# Most heavily Armed ship during ww2.



## elmilitaro (May 24, 2005)

In my opinion it was the Patrol Torpedo Boat or better yet known as the PT Boat.


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## mosquitoman (May 24, 2005)

Yamato and Musashi, if just for those 18" guns


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## cheddar cheese (May 24, 2005)

The Yamoto kicks ass.


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## mosquitoman (May 24, 2005)

No, it got it's ass kicked


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## Nonskimmer (May 24, 2005)




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## FLYBOYJ (May 24, 2005)

cheddar cheese said:


> The Yamoto kicks ass.


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## cheddar cheese (May 24, 2005)

I dont care, it kicks ass


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## cheddar cheese (May 24, 2005)

Actually, USS Thorn kicks ass, but thats another story 8)


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## reddragon (May 24, 2005)

The Yamato was an impressive ship but it was sent out without air cover and I'm pretty sure everyone knows that's not a real good idea. On the other hand, for it's size, the PT boat was pretty heavily armed.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 24, 2005)

cheddar cheese said:


> Actually, USS Thorn kicks ass, but thats another story 8)



That's better CC, you regained your senses!


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## Andrew (May 25, 2005)

The accolade of most heavily armed ship or ships must be awarded to the Fairmile D Type MGB's MTB's, they were armed with 2 X 6 Ponders 1 Forward 1 Aft, 2 X Twin .5" Machine Guns by the side of Bridge, 2 X Twin .303" Machines Guns aft of the Bridge, some also mounted Twin 20mm Oerlikon abaft the Bridge, The MTB's Mounted either 4 X 21" Torpedo Tubes or 4 X 18" Torpedo Tubes, and they had provision for Mines or Depth Charges, all this squezed into a hull 115' Long 21' Beam, and had a crew of 33.

Here is a picture of MTB753 a Fairmile D Type MTB






Picture from www.smesh.co.ouk/ml108/mtb753


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## trackend (May 25, 2005)

The E-boats where a better vessel than the MTBs or PT boats
In 1945, future president John F. Kennedy visited defeated Germany with US Navy Secretary James Forrestal. As a former PT boat captain, he was naturally interested in the German counterpart so he made a point of carefully inspecting an intact "E-Boat" at Bremen. Kennedy's diary records his conclusion: the Schnellboot was "far superior to our PT boat." 
Carriers had the biggest hitting power of any surface vessel but if I had to pick non aircraft carrying vessel I,d go for the Bismark or Tirpitz
they had superb gunnery control systems and the quality of the amour used was of the highest order. Thickness does not always mean best although it helps heres a piece of the Tirpitz belt armour.
_Image is from my own personel collection and my be used in the public domain_


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## evangilder (May 25, 2005)

Wow, that's a thick slab! I was thinking along the same lines as you trackend, Technically, the carriers would be the most heavily armed if you factor all the aircraft on-board.


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## BombTaxi (May 25, 2005)

But then, something like a Dido class cruiser had a huge AA armament, while the USNs four-pipe destroyers carried a massive torpedo armament...fot thier size, the USCGs A/S cutters packed a considerable punch, as did the RNs escort corvettes.This is one of those debates where you a can argue for many different winners, because of variables like tonnage, intended role and threat environment.


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## trackend (May 25, 2005)

The title of the thread is the most heavly armed ship on that basis if one vessel is pitted against another the carrier and the battleship are on the top of the pile a vessel of any size less than a heavy cruiser could be taken on by a battleships secondary armament once the main weapons are included its a slaughter.


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## plan_D (May 25, 2005)

Don't forget the Alaska-Class Battlecruisers and Iowa-Class Battleships.


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## mosquitoman (May 25, 2005)

If there weren't any planes in the vicinity (very unlikely I know ) I would take the Japanese monster battleships over anything else. 1 Carrier though would be able to reduce it to a smoking wreck before it ever got within range though


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## evangilder (May 26, 2005)

The Musashi and the Yamato had some big guns! They were 18 inch guns!. The Missouri and other Iowa class ships had 16 inch guns, which were no small one either.

When the Musashi was hit during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea (Part of the Battle of the Leyte Gulf), she was hit by 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes! It still took another 4 hours for it to capsize and sink.


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## plan_D (May 26, 2005)

The Iowa-Class BBs had better fire control systems though. I've also seen somewhere that the 16" on the Iowas' were more accurate. 

I would take the Iowa-Class over the IJN big hitters, personally.


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## trackend (May 26, 2005)

Yamato and her sister ship where indeed impressive vessels but there radar lagged well behind the western powers this in turn lost any effectiveness gained by the 18" guns I agree the Iowa were good vessels and indeed the fastest battleships every produced with a top speed of 32.5 kts as opposed to Yamatos 27kts or Bismarks 30.1 kts. 
As a gun platform the Iowa class had only a couple of minor flaws with the necessity to navigate the Panama canal locks the beam of the vessels was kept too 108.2 ft (Bismark 118.1ft Yamato 121.1ft) this made for a fast ship but also made them slightly less stable. Because of this loss of beam the bows had a relatively high for-peak to take the seas, this impeded the ability to use the forward turret when firing over the bow at closer ranges. but overall as you say D they where excellent and very beautiful ships. As for any battle-cruisers the concept was good but they invariably ended up being put against battleships, and they where not designed for this, so as with the Hood they lacked sufficient protection against large caliber shells. I am pleased that the US has kept at least one Battleship around as they represent an important period in world events also even though they could be sunk by later and more powerful weapons the sight of one of these incredible monsters unleashing a broadside is a mighty and impressive thing.
_Image C/O navyveterans.com_


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## plan_D (May 26, 2005)

Just a small, tiny, correction about the Battlecruiser. It was always intended to go against any kind of ship, what it was never intended to do was to get into a slugging match with a Battleship. 

The Battlecruiser should have been used as a powerful hit and run vessel. It's quite remarkable that the British invented the Battlecruiser and they also developed perfect tactics for them but time and again they forgot to read the manual! The Battle of Jutland and the sinking of H.M.S Hood are both times when the Royal Navy forgot that a Battlecruisers main defence is it's speed!


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## trackend (May 26, 2005)

Hood had a top speed of 30kts D slower than Bismark so it was always going to be a slugging match. When the Battle cruiser was first designed I agree they where 10kts faster than the battleships of the day so as you say they could use speed to an advantage so I stand corrected MR D .At jutland they also stacked munitions in the corridors as they had over filled the magazines.Not a good idea


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## plan_D (May 26, 2005)

The H.M.S Hood was set for a re-fit though, personally I don't believe she should have been sent out into the oceans until that was done but that is with the benefit of hindsight. 

In Jutland, as in the Hood, the turrets were stacked with cordite, which happens to be against Royal Navy regulation both then and now. The gunners enjoyed a higher rate of fire though. The light armour of the Battlecruiser left it open to destruction in the slugging match of Jutland.


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## trackend (May 26, 2005)

Im suprised D I didnt think the current navy had anything over 4.7" and they are auto fed fixed rounds.


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## plan_D (May 26, 2005)

You mean with the regulations? I think they've updated it to encompass all weapons explosives on the ship, like missiles and such. You don't want the hanger to be full of missiles ready to be put on GR.7s, when the ship gets hit. 

And I honestly think if someone got on the Ark Royal and started packing cordite around the inner workings of it, someone might say "What the hell are you doing?"  

Unless it was the Ark Royals mascot, that African Grey, then it'd probably say "Show us yah tits" ...oh, I started rambling.


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## evangilder (May 26, 2005)

Speaking of Iowa class, the picture below is on the USS Missouri during the surrender ceremonies in Tokyo Bay. The guy in the lower left, in the circle is my wife's cousin! When I found that out, I was amazed. Unfortunately, Teddy passed away before I met my wife. I would have loved to talk to him.


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## BombTaxi (May 26, 2005)

I visited the USS North Carolina when I was out there visiting my uncle, and I was totally blown away by the scale of that thing! I've visited HMS Belfast and several modern RN vessels, and they're like tugboats compared to a USN BB  Certainly the greatest concentration of firepower (barring CV's) that was ever set afloat!


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## trackend (May 26, 2005)

Thats some pic Evan he must have felt very privaledged to see such an important moment in history.
Its a shame they couldnt have kept a Battleship from the UK fleet as a reminder. when the Belfast was proposed as maritime attraction I seem to remember the old Ironduke was still about (somewhere in the middleeast I think) it would have been nice to see her saved.


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## Nonskimmer (May 26, 2005)

I saw the New Jersey up close, at Norfolk. What a monster! She wasn't berthed at the naval yard, she was tied up in the inner harbour, and I wasn't expecting to see this massive battleship when I rounded the corner. 
And once again, the camera was at home.


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## trackend (May 26, 2005)

There certainly an impressive symbol of sea power Skim I have a little 2 meg camera that I wear around my neck so If something crops up I can get a reasonable picture it's only 1" X 3"


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## Nonskimmer (May 26, 2005)

I've learned to take mine with me almost everywhere I go now.


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## cheddar cheese (May 27, 2005)

Mine doesnt work, well it does, but the battery life is shorter than an Irish midget


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## trackend (May 27, 2005)

cheddar cheese said:


> Mine doesnt work, well it does, but the battery life is shorter than an Irish midget


Why are the noted for being shorter than the Botswanan variety of midget Cheesy?


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## syscom3 (Jun 12, 2005)

"Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall Who's the Baddest of Them All?"

I found this article and think it should settle once and for all what is the most heavily armed ship. Plain and simply, its always been a battleship, and saying that a PT boat armed with a couple of MG and a couple of torpedo's is in the same league as a capital ship is lunacy.

The gentleman who wrote this article took into consideration all the factors that made up a battleship and quantified it. The results are surprising. Just because the Germans had a ship like the Bismark or the Japanese the Yamato doesnt mean automatically its great.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

Enjoy!


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## plan_D (Jun 13, 2005)

That's all well and good but an aircraft carrier would have no problem dealing with a BB. That said, the BB will always be the most heavily armed in terms of guns and no one has disagreed. I think you'll find the Iowa Class BB mentioned by me already on this thread.


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## syscom3 (Jun 13, 2005)

I dont count aircraft carriers for this thread. I think its more for the ships that carry guns, not aircraft.


