# Fulmar in 1941/42/43: feasible and/or plausible upgrades?



## tomo pauk (Jun 16, 2013)

Sometimes a much derided 'soldier', Fairey Fulmar was there when needed, providing a good important service in the rough days of early ww2. It's good qualities (great combat range, useful punch ammo count, 2 pairs of eyes, good ditching qualities) were many times too much a burden for it's engine, trying to squeeze performance out of the sizable airframe.
So what kind of upgrades would made the Fulmar to hold the line even better until the replacement is around ( historically, some time late 1943/early 1944)? Upgrades should be non-earth-shaking, simple if you want, plausible feasible, so we could get the improved planes quick on the decks.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 16, 2013)

Uh, Tomo, 

"The Firefly was designed by H.E. Chaplin at Fairey Aviation; in June 1940, the Admiralty ordered 200 aircraft "off the drawing board" with the first three to be the prototypes. The prototype of the Firefly flew on 22 December 1941.[3] Although it was 4,000 lb (1,810 kg) heavier than the Fulmar (largely due to its armament of two 20 mm Hispano cannon in each wing), the Firefly was 40 mph (60 km/h) faster due to improved aerodynamics and a more powerful engine, the 1,735 hp (1,294 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon IIB."

Futzing about with "improved" Fulmars is not likely to help the Firefly situation. Why it took so long for the Firefly to go into operation I have no idea. 

First Merlin production Merlin 32 ( 1,645 hp (1,230 kW) at 3,000 rpm at 2,500 ft (762 m)), doesn't show up until 17 June 1942. It may be the first of the low altitude cropped impeller engines?


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## tomo pauk (Jun 16, 2013)

Well, I'm trying to avoid 'eating into' Firefly allocated assets as much as possible. The 1st flight was made during late 1941 - meaning Fulmar will soldier on for at least 1 year and half, even if the Fairey's engineers are the best on the planet.
About the engine situation - Fulmar never flew with 2-speed engine aboard. Even the Merlin 30 was not able to be pushed beyond +12 psi, compared with it's 2-speed cousins (+14 psi in low gear, +16 in high gear, on 100/130 fuel). So maybe going with Merlin 20 series? Clip the wings a little bit, too?

I'm at loss why would even 10% of the improved speed of the Firefly should be credited to better aerodynamics (per quoted text) - the single stage Griffon at ~ 20000 ft was providing maybe 50% as much power as Merlin 30?


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## GregP (Jun 16, 2013)

Upgrade it to "retired" status.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 17, 2013)

No that's a contribution


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## RCAFson (Jun 17, 2013)

There an extensive analysis of Fulmar performance here:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/fulmar-ii-versus-f4f-4-under-10-000-ft-29212.html
including Fulmar and Firefly performance curves.

IMHO, adding either a Merlin XX or 45 would have given the Fulmar somewhat better maximum speeds and climb rates, especially when these engines were rated at 14 and 16lb boost, since the FTH would be improved in both cases while improved boost should give better performance than the Merlin 30 even at the 30's FTH.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 17, 2013)

Merlin 30 was basically the Merlin 20 series with low supercharger gear only (contrary to the Merlin 45/50, basically the Merlin 20s with high supercharger gear only). Installing a 'normal' 2 speed Merlin 20 series should give the historical performance with low gear clutched in, and much better performance above 12-15000 ft, where the high gear is clutched in. The Merlin 45/50 should give similar performance, above 12-15000 ft, as Merlin 20s indeed.


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## RCAFson (Jun 17, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Merlin 30 was basically the Merlin 20 series with low supercharger gear only (contrary to the Merlin 45/50, basically the Merlin 20s with high supercharger gear only). Installing a 'normal' 2 speed Merlin 20 series should give the historical performance with low gear clutched in, and much better performance above 12-15000 ft, where the high gear is clutched in. The Merlin 45/50 should give similar performance, above 12-15000 ft, as Merlin 20s indeed.



My speed guesstimate for a Fulmar with a Merlin 45 would be ~310 mph at ~12000ft with 16lb boost (1515hp at 3000rpm) while a Merlin XX should give ~280mph at ~7000ft (MS = 1485hp at 14lb boost @ 3000rpm)and ~312 mph at ~14000ft (FS = 1490hp at 16lb @ 3000rpm). Peak combat climb rates would be ~2100fps and ~5 mins to 10,000ft and ~10 mins to 20,000ft. The Fulmar would substantially outperform the F4F-4 and Martlet II/IV.


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## wuzak (Jun 17, 2013)

But not the Seafire, which is what Fairey should probably have been building/developing!


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## RCAFson (Jun 17, 2013)

wuzak said:


> But not the Seafire, which is what Fairey should probably have been building/developing!



The Fulmar had far more range and endurance than a Seafire and a lot more firepower (750rpg or 38secs or 1000 rpg or 50sec firing time) than a Seafire, especially a hypothetical Mk1 with 8 x .303 with 330rpg. Overall a Fulmar would probably score more kills per sortie than a Seafire I, given the typical opposition, especially with an upgraded engine plus the Fulmar would have a much lower operational loss rate per sortie. The Seafire could better handle enemy SE fighters but that wasn't really a major problem for the FAA anyways.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 17, 2013)

One of the major issues with the FAA is that they never really seemed to have enough aircraft in theatre initially, particularly in the Mediterranean. Granted, they were limited by the number of aircraft that could be carried aboard their carriers, but I would have thought that more Fulmars, rather than any modifications to the basic design, which would have delayed aircraft getting to the front line, would have been a better interim solution until a more effective aircraft came along.


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## MacArther (Jun 18, 2013)

How about dropping the rear position crewmember and all the equipment associated with that area? Would the weight savings be worth it?


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## fastmongrel (Jun 18, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> One of the major issues with the FAA is that they never really seemed to have enough aircraft in theatre initially, particularly in the Mediterranean. Granted, they were limited by the number of aircraft that could be carried aboard their carriers, but I would have thought that more Fulmars, rather than any modifications to the basic design, which would have delayed aircraft getting to the front line, would have been a better interim solution until a more effective aircraft came along.



There were times when there werent enough Fulmars to fill the hanger of even one Fleet Carrier in the Med. I believe they were down to 30 or so Fulmars at one point and that was everything even the ones in repair shops.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 18, 2013)

MacArther said:


> How about dropping the rear position crewmember and all the equipment associated with that area? Would the weight savings be worth it?



It would improve the climb some but the change in speed would probably be under 5mph. That is assuming there is no center of gravity shift that would require ballast.


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## Kryten (Jun 18, 2013)

Fleet Air Arm requirements were not just for a fighter role however, the second seat was invaluable on Recce and anti submarine operations, multi purpose was the name of the game with the handicaps that entailed!


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## nuuumannn (Jun 18, 2013)

> It would improve the climb some but the change in speed would probably be under 5mph. That is assuming there is no center of gravity shift that would require ballast.



I think improving the Fulmar is a bit of a lost cause; it was too slow, slow in the climb and slow in level speed. What the FAA really needed was a good single-seat fighter, they just didn't realise it when the Fulmar was conceived (hindsight is wonderful). Also, the FAA's insistence on catering too much to the needs of the navigator/observer in its aeroplanes proved to be a ball and chain. The Barracuda was another airframe whose concentration on the observer spoiled it; The nav had a big space below the wing with clear windows for good visibility; this meant the aircraft had to be a high/shoulder wing design. Placing the wing at shoulder level meant that when the Youngman flaps were used as dive brakes they blanketed the elevators, which were eventually moved to near the tip of the fin, although stability was always an issue even after this had been done. If you want a maritime patrol platform, don't use a dive bomber or a single-engine fighter.

If you are going to do something with the Fulmar, either take your chances with interim solutions like the Seafire and Sea Hurri (as well as a handful of Martletts) whilst waiting for Lend Lease to kick in and supply excellent purpose built naval fighters, or start afresh with a purpose designed single-seat carrier based fighter that didn't use a land based single engined day bomber as its basis.


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## RCAFson (Jun 18, 2013)

The Fulmar had a lot of capabilities, such as a good dive bombing capability and good range with the 60 gal DT, that were never fully exploited, probably because of the small production numbers. Boosting the production rate of the Fulmar and it's performance with a more powerful engine would have been very worthwhile, IMHO. The long range/long endurance scout/patrol fighter concept was a good one, IMHO and the Fulmar has the kill stats to back it up.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 18, 2013)

Now that we talk about bombed-up Fulmar - maybe the Zero/Oscar would be hard pressed to thwart a bombing run made by Fulmars?

The long range fighter that still can make 310 mph might give the defender better chances for multiple interceptions, rather than a short range interceptor that can do 330-350 mph?


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## fastmongrel (Jun 18, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> The long range fighter that still can make 310 mph might give the defender better chances for multiple interceptions, rather than a short range interceptor that can do 330-350 mph?



True but how many Wildcat/Martlets or Sea Hurricanes are doing 330 let alone 350mph. 

I love how the Fulmar annoys so many people


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## Shortround6 (Jun 18, 2013)

I see the S.P.O.O.S.E.S.* is back in full session. 

Please note that what ever boost level you can get out of a Merlin 45 or XX series engine is for about 5 minutes only. The 30 minute climb ratings and the max cruise ratings didn't change. 

Merlin 30 was good for 1260hp at 8750ft. the only way you are going to get a Fulmar to 310mph at 10,000ft is with a large rocket strapped to it. 

* Silk Purse Out Of Sow's Ear Society.


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## RCAFson (Jun 18, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> I see the S.P.O.O.S.E.S.* is back in full session.
> 
> Please note that what ever boost level you can get out of a Merlin 45 or XX series engine is for about 5 minutes only. The 30 minute climb ratings and the max cruise ratings didn't change.
> 
> ...



The Merlin 30 was rated at 1360hp at 6000ft @ 3000rpm with 12lb boost and FTH with ram was 6800ft = 268 mph TAS in the single test result we have access to. . The Merlin 45 was rated at 1515hp at 11000ft @ 3000rpm with 16lb boost. It follows from this, that a Fulmar with a Merlin 45 producing 1360hp at ~12000ft (with ram) = a TAS of ~290 mph but at 16lb boost it would be developing 155 extra HP at 12000 which should provide another ~20 mph for ~310mph TAS. The Merlin 45's climb rating was at 9lb boost but it could maintain 9lb boost for another ~6000ft higher altitude which would more than compensate for the slightly reduced climb rate at lower altitude.

The data for a Merlin XX would be similar.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 18, 2013)

155hp does not get you anywere near 20mph faster. 

IF 1360hp _did_ get you to 290mph in the Fulmar the cube law says you need about 1660hp to make 310mph. 

The reality check is the Firefly, while heavier it was a actually a smaller airplane, slightly less wing span and area and several feet shorter fuselage. It used the Griffon IIB engine which was also used in the Spitfire XII. 1490hp at 14,000ft (?)and the FireFly I could do 316mph at 14,000ft. 

Apparently the the MK XII Spitfire was a waste of time. Just crank the boost on the old Merlin 45 to 16lbs and away you go.


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## wuzak (Jun 18, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> I think improving the Fulmar is a bit of a lost cause; it was too slow, slow in the climb and slow in level speed. What the FAA really needed was a good single-seat fighter, they just didn't realise it when the Fulmar was conceived (hindsight is wonderful).



Like I said, Fairey should have been tasked with developing the Seafire. From 1938, like the Admiralty asked.

They could hav eeven made modifications to boost range.


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## wuzak (Jun 18, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The Fulmar had far more range and endurance than a Seafire and a lot more firepower (750rpg or 38secs or 1000 rpg or 50sec firing time) than a Seafire, especially a hypothetical Mk1 with 8 x .303 with 330rpg. Overall a Fulmar would probably score more kills per sortie than a Seafire I, given the typical opposition, especially with an upgraded engine plus the Fulmar would have a much lower operational loss rate per sortie. The Seafire could better handle enemy SE fighters but that wasn't really a major problem for the FAA anyways.



How often were Fulmars fully loaded with ammo? How often did they expend fully their ammo load?

Seafire I would be 40-50mph faster than your theoretical Fulmar. It will climb better. Turn better. Developed parallel to the Spitfire it could have its range issue (ie tankage) addressed.

Why would the Fulmar have a lower operating loss per sortie? Because of the undercarriage?


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## RCAFson (Jun 18, 2013)

wuzak said:


> How often were Fulmars fully loaded with ammo? How often did they expend fully their ammo load?
> 
> Seafire I would be 40-50mph faster than your theoretical Fulmar. It will climb better. Turn better. Developed parallel to the Spitfire it could have its range issue (ie tankage) addressed.
> 
> Why would the Fulmar have a lower operating loss per sortie? Because of the undercarriage?



Fulmars expended their ammo fully on a number of occasions. 

When would this mythical Seafire appear and what would the FAA do in the interim? 

The Seafire's historical fuel capacity wasn't significantly increased until the postwar Seafire 47 so asking for more capacity sooner is really stretching what was possible, especially without the Griffon to provide the needed power.

The whole point of giving the Fulmar extra ammo and fuel was to maximize it's time in the air and minimize the number of landing cycles, so compared to the Seafire the Fulmar can stay in the air twice as long and doesn't need to be rearmed as often, all of which combined with the stronger LG makes for a much lower operational loss rate. Additionally the Fulmar's combat and patrol potential is enhanced due to the extra set of eyes and a separate radio operator.


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## RCAFson (Jun 18, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> 155hp does not get you anywere near 20mph faster.
> 
> IF 1360hp _did_ get you to 290mph in the Fulmar the cube law says you need about 1660hp to make 310mph.
> 
> ...



If you give an aircraft the same power, but at a higher FTH, then the aircraft will go faster because there's less drag at higher altitudes and then add even more power and it goes faster yet. The Hurricane gained ~30 mph (295 to 325) with a ~250hp increase at 10,000 ft so I would expect something similar for the Fulmar at 12,000ft.

The Firefly was much heavier than the Fulmar and the frontal profile suggests that it probably had the same or even greater frontal area and we are giving our Merlin powered Fulmar another 25hp and asking less of it terms of speed. The Firefly's Griffon was low altitude rated and gave it far more power down low (1735hp TO rating) which it needed for CV TO because of it's extra weight and higher wing loading. 

The Spitfire XII had a maximum speed in M.S. supercharger gear of 375 mph at 4,600 ft and in F.S. supercharger gear, 389 mph at 12,800 ft with 1630 hp versus 369 at 13,000 ft for the V (Merlin 45 at 16lb and 1515hp) but the Griffon IIB powered XII could do 397 mph at 17800ft with only 1495hp so increasing FTH by 5000ft on the XII gave another 8 mph even with 135hp less.

In any event 310mph is a just a guesstimate but even 305 mph would have given the Fulmar a big boost in performance.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 18, 2013)

But you don't need the Griffon engine, just crank those Merlin 45s up to 16lbs of boost.

That is what you keep saying. 

I actually like the Fulmar but there are limits as to what you can reasonably do with it and Fairey themselves were ready to move on in the summer of 1940. 

The Best thing that could come of improving the Fulmar is the delay or cancellation of the Barracuda which would lower England's insults to the atmosphere a considerable amount

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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> But you don't need the Griffon engine, just crank those Merlin 45s up to 16lbs of boost.
> 
> That is what you keep saying.



No, you keep saying it, and I keep patiently explaining that the two speed Griffon VI has a lot more power at low altitude and medium altitude. However the XII and Griffon IIB was actually slightly slower than the V at the V's 16lb FTH because at that altitude the Merlin 45 had slightly more HP.



> I actually like the Fulmar but there are limits as to what you can reasonably do with it and Fairey themselves were ready to move on in the summer of 1940.
> 
> The Best thing that could come of improving the Fulmar is the delay or cancellation of the Barracuda which would lower England's insults to the atmosphere a considerable amount



There are limits to what can be done with it, but adding another few hundred HP via improved Merlins is not asking a lot. Historically, the Fulmar got caught in a squeeze where Fairey had to drop it to start production of the Firefly. 

The Albacore was dropped to start production of the Barracuda, which was the Allies most advanced carrier strike aircraft when it went into production given the Avenger's inability to divebomb and it's less than efficient torpedo, and given the SB2C-1's numerous teething problems. It's a pity the USN didn't produce the Barracuda in the USA as per the RN's request.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

duplicate post.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 19, 2013)

> The long range/long endurance scout/patrol fighter concept was a good one, IMHO and the Fulmar has the kill stats to back it up.



The majority of the Fulmar's kills were made in the Mediterranean, where its range was not a significant issue, but its weakenesses were plainly highlighted, when countering Italian and LW raids against Malta, bases in N/Africa and Allied shipping. The Fulmar was a competent aeroplane and served the FAA well; but it was clearly inadequate as a fighter against modern opposition. The service made the most out of all the equipment it had, however, in many, if not most cases when the opposition were operating superior equipment, in the early war years. This was largely because of the calibre of FAA personnel. The following quote gives an impression of what FAA crews were up against in the Mediterranean in their Fulmars; this is 806 Sqn's Robert Henley;

"I recall a fairly massive raid of Ju 87s and Ju 88s, with all available fighters scrambled - some four Fulmars - and we just flew around uncontrolled, shooting at anything that came within range. The poor old Fulmar had problems gaining height and speed against the Ju 88. My aircraft was hit, I think to my embarrasment, by a Ju 87, which stopped my engine some miles south-east of Hal Far." Henley was credited with a Ju 88 on that day.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

This is a summary of a post that I made awhile back:

_On May 08 1941 Fulmars from Ark Royal and Formidable engaged both the Luftwaffe and Reggia Aeronautica:

RA losses:

4 x SM79
2 x CR42 

Luftwaffe losses:
1 x Ju-88
4 x He-111
2 x Me-110 (crash landed due to battle damage)
1 x Me110 damaged
1 x Ju-87 (confirmed by Fulmar gun camera but not noted in Luftwaffe records)
1 x Ju87 damaged

FAA:

2 x Fulmar (one from bomber defensive fire)
2 X Fulmar crash landed on CVs
1X Fulmar crashed due to weather (not combat related)
6 x Fulmars damaged

Data from Shores, Mediterranean Air War, 1940-1945: Volume One: North Africa, June 1940-January 1942, p182-185_

So the Fulmars engaged Me-110s and CR-42s while racking up another impressive kill-loss ratio. Give the poor Fulmar another few hundred horses under the hood, and they'd do even better, or so you'd think.


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## wuzak (Jun 19, 2013)

So, this is one of the beasts the Fulmar engaged?







Impressive.

As to Bf 110s, surely if they nailed the throttle the Fulmars would be left trailing in their wake? Even with Merlin 45s at +16psi boost (the ones obviously not being used for Hurricanes).


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## wuzak (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> No, you keep saying it, and I keep patiently explaining that the two speed Griffon VI has a lot more power at low altitude and medium altitude. However the XII and Griffon IIB was actually slightly slower than the V at the V's 16lb FTH because at that altitude the Merlin 45 had slightly more HP.



I would say that at the Spitfire V's full throttle height on +16psi boost (13,000ft) that the Griffon II was around its gear change point. Either side of that the XII is markedly superior to the V in level speed.


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## wuzak (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> When would this mythical Seafire appear and what would the FAA do in the interim?



The FAA wanted a Seafire from 1938, apparently.

The Spitfire was in production, although it not going as quickly as desired.

First pass navalisation could be done quite quickly (add hook, beef up landing gear, folding wing). Using Fairey's production facilities, it should be in production before 1940 - I would hope.

Second pass would be adding tankage to increase range.

Third pass would be adding the Griffon (like the Spitfire XII). This could happen late 1942/early 1943 - and a couple of years ahead of when it was done for the Seafire XV.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

wuzak said:


> So, this is one of the beasts the Fulmar engaged?
> 
> As to Bf 110s, surely if they nailed the throttle the Fulmars would be left trailing in their wake? Even with Merlin 45s at +16psi boost (the ones obviously not being used for Hurricanes).



Yet the Cr-42 was nominally faster than the Fulmar and could be expected to out climb and out turn it as well. Improving Fulmar Performance surely must improve it's chances even more.

Yes, if the Bf-110s and Cr-42s bugged out they could probably escape but given their mission that wasn't an acceptable option and again better Fulmar performance would only improve it's kill ratio.


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## Dogwalker (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> This is a summary of a post that I made awhile back:
> 
> _On May 08 1941 Fulmars from Ark Royal and Formidable engaged both the Luftwaffe and Reggia Aeronautica:_


_
For completeness, it was not an open sky encounter. It was an attack on a British convoy of five merchants, two carriers, two cruisers and nine destroyers (Operation Tiger). Due to bad wheater, that the British were taking advantage of, to avoid the chase of the Axis forces, the action of the Regia Aeronautica could begun only at 13:45, a time particularly unfavorable for torpedo bombers, who usually preferred to strike at dawn or dusk, to take advantage of the sun.
Italian records registered two (of six present) SM79 torpedo-bombers lost (Lt. Cappa and Cpt. Boetto), the first credited to the ships' defensive fire, and three Cr.42 for various reasons. In the action was shot down, by a Cr.42, the Fulmar of Lt. Rupert Tillard (Commander of the 808 squadron, fighter ace with 6.5 victories) and Lt. Mark Somerville, observer. Three other Fulmars were also damaged. 

Don't know for the Germans, who attacked later, but I tend to believe that, even in this case, the fighters were responsible only for a part of the losses._


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## Dogwalker (Jun 19, 2013)

It's worth to say that, in may 1941, the Fulmars, on the Ark Royal, had just replaced the Blackburn Skuas, so they were, strange as it may seem, the newest aircrafts that operated that day.


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## Dogwalker (Jun 19, 2013)

This is the same encounter, in "Royal Navy Aces of World War 2"

"As the fighters approached the force of 16 (!) S.79s, they were in turn bounced by escorting Fiat CR.42s, and Tillard, attempting to dogfight with the nimble biplanes, was shot down and killed, along with his observer, Lt. Somerville. Lt. Ted Taylour's aricraft was also hit, and his TAG badly wounded. As the bombers pressed on to the carrier, the first Fulmars from 807 NAS arrived, Lt "Buster" Hallet waded in, hitting one of the Savoias, but his fighter was in turn struck by return fire, and he was in turn forced to ditch. Battle of Britain Ace, Billy Gardner, also attacked the same S.79 as Hallet, which duly disintegrated under the weight of his final burst, thus opening the squadron's account.
Two hours later ,another section of 808 NAS, led by Lt. Ronnie Hay (who had claimed his fifth victory the previous month), shot down an S.79 off Galita Island (!). ... . 
Just before dusk another raid approached, ... , the intruders were 28 Ju 87s escorted by 6 Bf 110s. The airborne section of 807 SAS went for the escort, whilst the remaining Fulmar from both squadrons attacked the dive-bombers. Lt Taylour, of 808 NAS, downed one of the Stukas before being hit, forcing him to limp back to Ark Royal with his starboard undercarriage dangling.
the other section also enjoyed success, whit Jimmie Gardner destroyng two Ju 87s. However, his fighter was also badly hit, and he too crashed on Ark Royal's deck upon his return to the ship."

The He 111 and Ju 88 claimed that day were described as unescorted aircrafts, intercepted by Fulmars of the 803 and 806 NAS, of the Mediterranean fleet (_Formidable_ carrier), in three different actions, much east than the main one.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 19, 2013)

I'll again call the Merlin 30 as 'Merlin 20 series with low supercharger gear only ', for the sake of comparison. The Hurricane IIC was making ~305 mph on low gear, ~325 on high gear, all at +9 psi boost. That's 7% increase in speed. 280 mph increased for 7% gives 300 mph, for the 'Fulmar III' (the hypothetical with Merlin 20 series).


