# Top 3 mistakes per country, in field of military aviation



## tomo pauk (Mar 1, 2016)

To divert from bashing onnly the UK military aviation for per-ww2 decisions, wonder what other countries have done wrong that much that competes for the 'podium places' of mistakes. Time scope - 1930s to end of ww2.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 1, 2016)

The British are easy because they are well documented. Try finding Japanese or Italian archives of the times 

The 30s covers a wide arena and the British were not alone in turret (or at least flexible armament) and French exerted undue influence on many nations, The French having come out of WW I with something of a reputation as military experts.... go figure  
The French did progress 'as far as aviation goes' quite well during the 1920s. Unfortunately this wound up hindering them in the 30s. 
Many nations made what were quite rational decisions _at the time they were made, _but changing circumstances left them holding the bag. 
Some nations (the US) had several more years to learn and purge bad aircraft from the ranks before the shooting started but the US certainly had their fair share of the "Weird and Wonderful" if not down right "what were they thinking!!!!!"

Most smaller nations underestimated the complexities on all metal, monoplane retracting gear aircraft and tried to keep up with larger countries despite shortages of engineering staff and facilities. This lead to protracted development times and designs that fell increasingly behind the leaders.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 1, 2016)

One of the glaring mistakes the Japanese made, was resting on their laurels with the A6M. Especially when they saw that the P-40 and F4F were able to survive it's attacks AND the fact that it wasn't able to withstand a significant amount of damage. These results should have made them either come up with a solution in regards to it's survivability or move towards a successor much sooner than they did.

The Germans...well, that could fill volumes, but I still feel that they (the RLM) did not recognize the Jet for what it was worth both when Heinkel demonstrated the He178 and again, when Heinkel demonstrated the He280. Had the RLM actually made the jet program a priority when it was first demonstrated (late 30's), then it wouldn't have been a mad dash to push the Me262 through while the bombers were darkening their skies.

The other mistake the RLM made, was making nearly every multi-engine aircraft dive-bomb capable. Some airframes were ideal for this role and others simply were not. To expect a manufacturer to have to rework an airframe just in case dive-bombing was required of it, is wasteful.


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## buffnut453 (Mar 1, 2016)

I'd add to the Japanese mistakes the construction and armament of their bombers which lacked self-sealing fuel tanks and were woefully under-gunned.

For the Germans (and, to an extent, the Japanese too), I'd say keeping highly experienced pilots at the front line for too long was a major failing. Essentially it meant that the front line force progressively grew less experienced over time whereas the UK and US front line air forces became progressively more experienced.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 1, 2016)

To be honest, I'd say that the biggest mistake Germany made, was starting a war...

That could apply to Japan, too

But that would tend to cut the conversation short, wouldn't it?

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## buffnut453 (Mar 1, 2016)

Being pedantic, that wouldn't fit the question in the OP which specified the mistakes had to be aviation related.

But I agree...for some reason, I have Vizzini's quote going through my head, "You fell victim to one of the classic blunders - The most famous of which is "never get involved in a land war in Asia"."







INCONCEIVABLE!

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## drgondog (Mar 1, 2016)

For RAF - 1.) not recognizing the limitations of unescorted Bombers to prosecute long range daylight precision attacks on Strategic targets, 2.) failure to recognize the potential of jet engines, 3.) placing too much stock in Harris' thesis that he could win the war with Bomber Command bombing of German cities.

For US - 1.) not recognizing the limitations of unescorted bombers to prosecute daylight precision attacks on Strategic targets, 2,) failure to emphasize Range combined with high performance in Requests for Proposals in 1940, 3.) Failure to develop two speed/two stage in-line engine as competition to Allison, either by license to Rolls or parallel development, as a necessary first step to build escort fighters to protect AAF high altitude bomber doctrine.

For Germany - 1.) not recognizing the grave threats that both USSR and US natural resources and industrial capacity posed for Germany if drawn into war, 2.) not recognizing, and investing much more in jet engine technologies to anticipate the potential threat of long range, high altitude bomber aviation to attack and destroy critical industry, 3.) for not investing in untouchable capacity training program for pilot training.

For Japan - 1.) not fully recognizing the industrial strength and ingenuity of US industry to not only recover from grave damage of Pearl Harbor attack, but the futility of Japan to trade losses with the US to hold onto strategic early wins, b.) not investing in on-going and intense pilot training to anticipate a long war of attrition, c.) not having core support capacity to consolidate gains in the PTO, ranging from maintenance and repair logistics to construction battalions to consolidate and build airfields rapidly.

For USSR - 1,) The Stalin purge of his officer corps combined with his failure to comprehend the speed and ferocity of the combined air and ground forces of Germany to advance to point of defeat and control of Moscow in six months, 2.) not developing an equal or better fighter than the Bf 109 by 1941 despite the observed results of the Bf 109 in Spain, 3.) not developing a program to train skilled pilots in quantity when it was pretty clear during the Spanish Civil War that Germany posed a grave threat to the USSR, further emphasized by the demonstrated power of the LW during the invasion of Poland.

For Italy - 1.) aligning with Germany. 2.) for not recognizing that neither the Italian army, air force or navy was on a par with either of Great Britain or France - the two defined European allies posing opposition to the Axis, and 3.) not entering negotiations with Britain and US during the North African campaign when it was clear that Italian forces were no match for Allies, that Germany could not prevail in the Med..

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## GrauGeist (Mar 1, 2016)

drgondog said:


> For Japan - 1.) not fully recognizing the industrial strength and ingenuity of US industry to not only recover from grave damage of Pearl Harbor attack, but the futility of Japan to trade losses with the US to hold onto strategic early wins, b.) not investing in on-going and intense pilot training to anticipate a long war of attrition, c.) not having core support capacity to consolidate gains in the PTO, ranging from maintenance and repair logistics to construction battalions to consolidate and build airfields rapidly.


I don't believe that the Japanese under estimated the industrial power of the U.S., but instead under estimated the will of the people to wage war.

The Japanese leadership felt that a strong initial blow would demoralize the seemingly isolationist public and force the U.S. to terms. When that didn't work out, then they anticipated a "grand confrontation" that would break the back of the U.S. fleet and force the U.S. to terms before the USN could build up it's forces to challenge the IJA. 

Unfortunately for them, the USN was well aware of their intentions and this great showdown never materialized but instead, the Japanese were dismantled piecemeal.


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## drgondog (Mar 1, 2016)

Dave - I disagree to a degree. For both Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. the prevailing leadership believed the US to weak and soft. Yamamoto was an exception and he was ignored. Speer was an exception and he was ignored.


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## mikewint (Mar 1, 2016)

Operationally, I think it would be the switch to city bombing in the BoB just when the RAF was really beginning to suffer from combat losses and base bombings.

The abandonment of the Ural Bomber project seems like a bad idea to some, but if the Bomber A (He177) had been more sensibly designed, the cancellation of the Ural Bomber would have been a very good idea. The Luftwaffe would be going into 1940 with a new and modern heavy bomber coming into service instead of large numbers of expensive Do 19s or Ju 89s that would have been hopelessly obsolete.

Apparently Messerschmitt was so esteemed that plans for a massive introduction (1000 were ordered) of the Me 210 were in place before the first prototype even flew. It took 16 prototypes and 94 pre-production examples to try to resolve the many problems. Actually the whole Zestorer concept come to think of it.

Although not quite as bad as the Me 210 situation, the presumption that the Ju 288 would work as the next generation medium bomber, together with constant requirements for design changes, when the Ju 88B/Ju 188 would have been the ideal Ju 88 follow on. 

Failure to recognize the importance of transport aircraft. Sure the Ju 52 was a great plane....in 1937. No excuse for no German equivalents to C-47, C-46, C-54.

The He 162? who thought that up? Also the Me 163. Ditto

Regarding the Me 262: Since jets were inevitable (the He 178 flew in 1939), the Germans would have been foolish not to develop it as quickly as possible (they started in 1939), and it did make more sense as an interceptor than as a "fast bomber". However, given the stage of jet engine development (Goering cut funding in 1940) and the fact that the Germans were massively outnumbered by 1943-44 anyway, it really makes little difference whether 262's were bombers, fighters, or a mix. Should they have focused on the He 280 instead? Hell no. Just look at the thing. Two jets slung under an airframe that looks more suited to 1939 than 1944. The Me 262 clearly would have had greater potential for development 

Lack of official interest in the Fw 187 or He 100, either one of which might have been better suited as a long-range escort in the BoB than the Bf 109 and 110. But to be perfectly honest this is is only a hindsight observation. The 109 and 110 were excellent planes and the main reasons given for not placing the FockeWulf and Heinkel planes in mass production (insufficient DB engine production capacity for additional fighter designs) was very legitimate.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 1, 2016)

Germany's aviation mistakes...

1. Hitler
2. Göring
3. No long range fighter or heavy strategic bomber in serious numbers.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 1, 2016)

In some cases the "mistakes" in equipment were the result of decisions made many years before. There is also the sheer matter of size. The US could afford to make mistakes. Countries the size of Italy and Japan could not.

For example the Italians 'started' with engines in 30s that were no worse than anybody else's, unfortunately their aircraft engine industry was not only small in total but fragmented between 4 major companies, this meant development of new types (of which there were too many) took too long and were never fully sorted out. The Italians had some good designers/engineers, they were just playing in a world arena that was beyond their political masters comprehension. Four relatively small companies could not compete with major players in the world scene. Building high power engines became increasing difficult for all countries but some countries had advantages in raw materials and in more developed metallurgical industries that could develop new alloys or heat treatments or development new manufacturing techniques. to build difficult parts in large numbers.

P & W had built 18,500 engines from 1925 until 1938(going to press date for Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft 1938 edition) while Wright had built 8,000 Cyclone 9s at that point ( add in a few thousand Whirlwind engines) making them major players on the world scene for modern engines. (modern being post WW I) 

The Italians had also "started" with a first class armament. The Breda-Safat 12.7 being little more than a modified Browning firing the 12.7 X 81 mm round. A pair of them, even synchronized was the equivalent of four/six 7.5-8mm machineguns which was certianly world class in the late 30s. Trouble is the rest of the world fitted heavier armament to higher powered planes very soon. Italians could NOT follow suit until they got higher powered engines (DB 601). Please note the Russians were often in the same situation. Their engines did not provide enough power to allow the weight of armament the Russians _desired. _

Many countries/companies were _trapped _by legacy tooling. With small orders for engines during the early and mid 30s many companies provided small steps or incremental improvements in existing designs rather than throw everything out and start over. 
Some new engines showed up but France, Italy, Russia and others basically tried to struggle on with engines that were at the end of their development cycle.

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## BiffF15 (Mar 1, 2016)

buffnut453 said:


> Being pedantic, that wouldn't fit the question in the OP which specified the mistakes had to be aviation related.
> 
> But I agree...for some reason, I have Vizzini's quote going through my head, "You fell victim to one of the classic blunders - The most famous of which is "never get involved in a land war in Asia"."
> 
> ...



One of my all time favorites! Loaded with spectacular quotes!

Cheers,
Biff


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## parsifal (Mar 2, 2016)

for Italy and Japan, rampant conservatism that led to an overreliance on manoeuvre in the horizontal, unde-estimated the value of speed, climb dive and firepower and allowed these nations to delude themselves into thinking they didn't need to pursue the horsepower god

For Australia, believing implicitly in the promises made to it prewar, and then pre-Japanese attack. in the prewar build up they believed british assurance t on access to british engines and were then shafted completely by the British department of supply(?) to the point that when we turned to the US for substitute the british, not for defence reasons, but purely for commercial interests took their bat and ball and stomped off .

Then in the lead up to the outbreak of the war in the far east, we were again suckered by the brits and their empty promises about holding Singapore and that a/c like the buffalo were "good enough" and we didn't need to worry.

The British weren't able to defend another front in 1941. but they didnt have to lie to us about it. in hindsight they should have said "we cant defend the empire properly, can you help"? There is every indication that Australia, with just a bit of assistance here and there could have had stepped in and helped fill that supply void that existed prior to December 1941.

And then we have ourselves to blame. Having worked so hard to build an indigenous aero industry, we decided to squander it in late 44 because it was by then easier to buy US surplus production rather than keep our own industry together. it was a travesty that the worlds 5th largest air force should simply give away its R7D and production capabilities so easily

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## Marcel (Mar 2, 2016)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Germany's aviation mistakes...
> 
> 1. Hitler
> 2. Göring
> 3. No long range fighter or heavy strategic bomber in serious numbers.


I would replace 3 with Udet. He wasn't the one to make strategic decisions about building te luftwaffe. His view was too narrow.

Can I add my country here as that is the part I know best (and you don't, so you cannot critisize me  ). 3 is not enough, I could make a list of 10 or more, but anyway, I will pick 3 and cheat a little.

1. Instead of focussing on a few models and buy many of them, small numbers of many different types were bought.

2. Only wanting the cheapest models (we're Dutch after all) and mostly preferring locally build aircraft over foreign aircraft while the local industry didn't have the capacity to deliver. This delayed orders abroad, so were not able to get enough numbers aircraft. In the en we started the war with about 45 moderately modern planes and a whole bunch of museum pieces against 1200 modern aircraft....

3. The Fokker G-1. While arguably one of the better aircraft of it's time, the concept was flawed and the aircraft too complex and expensive for a small organisation. I think the airforce was better served with more D.XXI's and more robust bombers. A radio in every aircraft would have been nice, too.


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## Shinpachi (Mar 2, 2016)

1. IJA and IJN hated to share technology like making DB601 copies respectively. That made effective development of better planes delayed.
2. Failure of Nagumo's command in Midway. He should not waste time by changing bombs with torpedoes at least.
3. 343-Ku did not intercept Enola Gay. A 343-ku pilot in the sky happened to witness the A-bomb explosion but he only reported it.
Ironically Genda for PH committed above 2 and 3.

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## stona (Mar 2, 2016)

drgondog said:


> For RAF - 1.) 3.) placing too much stock in Harris' thesis that he could win the war with Bomber Command bombing of German cities.



This is once again making Harris a scapegoat for British bombing policy.
On 14th February 1942 BEFORE Harris even assumed command of Bomber Command a new Directive was issued to the Command which cancelled the Transportation Directive of 13th July 1941. This new Directive listed as _'first priority'_ targets the industrial cities of the Ruhr-Rhineland area. The operations were to be_ 

"focussed on the morale of the enemy civil population and, in particular, of the industrial workers." _

This was not Harris' thesis or even his idea. It was the UK governments official bombing policy. Harris, as an officer serving in the RAF, hardly had a choice whether he carried it out or not.
The Cabinet had agreed with this new Directive and with the proposal that in implementing it Bomber Command could employ its effort without restriction. The gloves were off.
Harris was a champion of the resultant area bombing and he did believe that Germany could be defeated by bombing alone. So did a lot of other people, forming opinions with the same faulty statistics. They were not in the high profile position occupied by Harris and did not have to endure the post war revisionism (the BBSU report being a key starting point) and generally disgraceful treatment of Harris and the men who served under him.
Harris did need to be cajoled into attacking other targets under later Directives later in the war, but the statistics for both the Oil and Transport Plans show that he was nowhere near as recalcitrant as some would have us believe.

If the new Directive and the resulting bombing of Germany's industrial cities was a mistake in 1942, what alternative did the policy makers have?
In Harris they found a dominating personality and a dynamic and competent commander to carry out THEIR policy. Charles Carrington was the Army's liason officer at Bomber Command when Harris took over. He later wrote:
_
"As a horse knows by instinct when his rider holds the reins with a firm hand, so Bomber Command knew it had a master. The whole machine tautened up, seemed to move into a higher gear, and this though he rarely visited squadrons and scorned to give pep talks."_

Cheers

Steve
_._

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## yulzari (Mar 2, 2016)

One item each:

Japan. Not swapping their aeroplanes from the correct initial lightweight long range assault on an unprepared enemy philosophy fast enough to a heavy fast shorter range defensive one fast enough when they should have realised that this was the inevitable follow up if the USA continued to prosecute the war.

Italy. Too many types for a limited industrial base. 

Luftwaffe. Not prioritising pilot training in depth. 'Throw away' pilots are a bad investment. Well trained ones are force multipliers and reduce the demand for production.

USA. Did you not read the Wilhelmshaven 1939 raid reports you were sent?

RAF. See Luftwaffe but insert navigator for pilot. If a pathfinder can find the target to mark it why the hell can't the main force do so? Pathfinders were a good idea but a crutch to prop up the lamentable night navigation of the RAF.

Soviet Union. Too much battlefield emphasis and not enough effective interdiction of the vulnerable German supply lines back in Poland etc. No railway, no German army.

France. Politics.

Finland. Not screwing every last Curtis and Fokker out of the Germans and getting the Germans to make France sell it's products cheap to Finland. Finnish D520s etc.

Poland. Not beginning the updating process when it's fighter force was a world leader.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2016)

yulzari said:


> One item each:
> 
> Japan. Not swapping their aeroplanes from the correct initial lightweight long range assault on an unprepared enemy philosophy fast enough to a heavy fast shorter range defensive one fast enough when they should have realised that this was the inevitable follow up if the USA continued to prosecute the war.



A more basic mistake was the total lack of co-operation between the Army and Navy when it came to weapons and aircraft types. Different 7.7mgs for observers, different 12.7 and 13.2mm machine guns, different 20mm cannon and each service went through 2-3 different types of 20mm each requiring it's own ammo.
Better/quicker upgrades of existing types of aircraft might have done more than introducing brand new types.





> USA


 Did you not read the Wilhelmshaven 1939 raid reports you were sent? {/QUOTE]

The British didn't have the..........drum roll..........*.50 cal machine gun!!!! *_(cue the cheering and applause) _




> Soviet Union





> . Too much battlefield emphasis and not enough effective interdiction of the vulnerable German supply lines back in Poland etc. No railway, no German army.



See points on Germany and RAF: poorly trained pilots and navigators have all they can do to find the front line and get back to home base. Russians have no escort fighters putting them in the same boat as unescorted RAF or Americna planes. Trying to do deep raids just runs up losses. BTW trying to cut railroad lines is almost an exercise in futility. Given enough work men it was possible to repair a broken track and crater from a 500-1000lb bomb in 24 hours or less. One reason that later allied raids targeted switching yards (switches have to be laid/aligned with more care) and a dozen or more parallel lines are much easier target than single or double track.


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## stona (Mar 2, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> See points on Germany and RAF: poorly trained pilots and navigators have all they can do to find the front line and get back to home base. .



Harris wrote to the Air Ministry shortly after he took over command of Bomber Command raising his concerns about precisely this. He highlighted the problems he felt confounded effective navigation.

_a) The non-availability of certain navigating instruments essential to the proper prosecution of bomber operations.

b) Poor service prospects of the air observer.

c) The lack of Squadron Navigation Officers

d) The lack of attention given to the navigational aspects of the tactical planning of air operations.

e) The poor navigation training given to pilots._

Some of these issues were fixed sooner than others.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2016)

What is puzzling that if that was the condition/s in Feb 1942 when Harris took over (and I am most certainly not saying those were not the conditions) then what had the RAF been doing during the 30s and 1940/41 to solve the navigation problem for a Force/Service whose primary purpose (according to many of it's leaders/proponents) was the _long range_ destruction of the enemies ability to wage war. 

It doesn't matter what airframe was being used if the "details" like navigation and crew survivability are ignored. 
It becomes the aerial equivalent of "going over the top" in WW I. Large losses (unsustainable) for little gain.


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## stona (Mar 2, 2016)

They were supposed to operate in daylight. Navigation is relatively easy when you can see the ground and land marks. The RAF called this type of navigation 'Bradshawing' after a famous railway guide which is revealing. They simply followed railway lines.
They might have to fly across the North Sea, but on making a landfall somewhere on the coast of the Low Countries if they were heading for the Ruhr, they would easily be able to re-orientate themselves for the on going flight.
Even for daylight operations there were difficulties. Harris was one of the few who appreciated this. When he took over 4 Group in 1937 he instituted a program of night and long distance flying. His superior, Ludlow Hewitt was still expressing reservations.

_"...the rapid expansion of the numbers of aircraft had been at the expense of crew training and navigation aids."_

Harris' successor at 4 Group, Coningham, made the prescient comment that successful night operations would amount to

_"the never ending struggle to circumvent the law that we cannot see in the dark"._

He was not the only one who anticipated problems. Bomber Command issued a report on 10th April 1940 in which it stated

_"Our general opinion is that under war conditions the average crew of a night bomber could not be relied upon to identify and attack targets at night except under he very best conditions of visibility, even when the target is on the coast or on a large river like the Rhine...
if the target has no conspicuous aids to its location, very few inexperienced crews would be likely to find it under any conditions."_

Within days the Air Ministry ordered Bomber Command to concentrate on night time operations! What exactly it was expecting the bomber crews to find, let alone hit, given the Command's own pessimistic view of its abilities nobody seems to have asked.

The mistake, in the context of this thread has already been mentioned. It was the belief that the bombers would reach their targets without prohibitive losses in daylight. This was not a British mistake, just about everyone made the same mistake.
The problem of navigation at night was identified early. The problem was it took time to develop the sophisticated aids and training to overcome them. There was no magic wand that could have been waved in 1940 for a solution in 1941/2.
By 1945 Bomber Command was able to fly deep into Germany and concentrate its bombers in time and space with terrible consequences for Germany. In February 1945 all 240 aircraft of 5 Group, in the initial attack on Dresden, dropped their bombs, accurately, in fifteen minutes. That's better than one bomb load dropped every four seconds. The 881 tons of bombs that fell in the city in that fifteen minutes had well documented results.

Cheers

Steve


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## yulzari (Mar 2, 2016)

Shortround The Soviets had escort fighters for the distances needed but chose to use them as low level battlefield cover.

Keeping a railway going under regular air and special forces/partisan (properly both are 'partizan' in 18th century terms) attacks is like herding cats and you quickly run out of specialised rails and joints. Also the specialist repair rolling stock is rare and vulnerable. The aim is to prevent the route providing resources in adequate quantity. 1,500 km of railway x the number of E-W lines takes a huge number of troops etc. which themselves need to be supported by the railway and thus drain it's utility. The Germans were known to have to try to sweep areas in tens of thousands of all arms troops. The lines were at peak use. Any delay could not be made up. Time lost meant supplies did not arrive. The German army was a horse based one. Lorries were in short supply and roads were unmetalled and vulnerable to rain and ice. Rail support was the only way operations in Russia could be carried out. 24 hours is a meaningful shortfall in supplies and only needs to happen once a day over a length of hundreds of kilometres. Never mind bridges and tunnels. Damaging both is best done with a train in situ.

However, all this is matters of opinion so we had best agree to differ.

Ah yes. The magic .50" HMG. That solved the problem.........................


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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2016)

stona said:


> They were supposed to operate in daylight. Navigation is relatively easy when you can see the ground and land marks. The RAF called this type of navigation 'Bradshawing' after a famous railway guide which is revealing. They simply followed railway lines.
> They might have to fly across the North Sea, but on making a landfall somewhere on the coast of the Low Countries if they were heading for the Ruhr, they would easily be able to re-orientate themselves for the on going flight.
> Even for daylight operations there were difficulties. Harris was one of the few who appreciated this. When he took over 4 Group in 1937 he instituted a program of night and long distance flying. His superior, Ludlow Hewitt was still expressing reservations..........



The RAF in _general _may have been expecting to operate in daylight but during the 30s there was always a least one "night" bomber squadron and may pre-war references to the Whitley refer to it as a "night bomber". The problems, at least some of them (navigator being a poor career choice might not have been known), should have started showing up in 1937-38 if not before. 
And once again, lessons from WW I were either forgotten or ignored. There had been 8 squadrons Flying Handley Page O/400s at night by the time of the Armistice, let alone other night bomber squadrons.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2016)

yulzari said:


> Shortround The Soviets had escort fighters for the distances needed but chose to use them as low level battlefield cover.
> 
> Keeping a railway going under regular air and special forces/partisan (properly both are 'partizan' in 18th century terms) attacks is like herding cats and you quickly run out of specialised rails and joints. Also the specialist repair rolling stock is rare and vulnerable. The aim is to prevent the route providing resources in adequate quantity. 1,500 km of railway x the number of E-W lines takes a huge number of troops etc. which themselves need to be supported by the railway and thus drain it's utility. The Germans were known to have to try to sweep areas in tens of thousands of all arms troops. The lines were at peak use. Any delay could not be made up. Time lost meant supplies did not arrive. The German army was a horse based one. Lorries were in short supply and roads were unmetalled and vulnerable to rain and ice. Rail support was the only way operations in Russia could be carried out. 24 hours is a meaningful shortfall in supplies and only needs to happen once a day over a length of hundreds of kilometres.



The specialized rolling stock is pretty much a few flat cars carrying spare rail (no special rail needed unless a switch/points was hit)
perhaps a gondola carrying gravel and few cars/wagons of some sort to carry the guys with the shovels. In good weather it was not unheard of for large crews to lay 8-10 miles of single track on prepared (or semi prepared) roadbed in a single day while building 19th century trans-Continental railways with about zero power assist. Most if not all rail at the time in question was in lengths of around 10 yds/meters and joints were pretty much standard. Modern rail is continuously welded and rather different.

Bombing rail lines in Poland was beyond the escort capability of most Russian fighters until 1944/45.

Conscript labor works rather well as shovel brigades. Not a lot training needed for filling in bomb craters or shoveling/raking gravel/pounding in spikes. Not a lot of opportunity for sabotage either.

See this video for a rather theatrical rendition of track laying. 


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgVWf0S_mog_


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## stona (Mar 2, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> The RAF in _general _may have been expecting to operate in daylight but during the 30s there was always a least one "night" bomber squadron and may pre-war references to the Whitley refer to it as a "night bomber". The problems, at least some of them (navigator being a poor career choice might not have been known), should have started showing up in 1937-38 if not before.
> And once again, lessons from WW I were either forgotten or ignored. There had been 8 squadrons Flying Handley Page O/400s at night by the time of the Armistice, let alone other night bomber squadrons.



True, but one night bomber squadron does not an offensive make. Harris had 4 Group flying night time exercises before the war as well. The general expectation was to fly by day.
Between the outbreak of the war and 9th April 1940, close to when the switch to night time bombing commenced, there were only three nights on which bombs were dropped. There were obviously many other restrictions in place during this period, bombs were dropped on only eighteen daytime raids.
By May-June 1940 the number of night time sorties was more than double those in daytime (3,848 and 1,601).
By the June-October period the RAF Bomber Command was operating largely by night. The sortie numbers are now 8,804 to 1,185.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2016)

Good list; some comments:


drgondog said:


> ...
> For US - 1.) not recognizing the limitations of unescorted bombers to prosecute daylight precision attacks on Strategic targets, 2,) failure to emphasize Range combined with high performance in Requests for Proposals in 1940, 3.) Failure to develop two speed/two stage in-line engine as competition to Allison, either by license to Rolls or parallel development, as a necessary first step to build escort fighters to protect AAF high altitude bomber doctrine...



Re. 2): That failure really cut P-47's potential too much, leaving many LW pilots to live another day and score kills on heavies in the process.
Re. 3): Failures in engine 'policy' were not starting up the 2-stage program with V-1710 earlier. There was 2-stage R-2800 in volume production, early enough (January 1942, ie. earlier than 2-stage Merlin?), that USAF never made any use in day fighters.
The P-38s and P-47s were 1st steps in escort capability, having the P-47s without suitable drop tanks and not having the 2nd source for the P-38 (hence not enough of them for all 3 theaters USAF fought) meant that B-17s/24s in ETO were without maeningful escort in 1943.
The P-51 with 1-stage V-1650 would've been a great asset in 1943, unfortunately it was not meant to be.

A failure might also be not jumping into opportunity too have P-51 ASAP in production for USAF, even with V-1710 on board..



> For USSR - 1,) The Stalin purge of his officer corps combined with his failure to comprehend the speed and ferocity of the combined air and ground forces of Germany to advance to point of defeat and control of Moscow in six months, 2.) not developing an equal or better fighter than the Bf 109 by 1941 despite the observed results of the Bf 109 in Spain, 3.) not developing a program to train skilled pilots in quantity when it was pretty clear during the Spanish Civil War that Germany posed a grave threat to the USSR, further emphasized by the demonstrated power of the LW during the invasion of Poland.
> ...



The failure here might've been not going with 'pre-Tu 2' bomber, with AM-38 engines.
As for a fighter better than Bf 109, too bad the MiG-1/3 was not outfitted with 2 syncronised cannons until too late, and that version with AM-38 was not perfected and put into production, and later with AM-39 on board.

Yes - I'm all for producing far less Il-2s (prime user of AM-38 engines) than it was the case.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2016)

drgondog said:


> For US - 1.) not recognizing the limitations of unescorted bombers to prosecute daylight precision attacks on Strategic targets, 2,) failure to emphasize Range combined with high performance in Requests for Proposals in 1940, 3.) Failure to develop two speed/two stage in-line engine as competition to Allison, either by license to Rolls or parallel development, as a necessary first step to build escort fighters to protect AAF high altitude bomber doctrine.



#1 might have to do with timing and basing your defense on your own offense and not what your enemy really has. 
Part of the US bombing doctrine was that the US bombers would use their altitude advantage provided by turbo chargers to help evade enemy attacks, not just flak. The change from small formations to large ones may play into it too. Small formations being faster. Early B-17s _could_ ( I am not saying *did*) operate at speeds at 25,000ft that made interception difficult for the allied fighters _in use _in 1940-41 in exercises/tests. 
B-17E had initial contract placed Aug 30 1940 so I am not sure how much time had been allowed for lessons of the BoB to be absorbed and in any case comparing the defensive armament of a He 111 during the BoB to the defensive armament of a B-17E leaves room for hope on the part of the B-17. Germans took a different path to performance at 25,000ft than the US for fighters. Large engine in small airframe with limited fuel and armament. 

#2 is a bit iffy. US fighters like the P-47 having double the range on internal fuel than the Spitfire or 109 had at "nominal" cruising speeds ( around 200mph). This turned out to be pretty much useless in the escort role but specifying a "nominal" range of 1200 miles or better in 1940-41? The P-47 _might _have come close by using the 370 gal internal fuel capacity from the beginning (early P-47 burned 65 gal an hour at 200mph IAS (248mph true?) at 12,000ft. for a "nominal" range of about 1120miles. Still would need drop tanks for actual escort missions. Get the Army to drop back to 4-6 guns and less ammo and the weight problem goes away even for planes with tooth pick props and no water injection. 

#3 runs into Army philosophy of using turbochargers. Army had spent several million dollars by 1941 on the Continental V-1430 and Lycoming O-1230 projects which relied on turbos for the 2nd stage..
True they turned out to be major mistakes but many of the 1940-41 fighters were planned around the Continental engine at Army insistence. XP-49, XP-55, and others (including the P-39E which was switched to two stage Allison engines with the continued problems with the Continental.) 
Having the basic Merlin in production in the United States was a stroke of pure luck rather than good planning.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2016)

stona said:


> True, but one night bomber squadron does not an offensive make. Harris had 4 Group flying night time exercises before the war as well. The general expectation was to fly by day.



One squadron certainly does not make for an offensive but for too many years that one squadron was a "night" bomber squadron in name only and did little to develop techniques or even highlight potential problems.


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## drgondog (Mar 2, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> #1 might have to do with timing and basing your defense on your own offense and not what your enemy really has.
> Part of the US bombing doctrine was that the US bombers would use their altitude advantage provided by turbo chargers to help evade enemy attacks, not just flak. The change from small formations to large ones may play into it too. Small formations being faster. Early B-17s _could_ ( I am not saying *did*) operate at speeds at 25,000ft that made interception difficult for the allied fighters _in use _in 1940-41 in exercises/tests.
> B-17E had initial contract placed Aug 30 1940 so I am not sure how much time had been allowed for lessons of the BoB to be absorbed and in any case comparing the defensive armament of a He 111 during the BoB to the defensive armament of a B-17E leaves room for hope on the part of the B-17. Germans took a different path to performance at 25,000ft than the US for fighters. Large engine in small airframe with limited fuel and armament.
> 
> ...



Agree - but acceptance that bombers need escort immediately drives the range question - and the ARMY RFP process missed the P-51 and only gained the attention of Arnold, et al when the results (pushed by Tommy Hitchcock - carefully watching RAF/Rolls Rolls) in spring/fall 1942 - realized that the combination of internal fuel/in-line engine- two speed/tow stage supercharger - gave the AAF a great solution to an impossible problem.

Had the AAF Bomber Mafia been overcome with Prescience and fortune telling - AND had the political ability to drive Allison in 1940 orclose on RR migration to Packard, then maybe, just maybe the P-51B could have been jump started to enter combat ops before Black Thursday on October 14, 1943.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 3, 2016)

drgondog said:


> Dave - I disagree to a degree. For both Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. the prevailing leadership believed the US to weak and soft. Yamamoto was an exception and he was ignored. Speer was an exception and he was ignored.


Even Hitler knew of the industrial capacity and efficiency of American industry to the point of Hitler mentioning Henry Ford in his "Mein Kampf" and Henry Ford being awarded the Grand Cross of the German Eagle.
Several American automakers were involved in German industry (Ford and Opel, for example), there were also alot of other interactions between German and American industrialists.

Likewise, the Japanese were well aware of American industrial potential, as the Japanese and American industrialists interacted a great deal during the 20's and 30's.

Like I mentioned before, the Japanese were banking on the premise that the American public would have no stomach for war and a decisive blow (Pearl Harbor) would demoralize the public and increase the anti-war sentiment. If this didn't work, then a stunning victory of the weakened USN in a grand battle would drive them to the negotiating table.

The problem is, Pearl Harbor had the exact opposite reaction that they were counting on. Additionally, the great showdown never happened. The IJN missed several opportunities to have that "grand battle" when the USN was in a precarious position and time was of the essence, because the U.S. industry kicked into high-gear on a war-wime footing and within a short time, overwhelmed the Japanese. Yamamoto knew this, but I can guarantee you that many others in the cabinet knew it as well, but would never admit it.



mikewint said:


> The He 162? who thought that up?


Late war desperation...went from napkin sketch to flyingprototype in less than 6 months...



mikewint said:


> Regarding the Me 262: Since jets were inevitable (the He 178 flew in 1939), the Germans would have been foolish not to develop it as quickly as possible (they started in 1939), and it did make more sense as an interceptor than as a "fast bomber". However, given the stage of jet engine development (Goering cut funding in 1940) and the fact that the Germans were massively outnumbered by 1943-44 anyway, it really makes little difference whether 262's were bombers, fighters, or a mix. Should they have focused on the He 280 instead? Hell no. Just look at the thing. Two jets slung under an airframe that looks more suited to 1939 than 1944. The Me 262 clearly would have had greater potential for development


As far as the He280, it was a fighter in the true sense of the word. According to pilots who flew it, it was responsive, light on the controls and handled remarkabley well. It was well armed, having 3 20mm MG151/20 cannon in the nose, which would have made it one of the heaviest armed fighters for that point in time. A far as having two "jets slung under an airframe"...the configuration of the engine nacelles were not much different than the Me262 and then again, same can be said for the Meteor.
In regards to the He280's timeline historically, it could have been available for production before the Me262's prototype was finished being tested and refined.
So like I've mentioned before, had the RLM had the foresight to embrace and fund the jet program (engines, airframes), the He280 could have been on hand as a fighter AND with the introduction of the Me262 as a heavy fighter (interceptor), it could have flown top cover and protected the Me262s as it attacked the bombers (the bombers were inevitable...there is no way Germany would escape that).

The only difference historically, is that if Germany had gone ahead with the jets early on, then Britain and the U.S. would have ramped up their programs as a priority (the P-59 first flew in 1942) and the air battles over Europe would have had a much different look.


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## stona (Mar 3, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> One squadron certainly does not make for an offensive but for too many years that one squadron was a "night" bomber squadron in name only and did little to develop techniques or even highlight potential problems.



Yep. When Harris took over Bomber Command in 1942, the third year of the war, he found serious deficiencies which he listed in his 'Despatch on War Operations'.

_"These were, primarily, lack of suitable aircraft in sufficient numbers, absence of effective navigational aids, and a serious deficiency of trained crews. Moreover, the handicaps were not only due to a lack of material and trained personnel, as there were technical and tactical problems affecting the employment of the force which could only be surmounted by intensive research, continual experiment, and unshakable resolution."_

It is easy to argue that these factors should have been addressed two years earlier. They were acknowledged, it just took time for the aircraft, technologies and training to be achieved. When Harris arrived all of this was on the verge of happening. It was the impetus and drive provided by Harris that ensured it happened as soon as possible. He did not start the process.

In the pre-war years the development schedule for a new bomber was an incredible 96 months (eight years!) including 43 months of official procedures including 13 months of tests at Martlesham Heath and 12 months in which alterations were incorporated into the design and production requirements discussed. Obviously this was much reduced in the immediate pre-war and wartime period, but it is relevant to understand how the Air Ministry and industry were accustomed to working. Any working culture takes time and effort to change, you can't just turn it upside down without a catastrophic loss of production.

The fact that Bomber Command became the force it was within eighteen months shows just how badly Harris has been treated by many popular historians, and how he has shouldered the blame for issues surrounding the Anglo-American bombing campaign which others ducked. Harris was always completely honest about what he was trying to do and what he was bombing. He urged others to do the same, he didn't feel that there was anything to hide or apologise for. This is in direct contrast to the Americans who never publicly admitted to anything other than precision bombing. 

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Mar 3, 2016)

Some perspective re: navigational aids.
The operational use of Gee was first the subject of a Bomber Command Operational Research Section report, Memorandum 23, titled 'Operational Use of Gee' on 1st December 1941.The document outlined various potential uses for T.R.1335/Gee.
The ORS was entrusted with drawing up plans for practical experimental use of Gee. The resultant paper was Memorandum 30 which was titled 'The Operational Use of Gee III. The use of flares in conjunction with Gee.' This paper presaged not only how Gee would be used but also sowed the seeds of what would evolve into the Pathfinder Force.
The first experimental attacks, code named 'Crackers I' and II' took place over the Isle of Man and Wales on 13th and 20th February 1942 respectively and confirmed the viability of the 'Shaker' attack. This was an attack in three waves, first Gee equipped flare dropping 'Illuminators', then incendiary dropping 'Target Markers' and finally the 'Followers' bombing on the marking.
Bomber Command had its first coordinated, electronically aided mode of attack just in time for Harris to take over. There was much development, notably on the pyrotechnics used for marking, but with relatively minor variations this sort of attack became the backbone of operations for the rest of the war. It didn't exist until February/March 1942.
Cheers
Steve

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## mikewint (Mar 3, 2016)

The He 280 was plagued with engine problems. The HeS 8 sort-of worked and the aircraft was flown on 30 Mar 1941 for Udet who was unimpressed though the fact that it burned kerosene was a BIG plus. Here we can insert the big IF. Had Udet approved the 280 and Heinkel received full funding and the HeS 8’s technical problem been solved…

With a smaller footprint, greater ease of maintenance and better reliability than the Me 262, the He 280_could _have become operational by mid-1942. At that point, although the Royal Air Force was bombing Germany at night, the Allies did not yet have a full-fledged air campaign over the continent. The fledgling U.S. Eighth Air Force was still struggling merely to come into existence.

