# Boulton Paul Defiant



## Wildcat (Mar 24, 2007)

Gents, as I know very little about this a/c, I was wondering, when the limitations of the turrent fighter were painfully learnt when the Luftwaffe changed tactics to head on attacks, were any Defiants modified or fitted with forward facing guns for the pilot? I understand that a turrent-less prototype was designed (P.94) which was a pure fighter and armed with 12x.303 guns in the wings. Therefore my question is why weren't forward facing guns fitted when the Defiants started to take crippling losses? Was it a question of weight, loss of speed or because when finally employed in the NF role forward guns were deamed unnecessary?


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## Wildblue1972 (Mar 25, 2007)

As far as I'm aware the turret on the Defiant could be rotated and set to fire forward, with the four .303 brownings firing either side of the pilot's cockpit. I believe that it that position the pilot may have had a remote button to fire the guns. However, it could hardly have been an ideal solution. The noise in the pilots ears must have been tremendous! Seriously though, having the ability to fire the guns in this way was surely an acceptance of the fact that the Defiant was never intended as a dogfighter. For that purpose it must have been too heavy with all that weight and drag of the second crew member and the turret itself. The sole design rationale was for the Defiant to formate on the blind spot of a stream of bombers and hack away with immunity. In that respect maybe it was such a bad idea... in theory. However the rifle calibre guns would barely have sufficient punch and range. Not the mention that the german bombers were bristling with guns (often more guns than they had crew members to man them). However, all said and done, the Defiant was a valiant attempt to address a potential comabat tactic that could have worked. For proof of this you only need to look at the suuccess the germans had with their upwards firing guns slicing away from underneath at the undefended bristish heavy bomber fleet. It does beg the question though, if the people who came up with the idea for the Defiant could see the hazards of a blindspot on a bomber's defences, why wasn't more done to provide bristish bombers with better all round defences?


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## pbfoot (Mar 25, 2007)

What was used for the interupter gear so the 4 303's could fire through the propellor arc in the forward firing mode


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## merlin (Mar 25, 2007)

It would have been too late to fit wing guns to the Defiant after its short comings were painfully demonstrated by the Me 109s.
In WW1 the RFC had the Bristol two-seat Fighter (Brisfit). It was successful because it was armed with guns fore aft, and its large engine gave it a comparable speed with other fighters.
In the 30s the RAF had (if memory serves me correct) the two-seat Hawker Demon. As I recall, it was a fighter version of the revolutionary Hawker Hind (it was faster than most current fighters), and it to had guns fore aft.
The RAF wanted a replacement for the Demon, but they didn't have a bigger engine that would give it the power/weight ratio of a Hurricane or Spitfire. In theory this wouldn't matter as it was only expected to meet bombers.
Yet that being the case, why was it stationed in range of the 109s - theory again said that they had the tactics to deal with them; in practise only once!
Dowding didn't believe the publicity of the potential effectiveness of the Defiant, others were more enthusiastic - Sholto Douglas.
To my mind, it seems quite plausible that the P94 (Defoe?) should have been ordered - with the jigs tools readily available, aircraft could have been completed quite quickly. However I can't help but wonder, if it was a case of 'vested interest' i.e. to have the single seater version in service will show what fools we (those who championed the Defiant) are!!


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## Denniss (Mar 25, 2007)

pbfoot said:


> What was used for the interupter gear so the 4 303's could fire through the propellor arc in the forward firing mode



Boulton Paul Defiant - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia :



> The turret was armed with four .303 Browning machine guns, which were electrically fired. Insulated cut-off points in the turret ring prevented the guns from being activated when they were pointing at the propeller disc or tailplane.



Anyone able to confirm this?


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## HealzDevo (Mar 25, 2007)

No, but I know that they were used at the time of Dunkirk on missions when they got absolutely chopped to pieces. I play a game called Achtung Spitfire and I prefer to play the mission doomed Defiants as the Luftwaffe rather than the Allies because I think from memory the loss ratio ends up at 1:4 or something in the Luftwafe's favour.


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## Wildcat (Mar 25, 2007)

Even if the guns could be fired when facing forward by the pilot, it seems he did not have a gun sight (wiki), so basically useless anyway. Maybe guns weren't fitted in the wings due to the simple fact that the fuel tanks were located there, and with the added guns comes smaller tanks and greater weight, which in turn lessens the range/endurance.


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## Civettone (Mar 25, 2007)

I don't think the rebuild would have been worth it. Remember that the aircraft was designed around the turret. Once the turret proved to be inadequate, the entire aircraft followed suit. The aircraft wasn't designed as a conventional fighter. 

On the other hand, it surely was a waste of so many aircraft. But England's bottleneck wasn't aircraft, it was pilots. So it was better to put the pilots in better Spitfires and Hurricanes instead of in a stopgap modified Defiant. 

And in the end, those Defiants still served a purpose as nightfighters and glider tugs.

Kris


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## HealzDevo (Mar 25, 2007)

Yes, they did serve a good purpose as nightfighters. Still would have been hard to aim the turret wouldn't it from the cockpit?


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## Glider (Mar 26, 2007)

I always thought that the Defiant could have been turned into a decent GA plane.
Take the turret out save a huge amount of weight, put in a rear gunner. Couple of 20's in the wings and still have around 1,000lb for a payload.

Bingo a 300mph (clean), pretty agile GA plane. OK its no IL2 for taking damage but its a lot better than nothing which is basically what the RAF had for GA work.


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## Civettone (Mar 26, 2007)

Could just as well use the Hurricane for that...

Kris


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## Thorlifter (Mar 26, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Could just as well use the Hurricane for that...
> 
> Kris



Exactly! Good point Kris.


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## HealzDevo (Mar 27, 2007)

Yes, it made a good night-fighter while they were awaiting specialists aircraft to do the job...


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## Aggie08 (Mar 29, 2007)

Being a Defiant pilot is like winning ten cents in the lottery. You're a fighter pilot sure enough but you don't get to shoot anything.


