# German Gibraltar?



## comiso90 (Aug 28, 2009)

Did the Germans ever develop operational plans to take Gibraltar?

I cant imagine them attempting w/o holding onto N Africa and taking Malta but all sorts of crazy scenarios are hypothesized but never executed.


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## joy17782 (Aug 28, 2009)

I do belive the german okw did have plans too invade gilraltar. with the help of the franco,s spainish troops help , but the germans never could get francos help in that area, and bye that time the troops and planes were needed else where, and crete air drop put hitler in a sour puss mood about airdrops, but i think that they could have done it ,if franco would have opened his borders for the german troops too attack the base


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## imalko (Aug 28, 2009)

Any German invasion of Gibraltar would be impossible without Spain entering the war. Franco was not ready for that, so it never happened...


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## comiso90 (Aug 28, 2009)

imalko said:


> Any German invasion of Gibraltar would be impossible without Spain entering the war. Franco was not ready for that, so it never happened...



I agree but "impossible" doesnt keep the think tanks from developing plans..

If you can think of a scenario, it's probably been studied and evaluated... I'd like to know if anythng was developed.


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## parsifal (Aug 28, 2009)

It certainly has. The german codewaord for their plan was "Felix". "Felix" was the proposed name for a German/Spanish seizure of Gibraltar. It was scheduled for 10 January, 1941 but never executed. This plan was discussed at a meeting held between Franco and Adolf Hitler in late October 1940, in Hitler's railroad car at Hendaye, at the border of German-occupied France with Spain. Franco's material demands for joining the Axis powers included: 

400,000-700,000 tons of grain 
All the fuel required for the Spanish Army 
All lacking equipment for the Spanish Army 
Artillery, aircraft, and special troops for the conquest of Gibraltar 
In addition, Franco wanted Germany to hand over the French African territories of Morocco and Oran, and to help Spain get a border revision in the west of Río de Oro (in Spanish Sahara). Franco knew that these claims were impossible for hitler to meet.....the grain supplies would have left Germany hopelessly starving herself, and the te4rritoial claims on Vichy would have destroyed German credibility in the world, because it would destroy the recent terms of the peace treatry with France. 

Ciano's Diplomatic Papers report that Hitler later said he would rather have three teeth extracted than meet with Franco again. It is a subject of historical debate whether Franco overplayed his hand, demanding too much from Hitler for Spanish entry into the war, or whether he deliberately stymied the German dictator by setting the price unrealistically high. Also, Wilhelm Canaris, who secretly relayed information to Franco about the German plans, might have convinced Franco not to agree to Hitler's demands. 

In any case, the operation itself would not have been straightforward. German estimates were for as many as 30,000 troops to be involved in the assault. Use of airborne forces was not an option due to the small amount of level ground around the Rock and the perilous air currents. Supporting the assault with heavy siege artillery would have been difficult as the Spanish railway system would not support the movement of such large guns within range of Gibraltar. In addition the actual assault would have go across the exposed runway of the airfield, which runs parallel to the entire land border with Spain. Recognizing this fact, the British defenders had mounted rapid fire Bofors 40 mm guns in tunnel openings facing north and downwards onto the airfield to specifically deal with this threat.


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## comiso90 (Aug 28, 2009)

parsifal said:


> It certainly has. The german codewaord for their plan was "Felix".



Cool... Thanks!

I was wondering if airborne troops were an option... that was my next question.
If anything would motivate the Germans to use gas warfare.. it would have been Gibraltar.

How self sustaining was Gibraltar? drinking water? Crops? farm animals? 

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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2009)

I have a friend who has been there. Considering that the british were fortifying it since before the napoleonic war, I would say it it was one of the most impreganable fortresses of Europe.

I think either Glider or trackend were stationed there at some stage....maybe one of them can give a better answer


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 29, 2009)

They also said the same thing about Fort Eben Emael and it was knocked it in less then an hour.

If man can build it, he can also conquer it.


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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2009)

True, but forts also have had their succeses. Brest Litovsk, Sevastopol, Hango, Corregidor, Maginot, Tobruk, all had some success. Eban Emmanuel was one case, a special case, and a rather thin case to make against a 300 year old fortress


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 29, 2009)

Correct me if I am wrong, but everyone of the listed Forts/Fortifications fell in modern warfare.

Eban Emmanuel demonstrated that innovative tactics could succeed quite well and IMHO age is totally irrelevant in how impregnable a fortress is.


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## comiso90 (Aug 29, 2009)

Interesting side note... many researchers believe that Gibraltar was the last stand of the Neanderthals. I believe the most recent evidence of Neanderthals were found there:

BBC NEWS | Science/Nature | Neanderthals' 'last rock refuge'

I doubt it was happenstance that they chose a defensible position... can you imagine cro-magnons assailing Gibraltar against Neanderthals?



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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2009)

Most of the forts along the Atlantic Wall never surrendered, except after the surrender of their country. So too with the maginot Line, which did not surrender until either just before, or just after the surrender of France (I forget which.

The fortress at Hango never surrendered, it was evacuated. The fortresses around Leningrad and Moscow never fell, and Stalingrad, which was effectively a fortress also never completely fell. 

Tobruk held out for over a year, and only fell because of mistakes by the defending garrison. If it was so easy to take fortresses, why didnt Rommel take Tobruk before 1942. I can tell you it wasnt for lack of trying, or for a lack of innovation, or for a lack of resources. On any of those criteria, the place should have fallen within days of its first encirclement. An assault of the fortress at Malta was never attempted, but would have been bloody.

There is no gurantee in anything in life. Fortresses cannot gurantee a successful defence, but they can improve the chances of holding ground. 

Your logic is very akin to the attitude taken by the French in the opening days of WWI. They disdained the need to entrench, to dig in, preferring to rely on the elan of the troops to carry them forward and win the battle. The french army soon abandoned that disastrous policy and were digging in cowering in their increasingly sophisticated fortresses as the war progressed


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## comiso90 (Aug 29, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> Eban Emmanuel demonstrated that innovative tactics could succeed quite well and IMHO age is totally irrelevant in how impregnable a fortress is.



Gibraltar is much more than a fortress...

gibraltar - Google Maps

It's difficult to imagine a geographical feature that's more defensible. I drove by it and was impressed at the size. I think only a 10 year blockade would defeat Gibraltar...


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 29, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Most of the forts along the Atlantic Wall never surrendered, except after the surrender of their country.



Cherburg , Saint-malo Dinad, Brest, Boulogne where major parts of the Atlantic Wal that did surrebder early



QUOTE]So too with the maginot Line, which did not surrender until either just before, or just after the surrender of France (I forget which[/QUOTE]

Some of the smaller forts fell and others were captured due to them haven been abandoned;


The fortress at Hango never surrendered, it was evacuated. The fortresses around Leningrad and Moscow never fell, and Stalingrad, which was effectively a fortress also never completely fell. 




> Your logic is very akin to the attitude taken by the French in the opening days of WWI. They disdained the need to entrench, to dig in, preferring to rely on the elan of the troops to carry them forward and win the battle. The French army soon abandoned that disastrous policy and were digging in cowering in their increasingly sophisticated fortresses as the war progressed



My logic? The only statements I made:

They also said the same thing about Fort Eben Emael and it was knocked it in less then an hour. (in response to Gibralter being impossible to take.

If man can build it, he can also conquer it. I never made a statement saying the are uesless.


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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2009)

Look at the reasons behind each case, rather than trying to generalize. And then from those specific cases, try and draw the parrallel with Gibraltar.

Firstly, the example you cited originally. Facts are it fell easily, but for what reason. As you say, it fell to new techniques and weapons, specifically airborne troops and hollow charge explosives. Neither weapon had been anticipated in th original design, and the 1300 defenders were thoroughly demoralised from the very beginning

Is there a parrallel that can be drawn for Gib. If there is, I cant see one. Airborne troops could not be used, and as far as I know ther were no new weapons in the closet. There was just one path of advance. The chances of taking Gibraltar by surpise , by coup de main are slim, particularly since the Germans would need to spend many weeks getting into position

Maginot Line: You mentioned that some of the smaller forts fell, which may be true, but this only reinforces the fact that the main defences did hold, until completely surrounded and isolated. 

Is ther any lesson for Gibraltar, any methodology that could be used. Well, possibly that the Luftwaffe would need to maintain a total blockade of the place. But this would be very difficult given that the Brits would almost certainly take over Spanish Morocco, and have the Vichy on their side, due to the latter being betrayed by the Germans to get the Spanish into the war. They tried for more than two years to close communications to Malta, a far more isolated outpost than Gibaraltar, and failed ther. So ther is no reason to suggest that Gibraltar would ever be isolated as such

Tobruk: Here the Germans have a situation similar to that which would face them in "Felix". And here the qualities of the British and Dominion troops showed that in defence they could not be beaten by anything the germans were able to throw at them. The defenders were often outnumbered 4 or 5 to 1; the germans (and yes the majority of the assaults were german, not Italian) were bloodily repulsed and got nowhere. 

At Gibraltar, the most that could be thrownat the fort was 30000 troops according to the german Intelligence estimates. Yet the Defenders numbered no less than 16000. 2:1 might sound like good odds, but they are not, when the defender is entrenched, and properly supported. The defenders could count on continuous shore based and naval gunfire support, at least air parity.

Corregidor:

The Japanese were only able to take this fortress after a protracted bombardment, and ground assault, which in total lasted more than four months. Moreover, the critical factor that led to the loss of this position was the isolation imposed by the IJN. I dont think this would occur with Gib. Re-supply and reinforcement would occur as required in Gib. The Allied heavy artillery would prevent any effective Axis artillery barrage, and the Infantry assaults would be subjected to constant and withering fire. I cannot draw any parrallels here.

Sevastopol: This port was taken only after the Russian fleet was dealt with by the Luftwaffe (there being no effective Russian aerial presence at that time) and only after the heaviest artillery bombardment, using super heavy ordinance, was used to break open the Russian forts protecting the city. This bombardment lasted more than a month incidentally. A bomnbardment by heavy guns was not possible at Gib, for reasons relating to the Spanish railnet. .

I could continue, but you get the drift I think The reasons for a probable defeat need to be examined and put forward, rather than just mouthing dogma that is essentially unsupported. Tell people why you think Gibraltar would fall, or why forts are not of any use to a defence, rather than making generalised statements about how all forts can be taken. 

I agree that given the right conditions, a fort can be taken, but can those conditions be realistically generated in 1941? I cant see how they could.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 29, 2009)

Here is my take on Gibraltar. Was it unconquerable? Of course not. The Germans certainly could have taken it with the right strategy, attack, and support. Was it likely to happen? Not with out any support from Spain and the Med not being in their control.


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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Here is my take on Gibraltar. Was it unconquerable? Of course not. The Germans certainly could have taken it with the right strategy, attack, and support. Was it likely to happen? Not with out any support from Spain and the Med not being in their control.



I agree...the right conditions will allow the Germans to take the place, but are those conditions achievable. What are the conditions.

I see the necessary conditions as being a sustained artillery bombardment, and a total blockade, and interdiction strategy to prevent seaward interdiction and re-supply by the RN. To do this, I think the germans would need to occupy and hold both sides of the straits, and that probably means taking out the Vichy in North Africa. 

Once the geographical conditions have been achieved, the Germans would have to maintain a solid blockade for many months, whilst maintaining a continuous barrrage of the fortress. 

None of this was solvable in the terms available in 1940-41. The taking of this place would have been very difficult. This is why the French never attempted it 140 years before .


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## GrauGeist (Aug 29, 2009)

I have seen mention of German artillery being used in a scenario (if the Spanish had allowed the Germans access), but what about a concerted attack using the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe.

I know this falls heavily along the lines of *what if*, but the American assault on Iwo Jima and Okinawa comes to mind when I look at the way Gibraltar was set up.

Early in the war, the Germans did have the tools to mount such an attack. Although they lacked carriers, the Germans did have quite a bit of North African territory they could have used as staging bases for thier air support. As far as the naval aspect, just about all the battlehsips and cruisers Germany would build, were already in service and available.

Think this would have been a possibility?


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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2009)

Some images and comments about the place:

Subterranean Exploration: Gibraltar WW2 Tunnels

In detail the defences grew steadily, and included the following:


This, may take a while to type up, but the below is a list of the Batteries (Excluding Bofars) on Gibraltar.

PRINCESS CARLONINE'S BATTERY - One 6 inch Mk VIII
TOVEY BATTERY - Two 6 inch Mk VIII
WHITE ROCK AA - Two 3.7 Inch
SIGNAL HILL AA - Two 3 inch 30 CWT
GLACIS AA - Two 3,7 inch
MONTAGUE BASTON AA - Two 3.7 inch
DETATCHED MOLE AA - Two 30 inch 20 CWT
RECLAMATION AA - Four 3,7 Inch
DEVILS GAP BATTERY - Two 6 inch Mk VIII
OIL TANKS - One 6 inch Mk VIII
BREAKNECK BATTERY - One 9.2 inch Mk X on Mk V mounting
LORD AIREY'S BATTERY - One 9.2 inch on Mk VII Mounting
OIL TANKS AA - Two 3.7 inch
MARTINS BATTERY - Two 4 inch QF
O'HARA's BATTERY - One 9.2 Mk X on Mk VII mounting
SPUR BATTERY - One 9.2 Mk X on Mk VII mounting
LEVANT BATTERY - One 9.2 Mk X on Mk V mounting
EUROPA ADVANCE BATTERY - Two 4 inch QF
WINDMILL HILL AA - Four 3.7 inch
BUFFADERO BATTERY - One 9.2 Mk X on Mk V mounting
'P' EMPLACEMENT - Two 9.2 inch Howitzers
SOUTH BATTERY AA - Four 3.7 inch
LIGHTHOUSE AA - Four 3.7 inch
WEST BATTERY - One 9.2 Mk X on Mk V mounting
GENISTA BATTEY - Two 6 inch Mk VIII
NAPIER BATTERY AA - Four 3.7 inch
SOUTH MOLE BATTERY - One 4 inch QF

In addition the following emplacements were placed on the Harbour walls

T.1. - one 6pdr twin mounting (2pdrs I think in 1941)
T.2. - one 6pdr twin mounting
T.3. - one 6pdr twin mounting
T.4. - one 6pdr twin mounting
T.5. - one 6pdr twin mounting
T.6. - one 6pdr twin mounting

Also, a total of 34 Bofors sites existed.


British Defenses 
Had Operation Felix taken place during January 1941 as planned, what opposition would the attackers have faced? 
In September 1939 the garrison comprised two British battalions: 2nd The Kings Regiment and 2nd Somerset Light Infantry. 4th Devonshire arrived in May 1940 and 4th Black Watch in July 1940, so by January 1941 four infantry battalions were in place. 

However the British were in the process of transferring or forming additional Infantry. These were the 1st and 2nd Gibraltar Brigades each with with reinforced and additional battalions. 
3rd Heavy Regiment, Royal Artillery (previously "Gibraltar Coast Defenses" and later redesignated 3rd Coast Regiment) controlled 4th, 26th, and 27th Batteries with 8 x 9.2-inch guns, 7 x 6-inch guns, and 6 x twin 6-pounders. (Artillery strength also grew considerably later in the war.) 
In September 1939 two AA batteries, the 9th and 19th, defended Gibraltar from air attack with 4 x 3-inch, 4 x 3.7-inch, and 2 x 40mm guns. HQ 10th AA Regiment was later formed to control the two batteries. The 82nd Heavy AA Regiment arrived in July 1940 with three batteries (156th, 193rd, and 256th) including 16 3.7-inch guns, 8 x 40mm Bofors guns, and the first radar sets. 3rd Searchlight Battery also arrived in July. Some shuffling of assets and re-numbering of units followed (including departure of HQ 10th AA Regiment, but no batteries); however, this AA strength was further reinforced in March 1941 by approximately a further 6 batteries . If the airfield was not protected by an advance into Spain before the arival of the Germans, there would be no direct air support, since the airfield was forward of the defensive positions. However airfields were close by in Spanish Morocco. The British planned to capture these in the event of any aggressive moves by the Germans

The approach peninsula to the fortress was less than two miles wide, and had been deliberately cleared of all cover and obstacles. The german assault forces amounted to one Corps, and would advance across many thousands of yards of cleared terrain. It was heavily mined as I recall


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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2009)

The Germans had nothing to match the US Pacific Fleet. Iwo was defended by 220 guns of 75mm or larger, and by an Infantry force of 18000 men. It was attacked by an Infantry force in excess of 110000 men, and bombarded for over 3 days by over 1000 guns. This was considered insufficient by the MAF commanders, they had wanted 10 days.

It was bombed over that same period by over 1000 aircraft. It still took 25 days to secure, and cost over 27000 American casualties. If the Japanese had possessed even naval parity, it would never have fallen.

Against Gibraltar, it is likley that the Allies would enjoy naval supremacy. If the Germans moved through Vichy France, they would have had to fight the remains of the french a well as the British, and a two front war, with resources not even adequate for one front.

The only feasible method to approach the isue would be to advance from Spain, and doing it that way limits the frontage you can adopt, which in turn limits the size of your assault forces. In this case the limited front restricts your assault forces to no more than 30000 compared to the 110000 available to the Americans. The Germans could adopt a wave assault tactic, but that means and assumes that the initial wave can get out of the way once they run out of steam. And with the british having the ability to feed in reinforcements, as required, the battle becomes well nigh hopeless for the Germans


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 29, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Look at the reasons behind each case, rather than trying to generalize. And then from those specific cases, try and draw the parrallel with Gibraltar.
> 
> Firstly, the example you cited originally. Facts are it fell easily, but for what reason. As you say, it fell to new techniques and weapons, specifically airborne troops and hollow charge explosives. Neither weapon had been anticipated in th original design, and the 1300 defenders were thoroughly demoralised from the very beginning



I'm not sure what you base the defenders being thoroughly demoralised on but IMHO the most important factor in the attack was the simple fact nobody thought it was possible. 

_The Fall of Eben Emael_ by Annand states that the fort was considered the strongest in the world.