The Americans were going to change everything with their own four-engine heavy bombers and with high altitude precision daylight bombing of military and industrial targets. Yet as late as October 1943, they lost 60 bombers on one mission and had not yet fielded a true escort fighter, the P-51 Mustang. General Eisenhower was telling anyone who would listen that the Allied air campaign would have to succeed or plans for the invasion of Europe would have to be put on hold. If hundreds of He 280s had been in the field before the bombing campaign even began, before the first P-51 arrived or even before the first American bombers reached Berlin in March 1944, B-17s and B-24s could have been swept from the skies.

Instead without government support Heinkel started another engine design the HeS 30 and built another prototype equipped with 6 Argus As014 pulsejets (V-1 style). The prototype never got to fire it’s pulsejets as on 13 Jan 1942 it iced-up, freezing the controls, while being towed aloft and Helmut Schenk went down in history as the first pilot to eject from an aircraft. At this point the RLM orders Heinkel to abandon both the HeS 8 and the HeS30 and focus on yet a third engine design the HeS 011.

22 Dec 1943 – a 280 with redesigned HeS 8 engines competes head to head with an Fw 190. The 280 completes 4 laps of the course while the 190 is working on it’s third. The RLM is finally impressed and orders 20 prototypes.

Even with this the HeS 8s were still not reliable and Heinkel decided to go with BMW003 engines, which were also having their own problems and delays. So Heinkel again switched engines to the bigger and heavier Jumo004s. Though the aircraft flew with the Jumos, the big Jumos were unsuited to the 280 and performance/efficiency suffered. On 27 Mar 1943 the 280 project was killed for good

From an engineering perspective, the He 280 was more complex (tail problems) and had less growth potential in its design. The Me 262 with good engines was better tailored for air defense.

Was the Heinkel effort deterred in part by Ernst Heinkel’s misguided effort to develop an advanced four-engined bomber,the He 177? Was the effort deterred by Heinkel’s personally falling into disfavor with Hitler and other Reich leaders?

We can only speculate.


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## stona (Mar 3, 2016)

mikewint said:


> If hundreds of He 280s had been in the field before the bombing campaign even began,before the first P-51 arrivedor even before the first American bombers reached Berlin in March 1944, B-17s and B-24s could have been swept from the skies.



Swept from the daylight skies. The elephant in the room, rarely discussed, is the conversion of the USAAF to night time operations. They could have done it, not quickly, but an awful lot of the donkey work had already been done by the British.

The American bombing at night should have eventually matched Bomber Command's, considerably more accurate than their own 'radar' bombing in bad visibility by day.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 3, 2016)

Among 3 top mistakes that LW/RLM made might be a too late introduction of 2-stage supercharged engines, some 3 years later than RAF and 4 (four) years later than USN.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 3, 2016)

mikewint said:


> The He 280 was plagued with engine problems. The HeS 8 sort-of worked and the aircraft was flown on 30 Mar 1941 for Udet who was unimpressed though the fact that it burned kerosene was a BIG plus. Here we can insert the big IF. Had Udet approved the 280 and Heinkel received full funding and the HeS 8’s technical problem been solved…


And that's my point exactly...

The RLM saw the He178 demonstrated and did not realize the full potential and yawned it off.

The RLM saw the He280 and dismissed it and the technology yet again.

Had the RLM backed the engine development when they first saw the He178 (or sooner - when von Ohain successfully ran his prototype engine) and made it a priority, then the jet program would have been much more mature as the war got under way. I am a little surprised that when Udet finally backed the He280, he didn't insist on it being dive-bomb capable! 

On the otherhand, Henschel DID actually make a jet powered dive-bomber (Hs132)! So perhaps someone was trying to stay ahead of the trend?


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## mikewint (Mar 3, 2016)

#1 ERROR: Listening to Göring. Göring was courageous and brilliant but a drug addict. Hitler likely delayed the attack on Dunkirk as well as his invasion of Britain because of Goring's optimism about the power of the Luftwaffe. Hitler left his army in Russia because Göring told him he could resupply them by air. This cost him a quarter of a million soldiers. Göring's optimistic albeit misleading reports about the British air campaign may have led Hitler to keep losing planes and trained pilots longer than he might have otherwise. His Luftwaffe never recovered from the heavy losses suffered over England. Göring campaigned against developing a long range bomber. A decision that came back to haunt the Nazis. Goring may have single-handedly cost the Germans the war. Hitler eventually quit listening to Göring but by then it was too late.
Germany was never prepared for the war to be as long as it was. They were reliant on blitzkrieg as their main tactic and when this failed, the army faced a long war in which they were not prepared for. In his military thinking, Hitler believed in the importance of a short war. Germany had always planned for a quick war, and because of this they were not prepared for the long war that ultimately developed. Total war was not implemented until 1943, and by this time the Germans were already facing defeat. The military began to run out of resources, and began to collapse because the home front was not supportive enough of the campaigns. The general population that were not out fighting had no idea that Germany was losing, because they still had a high standard of living, and propaganda did not tell them otherwise. In February 1943, Goebbels finally called on the German people to wage total war, even though Germany was already facing defeat.
Most German factories did ramp up production, but did not go to full 3-shift production until after Albert Speer took over from Göring in 1942. The Germans did not at first understand the necessity because they thought they were in for a short war. But it is incredible that peak German production took place in 1944 after the war was strategically lost. What could have been done had they had such production when it was still conceivable to win in 1940 and 1941? More tanks & aircraft wisely used in 1941 and they might have been able to take Moscow. Instead Allied productivity outstripped the Germans. This oversight is a reflection of Göring's and Hitler's foolishness and lack of administrative ability. 
Albert Speer said Hitler had a heat-seeking missile that could have turned back the Allied air invasion. Multiple sources confirm this. Instead of okaying development of this potential game changer Hitler squandered valuable resources (estimates range from half to twice the cost of the Manhattan project. One estimate is, inflation adjusted, $500 billion vs $25 billion for the Manhattan project) developing the V-2 rocket, a nearly useless tactical weapon that delivered a warhead only 15% larger than the V-1's for far greater cost.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Among 3 top mistakes that LW/RLM made might be a too late introduction of 2-stage supercharged engines, some 3 years later than RAF and 4 (four) years later than USN.



Part of that may be fuel related. You need high performance number fuel for the two stage superchargers to work. Could the Germans _plan _on enough C3 fuel to go around? Coordinating fuel production and engine development might have been difficult.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2016)

The Germans failure to develop/produce long range heavy bombers is often trotted out as a mistake but had the Germans followed that path it may have been a bigger mistake. 
Substitute He 177s for B-17s or Lancasters and try to figure if that would have made any difference to the air war. The Germans simple could not produce _enough _4 engine bombers to have any real impact on the war and if they tried they would have been in the same boat/s as the Americans and British. By day not having escort fighters needed for raids into Russia or even attacking Britain by daylight. By night the navigation problems over Russia would have been huge (bad enough by day). Perhaps the Germans could have stayed a step ahead of the British in night flying/bombing aids for use over Britain, perhaps not. External navigation aids (radio beacons on the ground) don't work (or work as well) at long range due to the curvature of the earth. 
The American and British bombing campaigns worked to some extent but they were using bombers in quantities that the Germans could never hope to match.


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## mikewint (Mar 3, 2016)

#2: Hitler’s declaration of war against the United States, the single greatest industrial power in the world, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. On hearing the news, Churchill said he "went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful". It was poetic, but premature. It is ironic that Churchill's greatest Christmas present came from Hitler. Churchill said once the US was on board he knew Hitler was finished. After all, the Japanese attack indeed ensured that the US would go to war – but only against Japan.

Without Hitler's wholly gratuitous declaration, the Roosevelt Administration would never have persuaded Congress to go to war in Europe instead of focusing on the Pacific. And without US involvement, and knowing that the British could never have launched a D-Day type invasion on their own, the Germans could have kept a far smaller presence in France and would have allowed them to concentrate overwhelmingly on defeating the USSR. . However Hitler’s War declaration assured that the entire population of the United States, under threat from the Japanese, was now also threatened by the Germans as well. Attacked on two sides the people of the US became single minded in their pursuit of victory over both aggressors. For the first time ever women entered the workforce in huge numbers and proved they could do a man's work. which would thereby have Once Hitler was forced to engage in monumental struggles for existence on both his eastern and western fronts simultaneously, the end was never really in doubt.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 3, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Part of that may be fuel related. You need high performance number fuel for the two stage superchargers to work. Could the Germans _plan _on enough C3 fuel to go around? Coordinating fuel production and engine development might have been difficult.



The only 2-stage supercharged engine in LW service, the Jumo 213E, was using 87 oct fuel. 
Sure enough, the fuel of higher octane value will allow for better preformance under the rated height, The C3 fuel is already in production, having the Fw 190 with 2-stage engine that uses C3 fuel will mean more capability than the Fw 190 that has 1-stage engine and still uses C3 fuel. 
Main reason why the DB 605L (a too late attempt on 2-stage variant) used both C3 and MW 50 (even for 'Kampflesitung, second highest power setting) was too high a compression ratio, while being without intercooler. CR being 8.5/8.3:1, vs. 6.5:1 for the Jumo engines (both 211 and 213).
The DB 603L (C3 fuel), once received intercooler (thus becoming 603LA) was cleared for B4 fuel.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 3, 2016)

Starting from my country, Poland :
1. A wishful thinking and overoptimistic expectations from a prototype of air-cooled inline engine "Foka" which could fulfill the requirements given the limited resources, scientific potential and several other factors which basically led to complete failure in deploying any new fighter in the second half of 1930s.
2. An incredibly wrong choice for a Chief of Department of Aeronautics and later Commander of Polish Air forces, which were given to general Ludomił Rayski. He put in favor bombers and heavy fighters effectively hampering any research for modern fighters. The only type of a fighter he tried to lobby for was PZL P.39 with very light airframe, 400+ HP engine Foka and two machine guns, trying to match Italian and French designs (like Caudron C.714). However as the engine turned out to be failure, the fighter could not be finished and was effectively rejected. PZL P.38 Wilk was impossible to be completed.
Eventually he commissioned a development of a new fighter, PZL P.50 but it was too late to complete the prototype, carry the trials and mass produce it. Fighter also presented a mediocre performance and flight characteristics due to inadequate engine power.
That's about it I guess. One could extend it to three, but really all the blame goes to inadequate funds and terrible Chief.

Japan :
a) Lack of co-operation between Army and Navy, both in development and combat. The first one went to such an extent that same manufacturers like Nakajima or Mitsubishi had to effectively split their teams and factories in order to keep secrets of one branch from the eyes of the other. This obviously slowed down any developments as less engineers could be assigned to specific tasks.
In case of combat co-operation I think best example of what if, could be an operation Ryu Ichi Go Sakusen - a joint strike against Calcutta in December 1943 when big formations of Ki-21s and G4M bombers were escroted by over 100 Ki-43s and 27 Zeros, such a projection of power was unusual for Japanese and caught Allies with "pants down" allowing to bomb Calcutta and prevent any interception of bombers. If Japanese would combine their limited air resources on crucial fronts the Allied offensive would take most likely a lot more time.

b) Initial negligence (?) in development of electronics and radars, with prime example of radio problems in early Zeros or Hayabusa. That limited communication to hand signals obviously decreasing flight commanders ability to control the situation in the air. Eventually Japanese radios became much better, but by that time (1943) heavy losses were already suffered and air superiority shifted to Allies. 

c) Failure of Japanese industry to increase quality of production and create an effective quality control, to improve the quality of manufactured aircraft and equipment for them. Also in this department fits lack of additional production lines for spare parts, I know Kawasaki took such effort with their Ki-61 after field reports indicating multiple issues with lack of replacement for fuel injection systems, fuel lines, filters and so on. But that was rather an exception. 
One of the biggest failures coming from it was low serviceability on front airfields and limited ability of ground crew to fix damaged airframes or replace the engines. 

If there is any room for a discussion here, than I dont think Japanese Navy "resting on their laurels with the A6M", Mitsubishi was just quickly engaged with development of J2M and improving A6M. As early as in 1942 started the development of A7M but what really failed here was inability of Japanese industry to provide sufficiently powerful and in the meantime reliable engines. While A7M eventually was developed with very reliable MK9A engine, it was already end of the war. 



> Especially when they saw that the P-40 and F4F were able to survive it's attacks AND the fact that it wasn't able to withstand a significant amount of damage.


Japanese were not concerned with performance or supposed robust airframes, still in 1943 they felt that they can fight on even stand with American aircraft. There is a translated by US Intelligence report written in early 1943 by Lt. Cdr. Mitsuo Kofukuda who was a fighter pilot and participated in many actions over Guadalcanal as a member of 204th Kokutai. The report concentrated on lessons learned in combat with Allies. Kofukuda indicated that in order to provide necessary protection for bomber formations the amount of escort fighters should be at least three times higher than escorted bombers, this was quickly adopted.
Then Lt. Cdr. Kofukuda concentrated on new fighters like P-38 and F4U which he admitted, had excellent high altitude performance and were faster than Zero. However he still indicated that : "the performance of the Type Zero fighter is generally excellent, I do not feel at the present time any particular inferiority in opposing the American air force fighters ..."
Kofukuda also provided a list of modifications that should be considered by the Navy in further upgrades of Zero fighter or new developments :
- introduction of ~13 mm machine guns (effectively happened with 13.2 mm Type 3 MG which was a copy of Browning chambered for Hotchkiss 13.2 mm round)
- some measures to prevent fire which would greatly increase the survivability of the pilots (that was satisfied by the introduction of automatic fire extinguishers adopted on G4M, J2M or A6M5)

Japanese Navy felt that their 20 mm is sufficient weapon, and with introduction of Type 99-II with higher muzzle velocity a limited effective range was no longer a problem. 



> I'd add to the Japanese mistakes the construction and armament of their bombers which lacked self-sealing fuel tanks and were woefully under-gunned.


That's not entirely true. While G4M was unprotected for a long time(due to very specific design of wing fuel tanks, effectively preventing any kind of external protection to be placed on them) eventually Navy decided to place 20-30 mm rubber layer under each fuel tank, which of course increased drag and thus reduced speed and range. Navy also added mentioned CO2 fire extinguishers.

On contrary Japanese Army started providing protection much earlier and by the end of 1942 Japanese Army tested various armored plates on bombers and rubber covered fuel tanks on both bombers and fighters. By late 1943 such protection was a standard on Ki-48, Ki-21 and so on ... 

As for the lack of defensive firepower, I totally agree. 



> for Italy and Japan, rampant conservatism that led to an overreliance on manoeuvre in the horizontal, unde-estimated the value of speed, climb dive and firepower and allowed these nations to delude themselves into thinking they didn't need to pursue the horsepower god


That's a nonsense. Either Italians or Japanese were not "deluded", their industry was simply unable to quickly design and put into production high performing engines. That was coupled with lack of high octane gasoline allowing to reach higher boost ratings. 
But such a pursue for high power engines existed, everything was just starting a bit later than in US or Great Britain, however by the end of the war Japanese were closing the gap in development of engines, at least in a field of pure power :






Those are coming from TAIC Summary compiled by US Intelligence.

Main factors for the power increase are :
- increase of the displacement from a maximum 2290 cubic inches for engines in 1940 to 2740 cubic inches for Mamoru engines or 3301 cubic inches for Ha-104 series (1943-1944 engines)
- general increase in manifold pressures averaging 20 % due to use of water and methanol injection
- improved supercharger efficiencies, increased pressure ratios permitting the use of higher boost at altitudes around 18,000 feet
- Increase in piston speed from an average of 2750 ft/min to average of 2940 ft/min 
- increase of compression ratios, particularly Nakajima engines with Homare 21 reaching as high as 8:1 
- cooling improvements and combustion mixtures nearer the best power ratios

Major factors slowing down the progress are :
- lack of high octane gasoline, even though constant efforts are made to produce such
- lack of specific metals for better engine components
- lack of two stage superchargers and turbochargers


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## parsifal (Mar 3, 2016)

I think the biggest mistake for the LW was related to the biggest mistake for Germany. invading Russia when the western and southern fronts were far from secure. the LW was an enthusiastic supporter of the Russian invasion and then was unable to provide decisive resources to any of the TOs that the LW was engaged in. Stretched too thinly, it became an overused, ineffective exhausted organisation incapable of having any effect on the outcomes of the battles it participated in.

Second in line is the failure of the germans to manage the economic and natural resources of the occupied territories, both in the sense of not using the resources they did have more intelligently, and also in the sense of deluding themselves in 1942 that the Caucasus could offer them solutions to their fuel issues.


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## parsifal (Mar 3, 2016)

That's a nonsense. Either Italians or Japanese were not "deluded", their industry was simply unable to quickly design and put into production high performing engines. That was coupled with lack of high octane gasoline allowing to reach higher boost ratings. 
But such a pursue for high power engines existed, everything was just starting a bit later than in US or Great Britain.

ive got a book at home that deals with the development of the CR42 the MC200 and the G-50. There was some urgency at company level to increase the power of the engines but there was never the urgency felt for this by the customer. The fact that the RA wrote a spec that led to the CR42, introduced in quantity in 1940 no less, is telling of its innate conservatism. As a defensive fighter, the CR42 was a survivor, but as an effective air superiority weapon it was just not up to the task, and that arose mostly because of the specifications that led to it, much less so because of any failing in technology development. That is not to say that the Italians did not have problems, they certainly did, but this rather misses the point. Their customers never felt the urgency to extract more power from their engine technologies until it was well too late. The fact that the Italians eventually, and quickly were able to develop their own engines, and more significantly, adopt licence production of German engines once exposed to the full effects of the dive/climb/speed formula is self evident of their latent capability. So too is their development of the worlds best racing engines somewhat earlier, designed by the same people that were designing Italy's military aircraft a little later. The Italians had the know how to develop such engines, the industrial capacity to do so, but the customer (the RA) simply didn't see the need.

Similar motivation drove the Japanese, though they did not have quite the pedigree the Italians did in the 30's. The main operational types in 1941 were not the A6M or the Ki-43. numerically, the main types were the Ki27 and the A5M , at a time when the germans were flying and using the FW190. The Japanese had the ability to design engines of greater output, but in the case of the navy at least elected not to do so. They deliberately made the decision for an engine of small capacity for fuel economy reasons, but also they placed far too much belief that air battles would be fought in the traditional WWI style of dogfighting. they (and the Army) were simply not ready for the dive/climb/altitude/speed formula, as is brought out n a number of post war interviews. The tragedy for the Japanese is that they could have been.


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## buffnut453 (Mar 3, 2016)

Not an aviation-specific issue (although it certainly impacted aviation) was Japan's occupation of Pacific islands which left ever-increasing logistical chains for no tangible benefit. Few of the islands produced vital raw materials for Japan and all were vulnerable to being taken down piecemeal by locally stronger opposition. It's almost as if Japan's military leaders believed the propaganda maps showing a great and uninterrupted tide of Japanese influence extending across the Pacific. In reality, they were merely isolated strongpoints that were as vulnerable to encirclement and destruction as were castles in the age of gunpowder. I'm not suggesting the fighting for the islands wasn't tough...it was, extremely (some of the toughest during the entire war). I am suggesting that, from a strategic perspective, it was a complete waste of resources that achieved no tangible military objective other than setting up an attrition war that Japan couldn't hope to survive.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 3, 2016)

mikewint said:


> ...More tanks & aircraft wisely used in 1941 and they might have been able to take Moscow. Instead Allied productivity outstripped the Germans. This oversight is a reflection of Göring's and Hitler's foolishness and lack of administrative ability...


To expand on this a little:
Hitler's insistence on taking Stalingrad as a priority instead of focusing on Moscow and the Soviet manufacturing centers first.

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## parsifal (Mar 3, 2016)

Conquest of the islands was consistent with Japanese pre-war naval strategy. The intention was that a strong defensive position would be established in these outer islands, and that as the US forces fought across the pacific there would be a level of attrition inflicted on the allies as they did so. Such attrition was to be visited on the US battle fleet by a combination of airpower, light forces, mines and submarines. To take and control the vast ocean areas, the Japanese reasoned that it would be necessary for the Allies to take an occupy these islands by force, hence the Japanese reaction was to garrison them strongly and try and fortify

Virtually none of these pre-war assumptions worked as the Japanese intended. Their focus was always the "decisive battle" of the battle fleets but this was never going to happen after pearl harbour. Fast carriers meant that concentrated airpower efforts could be brought to bear so that areas in detail could be defeated in detail and isolated so as to begin the reduction and occupation of those key islands back from the Japanese. their submarines didn't work as intended, they didn't get the time they thought they would to fortify, US subs decimated their shipping making re-supply and logistics impossible, the americans were far too strong and far too able to concentrate at the decisive point


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## tomo pauk (Mar 3, 2016)

The Japanese missed the opportunity to have a cannon-armed fighter as early as mid/late 1930s in service, the Ki-12 was a promissing aircraft, at least on paper. Ki-12 on Wikipedia: link.
BTW - the increase in compression ratio is an own goal in field of ww2 aircraft engines, it is a double own goal if one's fuel is low octane; the Japanese were to blame for not developing a two-stage supercharger for themselves, as well as too late introduction of turbochargers.


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## parsifal (Mar 3, 2016)

mikewint said:


> .
> Without Hitler's wholly gratuitous declaration, the Roosevelt Administration would never have persuaded Congress to go to war in Europe instead of focusing on the Pacific. And without US involvement, and knowing that the British could never have launched a D-Day type invasion on their own, the Germans could have kept a far smaller presence in France and would have allowed them to concentrate overwhelmingly on defeating the USSR. .


 
It wasn't really a wholly gratuitous declaration. it was somewhat, so this is not a do or die rebuttal. hitler had made speeches about how he would go to war against America if they kept giving assistance to the British in the form of lend lease and the battles in the Atlantic. There was virtually an undeclared war already going on since at least September '41.

In terms of German effort in the East, The germans had deployed 37 divs in france and the low countries in 41, before US entry and this dropped to as low as 21 divs after US entry in early 1942. the limiting factors affecting german commitment in the east were threefold, fuel, motor transport and manpower. In terms of these three imitations, US entry had no impact until well into 1944. The fuel shortage arose because of the effective blockade imposed by the RN on the germans. The germans deluded themselves into believing they could solve their problems in the Caucasus, but tis was never going to happen. With regard to MT production, the germans had elected prewar on a narrow base for MT production and had not invested in factory capacity in the same way as the UK and others had. that wasn't going to change or increase quickly, and the attrition rate if more MT was sent east was simply going to further increase above sustainability levels if they tried. 

In terms of manpower, US commitment made no difference to available manpower. The war with the west and Poland to the end of 1941 had cost the germans less than 200000 permanent casualties. in the 6 months of fighting the soviets the heer had suffered 700000+ long term battle casualties, or more than 110000 per month. Return rates, as noted in halders diary lanquished at around 30000 per month. that meant, with no activity occurring I the west considered, the heer was rupturing to the tune of 80000 men per month. it only improved in 1942, because the germans pulled back and went defensive on 2/3 of the front, thus reducing their own casualties and attrition rates, but also doing the same thing for the russians. by May1942, the Russians had built up a reserve of more than 5 million men, admittedly short of artillery and MT, but immeasurably in better condition than the hard pressed Wehrmacht.

The turning point of the war was a combination of two things, the entry of the USSR, by far the most important, and, the entry of the US. Once the US was in against the Japanese, I think it inevitable that war would also follow against the germans.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 3, 2016)

I'm not a specialist on Italian aviation, base a lot of my info on Ali D'Italia series and conversation with a friend from Rome whose grandfather was an engineer in one of the companies. Italians had a small industry, limited funds and way too high ambitions for all the projects they could make. 



> Similar motivation drove the Japanese, though they did not have quite the pedigree the Italians did in the 30's. The main operational types in 1941 were not the A6M or the Ki-43. numerically, the main types were the Ki27 and the A5M , at a time when the germans were flying and using the FW190. The Japanese had the ability to design engines of greater output, but in the case of the navy at least elected not to do so.



That's only partially correct. While main fighter for the Japanese Army was still Type 97, two Sentais were already equipped with Type 1 fighter. Indeed Nakajima failed to produce quickly large amounts of Oscars and overall development was taking excessively long. 
On contrary Navy had A6M in service since late summer of 1940 which slowly replaced A5Ms. I dont have here exact tables with data, but by the outbreak of the war Zeros replaced A5M4s in vast majority of frontline units. Except for 1st, 2nd and 5th Carrier Divisions (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuikaku and Shokaku) Zeros were also a main fighter in 11th Air Fleet with a task to destroy any opposition over Philippines and few units based in Japan. 

It is also quite weird the comparison you made, no FW-190 had to satisfy requirements expected from A6M and vice-versa. Not to mention that there werent many 190s in that 1941 ...

Japanese had the ability to design them but development times were a lot longer, not because of negligence but due to limited manpower and mentioned lack of higher octane gasoline. 
Also, what you say is not true, there were available more powerful engines up to 1500-1600 HP (Kasei and later Kinsei series).



> They deliberately made the decision for an engine of small capacity for fuel economy reasons,


Like the Kasei engines ... except not. 



> but also they placed far too much belief that air battles would be fought in the traditional WWI style of dogfighting.


What belief ? What WW I ? 
Why would Japanese base on something they never participated in on a scale major powers did. Japanese based on their own conflicts, mainly in China and Khalkin Gol. Those experiences were basics for creating requirements for further aircraft developments. 
Good maneuverability was one of the requirements but not the only one. Others were speed, range, climb and so on. 
In this case Navy development was quite satisfying with every following fighter being almost 100 km/h faster than predecessor :
-> A4N - top speed 190 knots
-> A5M - top speed 237 knots 
-> A6M - top speed 290 knots (with overboost 300 knots)



> they (and the Army) were simply not ready for the dive/climb/altitude/speed formula, as is brought out n a number of post war interviews. The tragedy for the Japanese is that they could have been.


Except that their fighters did have a good rate of climb, superior to anything they have encountered (with the exception of CW-21), they were relatively fast (top speed is not the only element, the acceleration is very important part as well) and had better altitude performance than adversaries. 

How you imagine that "they could have been" when neither their industry could provide such a technological "jump" nor they had experiences that would lead them to such conclusions ? 



> BTW - the increase in compression ratio is an own goal in field of ww2 aircraft engines, it is a double own goal if one's fuel is low octane; the Japanese were to blame for not developing a two-stage supercharger for themselves, as well as too late introduction of turbochargers.


Japanese had initially a superior altitude characteristics, A6M2 performed much better than P-39D or P-40E above 20,000 feet. It was only the actual introduction of P-38 and F4U that changed this, and since then effort was put on increasing altitude performance. 

Not to mention turbochargers which were not needed until B-29, which started operating in summer 1944. By the end of the war there were multiple prototypes ready for mass production equipped with turbochargers, given that the actual need for turbochargers existed since a year or so ? That was moderately fast development. 

Again, its easy to say that they needed X and Y when one sits comfortably in front of PC, takes a sip of earl grey and thinks what someone should have done. But thats not how things develop in reality. How would Japanese foresee the need for a turbocharger when there was no threat until 1944 ?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2016)

A lot of altitude "performance" is related to power to weight ratio. Early Japanese fighters had relatively good altitude performance on low power due to low weight. The A6M2 weighing around 70% of what a P-40E did. The lower wing loading helped. 
The P-40 (no letter) had a lot better altitude performance than the P-40E despite the P-40E having a more powerful engine.
The P-40E weighing about 22% more than a P-40 no letter. An extra 10% or so in power didn't compensate.
The problem as the war went on was trying to balance protection and increase firepower and demand for more range (more fuel) with performance. 
The 109, being fairly small and light did fairly well without special superchargers, however due to it's size it was difficult to upgun. 
The FW 190A-3 certainly had guns but even though it had about 90 more hp than a 109G-6 at 18,700ft the fact that it weighed almost 25% more (and it's wing wasn't that much bigger, around 12%) meant that in comparison it lacked altitude performance. 

If you want heavy armament (and long range) at 25,000ft and up you need special superchargers. However the weight and volume of special superchargers (and intercoolers and large propellers) meant that such powerplants _usually_ could not be accommodated in existing air-frames. 

Any Japanese high ranking officer/official who thought the Japanese _wouldn't _face high flying aircraft at some point was living in a cave in the forest. They had captured 3 flyable B-17s in the Philippines, 2 of which were E models. Granted these had nowhere near the capability of B-29s but expecting the Americans to make zero progress or not introduce new aircraft in the next 2-3 years would be a major mistake. 

With turbos it was a long, long way from prototypes to service aircraft. The US had started "fooling around" with turbo chargers in the late 20s and by late 1939 had built around 100 aircraft with turbo-chargers (including over 50 P-30 fighters) and were still 2-3 years from really having combat suitable turbo-installations.


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## CarlAce (Mar 3, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> A lot of altitude "performance" is related to power to weight ratio. Early Japanese fighters had relatively good altitude performance on low power due to low weight. The A6M2 weighing around 70% of what a P-40E did. The lower wing loading helped.
> The P-40 (no letter) had a lot better altitude performance than the P-40E despite the P-40E having a more powerful engine.
> The P-40E weighing about 22% more than a P-40 no letter. An extra 10% or so in power didn't compensate.
> The problem as the war went on was trying to balance protection and increase firepower and demand for more range (more fuel) with performance.
> ...



But if you add larger engines for more power, the plane is obviously going to be heavier, and the fastest prop fighters of WW2 and just beyond had large/powerful engines. Obviously the air forces/navies of WW2 thought benefits of larger engines more than compensates for the added weight.


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## stona (Mar 4, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> The Germans simple could not produce _enough _4 engine bombers to have any real impact on the war



Indeed. People tend to look simplistically at numbers of aircraft produced, not the weight of air frames (the British usually refer to this as 'structure weight') which is a much better reference for overall production.
Of course you can just count the numbers for aero engines. You don't have to be Einstein to work out that each of these heavy bombers needs four times the engines of a single engine fighter to fly, and that makes no allowance for reserve engines.

In the 1st quarter of 1940 the British produced a structure weight of 8.9 million pounds. In the 4th quarter of 1941 this had risen to 24.1 million pounds. I don't have the German figures, but I doubt that they are comparable for 1941.
Figures for British engine production for the same quarters are 3,940 engines (2,555 thousand horse power) and 11,236 (10,279 thousand horse power). The British produced 36,551 aero engines in 1941. The Germans built 14,400 Jumo 211s and 7,431 Daimler Benz engines (all types) in the same period. I don't have such early figures for BMW but I don't see how they and the rest could have made up the shortfall of nearly 15,000 engines compared to the British.

Cheers

Steve

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## Hiromachi (Mar 4, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Any Japanese high ranking officer/official who thought the Japanese _wouldn't _face high flying aircraft at some point was living in a cave in the forest. They had captured 3 flyable B-17s in the Philippines, 2 of which were E models. Granted these had nowhere near the capability of B-29s but expecting the Americans to make zero progress or not introduce new aircraft in the next 2-3 years would be a major mistake.



Making a progress based on few captured heavy bombers is a one thing, but facing a massive formations of bombers flying over 23,000 feet is completely different scenario to imagine. In case of progress there was considerable effort given by Japanese manufacturers to raise the critical altitudes of the engines, Ki-43-I was powered by Ha-25 with single stage, single speed supercharger having critical altitude below 12,000 feet. A6M2 was powered by Sakae 12 with same single stage, single speed supercharger and critical altitude at 13,800 feet. 
By 1944/1945 standard engines in fighters were Ha-115-II with single stage, two speed supercharger and critical altitude 20,500 feet, Kinsei Ha-112-II and Homare 21 with single stage, two speed supercharger with critical altitude above 20,000 feet. 

There was an issue, and exactly because of existence of aircraft like B-17 the development of better superchargers was continued. It was just too slow.


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## Milosh (Mar 4, 2016)

Steve, this link gives BMW engine production, WW2 German Engine Prouction

Maybe you will have better luck searching than me, but I posted links to data on this board for German aircraft production.


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## stona (Mar 4, 2016)

Milosh said:


> Steve, this link gives BMW engine production, WW2 German Engine Prouction
> 
> Maybe you will have better luck searching than me, but I posted links to data on this board for German aircraft production.



Thanks for that. It was BMW I couldn't find. Since the company made less than 3,000 engines the Germans were about 12,000 engines short of British production in 1941.
That difference (about 35% less production than the British) is not as bad as comparable figures in other areas of the aircraft industry, but it's still bad for Germany's prospects in a prolonged war.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 4, 2016)

The two speed supercharger was introduced in 1936 by the Armstrong Siddeley Tiger VIII, the supercharger drive was innovative but the engine itself was a disaster. Wright was putting 2 speed superchargers on the Cyclone 9 in 1938 (and was reportedly offering retro fit kits), The Merlin X two speed engine was on Display at the 1938 Paris air show.
None of this was a secret. The turbo chargers on the B-17 were not exactly a secret either.

There had been 33 B-17s in the Philippines on Dec. More were flown out and joined the fighting from Java and Australia before the fall of the Philippines. That the Japanese had captured (or repaired) 3 of these aircraft is rather remarkable but the 3 aircraft in no way represented America's production capacity.

Japan had been working on two speed superchargers in 1940 and 41 and both the Ki 43 II and the A6M3 wound up with them, First prototype A6M3 flying July 15th 1941 and first Ki 43 II flying in Feb of 1942.

These engines were just part of the general trend to higher altitude going on at the time. Reports from Europe in 1939-40-41 just reinforcing it. Development of new engines was slow for the Japanese but they certainly didn't wait for the B-29 to show up before starting projects ( although it may have changed priorities).


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## tomo pauk (Mar 4, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> ...
> Japanese had initially a superior altitude characteristics, A6M2 performed much better than P-39D or P-40E above 20,000 feet. It was only the actual introduction of P-38 and F4U that changed this, and since then effort was put on increasing altitude performance.



The A6M*3* performed much better than P-39D or P40E at altitude. However, both P-40B and P-39C were at least as good, and were better than contemporary A6M2. The good (not great) altitude capabilities of Zero, prior 1943, were very much a function of no protection, light guns' weight and light ammo load, and less due to having some great engine. Once it acquired protection (but not for fuel tanks), better armament and heavier ammo load, both speed and RoC plumeted. The Kinsei, in the A6M8 prototypes, restored the loss and added some performance, but it was too little, too late.



> Not to mention turbochargers which were not needed until B-29, which started operating in summer 1944. By the end of the war there were multiple prototypes ready for mass production equipped with turbochargers, given that the actual need for turbochargers existed since a year or so ? That was moderately fast development.



Engines with better superchargers (be it 2-stage or turbocharger) were needed to fight Western airforces if anyone wanted a favorable loss ratio. 1:1 ratio means Japan is done for. The better superharger means that engine can do, say, 1500 HP at 20000 ft, instead of 1200 HP when outfitted with 1-stage S/C.



> Again, its easy to say that they needed X and Y when one sits comfortably in front of PC, takes a sip of earl grey and thinks what someone should have done. But thats not how things develop in reality. How would Japanese foresee the need for a turbocharger when there was no threat until 1944 ?



Japanese did not need a clairwoyant to tell them that several types of LMGs, then HMGs, then 20 mm cannons, than 30 mm stuff is a waste of resources. They know (or should know) that 900-1200 HP engines won't cut it against enemies that will deploy aircraft with 1500-2000 HP on board. They know that both Bristol and Junkers were making history in 1930s with record aorcraft that are powered with multi stage superchargers, ditto for US experiments with turbos.
Expecting that enemy will do what you want is false foundation, and it happened in the expected 'decisive battle', along with massive miscalculation of US will and capacity to fight. The prepartions befor Battle of Midway are telling, for anyone that read 'Shattered sword'.
And yes, the IJN, and/or it's suppliers, failed in procurement of next fighter to replace the Zero, while they squandered many resources and time fiddling with floatplane fighters, plus with separate land-based fighter.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 4, 2016)

In hindsight (and perhaps a bit of foresight) the Zero should have gotten the Kinsei much sooner. Mitisubishi had wanted to fit it after the first prototypes had failed to make the desired speed with Zuisei engines. The Japanese navy insisted on the Sakae engine, in part due to the extra range they expected. Granted the early Kinsei didn't have the power of the one fitted to the A6M8 but in 1942/43 it had about 100hp more at most altitudes (about 10%) than the Sakae. It's larger diameter would have meant deleting the cowl guns. It might not have given _extra _performance to the Zero but might have allowed the increases in protection and firepower _without _the decrease in performace that happened. The power boosting schemes for the Sakae not really paying off. 
The Japanese fell into the same trap the Germans did at times, in not spending enough effort in incremental changes in existing aircraft and trying to get a quantum jump in performance/capability with totally new designs. And as Tomo has pointed out, too many specialized designs. 
As to engines there _seems _to have been a bit of the fighter engine vs bomber engine thing going on. They had 1400-1500hp engines, they were just using them in bombers while fitting the 1100-1200hp engines in the fighters and designing new small diameter 18 cylinder engines for the _next _generation of fighters.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 4, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> The A6M*3* performed much better than P-39D or P40E at altitude.



