a designated target inevitably involved bombing an extended area around it 
In short, the British precision-bombed area targets by night and the Americans area-bombed precision targets by day.
After the war an American study into strategic bombing in Europe found than German military production rose steadily throughout the campaign and peaked in 1945 before dropping off sharply as ground forces overran production sites. It was also found that the impact of bombing in reducing output was secondary to effect of the Germans dispersing their production sites to decrease vulnerability. It would be silly to say that Allied bombing did not have an effect on German military production but the idea that German industry was devastated by Allied bombing is optimistic to say the least. 
Probably the greatest contribution made by USAAF daylight bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Thanks to the bomber crews and their escorting fighters the LW was a shadow of its former self by D-Day. This is where speculation that the De Havilland Mosquito could have done the job of the B-17 falls flat – the Mosquito could never have inflicted on the Luftwaffe the kind of losses caused by the heavily defended armadas of Flying Fortresses. Air superiority allowed the Allied aerial interdiction campaign to decimate German transport and fuel supplies. By the last months of the war the Germans still had plenty of fighters, just no fuel and no experienced pilots to fly them.
So what should have been changed in retrospect? The RAF should have restricted their bombing to targets large enough to be vulnerable at night – ports and large industrial complexes – until such time as technology (oboe etc) and tactics (pathfinders) increased their accuracy. This would have required a reduced force and the resources saved could have been committed elsewhere. The USAAF should have restricted their bombing to targets within range of the escort fighters of the time while they waited for the P-51. This would have minimised losses and inflicted maximum damage on the Luftwaffe, which as it transpired was to be their greatest contribution.


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## wuzak (Apr 11, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Probably the greatest contribution made by USAAF daylight bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Thanks to the bomber crews and their escorting fighters the LW was a shadow of its former self by D-Day. This is where speculation that the De Havilland Mosquito could have done the job of the B-17 falls flat – the Mosquito could never have inflicted on the Luftwaffe the kind of losses caused by the heavily defended armadas of Flying Fortresses.



Actually, no it doesn't. 

The Luftwaffe was not destroyed by the guns of the B-17s - which really weren't that effective - but by the long range escort fighters, such as the P-51. The effect was even greater when the escort fighters were released from close escort duties and tasked with hunting and destroying the Lutwaffe. By that stage the bombers were largely bait.

The Luftwaffe didn't help their cause either, with the edict that the defending fighters were to ignore the escorts and go after the bombers.


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## CobberKane (Apr 11, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Actually, no it doesn't.
> 
> The Luftwaffe was not destroyed by the guns of the B-17s - which really weren't that effective - but by the long range escort fighters, such as the P-51. The effect was even greater when the escort fighters were released from close escort duties and tasked with hunting and destroying the Lutwaffe. By that stage the bombers were largely bait.
> 
> The Luftwaffe didn't help their cause either, with the edict that the defending fighters were to ignore the escorts and go after the bombers.



Certainly the P51 was the terrible swift sword, but it was only able to be so because large scale daylight bombing dragged the Luftwaffe into the air and made them vulnerable. Remember, when the RAF had been flying their Rhubarbs over occuppied Europe the Luftwaffe, knowing the miserable number of bombers involved were incapable of causing any significant damage, could choose to engage or not. But they couldn't ignore a hundred B-17s over Germany


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## wuzak (Apr 11, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Certainly the P51 was the terrible swift sword, but it was only able to be so because large scale daylight bombing dragged the Luftwaffe into the air and made them vulnerable. Remember, when the RAF had been flying their Rhubarbs over occuppied Europe the Luftwaffe, knowing the miserable number of bombers involved were incapable of causing any significant damage, could choose to engage or not. But they couldn't ignore a hundred B-17s over Germany


 
So Mosquitos bombing the **** out of German industry wouldn't get the Luftwaffe in the air?

And if the LW don't send the fighters, all the better for the bombers.


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 12, 2012)

This was a long post, but I’ll cut it down to the highlights.

For the RAF:
1.	Better crew training, with emphasis on night flying, more flying hours and navigation. Increased specialisation within the RAF for crew members
2.	Two thirds reduction in daylight bombing raids and one third reduction in night raids in 1941, in favour of more aircraft and sending experienced pilots/navigators/gunners to training OTUs 
3.	OTU training increased to a minimum of 12 weeks
4.	More resources to weather forecasting, particularly on prevailing winds
5.	Earlier adoption of navigation aids – GEE and Oboe could be put into service at least 6-8 months prior to historical introduction, allowing their use from mid to late 1941
6.	Earlier formation of dedicated pathfinding force – initially with Hampdens then with Mosquitos
7.	Better reconnaissance and post-strike assessment by the RAF – more FC assets diverted to recon, systematic bomb damage assessment done with target cameras and post strike recon
8.	Development of MC (40-50% charge to weight) and HC (70-80% c-t-w) bombs earlier in the war
9.	Development of better target marking bombs – larger (500-2000 lbs) illumination and parachute flares and target marking devices with more predictable drop characteristics
10.	Improved target selection – greater concentration on oil, electricity and transportation hubs and the aircraft industry, at the expense of dehousing and ‘morale’ targets
11.	Increased mining operations 
12.	Earlier establishment of dedicated radio and radar countermeasures teams
13.	Earlier adoption of night fighter intruder operations 
14.	Earlier development of drop tanks for the Spitfire V

Generally, I foresee a much less operationally active BC during 1941. Raids would be cut be about 50%, in favour of BC building up its reserves of trained manpower and newer aircraft and introducing new technologies and bombing techniques. The OTUs would be expanded by at least 40-50%, allowing active squadrons to concentrate on actual bombing instead of training. 

The daylight campaign is limited to strikes against small targets in France and the Low Countries that would be too difficult or small to strike at night. This would include German naval and submarine bases, French transport hubs and Luftwaffe air bases.

When BC does bomb daylight targets, it does so with concentrations of greater significance. Circus raids are not limited to 6-20 bombers, but larger formations of at least 40-50 aircraft, escorted by appropriately large numbers of fighters. Raid results are properly assessed and targets, particularly day/night fighter airfields, are bomb repeatedly.


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## mhuxt (Apr 12, 2012)

View attachment Combined.zip


Assorted bits and pieces I did - sources are Davis for USAAF, Middlebrook for RAF. Graph titles either on graph itself or on tab name, in particular for the various Air Forces vs. German Oil targets.


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## CobberKane (Apr 12, 2012)

wuzak said:


> So Mosquitos bombing the **** out of German industry wouldn't get the Luftwaffe in the air?
> 
> And if the LW don't send the fighters, all the better for the bombers.



I think you miss the point. The USAAF daylight bombing campaign destroyed the Luftwaffe because it presented large, slow moving, well defended and well escorted formations which spent a long time over occupied territory. The luftwaffe engaged in a war of attrition it couldn't win. Even if they were escorted a formation of mosquitos moving at almost twice the speed of the B-17s would have been much more difficult to intercept and would have spent much less time in the air - that's what made the Mosquito such a great aircraft. The Luftwaffe wouldn't have had anything like the time required to launch wave after wave of attacks as they did against the formations of four -engined bombers and consequently any escorting fighters would have had less opportunity to inflict losses.
If you want to catch a lot of fish, use enticing bait and keep your line in the water.


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## wuzak (Apr 12, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> I think you miss the point. The USAAF daylight bombing campaign destroyed the Luftwaffe because it presented large, slow moving, well defended and well escorted formations which spent a long time over occupied territory. The luftwaffe engaged in a war of attrition it couldn't win. Even if they were escorted a formation of mosquitos moving at almost twice the speed of the B-17s would have been much more difficult to intercept and would have spent much less time in the air - that's what made the Mosquito such a great aircraft. The Luftwaffe wouldn't have had anything like the time required to launch wave after wave of attacks as they did against the formations of four -engined bombers and consequently any escorting fighters would have had less opportunity to inflict losses.
> If you want to catch a lot of fish, use enticing bait and keep your line in the water.



P-51s couldn't really close escort Mosquitos anyway.

And if the LW won't come up to play there is always the option of hunting them at their home airfields.


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## CobberKane (Apr 12, 2012)

I remember reading about a Mosquito being escorted by some mustangs - apparently the 51s had all sorts of trouble keeping up! I guess the mosquito must have had a higher criusing speed. In fact i think the mosquito had the highest cruising speed of anything untill the ME262 appeared - which is what happened to this one. The RAF pilot said he had to throw the Mosquito all over the sky untill the 262 ran out of ammo, gave him a wave and flew off. Must have been quite a show for the Mustang pilots.


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

Yes, Mosquitos had a better cruise speed than the Mustangs.

The USAAF used escorts for some (if not all) of their Mosquito missions (F-8s, which were either PR.XVIs or converted B.XXs). The RAF didn't provide escorts for their PR aircraft, at least generally.

There were some escorts for Mossies, however. The Amiens prison raid, for example, consisted of 18 FB Mossies plus one PR Mossie and an escort of Typhoons (can't recall the number).


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## PJay (Apr 13, 2012)

If I was in charge of Bomber Command? One thing I'd do is bomb the U-Boat pens while they were being constructed, might help the Battle of the Atlantic.


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## pbfoot (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Yes, Mosquitos had a better cruise speed than the Mustangs.
> 
> The USAAF used escorts for some (if not all) of their Mosquito missions (F-8s, which were either PR.XVIs or converted B.XXs). The RAF didn't provide escorts for their PR aircraft, at least generally.
> 
> There were some escorts for Mossies, however. The Amiens prison raid, for example, consisted of 18 FB Mossies plus one PR Mossie and an escort of Typhoons (can't recall the number).


From what I know Mosquitos cruised at 240


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## SHOOTER (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Actually, no it doesn't.
> 
> The Luftwaffe was not destroyed by the guns of the B-17s - which really weren't that effective - but by the long range escort fighters, such as the P-51. The effect was even greater when the escort fighters were released from close escort duties and tasked with hunting and destroying the Lutwaffe. By that stage the bombers were largely bait.
> 
> The Luftwaffe didn't help their cause either, with the edict that the defending fighters were to ignore the escorts and go after the bombers.



Actually, yes it was! B-17s shot down more Nazi aircraft than any other type of aircraft! B-24s were next! (At least according to Nazi records which were meticulous in that regard!)


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## pbfoot (Apr 13, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> Actually, yes it was! B-17s shot down more Nazi aircraft than any other type of aircraft! B-24s were next! (At least according to Nazi records which were meticulous in that regard!)


don't believe that for 1 minute


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## SHOOTER (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> So Mosquitos bombing the **** out of German industry wouldn't get the Luftwaffe in the air?
> 
> And if the LW don't send the fighters, all the better for the bombers.



With out the heavies, there would be no choice to be made in the Luftwaffe! Attack/defend against the heavies with 14,000 pounds up, or the Mossy with 2-4000? Right! The only reason that Mossies had such an enviable record was the Nazis made the only viable choice, ignore the flyweights fight the heavies!

There was no magic in the Mossy that made it invulnerable. It was not nearly fast enough to out run almost any single engined fighter. It was defenseless vs any fighter. It was not high enough of a flier to escape the lowly Me-109! The failure of judgment in that regard is made by ignorant or opinionated people with agendas. See the specs below of the best Mossy variant with the understanding that the actual loaded cruising speeds and ceiling are much less than these stated.

DH.98 Mosquito B Mk XVI 

Data from Jane's Fighting Aircraft of World War II[147] and World War II Warbirds[150]

General characteristics

Crew: 2: pilot, bombardier/navigator 
•Length: 44 ft 6 in (13.57 m) 
•Wingspan: 54 ft 2 in (16.52 m) 
•Height: 17 ft 5 in (5.3 m) 
•Wing area: 454 ft² (42.18 m²) 
•Empty weight: 14,300 lb (6,490 kg) 
•Loaded weight: 18,100 lb (8,210 kg) 
•Max. takeoff weight: 25,000 lb (11,000 kg) 
•Powerplant: 2 × Rolls-Royce Merlin 76/77 (left/right) liquid-cooled V12 engine, 1,710 hp (1,280 kW) each 

Performance

Maximum speed: 361 kn (415 mph, 668 km/h) at 28,000 ft (8,500 m) 
•Range: 1,300 nmi (1,500 mi, 2,400 km) with full weapons load 
•Service ceiling: 37,000 ft (11,000 m) 
•Rate of climb: 2,850 ft/min (14.5 m/s) 
•Wing loading: 39.9 lb/ft² (195 kg/m²) 
•Power/mass: 0.189 hp/lb (311 W/kg) 

Armament
•Bombs: 4,000 lb (1 800 kg) 

Avionics
GEE radio-navigation


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## Milosh (Apr 13, 2012)

Shooter you are shooting blanks.


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## pbfoot (Apr 13, 2012)

Would it please be possible to tone down the colour


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 13, 2012)

From what I have seen, he uses the red font on many forums. Most of those forums he is not very well liked. Shooter2000...


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> With out the heavies, there would be no choice to be made in the Luftwaffe! Attack/defend against the heavies with 14,000 pounds up, or the Mossy with 2-4000? Right! The only reason that Mossies had such an enviable record was the Nazis made the only viable choice, ignore the flyweights fight the heavies!



Which heavies could carry 14,000lbs+? Really only the Lancaster in the ETO/MTO, and they operated mainly at night. The German nightfighters had good success against Lancasters, but could not catch a Mosquito. They really did try.




SHOOTER said:


> There was no magic in the Mossy that made it invulnerable. It was not nearly fast enough to out run almost any single engined fighter. It was defenseless vs any fighter. It was not high enough of a flier to escape the lowly Me-109! The failure of judgment in that regard is made by ignorant or opinionated people with agendas. See the specs below of the best Mossy variant with the understanding that the actual loaded cruising speeds and ceiling are much less than these stated.



Yet history tells us that the Mosquitos, flying predominately day missions between May 1942 and May 1943, would often outpace s/e fighter chasing them. Even if the s/e fighters were faster than the Mossies it would take longer for the fighters to catch up than if they were chasing B-17s or B-24s.

The Luftwaffe even had a unit specifically tasked with killing Mosquito bombers (IIRC at night) - but they were disbanded or retasked due to lack of success.


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## mhuxt (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> The Luftwaffe even had a unit specifically tasked with killing Mosquito bombers (IIRC at night) - but they were disbanded or retasked due to lack of success.


 
I think it was JG 52, day fighters, intended to combat recce craft, again IIRC, not my area of expertise.


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> Actually, yes it was! B-17s shot down more Nazi aircraft than any other type of aircraft! B-24s were next! (At least according to Nazi records which were meticulous in that regard!)



Sounds more like bomber gunner claims.

For example, on the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission bomber gunners claimed 288 enemy aircraft shot down, Spitfire pilots 13 and P-47 pilots 19. Luftwaffe records show 25-27 aircraft were lost....

Wonder whether it was the gunners or fighters that shot the 25-27 down?


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

mhuxt said:


> I think it was JG 52, day fighters, intended to combat recce craft, again IIRC, not my area of expertise.



Nor mine....just going from a fuzzy memory!


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

Found it!

Jagdgeschwader 50 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



> Jagdgeschwader 50 (JG 50), sometimes erroneously referred to as Jagdgruppe 50, was a special high-altitude fighter unit that specialized in intercepting the Royal Air Force's de Havilland Mosquito light bombers during World War II.





> JG 50 were initially equipped with eight Messerschmitt Bf 109G-5s and Bf 109G-6s polished to increase speed, and equipped with a special tank for liquefied nitrous oxide as part of the GM-1 engine power boosting system, which was injected directly into the supercharger intake. This allowed the pilot to boost the rated horsepower of the DB 605 engine. Graf set a world record for high altitude flight of 46,885 ft (14,291 m) feet in one of the modified 109s. The unit was later also equipped with specially supercharged FW-190A-5.





> *In around four months of operations Graf was the sole pilot of JG 50 to down a Mosquito, which he caught after loitering at 30,000 feet over Groningen.*


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## SHOOTER (Apr 13, 2012)

Readie said:


> Siefried, you didn't mention the area bombing of British cities by the LW. The subsequent allied bomber offensive against the axis powers was part of the plan to defeat them.
> 'total war' was declared and the gloves came off.
> 
> I have said before that the casualties were appalling and a raid like Dresden is akin to a nuclear attack.
> ...



You are clearly wrong about that opinion! You should have said a resounding YES! When you fight modern war, the civilian population that powers the war machine is a valid target. The answer to carpet bombing civilians is that they are not really civilians, they are accessories before the fact in legal terms. If they had stopped Hitler before he started the war, they would not be targets afterwards!

Civilization faces the same question today! Islam is the source of the vast majority of all suffering and premature death in the world today! ( And for the last 1400 years!) If we really wanted to reduce the total suffering and premature death in the world we should threaten and then NUC Mecca if they choose not to clean up their own mess!


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## SHOOTER (Apr 13, 2012)

The Germans kept track of how their planes were shot down. They assumed that bullet holes in the front came from a bomber's deffencive guns and those with holes from the back were downed by fighters. The bomber gunners "Claimed" they shot down over 28,000 Nazi planes, But German records show that it was closer to 10-11,000, IIRC! The vast majority, 2/3rds, by B-17s!


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> The Germans kept track of how their planes were shot down. They assumed that bullet holes in the front came from a bomber's deffencive guns and those with holes from the back were downed by fighters. The bomber gunners "Claimed" they shot down over 28,000 Nazi planes, But German records show that it was closer to 10-11,000, IIRC! The vast majority, 2/3rds, by B-17s!



The claims to actual losses ratio look sway too low for defensive gunners to me.

It also sounds a lot like USAAF propoganda being used to defend the self defending bomber concept.


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## MIflyer (Apr 13, 2012)

We have come to realize that the best thing about the bomber offensive on Germany was that it destroyed the Luftwaffe. The Germans simply did not have the luxury of building an offensive bomber force that was good enough to even put on a decent 4th of July airshow by US standards. While destroying German cities perhaps did not hurt their war effort as much as had been though by airpower advocates, it imposed a huge psychological on the Luftwaffe. While the Luftwaffe might have been used to much better effect attacking Allied ground support aircraft and ground forces, the Jadgewaffe simply could not stand civilains saying to them "1000 bombers hit us yesterday! Where was the Luftwaffe?" 