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## nuuumannn (Jun 19, 2013)

Let's be realistic; even a small increase in speed isn't going to make anything but a negligible difference to the Fulmar's combat capability (no one's doubting the kills made in it, but the Med _was_ swarming with enemy aircraft). The Fulmar can be described as being the Boulton Paul Defiant of the FAA - without any derogatory connotations. Both were well designed and finely finished machines, which were easy to fly, but the concepts they were designed to were flawed in the face of modern combat scenarios. Another thing they both had in common was that there were very few of them in operation at any one time, facing overwhelmingly superior numbers of enemy aircraft. After a less than impressive innings as a day fighter (for which it was not designed - it was a bomber destroyer, not for fighter v fighter combat) The Defiant redeemed itself as a night fighter, but the fundamental problem with both types was that they were too slow, even after refitting with more powerful engines. This meant that both were always going to be replaced by better performing types. Both were also somewhat larger and heavier than their single-seat opposition. 

Comparing the two, the Fulmar I was larger, heavier (9,800 lb loaded weight), had a shorter range (800 miles) and lower ceiling (26,000 ft) and was slower (280 mph, 1,200 ft/min rate of climb) than the Defiant I (8,240 lb AUW) (950 miles) (31,000 ft) (304 mph, 1,900 ft/min).

Fulmar figures from Fairey Aircraft since 1915; H.A.Taylor, Defiant figures from The Defiant File; Alec Brew.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Let's be realistic; even a small increase in speed isn't going to make anything but a negligible difference to the Fulmar's combat capability (no one's doubting the kills made in it, but the Med _was_ swarming with enemy aircraft). The Fulmar can be described as being the Boulton Paul Defiant of the FAA - without any derogatory connotations. Both were well designed and finely finished machines, which were easy to fly, but the concepts they were designed to were flawed in the face of modern combat scenarios. Another thing they both had in common was that there were very few of them in operation at any one time, facing overwhelmingly superior numbers of enemy aircraft. After a less than impressive innings as a day fighter (for which it was not designed - it was a bomber destroyer, not for fighter v fighter combat) The Defiant redeemed itself as a night fighter, but the fundamental problem with both types was that they were too slow, even after refitting with more powerful engines. This meant that both were always going to be replaced by better performing types. Both were also somewhat larger and heavier than their single-seat opposition.
> 
> Comparing the two, the Fulmar I was larger, heavier (9,800 lb loaded weight), had a shorter range (800 miles) and lower ceiling (26,000 ft) and was slower (280 mph, 1,200 ft/min rate of climb) than the Defiant I (8,240 lb AUW) (950 miles) (31,000 ft) (304 mph, 1,900 ft/min).
> 
> Fulmar figures from Fairey Aircraft since 1915; H.A.Taylor, Defiant figures from The Defiant File; Alec Brew.



Everything I've seen indicates a range of ~465 miles for the Defiant I with 103 gals of internal fuel however the Defiant II NF was modded in Aug 1941 to increase fuel capacity to 162 gals to increase patrol time as a NF.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 19, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> I'll again call the Merlin 30 as 'Merlin 20 series with low supercharger gear only ', for the sake of comparison. The Hurricane IIC was making ~305 mph on low gear, ~325 on high gear, all at +9 psi boost. That's 7% increase in speed. 280 mph increased for 7% gives 300 mph, for the 'Fulmar III' (the hypothetical with Merlin 20 series).



And should we average that with the speed increase of the Defiant when it got the Merlin XX? 

The Defiant II managed 313mph at 16,500ft, a wopping 9 mph over the MK I with the Merlin III. The Defiant was a smaller airplane than the Fulmar. 

First "Protoype" Fulmar (actually first production plane, there was no true prototype, initial "prove of concept" had been done with a modified P.4/34 bomber) managed 230mph with a Merlin III uprated to 1080hp. With a lot of work to clean up the engine installation and the fitting of the Merlin VIII engine they got the speed up to 255mph. Fitting the Merlin 30 got the speed up to about 270mph but the planes also had tropical equipment fitted and extra radio equipment. (antenna's may cause more loss of speed than the weight??).

A Fulmar's "Tare" weight was heavier than a loaded Defiant. You are going to need a _LOT_ of power to get the Fulmar up to even the performance of a Defiant. And that gets you _what_ in 1942/43??


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## tomo pauk (Jun 19, 2013)

I have 155 imp gals of fuel for the Fulmar, plus 60 IG in drop tank ('later aircraft carrying it' - the Fulmar II?), 104 IG for the Defiant F.1 and 159 IG for the Defiant F.2. 
Range being 465 miles for the Defiant F.1, 550 miles for the F.2, and 830 miles for the Fulmar (with drop tank?). 'Search radius' for the Fulmar being 250/320 miles (DT absent/present), patrol endurance 4/5.5 hr (ditto).


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> For completeness, it was not an open sky encounter. It was an attack on a British convoy of five merchants, two carriers, two cruisers and nine destroyers (Operation Tiger). Due to bad wheater, that the British were taking advantage of, to avoid the chase of the Axis forces, the action of the Regia Aeronautica could begun only at 13:45, a time particularly unfavorable for torpedo bombers, who usually preferred to strike at dawn or dusk, to take advantage of the sun.
> Italian records registered two (of six present) SM79 torpedo-bombers lost (Lt. Cappa and Cpt. Boetto), the first credited to the ships' defensive fire, and three Cr.42 for various reasons. In the action was shot down, by a Cr.42, the Fulmar of Lt. Rupert Tillard (Commander of the 808 squadron, fighter ace with 6.5 victories) and Lt. Mark Somerville, observer. Three other Fulmars were also damaged.
> 
> Don't know for the Germans, who attacked later, but I tend to believe that, even in this case, the fighters were responsible only for a part of the losses.



It was a confusing action but Shores notes the loss of 4 SM-79s and two Cr-42s and identifies the flight crews. He doesn't state any losses to AA although it does seem likely that one or more of the SM-79s were lost to AA as some did succeed in dropping their torpedoes. However none of the Luftwaffe aircraft made contact with the RN ships.

The engagement with the Me-110 is described as 3 Fulmars versus 6 Me-110s and 4 Fulmars versus 28 Ju-87s.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> And should we average that with the speed increase of the Defiant when it got the Merlin XX?
> 
> The Defiant II managed 313mph at 16,500ft, a wopping 9 mph over the MK I with the Merlin III. The Defiant was a smaller airplane than the Fulmar.
> 
> ...



In 1942 the only other folding wing Allied naval fighter was the F4F-4/Martlet/II/IV:
View attachment 231438

View attachment 231439

so I don't understand your fixation on the Defiant. However to be fair the Defiant II added a lot more weight for fuel and radar so an increase in speed is actually quite impressive and proves my point.

A Merlin 45 with 16lb boost should bring the Fulmar well past the Martlet in performance.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 19, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> And should we average that with the speed increase of the Defiant when it got the Merlin XX?
> 
> The Defiant II managed 313mph at 16,500ft, a wopping 9 mph over the MK I with the Merlin III. The Defiant was a smaller airplane than the Fulmar.



The Spitfire V earned 25 mph over Spitfire II, Merlin 45 vs. Merlin XII as we know all too well. 
The Defiant was also lugging around the turret, unlike the Fulmar. 



> First "Protoype" Fulmar (actually first production plane, there was no true prototype, initial "prove of concept" had been done with a modified P.4/34 bomber) managed 230mph with a Merlin III uprated to 1080hp. With a lot of work to clean up the engine installation and the fitting of the Merlin VIII engine they got the speed up to 255mph. Fitting the Merlin 30 got the speed up to about 270mph but the planes also had tropical equipment fitted and extra radio equipment. (antenna's may cause more loss of speed than the weight??).



As you can see, I'm advocating the 2-speed Merlin to be installed, so our Fulmar can actually fly at 15-20000 ft, hence taking advantage of thinner air there. The 270 mph speed mark was reached between 5-10 kft?



> A Fulmar's "Tare" weight was heavier than a loaded Defiant. You are going to need a _LOT_ of power to get the Fulmar up to even the performance of a Defiant. And that gets you _what_ in 1942/43??



It gets you somewhere in 1941, and certainly gets you more than with historical Fulmar.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 19, 2013)

I agree, Shortround.



> a range of ~465 miles for the Defiant I with 103 gals of internal fuel



...at a speed of 259 mph according to Boulton Paul Aircraft since 1915 by Alec Brew - same author as The Defiant File. The Defiant II's range is quoted as being 840 miles in The Defiant File, with a maximum speed of 325 mph, although he quotes 313 in trials with the A&AEE in the text. It'd be interesting to find out where Brew got his figures for the Defiant's range in The Defiant File. Other books I've got also quote 465 miles for the Defiant. (Well spotted) The Secret years; Flight testing at Boscombe Down 1939- 1945 (Tim Mason) quotes the Fulmar II's range as 980 miles, but has no range figure for the Defiant I. The II achieved 450 miles and with a best range speed of 162 mph achieved 5.65 air miles per gallon.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 19, 2013)

> The Defiant was also lugging around the turret, unlike the Fulmar.



Yet the Defiant was still faster than the Fulmar.



> It gets you somewhere in 1941, and certainly gets you more than with historical Fulmar.



But not of any significance to make any appreciable difference compared to the real thing. Still far too slow and in need of replacement. It would have been a waste of effort to build a 'Fulmar III'.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> But not of any significance to make any appreciable difference compared to the real thing. Still far too slow and in need of replacement. It would have been a waste of effort to build a 'Fulmar III'.


 
The Fulmar III/Merlin 45 could have been in production from mid 1941 and when approval for 16lb boost happens in Dec 1941 it becomes the best performing Allied folding wing fighter. Again the "competition" in 1942 was the F4F-4 or Martlet II/IV.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 19, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Yet the Defiant was still faster than the Fulmar.



Of course. 
Since the Defiant was not in service with FAA, even if it was making 400 miles it's speed is a moot point.



> But not of any significance to make any appreciable difference compared to the real thing.



The real thing was, alas, the historical Fulmar. It was making maybe 250 mph at 15000 ft....



> Still far too slow and in need of replacement. It would have been a waste of effort to build a 'Fulmar III'.



You probably weren't around when I started some threads refering to the possible/feasible FAA planes for the pre-1943 time, and I certainly was not sparing Fulmars for it's lack of performance. Unable to relaibly catch those pesky SM.79s and Ju-88s etc.
The Fulmar III should be faster some 50 mph at 15000 ft and above vs. Fulmar I/II, so it would certainly be no waste.


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## Greyman (Jun 19, 2013)

The official 'Data Sheet' says:

permanent tanks (auxiliary tanks)

Fulmar I
Fuel Carried: 155 (215)
Fuel Allowance: 25 (25)
Range: 810 (1124)

Fulmar II
Fuel Carried: 155 (215)
Fuel Allowance: 25 (26)
Range: 795 (1070)

Defiant I
Fuel Carried: 162 
Fuel Allowance: 20 
Range: 950 

Defiant II
Fuel Carried: 162
Fuel Allowance: 29
Range: 840


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## tomo pauk (Jun 19, 2013)

Hello, Greyman, would it be possible to take a more compete look at the data sheets?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> A Merlin 45 with 16lb boost should bring the Fulmar well past the Martlet in performance.


Assuming that's done to a Fulmar II. 

The Fulmar I had a Merlin putting out a little over 1000 hp, the II had a 1200 hp Merlin. The 45 Merlin puts out 1500 hp if I remember right. You're not bolting on that much more HP without strengthening the structure = weight. Would the same propeller be run as well?

I don't see getting much more of an improvement that would be cost effective in both manpower and maintenance over the Martlet. 

In any recip of the WW2 era, putting an extra crewman on a "fleet fighter" was a waste of time and manpower.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 19, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> The Spitfire V earned 25 mph over Spitfire II, Merlin 45 vs. Merlin XII as we know all too well.
> The Defiant was also lugging around the turret, unlike the Fulmar.



Defiant with turret was only 15-25mph slower than a Hurricane with the same engine. Speed difference of the prototype Defiant without turret and versions with turret was under 10mph. 





tomo pauk said:


> As you can see, I'm advocating the 2-speed Merlin to be installed, so our Fulmar can actually fly at 15-20000 ft, hence taking advantage of thinner air there. The 270 mph speed mark was reached between 5-10 kft?



True on were the speed was reached but then most of the attacking aircraft against the fleet/convoys were NOT at 15,00-20,000ft. Granted you can dive but that is only going to work once per attack. 



tomo pauk said:


> It gets you somewhere in 1941, and certainly gets you more than with historical Fulmar.



Merlin XX is going to get you not much more than the Merlin 30 at low altitudes in 1941. When did the British allow the higher boost settings on the Merlin XX series engines? 

The Italian engines had critical altitudes of between 3800-4200 meters for the most part. They were in no hurry to try to fight at 20,000ft. 

The Merlin 30 was pretty much a Merlin XII with a cut down impeller ( 9.75in) and using the same supercharger gear as a Merlin III. 

Tip speed was almost identical to the tip speed of a Merlin XX in low gear. 

It did NOT have the improved Hooker designed supercharger inlet. 

Fitting the Hooker designed inlet, some internal strengthening ( you can't just jack the boost on the early engines to what ever you want) and the engine was cleared for 18lbs boost as the Merlin 32 used in the Barracuda. 1640hp at 2000ft is as good as it is going to get for chasing torpedo bombers.


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## Dogwalker (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> It was a confusing action but Shores notes the loss of 4 SM-79s and two Cr-42s and identifies the flight crews.


Who were they?

However, according to the report of "Royal Navy Aces of World War 2", it doesn't seems to me that the Fulmar had a so good day. Against a small group of low flying SM.79s burdened by torpedoes and escorted by Cr.42s (hardly the best escort you can encounter in mid 1941) they had two losses and a badly wounded TAG first to get their first strike.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

Greyman said:


> The official 'Data Sheet' says:
> 
> permanent tanks (auxiliary tanks)
> 
> ...



These numbers are wrong for the Fulmar. Numerous sources *(including the pilot's notes)* state 155 Gals of internal fuel and a 60 gal DT. Defiant I was later modded to carry 162 gals, but this was not on production Defiant Is.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Who were they?
> 
> However, according to the report of "Royal Navy Aces of World War 2", it doesn't seems to me that the Fulmar had a so good day. Against a small group of low flying SM.79s burdened by torpedoes and escorted by Cr.42s (hardly the best escort you can encounter in mid 1941) they had two losses and a badly wounded TAG first to get their first strike.



There was also small numbers of Fulmars. Shores gives the last names of the downed SM-79 pilots as Cappa, Marini, Boetto and Fonseca. Two Cr-42s were lost as well.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 19, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Defiant with turret was only 15-25mph slower than a Hurricane with the same engine. Speed difference of the prototype Defiant without turret and versions with turret was under 10mph.



Okay; the 1st prototype was not fitted with back-facing exhausts, that should cost some speed. The second prototype received turret?




> True on were the speed was reached but then most of the attacking aircraft against the fleet/convoys were NOT at 15,00-20,000ft. Granted you can dive but that is only going to work once per attack.



Fulmar will never be a true performer, so the ability to dive to the prey from 15000 ft, with decent amount of built-up speed will come in handy. One might use up the speed to make a zoom climb, too.



> Merlin XX is (NOT) going to get you not much more than the Merlin 30 at low altitudes in 1941. When did the British allow the higher boost settings on the Merlin XX series engines?



My addition in the brackets 
Seems the +12 psi was the limit prior late 1942, later increased to +14 in low gear and +16 in high gear.



> The Italian engines had critical altitudes of between 3800-4200 meters for the most part. They were in no hurry to try to fight at 20,000ft.



That would mean 13-14000 ft, ie. just down the patrolling 'Fulmar III'?



> The Merlin 30 was pretty much a Merlin XII with a cut down impeller ( 9.75in) and using the same supercharger gear as a Merlin III.
> 
> Tip speed was almost identical to the tip speed of a Merlin XX in low gear.
> 
> It did NOT have the improved Hooker designed supercharger inlet.



Thanks for corrections 



> Fitting the Hooker designed inlet, some internal strengthening ( you can't just jack the boost on the early engines to what ever you want) and the engine was cleared for 18lbs boost as the Merlin 32 used in the Barracuda. 1640hp at 2000ft is as good as it is going to get for chasing torpedo bombers.



The Merlin 32 should give indeed more oomph, but we still need to wait until 1943/43?


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## Dogwalker (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Shores gives the last names of the downed SM-79 pilots as Cappa, Marini, Boetto and Fonseca.


This is from the Historical Office of the Aeronautica Militare (in Italian, sorry).

"Missione del 8 maggio 1941 Il 7 maggio 1941 la squadriglia è messa in allarme. Vengono caricati i siluri su tutti gli apparecchi e si rimane pronti a partire. Il giorno successivo a mezzogiorno 5 velivoli partono su allarme all'attacco di una formazione navale inglese composta da una nave portaerei (HMS Ark Royal), 2 navi da battaglia, un numero imprecisato di incrociatori e cacciatorpedinieri e 10 piroscafi. Sul numero 2 il comandante di squadriglia Cap. Mojoli con Bellesia, Bucci, Picco, Monaco e Principe, il numero 3 ha come equipaggio Magagnoli, Santi, Conti, Grassi, Palù e Panato, sul numero 1 Rivoli, Segoni, Cerasa, Becciu e Artoni, sul velivolo 4 Marini, Marengo, Bevacqua, De Nardi e Ruscica. Sul velivolo n. 5 il ten. Cappa con Giovagnoli, Flamini, Scafa e Luciani. L'obiettivo è segnalato in Lat. 35°, 45' N, Long. 7°, 25' E, viaggia a circa 20 miglia orarie in direzione 90°. La testa della formazione navale è avvistata sulla dritta da distanza di 30 km a quota 25-300 metri. Gli aerosiluranti usciti dalla zona temporalesca dei primi 40 minuti di volo a bassissima quota (nubi basse, piovaschi e banchi di nebbia) entrano improvvisamente in zona sgombra con nubi alte copertura parziale e visibilità ottima. Si rileva subito che la rotta della formazione navale non è più di 90° ma di circa 70°. Questa variazione di rotta è certamente stata effettuata dalla formazione navale per portarsi ai margini della zona temporalesca onde avere un'ottimo occultamento ed effettuare il lancio di tutti gli aerei da caccia con vento in prua alla nave portaerei. All'attacco, infatti, le unità del lato opposto (nord) dello schieramento risultano non ben visibili trovandosi già nella zona di foschia. La formazione entra a 10.000 metri su di un beta generale di circa 70° rispetto alla formazione con convergenza sulla portaerei, a volo rasente (metri 3) pronta ad allargarsi alle prime salve in acqua. A 8000 metri inizia da parte delle navi lo sbarramento in acqua che risulta piuttosto corto (colonna d'acqua dei grossi calibri delle corazzate). La formazione si allarga cabrando fino a 200 metri. Lo sbarramento è nutrito e concentrato nel settore di avvicinamento alla portaerei. Tutte le unità, anche dal lato opposto, aprono il fuoco. Gli aerosiluranti sono completamente inviluppati dal fuoco contraereo dei cannoni e delle mitragliere. Il capo formazione giudicato non superabile lo sbarramento per giungere a distanza utile di lancio contro la portaerei trovandosi a quota superiore rispetto ai gregari di sinistra, vira sulla sinistra occupando così la posizione esterna sinistra della formazione attaccante: sicchè detta formazione risulta una leggera "ala destra". La manovra è rapidamente avvertita dagli altri equipaggi come il segnale di attacco al bersaglio immediato più opportuno (come contemplato nel 3° caso di previsione) che automaticamente si determina sulla linea degli incrociatori che dista ormai di circa 2500-3000 metri.Questa manovra porta su un beta ottimo di lancio tre apparecchi: il 1° di sinistra sull'incrociatore arretrato rispetto alla portaerei;i due esterni di destra (Cappa è gregario destro) su due incrociatori avanzati; Dei due interni - in una zona libera nella linea di fila degli incrociatori: Uno decisamente diretto all'attacco della portaerei viene abbattuto. L'altro supera la linea degli incrociatori interni ed attacca il piroscafo in prua alla portaerei. (Secondo gli appunti del comandante della squadriglia, cap. Mojoli, il velivolo di Cappa fu abbattuto dal fuoco della portaerei Ark Royal). La manovra di disimpegno per i tre apparecchi (attaccanti gli incrociatori) si è definita migliore con una controvirata con violenta cabrata sfilando a poppa della formazione navale. L'apparecchio attaccante il piroscafo di prua alla portaerei (e quindi al centro dello schieramento) ha trovato opportuno disimpegnarsi sfilando di prua allo schieramento per evitare di ripassare sulla linea degli incrociatori e dei cacciatorpediniere."

Fonseca is not listed, four SM.79, of five, escaped. Marino Marini came back from that mission, continued to fight throughout the war (became the Commander of the torpedo-bombers group "Buscaglia"), and died in 1959.

As for Armando Boetto: 
"L’8 maggio 1941 lo Stormo attaccò, nonostante le pessime condizioni meteo, un grosso convoglio, ... . Un velivolo partì col compito di fare da radiofaro: il capo equipaggio, Cap. Armando Boetto, non rientrò e alla Sua memoria venne conferita la Medaglia d’Oro al Valor Militare “sul campo”." 
Probably the lone SM.79 that Lt. Ronnie Hay claimed off Galita Island.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 19, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> In any recip of the WW2 era, putting an extra crewman on a "fleet fighter" was a waste of time and manpower.



what is seldom discussed is the 2nd crewman, often called the radio operator, as part of his equipment had a radio receiver that could find a signal transmitted from the carrier and home in on it, guiding the plane back to the carrier. He was NOT a 'navigator'. The British homing system was 'supposed' to be not interceptable by the enemy and give away the carriers location like a normal "homing system".


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 19, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> what is seldom discussed is the 2nd crewman, often called the radio operator, *as part of his equipment had a radio receiver that could find a signal transmitted from the carrier and home in on it, guiding the plane back to the carrier.* He was NOT a 'navigator'. The British homing system was 'supposed' to be not interceptable by the enemy and give away the carriers location like a normal "homing system".



AKA an ADF...


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

Another way of looking at potential performance increases is to look at the 13 mph increase in Fulmar II performance, from SL to 6800ft by increasing the boost from 9.75lb/3000rpm to 12lb/3000rpm. At 12000ft the FulmarII/Merlin 30 was down to about 7-8lb of boost at 3000rpm and was putting out maybe 1100hp and it could still make 260mph. With a Merlin 45/16lb boost we are adding another 400hp at 12000ft and this must give a substantially higher performance.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 19, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> AKA an ADF...



Yes but what you could do with 1937-40 technology is not what you could do with 1943-45 technology 

I think the description of the British system has been post here at some point (or a link) but apparently it took a dedicated operator in the early form.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> This is from the Historical Office of the Aeronautica Militare (in Italian, sorry).



It wouldn't be the first time that an official history was wrong, but you'll have to take up the accuracy of Mediterranean Air War with authors, Shores, Massimello and Guest.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Another way of looking at potential performance increases is to look at the 13 mph increase in Fulmar II performance, from SL to 6800ft by increasing the boost from 9.75lb/3000rpm to 12lb/3000rpm. At 12000ft the FulmarII/Merlin 30 was down to about 7-8lb of boost at 3000rpm and was putting out maybe 1100hp and it could still make 260mph. With a Merlin 45/16lb boost we are adding another 400hp at 12000ft and this must give a substantially higher performance.


 And what's being done to the structure to support that extra 400hp? When you bolt on hp you're going to pay somewhere else. You're still talking a fighter that could barely make 300 mph, had for the most part an unnecessary extra crewman and for the most part was obsolete by 1942. I think the Marlet was the better choice until Seafires became available. The Fulmar had its moments, but it was cast into the sunset at the right time.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Another way of looking at potential performance increases is to look at the 13 mph increase in Fulmar II performance, from SL to 6800ft by increasing the boost from 9.75lb/3000rpm to 12lb/3000rpm. At 12000ft the FulmarII/Merlin 30 was down to about 7-8lb of boost at 3000rpm and was putting out maybe 1100hp and it could still make 260mph. With a Merlin 45/16lb boost we are adding another 400hp at 12000ft and this must give a substantially higher performance.



Yep, it gets you to about 288-290mph. 