No, it was A6M2 that performed better than P-39D and P-40E at altitude. That was clearly indicated by combat over Australia, Dutch East Indies and New Guinea in 1942. The supercharger enabled it to engage targets at 20,000 feet without problems , and up to 30,000 feet if it was really necessary. 
Here is a quote from "Eagles of the Southern Sky" book ( Eagles of the Southern Sky ) :
"_After the war, former RAAF No. 75 Squadron pilot Pete Masters would recall his time fighting the Tainan Ku. On the performance of Zeros he wrote : There was much more we know now that we didn't know before we got to New Guinea, like the ability of Zeros to outperform us, contrary to what we had learned before we arrived. We were told that Japanese Zero was an upgraded copy of the Harvard Trainer as used by the Empire Air Scheme in Canada. It was underpowered and flimsy with very light aluminium and canvas cladding sometimes joined by canvas at the extremities. It had no armour plate to protect the pilot, and although it was reputed to fly higher than the Kittyhawk it was much slower and inferior in almost all its characteristics, including firepower. I am now sure that all this misinformation came about because very few Allied fighters had encountered Zeros in combat prior to New Guinea and those that had in Malaysia, the Phiilippines or elsewhere had never had a chance to examine the real specifications of this amazing aircraft at close quarters. 

In fact when I at last saw a Zero on the ground and crawled all over it I too was amazed at the rigidity of its structure and its apparent fighting qualities from the cockpit. In our combat assessments at Port Moresby during the 44 days we fought, we soon concluded that head-to-head combat between Kittyhawk and Zero was unwise, and at altitudes above 20,000 feet was simply dangerous. 
They were much more maneuverable and could outclimb us in the ratio of two or three to on. What they didn't have was our weight and pilot protection with 1/2 inch armour plate behind the pilot and in the firewall. Our battle plans therefore always included a desire to get above the enemy, if possible into the sun, and then to break away and come back for another shot. If we had height we could always get away from the Zero but with equal skills as pilots on both sides, the Zero always had the advantage at the same height *and also could maneuver much more effectively above 20,000 feet where the Kittyhawk would tend to "fall out of the sky"*._"

Sakae 12 still maintained over 800 HP at 20,000 feet which is as much as on Sea Level at rated power. That's quite good actually.



> However, both P-40B and P-39C were at least as good, and were better than contemporary A6M2. The good (not great) altitude capabilities of Zero, prior 1943, were very much a function of no protection, light guns' weight and light ammo load, and less due to having some great engine.



Exactly same thing can be said about mentioned by you aircraft, P-40B had no protection and instead of 6 .50 caliber machine guns it had only 2 in fuselage and 4 .30 cals in wings. Was 1.500 lbs lighters as well. P-40B still was climbing slower than A6M2 and its speed decreased fast after 15,000 feet. Allison engine was not delivering enough power at those altitudes. 
P-39C also had no protection for pilot or self sealing fuel tanks, it did not have two additional .30 cals added in D model. And climb performance was marginally better if compared to A6M2. 

So not sure what makes them ... better ? 

In regard to weight of the armament, I think its rather a positive feature that gun is both reliable and light. No designer wants a lot of added weight. 



> Once it acquired protection (but not for fuel tanks), better armament and heavier ammo load, both speed and RoC plumeted.


You mean once it acquired three more 13.2 mm Machine guns, bulletproof windscreen, armored plate behind pilot seat, underwing racks to carry air-to-air rockets and 250 kg bomb ? Obviously. But thats also because Sakae 31 was not performing as expected with water&methanol injection and engine was reversed to a similar performance of Sakae 21.



> The Kinsei, in the A6M8 prototypes, restored the loss and added some performance, but it was too little, too late.


It only restored the performance ... to a level of 1943 A6M5. The aircraft reached 563 km/h which is marginally slower than A6M5 which had a top speed of 565 km/h, the time to altitude was improved by mere 11 seconds. However landing speed has increased, thus indicating also a higher stall speed. Aircraft definitely had inferior flight characteristics, including the maneuverability. 

We already had that discussion how brilliant it was be to fit A6M with Kinsei engine. Except it was not ...



> And yes, the IJN, and/or it's suppliers, failed in procurement of next fighter to replace the Zero, while they squandered many resources and time fiddling with floatplane fighters, plus with separate land-based fighter.


This statement is absurd. 

In 1940 the Mitsubishi  received from the Kaigun Koku Honbu Gijutsubu the preliminary specifications for the 16-Shi Carrier fighter which was intended to replace the Zero. It was intended that the new aircraft, which would not be available in quantity for several years, would become the Navy's standard carrier fighter when the Zero had reached its limit in modification and improvement.

However, in 1940 the Mitsubishi was experiencing serious difficulties in the development of the 14-Shi land-based interceptor (J2M Raiden); the company was plagued by a shortage of competent engineering personnel and the lack of a satisfactory engine for the J2M Raiden design. These circumstances delayed the 16-Shi carrier fighter program for at least a year. 
But despite eventually solving problems with J2M the development was again postponed. In the autumn of 1941 Horikoshi became seriously ill and did not recover until several months had passed. The Navy preferred not to undertake the design project without my active participation. First engineering meeting to plan the new fighter was held on 14th April 1942, at the Japanese Naval Air Research and Development Center. In the long interval which had elapsed, the plane was renamed the 17-Shi carrier fighter. 

From Horikoshi memoirs on A7M : 


> In the light of past experience, I estimated that at least three years would be required to place the new fighter in actual operations. Because of the poverty of our industrial potential, frequent changes in fighter-aircraft types were a luxury we could ill afford, and my activities were always influenced by this situation. I thought it imperative that we concentrate our efforts on the principle of holding aircraft types to a minimum. To utilize to maximum efficiency the nation's limited manpower and personnel, we took special pains with the fighter project to insure an airplane superior in performance to that expected of the enemy three years hence.



The failure in providing a successor of A7M was than a combination of bad luck and stubborn Navy, Kaigun Koku Honbu Gijutsubu forced on Horikoshi a decision to use NK9K which proved unable to deliver expected power and effectively making aircraft underpowered. Horikoshi from the very beginning tried to lobby for much better developed Mitsubishi MK9A which not only delivered more power but was also very reliable and could be maintained by even less experienced ground crews. His opinions were rejected until flight tests carried on A7M1 in June 1944 proved that Homare engine is not a good choice here and during a meeting in late July decision to use MK9A was taken. 
A7M2 first flew in October 1944 and all tests indicated that aircraft finally had very good performance and characteristics. It could be finally put into production. 

But then on December 7th 1944 a heavy earthquake in Oe-machi where Mitsubishi plant was located damaged the factory sufficiently to prevent any production there. 5 days later B-29s bombed Oe Airframe Works of the Mitsubishi in Nagoya temporarily suspended all production activities, and few days later B-29s made their first attack against the Daiko Engine Works of Mitsubishi in Nagoya and, on 18th December, returned to batter the Oe Airframe Works. The air raids smashed machines and production lines, killed hundreds of workers, and threw the great factories into a wild state of confusion. The New Year brought even worse air attacks; the Daiko Engine Works received the heaviest blows. It was hugely unfortunate for the Japanese that this tremendous engine plant was so badly hit, for it was responsible for the production of the Mitsubishi MK9A engine. At the same time Jiro Horikoshi fell sick, and development was continued Yoshitoshi Sone. But it wasn't until end of the war when Mitsubishi could start delivering A7M2. 

The failure in providing a next generation fighter was as mentioned a combination of bad luck, stubborn Navy leaders and Mitsubishi lacking manpower to work on multiple projects. It had nothing to do with other manufacturers, who had their own designs to work on. No Air force is based only on fighters and Navy obviously had to call for other types of aircraft.

Sidenote here is that Horikoshi claimed later on that Navy would choose from the very beginning MK9A than fighters could be delivered before B-29 seriously started bombing Japanese mainland. 



> In hindsight (and perhaps a bit of foresight) the Zero should have gotten the Kinsei much sooner.


Which is exactly when ? Kinsei 40-series was rejected during development by Horikoshi himself. Series 50 became available in extremely limited numbers in 1942.



> Mitisubishi had wanted to fit it after the first prototypes had failed to make the desired speed with Zuisei engines. The Japanese navy insisted on the Sakae engine, in part due to the extra range they expected.



This is not correct either. There was never a choice between Sakae and Kinsei. There was choice between Kinsei and Zuisei.
And Horikoshi explained :



> Only when the engine has been selected can a designer produce a draft of the airframe. In case of Prototype 12 (12-Shi - prototype name of A6M) the Mitsubishi Kinsei Type 46 and the Zuisei Type 13 were listed as candidate engines, the Kinsei being the more powerful of the two. If we used the Kinsei, we could have an airplane with high performance and high speed in one jump. For just that reason I felt it should be selected. This was in keeping with my philosophy that it would be better to design a high performance fighter in one big leap rather than to eventually reach that goal by making numerous small improvements to a lower performance aircraft over the span of its lifetime.
> But there was a fateful obstacle in using Kinsei: it required a bigger airframe. The Kinsei was more powerful than the Zuisei, and it also was larger, heavier, and consumed more fuel. Because of this the airframe would be larger than if a smaller engine were used, and the fuel weight would be greater. In order to carry the increased weight, the wing must be larger and the fuselage and tail would also have to be larger. This, in turn, would require a stronger landing gear and yet another increase in airframe size.
> A quick weight estimate showed the airplane's weight would be about 3000 kg. This was acceptable for a land-based plane, but pilots accustomed to flying small 1,600 kg Type 96 fighters would not readily accept the heavy new fighter. And this would mean the loss of the Prototype 12 contract. In contrast, if we used the Zuisei engine, the airplanes weight was estimated to be about 2,300 kg, the wing span would be in the neighborhood of twelve meters with a wing area compatible with a good fighter performance.
> I thought this was about the maximum weight that the pilots would accept. Instead of pondering the future of the aircraft, our immediate job was to win the contact. *I decided, "Okay, let's get on with it." When I reported my decision to use the Zuisei to Mr. Hattori, he approved.*


Source: Eagles of the Mitsubishi - The Story of Zero fighter by Jiro Horikoshi 

Aircraft is always a compromise, and engine being a heart of the warbird affects all other systems - heavier and larger engine requires stronger and larger airframe, rises the amount of fuel that has to be carried to maintain the range, etc. etc.

And no, first prototype did not fail to meet the required speed. During first flight trials on 17 and 18 April 1939 aircraft reached a speed slightly over 490 km/h. After corrections (as you all know speed indicated by gauge in cockpit is not a true airspeed) the actual speed was recorded as 508 km/h. Requirement called for 500 km/h at 4000 meters. 
Thus Mitsubishi satisfied the requirement during very first trials. 

Sakae 12 was not installed by May :


> Also, on this day (May 1st), the Navy Aeronautics Headquarters gave us permission to install the Nakajima Sakae Type 12 engine in the number three flight test aircraft and it was designated as the A6M2.





> Granted the early Kinsei didn't have the power of the one fitted to the A6M8 but in 1942/43 it had about 100hp more at most altitudes (about 10%) than the Sakae. It's larger diameter would have meant deleting the cowl guns. It might not have given _extra _performance to the Zero but might have allowed the increases in protection and firepower _without _the decrease in performace that happened.


Kinsei 40 series was rejected. Kinsei 50 series delivered a lot more power but consumption of fuel was also much greater. And at that time range was crucial due to combat at Salomon Islands (hence why A6M3 model 22 was developed). So potentially yes, aircraft could be provided with protection, but that would reduce drastically its ability to escort bombers at ranges they had to operate. 



> The Japanese fell into the same trap the Germans did at times, in not spending enough effort in incremental changes in existing aircraft and trying to get a quantum jump in performance/capability with totally new designs.



No. Japanese did not fell into that trap. Japanese did something else, their policy was to do a great jumps with every following machine - > A4N -> A5M -> A6M -> A7M. But problem between A6M and A7M was that Mitsubishi was doing exactly what you suggested, spending a lot of time designing further improvements to A6M and developing J2M. Then extremly bad choice for an engine, problems with Horikoshi health and lack of personnel slowed down any progress.


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## pbehn (Mar 4, 2016)

I would say in general
1 Consider your enemy produces equipment as good as you do. I cannot see why Hampdens and Wellingtons were sent out in daylight when it must have been obvious they could not protect themselves from hurricanes and spitfires while everyone knew the Germans had the Bf109 before war was declared. How could it be thought the defiant could survive against the BF109. The same goes for He111s crossing the North Sea to north England and Scotland.

2 Consider outlandish possibilities your enemy may present you with, from Germany overrunning France in 6 weeks and producing jet fighters, to the UK managing to keep their aircraft off the ground and always intercepting your raids. Consider what you would do about an enemy doing 100% better in every way than you thought was physically possible 5 years ago.

3 Assume that as soon as a new technology is used it is completely understood by your enemy, who may already have it but not use it (as with window) and assume that your codes are broken as a matter of course.

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## tomo pauk (Mar 4, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> No, it was A6M2 that performed better than P-39D and P-40E at altitude. That was clearly indicated by combat over Australia, Dutch East Indies and New Guinea in 1942. The supercharger enabled it to engage targets at 20,000 feet without problems , and up to 30,000 feet if it was really necessary
> ....
> Sakae 12 still maintained over 800 HP at 20,000 feet which is as much as on Sea Level at rated power. That's quite good actually.



Thanks for the effort to type this out. 
Yes, the A6M2 will have better power-to-weight ratio than either of the two US fighters above 15000 ft, meaning better climb, even of drag is a a bit greater than in those US fighters.



> Exactly same thing can be said about mentioned by you aircraft, P-40B had no protection and instead of 6 .50 caliber machine guns it had only 2 in fuselage and 4 .30 cals in wings. Was 1.500 lbs lighters as well. P-40B still was climbing slower than A6M2 and its speed decreased fast after 15,000 feet. Allison engine was not delivering enough power at those altitudes.
> P-39C also had no protection for pilot or self sealing fuel tanks, it did not have two additional .30 cals added in D model. And climb performance was marginally better if compared to A6M2.
> 
> So not sure what makes them ... better ?



My point being that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Want protection, on same HP? Okay, your rate of climb will be lower.
The P-40B featured 93 lbs of armor and external protection for fuel tanks, per 'US hudred thousand', pg. 236. The P-39C was also cosiderably faster than either P-40B or A6M2.



> In regard to weight of the armament, I think its rather a positive feature that gun is both reliable and light. No designer wants a lot of added weight.



Apart from reliability (that nobody questioned anyway) and low weight, the costumer wants also certain muzzle velocity, rate of fire and ammo count. The Type 99-1 did not provied all of that, the Type 99-2 was far better. However, the price was weight, hence decrease in RoC.



> You mean once it acquired three more 13.2 mm Machine guns, bulletproof windscreen, armored plate behind pilot seat, underwing racks to carry air-to-air rockets and 250 kg bomb ? Obviously. But thats also because Sakae 31 was not performing as expected with water&methanol injection and engine was reversed to a similar performance of Sakae 21.



This is it - no free lunch. 
Further, water-methanol (ADI) has it's limits, the greater 'base HP' and better supercharger, the power gained is greater.



> It only restored the performance ... to a level of 1943 A6M5. The aircraft reached 563 km/h which is marginally slower than A6M5 which had a top speed of 565 km/h, the time to altitude was improved by mere 11 seconds. However landing speed has increased, thus indicating also a higher stall speed. Aircraft definitely had inferior flight characteristics, including the maneuverability.



Something needed to be done, since the A6M5c lost 20 km/h, how much of RoC, and 700 m of service ceiling once it gained more firepower and some protection - no free lunch. It took the belated installation of Kinsei to restore the performnce lost. 
Same happened to the Spitfire V - once it received cannons and external BP glass, the performance was back on Spit I level, despite more engine power.



> We already had that discussion how brilliant it was be to fit A6M with Kinsei engine. Except it was not ...



Nobody said that A6M with Kinsei was brilliant. It was a belated effort to upgrade Zero.



> This statement is absurd.



Ad hominem?



> In 1940 the Mitsubishi received from the Kaigun Koku Honbu Gijutsubu the preliminary specifications for the 16-Shi Carrier fighter which was intended to replace the Zero. It was intended that the new aircraft, which would not be available in quantity for several years, would become the Navy's standard carrier fighter when the Zero had reached its limit in modification and improvement.
> 
> However, in 1940 the Mitsubishi was experiencing serious difficulties in the development of the 14-Shi land-based interceptor (J2M Raiden); the company was plagued by a shortage of competent engineering personnel and the lack of a satisfactory engine for the J2M Raiden design. These circumstances delayed the 16-Shi carrier fighter program for at least a year.
> But despite eventually solving problems with J2M the development was again postponed. In the autumn of 1941 Horikoshi became seriously ill and did not recover until several months had passed. The Navy preferred not to undertake the design project without my active participation. First engineering meeting to plan the new fighter was held on 14th April 1942, at the Japanese Naval Air Research and Development Center. In the long interval which had elapsed, the plane was renamed the 17-Shi carrier fighter.



The IJN stride for Raiden as strictly land-based fighter is not a very good economy. Let Mitsubishi design a naval fighter, to replace Zero, then use it as a land based fighter once available in numbers - just like Zero was used.
Mitsubishi was not the only manufacturer in Japan. Why fiddling with floatplane fighter design by Kawainshi - attach the floats on a new fighter that is competing to be the next-gen carrier-borne fighter. Already done with Zero.



> The failure in providing a next generation fighter was as mentioned a combination of bad luck, stubborn Navy leaders and Mitsubishi lacking manpower to work on multiple projects. It had nothing to do with other manufacturers, who had their own designs to work on. No Air force is based only on fighters and Navy obviously had to call for other types of aircraft.



Bad luck was absent when duplication at many requirements was present, also when IJN and IJA were trying to have a separate design for any application that might come to mind.

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## Hiromachi (Mar 4, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Yes, the A6M2 will have better power-to-weight ratio than either of the two US fighters above 15000 ft, meaning better climb, even of drag is a a bit greater than in those US fighters.



Not sure about it, one of the sources I have indicates following for equivalent profile drag area : 
P-40C A6M2 model 21
5.05 sq. ft. 4.613 sq. ft.

A6M presented very clean lines while P-40 not so much, especially the landing gear and the way it was hidden in the wing added to the drag. 



> The P-40B featured 93 lbs of armor and external protection for fuel tanks, per 'US hudred thousand', pg. 236.


Maybe some did. But none at the outbreak of WW2 on the front. That is confirmed by various accounts from pilots who were stationed on the Philippines. There were three squadrons equipped with P-40 E which indeed were fully protected, there was one with P-40B which had no protection and one with P-35 which as well had no protection. 



> The P-39C was also considerably faster than either P-40B or A6M2.


There were 80 of them produced if I'm not mistaken ? It was considerably faster indeed. There was also P-43 which had considerably better altitude performance but Army decided not to push them to front-line despite great need. 
But since they were not used they made no impact on events. 



> Apart from reliability (that nobody questioned anyway) and low weight, the costumer wants also certain muzzle velocity, rate of fire and ammo count. The Type 99-1 did not provied all of that, the Type 99-2 was far better. However, the price was weight, hence decrease in RoC.



What exactly decrease in RoC if I may ask ? Type 99-II was ... 10 kg heavier. Combined weight of two guns was still less than a single MG 151/20. The difference in weight was really negligible and effect on rate of climb would be none. 



> Something needed to be done, since the A6M5c lost 20 km/h, how much of RoC, and 700 m of service ceiling once it gained more firepower and some protection - no free lunch. It took the belated installation of Kinsei to restore the performnce lost.
> Same happened to the Spitfire V - once it received cannons and external BP glass, the performance was back on Spit I level, despite more engine power.



A6M should have been dumped by then. That's what should be done. Full attention of the Navy should be given to N1K2-J and A7M2. 



> Ad hominem?


Argumentum ad hominem is an attack on an argument made by attacking the character, motive, or other attribute of the person making the argument. I dont attack You, your motives or attributes. I state that your statement was wrong, hence usage of word "absurd".
Nothing personal tomo, I respect you while disagree with your opinions  



> The IJN stride for Raiden as strictly land-based fighter is not a very good economy. Let Mitsubishi design a naval fighter, to replace Zero, then use it as a land based fighter once available in numbers - just like Zero was used.
> Mitsubishi was not the only manufacturer in Japan. Why fiddling with floatplane fighter design by Kawainshi - attach the floats on a new fighter that is competing to be the next-gen carrier-borne fighter. Already done with Zero.



I agree that J2M was a waste of resources (even though it turned out to be one of the best fighters Japanese had) but decision to develop it was taken prior to decision of developing A7M. 

Mitsubishi was not the only manufacturer but was the only sufficiently experienced manufacturer in terms of developing a carrier borne fighter. And seeing how A6M2 was superior to Ki-43-I I see no reason why Navy would turn to equally occupied with Army requests Nakajima. 

Kawanishi had absolutely no experience with land based fighters. It took them 3 years to make out of N1K floatplane a capable fighter in form of N1K2-J. Besides, floatplanes played important role in Navy doctrine and their existence was necessary. At least that was seen that way back in the day. Now if we would leave N1K and let supposedly Mitsubishi make out of developed A7M a floatplane ... that would divide the attention of the major company into some smaller tasks which Kawanishi could deal on its own.

Also, it did not work so well with A6M2-N. It had shorter range than A6M2 despite addition of a big fuel tank in a float and performance was reduced. Fighter was still very liked and satisfied frontline needs but quickly need for a faster machine raised. 



> Bad luck was absent when duplication at many requirements was present, also when IJN and IJA were trying to have a separate design for any application that might come to mind.


Well, how else one can call a health problems of leading engineer at the begging and end of the project ? Or massive earthquake ?
For me its a bad luck. 
Else indeed, duplication. I never could figure why those two could not co-operate. Hence why I mentioned that as first mistake of Japan. 

On a sidenote, I always wondered how would it be if Navy replaced 7.7 mm in A6M with 12.7 mm used in Oscar. Two 12.7 mm and two 20 mm sound a lot more better. Weight difference would really be negligible and there was plenty of room to put it.


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## stona (Mar 5, 2016)

pbehn said:


> I would say in general
> 1 Consider your enemy produces equipment as good as you do. I cannot see why Hampdens and Wellingtons were sent out in daylight when it must have been obvious they could not protect themselves from hurricanes and spitfires while everyone knew the Germans had the Bf109 before war was declared. How could it be thought the defiant could survive against the BF109. The same goes for He111s crossing the North Sea to north England and Scotland.
> 
> 2 Consider outlandish possibilities your enemy may present you with, from Germany overrunning France in 6 weeks and producing jet fighters, to the UK managing to keep their aircraft off the ground and always intercepting your raids. Consider what you would do about an enemy doing 100% better in every way than you thought was physically possible 5 years ago.
> ...



1 The bombers did alright in prewar exercises against Hurricanes because the umpires were using faulty assumptions to decide what got killed. Far too much weight was given to the bombers' defensive fire and far too little to the fighters offensive fire. 
Bomber Command did not cooperate in Park/Dowding's immediate prewar exercises which meant that at Group level it had no idea that Fighter Command's 11 Group was achieving theoretical interception rates of 60%. The Bomber men also reckoned that flights or single aircraft would be less liable to detection and interception, something they continued to believe until the shooting war proved them wrong. In the wrong hands, even with Fighter Command's system, the bombers could still get through as Leigh Mallory famously demonstrated on one exercise.

2 There a limit to what can be fore seen. France was considered the preeminent land based military power in Europe in the 1930s. Her collapse in short order was literally inconceivable to prewar planners.
Others you mention were intelligence failures and/or a failure to understand novel systems and their impact. These things are always easy with hindsight 

4 Generally the assumption that the enemy would soon understand new technology and counteract it was made. For example Bomber Command originally assumed that they would get limited use of Gee and initially resisted issuing the 'Lattice Charts' (the grid of Gee signals printed on special charts) to navigators for fear they would fall into enemy hands. It was only when the impossibility of the navigators using the system without them was demonstrated that the charts were issued.
It's what led to the early 'battle of the beams' and then a later electronic arms race. In 1940/41 nobody had imagined that Radio Counter Measures aircraft would be flying in numbers on most operations. This was an arms race decisively won by the British/Allies (in that order).

It is not necessary to assume your codes are broken, but _you must acknowledge that they can be broken_. For example,it was the German assumption of the impregnability of the various enigma codes, even in the face of evidence that they were compromised, that was the failing. All WW2 codes were vulnerable (some much more so than others) and the weakness is usually in the human operators who, like all humans, tend to become blase and lazy in their methods. Enigma was one of the first to largely, but, unfortunately for the Germans, not completely, remove the human from the system.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 5, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> Not sure about it, one of the sources I have indicates following for equivalent profile drag area :
> P-40C A6M2 model 21
> 5.05 sq. ft. 4.613 sq. ft.
> 
> A6M presented very clean lines while P-40 not so much, especially the landing gear and the way it was hidden in the wing added to the drag.



The P-51D was at 4.10 sq ft, Fw 190A8 at 5.22, Fw 190D-9 at 4.77; bothFocke Wulfs were smaller and with thinner wing than Zero. Buffalo was at 6.27, stubby as it was, so I think the value you've posted for the Model 21 is too low. Talk 5 to 5.5 sq ft? Increased once the armament grew.
P-40 was as high as 5.71, P-39 as low as 4.63.



> There were 80 of them produced if I'm not mistaken ? It was considerably faster indeed. There was also P-43 which had considerably better altitude performance but Army decided not to push them to front-line despite great need.
> But since they were not used they made no impact on events.



USAF decided that pilot protection was a right thing to trade for loss of performance. In the long run, they were right.
Once the V-1710 received a 'faster' supercharger drive, both P-40N and P-39N were far better performers, especially under 15000 ft, and Zero, that started aquiring protection and extra firepower was not that better in any altitude range.



> What exactly decrease in RoC if I may ask ? Type 99-II was ... 10 kg heavier. Combined weight of two guns was still less than a single MG 151/20. The difference in weight was really negligible and effect on rate of climb would be none.



There were two cannons, so 20 kg increase. 100 rounds of heavier ammo further tips the scales, especially when comapred with 60 rds of earlier Type 99-1. Addition of three 13 mm guns instead of two .303s adds another 70 kg, plus weight of heavier ammo. 
BTW - the MG 151/20 was 20% heavier than the Type 99-2, not 100%, and Germans used more powerful engines, in smaller aircraft.






> Argumentum ad hominem is an attack on an argument made by attacking the character, motive, or other attribute of the person making the argument. I dont attack You, your motives or attributes. I state that your statement was wrong, hence usage of word "absurd".
> Nothing personal tomo, I respect you while disagree with your opinions



If you think my statement is wrong, than please say so. 



> On a sidenote, I always wondered how would it be if Navy replaced 7.7 mm in A6M with 12.7 mm used in Oscar. Two 12.7 mm and two 20 mm sound a lot more better. Weight difference would really be negligible and there was plenty of room to put it.



The Army type 12.7 was not regarded as particulary reliable? 
Both IJA and IJN (and not just them) might've bought the Belgian developments of the Browning HMG, that was making 1000-1150 rpm prior ww2, and was offered on the market.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 5, 2016)

> The P-51D was at 4.10 sq ft, Fw 190A8 at 5.22, Fw 190D-9 at 4.77; bothFocke Wulfs were smaller and with thinner wing than Zero. Buffalo was at 6.27, stubby as it was, so I think the value you've posted for the Model 21 is too low. Talk 5 to 5.5 sq ft? Increased once the armament grew.
> P-40 was as high as 5.71, P-39 as low as 4.63.



I base it on 1976 publication titled : "Fighter Comparison Study No. 1 - The Curtiss P-40C vs The Mitsubishi A6M2 Model 21 Zero-Sen" by Murray Rubenstein which gives indicated above numbers. 
Here is a brief description from the source : 


> How can the Zero-sen, with bulky radial engine, be cleaner than a P-40 with a liquid cooled engine ? To begin with, Zero-Sen's engine was nicely cowled, with a large spinner. It's wing was exceptionally clean and the greatest attention was paid to wing and tail fillets.
> By comparison, the P-40 had its radiator chin-mounted (hardly the cleanest location), with bulges under each wing to house the landing gear struts. The P-40 had an interesting gear retraction mechanism, with the strut rotating 90 degrees so the wheel could lie flat directly behind the hinge point. As a result of the design options chosen by the designers of the P-40, the Curtiss fighter had marginally higher profile drag. Because its wing had a lower aspect ratio than that of the Zero-Sen, the P-40 induced drag was also higher.


So for now I will take it, since its actual written source. 

Also, at the same time the armament grew (added drag of long barreled Type 99s) the shape of the engine cowling was improved and wing was changed, since A6M5 had shorter wingspan to improve roll rate . 



> Once the V-1710 received a 'faster' supercharger drive, both P-40N and P-39N were far better performers, especially under 15000 ft, and Zero, that started aquiring protection and extra firepower was not that better in any altitude range.



Which was also explained by Jiro Horikoshi :


> No matter how the government tried to distort the news, these requests for redesign clearly told the story of the Zero's ordeal and difficult situation Japan faced. The most significant request was for bulletproofing [providing protection for pilot and fuel tanks], a feature which had not been even been mentioned in the Zero's initial planning requirements. Over the years, the lack of bulletproofing has frequently been mentioned as a weak point of the Zero. The reason for this shortcoming was that the aircraft could not afford the additional weight necessary for bulletproofing, given the requirement stipulated with respect to heavy armament, long range capability, speed and maneuverability. These items took priority over anything else, and since we did not have [at that time] reliable high-power engines, bulletproofing was sacrificed.



Zero was based on experiences gained in China, no need for protection was indicated in late 1930s when requirements were presented to Mitsubishi. Need for protection appeared later, when design was finished and any major changes would have to come at a price. 

Anyway, P-39 even in improved models never became a favorite machine of the USAAF and pilots achieved in it relatively low success if compared to Corsair, Hellcat or others. While in regard to P-40 ... it achieved better performance not only because of the engine but also dropping some firepower and "unnecessary" equipment which effected in weight drop of over 600 pounds if compared to P-40E. 



> There were two cannons, so 20 kg increase. 100 rounds of heavier ammo further tips the scales, especially when comapred with 60 rds of earlier Type 99-1. Addition of three 13 mm guns instead of two .303s adds another 70 kg, plus weight of heavier ammo.


Well, I mentioned one. I assumed that basic math is obvious. But yes, 20 kg increase. 

100 round magazines were used since A6M3 was delivered to the units, that is Summer 1942. A6M2s were also provided with those larger magazines eventually. So there was no gain in ammunition load related to the change of the guns.
And the loaded magazines of Type 99-II ammunition were not that much heavier, Shinpachi in one of his threads was kind enough to provide manual for Type 99 with weight tables for guns, additional parts and weight of ammunition. Weight of the 100 round magazine for Type 99-I was 37.04 kg, weight of 100 round magazine for Type 99-II was 39.3 kg. 
That's a weight increase of ... 4 kilograms for two guns. With added weight of two guns that brings 24 kilograms. 

Also, I thought this was related to a 1943 model ? 

But when you mentioned 13.2 mm Type 3 MGs than there was further increase in load of Type 99s, since they became belt fed. Since A6M5a Type 99s carried 125 rounds per gun, total weight of 20 mm ammunition indicated in manual for A6M5 is 57 kg.

Now for the 13.2 mm Type 3 machine guns. Nose mounted has weigth indicated as 27.5 kg, weight of 230 rounds for it - 32.5 kg.
Two wing mounted - 55 kg and ammunition for them - 68 kg.

A pair of Type 97 machine guns had a total weight of 27 kg, weight of 1400 rounds was 48 kg.

So if I do a simple math the combined weight increase was 84.5 kilograms. 



> The Army type 12.7 was not regarded as particulary reliable?


No, thats not correct. It was reliable. What caused reliability problems was the Italian ammunition and Italian guns, here is a translation of "The Maru Mechanic" vol.45 (1984), page 27, about the 12.7 mm guns used for Ki-43 :
"Early models of Ki-43 used a "Type I" [i.e. Type-Italian] 12.7 mm cannon made in Italy (Breda-SAFAT I guess) to enhance the firepower of 7.7 mm. However, the explosive ammo [imported from Italy] often jammed Type I during flight. Japanese explosive 12.7 mm ammo (made in Japan) didn't jam Type I cannon, but there was a risk of explosion inside the gun barrel due to oversensitive charge, which was soon corrected. "
Provisional safety measure was taken by putting gun barrels into a steel tubes.

The risk of explosion during the flight was considered better than not being able to shoot at all [Italian ammo], hence they used Japanese ammo instead. Later on, once they replaced Type-i with Ho-103 12.7 mm cannons manufactured in Japan in combination with Japanese explosive ammo, the explosion accidents no longer took place.



> Both IJA and IJN (and not just them) might've bought the Belgian developments of the Browning HMG, that was making 1000-1150 rpm prior ww2, and was offered on the market.



So could Germans, British, Soviets and French. But each of them favored their own developments.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 5, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> I base it on 1976 publication titled : "Fighter Comparison Study No. 1 - The Curtiss P-40C vs The Mitsubishi A6M2 Model 21 Zero-Sen" by Murray Rubenstein which gives indicated above numbers.
> Here is a brief description from the source :
> 
> So for now I will take it, since its actual written source.
> ...



Major changes were needed, since the aircraft don't fly by themselves, but trained and experienced men are needed to extract the true potential from them. No protection? Bad decision, since fighters engage not just other fighter, but also bombers and the like, plus they might come close to ground fire. Pilots don't grow on trees.
Not trying to bash the Zero here, the IJN needed to have the new design in the pipeline by the time 1st Zero squadron entered service.



> Anyway, P-39 even in improved models never became a favorite machine of the USAAF and pilots achieved in it relatively low success if compared to Corsair, Hellcat or others. While in regard to P-40 ... it achieved better performance not only because of the engine but also dropping some firepower and "unnecessary" equipment which effected in weight drop of over 600 pounds if compared to P-40E.



Re. P-40N - laws of physics still apply, or, no free lunch. The USAF have had plenty to choose, no need for the P-39. Unlike the IJN for the carriers they have left - it was Zero or nothing.




> ...
> So if I do a simple math the combined weight increase was 84.5 kilograms.



You're probably correct.



> ...
> The risk of explosion during the flight was considered better than not being able to shoot at all [Italian ammo], hence they used Japanese ammo instead. Later on, once they replaced Type-i with Ho-103 12.7 mm cannons manufactured in Japan in combination with Japanese explosive ammo, the explosion accidents no longer took place.



Thanks for that. Looks like the problems with Army 12.7 mm were solved by late 1942/early 1943, at least after reading this: link.



> So could Germans, British, Soviets and French. But each of them favored their own developments.



British were buying abroad, so did the Japanese, just on greater scale. Buying the pre-war Belgian design instead of Italian, French and/or American does not look like far fatched thing. 
The Belgian gun would've come in handy for the Bf 109, Hurricane and Spitfire, and as defensive weapon for bombers, but the Europeans were also entitled to make mistakes


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## Shortround6 (Mar 5, 2016)

What is often left out of simple comparisons of weapons is just what level of failure or malfunctions the various countries or services considered "unreliable" or excessive. Also what guns/ammo did on test stands on the ground vrs what they did in the air (especially while pulling 3-4 "G"s. 
I am personally rather doubtful of the rate of fire of the pre-war Belgian Browning gun, at least at the level of malfunction/parts breakage that would actually be acceptable to some customers. I would note that Colt was the major producer of Browning patent firearms in the US while FN was the manufacturer in the Europe and for some of the rest of the world. There was some level of cooperation between the two companies. 
The Japanese Navy 13mm machine gun was basically a copy of the standard .50 cal Browning adapted to take the French 13.2mm round used in the Hotchkiss MG already in use by the Japanese navy and Army. The round was little more than the standard .50 case necked up by 0.5mm and the neck shortened by 3-6mm (some batches/sources vary). It might even be possible to put a .50 cal round in a 13.2mm chamber, not a good idea to pull the trigger though  
It took the US about 3 years to get the rate of fire (or a bit higher) that the pre-war Belgian Browning was claiming _at a parts breakage and malfuction rate _that was acceptable to the US authorities. 
It is not 'magic'. The Breda-safat and the Japanese army 12.7 both used shorter rounds, 18mm shorter cases and shorter bullets so the overall cartridge was even shorter which allowed for shorter bolt/breech block travel per cycle. They could get higher rates of fire with the same bolt speeds and stress on parts. 
Now individual armorers/gunsmiths (hackers) could certainly play with springs/file parts, drill holes to lighten things and get guns up to pretty high rates of fire but the US standard for parts breakage and malfunctions was for a round count (5000 rounds I believe) that would have seen a Russian Berezin UB replaced at least once if not twice ( one reason for the Berezin's light weight). The US certainly paid for that durability in weight. 

Also when comparing guns most tables/charts give the weight of the bare gun. Some belt feed guns to not include the weight of the belt feed device like used on Hispanos. Most drum feed guns do not include the weight of the drum. Nobody includes weights of mounts/brackets/gun heaters/cocking systems and other bits and pieces. 
One table I have for the Oerlikon FFS (which used a slightly longer round than the FFL or Japanese type 99 II)
shows a weight of 9kg for a 45 round drum, 10kg for a 60-65 round drum*, 12 kg for a 75 round drum and 13kg for a 100 round drum. weight per round of ammo was 240 grams. 
*table says 65 round but may be a miss-print. It is the only place I have seen 65 round drum and making a 65 round and 75 round doesn't make sense, especially since we know they did make 60 round drums and plenty of them. 
Even if it is printed if something seems too good to be true it just may be a miss-print.

I would note that these weights agree pretty well with the weights given for the Japanese guns, that is 37kg for loaded 100 drum. I wouldn't worry too much about a 2kg difference in weight out of 35-37kg. 

I would note however that it does bring the weight of the 99 II a lot closer to the weight of an MG 151.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 5, 2016)

> No protection? Bad decision, since fighters engage not just other fighter, but also bombers and the like, plus they might come close to ground fire. Pilots don't grow on trees.



The requirements for 12-Shi Carrier fighter were stipulated in October 1937. At that time the only military that decided to provide any protection for fighters was VVS. They introduced a 9 mm thick plate protecting pilots head in 1936 for the I-15 and I-16 fighters. Those fighter in late production variants were also provided with with a system of piping that captured engine exhaust gases, cooled them , and introduced into the fuel tank to reduce the oxygen content of the vapor left in the tank as fuel was consumed. Those were first measures taken to provide any protection.

Germany provided no protection for their early 109 E-3 and E-1 models, which was confirmed by examination of wrecks in Poland and France. However later on newly produced 109 E-4s were provided with two 8 mm thick bolt on armor plates, a head protection plate (about 29 pounds) and a back plate (53 pounds), this was also provided before Battle of Britain for 109 E-3 and E-1 models left in service. By July 1940 some of the 109s were also provided with bulletproof windshield.
Bf 109 E had no protected fuel tanks until the end of Battle of Britain and only protection was provided by a laminated bulkhead behind the fuel tank.

