# Russia marks anniversary of its best tank



## syscom3 (Dec 20, 2009)

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - Seventy years ago, on December 19, 1939, the Soviet government's Defense Committee issued a resolution approving the supply of several new types of automobiles and armored vehicles to the army. One of the latter was the T-32 track tank with a B-2 diesel engine.

The resolution also said that the new tank's armor should be strengthened and its visibility and armaments improved. The revamped tank was called T-34. When it was delivered to the army, few people thought it would be such an enduring design.

A new design bureau led by Adolf Dik started working on the tank in 1937, but the chief designer soon fell victim to Stalin's persecution campaigns. He was replaced by Mikhail Koshkin, the designer of the plant that later manufactured the tank.

The T-34 fought its first battles during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). These battles showed that its 15-20 mm armor left it defenseless against 25-47 mm antitank guns. It had been decided that a thicker armor would increase the tank's weight and not allow the planned combination of tracks and wheels.

However, by that time the country could make chain tracks that lasted several thousand kilometers, allowing the designers to replace the wheels with tracks without affecting the tank's running performance. The T-34 tank was designed for offensive operations that involved long marches at a high speed.

In addition, it was decided to equip the tank with a more powerful 76 mm gun because the 45 mm gun proved insufficient against infantry and antitank guns.

On March 17, 1940, two T-34 tanks ran from Kharkov in Ukraine to Moscow, where they were presented to the Soviet leaders, including Stalin, in Ivanovskaya Square at the Kremlin. Koshkin, who led the march, caught pneumonia and died in the fall of 1940.

The tank had quite a few bugs and the production pace fell behind schedule. The army heavily criticized it, but the government did not discontinue production.

By June 22, 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the Red Army had over 1,000 T-34 tanks. But they could not prove their worth in border clashes. The German army was superior to the Red Army on nearly all counts, including the number of troops, the quality of command and control, combat experience, and logistics, and therefore easily neutralized the Soviet Union's superiority in tanks.

The Germans noticed the T-34 in the fall of 1941, when Soviet tank brigades started delivering very painful blows to the German units weakened by months of heavy fighting. With good drivers and commanders, the T-34 tank quickly and convincingly demonstrated its fire and armor superiority, as the Germans grudgingly admitted.

The production of the T-34 was increased while the country's industries were still being evacuated to the eastern regions. Much was also done to simplify the tank's design, which helped roll out more tanks and form more tank units. Soon the T-34 became the biggest concern for the Germans, who had previously taken legitimate pride in their tanks.

Germany could not increase the production of tanks as fast as the Soviet Union did, and so decided to improve its medium tanks and design the new-generation Tiger and Panther tanks. At that time, the role of tanks was changing, and tank duels became increasingly frequent toward the middle of the war.

The Germans created unmatched tanks for such duels but failed to make up for their strategic deficiency relative to the Soviet tanks. As the number of Red Army and Allied mobile units increased, Germany started feeling increasingly constrained.

Soviet designers improved the T-34 to be able to stand up against Germany's new tanks. In late 1943, the T-34 was equipped with a long-barrel 85 mm gun whose munitions could slice through the armor of German Tigers and Panthers. The T-34-85 tank became the calling card of the Red Army, the fast symbol of victory that was kept as a monument in many liberated European cities.

A survivor, the T-34 tank remained on combat duty in the Soviet Union for 20 years after the end of World War II in 1945. It was also exported to other countries and fought valiantly in wars in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East and in Africa.

Yet the most glorious page in the tank's history was the Great Patriotic War against Germany (1941-1945). This is a fact accepted not only in Russia but also in many other countries, including the Soviet Union's enemies who were nevertheless the first to declare it the best tank of WWII, and also its allies who said it was the world's best tank of all time.

The T-34 medium tank weighed 26 tons and had a crew of four, a speed of 55 km/h (34 mph), and a range of 115 miles.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 20, 2009)

Not taking it against you, Syscom, but: 
a) KV was much better tank design
b) no T-34s took part in SCW, not even in Winter war
c) 85mm was bare minimum to fight Panthers, let alone Tigers

All said, the tank itself was much better then a doctrine that employed it for couple of years.


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## syscom3 (Dec 20, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Not taking it against you, Syscom, but:
> a) KV was much better tank design
> b) no T-34s took part in SCW, not even in Winter war
> c) 85mm was bare minimum to fight Panthers, let alone Tigers
> ...



Im just posting a story I came across. I have no clue what youre talking about.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 20, 2009)

I'm talking about a tank.


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## Soren (Dec 20, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Not taking it against you, Syscom, but:
> a) KV was much better tank design
> b) no T-34s took part in SCW, not even in Winter war
> c) 85mm was bare minimum to fight Panthers, let alone Tigers
> ...



I agree on all points Tomo.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 20, 2009)

Yuppers


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## GrauGeist (Dec 20, 2009)

There's no doubt that the T-34 was a good tank, and it's one of those cases where timing was everything.

But the world's best tank of all time? Hardly...


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## syscom3 (Dec 20, 2009)

GrauGeist said:


> There's no doubt that the T-34 was a good tank, and it's one of those cases where timing was everything.
> 
> But the world's best tank of all time? Hardly...



The best tank of WW2, considering all aspects of it.


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## Soren (Dec 21, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> The best tank of WW2, considering all aspects of it.



Not even close. Better tanks were built at similar prices during the war.

Also despite what some people might say, combat performance weighs just as much as production when it comes to rating a combat vehicle.


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## syscom3 (Dec 21, 2009)

Producability: Excellent
Maintainability under field conditions: Excellent
Armor protection: Good to excellent
Gun: Good 
Cold weather performance: Excellent

Could the Soviets have won the Eastern front without it? No.

Overall, the best tank of WW2. A great tank on its own, combined with the right attributes of being able to be mass produced, operated by semi-trained troops and then maintained in the field by same.


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## diddyriddick (Dec 21, 2009)

I'm gonna side with Syscom here. While the KV may have been more heavily armored than the T34, the 34 gave you the one thing that a tank is supposed to give you-mobility.


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## Glider (Dec 21, 2009)

The T34 may not have been the best tank of WW2 but its timing was spot on and no one would really question its importance. Had it been 12 months later then the war may well have taken a different turn. It was better than the opposition when it needed to be better. 

To use a different example. The Cromwell with the Meteor engine arrived in early 43 when there was little call for it and by the D Day landings took place it could be described as an average tank, outclassed by the Panthers and Tiger I. Had it been 12 months earlier then it could have made a serious difference in the desert and had a similar reputation to the T34. 

Timing is almost as important as the overall quality.


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## syscom3 (Dec 21, 2009)

Glider said:


> .....
> 
> Timing is almost as important as the overall quality.



Exactly.

Just like the P51.


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## Soren (Dec 22, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> Producability: Excellent
> Maintainability under field conditions: Excellent
> Armor protection: Good to excellent
> Gun: Good
> ...


 
Sorry but the T-34, while very cheap to produce, was from mid 1942 a death trap. The number lost is so mindblowingly high that I feel sorry for the poor sods who had to go into battle in that thing.

Maintainability: Yes it was good..... in the end. In the beginning it was very poor, many T-34's breaking down due to a factor as simple as dust accumulation. 

Armour protection: Great in 1941, decent in 1942, insufficient in 1943, very poor in 1944, disastrously weak in 1945. The turret armour was so soft that it was vulnerable to fire from German 37mm AA guns

Gun: Decent in 1941 (although nothing to write home about), insufficient in 1942, poor in 1943, poor in 1944, poor in 1945. (Performance on the 85mm Zis 53 gun was poor to say the least) Add to this the abysmal optics and crew compartment.

Cold weather performance: Great, owing to its fuel tank heating system.

The only REALLY good thing about the T-34 was one thing..... its' price tag.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 22, 2009)

Gun ammo (76mm) themselves were as good as US 75mm we know from Sherman, while 85mm was as good as US 3in German 7,5/43, or /48 (topping them against 'soft' or 'house targets). The optics were the issue, and observability was problem too - Germans mounted the commander's cupolas from damaged Panzers atop of turret.
The 76mm gunned lacked dedicated loader, and had cramped turrets. Radio was a rare thing prior 1944 in T-34.
Armor was indeed good for 1941, but Germans rarely encountered T-34 in that year - T-26 and BT-5/7 were the main types. I've read more stuff about Germans taking on KV1/2, then on T-34, for 1941. In 1942, with introduction of longer 7,5cm cannon, armor was to thin. 
Reliability was the issue in 1941, gradually improving as people got the grip on it - both producers and operators.
It was maneuvre where T-34 shined, due to hefty engine broad tracks. The tracks were a issue in 1941, stuff got better later. The 30 ton tank still had manualy-operated gearbox, again a shortcoming.

FWIW, it's hard to find an information about Russian tankers speak a word against Sherman or Valentine. Therefore I'd say they loved those 

I suggest reading the "T-34, mythical weapon" book, and the US Aberdeen Proving Ground evaluation of both T-34 and KV-1.


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## riacrato (Dec 22, 2009)

The chassis, tracks, suspension and engine combination was certainly better than any other medium tank of its era. The turret was poor initially but good later. The gun was always mediocre as were optics.

Overall it was still the tank with the best ratio of effectiveness/cost and the one with the most consistent performance from late '41 to '45.


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## Soren (Dec 22, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Gun ammo (76mm) themselves were as good as US 75mm we know from Sherman, while 85mm was as good as US 3in German 7,5/43, or /48 (topping them against 'soft' or 'house targets).



It might surprise you but both the German 7.5cm Kwk40 L/43 48 and the US 76mm gun were better than the 85mm gun when it comes to actual armour penetration capability.

Aberdeen results against vertical 240 BHN RHA armour:

Range:..........................100m/500m/1,000m/1,500m/2,000m/2,500m/3,000m

7.6cm M1 L/52 (APCBC): 125mm / 116mm / 106mm / 97mm / 89mm / 81mm / 74mm
7.5cm KwK40 L/48 (APCBC): 135mm / 123mm / 109mm / 97mm / 86mm / 76mm / 68mm 
8.5cm Zis53 L/52 (APBC): 139mm / 121mm / 102mm / 88mm / 77mm / 69mm / 63mm 

On top of this the larger turret put on the T-34 in late 43 in order to accommodate the 85mm gun was made from so soft a steel that German 37mm AA guns were capable of penetrating it at ranges in excess of 500m and were thus a real threat.

The T-34 is praised by a lot of people concentrating only on its initial success in 1941 where it most definitely surprised the Germans in a bad way. But what is forgotten is that it was litterally a matter of nomore than a couple of weeks before the Germans adapted and effectively dealt with the threat. Soon after the 7.5cm L/43 armed Pz.IV's and StuG III's arrived and they litterally put the T-34 to shame. 

The KV-1 on the other hand proved more of a problem for the Germans. It was such a hard nut to crack that even when surrounded it didn't stop seriously bothering the Germans until the 7.5cm L/43 armed Panzers started arriving. Up until then 8.8cm Flak pieces were needed to silent the beast quickly effectively.


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## Glider (Dec 22, 2009)

Soren said:


> On top of this the larger turret put on the T-34 in late 43 in order to accommodate the 85mm gun was made from so soft a steel that German 37mm AA guns were capable of penetrating it at ranges in excess of 500m and were thus a real threat..


Soren - Have you got anything to support this statement as I find it hard to believee that a 37mm AA gun will do anything but scratch the paint off a tank at 500+ meters.



> The T-34 is praised by a lot of people concentrating only on its initial success in 1941 where it most definitely surprised the Germans in a bad way. But what is forgotten is that it was litterally a matter of nomore than a couple of weeks before the Germans adapted and effectively dealt with the threat. Soon after the 7.5cm L/43 armed Pz.IV's and StuG III's arrived and they litterally put the T-34 to shame. .


This is where my statement of timing comes in. My understanding was that the 75mm armed Stug III and PzIV didn't arrive at the front in numbers until the third quarter of 42 and it took time to re-equipe all the units around the end of 42. By that time the drive had been blunted and the German adance slowed. It should also be remembered that the PzIVF2 had pretty thin armour.


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## Soren (Dec 22, 2009)

Glider said:


> Soren - Have you got anything to support this statement as I find it hard to believee that a 37mm AA gun will do anything but scratch the paint off a tank at 500+ meters.



Glider, yes ofcourse, otherwise I wouldnt say it. I thought you trusted me on such matters.

The late war turret for the T-34 was constructed using cast armour, which is nowhere near as strong as rolled homogenous armour, thus making the T-34/85's turret very vulnerable to fire even from German 3.7cm AA guns.

German 3.7cm L/45 gun performance against vertical 240 BHN RHA armour plate:
Range: 100m / 500m / 1,000m / 1,500m / 2,000m / 2,500m / 3,000m
Penetration (APCR): 97mm / 75mm / 57mm / 43mm / 33mm / 25mm / 19mm

Now keep in mind that the performance against cast armour is significantly higher, making the 3.7cm L/45 gun potentially lethal to the T-34/85 past 1,000m.



> This is where my statement of timing comes in. My understanding was that the 75mm armed Stug III and PzIV didn't arrive at the front in numbers until the third quarter of 42 and it took time to re-equipe all the units around the end of 42. By that time the drive had been blunted and the German adance slowed. It should also be remembered that the PzIVF2 had pretty thin armour.



The 7.5cm L/43 armed StuG III's and Pz.IV F2 both arrived in March of 1942, and despite its thinner armour it proved a far superior combat vehicle to the T-34. The Panzers had excellent optics, communication systems and crew compartment ergonomics, making sure that they usually not only got in the first shot but also usually hit with their first shot. The easy communication between Panzers also proved a huge tactical advantage. In short the PzIVF2 and StuGIII quite litterally put the T-34 to complete shame on the battlefield once they arrived in March 1942.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 23, 2009)

Soren, check those penetration figures again - the 3,7 beats 5cm pak with that.


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2009)

Hello
more realistic, 3.7cm Pak 36 with APCR, which was rare ammo type, Penetration vs homogenous armour at 30º: 68mm/100y, 43mm/500y.

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Soren, check those penetration figures again - the 3,7 beats 5cm pak with that.



