# Kongo and Haruna



## renrich (Jun 28, 2012)

I have read that the IJN BBs Kongo and Haruna were sent late in 1941 to the Malaya area to support landings there and to cope with any British capital ships in the area. The Repulse and Prince of Wales were sunk by Japanese air in that area. If those two had not been sunk and had encountered the Kongo and Haruna, an engagement between them would have featured four British designed dreadnoughts with three of them being built in England. Assuming equal amounts of escorts, in a surface engagement, which force would have most likely prevailed?


----------



## davebender (Jun 28, 2012)

KGV class battleship quad turrets were notorious for malfunctions. For instance HMS Prince of Wales turrets malfunctioned during the engagement with KM Bismarck. If they malfunction again the RN is going to be embarrassed when their state of the art battleship designed during 1935 gets blown out of the water by a pair of Japanese battlecruisers designed during 1910.

If POW main gun turrets function properly the ship should win this fight without breaking a sweat. 
- Newer model 14" guns more powerful then those on the pre-WWI Japanese BCs.
- POW is a battleship. It has much heavier armor then the Japanese battlecruisers.
- The 25 year newer POW has numerous detail improvements resulting from newer technology.

HMS Repulse.
A WWI era eggshell armed with hammers in the finest Jacky Fisher tradition. A WWII heavy cruiser armed with 8" main guns would stand a reasonable chance of shooting it to pieces. 

HMS POW is the more dangerous threat so it will probably attract most Japanese attention. If HMS POW main gun turrets function properly then HMS Repulse has little to worry about. Otherwise it is toast.


----------



## starling (Jun 28, 2012)

Hey guys,hope you don't mind me blundering in here.Concerning the H.M.S.Prince of Wales' guns and gunnery systems,I'd like to add that perhaps the gunnery of the H.M.S.Duke of York should be looked at during the battle of the north cape,it worked out just right for her.I think we should assume that the guns and gunnery aboard the H.M.S.Prince of Wales,was somewhat better than when she faced the Bismarck and prince Eugene,those 14in guns were o.k.As I understand ,the H.M.S.Duke of York later helped the U.S.battleships in bombarding the Japanese home islands,later in 1945,although I don't know if her main armament worked well.Cheers,Starling.


----------



## davebender (Jun 28, 2012)

A newer ship with a couple more years to fix turret bugs. The crew had ample time to work up to peak efficiency.

HMS POW turrets malfunctioned during May 1941. The ship received significant battle damage too. Were all the technical flaws fixed only 7 months later (i.e. December 1941)? How good was the crew? It was green as grass during May 1941. After yard time to repair battle damage HMS POW was employed as a yacht to transport PM Churchill to North American. During September 1941 HMS POW was assigned to Force H in the Mediterranean. During October 1941 HMS POW departed for Singapore. That doesn't allow much time for testing and modification of main gun turrets. Nor does it allow much time for crew training except what can be accomplished while conducting combat operations.

I'm not saying HMS POW wasn't fully operational during December 1941. Neither would I assume it was. We need to see the historical engineering report filed just before POW departed for Singapore.


----------



## renrich (Jun 29, 2012)

Starling, the whole purpose of this forum is to get info and opinion from other people so welcome.

Ok, the IJN two ships were rated as BBs because they had been extensively remodeled twice since their initial launch and they had better protection, especially against torpedoes.

Advantages- British- six 15 inch guns plus ten 14 inch modern guns against sixteen old model 14 inch guns. Much better protection for the POW although overall the Repulse not as well protected as the IJN ships.

Advantages- IJN- Both ships can make 30 knots whereas POW can only make 27 knots, Repulse can make 30 knots. IJN BBS armed with 21 inch torpedo tubes.

Here is the fly in the buttermilk for the RN. Both forces are going to have DDs for escorts. At this stage of the war it is doubtful if the RN has a lot of knowledge about the IJN torpedo doctrine or capabilties. In a night surface engagement, one or both RN BBs might fall victim to those deadly DD's 24 inch, high speed, long range torps. In a daylight engagement the danger would be less but still a big problem for the RN. I would say that at night the IJN has the advantage and in daytime the odds are about even.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jun 29, 2012)

A real problem in trying to evaluate naval engagements between just a couple of ships is that real engagements seemed to hinge on incredible amounts of luck. Who hit who first and where. Magazine explosions aside even a few hits seemed to degrade the 'hittee' to a greater extent than most wargames would give credit for. Fire control seemed to more fragile/susceptible to nearby hits than most navy's planned for and if the fire control goes to pot early in the battle the outcome, baring another lucky hit or two,is a forgone conclusion. The more ships involved the more such hits average out but with just one or two heavy ships per side a few early hits can influence the rest of the battle. 

I believe the British 14" mounts suffered from break downs all their life but improved as time went on and the POW vs the Bismark being a particular low point, Builders construction crews still being on board (?).


----------



## davebender (Jun 29, 2012)

I agree. However HMS POW was so well armored that it's unlikely to blow up from a couple shell hits. Like KM Bismarck the POW will probably absorb dozens of large shell hits before it dies.

Calling the Kongo class a battleship doesn't make it so. They had BC scale armor even after modernization. HMS Repulse armor was even thinner. All BCs have the potential to blow up early on if hit by dreadnought size shells.

I've always wondered why Japan sent a pair of BCs to this potential fight. They should have sent the two Nagato class battleships. Even the older Fuso class battleships would have been a better choice.


----------



## renrich (Jun 29, 2012)

Janes 1942 rates the Kongo class as BBs as well as my "Fighting Ships of WW2" by Westwood. I will take their word for it. They did have lighter armor than many other BBs but debating whether they were BBs or BCs is splitting hairs and not worthwhile. Haruna and Kongo were what they were. Short of the lucky hit though, BBs and BCs were remarkebly resistant to shellfire. I think that Kirishima took about 30 hits before sinking. At Jutland Lion took 12 hits from heavy guns, Tiger 17, Princess Royal 9 and Warspite 13 and did not sink and could still steam and Fight although Warspite was sent to the bench.

I expect that the Japanese sent the two what they considered BBs because they were so much faster than the other BBs. Those ships could not catch Repulse or POW and would be at a severe disadvantage. The Japanese seemed to have favored speed and gun power over armor, especially in their CAs.

Incidently, on Tully's Imperial Japanese Navy online data base page it definitely says that the Kongos were rerated as BBs after reconstruction. Very interesting web site. I wonder why when the Kongos were reconstructed, they did not remove the six inch guns and use the weight for more armor? I understand after the Hiei was sunk, the steering compartment was lined with concrete and a couple of six inchers removed.


----------



## davebender (Jun 29, 2012)

The difference is simple. Battleships are armored to protect vs dreadnought size shells. Battlecruisers are not.

*Armor penetration @ 20,000 yards. WWII era AP shells.*
510mm. Italy 381mm/50. Main guns for Vittorio Veneto.
509mm. USN 16"/50. Main guns for Iowa class battleships.
419mm. German 38cm/52. Main guns for KM Bismarck.
297mm. British 15"/42. Main guns for HMS Repulse.
285mm. British 14"/45 Mk VII. Main guns for HMS POW.

Unfortunately I couldn't find armor penetration data for the older 14"/45 main guns of the Kongo class. However with modern shells I suspect it wasn't too much less then the newer British 14"/45 Mk VII.

*Armor belt thickness.*
410mm. IJN Yamato.
370mm. HMS POW.
350mm. KM Scharnhorst.
350mm. Vittorio Veneto.
320mm. KM Bismarck.
307mm. U.S.S. Iowa.

Now for the battlecruisers.
229mm. USS Alaska.
229mm. HMS Repulse. As of 1939. Was 152mm during WWI.
203mm. IJN Kongo. As of 1939.


----------



## barney (Jun 29, 2012)

"Battleships and Battle Cruisers 1905-1970" by Breyer lists both Kongo and Haruna as BC.


----------



## renrich (Jun 29, 2012)

What a bunch of nit pickers! I will take Janes and the other sources' word but so what? You can call them whatever you want to. The question is what would be the outcome if the POW and Repulse and escorts met Kongo and Haruna and their escorts. If the discussion is all about whether to call the ships BBs BCs or ox carts then let us get the moderators to close the thread.


----------



## barney (Jun 30, 2012)

The protective upgrades to these vessels consisted of the fitting of torpedo bulges and strengthening of horizontal armor. Vertical armor remained unchanged from commissioning. So, still BC.

These vessels were intended as escorts for fast aircraft carriers. 

On the night of November 14-15 a sister ship, the Kirishima, took an estimated 20 heavy hits and a plastering of 5 inch, and although she was sinking, no magazine explosion and only about 200 killed in action. So, these were fast and surprisingly tough ships.

But, I have to agree with what was written above; the IJN's torpedo attack (or lack thereof) would most likely determine the outcome of this hypothetical contest.


----------



## davebender (Jun 30, 2012)

It appears to me torpedoes were decisive for sinking both KM Bismarck and KM Scharnhorst. In fact I have my doubts whether HMS Duke of York's 14" shells could have sunk the heavily armored KM Scharnhorst. The RN clearly know how to conduct a torpedo attack and RN torpedos were reliable.


----------



## renrich (Jun 30, 2012)

According to Tully's website ( he is co author of Shattered Sword)

Japanese Type 93 Torp
24 inch diameter
1080 pounds of explosive
20000 meters @ 48 knots
32000 meters @ 40 knots
40000 meters @ 36 knots

American Mark 15
21 inch diameter
825 pounds of explosive
13700 meters @ 26 knots

At least some of the Kongos had additional deck armor added during remodeling.

A lot different torpedoing a ship already badly damaged and practically dead in the water and one moving and fighting. The Exeter fired torpedos at Graf Spee with no effect. A lot of dead American sailors because of those IJN torps.


----------



## davebender (Jun 30, 2012)

The British Navy did not use American torpedoes.

British Torpedoes of World War II
*21" Mark IX.* Used on most RN DDs and cruisers.
11,000 yards @ 36 to 41 knots (newer torpedo lots were faster).
722 lbs TNT or 805 lbs Torpex (newer torpedos had Torpex).

This reliable torpedo is perfectly capable of inflicting serious damage on large warships. KM Scharnhorst received multiple torpedo hits while underway.


----------



## renrich (Jun 30, 2012)

The Scharnhorst could not have been moving very fast or the DDs could never have caught her as the seas were very heavy. The Duke of York could only make 17 knots in them. The DDs fired a total of 28 torpedos with probably four hits. Then the CLs obtained 2 more torpedo hits and then the DDs obtained 6 more. Yep those British torps were deadly. Two of the salvo of six torpedoes which sank the Wasp missed and hit the BB North Carolina between five and seven miles away, tearing a hole 32 by 15 feet in her port bow and sank the DD O Brien.
One wonders how many Type 93s would have been needed to sink an already badly beat up Scharnhorst? Surely not twelve!


