# The Battle of Kursk - Biggest clash of armor.



## JugBR (Sep 4, 2008)

well, when i saw that charlie posted some texts about the panther in the battle of kursk, in his topic dedicated to the panther tanks, it cheered me up to make a topic about this battle - the most important and the most amazing of ww2 in mine opinion - 

so, i´ll starting posting some very interesting quotes:

*"If the tanks succeed, then victory follows. *

General Heinz Guderian, the father of blitzkrieg and the writer of "Atchung, Panzer !".

_*"the advance of an armoured army just could be stopped by another, in defensive position, with mines and anti-tank guns"*_

General Narcise Chauvineu, defending in his book the idea that armoured armies could be stopped using mines and anti-tank guns.

_*"A war is not lost until you consider it lost."*_

General Erich von Manstein.

*"War is a science, a group of math problems, to be resolved by men and guns, in the time and space"*

General Georgi Zhukov.


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## JugBR (Sep 4, 2008)

Germans:

*After the fall in Stalingrad, fighting for survive.*

Stalingrad marks clearly a point of change in ww2, because when in 01/30/43, Hitler refered to Stalingrad in a speech, he wasnt talking about the consolidation and expansion of III Reich anyway.

From the words of Hitler we are allowed to concludes that even the highest leader of nazi Germany had already realized that after Stalingrad, Germany wasnt fighting for victory anymore. but for survive.

*"The god of war has gone over to the other side." *

Adolf Hitler.

*Usefull sacrifice ?*

For many, the sacrifice of VI army in Stalingrad, was a non sense struggle between Hitler and Stalin. Others says that without the resistance of VI army, the german forces that was withdrawing from Caucasus, also could be surrounded by soviets, because soviets had not strenght enought to reach the black sea, since a great part of soviet forces was fighting in stalingrad.

*"If Paulus's army had capitulated before the end, the Russians would had the advantage of withdrawing forces against Paulus and against the southern front, where I had only two Romanian armies. Therefore, the resistance of the Sixth German Army, even to the death of the last man, was necessary."*

Field Marshall Erich von Manstein.

*After Stalingrad.*

Germans despite in great disadvantage and needing to cross 3 times more land than soviets, could withdraw at time of avoid the soviets to cut off their withdrawal, avoiding a siege.

In the sequence of the enormous success that was the strategic withdrawal of Caucasus, german generals convinced Hitler to withdraw the german forces that was found in a equally dangerous situation, in the central sector, withdraw then 100 miles back on the Rhzev-Gjatzk-Vyazma line

The withdrawal was made in April of 43, but produced a projection(salient), that immediately was occupied by soviet forces. the projection of Kursk.


source of research: WikiQuote , Area Militar


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## JugBR (Sep 4, 2008)

images of the hell of stalingrad:


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## B-17engineer (Sep 4, 2008)

Hey that really interesting and I like that painting the last photo....Thanks for sharing !!


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## SoD Stitch (Sep 4, 2008)

B-17engineer said:


> Hey that really interesting and I like that painting the last photo....Thanks for sharing !!



Gee, who do you think's gonna win this battle? The five or six hardened Wehrmacht soldiers in the foreground, or the angry mob of 50 or 60 Russian soldiers headed their way? I'd say the barrel of that MG34 is pretty hot right about now . . . .


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## m kenny (Sep 4, 2008)

I am pretty sure 'the horde' won. There is a lot of good wartime art about. It's a shame we don't see more of it.
.
.


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## JugBR (Sep 4, 2008)

kenny i think that images says everything about what was their "great patriotic war" still today, the nazi flags on the floor, in the russian war museums, like a dirty piece of cloth.

20 - 25 milion soviets deads kenny, was a genocide there.


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## B-17engineer (Sep 4, 2008)

lol I know It just a really nice painting


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## JugBR (Sep 4, 2008)

im very emotional b17...


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## B-17engineer (Sep 4, 2008)

huh? ..........


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 4, 2008)

Some images of the battle.


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## B-17engineer (Sep 4, 2008)

very nice charlie!


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 4, 2008)

A little more, this time Tiger related.

To the front.







loading up.








In the bulge:







Fighting:


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## JugBR (Sep 4, 2008)

nice pics charlie, im posting some pics about my visit in a museum in campinas, theres a krupp cannon there from reminds me that one i had saw in your post a month ago.

when i finish there ill come back here to write more crap lolll

my pc works in the speed of light...


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## Erich (Sep 4, 2008)

Charles or anyone else posting pics for this most interesting thread in the works; please try and ID the units if possible. I see Charles has posted from the Heavy tank component of the 2nd SS two well known photos.

E ~


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 4, 2008)

Yes, that would be the ideal thing, the problem I have is that in the book I took the pictures wich is "Images of Kursk" the epigraphs are very inaccurate.

For example in a photo of a panzer IV said : "Tiger advancing to the battle" and other depicting a group of Panzer IIIs with schurzen said " panzer IV in the build up area"

So, is best in my opinion let the people who knows better like you to indicate who is who and what are the units in the pictures.


