# Did the 8th Air Force precision bomb or area bomb?



## pattle (Jul 13, 2013)

We always hear that the RAF area bombed Germany by night and that the USAAF precision bombed Germany by day. This is the traditional belief, but was the 8th Air Force in reality area bombing?


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## VBF-13 (Jul 13, 2013)

They weren't dive bombing. But, yeah, I guess they could see better in the day than in the night.


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## wuzak (Jul 13, 2013)

I've seen it stated that the RAF precision bombed area targets (Oboe and visually marked, individually bombed and master bomber helping correct for wind and creepback, etc) and the 8th AF area bombed precision targets (formation bombing, use of more numerous and smaller bombs).


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## drgondog (Jul 13, 2013)

Every lead bombardier in squadron lead ship had a specific target such as a cracking plant in the middle of a refinery or a machine shop in an Engine manufacturing complex - and the rest of the squadron toggled on his drop. All of the squadron Bombardiers were setting up from the IP in case the lead ships went down.

Through 8/10 or worse cloud cover, there was a pathfinder assuming the lead ship bombardier responsibility but individual sight bombing could occur as the target may be exposed during the bomb run.

While results frequently fell short of precision bombing, there were spectacular successes in which small footprint targets were obliterated (intentionally)


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## davebender (Jul 13, 2013)

There was nothing precise about the majority of U.S. level bombing during WWII but that makes a great war slogan.


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## syscom3 (Jul 13, 2013)

The 8th and 15th AF's tried to be precise, but usually bombed all over the place. The RAF made no pretensions about it though.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 13, 2013)

In targeting terms there are 2 criteria - precision and accuracy. These 2 criteria are often conflated to mean the same thing but they are not. Precision is the ability to hit the same point with multiple weapons whereas accuracy is the ability to hit what you're actually aiming at. The example below from a NOAA website might help explain:

NOAA 200th: Surveying - Accuracy Versus Precision

Although we often talk of the 8th Air Force using "precision bombing techniques", in reality the aspiration was for both precision and accuracy. I would argue that neither were really achieved. 

The bombs dropped by the Lead Bombardiers, equipped with the Norden bomb sight, could be considered as being accurately aimed but the unpredictable flight path of the bombs released from altitude automatically reduced precision. If the Lead Bombardier altered his aiming point to account for the massed formation behind him, then his weapons were not accurately aimed. The following aircraft simply toggled when the Lead Bombardier released, resulting in neither precision nor accuracy. Most of those bombs were likely to drop short of the target (and would also be dispersed due to bomb flight path issues). 

In short, as Davebender points out, precision bombing was an aspiration and a great slogan but had little to do with actually hitting the target with any degree of precision or accuracy.


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## mhuxt (Jul 13, 2013)

I predict 18 pages, and three bannings.

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## Hop (Jul 13, 2013)

> Did the 8th Air Force precision bomb or area bomb?



Both. 

As well as "precision" attacks on German military/industrial targets, the 8th carried out command area attacks (where they went out with a German city area as the primary target) and attacks on city areas as secondary or targets of opportunity (where the primary target could not be bombed and so a city was attacked instead).

Richard G Davis is an official historian of the USAF. He is currently Command Historian, U.S. European Command.

And from American Bombardment Policy Against Germany:



> The first area raid noted in Eighth Air Force
> records occurred on August 12, 1943, when 106
> bombers attacked the city of Bonn, visually, as a
> target of opportunity.
> ...





> The primitive radar technology then available
> allowed the Eighth to locate a city through clouds,
> but not a specific plant or precision objective.
> 17
> ...





> Anderson also introduced another change in
> Eighth Air Force policy. It began to take effect at
> the same time as the introduction of H2S - a large
> increase in use of incendiary bombs. Anderson
> ...





> In October 1944 the Eighth’s area bombing
> increased as bad weather forced attacks on second-
> ary targets. At the end of the month the Eighth Air
> Force issued a new SOP, ‘Attack of Secondary and
> ...





> 3. It has been determined that towns and cities
> large enough to produce an identifiable return on
> the H2X scope generally contain a large proportion
> of the military objectives listed above. These cen-
> ...



From Bombing the European Axis Powers:



> n all, not excluding raids
> under 30 bombers, the command area raids accounted for
> 29,176 effective sorties, 915 lost aircraft, 46,570 tons of high ex-
> plosives, 24,936 tons of incendiaries, and 576 tons of fragmen-
> tation bombs, for a total of 72,082 tons of bombs.





> In all
> opportunity bombings accounted for 3,940 sorties, 82 lost heavy
> bombers, 7,437 tons of high explosives, 2,345 tons of incendi-
> aries, and 64 tons of fragmentation bombs, for a total of 9,846 tons.



No one would claim the 8th AF devoted as much effort to area bombing as Bomber Command did, but it's wrong to claim they didn't do it at all. Until 1944 they were pretty open about their area bombing against Germany, after that they removed all reference to area bombing from their records, although they still carried out area attacks.

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## Gixxerman (Jul 13, 2013)

I think what we call 'precision bombing' now is very very different from what it was thought of back then.
The tactics, tech training was being developed as the war happened.
Everyone thought they could avoid civilian deaths at the beginning, nobody managed it.
Even today tech fails /or intel is wrong non-combatants get hurt or killed.
How much worse in the pre-digital age?


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## Procrastintor (Jul 13, 2013)

As precise as was possible 70 years ago.


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## Procrastintor (Jul 13, 2013)

(aka area bombing)


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## stona (Jul 14, 2013)

Exactly.

Steve


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## Njaco (Jul 14, 2013)

Only the Luftwaffe 'precision' bombed............................


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## Procrastintor (Jul 14, 2013)

Thats a Stuka dive bomber,an A-36 or P-40 Apache (Mustang) could have similar results, we are talking B-17s/B-24s, so the German equivilant is a group of HE 111s.


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## Procrastintor (Jul 14, 2013)

whoops, A-36 Apache, dont know why the P-40 got between there


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## buffnut453 (Jul 14, 2013)

Freudian slip?


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## Procrastintor (Jul 14, 2013)

Yep


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## pattle (Jul 14, 2013)

I think there was a tendency on the part of the Western Allies to wish to disassociate themselves from area bombing post war, the best example of this was the lack of recognition given to bomber command by Churchill. I think that the Americans had probably realised earlier than the British that it would be best to distance themselves from the tactic of area bombing and so created the myth that it was the British alone that area bombed. The thing that confuses me is that while I have witnessed much controversy over the area bombing of Germany I don't recall hearing anyone questioning the area bombing of Japan and I wonder why there is such a difference in attitude between the area bombing of these two countries.
While I understand what a unpleasant event an area bombing raid was, I personally believe that they played a vital part in shortening the particularly unpleasant chain of events known as World War Two.

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## CobberKane (Jul 14, 2013)

The US came into the war with a genuine distaste for area bombing and a belief they could precision bomb in built up areas. Unfortunately they were wrong - the technology of the time meant that the difference between area bombing and precision bombing was largely a matter of semantics. As the realities of war setttled in the squeamishness at bombing civilians abated, until by the end of the war the USAF had pretty much done away with the idea of precision bombing as anything but a pretence, though propaganda for the folks back home still held that civilians were not being deliberately bombed.
The British, of course, barely never needed a pretence at all - they had been on the receiving end of German area bombing and were more than happy to hand it back in spades. When studies demonstrated how few bombs were landing in the target zone the RAF tactic to increase the number of hits was simple - drop more bombs. 
I think the fact that US reticence regarding the bombing of civilians in Japan was markedly less than was the case with Germans is due to two main factors. Fistly, by the time the US was in a position to area bomb Japanese cities, the necessity of doing so had already been recognised in Europe - all the hand-wringing was done. Secondly, the people on the receiving end weren't Caucasian. This is uncomfortable, but wartime propaganda persistently portrayed the Japanese as bestial and sub-human. Not that the US was at all alone in portraying enemies this way, but the fact that the Japanese were of another race undoubtedly gave the idea more traction. To be fair though, Kyoto was eliminated as a potential target for the atomic bomb due to it's historical and cultural significance, so such factors were never entirely disregarded.
Post war, peacetime niceties re-asserted themselves and no-one wanted to remember area bombing. Bomber Harris didn't get his knighthood and Bomber Command aircrew didn't get a mention in Churchill's victory speeches, in spite of sustaining the highest casualty rate of any branch of the services. To this day they have never received a campaign medal. The USA treated it's veterans better and the daytime heavy bomber crews are rightly lauded for their courage, but what was happening in the cities under the B-17s and B-24s is less considered, and for the layman at least, the myth persists of military targets being picked off in the middle of civilian centres.


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## Jabberwocky (Jul 14, 2013)

The official US doctrine was 'daylight precision bombing' and the USAAF generally attempted to precision bomb, for a given value of 'precision'. That is, they used mass style attacks from high altitude aimed at single large 'point' targets (marshalling/rail yards, factory complexes, oil refineries, transport hubs ect), with wildly varying degrees of accuracy. 

However, the VIII Air Force was willing to blind bomb as well. In fact given N/W European climactic conditions, it would have periodically been rendered ineffective if it had not adopted blind bombing techniques. To their credit, crews often abandoned missions if blind bombing equipment was not working (for example, on 20 March 1944, nearly 70% of bombers failed to bomb after the blind bombing equipment was found to be unservicable).

Precision in WWII was vastly different from modern precision bombing. 

An 8th AF combat box ranged from 1200 ft to over 3000 ft wide and could be even longer than this. 

The 8th AF improved its CEP from over 3000 ft in 1943 to just under 1000 ft by mid-1944. Medium altitude missions (15,000 ft) had an average CEP of 825 to 1175 ft. 

Still, that meant that on average more than 50% of bombs were falling 1000 ft away from their targets.


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## pattle (Jul 14, 2013)

What bombing technique did the USAAF use over Dresden?


