# Defeat of the Luftwaffe



## Jenisch (Feb 11, 2012)

Again, I will bring a polemic content, but please guys, considerate it is with with the best intention  

In another forum, two members posted the following about how the Luftwaffe was defeated on the Eastern Front, not the West.

The first posted:

_Anglo histories make much of the air war, no doubt because for most of the war the Anglos were unable to do much more than drop bombs on Germany. The fighting in Africa and Italy was a sideshow considering the limited commitment Hitler made to support Rommel or Kesselring. It was bloody and vicious and still very much war, but there can be no doubt that no army of any description was going to get to Berlin from Sicily.

Back to the air war: it is my opinion that the supposed destruction of the Luftwaffe over Germany by P-51s is another Great Myth. There wasn't much left of the Luftwaffe by the time the Eighth Air Force hit its stride.

The Luftwaffe was finished by the time of Kursk. The creme de la creme had been sent to the Eastern Front in 1941, when they achieved great success, comparable to the complete destruction of Soviet ground forces that took place at the same time. Germany controlled the air during 1942, which was another year of German victories until they got to Stalingrad.

Stalingrad was a disaster for the Luftwaffe. Göring promised a miracle, and dispatched the entire air transport force to support the encircled Sixth Army. When that proved inadequate, he stripped the training cadres of multi-engine aircraft and sent them in, as well as bomber squadrons. They were all destroyed.

From that point, the Luftwaffe was deprived of its offensive capability. The few bombers that remained were all that there were. There would be no more forthcoming because there were no more teachers, or training aircraft. After Stalingrad, the Luftwaffe became Hitler's fire brigade, and the few assets left were sent hither and yon to cover a series of emergencies, stripping the Front in one area to meet a threat in another_.

The other replied:

_As many here will already know, I've done a wee bit of reading about the Luftwaffe. While I agree in principle with your "big picture" statement, IMO, RLM procurement/operational procedures were a greater determinant than was the outcome of individual combats on any any singular "front".
I've been outspoken on this board in my appraisals of the RAF's "incursions" on the Channel "front" from 1941-43. Little was achieved in terms of "attrition" on the (mere) two Geschwadern that opposed the incursions. All the RAF "supporters" balk at the stats, but I tend to lean in the favor of the RLM records. The combats were fought over France and confirming the existence of a crumpled pile of metal and body bits in a farmers field was little more than a formality; but it was always pursued.
Without launching into a ten thousand word essay (encapsulating and expounding on Williamson Murray's seminal work), suffice to say that yes: the bulk of the Luftwaffe's assets were engaged in the east, for the greater part of the war. Especially the Bomber forces.
Much like all of the "greatest this" and "uber that", people always focus on the Jagdwaffe to the exclusion of all of the other elements that made up the entire effort. The KG's, StG's, SG's, Aufklarungs, Transport units, ZG's, Organic communications and liaison aircraft; all an integral part of the big picture. All suffered losses on a huge scale in the East; and ALL tacitly ignored by the people who focus on the 400-500 fighter planes operated by the "glamour boys" of the Jagdwaffe. Yes Scott, the heart of the Luftwaffe died in obscurity on the Eastern front. The losses among the "exigently" employed transport units get more press than they are due. Idiotic idea? You bet. It was all down to decisions made years before; the Schule units always had an operational assignment. They were drafted for the Norway operation, Fall Gelb, and the unexecuted Seelowe. That the pattern continued at Demyansk, Kholm and later Stalingrad and Tunisia should come as no great surprise. This was the bed they'd made for themselves. As an item of interest? A large number of (nominally) civilian pilots from the national airline (Lufthansa) died in these operations as well. _

It was a discussion with already some time and from a forum I don't participate anymore.

Personally, I think those guys were pseudo intellectuals, and were doing nothing more than put forward the B* Soviet propagandistic version of the Cold War.


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## Jenisch (Feb 11, 2012)

To counter this argument, an interesting (and impartial) text:

_Bourgeois falsifiers of World War II history attempt by any means at their disposal to minimize the role of the Soviet Air Force in the defeat of the Luftwaffe. They affirm that the power of the Luftwaffe was undermined by the Anglo-American bombing raids on German aircraft factories. However, historical documents and facts overthrow these unfounded assertions.(p. 382) *

*The Soviet Air Force in World War II: The Official History, Originally Published by the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, translated by Leland Fetzer, edited by Ray Wagner (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Company, 1973, $12.95), 440 pages.

Despite the ideological bias evident in the above statement, those interested in the Second World War will not want to dismiss lightly this Soviet history. While there are many good books available about the war, a perusal of Janet Ziegler’s bibliography World War II: Books in English 1945-1965 reveals the disproportionate lack of publications about the Russo-German part of the war. Miss Ziegler lists more books on the North African campaign than on the entire war in Russia. Although that disparity might be excused because of the Anglo-American military operations in Africa, it can lead to a distorted conception of the war that mistakenly minimizes the Soviet effort. Furthermore, the bulk of the literature about the war on that eastern front usually concentrates on the ground war; for example, neither Alan Clark’s Barbarossa nor Albert Seaton’s The Russo-German War gives any significant attention to air operations. On the other hand, Asher Lee’s The Soviet Air Force and Robert A. Kilmarx’s A History of Soviet Air Power give some attention to the air war but do so within a broader context of Soviet air power. And, unfortunately, most of the monographic literature on the Russo-German air war reflects Germany’s point of view.

Official histories often are suspect, and while for us Soviet histories probably are more so than others, they cannot be discounted offhand, for at the very least they are indicative of the party line at the time of publication. This history, for example, demonstrates how a “de-Stalinization” policy may operate: it makes no accusations against Stalin; instead his role in the war is generally ignored (there are only six references to him), and the command decisions are attributed to the General Headquarters of the High Command (Stavka).

In this account, the war on the Russo-German front is divided into three periods. During the first, which ran from the invasion of 22 June 1941 to November 1942, the principal feature was that of defense. Then the period to December 1943 included the battles for Stalingrad and Kursk and the reoccupation of Soviet territory to the Dnieper River. And the last, 1944-1945, was a period of Soviet successes on all fronts. For each of these periods there is a discussion of the general military situation and Soviet objectives, data are provided on aircraft types and production, and an account is given of the preparations for and conduct of various campaigns. The discussion of each period closes with a summary of the accomplishments and an assessment of Soviet air strengths and weaknesses.

The narration, like the air war itself, emphasizes the tactical ground support role of Soviet aviation; but strategic operations, reconnaissance, and air support of partisan forces also receive attention. However, no attempt has been made to draw a large canvas of the war, and matters of grand strategy and diplomacy are ignored. There are numerous vignettes of individual Soviet heroism, which at first seem more suitable for the Soviet propaganda pamphlets published during the war;l but, on reflection, these differ little from similar accounts of American heroism narrated in books like Samuel Eliot Morison’s The Two-Ocean War.

The book is especially enhanced by the annotations of the editor, Ray Wagner, author of American Combat Planes and The North American Sabre. He has provided additional data on Soviet aircraft, has noted discrepancies in the narrative from other evidence, and has added clarifying comments that considerably assist the reader. Included are about forty good photographs of World War II aircraft. The Soviet planes pictured range from the then obsolete I-153 biplane fighter and the TB-3 four-engine bomber to the later Yak-3 and La-7 fighters that were a match for the Luftwaffe Me-109 and Fw-190. Mr. Wagner also has added three appendices: on Soviet aircraft, Lend-Lease, and U.S.S.R. and German aircraft production._


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## Jenisch (Feb 11, 2012)

_This reader found the discussion of the first two periods the most interesting. In them it is argued that during the most critical years of the war the Soviets fought virtually unassisted by the Allies and that prior to 1944 the outcome of the war had been determined—by Soviet action alone.

Avoiding the issue of Stalin’s failure to initiate a state of readiness in June 1941, the book claims that the initial Luftwaffe onslaught succeeded because the Soviet Air Force was caught in the midst of a modernization program and forward airfield construction. It further claims that, despite the loss of over one thousand aircraft on the first day of the war, throughout the general retreat of 1941 Soviet air power played a vital role in the ultimate containment of the German attack. In accordance with prewar strategy that had assigned to long-range bombardment air power the responsibility for annihilation of important targets and destruction of enemy air forces, during the first days of the war Soviet aircraft struck at cities and industrial targets ranging from Königsberg in the north to Bucharest and Ploesti in the south, and Berlin was bombed in August and September 1941. Such operations were soon abandoned, however, and all air resources were applied to the tactical situation.

In defending Moscow during the winter of 1941-42, the Russians learned lessons concerning the essential priorities for the employment of air power. These lessons stressed the importance of thorough air reconnaissance and the attacking of enemy communications, troops concentrating for battle, and aircraft on the ground. The Soviets also recognized the advantage of mass air offensive and, most important, the fact that control of the air was a prerequisite for successful ground offensive. By December 1941 they established air supremacy around Moscow and were able to launch a counteroffensive.

Following the Moscow counteroffensive, major organizational changes were made within the Red Army Air Force. The incorporation of air forces within the armies and of different types of aircraft within the air divisions had proved to be impracticable; therefore, separate air armies and divisions were created as well as an Air Force for Long-Range Operations. It should be noted, however, that only some two hundred outmoded bomber aircraft were available, and the strategic strike concept had little significance. Aircraft production increases during 1942 provided the opportunity not only for air superiority at the front but for the creation of substantial reserves as well.

The climax of the second phase of the war came in the summer of 1943 at the battle for Kursk, where, this history states, “the struggle against the Luftwaffe . . . concluded in the destruction of its basic forces.” Strategic control of the air was gained as “the German command could no longer replace its great losses, especially in flying personnel.” (p. 186) Thereafter, say the Soviets, the Luftwaffe no longer had the ability to influence significantly the outcome of the war. (p. 201) In this period the Soviet Air Force was able to launch massive attacks upon the enemy with great success both in support of Soviet ground offensives and in destruction of the Luftwaffe on the ground and in the air. About 796,000 sorties were flown, and more than 20,000 aircraft were destroyed. A great increase in the use of radio communications, improved bombing accuracy and navigation procedures, and more aggressive air tactics all contributed to the Soviet superiority. Following the Kursk campaign, the Soviet offensive continued until the end of 1943, by which time the enemy had been driven across the Dnieper River. After that, declares the Soviet history, although the last two years of the war were dramatic and difficult, they were anticlimactic because by the beginning of 1944 the U.S.S.R. showed that it could defeat Germany singlehanded.

Within this book there is much that students of tactical air power will want to read. It honestly acknowledges initial Soviet deficiencies in the quality of aircraft, organization and combat procedures, but any stereotype of Soviet inflexibility and awkwardness is dispelled by the evidence of the continued evolution of tactical effectiveness. Although the repeated insistence on the aggressiveness of Soviet flyers from the very beginning of the war may be somewhat exaggerated, in the light of what we know about the offensive nature of Soviet soldiers, the characterization appears more correct than the hesitant qualities attributed to them by German analysts. Moreover, the combat accomplishments of the Red Army Air Force alone would merit that judgment.

In the present Soviet era of internal detention but of external détente with the West, one notes that, nevertheless, this history is most critical of Allied wartime policy and operations. The Anglo-American strategic bombing offensive is declared ineffective, the invasion of Europe in 1944 is regarded merely as a response to the Soviet success in the east and not as significant to the defeat of Germany. Throughout the war, it is argued, the Germans maintained the bulk of their forces, including their most experienced air units, on the Russian front, and Allied air superiority was gained in 1943 not through Anglo-American air raids “but by the defeat of its [the Luftwaffe’s] best squadrons on the Soviet-German front.” (p. 383) In general, Anglo-American military operations and assistance are dismissed as being too little, too late.

Despite tales of heroism and other citations of individual Soviet airmen included in the book, this is an impersonal narrative of aircraft and operations without any discussion of the interplay that must have gone on between air and other leaders and planners as to the direction of Soviet strategy and operations. Neither N. G. Kolesnikov nor N. V. Voronov, the Soviet Air Force representatives on the General Staff, is cited, which is unfortunate as they are generally ignored in S. M. Shtemenko’s The Soviet General Staff at War: 1941-1945, also. In all, no Arnold, George, or Spaatz emerges. Air Marshal Alexander A. Novikov, who became chief of the Soviet Air Force in April 1942 and held that position throughout the remainder of the war, is mentioned more than any other person except Hitler, but one acquires little appreciation of him either as an individual or as a commander. There is no comment about his removal in 1946 and disappearance from public attention until 1953. Nor is the organizational relationship between the Soviet Army, Navy, and Air Force made clear. Although there are many references to the Stavka, its subordinate relationship to the State Defense Committee (GOKO) is not mentioned._


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## Jenisch (Feb 11, 2012)

_The casual dismissal of Anglo-American assistance as insignificant requires further comment. Admittedly most combat aircraft provided the Soviets through Lend-Lease were not the latest models available, but it was a considerable effort in view of the facts that the United States was engaged in expansion of its own forces and those of the British and that deliveries to the Soviet Union involved difficulties in long-distance transportation. Robert Huhn Jones, in his study of Lend-Lease, tabulates 1663 Allied aircraft delivered to the Soviets by 1 November 1942—which he notes exceeded the number of modern Soviet-built aircraft used at Stalingrad.2 One of the greatest difficulties in assessing the Lend-Lease contributions to Russia is the lack of information about the Soviet employment of these aircraft. However, German sources have stated that after the spring of 1942 American and British aircraft were particularly noticeable on the Leningrad and Kuban fronts and that, on the latter, Allied aircraft sometimes outnumbered those built by the Soviets.3 It should also be remembered that as early as 1942, when the war was still undecided, Stalin was offered an Anglo-American bomber force that would operate from the Caucasus beginning in 1943, but for political reasons he rejected the proposal, desiring only the aircraft.4 The $11 billion of Lend-Lease also provided raw materials, foodstuffs, and technical assistance vital to Soviet sustenance and production.

Neither can the contribution of Anglo-American strategic bombardment be so brusquely condemned. The Soviet analysis emphasizes the tactical nature of the Russian operations, which they claim had won air superiority in 1943 and thus ultimate victory before extensive Western air raids had begun. No one questions that Allied strategic air power was applied belatedly or that targeting mistakes were made.5 However, the Soviet argument may hinge upon their own lack of a strategic capability and upon their desire to underplay the Allied invasion and subsequent ground operations in Europe by claiming that the outcome had been determined prior to that time. As Asher Lee has stated, the Soviet long-range bomber force was “without a really accurate destructive punch throughout the Second World War. It was typically realistic on the part of the Kremlin defense authorities to use their Soviet air arm primarily as a weapon of tactical air support and air transport.”6 And, too, the Germans had a different outlook. Albert Speer has written of the importance of 12 May 1944 as the day on which “the technological war was decided. Until then we had managed to produce approximately as many weapons as the armed forces needed, . . . But with the attack of nine hundred and thirty-five daylight bombers of the American Eighth Air Force upon several fuel plants in central and eastern Germany, a new era in the air war began. It meant the end of German armaments production.”7 This would indicate that the critical period of the war came much later than the Soviet history claims. As for the death blow to the Luftwaffe, according to Galland it was struck not in 1943 but in the winter of 1944-45, when Germany exhausted its fighter capability in the Ardennes campaign.8 Moreover, the Germans, who were subjected to and could assess both Soviet and Western applications of air power, not only regretted their inability to cope with the Anglo-American strategic bombardment but saw their lack of such a capability as a decisive factor in their defeat in Russia.9

Frank Futrell, whose knowledge of air power history is second to none, once commented at an Air Force Academy military symposium that despite the spate of surveys of World War II strategic operations an absolute evaluation was not available. He attributed that to the researchers’ lack of essential standards and techniques. He further noted that the “evaluators and historians tended to fall back upon the slippery facts of experiential history and to base many of their judgments upon the intensely personal experiences and views of the participants in the conflict. These varied views and experiences have permitted different interpretations.”10 The same same is true for other aspects of the air war, as this Soviet history attests. It is unfortunate that not until twenty-eight years after the war has this official Soviet record of the Red Air Force appeared in an English-language edition. Professional military men and other students of air power will want to read it._

Soviet Air Power and Victory in World War II


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## Jenisch (Feb 11, 2012)

Another source of information:

_4.06 times as many aircraft were lost in combat in the West than were lost in the East, a ratio reasonably close to Groehler's 3.41 for all "losses". The most chilling statistic for the JG 26 pilots appears in the sortie data. An airplane flying a combat mission in the West was 7.66 times more likely to be destroyed than one on a similar mission in the East. It is clear that the burden of sacrifice was borne by the Luftwaffe aircrew on the Western Front and over the Reich, not on the Eastern Front._

http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

I also think they didn't considerate the losses the Western Allies inflicted in 1939-40, particularly during the BoB, which were high and certainly did make a difference in the East. And while one can argue that by the time the Luftwaffe started to be removed from the East, the VVS was much more stronger to hold their own, I found hard to not considerate other actions from the Western Allies that were connected with the Luftwaffe (and the Wehrmacht in general) losses in the East, such as the naval blockade, the need to built U-boats, the bombing, the Lend-Lease for the Soviets (not only aircraft, everything) and much other things. I considerate much valid to argue about such things, because Germany was fighting against multiple enemies, and those factors were affecting significantly the German hability to conduct war in the East, while the Soviets were fighting with all their industry and still receiving much from their Allies, not to mention their direct contribution in combat, which again is something to think about. For example, the many transport aircraft lost in Africa and the Mediterranean, the majority of the Fw 190s, much better than Stukas as attack planes and that would certainly reduce much of their losses were most employed in the West, and the fact the attack aviation would not suffer so much losses in the East if it had fighter escort, the thousands of AA guns in the West that would inflict much more losses in the Soviet planes if were present there, etc. And all this should be analized in a cumulative matter in my view, and that's why it's clear that is impractical or pro-Soviet analyze the things in their way.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 12, 2012)

It's pretty daunting task to weight all of the opinions from those articles you've provided, but Luftwaffe, willy-nilly, was suffering atrition from Sept 1939, with many planes pilots lost on West in 1940, then turning East to take further losses. The Germany was not the nation that could supply it's AF with pilots from abroad (unlike RAF), to produce planes in US scale, let alone to fuel them. German allies were scarcely able to come to aid; it was more about Germany coming to help them. No wonder the pilots planes were consumed at good rate from Day One, result being Alied planes flying over Germany well prior WW2 ended.


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

I'm from the opinion of many German officers of the war: alone, it was possible to deal with the Soviets, at least counter them. Without the naval blockade, need to built U-boats, Lend-Lease and the bombing, the Germans would be much more stronger economically. Being able to import raw materials, it would be at least much harder for the Soviets to defeat Hitler.

Just in the historical Lend-Lease there are many skeptical authours about the Soviet hability to continue fighting without it, such as the professor Hubert van Tuyll, authour of Feeding the Bear, who says: 

“In the first 1.5 years the Soviet Union was fighting for survival and would have won without lend lease, but further victories and movement to Europe would be questionable”

American aid to Soviet Union, or unknown lend-lease

If the critics of the Lend-Lease decisiviness argue about quantity in the critical periods (which I don't think it's fair, because this involves factors such as the Soviets stopping of produce certain things to focus in others with sure they would receive them later, including free a large workforce in the industry and agriculture for the armed forces), I'm arguing about the Soviets without Lend-Lease, and the Germans with a much more stronger economy, being able to import everything they needed, and turning Festung Europe in a much more stronger economic zone. If only the absent of the Lend-Lease historically already could have hurt the Soviets, there's nothing more to mention about how the situation would be with Germany much stronger.

I'm a strong critic of historians like David Glantz in this regard. People who say the Soviets would likely won the war alone always desconsiderate the factors I mentioned.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 12, 2012)

"..... To counter this argument, an interesting (and impartial) text:

*Bourgeois f*alsifiers of World War II history attempt by any means at their disposal to minimize the role of the Soviet Air Force in the defeat of the Luftwaffe ........ "

_Bourgeois _... now that is a word I actively seek out in top-of-the-line military analysis ..... 

Oh, Jenesch, what are you try to say?

MM


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## Njaco (Feb 12, 2012)

In My Opinion - you can argue till the cows come home all the intracies that you want about reasons but it still comes down to this - quanity over quality. The economic might of the Allies (which includes the US, UK and USSR) swamped the Luftwaffe in the skies in all areas eventually.


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## Timppa (Feb 12, 2012)

To sound credible, it is not wise to write these two lines in the same message , at least next to each other:



Jenisch said:


> ..an interesting (and *impartial*) text:





> Bourgeois falsifiers of World War II history








> It further claims that, despite the loss of over one thousand aircraft on the first day of the war, throughout the general retreat of 1941 Soviet air power played a vital role in the ultimate containment of the German attack



German attack in 1941 was stopped by Soviet ground forces alone, nor German or Soviet air forces played any significant part.


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> "..... To counter this argument, an interesting (and impartial) text:
> 
> *Bourgeois f*alsifiers of World War II history attempt by any means at their disposal to minimize the role of the Soviet Air Force in the defeat of the Luftwaffe ........ "
> 
> _Bourgeois _... now that is a word I actively seek out in top-of-the-line military analysis .....



Perhaps if you and Timppa have read the text those comments would not be posted.



> Oh, Jenesch, what are you try to say?
> 
> MM



Dismiss a view that the Luftwaffe was defeated in the Eastern Front.


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

Timppa said:


> German attack in 1941 was stopped by Soviet ground forces alone, nor German or Soviet air forces played any significant part.


 
The Germans were not prepared for winter warfare, their logistics were inadequate and the winter of that year was more cold than usually. If you are thinking the Russians would be able to mount only winter offensives without control of the air for the rest of the year, no way. And this is specially true if they were alone against the Germans and pushed them back or made they retreat, because then they would be in the same boat as the Germans: logistical problems of an enemy with much more industrial power and with factories beyond your range. And the Germans also had tecnological advantage.


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## Glider (Feb 12, 2012)

I admit to looking at these questions in a simplistic way. Its my belief that Germany failed simply because it lacked the economic strength to take on the war on two fronts. They came desperately close to beating Russia despite these handicaps.

Had they not attacked France but just gone for Russia then they would have won, Russia wasn't liked by the West or the USA and no help would have gone their way. The Russians wouldn't have had the T34/KV1's that arrived in the nick of time, IL2's wouldn't have been around to hammer the German Army.

Germany simply didn't have the numbers to take on everyone at once


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

Glider said:


> I admit to looking at these questions in a simplistic way. Its my belief that Germany failed simply because it lacked the economic strength to take on the war on two fronts. They came desperately close to beating Russia despite these handicaps.
> 
> Had they not attacked France but just gone for Russia then they would have won, Russia wasn't liked by the West or the USA and no help would have gone their way. The Russians wouldn't have had the T34/KV1's that arrived in the nick of time, IL2's wouldn't have been around to hammer the German Army.
> 
> Germany simply didn't have the numbers to take on everyone at once



My view? The Americans frustrated Germany in both wars. In WWII, they first keep Britain in the war by helping it with the Lend-Lease, and later helped the Soviets and entered the conflict. They also were behind the war in the Pacific, with their hard line against the Japanese, which prevented any possibility of Japan to join in the war against Russia.

Richard Overy states in Why the Allies Won that Germany didn't lost because the multi front war, citing the US as an example of a country that fought in multiple fronts. I found this argument paradoxal, because how can Germany be defeated by the joint Allied efforts, and at the same time being not?

Many historians also like to do comparisons of dubious impartiality, like: "If not for the Russian resistance, the Allies would be unlikely to defeat Germany". Interestingly, the other way around could be quiet similar: if not for the British resistance in 1940, the Nazis would be free to pursue their goal of conquest Russia, and even if they fail, they would still have a back door to have at least a chance of a stalemate.

About the Soviet military hardware, without the war in the West, Germany would be able to send thousands of Panther and Tiger tanks to the front, together with all the Luftwaffe equipped with modern aircraft such as the Fw 190 Jabos, Hs 129s and the jets. In my opinion, it would be a bloodbatch for the Russians. Even if a victory was possible in theory, the cost would probably be prohibitive.

Logically, I'm not claiming that this that would happen, it's just a possibility, and a fair one in my view.


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## GregP (Feb 12, 2012)

After Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, he was essentially fighting on two main fronts; the Eastern Front and the Western Front. Yes, there was fighting in North Africa, but not in anywhere NEAR the numbers of either of the two main fronts. It was brutal, but not numerically large in comparison.

Approximately 65% of the Luftwaffe resources were on the Eastern Front from 1942 - 1944. Since this is an aviation forum, I am speeaking below of air opertions; not ground or Naval fighting.

What can be said without much argument is that the Sviet Union absorbed a lot of early losses, learned the lessons of air combat quite well, and rebounded to defeat the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front.

The British did not suffer as many losses statistically as the Soviet Union but did, in fact, give about as well as they took, early on, at least as far as the RAF / Luftwaffe are concerned. Later, when the American joined the effort, we helped with large numbers of aircraft, armaments, and crews. We probed, learned what worked and what didn't, and eventually defeated the Luftwaffe on the Western Front.

As Germany got pounded from both fronts, her ability to produce aircraft (as well as other war material), fuel, pilots, and even food decreased to the point where any sane person would have seen the writing on the wall and surrendered. Eventually, surrender was forced, but SHOULD have been offered in 1944.

As a U.S. citizen, it is natural to suspect any Soviet history reports since most were the product of state operated propagangists. There was little in the way of Soviet freedom of the press. But I cannot doubt the contrubutions of the Soviet Air Force. Without the Russian Front, the entire resources of Nazi Germany would probably have conquered Europe. Then Hitler could have turned on Russia with no Western Front. Without a divided front, the outcome was much less predictably a Soviet victory.

So it is my take that the Eruopean Allies would have lost without the Russian Front to help divide German forces, and the Soviet Union could e asily have also lost eventually if the European Allies had not kept fighting in the West. That is, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the U.S.A. all needed each other's contributions or the outcome could easily have been otherwise. So neither the Soviets nor the British / US can claim they "won the war." We needed each other to get it done.

For the life of me, I cannot see how so many people can claim over the years that the efforts on one front or the other were the real determining factor ... both fronts were required in order to have Germany fighting a divided front war.

I am not ignoring Japan, Itay, or any other country, but the discussion was about the German Luftwaffe, not about the "Axis Powers."


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## stona (Feb 12, 2012)

Take the advice of the second poster and read "Williamson Murray's seminal work" by which he means 'The Luftwaffe 1933-45-Strategy for Defeat'.
It will save us all a lot of typing 
Mine is well thumbed but I think it is still in print.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 12, 2012)

Not all countries were equal, or anywhere ear it, in capability. The US was able to fight a two front war in large part because it's industrial capabilities were much larger than any other nations. During the war years the US produced as much steel as the rest of world (allied and axis) did all put together and had a fair margin on top of that. The US topped out at around 80 million tons a year? while Germany topped out at 30 million or less? 

US production didn't really hit it's stride until 1944 and I am not sure if anybody knows what the full potential was because the end of the war was in sight about the time the peaks of production were being hit. For example peak production of aircraft engines was reached in the late summer of 1944 with production falling to late 1943 levels by the end of 1944. The drop being about 8 million horsepower worth of engines. 

In many cases (like the British in 1940 and the Soviets in 1941/42) what was contributed to victory was time. The time to get the factories (and farms) up and running. If the Americans could not have defeated the Germans without the Soviets (and the British commonwealth) the Germans could not have "defeated" the US. The Germans, indeed all of Europe at the time, did not have the ability to cross the Atlantic and boots on the ground in the US and keep them there.


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

GregP said:


> Approximately 65% of the Luftwaffe resources were on the Eastern Front from 1942 - 1944.



You are doing the same mistake the people from the other forum did: comparing the Western with the Eastern Fronts only after the latter started. WWII didn't started when the Barbarossa started, but in 1939. And in 1939-40, the Luftwaffe lost about 3000 aircraft fighting against the Western Allies, most bombers and ground attack planes, vital for the East. In 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 2.093 planes in Russia (don't know how many in the West). To put the things in a better perspective: imagine the Luftwaffe starting in 1942, with all losses readily replaced, with it's full initial strenght of '41, and reserves ready to cover subsequent losses. But hey, this didn't happened, because the Bourgeois falsifiers of World War II history destroyed 1/3 more planes than the Soviets did a year earlier. ;D

Shortround6, I think the Germans would not necessarily defeat Britain in case Stalin was defeated. Perhaps if the new U-boats entered in service, but even so I would not doubt the Allies would do something, like the Hughes Hercules plane and measures against the new submarines. I say this only by the fact that Britain proved capable to resist the Luftwaffe and all their power in 1940. Later, with the US and their full industrial power, it would still not be easy for the Nazis in the same way it was not for the Soviets in the Cold War.

Much would depend on how and when the Soviets would be defeated, and how much time the Nazis would take to use the resources in a viable way and the Allies would prepare their defenses. There was also the war in Africa, which in part would depend on the war in Russia because the Allies would be able to hit the Caucasus oil fields with bombers if they won there. Also, in overall the logistical situation for the Nazis in Africa was not good, and even with victory in Russia would not be in short term. 

The peace possibility of the Western Allies also would be present, something which the Russians would be unlikely to be presented from the Fuher, specially if he was winning.

And lastly: there was the Manhattan project, and the Americans already passed the Nazis in the nuclear race even before the Barbarossa. =D


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

Inconvenient History | A Quarterly Journal for Free Historical Inquiry

God, I will have to buy this book. Apparently people were divided about it, but the author makes many points quiet similar to the ones I made.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 12, 2012)

Jenisch, have you checked the bona fides of "Inconvenient History" ..... published by HBB - History Behind Bars. 

What is your fascination with revisionism .... ?

MM


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## GregP (Feb 12, 2012)

Jenisch, you are assuming I made a mistake. I didn't mention 1939 - 1941 at all, you did. If you want to discuss 1939 - 1940, say so, Don't assume everyone else doesn't know about it, we do. You'll do better if you refrain from using the phrase "Bourgeois Falsifiers." Calling people names never changes the facts.

So the Luftwaffe lost 3,000 aircraft in in 1939 - 1940. They built 27,000 Me-109's alone from 1941 - 1945. I think that more than replaces the losses, and that is just for Me-109's, never mind other aircraft. The Germans were beaten by being out-produced as Shortround has rlated above, combined with a two-front war against enemies who wouldn't roll over and quit.

In the Battle of Britain, the British lost 1065 aircraft (mostly fighters). The Germans lost 1922 (879 fighters, 80 Stukas, and 881 bombers). So what? They MORE than repalced tham.

German aircraft losses were down at 6.1 losses per 1000 sorties in France in 1940. They were at 9.6 in Britain in 1940, and 36.1 In pre-D-Day 1944. After D-Day, German losses shot up to 110.6 per 1000 sorties.

Allied losses per 1000 sorties were at 58.5 in France in 1940, 29.5 in Britian in 1940, 29.3 pre-D-Day 1944, and dropped to just 2.5 per 100 sorties post-D-Day 1944.

If those numbers don't tell a story, NOTHING does, and it has nothing to do with the Bourgeois. You can quibble over a few numbers more or less, but they are generlly in the agreed ballpark, so the story is plain, at least to me.

If we had better Sovoet data, we could compare. We already know the Soviet air losses were staggering early in the war, but they eventually got a point where german fighters simply could not live in a Soviet sky in late 1945 - 1945. So the Soviets MUST have learned a thing or two about air combat, huh?

We ALL made mistakes, Allied and Axis, but the outcome won't change, regarless of who tells the story, unless they depart from fact and get into fiction.

There are many great stories of WWII, on all fronts, and there is nobody who is an expert at all of them. Not all Axis soldiers were bad (there was a big difference between a Nazi SS Storm Trooper and German soldier, ideology-wise anyway) and not all Allied soldiers were good. There were heros and villains from every side and from every service, including civilians.


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

GregP said:


> Jenisch, you are assuming I made a mistake. I didn't mention 1939 - 1941 at all, you did. If you want to discuss 1939 - 1940, say so, Don't assume everyone else doesn't know about it, we do. You'll do better if you refrain from using the phrase "Bourgeois Falsifiers." Calling people names never changes the facts.



Hey mate, calm down, I was being ironic joking with the text I posted, I didn't want to offend you. Sorry for anything.


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> What is your fascination with revisionism .... ?



Well, revisionism is always present in history. Usually, I'm not a reviosinist. In fact, WWII is the only area of history were I'm very critic.

My perception is that today we are having a distorted view of WWII in the West, just changing D-Day for Stalingrad or Kursk. The fact it was a global conflict, fought from islands in the Pacific to deserts in Africa, just let clear how GLOBAL this conflict was. Even so, there's an incresing obcession among historians to say that the real war was fought in the Eastern Front, with all the other fronts being secundary. I don't agree with this by several reasons. The casualities figures in the Eastern Front for example, there's no way to desconsiderate them from the other fronts, from the naval blockade, the bombing, etc, because it was the same Germany that was at war with the Soviets and was being restricted by their Allies. When people say the D-Day didn't decided the war, I'm inclined to think like them, if consideration is only given to the superficial form I belive they think. But actually, D-Day and all the other operations, only happened for certain because other actions were being conducted by the Western Allies AND the Soviets before, and they all "decided" the war. Also, with the political factors out, we can say that not necessarily the D-Day was the last hope from the Allies, and neither an Allied (Soviet) defeat in the East would necessarily meant an Allied defeat or not defeat of the Axis.

In my view, the conflict was as it name says, global, and should be treated on this way. The goal of history is learn lessons to not repeat them, not use or distort such lessons for political interestes, what is done a lot. In my understanding, the greatest lesson of WWII is that a united force can defeat (and preferably avoid) a serious treat to their peoples and interests. Unfornately, like Gunther Rall said in an interview: "mankind didn't learned with WWII". And, like the mis-quotation by George Satayna says: "Those who ignore history are bound to repeat it". Unfornately, the UN really is not always succesfull.


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## Readie (Feb 12, 2012)

"mankind didn't learned with WWII"

Mankind did't learn anything from WW1 either, or from any post WW2 conflict....
We seemed fated to repeat the lessons from the past.

John


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 12, 2012)

Thank you for your prompt and thorough explanation of your "fascination with revisionism ...." 

Thought provoking. From a young age I have always appreciated the difference in _scale_ between the Eastern Front and the Western Europe - Mediterranean Front .... so revisionist narratives only interest me if they contain NEW DATA from the ex-USSR (for example). Hearing a former party loyalist retired comrade tell me how he won the war against the Nazi Devils is NOT new data .

Russia required a massive and well co-ordinated attack by Hitler ... to have a hope of succeeding. Hitler and Napoleon both took the same gamble and lost. Weather called time out, in both cases. Once up-to-speed, the USSR was able to muster vast resources and accept HORRENDOUS casualties. 

So I don't think in terms of "Did Russia Win The War "- but rather the statistical reality that Russian ground forces_ tore the guts_ out of the German nation. In large part - much the German attack achieved was soldiering at its best - moral and front line leadership. But it was "Bridge Too Far" on a continental scale .... from Day One. 

MM


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## GregP (Feb 12, 2012)

No problem, Jenisch. Perhaps I DID react a little too harshly. You make very good points.

My main point is that WWII was, inf act, a WORLD WAR, and almost everywhere was affected. If the events in, say, Croatia, were not as I learned, that doesn't mean my facts about, say, the battle of the Kasserine Pass, are wrong. Your posts are good and entertaining. I don't have the volume you were quoting, nor do I have accerss to one. I DO have access to my own books and local resources.

I have not checked your fact, nor do I expect to do so within a few days. I am assuming you have opinions based in fact and are therefore, not spouting fallacies. Iy brings new light to the war and I will investigate.

Meanwhile, I have no ax to grind with you at all, and apologize if my replies sounded acerbic. They were intended to convey that I didn't mention 1939 - 1940, and would be glad to discuss the era, but since I didn't ... it doesn't mean I made a mistake in my assumptions. All it means id you want to discuss a time period I didn't mention. Sorry for the apparently hard words ...

All the counties involved in WWII, including the Balkans, were heavily afffected. We in the U.S.A. don't hear a lot about WWII before we entered it unless we dig it up ourselves. That does not change the horrors that occurred in the eastern European countries in the 1939 - 1940 timeframe. They still suffered under German conquerors, sometuimes silently and horribly. Cavalry doesn't stand a chance against armor. There were war crimes committed in that timeframe that never came to light in the courtroom. That was mostly due to the nature of later crimes committed by the Nazis in concentration camps. The earlier crimes were never suitably addressed, legally, after the war.

As for the Luftwaffe, we pretty much know what happened to them, even early in the war. Later, they suffered heavily and were beaten. But, for a while, they ran pretty wild, but suffered losses against relatively unknown opponents in the early timeframe.


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> Russia required a massive and well co-ordinated attack by Hitler ... to have a hope of succeeding.


 
The actual attack obtained many of the most rich regions of Russia. The Nazis couldn't hold such regions because they were fighting in other fronts and suffering the consequences.


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## drgondog (Feb 12, 2012)

Jenisch - I believe the thesis was 'Defeat of the Luftwaffe'. Key point to consider. The LW drained experienced figher Squadrons from Ost and Sud fronts in mid 1943 to deploy to Germany and form LuftFlotte Reich. The Battle for Germany was conducted by the RAF (I'm counting all the Commonwealth AF) and USAAF from the West (England) and the South (Italy). The threat to German forces fighting Soviet forces was not only loss of men and material - but the ability to build weapons and defend the factories and refineries. 

The USSR contributed nothing to stop the factories and refineries and the critical mass of the LW fighter arms' ability to defend them.

From mid 1943 through may the LW transferred 33 squadrons into LuftFlotte Reich to defend against day and night bombing - the bulk of which were s/e day fighters from JG3, 5, 11, 26, 27, 53, 54, 300, 301 from other fronts into Germany. When the 8th acquired long range capability the t/e fighter (day and night) became easy prey instead of bomber destroyers and the 8th AF started the devastation of the LW fighter arm from December 1943 through May 1944 when it took (KIA) out approximately 3,000 of the total of 20,000 fighter pilots trained by the LW from 1935 through 1943. 

Combined with the initiation of daylight attacks on German/Poland/Czech oil and chemical plants to match strikes on Ploesti - the 8th, 9th and 15th AF not only dealt the LW a critical blow relative to experienced fighter pilots but also the means to train them, fuel mobile infantry and armor, provide fertilizer fo crops.

The LW losses were FAR higher over Germany from December 1943 through D-Day when it was critical to eliminate LW over the invasion beach heads - and oh, yes it WAS P-38s and Mustangs doing the killing over Germany... not Yak 3, Laag 9's etc.

I don't know what the overall loss totals are between Ost and Reich for the war - but the Soviets did not grind up the LW like the western Allies did.

Regards,

Bill


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## Jenisch (Feb 12, 2012)

My thesis is valid, the problem is I would need a research team to give a picture of it's potential. 

It would be necessary to calculate:

* The impact of the naval blockade of Germany

* Impact of the U-boat production

* Impact of the Lend-Lease for the Soviets (this is still impossible totally, because not all archives are not open)

* Impact of the bombing 

* Impact of Axis troops (including the LW) deployed in other fronts

All those factors calculated against the Soviet potential. This, by no means, can provide a definitive answer, but certainly would show how the Reds would face an enemy far more stronger than they think they faced. Of course, if not already done, this would be a mammoth task, and one that I cannot perform.


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## barney (Feb 12, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> My thesis is valid, the problem is I would need a research team to give a picture of it's potential.
> 
> It would be necessary to calculate:
> 
> ...



The difference between opinion and thesis is that a thesis is backed up by research. If you are unable to do the research you then have an opinion.


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## Elmas (Feb 13, 2012)

Mode O.T. on


A dear Friend, who died a few years ago, in 1943 was seventeen and he was doing the training as Pilot (first stage: sailplanes) in the Aeronautical College in Forlì, Northern Italy.

After 8th of September and the Armistice he voluntarily joined the Repubblica Sociale Italiana, where he served in a battalion (Xa Flottiglia Mas) fighting side by side with the Wermacht. 

He told me this story:

_"After the German surrender, the 25th of April 1945, I tried to return to Sardinia, trying to get to some southern port where I hoped to find a ship to bring me back home : La Spezia, or Civitavecchia perhaps, if I could get there. My family was two years without receiving news from me.

Of course I was travelling with the means of transport that were then: mostly on foot and sometimes, rarely, with a truck going south.

One evening, at dusk, I found myself on the Apennines at the Cisa pass: a convoy of U.S. artillery was passing along the road going north, with guns that seemed to come from science fiction to me._
(these)





_I camped the best I could to the side of a wrecked house to spend the night there, while the guns were uninterruptely continuing to go .....
The next morning at dawn the guns were continuing to go ......

Maybe I was not very conscious at that age, or perhaps it was for that ideal of "hero" of which we were all soaked in those times, but during the raids in the mountains against the “Maquisards” , when I was shot several times at, or at other very dangerous occasions, I must say that I didn’t prove a real fear.

But, seeing what were the disparity of the real forces we had against us, I was scared to death..... I did suddenly realized that if all those guns just fired a single shot, only just one each simultaneously, they would have sent us to pieces.
The fear was so great that I had to lean against the wall and throw up my poor breakfast ......

For years after the war I asked myself why they have not done. "
_

Mode O.T. off

IMHO, the disparity between Luftwaffe and USAAF was the same, even the former had some outstanding aeroplanes in the sky...


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## iron man (Feb 14, 2012)

stona said:


> Take the advice of the second poster and read "Williamson Murray's seminal work" by which he means 'The Luftwaffe 1933-45-Strategy for Defeat'.
> It will save us all a lot of typing
> Mine is well thumbed but I think it is still in print.
> Cheers
> Steve



Thanks for the "props" Steve! 

It just so happens that I may "resemble" that "second poster" at that "other website"...

_Just another "Pseudo Intellectual", with a Communist axe to grind..._LOL!

Cheers, Ron


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## Erich (Feb 14, 2012)

I have a copy of the written German order to all Geschwadern for July of 1943 that any and almost all - I paraphrase here - that they the S/E and T/E not involved in ground attack and regular bombing duties and not serving on the Ost front originally be returned to the Reich for defense duties against RAF and US formations. Gents from this order it is quite clear what happened to the LW they were wrecked from head to foot on the western front even after being sent back as depleted fighter Geschwadern for the last final battles over and near Berlin in Winter of 1945. It cannot be denied..............


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## Jenisch (Feb 14, 2012)

iron man said:


> Thanks for the "props" Steve!
> 
> It just so happens that I may "resemble" that "second poster" at that "other website"...
> 
> _Just another "Pseudo Intellectual", with a Communist axe to grind..._LOL!



Yeah, the Russians and their invencible war machine would defeat Hitler alone. Even with the latter being able to outproduce and outclass them in most areas.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 14, 2012)

They may have outclassed them in several areas. But In what areas did they outproduce them ? Aircraft ? Tanks? Firearms?


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## Shortround6 (Feb 14, 2012)

Russian war production, without lend lease, is very hard to judge. The Russians were able to concentrate on certain items and leave other items unbuilt and provided by the allies, the most famous example being the trucks. The allies also supplied thousands of tons of HE and propellent, without which those Russian artillery barrages would have been a lot less effective. Thousands of miles of telephone wire, hundreds of thousands of vacuum tubes (valves) also helped Russian communications considerably even if the complete radio or telephone was assembled in the USSR. I believe there were also considerable food stuffs imported?


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## Elmas (Feb 14, 2012)

Not just weapons....
More than 1/3 of the calories that a Red Army soldier did actually eat every day was produced in Iowa or somewhere near.....

Italo Balbo, whose name is certainly known by air enthusiasts, in 1940 was strongly against the war.
When the war was almost to start for Italy, he told disconsolately to the officers of his staff:

_“Unfortunately, Mussolini has never seen how thick is the telephone book of New York”._

Neither Hitler did, I think.


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## Jenisch (Feb 14, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Russian war production, without lend lease, is very hard to judge. The Russians were able to concentrate on certain items and leave other items unbuilt and provided by the allies, the most famous example being the trucks. The allies also supplied thousands of tons of HE and propellent, without which those Russian artillery barrages would have been a lot less effective. Thousands of miles of telephone wire, hundreds of thousands of vacuum tubes (valves) also helped Russian communications considerably even if the complete radio or telephone was assembled in the USSR. I believe there were also considerable food stuffs imported?


 
Now someone is talking my language. =D

Unfornately for the Russians, it would not be only this, it would be Germans being able to import fuel and all other raw materials they needed to put Festunga Europa at the full steam production, which would certainly improve significantly the Whermatch's fighting capability; it would be the non-need of the Germans to built very expensive and time-demaning submarines, which reduced 10-15% the German tank production in 1942; it would be the German industry, without bombing, being able to produce much more stuff and also transport it to the front without the Anglo-American air attacks in the transport system; it would be more than a million personal involved in the civilian defense to clean the mess of the bombings free to be dedicated to the industry; it would be thousands more of German tanks, mainly the Panther and Tiger models, that despite what Red Army fanboys claim, just one of such machines usually destroyed 10 or more of the Russian T-34 before was destroyed, and the Germans would have plenty of fuel to keep those armored beasts with well trained crews and air support. And there would be also the Luftwaffe, which by 1942 would start to use the full Fw 190 against the Russians to substitute many obsolete attack planes the Russians destroyed more historically. They certainly would not destroy as many attack planes as they did historically, and in overall it would be very hard for the Russians inflict the casualities they inflicted historically in the German forces if the latter would be at a single front due to fact they would be much better served in more areas.

Key point: Chaos Theory.


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## Jenisch (Feb 14, 2012)

The defeat of Nazism is a product the Russians can certainly claim more direct participation in the ground war, only this.

Arguments such as "it would be hard to view the democracies defeat Hitler without Russia" are totally partial, and also can be used in the other way around, such as saying "it would be hard to view the Communism defeat Hitler without the British resistance", precisely what I'm providing arguments in my last posts.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 14, 2012)

I just don't see a relistic scenario where Germany and Russia can be at war without the western powers being involved. To get to Russia, how else can Germany get there but thru Poland? That will bring in France and Britain.
If Britain and France had been spineless, and ignored their treaties. Germany would have never had the excuse for invading France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc.. He wouldn't have access to the resources he stole after he invaded them. These countries might sell them to Germany, but at a much higher price than what Germany paid in the real world.
So both sides of the conflict is going to be short of some of the resources they had in the real world. So it's still not a easy win for Germany.