In regards to the other forts you keep bringing up (not me), you commented in post #9:



parsifal said:


> True, but forts also have had their success. Brest Litovsk, Sevastopol, Hango, Corregidor, Maginot, Tobruk, all had some success. Eban Emmanuel was one case, a special case, and a rather thin case to make against a 300 year old fortress



If the purpose of this thread is to debate whether Gb could have been taken by the Germans or not (unless I have gone out on a tangent which I'll admit I've been known to do) I'm not sure how bringing up some of the other major fortresses that were taken by the enemy is relevant. The fact it took longer for some of them to fall doesn't matter unless we are talking about Germany taking Gb within a time frame. The fact is those that were labeled as “impossible to take” were taken.





parsifal said:


> Your logic is very akin to the attitude taken by the French in the opening days of WWI. They disdained the need to entrench, to dig in, preferring to rely on the elan of the troops to carry them forward and win the battle. The french army soon abandoned that disastrous policy and were digging in cowering in their increasingly sophisticated fortresses as the war progressed



Please explain to me how you derived this about by my statement:

“They also said the same thing about Fort Eben Emael and it was knocked it in less then an hour.

If man can build it, he can also conquer it.”

I challenge you to find any post I have ever made that stated fortresses were usless or digging in a waste of time.



parsifal said:


> I could continue, but you get the drift I think The reasons for a probable defeat need to be examined and put forward, rather than just mouthing dogma that is essentially unsupported. Tell people why you think Gibraltar would fall, or why forts are not of any use to a defence, rather than making generalised statements about how all forts can be taken.



You can’t be serious. You got all of this from my statement:

“They also said the same thing about Fort Eben Emael and it was knocked it in less then an hour.

If man can build it, he can also conquer it.”





parsifal said:


> I agree that given the right conditions, a fort can be taken, but can those conditions be realistically generated in 1941? I cant see how they could.



So you blast me for making a statement that “If man can build, he can also conquer it”, but then go to state that you agree if given the right conditions a fort can be taken. Huh?

-------------------------
But I'm willing to be an armchair general and take a whack at it.

The axis powers for 2 straight weeks day and night use incendiaries and heavy ordinance to bomb Gb to try and deprive the defenders of sleep. On the final day a German captured allied ship filled with fuel docks in the main harbor.

A few hours later at dusk an emergency message is sent from 2 twin-engine cargo aircraft that they are under attack and need to make an emergency landing – one of them visibly has an engine on fire. They are Jewish scientists (or somebody else) who have escaped with their wives and families from Vichy France. Pursuers turn around and the aircraft land on the runway. Out step German soldiers discussed as women and old men. At that point, the “allied ship” is detonated and either explodes or at least burns fiercely hopefully blinding AA gunners and lighting the way for the Germans. Soldiers from the 2 cargo aircraft pour out and secure the airport/runway. Paratroopers start to land and reinforce the troops already there (I’ve seen Gb and I do think it’s possible to land paratroopers there). Then Gliders proceed to land. What’s left of the harbor is now secured. Additional troops are landed via cargo U-Boats filled with men and equipment. The main German troop ships that were waiting nearby in Spanish harbors disguised as neutrals now set sail and arrive within a half hour.


I would prefer to have used the Fa 223 (helicopter transport) for surprise but it would not have been available at best until 42.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 29, 2009)

Regarding my earlier comments. My line of thinking was that early in the war, Germany would have had the resources to execute such a plan. Of course, they didn't have the naval power that the U.S. had at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but they did have considerable resources that would have contributed to such an attack in 1940 before they went to war with the Soviet Union in 1941. Perhaps had they committed to an all out assault like that, it would have kept the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union intact, at least for a little while...

Morocco and Algeria were technically considered Axis holdings, due to being mostly Vichy French, so I don't think that they would have had too much difficulty in securing a staging area for air strikes.

Had they focused on securing Gibraltar, perhaps they could have hampered the Allied supply effort to the North African campaigns.


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## parsifal (Aug 30, 2009)

The French problem is this.....the peace treaty they had signed in June 1940 had guranteed the territorial integrity of the remainder of france and her overseas empire, and allowed for the continued existence of the French Fleet as an independant force (not good enough in British eyes). But in order to bring in Spain, who demanded the handover of large proportion of french North Africa, the Germans would be forced to to renege on that agreement. The french demonstrated in November 1942 what their reaction to any inroads into their territory by the Germans would be. Despite the fact that the occupation of Vichy was touted as a security measure in response to the allied landings in North Africa, the French rejected this for the charade that it was, and to a man went over to the Allied side almost immediately. Now, in 1941, if the Germans tried that, they would firstly have to get the co-operation of the Italians. The Italians, despite the reverses they had suffered in Cyrenaica and Egypt, were still hopeful of maintaining their separate identities, something Mussolini called "parrallel war". There is no gurantee that they would allow a German adventure into Tunisia and beyond except with some whacko terms like "we want Tunisia" or something similar. Botom line is that the entire Vichy resources would go over to the allies in a shot. 

Now, the French had the best part of 15 divisions in 1940, and over 400 aircraft. To this the british were prepred to commit a full army and two corps, plus it is likely that the Canadians would put into the field I Canadian Corps. So, against what, maybe 2 German Divs, and say 4 Italian colonial Divs (5th army based at Tripoli) the Germans are going to face the better part of 20 allied divisions, in mostly mountain territory against what were probably the best mountain troops in the world at that time.

If the Germans tried to take a shortcut and land somehow in French North Africa closer to Gibraltar, they run the real risk of running foul of the RN as they attempted the crossing. And this wasnt Norway, the French were fully alerted and mobilized. 

What would have to happen in order to make this plan work would be to eliminate the RN as a threat in the eastern basin. The only way to do that is to drive them out of their base at Gibraltar, and the only way to do that is to take the place. We've come full circle, and are back where we started.

If I were tasked with assaulting the fortress, I would firstly move the Luftwaffe into southern spain and impose as tight a blockade as I could. I would dismantle the superheavy artillery park into transportable chunks, and move them about 40 miles from the fortress. I would start to re-assemble the guns at that point, whilst at the same time constructing/improving the rail lines as far forward as was required to bring those big rail guns into action. I would build up the airfields as well, and use Italian MAS boats to harass and undertake an intensive minelaying operation in the straits. All of this would be designed to increase the pressure on the supply lines to the fortress. Finally, by about June 1941, I would commence the bombardment. Using the experiences of Sevastopol as a guide, I estimate the time taken to reduce the fortress defences to a level able to be tackled would be two months. Finally the place is beginning to look assaultable. I would send in my 30000 men via the isthmus, and supported by say about 10000 men in rubber boats and Caiques to undertakew flanking attack across the bay. Finally, even though the site was unsuitable to Gliders, I would risk an airborne assault by paratroopers. The paras are unlikley to survive, but at least they would keep the British busy whilst the main force crosses no mans land. The advancing Infantry would be supported all the way to the enemy lines by the lighter guns unable to make any effect on the Fortress defences.

This might improve the chances of success, but it is only a might. And I think it comes at the cost of not invading the USSR. The strain on the LW, the engineering services, the artillery would be very high.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 30, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I agree...the right conditions will allow the Germans to take the place, but are those conditions achievable. What are the conditions.
> 
> I see the necessary conditions as being a sustained artillery bombardment, and a total blockade, and interdiction strategy to prevent seaward interdiction and re-supply by the RN. To do this, I think the germans would need to occupy and hold both sides of the straits, and that probably means taking out the Vichy in North Africa.
> 
> ...



I agree and without Spain these are not going to happen. The British in Gibraltar were dug in very well. Look at what it took to conquer Crete. Not really the same thing, but it kind of can give a pretty good idea.

Does anyone know if Gibraltar was ever shelled or bombed? I can not recall if it ever was.


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## pbfoot (Aug 30, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I agree and without Spain these are not going to happen. The British in Gibraltar were dug in very well. Look at what it took to conquer Crete. Not really the same thing, but it kind of can give a pretty good idea.
> 
> Does anyone know if Gibraltar was ever shelled or bombed? I can not recall if it ever was.


IIRC correctly the Italians bombed Gib with the Piaggiao P108's


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## Vincenzo (Aug 30, 2009)

pbfoot said:


> IIRC correctly the Italians bombed Gib with the Piaggiao P108's



also with S.M. 82


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 30, 2009)

Yeap just looked it up. Not only did the Italians but the Vichy French bombed it as well.


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## Civettone (Aug 30, 2009)

I'm a bit surprised by this discussion. I was even under the impression that the Italians could have conquered Gibraltar if they had set their mind (and complete navy) to it...


Kris


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 31, 2009)

Civettone said:


> I'm a bit surprised by this discussion. I was even under the impression that the Italians could have conquered Gibraltar if they had set their mind (and complete navy) to it...
> 
> 
> Kris



What is so surprising about it?


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## Freebird (Aug 31, 2009)

Civettone said:


> I'm a bit surprised by this discussion. I was even under the impression that the Italians could have conquered Gibraltar if they had set their mind (and complete navy) to it...
> Kris





GrauGeist said:


> Early in the war, the Germans did have the tools to mount such an attack. As far as the naval aspect, just about all the battlehsips and cruisers Germany would build, were already in service and available.
> 
> Think this would have been a possibility?




Not even close. Consider the situation in late Oct 1940 at the time of the first Hitler/Franco conference.
Naval power was still measured at this time by Battleships, and the British had 14 BB/BC, + 2 King George launched and almoste complete. The Italians had 6. The Germans had not completed the Bismarck yet, and both of the Scharnhorst Battlecruisers was severely damaged by torpedoes and out of action.

The war between the UK and Germany had been describes as a battle between a Lion a Shark, very apt description. While Germany was running roughshod over all of Europe, they were getting their asses kicked in the Naval war (sorry Adler )

Germany started the war with 2 Battlecruisers, 6 light cruisers and 3 heavy cruisers + 3 "Pocket" BB's 

By the fall of 1940, they have both Battlecruisers out of action, 1 pocket BB sunk, 1 Pocket BB out of action, 1 CA sunk, 2 CL sunk and 1 heavily damaged by torpedo, + about 60% of their DD's sunk . 

TheGermans therefore have less than half of their starting naval assets left, in exchange for sinking the the British BB Royal Oak, and 2 carriers lost (out of 8 ) The British also have a total of 23 CA (of 9,000 tons+) and 44 CL remaining by Oct 1940, and have lost only 1 CA (Effingham) and 2 CL. This does not even include the ships of the Allied navies, Dutch, Australian, Canadian, etc



GrauGeist said:


> I have seen mention of German artillery being used in a scenario (if the Spanish had allowed the Germans access), but what about a concerted attack using the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe.
> 
> Early in the war, the Germans did have the tools to mount such an attack. Although they lacked carriers, the Germans did have quite a bit of North African territory they could have used as staging bases for thier air support. Regarding my earlier comments. My line of thinking was that early in the war, Germany would have had the resources to execute such a plan.
> 
> Had they focused on securing Gibraltar, perhaps they could have hampered the Allied supply effort to the North African campaigns.



Actually the North African campaign was not supplied through the Med, but from the Indian Ocean, so that would not have been a factor.





DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I agree and without Spain these are not going to happen. The British in Gibraltar were dug in very well.



Quite correct.

Here are the key considerations that everyone seems to have missed: After the Spanish civil war, Franco was not prepared for any major campaigns, in addition being quite concerned that the Allies might ressurect the Republican cause should he get involved in the war.

Franco would certainly not be adverse to grabbing some "low hanging fruit" if the British were faltering, but the failure of the Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF, and the heavy KM losses vs. the Royal Navy gave Franco something to think about. I believe that he made such onerous demands because he didn't want the operation to go ahead.

The Spanish would not be terribly worried about the attack itself, as that would be left to the Germans. Gibraltar was not nearly as critical to Britain in 1940 as it was in 1941, because they still had control of the Eastern Med (as Crete was not yet in Axis hands) 


Here is the one overriding factor: Franco would have known that should he allow a German attack against Gibraltar, that Spain would certainly lose the Canary Islands in retaliation, as the Axis had no Naval assets that could protect it. The capture of the Canary Islands (and possibley Madeira as well) would provide a substitute base at the Western end of the Med, and in some ways the British would be better off in this position.

In addition, Spain would risk losing it's African colonies as well.


Within 3 months of the Hitler/Franco conference a string of Axis defeats around the Med made it even more unlikely that Franco woulkd risk entering the war.

1.) 11 Nov 1940 the RN carrier "Illustrious" launches an airstrike on the Italian fleet, sinking 3 Battleships and forcing the Italian Navy to retreat from the central Med.

2.) Dec 1940 The British operation "Compass" destroys the Italian army in Libya, and advances towards Tripoli

3.) The Italian attack against Greece is repulsed, and the Italian army is pushed back into Albania.


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## parsifal (Aug 31, 2009)

Great Post FB. One small correction, the Germans had lost 13 of the 22 DDs they started the war with in '39. 10 were lost at Narvik, and 3 in the North Sea, one from mines and two from the Luftwaffe bombing them by mistake. There may have been others, I will check when I get home


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## GrauGeist (Aug 31, 2009)

I was under the impression that the Bismark was commissioned and put to sea during the summer of 1940, the Tirpitz following a year later...

It was an interesting thought, seeing if there was a way to assault the fortress by any other means than by land. I think parsifal covered it pretty well though, in a land assault.

Regarding the Spanish rail system, with some improvements, it probably could have handled the K5 (283mm) traffic, but if a Schwerer (80cm) were to be used, it would almost have to be rebuilt in order to accomodate that artillery (which wasn't available until 1942 anyway).


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## Freebird (Aug 31, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Great Post FB. One small correction, the Germans had lost 13 of the 22 DDs they started the war with in '39. 10 were lost at Narvik, and 3 in the North Sea, one from mines and two from the Luftwaffe bombing them by mistake. There may have been others, I will check when I get home



I guess I didn't explain that very well, they had lost 3/5 (ie 60%) of their DD's, not that they had lost 3 ships from 5...



GrauGeist said:


> I was under the impression that the Bismark was commissioned and put to sea during the summer of 1940, the Tirpitz following a year later...
> 
> It was an interesting thought, seeing if there was a way to assault the fortress by any other means than by land. I think parsifal covered it pretty well though, in a land assault.



No, Bismarck had finished her training/"work up" by the spring of 1941, and was sunk on her first mission in May 1941. Keep in mind that capital ships of the era typically required 6 - 9 months of work-up after comissioning. So while Tirpitz was comissioned Mar 1941, it wasn't ready for operations until Jan 1942. If a ship did not have this period of training/work-up done, it would lead to problems later, as seen by the Prince of Wales which was rushed into sevice before it was properly ready, and had 2 turrets fail or jam during it's first battle (vs Bismarck)

. The Germans had quite some trouble keeping their capital ships operational, the 2 Battlecruisers had participated in the Norway operations and made 1 six week cruise in Feb Mar 1941, but apart from that were almost constantly under repair until the Scharnhorst was finally available in 1943. (Gneisnau never made it back into operational staus)

1940

On 4-9 June both ships operated against British forces on the Norwegian coast, engaging and sinking the carrier Glorious and her two screening destroyers, Ardent and Acasta on 8 June. But a torpedo from the latter destroyer hit Scharnhorst and badly damaged her abreast 'C turret, so the German squadron put into Trondheim. Leaving the crippled ship there, Gneisenau sailed with a cruiser and destroyer escort for another sortie but this was soon abandoned. By June Scharnhorst was ready to sail for repairs in Germany; Gneisenau was preparing for a sortie into Icelandic waters but on 20 June was hit by a torpedo from the British submarine Clyde and badly damaged. Neither ship was operational again until the end of 1940

1941  
The 2 ships made a six week cruise Feb/Mar 1941, sank 115,000 tons of Allied shipping, arrived in Brest 22 Mar 1941. Here they remained trapped until February 1942, becoming in the meantime regular targets for the RAF Bomber and Coastal Command. Both ships were given refits during this period, but on 6 April 1941 Gneisenau was hit by an aircraft torpedo and heavily damaged, then on 10/11 April was struck by four bombs and remained under repair until the Christmas 1941. Scharnhorst had completed her refit by 21 July 1941, and was moved to La Pallice for trials and training. Here she was attacked by the RAF on 24 July and hit by five bombs, resulting in very serious damage, some 3,000 tons of water flooding the ship. She limped back to Brest on 27 July and began new repairs, which also took until about the end of the 1941. 



1942
Both ships, with the cruiser Prinz Eugen, escorted by destroyers and torpedo boats left Brest on 11 February 1942, to return to Germany via the Channel. En route they evaded British attacks but first Scharnhorst then Gneisenau hit mines before the former was mined a second time. Gneisenau bombed 26-27
February 1942 while in drydock repairing mine damage. Bow completely
destroyed by explosion of munitions, #1 turret also destroyed.

Scharnhorst was under repair until June 1942 and then also moved east to Gotenhafen for trials and work-up until January 1943 when she was ordered to the Arctic
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Should the attack on Gibraltar ever have been done I would expect that it would be alot like Sevastopol, and take several months at least.

But I suspect that even if Franco had agreed to participate at the first conference, the events of the winter 40/41 would have made him change his mind (Compass, Taranto, Greece etc)

Keep in mind the dynamics of the situation, Gibraltar is only 2 square miles, and the Canaries are 2,800 sq. miles, so Spain would certainly not risk losing them unless Germany could guarantee their protection. (Which they could not) In addition, going to war with Britain would also result in the RN blockading Spain as well, which would cause shortages and cut off Spain's remaining colonies.

To be honest, the Britain would probably have preferred that Germany attack Gibraltar, as it would tie up a huge chunk of German assets, especially Luftwaffe artillery, which would have made a world of difference in Greece, Libya Malta in the spring of '41 as these assets would not be available. The British would also be in a better position off west Africa with a base on the Canaries, during the mid-war years the Bristol-Freetown route was quite dangerous, as there was no British base available between Gibraltar and Bathhurst (Gambia)


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 31, 2009)

I think it's somewhat misleading comparing the Royal Navy in strength of ships versus German and Italian. Yes, they had a much bigger Navy, but they were also spread out over a much bigger area then the Germans/Italians.

You also don't have to control the entire ocean, you only need to control the battle area.

Bismark was actually commissioned on Aug 1940, she went a further 8 months of training in the Baltic before making her first and only sortie.
_The Encyclopedia of Weapons of WWII_ page 150

Also, the Spanish were not exactly 100% neutral. They sent "volunteers" to the Eastern Front, they allowed U-Boats to refuel, and they turned a blind eye to the Italians lunching attacks from Spanish ports.