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## Erich (Sep 4, 2008)

top pic CB are Pz IV H's with Schurzen from the 3rd SS, please note the black III near the Balkenkreuz on the rear engine plate, for camo-ID protection the W-SS used I for the 1st, II for the 2nd and III for the 3rd W-SS Div.'s. Indeed I do own pics of other vehicles still drapped in regular W-SS Divisional insignia during the July battle. these were collected in the late 1960's-early 1970's before I really set myself into studying the Luftwaffe with a passion


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 4, 2008)

Thank you very much, I must say that the Panzer III L and Panzer IV Gs of the Waffen SS in 1943 look extremely neat compared with the Heer ones.


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## JugBR (Sep 5, 2008)

Soviets:

*The Tide Turns.*

from zhukov.mitsi.com:

Operation Barbarossa, an attempt to "overthrow Soviet Russia by a rapid campaign," had failed. The Soviet Union had survived the German onslaught by trading the lives of millions of its soldiers and huge tracts of its territory for time. In the months following the invasion, the Soviet Union had relocated hundreds of industries and millions of workers, which were now producing weapons. Everything they could not dismantle and move was destroyed to prevent its use by the invaders. Communist, religious, and patriotic sentiments, as well as hatred of the fascist invaders, were all tapped in support of the war effort.

*Help from outside*

Now, Russia had the mobilization of entire country and also the valuable allied assistance. Allieds had provided the Red Army with a vast increase in the quantity of equipment that was equal or in some cases better than that possessed by the Germans. 

Some numbers of Lend-lease, from wikipedia.org:

Aircraft - 14,795
Tanks - 7,056
Jeeps - 51,503
Trucks - 375,883
Motorcycles - 35,170
Tractors - 8,071
Guns - 8,218
Machine guns - 131,633
Explosives - 345,735 tons
Building equipment valued - $10,910,000
Railroad freight cars - 11,155
Locomotives - 1,981
Cargo ships - 90
Submarine hunters - 105
Torpedo boats - 197
Ship engines - 7,784
Food supplies - 4,478,000 tons
Machines and equipment - $1,078,965,000
Non-ferrous metals - 802,000 tons
Petroleum products - 2,670,000 tons
Chemicals - 842,000 tons
Cotton - 106,893,000 tons
Leather - 49,860 tons
Tires - 3,786,000
Army boots - 15,417,001 pairs

*A very know enemy.*

In 1943, russians was already very familiar with the german strategies. The espionage systems and the partisan movements began operates very efectively behind the front. The soviet leaderships adquired experience to fight the germans. 

Wasnt surprise for soviets that germans will join all their strenght to attack in kursk salient. The knowloge of enemy gave them the time to make their own plans. The biggest clash of armor was being designed on the horizon of russian sttepes...

research sources WikiPedia Georgi Zhukov´s website


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2008)

Some iages of Russian forces in action between Stalingrad and Kursk. My main source is a Russian Book, which in English translates to the "Great Patriotic War 1941-45. It was given to me by my wifes Russian Grandfather, a Siberian Cavalryman. Dont know the details, because all of the captions are in Russian


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2008)

My Russian connection...my wifes grandfather, the Russian Cavalryman

The picture is from early 1941 just before Alexander (that was his name) was married. He was already a battle hardened veteran having been engaged against the japanese at khakin Gol in 1939. Just looking at the steely look in his eyes (which he never lost) one can see the absolute iron nerve in his belly


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## JugBR (Sep 5, 2008)

parsifal, thanx for share it with us m8 !


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## Thorlifter (Sep 5, 2008)

What a cool pic to have of your grandfather-in-law. Thanks for sharing.


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## m kenny (Sep 5, 2008)

Erich said:


> top pic CB are Pz IV H's with Schurzen from the 3rd SS, please note the black III near the Balkenkreuz on the rear engine plate,



In the top photo the tanks are all Pz III. The engine deck layout is the giveaway.


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## SoD Stitch (Sep 5, 2008)

m kenny said:


> In the top photo the tanks are all Pz III. The engine deck layout is the giveaway.



That's interesting; I didn't know they put _Schurzen_ on the III's, I thought they just put it on late-model IV's. But you're right, that's definitely a III judging by the engine decking and the exhaust layout.


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## Erich (Sep 5, 2008)

my mistake, thank you gents for the correction please note the Tank nummer on the back of the turret shield. many times the III's were in the Stab Kompanies, as communique' vehicles II 8 or is it another number indicated ?


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## Ramirezzz (Sep 5, 2008)

parsifal said:


> My Russian connection...my wifes grandfather, the Russian Cavalryman
> 
> The picture is from early 1941 just before Alexander (that was his name) was married. He was already a battle hardened veteran having been engaged against the japanese at khakin Gol in 1939. Just looking at the steely look in his eyes (which he never lost) one can see the absolute iron nerve in his belly




my grandfather was been engaged there too. He often told me stories how unbelievable tough the Japanese soldiers were, and how hard it was to capture their positions.


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## mkloby (Sep 5, 2008)

Parsifal - great pics and thanks for sharing.


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## Ramirezzz (Sep 5, 2008)

SoD Stitch said:


> Gee, who do you think's gonna win this battle? The five or six hardened Wehrmacht soldiers in the foreground, or the angry mob of 50 or 60 Russian soldiers headed their way? I'd say the barrel of that MG34 is pretty hot right about now . . . .



BTW it's not a typical Stalingrad infantry assault pictured here. Russians as well as Germans used small squads with heavy firepower there.