----------



## nuuumannn (Jul 1, 2012)

Since this is very much a what if question, I'll throw something else in the mix between the Kongo/Haruna and Repulse/Prince of Wales. The other large warship that was to accompany the two British vessels as part of Force 'Z' was the carrier HMS Indomitable, newly commissioned and sent to Singapore via the Caribbean, where, on entry to the harbour at Kingston Jamaica, she struck the Palisadoes Reef at the harbour bar, which rendered her inoperative; she was sent to the USA for repairs, so missed the sinking of the two ships by the Japanese.

If Indom was there at the time that the Repulse and Prince were attacked, it would have added another element to the mix, particularly if the Japanese battleships were present (according to my copy of Siegfried Breyer's book Battleships and battlecruisers 1905 - 1970; "The fitting of torpedo bulges reduced their speed and from 1930 onwards they are therefore classified as senkan = battleships" - pedant ).

On an historical note, Singapore wasn't the last time that Indomitable escaped a probable fate; the ship was sent to Ceylon after her repairs and in early April 1942 was sent out on patrol to intercept a Japanese carrier group led by Adm Chuichi Nagumo and comprising five carriers, four fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers. Her torpedo bombers were readied, but the ship was not sent after the Japanese. She missed the bombing of Colombo on the 5th April by Japanese carrier aircraft. On that day the cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire were sunk. 

A few days later the carrier Hermes and destroyer Vampire were also sunk by Nagumo's aircraft. I read an account by a crewmember of the Indomitable once and the guy couldn't understand why they didn't intercept the Japanese, although it turned out that the Japanese task force was far superior in numerical size than the British ships in the region, which also included the battleship Warspite and carrier Formidable. According to this guy's account, Adm Somerville with held the British carrier because he wanted to prevent the inevitable. 

Sir John Somerville was commander of the Eastern Fleet, which comprised Indom, the carrier Formidable and the battleship Warspite had Singapore as his base for awhile, but left once the situation became untenable, although at that time his ships were elsewhere, both Formidable and Warspite had undergone repairs in the USA after bomb damage in the Mediterranean and were sent to the Eastern Fleet in February and March '42. So had the Warspite and Formidable not been damaged in the Med, they would have probably ended up in Singapore too. Just a thought.


----------



## renrich (Jul 1, 2012)

If Indomitable had been with POW and Repulse, unless the IJN could have gotten air cover for Haruna and Kongo, the odds would have been on the British side unless the battle took place at night. The Japanese had developed their torpedo doctrine and the weapons, tactics and night optics especially for night engagements as they expected to be outnumbered in a war with the US. Air strikes against the two IJN BBs if they had no air cover might have been lethal just as those against POW and Repulse were although it is doubtful that the air group from Indomitable would be as numerous or proficient as the Japanese air.


----------



## nuuumannn (Jul 1, 2012)

> Air strikes against the two IJN BBs if they had no air cover might have been lethal just as those against POW and Repulse were although it is doubtful that the air group from Indomitable would be as numerous or proficient as the Japanese air.



I agree, it would have been an interesting one to try and guess an outcome. Probably losses on both sides. Add to this the Buffalos sent to provide top cover for the Repulse and Prince but headed in the wrong direction because the ships had changed course away from their original rendezvous point and you have a bit more of an even fight against the torpedo bombers (although on another thread there is a war raging about whether the Buffalo was effective or not ).


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 1, 2012)

Well, there is effective against the Zero at altitude and there is effective against G3M level bombers and G4M torpedo bombers at a few hundred feet.  

The insistence on radio silence to point of not telling your land based air where you are is _not_ one of the brighter decisions of the battle.


----------



## davebender (Jul 1, 2012)

HMS Indomitable didn't carry enough fighter aircraft to protect itself. It would be just another target and most likely the first ship sunk by IJN airpower based in South Vietnam.


----------



## delcyros (Jul 2, 2012)

As far as KONGO vs REPULSE/PoW is concerned, one has to keep in mind the abilities of both sides.
The japanese emphasized night battle doctrines and long range combat. The RN emphasized decisive ranges and daylight battles initially. 
There is nothing on a KONGO which could prevent the 15inchers from reaching the vitals. Similarely, there is little on REPULSE to lend some sort of protection against 14inchers at most ranges and possible combat target angles.
PoW is the only (very...) well armoured ship here. Then there is little the 14 inchers could hope to achieve on KONGO´s armour, at least at the desired medium ranges. It has nothing to do with good armour on KONGO´s part but poor AP-shell performance on the british 14in APC. This was a negative surprise to the RN, not a nice story to be exact. In armour penetration trials, they found out that the 14in APC, which was a more or less scaled down 15in APC behaved poorly and shattered at velocities higher than 1500 to 1600fps rather than penetrate intactly. Thus, while a KONGO is indeed insufficiently protected against a modern, delay pattern APC, the defect in british 14in APC renders a high portion of hits as non-delay burst at all ranges closer than 20,000 yard while at larger ranges, barbettes and belt offer quite substantial resistence. Note that the 15in APC of REPULSE is not subject to this defect.
There is some evidence to suggest that this is what actually happened with BISMARCK. Very few penetrations (all identified as RODNEY´s 16in) and lots of shatter marks from 14in on main AND upper side armour belt. Such a hit can still hurt, take equipment out of action, silence turrets but it may not be as decisive as intended.
For further reading, compare the article "The End of an Era" in the Naval Review, 1960 - Vol 4. -Or, alternatively, SUPP 6-144 A.P.P. Committee Special from 31st of march 1943, the primary source for poor shatter velocity charackteristics of the newly introduced 14in APC.
The story is not pretty, being essentially a reprise of the navy's unhappy WW1 experience with inadequate AP projectiles.

That beeing said, british APC had exceptionally good service reliability and -unless shattered- burst even after beeing deflected by armour (no other AP fuse could achieve this!). Japanese AP, however, were fitted with break-away type seperated AP-caps as well as with an ultra-long delay action pattern, which allowed the shell to travel a certain distance under water and strike the ship where no armour is (up to 200 yard short for the 14in).
Thus, overs are overs for both AP but shorts can outturn as underwater hits for the japanese, which is a considerable danger for a large ship.


----------



## renrich (Jul 2, 2012)

Many thanks for you perspective on this matter,del. It seems to me that the tipping point in this imaginary engagement might be the IJN DDs and those torps. At this stage of the war, I doubt that the British just like the USN were aware of the Japanese doctrine with those torps. At Java Sea, the allies suffered from those weapons and one would think that, night or day, they could be a real factor.


----------



## nuuumannn (Jul 3, 2012)

> HMS Indomitable didn't carry enough fighter aircraft to protect itself.



Gee, that's a bold, if sweeping statement if ever there was one! How many aircraft does a carrier need to protect itself then? Indom could accommodate 48 aircraft. Of these, about half were fighters; Grumman Martletts and Sea Hurricanes in 1941. Against Mitsi G3Ms and G4Ms, they would have performed well, I'd imagine, contrary to your pretty baseless claim.


----------



## Juha (Jul 3, 2012)

Hello
in Apr 42, nearest date to Dec 41 I could easily find, Indo carried 12 Fulmars and 9 Sea Hurricanes (+24 Albacores), not good enough against Zeros but capable to catch Nells and Bettys and achieve at least some chaos amongst the torpedo bombers and before that to make life difficult to snoopers.

Juha


----------



## Denniss (Jul 3, 2012)

One or two fighters would be enough to catch the jap recon (float?)plane shadowing the task force, making the approach for the jap bombers even more difficult. But if the carrier was detected the jap force would have gotten a dispatch of Zeros.


----------



## davebender (Jul 3, 2012)

*IJN 22nd Naval Air Flotilla. * Saigon, Indochina.
22nd Naval Air Flotilla, 11th Air Fleet, Imperial Japanese Navy, 7.12.1941
96 x G3M2.
36 x G4M1.
25 x A6M2.

21 CV based fighter aircraft cannot stop an attacking force of this size. RN CAP may shoot down some bombers but most will get through and the British CV will be the primary target.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 3, 2012)

> 22nd Naval Air Flotilla, 11th Air Fleet, Imperial Japanese Navy, 7.12.1941[/url]
> 96 x G3M2.
> 36 x G4M1.
> 25 x A6M2.
> ...



I agree you have an intersting what if, but it is far from clear as to the outcome. Firstly not all of those 132 were available. Some were not airworthy, others were needed for search operations. historically the Japanese managed to hit Force Z with just over 60 strike aircraft, and a further 22 or so held back in a second wave if needed (they werent). The Zeroes of the "Yawata" Wing were not available as escort, they were assigned to fly cover to the invasion convoy and managed to average about 9 fighters over the invasion force for the period needed to coss the gulf of thailand.

Compared to the german and italian attacks onto the med convoys, the numbers available to the japanese were very meagre. "pedestal" was attacked by forces in excess of 590 a/c. The defenders numbered less than 70. Thats an attacker to defender ratio of more than 8:1. pedestal suffered the loss of 9 merchant ships, 1 carrier (not sunk by air attack) 2 cruisers and a destroyer, not all of them to air attack. in this scenario, the japanese would in total outnumber the allied defenders by about 3.5:1. The differece is in the training....the japanese were expert antishipping crews, by 1942, the germans and italians were not so well trained in this field. It would really get down to how well the CAP was managed i would suggest

The other thing that is glaringly obvious about the Fce Z scenario that has been suppressed from the start, is the marked superiority the japanese would enjoy. I should really check, but from memory they could call on 4 heavy cruisers and four light cuisers and about 24 fleet destroyers. by comparison the british, if they had decided to group their light forces at Singapore, (which they didnt) they could have had 2 or 3 light cruisers of WWI vintage and either 4 or 6 old destroyers . The japanese force included either one or two of their torpedo cruisers....cruisers devoid of gun armamanet and carring a broadside of over 40 Long Lance Torpedoes. In my opion the POW and REPULSE were ships able to deal with the IJN ships in a day engagement. As the bismark found in her final fight, and Scharnhorst as well....penetrations of the citadel counted for little. Ships could, and were, easily disabled by multiple nonlethal hits. These sorts of hits generally would either dpwngrade, or curtail the operations of either the comms, the propulsioon, the steering, the rangefinding, the guns or some other system, or combination of the above, leaving such ships crippled and vulnerable. in the case of the bismarck, her main guns were pretty much knocked out in less than an hour, which attasts to the effectiveness of british shells in my book. There is some doubt about what happened to Scharnhorst to cause her to lose speed, but once sje did, she was pummelled very quickly by DOY 14 batteries.