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## Tony Williams (Mar 30, 2007)

The Defiant was designed on the assumption that it would only have to attack unescorted bombers. It was not envisaged that the Luftwaffe would have the use of French bases from which they could launch their fighter escorts.

In its intended role it would probably have been very effective. The Luftwaffe bombers of 1940 were actually very poorly armed, with only a small number of rifle-calibre guns, and they were hand-aimed, not mounted in powered turrets, which reduced their effectiveness quite considerably. 

The Defiant was not a bad plane; it just had to fight a war for which it wasn't designed, and the addition of fighter escorts for the bombers destroyed its rationale. It provides a lesson in the dangers of designing armament which is specialised for one particular scenario, but not much good for anything else.


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## HealzDevo (Apr 1, 2007)

Yes, it did. I suppose it formed a good temporary night-fighter until the RAF could pull its finger out and get their beaufighters with radar online. It was not bad but it was just caught up by events. However, if the RAF had switched it to night attack earlier it could have provided a building up of night tactics that could have proved useful earlier in stopping Luftwaffe night visits...


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## merlin (Jun 23, 2007)

Firstly, to answer the orginal question regarding forward firing of the turreted machine-guns.
I quote from Tony Buttler's 'British Secret Projests: Fighters Bombers' p.52
"Boulton and Paul P.82
This project had a completely rotating turret behind the pilot's cockpit fitted with four 0.303in(7.7mm) Browning machine guns, which covered a field of fire equal to nearly the whole of the upper hemishere. Firing forward over the airscrew and backward and alongside the rudder was made possible by retracting local portions of fairing fore and aft of the turret."
It can be seen from this that use of any 'interupter gear' to protect the propeller was irrelevant.

Secondly, in reply to Civettone's comment on the P.94, I again I quote p.55/56 :
Boulton Paul P.94
Prototype Defiant K8320 eventually had its turret removed and in August 1940 was flown as an unarmed flying demonstrator for a fixed-gun version called P.94, which was intended for rapid production using many complete Defiant components. The P.94 had the turret replaced by twelve 0.303in (7.7mm)Brwning machine guns disposed in each side of the wing centre section in nests of six.
P.94 had a 1,100 hp (820kW) Merlin XX which offered a maximum speed of 360mph (579km/h) at 21,700 ft (6,614m), a sea level rate of climb of 3,235ft/min and would get the aircraft to 25,000ft in 8.1 minutes.
Some 'stopgap aircraft'. A vast improvement over the Defiant's performance of 304mph! 
Yet Tony states: "In April 1940 the Air Council agreed that, as an operational type, the Defiant had entered service two years too late and was thus verging on obsolescence."
Yes, in late August and September, the problem in the Battle of Britain was the shortage of pilots, but it seems to me the 'window of opportunity' was there for the P.94 to be available at the start, and what's more - with that performance to join with the Spifires in combating the 109's.
And who knows if there were enough of them, maybe the surplus Hurricanes may have been converted to hurri-bombers in time for the invasion !!


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## Graeme (Jun 23, 2007)

Worthwhile mentioning the Hawker Hotspur. Designed to the same specification F.9/35.

Hawker Hotspur - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Flew some ten months after the Defiant. Compared with the Defiant the Hotspur was somewhat smaller and lighter and, when fitted with a similar Merlin, proved to be faster by about a dozen miles per hour.
Four gun turret *PLUS* a single forward firing Vickers gun.
However the Hotspur was considered by Camm more as an insurance against any unforeseen difficulties with the Hurricane. Never happened.

Regarding the purpose of the Defiant. Francis Mason in 'The British fighter' mentions that the Defiant was introduced to replace the Hawker Demon. The trouble with the Specification lay not so much in the constantly changing requirements but in the conflicting views as to whether the two-seat interceptor had any place at all in the fighter defence system, for it should be recalled the the Demon had only been introduced with one purpose in mind - that of intercepting it's related light bomber version, the Hart. Such an aircraft posed no strategic threat to Britain and the manner in which Boulton Paul and Hawker interpreted the requirement brought forth aeroplanes that were hopelessly inept.


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## Catch22 (Jun 23, 2007)

Aggie08 said:


> Being a Defiant pilot is like winning ten cents in the lottery. You're a fighter pilot sure enough but you don't get to shoot anything.



I think it's more that you have to pay the lottery company 10 cents.


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## bomber (Jun 25, 2007)

Wildblue1972 said:


> It does beg the question though, if the people who came up with the idea for the Defiant could see the hazards of a blindspot on a bomber's defences, why wasn't more done to provide bristish bombers with better all round defences?



The simple answer is it wasn't required...

It's not a design flaw in British bombers that they didn't have ball turrets.. One might think that they'd feel safer having a ball turret, possibly 2 waist gunners, an observers gun, maybe 2 chin guns... but then you'd have the B17.. and you'd also feel safer with an elastic band wrapped around your wrist, your lucky underpants on and a small teddy in your flight jacket...

The facts are the ball turret fired bugger all rounds and the visibility was wowfull... the noise it make might be comforting mind..

I'm not against a ball turret in the B17 and B24, it's position and weight helps to 'anchor' the CoG of the plane within correct tollerances whilst at the same time allowing more 0.5" ammo for the tail turret.. Also bear in mind how much futher forward the upper turret is on a B17/B24 so far forward it's in front to the verticle datum line this helps massively with the design descision to include a ball turret... It might actually have been the case that without a ball turret, ballast would have to have been fitted (this is a guess) to maintain the planes correct handling characteristics, and it's better to fit a gun surely...

Consider the position of the upper turret on the early B24's without ball turrets used by the RAF.

On the subject of the defiants turret I'm not sure it was a complete failure as a mossie prototype with a similiar turret was built... even if this was rejected it shows that there were 'pros' and well as 'cons' to be considered.