It beats 5cm Pak figures with AP APC rounds, yes, anything wrong with that? With APCR the 5cm Pak 38 L/42 performed considerably better penetrating 130mm of vertical 240 BHN RHA armour at 100m. (All figures are corrected from yards results into meters, the original figure being 132mm at 100y for the Pak 38 )

Test results from Aberdeen (range in meters):








Juha said:


> Hello
> more realistic, 3.7cm Pak 36 with APCR, which was rare ammo type, Penetration vs homogenous armour at 30º: 68mm/100y, 43mm/500y.



More realistic ? How so Juha? Are you saying that actual real life test results are "unrealistic" ?

Well, what'ever suits you then...

Also APCR wasn't rare for 2cm, 3.7cm 5cm weapons. It became rare for larger caliber guns by 1943 onwards, but not the smaller caliber guns which were given top priority for tungsten ammunition.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 23, 2009)

> With APCR the 5cm Pak 38 L/42 performed considerably better penetrating 130mm of vertical 240 BHN RHA armour at 100m.



The 5cm pak 38 was L60, not L42.

Thanks for the table. 
Could you please post whole, not just a piece?


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

Gotta be ware of copyright laws tomo, but I can include the 5cm L/60 figures:






I have posted many other figures in the "updated tank gun comparison" thread.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 23, 2009)

Soren said:


> Gotta be ware of copyright laws tomo, but I can include the 5cm L/60 figures:
> 
> *Compared to what people post, you're about to be convicted to 10-12 years *
> 
> I have posted many other figures in the "updated tank gun comparison" thread.



Good, will look at that.

About the figures, I supose those at table are for 90 deg impact?


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

Yes tomo the results were achieved at 90 degree impact angles. As I wrote all tests were conducted against *vertical* 240 BHN RHA armour plates 

The German figures are lower for two reasons:
1. They were obtained at a 30 degree impact angle
2. They were conducted against 255 to 350 BHN RHA plates (255 to 265 BHN RHA plates for 12.8cm to 7.5cm guns, and 265 to 350 BHN for 7.5cm to 3.7cm guns)which were more resistant than 240 BHN RHA plates.


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2009)

Hello Soren
My numbers are from British tests and in fact better than the German figures. And because of a pure right angled hit was very difficult to achieve in battlefield, my figures are more realistic. BTW German figures for 3.7cm K.w.K L/45 with Pzgr. 40 ie APCR are 64m/100m and 31mm/500m. 30deg. Source for British data "Fire and Movement", RAC Tank Museum, Bovington, 1975, pages 22–25, for German data Jentz: Panzertruppen 1 p. 283

It seems to me that T-34/85 crews didn’t have much to worry on Pak 36, also Finnish and German reports what I have read backed that. Have you any sources that tell that Pak 36 crew really succeeded to shot through the side armour of turret of T-34 from 500m? I know one case when a Finnish crew using 37mm Bofors A/T gun succeeded to destroy a T-34 which tried to run over them. They hit the bow mg, there was a material failure and the hit pushed the mg and its, what is kugelblende in English, inside tank, Finns shot a couple more shells through the emerged hole and that was the end of the T-34, but that was a real “lucky” shot and IMHO T-34 was more or less immune to German 37mm KwKs and PaKs.

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

I never mentioned the Pak36, I said 3.7cm AA guns, which were more potent than the Pak 36 and actually accounted for some T-34 losses. The turret armour was so soft that the APCR rounds penetrated it without too much difficulty, bursts of APCR fire proving quite effective against the T-34.

As for actual accounts of it happening, well I don't really have any reports on hand mentioning confrontation between a T34/85 3.7cm AA guns atm. But it is mentioned in "T-34 in action" by Drabkin Sheremet, and looking at the recorded performance of the 3.7cm gun firing APCR rounds it must be true. The cast armour of the T-34's turret would've been vulnerable to the fire from 3.7cm AA guns all the way out to a 1,000m, that's for sure.


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2009)

Soren
From your message #19 "making the 3.7cm L/45 gun potentially lethal to the T-34/85 past 1,000m."

That clearly means 3.7cm Pak and KwK L/45. IIRC 3.7cm Flak was L/73 weapon. And past 1000m!

Juha


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## tomo pauk (Dec 23, 2009)

Soren said:


> Yes tomo the results were achieved at 90 degree impact angles. As I wrote all tests were conducted against *vertical* 240 BHN RHA armour plates
> 
> The German figures are lower for two reasons:
> 1. They were obtained at a 30 degree impact angle
> 2. They were conducted against 255 to 350 BHN RHA plates (255 to 265 BHN RHA plates for 12.8cm to 7.5cm guns, and 265 to 350 BHN for 7.5cm to 3.7cm guns)which were more resistant than 240 BHN RHA plates.



With that said, I'd stick to the penetration figures that are provided at panzerworld.net, for example (and those are from Jentz's Panzertruppen). And those, along with real experiences, are proving that it took a good hit from 5cm Pak 38 to pierce T-34, lighter weapons being useless.


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

Juha said:


> Soren
> From your message #19 "making the 3.7cm L/45 gun potentially lethal to the T-34/85 past 1,000m."
> 
> That clearly means 3.7cm Pak and KwK L/45. IIRC 3.7cm Flak was L/73 weapon. And past 1000m!
> ...



Juha which weapon did I mention first? The AA gun or the Pak36?? 

I mentioned the Pak36 because I had the Aberdeen test results for that gun, and if that gun was dangerous at 1,000m then you can be sure the 3.7cm AA gun was as-well!


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> With that said, I'd stick to the penetration figures that are provided at panzerworld.net, for example (and those are from Jentz's Panzertruppen). And those, along with real experiences, are proving that it took a good hit from 5cm Pak 38 to pierce T-34, lighter weapons being useless.



Ofcourse some will say that when they see their round harmlessy bounce of the T-34's front glacis plate which was made from rolled homogenous armour. But we're talking about the turret here tomo, which was made from cast armour which is a lot weaker than RHA. And REAL experience tells us that the 3.7cm AA gun Pak36 was effective against the T-34's turret at usual combat distances. 

PS: 240 BHN rolled homogenous armour is very strong, the being within the 235 to 270 BHN range required to be most effective against AP projectiles.


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2009)

Soren
a reality check, T-34-85 turret sides were 75mm thick and 20deg from vertical, so what figures you are refering for PaK 36. I can believe that 37mm AA cannon could realistically pierce the lower hull sides from 500m, if it hit it, most of it was shielded by bogie wheels. But the turret, Ju 87G had better chances, because the inclination worked for it.

And sources for the claim that PaK 36 was effective against T-34-85, please. Even Soviet A/T rifles could sometimes got an casualty producing hits on Elefant, but we surely agree that generally they were useless against Elefant/Ferdinand

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

Yes Juha, and the Pak36 pucnhed through 57mm of 240 BHN RHA at 1,000m. That equates to about 95 to 100mm of cast armour, if not more. The 3.7cm AA gun packed a good deal more punch with an extra 200 m/s in MV IIRC.


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2009)

So you said, but its a bit difficult to get right angled hit by a A/T gun to target which was inclined to 20 deg from vertical and situated 1.5 - 2m above ground level.

And the sources for real world achievement, Finns thought that Pak 36 was useless against T-34-85 in actual combat situation. And we tended to use everything which might be useful, even shotguns against T-26s

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

Well Juha, you go believe in what'ever suits you then. I really don't wanna discuss this any longer, its like beating a dead horse. If you ask me the facts are bright clear, esp. if one looks at multiple sources to gain an opinion and not just one. But I guess you're under the impression that Drabkin Sheremet lied in their book _"T-34 in action"_, oh well...


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2009)

Heh, my points made in this thread are based on at least 7 sources. And I don't have T-34 in Action, so I don't know what exactly Drabkin Sheremet write. Are they telling that PaK 36s regularly pierced T-34-85 turrets from 1000m? Can You give the exact quote and the page number?

BTW according to British data: 3.7cm Pak 36 with APCR Penetration vs homogenous armour at 30º: 22mm at 1000y, rather far cry from 75mm, even if cast.

Juha


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## Milosh (Dec 23, 2009)

Is that the Squadron/Signal book? They are full of errors.


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

They don't even mention the Pak36 Juha, they talk about German 3.7cm AA guns proving lethal against the T-34's turret.


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## m kenny (Dec 23, 2009)

Milosh said:


> Is that the Squadron/Signal book? They are full of errors.






T-34 in Action: Amazon.co.uk: Artem Drabkin, Oleg Sheremet: Books


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## Glider (Dec 23, 2009)

Just one question. If the 37mm AA gun was so lethal against the T34, why did the Germans have such trouble destroying them?


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## Soren (Dec 23, 2009)

Probably because there were many of them, they were fast, and due to their speed they probably didn't often let themselves get out flanked that easily by AA guns  I personally wouldn't like to take a Whirlwind for a spin against 100 T-34's heading my way. No sir, lets the Paks take care of that one, I'll stick to shooting a/c down then.

Desperate times call for desperate measures Glider. I bet it didn't happen often that a 3.7cm AA gun got to face off with a T-34, or was even considered for the task. But catch a soldier in a dire spot and I assure you he will give everything he's got to get outta there alive. So a T-34 turning around the corner to suddenly face a prep'ed AA gun probably couldn't expect them AA crew to just run for home. They'd no doubt let loose all they had at that thing and hope for the best. And apparently that sometimes worked, and for a good reason as the T-34 turret was a weak point. As to how many Germans actually knowing about it, well who knows, I bet they were mostly traumatized by seeing their 5cm shells bounce of the glacis.


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## syscom3 (Dec 23, 2009)

Did the T34's defeat the German tanks? Yes, with alarming frequency.

Were T-34's available in the middle of winter when the German designs were immobilized? Yes.

Does having a tank to be available at any time when your adversary cant field one help swing the tide of battle to your favor? yes.

Could the Russians build more tanks in a quicker time than the Germans? Yes.

What was the best tank when it counted? The T34.


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## riacrato (Dec 24, 2009)

It maybe true that a 3.7mm Flak can penetrate the T-34 armor, in fact it must've been possible or else the Ju 87 G makes a lot less sense, but I very much doubt German PAK crews used a 3.7mm cannon successfully against T-34s on many occasions. I'm willing to learn if anyone can bring up actual field reports or secondary sources though.

I do seem to recall that only 5cm PAK and only with the best of ammunition was considered to be a reliable stopper against the T-34 early in the campaign.

I would agree though, the myth created around the T-34 is overblown. If it never existed the Russians would have more KV-1s with essentially the same result. From a purely technical point of view it had a bad turret and reliability problems early and later it didn't receive necessary armor upgrades. The 85mm version is hyped a lot but realistically each of the three major medium tanks could destroy eachother at most combat ranges iirc. What remains is its great mobility though.


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## Glider (Dec 24, 2009)

From what you are saying the 37mm could penetrate the T34 and the 50mm L42 couldn't which you must admit, sounds lacking in common sense in particular as the Germans upgunned the Pz III as fast as they could from the 37mm, to the 50mm and then as quickly to the 50mm L60 

I am sorry Soren but I remain to be convinced.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 24, 2009)

Glider said:


> From what you are saying the 37mm could penetrate the T34 and the 50mm L42 couldn't which you must admit, sounds lacking in common sense in particular as the Germans upgunned the Pz III as fast as they could from the 37mm, to the 50mm and then as quickly to the 50mm L60
> 
> I am sorry Soren but I remain to be convinced.



+1


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## Juha (Dec 24, 2009)

Hello Soren
How one understand rare is a bit subjective but 37mm APCR production for Paks was 12,3% of the whole 3.7cm Pak 35/36 ammo productionduring WWII and that had dropped to 8,2% in 1942, the last full year of 3.7cm Pak ammo production. In 43, when the production stopped, production was mighty 1000, yes one thousand, APCRs for 3.7cm Pak the whole ammo production for those guns was over 2½ million.

And I knew Oleg, we changed messages years ago when I visited battlefield.ru message board. He was then very active there. He also wrote some articles in Journal of Soviet/Slavic Military Studies. He was well infprmed on Soviet tank forces, at least on 43 period. But I would like to know what exactly he or Artem wrote on the lethality of 3.7cm Flak.

Hello Riacrato
I agree that T-34-85 wasn't some kind of super tank but it suited for Soviet needs. KV had all the drawbacks of heavy tank, which became significant especially during a deep penetration offensives, which played significant role in Soviet operations during later part of the war. But of course one had to fight with the equipment one had and adapt tactics/stategies if necessary.

Merry Christmas to all!
Juha.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2009)

I see the tank theorists are hard at it again pedalling the same old half truths that conveniently ignore the big picture that doesnt conform to their view on the course and outcomes of the war. Looking at the results produces a totally opposing appraisal of the T-34 as a war winner and army beater. 

The USSR was a country with only about the same industrial index in 1938 as the Germans. As a result of German gains in Barbarossa, that Industrial index was down to about 70% of German capacity by the end of 1941. The Russians received Lend Lease aid that accounted for about 10-15% of its national economy, so roughly speaking the Russians fought their war with roughly 85% of Germany's military capacity. Based on time spent on the eastern front, over 80% of Germany's army strength, and around 40-50% of its air strength was committed to the eastern front. About 5% of german military capacity was spent on U-Boats

Yet T-34 production alone exceeded German Tank production by a wide margin. In terms of turreted tanks the Germans produced 23500, and a further 17445 of other vehicles, and remember the Germans had an additional two years of wartime production in which to ratchet up that total. T-34 production was over 40000 in that time, and the Russian emerged with over 20000 T-34s in their inventory (not all running, but useable nevertheless). If 80% of german tank losses occurred on the Eastern Front, and the Germans lost every tank in their inventory by the 8th May 1945, it had taken the loss of 20000 T-34s to see off the equivalent of 32000 German AFVs. Of course other Soviet tanks contributed to this effort, about 50% of that 32000 in fact, but the loss rates of German super weapons was almost the same as the T-34. And a T-34 cost less than 1/8 the cost of a Panther Tank...... 

To say that produceability is not a key issue in WWII is one of THE most dumb, uniformed, downright misleading statements I have ever read on this forum. The allies until the latter part of 1943 had not done that much to relieve the pressure on the Eastern Front. For example, there were something like 200 Divs committed to Barbarossa, with a further 60 on garrison in the occupied territories. After looking into this issue in some depth, I can report that until December, virtually none of these Divs were combat ready in the accepted sense. 

