# Douglas MacArthur vs Husband E. Kimmel Walter Short



## gjs238 (Dec 20, 2011)

After the loss of the Philippines, why did MacArthur survive politically while Kimmel and Short's careers were ruined?


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## davebender (Dec 20, 2011)

Because MacArthur had powerful friends in the Republican Party. If Big Mac had been fired for military incompetence (which was certainly true) he would have taken President FDR down with him. So MacArthur bombarded the American Government with press releases which were gross distortions of reality and President FDR insured those press releases made it into all the major newspapers. Then President FDR arranged for MacArthur to be assigned to Australia which was something of a military backwater during 1942 to 1944 but had the benefit of being located a long way from CONUSA.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 20, 2011)

I think it was because the defeat in the PI was a gradual loss. MacArthur was looked upon as a leader fighting an onslaught. Additionally MacArthur was a better politician.


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## mikewint (Dec 20, 2011)

total agreement, The disaster at Pearl REQUIRED someone to blame and those two, unfortunately, were holding the dirty-end of the stick and fell on their swords. As I recall, a few years ago the army reversed its findings and restored both of them.
Mac was simply better at PR and never failed to keep his image untarnished plus he was very politically savy and had done many "dirty" jobs for the Fed, i.e. his putting down of the WWI veterans bonus march on D.C.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 20, 2011)

The simple fact that Pearl Harbor was closer and was supposed to be a "safe" location might have had something to do with it. However, I do find it odd that Kimmel and Short were hung out to dry when they were attacked without warning whereas MacArthur had several hours' warning and still failed to disperse his air assets...and yet he still emerged with his reputation mostly intact.

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## davebender (Dec 20, 2011)

That excuse doesn't cut it for any American military commander in the Pacific. They received a war warning two weeks prior to the Japanese attacks. 

24 Nov 1941. 
Admiral Hart relayed Navy Department message to Gen MacArthur
MESSAGE TEXT (STARK TO HART):

THE CHIEF OF STAFF IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ESTIMATE PRESENTED HEREWITH AND REQUESTS THAT YOU INFORM THE SENIOR ARMY OFFICER IN YOUR AREA COLON CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF UNITED STATES DASH JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE VERY DOUBTFUL PERIOD THIS SITUATION TOGETHER WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENT OF THEIR MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCE INTIMATE IN OUR OPINION THAT SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY STOP THIS INFORMATION MUST BE TREATED WITH UTMOST SECRECY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE A TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE ACTION END STARK).


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 20, 2011)

Politics, phooy!


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## buffnut453 (Dec 20, 2011)

There had been a series of war warnings in the run-up to the Japanese attack but there's a world of difference between a non-specific "something's going to happen somewhere" (which is exactly what was issued) and clear knowledge that an attack on YOUR facilities is imminent. Kimmel and Short didn't have that clear knowledge but MacArthur did. Why the double standards in their respective treatments?

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## mikewint (Dec 20, 2011)

MacA is a prime example of: An ounce of image is worth a pound of performance


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## davebender (Dec 21, 2011)

Perhaps not but they had enough information to take basic precautions.

Pacific Theater, Order of Battle, 8/7.12.1941
- Keep most of the fleet at sea. 
- There were eight U.S.A.A.C. fighter squadrons in Hawaii equipped with P-36 or P-40 aircraft. Keep one in the air over Pearl Harbor from dawn to dusk (on a rotating basis). 
- There were three USN PBY wings at Pearl Harbor. One should be scouting from dawn to dusk.

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## mikewint (Dec 21, 2011)

Dave, mental mind-set is also an important factor. Orders are always subject to interpretation. Look at most WWII cartoonized Japanese: short, bandy-legged, buck-tooth, with heavy glasses while the western GI is a big, tall, Captain America-type. I don't think anyone pre-WWII really seriously believed Japan could successfully attack the US and on a Sunday near Christmas, never happen. Now the sneaky little SOBs might stoop to sabotage so keep your planes grouped together in the middle of the field where they can be watched. Additionaly the shallow waters of the harbor would prevent torpedoes from being launched. Actually, had a warning been given the fleet would have sallied from Pearl and thus been attacked in deep water. The losses would have been MUCH worse and the ships unrecoverable. On the Japanese end aircraft losses would have been very high.