Regards

Simon


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## Glider (Jun 25, 2007)

I think its fair to say that there was nothing wrong with the Defiants Turret, just that it was designed to carry one limiting its adaptability. There was no excuse on behalf of the RAF command over this waste of men and resources. The most successful two man fighter of all time, the The Bristol Fighter of WW1 didn't do all well until the pilots learnt to stop trying to position the plane for the rear gunner and fight it like a normal fighter. Leaving the rear gunner to keep the tail clear and take what oppertunities arose. By giving the Defiant no front guns they made it useless for day fighting.
Its also worth remembering that Wellingtons, Lancasters and Halifax's were designed with a ventral turret, they just didn't work.


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## HealzDevo (Jun 26, 2007)

Ok, fascinating look at history. What do you think about that fact that if the Defiant had been shifted to Night-Fighting role earlier it might have prevented more of the earlier German night raids on England? Would it have been successful at that or just as bad...


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## Glider (Jun 27, 2007)

Nightfighting depends on Radar. They may have shot down one or two more German bombers but they still would have been stumbling around in the dark and had little impact overall.


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## bomber (Jun 27, 2007)

I agree with Glider on this... 

I expect the losses due to ground crashes would have outweighed the numbers of enemy shot down.....

reading up on it nightflying scared the pants off of pilots.

Simon


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## The Basket (Jun 27, 2007)

One pilot who flew the Defiant said it was a good flying machine. But the turret idea was its downfall. He said that it could have made a fine ground attack platform without the turret but bad showing in the BoB ruined its reputation.

Also the Wilde Sau missions didn't have airborne radar so it is possible to be effective without.


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## Glider (Jun 27, 2007)

I doubt that Wilde Sau would have really worked over the UK in 1940. To really work well the ground needed to be a sea of flame for the bombers to be seen against and a large number of bombers needed to be in the sky at more or less the same time.
German Bomber raids were a lot smaller than the British night raids normally in the dozens, not hundreds and were spread out over a long time.


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## Marcel (Jun 27, 2007)

The wilde Sau was also not so very effective, only succeeded a few times, but most of the time it was a failure. Just a stopgap when the germans needed all to stem the tide.


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## The Basket (Jun 27, 2007)

TBH I do have a soft spot for the Defiant. Not a bad aircraft but never made the team. The concept was outdated and never worked in battle. But the turretless was faster than a Hurricane and may have made a grand attacker in the North African desert.

Maybe there were better places for a RR Merlin.


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## Downwind.Maddl-Land (Aug 29, 2007)

The Defiant wasn’t a bad aeroplane; it was just misused, as there were no alternatives and desperate times called for desperate measures. If, as it was intended, it had been used in conjunction with other fighters (eg Hurricanes and Spitfires) it could be extremely effective.

The Defiant’s ‘hour of glory’ came on 29 May 1940, when it was employed correctly. Twelve Defiants of 264 Sqn headed for Dunkirk at relatively low altitude looking for bombers while Nos 56, 151 213 Sqns of Hurricanes flew top cover. The formation was attacked by Bf 109s and 6 109s penetrated to the Defiants where 3 of them were shot down by the Defiants and a further 1 damaged; 1 Defiant was damaged and the gunner bailed out, but was lost in the English Channel. The aircraft did make it back to England, the pilot safe. 264 pressed on to the beaches and attacked He 111s. During this meleé a formation of Ju 87s and Bf 110s was spotted and the 110s attacked the Defiants with little effect. During this battle I understand 7 x 110s were claimed, as well as 4 more 109s and a Ju 87.

The same afternoon 264 returned to Dunkirk, again escorted by Hurricanes and, again, were intercepted by 109s. A ‘bitter battle’ ensued between the Hurricanes and the 109s but the Hurricanes kept the 109s off the Defiants, allowing the Defiants to attack a large formation of Ju 87s that were striking the beaches. A one sided running battle developed just above the waves as the Defiants did what they were designed for - attacking bombers. It was a Turkey Shoot for the Defiants; one team (Plt Off Cooke Plt Off Kay) claimed 5 Ju 87s by engaging the bombers from underneath and firing into the unprotected bellies of the Stukas – a foretaste of Sträge Musik? 264 then ‘went’ for a formation of Ju 88s. At the end of the day 264 claimed: 8 x 109s, 9 x 110s, 19 x Ju 87s, 1 x Ju 88 and another 3 ‘probables’.

This record (OK, the claims were over the top, but that always happens) shows what the Defiant could achieve when employed correctly with top cover to ward off the escorting fighters and aggressive leadership; the OC 264 (Sqn Ldr Hunter) was revered by his crews evidently.

The above shows that if ever an aircraft should have been employed in Bader’s Big Wing, it was the Defiant – although the reaction of ‘Himself’ is best left to the imagination! If 264 and 141 had been part of the Duxford wing with 3 other Hurricane/Spitfire Sqns they could have made a positive contribution to the Battle, without becoming the sacrificial lambs they were, when used in isolation within 11 Gp. It just goes to show that there are Horses for Courses. Acknowledgements to Alec Brew, author of ‘The Defiant File’.


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## trackend (Aug 29, 2007)

Never knew that, good post DW.


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## Downwind.Maddl-Land (Aug 29, 2007)

Sqn Ldr Hunter also flew in mock combat against a Spitfire of 65 Sqn flown by one Flg Off Tuck! Hunter flew on a course from Northolt to White Waltham (I lived at both those places during my Service career!) and Tuck attacked when and how he liked. Hunter went into a steep turn followed by the Spitfire. In an engagement that lasted 10 minutes, the Defiant gunner expended all his cine film, but Tuck expended none as he could not bring his sights to bear. He was often able to turn inside the Defiant but this only enabled the gunner to fire on him across the arc. On one occasion Hunter managed to get on the tail of the Spitfire, slightly below so that the gunner could fire forward and upwards. This engagement showed that a well-flown Defiant, which circled when attacked by a single seat fighter could adequately defend itself, provided its speed did not drop below 160 mph, which usually involved a spiral dive. Again, acknowledgements to Alec Brew, author of ‘The Defiant File’.