Yet, the Russian at first outproduced, and then outfought the Germans. The Germans were halted at Moscow, under somewhat controversial circumstances. Then came Stalingrad, also blamed on the controversial leadership of Hitler. Then came Kursk, again excuses are sought about failures in leadership, then the clearing of the Ukraine, the lifting of the siege of Leningrad, the destruction of Army Group Centre, the Drive to the Vistula, and then the final offensives into the heart of germany itself. None of these victories are attributed to the military prowess of the Russian war machine, or its equipment. It was all due to Russian superiority of numbers....but hold on, didnt we establish that Russian military/industria potential was only 85% that of Germany. Something does not add up here....if numbers arent important, but the Russians won by numbers, how can they do that if they only have 85% the industrial capacity of the germans????

And doesnt it seem just a little strange that these vastly superior German Tanks that we keep getting lectured on were unable to make any significant progress in the most significant tank Battles of the war, not just Kursk, but a whole string of them. 

The facts are the Russians did win by numbers, but the T-34 was a tank good enough in quality to send the finest army in the world into utter and total defeat. It needed numbers and some quality to do that


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## Juha (Dec 24, 2009)

Hello Soren
From Yugoslav tests of 1960s, guns vs armor 

75mm M40 PaK40 firing AP, HVAP and HEAT against T-34/85

M39 AP (PzGr.39?) penetrates glacis @ 1300m
M39 AP penetrates upper side hull @ 1750m, 350 BHN steel 45mm @ 40deg
M39 AP penetrates side turret @ 1750m

And according to German data, Penetration vs homogenous armour at 30º from vertical, PzGr.39:
74mm/1500m and 64mm/2000m. So I don’t see that the results supported your claim that the cast armour of the turret was significantly poorer quality than the armour of the hull or the plates Germans used in their tests.

Merry Christmas to all!
Juha.


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## riacrato (Dec 24, 2009)

parsifal,
although I overall agree with what you say (even though you add an awful lot of pathos sometimes) isn't it equally "dumb" as you put it to say "the tank can't be superior because it didn't win the battles for its nations"? Really to me that sounds just as dumb as saying mass produceability isn't a key factor.


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> Did the T34's defeat the German tanks? Yes, with alarming frequency.



Really? According to all the sources I have the T-34, while proving a shock to the Germans, didn't fair too well even in 1941, and by 1942 it was being put to complete shame by the StuG III PzIV.

The war in the east was a numbers game, and the Soviets were able to produce far more tanks than the Germans were.

It is odd how many people seem to ignore that the Germans were fighting a war on 4 fronts, the west, east, south and northern africa. The Germans while producing great tanks quite simply couldn't produce enough of them to supply all these fronts. 

The T-34 wasn't the key to victory in the east, Hitler decision to fight a war against 2 other superpowers in the west was however.

Sorry but the T-34 just gets far more credit than it deserves IMO. Ofcourse it played role in Germany's defeat, it was there and it fought, but it wasn't unique and better tanks could be built at a similar price. The Sherman tank was a superior combat vehicle if you ask me.


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

Glider said:


> From what you are saying the 37mm could penetrate the T34 and the 50mm L42 couldn't which you must admit, sounds lacking in common sense in particular as the Germans upgunned the Pz III as fast as they could from the 37mm, to the 50mm and then as quickly to the 50mm L60



Where did I say anything like that? Look at the tables I listed, the 5cm gun performs better than the 3.7cm gun with similar ammunition. 

If you're refering to me saying that the Germans were traumatized seeing their 5cm shells just glance off the T-34 glacis plate, then I am gonna have to ask what that has to do with the turret? The glacis plate is front upper hull plate incase you didn't know it.


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

Parsifal said:


> I see the tank theorists are hard at it again pedalling the same old half truths that conveniently ignore the big picture that doesnt conform to their view on the course and outcomes of the war. Looking at the results produces a totally opposing appraisal of the T-34 as a war winner and army beater.



Sorry but that's just complete nonesense. Look at how well the T-34 faired once the upgunned StuG's and PzIV's arrived in 1942, the T-34s were being slaughtered on the battlefield. Heck even in 1941 the Germans managed to cope with it.

The T-34 could be built in great numbers, but also had to because of its rather poor performance in the field.

I would btw also like know how on earth you came to the conclusion that Germany lost 80% of its tanks in the east? Remember that there's a further 3 fronts to take into account here.

Next come your claim that the Soviet Union only possessed 85% of the industrial potential of Germany... erm, where is that from? Shall we compare the mass of material produced by each country during the war and see who actually made the most?


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Soren
> From Yugoslav tests of 1960s, guns vs armor
> 
> 75mm M40 PaK40 firing AP, HVAP and HEAT against T-34/85
> ...



Forgive me for believing more in the controlled tests conducted at Aberdeen in Germany during the war than some Yugoslavian test done 20 years later with old worn guns firing old ammunition. Such a thing affects MV and armour penetration performance more than you know.


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## Juha (Dec 24, 2009)

Hello Soren
the main point was that the upper side and turret side offered same protection which was probable what was Soviet aim when they designed the turret. So same gun with same ammo could pierce 350 BHN steel 45mm @ 40deg and 75mm cast steel @20deg from vertical from same max range. Conclusion, if a gun was incapable to pierce the upper side armour it was also incapable to pierce the turret side armour. And the test were made against real T-34-85.

Merry Christmas to all!
Juha.


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

All that proves Juha is that the 3.7cm gun was lethal against the side hull as-well. I guess the problem with the turret is mention in the book because it infact was very thick, but the cast armour just didn't provide the protection the thickness implied it would. So it probably came as a surprise to Soviet tankers when they saw their own tanks being knocked out by 3.7cm hits to the side turret. 

One thing is clear, with APCR the 3.7cm AA gun was capable of puching through the T-34's side armour from 1,000m if the side angle was straight. But in combat it seldom is. Therefore I doubt many kills if any were achieved at such a range with the 3.7cm weapons. But at ranges of 200 to 300m the 3.7cm gun packs more than enough punch with APCR to overcome a slight side angle, and considering that AA guns are fully automatic, a burst of fire from that range would've been lethal to the T-34. From the front the T-34 had little to fear from light AA guns.


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## m kenny (Dec 24, 2009)

Soren said:


> .
> 
> I would btw also like know how on earth you came to the conclusion that Germany lost 80% of its tanks in the east? Remember that there's a further 3 fronts to take into account here.




For 1944 of the 7717 a total of 4450 were lost in the East.


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## Juha (Dec 24, 2009)

Soren
Quote from Your own message #26 : ” The German figures… were conducted against… 265 to 350 BHN for 7.5cm to 3.7cm guns…”

And T-34-85 upper side armour was 350 BHN steel 45mm @ 40deg from vertical.
And German figures for 3.7cm K.w.K L/45 with Pzgr 40 ie APCR from Jentz: Panzertruppen 1 p. 283 are 64m/100m and 31mm/500m, 30deg from vertical.

From those facts IMHO you might have difficulties to convince others to believe your conclusion
Quote:” One thing is clear, with APCR the 3.7cm AA gun was capable of puching through the T-34's side armour from 1,000m if the side angle was straight.”

Because at least the normal AP shell of 3.7cm Flak weighted exactly same as that of 3.7cm Pak and the muzzle velocity of AA gun was only little higher, 770m/s vs 745 m/s. Probably also APCR shots were same if normal AAA battery had any of them, because of they were not very common, see production figures I gave earlier. Of course burst of APs might have effect on fairly hard armour of the upper side. Also I would not be surprised if some 34-85 turretswere substandard cast, during mass production it is always possible that some products are "Monday quality" as for ex some of glacis of Panthers were.

Merry Christmas to all!
Juha.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2009)

[_QUOTE=riacrato;609423]parsifal,
although I overall agree with what you say (even though you add an awful lot of pathos sometimes) isn't it equally "dumb" as you put it to say "the tank can't be superior because it didn't win the battles for its nations"? Really to me that sounds just as dumb as saying mass produceability isn't a key factor.[/QUOTE]_
Possibly I didnt get the point out. In the end, the armed services of a nation and its associated hardware must achieve as much as possible of its political leaderships objectives, as cheaply as possible. The T-34 helped the Russian leaderships objectives be obtained. The German leadership achieved none of its wartime goals, and the hardware attached to its army contributed to that failure. But why. Any objective analysis is going to reveal the a marked qualitative superiority in German equipment, of just about every category, but a shortage in numbers. Given that the german industrial indexes are considerably higher in Germany than they are in Russia, the only way this can be explained is the relatively high cost of equipment made in Germany, and the relatively low cost in Russia.

The second part of the wquation is the effectiveness of that cheap equipment, of which the T-34 is a premier example. I have heard all sorts of fantastic loss exchange rates over the years, and none of them stand up to a great deal of scrutiny. Some loss rates of 20 or even 30 to 1 have been mentioned over the years by some. That may have happed on isloated occasions, but the reality from a strategic perspective is that the T-34, destroyed, captured or immobilized nearly the same number of german AFVs than their own losses. Roughly speaking, 20000 T-34s were lost destroying, capturing or disabling something in the order of 16000 enemy AFVs. These are rough numbers, other sources show that the total losses in T-34s in battle were just 12000. and that in exchange the T-34 equipped forces destroyed close to the same number of AFVs (not including Halftracks and the like) 


It is impossible to separate the political effects of the military (and its equipment) from its basic statistics, which might explain your conclusion that I rely on pathoss too much. Its not pathos, its an acknowledgement of that crucial relationship


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2009)

Soren said:


> Sorry but that's just complete nonesense. Look at how well the T-34 faired once the upgunned StuG's and PzIV's arrived in 1942, the T-34s were being slaughtered on the battlefield. Heck even in 1941 the Germans managed to cope with it.
> 
> The T-34 could be built in great numbers, but also had to because of its rather poor performance in the field.
> 
> ...



M Kenny gives a better breakdown of the loss rates for the Germans in their AFVs that is far better than anything I can produce. As you can see from his figures, 75-80 % of Tank losses are attributed to activities in the east front, which is a very neat correlation to the percentage of man days, as a proportion total force pool. In other words, 80% of losses in equipment equates to the fact that 80% of the German army was deployed to the east. 

Also your claims of decimation for the T-34 simply dont add up in a strategic sense. As I have said previously, 20000 lost to capture or destroy roughly 16000 AFVs is not corroborating your claims that they were massacred. In a strategic sense they were not being massacred. 

My sources on the superior german industrial index comes from a number of well respected sources, but as a starting point includes Overy and Ellis's work on the wartimes economies. Ellis produces some easily understood tables that shows prewar, in terms of all the major industrial indices, coal, iron ore, copper, in particular, the Germans were enjoying a lead in production. In terms of available factory space they enjoyed a lead of nearly two to one. 

In steel production figures are particularly revealing and explode the myth that Germany was outclased in her industrial potential compared to the Soviets. In 1942, the Russians produced 9.7 million metric tons of mild steel, compared to 50.6 m metric tons in Germany. In coal production, the Germans produced 408 m metric tons, to 75.5. There were exceptions in productive outputs, most significantly in oil and associated products, but it is not true that the germans were industrially outclassed by the Russian. What the Russians did do was to fully mobilize their economy to a war footing, but even this allowance cannot account for the vastly superior outputs of finished products by the Russians in comparison to the germans. The Germans should have been outproducing the Russians from 1942-45, even taking into account the effects of bombing and shortages (USSBS estimates that bombing accounted for 5% of german production in 1942, 10% in 1943, 40% in 1944), and not including the potential production sources from the occupied territories. 

Only if the cost of equipment is included into the equation can the relatively low outputs of German industry be explained. The reasons for this high cost are varied, but theyr are legitimate costs just the same


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## riacrato (Dec 24, 2009)

To say Germany didn't achieve any of its wartime goals is flat out wrong. That the equipment they produced and used contributed to their defeat is ultimately an empty statement as in the total war fought every single aspect contributed to the outcome to some degree. The impact of the equipment deployed is minimal to that of the strategic decisions that were made. Would Germany have won the war if they had T-34s and the Russians Pz IV/V/VIs? Certainly not.

When you complain about the expensiveness of German equipment or the comparably low production numbers you deliberately show only half of the truth so your argumentation essentially mirrors that of the Panzer-koolaid-fans you critizise. That German leadership dragged out the decision to go to full wartime production is not the equipments fault. That the major AFV of the second half of the war was the assault gun series which is on the same level as the T-34 series when it comes to cost effectiveness is also forgotten.


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## syscom3 (Dec 24, 2009)

parsifal 

The German tanks were good, but not good enough to totally offset the limitations of the T-34.

In a war of attrition where you have a lot of opponents, you better be magnitudes better. And the Soviets used the T-34 to the best of its advantages and ended up winning when it counted.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2009)

_


riacrato said:



To say Germany didn't achieve any of its wartime goals is flat out wrong. That the equipment they produced and used contributed to their defeat is ultimately an empty statement as in the total war fought every single aspect contributed to the outcome to some degree. The impact of the equipment deployed is minimal to that of the strategic decisions that were made. Would Germany have won the war if they had T-34s and the Russians Pz IV/V/VIs? Certainly not.

When you complain about the expensiveness of German equipment or the comparably low production numbers you deliberately show only half of the truth so your argumentation essentially mirrors that of the Panzer-koolaid-fans you critizise. That German leadership dragged out the decision to go to full wartime production is not the equipments fault. That the major AFV of the second half of the war was the assault gun series which is on the same level as the T-34 series when it comes to cost effectiveness is also forgotten.[/QUOTE

Click to expand...

_


riacrato said:


> ]
> 
> What war aims did the germans achieve? They achieved victories a plenty, certainly, but according to Moltke, the great german theorist on warfare, "war is an extension of policy". That is a truism that holds as much today as when it was first written. The Germans could not claim to have achieved any of their main war aims because they were so utterly defeated at the end of it all. In the narrower context of the war in the east the claims to success are even less. In terms of the Barbarossa objectives, none of the geographic, political or even military objectives were ever achieved. These were incidentally, the capture of western Europe, in particular Moscow Leningrad (and subsequently) Stalingrad. The political objectives of the campaign was the collapse of the communist regime, whilst the miltary objectives was the complete destruction of Russian military machine. None of these objectives were achieved, though it was not for want of trying. In large measure it was the failure of the machines of war that contributed to this failure, for example, the extremely low serviceability rates of their tanks is often stated as a reason for their failure in Taifun.
> 
> ...