In the Battle of the Bulge this was used to good effect. Want to hit the Panzer armies with P-47's and Typhoons with no interference from the Luftwaffe? Simple! Plan a 8th AF heavy bomber raid on a nearby German city. The Luftwaffe will abandon their ground troops to save their honor!

But of course, this is all true of daylight bombing, but far less so with night bombing.


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## mhuxt (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Found it!
> 
> Jagdgeschwader 50 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


 
Thanks for that. The trouble with the info on Graf's claim is, there never seems to be a clear date attached, apparently it was sometime in June '43, but that was apparently before the antil-Mossie unit went operational. Groningen is also a fair way from southern Germany.


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## SHOOTER (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Which heavies could carry 14,000lbs+? Really only the Lancaster in the ETO/MTO, and they operated mainly at night. The German nightfighters had good success against Lancasters, but could not catch a Mosquito. They really did try.
> Look up the He-219? But you confuse a strategic choice of the Germans in that they made little effort to chase the Mossy and spent huge sums to stop the heavies. WO the heavies, they could have spent those resources Vs the Mossies. You tell me what you would do if you were in charge of the Luftwaffe in WW-II and there were no heavies to chase.
> 
> What chance would the Mossy have if it was the only target in the sky? Right!
> ...


Yes this is true, but also irrealivant! Just because the Nazis chose to send half to a dozen single engined fighters to look for Mossies with little support, what do you think would happen if there were no heavies to chase? RIGHT!


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## SHOOTER (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> The claims to actual losses ratio look sway too low for defensive gunners to me.
> 
> It also sounds a lot like USAAF propoganda being used to defend the self defending bomber concept.



What part of "German records" did you fail to understand? in nice round numbers; the Nazis said that they lost ~7,000 to B-17s, 2,500 to B-24s, I was wrong about this before! I thought it was closer to 5,000! They also lost 400 to B-26s and 200 more to B-25s. According to the Nazis, they lost more AC to B-17s than any other type!


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## evangilder (Apr 13, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> You are clearly wrong about that opinion! You should have said a resounding YES! When you fight modern war, the civilian population that powers the war machine is a valid target. The answer to carpet bombing civilians is that they are not really civilians, they are accessories before the fact in legal terms. If they had stopped Hitler before he started the war, they would not be targets afterwards!
> 
> Civilization faces the same question today! Islam is the source of the vast majority of all suffering and premature death in the world today! ( And for the last 1400 years!) If we really wanted to reduce the total suffering and premature death in the world we should threaten and then NUC Mecca if they choose not to clean up their own mess!



Shooter, you need to put that attitude in check right now and get back on topic. This is your last warning.


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> Look up the He-219? But you confuse a strategic choice of the Germans in that they made little effort to chase the Mossy and spent huge sums to stop the heavies. WO the heavies, they could have spent those resources Vs the Mossies. You tell me what you would do if you were in charge of the Luftwaffe in WW-II and there were no heavies to chase.



A lot of the resources you speak of were twin engined night-fighters which could not hope to catch the Mosquito.

I think you need to look up the He 219. It could not catch the Mosquito bomber at night, unless it was a specially stripped version (A7?) which could barely catch them. The He 219 was also bigger, and was heavier empty than the Mosquito loaded.

I read a report somewhere that on a night raid almost all the available LW NF assets were sent against a diversionary raid by Mosquitos, leaving the main force to bomb relatively unmolested. Not many, if any, Mosquitos were lost, bu tthe LW may have shot down some of their own aircraft.

The evidence is that the LW did spend resources on trying to shoot down Mossies - maybe not as much as per theheavy bombers, but also less successfully.




SHOOTER said:


> What chance would the Mossy have if it was the only target in the sky? Right!



More than just about any other bomber in existance at the time.




SHOOTER said:


> While much of what you state is true, the mossy was hard to intercept. But not impossible. In addition, the Mossy was a slow and difficult plane to build that required large amounts of highly skilled labor and scarce types of wood, much of which had to be imported. What happens if there are no heavies to keep the Germans busy and they build several hundred He-219s, each of which shoots down just one Mossy on every other mission?



The Mossie was not "a slow and difficult" plane to build, and did not require large amounts of highly skilled labour. In fact, most of the labour involved in building Mosquitos was not skilled. It is true of the wood that it had to be imported. But that is also true of aluminium.

If each He 219s shot down a Mosquito every other mission I'm sure the LW high comman would be beside themselves with joy. I doubt it would ever happen.




SHOOTER said:


> Yes this is true, but also irrealivant! Just because the Nazis chose to send half to a dozen single engined fighters to look for Mossies with little support, what do you think would happen if there were no heavies to chase? RIGHT!



So, because a specially formed squadron couldn't down any Mosquito bombers or recce aircraft even though they were flying specially prepared aircraft has no relevence on how well the rest of the fighter arm would fare against them?


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> What part of "German records" did you fail to understand? in nice round numbers; the Nazis said that they lost ~7,000 to B-17s, 2,500 to B-24s, I was wrong about this before! I thought it was closer to 5,000! They also lost 400 to B-26s and 200 more to B-25s. According to the Nazis, they lost more AC to B-17s than any other type!



I don't believe it unless you show me, or point to where I could find them, the sources.


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## Erich (Apr 13, 2012)

I'd like to see that source(s) as well since 1945 records are lost to oblivion

addition any Mossie could be shot down by any LW NF if given the right angle and height advantage, my cousin shot down a FB in his outdated Do 217 N-1 while the FB's were attacking bases clsoe to Sylt in 1943. He 219A's accounted for a total of 12 Mossies. 10.(N)/JG 300 bf 109G-6AS craft accounted for more with only 3 months in action ..........it's all getting covered in my book....

if guys ask specific questions then I may be able to answer you.


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## mhuxt (Apr 13, 2012)

"Look up the He-219?"


What about the He-219?


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## Vincenzo (Apr 13, 2012)

The USAAF heavy bombers claimed 9.276 enemy aircrafts in the air in ETO&MTO, the light&medium 613.


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

Erich said:


> I'd like to see that source(s) as well since 1945 records are lost to oblivion
> 
> addition any Mossie could be shot down by any LW NF if given the right angle and height advantage, my cousin shot down a FB in his outdated Do 217 N-1 while the FB's were attacking bases clsoe to Sylt in 1943. He 219A's accounted for a total of 12 Mossies. 10.(N)/JG 300 bf 109G-6AS craft accounted for more with only 3 months in action ..........it's all getting covered in my book....
> 
> if guys ask specific questions then I may be able to answer you.



OK.

How many sorties were required to get the 12? 

Were 6 or these from the A-0s?



> The He 219 had an auspicious combat debut. On the night of 11–12 June 1943, Werner Streib flew the V9 and shot down five bombers between 01:05 and 02:22 hours, before crashing on landing. A claim has consistently been made that, "In the next 10 days the three Heinkel He 219A-0 pre-production aircraft would shoot down a total of 20 RAF aircraft, including six of the previously "untouchable" de Havilland Mosquito fighter-bombers. Greatly encouraged, Kammhuber continued to press for immediate production." No record of corresponding Mosquito losses or any documentary evidence exists, however, to suggest that He 219 pilots actually made claims for six Mosquitos during this time.



Heinkel He 219 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Were any He 219s victims of Mosquito NFs?


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> The USAAF heavy bombers claimed 9.276 enemy aircrafts in the air in ETO&MTO, the light&medium 613.



"Claimed". How many confirmed?


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## mhuxt (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Were any He 219s victims of Mosquito NFs?



Mossies made claims for 17.5 He 219s destroyed, the half being a claim shared with Mustangs on a daylight op. That particular He 219 is known to have gone down from LW and Allied (Ultra) records, current discussion over at 12 O'Clock HIgh forum.


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## Erich (Apr 13, 2012)

you can dig deeper in research to find the variants, the dates should help you

28/28 July 42 obviously no HE 219
27/28, May 43
12/13, December 43
6/7 of May 44
27/28 of May 44 - 2 kills
10/11 June 44
10/11 June 44
11/12 June 44
24/25 June 44
1/2 of July 44
10/11 July 44
18/19 of July 1944 by Hptm Strüning

too many He's shot down by Mossie NF's, remember most of the LW variants of the Uhu did not have rear warning radar installed.


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## Vincenzo (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> "Claimed". How many confirmed?



Look on german archive and cheeck for each USAAF bomber mission claim and actually losses of LW


i used claimed maybe not in your sense, this are claimed from usaaf not from bomber's crew


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## Erich (Apr 13, 2012)

as I said earlier the 1945 claims are not incorporated as they are lost except for the rare technical instance of Flugbuch entries, the German archivs will not help you though manyprivate parties seem to have a growing database of LW losses by A/C type


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

Erich said:


> you can dig deeper in research to find the variants, the dates should help you
> 
> 28/28 July 42 obviously no HE 219
> 27/28, May 43
> ...



So 12 in a year?

What happened after July 1944? Did the He 219 not encounter any more Mossies?


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## mhuxt (Apr 13, 2012)

Erich said:


> you can dig deeper in research to find the variants, the dates should help you
> 
> 28/28 July 42 obviously no HE 219
> 27/28, May 43
> ...


 
Hi Erich,

27/28 May '43 - Claim by Struening, would have been on a 110 I think? Before the 219 debut with Streib? 

12/13 December '43, I have a note that was Meurer, on a Ju 88 R-2.

1/2 July '44, the Mosquito claimed by Fincke was able to RTB.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 13, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> You are clearly wrong about that opinion! You should have said a resounding YES! When you fight modern war, the civilian population that powers the war machine is a valid target. The answer to carpet bombing civilians is that they are not really civilians, they are accessories before the fact in legal terms. If they had stopped Hitler before he started the war, they would not be targets afterwards!
> 
> Civilization faces the same question today! Islam is the source of the vast majority of all suffering and premature death in the world today! ( And for the last 1400 years!) If we really wanted to reduce the total suffering and premature death in the world we should threaten and then NUC Mecca if they choose not to clean up their own mess!


Pal, you better start behaving yourself and backing up your BS with some factual references or your life span around here is going to be VERY short. So far your gibberish is on the same scale as the last dump I took so this is your time to turn your attitude around and either participate accordingly or enjoy a quick trip into cyberspace. I hope I am abundantly clear!!!!!


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## wuzak (Apr 13, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> From what I know Mosquitos cruised at 240



There were different cruise settings, but most Mosquitos could cruise at over 300mph.


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## mhuxt (Apr 13, 2012)

wuzak said:


> There were different cruise settings, but most Mosquitos could cruise at over 300mph.


 
Account of fuelled-up USAAF Mustangs not being able to keep up with a fuelled-up USAAF Mossie is here:

German Jet Encounters


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## tyrodtom (Apr 14, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> The Germans kept track of how their planes were shot down. They assumed that bullet holes in the front came from a bomber's deffencive guns and those with holes from the back were downed by fighters. The bomber gunners "Claimed" they shot down over 28,000 Nazi planes, But German records show that it was closer to 10-11,000, IIRC! The vast majority, 2/3rds, by B-17s!


 A shot down fighter is nothing but a smoking hole in the ground, there is no front or rear. If the pilot survives, or he gets off a message before impact, they might know what brought him down.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 14, 2012)

Shooter needs to can his attitude. He should go and start his own forum, since he wants to be banned from every forum he plays in. He is about to make this his next one.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 14, 2012)

Shooter - you have come on this forum like a drunken cowboy stumbling out of a saloon. Be advised that many of our members have spent many years studying, maintaining, building and even designing aircraft. You are not dealing with a bunch of new-bees or kids so if you're going to come on here and spew baseless claims and comments, be prepared to be challenged by members who will back up their claims with documented and verifiable facts. If you want to throw insults around, you're dealing with the best and I guarantee you will not win. Heed the warning, pull you're head out of your @ss and conform or say good-bye.

BTW and for the record - many of us are former military. IMO anyone who "advertises" that they are a former spook is either an idiot, full of sh!t or delusional.


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## Glider (Apr 16, 2012)

mhuxt said:


> Account of fuelled-up USAAF Mustangs not being able to keep up with a fuelled-up USAAF Mossie is here:
> 
> German Jet Encounters



The RAF also had this problem. Mosquitos were often escorted by Mustangs but on the really long range missions there were times when Mosquitos were escorted by Fighter Mosquito's


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## bbear (Nov 2, 2012)

Newbie effort in reply to original question (mostly off the TV and internet - just sanity checking): 

What i would do? Don't attempt strategic bombing as a single route to victory by demoralisation. Don't bomb unescorted. Dont bomb by day. Don't attack targets simply because they are heavily defended. Don't let politicians take operational decisions or select targets. Don't go anywhere near a high attrition rate (above the 2% per missioin that was inevitable in those days)

Do train extensively for interdiction, close tactical support, night flying. Do go after U boats and pens with everything you can spare until May 1943. Do attack coastal shipping from Norway to the spanish border whenever you can. Do support the Archangel convoys. 

Do build up your forces for as long as it takes to have enough numbers to overwhelm the enemy. As and when you are ready to attack deep into Germany, do keep analysing and looking for intelligence on the effect of bombing different targets. Do perfect and practice pathfinder, master bomber and bomber stream coordination for the larger raids. Do use intelligence to strike where important targets are weakly defended. 

That's my 99% answer: don't do anything we now know was dumb. Trust each other. Integrate the bomber effort with the total Allied strategy. Use the tools you've got. 

Personal obsessions: 
Do practice bombing with TIs and Norden sight from maximum height and speed consistent with accuracy. Accept low levels of individual accuracy - if the target is in the destroyed area 2km wide- good enough. Do look for ways to habitually attack far and wide and move aircraft, spares, command and ground crews from one front to another quickly, to disperse the enemy defences. Do attack USAF and BC together on different targets but the same time to overwhelm area defences for big raids.

Pure fantasy/prejudice of a novice
Only use main force bombers that can maintain the same (stream air speed) highest possible fraction of the speed of the defending night fighters at a height where flak is a minimal problem. Take out defences and armour from the B17s and Lancs as necessary. Bomb with a minimal load even, but keep height and speed factors uppermost. These are the best defences. Build as many Mosquito's as possible so pathfinding, target marking, night bomber escort, radar carrying, information sifting and control of the target area are made easier. That is : build a rudimentary Airborne Warfare Control System function in this way. 

Oh, and don't apply moralistic judgement to the decisions of commanders who were working under conditiions of pressure and uncertainty we cannot dream of.


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## TheMustangRider (Nov 2, 2012)

Interesting summary bbear. 
If I'm allowed I'd like to make a couple of points regarding some of them. 

-Not using aerial bombardment as means of civilian demoralization while not bombing by day is IMO a tough task to accomplish given the rudimentary technology available during WWII (specially early in the war) to pursue night-time bombardment of industrial targets without devastating the urban areas in which they were located.
-Going after U-boat pens is exactly what the 8th AF did during its initial phase of operations over Nazi-occupied Europe without much impact to the German U-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic and causing the AAF escalating losses.
-Integrating the Allied effort with commanders that had vastly different views of strategic air power applications was a very difficult challenge to overcome and IMHO one that consistently pursued throughout the combined Allied strategic campaign.
-Taking defenses (defensive machine guns?) and armor away from heavy bombers would have been seen as suicidal to bomber crews as their light-loaded Libs, Forts or Lancs would not have been able to outrun single or twin engine LW fighters.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 3, 2012)

> -Going after U-boat pens is exactly what the 8th AF did during its initial phase of operations over Nazi-occupied Europe without much impact to the German U-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic *and causing the AAF escalating losses*.



Care to elaborate the bolded part?



bbear said:


> ...
> Dont bomb by day.
> ...
> Oh, and don't apply moralistic judgement to the decisions of commanders who were working under conditiions of pressure and uncertainty we cannot dream of.



Hi, bbear,
Many agreeable points in your post. 
Could you please explain why there would not be the day bombing? And elaborate a bit about the last commentary?


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## VBF-13 (Nov 3, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Could you please explain why there would not be the day bombing?


I was kind of wondering that, too, as, from perhaps the broadest of strategic perspectives, what those missions accomplished for us was, they kept the Germans, and, in particular, the Luftwaffe, tied up, literally, day and night. This was no Quinn-Martin Production. That is to say, those missions came at a very great sacrifice. But, think if they weren't there. Britain, I'd think, would have been pounded a lot harder. In other words, there was a defensive component incorporated in that strategy, as well, which contemplated that around-the-clock bombing.


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## drgondog (Nov 3, 2012)

SHOOTER said:


> Yes this is true, but also irrealivant! Just because the Nazis chose to send half to a dozen single engined fighters to look for Mossies with little support, what do you think would happen if there were no heavies to chase? RIGHT!



Is taht you NeoConShooter? This group of Admins will snuff you out in a heartbeat...


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## drgondog (Nov 3, 2012)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> From what I have seen, he uses the red font on many forums. Most of those forums he is not very well liked. Shooter2000...



Chris - on the two forums I have seen him bounced from the Admins were overly tolerant. I predict a short life cycle here...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 3, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Chris - on the two forums I have seen him bounced from the Admins were overly tolerant. I predict a short life cycle here...



He has not been active since May. I think he took the hint that we will not tolerate his behavior here.


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## gjs238 (Nov 3, 2012)

The ETO Strategic Bombing Campaign was another Front in the War.
I think it was Parsifal who wrote of the economic feasibility of the bombing campaign, i.e., it was cost effective.
Overall, the Germans expended much more treasure in the Defense of the Reich than the Allies expended on their end.


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## Tante Ju (Nov 4, 2012)

gjs238 said:


> I think it was Parsifal who wrote of the economic feasibility of the bombing campaign, i.e., it was cost effective.
> Overall, the Germans expended much more treasure in the Defense of the Reich than the Allies expended on their end.



It's extremely hard to believe and goes against pretty much all the established facts..


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## fastmongrel (Nov 4, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> It's extremely hard to believe and goes against pretty much all the established facts..



It has been established by economists that the UK spent 12% of its war budget on Bomber Command. I dont know the figures for the USAAF 8th but as a % it would probably given the size of the US war budget be a lot less. Does anyone have any genuine ie not Luft46 type figures for the German defensive and repair effort as a % of the war budget.