British introduced armor and bulletproof windshield in late spring or early summer of 1940, which as you have mentioned has affected the Spitfire performance. Armor has added for instance 73 pounds to the Spitfire weight. In fact first Spitfires with new windshield were given to No 92 Squadron in May 1940 when unit has entered combat. Spitfires in No 92 Squadron received armored plates in June 1940 as did a number of Spitfires and Hurricanes in other units.
In case of fuel tank protection the only thing provided was a "Linatex" which was a blanket of rubber and treated canvas of thickness no greater than 5 to 15 mm, it was provided first to the Hurricans and Spitfires (either retrofitted to older models or introduced to newly produced aircraft) in September 1940, though not all fuel tanks were even covered. In case of Spitfire the upper fuel tank in front of the cockpit was left uncovered, same was for the reserve fuel tank directly in front of the pilot of Hurricane. Protection was also claimed very inadequate against Luftwaffe armament.
And the reason all this was introduced ? Because RAF was sustaining heavy losses. Based on their experienced RAF decided to provide protective measures for their pilots. 

It wasn't until 1941 when flexible rubber self-sealing fuel tanks became a standard on 109 F and than G models and on Spitfire IX and other models in the early days of 1942. For instance standard German fuel tank from that time was made out of an inner lining of rubberized fabric and layers of vulcanized rubber, think raw rubber, thick raw rubber and vulcanized rubber of a total thickness of 15 mm. The tank weighed 121 pounds if compared to 58 pounds for the Bf 109 E fuel tanks.

In regard to US efforts, a great emphasis was put on producing a full rubber fuel tank capable of resisting some damage of .50 caliber bullets and providing the armor protection, based on direct observation of Battle of Britain as well as industrial support that US shown by producing aircraft for France and Britain. By the end of 1941 a policy was introduced to provide every fighter aircraft with armor to protect pilot and basic form of fuel tank protection, but as I mentioned earlier only fully protected fighters in Philippines were P-40E. In regard to Navy F2A-3 was provided with such protection, having protected fuel tanks, bulletproof windshield and armored plate behind pilot back but that resulted in great weight increase over F2A-2 model and decrease of performance.
On contrary F4F-3 had neither armor nor fuel tank protection though there were plans to retrofit them but they didnt have them until Spring of 1942. And that also came with own problems, in April 1942 VF-42 or VF-3 Wildcats began to encountered troubles. Self-sealing fuel tanks began to leak, due to various forms of deterioration. Gasoline with high aromatic content used by the US Navy virtually attacked tanks, the rubber would blister and begin to slough off particles which would block fuel lines. This for instance disabled at some point 8 of 19 Wildcats operated by VF-42. Exactly same problem was encountered by Buffalo pilots in January 1942 or other fighters in similar time.

At the same time Japanese started developing A6M there was no other military that provided full form of protection and only Soviets provided a partial protection for a pilot. By the time A6M2 entered service in 1940 the first protective measures were taken by the RAF and Luftwaffe based on the losses they sustained and experiences of their pilots.
And what were the experiences of the Japanese ? A small group of A6M2 virtually wiped Chinese opposition shooting about 100 aircraft for the loss of no fighters, except for the two shot down by AA. Opening rounds of the WW2 again indicated no need to provide any form of protection and even Battle of Midway tragic for aircraft carriers, brought very positive comments on A6M2 combat performance.

So the statement that Japanese Navy sacrificed the protection in favor of performance is flat wrong. They could not give up on something they never had, and others only introduced at similar time after negative war experiences.

Source : "Exploding Fuel Tanks - Saga of Technology That Changed the Course of the Pacific Air War" by Richard Dunn, chapters 1 and 2.



> Thanks for that. Looks like the problems with Army 12.7 mm were solved by late 1942/early 1943, at least after reading this


Yes, you can 100% trust Rick Dunn research. I mean US Government and NASA do, so ... 

The amount of failures was decreasing through 1942, there is a report from early to mid 1942 indicating amount of damaged guns and parts of the guns and how they were repaired. Its in Japanese though.


Edit : Seems something got wrong with your quoting tomo and I missed first points. Sorry.



> A book != always creditable source. You will note that I gave bigger drag for the P-40 than that 'Study'.
> Source for my numbers is the 'America's hundred thousand', a book, while not without a mistake (like 390-400 mph figure for the XP-39), is well worth a read. The chin radiator is indeed not ideal, but it is not that bad, it got there as an improvement over belly radiator (that was not that good as in the P-51) in P-40 and Typhoon.
> 
> If you wish to believe that Zero was more streamlined than Fw 190D-9 or Spitfire, I have Brooklyn bridge for sale.


So there is a book and a book, now we go into argument my book is better than your book  ? That sounds funny.

I dont have "America's hundred thousand", wanted to buy it long ago but price is to scary. Especially with shipping. Will get it at some point for sure though.

Anyway, the other source for the equivalent profile drag area I have is original Japanese edition of 堀越・奥宮の「零戦」 (Zero fighter) by Jiro Horikoshi and Masatake Okumiya. There was in 1958 (I believe) a translated to English version under same title, published by Cassell & Co LTD 35 Red Lion Square, London, W.C. 1; copyright by Martin Caidin, 1958. A small note at the bottom of the copyright page says that the book was made and printed in Great Britain by William Clowes and Sons, Limited, London and Beccles.

It provides a table with basic data, including Drag Coefficient, *Wing Area* and _equivalent profile drag area_ :
抵抗係数 * 翼面積 (m2)* _等価抵抗面積 (m2) (sq. ft.)_
Ａ６Ｍ１ 0.0200 22.44 0.449 -> 4.832 
Ａ６Ｍ３ 0.0215 21.53 0.463 -> 4.983

A6M2 would be between the two of those. It's a bit higher than what "Fighter Comparison Study No. 1" indicated, but still below 5 sq. ft.

And tomo, its not a matter of belief but matter of basing on some sources. You provided none for A6M, only assumed.

But thats less relevant if its cleaner than FW-190 or not. Original point you made :


> even of drag is a a bit greater than in those US fighters.


Which in regard to P-40 is not correct and I refereed to that.




> Shorter wing span does not mean that wing profile get thinner. Decreased aspect ratio adds drag.


You got any numbers for those possibly ? I mean for the wing.


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## pbehn (Mar 5, 2016)

stona said:


> 1 The bombers did alright in prewar exercises against Hurricanes because the umpires were using faulty assumptions to decide what got killed. Far too much weight was given to the bombers' defensive fire and far too little to the fighters offensive fire.
> Bomber Command did not cooperate in Park/Dowding's immediate prewar exercises which meant that at Group level it had no idea that Fighter Command's 11 Group was achieving theoretical interception rates of 60%. The Bomber men also reckoned that flights or single aircraft would be less liable to detection and interception, something they continued to believe until the shooting war proved them wrong. In the wrong hands, even with Fighter Command's system, the bombers could still get through as Leigh Mallory famously demonstrated on one exercise.
> *The exercises were run as gunnery training for the bombers from what I read, the conclusion was that (as well as I remember re defensive fighters) the more they send up the more we will shoot down, even a child can see that a Hampden or a flight of them cannot lay covering fire against attacking fighter.*
> 2 There a limit to what can be fore seen. France was considered the preeminent land based military power in Europe in the 1930s. Her collapse in short order was literally inconceivable to prewar planners.
> ...



Steve I was just making general points, basically about false assumptions. If you take the first flight by the Wright brothers as a marker, then see the progress between 1914 and 1918 in aviation, looking at aviation in 1939 and projecting the same progress forward it is in hindsight no surprise that jet fighters, 1000 bomber raids, precision day and night time bombing, fused projectiles, radar laying of defences and guidance of fighters appeared, the only question was who got them first advanced them and made best use.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
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## MiTasol (Mar 6, 2016)

I have spent some time over the last 12 months researching aircraft production in WW2 and I would rate the Germans biggest mistake as refusing to change their first production priority from consumer products to military products until 1943. Hitler did not want to disrupt the peacetime economy so civilian cars and washing machines were given a higher priority than aircraft. 

Compare that with the US and Britain where the car industry were drafted (well before the war in Britain's case) and produced tonnes of aircraft against Germany where the biggest auto producer, Opal, was not drafted until 1944.

Another big problem the German's had was their apprenticeship programme. This resulted in low numbers of highly qualified staff. The UK and US on the other hand used specialized training so they had a massive number of people with a high level of skill in a very small part of the production process. Although the German worker could do almost any job on the production line with a high level of skill, the Brits and Yanks could only do one job but do it much better.

The Americans designed aircraft to be machine made. Forming a wing or fuselage rib took seconds in a large press. The Brits were far more into wing ribs and other components made from dozens of small parts all riveted together - massively time consuming. There is a video at 
_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qi6PdWHSVG8_
showing how the fuselage frames on the Me108 were made. That makes the Brits look efficient. 

For the Japanese I think the policy that most males must leave school at 15 to go into military factories and then on 16th birthday go into the military was almost as serious a problem as the refusal of the army and navy to cooperate on virtually anything. Instead of stable well trained factory staff with low staff turnover the Japanese had rapid staff turnover. They spent months training a person and then, as soon as he became fully proficient, lost him to the military.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> ...
> Source : "Exploding Fuel Tanks - Saga of Technology That Changed the Course of the Pacific Air War" by Richard Dunn, chapters 1 and 2.



Thanks for the effort to type this all out.



> So there is a book and a book, now we go into argument my book is better than your book  ? That sounds funny.
> 
> I dont have "America's hundred thousand", wanted to buy it long ago but price is to scary. Especially with shipping. Will get it at some point for sure though.



My point was that even the most well researched and written books have mistakes, mis-prints and othe glitches, some more some less obvoiusly.



> ...
> It provides a table with basic data, including Drag Coefficient, *Wing Area* and _equivalent profile drag area_ :
> 抵抗係数 * 翼面積 (m2)* _等価抵抗面積 (m2) (sq. ft.)_
> Ａ６Ｍ１ 0.0200 22.44 0.449 -> 4.832
> ...



I was trying to put the numbers into a perspective, since drag figures for the Zero you've posted were suspiciously low. The Zero is supposedly more sreamlined (lower Cd0) than Bf 109F4, P-39, P-63, the aircraft with a shortcoming or two, but still with far more speed on same power used, than Zero.
I've given the flat plate for the P-40 that is even higher than what you've posted.



> You got any numbers for those possibly ? I mean for the wing.



You might want to check out here, the greater aspect ratio (AR) means that Cd is lower.


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## stona (Mar 6, 2016)

A precis from Sebastian Ritchie's 'Industry and Air Power'.
The British aircraft industry employed just 41,000 people in 1935 of whom 7,000 were deemed administrative or technical. Fulfilment of the re-armament programmes obviously depended on an increase in these figures. The official government policy was that re-armament should not interfere with normal trade, compulsory transfers were out of the question. The aircraft industry would compete with civil industry for staff and labour, Britain was not a dictatorship.

There was a geographic problem too. In this period most of the British aircraft industry was located in the south of the country whereas the majority of the available and unemployed engineers were in the north. People were by no means as mobile (much less willing to leave their families and communities) in the 1930s as they are today. It's an aspect of social history rarely taken into account.

When the aircraft industry recruited unskilled workers from other industries it faced serious opposition from the unions.

Historians such as RAC Parker and Corelli Barnett have argued that manpower shortages in all types of labour seriously undermined the efficiency of Britain's wartime economy, including the aircraft industry.
In fact it can be shown that the British aircraft industry did make more efficient use of its manpower resources than the Germans, but it was never easy and in some areas there was always a shortage, most damaging was the shortage of mangers, draughtsmen and other technical personnel, not semi or unskilled labour.

Maintaining the level of qualified technical personnel for industry had nothing to do with the Air Ministry.It was the responsibility of the Board of Education. Efforts were made to improve technical education between the wars but were restricted by government retrenchment, lack of funds, and also by the resistance of industry to the daytime release of staff for training.
It wasn't until 1938-39 that 11 new junior technical schools were opened.
British universities produced about 1,000 graduate engineers per year, only about 100 qualified in 'aeronautics'.
Of the 1,200,000 students enrolled in technical institutions in 1939 only 50,000 attended full time.
When Blackburn approached the Air Ministry with a plan for a national policy for technical training for the aircraft industry it was day release that proved the insurmountable sticking point. The Air Ministry argued that

_"it could not be party to any attempt to bring pressure on the aircraft firms to secure day-time release."_

There were however private schemes, financed by the industry that would later gain Air Ministry support.
The pre-war sequence of short term re-armament programmes and a lack of longer term objectives proved the biggest obstacle to improving technical education
It was only the out break of war that finally precipitate a series of training programmes in technical colleges and universities, significantly increasing the number of qualified engineers.

Just a couple of examples of the effect of this shortage.
The need to economise in the use of design resources meant that less importance was placed on the introduction of new types and more on improving existing types.
It took 330,000 man hours to design the Mark I Spitfire. Only 620,000 man hours were needed to design ALL the subsequent wartime Marks
The same economic realities lay behind Rolls Royce's decision to abandon the Vulture engine in 1941. Hives wrote.

_"We were certain that we could make a better contribution to the RAF both as regards quality and numbers, by developing the Merlin."_

Similar arguments exist in other areas. Where the British far outstripped the Germans was in the organisation of labour. During the early stages of re-armament the British just about managed to fulfil the requirement for skilled labour. Like all contemporary aircraft industries it depended on a small highly skilled work force.
Importantly, from the outset, the British worked to increase the ratio of unskilled to skilled labour, by mechanisation, upgrading and subdivision of operations etc. This led to a 'de-skilling' of the work force which, combined with new manufacturing methods, led to significantly higher productivity (compared to the skilled processes).
There was a policy of substantial sub contracting to other firms as a means of alleviating shortages in the aircraft industry itself.

There were problems with this unskilled work force. In February 1941 productive hours equivalent to 41 Merlin engines had been worked at Glasgow, but only 15 engines had been produced. Hives was not amused. He wrote that

_"Clydeside is seething with communism...it is inevitable that in any new factory we collect a lot of rabble, who seize control of the shop stewards and shop committee."_

Roy Dobson, one of the outstanding managers of the period, wrote to the MAP informing it of problems at A.V.Roe's new Yeadon works.

_"My main trouble so far as labour is concerned at Yeadon is the refusal of the workpeople to be properly disciplined, we having been constantly embroiled in the last couple of months in the difficult task of simply forcing discipline down their throats and trying to educate them to workshop conditions. All this is due to the fact that practically all the labour at Yeadon is one of the 'greenest' and most of it has never been in a workshop before and does not understand the necessities of production." _

That there were problems is hardly surprising when you consider that the number of people involved in airframe manufacture rose from 15,000 in 1935 to 262,000 in 1941. The figures for aero engines are 12,000 to 133,000.

In 1940 973,00 British workers produced 15,049 aircraft with a structure weight of 59 million pound
In 1940 1,000,000 German workers produced 10,247 aircraft. I don't have a figure for structure weight.

These comparative figures got steadily worse for the Germans as the war continued.

Cheers

Steve


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## Hiromachi (Mar 6, 2016)

Uff, what a rough day. Writing papers for my university is so annoying ...



> Thanks for the effort to type this all out.


I just felt necessary to put things into perspective. Because common view is that one side had all best protection right from the start and the other had nothing and made a huge mistake because of their negligence. In long term we know it was a mistake. But it came not because of negligence, but because of different experiences.
Navy in fact took an effort and certain teams were assigned for research, but they started comparatively 2-3 years later than British or Germans and the results would also come later. Army on the other hand decided to make small steps and field tested some protective measures, Ki-27b were tested with first generation self-sealing fuel tanks, Ki-21s were first Japanese bombers to receive armor plates before the outbreak of the world war two. And even though it did not became a standard, it allowed by 1943 to start producing Ki-43s, Ki-61s and other machines with armored plates and protected fuel tanks.
But this again was behind other Nations which had 2-3 years of experience in the field.



> My point was that even the most well researched and written books have mistakes, mis-prints and othe glitches, some more some less obvoiusly.



But you still assume that only your book is right. I actually took 「零戦」and compared it to English edition, same tables and same results. There might be something missing and possibility of a mistake exists, but by far its closest source to technical aspects of a Zero.



> I was trying to put the numbers into a perspective, since drag figures for the Zero you've posted were suspiciously low. The Zero is supposedly more sreamlined (lower Cd0) than Bf 109F4, P-39, P-63, the aircraft with a shortcoming or two, but still with far more speed on same power used, than Zero.



The Drag Coefficient is what it is, that's what was provided with table along with prop efficiency and so on.

But explain to me why do you assume they have the same power. I mean it looks like you compare all of them flat without taking into consideration the engine and thrust. Level speed is relation between thrust and drag. Even if the drag looks "suspiciously low" A6M2 is still an aircraft making 335 mph at 16,000 feet at rated power (so approximately 950 HP), with overboost it goes to 340-345 mph.
If compared to I-16 Type 24 (another radial engine after all) doing like 287 mph at same altitude with similar power from the engine ?




> You might want to check out here, the greater aspect ratio (AR) means that Cd is lower.


I was still expecting some actual numbers. I mean you assumed something so I thought you had some numbers to base on. And I was very curious to see them, since I dont have any very detailed drawings on A6M airfoil.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2016)

Sorry if it sounded to you that I rate Western aircraft as the ones having all the best, from engines, armament to protection. Eg. Soviets 1st started to add protection to their fighters, others followed quickly or slowly. The point is that Zero received pilot protection when it was too late, the weight of protection and drag and weight from uprated armament cut speed, RoC and ceiling. Fuel tanks were never self-sealing? Zero never received engines of 1500, let alone of 2000 HP (no feasible), so I'd repeat again that IJN pilots, and hence carriers, and hence Japan, were forced to receive services of a lesser fighter than Japan was capable to produce. A fighter based around Ha-41, later upgraded with Ha 109 was a possibility, or using the Kasei, just that we move away from Kinsei theme.
Japan/IJA/IJN was in war from 1937, unlike RAF, let alone USAF. In 1937-late 1940 there was no Zero around. Nor there was Ki 43, that also wound up without protection from start.



> *But you still assume that only your book is right.* I actually took 「零戦」and compared it to English edition, same tables and same results. There might be something missing and possibility of a mistake exists, but by far its closest source to technical aspects of a Zero.



Re. bolded part - don't jump to the conclusions. I've already stated that book has a mistake or two, and gave bigger Cd0 value for the P-40. If you have a better source for Cd0 values I've posted, then post them out.
In case original is stating one number/value, you can be sure that translation will state the same value. Same as many books wrongly stated that P-39 was used as a tank buster by VVS, repeating one from another.



Hiromachi said:


> But explain to me why do you assume they have the same power. I mean it looks like you compare all of them flat without taking into consideration the engine and thrust. Level speed is relation between thrust and drag. Even if the drag looks "suspiciously low" A6M2 is still an aircraft making 335 mph at 16,000 feet at rated power (so approximately 950 HP), with overboost it goes to 340-345 mph.
> If compared to I-16 Type 24 (another radial engine after all) doing like 287 mph at same altitude with similar power from the engine ?



Please re-read my post. I've stated that, on same power used, they will be faster than Zero. Not that they have had same power, their engines were capable for greater power.
Eg. the heavy clunker P-39D with 7 guns aboard will do 360 mph at 6000 m (~19500 ft), using less than 900 HP. The lightweight (comparatively) and less draggy P-39C will do another 10 mph?
The lightweight A6M3 will do 340 mph, and still lightweight A6M5 some 350 mph, with 50-100 HP more.



Hiromachi said:


> I was still expecting some actual numbers. I mean you assumed something so I thought you had some numbers to base on. And I was very curious to see them, since I dont have any very detailed drawings on A6M airfoil.



Lower AR -> greater drag. I did not assumed anything, the equation is there in you invest the effort to read the linked part of the page.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 6, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Sorry if it sounded to you that I rate Western aircraft as the ones having all the best, from engines, armament to protection.


Hey mate, I'm not offended or something. I just know a common view on this or rather a given presumption.



> The point is that Zero received pilot protection when it was too late, the weight of protection and drag and weight from uprated armament cut speed, RoC and ceiling. Fuel tanks were never self-sealing?


Yes, that is true. It received it only when it became absolute need and it was known that replacement (A7M) is not coming soon.
Also, I have manuals from Model 21 to model 63 series, and in section for model 52 upgrades (so model 52c) there are drawings for rubber covered fuel tanks. There is a cross section showing the inside of the tank as well as all layers of covering. It has separate drawings for main fuel tank in fuselage, two inboard fuel tanks and two small fuel tanks close to the wingtips.

No idea how many actually had them, but at least factory drawings indicate such existence.



> Zero never received engines of 1500, let alone of 2000 HP (no feasible), so I'd repeat again that IJN pilots, and hence carriers, and hence Japan, were forced to receive services of a lesser fighter than Japan was capable to produce. A fighter based around Ha-41, later upgraded with Ha 109 was a possibility, or using the Kasei, just that we move away from Kinsei theme.


Problem is not if such aircraft could be built. Problem is if it could keep the requirements for range or climb time with added weight coming from a lot more fuel, presumably stronger armament, additional protection ?



> Japan/IJA/IJN was in war from 1937, unlike RAF, let alone USAF. In 1937-late 1940 there was no Zero around. Nor there was Ki 43, that also wound up without protection from start.


Japan was in a very different war and as much as on the ground it could not defeat the Chinese, the combat in the air was rather favoring them.
And while Navy decided to focus on research only, the losses Army sustained during Khalkin Gol boosted it to field test first generation fuel tanks and some armored plates. No, first Ki-43s did not have protected fuel tanks, but by the end of production Model I such protection was introduced.




> In case original is stating one number/value, you can be sure that translation will state the same value. Same as many books wrongly stated that P-39 was used as a tank buster by VVS, repeating one from another.


Well, it also lists drag coefficient for Ki-46, J2M1, J2M2/3, A7M1 and A7M2. And you most likely see them as too low as well. Perhaps something might be missing that we cant see because its a book, something that author could have assumed as obvious.

But thankfully I know someone who is into this business in reality and there is a simple way to check if things make sense or they dont. 
Book gives following prop efficiency for A6M3 to A6M5 -> 0.76 
If we put all this into simple verification :





You just put mass, wing area, wingspan - those come from factory manual. 
Speed and engine power come from flight manual and engine manual. 
Propeller efficiency comes from same Jiro Horikoshi book. 
I only didnt have exact Oswald so its a bit estimation. But it is close enough to prove that CD0 is not wrong, even if some inputs could not be 100 % certain this gives a clear view.



> The lightweight A6M3 will do 340 mph, and still lightweight A6M5 some 350 mph, with 50-100 HP more.


There was no power gain between A6M3 and A6M5. They all used Sakae 21.
The actually thing that made the difference between them was addition of exhaust thrust, since the exhaust was changed from collective tubes going below the wings to individual stacks directed to the rear. This provided over 20 km/h speed gain.

Edit: Unless you mean in comparison to A6M2 ? In that case 0.0200 also is not applicable but closer to 0.0215. 
First one is related to A6M1 with twin bladed prop and Zuisei engine.


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## pbehn (Mar 6, 2016)

MiTasol said:


> The Americans designed aircraft to be machine made. Forming a wing or fuselage rib took seconds in a large press. The Brits were far more into wing ribs and other components made from dozens of small parts all riveted together - massively time consuming. .



By the time the USA were designing their aircraft the war was certain. The original orders for the Spitfire were for 310 aircraft. The Spitfire was never meant to do what it did it should have been replaced by other AC but wasnt, you have a completely different design philosophy when designing and producing 300 aircraft or 20,000


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> ...
> Yes, that is true. It received it [protection] only when it became absolute need and it was known that replacement (A7M) is not coming soon.



Need, whether absolute or not, arose in second half of 1942. The Zero with protection (52c) was available from Oct 1944.



> Problem is not if such aircraft could be built. Problem is if it could keep the requirements for range or climb time with added weight coming from a lot more fuel, presumably stronger armament, additional protection ?



It could. The Zero carried one drop tank (66 gals?) and ~150 gals of fuel internally. Use two drop tanks and 170 gals internally. With Ha-41, a bit more with Ha-109 or Kasei.



> Japan was in a very different war and as much as on the ground it could not defeat the Chinese, the combat in the air was rather favoring them.
> And while Navy decided to focus on research only, the losses Army sustained during Khalkin Gol boosted it to field test first generation fuel tanks and some armored plates. No, first Ki-43s did not have protected fuel tanks, but by the end of production Model I such protection was introduced.



So we have two problems. One is well known - Army and Navy don't love each other, no information exchange. Another - 4 years until Army is installing meaningful protection, compared with eg. 1 year for RAF? Another year for Navy.



> Well, it also lists drag coefficient for Ki-46, J2M1, J2M2/3, A7M1 and A7M2. And you most likely see them as too low as well. Perhaps something might be missing that we cant see because its a book, something that author could have assumed as obvious.



If you have the numbers, don't mind me, just post the stuff.



> ...
> You just put mass, wing area, wingspan - those come from factory manual.
> Speed and engine power come from flight manual and engine manual.
> Propeller efficiency comes from same Jiro Horikoshi book.
> ...


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## GrauGeist (Mar 6, 2016)

pbehn said:


> By the time the USA were designing their aircraft the war was certain. The original orders for the Spitfire were for 310 aircraft. The Spitfire was never meant to do what it did it should have been replaced by other AC but wasnt, you have a completely different design philosophy when designing and producing 300 aircraft or 20,000


However, the U.S. already had mass production in place for years before the war, prime example would be Ford, Chevrolet and Chrysler. Ford had pioneered a great deal of production-line aircraft manufacturing technology with their Trimotor, too.

The depression saw a scaled back output of products, but large aircraft companies like Lockheed, Consolidated, Douglas and Curtiss were using machine assisted production lines that enabled them to produce airframes quickly with lower overhead.

When the U.S. switched to a wartime production, numbers of produced units escelated dramatically, of course.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 6, 2016)

> Need, whether absolute or not, arose in second half of 1942.


No, losses were growing but I already quoted above a report Lt. Cdr. Mitsuo Kofukuda. He indicated that protection for the fuel tank is needed. As the Navy lagged behind in development of rubber protection the first and immediate solution was a CO2 fire extinguisher which was widely produced since 1943 and you could find it on aircraft like J2M, A6M, G4M ...

Japanese still felt that (despite the losses) situation is not alarming. Until second half of 1943 that was rather true.



> It could. The Zero carried one drop tank (66 gals?) and ~150 gals of fuel internally. Use two drop tanks and 170 gals internally. With Ha-41, a bit more with Ha-109 or Kasei.


I dont really want to break the bubble but Ha-41 and Ha-109 were 110 milometers wider, first one was 100 kg and second one 200 kg heavier. I dont even bring Kasei, which ... you know what they had to do to keep J2M as aerodynamic as possible.
But heavier and wider engine would require wider fuselage (and increase of frontal area would be the case) and weight of the engine would require at least stronger mounting.
Second of all, usage of two under-wing fuel tanks would require some strengthening of the wing structure. Those were not used until A6M5b I believe which had new A6M5 wing with additional strengthening added in model 52a.

That is a weight increase resulting also in increase of stall speed.

The only thing I really see here is usage of Ha-115-II. For unknown reason Sakae 31 had major issues with water injection, and yet almost the same engine (just different variation) was perfectly working for the Army. And that had decent increase of produced power along with great increase of time you can run engine at maximum power (pilots commented that Ki-43-III could be run up to 50 minutes at 100 % engine performance due to implementation of ADI).
I'd follow Ki-43 armoring/protection pattern in which case it was done gradually and had did not affect performance greatly. Ki-43-III while heavier still gad great maneuverability, range, 3 armored plates and well protected fuel tanks. And it used same engine, just newer variant.



> So we have two problems. One is well known - Army and Navy don't love each other, no information exchange. Another - 4 years until Army is installing meaningful protection, compared with eg. 1 year for RAF? Another year for Navy.


Army installed first protection actually earlier, first fuel tanks with basic protection were adopted in second year of Ki-21 production (so with Ki-21-Ib) which is actually before British or American bombers received such features. Some attempts to provide armor were also made. Last produced Ki-27b as I mentioned also were tested with rubber coated fuel tanks. 
Besides, 1 year ?
RAF indeed caught it fast, but they had a lot greater technology and resources to use. Their development reached practical level in 1939.
But that was rather first generation type of protection. 

And most importantly, they only did so because of the experiences. Japanese Army did so in less than a year after the outbreak of the war.



> Agreed.


Here is a very cool website in English presenting differences between early and late models of A6M5 : Variation of Zero fighter
The first models kicked out of factory were not much superior in performance to A6M3 model 22, however they had much better roll rate and some other characteristics that made them decent upgrade over older aircraft. Though some pilots were reluctant, and apparently it was happening, that veteran pilots kept older A6M2s and A6M3s due to tighter turn and ability to dodge easier.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2016)

Not everything revolves around Zero. BTW, people were installing radial engines on a V-12 fighters, worked just fine.

A brand new fighter needs to be designed around Ha-41. 170 gals, 2 cannons, 2 HMGs, 2 (later all 4 cannons), protection for fuel tanks and pilot, drop tanks, Fowler/butterfly flaps (keeps wing size down, and hence drag, for same or better maneuverability and low speed handling). Nothing beyond the scope of Japanese industry of early 1940s.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 7, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Not everything revolves around Zero.


Absolutely, I have a bit of a feeling that we have hijacked the thread 



> A brand new fighter needs to be designed around Ha-41.


Thank it is a different story, I thought it was about fitting a bigger engine to the Zero fuselage. But Ha-41 is not a good choice, it was shortly out of production as Ha-109 replaced it.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2016)

Ha 41 and Ha 109 are the members of same familiy of engines, Nakajima's NAL. The Ha 109 makes greater RPM and has 2-speed S/C. Thing is that Ha 41 is available one year earlier, 1940 instead in 1941 (for token number of engines), so the airframe designes can start with their job earlier. Once Ha 109 is available, switch to that engine; altitude power was in the ballpark with BMW 801C and ASh-82, but with far better reliability than BMW.

I know that we disagree, Zero (and Ki 43) needed better engines by mid/late 1942 than what they received. Having 4 carriers sunk by air power in one day looks like emergency to me, though Zero is only partly to blame for that.


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## stona (Mar 7, 2016)

MiTasol said:


> The Americans designed aircraft to be machine made. Forming a wing or fuselage rib took seconds in a large press. The Brits were far more into wing ribs and other components made from dozens of small parts all riveted together - massively time consuming.



Mechanisation was one way that the British compensated for the chronic lack of skilled labour in the aircraft industry. Machines are more precise than humans, if the holes are in the right place someone with an hours training can place the rivets.

The shortage of skilled labour was already evident in the mid 1930s as the relatively modest re-armament schemes were adopted. A 1935 report showed that skilled labour using handwork methods took from 10 to 50 times longer than semi skilled labour using mechanised production processes to perform comparable tasks.

The firms had good reason to introduce semi skilled or unskilled labour. There is a common misconception that the British aircraft companies were running extensive training programmes to produce suitably qualified workers, but this is not so. In April 1940 only one airframe firm, Rootes at Speke, was operating a long term training programme.
What the companies did was 'dilute' their work forces with semi and unskilled labour. This was enabled by several means, principally by more extensive jigging and tooling and the subdivision of operations. Some semi-skilled workers were upgraded to more skilled jobs (union problems here). The craft based nature of British Trade Unions meant that in one aircraft factory there were 24 unions active in one department alone!

As early as 1928 as the move towards metal construction was being discussed it was agreed by several leading aircraft firms that
_"aircraft work is for the most part (perhaps 75-85 per-cent) semi-skilled work."_
Vickers Aviation was the moving force behind the drive for dilution. By 1935 most aircraft firms still had a proportion of skilled labour in their work forces of around 50% whereas at Vickers it was just 27%.
One reason for this was that Vickers, being relatively prosperous in the early 1930s had the means to invest heavily in plant and machinery than smaller, independent, companies making small numbers of aircraft. Not all aircraft companies were the same. 

There were problems involved in de-skilling a work force, notably with Trade Unions, and it did cause difficulties. It didn't stop the British aircraft industry consistently and largely out producing its German counterpart. Production was lost to industrial action in Britain, that would not have been an option for a German worker. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Hiromachi (Mar 7, 2016)

> Ha 41 and Ha 109 are the members of same familiy of engines, Nakajima's NAL. The Ha 109 makes greater RPM and has 2-speed S/C. Thing is that Ha 41 is available one year earlier, 1940 instead in 1941 (for token number of engines), so the airframe designes can start with their job earlier. Once Ha 109 is available, switch to that engine; altitude power was in the ballpark with BMW 801C and ASh-82, but with far better reliability than BMW.


That is what I'm aware of. Point is that there are three problems I can think of :
- dry weight of Ha-109 has increased by 100 kg over Ha-41
- Ha-109 fuel consumption is higher by 20-30 liters 
- Ha-109 has second critical altitude 5200 meters, thats lower than Sakae 21. And I thought one of the issues to address is altitude performance ?



> I know that we disagree, Zero (and Ki 43) needed better engines by mid/late 1942 than what they received. Having 4 carriers sunk by air power in one day looks like emergency to me, though Zero is only partly to blame for that.


Wait, I thought the idea was to design new fighter around Ha-41/Ha-109, thus improving Zero would be pointless. 



> Having 4 carriers sunk by air power in one day looks like emergency to me, though Zero is only partly to blame for that.


I dont see any reason to blame A6M2 for the loss of the carriers. From the perspective of numbers of aircraft they shot down or damaged in relation to own losses A6M2 performed exceptionally well.


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## pbehn (Mar 7, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> When the U.S. switched to a wartime production, numbers of produced units escelated dramatically, of course.


True Graugeist but the point I was making was that you design and operate differently for different production volumes. When the spitfire was designed war was a possibility when the P51 was designed it was a fact and when the P51B/D were designed orders for thousands were guaranteed and the government was throwing up 1million sq/ft fatories to do it. Even now you do not set up a production line for small scale production, the cost and inflexibility make it counter productive.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> That is what I'm aware of. Point is that there are three problems I can think of :
> - dry weight of Ha-109 has increased by 100 kg over Ha-41
> - Ha-109 fuel consumption is higher by 20-30 liters
> - Ha-109 has second critical altitude 5200 meters, thats lower than Sakae 21. And I thought one of the issues to address is altitude performance ?



Main thing is to adress performance at all altitudes. So we don't have a situation where Allies deploy fighters with 1500-2200 HP at low level, with only IJA/IJN fighters with 1100-1150 HP to compete. We also avoid situation where a 300 mph bomber slips by and performs mast-height or skip bombing.
Sakae 21 makes 980 HP at 6 km, the Ha-109 will do ~1100 HP there (all metric HP, ie. CV). 
Most of the fighter aircraft that name received heavier and more powerful engines as war progressed. Hurricane, Bf 109, Spitfire, P-51, MC.200, indeed Ki-44 and host of Japanese and Soviet fighters. One of the things that made them better than prevoius types. The 'no free lunch' rule applies as ever.



> Wait, I thought the idea was to design new fighter around Ha-41/Ha-109, thus improving Zero would be pointless.



Improving Zero is an insurance in case the new fighter encunters problems during design, production and/or service. It was done by all major ww2 participants.



> I dont see any reason to blame A6M2 for the loss of the carriers. From the perspective of numbers of aircraft they shot down or damaged in relation to own losses A6M2 performed exceptionally well.



I don't blame Zeros exclusively. The blame starts from Yamamoto and his staff, the submarine flotilla chief, then goes down through the chain of command.
Purpose of fighters was not to make great victory:loss ratio (that would mean Germany won the ww2), their purpose is to deny the enemy from their goal. American fliers scored their goals. 
Let's recall that IJN fighter screen, made up by Zeros, was penetrated by Blenheims, B-17s and B-26, flying without fighter escort.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 7, 2016)

pbehn said:


> True Graugeist but the point I was making was that you design and operate differently for different production volumes. When the spitfire was designed war was a possibility when the P51 was designed it was a fact and when the P51B/D were designed orders for thousands were guaranteed and the government was throwing up 1million sq/ft fatories to do it. Even now you do not set up a production line for small scale production, the cost and inflexibility make it counter productive.


Ok, I see what you meant.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 7, 2016)

> Main thing is to adress performance at all altitudes. So we don't have a situation where Allies deploy fighters with 1500-2200 HP at low level, with only IJA/IJN fighters with 1100-1150 HP to compete. We also avoid situation where a 300 mph bomber slips by and performs mast-height or skip bombing.
> Sakae 21 makes 980 HP at 6 km, the Ha-109 will do ~1100 HP there (all metric HP, ie. CV).
> Most of the fighter aircraft that name received heavier and more powerful engines as war progressed. Hurricane, Bf 109, Spitfire, P-51, MC.200, indeed Ki-44 and host of Japanese and Soviet fighters. One of the things that made them better than prevoius types. The 'no free lunch' rule applies as ever.


Ok, so lets suppose this could happen. Lets suppose such fighter was possible.
Who would make it than ?
Mitsubishi is engaged in process of upgrading Zero, building J2M and until 1943 wont have enough engineers (including Horikoshi) to dedicate to a new project. Besides, Mitsubishi should work hard on replacement for this 1400 HP stopgap, aka they should keep doing what they were doing with A7M, just without Navy "suggestions". 
Interestingly Horikoshi wanted initially to built A7M as much faster aircraft than it ended up, with smaller wingspan and wingarea - sort of similar to F8F.

Nakajima had last experience with Naval fighter in mid 30s and new aircraft would most likely require few years of polishing until in a good state.

Kawanishi, Aichi and Kawasaki are companies without any experience in this field



> Improving Zero is an insurance in case the new fighter encunters problems during design, production and/or service. It was done by all major ww2 participants.


Ok, that occupies more resources but could be that way.



> Purpose of fighters was not to make great victory:loss ratio (that would mean Germany won the ww2), their purpose is to deny the enemy from their goal. American fliers scored their goals.
> Let's recall that IJN fighter screen, made up by Zeros, was penetrated by Blenheims, B-17s and B-26, flying without fighter escort.