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## riacrato (Dec 24, 2009)

The war didn't start with the invasion of the SU.

If you have solid figures about production costs please post them.

Germany considered the T-34 for lack of a comparable design. That means if they did they would've won the war. Great logic.

You compare the loss figures of a single design to all German AFVs lost. Even if it's the most important tank it's still presenting selective facts.



> Your position is yet another attempt at perpetuating the lie that germany was robbed of her rightful victory...




It's pretty clear where you are coming from. Good night.


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

Parsifal whats up with you atm ? You're posting nonesense.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2009)

riacrato said:


> The war didn't start with the invasion of the SU.
> 
> If you have solid figures about production costs please post them.
> 
> ...



My position is to cross check the strategic truths that led to victory to some of the claims made in this place and others

Finding reliable figures on equipment costs is hard to find, but they can be found. And the industrial weighted production indices says pretty much everything that needs to be said in this regard. Oh Ive got dollar figures on AFV costs, but the strategic indices offer a much better idea of what was happening 

Sorry that the truth doesnt sit well with your concept of how the war was fought and won. Genuinely sorry if my delivery of that message offended you. Hope that you come back and talk further. Your current presentation however does not persuade me in any way to modify my opinions and conclusions. That is, the Germans lost the war, having achieved none of their strategic objectives, in either the west or eastern fronts. The Russians were outlclassed in their industrial capacity at the beginning of the war, by a wide margin, but still managed to outproduce the germans by a wide margin. This can partly be explained by the low unit costs of Russian items of manufacture...their simplicity, crude finishes and the like, and the losses to their tank forces after the initial disaster in 41-2 were not nearly as one sided as some suggest. Unless it can be argued that somehow the T-34 was not puling its weight in killing German tanks, then does it not stand to reason that 50% of the available tank forces in the later ear inventory is going to account fopr 50% of the losses inflicted on the Germans


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

Ok, picked up my books on the T-34, so lets get the real facts on the table here:

1. Exactly 58,681 T-34's of all types were built during WW2, of that some *45,000* T-34's were lost in combat during the war, these are the official Soviet WW2 statistics for the tank.

2. A total of more than *100,000* Soviet AFV's were destroyed during the war (This includes lendlease). So the T-34 made up for atleast 40% of all Soviet tank losses!

3. The Germans lost approx. 42,000 AFV's in all during the war on all fronts, 70% were lost on the eastern front. Thats 29,400 AFV's lost on the eastern front, and most of these by AT guns, mines infantry, while many were simply abandoned and blown up later in the war in order to prevent them from getting in the hands of the Soviets. The total number of AFV's built by Germany during the war was 46,936. 

Sources: 
_T-34 Mythical Weapon_ by Robert Michulec Miroslaw Zientarzewski 
_T-34 in action_ by Artem Drabkin Oleg Sheremet


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

So I will repeat what I've said before; 

The T-34, while not a bad tank, wasn't anywhere near being the best allround tank of the war. It initially proved a shock to the Germans in 1941, the Germans never expecting the Soviets to come up with a tank which would pose any match for their then current Pz.III's IV's. However fortunately for the Germans the T-34, while hard to knock out frontally with the by then std. AT guns (3.7cm to 5cm PaK KwK guns), had some serious flaws which allowed to the Germans to deal with effectively even in 1941. 

The T-34 was lacking in these key areas:

1. Communication (The tank lacked any form of radio, and communication was conducted with colored flag signals!)

2. Ergonomics (The interior was cramped, not well layed out and the turret only housed to two crew members, the commander having to act as gunner as-well)

3. Sighting equipment (The T-34 lacked proper optics of any kind, and once buttoned up featured far less visibility than most other tanks)

4. Armour quality (The turret was made from cast armour which isn't anywhere near as strong as RHA, further the parts of the armour which were made up from RHA were so brittle than internal spalling caused by weapons which didn't even penetrate was a real hazard for the crew)

All of this pretty much ensured that by 1942 onwards the T-34 was put completely to shame by German tanks, the StuG III PzIV both enjoying overwhelming succes fighting it, and for tanks such as the Tiger the T-34 was mostly just gunfodder.


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## m kenny (Dec 24, 2009)

Soren said:


> 1. Exactly 58,681 T-34's of all types were built during WW2, of that some *45,000* T-34's were lost in combat during the war, these are the official Soviet WW2 statistics for the tank.



It is not 'Official' rather a collection of stats from Krivosheev.


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

m kenny said:


> It is not 'Official' rather a collection of stats from Krivosheev.
> He says that 55,000 Medium tanks were 'recieved' during 1941-45 and this number includes all the LL tanks (M3,M4,Matilda, Churchill ect) that totaled over 7,000 units. That gives a max of 48,000 T34's as recieved.
> Medium losses are given as 44,900 and that again includes the LL losses and some of the pre-war mediums..



No it is not from Kirosheev, it is the sources I listed, and 45,000 T-34's were listed as destroyed. A total of 58,681 being built during the war. 



> Krivosheev says 96,500 tanks and SPG's were lost. Of this total a staggering 33,400 were Light tanks and 44,900 were medium tanks (T-34 and the LL mediums).



Well then Kirosheev obviously forgets about the lendlease tanks, cause the total Soviet tank losses were above 100,000.



> 42,00? More like 50,000. Could you please explain to me where the Germans lost 12,000 AFV's in the West?
> France 1940 was 820, Poland 240 and around 4,000 in NW Europe. That leaves 7,000. Where were they knocked out? Certainly not N Afrika or Italy. I would suggest 5,000 of this missing 7,000 were lost in the East.



42,000 were lost in combat, ~30,000 in the Soviet Union. The rest were lost on all other fronts, including inside Germany itself due to allied bombing etc etc... Around 8,000 being lost combined in NW Europe, N Africa Italy as-well as other places.

The other 10,000 AFV's were given to other countries, lost on the production line due to allied bombing or simply captured.




> All the surveys I have seen say 50% of ALL tanks lost by ALL sides were victims of AP shot. If you want to exclude tanks abandoned or destroyed by the crews then you have to exclude most of the 20,000 Soviet tanks lost in 1941. Strangely not a lot of people want to do that. I wonder why?



lol, are you now claiming that most of the 18,000 soviet tank losses caused during 1941 were due to the crews abandoning them?? Sorry but that doesn't hold any water, esp. not when you check OKW kill figures.



> The production tables given by Jentz and Doyle in_ ' Encyclopedia Of German Tanks Of World War Two' _(AAP 1978) show:
> 
> 27,770 tanks
> 12,175 Stug.
> ...



Yes m kenny, but if you would care to check only 46,936 were built DURING the war! The rest, roughly 5,000, were built BEFORE WW2 m kenny.


[quote="m kenny]Not true and I know I posted a link showing this some time back and that you saw it.[/QUOTE]

That is untrue. And as I explained I have actually seen these so called "optics", and they are piss poor to say the least.

As verteran Soviet tank commander Dmitriy Loza put it:
_"None of the periscopes, even in the commander's cupola, gave us good visibility."_


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## m kenny (Dec 24, 2009)

Soren said:


> No it is not from Kirosheev, it is the sources I listed, and 45,000 T-34's were listed as destroyed.



And where do you think they got their figures? Check Krivosheev (page 251) and you will see.


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## Soren (Dec 24, 2009)

Okay, picked up Kirosheevs book here's what I found:

Total Soviet tank losses = 96,500 
On top of this was another 37,600 armoured vehicles lost. 

Thats a total of 134,100.

He lists German losses as 32,000 in the east. 

According to Hahn total number of German tanks built during the war was 46,936. Total listed as lost in combat is 44,481, which is tanks, TDs, SPWs SPG's.


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## m kenny (Dec 25, 2009)

Soren said:


> Okay, picked up Kirosheevs book here's what I found:
> 
> Total Soviet tank losses = 96,500
> On top of this was another 37,600 armoured vehicles lost.
> ...




As this is the total of all tanks/SPG/Armoured Cars and Tractors then surely you should compare it to the German total-which is 89,000.


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## Glider (Dec 25, 2009)

Some excellent information being put forward by all parties, I and no doubt others appreciate it.


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## parsifal (Dec 25, 2009)

A question, observation at this point. i take it that this massive figure for Soviet Tank losses includes the losses sustained by the pre-war tank park in the 41-42 period, when the Soviets did not know the front end of a tank from the south end of a north bound camel?

Either of you gentlemen care to offer an estimate of the percentage of this total were lost prior to August 1942.


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## riacrato (Dec 25, 2009)

T-26 was a solid pre-war design, absolutely state of the art when it was designed, easily superior to the common Pz II and on par with Pz 35 (t) and Pz 38 (t). Its cannon was capable of endangering early Pz III and IV models. BT series was arguably already ahead of its time when it comes to maneuvering. 

There was no time in the war where Soviet tank design was significantly behind that of Germany or the Western Allies.


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## parsifal (Dec 25, 2009)

Hi Riacrato

I would agree with your last post, but then, similar statements could be said about the french and/or British tanks of the 1940-41 campaigns. What made the early years of the war an absolute massacre of allied and soviet tanks was not their technological backwardness, it was their lack of training and adequate doctrine and leadership (and adequate crew training in the Red Army). . This was a particularly painful and costly lesson for the Soviets, who I believe suffered losses in that 41-42 period of at least 30000 tanks. I am waiting fr comments from Soren, and MK in this respect.


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## m kenny (Dec 25, 2009)

x


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## Kurfürst (Dec 25, 2009)

parsifal said:


> And a T-34 cost less than 1/8 the cost of a Panther Tank......



Source please. How on earth would it, for God's sake? The Panther, being all that advanced and bigger than its precedessors Pz III and IV was only marginally (10-20%) more expensive in terms of both labour hours and financial cost, despite many times as effective. 

Frankly I doubt a Panther would cost more than 20-30% more than a T-34. _Eight times_ more iis utter nonsense..

BTW the Krivosheev figures are interesting in that compared to common perception of masses of T-34s charging ahead followed by hordes of infantry, really the Soviet armored might, especially in the critical year of 1942, was characterized by huge amounts of near-useless light tanks against a comparatively small percentage (though significant in terms of absolute numbers) of medium T-34s and heavy KVs... up to about mid/late-1943, but light tanks still remained a significant element, whereas the Germans almost phased those out from their armory ASAP.


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## m kenny (Dec 25, 2009)

Axis History Forum • View topic - Soviet tank cost


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## Kurfürst (Dec 25, 2009)

It would appear that

*Pz.Kpfw.Panther* 117,100 Reichmarks, for early, without weapons (KwK 42 unit price adds another 12 000 RM), so 130 000 RM top for a complete vehicle.

*T-34* (in 1943) costs between 141822 (factory 183) and 209 300 (factory 112) rubles, say 176 000 rubles. Whether armament etc price is included is unknown.

The* M4 Sherma*n, depending on variant had a unit cost 45 000 - 50 000 $, or anywhere between 100 and 200 thousend Reichsmarks.

Now all we need is a currency conversion between Rubels and Reichsmarks.

Labour hours would be a better comparison, provided they are on equal footing (is it only assembly time for the vehicle, or the labours hours for sub components - engine, gun, materials - included? etc.), but the problem with the thread you provided that a, it gives any sort of labour figure for the T-34, from 3000 hours to 25 000 hours, and b, neither posters gave details of their sources, and what their figures would include.


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## Milosh (Dec 25, 2009)

Just to add to the discussion.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 25, 2009)

In the soviet system the prices in rubles of tanks it's pratically w/o significance.


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## Soren (Dec 25, 2009)

Total German armoured losses (armoured cars tractors included) was 48,140. 

Total Soviet losses were 96,500 tanks and 37,600 other armoured vehicles, which gives a total of 134,100 armoured losses.

So in total:

Soviet tank losses during WW2 in Europe were: *96,500*
German tank losses during WW2 in Europe Africa were: *33,146*
British tank losses during WW2 in Europe Africa were: *15,844*
US tank losses during WW2 in Europe Africa were: *8,199*


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## m kenny (Dec 25, 2009)

Soren said:


> Total German armoured losses (armoured cars tractors included) was 48,140.
> 
> Total Soviet losses were 96,500 tanks and 37,600 other armoured vehicles, which gives a total of 134,100 armoured losses.



Total German losses of tanks/SPG and armoured vehicles (excluding 'tractors) was over 52,000.


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## Soren (Dec 25, 2009)

According to Hahn total German tank losses were 33,146, thats including SPG's. Including armoured cars SPW's the number reaches 48,140. This is the total German armoured loss. So 33,146 tanks lost is around 17,000 less than were produced, which must have gone all round the world, I know Syria got a lot of PzIV's after the war, and the Russians took a lot of German tanks as-well. The Brits US took many back over to themselves as-well, but mostly for evaluation purposes. The Swedes got some too. In short a lot of German tanks left over by the Germans were given out to various countries after the war. Austria Switzerland got some Hetzers also.

Also during the war Hungary, Bulgaria Italy both recieved a good number of tanks from the Germans, and these wouldn't have been listed in the German loss figures.

I have also seen pictures with lots of German tanks stacked together after the war. So I am wondering how many tanks the Germans had left by 1945, and how many had simply disappeared. There were however no doubt more tanks available in 1945 than there were trained crew to operate them. 

So maybe ~17,000 tanks of all types, SPGs etc etc were left after the war, but not all situated in Germany ofcourse.


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## parsifal (Dec 26, 2009)

In todays money., 1 Russian ruble equals $ 0.03 USD. If there are roughly 2.5 RM to the dollar, and the exchange rate for rubles to dollars is about the same, then the conversion is about 0.08 RM per rouble, thats a conversion rate of 12. That means, on your own figures that a T-34 in some state of readiness is about 1/9 to 1/10 the cost of a Panther. There was no real conversion rate applicable during the war, at least not one that I am aware of, but it would have been in the general vicinity of the quoted exchange rate 

Whilst i agree with Vincenzo, that a straight conversion of Roubles to westen currencies is not very accurate, in general terms this does demonstrate just how cheaply the T-34 could be built for. 