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## Wildcat (Aug 29, 2007)

Very interesting. Were these trials done before or after the Defiants were withdrawn from frontline service?


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## Downwind.Maddl-Land (Aug 30, 2007)

Before; the inference is they were conducted during operational Work Up, while tatics were being developed for the new fighter.


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## TenGunTerror (Jun 30, 2009)

Yeah the Defiant's gun could be locked forward but I previously read that the gunners didn't like doing it because they couldn't protect the rear! It is very confusing when a plane is head on and you're worried about the tail...


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## nuuumannn (Nov 7, 2012)

Since the Daffy has arisen as a subject again, I thought I'd resurrect this thread rather than start a new one.

The fundamental problem facing the Defiant in the Battle of Britain was that there not very many of them. Only one squadron was ever in combat at any time and only two squadrons used the type as a day fighter; of those, 141 had one disastrous combat, which has been covered elsewhere, so it was kept out of the fight for further day fighter use.

During the battle, the highest number lost in one combat was six, which isn't that high, but when you consider that only nine were airborne at that time, it's a big percentage. Six aircraft lost of a squadron of 12 is fifty percent of squadron strength gone, which on paper is unsustainable. By comparison that figure was often reached and exceeded by Spitfire and Hurricane - and indeed in Luftwaffe squadrons. If there were more Defiant units, the losses suffered - as small in number as they actually were - would not have seemed so excessive compared to the number of aircraft in action.

Another aspect worth considering was the number of combats the Defiant took part in. Not as many as might be thought - they certainly weren't being sent up every day.

We'll go into this at a later time... gotta go feed the chickens...


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## nuuumannn (Nov 8, 2012)

Chooks are fed!

Total number of days on which the Defiant engaged in combat between May 1940 and end of August was eight, although on a couple of these days 264 Sqn took off and landed to re-arm and refuel before getting airborne again. By the end of May 264 Sqn had flown 174 sorties and claimed a total of 65 enemy aircraft for the loss of 14 Defiants. Obviously the e/a claims are exaggerated due to the excitement of the time.

A total of 32 Defiants were shot down on day operations. During the Battle of Britain proper the Defiant entered into four engagements with the enemy and 18 aircraft were lost; six in one engagement from 141 Sqn on the 19th July (a seventh crashed on return after being shot up but was subsequently repaired). That leaves 264 Sqn losing 11 aircraft in three combats.

(These figures from The Defiant File by Alec Brew)

As can be seen, these are not high figures and even bearing in mind the production output of Boulton Paul were not unsustaineable losses.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 8, 2012)

Regarding the Defiant's turret, it was an excellent piece of machinery. Designed in France by an engineer called de Boysson it was first built by Societé d' Application des Machines Matrices (SAMM), who granted BP a licence to produce it. For its time the SAMM turret was considerably advanced. Powered by the aircraft's electrical system via slip rings fitted in the base of the rotating section of the turret, its movement was actuated by a self contained hydraulic pump. Equipped with 600 rounds per gun, its most novel feature was its single-handed operation via a single joystick. Extensively applied in British bombers during and after the war, all Boulton Paul's turrets were based on the technology of the original SAMM electro-hydraulic unit. Although heavier and more complex to maintain than their contemporaries, the BP turrets were more sophisticated and easier to manipulate, however. Being self contained, they could continue operating even if essential services aboard the bomber had been disabled, which proved to be a big advantage in combat.

In service the turret's biggest drawback was access, which was done by rotating it 90º. Bailing out was via a door in the bottom of the rear fuselage, which the gunner had to wriggle himself into from the turret, a feat almost impossible for any normal sized human being. Consequently, in action Defiant gunners got themselves out the same way as they got in. 

Although the gun turret could fire forward under control of the pilot via a push-button trigger on his spade-grip joystick, the guns' minimum elevation pointing forward was 19° and he did not have a gun sight.


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## Glider (Nov 8, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> Chooks are fed!
> 
> Total number of days on which the Defiant engaged in combat between May 1940 and end of August was eight, although on a couple of these days 264 Sqn took off and landed to re-arm and refuel before getting airborne again. By the end of May 264 Sqn had flown 174 sorties and claimed a total of 65 enemy aircraft for the loss of 14 Defiants. Obviously the e/a claims are exaggerated due to the excitement of the time.
> 
> ...



I think we are going to have to agree to disagree as to the high losses. 174 sorties and 14 losses is a loss rate of 8% and note that those are sorties, presuamably a number of those did not involve combat which sends the loss ratio through the roof.

Regarding its use as a fighter, fighters are there to attack the enemy. Having one tactic that might work when defending yourself doesn't help you attack anything. 

The Defiant was slow, had a poor climb and had to rely on a defending bomber being very docile. At the end of 1939 I get the feeling that Dowding was very unsure as to the success that could be expected.

The CO of 264 was very reluctant to follow the official line, that the combat trials were not considered by the RAF to be representative and doubts were being raised in Jan 1940 as to how well it would do in day fighting. In view of what happened I can only say that the doubters were right to doubt


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## yulzari (Nov 8, 2012)

A part of the turret fighter concept that is usually overlooked is that of 'no deflection' shooting whereby the sight and the line of fire coincide (Google 'no deflection'). The reason for the Defiant turret being able to lock it's guns forward was to be that the pilot could use them in this mode (in conjunction with a suitable sight and training). Hence the pilot's firing button.

Sadly the concept got lost in the RAF works and pilot's were never advised nor trained in it. The only squadron to (on the commander's initiative) devise, experiment and practice unique procedures to maximise Defiant offensive and defensive manoeuvres was far more successful but the advice fell on deaf ears.

In effect the Defiant was possessed of both a 4 gun powered turret that could outgun a contemporary bomber from any direction and in concert with other Defiants, together with a fixed forward firing 4 gun battery. Hence there was no need to allow for wing guns. Boulton Paul were well aware of the weakness in a 4 x .303 battery and were working on a 20mm turret that would allow Defiants to lob 20mm HE shells at bombers from outside their defensive range.