The amount of victories in this operation in tasks they were dedicated to, indicates that Zeros did exceptionally well in protecting their own fleet. Better than F4F certainly. 
I think you put that blame wrong, fighter is only a machine piloted by a human and directed by other human on board of Aircraft Carrier. With no radar there was no possibility to envision where next wave is coming from, and they were coming from various directions and at various altitudes. SBDs really had some luck. But luck is also needed 

Indeed B-26s penetrated it, but at a price of one machine shot down in flames, other carried torpedo attack from too great distance and their fish scored no hits. Then another one was shot down. 
In regard to B-17s, they were flying high and entered the scene while Zeros were already fighting Major Henderson SBDs.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> Ok, so lets suppose this could happen. Lets suppose such fighter was possible.
> Who would make it than ?
> Mitsubishi is engaged in process of upgrading Zero, building J2M and until 1943 wont have enough engineers (including Horikoshi) to dedicate to a new project. Besides, Mitsubishi should work hard on replacement for this 1400 HP stopgap, aka they should keep doing what they were doing with A7M, just without Navy "suggestions".
> Interestingly Horikoshi wanted initially to built A7M as much faster aircraft than it ended up, with smaller wingspan and wingarea - sort of similar to F8F.



There is no J2M in my scenario. Mitsubishi designs a next-gen naval fighter, that will be also used from ground bases, and, if we're that desperate, as a floatplane fighter/recon.



> Nakajima had last experience with Naval fighter in mid 30s and new aircraft would most likely require few years of polishing until in a good state.
> Kawanishi, Aichi and Kawasaki are companies without any experience in this field



RAF, or any other air force, never used Supermarine's fighter before Spitfire, yet that one went to the greats. Fw 190 - 1st Focke Wulf's fighter, also great. Bf 109 - 1st fighter by BFW. P-38, 1st Lockheed's fighter, turned out to be pretty good. So let's give the japanese designers some credit, they did come out with good stuff more times than not.



> The amount of victories in this operation in tasks they were dedicated to, indicates that Zeros did exceptionally well in protecting their own fleet. Better than F4F certainly.
> I think you put that blame wrong, fighter is only a machine piloted by a human and directed by other human on board of Aircraft Carrier. With no radar there was no possibility to envision where next wave is coming from, and they were coming from various directions and at various altitudes. SBDs really had some luck. But luck is also needed
> 
> Indeed B-26s penetrated it, but at a price of one machine shot down in flames, other carried torpedo attack from too great distance and their fish scored no hits. Then another one was shot down.
> In regard to B-17s, they were flying high and entered the scene while Zeros were already fighting Major Henderson SBDs.



As before - only a part of the blame (but still) is with Zero as a fighter aircraft. It was incapable to deal with B-17s, only one of four B-26s was downed before entering the torpedo launch zone, the cannon ammo capacity was insufficient to the point of letting the bombers, that dropped their weapon, to escape. The LMGs won't cut it. No BP glass means rear gunners can still kill or wound the precoius pilots, before we talk about no fuel tank protection that will see the Zero desintegrate if a heavy burst hits home.
The US torpedo bombers were slaughtered because of several things - lousy torpedo launch envelope (heads should've rolled all around Rhode Island and DC because of the torpedo scandal), way too slow TBs on themselves, bad defensive armament, many inexperienced crewmen,next to no escort. Several US squadrons never saw the enemy. So there is more to the loopsided loss of US aircraft than just Zero.
Let's also recall that Zeros were fully unable to forestal any SBD attack, other than from green Henderson's squadron that came too low for real dive bomber, yet too high to somehow hide themselves behind the horizon
The B-17s were coming towards Kaga and Soryu from NW, while Henderson's squadron came from almost opposite direction, the two attacks being separated by quite a distance. Yet Zeros were not capable to climb up to 20000 ft in order to hit the B-17s, that is no single Zero.


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## Peter Gunn (Mar 7, 2016)

MiTasol said:


> *SNIP*
> 
> The Americans designed aircraft to be machine made. Forming a wing or fuselage rib took seconds in a large press. The Brits were far more into wing ribs and other components made from dozens of small parts all riveted together - massively time consuming. There is a video at
> _View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qi6PdWHSVG8_
> ...





Holy Mother of God, so how many AT-6 Texan/Harvards rolled out of Inglewood in the time it took the lederhosen wearing Messerschmidt boys there to fit together that 108? 17? 18? Just... Wow...


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## pbehn (Mar 7, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> Holy Mother of God, so how many AT-6 Texan/Harvards rolled out of Inglewood in the time it took the lederhosen wearing Messerschmidt boys there to fit together that 108? 17? 18? Just... Wow...


There were 15,000 AT-6 produced and 885 Me108. If you ask a company to produce 885 aircraft in 10 years it will be done as in the video, if you want 15,000 in the same time you do it as NA did it.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 7, 2016)

> There is no J2M in my scenario. Mitsubishi designs a next-gen naval fighter, that will be also used from ground bases, and, if we're that desperate, as a floatplane fighter/recon.


Alright, poor Raiden, one of the more interesting designs, but very well. It's your idea.



> RAF, or any other air force, never used Supermarine's fighter before Spitfire, yet that one went to the greats. Fw 190 - 1st Focke Wulf's fighter, also great. Bf 109 - 1st fighter by BFW. P-38, 1st Lockheed's fighter, turned out to be pretty good. So let's give the japanese designers some credit, they did come out with good stuff more times than not.


I give them a lot of credit. Especially that many of them became after the war in some car business or rocket research like Hideo Itokawa.

And it took quite a few years for Supermarine to develop Spitfire and put it into production. Same for Focke Wulf. Developing takes time when your start from the scratch. Look again how long it took Kawanishi to finally make a worthy aircraft from N1K.



> It was incapable to deal with B-17s, only one of four B-26s was downed before entering the torpedo launch zone, the cannon ammo capacity was insufficient to the point of letting the bombers, that dropped their weapon, to escape.


It was incapable to deal with decent formation of B-17s flying at 20,000 feet when all CAP was already engaged much lower by SBDs. 
And B-26 was quite fast bomber, racing over the water for torpedo run it they could have been quite challenging for Zeros. 

The case with cannon ammo insufficient is true, but so could be said about MG FF in Bf 109s or Hispano cannons in Spitfires II and V, until later models which received greater capacity loads. That certainly though hindered the defensive abilities, as Zeros had to land and rearm once in a while. 



> No BP glass means rear gunners can still kill or wound the precoius pilots, before we talk about no fuel tank protection that will see the Zero desintegrate if a heavy burst hits home.


Still few were even shot down by defensive fire. 



> The US torpedo bombers were slaughtered because of several things - lousy torpedo launch envelope (heads should've rolled all around Rhode Island and DC because of the torpedo scandal), way too slow TBs on themselves, bad defensive armament, many inexperienced crewmen,next to no escort. Several US squadrons never saw the enemy. So there is more to the loopsided loss of US aircraft than just Zero.


Many of this things could be said about B5N as well you know, with the exception to torpedoes and crews however. And yet they scored hits in their desperate attack. Despite lower number of aircraft.

And in regard to escort, VT-8 had escort in form of 10 VT-6 Wildcats. Only one to blame for lack of cover at the approach was Lt. James Gray. He also missed their own VT-6’s call for assistance minutes later. 




> Let's also recall that Zeros were fully unable to forestal any SBD attack, other than from green Henderson's squadron that came too low for real dive bomber, yet too high to somehow hide themselves behind the horizon


Henderson deliberately choose the "skip bombing". He was flying the way he decided to due to limited skills of his unit.
And yes, Zeros failed to intercept SBDs before they managed to drop their bombs (even though shortly after that SBDs suffered losses) as they were already engaged in dealing with VT-6, then materialized attack from VT-3. High above VT-3 were flying VB-3 covered by clouds. Not to mention that VT-3 actually had some escorts that engaged Zeros, and according to Thach he managed to concentrate on him almost a third part of the CAP. 
Zeros were simply lower and under continuous action, being spread due to attack from various directions and distances. For a fighters without any kind of vectoring provided by Carrier that is very hard to predict another threat. And Carriers could provide no more details due to absence of radar. 



> The B-17s were coming towards Kaga and Soryu from NW, while Henderson's squadron came from almost opposite direction, the two attacks being separated by quite a distance. Yet Zeros were not capable to climb up to 20000 ft in order to hit the B-17s, that is no single Zero.


That's not true. First of all the entire CAP was exactly at the mentioned opposite side engaging Henderson. 
Second, B-17s actually were attacked and damaged although not seriously by nine Soryu Zeros and few more from Kaga, which went after them in a steep climb and made firing pass. From Shattered Sword :


> _However, the B-17s overhead proved to be tough customers. Kaga’s Yamaguchi immediately took two of his wingmen up in pursuit of them, joining Soryu’s Zeros. However, the attacks by both groups of fighters were desultory at best. They managed to damage a few of the Flying Forts, but none seriously. Lt. Col. Sweeney’s pithy summation afterward was that “their heart was not in their work.”This was probably simply confirmation of what everybody in the force below already knew–the Zero was no great shakes at high-altitude combat. Not only that, but after four hours in the air, Soryu's fighters were almost at the end of their tether in terms of fuel and ammunition._


 
Again, I see no particular lack of Zeros here as interceptors except for limited ammunition for Type 99 cannons. The true lack was in absence of radar.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 7, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> Still few were even shot down by defensive fire.


And if Saburo Sakai had bullet proof glass, he may not have sustained near-fatal injuries from defensive fire.[/QUOTE]


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## Shortround6 (Mar 7, 2016)

I would note that the Japanese were adopting 60 round drums at just about the time the Germans and British were giving up on them. 
There was actually some overlap but the Germans had shifted to the engine mounted cannon (15mm) with 200 rounds in the Spring of 1941. The British were also moving away from drum feed guns in late 1940 and into 1941. Some aircraft took a bit longer than others, Spitfires getting belt feed guns in Oct 1941. 
The Japanese waiting until 1942 to fit a larger drum or mechanized box magazine is rather behind the times. 
American pilots complained about Wildcats with 240rpg ( 18 seconds firing time) when they switched to 6 guns. The 20mm cannon on the Zero were good for about 7 seconds. Larger drums were available from before the war if anybody cared to use large bulges over the larger drums.
Using essentially the same armament as a 1940 109E in the summer of 1942 is showing a definite lag (although head and shoulders ahead of the Army) 

The delay in Mitsubishi programs due to the head designer being ill just points to the whole Japanese aviation industry being stretched way too thin.
The J2M may have been "interesting" but it was not only an unnecessary complication, it was unnecessarily complicated. Too much was sacrificed in order to get the last 10-15mph out of the design. 
With a shortage of design staff trying to use trick engine installations and trick engines just slows things down. In the end (just like the Americans) the extended shaft engine and really pointy cowl on a radial engine were give up as unworkable. Engine design staff working on contrarotating props didn't help speed things along either. 
Trying to "out clever" the opposition seldom really works. Americans tried a number of "trick" airplanes (including but not limited to the XP-54, XP-55, XP-56) and all of them "crashed and burned" in a figurative sense. Americans just had enough engineers that these dead end sidetracks didn't actually delay service aircraft (at least not much.) 
The Japanese just couldn't afford such side shows no matter how clever/inventive they were.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 8, 2016)

> And if Saburo Sakai had bullet proof glass, he may not have sustained near-fatal injuries from defensive fire.


Pappy Boyington had the known and sturdy F4U with all kinds of protection and yet he and his wingman were shot down in flames. 
I am for all the protections, since dead pilot does not fight anymore, but was just pointing that during the Midway operation only few losses were inflicted by defensive gunners.



> American pilots complained about Wildcats with 240rpg ( 18 seconds firing time) when they switched to 6 guns. The 20mm cannon on the Zero were good for about 7 seconds. Larger drums were available from before the war if anybody cared to use large bulges over the larger drums.
> Using essentially the same armament as a 1940 109E in the summer of 1942 is showing a definite lag (although head and shoulders ahead of the Army)


For a Wildcat six .50 caliber guns were main armament to fire any time. For a Zero there were only two 7.7s, as cannon was considered a weapon to finish the target. Thus if pilot conserved his 20 mm rounds and used them only when he had good firing position, this could be enough to take down 2-3 enemy single engine aircraft. 

But absolutely, the low capacity drums were an issue. Luckily for the Japanese 100 round magazines arrived 7 months after Pearl Harbor. 



> The Japanese just couldn't afford such side shows no matter how clever/inventive they were.


Indeed, but thats something someone should tell the Navy. They were the ones forming a new programs for new machines.


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## stona (Mar 8, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> Holy Mother of God, so how many AT-6 Texan/Harvards rolled out of Inglewood in the time it took the lederhosen wearing Messerschmidt boys there to fit together that 108? 17? 18? Just... Wow...



And that fuselage construction, with the 'frames 'pressed into the edges of the skins, as opposed to attaching the skins to a jigged frame work, was a very clever method of construction and lent itself easily to the later mass production of the fuselages of the Bf 109, Bf 110, Me 210/410 and even the Me 262.
Of all the German manufacturers BFW/Messerschmitt designs lent themselves most readily to mass production, far more so than for example Supermarine's Spitfire.

That film reflects what you would have seen in a British airframe factory at a similar period, when it was already established that a skilled man hand working parts (plenty of tin snips visible) took from 10 to 50 times longer than a semi skilled man or woman using machinery to accomplish a comparable task. That machinery and tooling costs money and firms need to have an incentive to invest. British firms only got that incentive with the late production schemes following the Anschluss and Munich crisis which guaranteed orders for significant numbers of aircraft. 

It was actually worse for the Germans erratic and constantly revised planning (just read the various programmes promulgated through the 1930s) made it difficult for the industry to make any long term plans. After the war started, between September and December 1939 the entire German aircraft industry only produced 1,961 aircraft. This despite a substantial lead in manpower and facilities, not efficiency, that the Germans enjoyed in the mid 1930s. In 1935 German airframe plants employed 51,106 people against Britain's 15,000. For aero engine plants the figures are 17,788 for Germany and 12,000 for Britain.

It was much easier for the US with more than two years warning of what was to come to make plans and preparations for its industry.

Cheers

Steve

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## yulzari (Mar 8, 2016)

It is also worth remembering that the British and Canadian production in the first four years of the war was coping with losing campaigns in Norway, France and the Low countries, defending Britain against direct air attacks by day and night, extending bombing attacks into continental Europe, covering a host of maritime demands across the world, establishing (in contrast to the Luftwaffe) a huge aircrew training programme that extended across North America, the Caribbean and Africa, run an extensive Fleet Air Arm, fight in campaigns in North Africa, Greece, Crete, East Africa, Iraq and Syria whilst sending production also to the Soviet Union and helping arm initial USAAF fighter squadrons. Also maintain (poorly) combat air resources in India, Burma and Malaya and later increase Indian support after Japanese attacks. Also support landings and the land campaign in Algeria. Did I leave anything out? Meanwhile with their third hand in their extensive spare time.............

The Luftwaffe (bar minor diversions to help prop up the Italians) carried out four campaigns but consecutively. Namely Poland, the assault in the west which went on to be an air campaign over Britain, swap these resources to the clearance of the Balkans and only then send them to attack the Soviet Union. Of course they had some maritime demands in the NE Atlantic and the White sea and home defence plus a training regime but they could, and did, have to concentrate their air resources to achieve effective numbers in any chosen campaign. Whilst they boosted production in later years this was frittered away in poor pilot training and diluted by having to increasingly fight on multiple fronts. Italy, Russia, Balkans, home defence night and day, the land war in NW Europe.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 9, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> ...
> The case with cannon ammo insufficient is true, but so could be said about MG FF in Bf 109s or Hispano cannons in Spitfires II and V, until later models which received greater capacity loads. That certainly though hindered the defensive abilities, as Zeros had to land and rearm once in a while.



Nobody will deny that early war Bf 109 was hampered by limitation of it's armament. Spitfire received belt-fed cannons by mid/late 1941. The MG FF*M* and Hispano were with higher MV, so both could be used unison with LMGs installed, not the case for Zero's armament until 1943.
Lowe MV means that a seasoned flier/marksman is needed to use the cannon to the fullest, the seasoned pilots need to be looked after, and it will took time for green pilots to bacame good marksmen, that is if they live ling enough.



> Many of this things could be said about B5N as well you know, with the exception to torpedoes and crews however. And yet they scored hits in their desperate attack. Despite lower number of aircraft.



Why making the exception of torpedoes and crews? Japanese torpedoes were far better than American until late war, meaning they could be launched at higher speed and altitude. That greatly improves bomber's chances to avoid interception/downing, either by fighers of AAA. Seasoned crew will make more hits than inexperienced under same circumstances. Low number of aircraft was attacking single CV, in one 'slice' of time. F4F was no great shakes in raw speed, it was even slower than Zero, and not all US fighters were concentrated over Yorktown when Kates arrived.
B5N was also a newer TB than Devastator.



> And in regard to escort, VT-8 had escort in form of 10 VT-6 Wildcats. Only one to blame for lack of cover at the approach was Lt. James Gray. He also missed their own VT-6’s call for assistance minutes later.



The story of US fighters doing escorts went better as war progressed, but at Midway they were not doing a good job. Including VF-6 (VT-6 is torpedo squadron), that lost sight of VT-8 Devastators as they started descend.



> Henderson deliberately choose the "skip bombing". He was flying the way he decided to due to limited skills of his unit.
> And yes, Zeros failed to intercept SBDs before they managed to drop their bombs (even though shortly after that SBDs suffered losses) as they were already engaged in dealing with VT-6, then materialized attack from VT-3. High above VT-3 were flying VB-3 covered by clouds. Not to mention that VT-3 actually had some escorts that engaged Zeros, and according to Thach he managed to concentrate on him almost a third part of the CAP.



Henderson went for glide (shallow 'version' of dive bombing, say 35-50 degrees) bombing, not skip bombing (bomber flies low and fast, drops bombs that bounce on water surface in order to hit ship's side). Lack of engine power between sea level and 20000 ft meant Zero (and F4F for that matter) meant that interception of enemy aircraft above 15000 ft, like SBDs, let alone B-17s, will not be the easy task.



> Zeros were simply lower and under continuous action, being spread due to attack from various directions and distances. For a fighters without any kind of vectoring provided by Carrier that is very hard to predict another threat. And Carriers could provide no more details due to absence of radar.



As before - nobody is blaming just Zeroes for the loss of carriers.



> That's not true. First of all the entire CAP was exactly at the mentioned opposite side engaging Henderson.
> Second, B-17s actually were attacked and damaged although not seriously by nine Soryu Zeros and few more from Kaga, which went after them in a steep climb and made firing pass. From Shattered Sword :
> <snip>
> Again, I see no particular lack of Zeros here as interceptors except for limited ammunition for Type 99 cannons. The true lack was in absence of radar.



That lack of engine power is a major fail. Disballanced weponry, at least in 1942, is another. We've also seen that, once even the small part of US fighter units (and F4F was never rated as equal to the Zero, let alone superior) got they act together, the Zeros went speechless. This is also where lack of protection was felt.
Reliable radios, for all the Zeroes? Really folding wings?[/QUOTE][/QUOTE]


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## Hiromachi (Mar 9, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Nobody will deny that early war Bf 109 was hampered by limitation of it's armament. Spitfire received belt-fed cannons by mid/late 1941. The MG FF*M* and Hispano were with higher MV, so both could be used unison with LMGs installed, not the case for Zero's armament until 1943.
> Lowe MV means that a seasoned flier/marksman is needed to use the cannon to the fullest, the seasoned pilots need to be looked after, and it will took time for green pilots to bacame good marksmen, that is if they live ling enough.


True, limitations of Type 99 existed. But it also had some advantages like very high reliability, something that could hardly be said about Hispano cannons.



> Why making the exception of torpedoes and crews? Japanese torpedoes were far better than American until late war, meaning they could be launched at higher speed and altitude. That greatly improves bomber's chances to avoid interception/downing, either by fighers of AAA. Seasoned crew will make more hits than inexperienced under same circumstances. Low number of aircraft was attacking single CV, in one 'slice' of time. F4F was no great shakes in raw speed, it was even slower than Zero, and not all US fighters were concentrated over Yorktown when Kates arrived.
> B5N was also a newer TB than Devastator.


Americans sent 22 Wildcats to intercept 16 attackers, 10 B5N2s and 6 Zeros. Despite radar directing, first four missed the bombers and had to chase them. Then two Wildcats attacked B5Ns only to be intercepted by Zeros. One Kate went down and both Wildcats were shot down. Then B5Ns managed to carry an attack at the speed approaching 200 knots, achieving two hits but in process Japanese lost Hiryu hikotaicho machine (Tomonaga), his wingman machine as well as other pair sent around.
So yes, not all Wildcats could intervene since they had to split between Tomonaga (whose chutai was wiped out) and Hashimoto. But they still had numerical advantage over the attackers and six Zeros really should not be a problem. 

Yes, B5N was newer than TBD Devastator, but marginally. Sure, B5N2 had some upgrades over initial model but retained same aiframe and features. B5N was powered also by a slightly more powerful engine. But TBD interestingly had stronger defensive armament.



> The story of US fighters doing escorts went better as war progressed, but at Midway they were not doing a good job. Including VF-6 (VT-6 is torpedo squadron), that lost sight of VT-8 Devastators as they started descend.


Yes, that was just a typo. 
And true, they lost sight. But unlike Zeros they could fully take advantage of their radios. 



> Lack of engine power between sea level and 20000 ft meant Zero (and F4F for that matter) meant that interception of enemy aircraft above 15000 ft, like SBDs, let alone B-17s, will not be the easy task.


I think I already told you that Sakae 12 delivered over 810 HP at 6000 meters, which is 20 HP less than at Sea level. 



> That lack of engine power is a major fail. Disballanced weponry, at least in 1942, is another. We've also seen that, once even the small part of US fighter units (and F4F was never rated as equal to the Zero, let alone superior) got they act together, the Zeros went speechless. This is also where lack of protection was felt.
> Reliable radios, for all the Zeroes? Really folding wings?


Point above. There was no lack of engine power at 20,000 feet. 

With the armament I agree. Hence why I thought if there would any cooperation exist between IJN and IJA could take advantage of Ho-103 machine cannons. Those were interchangeable with Type 89 MGs so I see no problem in replacing with them Type 97s. 
A6M2 carried 1360 rounds for 7.7 mm machine guns, which is 45 kg. 700 12.7 mm rounds could be easily taken increasing the weight by 10-11 kg, which is ... marginal. 

I'd say that what you mean is tunnel vision. Too many Zeros tried to attack Thach and in fact they were interfering each other. That reminds me of those 15 Hellcats trying to shoot down Sakai over Iwo Jima. And as much as it was nice for F4Fs that also mean they were in total defensive, they could not help TBDs they were supposed to be protecting. Sure, they scored well on Zeros but at the same time allowed others to make passes on Devastators. 
Thach wave is a defensive maneuver, it is very good maneuver, but an escort fighter that is in full defensive like this is not doing its job - providing the protection to the vulnerable bombers.

In regard to radios, at the very begging when I presented my points of 3 mistakes made by Japan I indicated a technological gap and little attention given to radios and radars. This indeed was a major lack.

Folding wings were not a requirement. They would greatly increase the weight (the folding mechanism) and require a full redesign of wing structure.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 9, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> True, limitations of Type 99 existed. But it also had some advantages like very high reliability, something that could hardly be said about Hispano cannons.



Depends on what time frame, platform type, and on type of installation. Hispanos in Hurricane and Typhoon were performing reliably, ditto for (belt fed type) on Beaufighter and Mosquito. Spitfire have it's share of problems, mostly early, with drum-fed cannons, and then mostly (due to insufficient heating capacity) on Mark Vc with 4 cannons.
Even the US Hispano, always indeed judged as unreliable, performed well aboard the P-38.



> I think I already told you that Sakae 12 delivered over 810 HP at 6000 meters, which is 20 HP less than at Sea level.
> ...
> Point above. There was no lack of engine power at 20,000 feet.



I'm not sure what is the problem here - for a light & well streamlined aircraft like Zero, Sakae decent power for the era, above 20000 ft. It was power under 20000 ft that was lacking.



> With the armament I agree. Hence why I thought if there would any cooperation exist between IJN and IJA could take advantage of Ho-103 machine cannons. Those were interchangeable with Type 89 MGs so I see no problem in replacing with them Type 97s.
> A6M2 carried 1360 rounds for 7.7 mm machine guns, which is 45 kg. 700 12.7 mm rounds could be easily taken increasing the weight by 10-11 kg, which is ... marginal.



Good idea.



> Folding wings were not a requirement. They would greatly increase the weight (the folding mechanism) and require a full redesign of wing structure.



New aircraft needed


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## Hiromachi (Mar 9, 2016)

> Even the US Hispano, always indeed judged as unreliable, performed well aboard the P-38.


In field tests as late as in 1945 US Hispano was still found unreliable and prone to jamming under high G maneuvers. Gun was compared in tests with Ho-5 though. But I never heard any reliability issues related to Type 99 so could safely say it was similar in that. 



> I'm not sure what is the problem here - for a light & well streamlined aircraft like Zero, Sakae decent power for the era, above 20000 ft. It was power under 20000 ft that was lacking.


Ah,I understood it was 20,000 ft and above.

Anyway, below 20,000 ft Sakae 12 could be pushed to over 1000 HP (at 11,000 ft to be precise). That gives 0.19 hp/lb power-to-weight ratio. Bf 109 F-4 had something like 1.21 hp/lb, G-2 had 0.22. F4U had 0.17.
Power is always a relative thing. A6M could have engine of a greater output but price would be weight and drag.
Unless it would be like I proposed, aka going the Oscar way with Ha-115-II. 



> Good idea.


I actually tried to learn why the belt fed Type 99 arrived so late. Dr. Masaya Kawamura was working on the belt system. If that could be introduced earlier, it would help tremendously with the limited ammo supply.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 9, 2016)

In general, the story of Hispano cannon in the US in ww2 was not a happy one, anyway. Not as bad as the story about torpedoes, though 



Hiromachi said:


> ...
> Anyway, below 20,000 ft Sakae 12 could be pushed to over 1000 HP (at 11,000 ft to be precise). That gives 0.19 hp/lb power-to-weight ratio. Bf 109 F-4 had something like 1.21 hp/lb, G-2 had 0.22. F4U had 0.17.
> Power is always a relative thing. A6M could have engine of a greater output but price would be weight and drag.
> Unless it would be like I proposed, aka going the Oscar way with Ha-115-II.



In therms of speed of piston engined aircraft, it is power-to-drag ratio, or, better yet, the surplus power once the drag is overcome. This is where a fighter with 1000-1200 HP is in stark disandvantage vs. a fighter that has 1500-2000 HP under the hood, provided that drag (as force, not as coefficient) is not much greater. So the F4U or F6F will have hard time to climb with Zero (bad power-to-weight ratio), but it will outpace it easy (has more of surplus power once drag is 'beaten' than Zero). The lighter aircraft sacrified plenty to achiveve that power-to-weight ratio, though.



> I actually tried to learn why the belt fed Type 99 arrived so late. Dr. Masaya Kawamura was working on the belt system. If that could be introduced earlier, it would help tremendously with the limited ammo supply.



The offspring of the Oerlikon FFL, the Type 99-2 (T. Williams says 99-4?), got belt feed. Type 99-1 was the license of FF (similar was the MG FF). The FFL (and Type 99-2) were designed around a more powerful ammo than the FF, but not so powerful as the FFS (and Hispano). The ammo for FFL was, IMO, perhaps the most ballanced 20 mm cartridge around for air fighting, until Soviet came out with 20mm for Shvak, and Germans for MG 151/20.

Why no earlier belt feed, or more ammo capacity? Perhaps due to doctrine - 6 carriers, with 25-30 Zeros each, means 300-360 cannons, 20000 of cannon shells (give or take) to provide the defense. Even 4 carriers (timing as conception of Zero) equals 12000 shells airborne.
Other than that, 60 rd drum was in vogue in late 1930s.

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## Hiromachi (Mar 9, 2016)

One thing that could be improved without even touching engines would be propeller designs. If you take a notice of the table on page 4 and quotes from book, the propeller efficiency is quite low - 0.76 
J2M1 -> 0.70 
J2M2 -> 0.74 
Based on my knowledge (limited though) it usually is around 0.79 at climb speed for 3 blade prop, 0.84-0.85 for 3 blades at max speed. ~0.84 at climb speed for 4 blades, 0.88-0.89 at max speed.
There is something really wrong with Sumitomo propellers.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 9, 2016)

Reliability of weapons is often anecdotal. Hard numbers are available for only a few weapons and reliability even for the same weapon varied with the installation and year (and in some cases the ammo.) 

Anecdotal reports are often in relation to the other weapons mounted on a plane or in service at the same time/place.

For example the Japanese Navy may have had no complaints about the type 99-1 cannon in relation to the reliability of Type 97 machine gun but that isn't really saying a whole lot because the Type 97 was a licensed Vickers Class E machine gun. The British had given up on the Vickers Machine gun as an aircraft weapon in the late 20s/early 30s due to it's unreliability and cast around for something else which lead to adopting the Browning Machine gun in .303 (the British were never shy about adopting guns from outside of England if they worked). The British _almost never _mounted the Vickers where the pilot (or crewman) could not get at it, even if only to beat on it with a gloved fist. I would note that the Japanese seemed to follow that practice. Neither the type 97 or Army Type 89 seem to have been mounted in the wings to any great extent. 

Early Hispanos in Spitfire wings that were drum feed and flopped on their sides seem to have trouble emptying a 60 round magazine without jamming. Late war belt feed guns may have gone around 700 rounds between malfunctions/jams. Over 1000rounds between major malfunctions/breakages have been reported. It also varied with their base/climate. Dirty airfields lead to greater jams. 
Please note that I don't know the rate of jams/malfunctions of the Japanese weapons. But without such numbers just saying Gun x was considered reliable by AI Force (or Navy) Y doesn't tell us much. 
Reliability should also not be confused with long life. The Hispano being originally designed for a gun life (not barrel) life of 10,000 rounds. 

The Japanese army was without question several years out of date with it's armament. No other major power have adopted such a light armament as Ki 43 for a number of years (even if we count the standard armament as one 7.7 and one 12.7 and count the 12.7 as being equal to three 7.7mms). It required skilled, experienced pilots to use effectively. 
The Navy was better but in the fall of 1941 the Zero's armament was already behind the times, let alone the summer of 1942.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 9, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> One thing that could be improved without even touching engines would be propeller designs. If you take a notice of the table on page 4 and quotes from book, the propeller efficiency is quite low - 0.76
> J2M1 -> 0.70
> J2M2 -> 0.74
> Based on my knowledge (limited though) it usually is around 0.79 at climb speed for 3 blade prop, 0.84-0.85 for 3 blades at max speed. ~0.84 at climb speed for 4 blades, 0.88-0.89 at max speed.
> There is something really wrong with Sumitomo propellers.



Not really. Most props, wither 3 blade or 4 blade only _averaged _about .80
Many designers would have given their first born male child for a prop with 0.88% efficiency during WW II

edit: Something unknown in those tables may be the altitude. A propeller that shows _very _high efficiency at low altitude may not be very efficient at high altitude (20,000ft) where the air is 1/2 as dense or less as you go up. A large high altitude prop may not be the most efficient at low altitude as it is bigger in diameter and has more blade area causing more drag than needed at low altitude. 

A few charts.









Please note the 2nd chart. In a time period when Turbo fans were in use the free propeller was still just under 90% and an awful lot had been learned about prop design and construction during the late 40s and 50s. The US was using some props in 1942/43 that didn't have the highest efficiency either, the tooth pick props on the early P-47 for example. 
The Japanese props you show may not have been the best but really weren't that far off of what was know/possible at the time.

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## parsifal (Mar 9, 2016)

ive read accounts that the hispano 20mm fitting into the spitfire had jamming issues initially, but that these were in part solved by simply turning the weapon on its side. belt feed also helped I understand.

As I understand it the type 99-1 cannon was drum fed, whilst the 99-2 and after were fitted with a belt feed mechanism. The 99-2 was not fitted until some way through the A6M-3 series, probably around the end of 1942. From what ive read, the drum feeds came in two types, a 60 round drum, which worked okay, but with only 60 rounds apiece was too small. There was a 100 round drum installation which had feed issues. 

When did the allies start to fit belt feed into their cannon. I think its 1941 from memory. certainly the Mk IX spitfire featured a belt feeder mechanism from introduction, in mid - 1942.

Whatever the date, there is no comparison between a drum fed weapon and a belt feed one


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## stona (Mar 11, 2016)

stona said:


> This is once again making Harris a scapegoat for British bombing policy.
> On 14th February 1942 BEFORE Harris even assumed command of Bomber Command a new Directive was issued to the Command which cancelled the Transportation Directive of 13th July 1941. This new Directive listed as _'first priority'_ targets the industrial cities of the Ruhr-Rhineland area. The operations were to be_
> 
> "focussed on the morale of the enemy civil population and, in particular, of the industrial workers." _
> ...



I hesitate to quote myself, but I have come across the text of an Air Staff paper, dated 23rd September 1941, which predates the February 1942 Directive and on which that Directive is evidently based. The Air Staff paper was intended for a smaller circulation and does not mince words.

_"The ultimate aim of the attack on a town area is to break the morale of the population which occupies it. To achieve this we must ensure two things; first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction, and (ii) the fear of death."_

Harris didn't struggle hard to interpret what was required of him. He wrote.

_"My primary authorised objective was therefore clear beyond doubt: to inflict the most severe material damage on German industrial cities."_

In attempting to achieve his _"authorised objective"_ he was carrying out the policy of the UK government. People today who have problems with this policy should apportion their blame to the UK government, not Harris or the men of Bomber Command. It is a disgraceful fact of British history that the immediate post war UK government(s) tacitly deflected the responsibility for its predecessors policies on bombing to Harris and Bomber Command, as if that organisation was somehow acting on its own. If you fling enough mud some of it will stick, and that is the case here.
The men of Bomber Command have from time to time been pilloried in the UK press and in some publications for their part in the campaign. Generally this now diminishing band have responded with great dignity to this disgraceful and ungrateful treatment. I, on the other hand, don't have to and will call it out for what it is at any opportunity.

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Mar 11, 2016)

The effects of the 'area' campaign.






There are a lot of whats, ifs and maybes in that graph (the Air Staff Memorandum circulated with Harris' 'Despatch' advises us to discount it) but it is easy to see why Harris was frustrated at being diverted to the pre-invasion campaigns and away from his city busting campaign in February 1944, just when he was starting to make a serious dent in Germany's production capacity. The index was flat lining for about eight months before the diversion. He would argue that the subsequent German recovery was at least partially due to him being obliged to release the pressure on the German cities and infrastructure.

Cheers

Steve


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## Peter Gunn (Mar 11, 2016)

stona said:


> *SNIP*
> 
> The men of Bomber Command have from time to time been pilloried in the UK press and in some publications for their part in the campaign. Generally this now diminishing band have responded with great dignity to this disgraceful and ungrateful treatment. I, on the other hand, don't have to and will call it out for what it is at any opportunity.
> 
> ...



Perhaps I'm not enlightened enough but I have always failed to understand why present day nobs insist on passing judgment using 21st century ideals that have no bearing on a 1940's issue. How could anyone with two brain cells to rub together even begin to disrespect the men that fought and won WWII? While I believe atomic weapons are ghastly, I do not question the decision to use them in 1945, I wasn't there and have no frame of reference other than what I've read. And from what I've read, I'm glad I wasn't in on having to make that kind of decision.


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## stona (Mar 11, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> Perhaps I'm not enlightened enough but I have always failed to understand why present day nobs insist on passing judgment using 21st century ideals that have no bearing on a 1940's issue.



It's a very good point Peter. The fact that we won a war for national survival, and it was the men of Bomber Command among many others that won it, is what affords these people the luxury of expressing their views. They are absolutely entitled to do so, and I am entitled to rebut them. 
Would I have bombed German cities, Tokyo, dropped the atomic bombs? Knowing what I do now and knowing what the decision makers knew then, yes to all three.
Whatever morals might have slipped in efforts to win the war, a far worse offence would have been losing to Nazism and allowing the world, in Churchill's words to "sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science." The stakes were very high and it was not a game that could be lost under any circumstances. This is a fact not always grasped today.

Cheers

Steve

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## Peter Gunn (Mar 11, 2016)

Totally agree Steve, well put.

I remember the end of "The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp" with Roger Livesay where he gets pulled from making his broadcast about fighting the war with honor and not stooping to the Nazis level or some such issue. I thought it very pointed when the radio exec explained that this war wasn't going to be played like a cricket match. I don't remember the words but the sentiment was it's a war to preserve civilization.

And I also agree, I'd say yes to the bombing issues you mentioned as well.

Just another movie quote for some reason that came to mind. In "Above and Beyond" about the A-Bomb, Robert Taylor as Col. Tibbets is handed a little cylinder with a button on it and a cord attached. The guy asks him, "If I said you could end the war by pushing that button would you do it?" Taylor does well because he's a good actor as he brightens to the idea, but then comes the "But if you do, 100,000 people will die" quote. YIKES! Taylor did a great job in that scene and I must admit from a small age, General Tibbets was a 10 foot tall hero to me.


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## drgondog (Mar 11, 2016)

stona said:


> The effects of the 'area' campaign.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Steve - it could be useful to note that 8th AF surpassed BC in tonnage dropped in December 1943 for the first time and the 15th would be on-line during Big Week Feb 20-25, 1944. It would, accordingly, be useful to point out that the Combined Bomber Offensive was conceived and ordered at Casablanca - and that the RAF night raids deep into Germany carried the primary load in eastern Germany until February, 1944


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## stona (Mar 11, 2016)

The careful wording of the Anglo-American bombing directives always allowed Harris the latitude to interpret them to suit his methods.. Casablanca stated that the main object was 
_"the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."_
That suited Harris just fine, it's what he had been doing for the last year. When Casablanca was revised in June, making the 'German Air Force' the main priority, followed by several other specific targets, these were assigned to the US 8th AF and Bomber Command was allowed to continue in its main aim, the _'general disorganisation of German industry.'_ The Command was supposed to operate in a way _'designed as far as practicable to be complimentary to the operations of the VIII U.S.A.A.F."_
Harris wrote that in order to do this _"the Command paid particular attention to the main industrial centres associated with aircraft production." _Since all German industrial cities were associated to a greater or lesser extent with aircraft production he could carry on bombing what he wanted.
To this extent I've always considered the phrase 'combined Bomber Offensive', at this time, a bit of a misnomer as the two principle air forces involved were pursuing the same ultimate objective, the defeat of Germany, in very different ways and with only occasionally overlapping short term objectives and targets.
Later Harris would cooperate more fully, particularly with the Oil Plan, but he was not easily diverted from his original 1942 objective.