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## gjs238 (Nov 4, 2012)

This is from the "Target Schweinfurt" thread
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/target-schweinfurt-34434.html




parsifal said:


> I agree that choke points are overrated, but I dont agree at all that the WWII strategic bombing campaign did not profoundly affect Axis production. Even if you wish to discount the the effects of the bombing itself (which I dont...i think it affected german production capabilities greatly in itself), the Germans were spending well over 50% of their military budgets on air defence and civil defence by 1944, and had sucked out well over 2 million personnel either directly or indirectly in their attempts to counter the Allied bombers. For the RAF, this effect came at a cost of 12% of their military budget. Thats an excellent investment.
> 
> Then we have to factor in the effects of the bombing itself. There is a sharp wide difference of opinion on that score, but the USSBS and the post war British equivalent (the name escapes me, but I have read it), both estimate German production was affected/downgraded by up to 50% by the middle of 1944. There was no magic bullet, although targetting the oil industry comes close, and the allied effort came at a steep cost. it was an even steeper cost (and markedly so) for the Germans in their efforts at defence.
> 
> Even the Germans (the ones not attempting to rewrite history that is) acknowledge the strategically important effects of the bombing campaigns


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## parsifal (Nov 4, 2012)

Im flattered to have been quoted across two threads. thanks guys. There are a number of sources for the numbers I quoted, but a good single volume English history that I use a lots is Professor Westermans "Flak - German Anti-Aircraft Defences, 1914-45" - University Of Kansas Press 2001. Westermann makes an exhaustive study of the costs of German defences, and does make some claims that many find hard to accept. But his credeentials are pretty impressive and research first class. 

Defending against a sustained bombing camapign was very costly for the Germans, let there be no mistake or misinformation in that regard. Where most of the criticism of the Bombing campaign arose is becuse claims were made about what it could do before and during the war, that it simply could not do. Countries could not be brought to surrender by bombing alone. From those bombastic and embarasing claims has arisen in the postwar endless debates, the opportunity for revisionists and German apologists to raise questions about the fundamental failures of bombing on a much more generic and widespread scale. none of these postwar aopologists and revisionists have much to go on, but it hasnt stopped virutally an entire cottage industry springing up to support the various notions that are carried with it.


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## bbear (Nov 4, 2012)

Thank you for your kind comments and questions. I'll wait a while. But I will answer every query.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 4, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Defending against a sustained bombing camapign was very costly for the Germans, let there be no mistake or misinformation in that regard. Where most of the criticism of the Bombing campaign arose is becuse claims were made about what it could do before and during the war, that it simply could not do. Countries could not be brought to surrender by bombing alone. From those bombastic and embarasing claims has arisen in the postwar endless debates, the opportunity for revisionists and German apologists to raise questions about the fundamental failures of bombing on a much more generic and widespread scale. none of these postwar aopologists and revisionists have much to go on, but it hasnt stopped virutally an entire cottage industry springing up to support the various notions that are carried with it.


The defense of the campaign tied up valuable resources that otherwise would have been deployed offensively, it's as simple as that.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 4, 2012)

bbear said:


> Thank you for your kind comments and questions. I'll wait a while. But I will answer every query.



I have a querry here:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bomber-offensive-vs-gemany-you-charge-31998-22.html#post952180


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## TheMustangRider (Nov 4, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Care to elaborate the bolded part?



The Eight took on its initial offensive against Germany on a capacity pretty much underpowered of what it could have been, being forced to minimize itself in order to form the Twelfth AF and support Operation Torch.
U-boats bases on the French coast were well defended by a high concentration of flak guns and well protected by reinforced concrete pens which cost 8th AF raiders dearly, in return for pulverized concrete pens and U-boats relatively safe inside them.
On more than one occasion I’ve read about 8th AF vets of those early days of Eight AF operations in late 1942 and how bitterly they recall those missions which, to their opinion, were more useless than effective against the U-boat menace and how the Eight could have been better off pursuing more accessible targets in France and the Low Countries in the face of a slow growing rate for VIII BC.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 4, 2012)

Thanks. The reason I'm asking is this: reading this



> -Going after U-boat pens is exactly what the 8th AF did during its initial phase of operations over Nazi-occupied Europe without much impact to the German U-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic and causing the AAF escalating losses.



seemed like pointing that a lousy target choice made the AAF 'escalating losses'. So indeed that was 'AAF's Kasserine pass', when they went unprepared (in more than one category) vs. a seasoned opponent, with predictable results.


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## TheMustangRider (Nov 4, 2012)

I don’t know exactly what priority level did U-boats had in AWPD-1 but I suspect it certainly was high given the promptness which the 8th planning officers took to tackle them.
The Battle of the Atlantic was without doubt a decisive battle for both belligerent factions but as history proved, one that was decided out in the sea rather than in the naval bases.

Kind of like the LW if one thinks about it: it suffered from the heavy bombardments to the industries that fed and maintained it but, given German resolve and resourcefulness, it was a struggle that had to be dealt with in the skies.


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## bbear (Nov 4, 2012)

TheMustangRider said:


> Interesting summary bbear.
> If I'm allowed I'd like to make a couple of points regarding some of them.
> 
> -Not using aerial bombardment as means of civilian demoralization while not bombing by day is IMO a tough task to accomplish given the rudimentary technology available during WWII (specially early in the war) to pursue night-time bombardment of industrial targets without devastating the urban areas in which they were located.
> ...



Thank you. I understand and your points and actually they highlight why I'm thinking this way. 
1, Aerial bombrdment of GAF and factories particularly at night would be bloody and grim for civilians - but not the aim. 
2. Welcome to the ETO. I don't mind a nasty surprise, there was some overconfidence at that time. Any degree of intimidating U boats off the surface was welcome in 1942 as an advantage of a first mision set though i thnk u-boat killls in that period was one. 
3, Exactly, the original question changed the situation into a 'what-if' scenario by putting someone in overall command. 
4, That's for night ops and under the biggest 'speculation alert' heading. I've been reading about how diffcult a night interception is. How slow, how dangerous. How expensive and how few the pure night fighters were. How the searchlights worked in teams. Is it possible to bomb deep into germany at night with twin engine escorts and fewer losses overall? I was thinking out loud how to obtain the best limited passive defence (how fast how high) and how to calculate the effect. Where would a contemporary description be? Now I know that it is not not wise to do that here. Thanks for the cautionary tone and I expect to get a roasting - but i owed you an explanation.


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## Njaco (Nov 4, 2012)

I may be incorrect on this but the initial bombing campaign on the U-Boat pens by the USAAF was encouraged and politely asked for by the British - mainly because of the effect of the U-Boats on the convoys. The USAAF took it up as a somewhat 'exercise' and training for USAAF crews. That was the impression that I have gotten after reading several books over the years but I may be mistaken.


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## bbear (Nov 4, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Care to elaborate the bolded part?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The RAF BC and LW made an advantage of night bombing when they found it hard to survive with limited day escort. If the 8th AF invested mightily and early in night flying they could co-ordinate with BC and with the same advantage bomb the GAF in pursuit of Pointblank objectives starting much earlier deeper into germany and with lower losses than sustained in 1943. That's the newbie thought I never did buy into the night/day round the clock pressure theory. Normallly an attack would seek to overwhelm a defence at one time, Not form an orderly queue to give the defence a shift sytem.

I expect a roasting..

All that baloney aside- as I put myself in that position I could see I would have to make choices for political reasons. In an alliance you just have to bargain and manouvre for the leeway to take a decision. Even if the decision is - stop arguing and lets follow our orders. I started off wanting to get rid of the political masters. I ended up understanding why they had to be involved in the CBO and why they found it impossible to truly combine the offensive. So now I have a lot of respect for Haig and the generals. It's just very very sad.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 4, 2012)

bbear said:


> The RAF BC and LW made an advantage of night bombing when they found it hard to survive with limited day escort. If the 8th AF invested mightily and early in night flying they could co-ordinate with BC and with the same advantage bomb the GAF in pursuit of Pointblank objectives starting much earlier deeper into germany and with lower losses than sustained in 1943. That's the newbie thought I never did buy into the night/day round the clock pressure theory. Normallly an attack would seek to overwhelm a defence at one time, Not form an orderly queue to give the defence a shift sytem.



Did the LW and BC found the advantage of night bombing? I can agree that it was harder to kill a night bomber, but it was also harder for the night bomber to really plant it's bomb where it should. It took the BC from late 1939 to mid 1943 to achieve such a level of accuracy to actually hit a big city, Dambusters notwithstanding. And even after mid 1943 there were set backs.
Conversely, if the RAF concentrated on long range/high performance day fighters from 1941 on, the LW would've find themselves with pants down once they started Op Barbarossa and MTO operations. That example would also show the USAAF that escorted day bombing provides a handy opportunity to eliminate enemy AF from skies - that being a crux of Pointblank?
Be it as it was, the CBO was stretching LW thin - they had to design produce tools and crews for both day night duties, with enough fuel to keep the planes operating. No wonder LW started to collapse in 1944.



> I expect a roasting..



Chill out, man  You seem like a knowledgeable decent person.



> All that baloney aside- as I put myself in that position I could see I would have to make choices for political reasons. In an alliance you just have to bargain and manouvre for the leeway to take a decision. Even if the decision is - stop arguing and lets follow our orders. I started off wanting to get rid of the political masters. I ended up understanding why they had to be involved in the CBO and why they found it impossible to truly combine the offensive. So now I have a lot of respect for Haig and the generals. It's just very very sad.



Oh boy. I have no respect for Haig, many a French Russian/Soviet generals - sorry, many of them are butchers in my eyes, plain simple. I mean - infantry charges against MGs and minefields???


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## wuzak (Nov 4, 2012)

Maybe the 8th was asked to go after the subs, but their doctrine required them to bomb strategic targets. So instead of going after U-boats at sea they scratched the tops of the pens.

In the early days of the 8th in Britain, there was a lot of pressure to join the RAF in the night campaign. This was against what all the 8th AF commanders stood for, so they resisted for all they were worth.


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## bobbysocks (Nov 4, 2012)

they sure went after them....but IIRC the results were minimal because they were so fortified. they even tried using remote control war weary b17s and 24s packed with explosives ( code named aphrodite and anvil )...but those didnt pan out well either.


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## wuzak (Nov 4, 2012)

Their bombs weren't big enough.

It required Tallboy and Grand Slam, but these were 2+ years into the future.


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## bobbysocks (Nov 4, 2012)

they were still bombing them in '45...


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## tyrodtom (Nov 4, 2012)

They were also limited by the lenght of the B-17s bomb bay, nothing longer than a 2000 lb GP bomb would fit. A 2000 lb bomb just didn't have enough weight or body strenght to penetrate the roof on the sub pens. Even if a smaller, shorter, Tallboy had be developed, by the time it had be reduced to the length of the B-17's bomb bay, it would have been useless. Some B-17s were modified to could carry up to 1000 lb external on each wing, but that's no help for this situation.,


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## TheMustangRider (Nov 4, 2012)

bbear said:


> Thank you. I understand and your points and actually they highlight why I'm thinking this way.
> 1, Aerial bombrdment of GAF and factories particularly at night would be bloody and grim for civilians - but not the aim.
> 2. Welcome to the ETO. I don't mind a nasty surprise, there was some overconfidence at that time. Any degree of intimidating U boats off the surface was welcome in 1942 as an advantage of a first mision set though i thnk u-boat killls in that period was one.
> 3, Exactly, the original question changed the situation into a 'what-if' scenario by putting someone in overall command.
> 4, That's for night ops and under the biggest 'speculation alert' heading. I've been reading about how diffcult a night interception is. How slow, how dangerous. How expensive and how few the pure night fighters were. How the searchlights worked in teams. Is it possible to bomb deep into germany at night with twin engine escorts and fewer losses overall? I was thinking out loud how to obtain the best limited passive defence (how fast how high) and how to calculate the effect. Where would a contemporary description be? Now I know that it is not not wise to do that here. Thanks for the cautionary tone and I expect to get a roasting - but i owed you an explanation.




Not roasting from my part mate, we all are learners here. Some, of course are older and much more experienced and knowledgeable than others.  

-Precise night-time bombardment of relatively small targets such as LW airfields and factories was next to impossible during a big part of the air war over Europe; and making life bloody and grim for civilians, apart from hitting industrial targets weather permitting, is to me exactly what the CBO historically did during the war. 
-I may be wrong but the taking of both Allied bombing forces by Eisenhower before D-Day proved how difficult it was to vector both bomber commands, their commanders -and their doctrines- to work side by side without fiery opposition in the face of targets priorities.


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## Njaco (Nov 4, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> they sure went after them....but IIRC the results were minimal because they were so fortified. they even tried using remote control war weary b17s and 24s packed with explosives ( code named aphrodite and anvil )...but those didnt pan out well either.



Wasn't a Kennedy killed in one of those operations?


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## wuzak (Nov 4, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> They were also limited by the lenght of the B-17s bomb bay, nothing longer than a 2000 lb GP bomb would fit. A 2000 lb bomb just didn't have enough weight or body strenght to penetrate the roof on the sub pens. Even if a smaller, shorter, Tallboy had be developed, by the time it had be reduced to the length of the B-17's bomb bay, it would have been useless. Some B-17s were modified to could carry up to 1000 lb external on each wing, but that's no help for this situation.,



The wing racks could carry a 4000lb bomb.

In fact, they could, and did, carry teh 4500lb Disney Bomb







Disney bomb - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## wuzak (Nov 4, 2012)

Njaco said:


> Wasn't a Kennedy killed in one of those operations?



Yes, Joseph Kennedy Jr


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## Milosh (Nov 4, 2012)

Njaco said:


> Wasn't a Kennedy killed in one of those operations?



Yes Joe Kennedy.


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## TheMustangRider (Nov 4, 2012)

bbear said:


> The RAF BC and LW made an advantage of night bombing when they found it hard to survive with limited day escort. If the 8th AF invested mightily and early in night flying they could co-ordinate with BC and with the same advantage bomb the GAF in pursuit of Pointblank objectives starting much earlier deeper into germany and with lower losses than sustained in 1943. That's the newbie thought I never did buy into the night/day round the clock pressure theory. Normallly an attack would seek to overwhelm a defence at one time, Not form an orderly queue to give the defence a shift sytem.



The problem I see with that is that making the Eight to adapt to night bombing before giving a chance to daylight bombing would be the same as forcing the AAF commander to give up their fervent beliefs in high-precision daylight strategic bombing without a fight and before proving, in their view of the time, that it could work and the self-defending bomber rendering German war-making industries to rubble was the most effective and efficient way of pursuing the war.


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## bobbysocks (Nov 4, 2012)

i dont think you are going to get the us high brass to concede any tactic or strategy they have already made their minds up on. a stubborn lot if ever there was one. they didnt listen to mitchell, chennault, the raf, or the hosts of others who tried to tell them. it took heavy losses for them to decide self defending bombers are so self defending....


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## drgondog (Nov 5, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> i dont think you are going to get the us high brass to concede any tactic or strategy they have already made their minds up on. a stubborn lot if ever there was one. they didnt listen to mitchell, chennault, the raf, or the hosts of others who tried to tell them. it took heavy losses for them to decide self defending bombers are so self defending....



If we are permitted the prism of hindsight, and given supreme command of Allied Air Forces in Europe following Casablanca, I would frame the problems to be solved as follows:

Objective - shorten the war by destroying German capacity to wage effective war. Their ability to sustain a high capability force depended on a.) raw materials, b.) industrial base, c.) technology/innovation, d.) a healthy population with will to continue to supply labor, troops and logistical support and c.) a power grid to adequately support their industrial base and food production. Secondary but essential - kill the luftwaffe for D-Day invasion

Means and Assets of Airwar/Strategic and Tactical mid 1943 Casablanca Summit;
I. Strengths UK (ad Commonwealth) - RAF Heavy bomber force well trained and capable in 1943 to go anywhere in Germany and attack any target with large tonnage capability. Weakness - vulnerable to night fighters and less capable of 'precision bombing required to hit point targets of a city block size at night. Strength - good bombsights and bombers equally capable of precision bombing in daylight as US counterparts. Weakness - lack of daylight escort fighters to reduce losses to acceptable levels. Strengths - highly capable RAF Fighter and Tactical Air Command with comparable or better aircraft with respect to local air superiority. Weakness - range. RAF Medium bombers largely same as US in type and mission. Weakness - defense when target objectives exceeded escort range. Strength - extremely capable long and short range special ops in form of Mosquito night fighters, daylight intruders. Weakness - maybe not enough quantity to standardize US and UK staffing, TOE and aircraft to unify the missions.

II. Strengths US - Large and growing force of Heavy, medium and attack bombers capable of precision bombing in daylight when crews trained and weather favorable. Weakness - initially incapable of delivering multi range results on key targets without heavy losses. Small and rapidly growing 8th and 9th AF Fighter Command chartered intially with supporting Heavy bombardment strategic objectives deep in germany as well as Medium bomber objectives in France, Holland, Belgium to destroy logistics infrastructure capability. Weakness - no long range escort in early to late 1943. 

III. Combined strengths
RAF/US BC had ability to go anywhere from UK to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany and attack key industrial targets. RAF/US had ability to cover bomber to Bremen, Frankfurt by late 1943 before Mustangs arrived. Weakness - no cover beyond Dummer lake, Stuttgart until December 1943.

Conclusions - Independently both 8th AF and RAK Bomber Command were experiencing heavy losses versus German Day and Night fighters while attempting to a.) destroy German cities and b. German industrial capability while giving the GAF a maximum effective defense capabilty versus day and night ops.

Change the game. RAF and US go to 90% daylight bombing in late 1943 to spread the GAF day fighter defenses and neutralize the NJG effectiveness as a single force. Re-assign RAF to attack key targets such as Schweinfurt, Ruhr valley dams, Merseburg, Misburg, etc during day light.

Shift priorities of P-38 assignment from PTO/MTO and move all to ETO to support both the RAF and USAAF on deep penetrations. Expedite production of P-51s (A and B) to ETO. P51A to escort RAF and US Medium daylight attacks as far as Brunswick and Friedrichshafen. Re-deploy P-47s to MTO and PTO for medium range escort until P-47N and P-51B and P-38s are available tomove from ETO.

Key emphasis - destroy chemical, oil, power generation, rail, ball bearings and armaments centers - skip the population concentrations unless a major industrial capability is in the center.