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## CobberKane (Jul 14, 2013)

I believe they bombed with radar. There is dispute as to whether the 'target' was the city centre, or industrial sites near the city centre. The commanding officer's report after the bombing states that they were targeting the built up area in the centre of the city. As was so often the case, the language is largely irrelevant; bombs fell everywhere. No-one involved in the planning of the operation could seriously have believed that the end result was going to be anything other than the destruction of Dresden as a city.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 15, 2013)

davebender said:


> There was nothing precise about the majority of U.S. level bombing during WWII but that makes a great war slogan.


In 1944 it was precise as the technology of the day. If you're comparing it by todays standards, just turn the page.


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## CobberKane (Jul 15, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> In 1944 it was precise as the technology of the day. If you're comparing it by todays standards, just turn the page.


 
It was precise as the technology of the day in that the technology didn't exist. Armaud Amalric had already summed up the nature of this sort of campaign in the Thirteenth century; "Caedite eos. Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius."


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## Jabberwocky (Jul 15, 2013)

For me, the key question is: given the techniques and technology available at the time, could the USAAF have bombed more precisely? As I see it, the answer is yes, but only at significant cost in operational losses and tempo and only with significant learning from experience.

To increase accuracy, the Eighth could have done the following:

Use larger bombs, 
Bombed from lower altitudes, 
Bombed in smaller formations, 
Increased intervals between bomb groups, 
Reduced the width of combat boxes,
Switched to an all B-17 force,
Increased the level of training for crews,
Improved its meteorological forecasting,
Never visually bomb through anything more than four tenths cloud,
Never bomb using blind bombing techniques
Introduce pathfinder aircraft 
Reduced/eliminated use of fragmentation bombs

Most of these were figured out during the war by various operational study units, but not all were implemented. Some were ignored completely, or the opposite happened.

Formations got bigger instead of smaller and bomb groups were more tightly bunched for mutual defence, instead of spaced out at intervals to reduce target occlusion. The Eighth increasingly used blind/through cloud bombing through late 1944, which was almost never as accurate as visual bombing. Average bombing heights declined from about 23,000 to about 20,000, but never to the 11,000 to 15,000 ft necessary to produce sub 750 ft CEPs. 

The four most significant factors in terms of accuracy were determined to be:
The cloud/visibility conditions above the target. This could affect accuracy by a factor of 10.
The number of bomb groups involved in the raid. A raid of three bomb groups was up to 40% more accurate than a raid of 10 or more groups
The bombing altitude. 
The amount of flak over a target. Particularly heavy flak could halve accuracy.


If accuracy is the primary concern, then the best option may be to partially replace/supplement the heavy bomber force with a couple of other types. This could take the form of either long range dive-bombers (single or twin engine) or unescorted fast bombers (two or even four engines). 

A dedicated long-range dive bomber in the form of a Ju-88/Tu-2/Pe-2 style aircraft could be used on targets requiring a higher degree of precision or ones that had a reduced level of flak defences. Bombing from lower levels, dive bombers were significantly more vulnerable than heavy bombers, but also significantly more accurate. 30-40 dive bombers with a CEP of 750 ft might put more bombs actually on the target than 200-300 heavy bombers with a CEP of 1200 or 1500 ft

A fast bomber similar to a Mosquito, or even an enlarged, four-engine Mosquito. In daylight Mosquitoes were consistently capable of CEPs of 390-450 ft when bombing from under 6000 ft in gentle dives. Average CEP for low level bombing was about 660 ft. This might be the solution needed for relatively high-precision targets with higher levels of defence. 

So, I think the USAAF could have pursued a hi-medium-low approach: Use escorted heavy bombers during clear conditions over Europe for the largest of target, use dive bombers for ‘precision’ smaller targets with lighter defences, use fast/low level bombers for ‘precision’ heavily defended targets.


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## Milosh (Jul 16, 2013)

How precise can a formation that is almost 1600ft wide be? (Jan 1944) In Feb 1945, the width was reduced to ~1200ft wide.


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## Balljoint (Jul 20, 2013)

If it were possible, accurate bombing would no doubt be preferable. Why put ordinance on marginal targets? 

However, it appears rather evident that the strategy changed as the poor accuracy was recognized as yielding unacceptable results. Incendiary bombing isn’t just a harrassment tactic. It’s a marked and very effective change in the theory of bombing. Rather than relying on the energy of the bomb, incendiary bombing utilized the energy in structures and material on the ground at the target. This allowed orders of magnitude more destructive energy to be visited on the general area of the target. By the time Japan became the target, large cities were routinely destroyed by firestorm. A few cities had to be reserved from such attack so there would be appropriate targets for the nuclear bombs.


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## Kryten (Jul 22, 2013)

We have all heard the claim to be able to put a bomb in a pickle barrel, but what was the real CEP of the Norden sight, and surely the type of ordinance dropped would have a considerable effect on accuracy?


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## stona (Jul 22, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> However, the VIII Air Force was willing to blind bomb as well.



Blind bombing and area bombing are NOT the same thing.

All Air Forces did both. The US 9th Air Force rummaged through its photo files to illustrate the difference in its own official history.










Cheers

Steve


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## bada (Jul 23, 2013)

I never read about precision bombing by the 8thAF, 
just like Jabberwocky i can't see how it could be doable by rather large formations and using mass produced bombs (notperfect aerodynamicaly).

But it was achieved in WW2, but not by the USAAF, but by the RAF with the 617sq. That sqn was the only (to my knowledge) to be able to hit targets with very great precision (using technical capabilities of WW2), but they also used specially handcrafted bombs for this use (the 6 and 10tons earthquake bombs).


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## pattle (Jul 23, 2013)

I suppose Hiroshima and Nagasaki were technically precision bombings as both bombs hit the targets!


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## stona (Jul 23, 2013)

bada said:


> But it was achieved in WW2, but not by the USAAF, but by the RAF with the 617sq. That sqn was the only (to my knowledge) to be able to hit targets with very great precision (using technical capabilities of WW2), but they also used specially handcrafted bombs for this use (the 6 and 10tons earthquake bombs).



617 and 9 Squadrons were the RAF's premier "precision bombing" units. They did not use the standard Mk XIV bombsight but the superior SABS MkIIa sight. In early 1945 617 Squadron was achieving an average radial error of a mere 125 yards from 20,000 ft which is as precise as anybody ever got. Two other precision squadrons (can't remember the numbers) were formed, but using the Mk XIV sight the best they achieved was an average radial error of 195 yards.

Cheers

Steve


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## Jabberwocky (Jul 23, 2013)

> Blind bombing and area bombing are NOT the same thing.



Correct, and I did not say that they were.

However, blind bombing was an order of magnitude less accurate than visual bombing and this was never corrected, even with heavy training in the US of Oboe, Gee and H2X. USAAF studies at the beginning of 1944 showed that only *5%* of bombs dropped in 10/10ths cloud using blind bombing techniques fell within a mile (5280 feet) of the target. By December 1944, this figure was *5.6%*.

To quote Lt Col Raymond H. Willcocks' essay, 'The Ethics of Bombing Dresden'

"As the war in Europe ended, the* American method of bombing had moved away from its established strategy of precision daylight bombardment. It began to merge with the RAF strategy*. This merger enabled the USAAF to assist in the land battle with Germany by directly supporting the field commander in striking targets anytime, day or night. The USAAF had begun using "blind bombing" guided by the H2X radar, the American version of the British H2S system. By the war's end, *80 percent of all of the 8th AF missions utilized this technique*."


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## fastmongrel (Jul 24, 2013)

stona said:


> 617 and 9 Squadrons were the RAF's premier "precision bombing" units. They did not use the standard Mk XIV bombsight but the superior SABS MkIIa sight. In early 1945 617 Squadron was achieving an average radial error of a mere 125 yards from 20,000 ft which is as precise as anybody ever got. Two other precision squadrons (can't remember the numbers) were formed, but using the Mk XIV sight the best they achieved was an average radial error of 195 yards.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



I thought 617 squadron was the only user of the SABS during wartime and 9 sqn used the standard Mk XIV


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## swampyankee (Jul 24, 2013)

I think that the 8th Air Force had specially trained, selected units, analogous to the RAF's 617 Squadron, that could precision bomb, but there was no attempt to do so in the massed raids.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 24, 2013)

Let's get real. How could you "precision bomb" in a B-17?


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## Procrastintor (Jul 24, 2013)

Dive bomb and drop the whole payload, sure, you'll lose a wing mid-dive, but it'll look bad*** up until that point.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Let's get real. How could you "precision bomb" in a B-17?



Short answer is...you can't. I suspect part of the problem is a mis-match of aircraft capability to actual need which had its origins in the 1930s perception that "the bomber will always get through" coupled with Billy Mitchell's claims about precision attack of naval vessels. As late as 1941, the US Government believed in the "strategic deterrent" of the B-17 as demonstrated by the reinforcement of the Philippines that year in a failed attempt to cow Japan into limiting Tokyo's imperial aspirations. Japan had been using "heavy" bombers in China for years and was not intimidated. 

When war came to America in December 1941, it was found that the B-17 was not the impregnable airborne battleship that pre-war planners seemed to perceive it as, indeed its early war operations were rather unsuccessful. Some of this revisionist understanding came from the RAF's usage of the B-17 which clearly showed that the bomber didn't always get through. The B-24 had some better features than the B-17, not least of which was a better bomb load, but it was harder to fly and there is anecdotal evidence that it was less resistant to combat damage than its Boeing stablemate. There was undoubtedly continued belief in the Norden bombsight as the ultimate extension of Billy Mitchell's belief in precision bombing but sufficient bombs had to be delivered on the target in a hostile environment, something that Mitchell's demonstrations never replicated.

It should also be observed that interwar expectations of the efficacy of "heavy" bombing were woefully over-optimistic. By early 1942, it was pretty clear that the B-17 didn't deliver sufficient explosive force at long ranges. Pre-war beliefs that small numbers of bombers (small by comparison with the 1000-bomber raids of 1944) carrying 2000lb of bombs each would paralyse a city proved to be totally inaccurate.