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## trackend (Jun 13, 2005)

Had a quick look at thet web site SYS not totally convinced at one point he states the Bofors had a higher rate of fire than the PomPom the KGV had 1x 40mm Bofors and 4 multi barrelled pompoms
It was very rare for the pompom to be less than 4 barrelled and normally eight on major war ships the unit was treated the same as the modern Phlanx or Gatling gun although multi barrelled it was a single weapon this gave it a rate of fire of 90 X 2lb rounds per barrel per minute in otherwords 720 RPM for each weapon with a maximum range of 13000ft this is less than the Bofors which could reach 23000ft but inpractice the Bofors was best below 12000ft,the Bofors rate of fire was 120 rounds per minute but in the case of the USN quad barreled unit it gave a rate 440 RPM (or with really good loaders 540RPM) both the 4 barrelled Bofors and the 8 barrelled pompom's required large crews to keep there thirsty magazines supplied.
Having said all of that, personaly I dont neccesarily go along with his findings regarding the heaviest armed vessel of ww2.


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## HealzDevo (Jun 13, 2005)

I think what we are trying to do is work out the most heavily armed ship in comparison with its size. IE. for how small it is the PT Boats are very well armed.


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## trackend (Jun 14, 2005)

HealzDevo said:


> I think what we are trying to do is work out the most heavily armed ship in comparison with its size. IE. for how small it is the PT Boats are very well armed.



In that case Healzdevo I'll go for the LCT(R) (Rocket firing landing craft)
This had a set of launchers for 60-lb rockets mounted on the covered-over tank deck. The full set of launchers was 'in excess of' 1,000 The firepower was claimed to be equivalent to 80 light cruisers or 200 destroyers.(I think they mean in terms of a broadside)

The method of operation was to anchor off the target beach, pointing towards the shore. The distance to the shore was then measured by radar and the elevation of the launchers set accordingly. The crew then vanished below (apart from the commanding officer who retreated to a special cubby hole to control things) and the launch was then set off electrically.


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## HealzDevo (Jun 14, 2005)

I agree from some of the D-Day footage pity the poor Germans if those LCT(R)s were aimed accurately as they really did put in a heavy barrage. Pity they weren't aimed more accurately orginally as they probably could have reduced US casualities quite a bit at Omaha if they had hit the German Defences in the right places.


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## plan_D (Jun 15, 2005)

Hah! Try putting a 60 lbs rocket through a 4 metre thick reinforced concrete bunker...no matter how many you use, it ain't going to give way.


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## trackend (Jun 15, 2005)

The LCT(R) wasn't designed to destroy pill boxes D it was used to clear beaches of mines barbed wire and hedgehogs many of which where topped with Tella mines the idea was this would also leave shell holes for additional troop cover unfortunately although the range was worked out fairly good due to the very heavy seas that where running at the landing sites many of the missiles landed well short of the beaches or over shot and went inland. In calmer conditions during trials they had blasted test Beach's layed with obstacles and mines to bits.
The reason I selected it as the most heavily armed vessel was that as a small boat of only 300 odd tons it could deliver 60 thousand lbs of ordnance in one whack.


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## plan_D (Jun 15, 2005)

No, I'm talking about the comment about them being aimed better. It was the boxes over looking Omaha beach that did all the damage. LCT(R)s wouldn't have made a slightest bit of difference on that beach.


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## trackend (Jun 15, 2005)

Got yer D. I agree if 50 rockets had hit a pill box it could not destroy it 
A few more shell holes would have helped give the guys a bit more cover and the old LCG(L),s with there 4.7's if they had been deployed on the shore line would have definatly made the pill boxes cough a bit when fired at 200yds into the slits as they did 3 months later in the Walcheran island invasion.


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## plan_D (Jun 15, 2005)

I agree completely. We all know that the beach really needed those Sherman DDs getting ashore. A good few 75mm rounds going through the slits would have done some good for the U.S troops on the beach.


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## trackend (Jun 15, 2005)

Me old man went ashore after D-day+ (I think) 3 and had a look at one of the coastal defence buildings It had been hit by heavy naval shells and although having small cracks was still in good condition but inside all the occupants had been pulverised into Jelly by the colossul concussion.
He always said the German constructions lost the allied pill boxes for quality and strength.


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## DAVIDICUS (Jun 17, 2005)

Trackend, that's certainly an impressive chunk of steel depicted in that photo.

My understanding, from a book I have as well as a coupe of sites that I pulled up on the web, is that the thickest portion of the Tirpitz's belt was 12.4" or 12.6" (I see both figures listed).

That chunk looks thicker than that.


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## zerum (Jun 28, 2005)

I have read some place that Tirpitz belt was 15" of Krupp Wotan C steel.
OT. If you are going to Oslo and see some steelplates in the street,they are from Tirpitz.


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## delcyros (Jul 16, 2005)

The Tirpitz had an 320 mm KC, not Wotan C - main armor bel and a sloped 100 mm Wotan hart armor belt, contacting the 80-120mm Wotan hart main armor deck. Behind the sloped armor deck is an additional 50 mm Wotan weich armor belt. If you consider any hits to penetrate the main armor deck (in order to hit vital structures, not just pass aways in the two deck deep empty space), they must also penetrate the sloped 100 mm AND the 50 mm behind it in order to get an important hit. Under most possible impact angles there is no chance except for a fluke hit under the main belt (a diving grenade may do so but for much reduced penetration abilities, the POW got one such hit against the Bismarck, but the grenade was stopped by the 50 mm Wotan weich armor belt completely) to penetrate the Tirpitz protection system at the main hull. Even a Yamato´s 18" shell, fired from elevation zero (point blanck range) has only a 11% probability to move beyond the protection into the main region. No other gun has even a chance to do so. Bets chance to get vital hits is from high elevation, the Tirpitz and Bismarck miss some good deck protection (esspeccially compared to contemporary US and jap. designs). But even here you need a huge distance (26.000 yards and more), where hits are very rare and uncommon.


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## trackend (Jul 17, 2005)

They where very well protected vessels del but as with all battleships had become obsolete weapons by the beginning of the war by the end battleships where no more than coastal bombardment platforms with the carrier taking the role of capital ship which it still holds today.


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Jul 17, 2005)

coming up against one's still a bloody scary thought though


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## trackend (Jul 17, 2005)

A mear bagatelle Lanc I have and Avon inflatable and a battery drill with a cobalt bit


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## delcyros (Jul 20, 2005)

Indeed.
I think, those battleship designs are interesting but they had little justification in general with all the carriers around them. From the german position there is more justification to build them, not tacticly, they were way outnumbered, but strategicly. Scharnhorst, Bismarck and Tirpitz have been so succesful in binding large enemy forces.
The raids of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau earlier in the war have been a scary thing for the allied convois, as lone merchant raiders they had been promising, but Radar and reconplanes turned the tide.With the arrival of succesful carrier raids (Tarento), they lost what they have been originally thought for: the ultimate weapon on sea.


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## elmilitaro (Sep 12, 2005)

Still, the PT-Boat was the best.


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## syscom3 (Sep 12, 2005)

mosquitoman said:


> Yamato and Musashi, if just for those 18" guns



Heres a pix I took of one of the 6" guns that was removed from the Musashi.

The Japanese put it on Corregidore.

Sorry for the darkness of the pix. I didnt know my camera was broken untill the film was exposed.


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## evangilder (Sep 13, 2005)

Nice shot. Have you tried brightening it up with photoshop or another photo editting software?


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## dutchman (Aug 3, 2013)

I'm a huge PT Boat fan, The boys on those boats had big brass ones!!! If your going for firepower per pound the PT would be in the running, but if that's the case you also must consider the Kaiten Class, Japanese Manned Suicide Torpedoes. Again looking for punch per pound this would be a tough one to beat! 

Tonnage
8.3 tons


Dimensions
48'4" by 3'3" by 3'3" or 14.73m by 0.99m by 0.99m


Maximum speed 
30 knots


Dive
250 feet
75 meters

Complement
1

Armament
1.55 ton explosive charge

Machinery
1-shaft oxygen/kerosene motor (550 hp)

Range
78 nautical miles (144 km) at 12 knots
43 nautical miles (80 km) at 20 knots
23 nautical miles (43 km) at 30 knots

Production
330 Type 1
2 Type 2
1 Type 3
50 Type 4
6 Type 10

Modifications
The Type 2 had one or two crewmen and a powerful hydrogen peroxide motor, but these could not be produced in quantity and the program was canceled.
The Type 3 reverted to a kerosene motor with improved performance but only a single prototype was produced.
The Type 4 used the much larger hull (18 tons) and warhead (1.8 ton) of the Type 2 but with a conventional kerosene motor.
The Type 10 was based on the Type 92 torpedo, which used an electric motor.

These were dangerous little tinker toys, for the operators as well as the targets. I know it's hard to call it a ship, but it floats, it moves, it dives and sometimes comes back up!!, and it has a crew. So it's a boat I guess!!


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## razor1uk (Aug 3, 2013)

I think for a 'ship' with munitions not aircaft, armour, for a given size, weapon performance/spec it can only be the Yamato class; even if they were wasted, ill unused and were less useful than the Germans railed heavy/super cannons, even so in my mind, they are at least joint 1st, or within the top 3. It is just as well as for us, the HMIJN utilised them mostly for ego and not for war, or in anythink like a more proper warlike navally offencive manner where those macro cannons could find and home in on a target.

There was a few chances where they could've fired in anger, but they largely ignored, kept safe (to preserve egos) or used ineptly tactically by (higher) brass whom didn't wish to be the ones whom 'lost it/them' following the Navies sand in the headedness after Admiral Yamamoto's assasination. For that the allies should be greatful as we never saw what they could do had they been utilised as they were designed to, thank the/your/whichever deitie(s).

Airpower is largely 'king' nowadays, but for how long; war, warriors and their weapons do come and go around in cycles at times...