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## davebender (Dec 21, 2011)

I agree. 

The ability to make sound judgements is the most important factor in competent leadership.


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## mikewint (Dec 21, 2011)

You bet, but what is thought to be sound on Mondays becomes (with 20-20 hindsight) totally stupid on Friday


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## gjs238 (Dec 30, 2011)

I'm also wondering that if MacArthur had suffered as Kimmel Short had, there might have been less emphasis on the South West Pacific Area (MacArthur/Philippines) campaign and more emphasis on the Pacific Ocean Areas (Nimitz) campaign.


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## syscom3 (Jan 1, 2012)

gjs238 said:


> I'm also wondering that if MacArthur had suffered as Kimmel Short had, there might have been less emphasis on the South West Pacific Area (MacArthur/Philippines) campaign and more emphasis on the Pacific Ocean Areas (Nimitz) campaign.



Not necessarily. Untill late 1943, the only offensive capability the US had was in the Solomons and NG.


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## bowfin (Feb 18, 2012)

MacArthur got caught flat footed in the Phillipines and again ten years later when the Chinese poured across the Yalu River. He must have looked good in a uniform to get where he got, because he wasn't a fightin' general.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 7, 2012)

gjs238 said:


> I'm also wondering that if MacArthur had suffered as Kimmel Short had, there might have been less emphasis on the South West Pacific Area (MacArthur/Philippines) campaign and more emphasis on the Pacific Ocean Areas (Nimitz) campaign.



Accordng to Lundstrom, Earnest King, CNO in WW2, was pushing the SW Pac axis of advance almost from the war's start. One early rift that developed between King and FJ Fletcher was the latter's reluctance to take more aggressive action inthat area, early 1942, prior to Coral Sea. Fletcher came to know and respect the IJN's search capability and knew he couldn't approach Rabaul without detection. Moreover, intelligence was spotty and failed to discern targets worthy of risking an aircraft carrier. His failure to produce some retaliatory success put him in dutch with EJK that culminated in his relief in August after Eastern Solomons. 

The contrast in leadership between Big Mac and his successor in Korea: M.B. Ridgeway is startling. MBR is a real battle commander, not just a great strategic thinker. His development of the artillery targeted 'fire sack,' turned around the disaster that attended Mac's misjudgement of ChiCom intentions before they crossed the Yalu. Old "Iron Tits" ran a tight ship and seems to have spent a lot of time making sure his divisional commanders were up to snuff. I don't get the sense that Mac ever visited the front during the PI campaign. Not that he was a coward, but I think it just wasn't his style of "leadership."

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Mar 6, 2018)

davebender said:


> Perhaps not but they had enough information to take basic precautions.
> 
> Pacific Theater, Order of Battle, 8/7.12.1941
> - Keep most of the fleet at sea.
> ...


And the newly installed radar towers lack a comm link to the main bases at Oahu-nor were the enlisted or commissioned officers involved with that new technology properly trained. When the first of the Japanese Zeros showed up as blips on the screens, they were assumed to be returning American aircraft from a morning patrol-nobody "checked and then- double-checked".. We found out, the hard way, that what assisted England in the BoB in 1940 to hold off the Luftwaffe, should have been applicable to the USA at Pearl Harbor in late 1941.


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## syscom3 (Mar 7, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> And the newly installed radar towers lack a comm link to the main bases at Oahu-nor were the enlisted or commissioned officers involved with that new technology properly trained. When the first of the Japanese Zeros showed up as blips on the screens, they were assumed to be returning American aircraft from a morning patrol-nobody "checked and then- double-checked".. We found out, the hard way, that what assisted England in the BoB in 1940 to hold off the Luftwaffe, should have been applicable to the USA at Pearl Harbor in late 1941.



Except that in the BoB, The UK was at war. On the morning of Dec7th 1941, the US was at peace and no one in the world could have conceived of "lil ole Japan" pulling off such an attack.


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## buffnut453 (Mar 7, 2018)

syscom3 said:


> Except that in the BoB, The UK was at war. On the morning of Dec7th 1941, the US was at peace and no one in the world could have conceived of "lil ole Japan" pulling off such an attack.