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2008)

I feel i am in a unique position when it comes to my family heritage. I am an Australian, with my own grandfather being a Light Horseman who fought at Gallipoli, and palestine in the "Great" War. My mums second husband (my step father , I guess, although I was an adult when they married) was a German machine gunner who was attached to the 373rd Div of the wehrmacht. Lastly, my wife is Russian, and before he died, I developed a strong friendship with my Grandfather in law. Talk about multi-cultural!!!


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2008)

A few more shots for you guuys, mostly of Soviet forces. Some of the photos have captions, if you can read them, and understand Russian, wouldnt mind a translation


This first photo is of Soviet Infantry and armour on the attack just after the Battle. The shot was taken, I believe, just north of either Kharkov or Belgorad

The second shot has a caption, which i cannot read. i believe, however, this is a shot of Soviet armour in the 'ring of stell", the encircling forces around SAtalingrad in late 1942-early 1943

The third shot is of Soviet infantry attacking in May 1943 (I think). Again it has a caption, which would be great if someone could interpret....

Lastly I have included a photo of stalingrad in wht I believe is the late summer or early Autumn of 1942, to give an idea of the devastation in the city


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## Ramirezzz (Sep 9, 2008)

parsifal said:


> The second shot has a caption, which i cannot read. i believe, however, this is a shot of Soviet armour in the 'ring of stell", the encircling forces around SAtalingrad in late 1942-early 1943


according to the caption here this is a tank desant entering the village at Cuban , autumn 1943.


> The third shot is of Soviet infantry attacking in May 1943 (I think). Again it has a caption, which would be great if someone could interpret....


"assault on stanica Krymskaja, May 1943" . I believe it's in Kuban region as well.


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## parsifal (Sep 9, 2008)

Thanks Ramirezz. I didnt think i could guess correctly. I stand corrected


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## parsifal (Sep 9, 2008)

Ramirezzz said:


> BTW it's not a typical Stalingrad infantry assault pictured here. Russians as well as Germans used small squads with heavy firepower there.



Yeah, ther are a lot of biases against the russian capability in places like this. They forget that the Russians for most of the war on the eastern front were attacking, and as a result their losses were inherently heavy.

Also more than 50% of Russian caualties were inflicted in the first 18 months of the war, thereafter, whilst russian casulaties were never light they were much closer to those being sustained by the Germans in the last half of the war


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## Ramirezzz (Sep 9, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Yeah, ther are a lot of biases against the russian capability in places like this. They forget that the Russians for most of the war on the eastern front were attacking, and as a result their losses were inherently heavy.
> 
> Also more than 50% of Russian caualties were inflicted in the first 18 months of the war, thereafter, whilst russian casulaties were never light they were much closer to those being sustained by the Germans in the last half of the war



no wonder - actually the only sources available to the western researchers in the postwar period were the German vet's memoirs.


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## Erich (Sep 9, 2008)

ah is this thread about Kursk or Stalingrad or maybe I missed something along the way ?

E ♫


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## parsifal (Sep 10, 2008)

Your right Erich, sorry, to get onto that detour...I have a question, do you have figures on the air battle losses for each side during Kursk. There are so many conflicting reports on this subject, so its a question that people are going to need patience to answer properly


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## Erich (Sep 10, 2008)

I believe what you wish for is in book form but not sure if Christer Bergstrom and a Russian author have or are doing this or not. For me no I do not have anything for losses or kills except for individual JG histories. Nothing in total for the Schlacht units either.


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## Ramirezzz (Sep 10, 2008)

Erich said:


> I believe what you wish for is in book form but not sure if Christer Bergstrom and a Russian author have or are doing this or not.


I believe the latest volume of their book covers only a period till late 1942.


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## Ramirezzz (Sep 10, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Your right Erich, sorry, to get onto that detour...I have a question, do you have figures on the air battle losses for each side during Kursk. There are so many conflicting reports on this subject, so its a question that people are going to need patience to answer properly



according to my sources (although they seem to be a little bit outdated) during the period from 5.07 to 23.08.1943 the VVS lost 1934 planes.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 11, 2008)

Kursk Bulge defences.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 11, 2008)

122mm howitzers and 14,5 Simonov antitank rifle emplacements.


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## parsifal (Sep 11, 2008)

Fantastic pics Charles!!! What is the source????


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 12, 2008)

Thank you.

Source is "Images of Kursk: History's Greatest Tank Battle" By Nicholas Kornish.

German weekly newsreel dealing with the battle, very good footage of german armor and self propelled artillery.

Left clik only

Wochenschau-Archiv


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## parsifal (Sep 12, 2008)

The air battle at Kursk is very interesting, and because of the lack of hard data on losses, a still very much disputed battle as to outcome and impact (on the ground campaign). there are many that argue the VVS was inneffective in the battle, and that throughout the LW continued to dominate. I respect that point of view, but i dont agree with it.