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## dutchman (Aug 3, 2013)

If one was to compare battleships, then the Yamato class, the Iowa class and the Bismarck class would all be in the running. In any battle between these monsters luck would always play a roll. A critical hit to any system could change the course of the fight. If I remember right Bismarck took a hit to it's sighting computer when it fought Hood. You can't trade 2000 plus pound shells without braking something!! Also weather could be critical, in a heavy rain or a night battle the Yamato class might have a little problem. If I remember right the U.S. was thinking of a super battle ship based on the Iowa class but longer with a 4th. turret giving it 12 16 inch guns. But it never got off the drawing board. The day of the Battleship had passed. I don't think anyone can decide which would be the best. 
Also you must remember that many of these beasties were directly linked to the pride of the country. That's why Yamato was never too active for fear that damage or loss would reflect on the honor of the country. Tirpitz suffered the same fate. So when it becomes a symbol of the country it can lose it's combat effectivness as a warship.


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## razor1uk (Aug 3, 2013)

When egos rule, eventually they'll suffer as a fool.... (at somepoint hopefully karmically)


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## swampyankee (Aug 4, 2013)

elmilitaro said:


> In my opinion it was the Patrol Torpedo Boat or better yet known as the PT Boat.



In terms of armament per weight, that's defensible, but certainly not in any sort of absolute terms. 

Since I count carrier's aircraft as part of its armament, one of the _Essex_ class carriers. If you don't consider that reasonable, it would have to be the Yamato or Musashi, with the USN post-1935 battleships in second place.


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2013)

I dont see how we can compare different categorie of ship on anything like a level of playing field. You need to nominate most heavily armed ship in each category. Even then the criteria for measuring most heavily armed is relative....a ship with a heavy gun or torpedo armament, like the Shimakaze, wont do very well when looking at AA defences, or ASW capability...

Restricting each class to a primary mission of anti-surface role (a very big assumption), I would rate the ships in the following classes

1. BB : Yamato, honourable mention to the Iowas
2. BC : Hood 
3. CA : Suzuya 
4. CL: Southampton or Fiji
5. DD: Shimakaze, honourable mention to the Taskkent
6. TB (large): T-28 (I think...also known as the Elbings)
7. DE: Matsu
8: SS: Type XXI
9. PT: "S" Boote


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## syscom3 (Aug 4, 2013)

The Brooklyn class light cruisers were the best,

Multiple engagements in the MTO and PTO proved their worth. Anyone want to argue about having fifteen 6" guns proven under actual combat and battle conditions?


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## JtD (Aug 5, 2013)

parsifal said:


> 1. BB : Yamato, honourable mention to the Iowas
> 2. BC : Hood
> 3. CA : Suzuya
> 4. CL: Southampton or Fiji
> 5. DD: Shimakaze, honourable mention to the Taskkent


I can pretty much agree with this, but one could also say the Alaska to be the most heavily armed CA and the Mogami-class to be the most heavily armed CL.


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## syscom3 (Aug 5, 2013)

JtD said:


> I can pretty much agree with this, but one could also say the Alaska to be the most heavily armed CA and the Mogami-class to be the most heavily armed CL.



Just what exactly did the CB's? do?


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## swampyankee (Aug 5, 2013)

syscom3 said:


> Just what exactly did the CB's? do?



Other than waste money and resources?

The Alaskas were lovely ships, easily the most powerful "cruisers" of the war, but the specific role for which they were constructed ceased to exist in late 1942, which is why the other ships of the class were never finished. About their most important role in history has been as troll bait: "were the Alaskas battlecruisers?" or "in a one-on-one fight, which would prevail: Alaska or Scharnhorst?"


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## JtD (Aug 5, 2013)

swampyankee said:


> About their most important role in history has been as troll bait: "were the Alaskas battlecruisers?" or "in a one-on-one fight, which would prevail: Alaska or Scharnhorst?"


 , yes, sums it up nicely.


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## dutchman (Aug 6, 2013)

If you give the crews the same level of training and remove luck from the battle, I'd have to give the Alaska a bit of an edge.


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## parsifal (Aug 6, 2013)

there is an oldthread somewhere that debated this topic in great depth. given that the KGV in its fight with the scharnhorst was pretty hard pressed at times to bring the german ship down, its hard to see how the alaska can be given a great edge


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## Shortround6 (Aug 6, 2013)

Not a great edge vs the KGV class but the American 12" guns were in a class of their own as far as 12" guns go. 

It does come down to luck. The American 12" guns are a lot more powerful than the German 11" guns but the protection is a lot weaker. SO it comes down to who hits first and where. The American 12" guns at 25,000yds were almost the same as the British 14" as far as penetration goes but the British shells carried a _much_ larger bursting charge. 

The American guns fire faster than the British guns but not as fast as the Germans but at long range they may not use the top rate of fire, at long range you might be able to have the 3rd salvo in the air before the first one lands.


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## DonL (Aug 6, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Not a great edge vs the KGV class but the American 12" guns were in a class of their own as far as 12" guns go.
> 
> *It does come down to luck. The American 12" guns are a lot more powerful than the German 11" guns but the protection is a lot weaker. SO it comes down to who hits first and where. The American 12" guns at 25,000yds were almost the same as the British 14" as far as penetration goes but the British shells carried a much larger bursting charge.
> *
> The American guns fire faster than the British guns but not as fast as the Germans but at long range they may not use the top rate of fire, at long range you might be able to have the 3rd salvo in the air before the first one lands.



This is far away from reality!

After the Navyweapons homepage and the World War II Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables, which are basing on Nathan Okuns facehard program, which in reality gave USA and Brititish guns through biases and ignoring primary sourcing about german guns and armour, from the ground a slight edge, this claim is far away from reality.

Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
Britain Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
United States Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
Germany Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables

German 11.1”/54 gun, 727-lb shell with 640-lb body weight against US class A steel in EFF (Effective Limit: fit to burst)
16000 yard: 12.9 inch 
20000 yard: 10.9 inch
24000 yard: 9.2 inch

US 12”/50 gun, Mk 18-1 (Alaska class) 1,140-lb shell with 1,002.1-lb body weight; against german Kc/n.A steel in EFF (Effective Limit: fit to burst)
16000 yard: 13.7 inch 
20000 yard: 11.8 inch
24000 yard: 10.4 inch

British 14”/45 gun, 14” Mk 1B 1,590-lb shell with 1,399-lb body weight; against german Kc/n.A steel in EFF (Effective Limit: fit to burst)
16000 yard: 17.8 inch 
20000 yard: 15.7 inch
24000 yard: 14.2 inch

From german Gdokos1oo, the german gun is a slightly more powerful then after facehard from Nathan Okun.

Anyway what we can see is, that the british 14 inch gun it is in her own leage of vertical penetration power and far away from the US 12”/50 gun.
The german 11 inch is much much closer at US 12”/50 gun then the US 12”/50 at the british 14 inch gun. Also i can't see that the US 12 inch is so much more powerful then the german 11 inch gun.

Also at the deck penetration, the british 14 inch gun is much more powerful then US 12”/50, but both are to my opinion not able to penetrate the german spaced array armour of Scharnhorst under 30000 yards, after the newest found primary sources from British ADM letters and shooting test of the british Admirality against the german spaced array armour layout of 50mm weather deck and 80mm main armour deck, which was thicker over the magazines.

british
ADM 213-951 German steel Armour piercing ammunition and theory of penetration_1946
DEFE 15-490 High Obliquity Attack of Deck Targets. Part III
High Obliquity Attack of Deck Targets. Part I appears as the primary test report regarding the german horicontal protection registration unknown
SUPP 6-481 Underwater performance of shells (written shortly after High obliquity attack of deck targets ; *this report consider the germen horizontal protection as beeing 6 inches single plate (equivalent)*
SUPP 22-68 SPACED ARMOUR



The weak point of the SH class was it's very thin 2,30m high and 45mm thick upper belt, which is a weak point from ranges betwenn 19000 till 23000 yards, where a shell could penetrate the upper belt and could go directly to the 105mm slopes or 80mm main armour deck.


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## dutchman (Aug 6, 2013)

I have to say again that these two ships the Alaska and the Scharnhorst are fairly well matched. for main guns I'd say the 12 inch has a slight edge, but the Alaska offers a bigger target area. The secondary guns goes to the Scharnhorst, that might be the deciding factor if the range could be closed. But the Alaska has a touch more speed, so it may control the engagement and keep her distance. The German has a thicker belt so closing to get the fire off the deck might be wise. Much like the Hood was doing with the Bismarch. Once close the Schanhorst has torpedos that could come into play, which the Alaska didn't. So, again pretty close to a wash.


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## parsifal (Aug 6, 2013)

The issue is not so much the guns, as in the armouring scheme. Del has great details on this, but the difficulty is in the distribution. The German ships armourig scheme was exceptionally good, which made her a very hard ship to sink. It was possible, with difficulty to knock out Main guns but never simple.

Some of the pro-German guys (not DonL) have discounted the effects of the Allied radars, but in my opinion this made all the difference at North Cape. But despite several hits by DoY (a KGV class sistership) Scharnhorst was pretty much impervious to the hits until very late in the engagement. its not overstating the situation to describe the loss of Scharnhorst as very poor luck for the german ship.


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## Wavelength (Aug 8, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Some of the pro-German guys (not DonL) have discounted the effects of the Allied radars, but in my opinion this made all the difference at North Cape. But despite several hits by DoY (a KGV class sistership) Scharnhorst was pretty much impervious to the hits until very late in the engagement. its not overstating the situation to describe the loss of Scharnhorst as very poor luck for the german ship.



I know what your saying, but I see the main issue with radar as being the unlucky loss of Scharnhorst's forward radar set in the first engagement. Once this happened the Germans were at severe disadvantage. The other problem for the Scharnhorst's command was becoming seperated from their own destroyers. This made completing the asigned mission all but impossible combined with the loss of the forward radar on their battleship. It also set Scharnhorst up to being surprized. Had the Scharnhorst had some friendly destroyers in company the radars on the destroyers could have given the German admiral a clear picture of the developing situations. The Scharnhorst could have taken evasive action in time.


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## DonL (Aug 9, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The issue is not so much the guns, as in the armouring scheme. Del has great details on this, but the difficulty is in the distribution. The German ships armourig scheme was exceptionally good, which made her a very hard ship to sink. It was possible, with difficulty to knock out Main guns but never simple.
> 
> Some of the pro-German guys (not DonL) have discounted the effects of the Allied radars, but in my opinion this made all the difference at North Cape. But despite several hits by DoY (a KGV class sistership) Scharnhorst was pretty much impervious to the hits until very late in the engagement. its not overstating the situation to describe the loss of Scharnhorst as very poor luck for the german ship.