----------



## renrich (Jul 3, 2012)

Don't count on the fighters from Indomitable ( if she was present) to down any Japanese recon planes. That task was a little like a crap shoot. The US carriers had superior VFs aboard and even when radar detected a Japanese snooper they often could not make contact with that snooper. If they did, however, they usually shot it down.


----------



## JoeB (Jul 3, 2012)

Even a relatively small fighter force makes it much more difficult for shadowing recon a/c, as shown by many episodes in WWII with even smaller fighter forces (for example, the ersatz merchant ship carriers the Brits used to disrupt German shadowing of Atlantic convoys). However such small fighter forces and the radar/fighter direction capabilities of late 1941 (even British, which were the best developed as of then) would hardly render such a force immune to detection and shadowing. Radar detection of single a/c was (still is in certain circumstances) a statistical probability of a certain magnitude, not a certainty, and weather with any cloud can afford even radar-detected shadowers plenty of cover. This was also repeatedly demonstrated.

So a British force including a single carrier with 20 or so Fulmar/Hurricane types would be in a significantly better position to harass Japanese air recon efforts. But, IMO the ultimate outcome would still probably add a carrier loss to the historic loss of two capital ships. Some of the posts above posit these two points as if contradictory or mutually exclusive, but they aren't. As it was the British force was easily dispatched without ever posing a real threat to any Japanese force. It's a long way from that outcome to actually achieving a success, including literally so in physical distance. I don't see the British force surviving in the end against the forces the Japanese had in the area.

As far as a straight up capital ship engagement, outright British success depends on the Japanese fighting on terms favorable to the British. And again it's hard to see that happening.
-a night engagement is probably not favorable to the British (not as certain as IJN's advantage over USN at the time, but probably still the case, RN units participated in the generally unsuccessful night actions v IJN in DEI without obviously distinguishing themselves from the Dutch or US units)
-a day action would tend to be favorable to the two British big gun ships, but would also blow up any idea of preventing good intelligence by the Japanese about the exact whereabouts of the British ships to launch a concentrated air attack with escort (the likely battle area well within Zero range if the location of the target ships was well known at launch).
-either a day or night action would likely be closer to the Japanese air bases than the actual air attack on Force Z.
-many capital ship engagements in the 20th century were not decisive; especially when one side was at a disadvantage in combat power but advantage in formation speed (as the Japanese ships would be in this case). It's always possible the British ships could score a lucky devastating hit on one of the Japanese ships (in which case the other would probably withdraw) or the Japanese score a similar hit on Repulse (mainly, less likely v PoW), but it's at least likely IMO one or the other side or both would disengage without a decisive outcome...to the capital ship contest, still leaving the major British ships including the carrier likely to fall prey to air attack, or perhaps surface torpedo attack, or slowed by one and finished off by the other (or by subs, also in the area).

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Jul 3, 2012)

I thought it might be useful to look at the force compositions for the respective sides in the pedstal Operation. It shows very cloearly just how difficult it could be for land based air groups to mount effective attacks against TGs provided with even minimal aircover. The advantage of the CAG is always that it is easier to concentrate and regroup the defenders than it is for the attacker operating at long range. Thats as true today as it was in 1941. 

Sources: Fioravanzo, La Marina Italiana Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, vol. 5, pp.
410–13; 

Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys, pp. 129–31; “Operation Pedestal,”
Supplement to the London Gazette, p. 450-6.


"_THE ALLIED FORCES
OPERATION PEDESTAL
FORCE F
Convoy WS.5.21S
13 freighters (Empire Hope, Dorset, Wairangi, Rochester Castle, Waimarana,
Brisbane Star, Port Chalmers, Almeria Lykes, Santa Elisa, Clan Ferguson, Glenorchy,
Melbourne Star, Deucalion)
1 oiler (Ohio)
Additional escorts from Britain to Gibraltar: 5 destroyers (Keppel, Malcom,
Amazon, Venomous, Wolverine)
FORCE Z
2 battleships (Nelson, Rodney)
*3 aircraft carriers (Victorious, Eagle, Indomitable)
72 fighters, 38 torpedo bombers*3 light cruisers (Charybdis, Phoebe, Sirius)
15 destroyers (19th Destroyer Flotilla) (Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Quentin,
Eskimo, Tartar, Wilton, Westcott, Wrestler, Somali, Wishart, Zetland, Ithuriel,
Antelope, Vansittart)
FORCE X
4 light cruisers (10th Cruiser Flotilla) (Nigeria, Kenya, Manchester, Cairo)
11 destroyers (6th Destroyer Flotilla) (Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight, Fury,
Derwent, Bramham, Bicester, Ledbury, Pathfinder, Penn)
1 ocean tug (Jaunty)
FORCE Y
2 freighters (Troilus, Orari)
2 destroyers (Matchless, Badsworth)
FORCE R
3 fleet oil tankers (Brown, Ranger, Dingledale)
4 corvettes (Jonquil, Spirea, Geranium, Coltsfoot)
1 tug (Salvonia)
Malta Escort Force (17th Minesweeping Flotilla)
4 minesweepers (Speedy, Hythe, Hebe, Rye)
7 motor launches (121, 126, 134, 135, 168, 459, 469)
Submarine Group (10th Submarine Flotilla)
2 submarines off Milazzo and Palermo (P.211, P.42)
6 submarines between Malta and Tunisia (P.44, P.222, P.31, P.34, P.46,
Utmost)
OPERATION BELLOWS
1 aircraft carrier (Furious)
RESERVE ESCORT GROUP
8 destroyers (Keppel, Westcott, Venomous, Malcolm, Wolverine, Amazon,
Wrestler, Vidette)
OPERATION M.G. 3
Port Said
Convoy M.W.12 (3 merchant vessels)
Escort (2 cruisers, 10 destroyers)
Haifa
1 merchant vessel
2 cruisers
3 destroyers
SERVICEABLE LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT ON MALTA
9 fighter squadrons
3 torpedo-bomber squadrons
4 bomber squadrons
2 air recce squadrons
38 Spitfire fighters from Furious_
(Note these forces were unavailable for most of the battle)

_The Allied sector of the main effort in Operation PEDESTAL was the western
Mediterranean, while the easternMediterranean was the sector of secondary effort.
This decision was predetermined because the convoy started its voyage in
Gibraltar and headed towardMalta. The sectors of effort dictate where the principal
forces and their supporting forces should be concentrated or employed in a
major naval operation. In a defensive major naval operation as was Operation
PEDESTAL, the main Allied forces were those that defended the convoy, Force X.
Force Z, submarines, and land-based aircraft were supporting forces.
VEGO 125
THE AXIS FORCES
ITALIAN MAJOR SURFACE FORCES
3rd Naval Division (Messina)
3 heavy cruisers (Gorizia, Bolzano, Trieste)
7 destroyers (Aviere, Geniere, Camicia Nera, Legionario, Ascari, Corsaro,
Grecale)
7th Naval Division (Cagliari)
3 light cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Muzio
Attendolo)
4 destroyers (Maestrale, Gioberti, Oriani, Fuciliere)
1 destroyer for mining the Sicilian Narrows (Malocello)
8th Naval Division (Navarino)
3 light cruisers (Duca degli Abruzzi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Emanuele Filiberto
Duca d’Aosta)
5 destroyers
SUBMARINES
18 Italian submarines (Bronzo, Ascianghi, Alagi, Dessié, Avorio, Dandolo,
Emo, Cobalto, Otaria, Axum, Asteria, Brin, Wolframio, Granito, Dagabur,
Giada, Uarsciek, Vellela)
2 German U-boats (U-73, U-333)
LIGHT FORCES
2nd MS Squadron (MS 16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31)
15th MAS Squadron (MAS 549, 543, 548, 563)
18th MAS Squadron (MAS 556, 553, 533, 562, 560)
20th MAS Squadron (MAS 557, 554, 564, 552)
German S-boats (S30, S59, S58, S36)
Total: 9 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 20 submarines, 10 MS, 13 MAS
LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT (SICILY/SARDINIA)
*Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
fighters)
German II Air Corps
456 aircraft (328 dive bombers, 32 bombers, 96 fighters)
Total: 784 aircraft (328 Italian, 456 German*_*)"*


----------



## nuuumannn (Jul 3, 2012)

> Indo carried 12 Fulmars and 9 Sea Hurricanes (+24 Albacores)



Yes, indeed she did, she didn't get the Martletts until later - sorry. Interesting figures there Dave, but they wouldn't have sent them all over at once.


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 4, 2012)

parsifal said:


> LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT (SICILY/SARDINIA)
> *Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
> 328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
> fighters)
> ...



i've many doubt on this data, 
example there was one alone Stuka Geschwader in Medit the 3rd and this sure can not had 328 dive bombers (actually 1st august had 67, 1st september had 100) and almost one gruppe was too east based for this operation.


----------



## davebender (Jul 4, 2012)

Not all of the RN CV based aircraft will be available either. In addition to normal maintenance issues there will be CV landing accidents and perhaps combat damage inflicted by IJN seaplane tail gunners.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 4, 2012)

davebender said:


> Not all of the RN CV based aircraft will be available either. In addition to normal maintenance issues there will be CV landing accidents and perhaps combat damage inflicted by IJN seaplane tail gunners.



Correct,however the carrier like nearly every carrier operation of this kind could count on a higher servicieability rate than land based air, and also had the priceless advantage of being able to concentrate at any given point. this is what gave the british their victory with pedestal and allowed the USN with just two carriers to hit at Rabaul in 1943.
Fulmars and Sea Hurricanes suffered the lowest non-combat loss rate of any british type. at the end of Pedestal, ther had been just three such losses over a five day period.

Against the tail gunners of the LW and RA seaplanes, fulmars suffered very few losses. In the six months from september to march 1941, they suffered something like 10 losses to axis bombers (of all types), out of either 40 or 60 a/c deployed (i cant remember the exact numbers, but it was in that area) whilst shooting down more than 100 of these aircraft. Why would they all of a sudden suffer heavier losses agaist the japanese. Fighters were needed to hurt the CAP, and fighters were unavailable to the 22 AF


----------



## davebender (Jul 4, 2012)

I served on the U.S.S. America for 2 1/2 years. We lost no aircraft to enemy action. However we lost an A-6 to a catapult accident, an F-14 to a landing accident and had a second F-14 slide off the deck when the ship took an unexpectedly large roll. We lost a pair of A-7s to aerial collision. Several aircraft were made temporarily unservicable when a hanger deck sprinkler system malfunctioned and sprayed them with fire fighting foam.