My basic position on the air battle is that in many ways it mimicked the the ground campaign. The Soviets were still far behind the Germans in terms of qualitative edge. However they now enjoyed a considerable quantitative edge 9they had that previously as well, but now they possessed sufficient grasp of Command Control Issues as to exploit that advantage properly. At the beginning of the battle the Soviets actually deployed less aircraft into the battle zone than the germans, about 1800 aircraft, but they were supported by a further 5-6000 aircraft outside the salient, and more importantly outside the range of a german pre-emptive strike. That was not the limit of Soviet reserves....these are just the front line units. There were about 8000 airframe replacements behind that as well. In comparison, the german replacement parks and reserve units were virtually nil 

The Russians attempted a pre-emptive strike themselves, which failed dismally, however the battle of attrition that their deployments obviously were geared towards did eventuate, The result was that whilst the germans started with a very high success and sortie rate, as the battle progressed the german sortie rate plummetted, as spares and replacements ran out very quickly, and the balance of forces began to tip in favour of the Russians. Losses i think at the end of July were running still slightly in the germans favour, but the gap was narrowing very fast. This will no doubt be disputed, and frankly there are not reliable figures on osses for the russians particularly. However the Germans sorite rates were down to about a quarter of the levels being achieved at the beiginning of the battle.  Soviet sortie rates reflected the huge reserves that they possessed. My best estimate is that by the end of the battle, the Soviet sortie rate was about 8 times that of the germans, and consequesntly air superiority had in fact passed to the Soviets, despite the heavy attrition being inflicted by the Luftwaffe. For the Soviets, the important thing was not so much the killing of the Luftwaffe, as achieving the primary misssion of supporting their advancing ground formations. I think they achieved this objective in spades. There conduct of the battle, given the limitations of qualtity, and their advantages in numbers and support, was near perfect, IMO


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 13, 2008)

The russians claimed a huge number of Panzer destroyed by shturmovik but also the same russians after the war recognized that only 8% of german tank and self propelled guns casualties were due the air attack by VVS, I have good a link in some place, let me see if I can found it.


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## Njaco (Sep 13, 2008)

This site gives a good accounting of the tank losses.

The Battle of Kursk


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## B-17engineer (Sep 13, 2008)

what plane is that in the background ?


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 14, 2008)

An Il-2 obviously.


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## B-17engineer (Sep 14, 2008)

Well sorry..........


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## parsifal (Sep 14, 2008)

If the Russians were able to destroy 8% of the total Tank casualties by air attack, they would easily be the most efficient Tank Busting air force in the world at that time. The Germans, by comparison were killing about 5.5% of tank Casulatiers by Stukas. 

Killing thnings by air attack is about the least important thing that ground attack aircraft do. They keep the enemy pinned, , spot for the ground forces, and generally harrass and dislocate the enemy. The Soviets were the masters at that level of co-operation, simply because they would select a section of the front, and swamp it with numbers. There was basically nothing the Germans could do about that tactic. Even though the germans retained individual qualitative advantage over the Russian pilots, they could not paralyse the battlefield in the same way as the VVS could. Shooting down large numbers of Russians was irelevant, if the russians were still achieving their mission. Shooting up large numbers of Russian AFVs was pointless, if the Russians were still overrunning the ground (and presumably recovering and often repairing the disabled tanks). And I am even doubtful that the killing spree so often promoted by the german sources is all that credible. I think the russians were starting to shoot back, with increasing effectiveness, from Kursk onwards.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 14, 2008)

I found the link it said 4 or 5 % not 8% as I said before.



> Вот почему немцы и американцы для борьбы с танками пытались ставить на самолеты качающиеся части 501 мм — 75-мм противотанковых пушек. В большинстве случаев пушки эти были полуавтоматические, но это не имело существенного значения, так как прицельный выстрел мог быть все равно один.
> 
> В целом за время войны боевые потери советских средних и тяжелых танков по видам средств поражения составили: от артиллерии 88—91 %; от мин и фугасов 8— 4 %; от бомб и артогня авиации 4—5 %. Хотя в отдельных операциях потери от огня авиации доходили до 10—15%.



A rough translation with babelfish 

This is why Germans and Americans for dealing with the tanks attempted to place on the aircraft the being rocked parts of 501 mm - 75- mm of antitank guns. In the majority of the cases of gun these were semiautomatic, but this did not have vital importance, since aiming shot could be nevertheless one. As a whole in the time of war the combat losses of Soviet average and heavy tanks on I see weapons of destruction they comprised: from artillery 88- 91%; from the mines and the contact mines it is eighth 4%; from bombs and artillery fire of aviation *4 - 5%*. Although in the separate operations of loss to the fire of aviation reached to 10-15%. 

NS 37

Other aircraft that performed very well in Kursk against light armor and soft skinned vehicles was the Hs-129.


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## Njaco (Sep 14, 2008)

> There was basically nothing the Germans could do about that tactic. Even though the germans retained individual qualitative advantage over the Russian pilots, they could not paralyse the battlefield in the same way as the VVS could.



Sometimes it worked.

8 July 1943

The Russian attack began in the morning, moving west in an attempt to cut the Begorod-Oboian highway. Along the woods north of Belgorod, Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Bruno Meyer, flying a Hs 129B of IV./SG 9, spotted moving Russian tanks and large concentrations of troops in the attack on the German flank. Meyer radioed to base that he saw at least 40 tanks and, "...._dense blocks of infantry, like a martial picture from the middle ages." _and ordered the rest of his _Gruppe _up from Mikoyanovka to assault the Russian attack.
....The Luftwaffe immediately scrambled 4 squadrons, a total of 64 Hs 129s, to Meyer's coordinates. Using high-velocity 30mm cannons, the planes swept the forset, pumping shells into the rears of the tanks. Within a few minutes, half a dozen tanks were destroyed and burning. Fw 190 fighters joined the fray, strafing infantry and bombing wherever the Soviets were clustered. Follow up attacks by squadrons led by Major Matuschek, Oblt. Oswald, Oblt. Dornemann and Lt. Orth along with attacks on the infantry by Major Druschel's Fw 190 jabos, soon destroyed the Russian brigade and they retreated into the woods. The Soviet armoured assault had been blunted solely through air power.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 14, 2008)

*Yes*, is that episode exactly the one wich I had in mind when I wrote my earlier post, Thanks Njaco.