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## Freebird (Aug 31, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> Bismark was actually commissioned on Aug 1940, she went a further 8 months of training in the Baltic before making her first and only sortie.
> _The Encyclopedia of Weapons of WWII_ page 150



Correct, but see my previous post for the difference between "comissioned" and "available for operations"



vikingBerserker said:


> I think it's somewhat misleading comparing the Royal Navy in strength of ships versus German and Italian. Yes, they had a much bigger Navy, but they were also spread out over a much bigger area then the Germans/Italians.
> 
> You also don't have to control the entire ocean, you only need to control the battle area.
> 
> Also, the Spanish were not exactly 100% neutral. They sent "volunteers" to the Eastern Front, they allowed U-Boats to refuel, and they turned a blind eye to the Italians lunching attacks from Spanish ports.



True, and the Spanish pushed it about as far as they could without risking some serious retaliation by the British. 

The British had 3 Battleships + a carrier in the Med for most of 1941, all the rest of the capital ships are available in the Atlantic. The Japanese are not a factor until the end of 1941 as they are being watched by the US Pacific fleet. The 3 remaining Italian ships cannot leave the Med, as this would allow the British complete control, and able to interdict the Axis shipping link with Africa.

So if the Germans were to promise Spain a naval force to protect the Canaries, they would be looking at the Bismarck, 2 Battlecruisers, Scheer + 2 CA 3 CL. The German 11" guns are no match for the British 15" guns, and could expect to face 10 - 12 British Battleships in such a major operation.


There is no reasonable hope for success, which is probably why Franco would demand Vichy African territories to compensate for the expected loss of the Canaries. And this has been covered earlier by Parsifal, with the Spanish demands of French territory would likely push the French (and especially the French Navy) back into conflict with Germany.


Bottom line:
1.) The operation is not feasable without Spanish help
2.) What possible benefits could be offered to the Spanish to compensate for the loss of the Canaries and for Spanish colonies in Central Africa? {Rio Muni, Fernando Po, Santa Isabel etc}


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 31, 2009)

I still fail to see the absulute requirement that Spain must join in on this. Would it be easier with them, sure. Would it make it impossible to do without them, IMO no.


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## Freebird (Aug 31, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> I still fail to see the absulute requirement that Spain must join in on this. Would it be easier with them, sure. Would it make it impossible to do without them, IMO no.




What is your alternative? That Germany attack Spain to gain land access?

Or try some amphibious/airborne attack on Gibraltar?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 31, 2009)

Without Spain you are talking about an entiely sea and air operation. And the air is doubtful. 900km directly over Spain from the French border? Over 1200km if you skirt the Spanish coast.

Sea might not look to good either. 1900km from Brest? over 40hrs at full speed for a pocket battleship if it doesn't break down. 
Only 1300km or so from Marsielle but then you are depending on the Italian navy to take out the English ships and for gunfire support.


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## parsifal (Aug 31, 2009)

without Spain in the war, the naval option becomes pretty much impossible. If the Axis attack the Vichy assets, then the remains of the french fleet, and the French North African garrisons become allied assets, which makes the defence of gibraltar very easy. 

The only way that the italians and the germans could approach the issue, without Spain in the war, is to risk a Naval assault from distant bases. For Italy that means Naples or at best Cagliari. For the Germans it initialy means Kiel, assuming a succesful breakout it then means a sortie from one of the French Ports (Brest, Lorient or St Nazaire....Bordeaux is not suitable as a port of departure).

For both Navies (Italian and German) a long ocean crossing is fraught with danger, to which the addition of the Luftwaffe has very limited compensations. For most of their respective voyages they will be without effective aircover, during which time both would be subjected to the full force of the RN, including carrier based airstrikes. The italians in particular had no stomach for this, and the Germans had also demonstrated that without effective aircover or supporting screen, their fleet was very vulnerable.

On those occasions that the Italians had been run down to a fight, they had demonstrated no stomach for close action with the RN. They consistently refused to risk charging smoke screens, and tended lose command and control at the slightest levels of damage inflicted on them. On the few occasions that their heavy ships had closed for action, their gunnery had been shown to be totally inneffective. It is no exaggeration to say that the entire Italian fleet could be contained by a force half its size. But the Italians could not call upon their entire fleet....they had other committments to attend to, like North Africa and the actions occurring in Greece (Matapan). 

An whilst it might be possible to undertae a sea denial strategy (tip and run tactics, high speed bombardments perhaps), this is not the strategy that would be needed to take Gib. Sea Control is what is needed, that is, to move to an area, ensure total control of that sea area, and then undertake a prolonged assault bombardment, before sending in the amphibious forces. Something akin to Iwo or Okinawa in other words. This was totally beyond the ability of either axis Navy to achieve. They lacked the strength to eject the RN presence for a start, and even lacked the necessary skills training and doctrine, or know how to undertake such a complicated naval strategy. We are taliking 16000 defenders in heavily fortified positions here......at Iwo it took 110000 of the best Marines in the world 25 days to subdue 18000 defenders, how on earth are the Axis going to get that many men to the target safely, hold off what can only be assumed as ferocious attacks by the RN and get their people safely ashore only after having dealt with the coastal guns first.

It is just totally unfeasible to consider an attack on the fortress without Spanish assistance.


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 31, 2009)

I would do an amphibious/airborne attack on Gibraltar. The French, Italians and Germans had been bombing them so range IMO is not critical


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## Freebird (Aug 31, 2009)

Assuming that you meant something like this, there are alot of problems with this scenario



vikingBerserker said:


> -------------------------
> But I'm willing to be an armchair general and take a whack at it.
> 
> The axis powers for 2 straight weeks day and night use incendiaries and heavy ordinance to bomb Gb to try and deprive the defenders of sleep.



How do they manage to bomb Gibraltar? There are very few Axis ultra-long range bombers, and it is about 900 - 1000 miles each way over water from Marseille south france. It is only about 600 miles from Bayonne in France, but this would involve violating Spanish neutrality. IIRC the range of a Ju88 is about 1300 miles?

In any event, there would be no escorting fighters, so the Axis bombers would be savaged by intercepting British night fighters, and Gibraltar was well equipped with Flak



vikingBerserker said:


> On the final day a German captured allied ship filled with fuel docks in the main harbor.



All ships were searched by the RN blocade, and certainly not allowed to dock at Gibraltar. an unidentified ship attempting to dock would be fired on



vikingBerserker said:


> A few hours later at dusk an emergency message is sent from 2 twin-engine cargo aircraft that they are under attack and need to make an emergency landing – one of them visibly has an engine on fire. They are Jewish scientists (or somebody else) who have escaped with their wives and families from Vichy France. Pursuers turn around and the aircraft land on the runway. Out step German soldiers discussed as women and old men.



Again, unidentified aircraft were not allowed to land, an aircraft in distress would be directed to Cadiz




vikingBerserker said:


> At that point, the “allied ship” is detonated and either explodes or at least burns fiercely hopefully blinding AA gunners and lighting the way for the Germans. Soldiers from the 2 cargo aircraft pour out and secure the airport/runway.



I'm not sure how feasable this would be? But certainly would not blind gunners on the seaward side of Gibraltar.
As Parsifal has pointed out, the runway contained no cover, and was directly under the guns of the fortress, any troops in transport aircraft would be slaughtered. Besides, how many troops can you fit in a Ju52 for example?



vikingBerserker said:


> Paratroopers start to land and reinforce the troops already there (I’ve seen Gb and I do think it’s possible to land paratroopers there). Then Gliders proceed to land.



Paratroops Gliders landing on the runway would be wiped out by the guns. Are you suggesting that the paratroopers try to land on the rocky slopes?



vikingBerserker said:


> What’s left of the harbor is now secured. Additional troops are landed via cargo U-Boats filled with men and equipment.



How many troops can you land by U-boat? 300? 500? vs 20,000+ defenders?



vikingBerserker said:


> The main German troop ships that were waiting nearby in Spanish harbors disguised as neutrals now set sail and arrive within a half hour.



They would still be unable to neutralize the seaward side fortress guns, which would have a field day with approaching cargo ships.

Where would these cargo ships come from, Germany or Italy?


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 31, 2009)

parsifal said:


> without Spain in the war, the naval option becomes pretty much impossible. If the Axis attack the Vichy assets, then the remains of the french fleet, and the French North African garrisons become allied assets, which makes the defence of gibraltar very easy.



The Vichy have been attacking Gb themselves. what is the logic of Germany in turn attacking them?



parsifal said:


> The only way that the italians and the germans could approach the issue, without Spain in the war, is to risk a Naval assault from distant bases. For Italy that means Naples or at best Cagliari. For the Germans it initialy means Kiel, assuming a succesful breakout it then means a sortie from one of the French Ports (Brest, Lorient or St Nazaire....Bordeaux is not suitable as a port of departure).



This has been done successfully several times. The Falkland War comes to mind. However I would like to point what I had mentioned a few posts back that the axis were already using Spanish ports to launch attacks against Gb.



parsifal said:


> For both Navies (Italian and German) a long ocean crossing is fraught with danger, to which the addition of the Luftwaffe has very limited compensations. For most of their respective voyages they will be without effective aircover, during which time both would be subjected to the full force of the RN, including carrier based airstrikes. The italians in particular had no stomach for this, and the Germans had also demonstrated that without effective aircover or supporting screen, their fleet was very vulnerable.



Both had a fleet of subs that could be used for this as well.



parsifal said:


> An whilst it might be possible to undertake a sea denial strategy (tip and run tactics, high speed bombardments perhaps), this is not the strategy that would be needed to take Gib. Sea Control is what is needed, that is, to move to an area, ensure total control of that sea area, and then undertake a prolonged assault bombardment, before sending in the amphibious forces. Something akin to Iwo or Okinawa in other words. This was totally beyond the ability of either axis Navy to achieve. They lacked the strength to eject the RN presence for a start, and even lacked the necessary skills training and doctrine, or know how to undertake such a complicated naval strategy. We are taliking 16000 defenders in heavily fortified positions here......at Iwo it took 110000 of the best Marines in the world 25 days to subdue 18000 defenders, how on earth are the Axis going to get that many men to the target safely, hold off what can only be assumed as ferocious attacks by the RN and get their people safely ashore only after having dealt with the coastal guns first.
> 
> It is just totally unfeasible to consider an attack on the fortress without Spanish assistance.



THis is where I strongly disagree with you. I think tying a prolonged approach would be the worst thing to do. IMHO you need to strike fast and quickly before the British can react with additional assets.


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## comiso90 (Aug 31, 2009)

Compare and contrast Gibraltar with Mt Surabaci.. ..

.


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## Freebird (Aug 31, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> I would do an amphibious/airborne attack on Gibraltar. The French, Italians and Germans had been bombing them so range IMO is not critical





pbfoot said:


> IIRC correctly the Italians bombed Gib with the Piaggiao P108's



Yes it is. The French bombed Gibraltar from nearby bases in North Africa. The Italians used P 108's which have over 2,000 mile range, but are not in service until 1942.

It is about 900 miles to Gibraltar from Italian bases on Sardinia



Vincenzo said:


> also with S.M. 82



What is the range of an SM 82? When did this attack take place?



parsifal said:


> without Spain in the war, the naval option becomes pretty much impossible. If the Axis attack the Vichy assets, then the remains of the french fleet, and the French North African garrisons become allied assets, which makes the defence of gibraltar very easy.
> 
> The only way that the italians and the germans could approach the issue, without Spain in the war, is to risk a Naval assault from distant bases. For Italy that means Naples or at best Cagliari. For the Germans it initialy means Kiel, assuming a succesful breakout it then means a sortie from one of the French Ports (Brest, Lorient or St Nazaire....Bordeaux is not suitable as a port of departure).
> 
> ...



I'm afraid Parsifal is correct, I don't see how it can be done except overland through Spain


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## Freebird (Aug 31, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> The Vichy have been attacking Gb themselves. what is the logic of Germany in turn attacking them?



The French launched a few "protest" attacks against Gibraltar in the summer of 1940, but by early 1941 are not at war with Britain. Again, the French are concerned with protecting overseas territories, so are trying to avoid total war with the UK




vikingBerserker said:


> This has been done successfully several times. The Falkland War comes to mind. However I would like to point what I had mentioned a few posts back that the axis were already using Spanish ports to launch attacks against Gb.



What attacks are you talking about? There is a huge difference between turning a blind eye to a few frog-men attacks and supporting a full amphibious invasion. Any overt support by Spain would have the same result, an Allied retaliation against Spanish overseas assets.

There is also a huge difference between Falklands where the UK had total control of the seas except for coastal areas, and the Axis trying to break an Allied blockade. The Axis shipping had already taken a heavy beating in the early years of the war, there was not loads of it to spare.



vikingBerserker said:


> Both had a fleet of subs that could be used for this as well.



How many subs would the KM allow to be used for this? How many men could they carry each? Where would they unload? In the harbour right under the fortress guns?



vikingBerserker said:


> THis is where I strongly disagree with you. I think tying a prolonged approach would be the worst thing to do. IMHO you need to strike fast and quickly before the British can react with additional assets.



There are pros and cons for both, but I just don't see how the Axis can deliver the 30,000 to 40,000 troops needed.


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 1, 2009)

freebird said:


> How do they manage to bomb Gibraltar? There are very few Axis ultra-long range bombers, and it is about 900 - 1000 miles each way over water from Marseille south france. It is only about 600 miles from Bayonne in France, but this would involve violating Spanish neutrality. IIRC the range of a Ju88 is about 1300 miles?



The Vichy bombings that they were already doing were being launched from Algeria Morocco. I could not find the bases from which the Italian or Germans flew from- but obviously it was feasible.




freebird said:


> In any event, there would be no escorting fighters, so the Axis bombers would be savaged by intercepting British night fighters, and Gibraltar was well equipped with Flak


 For what ever reason, the Vichy aircraft were not intercepted by anything. I have to disagree with you about there being no escorting fighters.





freebird said:


> All ships were searched by the RN blocade, and certainly not allowed to dock at Gibraltar. an unidentified ship attempting to dock would be fired on


 Remember it's a captured allied ship so it's not unidentified.





freebird said:


> Again, unidentified aircraft were not allowed to land, an aircraft in distress would be directed to Cadiz


 This might be something as simple as a good sales job. - but in the 15 minutes I came up with this, it might need some more work.






freebird said:


> I'm not sure how feasable this would be? But certainly would not blind gunners on the seaward side of Gibraltar.


 That's fine, mainly trying to blind the AA gunners.




freebird said:


> As Parsifal has pointed out, the runway contained no cover, and was directly under the guns of the fortress, any troops in transport aircraft would be slaughtered. Besides, how many troops can you fit in a Ju52 for example?


 I tried to find if any of the guns could shot the run way itself, so I'm not sure. The C-47 I've heard of 50+ people being packed it.





freebird said:


> Paratroops Gliders landing on the runway would be wiped out by the guns. Are you suggesting that the paratroopers try to land on the rocky slopes?


 If it turns out the runway is not a good please, then another site will be found. I've been to Gb before and there are more features then 1 runway and cliffs.






freebird said:


> How many troops can you land by U-boat? 300? 500? vs 20,000+ defenders?


 Not sure, but if 10 large boats could drop off 5k troops, that would be great.





freebird said:


> They would still be unable to neutralize the seaward side fortress guns, which would have a field day with approaching cargo ships.


 That's something obviously that would need to be taken out. However you only need to open a channel wide enough to get the ships through safely.



freebird said:


> Where would these cargo ships come from, Germany or Italy?


 Originally yes, but they would be either in Spanish ports or anchored off the Spanish coast. Apparently it was not a big deal.

Like I said, I only spent 15 minuts on this brain storming.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 1, 2009)

Well, if we're going to explore scenarios, then why not invite the Japanese to the party?

With a little advance planning, the Japanese could have spared a group from the perhaps the Indian Ocean ops. In 1940, early '41, they weren't engaged like they would be in 18 month's time.

Now the Japanese definately had the sea and air assets to make something like this work. I know it's reaching a little, but I don't see why Germany and Japan couldn't have worked out some kind of deal.

At least something to ponder.


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## Freebird (Sep 1, 2009)

Well, lets take a look at the place then









The runway






Night view






Tunnel/ firing portal







Map


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## GrauGeist (Sep 1, 2009)

More info:


> Physically, Gibraltar is a limestone mountain rising some 426 meters from sea level, dominating the Straits of Gibraltar, which are less than 16 miles across to Spanish Morocco. The entire territory is less than a kilometer wide and five kilometers long. Along its western side is Gibraltar Bay, where the Port of Gibraltar is located, with a breakwater and facilities almost 50% as large as the territory itself. The mountain itself is honeycombed with 34 miles of tunnels dug into the rock by the British over the years, providing cover for numerous gun emplacements, hangars, storage facilities, barracks, hospitals and thousands of troops.
> 
> Militarily, the fortress was used primarily as a naval base and air station, since its limited size allowed it to support a garrison of only 15,000 ground troops. The one airfield, running across the length of the peninsula at the northern extreme of the territory, was expanded into Gibraltar Bay starting in 1937 and completed by 1942. This allowed support for nearly 100 fighters and several squadrons of medium and heavy bombers, and allowed Gibraltar to act as a vital staging point for aircraft transferring into the Mediterranean theater. Anti-air defenses were substantially improved during the war. In 1940, there were some 20 3.7" guns, four 4" guns, 10 40-mm Bofors and two pom-poms, plus numerous searchlights. 1942, this complement had been increased to 30 3.7" guns and almost 20 Bofors.
> 
> ...


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## Freebird (Sep 1, 2009)

Good article GG.

That is pretty much what Parsifal had said earlier, the fortress is vulnerable to a concentrated attack from Spain. 

But again, the British retalite by seizing the Canaries and blockading Spain, which leave the British in a better position and the Spanish in a worse one.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 1, 2009)

What I liked about the article, was it's detail about the defenses and it's comparison to Singapore and Corregidor...which leads me back to my wondering about Japanese involvement in such an assault.

A concerted attack by German and Japanese forces sounds a little far-fetched at first, but then again it would have been something the Allies in that area were not prepared to deal with. The Allies were banking on both the German's and the Italian's limited naval forces so perhaps the Japanese making a showing in that region would have been a tipping point.


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## Freebird (Sep 1, 2009)

GrauGeist said:


> What I liked about the article, was it's detail about the defenses and it's comparison to Singapore and Corregidor...which leads me back to my wondering about Japanese involvement in such an assault.
> 
> A concerted attack by German and Japanese forces sounds a little far-fetched at first, but then again it would have been something the Allies in that area were not prepared to deal with. The Allies were banking on both the German's and the Italian's limited naval forces so perhaps the Japanese making a showing in that region would have been a tipping point.