It is of note that the Air Staff,* after the war*, took exception to Harris' interpretation of his 1942 directives, arguing that Harris _"tends to obscure the fact that the Air Staff intention was always to return to the bombing of precise targets as quickly as the tactical capabilities of the bomber force, and the improvement of night bombing technique, would permit." _
What nonsense, no explanation of how a return to something that was never achieved in the first place might practically be realised, just a bunch of flannel about improved technique. Night bombing techniques never allowed for the bombing of precision targets, anymore than radar techniques could achieve precision by day in less than ideal conditions. Both the British and Americans were in some kind of denial about this, but at least the Americans had the decency not to stab the commanders carrying out their orders in the back.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 11, 2016)

For the USA, this might be the top 3 mistakes:

- For USAF - insisting that bombers will negate enemy air defenses when flying high, 'fast' and via the defensive guns. 'Knock on' effect was that no effort was invested in suitable escort doctrine and technology, despite having engines with good/great altitude power early on (R-2800 in 2-stage variant and turbo, the turbo V-1710, later the V-1650-1)
- For USN - not introducing a fighter designed around R-2800 early enough, say mid 1941.
- The torpedo scandal


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## stona (Mar 11, 2016)

Tomo I agree with your first point, particularly as the US air forces had an extra couple of years to learn a lesson that the British and Germans had already learned the hard way. Simply looking at the performance of German fighters in 1940/41 should have shown them that their bombers were not going to fly high and fast enough in 1943 and the assumption that self supporting fields of defensive fire would be enough to defeat determined attackers was optimistic at the very least.

I can't really comment on the other two as what I know about US production planning and development you could write on a postage stamp 

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 11, 2016)

About the US torpedos, this is might be a start: U.S. Navy Torpedoes (part two)
About the R-2800 - in 1941 it was delivered in 1700+ examples, 1st hundred of those were delivered in March of 1941. Take off power 1850 HP, at ~1200 HP at 20000 ft. The 2000 HP version was delivered in ~250 pcs by Jan 1942; at 20000 ft power of ~1300 HP. 
Granted, we won't have exactly Fw 190- or Typhoon type of performance (but we'd have relability, in contrast) in the early R-2800 powered naval fighter, but 370-380 mph might be realistic.

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## Shortround6 (Mar 14, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> For the USA, this might be the top 3 mistakes:
> 
> - For USAF - insisting that bombers will negate enemy air defenses when flying high, 'fast' and via the defensive guns. 'Knock on' effect was that no effort was invested in suitable escort doctrine and technology, despite having engines with good/great altitude power early on (R-2800 in 2-stage variant and turbo, the turbo V-1710, later the V-1650-1)
> - For USN - not introducing a fighter designed around R-2800 early enough, say mid 1941.



Both of these "mistakes" require an incredible amount of foresight in order to correct. Or in other words they require a time traveler to be able to make decisions at exactly the right time almost down the right day and even that is pushing things. 
Please remember that it took 3-4 years to bring a plane from concept to service use (1st squadron, it took another 6-12 months to get 3-6 air groups). In the 1930s technology could change an awful lot in 3-4 years so that what looked like a good idea/concept at the start could end up not looking so good when planes went into service. 
The US "bomber boys" had invested quite a bit of work and money on long range bombers, more than any other nation, during the 30s. The XB-15 was more a proof of concept aircraft than practical bomber but it started in 1934 with a desire for a 2000lb bomb load and a range of 5000 miles. The US "bomber boys" always thinking of greater ranges than European bomber advocates due the size of the US and the distance from any likely enemies. What they got was a plane that was late in flying (after the later B-17) and not reaching the goal/s. It did set a record of carrying a 4409lb payload 3107 miles at 166mph in 1938 and was rated at a range of 3400 miles while carrying a 2500lb bomb load. Obviously this range was well beyond the capability of any single engine fighter or even twin engine fighter. The Y1B-17s were ordered in 1936 and delivered in 1938. They had no turbos and their Cyclone 9 engines were rated at 930hp for take-off and 775hp at 14,000ft. Range in overload condition with 4000lbs of bombs was 2400 miles. Obviously this to was well beyond the capabilities of any fighter, single or twin engine, in 1938. 
The Army funded and built the B-19 as another proof of concept aircraft and was funding the hyper engine project as the 'knowledge' of the time was that liquid cooled engines would stand up to turbo charging at high altitudes better than air cooling. (Makers of air cooled engines increase the amount of fins on each cylinder). The fitting of turbos to the B-17 increase the top speed by around 50mph and increased the ceiling by thousands of feet. The B-17C was ordered in 1939 and the first delivered in July 1940. With four .50 cal guns and single .30cal gun it makes the He 111 with three 7.9mm guns look rather badly armed. 
Army (and Boeing, among others) had been working on successors to the B-17 with Boeing alone going through at least eight different 'paper' aircraft. Boeing designs 316, 322, 333A, 333B, 334, 334A, 341 and finally the 345 which was the basis for the B-29 and was submitted to the Army in May of 1940. After engineering studies, wind tunnel models and full size mock ups and prototypes ordered the Army orders 250 production B-29s in May of 1941, 4 months before the first _single stage_ Merlin production engine is delivered by Packard. Back in Sept of 1940 (end of the daylight BoB?) The Army was ordering B-17Es with eight .50 cal guns and single .30. At high altitudes they could outrun and out climb Hurricane Is . And again with a nominal range of 2000 miles with a 4000lb bomb load there was no possible single engine fighter that could escort them when they started rolling off the production lines in Sept of 1941. 
Now at some point the level of technology did get to a point where a single engine fighter could perform the escort mission but that wouldn't be until 1943. 
The 2 stage mechanical supercharged R-2800 wasn't really the answer. It wasn't enough lighter or more compact compared to the turbo R-2800 used in the P-47 to make up for the 350-400 less hp at 22,000ft and up.


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## stona (Mar 14, 2016)

The problem for the Americans was that their bombers could not outrun a Fw 190 or Bf 109 in 1943, particularly when the fighters were just the pointy end of a sophisticated air defence system, not unlike that developed by the British several years before the US even entered the war. I don't believe a crystal ball was needed to foresee this, just a careful analysis of campaigns that had already happened. They either needed a complete volte-face on daylight bombing or they needed to develop suitable escort fighters as a matter of priority. It took them far too long to even develop the drop tanks to extend the range of the fighters they already had.
Neither do I think a crystal ball was needed to anticipate the increase in the efficacy of flak. All the weapons and systems of control which would allow German flak to cause so much damage to the American bombers was in development (some even deployed in early forms) before the US entered the war.
What the Americans did was develop a concept or doctrine and then adhere rigidly to it, even in the face of evidence that it might not work as well as predicted. They were far from alone in this, in fact I can't think of any nation that didn't do the same somewhere. Whether they were right to persevere, eventually developing the escort fighters and tactics to mitigate losses to an acceptable level is a moot point. If you were one of the aircrew lost on one of the early 'proof of concept raids' concept it might not be so moot.
Cheers
Steve

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## tomo pauk (Mar 14, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> ....
> Army (and Boeing, among others) had been working on successors to the B-17 with Boeing alone going through at least eight different 'paper' aircraft. Boeing designs 316, 322, 333A, 333B, 334, 334A, 341 and finally the 345 which was the basis for the B-29 and was submitted to the Army in May of 1940. After engineering studies, wind tunnel models and full size mock ups and prototypes ordered the Army orders 250 production B-29s in May of 1941, 4 months before the first _single stage_ Merlin production engine is delivered by Packard. Back in Sept of 1940 (end of the daylight BoB?) The Army was ordering B-17Es with eight .50 cal guns and single .30. At high altitudes they could outrun and out climb Hurricane Is . And again with a nominal range of 2000 miles with a 4000lb bomb load there was no possible single engine fighter that could escort them when they started rolling off the production lines in Sept of 1941.
> Now at some point the level of technology did get to a point where a single engine fighter could perform the escort mission but that wouldn't be until 1943.
> The 2 stage mechanical supercharged R-2800 wasn't really the answer. It wasn't enough lighter or more compact compared to the turbo R-2800 used in the P-47 to make up for the 350-400 less hp at 22,000ft and up.



The 2-stage mech-supercharged (did I just invented a new term...) R-2800 'B' will provide 1/3rd more power than the fully rated BMW 801D above 22000 ft (in your face, Hap Arnold), and we know that huge F4U-1 have had no problems with Fw 190 when tested. The Army fighter designed around that R-2800 does not need the 18% thick wing as the F4U, nor it does not need the 314 sq ft wing. Use 15-16% thick wing (at root), 270-280 sq ft (like Sea Fury), we'd still wind up with wing loading lower than P-47, but with more speed than the F4U. Engine available by January 1942.
The 2-stage R-2800 'A' series (= earlier model than 'B' series) was doing 1460 HP at 23000 ft, some 40% more than BMW 801C or the de-rated 801D.
The turbocharged R-2800 'A' is yet another option, feasible in 1941.

Even not going with that, the drop tanks outfitted P-47 didn't required rocket science. The US planers knew by winter of 1941/42 that targets of their bombers are within 600 miles from their future bases, and that drop tanks actually work (they know that for years, of course).

The P-51 with V-1650-1 would still give the Fw 190 good run for their money, especially in 1942.


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## stona (Mar 14, 2016)

In the context of my earlier post it is only fair to note that when the USAAF did finally get the escort fighters, tactics and strategy for its bombing offensives sorted out it scored the one clear victory of the combined bombing offensive and that was the destruction of the Luftwaffe (or German Air Force as it liked to call it) in 1943/44. This was an almost entirely American victory, expensive in blood and treasure, and an important one for which enough credit is not always given. Had the Americans turned to night time bombing who knows what might have happened (apart from a lot more night fighters!).
Cheers
Steve

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## tomo pauk (Mar 14, 2016)

Three top mistakes for the UK might possibly been:
- Too much of adherence to the 'bomber will always get through (during the day)' mantra. From there several things (problems) emerged: neglection/rejection of long range fighter escort design/service, the turret fighter (to combat enemy bombers trying to get through), non availability of technology and training for night bombing
- Belated introduction of high performance aircraft in the FAA inventory
- Belated introduction, or non-introduction of advanced airfoils and high lift devices as a norm, rather than as an exception


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## stona (Mar 15, 2016)

Everyone thought that the bomber would get through in the 1930s, only the Americans continued to believe so in the 1940s.

You don't need long range fighters or bombers when you are expecting to have a conflict with France. The fighters were designed around the requirements of ADGB, only the zone fighters needed any kind of endurance and as the zone and interceptor fighter specifications became more blurred and converged endurance/range was sacrificed for performance. At the time this was a reasonable route to take.

Turret fighters seemed like a good idea at the time. With hindsight something closer to the German 'zerstorer' concept would have been better, but even that had limitations. Designs much closer to a heavy fighter/zerstorer were considered in the early to mid 1930s, but the turret concept won out. I still believe this was due at least in part to financial considerations. A suitable French turret was available, the rights already in British hands, and there would be no substantial development costs.

The non-availability of training and equipment for night bombing was undoubtedly a mistake, but it was founded on an underestimation of just how difficult it was to navigate in the dark. I'm not convinced that with the technology available in 1940/41, even with much increased and better training, significantly better results would have been achieved. The technologies that enabled effective, if not precision, night bombing did not become available until much later.
GEE from March 1942. OBOE from December 1942. G.H. and H2S November 1943. LORAN, very late 1944, hardly used at all.
Unfortunately there was no way that any of this technology can be magically advanced by a couple of years making it available in 1940 as Bomber Command switched almost exclusively to a night time effort.

The lack of high performance aircraft in the FAA was a mistake, or rather a combination of mistakes. Fundamentally the Senior Service was run by sailors, not airmen, and it was slow to grasp the rapid changes taking place in the late inter-war period. Their Lordships very nearly went to war without a fighter capable of protecting its fleets and they did go to war with strike aircraft that looked like they belonged to a previous era. We should be grateful for the Fulmar which was not as bad as it is often portrayed to be.

I'm not sure what you mean about airfoils and wing design, you' need to be more specific. The performance of the best British aircraft in all categories, apart from naval, in the latter part of the war was as good as or better than any other nations (say Spitfire, Tempest, Mosquito, Lancaster).

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2016)

With France assumed as ally in upcoming war against Germany, the escort of RAF bombers makes plenty of sense. Base the fighters in France (not unlike what was done in ww1), bombers taking off from UK, then overfly the Channel and France, where they are joined with fighters, then carry on into Germany proper. Damaged bombers can land in France, or maybe in Belgium/Netherlands that we assume as neutral. Fighters can have 250-300 miles of radius, and Merlin I/II/III has something like twice the power above 16000 ft than the main German fighter engine of late 1930s, the Jumo 210. Merlin III/X, let alone Merlin XX are also better than DB-601A, especially with 100 oct fuel. Or Sabre vs. BMW 801.

The Germans were not really sure that bomber will always get through, the Bf 110 (while non-ideal) was very much a fighter that was to clear the way for the upcoming bomber strike. They almost got the Fw 187 for similar purpose. The Japanese were also not sold to the idea.
A long range fighter was very much within the scope of UK technology from mid-30s on, more so than it was the case for any other country, but a firm separation between FC and BC, reinforced by 'will get through' mantra, meant it will never, or too late came to frutition.

I did not state that advanced airfoils and high-lift devices were not present on all British aircraft, but that outdated airfoils and non-applications of hi-lift devices were present in plenty of their A/C.


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## stona (Mar 15, 2016)

Germany only emerged as a potential adversary in the two years after the NSDAP's consolidation of power and self evidently after the Anschluss and Munich in 1938. Even with remarkable powers of perception this could not be before late 1934 or early 1935 when the Nazis truly took control and realistically voices didn't start to be raised in concern until about a year after that. 
Given that at this time it was expected to take 8 years to introduce a new bomber into service from first design and 4-5 years for a fighter I think the familiar crystal ball would be needed.
Rearmament in Britain gained pace with Scheme F introduced in 1936, by which time Germany was emerging as the potential enemy, but even then deliveries of the orders for the scheme were scheduled for between February 1939 (Battle) and August 1939 (Hurricane, Wellington) and even this was not achieved. Of the 270 Spitfires supposed to be delivered by just 130 were completed by April.
In the period between 1935 and 1938 the total number of aircraft delivered rose from 893 to 2,828 but rocketed to 7,940 in 1939. The total structure weight went from 1.91 to 9.82 million pounds in the same period before rocketing to 28.89 million pounds in 1939. Equivalent figures for the total work force are 15,000 (1935) 65,000(1938) and 130,000 (1939).
The process was much longer and slower than seems to be the perception here. Britain entered the war with aircraft designed in the mid 1930s (or earlier) not in 1938.
The increased production of 1939-1940 was based on investment in fixed capital (the firms felt secure in doing so), better state-industry planning (a looming war concentrates minds), the stabilisation of design (not new designs), improved design and construction methods (though you might not think so building Wellingtons at Weybridge) and finally the extended use of sub contracting.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 15, 2016)

The point was that while the inability of the bombers to defend themselves in daylight was shown to be true in 1942/early 43 that is more than a little late to _start _designing escort fighters. Before then things were more confused and I hope that I showed that in late 30s a single engine fighter could not hope to match the range/endurance of a 4 engine bomber. 3 (at a minimum) things changed this.

1. Better aerodynamics. Like the airfoil used on the Mustang that allowed for the carriage of large quantities of fuel _while _keeping the drag low.
2. Better fuel. While the Americans had moved from 87 octane to 91 octane and then 100 octane while the British were stuck on 87 octane the American 100 octane had lower peak performance capability than the British 100 octane. It wasn't until 1941/42 that 100/130 was finally sorted out and engine makers (and aircraft designers) could get a good idea of what they could expect.
3. Better engines and superchargers that combined with the better fuel allowed for much better power to weight ratios than early powerplants could offer. 

_When _the planners could *count *on such changes is a real question. We know _now _when such changes occurred but trying to predict these changes would occur in 1939-40-41 was a lot harder.

I am really not sure where this "Mystery" R-2800 powered fighter comes from or how it fits in. Who builds it and when is it ordered? 
The First R-2800 doesn't get into the air until July 1939 in a test hack. The F4U was the first airframe designed to use the R-2800. 
The single stage engine in the P-47 is about 200lbs lighter than the two stage engine in the F4U and both planes need inter-coolers


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## stona (Mar 15, 2016)

The inability of the US bombers to defend themselves was proven in 1942. The inability of German and British bombers to defend themselves had been demonstrated in 1939/40. The American faith in the ability of_ their_ bombers to defend themselves by dint of much heavier armament was the mistake. I don't know enough about the policy making process behind the USAAF's adoption of the principle that given enough guns a formation of bombers would be able to defend itself, but there must surely have been some doubters given events in Europe two years earlier. Were there no Cassandras being ignored in 1940/41?
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 15, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> A long range fighter was very much within the scope of UK technology from mid-30s on, more so than it was the case for any other country, but a firm separation between FC and BC, reinforced by 'will get through' mantra, meant it will never, or too late came to frutition.



Sorry Tomo but it wasn't possible in 1930s. It was possible in 1942. The question was _when _it became possible. 

As mentioned above it was fuel and engines, The Merlin III gave 880hp for take-off with 87 octane fuel. Even if the British had gone to constant speed props sooner that is not enough power to get a fighter with the capability of a 400 mile escort mission (roughly 1200 miles 'nominal range') out of a standard British Airfield. Yes, "technically" the British could have made the airfields bigger pre-war but financially it was another story. Initial specification for the Stirling bomber called for operating out of a 500yd field. 

A Merlin III went 1375lbs, A Merlin XII went 1420lbs, The Merlin X and XX went 1450lbs for 1280hp take-off. Late model 20 series engines went 1475lbs and were allowed 1610hp for take-off using 18lbs of boost. Merlin 61 weighed 1640lbs and was rated at 1280hp for take-off. Merlin V-1650-7 weighed 1715lbs and had 1490hp for take-off using 15 1/4lbs boost on 100/130 fuel. The power to weight ratios of the powerplants (and the fighters) changed dramatically in just 4-5 years. Where was the 'tipping" point at which a long range fighter (which is a very imprecise phrase, a P-40C was long range fighter compared to a Spitfire MK I) became feasible? 

And the question isn't just about take-off, it is about providing a fighter that is _good enough_ to actually fight the enemy interceptors over their home territory. Which the Bf 110 wasn't able to do. You may not need to shoot down the enemy at a 5 to 1 ratio but you need to disrupt his attacks on the bombers and keep his interceptors busy. If your escort fighter is bigger and heavier and using roughly the same engine you are in trouble. 

Now you just need a design team that is clued into engine (and fuel) development enough to _rapidly _respond with a good design and get it into production in months rather than the normal 2-3 years (or 4 years). You also have to compromise on certain things. The US army in 1942 wanted high speed, high altitude and long range. What they got was the Fisher P-75.

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## stona (Mar 15, 2016)

The British were not looking at for a long rage fighter for the RAF. The nearest thing to it in 1940/41 would be something like the Fulmar and that couldn't compete with the Bf 109 anywhere. The Spitfire and Hurricane were both produced as a result of a conscious decision to sacrifice endurance for performance. It was not accidental that the RAF's two best fighters in this period had such limited range, it was intentional. The factor which most influenced the decisions influencing this generation of British fighters was not the performance of other nations fighters, though they were not ignorant of it, it was the rapidly increasing performance of bombers. 

Between 1930 and 1936 the British went from the Bulldog, incapable of reaching 200 mph, to the Spitfire. The specification for a Bulldog replacement, F.7/30, was issued in October 1931 (NOT 1930) and called for a top speed of 195 mph and at no time in its evolution was a speed of more than 215 mph mentioned. A few years later and F.10/35 would be met by the development of designs funded as part of the Air Ministry's high speed aircraft research programme, aircraft flying in the 300-350+ mph range. It was a considerable achievement, but that performance came, knowingly, with the sacrifice of endurance.
All aircraft designs are a compromise and at the time these aircraft were being developed, the Spitfire and Hurricane being produced in numbers, the primary driving factor was the quest for speed. 

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Mar 15, 2016)

I don't know if it was "intentional" but the Spitfire and Hurricane were no more short legged than another _European _fighter of the time. Or perhaps I should say any other European fighter that the British had _reasonable knowledge_ of. Russia may or may not qualify as European and in 1937-39 only the I-16 was really "known" in the West. Japanese fighters also being unknown or known from Chinese reports and with the Ki 27 first flying 7 months after the Spitfire even if the British had been handed a full set of blueprints it wouldn't have changed a thing. The Ki 43 first flying almost 3 years after the Spitfire. 
Deliberately designing (requesting) a slower, poorer climbing, larger turning radius aircraft that had more range than it's contemporaries in the mid to late 30s would not have gone over well. It didn't go over well when the British got their hands on the early P-40s. They promptly shuffled them off to fight the Italians. Early P-40s having 35-60% more internal fuel than a Spitfire (depending on self sealing tank set up) and provision for the 52 gal drop tank? With drop tank the P-40 had nearly double the fuel of an early clean Spitfire.
The early Allison was good for 1040hp at 15,000ft which wasn't that far off form the Merlin IIIs 1030hp at 16,750ft. 
In other words sticking a Melrin III in Tomahawk would have done almost nothing for altitude performance.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 15, 2016)

"...The American faith in the ability of_ their_ bombers to defend themselves by dint of much heavier armament was the mistake....."


The 'Custer' Mistake


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## stona (Mar 15, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> I don't know if it was "intentional" but the Spitfire and Hurricane were no more short legged than another _European _fighter of the time.



The only European fighter of comparable performance to the Spitfire, in service in meaningful numbers, by 1939, was the Bf 109. It's a case of convergent evolution. I believe some of the better French fighters like the M.S. 406 had better range, but in no way qualify as 'long range'.
The sacrifice of range was intentional in the sense that the high speed aircraft research programme explicitly accepted that the compromise, reducing endurance for performance, specifically speed, would have to be made.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Sorry Tomo but it wasn't possible in 1930s. It was possible in 1942. The question was _when _it became possible.
> 
> As mentioned above it was fuel and engines, The Merlin III gave 880hp for take-off with 87 octane fuel. Even if the British had gone to constant speed props sooner that is not enough power to get a fighter with the capability of a 400 mile escort mission (roughly 1200 miles 'nominal range') out of a standard British Airfield. Yes, "technically" the British could have made the airfields bigger pre-war but financially it was another story. Initial specification for the Stirling bomber called for operating out of a 500yd field.



How bad the RAF wants the long range fighter (yes, we know they don't want it)? Lengthening 1/5th of take off lanes by extra 200 ft (70 yards?) to accomodate the longer ranged fighter should be cheaper than to produce bombers that Germans will make the practice shooting of.



> A Merlin III went 1375lbs, A Merlin XII went 1420lbs, The Merlin X and XX went 1450lbs for 1280hp take-off. Late model 20 series engines went 1475lbs and were allowed 1610hp for take-off using 18lbs of boost. Merlin 61 weighed 1640lbs and was rated at 1280hp for take-off. Merlin V-1650-7 weighed 1715lbs and had 1490hp for take-off using 15 1/4lbs boost on 100/130 fuel. The power to weight ratios of the powerplants (and the fighters) changed dramatically in just 4-5 years. Where was the 'tipping" point at which a long range fighter (which is a very imprecise phrase, a P-40C was long range fighter compared to a Spitfire MK I) became feasible?



The tipping point is achieved once Merlin I/II/III is available. It provieds twice the power of what Jumo 210 was doing. Another tipping point is achieved with Merlin XX, that does not have peer in LW service before late 1941, when DB 601E is finally cleared for 2700 rpm.



> And the question isn't just about take-off, it is about providing a fighter that is _good enough_ to actually fight the enemy interceptors over their home territory. Which the Bf 110 wasn't able to do. You may not need to shoot down the enemy at a 5 to 1 ratio but you need to disrupt his attacks on the bombers and keep his interceptors busy. If your escort fighter is bigger and heavier and using roughly the same engine you are in trouble.



Didn't I've alredy stated that Bf 110 was not ideal for the job? Keep things simple - 1 or 2 (in German case) crew members, 8-12 LMGs, either Merlin or DB 601, not too big and that's it. RAF has advantage in engine power at altitude at least by late 1941.



> Now you just need a design team that is clued into engine (and fuel) development enough to _rapidly _respond with a good design and get it into production in months rather than the normal 2-3 years (or 4 years). You also have to compromise on certain things. The US army in 1942 wanted high speed, high altitude and long range. What they got was the Fisher P-75.



Not every long range fighter was a lemon like P-75. Talk P-47N, Merlin Mustang, P-38, P-82, Hornet.
As for earlier stuff - Westland can very much design the Whirlwind-like fighter instead of historical Whirly, but a bit bigger, say 300 sq ft wing, Merlin engines in power egg installation, fuel both outboard and inboard the nacelles, 12 Brownings.



Shortround6 said:


> ...
> Deliberately designing (requesting) a slower, poorer climbing, larger turning radius aircraft that had more range than it's contemporaries in the mid to late 30s would not have gone over well. It didn't go over well when the British got their hands on the early P-40s. They promptly shuffled them off to fight the Italians. Early P-40s having 35-60% more internal fuel than a Spitfire (depending on self sealing tank set up) and provision for the 52 gal drop tank? With drop tank the P-40 had nearly double the fuel of an early clean Spitfire.
> The early Allison was good for 1040hp at 15,000ft which wasn't that far off form the Merlin IIIs 1030hp at 16,750ft.
> In other words sticking a Melrin III in Tomahawk would have done almost nothing for altitude performance.



By the time P-40C is available, the Merlin 45 is around (the Merlin XX even earlier), so let's stick that one. No wonder P-40C was a worse performer than Spitfire V, at 15000 ft it has 300 HP less and admitedly greater weight. 
edit: the Spitfire with 20-30 gals extra is a better bet
(end edit)
I don't know why the long range fighter with 8 Brownings in case of UK will be slower, a worse climber and more sluggish than an interceptor with 4 Hispanos.
P-40 was not the only long range aircraft with humble power, let's take a look on the Ki 61, granted a mid-war aircraft, but using an engine of less power than Merlin III or the early V-1710.

The fact that escorting fighters are already at 15-20 kft, cruising at 250 mph puts them in advantage vs. defendes that need to climb 1st to get there - altitude and speed advantage counts for something. The defending side can call up the fighters that are nearby, say those at Ruhr area, while those around Hamburg, Munich or Berlin can't help. Makes things interesting - 500 bombers and 200 escorts vs. 250 defenders?


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## stona (Mar 15, 2016)

The endurance of the Spitfire and Hurricane have their origins in the 'Operatonal Requirements Committee' and it's requirement for F.10/35, though neither was built to that specification.
At discussions on 29th March 1935 speed and firepower were given priority over rate of climb and manoeuvrability and landing speed requirements were omitted, possibly because more and more aircraft were now being designed with flaps. An armament of 6, preferably 8, .303 machine guns was required.
For the first time a table was introduced which showed the estimated relationship between endurance and maximum speed. The DCAS (Courtney) proposed that endurance should first be decided as this would determine maximum speed. Wing Commander H A Whistler gave the views of ADGB. *He asked for fuel for 30 minutes at ground level (or at 15,000ft, whichever gave the greater) at maximum continuous power to cover climb and fuel reserve, plus 60 minutes at economic speed at 15,000ft for patrol, plus 15 minutes at maximum power for pursuit and attack. *This was agreed.
The concept of determining fuel capacity by reference to a hypothetical operational mission was entirely new, and much better than the previous practice of just specifying a time at maximum power. Whistler's detailed prescription was equivalent to 60 minutes at maximum power plus a 15 minute reserve. This equated to a maximum speed of 315 mph in the table.
By the time the specification was circulated Courtney noted that the new aerodromes being built allowed a run of 1,100 yards and that this would permit an increase in wing loading to allow a maximum speed of 330 mph.
Both the Spitfire, being built to the F.37/34 version of F.7/30, and the Hurricane, being built to F.36/34, incorporated the requirements of F.10/35 into those aircraft and that's why the endurance and maximum speed of both is roughly in this range. They are based on a requirement dating from March 1935 when a high speed (300+mph) long endurance fighter was not deemed to be possible.
Cheers
Steve

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## Peter Gunn (Mar 15, 2016)

Sadly, I am in no way smart enough to add to this discussion, but I am certainly learning a ton of good stuff. Thanks guys, please continue and well done.

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## soulezoo (Mar 15, 2016)

I agree with you Peter. Much to be learned.

Best of all, the lads are keeping it civilized!


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## pinsog (Mar 15, 2016)

Many of you guys keep talking about the "myth of the self protecting bomber". I'm not really sure why this is considered a "myth". In 1940 there at most, 2 countries in the world that would be capable of intercepting B17's with any real hope of success, the Germans and maybe the British. As was pointed out above, the B17E could actually outrun and outclimb a Hurricane, and a 1940 model Spitfire with 8 303 LMG's would't really excite me when trying to attack a plane that has 8 50's to shoot back at me with, plus the fact that the Spitfire wouldn't have a huge speed advantage itself when you begin talking about multiple passes at altitude that a Spitfire would need. The Spitfires couldn't even deal with Japanese twin engine bombers in 1942-43 over Port Moresby when they had a pair of 20mm cannon, so why would we think they could handle a B17? 

The Japanese were never very good at shooting down 4 engine heavy bombers and when the B29 arrived it was virtually immune. The Zero would have nearly the same problem as the Hurricane in catching a B17 at altitude.
The Italians wouldn't be a threat.
The US themselves only had 2 planes that could catch a B17 at altitude at that time, the P38 and the P43, neither of which was really combat capable and the P43 being very underarmed.

The Germans best hope at that time would have been the BF110 which would probably have done a very credible job, the ME109 probably doing ok, but still being underarmed and not carrying enough cannon ammunition.

All that being said, the Germans made quite an advancement in their ability to shoot down heavy bombers, but they were using 1940's tech to shoot down 1930's bombers. They never faced the B29. A B29 at 33,000 feet at 300-325-350 mph is a far different animal than a B17 or B24 at 24,000 feet at 200 mph

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## Shortround6 (Mar 15, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> How bad the RAF wants the long range fighter (yes, we know they don't want it)? Lengthening 1/5th of take off lanes by extra 200 ft (70 yards?) to accomodate the longer ranged fighter should be cheaper than to produce bombers that Germans will make the practice shooting of.



What take-off lanes? RAF 'Fields' were pretty much exactly that, 'fields'. Grass "fields" roughly square in shape so the planes could take off in whatever direction the wind was coming from. The Grass Field presented another problem. To prevent heavy aircraft from putting ruts in the field ALL aircraft, bombers and fighters, had were limited to the same maximum tire pressure. It was only as the war got closer that fields were extended by buying or commandeering neighboring property and a few planes were granted exemptions form the tire pressure limit. Whirlwind was allowed 42psi instead of the standard 38psi for instance to avoid redesigning the engine nacelle and doors. 





> The tipping point is achieved once Merlin I/II/III is available. It provieds twice the power of what Jumo 210 was doing. Another tipping point is achieved with Merlin XX, that does not have peer in LW service before late 1941, when DB 601E is finally cleared for 2700 rpm.


 The Merlin I/II/III was hardly a tipping point as the British were well aware that the Jumo 210 was Kestrel class engine and that the Germans would be working on something better in short order (if not already, Germans didn't put out press releases unless it put them in a favorable light). The French already had 860hp Hispano engines and were working on improving them. Germans were displaying 950hp DB engines in international flying meets in mid 1937. 
Designing a long range fighter when the Germans are flying Jumo powered 109s is one thing, actually flying them in service once the DB powered 109s reach the squadrons is another story.
Germans do not _have _to match the Merlin for power. The interceptor fighter does have to come close in power to weight ratio though, which means the defending fighter can equal the performance of the escort fighter while using a lower powered engine if the defender is light enough. 
Germans were using the DB 601N engine with 1175PS at about 16,000ft in the Fall of 1940 (some had shown up in the summer of 1940). Only a few hundred to be sure but then the British didn't instantly replace all Merlin IIIs with Merlin XIIs and Merlin 45s in a matter of a few weeks either. 





> Didn't I've alredy stated that Bf 110 was not ideal for the job? Keep things simple - 1 or 2 (in German case) crew members, 8-12 LMGs, either Merlin or DB 601, not too big and that's it. RAF has advantage in engine power at altitude at least by late 1941.


 Mentioning the Bf 110 was to show that it is not enough just to have some sort of fighter show up. The fighter has to able to put up a creditable fight which the 110 could not. BTW the armament in the 110 was no heavier than what you are proposing. 4 LMG and 2 light cannon aren't much different in weight than 8 LMGs and and lighter than 12 LMGs. It rather depends on ammo carried. 





> Not every long range fighter was a lemon like P-75. Talk P-47N, Merlin Mustang, P-38, P-82, Hornet.


True but then the P-47N, the Merlin Mustang and the P-38 were _not _designed to be escort fighters. They were adapted from existing designs which means they managed to avoid some of the unrealistic "wish list" type requirement/s that bedeviled many new aircraft. 
They also benefited immensely from the better fuel and engines. A P-47N with R-2800-21 engine without water injection and a tooth pick prop trying to fight with 500 gals of internal fuel??? even if you left 1/2 the guns home and 3/4 of the ammo things might not look good. Same with The Mustang. The two stage Merlin gave several hundred more HP for only a few hundred pounds of powerplant weight. P-38E with the 1150hp engines and 400 gallons of fuel after the drop tanks are gone? Got to loose 600lbs of _something, _guns/ammo/etc to get the performance back. 600lbs might be worth 200fpm of climb to the P-38 (or more?) 



> By the time P-40C is available, the Merlin 45 is around (the Merlin XX even earlier), so let's stick that one. No wonder P-40C was a worse performer than Spitfire V, at 15000 ft it has 300 HP less and admitedly greater weight.
> edit: the Spitfire with 20-30 gals extra is a better bet



OK My mistake, the P-40C did show up late, but Tomahawks with 160-180 US gallons of internal fuel (ex-French contract) were showing up in England in the fall of 1940. The extra fuel was certainly not the only reason for the extra weight but these P-40s were real airplanes and not a hypothetical aircraft of rather indeterminate performance. Some of these Tomahawks were "rated" as having a range of 1200-1300 miles which only seems possible if the pane was towed into the air, the engine started and then flown at the exactly right altitude/speed until the fuel ran out. In other words the rating is bogus but obviously they had more range than a Spitfire. Again, like the Bf 110, range wasn't the only requirement. The fighter had to be able to actually have a decent chance of fighting in the environment of the time. 



> P-40 was not the only long range aircraft with humble power, let's take a look on the Ki 61, granted a mid-war aircraft, but using an engine of less power than Merlin III or the early V-1710.



Uh, no. It had more take-off power than either and had very close to the same power at altitude. With 121 imp gallon of internal fuel (145US?) it's range had a lot more to do with better aerodynamics (less drag) than fuel capacity. Claiming you could design a fighter in the mid 30s that could match a fighter that started design in 1939 ignores the lessons learned in the intervening 3-4 years. 



> The fact that escorting fighters are already at 15-20 kft, cruising at 250 mph puts them in advantage vs. defendes that need to climb 1st to get there - altitude and speed advantage counts for something. The defending side can call up the fighters that are nearby, say those at Ruhr area, while those around Hamburg, Munich or Berlin can't help. Makes things interesting - 500 bombers and 200 escorts vs. 250 defenders?



The beginning part of your scenario only works if the defender has a really crappy early warning system (near border/coast or telephone system doesn't work? ) radar was not a necessity. Even the Chinese managed 20-30 minute warnings for raids from Japanese bombers at times. A fair number of the defenders would already be at altitude waiting for the raiders to show up although even with early radar exact location and especially altitude were often in error.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 15, 2016)

pinsog said:


> Many of you guys keep talking about the "myth of the self protecting bomber". I'm not really sure why this is considered a "myth". In 1940 there at most, 2 countries in the world that would be capable of intercepting B17's with any real hope of success, the Germans and maybe the British. As was pointed out above, the B17E could actually outrun and outclimb a Hurricane, and a 1940 model Spitfire with 8 303 LMG's would't really excite me when trying to attack a plane that has 8 50's to shoot back at me with,................



Several other things affected the US planning/theory of bombing. One was that the support equipment for the crew was not up to the altitude capability of the aircraft itself. The heated flying suits for gunners (or heating in general) was not up to the demands placed on it. In the 30s in was assumed that just providing oxygen to the crew would be good enough for 6-8hour flights at 30,000ft. It wasn't, Oxygen masks allow shorter flights at 30,000ft but not flights of the duration the bomber missions wound up lasting. 
Pre war planning didn't really include formations of hundreds of bombers. Large formations having to fly lower and slower than small formations. 
The added equipment (including guns/ammo) didn't help altitude performance either. Weather (clouds) over Europe also caught the USAAF a bit by surprise ( a little less sympathy here).
It all added up to actual operations being flown 5-10,000ft _lower than pre-war planning/theory _called for. 

US had also fallen into the same trap as many other air forces in believing small quantities of small (250-500lb) bombs could be delivered with precision/accuracy and get decisive results.


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## pinsog (Mar 15, 2016)

Another thing I noticed is the armor/self sealing fuel tank issue. The British considering many American fighters not fit for combat due to no self sealing fuel tanks (I certainly agree that every fighter needed seat armor). 35 years of reading had led me to believe that Japanese planes would burst into flame as soon as they were hit, a synopsis of 35 years of reading goes something like "I got behind the zero, gave him a quick burst, he exploded, gave a 2nd Zeke a 2 second squeeze of the trigger and he burst into flames. Now completely out of ammo I gave a 3rd Zeke a dirty look and instantly his fuel tanks erupted into flame" and yet, after reading "The First Team" from Pearl Harbor through the Guadalcanal campaign, it was amazing how many Japanese planes returned back to base shot to pieces. Zeros, Betty's and carrier based torpedo planes all returned to base shot up so badly they never flew again, yet they didn't burn. If Zero's would have had seat back armor, I have a feeling the US Navy would have had a MUCH tougher time dealing with them. Yet, during the Battle of Britain, Hurricanes especially, seem to burn every time inflicting horrible wounds on the pilots in spite of them having so called self sealing tanks.