The power needed goes up according to the cube law. going from 1100 to 1500hp gets you about a 10.8-11% increase in speed. Starting with a 260mph airplane gets you 28-30mph( assuming NO INCREASE IN DRAG). 

If you start with a 350mph plane the same 10.8-11% increase in speed gets you 38-39mph increase in speed.


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## Greyman (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> These numbers are wrong for the Fulmar. Numerous sources *(including the pilot's notes)* state 155 Gals of internal fuel and a 60 gal DT. Defiant I was later modded to carry 162 gals, but this was not on production Defiant Is.



Good catch. Typo fixed.

Original Defiant I performance and handling tests give 104 gallons (A&AEE, Jul '40 - data sheet date is Aug '41)



tomo pauk said:


> Hello, Greyman, would it be possible to take a more compete look at the data sheets?



Not especially handy at the moment, was there something specific you needed or just needed to take a look at the overall data?


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And what's being done to the structure to support that extra 400hp? When you bolt on hp you're going to pay somewhere else. You're still talking a fighter that could barely make 300 mph, had for the most part an unnecessary extra crewman and for the most part was obsolete by 1942. I think the Marlet was the better choice until Seafires became available. The Fulmar had its moments, but it was cast into the sunset at the right time.



The Spitfire V had no major problems ( apparently there was some local strengthening of the engine mounts) in accepting the power increases from the Merlin 45 and I doubt that the Fulmar would either. I have posted the performance graphs for the Martlet IV and it would probably trail a Fulmar/M45 in every category:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...-f4f-4-under-10-000-ft-f4f4b_fulmar_speed.jpg
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...us-f4f-4-under-10-000-ft-f4f_fulmar_climb.jpg

and it's margin of performance over the Fulmar II wasn't all that much under 12000ft or so.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 19, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The power needed goes up according to the cube law. going from 1100 to 1500hp gets you about a 10.8-11% increase in speed. Starting with a 260mph airplane gets you 28-30mph( assuming *NO INCREASE IN DRAG*).



And weight AND assuming the extra power (torque) can be coordinated with a propeller...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The Spitfire V had no major problems ( apparently there was some local strengthening of the engine mounts) in accepting the power increases from the Merlin 45 and I doubt that the Fulmar would either. I have posted the performance graphs for the Martlet IV and it would *probably* trail a Fulmar/M45 in every category:
> 
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...-f4f-4-under-10-000-ft-f4f4b_fulmar_speed.jpg
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...us-f4f-4-under-10-000-ft-f4f_fulmar_climb.jpg
> ...


 
Read Shortround's prior post. This "assumption" is speaking in terms of a perfect world matching airframe/ engine/ propeller with minimal changes in weight and drag.


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## Dogwalker (Jun 19, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> It wouldn't be the first time that an official history was wrong, but you'll have...


Curiously the Aeronautica Militare report is consistent whit that of Andrew Thomas' _"Royal Navy Aces of World War 2"_ (two SM.79 shot down, one during the attack on the Ark Royal, one alone). I don't think the survival of Marini could be seriously doubted. Given that, I do not think it's up to me to take further actions.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 19, 2013)

Greyman said:


> ...
> Not especially handy at the moment, was there something specific you needed or just needed to take a look at the overall data?



I'd like to take a look at technical data re. ww2 types, but anytime you can post the data sheets is good time


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## fastmongrel (Jun 19, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Yes but what you could do with 1937-40 technology is not what you could do with 1943-45 technology
> 
> I think the description of the British system has been post here at some point (or a link) but apparently it took a dedicated operator in the early form.



I posted a link about the Homing Beacon
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/rn-carrier-homing-beacon-35429.html


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## wuzak (Jun 19, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And what's being done to the structure to support that extra 400hp? When you bolt on hp you're going to pay somewhere else. You're still talking a fighter that could barely make 300 mph, had for the most part an unnecessary extra crewman and for the most part was obsolete by 1942. I think the Marlet was the better choice until Seafires became available. The Fulmar had its moments, but it was cast into the sunset at the right time.



Right. How nice it would have been in Seafire development had started when the FAA requested it - ie in 1938 or so.


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## wuzak (Jun 19, 2013)

With all these Merlin 45s going to Fulmars and Hurricanes I guess the RAF gets the Spitfire III (Merlin XX) instead of the "interim" Spitfire V? If that's the case I don't think the RAF would complain.

The Spitfire III would also make a good base for a Seafire.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 19, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Right. How nice it would have been in Seafire development had started when the FAA requested it - ie in 1938 or so.



Does anyone know how this original 1938 Seafire would have looked. Would it have been a similar job to the Seafire MkIII.


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## wuzak (Jun 19, 2013)

> The matter of a seaborne Spitfire was raised again in November 1939 when the Air Ministry allowed a Commander Ermen to fly a Spitfire I. After his first flight in R6718 Ermen learned that Joseph Smith, Chief Designer at Supermarine had been instructed to fit an "A-frame" arrestor hook on a Spitfire and that this had flown on 16 October; a drawing of this aircraft had been shown to the FAA on 27 October. After further discussions Supermarine submitted a drawing of a Spitfire with folding wings and an arrestor hook. *In this case the wings were designed with a fold just outboard of the undercarriage bays; the outer wings would swivel and fold backwards, parallel with the fuselage*. On 29 February 1940 the Admiralty asked the Air Ministry to sanction the production of 50 folding wing Spitfires, with the first deliveries to start in July.



Supermarine Seafire - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So Supermarine's initial navalisation proposal was different to what the Seafire III would turn out to be.


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## wuzak (Jun 19, 2013)

The idea for Fairey to develop the Seafire was rejected in 1938.

The Supermarine proposal of late 1939 was still 2 years ahead of the eventual development of the Seafire.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Curiously the Aeronautica Militare report is consistent whit that of Andrew Thomas' _"Royal Navy Aces of World War 2"_ (two SM.79 shot down, one during the attack on the Ark Royal, one alone). I don't think the survival of Marini could be seriously doubted. Given that, I do not think it's up to me to take further actions.


 

Upon re-reading Shores, I noticed that Marini was not killed, but was rescued along with his crew: _"...Marini had to crash land in the sea near Galite Island..."_ The crews of the other 3 SM-79s were all lost and I failed to note that Marini and his crew are listed as being rescued. The initial combat between the Fulmars and the first wave of SM-79s involved 5 Sm-79s, 15 CR-42s and 8 Fulmars, with the Fulmars being bounced as they intercepted the SM-79s.


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## RCAFson (Jun 19, 2013)

wuzak said:


> With all these Merlin 45s going to Fulmars and Hurricanes I guess the RAF gets the Spitfire III (Merlin XX) instead of the "interim" Spitfire V? If that's the case I don't think the RAF would complain.
> 
> The Spitfire III would also make a good base for a Seafire.



Fulmar production peaked at 25/month.


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## MacArther (Jun 19, 2013)

As I said earlier, the only really feasible solution would be the removal of the "junk in the trunk," AKA remove all the stuff you can (including the extra crew member) from the rear position. It might not gain you much, but other than this option and MAYBE higher grade fuel than what was used (if possible), I don't see the Fleet Air Arm sanctioning new production of an older aircraft. Then again, the Fulmar is mean like the P-40 to plug a hole until better things come along.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 19, 2013)

And the better thing (the Firefly)* was delayed while the Griffon was pushed aside to concentrate on the the Merlin, Production, upgrading and new versions. 



* that was the intention, if the Firefly was really what was needed is another question.


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## wuzak (Jun 19, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> And the better thing (the Firefly)* was delayed while the Griffon was pushed aside to concentrate on the the Merlin, Production, upgrading and new versions.
> 
> 
> 
> * that was the intention, if the Firefly was really what was needed is another question.



I believe the Firefly was Fairey's response to teh request to build Seafires....


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## Shortround6 (Jun 19, 2013)

Perhaps, but the Air Ministry bought it (the proposal?) and issued a specification for it in the summer of 1940. They had the final choice, not Fairey.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 19, 2013)

> if the Firefly was really what was needed is another question.



The Firefly was built to N.5/40, which was a reconfiguration of N.8/39 and N.9/39, which were derived from earlier specs for a two-seat fighter and a turret fighter for the FAA. The idea was for a spotter reconnaissance fighter - again, too many requirements compromising a primary role. This was largely the doing of the Air Ministry in 1940, who concluded that the RAF's fighters had differing requirements to the FAA's, so single-seat fighters were a given and that performance differences between a single and two-seat fighter was negligible, therefore a long range recon element was necessary because of the nature of the attacking aircraft being slower bombers at long range attacking the fleet. In reality however, the Firefly gave excellent service as an attack aircraft; even with that big 36.7 litre 1,720 hp Griffon IIB up front, the maximum speed of the Firefly F.I was 316 mph at 14,000 ft - by mid 1943 was far too sluggish for a fighter.

The 'Sea Spitfire' was proposed by the Admiralty as an interim between the Fulmar and N.5/40 (Firefly) because their Lordships wanted a high performance fighter in service as quickly as possible. the idea was put forward on 29 February 1940, but the Air Ministry decided that diverting Spitfire airframes from RAF production was not acceptable, so by end of March 1940, the idea was dropped. 




> and this must give a substantially higher performance.



It most certainly does not. Compare with figures for the Firefly - although the Firefly is a heavier machine than the Fulmar, any increase in speed would have been negligible and not enough to match increasing performance in enemy fighters and bombers. Interceptors need to be quick to get to altitude, neither the Firefly nor the Fulmar had very good rates of climb and Ju 88s frequently showed Fulmars attempting to intercept them a clean pair of heels because they were too slow to get up there. Adding a few mph isn't going to change that by much. 

Aviation history is littered with designs that on paper had promising performance, but in reality once translated into hardware did not live up to expectations. Again, I turn to the Defiant for an example; when BP offered the Mk.II, its expectations for the aircraft with the Merlin XX fitted were a top speed of 345 mph at 21,000 ft, but found in trials that it could only manage 313 mph at 19,000 ft. The Fulmar would be the same, being bigger and heavier than the Defiant (yes, I know I keep going on about the Daffy, but it does make an interesting comparison with the Fulmar). A more powerful engine in the Fulmar would not offer anywhere near the leap in performance that either Tomo or RCAFson are expecting.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 19, 2013)

Thank you.



nuuumannn said:


> In reality however, the Firefly gave excellent service as an attack aircraft; even with that big 36.7 litre 1,720 hp Griffon IIB up front, the maximum speed of the Firefly F.I was 316 mph at 14,000 ft - by mid 1943 was far too sluggish for a fighter.



In 1939/40 They were expecting the Griffon to give closer to 2000hp and to ready in 1942. The Fall of France, the summer battles and the BoB meant that Griffon development was stopped for while short term needs were dealt with. quite a few months of development were lost. Perhaps some aircraft programs were resumed without much review as to changed requirements?


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## tomo pauk (Jun 20, 2013)

Out of curiosity - how fast was the Defiant I at 19000 ft?


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## Greyman (Jun 20, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Out of curiosity - how fast was the Defiant I at 19000 ft?



About 297.5 mph (A&AEE).

Speaking of A&AEE tests, the one that is being quoted a lot, I believe, might not be the best representative of the Defiant II's performance.

Indeed the actual test of Defiant II N1551 reports a top speed of 313 mph at 19,400 feet (9 boost). However, looking at the graphs it is apparent that something is wrong. The speed curve in 'M ratio' is fine, showing the same type of gain over a Merlin III as seen in the Spitfire and Hurricane. But the speed curve for 'S ratio' is very anemic. The performance test indicates they had trouble with the engine in M ratio, perhaps a typo? Also the A&AEE had to give the aircraft back to Boulton Paul earlier than they'd have liked.

Now, plotting basic curves from speed points given by the Defiant II 'data sheet' (325 mph at 22,000 feet) - makes the curves fit much more closely with the type of gains we see in the Hurricane and Spitfire when moving from Merlin III to Merlin XX.

In my heart I believe the data sheet to be a better representation of what the Defiant II was capable of.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 20, 2013)

Was there a speed loss when fitted with the radar aerials? 

The 313 mph is quite commonly quoted ( doesn't mean it is right) but perhaps the nightfighter versions were fighting the drag of the black finish and aerials which dropped the speed back to near the day fighter MK I level?


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## Mike Williams (Jun 20, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Out of curiosity - how fast was the Defiant I at 19000 ft?



Hi Tomo, see Defiant K-8620 Level Speeds and R.P.M. at Heights


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## Greyman (Jun 20, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Was there a speed loss when fitted with the radar aerials?
> 
> The 313 mph is quite commonly quoted ( doesn't mean it is right) but perhaps the nightfighter versions were fighting the drag of the black finish and aerials which dropped the speed back to near the day fighter MK I level?



It appears the speed tests were done on a Defiant II in normal condition.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 20, 2013)

What to say - many thanks Mike, maybe it's time to give space at your site for the Defiants, Fulmars and Fireflies 

Greyman, it goes without saying that I look forward to see any posts containing original documents (in their 'electronic shape', of course), re. ww2 flying hardware, any time you can spare. Thanks for the feedback.

Until someone doesn't post something more professional, here is the graph comparing Merlin 45 (blue line, +16 boost, 1515 HP at 11000 ft max) and Merlin 30 (red line, +12 boost, 1360 HP at 6000 ft max). Not too shabby, 30% more power above 10000 ft:


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## RCAFson (Jun 20, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> What to say - many thanks Mike, maybe it's time to give space at your site for the Defiants, Fulmars and Fireflies
> 
> Greyman, it goes without saying that I look forward to see any posts containing original documents (in their 'electronic shape', of course), re. ww2 flying hardware, any time you can spare. Thanks for the feedback.
> 
> Until someone doesn't post something more professional, here is the graph comparing Merlin 45 (blue line, +16 boost, 1515 HP at 11000 ft max) and Merlin 30 (red line, +12 boost, 1360 HP at 6000 ft max). Not too shabby, 30% more power above 10000 ft:



Hi, you've made a mistake on the Merlin 45 output curve, as you are using the 12lb boost figure for SL output. With 16lb boost it should look something like this:





and it provides more power than the Merlin 30 at all altitudes.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 20, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Hi, you've made a mistake on the Merlin 45 output curve, as you are using the 12lb boost figure for SL output. ...



+12 psi _was_ the SL output, when/where engine is not supplied with any worthwhile ram; the _moving_ airplane/engine should indeed be able to use +16 psi up until 13000 ft (ram present from SL up to the FTH for +16 psi). Here.
The problem with +16psi boost is that it was authorized some time in late 1942? When was the +12 boost authorized?


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## RCAFson (Jun 20, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> +12 psi _was_ the SL output, when/where engine is not supplied with any worthwhile ram; the _moving_ airplane/engine should indeed be able to use +16 psi up until 13000 ft (ram present from SL up to the FTH for +16 psi). Here.
> The problem with +16psi boost is that it was authorized some time in late 1942? When was the +12 boost authorized?



The ability of the Merlin 45 to generate 16lb of boost was always possible, even at SL under static conditions, and this could be maintained to the static FTH for that boost level. Ram air permitted 16lb boost to be maintained to a higher altitude than the static rating of the engine, which on the Spitfire V was 13000ft, but on the slower Fulmar it would be about 12000 ft. 

16lb boost was authorized in Dec 1941, according to Lovesey.


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## RCAFson (Jun 20, 2013)

Based upon our discussions here's my take on a Fulmar III versus the Fulmar II, Martlet IV and Firefly I:






I came up with this performace based upon extending the Fulmar II 12lb curve to 12000ft which gives about 285 mph at ~1400hp and I added another ~12 mph for a Merlin 45 @ 1515hp. IMHO, this would have provided a very useful increase in perfomance.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 21, 2013)

> IMHO, this would have provided a very useful increase in perfomance.



Compared to what? As a fighter in 1941 - 1943? That still less than 300 mph! Your charts are very pretty, but I don't think you are seeing the big picture.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 21, 2013)

The chart seems a little bit off. *IF* I am using the cube law correctly the FUlmar "III" should be good for 291mph at 12,000ft using your assumptions. Since people seem to want to turn the the Fulmar into a higher altitude fighter let's also look at 20,000ft. 
Just about all official charts show the speed at altitude falling off in a curve, not a straight line. And even if the Fulmar did to 240mph at 20,000ft ( which rather shows how hopeless things were to begin with as on test a Gladiator did 239.5mph at 20,000ft) the difference in power between the the Merlin 30 and the 45 gets narrower with altitude. The 45 has a good margin but the difference in speed will _not_ be simply moving the Fulmar II line over to correspond to the peak power point a 12,000ft.
Going by the TOmo's chart and having 6000 meters equal 20,000ft. it appears that the Merlin 30 was good for 850hp (give or take) and the Merlin 45 was good for 1100 hp (give or take). The Merlin 45 had 37.7% (?) more power at 12,000ft but at 20,000ft it has 29.4% (?) more power. Ussing the cube law and the 240mph speed at 20,000 ft we wind up with a speed of 261mph at 20,000ft not 273-5mph. 

Perhaps minor quibbles but then the Martlet chart is for the Martlet IV which was the _worst_ performing Martlet/Wildcat built (used the _same_ engine as most American Brewster Buffaloes). Granted the UK got about 220 of them but at anywhere above 13,000ft it is going to be about 10-15mph faster than a Fulmar "III". 

And that is part of the big picture, Any other Martlet/Wildcat is going to be 20-40mph faster than the Fulmar "III" above the Merlin 45's 16lb boost critical altitude. 

Now what is the performance of a Sea Hurricane?


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Compared to what? As a fighter in 1941 - 1943? That still less than 300 mph! Your charts are very pretty, but I don't think you are seeing the big picture.


 
*The Allies had two carrier rated folding wing fighters (with variants) from 1940 to mid 1943, namely the Fulmar and the F4F/Martlet*. I have provided the performance of the F4F-4B in the previous chart. A USN comparison of the F4F-4 with the F4F-4B had this to say:



> "The F4F-4 was compared to the F4F-4B...the difference in performance was very small, the F4F-4B being slightly superior in speed and climb at low altitudes and the F4F-4 slightly superior at 15000ft and above..."
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-02135.pdf



So "looking at the big picture" I think that it's pretty fair to say that an improved Fulmar would have been very worthwhile as would a variant with the Merlin XX.

Looking at the Firefly performance, we can see that it would have been a pretty hot ship if ready for service in late 41/early 42 as planned, rather than late 1943.


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## Greyman (Jun 21, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Now what is the performance of a Sea Hurricane?



Data sheet says: 
308 mph at 18,000 feet (+ 6.25 boost)
315 mph at 7,500 feet (+ 16 boost)

Merlin III/eight-Browning version (only Sea Hurricane sheet available).


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The chart seems a little bit off. *IF* I am using the cube law correctly the FUlmar "III" should be good for 291mph at 12,000ft using your assumptions. Since people seem to want to turn the the Fulmar into a higher altitude fighter let's also look at 20,000ft.
> Just about all official charts show the speed at altitude falling off in a curve, not a straight line. And even if the Fulmar did to 240mph at 20,000ft ( which rather shows how hopeless things were to begin with as on test a Gladiator did 239.5mph at 20,000ft) the difference in power between the the Merlin 30 and the 45 gets narrower with altitude. The 45 has a good margin but the difference in speed will _not_ be simply moving the Fulmar II line over to correspond to the peak power point a 12,000ft.
> Going by the TOmo's chart and having 6000 meters equal 20,000ft. it appears that the Merlin 30 was good for 850hp (give or take) and the Merlin 45 was good for 1100 hp (give or take). The Merlin 45 had 37.7% (?) more power at 12,000ft but at 20,000ft it has 29.4% (?) more power. Ussing the cube law and the 240mph speed at 20,000 ft we wind up with a speed of 261mph at 20,000ft not 273-5mph.
> 
> ...



Adding an extra ~130 hp at 6800 ft gives the Fulmar another ~13 mph of performance. At 12000ft adding another ~115hp should do the same.

The lines above FTH should be curves, but the effect of this would be to slightly raise speeds above FTH to the last data point on the graph. The Fulmar II performance at 20,000 feet was a data point taken from official test results. The Fulmar's reliance on low altitude rated engines greatly handicapped it at higher altitudes but the Merlin 45, for example, was static rated for 1230hp/16000ft/9lb boost/2850rpm. At 3000 rpm it could hold 9lb boost to ~18000ft and this is substantially better than the XXX which would down to 3 or 4 lb of boost at 18000ft. The Merlin XX would probably give superior high altitude performance compared to the Martlet IV.

The F4F-4B performed very close to the F4F-4 under 15000ft, and most FAA combat was under this altitude, however increasing Fulmar performance above 15000ft would have allowed for more successful intercepts of high altitude recon aircraft and give a better climb rate for better diving intercepts.


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

Greyman said:


> Data sheet says:
> 308 mph at 18,000 feet (+ 6.25 boost)
> 315 mph at 7,500 feet (+ 16 boost)
> 
> Merlin III/eight-Browning version (only Sea Hurricane sheet available).



Thanks!

Say what weights are given and what is the ammo load out?


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## Greyman (Jun 21, 2013)

330 rounds per gun

weights (no tanks or bombs)
max - 7,015 lb
mean - 6,655 lb
light - 6,100 lb
tare - 5,344 lb

Speeds are supposedly with 'mean' weight, but take this with a grain of salt, I've seen this be untrue on some sheets, based on A&AEE tests


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

Greyman said:


> 330 rounds per gun
> 
> weights (no tanks or bombs)
> max - 7,015 lb
> ...



Thanks again!

One last thing, what was the climb rates?


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## Greyman (Jun 21, 2013)

10.0 minutes to 20,000 feet at max weight


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

Greyman said:


> 10.0 minutes to 20,000 feet at max weight



Does it give a combat climb rating?

This is really interesting stuff.


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## Greyman (Jun 21, 2013)

That's all its got for climb data unfortunately.


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## Mike Williams (Jun 21, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> What to say - many thanks Mike, maybe it's time to give space at your site for the Defiants, Fulmars and Fireflies



Hi Tomo, I'm happy to contribute and I'm glad you found it useful. Good idea on Defiants, Fulmars and Fireflies!  We'll see what we can do...


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## Shortround6 (Jun 21, 2013)

The Merlin III in the Sea Hurricane (only) was approved for 16lbs boost. At this level of boost it gave 1440hp at 5500ft. 

When this was done, I don't know (Wiki says for Operation Pedestal in Aug 1942) and how expendable the engines/aircraft were considered I also don't know. The ones flown off of CAM ships were pretty much one flight operations. Trashing the engine was probably not high on the list of concerns. 

I am not sure if this engine was ever approved for higher than the "normal" 2600rpm/6 1/4lb boost climb. 

The window of opportunity for an "improved" Fulmar seems to be AFTER the RAF gets the Spitfire V in some numbers ( and or gets satisfied that the MK II Hurricane isn't REALLY going to be a front line fighter and can free up some MK XX engines) AND after the boost limit is raised to at least 12lbs for such engines. AND Before Sea Hurricanes are available in any numbers. 

Something to consider on the 12lb vs 16lb limit is how much was engine strength/engine life and how much was fuel limited. I don't know when the British got large stocks of 100/130 fuel. The British 100 octane during the BoB was NOT 100/130. It was 100/115-120 depending on the batch. It was AFTER the BoB that the performance number scale (anything over 100 octane) was established and fuel could be specified and tested to the new standard. In the US some Allison engines were being rated on 100/125 fuel in 1941. Exactly _When_ the British and Americans standardized on 100/130 fuel seems to be little noted. I have read that the allowable formulations for 100/130 were changed in early 1943 which is part (only one part) of what lead to the P-38 Allison problem in Europe but this was anticipated and work begun on a new intake manifold in the spring/summer of 1943 for the "new" 100/130 fuel as compared to the "old" 100/130 fuel. 

Martlet Vs with two stage engines _started_ to be supplied to the RN in Dec 1942 (in small numbers) which rather puts paid to any notion of using any sort of Fulmar past then.