Problem is that they don't trust each other, so they didn't work together. There was actually an earlier thread about total Axis effort, and how they might have won the war. (mainly involving a full-throttle effort by all axis subs from Pearl +1)


But back to the task at hand.

1.) What would the Japanese gain from it?
2.) What benefit does Spain get vs. the cost
3.) What is the cost to the British.


The wild card in your calculations would be the US, they are hardly likely to allow Japan to run rampant all over the Indian Ocean


But I think we will get off-track if we start mixing Japan into this discussion, we should probably have a separate thread: "Could Japan have entered the war in 1940?"


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## parsifal (Sep 1, 2009)

_The Vichy have been attacking Gb themselves. what is the logic of Germany in turn attacking them?_

These were small scale nuisance raids, designed as a political sop to the Germans after the British attacks at Mers el Kebir. The French never intended these attacks to do anything or hurt anybody. 

The French particularly the leaders in North Africa, always viewed the Axis as their real enemy. They believed they had done enough to ensure that their military assets (particularly their fleet) did not end up in German hands. The British did not see it that way. This caused the unhappy situation of former friends turning on each other and attacking each other. This is an entirely diifferent situation to the Axis carving up the Vichy state to feed to the Spanish and the italians appetite for empire . And this is what germany would need to do to allow any action to take place in Vichy territory . And deployment into Vichy territory is one of the ways of putting into effect a proper blockade of the place. Unfortunately this becomes a rather circular argument...."we need Vichy territory to blockade Gibraltar" and " the destruction of Vichy is needed to get the italians and the Spanish into the equation" , but then "if we occupy Vichy territory we force the French into the Allied camp, thereby negating the effects of a blockade". The whole thing takes on a diabolical complexity that I cant see the solution to. 



_This has been done successfully several times. The Falkland War comes to mind. However I would like to point what I had mentioned a few posts back that the axis were already using Spanish ports to launch attacks against Gb._
Ah yes, in total secrecy, under the strictest conditions imaginable. These attacks (mostly by elements of the 10th Flotilla) are not equivalent or comparable to an overt strategy to taking the place. That would involve the overt deployment of thousands of aircraft, hundreds of thousands of troops, and surface units, none of which would be allowed by the Spanish, whilst they remained ostensibly neutral. The costs to spain, for laying down and prostituting themselves to the Axis in this way, for no benefit to their own situation was simply too high

And the Falklands was not a case of either the British or the Argentinians undertaking an assault by stealth. The argentinians attacked whilst they held naval supremacy, and without a declaration or war, whilst the British return was anything but stealthy. The former situation has no parallel to Felix....the British are fully alerted and ready. An attack by stealth is simply not going to happen

_Both had a fleet of subs that could be used for this as well._

The British could deal with the italian sub fleet in these fleet support situation with ease. They were shown to be no threat to RN fleet movements (the italian subs did enjoy some success when deployed to the distant areas of the south and midAtlantic, but this is not comparable to attacks on heavily defended fleet TFs and military convoys). if the italians had tried to do this they would have beeen massacred. 

Similar conclusions can be drawn about German subs operating in fleet support roles. They at least might be able to pick off the odd ship here or there, but at the cost of wrecking their mercantile campaign in the western approaches. 

As a general rule, subs operating in a tactical role like that are not successful. And subs dont deliver the conditions of sea control needed to undertake an invasion...... 

_THis is where I strongly disagree with you. I think tying a prolonged approach would be the worst thing to do. IMHO you need to strike fast and quickly before the British can react with additional assets._

Iam not saying they could undertake a long program of sea control.....quitee the contrary. I am saying that naval invasions demand this sort of exposure, but against heavily6 defended target like Gib there would be no choice other than to hang around to support the landing forces. 

I agree that a prolonged approach is suicide for the Axis fleets, but how are you proposing to do this otherwise. The experiences at Sevastopol and Iwo, which are both comparable, indicate a clear need for a prolonged campaign. In the case of Sevastopol it took about three months to complete the prepration and several weeks to complete the assault. In the case of Iwo it took three days of bombardment by the navy (which proved insufficient anyway), and 25 days of support afloat as the ground forces inched their way ahead. Unless the Germans are supermen, how are they going to 
A) get 100000+ men to the target
B) get those men safely ashore
C) provide the necessary support to prevent those men becoming guests of His Majesty? 
without the fleet hanging around??????


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## GrauGeist (Sep 1, 2009)

"Could Japan have entered the war in 1940?" would make for an interesting thread!

If the Japanese sent a task force from the Indian Ocean over to support a German assault, I don't think the U.S. would have done anything more than they had already done during the initial phases of Japan's south-west Pacific conquest.

It's hard to say what could have been forged, as far as an agreement goes, but perhaps the prospect of the Axis bottling up the Med and thus hampering the Allied efforts based out of the middle-east and India would have seemed like an interesting prospect to the Japanese. There's also the issue of the Iron that Japan needed and the U.S. embargoed, so there too is an option that may have seemed lucrative to the Japanese and the Germans may have been willing to part with a certain amount to "sweeten the deal".

Now keep in mind that Japan would be only supplying the naval power needed to assault the fortress, not hold it. That would be the German's part. Once the operation concluded, they could resupply in Italian ports and either head back home...or they could stay in the Med and start a whole new thread for us! 

And I couldn't see any need for Spanish involvement, since this would be an assault from the sea and the air.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 1, 2009)

I might take exception to the articles lack of faith in the 9.2 in guns. Shore batteries seldom had the number of guns that ships did. It was generally considered that the shore mounted guns were more accurate. They weren't moving, or rocking or rolling. they also knew where they were. 
Since most treaty cruisers had trouble keeping out 8in shell fire I don't think that they are going to keep out 9.2in shells. While 9.2s might not be ship killers against battleships they might be able to "mission kill" a battleship. Knock out fIre control, flood bows or sterns. generally muck up anything not behind heavy armour. 
THe extra 1.2 inches over an 8in shell actually means a 380lb shell vrs about a 260lb shell for most 8in guns (US excepted)


I really liked vikingBerserker's idea.

"Not sure, but if 10 large boats could drop off 5k troops, that would be great."

it sure would be great. 500 troops per submarine?

See:Makin Island raid - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

and:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Argonaut_(SS-166)


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## Juha (Sep 1, 2009)

I seconded Shortround 6 on 9.2 in guns.
IIRC one RN CA was temporary disabled off Dakar by one French 9.2 in hit. And if one looked the list of CAs sunk or badly damaged by 8 in hits, it is difficult to believe that 9.2 in hits could not sink a CA.

Even battleships were not invulnerable to 9.2 in fire. One should only look the effects of clearly smaller 8 in hits on Hood, Hiei and South Dakota. They didn’t sunk those but inflicted significant damage.

Juha

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## Freebird (Sep 4, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> I tried to find if any of the guns could shot the run way itself, so I'm not sure. .



Well, here's what I found. In 1941 these were the guns of 4" and above:

8 x 9.2" fixed gun
2 x 9.2" howitzer
8 x 6" fixed gun
1 x 6" howitzer
15 x 4" fixed gun
5 x 4.5" howitzer

Pictured on the map below. 

I don't know how much 9.2" HE ammo there would be, but the 6" 4" guns would certainly have plenty of both HE AP ammo.

Note - 3.7" AA, 25 pdr, 75mm, 6 pdr, Bofors 20mm AA not shown on map.


There were six 75mm guns sited overlooking the runway, + at least one of the twin 6 pdr mounts on the harbour walls had a clear view of the entire runway


The lower picture is Queen Anne's mount, just to the north of Princess Caroline's mount. I belive this position in 1941 was a 75mm gun a 4" gun (the northernmost 4" gun) In 1942 the 75mm gun was upgraded to a 17 pdr, to provide anti-tank defence in event of attack from the north.

Later this position was upgraded to 3 x 5.25" DP


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## Vincenzo (Sep 4, 2009)

the port defence it's good for light ship not versus battleship, not because the 233 mm sheel don't make damage but because the BS firing out of range of this old guns. in caming on enemy fleet for save the rock need a fleet and for stay it that moment there are not in other place for time, months? idk how many fleet the RN can left in defence on the Rock in '40.
imho the invasion of gibraltar was do early after french fall (and with spain allied i think and iread somethong years ago the in june/julliet Franco was not so negativa as in october


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## GrauGeist (Sep 4, 2009)

I would agree, an earlier attack would have been more favorable, and most likely caught the British in a less capable condition.


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## parsifal (Sep 4, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> the port defence it's good for light ship not versus battleship, not because the 233 mm sheel don't make damage but because the BS firing out of range of this old guns. in caming on enemy fleet for save the rock need a fleet and for stay it that moment there are not in other place for time, months? idk how many fleet the RN can left in defence on the Rock in '40.
> imho the invasion of gibraltar was do early after french fall (and with spain allied i think and iread somethong years ago the in june/julliet Franco was not so negativa as in october



Hi Vincenzo


THe harbour defences are unlikely to damage the Battleships, but that was not their intention. They are intended to to break up the co-ordination of the landing forces and lighter ships operating operating inshore. And the allied experiences later in the war showed that it was the lighter ships that provided the most effective gunfire support. During the landings at Sicily, for example it was the Destroyers that prevented the Axis from succeeding at places like Gela. DDs would manouvre to very close to the shore and pump 5in shells into the attacking formations, providing heavy and direct gunfire support on demand. Battleships were good at attacking fixed defences, but not as efficient at attacking mobile targets.

Now, the Allied experiences demonstrated that it took weeks to suppress and destroy seward defences that were comparable to those at gib. The defences at Normandy, Sicily and southern France were nowhere near as formidable those at Gibraltar Dieppe Sevastopol Okinawa and the like. And the allies had radar assisted gunnery, which made their accuracy much higher. Moreover the forces employed in all these operations were specially trrained for shore bombardment work, having spent several years perfecting the techniques needed. 

In order to get the defences reduced to a level that assault forces could approach the fortress, you are looking at weeks or months of continuous bombardment. The best analogy would probably be either Sevastopol or Odessa. Sevastopol took over three weeks of continuous bombardment, by the heaviest German artillery concentration of the war. Odessa took about 2 months to do the same job. 

With say 3 battleships available, the italians are going to need several months of continuous bombardment to destroy the port defences of the port. In that time the RN will have -plenty of time to intervene.

To give some idea of what the Italians themselves thought, it is interesting to look at their plans for the invasion of Malta, the so called Operation "C-3" . They were planning to support several divfision (some italian, some German) for several weeks to subdue the island.

The trouble with an amphib operation is that once you are committed to the landing, you must stay there, or abandon you troops to their fate. Marine forces are totally dependant on the support fleet until they get a permanent foothold.....for places like Malta or Gibraltar, that means getting control and subduing all resistance permanently


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## Freebird (Sep 4, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> How many fleet assets can the RN can send for defence on the Rock in '40.



Well, I posted this earlier.



freebird said:


> Not even close. Consider the situation in late Oct 1940 at the time of the first Hitler/Franco conference.
> Naval power was still measured at this time by Battleships, and *in the fall of 1940 the British had 14 BB/BC, + King George V + Prince of Wales launched and almoste complete*. The Italians had 6. The Germans had not completed the Bismarck yet, and both of the Scharnhorst Battlecruisers was severely damaged by torpedoes and out of action.
> 
> The war between the UK and Germany had been describes as a battle between a Lion a Shark, very apt description. While Germany was running roughshod over all of Europe, they were getting their asses kicked in the Naval war (sorry Adler )
> ...



In Oct 1940 the Italians have 6 Battleships, but Germany has no capital ships operational. By the time Germany repairs the two BC's, (and assuming that they rush Bismarck into service early) by Christmas 1940, the Italians are down to 3 BB operational. 

The British have 3 BB in Egypt, 3 BB at Gibraltar, and 8 more in the UK or in the N. Atlantic. The best the Axis could hope for is about 6 BB vs. 10 or 12 for the RN.


The problem for a June/July scenario is that the Luftwaffe needed German troops (Paratroops, Amphip etc) are all deployed in Northern France waiting for Sealion. It is only with Sealion cancelled that they are ready to mount this operation.


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## Freebird (Sep 4, 2009)

Here is the second map, of the smaller guns AA.

*3.7" AA twin mounts are dark blue
3" or 75mm are green
25 pdr field guns are light blue
6 pdr guns are yellow
Light AA positions are red circles
The 2 pdr pom-pom is purple*

For all - circle is single mount, a square is twin mount. 
Map has only guns smaller than 4" coloured, all larger guns are small black dots. (everything on previous map)
There are 42 light AA positions shown, in 1941 these are about 1/3 40mm Bofors, and 2/3 20mm, with some 20mm being replaced by Bofors in 1942
The positions listed as "17 pdr" were 75 mm guns in 1941


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 4, 2009)

Excellent find freebird!! I wonder how willing they would have been to fire on the runway with it being filled with British aircraft?

The Germans also started the war with a couple of older Deutshland Class Pre-Dreadnought Battleships armed with 4 x 280mm and 14 x 170mm guns and both were active in Poland during the invasion. Probably not something I would want to engage the RN with, but good for bombarding and were both pretty active during the war.


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Hi Vincenzo
> 
> 
> THe harbour defences are unlikely to damage the Battleships, but that was not their intention. They are intended to to break up the co-ordination of the landing forces and lighter ships operating operating inshore. And the allied experiences later in the war showed that it was the lighter ships that provided the most effective gunfire support. During the landings at Sicily, for example it was the Destroyers that prevented the Axis from succeeding at places like Gela. DDs would manouvre to very close to the shore and pump 5in shells into the attacking formations, providing heavy and direct gunfire support on demand. Battleships were good at attacking fixed defences, but not as efficient at attacking mobile targets.
> ...



imho the occupation of the rock are not comparable with the invasion of sicily, normandy and south france. Sevastopol/Odessa maybe more near but afaik this were best defended and more large. 
if it's true need months for destroy the defences the operations it's hard to do, the italian ready BB are few only 2 for true at declaration of war but were 5 in september, the long time bombardment can be a advantage the RN can put for months their BB to protect the Rock and left the atlantic route and home water. 
Gibraltar was not first target for italian royal navy the first need Malta after this maybe. (C-3 it's for a '42 invasion too late, malta need invade in summer '40 (best in june '40) fast invasion before of up defence we small, relative, landing force


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2009)

para on The Rock hard where need take off? i think no more that commando operations were possible


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 5, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I agree that a prolonged approach is suicide for the Axis fleets, but how are you proposing to do this otherwise. The experiences at Sevastopol and Iwo, which are both comparable, indicate a clear need for a prolonged campaign. In the case of Sevastopol it took about three months to complete the prepration and several weeks to complete the assault. In the case of Iwo it took three days of bombardment by the navy (which proved insufficient anyway), and 25 days of support afloat as the ground forces inched their way ahead. Unless the Germans are supermen, how are they going to
> A) get 100000+ men to the target
> B) get those men safely ashore
> C) provide the necessary support to prevent those men becoming guests of His Majesty?
> without the fleet hanging around??????



and Eben-Emael fell after 31 hours.

I never said anything about Germany needed to land 100,000+ men, where did you get that from??


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## comiso90 (Sep 5, 2009)

Great info Freebird... do u know if the 25 pounders are still there?


2 out of 8 carriers lost.... by subs?


.


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> and Eben-Emael fell after 31 hours.
> 
> I never said anything about Germany needed to land 100,000+ men, where did you get that from??




I know you didnt say anything about 100K in men. However, the Americans needed a force of 110000 men to subdue a garrison of 18000 on Iwo. The garrison on Gibraltar was never less than 16000, and was rapidly expanded to something like 25-30000 by early 1941.

Against the defences of Malta, the Axis (both German and Italian planning staffs) allocated a force of over 100000 men to subdue a force built around just two brigades and believed they could complete the operation in about 25 days

It is unrealistic to try and plan a successful assault against a target as strong as Gibraltar with anything less than a 5:1 superiority, and thats assuming that the force multipliers render the attackers equal to or superior to the defenders in terms of quality. That means, for a start that the defenders dont have gunfire support, or air support, It means that the shore defences are suppressed. It means that in issues like landing craft, command and control, supply, and a myriad of other variable, the attacking forces have parity or more often, superiority to the force miultipliers that will be favouring the defenders.

I cannot see the Germans or the Italians enjoying any of these advantages with the historical or near historical forces thney could be reasonably be expected to have access to. In just about every area that can be examined, or postulated about, they will come up short. They will be hopelessly short of landing craft, their fleet will be at huge risk, they will not enjoy air superiority. Their fire support will be second rate, or third rate, or most likley non-existent. From what I can see, from the photos, the landing area will be small rendering the assaulting forces highly vulnerable to enfilade fire. The problems are endless, and in my view insurmountable

You endlessly rely on the example of Eban Emael, without giving the applicabilty of this battle to the one in front of us anything more than a cursory, and quite inadequate assessment. As a staff officer you would get court martialled for that , because about all you would achieve is to get a lot of friendly troops killed or captured, and a lot of equipment lost. 

Eben Emael was a special operatioon, carried out brilliantly, with special weapons and techniques that had never been see before. I seriously doubt that such an approach would work in a fort the size of gibraltar, and at such a distance from support. If nothing else, if you wanted to adopt a straight extrapolation in time.....the fortress at Eban Emmanuel was garrisoned by just 1300 men and as you say fell in just 31 hours. The garrison at Gibraltar was somewhere in the order of 25000 men, so extrapolating the time taken to take and assault forces for Eben Emael (with a garrison of 1300 men, requiring an assault force of 75 men) to the garrison of Gib (25000 men), means that you would need an asault force of about 2000 men (roughly, and about 300 hours to complete your special operation. Plus you would need to find a way to spook the garrison in the same way that the Belgians were rattled. In their case they believed the entire german army was shelling them, and that they (the Germans) were attacking them in massive strength. I cannot think of a single instance where such a charade worked against a british garrison so cheaply (the closest I can think of is Singapore).


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2009)

comiso90 said:


> 2 out of 8 carriers lost.... by subs?
> 
> 
> .