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## wuzak (Nov 5, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Objective - shorten the war by destroying German capacity to wage effective war. Their ability to sustain a high capability force depended on a.) raw materials, b.) industrial base, c.) technology/innovation, d.) a healthy population with will to continue to supply labor, troops and logistical support and e.) a power grid to adequately support their industrial base and food production. Secondary but essential - kill the luftwaffe for D-Day invasion


As hindsight is a wonderful thing. I agree with you.
I think that attacking the transportation systems would give more downstream benefits than the other tragets. The problem is that such targets are often easily repaired.

Historicaly transportation was hit in teh lead up to D-Day as the primary target system, but it had been targetted earlier, with mining operations in waterways, for example. 




drgondog said:


> I. Strengths UK (ad Commonwealth) - RAF Heavy bomber force well trained and capable in 1943 to go anywhere in Germany and attack any target with large tonnage capability.



The RAF did, indeed, have a very impressive heavy lift capability.



drgondog said:


> Weakness - vulnerable to night fighters



I think the solution to this would to move up the approval to use the latest British nightfighters - Mosquitoes and Beaufighters - over the continent earlier. Historically only those with older radar sets, like Mosquito NF.IIs, were cleared for operations over mainland Europe earlier. Mosquitoes began to be equipped with Mk.VIII and Mk.X (SCR 720) radar sets in late 1943.



drgondog said:


> less capable of 'precision bombing required to hit point targets of a city block size at night.


I would dispute this. By late 1943 bombing aids and pathfinding methods could give the RAF equivalent results to the 8th AF. Also the introduction of teh master bomber, who would control teh bombing, call for additional marking when required, and correct for bomb drift.
617 squadron pioneered low level target marking, at first with Mosquitoes and then with Mustangs, giving even better results.





drgondog said:


> Strength - good bombsights and bombers equally capable of precision bombing in daylight as US counterparts.



Harris didn't think so, until his own crews proved him wrong.
Precision bombing requires an unobstructed target, long straight bomb runs and bombing invidually - for maximum accuracy. These would be troublesome for either without local air superiority.



drgondog said:


> Weakness - lack of daylight escort fighters to reduce losses to acceptable levels.


Something they shared with the USAAF. The RAF didn't think they were possible, so didn't try to develop them, the USAAF didn't think they were necessary.
In any case, the solution for the RAF was probably the same as the 8th AF - P-51B/Mustang III. Or the RAF could have pushed Supermarines for more range on teh Spitfire - particularly the XIV, which was being developed through 1943.



drgondog said:


> Strengths - highly capable RAF Fighter and Tactical Air Command with comparable or better aircraft with respect to local air superiority. Weakness - range.



Very true. Range is an issue that could have been solved with the appropriate priority but with the emphasis on heavy bombers at night this wasn't really addressed by the RAF.



drgondog said:


> RAF Medium bombers largely same as US in type and mission. Weakness - defense when target objectives exceeded escort range. Strength - extremely capable long and short range special ops in form of Mosquito night fighters, daylight intruders. Weakness - maybe not enough quantity to standardize US and UK staffing, TOE and aircraft to unify the missions.


That was always the big issue with the Mosquito - the production mix. Mosquito bombers could have provided a highly efficient daylight bombiing force, but where do you take them from? NFs, FBs, PRS?




drgondog said:


> II. Strengths US - Large and growing force of Heavy, medium and attack bombers capable of precision bombing in daylight when crews trained and weather favorable.



The weather was a very big factor in the success of daylight bombing. Also the Germans could employ countermeasures such as decoys and smoke screens to prevent accurate aiming. The necessity of bombing in formation on the lead's signal also lead to a reduction in the bombing accuracy and effectiveness.
The USAAF also tended towards a higher number of smaller bombs, reasoning that they were more likely to hit something.



drgondog said:


> Weakness - initially incapable of delivering multi range results on key targets without heavy losses.



This is the big weakness. But it was overcome through sheer industrial capacity. Churning out equipment and aircrew to replace those that were lost. 



drgondog said:


> Small and rapidly growing 8th and 9th AF Fighter Command chartered intially with supporting Heavy bombardment strategic objectives deep in germany as well as Medium bomber objectives in France, Holland, Belgium to destroy logistics infrastructure capability. Weakness - no long range escort in early to late 1943.



This was an error in doctrine that went back many years. If a long range escort fighter need to be developed after the hierarchy discovered it was necessary (mid-late 1943) it would have been too late.




drgondog said:


> III. Combined strengths
> RAF/US BC had ability to go anywhere from UK to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany and attack key industrial targets. RAF/US had ability to cover bomber to Bremen, Frankfurt by late 1943 before Mustangs arrived. Weakness - no cover beyond Dummer lake, Stuttgart until December 1943.





drgondog said:


> Conclusions - Independently both 8th AF and RAF Bomber Command were experiencing heavy losses versus German Day and Night fighters while attempting to a.) destroy German cities and b. German industrial capability while giving the GAF a maximum effective defense capabilty versus day and night ops.
> 
> Change the game. RAF and US go to 90% daylight bombing in late 1943 to spread the GAF day fighter defenses and neutralize the NJG effectiveness as a single force. Re-assign RAF to attack key targets such as Schweinfurt, Ruhr valley dams, Merseburg, Misburg, etc during day light.



I suppose that could work, providing there was enough co-ordination. Perhaps some feints where either the 8th of BC would occasionally form up and head towards target, attracting the attention of the defenders. They would fly until the limit of their escorts' range and then could choose to turn back if they were successful in drawing the defences. Meanwhile, the other force can go to another target relatively unmolested.



drgondog said:


> Shift priorities of P-38 assignment from PTO/MTO and move all to ETO to support both the RAF and USAAF on deep penetrations. Expedite production of P-51s (A and B) to ETO. P51A to escort RAF and US Medium daylight attacks as far as Brunswick and Friedrichshafen. Re-deploy P-47s to MTO and PTO for medium range escort until P-47N and P-51B and P-38s are available tomove from ETO.



I think switch from strict escort duties to fighter sweeps and Luftwaffe hunting.



drgondog said:


> Key emphasis - destroy chemical, oil, power generation, rail, ball bearings and armaments centers - skip the population concentrations unless a major industrial capability is in the center.



Rail, road and waterways. Bomb and mine them, particularly around the Ruhr Valley. Stop or restrict the movement of raw materials through occupied Europe. This should give the biggest benefits for the cost.


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## parsifal (Nov 6, 2012)

DG has pretty much nailed it in my opinion


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## drgondog (Nov 6, 2012)

I have no real issue with any of Wuzak's counterpoint/observations.

For me the summary (with one MAJOR problem to be solved) is to combine RAF and USAAF heavy bombers in daylight raids in summer of 1943 after Hamburg, and combined, hit the major priority targets in cmbination, in daylight - 

With hindsight I would hit oil and chemicals first, power generation (Dams/hydro/Grid centers) and ball bearings second, engine plants third. No question Marshalling Yards critical as nexus points for load switching, dumping and acquisition - particularly when time was critical (i.e moving men, material to Normandy in June 1944)

Aside from LW (and huge daylight losses during the July 1943 to Feb 1944 - somewhat mitigated by extra P-38s - was the 'simple' issue of 2000+ bombers taking off and landing in the same general 14 hour window. East Anglia was crowded enough as it was. 

The reason I would not initially hit Rail and Barge and Bridges is that there were a myraid of re-route options when choke points were struck.

IMO there were three significant advantages the RAF brought to daylight bombing. First was heavier tonnage and more bombs to the target with larger bombs per sortie for more destuctive results per hit. Second was the ability to hit targets (better results whether 'hit' or not) on targets obscured by cloud cover. Last, the huge stress placed on LW day fighter force - compelling them to throw perhaps more NJG units and even more reserves from East and South... and I would speculate that RAF losses might be less - and Certainly less when P-51B/Mk III arrived in numbers in Jan-April 1944.


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## Siegfried (Nov 6, 2012)

A lot of the targets mentioned are "one hit wonders". For instance attacks on the German oil industry were delayed untill a few months before D-day so that the effect would be concentrated around the landings. Had the bombing commenced earlier the Germans would have responded and eventually recovered much of their production capacity as they did in many other areas. The Edmund Geilenberg Plan consisted of dispersed mini plants plus a few deep underground plants as well as hardening of critical areas of the plants.

Edmund Geilenberg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I would say that had the plants been hardened with basic precautions such as semi submerging of key parts of the plant and armour concrete around key areas much of the oil bombing campaigne would have had limited effects.

Albert Speer eschewed building these plants underground as he thought putting the resources into wining a war before a bombing campaign began was a better way.


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## Milosh (Nov 6, 2012)

I would put power generation targets at the top of the list. From memory, there was 4-5 major power stations (fueled by coal) that produced 70% of the electric power for Germany. No electricity and no machines can operate.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2012)

Not so easy to relocate disperse either


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## parsifal (Nov 6, 2012)

> A lot of the targets mentioned are "one hit wonders".



A lot of the targets mentioned in DGs assessment were historically hit, just not in the order he specified, and in some instances with less emphasis in terms of resources. These targets were hit repeatedly historically and did not prove to be one hit wonders in the actual conflict. Why all of a sudden would they magically acquire such status?




> For instance attacks on the German oil industry were delayed untill a few months before D-day so that the effect would be concentrated around the landings



Its a very debateable point. I think the decision wass siply a matter of finding the right target priority, and this took some time. In actual fact, both BC and the USD 8th were detailed the destruction of the French communications and rail net i as their priority targets in the lead up to D-=Day, rather than deep penetration attacks on oil installations per se. 



> Had the bombing commenced earlier the Germans would have responded and eventually recovered much of their production capacity as they did in many other areas.


Another highly debateable statement. There is no evidence to support either of the two notions pedalled in this piece. Germany may not necessarily have responded adequately (she may well have not been able to) and there is not evidenece that actual German potential could have been recovered after the "bomb proffing of her oil industry (if that were in fact possible). In any event, spending money and manpower to do that work hands the allies a victory in itself. As it was, the establishement of the synthetic plants cost germany a bomb prewar, making them harder targets only adds to that cost, something that would have knowck on effects somewhere. Personally i doubt they had the resources or capability to achieve the outcomes you are suggesting. 



> I would say that had the plants been hardened with basic precautions such as semi submerging of key parts of the plant and armour concrete around key areas much of the oil bombing campaigne would have had limited effects.



As above, making the germans expend resources to achieve that outcome hands a bloodless victory to the Allies in itself, moreover I dont think that given the resources available to the germans that such an outcome is at all relaistically achievable. If it was, I think they would have at least done it to some of their petrochemical industry. they didnt, and I think that was partly bewcause they couldnt


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## wuzak (Nov 6, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Another highly debateable statement. There is no evidence to support either of the two notions pedalled in this piece. Germany may not necessarily have responded adequately (she may well have not been able to) and there is not evidenece that actual German potential could have been recovered after the "bomb proffing of her oil industry (if that were in fact possible). In any event, spending money and manpower to do that work hands the allies a victory in itself. As it was, the establishement of the synthetic plants cost germany a bomb prewar, making them harder targets only adds to that cost, something that would have knowck on effects somewhere. Personally i doubt they had the resources or capability to achieve the outcomes you are suggesting.
> 
> 
> 
> As above, making the germans expend resources to achieve that outcome hands a bloodless victory to the Allies in itself, moreover I dont think that given the resources available to the germans that such an outcome is at all relaistically achievable. If it was, I think they would have at least done it to some of their petrochemical industry. they didnt, and I think that was partly bewcause they couldnt



It would have taken years to put the synthetic oil industry underground.


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## TheMustangRider (Nov 6, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> For instance attacks on the German oil industry were delayed untill a few months before D-day so that the effect would be concentrated around the landings. Had the bombing commenced earlier the Germans would have responded and eventually recovered much of their production capacity as they did in many other areas. The Edmund Geilenberg Plan consisted of dispersed mini plants plus a few deep underground plants as well as hardening of critical areas of the plants.




The major offensive against Oil didn’t start until after the Normandy landings in favor of the Transportation Plan on grounds that it could cause a faster, more meaningful short-term impact on German logistics and mobility to repulse an Allied invasion than the Oil Plan offered.

Months before D-Day and still without a clear air superiority of the 8th AF over much of Nazi-Occupied Europe, Pointblank targets were still being pursued aggressively by Doolittle in an effort to draw and defeat the Luftwaffe in the air.

IMO the Edmund Geilenberg Plan seems interesting and perhaps promising; I believe however that it would have taken years to be fully executed and time was not a luxury Nazi Germany afforded in late 1944 into 1945.


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## Siegfried (Nov 6, 2012)

The truth is that the allied anti synthetic oil bombing campaigne began in May 1944, a full month before opperation Overlord with some 21 major missions and 4000 tons of bombs dropped. It was effective however follow up campaigns were repeatedly required to prevent repair which initially required 2 weeks to restore full production.

If that campaign had of been started much earlier in the absence of the stressfull high fuel demands and high resource demands d-day placed on the Germans the allies would have played their hand too early. 

Hardening oil plants turned out to be not that expensive or onerous. The pipes and pressure vessels operated at 700 bar and could take direct hits from bombs unscathed. Cables can be run in trenches while critical parts of the plant such as electrical control cabinets and personnel can be placed in bomb proof concrete blockhouses. This greatly reduces any major damage to only those parts of plant directly hit by large bombs and ensures quick recovery. Earlier campaigns are also less effective due to the mitigating availability of Romainian oil. If you start the campaigne 1 year before overlord the German synthetic oil industry would be well forewarned, hardened and also dispersed with fully bomb proof plant likely in use in some areas. Certainly costly for the Germans but also for the allies and a life saving respite for the people of German cities.


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## gjs238 (Nov 7, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> For quite some time, the the bomb raids were the only instrument available for Allies to bring the war to Germany. However, those raids whole Combined bomber offensive is criticized sometimes. So how would you conduct it, both during day night, with equipment historically available?


 Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2012)

What would you do between 1941-44?


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## TheMustangRider (Nov 7, 2012)

gjs238 said:


> Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.



What would happen to the thousands of B-17s/B-24s already being turned out in mass production.
They would have to fit somewhere else within the Allied effort as their numbers are too great to become redundant.
Aircrews would have to be re-trained as well consuming a certain amount of time.


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## drgondog (Nov 7, 2012)

gjs238 said:


> Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.



B-29s weren't the answer in 1943 or 1944. The answer was 'put great tonnage of the right mix of bombs during daylight on the right targets'. The B-17, Lancaster, Halifax, B-24s were capable. The losses IMO for combined daylight attacks on the key industries would not have been significantly higher simply because the LW would have been taxed even more to attack 2000+ combined RAF/US heavy bombers streaming into Germany every day... provided that a complete shift of P-38s from other theatres had occurred to form the first deep target escort.

IMO -The combined fighter and bomber commands would have suffered grievous losses but would have also dealt the LW more losses deep inside Germany that they otherwise would not experience until Feb-May 1944. If I am correct about the assumption the fighter losses would have been closer to 1:1 rather than 8th AF ratios of ~7:1 in 1944 but Allies far better positioned with streams of much better fighter pilot trainees to pick up the slack and German industry would be on its heels in late 1943/early 1944 - much faster than actual results.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2012)

Bill, what was the exchange ratio in the ETO, for fighters alone, in second half of 1943?


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## VBF-13 (Nov 7, 2012)

TheMustangRider said:


> What would happen to the thousands of B-17s/B-24s already being turned out in mass production.
> They would have to fit somewhere else within the Allied effort as their numbers are too great to become redundant.
> Aircrews would have to be re-trained as well consuming a certain amount of time.


I suppose that fact had a big impact. That is to say, that had to be a hard habit to quit, once they got it underway. I'm just a novice on this, understand, but that'd be my observation.


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## gjs238 (Nov 7, 2012)

B-32's were slated to be deployed to MTO and eventually ETO.




FLYBOYJ said:


> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/b-29s-over-germany-4013-17.html
> 
> From Wiki..
> 
> ...


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## drgondog (Nov 7, 2012)

In the second half 1943, the exchange rate moved from about 1.5:1 in favor of the P47 in July to about 3.5:1 by December with P-38 dragging the ratio down. It climbed to ~ 6:1 with Mustangs higher and P-38s lower than P-47 between Jan 1 and May 30, 1944, then increased to end of war.

Caution - these are from 8th AF VCB in context of air victory credits to Macr weighted losses air to air. USAF Study 85 is very slightly lower but differs only in removing a series of double credits that leaked into 8th VCB.

I do not know what the RAF or 9th AF exchange rate is because I haven't looked at 9th AF macrs, nor do I have the RAF VC's.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2012)

Many thanks. Would you be so kind to re-post that table, covering LW strengths losses in 1943 and '44?


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## parsifal (Nov 8, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Many thanks. Would you be so kind to re-post that table, covering LW strengths losses in 1943 and '44?



This is one source that may be of interst


Attrition and the Luetwaffe


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## drgondog (Nov 8, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Many thanks. Would you be so kind to re-post that table, covering LW strengths losses in 1943 and '44?



I have the 8th and 9th victory credits table (by qtr) going into my book, as well as the 8th AF FC tables (victoty credits and losses, by type, in total) but the latter is not organized on a month by month basis.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2012)

Many thnaks, parsifal.

Bill (or anyone that can chime in), if I can describe the table right: the strengths of the LW Jagdwaffe are listed in, with columns containing the strengths losses in ETO, MTO and Eastern front. The rows are separating the years (quarters?) - 1943-45.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 8, 2012)

here Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, Jagdverbnde there is the losses for the luftwaffe unit unlucky there were not distinton on losses on ground and in air and from bomber or fighter only a generic enemy related losses


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## tomo pauk (Nov 9, 2012)

Thanks, Vincenzo.


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## joeviking61 (Nov 9, 2012)

Greetings, I am a new member and have a question, not really a response to this thread. Can anyone tell me why the US used .50 caliber machine guns to defend the heavy Bombers like the 17 and 24. Why didn't it occur to anyone to use cannons with exploding shells like flak. OK, maybe there would have been fuse timing issues. Then why didnt they simply use grapeshot like old Naval cannons. 500 MPH ME-109's can't outrun huge ammounts of steel ball bearings traveling at 1000 feet per second. Seems to me the Bomber Crews would have been so much more sucessful in self defense if the Gunners simply had better guns firing huge ammounts of grape shot or shrapnel. Please bear in mind I'm a newbie on this site.