CVs are the most dangerous airfield in the world. Any CV that remains at sea awhile will have aircraft casualties. That's before we consider damaged aircraft that made it back to the CV and are unservicable for a couple days while being repaired.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 4, 2012)

davebender said:


> I served on the U.S.S. America for 2 1/2 years. We lost no aircraft to enemy action. However we lost an A-6 to a catapult accident, an F-14 to a landing accident and had a second F-14 slide off the deck when the ship took an unexpectedly large roll. We lost a pair of A-7s to aerial collision. Several aircraft were made temporarily unservicable when a hanger deck sprinkler system malfunctioned and sprayed them with fire fighting foam.
> 
> CVs are the most dangerous airfield in the world. Any CV that remains at sea awhile will have aircraft casualties. That's before we consider damaged aircraft that made it back to the CV and are unservicable for a couple days while being repaired.



I served on the melbourne for three years . There were no losses of any kind on the Melbourne for a three year continuous period, but admittedly we lost two aircraft in three months in the final months of 1981 just after that. And melbourne steamed more miles and flew more sorties per aircraft than any other carrier in the world.... 

Look also at the RN operations in the south atlantic during the falklands, under combat conditions. how many harriers were lost whilst the ship was on combat patrol.

Im not disputing that noncombat losses on a carrier can be high, but british carriers were operated more safely than any US carrier. maybe that explains why no US carriers have ever operated above the arctic circle...it takes a lot of careful deck management to do it. i can say that from experience. And the losses for Illustrious Ark Royal are what they are, and they are low.

It generally does not take a few days to get aircraft that have been damaged airborne again....usually overnight sometimes even just a few hours. In wartime, on a carrier, safety standards are often ignored to get the CAP back up again. Sometimes that goes wrong as it did for the japanese at Midway. but its a risk all CAGs will take 

a lot of who har is made about the high accident rate of the sefire, by way of comment. true enough in 1943, when operating from escort carriers under extreme conditions (conditions too still to get enough air under the wings). peopple then conveniently ignore the operations of the Seafires in 1945, when operating under better conditions on fleet cariers....the safest record of any type in any navy in that period, on a per sortie basis. seafires in those final months were flying 6-8 sorties per day and had low loss rates

And, for this scenario, we are not talking a long period...perhaps 2-3 days. For comparison, during korea Sydney lost 11 a/c over a 4 month period, 5 over the side in a typhoon 3 on combat operations and 3 to landing or non operational causes.

if the brits lost 2 aircraft over that 3 days hypothetical they would be doing badly


----------



## parsifal (Jul 4, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> i've many doubt on this data,
> example there was one alone Stuka Geschwader in Medit the 3rd and this sure can not had 328 dive bombers (actually 1st august had 67, 1st september had 100) and almost one gruppe was too east based for this operation.



I have quoted from two good sources, you have how many??? You need to quote your sources to challenge these numbers


----------



## JoeB (Jul 4, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I thought it might be useful to look at the force compositions for the respective sides in the pedstal Operation. It shows very cloearly just how difficult it could be for land based air groups to mount effective attacks against TGs provided with even minimal aircover.LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT (SICILY/SARDINIA)
> *Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
> 328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
> fighters)
> ...


The Mediterranean campaign in this period is indeed interesting, but the gambit of directly comparing nominal Italo-German air strengths in that campaign to project results in Pacific War 'what ifs' is fatallly flawed. And you, being a good student of the Pacific War, already undercut this idea yourself in your previous post by correctly pointing out the non-comparability of typical Italo-German v Japanese air unit anti-ship capability in this period. As Vincenzo also suggested, the numbers also don't look exactly right either, but that's secondary. The Italo-German forces were more numerous, but a relatively small proportion were skilled anti-ship units. The bombers missed a lot even in cases where not directly interfered with by British a/c from the carriers or Malta. 

The other major problem is the non-comparability of the missions and geographical set up. The success of carrier escorted convoys for *part* of those journeys to Malta importantly depended on the carriers staying far enough from the Axis air bases for the short legged Axis fighter escorts, the German 109's especially, to have minimal if any persistence over the convoy. German Med theater Bf109 units in this period did not fail to noticeably affect any of those attacks because they lost fierce battles with FAA fighters. There were hardly any engagements between the 109's and the FAA a/c, and only a handful between other Axis fighters and the FAA fighters. The 109's were too far from their bases to be effective. And, the convoys had to carry on without carrier cover after the carriers turned back. This worked out ultimately satisfactorily in the Pedestal case: merchant ship losses after the carrier turn back were heavy but ultimately not heavy enough to starve out Malta; although they would have been if the success of Harpoon (for the Axis anti-merchant ship effort) had been repeated.

But in any case a single carrier supporting a pair of capital ships seeking to intercept enemy invasion shipping is a quite different scenario. The capital ships have to close to essentially zero range; practically speaking the carrier has to come almost all the way with them. I can see why a carrier would be highly welcomed by the Force Z commander if determined to attempt this mission at all cost, but I don't see how that carrier or the capital ships could ultimately survive such a mission against the Japanese forces arrayed against them.

We can also look at JNAF v RN surface units situations in the early Pac War fighting and see that the JNAF is likely to score hits at a much higher rate than Italo-German attackers usually did. If we bring the LW and RA to the Pacific, or equip the JNAF with only very short range, though otherwise formidable, single engine fighters (Bf109F's), or if we change to the scenario to partial cover for an Allied convoy, then run in alone or with air support from Malaya...all those scenarios might have varied and interesting outcomes. But the scenario at hand, add a single typical FAA CAG to Force Z attempting to destroy Japanese invasion shipping, and further assume as the thread does that a pair of (old) fast Japanese BB's and DD/CL screen would engage, then IMO the outcome isn't subject to a lot of doubt as far as British losses, assuming the British commander is intent on pressing home his attack: the British would lose the carrier *and* the two big gun ships. Although, the scenario would present more difficulty for the Japanese, probably result in heavier JNAF a/c losses, and possibly warship losses, though it's doubtful that would justify a British carrier loss, since no Japanese carrier would be at risk.

Joe


----------



## JoeB (Jul 4, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I have quoted from two good sources, you have how many??? You need to quote your sources to challenge these numbers


Though I again I don't think the exact number is the central point, but rather capability and operational context, the order of battle you presented is detailed for naval forces, not so for air forces. Shores in "Malta the Spitfire Year" p.653-55 gives a detailed OOB of air units, and 328 is much too high for German bombers. Also I think you and Vincenzo are speaking somewhat at cross purposes about 'divebombers' v Ju-87's. There was according to Shores only one German Stuka gruppe, I/Stg3 w/ 26 Ju-87D's, involved in the Pedestal action, though there were 144 Ju-88A's in various units; however those units didn't all always act as divebombers. II Fliegerkorps had a total of 255 operational a/c on Sicily according to Shores.

The Italian forces in range on Sardinia and Sicily were larger, approx 304, but that again included short ranged fighters defending various bases and which weren't involved in missions v the convoy, dedicated (and vulnerable) recon types, and level bombers which basically didn't hit ships. There were 44 S.79sil (ie torpedo version) on Sardinia 20 more S.79/84 sil on Sicily and 14 Ju-87B on Silicy. That was the heart of the Italian strike capability as far as a/c capable of sinking ships with any probability, but the record of the Italian Ju-87 units wasn't so impressive; the S.79sil units OTOH were a real menace to Allied ships, but still probably not fully comparable to JNAF torpedo units. It wasn't a bed of roses for the Pedestal carriers, but they faced a less numerically formidable air force than is implied by the sources you read, and again the quality as well as the difference in overall context of the Pedestal action and what if action around Malaya is very important. Also AFAIK 1 carrier to add to Force Z was mentioned, not 3.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Jul 4, 2012)

> The Mediterranean campaign in this period is indeed interesting, but the gambit of directly comparing nominal Italo-German air strengths in that campaign to project results in Pacific War 'what ifs' is fatallly flawed. And you, being a good student of the Pacific War, already undercut this idea yourself in your previous post by correctly pointing out the non-comparability of typical Italo-German v Japanese air unit anti-ship capability in this period. As Vincenzo also suggested, the numbers also don't look exactly right either, but that's secondary. The Italo-German forces were more numerous, but a relatively small proportion were skilled anti-ship units. The bombers missed a lot even in cases where not directly interfered with by British a/c from the carriers or Malta.



My point was that in fact in the Med the allies were outnumbered in the air 8:1, whereas in this scenario, they would at maximum be outnumbered 3.5:1. I acknowledged the superior skills of the japanese aviators in anti-shipping operations, but is that enough to make a shortfall of 5-700 a/c. Incidentally, I think i know why the figures appear high...they are looking at two operations, one in the eastern basin the other in the western basin. There are two operations described, hence i think the sources are quoting the airforces based in Sicily, southern italy and Crete and available for operations. 

One case where the there can be no doubt about the proficiency of the crews were the attacks by FKX on Illustrious Jan 41. There were 248 a/c directly attached to the Korps, plus approximately another 60 RA a/c in support. These a/c were tasked specifiically to sink the carrier. Despit those numbers, and repeated attacks on the damaged ship, they failed to do that. the biggest single attack was by 48 a/c from memory, and well within fighter range, just 60 miles off the Italian Coast. Despite misdireecting their CAP, and taking 7 bombn hits, 3 of them in excess if 1000 lbs, they failed to sink the carrier. 

Even though the japanese were far more likley to put a larger proportion of their forces corectly over the target, they would still be hard pressed to get more than 50% there at any given time. They would suffer similar problemes in concentration of effort just like everyones land based air had when it came to carrier operations. Finding the target is at least half the battle. 



> The other major problem is the non-comparability of the missions and geographical set up. The success of carrier escorted convoys for *part* of those journeys to Malta importantly depended on the carriers staying far enough from the Axis air bases for the short legged Axis fighter escorts, the German 109's especially, to have minimal if any persistence over the convoy. German Med theater Bf109 units in this period did not fail to noticeably affect any of those attacks because they lost fierce battles with FAA fighters. There were hardly any engagements between the 109's and the FAA a/c, and only a handful between other Axis fighters and the FAA fighters. The 109's were too far from their bases to be effective.



There are enough exceptions to this broad statement to bury it. I would agree that in the majority of instances carriers attempted to stay out of range of the SE fighters, but the geography of the med is such that there were also many occasions when the FAA did have to fight or deal with Me 109s. The problem was not that the 109s could not often be at the scene.....they often were....the problem was that a carrier battle required a certain amount of loiter time....aircraft just hanging around as the attack was deployed and executed. 109s did not have the endurance to deal with that. 110s did however, although they tended to be used as bomb trucks most of the time. 