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## Jenisch (Feb 14, 2012)

Yeah, it's not a very realistic scenario, but it is realistic argue about a scenario were Germany defeats the Soviet Union, and the Allies are certainly hopeless because Stalin was defeated? (e.g Richard Overy in Why the Allies Won). 

Today, we know that Hitler's war machine was far less effective than usually decipted, and a stalemate against the Soviets was as good as Pyrrhic victory for the Nazis to save their country, and for a simple reason: Western Allies.

What I really don't like is the view of the Russians "saving the world from Nazism". What happened, was a simple opportunistic alliance for both sides to defeat Hitler (a common enemy, and an announced enemy for Russia since Mein Kampf). 

Let's think about some possibilities with and without the Grand Alliance:

*Britain signs peace in 1940: Hitler has a realistic chance of survival.

*Without the Western Allies, Hitler fights the Soviet Union: with a victory or stalemate, Hitler has realistic chances of survival. 

*Hitler fights the historical Allied coalition: Hitler's chances are greatly reduced, and the rest is history.

So, I think it's fair to claim that the USSR was the main military responsable for the defeat of the most powerful Axis country, but drawn comparisons such as the one from Overy is not the best way to depict this, because they are needlessly provocative for a still very sensitive subject in the West. The Western freedom was not necessarily "saved" by the Communism (which, by it's part, destroyed the freedom of Eastern Europe), but was certainly much more easily obtained by the alliance sealed with the Communists against the common enemy, and those Soviet contributions that certainly deserve much needed recognition in the West, while the Russians and other ex-Soviet peoples need to learn about the contributions from their allies as well.


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## Siegfried (Feb 14, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> I just don't see a relistic scenario where Germany and Russia can be at war without the western powers being involved. To get to Russia, how else can Germany get there but thru Poland? That will bring in France and Britain.
> If Britain and France had been spineless, and ignored their treaties. Germany would have never had the excuse for invading France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc.. He wouldn't have access to the resources he stole after he invaded them. These countries might sell them to Germany, but at a much higher price than what Germany paid in the real world.
> So both sides of the conflict is going to be short of some of the resources they had in the real world. So it's still not a easy win for Germany.



Britain and France's treaties arguably might have caused the war. Germany had serious territorial disputes with Poland and Czechoslovakia caused by the Versailes Treaty which was designed to reduce Germany's population and land area. Moreover she had serious concerns with the protection of German minorities within these nations at times; The discrimination that ethnic Germans and Austrians suffered is well documented under the league of nations (land seizures, exclusion from pulbic service, threats of expulsions, Eduard Bennes threstened to expell all the Suddeten Germans should Austria and Germany unite.) Forcing 3 million Germans to remain part of Czechoslovakia was morally rather difficult to justify (not even the Slovaks wanted to be part of it) so it is no suprise that the allies let it slip back out.

The situation with Poland is more difficult, however Britain and France's carte blanche backing meant that Negotiation between Poland and Germany were more protracracted. Hitler had offered an anti-soviet pact to Poland in return for rail and road access to Danzig. Poland didn't compromise, so Hitler negotiated with someone who would: the Soviets. I have read that the Polish government had shown signs of comming around but by then it was to late.

One scenario has Poland AND Germany attacking the Soviet Union together. Given terrible history between the two nations this might sound inconceivable but the terrible history did not yet exist.

The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway could reasonably be considered a strategic necessity as part of defensive measures to France and Britain's declaration of war.


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## Erich (Feb 14, 2012)

more spider webing on the posts guys


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## drgondog (Feb 14, 2012)

Back to the thesis. Which power carved the heart out of the experienced LW Fighter Arm? It wasn't the USSR. They gradually reached parity in quality aircraft in late 1942/early 1943. They reached parity in quality of airmen in late 1943.

By that time however, the LW had transferred/stripped and otherwise removed so many experienced leaders and pilots to the west - and it was in the West that RAF and USAAF steadily ground out the experienced Experten and wingmen - with the real attrition beginning in late 1943 and early 1944.

The LW was basically ineffective in the most important battle they had to win - namely control of the skies over their oil/chemical plants and the Invasion front. Had Hitler turned the Normandy Invasion it is entirely possible they could have sued for peace terms favorably (in contrast to total surrender) with the West. 

The VVS had nothing to do with the destruction of German industry or LuftFlotte Reich, Sud or 3 - which from mid 1943 through mid 1944 had 2/3+ of all their fighter strength facing westward. On the other hand Lend Lease supplies had an enormous positive effect toward the ability of VVS to gain parity versus LW while Soviet industry concentrated on prosecuting the ground war as well as introducing new and better fighters to support air ops over each critical land battle.


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## Erich (Feb 14, 2012)

my point Bill. one reason why the T/E's were brought back up to rearm with heavy cannon the experimentation of S/E and T/E and the useage of the Br 21 rocket launchers-the new wave of aerial warfare for one besides the silly use of aerial bombing, none of this was to be used on the Ost front in similar situations.


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## parsifal (Feb 14, 2012)

I havent read all the posts, so apologies if I missed something, or repeat something. The Luftwaffes defeat was comprehensive. It wasnt just a case of being outnumbered. It was defeated qualitatively, militarily, and because superior resources were brought to bear against it. its defeat was utter and total.

What caused this happen. in 1939-40, the LW was all powerful a force unstoppable and much feared. By 1945 it was a shadow of itself, on every front at best able to engage hit and run tactics and inflict pinpricks on its opponents.

It is impiossible to separate or promote one power as being decisive, or critical to that victory. In the West, the emphasis was in gaining air superiority and in the destruction wreaked on Germany indfrastructure. this process began with the battle of britain and reached its climax in the battle for Germany. That was a crucial battle. equally critical were the battles on the eastern front. Here the VVS objective was never to win air superiority outright. Even post war the Soviet airpower theories never sought that. they considered the effort needed to gain air superiority on a front wide basis to be not worth the effort for the type of war they needed to fight. Instead they aimed to select a section of the front and saturate it with strike aircraft, as an adjunct to the ground battles. fighters were there simply to keep the LW off the backs of their sturmoviks until the job was done. They succeeded in doing that from the end of kursk on. LW was never able to thwart Soviet airpower from that point on though it tried repeatedly. 

East front is also significant because of the crippling attrition rates due to non-combat causes, particulalry for the LW. The LW suffered around twice the attrition rate (to non-combat causes) on the EF compared to the west. Many LW aircraft became unserviceable, and then had to be burnt because they were going to be overrun (there were other reasons as well).

Much criticism has been made regarding both the day and night bomber offensives. Yet both were critical in the defeat of the LW. mostly because they forced the germans down a strategic blind ally. Aircraft losses in defence remained pretty constant throughout the war....the only way to win air superiorty was to get your bombers to the target, whatever the target. Germans had shown a marked reluctance to put aircraft up unless they had the advantage, or unless a critical target was being threatened. the long hard years of 41-42 over france and the low countries had shown that in spades. over Germany, they couldnt ignore the Allied offensives. once the Allies were able to escort properly, it was game over for the germans. its that simple. at night losses were much more modest, mostly because of harris' intransigence, still large amounts of resources were needed to counter BC campaign , and LW losses were still substantial, particularly from June 44 on. Moreover, whilst BC losses late 43 through to about April 44 were crippling, after that loss rates steadily declined


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## bobbysocks (Feb 14, 2012)

i dont think we appreciate how much of a true chess game this was. it seemed it was all about pinning certain axis assessets at specific times to employ a strategy. stalin in meetings with us officials kept vehemently demanding the western allies open a second front. in order to do this the western allies ran operations like the frantic missions in an attempt to fool germany into thinking they were going to commence long range bombing missions from within the SU....thus fixing LW units away from the invasion point. D-day was a saving grace to the ussr...it took or kept german forces out of the eastern front. as for the ussr going it alone it...i cannot find it but have read the speach or interview of zhukov about the lend lease aspect...i tried to find it but cant at the moment. basically his opinion was the ussr would have been dead in the water with out it. it was the reason for their success. it gave them the steel for the tanks, planes, guns....gave them the ammo and powder...gave them food and medicine....gave them machinery to boost their industrial output. basically the ussr supplied the manpower which it was more than willing to send into the meat grinder....what some 20 million soviets died!! germany was already unable to keep up its production to meet its logistical demands....especially trucks and supply vehicles....when the westeran allies began their massive deep bombing raids that was a huge nail in the coffin.


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## Jenisch (Feb 15, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> i dont think we appreciate how much of a true chess game this was. it seemed it was all about pinning certain axis assessets at specific times to employ a strategy. stalin in meetings with us officials kept vehemently demanding the western allies open a second front. in order to do this the western allies ran operations like the frantic missions in an attempt to fool germany into thinking they were going to commence long range bombing missions from within the SU....thus fixing LW units away from the invasion point. D-day was a saving grace to the ussr...it took or kept german forces out of the eastern front. as for the ussr going it alone it...i cannot find it but have read the speach or interview of zhukov about the lend lease aspect...i tried to find it but cant at the moment. basically his opinion was the ussr would have been dead in the water with out it. it was the reason for their success. it gave them the steel for the tanks, planes, guns....gave them the ammo and powder...gave them food and medicine....gave them machinery to boost their industrial output. basically the ussr supplied the manpower which it was more than willing to send into the meat grinder....what some 20 million soviets died!! germany was already unable to keep up its production to meet its logistical demands....especially trucks and supply vehicles....when the westeran allies began their massive deep bombing raids that was a huge nail in the coffin.



Yeah, I tend to trust a lot in those first hand statements. This Lend-Lease claim was also supported by Nikita Kruschev, who also said that no one less than Joseph Stalin also said the same. The Lend-Lease stuff is still controversy, and there are still closed arquives. Even so, new evidence by the Russian historian Boris Sokolov shows that in fact the LL was even more important than it was perceived until few years ago. This, together with what Zhukov and Stalin said, makes me think it's higly likely that when everything be open, we not gonna have a surprise.

I also think the D-Day comparison is not the best one. D-Day, and preparations for it (including the bombing) certainly reduced considerably the capability of the Germans to respond to the Soviets offensives. This was specially true due to the fact that by 1944, the German industry achived it's peak of production, with thousands of modern weapons arriving for the troops. The Allied bombing and subsequent invasion of Normandy were certainly behind the mediocre number of German tanks and planes in the Eastern Front in 1944, even with much shorter supply lines for the Germans. The attacks in the oil fields in Romania and in the syntetic petroleum plants in Germany were also very responsible for the total defeat of the Luftwaffe and decrased quality of the Panzer crews training.

Make not mistake, for the Nazis the West was a more serious treat than the Soviets in 1944. The Anglo-Americans not only would split the German Army, but they also were much more closer to the Ruhr Valley, and this was like a dagger pointed at Germany's heart.


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## Jenisch (Feb 15, 2012)

Parsifal, I also think the air campaign was a critical one. Even if the Germans defeated Russia, it would be by no means easy for them to overcome the Allied air power, which would be greatly expanded in such a scenario. First, the Allies would certainly target the Caucasus oil fields, and probably the Russians would trown fire on them before were captured and made them useless for many months before the bombing started. So, Germany would still suffer with lack of oil.

Another thing is the Western Front and air power. Many people say that the Germans would be able to avoid the success of the D-Day just because they would have much more men if they had defeated Russia. I simple don't know how the Germans would put so many men in Normandy, if the transport infraestructure for their logistics would be destroyed by the Allied air power to proceed with the invasion, like it was historically. In the West, it was very easy to sature the air space, and maintein patrols with the long range Allied fighters was also easy. You have air control, have naval control, and the adequate number of troops with supplies, you have all the elements for a succesfull amphibious assault (although with much higher casualities certainly).


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## drgondog (Feb 15, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> in order to do this the western allies ran operations like the frantic missions in an attempt to fool germany into thinking they were going to commence long range bombing missions from within the SU....thus fixing LW units away from the invasion point. germany was already unable to keep up its production to meet its logistical demands....especially trucks and supply vehicles....when the westeran allies began their massive deep bombing raids that was a huge nail in the coffin.



Actually Bobbysocks, the Frantic missions didn't start from England until after D-Day and the were a serious strategic initiative. The actual first Frantic I was flown June 2 from Italy to Ukraine and back - and had zero effect on the mobilization of fighters from Germany, nor did any of the subsequent Frantic missions.

The Soviets were very interested but consistently tried for operational control of the bomb groups which would be stationed at Poltava and Myhrorod.

Stailin stopped them after Frantic VII - September 19-22 when the 8th AF dropped supplies to the Polish underground which Stalin wanted exterminated. He was furious that the USAAF failed to alert him to the purpose of the mission.


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## iron man (Feb 16, 2012)

The one salient point that I tried to make in that "other post", on that "other board" was that there is a whole lot more to the "Luftwaffe" than it's fighter arm (Jagdwaffe)...and _especially so _in the period 1941-43. Irrevocable losses in the East during this period (to _all_ types) dwarf those on other fronts...and by a significant margin. 
I have no "Commie" axe to grind here...the facts are the facts. 

The reminant core of the KG's experienced crews died over the USSR (and to a far lesser extent, over the Med) during this period. 
These are conditioned crews of men that had been _fighting together as an homogenous unit _for as much as five contiguous years by this point.
You don't replace this stuff easily. 

Same as to all of the crews they lost flying transport missions. 

Many of these guys had _thousands of hours of IFR time under their belts_; the kind of crews that could find some little shithole grid reference (on an outdated map) in 10/10 overcast and put a heavily laden aircraft down on a marginal airfield.

_This _is what the "Luftwaffe" lost in the east..._this_ is what it means to "cut the guts" out of an airforce.

Fighter jocks (of the period) operated in mostly VFR conditions, at a short distance from their airfield.

The skillsets involved are _not even *remotely* comparable_.

A fighter jock either "gets it" (quickly) or he dies.

An experienced multi-engined IFR crew takes years to become so...

And when they're _mostly all _gone? 

See "Steinbock"...

Just sayin'


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## Tante Ju (Feb 17, 2012)

iron man said:


> An experienced multi-engined IFR crew takes years to become so... And when they're _mostly all _gone?
> 
> See "Steinbock"...
> 
> Just sayin'



I do not think it is true.. Steinbock problem was Germans was exactly lack of experienced bomber crews, which often saw difficulty finding targets. Not always but generic bomber crew quality was not high. Besides Steinbock losses were not severe at all, especially compared to monthly losses on EF _for years_..


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## Milosh (Feb 17, 2012)

With some 329 a/c lost out of 522 participating in Steinbock, I would say the losses in Steinbock were severe (63%).


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## Jenisch (Feb 17, 2012)

iron man said:


> The one salient point that I tried to make in that "other post", on that "other board" was that there is a whole lot more to the "Luftwaffe" than it's fighter arm (Jagdwaffe)...and _especially so _in the period 1941-43. Irrevocable losses in the East during this period (to _all_ types) dwarf those on other fronts...and by a significant margin.
> I have no "Commie" axe to grind here...the facts are the facts.


 
I think you fail to considerate that bomber/attack plane losses were to an appreciable degree caused by the lack of the fighter arm to protect them. The Germans also couldn't reduce the losses of ground attack planes by the lack of modern attack aircraft in proper numbers. The ground attack models of the Fw 190, were much superior to the Stuka for example. If there was not an Western Front to take most of the 190 production, make no mistake that the Luftwaffe would equip much more units with Fw 190 and reduce the losses considerably (not to mention other luxuries, like development of specific aircraft models for the war in Russia, speed up development of improvements for existing aircraft and far superior designs like the jets). Another thing is that the bombing campaign made the Germans focus on fighter production, rather than in attack aircraft vital to the East. Other was the night fighters, that the crews needed extra training. If all the night fighter aircraft and their pilots could be ground attack pilots in the East, certainly the situation for the Russians would be worse. 

I cited some factors which are intangibles, but certainly any reader will agree with me that they would be relevant to analyze the problem if the VVS would overcome the Luftwaffe regardless of the Western Allies. In my view, if alone the Lufwaffe would have the conditions to at least avoid the Russians from arrive at the borders of the Reich if the war happened like historically in all the other aspects. The main problems for the Germans in the two-front war were lack of fuel and need to split their air force and it's resources - neither of those factors existing if that was the case.


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## drgondog (Feb 17, 2012)

iron man said:


> The one salient point that I tried to make in that "other post", on that "other board" was that there is a whole lot more to the "Luftwaffe" than it's fighter arm (Jagdwaffe)...and _especially so _in the period 1941-43. Irrevocable losses in the East during this period (to _all_ types) dwarf those on other fronts...and by a significant margin.
> I have no "Commie" axe to grind here...the facts are the facts.
> 
> *a.) define 'dwarf', b.) define irrevocable, c.) define signifcant margin*
> ...



You are entirely welcome for your opinion. The facts will show that the LW Fighter losses were far greater in the West than East - and when that capability shrunk to the point of being ineffective the Allies had their way with targets that benefited both the East and West when they were destroyed.

The bomber force in the East did diddly relative to the USSR's ability to mobilize, integrate their own manufacturing as well as Lend Lease, maintain strategic resources above the levels required to grind the German forces into submission. The transport forces did not achieve any appropriate level of supply in the East - they were way under capacity to even supply the troopers at Stalingrad with the resources allocated, as a major important example.

Even with reduced resources the Fighter arm of the LW maintained parity over the battlefields in the East while they were being stripped of experienced pilots and aircraft to attempt to turn back the West's strength in the air in mid 1943.

Regards,

Bill


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## Jenisch (Feb 17, 2012)

About Lend-Lease aircraft, something interesting in the text I posted earlier:

_Robert Huhn Jones, in his study of Lend-Lease, tabulates 1663 Allied aircraft delivered to the Soviets by 1 November 1942—which he notes exceeded the number of modern Soviet-built aircraft used at Stalingrad.2 One of the greatest difficulties in assessing the Lend-Lease contributions to Russia is the lack of information about the Soviet employment of these aircraft. However, German sources have stated that after the spring of 1942 American and British aircraft were particularly noticeable on the Leningrad and Kuban fronts and that, on the latter, Allied aircraft sometimes outnumbered those built by the Soviets.3 It should also be remembered that as early as 1942, when the war was still undecided, *Stalin was offered an Anglo-American bomber force that would operate from the Caucasus beginning in 1943, but for political reasons he rejected the proposal, desiring only the aircraft*.4 The $11 billion of Lend-Lease also provided raw materials, foodstuffs, and technical assistance vital to Soviet sustenance and production._

Soviet Air Power and Victory in World War II

In bold we have a slap in the face from those who say the Western Allies were not determined to help Stalin. Not only they were engaged in the Pacific, Africa, Mediterranean, in the Battle of the tlantic and in the air front over Germany - scenarios with significant logistical and hardware costs - but were also willing to provide direct help for the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front.


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## Tante Ju (Feb 17, 2012)

drgondog said:


> True - having said that you must have control of the airspace for the bomber crews to operate and achieve the tactical results to justify existance. Out of curiosity, what would you cite as very important achievements for the Luftwaffe multi engine bomber force from 1941-1943 in the East?



The Luftwaffe dropped more bombs in the East in 1941-1943 than the USAAF and the RAF BC_combined_. In this context, what would you cite as very important achievements for the RAF and USAAF multi engine bomber force from 1941-1943 in the West - since you seem imply that somehow there weren't any such in East?

Luftwaffe bombers were bombing exactly the same targets which you consider very important prior to the Normandy landings - they paralyzed Soviet marshalling yards, railways, and communication lines. They dropped far more bombs and did more damage to it than the USAAF and RAF did in Normandy - the difference being that the effect was much more feelable in Normady, since its smaller area, firepower was concentrated into a small space. But in the East, neither Soviets or German had the chance fighting a luxury war like in the West. The fighting involved incomparable bigger scale, bigger operation area - an area larger than Europe in classical sense. You can't deny movement on the Steppe by air.

You seem to think that losses of the LW bombers in the East in are not a major point in the big picture of events, especially compared to fighters losses of the Luftwaffe, which you concentrate on and see decisive. In view how much support LW bombers gave to the army in the east it seems very questionalbe to me. 



> Losing air superiority over the continent gave a crucial advantage to the West, particularly for the invasion - as it denied flexible movement and logistics to Germany while adding force multipliers to Allied Infantry, Armor, Artillary and Naval forces. The Soviets could not even effectivey attack key transport nexus/marshalling yards in East Germany in the last two months of the war - that was left to the Allies which could do so with impunity.



Look at size of Western Front and Eastern front - I don't think comparison or parallel can be made. 





> The facts will show that the LW Fighter losses were far greater in the West than East - and when that capability shrunk to the point of being ineffective the Allies had their way with targets that benefited both the East and West when they were destroyed.



And what significance LW fighter losses have? The war was decided on the East. On the ground. Ground battles were influenced by bombers, not fighters.

LW fighters losses did not have that much of an effect on Allies having their way, as you put it. The German had increasing amount of fighters, and flew increasing amount of intercept mission - but become ineffective as a defense for by the end of 1944, when the LW fighters could no longer give enough resistance to hordes of USAAF bombers, number were built up in 1944. 

This was not achieved by destroying the Luftwaffe, but simply by the growing numbers of USAAF. USAAF had so many planes that it was virtually impossible to oppose them everywhere with chance of success. 

That's one point. Indeed USAAF by the end of 1944 was in position to make the strategic air war effective, it could attack key points, with effective, that Germans felt badly. By this time however, the war was effectively concluded in the East with Bagratyion, mid-1944, before strategic air war could effect the German ability to fight. 



> The bomber force in the East did diddly relative to the USSR's ability to mobilize, integrate their own manufacturing as well as Lend Lease, maintain strategic resources above the levels required to grind the German forces into submission. The transport forces did not achieve any appropriate level of supply in the East - they were way under capacity to even supply the troopers at Stalingrad with the resources allocated, as a major important example.



So, I question, what did all those shot down German fighters achieved..? Allowing bombers to wage a stragegic war effectively in the end - to what point? It would make sense if it happened in say 1942 - but not so much importance in 1944, when the German army itself was repeatadly defeated, regardless of the air campaign.


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## stona (Feb 17, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> So, I question, what did all those shot down German fighters achieved..?



They allowed the Western allies to conduct "Overlord" without which several people contributing here might be typing in Russian rather than English.
Steve


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## Erich (Feb 17, 2012)

if the war had been decided in the east as mentioned in above posting why the critical order to remove 3/4's of the LW fighter force in July of 1943 - pull it back for the defense of the Reich ? and then why so many living LW pilots have stated the air war in the west broke the LW back both day and the often overlooked Nachtjagd force................


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## drgondog (Feb 17, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> The Luftwaffe dropped more bombs in the East in 1941-1943 than the USAAF and the RAF BC_combined_. In this context, what would you cite as very important achievements for the RAF and USAAF multi engine bomber force from 1941-1943 in the West - since you seem imply that somehow there weren't any such in East?
> 
> *I didn't imply - I simply asked. As to USAAF in 1941-1943 multi engine, the results weren't very impressive either but to be fair the USAAF mult engine strike capability only started in the UK and North Africa in late 1942 at squadron level force. I would be the last to over glorify bombing results for ANY nation on a strategic level - until summer 1943 at the earliest*
> 
> ...



The thesis of this thread is "What Defeated the Luftwaffe". That is what shooting down German fighters achieved. To the point of strangling German war capability via elimination of sufficient fuel supplies... which affected EVERYTHING Germany required to stop either the East or the West ground offensives.

I might add that the withdrawal of thosands of 88mm and 120mm artillary from the front to be redeployed around critical industrial assets, plus the re-deployment of troops to man them, plus the massive re-deployment of desparately needed armor from the East in fall of 1944 - to launch the surprise attack in the Ardennes probably prevented the Allies from not only taking Berlin, but also much of Czechoslovakia and East Germany before the Soviets. To the question of the Ardennes campaign, it would have been stopped dead in its tracks had good weather prevailed at the beginning of the attack.

What you could say is that Germany was not capable of stopping either the East or the West in 1944.


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## Gixxerman (Feb 17, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I havent read all the posts, so apologies if I missed something, or repeat something. The Luftwaffes defeat was comprehensive. It wasnt just a case of being outnumbered. It was defeated qualitatively, militarily, and because superior resources were brought to bear against it. its defeat was utter and total.
> 
> What caused this happen. in 1939-40, the LW was all powerful a force unstoppable and much feared. By 1945 it was a shadow of itself, on every front at best able to engage hit and run tactics and inflict pinpricks on its opponents.



The book 'The Last Year of the Luftwaffe: May 1944 - May 1945' makes an interesting read.
In many respects the LW entered 1944 with some good cause for optimism given the new planes about to enter service looking at the map Germany still controlled a lot of territory.

But I agree, German arms, including the LW, were not just beaten but utterly smashed to pieces, as total and comprehensive defeat as could be imagined.

As Tante Ju says rightly this was first and foremost a defeat on the ground (but not forgetting the sea and air too).


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## Hoju2k (Feb 18, 2012)

drgondog said:


> We need to disagree here. The Wermacht was paralyzed at Normandy with respect to mobility in daylight


That's a great exaggeration. Not all German army movements happened at night.



> I might add that the withdrawal of thosands of 88mm and 120mm artillary from the front to be redeployed around critical industrial assets, plus the re-deployment of troops to man them,


No such thing happened. In fact, the number of light and heavy Flak batteries on the Eastern Front in 1944 increased by more than 100% compared with 1943. There was no "troop re-deployment" to man the Flak guns in Germany (also, FYI, by 1944 40% of the Flak arm consisted of auxiliaries -young, women, former POW-). And there was not 120mm Flak gun.


> in plus the massive re-deployment of desparately needed armor from the East in fall of 1944- to launch the surprise attack in the Ardennes


Again, completely wrong: no Panzer unit was withdraw from the East to launch the "WACHT AM RHEIN" and "NORDWIND" offensives.


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## drgondog (Feb 19, 2012)

Hoju2k said:


> That's a great exaggeration. Not all German army movements happened at night.
> 
> *Of course not. Having said that Falais was an example of result of being Forced to move in daylight - and I didn't say ALL German army movements happened at night - read it again. If paralyzed is not the right word for you - try 'crippled' or 'greatly hampered'. I also cited a note from Albert Speer below regarding effect of Allied control of air over Normandy*
> 
> ...



You are correct - it was twin 128mm flak batteries. As to 'Flak Batteries' in the context of the East - they were deployed as anti-tank batteries but the deployment of critical additional AAA capability of the 88's (and 128mm) were to the key cities and industrial areas to the detriment of deployment to the East where they were most needed to stop Soviet armor. More below from Speer.

The Wermacht Strategic Reserve, destined to oppose the Soviet winter Offensive was stripped and comprised the bulk of the attacking forces after moving west. Quibble about whether withdrawing from the East Front or taking the Strategic Reserves to back up the east front is meaningful.

As to the effect of the Allied air strikes from the West, relative to reducing capability of deploying flak batteries and/or additional manpower to the East:

From Albert Speer, pg 278 "Inside the Third Reich'
"Our heaviest expense was in fact the elaborate defensive measures. In the Reich and in the western theatres of war were the barrels of ten thousand antiaircraft guns were pointed toward the sky. The same guns could have well been employed in Russia against tanks and other ground targets. Had it not benn for the air front over Germany, our defensivestrength against Russian tanks would have been doubled, as far as equipment was concerned. Moreover the antiaircraft force tied down hundreds of thousands of young soldiers. A third of the optical industry was producing gunsights for the flak batteries. About half of the electronics industry was engaged in producing radar and communication networks for defense against bombing. Simply because of this, in spite of the high level of the German electronics and communication and optical industries, the supply of our frontline troops with modern equipment remained far behind that of the Western armies."

On page 406
"In July (1944) I had written Hitler that by September all tactical movements would necessarily come to a standstill for lack of fuel. Now this prediction was confirmed." 
"When I visted the commander of the training company informed me that his student pilots could only have flight practice for an hour every week."
"Meanwhile the Army, to, had become virtually immobile because of the fuel shortage".
"General Jodl, of course, knew even better than I did how great the emergency was. In order to free the seventeen thousand tons-forming the production of two and a half days- for the Ardennes offensive, he had to withold fuel from other Army groups on November 10, 1944"


"In the meanwhile the attacks on the hydrogeneration plants had directly affected the entire chemical industry.. actually from October, 1944 our explosives consisted of 20 percent rock salt, which affected their effectiveness correspondingly"

On the effect to mobility at Normandy. pg 355, relative to throwing the OKW reserve in France against the Anglo-American beachead on June 6-7
"The two armored divisions were delayed. By daylight of the 7th their deployment was held up by enemy bombers, and even before they made contact with the enemy they suffered severe losses in men and material"

On the cumulative effect of Western airpower on German industry, pg 414.

"On November 11 a new note of alarm entered my frequent memoranda on shutdowns in the fuel industry. For more than six weeks traffic to and from the Ruhr area had been blocked. It is self evident, given the whole nature of the Reich's econmoic structure that cessation of production in the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area is intolerable for successful conduct of the war. The most important armaments plants are reported on the verge of going under"
"


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## Hoju2k (Feb 19, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Of course not. Having said that Falais was an example of result of being Forced to move in daylight - and I didn't say ALL German army movements happened at night - read it again. If paralyzed is not the right word for you - try 'crippled' or 'greatly hampered'.
> "


 Yeah, those words work better. Although what happen in Falaise had a lot more to do with the German forces being outflanked and eventually encircled by ground Allied forces than the effects of Air Power.



> You are correct - it was twin 128mm flak batteries. As to 'Flak Batteries' in the context of the East - they were deployed as anti-tank batteries but the deployment of critical additional AAA capability of 88 and 128mm were to the key cities and industrial areas to the detriment of deployment to the East where they were most needed to stop Soviet armor.


Well, in the case of the 12.8cm gun it could never be withdraw from the front, since it was never deployed on it (until the front came to them, or course). And I'd say that was useless as an AT gun (too big).
And, no, even in the East, the flak batteries functioned mostly as... Flak batteries, also supported by the fact of the increased deployment of searchlights batteries on that front (0 in 1942, 43 by 1944).
Believe or not, the Germans also had to defend things against air attack in the East too.



> The Wermacht Strategic Reserve, destined to oppose the Soviet winter Offensive was stripped and comprised the bulk of the attacking forces after moving west. Quibble about whether withdrawing from the East Front or taking the Strategic Reserves to back up the east front is meaningful.


I don't know about that "Strategic Reserve" that you mention, but the armor assembled to the attack came mostly from the refitting of the units that were already in the West, and you specifically said "re-deployment of desparately needed armor from the East", which as I said, is wrong.

As for the rest, I don't deny the effects of having a large part of the German forces deployed against the Western Armies and Air Forces (the opposite works too, right?), but just wanted to point out some inaccuracies, to put it mildly.


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## drgondog (Feb 19, 2012)

Duly noted.


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## Erich (Feb 19, 2012)

single 12.8cm were mounted on railcars and delivered to the appropriate spots in the Ruhrgebiet and then removed as needed for camo or to other possible target sectors, the zwilling was a stationary mounting on the heavy flak towers of Berlin, Hamburg and Wien.

88 and 105s on the Ost front provided a dual role configuration in the LW as well as the armored panzern div's in their respective Flak Abteilungs with the 8.8cm gun.


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## Gixxerman (Feb 19, 2012)

I've seen the flak towers mentioned many times always was amused at the thought that peace-time apparantly saw the Hamburg tower converted into a nightclub.
Someone once said something similar to 'let our revenge be the laughter of the children' which sprang to mind.


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## Erich (Feb 19, 2012)

I believe that Augarten in Vienna once had a nice restaurant within


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## parsifal (Feb 20, 2012)

Understanding German flak movements is complex and incomplete so its hard to make dogmatic comments either way. For a reasonable on line resource for the regular units I would recomm4end the following


Flak units

Samuuel Mitcham - The German army Order of Battle WWII, Dorsetr Press - 1985

Ian Hogg - The German Army order of Battle 1944, Hippocrene Books 1975

Westermann EB, Flak - Geran AA defences 1914-45, Kansas University Press 2003

In 1939 through to 1942, the German flak batteries were separately manged, one part by the army with mostly light flak units and generally attached to field divisions. There was a second force, under LW control, employing about 1.2 million men and organised into 24 Flak Divisions. The paramilitary contribution at this time was quite small

According to Westermann, German flak efficiency reached its peak in 1942, with the general introduction of radar guidance, and fully trained flak crews. Average ammunition expenditure per kill against strat egic bombers was about 4000 rpk. Average gun failures was about 30 per month for several million barrels.

From 1942 to the end of 1943 ther was some shifting ofregular flak units to the frontlines....about 8 divisions. On the eastern front at the time of Kursk ther were four flak divisions that I know of. Operations on the eastern front were hazardous, since the LW flak units were usually deployed as front line anti tank and anti -personnel units. They suffered heavy casualties in this capacity. further, in the crisis of 1944, some units of the regular flak units were returned to Germany.

From 1942, through to 1944, ther was an exponent5ial growth in paramilitary flak units. Over a million men were employed in this role. More than 80% of german ordinance production (by dollar investment) was flak production, and more than 70% of this was allocated to the home defence flak formations. The Germans got a generally poor return for this investment. Gone were the trained crews....it nbow took an average of 16000 shell to kill each bomber, and gun failures went off the chart....over 300 accidents per month in 1944.

Using half trained militias to man the flak batteries was a false economy for the germans....it finished up lessning the effectiveness of their flak park, did affect production as well and made the flak arm a generally uneconomic proposition. IMO the germans would have been better off taking a few of those 1 million part timers...putting the majority back into full time employment, and training a further 300000 or so as full timers (from the million part timers....combining that with the 300000 regulars redeployed back to Germany historically. that would have given the Germans 600000 properly trained flak personnel, as opposed to 1 million half trained, and 300000 trained guys. They would have been better off with fully trained guys, and lettering the remainder sit out the raids in the air raid shelters. The draft into the flak arm by the home guard etc was only ever seen as a proper ganda stunt mostly to pander to Hitlers mania for all things that go bang in the night


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## Tante Ju (Feb 20, 2012)

drgondog said:


> As to 'Flak Batteries' in the context of the East - they were deployed as anti-tank batteries but the deployment of critical additional AAA capability of 88 and 128mm were to the key cities and industrial areas to the detriment of deployment to the East where they were most needed to stop Soviet armor.



8,8cm Flak was integral to TOE of Panzer Division since war begun in 1939. They were never meant to be primarly ground weapons, but used on occasion with great success because of some properties that were advantagous (good ballistics). It was an anti aircraft gun, after all.

12,8cm Flak was never deployed on front, they were rare, their high altitude performance was complete unneccsary.

BTW, the 8,8cm Flak was quite cheap compared to building thousends of bombers. One FlaK 18 costed 33 000 RM, whereas a Bf 109 ca. 45 000, and a He 111 around 250 000. I suppose a viermot in German, like He 177, would cost at least 500-600 000 RM, now please compare that to cost of gun. For every heavy bomber price, you could build 20(!) heavy Flak...

Also there seem to be hardly increasing preference to Luftwaffe (mainly guns at home defence, but also some guns in frontline were directed under LW) to Heer. Receivence of Flak guns, by Heer and total production (% of total production Heer units received)

1941 : 126 / 1872 (6,7 %) - total production worth: 61 M RM,-
1942 : 176 / 2876 (6,1 %) - total production worth: 95 M RM,-
1943 : 296 / 4416 (6,7 %) - total production worth: 145 M RM,-
1944 : 549 / 5933 (9,2% ) - total production worth: 195 M RM,-

So, regardless of what Speer laments, truth is that Army received 50% greater share and almost twice the number of Flak guns in 1944, than in 1943... and as for costs, even at peak all 8,8 cm Flak gun production (to be fair, the cost is a bit higher because 10,5cm and 12,8cm guns were also produced) cost as much as a single of the Bismarck class ship (196 RM).

German Army bottleneck was never weapons, anyway. It was manpower, and fuel.. weapons they had more than enough.



Gixxerman said:


> I've seen the flak towers mentioned many times always was amused at the thought that peace-time apparantly saw the Hamburg tower converted into a nightclub.
> Someone once said something similar to 'let our revenge be the laughter of the children' which sprang to mind.



Wien flaktower, on of them is converted to storage of modern art. I think its all well, because its safe, and modern art is so ugly anyway its better if locked away. 

BTW it looks really weird in its surroundings. Huge (and I mean HUGE) concreate building in the midst of really nice park, with nice classical buildings around it.. then, this monstrosity. People who have house there must love that if they look out of window they just see an inductructable concrete wall.


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## Juha (Feb 20, 2012)

Hello Tante Ju
thanks for the interesting info on how many of AA guns was allocated for Heer.



Tante Ju said:


> 8,8cm Flak was integral to TOE of Panzer Division since war begun in 1939. They were never meant to be primarly ground weapons, but used on occasion with great success because of some properties that were advantagous (good ballistics). It was an anti aircraft gun, after all.



That wasn't so, but during early in the war PzDivs usually had LW Flak.Abt. attached to them later GHQ Heeres Fla.Abt., during early part of 42 the 11 PzDivs (out of 25) which have had these semi-permanently attached Flak.Abt:en, usually these divs were those taking part in Oper. Blau had these Flak.Abt:en permanently assigned to their Arty Rgts as IVth battalion. But because the result was the (mis)use of the Flak guns as field arty in 1943 there AA battalions revereted back to being GHQ troops.



Tante Ju said:


> German Army bottleneck was never weapons, anyway. It was manpower, and fuel.. weapons they had more than enough.



I disagree, just looking for combat divs material states clearly shows permanent lack of heavy weapons, which got progressively worse after winter 41-42, many batteries lost their 4th gun, A/T battalions usually had clearly fewer A/T guns than they should, PzDivs were chronically short of tanks etc.

Juha


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## Tante Ju (Feb 20, 2012)

Juha said:


> I disagree, just looking for combat divs material states clearly shows permanent lack of heavy weapons, which got progressively worse after winter 41-42, many batteries lost their 4th gun, A/T battalions usually had clearly fewer A/T guns than they should, PzDivs were chronically short of tanks etc.
> 
> Juha



First thanks for the note on Pz Div table, I did a quick check and found that 88s were issued to 1942 Pz Div Gliederung, but did not know it was only apply to Fall Blau troops.

Here however things get a bit complicated, since LW was responsible for operating heavy Flak, in units that nominally under central GHQ command, in practice they could be often find permanent attached to division with important task..

As for permanent lack of heavy weapons, it depends on how close you look at the picture. Big picture or microscoping.. I agree that typical for EF front division was not to have its Sollstaerke, actual Iststaerke was random array of weapons, usually well below Sollstaerke.. but I disagree you conclusion - it was a result of the heavy combat on the EF, in heavy combat, constant heavy losses you will never find a unit that matches the paper TOE. It was equally true for Russians.. they had severe manpower shortage by 1944, desperately filled by drafting re-liberated populace, mobilization of women etc. 

Equipment in actual divisions never seem to reach paper levels, expect before offensives, when units were refilled, but did not stay such state for long. Same story of German side, when a Pz Div appeared on the front back from refill at Hinterland, they had all their shiny toys.. for a week or so. But this is IMHO normal if you are in combat. US troops looked very nice when landed in Normandy, but by Ardennes, look how some divisions looked like, tattered, much of the equipment lost or not working.. yet I doubt US had lack of heavy weapons, but replacements did not happen instant.

I stand that German production was more than enough. Planes, tanks.. thats why numbers kept increasing despite very heavy losses isnt it, how else, if there was lack of equipment? For example in late 1944 there were enough surplus Panthers to create some all-new Panther Brigades (which however didnt work well at all - the idea was to create modern "firefigter" units - but fresh units from scratch didnt have experience, and fared badly). Or for example SS Pz divisions like LSSAH, filled up before Normandy, lost nearly all equipment; filled up again for Ardennes, again lost near all equipment; filled up AGAIN for Balaton offensive, even extended into a Panzer Army, again lost all equipment. In 9 months the unit was complete reequipped 3 times, this doesnt sound like to me as lack of equipment. Again if you look at production numbers, it simply isnt case - Jentz has good figures for Panzern, for example.

Also looking at Milosh numbers of tanks, ironic it seems that in January 1945 German had the most Panzer and SPA ever - something like 13 000 in total on all fronts, more than twice and half than they had in 1941.. numbers kept steady increasing to wars end, so I have difficulty of believing a lack of heavy weapons. But maintaining these weapons become progressive more difficult. Fighting was much more intense, losses were constant, and transportation wrecked by both worsening of railway and fuel situation.

Overall looking at USSBS fuel graphs (consumption - production) it seems to me the real limit for German to field even more tanks was really fuel. Same reason, often mentioned (truly) as weakness of German army, weak motorization, has probably same reason. If you produce 100 fuel, and 100 unit of trucks, and current tanks and trucks already consume 98 unit of fuel, whats good for you if you pruduce 200 fuel and 200 trucks? They cant go anywhere without fuel supplies equally increased.. so probably the level of motorization in German army was maximum in relation to fuel availabilty. Just an observation.


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## Juha (Feb 20, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Here however things get a bit complicated, since LW was responsible for operating heavy Flak, in units that nominally under central GHQ command, in practice they could be often find permanent attached to division with important task.



Yes, it was usual that PzDiv had a Flak.Abt. semi-permanently attached, but not all of them had that all time when they were at front.



Tante Ju said:


> As for permanent lack of heavy weapons, it depends on how close you look at the picture. Big picture or microscoping.. I agree that typical for EF front division was not to have its Sollstaerke, actual Iststaerke was random array of weapons, usually well below Sollstaerke.. but I disagree you conclusion - it was a result of the heavy combat on the EF, in heavy combat, constant heavy losses you will never find a unit that matches the paper TOE .



IMHO not so, it was fairly normal after 41/42 winter that field arty batteries had only 3 guns, that 25%-50% less than in the field batteries of most other combatants had. 4.PzD for ex had most of 42 only one PzCoy worth of tanks while it wasn't constantly exposed to heavy fighting, those PzDivs fighting in South had got most of replacement tanks in Spring/early Summer 42 and continued to get most of replacement tanks to late 42. Only in early 43, after collapse of southern part of the front and Soviets advancing fast towards Kursk when 4th PzD was hastly sent to there it got one or two StuG. Abtailung(en) for attachment and 28 Marder SP A/T guns as reinforcements. Germany simply lacked permanent tank parks were one could get immediate replacements, compare what happened to 11th Armoured Div (UK) after first day of Goodwood, crews of knocked out tanks had went to rear to collect replacement tanks and drove them forward during the night. German and in lesser extent Soviet units tended to fight with fewer and fewer tanks until they were withrawn to rear for re-equiptment and rest just because they didn't have sufficient number of reserve equipment to keep up with attrition. This was just the reason why German PzDivs desperately tried to patch up their tanks locally. They had learned that if they sent their tank to rear for proper repairs the odds were they would not see it again or get a replacement either. There was too great risk that the repaired tank would be sent to another div which the GHQ thought needed replacements more desperately or to a new unit because Hitler thought that more units was better, no matter of their actual strength.



Tante Ju said:


> It was equally true for Russians.. they had severe manpower shortage by 1944, desperately filled by drafting re-liberated populace, mobilization of women etc..



I agree with that, Soviet manpower resources were not endless, in fact they had about twice the population of Germany in 1941.



Tante Ju said:


> I stand that German production was more than enough. Planes, tanks.. thats why numbers kept increasing despite very heavy losses isnt it, how else, if there was lack of equipment? For example in late 1944 there were enough surplus Panthers to create some all-new Panther Brigades (which however didnt work well at all - the idea was to create modern "firefigter" units - but fresh units from scratch didnt have experience, and fared badly). Or for example SS Pz divisions like LSSAH, filled up before Normandy, lost nearly all equipment; filled up again for Ardennes, again lost near all equipment; filled up AGAIN for Balaton offensive, even extended into a Panzer Army, again lost all equipment. In 9 months the unit was complete reequipped 3 times, this doesnt sound like to me as lack of equipment. Again if you look at production numbers, it simply isnt case - Jentz has good figures for Panzern, for example.
> 
> Also looking at Milosh numbers of tanks, ironic it seems that in January 1945 German had the most Panzer and SPA ever - something like 13 000 in total on all fronts, more than twice and half than they had in 1941.. numbers kept steady increasing to wars end, so I have difficulty of believing a lack of heavy weapons. But maintaining these weapons become progressive more difficult. Fighting was much more intense, losses were constant, and transportation wrecked by both worsening of railway and fuel situation
> 
> Overall looking at USSBS fuel graphs (consumption - production) it seems to me the real limit for German to field even more tanks was really fuel. Same reason, often mentioned (truly) as weakness of German army, weak motorization, has probably same reason. If you produce 100 fuel, and 100 unit of trucks, and current tanks and trucks already consume 98 unit of fuel, whats good for you if you pruduce 200 fuel and 200 trucks? They cant go anywhere without fuel supplies equally increased.. so probably the level of motorization in German army was maximum in relation to fuel availabilty. Just an observation.



Now the PzBrigs were created around PzAbt:en from existing PzDivs which had been sent to Germany to be converted to Panther Abt:en of those divs. Now the creation of those PzBigs meant that those PzDivs were left with only one Pz.Abt. equipped with PzIVs. IMHO that sort rob Paul so you can give to Peter only shows how desperatively short of tanks Germany was. You are right that in the absolute numbers the Panzer arm became stronger but TOEs became more and more unrealistic because units were constantly underequipped and so the proportion of the tail became bigger and bigger when compared to the fighting elements. That ws very uneconomical. In the end Germans decided that they could equip their Panzer divs with only one tank battalion and so born the TOE of 1945 PzD. That didn't mean that Germans tought that 1:4 was optimal relationship with tanks:infantry only that that was best they could try to achieve.

The scarity of fuel was a fact, but IMHO Germans didn't solve their problem in best way, fewer divs with fewer less important vehicles and with more firepower and tanks would have been IMHO better optio for resources available. The tendency of create new formations and re-create the destroyed ones when there wasn't enough equipment for the existing ones was very stupid. Hitler was the main culprit for this but not the only one, for ex. Guderian, the inspector of Panzertruppe, wanted to re-create the Pz formations lost in Stalingrad even if several existing PzDivs were badly underequipped.

Juha


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## Hoju2k (Feb 20, 2012)

Juha said:


> Now the PzBrigs were created around PzAbt:en from existing PzDivs which had been sent to Germany to be converted to Panther Abt:en of those divs. Now the creation of those PzBigs meant that those PzDivs were left with only one Pz.Abt. equipped with PzIVs. IMHO that sort rob Paul so you can give to Peter only shows how desperatively short of tanks Germany was.