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## Njaco (Sep 15, 2008)

Thanks Bronson.

And the closest thing on stats I have found is this.

from "Hitler's Luftwaffe" by Tony Wood / Bill Gunston pg 80,

"During the opening phases of Zitadelle, the Luftwaffe flew over 3,000 sorties a day, with each servicable Ju 87D flying up to 5-6 missions per day. This effort decreased to around 1,500 sorties per day after the first week and then averaged 1,000 per day for the remainder of July. The Jagdgruppen claimed 432 kills on the first day, of which II./JG 3 claimed 77 kills, including 62 bombers, and III./JG 52 shot down 38 Soviet aircraft. German losses on the first day of Zitadelle amounted to only 26 aircraft. In total, the Luftwaffe flew 37,421 sorties throughout the battle, destroying 1,736 enemy aircraft for the loss of 64. Twenty thousand tons of bombs were dropped and Fliegerkorps I alone claimed 1,100 tanks and 1,300 vehicles."


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2008)

Thers always exceptions, even big ones, and the germans may still have won, if they could get their high command to fight the war properly. even though Russian reserves were huge, they were not bottomless, If the germans could have lifted the attrition rate even higher, perhaps the Russians might have run out of steam


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Thanks Bronson.
> 
> And the closest thing on stats I have found is this.
> 
> ...



In fact Russian actual losses on the first day, just over the Kursk sector, according to Hardesty (who says he bases his figures on Russian sources), were just 176 aircraft. Soviet claims on the 1st day were 260 aircraft, which even hardesty says are too high. by the end of the first week, Soviet claims amounted to 854 aircraft, which is patently incorrect. Soviet sources also say that Luftwaffe losses to the 1st week in August amounted to 1400 a/c. this is also an exaggeration. However, Soviet admitted losses in that same periood is just 566 aircraft. 

Hardesty estimatre German losses July was 487, and he accepts the figure of 566 aircraft losses for the Soviets. this at least looks more relaistic to me, but the actual figures are spongy and unreliable, mostly because the postwar accounts are just a regurgitation of LW wartime claims and estimates, and the Soviets/Russians have proven reluctant, or unable to cite consistent and realistc figures and claims for losses. Evidently, even 70 years on, its a sensitive subject

There is absloutely no way that german losses for the entire battle amounted to just 64. Put a 0 at the end of that and you might be getting closer


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## Njaco (Sep 15, 2008)

I agree. It was the only thing I've found so far on stats. It does seem out of kilt. What it doesn't say is the time frame. Was it just July? When did the battle officially end? Need some parameters.


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2008)

I admit that I dont have reliable figures for losses for either side. But the claims and counter claims from both sides are just unbelievable at times, and thats frustraing. Sorry, I didnt mean, or imply to take it out on you (or anybody really, its not our fault), but it would just be nice to get a set of figures that seemed realistic.....

This is what I think can be said

1) The germans were superior qualitatively by a wide margin, and this continued for most of the war. This meant that a few German airraft could often inflict disproportional losses on the Soviets


2) Soviet Command Control, and the general standard of training had improved sufficiently from the wars beginning, until Kursk, to the point that the Soviet air assets were now a significant factor in the ground war. The Soviets previously (ie in 1942) had the numbers, but were still inneffective in the air, because of very poor pilot standards, poor servieability rates, and extremely poor C&C. By 1943 serviceability rates were up, pilot training and tactics had improved, and the command and control of assets had vastly improved. 

3) From Kursk onward, the GENERAL trend was for the VVS to have an increasing efect on the outcome of the ground battle, and for the LW to have a decreasing effect....


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## Erich (Sep 15, 2008)

actually the Soviets never had superior air cover any time during the war, there was just too much open space and in fact after Jan 15, 1945 there were more LW fighter gruppen on the Ost front than at any one time, Soviet air losses were enormous and of course coveniently lost right after the war so we will never fully know.

where it mattered was on the ground even with the Soviets taking terrible tank casualties they had full on factory/tech support to replace those losses besides the overwhelming majority in man-woman power to assist in their ground objectives.

back to Kursk as a specific unless one has access to ALL known and even unknown LW histories which no-one has then a truthful and I mean truthful account of claims and losses will never be told. Something can and will be close and hopeful somewhat realistic in the future covering this portion of the Battle


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## Njaco (Sep 15, 2008)

> Sorry, I didnt mean, or imply to take it out on you (or anybody really, its not our fault), but it would just be nice to get a set of figures that seemed realistic.....



Never even took it that way.  I was trying to contribute. I've read and seen too much info on Zitadelle to have come to an informed conclusion just yet and that after ....ohhh, how many years?! Numbers are numbers but the fact still remains that Germany wasted its strength on the battle with no appreciable results.