A far better way of gauging the cost of Soviet armemtns is to look at the Industrial indices of the two countries....bottom line is this. Germany enjoyed a considerable advantage in basic industrial potential over the USSR, but which was made even more pronounced by the effects of the occupied teritories and the foreign suppliers like Sweden and Spain. Despite this, the Germans could not compete in terms of finished products (ie military hardware) even when fully mobilized (1942 to 1945)and under very good economic management (ie Speer). Some of the reason for that relatively low output is the high cost of items under construction. Admittedly the Nazi sytems for controlling industrial output were innefficient and wasteful, but that still has to be included in the unit costs. The use of slave labour is a shallow expedient that contains hidden costs that actually push up the costs of production (sabotage, low outputs pe square metre of factory space, high failure rates that in turn require returns to the line for repair which in turn cause disruptions to output, low levels of expertise in t he factories, no pride of workmanship,etc etc ).

The cost of a Sherman was actually $33500, delivered stateside, according to the contracts signed between the US government and the Chrysler corporation.

The RM12000 cost is the cost of a towed 75 mm AT gun, but I am not sure this is transferable to a Panther tank. Not completely sure, but I think the cost exclusive of armament means, no turret. I have a number of sources that state the cost of a Panther, fully equipped, run in and delivered was RM180K, whilst a Tiger finished and delivered to a similar standard, was RM 312K.

The Germans conversely produced cheap and very effective small arms, their MG 42s and SMG production was world class. Complex machines like Tanks, using unskilled labour, with high end technologies like German tank designs of the late war period was bound to lead to massive cost blowouts. The beauty of the Russian designs is, however that whilst they possessed adequate capability, they were just dirt cheap and very easy to construct...just the thing for Russian industry of the time, and more than adequate to defeat the limited numbers of german tanks that could be turned out to face them.


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## riacrato (Dec 26, 2009)

Hi parsifal
Imo, comparing monetary costs under total war conditions is meaningless no matter how you put it. For military goods they are even very debatable under peacetime conditions. The company I am working for sells engines way below market price to military customers for a variety of reasons among them contractual obligations.

To act as if occupied resources can be transformed 1:1, especially if you refer not to raw materials but complex workforce and secondary products, is faulty as well. I guess we should count Iraqi resources to that of the US now.

Finally, taking a highly aggregated statistic such as an index and derive conclusions from that to a single variable (unit costs), especially if you portray them as definitive as you do, is misleading at best.

All they can do is give a rough indication. The figure itself is problematic especially under wartime conditions. Any index given for Germany from 1941-45 and for Russia in the forced industrialization period is subject to debate itself. The industrial situation is too volatile to be measured by indices that were tailored to peacetime conditions. Effects like bombing of factories and moreover the logistical system, the draft of qualified workforce and replacement by kids, women and old men (even than not 1:1 numerical parity with peacetime workforce) are even today not really understood. The method you take for deriving your conclusion ('German industrial index is x times that of the Russian, Russian output in category i is y times that of the German, therefor German products in category i is z times as expensive') is way too simplistic to capture the complexity.

The only useful comparison would be man hours and amount of critical raw materials at any given point in the war. With the first (to some degree also the second) number(s) you will again have the problem of cost degression that will have fully kicked in for the T-34 by the time the Pz V is still in prototype stage, leading to an 'unfair' evaluation with regards to design potential (nevertheless valid for comparison).

I agree the Soviet tank designs were perfect for their industrial system. I have a hard time believing you can just apply these systems at will. Can you say that because a German tank factory built in the 30s could churn out 20 Pz 4s per month it could also churn out 40 T34s per month because the latter was half the cost according to your calculation based on comparing indices?


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## Juha (Dec 26, 2009)

Hello Soren
Yes, Germany exported tanks, but numbers were under 10% of the number you suggested. 1224 tanks, StuGs and Marders were exported to Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland and Slovakia. Those incl Pz35(t)s and Pz38(t)s, many of which were manufactured before occupation of Czech. Those which went to Switzerland were sold by Czechoslovakia after WWII, some of which were completed after the war. Germany never exported AFVs to Syria during WWII, those which ended there after the war were either from someone’s warbooty or some of those exported during the war to over mentioned countries and sold later to Syria. And before the war Germany exported some PzIs to China and to Spain. IIRC the number exported to China was 100 or 200.

On the other hand Germany lost numerous ex-French and ex-Italian tanks and StuGs and those must be added to Germany’s losses.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 26, 2009)

riacrato said:


> Hi parsifal
> Imo, comparing monetary costs under total war conditions is meaningless no matter how you put it. For military goods they are even very debatable under peacetime conditions. The company I am working for sells engines way below market price to military customers for a variety of reasons among them contractual obligations.
> 
> To act as if occupied resources can be transformed 1:1, especially if you refer not to raw materials but complex workforce and secondary products, is faulty as well. I guess we should count Iraqi resources to that of the US now.
> ...



All valid points, I agree, you can never achieve a truly satisfactory comparison, the best that can be done with the information that we seem to have to work with is to use what are called surrogate measures, to estimate the relative costs of the items concerned. Thats why figures like steel outputs, factory space, manhours and unit costs are in the end only surrogates (substitutes) for the true oncost of the items we are comparing. Whilst to rely on monetary costs alone is dangerous, I think you being too dismissive of its value, it is a valid indicator of cost, but one needs to be careful with drawing too many conclusions from that one piece of data. But when this information is used in conjunction with other indicators, and those other indicators also show a similar trend of low production costs, the weight of evidence starts to definately suggest that indeed the t-34 was far cheaper than its opponents 

However, this much we do know. Germany had an industrial index at least as great as the Soviets pre-war, and by the end of 1941, it was at least 30% greater , due to the overrunning of much of European Russia. That is not my observation, it is evident in the generally accepted industrial indexes like steel and coal production. In th period 1942-5 the Germans fully mobilized their economy and did not mismanage it in the way they had 1939-41. The economic effects of the occupied territories, whilst not directly transferrable as you say, nevertheless had an effect (for example I seem to recall athat fully 30% of the vehicle park for Barbarossa was from vehicles of foreign manufacture). It would be a brave man indeed to try and argue that Germany lacked the potential to completely eclipse the USSR in industrial output. Yet in terms of actual output of hardware, the Germans were completely out-produced. The reasons for this were complex and multi-dimensional, but I am sure that at least some of this was the low cost of production for Soviet items, versus the high cost of German items. Bombing only ever had a limited effect on production, until 1944, though the indirect effects of bombing were felt more quickly (eg the re-direction of aircraft production to fighters, and the recall of assets to the defene of germany)

The dollar costs of individual unts is, i admit a crude and inaccurate way of measuring the true cost, but it is one of the factors that need to be looked at when determinng military outputs. And it cannot be denied that their is a massive difference in the apparent costs of German military equipment, to that equipment used to equip Soviet forces (eg the T-34 versus the Panther). This is not intended to be an excervise in anti-germanic propaganda, or proSoviet propaganda for that matter, simply to understand why German miliatry outputs were so low when compared to those of her opponents. in the case of the Soviets, it should have ben them who were outclassed in the military output..... 

If the Germans had started producing T-34s, I doubt they could have produced them a efficiently as the Soviets. however, the low standards of finish applied to the T-34 and the general lack of finesse leads to believe that the germans could have considerably increased their overall output of tanks. Speer certainly strongly advocated the adoption of a simpler, more easily produced tank park throughout his tenure...


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## Kurfürst (Dec 26, 2009)

m kenny said:


> Total German losses of tanks/SPG and armoured vehicles (excluding 'tractors) was over 52,000.



and



m kenny said:


> I make German tank* and* SPG losses as 50,000.



Care to provide a source for this? It seems self-contradictory, and based on a simple assumption that all German tanks and SPGs were lost by the end of the war. Which seems inaccurate anyway, for the number I've seen on Panzerworld indicate that the Heer still possessed around 10 000 tanks and SPGs by the end of 1944..

That and the fact that it appears that Hahn (who I have a very high opinion of) states that total German tank and SPG losses were 33,146 during the war, a far more believable figure.

If we are to measure combat effectiveness of the units, it must be based on their combat or combat related losses.


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## Juha (Dec 26, 2009)

Hello Kurfürst
not bothering to dig out my copies of Hahn's books, up to where his loss figures go, during the last few months of war Germany lost almost all of its AFVs, I don't recall mass surrenders of armoured vehicles save those in Norway and Denmark. For ex those Pzdivs which fought their way from East to surrender to Allies had very few tanks left.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Dec 26, 2009)

parsifal said:


> In todays money., 1 Russian ruble equals $ 0.03 USD. If there are roughly 2.5 RM to the dollar, and the exchange rate for rubles to dollars is about the same, then the conversion is about 0.08 RM per rouble, thats a conversion rate of 12. That means, on your own figures that a T-34 in some state of readiness is about 1/9 to 1/10 the cost of a Panther.



You can't compare based on today's conversion rates.... 

According to Axishistory poster, the (fixed) conversion rate was 1 US dollar = 5,3 Rubel during WW2. That would translate to something like 32 000 USD for a T-34, assuming 170k Rubel price tag.

The conversion rate between the USD and the RM is a different matter, I have seen anything from 2.5 to 4:1. That would mean that the 130 000 RM unit price for an armed Panther would cost anywhere between 32 500 and 52 000 USD, practically the same as the T-34 (32k USD) or the M4 Sherman (figures ranging from $33500 ie. Chrysler to 55-64 000 USD, i.e. M4A6 as per Panzerworld).

Certainly there was nothing like many times the cost difference involved between these tanks. The Panther may have been somewhat more expansive, given its bigger size, more complex gun etc., but it was not significant. A telling figure is that in-house, where figures were certainly comparable, the Germans calculated the costs in both man hours and RM of the Panther being only about 20% greater than the much smaller and simplier Panzer III.




parsifal said:


> A far better way of gauging the cost of Soviet armemtns is to look at the Industrial indices of the two countries....bottom line is this. Germany enjoyed a considerable advantage in basic industrial potential over the USSR, but which was made even more pronounced by the effects of the occupied teritories and the foreign suppliers like Sweden and Spain. Despite this, the Germans could not compete in terms of finished products (ie military hardware) even when fully mobilized (1942 to 1945)and under very good economic management (ie Speer).



As other have noted, the pitfalls are far too numerous to make any valid conclusion. The German industry was not mobilized until 1943; the outputs and priorities were decided differently on the strategic level, and the products are not comparable (ie. you can compare tank production, but how do you factor in say radar production or submarine/naval production, an area where the Soviets were near non-existent..?)






parsifal said:


> The use of slave labour is a shallow expedient that contains hidden costs that actually push up the costs of production (sabotage, low outputs pe square metre of factory space, high failure rates that in turn require returns to the line for repair which in turn cause disruptions to output, low levels of expertise in t he factories, no pride of workmanship,etc etc ).



Except that the much vaunted 'slave-labourers' were not much used in active production. I can grab a peasant women in Ukraine, give him a blowtorch and then whip her until she fells, she still won't weld hull elements together. She may help moving parts and stuff around, and sweep the floor in the factory, but she still doesn't do any active production. 




parsifal said:


> The cost of a Sherman was actually $33500, delivered stateside, according to the contracts signed between the US government and the Chrysler corporation.



As always, it depends on the factory contracted, the type being built and which order batch we are talking about. 

Product prices



parsifal said:


> The RM12000 cost is the cost of a towed 75 mm AT gun, but I am not sure this is transferable to a Panther tank.



I looked up both PW and Spielberger (probably the source of PW) and it states the 12 000 RM cost is for the 7.5cm KwK 42, ie. the gun used in the Panther.




parsifal said:


> The beauty of the Russian designs is, however that whilst they possessed adequate capability, they were just dirt cheap and very easy to construct...just the thing for Russian industry of the time, and more than adequate to defeat the limited numbers of german tanks that could be turned out to face them.



I am in complete agreement with that.


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## m kenny (Dec 26, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> I've seen on Panzerworld indicate that the Heer still possessed around 10 000 tanks and SPGs by the end of 1944.




As of 30 Dec 1945 tank/Stug totals were 8,000. No SP info.


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## Juha (Dec 26, 2009)

Hello Kenny
M-H figures
Bestand 1. Feb 45 6.191 Pz of which 5.577 “frontfähigen”, 6.501 StuGs StuHs StuPzs and JgPzs, of which 6.277 “frontfähigen” and 670 Pak/Sfl. Summe all 13.362 of which 12.524 “frontfähigen”.

Verluste Summe Mai 1941 bis Jan 45 18.966 pzs, 7.231 StuGs StuHs StuPzs and JgPzs and 2.265 Pak/Sfl

Juha

ADDITION: The loss figures probably lacked the Pz35(t)s lost by 6th PzD from June 41 to March 42 because there was no Pz35(t) losses shown, a note also states that Pz35(t) “waren ab 1941 nicht mehr im Feldheer vorhanden.” 6th Pz had on 22.6.41 155 Pz35(t) and got at least 2 replacements and lost all its Pz35(t)s before it was withdrawn to West in Spring 42.


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## syscom3 (Dec 26, 2009)

Its obvious that the T34 was less effective against the Panther, its only true opponant. But it could it hold its own when in battle when visibility dropped to the point where it didnt matter how good the Panthers 75mm was, as the T34's gun (75mm or 85mm, doesnt matter) was within its effective range.

But in the critical year of 1942, it was far superior to whatever the Germans had. In 1943, It was still better than whatever the Germans could field in quantity. And since those were the two years that decided the fate of the war in Europe, then we can say it was the best tank at the right time, for when it counted.

Soren, answer my question: If the vaunted Panther couldnt operate due to terrain or weather conditions, but a lesser design from your adversary is operating and attacking your army, which is the superior one?


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## Glider (Dec 27, 2009)

Soren said:


> Juha which weapon did I mention first? The AA gun or the Pak36??
> 
> I mentioned the Pak36 because I had the Aberdeen test results for that gun, and if that gun was dangerous at 1,000m then you can be sure the 3.7cm AA gun was as-well!



Another question for you Soren. If the T34/85 was in service from 1944, how did the 37mm AA guns knock them out with ammunition that hadn't been produced in any numbers since 1942 and as far as I can see there is no evidence that this ammunition was ever fired from the AA guns. The only reference I can find is for an AP shell.