A very sophisticated and fair summary!
And that has nothing to do with my name in this post.


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## parsifal (Aug 9, 2013)

too much agreeing. we need to stop this right now!!!!!


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## Shortround6 (Aug 10, 2013)

A strange thing, to my eyes anyway, is that so many WW II naval engagements ( and some WW I) were decided by "lucky" hits. 

How many times does the phrase "in the worst possible place" or it's equivalent show up in a description of a hit or damage? In ships 600-800ft long with 50-66% of the length having torpedo protection how often did the torpedoes hit just forward or aft of the protection? 

Or one of the first (only?) hits striking the bridge or fire control or main turret? Targets that represent a percentage of the whole ship in single digits.


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## DonL (Aug 10, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> A strange thing, to my eyes anyway, is that so many WW II naval engagements ( and some WW I) were decided by "lucky" hits.
> 
> How many times does the phrase "in the worst possible place" or it's equivalent show up in a description of a hit or damage? In ships 600-800ft long with 50-66% of the length having torpedo protection how often did the torpedoes hit just forward or aft of the protection?
> 
> Or one of the first (only?) hits striking the bridge or fire control or main turret? Targets that represent a percentage of the whole ship in single digits.



This is very speculative!
Nearly all turrets of the famous five of Hippers BC's were out of action at the end of the day, but they could sunk 3 enemy BC's, Lützow was lost through not enough training at damage control, Seydlitz could manage to sail to port with "more" damage. 
The hit at Hood was something of luck, also the torpedo hit to Bismarck's control surface and to my ooinion the first hit from DoY at 12000 yards to turret Anton of SH, and the circumstances at 18.20 are mor luck then planed shooting.

Which other battles were luck?


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## Denniss (Aug 10, 2013)

Don't forget the lucky hit on Graf Spee, disabling their oil cleaning machinery. Or, not direct a naval battle, the torp hit that basically crippled the PoW (+ rather bad damage control, failing to restore/stabilize the power circuits for the pumps + AAA).


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## parsifal (Aug 10, 2013)

the problem with this "lucky hit" scenario are all th battles, or all the salvoes where "lucky hits" werent achieved. You dont read about those battles, because nothing intersting happens.

Typically a ship would carry several hundred rounds of ammunition. And typically also, in a naval battle, that ship was likley to expend a good part of that ammunition supply to get that one "lucky hit". 

There were lucky hits, But usually, a ship had to work really hard to get that "lucky hit. Which means, nothin lucky about it at all


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## JtD (Aug 10, 2013)

It would be interesting to know how much of a ship consists of "lucky spots". Imho, there are plenty, on every ship - ventilation, hatches, exhausts, smokestacks, power cables, armour joints, communications, fire control, command, secondary guns and ammo, AAA and ammo, Aircraft, ammo and fuel, rudders, screws, ship oil, boiler water ... there's so much on every ship outside of the armoured parts, so many weak points in the armour, that they add up to a significant source of trouble. Add to that ship roll, which alters the immunity zone, waves, that expose parts below the main belt to gunfire and what not else.

I also tend to think that even inside the immunity zone, there's more target area vulnerable than immune, outside of "lucky" hits. Bottom line, a hit, even inside the immunity zone, leaving no impression at all, will be the exception.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 10, 2013)

The great golfer Gary Player said "The more I practice the luckier I get"


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## dutchman (Aug 10, 2013)

Let me point out, we are missing the idea that damage can be done without going through the armour. The tramatic impact of a heavy shell will shock systems throughout the vessel. If you break a fuel line, cause power to fail in sections, cut commo lines to different departments. Radios ran on tubes, shock could disable on in a heartbeat, the same with the radar systems. You could inflict more damage then the repair crews could keep up with. The critical hits get all the glory, but if you pummel the ship for a while her fighting effectiveness goes down and the crew starts to get a bit concerned, which may undermine their effectiveness. 
Their will always be luck in any battle, it's as important as tactics, Their is a quote from Nepolean which I'm trying to recall, but it's something to the effect of give me a lucky general over a brilliant one. I know that's not right, but maybe one of you folks can find the real one. It's way to early to care and I have to be to work in a few minutes. I know we speak of 25,000 yard ranges, but the hip probablity at that distance is likely low, Training, morale and pride will help fill the gaps when luck turns against you. But it truly is a two sided scale. You need both luck and ability.


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## Wavelength (Aug 10, 2013)

The critcal factor of Scharnhorst becoming seperated from its destroyers was not a matter luck though. It was plain mismanagement by the German admiral. Likewise the failure to pass on the Luftwaffe recon intel about Fraser's battle group's location along to the command on Scharnhorst in a timely manner was inexcusable.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 10, 2013)

I wasn't really referring to "lucky" in regards to training or skill but more in the line of critical hits being obtained early in a hit sequence or critical hits resulting at a higher percentage than random distribution would indicate. 

Given the size of a battleship (or large cruiser) for one of the first hits to be on the Bridge, fire control or turret just seems like flipping a coin and coming up heads a number of times in a row. 

How many times do we read of a first hit being on the Funnel Cap, quarter deck, boat deck or some place NOT critical to the ships fighting ability, it happened, but some how critical systems seem to be hit affected with the first few hits more often than not. 

Given the length of a ship for a torpedo to hit in the prop shaft/rudder area is certainly not impossible or even improbable but three German major warships (or 4?) were crippled by such hits ( which didn't always lead to the loss of the ship), the PoW famously being hit there ( if not first torpedo then among the first) and a few others? 

It makes trying to figure out which ship was better a little difficult because the one or another ship suffered a rapid or radical change in ability due to an out of ordinary hit.


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## Wavelength (Aug 11, 2013)

Hits to the foretop disabling the vital equipment there and thereby altering the course of battle was actually quite common:

Graf Spee-River Plate
Gneisenau-Encounter with Renown
Bismarck-Final battle
South Dakota-Guadalcanal II
Scharnhorst- 1st Skirmish North Cape
Norfolk- Second Skirmish North Cape
Duke of York- 3rd Skirmish North Cape 

There's a pattern here, but foretops and foremasts stick up there just asking to get hit.


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## parsifal (Aug 11, 2013)

Armouring schemes are never 100% fullproof. there is always some chance of a critical hit. The chances just go down so far as to be not worth worrying about.

If a BB was unable to fire back in any way, it might be possible for a DD to sink here using just gunfire, but it would require an extremely lucky hit. Case in point is the Hood. There is fairly good evidence that the fatal shot that caused her to explode may well have been fired by the PE....a ship that in theory should not have been able to hurt her. Its only a theory, but there is some good evidence to support it.

But armouring schemes do reduce the risk. The USN had a system of immune zones to estimate the level of protection that a ship possessed against a particular caliber and type of weapon....ranges at which the armouring scheme (taking into account plunging fire and the like) should not suffer any serious damage or shell penetrations into vital areas. Generally the American system was accurate, but everyone could have a bad day. And firing as many rounds as possible increased the chances for that bad day to become a reality. 

In an Alaska vs Scharhorst match up, the Immune zone for the Scharnhorst will be considerable, whereas the immune zone for the Alaska will be virtually never. If the scharnhorst has radar, the advantage swings firmly in her favour. if, as happened historically she doesnt have radar, or loses it as a result of battle damage, she is probably in trouble. in planning an enagagement, you try not to count on those "lucky hits" however. The Germans also had a rather strange operational policy for their radars, according to Cajus Bekker. They feared passive detection, so tended to go into battle with the radar switched off. They would switch it on only after they went into battle. This had some advantages, but it left the ship virtually blind in the battle preliminaries, and has to be figured as a significant factor in her loss


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## DonL (Aug 11, 2013)

> The Germans also had a rather strange operational policy for their radars, according to Cajus Bekker.They feared passive detection, so tended to go into battle with the radar switched off. They would switch it on only after they went into battle. This had some advantages, but it left the ship virtually blind in the battle preliminaries, and has to be figured as a significant factor in her loss





> parsifal
> 
> too much agreeing. we need to stop this right now!!!!!



I'm "so sorry" but to your quote of the rather strange KM operational policy for their radars, I can't agree more!
It is next to the discharge of the destroyers my absolute biggest criticism on Adm Bey and also on the whole leadership of the KM.
They were not realy aware of the advantages of Radar or not able to realy sort it out and to work out a proper service regulation.

Mostly it was the personal estimation of the commanding Admiral which count, you can also see this from Lütjens at BS, as BS had shaked off the detection of Suffolk, but Lütjens and his specialist of his crew were the opinion through the passive reception of emissions they are still detected and they broke the radio silence.

I think the KM overslept proper service regulation and excact tests of radar handling till 1944 and the price was very high.


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## Wavelength (Aug 11, 2013)

Bekker is stating this as the probable reason Bey was surprised at the 1st skirmish, but he can’t know if that was really the case or not. (Actually there are indications that Bey was not practicing radar silence after all, but it is a complex explanation and far from certain as well) 


The KM issued no formal guide lines on radar silence at the time of North Cape. Indeed they issued no formal guidelines on radar use at all until 1944. It was on a case by case basis. For example, many German kapitans and admirals would operate the radar for two or three minutes every ten minutes if it was a situation were radar usage might give away their positions. This was done by Stange quite successfully prior to the Battle of Barents Sea, for example. This wasn't possible with most allied radars, which required extended warm up times. Seetakt could be switched on and off at will. 

The possibility of giving away ones own position through active radar use was expressed by Brinkmann captain of the Prinz Eugen during the Bismarck chase in 1941. 

Of course, the reluctance of U-boat commanders to use radar after May 1943 is well known. U-boat command actually issued orders ordering U-boat commanders to operate Hohentwiel radar. Hohentwiel could detect the approach of anti-submarine patrol bombers several minutes before the airborne ASV radars could in turn locate a surfaced U-boat. This was far better than relying on a passive radar detector device alone because a passive device can not determine range.