Courageous was sunk two weeks after the outbreak of war (17-09-39), by two torpedoes fired from U-29. The British lost her needlessly, trying to carry out hunter killer missions in the Irish sea, when in reality they did not have the weoponry at that stage to undertake such a mission 

Glorious was sunk 8-6-40, by the Battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. This was a memorable battle on several counts. The Scharnhorst very possibly scored the longest ranged hit against a moving target at over 25000 yards (though Warspites hit on the Cavour later that year can also be argued to claim that prize). The Glorious was the only Carrier (edit, there was one other, an American carrier at Leyte Gulf.....I forgot) in the war sunk by enemy surface forces, whilst still under command. Finally, the Gneisenau was heavily damaged by a torpedo fired at extreme range by the British Destroyer Acasta, commanded by Commander Glasfurd. Glasfurd is reputed to have cassually lit a cigarette on the Bridge of his sinking ship as the torpedo hit the German Battlecruiser. One amazingly brave sailor in my book


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2009)

are you sure on force of garrison afaik in '40 there were only 4 infantry btl, also the artillery situation presented are for '41 and imho in 40 was almost a bit inferior


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2009)

Hi Vincenzo

Have a look at my Post 19, which gives a lot of detail on the available forces. If the invasion occurred in 1940, the attacker would have faced 16000 defenders, of which 4 Battalions were INfantry. By the time the operation would have been ready, an additional two brigades of Infantry had been added, bringing the strength of the defence up to over 25000 men. To these 2 Infantry Brigades were added approximately 6 battalions of artillery, which I think are additional to those depicted on Freebirds map.

Gibraltar was one of the most heavily defended locations on earth. As others have pointed out, any position is capable of being taken, and Gibraltar is no exception. But the idea that the place could be taken without heavy losses, and without a long period of prepration is unrealistic iun my opinion.


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## Freebird (Sep 5, 2009)

comiso90 said:


> 2 out of 8 carriers lost.... by subs?
> .



Yes, Parsifal got it already. 
In Oct 1940 the RN had:

Illustrious - first of the new RN CV's
Ark Royal - modern carrier, no armoured deck but carried 60 aircraft
Furious - older CV, a BC conversion similar to Courageous Glorious. carried 36 aircraft

Then there were 3 older carriers, slower (20 - 24 knts) and carried 20 - 25 aircraft each
Eagle
Hermes
Argus

In addition a 7th carrier Formidable was ready to enter service. (Nov 1940)



parsifal said:


> Courageous was sunk two weeks after the outbreak of war (17-09-39), by two torpedoes fired from U-29. The British lost her needlessly, trying to carry out hunter killer missions in the Irish sea, when in reality they did not have the weoponry at that stage to undertake such a mission
> 
> Glorious was sunk 8-6-40, by the Battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.



Just really, really in the wrong place at the wrong time. Glorious was actually being sent away from the combat zone for safety (oops!) and ran into the Kriegsmarine on the way home. The torpedo hit from the Acasta was a bad one, it took about 6 months to repair


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## syscom3 (Sep 5, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> Excellent find freebird!! I wonder how willing they would have been to fire on the runway with it being filled with British aircraft?



They would have fired on the attackers, with or without allied AC on the runways.


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## Freebird (Sep 5, 2009)

comiso90 said:


> Great info Freebird... do u know if the 25 pounders are still there?



Thanks Comiso! I don't imagine they are still there, as many of the 4" guns were replaced by 5.25 DP mounts, and I imagine that the 25 pdrs (85 mm? IIRC) would have been replaced by more modern 105 or 155 howitzers.




Vincenzo said:


> are you sure on force of garrison afaik in '40 there were only 4 infantry btl, also the artillery situation presented are for '41 and imho in 40 was almost a bit inferior



Well certainly all of the heavy guns were in place by 1940. I believe that almost all if not all of the fixed 4" mounts were pre-war.

From GG's earlier post: 



GrauGeist said:


> In 1940, there were some 20 3.7" guns, four 4" guns, 10 40-mm Bofors and two pom-poms, plus numerous searchlights. 1942, this complement had been increased to 30 3.7" guns and almost 20 Bofors.



The map shows 13 twin 3.7" AA mounts (26 guns), so presumably they are halfway from 20 in summer 1940 to 30 in 1942. There may have been a few less light AA positions, but they had 10 Bofors, and probably 20 - 25 of the 20mm sites in 1940.

I believe that the two twin 3" mounts (Signal Hill Harbour Wall) were the older 3" AA models, that could still be effective as AA. They had been bringing in the newer 3.7" AA as the 3" didn't have the high level ability, but could still be effective.

It says ther were 4 of the 4" guns as AA, I'm not sure if that is the two 4" QF mounts? If the 15 of the 4" guns were naval models, they could also be used as AA (as they were used for this on ships.)


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## Freebird (Sep 5, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> Excellent find freebird!! I wonder how willing they would have been to fire on the runway with it being filled with British aircraft?






syscom3 said:


> They would have fired on the attackers, with or without allied AC on the runways.




It is my understanding that all of the fighter aircraft were housed in bomb-proof hangers when not actually taking off/landing. This is the same system that was used on Malta.


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## Freebird (Sep 5, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> I would do an amphibious/airborne attack on Gibraltar.





vikingBerserker said:


> The French, Italians and Germans had been bombing them so range IMO is not critical. I could not find the bases from which the Italian or Germans flew from- but obviously it was feasible.



Range is ALWAYS critical. As posted earlier, the Italians bombed Gibraltar with P-108's, which had a 2,100 mile range, from their bases on Sardina which is about 900 miles from Gibraltar. Southern France is no closer. However the P-108 was only introduced in 1941.
The Germans were probably making nuisance raids with FW-200's, because I don't believe that had any significant numbers of bombers with an 1,800 mile range in 1941. 

Does anyone have any data on theses raids? Did they occur in 1940/1941 or later?

In any event, there is no record of these raids causing any significant damage, unlike the ones on Malta that wiped ou dozens of Spitfires, among other things



vikingBerserker said:


> I have to disagree with you about there being no escorting fighters.



?? Then please explain how they could have escorts, if they don't have access to Spanish or French North African bases? There is no Axis fighter with an 1,800 mile range in 1941 IIRC



vikingBerserker said:


> Remember it's a captured allied ship so it's not unidentified.
> That's something obviously that would need to be taken out. However you only need to open a channel wide enough to get the ships through safely.



It would be almost impossible to take out all 10 gun mounts on the Harbour wall, but even if they did there are at least two twin 6" mounts, two 4" mounts and the twin 3" mount on Signal Hill/Devils Gap that can fire directly into the Harbour or the bay, not to mention about a half dozen or so of the 75mm guns. And how do you disembark? A couple of shells from the 25 pdrs 4.5" howitzers are going to dropping right down the hatches of this floating coffin. 



vikingBerserker said:


> Not sure, but if 10 large boats could drop off 5k troops, that would be great.



Even assuming they could cram 200 men per sub, that would be 25 subs. Where are they going to unload? 



vikingBerserker said:


> Originally yes, but they would be either in Spanish ports or anchored off the Spanish coast. Apparently it was not a big deal.



Well it would be a biig deal, because the RN is checking all ships near Europe or that pass through the straights


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Hi Vincenzo
> 
> Have a look at my Post 19, which gives a lot of detail on the available forces. If the invasion occurred in 1940, the attacker would have faced 16000 defenders, of which 4 Battalions were INfantry. By the time the operation would have been ready, an additional two brigades of Infantry had been added, bringing the strength of the defence up to over 25000 men. To these 2 Infantry Brigades were added approximately 6 battalions of artillery, which I think are additional to those depicted on Freebirds map.
> 
> Gibraltar was one of the most heavily defended locations on earth. As others have pointed out, any position is capable of being taken, and Gibraltar is no exception. But the idea that the place could be taken without heavy losses, and without a long period of prepration is unrealistic iun my opinion.




Al depend what's the time of operation, in a what if active italain in mediterraneo after take malta in june, we can suppose attack on the rock in late summer so no 2 brigades more only the 4th btls, your 19th post it's like one in axis history forum. most defended maybe i 'm not a expert but i don't think so and with spain in war have little hope few weeks at best i think


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## Milosh (Sep 5, 2009)

Vincenzo, you think the Italians could pull off an amphibious operation when they couldn't even win in the desert?


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2009)

imho for the italian armed forces more easy a amphibious operation (not in large scale as a invasion) that win the desert war, i think for all the armed forces are so


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> Al depend what's the time of operation, in a what if active italain in mediterraneo after take malta in june, we can suppose attack on the rock in late summer so no 2 brigades more only the 4th btls, your 19th post it's like one in axis history forum. most defended maybe i 'm not a expert but i don't think so and with spain in war have little hope few weeks at best i think



Not necessarily. The allies were reading a good deal of Axis signal traffic from April 1940, including the Italian Supermarina coded messages. The security of the italian high commands signals were notoriously bad from the very beginning of hostilities. So the likley outcome is that the Rock would be reinforced prior to any undertaking of an operation of this magnitude.

Moreover, it takes time to plan and prepare for an operation of this magnitude. The planning and preparation for Normandy, for example took over a year, Sicily was being planned and prerpred for for more than 3 months. Given that the Italians would be starting from a point very far behind, an operation of this kind would take more than 6 months to prepre for. The planning for Hercules (the invasion of Malta) was begun in 1941, and could not be undertaken until after July 1942, according to the Italian High Command. Even thenn they were not quite ready.

Given the lethargy the italian High Command displayed in all their other major operations, a realistic estimate to undertake an operation of this type might be March or April 1941. They could start planning in 1939, but then we are starting to leave the realm of possibility, and relying on fantasy and conjacture.


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> imho for the italian armed forces more easy a amphibious operation (not in large scale as a invasion) that win the desert war, i think for all the armed forces are so


Hi Vincenzo

How is it easier for the italians to pull off an amphibious invasion than to conduct a land offensive? The allies found amphib operations to be the most difficult of operations to plan prepare and execute. The Italians did plan an amphib, for Corfu, Crete and Malta. All three were called off for various reasons.

I can assure you that planning and preparing for an amphibious operation is far from easy, far from quick, and it is questionable that the Italians possessed the expertise, the equipment, or even the will to undertake an operation such as that being discussed.

Some may use the Falklands as an example of an operation carried out in rapid time. Not quite true. It still took two months to prepare for, and whats more the studies that led to such rapid execution were planned and allowed for, in years of pre-operation planning. The RN had been preparing for this contingency for more than 10 years before it happened that I know of, possibly more. There were no such plans or preprations in the italian navy for Gib..... they would be starting from nothing basically


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## Freebird (Sep 5, 2009)

Well let''s review the options. Using the assumption that the attack takes place in Jan/Feb 1941, and is a combined German/Italian operation. It's hard to see how it could have taken place earlier, as the Germans didn't start thinking about it until after Sealion failed -it would take at least 2 months to plan.

The options:

*1.) Germany/Italy try an airborne/amphib operation with no French or Spanish help
2.) Spain allows the Axis to invade from Spanish territory
3.) The Axis have the assistance of the French, but Spain remains neutral *



I will re-post the maps from last page


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## Freebird (Sep 5, 2009)

I think the Axis attempting an attack without any nearby bases would be just pure suicide.
While the fortress was vulnerable to an attack from Spain, it would be near impregnable to an air/amphip assault, considering the British naval strength.

VB, you can't point to Eban Emal as an example, because it was mainly a huge oversight of the Belgians that allowed it to happen. That's like saying "Capturing bridges was easy in WWII" and then point to Remagen as an example. If the Belgians had even 2 or 3 machine gun crews on the roof it would have been a totally different matter. A vigorous defence in wartime is a world different from a surprise attack against an unsuspecting/ neutral power.

I think you have to look at the contemporary operations for examples.

1. US para drop on St Mere Eglise
2. German para drop on Crete
3. Canadian amphib assault on a defended port.

In every case that I can think of, paratroops dropping directly on an alert, defended target took very heavy casualties, and failed the objective.

1.) The US para's dropping on D Day took huge casualties, and it was only the forces that arrived OFF-SITE that were able to re-group and push the Germans out of the town.


> The early landings, at about 0140 directly on the town, resulted in heavy casualties for the paratroopers. Some buildings in town were on fire that night, and they illuminated the sky, making easy targets of the descending men.



2. On Crete, the German troops landing directly on top of the airfield were massacred, it was only the paras that landed off site that were able to function, pushing the Allies off of the airfield



> At 8:00 am on 20 May, German paratroopers landed near Maleme airfield and the town of Chania. The 21st, 22nd, and 23rd New Zealand Battalions defended Maleme airfield and its direct surrounding area. The Germans suffered heavy casualties within the first hours of the invasion. One company of the III Battalion, 1st Assault Regiment, lost 112 killed out of 126; 400 of the battalion's 600 men were killed before the end of the first day.
> 
> Of the initial forces, the majority were mauled by New Zealand forces defending the airfield and Greek forces near Chania. Many of the gliders following the paratroops were hit by mortar fire within seconds of landing. Those who did land were wiped out almost to a man by the New Zealand and Greek defenders.



3.) As for an amphib landing, consider the disaster suffered by the Axis on Crete, and a similar heavy defeat at Dieppe for the Canadians.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The difference between Crete Gibraltar:

1.) Both had about 25,000 - 30,000 active defenders, but on Crete they were protecting a huge territory, at Gibraltar concentrated.
2.) After the retreat from Greece, the Allies had lost most of their heavy weapons, and all of their transport. On Gibraltar there was a huge arsenal of all kinds of guns, and a tunnel network (complete with trucks) to move troops around.
3.) On Crete they were very short of AA, having just a single battery of light AA for the whole island, while on Gibraltar there over 80 AA positions.
4.) On Crete the defenders of the airfield did not have the advantage of the elevated positions on Gibraltar.
5.) Most of Gibraltar is a very steep slope unsuited for para landings, otherwise the paras landing risk falling in the sea, or onto the runway
6.) Crete was assaulted with the help of over 1,000 Axis aircraft, yet Gibraltar is out of range except for very long-range bombers






Some more pics of Gibraltar:

A. From Spain, looking south across the runway
B. The Spanish town (La Linea) that borders Gibraltar
C. The East (Seaward side)
D. The view from O'Hara's mount ( 9.2" gun mount)
E. WWII AA mount


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## syscom3 (Sep 6, 2009)

Lets do a reality check here .... the Germans and Italians did not have any capability to have a forced amphib landing on a defensive nugget like Gibraltar. And I don't think the USN had that capability either even in 1945.

Want to know what will happen to infantry when it tries to do something like that against even moderately dug in field fortifications? Look at what happened to the IJA with General Kobayashi's brigade attack on the marine perimeter at Alligator Creek at Guadalcanal in Aug 1942. They were slaughtered. Slaughtered almost to the man.

Any invasion will have to be done on land from the Spanish side. And even then, there's going to a bloodbath with the attackers. Whats the normal assumptions of a forced landing on a beach ... something like the attacker needs a 3-1 ratio to have a possibility of success? Well I wouldn't be surprised to see the a ratio of 5 or 6 to one to be needed for Gibraltar.

And forget about having subs land men. I would think that rubber boats are not the epitome of protection. A couple of rifle caliber bullets would make it problematic for anyone to get ashore with eqmt and in the mood to have a fight.

And think of that .... a multi-divisional attack with little direct sea gunnery, no air support, no true amphib landing craft and it being performed by two countries who have no amphib experience against a modern well equipped army in heavily fortified positions.


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2009)

From those photos, there dont appear to be too many suitable landing areas either, for either airborne or marine troops. Its a tough nut to crack.......


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## Vincenzo (Sep 6, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Not necessarily. The allies were reading a good deal of Axis signal traffic from April 1940, including the Italian Supermarina coded messages. The security of the italian high commands signals were notoriously bad from the very beginning of hostilities. So the likley outcome is that the Rock would be reinforced prior to any undertaking of an operation of this magnitude.
> 
> Moreover, it takes time to plan and prepare for an operation of this magnitude. The planning and preparation for Normandy, for example took over a year, Sicily was being planned and prerpred for for more than 3 months. Given that the Italians would be starting from a point very far behind, an operation of this kind would take more than 6 months to prepre for. The planning for Hercules (the invasion of Malta) was begun in 1941, and could not be undertaken until after July 1942, according to the Italian High Command. Even thenn they were not quite ready.
> 
> Given the lethargy the italian High Command displayed in all their other major operations, a realistic estimate to undertake an operation of this type might be March or April 1941. They could start planning in 1939, but then we are starting to leave the realm of possibility, and relying on fantasy and conjacture.



the plan can be prepared before of war in all the 30s, if we back in real word no german gibraltar and this is a useless discussion, no italian will to do. afaik the italian code was not knew from allied.


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2009)

QUOTE=Vincenzo;554217]the plan can be prepared before of war in all the 30s, if we back in real word no german gibraltar and this is a useless discussion, no italian will to do. afaik the italian code was not knew from allied.[/QUOTE]

Vincenzo

I detect from this post that you want to make three main points:

1) The italians could prepare their plans from pre-war. 

This is true, but then if you accept this, then you must accept the various quid pro quos that go with an early italian Belligerency. For a start nearly all of the italian Batleships were not available. The Littorio classes were not ready until october, and all but two of the Cavour/Doria class were also unready for action until the latter part of 1940. And if the the Italians are making preparations for war, why would the allies not also make ready for war. As you will see in the following posts, your assumption that the italian naval codes were secure is a false premise, n fact the italian security had been breached as early as 1937. So, if the italians start to make their plans for an invasion of Gibraltar, from prewar, they are only going to spur the allies into even greater prewar preparations 

2) We need to depart from history to allow the issue to be explored

I agree, but having partaken in many staff studies during my naval career, there is a difference between legitimate discussiuon/exploration of what might be possible, and sheer navel gazing to promote a biased national agenda.

During the preprations for the Occupation of Midway, the IJN wargamed the operation extensively, and were dismayed to find their navy was being sunk most of the time. So they changed the parameters, and the assumptions underpinning their operation, until they got the result they wanted (in the simulation). They managed to win the wargame, and then lost the battle. i believe they introduced unrelaistic assumptions into their simulation. I believe we are starting to do that here as well, to promote vested national agendas, and preconceptions. The discussion is not producing the result that is desired, so new parameters are introduced, each one more outlandish than the last, in order to try and achieve the result that is wanted. Maybe it might be time to concede the original supposition was at fault rather than trying endlessly to alter the sceanario parameters to try and make a dead horse gallop.......

3) The Italian signal traffic was secure

Sorry but you are definately, and fundamentally mistaken here. Italian naval codes were broken from 1937. This happened during the Civil war. There was a time when they were allowed to lapse, but from April 1940 the codes were broken once again. It is one of the reasons Italians losses at sea were so heavy.