That's incorrect, most Pz.Brigaden were created around newly formed Abteinlungen, and only the 111-113 Brigaden were assigned existing Pz.Abt., not in process to convert to Panther, but actually recently formed, and in no case the divisions that were supposed to receive those Abt. were left only with the Pz.IV Abt. 
They received other Panther Abt., I./Pz.Reg 24 for the 116.Pz, and I./Pz.Reg 6 for the Pz.Lehr, as their "original" Panther Abt. were not ready by the time they have to move to Normandy.


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## Juha (Feb 21, 2012)

Hoju2k said:


> That's incorrect, most Pz.Brigaden were created around newly formed Abteinlungen, and only the 111-113 Brigaden were assigned existing Pz.Abt.



I checked and yes You are right. Thanks for correction.



Hoju2k said:


> not in process to convert to Panther, but actually recently formed, and in no case the divisions that were supposed to receive those Abt. were left only with the Pz.IV Abt.
> They received other Panther Abt., I./Pz.Reg 24 for the 116.Pz, and I./Pz.Reg 6 for the Pz.Lehr, as their "original" Panther Abt. were not ready by the time they have to move to Normandy.



In this I disagree, only I./PzR 130, which was assigned to PzBrig 113, seems to be a new battalion.

I./PzR 16 was assigned to PzBrig 111. It was the former Pz.Abt 116, the Pz.Abt of the famous 16.Inf.Div.(mot) and originally it was created as I./PzR 1, created on 1 Oct 35, difficult to get older lineage for a panzer abt in WM. 

I./PzR 29was assigned to PzBrig 112, PzR 29 was created on 1 Oct 1940 and was assigned to 12. PzD on 10 Jan 1941 so the battalion wasn’t a new one. 12.PzD was sent from AG Nord to AG Mitte in late June 44 in an effort to try to avert the catastrophe looming there. It fought very well but surely missed its Panther Abt, it had only 35 PzIV(lg)s and 9 PzIII(lg)s under its control when it was committed to try to open an escape route to those units trying to break out from Bobruisk. And did it ever got its Panther battalion? 

When 116. PzD got I./PzR 24 that means that the 24. PzD didn’t got it. IIRC 24th never got its Panther battalion.

When PzD Lehr got I./PzR 6 that meant that 3.PzD had to fought its hard battles in the East without its Panther battalion during Summer and Autumn 44.

So it was still robbing Paul to give Peter.

Juha


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## Siegfried (Feb 21, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Wien flaktower, on of them is converted to storage of modern art. I think its all well, because its safe, and modern art is so ugly anyway its better if locked away.



The 8.8cm calibre was a common calibre and covered a multitude of guns. The most well known was the FLAK 37 8.8cm anti-aircraft gun. This gun was less powerfull than its US 90mm cunterpart or the British 3.7 inch 34 pounder. However it was also much lighter, had optics capabile of engaging ground targets and could also depress sufficiently to engage ground targets. It was mobile enough to travel with the troops as it was much lighter. The gun was of course of great use in dealing with difficult targets such as the Matilda or T-34 tank when the typical 5.0cm PAK guns were barely adaquete. However latter 7.5cm german AT guns could deal with the T-34 and Sherman almost as well and had higher mobillity and profile to boot.

The more sophisticated and heavier 10.5cm and 12.8cm guns featured automatic fuze setting mechanisms and auto-loaders. The FLAK 37 8.8cm simply hit the sweet spot even though its power against aircraft fell of after 20,000ft. (more than enough for defending against the medium and light bombers that would be attacking troops). The KWK 36 L56 of the Tiger 1 was essentially a different gun of about the same power. The 8.8cm FLAK 37 was to be replaced with the very much more powerfull 8.8cm FLAK 41 which could engage aircraft such as Oboe carrying mosquitos to 40,000ft or smash through 200mm of armour. It was much heavier than the FLAK 37 but still considerably lighter than its US and UK equivalents due to the use of clever engineering and techniques such as firing on the recuperation to keep vibration down. It featuered power loading and auto fuze setting. I had much lower profile than the FLAK 37 and was thus easier to hide and use as an AT gun. A few were deployed to Nth Africa however problems occured when steel cartridges replaced brass ones as they expanded an get caught at the seam of the multi piece barrel sleeve. They ended up being withdrawn to the Riech untill the gun could be re-engineered. The 10.5cm guns was less mobile and the 12.8cm gun less mobile still but their power was not necessary to protect troops as stratospheric high altutude attacks on troops would be excedingly rare.

Also appearing was the 8.8cm PAK 43 a powerfull purpose built AT gun of similar power to the FLAK 41 but of different design and manufacture. The KWK 43 L71 of the Tiger II was again a slightly differrent gun though I believe ammunition was compatible.

Clearly however a lot of munitions was spent on air defense that could better have been used to deal with Soviet tanks.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 21, 2012)

The last sentence wraps it up.


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## drgondog (Feb 21, 2012)

Siegrfried - that was a very nice summary. Thanks.


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## bluezanzibar (Feb 26, 2012)

This topic is well covered by a new addition to the excellent HyperWar site HyperWar: World War II on the World Wide Web. The article is "Strategy for Defeat The Luftwaffe 1933-1945" Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945


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## stona (Feb 26, 2012)

bluezanzibar said:


> This topic is well covered by a new addition to the excellent HyperWar site HyperWar: World War II on the World Wide Web. The article is "Strategy for Defeat The Luftwaffe 1933-1945" Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945



I refer the honourable gentleman to my post #16 on the second page of this thread which seems strangely prescient after all this typing.

It's good to see the book is available to read online.

Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Feb 26, 2012)

The author of such work presents the popular view that the Eastern Front was the decisive theater of WWII. As I have already pointed out, I can't agree with this. Even if Hitler defeated Russia, this would not necessarily meant the war would be won by him. Maybe the Allies would not won, but I also cannot see the Soviets in a much better position if Hitler had defeated Britain or made it sign peace.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 26, 2012)

"... the popular view that the Eastern Front was the decisive theater of WWII. As I have already pointed out, I can't agree with this."

So what are you saying, Jenesch? ..... that the Eastern Front was just a side show?

MM


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## Jenisch (Feb 26, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... the popular view that the Eastern Front was the decisive theater of WWII. As I have already pointed out, I can't agree with this."
> 
> So what are you saying, Jenesch? ..... that the Eastern Front was just a side show?
> 
> MM


 
No way Michael. I considerate both fronts equally important. 

Most historians considerate the Eastern Front decisive, and by decisive they want to mean that the West helped, but the Soviets didn't ultimately needed of their allies to defeat Hitler. This is certainly discussible, and I already presented arguments about this many times on this thread.


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## Jenisch (Feb 26, 2012)

To put in a better perspective what I want to mean, let's imagine two soldiers: Smith and Ivan. They have a task of defend a perpendicular corridor were enemies can attack from both sides, each defending a side. When the enemy attacks, Ivan starts to receive more enemies than Smith but his comrade ocasionally eliminates an enemy that would kill him if he was alone. Fortunately they finish their mission without enjuries, and despite the fact that Ivan eliminated more enemies, he certainly would not claim he was "more important". On the contrary, he could have even say something like this historical comrade said:

_“ Without American production the United Nations could never have won the war.”

— Joseph Stalin during a dinner at the Tehran Conference, 1943_

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_the_United_States_during_World_War_II

Pretty obvious that was a team work. I just don't understand how some people can accept a team work in any other situation but not in the efforts from the Allies in WWII. They have to find someone that was "more important" to get the credit of saving the others. And of course that I already give the answer from this when posted a quote from Stalin: Cold War. Pure and simple politics are behind all this, being the US, Russia, the UK or any other country.


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## bluezanzibar (Feb 27, 2012)

stona said:


> I refer the honourable gentleman to my post #16 on the second page of this thread which seems strangely prescient after all this typing.
> 
> It's good to see the book is available to read online.
> 
> ...



My apologies for missing your post.

It's a great book and many thanks to DARPA and Mr Berners-Lee or I would almost certainly never have read it.

I was astonished to see in the graphs of (average monthly by) half year aircraft production that it wasn't until approximately the start of 1943 that German aircraft production roughly matched even that of Britain alone. Given that the truly awesome production capacity of the US (and also Russia) was just beginning to ramp up it would seem that by then the war was already lost for the Luftwaffe.


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## stona (Feb 27, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> The author of such work presents the popular view that the Eastern Front was the decisive theater of WWII.



Which author,Williamson Murray? I'm not sure how much of the book is available online but that is not his conclusion at all.The book concentrates on the defeat of the Luftwaffe but this self evidently links to the broader defeat of the Third Reich.
Here is a paragraph from his conclusions.

"When one strips aside the layers of myth and legend from those dark days over Europe when "strategic" bombing ground Germany's cities into dust, there is no doubt that airpower played a decisive role in the winning or losing of the war. But that decisive role was no greater than the victory in the Atlantic that allowed America to bring its industrial and military power to bear or the victories of the Red Army on the eastern front that slowly but surely wore away the Wehrmacht's fighting edge. Although the air war was only a part of an enormous conflict that swept over Europe, it did prove decisive in helping the Allies achieve victory since it played an indispensable role, without which the Anglo-American lodgment on the continent and the final defeat of the Third Reich is inconceivable."

I think you misrepresent him by suggesting that he suggests that the Eastern front was the decisive theatre. They were all interlinked in a global conflict and NO one theatre was decisive. 

Cheers
Steve


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## Siegfried (Feb 27, 2012)

bluezanzibar said:


> My apologies for missing your post.
> 
> It's a great book and many thanks to DARPA and Mr Berners-Lee or I would almost certainly never have read it.
> 
> I was astonished to see in the graphs of (average monthly by) half year aircraft production that it wasn't until approximately the start of 1943 that German aircraft production roughly matched even that of Britain alone. Given that the truly awesome production capacity of the US (and also Russia) was just beginning to ramp up it would seem that by then the war was already lost for the Luftwaffe.



Adam Tooze an economist who has studied the Reich, who I however take with a grain of salt, has made contributions to the field. He notes that during the period before 1942, contrary to previous claims that they were in a peacetime mode designed to maintain Nazi popularity, that the Germans were in fact making substantial investments in munitions, were on a war economy footing. However the investment and labour was going into building the production facilites (factories, machine tools, coal to oil). After the facilities had been made the investment switched to actual production. 

Milch found that he could barely squeeze out 1000 aircraft per year in 1937 one reason he ordered thousands of Ju 52 transports as primitive bombers. The industrial capacity of Britain especially with her colonies was substantially greater, a lot of German labour and GDP were concentrated in the agricultural sector (80% of German food consumption was autonomous compared to less than 50% of Britains). Britain had a more 'modern' style economy while the Germans were very concerned by being Blockaded and obtaining access to markets for their goods so that they could import tried to at least limit their need for food imports. The claim that German women were not mobilised into the workforce is also incorrect as they simply remained as agricultural workers, often on family farms, while men went of war. Someone has to milk Frieda the cow, collect eggs and manage the farms affairs. Of course these farms were much smaller than US farms and thus less efficient as mechanisation was less amortisable and colder European growing seasons precluded multiple yearly crops.

Much of this information was known and openly available, unfortunatly many Historians became biased prone to polemically condemn the Nazi ideology and personalities and sought ways to show their corruption or incompetance. The Nazis certainly had some issues in these areas I don't deny but they are overstated. He makes other points, a point made by the German economics minister Hjalmar Schacht long ago, that the German economy could not support this level of munitions expansion. Hey, the Germans were already telling us but no one wanted to listen.

There was a substantial organised program to develop mass production; the Ju 88 being an example that looks impressive but looks pitifull when compared to B-24 production. It must be remembered that much of the German economy then as now is based on niche markets "We make the thing that makes the thing that goes inside the thing" is a statement of today that is applicable to pre war germany. Mass prodution was not as evolved despite the substantial German engineering capabillity and it takes a while to build up. Timming meant they never really got the full fruits of this effort. For instance the Ju 288 4 wing spars were to be pressed out in a single opperation, optimally tapered with even the bolts for attachment integral to the spars but this aircraft but this ambitious aircraft failed for political and or technical delays.


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## stona (Feb 27, 2012)

There was a lot of slack in the German industrial economy in the early years of the war. It can't be said to have been on a wartime footing comparable to say the U.K. This was due to the short war doctrine of the nazi leadership.
I had an Aunt who went from serving in a shop (The Coop if I remember correctly) to working a twelve hour shift sewing fabric onto control surfaces at Castle Bromwich in 1941. My cousin still lives in Sutton Coldfield,the other side of the modern M6.
This under mobilisation of German industry is the principal reason that Speer was able to achieve the results he did in the mid/late war period.
The USSBS noted.

"After the defeat at Moscow early in 1942, armament production increased rapidly. However, such increase was more the result of improvements in industrial efficiency than of general economic mobilization. Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards."

Cheers
Steve


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 27, 2012)

".... The claim that German women were not mobilised into the workforce is also incorrect ...."

Tooze also makes the important point that more German women were _already_ in the workforce (than UK women) prior to the start of WW2. And that the standard of living (pre WW2) in the UK was higher than in Germany.

Jenisch you may disagree with this, but history, especially recent history, is in a state of 'normalization' -approaching (but never quite reaching) normalization. This is particularly true in the case of the USSR where when the wall came down and the ice melted, information began to flow more and more freely. Naturally this is a good thing but it creates 'niches' for historians to jump into and make their mark by presenting 'old' history in the 'new' light of uncovered information.

Take your example of Smith and Ivan. You could say - for example - that the USSR made the greatest contribution in WW2 because more Ivans died than Smiths. You could also - however - *put a dollar value* ($$$ ) on the overall contribution of the Smith effort and the Ivan effort. If you used this as your measuring stick, you might reach a different conclusion.

The simple fact is that in WW2 ( as is the case today), all countries and all cultures/ideologies do NOT value human life the same.

So - how do you want to measure war effort "contribution"? In terms of war-end *gains*, the USSR and USA were the winners. In terms of war-end *losses*, the UK was the biggest loser (compounding its WW1 losses).

Chairs,

MM


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## Jenisch (Feb 27, 2012)

stona said:


> Which author,Williamson Murray? I'm not sure how much of the book is available online but that is not his conclusion at all.The book concentrates on the defeat of the Luftwaffe but this self evidently links to the broader defeat of the Third Reich.
> Here is a paragraph from his conclusions.
> 
> "When one strips aside the layers of myth and legend from those dark days over Europe when "strategic" bombing ground Germany's cities into dust, there is no doubt that airpower played a decisive role in the winning or losing of the war. But that decisive role was no greater than the victory in the Atlantic that allowed America to bring its industrial and military power to bear or the victories of the Red Army on the eastern front that slowly but surely wore away the Wehrmacht's fighting edge. Although the air war was only a part of an enormous conflict that swept over Europe, it did prove decisive in helping the Allies achieve victory since it played an indispensable role, without which the Anglo-American lodgment on the continent and the final defeat of the Third Reich is inconceivable."
> ...



_CHAPTER III 
THE TURN TO RUSSIA 

*The decisive campaign of the Second World War* was the German invasion of Russia in 1941. The defeat of that effort reflected the failure of German leaders to prepare the economic and productive capacity of the Reich and western Europe for war on a continental rather than a western European scale. Thus, in a certain sense, the production and industrial decisions made by the German leadership in the summer of 1940 represented a decisive turning point in World War II. In effect, Germany's leadership had sealed her fate before the campaign opened. _

And yes, the author also posted what you said stona. The problem I notice of this is that many historians apparently make an incorrect use of the word "decisive". Call the Soviet participation decisive means the Soviets that really defeated Hitler, and they would do this regardless of their Allies. The Brazilian troops send to Italy certainly played a secondary participation, since they helped, but only arrived and fought when the Allies certainly already decisively  defeated Hitler. The Western Allies in WWII, not necessarily. 

I give the credit of the Russians for conduct most of the ground combat. But call their participation decisive or that they certainly didn't need their Allies is a definative untrue.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 27, 2012)

"... In effect, Germany's leadership had sealed her fate before the campaign opened[/I]." 

Exactly.

MM


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## Jenisch (Feb 27, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... In effect, Germany's leadership had sealed her fate before the campaign opened[/I]."
> 
> Exactly.
> 
> MM


 
Many people say this about the Axis in WWII, but I'm not so certain. The Allies in France in 1940, the Germans in Stalingrad and Kursk, the Japanese in Midway, etc, it was all strategical errors from them or the Intelligence from the enemy behind such defeats. No doubt, if they were more prepared the chances of success would be higher, but this don't change the fact that the war was not certainly won since the start only by industrial superiority or logistical tables like is frequentely pointed out.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 27, 2012)

There were doctoral faults deeply embeded in the Nazi system that set the stage for defeat, they doomed themselves.

Their policies on the Jews ensured that they lost the foremost nuclear physicist, ensuring they'd never developed the greatest force multipier of all, the atom bomb
.
Their policies on the treatment of people other than what they considered of Germanic blood, lost them many potential allies. A classic example of making enemies faster than you can kill them. That resulted in tieing down many assets that would have been useful on the fronts.

Their whole industrial base was hampered by a system of favortism and cronyism, that led to much dupilcation of effort and wasted effort on projects that had no chance of effecting the war being fought. Such a mess even Speer could only correct some of it's problems.

And then of course their's Adolf himself in charge.


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## Siegfried (Feb 27, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> There were doctoral faults deeply embeded in the Nazi system that set the stage for defeat, they doomed themselves.
> 
> Their policies on the Jews ensured that they lost the foremost nuclear physicist, ensuring they'd never developed the greatest force multipier of all, the atom bomb
> .
> ...




This is the usual Hollywood distortion of history. It avoids subtelty and objectivity. These people could keep whineing longer than a J-79 connected to an oil refinery.

Nazi Germany maintained allies in the form of Hungary, Rommania, Bulgaria, Italy with friendly relations with Turkey, Spain, Portugual, Argentina. Within the nascient Arab states and independance movements they also had friendly relations. Nazi Germany had co-opperation agreements and for instance brought Bulgarian students to Germany for education. A victorious Reich certainly would have had allies and friendly nations.

Within a few months of opperation Barbarossa Hitler is signing orders to release Ukranian POWs. Hitler is even quoted in table talk advocating the introduction of Ukrainian blood/women into the race to improve the strain (table talk page 696). Faced with the reality of contact with other races and cultures the Nazis threw the book away and started again. There were even black (half black half white) officers in the Whermacht, results of marriages between Germans who had lived in Africa.

Nazi racial ideology is a lot more flexible, reasonable than the hyped version of history would have us believe. That's why it enroled a substantial portion of the world.

As far as the atomic bomb goes: the Germans lacked the resources to complete a bomb by 1945, It has nothing to do with "Exiled Jeiwsh Scientists" in fact the USA lacked the resources to comple a bomb by the end of the european war. Having a synchotron was more imporatant than any supposedly superior exiled Jewish scientist. A German A bomb would have been ready by early 1947 given their virtual success in achieving criticality in late 1944., probably mid 1946 had there been no bombing campaign. They kept their research at an R+D level rather than precieding to industrilisation in order to find more efficient ways of achieving enrichment etc and decided to go for a reactor as a stepping stone. It's possible they would have bypassed gaseous diffusion and caulutrons entirely.

The B8 Hairgerloch critical reactor, which proved reactor dimensioning, could certainly have been expected to have been conducted a year earliier given the Heavy water and Uraniun they need and its slightly enlarged succesor variant (50% volumetrical) go critical had the researchers not have been forced to move from their city institutes or have loss so much equipment from bombing.


You might also cite what the projects were "that led to much dupilcation of effort and wasted effort on projects that had no chance of effecting the war being fought." and how that was worse than the allies.


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## parsifal (Feb 27, 2012)

All these comments about Germany being doomed from the start I dont agree with. In 1939 the Germans held most of the advantages, the alliers had virtully none. Victory was never a "slam dunk". What destroyed the Nazis was a mixture of their own mismanagement (I am not completely dioscounting that claim, just that its an incomplete explanation), coupled with superior allied efforts and organization. All of the allied nations were geared this way, but i will use the british because they were the moral heart of the allied effort. without them, the war would have ended in June 1940. 

Starting with the pre-war preparations, Britains effort was much more about getting the production lines set up for the "big push" once the war started. Their pilot training schemes didnt happen just by accident. The German efforts were much more "traditional"....essentially "hand crafted" pilots. Good quality, well trained, but too few to win the battle. Britain set up to churn aircrew out at a phenomenal rate....mass produced "woolworth" pilots that in the end learned the hard way, and eventually bested their opponents both qualitatively and quantitatively. same basic pattern for military production. the germans, with their mania for size and technology built some of the most advanced military machines for war, but the cost, complexity and reliabiltity of many of these items left much to be desired. There are reasons why a country like Russia, with a prewar industry about 70% that of prewar germany (and then also losing about 30% of its prewar capacity to German occupation) could nevertheless outproduce the germans by factors of 2, 3, 4 to 1. 

The Axis never managed their foreaign relations in anything like a competent manner. They basically were in it to screw everyone, in particuloar their "allies" for all they could. They failed to appreciate the importance of alliances.....the case in point being the attack on the russians. by contrast. britains sole aim from 1940 was the formation of a collective alliance of anyone who would oppose the Germans. The British were highly successful in that. this was not just a case of the world having an aversion to the Nazis (though that helped). Every country was in some way or another employed to containn or confront the Nazis, and the british did that by a mixture of different approaches, but always aware of the frailties and strengths of the country they were dealing with. The British were responsible for the formation and holding together of the grand alliance . but even less significant countries, like Spain, or Brazil, were either led to joining the war effort, or constrianed from assisting too much the efforts of the Nazis. As the war progressed the nazis found themselves, cut off, isolated and starved out. this was as much about the diplomacy undertaken by the allies (in this case led by the British) as it was in the application of the blockade.

In the end the allied effort was the classic application of seapower over a continentally focussed land power. Even the Russian effort whilst so obviously focussed on the land was in part dependant on the continued control of the oceans. Without that control, the Russians could not have done what they did. The Germans did mount a serious challenge to allied control and use of the oceans, but with American industrial power on board, this eventually proved a futile effort.

But to try and argue that all of this was written into the stars somehow, that things would have happened as they did "anyway" is a quintessntially american view of how the war was won. It presupposes that nothing happened until December 7 1941, and is to short change the British of their greatest victory....the formation and holding topgether of a grand alliance that was anything but a "foregone conclusion".


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## Jenisch (Feb 27, 2012)

As I already stated, certainly many factors helped the Nazi defeat, but this don't change the fact that the industrial advantage only was not synonymous of vitory. The decisive battles were close encounters were the man in command that decided their outcomes.


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## stona (Feb 27, 2012)

I make this post as an ex chemist. 
The Germans were years away from a workable atomic weapon in 1945. Heisenberg had made some very serious mistakes which in the absence of a working group to provide qualified peer review of his work had gone uncorrected. The departure of many scientists,the very people capable of such review (Hahn,Strassmann,Frisch,indirectly Szilard to name a few and of course Einstein himself) and their inability to share research with the international community as a result of the idiotic nazi racial laws must have had an effect on this.
No wonder the German atomic scientists were astonished when they heard that the Americans had not only built a working device but also dropped it from an aeroplane.
The reactor mentioned above is one of the first steps on a long and arduous journey and is a long,long way from an atomic bomb. Let's get this into perspective. The U.S was running the Manhattan project and the Germans were running a small reactor with a multiplication factor of less than seven,using heavy water as a moderator, in the cellar of a pub. It was a very picturesque setting unlike Los Alamos and they didn't have a couple of billion dollars to spend. Heisenberg and Diebner never really came close to building a critical reactor and were even further away from building a weapon. I've seen their attempts described by other physicists as "feeble".
Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Feb 27, 2012)

Parsifal, I learned about the effects with the blockade with you, and have to say that it's a part of WWII history that few people know about. Without the blockade and Anglo-American naval power, Festunga Europe would be turned into a industrial boost for Hitler's war machine that probably would be very difficult for Stalin contain, not to mention that the Lend-Lease would hardly be present as well.

Here there's a very interesting article about the blockade: Blockade of Germany (1939


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## tomo pauk (Feb 27, 2012)

Parsifal's post wraps it up.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 27, 2012)

"... In 1939 the Germans held most of the advantages, the allies had virtually none. Victory was never a "slam dunk".

No one is claiming a slam dunk, Parsifal, .... but to state: "the allies had virtually none" is to willfully ignore the fact that Germany and Germans were saddled (politically, economically and militarily) with a leader and a political party that was DELUSIONAL and RACIST. Such a country - Germany, under the Nazis - faced with wealthier, more democratic and less avaricious opponents was doomed to failure from the outset. Germans opted to misread their own history as a panacea for their 1918 woes - instead of recognizing their plight and addressing it in an empirical fashion.

MM


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## pbfoot (Feb 27, 2012)

parsifal said:


> All of the allied nations were geared this way, but i will use the british because they were the moral heart of the allied effort. without them, the war would have ended in June 1940.


They lucked out , it was self induced ineptness, no welded armour because the riveteers threatened job action and god knows you couldn't have that . The UK's ambassador to the US prefffered the folks in Palm Beach over the government of the US , the major saviour of the UK was FDR pushing through Lend Lease other then that the UK was broke It was a close run thing and FDR instead of Churchill should be considered the saviour of the UK.Were you aware that the US policy was that anyone buying US goods who owed money to the US from the 1st war was to pay COD the last money the UK had was picked up by the USS Louisville in Simonstown SA in Dec 1940 . They then began to sell off of overseas assets to pay for the war . 
Most of this is taken from a book called Blood Tears and Folly by Len Deighton


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## Jenisch (Feb 27, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... with a leader and a political party that was DELUSIONAL and RACIST.


 
Stalin's paranoid was not much different in my view, and this includes the great purge in the military of the USSR. And while one can praise the military actions from the Soviets, they must be analyzed in the context of the Allied effort, with effects against the Germans such as the blockade. If Stalin was alone against Hitler without the blockade and the war with the West itself, he would enter in a scenario quiet similar to the one Hitler was in my view. With of course the difference that he and his "insane" actions would literally burry his country.

In short: Hiler was an "evil" leader, but certainly not the only one. As Siegrified pointed out, Hitler had foreign relations with many peoples despite the Holocaust. While Stalin, well, we know what he did in Ukranie in 32-33 and some minorities in the USSR. He was a mass murder, and the Stalinists trying to use the excuse he was not racist is an absurd. The man didn't liked from certain peoples, and wanted to finish with them or deport them. Hitler was practically the same.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 27, 2012)

I was not saying the Allies couldn't help but win, I'm saying the Nazis had problems they COULDN'T correct , they didn't see them as faults, they didn't want to correct them .


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## Jenisch (Feb 27, 2012)

Ok.

But what do you think of what Stalin did? Yes, the Soviets won, but at which cost? The Russian population still suffers with low population, specially of males because of his actions. The purge of the Soviet military in a period of world crises was not worse than an action from Hitler because the Soviets managed to recover later.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 27, 2012)

"... Hitler was an "evil" leader, but certainly not the only one..."

Stalin was in charge of a rich country - in terms of resources; a vast country - in terms of space; and his country had launched what many people (worldwide) believed was a bold new social experiment. 

The two men were holding very different 'hands' at this card table. After Kristalnacht everyone knew where the Nazis where heading. After the Ukraine starvation progrom, most media in the west made excuses for Stalin and the Soviet leadership.

There is no comparison between the two men -- other than the evil megalomania that you referred to, Jenisch.

MM

[to follow up post, Jenisch]

".... The Russian population still suffers with low population, specially of males because of his actions."

Russia has a declining Caucasian population, not because of Stalin, his purges or the war. Russian males have a declining life expectancy because of very destructive life style choices .... end of story.


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## Tante Ju (Feb 28, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The British were responsible for the formation and holding together of the grand alliance.



Not really. Neither the US or the USSR were 'talked into war' by skilled British diplomats, FDR and Stalin weren't infants in politics who need a guiding hand. They had their own strategic plans which happened to coincide. Stalin wanted to export communism, and fill the vacuum in Eastern europe left after the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Just like he wasn't talked into forming a allience of convenience with Hitler in 1939, when it suited his goals, he didn't need Churchill's nonsense who did not befriend the USSR, but hostiled it until it entered the war. Similarly, FDR's mind was on hauling the US economy out of the great depression and secondly, which has been an ambition of US presidents in the last 50 years establishing the US as the dominant power of the 'Western Hemisphere' in weight of US industrial power (a situation not unlike that of the 2nd Reich under the Kaiser I must add), and taking control of sea trade and securing markets for the US industry. A newly emerging industrial power challanged the old colonial powers.

The British were hoping that the US will join (US intentions to do so were quite clear to anyone) and save their ass. But it was the US who named the price for that - we save your ass, in exchange you hand over your trading position and markets. Just read the Atlantic Charter. Britain wasn't in the position to lead or set the conditions of this 'grand alliance'.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 28, 2012)

"... Britain wasn't in the position to lead or set the conditions of this 'grand alliance'."

Economically speaking, Tante Ju, you're quite right of course ... but in terms of MORAL LEADERSHIP ... quite another story. Britain (and their CW partners), morally speaking, "saved their own ass" -- as you put it so colorfully. 

Is that a distinction that might occur to you ...  ...? 

MM
Proud Canadian


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## Tante Ju (Feb 28, 2012)

I am not sure what you refer to here..?


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 28, 2012)

".... I am not sure what you refer to here..?"

Oh well - there are dictionaries, Tante Ju. You could look up "Moral" and " Leadership" for a start.

MM


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## Hoju2k (Feb 28, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Not really. Neither the US or the USSR were 'talked into war' by skilled British diplomats, FDR and Stalin weren't infants in politics who need a guiding hand. They had their own strategic plans which happened to coincide. Stalin wanted to export communism, and fill the vacuum in Eastern europe left after the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Just like he wasn't talked into forming a allience of convenience with Hitler in 1939, when it suited his goals, he didn't need Churchill's nonsense who did not befriend the USSR, but hostiled it until it entered the war. Similarly, FDR's mind was on hauling the US economy out of the great depression and secondly, which has been an ambition of US presidents in the last 50 years establishing the US as the dominant power of the 'Western Hemisphere' in weight of US industrial power (a situation not unlike that of the 2nd Reich under the Kaiser I must add), and taking control of sea trade and securing markets for the US industry. A newly emerging industrial power challanged the old colonial powers.
> 
> The British were hoping that the US will join (US intentions to do so were quite clear to anyone) and save their ass. But it was the US who named the price for that - we save your ass, in exchange you hand over your trading position and markets. Just read the Atlantic Charter. Britain wasn't in the position to lead or set the conditions of this 'grand alliance'.



Good post. Also, its always easier to find allied for keeping the Statu quo, than for the contrary. I have some extra comments to the amazing (not a compliment) Parsifal's post:



> All these comments about Germany being doomed from the start I dont agree with. In 1939 the Germans held most of the advantages, the alliers had virtully none.



Let's see: Germany found itself in war with two great powers (UK and France), that everyone knew would be eventually supported by the US, her only Ally choose to not get involved (Italy), and her economy was totally dependant on the good will of the Soviets, that, they were only waiting their chance to stab Germany in the back. That's not holding most advantages, that was an almost hopeless situation.



> Their pilot training schemes didnt happen just by accident. The German efforts were much more "traditional"....essentially "hand crafted" pilots. Good quality, well trained, but too few to win the battle. Britain set up to churn aircrew out at a phenomenal rate....mass produced "woolworth" pilots that in the end learned the hard way, and eventually bested their opponents both qualitatively and quantitatively.



I would like to see some evidence on this. About the part of "eventually bested", when did that happen?? Not in 1939, not in 1940, not in 41-42...and the VVS and USAAF did more than the RAF to accomplish the defeat of the LW.



> the germans, with their mania for size and technology built some of the most advanced military machines for war, but the cost, complexity and reliabiltity of many of these items left much to be desired. There are reasons why a country like Russia, with a prewar industry about 70% that of prewar germany (and then also losing about 30% of its prewar capacity to German occupation) could nevertheless outproduce the germans by factors of 2, 3, 4 to 1.



Absurd. And the USSR (never mind Russia) did not  outproduce Germany during the war.


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## parsifal (Feb 29, 2012)

> Not really. Neither the US or the USSR were 'talked into war' by skilled British diplomats, FDR and Stalin weren't infants in politics who need a guiding hand.


T

The russians and the US were each different cases, each with vastly different starting positions, and each with vastly differnt agendas. In the case of the Russians, they entered the war as allies of the germans, with close economic ties, and a desire on the part of the Russians to co-operate in the destruction of the western powers. it was only after the german betrayal of the the Russians that the Russians could be approached by Allies. At least until the latter part of 1943, the various negotiations undertaken by the allies with the russians were overwhelmingly conducted by the British. The ofocial alliance documents, signed in June 1942, between the allies and the Russians were drawn up by mostly British diplomats, and the terms negotiated by British politicians. The british in that first six months kept the US allies fully informed of developments, but it was not the US that drove these negotiations. Basically, they didnt know how to. 

Moreover, at least until 1944, the main re-supply route remained the arctic convoy route, followed by the Persian route. Both these routes were opened up, guarded and maintained by British efforts. in the case of the Arctic route, it was British warships, and by far in the majority british registered merchant ships until 1944 that provided the transport. In the case of the Persian route, it was again British controlled rolling stock, taken mostly from India, British engineers, British military forces (along with some Russian forces) , that took over Persia and opened up that supply route. Later, the Americans did provide substantial numbers of Hevy prime movers and engineers. It was also the Americans that opened up the alaskan route , but both these efforts came much later.

Similalry, the initial aid provided by the allies to the Russians were taken from British controlled stocks. There were seven major re-supply convoys undertaken in 1941. None of these were supported or carried US equipment (ther were items of lend Lease equipment, but these were drawn from British controlled stocks. US aid did not really begin to kick in all that much until 1942, and did not take a dominant position until 1944. So in both a diplomaic and material sense the Russian/Allied alliance was formed and mainained by the british for a very long time. 






> They had their own strategic plans which happened to coincide.



This is about as far from the truth as can be got. the Russians were in alliance with the germans. They were interested in European domnination and were playing a pretty active role in achieving that, short of active involvement. In terms of military hardware the Russians were the most heavily armed nation on earth. Stalinist foreign policy was expansionist and aggresive. 

The US at the beginning of the war was essentially intraspective (inward looking) with only a passing interest in foreign relations. Their military was almost totally unprepared for war, and the country remained essentially pacifist and antiwar. Two men alsmost single handedly turned that situation around.....FDR and Churchill, but that took time, and the initiative for rearming and reassessment of the American position came from British goading not from within. The Grand Alliance, which you are so quick to dismiss did exist, and its stearing authority was controlled by an organization called the Joint Chiefs (a british initiative) which remained under British dominatioon until well into 1943. Wartime political directions also remained under british domination, with the Americans tagging along for the ride until well after the casablanca conference of mid 1943. The formation of the Atlantic Charter (the foundation of the UN, and primary objective in wartime foreign relation for the allies) was a British initiative. The "Europe First" doctrine was insisted upon by the british and agreed to by the Americans, doctrines such as "Pont Blank" the bomber offensive and many other critical foreign policy and military planning inititives were all dictated to by the british. Not that the Americans were unwilling...they were more than willing....they wanted the brits to help them learn. In terms of exchange of military tech, the Brits selflessly gave nearly all their secrets to the Americans under tizard and others. Sure there was self interst at work here, but the moral leadership (I know, you have already acknowledged to Michael you dont understand the concept of morals, but I can assure you existed at least in the Allied camp) in all the key areas of the Allied war effort remained a British dominated area until well into 1943. It was because of this and the reluctance of the british in 1942-3 to the opening of a second front that led to the abandonment of the round Up strategy ( the promised cross channel attack in 1942) that led to its abandonment. Despite the obvious huge production and manpower potentia of the Americans, throughout 1942 their ability in Europe to project remained severely limited. numbers of Fighter squadrons could be just about counted on one hand....the first bombing missions of about squadron size were not undertaken until July, in minscule proportionsd. By that stage the british had already commenced 1000 bomber raids over Germany and were gradually fighting for and winning air superiority over france (though you dispute this, with as usual no supporting evidence and without the slightest understanding of what the term "air superiority" actually means). At the torch landings, the initial US land committment was just less than a Corps, whilst the british committed the equivalent of an army, with a further army engaging the Germans from the east, and a further two armies ready in Britain for rapid action if necessary (one Canadian) 



> Just like he wasn't talked into forming a allience of convenience with Hitler in 1939, when it suited his goals, he didn't need Churchill's nonsense who did not befriend the USSR, but hostiled it until it entered the war.




Wrong. Stalin did enter an alliance with the germans in 1939. It was called a nonagression pact, but it went much further than that. The Russians actively assisted in military operations with the Germans in destroying Poland. if thats not a military alliance I will be a monkeys uncle. And Stalin was fooled by the germans. He actively sought military alliance with the Germans and made the cardinal error of trusting them. Which seamlessly explains Churchilss hostility toward them. Not that Churchill needed much of a modus operandi to justify his hostility. He saw Stalin for what he was, but given the closeness of the Soviets to the germans, and the fact that the british were reading that diplomatic traffic in its entirety, ther is little wonder why the British and Churchill in particular were hostile to the russians. Despit the russian duplicity with the enemy, the british made repeated attempts to warn the Russians about what was coming. The Soviets chose to ignore those warnings, besotted by Hitlers lies and their own ambition. 



> Similarly, FDR's mind was on hauling the US economy out of the great depression and secondly, which has been an ambition of US presidents in the last 50 years establishing the US as the dominant power of the 'Western Hemisphere' in weight of US industrial power (a situation not unlike that of the 2nd Reich under the Kaiser I must add), and taking control of sea trade and securing markets for the US industry. A newly emerging industrial power challanged the old colonial powers.



Rubbish, mostly. The US was completely disinterested in European dominance or colonialism. They advocated a rather naive policy of free trade and open door access to markets. The Amnericans had no interest in European wars or domination or foreign control. Thats was directly the reason they were prepring for war against the closed door minded Japanese.

The US did not engineer their entry into WWII on the basis that they needed the economic stimulus or were recovering from the depressiuon. The US was still recovering from the depression, but it is absolute poppycock to argue that the US prepared for war because they needed to stimulate their economy. The US drift to war pre-1941 was the product of active efforts by Churchill and FDR to contain Nazi aggression. It was fanned by the German use of unrestricted mercantile attacks on neutral shipping in the pan-American neutrality zone. this was essentially a repeat of German sea behaviour of 1917. 



> The British were hoping that the US will join (US intentions to do so were quite clear to anyone) and save their ass. But it was the US who named the price for that - we save your ass, in exchange you hand over your trading position and markets. Just read the Atlantic Charter. Britain wasn't in the position to lead or set the conditions of this 'grand alliance'


. 

Again rubbish. i have read the Atlantic charter and it says nothing of the sort you are clainming. In the finish the Brits became the junior partner in the miltary alliance. in the finish the USA came to dominate the politics of the west and its economy, but this was not the reason for its entry into the war, nor was the british playing second fiddle to the American diplometically or militarily in 1941-2. It was the other way around in fact


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

Hoju2k said:


> and the VVS and USAAF did more than the RAF to accomplish the defeat of the LW.



Ah, that's an unfair judgment in my view. If not for the RAF (and overall British) resistance, perhaps the US and the USSR would not have a Luftwaffe to defeat, but rather to be defeated. This was specially the case of the Russians.



> Absurd. And the USSR (never mind Russia) did not  outproduce Germany during the war.


 
Of course it did for most  of the war, check in any industrial table. Only in 1944 Germany was capable of match the Soviet production in key areas such as armored vehicles and aircraft production.


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## Elmas (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Of course it did for most  of the war, check in any industrial table. Only in 1944 Germany was capable of match the Soviet production in key areas such as armored vehicles and aircraft production.



But more than 1/3 of the everyday calories of a Red Army soldier was produced in the Midwest.....
No calories, no war.......


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

Elmas said:


> But more than 1/3 of the everyday calories of a Red Army soldier was produced in the Midwest.....
> No calories, no war.......



I'm including the Lend-Lease on this. 

If you want to considerate the Soviet capability without the West with the war starting like historically, I'm probably the strongest advocate here that Stalin would be in a serious situation.


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## Hop (Feb 29, 2012)

> About the part of "eventually bested", when did that happen?? Not in 1939, not in 1940, not in 41-42...and the VVS and USAAF did more than the RAF to accomplish the defeat of the LW.



That's an odd claim to make. The RAF probably destroyed more Luftwaffe aircraft than the USAAF and RAF victories early in the war meant losses of higher quality German pilots. Oh, and those early RAF victories came at a more critical time in the war, too.


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## drgondog (Feb 29, 2012)

Hop - a.) what are your figures for RAF total destroyed, and b.) are you including aircraft destroyed on the ground or even considering aircraft lost in factories, assembly plants or Repair depots?


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## drgondog (Feb 29, 2012)

Hoju2k said:


> Let's see: Germany found itself in war with two great powers (UK and France), that everyone knew would be eventually supported by the US, her only Ally choose to not get involved (Italy), and her economy was totally dependant on the good will of the Soviets, that, they were only waiting their chance to stab Germany in the back. That's not holding most advantages, that was an almost hopeless situation.



Hmmm, if you study American politics and Congress make up in 1940-41 you will see clearly that FDR was NOT going to be successful in expanding Lend Lease nor was he going to lead America into war. Only the Japanese succeeded where his leadership failed. The isolationist mood was far too strong in the US. 

As to "Germany finding itself" at war? Did Germany just kind of 'stumble' into conflict or in fact move boldly because they believed they would prevail?


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## pbfoot (Feb 29, 2012)

Who paid for the lend lease goods that went to Russia it certainly was not the UK , as they were out of money , they were flat broke as of Dec 1940 . The aircraft supplied to the USSR were for the most part delivered by the North West Staging route which was supplied by the Alaska Highway . The Alaska Highway was paid for by the US and was the second most costly project of WW2 after the Manhattan Project . The only thing that prevented the UK from being overrun was the English Channel not the RAF.


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## stona (Feb 29, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> The only thing that prevented the UK from being overrun was the English Channel not the RAF.



So if the RAF had been committed to France and destroyed there the UK would still have survived?
I think not.
Steve


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## pbfoot (Feb 29, 2012)

stona said:


> So if the RAF had been committed to France and destroyed there the UK would still have survived?
> I think not.
> Steve


I do believe so


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> The only thing that prevented the UK from being overrun was the English Channel not the RAF.


 
And the only thing that prevented the Soviets from defeat in 1941 was their vast territory.


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## Elmas (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> And the only thing that prevented the Soviets from defeat in 1941 was their vast territory.



Not far from the Channel there were some pieces of rusty scrap iron that the Britons insisted to call the Home Fleet.....

IMHO there were many other.

A) The delay with wich the Campaign started,

B) that instead of giving a punch with all the possible strenght, like in the battle of France, the Wehrmacht split his forces

C) and last but not least, 

_mode O.T. on_

I was a close friend of the Author of this book, as we went sailing hundreds of times together in the sea surrounding Sardinia







but hardly I knew that He had been in the Russian Campaign and that He was awarded with the Italian Silver Medal.
Being, like me, a Structural Engineer and an excellent Pianist, He was a very modest person indeed.
After his passing, some years ago, the Heirs did find his War diary, a tiny booklet that his now in print.
Several times Paolo (the Author, on the cover preceding the Flag) speaks in this book about the very good relationships between the Italians and the local Ukrainian population, wich were of course not those between the Germans and the local population.......
And not only him: read what Vasilji Grossman says on the matter, in Life and Fate......
_mode O.T. off_

the politically silly and suicide attitude of the Germans to shoot at the population of Russia and Ucraine that was welcoming them with flowers for they were getting rid them off the Communism......


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## Elmas (Feb 29, 2012)

double message, deleted.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> And the only thing that prevented the Soviets from defeat in 1941 was their vast territory.



Wasn't there something about soviet soldiers dying in thousands for every square km Germans occupied?


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## Elmas (Feb 29, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Wasn't there something about soviet soldiers dying in thousands for every square km Germans occupied?



_No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country._
George S. Patton


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## pbfoot (Feb 29, 2012)

Elmas said:


> _No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country._
> George S. Patton


IMHO the man Patton was a blowhard


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## Gixxerman (Feb 29, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Wasn't there something about soviet soldiers dying in thousands for every square km Germans occupied?



Indeed and not just that, despite all the enthusiastic tales of the successful vast encirclements and huge numbers of planes etc etc destroyed on the ground it is also true that right from the start the Russians were making Germany bleed.
It was cumulative effect, nothing to too disastrous to begin with but in the coming months the steady losses in men and material would become losses Germany simply could not afford.

Some of the material losses were as a direct result of the vast distances involved - for instance tanks obviously have a fixed 'life' being driven around before the engines, brakes suspension are worn out beyond repair, less than 1000mls quoted for the absolute service life of a Panther engine.
But these as direct consequences of the German decision to go to war and so are entirely their responsibility for being so foolish. 

I must admit it always surprises me that the central fact here so often goes unremarked amongst all the glowing appreciation(?) of German arms and all the talk about what they did and what they did not do.
The German leadership of the day back then were not only responsible for setting death, injury, brutaity and misery on a until then unseen scale on the Russian people (and all the others they turned on) but they also brought about a blood-letting upon the German people on an enormous and similarly unseen scale.

The nazi crimes aren't just what they visited upon others but also the crime against the German nation.
The multi-millions of German deaths and injury they directly created caused.

I think it's worth just reflecting remembering that once in a while.


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

Elmas said:


> _No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country._
> George S. Patton


 
Stalin was aware that Germany would not only not last long, but also have impossibility of conduct his campaign in the West without his supplies? If yes, it's very clear that Stalin wanted to assume a paper less important than the Western Allies, just letting the Germans and Allies worn out each other to come with the Red Army in the "interests of peace" and occupy Europe. Patton is damn right, and the apologists from the Soviet Union love to say how their sacrificies were tremendous. Certainly the people in the Kremlin didn't thought the same with a significat part of the population killed and most of European Russia destroyed. Not something to be much proud of...