By late1943, everybody had learned that you can’t just use radar willy nilly. Indiscriminate use of radar was costing the Japanese, for example. IJN submarines were equipped with Type 22 10cm radar which they operated when on the surface. However, American subs, and ASW ships, and aircraft, had radar detectors. A radar detector can always detect radar emissions to a greater range than the radar it is detecting can register a return echo. The American subs would then locate the emitting IJN sub using its SJ active radar which had a slightly greater detection range than the Japanese Type 22 submarine to submarine. All submarine mounted radars have relatively short range to surface targets because of the needed small antennas and the relatively low mounting height of the antenna. The American subs would then ambush the Japanese subs.

Once everybody had reliable radar detectors the game changed. This included the Allies as well as the Axis. As early as mid 1943 the RN was instructing captains to keep all radars except S-band switched off until action was joined. Once it became known that the Germans had centimetric radar detectors this policy was expanded to include all radars. In operations in northern waters late in 1944 and in 1945 the RN was operating with all radars switched off as well.

The late Adm. Woodward, who lead the British task force to the Falklands once wrote that perhaps the most challenging aspects of modern command was the cat and mouse game of when to switch on radars and when to switch them off.


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## silence (Aug 20, 2013)

German Naval Radar was roughly on a par with US/UK. Unable to steer "him"self Bismarck was able to drive off Vian's five destroyers without getting hit by a single torp. Vian commented that Bis's shooting was so accurate (remember, this was at night) that he was convinced they were using radar. As well, at the Battle of the Barents Sea Admiral Hipper had at least two first-salvo hits against destroyers in conditions of near-dark, snow, low-lying fog, and optics icing up at ranges up to 18km. In the same battle Luetzow straddled with seven straight salvos at 16km+ in a snow storm.

None of this matters, though, if the RN brings Norfolk: she took out both Bis's and Scharnhorst's main fire control! My vote for RN MVP.


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## silence (Aug 20, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Armouring schemes are never 100% fullproof. there is always some chance of a critical hit. The chances just go down so far as to be not worth worrying about.
> 
> If a BB was unable to fire back in any way, it might be possible for a DD to sink here using just gunfire, but it would require an extremely lucky hit. Case in point is the Hood. There is fairly good evidence that the fatal shot that caused her to explode may well have been fired by the PE....a ship that in theory should not have been able to hurt her. Its only a theory, but there is some good evidence to support it.
> 
> ...



Scharnhorst had the best radar suite in the KM except for possible Tirpitz. However, as you point out, they did not do a good job of using it prior to Norfolk taking it out.


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## Wavelength (Aug 21, 2013)

silence said:


> German Naval Radar was roughly on a par with US/UK. Unable to steer "him"self Bismarck was able to drive off Vian's five destroyers without getting hit by a single torp. Vian commented that Bis's shooting was so accurate (remember, this was at night) that he was convinced they were using radar. As well, at the Battle of the Barents Sea Admiral Hipper had at least two first-salvo hits against destroyers in conditions of near-dark, snow, low-lying fog, and optics icing up at ranges up to 18km. In the same battle Luetzow straddled with seven straight salvos at 16km+ in a snow storm.
> 
> None of this matters, though, if the RN brings Norfolk: she took out both Bis's and Scharnhorst's main fire control! My vote for RN MVP.


 


Vian was right. An AVKS report on BS radars reveal they included the lobe switching supllimental modules. This means BS had blind fire capability. I believe BS was first warship in the world to have it.

Hipper's action report about Barents Sea is puzzling. It says that radar was ordered to be used for firecontrol. However after hitting Achates with its first salvo the forward radar was knocked out and had to be re-set which took some time. The aft radar was out of order the whole battle due to a fault in the ship's power supply that wasn't traced down in time. When the forward radar was brought back online the report states it was used for surface search and not for firecontrol. But if this was the case how did Hipper get surprized by the British cruisers? Furthermore, how did manage to hit Achates with another first salvo at darn near 18,000 meters at that time? Is it coincidental that when the forward radar came back online Hipper suddenly pummeled the Onslow scoring IIRC 4 hits in 8 salvoes?


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## Wavelength (Aug 21, 2013)

silence said:


> Scharnhorst had the best radar suite in the KM except for possible Tirpitz. However, as you point out, they did not do a good job of using it prior to Norfolk taking it out.



This is what KzS Giessler wrote in a secret Bundes Marine document from 1948. He wrote that Scharnhorst's radar were the best available at the time and they had been tested extensively and proven to be of exceptional accuracy. I have seen the photographic evidence that SH's radar were upgraded just weeks before the sorti. There are records of SH conducting blind fire training exercises in the fjords.


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## silence (Aug 22, 2013)

Wavelength said:


> But if this was the case how did Hipper get surprized by the British cruisers?



Good question. Here's a discussion on it: German Navy Forum | Admiral Hipper Class | Hipper may not have been surprised


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## Wavelength (Aug 23, 2013)

silence said:


> Good question. Here's a discussion on it: German Navy Forum | Admiral Hipper Class | Hipper may not have been surprised



Most of that discussion is conducted without a knowlege of the Action Report which comes in at the end and largely settles the original question. 

However, the details from the action report submitted by T-geronimo raise the same questions rasied here. Indeed why were reccomendations made on how to make the radars better for firecontrol use if the radar wasn't used for firecontrol? If there was a mix up in writing up the report and it should read that the radar was not used for surface search and was used for firecontrol; then everything makes sense. The OKM commentary according to T-geronimo don't call this into question though. They accept it. They say it was right to use the radar for surface search (although it did not do any good? and why not?) because they had other proven options for firecontrol.


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## Wavelength (Aug 23, 2013)

Mike Whitley's description of the events in his book German Cruisers match and don't match the Action Report in places. Whitley reports that the forward radar was knocked out during the initial shooting at Achates at 0939. However, Whitley reads that the aft radar remained in operation and it was this which made the succussful shooting at Onlsow possible at 1020 hours:



> Hipper whose after radar was operative, engaged her (Onlsow) very effecteively with 48 rounds..



Whitely does ask the important question about how Hipper got caught with its pants down:



> Which leads to the next question, why was the British cruisers' arrival such a surprize?... during the action itself the poor visibility necessitated constant use of radar for gunnery ranging and it may be that sweeps were not carried out as frequently as prudence required (Admiral Hippers radar log is not clear on this point).....



Whitley implies that he has examined the logs but dismisses the idea that the radar wasn't used for firecontrol as nonsense.

The British CinC Adm. Tovey criticized the British radar personal for making essentially the same mistake in his commentary submitted to the Admiralty. When the German destroyer closed to within a few thousand yards undetected it was because the surface search set on Sheffield (on Jamacia the radar had been knocked out by the shock of its own guns firing) was being used to range the Hipper and not being used for surface search.


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## Wavelength (Aug 23, 2013)

Going back to Vian's insistence that Bismarck was using radar to target his ships, a description (given by Vian) is included Grenfell's The Bismarck Episode:



> "...it was a pitch dark night. There was no moon and the blanket of cloud overhead shut out any faint light from the stars. Normally, this should have been in the destroyers favor, for the blacker the night the closer they should have been able to get to the Bismarck without being observed; they, the much smaller targets, being due to sight her first....It very soon became clear, however, that the darkness was no handicap to the Bismarck. Time after time she opened a very accurate fire on the destroyers whether, they could see her or not, and therefore she them. She was evidently firing by radar and independent of visual sighting. The shooting was too good be trifled with, and the Cossack was forced to shear away....at 11.42PM while (Cossack) was still (8,000 yards) away from the Bismarck, flashes of gunfire were seen from the latter's direction, and salvoes of large and small shells fell close alongside the Cossack, splinters from which shot away some of her wireless aerials....Eight minutes latter, the Zulu received the same treatment. She could just make out the Bismarck to the northward and had seen her shooting at Cossack. Now the enemy's guns flashed out again; and a few seconds later a 15-inch salvo straddled the Zulu herself. Two more similar salvoes straddled her in quick succession, the splinters wounding one officer, and two men. It was providential that she was not hit....it was a weird and rather awe-inspiring experience for the destroyers to undergo. Had the Bismarck been using search lights it would have seemed less unnatural, but there was no such warning. Out of the darkness in the Bismarck's direction would come a ripple of brilliant flashes, momentarily lighting up the sky. A ten or fifteen second’s pause, and then the shriek of approaching shells...."


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## parsifal (Aug 25, 2013)

Wavelength said:


> This is what KzS Giessler wrote in a secret Bundes Marine document from 1948. He wrote that Scharnhorst's radar were the best available at the time and they had been tested extensively and proven to be of exceptional accuracy. I have seen the photographic evidence that SH's radar were upgraded just weeks before the sorti. There are records of SH conducting blind fire training exercises in the fjords.



Its difficult to say one way or another whether Scharnhorst was a significantly more accurate gunnery platform. its an often stated claim that german radars (and hence ships) were much more accurate gunnery platforms than their allied opponents. The trouble is, there is virtually no operational results to establish, one way or the other the degree of Scharnhorst claimed superior accuracy. The conclusion to draw is that if she did have superior accuracy levels, it did not confer significant real advantages in her operational service. 

One thing that can be said is that Allied gunnery during North Cape was not particularly good. During the opening pahases of the battle, with Scharnhorst operating at speeds 26knots or more, and the engagement ranges starting at 11000m (at1647 hours ) and thereafter increasing to 19500m (at 1824 hours), the DoY managed to hit the Scharnhorst 7 or 8 times. To achieve those 7-8 hits. One source I know of says the DoY expended 52 salvoes to achieve those hits, which would equate to 520 rounds. However, for the entire engagement, DoY only expended 443 14inch rounds, so in all probability some of those 52 salvoes were secondary only. Estimated ammunition expenditure 1947 to 1824 is around 240 rounds. If correect, the DoY was hitting the Scharnhorst with 1 hit for every 25 shots, roughly speaking. The overwhelming majority of these hits were registered with fire controled radar only, no visual confirmation. Visual hits were achieved later, so are not really comparable.


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## DonL (Aug 25, 2013)

Parsifal,

I don't think that most people, who are involved in this theme through their knowledge and the given primary sources, would claim that the german radar was superior to allied radar or had significant advantages at accuracy.
The primary goal is to prove from primary sources and happened events, that the german radar was equal to the allied and not so much inferior, as often claimed in many books and secondary sources.