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## gjs238 (Nov 9, 2012)

Tomo - can you design us B-17's B-24's with Blunderbusses?


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## tyrodtom (Nov 9, 2012)

Shotguns of about any managable size are very short range weapons, the fighters would just stay beyound that range and shoot the bombers down.

Any kind of Flak weapon requires a method of estimating time of flight to where you want the flak to explode, that would be a constanly changing value with a fighter attacking a bomber. A about impossible computation with the state of electronics in the WW2 era. Plus a shell big enough to explode as in a timed flak shell requires a big shell, big shell = big gun = big turret impossible to fit on a aircraft.


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## bbear (Nov 9, 2012)

Still very much the newbie: I wonder if it might reduce the complexity of analysis, and the disagreements, to ground the dream combined command in historical events?

In May-June 1942 Arnold went to Britain as a trusted and welcome freind of Britain in general and Portal and Harris in partcular, Andrews was still alive, Doolittle I believe was just about to leave, Eisenhower was new in post and Eaker was only just warmng up the charm offensive for formation day bombng. Is that the earliest or only time such a dream command might be arrived at by a deal? 

The deal would have to satisfy FDR, Churchilll and Stalin so would have to include a major and convincing effort by both commands against the subs. The promise would be that afterwards it would be time to reshare the air-resources to high performers, hand out promotions, give commanders the procurement they desired and the willing poltical encorgagement to try theories in practice. 

Eaker/Spaatz might get access to the load bearing lancs and their wide arsenal, Harris drools over the prospect of mighty numbers of B 17s and Libs in a bomber stream. And natch, both think they will be best as sub busters and Condor killers - as long as no concrete is involved. Would you go for it?

The first commander would have to be - who? It would have to be a very senior American: Andrews? and (after sad loss) if possible Doolittle then Eisenhower personally - reasons in order being politics; protocol; American public acceptability; to save face for Portal, enough natural authority as an airman to make even Harris nod and... politics again. 

That gets us to an equlibrium point: De housing vs choke points vs aerial attrition parsifal style vs ANother set of orders - real politcal infighting included. All with a neutral but authoritatve commander with no air-power axe to grind, political sponsors satisfied for now, all bomber theories with an equal kick off date and combined capacities suffcient in scale and capabilties wide in scope to follow any strategy. At the first time hstorically that contemporary loss-kill numbers etc are available for each aircraft type on most mission types. 

Say we agree to start the clock at 31st August 1942 assuming the subs had been temporarily routed? Perhaps in historical context - orders of battle just as they were, (need to agree natural phases? that is, no piling 'what if' upon 'what if' to frustrate the numbers analysis) - just that one specific real deal - or a better one.


How good could Air power be, ETO, stage by stage.

Is that any help? Or is all that assumed already?


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## bbear (Nov 13, 2012)

[ ....The first commander would have to be - who? It would have to be a very senior American: Andrews? and (after sad loss) if possible Doolittle then Eisenhower personally - reasons in order being politics; protocol; American public acceptability; to save face for Portal, enough natural authority as an airman to make even Harris nod and... politics again."...

That could have been better expressed. Apologies to anyone who can't understand what i say or finds offence. None meant I assure you. 

I thought we might be starting into some statistical analysis phase in the thread. On other sites I've seen kill/loss ratio arguments hotly disputed or claims of 'well in my scenario that formation would have been destroyed by now". I was looking for agreement about the common base of comparision and a way of limiting the number of events to be considered (there were so many in the real world). So a fixed start date, defined command, defined aircraft types and short historical stages (Dieppe to Torch for example) and no 'accumulated gains' might limit the chaos. That way the carefully compiled tables might give some light. 

I was assuming that it is the strategic command we're interested in (historial 8th AF plus BC plus some limited 'co-operation'). that is the varying 'air power' strategies dehousing, chokes etc. are of interest not Overlord. That is i think we're comfortable with 9th AF and 2nd TAF, fighter command and coastal command as partners not actuallly part of the command. Or not?

The Subs were the highest priority in pre Pointblank and Pointblank and 8th AF wasn't deployed in force ETO before around August 42. Thus the rest of the set up.

I hope that is clearer.


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## Jabberwocky (Nov 13, 2012)

joeviking61 said:


> Greetings, I am a new member and have a question, not really a response to this thread. Can anyone tell me why the US used .50 caliber machine guns to defend the heavy Bombers like the 17 and 24. Why didn't it occur to anyone to use cannons with exploding shells like flak?



Hi, and welcome to the site.

There are a host of considerations, including weight and space and the feasibility of aiming and, as you've mentioned, fusing, as to why a flak style weapon wasn't considered for a defensive armament.

Weight: A fully-powered Sperry ball turret on a B-17 with 2 .50 cals and 250 rounds per gun weighed a little under 1200 lbs, gunner included.

The smallest US flak gun with an exploding shell was the Bofors 40 mm. A single, unpowered mount weighed about 2,440 lbs. A mount with a full power traverse and range finder set-up weighed about 4,200 lbs, not including ammunition or the five to six men it took to properly operate the thing.

Space: A B-17 fuselage is a maximum of 3.5 m (11 1/2 ft) in diameter). A 40 mm Bofors is 3.8 m (12 ft) long, without including the mount. Getting the 5-6 men necessary to operate it into a cramped bomber fuselage is only going to work for 1 gun, maximum.



> Then why didnt they simply use grapeshot like old Naval cannons. 500 MPH ME-109's can't outrun huge ammounts of steel ball bearings traveling at 1000 feet per second. Seems to me the Bomber Crews would have been so much more sucessful in self defense if the Gunners simply had better guns firing huge ammounts of grape shot or shrapnel.


 
A 'grapeshot' round has a very limited effective range (depending on a number of considerations like shell design and firing pattern). Firing a shotgun/canister-like round, even from a large calibre weapon, is going to limit the size of the defensive fire envelope, leaving US crews unable to return fire effectively. 

Even a modern 120 mm canister round has an effective range of only 600-700 There is a reason why shotguns are considered a close quarters weapon.

As German fighters got heavier weapons (like the various 30mm cannon) the range they fired from increased. By 1944, the average German fighter pilot began firing at about 900 m out from their bomber target.

1000 fps sounds like a lot, but an M2 round left the barrel at around three times that velocity.


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## Glider (Nov 18, 2012)

A Wellington was fitted with a trials 40mm gun turret using the 'S' gun used in Hurricanes. No idea what it weighed but it was a good size.

MILITARIA • Toon onderwerp - Wellington with 40mm Vickers.


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## Jabberwocky (Nov 18, 2012)

The Vickers S gun was actually designed as a bomber defensive/offensive gun. It was based around the RN's 40 x 158R ammunition, basically the same that was fired from the famous 2 pdr 'pom pom'. As such, it was much smaller and lighter than a 40 mm Bofors, and fired fixed rather than fused ammunition.

The S gun was about 2.9 m in length, vs 3.8 m for the Bofors. The S gun and turret would have weighed in less than half of that of the Bofors.

The original idea was that a 40 mm turret armed Wellington would act like a super-heavy Defiant, using its heavy armament to destroy enemy bombers from well outside the range of defensive fire.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 18, 2012)

As to the idea of canister or Grape shot. The American 37mm AT gun ( and light tank cannon) had a canister round. It contained 122 3/8in steel balls. It's effective range was considered 250yds (against men). The projectile weighed 1.94lbs and had MV of 2500fps. Round ball looses velocity at a truly appalling rate. A 3/8s steel ball weighs about 3.5 grams, 1/2 to 1/3 of what a rifle caliber bullet weighs. Going to a 1/2in ball gets you 8.4 grams but a lot fewer balls per round. A 1/2in ball at sea level can loose 1/2 of it's velocity in under 250yds. Since energy depends on the square of the speed that means 1/4 the striking energy. Things are better at high altitude where the air is thinner but canister or grape shot is a very short range weapon with close to an all or nothing hit probability. You are only going to get one or two shots per attacker (and one of them _WILL_ be at a less than optimum distance). 

The 37mm AT gun was good for 20-25 rpm with a 3 man crew. One to aim/fire, one to load and one to hand the rounds to the loader.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 19, 2012)

The USAAF can use the 37mm M4, if they're too desperate to have a cannister shot fired with decent rate of fire. But even then the one crew member would be needed to forward in the fresh ammo (be it in trays, or clips, or whatever). The range would be even less, though, maybe some 200 yds, and unlikely to harm the sturdy Fw-190s.
I'd rather go for a proper escort performed by capable fighters, thankyou.


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## bbear (Nov 19, 2012)

...and i'd rather go at night when interception is always from the rear, you have some hope of being escorted by an effective fighter even at max range, final closing speed of interceptor is slow, and if you spot the attacker even for a split second you have a chance to evade (what i can make of the tabular data i think shows lower losses per long range mission flying by night....)

And daylight bombing degrees of accuracy are not needed for - my next move.


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## dobbie (Nov 22, 2012)

I believe the fallacy of bombing with the heavies on the industries is fairly apparent, be it day or night against a determined and suitably equipped foe was proven over and over again. Not that the industries, transportation network and power generation stations shouldnt be attacked, but I do believe a different priority might have been more effective.

When Doolittle took over the 8th AF, he got the mustangs he wanted for escort, but also turned them loose to hunt down enemy fighter formations.

Lemay saw the weaknesses of the early B29s, stripped them of most of their guns, loaded them up with incendiaries an GP bombs and sent them in at night. He didnt of course have to deal with an extensive radar detection system as was in place in the ETO, so what I propose is....

Begin the attack against the radar sites with intruder type aircraft, such as the Mosquito and other twin engined light bombers. The technology was available to convert what was at hand to detect search radars. You cant whip what you cant see.

Pair the escort fighters with fighter/bombers to go after the airfields, transportation (trains and yards), and flak sites during the daylight hours. If they have no transportation network, they have no way to move raw materials or finished parts to where they need to go.

Once their defenses are knocked back some, send in the heavies to hit the munitions, dams and such both day and night.


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2012)

There were better solutions than direct attacks, though this was an integral part of the attack strategy. Window and 100 Group were both tasked with defeating German defences by ECM. Serrate and mousetrap were technologies devoted to overpowering the German electronic defences (serrate was designed to counter airborne radars). Some technologies were more successful than others, others were very successful for a while and then tended to fall away as the Germans got a hold on the technology. Some efforts, like mousetrap, were hardly worth the effort


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## tomo pauk (Nov 22, 2012)

Serrate was a what we could today call a RWR - radar warning receiver. It used the emissions of LW NF radars to detect them.


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2012)

Yes, I know, but it still was a device used to defeat German radars, in that particular case by giving the intruder advance warning of the nightfighters approach. Mossies had a standard tactic designed to turn the tables on the LW nightfighter...fly as part of the bomber stream, making out or foxing that they were one of the lumbering behemoths. Once the interceptor got to within about 1000 yds astern or even less (depending on the nerve of the Mosquito pilot, the AI Mk X would be quickly switched on, the Mosquito would open the thottle and carry out a relatively violent half roll and tight turn. The LW fighter would fairly quickly lose its radar fix on the Mosquito and in any event could not match the speed or turn rate of the Mosquito. They would usually panic and dive often smashing into the ground as they did. if they did not the Mosquito, with its far more efficient radar fit and near 180 search arcs would quickly re-aquire the interseptor and get on his tail, move into position astern of him and shoot him down.

Approximately 600 NJGs were shot down in this way., and it is believed several thousand more lost to accidents as a result of the extreme stress these tactics (and equipment placed them under). Staggeringlythere were only ever about 150 Mosquitoes mployed in this highly successful campaign.


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## Siegfried (Nov 22, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Serrate was a what we could today call a RWR - radar warning receiver. It used the emissions of LW NF radars to detect them.



Serrate didn't work too well in practice, it kept going of from the multiple Luftwaffe radars, triggering of reflections.

Some late model Ju 88G had the "R" Version of their Radars which Incorporated tail warning and was considered very useful in evading RAF attack. German tail warning radars gave the range on a trace and so they could discriminate false alarms. The Naxos passive receiver gave direction to a bomber via its H2S but could also warn of night fighters.

These devices tended to be in short supply.


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2012)

> Serrate didn't work too well in practice, it kept going of from the multiple Luftwaffe radars, triggering of reflections.




Thats completely contrary to both LW and RAF reports that used them. Bill gunston, who used it, and flew during the war, wrote a book on WWII nightfighters that includes considerable sections on the success of Seerrate.

Im not necessarily refusing to accept what you are climing, but if you are going to make claims like that, you should consider backing it up with something


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## parsifal (Nov 23, 2012)

Further to the above, the late Henry Black, a recognized authority on the night bombing offensive wrote this in his book

"A number of authors have expressed the opinion that SERRATE was an operational failure but this is not the view of this author. The reduction in contacts during one period was due to the introduction of ‘WINDOW’ by the British and it had an unfortunate effect upon SERRATE Mk. II. This was remedied relatively quickly by the introduction of the clever design of SERRATE Mk. IV."


The Germans enjoyed a period of relative immunity from April through to July 1944 with the introduction 
their SN-2 radar. However introductioon of this technology was not immediately complete....200 sets by April, about 1000 by July, moreover from July through to December, the RAF became increasingly adept by new technology at detecting even SN-2 equipped aircraft.

The use of the Lichtenstein SN2 led to the urgent development of SERRATE Mk IV as a method of homing onto this new German radar. The signals were presented to the Mosquito navigator aurally through a set of normal headphones rather than through a cathode ray tube (CRT). The DF (direction finding) is conveyed to the operator by coding the signal through ‘dots and dashes’ as with a Lorenz beam. This was necessary because of the number of CRTs already in use in group aircraft for the navigator to read, had almost reached their maximum.

When the Germans came to design their SN-2 radar, they were aware that the British were able to lock their A.I. radars on to their earlier designed radars. To make their new radar more secure, they selected a frequency within the band already used by some of their ground plotting stations - the Freyas. This simple approach met with considerable success because if a receiver was used to pick up the weaker SN-2 signals it would also pick up the more numerous and much stronger signals of the FREYAS. They also made their new radar to have facilities for front and rear scanning.

In the SERRATE Mk. IV, using audio-frequency filtering, the FREYAS signals were almost completely removed while the SN2 signals came through the headphones as a characteristic high pitched note with a pronounced tremor due to the ‘Split’ transmitter aerial. This became operational in January 1945.


The establishment of the frequency of the SN2 became an urgent problem to solve. It was not completely established until a Ju 88 landed in error at Woodbridge at July 13th 1944. 

SERRATE Mk. IV and SERRATE Mk. IV(a) became available at about the same time. The Mk. IV was a modification of the TR 1143 receiver while the TR1430 was used as a basis of the SERRATE Mk. IV(a). 

The use of the Lichtenstein SN2 led to the urgent development of SERRATE Mk IV as a method of homing onto this new German radar. Serrate MkIV was highly effective at this. The earlier Marks of Serrate continued to have some usefulness, because only a fraction of German NFs were SN-2 equipped for many months, and by the time they had been converted, the fighters of 100 group had fully converted to Serrate Mk IV.


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## Siegfried (Nov 23, 2012)

In other words not "completely contrary" to LW or RAF reports since serrate was swamped by windows reflections from the radars it was to be homing on to, then progresivly rendered useless by the unknown SN-2 frequencies which were in anycase designed to conflate with ground based freyas. The Serrate Mk IV version only entering service in Feb 1945, a time the Luftwaffe was accepting deliveries of its own 9cm radars and was also operating the new FuG 218 Neptun radar.

Of course serrate no doubt worked as intended at times, these are the reports that we read about.


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## parsifal (Nov 24, 2012)

> In other words not "completely contrary" to LW or RAF reports since serrate was swamped by windows reflections from the radars it was to be homing on to



Black does not say that at all. Window had an effect, but it was not a complete blackout. Interceptions were still occurring, but not as many 



> , then progresivly rendered useless by the unknown SN-2 frequencies which were in anycase designed to conflate with ground based freyas. The Serrate Mk IV version only entering service in Feb 1945


,


It began entering service with 100 Group considerably before then, and. The LWs "window of immunity was shortlived and only partial, from May 1944 through to about September. SN-2 was introduced only slowly and barely kept pace with attrition. The Germans did achive an advantage, i will grant you, however that advantage was naything but a runaway victory in this fascinating aspect of the war. They were unable to translate the obvious advantages of SN-2 over serrate II before the British were abale to respond. the British response was a little late, but there was no great success for the LW. 




> a time the Luftwaffe was accepting deliveries of its own 9cm radars and was also operating the new FuG 218 Neptun radar


.

And the British were working on Serrate Mk VI to counter that very installation. The electronic war, like everything else in the war was about resources in the finish, and the Germans simply did not have enough resources to make a difference. They were never going to win a technological race.....they were a clever enginerering nation, but cleverness is only a part of the issue leading to success. 



> Of course serrate no doubt worked as intended at times, these are the reports that we read about.




Well true, but in the last twenty years or so, like a lot of views on the course of the war, there is a dedicated group of zealots absolutely committed to revising and rewriting the accepted versions of history, usually to cast the germans in the best possible light or reveal some oversensationalised aspect of the war that they 9the author) wants us to know about. only with careful examination of the facts can it be usually exposed that these claims are largely fraudulent . im sure you have read many of those sort of histories.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 24, 2012)

Hello, gentlemen,
Maybe the electronic war at 20000 ft (give or take) deserves a thread on it's own?


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## VBF-13 (Nov 24, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Hello, gentlemen,
> Maybe the electronic war at 20000 ft (give or take) deserves a thread on it's own?


Is that a polite hint? 

Seriously, Tomo, this thread has been going on since March. Haven't you boys figured anything out, yet? This is totally not my area, but I've been lurking on this thread for at least a month, now. While I know that these missions were highly controversial, I'm wondering, what else can be said? You boys seem to have exhausted the subject.


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## bbear (Nov 24, 2012)

Parsifal and Siegfried are exchanging very great stuff about how and when and what of the radiio waves campaign. But - why contend the sky at night in ETO at all? 