Fortunately for the USAAC, the solution to both the lack of delivered explosive force and the bomber not getting through to the target was the same - send over a large number of bombers flying together in formation to provide weight of bombs and mutually-supportive defensive firepower (although it took time to get that right, with different formations and considerable up-arming of defensive firepower in individual bombers). Of course the problem is that precision/accuracy pretty much disappears with the the large-formation approach.

Early 1940s technology could have implemented precision bombing more effectively, either using long-range dive bombers or by adopting the early Mosquito tactic of going in fast at low level. Neither approach was a silver bullet, though, and losses - particularly for the dive bombers - would have been high. There remain questions about whether the high-speed, unarmed "Mosquito approach" could have worked on the scale required for a sustained strategic bombing campaign - it would be great for taking out key components within a target system (eg hit the switching controls rather than plastering the entire railyard) but such targets are relatively easy to repair.

What is clear, though, is that the USAAF was saddled with the B-17/B-24 and Norden bombsight which, frankly, were not up to the expectations set for precision bombing even at that timeframe, and particularly not in the European theatre. It could be argued that the bomb load of the B-17 wasn't really sufficient for a strategic air campaign in 1942...although that's a drift from the main thrust of this thread. The B-17/B-24 + Norden combination did the job because they had to - it would take too long to overhaul doctrine, equipment and training to start a strategic bombing campaign commencing in early 1942.


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## swampyankee (Jul 26, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Let's get real. How could you "precision bomb" in a B-17?



The same way 617 Squadron did it from a Lancaster. It could be done, but it was far from routine practice and, I suspect, very few heavy bomber units had the capability.

As an aside, I've read (I cannot remember where) that, until the adoption of electronic aids to navigation (especially, iirc, radar), navigational errors made any claim of precision bombing total pretense: when you navigate to the wrong city, it doesn't matter if your bombsight can give you a CEP of 10 m. (as a second aside, I've read that the CEP for the 8th AF's heavy bombers was about a quarter mile, or 400 m).


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## stona (Jul 26, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> I thought 617 squadron was the only user of the SABS during wartime and 9 sqn used the standard Mk XIV



I've got 9 Squadron with the SABS in late'44, _after_ the September Tirpitz raid. The other two squadrons (whose numbers aren't on my PC, or at least I can't find them) used the Mk XIV. I'll try to dig out the source for this when I get home.

Incidentally then Air Commodore Bennett, fulminating in the lack of accuracy of Bomber Command's Main Force units, said that 50% of crews didn't bother to use their bomb sight at all!

Cheers

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 26, 2013)

From Wiki, food for thought...

_"For the U.S. Army Air Force, daylight bombing was normal based upon box formations for defence from fighters. Bombing was coordinated through a lead aircraft but although still nominally precision bombing (as opposed to the area bombing carried out by RAF Bomber Command) the result of bombing from high level was still spread over an area. Before the war on practice ranges, some USAAF crews were able to produce very accurate results, but over Europe with weather and German fighters and anti-aircraft guns and the limited training for new crews this level of accuracy was impossible to reproduce. *The US defined the target area as being a 1,000 ft (300 m) radius circle around the target point - for the majority of USAAF attacks only about 20% of the bombs dropped struck in this area. The U.S. daytime bombing raids were more effective in reducing German defences by engaging the German Luftwaffe than destruction of the means of aircraft production*. 

In the summer of 1944, forty-seven B-29's raided Japan's Yawata Steel Works from bases in China; only one plane actually hit the target area, and only with one of its bombs. This single 500 lb (230 kg) general purpose bomb represented one quarter of one percent of the 376 bombs dropped over Yawata on that mission. It took 108 B-17 bombers, crewed by 1,080 airmen, dropping 648 bombs to guarantee a 96 percent chance of getting just two hits inside a 400 x 500 ft (150 m) German power-generation plant."_

I think this sums up what defined "Precision Daylight Bombing" when you see what defined the target area and what the actual results were. Again consider the technology of that day and don't compare it with what is achievable today!


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## pattle (Jul 26, 2013)

It is frustrating that even today I pick up books and watch documentaries in which experts claim that unlike the RAF the Americans didn't area bomb, I hope these experts are of comfort to the survivors of area bombing. I understand the horrors of area bombing and it was a truly horrific and terrible strategy, but the stark reality was either area bomb Germany or be area bombed, invaded and then enslaved and murdered, there was no third option. The Nazis had to be stopped and stopped they were and if anyone is looking for someone to blame for the area bombing of Germany then blame the Nazis, what Bomber Harris said about sowing the seed and reaping the whirlwind was right and we need not feel ashamed of it.


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## Balljoint (Jul 26, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> From Wiki, food for thought...
> 
> 
> In the summer of 1944, forty-seven B-29's raided Japan's Yawata Steel Works from bases in China; only one plane actually hit the target area, and only with one of its bombs. This single 500 lb (230 kg) general purpose bomb represented one quarter of one percent of the 376 bombs dropped over Yawata on that mission.I think this sums up what defined "Precision Daylight Bombing" when you see what defined the target area and what the actual results were. Again consider the technology of that day and don't compare it with what is achievable today!



The B-29 over Japan has serious problems with accurate bombing. Japan has a persistent, strong and unfamiliar jet stream and the B-29 got into the stratosphere. The firebombing of Tokyo at low altitude was specifically to avoid this.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 26, 2013)

Balljoint said:


> The B-29 over Japan has serious problems with accurate bombing. Japan has a persistent, strong and unfamiliar jet stream and the B-29 got into the stratosphere. The firebombing of Tokyo at low altitude was specifically to avoid this.


That's a well known fact but was unknown prior to WW2 and even during the B-29 development. In a perfect world the B-29 should have theoretically been able to bomb accuracy at altitude.

_"The Norden bombsight was a tachometric bombsight used by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and the United States Navy during World War II, and the United States Air Force in the Korean and the Vietnam Wars to aid the crew of bomber aircraft in dropping bombs accurately. Key to the operation of the Norden were two features; a mechanical computer that calculated the bomb's trajectory based on current flight conditions, and a linkage to the bomber's autopilot that let it react quickly and accurately to changes in the wind or other effects.

Together, these features allowed for unprecedented accuracy in day bombing from high altitudes; in testing the Norden demonstrated a circular error probable (CEP) of 75 feet (23 m), an astonishing performance for the era. This accuracy allowed direct attacks on ships, factories, and other point targets. Both the Navy and the AAF saw this as a means to achieve war aims through high-altitude bombing, without resorting to area bombing, as proposed by European forces. To achieve these aims, the Norden was granted the utmost secrecy well into the war, and was part of a then-unprecedented production effort on the same scale as the Manhattan Project. Carl L. Norden, Inc. ranked 46th among United States corporations in the value of World War II military production contracts.[1]

In practice it was not possible to achieve this level of accuracy in combat conditions, with the average CEP in 1943 being 1,200 feet (366 m). Both the Navy and Air Forces had to give up on the idea of pinpoint attacks during the war. The Navy turned to dive bombing and skip bombing to attack ships, while the Air Forces developed the lead bomber concept to improve accuracy. Nevertheless, the Norden's reputation as a pin-point device lived on, due in no small part to Norden's own advertising of the device after secrecy was reduced during the war."_

Norden bombsight - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Daylight Precision Bombing


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## mhuxt (Aug 16, 2013)

I realise this thread had pretty much run its course, but I remembered Davis splits his tonnages out by bomb type, so I had a look at how Incendiary attacks on Germany weigh up between Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th Air Forces. 

BC and 8th were closer than I had expected, both in terms of the % of the load represented by incendiaries, and by the total tons of incendiaries dropped.











The 15th AF seems to have been closes to the original USAAF intentions, IIRC a much higher % of their sorties against oil targets.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 16, 2013)

Some comments derived from Bartsch regarding this topic as it relates to the early PTO:

During the initial air raid on Clark Field, the very well-trained, veteran IJN bombadiers flying over Clark field unopposed by USAAF Interceptors which weren't able to climb to their altitude, put virtually all their bombs on target. The airfield was rendered nearly useless and many bombs fell on individual aircraft including parked B-17s and P-40's in the process of taking off. I am sure the latter was due mainly to the fact that so many bombs were dropped directly on and distributed over the air strip itself. IIRC, all the dozen or so B-17s present were destroyed as well as most to nearly all but perhaps two of the P-40B fighters of the 20th Pursuit Squadron then on the ground. 

The example gives a sense of what could be achieved under essentially ideal circumstances (no enemy opposition and crews exceptionally well trained) *even without a Norden bombsight *from high altitude (greater than ~25,000'). 

WRT the efficacy of the B-17 and its accuracy, the early experience in that theater showed (or should have shown) the limitations of the early Bomber deterrent philosophy.

1/15/42: during a strike against IJA forces in northern Malaya, 2 of 7 B-17Ds aborted. No damage reported.
1/16/42: 2 B-17Es 3 LB-30s attack on shipping Langoan airfield, no damage reported.
1/19/42: 10 B-17Es and 4 LB-30s were in theater. 8 B-17Es attack Jolo airfield, resulted in a total wx abort.
1/23/42: Unknown number of Martin 139WH (export B-10s) attack 16 IJN amphib invasion ships off Balikpapan, _NEIAF reports_ destroying 2 transports. NEI Sub sinks 1 a Night attack by USN DDs sink 3 more. 1/24/42: 8 B-17s unk. # of Martin 139WH attack ships anchored lying off Balikpapan.
1/25/42: 8 B-17s Martin 139WH reprise prior Balikpapan attack, 6 damaged and forced to land at Singosari, Java.
1/26/42: 5 B-17s attack same targets, damaging one seaplane tender (see below)
1/27/42: 6 B-17s attack same targets
To the IJN/IJA the cumulative damage was no more than a speed bump. B-17s account for one ship known hit and damaged but probably believed sunk at the time.Of course, some sources say optimistic B-17s crews typically interpreted their bomb splashes as hits. 