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2013)

Radar is part of a system. To prove or show anything, one has to resort to the operational or observed results, under similar conditions. I really cant think of many instances where thi situation developed. 

Perhaps one (slightly) similar action was that of the Rawalpindi, though it is marginal at best I concede. The German battle cruisers passed north of the Shetland and Faeröe Islands and patrolled in the Iceland* Faeröe channel throughout the 23rd of November. Towards dusk the Rawalpindi was sighted by the Scharnhorst, which chased and engaged at 8,000 yards range, and destroyed the armed merchant cruiser after a one-sided action 

Action here began at 1530 hours, with the Rawalpindi sighting the German Battlecruisers, and attempting to run. Gunnery commenced 1545. There was a hit with the first salvo, and the action only lasted another 15 minutews really. However the ship did not sink until 2000, and she was not fully immobilised until 1645. She had suffered 8 hits by then. sea state unknown, but better than at North Cape. Visibility also unknown, but probably du sky half light. Given the time of the year unlikely that gunnery was all visual. Ive read somewhere that Scharnhorst expended 230 rounds to achieve that hit rate. Thats not better than DoYs effort, in fact its significantly worse when you take into account the target state (immobilised) and range (no more than 8000m) for most of the engagement. 

This example proves nothing, but it does underline the fact that German ships were necessarily better shots than their allied counterparts. And the dataset is so limited that I doubt we can arrive at any meaningful comparison.


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## JtD (Aug 26, 2013)

parsifal said:


> ...the DoY managed to hit the Scharnhorst 7 or 8 times. To achieve those 7-8 hits. One source I know of says the DoY expended 52 salvoes to achieve those hits, which would equate to 520 rounds. However, for the entire engagement, DoY only expended 443 14inch rounds, so in all probability some of those 52 salvoes were secondary only. Estimated ammunition expenditure 1947 to 1824 is around 240 rounds...


.


http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_14-45_mk7.htm said:


> During the early part of her action against Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943, HMS Duke of York scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. However, HMS Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems.


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2013)

a straddle is not a hit, though it is a worthwhile event to take note of. Good information just the same. Just bear in mind that Navweapons is a notoriously anti-RN source.

However applying that datqa to the analysis, if the Brtisih recorded 77 salvoes, to expend 443 round of 14 in ammo, thats an average of 5.7 shells per hit....or effectively the front two turrets...


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## Wavelength (Aug 26, 2013)

I can find reference for 4-5 14-inch hits on Scharnhorst during 90 minute stern chase. But that is a key here: it was a stern chase so the average target area was small most of the time. Scharnhorst would occasional turn partly broadside to fire a 6 shot salvo at intervals. The seas were extremely heavy with gigantic breakers and high winds. It a wonder that both sides managed a few hits given the conditions.

Scharnhorst’s shooting from the reports of British observers was actually fairly good throughout, as was Duke of York’s.

Both opponents used star shell until the range opened up to the point that star shell was no longer useful. This was about 13,000 yards when Duke of York switched over to full radar direction. Scharnhorst obviously had to do the same. It was after Scharnhorst had to rely on radar that there was a noted improvement in its shooting, with Scharnhorst consistently straddling with its occasional salvoes and scoring 3 hits on Duke of York’s upper works. 

Duke of York was directing fire using Type 284M radar. This radar operated on 50cm wave length. The indication was by A-scope. The range accuracy using the new L42 precision ranging panel was 25 yards from the null point to the pip. However, in practice the range accuracy was 120 yards because of tiny variations of when the pulser actually initiated the transmitted pulse. Please don’t misunderstand, 100 meters range accuracy is exceptional compared to optics and plenty accurate for naval artillery. The resolution for range was 150 meters. The bearing resolution was 4.5 *. Bearing accuracy using lobe switching was exceptional at about 0.10*. According to Derek Howse, an expert on British radar, the Duke of York had to quit firing at 1824 hours because they could not spot the fall of shot. Other sources report that the Type284 had developed a fault and was no longer operational. I trust Howse. Duke of York was indeed asking other ships to spot the fall of shot and report it to them. The fact that DoY could not spot the fall of shot with its firecontrol radar hints that it was landing salvoes with 150 meters of the target, provided the resolution for range had not opened up due to fault in the pulser. 

Type 284M could not spot the fall of shot for bearing because it used an A-scope indicator which presents only range data. The operator knew if the antenna was on line for bearing using beam switching if the trace on the A-scope blinked or held steady. If it held steady then the antenna was aimed directly at the target.

Scharnhorst’s radars had recently been upgraded. The upgrades included larger antenna which operated in common mode and provided similar bearing resolution to the British radar. Also a new fine ranging system was fitted that could provide an accuracy of 25 meters depending on the skill of the operator. Of course Scharnhorst no longer had the services of its foretop radar due to its destruction by direct hit at 0930 hours.


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## Wavelength (Aug 26, 2013)

The shooting by Washington and South Dakota on Nov 15 1942 east of Savo Island illustrates the difficulty with accurate shooting at night even using radar. Washington expended 42 16-inch rounds in exchange for 0 hits at ranges of less than 18,000 yards. South Dakota expended 14 salvoes in exchange for no hits at 15,000 yards.

South Dakota thought it was scoring hit after hit because it could track the shells in flight flying right into the target pip on its radars. What was happening was that radars had resolution of 400 yards so that once shells landed with in 400 yards of the target they merged with the target echo on the indicator. 

Washington divided its fire between targets 13,000 yards away and a big pip 18,500 yards away. There were no Japanese warships 18,500 yards away so Washington sent its 16-inch shells after a phantom radar echo. After two salvoes Washington's radars all went out and failed to register any targets. The targets could no longer been seen either because of a smoke screen. Washington fired thereafter using "generated data" or to where its computor expected the targets to be based on the last data received.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 26, 2013)

Wavelength said:


> The shooting by Washington and South Dakota on Nov 15 1942 east of Savo Island illustrates the difficulty with accurate shooting at night even using radar. Washington expended 42 16-inch rounds in exchange for 0 hits at ranges of less than 18,000 yards. South Dakota expended 14 salvoes in exchange for no hits at 15,000 yards.
> 
> South Dakota thought it was scoring hit after hit because it could track the shells in flight flying right into the target pip on its radars. What was happening was that radars had resolution of 400 yards so that once shells landed with in 400 yards of the target they merged with the target echo on the indicator.
> 
> Washington divided its fire between targets 13,000 yards away and a big pip 18,500 yards away. There were no Japanese warships 18,500 yards away so Washington sent its 16-inch shells after a phantom radar echo. After two salvoes Washington's radars all went out and failed to register any targets. The targets could no longer been seen either because of a smoke screen. Washington fired thereafter using "generated data" or to where its computor expected the targets to be based on the last data received.



WL this sounds like it would be very interesting reading. Can you provide a source please?


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## Wavelength (Aug 26, 2013)

Sure:

USS Washington Action Report A316-3 This is the best one regarding Washington's radar problems.

Also see USS South Dakota Action Report, BB57 damage report, Naval War College Battle Summary

(Some of these documents are available online if I recall correctly at hyperwar.com)

Also Eric Hammels Decision At Sea is an excellent secondary account tying things together. Also highly reccomended is James Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno.


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2013)

> I can find reference for 4-5 14-inch hits on Scharnhorst during 90 minute stern chase. But that is a key here: it was a stern chase so the average target area was small most of the time. Scharnhorst would occasional turn partly broadside to fire a 6 shot salvo at intervals. The seas were extremely heavy with gigantic breakers and high winds. It a wonder that both sides managed a few hits given the conditions.




Ive got a couple of references that say that as well, but several others that have slightly different accounts of the battle (with respect to the hits received and inflicted). Just glancing at the WWII cruiser action reports, gives the follwing brief, but good account of the battle..

"At 16.17 Duke of York obtained radar contact at 45,500 yards to the north-east, and then Fraser knew he could bring the German ship to action. By 1632 Duke of York's gunnery radar had acquired Scharnhorst at 15 miles. He chose to hold on to close the range before opening fire. At 16.40 Belfast 10 miles astern, was ordered to illuminate Scharnhorst with star shells. However, Scharnhorst could not be seen from Duke of York. The latter then fired her own star shell which burst precisely beyond Scharnhorst, silhouetting her against the pale light, her guns trained fore-and-aft, completely caught by surprise" 

and...

"She had been hit by at least 13 x 14in shells, 12 x 8in or 6in and by 11 torpedoes. Duke of York fired 443 rounds in 52 broadsides, of which 31 were straddles".

Note that for the last paragraph that relates to the total hits, some of which were inflicted after Scharnhorst had stopped. So its not the hits within the 90 mins of the main action (1647 to 1824), it relates to the full action up until the time of sinking, at 1945. In that full time, DoY fired 443 rounds to achieve a total of 14 hits an average of 1 hit per 31 rounds fired

During the first 90 minutes (up until 1825), the following 14inch hits were recorded

At 16:47, Admiral Fraser ordered Belfast to open fire with star shells from 17.500 meters, at 16:50 the starboard side 133 mm guns of Duke of York did the same from 11.000 meters, Scharnhorst got illuminated and was caught by surprise and unprepared especially by the presence of heavy ships between her track to south and Norway. The first salvo occurred at 1650, and knocked out A tutrret of the german ship, permanently, and remporarily caused B turret to be flooded

Scharnhorst got hit with first salvo and immediately reacted firing at Duke of York and Jamaica, turned to east and than to north increasing speed to the maximum. From that point until 1824, range continued to increase out to 18500m, but a good proportion of the fight was at ranges below 15000m because for a time both sides relied on visual spotting 

At 17:08, another shot by Duke of York hit the Scharnhorst between the C turret and the airplane catapult damaging the aircraft hangar starting a fire due to aircraft fuel, fire was immediately extinguished.

At 17:20, Scharnhorst was sailing east at 26 knots , Duke of York and Jamaica on her wake were still firing at the Scharnhost from 13.000 meters. DoY was firing forward turrets only.

At 18:00, distance was 18.000 meters between Force 2 and Scharnhorst. 

At 18:15 Scharnhorst's turret B went out of action when a further hit from Duke of York broke the turret ventilation system making the turret unusable because of smoke from the guns when fired.