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## parsifal (Dec 27, 2009)

Official exchange rates are very misleading in the case of the the Soviets, since it was illegal to take currency out of the country without government approval, and the Soviet currency was not on the gold standard until after Stalin (if I recall correctly. The sviets grossly inflated the value of their own currency for reasons known only to them. The real exchange rate (if you could call it that), was about $0.05 per Rouble during the war, which explains why the Soviet citizens were always happy to deal in USD over their own domestic currency. This is a situation that continues to this day....local p[eople do not believe in the value of the currency even today.

I agree that none of these standards are accurate in themselves. However they are valid surrogate measures, and whilst it might be valid to dismiss one or two of them as aberrations and not representative, it becomes a bit implausible to mount that argument when all the surrogate indicators point in the opposite direction. Economics is a science, but it becomes imprecise, and somewhat based on guesswork when incomplete information is all there is to go on.

We can argue all day long about the accuracy of these figures, but this wont get us any closer to understaning why Germany, with an Industrial index much greater than the Soviets prewar, on the basis of nearly all the accepted indicators, was far more powerful that the USSR, but in terms of actual outputs delivered was far less efficient. 

Some have argued that the Germans were engaging some of their industrial potential in other fields, such as electronics and naval construction. Radar I think is a valid point, but then it is not widely known that the Soviets constructed and maintained over 2000 ground station radars of their own, based on Allied technologies. Also, the Soviets outproduced the Germans in tems of surface ships during the war, and were only slightly behind in submarine production. They also built huge river flotillas in the thousands, which the germans did not. My opinion is that all these swirling reasons for the dissipation of GTerman industrial potential can be met by equally strange dispersal of effort in the Soviet camp....why would the Soviets need nearly 500 submarines for example 

Geran oncosts are in my opinion high because of the low production runs, the high costs of the technology that was put into them, and because the German auto industry from pre-war days had always concentrated on quality, and were inexperienced in mas production techniques. Throughout the interwar period, German car ownership rates remained very low for a developed western nation. I think it very significant that huge proportions of the soft skinned vehicle parks were from foreign manufacture, and that the German output of soft skinned vehicles....about 300000, was so badly dwarfed by the USA (over 2000000). 

Another area of weakness for the German Industrial complex was the very regime itself. Whereas in the US the competitive tender process was just that, so that the contract price arrived at between the General Board and Chrysler of $33500 per unit, was transferrable to most of the other contracts such as GMs arrangements, the same cannot be said in the case of German industry. (Chryslers contract, incidentally was responsible for something like 30% of the Sherm,an deliveries during the war, at what is today known as the TACAM plant.....its a huge complex). In the case the competitive tender process was often corrupted by the regime, and there were often compensatory contracts issued to competing designs which, inreality served only to make the process even less efficient.

Panther tanks were not RM130K, the stated cost does not include armement, which means, I now believe, they were delivered without turrets. The cost of a turret was not RM 12.5K. That is the cost of the gun. The turret assembly and its fitting shot the cost of the Panther all the way up RM180K per unit.

Lastly there is some debate about the exchange rate of the RM. From 1934 until the end of 1941, it hovered at about 2.489 or 2.5, and then from 1942 to the end of the war was totally off the western exchange rates. Exchange rates between Germany and the occupied territories were peged artificailly low in favour of Germany, so that trade terms were heavily weighted in favour of Germany in that period. This seems to have affected the exchange rate adopted of the new currency in 1946, since the new DM emerged with an exchange rate of about 3.3. Properly manage currency is a measure of the nations welath and potential, so while we cant be sure about the exchange rates in the 42-5 period, it seems to me reasonable to assert its was hovering somewhere in the area of 2-5 to 3-0. 

None of this is controversial or seriously disputed in academic circles. You have to keep getting back to the fundamental issues driving this....German AFV production was low, its industrial potential was high, but it had significant problems. This all suggest s very clearly that in those sectors where the Germans lacked a great deal of expertise, they were going to do badly in those areas. Given the absolute necessity of AFVs to the war, and the relative inexperience of German industry in vehicle mass production techniques (this is not questioning the technical espertise of the designs), alomng with thos other handicaps I mentioned, I am at a loss as to why people still dont think that German production costs for these items were high.... 



Germany did excel in production terchniques during the war, particulalry for small arms, but they were never strong on the full implementation of vehicle manufacture mass pro duction techniques, including armoured vehicles, and this drove the unit costs for such items through the roof. This was not helped by the decreasing skills base in the workforce (I mentioned the influx of forced labour, 8 millio of them, which was refuted....I dont accept that, but what is undenaible was the drain of highly skilled tradesman, like toolm,akers, from the workforce to the army particulalry after 1942. Up to that point certain trades were exempt in Germany from military service, but after 1942, this became less and less the case. My own stepfather was a toolmaker, and was called to the colours in 1942, along with a large number of other tradesmen working at the plant he was employed in. He says they were all replaced by foreign tradesman, and the plant prompltly suffered a near 30% loss in productivity as a result


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## Juha (Dec 27, 2009)

Hello Glider
In defence of Soren, BK 3.7cm was airborne version of 3.7cm Flak 18, and LW had developed a very powerful APCR ammo for it, it’s problem was that its penetration power sharply reduced when the hit angle increased/decreased from perpendicular (depends how one gives the hit angle). So if a battery of 3.7cm Flak guns had those special shots it might have been possible that while the upper side armour was impenetrable a bit substandard turret side armour might have been penetrable from 600m, a bit so and so but maybe. Because of this behaviour of the APCR ammo, Ju 87G pilots tried to achieve as close as possible perpendicular hits when attacking Soviet armour..

On German total losses, I would say appr 42.000 panzers, StuG,s StuHs, StuPzs, JgPzs and Pak/Sfls based on M-H's figures, when one takes into account those lost before May 41, those produced during the last couple months of the war and those lost in the last 3+ months of the war unless someone can give info on mass surrenders of AFVs somewhere in Reich in May 45.

Juha

ADDITION: Because SU-76s was also used as SP artllery, IMHO we should add to German losses their SP artillery vehicles, Wespes, Hummels and those build on war booty chassis, say 2.000 losses. That still leaves over 350 SP guns to German hands at the end of the war. Plus appr 1.000 war booty tanks, StuGs etc officially used by WM, so altogerher some 45.000 German losses vs 96.500 Soviet losses + Allied losses in ETO and MTO. And of course to Germany's side clearly smaller losses of its allies.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 27, 2009)

Only a "economic" note this is not only a exchange problem, the price system in soviet union it was not comparable (or not easy) with that in capitalist countries. it's true they called all roubles but all day money, accountancy money for factory, money for foreign trade were not same that in capitalist country. i'm enough old and i take a class (the alone that there was) of comparate economics system and a take the " a choice part" on soviet system for the class of industrial economics


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## Glider (Dec 27, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Glider
> In defence of Soren, BK 3.7cm was airborne version of 3.7cm Flak 18, and LW had developed a very powerful APCR ammo for it, it’s problem was that its penetration power sharply reduced when the hit angle increased/decreased from perpendicular (depends how one gives the hit angle). So if a battery of 3.7cm Flak guns had those special shots it might have been possible that while the upper side armour was impenetrable a bit substandard turret side armour might have been penetrable from 600m, a bit so and so but maybe. Because of this behaviour of the APCR ammo, Ju 87G pilots tried to achieve as close as possible perpendicular hits when attacking Soviet armour..
> 
> On German total losses, I would say appr 42.000 panzers, StuG,s StuHs, StuPzs, JgPzs and Pak/Sfls based on M-H's figures, when one takes into account those lost before May 41, those produced during the last couple months of the war and those lost in the last 3+ months of the war unless someone can give info on mass surrenders of AFVs somewhere in Reich in May 45.
> ...



Juha
Thanks for your comments. I understand that the BK 3.7 was an airbourne version of the Flak guns. My problem is the statement that the T34 85 was vulnerable to flak fire. 
Its a bit like me saying the Crusader III tanks were fine as the 6pd HE shells were effecrtive against AT guns. That would of course be rubbish as the tanks were not given the HE ammunition. If the Flak guns were not given the APCR ammunition then to say that they were a risk to T34/85 tanks is equally rubbish. 

A theoretical risk is not a real risk.


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## parsifal (Dec 28, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Glider
> 
> 
> On German total losses, I would say appr 42.000 panzers, StuG,s StuHs, StuPzs, JgPzs and Pak/Sfls based on M-H's figures, when one takes into account those lost before May 41, those produced during the last couple months of the war and those lost in the last 3+ months of the war unless someone can give info on mass surrenders of AFVs somewhere in Reich in May 45.
> ...




Hi Juha

It seems to me that the loss rates for both the Russians and the germans were skewed by what happened at the very beginning and at the very end of the war. In the case of the Russians, huge numbers of AFVs were lost in 1941 and trhe first half of 1942, for no significant effect on the germans. The Russians were so bad at the use of armour that they really got nothing out of their armour.

Conversely, in the last months of the war, German losses skyrocketed as tanks ran out of fuel and were captured or scuttled by their own crews. 

In both cases, these phenomena skews the result one way or the other. What really needs to happen is to assess the effectiveness of the respective tank parks whilst they could be gainfully used. I would suggest as a rough starting point the assesment be from the end of 1942 through to the end of February 1945, or some other nominated time frame. That way we might get a better idea of the relative performance of each force, whilst they were both effective.....


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

Hello Parsifal
I agree. IMHO for simplicity easiest way is to compare losses of 43-44.
But there was big tank battles in early 45 for ex in Western Hungary where Soviets turned the northern flank of German attack and forced Germans to headlong retreat with massive losses of heavy equipment incl AFVs. The question wasn't so much of lack of supplies but cleaver use of topography by Soviets. They allowed Germans advance deep into a bag before they launched their counter-attack.

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

Soviet losses however also skyrocketed in 1945 where 13,700 Soviet tanks were lost for ~2,700 German tanks. Many of the Soviet tank losses were inflicted by infantry armed with Panzerfausts, where'as most German tanks were simply abandoned and blown up.


Soviet German tank losses by year:

Soviet (Eastern front only) / German (All fronts)
1940: 0 / 822
1941: 20,500 / 2,950
1942: 15,100 / 3,282
1943: 23,500 / 9,594
1944: 23,700 / 14,692
1945: 13,700 / ~2,700


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

Glider said:


> Another question for you Soren. If the T34/85 was in service from 1944, how did the 37mm AA guns knock them out with ammunition that hadn't been produced in any numbers since 1942 and as far as I can see there is no evidence that this ammunition was ever fired from the AA guns. The only reference I can find is for an AP shell.



No evidence that this round was fired from AA guns? What'ever let you to that assumption? 

As the Pak36 was phased out the APCR ammunition was handed over for the AA guns a/c armaments. Plus there was still being made APCR even in 1944, the last stocks of tungsten being prioritized for small caliber ammunition production. 

Anyway you really should be talking to Oleg Drabkihn about this, they're the ones who wrote that German 3.7cm AA guns proved dangerous to the T-34 because of the soft turret armour. I just checked to see if it could be true and according to actual tests it is true. So thats it really.


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

Really Soren
First of all as m_kenny has informed you at least 3 times, the figures you used from Krivoseev as Soviet tank losses are clearly marked in the book as tank AND SP GUN losses as anyone can check from m_kenny’s message #78. Soviet tank losses in 1945 were 8700. And WM had 6284 German made tanks on 1.1.45 according to Müller-Hillebrand, and produced say 1.000 more in 45, so German tank losses were clearly higher than what you claim.

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

Juha said:


> Really Soren
> First of all as m_kenny has informed you at least 3 times, the figures you used from Krivoseev as Soviet tank losses are clearly marked in the book as tank AND SP GUN losses as anyone can check from m_kenny’s message #78. Soviet tank losses in 1945 were 8700. And WM had 6284 German made tanks on 1.1.45 according to Müller-Hillebrand, and produced say 1.000 more in 45, so German tank losses were clearly higher than what you claim.
> 
> Juha



Juha for christ's sake, pay attention will you  I included German SP's in the figures as-well. 

And the German tank SP losses were not higher than the figures I posted, they are exactly as stated by Hahn:

1939: 229
1940: 822
1941: 2,950
1942: 3,282
1943: 9,594
1944: 14,692
1945: ~2,700 + ~2,800

And Hahn's figures are taken directly from the statistics of the Heereswaffenamt ("Rüstungsstand") as explained in his book. So the above figures are the most accurate you will find anywhere Juha and they are the actual losses. The only period of uncertainty is from Feburary 45 to April 45, in which period it is estimated that around 2,000 Germans tanks were lost, most just left behind or blown up by their own crews.


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

Soren
if you want to compare tank, StuG etc losses in 45, the exchange rate becomes even worse to Germans, add 6.000+ StuGs StuHs, StuPzs and JgPzs which WM had on 1.1.45, add production in 45 (3.000+), add Pak/Sfls and SP guns WM had on 1.1.45, appr 1.000 altogether. And WM didn’t have many AFVs left when Germany surrendered; those in Scandinavia, in Reich least 12th A had some, in Northern Italy Germans had surrendered a few days earlier and 26th PzD may well have had some still in strength, in Kurland Pocket there still was some AFVs. But almost all were lost, say 16. – 17.000.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

Are you serious
no losses in May 45 and uncertaintity of losses between Feb and April, so sure info only on losses in Jan 45, no wonder that your figure is so low. And where those some 15.000 German AFVs disappeared? Small green men arrived from outer space and eaten them???

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

Yes I'm serious Juha, and your figures are extremely overblown. Actual German tank SP losses are as stated in my last post.


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

So what is your explanation to where those some 15.000 AFVs ended, they clearly were not in Germans hand when the war ended. So they were lost or... some explanation, please.


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

*1939:*
Tanks: 229
Armoured cars: 101

The figures are total losses

*1940*
Tanks: 822
Armoured cars: 188

*1941:*
Tanks: 2813
StuG: 96
Armoured cars: 535
SPW: 285
SP-guns: 41

*1942*
Tanks: 2952
StuG: 332
Armoured cars: 336
SPW: 383

*1943:*
Tanks: 6479
StuG/Jagdpanzer: 1609
Armoured cars: 1221
SPW: 2673
SP-guns: 1506 (incl. Sturmpanzer)
BIV charge carriers: 227

Figures include losses that were later rebuilt and reissued.

*1944*
Tanks: 7714
StuG/Jagdpanzer: 4910
Armoured cars:936
SPW: 7198
SP-Guns: 2068 (incl. Sturmpanzer)
BIV charge carriers: 68

Figures to include losses that were later rebuilt and reissued.