But, crucially, the Chain Home system AND the critical C3 infrastructure were in place and thoroughly tested before the onset of war. Development of an integrated C3 infrastructure commenced in 1937 and US forces in Hawaii hadn't achieved even that by the end of 1941. Yes, the US wasn't at war when the Japanese attacked but neither was Britain when the Chain Home system was developed and integrated. It's still an incredible oversight by the US military not to have even a rudimentary radar and C3 infrastructure by the end of 1941 given the knowledge of what had already happened in Europe and during the Battle of Britain.

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## pbehn (Mar 13, 2018)

buffnut453 said:


> But, crucially, the Chain Home system AND the critical C3 infrastructure were in place and thoroughly tested before the onset of war. Development of an integrated C3 infrastructure commenced in 1937 and US forces in Hawaii hadn't achieved even that by the end of 1941. Yes, the US wasn't at war when the Japanese attacked but neither was Britain when the Chain Home system was developed and integrated. It's still an incredible oversight by the US military not to have even a rudimentary radar and C3 infrastructure by the end of 1941 given the knowledge of what had already happened in Europe and during the Battle of Britain.


Worse than that, the Chain Home system was not particularly advanced even in 1939, the C3 system used everyday technology of the time. I believe the British were obliged to divulge how such things worked under the terms of Lend Lease, but even if it wasn't shown to the US it is a pretty simple thing to figure out, just needing a lot of effort getting it all working.


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## Zipper730 (Mar 13, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> And the newly installed radar towers lack a comm link to the main bases at Oahu-nor were the enlisted or commissioned officers involved with that new technology properly trained.


Why?

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Mar 14, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> Why?


We should have studied the British radar installations "Chain Hope" in the BoB 1940-and schooled our Armed Forces in the ways the Brits were detecting incoming Luftwaffe aircraft-- but we didn't-- One of the many mistakes Hermann "Fat Boy" Goering made was underestimating the effectiveness of British Radar- "Forewarned is also Forearmed" Words of wisdom..


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## Zipper730 (Mar 14, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> We should have studied the British radar installations "Chain Hope" in the BOB 1940 and schooled our Armed Forces in the way the Brits were detecting incoming Luftwaffe aircraft-- but we didn't


I thought we did? When did Gordon Saville begin re-structuring our radar configurations and set-ups?

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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 29, 2018)

buffnut453 said:


> It's still an incredible oversight by the US military not to have even a rudimentary radar and C3 infrastructure by the end of 1941 given the knowledge of what had already happened in Europe and during the Battle of Britain.



It's especially interesting considering that the Carriers had already begun implementing such a system. In the First Team chapters 4 & 5 Lundstrom describes the fighter description system employed by the USN carriers, during the early raids and the Bougainville operation, of February, 1942. While far from fully developed, he explicitly states that the FD system was based upon the British model and experience. Considering the time to train and develop a Fighter direction system, I believe this suggests efforts to implement it that predate Pearl Harbor. How much before, I don't know for certain, but would expect at least a few months. Considering the rather sleepy state of the nation and much of its leadership (with some important exceptions) that may represent a furious pace for the prewar time... The first Tizard mission meeting occurred in late August 1940 and according to the website below, FD development was in full swing by march of 1941. I don't know what was being done by the army at PH, but I would be surprised if it was nothing. According to Bartsch (Doomed at the Start) , even the PI air defenser forces on Luzon had a rudimentary FD system well before PH.
From:
The Beginnings of Naval Fighter Direction - Chapter 5 of Radar and the Fighter Directors - Engineering and Technology History Wiki

"_By *March 1941 *some of the heavy combatants that had been equipped with the CXAM radar were gaining experience in its use. In that month the CO of the carrier Yorktown reported that with the CXAM used in practice exercises, *combat air patrols “have been quickly and reliably directed to intercept.” *The report also noted that the *Fighter Director Officer (FDO)* had hardly any room to work, that he needed a trained team of supporting plotters, and he needed a central radar plotting room where he could develop a complete tactical picture. The report continued to say that the chief petty officer radar operators provided their “unrelated and heterogeneous ranges and bearings” by sound powered phone to the bridge, Flag Plot, Air Plot, and Sky Control with no correlation among the various reports. It concluded, “Consequently there must be provided a RADAR plotting team with adequate facilities for assimilating and segregating vital information.”_ "


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