Hindsight tells us that the Defiant was a good answer but to the wrong question. However, a well trained crew, practiced in the full use of the aeroplane, was able to both defend itself and attack contemporary bombers; but few were ever so fortunate and all lacked the vital pilot gunsight. With the no deflection gunsight and proper training I suspect we might have been talking of the Defiant as the 'Bristol Fighter of the Battle of Britain'.

The subject of pilot shortage has been touched on above and was genuine. However, there was a need for pilots to be available to attack invasion barges (and Bomber Command gets too little credit for their channel port bombing) and to attack the invasion itself. The crews of target tugs, training instructors, pilot trained ground staff, army cooperations, communication flights etc. were only allowed to be dribbled into Fighter Command so that an invasion could be met with hundreds of bombing aeroplanes. Even if they might range from Battles and Blenheims through Harts, Wallaces, Henleys, Oxfords to Tiger Moths to give a very uncomprehensive list. I have known an ex-target tug pilot who, with his colleagues, was consistently refused permission to transfer to Fighter Command as his Wallace would be needed as a bomber should there be a German invasion.

Commonwealth pilot training was the real jewel in the crown of the air war. Other than in the first year of the war, aircrew training generally exceeded demand and training programmes were scarcely ever reduced and were generally made to increasingly higher standards. The late war shortfall was in infantry and tank crews due to WW1 type losses in the fighting from Normandy to Germany through northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands. By 1945 the losses meant that even excess aircrew in training were reroled into infantry and serious consideration was given to reducing coal output to release conscripted miners for infantry training. After 6 years of war Britain was simply running out of young men to fill regiments in NW Europe, Italy, Greece and Burma whilst maintaining a Navy across 3 oceans and the Arctic, never mind a huge air force.

In contrast we can see the quality of aircrew declining for the German and Japanese air forces as they devoted too little resources to training so the fighting equipment they made was wasted on the new aircrew and one can see it was the experienced ones who were the only effectives users.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 8, 2012)

> The CO of 264 was very reluctant to follow the official line, that the combat trials were not considered by the RAF to be representative and doubts were being raised in Jan 1940 as to how well it would do in day fighting. In view of what happened I can only say that the doubters were right to doubt.



Yep, you are absolutely right, they were right to doubt; the thing is, the Defiant was not designed for the purpose of attacking single seat fighters, but it was employed in that role. Hence my comment about misappropriation of resources in another thread. Yet, despite a couple of bad days (264 Sqn suffered six shot down on one day too, but no lesson was learned) the Defiant continued to be used in a role it was not designed for. Clearly as these documents show, there was doubt about its speed in the face of the enemy, yet apart from Sqn Ldr Hunter's efforts, nothing was done officially to change its tactical use in the battle. This is not the fault of the aircraft, as obvious as that statement is.

Bearing this in mind, the Defiant did not do anywhere near as badly as is always assumed. Your statement of "loss rates through the roof" is a bit of an exaggeration considering only 14 aircraft were lost in combat in those 174 sorties, regardless if they were all combat sorties or not. Read my earlier post; on papr it looks worse than actual numbers suggest, but 14 lost in a month is not comparitively high losses at that time. As a percentage of a single squadron, yep - looks real bad on paper.

Yes, I agree with you that the Defiant should not have been used in the roles it was, convoy escort, standing patrols, yet, throughout the time it was - that is the fault of Fighter Command for ignoring the signs i.e. your documents - especially the last line of the January one! My second point is that losses of Defiants were not as high numerically as assumed by comparison to other types and the type fared better than you give it credit for. Yes it was slower than single seat fighters, but no more vulnerable than any other fighter if the tactics 264 Sqn employed were used. Actual combat proves that.

Regarding Sqn Ldr Hunter's reluctance to follow the official line - why would he? the tactics Defiant crews were trained to use against bombers clearly wouldn't work against fighters! His actions saved the lives of his squadron mates! Almost all RAF pre-war tactics were found wanting once the shooting started - squadrons were left to their own devices to adopt tactics based on their experiences, this is why Sailor Malan put out his Ten Rules of Air Fighting; this wasn't an edict from up above, this was a commander concerned about the high losses his troops were suffering. Again, the reason why RAF units adopted the Finger Four formation was because combat experience that proved that the Vic formation was unwieldy. This is also why indidivual airmen synchronised their guns to meet at a much closer range than what was officially specified and fitted armour plating behind their seats. These didn't come from official sources. 

There was no substitute for experience; Hunter was smart to trial these tactics - wouldn't you if you were in his position? They were employed in combat and proved successful - no better endorsement than that. 141 Sqn's CO refused to listen to Hunter when they met after the squadron was declared operational in May 1940 and it cost him and his squadron dearly.

As for that January document, as you are well aware, interception speeds need to be high, but combat descends and speed bleeds off - the Defiant proved on a number of occasions that it could successfully intercept and destroy unescorted bombers by day - the role it was designed for. On 27 May 1940 264 Sqn encountered a formation of 12 He 111s and shot down three of them and damaged a fourth without loss to the Defiants.

Interesting documents though Glider, thanks for sharing. Since I am in New Zealand it's kind of hard for me to gain access to material about the Defiant from official sources. I am keen to get hold of documents that outline when and why (yes, I know why, but offically) the Daffy squadrons were withdrawn from day ops.


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## Glider (Nov 8, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> Yep, you are absolutely right, they were right to doubt; the thing is, the Defiant was not designed for the purpose of attacking single seat fighters, but it was employed in that role. Hence my comment about misappropriation of resources in another thread. Yet, despite a couple of bad days (264 Sqn suffered six shot down on one day too, but no lesson was learned) the Defiant continued to be used in a role it was not designed for. Clearly as these documents show, there was doubt about its speed in the face of the enemy, yet apart from Sqn Ldr Hunter's efforts, nothing was done officially to change its tactical use in the battle. This is not the fault of the aircraft, as obvious as that statement is.