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

Here's the performance chart with the Sea Hurricane 1B added, using my best guess to the performance curve in between Greyman's data points. I have also added the curves for a hypothetical Sea Hurricane/M45 with 16lb boost. It should give a slight increase in performance over the MIII even at the MIII FTH because of the superior SC on the M45:







I don't agree that the Martlet V could fully replace the Fulmar because the Fulmar still has a very useful advantage in recon capability and can act as a DB, but historically these capabilities were never used to their full potential because RN CVs were only briefly active in the IO/Pacific in 1942/43. Also the measured performance of the F4F-4 (Martlet V) never came close to it's SAC/FAA data card figures, at least in 1942, and it compared very poorly with the Zero in terms of level performance, during USN/USAAF comparative trials.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 21, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> I don't agree that the Martlet V could fully replace the Fulmar because the Fulmar still has a very useful advantage in recon capability and can act as a DB, but historically these capabilities were never used to their full potential because RN CVs were only briefly active in the IO/Pacific in 1942/43. Also the measured performance of the F4F-4 (Martlet V) never came close to it's SAC/FAA data card figures, at least in 1942, and it compared very poorly with the Zero in terms of level performance, during USN/USAAF comparative trials.



What does "never came close to it'sSAC/FAA data card figures" Mean?

In the test report that you quoted before it has an F4F-4 doing 316mph at 17,200ft. Now this may NOT be "close" to the 332mph some times claimed but on the other hand it is just about equal to the Firefly I. It is marginally faster than a Sea Hurricane I with a Merlin III, It is about 20mph faster than the Martlet IV and almost 35mph faster than your proposed Fulmar III. If the F4F-4 isn't fast enough then were does that leave the rest of these planes?


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> What does "never came close to it's SAC/FAA data card figures" Mean?
> 
> In the test report that you quoted before it has an F4F-4 doing 316mph at 17,200ft. Now this may NOT be "close" to the 332mph some times claimed but on the other hand it is just about equal to the Firefly I. It is marginally faster than a Sea Hurricane I with a Merlin III, It is about 20mph faster than the Martlet IV and almost 35mph faster than your proposed Fulmar III. If the F4F-4 isn't fast enough then were does that leave the rest of these planes?



Actual trials showed the F4F-4 to be slower than the SAC data but also to have a much poorer climb rate, which made it barely superior to the Fulmar when both use normal climb power and probably worse when military/combat power was used, and this in turn limited its ability to act as an interceptor. I've already quoted part of a comparative trial showing the F4F-4 being outperformed by the F4F-4B at low altitude, and in turn the F4F-4B is greatly outperformed by the Sea Hurricane and Firefly especially under 12,000 ft where most naval fighter combat took place. The Firefly 1 is generally faster than the F4F-4, outclimbs it, has far more firepower, and both it and the Sea Hurricane can outturn the F4F. The Firefly can also act as a long range escort, naval strike fighter, and long range recon aircraft. In 1942 the Firefly would have been a very potent aircraft. Also, a two seat fighter always has an inherent advantage in combat in terms of visibility because the pilot has someone else to help locate and track the opposition.


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## Aozora (Jun 21, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Also, a two seat fighter always has an inherent advantage in combat in terms of visibility because the pilot has someone else to help locate and track the opposition.



Doesn't help much having extra eyes when all that extra weight needed to carry those extra eyes reduces speed and manouverability while making the entire aircraft into a bigger target. The reason fighter formations were devised was to provide extra eyes and mutual support. The rear seat eyes in the Fulmar didn't even have a peashooter with which to provide some slight protection/support for the pilot.

Why the FAA persisted with a two-seat fighter when the other two carrier forces got purpose-built single seat fighters is a mystery wrapped up in a riddle, but has a great deal with the RAF's obsession with making the FAA use multi-role aircraft as an economy measure (the RAF controlled the FAA until 1939).


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Doesn't help much having extra eyes when all that extra weight needed to carry those extra eyes reduces speed and manouverability while making the entire aircraft into a bigger target. The reason fighter formations were devised was to provide extra eyes and mutual support. The rear seat eyes in the Fulmar didn't even have a peashooter with which to provide some slight protection/support for the pilot.
> 
> Why the FAA persisted with a two-seat fighter when the other two carrier forces got purpose-built single seat fighters is a mystery wrapped up in a riddle, but has a great deal with the RAF's obsession with making the FAA use multi-role aircraft as an economy measure (the RAF controlled the FAA until 1939).



By the end of WW2 the USN had come around to the FAA position of having only two primary CV based aircraft; a multi-purpose strike fighter and a multipurpose recon-DB-TB as evidenced by the aircraft complement of the armoured flight deck Midway class CVs. Under RN control, the FAA planned, by 1942, to equip it's carriers with two primary aircraft, the multipurpose recon-strike fighter Fairey Firefly and the multipurpose recon-DB-TB-ASW Fairey Barracuda. Such a combination would have been completely competitive, if not superior to the 1942 IJN and USN in terms of capability. It was the BofB and the consequent disruption in FAA aircraft development that prevented this plan from reaching fruition.

The Firefly 1 with 230 usg was slightly lighter (12250lb) than the F6F-3 with 250 usg (12500lb). In 1942 the Firefly would have been a winner, but even in 44/45 it was still a capable recon-strike fighter that, with its F-Y flaps, could out-turn a Zero.


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## Juha (Jun 21, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> By the end of WW2 the USN had come around to the FAA position of having only two primary CV based aircraft; a multi-purpose strike fighter and a multipurpose recon-DB-TB as evidenced by the aircraft complement of the armoured flight deck Midway class CVs. Under RN control, the FAA planned, by 1942, to equip it's carriers with two primary aircraft, the multipurpose recon-strike fighter Fairey Firefly and the multipurpose recon-DB-TB-ASW Fairey Barracuda. Such a combination would have been completely competitive, if not superior to the 1942 IJN and USN in terms of capability. It was the BofB and the consequent disruption in FAA aircraft development that prevented this plan from reaching fruition.
> 
> The Firefly 1 with 230 usg was slightly lighter (12250lb) than the F6F-3 with 250 usg (12500lb). In 1942 the Firefly would have been a winner, but even in 44/45 it was still a capable recon-strike fighter that, with its F-Y flaps, could out-turn a Zero.



Why RN still needed Seafires, Hellcats and Corsairs? They needed something to protect their CVs and their strike a/c. So much on the 2 multi-role a/c concept.


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## RCAFson (Jun 21, 2013)

Juha said:


> Why RN still needed Seafires, Hellcats and Corsairs? They needed something to protect their CVs and their strike a/c. So much on the 2 multi-role a/c concept.



None of the above was available in any numbers before 1943, and I didn't claim that the Firefly was competitive as a pure fighter/interceptor after mid 1943.

With it's upgraded engines and cooling systems, the Firefly F4 would have been competitive with the Hellcat, had it appeared a couple of years sooner, as it wasn't the 2nd crew member that cut it's performance so much as the underdeveloped state of the Griffon engine and the RAF having priority for them.


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## wuzak (Jun 21, 2013)

Oh! I do like to fly in a fast Seafire
I do like to fly over the sea!
I do like to climb then turn, turn, turn!
And make the Hun's planes
Burnity-burn-burn-burn
So just let me fly in a fast Seafire
I'll be beside myself with glee


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## Aozora (Jun 22, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> By the end of WW2 the USN had come around to the FAA position of having only two primary CV based aircraft; a multi-purpose strike fighter and a multipurpose recon-DB-TB as evidenced by the aircraft complement of the armoured flight deck Midway class CVs.



That's an over-simplification of the American position because it ignores the use of the F8F as a pure fighter and the obsolescence of the dive bomber as a concept. And note that the Americans were not interested in having a *two-seat* single-engine strike fighter because they chose to utilise the F4U complemented and later supplanted by the AD Skyraider in the strike role. Until the late 1950s American carrier-borne fighters were rarely two-seaters. It could be argued that even in the 21st century the USN continues to rely on single-seat multi-role strike aircraft in the form of the F/A-18E series which, incidentally, partly replaced the two-seat F-14.



RCAFson said:


> Under RN control, the FAA planned, by 1942, to equip it's carriers with two primary aircraft, the multipurpose recon-strike fighter Fairey Firefly and the multipurpose recon-DB-TB-ASW Fairey Barracuda. Such a combination would have been completely competitive, if not superior to the 1942 IJN and USN in terms of capability. It was the BofB and the consequent disruption in FAA aircraft development that prevented this plan from reaching fruition.



Where did you get this idea? There was a requirement for a turret fighter under N. 9/39 - which resulted in the useless Blackburn Roc. The FAA also wanted a single-seat fighter and were offered a Sea-Spitfire in 1938, plus there were plans for a single seat fighter under N.11/40, which eventually resulted in the Blackburn Firebrand - an aircraft which only became a "strike fighter" because it was useless at anything else; the plans for a Sea-Spitfire with folding wings came to naught because, as mentioned elsewhere, Dick Fairey absolutely refused to allow his factories to build anything other than Fairey designs. 

There is absolutely no evidence that a Firefly/Barracuda combination would have been superior to the IJN or USN - that's an assumption on your part.

The concept of continuing with a two-seat fighter in 1942 was wasteful of resources when it had been proven that single-seat, single engine fighters were more than useful, and it should be noted that no more specifications were issued for two-seat naval fighters after 1940.



RCAFson said:


> In 1942 the Firefly would have been a winner, but even in 44/45 it was still a capable recon-strike fighter that, with its F-Y flaps, could out-turn a Zero.



The Firefly would have been even better and more useful in 1942 as a smaller aircraft without the back seat - it might have even truly been a winner. Useful in 1944/45, sure but essential, no.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 22, 2013)

> Under RN control, the FAA planned, by 1942, to equip it's carriers with two primary aircraft, the multipurpose recon-strike fighter Fairey Firefly and the multipurpose recon-DB-TB-ASW Fairey Barracuda.



Do you have any evidence to back this up? Where does the order for Grumman Martlets fit into this? What about the Blackburn Firebrand, built to N.11/40 raised to cover the type as a single-seat fighter with a minimum top speed of 403 mph? There is more than enough evidence presented here in this thread that the Admiralty wanted high performance single-seat fighters. 

Of interest, owing to delays in the Firebrand programme, the Admiralty examined the prospect of a Sea Typhoon, the P.1009 that was to be built to N.11/40 instead. A Sea Tempest was considered in 1942, but was rejected as the Seafire, the aeroplane the Admiralty had been requesting for a few years was in service.


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## RCAFson (Jun 22, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Do you have any evidence to back this up? Where does the order for Grumman Martlets fit into this? What about the Blackburn Firebrand, built to N.11/40 raised to cover the type as a single-seat fighter with a minimum top speed of 403 mph? There is more than enough evidence presented here in this thread that the Admiralty wanted high performance single-seat fighters.
> 
> Of interest, owing to delays in the Firebrand programme, the Admiralty examined the prospect of a Sea Typhoon, the P.1009 that was to be built to N.11/40 instead. A Sea Tempest was considered in 1942, but was rejected as the Seafire, the aeroplane the Admiralty had been requesting for a few years was in service.



The wiki article on the Firebrand states that it was originally intended for fleet base defence, but I have no doubt that the FAA was actively exploring long range options for SS fighters, in response to foreign developments but this doesn't alter the fundamental priority placed on the two seat fighter. The development of useful long range AW seaborne radar also undercut the need for two seat fighter (radar/IFF could act as a homing device) but in 1939 this was unknowable.

The GSG, Martlet, HSH and SSF were all emergency responses to the contemporary situation where the FAA found itself at war prematurely, and then had it's own development and procurement plans delayed by the FofF, BofB and the general crisis which ensued following the Commonwealth finding itself alone against the Axis.

We can see the FAA/RN doctrine in action during 1940/41 when the typical complement of RN fleet CVs was the DB/TB Swordfish/Albacore and the recon/fighter Fulmar. Technically the Fulmar was also a strike fighter but this capability was delayed until late in it's career although it was in the Admiralty specs. The development of both the Firefly and Barracuda were delayed but if they had entered service as planned then instead of the interim Fulmar/Abacore the FAA would have fielded the Firefly/Barracuda as their sole carrier borne aircraft, and in 1942 this combination generally outperformed the IJN/USN equivalents and in <1940>the Fulmar/Albacore actually compared well with foreign carrier borne aircraft.

If the Firefly had been coming into service in 1942 then both the HSH and Martlet would have been superfluous, as neither (especially the Martlet) has enough of a performance/range or firepower edge over the Firefly to make them worthwhile.

The development and specs for the Barracuda and Firefly were driven by Admiralty/FAA requirements not limitations imposed by the RAF and any reading of their design and development will show that this was so. For example the RAF was doctrinally opposed to DBs, yet the FAA fielded 3 TB/DBs (Swordfish/Albacore/Barracuda) and 3 DB/strike Fighters (Skua, Fulmar, Firefly) and it was the Admiralty that pushed for this:



> ...From about 1933 on, the Admiralty showed increasing interest in dive-bombing, as the best means of accurate delivery against small and highly manoeuvrable ships. Dive-bombing was also particularly attractive as a means of neutralizing enemy aircraft carriers, which some in the Fleet Air Arm considered their primary targets. British observers seem to have been impressed by US demonstrations...Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, p.156


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## RCAFson (Jun 22, 2013)

Aozora said:


> That's an over-simplification of the American position because it ignores the use of the F8F as a pure fighter and the obsolescence of the dive bomber as a concept. And note that the Americans were not interested in having a *two-seat* single-engine strike fighter because they chose to utilise the F4U complemented and later supplanted by the AD Skyraider in the strike role. Until the late 1950s American carrier-borne fighters were rarely two-seaters. It could be argued that even in the 21st century the USN continues to rely on single-seat multi-role strike aircraft in the form of the F/A-18E series which, incidentally, partly replaced the two-seat F-14.



It's not an over simplification at all, because the USN put this doctrinal change into practice. The F8F was a response to the need for a fast climbing fighter to meet a similar development in the IJN (which didn't materialize ) and later as an anti-kamikaze fighter, but the last variants of the multi-role F4U had similar performance. The Seafire had a somewhat similar rationale, but it was Luftwaffe FBs that drove it's development.




> Where did you get this idea? There was a requirement for a turret fighter under N. 9/39 - which resulted in the useless Blackburn Roc. The FAA also wanted a single-seat fighter and were offered a Sea-Spitfire in 1938, plus there were plans for a single seat fighter under N.11/40, which eventually resulted in the Blackburn Firebrand - an aircraft which only became a "strike fighter" because it was useless at anything else; the plans for a Sea-Spitfire with folding wings came to naught because, as mentioned elsewhere, Dick Fairey absolutely refused to allow his factories to build anything other than Fairey designs.



Simple, there was only two planned possibilities for folding wing carrier aircraft to come into service in 1942 and that was the Firefly and Barracuda - nothing else was even close to fruition.



> There is absolutely no evidence that a Firefly/Barracuda combination would have been superior to the IJN or USN - that's an assumption on your part.



What? Haven't been reading this thread? The Firefly was greatly superior to the F4F-4 and would have been a very potent CV borne air defence fighter in 1942 with unrivalled firepower and strike capability. The Barracuda could carry a heavier bomb load than either the Val or SBD and outperformed the TBD and Kate as well.



> he concept of continuing with a two-seat fighter in 1942 was wasteful of resources when it had been proven that single-seat, single engine fighters were more than useful, and it should be noted that no more specifications were issued for two-seat naval fighters after 1940.



The Firefly still performed very useful service as a strike/escort fighter in 1944/5 and the FAA continued it's development long after WW2 ended.





> The Firefly would have been even better and more useful in 1942 as a smaller aircraft without the back seat - it might have even truly been a winner. Useful in 1944/45, sure but essential, no.



The Admiralty was short of crystal balls in 1939, but Firefly performance was not hampered by its two seat requirements; both the F6F and F4U were in the same weight class as was the Typhoon. Any naval fighter with the same requirements for range, firepower and strike capability will weigh about the same, and IMHO, the problem stemmed from the RAF having priority for aircraft and engine development.


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## Greyman (Jun 22, 2013)

Aside from the second crewman, what could a Firefly could do that a Corsair couldn't do better?


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## Juha (Jun 22, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> ... The development of both the Firefly and Barracuda were delayed but if they had entered service as planned then instead of the interim Fulmar/Abacore the FAA would have fielded the Firefly/Barracuda as their sole carrier borne aircraft, and in 1942 this combination generally outperformed the IJN/USN equivalents and in the Fulmar/Albacore actually compared well with foreign carrier borne aircraft...:


 

So are you claiming that Fulmar/Albacore compared well with Zero/Kate/Val?


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## Aozora (Jun 22, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> It's not an over simplification at all, because the USN put this doctrinal change into practice. The F8F was a response to the need for a fast climbing fighter to meet a similar development in the IJN (which didn't materialize ) and later as an anti-kamikaze fighter, but the last variants of the multi-role F4U had similar performance. The Seafire had a somewhat similar rationale, but it was Luftwaffe FBs that drove it's development.


 
Evidence please that the USN ever contemplated replacing single seat fighters with multi-seat, multi-purpose designs. 



RCAFson said:


> Simple, there was only two planned possibilities for folding wing carrier aircraft to come into service in 1942 and that was the Firefly and Barracuda - nothing else was even close to fruition.



That's because because Fairey absolutely refused to have anything to do with helping develop or build a folding wing Sea-Spitfire in 1938! One of the PRIME reasons single-seat fighter development was retarded for the FAA was because of Fairey's refusal to allow such development to take place.



RCAFson said:


> The Admiralty was short of crystal balls in 1939, but Firefly performance was not hampered by its two seat requirements; both the F6F and F4U were in the same weight class as was the Typhoon. Any naval fighter with the same requirements for range, firepower and strike capability will weigh about the same, and IMHO, the problem stemmed from the RAF having priority for aircraft and engine development.



Really? - top speed of Griffon engine Firefly I in 1944 was 316 mph at 14,000; 5 min 45 sec to 10,000 ft: 
top speed of Griffon engine Seafire XV was 392 mph; climb rate = 4,600 ft/min: 
F6F-3 = 391 mph; 3,650 ft/min:
F4U = 416 mph; 3,210 ft/min:
Typhoon = 413 mph; 6 min to 15,000 ft 

there was a huge performance penalty paid for having an extra seat.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 22, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> It's not an over simplification at all, because the USN put this doctrinal change into practice. The F8F was a response to the need for a fast climbing fighter to meet a similar development in the IJN



Part of the F8F requirement was a NEW plane to operate of small carriers, ie, a F4F/FM-2 replacement. 



RCAFson said:


> What? Haven't been reading this thread? The Firefly was greatly superior to the F4F-4 and would have been a very potent CV borne air defence fighter in 1942 with unrivalled firepower and strike capability.



Not really in the 1942 version unless you bring the Griffon even more forward in timing. Like using at least the MK XII Griffon in 1942 instead of the IIB. A fight at 25000 ft might have been rather interesting. The F4F might have double the climb rate of a Firefly MK I. At that altitude. Climb of the MK I Firefly according to one source was 5 min 45 seconds to 10,000ft which is within a few seconds of what the F4F-4 was supposed to to do. 

The Firefly does have a large edge in firepower and strike capability though. 



RCAFson said:


> The Barracuda could carry a heavier bomb load than either the Val or SBD and outperformed the TBD and Kate as well.



No kidding??? It should, it had DOUBLE the power of a TBD (even with the low powered Griffon), the last of which rolled out the factory door back in 1938 if not before. Kates had about 1000hp even in the 2nd model. 

You want to move up the service introductions of aircraft? 

Fairey Firefly " Z1826 made its maiden flight on 22 December 1941, Z1827 on 4 June 1942 and Z1828 on 26 August 1942"

Curtiss SB2C, "first prototype made its maiden flight on 18 December 1940,....The revised prototype flew again on 20 October 1941........Large-scale production had already been ordered on 29 November 1940"

Granted the Curtiss SB2C was one of the big "turkeys" of WW II but it did go into operational service about _ONE month_ after the Firefly. 

And the Grumman Avenger, first flown on 7 August 1941, was at Midway in small numbers in June of 1942. About the same day the second prototype Firefly flew. Granted it was about useless as a fighter but how about comparing the Firefly to fighters and bombers of _IT'S generation_ rather than planes that were one or two generations earlier. First flight of a TBD Devastator was just about exactly (2 days different) one year later than the first flight of a Fairey Swordfish. 




RCAFson said:


> The Firefly still performed very useful service as a strike/escort fighter in 1944/5 and the FAA continued it's development long after WW2 ended.



Yes it did but then both the US and the RN used the Avenger for a number of roles post war that it was not used for during the war, and in RN and Canadian service the Avenger replaced both the Barracuda and the Firefly. So the continued development of the Firefly proves what? 

And for what the FAA was really thinking it needed for a "fighter" in late 1943/44 " The first Sea Fury prototype, SR661, first flew at Langley, Berkshire, on 21 February 1945, powered by a Centaurus XII engine"
Work had started in 1943. 







RCAFson said:


> The Admiralty was short of crystal balls in 1939, but Firefly performance was not hampered by its two seat requirements; both the F6F and F4U were in the same weight class as was the Typhoon. Any naval fighter with the same requirements for range, firepower and strike capability will weigh about the same, and IMHO, the problem stemmed from the RAF having priority for aircraft and engine development.



Well something was going on because a MK 4 Firefly..... " Fairey produced a true prototype, which made its maiden flight on 25 May 1945 (at this stage it had the standard Mk I wings).........A second prototype made its maiden flight on 21 February 1946, and the first production aircraft took to the airs on 25 May 1946."......Would get eaten for lunch by a 1943 Spec F4U-1 WITHOUT water injection.


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## RCAFson (Jun 22, 2013)

Juha said:


> So are you claiming that Fulmar/Albacore compared well with Zero/Kate/Val?



The Fulmar/Albacore entered service in 1940. In 1940 they compared well with foreign contemporary carrier aircraft. 
The Firefly/Barracuda was intended to replace both by 1942.

Neither the Val or SBD was in service in any numbers until 1941, ditto for the F4F and Zero, and the first folding wing version of the F4F didn't enter service until 1942.

Edit- see post 120 - I left out the year 1940 in that post!


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## RCAFson (Jun 22, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Evidence please that the USN ever contemplated replacing single seat fighters with multi-seat, multi-purpose designs.



As I have explained technical developments allowed a SS CV borne fighter to have multi-roles, and both the F6F and especially F4U were combination fighter/strike fighter and they were even capable of acting as TBs, but they were less useful in the recon role.





> That's because because Fairey absolutely refused to have anything to do with helping develop or build a folding wing Sea-Spitfire in 1938! One of the PRIME reasons single-seat fighter development was retarded for the FAA was because of Fairey's refusal to allow such development to take place.



Last time I look Fairey Aviation was NOT in charge of the Admiralty and the RN brass had lots of other potential contractors to provide them with a Seafire. Fairey's argument for the Fulmar/Firefly was a persuasive one but if the Admiralty had told Fairey to build the Seafire or receive no contracts what could Fairey have done - declare bankruptcy to spite the admiralty? 






> Really? - top speed of Griffon engine Firefly I in 1944 was 316 mph at 14,000; 5 min 45 sec to 10,000 ft:
> top speed of Griffon engine Seafire XV was 392 mph; climb rate = 4,600 ft/min:
> F6F-3 = 391 mph; 3,650 ft/min:
> F4U = 416 mph; 3,210 ft/min:
> ...



First off, the Firefly was planned for 1942 (how many times to I have to say this?) and in 1942 it would have been more than competitive. However, in 1944 it needed a lot more HP to remain competitive. *However, and I'll say this again, the 2nd seat didn't create a performance penalty, as it was the requirement for large internal fuel capacity and a 2000lb bomb load that required a large aircraft, and the weight and external dimensions of the Firefly were very similar to other naval fighters with the same internal fuel capacity, firepower and bomb load.* The Firefly did fly a variety of missions in 44/45 and generally did quite well.