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Sanuki Maru_t.htm

"_1/27/42, Balikpapan. At 1259, from an altitude of *5.000 meters (~16,400')*, five Boeing B-17E "Flying Fortresses", of the USAAF's 19th Bomb Group at Malang, attack SANUKI MARU. 's On the first run two of her F1M2 Petes are damaged. At 1309, the bombers return for a second attack. Two near-misses explode under the waterline very close off portside foreship. The outer hull planking is dented up to 6 feet between frames 120 to 132. The explosions open seams over a length of 25 deet below the waterline causing complete flooding of No. 2 hold and partial flooding of No. 1 hold. Bombs and ammunition are offloaded onto small cargo ship KUREHA MARU No. 3._"

I can see the logic evolving from this early experience: If a raid by half a dozen B-17's fails to make a dent then clearly an attack by 60 or 600 must be needed. 
The B-17 in small numbers was evidently no more effective _*from (I assume typically) high altitude *_against fixed and anchored targets than were the lower altitude P-35's P-40's (attacking IJN ships off Vigan), ancient Martins and RAF, RAAF and NZ Hudsons attacking invasion ships off Malaya at not much more than mast head height.


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## stona (Jul 5, 2014)

pattle said:


> It is frustrating that even today I pick up books and watch documentaries in which experts claim that unlike the RAF the Americans didn't area bomb,



It is a myth that has arisen, like the RAF refusing to take part in the late war bombing of oil targets.

Between June 1944 and the end of the war in Europe the 8th Air Force devoted 16% of its sorties to area or 'area type' raids. This is a significant proportion, though less than the RAF's 36% for the same period.

In this period the RAF devoted 15% of it's total sorties to attacks on oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures are larger than the 8th Air Forces efforts (13% and 73,000 tons respectively).

Sometimes the facts just get in the way of a good story 

Cheers

Steve

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## mhuxt (Jul 12, 2014)

stona said:


> It is a myth that has arisen, like the RAF refusing to take part in the late war bombing of oil targets.



One of the interesting things about Davis' work on the bombing war is that he says, quite plainly, that it's less a myth that has arisen than a deliberate revision of the facts in the immediate post-war period.

This is taken from the sheet key included with the book:






(Note also what Davis has to say about BC playing coy with the truth about bombing France.)

You'll note Davis has reviewed the original orders, to contrast them with post-war reports, and also, I think quite importantly, to distinguish between area raids by order from "area-like" raids by effect:






There's various ways to slice it, but I've done it as below, since 8th and 15th really only area-bombed versus Germany and Austria:






Davis' view is that the area raids were "revised" to become raids on Industrial Areas - as you can see from one of the reports of the USSBS, Davis' area figures correspond closely to what was described post-war as attacks on industrial areas. (I've included the relevant link in the graphic.)






The thing is, the area raids were acknowledged as such during the war itself by the USAAF - the following are taken from the various bomb damage files I've posted here before:
















As Steve's mentioned, the USAAF area-bombed far less frequently than the RAF. That said, arguing the relative proportions between air forces is radically different than arguing that only one air force did it.

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## wuzak (Jul 14, 2014)

stona said:


> In this period the RAF devoted 15% of it's total sorties to attacks on oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures are larger than the 8th Air Forces efforts (13% and 73,000 tons respectively).



Do you have any data on the types of bombs the RAF used on oil targets?

My understanding is that the USAAF used 500lb and smaller bombs - more bombs meant a better chance of hitting something.


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## Milosh (Jul 14, 2014)

With the formation almost 1/2 mile across, hard to say it is not area bombing.

B-17 Flying Fortress / Details / Formation


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## stona (Jul 14, 2014)

Milosh said:


> View attachment 267271
> 
> 
> With the formation almost 1/2 mile across, hard to say it is not area bombing.



Particularly when bombing 'blind' through cloud using radar or other navigational aids.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Jul 14, 2014)

Theoretically, from that altitude, is it not possible for all planes to sight on the same target?


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## Shortround6 (Jul 14, 2014)

They can "sight" on it but unless they fly over it _exactly_ they can't hit it. There is no way to move the bomb laterally, or impart a sideways vector. 

The idea of linking the bombsight through the autopilot was to allow the bombardier to "fly" the aircraft over the target.


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## wuzak (Jul 14, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The idea of linking the bombsight through the autopilot was to allow the bombardier to "fly" the aircraft over the target.



And most f them in those big formations were just bombing on the cue of their leaders.


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## mhuxt (Jul 14, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Do you have any data on the types of bombs the RAF used on oil targets?
> 
> My understanding is that the USAAF used 500lb and smaller bombs - more bombs meant a better chance of hitting something.



Hi Wuzak,

Thanks to the efforts of Australian archivists, it's actually possible to determine for oneself what bombloads were carried on which raids, from original documents.

The Official History of the RAAF describes which of its squadrons (460, 462, 463, 466 and 467) participated on which raids in the Oil Campaign in this chapter:

http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/pdf/RCDIG1070709--1-.PDF

With the raid / date information in hand, one can then go to the Australian National Archives website to have a look at scans of the relevant squadrons' Operations Record Books.

Search the collection ? National Archives of Australia

For example, the RAAF history says that 460 Sqn dispatched 18 Lancasters on the raid against Scholven-Buer on 18/19 July 1944. If you type "460 Squadron" into the search box, you come up with a results page. Click on the "digitised item" heading to see which records have been scanned. Click the "paper sheaf" icon for the item labeled " A9186 147 Unit history of number 460 Squadron - January 1944 to October 1945", and you'll get something which looks like this (I hope):

http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=1359212

Click the "Enlarge" radio button for a better view.

Enter "365" in the Page box and you'll come to the relevant scan, in which the squadron archivist has recorded that the squadron that night despatched 18x4,000 lb cookies and 288x500 lb bombs to Gelsenkirchen.

On page 417 you'll see that 460 was involved in the raid on the oil tankage at Aire, despatching 300x1,000 lb-ers and 100x500 lbs.

Takes a little time, but it's worth a look.

I believe the post-war debriefings (along with studies undertaken during the war itself) indicated that a few hits from heavy bombs caused more damage than the same weight of hits by smaller bombs. Have more info on this, will post in another thread.


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## wuzak (Jul 14, 2014)

Thanks mhuxt.

I will check that out later.

From those numbers, I take it that there were 18 aircraft in that squadron, each carrying 1 x 4000lb HC "Cookie" and 16 x 500lb MC/GP bombs. A total load of 12,000lb each.


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## mhuxt (Jul 14, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Thanks mhuxt.
> 
> I will check that out later.
> 
> From those numbers, I take it that there were 18 aircraft in that squadron, each carrying 1 x 4000lb HC "Cookie" and 16 x 500lb MC/GP bombs. A total load of 12,000lb each.



No worries. Yes, I think your calculations are correct.


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## tomo pauk (Jul 17, 2014)

Enjoy some bacon, Mark  I'll have plenty to read from October on.


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## mhuxt (Jul 17, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Enjoy some bacon, Mark  I'll have plenty to read from October on.



Cheers tomo, and thanks.


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## wuzak (Jul 19, 2014)

mhuxt said:


> The Official History of the RAAF describes which of its squadrons (460, 462, 463, 466 and 467) participated on which raids in the Oil Campaign in this chapter:
> 
> http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/pdf/RCDIG1070709--1-.PDF



This section caught my attention:



> Apart from these main-force attacks, Mosquito aircraft of the Path-finder Group made six small-scale raids in June 1944. Four of these attacks, totalling only 80 sorties, were against the Scholven-Buer installations, while the other two, totalling 82 sorties, were directed to the Meerbeck works of Rheinpreussen, a typical Fischer-Tropsch plant about three miles north-west of Homberg . For the comparative outlay these small raids were far more effective than the main efforts, especially against the "thin-skinned" Fischer-Tropsch target. This was the result of the superior tactical freedom of the Mosquito in bad weather and also because each aircraft could be controlled by Oboe, and thus even when bombing blind a greater theoretical concentration of bomb pattern was possible. Only two R.A.A.F. pilots, Flight Lieutenant Molony of No. 105 and Flight Lieutenant Grant of No. 109, both experienced second tour men, have been identified in the first two attacks against Meerbeck, but, as this plant will henceforth be used as the yardstick of Bomber Command efficiency against this type of target, the raids warrant some analysis.
> 
> Meerbeck occupied an area of about 100 acres of which one-third was occupied by essential process structures and the remainder open ground, transport and supply facilities. It was defended in June by nearly 100 guns, was well camouflaged and had a decoy plant about three miles away. Previously the main plant had never been bombed but the decoy plant had been successful on several occasions in attracting bombs during raids in the Homberg area . On 25th-26th June, however, the Mosquitos did hit the main works although, of 44 tons of bombs dropped, only a ton and a half fell inside the plant perimeter. Even so the sulphide-removal sections, gas-holder, cracking section and many pipe-lines were damaged. This raid alone cut the daily production at Meerbeck of 175 tons by two-thirds. The second raid on 30th June-1st July employed heavier individual bombs, but of 55 tons dropped only six and a half fell on the plant. This was sufficient to cause severe damage to gas-holders and a compressed-air main which put the whole installation temporarily out of action.



These show low success rates of hitting the target (3.4% on the first raid and 11.8% on the second). From teh account it seems that the first raid was probably with 500lb bombs - meaning that 6 bombs hit (assuming short tons), whereas the second raid is likely to have used either 4000lb or 1000lb bombs, or a combination. If it were 1000lb bombs that would be 13 hits from 55 aircraft whch knocked the plant out.


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## wuzak (Jul 19, 2014)

Just downloaded a couple of Operational Record Books for 109 and 139 Squadrons.

On the night of the 25th June 1944, 109 Squadron bombed the Oil facility at Homburg. 8 B.XVIs from 109 were sent - one with markers, 7 with 4000lb MC bombs. Several of the aircraft list "Bombed D.R. due to technical failure". I assume this is because they were using Oboe to bomb?