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## Elmas (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Stalin was aware that Germany would not only not last long, but also have impossibility of conduct his campaign in the West without his supplies? If yes, it's very clear that Stalin wanted to assume a paper less important than the Western Allies, just letting the Germans and Allies worn out each other to come with the Red Army in the "interests of peace" and occupy Europe. Patton is damn right, and the apologists from the Soviet Union love to say how their sacrificies were tremendous. Certainly the people in the Kremlin didn't thought the same with a significat part of the population killed and most of European Russia destroyed. Not something to be much proud of...




Hitler has been the worst criminal that the mankind has seen (not that Stalin was so much inferior, if any, of course.....) and, fortunately for the mankind also, sometimes, extremely stupid: probably, if in the Third Reich the Theory of Relativity would not have banned as the result of a degenerated Jewish mind, the history of the atomic bomb would have been different.....

But he was not so stupid: he knew perfectly ( the defeat of Wilhemine Germany in Ist WW, that was for Hitler's mind an obsession, _docet_) that you can’t win a war with an empty belly.

So, as soon he did realize that Britain could not be invaded much less defeated with the forces he had at hand, the only remaining thing for him was to acquire a territory were the resources in terms of possibility to grow food, extract oil, build factories at a safe distance from British bombers in wich to grow a much more powerful Army was the consequent and only decision to take.

Hitler did not want supplies from Stalin: Hitler did want the Stalin's supplies, that’s different....


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## Gixxerman (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Stalin was aware that Germany would not only not last long, but also have impossibility of conduct his campaign in the West without his supplies? If yes, it's very clear that Stalin wanted to assume a paper less important than the Western Allies, just letting the Germans and Allies worn out each other to come with the Red Army in the "interests of peace" and occupy Europe.



I don't think it has ever been anything much beyond speculation that Russia ever planned to occupy Europe as such.
It is quite plain that Russia in common with several European countries had disputes over various territories (some pre-dating Stalin the USSR).
It is also clear Stalin thought in terms of 'spheres of influence' - as did everyone.
Given what Russia suffered during after WW2 (in terms of the enormous costs of rebuilding etc) it is not much of a surprise that the well being of the states which had been allies to Hitler's gang was low on the Russian priority list.
The fact that Russia thought in terms of a buffer zone between east west is hardly unusual in the circumstances.

.....none of which mitigates or denies Stalin his gang were also criminal monsters. 



Jenisch said:


> .......the apologists from the Soviet Union love to say how their sacrificies were tremendous.



You know you really don't have to be an 'apologist' for anything or anybody to see the truth is that the Russia people did suffer losses, sacrifices and ruin on a truly staggering scale.

I do wonder why you continually try to link this as something particularly 'communist' and therefore to be minimised and denied. 



Jenisch said:


> Certainly the people in the Kremlin didn't thought the same with a significat part of the population killed and most of European Russia destroyed. Not something to be much proud of...



......are you saying that the German attack on European Russia was the Russian Gov's fault?

I can agree that they were very incredibly deluded to imagine that all the info telling them an attack was imminent was just the western allies trying to stir trouble between Germany Russia (but one can hardly say they had no reason to distrust the western allies......it being less than 20yrs since some of them sent arms to Russia to try to defeat the Soviet revolution).
But nevertheless Germany attacked Russia without provocation in breach of the very agreement the Germans had only recently made with the Soviets.


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

Elmas said:


> Hitler did not want supplies from Stalin: Hitler did want the Stalin's supplies, that’s different....


 
This was perhaps Hitler's ever present objective. However I understand this perfectly. My point is that Stalin was aware that Germany was in war with Britain and France, and with a naval blockade. Stalin was also aware that consequentely Germany would not last long, since it didn't have near the resources, credit and even the navy the Kaiser had. Germany was unable to fight Britain, France and the Soviet Union at the same time. And while Hitler that started the war, Stalin and his interests were key factor behind it's expansion to a global scale.


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> It is also clear Stalin thought in terms of 'spheres of influence' - as did everyone.



Stalin was aware of the economic situation of Germany when he signed the trade agreement. He financed Hitler's conquests in '39-40. And don't tell me there was no serious considerations for a Nazi agression in the USSR, Stalin was interested in Anti-Hitler pacts with the West years before the war, which first the West and later he himself rejected.

Conclusion: both the Communists and Democracies wanted to trow Hitler against each other. And both, specially the Soviets paid a high price for this.


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## parsifal (Feb 29, 2012)

> Let's see: Germany found itself in war with two great powers (UK and France), that everyone knew would be eventually supported by the US, her only Ally choose to not get involved (Italy), and her economy was totally dependant on the good will of the Soviets, that, they were only waiting their chance to stab Germany in the back. That's not holding most advantages, that was an almost hopeless situation.



In 1939 the germans had access to the second most powerdul econoimy in the world. They had a modern war winning doctrine the most powerful airforce. They had conquered a significant enemy and could have exploited its economic resources to a much better effect.
The alies were weak and disorganzed. France was a nation with the veneer of strength, but in reality her "pillars of marble and stone" were made of paper mache. Her army followed a massively floored doctrine, she was racked by pacifism and antiwar sentiment. The allies as a whole had weak air forces. Only at sea did they enjoy a decisive advantage. 

The US involvement in 1939 was not inevitable. They madfe it clear they were neutral. and intended to remain that way. The italians remained neutral as well, but unlike the US they DID make it clear they intended to enter the war at some stage soon. This necessitated a watching garrison to be placed in the territories that surrounded or bordered Italian possessions....for example, for the french in North Africa and in the Alps, over 20 divisions of their 90 division army were not facing the germans at all, they were facing the italians. For the brits, eventually (not in 1939, but by the latt4er part of 1940) they had 8 divisions of their available 32 in the middle east facing the italians, where not a single german was yet deployed 



> I would like to see some evidence on this. About the part of "eventually bested", when did that happen?? Not in 1939, not in 1940, not in 41-42...and the VVS and USAAF did more than the RAF to accomplish the defeat of the LW.



The RAF prevented a LW victory over England in 1940, which by the nature of the battle and the objectives of each protagonist counts very clearly as an allied victory. In 1941, despite taking significant losses, the British defeated the German continued blitz and extended their air superiority to most parts of the channel and most of the coastline of North West Europe. I am not sying they inflicted mo9re losses. I am saying they were achieving the objectives they set out to. British strategy from June 1941 was altered to trying to retain as much of the LW in west4ern Europe and the med, out of position as could be achieved. They did that by continuous harrassment and unceasing attacks on German controlled territory. They were succesful in the prosecution of that strategy. In 1941, more than 1000 a/c of the LW were retainedf in the west after Barbarossa, and over 500 deployed to the med. That left just over 2000 to be deployed to the East, where their lack of numbers prevented the germans from achieving decisive victory over the rusians. The Russians did not surrender, despite horendo9us losses, and eventually came back to defeat the LW 




> Absurd. And the USSR (never mind Russia) did not  outproduce Germany during the war


.

Ah yes they did. In tanks, aircraft, guns, small arms they outproduced the Germans by a considerable margin. They produced more submarines up to 1943, more vehicles. I would say it absurd to claim the germans outproduced the Russians. Why dod you think it absurd to say German equipment was bulky unrelianble (somewhat) and impractical. Many commentators say that


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## Gixxerman (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Stalin was aware of the economic situation of Germany when he signed the trade agreement. He financed Hitler's conquests in '39-40. And don't tell me there was no serious considerations for a Nazi agression in the USSR, Stalin was interested in Anti-Hitler pacts with the West years before the war, which first the West and later he himself rejected.
> 
> Conclusion: both the Communists and Democracies wanted to trow Hitler against each other. And both, specially the Soviets paid a high price for this.



.....and every little plan whether it was the west hoping Hitler's Germany would diminish if not absolutely defeat Russia or Russia hoping for Hitler's Germany to diminish if not actually defeat the western powers all hinged upon _the central issue which remains that Hitler's gang were going to be the ones to make war _on whichever opponent.

.....and nobody can say that Russia was that cynical about the 'cost' or price of the war as the type of war Hitler would choose to fight (a war of extermination no less) was outside anyone's living experience or expectation. 

Any serious reading of anything Hitler had to say on the subject shows again and again that the paranoid mentality underlying it all was bent on war - and in fact on occasion exxpressed disappointment at not getting war. 
It is a sad truth that the paranoid nutters on each side feed off of each other but it is simply undeniable that nazism Hitler was all about wars of aggression.
Those who kid themselves that Hitler was interested in an agreed peace based on compromise accomodation simpy ignore the fact that many of the so-called peace offers were a fraud.
There could be no negotiated settlements because when it came down to it the demands made were often framed in the certain knowledge that they would be completely unacceptable or in fact impossible.
Cynical to the extreme, in other words.

Besides, there is another proof of what it was all about.
Hitler's Germany needed war in 1939 because the jig was up, nazi Germany had painted itself into a corner was broke.


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## pbfoot (Feb 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The RAF prevented a LW victory over England in 1940, which by the nature of the battle and the objectives of each protagonist counts very clearly as an allied victory. In 1941, despite taking significant losses, the British defeated the German continued blitz and extended their air superiority to most parts of the channel and most of the coastline of North West Europe. I am not sying they inflicted mo9re losses. I am saying they were achieving the objectives they set out to. British strategy from June 1941 was altered to trying to retain as much of the LW in west4ern Europe and the med, out of position as could be achieved. They did that by continuous harrassment and unceasing attacks on German controlled territory.


if loosing more aircraft and men is winning I'm at a loss of words,the Battle of Britain was lost as soon as the Germans hit the Channel they just did not have the tools nor the proper equipment or skill set to perform the task


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## Siegfried (Feb 29, 2012)

Elmas said:


> Hitler has been the worst criminal that the mankind has seen (not that Stalin was so much inferior, if any, of course.....) and, fortunately for the mankind also, sometimes, extremely stupid: probably, if in the Third Reich the Theory of Relativity would not have banned as the result of a degenerated Jewish mind, the history of the atomic bomb would have been different.....
> 
> But he was not so stupid: he knew perfectly ( the defeat of Wilhemine Germany in Ist WW, that was for Hitler's mind an obsession, _docet_) that you can’t win a war with an empty belly.
> 
> ...



Hitler was mild by historical standards and far from the maddest of people. Pol Pot, Mao and Stalin were far worse and certainly far worse. If you kept your head down in WW2 Germany or Reich territory you got to stay alive unless you were jewish. Hitler might get angry, might rant, but he didn't kill anyone unless he had a good reason. Within that I include laying waste to a village and its inhabitants for being used by or by supporting insurgent/partisan activities (which often involved deliberately provocative atrocities against German soliers)

I think this also falls into "Hitler bad" therefore "Stalin the good anti-hero". Stalin killed millions probably more than Hitler who gets to carry the can, he sometimes killed them randomely to show his power and broaden fear (somethingn Hitler never did) , so did Lenin, Beria, Trotsky. Incidently all of these people were 'ethnic' of a sort and carried hatreds against other cultures and races they subsumed into Communist ideology. Once he decided that Jews were too much of a power body he started to turn his purges on them. His purging of the Soviet Army is in some quarters motivated by this as well.


There are plenty of ethnic Russian Historians who believe Stalin was preparing an invasion of Western Europe, if not in 1941 when Suvorov suggests (the buildup failed totally) then 1942. Many high ranking Nazis pleaded that the war was a preventative war. The suggestion is virulently only opposed in certain quarters of the UK and USa by those one would expect because of their political or ethnic leanings. IE it is a case of being closed to an idea because it rationalises and credits some of Hitlers decisions, it would make his fanatic actions somehow rational. This would turn the world upside down for many. Yes, they'll cling to the work of David Glantz who will show that the 25,000 tanks the Soviets had were mostly in disrepair and that the hundreds of T-34 and KV-1 didn't mean anyting, nor did the thousands of T-34s about to come of massive well planed production lines also didn't mean anything.

Hitler certainly had affinity to the idea of Lebensraum having seen the defeate of Germany in WW2 as a result of food and resource blockade and deeply resentfull of the enlargement of slavic territory at the expense of ethynic Germans due to the French desire to cut up Germany (implemented via the treaty of Versailes). Hitler may just have accomodated with Poland and allied with them against the Soviet Union had they baragined on access to Danzig by land and rail. Reading Hitlers table talk on the German colonisation of the Ukrain is interesting. Its clear he wasn't interested in 'ethnic cleansing'. He was interested in seperating Germans from Russians etc as he felt Germans would be too inclined to organise and fix the problems of the locals and then become of them. He seemed to have an impression the territory was so vast its resouces were unlimmited.


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## Siegfried (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Stalin was aware of the economic situation of Germany when he signed the trade agreement. He financed Hitler's conquests in '39-40. And don't tell me there was no serious considerations for a Nazi agression in the USSR, Stalin was interested in Anti-Hitler pacts with the West years before the war, which first the West and later he himself rejected.
> 
> Conclusion: both the Communists and Democracies wanted to trow Hitler against each other. And both, specially the Soviets paid a high price for this.



Stalin had a Polish problem, the alleigence with nazi Germany solved that. It also solved Germany's problem. Polands diplomacy must have been mad, all they had to do was throw some minor peace offerings and they would have brought enough time to become too costly to attack. For Hitler it was access to Danzig and secure rights for Germans that had become part of Poland which was not a homogenous nation but a successor to the Polish Lithiuanian commonwealth. "Poland" (a multi-enthnic nation made up of Germans, Old Prussians, Ukranians, Silensians, Hungarians, Wends, Lithuanians and a heapm of Russians, all of whom had been there for a thousand years or more.


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## stona (Feb 29, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I do believe so



The internal politics of the British government would have made this impossible. There was never going to be an invasion but with at least local air superiority over South Eastern England and the inevitable consequences for the capitol an ignominious settlement with Germany would have been inevitable. Britain out of the war in 1940 is a great 'what if' already amply represented in fiction.
Are you suggesting that we might have well not have bothered fighting the BoB. Permit the RAF to withdraw to the North of England and allow the Luftwaffe a free hand across the channel? Allow unmolested daytime bombing of London in the same way as say Rotterdam was attacked. Do you believe this would have made no difference to Britain's ability to carry on fighting through 1940/41 when she could be saved by the USA's 'official' entry into the conflict? 
You can't be serious. Ask a German.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbfoot (Feb 29, 2012)

stona said:


> The internal politics of the British government would have made this impossible. There was never going to be an invasion but with at least local air superiority over South Eastern England and the inevitable consequences for the capitol an ignominious settlement with Germany would have been inevitable. Britain out of the war in 1940 is a great 'what if' already amply represented in fiction.
> Are you suggesting that we might have well not have bothered fighting the BoB. Permit the RAF to withdraw to the North of England and allow the Luftwaffe a free hand across the channel? Allow unmolested daytime bombing of London in the same way as say Rotterdam was attacked. Do you believe this would have made no difference to Britain's ability to carry on fighting through 1940/41 when she could be saved by the USA's 'official' entry into the conflict?
> You can't be serious. Ask a German.
> Cheers
> Steve


no I'm not saying that but I am saying the actual aerial Battle of Britain did not play the part of saving the UK its purported to have done , it was a very much needed propoganda victory of which there had been very few . The Germans could not have crossed the channel , with or without the intervention of RN


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## marshall (Feb 29, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> "Poland" (a multi-enthnic nation made up of Germans, Old Prussians, Ukranians, Silensians, Hungarians, Wends, Lithuanians and a heapm of Russians, all of whom had been there for a thousand years or more.




You forget about Jews and the biggest group Poles...


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## Gixxerman (Feb 29, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Hitler was mild by historical standards and far from the maddest of people. Pol Pot, Mao and Stalin were far worse and certainly far worse. If you kept your head down in WW2 Germany or Reich territory you got to stay alive unless you were jewish.



.....or disabled, or gay , or a gypsy or informed against by anyone with an axe to grind you ended up unlucky enough to be sent away encountered a psychopath in charge on a bad day.

Not forgetting the 'mere' brutal incarceration for a host of other so-called offences (like daring to hold different opinions views).



Siegfried said:


> Hitler might get angry, might rant, but he didn't kill anyone unless he had a good reason.



I find it incredible anyone could seriously write this rubbish in this day age after all we know about the nazi regime.

I suppose disability falls under 'good reason' for you does it?
Or being gay?

What exactly is the 'good reason' underlying a war of extermination?
By definition 'reason' has nothing to do with it, you simply are 'the other' must die. 



Siegfried said:


> Within that I include laying waste to a village and its inhabitants for being used by or by supporting insurgent/partisan activities (which often involved deliberately provocative atrocities against German soliers)



.....which ignores the fact that war crimes were a habit of the German army (as well as the SS) long before there was a resistance to speak of. 



Siegfried said:


> I think this also falls into "Hitler bad" therefore "Stalin the good anti-hero".



Sorry, but I think you're about to employ the classic bad debating technique of framing this in your own way but claiming it is how most see it,



Siegfried said:


> Stalin killed millions probably more than Hitler who gets to carry the can



They are 2 separate individuals.
Both were vile murderous monsters.

Each committed unique crimes but Hitler was the one who began WW2 and so not surprisingly he gets reviled the most (what with it being the most deadly appalling war ever and the genocidal industrial murder machine which was a facet of Hitlers regime unique in modern history).



Siegfried said:


> he sometimes killed them randomely to show his power and broaden fear (somethingn Hitler never did)



Oh really?
So I suppose the deliberate use of an irregular corps during the pre-Gov electioneering was just for fun giggles?
Or the 'Night of the long knives' was a gentle thing?
Or how about 'Kristallnacht' or the Jewish boycott.....yeah sure, no visible weilding of power or attempting to broaden a state of fear in any of that?

Are you serious? 



Siegfried said:


> His purging of the Soviet Army is in some quarters motivated by this as well.



I'm not going to excuse Stalin's crimes but this is an interesting one.
Curious as it is documented that Hitler became a fan of the idea of purging the German armed forces the German officers later in the war.



Siegfried said:


> There are plenty of ethnic Russian Historians who believe Stalin was preparing an invasion of Western Europe



Which is an interesting idea but that is all it is.
A claim.
A suggested possibility, from some but by no means all or even a majority.
There is no proof of this and when it comes down to it it basically is a claim to imply that the russians were just as bad if not worse than Hitler's mob and Hitler's mob therefore weren't really that bad, what with the russians being allied to the western powers. 



Siegfried said:


> The suggestion is virulently only opposed in certain quarters of the UK and USa by those one would expect because of their political or ethnic leanings. IE it is a case of being closed to an idea because it rationalises and credits some of Hitlers decisions, it would make his fanatic actions somehow rational.



Nope.
It is dismissed by many (from all over the world) because it is a theory without a shred of actual proof.
It also happens to have the distinct disadvantage inconvenience for those wishing to excuse minimise Hitler's record by being utterly at odds with what actually happened.

Ifs, buts, maybes, coulda, woulda, shoulda.....but Hitler did. 



Siegfried said:


> This would turn the world upside down for many.



Actually it wouldn't.
It's nothing like the surprise you seem to think.
We do know Stalin's Russia attacked Poland you know. 

Here's another one that might surprise you, we also know 'poor little Poland' attacked Czechoslovakia annexed a part of that state......but none of this is justification, reason or cause for Hitler's actions. 



Siegfried said:


> Yes, they'll cling to the work of David Glantz who will show that the 25,000 tanks the Soviets had were mostly in disrepair and that the hundreds of T-34 and KV-1 didn't mean anyting, nor did the thousands of T-34s about to come of massive well planed production lines also didn't mean anything.



....whereas those seeking to excuse, justify and apologise for Hitler's wars will ignore the one stark and obvious reason behind those events - events bourne out by the actual history - *Hitler was planning to attack Russia and annex a large chunk of it!*
That is simply the fact of the matter.

Sadly for the Hitler apologists it is a fact that in those days Russia had a very good spy network operating in Germany and whilst they may not have known all of the minute detail they were under no illusions as to what Hitler was about and what he his Gov planned.

No wonder they moved their factories.
No wonder they ordered vast numbers of tanks.

This is just a most outrageous case of blaming the victim.
Stalin 'made' Hitler attack eh? 



Siegfried said:


> Hitler certainly had affinity to the idea of Lebensraum having seen the defeate of Germany in WW2 as a result of food and resource blockade and deeply resentfull of the enlargement of slavic territory at the expense of ethynic Germans due to the French desire to cut up Germany (implemented via the treaty of Versailes).



Well sadly for Germany she had just lost a major war......and as events were to prove (and how!) when the boot was on the other foot losers don't usually end up doing too well.
Especially when Europe had just gone through the blood-letting of WW1.

Even so after WW1 France never treated Germany as cruelly as Germany did France after 1940.

If Hitler had been serious there were many in the UK USA who felt that Germany had been treated badly at Versailles and better agreements could have been reached.
But Hitler's pre-war 'diplomacy' was not at all about reaching agreement.
It was one extended series of intimidation threat and in several cases ending up in murder. 




Siegfried said:


> Reading Hitlers table talk on the German colonisation of the Ukrain is interesting. Its clear he wasn't interested in 'ethnic cleansing'.



No.
What is clear to anyone who has read much about Hitler is that his so-called 'table talk' is just idle shooting the breeze in mixed company and we know Hitler was fastideous about what he would say in mixed company.
His (in fact rather banal) wandering musings are however no substitute for the reality on the ground.

As was pointed out earlier, regardless of what idle chit-chat over the cream cakes in front of the ladies might have been, the Germans were unbelievably brutal in the east and were dumb enough to talk idiotic rubbish about 'race' and treat so many people under their occupation appallingly.

There is a stunning irony here.
I am fully aware of just how awful Stalin his gang were - it just surprises me that those who would spend so long trying to compare contrast Stalin Hitler, so as to claiming Stalin was so much worse can't seem to understand the logic that the people on the ground experiencing this flocked to Stalin's side once they got a fair idea of what Hitler's side had in mind for them. 



Siegfried said:


> He was interested in seperating Germans from Russians etc as he felt Germans would be too inclined to organise and fix the problems of the locals and then become of them.



"Seperating"!?
Well that's one way to describe a policy of extermination I guess.



Siegfried said:


> He seemed to have an impression the territory was so vast its resouces were unlimmited.



The irony here being that the nazi ideal of the farming German scraping a living on some freezing stepp is about as unappealing to modern Germans as could possibly be. 

Siegfreid

I am all for a rounded discussion of the nazi era and I am quite happy to agree that not every facet of German life under the nazi regime was dreadful.
I'll even agree that for many Germans at least to begin with it sort of made sense given the previous prospect of a slide towards anarchy or communism.
But we now know far too much to be letting slide comments like "Hitler might get angry, might rant, but he didn't kill anyone unless he had a good reason".
Come on, you know better than that.

Apologies to the board but I just couldn't let this one go without rebutting it point by point.


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## parsifal (Feb 29, 2012)

Unbelievable. im speechless. the depths of historical revisionism here are staggering


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## pbfoot (Feb 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Unbelievable. im speechless. the depths of historical revisionism here are staggering


I don't necessarily follow the party line , I'm not an expert but in my 50 years of unofficial research I'm never shocked at what I learn > we've been given to understand over the years the LW was unaware of RAF radar whereas the opposite it turns out to be true the RAF the United Kingdom did not admit to the Germans having radar until Feb 24 41 although they had been given much evidence to the opposite. Including the Radar mast of the Graf Spee As for the invasion of the UK how were the Germans supposed to get prime movers (horses) over the Channel.


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## Siegfried (Feb 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Unbelievable. im speechless. the depths of historical revisionism here are staggering



The word 'revision' comes from re vision ie to look again. Nothing wrong with that. History is written by the domination that victors have achieved and they want a version in which they are the heroes and the other guy is the villain. Black and White. That is the current version of history.

However I offered no revision, no new facts. All the things I said are commonly accessible.

The Spannish communists were going around killing Nuns and Priests, going a bit far isn't?, and they were talking of Soviet style purges and gulags in Spain as they invited in Soviet support. Suprise the suprise forces within spain and built up against them, the Nazis helped. They got killed in the hundreds of thousands: exactly what they would have done had they been victorious.

These kind of odd people now get called 'freedom fighters' by revisionists.

The Germans, the Nazis may just have saved much of europe from the kind of lunacy Stalin inflicted on the various peoples of the former Tsarist empire and that we saw Bella Kuhn inflict on Hungarians. The ideas that Mao, Pol Pot latter copied.

The people whose version of history you seem to support were people like Roosvelt who along with the New York times and similar press were doing their utmost to hide or downplay the Ukranian genocide. That's about 4.5 million people. If a peasant women hid away some food, just soak her skirt in gasoline and set it alight. She might die of infections from the burns but she'd have starved anyway. Mostly inflected by 'cosmopolitan communists of different ethnic groups. Throw in at least twice as many casualties around the rest of the USSR. Throw in soviet expansionism in the Sth around Rommnia and in the North around the Baltic states. 

Stalin and Lenin (a mass murder of massive proportions) did this years before WW2, years before 'the holocaust'. Some folks America were doing their damdest to hide this. If it weren't form Malcolm Muggeridge they might have succeded even more.

Do you think the Germans had reason for concern? It seems in a certain lunar world uncle Jo Jo as the Beatles called him, was and still is a well meaning angel intent on world peace most of the time. No need for concern. 

The true revisionists were and still are in New York. Walter Durante gets blamed but too many were behined him.


You only need to look at Soviet production plans, which were truely massive, and the incredible surge of high quality armour and aircraft that had already started before Barabarossa to see something was going on. * Non of the soviet types were inferior in any substantial way to German aircraft.* Had Hitler not invaded when he did the Soviet Army and its airforces would be of massive proportions within 9 months as the tens of thousands of experienced tankers and pilots converted to the new types. That certainly would have solved Stalins Polish problem perhaps all the waay through to Jutland.


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

Siegfried, I like from many of your revisionists approches, and will add a video with a testimonal from a KGB defector about the political modus operandi of the USSR expansionism: 


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dE38dLxapVo_

However, even if Stalin was planning to invade Europe, I don't think Hitler "saved" it, since he defeated many European countries that were also in serious modernization process of their armed forces. Many of those countries had effective plans against the USSR, such as Britain, France and Poland. If the goal of Hitler was just save Europe from Communism - which definately wasn't - then he logically would only need to need enter in an alliance with them. Italy and Japan plus US support for many of those countries also would be present. That probably would be enough to desincourage any Communist agression.


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## parsifal (Feb 29, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I don't necessarily follow the party line , I'm not an expert but in my 50 years of unofficial research I'm never shocked at what I learn > we've been given to understand over the years the LW was unaware of RAF radar whereas the opposite it turns out to be true the RAF the United Kingdom did not admit to the Germans having radar until Feb 24 41 although they had been given much evidence to the opposite. Including the Radar mast of the Graf Spee As for the invasion of the UK how were the Germans supposed to get prime movers (horses) over the Channel.



I didnt learn anything friom siegfrieds post except he is delusional in his opinions of hitler. 

With regard to radar, are you being dliberately obtuse here? it would seem so. britain knew of German developments in radar (in a military application sense) since at least 1936. germany was also aware of british radar. What they failed to understand or indeed approeciate was the organization behind its use....how it had been integrated into a comprehensive air defence system. They may well have had the beginnings of their own in 1940, but such technique, and its effects on air battles had not been absorbed by the LW commanders. They utterly failed to realize what the network of radar stations was there for, or how it worked, or how the network of stations could make a force of 300 fighters have the same effect as 600 without radar 9roughly speaking.

Lets say you are right, and the germans knew about radar, knew about the way the british had employed it. That just serves to underline even furthe the utter stupidity of the LW leadership, since their approach in the Battle utterly failed to take the effects of radar and its importance into account. They utterly failed to developed either strategy or tactics to counter radar.

so, in your defence of the germans, you are faced with a choice. either they didnt appreciate the impacts of the british network (ne "the Germans didnt "know" about radar", to put it in its most kind form) or they knew about it, and were stupid because they didnt do anything about it. Im happy with either conclusion, because I happen to think both applied.


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## pbfoot (Feb 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I didnt learn anything friom siegfrieds post except he is delusional in his opinions of hitler.
> 
> With regard to radar, are you being dliberately obtuse here? it would seem so. britain knew of German developments in radar (in a military application sense) since at least 1936. germany was also aware of british radar. What they failed to understand or indeed approeciate was the organization behind its use....how it had been integrated into a comprehensive air defence system. They may well have had the beginnings of their own in 1940, but such technique, and its effects on air battles had not been absorbed by the LW commanders. They utterly failed to realize what the network of radar stations was there for, or how it worked, or how the network of stations could make a force of 300 fighters have the same effect as 600 without radar 9roughly speaking.
> 
> ...


th e Brits thought they had the only Radar until the Oslo report and even thenn the Admiralty thought it was a hoax


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## Easy1 (Feb 29, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> .....or disabled, or gay , or a gypsy or informed against by anyone with an axe to grind you ended up unlucky enough to be sent away encountered a psychopath in charge on a bad day.disabled, or gay , or a gypsy.



I take you are aware of that castrating the "unfit", gays and gypsies were more or less common in Europe both before and after the Second World War? This is not something that can be atomized to Germany, even though many people do this for political resons.

Saying they killed the disabled is utterly wrong. Old people are disabled and they were not massacered. Goebbels himself was disabled with his by a clubbed foot which hindered his ability to walk



Gixxerman said:


> .....Not forgetting the 'mere' brutal incarceration for a host of other so-called offences (like daring to hold different opinions views).



Yes, Nazi Germany persecuted political opposition, but if we are to compare her with what other regimes did at the same time or even after the war the brutality of the Nazi regime should be put into perspective.



Gixxerman said:


> .....I find it incredible anyone could seriously write this rubbish in this day age after all we know about the nazi regime.
> 
> I suppose disability falls under 'good reason' for you does it?
> Or being gay?.



I'm afraid your view seem to be a bit black and white, and what we are beginnig to see is that much of the rubbish about the Nazi regime comes from people with this black and white perception of WWII - as if it was a moral crusade between good and evil.

Persecution of gays and the "unfit" is not so much related to Hitler. Hitler was not the most prominent advocator of this in Germany and it happened in many other countries, for example among the victors of WWII. To your information, there were several nazi officials that were Gay. Erns Röhm being one of them. Being gay did not imly you would be killed.



Gixxerman said:


> .....What exactly is the 'good reason' underlying a war of extermination?
> By definition 'reason' has nothing to do with it, you simply are 'the other' must die. ?.



Reason had very much to do with it. More precisely if you were for example gay or Jewish but the nazi administration found you usefull, you would live. Thousands of men of Jewish descent and hundreds of what the Nazis called 'full Jews' served in the German military with Adolf Hitler's knowledge and approval, including two field marshals and fifteen generals. Hitler's automobile driver was also jewish.



Gixxerman said:


> ..........which ignores the fact that war crimes were a habit of the German army (as well as the SS) long before there was a resistance to speak of.



As for the war in the east, there was harsh brutality on all sides. Are you saying the Germans somehow started it?



Gixxerman said:


> .....Sorry, but I think you're about to employ the classic bad debating technique of framing this in your own way but claiming it is how most see it,?.



Bagatalizing Stalin and demonizing Hitler is the consequence of a black and white thinking in regards to the Second World War.



Gixxerman said:


> .....They are 2 separate individuals.
> Both were vile murderous monsters.
> 
> Each committed unique crimes but Hitler was the one who began WW2 and so not surprisingly he gets reviled the most (what with it being the most deadly appalling war ever and the genocidal industrial murder machine which was a facet of Hitlers regime unique in modern history).



Saying Hitler started WWII is an exageration, an extremely typical one for that matter. Japan had already waged war in Asia for for three years before Hitler attacked Poland. Italy had already conquered Ethiopia. Stalin had attacked Finland, annexed the Baltic countries and Besarabia AND did indeed attack Poland days after Hitler did. For some reason, the allies chose not to declare war against USSR as they did when Germany did the very same Poland.

For the record, all western powers fought colonial wars in the same period with a level of cruelty comparable to that of the Germans in the east, against people who saw the Western colonial powers as illigitmate occupiers.



Gixxerman said:


> .....Oh really?
> So I suppose the deliberate use of an irregular corps during the pre-Gov electioneering was just for fun giggles?
> Or the 'Night of the long knives' was a gentle thing?
> Or how about 'Kristallnacht' or the Jewish boycott.....yeah sure, no visible weilding of power or attempting to broaden a state of fear in any of that?



Yes, it was also part of a political campaign. Widespread antisemitism in Europe was something Hitler knew how to exploit politically.



Gixxerman said:


> .....I'm not going to excuse Stalin's crimes but this is an interesting one.
> Curious as it is documented that Hitler became a fan of the idea of purging the German armed forces the German officers later in the war.



But he did not. And he could not. Hitler never assumed the same amount of power as Stalin.



Gixxerman said:


> .....Which is an interesting idea but that is all it is.
> A claim.
> A suggested possibility, from some but by no means all or even a majority.
> There is no proof of this and when it comes down to it it basically is a claim to imply that the russians were just as bad if not worse than Hitler's mob and Hitler's mob therefore weren't really that bad, what with the russians being allied to the western powers.



The number of historians who support this view are increasing. USSR was in an alliance with Germany at the time Germany started Bararossa. 



Gixxerman said:


> .....Actually it wouldn't.
> It's nothing like the surprise you seem to think.
> We do know Stalin's Russia attacked Poland you know.
> 
> Here's another one that might surprise you, we also know 'poor little Poland' attacked Czechoslovakia annexed a part of that state......but none of this is justification, reason or cause for Hitler's actions.



It depends upon what you mean by Hitlers actions. The fact that Poland was extremely antisemitic at the same time and central men within the Polish government (for example Piludski) wanted war with Germany is seldom justified.



Gixxerman said:


> .........whereas those seeking to excuse, justify and apologise for Hitler's wars will ignore the one stark and obvious reason behind those events - events bourne out by the actual history - *Hitler was planning to attack Russia and annex a large chunk of it!*
> That is simply the fact of the matter.
> 
> Sadly for the Hitler apologists it is a fact that in those days Russia had a very good spy network operating in Germany and whilst they may not have known all of the minute detail they were under no illusions as to what Hitler was about and what he his Gov planned.
> ...



Most importantly, Stalin did not believe Germany would attack, and he refused to admit they had done so long after they actually did.



Gixxerman said:


> .....Well sadly for Germany she had just lost a major war......and as events were to prove (and how!) when the boot was on the other foot losers don't usually end up doing too well.
> Especially when Europe had just gone through the blood-letting of WW1.



Same logic can be used to justify German victory over France in WWII right here.



Gixxerman said:


> .....Even so after WW1 France never treated Germany as cruelly as Germany did France after 1940.



Well, thats depends how you look at it. The Germans were more or less allowed to rule themselves politically but not economically. The French were not allowed to rule themselves politically, but more or less economically. 



Gixxerman said:


> .....If Hitler had been serious there were many in the UK USA who felt that Germany had been treated badly at Versailles and better agreements could have been reached.
> But Hitler's pre-war 'diplomacy' was not at all about reaching agreement.
> It was one extended series of intimidation threat and in several cases ending up in murder.



How come Germany just finished paying the World War One reparations 92 years later then?. 

In any case, provide the data that suggest there were many in the UK USA who felt that Germany had been treated badly at Versailles and better agreements could have been reached.


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## Easy1 (Feb 29, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> There is a stunning irony here.
> I am fully aware of just how awful Stalin his gang were - it just surprises me that those who would spend so long trying to compare contrast Stalin Hitler, so as to claiming Stalin was so much worse can't seem to understand the logic that the people on the ground experiencing this flocked to Stalin's side once they got a fair idea of what Hitler's side had in mind for them.



This argument can be used both ways so it is not so ironic. Many Ex-Soviet soldiers joined Nazi-Germany. Even a general!



Gixxerman said:


> .....No.
> What is clear to anyone who has read much about Hitler is that his so-called 'table talk' is just idle shooting the breeze in mixed company and we know Hitler was fastideous about what he would say in mixed company.
> His (in fact rather banal) wandering musings are however no substitute for the reality on the ground.
> 
> ...



War of extermination against who? The slavs? In case you mean the slavs, it is exagerated. If the Nazi administration were really that eager to exterminate the slavs they would not have allied with Slovakia and Bulgaria would they?



Gixxerman said:


> .....The irony here being that the nazi ideal of the farming German scraping a living on some freezing stepp is about as unappealing to modern Germans as could possibly be.



The USSR was not exaclty some freezing steppe. For example, the black soil of Ukraine made it one of the most (if not the most) valuable farming lands in the world.


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## DonL (Feb 29, 2012)

@ Gixxerman

I agree with most of your statement. But two points I want to pick out.

I'm not a fan of the preventative war theorie for Barbarossa and I don't believe that Stalin planed an invasion at 1941. But from a military viewpoint the Sowjet Troups had a massive focal point of armed vehicles at their Westfront, far more then necessary to defend and the arrangement of the Troups wasn't only to defend from the strategy. So I believe Stalin planed an invasion but perhaps 1942 or 43. 



> Even so after WW1 France never treated Germany as cruelly as Germany did France after 1940.



This is rubbish. France did all to humiliate Germany after WWI. The invasion of the Ruhrgebiet wasn't only to get their reperations, they wanted to occupy the Ruhrgebiet for themself, that was the goal! They did all to get revenge on germany take a look at the votes at Poland at 1919/1920 about parts of Schlesien. Only Britain and USA avoid that France did with Germany and the Ruhrgebiet what they wanted and by the way they executed hundreds of civil people who fight passivly against the occupation (don't work to pay the reperations).

Every political party in the 1930's would have had the total support of the german people to get in a war against France and Poland. Revenge was the dominated feeling of the german people after the Versaille Treaty and especially against France.

Edit: The Versaille Treaty and the humiliation from France after the war, is one major reason why the Nazi Party and Hitler could get popular by the german people in the 1930's


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## parsifal (Feb 29, 2012)

DonL for once we are in near total agreement....i am even more speechless given our past. well done and a good summary

My opinion is that the Soviets were getting ready to take punitive action into Rumania, not Poland. they had massed most of their armour in the southern sector, and were building an inordinate number of airfields. The germans had wanted Soviet action to the South, against turkey, but the the Soviets wanted to gain control of the balkans.first step, overrun Romania


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## DonL (Feb 29, 2012)

Thank you,

and I totaly agree with your analysis about Romania, but at the same time this was Hitler's most feared action because the 3. Reich was absolutely in need of the Romanian Oil fields! Without Romanian Oil no war!

Edit:
That was one reason for the dircet order from Hitler to occupy the Krim, which is to my opinion not necessary because you could close off the Krim with far less Troups compare with the needed Troups to occupy the Krim, Kertch and Sewasterpol.

The Romanian Oil fields played a very major part in Hitler's thinking all through his gouverment.


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## parsifal (Feb 29, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> th e Brits thought they had the only Radar until the Oslo report and even thenn the Admiralty thought it was a hoax



Ive seen this stuff before. Some oficers of the RN and the RAF dismissed the Oslo Report. The scientists did not. RV Jones mentions British knowledge of german radar in his book ("Most Secret War"), and research into countering Freya and Wurzburg had begun alsmost from the beginning of the war, with a conspicuous lack of success.

Britain began planning commando raids to capture a German radar set (I think it was freya) in brittany almost from the immediate aftermath of the BOF. I believe this attack actually occurred April 41. It is as untrue to claim the british did not know about german radar as to claim the british invented radar or that the germans did not have radar pre-1939. There are many, many untuths from both sides about radar technology which people routinely seize upon for some sensationalist purpose or other.

what is undeniable is that the germans failed to appreciate the importance and effect of the British radar development as part of their air defence system. 

Its a bit like your earlier statements about Britain being broke from December 1940. "being broke" suggest insolvency, similar to the situation faced by the Greeks today. It suggests that even with all their incomes and no real expenditures they could not pay their bills. But England was not insolvent in 1940. As part of the lend lease agreement, the british Government had to demonstrate they lacked the on hand cash to continue the 'cash and carry" agreement. this lack of gold reserves.....ready cash lying round doing nothing, was necessary in order to secure the line of credit that is now known as "Lend Lease". Thats not being broke. Thats being politically savvy to secure a vital agreement. Cash reserves were drying up, but the British were anything bu broke. They were still substantially balancing their budgets and churning out (and paying for) large amounts of equipment indigenously.


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## Hoju2k (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Ah, that's an unfair judgment in my view. If not for the RAF (and overall British) resistance, perhaps the US and the USSR would not have a Luftwaffe to defeat, but rather to be defeated. This was specially the case of the Russians.


Maybe.. maybe not. And the opposite could also be argue. Anyway, this is not relevant to the point I was addressing.





> Of course it did for most  of the war, check in any industrial table. Only in 1944 Germany was capable of match the Soviet production in key areas such as armored vehicles and aircraft production.



Wrong:








Also, as it can be see, for all the talk about the British preparedness and efficiency, _Großdeutschland _outproduce the UK by a great margin for most of the war.


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## Hoju2k (Feb 29, 2012)

Hop said:


> That's an odd claim to make. The RAF probably destroyed more Luftwaffe aircraft than the USAAF and RAF victories early in the war meant losses of higher quality German pilots.



I don't think so (about the first point). Anyway, German aircraft/aircrew losses losses during pre-Barbarossa times (not all to the Bristish), while heavy, did not produce a decline in its overall effectiveness, proved by the fact that the years 1941-42 (especially the former) would witness the peak of Luftwaffe effectiveness during the war. 
The eventual arrive of considerable USAAF elements would gradually tip the scales.



> Oh, and those early RAF victories came at a more critical time in the war, too.


Critical for whom?


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

Hoju, this is GPD, not armament production. Russia produces much more armament than Germany today, but it's GDP is inferior. In WWII Germany only achived a serious military competition with the USSR industry in 1944, check in any source. But even then the vacuum from the previous years, the Lend-Lease, improvements in the Soviet combat capability and the now open front in Normandy made the situation for Germany simply hopeless.


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## Hoju2k (Feb 29, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Hmmm, if you study American politics and Congress make up in 1940-41 you will see clearly that FDR was NOT going to be successful in expanding Lend Lease nor was he going to lead America into war. Only the Japanese succeeded where his leadership failed. The isolationist mood was far too strong in the US.



Really? Do you think that the US policy pre-Pearl Harbour qualifies as isolationist? 



> As to "Germany finding itself" at war? Did Germany just kind of 'stumble' into conflict or in fact move boldly because they believed they would prevail?



Was just an expression. And, well, Hitler definitely was really surprised (shocked actually) when the Allied declared war on 3 September.


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## Hoju2k (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Hoju, this is GPD, not armament production. Russia produces much more armament than Germany today, but it's GDP is inferior. In WWII Germany only achived a serious military competition with the USSR industry in 1944, check in any source. But even then the vacuum from the previous years, the Lend-Lease, improvements in the Soviet combat capability and the now open front in Normandy made the situation for Germany simply hopeless.


Perhaps you should pay more attention? Let me remind you Parsifal's ridiculous claim: 



> here are reasons why a country like Russia, with a prewar industry about 70% that of prewar germany (and then also losing about 30% of its prewar capacity to German occupation) could nevertheless outproduce the germans by factors of 2, 3, 4 to 1.



Now, as I said before, a country need much more that "armaments" to wage war. Such division is meaningless.
But, let's play it: show me that the Soviets produced "much more armament" than the Germans. I have no idea how that could be quantify: how many tanks is worth a submarine? how many artillery shells an aircraft? This should be interesting...


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## Jenisch (Feb 29, 2012)

Hoju2k said:


> But, let's play it: show me that the Soviets produced "much more armament" than the Germans. I have no idea how that could be quantify: how many tanks is worth a submarine? how many artillery shells an aircraft? This should be interesting...



I think Parfisal is considerating everything in the historical context of the war. The Soviet Union outproduced Germany for most of the war certainly because Germany needed to built things such as submarines and AA shells for the war in the West, and also because it had the Lend-Lease, the naval blockade of Germany and other factors in it's favour. But the fact is that Germany lacked equipment (including primarily logistics) in the Eastern Front, a front that was part from a global conflict.


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## parsifal (Feb 29, 2012)

Wrong:

View attachment 194469




Also, as it can be see, for all the talk about the British preparedness and efficiency, _Großdeutschland _outproduce the UK by a great margin for most of the war.

Your attachment, which i have not cross checked, but which looks about right, illustrates in spades why the germans were outproduced by both britain and the USSR. And serves to underline the gross inefficiency of the German war economy. Despite the obvious potential strength of the German economy this did not translate to enhanced military outputs. They lagged badly in all the major categories. Reason....well ther are many, but in amongst it is the cost per unit of their equipment, the innefficiency and sheer corruption of the regime....too many leaks in the bucket to be a modern economy too many snouts in the trough. Of course there were legitmate reasons like a shortage of raw materials and shortages of manpower, but still, your claim is that they 9the germans) outproduced the Russians. They had more resources, as your little graph show, but they did not outproduce them 

here are some basic figures on military outputs for Germany/USSR

Tanks SPGs
67425/105,251

Artillery (inc mortars)
159,147/516,648 

Trucks
345914/197,100

Aircraft 
119,307/143,145 

The breakdown of GDP for Germany/USSR in the period 1938-45 was as follows

1938:351/384
1939:384/366
1940:384/417
1941:387/359
1942:412/274
1943:417/305
1944:437/362
1945 :310/343
Total; 3124/2810

So with 88% of the GDP the Soviets managed to produce 156% of the tanks, 325% of the artillery, 57% of the trucks, and 120% of the aircraft.


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## Hoju2k (Feb 29, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> I think Parfisal is considerating everything in the historical context of the war. The Soviet Union outproduced Germany for most of the war certainly because Germany needed to built things such as submarines and AA shells for the war in the West, and also because it had the Lend-Lease, the naval blockade of Germany and other factors in it's favour. But the fact is that Germany lacked equipment (including primarily logistics) in the Eastern Front, a front that was part from a global conflict.


So, AA shells and submarines do not count?. What items do count? Show me how the SU outproduce Germany. I'd like to see some facts supporting that.


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## parsifal (Feb 29, 2012)

> Really? Do you think that the US policy pre-Pearl Harbour qualifies as isolationist?



In 1939 it was almost exclusively isolationist. When war broke out it moved slowly towards beligerency especially in the ETO. This was brought about by a combination of factors, buit principally two. Firstly the efforts of FDR and Churchill to move the US administration and congress and indeed people away from isolationist attitudes to a more active role, and secondly, the insistence by the germans to carry out unrestricted mercantile warfare in the Pan american neutrality zone. so the period 1939-41 was a period of dynamic change in terms of US foreign policy stance, but certainly not one of overt aggression 



> And, well, Hitler definitely was really surprised (shocked actually) when the Allied declared war on 3 September


.

bollocks. hitler expected and wanted war in 1939. He confided (I think to Mussolini) that his greatest fear was that the allies would make another deal as they had at Munich.