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## pbehn (Mar 15, 2016)

Just a few points I would like to add about range/performance. The books I read about Dunkerque and the Battle of Britain frequently stated that pilots ran out of or were low on ammunition and/or fuel. Fuel weighs a lot, if you were a pilot would you voluntarily put on extra weight to allow you to fly about for an extra hour after the interception but will mean you dont make the height to have the tactical advantage at the interception? Park/Dowding forbade RAF pilots following the conflict out to sea in the BoB so unless you mount a post battle standing patrol what use is range for a 1940 spitfire? The Spitfire and P 51 both had Merlin engines, The P51 had a great internal fuel load but how would it climb with a 1940 1050BHP engine? I would suggest apart from its firepower such a plane had less utility than a hurricane. From all I have read Battle of Britain pilots wanted rate of climb and canons not increased range. Escorting bombers is of course a completely different game.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2016)

pinsog said:


> Many of you guys keep talking about the "myth of the self protecting bomber". I'm not really sure why this is considered a "myth". In 1940 there at most, 2 countries in the world that would be capable of intercepting B17's with any real hope of success, the Germans and maybe the British. As was pointed out above, the B17E could actually outrun and outclimb a Hurricane, and a 1940 model Spitfire with 8 303 LMG's would't really excite me when trying to attack a plane that has 8 50's to shoot back at me with, plus the fact that the Spitfire wouldn't have a huge speed advantage itself when you begin talking about multiple passes at altitude that a Spitfire would need. The Spitfires couldn't even deal with Japanese twin engine bombers in 1942-43 over Port Moresby when they had a pair of 20mm cannon, so why would we think they could handle a B17?



The Japanese having Zeros or Oscars around meant their bombers were much safer than when flown without escort. The Spitfire and P-40 were hard pressed to defend during Darwin raids, for example. The B-17E was a late 1941 model, I wouldn't bet the house it would've fared well vs. European fighters of same era, although RAF did not suffer some great losses when using ealy Fortresses.



> The Japanese were never very good at shooting down 4 engine heavy bombers and when the B29 arrived it was virtually immune. The Zero would have nearly the same problem as the Hurricane in catching a B17 at altitude.
> The Italians wouldn't be a threat.
> The US themselves only had 2 planes that could catch a B17 at altitude at that time, the P38 and the P43, neither of which was really combat capable and the P43 being very underarmed.



If the P-38 of late 1941 was not combat capable (it was), the B-17 of same year was no better. Zeros did have problems with B-17, the Oscars probably even more.



> The Germans best hope at that time would have been the BF110 which would probably have done a very credible job, the ME109 probably doing ok, but still being underarmed and not carrying enough cannon ammunition.



In 1941 the Bf 109 is a far better fighter, and it carries plenty of cannon ammo.



> All that being said, the Germans made quite an advancement in their ability to shoot down heavy bombers, but they were using 1940's tech to shoot down 1930's bombers. They never faced the B29. A B29 at 33,000 feet at 300-325-350 mph is a far different animal than a B17 or B24 at 24,000 feet at 200 mph



Americans use turboed engines on their bombers ( two supercharger stages in effect) the Germans were still with 1-stage superchargers - US tech level is greater there.


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## pbehn (Mar 15, 2016)

pinsog said:


> Another thing I noticed is the armor/self sealing fuel tank issue. The British considering many American fighters not fit for combat due to no self sealing fuel tanks (I certainly agree that every fighter needed seat armor). 35 years of reading had led me to believe that Japanese planes would burst into flame as soon as they were hit, a synopsis of 35 years of reading goes something like "I got behind the zero, gave him a quick burst, he exploded, gave a 2nd Zeke a 2 second squeeze of the trigger and he burst into flames. Now completely out of ammo I gave a 3rd Zeke a dirty look and instantly his fuel tanks erupted into flame" and yet, after reading "The First Team" from Pearl Harbor through the Guadalcanal campaign, it was amazing how many Japanese planes returned back to base shot to pieces. Zeros, Betty's and carrier based torpedo planes all returned to base shot up so badly they never flew again, yet they didn't burn. If Zero's would have had seat back armor, I have a feeling the US Navy would have had a MUCH tougher time dealing with them. Yet, during the Battle of Britain, Hurricanes especially, seem to burn every time inflicting horrible wounds on the pilots in spite of them having so called self sealing tanks.



I think many things get overblown, the problem with the Hurricane was that not all tanks were self sealing, statistically more Hurricane pilots were burned than spitfires, it doesnt mean all Hurricanes erupted in flames or that no one in a Spitfire was burned. If you are hit in the fuel tank by cannon fire then self sealing makes little difference.

The Guinea pig club had pilots from all over the world and all aircraft types, 80% were from bomber command.


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## pinsog (Mar 15, 2016)

pbehn said:


> Just a few points I would like to add about range/performance. The books I read about Dunkerque and the Battle of Britain frequently stated that pilots ran out of or were low on ammunition and/or fuel. Fuel weighs a lot, if you were a pilot would you voluntarily put on extra weight to allow you to fly about for an extra hour after the interception but will mean you dont make the height to have the tactical advantage at the interception? Park/Dowding forbade RAF pilots following the conflict out to sea in the BoB so unless you mount a post battle standing patrol what use is range for a 1940 spitfire? The Spitfire and P 51 both had Merlin engines, The P51 had a great internal fuel load but how would it climb with a 1940 1050BHP engine? I would suggest apart from its firepower such a plane had less utility than a hurricane. From all I have read Battle of Britain pilots wanted rate of climb and canons not increased range. Escorting bombers is of course a completely different game.



On the other hand, over Darwin, Zeros flew 500 miles one way and ran Spitfires out of fuel over their own territory AND outfought them. That is actually pretty sad for what so many consider the "best interceptor of the war".


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## pbehn (Mar 15, 2016)

pinsog said:


> On the other hand, over Port Moresby, Zeros flew 500 miles one way and ran Spitfires out of fuel over their own territory AND outfought them. That is actually pretty sad for what so many consider the "best interceptor of the war".


When was that? I thought it was P40 Kittyhawks?


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## pinsog (Mar 15, 2016)

pbehn said:


> When was that? I thought it was P40 Kittyhawks?


The P40's were there, but most of the time they couldn't even climb up to the 27-28,000 foot altitude that the Japanese bombers flew at. No sir, it was the Spitfires that were shot down several to 1 by the "inferior" and "obsolete" Zero.

In fact, as I understand it, the Japanese started coming in at 27,000 feet or so specifically because it virtually eliminated interception by P39 and P40's

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## pbehn (Mar 15, 2016)

pinsog said:


> The P40's were there, but most of the time they couldn't even climb up to the 27-28,000 foot altitude that the Japanese bombers flew at. No sire, it was the Spitfires that got their butts handed to them by the "inferior" and "obsolete" Zero.
> 
> In fact, as I understand it, the Japanese started coming in at 27,000 feet or so specifically because it virtually eliminated interception by P39 and P40's


Sorry friend putting "no sire" and "got their butts handed to them" makes me get out of the conversation, it only gets increasingly unpleasant.

Is there an ignore function on this new format?


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## pinsog (Mar 15, 2016)

pbehn said:


> Sorry friend putting "no sire" and "got their butts handed to them" makes me get out of the conversation, it only gets increasingly unpleasant.



Sorry if that offend you, didn't mean to. US got its butt handed to it more than once. So did every combating nation at one time or another.

Fact is that Spitfires over Darwin lost several planes per Zero shot down.

Call it whatever you want to, I didn't think I was doing anything but stating the facts

I just now saw the "No sire" That is a typo. That was supposed to be "No sir"

That would change the perceived meaning of what came afterward. I am fixing that typo now


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## pbehn (Mar 15, 2016)

pinsog said:


> Sorry if that offend you, didn't mean to. US got its butt handed to it more than once. So did every combating nation at one time or another.
> 
> Fact is that Spitfires over Darwin lost several planes per Zero shot down.
> 
> Call it whatever you want to, I didn't think I was doing anything but stating the facts


We are on Darwin now are we? I thought it was Port Moresby?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> The Merlin I/II/III was hardly a tipping point as the British were well aware that the Jumo 210 was Kestrel class engine and that the Germans would be working on something better in short order (if not already, Germans didn't put out press releases unless it put them in a favorable light). The French already had 860hp Hispano engines and were working on improving them. Germans were displaying 950hp DB engines in international flying meets in mid 1937.
> Designing a long range fighter when the Germans are flying Jumo powered 109s is one thing, actually flying them in service once the DB powered 109s reach the squadrons is another story.



British know that Germans are buying Kestrel, since their 600 HP engine is late. How late is the next generation of engines? 
At 5 km, the HS 12Y will do 20-25% less power than Merlin I/II/III in mid 1930s.



> Germans do not _have _to match the Merlin for power. The interceptor fighter does have to come close in power to weight ratio though, which means the defending fighter can equal the performance of the escort fighter while using a lower powered engine if the defender is light enough.
> Germans were using the DB 601N engine with 1175PS at about 16,000ft in the Fall of 1940 (some had shown up in the summer of 1940). Only a few hundred to be sure but then the British didn't instantly replace all Merlin IIIs with Merlin XIIs and Merlin 45s in a matter of a few weeks either.



Defender has to match the power, since, especially in era where radar coverage is spotty or non-existant, it will do the climb in order to match the position, altitude and speed that esort already has. And in case it suceeeded, ie. the escort somehow failed to take advantage of it's speed & altitude advantage, it has the choice to either get the bombers, or to tangle with escorts thus leaving bombers free.
The DB 601N in 1940 can do that power (1160 BHP) for 1 (one) minute, vs. Merlin XX five minutes, 2500 ft higher. 



> Mentioning the Bf 110 was to show that it is not enough just to have some sort of fighter show up. The fighter has to able to put up a creditable fight which the 110 could not. BTW the armament in the 110 was no heavier than what you are proposing. 4 LMG and 2 light cannon aren't much different in weight than 8 LMGs and and lighter than 12 LMGs. It rather depends on ammo carried.



The reason I've mentioned multiple LMGs is to avoid the low ammo carried for cannons in 1940 by UK and Germany.



> Uh, no. It had more take-off power than either and had very close to the same power at altitude. With 121 imp gallon of internal fuel (145US?) it's range had a lot more to do with better aerodynamics (less drag) than fuel capacity. Claiming you could design a fighter in the mid 30s that could match a fighter that started design in 1939 ignores the lessons learned in the intervening 3-4 years.



I don't think that Ki 61 was any more advanced in aerodynamics than Spitfire or P-39. Internal fuel was some 750 L (around 200 US gals; double checked; self-sealing tanks), plus external fuel - two drop tanks of 200 L. Later it was 650 liters of internal fuel, together with introduction of 20 mm cannons, comparable internal fuel as the Typhoon with almost the twice the power. 
So I'd repeat that it was doctrine, not technology that interfered with RAF acquiring the long range fighter early on.


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## pinsog (Mar 15, 2016)

pbehn said:


> Sorry friend putting "no sire" and "got their butts handed to them" makes me get out of the conversation, it only gets increasingly unpleasant.
> 
> Is there an ignore function on this new format?



Went back and changed the typo on "No sire", that was an accident and changed the wording on "Spitfires got their butts handed to them" to "Spitfires were shot down several to 1"

Is that better wording?

Also changing Port Moresby to Darwin


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## pinsog (Mar 15, 2016)

pbehn said:


> Sorry friend putting "no sire" and "got their butts handed to them" makes me get out of the conversation, it only gets increasingly unpleasant.
> 
> Is there an ignore function on this new format?



I believe all offending language has been removed


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## Shortround6 (Mar 15, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> British know that Germans are buying Kestrel, since their 600 HP engine is late. How late is the next generation of engines?
> At 5 km, the HS 12Y will do 20-25% less power than Merlin I/II/III in mid 1930s.



Once again, timing has a lot to do with it. Germans bought (or were loaned?) 1 or 2 Kestrels which were loaned around (each Kestrel powered more than one prototype). R-R got a He 70 as an engine test bed ( room for observers/instruments in the cabin). 

However the DB 600 made a very public debut at the Zurich air meet of 1937 and Flight Magazine had a short write up in the Sept 2 1937 issue. 1937 | 2418 | Flight Archive

This would have caught any long range British single engine fighter designed in 1935-36 thinking the Germans were going to use 650-700hp engines with it's proverbial pants down. From then on it is a race between the different engines. 

HS 12Y engine/s were several hundred pounds lighter in weight than a Merlin. This puts them in hunt in the mid 30s but fading. They are too light to stand up to higher rpm or higher boost when better fuels come along but in the mid/late 30s it is possible to design a working fighter using one. 





> Defender has to match the power, since, especially in era where radar coverage is spotty or non-existant, it will do the climb in order to match the position, altitude and speed that esort already has. And in case it suceeeded, ie. the escort somehow failed to take advantage of it's speed & altitude advantage, it has the choice to either get the bombers, or to tangle with escorts thus leaving bombers free.


The Defender needs to match the power to weight ratio of the complete fighter and needs to match the thrust to drag. Using a smaller/lighter plane means either a lower powered engine can be used for equal performance or a similar powered engine will give the defender better performance. And that was the problem in the 1930s. 

A Spitfire I that had an all up weight of 5,875lbs had a powerplant weight of 2,035lbs (engine cowl 86lbs and engine mount 58lbs are included in structure) , a structure weight of 1890lbs and a "payload" of 1585lbs. The "payload" includes pilot and parachute (200lbs) armament (685lbs) fuel (646lbs) oil (54lbs), please note that this for a plane with no armor, no BP glass, unprotected tanks and a wooden two blade prop (96lbs + 36lb prop hub).
Adding another 500-600lbs of fuel even in unprotected tanks is a substantial increase in weight when looked at as a percentage. 

Engine section of a P-51B/C was 2912lbs not including cowl/mount or fuel tanks (since they are selfsealing it tends to distort the picture, as does the propeller. 483lbs worth of prop on the P-51.
P-51 without rear tank went around 9600lbs clean so adding 500lbs of fuel is a much smaller percentage increase. 
Engine installation in the P-51 was about 30% heavier (including two stage supercharger, after cooler and bigger radiators and coolant) for about 45-58% more power (61in boost/67in boost). 

It was this increase in the power to weight ratio for the engines/powerplant that opened up the escort fighter. 





> The DB 601N in 1940 can do that power (1160 BHP) for 1 (one) minute, vs. Merlin XX five minutes, 2500 ft higher.


There may be some dispute about the time limit. Germans stumbled in development of the DB 601E/605 engines. Allies knew what kind of progress they were making, they were guessing at German progress and had to rely on captured equipment/documents to confirm German progress. We know now using the rectrospectroscope that the Germans had trouble for a considerable period of time in matching the Merlin progress. 





> The reason I've mentioned multiple LMGs is to avoid the low ammo carried for cannons in 1940 by UK and Germany.


The point was that from a weight/performance standpoint it doesn't make any difference. The Bf 110 wasn't a poor performer because it carried a pair of MG/FF cannon. It was a poor performer because of it's size. 





> I don't think that Ki 61 was any more advanced in aerodynamics than Spitfire or P-39. Internal fuel was some 750 L (around 200 US gals; double checked; self-sealing tanks), plus external fuel - two drop tanks of 200 L. Later it was 650 liters of internal fuel, together with introduction of 20 mm cannons, comparable internal fuel as the Typhoon with almost the twice the power.
> So I'd repeat that it was doctrine, not technology that interfered with RAF acquiring the long range fighter early on.



Do you have a good source for the fuel capacity?

Some sources are all over the place (as low as 550 liters internal) and in general, when something is too good to be true, it often isn't true. Ranges are also all over the place but since the ranges almost never mention either speed or fuel capacity (external tanks or not) one is left with a lot of guess work. 
The two different reports/charts on Spitfire Performance disagree with each other on both fuel capacity and weight.


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## stona (Mar 16, 2016)

pinsog said:


> They never faced the B29. A B29 at 33,000 feet at 300-325-350 mph is a far different animal than a B17 or B24 at 24,000 feet at 200 mph



Had the Germans faced the B-29 they would have faced it with the Me 262 armed with 30mm cannon. Even 350 mph doesn't look so good against 500mph+. I'm not sure I'd want to bet on the B-29 in that scenario.
There were other heavily armed jets and even rocket interceptors that may have been available too. How good they would have been we will never know.

I'm not sure that a fully loaded B-17 could out climb a Hurricane. The whole point of the British system was to get its fighters into a position to attack the bombers with as much tactical advantage as possible. The idea that a formation of B-17s cruising at 200mph or less could outrun a properly vectored and controlled 300mph+ fighter is invalid. Even the maximum speed of the B-17 is considerably lower than that of a Hurricane and much lower than the Spitfires and bombers can't fly in self supporting formations, laden, at anything approaching their maximum speed. A typical B-17 formation cruised at a speed not much different from a typical Luftwaffe formation in 1940.
You do make a valid point about armament. 8 .303 machine guns was not designed to shoot down a heavily armoured bomber and would have struggled to do so. Cannon armed aircraft became standard in the RAF in 1941/2 and that is a different matter.

As for the Aussie Spitfires, read Anthony Cooper's 'Darwin Spitfires'. A realistic tally shows that in the actions against the Japanese 1 Fighter Wing achieved results comparable to those of similar squadrons in other theatres. Their balance sheet compares well with those achieved by Spitfire Is in the BoB and the Spitfire Vs on Malta and is considerably better than that achieved by Spitfire Vs in Mallory's lean into France in 1941/2.
1 Fighter Wing was made up of very average, inexperienced, squadrons and went on a sharp learning curve once deployed in North West Australia. It's performance was comparable to any of its contemporaries in the British and Commonwealth air forces. It doesn't look so good when compared to the standards set by the American units in theatre, but that is an unfair comparison.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Mar 16, 2016)

The B29 was in many ways an improvement on the B 17 but it was also a new age in military aviation. Even the US could not sustain loss rates of B29s thay they accepted with the B17. The crews needed much more training and the planes themselves cost much more.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 16, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> Do you have a good source for the fuel capacity?
> 
> Some sources are all over the place (as low as 550 liters internal) and in general, when something is too good to be true, it often isn't true. Ranges are also all over the place but since the ranges almost never mention either speed or fuel capacity (external tanks or not) one is left with a lot of guess work.
> The two different reports/charts on Spitfire Performance disagree with each other on both fuel capacity and weight.



This table states 199 US gals: link
Also this report, pdf: link
The table in the Bunrin Do book about the Ki 61 state internal fuel capacity of 650, 700 and 750 L. Max capacity: wing tanks 2 x 190 L, lower fuselage tank (between the two wing tanks, under the pilot)170 L, rear fuselage tank was at 200 L. Don't fill rear tank and it s indeed 550 L. 

Wing profile at root was 2R 16, at tip 24009, 200 sq m wing area (215 sq ft).


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## stona (Mar 16, 2016)

The British mistake with night bombing is compounded by the fact that they were aware of problems years before the war. In 1937, when arguments over exactly what the next generation of British bombers should look like were raging, Peirse expressed fears that large aircraft would be limited to night operations and be unable to undertake precision operations. The results of 1938 exercises confirmed his doubts when of 47 raids only one got close enough to the target to be plotted, and even that had an error of over a mile. The Bomber Command report attributed this to
_
"the extreme difficulty of finding and attacking an unilluminated target at night with high speed aircraft."_

Nothing had changed two years later when the Command's aircraft attempted the same operations for real. The RAF did not really develop a night bombing programme in the late 1930s.

When discussions of the 'Ideal Bomber' were held in May 1938 it was decided that the bomber should be designed around its turrets. Whereas previous doctrine had emphasised the need for formation flying for mutual defence, the bomber should now be capable of defending itself (though it was acknowledged that formation flying might still be required). These points clearly referred to operation in daylight, but it was agreed that provision for night bombing be made.
The Operational Requirements branch of the Air Staff drew up requirements that emphasised high speed and formidable armament (front, dorsal, ventral and tail turrets, all with 20mm cannon). There were even plans for some aircraft to fly as 'escorts' to the formation with a lower or no bomb load and much increased ammunition. Had this evolved the British might have followed a rather similar route to that taken by the Americans.
At the same time a parallel argument for a clean high speed and lightly or unarmed bomber was being promoted, notably by Ludlow Hewitt.
The Ideal Bomber investigation was based on the long held belief that bombers could defend themselves on daylight operations and that the speed required to reduce exposure to fighter attack inevitably led to large bombers. This line of development was revealed to be unsound when tested in war.
It took years to adapt the large heavy bombers with with Bomber Command would start the war into potent night time weapons.
It was the much derided, but never quite forgotten, unarmed fast bomber which was the most successful concept to emerge from the immediate pre-phoney war period. This did not emerge, as the Official History' would have us believe from some sort of revolutionary lateral thinking by De Havilland. In a liason meeting between the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and the Director-General of Research and Development on 23rd August 1939 concerns were expressed that some specifications had not been issued and that some aircraft firms were without sufficient design work. The DGRD (Tedder) proposed that these firms be allowed to study
_
"projects that would follow up aspects of design of general interest.
(a) a relatively small high speed bomber
(b) aircraft directed to attaining the highest possible speed.
(c) aircraft designed for jet propulsion."_

The ACAS (Sholto-Douglas) mentioned that a specification for a light bomber would be issued soon as a revision of B.1/39 (Ideal Bomber). The meeting also decided that.
_
"In the meantime Armstrong Whitworth and A.V.Roe would proceed with a small lightly armed high speed bomber."_

It was a month after this that Geoffrey De Havilland, following a meeting with Freeman, put forward his specification for a high speed bomber made of wood (Like the Comet and Albatross) which would look like this.

_"Merlin engines using 100 octane fuel
Range of 1,500 miles
Two 500lb bombs or six 250lb bombs
Crew of two
Maximum speed 405 mph at 20,000ft
Cruise o weak mixture at 320 mph."_

That's where the Mosquito came from, not from some strange vacuum. It was the one successful aircraft to come out of the long and convoluted discussions around the failed concept of the Ideal Bomber.

You did read Tedder's item (c) correctly above. In August 1939 the British were at least talking about a jet powered bomber, months before the contract for the Gloster E.28/39 was issued

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 16, 2016)

And then we have this report: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/Tony-I.pdf

No under seat tank and total fuel capacity of _about_ 550 liters, arguing over 2-3 liters is foolish. Especially considering manufacturing tolerances and conversion charts/formulas. 
Apparently there was quite a variation in tanks fitted and perhaps even their capacities. 
Also of interest is the performance of the captured plane against US fighters, most of the comparisons are pretty much forgone conclusions but comparing it to the FM-2 is interesting, especially considering the test weight of the Tony was 6150lbs and not the 6982lbs shown in some of the other charts with the 199-200 gal fuel load. 
Perhaps the captured plane's engine wasn't running right or the plane was mis-rigged (out of alignment?) but it was a dog when climbing compared to the FM-2 (which is over 1000lbs heavier) and adding 300lbs of fuel and then extra protected tank weight certainly wasn't going to help. 

Climb is important for escort fighters because the escort fight isn't one diving pass at the interceptors. The escorts, even if smart enough not to chase the interceptors too far from the bombers often have to climb back up to the bombers height or to escort positions 3-5,000ft above the bombers to stop the next attack and climbing speed isn't even fast escort cruise, it takes time to accelerate back up to speed once the plane/s level off at the desired altitude. 
Climb may not be quite as important as it is to interceptors in some scenarios but it can't be ignored either. Early P-47s often got into positions where they had trouble getting back to the bombers in a timely fashion.


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## drgondog (Mar 16, 2016)

As a side note Re; B-29. SAC had to shift B-29 operations over N.Korea from daylight to night because the MiG 15, with less armament than Me 262 couldn't be defended.

Tomo - the B-17E staffed the first bomb groups for England and North Africa as well as all the BG's(heavy) in the PTO (rapidly replacing few remaining B-17Ds). I accorded itself well but the B-17F was immediately better suited to combat. RAF got some in Coastal Command but the bulk of their B-17 experience was the B-17C.


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## Peter Gunn (Mar 16, 2016)

stona said:


> Had the Germans faced the B-29 they would have faced it with the Me 262 armed with 30mm cannon. Even 350 mph doesn't look so good against 500mph+. I'm not sure I'd want to bet on the B-29 in that scenario.
> There were other heavily armed jets and even rocket interceptors that may have been available too. How good they would have been we will never know.
> 
> *SNIP*
> ...



Interesting point you bring up Steve. I've wondered a long time how the B-29 would have fared in the ETO. I think intercepting the B-29 that's for sake of argument, 100 mph faster and flying 10,000 feet higher a tougher nut to crack, even for the 262. The 29 was operational in China in April-June of '44, could the USAAF have changed it's system to deploy it to Europe in the same time frame instead? I don't know, I do know that was the stated reason why they didn't, not wanting to introduce a new and totally different weapon into a system that was running at a pretty good pace.

But if they had, realistically were there enough 262's to make a difference? Historically they couldn't stop the B-17 raids so I'd expect they'd have a similar effect on a much improved bomber. If the B-29 was running operational strikes by July-August 1944 what amount of 262's were available for intercept at that time? I would imagine there would be B-17's and B-24's running thousand plane raids concurrently. Which to me sounds like the logistics/planning nightmare the AAF wisely avoided.

I guess what I'm trying to say with all this bleeber-blabber is the question: Historically, with what was actually produced and operational at the time, would the B-29 give a good account of itself in the ETO? Against 109's and 190's and flak, I'd say yes.

But as pbehn pointed out, the resource they represented made even moderate losses prohibitive, so perhaps if the meager 262 force concentrated on the Superfortress alone, that may have warranted stopping B-29 raids.

Sorry, I tend to ramble it seems.


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## stona (Mar 16, 2016)

I would be assuming something of a wider 'what if' for the B-29 deployed in the ETO. Somehow the Germans would have to be in a much stronger position in 1945 for it even to be deployed. In that scenario I would assume many more Me 262s and a generally better air defence capability over Germany.
The point I was making is that the B-29 was another generation of aircraft, like the Me 262, and we should compare apples with apples, not pears 
I didn't know that the B-29 had been forced into night time operations by the MiG 15 until I read drgondog's post above, I was just assuming that in an Me 262 v B-29 scenario the odds would not necessarily favour the bomber.
Cheers
Steve

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## tomo pauk (Mar 16, 2016)

What about the Soviets? Some of contenders could be:
- failure to produce a fighter with reasonable armament (say, 2 cannons at least) and powerful engines (AM-35A, AM-38, M-82) early enough
- not producing a proper heir to the 'Fast Bomber 2' (SB-2) in 1941, in shape of ANT-58/'aircraft 103' until almost too late, that, combined with next mistake meant the Germans have the long logistic lanes safe from air attacks
- non introduction of drop tanks for fighters


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 16, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> Interesting point you bring up Steve. I've wondered a long time how the B-29 would have fared in the ETO. I think intercepting the B-29 that's for sake of argument, 100 mph faster and flying 10,000 feet higher a tougher nut to crack, even for the 262. The 29 was operational in China in April-June of '44, could the USAAF have changed it's system to deploy it to Europe in the same time frame instead? I don't know, I do know that was the stated reason why they didn't, not wanting to introduce a new and totally different weapon into a system that was running at a pretty good pace.


 the actual intent was to replace the B-17 and B-24 with the B-32

_"The Army Air Forces wanted to begin replacing B-17s and B-24s with B-32s in the summer of 1944. The plan called for Mediterranean-based B-24 bomb groups to transition first, followed by other groups in the 15th Air Force and finally 8th Air Force groups."
_
B-32 Bomber Factory in Fort Worth, Texas,1944

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## pbehn (Mar 16, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> But as pbehn pointed out, the resource they represented made even moderate losses prohibitive, so perhaps if the meager 262 force concentrated on the Superfortress alone, that may have warranted stopping B-29 raids.
> 
> .


I think the maximum that could be considered acceptable was 2% and whereas the B 29 was fast it could not be escorted, interception by just a few fighters could have been serious.

Also the problem of actually hitting anything from 33,000 feet hadnt been solved.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 16, 2016)

pbehn said:


> I think the maximum that could be considered acceptable was 2% and whereas the B 29 was fast it could not be escorted, interception by just a few fighters could have been serious.
> 
> Also the problem of actually hitting anything from 33,000 feet hadnt been solved.


The B-29 could have been escorted and the problem of the B-29's wild inaccuracy over Japan at extreme altitudes was caused by the Jet Stream's presence over the home islands.

This is not to say that the Jet Stream wasn't present over Europe, but the conditions were different due to the geographic makeup.

Dealing with those high-altitude currents was a steep learning curve at the time.


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## stona (Mar 16, 2016)

Bombers in the ETO didn't operate at the altitudes where the polar jet stream would be encountered, typically not below 9,000m/29,000ft.
B-29s operating against Japan flew at exactly the same altitude as the lower range of the sub tropical jet stream, around 10,000m/33,000ft making it very much a factor.
Cheers
Steve.


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## Hiromachi (Mar 16, 2016)

Ehh, it would be nice if someone actually based on a decent source in regard to Ki-61.

First, the fuel capacity. Early Hiens had four fuel tanks : two 190 l wing fuel tanks, one 170 l center-wing fuel tank and one 200 l rear fuselage fuel tank. The last one was only used in very long flights and even during escort missions it was preferred to carry two drop tanks rather than load the rear fuel tank. Why ? Because it created stability issues moving the Center of Gravity of the machine to the rear (reminds P-51D, doesnt it ? ). Most of the time this fuel tank was left empty or even removed.

Soon after production of Ki-61-I Otsu started (after producing 90 or so airframes) it was removed completely. Thus total capacity was reduced from 750 to 550 liters.
This was further decreased after producing about 150 Ki-61-I Otsu, when additional protection to the fuel tanks was provided, reducing capacity of wing fuel tanks to 170 l and center-wing fuel tank to 160 l - overall capacity decreased from 550 to 500 liters.



Shortround6 said:


> And then we have this report: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/Tony-I.pdf
> 
> No under seat tank and total fuel capacity of _about_ 550 liters, arguing over 2-3 liters is foolish. Especially considering manufacturing tolerances and conversion charts/formulas.
> Apparently there was quite a variation in tanks fitted and perhaps even their capacities.
> ...



This was one of the two Ki-61s tested in US. I believe in one of them engine stopped working during the testing leading to plane crash. Either this was the mentioned in report model or the other one. But makes no difference, since aircraft had multiple issues. None of the Hiens was captured even in decent conditions and it took engineers weeks to bring them back to flyable condition. Hardly it represents the actual machine performance.
Fortunately I have Ki-61 Piloting Procedure (sort of a pilots handbook) captured in 1944 in Hollandia. I once made a comparison of it to Bf 109 F-1 / F-2 powered by Db 601 N so a bit better performing engine if compared to Ki-61 powered Ha-40 (license built Db 601Aa).
Results at rated power were :
Ki-61 (Ha-40) vs Bf 109 F-1 / F-2 (Db 601 N)
Level speed
Alt
1 km 496 km/h 514 km/h
2 ....... 520 ......... 534
3 ....... 545 ......... 553
4 ....... 569 ......... 573
5 ....... 589 ......... 592
6 ....... 591 ......... 594
7 ....... 589 ......... 590
8 ....... 580 ......... 580
9 ....... 561 ......... 565
10 ....... 523 ......... 523

Time to altitde in min (rate of climb in m/s)
Alt 
1 km 1-20 min (14.3 m/s) / 1 min (16 m/s)
3 ............... 3-34 (16.8) / 3-12 (16)
6 ............... 6-50 (11.1) / 6-30 (11.2)
8 ............... 10-48 (6.9) / 10-30(6.4)
10 ............... 17-14 (3.3) / 18-42(2.5)

Data for Bf 109 F-1 / F-2 based on Specification sheet for the Bf 109 aircraft type, models F-1 and F-2 with DB 601N engine from Kurfurst.org website - http://kurfurst.org/Performance_tests/109F1F2_Kennblatt/Kennblatt_fur_Bf109F1F2_DB601N.PDF .

Ki-61 certainly wasn't the best performing aircraft around, but it wasnt nearly as bad as the US report made it look like. As often it is captured aircraft fail to present full level of performance simply due to state they were captured in, lack of knowledge about operation of the aircraft by the intelligence and crews and finally lack of desire to push the aircraft to the limits and loose the precious object.

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## Peter Gunn (Mar 16, 2016)

Not to put too fine a point on things but B-29's were under escort in the PTO by D model Mustangs so there's that.

FLYBOYJ - Thanks for the info, never knew they were going to replace the Forts and Libs with the Dominator, man, learn something new everyday.


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## stona (Mar 16, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> Not to put too fine a point on things but B-29's were under escort in the PTO by D model Mustangs so there's that.



And why not?  Someone above is confusing maximum speed and cruising speed! The B-29 cruised at 220-230mph at an altitude well below the P-51 D's service ceiling, meaning that the P-51 is quite capable of performing the escort for a typical B-29 mission.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Mar 16, 2016)

stona said:


> And why not?  Someone above is confusing maximum speed and cruising speed! The B-29 cruised at 220-230mph at an altitude well below the P-51 D's service ceiling, meaning that the P-51 is quite capable of performing the escort for a typical B-29 mission.
> Cheers
> Steve


Well I was confusing it mainly because people were talking about its speed of 350MPH making it difficult to intercept.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 16, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> Not to put too fine a point on things but B-29's were under escort in the PTO by D model Mustangs so there's that.


VLR missions started 7 April 1945

You had four FGs operating from Iwo Jima: 15th, 21st and 506th who were operating the P-51D and then there was the 414th that was equipped with the P-47N that went operational a few months later.

Before that, the B-29s ran the gauntlet alone


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## airminded88 (Mar 16, 2016)

And given the VLR escorts got a late start it was a good thing for the 20th BC the IJAAF was weakened as it was by the end of the Pacific War from what I gather because the Superforts initial operations from China/Marianas were less than stellar due to technical issues on their massive Wright engines.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 16, 2016)

The B-29s also started their ops from the newly captured islands in late '44 and were actively intercepted over the home islands.

The VLR escorts were a welcome relief


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## airminded88 (Mar 16, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> The VLR escorts were a welcome relief



Indeed they were.
Anywhere in the aerial battleground of WWII where the enemy was still present the sight of escorts must have looked like God-given to the bomber boys.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 16, 2016)

Hiromachi said:


> Ehh, it would be nice if someone actually based on a decent source in regard to Ki-61.
> 
> First, the fuel capacity........................



Thank you. Would you happen to have the weight of Ki-61 for those performance figures? Or the armament?


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## Hiromachi (Mar 16, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Thank you. Would you happen to have the weight of Ki-61 for those performance figures? Or the armament?



Performance figures are based on a model with 2950 kg weight (CG position 25.8%), no idea what was armament of that specific model they based performance on but Handbook in Chapter I Section 1 e gives following : " Armament : Fuselage : Two 13 mm machine cannons, Wing : Two 13 mm (machine cannons) " 
Japanese usually in flight manuals rounded the caliber numbers, so 12.7 mm Ho-103 are often mentioned just as 13 mm machine cannons. 

The really problem with weight is that it was changing through the production - the armament and armor protection were increasing it but at the same time aircraft fuel load was decreasing thus partially compensating the weight increase. In general it should oscillate around 3000 kg.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 16, 2016)

FWIW:


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## Hiromachi (Mar 16, 2016)

Yeah, I have it since like forever.
I also have manual which is a closest to actual data.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 16, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> What about the Soviets? Some of contenders could be:
> - failure to produce a fighter with reasonable armament (say, 2 cannons at least) and powerful engines (AM-35A, AM-38, M-82) early enough
> - not producing a proper heir to the 'Fast Bomber 2' (SB-2) in 1941, in shape of ANT-58/'aircraft 103' until almost too late, that, combined with next mistake meant the Germans have the long logistic lanes safe from air attacks
> - non introduction of drop tanks for fighters



I am not sure that failure to develop certain engines (or more properly the failure of certain development projects) are really "mistakes".
Russians were trying to develop higher powered engines from 1939 on. Unfortunately the base engines they had to work with limited the projects and most failed. It wasn't really lack of effort or a decision _not _to develop higher powered engines (like British decision _not _to buy/fit constant speed props or fully feathering props on multi engine aircraft when they were avialable). 

Unfortunately the Russians then faced two problems. One was the engines were behind world standard (until the M-82) and the 2nd was that the typical Russian wood construction for fighters was heavier than equivalent metal construction. Russians sacrificed Armament (weight) for performance. The Russians often tried small batches of fighters with heavier armament but reverted back to the lighter armament after the experiments. Even the La-7 didn't get 3 cannon until a new model cannon allowed the fitting of 3 cannon for the weight of 2 of the old cannon. Total number of rounds carried didn't actually change much, fewer rounds per gun for the 3 gun planes. 400 rounds for two guns and 450 rounds for 3 guns.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 16, 2016)

Was not trying to suggest a development of much more powerful engines than Mikulins that were in production. The AM-38 on board of a Soviet fighter will mean performance similar to the Fw 190 under 4 km, that a fighter powered by M-105 will never match. Even the M-82 will be hard pressed for that. A 2-speed supercharged version of the AM-38 is no rocket science, nor it is a version with 'faster' S/C (so inbetween AM-35A and AM-38 for altitude power). 
The Soviets were indeed using plenty of wood in their aircraft, but the fighters were of modest proportions and weights, wing area was closer to the Bf 109/MC 202 than to Spitfire/P-51. Even the small P-39 was bigger than MiG-3. They were also using reasonably thin wing profiles (15-16% at root), so the drag penalties were manageable.
Two Shvak cannons was not installed on Soviet fighters until late 1942. Not world beating, but far better than 1 cannon + 2 LMGs (Yak-1, Bf 109F-early G), let alone what MiG-3 usually carried.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2016)

For the Italians:
- thinking that maneuverability is the main asset of a fighter, thus not developing fast monoplane fighters with armament better than 2 HMGs in late 1930s
- not developing carrier vessel & aircraft for them
- stopping the develpment and use of V-12 engines in late '30s


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## stona (Mar 17, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> For the Italians:
> - thinking that maneuverability is the main asset of a fighter, thus not developing fast monoplane fighters with armament better than 2 HMGs in late 1930s



Interesting point. We've discussed the development of British fighter aircraft at some length and I'm sure the same considerations exercised the minds of the Italians as well.

I feel the two primary features traded off by the British were speed and fire power. Other factors like endurance and manoeuvrability were secondary considerations. It was really a happy coincidence that the combination of the quest for speed led to fast monoplane fighters and that the quest for firepower led to the eight gun fighter with a long standing intention to mount cannon armament. It also led to the turret fighter over which we'll draw a discrete veil.