At 18:19, a new message was sent from Rear-Admiral Bey to SKL: "The enemy is firing by radar at a range of more than 18.000 meters. Position AC4965, Course 110°, Speed 26 knots".

At 18:24, Duke of York was at 19.500 meters and ceased fire (after 52 broadsides), a shell from Scharnhorst passing through the mast had broken some wires of the Type 284 Artillery Radar consequently firing was going to be only a waste of ammunition. This is the only hit recordedd by Fraser on the DoY. RN DD Saumarez was also hit by a 280mm shell, later at 1850, when at range of 1800m. At that range the chances of a hit were greartly increased. these are the only two recorded hits by 280mm shells in British accounts, and we dont have any german accounts to make any conclusions from. all other sources must be considered secondary, and all claims of additional hits are very suspect. 

Also at 1824, with one of the last salvoes fired Duke of York had hit a vital spot on the German battleship, penetrating the Nr. 1 boiler room, severing a steam-pipe that fed the turbines. This hit has been challenged as being the fatal blow (some claim the machinery just stopped, but the official British version is that the shell penetrated the engine space. Whatever the truth, Scharnhorst was hit at 1824 and then rapidly lost speed. 

From 1824 through to 1901, DoY radar was out of action due to the Scharnhorst 280mm hit on the British BBs mast. There was no fire from DoY during this period. .

At 18:40, with the radar still out of action, and Scharnhorst apparently drawing away, Admiral Fraser signalled to Admiral Burnett: "I see little hope to catch Scharnhorst and I am proceeding to support convoy".

Thus, in the period 1647 to 1824, there were 4 hits by DoY 14in guns, and one hit by Scharnhorst on the DoY at 1824. There was a further second hit on a DD at range 1800 by the Scharnhorst

To complete the analysis, DoY radar is reecorded as repaired from 1901, and she re-commenced firing at that time. By that stage the Schanrhorst had been torpedoed and had her speed reduced to 10knots

At approximately 1904, Duke of York registered at least two further hits on the Scharnhorst, these were very damaging hits Schanhorst was again on fire in the hangar area, and B turret ceased fire again, this time permananetly (after the ventilation had been destroyed this turret was only firig very intermittently turret C was the only one responding fire at normal rof. 

Between 1904 and 1928, Scharnhorst was hit 8 more times by Duke of York at a range of around 7000m In the final part of the battle (1824 to 1928), DoY had fired a further 28 salvoes , and in total had fired 80 broadsides on Scharnhorst (446 rounds).

After the battle, Fraser was highly complimentary of the Scvharnhorsts gallantry and fighting spirit.




> Scharnhorst’s shooting from the reports of British observers was actually fairly good throughout, as was Duke of York’s.



According to Fraser after action report Scharnhorst put one 11 in (280 mm) shells through Duke of York's masts severing a vital radar cable at 1824. This caused reduced DoY to cease firing until 1901 when the radar was repaired. During the first part of the battle (until 1824), DoY recorded 31 straddles out of 52 salvoes. Seriously, there is no comparison between the shooting accuracy of the DopY and the Scharnhorst, though I hasten to add this is hardly a fair comparison. DoY fire was radar controlled, Scharnhorsts was not 

In the aftermath of the battle, the Kriegsmarine commander, Großadmiral Karl Dönitz remarked, "Surface ships are no longer able to fight without effective radar equipment." 



> Both opponents used star shell until the range opened up to the point that star shell was no longer useful. This was about 13,000 yards when Duke of York switched over to full radar direction. Scharnhorst obviously had to do the same. It was after Scharnhorst had to rely on radar that there was a noted improvement in its shooting, with Scharnhorst consistently straddling with its occasional salvoes and scoring 3 hits on Duke of York’s upper works.



According to Fraser, starshell was used to 15000m, slightly more than 13K. According to Fraser, there was only one hit on the DpY, at range 19500. I have no information on the number of straddles the Scharnhorst achieved.


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## Wavelength (Aug 26, 2013)

> DoY fire was radar controlled, Scharnhorsts was not



And why not? Why would the Scharnhorst not use its aft radar?

There were three hits on DOY. One each passed through each mast. Another one past through the structure under the 273 radar office. = 3 Had Scharnhorst been firing nose fused HE instead of AP shells the damage would be greater. The British battle observers noted that Scharnhorst straddled with its second straddle and several accounts including Fraser's note that Scharnhorst straddled consistently from 17,000 yards out to 21,500 yards. How could it possibly do this without radar? Looks to be comparable to DOY's shooting to me.

Battle Summary 24 reads Duke of York switching over to full radar well before 16,500 yards.



> According to Fraser after action report Scharnhorst put one 11 in (280 mm) shells through Duke of York's masts severing a vital radar cable at 1824. This caused reduced DoY to cease firing until 1901 when the radar was repaired



This cable served the Type 281 air warning radar. A different radar from the Type 284M firecontrol set which either developed a fault or could not spot the fall of shot or both. The Type 281 remained unoperable until repairs at the Kola Inlet later. The hit which passed under the Type 273 office knocked out that radar temporarly also.



> At 18:40, with the radar still out of action, and Scharnhorst apparently drawing away, Admiral Fraser signalled to Admiral Burnett: "I see little hope to catch Scharnhorst and I am proceeding to support convoy".



Note how much time has passed since DoY has ceased fire. Quite a problem for the boiler room penetration theory there. It greatly supports a mechnical problem instead.


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2013)

> And why not? Why would the Scharnhorst not use its aft radar?



I always thought that there were two hits to the Scharnhorsts radar, one in the earlier cruiser action at around 0930 and another at 1647 with the very first salvo from DoY. 

Maybe you are right, but most accounts do comment on Scharnhorst having to fire blind and then having difficulty firing at those ships with flashless powder, since she relied heavily on seeing the gun flashes of her opponents for spotting.

If Scharnhorst did possess radar spotting in her last encounter, then her shooting is not that flash at all 



> There were three hits on DOY. One each passed through each mast. Another one past through the structure under the 273 radar office. = 3 Had Scharnhorst been firing nose fused HE instead of AP shells the damage would be greater. The British battle observers noted that Scharnhorst straddled with its second straddle and several accounts including Fraser's note that Scharnhorst straddled consistently from 17,000 yards out to 21,500 yards. How could it possibly do this without radar? Looks to be comparable to DOY's shooting to me.



Fraser does not mention three hits, though it is possible. He simply refers to "a hit", but that is not conclusive one way or the other. Barnetts account also only mentions one hit. Kembles account doesnt shed a lot of light on the number of hits either. It may well be that there were three hits, but you need to give me verification of your source(s) before I am willing to accept it. Ive learned long ago about this battle that things are often not what they seem..... 

Even so, this is three hits from the same salvo, all occurring at 1824. A very tight firing pattern and excellent shooting, if it did occur. You mention Frasers account, which i would like to re-check, since ive not found any mention of three hits in his account. his praise of German Gunnery I did find.

As to your last sentence, it would be difficult, I agree, but not impossible. Most contemporary accounts say that Scharnhorst relied on the muzzle flashes of the RN ships, and DoY was not using flashless powder. Despite the poor weather, visibility was actually not that bad....it was dark, for sure, the sea state terrible and radar did give a big advantge, but not impossible to hit by visual alone. if the rangefinders could stay out of the sea spray, they could in theory find a firing solution for the guns 

According to an eyewitness account of a sailor that was actually working in the Type 273 office, there was no penetration of that office.....the claimed hit actually passed overhead



> This cable served the Type 281 air warning radar. A different radar from the Type 284M firecontrol set which either developed a fault or could not spot the fall of shot or both. The Type 281 remained unoperable until repairs at the Kola Inlet later. The hit which passed under the Type 273 office knocked out that radar temporarly also.



Im more than a litle confused by this. it was indeed the Type 281 mast that was knocked out, but RN accounts say that this wire was reconnected by Lt Bates, some 36 minutes later. Are you sure it wasnt the Type 284 that was out of action for the engagement, and repaired post event. Which radar did Bates repair? 



> Note how much time has passed since DoY has ceased fire. Quite a problem for the boiler room penetration theory there. It greatly supports a mechnical problem instead


. 

The basis of the "engine failure" theory is mostly that in theory the engine spaces of the scharnhorst were too well protected for the 14 inch guns to penetrate, and hence the loss of boiler pressure arose from a ruptered line, rather than the destroyed boiler claimed in the RN reports. A ruptured line should take only a few minutes to repair. Id agree that it was difficult to penetrate the armour belt and protection system around the machinery spaces and further, it seems unlikley that a ruptured line would cause a loss of power for nearly 40 minutes. However, on its final discovery around 2004 (as I recall), the ROV undertaking the survey of the hull showed massive blowouts of the plating under the magazines of A Turret, and numerous shell penetrations of the main belt. This suggests the armouring scheme was not as impervious as is often claimed. There is evidence of the DoY penetrating the protection of the Scharnhorst. Exactly at what range (and hence when) we cannot be sure. However, the jury is out as to what caused the Scharnhorst to lose speed. It is clearly more plausible than is often admitted that she indeed suffered a wrecked boiler rather than a ruptured line.


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## Wavelength (Aug 26, 2013)

I find the shooting a gun flashes theory completely implausable.

Bates repaired the 273 antenna. The 281 wasn't repaired until later.


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2013)

I would agree, its hard to imagine, but that is the often quoted reason why she concentrated almost exclusively on the ships with flah powder only. Flashless powder certainly made a difference in the Pacific Night battles.

With regard to the 273 being repaired, certainly makes sense, but the official report to the admiralty does say the 284 was repaired Then again, the admiralty report is also out by more than 20 miles in scharnhorsts sinking position....even the official records can be wrong....


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 27, 2013)

Wavelength said:


> Sure:
> 
> USS Washington Action Report A316-3 This is the best one regarding Washington's radar problems.
> 
> ...



Read Hornfischer's (3 times) and Franks which isn't quite so focused on the sea dimension of the campaign but does provide some detail lacking in Neptune's (Hornfischer's) more personal account. 

Based upon Hornfischer, the problem with misinterpreting the fall of shells observed to be disappearing into the ship's echo with resolution defined by the pulse width seems to appear coincident with the first use of the SG set in a theater engagement. In other words, at Cape Esperance. It would appear that the advantage of radar wasn't so much that you got more hits, but that statistically they came a lot sooner by essentially eliminating the process of ranging salvoes (walking the ordnance onto the target). Once established, the moving target ship was just as likely to be subjected to straddles as hits as during an optically managed fight and perhaps, depending on conditions, even less so? 