One aircraft "marked and bombed from 30,000ft by A.R. 5513" and another "bombed by A.R, 5513". Does anybody know what that means?


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## mhuxt (Jul 20, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Just downloaded a couple of Operational Record Books for 109 and 139 Squadrons.
> 
> On the night of the 25th June 1944, 109 Squadron bombed the Oil facility at Homburg. 8 B.XVIs from 109 were sent - one with markers, 7 with 4000lb MC bombs. Several of the aircraft list "Bombed D.R. due to technical failure". I assume this is because they were using Oboe to bomb?
> 
> One aircraft "marked and bombed from 30,000ft by A.R. 5513" and another "bombed by A.R, 5513". Does anybody know what that means?



Hi Wuzak,

My *guess* is that it's the Automatic Release system which was tried for Oboe - ground signal released bombs instead of the aircrew. It was first tried on May 2 '44, so late June may still be realistic for it. It wasn't continued with as the system on at least one occasion released early.

Will PM you in a bit, sorry not to do so now but going out the door...


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## wuzak (Jul 20, 2014)

I was posting the following but I couldn't access teh forum:

Also on the night of the 25th June, 139 Squadron bombed Homburg with 6 aircraft. Their ORB mentions a total force of 42 Mosquitoes, of which 39 bombed the target. Bombing was claimed to be good, with all but two falling in a tight concentration around a Target Indicator. No mention is made of the bomb load in this record, but since 4 of the attacking aircraft were B.IVs it stands to reason that the majority were 500lb MC bombs. Bombing was from between 20,000 and 24,000ft.

Both 109 and 139 Suqdrons had attacked another target the previous night. 109 Squadron had also marked 3 other targets on the morning of the 25th - 2 aircraft flew on both missions, but the crews were all different. 


On the night of the 30th June, 139 reports that 40 Mosquitoes attacked Homburg, 24 of which were carrying 4000lb bombs (not identified as MC or HC). 139 had 7 aircraft in the attack which bombed between 20,000 and 23,000ft.

The report reads: "At 00.55 a large explosion was observed slightly in the North of the first T.I.s down. This large explosion started a very large fire, which could be seen up to a hundred miles from the target. Bombing was fairly concentrated in the vacinity of the markers."

109 Squadron had 6 aircraft in that attack. 3 of them identify carrying 4000lb HC bombs. 3 say bombed "D.R." and 3 "A.R. 5513", one of which follows with "(inaccurate)".

Two 109 aircraft attacked Homburg on the night of 1 July 1944 with 6 x 500lb MC bombs. 4 attacked Scholwen with the same bomb load.


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## wuzak (Jul 20, 2014)

mhuxt said:


> Hi Wuzak,
> 
> My *guess* is that it's the Automatic Release system which was tried for Oboe - ground signal released bombs instead of the aircrew. It was first tried on May 2 '44, so late June may still be realistic for it. It wasn't continued with as the system on at least one occasion released early.



That sounds reasonable. D.R. would, perhaps, then be "delayed release". 5513 must be some sort of grid or target reference.


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## mhuxt (Jul 20, 2014)

wuzak said:


> That sounds reasonable. D.R. would, perhaps, then be "delayed release". 5513 must be some sort of grid or target reference.



Heya,

Sorry, should have said earlier, DR is "dead reckoning" - good old-style navigation.


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## stona (Jul 21, 2014)

mhuxt said:


> Heya,
> 
> Sorry, should have said earlier, DR is "dead reckoning" - good old-style navigation.



And not very accurate in terms of dropping explosives on relatively small targets, even when undertaken by very good and very experienced navigators. They would essentially navigate by the stars, fine for a Viking looking for the north east coast of England and a monastery or two to ransack, not so good for a bomber crew looking for a precise target hundreds of miles away and flying at several hundred miles an hour when any error is very rapidly compounded.
I do not under estimate the immense skill of _some_ navigators, my own great uncle was one, but you have to be realistic. Without seeing a recognisable _and correctly identified _feature on the ground by which to accurately fix position the important part of the phrase 'dead reckoning' is the reckoning.
Cheers
Steve


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## mhuxt (Jul 21, 2014)

Can't say I disagree - dead reckoning was what got BC into trouble during Pierse's tenure.


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## Timppa (Jul 21, 2014)

pattle said:


> It is frustrating that even today I pick up books and watch documentaries in which experts claim that unlike the RAF the Americans didn't area bomb.



But generally it is true (against Germany). USAAF targeted mainly industrial targets, while the RAF concentrated on "dehousing" (euphemism for simply killing as many people as you can ).

RAF had the capability to hit pinpoint targets,as Dams and Peenemunde raids proved. But as Harris himself have told in his book, "dehousing" was a deliberate decision.



pattle said:


> stark reality was either area bomb Germany or be area bombed, invaded and then enslaved and murdered, there was no third option.



As the oil campaign showed, there was indeed a much better option.



pattle said:


> what Bomber Harris said about sowing the seed and reaping the whirlwind was right and we need not feel ashamed of it.



Fortunately, now in this cynical nuclear era, everybody agrees that the "women and children first " -strategy is the right way to go (and not feel ashamed).


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## stona (Jul 21, 2014)

Harris' failing not that he believed that he could defeat Germany by flattening her cities, but rather that he ignored the ever increasing evidence that this was not going to happen and refused to allow his bombers to take part in a joined up campaign, in support of the other services and an overall strategy to defeat Germany, until virtually forced to do so. 
He didn't concede until the summer of 1944 and when Bomber Command did go after the targets famously and derisively described by Harris as panaceas it proved very effective indeed.
This reluctance to deviate from his city smashing strategy also led directly to what Bomber Command itself acknowledged as a defeat in the so called 'Battle of Berlin' which cost many lives and probably extended the war in Europe by a couple of months.
I don't mind that Harris was wrong in supposing that he might win the war his way and I admire his determination. He himself said that he didn't know whether the task was possible because it had 'never been tried'. What I find unpalatable is his refusal to acknowledge the evidence that, having tried, it was indeed impossible and alter his tactics.
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jul 21, 2014)

Harris was a soldier if someone from either RAF high command or the Cabinet had told him not to carry out his plans he had 2 choices tender his resignation or follow orders. The fact that no one ordered him to stop is the fault of his superiors he was given a fairly vague and broad objective and he attempted to carry it out. The fact that some slippery politicians tried to rewrite history when they failed to reign him in at the time is more there crime than Harris's


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## stona (Jul 21, 2014)

Portal forced him to toe the line eventually. He should have been fired or brought into line sooner, but that's another question. Harris never accepted the mounting evidence that a bombing campaign as part of a more subtle integrated strategy was the way to use Bomber Command. Bludgeoning German cities, particularly Berlin, was never going to win the war and might actually break Bomber Command. Even when he did finally do as he was told he did it reluctantly, though not as some would have you believe, half heartedly. 
Cheers
Steve


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## wuzak (Jul 22, 2014)

Reading through the Oil Campaign section of the Bomb Damage Assessment discussion paper mhuxt posted in http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bomb-damage-assessment-good-paper-41285.html, the conclusion is that the damage done by BC was more devestating than that by the 8th and 15th AFs.



> The most spectacular success in this opening phase of the oil campaign went not to the 8th Air Force, which carried out all the attacks just reviewed, but to Bomber Command, whose 12-13 June night attack on the Gelsenkirchen-Nordstern Bergius plant caused severe damage.



Note that the 8th AF raids referenced were themselves quite damaging to the oil prodcution of Germany.



> key reason for this success was the superb accuracy resulting from expert Pathfinder Force work with improved Oboe sets that allowed Pathfinder Mosquitoes to drop flares at precisely the right locations. The 286 Lancasters of the main force then dropped 1,500 of their 4,637 bombs—over 32 percent of all munitions— directly on the oil plant. The fact that 320 of these bombs were 4,000-lb. “Blockbusters proved highly significant because they caused severe structural damage and smashed both buried electrical and water conduits as well as overhead steam pipes, creating a nightmarish situation for repair crews. These British raids put a much greater weight of bombs on their targets than did 8th Air Force missions because Lancasters carried 14,000 pounds of bombs and B-17s only 6,000-9,000 pounds. The fact that British bombers attacked their targets in trail and individually rather than in combat boxes, which bombed in unison, also meant a heavier concentration of hits around the aimpoint.



This lends support to the idea that BC "precision bombed area targets" and the 8th AF "area bombed precision targets".


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## stona (Jul 22, 2014)

I think late in the war the difference between precision and area bombing for Bomber Command becomes blurred. A successful area raid, like that on Dresden, was actually a very precise operation. Sector bombing depended on aircraft flying very accurately over well placed markers on slightly different bearings to totally devastate and area looking a bit like a slice of cake. The target is an area (that slice) but the method is very precise. The RAF could apply these techniques to so called precision targets to great effect.

I agree 100% that Bomber Command, by mid 1944, had the capacity to and did 'precision bomb area targets' as you put it. Whether we like it or not the USAAF was generally slightly less accurate than the RAF by this stage of the war. The nature of the American bombing technique, bombing on the leader, gives credence to your second contention, though I doubt the USAAF then or now would concede the point and I wouldn't like to force it 

In defence of Arthur Harris, when he took over at Bomber Command that organisation had received 22 directives from the Air Ministry, many conflicting or imprecise, on how to go about the bombing of Germany. Harris was determined that this groping 'in the darkness for Germany's economic jugular', as Max Hastings so succinctly put it, would stop. No more 'panacea targets' like aircraft factories or oil plants. He saw these as a futile short cut and was determined to concentrate all available forces for the progressive, systematic destruction of the urban areas of the Reich. At the time this was effectively what he had been ordered to do and he would do his utmost to succeed.
The problem was that his conviction became an obsession and obsessives are blind to any alternative. On 12th August 1943 he wrote to Portal saying 

_'It is my firm belief that we are on the verge of a final showdown in the bombing war... I am certain that given average weather and concentration on he main job, we can push Germany over by bombing this year.' _

He couldn't. He also upset many with his efforts to force a faster US build up of bomber forces in the UK and his efforts to get them to join his campaign.