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## Hoju2k (Feb 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Your attachment, which i have not cross checked, but which looks about right, illustrates in spades why the germans were outproduced by both britain and the USSR.


Actually, it shows Germany outproducing both the UK and the USSR


> And serves to underline the gross inefficiency of the German war economy. Despite the obvious potential strength of the German economy this did not translate to enhanced military outputs. They lagged badly in all the major categories. Reason....well ther are many, but in amongst it is the cost per unit of their equipment, the innefficiency and sheer corruption of the regime....too many leaks in the bucket to be a modern economy too many snouts in the trough. Of course there were legitmate reasons like a shortage of raw materials and shortages of manpower, but still, your claim is that they 9the germans) outproduced the Russians. They had more resources, as your little graph show, but they did not outproduce them


The graph (Harrison, "The economics of WW2") do not show "resources", nor those absurd claims that you are making. 



> here are some basic figures on military outputs for Germany/USSR
> 
> Tanks SPGs
> 67425/105,251
> ...


Not an exhaustive list. What about submarines? or explosives production?, just to name a few, that would show the SU way behind Germany in those categories.
Anyway, what would that prove? That there was no LL for Germany, or that the Germans needed to expand their industrial capacity before expand the armament production, or that the soviets factories did not have to face an "around the clock" bombing, or that the Germans were facing shortages in many key resources?. That simplistic analysis is worthless.


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## Hoju2k (Feb 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> .
> 
> bollocks. hitler expected and wanted war in 1939. He confided (I think to Mussolini) that his greatest fear was that the allies would make another deal as they had at Munich.



Wrong. He wanted war with the Poles, not with the Allies. From the wiki (I know... but at least this is sourced):



> When on the morning of 3 September 1939 Chamberlain followed through with his threat of a British declaration of war if Germany attacked Poland, a visibly shocked Hitler asked Ribbentrop "Now what?", a question to which Ribbentrop had no answer except to state that there would be a "similar message" forthcoming from the French Ambassador Robert Coulondre, who arrived later that afternoon to present the French declaration of war.[293] Weizsäcker later recalled that "On 3 Sept., when the British and French declared war, Hitler was surprised, after all, and was to begin with, at a loss".[245] The British historian Richard Overy wrote that what Hitler thought he was starting in September 1939 was only a local war between Germany and Poland, and his decision to do so was largely because he vastly underestimated the risks of a general war.[294] In part due to Ribbentrop's influence, it has been often observed that Hitler went to war in 1939 with the country he wanted as his ally – namely the United Kingdom – as his enemy, and the country he wanted as his enemy – namely the Soviet Union – as his ally.[


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## DonL (Mar 1, 2012)

@ Parsifal



> My opinion is that the Soviets were getting ready to take punitive action into Rumania, not Poland. they had massed most of their armour in the southern sector, and were building an inordinate number of airfields. The germans had wanted Soviet action to the South, against turkey, but the the Soviets wanted to gain control of the balkans.first step, overrun Romania



A little Offtopic, but from your personal viewpoint, do you think the Red Army had a realistic chance to overrun Romania without Barbarossa, the military learning of Barbarossa and without Land Lease, if the Wehrmacht/Luftwaffe would defend Romania? 

To my personal opinion, without a deep operation strategy, such an invasion would end in a disaster for the Red Army, but this is only my viewpoint.


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## parsifal (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL said:


> @ Parsifal
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Its hard to see the germans just standing idly by and allowing the Russians to take over such a vital area without resisting or providing assistance to the rumanians. In hindsight we know that the Germans did not view the Soviet/German pact the same as the germans did. From the Soviet perspective in 1940 they had watched the Germans giving the Rumanians a bit of a drubbing over Ruthenia, where they sided with the hungarians and ceded the territory to the hungarians. This is my take on the Soviet appraisal then. They overestimated the elevel of co-operation between the Soviets and the germans, and misread the walloping the germans had given the Rumanians. They therefopre perhaps concluded that the germans would not raise too much objection to the dismberment of Rumania. Perhaps they expected a poland style demarkation into spheres of influence with the oil areas going to germany and other parts going to Russia. 

this is all speculation from me. What we do know is that the Soviets were expansionist and militaristic and were not afraid to "go it alone" if they had to. Stalin was not afraid to confront Hitler, as he had done in the Baltic States in 1940

My opinion on Soviet military capability in 1941? very low. They could have beaten the Rumanians fairly easily escept if the germans provided assistance to the Rumanians, then the equation becomes much more difficult


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 1, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Hitler was mild by historical standards and far from the maddest of people. Pol Pot, Mao and Stalin were far worse and certainly far worse. If you kept your head down in WW2 Germany or Reich territory you got to stay alive unless you were jewish. Hitler might get angry, might rant, but he didn't kill anyone unless he had a good reason. Within that I include laying waste to a village and its inhabitants for being used by or by supporting insurgent/partisan activities (which often involved deliberately provocative atrocities against German soliers)



Really???

Come one now? So he had a good reason for killing 6 million Jews? 



You said it.

And let alone the Jews, what about all the other groups that have been mentioned? Gays, Gypsies, etc.? Did he have a good reason for them?


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## Juha (Mar 1, 2012)

I'd not go through the whole text, I'll comment only the silliest points.



Easy1 said:


> ...Saying they killed the disabled is utterly wrong. Old people are disabled and they were not massacered. Goebbels himself was disabled with his by a clubbed foot which hindered his ability to walk



Not all old people are disabled, where you got that idea?




Easy1 said:


> Persecution of gays and the "unfit" is not so much related to Hitler. Hitler was not the most prominent advocator of this in Germany and it happened in many other countries, for example among the victors of WWII. To your information, there were several nazi officials that were Gay. Erns Röhm being one of them. Being gay did not imly you would be killed.



You might need to check what happened tp Röhm.




Easy1 said:


> As for the war in the east, there was harsh brutality on all sides. Are you saying the Germans somehow started it?



Einsatzgruppen were formed before the beginning of the Barbarossa, so German brutality was preplanned. Saying that doesn't mean that the brutality was onesided, Soviet shot PoWs from day one but only one side, the Germans, had planned exterminationpolicy beforehand and only they had plans to wipe out certain population groups among their enemies.




Easy1 said:


> Saying Hitler started WWII is an exageration, an extremely typical one for that matter. Japan had already waged war in Asia for for three years before Hitler attacked Poland. Italy had already conquered Ethiopia. Stalin had attacked Finland, annexed the Baltic countries and Besarabia AND did indeed attack Poland days after Hitler did. For some reason, the allies chose not to declare war against USSR as they did when Germany did the very same Poland.



SU attacked Finland on 30 Nov 39, 3 months after Germany's attack on Poland and annexed Baltic countries in 1940, during the summer IIRC.


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## DonL (Mar 1, 2012)

> Hitler was mild by historical standards and far from the maddest of people. Pol Pot, Mao and Stalin were far worse and certainly far worse. If you kept your head down in WW2 Germany or Reich territory you got to stay alive unless you were jewish. Hitler might get angry, might rant, but he didn't kill anyone unless he had a good reason. Within that I include laying waste to a village and its inhabitants for being used by or by supporting insurgent/partisan activities (which often involved deliberately provocative atrocities against German soliers)



Personaly I can't understand the argumentation "unless you were jewish", that's the same human beings as all other humans of the world.
And I don't want to negate in such a discussion the execution of women and childs only because they belived in the jewish church or creed!

Apart from that the sentence is quiet wrong. The SS/SD executed parts of the polish intelligence and all over Europe in every occupied country every person who was in the wrong political party, part of the country intelligence or in opposisition (not partisans) to the Nazi Party must reckon to be executed and many were executed.

Also the difference in races was one major impact, for the Nazi Party all Slav's were Untermenschen and could be treated as slaves or executed to very minor delicts. That was a fundemental proclamation of the Nazi Party! Further their were the execution of the Sinty and Roma!

So very many people/persons must fear the Nazi Regime all over Europe independent from the fact if they were "jewish" or not!


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## Gixxerman (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL

I know German resentment of France's post WW1 attitudes were a major factor in what gave rise to the 1930's and all of that (some have even written that there was a brief interlude between phases of the same war).
The reality is also clouded by the fact Germany was at war during the time of the occupation, whereas France was not right after WW1.
But I do not think one can compare the (and I freely admit unnecessarily harsh) treatment the French imposed on Germany to the wartime privations Germany would later impose on France in WW2.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 1, 2012)

As for the rest of the commentators taking issue with what I said?

Wow.
The Hitler apologists came out alright.

I'm not going to bother addressing what in large part boils down to a shabby exercise in 'whataboutery'.

I will kill one lie stone dead though.......yes, the nazi regime did murder disabled people.
It was called Operation T4," a reference to Tiergartenstrasse 4, after the address of the Berlin Chancellery offices where the program was headquartered.

Clearly not all disabled people an I never said or implied any such thing (although citing the case of Goebbels as proof of anything here strikes me as stunningly ill-informed and worse frankly utterly sick).

There was a state sanctioned euthanasia program where German doctors medical staff killed the mentally physically 'unfit'. 
.......and it is a subject which causes great offence, hurt and shame in Germany today.
German people murdering Germans, quite deliberately.
This was nothing to do with Stalin, communists, perfidious Britons, meddling American finance or Jews; one of the first great nazi crimes was against the most vulnerable defenseless German people.
The - German - estimate is between 200,000 250,000 poor souls.

I have to say I have found some of the comments on this thread quite outrageous utterly shameful.

Yes I know about sterilisation programs elsewhere and some worse but to claim or imply an equivalence in the face of the scale of the nazi crimes in this is just a gross deceit.


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## Elmas (Mar 1, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Unbelievable. im speechless. the depths of historical revisionism here are staggering



So am I.

But probably not to the point I've seen in another forum in wich a fella stated that:

_" the Americans bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki just to stop the Soviets to invade Japan, as the Russians were ready to invade and the Americans were not......"_sic

I vainly tried this fella to consider just the numbers of CVA, CVE, BB, DD, LS etc. between Americans and Soviets in 1945, but with no appreciable result.
Thats was very interesting, as I had the possibility to measure one of the highest hardness of brain in my career of Structural Engineer, no less than 600 Brinell, I should say......
Did we reach these depths?
Probably not, but we are dangerously approaching.....


Mode O.T. on

In the pages of this forum several times I mentioned one of my best Friends, that aged 17 joned the R.S.I.





He spent hours telling me about his experiences, knowing that I was so eager to know first-hand about WWII.
Once he told me exactly these words:
_“For what I had the possibility to know after the end, I must say that I was very fortunate for losing the war”_....
So He told me.

Mode O.T. off


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## Siegfried (Mar 1, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Who paid for the lend lease goods that went to Russia it certainly was not the UK , as they were out of money , they were flat broke as of Dec 1940 ..



Not quite, the Commonwealth and colonies still had money that Britain had available.


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## pbfoot (Mar 1, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Not quite, the Commonwealth and colonies still had money that Britain had available.


I think you better check that out , Canada was paying its own bills rather then chip in to the Brits that way we maintained control over the Part XV Squadrons


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## Elmas (Mar 1, 2012)

And I do not certainly say, even if some left-wing propaganda expecially here in Italy says the contrary, and even if many German Soldiers acted so, that every and each German Soldier was a bloodthirsty enraged beast.

Mode O.T. on
At September 8th, 1943, my Grandfather was the Chief-Technician in the small gauge Railway in a tiny Village in the inner part of Sardinia, where the services had been dispatched to avoid the bombings that were flattening a great deal on the main city.
In the same Village a Division of Wehrmacht was deployed.
As soon the news of the Armistice started to go around the Commander of the Division asked for my Grand-father and the Commander told him:
_“We have seen you are an honest person. We are going away and we won’t take with us all the provisions. Here are the keys, distribute all to the population.”_
And so was done: the following morning the Division went north to embark for the mainland.
As my Grand-father died when I was ten, this story was told me by several of the Villagers.”
Mode O.T. off


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## drgondog (Mar 1, 2012)

It is interesting to see how this thread has devolved from a discussion of major influences on the dcline of the Luftwaffe to one of 'which regime and leader' was the most brutal.

I would nominate Stalin as number one because he killed the most of his own people, with Hitler a plausible second. Staling killed because of ideology failures and Hitler because of genetic deficiencies. Anybody care to quibble on this point?

Mussolini was a choir boy in comparison. Hirohito/Tojo slip into third place for me for all the reasons we can bring up in China as well as treatment of POWs.

Folks, we can't discount Churchill, FDR and Truman. If you happened to be a civilian and were in or around a target that was being shelled or bombed, so solly for that. Hamburg and Dresden were high on a list that included Nagasaki and Hiroshima but the night raids on Tokyo may take supreme prizes for most civilians whacked over a span of time and of course 'one bomb kills all' set the tone for MADD during the cold war when all us chillin's were doing nuclear bomb drills at school during the 50's. 

I am an American, I lived in Tokyo in 1947-1950 when my father had the 35th FBW. Few stones in Tokyo were stacked on another even though a great rebuilding process occurred. I am not ashamed of what we did - but I am sad that we don't seem to get it right no matter how many illustrations we have of bad behavior in the past. Anybody wondering if the next Flood or Armageddon is just around the corner to sweep it all away and try, try again - or has the Skipper given up?

No nation's leaders or soldiers escaped the brush of 'killers' of innocents.

Now, let us all back away from my soapbox and ask 'so what happened to the Luftwaffe, and why did they move so many of their assets from Ost and Sud to Germany in mid to fall of 1943 when the USSR was advancing in the East?" "Why was the fighter pilot survival rate, per sortie, in the West so much lower than in the East"

Regards,

Bill


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 1, 2012)

Bill, a man of wisdom...


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## Elmas (Mar 1, 2012)

drgondog said:


> .................................
> Now, let us all back away from my soapbox and ask 'so what happened to the Luftwaffe, and why did they move so many of their assets from Ost and Sud to Germany in mid to fall of 1943 when the USSR was advancing in the East?"
> ...................................
> Regards,
> ...



This is easier matter, I think....
The first thing that a Structural Engineering Student apprehends, apart vulcanoes of Maths, is that every object created of the surface of the Earth is always the result of a compromise. Aeroplanes most of all.
Generally there are no extremists between Engineers ( vith notable examples: Osama Bin Laden was Graduated in Civil Engineering....)
That tends Aeroplane designers and Top Brasses of Air Staffs to a rater conservative point of view.
The position of German H.Q. was simple: they do not have sufficient planes for both Fronts and they sent the planes were they feel they were, in their own point of view, needed the most.
Like to have two creditors: you start to pay the more menacing one.......

They know perfectly that Ruhr was at a spit throw from Lincolnshire, and Germans also had read, a little bit too much maybe, like many others in those times, the book of this General






wich, strange it may sound to you, is the General Giulio Dohuet....

For the Germans Headquarters this was the best of the compromises, and at good reasons, seeing that the War lasted, in comparison to the overwhelming Forces that the Allied and the Germans throw in the respective plates of the scale, two more years.

And time was the most scarce and most needed raw material for the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe in those days.


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

Elmas said:


> This is easier matter, I think....
> The position of German H.Q. was simple: they do not have sufficient planes for both Fronts and they sent the planes were they feel they were, in their own point of view, needed the most.



But the main reason for this was a misconception of the reality. Many people say that Germany was always doomed because the industrial numbers. I don't think so. Germany started the war with planing, and that planing went wrong. 

Parsifal, I don't want to get off-topic, but a question for you: do you think that if Nazi Germany defeated the Soviets in '41 or 42, they would be able to stop the Anglo-Americans? I'm skeptical about this, and many historians use this to argument a total dependency of the West from the Communists. In my view, Germany would still face a terrible air war in the West, while the Baku oilfields would certainly be targeted by the Allies, not to mention a likely scorched earth policy from the Soviets in all their resources. The Americans also certainly would not start to desacelerate their industry in '44, and would include much more air and ground units. And ultimately, there would be the Manhattan Project.

BTW, didn't the Germans already captured many of the most rich regions in the USSR? (apart from oil)


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## Elmas (Mar 1, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> But the main reason for this was a misconception of the reality. Many people say that Germany was always doomed because the industrial numbers. I don't think so. Germany started the war with planing, and that planing went wrong.



I’m afraid to be in the position where I can’t agree with your words at all.
The Germans were just planning a thing: a war.
But how to, where and when, in 1939, where for them in the glass ball and they were planning a completely different war.
Or, better still: they were planning the war they made to Soviet Union.
The French Army was considered in 1939 by Germans Generals (and Hitler...), of course wrongly as the History clearly has show, far to strong to be easily beaten, let alone in a couple of weeks.
But _Fortuna audaces adiuvat_, Ancient Romans used to say ( and a modern, well trained and well commanded Army, were paperworks were kept to a minimum, I would like to add....)
The Fall of France of course changed all that: I think that even in the loveliest of the dreams in 1939 neither Grossadmiral Raeder and Doenitz (that was not GrossAdmiral, then...) were dreaming to have bases in La Pallice, Lorient, Brest, Bordeaux....like a boy that receives a toy train (probably a Playstation, nowadays)......
If they had planned all this, they would have started to build flocks of submarines from 1933 instead of building Bismark, that gave the British a smart victory just at the right moment, and Tirpitz, that was, for the whole war, a rusty piece of scrap iron....
It was certainly the British political foresight ( and planning) to sign the treaty with Poland, that permitted to start in 1939 a war that should have started probably in 1945 or 46.




Jenisch said:


> Parsifal, I don't want to get off-topic, but a question for you: do you think that if Nazi Germany defeated the Soviets in '41 or 42, they would be able to stop the Anglo-Americans? I'm skeptical about this......



I don’t want to be unpolite as the question it is not towards me........
IMHO, no.
But it would have been much more difficult. 




Jenisch said:


> BTW, didn't the Germans already captured many of the most rich regions in the USSR? (apart from oil)



Yes, certainly. But, as I said before, their silly and suicidal politics against the local population ruined all that, and made to grow a partizan war behind the lines that wasn’t in other parts of the occupied Europe.
It has to be remembered that the German garrisons of La Pallice, Lorient, Brest, Bordeaux surrendered......in May 1945, a fact generally hidden under a pity veil.......

Mode O.T. on
In these days, where German politicians are not very popular among the continental Europe, expecially in Greece, I’ve heard a very intelligent comment (IMHO, of course...) at the telly:

“_Poor Germany! It is the same old story. Far too big for Europe, far too small for the World_....”
Mode O.T. off


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

Elmas, I agree with those historians who say the French were capable of stoping the Germans. They just needed more agressivity. The Germans were lucky in the French campaign, not so superior.

About the Nazis and industry, well, something to think (including content for the question I addressed for Parsifal):

_In the summer of 1940, when German raw materials crises and a potential collision with the Soviet Union over territory in the Balkans arose, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union looked increasingly like Hitler's only solution.[40] While no concrete plans were made yet, Hitler told one of his generals in June that the victories in western Europe "finally freed his hands for his important real task: the showdown with Bolshevism",[41] though German generals told Hitler that occupying Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation."[42] The Führer anticipated additional benefits:

When the Soviet Union was defeated, the labor shortage in German industry could be relieved by demobilization of many soldiers.
Ukraine would be a reliable source of agricultural products.

Having the Soviet Union as a source of forced labor under German rule would vastly improve Germany's geostrategic position.
Defeat of the Soviet Union would further isolate the Allies, especially the United Kingdom.

The German economy needed more oil and controlling the Baku Oilfields would achieve this; as Albert Speer, the German Minister for Armaments and War Production, later said in his interrogation, "the need for oil certainly was a prime motive" in the decision to invade.[43]

*Weisung Nr. 21: Fall Barbarossa *

On 5 December 1940, Hitler received military plans for the invasion, and approved them all, with the start scheduled for May 1941.[44] On 18 December, Hitler signed War Directive No. 21 to the German High Command for an operation now codenamed "Operation Barbarossa" stating: "The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign."[44][45] The operation was named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century. The invasion was set for 15 May 1941.[45] In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December, Stalin mentioned Hitler's references to an attack on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf, and said they must always be ready to repulse a German attack, and that Hitler thought the Red Army would need four years to ready itself. Hence, "we must be ready much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another two years."[46]

In autumn 1940, high-ranking German officials drafted a memorandum on the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union. They said Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic States would end up as only a further economic burden for Germany.[47] Another German official argued that the Soviets in their current bureaucratic form were harmless, the occupation would not produce a gain for Germany and "why should it not stew next to us in its damp Bolshevism?"[47]

Hitler ignored German economic naysayers, and told Hermann Göring that "everyone on all sides was always raising economic misgivings against a threatening war with Russia. From now onwards he wasn't going to listen to any more of that kind of talk and from now on he was going to stop up his ears in order to get his peace of mind."[48] This was passed on to General Georg Thomas, who had been preparing reports on the negative economic consequences of an invasion of the Soviet Union — that it would be a net economic drain unless it was captured intact.[48]_

Operation Barbarossa - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Not a very different idea from the Japanese: "the enemy will fight in the way I want". Of course, if the enemy didn't - and we all know it didn't - it happened in the way it happened.


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## Siegfried (Mar 1, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Elmas, I agree with those historians who say the French were capable of stoping the Germans. They just needed more agressivity. The Germans were lucky in the French campaign, not so superior.
> 
> About the Nazis and industry, well, something to think (including content for the question I addressed for Parsifal):
> On 5 December 1940, Hitler received military plans for the invasion, and approved them all, with the start scheduled for May 1941.[44] On 18 December, Hitler signed War Directive No. 21 to the German High Command for an operation now codenamed "Operation Barbarossa" stating: "The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign."[44][45] The operation was named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century. The invasion was set for 15 May 1941.[45] In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December, Stalin mentioned Hitler's references to an attack on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf, and said they must always be ready to repulse a German attack, and that Hitler thought the Red Army would need four years to ready itself. Hence, "we must be ready much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another two years."[46]
> ...



There are however completely differing points of view, also supported by facts and footnotes. The art of footnoting has become rather suspect of late I think a lot of them just lead to just an opinion peace rather than a reliable source.


Soviet offensive plans controversy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Another piece of evidence is a recently discovered Stalin's speech on the 5 May 1941 when he revealed his mind to graduating military cadets.[30] He proclaimed: "A good defense signifies the need to attack. Attack is the best form of defense.... We must now conduct a peaceful, defensive policy with attack. Yes, defense with attack. We must now re-teach our army and commanders. Educate them in the spirit of attack"

Middle positions

In a 1987 article in the Historische Zeitschrift journal, the German historian Klaus Hildebrand argued that both Hitler and Stalin separately were planning to attack each other in 1941.[48] In Hildebrand’s opinion, the news of Red Army concentrations near the border led to Hitler engaging in a Flucht nach vorn ("flight forward"-i.e. responding to a danger by charging on rather than retreating).[48] Hildebrand wrote "Independently, the National Socialist program of conquest met the equally far-reaching war-aims program which Stalin had drawn up in 1940 at the latest".[48] Hildebrand's views could be considered as a median viewpoint in the preventive war debate.[citation needed]

A middle position seems to be taken by the Israeli historian Martin van Creveld. In an interview in the April 11, 2005 edition of the German news magazine FOCUS, which is the second largest weekly magazine in Germany, he said: "I doubt that Stalin wanted to attack as early as autumn 1941, as some writers argue. But I have no doubt that sooner or later, if Germany would have been entangled in a war with Great Britain and the United States, he would have taken what he wanted. Judging by the talks between Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov in November 1940, this would have been Romania, Bulgaria, an access to the North Sea, the Dardanelles and probably those parts of Poland that were under German control at that time." Asked to what degree the leaders of the Wehrmacht needed to feel threatened by the Soviet military buildup, van Creveld replies "very much" and adds: "In 1941, the Red Army was the largest army in the world. Stalin may, as I said, not have planned to attack Germany in autumn 1941. But it would be hard to believe that he would not have taken the opportunity to stab the Reich in the back sometime."[49]

Support

While Western researchers (two exceptions being Albert L. Weeks[50] and R. C. Raack [51][52][53]) ignored Suvorov's thesis,[54] he has gathered some support among Russian professional historians, starting in the 1990s. Support for Suvorov's claim that Stalin had been preparing a strike against Hitler in 1941 began to emerge as some archive materials were declassified. Authors supporting the Stalin 1941 assault thesis are Valeri Danilov,[55] V.A. Nevezhin,[56] Constantine Pleshakov, Mark Solonin[57] and Boris Sokolov.[58] As the latter has noted, the absence of documents with the precise date of the planned Soviet invasion can't be an argument in favor of the claim that this invasion was not planned at all. Although the USSR attacked Finland, no documents found to date which would indicate November 26, 1939 as the previously assumed date for beginning of the provocations or November 30 as the date of the planned Soviet assault.[59]

One of views was expressed by Mikhail Meltyukhov in his study Stalin's Missed Chance.[60] The author states that the idea for striking Germany arose long before May 1941, and was the very basis of Soviet military planning from 1940 to 1941. Providing additional support for this thesis is that no significant defense plans have been found.[61] In his argument, Meltyukhov covers five different versions of the assault plan (“Considerations on the Strategical Deployment of Soviet Troops in Case of War with Germany and its Allies” (Russian original)), the first version of which was developed soon after the outbreak of World War II. The last version was to be completed by May 1, 1941.[62] Even the deployment of troops was chosen in the South, which would have been more beneficial in case of a Soviet assault.[63]

Mark Solonin presents that several variants of the war plan against Germany existed since at least August 1940, although the differences between them were slight. Solonin also notes that no other plans for Red Army deployment in 1941 has been found so far [64], and that the concentration of Red Army units in Western parts of USSR was done in direct accordance with May “Considerations on plan for strategic deployment”:


Its worth noting why these ideas are so vehemently opposed:

_David M. Glantz disputes the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941. According to Glantz, the Red Army was only in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941, from which neither effective defensive or offensive actions could be offered without considerable delay. Glantz is also explicitly concerned that Suvorov's thesis involves condemnation of the Soviet regime and in his view exculpates Germany:

"In short these new theories categorically blame the Soviet Union for planning preemptive war against Germany in July 1941. Enunciation of this theory further condemns the Soviet regime, and more importantly, justifies the German invasion and absolves Germany of blame for the ensuing human suffering"_


Glantz's concern is not getting to what happened but ensuring the remaining moral constellation constructed remains in place.

He who controls history controls the past, he who controls the past controls the present.


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

Siegfried, if Stalin wanted to attack Germany and take Europe or not, the Nazis don't deserve any credit in saving anybody. According to your logic, what Hitler did was the same as open a barrage to flood a city and offer a friendly hand for the survivors later. If he didn't destroyed the order in Europe, it would be unlikely for Stalin to attack if really was the case.


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## DonL (Mar 1, 2012)

> Elmas, I agree with those historians who say the French were capable of stoping the Germans. They just needed more agressivity. The Germans were lucky in the French campaign, not so superior.



Here I disagree fundamental from the military viewpoint.
The French Army/Leadership was thinking in terms of WWI and believed in the Maginot Line. The money and material effort of the Maginot Line was a very huge part of the French military budget. But the Maginot Line was a relict of a static warfare and was totaly useless in a modern armored warfare. The most part of the 1930's the French Army wasted a lot of money for nothing.
Also most parts of the French Armyleadership didn't recognize the importance of modern armored warfare and the new armoured divisions of the French Army were more or less some outsider Divisions with no clear tactical concept.

I agree that the French Army was equal to the Wehrmacht in terms of weapon quality and quantity but years behind from trained modern armored divisions, tactics and strategy. The French Army in the condition of 1940 had no single chance against the Wehrmacht, because the French Army laged fundemental knowledge, concept and training about a modern armoured war!


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## Elmas (Mar 1, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Elmas, I agree with those historians who say the French were capable of stoping the Germans. They just needed more agression. The Germans were luck in the French campaign, not so superior.
> ......................



That the Germans were extremely lucky (beginners luck, I should say...) was already told.
It would have been sufficient just a Fairey Battle by chance out of route over the gigantic traffic jams of Ardennes....
but....
If you are speaking of the Historians, with capital H, they have also a capital sin: they are graduated in something similar to Literature and consider with dis gust to dirty themselves with the grease, gasoline, screwdrivers and explosives that are necessary to win a war.
Probably in the AngloSaxons Nations it is a little bit different ( ....not very much, for that) but time ago I had to explain to a Colleague that teaches Modern and Contemporary History here in the College what was a Magnetron...
And how can you understand the Battle of the Atlantic without knowing what a Magnetron is?
History is mostly history of the war, and war is technology, from stone to claw, to arch and arrow to atomic bomb. Have you ever seen the movie 2001 A space odissey?
Just consider one thing: D 520 was certainly a good plane but was it so good, in good numbers, and with sufficient trained Pilots and ground Crews to oppose Luftwaffe?
IMHO, no.


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## pbfoot (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL said:


> Here I disagree fundamental from the military viewpoint.
> The French Army/Leadership was thinking in terms of WWI and believed in the Maginot Line. The money and material effort of the Maginot Line was a very huge part of the French military budget. But the Maginot Line was a relict of a static warfare and was totaly useless in a modern armored warfare. The most part of the 1930's the French Army wasted a lot of money for nothing.
> Also most parts of the French Armyleadership didn't recognize the importance of modern armored warfare and the new armoured divisions of the French Army were more or less some outsider Divisions with no clear tactical concept.
> 
> I agree that the French Army was equal to the Wehrmacht in terms of weapon quality and quantity but years behind from trained modern armored divisions, tactics and strategy. The French Army in the condition of 1940 had no single chance against the Wehrmacht, because the French Army laged fundemental knowledge, concept and training about a modern armoured war!


and how about them horses that moved 90% of the Wehrmacht


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## DonL (Mar 1, 2012)

> That the Germans were extremely lucky (beginners luck, I should say...) was already told.



The "Sichelschnitt Plan" from Manstein had nothing to do with luck, it was a custom made plan to the possibilities of the Wehrmacht and it's modern armored warfare strategy and tactic in combination with the Luftwaffe.

I should asked how long did you think you could stop the Wehrmacht at some parts of the Ardennes and how much time the Wehrmacht needed to search the next weak point of the French Army Front to built a focal point to punch through?

To say the French campaign 1940 was luck is to my opinion very adventurous!


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## DonL (Mar 1, 2012)

> and how about them horses that moved 90% of the Wehrmacht



This is a kind of myth!

At the France Campaign the Wehrmacht had 10 Panzer Divisions and roundabout 8-9 motorized Infantry Divisions out of 76 Divisions, (19 out of 76) hardly 90 percent horse driven.

At the Barbarossa Campaign the Wehrmacht had at the beginning 20 Panzerdivisions and 17 motorized Infantry Divisions out of 150 Divisions. At the beginning of 1942 they had 24 Panzer Divisions and 17 motorized Infantry Division out of 150 Divisions.
(37 out of 150 Divisions) and (41 out of 150 Divisions) are hardly 90 percent horse driven Divisions!


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## parsifal (Mar 1, 2012)

drgondog said:


> It is interesting to see how this thread has devolved from a discussion of major influences on the dcline of the Luftwaffe to one of 'which regime and leader' was the most brutal.
> 
> I would nominate Stalin as number one because he killed the most of his own people, with Hitler a plausible second. Staling killed because of ideology failures and Hitler because of genetic deficiencies. Anybody care to quibble on this point?
> 
> ...




Bill

For once I disagree with you, and strongly so. This opinion has all the hallmarks of a Munich style appeasement....an attempt to water down the unpleasntness that has rampages into this thread. Comparing the allies with the murderous regimes of the nazis or the Soviets is deeply offensive and just wrong. The deaths they ordered as a result of their military campaigns, including the Point Bank offensive (strategic bombing offensives) were attacks against unsurrendered belligerents who continued to resist as a nation the will of our nations. The bombing campaign was new and controversial because it targetted civilans deliberately. Whilst distasteful , and a crime under modern International law, back in 1945 it was not outlawed, and not against the conventions of wars that applied at that time. It was distasteful, but not illegal.

By contrast the activities of the Nazis was illegal. They murdered their own people without trial and who were guilty of nothing. They did the same to millions of others, whose governments had surrendered, effectively saying to the germans "we will no longer resist you, in exchange for your protection and continued survival". The Germans accepted those surrenders, effectively as a nation giving their word to do just that. They broke that promise by systematically murdering anyone they liked. these people , with some exceptions were not resisting the Germans.

There is a world of difference between killing an enemy (civilian or not) who is still resisting you, and killing people whose country had surrendered and were no longer offering resistance. One is collateral damage, the other is murder. We need to know the difference, and standf for what is right, not for what we think might gain a litlle peace in this place


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL said:


> Here I disagree fundamental from the military viewpoint.
> The French Army/Leadership was thinking in terms of WWI and believed in the Maginot Line. The money and material effort of the Maginot Line was a very huge part of the French military budget. But the Maginot Line was a relict of a static warfare and was totaly useless in a modern armored warfare. The most part of the 1930's the French Army wasted a lot of money for nothing.
> Also most parts of the French Armyleadership didn't recognize the importance of modern armored warfare and the new armoured divisions of the French Army were more or less some outsider Divisions with no clear tactical concept.
> 
> I agree that the French Army was equal to the Wehrmacht in terms of weapon quality and quantity but years behind from trained modern armored divisions, tactics and strategy. The French Army in the condition of 1940 had no single chance against the Wehrmacht, because the French Army laged fundemental knowledge, concept and training about a modern armoured war!



OMG, I loose one full translation from an article in Portuguese I did about this, due to a problem with the internet when was posting it here. +_+ 

In a summary: the Le Mond published a series of articles based in new evidence in 2010 - that unfornately I don't have any link at the momment - which says that the Allies overlooked the Ardennes, and there was no such a thing as Blitzkrieg (it was a myth), and the final decision for the attack in the Ardennes was taked by Guderian and Manstein when they meet in a acampment by random. The Allied plan was to stabilize the front and cut Germany from the Swedish iron to suffocate it. The plan is said to have been very well done, even by modern analists, it's only flaw being the already mentioned overlook of the Ardennes.


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## parsifal (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL said:


> This is a kind of myth!
> 
> At the France Campaign the Wehrmacht had 10 Panzer Divisions and roundabout 8-9 motorized Infantry Divisions out of 76 Divisions, (19 out of 76) hardly 90 percent horse driven.
> 
> ...



I agree with your summation of the french campaign in your preceding posts, and even that in 1940-1 the German army was at least partially motorized. Moreover, in 1940, even the horse drawn transport per 1st line division was lavish. The front line Infantry Divisions....numbering roughly 30 Divs in 1940, had authorised truck compliments of over 750 vehicles and over 5900 horses per division. That compares to about 2500 vehicles in a British Infantry Div of the BEF (plus another 2500 serving in LOC capacities but not attached directly to the division. From th end of the French campaign, however, to the end of the war there was a mrked dcline in the extent of motorization. In 1940, Hitler ordered the formation of additional Panzer units. These were achieved by removing one of the regiments of the Panzer Brigade orf each Pz div, and marrying that to either a regiment taken from the PG divs (at that time referred to as motorized Divs), or more usually taking one of the regiments from a 1st line Infantry Div and more than half the trucks attached to those divisions. Some divs lost no men but did lose trucks. New replacement regiments for those Infantry regiments taken were raised as replacements, and generally given inferior foreign MT as replacement (but not to the same scale, such that these spearhead Infantry units enteredf Russia with about 500 or so trucks per div. Unfortunately for them, the cheap french trucks they were now equipped with had poor spares support, and wer not up to the rigours of the Russian campaign. By winter, the vast majority of german controlled trucks were unserviceable awaiting repair or written off. There was a partial recovery in 1942, but by 1943 the numbers of trucks per division in the Infantry had sunk to under 300. The numbers of draft animals had taken a similar plunge....there were on average less than 1900 horses per div, even before the 1943 reorganizations of the infantry.

Manstein knew this, and even though he advocated a form of defence/offense in 1943 to wear the Russians down, he also knew that long distance mass movements on a front wide basis was now beyond the transport capacity of the german army. To undertake mobile operations he could only do this by absolutely stripping out transport from quiet sectors and pooling his transport at the point it was needed.

German motorization did eventually become a myth, but in 1940 it was one of the most mobile armies in Europe


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## DonL (Mar 1, 2012)

> In short: the Le Mond published a series of articles in 2010 - that unfornately I don't have any link at the momment - which says that the Allies overlooked the Ardennes, and there was no such a thing as Blitzkreig (it was a myth), and the final decision for the attack in the Ardennes was taked by Guderian and Manstein when they meet in a acampment by random. The Allied plan was to stabilize the front and cut German from the Swedish iron. The plan is said to have been very well done, even by modern analists, and it's only flaw being really the Ardennes.



I don't understand this argumentation!

1. The Blitzkrieg concept comes in action *after* you built a focal point at a weak spot at the enemy front and punch through this hole!
There are more weak spots at the French front not only the Ardennes or part of the Ardennes
2. The deployment of the troops at the Ardennes were fundemental part of the "Sichelschnitt Plan". The german strategic plan of the French Campaign.
3. How do you will cut Germany from the Swedish/Norway Iron? The French Campaign started at 10 Mai 1940, Germany had occupied Denmark and Norway at 9 April 1940!


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## pbfoot (Mar 1, 2012)

Do not forget the logistics tail of these units they were very much horse drawn


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## drgondog (Mar 1, 2012)

Parsifal - I understand your argument. I agree the points regarding 'legality'. I believe I ranked the 'highly illegal' contributors in their proper order. I deeply respect your point of view.

Having said and agreed your key points, do you now want to pose ethical and moral high ground when a bomber commander, with full authority of his Commander in Chief, decides to initiate and execute a campaign that not only 'possibly will result in collateral damage' but surely deep fry and otherwise barbeque infants, women and children as ok because we are the good guys? 

For the moment in this discussion, had I been Curtis LeMay and chartered with bringing a long war to conclusion I would have done EXACTLY the same thing. He accepted the moral consequences as I would have in the same circumstances. Having said that, there are universal legal and ethical constraints in the rules and guidelines of war. It doesn't give us a break as an aircraft commander, or a panzer/tank commander, or airborne infantry platoon commander when he a.) blows up a train that may have civilians on it, b.) blasts a building that is marked with a Red Cross that he 'thinks' it is being used as an OP, c.) strafing a train because it 'might be' carrying troops instead of civilians, or d.) whacking a couple of prisoners because you need to travel 'light'.

As winners we didn't look in the rear view mirror - and still, individually, we committed many (not all) of the same acts as our 'barbarous enemies'. I do not want to pick on Bomber Harris or LeMay - but did either of these great war time commanders do anything less than Luftwaffe or IJN or VVS commanders bombing entire cities, churches, schools (the historic baited fields for children). No - they were just more efficient.

Parsifal, help me understand how kids in a school or mothers in a church were actively resisting Harris or Lemay. They (Allied commanders) didn't have the latitude, nor should they have, to halt a bombing attack because of collateral damage. From our perspective the end justified the means - but recognize that few were happy with the outcome in context of lives taken that they wished didn't happen. Non combatants, innocents, POWs, slave labor were killed just as effectively in a factory complex as the died in the wool nazi - as were the women and children that lived six miles away from the Aiming Point. Yes?

I will re-iterate. I am a proud American and Citizen who strongly supports our military and the conduct of our troopers in contrast with other nations, past and present - but I am not going to equate my pride with blanket approval of Dresden or Tokyo or Hamburg. Nor am I an Apologist. I just wanted to note that Germans that bombed Coventry, or Japanese that bombed manilla and Singapore were no more or less rightous than our guys bombing Tokyo, Berlin, Dresden and Hamburg.

I know and have known a lot of fighter pilots who wished that they didn't have to strafe trains - and bomber crews that had to bomb factories near homes and schools, or wondered where a salvo that was dumped into 10/10 cloud cover landed - but they did what they had to do as soldiers and what they could do for their own conscience... and got on with the task at hand. My father expressed regrets (often) about killing the Germans he killed as a fighter pilot - but he killed 'em and killed 'em again, and again... and let God sort it out.

In the cess pool of war, we took a higher position on the walls of depravity than say Germany or USSR or Japan but let us never fail to look in the mirror when we condemn the soldiers we fought. Nor should we hold FDR and Churchill on a high ethical plane because we were the 'good guys'. They understood the burdens they bore with respect to innocent lives and we can applaud their steadfast determination to prevail despite the collateral damage.

Under no circumstances should you consider me an apologist for Hitler or Stalin or a detractor of Churchill, FDR or Truman. I'm glad we had leaders like those rather than one I won't mention on the forum... and that is all I am going to say about the subject.

Regards,

Bill


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL, I need to find the article.

But about the Norway campaign, I will say that it started in April but only finished in June, when the French campaign was already a disaster for the Allies.


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## DonL (Mar 1, 2012)

> Do not forget the logistics tail of these units they were very much horse drawn



That isn't quiet correct! The logistics of the Panzer- and motorized Infantry Divisions were also fully motorized!

I agree with parsifal that the grade of motorization of the german Army droped down with every year of the war, because there was not enough supply to replace the losses but from the plan of organisation of the Panzer and motorized Infantry Division they were fully motorized at all units of the Division.


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## Siegfried (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL said:


> I don't understand this argumentation!
> 
> 1. The Blitzkrieg concept comes in action *after* you built a focal point at a weak spot at the enemy front and punch through this hole!
> There are more weak spots at the French front not only the Ardennes or part of the Ardennes
> ...



The book "The Blitzkrieg Myth" is by an American academic called Mosier. He makes a few valid points, certainly one is left with the impression that the usage of "Blitzkrieg" tactics by the Germans was exaggerated but I think Mosier is exaggerated as well. The "Blitzkrieg strategies incidently come from an English Officer called "Fuller" and were called "Breakthrough". IE the use of mechanised armour to "Breakthrough" at weak points before the enemy can respond.

However at the end of the day the Germans did prepare for short sharp wars and even if supposedly they didn't practice Blitzkrieg they had the appropriate mentality, equipment and command structures. They did have effective radios when others didn't, they did have an effective encryption system, they did have decentralised decision making. A German officer seeing an opportunity to attack would do so agressively, sometimes too hastily. He didn't send a telegraph to head quarters in Paris and wait a few days for it to clear someones in tray as actually happened during the battle of France; he used a radio or else his own automomy. If he died his second in command took over FULL and immediate authority and was trained to do so. I believe it was Moedel who surmised that that the key to winning to make decision more rapidly than your enemy and that a bad decision was better than no decision at all. In this aspect the Whermacht was way ahead of other armies, most particularly the French. A a tactical level the Germans were simply way ahead at the begining of the war.


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## Elmas (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL said:


> The "Sichelschnitt Plan" from Manstein had nothing to do with luck, it was a custom made plan to the possibilities of the Wehrmacht and it's modern armored warfare strategy and tactic in combination with the Luftwaffe.



That’s for sure.



DonL said:


> I should asked how long did you think you could stop the Wehrmacht at some parts of the Ardennes and how much time the Wehrmacht needed to search the next weak point of the French Army Front to built a focal point to punch through?



Quite a lot. A true war is not a Risiko as the real Finance is not Monopoly.....
Once an Army moves in a direction it not easy to redeploy it, expecially in extremely narrow and winding hilly lanes, with all the consequent traffic jams and with an enemy that is capable to keep an eye on you. One thing is an enemy that arrives unespected and unsuspected, another one is when arrives expected: the Germans lost the First Battle of Marne for this very reason, and fortunately there were all the Paris taxis to bring the “poilus” to the front.....
The French and British H.Q. were in 1940, IMHO, criminal in this respect, or put it as you want, they were not so lucky like in the WWI...



DonL said:


> To say the French campaign 1940 was luck is to my opinion very adventurous!



Of course the word “luck” has between an Italian and a German two completely different meanings....
I didn’t say that the German victory in the battle of France was due just and only to sheer luck, and if you will be so kind to read carefully my previous messages you will clearly discover it.


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## Siegfried (Mar 1, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Bill
> 
> For once I disagree with you, and strongly so. This opinion has all the hallmarks of a Munich style appeasement....



The "Munich" agreement wasn't appeasment or a Betrayal. It was the right thing to do and seen as such.

There were 3 million Sudden Germans concentrated on the German side of the border. They didn't want to be there. 5.5 millions Czechs and about 2.5 million Slovaks. The Slovaks didn't want to be there.

The Suddetens, once Bavarians, ended up part of the Austro-Hungarians empire as a result of one of the many strategic Hapsburg marriage in the 17th century. French and allied insistance, *against the principles of the Armistice*, imposed by a a food blocakde which lasted till 1919 that caused the starvation of about 1 million Germans, made them part of the *Chimera nation without a plebescite.*. This is "Czechoslovaka" which should best be called CzechoGermanoSlovakia. In the early 1930s Eduard Bennes, the ultra nationalist Czech president threatened to expell every German IF Austria and Germany united, as they were inlinded to do. IE ethnic cleansing which always leads to vast deaths. About 50,000 Germans were fired for "linquistic reasons" from the railways, land residtributions took land from Germans in German areas and gave it the Czechs, at which point czech shools were built for the new settlers. Jobs in the public service didn't seem to go to ethnic Germans. Czechoslovakia was supposed to be a Democracy. It wasn't. It was a giant Gerrymander. This wasn't a Swiss style confederation with decentralised democracy. It was a first past the post system that guaranteed domination by one ethnic group. The only democracy was at the small scale council level, to ensure the Suddens couldn't get any autonomy or God forbid vote to leave. Czech police ruined even local council elections by shooting some 80 unarmed German demonstraters in half a dozen villages. Did the Irish forget Bloody Sunday? Sudden Germans didn't forget the massacres either. The poverty Sudden Germans went through was far worse than ordinary Germans had to face. "Zuruck Ins Reich" (Back into the Reich) was a popular slogan. It's worth noting that woodrow Wilsons propagandistic 14 points was acually quite popular in Germany during WW1 and they likely would have accepted a swiss style confederalist democracy that had been mooted in Wilson "Plan".

Letting the Suddetens go, when they wanted to go, then it was non of Britains Business to force them to stay. Was Britain supposed to fight a war in order to compell 3 million ethnic Germans to stay when they didn't want to stay?

It's stupid to say Munich was 'appeasment' because it wasn't.