The problem we have is that the role of the Defiant was to fight fighters and bombers, in combat you cannot pick and choose as the bombers are escorted by fighters.


> Bearing this in mind, the Defiant did not do anywhere near as badly as is always assumed. Your statement of "loss rates through the roof" is a bit of an exaggeration considering only 14 aircraft were lost in combat in those 174 sorties, regardless if they were all combat sorties or not. Read my earlier post; on papr it looks worse than actual numbers suggest, but 14 lost in a month is not comparitively high losses at that time. As a percentage of a single squadron, yep - looks real bad on paper.


I dont think my comment was an exageration. 14 losses in 174 sorties is an 8% loss ratio and that is very high. If as is likely some of those sorties didn't involve combat, then the loss rate would be through the roof.
Look at it another way Many RAF squadrons flew three missions a day. Assume 12 planes a mission you would lose the squadron in a week at an 8% loss rate. 


> Yes, I agree with you that the Defiant should not have been used in the roles it was, convoy escort, standing patrols


This is where we disagree, any fighter in the front line had to face anything that came its way. You cannot and should not pick and choose. In theory the Hurricane was targeted against the Bombers but they fought fighters as often as they fought bombers. 



> ,My second point is that losses of Defiants were not as high numerically as assumed by comparison to other types and the type fared better than you give it credit for. Yes it was slower than single seat fighters, but no more vulnerable than any other fighter if the tactics 264 Sqn employed were used. Actual combat proves that.


Losses for Defiants were much higher than Hurricane or Spitfire squadrons in a percentage of losses vs sorties. Actual combat proved that.



> Regarding Sqn Ldr Hunter's reluctance to follow the official line - why would he? the tactics Defiant crews were trained to use against bombers clearly wouldn't work against fighters! His actions saved the lives of his squadron mates! Almost all RAF pre-war tactics were found wanting once the shooting started - squadrons were left to their own devices to adopt tactics based on their experiences, this is why Sailor Malan put out his Ten Rules of Air Fighting; this wasn't an edict from up above, this was a commander concerned about the high losses his troops were suffering. Again, the reason why RAF units adopted the Finger Four formation was because combat experience that proved that the Vic formation was unwieldy. This is also why indidivual airmen synchronised their guns to meet at a much closer range than what was officially specified and fitted armour plating behind their seats. These didn't come from official sources.


Small point but the official tactic for the Defiant was to use them in groups of four. It was the Squadron Leader who insisted on flights of three.


> Interesting documents though Glider, thanks for sharing. Since I am in New Zealand it's kind of hard for me to gain access to material about the Defiant from official sources. I am keen to get hold of documents that outline when and why (yes, I know why, but offically) the Daffy squadrons were withdrawn from day ops.


I attach the combat trials which I hope you find of interest, I also hope you can read then because they are dreadful copies.


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## CobberKane (Nov 8, 2012)

Irrespective of whether the Defiant was misused or did not perform so badly as is commonly believed, I think the whole concept of the turret fighter was fatally limited. Initially it seems that the Defiant had some success against enemy fighters when they were mistaken for Hurricanes but once the LW figured out what was going on the only option for the turret fighter was to go onto the defensive. Obviously then the Defiant was useless against fighters in any offensive capacity.
Against unescorted bombers the Defiant had some success but it is worth noting that the bombers it shot down were slow and poorly armed – D0-17s and Ju87s for the most part. Against turret equipped bombers the Defiant’s tactics would have amounted to a match-up of firepower and durability, like a couple of man’o’wars duking it out at Trafalgar. The bomber would generally have won. 
About the best gloss that could be put on the Defiant is that it could be effective against slow, lightly armed and unescorted bombers and that with the right tactics it could defend itself against fighters, though it could not take the offensive against them. That’s a pretty narrow job description, and one that could be filled at least as well by single seat fighters which were also more economical in terms of money and lives, able to intercept faster, better armed bombers and able take the offensive against enemy fighters as well.


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## buffnut453 (Nov 8, 2012)

I don't think anyone's arguing that the Defiant concept was a smart idea. Indeed, it was an entirely flawed product of interwar thinking and mis-application of lessons from WWI. One of the reasons it was developed was the belief that enemy fighters would not reach the British Isles, an assumption that was entirely valid...right up to the point where France fell, which brought the Luftwaffe's operating bases much closer to the UK. None of this should take away from the fact that the tactics developed by Hunter made the most of a bad situation, indeed he deserves much credit for his leadership and tactical acumen.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 8, 2012)

Thank you Buffnut, very well put. 264 Sqn made the best of an awkward situation; yes, the turret fighter concept was flawed, but didn't they do well all things considered!

The Battle of Britain was about numbers; FC heads counted the German bombers and fighters and allocated their squadrons accordingly. The Defiant's strengths and weakenesses were well known, yet nothing was done to pull them out of harm's way. Documents provided by Glider prove that there were questions asked about whether it was able to cope, but nothing was done. 264 proved in combat that the type could and did do well against determined opposition. Getting rid of them before they had proven themselves in combat would have reduced the number of available units - this might also answer why the type was kept as a fighter until August 1940. That decision was a knee jerk reaction to circumstance - as I stated in another thread.

Here's a possible scenario. Take the _bomber destroyer _off fighter duties - standing patrols, convoy escort etc (it's not about picking and choosing - my point was that there was clearly weaknesses identified with the type yet the Daffy was STILL used in these roles) and away from single-seat fighter opposition and place it in the North of England and Scotland at places like Prestwick where 141 Sqn went to recouperate, or Drem and Turnhouse, near Edinburgh (where 264 was sent to recouperate) where it can effectively be used against bombers flying from Norway. By doing this squadrons of Spits and Hurris based at these airfields, 602 was based at Drem in late 39 early 40 but moved to Westhampnett (satellite to Tangmere) by August 1940, 603 at Turrrnhoose (now Edinburgh Airport) for example, can be moved to 11 Group airfields, thereby increasing the number of units operating types more suitable for the fighter role.