I would like to ask whether the advantage really did change in 1940/41 from day ops to night. Knickebein/Gee.....I had thought that was accepted as the start of the modern path and the advantageous tactic at the time. But then i came here and started reading more

I've tried my poor answers to the why' question - less losses per bomb ton on target - but that seems to get diffferent rebuttal every 5 minutes as I look around . I've tried the Bombng Surveys (long procurement and resourcing cases for more money/status for air power or thats how they read to me), interpreting mchueks tables I find that data needs careful handling or it just shows whatever I want (the data deserve better than to be torured ) and I note parsifals referenced argument on attrition (a slightly different question). 

If we just want to 'blow stuff up strategically' in ETO : night or day? 

Is there a really good independent and balanced assessment? Riffling through internet samples the contemporary ones are partisan or maybe written in passion. Modern ones are - variable. Some writen to please others seem - a bit bent. At least at my non-academic level.


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## Glider (Nov 25, 2012)

bbear said:


> Parsifal and Siegfried are exchanging very great stuff about how and when and what of the radiio waves campaign. But - why contend the sky at night in ETO at all?
> 
> I would like to ask whether the advantage really did change in 1940/41 from day ops to night. Knickebein/Gee.....I had thought that was accepted as the start of the modern path and the advantageous tactic at the time. But then i came here and started reading more.



I think the simple reply is that before the advent of long ranged fighters, the bombers could not live in enemy skies during daylight. If you wanted to bomb deep in the enemy area then you had to go by night.


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## parsifal (Nov 25, 2012)

Gliders pretty much nailed it. In 1939, the RAF mounted a few raids by daylight on several targets in Germany. The RAF up to that time was as wedded as any of the major nations that the bomber would always get through. These raids suffered horrendous losses (about 50-70%). Some time later, in the latter part of 1940, the Germans mounted an effective night bombing campaign, in which the bomber losses compared to those they had suffered in daylight had reduced significantly.

In 1941-2, the only option and opportunity for serious offensibve action was via BC attacks. Some attacks were undertaken by daylight, over france and the low countries. Despite suffering greater losses than the LW, this campaign did achieve results, but the loss rates remained unnacceptable, and that was with massive fighter prrotection for most raids(in fact the bombersd apart from the raids o the KM and shipping did not achieve that much....it was the escorts protecting them and the attemtps to get the LW to come and fight that achieved the result. the only real option at that time was by night bombing for all attacks over Germansy. Britain simply could not provide a long range fighter escort, and could not afford the losses that a day campaign entailed. 

Despite the apparent lack of direct success in those early years, the Germans were evidently concerned by the potential the campaign had. They poured massive amounts of resources into countering it, about 80% of the flak forces were deployed so as to counter BCs campaign, and the night fighter forcesand their ground based support soaked up about 30% of the LWs budeget. For an outlay repr3senting about 12% of Britiains military spending, the results were massively successful...not because they pulled existing units from the East, but because moneyand manpowoer otherwise spent on other progrmas were tied to countering the bombers. 

Later in the war, once the Americans had basically destroyedor grounded the LW day fighte forces, BC returned to a day bombing campaign at least in part.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 25, 2012)

Good post; if a defender must invest spend more (percentage-wise), than the attacker, that is not a viable defence.

About this:



> In 1941-2, the only option and opportunity for serious offensibve action was via BC attacks. Some attacks were undertaken by daylight, over france and the low countries. Despite suffering greater losses than the LW, this campaign did achieve results, but the loss rates remained unnacceptable, and that was with massive fighter prrotection for most raids(in fact the bombersd apart from the raids o the KM and shipping did not achieve that much....it was the escorts protecting them and the attemtps to get the LW to come and fight that achieved the result. the only real option at that time was by night bombing for all attacks over Germansy. Britain simply could not provide a long range fighter escort, and could not afford the losses that a day campaign entailed.



We can note that, after Op, Barbarossa (and contary to 1939 - mid 1941), Luftwaffe fielded far less fighters (and other planes) in West. Two JagdGeschwaeders were deployed west of Rhine. Compared to majority of RAF's assets. 
Those two JGs were able to choose when to fight and when to stay away, because the Rhubarbs similar operations were involving 50-60 RAF's bombers, with hundreds of fighter acting as cover. No sane LW commander will send his planes against that force - the gains would be low, the risks for his outnumbered force too high. When the LW commanders decided that it was a time to act, they did, and RAF suffered disproportional losses.
RAF never tried to 'entice' the LW with, say, 500-600 bombers*. Bombing, in France Low countries, the under-construction submarine pens, LW, KM and Heer assets, fuel infrastructure, electrical infrastructure etc. That way the LW commander must act, scrambling his fighters to trade blows both against bombers and fighters. Will his fighters be able to land safely at cratered runaways? Even trading one bomber and one fighter (RAF), for one LW fighter, how many days the 2 JGs can withstand before they're bled dry?
In the same time, make night harassment attacks, so the Germans must have two shifts of manpower to man the guns, while increasing ammo expenditure gun wear.

Now before people rightly say that Spitfire V was not suitable for long range work, the shortcomings surfaced up from mid 1941 should lead to installation of more fuel for upcoming 1942. Main fuel tankage up to 95 IG, or rear fuselage tank for combat purposes, or an earlier introduction of wing leading edge tanks, or a combination of those 3 options. 

*730 bombers in RAF's service in July 1941.


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## parsifal (Nov 25, 2012)

> We can note that, after Op, Barbarossa (and contary to 1939 - mid 1941), Luftwaffe fielded far less fighters (and other planes) in West. Two JagdGeschwaeders were deployed west of Rhine. Compared to majority of RAF's assets.



True, however, the germans did retain well over 1000 aircraft in the west and over Germany exclusive of transports and trainers. There were roughly 140 day fighters in the Reich defences and about 90 fighters in southern Norway and Denmark. All of these resources were available for any major incursions by day over Germany 



> Those two JGs were able to choose when to fight and when to stay away, because the Rhubarbs similar operations were involving 50-60 RAF's bombers, with hundreds of fighter acting as cover. No sane LW commander will send his planes against that force - the gains would be low, the risks for his outnumbered force too high. When the LW commanders decided that it was a time to act, they did, and RAF suffered disproportional losses.




Correct, the LW refused to fight except when the situation or the odds favoured the. According to galland this was very demorqalising for them, and even though RAF operations came at a high cost, it won for them control of the channel and the port districts on both sides of the ditch. 



> RAF never tried to 'entice' the LW with, say, 500-600 bombers*. Bombing, in France Low countries, the under-construction submarine pens, LW, KM and Heer assets, fuel infrastructure, electrical infrastructure etc. That way the LW commander must act, scrambling his fighters to trade blows both against bombers and fighters.




Opinions will vary I am sure, but I think service politics comes into play heree. 2 Group and Coastal Command were the day bomber forces tasked with prosecuting and achieving control of the channel, along with (for most of the time) about 18 fighter squadrons of FC. 18 squadrons is not that big an advantage over the 190 or so fighters of the defeding german forces incidentally. 

The air commanders tasked with attacking targets in France were siomply not given access to the resources you are talking about. 2 Group was a force of about 6 squadrons, armed mostly with blenheims. moreover, elsewhere you talk about a force structure of 791 a/c. True, if you include everything, including OTUs, and aircraft like Oxfords and Ansons. Throughout 1941, BC was never able to mount raids stronger than roughly 250-300 aircraft. Harris, and his famous 1000 bomber raid, was only possible after a near three month sojourn, and then only by including everything in the force structure....an unsustainable effort 




> Will his fighters be able to land safely at cratered runaways? Even trading one bomber and one fighter (RAF), for one LW fighter, how many days the 2 JGs can withstand before they're bled dry?



Whilst acknowledging your point about "forcing" the germans to defend, the Germans never felt compelled to defend any airspace in France. on those few occcasions when threats to airfields were mounted, and the germqans were unwilling to to fight for that space, they simply transferred to other fields temporarily. The LW with several times the numbers of bombers a year earlier could not achieve this, why would the RAF, even if attacking at full strength be expected to do any better? 




> In the same time, make night harassment attacks, so the Germans must have two shifts of manpower to man the guns, while increasing ammo expenditure gun wear.



Agreed. 




> Now before people rightly say that Spitfire V was not suitable for long range work, the shortcomings surfaced up from mid 1941 should lead to installation of more fuel for upcoming 1942. Main fuel tankage up to 95 IG, or rear fuselage tank for combat purposes, or an earlier introduction of wing leading edge tanks, or a combination of those 3 options.



You would think so, given the increases in range achieved for the later marks of Spit. it was the lack of range that made the ofensive over france so frustrating and limited 

*


> 730 bombers in RAF's service in July 1941


.

As I said, thats everything, the reality was a lot smaler than that.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 26, 2012)

parsifal said:


> True, however, the germans did retain well over 1000 aircraft in the west and over Germany exclusive of transports and trainers. There were roughly 140 day fighters in the Reich defences and about 90 fighters in southern Norway and Denmark. All of these resources were available for any major incursions by day over Germany



In Norway, out of 52 Bf-109E/T, only 26 were serviceable; retreating those from Norway gives Coastal command free reign in coastal waters there. In Germany and Denmark, only ~40 serviceable Bf-109. We can add some 80 Bf-110, from Norway, Denmark and Germany. 
Luftwaffe Orders of Battle 24 June 1941, 27 July 1942, and 17 May 1943



> Correct, the LW refused to fight except when the situation or the odds favoured the. According to galland this was very demorqalising for them, and even though RAF operations came at a high cost, it won for them control of the channel and the port districts on both sides of the ditch.



Unfortulately, the Channel ports were not where the sub pens were. 



> Opinions will vary I am sure, but I think service politics comes into play heree. 2 Group and Coastal Command were the day bomber forces tasked with prosecuting and achieving control of the channel, along with (for most of the time) about 18 fighter squadrons of FC. 18 squadrons is not that big an advantage over the 190 or so fighters of the defeding german forces incidentally.



If I'm counting right here, the 'home' RAF FC squadrons were counting far more than 18 squadrons; the notable 11th Group having 26 squadrons on their own? Sure enough, not all the fighters will not be based in Channel front, but gives RAF a sure numerical superiority vs. 2 JGs. 



> The air commanders tasked with attacking targets in France were siomply not given access to the resources you are talking about. 2 Group was a force of about 6 squadrons, armed mostly with blenheims. moreover, elsewhere you talk about a force structure of 791 a/c. True, if you include everything, including OTUs, and aircraft like Oxfords and Ansons. Throughout 1941, BC was never able to mount raids stronger than roughly 250-300 aircraft. Harris, and his famous 1000 bomber raid, was only possible after a near three month sojourn, and then only by including everything in the force structure....an unsustainable effort



You can go here, where our, rather reliable, vincenzo gives 53 bomber squadrons in service. Planes ranging from Blenheim, Hampden, Whitley, Wellington, Strirling, even few had Hallifaxes and Fortresses. No Oxfords nor Ansons there.



> Whilst acknowledging your point about "forcing" the germans to defend, the Germans never felt compelled to defend any airspace in France. on those few occcasions when threats to airfields were mounted, and the germqans were unwilling to to fight for that space, they simply transferred to other fields temporarily.



The Germans rightly concluded that RAF bombers incoming in penny packets are hardly to make any damage, let alone when they uncovered ruse of bombers acting as bait for RAF trap. With hundreds of bombers making their presence felt, there is no ruse - LW must scramble kill bombers. Not the greatest thing if RAF flies twice the number of fighters as cover.
If LW moves away, all the better.



> The LW with several times the numbers of bombers a year earlier could not achieve this, why would the RAF, even if attacking at full strength be expected to do any better?



LW in BoB was not fighting against an opponent that just deployed bulk of it's fighters in some other major theater of war. 



> You would think so, given the increases in range achieved for the later marks of Spit. it was the lack of range that made the ofensive over france so frustrating and limited



Unfortunately, later Spits, deployed in ETO, featured better range only from late 1944, when it was no more the issue with W. Allies firmly established in Continent.



> [BC compostition strength]As I said, thats everything, the reality was a lot smaler than that.



Covered above.


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## bbear (Nov 26, 2012)

Thanks for the answers. So day or night? Is definitely night any time from 1939 when the RAF learned the leson until 1942, and for deep missions until around April 1944. The limiting factor being range of day fighters in both cases. But... 

With hindsight (or contemporary thought) the only point of bombing was to provoke disproportionate expenditure of resources by the enemy to defend a sky he had no real strategic interest in defending except when he could make tactical in-roads into your air force? So over France this was like the early part of BoB. LW trying to bring the RAF FC into combat over the channel shippping, Parks being cagey, never over-extending - feints and bluffs, flurries amd decoys, the occaisional non-decisive 'Jutland' in the sky. Over German cities the LW might say 'why interfere with an enemy who is making a mistake' - let the flak and mechanical fault and navigation error and weather and the channel do the work and let the night fighters take the easy prey on the way in. Have I got the right picture?

If so, am I right in thinking that the most important 'choke point' of all was pilots? I seem to rember that was priority 1 in the BoB for Dowding. Target 1 in any resonable AWPD - Not the LW might in planes or airfields or ball bearings or even fuel and transport - but in crew especially pilots. So a 'kill' is not a 'kill' unless someone got, well, killed?

And if that's right is the real reason for the suden collapse of the LW as seen by decline in bomber losses around May 1944 just that - with the range of fighter pilots extended the LW ran out of air to retreat to so our numerous hawks shot down their numerous chicks - from whch position no recovery is possible no matter what material investment is made - because pilots need a long period of safe flying before they can fly safely - let alone fight on equal terms? After which all those expensive flak guns and radar are almost worthless scrap iron. Apart from srvining the few remaining experts, and the 262s we couldn't catch.

In which case Dowding or Parks would have had the answer to best strategic bombing policy in historical time. No hindsight needed. Pity they got canned or posted for the sheer cheek of winning something.

That may be a flight of fantasy, probably is - I'll post it in case anyone bites.


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2012)

There was actual damage arising from bombing, including night bombing. The percentages of lost potential arising from bombing is sharply debated. Some argue the losses to production were virtually nothing, others argue up to 50% of late war production was lost.

The USSBS provides figures foir the US forces but tends to downplay the efforts of BC. The USSBS estimates about 40% of total German potential. There is a far less well publicised British source, which estimates the losses to production in 1943 amounted to about 17% of estimated potential. In 1944, there was an increase to about 26% of war potential.

as I said at the beginning, these figures are disputed. However if you accept that they have some validity, the preliminary work undertaken by the RAF in 1941-2 played its part in learning the necessary lessons needed for that result. 

For me, the figures are thoroughly plausible. I find it hard to believe that the Germans would not react so violently and devote so many of their resources, unless the bombing had some impact on their economy


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## bbear (Nov 28, 2012)

Thanks once more. I'll just remember for future reference that when people speak of attritional loss in enemy air forces they may primarily be talking about pilots. 

As for industrial production losses, it must be almost impossible to tell one effect from another - for example all BC/8th activity vs drafting of younger workers into uniform vs territory gains/losses. 

It would be one heck of an analysis. At least it seems agreed that bombers posed sufficient threat over Germany by day to force the attack by LW fighters. But not so over France or other occupied nation.

I must read some books now and the Bombing Surveys or what i can get of them- carefully this time. I won't surface for a while.


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## stona (Jan 10, 2013)

Just happened across a passage in "Rise and Fall of the German Air Force", a British Air Ministry report published post war. It doesn't relate to the effects of bombing on German production but rather specifically on the Luftwaffe.

"From early 1943 until the Allied landings on 6th June 1944,the combined Anglo-American air attack on the Reich was the dominating factor in the air war.It resulted in the reduction of the German Air Force in the Mediterranean to a size at which their influence over the course of operations was negligible. It resulted in the transfer from Russia to Germany of single-engined and twin-engined fighter units at the very moment when the growing superiority of the Soviet Air Force required a strengthening of German fighter opposition.And,above all else,it enforced a change-over from bomber to fighter,from offensive to defensive equipment,which irrevocably altered the whole composition and character of the German Air Force."

Not a bad list of by-products.

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Jan 10, 2013)

I would say the British Air Ministry's own post war self-justification for its existence and horrendous wartime budget makes a poor source for reliable information.

Especially the claim of fighter transfers is a great stretch, since these always happened in bulk when Allied ground troops actually made a landing. See Allied landings in Siciliy/Italy, or in Normandy. It had little to do with the 'air attack' and very much with the ground troops appearing.

Winter transitions back and forth between the EF and the WF were commonplace in the winter, but simply made better use of resources. Bombers that could not fly in winter conditions in Russia could merrily do so in the MTO.


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## stona (Jan 10, 2013)

Why do you think they compiled such reports?

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Jan 10, 2013)

For the same reason large organisations often do: the justify their own existence. The air force lobby was strong in Britain, and I think it goes without saying that self-evaluations are hardly the most objective assessments..


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## vinnye (Jan 10, 2013)

If I were in charge, I would have demanded more Mosquitoes to be made and used them as both day and night intruders attcking with precision rather than the carpet bombing used by the heavies.
I am not decrying the efforts of those who served, but it is what I would have done!

I would also have had the Westland Whirlwind fitted with Merlins as used to attack any ground targets within range.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 10, 2013)

If the Luftwaffe aircraft were just waiting for troops to land, then i'll ask the same question that a lot of German troops in Normandy, June 44 asked. 
Where is , or was , the Luftwaffe ???


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## stona (Jan 10, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> For the same reason large organisations often do: the justify their own existence. The air force lobby was strong in Britain, and I think it goes without saying that self-evaluations are hardly the most objective assessments..



So what would you make of the oft quoted USSBS?

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 10, 2013)

vinnye said:


> I would also have had the Westland Whirlwind fitted with Merlins as used to attack any ground targets within range.



I like the Whirlwind and think it got a bit of a raw deal but it was a small airplane (smaller than a Typhoon) and was too small to be fitted with Merlins. You could make a "Whirlwind type" of fighter with twin Merlins but it would share very few actual parts with e Whirlwind.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 10, 2013)

stona said:


> So what would you make of the oft quoted USSBS?



Its a useful source of primary data and it is generally much more cautious in drawing conclusions. 

It is also very different compared to your source, which only seems to present an opinion, that the USSB also presents the factual basis on which the opinion was formed.