The situation of Ethnic Germans under the Polish government wasn't all that much better in some regions. Its worth noting that the first atrocities of the Polish-German war was by Polish soldiers entering the house of vulnerable and unarmed ethnic Germans and murdering the families there. Its worth putting that in the light of what happened in the subsequent occupation of Poland. The nazi regime may not have shown moderation and a lot of humanity, but neither was the other side without blame.


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

Anyway Siegfried, the French Army and Air Force were under a profound modernization by the time Hitler invaded. So were the Poles and many other countries. It would be unlikely for Stalin conduct any attack in Europe had the mess Hitler turned the continent and consequentely Asia (vulnerable colonies to diverte Japan away from the USSR) didn't existed. So, the Nazis didn't "saved" nobody.


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## DonL (Mar 1, 2012)

> Quite a lot. A true war is not a Risiko as the real Finance is not Monopoly.....
> Once an Army moves in a direction it not easy to redeploy it, expecially in extremely narrow and winding hilly lanes, with all the consequent traffic jams and with an enemy that is capable to keep an eye on you. One thing is an enemy that arrives unespected and unsuspected, another one is when arrives expected: the Germans lost the First Battle of Marne for this very reason, and fortunately there were all the Paris taxis to bring the “poilus” to the front.....
> The French and British H.Q. were in 1940, IMHO, criminal in this respect, or put it as you want, they were not so lucky like in the WWI...



But this is the whole concept of mobility to strike through unexpected. How often had the Wehrmacht the problem of very good defended stratical points at Barbarossa and how often they were searching a weak spot next to this point in the front, regroup and break through absolutely unexpected 30-60 miles away to drive in the back of the very good defended frontline. 

All officers were trained for this and as Siegfried mentioned it was part of their military education.

I don't want to deny that the French Army could stop the Wehrmacht perhaps for one or two weeks but after that, the Wehrmacht had found the one, two, three weak points in the frontline to strike through unexpected!

The whole problem of the French Army was their untrained Soldiers to tank attacks. Most of the units had the "tank scare" and they were unable to built a coordinated frontline, if tanks were in the back of the major frontline.


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## marshall (Mar 1, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The situation of Ethnic Germans under the Polish government wasn't all that much better in some regions. Its worth noting that the first atrocities of the Polish-German war was by Polish soldiers entering the house of vulnerable and unarmed ethnic Germans and murdering the families there. Its worth putting that in the light of what happened in the subsequent occupation of Poland. The nazi regime may not have shown moderation and a lot of humanity, but neither was the other side without blame.



Can you give some more details about it?


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## pbfoot (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL said:


> That isn't quiet correct! The logistics of the Panzer- and motorized Infantry Divisions were also fully motorized!
> 
> I agree with parsifal that the grade of motorization of the german Army droped down with every year of the war, because there was not enough supply to replace the losses but from the plan of organisation of the Panzer and motorized Infantry Division they were fully motorized at all units of the Division.


Come on man even Canada made more military trucks then Germany by 800K to 500k


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

DonL said:


> But this is the whole concept of mobility to strike through unexpected. How often had the Wehrmacht the problem of very good defended stratical points at Barbarossa and how often they were searching a weak spot next to this point in the front, regroup and break through absolutely unexpected 30-60 miles away to drive in the back of the very good defended frontline.
> 
> All officers were trained for this and as Siegfried mentioned it was part of their military education.


 
The Germans had better coordenation and independance of their Panzer divisions, together with the Luftwaffe. Other armies in the world already realized the combination of massive armored assaults with air support (Soviet Union in Khalkhin Gol). The Germans were "just" fully integrated with those techonologies already. 

Anyway, I maintein what I posted that had the French and British being more agressive and coordenated than they were, it would be possible to stabilize the front.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 1, 2012)

Would I be banned if I say that plenty of neo-Nazi crap is ruining this fine forum?


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## tyrodtom (Mar 1, 2012)

Siegfried is just regurgatating old propaganda put out by the Reichs Ministry of Propaganda 60+ years ago , and exposed as lies before most of us was born.


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## marshall (Mar 1, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Would I be banned if I say that plenty of neo-Nazi crap is ruining this fine forum?



I think I would be banned with you.


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## parsifal (Mar 1, 2012)

I will leave it up to individual members to consider his post 505 @ me. To me these are just deluded rantings not worth the effort of a reply. Knowing his earlier efforts in this pace it is no longer any surprise to me what is spewed out of this members mind. I will not glorify it by any other response


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> Siegfried is just regurgatating old propaganda put out by the Reichs Ministry of Propaganda 60+ years ago , and exposed as lies before most of us was born.



I think he does some valid points. The racial stuff for example is by some means true. There were people from different ethnic groups fighting with the Germans, and they have relations with many multiethnic societies such as in my country, were the Nazi party was the largest after Germany (in great part because the German immigration) . Many people think they simply wanted to kill anyone different from them, which is definately not truth.

Anyway, there's no excuse for what the Nazis did. But what let me sad in all this story is remember that the Communists are not even close to have legislation against their lies than the Nazis, and talk much more fallacies than them without any respect for the victims of the ideology.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 1, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Would I be banned if I say that plenty of neo-Nazi crap is ruining this fine forum?



I would just add that I have found the last 2 or 3 days at this site a very unpleasant shock.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 1, 2012)

Legislation or not, nobody here acclaims the deeds of Communists. And just because such legislation is not introduced, that does not mean that we need to listen the neo-Nazi stuff here. 
Since you were not at the receiving end of the deeds of a similar warmonger, while I and my family were, I do claim to have a far more crisp view at what is here presented as nothing-but-the-truth.

BTW, how well a predominately political topic fits into an Aircraft sub forum?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 1, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> I would just add that I have found the last 2 or 3 days at this site a very unpleasant shock.



Ditto.


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## Hoju2k (Mar 1, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> and the final decision for the attack in the Ardennes was taked by Guderian and Manstein when they meet in a acampment by random. The Allied plan was to stabilize the front and cut Germany from the Swedish iron to suffocate it. The plan is said to have been very well done, even by modern analists, it's only flaw being the already mentioned overlook of the Ardennes.



How come the decision of the main point of attack be taken by a Corps Commander (G) or a Chief of Staff of an Army Group? (M, later Corps CO). 
It can't, the decision was taken by the only man who was able to do that, I'm sure I don't have to name him...
The Guderian-Manstein "connection", if you will, actually happened during the time when Manstein was developing his idea for a new plan (later expresses in several memorandums), when the Headquarters of HGr A and the one of the XIX Korps were both in stationed in Koblenz, and the Generals were billeted in hotels that were next to each other. In that way, Manstein was able to consult Guderian about the feasibility of a Panzer attack across the Ardennes.

About the Allied plan, actually it was a very bad one, while based in some sound military and political principles, it completely misinterpreted the German intentions (that alone would be enough to disqualify it), and the addition of the "Breda" variant, that deprived the only strategic "mass of maneuver" (French 7.Armee), it has to be viewed as a criminal act.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 1, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> . Many people think they simply wanted to kill anyone different from them, which is definately not truth..


You seem to not know , or ignored that the Third Reich not only murdered 6 million Jews, but also almost as many other peoples.

WE all know the Communists murdered more, but over how many years did they do this ? 30 ? 40? The Third Reich did their 10 or 11 million in 6 years. 

So yes, I think a good argument could be made that they did wanted to kill everyone different from them. You were either Germanic, a slave, or dead, where ever they ruled.


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> You were either Germanic, a slave, or dead, where ever they ruled.


 
I don't think so. The Germans had allies, which it is not need to mention that were not Germans, not slaves and were well alive fighting alongside them.

Of course, such things by any means justify what the Germans did with millions of people. Just that like Stalin and the Communists, the Nazis didn't commited certain things much popularly mentioned about them.


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## parsifal (Mar 1, 2012)

> Actually, it shows Germany outproducing both the UK and the USSR



Actually it doesnt. It shows the germans had greater GDP. My figures are what they got in terms of actual materiel produced. This very clearly shows the germans were outproduced by both Britain and the USSR. You need to re-read the material 



> The graph (Harrison, "The economics of WW2") do not show "resources", nor those absurd claims that you are making.



Why are my claims "absurd". I was responding to your claim that the germans outproduced the russians and the Brits. I said that with about 70% of the german GDP the Rusians outproduced the germans by a clear margin. I produced data that suggests the GDP of the Russians 1938-45 was about 88% that of the germans, but in certain categories the russians outproduced the germans by as much a 3.24 times. Ther is nothing silly about that. the only thing silly is that you dont know the difference between GDP and equipment deliveries 



> Not an exhaustive list. What about submarines? or explosives production?, just to name a few, that would show the SU way behind Germany in those categories


.

Ah yes the gernmans outproduced the russians in naval construction for the entire war, but for the period up to June 1941, it was actually the Rusians in the lead. Up to that point they had produced something like 300 submarines about 50 destroyers. they had two battleships and two battlecruisers under construction, and about a dozen cruisers. they had several hundred coastal patrol vessels. In terms of river gunboats, the germans never came close to the Soviet production levels .

In terms of explosives production, I would dispute that the germans outproduced the russians, but would be interested to see what figures you are basing that claim on. ive never seen a completely exhaustive list for either belligerent but the bits and pieces I do have are suggesting the reverse to your claim. German AT ammunition production was less than that of even Canada. The Russians laid more land mines around Kursk than the entire wartime production by the Germans. ive got some other information at home, but I seriously doubt your claims here, which remain unsubstantiated at this point. time for you to put up, or shut up i would suggest. Produce your evidence, or stop callinmg me out with flippant comments. Dont stir me up, you wont like it. 



> Anyway, what would that prove? That there was no LL for Germany, or that the Germans needed to expand their industrial capacity before expand the armament production, or that the soviets factories did not have to face an "around the clock" bombing, or that the Germans were facing shortages in many key resources?. That simplistic analysis is worthless.



Its only worthless if you have a preconceived agenda and the information doesnt serve that agenda. The basic facts are just that. German productive capacity was potentially much greater than its opponents, but in the finish, due to systemic innefficiencies, resource shortages and manpower shortages, along with shortages of transport and a few other factors, lagged badly behind that of its oppnents. Remember your initial claim, that german production far outstripped that of the russians. You have produced squat to support that. Despite ample opportunity to correct that omission we are all waiting with baited breath for your enlightening clarification. persoanlly i thjink I will run out of breath before that ever happening.

Incidentally, in response to your rhetorical question "what does this all prove" It shows the latent inneffieiciency of the Nazi system and that Germany, despite considerable economic resources at its disposal, failed to capitalize on that advantage. this doesnt even look at the missed opportunities they squandered with the occupied territories....


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## tyrodtom (Mar 1, 2012)

America had allies, did they rule them ? Britain had allies, did they rule them?

I said where they ruled, in particular the eastern territories. They were not as harsh in Denmark, Belgium, Holland and France, they just murdered you if you showed the slightest resistance, or were a Jew. But in the eastern Europe the Third Reich conquered, you were either Germanic, a slave, or dead when your turn came.


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## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> But in the eastern Europe the Third Reich conquered, you were either Germanic, a slave, or dead when your turn came.



Ok, I understand you now.


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## Hoju2k (Mar 1, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Actually it doesnt. It shows the germans had greater GDP. My figures are what they got in terms of actual materiel produced. This very clearly shows the germans were outproduced by both Britain and the USSR. You need to re-read the material


Yes, it does. The Gross domestic product is much more comprehensive way to measure actual production that to take the numbers of very very few cherry picked items. If you can't understand this simple fact there's no reason to continue this.





> Why are my claims "absurd". I was responding to your claim that the germans outproduced the russians and the Brits. I said that with about 70% of the german GDP the Rusians outproduced the germans by a clear margin.



This is a clear contradiction.


> I produced data that suggests the GDP of the Russians 1938-45 was about 88% that of the germans, but in certain categories the russians outproduced the germans by as much a 3.24 times. Ther is nothing silly about that. the only thing silly is that you dont know the difference between GDP and equipment deliveries



What is really stupid is to take "certain categories" and use that to arrive to overall conclusions about the "outproducing". When there's absolutely no need to do that, when the graph clearly shows the overall production.

.



> Ah yes the gernmans outproduced the russians in naval construction for the entire war, but for the period up to June 1941, it was actually the Rusians in the lead. Up to that point they had produced something like 300 submarines about 50 destroyers. they had two battleships and two battlecruisers under construction, and about a dozen cruisers. they had several hundred coastal patrol vessels. In terms of river gunboats, the germans never came close to the Soviet production levels .


I suspect of those numbers because by June 22 1941, the Soviets only had 212 submarines... and I don't think they lost that many against the Finnish. Actual war production of submarines by the SU was 51 (june 41-may 45), this can be compared to the approx. 940 German submarines produced during the same period (I calculated the numbers for 1941 as half of the total for that year).


> In terms of explosives production, I would dispute that the germans outproduced the russians, but would be interested to see what figures you are basing that claim on. ive never seen a completely exhaustive list for either belligerent but the bits and pieces I do have are suggesting the reverse to your claim.


I'll get back to you on that.


> German AT ammunition production was less than that of even Canada. The Russians laid more land mines around Kursk than the entire wartime production by the Germans.



BS


> ive got some other information at home, but I seriously doubt your claims here, which remain unsubstantiated at this point. time for you to put up, or shut up i would suggest. Produce your evidence, or stop callinmg me out with flippant comments. Dont stir me up, you wont like it.



I have give you the evidence, you just can't or are unwilling to comprehend it. And thanks for the warning, I'm really impressed.





> Remember your initial claim, that german production far outstripped that of the russians.



Did not say that.


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## Siegfried (Mar 2, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Anyway Siegfried, the French Army and Air Force were under a profound modernization by the time Hitler invaded. So were the Poles and many other countries. It would be unlikely for Stalin conduct any attack in Europe had the mess Hitler turned the continent and consequentely Asia (vulnerable colonies to diverte Japan away from the USSR) didn't existed. So, the Nazis didn't "saved" nobody.



The French problem seems to have been a haphazard and dispersed small scale production of many different types of aircraft, including several models of fighters. This ensured that stable high quality production didn't quite get of the ground. Technically their engines were too weak. If the 860hp MS 460s engine had of matched the outuput of the 1100 or 1170hp DB601 the gap in performance might have been minimal.

France also had severe industrial relations problems that disrupted production, she was teetering on the edge of some kind of communism. National Socialism pretty much solved Industrial relations one way or another.

Given another 6 or 12 months the French would be ready, but then where would the Germans have advanced to.

The icebreaker strategy Suvorov advances involved a Soviet strategy of encouraging war between European countries in oder to exhaust them after which the Soviets would advance. Soviet modernisation plans couldn't quite make it by 1941 as Suvov claims but they certainly could by 1942. Without access to Soviet raw materials the Whermacht could never have rearmed. The Yak 1, MiG 3, LaGG 3 were all in mass production before Barbarossa and would certainly be debugged within 6 months. 

It's clear that Stalin was quite capable of taking not only the Baltic states Finland but Rommania, Bulgaria and likely Yugoslavia with or without Hitler. *He did as much.* and from there the strategic stituation dramatically shifts and improves Soviet options. Yes, Stalin played Ball with Hitler, he tried to things as easily as possible. That doesn't mean he didn't have means without Hitler.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 2, 2012)

This thread has the remainder of this day to get back on topic, which is about the "Defeat of the Luftwaffe", or it will be closed.

Any more talk that is not about the defeat of the Luftwaffe will have this thread closed.

Do all parties understand?


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 2, 2012)

On topic ..... the "Defeat of the Luftwaffe":



MM

(I do *not* discount the big US radials but _this_ is iconic - from Hurricane Spits to Lancasters, Mosquitos and Mustangs.) Merlins over Berlin


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

If I say 'splendid engine', that would be an understatement.


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> On topic ..... the "Defeat of the Luftwaffe":
> 
> 
> 
> ...


 
BTW, someone has a link with diagrams for WWII engines? I like to know the components but have dificulty to identify them, particularly in the acessory box.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 2, 2012)

Here is the link for the manual for 2-stage Merlins:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/engines/rr-merlin-2-stage-manual-30711.html


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> If the 860hp MS 460s engine had of matched the outuput of the 1100 or 1170hp DB601 the gap in performance might have been minimal.



The D.520 was a respectable machine for 1940. But like you said, the French would need some more time to produce more units. They also had the D.530 planned version with a 1,400 hp Rolls-Royce Merlin or a 1,800 hp Hispano-Suiza 12Y.

I have great interest in the French military, and no need to mention it was really a shame for the Allies they had been defeated so quickly.


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## stona (Mar 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> no I'm not saying that but I am saying the actual aerial Battle of Britain did not play the part of saving the UK its purported to have done , it was a very much needed propoganda victory of which there had been very few . The Germans could not have crossed the channel , with or without the intervention of RN



B
The British mainland did not have to be invaded to take Britain out of the war and I never said it did. I don't believe that the Wermacht could have mounted an invasion in 1940.
Had the RAF not fought and won the BoB a situation would have arisen where as London burned changes would have occurred in the coalition government followed by a treaty with Germany allowing her a freehand in Europe. That's all she wanted,to pursue her true ideological war in the East.
The BoB was far more than a propaganda victory for the British,it kept us in the war. It was also a defeat for the Luftwaffe however the numbers get spun today. It was the first time it had failed to achieve its objectives. It may have suffered heavy casualties during the Polish campaign and the BoF but German troops still marched up the Champs Elysee. They never marched down The Mall and the sacrifice of the men and women from around the world who served with the RAF at that crucial time has a lot to do with it.
Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

Had the Germans managed to destroy the RAF, they would be free to attack industrial targets, and perhaps more importantly: suffocate Britain attacking the convoys.


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## drgondog (Mar 2, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Had the Germans managed to destroy the RAF, they would be free to attack industrial targets, and perhaps more importantly: suffocate Britain attacking the convoys.



This is the thesis I support the most. Airpower attacking inbound shipping from ports outward, unfettered mine laying, complete access to key aircraft, oil storage and power should be a winning formula to force Britain out of the war.

In addition RN under constant harrassment which would hinder operations to curtail U Boat operations.


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

drgondog said:


> This is the thesis I support the most. Airpower attacking inbound shipping from ports outward, unfettered mine laying, complete access to key aircraft, oil storage and power should be a winning formula to force Britain out of the war.
> 
> In addition RN under constant harrassment which would hinder operations to curtail U Boat operations.


 
BTW, there's a book from 2010 called Operation Sea Lion: A Joint Critical Analysis, that seems interesting.

Description:

_Three U.S. officers -- one from the Air Force, one from the Army, and one from the Navy -- met at the Joint Forces Staff College to argue that a truly "joint" approach could have produced success for Hitler in Operation Sea Lion, the proposed invasion of England in 1940.
Military history contains many lessons from which the warfighting doctrine of the individual services, as well as joint doctrine, is derived. World War II stands as one of the major contributors of valuable lessons learned. From a joint and combined warfighting perspective, Germany's planning and preparatory military actions to the invasion of Great Britain after the fall of France are instructive. Their plan, called Operation SEA LION by the Germans, was never carried out, as certain prerequisite conditions were never achieved, and Hitler elected to move on to other operations. But Germany could have been successful in invading and, if necessary, occupying Great Britain had they exercised joint and combined operations to achieve better unity of effort within the German military, remained focused on key British operational centers of gravity, and exploited the capabilities of friendly nations such as Spain, Italy, and the Vichy government of France_

I didn't find any reviews from it, anyone already read?


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## Siegfried (Mar 2, 2012)

marshall said:


> Can you give some more details about it?



Such events qare naturally overplayed by one side (Goebells certainly did) and completely dismissed by the other (As some Polish histories do). The Bromberg Massacre (300 is the low end 700 the high end) is sometimes explained in terms of Polish Officers shooting into the air to restore order, another is that these civilians (of a variety of documentate ages and genders) suddenly became non uniformed insurgents, another is that they carried Swastika arm bands (which would make them legal combatents incidently) or that they were mistaken for paratroopers without uniform.

All of these explanations I think would sound ludicrous to most folks.

http://www.deutsche-und-polen.de/_/them ... morde.html 
Tidied up Machine translation:

"During the first days of the war, some thousands of ethnic Germans were killed by Poles in the chaos of the withdrawal as well as on the basis of nothing but suspicion. \the crimes later justified the anti-Polish measures of the German occupation power in Poland.

Murderous Assaults and Alibi for the Policies of Destruction

Immediately on the outbreak of the Second World War, "suspicious" ethnic Germans were interned and conveyed to the interior of the country. Many of them got caught up in the Polish retreat and perished, in part they were shot. In Bromberg and other localities with a German population, Germans were shot on the basis of extremely dubious accusations such as espionage, firing on Polish troops and suchlike,which for the most part rested on rumours and denunciations. In total, around 6,000 ethnic Germans died during the hostilieis between the Wehrmacht and the Polish Army. When members of the Polish armed forces and those killed for example by German bombing are deducted, there remain 4-5,000 Germans slain by Poles in the excitement of the first days of the war.

Soon after the investigation of the official numbers of victims, the dimension of the crime was multiplied tenfold in Hitler's command. The alleged 58,000 victims of the "September murders" and the "Bromberg bloody Sunday" served in the following period as justification for the systematically destructive occupation policies of Hitler Germany."

This is in the fairly politically correct language of modern Europe.

The disenfranchisment of Germans in Poland between the wars is documented by Alfred-Maurice de Zayas ; in "A terrible revenge" and "nemisis at Potsdam. These documents actually available in their thousands as ethnic Germans filed protests with the Legaue of nations.

I should point out that in the the 1930s in the Ukrainian part of Poland "Galacia" ethnic organisations were banned, and in 1930's the military and police carried out a number of pacification campaigns, which led to many arrests, widespread brutality and intimidation, and destruction of property. In 1930's Polish authorities promoted, sometimes by force, the conversion of the Orthodox to the Roman Catholicism (so-called Union) and seized hundreds of Orthodox churches for closure, destruction, or transfer to the Roman Catholic Church.

Polish nationalism was a very potent and agressive force in the 1930's and its many minorities had good reason to be in fear.

A summary of what really happened is given here on the tightly moderated axis history forum:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=42829&start=120

I would like to add that I have no problem with Poles or Poland, they deserve a place of their own and self determination and it is good to see them in new Europe. It is understandable that they were ardent. Poland was heir to the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth and that entity was made of of many ethnicities who had been there for 1000-1500 years or more. Many of the Germans expelled after WW2 would have been descended from "Old Prussians" a non Germanic non Slavic. Baltic peoples that had adopted German as their language. When the Post war Polsih governments expelled these Germans, killing tens if not hundreds of thousands they were expelling the original inhabitants.


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## parsifal (Mar 2, 2012)

> Yes, it does. The Gross domestic product is much more comprehensive way to measure actual production that to take the numbers of very very few cherry picked items. If you can't understand this simple fact there's no reason to continue this.



GDP is not a measure of military output. Its a measure of the national income, and econimic activity. To translate that into how much bang for your buck you get, you have to get your hands dirty and look at the actual outputs You usually have to use representative sampling because we dont have complete numbers of outputs. But in all the critical areas the Russians outproduced the Germans, even though they had less GDP.

The problem with your methodology, and why it is a complete misrepresentation of military outputs is that it fails to take into account systemic innefficiencies, production bottlenecks shortages and unit cvosts for german production. These were all very bad in the German procurement machine and madfe their high GDP (a measure of wealth not a measure of production. Something you seem to have a lot of trouble with. 




> This is a clear contradiction


. 


No.ts a clear indication that you dont know the difference between GDP and military output, and either cant, or wont 9more likely the latter) understand the inneficiencies in the German procurement sytem that made thei economy innefficient



> What is really stupid is to take "certain categories" and use that to arrive to overall conclusions about the "outproducing". When there's absolutely no need to do that, when the graph clearly shows the overall production.



Your graph shows nothing of the sort. Assuming it is correct (not a given) it is a measure of national wealth. Between the national income and the machines on the ground ther is the procurement machine, and its here that the Germans were grossly innefficient. The only way we can realistically measure outputs is to look at what they received, and since we do not have a complete list, have to content ourdelves with a selective list. however since the war was largely won or lost by items susch as the numbers of tanks, guns, vehicles aircrafrt and ships produced, the germans must have been really dumb in their production choices, since they were outproduced in nearly all those categories (just to use your figures about subs, which appear low I might add....in the first year of the war, from September 1939 through to the end of 1940, the Germans produced a further 40 or so subs, to the Russian 200+. In 1941 the Germans began to overtake the Russians in sub production, but subs dont win wars on land either) 

.




> I'll get back to you on that.




Don5t bother, unless you can provide verifiable sources



> BS



Right back at you sugar



> I have give you the evidence, you just can't or are unwilling to comprehend it. And thanks for the warning, I'm really impressed.



Err no you havent. GDP is not a measure of military output, its a measure of national wealth. Germans might be good at making cheese or beert, they may be less good at manufacturing vehicles (for example. if its vehicles you need for war, and not beer or cheese, and you are operating in a bubble (ie a blockade) your beer and cheese making ability isnt going to help you much


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

Parsifal, I already told him to compare with today's reality, it's the same: Russia produces more armaments than Germany, despite it's inferior GDP.

However, I would like to present something I found about the bombing and the German economy:

_Buckley argues the German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer’s appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, "but it is spurious to argue that because production increased then bombing had no real impact". But the bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned.[17] In fact, German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, "which gives an idea of direction Erhard Milch and the German planners were pushing", "unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher"._

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II

No doubt that the Soviets had a superior economy than Germany in the critical years of the war, but the peak of Soviet aircraft production was 40,000 in '44. Maybe in that period the Soviets were already starting to desacelerate their war economy like the US, but even so it's the double of the Soviet production, and we know the German GDP was higher. Perhaps our friend wants to tell us that the Germans had more potential than the Soviets, which I'm in doubt.


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## Siegfried (Mar 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Come on man even Canada made more military trucks then Germany by 800K to 500k



Canada's contribution was very significant. I believe most commonwealth APC came out of Canada. Canada specialised in certain classes of weapon. And there you have a critical allied advantage. Production in Canada and the USA was free from air attack. Whole classes of weapons that were luxuries for the axis could be made there.

And of course we tend to treat WW2 as a UK and latter US only affair. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sth Africa and many other commonwealth countries were there from the begining even before Japans attack on Britain in the far year: including India.

As soon as Long range aircraft, irrespective or radar, Huffduff or Enigma decrypts became available the jig was up for u-boats Unless they could opperate surfaced most of the time they were just to slow to intercept a convoy.


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## Siegfried (Mar 2, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> The D.520 was a respectable machine for 1940. But like you said, the French would need some more time to produce more units. They also had the D.530 planned version with a 1,400 hp Rolls-Royce Merlin or a 1,800 hp Hispano-Suiza 12Y.
> 
> I have great interest in the French military, and no need to mention it was really a shame for the Allies they had been defeated so quickly.



I think you mean the Hispano-Suiza 12Z

The MS 406 had a speed of 303 mph on 860hp.

Using a cube root law I get the following increases in speed for the MS 406
Merlin on 87 octane 1030hp (1030/860)^0.333 = 1.06 or 321 mph
Merlin on 100/130 octane 1260hp (1260/860)^0.333 = 1.13 or 342 mph.
DB601A on 87 octane 1100hp (1100/860)^0.333 = 1.085 or 328mph (about the same for early Allison)
DB601A1a on 87 octane 1170hp (1170/860)^0.333 = 1.1 = 335mph

The MS 406 was available in quantity, it just had too weak an engine to make it fully competitive.

With the latter 940hp HS12Y the speed might have been (940/860)^0.333 = 1.03 or 312 mph.


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## marshall (Mar 2, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Such events qare naturally overplayed by one side (Goebells certainly did) and completely dismissed by the other (As some Polish histories do). The Bromberg Massacre (300 is the low end 700 the high end) is sometimes explained in terms of Polish Officers shooting into the air to restore order, another is that these civilians (of a variety of documentate ages and genders) suddenly became non uniformed insurgents, another is that they carried Swastika arm bands (which would make them legal combatents incidently) or that they were mistaken for paratroopers without uniform.
> 
> All of these explanations I think would sound ludicrous to most folks.
> 
> ...




Your first link is "error 404".

More about these events can be found here Bloody Sunday (1939) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia I know it's only wiki but at least it shows both perspectives.

I don't want to say that Poles didn't do anything wrong before or during or after the ww2 (becasue they did) but it's funny how you point out what Poles did wrong and state that the atrocities were started by Polish soldiers and you don't say what at that times was happening in Germany or Soviet Union, where for example concentration camps were established many years before the start of the war. I would say it's called propaganda.

I agree that there were atrocities in Poland but it's good to look on the matters with (or from - don't know which version is correct) a broad perspective and don't forget what else was happening in Europe then.


Sorry for the OT mods, won't happen again.


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## parsifal (Mar 2, 2012)

> Parsifal, I already told him to compare with today's reality, it's the same: Russia produces more armaments than Germany, despite it's inferior GDP.




I know but the response was to me. I didnt want to leave this man in any doubt as to what my opinion was



> However, I would like to present something I found about the bombing and the German economy:
> 
> _Buckley argues the German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer’s appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, "but it is spurious to argue that because production increased then bombing had no real impact". But the bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned.[17] In fact, German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, "which gives an idea of direction Erhard Milch and the German planners were pushing", "unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher"_


_.

Ive read buckleyand concur with his conclusions, though there is debate in many sources as to the extent of the bombing campaign. some sources attribute the bombers as affecting the german economy by as much a 50%. you have to factor in the lost production, wrecked facilities and resources expended on air defence. The allies spent 12% of their military potential on the bombing campaigns (not including the B-29s and AS-Bombs). In return they either destroyed, caused diversion of resources or prevented production from ever being oftheir total potential. 





No doubt that the Soviets had a superior economy than Germany in the critical years of the war, but the peak of Soviet aircraft production was 40,000 in '44. Maybe in that period the Soviets were already starting to desacelerate their war economy like the US, but even so it's the double of the Soviet production, and we know the German GDP was higher. Perhaps our friend wants to tell us that the Germans had more potential than the Soviets, which I'm in doubt

Click to expand...

.

Maybe, but not relevant to the reasons for the defeat of the Lw either_


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## Jenisch (Mar 2, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Maybe, but not relevant to the reasons for the defeat of the Lw either



Yeah. I don't support the view of the Germans as doomed since the start only by the industrial numbers of the Allies. You simply don't start a war you have sure that gonna lost. Quiet the opposite.

And Parsifal, have you already read Why the Allies Won, by Richard Overy? Very good book in my view, I just don't agree much with him about the argumentation that Democracy was saved by the Communism.


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## Hoju2k (Mar 2, 2012)

parsifal said:


> GDP is not a measure of military output. Its a measure of the national income, and econimic activity. To translate that into how much bang for your buck you get, you have to get your hands dirty and look at the actual outputs You usually have to use representative sampling because we dont have complete numbers of outputs. But in all the critical areas the Russians outproduced the Germans, even though they had less GDP.



GDP def: "Gross domestic product (GDP) refers to the market value of all officially recognized final goods and services produced within a country in a given period.". 
I never said that GDP is measuring military production. I can't see the value in trying to calculate that, because all production and services, military or not, are necessary and contributing during times of war.
Now, since you are so big in "military output", please tell me exactly what items are included here? Surely there's much more than tanks, trucks, aircraft, guns and mortars.
"Critical areas": Are you the one defining what those are, or there some actual reference here? 


> The problem with your methodology, and why it is a complete misrepresentation of military outputs is that it fails to take into account systemic innefficiencies, production bottlenecks shortages and unit cvosts for german production. These were all very bad in the German procurement machine and madfe their high GDP (a measure of wealth not a measure of production. Something you seem to have a lot of trouble with.



Pure speculation on your part. There were inefficiencies everywhere, show me how it was worse in Germany. And please, with some actual sources. I'm tired to read your long, reference-less posts.

. 




> No.ts a clear indication that you dont know the difference between GDP and military output, and either cant, or wont 9more likely the latter) understand the inneficiencies in the German procurement sytem that made thei economy innefficient



What is clear here is that you are talking out of your a$$.



> (just to use your figures about subs, which appear low I might add....in the first year of the war, from September 1939 through to the end of 1940, the Germans produced a further 40 or so subs, to the Russian 200+. In 1941 the Germans began to overtake the Russians in sub production, but subs dont win wars on land either


)

Oh they appear low to you? Well, how about to substantiate the numbers you gave before?
In 1940 the Germans produced 50 submarines, plus 18 in 1939 (I don't know how many before the war), and no, the Soviets did not make 200+ submarines in that time, they had 212 on hand by June 1941.

.







> Don5t bother, unless you can provide verifiable sources


Hey, why not? empty talking is working for you... 
But, here you are: 

"The Soviet production of exposives and powder was much smaller then German one, overall capacity of chemical industry being the principal bottleneck. The most reliable figures I've seen are from I.Vernidub's book - 505 thousands tons of TNT and other individual exposives and 399,8 thousands of smokeless powder produced during the war" (Check Art's post here: Axis History Forum • View topic - USSR artillery shell production

For the Germans, it was 1595 thousands tons for explosives, and 2405 thousand for the powder, o_nly for the 1940-44 period_. See here: Appendix D. Strategic Air Attack on the Powder and Explosives Industries




> Right back at you sugar


So, you are not gonna back up your claim? shocker...but since I'm not like you: 
"The Russians laid more land mines around Kursk than the entire wartime production by the Germans. ". Yeah sure, the soviets laid approx. one million mines (both AT and AP) in both fronts of the salient (Mine and countermine operations in the Battle of Kursk), this could be compared to the production of some models of German mines: more than three millions for the Riegelmine 43, or 5+ millions of the Holzmine 42, just to name a few (see: Mines Flamethrowers)
As I said, BS.


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## parsifal (Mar 3, 2012)

> "Gross domestic product (GDP) refers to the market value of all officially recognized final goods and services produced within a country in a given period.".



In other wordws, a measure of national income or activity



> I never said that GDP is measuring military production. I can't see the value in trying to calculate that, because all production and services, military or not, are necessary and contributing during times of war




What you said was an unsubstantiated rebuttal of me. i sad that in terms of military production the USSR (and later we also discussed the British), outproduced the germans in all the vital areas of military production. You said, in your reply that the Germans outproduced the Russians and then attempted to say that GDP was a measure of military outputs. You still are. 




> Now, since you are so big in "military output", please tell me exactly what items are included here? Surely there's much more than tanks, trucks, aircraft, guns and mortars.



Im not going to do that. i know it, as every other thinking person in this tforum does as well. Never givfe a troll oxygen. Why dont you give us your definition einstein



> "Critical areas": Are you the one defining what those are, or there some actual reference here?



There is a definition for it....go find it troll



> Pure speculation on your part. There were inefficiencies everywhere, show me how it was worse in Germany. And please, with some actual sources.


. 

Do some reading, I would suggest for you the wages of destruction and How the allies won. You might also look aty Ellis (Brute Force). and of course you might want to interpret the GDP stuff you yourself posted. German military production was lower yet they had more money to spend....wonder why?????



> I'm tired to read your long, reference-less posts.



Well, if you are tired of them, dont read them, and dont respond to them



> What is clear here is that you are talking out of your a$$.


)


R U sure about that



> Oh they appear low to you? Well, how about to substantiate the numbers you gave before?



I can substantiate them , try looking at something like conways as a general reference or similar



> In 1940 the Germans produced 50 submarines, plus 18 in 1939 (I don't know how many before the war),



Err no, incorrect. "Producing" for naval warships means at what point they were commissioned. From 1933 to August 1939, the KM commissioned 57 boats, from September '39 through to December 1940, the German commissioned a further 35 Boats. Thats a total of 92 boats commissioned.




> and no, the Soviets did not make 200+ submarines in that time, they had 212 on hand by June 1941.



In that same time frame (1933-40) the Red Navy commissioned 283 new submarines.



> Hey, why not? empty talking is working for you...
> But, here you are:
> 
> "The Soviet production of exposives and powder was much smaller then German one, overall capacity of chemical industry being the principal bottleneck. The most reliable figures I've seen are from I.Vernidub's book - 505 thousands tons of TNT and other individual exposives and 399,8 thousands of smokeless powder produced during the war" (Check Art's post here: Axis History Forum • View topic - USSR artillery shell production



So, let me get this straight. you have come in here, guns blazing, shooting your mouth off on eht ebasis of what? A thread of another forum, which gives an unsubstantiated listing of ammunition production. Its a start, I will grant you that, but ou have not built your house on rock foundations here, more like quicksand . I dont accept these figures. they are unsubstantiated claims made in another forum 




> For the Germans, it was 1595 thousands tons for explosives, and 2405 thousand for the powder, o_nly for the 1940-44 period_. See here: Appendix D. Strategic Air Attack on the Powder and Explosives Industries



Another unsubstantiated source. its a start I agree, and better than what I have,, but hardly a solid foundation on which to mount such a spirite attack. You are either stupid or brave....i cant work out which. I'll go the safe money and assume stupid for the time being 





> So, you are not gonna back up your claim? shocker...but since I'm not like you:
> "The Russians laid more land mines around Kursk than the entire wartime production by the Germans. ". Yeah sure, the soviets laid approx. one million mines (both AT and AP) in both fronts of the salient (Mine and countermine operations in the Battle of Kursk), this could be compared to the production of some models of German mines: more than three millions for the Riegelmine 43, or 5+ millions of the Holzmine 42, just to name a few (see: Mines Flamethrowers)


A good source, so I have to concede the point I guess. However, dont know where you got the figure of 1 million. More like 4million according to my source ("claws of the bear) 



> As I said, BS.



In this case, it looks like it,, though makes no difference to the larger argument we are having.....what percentage of your precious GDP do you think was spent on mine production....1%, 2%??? Given that the US built over 250 subs in WWII representing less than 2% of their military expenditures what percentage can 10 or even 20 million mines be of the german military expenditures. I would suggest miniscule


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 3, 2012)

Hoju2k, Parsifal, both of you need to tone it down. Do not let this thread get out of hand with personal insults. Personal insults ruin threads for the other members, and *I am sick and tired of handing out warnings and constantly being ignored!*

This is the only warning being given. Next insult to come from anyone, will get an infraction and the thread closed.


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## stona (Mar 3, 2012)

GDP is not a measure of military or even industrial output. It is a measure of the whole economy. For example a significant proportion of the GDP of the current British economy comes from the financial service sector,banking,insurance etc. Not terribly useful when repelling an invasion though it may give you the means to buy in equipment or technology.
Cheers
Steve


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## Ratsel (Mar 3, 2012)

Interesting thread, good read.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 4, 2012)

I am sick and tired of .... constantly being ignored! 

Yeah, sure you are ... with* that *avatar 

MM


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## Jenisch (Mar 4, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> I am sick and tired of .... constantly being ignored!
> 
> Yeah, sure you are ... with* that *avatar
> 
> MM



Mate, he is tr00, and he will burn you and everyone that don't obey him together with the churches, so be careful. 

ps: just a joke DerAdlerIstGelandet.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 4, 2012)

I've always liked that avatar, wished I was computor savy enough to do one like that myself.


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## Njaco (Mar 4, 2012)

Tread lightly. DerAdler is not the only one fed up with the way threads go.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 4, 2012)

".... Tread lightly. "

Mines.

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 4, 2012)

I was one of the protagonists in the last foray. i dont want anyone burnt by this indiscretion. Everyone should just step back and let things cool off. 

I dont resile from the position I took, but I went too far and allowed the emotion of the moment get the better of me.

We can continue the discussion, after termpers have cooled a little. This issue is relevant to the topic. The only thing that needs to be quaterised is the personal attack stuff. 

And dont mess with the mods, unless you have a death wish guys


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## cherry blossom (Mar 6, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> BTW, there's a book from 2010 called Operation Sea Lion: A Joint Critical Analysis, that seems interesting.
> 
> Description:
> 
> ...


You can download “OPERATION SEA LION: A JOINT CRITICAL ANALYSIS” by Lt Col Randy McCanne, USAF, LTC Greg D. Olson, USA and CDR Dario E. Teicher, USN at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA421637


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## barney (Mar 7, 2012)

Great read

Thanks


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## mhuxt (Mar 7, 2012)

Thanks for the link.


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## Jenisch (Mar 8, 2012)

Interesting, thanks.

I'm always cautious towards "radical" views, such as that Sea Lion could have never succeed, and the Wehrmacht was doomed since the start. This work only boost my thinking.


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## stona (Mar 11, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Interesting, thanks.
> 
> I'm always cautious towards "radical" views, such as that Sea Lion could have never succeed,



I don't think that this is a radical view,quite the reverse. With the benefit of hindsight I think most people can't really envisage any way for the German Armies to make a landing across the Channel. Just look at the resources the Western Allies deployed during "Overlord". German defences were of course much better prepared but it was still a much closer run thing than some would have us believe. In 1940 the Wermacht did not posess a single specialised landing craft of any sort! Soldiers were to row ashore in rubber boats and tanks were,eventually,to be off loaded from barges.
I believe that "Sealion" was little more than an elaborate bluff and part of a larger plan,along with the air assault on Britain,to force a negotiated peace,favourable to Germany,which would allow her to pursue her real objectives. These had always lain in the East.
If these are radical views I know a lot of radical people 
Cheers
Steve


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## Gixxerman (Mar 11, 2012)

I agree stona.
In fact I recall reading that the German command always 'war gamed' big operations like Sea Lion and even they concluded that (barring several outrageously enormous strokes of good fortune and/or British political stupidity) they could not succeed with Sea Lion.

Sad to say the usual 'health warning' applies.
I'm afraid my recall is as good as this gets, I'm certain i'm not mistaken on this but I'm afraid I can't give a link to back this up.


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## parsifal (Mar 12, 2012)

stona said:


> I don't think that this is a radical view,quite the reverse. With the benefit of hindsight I think most people can't really envisage any way for the German Armies to make a landing across the Channel. Just look at the resources the Western Allies deployed during "Overlord". German defences were of course much better prepared but it was still a much closer run thing than some would have us believe. In 1940 the Wermacht did not posess a single specialised landing craft of any sort! Soldiers were to row ashore in rubber boats and tanks were,eventually,to be off loaded from barges.
> I believe that "Sealion" was little more than an elaborate bluff and part of a larger plan,along with the air assault on Britain,to force a negotiated peace,favourable to Germany,which would allow her to pursue her real objectives. These had always lain in the East.
> If these are radical views I know a lot of radical people
> Cheers
> Steve


Hi Steve
cto

95% of what you say I agree with, and yet this can still be used by those not wanting to embrace the truth of the victory achieved. Ask yourself these questions. Could the british afford to not fighht the battle (for more than just propaganda reasons) and what wouold have happened if they had lost. Beyond that .....was it possible for the british to lose.


Here are my answers to my own questions


1) _Could the british afford to not fighht the battle (for more than just propaganda reasons)_
No, they needed to deny air superiority to the LW and then gain it for themselves if they wanted any hope of turning the fortunes of war in their favour

2) _what wouold have happened if they had lost_

At some point, probably early to mid '41, they would have been forced to the peace table 
3) _Beyond that .....was it possible for the british to lose_

Undoubetedly. In fact, with only a few degrees of different approaches, it is my opinion this battle was likely to be lost. It was the most unlikley of victories. Because we can sit here now, 70 years later with the benefits of hindsight, and see the perfection in the British defencee to the bumbling mess made of the German offensive, its easy to say this was a battle that Britain would never lose. i have more faith in the Germans than that


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## Jenisch (Mar 12, 2012)

Parfisal, despite what I have said, many historians today point it was unlikely for the LW to defeat the RAF, even if they had focused in the airfields. They say that even attacking the airbases, the damage inflicted was mediocre, and the RAF was each time more strong.


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## Elmas (Mar 12, 2012)

Not to say that the LW attacks were mainly on the airfields south of London: to destroy also those north of London the effort of the LW shuld have been much greater, an effort that LW did not have the strenght to sustain.
It was just for political reasons that the Squadons were compelled to stay in the more exposed airfields, like Biggin, Kenley etc.


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## Jenisch (Mar 12, 2012)

Another thing is that if the Germans focused on the airfields, not only the losses would still be replaced, but perhaps even faster, because the industry and the infraestructure would not been affected. 

However, I don't agree with those who say the BoB was only a bluff from Hitler. Had he obtained air superiority, it would be quiet possible the invasion would proceed.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 12, 2012)

the resources most rare were the pilots, so need to take out this


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## Ratsel (Mar 12, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> the resources most rare were the pilots, so need to take out this


Who? The Luftwaffe? They had pilots, lots of pilots.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 12, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> Who? The Luftwaffe? They had pilots, lots of pilots.



i was talking for RAF in BoB, but same is true for LW, was shorter of pilots, 29/06/40 906 ready SE fighters pilots, 28/09/40 676 ready SE F pilots


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## stona (Mar 12, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Had he obtained air superiority, it would be quiet possible the invasion would proceed.



But with what exactly? Lines of river barges towed at 3-5 knots across the channel packed with men and equipment which would then have to stop off shore to enable the men to enter rowing boats to make a landing. Even with limited local air superiority we still had the Royal Navy. Even a handful of destroyers in amongst that flotilla would have wreaked havoc and there was far more available to the British than that.

All seaborne invasions,even in ancient times,required a huge investment in materiel (Look at the size of the 13th century Mongol fleets attacking Japan or Henry V's fleet landing unopposed at Chef de Caux in the Seine estuary) and the Wermacht simply hadn't done that. History is long and not everyone learns from it,Hitler certainly didn't.

Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Mar 12, 2012)

Meteorology is another crucial reason. If I'm not wrong, the weather is only generous for a small window of the year, and this is even more when talking about the Germans and their poor amphibious capability.


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## Jenisch (Mar 12, 2012)

stona said:


> But with what exactly? Lines of river barges towed at 3-5 knots across the channel packed with men and equipment which would then have to stop off shore to enable the men to enter rowing boats to make a landing. Even with limited local air superiority we still had the Royal Navy. Even a handful of destroyers in amongst that flotilla would have wreaked havoc and there was far more available to the British than that.
> 
> All seaborne invasions,even in ancient times,required a huge investment in materiel (Look at the size of the 13th century Mongol fleets attacking Japan or Henry V's fleet landing unopposed at Chef de Caux in the Seine estuary) and the Wermacht simply hadn't done that. History is long and not everyone learns from it,Hitler certainly didn't.
> 
> ...