Wiki has this to say regarding Italian Naval security:

"_During the Spanish Civil War, Italy, was on the side of Francisco Franco's Nationalists. The Italian Navy used a version of Enigma that did not have a plugboard. In 1937 Dillwyn 'Dilly' Knox, a gifted British cryptanalyst veteran of World War I and the cryptanalytical activities of Room 40, managed to break this cipher, using a technique that he called 'buttoning up' to discover the rotor wirings and another that he called rodding to break messages. This relied heavily on cribs and on crossword expertise in Italian, as it yielded a limited number of spaced-out letters at a time.

When in 1940 Dilly Knox wanted to establish whether the Italian Navy were still using the same machine, he instructed his assistants to use rodding to see whether the crib PERX (per being Italian for 'for' and X being used to indicate a space between words) worked for the first part of the message. After three months there was no success, when Mavis Laver, a 19-year-old student, found that rodding produced PERS for the first four letters. She then (against orders) tried beyond this and obtained PERSONALE (Italian for 'personal'). This confirmed that the Italians were indeed using the same machines and procedures.

The subsequent breaking of Italian Naval Enigma ciphers led to substantial Allied successes. The cipher-breaking was disguised by sending a reconnaissance aircraft to the known location before attacking the warship, so that the Italians assumed that this was how they had been discovered. The British Royal Navy's victory at the Battle of Matapan (March 1941) was considerably helped by Ultra intelligence obtained from Italian Naval-Enigma signals_."

The Italians were a notoriously leaky command, and this showed in the losses they sustained, particularly at sea. To be fair, the italians as the war progressed were also very successful in penetrating Allied security. They alone predicted the torcjh landings, whereas the Germans were caught napping.


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## Vincenzo (Sep 6, 2009)

for the codes only the 0,76% (37800 msgs) of all RM signal traffic was cleared from the british, only the 10% of traffic was on C-38 machine. Many of trouble in war was that the british cleared the german code that give many info also on italian navy movement.


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## Freebird (Sep 6, 2009)

I think most of us agree that the chances for a para/amphib operation without Spanish help looks very bleak at best.

Also that an operation from Spain is doable, a "Sevastopol" type operation.


Parsifal, what about the third option, if Germany Italy have access to French N Africa bases, but that Spain is strictly neutral?

*1.) Germany/Italy try an airborne/amphib operation with no French or Spanish help
2.) Spain allows the Axis to invade from Spanish territory
3.) The Axis have the assistance of the French, but Spain remains neutral *

Assuming that the Germans try the operation in Jan/Feb 1941, is there any chance of success?

Assume that they could break out with Bismarck, 2 x BC's 2 CA's to bring down to Gibraltar.
Could they force a landing somewhere on Gibraltar?

(Assumes that a powerful Luftwaffe based in Algeria has driven off the RN)


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2009)

freebird said:


> I think most of us agree that the chances for a para/amphib operation without Spanish help looks very bleak at best.
> 
> Also that an operation from Spain is doable, a "Sevastopol" type operation.
> 
> ...



I think the French North African option has problems. Ive commented on this at length previously, but essentially the issue is this....the ability of the Axis to support troops in North Africa is limited. For an operation in North Africa, they could support perhaps another 4-6 Divs and maybe 200-300 aircraft, but would be resisted by more than 15 French Divisions, the entire re3sources of the French and British Fleets, plus the additional resources that the British could put into defence. I think it just hastens the demise of the Axis in North Africa. 

There are also huge diplomatic implications with this approach.  Because the Germans would be forced to euthenase a creation of their own making (namely the Vichy regime) only months afters its formation, it would demonstrate conclusively that the Axis could not be trusted. This, at a time when the US presidential elections are being run, and every neutral is considering whether the Germans could be trusted at all. This act of duplicity would show that they could not be trusted....


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## syscom3 (Sep 6, 2009)

parsifal said:


> .... it would demonstrate conclusively that the Axis could not be trusted. This, at a time when the US presidential elections are being run, and every neutral is considering whether the Germans could be trusted at all. This act of duplicity would show that they could not be trusted....



I think that it was a given by Oct 1939 that the Germans could not be trusted in any circumstance.


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> for the codes only the 0,76% (37800 msgs) of all RM signal traffic was cleared from the british, only the 10% of traffic was on C-38 machine. Many of trouble in war was that the british cleared the german code that give many info also on italian navy movement.




So let me get this straight. You are attempting to claim, that despite the fact that the Italians were using, prewar, a commercial version of Enigma, known as enigma "D", which was even less secure than the version used by the japanese (prewar, Enigma "E"), that this version of the system had been cracked as early as 1932, and that close to 100% of signal traffic was being read by other countries using this system (eg Switzerland"), that by some miracle of divine fate, the British could only read less than 1% of Italian signal traffic.

Sorry, but without good proof to support that, your claim is just too fantastic to be given any semblance of credibility at all.

The Germans, incidentally were using a military grade of Enigma (Enigma "F") from the outbreak of the war, which was upgraded by the addition of additional rotors to the system. It was an inherently more secure version than that used by the Italians.

Lastly, like all cryptoanalysis, the amount of traffic varied greatly as codes were changed. It fluctuated on an almost daily basis, so giving precise numbers on the amount of traffic being read is almost meaningless, and highly suspect as a statistic to quote.

In any event its academic and irrelevant as a statisitc. Whatever the amount of traffic being read, or the source of that traffic, it was enough to give the Allies absolute surety as to Italian intentions plans and movements.

Whilst I am very sceptical about these percentages you are quoting, even if they are true, statistically that means that it would only take somewhere between 35 and 50 days for the allies to find out about the operation. And this does not take into account such variables as reconnaisance and espionage....how long do you suppose the italians could keep secret the fact they were building landing craft and the other engines of war needed to pull this off?????

If the Italians had planned an early move on Gibraltar, it would have been found out.


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> I think that it was a given by Oct 1939 that the Germans could not be trusted in any circumstance.



As a general comment you are right, but what about countries like the USSR, and turkey. I think even Japan would think twice about trusting the Germans if they pulled a stunt like that


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## Freebird (Sep 6, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I think the French North African option has problems. Ive commented on this at length previously, but essentially the issue is this....the ability of the Axis to support troops in North Africa is limited. For an operation in North Africa, they could support perhaps another 4-6 Divs and maybe 200-300 aircraft, but would be resisted by more than 15 French Divisions.




No, what I meant was if the French allowed Germany access, similar to the arrangement with the Japanese.

From the French point of view:

1. The British double-crossed a former ally by attacking the French fleet.
2. The Allies are slowly chewing off bits of the Vichy Empire, like Central Africa, Tahiti, New Caledonoa etc.
3. If they give the Axis access to Algeria, with the guarantee that they keep all French sovereign territory
4. The French have a similar arrangement in the Levant in spring 41, as the Germans are basing there.
5. The French realize that this might be opening hostilities with Britain, but since the attack on Dakar has failed, they are confidant that they can keep control of West Africa, Martinique, the Levant and perhaps Madagascar, everything else is already gone over to deGualle 


If France did allow Germany to use French African territory, what else could the British do to retaliate, that they were not doing already?


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2009)

France agreeable to the entry of German troops to their territory tips the military balance completely in favour of the Axis. Gibraltar under those circumstances becomes all but untenabl.

However, as a scenario it was never going to happen. The whole raison detre of Vichy was to protect what was left of France and her empire from a German occupation. They adhered to that idea, despite some overtly unfriendly acts by the British. The British were able to get away with things like Dakar, invasion of Levant and Mers El Kebir because no matter what, the Vichy were even more distrustful of of the Germans than they were of the british. 

If Laval and his cronies had made declarations to join the Axis or even allow Axis military access, they would have faced a revolt by the military governors in Vichy, particularly Darlan.


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## syscom3 (Sep 6, 2009)

BTW, how weer the axis fleets going to handle the RN sub threat? If the allied ASW capabilities at this time of the war were "poor" at best, the axis capabilities were even worse.

Any invasion force off of Gibraltar had better be ready for some big time, possibly crippling losses, even before the attack starts in earnest.


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## Juha (Sep 7, 2009)

Hello Vincenzo
9.2 in BLs had a max range of 26200m, some on the Rock being some 400m above the SL got sone extra range because of that height difference.So the gun had fairly long reach.

Juha


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## Freebird (Sep 7, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> BTW, how weer the axis fleets going to handle the RN sub threat? If the allied ASW capabilities at this time of the war were "poor" at best, the axis capabilities were even worse.
> 
> Any invasion force off of Gibraltar had better be ready for some big time, possibly crippling losses, even before the attack starts in earnest.



That's some of the uestions that I was wondering, 
Ok, suppose the Germans had been able to break out from the Baltic with their small fleet, ie 1 BB, 2 BC, 2 CA, and perhaps 4 or 5 DD, but no minor assets.

What minor asssets did the Italians have (DD, FF, TB) that could be used for ASW? Could they bring enough to Gibraltar?



parsifal said:


> France agreeable to the entry of German troops to their territory tips the military balance completely in favour of the Axis. Gibraltar under those circumstances becomes all but untenabl.
> 
> However, as a scenario it was never going to happen. The whole raison detre of Vichy was to protect what was left of France and her empire from a German occupation. They adhered to that idea, despite some overtly unfriendly acts by the British. The British were able to get away with things like Dakar, invasion of Levant and Mers El Kebir because no matter what, the Vichy were even more distrustful of of the Germans than they were of the british.
> 
> If Laval and his cronies had made declarations to join the Axis or even allow Axis military access, they would have faced a revolt by the military governors in Vichy, particularly Darlan.



I think I would disagree with that assesment somewhat, Darlan hated the British, so he wouldn't be that put out. Consider that the Vichy had this exact similar arrangement in Syria, allowing the Axis to use bases to support a Fascist revolt in Iraq.

From the Vichy point of view, the Allied cause is a no-win situation, as they will continue to lose colonies to the Free French, and should Britain win they will install DeGualle as leader of France, and probably put the Vichy leaders on trial. (Which is what actually happened.

On the other hand, they expect Germany to win (Britain's neck wrung like a Chicken,, remember?) so if Germany promisises to honour all French colonial posessions, and to return French Equatorial Africa to the Vichy (Lost to the Free French in 1940/1941), it might sound like a good deal, especially if they can extract some consessions from Berlin, ie a relaxing of some terms of the Armictice.



In any event Parsifal, humour me if you would, suppose that the Axis DID have French bases available, but Spain is strictly neutral. Does the invasion of Gibraltar become realisticly possible?

I still have some doubts, (as does Syscom) of the Axis ability to make an amphibious invasion, even if it's from only 50 - 100 miles away. Where would they land? Try to capture the harbour? land on the southern beaches?

Do we have anyone here with para training? The slope of the rock seems to be 30 - 40 deg, I would think that's too steep for a para landing, but I could be wrong.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2009)

Trying to co-ordinate a combined German-Italian attack might be difficult.

German ships coming from Brest at a best case, Italian ships coming from the east. there is no mutual support until they are in gun range of Gibraltar.

Staging out of French territories makes things both easier and harder. Easier in the actual attack but you have to get the attack forces to Oran and Algiers in the first place. Given the lack of axis shipping in the Med a greatly increased number of sailing to/from these ports would surely have been noticed along with increase air traffic. These may give the British warning and time to do something about the gathering forces.

Increased submarine patorls of the ports

Air strikes. 

Bombardment missions by surface ships on the French Harbors. 

reinforcements sent from Britian.


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## Juha (Sep 7, 2009)

9.2 in Mk X on Mk VIII mounting from Spur Battery, Gibraltar. Nowadays in Duxford IIRC

Juha


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2009)

To win an amphibious assault, the Axis have to isolate the Rock. They also have to neutralize the harbour defences, which could only be achieved by sustained bombardment. .

Going by the experiences in Sevastopol, the Luftwaffe could not subdue the Port defences by aerial bombardment. They needed superheavy artillery to do that. And to get the artillery into position, they need to occupy some part of Spain, either the mainland, or Spanish Morocco.

The only other way I can see the Axis being able to overrun the place is if the fleet can undertake a sustained bombardment, lasting weeks or months with no interference from the RN. That would require the attentions of a substantial portion of the Luftwaffe (a rough guess, 1000-1500 aircraft????) which would need to be supplied over a sustained period, and maintain a long protracted campaign. The aerial assault over Malta in 1942 took about three months to achieve, with over 500 aircraft (not including the Italians). I believe a larger force would be required to subdue and isolate Gibraltar (a matter for debate, admittedly). 

The whole thing is difficult for the Axis, but with French co-operation, do-able. Assuming French support, the Axis can move forward their POEs into the territory to Oran or Algiers, rely on the French Fleet for escort, and the French mercfhant marine (about 1000000 tons) for transport across the western med. 

However, it would almost certainly see the US supporting the Brits to a much greater extent than they did, with neutrality patrols being extended, the US placed on a war footing earlier. 

The Brits would almost certainly apply their ancient treaty with Portugal to get control of Madeira and the Azores early (historically they did not do this until 1944, but the Portuguese would have honoured their trteaty committments earlier if asked IMO).

Because I cannot see the french agreeing to this willingly, I believe there would be massive implications in the diplomentic arena. I believe the USSR would realize the germans could not be trusted, and countries like Spain, Portugal the US etc etc would all react adverselly toward germany as a result of their duplicity.

Comparing French North Africa with what happened in Syria is not a valid comparison. The French commander in Syria was rabidly pro-German, and in any case the Axis were granted transit rights, not basing rights. What would be required in French North Africa would be substantially more than what happened in the Levant.


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## Freebird (Sep 7, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> BTW, how weer the axis fleets going to handle the RN sub threat? If the allied ASW capabilities at this time of the war were "poor" at best, the axis capabilities were even worse.
> 
> Any invasion force off of Gibraltar had better be ready for some big time, possibly crippling losses, even before the attack starts in earnest.



What about the light "Caliques" (fish-boats?) that the Axis tried to use to invade Crete. Would these flat-bottom boats still be affected by torps?

Might be easier to get onshore too, run them right onto the beach. But taking out the British guns MG's would be critical.

Does anyone know just how many guns the Germans had on the nearby coast for D-day?



parsifal said:


> To win an amphibious assault, the Axis have to isolate the Rock. They also have to neutralize the harbour defences, which could only be achieved by sustained bombardment. .
> 
> Going by the experiences in Sevastopol, the Luftwaffe could not subdue the Port defences by aerial bombardment. They needed superheavy artillery to do that. And to get the artillery into position, they need to occupy some part of Spain, either the mainland, or Spanish Morocco.
> 
> ...



What about if the French fleet does not participate? Say Bismarck, 2 x Sharnhorst BC's 2 Italian BB's- would it be enough, along with the Luftwaffe Italian bombers?

Would the British be able to keep the airfield operational, like they did on Malta?


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## syscom3 (Sep 7, 2009)

freebird said:


> What about the light "Caliques" (fish-boats?) that the Axis tried to use to invade Crete. Would these flat-bottom boats still be affected by torps?
> 
> Might be easier to get onshore too, run them right onto the beach. But taking out the British guns MG's would be critical.



The attack would need quite a few warships providing covering power close up. That's where the subs would come in handy. 

And if you think that you could invade Gibraltar without heavy specialized amphib craft, then you would be seeing a slaughter of epic proportions. And flat bottomed boats might make the run in easy, but just a little bit of seas and youre in trouble.


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 7, 2009)

I'm not sure Germany would need specialized amphibious equipment, they had already been able to make amphibious landings against forts without specialized equipment.

Just going on the French angle, if the only purpose is to kick the British out why not just give them (ie France) Gibraltar for helping? They get the price and the Axis gets rid of a thorn.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2009)

To transport any real number of troops by submarine is going to require an awful lot of submarines. Please see the Makin raid: Makin Island raid - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Please note that those two American submarines were not only larger than the later fleet boats but almost 3 times the size (tonnage) of a MK IX U-boat or many Italian Submarines. 
Also please note these two subs carried a pair of 6in guns apiece as fire support compared to the single 3"-4" gun on most German, French or Italian boats. 

Subs vrs shore batteries is a battle that heavily favors the shore batteries. With One or at best two guns per sub (compared to 4 or more guns on a destroyer) and no directors or fire control the fire suport from subs is going to be marginal. While the subs are a small target a single good hit on a sub turns it into a slow serface vessel. It is win or die as a surfaced sub is going to moving at below fleet speeds. Perhaps no worse than some impressed freighters though. 
Considering the cost per ton of submarines vrs surface ships ( and the time to build them) offering up a large percentage of a fleets operational subs to shore batteries doesn't seem like a good idea. I mean, what is the point of the Italians getting better access to the Atlantic for theri subs if they loose a fair number of them getting that access.


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## Milosh (Sep 7, 2009)

How many capital ships did the British have in Egypt?


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## syscom3 (Sep 7, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> I'm not sure Germany would need specialized amphibious equipment, they had already been able to make amphibious landings against forts without specialized equipment.
> 
> Just going on the French angle, if the only purpose is to kick the British out why not just give them (ie France) Gibraltar for helping? They get the price and the Axis gets rid of a thorn.



What fortifications on the scale of Gibraltar did they attack by sea, being multiple sea miles from their bases?


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 7, 2009)

Norway


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2009)

Maybe not the scale of Gibraltar but they did take out a number of Norwegian fortifications. Of course the Norwegian fortifications also took out a German ship or two?

And Norway was closer.

One more victory like Norway for the Germans and the Britsh could stop worring about a German serface fleet.


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2009)

QUOTE=freebird;554888]What about the light "Caliques" (fish-boats?) that the Axis tried to use to invade Crete. Would these flat-bottom boats still be affected by torps?

Might be easier to get onshore too, run them right onto the beach. But taking out the British guns MG's would be critical.

Does anyone know just how many guns the Germans had on the nearby coast for D-day?



What about if the French fleet does not participate? Say Bismarck, 2 x Sharnhorst BC's 2 Italian BB's- would it be enough, along with the Luftwaffe Italian bombers?

Would the British be able to keep the airfield operational, like they did on Malta?[/QUOTE]

The problem is not so much the availability of heavy units, so much as the availability of sufficient merchant shipping to support the operation. 

This would be an operation around half the size of Overlord, and would therefore require the attentions of about 3.5 million tons of shipping for the duration of the operation. The ground troops could be kept at their home stations for a while, but the Luftwaffe (and its supporting elements) will need logistic support. Very roughly, each 200 aircraft consumes approximately the same amount as a motorized Infantry Division. Thats about 1500 tons per day. If there are 1500 aircraft deployed forward, there are also the logistic support units to consider. Using the Axis expereince in Cyrenaica, every ton of supplied delivered to the front from Tripoli also required the consumption of a further ton of supplies in the rear area support elements....the transport companies, the flak formations, the policemen, the gardeners, and the like. 