> And, the convoys had to carry on without carrier cover after the carriers turned back. This worked out ultimately satisfactorily in the Pedestal case: merchant ship losses after the carrier turn back were heavy but ultimately not heavy enough to starve out Malta; although they would have been if the success of Harpoon (for the Axis anti-merchant ship effort) had been repeated.



The merchant ships were never left without cover of some description The carriers were pulled back after the Sardinian narrows had been negotiated, as the convoy pressed on to be within Beafighter rangeand then Spitfire range later in the morning 



> But in any case a single carrier supporting a pair of capital ships seeking to intercept enemy invasion shipping is a quite different scenario. The capital ships have to close to essentially zero range; practically speaking the carrier has to come almost all the way with them. I can see why a carrier would be highly welcomed by the Force Z commander if determined to attempt this mission at all cost, but I don't see how that carrier or the capital ships could ultimately survive such a mission against the Japanese forces arrayed against them


.

This statement is, with respect, rubbish. Lets look at the historical situation just to show how wide of the mark it is...Scouts for Force Z came within 5 miles of the invasion convoy (with the battleships some 26 miles) behind them before Phillips decided to abandon the operation. He made his decision because it was evident that the landings had already occurred, and he could not identify the force that was defending the transports. At that time, the Japanese BBs were not directly attached to the invasion force and were standing off by at least a days sailing. The direct escort consisted of 1 Ca 2 CLs and 6 or 8 DDs. If the carrier had been attached, he would have received pertinent up to date information on the enemy forces and their dispositions. He would have realized that a milk run awaited Fze Z if he had committedf them. He could have used the 24 strike aircraft (night capabale as the strikes against bismarck had shown). PoW and Repulse could have gone in, sank the escort and convoy7 and be heading home for tea with the carrier never seriously troubled by any of this. british TF were rpeatedly used in this way in 1940-41 in the med, without the slightest effect on either the TF ofr the Carrier groups, only when tied to a low moving convoy on a predictable path was there ever even the slightest trouble for the FAA. 




> We can also look at JNAF v RN surface units situations in the early Pac War fighting and see that the JNAF is likely to score hits at a much higher rate than Italo-German attackers usually did. If we bring the LW and RA to the Pacific, or equip the JNAF with only very short range, though otherwise formidable, single engine fighters (Bf109F's), or if we change to the scenario to partial cover for an Allied convoy, then run in alone or with air support from Malaya...all those scenarios might have varied and interesting outcomes. But the scenario at hand, add a single typical FAA CAG to Force Z attempting to destroy Japanese invasion shipping, and further assume as the thread does that a pair of (old) fast Japanese BB's and DD/CL screen would engage, then IMO the outcome isn't subject to a lot of doubt as far as British losses, assuming the British commander is intent on pressing home his attack: the British would lose the carrier *and* the two big gun ships


. 

I disagree completely. And there is no evidence to support any of the claims you are making here. The limited numbers of Zeroes available....just 25 precluded any heavy escort for their bombers. These zeroes in any event were tasked to fly continuous cover for the convoy. so, the japanese strike aircraft...a/c with a top speed (unloaded) of just 230 knots, are going to be shot out of the sky with ease. if Zeroes are available, the equation does change, that i will grant you, but that is not what is being claimed by you, or anyone else.....the claim is that with the tools at hand the japanese would defeat the carrier. They could not. 

Moreover, you are claiming that that the IJN, with no heavy ships (remember the two BBs and most of the escort were not in direct contact with the convoy as they had detacjhed after the landings) and just a force of three cruisers and 8 DDs at most, could defeat 2 battleships and 24 strike aircraft. I doubt it. 



> Although, the scenario would present more difficulty for the Japanese, probably result in heavier JNAF a/c losses, and possibly warship losses, though it's doubtful that would justify a British carrier loss, since no Japanese carrier would be at risk.




You have presented no evidence that I find reasonable to support the claim that the carrier was likley to be lost, just opinion. The fact that that opinion is running counter to nearly every experience the RN had in the central basin before that doesnt seem to worry you. Sorry, but I cannot accept your hypothesis on this occasion. if the carrier had been present, and fully worked up, it would have been a bloodbath against the japanese IMO.


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 5, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I have quoted from two good sources, you have how many??? You need to quote your sources to challenge these numbers



a this point i think that your sources are not so good.

i only checked on ww2.dk what Stuka units were in medit

i've checked because clearly 328 dive bombers it's a very high number, 
because 5 italian squadrons with 328 planes it's so strange also for 5 italian stormi* this was a too high number, i've checked for 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th and this had not o limitate positive check, a few are sea recce squadriglie (recce squadriglia had, on paper, 7 planes so around half squadron) 

*stormo (pl stormi) is larger tactical unit of RA


p.s.
just for add data on 1st august the LW had less of 94 Ju 88A-4 in Sicily (less because the III/77 was partly in Greece) source my sum on data of ww2.dk


----------



## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> a this point i think that your sources are not so good.
> 
> i only checked on ww2.dk what Stuka units were in medit
> 
> ...



so, you are going to try to argue that some unnamed source material that you have is superior to firstly what can be reasonably argued as an italian source passable as an official naval history. fioraranzo is pretty universally accepted as your country's official history of your country's war at sea, is he not? And you arre saying that 'official history is wrong. Further the london gazatte, whilst not the "official history is the nearest i can find to a primary source of the force committments and estimated enemy force dispositions. Admittedly I found these references to the official histories, indeed the summary itself in Admiral messervis's account of the war in the med 1940-3. 

So in effect you are rubbishing three sources....two more or less official gistories from two countries, and a third independant author well respected by both sides. all i can say is you really must habe some fantastic sources to be a brave as that. You seem to be relying on identified squadrons of the RA, but there is every possibility that not all the squadrons wre identified, ut the toatal numbers.

Incidentally Roskill identifies 590 a/c ranged against the pedestal convoy, that is half the operations quoted. He doesnt give information on the forces ranhed against the convoy coming from the west, but by calculation if roskill is correct, then there were 194 facing the westen group.

Anyway, you seem to be saying;

ignore the (more or less) official history of the italian navy
ignore the nearest that i can find to primary material on allied reports of their own forces committed and their own estimates of enemy strength
ignore what is widely considered the "official" historian of the RN during the war

believe you, with an improperly referenced source and imprecise figures, and a blanket claim that it is just all wrong.
 
You will excuse me if i dont follow your advice and dont give a lot a credence to your claims


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 5, 2012)

ww2.dk is very good page the sources are indicated and are primary luftwaffe sources.

i've not the vol V of italian official WW II navy history so i can check it but if it's write that that 5 "squadrons" (it's write in italian so i'm sure that not use the word squadrons) had 328 planes it's in wrong. so i gentle ask you to recheck the book and report that it's write in it.

i'm ignoreing nothing are you ignoring the luftwaffe reports on her own unit
and well knewn that estimated of enemy strenght are useless if we have the right side report on the strenght


----------



## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

This is another source for you to consider 
Lt Col Eddie Bauer - The History Of WWII Jaspari Polaris Monaco 1984 
Lt Col Eddie Bauer is a swiss historian. not a fantastic source, but he is considered thorough and unbiased

In Chapter 34 of his book he makes the following observation 

_"it was difficult to keep such a large operation as the pedestal convoy a secret,and the italian secret serviceused paid informers in the bay of Algeciras to give ample early warning of the the convoy. German B-Dienst wservices had also given warning of the operation some days previously. This allowed the germans to prepre down to the smallest details and concentrate a maximum of force to counter the allied movement. Recognizing that the re-supply of Malta represented a direct threat to the control of the central basin, Kesselring Admiral Ricardi of Supamarina and the Commando Supremo command issued instructions accordingly. This shows a close level of co-operation now existed between Supermarina under adm riccardi, Superareo(Gen Rino Corso Fougier and the german commands under feldmarshal Kedsselring and Admiral Weichold. (Supermarina) reported that it could not use its four battleships so great had the fuel crisi become. in a memot to OKW kesselring reported August 10 on the following force availability

1.16 Italian and 5 German submarines which had the task of attacking the enemy between the straits of algiers and the Sicilian Narrows. 
2. A total of *784 aircraft *from both FKX and the RA (447 bombers, 90 torpedo aircraft, 247 fighters and fighter bombers)
3.18 MTBs which had been ordered to concentrate around Cape Bon and the island of Pantelleria
4. 6 cruisers and 11 destroyers which in conjunction with the the land based air units would finish off the convoy."_

Bauers account then gives a pretty good summary of what happened. Eagle was sunk by U-73 1209 on the 11th August, south of Majorca. RN DDs a few hours later attacked and sank the italian submarine Dagabur as she attempted to torpedo the Furious. 

There were some vlr attacks at 2000 on the 11th by Ju88s . These attacks were inneffective

_"At 0800 on the 12th the convoy was 120 sw of Cape Spartivento, and came under the first air attacks at about that time. Bauer states "throughout August 12, the CAP of the three carriers repulsed successive attacks that amounted to more than 200 aircraft. 28 were shot down and scores forced to turn back before pressing home their attacks . The successes of the Axis attackers were extremely meagre, the CAP not deviating from its primary purpose....to break up and disrupt the axis attackers, and not be drawn away from the defence of the fleet. Axis success was extremely meagre - one cargo vessel damaged by a bomb lagged behind and was finished off during the night by an MAS boat. Hits were scored by Ju87s on the flight deck of the Indomitable , however it was possible to transfer the planes of this carrier to the Victorious. Destroyer Foresight was hit by a torpedo and was scuttled. The eastwards movement of the convoy continued, with four more airstrikes between 1600 and 1900. At 1908 some 65 miles NNW of Bizerte, Syftret detached the main force from the convoy and turned west". 

The main force increased speed and had cleared the sardinian narrows by morning. they were not again troubeled by the Axis air units. However during the night, Axis submarines and MTBs were very effective. RM submarines Axum and dessie hit and sank the AA cruiser Cairo (a major loss at that point)and also hiting tanker Ohio. Cruiser Nigeria was also hit, whilst two cargo vessels were hit by night air attack (which were sunk after 2200 by italian naval forces). In addition, RM sub Alagi damaged the cruiser Kenya and sank another merchant ship. MAS Boats sank a further 4 cargo ships and the cruiser Manchester"_. 

However during that fateful night the convoy moved from a point west of the skerki bank to a point 60 miles south of Pantelleria and about 80 miles from Malta ....well within fighte range (now reinforced by the Spifires flown off from Furious the previous day). A fierce battle was now raging in the axis high command....what to do with the available fighters. Should they be used to provide aircover to the cruisers so as to finish off the convoy with naval power, or should they be used to provide escort to the strike aircraft? The axis high command decided to put their faith in the air force and allocated their fighters to escort duties. The commanders could not agree, the final decision was made by Mussolini himself.