*1945 - only January:*
Tanks: 707
StuG/Jagdpanzer: 727
Armoured cars: 41
SPW: 796
SP-guns: 141
BIV charge carriers: 6

+ another ~2,700 tanks ~2,800 SP's lost between Feburary April 45, giving a total for 1945 of 6,937.


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

as I wrote earlier on 1 Feb 45 WM had well over 13.000 tanks and StuGs etc in hand, they manyfactured still more, Hahn doesn't have sure info on German AFV losses from that date onwards, you claimed that they were not lost, what happened to them

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

So this would be the final figures.

1939: 229
1940: 822
1941: 2,950
1942: 3,282
1943: 9,594
1944: 14,692
1945: ~2,700 + ~2,800 SP's


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

So You claim that WM had well over 10.000 tanks, StuGs etc when Germany surrendered? Can you give clues where they were? Huge majority were not in combat units, so where they were?


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

Juha said:


> as I wrote earlier on 1 Feb 45 WM had well over 13.000 tanks and StuGs etc in hand, they manyfactured still more, Hahn doesn't have sure info on German AFV losses from that date onwards, you claimed that they were not lost, what happened to them
> 
> Juha



Are you claiming that the Germans lost some 13,000 tanks in combat in the space of 3 months? Sorry but that's just downright ridiculous. A more accurate figure would be less than half that. 

Many of the Panzers which stood intact in May 1945 were within Allied hands and probably never made it to the loss figures seeing they were simply seized by the Allies. The Allies also seized plenty of finished tanks aircraft standing ready at their own factores just waiting to be taken to the front. 

Also what about the thousands of tanks lost to Allied bombing near their own factories in 1945? What about those Juha?

I'm sure that subtracting the amount destroyed by Allied bombing around 5,000 to 6,000 German AFV's were left at wars end, many at their own factories, and many left there because there were no'one to man them. The majority of all these left over tanks were scrapped and remelted after the war.

Yes, a lot more tanks were available and being made in 1945 than there were crews ready to man them.


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

Hello Soren
Quote:” Many of the Panzers which stood intact in May 1945 were within Allied hands and probably never made it to the loss figures seeing they were simply seized by the Allies. The Allies also seized plenty of finished tanks…”

Now Allies captured numerous tanks etc before Germany surrendered, yes? Now usually if enemy captured one’s weapons, the original owner had lost them. Also Soviets captured German tanks etc, so Germans lost them. Yes?

Quote:” Also what about the thousands of tanks lost to Allied bombing near their own factories in 1945?”

How many tanks were lost to Allied bombing in 44 near their own factories, 2-3 times more? After all in 45 Allied have time to bomb only some 4 months, 44 12 months. And the fanny part, IMHO most of us think that if a 500lb bomb hit a panzer and destroyed it, the Germans lost it, so those lost in bombings were also lost. And remember that those 13.000+ in WM’s hand were not in factories, some were of course in tank parks and could be destroyed there, of course, but Germans still lost them. Did VVS bombers ever hit panzers? How many were lost by Soviet bombing, what is your guess?

Quote:” I'm sure that subtracting the amount destroyed by Allied bombing around 5,000 to 6,000 German AFV's were left at wars end, many at their own factories, and many left there because there were no'one to man them.”

Now some were left in their own factories but not in huge numbers, or at least I have never photos which showed hundreds of complete AFVs in German factories after VE Day. And those PzDs, incl 1., 3., 6. and 23.PzDs and 1., 2., 3., 12. SSPzDs, which retreat from Western Hungary to Austria near end of March 45 were almost without AFVs but still had many tankmen left, so there were lot of trained tankmen around without tanks, Stugs etc in Apr 45 near the big tank factories in Austria. Surely Germans tried to use those complete AFVs in factories, at least they send men from Western Front to pick up new JagdTigers from Austrian factories at that time or in March 45, I cannot remember for sure the month.

Juha


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

So German tank SP losses are:

1939: 229
1940: 822
1941: 2,950
1942: 3,282
1943: 9,594
1944: 14,692
1945: 6,937
________________
Total = 38,506 tanks SP's lost

Leaving 8,430 tanks SP's which were in part bombed to destruction in 1945, captured intact at their factories, exported and finally the ones surrendered by the Germans at the end of the war. Of that number roughly 4,000 tanks SP's were left at wars end, most of which were scrapped remelted, the rest being transported to other countries for evaluation or field use. Subtract from the figure also the tanks exported to allies during WW2. In the end we arrive at around 46,400 tanks SP's.


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

Picture from Krupp factory at Magdeburg April 20th 1945:


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

When the German factories were bombed in 1945 Juha, they were full. And the tanks which were lost there never made it to the loss figures as they were never registered with the Wehrmacht.


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## imalko (Dec 28, 2009)

Oh, common now. What kind of logic is that? They were manufactured and destroyed, but because they were not officially registered with the Werhmacht then they can't be counted as lost! By that line of thinking the AFW exists only from the moment is registered and not from the moment when manufactured!?


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

imalko said:


> Oh, common now. What kind of logic is that? They were manufactured and destroyed, but because they were not officially registered with the Werhmacht then they can't be counted as lost! By that line of thinking the AFW exists only from the moment is registered and not from the moment when manufactured!?



You're misinterpreting what I wrote. Ofcourse they can be counted as lost, but not as lost in combat. Fact of the matter is that ALL German tanks vehicles made during WW2 were lost, but far from all of them were lost in combat or even destroyed in the first place. 

46,936 tanks SP's were lost by the Germans, ~38,506 in combat. 

That leaves ~8,430 tanks SP's which had one of the following fates:
1. Surrendered by the Germans at the end of the war
2. Found intact at factories but not yet registered with the Wehrmacht
3. Destroyed in or around the factories by Allied bombing
4. Exported to other countries
5. Found abandoned around Germany Austria for no apparent reason

And of the ~38,506 lost in combat many were captured, abandoned, blown up by their own crews, esp. in late 1944 to 1945.

Fact is that of all the tanks SP's registered with the Wehrmacht exactly 33,146 were lost from 1939 to Feburary 1st 1945. From Feb 1st to May 45 the loss figures are incomplete and it is therefore estimated that another ~5,500 German tanks SP's were lost in that period.

German tank factory lined with Panthers destroyed by Allied bombers:


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

Of the German tanks left by the end of the war many were to be found in the still Axis held areas (Marked in blue):


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

Hello Soren
in your first photo there is 5, five, PzKw IIIs, as I wrote according to you there should have been hundreds and hundreds. And in the last photo all Panthers are incomplete so they were not amongst those 1.000+ completed in 1945. And when factories were bombed there were numerous, mostly incomplete tanks, and those incomplete, if not completed later were not counted as completed tanks. You clearly take your bombed etc in 1945 number from a hat, believe what you want but if you want to convince others, please produce some sources to back up your claims. We know what Germans had 1 Feb 45, we have fair idea what was produced after that. One must only try to establish what was left in Germans hand when Germany surrendered, others were lost one way or another. Anyway we don't know how many Soviet tanks were abandoned in 1941, or taking note on you thinking, how many were bombed on first days of Barbarossa in tank parks, if you think that those bombed away from battlefields were not combat losses etc.

From your message #112, Germany’s losses in Jan 45 were 1575 tanks, StuGs, JgPz and SP-guns and the last 2½ months of the war were the worst for Germans, so if one count 2x1575 + 2,25x2x1575, result is 10.238. And that if we think that the last 2½ months were only twice as bad as the Jan.


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## m kenny (Dec 28, 2009)

Tanks destroyed or captured in/at factories never entered the accounting system and thus do not appear on any loss list.


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## Soren (Dec 28, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Soren
> in your first photo there is 5, five, PzKw IIIs, as I wrote according to you there should have been hundreds and hundreds. And in the last photo all Panthers are incomplete so they were not amongst those 1.000+ completed in 1945. And when factories were bombed there were numerous, mostly incomplete tanks, and those incomplete, if not completed later were not counted as completed tanks. You clearly take your bombed etc in 1945 number from a hat, believe what you want but if you want to convince others, please produce some sources to back up your claims. We know what Germans had 1 Feb 45, we have fair idea what was produced after that. One must only try to establish what was left in Germans hand when Germany surrendered, others were lost one way or another. Anyway we don't know how many Soviet tanks were abandoned in 1941, or taking note on you thinking, how many were bombed on first days of Barbarossa in tank parks, if you think that those bombed away from battlefields were not combat losses etc.
> 
> From your message #112, Germany’s losses in Jan 45 were 1575 tanks, StuGs, JgPz and SP-guns and the last 2½ months of the war were the worst for Germans, so if one count 2x1575 + 2,25x2x1575, result is 10.238. And that if we think that the last 2½ months were only twice as bad as the Jan.



Well you go believe the Germans lost 10,000+ vehicles in less than 3 months then, but if you ask me that's just plain ridiculous.

There's no reason to believe that the months Feburary, March April each produced greater losses than January. Thus the figure of 6,936 losses endured from January to March 45 seems a lot more sensible.



m kenny said:


> I note how the debate now turns on diminishing the German loss figures by finding reasons why certain losses were not 'combat losses' and thus we get the magic 'kill ratios'.



No'one is diminishing German losses, only explaining the true cause of their loss. Or are you about to claim that not many German tanks were simply abandoned in late 1944 45? 



m kenny said:


> I note that when earlier the British loss totals were mentioned no one pointed out it included a great number of old Cruiser tanks scrapped because they were obsolete.



How many exactly and when?


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## parsifal (Dec 28, 2009)

It seems at least logical to me that in 1945, German tank losses would be heavy, their standards of crew training were reaching the very bottom of the barrel. Fuel and ammunition was virtually non-existent, massive encircelements occuring almost daily. 

However, the same can be said about Russian tanks lost in 1941. Many of the tanks lost in the initial onslaught in 1941 were not even manned, or operational.

All this discussion does for me is confirm that the objective analysis simply cannot include those periods where one side was in its death throes....the results get badly skewed and give a false result to the overall effectiveness.

I doubt for example that the claimed 13000 losses for Soviet forces in 1945 were very representative. They certainly dont accord to write offs figures contained in a book that I have "The claws of the bear". This book state that in 1945, were only 3400. I suspect the remainder that bring the total up to 13000 are breakdowns and tanks under repair. At that time the Soviets were pushing their forces to occupy as much German territory as possible. It was quite typical for the Russians to not worry about repairing non-starters until an offensive had run out of steam, and typically about 75% of tanks listed as losses were in fact only temporary losses.

If you look at German losses before Taifun for example, the Panzer units were typically down to about 40% strengths. However many of these so-called losses were in fact returned to service for the following Spring, having been returned to the workshops to undergo repair. Nearly 75% of these tanks were in fact repaired and returned to service. the russians were no different, so I am almost certain that the losses quoted for the Russians in 1945 are not taking this into account.

I am also stuck on many of the loss figures being quoted here. My reference material says that total Soviet losses were 83400, whilst the Germans lost about 46000 vehicles. Brit losses were about 15000, but many of these were retirements....a lot of British tank production ended up in failures unfortunately....their combat losses were about 10000 by my best estimate. 

I suspect strongly that vehicles included in the loss sheets were not in fact lost permanently, or lost in the accepted sense of combat.

But to try to get the discussion back on topic, it seems pretty clear to me that the Soviets, or the Allies, for that matter were not losing 6 or 8 tanks for every german tank lost, once the the two sides got down to serious fighting. Perhaps two to one, at best, maybe a little more, but not much


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## Juha (Dec 28, 2009)

Soren
Quote:” There's no reason to believe that the months Feburary, March April each produced greater losses than January.”

First, look a map, 3rd Reich was shrinking fast feb-may 45. Secondly, In Feb 45 for ex happened the 11.SSPzA’s attack near Stargard which ended to loss of whole Pommern. Secondly, in a month from 15 March to 16 Apr AG Süd/South alone lost well over 1000 tanks and StuGs. That was time for disaster after disaster for WM.

Its fun how you 3rd Reich fans acted, I have never had any problem with British on losses of BEF in 1940, they have had no problems of admit that BEF lost vast majority of its heavy equipment in France. No claiming, ” no no, they were not lost, they were just abandoned”. Still like to see photos on hundreds of complete tanks abandoned inside German factories, surely the Allied soldiers would have taken plenty of photos on those or on those hundreds, no thousands, of tanks bombed “around their factories”.

Juha


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## Tzaw1 (Dec 28, 2009)

Soren said:


> And the German tank SP losses were not higher than the figures I posted, they are exactly as stated by Hahn:
> 
> [...]
> 1945: ~2,700 + ~2,800


Where did exactly Hahn this stated?

BTW German's human losses in last months (Jan-May '45) were significantly higher, than average in preceding years (23% of the whole). 
Why it would not have so to be for losses in the equipment?


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## Kurfürst (Dec 28, 2009)

m kenny said:


> I note how the debate now turns on diminishing the German loss figures by finding reasons why certain losses were not 'combat losses' and thus we get the magic 'kill ratios'.



Huh...? Did you even read what you wrote? 

It appears to me that Soren is making a perfectly reasonable thing by sticking to the losses reported by a reputable source, and not inventing them up as you do, based on your very own assumptions. 

In any case, how exactly newly produced tanks abandoned and captured on the factory yard give an idea of the combat effectiveness of an armored fighting vehicle...? If one wants to get some idea how this or that armored vehicle's (+tactics, training, doctrine, strategical decisions) combat potential against a comparable vehicle, he has too look on the combat results. 

Of course when one isn't happy with the numbers meticulously researched by someone like Hahn, and wants to fantasize nice bigger numbers that are more acceptable for him, the sources are getting thrown out of the window, and all sorts of odd arguments start to appear....


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## Kurfürst (Dec 28, 2009)

Soren said:


> As the Pak36 was phased out the APCR ammunition was handed over for the AA guns a/c armaments. Plus there was still being made APCR even in 1944, the last stocks of tungsten being prioritized for small caliber ammunition production.



I am afraid its impossible, the small PaK and the Flak guns fired different ammunition.  