That means that the 1500 strong air striking force would require 25000 tons per day, just to remain supplied, thats approximately 150000 tons per week. The average displacement of the italiahn merchant fleet was under 3000 tons per hull, which roughly means that each ship can carry about 1000 tons of cargo (this is much smaller than the US and British fleets). This means that the ports of Oran and Algiers (and in a pinch, Tunis) would between them need to be able to handle at least 150 unloadings per week. I seriously doubt this is even possible to be honest. In terms of the merchant fleet, the minimum requirements, in deadweight tons, in order to maintain a continuous flow of supplies has to be placed at atleast 1000000 tons. The Italians only had 2 million tons available to them, and this was hard pressed to keep the units in Libya supplied. So where is the extra shipping going to be drawn from if the french are not co-operating????? And please note, we have not even put a single soldier into a transport, or buiult a single landing craft as yet

Logistically, the operation cannot be done without the French (or someone) providing a massive injection of shipping to the operation. There would need to be massive investments into the capacities of the ports undertaken, as the allies did in 1942. I just see the whole thing as completely impractical, given the constraints the Axis would be operating under. And we have not even started to look at the operational difficulties the two axis navies would be labouring under in this scenario.....


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> Maybe not the scale of Gibraltar but they did take out a number of Norwegian fortifications. Of course the Norwegian fortifications also took out a German ship or two?
> 
> And Norway was closer.
> 
> One more victory like Norway for the Germans and the Britsh could stop worring about a German serface fleet.




Norway had not mobilised at the time of the invasion. There were something like two Battalions in the whole of the country to defend against the invasion. I know of no single case where the defending batteries were actually taken out. A couple surrendered as a result of 5th column activity, the rest were captured by landward assault. None were actually knocked out by German gunfire.


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## syscom3 (Sep 7, 2009)

Parsifal, those are some good comments about the logistics. I forgot about the port capacities in Morocco and Algeria.

I think the key here is not so much as having a lot of infantry divisions on hand, but having more heavily armored amphib ships to protect the troops as they hit the beach. But then its problematic for the troops as once they left were on shore, they were sitting ducks. Just like the marines at Iwo Jima and the USA at Omaha.

I would also suppose the LW could knock out the RAF, surely by attrition.

But the RN would score heavily on the supply convoys further putting strain on the axis forces.

As for the French navy ..... its one thing for them to defend the french possessions. Its another thing to go after British possessions. The French navy might look good on paper, but it would have to be forced to fight and it would be quite unreliable.


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 7, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Norway had not mobilised at the time of the invasion. There were something like two Battalions in the whole of the country to defend against the invasion. I know of no single case where the defending batteries were actually taken out. A couple surrendered as a result of 5th column activity, the rest were captured by landward assault. None were actually knocked out by German gunfire.



I believe that is in error. Off the top of my head I recall the Hipper herself knocked out (ie silenced the guns) at least one Fort in Trondheim which was later secured by German ground troops. I believe there were a few others as well.


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## Freebird (Sep 8, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> I'm not sure Germany would need specialized amphibious equipment, they had already been able to make amphibious landings against forts without specialized equipment.



Nope, never landed against a fort



vikingBerserker said:


> Just going on the French angle, if the only purpose is to kick the British out why not just give them (ie France) Gibraltar for helping? They get the price and the Axis gets rid of a thorn.



For the effort, Germany would keep it, giving them a first class base, and control the entrance to trhe Med



Milosh said:


> How many capital ships did the British have in Egypt?



In the second half of 1940 - 4
First half of 1941 - 3


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## Freebird (Sep 8, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> Norway





Shortround6 said:


> Maybe not the scale of Gibraltar but they did take out a number of Norwegian fortifications.



Not by ship.



vikingBerserker said:


> I believe that is in error. Off the top of my head I recall the Hipper herself knocked out (ie silenced the guns) at least one Fort in Trondheim which was later secured by German ground troops. I believe there were a few others as well.



Nope, the fort fired on Hipper, but didn't hit. Hipper didn't take out the fort


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## GrauGeist (Sep 8, 2009)

Technically, the sea assault on Norway was a disaster. It incorporated almost the entire Kreigsmarine with the exception of 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers and 4 torpedo boats, all of which were layed up for repairs.

After losing the Blücher to the 280mm guns of Oscarborg fortress (at the head of Oslofjord), the task force (TF5) had to withdraw and had the Luftwaffe attack Oscarborg. The only reason the fort fell, was because the emplacements were exposed from above and the crews had to take shelter, leaving the guns unmanned. Wehrmacht units were landed below the fort by minesweepers and they effected the fort's surrender.

Lützow and Emden took damage while inflicting little damage to the fort and no Norwegian casualties.

In the end, the Germans had to take Oslo by air to force a capitulation.

Even the General staff considered the naval invasion of Norway "lunatic", Adm. Raeder even telling Hitler that the operation broke al the rules of naval warfare. Aparently, they were anticipating a loss of about 50% of thier forces.

Doesn't look like amphib Ops were a German specialty...


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2009)

This is an extract from the following site
German invasion of Norway, 9 April-9 June 1940
“_The only real German setback on 9 April came at Oslo. There the German cruiser Blücher was sunk gunfire and torpedoes from the Norwegian fortress at Oscarborg, preventing the naval expedition from reaching the Norwegian capital. The city fell later on 9 April after an aerial assault captured Fornebu airfield, but by then King Haakon VII and the Norwegian government had escaped, ending any chance that the Norwegian campaign might have ended as quickly as the invasion of Denmark. 
The attack on Kristiansand was delayed by fog, which stopped the first attempt to land at 3.45am. A second attempt was made just after 6am, but was defeated by the Norwegian gun batteries, which were now alert to the danger. However, a third attack after 11am succeeded, partly because the fog had returned and partly because the Norwegians mistook the Germans for French ships. 
At Bergen the Germans came under fire from coastal gun batteries at 5.15am, and remained under fire for four hours. The Königsberg was hit three times, and received damaged that prevented her from leaving Bergen as planned. 
At Trondheim the Hipper became involved in a short duel with the coastal gun batteries guarding the entrance to the fjord as she led her destroyers past them at 25kts. The city itself fell without resistance, but the airfield at Vaernes was not captured on the first day. 
Narvik was defended by the two elderly coastal defence vessels Eidsvoll and Norge. The Germans sank the Eidsvoll on their way to Narvik, and the Norge in the harbour. General Dietl, commanding the forces attacking Narvik, then bluffed the Norwegian commander at Narvik, Colonel Sundlo, into surrendering with any resistance. At the end of 9 April the Germans had captured most of their main objectives._”
I don’t think any of the actions in which the Kriegsmarine was involved can in any reasonable way qualify as “overpowering through gunfire” the defensive batteries in Norway. Only where the batteries were unmanned, or were inadequately defended from land assault, or where the Norwegians made fundamental errors of judgement were the Germans able to get ashore. No argument that the Germans were successful, but they weren’t successful by force of arms; they succeeded because there was no-one in place to defend once the ground troops got ashore. At sea, the operation was a disaster for the Germans. At no point did they actually silence the guns through the actions of their own ships. 

This site gives a brief history of the Hippers attack on the Trondheim defences

German_cruiser_admiral_hipper encyclopedia topics | Reference.com

As can be seen, whilst the battery fire against the Hipper was ineffective, they were not silenced, and because the Norwegians had no ground troops with which to defend the port, the Germans were able to put their landing into effect. The batteries were not silenced by gunfire, but by occupation. 

“_Admiral Hipper took part in the German invasion of Norway (Operation Weserübung). On 8 April 1940 she encountered the British destroyer HMS Glowworm north-west of Trondheim (Norway's third largest city, roughly half way up Norway's west coast). After exchanges of fire and despite fatal damage, Glowworm turned to ram Admiral Hipper, causing damage to her before sinking. 
On 9 April 1940, she passed the Norwegian coastal forts in the Trondheimsfjord, being fired at ineffectively, and entered Trondheim's harbour. Troops landed from Admiral Hipper occupied the city in the early hours, flying the Nazi flag on the city's old Kristiansten fortress and other municipal buildings before most of the inhabitants had even awoken_.”


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> Parsifal, those are some good comments about the logistics. I forgot about the port capacities in Morocco and Algeria.
> 
> I think the key here is not so much as having a lot of infantry divisions on hand, but having more heavily armored amphib ships to protect the troops as they hit the beach. But then its problematic for the troops as once they left were on shore, they were sitting ducks. Just like the marines at Iwo Jima and the USA at Omaha.
> 
> ...



A few quick comments. With regard to the Luftwaffe versus the RAF, even though the RAF would be heavily outnumbered, it would still be a Malta like situation, but without Me 109 escort (I think its too far for 109s to reach, unless spanish Morocco is occupied or has its airspace violated...remeber Spain is supposed to be neutral in this scenario) 

The Germans would need at least some divisions in French North Africa, to guard their airfields. They otherwise risk commando style raids by the british that might otherwise c9ost the germans a sizable portion of their air fleet. 

I dont think the Luftwaffe would win a battle of attrition, so much as they would render the airfield inoperative. If the British obtained access to another airfield, for example by occupying the free city of tangiers before its occupation by the Spaniards in 1940, or by occupying an airfield and defending it Tobruk style , the outcome might be more protracted. If the BoB is being fought, the Germans would be suffering acute shortages of fighters by the end of october. if it has not been fought, the Raf will have about twice as many fighters as the germans to call on. Not all the air resources available to either side could be devoted to this operation, but the British have greater flexibility....the germans have divert resources to defend the reich, maintain pressure in the North Sea, protec their fleet in the french Atlantic bases (historically the Brits harried any ship deploywed into these ports). They have to allocate resources to support the itaslians in the central basin, and the battle in the western desert. Historically, the RAF managed to hold these places, in a defensive way, using far less resources than their counterparts, if the Axis slacken the pressure on the brits, the brits are bound to react aggressively because they can.....

I agree with about the french Navy, although I think it was effective, from an axis perspective it would be highly untrustworthy....a nett liability in reality


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 8, 2009)

Per _ Norway 1940_ by Bernard Ash, page 87, as quoted by _ Forcible Entry and the German Invasion of Norway _ by Maj Michael W, Richardson - USA, page:

"The bypassed forts continued to fire at the destroyers, causing one to beach after being hit, and Hipper had to go to the aid of the group by landing additional troops and providing gunfire to silence the forts...................Naval fire silenced the batteries by 1700."


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> Per _ Norway 1940_ by Bernard Ash, page 87, as quoted by _ Forcible Entry and the German Invasion of Norway _ by Maj Michael W, Richardson - USA, page:
> 
> "The bypassed forts continued to fire at the destroyers, causing one to beach after being hit, and Hipper had to go to the aid of the group by landing additional troops and providing gunfire to silence the forts...................Naval fire silenced the batteries by 1700."




Your first source i have not been able to locate a copy of, but I will. 

The second source you are misquoting. I happen to have a copy of this report, and relevantly it says on Page 33 that

"_The landings at Trondheim encountered less initial resistance than the Germans
experienced at Narvik. The shore batteries guarding the harbor managed only one volley

before the German assault ships dashed by at high speed. The warships of the group
disembarked their infantry at the docks with no interference. The Germans secured the
city by nightfall_."

The whole thrust of this article was that the Germans achieved their goals because of the level of unpreparedness and devotes considerable space in the article to the threats posed by the coastal batteries. According to Richardson, the Germans specifically aimed to capture the batteries intact, so as to prevent British penetrations of the ports. So, if Hipper did destroy the batteries in the manner you suggest, they were acting contrary to the operational plan. 

If Ash does say that (and I note as a source it is very old) he is making assertions that are contrary to every other source I have ever seen. Hippers consorts ducked past the harbour defences, whilst Hipper engaged them. Hipper did not knock them out, however. They eventually surrendered to German troops from the landing force. . 

Once I get a copy of the book in question, I am sure the issue will be cleared up. I am expecting another example of misquoting at this stage.....


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## parsifal (Sep 9, 2009)

Another online history had this to say on Group 2s assault of trondheim:

"_TRONDHEIM

Against Trondheim sailed Gruppe 2 of the German invasion fleet commanded by Kpt.z.S. Hellmuth Heye. Gruppe 2 was to land 1,700 men of the elite Gebirgs-Regiment 138/3.Gebirgs-Division. The ships of Gruppe 2 were as follows:

Schwere Kreuzer Admiral Hipper 17209
Zerstorer Paul Jacobi (Z5) 17474
Zerstorer Theodor Riedel (Z6) 01923
Zerstorer Bruno Heinemann (Z8) 13029
Zerstorer Friedrich Eckoldt (Z16) 03772

Two U-boats were also allocated to the attack Trondheim.

The last of the five main Norwegian naval fortification was located on the approaches to Trondheim at Agdenes on the bank opposite the Agdenes lighthouse. Here was located one battery of 2 x 210mm guns, 3 x 150mm guns, and 2 x 65mm guns. A second battery of 2 x 210mm guns, 2 x 150mm guns, and 3 x 65mm guns was also on this bank. On the other bank, just inland of the lighthouse, was located 2 x 150mm guns. During the German attack, a blocking position was established near the second battery listed above, with 35 men manning nine tripod-mounted Colt-Browning machineguns, which successfully withstood five attacks by a 500-man German landing force. In addition to these fortifications, the Norwegian Navy also had in the Trondheim Fjord a number of small vessels including the minelayer FROYA.

Despite damage received at sea April 8th, HIPPER engaged the Norwegian gunners while the four destroyers boldly ran the batteries, speeding through at 25 knots (equivalent to a land speed of 28 mph) on a course calculated to minimize the time they spent under the guns. A shell from HIPPER severed the electric cable which powered the two Norwegian searchlights, and the slow rate of fire of the old Norwegian guns-- three salvos every two minutes-- also helped the plan succeed. One destroyer was hit in the effort. Although the Norwegian Navy forts at the entrance to the Fjord held out for eleven hours, Trondheim itself was captured with little difficulty. In the fighting the Norwegian fortress garrisons lost only one man killed and two wounded. German troops who attacked the blocking position (35 men and 9 mgs, see above, Section C) established by Capt. Lange outside the fort he commanded suffered 22 casualties. Minelayer FROYA was captured_".

Source:

The Invasion of Norway



I guess if you count knocking out the electricity supply for the searchlights, then Hippers effort counts as knocking out the battery.....most people would not say that however


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## Juha (Sep 9, 2009)

Hello
on Norway, not very good comparison, Norwegians were in peacetime mood, being citizens of a neutral country which was attacked without warning by a country which had been in a war over ½ year. The shock of surprise attack among unprepared victims is usually great. And if one read the German and Norwegian descriptions on the first day of the invasion, they show that Norwegians many times gave in when Germans threatened to bomb nearby cities. After the initial shock had been overcome Norwegians fought better. On Gibraltar British knew that they were at war.

Germans made some amphibious landings, for ex on the Estonian islands Saarenmaa, Hiidenmaa and Muhu, I recall only the English name of the last, Moon, in 1941. In Autumn 43 they took Leros and Kos by paratroopers and amphibious landings. They also tried to take Suursaari/Hogland from Finns in Autumn 44, but even if most of coastal batteries had been dismantled for transportation to mainland and Finns knew that they were to give up the island to Soviets they smashed the German attempt with heavy German losses. Germans suffered from bad coordination and part of the heavy fire support unit, for ex Prinz Eugen didn’t participate because of communication breakdowns.

German and Italian Navies had at least some A/S capacity. Germans didn’t have ASDIC but had technically very good hydrophones. And RN subs suffered heavy losses in Med.

Juha


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 9, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Your first source i have not been able to locate a copy of, but I will.
> 
> The second source you are misquoting. I happen to have a copy of this report, and relevantly it says on Page 33 that
> 
> ...



I am not misquoting. What I quoted was on page 77 of that report and my apologies for forgetting to list the page number. I had it written down just forgot to type the dam thing.


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## parsifal (Sep 10, 2009)

Thankyou for the page numbers. It still does not say the hipper knocked out the forts. It does confirm that the forts were eventually surrendered to ground formations. Also, whilst the article does say that the hipper assisted in silencing the forts, it does not say the hipper knocked the forts out of action, or that even the hipper silenced the forts. What actually happened was that the hipper assisted in silencing the forts. I admit, i am not quite sure what that means, so at best it is unclear.

What I do know is that as the afternoon wore on, the forts at Agdenes were being assaulted by more than 500 men of the landing force, and the that some of the men in the gunpits were forced to go and assist the detachment of 35 men that had already been sent to block the germans advancing toward the gunpits. I strongly suspect that the guns went silent because there simply were not enough men able to man the guns, and defend against the advancing German mountain troops. 

In any event the guns were not destroyed, and in fact were being manned by the 100 strong coastal artillery detachment sent to man them in the initial assault force. I know this, the guns were fully operatuional and in Germanhands by the following morning. For me, this is conclusive proof that the Hiper did not knock those guns out.....

Relating back to the topic, if the hipper did not knock out these batteries, then ther is not really any analogy with a fortress like Gibraltar. Because the fortress at gib is such a large fort, and possessing such integrated and interlocking defences, it would not be possible to rely on lucky shots to immobilise the forts defences. There really is not any correlation here.....


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 10, 2009)

It specifically states: "Naval fire silenced the batteries by 1700." If it was not by the Hipper then it had to be by the destroyers. 

The correlation I was drawing or was attempting to draw was an amphibious invasion of fortified areas. IMHO regardless if the troops landed directly in front of the fort and took it, or landed to the side and outflanked it. It still was an amphibious operation that took out forts.


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## parsifal (Sep 10, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> It specifically states: "Naval fire silenced the batteries by 1700." If it was not by the Hipper then it had to be by the destroyers.
> 
> The correlation I was drawing or was attempting to draw was an amphibious invasion of fortified areas. IMHO regardless if the troops landed directly in front of the fort and took it, or landed to the side and outflanked it. It still was an amphibious operation that took out forts.