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## Erich (Sep 15, 2008)

nothing appreciable except some different weapons systems both air and ground


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## CharlesBronson (Oct 7, 2008)

KV-1S versus Tiger tank, a story from the Kursk battle.


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## parsifal (Oct 7, 2008)

Hi Charles

great article...what is the source??

You seem to be suggesting (perhaps i misunderstand you), that the KV series was not further developed. That is surely not the case.....what about the KV-85, and the JS series, arent they based on the basic KV chassis????


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## CharlesBronson (Oct 7, 2008)

Hmm, no quite, as you say the KV did was developed further, but the S variant was terminated after Kursk. 

Source.


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## hedgehogib (Dec 3, 2008)

Hey,
What was the main cause of the USSR victory in the battle? Share your opinion:] Maybe somebody has any links or can share some sources on this topic.  (I am writing on this topic for my history class)


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## Juha (Dec 3, 2008)

Hello
simply SU hand many more men, planes, guns and tanks and SUs. Also they achieved partial surprise in their attack against NE flank of Orel bulge, Germans had attacked where Soviets expected them. Hitler also lost his nerve when Allied landed in Sicily and SU played its charts well when it attacked in different parts of Eastern front. Some PzDs and 3rd SSPzGrD spent considerable times on trains moving from one hot spot to another. Remember also that for ex 3rd SSPzGrD suffered heavier losses at Mius after Kursk attack phase than during that attack phase (5-13.7.43)

Juha


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Dec 3, 2008)

Juha said:


> Hello
> simply SU hand many more men, planes, guns and tanks and SUs. Also they achieved partial surprise in their attack against NE flank of Orel bulge, Germans had attacked where Soviets expected them. Hitler also lost his nerve when Allied landed in Sicily and SU played its charts well when it attacked in different parts of Eastern front. Some PzDs and 3rd SSPzGrD spent considerable times on trains moving from one hot spot to another. Remember also that for ex 3rd SSPzGrD suffered heavier losses at Mius after Kursk attack phase than during that attack phase (5-13.7.43)
> 
> Juha



Agreed, even if the Germans had the better soldiers and weapons; the Russians had plenty of numbers to offset that.


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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2008)

The Russians ought to be given credit for fighting a masterly defensive battle, followed by a devastating counteroffensive. Despite the continued technical superiority of the germans, this advantage counted for nothing in the final wash up. Russian general ship had come of age, and the proficiency of Soviet arms was now such that they could practice all arms warfare with success


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## Njaco (Dec 3, 2008)

Heres a link.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/battle-kursk-biggest-clash-armor-14796.html



along with these....

Kursk Page

Battle of Kursk: Germany’s Lost Victory in World War II » HistoryNet

The Battle of Kursk

That last one is very interesting.


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## parsifal (Dec 4, 2008)

That was a good thread NJ...I wonder if it could be ressurrected and this discussion transferred


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## Njaco (Dec 5, 2008)

Yes it was. I don't know if the Mods can do that but its a good idea.


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## rochie (Dec 5, 2008)

wow njaco that last link does go against everything i've known about kursk


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## Njaco (Dec 6, 2008)

I know, opened my eyes. I'm just curious about his stats. He does appear to give some references.


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## lesofprimus (Dec 6, 2008)

I can combine both these threads guys... Gimmie a minute...


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## lesofprimus (Dec 6, 2008)

Combining threads....


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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2008)

Thanks, thats great


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## Njaco (Dec 6, 2008)

Thanks Dan!


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 6, 2008)

Regarding the German strategy for 1943, a much more elegant solution was proposed, by FM Manstein (almost sure I've got the right FM but will check). He proposed a general withdrawal of the entire southern part of the Eastern Front, and when the Russians advanced to take over the vacated ground, a sudden surprise counterattack "with the backhand". It was a daring and elegant solution, and should have been pursued.


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## Erich (Dec 6, 2008)

a short note the last link listed on page 5 is drawn up from the experience by the SS Panzerkorps through the large and most out of print work by Sylvester Stadler whom wrote of his experiences and the 3 SS Panzergrendier Div's at Kursk. the truth was finally exposed through that old work and rewritten of sorts to fit into George Nipes book on Kursk and the Mius. Caidens work of which I own I left as a door step right after I first read the silly book giving total credit to the Soviets and noting huge losses sustained by the Germans which was total bunk.

the link goes into some details and the ending is of course the authors personal opinion. had the W-SS Armor been bolstered up they would of done the Mississippi two-step on the Soviets as they were wearing down, but obviously Hitler had bone head ideas about Italy.


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2008)

Well, time to stick my two cents worth in.......I dont believe the german Infantry was up to a mobile defence at all. By 1943, the mobility of german Infantry was about half that what it was due to the losses in trucks and horses. Every time they were called upon to undertake a major march, the losses went through the roof, particualrly in terms of equipment.

In contrast the Soviet Infantry was going from strength to strength in terms of its mobility, thanks to the 350000 trucks supplied under LL. And whilst the SS and the Panzers generally were an essential attacking arm (whether that be a defensive counterattack, or a full on offensive, they needed the Infantry to fill the gaps and absorb the punishment, otherwise they took inordinate losses themselves.