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## Juha (Jun 22, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The Fulmar/Albacore entered service in 1940. In 1940 they compared well with foreign contemporary carrier aircraft.
> The Firefly/Barracuda was intended to replace both by 1942.
> 
> Neither the Val or SBD was in service in any numbers until 1941, ditto for the F4F and Zero, and the first folding wing version of the F4F didn't enter service until 1942.



The first kill of a Zero pilot was achieved in Sept 40. Kate was also in service in 1940, Val arrived a bit later.


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## RCAFson (Jun 22, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Part of the F8F requirement was a NEW plane to operate of small carriers, ie, a F4F/FM-2 replacement.


 Yes, but that's not was pushed it's development, especially when the Kamikaze threat appeared. 





> Not really in the 1942 version unless you bring the Griffon even more forward in timing. Like using at least the MK XII Griffon in 1942 instead of the IIB. A fight at 25000 ft might have been rather interesting. The F4F might have double the climb rate of a Firefly MK I. At that altitude. Climb of the MK I Firefly according to one source was 5 min 45 seconds to 10,000ft which is within a few seconds of what the F4F-4 was supposed to to do.
> 
> The Firefly does have a large edge in firepower and strike capability though.



The Firefly F1 could climb to 20k ft in 12.4 minutes with *normal climb power* versus 12.6 minutes for the F4F-4 with military power. However naval combat typically took place well under 20k ft, and the Firefly has the edge here





> No kidding??? It should, it had DOUBLE the power of a TBD (even with the low powered Griffon), the last of which rolled out the factory door back in 1938 if not before. Kates had about 1000hp even in the 2nd model.
> 
> You want to move up the service introductions of aircraft?
> 
> ...



Again, we have discussed the fact that FAA development priority took a huge hit due the FofF and BofB, so the fact the Fairey couldn't meet it's planned timetable is no surprise, but the fact is that the Firefly/Barracuda would have been a potent combo in 1942, if their planned develop and production schedule could have been met.




> Yes it did but then both the US and the RN used the Avenger for a number of roles post war that it was not used for during the war, and in RN and Canadian service the Avenger replaced both the Barracuda and the Firefly. So the continued development of the Firefly proves what?



It proves that the Firefly concept was a valid one, and it produced a high performance strike fighter that went on to see front line combat in Korea.



> And for what the FAA was really thinking it needed for a "fighter" in late 1943/44 " The first Sea Fury prototype, SR661, first flew at Langley, Berkshire, on 21 February 1945, powered by a Centaurus XII engine"
> Work had started in 1943.



Yeah, 1943.









> Well something was going on because a MK 4 Firefly..... " Fairey produced a true prototype, which made its maiden flight on 25 May 1945 (at this stage it had the standard Mk I wings).........A second prototype made its maiden flight on 21 February 1946, and the first production aircraft took to the airs on 25 May 1946."......Would get eaten for lunch by a 1943 Spec F4U-1 WITHOUT water injection.



No, the "ensign eliminator" was faster, but not a better CV based aircraft.


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## Juha (Jun 22, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> ...No, the "ensign eliminator" was faster, but not a better CV based aircraft.



Why not FAA just kep t Sea Gladiators, they turned even better than Firefly, after all turning was the only aspect in which Firefly beat Corsair in aerial combat besides somewhat better firepower. But Firefly was slow and lazy climber when it arrived.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 22, 2013)

Very interesting RCAFson. Yes, you're right, the Firebrand was conceived as a fleet base defence interceptor, but with the ability to operate successfully from carriers - largely for transportation, too. Once the urgency for single-seat fighters increased, the need for ship baesd single-seat fighters grew, however, as you well know.



> but this doesn't alter the fundamental priority placed on the two seat fighter.



Yes, it does. Both the Fulmar and the Firefly evolved from pre-war needs; there's no evidence at all that a more 'fundamental' priority was placed on them over what wartime needs dictated. Once the war got into swing, the FAA realised that its pre-war policies of relying on heavy AA for ship defence was flawed and the lack of single-seat fighters became plainly evident, particularly in the Mediterranean. Premature entry into the war was not the issue facing the FAA - the issue was an inability to recognise that technology and the nature of modern warfare had overtaken its best laid plans in pre-war peacetime. In the FAA's defence, this wasn't just a situation facing them, but the British armed forces in general. There was no preparation for opposing Blitzkrieg tactics that the British army encountered in France - even then, the Germans surprised themselves at how fast they managed to achieve what they did. Pre-war aircraft concepts such as the bomber-transport, turret-fighter and single-engine day bomber found little place in modern warfare and it took time and experience for the Air Staff to realise this. But I digress.



> The development of both the Firefly and Barracuda were delayed but if they had entered service as planned then instead of the interim Fulmar/Abacore the FAA would have fielded the Firefly/Barracuda as their sole carrier borne aircraft, and in 1942 this combination generally outperformed the IJN/USN equivalents and in the Fulmar/Albacore actually compared well with foreign carrier borne aircraft.



You are partly right regarding pre-war policy and the request for Sea Spitfires in 1940 was as an interim until the N.5/40 replacement for the Fulmar, the Firefly entered service, but the FAA's position on an insistence on multi-role aircraft was outdated and did not take into account the fact that during wartime its carriers would be operating in areas where they would be exposed to land based single-seat fighters and fast bombers, such as the Bf 109, Bf 110 and Ju 88, all of which could outpace and outnumber the FAA's meagre resources and frequently did.

You have to remember that at the outbreak of war, the FAA was equipped with obsolescent aircraft by comparison to other carrier armed countries. Apart from the Skua, every other carrier type in the FAA was a biplane. By 1941 the Japanese did not have a single biplane type operating in a front line role on board their carriers. The decision to configure the Swordfish replacement as a biplane was again based on pre-war practise and did not take into account advances in technology abroad, nor the future needs of the FAA as evolving technology forced warfare to change. Just because the FAA did it that way, does not mean that was the most efficient way of doing things. Wartime experience taught the Admiralty that. Your statement that the Fulmar/Albacore compared well with foreign aircraft is pure nonsense. Both types were obsolescent when they entered service compared to their contemporaries; as has been demonstrated, the Fulmar was too slow as a fighter and the Nakajima B5N was widely regarded as the most advanced carrier based torpedo bomber when it entered service.

You forget that the air war in the Pacific was fought across enormous distances, where the range of the Fulmar and Firefly were at a distinct advantage, but neither the US Navy, nor the IJN had two-seat fighters; there was just no need for them. In late 1941, early 1942, the IJN were carrying out the longest ranged naval air strikes in history in single-seat monoplane fighters and modern all-metal single-engined monoplane bombers. 



> If the Firefly had been coming into service in 1942 then both the HSH and Martlet would have been superfluous, as neither (especially the Martlet) has enough of a performance/range or firepower edge over the Firefly to make them worthwhile.



Again, this is based on pre-war doctrine, which was outmoded and had little real place in modern carrier warfare as it unfolded in WW2. If you were in a senior place in the Admiralty in WW2, you might have been surprised to find yourself in the same position the Admiralty found itself, when confronted with the fact that you had not invested properly in a decent modern single-seat carrier based fighter and continued with outdated concepts of warfare.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Yes, but that's not was pushed it's development, especially when the Kamikaze threat appeared.



Which is it, stop the Kamikaze threat or counter a fast climbing Japanese fighter? 

"Work on the Grumman G-58 Bearcat began in 1943 with the specifications calling for an aircraft able to operate from the smallest carrier, primarily in the interceptor role."

There were no Kamikazes in 1943. 

"One source claims that the first kamikaze mission occurred on 13 September 1944"

This may be wrong but the first flight of the F8F prototype was 21 August 1944. The Kamakaze threat may have sped up development and production a bit but had darn little to do with the initial concept or even much of the finished product as it was pretty well finalized by the time there was a Kamikaze threat. 




RCAFson said:


> The Firefly F1 could climb to 20k ft in 12.4 minutes with *normal climb power* versus 12.6 minutes for the F4F-4 with military power. However naval combat typically took place well under 20k ft, and the Firefly has the edge here



Not much of one does it? and it gives up the high altitude area completely. Wildcats over Guadalcanal may have taken a while to climb to altitude but once there they were faster than the P-40s. And since the Japanese were not considerate enough to fly at the P-40s best altitudes it was up to the Wildcats. 



RCAFson said:


> Again, we have discussed the fact that FAA development priority took a huge hit due the FofF and BofB, so the fact the Fairey couldn't meet it's planned timetable is no surprise, but the fact is that the Firefly/Barracuda would have been a potent combo in 1942, if their planned develop and production schedule could have been met.



And if the Jumo 222 had actually worked or closer to home if the Rolls_Royce Vulture had worked? Yes development and production were pushed back but the Griffon engine didn't hit it's predicted numbers until sometime 1944? The 1943 engines did not meet the anticipated power levels. How much delay was there in the Griffon? 9 months or 12 months or 18 months or more? 

The American combo of F4Us, SB2C and TBFs would have been a very potent combo in 1942 IF the Navy and Chance Vought hadn't taken 21 months to a a second Corsair flying ( P&W having trouble with the engine?) and IF the SB2C had not been a combination of the Botha and Firebrand rolled into one. 



RCAFson said:


> It proves that the Firefly concept was a valid one, and it produced a high performance strike fighter that went on to see front line combat in Korea.



It "proves" nothing of the sort. Lots of aircraft (and other weapons) were used in Korea simply because they were available (on hand), not because they were the best suited for the job. 

And "mud moving" in Korea wasn't that demanding of high performance. Danger from ground fire was certainly present but the number of UN attack aircraft that were "intercepted" by North Korean or Chinese planes may have been rather small. 

Some of the Firefly's post war development was as an anti-submarine plane. As was the Avenger, a role that little to do with either of their original purposes. So bragging about how long either one served "AFTER" the war in roles other than fighter or anti ship/bomber doesn't really reflect how good they were at their original role does it? 





RCAFson said:


> Yeah, 1943.



Yeah, 1943, The Firefly isn't released for operational duty until Oct 1943 ( and then with higher powered engines than the Griffon IIB) and has it's first engagement with the enemy in May of 1944. So not only Sea Spitfires but the Sea Fury were seen as the way to go Months before the Firefly ever fired it's guns in anger. Whatever the concept had been in 1940 and whatever validity it had in 1940/41 (like being able to find it's carrier in North Atlantic weather) it was gone by the time the first squadron went into action. Wither it was gone in 1942/ early 1943 might be subject to question but it was sure fading. 




RCAFson said:


> No, the "ensign eliminator" was faster, but not a better CV based aircraft.



that may be true but it rather misses the point, doesn't it. The Corsair may be harder to land, it may have more handling problems but in the air the 1943 version was a much better fighter plane than the 1946 Firefly. It has decent range and before the Firefly goes into action for the first time (let alone the MK IV version) the Corsair is not only skip bombing with 1000lbs bombs but dive bombing at up to 85 degrees. As fighter it not only is faster but climbs much better and has a much better ceiling. A few are also adapted as a radar equipped night fighter. 
And if a -1 Corsair is better than a MK IV firefly where does that leave the MK I Firefly?


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## Shortround6 (Jun 23, 2013)

Juha said:


> Why not FAA just kep t Sea Gladiators, they turned even better than Firefly, after all turning was the only aspect in which Firefly beat Corsair in aerial combat besides somewhat better firepower. But Firefly was slow and lazy climber when it arrived.




The F4U-1C provided the answer to the fire power problem if needed.


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## Aozora (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> First off, the Firefly was planned for 1942 (how many times to I have to say this?) and in 1942 it would have been more than competitive. However, in 1944 it needed a lot more HP to remain competitive.



Operational in 1942 - Purely hypothetical and not worth pursuing. Needed extra HP - see below...



RCAFson said:


> *However, and I'll say this again, the 2nd seat didn't create a performance penalty, as it was the requirement for large internal fuel capacity and a 2000lb bomb load that required a large aircraft,*



??? Are you honestly saying that building in an extra cockpit didn't exact a performance penalty?? An extra crew member alone = at least 200 lb. Add cockpit, seat, armour etc, plus extra fuselage structure and larger wings = at least another 1,500 lbs. The Firefly was larger and heavier than it would have been had it required one cockpit and would have had a much better performance with the same power given by the Griffon.

Firefly internal fuel carried = 192 imp gal plus up to 180 imp gal external (2 x 90 gal drop tanks). P-51B/C = 153 imp gal plus a 71 imp gal fuselage tank (albeit the latter led to instability until part emptied) + 2 x 75 imp gal drop tanks (or 2x 125 gal ferry tanks). 

Read the specifications and show us where a 2,000 lb bomb load was required: 

N.8/39










superseded by 5/40/F












RCAFson said:


> and the weight and external dimensions of the Firefly were very similar to other naval fighters with the same internal fuel capacity, firepower and bomb load.



This isn't to deny the abilities of Firefly aircrew, but a single seat fighter with comparable engine power, firepower and range would have been far more useful to the FAA in 1942. Again, *the Firefly was larger and heavier than it needed to be because of that second cockpit*.



RCAFson said:


> The Firefly did fly a variety of missions in 44/45 and generally did quite well.


 
And it never really encountered decent fighter opposition - had the Firefly operated in the strategic and tactical situation imposed in SE Asia by the Japanese in 1942 it might not have fared nearly as well.


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> V
> You have to remember that at the outbreak of war, the FAA was equipped with obsolescent aircraft by comparison to other carrier armed countries. Apart from the Skua, every other carrier type in the FAA was a biplane. By 1941 the Japanese did not have a single biplane type operating in a front line role on board their carriers. The decision to configure the Swordfish replacement as a biplane was again based on pre-war practise and did not take into account advances in technology abroad, nor the future needs of the FAA as evolving technology forced warfare to change. Just because the FAA did it that way, does not mean that was the most efficient way of doing things. Wartime experience taught the Admiralty that. Your statement that the Fulmar/Albacore compared well with foreign aircraft is pure nonsense. Both types were obsolescent when they entered service compared to their contemporaries; as has been demonstrated, the Fulmar was too slow as a fighter and the Nakajima B5N was widely regarded as the most advanced carrier based torpedo bomber when it entered service.



The USN was operating a biplane fighter and biplane DB in 1939 - most people think that the USN and IJN were operating their Dec 1941 aircraft from 1939 onward when both the IJN introduced new fighters and DBs in mid to late 1941 - just in time for the Pacific war. In 1939 the IJN was just introducing the B5N with a low powered engine that was probabaly barely operable from a CV, and their primary fighter was the fixed wing A5M, and the A6M was only introduced in numbers in 1941, paralleling the F4F.

In 1940 the Folding wing Fulmar was the best carrier borne fighter in service (Fulmar - A5M- F3F), and the Albacore was still better than the TBD, and the Albacore was an efficient DB as well.

The RN had a number of older carriers in service with very short flight decks, so aircraft with good STOL characteristics were a necessity, so a low powered monoplane TB was not an option,

sorry I didn't have time to respond to your entire post.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 23, 2013)

> sorry I didn't have time to respond to your entire post.



That's okay, no rush. Firstly, granted, the smaller carrier argument might stand if it were not for the fact that the RN operated Grumman Avengers, larger and heavier than Albacores, with a higher landing speed from escort carriers with far smaller decks than _Furious_ and her half sisters, later in the war. More evidence the FAA's thinking was backward regarding the Albacore. Also, the IJN had the Aichi D3A in 1940, as well as the Nakajima B5N and Zero; all benchmarking carrier warfare. As for your statement about the Fulmar being the best carrier fighter in 1940 - not true by a long shot. The Mitsubishi Zero _was_ the best carrier fighter in the world, bar none when it entered service around the same time as the Fulmar in 1940. Also, the F4F was a match for the Fulmar and my bets would be on the Grumman to whip its ample backside in a fight. Even the A5M would have given the Fulmar a run for its money; small and agile, a very under-rated little aeroplane. 

You are missing the point though, despite your assertions. The FAA's policy of long range two-seat fighters was based on pre-war strategy. By 1940 they were outdated. No other carrier based air force operated them, even more evidence the FAA was barking up the wrong tree and the IJN's carrier based aircraft served as a warning of what to expect in the forthcoming war at sea.


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## Juha (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The USN was operating a biplane fighter and biplane DB in 1939 - most people think that the USN and IJN were operating their Dec 1941 aircraft from 1939 onward when both the IJN introduced new fighters and DBs in mid to late 1941 - just in time for the Pacific war. In 1939 the IJN was just introducing the B5N with a low powered engine that was probabaly barely operable from a CV, and their primary fighter was the fixed wing A5M, and the A6M was only introduced in numbers in 1941, paralleling the F4F.
> 
> In 1940 the Folding wing Fulmar was the best carrier borne fighter in service (Fulmar - A5M- F3F), and the Albacore was still better than the TBD, and the Albacore was an efficient DB as well.
> 
> ...



Now Zero was accepted as a Carrier fighter by the end of July 1940 after it had passed its carrier tests, Kate had entered service as Carrier Attack Bomber in 1937 and even B5N2 in 1940 and even Val passed its carrier tests in 1940


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## Shortround6 (Jun 23, 2013)

It would help if we stayed with the facts instead of doing some flag waving. 

"The USN was operating a biplane fighter and biplane DB in 1939" 

Yes they were but then the RN was operating biplane fighters also. Key part here for both services is "operating" which does not mean that they were using those types exclusively. The US managed to sneak 10 monoplane fighters onto a carrier in Dec 1939. The Northrop BT-1 was aboard carriers in 1938, granted it was not a success but it lead to the SBD Dauntless which was in service (shore based) in 1940 with the first carrier deployment _early_ in 1941. It also rather ignores the Vought Vindicator which was first used on a carrier in 1937. 

" most people think that the USN and IJN were operating their Dec 1941 aircraft from 1939 onward when both the IJN introduced new fighters and DBs in mid to late 1941 - just in time for the Pacific war."

Partially answered above. The US Navy was looking for NEW dive bombers and torpedo bombers in 1939/40. They knew the existing ones were NOT the best that could be built. 

"In 1940 the Folding wing Fulmar was the best carrier borne fighter in service (Fulmar - A5M- F3F)" 

Now this is a loaded statement. Out of the 3 listed it may be the best, It may be the best folding wing Fighter, although the A5M folds only just enough to say so and teh F3F not at all but it rather ignores the F2A, in service in small numbers, and the fact that by Dec 1940, while they weren't on carriers, F4Fs were in service. It also rather ignores the fact that a number of F2As and F4Fs were sold or released to be sold to Finland, France, Belgium and England which _delayed_ their more widespread use by the US Navy. A Wildcat in British service makes the types first kill claim Dec 25 1940. 

"and the Albacore was still better than the TBD, and the Albacore was an efficient DB as well"

Still beating up on the TBD I see. What part of "out of production in 1939" aren't you understanding? The US Navy had no intention of ordering any more TBDs after 1938 and the order for 15 placed in 1938 was to make good on operational losses( crashes). The US Navy knew they wanted something better than the TBD _before_ the Albacore made it's first flight. 
I also like this quote from the Fleet air arm Archive; " The Albacore was retired before the Swordfish, and started to be replaced from 1942 by the Fairey Barracuda and Grumman Avenger." Which says something about a plane that was first went operational in April of 1940. 

"The RN had a number of older carriers in service with very short flight decks, so aircraft with good STOL characteristics were a necessity, so a low powered monoplane TB was not an option,"

See the Vindicator mentioned above, not a torpedo bomber but the last squadron to issued it was training on the USS Charger ( 492ft long and 17 knots) before re-equipping with SBDs.

The TBD used an 825-850hp engine, Surely with 1060-1090hp available a usable monoplane could have been built? The Japanese B5N2 had 1000hp. 

Buying aircraft in 1939-41 based on their suitability for operating from the HMS Argus doesn't seem particularly smart.


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> That's okay, no rush. Firstly, granted, the smaller carrier argument might stand if it were not for the fact that the RN operated Grumman Avengers, larger and heavier than Albacores, with a higher landing speed from escort carriers with far smaller decks than _Furious_ and her half sisters, later in the war. More evidence the FAA's thinking was backward regarding the Albacore. Also, the IJN had the Aichi D3A in 1940, as well as the Nakajima B5N and Zero; all benchmarking carrier warfare. As for your statement about the Fulmar being the best carrier fighter in 1940 - not true by a long shot. The Mitsubishi Zero _was_ the best carrier fighter in the world, bar none when it entered service around the same time as the Fulmar in 1940. Also, the F4F was a match for the Fulmar and my bets would be on the Grumman to whip its ample backside in a fight. Even the A5M would have given the Fulmar a run for its money; small and agile, a very under-rated little aeroplane.
> 
> You are missing the point though, despite your assertions. The FAA's policy of long range two-seat fighters was based on pre-war strategy. By 1940 they were outdated. No other carrier based air force operated them, even more evidence the FAA was barking up the wrong tree and the IJN's carrier based aircraft served as a warning of what to expect in the forthcoming war at sea.



The Avenger had 1700hp and didn't appear in USN CV service until Aug 1942.

The first 65 Zeros had fixed wings and were not carrier capable. A total 328 in service by Dec 1941 including 228 carrier capable with folding wing tips. Almost no CV capable Zeros in 1940. A5M4 still in service on all CVLs in Dec 1941 and was in production until 1940. 

Total D3A1 Val production was 430 by Aug 1942. Production of biplane D1a2 ended in 1940.
126 CV based + 68 land based D3A1 by Dec 1941 - almost none in service in 1940.

The Zero, Val and Kate had no armour and no self sealing tanks - this allowed them to achieve a very light weight and use low powered engines, but this would have been unacceptable to the RN (and USN) after 1940. None of the IJN aircraft would have been approved for RN CV service even if the IJN gave them away.

The F4F-3 didn't enter USN carrier service until early 1941 and the Martlet was not in RN CV service until Sept 1941 (early models were not carrier capable for a variety of reasons) and of course folding wing F4F/Martlets don't appear until 1942. The HSH predated the Martlet into RN CV service.


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> It would help if we stayed with the facts instead of doing some flag waving.
> 
> "The USN was operating a biplane fighter and biplane DB in 1939"
> 
> ...



So basically, as I stated earlier the USN was transitioning to new types with that transition still only partially complete by June 1942.

The Albacore went out of production in 1942 to free up factory space for Barracuda production. The Swordfish continued in production, mainly at Blackburn, because it had been modded into a dedicated ASW aircraft, but both were in use until 1945

In 1939 the RN had 6 CVs and CVLs in service with short flight decks (G-C-F-E-H-A), and they all needed an aircraft that could combine TB/DB/ASW/Recon into a single aircraft and only the Swordfish/Albacore could do this.


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Operational in 1942 - Purely hypothetical and not worth pursuing. Needed extra HP - see below...
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Your specification sheets are incomplete and they dont include additional requirements - such as 180rgp instead of 60 and the capability for DT and bombs which even the Fulmar had to meet.

Yes, I can honestly state that it didn't add extra weight (well maybe 400lb or 3% for the observer and seat) because, as I've stated, USN fighters with the same fuel and weapons load had approximately the same weight. Heck even the F4F-4 weighed almost 8000lbs with only 120IG of internal fuel, and if the airframe was redesigned to accept more fuel, then weight would inevitably climb. The fuselage of a large fighter aircraft is almost empty anyway so adding an extra seat was not a major source of extra weight, but the observer also contributed to the aircraft's combat effectiveness by providing extra visibility and by removing some of the work load from the pilot. Another factor is that long range voice communications were not generally possible in 1938/39 until 1942 so that morse code had to be used for long range com links, and this was very difficult for a single crewmember.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Another factor is that long range voice communications were not generally possible in 1938/39 until 1942 so that morse code had to be used for long range com links, and *this was very difficult for a single crewmember*.


And why do you think it was so difficult?


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And why do you think it was so difficult?



It might be possible under still air conditions for the pilot to use morse, but pretty much impossible if he encounters flak and/or enemy fighters as would be expected for a long range recon aircraft.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> It might be possible under still air conditions for the pilot to use morse



It might? It is!!! - once the plane is trimmed and you're in cruise flight, no more difficult than calculating DR or talking on a conventional radio, even in light or moderate turbulence.