_'We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF will come in on it. It will cost between 400-500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war.'_

It didn't. It led instead to a near catastrophic defeat for his own command. It was the compulsory transfer of Bomber Command to tactical operations in support of the invasion meant that Harris never really acknowledged the defeat. He deluded himself that had the preparations for the invasion not intervened then, true to his Trenchardist belief, he would have brought Germany to her knees. 

He was not alone. The tactical deployment of the allied bomber forces in the 'Transport Plan', effectively a massive campaign of interdiction behind the allied bridgehead(s) in Normandy brought things to a head. He had an ally in Spaatz who also believed that any tactical use of the heavy bomber forces was a misuse. Spaatz believed that 'Overlord' was a bad mistake and that Germany was already on the brink of defeat. He, unlike Harris, also felt that he had found Germany's jugular and this would eventually mature as the 'Oil Plan'. Spaatz was correct. Harris also had support from Lord Cherwell and even Churchill (though his concern was French civilian casualties.) 

In the end Harris had to be ordered to start the transport plan. In March 1944 Bomber Command attacked various transport targets in France with conspicuous success and very few civilian casualties. Harris had been confounded by the virtuosity of his own men. Churchill still resisted the 'Transport Plan' until May before bowing to American pressure. In March 1944 70% of British bombs were directed against Germany. In April this was under 50%, by May less than 25%. In June this figure was negligible.

_'The panacea merchants' _had triumphed, wrote Harris. _'Naturally I did not quarrel with the decision to put the bomber force at the disposal of the invading army once the die had been cast; I knew that the armies could not succeed without them' _ he continued somewhat disingenuously.

Bomber Command was forced into a different role and it is to Harris' credit that once 'the die had been cast', though it was a long time in the casting, he applied the same determination, at least initially, to this new role as he had the previous one. The aircrew of Bomber Command proved themselves more than capable of attacking these new targets effectively, employing skills, techniques and tactics developed over the previous five years.
It is to his discredit that by the end of the year he was returning to area bombing and neglecting the oil campaign. Once again Portal had to more or less force him to toe the line. There was a truculent exchange of letters leading to Harris threatening to resign. Portal should have accepted his resignation but once again failed to get rid of Harris.
Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Jul 22, 2014)

Was BC able to fly lower altitude during their night missions than the US flew?


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## wuzak (Jul 22, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Was BC able to fly lower altitude during their night missions than the US flew?



Certainly the Lancaster could not fly as high as the B-17 or B-24.

So, yes, I think generally they bombed from lower altitudes.

On the other hand, BC also used Mosquitoes to bomb. These bombed from varying altitudes - 109 squadron bombed Homburg from 30,000ft, while 139 bombed from 20-25,000ft.


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## Balljoint (Jul 22, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Was BC able to fly lower altitude during their night missions than the US flew?




Actually, the pathfinders Mosquitos flew at higher altitudes that allowed them to focus on the target. FLAK seriously diminished the bombardiers’ attention. Radio bombing navigation aids such as H2S, GeeH, Oboe and MicroH were British developments and better used by the RAF, particularly when based closer to the targets as ground was gained in Europe. The RAF marked the target and bombed largely as individual planes. The Eighth bombed as a block upon release by a lead bombardier.

Harris apparently recognized that oil target were better attacked by smaller formations in that the target was fairly small and well covered by smoke, both intentionally and bombing generated. And, as has been mentioned, the big RAF bombs were more effective than the AAF 500 pounders.


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## mhuxt (Jul 22, 2014)

Bear in mind not all Pathfinders were Mosquitos, nor were all BC Mossies employed in a pathfinding role.


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## wuzak (Jul 22, 2014)

Interestingly, in the Operational Record Books I have for 109 squadron, some say "marked", some say "bombed" and yet others say "marked and bombed".

That would suggest that they would sometimes carry a mixed load of TIs and bombs.


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## stona (Jul 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Was BC able to fly lower altitude during their night missions than the US flew?



Generally yes. Main Force squadrons bombed over a range of altitudes from as low as 6,000 ft up to 17,000 ft. There may have been some higher. For example 5 Group attacked Dresden from between 12,000 and 13,500 ft. Main Force squadrons attacked Peenemunde from 6,000-10,000 ft.
Bombing heights were not rigorously regimented as in the USAAF because Bomber Command was flying in a stream at night, not in tight defensive formations. Different squadrons would receive slightly different orders about bombing heights depending on the mission and defences expected. The absolute minimum height, for safety reasons, was 4,000 ft.
It is often not appreciated that some of the markers, particularly the Blind Markers, actually flew higher than the Main Force squadrons in order to allow their radar to illuminate a large enough area to establish position. They often flew at 16,000ft.
Cheers
Steve


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## gjs238 (Jul 23, 2014)

Did BC suffer higher flak losses due to bombing at lower altitudes?


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## stona (Jul 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Did BC suffer higher flak losses due to bombing at lower altitudes?



No. Flak accounted for around 40% of Bomber Command operational losses at night compared to over 50% of 8th Air Force operational losses by day.

The night fighter was Bomber Command's worst enemy until close to the end.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Jul 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Did BC suffer higher flak losses due to bombing at lower altitudes?



Won't answer your question.

Aircraft	Total Sorties	Losses	Sorties flown per loss
Lancaster	156,192	3,832	40.76
Halifax	82,773	2,232	37.08
Wellington	47,409	1,709	27.74
Mosquito	39,795	396	100.5
Hampden	16,541	607	27.25
Blenheim	12,214	534	22.87
Stirling	18,440	769	23.98
Whitley	9,858	431	22.87
Boston	1,609	46	34.98
Ventura	997	42	23.74
Manchester	1,269	76	16.70

WW2 RAF Bomber Command Stats


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## stona (Jul 23, 2014)

What flak was very good at , far exceeding fighters, day or night, in this respect, was damaging the bombers. Tens of thousands of bombers from both the USAAF and RAF were damaged, sometimes terminally, by flak throughout the war.
A damaged bomber requires repair, uses valuable resources in the process, and may well be grounded for some time.
Cheers
Steve


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## gjs238 (Jul 23, 2014)

stona said:


> No. Flak accounted for around 40% of Bomber Command operational losses at night compared to over 50% of 8th Air Force operational losses by day.
> 
> The night fighter was Bomber Command's worst enemy until close to the end.
> 
> ...



So I'm going to assume that flak is more effective during daylight.

This is making me wonder if the US would have been more effective flying lower, at night, and in single file like BC.

I used to assume that the purpose of the US bombing campaign was, well, to bomb.
But it seems that somewhere along the line the goal changed to luring the Axis day fighters up into a war of attrition.
If true, then bombing lower at night, while likely improving bombing effectiveness, doesn't contribute to the attrition of Axis day fighters.

This opens a can of worms...
Would the US indeed have been more effective using BC tactics?
What was more important, bombing effectiveness or shooting down Axis day fighters?


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## stona (Jul 23, 2014)

I believe that the two different methods used inadvertently complimented each other. Don't forget that night bombing was_ forced _on the RAF by the Luftwaffe. 

Even as an Englishman I must concede that the two unequivocal achievements of the allied strategic air offensive belong to the Americans. The defeat of the Luftwaffe, principally by the escort fighters of the 8th Air Force and, towards the end, the inception of the oil plan which proved deadly to the Reich's economy. If the USAAF had followed the RAF and bombed by night the first of these, which led directly to a virtually unmolested invasion of the European mainland in 1944, would not have been achieved. The second might have proven more difficult.

This doesn't mean that the smashing of German cities and all the effects this caused in terms of German production and defensive resources were meaningless. It had a significant effect, an effect still hotly debated today, however, it wasn't going to win the war in 1945. The destruction of the Luftwaffe and the assault on the German oil industry did.

Was flak more effective in daylight? Not necessarily. It was more effective at engaging the tight defensive formations flown by the US bombers.

Cheers

Steve

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## gjs238 (Jul 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> This opens a can of worms...
> Would the US indeed have been more effective using BC tactics?
> What was more important, bombing effectiveness or shooting down Axis day fighters?



I guess I can flip this around...
Would BC have been more effective using USAAF targeting?
Perhaps not initially. But later on, as accuracy improved.


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## stona (Jul 23, 2014)

Well Bomber Command had developed some very sophisticated tactics and techniques to bomb accurately by night. The unpredictable weather in Western Europe, particularly from October to March, is often over looked by people from across the pond (nothing personal ). Many day light raids were more blinded by the weather than Bomber Command's night time raids. A 'good' RAF night time raid was at least as accurate as a 'good' USAAF day time raid. Both air forces were at the mercy of the weather and their various technical aids. 

I don't think it would have been sensible or even possible for Bomber Command to undertake routine day time bombing in the face of Luftwaffe resistance. In the last months of the war, when the Luftwaffe threat had been virtually eliminated by the Americans, Bomber Command did operate more frequently by day.

I have nothing but admiration for the men of both air forces who persevered in the face of appalling losses. Whatever the debates about the most effective tactics, the morality of the bombing and the difficult to quantify effects on the German war economy it would be hard to argue that their efforts did not shorten the war and save the lives of many of their earth and sea bound comrades. The men of Bomber Command and the various American air forces did what they were told and what had to be done to ensure an Allied victory.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Jul 23, 2014)

stona said:


> I don't think it would have been sensible or even possible for Bomber Command to undertake routine day time bombing in the face of Luftwaffe resistance. In the last months of the war, when the Luftwaffe threat had been virtually eliminated by the Americans, Bomber Command did operate more frequently by day.



I was thinking more in terms of the targets selected, not day vs. night.


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## Balljoint (Jul 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> This opens a can of worms...
> Would the US indeed have been more effective using BC tactics?
> What was more important, bombing effectiveness or shooting down Axis day fighters?