It was a bad decision. The next day beginning at 8am and continuing all day, the axis delivered multiple attacks on the convoy. They were largely unsuccessful. The newly arrived Spitfires and the beafighters on Malta prevented all further losses bar one. worse, the italian cruiser force itself was attacked on its way home by RN submarine Unbroken, the cruisers Bolzano and Atendolo were both hit and so badly damaged they never returned to service. 

This was a hard fought action by both sides, with heavy losses, but the effectiveness of the British carriers to protect a convoy should be amply clear. And a convoy is a preedicatable, slow moving target. 

Against a fast moving target like Fce Z, the Japanese would have their intell quality downgraded, and be penalised as to the numbers of aircraft they could bring to bear. if 60 or so Sea Huricanes and Fulmars (and a few Martlets) (60, because some of the CAP was lost when Eagle went down), could destroy 28 aircraft and turn back over 100 (some escorted and most strike aircraft with better performance and much better protection than the Nells), then it is not unreasonable to extrapolate the 24 fighters of the Indomitable to be able to shoot down about 15-20 of the 22 flotilla and see off about 30 or so. We cannot assume that 22flotilla will have as many aircraft held back for airstrikes as they did....the british aircover will force them to pour more resources into searches. lets say that an additional 20 aircraft are needed for searching because of that fighter presence. That reduces the strike potential of 22 flotilla from the historical 86 a/c that they had, down to about 66. We know that PoW and Repulses AA batteries managed to stop roughly 15 aircraft from getting through. You can double that with the more modern and effective flak suite of the carier added. That means that roughly 55 aircraft will be shot down or stopped by the CAP, and 30 aircraft shot down or stopped by the AA effects. thats a total of 85 kills/aborts from a strike force not likley to exceed 65 a/c. On balance the IJN should not get through. Im the first to admit, anythings possible, but that little red herring cuts both ways. We are looking at the balance of probabilities, and on the balance of probabilities, based on the RNs contemporary performances, the Indomitable should help to win the battle.


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 5, 2012)

just for info 
all luftwaffe combat unit (not recce unit included) in mediterranean (also too far from pedestal operation), data from ww2.dk
strenght at 1st august

67 Ju 87
144 Ju 88A
22 He 111H
9 Do 17Z
30 Ju 88C
40 Bf 110C-F
127 Bf 109*

total 439 

this give me clear the situation 
your sources give the force of the luftwaffe in mediterranean not that alone enough near to Half August Battle (the italian name of the battle battaglia di mezzo agosto)

* w/o Geschwader HQ fighters, they are 5 so 132 109 and total 444

p.s. the recce unit had around 85 planes, this are to check for staffeln so it's possible i miss a few


----------



## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> just for info
> all luftwaffe combat unit (not recce unit included) in mediterranean (also too far from pedestal operation), data from ww.dk
> strenght at 1st august
> 
> ...




....which is different to the numbers quoted by my three sources as well as Kesselrings repoprt to his bosses in what substantial way???

My list says:

Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
fighters)
German II Air Corps
*456 aircraft *(328 dive bombers, 32 bombers, 96 fighters)
Total: 784 aircraft (328 Italian, 456 German)" 


Your saying 444 not including recons. I dont know about "everything in the med" but I doubt it since air units not subordinated to Commando Supremo or Kesselring continued to operate elsewhere under other commands. I would say your "everything in the med" is actually "everything under Kesselrings command" and by extension, under the control of CS.

Why the small difference between Kesselrings numbers and your website source (why I am bothering to debunk yet another website is a mystery even to me....)? I would say almost certainly because Kesselring did include recons. I know that at least 9 German flying boats were under II Air Korps command, not sure about FKX.

Rememeber also that the axis made the defeat of this convvoy an absolute priority. They didnt view it as a minor or peripheral issue. They poured as much material as they could possibly spare into stopping this convoy....

Another source (which I cannot recall) put the total numbers of aircraft at about 1200 for the entire meditterranean front as at June 1942. I doubt very much that they (the Germans) lost 800 aircraft in two months in this TO. 

I am still underwhelmed by the quality of the information you are presenting. Why dont you properly reference it so i can have a look for myself. Who knows, maybe you might have something worth looking at....


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 5, 2012)

you have presented that force how that used in operation pedestal "useful to look at the force compositions for the respective sides in the pedstal Operation" not as the force present in mediterranean elsewhere in the fact when you presented allied air force you writed only the Malta units.
i've writed all times that the source is the web page ww2.dk if you want not write is not my fault


----------



## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

Vincenzo
I do apologise for getting a little hot under the collar. your a fine researcher, and a good friend, ....so we have a somewhat different understanding about the numbers. big deal. People can judge for themselves. 

What can we agree on then.....well, I'll put it to you this way. would you agree that the the CAP was heavily outnumbered, and that despite this the attacking land based air units were unable to sink any carriers, despite they being the focus of many attacks. The attacking aircraft could not much hurt the convoy either. most of the damage to the convoy was done by submarines, surface ships of the RM and submarines. I count 1 ship sunk outright and several shared kills, and most of these were achieved after Force H had left the battle. 

How would you feel about that position?


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 6, 2012)

as your post the allied had 72 carrier fighters and 9 fighters squadrons on Malta
the LW had in Sicily a Ju 87 Gruppe, 2 Bf 109 Gruppen, part of 1 Ju 88C Gruppe (night fighters), 5 Ju 88A Gruppen (1 partly also in Crete)
this were as numbers around same of the only allied fighters. there was also the RA your posted there were 328 italian planes if this are all in sicily or sardinia and the battle was in the range of axis fighters sure there is a numerical advantage on air forces available for the axis but they are flying on 2 different HQ german and italian speakers 2 different language and for the italian take off from 2 different island hundred miles far so the situation was not so bad (comparate to situation with one HQ, 1 language, take off from all the same area) for the allies. if the operation were farther of axis fighter range, or also farther of most of axis fighters range, the advantage is all in the allied side.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 6, 2012)

I think we have a number of differeing sources.

In summary I have the following sources

Messervis:

Says that on the eve of the operation there were a total of 784 a/c available to the axis forces. He says that he has used the Italian "official" history and the London Gazette to put that list together.

Bauer

Says also that on the eve of the operation there were 784 a/c available and further says that most of the advantages were with the Axis. they had advanced warning what was coming, at the start a single unified command system (Kesselring was answerable to Commando Supremo though he still also answered to OKW. OKW did not interfere with the battle)

Bauer says he is quoting from Kesselrings own report to his superiors

Roskill 

says that 590 a/c were deployed in Sicily and Sardinia to attack the convoy. He does not give details on dispositions or types and does not appear to include the reserves held in italy. 

Some additional sources to consider

Ellis 
says that in June the Italians had 748 in Italy and the Med, plus an additional 248 a/c deployed in North Africa. By the end of the year this figure was 515 in Italy/Med (of which 376 were in Northern and central italy) and 283 in NA. 

In June the Germans are listed as having 357 a/c in Italy and the Med (LF II, which by the time of Pedestal had absorbed FliegerKorps X). However LF II did not take FliegerKorps VIII with it when it deployed to the med (meaning Italy and the central basin) in December 1941. This unit operated on the Eastern Front as a separate independant command, playing critical roles there ). There were in June 1942 183 a/c operating in North Africa under the command of FliegerFuhrer Afrika. Additionally there was yet another command in the eastern meditterranean, covering the Balkans (excluding Rumania), and the Aegean Islands, including Crete. This command was designated LuftwaffeKommando Sud, and had under its command in June 186 a/c, most of them in Crete and Greece. 

If you add up the numbers you will arrive at 706 combat aircraft (ie excluding transports) across the whole TO in June

There was an additional command that I have not fully researched. General Students FliegerKorps XI was the German tranport command, operating independantly to the abovementioned commands. I am not entirely sure of numbers, but it was about 490 from memory. Not all of these were in the med, but a substantial number were . .


In prepration of the convoy operation in mid August, the Germans appear to have reinfoorced the Med command , not only from the other two med commands, but also from outside the TO. By the middle of August, there were 940 a/c under LFII command, 375 under FlgrFuhrer Afika. There were 194 a/c in the Balans command. That gives a total of LW 1509 a/c in the TO overall excluding their transport commands.

To cross check these numbers, I also had a look at the quarterly returns for the LW, to see if such numbers were at least plausible. In total (excluding transports and trainers) the LW had a total strength of 3860 frontline A/C in June. 706 a/c I know from other sources, that roughly 20% of the LW strength was being poured in the MTO by June. 20% of 3860 is roughly 780 a/c. so these numbers are entirely consistent with each other. 

Next I checked with Dunnigans and Bergs "Campaign For North Africa". A simulation used at Sandhurst and here in Australia at our RMC. It has over 30 square fet of maps, requires a minimum of 32 personnel to run, 8500 pieces uses the German Kriegspiel system, and takes a minimum of two year to work through. Call it a game if you like, but be aware that Dunnigan now works directly for the pentagon as a military adviser. he has over thirty books to his name, and is a specialist on the MTO. Bergs CV is equally impressive. And their work is in print, not just online sources, so i would hold their credentials and accuracy up to any one volume or online source any day. 

Without repeating myself, CNA almost exactly replicates the above figures. There is some variation for the forces under LuftwaffeKommando Sud, giving them just 90a/c, but I suspect this is because they only inldude the a/c on Crete and disregard the other deployments 

I cannot explain why your figures are different to mine, but they are fundamentally so. I get back to Kesselrings report to OKW. Why would he say that he had deployed 784 a/c to counter the convoy unless he had done so. These are primary records, that cant be easily written off or ignored. 