Be advised that some folks on here do fly and have done similar tasks while flying solo....



RCAFson said:


> but pretty much impossible if he encounters flak and/or enemy fighters as would be expected for a long range recon aircraft.


When one is in combat and getting shot at, the last thing you're going to do is worry about communicating, you fly the aircraft first, communicate when you can..

1. Aviate
2. Navigate
3. Communicate

Still the rule today...


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## Aozora (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Your specification sheets are incomplete and they dont include additional requirements - such as 180rgp instead of 60 and the capability for DT and bombs which even the Fulmar had to meet.



Well then, how about showing us what you call the complete specifications and/or where the supposed requirements for extra loads, particularly the "2,000 lbs of bombs" came from.



RCAFson said:


> Yes, I can honestly state that it didn't add extra weight (well maybe 400lb or 3% for the observer and seat) because, as I've stated, USN fighters with the same fuel and weapons load had approximately the same weight. Heck even the F4F-4 weighed almost 8000lbs with only 120IG of internal fuel, and if the airframe was redesigned to accept more fuel, then weight would inevitably climb. The fuselage of a large fighter aircraft is almost empty anyway so adding an extra seat was not a major source of extra weight...



I stated extra weight *and size* required to carry the observer, which did mean that the Firefly was bigger than it needed to be, meaning that there was an inevitable increase in the size and drag of the airframe, meaning more structural weight plus observer and seat and armour and extra equipment. An aircraft the size of the P-51 could carry as much, if not more fuel, than the Firefly yet had a far superior performance.



RCAFson said:


> but the observer also contributed to the aircraft's combat effectiveness by providing extra visibility and by removing some of the work load from the pilot. Another factor is that long range voice communications were not generally possible in 1938/39 until 1942 so that morse code had to be used for long range com links, and this was very difficult for a single crewmember.


 
Yet somehow the USN and JNAF struggled on with overloaded fighter pilots who were unable to communicate properly and could not see around themselves well enough to know what was happening. The FAA was the only organisation that persisted with an observer in the rear cockpit who's only communication with the pilot was via a voice tube, in addition to which the observer didn't even have a peashooter to aid the pilot.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 23, 2013)

An extra set of eyes in any aircraft is always a good thing but during ww2 in fighter aircraft, unless that extra crewman was aiming bombs or working radar, they were for the most part useless, exception being the Mosquito IMO.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 23, 2013)

Radios may have evolved quickly, I don't know for sure but apparently the US Navy didn't think that a rear seater radio operator was needed for future aircraft in 1942. 







Work started in late 1942 but as usual it took a while and it didn't see action until 1945 in Borneo.

Catapult plane for battleships and cruisers.

The 1942/43 crop of attack planes were all single seaters or modified to be be single seaters. 
The Douglas BTD Destroyer
Martin Mauler
Curtiss XBTC-1/2
Kaiser-Fleetwings XBTK-1
Douglas XBT2D-1

So either something else was doing the scouting or the communications problem had been ( or was expected to be) Fixed.


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> It might? It is!!! - once the plane is trimmed and you're in cruise flight, no more difficult than calculating DR or talking on a conventional radio, even in light or moderate turbulence.
> 
> Be advised that some folks on here do fly and have done similar tasks while flying solo....
> 
> ...



The USN and IJN used 2 or 3 seat aircraft for recon; they didn't use SS aircraft. When a recon aircraft sights the enemy fleet, the first order of business to signal the sighting, and that signal is completely crucial to the success or failure of the subsequent operations.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> *The USN and IJN used 2 or 3 seat aircraft for recon*; they didn't use SS aircraft. When a recon aircraft sights the enemy fleet, the first order of business to signal the sighting, and that signal is completely crucial to the success or failure of the subsequent operations.


 
Recon? - I thought we were talking FIGHTERS! Ex - Fulmar/ Firefly!!!

Look, you're backpedaling and now talking about things you know nothing about.

It's one thing to get vital information back to the fleet, it's another thing not to get your @ss shot apart. *The first order of business to FLY THE AIRCRAFT!* Without following the "three rules" the mission is useless!!! 

Bottom line both the Fulmar and Firefly had their moments, but their concept faded into history until a second crewman could actually have a USEFUL place on a fighter without limiting performance and that happened a generation later, so all the "would haves" and "what ifs" and revisionist perspectives are interesting to discuss, but please stick to real facts instead of assuming things you know little about and trying to pass it off as gospel.


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Recon? - I thought we were talking FIGHTERS! Ex - Fulmar/ Firefly!!!
> 
> Look, you're backpedaling and now talking about things you know nothing about.
> 
> ...



I disagree, IMHO, the first order of business is a successful sighting report, that's why recon aircraft required a 2nd seat,so that the pilot could fly and the observer could signal and the RN wanted their fleet fighters to be able to double as recon aircraft.


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Well then, how about showing us what you call the complete specifications and/or where the supposed requirements for extra loads, particularly the "2,000 lbs of bombs" came from.



We know that somewhere the aircraft acquired 3x the ammo load of the specs you provided. We know that Firefly and Fulmar could carry bombs, so somewhere someone made the decision to tack those onto the requirements. I don't have to prove that this is so, as we all have access to the specs via the web. We know that for the Fulmar that the bomb capability was not fully developed until late in production, and this was probably because Fairey didn't have time to fully develop the aircraft.



> I stated extra weight *and size* required to carry the observer, which did mean that the Firefly was bigger than it needed to be, meaning that there was an inevitable increase in the size and drag of the airframe, meaning more structural weight plus observer and seat and armour and extra equipment. An aircraft the size of the P-51 could carry as much, if not more fuel, than the Firefly yet had a far superior performance.



The Firebrand, Corsair and F6F all weighed about the same loaded as the Firefly F1, but they also all have more powerful engines than the Firefly so the small increase dimensions in the Firefly was driven by the less powerful engines available to the Firefly.

The P-51 was not a carrier aircraft and operating from ground strips it could carry a heavy bomb load via a long TO run, something not possible for a carrier aircraft: compare wing area of the p-51 with the F6F and F4U, both aircraft with more TO power than the P-51. Comparing a P-51 to naval fighter is just plain silly.




> Yet somehow the USN and JNAF struggled on with overloaded fighter pilots who were unable to communicate properly and could not see around themselves well enough to know what was happening. The FAA was the only organisation that persisted with an observer in the rear cockpit who's only communication with the pilot was via a voice tube, in addition to which the observer didn't even have a peashooter to aid the pilot.



As I have stated repeatedly the RN planned to have the Firefly in service in 1942, and in 1942 it is not inferior to either the F4F-4 or the A6M, since it was a better fighter than the F4F-4 in the typical altitudes naval air combat took place in, and the F4F-4 and Zero proved to be roughly equal to each other in combat.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> I disagree, IMHO, the first order of business is a successful sighting report, that's why recon aircraft required a 2nd seat,so that the pilot could fly and the observer could signal and the RN wanted their fleet fighters to be able to double as recon aircraft.


You're entitled to your opinion but how are you going to sight anything it you can't fly and navigate to the target first?!?!

Again, I thought this was about FIGHTERS with a second crewmember? How about sending out Morse code while flying?



RCAFson said:


> As I have stated repeatedly the RN planned to have the Firefly in service in 1942, and in 1942 it is not inferior to either the F4F-4 or the A6M, since it was a better fighter than the F4F-4 in the typical altitudes naval air combat took place in, and the F4F-4 and Zero proved to be roughly equal in to each other in combat.


So with that said I'm wondering how it would do against the Zero using RN tactics? My guess not that good!


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

AFAIK, the only air combat the Firefly engaged in was in 1944 and 45 when they shot down 6 Ki-43-2s and Ki-44 after attacks on Indonesian oil refineries and 5 Sonia DBs over Japan, all without loss. One Firefly was lost over the oil refinery, and where the Fireflys acted as strike fighters to suppress flak and as close escorts to the Avengers (where they shot down the IJN fighters) on the return trip to the carriers, after the top cover of F4Us failed to intervene in time.


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## wuzak (Jun 23, 2013)

Just a random thought....

The USN used some Spitfires for gunnery spotting (during the Normandy invasion). If a pilot in a single seat aircraft can spot where shells land, surely they can spot ships in the ocean?


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> You're entitled to your opinion but how are you going to sight anything it you can't fly and navigate to the target first?!?!
> 
> Again, I thought this was about FIGHTERS with a second crewmember? How about sending out Morse code while flying?
> 
> So with that said I'm wondering how it would do against the Zero using RN tactics? My guess not that good!



That's precisely why the RN required a 2nd crew member, so that pilot's work load could be reduced and it makes sense to use the highest performing aircraft for recon, as they will have the best chance of survival.

The Firefly was the only allied fighter that could outturn a Zero and the Firefly did very well against IJN fighters during their only engagement.


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## RCAFson (Jun 23, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Just a random thought....
> 
> The USN used some Spitfires for gunnery spotting (during the Normandy invasion). If a pilot in a single seat aircraft can spot where shells land, surely they can spot ships in the ocean?



So why didn't the USN, IJN and RN use SS CV aircraft for recon? 

I have to depart for a day or so. Duty calls...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> AFAIK, the only air combat the Firefly engaged in was in 1944 and 45 when they shot down 6 Ki-43-2s and Ki-44 after attacks on Indonesian oil refineries and 5 Sonia DBs over Japan, all without loss. One Firefly was lost over the oil refinery, and where the Fireflys acted as strike fighters to suppress flak and as close escorts to the Avengers (where they shot down the IJN fighters) on the return trip the carriers, after the top cover of F4Us failed to intervene in time.


Ki-43s and Ki-44s, 1944, IJAAF. How about a Fulmar in 1942 against Zeros say at Midway?


RCAFson said:


> That's precisely why the RN required a 2nd crew member, so that pilot's work load could be reduced and it makes sense to use the highest performing aircraft for recon, as they will have the best chance of survival.


What workload? Radios? A second set of eyes? Here we go again, are we talking recon or fighters????


RCAFson said:


> The Firefly was the only allied fighter that could outturn a Zero and the Firefly did very well against IJN fighters during their only engagement.



Oh, I thought they fought Ki-43s and 44s? (IJAAF) 



> *AFAIK, the only air combat the Firefly engaged in was in 1944 and 45 when they shot down 6 Ki-43-2s and Ki-44 *after attacks on Indonesian oil refineries and 5 Sonia DBs over Japan, all without loss. One Firefly was lost over the oil refinery, and where the Fireflys acted as strike fighters to suppress flak and as close escorts to the Avengers (where they shot down the IJN fighters) on the return trip the carriers, after the top cover of F4Us failed to intervene in time.





RCAFson said:


> So why didn't the USN, IJN and RN use SS CV aircraft for recon?
> 
> I have to depart for a day or so. Duty calls...



As Shortround stated earlier, eventually the USN did, at least in one example...


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## Aozora (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> We know that somewhere the aircraft acquired 3x the ammo load of the specs you provided. We know that Firefly and Fulmar could carry bombs, so somewhere someone made the decision to tack those onto the requirements. I don't have to prove that this is so, as we all have access to the specs via the web. We know that for the Fulmar that the bomb capability was not fully developed until late in production, and this was probably because Fairey didn't have time to fully develop the aircraft.



The following are _your_ words, not mine:



RCAFson said:


> * it was the requirement for large internal fuel capacity and a 2000lb bomb load that required a large aircraft,*


 
As I pointed out, quite correctly, the P-51 carried much the same fuel load in a much smaller airframe: _the required fuel load did not dictate the size of the Firefly_, nor did the need to carry bombs because this "requirement" was not in the specifications! Sure, the Firefly was adapted to carry bombs but this *did not dictate the size of the aircraft*. The Typhoon was adapted to carry bombs but the dimensions stayed exactly the same as when it was used as a fighter. 

So, to avoid any further misunderstanding or need to repeat myself* The extra size and weight of the Firefly was dictated primarily by the need to carry an extra crewman making the Firefly bigger than it could have been had it been designed from the outset as a single seater*. As a two seater it was an okay fighter - as a smaller, lighter single seater in 1942 it could have been exactly what the FAA needed in the Med.



RCAFson said:


> The Firefly was the only allied fighter that could outturn a Zero and the Firefly did very well against IJN fighters during their only engagement.



Seriously? Eric Brown said the Firefly could turn with its contemporary single-seaters with the FY flaps deployed - where does anyone say it could out-turn the Zero and where is the evidence?


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## wuzak (Jun 23, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> An extra set of eyes in any aircraft is always a good thing but during ww2 in fighter aircraft, unless that extra crewman was aiming bombs or working radar, they were for the most part useless, exception being the Mosquito IMO.



Don't forget the important task of pointing a peashooter for self defence.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 23, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Don't forget the important task of pointing a peashooter for self defence.


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## wuzak (Jun 23, 2013)




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## nuuumannn (Jun 23, 2013)

> The Avenger had 1700hp and didn't appear in USN CV service until Aug 1942. The first 65 Zeros had fixed wings and were not carrier capable. A total 328 in service by Dec 1941 including 228 carrier capable with folding wing tips. Almost no CV capable Zeros in 1940. A5M4 still in service on all CVLs in Dec 1941 and was in production until 1940. Total D3A1 Val production was 430 by Aug 1942. Production of biplane D1a2 ended in 1940. 26 CV based + 68 land based D3A1 by Dec 1941 - almost none in service in 1940. The Zero, Val and Kate had no armour and no self sealing tanks - this allowed them to achieve a very light weight and use low powered engines, but this would have been unacceptable to the RN (and USN) after 1940. None of the IJN aircraft would have been approved for RN CV service even if the IJN gave them away. The F4F-3 didn't enter USN carrier service until early 1941 and the Martlet was not in RN CV service until Sept 1941 (early models were not carrier capable for a variety of reasons) and of course folding wing F4F/Martlets don't appear until 1942. The HSH predated the Martlet into RN CV service.



This is nitpicking and you know it. Once again, you are missing the point, RCAFson. The Avenger issue was not about the time it entered service, but that a bigger aircraft could land on a smaller carrier. As for the Japanese aircraft and their carrier trials, when they first went to sea is irrelevant, also just because they didn't have self sealing tanks and armour doesn't make them less effective at the job they were designed for compared to their contemporaries. The fact that they were more advanced in concept compared to the Fulmar and Albacore is the issue that you are studiously ignoring.

Nothing you have written is convincing enough that the two-seat fighter concept wasn't outdated by 1940; making bogus unsubstantiated claims about the abilities of these aircraft does nothing to reinforce your point; claiming that the Firefly was a good fighter because it shot down Japanerse aircraft doesn't prove a thing. In mid 1940 over Dunkirk, an Avro Anson shot down two Bf 109s and damaged a third, but that doesn't make it a good fighter. Yes, the FAA had high hopes for the Fulmar, but that doesn't detract from the fact that its policy of deploying it was based on pre-war strategies that were found wanting in modern warfare.


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## wuzak (Jun 23, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> As I have stated repeatedly the RN planned to have the Firefly in service in 1942, and in 1942 it is not inferior to either the F4F-4 or the A6M, since it was a better fighter than the F4F-4 in the typical altitudes naval air combat took place in, and the F4F-4 and Zero proved to be roughly equal to each other in combat.



What could they have had in 1942? (Well, actually, 1943 because of engine supplies).


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## Shortround6 (Jun 23, 2013)

I would certainly agree that the 2nd seater performed an important function in the Fulmar. The RN had their system of getting the planes back to the carrier and the 2nd seater was part of it. His ability to operate the radio was important also. One of the reasons the Bf 110 had the rear gunner was NOT for extra eyes or for the pea shooter out the back but to operate the SAME radio used in He 111s. 
Now, perhaps, the 2nd seater was thought to be needed in 1940 when work started on the Firefly. But radios did not stay the same from 1937 to 1945. By the time the Firefly entered service (belatedly) other aircraft and other navies were showing that the 2nd seater was no longer needed. Different radios(?) and different priorities. 

The Firefly was not a good concept for a _fighter_. It was a compromise. And, yes, the weight penalty for a 2nd crew man is a lot bigger than some people think. Especially in the initial design stage. Stuffing a 2nd crew man into an existing design is sometimes much easier because the customer will relax or forget about some of the _initial_ *rules/requirements.* 
Things like take-off speed, landing speed, and even tire size. The RAF had a requirement that lasted at _least_ until 1938 if not longer that *ALL* aircraft could not use tires with more than 35lb/sq/in pressure to avoid rutting the grass fields for instance, increase the weight of the airplane by 300-400lb might mean fitting the next larger size tire. Once the shooting started this requirement and a few others were quickly forgotten, but many a British plane carried rather large tires ( and nacelles to house them) to the end of their production. 
A lot of fighters carried a payload of around 20% (give or take, without bombs) made up of guns, ammo, fuel, oil, pilot, etc. In a "rubber" airplane on the drawing board a 200lb crew man can easily turn into about 1000lbs of gross weight. Granted a few things are fixed like engine and propeller but the fuselage will have to grow some, seating and cockpit heating/ventilation accounted for, doubling the oxygen system etc. Now you need 8-12 sq ft more wing for the landing speed to meet the requirement ( with an existing design the customer may just eat the 1-2 mph difference but for an initial design?) which means another 30-40lbs, landing gear may or may not be the same. the extra size of the fuselage and the wing mean more fuel to get the same range which again may mean a bigger wing to get the take-off performance and around it goes.

A lot of bombers/torpedo planes were big enough to begin with to take an extra crewman (for 2 to 3) without a lot of trouble but they were a lot bigger than fighters to begin with, and at max load were often restricted to 2 men. 

There are times when multi-purpose airplanes make sense but air superiority is not one of them.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 23, 2013)

Here is a well considered passage about the FAA's pre-war approach to fighter development made by Jeffrey Quill, Supermarine test pilot and a rather astute individual who knew more about the subject than me at least. Quoted directly from his brilliant book Spitfire, a test pilot's story;

"...as aeroplanes developed in performance and load carrying capacity, the Admiralty became faced with the problem of providing the fleet at sea with a defence not just against reconnaissance aircraft but also against a potentially devastating form of air attack - the air launched torpedo. At this stage the doctrine that it takes an aeroplane to destroy an aeroplane still held sway, but later, in the inter-war period the Navy's attitude towards the air defence of the Fleet changed. It was considered that the best defence against high level bombers and torpedo launching aircraft would be the intense and concentrated anti-aircraft fire which could be mounted in capital shps, rather than dependence on the then uncertain and unreliable operations of single-seat fighters."

Gunnery was the Navy's stock-in trade and they placed great faith in certain technical developments in anti-aircraft gunnery which were being studied in the early 1930s. Therefore they reasoned that carrier borne fighters should be confined to the minimum required to destroy enemy shadowing aircraft. But common sense and the restricted space available on aircraft carriers demanded that the fighters that were embarked should at least have a dual role. Since enemy carrier-borne reconnaissance aircraft were unlikely to be of very hgih performance it was argued that the fighters to intercept them need not be of very high performance either. These views, taken with the concept that naval fighters should be capable of attacking enemy aircraft carriers and putting their flight decks out of action with machine gun fire and by dive bombing attacks with light bombs so as to immobilise their aircraft very early on in a fleet action led to the Skua, a dive bomber with a fixed gun armament and just sufficient performance to fulfil the now secondary task of defending the fleet against enemy shadowing aircraft. Thus by the late 1930s the single-seat fighter had all but disappeared from the Navy except for the small force of Sea Gladiators which was retained to protect the older carriers, Furious, Glorious, Courageous and Eagle, whose flgith decks were not armoured and whose anti-aircraft fire was not yet up to the latest standards."

"It should be remembered that until the late 1930s the single-seat fighter suffered from severe limitation, especially at sea. It had no bad-weather capability, no navigation capability when out of sight of land or the fleet, very little night capability, very restricted range and firepower and no radio communication air-to-air or air-to-ship. Their Lordships could hardly be expected to commit the safety of the Fleet to such a dubious mode of defence. The gunnery policy, however, failed to take fully into account the advances made in the late 1930s in the land based bomber in terms of speed, range and bomb load or the extent to which the Fleet in war would find itself operating within range of such shore based bombers."

"This was to be brought home forcibly to the Admiralty very early in the war when on 25 September 1939 the Home Fleet put to sea from Scapa Flow to cover the rescue by the cruisers and destroyers of Humber Force of a British submarine in trouble near the Horns Reef off the coast of Denmark. The Home Fleet included the aircraft carrier Ark Royal with the Skuas of 800 and 803 Sqns on board and the battlecruiser Hood. Early next day the fleet was detected by three German reconnaissance flying boats (Do 18s) and in accordance with their design function the Skuas were launched to intercept. One of the flying boats was destroyed by a Skua of 803 Sqn (the first German aircraft to be destroyed by the Fleet Air Arm in the war) but the other two managed to escape to radio a sighting report back to base."

"The result was an attack on the fleet by four Ju 88s from the Island of Sylt operating as dive bombers in the course of which one of the Ju 88s planted a 1,000 lb bomb just off Ark Royal's bow throwing a huge wall of water over the forward end of her flight deck and another scored a hit on HMS Hood, fortunately without the bomb exploding. This was a let off for both ships and significantly no German aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire. Weather conditions were overcast, which no doubt influenced both the effectiveness of the German attack and the ships' anti-aircraft fire but obviously the incident called into question the wisdom of having no high performance interceptor fighters at sea."


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## Juha (Jun 24, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> AFAIK, the only air combat the Firefly engaged in was in 1944 and 45 when they shot down 6 Ki-43-2s and Ki-44 after attacks on Indonesian oil refineries and 5 Sonia DBs over Japan, all without loss. One Firefly was lost over the oil refinery, and where the Fireflys acted as strike fighters to suppress flak and as close escorts to the Avengers (where they shot down the IJN fighters) on the return trip to the carriers, after the top cover of F4Us failed to intervene in time.



Claimed to shot down or shot down?


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## Juha (Jun 24, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The Avenger had 1700hp and didn't appear in USN CV service until Aug 1942.
> 
> The first 65 Zeros had fixed wings and were not carrier capable. A total 328 in service by Dec 1941 including 228 carrier capable with folding wing tips. Almost no CV capable Zeros in 1940. A5M4 still in service on all CVLs in Dec 1941 and was in production until 1940.
> 
> ...



577 B5N1s, 16 B5N2s and 55 D3A-1s produced by 1 Jul 40 and 577B5N1s, 106 B5N2s and 118 D3A-1s by 31 Dec 40.

The fixed wing A6Ms were carrier capable but the elevator clearence was so tight that IJN decided that it was better use them as land-based fighters. I cannot find out when the Model 21 (with folding wingtips) was included in IJN CAGs but it seems that when Hiruy operated off Hainan in Sept. 40 it still had A5M4s in her fighter component. So you might well be right that A6M wasn't a 1940 CV fighter but 1941.


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## RCAFson (Jun 24, 2013)

Juha said:


> 577 B5N1s, 16 B5N2s and 55 D3A-1s produced by 1 Jul 40 and 577B5N1s, 106 B5N2s and 118 D3A-1s by 31 Dec 40.
> 
> The fixed wing A6Ms were carrier capable but the elevator clearence was so tight that IJN decided that it was better use them as land-based fighters. I cannot find out when the Model 21 (with folding wingtips) was included in IJN CAGs but it seems that when Hiruy operated off Hainan in Sept. 40 it still had A5M4s in her fighter component. So you might well be right that A6M wasn't a 1940 CV fighter but 1941.



Here's the complement of the IJN's newest fleet CV in Dec 1939:


Hiryu: 12/1939; 16 A5M2 20 D1A2 38 B4Y1
HIRYU aircraft carrier (1939) - Aircraft Carriers - Aircraft Carrying Ships - Japan - Ships - Navypedia

*So except for the A5M2 the rest are biplanes*.