The two objectives are probably complementary in the intermediate term. By attacking the LW interceptors anywhere from takeoff to landing, the escort fighters were able to disrupt the LW organization, and were particularly able to destroy the old hare, alte hasen, experienced LW pilot resource. It has been thought that the bombers were being used as bait –this was the view of the crews. However, Doolittle’s experience in the Mediterranean convinced him that escorts were much more effective on the offense. Of course it helped that long range P-47s and P-51s were available at the same time. And Hitler decided to go with FLAK rather than fighters. It was a sea change in the bombing campaign.


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## wiking85 (Jul 23, 2014)

stona said:


> I have nothing but admiration for the men of both air forces who persevered in the face of appalling losses.


Not really like they had a choice.


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## stona (Jul 24, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Not really like they had a choice.



They could refuse to fly. Some did. In the RAF this resulted in being labelled as LMF (lack of moral fibre). This was very unfair, most people have a limit and some are lower than others, that's not my opinion but the opinion of veterans who saw good men stigmatised in this way. I don't know how the US system worked.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Jul 24, 2014)

stona said:


> They could refuse to fly. Some did. In the RAF this resulted in being labelled as LMF (lack of moral fibre). This was very unfair, most people have a limit and some are lower than others, that's not my opinion but the opinion of veterans who saw good men stigmatised in this way. I don't know how the US system worked.
> Cheers
> Steve



Considering the horrible social stigmatization from the LMF, it was as good as social death, even after the war IIRC. I'm not sure about the US system either, but I know they only executed one man in the army for refusing to fight (Pvt. Slovik). I think otherwise it was arrest and dishonorable discharge.


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## stona (Jul 24, 2014)

Balljoint said:


> The two objectives are probably complementary in the intermediate term. By attacking the LW interceptors anywhere from takeoff to landing, the escort fighters were able to disrupt the LW organization, and were particularly able to destroy the old hare, alte hasen, experienced LW pilot resource. It has been thought that the bombers were being used as bait –this was the view of the crews. However, Doolittle’s experience in the Mediterranean convinced him that escorts were much more effective on the offense. Of course it helped that long range P-47s and P-51s were available at the same time. And Hitler decided to go with FLAK rather than fighters. It was a sea change in the bombing campaign.



Actually the two complimentary elements were the destruction of the Luftwaffe and its pilots by the escort fighters and the oil campaign. The latter complimenting the former by not only reducing the effectiveness of front line Luftwaffe units but also making it impossible to replace the losses of personnel by denying the means to train new pilots. These achievements must be credited to the USAAF.

Hitler's rant or decision (depending whose account you believe) abandoning the fighter arm and placing more emphasis on flak defences came in August 1944 at a time when the _Jagdwaffe_ was already on the verge of defeat and struggling to exert any meaningful pressure on USAAF campaigns. Some would argue that it was already defeated and Hitler clearly felt the same way. In September 1944 the Luftwaffe still had over 1,600 fighters, more than in January of the same year and comparable to the 1,849 of July 1943. Production of single engine fighters continued unabated virtually until the end but there was no fuel or trained pilots to fly them.

In the last two quarters of 1944 the production of flak guns did increase. What the guns lacked was ammunition, partly another result of the oil campaign. In late 1944 batteries were compelled to hold their fire in anything but ideal firing conditions.

Cheers

Steve

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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2014)

stona said:


> Actually the two complimentary elements were the destruction of the Luftwaffe and its pilots by the escort fighters and the oil campaign. The latter complimenting the former by not only reducing the effectiveness of front line Luftwaffe units but also making it impossible to replace the losses of personnel by denying the means to train new pilots. These achievements must be credited to the USAAF.
> 
> Hitler's rant or decision (depending whose account you believe) abandoning the fighter arm and placing more emphasis on flak defences came in August 1944 at a time when the _Jagdwaffe_ was already on the verge of defeat and struggling to exert any meaningful pressure on USAAF campaigns. Some would argue that it was already defeated and Hitler clearly felt the same way. In September 1944 the Luftwaffe still had over 1,600 fighters, more than in January of the same year and comparable to the 1,849 of July 1943. Production of single engine fighters continued unabated virtually until the end but there was no fuel or trained pilots to fly them.
> 
> ...



With regard to ammunition shortages, Westermann ("Flak - German Anti Aircraft Defences"), states on page 273, Despite increased output of weapons, the flak arm faced a number of serious problems. Without a doubt, the most pressing was the ammunition shortage. by the fall of 1944, the Luftwaffe consumption of flak peskerd at over 3.5 million rounds of heasvy AA and 12.5 million rounds of Light AA. The shortage in ammunition supply arose for several reasons. First allied attacks on the chemical industry affected the production of explosives particularly nitrogen, leading to ever increased usage of inert fillers,which in turn affected the explosive capabilities of the shells fired. Second the attacks on the allied transport targets led to significant distribution problems. The attacks on the transport network in turn led to a disipation of flak barrels to protect new targets of the bomber offensive". Westermann also goes on to document lesser but still significant shortagers in radar and communications, again a priority target of mostly BC attacks.

The RAF was responsible for many of the attacks that led to these shortages and failures, so to an extent the allied victory in 1944 should be assigned to BCs very tangible efforts

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## stona (Jul 24, 2014)

parsifal said:


> The RAF was responsible for many of the attacks that led to these shortages and failures, so to an extent the allied victory in 1944 should be assigned to BCs very tangible efforts



Absolutely agree. In high lighting the two most obvious and quantifiable successes of the strategic air offensive (the USAAF's defeat of the Luftwaffe and the oil campaign) I did not intend to ignore or deny the substantial contribution in all sorts of ways of Bomber Command's effort.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Jul 24, 2014)

Maybe oversimplifying, but would it be possible to paste together the best of USAAF and BC efforts into one unified effort?

USAAF: More emphasis on night time, lower altitude, heavier bombs
BC: More emphasis on oil and transportation

(Just an example)


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## stona (Jul 24, 2014)

Bomber Command did make an all out effort in support of the transport plan. Sadly the same can't be said for the oil plan and the blame for this rests squarely with Harris who, post invasion, gradually drifted back to his city smashing raids.
Portal didn't seem to realise just how blatantly Harris was disregarding the September directives relating to the oil plan. In October only 6% of Bomber Command's sorties were directed against oil targets. Between October and December 11% were sent against oil targets, 54% against cities. It wasn't until November, and several interventions from Portal, that Bomber Command finally made a real effort against oil targets, despatching 25% of sorties against them and finally exceeding the tonnage dropped on them by the USAAF.
The difference between the actual and potential effort made by Bomber Command against oil targets is debateable. Most sources reckon that somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 more sorties could have been made. This might not seem many in the overall context of the oil plan but such a marginal increase in effort might have had dramatic consequences.

Professor Milward (economist) referring to the oil plan.
_"By the narrowest of margins, the strategic air offensive failed to smash Germany's economy by this one method of attack."_

Galland (I'm sure we all know him)
_"The most successful operation of the entire allied strategic air warfare was against Germany's fuel supply...Looking back, it is difficult to understand why they started this undertaking so late."_

Speer, writing about the abandoning of the initial, pre oil plan, attacks on some oil targets as early as the spring of 1944.
_"Had they continued the attacks of March and April with the same energy, we would quickly have been at our last gasp." _

Blame also lies with Portal. It was he who had fought for Bomber Command's independence from SHAEF at Quebec and who then failed to impose his will on the command structure he had created. I for one do not believe that had Bomber Command continued under SHAEF's orders, that Tedder would have accepted the same defiance to its overall policies as was accepted by Portal. This last point is crucial. Had Bomber Command implemented a coherent and consistent policy, directed by SHAEF and aimed at the strategic targets required by that command, there is a chance that the war in Europe might have ended somewhat sooner with all the consequences that might have had for a post war Europe. Now that's a realistic 'what if?' for another place and time!

Cheers

Steve

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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2014)

still, the city smashing raids after June were probably more successful , and certainly less costly than the earlier efforts September '43 to April'44. These were very coslty and of limited value really , but the raids after June were really quite accurate and really were flattening the cities.....


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## stona (Jul 24, 2014)

Yes, they were, but the question is whether that effort might have been better applied in support of a coordinated plan in tandem with the Americans against targets decided at SHAEF rather than at High Wycombe. I think it would have been. Much has been made of the post war treatment of Harris, the lack of a peerage etc and it is often simplistically suggested that he was made a scapegoat for Dresden. This is nonsense. Had he been more flexible in the second half of 1944 and acknowledged, as many others did, that the usefulness of area bombing as a war winning tool was past and that Bomber Command was capable of better things then he might have been judged more kindly. 

The official British history is not exactly fulsome with its praise for him.

_"Sir Arthur Harris had a habit of seeing only one side of a question and then exaggerating it. He had a tendency to confuse advice with interference, criticism with sabotage and evidence with propaganda. He resisted innovations and was seldom open to persuasion. He was sceptical of the Air Staff in general, and of many officers who served on it he was openly contemptuous. Seeing all issues in terms of black and white he was impatient of any other possibility, and having taken upon himself tremendous responsibilities, he expected similar powers to be conferred."_ 

Ouch! 

It begs the question, raised by someone earlier, why Portal didn't get rid of him. The failure to do so, and the failure to force him to carry out the Air Staff's directives reflects badly on Portal too.

Writing in 1959 Portal attempted a rather feeble justification.

_"His [Harris'] good qualities as a commander far outweighed his defects, and it would have been monstrously unjust to him and his command to have tried to have him replaced on the ground that while assuring me of his intention to carry out his orders, he persisted in trying to convince me that different orders would have produced better results."_

I don't buy that and neither did many of their war time contemporaries.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jul 24, 2014)

Exactly what I was saying before Harris gets the blame but ultimately he wasn't given strong enough orders and wasnt kept on a short leash by those that had the ultimate responsibility. He made a lot of mistakes and wasted a valuable lot of men on the battle of Berlin. Someone should have been carrying out proper oversight.