As far as the convoy having all the advantages....hardly. They had advantages, I will grant you that, but on the basis of the above numbers, they certainly did not have any numerical advantage. What did happen was that the axis had great difficulty in concentrating their forces, which gave the RN the opportunity to defeat each strike individually. This would be no different to the situation in Malaya. The Japanese did not attack as a single group, they attacked in separate strikes, each broken up into waves, with each wave coming in at intervals of about 20-40 mins apart. Forced on them by the dispersal of their airfields, though admittedly also designed to try and dissipate the CAP. Against carrier borne CAP that would be very hard to achieve for strikes coming in from several hundred miles distant


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 6, 2012)

LW unit in Sicily (strenght 1st august) (ommited HQ they had no more of 3 planes) I/KG54 (25-88 ), II/KG77 (16-88 ), 606 KGr (14-88 ), 806 KGr (15-88 ), III/KG77 (20-88 but with a detachment in Crete), I/NJ2 (30-88, scattered in all Mediterranean), II/JG53 (24-109), I/JG77 (17-109), I/STG3 (10-87), I/LG1 (24-88 ), II/LG1 (25-88 ) i've missed LG unit in my post n° 50th
LW in North Africa III/ZG26 (40-110, 1-109 but with detachment in Crete), 10/ZG26 (9-17), I/JG27 (24-109), II/JG27 (24-109), III/JG27 (24-109, with a detachment in Crete), 10/JG27 (6-109), 10/JG53 (7-109), II/STG3 (29-87), III/STG3 (28-87)
LW in Crete&Greece II/KG100 (22-111) plus the detachment previous indicate


the LG gruppen are commonly based in Crete was moved in Sicily for the operation, the I/STG3 was commonly based in NA was moved in Sicily, idk if for the operation or for reequip in august came in the unit many 87D that overred the older 87R


----------



## parsifal (Jul 6, 2012)

Thanks Vincenzo, very useful post, I should say. however I do have some problems with the information just the same. The information is not referenced, so it cannot be verified one way or another. The Geographical limits on the deployments dont cover the entire commands, so dont give a full picture. LF2 for example was not limited to just Sicily, though your report does limit itself. LF-2s commamnd area was not restricted to just Sicily. The report is dated 1 August , which, allowing for the time needed to collate that information, probably means that it is actually a snapshot from a few days before that date. Moreover, LF-2 did not get knowledge of the convoy until some time aft4er that, after which they initiated their reinforcement plan. Kesselrings memo is dated 10 August. There will almost certainly be a massive movement and concentration of force in the intervening period, for both the RA and LF-2. 

Lastly,, there were quite massive differences in the strength of individual formations. Fiebigs FiegerKorps VIII was at one point in the east Front several orders of magnitude stronger than LF-=4. By rights it should have been a far smaller command. Thats a mark of the flexibility of the german system, and the depth of talent that existed in its command echelons


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 7, 2012)

the source it's same, ww2.dk i thinked at this point this was clear
there are not other unit in italy with exception of replacement staffeln in north italy and this is not a combat unit. tell the me what you want as territorial limit i've checked all mediterranean area. the report is not dated 1st august they are the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen that give monthly situation, (aircraft strenght start to month, changes in the month, strenght end the month). (example I/STG3 10 Ju 87R, - 8 87R to others units, +26 87D new, final 2 87R and 26 87D).


----------



## starling (Jul 7, 2012)

Hey guys,forgive me for jumping in here,and I may have missed the data,but during the Pedestal'timeframe',did the R.A.F.bomber units(Wellington,Beaufort and beaufighters?),not attack the axis airfields on Sicily etc.? Are there any accurate figures on the axis losses that were sustained,if any.?Starling.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> the source it's same, ww2.dk i thinked at this point this was clear
> there are not other unit in italy with exception of replacement staffeln in north italy and this is not a combat unit. tell the me what you want as territorial limit i've checked all mediterranean area. the report is not dated 1st august they are the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen that give monthly situation, (aircraft strenght start to month, changes in the month, strenght end the month). (example I/STG3 10 Ju 87R, - 8 87R to others units, +26 87D new, final 2 87R and 26 87D).



Thankyou for clarifying your source. This is one source, with impressive references, I will grant you, however it is still at odds with Kesselrings report, and with four contrary sources that each refer back to primary material. And, with the greatest reespect, it is not a verifiable source 

This source look as if it is a good one, but from the quick look I have made of it, it is typicial of internet based sources. Whilst impressively referenced (which is a vast improvement on most web based sources) there is no evidence of any independant verification of the sites accuracy, no critique or review done by independant authorities. When faced with an apparent conflict in the information, the reliability of that information ha to be looked at, and when you look at this material, it looks good, but it is not independantly verified. That weighs very heavily against it. . There is no way of relying or verifying what statements are made within its pages. they could be saying ANYTHING, and there is no easy way of cross checking any of the material. 

You need to cross reference this one source with an alternative to verify your claims, as I have done. I have taken four completely different hiostorical accounts and cross referenced them. They each confirm the strengths that were available , thereby buttressing each other and making the argument stronger. I have four sources, all in print and therby benefitting from the advantage of having an independant editor in each case, and in the case of Dunnigans and Bergs running the gauntlet of being independantly critiqued on many occasions. These sources all say the same thing, the Axis had 784 aircraft concentrated in the central basin for the purpose of attacking the convoy. They also say that ther were other air units in the TO not committed to the battle. They all link back to primary sources, and in particular make reference to Kesselrings report. 

We do not have that level of scrutiny for your website. It looks like a very good site, and they do cite very good records. But there is no editor, no independant review, no peer review of this material. Though unlikley, they could be missing things, or saying anything and there is no real way of making sure the material is correct or not. For that reason alone, it makes the claims you are making unreliable. You need to verify your material as I have done, or refer to the original sources. 

i have provided four referenced sources that can be verified and traced back to their original sources. The original sources are primary datra, most importantly Kesselrings own report to OKW which you are just refusing to acknowledge even exists. You need to look at this document and find out why it, as a primary source document, is so different to the website material that you are relying on You cannot, with respect say that these were the only units in all of italy, on the basis of the one source that you are relying on. 

you are not going to like this criticism, I know, but I am applying standard research standards to this debate, and this material you are relying on does NOT measure up however cool or sexy it may look.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2012)

To be fair however, Roskill does put the number of aircraft involved at 590. Alfred Price says that there were 660 a/c, whilst Correlli Barnett puts it at the same number. The German Historian Jurgen Rohwer puts the figure at 620 a/c. Norman Polmar in his book "Aircraft Carriers" (written in collaboration with Minoru Genda, Eric Brown and Robert Langdon), puts the figure at 650a/c. Peter Shackland and Anthony Hand in their joint Work "Malta Conoys " puts the number at just over 660 a/c as well;.

I have a few more sources that may be worth digging up from the basement .

So there seems to be some dispute on the numbers, hovering between as low as 590a/c through to 784 from the sources I have dug up so far. Barnetts does say that the last 70 a/c (ju88s and He111s) flew into Sardinia on the 11th, ...just before the battle proper began


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 7, 2012)

if the italian number 328 is good and this is possible there were in 1940 around 300 combat planes in Sicilia&Sardegna, around 200 lw planes the 1st august maybe some more (teens) in right days just add recce planes and easy get number like 590 planes


----------



## barney (Jul 9, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> If Indom was there at the time that the Repulse and Prince were attacked, it would have added another element to the mix, particularly if the Japanese battleships were present (according to my copy of Siegfried Breyer's book Battleships and battlecruisers 1905 - 1970; "The fitting of torpedo bulges reduced their speed and from 1930 onwards they are therefore classified as senkan = battleships" - pedant ).



I've been away from home and computers for a few days and I see this discussion has become quite advanced in my absence. However, I'd like to go back and write a few words about the importance of the classification of these ships. 

You are correct in writing that Siegfried Breyer reports that the Kongo Class battle cruisers, after conversion were listed as battleships and after new engines were installed, as fast battleships. These were 30 knot ships. The 30 knot speed should be the giveaway here. If these ships had been armored to the standard of WWII era battleships they couldn't have had that speed. As it was, their vertical armor has been described as “Incredibly thin”. 

So, why is this important? I suggest that the turning point in the Pacific was not Coral Sea or Midway but the loss of two of these vessels on successive nights near Savo Island. After that the Japanese Army began withdrawing from Guadalcanal and the Japanese Navy didn't come out to fight again until Leyte Gulf. 

Also, if these ships were battle cruisers, the battle of Friday the 13th, where an American cruiser flotilla left Hiei circling at 5 knots to be finished off the following day and the decisiveness of the Washington Kirishima engagement are both better explained. Finally, history books tell us that battleship to battleship engagements occurred twice in the Pacific during WWII. I suggest the correct answer is once.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 9, 2012)

> These were 30 knot ships. The 30 knot speed should be the giveaway here. If these ships had been armored to the standard of WWII era battleships they couldn't have had that speed.




They were re-engined and rearmoured between the wars. Whilst I agree that they were not on a par with a South Dakota class, they were better protected than the heavier WWI era ships that were their contemporaries. Not in overall armour thickness, but certainly in the amount of armour as a precentage of total displacement, and also from the more modern bulges and subdivision of these ships. They were pre-WWI era battlecruisers, in which armour was spread allover the ship like margarine. As a result their armour was insufficient against 16", but they could concevably stop a 14" of lower power.

These ships are similar to the Italian cavour class in that they were almost completely gutted in their rebuild. Are the cavour class a Battlecruiser as well? 



> As it was, their vertical armor has been described as “Incredibly thin”.



Yes, they were, if they are judged by the standards of ships built 25 years their junior 



> So, why is this important? I suggest that the turning point in the Pacific was not Coral Sea or Midway but the loss of two of these vessels on successive nights near Savo Island. After that the Japanese Army began withdrawing from Guadalcanal and the Japanese Navy didn't come out to fight again until Leyte Gulf.



This is factually incorrect. The Japanese fought at Phillipine Sea in THE major battle that defeated the japanese. they fought repeated cruiser actions in the Solomns and in the far north, winning more than they lost. The defeat of yammamotos aerial offensive in April 1943, and the decimation of the carrier air groups that such a defeat brought along with the unrelenting pressure being put on the japanese were far more important. The death of Yammamot , an inherently aggressive commander, brought with it a switch to a more defensive stance by the japanese, as they looked to fight their decisive battle in the central pacific. they believed the decisive location for that were either the marshalls or the marianas. 




> Also, if these ships were battle cruisers, the battle of Friday the 13th, where an American cruiser flotilla left Hiei circling at 5 knots to be finished off the following day and the decisiveness of the Washington Kirishima engagement are both better explained.



In the case of the two battleship actions, on both occasions, the Japanese were hampered by the shell loadout they were using. On both occasions they were loaded out with HE shels, which severely downgraded the effectiveness of their guns, at least initially. On both occasions they were not expecting the opposition they received,. In the second battle, despite being outnumbered, and outgunned, and at a tactical disadvantage, Kirishima still came close to sinking the sth Dakota, who suffered repeated failures. Washington was very fortunate, her radar allowed her to close to point blank range, and pump a full broadside into the japanese ship from point blank range. Even a bismarck or a new Jersey would not have withstood that sort of pounding.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 9, 2012)

Have attached two articles by Robert Lundgren one concerning the details of the action fought, and the second is a detailed damage assessment for Kirishima,


----------



## barney (Jul 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> In the case of the two battleship actions, on both occasions, the Japanese were hampered by the shell loadout they were using. On both occasions they were loaded out with HE shels, which severely downgraded the effectiveness of their guns, at least initially. On both occasions they were not expecting the opposition they received,. In the second battle, despite being outnumbered, and outgunned, and at a tactical disadvantage, Kirishima still came close to sinking the sth Dakota, who suffered repeated failures. Washington was very fortunate, her radar allowed her to close to point blank range, and pump a full broadside into the japanese ship from point blank range. Even a bismarck or a new Jersey would not have withstood that sort of pounding.