> Initially it seems that the Defiant had some success against enemy fighters when they were mistaken for Hurricanes but once the LW figured out what was going on the only option for the turret fighter was to go onto the defensive.



Cobber, you've been misled - such a thing is popular myth. This is the work of the RAF's official scribe of the Battle of Britain and has been constantly repeated by authors since. The Defiants was not initially misidentified by the Germans (how could the British know this at that time?!), evidence proves this in that before 264 Sqn's Big Day (37 e/a _claimed_ without loss), the day identified as when the Germans misidentifed the Daffys as Hurricanes, Defiants were attacked by Bf 109s in numbers over Holland where the Daffys suffered. They knew about the turret, no denying that. Also on that day, the Defiants attacked the Germans, not the other way round.

As for the claim that losses to Daffys were slower types, the first aircraft shot down by a Defiant was a Ju 88 on 12 May 1940! More was to follow. On the 24th August four Ju 88s were claimed and another damaged by 264 Sqn. Elsewhere I have given examples of He 111s being attacked without loss to the Defiants, and even on 29 May 264 Sqn claimed Bf 110s and a single Ju 88.

Later combats in August 1940 show that the Defiants were not solely on the deffensive as popular myth would have you believe - 24th August the day Sqn Ldr Hunter went missing, 264 was scrambled to intercept a formation of Ju 88s attacking Manston when they were attacked by the bomber's escorts. 

In every combat 264 Sqn entered into in August 1940 they were scrambled to attack formations of bombers and escort fighters and in every one of those combats, the RAF fighters were attacked by largely superior numbers of enemy escort fighters; on the 26th for example the 12 Do 17s and 40 He 111s were escorted by no less than 80 Bf 109s and '110s. 



> the official tactic for the Defiant was to use them in groups of four.


 Small point, this was to attack bombers, not fighters. A 'Flight' was three a/c based on the Vic formation, which fighter pilots were trained to fly.



> Many RAF squadrons flew three missions a day. Assume 12 planes a mission you would lose the squadron in a week at an 8% loss rate.


 Yep, but actual combat shows that the actual loss figures (NOT percentages - and at any rate, the same percentage of losses on one combat op would not necessarily be suffered on another - actual combat proves this) suffered by Defiants were not significant by comparison to other types. I can post figures of Spitfire and Hurricane combat losses in the month of August by Squadron to prove my point.

Thanks for the documents Glider, very interesting.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 8, 2012)

Lots of words, Guys; my angle is that the turret fighter was flawed, we are all in agreement about that. I'm not defending the concept, I'm defending the aircraft built to fulfill that role. There are many myths published about the Defiant that actual experience proves are wrong. The vision of Defiants falling out of the sky in numbers every time they got airborne is a fallacy; actual combat and my figures prove that without a doubt. I believe it simply does not deserve the bad reputation it has.

In fact we are all in agreement about many aspects of the Defiant and its use as a day fighter, but the exercise from my point of view is to dispell the myths - sort out the fact from fantasy.


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## CobberKane (Nov 8, 2012)

When I said the Defiant’s had to go on the defensive when attacked by enemy fighters I was referring to the Luffberry circle that seemed to work well for them, but ceded all initiative to the enemy. I wouldn’t call being intercepted by a bomber escort and example of the defiant being used offensively against fighters Likewise the example of the Defiant being flown against Spitfire – it demonstrated that it could defend against a single seat fighterwhen expertly flown but it didn’t demonstrate it could attack one. If would be interesting to know how mant if any of the Defiant victories over fighters came about from circumstances other than the single seat fighter makiing the boo-boo of initiating and ttack from behind. But at the end of the day it sounds like we are all pretty much on the same page re the Defiant’s place in history, anyway. 
I’m a little reminded of the a recent thread where someone pointed out that the Bf110 had a better kill/loss ratio than any other BoB. On paper you might call it the most successful fighter of the battle, but in practice it succeeded by only attacking whenever the odds were heavily in its favour and otherwise avoiding combat – not an ideal way to win air superiority!


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## Glider (Nov 9, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> As for the claim that losses to Daffys were slower types, the first aircraft shot down by a Defiant was a Ju 88 on 12 May 1940! More was to follow. On the 24th August four Ju 88s were claimed and another damaged by 264 Sqn. Elsewhere I have given examples of He 111s being attacked without loss to the Defiants, and even on 29 May 264 Sqn claimed Bf 110s and a single Ju 88.


On the 24th August the Defiants claimed four but shot down one, whilst losing over three days twelve Defiants.



> Yep, but actual combat shows that the actual loss figures (NOT percentages - and at any rate, the same percentage of losses on one combat op would not necessarily be suffered on another - actual combat proves this) suffered by Defiants were not significant by comparison to other types. I can post figures of Spitfire and Hurricane combat losses in the month of August by Squadron to prove my point.


Clearly we disagree over this and I would appreciate your figures over the August Losses plus the sortie rate. After all 14 fighters in a month is not excessive but if you stay on the ground most of the time, it is excessive. 174 sorties would equate to about 15 missions over the month.


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## Juha (Nov 9, 2012)

IIRC Mason in his Battle over Britain notes that while Defiants claimed during Battle of France 65 enemy a/c they in fact shot down only 12 - 16. So their kill ratio was in reality appr. 1:1 (14 losses), not very good for a fighter whose victims were mostly bombers and dive-bombers, many of them unescorted.

And thanks to Nuuumannn and Glider for their very informative posts! 
 
@Glider do you have NA signums for the docus you posted in style of AIR...

Juha


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## Glider (Nov 9, 2012)

I am afraid not.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 10, 2012)

Hello Glider, haven't forgotten about those figures, will post soon, just a bit held up with other things right now. They are taken from the book Battle of Britain Then and Now (a fairly accurate source) and cover losses in combat by squadron over the month of August but not sortie rates of those squadrons (sorry). I'm researching RAF losses in that period and thought people might be interested if I posted them.