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## stona (Jul 24, 2014)

As late as NOVEMBER 1944 Harris was writing to Portal saying that all was needed to finish his grand plan and finally defeat Germany was the destruction of Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz, Nuremberg, Munich, Koblenz, Karlsruhe and the surviving areas of Berlin and Hannover. This is patent nonsense and is yet another case of Harris overstating the case and capabilities of area bombing. By this time many other airmen had already come to the conclusion that it was no longer useful.

Portal carried on a rational debate with Harris.

Portal November 5th.
_"At the risk of you dubbing me another panacea merchant I believe the air offensive against oil gives us by far the best hope of complete victory in the next few months."_

But he didn't force him to do it or accept his tendered resignation.

Portal November 12th.
_"You refer to a plan for the destruction of the sixty leading German cities, and with your efforts to keep up with, and even exceed, your average of two and a half such cities devastated each month. I know that you have long felt such a plan to be the most effective way of bringing about the collapse of Germany. Knowing this, I have, I must confess, at times wondered whether the magnetism of the remaining German cities has not in the past tended as much to deflect our bombers from their primary objectives as the tactical and weather difficulties which you described so fully in your letter of 1st November. I would like you to reassure me that this is not so. If I knew you to be as wholehearted in the attack on oil as in the past you have been in the matter of attacking cities, I would have little to worry about."_

Harris didn't reassure him but made a truculent reply saying that 
_"The MEW [Ministry of Economic Warfare] experts have never failed to overstate their case on panaceas....the oil plan has already displayed similar symptoms."_

Actually the MEW experts were correct and it was Harris who overstated his case and yet he held on to his command until the end.

Cheers

Steve

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## wuzak (Jul 24, 2014)

parsifal said:


> still, the city smashing raids after June were probably more successful , and certainly less costly than the earlier efforts September '43 to April'44. These were very coslty and of limited value really , but the raids after June were really quite accurate and really were flattening the cities.....



Imagine if that ability to flatten such areas was directed at the large oil pants?

One could argue that ability was there from late 1943 - or earlier. Certainly Hamburg was devastated in July 1943. 

As shown earlier, when the RAF did bomb oil targets it was very effective. The most effective raid of the early oil offensive was by Bomber Command - and those of the 8th AF were far from ineffective.

Even small Mosquito raids of 40-50 bombers and markers could do significant damage to oil facilities.


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2014)

I think it would have been more productive to switch to some kind of precision attack after the defeat of the Luftwaffe Feb-May. However i would caution against assuming a single concerted attack on the oil industry as the overarching panacea. Germany's collapse was due to a coomprehensive attack on a number of key targets,principally its oil, its actual airforce, it transport networks and certain key industries including certain key chemical industries and certain sectors such as electronics. Harris refusal to completely embrace the attacks on oil is a worthwhile criticism, but I think it more appropriate to criticise him on a more general level. His refusal to persist on area attacks was the problem, not so much the attacks on oil per se.

I wish there was a straightforward easy answer to this, but there isnt. I certainly am not defending Harris. i think he made some really bad errors of judgement and this was one of them. Attacking Berlin directly was another. .


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## stona (Jul 25, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Imagine if that ability to flatten such areas was directed at the large oil pants?



And other key areas of the German economy as mentioned by Parsifal. 

At the end of the day the 'panacea merchants', the intelligence analysts and those grey men at the MEW were correct; Harris and the ever dwindling band of Trenchardists were wrong.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing and we all benefit from it. It might not have been so clear to Harris that his method was failing and that others might be more successful, yet there was plenty of evidence _at the time_ which he chose wilfully to deny or ignore. To this extent he is culpable.

The Battle of Berlin was a near disaster for Bomber Command. It wasn't saved by Harris but by the enforced switch to targets in support of the invasion. This in turn enabled Harris to remain in denial as to the true nature of the defeat he had suffered.

More incredible is his pursuit of the destruction of German cities AFTER the explicit directives of 14th and 25th September (44). After Quebec control of the strategic bomber force in Europe had reverted from SHAEF to Sir Norman Bottomley and General Spaatz. The Chiefs of Staff's instructions for 'Pointblank' were translated into formal orders issued by Bottomley and Spaatz on the 25th. These orders are unequivocal. Oil was the sole 'First Priority' target. Transport links, tank and vehicle production were 'Second Priority'. 
There is barely a mention of area targets though they are mentioned in the same terms as the earlier September 14th directive. Important industrial areas were to be attacked _"when weather or tactical conditions are unsuitable for operations against specific primary objectives."_

These were direct orders which Harris flouted and for which he should have been fired. No wonder he didn't get offered any further posts after the war.

Cheers

Steve

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## Barrett (Jun 7, 2018)

Usually lost in the Precision Bombing Debate is the definition of "precision." We should start with the AAF criterion of the 1000-foot circle around the aim point. The 1000-ft CEP (circular error probable) BEGAN with the notion that half the bombs would strike outside that circle. A 1000-pounder hitting at 1050 feet still would inflict some damage but presumably would not be cited as a success. The fact was: the 1000-ft CEP was seldom achieved, though things did improve (they had to.) In researching the Curt LeMay biography, IIRC when took the 305th BG to England he found that the 8AF could not tell where half its ordnance landed--a hellacious big CEP. (In the highly controversial Monte Cassino bombing, Gen. Mark Clark's trailer was rocked by explosions miles behind the lines. And that was in broad daylight.) There were of course multiple reasons: equipment, weather, and especially training. In each of his commands LeMay established remedial training programs to compensate for Stateside shortcomings.


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## drgondog (Jun 7, 2018)

Hop said:


> Both.
> No one would claim the 8th AF devoted as much effort to area bombing as Bomber Command did, but it's wrong to claim they didn't do it at all. Until 1944 they were pretty open about their area bombing against Germany, after that they removed all reference to area bombing from their records, although they still carried out area attacks.


 
This is an old post but I agree Hop. It is worthwhile to note that Northern Europe weather and visibility precluded
visual acquisition of the Aiming Point in many instances from October through February and mid March.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 7, 2018)

drgondog said:


> This is an old post but I agree Hop. It is worthwhile to note that Northern Europe weather and visibility precluded
> visual acquisition of the Aiming Point in many instances from October through February and mid March.



Plus, has been pointed out before, formations would pickle their bombs when they saw the master bomb aimer release his bombs. Hard to achieve precision when your aircraft isn't even fitted with a Norden Bomb Sight and you're simply releasing on a cue from someone else.


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## billrunnels (Jun 7, 2018)

Barrett said:


> Usually lost in the Precision Bombing Debate is the definition of "precision." We should start with the AAF criterion of the 1000-foot circle around the aim point. The 1000-ft CEP (circular error probable) BEGAN with the notion that half the bombs would strike outside that circle. A 1000-pounder hitting at 1050 feet still would inflict some damage but presumably would not be cited as a success. The fact was: the 1000-ft CEP was seldom achieved, though things did improve (they had to.) In researching the Curt LeMay biography, IIRC when took the 305th BG to England he found that the 8AF could not tell where half its ordnance landed--a hellacious big CEP. (In the highly controversial Monte Cassino bombing, Gen. Mark Clark's trailer was rocked by explosions miles behind the lines. And that was in broad daylight.) There were of course multiple reasons: equipment, weather, and especially training. In each of his commands LeMay established remedial training programs to compensate for Stateside shortcomings.


I question LeMay's judgement regarding Stateside shortcomings. Having personally gone through the Bombardier Training Program I can attest to it's quality.

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## wuzak (Jun 8, 2018)

billrunnels said:


> I question LeMay's judgement regarding Stateside shortcomings. Having personally gone through the Bombardier Training Program I can attest to it's quality.



I wonder if those remedial schools were before your time in training.

I believe that the training quality issues were for the initial intakes of the 8th AF, and the later trainees benefited from improved training informed by combat experience/


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## billrunnels (Jun 8, 2018)

wuzak said:


> I wonder if those remedial schools were before your time in training.
> 
> I believe that the training quality issues were for the initial intakes of the 8th AF, and the later trainees benefited from improved training informed by combat experience/



That could very well be. The training I received was excellent and prepared me mentally and physically for combat. It demanded the very best I had to offer.

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## drgondog (Jun 12, 2018)

billrunnels said:


> I question LeMay's judgement regarding Stateside shortcomings. Having personally gone through the Bombardier Training Program I can attest to it's quality.


Bill - LeMay's experiences and reflections pointed to the very earliest days of 8th AF operations in fall and Winter of 1942 - based on observed results.

The trained officer corps was at a very low level in 1938-1939-1940 due to budget constraints. The crews and Navigator/bombardiers were trained and deployed without the integration of combat experienced trainers or combat experience relative to weather and least of all, the combined systems/doctrines and flight disciplines that led him to institute Lead Crew training.

I suspect that your training program in the states was circa mid-late 1943 after more Lessons Learned filtered back to the States? Additionally, the B-17E and early Fs went to England without the Automatic Flight Control systems that permitted the Bombardier to take over control from pilot during the bomb run from the IP (IIRC).


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## billrunnels (Jun 12, 2018)

drgondog said:


> Bill - LeMay's experiences and reflections pointed to the very earliest days of 8th AF operations in fall and Winter of 1942 - based on observed results.
> 
> The trained officer corps was at a very low level in 1938-1939-1940 due to budget constraints. The crews and Navigator/bombardiers were trained and deployed without the integration of combat experienced trainers or combat experience relative to weather and least of all, the combined systems/doctrines and flight disciplines that led him to institute Lead Crew training.
> 
> I suspect that your training program in the states was circa mid-late 1943 after more Lessons Learned filtered back to the States? Additionally, the B-17E and early Fs went to England without the Automatic Flight Control systems that permitted the Bombardier to take over control from pilot during the bomb run from the IP (IIRC).


Thanks for the info. I graduated from Bombardier School September 30, 1944 so the training I received would have included the changes he made.

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