It is true that South Dakota suffered numerous failures; radar, gun directors, radar plot and radios were shot out. Radio communication was out because all of the ship's antennas were shot off! But the main problem, electrical failure, was self induced and this left her main battery silent. 

Until my brother came by, I had a book that listed the Japanese order of battle. So, from hazy recall I think there were 26 IJN ships in the waters around Guadalcanal that night. This includes some Marus on a mission to land troops on the island plus their escorts. In the immediate neighborhood of the battle there were:

Battle Crusier (I contend) Kirishima a 30 knot ship armed with 8x14inch, 16x6inch and 8x5inch guns
Heavy Cruiser Atago a 35 knot ship armed with 10x8inch guns
Heavy Cruiser Takao a 35 knot ship armed with 10x8inch guns
Light Cruiser Nagara a 36 knot ship armed with 7x5.5inch guns
Light Cruiser Sendai a 35 knot ship armed with 7x5.5inch guns
Plus seven destroyers

I point this out because this battle is often described as being between the Kirishima and the South Dakota or the Kirishima and the Washington when in fact there were 12 IJN vessels in the area.
So, as for Kirishima being outnumbered, I say false. As for being outgunned, that is a judgement call, does the many guns of the Japanese fleet rule or does the throw weight of the 16 inch rifles?

As for the contention that the bombardment group was hampered by being loaded out with HE shells, I agree. Of the heavy hits received by South Dakota, two were HE, two were Incendiary and only one was AP. The AP round struck the barbette of number 3 turret, misaligning the roller table and making the turret hard to train. South Dakota was also hit by what appears to be the cap head of a 14 inch AP round, the projectile having disassembled upon hitting the water. 

You state Kirishima came close to sinking South Dakota. That got me wondering how good the shooting of the Kirishima was the night of her loss? According to the South Dakota damage assessment posted at USS South Dakota Damage Analysis
the South Dakota was hit 27 times. Some of the hits are known to have come from the heavy cruisers, the Kirishima did not have 8 inch guns and South Dakota took five 8inch AP rounds and 2 8inch HE rounds. Tallied up, as best as I could (the source of some of the hits is unclear), it looks like the Kirishima was responsible for 14 or 15 of the hits, a little over half. You are welcome to make your own tally if you wish. So, this was an engagement between the South Dakota, the Kirishima, some cruisers and maybe IJN destoryers.

As for the South Dakota, she emerged pretty beat up but in no sense close to sinking and still making full power. One interesting thing was the hull seams that opened up well below where hits impacted her side armor. This I take to be the result of having side armor far inside of the outer hull. Another fact I came across was that the Washington was shooting nearly over the South Dakota to engage the Kirishima. Luckily, no holes in the other side of South Dakota.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2012)

> It is true that South Dakota suffered numerous failures; radar, gun directors, radar plot and radios were shot out. Radio communication was out because all of the ship's antennas were shot off! But the main problem, electrical failure, was self induced and this left her main battery silent.
> 
> Until my brother came by, I had a book that listed the Japanese order of battle. So, from hazy recall I think there were 26 IJN ships in the waters around Guadalcanal that night. This includes some Marus on a mission to land troops on the island plus their escorts. In the immediate neighborhood of the battle there were:
> 
> ...




The numbers are correct, however I suggest you have a look at Lundgrens article on the action. These ships did not fight as a coherent co-ordinated unit. At best, the Battleships were engaged by the BC and the two CAs, although I do concede the light forces of the Japanese fired a large number of Long lances at the two USN battlewagons. 



> I point this out because this battle is often described as being between the Kirishima and the South Dakota or the Kirishima and the Washington when in fact there were 12 IJN vessels in the area.
> So, as for Kirishima being outnumbered, I say false.



She was outnumbered for most of the battle that she engaged the battle ships. the Takao and Atago turned away and were with drawing from 0100, The two Destroyer Divisions, less those that had been disabled, were already retreating by then. Kirishima received her most damaging hits 0107 and later, ,so it is more true to say she was outnumbered and outgunned than to claim otherwise. 



> As for being outgunned, that is a judgement call, does the many guns of the Japanese fleet rule or does the throw weight of the 16 inch rifles?



Obviously the lighter guns have some impact, as the preceding engagement with Hiei demonstrates. However, Kirishimas 14in batteries were hard pressed to penetrate the citadels of the two US Battleships, whilst the 16 in batteries of the US ships were designed to deal with ships of the Kirishima class (ie ships designed to withstand hits from a 14" or lighter, at ranges of about 18000 yards or greater (from memory)).

However, despite that disadavantage, as well as the disavantages of being a dispersed force, caught with the wrong ammunition loadout, Kirishima for a time did achieve the upper hand over the American ships. If it had been just one Battlship/cruiser versus one battleship (with say one or 2 US CAs to help out), I think the result would have been a japanese victory. What killed the Kirishima was that she did not relaize, until too late, that she was faced by two BBs each of superior size, protection and power to her own. But its a long way from concededing the superior power of the American ships, to claiming the Kirishima was inherently weak just on the basis of what bhappened to her in her final action. 


As for the contention that the bombardment group was hampered by being loaded out with HE shells, I agree. Of the heavy hits received by South Dakota, two were HE, two were Incendiary and only one was AP. The AP round struck the barbette of number 3 turret, misaligning the roller table and making the turret hard to train. South Dakota was also hit by what appears to be the cap head of a 14 inch AP round, the projectile having disassembled upon hitting the water. 



> You state Kirishima came close to sinking South Dakota. That got me wondering how good the shooting of the Kirishima was the night of her loss? According to the South Dakota damage assessment posted at USS South Dakota Damage Analysis
> the South Dakota was hit 27 times. Some of the hits are known to have come from the heavy cruisers, the Kirishima did not have 8 inch guns and South Dakota took five 8inch AP rounds and 2 8inch HE rounds. Tallied up, as best as I could (the source of some of the hits is unclear), it looks like the Kirishima was responsible for 14 or 15 of the hits, a little over half. You are welcome to make your own tally if you wish. So, this was an engagement between the South Dakota, the Kirishima, some cruisers and maybe IJN destoryers.



When I claim she came close to sinking her, I conceded I am extrapolating a bit. What would have happened if Washington had not been there to pull Daks chestnuts out of the fire? I think the Japanese would have sunki her



> As for the South Dakota, she emerged pretty beat up but in no sense close to sinking and still making full power. One interesting thing was the hull seams that opened up well below where hits impacted her side armor. This I take to be the result of having side armor far inside of the outer hull. Another fact I came across was that the Washington was shooting nearly over the South Dakota to engage the Kirishima. Luckily, no holes in the other side of South Dakota


.

This is a good summary. As far as washington shoting over or near the Dak, maybe for a short while, but Dak basically stopped in the water for some timeand was forced to turn away, as did the Kirishima. Again I would recommend Lundgreens article, which I have attached in a previous post.


----------



## barney (Jul 15, 2012)

parsifal said:


> She was outnumbered for most of the battle that she engaged the battle ships. the Takao and Atago turned away and were with drawing from 0100, The two Destroyer Divisions, less those that had been disabled, were already retreating by then. Kirishima received her most damaging hits 0107 and later, ,so it is more true to say she was outnumbered and outgunned than to claim otherwise.



Okay, some more about this battle. 

Early in the war the Japanese were rightly known as the masters of the night. What made them particularly deadly was their ability to inflict a vicious torpedo attack. US naval forces around Guadalcanal, on the other hand, continually had friendly fire problems.

It perhaps made perfect sense for the IJN to divide their forces in the way they did on the night of November 14-15. In the dark it obviously would have been easier to command and maneuver small forces rather than a large one. Later in the war when the US fielded large forces, these fleets had to learn to navigate and maneuver as a unit. So, with experience, this is possible. 

The fact that the separate Japanese surface formations were not in position to screen Kirishima, when she came under fire from the Washington, I suggest, does not mean Kirishima was outnumbered, but only that the Washington was able to defeat Kirishima in detail. 

Since you recommend Lundgreen's account of the battle, view the plot on page 17, noticing the location of the SD and Atago at 0103. The SD was broadside to the Atago when Atago launched an 8 torpedo spread at 3000 yards. None hit. The fact that neither the Washington nor SD suffered torpedo damage in this battle is nothing short of miraculous. It just wasn't going to happen that night. But, had the IJN smashed into the US formation the way Callaghan led his cruiser fleet the previous night, I'm thinking the outcome could have been completely different. I believe it was DD O'Bannon that engaged the Hiei at a range of less than 100 feet. So, I contend the IJN sent sufficient vessels down the slot to even contend with the unexpected power of the US forces present. 

Washington opened fire with her main battery at 0100 and then ceased fire at 0102 because the cruisers in the van of Kirishima stopped illuminating SD. So, how much was Washington depending on radar? At 0104 Washington's main battery resumed fire. By 0105 SD is sailing right through the Washington's sights. At 0107 the SD is still in the Washington's sights and the Washington ceases fire. The final broadside from Washington put a projectile under Kirishima's fantail as she was turning away, knocking one of her rudders sideways. The Kirishima is done for.


----------



## RCAFson (Jul 17, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I disagree completely. And there is no evidence to support any of the claims you are making here. The limited numbers of Zeroes available....just 25 precluded any heavy escort for their bombers. These zeroes in any event were tasked to fly continuous cover for the convoy. so, the japanese strike aircraft...a/c with a top speed (unloaded) of just 230 knots, are going to be shot out of the sky with ease. if Zeroes are available, the equation does change, that i will grant you, but that is not what is being claimed by you, or anyone else.....the claim is that with the tools at hand the japanese would defeat the carrier. They could not.


 
Exactly, and with a carrier present, Force Z would be launching offensive strikes of Albacores escorted by Fulmars, forcing the IJNAF into an even more defensive posture; Do the Zeros escort bombers, or defend the convoy? On Feb 20 1942, Lexington's fighters slaughtered a group of IJN twin engine aircraft, that attacked her without a fighter escort. The Fulmars were designed with a massive ammo capacity to deal with exactly such attacks


----------