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## stona (Jan 10, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> It is also very different compared to your source, which only seems to present an opinion



That is simply not so.
The British conducted their own survey,to which the report refers. It was published as "The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-45".

Anyway,off topic and I can see we'll have to agree to disagree.

Cheers

Steve


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## vinnye (Jan 10, 2013)

I had not realised that the Peregrine engine was so different than a Merlin. I knew that the Peregrine had its problems - which detrarcted from the overall package. Thats why I said I would have put he Merlin in - to make it reliable. The plane was often described very favourably by those who flew it, so with reliable engines - it may have had a larger role to play?


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## Shortround6 (Jan 10, 2013)

We have other threads on this, Basically the unreliable part is way over blown. Two squadrons of Whirlwinds continued to operate for 1 1/2-2 years after the engine went out of production, Replacement engines and aircraft being drawn from existing stocks.

Decision to stop production of the Whirlwind and Peregrine had been made before they really saw any operational use. No other aircraft used the Peregrine and none were likely to, R-R had too much on their plate to bother with updating a 80% Merlin.


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## bbear (Jan 28, 2013)

This newbie has been thinking. 

A way to victory by bombing Germany: engineer a moral collapse of the will to fight on. 

Prime ref: Bombing States and Peoples in Western Europe 1940-45 Editors, Baldoli, Knapp, Overy.
Continuum 2011 New York.

The book includes an account (chapter 3) of spontaneouos evacuations in Italy and names some determinants : disrespect for the authorities, bungling, miscommunication, conflict, difficulty of consensus in a dictatorship, presence of the Germans. 

Getting to the point, to make a start, keep the raids as historically occured but change the bomb load. No incendiaries, all HE. But instead of impact fuzes, use chemical timed type 0-6 days delay type M123 and variants and developments, a problem to handle (contains glass capsule) but.. time setting : random. Would last longer than 6 days in the winter.

Advantages of a parallel kind.
You only need (guess) an area attack, about 1 500lber per 200m radius to pose a critical psychological threat to all civilian life - but no killing actually required. 'Clear air' bombing first to last, no smoke, little dust, no updraft no turbulence, 

Purpose
My aim is to provoke civilians to evacuate but not to disperse industries (100% lost productiion of a whole town/city for a week, again and again and again) using less bombs and raiding more towns at once - civil authorities overwhelmed, no intact cities to evacuate to temporarily, civil transport to city hubs disrupted, no trams no trains, train systems are usually built around city centre terminii so freight would be impaired too. asssuming train drivers wont walk to work through a 'random minefield'

and all over in a week, rinse and repeat....

1000 bomber raid can attack 10 primaries maybe 20. Low losses, drop at max height max speed, drop blind on Gee/Oboe if necessary. Render expensive concrete civil defence bunkers obsolete overnight. Put population at odds with authorities. Their adoption of same tactics on say London is not effective on morale and unlikelly to persist. (Britain did not invest in mass shelters. UK Government never posed as infallible and invincible. Center of allied production is US not UK. Non lethal weapons - incompatible with Nazi revenge philosophy. They would not laugh, we would - a lot.)

Counter measures, Uxo teams, are expensive and take time to train en masse. The Reich might take months to invent and deploy a way to deal quickly with a novel attack like this.

More to follow if anyone is interested. Apologies if this is old hat.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 28, 2013)

The trouble with using something like the M123 too much, the enemy will develope a countermeasure.
As it was the bomb disposal units when confronted with a unexploded bomb didn't know if the dealing with a dud, a long delay bomb, or a long delay bomb with a antidisturbance fuze. The M123 was of the last type, and targeted bomb disposal teams. But if they were up against M123 fuzed bombs often they would have eventually come up with a disarming procedure.
There was a disarming prodical for the M123, but it was still classified in the early 70's, might still be for all I know. I was a munitions specialist in the late 60's, I had my suspicions of what some of the precedure was, but the exact prodical was above my classification.


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## bbear (Jan 28, 2013)

Thank you. Your expertise is what i had hoped for. My uninformed guess was about 3-4 months in war conditions to train a mass of uxb teams to clear up say 10 cities containing 10,000 M123 bombs in total in under a day or so. Would you care to comment on how far adrift i am in that 3-4 month estimate? My hope was that the initial professional response would be to protect the bombs in critical areas with piles of sandbags and just leave the rest for 6 days. That would be enough to get an evacuation effect going, i think.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 28, 2013)

Interesting theory, bbear, but I don't believe that even your suggestion would have the desired result. Area bombing was a false prophecy (not to mention a waste of resources) and was not going to sway the population into giving in. This has been raised in another thread, but worth doing here (if it hasn't been done already - I'm not reading through every post; I just don't have time); the best solution is targeting specific works, factories, airfields etc and destroying them in precision raids using sophisticated radio navigation aids to improve accuracy. In my opinion, the use of small, fast, high speed bombers (i.e. Mosquitoes) would be more profitable since they could get to and from the target areas faster and with a greater measure of success in numbers than heavies. Not to forget that when one is lost, just a crew of two went with it, not seven or more individuals.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 28, 2013)

Delayed action bombs have to be dropped with precision close to vital targets, or they're wasted.
In a lot of cases they will be deep underground, with their tailfins tore off and at the surface. Impossible to miss, plus informing even ordinary troops what size of bomb is underground. The SOP for such situations is unless it's close to something vital, just condon it off and blow it up in place. Even a 750 bomb going off 10-12 feet underground will not do a lot of damage.


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## bbear (Jan 29, 2013)

Yes, I understand and in fact readily agree to both of the last comments. As far as demolitiion effects go. (The thread has dealt with area and precision and B 17s and Mossies - probably twice. Parsifal made the telling summary that the effort in the CBO over Germany was worth the costs - but only known to be so with hindsight (my words i hope i did the summary justice). I am aware of the 'hot threads' on a similar vein elsewhere. 

I am... unsettled .. by the lack of popular support for the bomber boys so I'm looking for a more positive account of strategic air power potential in WWII. Thats my motivation.

What i'm trying for is not a demolition effect. I just remembered that you would probably call it a form of Psyops -depriving the enemy of the will to fight on. I think thats actually not psyops as such but one form of strategic victory in conventional theory ?

stage 1 was to unsettle his mind and social cohesion, the power to provoke spontaneous evacuation at a time of our choosing was one way to demonstrate this. The time fuse idea my meddling too deep in matters i don't know enough about. But for understanding by this group i needed an actual suggestion not a blank space. The possible short drop in industrial output was a benign by-product on an intermediate aim not the end objective in itself - i'm looking for capitulation.

Now i've said psyops on a technical forum we can probably draw a line under this. I hope it was fun not annoying. Thanks again.


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## Njaco (Jan 29, 2013)

> A way to victory by bombing Germany: engineer a moral collapse of the will to fight on.



I think the war showed that this is a failed option. I believe moral increased in Britain during the BoB. And Berlin did not lay down even after Hamburg and Dresden.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 29, 2013)

I think some of us are forgetting how moral was "encouraged" in Germany. 
It was a capital crime to listen to foreign broadcast during the 3rd Reich. A lot more Germans than just Sophia Scholl and her other White Rose friends went under the guilotine for the treason of handing out flyers or posting placards critical of the Nazis. We're talking numbers of over 16,000 in Germany and Austria.

Just a careless word overheard by the wrong person could end up with you undergoing some tough questioning in the local Gestapo headquarters.

Such measures tend make it hard to determine just how good the average Germans moral was.


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## parsifal (Jan 29, 2013)

Bombing as a means of breaking morale and then surrender did not work. that should be obvious. But bombing of the civilian population did not solely rely or was carried out for that purpose. area bombing had an effect on productivity, how much is harder to quantfy. People made homeless, people forced to undertake civil defence, people manning flak guns are all people not building or producing things. That adds to the inefficiency of industry. Bombing was successful in that regard. It just depends on how much. 

Psychologically, bombardment does affect morale. Conflicts during and since the war (eg the invasion of Iraq) shows that the general population will generally not overthrow their leaders and seek peace terms. But during the war, I think it entirely plausible that peoples productivity would suffer because of bombing. so too would the quality of the production undertaken. The debate should centre on how much.

During the war, some very competent Germans made what they believed to be accurate estimates for production target. For example, the Armaments ministry estimatedd they could produce 600 tanks per month. The best month achieved was 370. It was a critical piece of kit, so one can reasonably expect the Germans would give its production a very high priority. Why werent its production targets met. A whole bunch of reasons, many of which have nothing to do with bombing. Also, there might be a 10 or 20% discrepancy because production capabilities were overestimated. but at least some of that shortfall was due to bombing. In the case of the panther, at least 5 months of engine production was ost for example, because the engine factory was so heavily bombed. How much lost production, or reduced production was there because people were busy repairing their hous, or looking after injured relatives or similar. I think there was an effect, and I think it was substantial


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## stona (Jan 29, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I think there was an effect, and I think it was substantial



I agree but it is almost impossible to quantify,despite the best efforts of the USSBS.

I've said it before and I'll say it again. We should be asking what all those graphs and histograms representing German production might have looked like had there been no bombing.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 29, 2013)

Exactly


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## Tante Ju (Jan 29, 2013)

stona said:


> I've said it before and I'll say it again. We should be asking what all those graphs and histograms representing German production might have looked like had there been no bombing.



The point is valid and IIRC USSBS shows that plans were not nearly met during the heaviest bombing. This probably had other reasons as well (lack of material or cease of alloys from import, lack of workers, optimistic planning etc.).

The bottomline however is that German did not have a lack of weapons, they in fact had a large surplus in the midst of heaviest bombing towards end of the war. There bottlenecks were manpower to man it (this was shared by many others, esp. UK and surprisingly - USSR), and fuel to drive it.

If production would be less hard hit the Germans would likely produce more - but again in all likelyhood, it would just end up storage.


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## Glider (Jan 31, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> The point is valid and IIRC USSBS shows that plans were not nearly met during the heaviest bombing. This probably had other reasons as well (lack of material or cease of alloys from import, lack of workers, optimistic planning etc.).
> 
> The bottomline however is that German did not have a lack of weapons, they in fact had a large surplus in the midst of heaviest bombing towards end of the war. There bottlenecks were manpower to man it (this was shared by many others, esp. UK and surprisingly - USSR), and fuel to drive it.
> 
> If production would be less hard hit the Germans would likely produce more - but again in all likelyhood, it would just end up storage.



There is no doubt that Germany had more aircraft than it fuel to power and pilots to fly them but there was a serious shortage of equiment for the Army. To few tanks, guns, small arms you name it.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 31, 2013)

Glider said:


> To few tanks, guns, small arms you name it.



That is not correct. Tanks actually was surplus.

Take a look at Sepp Dietrich SS Panzer units. Rebuilt completely after Normandy, rebuilt completely after Ardennes, Rebuilt after Spring 1945 offensive for example. 3 times in less than a year. The losses were extremely heavy but like the Luftwaffe, the Heer kept increasing in numbers despite those losses (and bombings). The Germans were quick to plug in the gaps in the equipment and this would be impossible without the production quotas achieved in 1944.

Fuel, manpower and to a lesser extent, transportation were the bottlenecks.


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## Glider (Jan 31, 2013)

SS Panzer units had I believe an absolute priority on equipment. The regular army units paying the price for this priority. Had they had surplus the army units would have been maintained at full strength


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## parsifal (Jan 31, 2013)

One only has to look at the shortages experienced by Guderian as he struggled to rebuild the panzer Units to know that the Heer was chronically short of equipment. The authorized strength of of a Panzer Div in 1944 was intended to be 180 tanks, but because of shortages went to war considered as full strength 9even though even by German standards it was not) with an average of just over 100 tanks. The Germans time and again for their line units were forced to accept a depressing array second rate foreign castoffs. For example a number of the Infantry formations garrisoning Holland were issued venerable Swharscloze MG dating back to 1889. Many Divisions on the Eastern Front were forced to accept as their artillery parks non-standard ordinance mostly of the captured variety. A few even had nothing more than a few 120mm mortars as their "artillery regiment" Truck allocations for the Infantry fell through the floor in 1943-4, from an average of around 880 for a standard Infantry Div in 1941 down to less than 200 in 1943-4. By comparison a british Infantry Div had well over 3000 MT attached. Every category of weapon faced shortages. Some of the glaringly obvious ones were MT, Tanks, artillery and small arms. Less obvious were the shortages of rolling stock and prime movers for the State railways. At the end threre were shortages that limited ammunition supply as well. 

the germans were ineed short of manpower, thats true, but saying they had plenty of weapons is just palpably incorrect. Their armed forces were chronically and acutely short of equipment.


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## parsifal (Jan 31, 2013)

According to CD Winchester "Advancing Backwards: The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2", makes the following observations with regard to weapons and transport availability for the german armed forces.

"_It looked very different from the other side of the front-line. ....successive TOEs (Tables of Organization and Equipment) reveal, a high proportion of the German army relied on horse-drawn vehicles throughout the war. German tanks were of excellent quality, but their numbers dwindled. In September 1939 the authorized strength of a panzer division included 328 tanks, reduced to 165 by 1943 and to just 54 in 1945. The war ended before this could be effected, some formations fighting on at about 1944 establishment, many others reduced to fighting on foot. Many elite panzer and panzer-grenadier formations spent considerable periods as infantry formations due to losses and shoirtages of supply. a process of 'demodernization' that had profound consequences. The turnover in personnel was equally fearsome, many of the better German formations suffering annual losses equal to their entire strength in enlisted men and 150% of their officers.

Hitler effectively had two armies in 1939: a modern core of panzer divisions and infantry formations with motor transport columns and vehicle-drawn heavy weapons, plus an unmechanized mass of infantry divisions. Even that degree of modernization was achieved by pressing captured Czech tanks into service in 1940. More were added after the fall of France. The number of panzer divisions was doubled, but only by the expedient of reducing them to one tank regiment each.

Attrition in Russia


The German army found itself increasingly outnumbered on all fronts. Although production totals for tanks and aircraft did increase rapidly after 1942, Allied production soared. Despite controlling most of Europe's manufacturing resources — including the USSR's industrial heartland in the Donbas— Germany failed to reap much benefit and production targets from domestic sources fell well short of targets in part due to bombing. Domestic supply was insufficient to meet the equipment needs of the armed forces. For instance, the French aviation industry was brought under German control to manufacture, among other types, Fieseler Fi-156 Storch spotter/liaison aircraft and parts for the Junkers Ju-52. But its production rate never exceeded ten per cent of pre-war totals.

Air support deteriorated as the Luftwaffe became entangled in an increasingly costly defensive fight against British and American bomber raids. German bomber production tailed off during 1943 as resources were concentrated on fighters — and the much vaunted 'V' weapons. The German army had come to rely on air support to compensate for its numerical inferiority on the Russian front, so the absence of the Luftwaffe was keenly felt. However, the devotion of the Luftwaffe to immediate tactical crises had helped prevent the emergence of a strategic air arm. Even when key economic targets were within the limited range of Germany's twin-engine bombers, little attention was given to attacking them. Russian industry was largely untroubled by the Luftwaffe while the Ruhr was subjected to increasingly devastating raids by RAF Bomber Command and the US 8th Air Force. In early fall 1942 Russia's oil fields lay within reach of the Luftwaffe, but until the very eve of the Russian winter offensive, Hitler still clung to the idea he could capture them. Baku was not blitzed.

Military professionalism, economic amateurism

In reality the German wartime economy was a mess of competing and overlapping bureaucracies that did not respond well to the challenges of the strategic attacks made against it. Nazi officials jockeyed for position. A sharp pair of elbows was required in what Hitler viewed as a Darwinian struggle for survival; but the fittest did not survive, just the corrupt and self-serving. Albert Speer imposed some much needed central direction from his appointment in 1942, but the Russians had been granted breathing space to relocate their industry.

Perversely, the German army's close involvement in the procurement process contributed to the shortages. Whereas the Allies involved civilians at the earliest stages of the war, the development of radar and signals intelligence being good examples of civilian contribution, in Germany the army was able to dictate to the factories. Some very high quality equipment emerged, the Tiger, the Panther, the MG42 machine gun, but there was a terrible downside: many items were over-engineered, produced in small production runs and subject to endless minor modifications which meant they were no longer interchangeable. For great successes like the MG42 there were expensive failures like the Me-210 twin-engine fighter or the He-177 bomber.

Take one minor, but important item: the humble track fitted to the American M3 and German Sdkfz 251 'Hanomag' half-track vehicles. The American track consists of two steel cables with reinforcing crossbars molded into a single unit by vulcanised rubber. It wears out after 1,500 miles but is quickly and easily replaced. Its German equivalent is far better engineered, like comparing a BMW part to something off a tractor. It comprises individual steel crossbars rendered into a continuous link by a series of pins. Each pin is held in position by needle bearings. The German track is stronger and longer lasting, but requires considerably more man-hours to build. And if you drive over a mine, neither type will survive.

Even the magnificent Tiger had feet of clay. Gas-thirsty, its massive Maybach powerplant was superbly made but the strain of driving such an enormous vehicle, especially if one Tiger had to tow another, could damage them beyond local repair. But few spare engines were made, just one per ten complete new tanks. Many of Germany's best tanks spent a large part of their service life in transit from the front-line to workshops in Germany. The situation worsened as logistic services broke down in the face of Allied air superiority. A US tank commander recalled, 'Almost half the Tiger tanks we ran into during our division's advance across Europe were abandoned either due to mechanical problems or lack of fuel'.

German ingenuity produced an endless succession of field expedients to compensate for the lack of armor. Most types of captured French tank were used as the basis for self-propelled anti-tank guns or artillery pieces; obsolete German tank chassis served in the same roles. Of these, one proved to be perhaps the most effective tank destroyer of the war: based on the Pz. 38(t), the Hetzer was small, easily concealed and mounted a 75mm gun. Better yet, it was mass produced with some 2,500 leaving the Skoda works by 1945. However, many others were clumsy, unreliable and only a few hundred of each were built. Spare parts were a nightmare.


Impact at the front
It was easier to supply the army in defence of static positions or during an orderly retreat, but the absence of transport exacerbated the consequences of defeat. At Stalingrad, a phased withdrawal towards von Manstein would have been terribly difficult, even had Hitler permitted it......" _


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## tomo pauk (Feb 1, 2013)

Thanks for posting the excerpts, parsifal.