However, there was indeed a Hartkern APCR ammo developed for the 3.7cm Flak guns, fired at 1170 m/sec and penetrating massive amounts of armor under ideal condtions (up to 145 mm springs to my mind but I can't seem to find the penetration sheet) used by amongst other Rudel's Ju 87G tank-hunters (which mounted 3.7cm Flak guns for anti tank roles) with great success.

I am not sure if it was available for land based ordinary FlaK guns (what for?) though. Probably not. And then, probably not needed at all. Medium Flak could deal with the typical Soviet tanks or armored cars... they were not meant to deal with enemy armor on a regular basis.


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## m kenny (Dec 28, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Huh...? Did you even read what you wrote?



All the time. Usualy it is the only sensible input!


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## Soren (Dec 29, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> I am afraid its impossible, the small PaK and the Flak guns fired different ammunition.



Oh I know, I meant the shots themselves. Tungsten was in such a limited supply that once the Pak36 was phased out the ammunition stores were used the production of new ammunition.


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## Soren (Dec 29, 2009)

m kenny said:


> All the time. Usualy it is the only sensible input!



You're so full of yourself it hurts.

Btw, still waiting for the figures on how many British tanks were retired and how many made the loss list for that reason. Sounds very odd in my ears.


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## Soren (Dec 29, 2009)

Parsifal,

Soviet losses are total losses, and they don't include vehicles which broke down. The Soviets were on the advance, and any vehicles that broke down (which cant have been too many seeing how reliable the T-34 was) were simply scooped up and repaired in no time. The Germans on the other hand usually lost the tanks which broke down on them, they simply didn't have time to repair them, and often they didn't even have the parts, so they simply abandoned the tanks and blew them up. Over 50% of all TigerII's lost were so in this fashion. And on top of this many were abandoned and blown up for the simple reason that they had run dry on fuel.

And yes, in 1941 many of the 20,500 tanks (17,500 of them light tanks) lost by the Soviets were simply abandoned, there's no getting around that and AFAIK no'one was ever trying to get around that. But from 1942 onwards it was quite simply a slaughter, the Soviets throwing tanks men at the Germans in enormous numbers. It continued like this until May 1945.

And then there's the western front, and again the Allies were on the advance and as such hardly ever had to abandon their tanks. Spare parts fuel never being an issue for them.

The Germans were the most hard pressed, it was a single country up against 3 superpowers and their allies, and Germany's own Allies didn't prove much help, the Italians being put to shame in Africa and the Germans having to come to the rescue. And on the eastern front the Soviets deliberately attacked the lines not held by the Germans knowing full well they'd meet less resistance from Germany's allies.


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## parsifal (Dec 29, 2009)

_Soviet losses are total losses, and they don't include vehicles which broke down. The Soviets were on the advance, and any vehicles that broke down (which cant have been too many seeing how reliable the T-34 was) were simply scooped up and repaired in no time. _

Thats not how the Soviets undertook any of their previous offensives. They would always push their formations until the logistics systems broke down, which included running the tank park down to almost zero. Then they would stop, wait for the Infantry to relieve them, and repair the broken down vehicles that were strwewn behind their lines. typically the return rate for these broken down vehicles was about 75%, so for an attacker of the 100% loss rate sustained initially only 255 were permanently written off.

That means, that in order to lose the 13400 being quoted in your figures as total write offs, the Soviets would have needed to have suffered around 65000 temporary casualties in that offensive. That is just impossible. Its why I think your figures for 6000 losses to the germans might be plausible, but only if we ignore those that broke down and were captured and the like....it means I am almost certain that your figures are only listing the write offs in the wm, whilst inclding all losses temporary and permanent for the Russians. The russians simply did not have 65000 AFVs to break down in '45. 

_The Germans on the other hand usually lost the tanks which broke down on them, they simply didn't have time to repair them, and often they didn't even have the parts, so they simply abandoned the tanks and blew them up. Over 50% of all TigerII's lost were so in this fashion. And on top of this many were abandoned and blown up for the simple reason that they had run dry on fuel._

I agree that losing ground in a tank battle makes recovery of broken down vehicles more difficult, but not impossible. During Kursk, many of the vehicles broken down were recovered by the germans, which shows that whilst there was a viable defence, it was possible to recover broken down AFVs. 

_And yes, in 1941 many of the 20,500 tanks (17,500 of them light tanks) lost by the Soviets were simply abandoned, there's no getting around that and AFAIK no'one was ever trying to get around that. But from 1942 onwards it was quite simply a slaughter, the Soviets throwing tanks men at the Germans in enormous numbers. It continued like this until May 1945._

The numbers you are quoting are just the tanks on strength with the Red army. I dont know how many but there were many vehicles not accepted into the Red Army also captured and destroyed

_And then there's the western front, and again the Allies were on the advance and as such hardly ever had to abandon their tanks. Spare parts fuel never being an issue for them.

The Germans were the most hard pressed, it was a single country up against 3 superpowers and their allies, and Germany's own Allies didn't prove much help, the Italians being put to shame in Africa and the Germans having to come to the rescue. And on the eastern front the Soviets deliberately attacked the lines not held by the Germans knowing full well they'd meet less resistance from Germany's allies._

I am certainly bot denigrating the German effort. They were the best army in the world, with qualitatively the best tanks in the world. No argument there. Whats at issue is the creative accounting that is going on here, by both sides of the argument....I doubt we will ever be able to achieve consensus on this issue....people will have to assess the statistics and make up their own minds on this topic. 

A few small points about the remarks you make about germany's allies. In the case of the colapse of the Rumanians, it was actually the Germans interlaced into the defences that panicked and ran first. The Rumanians were promised effective 75mm AT guns, and a certain number of them. They received French 75s, and about half the number they had purchased. This sort of chicanery was the norm in Germany's dealings with her allies, She has only herself to blame for their lacklustre perfoirmance.


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## alejandro_ (Dec 29, 2009)

> That leaves ~8,430 tanks SP's which had one of the following fates:
> 
> 5. Found abandoned around Germany Austria for no apparent reason



To me, abandoned/left in factory does count as a loss. For all sides, especially if we are going to compare to Krivosheev, who even includes scrapped vehicles. German losses in January 1945: 

Year 1945 - only January
Tanks: 707
StuG/Jagdpanzer: 727
Armoured cars: 41
SPW: 796
SP-guns: 141
BIV charge carriers: 6

Note that SPW vehicles do increase the total German losses by a lot. 



> There's no reason to believe that the months Feburary, March April each produced greater losses than January. Thus the figure of 6,936 losses endured from January to March 45 seems a lot more sensible.



Why not? after German offensive in Balaton area, the Soviets counted 968 tanks and SPG knocked out or abandoned. ~2,700 + ~2,800 for 1945 just seem too low. More offensives and big battles took place in Prussia, Poland and Central Germany.

Panzer units strength according to Jentz, the complete guide..., 1943-45, pag 247-248:

Strength of Panzer Units on the Eastern front on 15 March 1945:

StuG: 545
PzIVlg: 603
PzIV/70: 357
Flakpz: 97
PzV: 776
PzVI: 212
Total: 2590

Strength of Panzer Units on the Western front on 15 March 1945:

StuG: 126
PzIVlg: 59
PzIV/70: 77
Flakpz: 41
PzV: 152
PzVI: 28
Total: 483

Strength of Panzer Units in Italy on 15 March 1945:

StuG: 67
PzIVlg: 131
PzIV/70: 0
Flakpz: 21
PzV: 26
PzVI: 36
Total: 281

Total strength of Panzer units only: 3354.

And going back to topic, I don´t really understand all the criticism to T-34. By 1944 it was past its best but it was superior to German workhorse (Pz-IV), which had thin tracks, 50mm protection in the turret, and 30mm on the sides. By late 1944 they even eliminated electric motor to turn the turret. These are of course theoretical specs, the usual catalogue of sabotage and poor finish should be added for vehicles built late in the war.

If Soviets kept producing T-34 by late 1944/45 it was because it was not worth changing to T-44 considering the threats, it does not say a lot about the German tanks. Optics were better in T-34-85 than in Sherman according to Yugo officers, their units managed to get 95% availability by the way.

Finally, T-34 role changed during the war, in 1944 it was used in exploitation, where armor or fire power was not that critical. IS-2/ISU-122/152 and SU-100 provided support. Some T-34 units advanced 500kms in 3 days.

*By the way, can anyone give the complete reference to Hahn? I might try to get it to have a look.*


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## Vincenzo (Dec 29, 2009)

What is Pz IV/70? maybe the jagdpanzer IV with 75/70?


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## m kenny (Dec 29, 2009)

Soren said:


> You're so full of yourself it hurts.



Kettle, Pot, Black.............get a sense of humour!


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## alejandro_ (Dec 29, 2009)

> What is Pz IV/70? maybe the jagdpanzer IV with 75/70?


Yes.

Can anyone give me Hahn´s reference?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 29, 2009)

I am sick of this ****!

Here is another good thread with a lot of good information about to go down the drain because two members (m kenny and Soren) have to act like a bunch of ****ing children! Yes both of you!

This is the last and final warning!

If I hear any more personal attacks out of both of you and that includes your typical (Allied this bullshit and German this bullshit) you are both banned!

Consider yourself warned! NO more warnings! Ban shall be permanant as well! Keep your ****ing childish bullshit off of our boards! Do it privately or go some place else!


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## parsifal (Dec 29, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> What is Pz IV/70? maybe the jagdpanzer IV with 75/70?



Yes, correct Vincenzo


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## parsifal (Dec 29, 2009)

Listen to the Mod guys, he's serious. You guys have so much knowledge I just dont get why the differing point of view have to deteriorate to the lowest denominator all the time. And yes, I know I am guilty of that as well, but you guys are experts. I consider you both to be friends of mine incidentally


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## Soren (Dec 29, 2009)

I am just gonna stop discussing with him, I think it's the only solution. I don't want to be booted over an argument with another member..


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## Njaco (Dec 29, 2009)

Don't know if this helps the discusion but from "WWII Data Book" by John Ellis:

pg 277

Total Tank and SPG production for,
1944 - 19,002
1945 - 3,932

Tanks and SPG with 75mm guns and above,
1944 - 18,576
1945 - 4,000

Soren, just a word of advice. Sometimes what you are trying to say doesn't come out in your posts and others can misread and the argument begins. As a case in point:



> "46,936 tanks SP's were lost by the Germans, ~38,506 in combat.
> 
> That leaves ~8,430 tanks SP's which had one of the following fates:
> 1. Surrendered by the Germans at the end of the war
> ...



Sounds like you're splitting hairs saying that "combat losses" included abandonment while saying those "non-combat losses" also includes abandonment. Its confusing.


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## Soren (Dec 29, 2009)

My mistake Njaco, for nr.5 on the list I meant found abandoned after the war had ended. As you can see there were still very large areas controlled by the Germans when the war ended, and a lot of vehicles were found there. Where'as many of the combat losses were tanks which abandoned during the war because the situation demanded it, like having run out of fuel or broken down with the enemy right at their heels.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 29, 2009)

Soren said:


> I am just gonna stop discussing with him, I think it's the only solution. I don't want to be booted over an argument with another member..



How about you just act like an adult! That goes for you as well m kenny!


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## Soren (Dec 29, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> How about you just act like an adult! That goes for you as well m kenny!



Just to be fair I only made that comment to point out that him saying this:


m kenny said:


> Kurfurst said:
> 
> 
> > Huh...? Did you even read what you wrote?
> ...



- Was very arrogant and rude towards 'everyone' on this forum. It was not an attempt at offending him as I didn't recognize it as the joke, which he claims it was. Instead of merely pointing that out however he chose to fire it back at me.

So not an attempt at throwing mud on my part, and that's not an excuse, just being honest.


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## Juha (Dec 29, 2009)

Hello Alejandro
I think they refer this book: Waffen und Geheimwaffen des Deutschen Heeres 1933-1945: Amazon.de: Fritz Hahn: Bücher

Mine is older two volume work of same title, from year 1987, AFV and loss info in it are in the Band 2, Panzer- und Sonderfahrzeuge, “Wunderwaffen”, Verbrauch und Verluste. Hopefully Soren or Kurfürst will confirm this.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 29, 2009)

If one counted from production tables in Chamberlain’s, Doyle’s and Jentz’s Encycl. Of German Tanks of WWII (1993), maybe easiest source even if it gives a bit too low production figures for 1945 (it gives for ex Hetzer 45 production as 1127 when 1256 (+80 Berge) were produced) and took along SP-guns but AA-tanks because the wide variety of roles Soviets used SU-76, one got 51.142. The figure is some hundreds too low but a good approximation. Then subtract exports, 1.159 to war partners (this is corrected figure, MBI's Hetzer book confirmed that the source which gave the higher figure for Hetzers given/sold to Hungarians, which I have used following the benefit of doubt principle, was in error. At same time added the 10 given to ROA), few hundreds Pz Is to Spain and China in late 30s. Several hundreds scrapped but at least with a/c Soviet loss records included scrapped a/c so probably we can forget those. In Scandinavia and Courland there were only some hundreds AFVs and rather exact numbers can be found for ex in Hahn’s book. Only difficult area is that between Protectorate/Czech and Northernmost Italy, inclusive. I’d say at most a couple thousands there.

Those found intact at factories but not yet registered with the Wehrmacht, IMHO only some maybe a couple hundred at most, at least no one had produced any evidence of vast amount of these or those claimed to be destroyed in or around the factories by Allied bombing. Bombing had big impact on production but that is a different thing.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 30, 2009)

Hello
checking from later sources it seems that actual German production in 45 was a couple hundreds higher than what is given in Chamberlain’s, Doyle’s and Jentz’s book. So production in 45 was 4217+ tanks, StuGs, StuHs, StuPzs, JgPzs, Nashorns and Hummels.

Juha


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## Njaco (Dec 30, 2009)

Thats about the number Ellis gives in his book, although he states "around 4,000".


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## Juha (Dec 31, 2009)

Hello Njaco
Yes, the latest info only makes some adjustments to for ex those figures in Chamberlain’s, Doyle’s and Jentz’s book, in which most production figures for 1945 are right but for some AFVs there are some increases and for a few even little decreases. 

Juha


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## alejandro_ (Dec 31, 2009)

> Hello Alejandro
> I think they refer this book: Waffen und Geheimwaffen des Deutschen Heeres 1933-1945: Amazon.de: Fritz Hahn: Bücher



Thanks a lot Juha.


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