The Germans went for speed too, and early versions of the Bf 109 were very lightly armed (like the Italians with 2 machine guns) compared to a British eight gun fighter. They also developed the 'zerstorer' concept, heavily armed, and in some ways related to the less successful turret concept.

I think that the light armament of the Italian aircraft is understandable, it was the British that were the exception in this area, they carried out a lot of research into practical armament for aircraft. Not emphasising the need for speed as evidence of faster and faster foreign fighters_ and bombers _mounted was indeed a mistake. In their defence, despite all this, they did have a 300mph fighter in 1940.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 17, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Was not trying to suggest a development of much more powerful engines than Mikulins that were in production. The AM-38 on board of a Soviet fighter will mean performance similar to the Fw 190 under 4 km, that a fighter powered by M-105 will never match. Even the M-82 will be hard pressed for that. A 2-speed supercharged version of the AM-38 is no rocket science, nor it is a version with 'faster' S/C (so inbetween AM-35A and AM-38 for altitude power).
> The Soviets were indeed using plenty of wood in their aircraft, but the fighters were of modest proportions and weights, wing area was closer to the Bf 109/MC 202 than to Spitfire/P-51. Even the small P-39 was bigger than MiG-3. They were also using reasonably thin wing profiles (15-16% at root), so the drag penalties were manageable.
> Two Shvak cannons was not installed on Soviet fighters until late 1942. Not world beating, but far better than 1 cannon + 2 LMGs (Yak-1, Bf 109F-early G), let alone what MiG-3 usually carried.



An AM-38 would have normal soviet fighter falling over on it's nose. It is about 500lbs heavier than a M-105 engine. Almost like trying to stick a DB 603 in a 109G. 
Yes you could design a new fighter to use the engine but you are back to the wood construction. The Mig 3, despite it small size and light armament, went about 7200-7300lbs. And the Mig had problems due to it's small size. A new, larger fighter to solve some of the problems and to carry heavier armament would be even heavier. MIg was restricted in armament in order to help performance. they built over 800 with an extra 12.7mm UBK under each wing but weight went up over 200kg and performance dropped to where they couldn't use mixed formations of 3 gun and 5 gun fighters. The 5 guns fighters couldn't climb fast enough. Many of the 5 gun fighters had the underwing guns removed in service. 
One 20mm Shvak weighed almost double what a 12.7mm UB machinegun weighed and about 4 times what the 7.62mm Shvak machinegun weighed. 
I am not sure the reported cycle rates for the synchronized guns vs synchronized guns are 100% accurate either.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 17, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> For the Italians:
> - thinking that maneuverability is the main asset of a fighter, thus not developing fast monoplane fighters with armament better than 2 HMGs in late 1930s
> - not developing carrier vessel & aircraft for them
> - stopping the develpment and use of V-12 engines in late '30s



The 1st is certainly valid, the 2nd is much less so. Italy was actually a poor country and was the least powerful (economically) of the major powers. Having one or two carriers (could she afford anymore?) wasn't really going to change the naval situation in the Med. And like the British found, operating one or two carriers in range of land based air was asking for trouble. 
Could Italy really afford to spread it's design talent any further than it did and design special carrier aircraft?

#3 is also questionable. Italy only had two families of V-12 engines in the 30s and they were of a similar age/concept to the Hispano in some ways. They were better in some ways but the existing engines of the early and mid 30s needed to be thrown out and a new designs started/developed. Does Italy really have the resources to do that plus develop air-cooled engines? 

The Fiat and Isotta V-12 engines were separate cylinder engines. They did not use one piece cylinder blocks for each bank but 6 individual cylinders with sheet meat cooling jackets. The cylinder head was in one piece with the cylinder barrel and the valve gear was held in a separate "box" that bolted to the top of the cylinders. 
They were light weight, slow running engines for their displacement (Fiat A.30 an exception).


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> An AM-38 would have normal soviet fighter falling over on it's nose. It is about 500lbs heavier than a M-105 engine. Almost like trying to stick a DB 603 in a 109G.
> Yes you could design a new fighter to use the engine but you are back to the wood construction. The Mig 3, despite it small size and light armament, went about 7200-7300lbs. And the Mig had problems due to it's small size. A new, larger fighter to solve some of the problems and to carry heavier armament would be even heavier. MIg was restricted in armament in order to help performance. they built over 800 with an extra 12.7mm UBK under each wing but weight went up over 200kg and performance dropped to where they couldn't use mixed formations of 3 gun and 5 gun fighters. The 5 guns fighters couldn't climb fast enough. Many of the 5 gun fighters had the underwing guns removed in service.
> One 20mm Shvak weighed almost double what a 12.7mm UB machinegun weighed and about 4 times what the 7.62mm Shvak machinegun weighed.
> I am not sure the reported cycle rates for the synchronized guns vs synchronized guns are 100% accurate either.



The MiG-3 was tested, 2 prototypes, with AM-38, wasn't doing any falling over the nose. Soviets, however, forgot that more HP demands more cooling capacity, so the engine overheated with cooling system left over form AM-35A engine. There was a small series of MiG-3 with two synchronised cannons, so that armament is also not a long shot for 1941, even for 1940.
If 1600 CV (nominal, not short-burst power) is not enough for 2 cannons that are much lighter than Hispano, with lighter ammo, I'm not sure what power is needed.
The La-5 didn't do much of falling over the nose either, when VK-105PF from LaGG-3 was replaced with heavier M-82, while also loosing the cooling system that was aft the CoG.

I'm not sure what the podded HMGs have to do with my proposal.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2016)

stona said:


> ...
> The Germans went for speed too, and early versions of the Bf 109 were very lightly armed (like the Italians with 2 machine guns) compared to a British eight gun fighter. They also developed the 'zerstorer' concept, heavily armed, and in some ways related to the less successful turret concept.
> 
> I think that the light armament of the Italian aircraft is understandable, it was the British that were the exception in this area, they carried out a lot of research into practical armament for aircraft. Not emphasising the need for speed as evidence of faster and faster foreign fighters_ and bombers _mounted was indeed a mistake. In their defence, despite all this, they did have a 300mph fighter in 1940.
> ...



In 1940, Britain, Germany and USA were producing 350 mph fighters. French and Japanese started production & service of 320-330 mph fighters. Not just that, all of those are equally or better armed (Germans have cannons before 1939 on Bf 109), and are better suited for high altitude work.



Shortround6 said:


> The 1st is certainly valid, the 2nd is much less so. Italy was actually a poor country and was the least powerful (economically) of the major powers. Having one or two carriers (could she afford anymore?) wasn't really going to change the naval situation in the Med. And like the British found, operating one or two carriers in range of land based air was asking for trouble.
> Could Italy really afford to spread it's design talent any further than it did and design special carrier aircraft?



The carrier aircraft around means that biplane bombers don't have a field day over the surface fleet. The Italians developed the version of Regianne fighter for carrier vessel service, and were the 1st to embrace mast-height bombing with Re.2002.



> #3 is also questionable. Italy only had two families of V-12 engines in the 30s and they were of a similar age/concept to the Hispano in some ways. They were better in some ways but the existing engines of the early and mid 30s needed to be thrown out and a new designs started/developed. Does Italy really have the resources to do that plus develop air-cooled engines?



Even going with Asso XI and L.121 means a performance gain over Fiat A.74. As for resources - stop developing a dozen of V-12 and radial engines of 600-1000 HP, and plenty of resources can go into V-12s of 1000-1500 HP.


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## stona (Mar 17, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> French and Japanese started production & service of 320-330 mph fighters. Not just that, all of those are equally or better armed (Germans have cannons before 1939 on Bf 109), and are better suited for high altitude work.



The Macchi C.200 is comparable to those fighters.

The Bf 109 E-3 did get the wing mounted cannon, but it was a maturing design and it had originally been more lightly armed, ignoring the motorkanone which the Germans couldn't get to work and abandoned for the early series aircraft. 
The MG FF cannon was first tested in a Bf 109 wing in October 1937. Problems with the wing structure meant that the C and D series were equipped with MG 17s in the wings. It was not until after a substantial reworking of the wing that the cannon armament was cleared for fitting to the E-3 in May 1938.
The point is that the Bf 109 was not designed around wing cannons, and the motorkanone installation didn't work until the F series leaving early versions with armament comparable to many of their contemporaries. The Germans did realise this was a problem and did make efforts to up arm the aircraft before the war, before, strangely, reducing the armament on the F series.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2016)

I was trying to point out that MC.200 was some 2 years behind the curve, both in performance and armament vs. what the major players were producing.
The Italians were very much in position to have a monoplane fighter that uses I-F Asso IX and has 2-3 HMGs in production in 1935. That they passed on this opportunity was their own fault. Ditto for a fighter that uses L.121 and has 3-4 HMGs in 1938.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 17, 2016)

It seems alot of times that these discussions tend to focus on the main Allies/Axis nations, but could the smaller nations' airforces (Axis/Allied) have made an impact early on?

Let's take the Polish Airforce for example. Had they focused on a more modern air wing, coupled with better communications, forced the Luftwaffe to alter their plans or caused a delay in the Blitzkreig?

How about the Netherlands? Had the RNAF invested more in outfitting their units, could they have forced a delay in Germany's attacks? The Fokkers were very capable aircraft, but sadly, outnumbered and again, communications played a large factor.

And a certainly not a small nation, but often overlooked in discussions: the French...there is a laundry list of mistakes that can be brought up...


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## parsifal (Mar 17, 2016)

For the Italians:
- not developing carrier vessel & aircraft for them

Not developing a carrier actually made sense for the italians. The assumption was that Italy was a giant aircraft carrier, and adequate support would be provided by the RA. As for nearly every other nation, no such co-operation, or rather effective co-operation was forthcoming until a dedicated specialised wing or arm of the airforce was formed for the specific task of attacking ships. The italaians finally did this in the latter part of 1940, and even then their efforts were fitful and patchy. Even so, in 1941, the italians managed to sink with their air arm a considerable amount of british shipping, and this continued into 1942.

It wasnt a carrier that the italians needed, it was an effective doctrine and a separate force specially trained for the purpose of fleet co-operation. Effective carrier operations for the italians was an unattainable goal that would have sucked out a lot of resources for not much gain for them.

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## stona (Mar 17, 2016)

Italy, at least theoretically, had the capacity to base aircraft not only on the Italian mainland and islands but also Libya on the southern shores, and, at the eastern end, in Albania. It could have done this before entering WW2 'proper', which could have allowed Italian air power to dominate the MTO. 
Hindsight is a wonderful thing 
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2016)

Then how will the Italians provide fighter cover for their surface units when those are more than 200 miles from airbases? Hopefully more than 15 minutes worth a day.


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## stona (Mar 17, 2016)

I'd quote Parsifal's last paragraph above. They needed a coordinated approach to develop the aircraft and tactics to match their strategic aims, hardly likely in 1930s Italy, but there you go.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 17, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Then how will the Italians provide fighter cover for their surface units when those are more than 200 miles from airbases? Hopefully more than 15 minutes worth a day.


Many Italian single engine fighters had auxiliary fuel tanks that extended range to 600 miles or more. 30-45 minutes on station.
More seriously they had built the Fiat C.R. 25 in small numbers and the later I.M.A.M. 57 had nothing that could not have been made earlier.
It should have been no great trick to build an Italian version of the Blenheim fighter which would have been good enough for fleet protection against Swordfish and Albacores around 400-500 miles from shore.


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## parsifal (Mar 17, 2016)

The number of times british carrier based strike aircraft hit the Italians more than 200 miles from a land base was rar3e, moreover the majority of airstrikes that were made were delivered at night (against stationary or slow moving targets) or in conditions of half light or poor weather. it was a rare, but not unheard of event for swordfish to make air attacks in broad daylight, and when they did, the results were usually not pretty.

Defending against Swordfish attacks was more than just a matter of getting fighters over your convoys or task gps. You needed fighters with the legs as you point out, but also the ability to fly in all manner of conditions. Good luck finding an aircraft anywhere in 1940-1 able to fill that brief . 

The biggest handicap facing the Italians in 1940 wasn't a carrier, or a long range fighter, or even effective airborne strike capability. it was a lack of effective fleet co-operation that could provide its fleet with effective and timely warning of the location, diposition and intentions of the RN forces. In 1940, in the Med, the RM was stronger, better equipped and full of fight, despite the propaganda weve been subjected to postwar. but it was a force vulnerable and ineffective because it was unable to see and anticipate the enemy moves. give them that capability, and you have a game changer.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 17, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> The MiG-3 was tested, 2 prototypes, with AM-38, wasn't doing any falling over the nose. Soviets, however, forgot that more HP demands more cooling capacity, so the engine overheated with cooling system left over form AM-35A engine. There was a small series of MiG-3 with two synchronised cannons, so that armament is also not a long shot for 1941, even for 1940.
> If 1600 CV (nominal, not short-burst power) is not enough for 2 cannons that are much lighter than Hispano, with lighter ammo, I'm not sure what power is needed.
> The La-5 didn't do much of falling over the nose either, when VK-105PF from LaGG-3 was replaced with heavier M-82, while also loosing the cooling system that was aft the CoG.
> 
> I'm not sure what the podded HMGs have to do with my proposal.



MIG was designed for the AM -35 engine and shows the problem/s rather nicely. The Mig-3 weighed within 100lbs or so of a MK IX Spitfire clean ( depending on individual aircraft and exact equipment). The MIG has a smaller wing for higher wing loading, higher stall speed, worse turn. Weight of engine and wood construction of the smaller airframe leaves much less weight allowance for armament. Which was the point of bringing up the podded guns. The addition of two guns, each about 1/2 the weight of a 20mm and around 145 RPG of 12.7 mm ammo had a noticeable effect on performance. 
As the Russians were able to Incorporate more metal onto some of their fighters they added more fuel or more armament for about the same total weight.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2016)

The lousy installation of canopy in the MiG-3 (in most cases unable to be opened in flight, so the pilots prefer to fly with canopy open) was a far worse thing. The podded guns were also a drag penalty, that synchronised cannons avoid. Part of lack of performancec was a single speed supercharger, that restricted engine power down low (despite the swirl throttle contribution), where most of combats happened in USSR - something that AM-38 in the nose avoids easy.
The MiG-3 have had lower wing loading than the lightest version of Fw 190 (one with just 2 cannons and removed protection). The version with podded guns (yes, it was a lemon) was with same wing loading as that Fw 190.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 17, 2016)

A lot of Russian aircraft suffered from poor details or finish. The Mig also suffered from a number of handling problems, The Mig 3 being better than the Mig 1 but the Mig was still a handful compared to the other _new _soviet fighters. 
The usual Russian response to trying to improve performance, given the limited power of the engines, was to lighten the load (basically armament). Economics also had something to with it as the Shkak 7.62mm machine gun was expensive to manufacture. The 12.7mm UB was cheaper (fewer man hours) so one 12.7 often replaced two 7.62s. Cost of the 20mm Shvak is unknown but it may be cheaper than western weapons. Russians still needed them in large quantities. 10000 fighters with one 20mm each or 5000 fighters with two 20mm guns each? 
Both the M-106 and M-17 were prewar projects, It was the failure of both engines that meant the M-105 had to be retained in production despite low power and less than ideal solutions found to keep performance within competitive limits. 

The AM-35/38 series were large slow turning engines. They really needed bigger airframes than the existing Russian fighters. 
But with the wood construction the airframes were heavy for their size. 
Using the weight comparison of the ASh-82 doesn't take into account the physical size of the engines or were the center of gravity of the engine is in relation to the center of gravity of the aircraft.





Please note that the cylinders/crankcase is under the pretty much cylindrical part of the cowl and the tapered/curved part is pretty much empty (long nose case and fan) so the engines real weight is pretty close to the leading edge of the wing. 
Sticking in a AM-35/38 engine that is both longer and heavier than the M-105 engine may be a lot harder.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 17, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> I was trying to point out that MC.200 was some 2 years behind the curve, both in performance and armament vs. what the major players were producing.
> The Italians were very much in position to have a monoplane fighter that uses I-F Asso IX and has 2-3 HMGs in production in 1935. That they passed on this opportunity was their own fault. Ditto for a fighter that uses L.121 and has 3-4 HMGs in 1938.



This would have put the Italians _weelllll_ ahead of the "curve". The two existing 12.7mm machine guns were the equal of 4-6 rifle caliber machine guns in firepower. 4 12.7mm guns would be equal to 8-12 rifle caliber guns. 
Russians are using (mostly) 2-4 fast firing RCMGs in the I-16s. French are using one slow firing (470rpm?) cannon, there is a lot of confusion as to when the HS 404 first showed up, and two RCMG in the MS 406. . Americans are using ONE .50 cal and ONE .30 cal.
in the P-35 and P-36 (later got two extra .30 cal) and Navy Grumman Biplanes. 

The Italians certainly did have too many engine projects going on. But should they have concentrated on one to three better radials or tried to develop a brand new V-12? The old V-12s needed new crankshafts, new crankcases, new cylinder blocks and so on. Really a Brand new engine. 
I don't know why the Fiat company dropped the A 76 which was only a bit larger than the A 74 but rated at 1000hp at altitude. It would have helped. Better cowlings, use of exhaust thrust would also have helped. development of a two speed supercharger would have helped.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 18, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> A lot of Russian aircraft suffered from poor details or finish. The Mig also suffered from a number of handling problems, The Mig 3 being better than the Mig 1 but the Mig was still a handful compared to the other _new _soviet fighters.
> The usual Russian response to trying to improve performance,* given the limited power of the engines*, was to lighten the load (basically armament). Economics also had something to with it as the Shkak 7.62mm machine gun was expensive to manufacture. The 12.7mm UB was cheaper (fewer man hours) so one 12.7 often replaced two 7.62s. Cost of the 20mm Shvak is unknown but it may be cheaper than western weapons. Russians still needed them in large quantities. 10000 fighters with one 20mm each or 5000 fighters with two 20mm guns each?



(my emphasis)
Exactly why I've mentioned the AM-38 and M-82, to be installed in fighters as early as possible.
BTW, that extra 5000 fighters, each with single cannon, will still need, say, 10000 of Skash MGs. The Soviets were installing in the I-16 two cannons as early as 1937, along with 2 LMGs, and 4 (four) cannons in 1939, so my proposal means saving, not expense.




> Both the M-106 and *M-17* were prewar projects, It was the failure of both engines that meant the M-105 had to be retained in production despite low power and less than ideal solutions found to keep performance within competitive limits.



Typo - you've meant the M-107? The M-17 was predecessor to the Mikulin's engines. The early application of more powerful and available engines means those Klimovs are not dearly needed. Both M-82 and Mikulins have had much more growth potential than Klimov's, where M-107/108 were brand new engines vs. M-105.



> The AM-35/38 series were large slow turning engines. They really needed bigger airframes than the existing Russian fighters.
> But with the wood construction the airframes were heavy for their size.
> Using the weight comparison of the ASh-82 doesn't take into account the physical size of the engines or were the center of gravity of the engine is in relation to the center of gravity of the aircraft.
> Please note that the cylinders/crankcase is under the pretty much cylindrical part of the cowl and the tapered/curved part is pretty much empty (long nose case and fan) so the engines real weight is pretty close to the leading edge of the wing.
> Sticking in a AM-35/38 engine that is both longer and heavier than the M-105 engine may be a lot harder.



Indeed, the, say 10% bigger engine for a fighter with such a heavy and powerful engine. Much of the engine weight is compensated by having the cooling system behind the CoG, not applicable for radial engines. The ASh-82 does not have the fan, but a segmented shutter that prevents overcooling of the engine, the idea was a carry-over from I-16.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 18, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> (my emphasis)
> Exactly why I've mentioned the AM-38 and M-82, to be installed in fighters as early as possible.
> BTW, that extra 5000 fighters, each with single cannon, will still need, say, 10000 of Skash MGs. The Soviets were installing in the I-16 two cannons as early as 1937, along with 2 LMGs, and 4 (four) cannons in 1939, so my proposal means saving, not expense.



An I-16 with *FOUR *cannon? in production? Out of over 9000 I-16s built only a little over 700 had the cannon. And the "last" 650 had two 7.62 and one 12.7mm (there was probably some overlap of production between the last models).
Russians were trying to change to the 12.7mm as it was much cheaper to make than the ShKAS gun. Which is why a lot of Laggs and Yaks had one 20mm and one 12.7mm gun. 






> Typo - you've meant the M-107? The M-17 was predecessor to the Mikulin's engines. The early application of more powerful and available engines means those Klimovs are not dearly needed. Both M-82 and Mikulins have had much more growth potential than Klimov's, where M-107/108 were brand new engines vs. M-105.



yes, typo ;( 
Trouble is that the M-38, the M-106 and the M-82 are pretty much contemporaries. Work started on the M-106 in 1938 and on the other two in 1939. The M-106 was NOT a new engine and in fact would fit standard M-105 mounting points. two were fitted with 2-speed superchargers in 1939. Apparently development did not go smooth and while some were fitted to production Yak-1 fighters they were removed and the planes fitted with M-105s. The M-106 did not go into service until 1944 and then in modified form.
Work on the M-107 started in March 1940. According to preliminary planning the service interval was to reach 100 hours by May 1st 1941 and 2000 M-107 were to be completed by the end of 1941. Things went badly from there on out. 
May 13th 1941 saw the NKAP issue a production decree for the M-82.
The M-38 was in production (small numbers?) in the beginning of 1941 although the engine didn't pass it's state tests until July of 1941. 

Obviously in preliminary designs and production planning the M-106/107 would have the inside track as so little needed to be changed. Not until they fall on their faces does the need arise for alternative engines and by then the Germans have invaded and pre-invasion production plans are tossed out the window. 
Claiming the Russians made a mistake in NOT switching to the M-82 and M-38 sooner doesn't hold up very well as both engines were in development/testing at the time the decision would have to be made. If either one had also run into trouble things would have been really sticky (M-82 was the 3rd 14 cylinder radial engine worked on by Shvetsov and team) 





> Indeed, the, say 10% bigger engine for a fighter with such a heavy and powerful engine. Much of the engine weight is compensated by having the cooling system behind the CoG, not applicable for radial engines. The ASh-82 does not have the fan, but a segmented shutter that prevents overcooling of the engine, the idea was a carry-over from I-16.



Thank you for the correction on the fan.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 18, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> An I-16 with *FOUR *cannon? in production? Out of over 9000 I-16s built only a little over 700 had the cannon. And the "last" 650 had two 7.62 and one 12.7mm (there was probably some overlap of production between the last models)...



The I-16 Type 18 was supposed to have 4 cannons aboard, per table in Yefimov & Khazanov book on Soviet fighters.



> Trouble is that the M-38, the M-106 and the M-82 are pretty much contemporaries. Work started on the M-106 in 1938 and on the other two in 1939. The M-106 was NOT a new engine and in fact would fit standard M-105 mounting points. two were fitted with 2-speed superchargers in 1939. Apparently development did not go smooth and while some were fitted to production Yak-1 fighters they were removed and the planes fitted with M-105s. The M-106 did not go into service until 1944 and then in modified form.
> Work on the M-107 started in March 1940. According to preliminary planning the service interval was to reach 100 hours by May 1st 1941 and 2000 M-107 were to be completed by the end of 1941. Things went badly from there on out.
> May 13th 1941 saw the NKAP issue a production decree for the M-82.
> The M-38 was in production (small numbers?) in the beginning of 1941 although the engine didn't pass it's state tests until July of 1941.



The AM-38 also fits on mounts for the AM-35A, or at least the installation on the MiG-3 didn't make problems to that end. The Mikulin was also not to be undone, they were testing AM-37 (a bit bigger S/C, intercooled; with problems) and AM-39 (2-speed supercharged; problem free?) with 1500 HP at 5.8 km (~18700 ft) and 1650 HP at 1 km. Pretty much out of scope for Klimov's engines.
There is also nothing that prevents Mikulin to install 'mid altitude' S/C drive on the AM-38, to gain a bit at altitude and loose a bit at SL.
The VK-106 offers mere 50 HP more than M-105, nothing to gain there. A reason why Klimov's team moved on M-107 and M-108?



> Obviously in preliminary designs and production planning the M-106/107 would have the inside track as so little needed to be changed. Not until they fall on their faces does the need arise for alternative engines and by then the Germans have invaded and pre-invasion production plans are tossed out the window.
> Claiming the Russians made a mistake in NOT switching to the M-82 and M-38 sooner doesn't hold up very well as both engines were in development/testing at the time the decision would have to be made. If either one had also run into trouble things would have been really sticky (M-82 was the 3rd 14 cylinder radial engine worked on by Shvetsov and team)



Russians tested many of their aircraft with different engines that were in pipeline. So I'm not that convinced that testing fighters with the two engines I've suggested would've interfered with then current practice, and allows for reasonably fast switch to the engines that are in actual production while offering power at desired altitude. 
It does not take that much of hindsight to reckon that there is far more stretch in Mikulin's engines than it is in Klimov's.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 18, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> The I-16 Type 18 was supposed to have 4 cannons aboard, per table in Yefimov & Khazanov book on Soviet fighters.


Unfortunately that is not backed up by the text or other sources. Even the table itself has a contradiction in the fact that the type 18 with a heavier engine was lighter than the type 17 with two cannon and 2 machineguns. 





> The AM-38 also fits on mounts for the AM-35A, or at least the installation on the MiG-3 didn't make problems to that end. The Mikulin was also not to be undone, they were testing AM-37 (a bit bigger S/C, intercooled; with problems) and AM-39 (2-speed supercharged; problem free?) with 1500 HP at 5.8 km (~18700 ft) and 1650 HP at 1 km. Pretty much out of scope for Klimov's engines.
> There is also nothing that prevents Mikulin to install 'mid altitude' S/C drive on the AM-38, to gain a bit at altitude and loose a bit at SL.
> The VK-106 offers mere 50 HP more than M-105, nothing to gain there. A reason why Klimov's team moved on M-107 and M-108?



Actually what we have here is a fair amount of confusion as to what was _promised and when._ I haven't seen any power figures for the M-106 for the early stages of the project (1938-39) when the M-105 was offering 1000/1100hp. it was 1943 before they stuck any in production planes (and didn't fly them) and by that time much modified M-105PF had been in production for months and the M-105PF2 was being tested in July of 1943. At this point the M-105PF-2 is 50-60hp behind the V-106 but we don't know the power difference in 1940. The book on Russian engines doesn't mention altitudes (at least not often) so comparisons are also hard to make on that score. 
The M-107 was a sort of parallel development started in 1940 with a lot of modifications (including 4 valve cylinder heads) and supposedly 29 were built in 1941 and 686 total by the end of 1942. What they went in (if anything?) I have no idea at the moment, power was _supposed _to be 1200/1400hp for a weight of 765Kg but again, altitude information is lacking. The 1942 test version (M-107A) was rated at 1500/1600hp for 769kg and used Ploikoviskiy's blades on the inlet to the supercharger, this engine got into Yak-9s in 1944. 





> Russians tested many of their aircraft with different engines that were in pipeline. So I'm not that convinced that testing fighters with the two engines I've suggested would've interfered with then current practice, and allows for reasonably fast switch to the engines that are in actual production while offering power at desired altitude.
> It does not take that much of hindsight to reckon that there is far more stretch in Mikulin's engines than it is in Klimov's.



It is one thing to test an engine in an airframe, it is another thing to actually make a usable fighter out of the combination. 
Switching engines is a lot easier on bombers where there is more room to play with equipment to get the CG correct. It has been done on fighters but sometimes we are not aware of some the changes done to get things right. On a P-36 the fuel tank behind the seat was the overload ferry tank. On the P-40 (early) the behind the seat tank was a "normal" tank to be used in combat and one of the in wing under cockpit tanks became the overload tank. P-40s shifted oil tanks around as the engines changed (from behind seat to behind engine?) 
Again it is easier to play with large fighters (Hawker Tempest) than small fighters.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 18, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> ...It is one thing to test an engine in an airframe, it is another thing to actually make a usable fighter out of the combination.
> Switching engines is a lot easier on bombers where there is more room to play with equipment to get the CG correct. It has been done on fighters but sometimes we are not aware of some the changes done to get things right. On a P-36 the fuel tank behind the seat was the overload ferry tank. On the P-40 (early) the behind the seat tank was a "normal" tank to be used in combat and one of the in wing under cockpit tanks became the overload tank. P-40s shifted oil tanks around as the engines changed (from behind seat to behind engine?)
> Again it is easier to play with large fighters (Hawker Tempest) than small fighters.


Although Lavochkin had a great deal of success when he swapped the M-105 out for the ASh-82, transforming the LaGG-3 into the La-5


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## tomo pauk (Mar 18, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> Actually what we have here is a fair amount of confusion as to what was _promised and when._ I haven't seen any power figures for the M-106 for the early stages of the project (1938-39) when the M-105 was offering 1000/1100hp. it was 1943 before they stuck any in production planes (and didn't fly them) and by that time much modified M-105PF had been in production for months and the M-105PF2 was being tested in July of 1943. At this point the M-105PF-2 is 50-60hp behind the V-106 but we don't know the power difference in 1940. The book on Russian engines doesn't mention altitudes (at least not often) so comparisons are also hard to make on that score.
> The M-107 was a sort of parallel development started in 1940 with a lot of modifications (including 4 valve cylinder heads) and supposedly 29 were built in 1941 and 686 total by the end of 1942. What they went in (if anything?) I have no idea at the moment, power was _supposed _to be 1200/1400hp for a weight of 765Kg but again, altitude information is lacking. The 1942 test version (M-107A) was rated at 1500/1600hp for 769kg and used Ploikoviskiy's blades on the inlet to the supercharger, this engine got into Yak-9s in 1944.



The comparison between VK-106 and -107/-108 is telling. The later engines were not just M-105s with a handful of minor changes (that was more the case with the -106), they were featuring new heads & valvetrain, new crankshaft and prossibly crankcase (due to higher RPM and manifold pressure), addition of swirl throttle, new intake manifold, exhausts, possibly also the compressor with new drive. New carbs? New cooling system, new oil system. New pistons, con rods? Basically, a brand new engine.

edit: yes, new compressor was installed on the VK-107, in comparison with M-105



> It is one thing to test an engine in an airframe, it is another thing to actually make a usable fighter out of the combination.
> Switching engines is a lot easier on bombers where there is more room to play with equipment to get the CG correct. It has been done on fighters but sometimes we are not aware of some the changes done to get things right. On a P-36 the fuel tank behind the seat was the overload ferry tank. On the P-40 (early) the behind the seat tank was a "normal" tank to be used in combat and one of the in wing under cockpit tanks became the overload tank. P-40s shifted oil tanks around as the engines changed (from behind seat to behind engine?)
> Again it is easier to play with large fighters (Hawker Tempest) than small fighters.



Soviets were bad in some things, but sticking a big engine on a smallish fighter was what they were good at. The AM-35A and -38 were both installed and flew in a small fighter, so was the M-82. Both La-5 and La-7 were tested with whacking big M-71, the 18 cyl engine. They even installed the ASh-82 on the Yak-3.
So I'm not expecting from them something requiring rocket science.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 18, 2016)

The VK-108 was a bit late,Prototypes built in 1943-44. The 106 and 107 were both running and being considered for production before the Germans attacked making them "contenders" for the higher powered engine you desire. It is their existence (flawed as they were) that may have delayed or help decide against building new fighters with other engines. The M-82 didn't really enter production (large numbers) until after the invasion which also means that a lot of it's use was in "lash-ups" rather than aircraft that could take full advantage of it. Granted some of the lash-ups were very successful but perhaps a fighter designed from the start for the M-82 (and using all metal construction?) would have done even better? The LA-7 prototype was supposed to be about 180KG lighter than a test LA-5, due in large part (but not entirely?) to the wing spars being metal instead of wood.

Rocket science back then wasn't quite what it is today.

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuCRVx9CYRw_


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## GrauGeist (Mar 18, 2016)

While the La-7 was a definite improvement over the La-5, the La-5 was a huge difference over the LaGG-3 and most likely saved Lavochkin's life - because Uncle Joe wasn't happy with Lavochkin due to the LaGG-3's shortcomings...


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## Shortround6 (Mar 19, 2016)

That is certainly true. The production versions of the 3 main fighters being generally overweight. The wood construction needed good workmanship in order to get even close to the designed weight.
We have to remember that all three of these fighters were designed and developed in a great hurry. The I-26(Yak prototype) first flying in Jan 1940. The Lagg prototype fling March 30th 1940 and the Mig prototype flying April 5th 1940. While Russia wasn't at war with Germany it was fighting Finland and with the rest of Europe at war continued reliance on the I-15s and I-16s while a more leisurely development took place was not going to happen. Short comings were going to have to be tolerated in order to get some sort of modern aircraft into service.
also please note the the I-200 (Mig prototype) was originally supposed to have the M-37 engine and had to make do with the M-35A. Likewise the I-26 (Yak) was supposed to use the M-106 engine and was making do with the M-105 engine. 
The government didn't help in October of 1940 when it issued and edict calling for all new fighters to have a range of 1000KM. Extra tankage/weight being added to all the fighters, some easier than others. 

A Lagg-3 was built with a M-107 engine rated at 1400hp for take off and 1300hp at 5000 meters but the test pilot stated that the plane made 33 emergency landings in 33 flights, mainly due to overheating. 

It is easy now to pick the 'winners' out of the engines and airframes available, it was not so easy in 1940-41. Especially considering that while the Gu-82, Mig-9 (Mig 3 with M-82) and a Yak 7 with M-82 had all flown before the LA-5 prototype none had really shown a marked improvement in performance or at least the sort of improvement shown by the La-5 prototype and as a consequence development on those stopped. The Russians needing aircraft by the hundreds if not thousands after the German attack and not somewhat better ones in the future at the expense of production at the present.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 19, 2016)

I find it interesting that the Soviets really didn't press forward with fighter development in the late 30's as stormclouds were gathering. It seems that after things starting heating up, did they make it a priority.

As late as summer 1939, during the battle of Khalkhin Gol, the VVS was pitting biplanes against older IJA aircraft...perhaps one of the last battles that saw biplane against biplane (I-152/I-153 vs KI-10). Of course, there were monoplanes, the VVS had the I-16 but the IJA had the KI-27.

So it seems that if the Soviets had been ahead of the curve a little bit and pressed for fighter developmentearlier, then the airwar against Finland and Japan may have produced different results. This in turn, may have helped a great deal when Germany turned on the Soviet Union.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 19, 2016)

What about Germany? Some of major mistakes, at random order:
- questionable (an understatement) treatment of pilots, both trainees and veterans
- requirement for all bombers to dive bomb
- too much of engine projects in design phase, with no two stage supercharged engine before too late
- not enough of emphasis for long range fighters (backfired not just for battles in W. Europe, but also for Eastern fromt and MTO)

Yes, 4/5 mistakes are listed, after the pilot's 'problem' other seem a bit lower on the list of mistakes.


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## stona (Mar 19, 2016)

The bad management and incompetent planning of many RLM/Luftwaffe projects are based in politics. Both organisations were creations of the Nazi regime and both suffered from the crippling Nazi notion that just ordering something to be would make it so. This dates back to the ludicrous production plans proposed from 1933 on, more or less as soon as the party had consolidated power, and continued until the last days of the war.
The list of mistakes would fill a book, the list of avoidable and foreseeable mistakes at least a chapter of that book 
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 19, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> - too much of engine projects in design phase, with no two stage supercharged engine before too late
> - not enough of emphasis for long range fighters (backfired not just for battles in W. Europe, but also for Eastern fromt and MTO)



The Germans certainly had too many engine proposals on paper. How many advanced to even single cylinder models might be a different story. 
Many nations had been working on either very large engines or compact high power engines or both. "Keeping up with the Jones's"
in peace time is understandable. Cutting back to the minimum in wartime is harder. P & W requested to be let out of contracts for at least 3 different liquid cooled engines (including sleeve valves) in order to concentrate on air-cooled engines. The Government agreed to this and work started on the R-4360 28 cylinder engine in 1940, within weeks if not days of the R-2800 C model. It took the R-2800 C until 1944 to become a production model and the R-4360 just missed the war. 
Many countries and companies underestimated how difficult it was to get to the next levels of engine performance. _Especially _if durability and reliability were being increased at the same time. 

Germans _thought _they had the long range fighter question answered with the 110. 
Long range fighter is also a rather squishy concept. Drop tanks under 109Es would have done wonders in the BoB. Doubling the internal fuel of a 109 + drop tank/s and having decent armament + ammo for Mustang like range was probably not possible until the DB 605 was sorted out with 1.42 boost. Granted they could have been working on it while the engine was being sorted out.


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## stona (Mar 19, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Drop tanks under 109Es would have done wonders in the BoB.



I see this a lot, but there are problems with the idea.

First and foremost the RAF fighters intercepted incoming formations over the southern counties, within 20-30 miles of London, at which point they would be forced to drop those tanks. The RAF intercepted the bombers at the same point. Fighter Command used the single squadron as the principle tactical unit and effectively adopted a policy of harassing the Germans to and from the target. As soon as that first squadron attacks, the Bf 109s drop their tanks.

The Germans never made advanced interceptions of allied escort fighters forcing them to drop their tanks, remembering that they had much further to fly, because by doing so the escorts would have served their purpose of preventing the intercepting Luftwaffe fighters engaging the bombers en masse. They preferred to ascertain where the bombers were heading and concentrate their forces against the bombers in a different way. They could trade space for time to allow them to do this in a way the British could not, as Leigh-Mallory/Bader and their Big Wing demonstrated on numerous occasions. Over Britain the targets for the Luftwaffe started at the Channel coast.

It all comes down to distances. Allied formations had hundreds of miles to fly to their targets, the Luftwaffe heading for London had tens. Had they tried for Birmingham (possible with drop tanks) it was only about one hundred more. I'm sure Leigh-Mallory and 12 Group would have liked them to try.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 19, 2016)

You may be right.
The drop tanks might have only allowed for 20-30 more miles (take-off on the main tank) of radius or saved a some pilots from ditching in the channel after spending a few too many minutes in combat. 
Americans often operated in relays. 3 or more sets of escorts needed for the round trip of the bombers. Getting the first set of escorts to drop tanks over the French coast doesn't stop the 2nd set of escorts from meeting up with the bombers near German Border. 
Germans were short of fighters as it was and probably couldn't do the escort relay tactic.


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