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## Tante Ju (Feb 2, 2013)

Inventories of the four main types of German tanks - as of 1st January 1944 / 1st January 1945.

Pz IV: 1668 / 1684
Panther: 1177 / 2151
Tiger I : 409 / 276
Tiger II: 0 / 195

Total: 3254 / 4306

Figures speak for themselves.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 2, 2013)

Many thanks for posting the graphs.

Panther + Pz-IV are produced, monthly in 1944, to some 650 copies (T-34: almost 1170). The Tiger I + II: some 100 pcs monthly until Sept 1944, under 50 pcs after that. IS-2: almost 190 monthly in 1944. Soviets also built 200 pcs of ISU-122/152, monthly in 1944, the German JagdPanther JagdTiger production combined was some 500 pcs for the 1944-45.

Now I know that amount of produced tanks AFV does not mean that Soviets were able to muster 2:1 numerical advantage in battlefield, but a comfortable 2:1 production advantage is not something that should be take lightly. Especially if one fights 2 another major powers, having far less artillery, without air superiority enough fuel.


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## Jenisch (Feb 2, 2013)

The Germans practically no had tanks in the EF by 1944.


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## Vincenzo (Feb 2, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> The Germans practically no had tanks in the EF by 1944.



31st may '44 panzer units strenght in EF: 603 Pz IV, 313 Pz V, 298 Pz VI
it's true that all the units were in low strenght, only the Wiking had a little more of 100 tanks


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## stona (Feb 2, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> 31st may '44 panzer units strenght in EF: 603 Pz IV, 313 Pz V, 298 Pz VI
> it's true that all the units were in low strenght, only the Wiking had a little more of 100 tanks



What were these strengths it in September after the collapse in Normandy and the carnage of the "Falaise pocket"?
Production started declining from the summer of 1944 onwards and continued to fall until the end of the war.
Cheers
Steve


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## Tante Ju (Feb 2, 2013)

stona said:


> What were these strengths it in September after the collapse in Normandy and the carnage of the "Falaise pocket"?
> Production started declining from the summer of 1944 onwards and continued to fall until the end of the war.
> Cheers
> Steve



On the Eastern Front...? Inventory is on the Graphs, not including Pz IIIs and StuG/StuH/JPz...

German army armored strenght as of 15 January 1945.

Panzer III (5 and 7,5 cm)	534
Panzer IV (7,5 cm)	1 684
Panther (7,5 cm)	2 151[189]
Tiger E (8,8 cm)	276
Tiger B (8,8 cm)	195
Assault Guns and Assault Howitzers:	1 213
Total:	*6 053*

Yeah right, six thousend tanks and assault guns being a 'shortage'...


Anyone who thinks units were ever fully filled up with armor materiel on the Eastern Front, on either sides simply kids himself. Units were experienced severe combat and losses, and were usually down to a few dozen tanks even if previously they had 200 a few weeks before.. But let's look at Soviet side from available documents for comparison. 

Soviet armored strenghts for 1st Guards mech. corps, 23rd tank corps, 18 tank corps as of 1st February 1945 (combined for the three corps)

T-34s: 13
M4A2: 50 
IS-2: 26
SU 85: 22
SU 100: 17
ISU 122 6 
ISU 152: 8

Or 142 in total.

These units were hammered heavily in previous fightings and their losses were severe. Now in contrast to this reality, a Soviet mech. corps TOE authorized 3 x 21 SU 76/85/122 and 183 medium tanks (246 in toal(, and a single tank corps was supposed to have the same 3 x 21 SU 76/85/122 plus 207 medium tanks (270 in total).

Now it follows that these two Soviet tanks corps and the mech. corps was supposed to have no less than 597 medium tanks (instead of thirteen T34s and fifty Shermans..) and no less than 189 SUs (instead of 31). The 1st and 5th Guards cav. corps did not even have any tanks anymore.

Units down on strenght were hardly only a German headache on the EF... just to put it into reality world vs. thoughts of armchair historians who believe units actually were anywhere near their TOE. Yeah, those who did not fight. AFAIK even those US armored formations were very badly down on armor by the time ardennes offenzive, and they had only a bit of fighting for couple of months, not 3+ years of savage bloodletting on the Eastern Front. So all this wording of the 'carnage of Falaise...'  by who's standards? Everyday rearguard action by Eastern Front standards... the Red Army lost about _a hundred _tanks on avarage daily during the siege of Berlin...


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## Vincenzo (Feb 2, 2013)

stona said:


> What were these strengths it in September after the collapse in Normandy and the carnage of the "Falaise pocket"?
> Production started declining from the summer of 1944 onwards and continued to fall until the end of the war.
> Cheers
> Steve



that the tank production was declining, probably is best tell from the fall '44, is obvious the germans were loss ground the bombing gain intensify. 
However this are the numbers, this are for tanks in the EF not the same of previous ( (total) of strenght of panzer units)
31/5/44: 307 Tigers, 292 Panthers, 771 Pz IV; (include tanks need repair) 
30/9/44: 267 Tigers, 721 Panthers, 579 Pz IV; (the % of need repair is higher)
30/12/44: 261 Tigers, 726 Panthers, 768 Pz IV (the % need trpair is around the same of september)


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## parsifal (Feb 2, 2013)

Many of the socalled "available" in the German army were also laughably not ready for combat. I recall somwhere a report of a Panther listed as ready for combat.....it had no tracks, no engine and the turret was not functioning.

During the advance on Moscow, in 1941, the Germans still had over 3000 tanks in their frontline inventories, yet Guderian was complaining that his formation, 2Pz was down to about 30 tanks as true runners. Even then there were shortages that were affecting true German tank strengths. A shortage of reconditioned engines, gearboxesand the like. There were tanks strewn allover Russia, still listed as operational, but in reality not functioning. In the case of the 1941-2 period, it took a lull in the fighting which allowed a partial recovery. In the finish about 60-70% of the (in reality) non-operational tanks were returned to service, but fully 30-40% were not. History shows what the the Germans were forced to do. The norther mobile units were stripped out of MT manpower and tanks, to reinfoce 4 Panzer Army, which led the 1942 southern offensive.

In 1944-5 there was no such respite. Many of the so-called runners were in fact non-operational. Moreover there was no longer the MT neded to keep the fortmations supplied properly. Spare parts, particulalry engines were in acute short supply. Fuel also, of course was very scare. Bombing accounted, or was responsible for many of these shortages. 

There are lies, damn lies, statistics, and there is German propaganda prepared mostly for Hitlers consumption.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 2, 2013)

parsifal said:


> There are lies, damn lies, statistics, and there is German propaganda prepared mostly for Hitlers consumption.



I was thinking the same thing. The wrong report to Hitler could be bad for your health.


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## Milosh (Feb 2, 2013)

What is the source for your numbers Tante Ju?


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## Vincenzo (Feb 2, 2013)

My source is Panzertruppen of Jentz, from this book came also the tables posted from Tante Ju. Also the situation 15th jan '45 there is on that book but is stated as 1st january


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## Tante Ju (Feb 2, 2013)

parsifal said:


> There are lies, damn lies, statistics, and there is German propaganda prepared mostly for Hitlers consumption.



And also people with opinion measured against the figures supplied by one of the most authoritive figure on German armor, Thomas Jentz... (may he rest in piece for all the good research he made during his labourous life  )


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## stona (Feb 3, 2013)

Still asking the wrong question.
How many tanks,armoured vehicles and motor transports would have been available to the Wermacht,with the fuel to run them and spares to keep them going had there been no bombing?
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 3, 2013)

Zalogas Brandsens figures provide a good alternative view to jentz. Their figures are restricted to the east front only but give the following total Tank strengths for both sides (including SPGs). The figures do not include Soviet AFVs held in reserve in the interior MDs or in the Far east, they are soley the front line units in the ETO. German Strengths inlcude satellite armoured strengths on the eastern front, and include both runners, and those held in reserve, and those undergoing repairs. The strengths according to these sources are as follows (Axis/Soviet). The second set of numbers is the percentage growth from the starting baseline in August 1943

8/43: 3,555 / 6,200; 0/0
6/44: 3,970/11,600;111/187 
9/44: 4,186/12,900; 117/208
11/44: 5,202/14,000; 146/226 
12/44: 4,785/15,000; 134/241 
1/45: 4,881/16,200; 137/261

German abilty to expand had been far slower than thier Soviet opponents. Soviet frontline tank strengths had grown at a rate more than four times that of the Axis

Moreover, as Zaloga points out, these figures belie the true strength of the wehrmacht tank formations. The overwhelming majority of those thousands of tanks were not operational, According to Zaloga the German tank strength for a slightly earlier period February 43, were as follows. the first number is the total AFVs available, the second number is the the number operational

2/42: 2671/465 
3/42: 1503/440
1/43: 2374/495
4/43: 2555/600 
10/43:3478/770

I tried to cross check these figures with other sources. The sources sources I have only deal with selected time frames within that period, but do tend to back up Zaloga. Nagorski more or less confirms Zalogas earlier figures whilst Moynahan and Dougherty each independantly corroborate Zalogas figures for the latter dates. Some of Zalogas figures, however, I could not corroborate.

However, getting back to the avilability figures, another, less credible on line source I found gives one detailed inventory for June 1944. It gives total wehrmacht AFV totals for both east and west front as 6200 vehicles, however, of these figures,, more than 1800 were of types no linger in production at that time.

I simply fail to see how it can be reasonably argued that Germany was not short of tanks, indeed, all manner of land weapons and transport, in the latter part of the war. Not when your main opponent is accumulating tanks at a rate four times faster than you (the Germans) are able to do.


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## Jenisch (Feb 3, 2013)

RAF Bomber Command - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



> The greatest contribution to winning the war made by Bomber Command was in the huge diversion of German resources into defending the homeland; this was very considerable indeed. By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich – mostly twin engined Me 110 and Ju 88. Most critically, by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns – 20/37 mm. The 88mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was a deadly destroyer of tanks and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front.
> To man these weapons the flak regiments in Germany required some 90,000 fit personnel, and a further 1 million were deployed in clearing up and repairing the vast bomb-damage caused by the RAF attacks.
> This diversion to defensive purposes of German arms and manpower was an enormous contribution made by RAF Bomber Command to winning the war. By 1944 the bombing offensive was costing Germany 30% of all artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of the output of the optical industry for sights and aiming devices and 50% of the country's electro-technical output which had to be diverted to the anti-aircraft role.



This is Wik, of course...


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## Jenisch (Feb 3, 2013)

Strategic bombing during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



> The impact of bombing on German morale was significant according to Professor John Buckley. Around a third of the urban population under threat of bombing had no protection at all. Some of the major cities saw 55–60 percent of dwellings destroyed. Mass evacuations were a partial answer for six million civilians, but this had a severe impact on morale as German families were split up to live in difficult conditions. By 1944 absenteeism rates of 20–25 percent were not unusual and in post-war analysis 91 percent of civilians stated bombing was the most difficult hardship to endure and was the key factor in the collapse of their own morale.[155] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that the bombing was not stiffening morale but seriously depressing it; fatalism, apathy, defeatism were apparent in bombed areas. The Luftwaffe was blamed for not warding off the attacks and confidence in the Nazi regime fell by 14 percent. Some 75 percent of Germans believed the war was lost in the spring of 1944, owing to the intensity of the bombing.[156]
> Buckley argues the German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer’s appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, "but it is spurious to argue that because production increased then bombing had no real impact". But the bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned.[17] In fact, German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, "which gives an idea of direction Erhard Milch and the German planners were pushing", "unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher".[18]



Again the myth of Speer, but anyway...


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## tomo pauk (Feb 3, 2013)

This sentence from wiki:



> By January 1943 *some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters* were committed to the defence of the Reich – mostly twin engined Me 110 and Ju 88.



Maybe someone (Erich?) could deny or confirm, 1000 night fighters in Jan 1943?


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## Jenisch (Feb 3, 2013)

Looks too much for me....


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## tomo pauk (Feb 3, 2013)

Here the strength is stated as 378 serviceable aircraft, on 17 May 1943, the detailed list of planes is available also at the web page.


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## parsifal (Feb 3, 2013)

I found another source for german AFV vproduction and other things. I dont yet have a copy, but I saw it in one of those googlre reviews. lokks pretty good, so i intend to get a copy. 

The book details are R L DiNardo ; Germany's Panzer Arm 

Just flicking through the online preview, its packed full of good stuff by the look of it. According to this source, Germany's Tank Park went through the following permutations

1/41:4400
4/41:4700
7/41:5300
10/41: 4900

1/42:4900
4/42:4500
7/42:5200
10/42:5900

1/43:5800
4/43:3700
7/43:4100
10/43:4300

1/44:5100
4/44:5500
7/44:7300
10/44:4200

1/45:5200


It has monthly breakdowns for production and servicibility rates. With regard to the latter he confirms a generally low level of servicibility on the eastern front as compared to the west.

I think a good source and worth a second look. Will try and secure a hard copy if its not too expensive I think.

But if the above figures are correct, and they do seem to correlate to Zaloga, if a little low, then Germany was not producing enough AFVs to permit significant expansion of the avilable tank park


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## stona (Feb 4, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Here the strength is stated as 378 serviceable aircraft, on 17 May 1943, the detailed list of planes is available also at the web page.



That seems much more like it.
In May 1943 the Luftwaffe establishment of _all fighters_,in all theatres was only 1,786.
Cheers
Steve


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## Glider (Feb 4, 2013)

Just a thought but the general view is that everyone is talking about how many of X were built, be it a tank or an aircraft was built. I was reading some papers about Spitfire production in the UK and the person in charge was under huge pressure to explain why the number of aircraft delivered was less than the planned amount. His reply was simple, instead of concentrating on building aircraft he concentrated on producing the most servicable aircraft, that meant less aircraft and more spare parts. The effort needed to produce one aircraft could easily produce spares for more than one aircraft to be made servicable. He won his case.

Looking at the German production figures and low servicability is it possible that they made the mistake that the guy in the UK was being asked to do. ie meet production targets and not concentrate on what would produce the most servicable tanks/planes whatever


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## tomo pauk (Feb 4, 2013)

From the Jentz graphs, we don't know how many of the tanks on-hand were actually serviceable, combat-worthy tanks.


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## Tante Ju (Feb 4, 2013)

Similar to such aircraft servicibility figures, tank servicibility figures tended to fluctuate wildly even during the day. Higher in the morning (before fighting), lower in the evening. If a tank steps on a mine and looses a track, it will be unservicable for a couple of hours or days for example. A tank with an engine failure in noon may be serviceable again by the evening after an engine change. So there is not much point in sticking to figures on any given day, and sometimes there were even machinations with reports - Kershaw for example writes that some armored formations reported their Hanomags 'immobile' after they received a hint that another unit was supposed to take over them. Suddenly all of them developed various engine issues, and regrattably, could not be effectively transferred. Of course after some hasty 'repairs' the units own Panzergranadiere made good use of them again.


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## Vincenzo (Feb 4, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> From the Jentz graphs, we don't know how many of the tanks on-hand were actually serviceable, combat-worthy tanks.



this is possible for the graphs for tanks in east front, page 230 on volume 2 english edition (that available......)
unlucky are only graphs is not easy the stime of number probably around 30% of Pz IV need repair at 30 december '44


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## parsifal (Feb 4, 2013)

Di Nardo in his book, has pretty good figures on AFV serviceability which he summarises in a number of graphs in his statistical annexure. However the narrative is also quite revealing. At pages 20-21 for example he states. 

"By 1944 disruptions in production caused by bombing and the ever increasing combat losses was causing acute shortages of spare parts and skilled maintenance personnel. On the eastern front the shortage of spare parts came back with a vengeance to haunt the Germans. On the 10 March units of onevs 2 Ukr front captured the German supply depot at Uman, where over 300 immobilised tanks were captured. According to the AGS report, these tanks were all damaged and could not be repaired because of a lack of spare parts. Evacuation of the non-operational tanks was impossible due to choronic shortages in rolling stock and prime movers.

Given the poor maintenance situation in the various theatres especially on the eastern front, Hitler ordered in November 1943 that damaged tanks be sent back to Germany for repair. This way the tanks could be brought closer to the spare parts they needed. The effort however was a failure, for several reasons. First, the maintence performed in Germany proved no better than that performed at the front. Having maintenance performed in Germany involved the setting up of a number of new organizations, thus consuming scarce men and resources. There were additional strains placed on the transport system which proved unsustainable. There were delays in the processes of transport. It was found the average transport time to and from the front was 8 weeks. The new system blew repair times out to an average of 10 months. Guderian strongly argued that the best measure to address the problem was to improve the situation was to increase the supply of spare parts.". 

The shortage of spare parts had a measurable effect on combat operations

"By 5th july 1944 2Pz XX had been action since 9 June reported that the lack of spare parts in its inventory was now critical and was preventing the Division from further combat operations. This was a relatively common occurrence for the Germans by this stage of the war.

The vehicle situation was equally poor. Panzer divs on all fronts were reporting problems with excessive wear for all MT. Some Divs had to make do with over age vehicles. The 8 Pz XX for example had not had a major refit of its vehicle park since 1941. This had the effect that the division in 1944 was no longer fully motorized, only about 1/3 of its Infantry could be moved by truck. This division, along with others was forced to rely on horse drawn transport for much of its support. The 23 Pz XX reported in August 1944 that the average mileage of its truck park was over 12000 miles per vehicle. 1st Pz Div reported that its vehicle serviceability rates after a month of fighting in 1944 was down to an average daily availability of 29%"

With regard to MT availability, Di Nardo gives some valuable insights.

"German truck losses from January to August 1944 ran at 109000 vehicles, well in excess of the entire production numbers of 1943. 1944 production levels could not nearly keep pace with this loss rate". 

Di Nardo does have graphs included that show the readiness rates. In January 1941, the Panzerwaffe had over 90% 0f its vehicles listed as ready. By January 1942, it was down to 55%. It recovered in the summer to a high of 78% before plummeting again to 58% in the 2nd week of July (after Kursk I expect) . From that point until January 1945 there was a gradual increase back to about 90%. Di Nardo explains this by stating the obvious….in a year marked by near constant retreats, any unserviceable vehicles were rapidly lost to the enemy, leaving only those vehicles still combat worthy as the only survivors.


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