Is it your impression that the gunnery teams understood that their shells may not have been hitting metal simply because they were merging with the echo? Not having read the after action reports, but only historical accounts, I had no idea that there was any problem with BB-56's radar and the accuracy against Kirishima seemed very effective. Are you saying the hits registered were based on predictions and not real-time radar data?


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## parsifal (Aug 27, 2013)

Mention was made in the discussion about BBs Washington and Sth Dakota on the Kirishima. The best detailed account that I know of is Kirishima Damage Analysis By Robert Lundgren Edited by Tony DiGiulian. It is available at Nav weapons , and a link is provided here. http://www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

What has been written in the US "final reports" about her final hours has largely been taken from a single USSBS entry. This includes the interrogation of Lt.Cdr. Tokuno Horishi. In this report Horishi writes that Kirishima received nine 16-inch shell hits and forty 5-inch shell hits and that Captain Iwabuchi had Kirishima scuttled. The estimate of nine major caliber hits was consistent with Admiral Lee’s estimate of eight 16-inch shell hits documented in his action report to Admiral Nimitz. There however was no information on the location of these hits or the damage suffered (however details can now be added following Ballards details survey of the wreck in recent years). There was no information on what attempts were made to save her after the battle if any. 

The detailed action report for Kirishima were lost in 1945. However, pieces of the battle from the Japanese side are available from the after action reports of other ships that participated and whose action reports survive, and from other survivors who were not interviewed by the USSBS. There were some brief and incomplete action reports from Kirishima (Japanese practice was to submit a brief report more or less immediately, and then a more detailed after action report perhaps a month later, similar to RN practice). Detailed after action reports are, however available from Takao, Sendai, dand Atago (all of which were not addressed in the US final report). There were also quite a number of surviving officer testimony post war, and Japanese secondary sources written on the subject. The most important piece of new evidence was supplied by Lt.Cdr. Shiro Hayashi who was Kirishima’s Chief Damage Control Officer and before the ship sank he sketched a drawing of the hit locations suffered by his ship. Lt.Cdr. Tsurukichi Ikeda was his good friend and when they were about to abandon ship Ikeda copied these hit locations meticulously and published it post war in a small Japanese book Shikikan-tachi no Taiheiyô Sensô [Pacific War as Described by the Senior Officers]. What was reported was vastly different then Horishi’s account. Ikeda shows 20 16" caliber hits and seventeen smaller caliber hits. 

In 1992 Dr. Robert Ballard discovered Kirishima’s wreck and was shocked to see her upside down with her forward section completely destroyed and her forward anchor chain draped over the stern. Dr Ballards survey of the wreck confirms Hayashi’s and Ikeda’s account (ie the US report significantly underestimates the amount of damage and the number of hits suffered by the Kirishima). Unfortunately, when it was discovered she was upside down, Dr. Ballard decided not to film the entire wreck and so not all hit locations were caught on tape. 

So, virtually all the accepted (American) accounts of the damage suffered by the Kirishima....the numbers of hits sustained, and when, are suspect. Read the article, look at the damage diagrams, and come to your own conclusions is what I would recommend......


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 27, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I would agree, its hard to imagine, but that is the often quoted reason why she concentrated almost exclusively on the ships with flah powder only. Flashless powder certainly made a difference in the Pacific Night battles.



I've posted a photo, looking aft from the bow, of the Washington (BB-56) at Guadalcanal during the November 14-15 night battle. It presumably shows the night engagement flash problem that put USN combatants at a disadvantage. It would be interesting to see a similar photo, taken aboard an IJN ship that might reveal the difference in illumination during main battery discharge.


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## vinnye (Aug 27, 2013)

Yep, that might tell the enemy where you are!


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## parsifal (Aug 27, 2013)

Great images, would love to see the others that you have.

I dont have any images of Japanese flashless cordite in operation, but I do have this link of HMAS Shropshire firing flashless cordite ammunition in October 1944, off Leyte. 

Each nation developed flashless powder to deiffernet detail specifications. I dont know the flash characterisitcs of each different propellant. Scharnhorst was using a somewhat flashless cordite, but it still gave off a dull red glow by some eyewitness statements

October 1944. HMAS SHROPSHIRE fires flashless cordite broadside at the Philippines invasion - USN. | Flickr - Photo Sharing!

Ill have a quick look and see if I can find anything elsse showing flashless cordite


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 27, 2013)

Neat photo Pars. It seems to provide some confirmation of a suspicion I've had that there may have existed an untested assumption by USN officers that the optically thick muzzle _smoke _might mask the gun _flash_ at night. It certainly seems to do so during the day, but based on the Washington photo, I can imagine so much scattered light propagating through the smoke cloud from the initial muzzle flash to make the smoke appear as a large, easily observed, luminous ball. I've heard that the USN did very little night engagement practice so it may not have occurred to anyone that they were providing an optical firing solution to enemy vessels during a night engagement. I've seen paintings of the engagement that show dull red muzzle flashes on the horizon issuing from IJN ships. 

Hornfischer in _Neptune's Inferno_, tells the story of the USS Atlanta (CLAA-51) engaged during the preceding night's action of 12-13 November. When illuminated by IJN search lights its Captain responds with "Counter Illuminate!" (instead of the "Open Fire!" immediately called for by the, evidently better adapted, gunnery officer) demonstrating the rather peacetime mindset that handicapped USN officers well into the Guadalcanal campaign. 

Unfortunately, while I wish I had more such photos, I just happened to stumble upon this one while doing research to support a prior post.


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## Wavelength (Aug 27, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Is it your impression that the gunnery teams understood that their shells may not have been hitting metal simply because they were merging with the echo? Not having read the after action reports, but only historical accounts, I had no idea that there was any problem with BB-56's radar and the accuracy against Kirishima seemed very effective. Are you saying the hits registered were based on predictions and not real-time radar data?



It is pretty clear that gunnery/radar personal didn't understand the science of radar all that well during WWII. 

To be clear I'm talking about the radar problems which occured to the east of Savo Island some 45 minutes before the engagement with the Kirishima to the west of Savo. 

Adm Lee and Capt Murrey (in the action reports) are puzzled by the phantom radar contacts they keep having problems with operating among south pacific islands. But it was a function of the pulse repetition rate being too high on the American radars. The other problems are minor lobes (side lobes) and the resolution for range operating so close to islands.

On Washington they did indeed fire at Hashimoto's cruisers (and the radar phantom) based on predictions after the first two salvos. Once the targets could not be found with radar (because they went out temporarly after salvo 2) or visually (because of the Japanese smoke screen) they just assumed they had sunk them. 

South Dakota credited itself with sinking 1 battleship, two cruisers, and another cruiser later on, when it actually hit nothing all night long.


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## Wavelength (Aug 27, 2013)

In the BB56 action report they also report the problem of their own gun flashes blinding the night vision of their own personal and making rangefinder optics useless. They report that gunnery officers resorted to hand held binoculars in a vain effort to spot the fall of shot. Radar could not spot of shot and the optics were blinded by their own ship's gunflashes.


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## parsifal (Aug 27, 2013)

> South Dakota credited itself with sinking 1 battleship, two cruisers, and another cruiser later on, when it actually hit nothing all night long



Im not going to defend Sth dakotas claims, they seem outrageious to me to be honest. To that extent I agree with the thrust of what you are saying. However, I cannot agree with the vercity of your statement as to whether she made or achieved any hits or not. Thats because of the latent innaccuracies of the USN after action reports, that appear to be the main basis of your conclusions. These reports in more recent post war analyses, are shown to be clearly inadequate, and not in a small way. Lees final report claimed just 8 hits (of heavy BB calibre), the USSBS report, based on that report, plus Harashi's testimony concluded 9 hits. These were all pretty much debunked by the Kirishimas Damage Control Officers account, the after action reports of other ships nearby and of course Ballards underwater survey which all attested to more than twenty hits of BB calibre on the Japanese BB. Conclusion: the USN after action reports arent worth the paper they are written on, because they grossly underestimate hits achieved. 20 actual to 8 estimated. Further conclusion, it is entirely plausible, indeed, likley, that Sth Dakota achieved some of the hits she claimed.


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## Wavelength (Aug 27, 2013)

That is why we need to weigh all the available evidence and correlate action reports with well researched secondary accounts. As well as just use some common sense. The action reports do give us a lot of insight into such things and details such as Washington shooting on generated data instead of real time data at times and so forth. It is only by this that it becomes obvious that Washington had to be shooting at phantom. But this could not be known to the Americans until it was checked against Japanese records after the war. Even then it seems to slip by most secondary accounts. 

The caution about treating action reports and other documents as written in stone also applies to the British reports about N. Cape. That's probably one reason that the actual events of N Cape as you say tend to be a bit ambiguous from account to account. 



oldcrowcv63 said:


> I've heard that the USN did very little night engagement practice so it may not have occurred to anyone that they were providing an optical firing solution to enemy vessels during a night engagement.



I don't think firing solution is the right term. Firing solution implies that the location of the momentary gunflashes can be ranged with a degree of precision. It going to be pretty mercurial. The biggest problem of the American gun flashes wasn't in giving away their location to the enemy but by blinding their own crews. The American warships were not originally designed to fight night it would seem. The optics proved useless at night. 

German ships had completely seperate optical equipment for fighting at day and fighting at night or during poor visibility. This is why the British speculation that Scharnhorst was accurately ranging on gunflashes beyond 17,000 yards is so implausable. The day optics couldn't do it and the night optics were designed to operate within about 10,000 meters range. The night optics expected to be able to range on a target illuminated by starshell or search light, not a flash lasting a split second.

The British speculate that SH might have been ranging on gunflashes because the accuracy seemed to drop off a bit when the secondary battery of Duke of York stopped firing. But in the same paragraph they also state that these temporary drop offs in accuracy coincided to when the jammer had zeroed in on the German radar frequency thereby supporting that sH was indeed using radar. Seetakt was frequency agile so once a jammer zeroed in on the frequency they could change frequency in a constant cat and mouse game.


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