Read this study: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA421637 

The Germans had a plan to deal with the Royal Navy, BUT, only if they had obtained air superiority. Air superiority would do much for the Germans. It would not only meant the Army would have direct support on the landings, but also that interdiction and attacks on the British harbours and merchant ships arriving with vital supplies would be possible. Attacks in aircraft factories and shipyard facilities would also certainly happen.


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## Siegfried (Mar 12, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Read this study: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA421637
> 
> The Germans had a plan to deal with the Royal Navy, BUT, only if they had obtained air superiority. Air superiority would do much for the Germans. It would not only meant the Army would have direct support on the landings, but also that interdiction and attacks on the British harbours and merchant ships arriving with vital supplies would be possible. Attacks in aircraft factories and shipyard facilities would also certainly happen.



Indeed, with the RAF's effectiveness broken the Luftwaffe should be able to focuss on doing what the u-boats could not: choke off the merchant marine trade and it should be able to do so with acceptable losses. It considerable effort would need to be maintained in ensuring the RAF doesn't get up again but this could again be done from a point of view of superiority and limited losses.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 12, 2012)

The trouble with so many claims that the BoB was a close run thing is it ignores two of the most central points.
Firstly No. 11 Group was not 'the RAF' and secondly at no stage did the RAF come close to losing men machines at an unsustainable rate, even when the airfields were the primary targets.

In fact if Stephen Bungay's figures are correct in his book 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' it was the Luftwaffe that was suffering losses that could be ill afforded......losses which would later be missed during the Russian campaign (and similarly there even during the early good days for the Germans they would suffer losses which eventually compounded to make for a calamitous situation).

Whilst airpower would undoubtedly have impeded the Royal Navy intervening in any invasion attempt that is a million miles away from being able to claim with any certainty that the RN's intervention would not have been grotesquely disastrous for those poor guys sent out in the English Channel in little more than crudely converted river barges.
My own view is that several thousand German soldiers, sailors and airmen lived when had that farcically poor attempt at invasion actually gone ahead they would otherwise not have.


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## Jenisch (Mar 12, 2012)

In fact, the LW was never close to defeat the RAF.

However, had it defeated, the situation would be different. The problem is, that for this happen, either the LW would need to be more stronger than historically, or the RAF more weeker. And this being part of the equation, all counterfactual interpretations parts must have the same consideration. Therefore, it's hard to discuss this in a realistic matter IMHO.

Exactly the same thing I say for those who considerate the Russian front more important, because, according to them, had Germany won there, it would be unlikely for the Allies won. The problem is that I can also use this logic for the Pacific, and make Japan's war machine like the propaganda decipted it: magnific, inflicting one blow after another in the Americans, until the point they sign peace. Then what would happen? What would be the consequences for Stalin of the IJA victorius in China in the Soviet borders?


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## parsifal (Mar 13, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Indeed, with the RAF's effectiveness broken the Luftwaffe should be able to focuss on doing what the u-boats could not: choke off the merchant marine trade and it should be able to do so with acceptable losses. It considerable effort would need to be maintained in ensuring the RAF doesn't get up again but this could again be done from a point of view of superiority and limited losses.




If the Brits had lost air superiority over SE England or indeed, in the channel or along the french Coast after 1941, there there are any number of possibilities, and none of them good for the British. 

You and i probabaly have diametrically oppsed views on the importance of the battle, and who won it, but we at least have common ground about the impacts on shipping. Even without air superiority but with the ability to achieve air parity, the Germans were able to inflict heavy losses on British coastal trade around the british Isles. This situation continued, at least until December 1941. However, after reaching a peak of efficiency prior to May 1941, the effedctivenes of the German anti-shipping operations, of all descriptions fell away markedly gtom May, as the british started to make life difficult all along the Coast. The primary anti-shipping weapons in the Coastal waters were the air launched mines and S-Bootes. S-Bootes began to fall away in effectiveness once their bases came under sustained air attackj by the RAF, whilst the attrition suffered by the specialist minelaying groups was steady, and eventually caused an abandonment of the campaign.

If Germany had somehow been able to maintain air parity, instead of being reduced to a strategy of air denial in 41-3 (in which they extracted a heavy toll, but were unsuccessful in their objectives) Britain almost certainly would have been forced to its knees by middle to late 1941.

I have already documented each and every loss in British and Euopean coastal waters (not including ostfront operations) throughout 1941.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/3-fighters-30447-7.html

Go to about Post 80 and read on from there....


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## stona (Mar 13, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Read this study: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA421637
> 
> The Germans had a plan to deal with the Royal Navy



I am aware of the German planning for Sealion,they had a plan for dealing with the USSR too. 

"No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy"-Helmuth Graf von Moltke

The Germans were playing a game closer to Clausewitz's original doctrine ""Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln", war is a mere continuation of politics by other means. Force terms favourable to Germany on Britain at the negotiating table without undertaking a dangerous and technically near impossible seaborne invasion.
Seperating the political aims of the nazis from their military objectives is foolhardy. Military history is simply one aspect of a larger picture. Neither Hitler nor any of the military and political leadership had any desire to invade Britain, at worse they just wanted her off their backs,at best she was a potential racial ally. I believe that after the euphoria of defeating mainland Europe's pre-eminent military power (France) in weeks the Germans became exasperated by Britain's stance. It's why Hitler's "Last Appeal To Reason" speech in the Reichstag was dropped as a leaflet over Britain in July 1940.
I'll say it once more,Germany's real objectives lay in the East not across the English Channel. This was a regime driven by racism and a paranoid fear of Bolshevism envisaged as a huge,communist,Slavic horde (reminiscent in their propaganda of the Mongols). These base qualities drove much of nazi policy. 

As for the weather Dowding reckoned that he had only to remain undefeated until November. With hindsight we can now see that the jig was up for the Luftwaffe well before then and that Dowding had achieved his stated objective with time to spare.

Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Mar 13, 2012)

stona said:


> Neither Hitler nor any of the military and political leadership had any desire to invade Britain



But like you said, they didn't wanted Britain in the war. When they failed to defeat the USSR, Britain meant a deadlock for the Nazis.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 13, 2012)

stona said:


> a regime driven by racism and a paranoid fear of Bolshevism envisaged as a huge,communist,Slavic horde (reminiscent in their propaganda of the Mongols). These base qualities drove much of nazi policy.



Indeed, it is quite amazing to see the 'asiatic hoardes' cast up so often as a driving motivator in nazi ideology, I'd say to the point of obsession.
Some things never change eh?
Talk about a 'race memory'.



Jenisch said:


> But like you said, they didn't wanted Britain in the war. When they failed to defeat the USSR, Britain meant a deadlock for the Nazis.



Sadly this is where they blinded themselves to reality.
They may not have wanted a war with Britain (and I am pretty sure it is perfectly clear that they did not) but their ideas of 'a free hand in Europe and the east' was never going to be acceptable to the British (or the USA for that matter).
Determined as they were and deaf to all council to the contrary we ended up lumbered with the only possible conclusion, war.
Global war at that.
One I just cannot see how anyone on the axis side (barring hubris nonsense about 'will' and political personality) could possibly imagine they could win.


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## Jenisch (Mar 13, 2012)

After Hitler ignored the Allied warnings and proceed with the invasion if Poland, there was no more back. The USSR needed to be invaded, because the British naval blockade would kill Germany sooner or later, and Roosevelt was willing to support the British, which the peak was the Lend-Lease act. The Soviet Union, gived the enormous size of it's armed forces, would quiet possibly intervene "in the interestes of peace and to save human lifes" in the starving and chaotic Europe under the blockade sooner or later.

I think we can say with certain that if Hitler's idea of war with Britain was serious, Germany would have a much greater naval capability in 1939. Perhaps this can be used as a definitive indicator that Hitler always wanted to invade the USSR.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 13, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> The Soviet Union, gived the enormous size of it's armed forces, would quiet possibly intervene "in the interestes of peace and to save human lifes" in the starving and chaotic Europe under the blockade sooner or later.



But this does not accord with what was happening just prior to the nazi invasion of Russia.
In fact everything I have read on the subject (barring some petty squabbling at a more local level) shows that the Russians did everything they could to accomodate Germany via their pact.
IIRC the trains with Russian supplies were still rolling west towards Germany on that fateful day - and Stalin had given strict orders that they do so and that the German demands in supplies be met in full.

It also seems difficult to me at least to reconcile the idea of a Russia itching for war a leap westward with the known instant reaction of Stalin to the news of the German invasion and his refusal to believe the warnings leading up to June 22nd.
If Stalin really was looking for any excuse to invade western Europe - and had been building up an invasion force in the Russian west as some claim - then why did he not at least attempt to order his numerically superior forces to move west the instant he heard war had come?



Jenisch said:


> I think we can say with certain that if Hitler's idea of war with Britain was serious, Germany would have a much greater naval capability in 1939.



I think the 1936 naval agreement illustrates his desire to placate the British.
But he was very misguided in what he imagined British interests were and how Britain would react to them being threatened.



Jenisch said:


> Perhaps this can be used as a definitive indicator that Hitler always wanted to invade the USSR.



I think anyone reading Mein Kampf (published let us not forget in 1925) would be a fool to imagine Hitler was not serious about his plan to invade Russia.
No wonder they moved factories etc etc when it became apparent in the mid 1930's that they were also developing the means as well as having the aspiration.


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## Siegfried (Mar 13, 2012)

The icebreaker strategy as expounded by Soviet intelligenc analyst Suvorov was one of allowing the Germans and French/British to exhaust themselves by feeding the Germans enough to keep going so that they exhaust the each other, the Germans did too well however by defeating france. The full blown attacks on Finland comming only 2 weeks after the signing of the German-Soviet co-operation pact took Hitler the wrong way. Hitler expected a realignment of Borders but not to this degree.

For various reasons the Soviet mobilisation of 1941 was a failure, there may have been thousands of T-34 or KV-1 but the buildup had come to late and a very large number of *MiG-3, Yak-1 and LaGG 3* comming of the production (already in their 2nd issues) but the improved versions of these aircraft were barely out of the factors (due to mismanagment of the MiG 1 and LAGG 1) but not fully integrated into squadron service (mainly I-16) . The MiG 1, LaGG 1 and Yak 1a had been too defective. An attack on Western Europe had to be postponed untill 1942.

Those who believe that Stalin was not a shrewd, *forward driven*, agressive man have not studied him. Those who think that he was not capable of extreme behavior have not studied him. There were barely 4000 people in Nazi concentration camps by the time of Barbarossa by which time Stalin had killed millions. Some folks in in many cases in my opinion are deliberalty deceiving themselves in order to maintain passionate shiboleths of the origin of WW2, the treatly of Versalaies, the holocaust etc etc. They can't handle the truth as Colonel Nathan R. Jessep says. The prime cause was a desire to fully and functuionaly return Danzig to the Reich and to deal with a dangerous Soviet Union before it became impossible to do so exactly as Hitler said.

The Soviets may have been fastidious of meeting their obligations under the treaty but so were the Germans. Maybe dictors are firm in promises of that kind. Both the Bismark and the Prinz Eugen had their very sophisticated triaxial FLAK directors removed in order to supply the Soviet Union with this very advanced technology. The treay of Versailies had induced the German Navy to found "Krisselgeraete" (gyro-apparatus) a company that along with Anschutz had exeptional abillity in the area of guidance and control in order to compensate for the restrictions to the Germany Navy.

Hitler may have had more than one reason to attack the Soviet Union but the two most important ones are actively ignored by the denialists.


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## Jenisch (Mar 13, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> But this does not accord with what was happening just prior to the nazi invasion of Russia.
> In fact everything I have read on the subject (barring some petty squabbling at a more local level) shows that the Russians did everything they could to accomodate Germany via their pact.



About this, I would like to point out that the world well aware that Nazi Germany was not Imperial Germany, and it didn't had the resources, credit and naval power to sustain a prolongued war. When Stalin signed the commercial treaty, he was promptly financing the Nazi agressions, which makes one think if at least the pillar of Surov's arguments is so wrong like most historians say. 




Siegfried said:


> The icebreaker strategy as expounded by Soviet intelligenc analyst Suvorov was one of allowing the Germans and French/British to exhaust themselves by feeding the Germans enough to keep going so that they exhaust the each other, the Germans did too well however by defeating france.



Interesting is that the Allies had a plan just to deal with this: Operation Pike. If the French managed to stabilize the front, and Stalin tried to pursue this objective, he would likely be attacked in his oil lifeline. And in short time the French would be with great quantity of modern equipment, like the D520 fighter, as well as a new doctrines. Both Britain and France would also have US support. The Communists would not necessarily have an easy life...


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## Gixxerman (Mar 13, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The icebreaker strategy as expounded by Soviet intelligenc analyst Suvorov was one of allowing the Germans and French/British to exhaust themselves



That is as maybe but it in itself proves nothing.

Every military has plans and scenarios for various options possibilities - even contemporary allies verses each other.
It's just what military planners do, they must. 



Siegfried said:


> An attack on Western Europe had to be postponed untill 1942.



I'd like to see the level of proof you have for this.



Siegfried said:


> Those who believe that Stalin was not a shrewd, *forward driven*, agressive man have not studied him. Those who think that he was not capable of extreme behavior have not studied him.



It is not mutually exclusive to see Stalin as another monster.
But you keep making big claims that his intent was the occupation of all of Europe, including western Europe.
I'd like to see the level of proof you have for this rather than you just continually assert it.

Much as the occupation of eastern Europe was a crime, in several instances it was perfectly foreseeable understandable given that several of those eastern European countries had allied themselves with the nazi state and given what Russia had just suffered.
Throw in the common ideas about 'buffer zones' and 'spheres of influence' and it is not exactly difficult to work out why what happened happened in E. Europe.
You don't have to want to occupy all of Europe including western Europe to want to do that.

.....and this is not justification for it either. 



Siegfried said:


> There were barely 4000 people in Nazi concentration camps by the time of Barbarossa by which time Stalin had killed millions.



Even if that is true.....well, boy oh boy didn't they soon change all of that, huh?

What is this, compare the relative excesses of your chosen multi-million murdering monster?



Siegfried said:


> They can't handle the truth as Colonel Nathan R. Jessep says.



No.
It's just that some will use any relative comparison to claim one multi-million murderer is 'better' than another multi-million murderer.

Personally i find both loathesome.....and each have attributes unique to themselves to find ing vile.



Siegfried said:


> The prime cause was a desire to fully and functuionaly return Danzig to the Reich and to deal with a dangerous Soviet Union before it became impossible to do so exactly as Hitler said.



No.
That's the circular logic deployed to excuse the nazi war of extermination.
That's all.

If Danzig was what it was really about then there would have been no invasion of Russia Germany would have been all about defending the territories recovered.
The fact that there was absolutely none of that and that all the planning was devoted to an invasion proves exactly what they were about.

The fact that after the German attack they found Russian numbers so massive was a shock to the Germans (as Hadler makes clear in what he wrote).....and the claims about Russian intent are plainly a belated revisionist excuse, as Hitler's ridiculous boasting about 'one only had to kick in the door for the whole rotten edifice to come tumbling down' proves. 



Siegfried said:


> Hitler may have had more than one reason to attack the Soviet Union but the two most important ones are actively ignored by the denialists.



I don't 'deny' anything, and I'm certainly no fan of Stalin or the communist system.

The fact is Hitler wanted Russian territory and was prepared to use any method to get it - and go to any length to ensure it stayed German, including the deliberate, systematic industrial slaughter of the indigenous peoples.
Not for what they said or did but for what they were and it is here on this point that the unique evil of nazism is laid bare.

Thank God no-one else acted towards Germans in the same way as the nazis acted to so many others, huh?


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## pbfoot (Mar 13, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> Thank God no-one else acted towards Germans in the same way as the nazis acted to so many others, huh?


Say thank you Siegfried


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## Ratsel (Mar 13, 2012)

what, you mean like the russian did


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## tyrodtom (Mar 13, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> They can't handle the truth as Colonel Nathan R. Jessep says.


 It's sort of revealing you'd use a quote from a ficional character played by Jack Nicholson, in" A Few Good Men".


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## Gixxerman (Mar 13, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> what, you mean like the russian did



OK Ratsel, go ahead show me when where the Russians attempted the systematic extermination of the German people.

Nobody treated the German people the way the nazis treated several specific 'peoples'.

Be serious quit trying to whitewash Hitler his gang using Stalin his gang.


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## Ratsel (Mar 13, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> OK Ratsel, go ahead show me when where the Russians attempted the systematic extermination of the German people.
> 
> Nobody treated the German people the way the nazis treated several specific 'peoples'.
> 
> Be serious quit trying to whitewash Hitler his gang using Stalin his gang.


 I'm trying to whitewash Hitler?... are you for real? seriously? If you don't know what the Russians did as they marched into berlin, I can't help you.
But thanks for the good laugh.


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## Jenisch (Mar 13, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> Be serious quit trying to whitewash Hitler his gang using Stalin his gang.


 
I don't think his intention is this. The problem is that since the Soviets were among the victorius, and the apologists of the USSR are very numerous in humanities, the space for their total disrespect of the Soviet victims using comparisons with Hitler is large, and definately very immoral. They commonly justify Stalin's crimes just because they are not based in systematic extermination. However, this is not necessarily truth, because the Holodomor is still an open question. And anyway, millions died in conditions quiet similar than the Nazis, like in the train carts used in the deportations.

Having said that, I was surprise with this declaration from Putin about Stalin in 2009:


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nlFDfGfKQto_=


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## tyrodtom (Mar 13, 2012)

What did the Germans expect from the Russian troops after they had beat the Nazi armies back out of their land, and saw with their own eyes the evidence of the atrotcities the Nazis had commited ? I'm not just talking about the deathcamps the over run in Poland, but the wasted villages and cities in the Ukrane and Belorussia.

The Nazis knew the brutality they'd dealed out to the Russians was going to be returned, that's why they fought to the bitter end, they knew for them there was no future.
The Russian soldier didn't differentiate between Nazi and German.


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2012)

Id say the Russian oppression was more arbitrary and unpredictable. I'd say the german oppression was more methodical and thorough, but more targetted.

At the end of the day why would i pass a harsher judgement on the germans over the russians? It has to do with the social maturity of the two states. russians under stalin, and before that the Tsars had known nothing else other than brutality and oppression. Life was always cheap in Russia. In many ways their behaviour, whilst reprehensible was at least understandable. Russians had never known anything different as a society. They behaved as they had been treated themselves.

The Germans have no such defence. They were amongst the most refined, cultured and priveleged of the western societies. Unlike the russians, who had known nothing better in their modern history, the germans had known tolerance and freedom, knew that prejudice and brutality was wrong, and possessed the educational base in their socieites to make that call. As a society they consciously forfeited all that. They chose the low road, by conscious choice. thats what they wanted, and therein lies a crime peerless in recent European History. Its a crime that to this day robs the German state of any moral traction. Despite the death of Nazism for more than 70 years, its a legacy they simply cannot rid themselves of. As far as im concerned, germany was, and always will be a morally bankrupt state that can never be allowed to forget its past..... I am not referring to the people, the current generation is blameless. i am referring to the concept that is Germany. no matter how hard it tries, it will always be tainted by that spectre 

Both the russian and german societies failed the basic tests of human rights in the first half of the 20th century. But of the two, the german failure was by far the greatest. Not by reason of the extent of their crime, but by reason of the fact that they had the greater capacity to choose, and they chose poorly.


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## Ratsel (Mar 14, 2012)

parsifal said:


> As far as im concerned, germany was, and always will be a morally bankrupt state that can never be allowed to forget its past.....


That's a pretty bold statement. Underlying agenda perhaps?


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2012)

Of course. The agenda is that we never allow such crimes to occur ever again. You do that by never forgetting the past. This is particularly true for the Germans, who by choice stepped outside the norms of decncy to pursue dreams of world domination


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 14, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> what, you mean like the russian did



Eye for ane eye, huh?


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## Gixxerman (Mar 14, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> I'm trying to whitewash Hitler?... are you for real? seriously? If you don't know what the Russians did as they marched into berlin, I can't help you.



I have a good idea of what went on as Russia marched westwards into Germany - and not just into Berlin.
But for you to pretend this is equivelant to the death camps and the attempt to wipe out entire various groups of peoples in Europe is quite wrong.

There has never been a modern industrial death factory system anything like the nazis created.


Now I am interested, genuinely, if you are not 'whitewashing Hitler'.............why the heck would you make such a transperantly absurd statement?

(just to refresh memories I said - _no-one else acted towards Germans in the same way as the nazis acted to so many others, huh?_
and you said _what, you mean like the russian did_ )

As tyrodtom correctly says, the Russians on regaining their territory saw exactly what the nazis had done and not surprisingly made little distinction between 'ordinary German soldiers' and naziz/SS/Wafen SS/local corps acting under German instruction.
But for all that the revenge of those Russian 'ordinary soldiers' is not comparable to the planned industrial slaughter machine the nazis created and operated for as long as they could.

I also think parsifal makes a good point......and as tales from the time illustrate it too was something the nazis were well aware of and tried to use to hide their plans 
(I am thinking of the camp guard quoted in 'The World at War' series who told a woman who suspected she was about to be led to her death 'Madam, do you think we are barbarians?').

Being a 'centre of European culture' (as Germany undoubtedly was/is) was certainly no safeguard against the plain evil nazi ethos......which turned out to be about as anti-German as it is possible to get, considering the stunning degree of ruin misery they brought to Germany the German people.

Let us not forget amongst their first victims were the German disabled, of all ages, male female whether physically or mentally disabled.
They fell on destroyed the weakest most vulnerable German people first.

This tone here of preferring to ignore all of that to start diverting the topic to 'well what about Stalin.....' is not only to miss the point but I can only wonder just what 'agenda' is at work.

Stalin is gone, so is Mao and so is Hitler. 
Thank God.
There's no need to continually act as if discussing the record of one is to go easy on the other(s).


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## Tante Ju (Mar 14, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> OK Ratsel, go ahead show me when where the Russians attempted the systematic extermination of the German people.
> 
> Nobody treated the German people the way the nazis treated several specific 'peoples'.
> 
> Be serious quit trying to whitewash Hitler his gang using Stalin his gang.



Some good reading for you... Holodomor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



parsifal said:


> As far as im concerned, germany was, and always will be a morally bankrupt state that can never be allowed to forget its past..... I am not referring to the people, the current generation is blameless. i am referring to the concept that is Germany. no matter how hard it tries, it will always be tainted by that spectre[



We are aware that is your opinion.. disturbingly often expressed I would say. But IMHO German guilt in World War II is not to be used by other nations to forget about their guilt as well. I suspect agenda of many who go great lenght about discussing German guilt is really about not discussing their own guilt. They want to forget their guilt, and by talk only about German guilt. Everyone should deal with their own past. Germany _did_. It needs no externals from countries who did NOT deal with their past to give 'lessons' about something they _did not_ learn themselves.

As for the concept of Germany, German people need no allowance and no approval from anyone else to exist in the country of their own. The concept of Germany is a sovereign, unified country of many nations that exist and governed by German law and firmly held principles of constitution.



parsifal said:


> This is particularly true for the Germans, who by choice stepped outside the norms of decncy to pursue dreams of world domination



Sorry, you are factual wrong.. Germany, even under Hitler had no plans of 'world domination'. Maybe the Kaiser had, or more like he wanted a 'place under the sun' too. The 'secret nazi world domination plans' was a the propaganda brainchild of FDR administration, who tried to convince American people to convince war, and produced a number of faked - allegad nazi - plans for the public that showed South America was targeted to colonize by Hitler.

Also if you want to better understand who really had 'pursue dreams of world domination' I suggest to study this map careful:


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 14, 2012)

Don't let this get out of hand. We are watching...


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## Gixxerman (Mar 14, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Some good reading for you... Holodomor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



It may surprise you but this is not news to me.......and despite the incredible level of this crime it is still not the same as a deliberately constructed industrial death complex like Auschwitz-Birkenau, Belzec, Chelmno, Majdanek, Sobibor, and Treblinka where the expressed intent is the complete extermination of entire peoples.


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## Tante Ju (Mar 14, 2012)

What do you think Holodomor was about?


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## stona (Mar 14, 2012)

parsifal said:


> This is particularly true for the Germans, who by choice stepped outside the norms of decncy to pursue dreams of world domination



They are hardly the only nation to have done that,though "world domination" was not really a nazi objective. Even a nation as young as yours should be wary of casting the first stone. There are many less than edifying episodes in most of our histories,including attempts at genocide,the use of slave labour and many more.Do I need to go on?
The kind of savagery perpetrated by the nazis is part of human nature,not specifically German.
I can see no conceivable reason why a young German today should feel responsible for,or guilty about,the sins of his grandfathers.
Cheers
Steve


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## renrich (Mar 14, 2012)

Sea Lion was not a plan that many in the German High Command believed in, including Hitler. If Hitler wanted to "win" the war or at least prolong it, he should have, in 1940, have first taken Malta and then concentrate on defeating Britain in N Africa and making the Med an Axis Lake. Close the Suez Canal and take the oil resources in the Middle East and above all. Do not declare war on the USA in December, 1941, and do not invade the USSR in 1941.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 14, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> What do you think Holodomor was about?



I think it was the criminally deliberate consigning of a class of people to starvation and death as the Russians preferred to industrialise rather than give resources to mitigate a famine (and yes I am aware of the outrageous murderous demands the Soviet state made on the starving to supply foodstuffs and yes I will agree that this may - accepting that it is subject to debate - qualify as an act of genocide against some of the Ukrainian people).

It also has its equivelant in WW2 in the way the nazi regime systematically starved people on numerous occasions on a large scale too.

...... but it is still not the same Auschwitz etc etc.



Tante Ju said:


> Also if you want to better understand who really had 'pursue dreams of world domination' I suggest to study this map careful:



Whilst I agree that the British Empire is dotted with some criminally disgraceful incidents and terrible crimes, on balance and overall I think most would prefer their chances as a foreign person or a Jew under British rule than nazi.
Every day of the week.

.....and again, nothing the British ever did compares in any serious way to Auschwitz etc etc.

Not even the Boer war concentration camps.


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## stona (Mar 14, 2012)

renrich said:


> do not invade the USSR in 1941.



But that was the whole point of the nazi political agenda of the time. This was the primary objective of their war,not the Western Front. If it made sense to seperate the ideology of nazi Germany from its political and military objectives I would agree with you but it simply can't be done. They were waging an ideological and racial war on the Eastern Front,they didn't really want a fight in the West. That was forced on them by what they saw as Britain's (and her allies) incalcitrance.

They tried to take Malta and failed. They tried to defeat Britain in North Africa and failed again. To paraphrase another post above "they had plans" for this. I think we deserve some credit for thwarting those plans and denying Germany these objectives. Sometimes I think that Britain's effort in those crucial first three years are minimised with the passing of time.
Could or should they have tried harder? Maybe,but Germany only had a limited number of resources and couldn't win everywhere.
Cheers
Steve
By "Britain" I always mean Britain and her Commonwealth/Empire allies,I'm not daft enough to imagine that we could have done it without them.


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## Ratsel (Mar 14, 2012)

I admire you Gixxerman, you refrain from lumping all German people together, whereas PARSIFAL dosn't make a distinction, kudos Sir.
I will add how ever, there are much more worse things then death (crimes by othe nations, which I will not say in this forum). Anyways, excellent discussion Gentlemen, I'm learning alot.


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2012)

> We are aware that is your opinion.. disturbingly often expressed I would say


.

Who is "we" and why is it disturbing to remember the past and learn from it. Perhaps you find my views disturbing because they are views you find hard to listen to or accept. Why is it disturbing for me to express views that you dont agree with? would you prefer a censored forum, where only views that conform to your own are allowed to be aired? now that is a disturbing thought because it harks back to the very things i have spoken about.....and they revolve around the Nazi debasement of human values and the basic freedoms we have all come to enjoy and be accustomed with . 



> But IMHO German guilt in World War II is not to be used by other nations to forget about their guilt as well.



Im glad you qualify this as your opinion. Trying to shield german war guilt by dressing up the alleged crimes of other nations and then saying because they did something that excuses the germans. It doesnt. in law, as well as in the application of basic human rights, the carrying out of one crime is not erased or cancelled out by another. The only exception to that, and its a biggy, is if a nation or person is taking steps to defend themselves from anothers agression. Germany was not defensding itself, other nations were. After the war the germans were found guilty as a nation of waging aggressive war. That was a precondition to many things, including the indictment of many Germans on war crimes. its why other nations, like the british could never have its personnel indicted for war crimes under the legislation as it existed in 1945. The british were not guilty of waging aggressivfe war, therefore, none of its personnel could be indicted for war crimes under international law as it existed at that time. 

If two people are guilty of a crime, then they are both guilty. Both are not exonerated because the other one did it as well.

But nobody embarked on a spree of national criminality to the same extent as Germany. There were nations that in their own way were as murderous as the germans, like some elements of the hungarian regime for example. none approached the Germans in terms of the scale or malevolence. Not even the Soviets. The Soviets committed their crimes from the position of social immaturity 



> I suspect agenda of many who go great lenght about discussing German guilt is really about not discussing their own guilt.



In the case of the british and the commonwealth, there was no case to answer under international law. none of the commonwealth nations or the british were guilty of waging aggressive war, so there was no case to answer outside the national criminal codes. This is why the many attempts to say the british committed a crime with their area bombing strategies is just so much hot air. it was not contrary to any military code, or convention (it is now, i admit, but not in 1945). The british did not target their own people, or people who had surrendered to them. There was not the systemic abuse of morals that there was in germany. where criminal acts occurred, it was within the ability of the criminal justice system in each country to deal with that crime. The Germans had descended to the point in their moral code could no longer function as amodern, moral state, because the state itself was rotten to the core. 



> They want to forget their guilt, and by talk only about German guilt. Everyone should deal with their own past. Germany _did_. It needs no externals from countries who did NOT deal with their past to give 'lessons' about something they _did not_ learn themselves.




Germany did not deal with their war guilt. thats the problem. It was dealt with for them. by the very people you want out. 

I cant answer for every nation, but i can answer for germany, and I can answer for my own country. These are the facts, Germany was found after the war to have waged an aggressive war, and from that to have carried out numerous attrocities, including genocide. thats why other nations have intervened with germany since 1945. Left to their own devices they proved to be decidedly unhealthy to the well being of nations that surrounded them. So, whilst you may be expressing the heartfelt wishes of many, there are many more, who know that Germany after the war unconditionally surrendered, but only after they had forced many nations around them to expend much blood and treasure making sure that the german idea of "dealing with their past" did not raise its ugly head again. The German idea of "dealing with their past" was to be xenophobic in the extreme, and involved the employment of concepts like genocide, the abandonment of leagal or moral codes, to murder anyone they did not like, without trial, to wage wars of aggression and attempt to subjugate anyone they thought to be useful or in their way. Thats why Germany was dealt with in the way that it was after the war. Their wartime actions cost them the right to self determination or self defence for many years, and to this day affects their moral image. In the eyes of the law, the crimes have been dealt with, so in a legal sense Germany's debt to the world has been paid. But from the moral standpoint, the Germans have never been able to cast off that terrible stigma that attached itself to the national psyche after the Nazis. and neither should it. I have 50 million reasons for saying that. we should never forget what was done. forgive yes, forget, never

In the case of my country, I would be the last to try and claim perfection or pure innocence. But my country was never guilty as a nation of waging an aggressive war, it was never guilty of genocide, or murder on a national scale. I am sure that there are things we could have done better, but there is no comparison between the moral position reached by my country, and that which the germans reached by 1945. sorry, but you argument to try and lift Germany out of its dilemma by comparing it to my country is just laughable




> As for the concept of Germany, German people need no allowance and no approval from anyone else to exist in the country of their own. The concept of Germany is a sovereign, unified country of many nations that exist and governed by German law and firmly held principles of constitution.



I agree that germany has paid a price for its indiscretions, but a memory still remains, not least within the German state itself. No nation exists on itself, or by itself, we are all interconnected. German guilt and moral dilemma affects us all, not just the germans. 




> Sorry, you are factual wrong.. Germany, even under Hitler had no plans of 'world domination'. Maybe the Kaiser had, or more like he wanted a 'place under the sun' too. The 'secret nazi world domination plans' was a the propaganda brainchild of FDR administration, who tried to convince American people to convince war, and produced a number of faked - allegad nazi - plans for the public that showed South America was targeted to colonize by Hitler


.

I disagree. Certainly people like FDR and churchill played the "aggression" charge for all it was worth, but many people, including many scholars have named germany as the wager of aggression at that time. In a legal sense, your position is a nonsense....germany was found guilty of waging aggressive war, illegally subjugating many peoples. if the Germans had not been stopped do you honestly believe they would have stopped at the borders of Europe???? Even within the context of wartime planning, they had serious (if rather vague) ideas about conquests in the Atlantic, Afric, the subcontinent and the middle east that I know of. they had designs inhto South America. German appetite for conquest proved bigger than their means, but if they had the means they would not have hesitated to continue their wars of conquest 



> Also if you want to better understand who really had 'pursue dreams of world domination' I suggest to study this map careful:



There is no comparison between the British empire and the Nazis. you have got to be kidding. In the case of my country, there was no feelings of subjugation or domination. we were a nation of free men, wilingly offering our services to the home country in its hour of need. That was also the case in South Africa New Zealan and Canada. Other parts of the empire were less free, but neither did they exist as nations. moreover, Britains empi8re was the product of several hundred years of colonilaism, applied at a time when it was not seen as distasteful or illegal. Applying the standards of International law to an entity that existed for many years prior is just a little too cute for my taste I am afraid, and completely irrelevant to the issue I might add.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 14, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> I admire you Gixxerman, you refrain from lumping all German people together, whereas PARSIFAL dosn't make a distinction, kudos Sir.



I have some German friends I am very very fond of, I wouldn't dream of it Ratsel 
(and we have had some very interesting discussions about the war as one in particular was very close to his grandfather who served on the eastern front - mine was in the western front).

It's maybe a little like the 'schizophrenic split' one has when you have to make with English parentage with Irish and Scottish heritage in your background.
The concept of 'some English yes but certainly not all English'.
I am well aware of the dreadful side of English history where the Scot Irish is concerned but I am of all 3........and I even have some continental near relatives too - a grandmother - from the northern Italian region.


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2012)

> They are hardly the only nation to have done that,though "world domination" was not really a nazi objective. Even a nation as young as yours should be wary of casting the first stone. There are many less than edifying episodes in most of our histories,including attempts at genocide,the use of slave labour and many more.Do I need to go on?
> The kind of savagery perpetrated by the nazis is part of human nature,not specifically German.
> I can see no conceivable reason why a young German today should feel responsible for,or guilty about,the sins of his grandfathers.



Hi Steve

And i have attempted to blame post war germans where in any part of my argument? If you read my posts carefully, at no point do i do that. But in 1945, as a nation, every man, woman and child who was German was found guilty of waging an aggressive war. That was a national crime, that the nation was guilty of, not just the few leaders at the top, or the SS thugs, or just the armed forces. the whole nation was guilty. From that position of national culpability sprang the idea of bringing the criminals that orchestrated that descent into madness to some sort of justice. Some of the perpetrators, the most notorious ones were brought to justice, others escaped unfortunately. 

I also never suggested that any nation was completely without guilt. But the nations themselves were not morally bankrupt, individual acts of bastardry in places like England or Austrralia could be dealt with by the internal justice system. in Germany it could not be dealt with. The nation itself had forfeited its morals, its sense of right and wrong so badly that it could not function as a nation without supervision for several years. neither could nations that surounded the germans bring themselves to trust the germans after thjeir experiences with them


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## Tante Ju (Mar 14, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> I think it was the criminally deliberate consigning of a class of people to starvation and death as the Russians preferred to industrialise rather than give resources to mitigate a famine (and yes I am aware of the outrageous murderous demands the Soviet state made on the starving to supply foodstuffs and yes I will agree that this may - accepting that it is subject to debate - qualify as an act of genocide against some of the Ukrainian people).



Thank you. Part I do not understand - 'may'? It targeted Ukrainian people specific. It was planned and constructed by men, not by nature. Millions died. So - 'may'?



> It also has its equivelant in WW2 in the way the nazi regime systematically starved people on numerous occasions on a large scale too.
> 
> ...... but it is still not the same Auschwitz etc etc.



My (and most scholar) definition of genocide is intentional mass killing (direct or indirect) of a group. Method of killing (forcing into living conditions leading to death, starvation, direct killing, sterilizing etc.), selection method of group (racial, national, class, tribal, age, religion etc.) is not relevant for decide if its genocide or not. What sets apart Holodomor and Holocaust is method of killing, the HC was industrilized though but both showed groups forced into inhabitable conditions (sickness, famine). So it is a matter of question wheter you think a genocide by modern/industrial methods (poison gas) is really different from a genocide with 'more tradiatonal' methods (clubs, machetes, good old 7.62 in back of head, famine, disease).



> .....and again, nothing the British ever did compares in any serious way to Auschwitz etc etc. Not even the Boer war concentration camps.



I think you miss the point - I was making reference to so-called World Domination plans, not comparing the level of attorcities commited by British or German Empires. I was pointing out that if ever there was such as a 'world domination plan' (I think Alexander the Great was the only person with such BTW), it is certain to see such accusation and moralism come from anyone in the former British Empire.. ironical. The notion is subject of irony portrayed by Cpt. Blackadder 'how did the war start' satire.


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## DonL (Mar 14, 2012)

> As far as im concerned, germany was, and always will be a morally bankrupt state that can never be allowed to forget its past..... I am not referring to the people, the current generation is blameless. i am referring to the concept that is Germany. no matter how hard it tries, it will always be tainted by that spectre



@ parsifal

I don't want to be offensive and this is no post to get on with our past. 

I agree with you and I'm with your opinion that we (german people but all other people around the world too) never forget the Holocaust or be allowed to forget the Holocaust and do all in our power that this will never happen again!

But I disagree with all my heart that germany as state/concept always will be a morally bankrupt state.
A state/concept will be always defined about it's peoples behaviour and the politics of the government and the individual political parties. 

Your statement implied that the state and government of germany will have always minor/less rights, requirements or importance then other states and I think that is the wrong way.

The german people and government had now shown for nearly 70 years that they could be a reliable partner to other states or countries and that we have no world or other domination plans. But the german country has as all other countries it's own agenda and goals and I think it has the same rights to "fight" for this as all other countries of the world.

And nowadays many countries want support from germany and the help from it's money, but this is only functioning if germany is a fully equitable member of the world community, that can't be automaticly (as always bankrupt state) morally attacked with it's past, if some decisions from the german government are not popular at other countries.

Nowaday we have a very good example with Greek. The german goverment decisions about the "Eurocrises" are not popular at greek. I don't want to judge or discuss the decisions of the german or greek government at the "Eurocrises", but the greek medias attack the german state/people and goverment a lot with the Nazi time and with the Holocaust, because they think they have the moral right.
But the Eurocrises has nothing to do with the Nazi time, WWII or the Holocaust. And german people are not very happy to get attacked with this past but at the same time should spend some of their money to this people.

So I think your statement doesn't work in this harsh form. Never forget this past, I agree with you, but please don't show the moral finger and that germany always will be a morally bankrupt state. That isn't functioning!


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## Gixxerman (Mar 14, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Thank you. Part I do not understand - 'may'? It targeted Ukrainian people specific. It was planned and constructed by men, not by nature. Millions died. So - 'may'?



The reason I put the 'may' in there is that, to the best of my knowledge, the question of whether this was genuinely an attempt at genocide is open to question and still being argued over by historians.



Tante Ju said:


> My (and most scholar) definition of genocide is intentional mass killing (direct or indirect) of a group.



.....and it is on this point that the question arises.
Yes a dreadfully enormous number of Ukrainians died but I do not think one can say that Stalin attempted to wipe out the Ukrainian people, otherwise why stop at all? 



Tante Ju said:


> Method of killing (forcing into living conditions leading to death, starvation, direct killing, sterilizing etc.), selection method of group (racial, national, class, tribal, age, religion etc.) is not relevant for decide if its genocide or not.



I agree to an extent on that........but I do think that the industrial international effort that was the nazi Halocaust places it well beyond anything seen before.
It must also be remembered that the nazi regime was also responsible for millions who died of disease starvation through the collapse of society in the areas they fought over for so long and not just those transported away to the death camps or the starved-and-worked-to-death camps. 



Tante Ju said:


> What sets apart Holodomor and Holocaust is method of killing



Well we shall have to disagree here.
Intent is the difference.
I do not think one can say Stalin attempted the genocide of the Ukrainian people.
Not even the collapse of the USSR the opening up of the Soviet archive produced evidence that was a deliberate attempt to destroy the Ukrainian people.
The nazis did attempt the genocide of entire peoples.



Tante Ju said:


> I think you miss the point - I was making reference to so-called World Domination plans, not comparing the level of attorcities commited by British or German Empires.



My mistake my apologies.



Tante Ju said:


> I was pointing out that if ever there was such as a 'world domination plan' (I think Alexander the Great was the only person with such BTW), it is certain to see such accusation and moralism come from anyone in the former British Empire.. ironical.



.....and yet I am quite sure that I have seen Hitler quoted as talking about a state of perpetual war being 'good' for the (German) nation's men to keep them strong stop them going soft.
That smacks to me of a plan for endless war by logical extension global domination......besides, in the event of success what would anyone call a Germany which had cut Britain off from Europe to deal with her Empire in decline, that had come to dominate all of Europe, annexed all of European Russia, gained control of North Africa?
Hardly a 'regional power' surely?



Tante Ju said:


> The notion is subject of irony portrayed by Cpt. Blackadder 'how did the war start' satire.



Indeed.
Most of us are not blind to the red or pink coloured globe of the BE verses the "small sausage factory in Tanganyika"?



DonL said:


> I disagree with all my heart that germany as state/concept always will be a morally bankrupt state.



I think that is fair comment.....but like it or not thanks to the nazi regime Germany has a special responsibility to bear here and will have to do so for many decades if not centuries to come.
It could have been any number of nations which fell for that racial purity/national eugenics garbage but sadly events conspired such that it was nazi Germany that did and only nazi Germany acted on it that way.
It is the special dimension to WW2 which seperates it entirely from WW1, regardless of the obvious linkage.


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2012)

Hi donl

Good post. i didnt mean to imply that modern germany is in some way morally bankrupt, rather that at some point in its recent history it was. That point was in 1945, and the event that led to it. What i should say is that the experiences for the nation were so terrible in that period that it reached a point of moral bankruptcy. if i am reading your posts correctly, i think you are agreeing with me. Since then germany has rejoined the world communit, embraced the principals of democracy and the rule of law.....and they have propepered as a result of that, and the efforts and toils of its people. all good and all positive.

But still, deep within the psyche of the nation are a lot of ghosts. My point with regard to the post war experience is those ghosts ought not be forgotten, least of all by the germans themselves.

Trying to pass off the nazi experience as something of a nations 'business as usual" perhaps a little rqadical, the result of a few at the top is dangerous and wrong. in that sense (an illdefined concept at best) the nation at least, in the dark corners of its consciousness retains a sense of moral bankruptcy, betrayed by its own past, and its own experiences. We are all affected by it 

This is not a tirade against things german. it is intended to be a reminder, a call not to betray our grandfathers, and try and forget or minimise what happened. My father is german, fought for hitler, is proud of his german heritage. but he is conscious of what happened and the evil that descended onto the country, and thence, the whole world. he doesnt deny it, or belitle it. he doesnt try to make it a grand and noble adventure. He admits his shame and guilt, confronts it, and gets on with his life. he does not try and forget, but he does try to progress....even at 90 years of age


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## Ratsel (Mar 14, 2012)

Gixxerman, just a question here, no disrespect implied or intended, but in your opinion how much of the WWII Germans goverment aggression was atributed to the Treaty of Versailles? Do you think that it was one of the main causes of Germany invading France (aside from France declaring war on Germany)? Many Thanks.


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2012)

The Treaty of Vesailles was without doubt unfair to Germany but how long were all the middle european powers unfair to Poland pre 1918 , there are many treaties that are unfair in some sense or another but having an unfair treaty is what kind of reason to attack Netherlands or Denmark which as far as I know had nothing to do with the Treaty Of Versailles . Using the unfairness of the Treat of Versaille to back up any thing Nazi Germany did is a cheesey excuse.


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## Ratsel (Mar 14, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Using the unfairness of the Treat of Versaille to back up any thing Nazi Germany did is a cheesey excuse.


I was asking a question, NOT making an excuse. Hence the 'question mark' Instead of a 'period'.


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## DonL (Mar 14, 2012)

@ Parsifal

Good post!

I agree with your last post.

I think I/we have misunderstood your other statement, because to me, I have understood that the german state will be always morally bankrupt.

And this was/is for me a dangerous opinion, because many persons/people/countries will always think they can employ this morally bankruption to criticize or comment german government decisions.


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## DonL (Mar 14, 2012)

> The Treaty of Vesailles was without doubt unfair to Germany but how long were all the middle european powers unfair to Poland pre 1918 , there are many treaties that are unfair in some sense or another but having an unfair treaty is what kind of reason to attack Netherlands or Denmark which as far as I know had nothing to do with the Treaty Of Versailles . Using the unfairness of the Treat of Versaille to back up any thing Nazi Germany did is a cheesey excuse.



No pbfoot, it is *one* reason and explanation but no back up, so I agree with you.

But one hint from history not law. It is very different to treat a large and strong/powerful country unfair compare to a small and not so strong country.

The "real" consequences are mostly fundemental differnet!
That's not fair but the reality from history.

Edit:
This is my personal opinion and not offensive but Poland has/had the ****.. worst geographic place on this earth.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 14, 2012)

".... Since then germany has rejoined the world community, embraced the principals of democracy and the rule of law.....and they have prospered as a result of that, and the efforts and toils of its people. all good and all positive...."

And now the German Banks own western Europe - or at least Western Europe's debts .

This moral bankruptcy bogey-man-thingy .... its roots are way deeper than Versailles. Catholic, Imperial, France screwed with German principalities during the 100 Years War ..... the payback was the FrancoPrussian humiliation of the French Army and of France. From that point on it became about _revenge between the two _-- with Germany almost always possessing the superior armed forces and weapons .

MM


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## Gixxerman (Mar 14, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> Gixxerman, just a question here, no disrespect implied or intended, but in your opinion how much of the WWII Germans goverment aggression was atributed to the Treaty of Versailles?