Manstein, before he got this cockamamie idea of mobile defence realized that the only real hope was to make short withdrawals of twenty to twenty five kilometres to avoid the devastating effects of the Soviet artillery. The key to the German defences wasnt the Infantry ofr the tanks so much, as the ability to avoid the dislocation from the enemy artillery, and to concentrate ones own artillery sufficiently to have a significant effect. These "last minute short legged withdrawals would have been entirely possible along limited sections of the front, because it would have allowed the dweindling supply of MT in the Heer to be pooled wher necessary. Leaving it to the last minute was entirely plausible as well, given the ecellent intelligence work being done by that stage by Gehlen and his staff.

But the wholseale withdrawal from the entire front was a pipe dream and a recipe for disaster, given the parlous state of the German logistics arm by that stage of the war


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 7, 2008)

Good point, Parsifal. My knowledge of the logistics shambles of the German Army of the East, 1943, is not complete - I am still studying that phase of the campaign. I still am not completely convinced, however. Didn't Hasso Manteuffel do something very similar to regain Kharkov after the Red Army push to exploit Stalingrad?


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2008)

Yes, but it was not the front wide withdrawal being talked about her. What Manstein wanted to do was to withdraw small sections of the front just before the Soviet hammer fell. The Infantry would be pulled back to present a solid undisrupted defence....the Soviet hammer would fall on largely empty space, and then the Panzers would, if the situation was favouraqble, undertake powerful but localised counterattacks. The idea was to cause higher attrition on the Soviets, and thereby wear them down by a process of attrition.

But there were a number of issues that prevented this approach from ever being adopted. In order for this system to work, the German command system needed to be far more flexible than it had been through the recent Stalingrad debacle. Specifically that meant that hitler, and OKH needed to allow the commanders on the spot much greater freedom of decision than they possessed. This never happened, and the outgrowth of that inflexibility was the Bagration debacle (to the north of AGS). 

However the Germans also nereded to look at their procurement machine. They were concentrating on the heaviest and most advanced tanks, which I think was a mistake, given all the other shortages plaguing the Heer at that time. I agree with Rommels assessment, he advocated producing bucket loads of Stugs and AT guns instead of the Tigers and Panthers that were being concentrated on at the time. A Tiger cost 300000 RM to field, a panther 185000. A Stug III cost just 52000 and a PAK 75 (towed) cost just 12000. I think Russian attrition would have increased many times over, if the germans had concentrated their efforts on these less glamorous weapons

But the other thing that was sorely needed weas Motor transport. There was no easy fix here, but I think the full implemkntation of the Shcnell plan in 1939, which would have standardised truck production on just a few types, might have helped. I also think that if the germans had managed the occupied territories a little better, they may have derived some benefit from their production, But their economic exploitation of them, chiefly by setting the exchange rate to Germ,any at artificially low levels. made it uneconomic to use the production capacities of the occupied territories all that much


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## Juha (Dec 7, 2008)

Hello Erich
I have always been surprised how easily Jukes et al accepted the Soviet myth on Prokhorovka and Kursk battle in general. It should have been easy to debug simply by looking German documents. To me in late 80s published Vopersal’s Soldaten, Kämfer Kameraden. Band 3 (3rd volume of the history of 3rd PzGrD Totenkopf) and especially Victor Madeja’s Russo-German War: Summer and Autumn 1943, a cheap, slim plastic cover “book”, were eye openers.

Juha


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 7, 2008)

Excellent, Parsifal...you have filled in some of the gaps in my knowledge, and while I might nitpick here and there (I believe the panther cost 118,500, but I know different websites - even those with authentic document copies from WW II as proof! - have different figures) I broadly accept your figures, as they, AFAIK, tally with the ones I have in the grey matter between my two ears, garnered over the decades from hard and soft copies and the VDU. 

BTW I now see where Henrici's "withdrawal just before the attack" tactic had its roots in!


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## m kenny (Dec 7, 2008)

I would say one of the biggest 'mtyhs' is the one where you judge the outcome of any battle on the number of tanks listed as total losses. There seems to be an industry devoted to reversing historical outcomes on the basis that one side-though clearly beaten and often in full flight-did much better because it lost fewer tanks than the winner! Overall strategic situations matter very little in comparison to Tiger losses!
Mark Healy's book on Zitadel has just hit the shops in the UK
Zitadelle The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 - Coming Soon - World War Two Books – Military History Books online - Ceredigion - Wales UK


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## Njaco (Dec 7, 2008)

> The Infantry would be pulled back to present a solid undisrupted defence....the Soviet hammer would fall on largely empty space, and then the Panzers would, if the situation was favouraqble, undertake powerful but localised counterattacks. The idea was to cause higher attrition on the Soviets, and thereby wear them down by a process of attrition.



Wasn't a similar plan of action used before Berlin in Apr. 45?


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## Juha (Dec 7, 2008)

Hello m kenny
Quote:"I would say one of the biggest 'mtyhs' is the one where you judge the outcome of any battle on the number of tanks listed as total losses."

Out of curiorisity, who are you in that quote? IMHO most of us can read maps and the movement of frontline is a very good indicator who was winning and who was losing.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Wasn't a similar plan of action used before Berlin in Apr. 45?



I think so, but by then the situation was hopeless. However, it is worth noting that in the last months of the war, Soviet casualty rates shot right up, to an unsustainable level. Their losses in the final battles have been reported as high as 400000 over a three month period. Even for the Soviets, that was a very high casualty rate. I wonder if at least a part of that casualty list was due to improved tactics by the germans????