*Kaga in Dec 1940* after re-entering service after a rebuild: 


> Kaga embarked 12 Mitsubishi A5M fighters, 24 Aichi D1A dive bombers and 36 Yokosuka B4Y torpedo bombers.
> Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



*So Kaga in Dec 1940 still operated the A5M along with biplane TBs and DBs. *

We have discussed how the Firefly had a delayed entry into service after their nominal production starts and it is pretty obvious that the same held true for the Zero, Val and Kate. One look at the B5N1 specs and it's 770hp engine, should be enough to cause any cautious researcher serious doubts about it's ability to operate off a CV while carrying a worthwhile weapons load.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 24, 2013)

> So you might well be right that A6M wasn't a 1940 CV fighter but 1941



This is not the point and you guys are aware of it. You're haggling over petty semantics and avoiding the fact that the IJN's potential in 1940 - whether these aircraft had indeed embarked on carriers or not was still greater and more advanced than anything the FAA had in service in 1940 or in the next year or two. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, the two-seat fighter, regardless of when it entered service was an outdated pre-war concept based on FAA doctrine that had been found to be lacking once the war began.


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## RCAFson (Jun 24, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Here is a well considered passage about the FAA's pre-war approach to fighter development made by Jeffrey Quill, Supermarine test pilot and a rather astute individual who knew more about the subject than me at least. Quoted directly from his brilliant book Spitfire, a test pilot's story;
> 
> "...as aeroplanes developed in performance and load carrying capacity, the Admiralty became faced with the problem of providing the fleet at sea with a defence not just against reconnaissance aircraft but also against a potentially devastating form of air attack - the air launched torpedo. At this stage the doctrine that it takes an aeroplane to destroy an aeroplane still held sway, but later, in the inter-war period the Navy's attitude towards the air defence of the Fleet changed. It was considered that the best defence against high level bombers and torpedo launching aircraft would be the intense and concentrated anti-aircraft fire which could be mounted in capital shps, rather than dependence on the then uncertain and unreliable operations of single-seat fighters."
> 
> ...



Actually it is a very ill considered passage that betrays Quill's ignorance of RN and FAA doctrine and operational practice. 

The older CVs operated the GSG because their lifts were large enough to accommodate a fixed wing fighter, while the 4 newer fleet carriers (The non Armoured Flight Deck Ark Royal and the 3 Illustrious type AFD CVs) had smaller lifts that forced the use of folding wing aircraft including fighters. This was the reason for the reliance on the Skua on Ark Royal and the why the Fulmar was rushed into service. 

*Quill's reasoning falls apart when he states that it was overcast*...how exactly does a single seat fighter mount an interception when it can't see the enemy's approach and the fleet is not yet equipped with radar? How many times was the IJN's carriers caught with their pants down by Allied bombers? I can think of at least twice in 1942. In fact in a pre-radar scenario it is the twin seat fighter with long endurance, to mount standing patrols, and an extra pair of eyes that will have the best probability of visually spotting an approaching aircraft, although it must be emphasized that the probability of any fighter interception in typical North Atlantic conditions is very low especially considering the IJN's experiences in the IO and Pacific. The RN conducted it's first radar directed interception late on April 23 1940 when HMS Carlisle used her type 280 radar to direct Ark Royal's Skuas onto an approaching flight of He-111s. A few months later Illustrious would be using her Fulmars to perfect naval radar GCI. The very idea that the RN would not attempt to make a fighter interception in favour of AA is completely ludicrous.


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## Juha (Jun 24, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Here's the complement of the IJN's newest fleet CV in Dec 1939:
> 
> 
> Hiryu: 12/1939; 16 A5M2 20 D1A2 38 B4Y1
> ...



Thanks for the IJN CAG info but if you think that B5N1 had inadequate power with 770hp engine how about Swordfish with 690hp engine? And when operated from rather small Ryujo in the Bay of Bengal one B5N1 managed to drop a 800kg bomb during the attack on an Indian harbour Vizagapatan, usually they carried around 500kg loads during that operation.

Juha


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## nuuumannn (Jun 24, 2013)

> The very idea that the RN would not attempt to make a fighter interception in favour of AA is completely ludicrous.



And this alone betrays your ignorance and your refusal to let go of a pre-war policy that had little justification in the war. Clearly every other carrier armed nation preferred single-seat fighter defences before and during WW2 to the FAA's approach. It was the FAA that changed its policy - as Quill states, not any other nation. Remember, the RNAS instigated ship based aircraft during WW1 and introduced single-seat fighters aboard seaplane tenders firstly in the form of Bristol Scouts and Sopwith Pups and Camels, then HMS _Furious_ and _Argus_ once those two ships entered RN service. The Fairey Flycatcher was one of the best inter-war biplane fighters amd served the FAA well. Quill is right; the FAA changed its policy. So it is you who is ill considered. 

You haven't provided anything that justifies your statement that Quill's quote is not accurate. It's fact and when time and time again evidence has been provided that singe-seat fighters were the way ahead in modern carrier warfare, you just won't accept it. How can you sit there and make such a unqualified and - using your words - ill considered statement when Quill was there and his words are clearly right? "obviously the incident called into question the wisdom of having no high performance interceptor fighters at sea." Both the IJN and USN flew long range sorties in their single-seat fighters in the Pacific, which totally nullifies the FAA's reasons for hanging on to two-seat fighters. 

Claiming that fighters would not have made a difference due to the weather again betrays your ignorance. Many combat ops at sea were flown in overcast conditions and yes, it does affect accuracy, but if there were single-seat fighters swarming about, the Ju 88s would not have had much chance to affect an attack. You don't necessarily need radar at such close range.


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## RCAFson (Jun 24, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> This is not the point and you guys are aware of it. You're haggling over petty semantics and avoiding the fact that the IJN's potential in 1940 - whether these aircraft had indeed embarked on carriers or not was still greater and more advanced than anything the FAA had in service in 1940 or in the next year or two. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, the two-seat fighter, regardless of when it entered service was an outdated pre-war concept based on FAA doctrine that had been found to be lacking once the war began.



It certainly is the point. What aircraft the IJN *actually* had on their carriers in 1940 shows the *real* state of affairs. In Dec 1940, in contrast to Kaga, Ark Royal would be operating a squadron of Fulmars, a squadron of Skuas and several squadrons of Swordfish for about 54-60 aircraft total, so while Ark Royal has fewer aircraft they are not inferior to Kaga's. In late 1941/42 the crippling effects of the BofB's effect on FAA production and development and the loss of 3 fleet CVs (one in 39/40/41) reduced the FAA to a low ebb but without war and/or without the loss of so many fleet CVs the RN would have retained both numerical and qualitative superiority over the IJN in 1940 and up to mid 1941.


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## wuzak (Jun 24, 2013)

MaritimeQuest - HMS Implacable Stoker Cyril Thomas Restorick, R.N. Collection Page 4


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## wuzak (Jun 24, 2013)

A nicer place for a Griffon.....


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## RCAFson (Jun 24, 2013)

Juha said:


> Thanks for the IJN CAG info but if you think that B5N1 had inadequate power with 770hp engine how about Swordfish with 690hp engine? And when operated from rather small Ryujo in the Bay of Bengal one B5N1 managed to drop a 800kg bomb during the attack on an Indian harbour Vizagapatan, usually they carried around 500kg loads during that operation.
> 
> Juha



The Swordfish's Pegasus III was TO rated at 775hp at SL. The Swordfish was also lighter, had 50% more wing area and weighed about 1000lb less.

If Ryujo actually had B5N1s it would probably have taken a very windy day for one to get airborne on such a short flight deck.


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## Juha (Jun 24, 2013)

They seems to be at that time B5N1s and more probably the plane carrying the 800kg bomb was just the last to take off (max t/o lenght) and flown by the most experienced pilot. After all specs for B5N1 demanded ability to carry 800kg torpedo or that weight in bombs. Of course normal take off with 800kg torpedo was thought to happen from faster and longer 1-line CVs and at least when operating from smaller Ryujo, at least during that Bengal op, the usual load seems to have been 500kg


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## RCAFson (Jun 24, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> And this alone betrays your ignorance and your refusal to let go of a pre-war policy that had little justification in the war. Clearly every other carrier armed nation preferred single-seat fighter defences before and during WW2 to the FAA's approach. It was the FAA that changed its policy - as Quill states, not any other nation. Remember, the RNAS instigated ship based aircraft during WW1 and introduced single-seat fighters aboard seaplane tenders firstly in the form of Bristol Scouts and Sopwith Pups and Camels, then HMS _Furious_ and _Argus_ once those two ships entered RN service. The Fairey Flycatcher was one of the best inter-war biplane fighters amd served the FAA well. Quill is right; the FAA changed its policy. So it is you who is ill considered.
> 
> You haven't provided anything that justifies your statement that Quill's quote is not accurate. It's fact and when time and time again evidence has been provided that singe-seat fighters were the way ahead in modern carrier warfare, you just won't accept it. How can you sit there and make such a unqualified and - using your words - ill considered statement when Quill was there and his words are clearly right? "obviously the incident called into question the wisdom of having no high performance interceptor fighters at sea." Both the IJN and USN flew long range sorties in their single-seat fighters in the Pacific, which totally nullifies the FAA's reasons for hanging on to two-seat fighters.
> 
> Claiming that fighters would not have made a difference due to the weather again betrays your ignorance. Many combat ops at sea were flown in overcast conditions and yes, it does affect accuracy, but if there were single-seat fighters swarming about, the Ju 88s would not have had much chance to affect an attack. You don't necessarily need radar at such close range.



*Again, the IJN had lots of SS fighters at Midway yet the SBD's made their drops undetected...leading to the slaughter of their non-armoured flight deck carriers. In April 1942 9 RAF Blenheims attacked the IJN CVs off Ceylon, and they were undetected until the bombs hit the water. It was the USN's use of radar that allowed the SS fighter to be truly viable. The Admiralty and the FAA were never opposed to SS fighters, but they were realistic about their actual potential in a pre-radar environment. If you have to mount standing patrols, then a 2 seat fighter will have a better chance of detecting and thus intercepting an approaching force of strike aircraft.*

The fact is that Quill's book and his description of the FAA's requests for folding wing Seafires is a lot more complex than you imply. The Admiralty, according to Quill requested 50 folding wing Seafires in Jan 1940 (after making preliminary inquiries), but it was the RAF who argued against the request due to anticipated development time, and the loss of 200 Spitfires to the RAF from the already low Spitfire production numbers leading the Admiralty to drop the request. By 39/1940 the Admiralty and FAA were aware that Radar had the potential to make a short range, high performance SS fighter truly viable for fleet defence but events, not Admiralty or FAA incompetence, conspired to thwart the early introduction of a folding wing SS fighter although the Sea Hurricane showed up in early 1941, but by then the two largest RN carriers capable of operating them in large numbers had been lost (and not to aerial attack).


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## wuzak (Jun 24, 2013)

Didn't the RN have radar before the war?

And the IJN never did?


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## wuzak (Jun 24, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The fact is that Quill's book and his description of the FAA's requests for folding wing Seafires is a lot more complex than you imply. The Admiralty, according to Quill requested 50 folding wing Seafires in Jan 1940 (after making preliminary inquiries), but it was the RAF who argued against the request due to anticipated development time, and the loss of 200 Spitfires to the RAF from the already low Spitfire production numbers leading the Admiralty to drop the request.



Perhaps if Fairey was seconded into Seafire development and production instead of continued development and production of the not-so-brilliant Fulmar and the never-going-to-be-ready-in-time Firefly the FAA coul dhave had Seafires in late 1941, Seafire XVs in early 1943, etc.

Perhaps if the FAA said Hurricanes were all well and good for disposable catapult convoy defence fighters but not for our fleet defence fighters. And if they stuck to their guns and demanded that Seafires be built for them they may have got them - when they needed them.


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## Aozora (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> In fact in a pre-radar scenario it is the twin seat fighter with long endurance, to mount standing patrols, and an extra pair of eyes that will have the best probability of visually spotting an approaching aircraft,


 
An aircraft does not have to be a two-seater to have good endurance; the fuel supply of the Firefly, for example, was no better than many single-seat fighters. The main contributor to longer endurance is how the engine performs at low revs with lean mixture, plus pilot training. Naturally an aircraft with a bigger fuel supply has greater endurance, but that endurance is reduced by having to haul around extra weight. 

As for requiring two sets of eyes to visually spot an approaching aircraft? - maybe, but there's also the option of devising and using decent formations of single seat fighters, which can accelerate and climb more quickly and intercept the approaching aircraft faster than a couple of two-seaters. The FAA exacted a heavy price to pay for those extra eyes, particularly when the observer had no weapon with which to assist the pilot.
(NB: to get an idea of how the Griffon in the Firefly performed: Lean Mixture for Spitfire XII at 2,000 rpm and -4 lb boost = 42 gal/hour. P&W R-2800-10 of Corsair, Lean Mixture at 2,000 rpm, 22" Hg = 37 gal/hr.)



RCAFson said:


> *Again, the IJN had lots of SS fighters at Midway yet the SBD's made their drops undetected...leading to the slaughter of their non-armoured flight deck carriers. In April 1942 9 RAF Blenheims attacked the IJN CVs off Ceylon, and they were undetected until the bombs hit the water.*



And how would two-seat fighters have improved matters in these circumstances? The reasons the SBDs got drop on the JNAF at Midway had a great deal more to do with the relatively small fighter cover that was set (the majority of the JNAF's fighters were engaged on escort duties) having to ward off several low-altitude torpedo attacks from different directions over a relatively compressed time period; as well as this the JNAF carriers were well out of their normal formation. What you are overlooking is the fact that the JNAF's _single-seat_ fighter cover was in fact highly effective, and was able to totally destroy formations of TBDs, SB2Us and TBMs, as well as shooting down several B-26s and F4Fs. That was without radar...



RCAFson said:


> It was the USN's use of radar that allowed the SS fighter to be truly viable.



This just shows an ignorance of how the USN, and Carriers in general operated. The USN set fighter cover in the form of standing patrols, regardless of the use of radar, simply because it was far easier to have fighters already in the air, ready to intercept, rather than waiting until radar spotted incoming aircraft. It was also highly inconvenient not to have standing patrols operating while a carrier or carrier group was launching its own attack aircraft.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Aozora said:


> The following are _your_ words, not mine:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Aircraft, Fuel load, nominal bomb load,weight (no bombs full fuel), TO HP, combat HP.
F6F-5, 250usg, 2000lb, 12500lb, 2000hp, 2135hp @ 15000ft
F4U-1C, 237usg, 2000lb, 12,095lb, 2000hp, 2135hp @ 15000ft
Firefly, 226usg, 2000lb, 11685lb, 1720hp, 1490hp @ 14000ft 
P-51, 184usg, ?????, 9500lb, 1495hp, 1595hp @ 17000ft
XF8F, 150usg, ?????, 8810lb, 2100hp, 1600hp @ 1600lb (attempt to build lightweight naval fighter - not CV capable.)
F8F-2, 170usg, 2000lb, 10,337lb, 2250hp, 1800hp @ 23250ft (SAC data actual weight after mod for carrier capability - note the weight growth)
P-51D 270usg, 1000lb, 10,100lb, 1490hp, 1630hp @ 13600ft (Tac planning chart 26 May 1944)
(weight, HP and fuel data for first 5 from Report of the JFC). It is pretty obvious that the Firefly's performance is crippled not by the 2nd crew member but by the low HP rating of it's engine.

Why did the USN need to build such heavy SS fighters?





> Seriously? Eric Brown said the Firefly could turn with its contemporary single-seaters with the FY flaps deployed - where does anyone say it could out-turn the Zero and where is the evidence?





> Toward the end of 1943, Firefly F.1 Z1883 was sent to the Naval Air Fighting Development Unit, then based at RAF Wittering, for tactical trials. These revealed that, although the Firefly F. I had good handling characteristics, it would be more suited for long-range close-escort duties and/or as a naval night fighter, rather than as a straight day combat fighter. The trials also showed that in mock combat with contemporary single seat fighters, the Firefly's turning circle was outstanding when the pilot lowered the flaps to the mid-position. In fact, Firefly F.1 Z1908 was sent to the US for such trials at a Joint Fighter Conference, where it was flown against various British and American fighters, including a captured Japanese Mitsubishi A6M2 Type O 'Zero.' When its flaps were lowered to the mid-position the Firefly conld out turn the Zero.
> Fairey Firefly in Action, page 5.



Yes, seriously. The F-Y flaps gave the Firefly a distinct advantage in a turning fight.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Didn't the RN have radar before the war?
> 
> And the IJN never did?



The RN had a few experimental sets at Sea from 1936 (Type 79):
Type 79 radar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The IJN CVs had AW radar in late 1942 but it was probably not very reliable.


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## Aozora (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Aircraft, Fuel load, nominal bomb load,weight (no bombs full fuel), TO HP, combat HP.
> F6F-5, 250usg, 2000lb, 12500lb, 2000hp, 2135hp @ 15000ft
> F4U-1C, 237usg, 2000lb, 12,095lb, 2000hp, 2135hp @ 15000ft
> Firefly, 226usg, 2000lb, 11685lb, 1720hp, 1490hp @ 14000ft
> ...



You have just proved the Firefly did not have to be a two-seater to carry a good fuel load. Plus you have overlooked all of my main points, once again, so I will not bother to repeat myself.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Aozora said:


> An aircraft does not have to be a two-seater to have good endurance; the fuel supply of the Firefly, for example, was no better than many single-seat fighters. The main contributor to longer endurance is how the engine performs at low revs with lean mixture, plus pilot training. Naturally an aircraft with a bigger fuel supply has greater endurance, but that endurance is reduced by having to haul around extra weight.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The extra pair of eyes was there for a reason, namely a higher probability of sighting the enemy.

The F-Y flaps gave the Firefly more lift for a enhanced low speed cruise and in all probability it's Griffon could operate at lower RPM for enhanced fuel economy.





> And how would two-seat fighters have improved matters in these circumstances? The reasons the SBDs got drop on the JNAF at Midway had a great deal more to do with the relatively small fighter cover that was set (the majority of the JNAF's fighters were engaged on escort duties) having to ward off several low-altitude torpedo attacks from different directions over a relatively compressed time period; as well as this the JNAF carriers were well out of their normal formation. What you are overlooking is the fact that the JNAF's _single-seat_ fighter cover was in fact highly effective, and was able to totally destroy formations of TBDs, SB2Us and TBMs, as well as shooting down several B-26s and F4Fs. That was without radar...



Simple, there would be a lot more Mk 1 eyeballs looking for the dreaded SBDs and shooting down the low and slow USN TBs doesn't justify losing 4 CVs, does it? You still haven't explained how the Blenheims got through the IJN CAP.





> This just shows an ignorance of how the USN, and Carriers in general operated. The USN set fighter cover in the form of standing patrols, regardless of the use of radar, simply because it was far easier to have fighters already in the air, ready to intercept, rather than waiting until radar spotted incoming aircraft. It was also highly inconvenient not to have standing patrols operating while a carrier or carrier group was launching its own attack aircraft.



Why would USN fighter pilots have more luck with the Mk 1 eyeball than their IJN counterparts? Simple fact is that the USN relied on radar GCI for every carrier battle that they ever fought, starting with Coral Sea.


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## wuzak (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The F-Y flaps gave the Firefly more lift for a enhanced low speed cruise and in all probability it's Griffon could operate at lower RPM for enhanced fuel economy.



Flaps deployed = more drag.


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## Aozora (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Simple, there would be a lot more Mk 1 eyeballs looking for the dreaded SBDs and shooting down the low and slow USN TBs doesn't justify losing 4 CVs, does it?



Okay, all you have to do is provide evidence that a two-seat fighter CAP would have spotted and stopped the SBDs in time while the A6Ms couldn't. Should be easy enough with this type of reasoning.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Okay, all you have to do is provide evidence that a two-seat fighter CAP would have spotted and stopped the SBDs in time while the A6Ms couldn't. Should be easy enough with this type of reasoning.



No I don't. It is self evident that having a dedicated observer would improve the chances of detection, and that's all anyone can say. The RN thought the odds of stopping an attack via air defence, pre-radar, was very low (and it was) and so they devoted a lot of resources to improving their AA defenses and they designed AFD carriers. Luckily the IJN didn't follow the RN lead inn these areas.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Flaps deployed = more drag.



Drag is minimized when the flap is in the cruising position. The F-Y flap was a kind of variable incidence wing and it increased wing area and lift in the cruise position by keeping the leading edge of the flap parallel with the wing leading edge, so the aircraft could maintain altitude with less power.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Aozora said:


> You have just proved the Firefly did not have to be a two-seater to carry a good fuel load. Plus you have overlooked all of my main points, once again, so I will not bother to repeat myself.



What I have showed is that naval fighters inevitably weigh more than their land based counterparts and that the Firefly is in the middle of the range, weight wise. Even the P-51, by the time it is carrier ready, would have ended up with almost the same weight as a Firefly and it would have a lower bomb load and probably would need an accelerator to TO from a CV due to it's small wing area. The F8F-2 could reduce weight by using a very powerful engine to generate lots of thrust for CV TO, but even this extreme example of a fighter designed to the lowest possible weight would have weighed about 10,600lb when carring a 230usg fuel load.


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## wuzak (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Drag is minimized when the flap is in the cruising position. The F-Y flap was a kind of variable incidence wing and it increased wing area and lift in the cruise position by keeping the leading edge of the flap parallel with the wing leading edge, so the aircraft could maintain altitude with less power.



Drag is less than when the flap is deployed - but is it any better than a conventional wing? Doubtful.

btw, is this the flap in its "cruising" position?


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## Juha (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The extra pair of eyes was there for a reason, namely a higher probability of sighting the enemy.
> 
> The F-Y flaps gave the Firefly more lift for a enhanced low speed cruise and in all probability it's Griffon could operate at lower RPM for enhanced fuel economy.
> 
> ...



My God, and what happened to HMS Illustrious on 10 Jan 41, CAP chasing TBs at low level when Ju 87s suddenly arrived above their carrier? How that could happened with observers aboard Fulmars? And the just launched Fulmars had no chance to achieve interception because burdened with their observers they had poor roc.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Drag is less than when the flap is deployed - but is it any better than a conventional wing? Doubtful.
> 
> btw, is this the flap in its "cruising" position?
> 
> ...


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Juha said:


> My God, and what happened to HMS Illustrious on 10 Jan 41, CAP chasing TBs at low level when Ju 87s suddenly arrived above their carrier? How that could happened with observers aboard Fulmars? And the just launched Fulmars had no chance to achieve interception because burdened with their observers they had poor roc.




Illustrious was badly damaged but saved by her AFD, so this is an example of the RN's insistence on passive defence paying off. $hit happens - thank god for AFDs! Also, the Luftwaffe threw almost as many DBs, armed with 1100lb bombs against Illustrious, as the USN flew against 4 carriers at Midway. Apparently the Fulmars were able to break up the last part of the first attack and probably prevented more hits and they intervened again (now based in Malta) during a 2nd attack by 15 Stukas, escorted by 5 Me-110s several hours later, and this along with a concentrated AA screen keep the Stukas to only one 1100 lb bomb hit.

It is also an example of how even radar GCI could still fail as the detection ability was still inadequate at that time (aircraft were not detected soon enough but this is still a bit of mystery to me) and However as we've seen the Martlet ( the only other Allied folding wing fighter but not yet available) had a climb rate little better than the Fulmar (and probably worse using military/combat power), and as I stated earlier the design of Illustrious' lifts prevented her from operating fixed wing fighters and there's no way that folding wing Seafires could have been ready by then. Probably the only way the attack could have been thwarted was by having a standing patrol that had the good fortune to sight the attack and/or by the GCI guessing that the carrier was the primary target.

FAA air defence and fleet AA defence was also hampered due to the fact that the Luftwaffe and RA had multiple targets (the nearby Malta bound convoy) which were strategically more important than the carrier, and so the RN AA escort for Illustrious was very minimal. In the Pacific, the carriers were the always the central target and the fleet was arraigned around them and not a bunch of 15 knot merchantmen.


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## Juha (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> ...FAA air defence and fleet AA defence was also hampered due to the fact that the Luftwaffe and RA had multiple targets (the nearby Malta bound convoy) which were strategically more important than the carrier, and so the RN AA escort for Illustrious was very minimal. In the Pacific, the carriers were the always the central target and the fleet was arraigned around them and not a bunch of 15 knot merchantmen.