The Hipper did not knock out any guns. They assisted in the silencing of the guns, but what was happening at the same time as the Hipper was engaging them was an that elements of the assault forces were engaging the Norwegian blocking forces. What isnt in Richardsons article is that by nightfall additional Nowegian troops, (gunners from the pits), had been detached to assist the blocking forces, operating as Infantry. The reason the coastal batteries fell silent was because there was no-one to man them, everybody had been detached to fight the attacking German Infantry force overnight. This makes perfect sense, since earlier the German had knocked out their searchlight electricity supply.

Proof that the hipper or any other ship did not knock these batteries out is that the very next day, immediately after their capture, these batteries were operational, this time under german control.

There is a difference incidentally, between knocking out a battery, and the guns being silenced. Admittedly Richardson infers that they were knocked out, but this is inconsistent with his own subsequent narrative, namely that the guns were returned to service very quickly after their capture. I know from other sources that the reason they fell silent that night was because the gunners were busy fighting the Gebirgjagers, not because the guns were inoperative from naval gunfire

I still dont think this qualifies as a German amphibious assault of a defended beach. The landing sites at Trondheim port are more than 30 miles away the forts at Agdenes. The Germans movewd as quickly as they could to engage the defenders of these guns, but that was many hours after the actual landings. This kind of approach could not be undertaken at Gibaraltar


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## Freebird (Sep 12, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello
> 
> German and Italian Navies had at least some A/S capacity. Germans didn’t have ASDIC but had technically very good hydrophones. And RN subs suffered heavy losses in Med.
> 
> Juha



Enough A/S to cover an Axis fleet from sub attack?



parsifal said:


> A few quick comments. With regard to the Luftwaffe versus the RAF, even though the RAF would be heavily outnumbered, it would still be a Malta like situation, but without Me 109 escort (I think its too far for 109s to reach, unless spanish Morocco is occupied or has its airspace violated...remeber Spain is supposed to be neutral in this scenario)



Just a note: Axis have access to French territory, but no French military participation, perhaps some merchant shipping in the central med only

Oran is 270 miles from Gibraltar, and Casablanca 200 miles, but the French territory west of Oran would be about 180 miles, while bases north of Casablanca could be about 125 miles away, so if the Germans were to improve some local airfields Me109's could be operational. (Distances measured over water only)



parsifal said:


> The problem is not so much the availability of heavy units, so much as the availability of sufficient merchant shipping to support the operation.
> 
> This would be an operation around half the size of Overlord, and would therefore require the attentions of about 3.5 million tons of shipping for the duration of the operation. The ground troops could be kept at their home stations for a while, but the Luftwaffe (and its supporting elements) will need logistic support. Very roughly, each 200 aircraft consumes approximately the same amount as a motorized Infantry Division. Thats about 1500 tons per day. If there are 1500 aircraft deployed forward, there are also the logistic support units to consider. Using the Axis expereince in Cyrenaica, every ton of supplied delivered to the front from Tripoli also required the consumption of a further ton of supplies in the rear area support elements....the transport companies, the flak formations, the policemen, the gardeners, and the like.
> 
> ...




What about using Tunis nearby ports for shipping? It would be about 1/3 or 1/2 the distance Naples - Tunis instead of using Tripoli, and then the Axis units could be supplied by rail through Algeria -> Casablanca. (The railway would need improvements obviously)

Also, could they not use a smaller Axis air group if they had some KM/RM fleet support?

Say only 500 aircraft, not 1500. Perhaps 200 fighters, 100 DB and 200 Ju88/He111?

If the Axis had Bismarck 1 or 2 italian BB's, how well could they blast the Gibraltar guns? 

Does anyone know how thick the turrets are for the 9.2" guns?

Has anyone been to see that one in ... Duxford was it?


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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2009)

freebird said:


> _Enough A/S to cover an Axis fleet from sub attack?_
> 
> _Just a note: Axis have access to French territory, but no French military participation, perhaps some merchant shipping in the central med only
> 
> ...





If the french provide merchant shipping, it will need escort. If they are provided with escort, it is either Axis or French. In any event, that simple statement escalates French collaboration way beyond anything they were prepared to do historically, and the reason for that was mostly because of the war aims of the Vichy government.....basically the surival of the french state, and to minimise antagonising the US in particular. They certainly did not want to align closer with the Germans, except for one or two utter sycophants. Even Darlan was more pro-allied in his predisposition than this situation assumes. 

Tunis would be fine as a port, and would be far safer as a port of entry, but it is a long way from the front. Unless the rail line is more substantial than I think it was, basically every gallon of fuel or stores brought forward from that point will need another gallon or ton expended in transport and rear area support (guarding bridges, rear area AA and the like). The British are not going to leave this long supply line alone. If there are no ships to attack, they will attack the motor convoys (as they did in the western desert). In that theatre, from the very beginning, the Axis were forced to expend huge quantities of resources in these rear areas, and these in turn suck up vast amounts of supply.

The rail line is an obvious option, but my world railways atlas indicates that at that time, ther were only 123 carriages in the whole of French North Africa and 26 trains. Not nearly enogh, and an asset highly vulnerable to sabotage. The British Special Forces and French resistance would have had a field day against this link. It would have required huge investments to protect, upgrade, and maintain

As far as a smaller air component , I dont think that this is possible, because of the multiple tasks it has to undertake. The Air component needs to suppress the british fleet, protect against subs, provide recon and search/SAR services, suppress the airfield as well as reduce the harbour defences. This is several additional task over and above those undertaken by FliegerKorps X and other assets in the central basin. There, it required over 400 aircraft two months to suppress the harbour, and airfield. There was no attempt to destroys the coastal batteries....these were to be captured by the airborne forces, and then the Italians were to land the main force, in the final version of the herkules plan. Meanwhile more than 600 other Axis aircraft were intended to maintain the blockade, which were shown incapable of doing.

In this Gibraltar scenario, the airfields are further away (c200 miles, compared to 60 over malta). The SE assets in particular are going to be hard pressed to reach that far and maintain a constant air patrol.....Whereas about 150 Me 109s were found necessary to keep Malta suppressed, this extra range over Gib is going to demand a force two or three times that number. Unless the German Bombers are prepared to accept massive losses, they need a lot of escort with very long legs. Typically, if I were the british commander, I would time my re-supply convoys to arive just before dawn, which means that the air assets will need to travel a further 200 miles so as to attack in daylight. Do Me 109s have an effective range of 400 miles???? And assuming I have two or three carriers, I would use my Albacores, Fulmars and Swordfish to undertake hit and run attacks against the German airfields at night (which they were trained and experienced at....the only force in the world at that time capable of hitting pinpoint targets at night, as demonstrated by their strikes against Bismarck), That means to allow for the run in, the strike time and the retirement, they would typically be 300 miles from the target in daylight hours, and given the time needed to locate them and organize a strike, this figure is more like a 400 mile buffer....

I am not saying the Luftwaffe could not achieve a blockade, but it would be costly and difficult, and would require a lot of aircraft. I dont think 500 would be enough to be honest. And from the British perspective, neither the RM or the KM were ever much of a threat. Even when heavily outnumbered, against the Italians, there was never much fight in the Italians.

I doubt the Axis Battleships could get that close. British carriers and submarines, and minefileds would tend to sink them very effectively until the air blockade was well and truly biting


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## Glider (Sep 13, 2009)

The batteries which were installed at Gibralter where but one part of the defence. The entire Rock of Gibralter is riddled with tunnels which were dug during the Napoleonic Wars with numerous portals for firing down at anything apporaching the island. Anything that landed would be shot to bits.
The batteries themselves are a formidable defence. The 9.2 in gun may be old but carried a significant punch and being mounted so high gave them two additional advantages:-
a) There range was increased significantly
b) Any hit would be plunging fire coming down almost vertically
Any Heavy Cruiser would be at significant risk of sinking as the armour would not be sufficient to protect it.

Re the ability of air support to subdue the batteries and other defensive fire. I doubt that the Germans would have sufficient firepower. Think of the massive firepower that the USN used to pour into the islands in the Pacific and the limited effect that it had. 
Iwo Jima would be a walk in the park compared to Gibraltar, I say this for a number of reasons

a) Gibraltar had more heavy and light guns for the defense
b) There is more ammunition and larger infrastructure built into the rock than IwoJima including its own powerstations, remember the defences had been planned for centuries and continually updated
c) Gibraltar is a lot smaller, rifle fire would cover nearly all the possible usable ground leaving the Germans nowhere to form up or rest. The airfield would be one big killing ground
d) The fiepower available to the attackers is very limited, I do not see it subduing the defences
e) The RN would be sure to wade into the defence, submarines alone would suffice to but the attacking ships as significant risk

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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2009)

The 9.2 inch was a retired piece of Naval ordinance, that had both good and bad aspects. The mounts had a maximum elevation of 35 degrees, but could fire 5/10 crh shells which gave it a range of 32,600 yds. However in the elevated gun platforms at gibraltar, this was extended to a range in excess of 39000 yds. Muzzle velocity was 2,900 fps (884 mps) using a 144 lbs. (65.3 kg) charge. These projectiles were required to be able to penetrate 8.75 in (22.2 cm) of Krupp cemented (face hardened) armor at 7,650 yards (7,000 m). . With the supecharges carried as standard the muzzle velocity of these guns was exceptionally high, at over 2900 f/s. Rate of fire was a theoretical 2 rounds per minute. '

A cavour class battlecruiser had deck armour of 80mm over the machinery spaces, and 100mm over the magazines. They had a maximum armour thickness of 280mm on the turret faces. The maximum theoretical range of their 12.6 in guns were 31000 yds, but in relaity the limits of their optical rangefinders meant they could only engage out to 24000 yds. The ROF for the Italian guns was 2 rounds per minute as well
At 15-240000 yds (the likley engagement range) these ships would have been just targets for the heavy batteries on the rock.


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## Juha (Sep 13, 2009)

Hello
I have seen the 9.2 in gun, years ago and IIRC it was at Duxford
Another photo, it isn't a proper turret the back is open.


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## Longshaor (Sep 27, 2009)

Gibraltar has always been a facination of mine.

As for Operation Felix, with Spanish complicity, holding Gibraltar was hopeless. In the west, if the Kreigsmarine had been able to station U-boat S-boat flotillas in Spanish ports, as they had done in France, they could have effectively neutralized the Royal Navy's otherwise overwhelming superiority. Additionally, while the airfiield at Gibraltar was under the protection of gun emplacements in the rock, if the Spanish cooperated with the attack, it could easily have been made untennable. In the east, the Italian Navy was certainly capable of keeping the RN's Mediteranian fleet bottled up east of Malta, the real question would have been how strongly they stuck to their guns against the Brits. With the Britain's naval forces kept at bay unable to resupply the garrison, and air supremacy probably in the hands of the Luftwaffe - again operating from Spanish bases - Gibraltar could not have been held. The cost to the German army would have been very high, and it would have degenerated into a battle of atrition, but they would eventually have been able to reduce the garison and take the penninsula.

Without Spanish help, I don't see that there would have been a way for the KM the Luftwaffe to secure the necessary preconditions for an assault launched from Italy, which would be the only viable staging area.


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2009)

How would the Italian Navy "certainly keep the Med fleet bottled up". The British time and again demonstrated they had nothing to fear from the italians, even when hopelessly outnumbered. What is your source, or even historic trends to support your claim.

As for U-Boats containing the British on the western side of the rock, the Japanese experiences around Pearl in 1941 witrh their submarine fleet, demonstrates very clearly the inability of submarines to maintain a close blockade of the time you are suggesting. The axis tried to isloate Malta using S-Boats and subs, and could not hold the blockade. Subs are a weapon of strategic capability, but in tactical operations, they are pretty well useless

If the Germans were given air bases in Spain, the equation becomes more difficult, admittedly. however, i am inclined to agree with Franco's assessment......if the Germans were allowed into the Iberian peninsula, the british would react, most likley by occupying Spanish Morocco and the Canary islands. With Spanish Morocco in their hands, the British can fly single engined fighter cover over their miliatry convoys into and out of the Rock. The Germans are reduced to the same problem they have over England....how to to defeat the British fighters. They cant, as history shows.....unless they are willing to absorb enormous loses to their air force


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## Civettone (Oct 7, 2009)

I wouldn't exactly say they had nothing to fear from the Italians. At night, that's true. But the real reason for Italian failure was their phobia of losing ships. They were not prepared to risk more than a few ships with only worsened the situation: they were destroyed by relatively small British detachments. In fact they played right in the cards of the British who were hopelessly overstretched, also in the Mediterranean, They forfeited the initiative and the British took full advantage. 

One could even say that the Italians had nothing to fear from the British Royal Navy. They just had to dictate the place and time of the battle. That way they could have provided their ships with air cover and they could have won any daytime encounter.

A good example of that is in fact Malta. Staying clear of the larger coastal guns they could have steamed towards the islands and cut them off. The British would have had to engage them under unfavourable conditions. 

Kris

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/italian-navy-outset-wwii-how-good-7774.html
http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/9226/ww2.html


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## parsifal (Oct 7, 2009)

I cannot think of a single occasion that the italians came anywhere near to challenging the british supremacy with their main fleet. The British were always going to dictate terms for battle whilst they possessed a night capable carrier force, and the italians were relying on an unsympathetic air arm. On those occasion that the Italians were handed the opportunity to do something effective, they muffed it in a big way. As an example, at Cape Spada, the two Italian cruisers took on one Australian cruiser, and a few destroyers, and lost. At Spartivento, the Italains outnumbered the British in every category, in daylight, and lost because they refused to charge a smokescreen...

Whilst Taranto demonstrated what the British advantage was at night.....most of the italian battlefleet disabled for months, one never to return to service, at the hands of just 18 aircraft, Matapan (or more corectly the lead up to it) demonstrated the advantage the British enjoyed by day. Able to locate the Italians whailst the italians remained blind, the British were able to choose their time and place for attack at their own choosing.

Whilst ever the Italians lacked an effective fleet air arm (and by 1940 there was virtually no chance of that happening anytime soon), the British were never going to be caught in the trap you suggest, and consequently the conditions you describe were never going to be relaized. moreover, the Germans would not be able to deploy their single aeronavla unit at the time (Flieger Korps X) into the central basin because they would be needed in the western med. if the war taught one leson, it was that inproperly trained aircrew are next to useless in attacking ships. There are special skill required, which cannot nbe picked up as they go.

It is also untrue that the british were heavily outnumbered. The Italian and German fleets combined were not even half as strong as the Royal Navy. Neither italy or germany had even the slightest chance of putting to sea in fleets more powerful than the British....and thats even with the affects of raiders to contend with


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## Vincenzo (Oct 7, 2009)

Capo Spada 2 light cruiser ((in)famous for the light armour), acting as fast trasport, versus 1 light cruiser (sure best armoured) and 5 DD imho there is a british superiority

Capo Teulada 2 BB (1 new and 1 old), 6 CA, 14 DD, versus 2 BB (both old but both with 15'), 1 CA, 4 heavy CL, 1 old CL, 14 DD, 1 AA cruiser, 4 corvettes and the Ark Royal imho also here there is a british superiority

(anti ship guns: 9-15', 10-12.6', 48-8', 12-6', 68-4.7 versus 14-15', 8-8', 68-6', 60-4.7', 36-4.5')


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## Civettone (Oct 7, 2009)

Twice at large in the Mediterranean ??

And I think the Italians often had the chance of having a decisive victory. But like I said before, they were too prudent!

_The first clash between the two navies was at Point Stilo two squadrons escorting the respective convoys, Italian ships (under the command of Admiral Campioni) were Cesare, Cavour, 14 cruisers and numerous destroyers, British units were battleships Warspite, Malaya, and Royal Sovereign, aircraft carrier Eagle, five light cruisers, and 14 destroyers, commander was Admiral Cunningham.
The result of this match was that only Giulio Cesare was lightly damaged, but it demonstrated the inferiority of the Italian since they were in a more favorable position and they lost a good chance to beat the British more significantly. The battle was near the coasts of Italy and if the cooperation with the Air Force had work properly, Point Stilo would have been a great victory. In addition Veneto and Littorio were almost ready for combat, and his commander, Admiral Bergamini, asked the permission to join the battle, but it was denied by Supermarina._

Italian optical rangefinding equipment was also superior to that of the British. 
Kris


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## GrauGeist (Jun 17, 2021)

SaparotRob
- here's a classic thread with fantastic input by Michael.
There's even contributions by Neil (PBFoot) who was another forum great that has since passed.

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## Glider (Jun 17, 2021)

Civettone said:


> Twice at large in the Mediterranean ??
> 
> And I think the Italians often had the chance of having a decisive victory. But like I said before, they were too prudent!
> 
> ...


I agree with a lot of this apart from the last sentence. Italian fire control generally was quite poor


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## Thumpalumpacus (Jun 18, 2021)

To take up the discussion -- it's hard for me to see conditions where the Germans might get their few heavy surface vessels to the arena of combat. Even without knowing their destination, increased radio traffic would indicate something was up, and recon based in Blighty would likely pick up the ships as they sortied, much like they did the _Bismarck_ sortie in 1941.

The same would hold true for the Italians, although they'd have a much shorter and presumably easier run-in to the Rock.

In short, surprise is not going to be in the cards; whether discovered by sigint or by physical recon the preparations stand a good chance of discovery, and the Germans especially will have to sail past or around the Home Fleet. Also, with the Italians simultaneously showing signs of preparation for a big offensive, a locus of ops in the western or central Med becomes clearer -- and from there, guessing the Rock as the objective is made easier.

Additionally, it'd be pretty hard for the Axis fleets to both provide gunfire support _and_ fight off the inevitable British naval attacks at the same time, especially given the nature of Gibraltar's defenses, dug into stone and with some heavy weaponry of its own. If you shield the invading force from the RN, you will need to sacrifice at least some naval-gunfire support, and I doubt air-support could pick up the slack.

It really boils down to whether the objective is worth the cost, and I don't think the Germans or Italians would find the potential costs acceptable for the benefits, without an overland arm bringing Spain in, which wasn't going to happen. Franco was canny and stalled Hitler out to his wit's end in the 1940 summit they had.

My two-cents' worth, and worth every penny you've paid for it.

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## SaparotRob (Jun 18, 2021)

SSSHHHHH! No spoilers. I'm only up to page 5.

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## SaparotRob (Jun 18, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> SaparotRob
> - here's a classic thread with fantastic input by Michael.
> There's even contributions by Neil (PBFoot) who was another forum great that has since passed.


I almost started awarding "likes" as I got into the thread until I remembered.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 18, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> I almost started awarding "likes" as I got into the thread until I remembered.


Why not?
I'm sure he would have appreciated it

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