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## m kenny (Dec 7, 2008)

The Soviet losses are given as 80,000 dead and 280,000 sick and wounded.
Thats what happened when they decided to take Berlin regardless of costs. I would venture it is more a result of political objectives overiding military prudence.
In the new book 'Bloody Streets, The Soviet Assault On Berlin April 1945' there is a map





showing the position of the 400 Divisions that surrendered on May 12.
Without the removal of Berlin (i.e.Hitler) it is unlikely this surrender would have happened.


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2008)

Burmese Bandit said:


> Excellent, Parsifal...you have filled in some of the gaps in my knowledge, and while I might nitpick here and there (I believe the panther cost 118,500, but I know different websites - even those with authentic document copies from WW II as proof! - have different figures) I broadly accept your figures, as they, AFAIK, tally with the ones I have in the grey matter between my two ears, garnered over the decades from hard and soft copies and the VDU.
> 
> BTW I now see where Henrici's "withdrawal just before the attack" tactic had its roots in!



The production costs of the panther were indeed in the order of 117-119K . By comoparison the MkIV was 105K. However these costs, afaik dont take into account the development costs, which in the case of the Germans were considerable. Because the germans were at the cutting edge technologically with their tank development, this forced them to undertake a lot of primary research for each of their models. Hence, after the development costs are factored into the equation, there is a huge cost blowout. this becomes a massive modifier when the relatively small roduction runs for Germ,an tanks are taken into account 

To give you an analogy, the very first ring pull can of Coca Cola, cost a few cents for the can and its contents, plus several millions for the technology. For the competiors of Coca Cola, the cost of their first ring pull can of soft drink was a few cents for the product, plus something less than the the millions spent by the pioneer company. Forty years on, and several billion cans of drink later, the cost for each can of coke is a few cents per can and it contents, and a few cents for the technology. The huge production run reduces the technology cost to negligible proportions 

This explains why the Sherman cost less than 50K to produce, there were so many of them, and they used "off the shelf" technology. Plus, the actual costs of production were far less in US factories, because the US were so efficient in getting product across the assembly lines...little time spent means smaller production costs


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## Njaco (Dec 7, 2008)

Just found a very unique site about the battle. Tons of pics and goes into the air operations.

World War II: Battle of Kursk


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## Erich (Dec 7, 2008)

Njaco

wonder why the webmaster on your last link posed a Ju 87B instead of an Ost Front D ? also listing Hs 129's with JG 51.............ooooooooooops !


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## Juha (Dec 8, 2008)

Hello
have not time to look Njaco's link but JG 51 had a Hs 129 Staffel in one period.

Juha


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## Njaco (Dec 8, 2008)

ohhhh, sorry Erich, didn't catch that one. I was reading halfway down when I thought it would a good addition to the thread. Whats the saying...don't go off half ......

Maybe I'll learn.


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## renrich (Dec 8, 2008)

Seems like I remember, at Kursk, the Panther was new and suffered many breakdowns. Perhaps that contributed to the loss.


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## Erich (Dec 8, 2008)

yes Juha the 13th staffel had Hs 129 in summer of 43 and the special unit became part of the famous SG 9 in October 43, my question is did it even play a role at Kursk, personally no it did not. will do some more hunting to make a positive


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## Glider (Dec 8, 2008)

Just a brief thank you to everyone on this thread. Its opened my eyes a lot about the battle in particular the losses not reflecting the often reported stories.
I always thought that the tanks charging other tanks was more than a little overdramatic.


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## Erich (Dec 8, 2008)

it always sounds more sensational doesn't it glider. At least some of the myths-corrections can be assembled and corrected if one has an open mind as a dedicated researcher and historian instead of taking falsehoods as blank fact.

point of reflection is that in the south the W-Ss heavy panzers did not take it in the shorts as nearly 9/10's of the history books have stated, the panzergrenadier elements though on the other hand received heavy punishment through the Soviet dug in positions and the ever present mine fields that could never be avoided.


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## Erich (Dec 15, 2008)

thought I would throw this image out from Das Reich during the Kursk battles

care of BA, Deutschland


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## Njaco (Dec 16, 2008)

If tank losses and strengths weren't what they were why have history books continued to call this the Greatest Tank Battle?


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Dec 16, 2008)

Njaco said:


> If tank losses and strengths weren't what they were why have history books continued to call this the Greatest Tank Battle?



A general embellishment of the after action reports?


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## Amsel (Dec 16, 2008)

m kenny said:


> The Soviet losses are given as 80,000 dead and 280,000 sick and wounded.
> Thats what happened when they decided to take Berlin regardless of costs. I would venture it is more a result of political objectives overiding military prudence.
> In the new book 'Bloody Streets, The Soviet Assault On Berlin April 1945' there is a map
> 
> ...


The losses would have been much higher for the Soviets had Hitler let the 30 divisions in Courland be redeployed to Prussia and the SS Panzerdivisons in the Ardennes and Hungary also. 
The Soviets had about 6 million troops spread along the entire front but a concentrated defense at the Vistula and East Prusssia could have put a sizable dent in those numbers. The main problem was the denial amongst the Nazi party of an iminment threat and lack of a sizable amount of fuel and ammo.


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