My God, minimal AA defence! 2 reconstructed BBs, of which Valiant had the best AA RN had (with Renown and QE) 2 Tribals (Your wonder AA defence DDs, can't you remember) one J (another wonder DD) and 3 older DDs. Saying nothing onIllustrious own AA, 16 x 4.5" + 48 x 2pdr.

Juha


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## Aozora (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Simple, there would be a lot more Mk 1 eyeballs looking for the dreaded SBDs and shooting down the low and slow USN TBs doesn't justify losing 4 CVs, does it?



You have made an assertion to the effect that because the JNAF did not use two seat fighters for the CAP it lost four carriers. There were plenty of mk 1 eyeballs on board the ships that were on the lookout. Please explain exactly how the Japanese would have been able to foil the SBDs because they were using two-seaters for their cap rather than single seaters.



RCAFson said:


> No I don't. It is self evident that having a dedicated observer would improve the chances of detection, and that's all anyone can say.



If you want to make an assertion be prepared to prove it. It is also self evident that the Japanese should have had radar and should have used F4 Phantoms to protect the fleet, but they had neither of them, nor did they do the British thing and use two-seat fighters - but then, as you've pointed out s***t happens in wartime, and not even two seaters with four Mk 1 eyeballs can guarantee total protection.


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## wuzak (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> and as I stated earlier the design of Illustrious' lifts prevented her from operating fixed wing fighters and there's no way that folding wing Seafires could have been ready by then.



That all kinda depends on when they started.

btw, how big were the lifts?


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Juha said:


> My God, minimal AA defence! 2 reconstructed BBs, of which Valiant had the best AA RN had (with Renown and QE) 2 Tribals (Your wonder AA defence DDs, can't you remember) one J (another wonder DD) and 3 older DDs. Saying nothing onIllustrious own AA, 16 x 4.5" + 48 x 2pdr.
> 
> Juha



The Luftwaffe attacked both battleships to split their fire (both received minor damage) and the RN force around the carrier was reduced to only the two BBs, WARSPITE, VALIANT, ILLUSTRIOUS, and destroyers NUBIAN, DAINTY and GREYHOUND and JAGUAR and only Jaguar andd Nubian had an AA FC system. The other RN forces in the area were screening the Malta Convoy. The radar system did not detect the attack and there was only 3 minutes warning from sighting the Lufwaffe force to first bomb hits. When Illustrious turned into the wind to launch her remaining Fulmars she also moved away from the slower BBs. Edit: AFAIK only Jaguar formed a close escort to Illustrious

In later attacks against Illustrious the fleet formed a more concentrated formation, but not during the initial attack.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

wuzak said:


> That all kinda depends on when they started.
> 
> btw, how big were the lifts?


.

IIRC, 22ft x 45ft


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Wrong! You have made an assertion to the effect that because the JNAF did not use two seat fighters for the CAP it lost four carriers. There were plenty of mk 1 eyeballs on board the ships that were on the lookout. Please explain exactly how the Japanese would have been able to foil the SBDs because they were using two-seaters for their cap rather than single seaters.



LoL, no. I stated that two seat fighters would have a greater *probability* of sighting an incoming attack; I have emphasized this time and again. see: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...-plausible-upgrades-37498-12.html#post1030554

Only when radar came into play could interceptions reach a high level of success.


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## Juha (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The Luftwaffe attacked both battleships to split their fire (both received minor damage) and the RN force around the carrier was reduced to only the two BBs, WARSPITE, VALIANT, ILLUSTRIOUS, and destroyers NUBIAN, DAINTY and GREYHOUND and only Nubian had an AA FC system. The other RN forces in the area were screening the Malta Convoy. The radar system did not detect the attack and there was only 3 minutes warning from sighting the Lufwaffe force to first bomb hits. When Illustrious turned into the wind to launch her remaining Fulmars she also moved away from the slower BBs.
> 
> In later attacks against Illustrious the fleet formed a more concentrated formation, but not during the initial attack.



Now even 2 BBs, even if Warspite's AA wasn't so powerful but Valiant's was very powerful, best what RN could offer, and 3 DDs wasn't a minimal AA screen. And Adm Conningham believed that he had a ring-side seat to watch the attack, the professionialism of which he greatly admired. And he was on the bridge of Warspite, so the ship couldn't have been so far away. And if 10 out of 43 Stukas attacked the BBs, it was a question of tactics used, not of the size of the AA screen. and also meant that there were 10 Stukas less to attack Illustrious

So conclusion, whether one had 2 seat or single seat fighters, the CAP could be distracted and the CV could be left without fighter protection. Your theory that the observer would greatly increase the possibility of noticing approaching aerial attack isn't IMHO valid, especially when looking the position of observer in Fulmar. 4 SS fighter formation should have been able to adequately observe their enviroment in the limits given by the weather.


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## Aozora (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Only when radar came into play could interceptions reach a high level of success.


 
Totally agree - two seat fighters could not make enough of a difference because even double the number of available Mk 1 eyeballs could spot incoming aircraft quickly enough to to ensure a timely interception.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Juha said:


> Now even 2 BBs, even if Warspite's AA wasn't so powerful but Valiant's was very powerful, best what RN could offer, and 3 DDs wasn't a minimal AA screen. And Adm Conningham believed that he had a ring-side seat to watch the attack, the professionialism of which he greatly admired. And he was on the bridge of Warspite, so the ship couldn't have been so far away. And if 10 out of 43 Stukas attacked the BBs, it was a question of tactics used and also meant that there were 10 Stukas less to attack Illustrious, not of the size of the AA screen.



It actually sounds like Cunningham was far enough away that he could admire the view rather than being just a few thousand yards away with the Ju-87s almost directly overhead. However as I stated, the RN had to cover both the valuable convoy and the carrier and this inevitably watered down the defence
.
In any event, the BBs couldn't afford to ignore the attacking Stukas and the Luftwaffe struck with more DBs than attacked in the first wave of SBDs that sank 3 IJN CVs at Midway.

At Midway, for example Yorktown was covered by two heavy cruisers and 5 destroyers (all with AA FC) and for the 2nd attack by 4 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers, to face much smaller attacks than hit Illustrious and the USN knew full well exactly which ship the IJN was going to attack. 

Also in Jan 1941, none of the RN ships had radar AA FC. Radar detection of the approaching Luftwaffe formation was strangely lacking, yet two days before Sheffield had detected a RA raid at 43nm.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 25, 2013)

A two seat fighter may have some use as a recon plane looking for ships. Trying to use rear seaters to significantly change the rate of interceptions of attacking aircraft seems like quite a stretch. 

Once the attackers are spotted you may need the performance of a single seater to make the interception.


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## Aozora (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Illustrious was badly damaged but saved by her AFD, so this is an example of the RN's insistence on passive defence paying off. $hit happens - thank god for AFDs! Also, the Luftwaffe threw almost as many DBs, armed with 1100lb bombs against Illustrious, as the USN flew against 4 carriers at Midway. Apparently the Fulmars were able to break up the last part of the first attack and probably prevented more hits and they intervened again (now based in Malta) during a 2nd attack by 15 Stukas, escorted by 5 Me-110s several hours later, and this along with a concentrated AA screen keep the Stukas to only one 1100 lb bomb hit.
> 
> It is also an example of how even radar GCI could still fail as the detection ability was still inadequate at that time (aircraft were not detected soon enough but this is still a bit of mystery to me) and However as we've seen the Martlet ( the only other Allied folding wing fighter but not yet available) had a climb rate little better than the Fulmar (and probably worse using military/combat power), and as I stated earlier the design of Illustrious' lifts prevented her from operating fixed wing fighters and there's no way that folding wing Seafires could have been ready by then. Probably the only way the attack could have been thwarted was by having a standing patrol that had the good fortune to sight the attack and/or by the GCI guessing that the carrier was the primary target.
> 
> FAA air defence and fleet AA defence was also hampered due to the fact that the Luftwaffe and RA had multiple targets (the nearby Malta bound convoy) which were strategically more important than the carrier, and so the RN AA escort for Illustrious was very minimal. In the Pacific, the carriers were the always the central target and the fleet was arraigned around them and not a bunch of 15 knot merchantmen.


 
In all of this you have provided no evidence whatsoever that the Fulmar's observers assisted in any way - just because Fulmars broke up the first attack doesn't mean that the extra eyeball Mk 1s of their observers were the sole reason, or a reason, for the slow flying Stukas being intercepted in time - what it does suggest is that had the Fulmars been single seat fighters with a better acceleration, top speed and rate of climb the Stukas could have been intercepted earlier and more damage could have been done to other raids - perhaps enough to stop even the one bomb hit.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Why did the USN need to build such heavy SS fighters?



Because they were stressed for carrier operations?


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## tomo pauk (Jun 25, 2013)

In a more affirmative tone: USN heavyweights were featuring heavy ( and powerful) 2-stage engine, carrying big loads of fuel, armament and ammo, along with heavy under-slung cargo (bombs, DTs...) They were, of course, fully stressed for CV operations, and were featuring the wings of generous area thickness (= again more weight), so their take off and landing characteristics are within acceptable limits. 
In other words, there was almost no way to make a light weight fighter, that would offer long range, while carrying hefty loads of lethality and pilot protection, with big radial engine that was providing plenty of power at broad band of altitudes.

added: USN was not the only one going after heavy fighter, the gorgeous Sea Fury was not particularly light neither.
added 2: the USN heavies were also capable to make 380-410 mph in 1943, something to behold back then for the CV-based fighters, and not achieved by other in-service CV fighters until the end of 1945?


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## Shortround6 (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Aircraft, Fuel load, nominal bomb load,weight (no bombs full fuel), TO HP, combat HP.
> F6F-5, 250usg, 2000lb, 12500lb, 2000hp, 2135hp @ 15000ft
> F4U-1C, 237usg, 2000lb, 12,095lb, 2000hp, 2135hp @ 15000ft
> Firefly, 226usg, 2000lb, 11685lb, 1720hp, 1490hp @ 14000ft
> ...



In part because of the engine selected. The R-2800 was initially proposed as a 1650hp engine on 87 octane fuel. You don't get that kind of power with 87 octane fuel from a small, light engine. During development 100 octane became available and power was initially raised to 1850hp ( shrinking the engine means starting over) and please remember that early American 100 octane is *NOT* 100/130 or even the 100/115-120 fuel used by the British in the BoB. American 100 octane in 1939-40 and early 1941 was 100/98-103 depending on batch. Getting 2000 hp from such fuel was doable but again the engine _stays_ large and heavy. 

The power plant weight for the F4U was just about 3900lbs including prop, controls, cowl, oil system and fuel piping ( but not fuel tank weight). You don't stick that kind of weight on a small airplane. The Americans had only one engine that was smaller and offered the right amount of power when design work started on these fighters and that was the Wright R-2600 which, while lighter, was bigger in diameter and didn't have a good supercharger even in the development stage. Please remember that Chance Vought was part of United Aircraft, the Parent Company of Pratt Whitney so maybe they had a bit more fore knowledge of P&W engine developments. 

A single stage Griffon is about 680lbs lighter than a two stage R-2800 and that should cover quite a bit of radiator and coolant. 

The High powered Merlins and the R-2800s used in the F8Fs weren't much more than a gleam in the engine designers eyes when the R-2800 used in the F4U was OK'd for production.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> It might be possible under still air conditions for the pilot to use morse, but pretty much impossible if he encounters flak and/or enemy fighters as would be expected for a long range recon aircraft.


 
Quote from Bartsch Doomed at the start: "Grashio had spotted the dive bombers (Ki-30 Anns) below him too. Recognizing them as easy meat, he got on the radio and sent a Morse code message to Sneed." (Bartsch doesn't say whether it was telegrapher's key or perhaps his mike button). He continues, "But when nothing happened, as the Dive Bombers were getting closer on their northwestward course, Grashio repeated his radio morse code call to Sneed and again pointed out the planes to Sneed." (Paper back, page 281) 

This was a USAAF pilot in a heavily loaded P-40E, over brown water off the West coast of Bataan, probably not on autopilot and in the process of setting up and about to attack IJA dive bombers over Bataan moments later, all the while concerned about keeping an eye out for the omnipresent Ki-27 fighters. Radio code work isn't impossible from a single seat fighter even in somewhat difficult, distracting circumstances.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

Aozora said:


> In all of this you have provided no evidence whatsoever that the Fulmar's observers assisted in any way - just because Fulmars broke up the first attack doesn't mean that the extra eyeball Mk 1s of their observers were the sole reason, or a reason, for the slow flying Stukas being intercepted in time - what it does suggest is that had the Fulmars been single seat fighters with a better acceleration, top speed and rate of climb the Stukas could have been intercepted earlier and more damage could have been done to other raids - perhaps enough to stop even the one bomb hit.



There's nothing in the Fulmar Pilot's Notes that requires an observer in the rear seat. If the RN thought that he did no good, they could simply leave him behind, but they didn't. Fulmars operating from shore bases, flying purely interception missions did sometimes leave the observer behind but this doesn't seem to have happened while operating from carriers. Again, we simply have to look at probabilities, and the probability is that a 2nd pair of eyes will assist in locating potential targets and potential attackers, especially when radar is absent. I suspect that most pilots would like to have an extra pair of eyes "checking their six" full time.

The Pilot's Notes do state that the Observer is also a navigator, and he also operates a winch to extend or retract a trailing aerial, which I suspect is used with the long range Morse set. The pilot and observer/navigator can communicate via speaking tube or via the voice radio system, which doubles as an intercom.

The observer also has a swivelling seat so that he can face rearward for better rearward vision when needed, or forward, as the situation requires.


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## RCAFson (Jun 25, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Quote from Bartsch Doomed at the start: "Grashio had spotted the dive bombers (Ki-30 Anns) below him too. Recognizing them as easy meat, he got on the radio and sent a Morse code message to Sneed." (Bartsch doesn't say whether it was telegrapher's key or perhaps his mike button). He continues, "But when nothing happened, as the Dive Bombers were getting closer on their northwestward course, Grashio repeated his radio morse code call to Sneed and again pointed out the planes to Sneed." (Paper back, page 281)
> 
> This was a USAAF pilot in a heavily loaded P-40E, over brown water off the West coast of Bataan, probably not on autopilot and in the process of setting up and about to attack IJA dive bombers over Bataan moments later, all the while concerned about keeping an eye out for the omnipresent Ki-27 fighters. Radio code work isn't impossible from a single seat fighter even in somewhat difficult, distracting circumstances.



I'm not sure if the quoted passage proves or disproves that a separate radio operator is beneficial, and I note that he is not under attack. It seems to me that the pilot he is attempting to contact might also have had other concerns on his mind, and that overall efficiency would improve if the pilot could order his observer to contact the other pilot's observer.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> There's nothing in the Fulmar Pilot's Notes that requires an observer in the rear seat. If the RN thought that he did no good, they could simply leave him behind, but they didn't. Fulmars operating from shore bases, flying purely interception missions did sometimes leave the observer behind but this doesn't seem to have happened while operating from carriers.



Once you have "paid the penalty" of designing a 2 seat aircraft ( bigger fuselage, bigger wing, etc) trying to get a "refund" by leaving the 160-200lb crewman on the deck/field really doesn't change things much. 

The 2nd seater wasn't really a "navigator" in the common sense of the word although he did operate the "navigation"/homing equipment that allowed the Fulmar to find it's own carrier when it was beyond visual range. One reason the shore based planes could leave him behind. The shore base wasn't going to move 30-100 miles while the plane was in the air. And even if the shore based plane couldn't find it's own base it could probably find _some_ air field to land on even if the weather got crappy. The Carrier pilot had a choice of find his ( or a friendly) carrier or see how well his dingy worked. 

I can easily buy _why_ the FAA went for the 2 seat fighter in 1937-40 before getting real experience in a shooting war. Continuing the policy in the middle of 1940 may or may not be harder to understand but once the Firefly suffered a number of delays somebody should have pulled the plug on the program before 1943-44. Or re-purposed the airframe and quit calling it a fighter. 

Nobody has shown what the differences were in the radios between 1937/40 and 1943/44 but I am thinking there were some differences.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 25, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> I'm not sure if the quoted passage proves or disproves that a separate radio operator is beneficial, and I note that he is not under attack. It seems to me that the pilot he is attempting to contact might also have had other concerns on his mind, and that overall efficiency would improve if the pilot could order his observer to contact the other pilot's observer.



Conversation with a USN A-7 pilot transitioning to the multi-crew EA-6B, "I'd trade any NFO for 200 pounds of JP-5. (NFO's typically handle the radios)...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 26, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> I can easily buy _why_ the FAA went for the 2 seat fighter in 1937-40 before getting real experience in a shooting war. Continuing the policy in the middle of 1940 may or may not be harder to understand but once the Firefly suffered a number of delays somebody should have pulled the plug on the program before 1943-44. Or re-purposed the airframe and quit calling it a fighter.
> 
> Nobody has shown what the differences were in the radios between 1937/40 and 1943/44 but I am thinking there were some differences.


In the pre WW2 days radios were big and bulky and tuning them to acquire the desired frequency required a steady ear, time and patience so you had many aircraft having a dedicated radio operator as a standard crewmen. AFAIK most if not all aircraft radios during pre WW2 days were either LF or MF sets with a seperate tuner and transmitter and had no way to pre-tune channels, so you were tuning radios in the same manner as you would an old transistor or AM radio with an analog tuner.

As Shortround pointed out, by mid WW2 radios were much improved and the need for a dedicated radio operator went away.

Does having a dedicated radio operator relive the pilot of some workload? Yes
By 1943 was it really necessary to have a dedicated radio operator on a carrier based aircraft like the Fulmar? NO!

An extra set of eyes is always a good thing but during WW2 to justify an observer/ radio operator in a fighter (with the exception of the Mosquito) who was not at least operating radar was just a waste of time, a waste of aircraft performance and a waste of personnel; history as played out proved this until the extra weight of an additional crewman performing a more meaningful role than operating a radio became a reality (example F-4, Tornado, etc.)

Anyone trying to justify 180 pounds worth of ballast (or a nice thing to have) is trying to justify a losing argument. Having a buddy along for the ride can be comforting but people who never flew airplanes are very unfimilar with terms like "cockpit resource management" and "multi-tasking" when flying a single seat aircraft - operating a "channel tuned" MF or VHF frequency radio (which was the norm by the first few years of the war) is no more difficulat than chewing gum and walking at the same time 




oldcrowcv63 said:


> Conversation with a USN A-7 pilot transitioning to the multi-crew EA-6B, "I'd trade any NFO for 200 pounds of JP-5. (NFO's typically handle the radios)...


Apples and oranges and you're comparing aircraft generations apart - NFOs on A-6s and especially EA-6Bs (a four man crew) did waaaay more than operate radios.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 26, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Apples and oranges and you're comparing aircraft generations apart - NFOs on A-6s and especially EA-6Bs (a four man crew) did waaaay more than operate radios.



Yes indeed, but I loved the story of this rather atavistic attitude of this soon to be EA-6B squadron commander toward '_Non-Flying Officers_' (sic) and we did operate radios, but of course did not typically transmit in Morse. Morse was used strictly in the listening mode to identify TACAN and/or IIRC VOR stations although I may be mixing that (VOR ident) up with my private pilot experience, although I had learned Morse long before that (circa 1969). as I can't remember whether we had VOR capable gear.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 26, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Yes indeed, but I loved the story of this rather atavistic attitude of this soon to be EA-6B squadron commander toward '_Non-Flying Officers_' (sic) and we did operate radios, but of course did not typically transmit in Morse. Morse was used strictly in the listening mode to identify TACAN and/or IIRC VOR stations although I may be mixing that (VOR ident) up with my private pilot experience, although I had learned Morse long before that (circa 1969). as I can't remember whether we had VOR capable gear.



Morse still used for navaid identification (VOR TACAN and NDB when found)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 26, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> I'm not sure if the quoted passage proves or disproves that a separate radio operator is beneficial, and I note that he is not under attack. It seems to me that the pilot he is attempting to contact might also have had other concerns on his mind, and that overall efficiency would improve if the pilot could order his observer to contact the other pilot's observer.



You may have made an (understandably) incorrect assumption about the situation described in the Bartsch's text. An observer in Sneed's aircraft might indeed have helped by threatening his pilot with bodily harm if he didn't attack the IJA Anns he clearly observed below him. Sneed was in the grip of an extended nervous breakdown which lead within a week to his relief from flying duties by flight surgeon's order. This was essentially his last '_combat_' flight as he had apparently, on this and other occasions, come to the conclusion that his own personal war was over. Yes, Grashio wasn't under attack, but he was existing in an undernourished, sleep deprived state typically of the small cadre of overtaxed flyers fighting in defense of MacArthur's troops in the PI in late January of 1942. I would characterize that as a stress level few of us can imagine even compared to that experienced in combat. What you correctly imply is the lack of time available to an aircrew when under attack. That certainly is a factor absent in this case, although I'd submit that the time factor is present at some undetermined level in this particular situation.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 26, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> You may have made an (understandably) incorrect assumption about the situation described in the Bartsch's text. An observer in Sneed's aircraft might indeed have helped by threatening his pilot with bodily harm if he didn't attack the IJA Anns he clearly observed below him. Sneed was in the grip of an extended nervous breakdown which lead within a week to his relief from flying duties by flight surgeon's order. This was essentially his last '_combat_' flight as he had clearly on this and other instances been forced to the conclusion that his war was over. Yes, Grashio wasn't under attack, but he was existing in an undernourished, sleep deprived state typically of the small cadre of overtaxed flyers fighting in defense of MacArthur's troops in the PI in late January of 1941. I would characterize that as a stress level few of us can imagine even compared to that experienced in combat. What you correctly imply is the lack of time available to an aircrew when under attack. That certainly is a factor absent in this case, although I'd submit that the time factor is present at some undetermined level in this particular situation.



AVIATE

NAVIGATE

COMMUNICATE


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 26, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Morse still used for navaid identification (VOR TACAN and NDB when found)



That's good, you never know when an airman will find he has become a POW.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 26, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> AVIATE
> 
> NAVIGATE
> 
> COMMUNICATE



But the truly competent aircrew may have occasion to add to his mantra:

"_*Intimidate*_" in no particular priority... 

It's why an experienced NFO's nav bag always contains a little ball peen hammer. 

But of course the knowledgable pilot will have brought a roll of duct tape on every flight.


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## RCAFson (Dec 4, 2013)

I just discovered that the Merlin 30 was cleared for 16lb boost in late 1941/early 1942:





so my chart with Fulmar II:




(and others) performance at 16lb boost was probably correct to about 4000ft and it would then gradually join the curve for 12lb boost performance.


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## wuzak (Dec 4, 2013)

Interesting that those documents specify MAP in inches of mercury (inHg) rather than the usual, for British aircraft, PSI boost. Was that because the RN operated a number of US types?


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## RCAFson (Dec 4, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Interesting that those documents specify MAP in inches of mercury (inHg) rather than the usual, for British aircraft, PSI boost. Was that because the RN operated a number of US types?



It appears to be a UK MAP report, and I suspect that it is being written for US consumption.


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## wuzak (Dec 4, 2013)

I don't have access to my books, but wasn't the Merlin 30 a 2 speed unit?

If that is the case, where is the advantage of the Merlin 45?


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## RCAFson (Dec 4, 2013)

wuzak said:


> I don't have access to my books, but wasn't the Merlin 30 a 2 speed unit?
> 
> If that is the case, where is the advantage of the Merlin 45?



The Merlin 30 had a single speed SC but with a smaller rotor and lower gearing than on the 45, so it produced a bit more power at the same boost levels (because of lower losses to the SC), but it could only maintain 16lb boost to ~4000ft on a Fulmar versus 16lb boost at ~13000ft for the 45 on a Spit V.


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## wuzak (Dec 4, 2013)

Still, a XX series would be better than the 45.


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