As for the figures of Defiant kills over the posts, I've deliberately stuck to what 264 Sqn claimed rather than actual kills since at the time that's what was believed had been shot down. Obviously the number of aircraft shot down by the squadrons was going to be lower once post war research goes into action. My reason for this is that the men of 264 Sqn, despite what happened to 141 Sqn, did not believe they were at any disadvantage to any other unit and were dismayed by the decision to go onto night duties. This is despite the loss of Sqn Ldr Hunter four days after their last day combat.

Yes, Cobber, you are right; the Lufbery circle was a desperate measure, but it proved to work to the Defiant's advantage. Sqn Ldr Hunter was a smart man to employ it.



> but in practice it succeeded by only attacking whenever the odds were heavily in its favour and otherwise avoiding combat – not an ideal way to win air superiority!



That's a pertinent point, but its pretty hard to expect to win air superiority with only 12 Defiants against 30 or more Bf 109s!


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## Glider (Nov 11, 2012)

No urgency about the figures, take your time and thanks for the effort, its appreciated


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## Juha (Nov 11, 2012)

Hello Nuuumannn
Have you seen John Alcorn's survey on the claims and real victories of the British fighter sqns during the BoB, I mean the 2nd and better one? It must be taken with a grain of salt because much of the results were based on Circumstancial, Statistical Credit, but still interesting. It was published in July 2000 Aeroplane.According to him 141 Sqn claimed 3, of which he credits one to the sqn and lost 6 a/c, 264 15.5 claims of which he credits 8 to the sqn and 10 losses.

Juha


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## 61fury (Nov 12, 2012)

If they were designed as bomber attackers were they ever escorted by "real" fighters to provide cover?


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## Edgar Brooks (Nov 12, 2012)

Cover against what? The only expected threat, as well as bombers, came from the Me110, and the Spitfire and Hurricane were expected to deal with them, without trouble. 
As always, in these discussions, 20:20 hindsight is allowed to colour the debate. There was never a thought that France would be defeated, and single-seat fighters would be within easy reach of these shores, so the Defiant was designed to meet a threat from massed bomber formations, possibly with twin-engined fighter escorts, and the drawn-up planned attacks (from alongside, in front, and underneath) reflected this thinking. 
It's very easy, with the accumulated knowledge of 72 years, to mock 1930s planning, but, just occasionally, try putting yourselves into the 1930s, and anticipating the future; when Dowding demanded armour plate, for his pilots, Sholto-Douglas refused it for the Spitfire, because, as far as he was concerned, there was nothing faster than the Spitfire, and only an incompetent pilot would allow anyone to get behind him. Again, no expectation of combat with the Me109.
Once the invasion of France began, and the BEF needed fighter cover, the Defiant was thrown into a situation for which it was never designed, and many men died because of it.


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 12, 2012)

"... There was never a thought that France would be defeated ....".

Not like _that _hadn't happened - repeatedly - over the years, EB 

MM


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## Edgar Brooks (Nov 12, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> Not like _that _hadn't happened - repeatedly - over the years, EB


Didn't happen in WWI, though, and, on paper, at least, their armed forces were no weaker in the 1930s.


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## stona (Nov 12, 2012)

France was considered the pre-eminent military power on the European mainland in the 1930s. Her defeat would have seemed almost inconceivable to 1930s military planners. 

There is a famous film of Hitler literally skipping for joy following the fall of France in 1940. He could scarcely have believed it himself.

Steve


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 13, 2012)

".... France was considered the pre-eminent military power on the European mainland in the 1930s."

They obviously believed their own propaganda and defense spending stats --- I have no doubt that your statement is true Stona but - in reality - the Soviet forces were probably in better overall disposition -- before the Purge, of course. The Soviets had joint-trained with Weimar Germany in facilities funded in Russia by the Weimar Republic.

The 1930's was a very delusional period IMHO ...

"... Didn't happen in WWI, though,"

ONE swallow a summer does not make, EB. 

MM


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## Shortround6 (Nov 13, 2012)

It was always _iffy_ if Russia was considered part of the European mainland from a political or economic view point, no matter what the geography says. Is Turkey European or mid-eastern? 

It may have been patronizing or false pride but France had been considered the premier Continental land power since Napoleon. 

People tended to count bayonets, guns, and tanks without asking if the troops were trained, if there were spare parts or adequate stocks of ammo let alone if the weapon designs were actually any good.


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## Edgar Brooks (Nov 13, 2012)

michaelmaltby;955637
"... Didn't happen in WWI said:


> It does, here, when you see how much rain it has to dodge.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 14, 2012)

> the Defiant was thrown into a situation for which it was never designed, and many men died because of it.



...and as I've said before the thing was about numbers. Having the Defiant there doing what it did was considered better than not having it at all. What I'd really like to find out was the documentation that covers the decision to put 264 and 141 Sqn onto night duties only by the higher ups. It'd make interesting reading considering the Defiant's issues were known from early on. I'd also like to get hold of 264 Sqn ORB for the time.

Another thing we also forget about the thinking in between the wars is that 20 years earlier from the beginning of WW2 the worst war in history had just been waged and for many families a generation had been lost. The pain that everyone had felt over the Great War still lingered and manifested itself in defence thinking in every country. Lessons had been learned, but above all there would have been the consideration of how to reduce the scale of human loss. The maintenance of peace was the priority in Britain. Peace at any cost - no one wanted to go through the hell on earth that WW1 was again. Chamberlain was very keen for peace and he sincerely believed he had secured it, but when he had to declare war on 3 September it was the hardest thing he ever had to do. Was there anyone who really wanted to go to war in 1939?

Just imagine, there must have been so many people in Europe who were flabbergasted by the Nazis and their invasions of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland so soon after the Great War and its horrors. People who were youngsters during the war and who had survvived it had to contemplate sending their children off to fight? The impact of the Great War also explains the disarray in France after invasion by Germany to a certain degree.


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