An interesting question.
My own view is that what could have been a lasting piece had the original Wilson fourteen points principles was blown drastically off course by the French determination to make Germany pay for WW1.

......and that goes back to the fall-out of 1870, just as undoubtedly if we are stupid enough to do it some sort of society survives it a historian will point to the roots of WW3 going back to WW2.

Versailles dealt the world a huge problem......but as events were to show (even with Hitler and his crowd in charge of Germany) the USA, UK and others were inclined to this view and were prepared to revise revisit some of what had been done.
I'd also say that WW1 itself was a huge part of the problem, with millions of brutalised men taking back harsh attitudes home with them, it's a wonder the idea of inflexible dictatorship wasn't successful elsewhere (although Britain did have the Hitler admiring Mosley his blackshirts).

So I would agree that the French were not very smart in what they did and undoubtedly it provoked German hostility but even so at the end of the day it was Germany that knowing started the war with the invasion of Poland, knowing the guarantees France Britain had given.
In fact Hitler is on record as saying that he had wanted the war to begin in 1938.
He was an opportunist cynic to the core and he brought nothing but horror to Germany and the German people he claimed to love so much. 




Ratsel said:


> Do you think that it was one of the main causes of Germany invading France (aside from France declaring war on Germany)? Many Thanks.



As a main reason for the German invasion of France itself I'd have to say no, I don't think so.

Yes, it was no doubt in there as a chance to settle a score amongst that generation and I don't think one can forget the effect of what was seen as the repeated humiliation on the German middle-classes who not only suffered the WW1 defeat but economic catastrophe shortly after (and some of that in large part due to French reparations demands). 

My view is that the real main reason for invading France was to attempt to knock the French and British out of the war before Hitler turned towards Russia which was always his chief goal.
His recorded comments about a 2-front war and so on being prime.
The fact that the Germans were more successful in France in 1940 - even more so than they had dared hope - was simply an unexpected bonus.

(although I have to say, given that they were so successful and as we saw events transpire I just wonder what on earth they would have done had they not been so successful as they themselves expected? 
Had a situation akin to the WW1 stalemate arisen with the British and French still operating in a partially occupied divided France how could that have been a 'platform' to operate freely against the Russians or anywhere else?
That's one I find difficult to understand.)


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## Gixxerman (Mar 14, 2012)

DonL said:


> Edit:
> This is my personal opinion and not offensive but Poland has/had the ****.. worst geographic place on this earth.



This is an aspect of the nazi ideal I always wondered at.
The notion that large sections of modern 1930's German society was just itching to go off to eastern Europe and European Russia to be some kind of yeoman farmers.
Nevermind all the stuff about being recent invaders (with itinerant bands of surviving locals not surprisingly looking for revenge etc) but stuck out in what they planned to be sparsly populated huge farming regions, and often freezing cold places!?

Maybe I'm just some soft western European type but it seems like a bit of a nightmarish vision to me.


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## DonL (Mar 14, 2012)

Very good post Gixxerman!

I totaly agree with you.

Also I want to say that Hitler "needed" the war against Poland and France to get the support from most or all german people and so he could fog his real pretension at the east to the german people.

Edit:
@ gixxerman



> Edit:
> This is my personal opinion and not offensive but Poland has/had the ****.. worst geographic place on this earth.



This comment from me refer to the geographic place between Germany/Prussia and Russia/UDSSR.
I think for any country all around the world it is the worst thing to sit right between two very very strong countries. That's a very worst place and not a place you will always be treat very fair.


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## Ratsel (Mar 14, 2012)

DonL said:


> Very good post Gixxerman!
> 
> I totaly agree with you.


+1

A+++++++ Gixxerman!


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## Readie (Mar 14, 2012)

I don't believe that modern Germany will ever forget the 2 WW's and the Holocaust. 
We all have to learn from history and few countries have a whiter than white past.
'Smoke and mirrors' arguments are not convincing.
Hypocrisy is the worse crime of all.

John


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 14, 2012)

Not "hypocrisy", John. *Denial*. All of us are hypocrites about some things, but when a nation side-steps inconvenient historical fact ( e.g. biological warfare experiments by Imperial Japan in China) then that is a very disturbing symptom. Japan will have to deal with it sooner or later, IMHO, and they are a strong, resilient culture .. * they will*. 

MM


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## Readie (Mar 14, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> Not "hypocrisy", John. *Denial*. All of us are are hypocrites about some things, but when a nation side-steps inconvenient historical fact ( e.g. biological warfare experiments by Imperial Japan in China) then that is a very disturbing symptom. Japan will have to deal with it sooner or later, IMHO, and they are a strong, resilient culture .. * they will*.
> 
> MM



You are right Michael.
I think we could say both words in 2012 and apply them to many countries...
John


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 14, 2012)

Well it is rather obvious that this thread has run its course. People have been asked to get back on topic. 

One more post that does not have to do with the Defeat of the Luftwaffe, and this thread is closed.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 14, 2012)

".... post that does not have to do with the Defeat of the Luftwaffe"

How can you take an organization seriously that was run by an overweight, morphine-addicted, egomaniacal mobster ..... (he personally 'owned' Austria after the take-over)

Right, CrewChief ... 

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2012)

i think adler wants more focus on its military defeat rather than the moral defeat that it suffered. i would have thought "defeat" can be interpreted on many levels however.


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## Jenisch (Mar 14, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... post that does not have to do with the Defeat of the Luftwaffe"
> 
> How can you take an organization seriously that was run by an overweight, morphine-addicted, egomaniacal mobster ..... (he personally 'owned' Austria after the take-over)
> 
> ...


 

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E5XG0LYz5B4_

Galland confirmed this!


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## Ratsel (Mar 14, 2012)

Bubbi, Galland, Bar, Specht, Marseille, etc., were the real leaders of the Luftwaffe. The higher ups would have been wise to listen to them. 
Unit commanders in the end, made the most critical of choises. They ignored the FAT MAN Hitler, and concentrated on how and where to surrender. 

They (Luftwaffe pilots) did the best they could.


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## parsifal (Mar 15, 2012)

I dont think LW leadership doctrine or tactics was, overall, any better or worse than that of its opponents. Goring is often blamed for systemic and doctrinal failures within the LW. Sometimes deservingly, but often as a convenient scapegoat for a wider failure.

In the end the LW was defeated by two related issues: overuse/over-extension (as one issue), and inadequate resources (as another issue) compared to their opponents. from those fundamental weaknesses grew a whole plethora of other failures. those "other" failures are numerous, and extend to such issues as inadequate training schedules, insufficient training aircraft, overworked crews, inadequate type replacements, inadequate logistic support (on some fronts). All are relevant, but all can be traced or linked back to that same root cause....resourcing.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 15, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> Right, CrewChief ...
> 
> MM



Is there a problem?



parsifal said:


> i think adler wants more focus on its military defeat rather than the moral defeat that it suffered. i would have thought "defeat" can be interpreted on many levels however.



The war guilt of Germany 70 years after the war has nothing to do with the defeat of the Luftwaffe. Nore is the question of who is worse, the Russians or the Germans? We let threads go off topic here and there if it is a good discussion, but eventually it is time to get back on topic. Is that a problem?


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## stona (Mar 15, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Galland confirmed this!



Galland had his own post war agenda. Distancing himself from the nazi regime was high on his list of priorities and he was very good at it. 
The reasons for the Luftwaffe's defeat have been well covered already. They were systemic failiures at many levels (including Galland's) and the mechanisms for defeat were in place before or very early in the war.

Ratsel,unit commanders surely implement strategy,they don't make it. They have a much greater input over tactics.  
Some junior leaders can I concede have an influence above their rank,usually by politicing (bending the ears of groups of their seniors who may share their view) and by-passing their chain of command to the point of disloyalty. On the British side Douglas Bader's influence as a mere squadron leader in the "Big Wing" debacle would be an example. 
Bader,a shameless self publicist,had a lot in common with Galland.
Cheers
Steve


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## tyrodtom (Mar 15, 2012)

Let's not forget that the Nazi's did execute some Generals, and not all. were envolved with the June 44 plot. I can't remember the exact figures, but something over 14,000 Wehrmacht men were excuted during WW2, those were mostly for combat refusal, etc. but that definition was very flexible in the last year of the war. So that was hanging over the head of any German officer who knowingly ignored orders.


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## stona (Mar 15, 2012)

As Voltaire wrote after we had executed Admiral John Byng for his failiure "to do his utmost" at Minorca.

"Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres"

"In this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time to encourage the others."

I'm sure the same applies to generals. In reality poor old Byng was the scapegoat for the Royal Navy's own lack of preparation and failings and paid with his life. Sound familiar?

Cheers
Steve


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## Readie (Mar 15, 2012)

Interesting points.
It seems to me that 'defeat' can come from within as well as from a superior force.
John


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## stona (Mar 15, 2012)

Readie said:


> Interesting points.
> It seems to me that 'defeat' can come from within as well as from a superior force.
> John



I think that it is invariably a combination of both. It certainly was in the case of the Luftwaffe. We all bang on about the Luftwaffe's lack of suitable aircraft,pilots,training,fuel,the RLM's production difficulties and poor planning but none of these are relevant without the stresses imposed on the organisation(s) by the various allied air forces.
Cheers
Steve


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## Readie (Mar 15, 2012)

stona said:


> I think that it is invariably a combination of both. It certainly was in the case of the Luftwaffe. We all bang on about the Luftwaffe's lack of suitable aircraft,pilots,training,fuel,the RLM's production difficulties and poor planning but none of these are relevant without the stresses imposed on the organisation(s) by the various allied air forces.
> Cheers
> Steve



Quite so Steve
John


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## Ratsel (Mar 15, 2012)

Ahhh yes, the enemy within, always more dangerous then ANY outside force. The Luftwaffe suffered this. The FAT MAN was in large responsible for this.


HIS doctrine on bomber engagement in late 43/44 was laughable.


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## parsifal (Mar 15, 2012)

> The war guilt of Germany 70 years after the war has nothing to do with the defeat of the Luftwaffe. Nore is the question of who is worse, the Russians or the Germans? We let threads go off topic here and there if it is a good discussion, but eventually it is time to get back on topic. Is that a problem?



Hard to disagree that this discussion has not drifted completely off topic. So i am not defending the discussion per se. in that regard i think you are right. however, in regard to the luftwaffes defeat, it was much more than a narrowly defined material defeat, more than a loss of personnel and material. Its defeat was all encompassing and comprehensive. It was a defeat of its doctrine, a morale and moral defeat, as much psychological and ethereal, a defeat of doctrine and belief as it was a case of nuts and bolts and numbers. moreover, its defeat of the Luftwaffe as a concept and all that it stood for that matters in todays world and retains its relevance to us more than the material defeat that is more relevant today.
So no, you cannot describe or understand the importance of the defeat from just the perpective you are wanting this discussion to progress to. Its more wide ranging than that, though as i said, this discussion that led to your intervention is not where the discussion had to go.


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## Readie (Mar 15, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> Ahhh yes, the enemy within, always more dangerous then ANY outside force..



Oh yes,and truer in 2012 for us.
John


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## Siegfried (Mar 15, 2012)

Readie said:


> I don't believe that modern Germany will ever forget the 2 WW's and the Holocaust.
> We all have to learn from history and few countries have a whiter than white past.
> 'Smoke and mirrors' arguments are not convincing.
> Hypocrisy is the worse crime of all.
> ...



Not to put too fine a point on it, while most countries don't have a Whiter than White past Britiai (and Europe) certainly hasn't got too much of a White future at all. The Welsch actor John RhysJones calls it the "demographic catastrophe happening in Europe that nobody wants to talk about" and that is a result one way or another of WW2 as well. I perceive the endless guilt mongering against Germans as having some unique evil, rather than being a people pushed hard up against the wall, as being a subtextual attack on all Western civilisation and Europeans themselves by folks with various motives. If you read around enough you will find people declaring this outright. And its actually quite effective. It's also extraordinary don't you think that no one seems to or dares to care. This war was a tragedy for Europeans it is an ongoing tragedy today.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 15, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Hard to disagree that this discussion has not drifted completely off topic. So i am not defending the discussion per se. in that regard i think you are right. however, in regard to the luftwaffes defeat, it was much more than a narrowly defined material defeat, more than a loss of personnel and material. Its defeat was all encompassing and comprehensive. It was a defeat of its doctrine, a morale and moral defeat, as much psychological and ethereal, a defeat of doctrine and belief as it was a case of nuts and bolts and numbers. moreover, its defeat of the Luftwaffe as a concept and all that it stood for that matters in todays world and retains its relevance to us more than the material defeat that is more relevant today.
> So no, you cannot describe or understand the importance of the defeat from just the perpective you are wanting this discussion to progress to. Its more wide ranging than that, though as i said, this discussion that led to your intervention is not where the discussion had to go.



Agreed, and thank you.

Lets just try and stay on topic as much as possible. I do understand that it is far more to it than just a material defeat.


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## Readie (Mar 16, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> This war was a tragedy for Europeans it is an ongoing tragedy today.



Off topic reply, but needs to be said I think...

Agreed. But, two conflicts within 21 years is bound to have had an effect.

There is an undoubted legacy handed down through the generations...I'm not saying that this is a good thing, but I believe that it is true. Our past time of discussing WW2 is a possible example of this. We get angry at perceived slights on our national honour etc etc.
Having said that I reckon that both WW's will eventually be viewed like the Napoleonic wars...a long time ago and interesting enough but, irrelevant in 100 years time.

As for modern Europe that is a subject in itself Siegfried.

Why do you think emigration to Australia is still so popular?

John


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## Ratsel (Mar 16, 2012)

Mistakes in pilot selection and training

The bomber arm was given preference and received the "better" pilots. Later, fighter pilot leaders were few in numbers as a result of this. As with the late shift to fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools did not give the fighter pilot schools preference soon enough. The Luftwaffe, the OKW argued, was still an offensive weapon, and its primary focus was on producing bomber pilots. This attitude prevailed until the second half of 1943. During the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were not enough commissioned fighter pilots and leaders to meet attrition rates, as the need arose to replace aircrew (as attrition rates increased), the quality of pilot training deteriorated rapidly. Later this was made worse by fuel shortages for pilot training. Overall this meant a fall on training on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, combat training and a total lack of instrument training.

Mistakes in leadership

At the beginning of the war commanders were replaced with younger commanders too quickly. These younger commanders had to learn "in the field" rather than entering a post fully qualified. Training of formation leaders was not systematical until 1943, which was far too late, with the Luftwaffe already stretched. The Luftwaffe thus lacked a cadre of Staff officers to set up, man, and pass on experience.

Moreover, Luftwaffe leadership from the start poached the training command, which undermined its ability to replace losses, while also planning for "short sharp campaigns", which did not pertain. Moreover, no plans were laid for night fighters. In fact, when protests were raised, Jeschonnek himself said, "First we've got to beat Russia, then we can start training!"


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## Readie (Mar 16, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> Mistakes in pilot selection and training
> 
> The bomber arm was given preference and received the "better" pilots. Later, fighter pilot leaders were few in numbers as a result of this. As with the late shift to fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools did not give the fighter pilot schools preference soon enough. The Luftwaffe, the OKW argued, was still an offensive weapon, and its primary focus was on producing bomber pilots. This attitude prevailed until the second half of 1943. During the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were not enough commissioned fighter pilots and leaders to meet attrition rates, as the need arose to replace aircrew (as attrition rates increased), the quality of pilot training deteriorated rapidly. Later this was made worse by fuel shortages for pilot training. Overall this meant a fall on training on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, combat training and a total lack of instrument training.
> 
> ...



Good post, You make the point that I was trying too...that an organisation can defeat itself almost without outside help.

Is there anything else that we can usefully say on this thread?

I would like to start to discuss the time 1945 - 1955 and see how the countries dealt with the post war period.
Anyone up for that?

John


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## Ratsel (Mar 16, 2012)

Readie said:


> Good post, You make the point that I was trying too...that an organisation can defeat itself almost without outside help.
> 
> 
> John


Thats exactly it, it takes much more then the Allied airforces combined. Take a unit like say JG 52, they didn't follow Oberkommando Der Luftwaffe 'doctrine' as outline, and were very sucessful, even right to the very end. Others, mostly in the west mind you, followed OKL and were much less sucessful.

Now if they had the proper fighter pilot training, and dedicated night fighter force, and enough pilots dedicated to home defence, before the BOB, I shutter to think of what the results may have been.

Even with all that lacking, they did on hell of a job, you must admit.

Cheers.


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## Readie (Mar 16, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> Thats exactly it, it takes much more then the Allied airforces combined. Take a unit like say JG 52, they didn't follow Oberkommando Der Luftwaffe 'doctrine' as outline, and were very sucessful, even right to the very end. Others, mostly in the west mind you, followed OKL and were much less sucessful.
> 
> Now if they had the proper fighter pilot training, and dedicated night fighter force, and enough pilots dedicated to home defence, before the BOB, I shutter to think of what the results may have been.
> 
> ...



Kesselring showed Germany ingenuity in Italy, and I would not expect anything less of the LW,
Resilience, discipline, a sense of honour and ingenuity are great traits to have.

All of which have served Germany well in war and peace.

John


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## Ratsel (Mar 16, 2012)

Uncle Albert saved Italy from total destruction, well in my opinion anyways.


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## Jenisch (Mar 18, 2012)

The document Stona suggested at the start of this thread is very clear: Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945

I also would like to say that some people, including myself, objected the idea that the Eastern Front *proved*  to be the decisive theater of WWII. However, this is a fact. And as a matter of fact, Hitler's strategy to deal with Britain and the US necessarily needed the USSR conquered and it's resources obtained - which as everybody knows, failed.

This don't necessarily meant that had the Soviets been defeated, Hitler would won or not be defeated. What this means is that the Fuher's plans for sure stopped in Russia. 

I think many people who used to think like me, were "victims" of the Leftist historical views, such as "the Soviet Union won/would have won WWII alone", or "without the Soviet Union, the West would be doomed". The Soviet Union, without doubt, played the main role in Hitler's defeat. But without Britain's resistance in 1940, or the US government with the Lend-Lease for the Allied nations and it's hard line against Japan, among many other actions from them, it's success would be by no means certain. So, in the end it was an *Allied * victory in which the Soviet Union was the Allied nation that played the most important role in the context the things happened. This serves as one of the history *lessons * of WWII. However, of course people are free do do their own interpretations of historical events in order to them serve as lessons to not be repeated, since it's just for this that History is intended.

Given what I wrote above, I'm not claiming it was the Soviets that were also chifely respomsible by the LW's defeat. This certainly goes to the Western Allies.


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## stona (Mar 19, 2012)

There is hardly a view expressed in your post above with which I agree!
I suppose the fact that two people can read the same information and develop different conclusions is one of the things we were fighting for 
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Mar 19, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> The document Stona suggested at the start of this thread is very clear: Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945
> 
> I also would like to say that some people, including myself, objected the idea that the Eastern Front *proved*  to be the decisive theater of WWII. However, this is a fact. And as a matter of fact, Hitler's strategy to deal with Britain and the US necessarily needed the USSR conquered and it's resources obtained - which as everybody knows, failed..



The other way around. Germany needed Britain out of the war,before the US entered it,in order to turn her attention to her true objectives in the East. Defeat France,force Britain to terms and have a quick and decisive war in the East. It nearly worked.

.[/QUOTE]This don't necessarily meant that had the Soviets been defeated, Hitler would won or not be defeated. What this means is that the Fuher's plans for sure stopped in Russia..[/QUOTE]

No,they stopped with Britain. 

.[/QUOTE]I think many people who used to think like me, were "victims" of the Leftist historical views, such as "the Soviet Union won/would have won WWII alone", or "without the Soviet Union, the West would be doomed". The Soviet Union, without doubt, played the main role in Hitler's defeat. But without Britain's resistance in 1940, or the US government with the Lend-Lease for the Allied nations and it's hard line against Japan, among many other actions from them, it's success would be by no means certain. So, in the end it was an *Allied * victory in which the Soviet Union was the Allied nation that played the most important role in the context the things happened. This serves as one of the history *lessons * of WWII. However, of course people are free do do their own interpretations of historical events in order to them serve as lessons to not be repeated, since it's just for this that History is intended..[/QUOTE]

Germany may have defeated the USSR had help not been available,but the Anglo-American alliance would have been a step too far. Ultimately Germany would have been out muscled by the USA.

.[/QUOTE]Given what I wrote above, I'm not claiming it was the Soviets that were also chifely respomsible by the LW's defeat. This certainly goes to the Western Allies.[/QUOTE]

Neither was "chiefly responsible" but both were responsible.

Isn't it amazimg how two people can draw entirely different conclusions from the same information!

Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

stona said:


> The other way around. Germany needed Britain out of the war,before the US entered it,in order to turn her attention to her true objectives in the East. Defeat France,force Britain to terms and have a quick and decisive war in the East. It nearly worked.



I don't understand what you mean. Germany wanted to defeat the USSR, obtain it's resources and desmobilize the personal in the armed forces to the industry in order to defeat Britain and fight the US (if necessary).



> No,they stopped with Britain.



You want to mean this with hindsight of the inadequate German situation against the USSR with the war in the West existing? 



> Germany may have defeated the USSR had help not been available,but the Anglo-American alliance would have been a step too far. Ultimately Germany would have been out muscled by the USA.



Yeah. One decisive area which Germany lacked was nuclear research. The Americans were years ahead with the Manhattan Project.



> Isn't it amazimg how two people can draw entirely different conclusions from the same information!



Frankly, what I wrote was to try understand the widely accepted historical view. However, given what you said, I can say now that I also don't agree with it. LOL!


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## stona (Mar 19, 2012)

Really it is only the first point on which we differ widely.
Germany always had her eyes on the land and resources lying to her East. A quick scan of the appalling turgid prose of" Mein Kamf " gives the game away,if you can read it without falling asleep.

On March 31 1939 Britain (the world's pre-eminent naval power) pledged her support and France's (European mainlands pre-eminent military power) to Poland as a result of Germany's defiance of the Munich agreement. In May 1939 a secret protocol was signed to the Franco-Polish military alliance of 1921. The British prevaricated.

Germany would have to attack Poland in order to reach her Eastern objectives. Even the nazis realised that the Western powers might finally honour one of their guarantees and it was to this end that the Nazi-Soviet non agression pact was signed. 
The unprecedented Anglo-French guarantee of Polish independance played no small part in persuading the Soviet Union into this agreement but that is another,large,topic. 
Two days after the pact was signed Britain finally got off the fence,on 25 August 1939,and the Polish-British Common Defence Pact was signed. This unbeknownst to the Poles didn't cover a Soviet invasion,another topic again.

The overall aim of the Nazi-Soviet pact was to PREVENT a situation where Germany would have to fight a war on two fronts. The German plan was to defeat or at least force terms on Britain and France before launching an assault on the Soviet Union. At this point the USA was irrelevant as the Germans envisaged a quick,or rather two quick,European wars.

It was Germany's inability to defeat or force terms on Britain and Britain's ability to hold out until the economic and military might of the USA became involved that lost the Germans the war,not their failiure to reach Moscow in 1941. It was Britain's stubborn survival that forced the Germans to fight a war on two fronts,the very thing all their pre-war "diplomacy" was aimed at preventing.

Relevant to the original thread title is the fact that the defeat of the Luftwaffe was as much due to the allies,East and West,ability to avoid fighting and losing those two quick wars and force a long war of endurance on Germany for which she had not planned and failed to plan for properly at any later stage.

Cheers
Steve


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## Tante Ju (Mar 19, 2012)

stona said:


> It was Britain's stubborn survival that forced the Germans to fight a war on two fronts,the very thing all their pre-war "diplomacy" was aimed at preventing.



What 'two fronts'? The British left the continent in 1940. They did not come back. They could not.

Survival is one thing, but a hostile Britain that could not and had not challange the German on continent was a very different thing than a two-front war. The German force fighting the British was a mere 30 000 men of Rommel, two JGs in the West, and submarines. None of that was missed in the East - 30 000 men was a drop in the ocean of 3 million Axis troop, the LW enjoyed clear air superiority until about the mid 1943, and subs are not very good on the steppe.. it was anything like the actual two front war of WW1.

What forced the Germans into a two front war was the USA entry of war.. Britain's stubborn survival was exactly that, stubborn survival and no more. It 'forced' nobody into nothing, well maybe the Brits themselves into bankcrupt and something of role of servitude as a US proxy.


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2012)

That really is an excellent summary of what went wrong for the germans. too many wars running at the same time, too much unfinished business too many fronts opened up such that germany could no longer bring decisive power to bear on any of them.

But it goes further than that. The Germans were pioneers in the art of warfare for most of the last century, but in particular they pulled head an shoulders away from their enemies 1937-43. The german perfection of offensive warfare gave themn an invaluable edge that nearly won them the war. part of that near victory was their use of airpower. German technique did not envisage the air arm seeking victory as an independant, stand alone weapon. It was seen as an extension of the army, supporting ground operations either directly or indirectly. There are of course exceptions to this, for example the development in 1939-40 of dedicated anti-shipping units, but the main effort was always their army co-operation elements.

more particulalry the germans, because of their limited resources, tended to concentrate their airpower at the point of breakthrough....the schwerpunkt. once a hole had been breached, with the assistance of the Luftwaffe (who also had a mission of keeping enemy air interference to a minimum in the area of operations) it was the job of the armour to exploit that breakthrough and that of the Infantry to consolidate the gains.

There were weaknesses though in the german technique. the most acute weakness was the shortage of MT and long term air reserves. Everything was done on a shoestring. In France and the west the system worked well enough to give them victory. in the east and in Africa, their techniques delivered them largish tactical victories for a time, but strategic victory evaded them, and not just because they were outnumbered. as the logistics issues floated to the surface and began to take hold (basically as the short war(s) became long tem bogged down affairs), the wheels began to fall off for the germans. The allies developed techniques that worked to their strengths and against the germans. They werent glamorous, they werent cheap, but they were effective. It wasnt just attritional, but there were heavy costs involved in defeating what had been the best air force in the world at the beginning of the war.

For the russians they too saw their air force as an adjunct to their ground operation. That wasnt always the way. In 1941-2 they had tended to view their air assets as an independant arm, and had attempted to drive the LW from the skies, with disastrous results. at some point it was realized this was never going to work....the skills diffrence between the LW and the VVS was too great. but also at some point it was realized this wasnt necessary. All air operations come at a cost, in losses, in servicability rates. i am convinced that at some point realized the german achilles heel....sustain the pressure and they will crack. Achieving Soviet war aims was more about ground operations, and the job of the VVS was to support those operations, not duke it out with the LW so much. Marrying all this together produced a war strategy for which the germans had no answer. When the russians attacked, their air force was not tartgetting the LW so much, they were attacking the field positions of the German army. The victory over the LW came from the numerous airfields overrun capturing aircraft grounded from excessive operations. The Russian method was not so much to attack at one decisive point (though thet did happen) it was more about attacking everywherealong the front simultaneously, to stretch and break the limited resources available to the germans. In the later parts of the war, the Soviet methods worked near perfectly 

So, niot only were the germans defeated from within, not only were they defeated by numbers. they were also defeated by over ambitios expansion, and further, their method of warfare were eventually countered and overtaken. strategically they were out manouvered....they were out generalled by their opponents. the masters of the trade had become one of the also rans in the deadly contest


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> The German force fighting the British was a mere 30 000 men of Rommel, two JGs in the West, and submarines. None of that was missed in the East - 30 000 men was a drop in the ocean of 3 million Axis troop, the LW enjoyed clear air superiority until about the mid 1943, and subs are not very good on the steppe.. it was anything like the actual two front war of WW1.


 
Ok, now put the naval blockade in the equation and things change drastically. 

Also, I wouldn't underestimate the U-boat production (that was FORCED to exist by Britain). The U-Boats reduced 10-15% of the German tank production in 1942. This could have changed the outcome of many things that happened in the East.

In the end, if you sum all the things that the British survival allowed for the Allies (including the deployment of American forces against Hitler), the joint Allied effort in a GLOBAL scale of just a global conflict begins to be much more appreciable.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 19, 2012)

".... What forced the Germans into a two front war was the USA entry of war.. Britain's stubborn survival was exactly that, stubborn survival and no more. It 'forced' nobody into nothing, well maybe the Brits themselves into bankcrupt and something of role of servitude as a US proxy..."

Simplistic jingoism, Auntie. Survival is survival ... and if Hitler couldn't clear the table in 1940 ( and he couldn't) he was fighting Britain in every corner of the globe that British seapower and Commonwealth reached ... from the Indian Ocean, to the Med to the South Atlantic. Hitler had a multi-front war on his hands well BEFORE June 22, 1941.

MM
Proud Canadian


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

Many people don't understand how the war in the West was draining Hitler of practically everything. By 1944, Germany was becoming much more stronger, with state-of-art equipment like Panther tanks, assault rifles and jets. However, it was the Western Allies that prevent this awesome "firepower" to be employed against the Soviets, which were resisting just like Britain. The same British resistance that allowed all this to happen.

Also, the British, by their resistance, removed some 600,000 German soldiers in Norway, Africa and the Balkans (not to mention France). This, by no means can be considerated "little". Also, casualities comparisons with the war in the East are not much valid, as this article shows: So did the Red Army really singlehandedly defeat the Third Reich? « Stuff I Done Wrote – The Michael A. Charles Online Presence


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

And about the submarines again, someone can confirm me this, from a discussion in other forum:

_each U-boat cost 5 million marks to build. The Germans built over 1000. A panther tank cost 117 thousand marks. That means about 40,000 german tanks were not built so that the Germans could wage the war of the atlantic._


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## Tante Ju (Mar 19, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> And about the submarines again, someone can confirm me this, from a discussion in other forum:
> 
> _each U-boat cost 5 million marks to build. The Germans built over 1000. A panther tank cost 117 thousand marks. That means about 40,000 german tanks were not built so that the Germans could wage the war of the atlantic._


 
I do not think the resources can be straight converted to make a comparison. For example, could about 1 million tons of lower grade steel for 1000 subs be converted into 1,8 million tons of armor grade steel (alloys.. industrial capacity etc.) for 40 000 Panthers? Could the diesel fuel required by sub converted to petrol to fuel tanks? Could 1000 high velocity gun of 8,8-10,5 cm calibre, large radio sets of subs, a couple of thousend large MAN diesel production converted into 40000 long 7,5cm tank guns, and 40 0000 smaller Maybach petrol engines..? Could 50 000 submariners for 1000 subs become 200 000 tank crews..? You get picture..


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> I do not think the resources can be straight converted to make a comparison. For example, could about 1 million tons of lower grade steel for 1000 subs be converted into 1,8 million tons of armor grade steel (alloys.. industrial capacity etc.) for 40 000 Panthers? Could the diesel fuel required by sub converted to petrol to fuel tanks? Could 1000 high velocity gun of 8,8-10,5 cm calibre, large radio sets of subs, a couple of thousend large MAN diesel production converted into 40000 long 7,5cm tank guns, and 40 0000 smaller Maybach petrol engines..? Could 50 000 submariners for 1000 subs become 200 000 tank crews..? You get picture..


 
Some comparisons you made of course cannot be done. However the work in the submarine industry, if not needed, would certainly be employed elsewhere. And in that way, you would have many results. For example, U-boat manufacture was complex, needed skill labour and was time demaning, it's industrial machinery, the U-Boats crews (that certainly a lot of them could become Panzer troopers), the refinement of diesel, etc. All this would show itself in other areas.

Can someone confirm if the submarine production caused 15-20% of reduction in German tank production in 1942?


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## stona (Mar 19, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> What 'two fronts'? The British left the continent in 1940. They did not come back. They could not..



They did come back in 1944,there were more British and Canadian troops landed on D-Day than U.S. I'm not disputing that this was made possible by American muscle.

What's your point,the Mediterranean theatre (Malta,El Alamein,both defeats for the Germans) The Battle of the Atlantic (another defeat) and all the other commitments that the Germans were forced to make were not a second front? You have to explain what does comprise a second front in your view.

Do you have a double personality on this forum? Your "simplistic jingoism" (thanks Michaelmaltby),and rabidly anti British prejudice are reminiscent of someone elses ill informed views. 


Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

It's impossible (and offensive) to say the Western Allies didn't also played a pivotal role in WWII. Let's not forgot that while Russia was facing most of the German Army, the Western Allies were facing most of the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, the Italians and the Japanese. And thanks to Britain and it's naval blockade of Europe, Hitler was never able to turn his Festunga Europe into a much more powerful economic zone.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 19, 2012)

Jenisch, why do you lament about some people that may claim that Soviets single-handedly defeated Germans in WW2? At least in this forum the Allied victory/ Axis defeat is always pictured as a result of joint effort (rightly so). 
For me, it's just knocking on the open doors.


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Jenisch, why do you lament about some people that may claim that Soviets single-handedly defeated Germans in WW2? At least in this forum the Allied victory/ Axis defeat is always pictured as a result of joint effort (rightly so).
> For me, it's just knocking on the open doors.


 
Tante Ju mentioned there was not a second front until 1944.


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## stona (Mar 19, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> It's impossible (and offensive) to say the Western Allies didn't also played a pivotal role in WWII.



It also flies in the face of the facts. Anyone is entitled to an opinion but history must be approached with an open mind. The sort of groundless prejudices displayed by some posters is merely a foundation for revisionism of the worst type.
The facts,utimately,will always speak for themselves.

Many people receive a sort of Hollywood history. "Saving Private Ryan" may be a good film,I certainly enjoyed it,but a history of "Overlord" it ain't! This is nothing new,a quick google of "Objective Burma" will show how long this has been going on for.

This has evolved into a trend in recent years to diminish the role of Britain and her allies. Some young British people,even of Indo/Pakistani origin, are completely unaware that India had any involvement in WWII at all! The Indian Army became the largest volunteer force in history with a strength of about 2.5 million. 
How easily we forget,particularly when it doesn't suit us to remember.

Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 19, 2012)

Well said, Steve.



Jenisch said:


> Tante Ju mentioned there was not a second front until 1944.



Okay, I stand corrected about that.


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## stona (Mar 19, 2012)

Thanks. The epitaph on the memorial to the 2nd British Division at Kohima says it better than I can.

"When You Go Home, Tell Them Of Us And Say,
For Their Tomorrow, We Gave Our Today"

Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 19, 2012)

All well - both of my grandparents fought vs. Axis back then, starting as mere 18-years boys, using Allied (and captured Axis) stuff, so I know that the effort was the joint one.


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

stona said:


> It This has evolved into a trend in recent years to diminish the role of Britain and her allies. Some young British people,even of Indo/Pakistani origin, are completely unaware that India had any involvement in WWII at all! The Indian Army became the largest volunteer force in history with a strength of about 2.5 million.
> How easily we forget,particularly when it doesn't suit us to remember.



I understand. Also, now there are many people in the US victims of view the Eastern Front was "everything" in WWII, and Marxist teachers are eager to put this in the minds of students. Here in Brazil, due to the opposition of the Communists to our dictator from the wartime, and the military dictatorship that followed in the 1960s after some time of democracy, our participation in the war is also much unknow by the general public.


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## Siegfried (Mar 19, 2012)

stona said:


> Really it is only the first point on which we differ widely.
> Germany always had her eyes on the land and resources lying to her East.



There is no historical precendent for this.

No it didn't and no it also never did lust for land in resource in the east at least as far as Russia/Soviet union is concerned. Part of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth came to be absorbed into Fredericks Prussian empire because the Polish-Nobillity and King had allowed a Russian army through their country, feeding it on the way, to attack Prussia. No king could tollerate such a government.

After WW1, Predominantly at the insistance of France large areas of land and large parts of the German population were driven driven into newely created nations way beyind the traditional area of those nations. The Suddetenn Germans didn't want to be part of Czechoslovakia and neither did the Slovaks. They were even denied Swiss style democractic cantonic govermment. During 1920 council elections about 80 unarmed ethnic german demonstrators were killed by Czech police. No one forgets their "bloody sunday". They were sacked from the public service, they had their land appropriated by the new Governments and redistributed to Czechs with new Czch schools and villages built in those areas. They were threatened by ethnic cleansing, the same happened in Poland. The Germans in these areas filed complaints by the tens of thousands with the League of nations who did nothing. These nations were made much larger than was decent and correct at the insistance of a should have been French circus clown called Clementau who created and impossible situation for Europe.

Incidently France was a country which had been asked by the Kaiser government if they would stay neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia and actually replied *no.* Part of the reason was secret British Naval guarantees of 1905 which promised Royal Navy support in the even the German Navy and French Navy came into conflict. Thus supported the French felt secure in not being neutral and takeing opporunity to take revenge for their loss in the Franco Prussian war as soon as Germany turned its back to face the Tzar.

For the majority of Germans WW2 was about protecting other Germans who had the misfortune of ending up with in these new nations without plebescite.




stona said:


> A quick scan of the appalling turgid prose of" Mein Kamf " gives the game away,if you can read it without falling asleep.



Mein Kampf wouldn't have been effective if it had of been written in the haughty turgid tones used by loathing thematic biographers like Kershaw. such small minded men can't even avoid makeing snide remarks over Eva Brauns hairstyle. Kershaw even takes Hitlers pain at the loss of his pet terrier as evidence that he couldn't relate to humans. That would be news to most pet owners wouldn't it? He's the Perez Hilton of WW2 Hitler Histories.

Hitler was highly intelligent, he was of artistic temprement and thus lacked a sense of proportion and prefered grande and total solutions. He fed himself as a teenager for several years when his mother died by selling paintings, he essentially architecturally redesigned the city of Linz as a boy.

When Hitler wrote grimmly and fantastically about the possibillity of building an empire big enough and able to sustain and resource itself by takeing eastern European countries into a greater empire *most people simply ignored it and considered it as a result of the anger he felt at 2 million of his collegiate German solidiers dying in WW1.*. He says as much in mein kampf and refers to the wasted lives of the 2 million. It was also a time when demobed solidier "Freikorps" defended Germany against further seizures of land by Polish armed forces in 1919 and 1920. Mein Kampf was written in the immediate aftermath of that dreadfull war when feelings were high so this was put aside. A war he volunteered in, survived 4 years in, obtained both a iron cross second and then first class, a wound badge in black in 1915 (6 months in hospital) managed to single handely capture an entire French patrol and bring them in alone and took several other prisoners on his own. This was a passionate and dedicated man. He commited no atrocities, killed no POW, harmed no animals (rather loved them) at this time. However this war hardened him.


Hitler liked total and solutions, he was not an politician beholden to lobbies so he had great freedom of action. He decided to come up with a total permanent solution to Germany being the meat in the Sandwitch between Poland, France (both Hostile, france invaded german states no less than 25 times). Since the Danzig issue wasn't solved by diplomacy and negotiation (likely due to British gurantees under pressure from Roosevelt) there clearly wasn't going to be much opportunity for using military force, then just withdrawing, hoping that the slightly diminished Poland would now respect the Polish corridor to Danzig. Hitler saw Poland and the Soviet union as a source of eternal threat, so he came up with a solution.

No one knew what Hitler was planning. When the Belgium Fortress Emmanthaal had to be taken to secure the eastern military routes into Belgium he studied the matter himself and decided that there was only once succesfull fortress capture in WW1 and that had been due to ballistic penetration. As no possible guns existed Hitler personally studied the literature and worked out that shaped charges might do the job. He then enquired whether they could be scalled up. When the paratrooper Kurt Student was called to Hitlers Office by Goering, Goering had to admit he knew nothing of why he was calling Student. Hitler came up with his own ideas all by himself. They were creative, right brained, radical as came from his artistic mentallity and teenage style of working (mulling over the idea before a flurry of activity). That's the way Hitler planned the bigger actions of WW2.


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## Jenisch (Mar 19, 2012)

Siegfried, have you already read Cross of Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German War Machine, by John Mosier?


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 19, 2012)

"... There is no historical precedent for this."

There may not be a "historical" precedent, but then there was no Germany before 1871, Seigfried.

Germans - historically - sought economic advantage in eastern Europe - this was well understood and Russian Tsars from Peter onwards encouraged the migration East of German peoples. The Tsars used the more advanced German people to improve the economic conditions of their feudal, backward, lands. Workers such as smiths, millers and other skilled workers and industrious farmers (like Mennonites) were offered land and privileges to live in Russia.

So it against THIS BACKGROUND that you should consider the Nazis' interest in the East -- it may not have precedence as German state policy but had hundreds of years of practical precedence for German people -- whom Hitler and the Nazis appealed to.

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2012)

a new twist....the peace loving defence minded germans were the victims of allied imperialism and soviet aggression i see. 

nazism was by nature aggressive in the extreme, and there is plenty of evidence to support that. They desired and lusted for the riches of the east, which makes the non-aggression pact all the more an amzing and unusual outcome. However, before this is seized on a evidence of german good intentions, neither signatory to the pact believed it was a lasting treaty. it was a marriage of convenience. It just that stalin underestimated the german desire for self harm and untrustworthiness over his own. Both were as bad as each other, neither could be trusted, both had evil aggressive intent. With regard to germany that was proven in the post war war crimes trials, but we are not going there, weve been told not to.


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## Tante Ju (Mar 19, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> There may not be a "historical" precedent, but then there was no Germany before 1871, Seigfried.



I take "Germany" as a fiction. It would mean - a uniform entity. It is not - many different nations make it up sharing a similar culture, and speaking the (more or less) same language.

It was called the Reich for reason. Empires by definition are multi-background.


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## Elmas (Mar 20, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> There is no historical precendent for this.
> 
> No it didn't and no it also never did lust for land in resource in the east at least as far as Russia/Soviet union is concerned........


 
No words.


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## Jenisch (Mar 20, 2012)

ROFL!


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## tyrodtom (Mar 20, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> There is no historical precendent for this.
> 
> No it didn't and no it also never did lust for land in resource in the east at least as far as Russia/Soviet union is concerned. Part of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth came to be absorbed into Fredericks Prussian empire because the Polish-Nobillity and King had allowed a Russian army through their country, feeding it on the way, to attack Prussia. No king could tollerate such a government.
> 
> ...


To Hitler the German people was just a means to a end. That was fully revealed in his last actions late in the war, he had no concerns of what would happen to the German people after his death. In his opinion, he hadn't failed Germany. Germany had failed him. 

Instead of taking responsibility for his own actions, he took the cowards way out, and let other people take the punishment.


So finally Siegfried, you fully reveal yourself, not only the reincarnation of the 3rd reich's ministry of propaganda, but also a open admirer of Adolf Hitler.


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## Readie (Mar 20, 2012)

stona said:


> I
> This has evolved into a trend in recent years to diminish the role of Britain and her allies. Some young British people,even of Indo/Pakistani origin, are completely unaware that India had any involvement in WWII at all! The Indian Army became the largest volunteer force in history with a strength of about 2.5 million.
> How easily we forget,particularly when it doesn't suit us to remember.
> Cheers
> Steve



I have been following this thread but, not posted.
You Michael have summed it all up very well...and, I must say, better than I could.
Thank you
John


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## Readie (Mar 20, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> There is no historical precendent for this.
> 
> No it didn't and no it also never did lust for land in resource in the east at least as far as Russia/Soviet union is concerned. Part of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth came to be absorbed into Fredericks Prussian empire because the Polish-Nobillity and King had allowed a Russian army through their country, feeding it on the way, to attack Prussia. No king could tollerate such a government.
> 
> ...



I assume that you actually believe what you write...or is this some kind of joke?
You should be ashamed at posting such overt admiration for Hitler.
John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 20, 2012)

This is beyond comment, esp. the bold part:


> Hitler came up with his own ideas all by himself. *They were creative, right brained,* radical as came from *his artistic mentallity* and teenage style of working (mulling over the idea before a flurry of activity). That's the way Hitler planned the bigger actions of WW2.


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> To Hitler the German people was just a means to a end. That was fully revealed in his last actions late in the war, he had no concerns of what would happen to the German people after his death. In his opinion, he hadn't failed Germany. Germany had failed him.
> 
> Instead of taking responsibility for his own actions, he took the cowards way out, and let other people take the punishment.
> 
> ...



Yup, and justy like the nazis, mix some truth with a lot of lies to make an even more potent brew that at least some people will believe.

Dont get me wrong. Siegried actually believes this stuff. I dont know how that might happen, because the guy is smart and knowledgable. unfortunately, with those very admirable traits is another.....malevolent misguidance, and a desire to sow his version of the truth whatever the cost.

For those of us who had family that fought to defeat this malevolent shadow, its very sad to watch it rising again. we wonty have to fight this, but as a baby boomer, our grandkids will, i predict


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## pbfoot (Mar 20, 2012)

do you go out of the house Siegfied , because I can't really see you having any friends with views like that


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## stona (Mar 20, 2012)

"There is no historical precendent for this.
No it didn't and no it also never did lust for land in resource in the east"

I referred to Hitler's writings and you wrote

"When Hitler wrote grimmly and fantastically about the possibillity of building an empire big enough and able to sustain and resource itself by takeing eastern European countries into a greater empire most people simply ignored it"...

Your two quotes are mutually exclusive. Hitler's writings indicate that he did have the intention of attaining space (liebensraum) and resources in the East,you confirm this yourself. Most people may indeed have ignored it,at their peril.

The rest of your post is faintly ludicrous I shall give one of your lines as an example.

"Hitler liked total and solutions, he was not an politician beholden to lobbies so he had great freedom of action."

He was a dictator in a totalitarian state for heaven's sake! You do understand the nature of dictatorship. Everything,the atrocities,the extermination camps, the politico-racial nature of the war in the East stemmed from him. "He had great freedom of action"....you can't be serious. 

I do NOT hold the popular view that Hitler was some kind of carpet biting mad man,he was far more intelligent and dangerous than that,but your apologia is slightly disturbing. I was half expecting you to suggest that he had no knowledge of "die endlösung der Judenfrage".

Steve


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## Readie (Mar 20, 2012)

It is unacceptably offensive to laud Hitler as Siegfried does.
His outrageous views belittle the forum.
John


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 20, 2012)

Well it is obvious that this will not stay on topic, thanks...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 21, 2012)

I will clarify something here.

This thread was closed because it is no longer on topic. It was asked to that the thread be redirected to being on topic and that was not done.

As for Siegrieds posts. I do not agree with him, nor do I agree with anyone who is a Hitler Apologist or Pro Nazi. I will however not censor anyone or punish them for expressing their views as long as it is not a personal attack on any member of this forum. We live in a world of Free Speech and I will not censor. I do not agree with censorship and will not do it.


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