# World War II American vs. Japanese ships



## Jerry W. Loper (Dec 1, 2011)

Comparing like ships with like ships, which ships in the following categories were generally better, American or Japanese? I'm thinking in terms of the best in its category vs. its enemy counterpart, like Iowa class battleship vs. Yamato class battleship, etc.

Battleship
Aircraft Carrier
Heavy Cruiser
Light Cruiser
Destroyer
Destroyer Escort smaller
Submarine


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## Juha (Dec 1, 2011)

I would say that USN light cruisers were clearly better that those of IJN and USN had better carriers, DEs, MTBs (PTs) and subs.

Juha


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## Messy1 (Dec 1, 2011)

Juha said:


> I would say that USN light cruisers were clearly better that those of IJN and *USN had better carriers*, DEs, MTBs (PTs) and subs.
> 
> Juha


Definitely with the launch of the Essex class.


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## davebender (Dec 1, 2011)

The USN didn't build any light cruisers after the early 1920s Omaha class. 

Brooklyn class cruisers were officially called light cruisers but in fact were heavy cruisers armed with a multitude of 6" guns. Their Japanese counterparts were the Mogami class which were also heavy cruisers armed with a multitude of 6" guns. In both cases this was done to circumvent a poorly written naval treaty which defined light cruisers as having 6" main guns, no matter how large the ship was or how many guns it had. 

Japan chose to replace Mogami class triple 6" gun turrets with twin 8" gun turrets during a 1939 rebuild. The USN could have done the same thing for the Brooklyn class but didn't. The USN could also have armed the 27 Cleveland class cruisers with 8 x 8" main guns rather then the historical 12 x 6" main guns.


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## Arossihman (Dec 9, 2011)

Japanese carriers exhausted their smoke close to the waterline which made them a little more stealthier than ours but we could carry more planes and armament so to me our carriers gave us the edge in battle.


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## davebender (Dec 9, 2011)

Was there a significant difference in hanger deck space? 

I am under the impression the USN kept more aircraft parked on the flight deck to increase total aircraft carried. Japan could have made the same operational choice.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 9, 2011)

American carrier aircraft's wings folded at much closer to the wing root than Japanese carrier aircraft usually, so they took up a lot less room . Also meant they could place more aircraft on the elevators, so they could move more aircraft, and quicker from the hanger deck to the flight deck. 

I think USN carriers had larger aircraft elevators also.


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## ToughOmbre (Dec 9, 2011)

Essex class carriers were better than any Japanese carrier for a number of reasons, even though they did not have armored flight decks. No Essex class carrier was lost in WWII, even though they were the main targets of the "Divine Wind". 

And the Iowas would defeat the Yamatos one on one (radar fire control). 

TO


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## davebender (Dec 10, 2011)

A good idea but that doesn't change the amount of CV hanger deck space. What if Shokaku class CV air wings consisted of F4Fs, SBDs and TBDs? Could they carry as many aircraft as a Yorktown class CV?


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## tyrodtom (Dec 10, 2011)

All other things being equal you could pack more American naval aircraft into a given space than Japanese, so yes, a Shokaku class could have carried more aircraft than they did.

Could they carry as many as a Yorktown class ? One would have to see which has more space availible for aircraft storage and tie down.


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## davebender (Dec 10, 2011)

*Shokaku class CV specifications.* FY 1937.
34 knots. 9,700 miles @ 18 knots.

Magazines protected against 800kg bombs and 203mm shellfire.
Engine spaces protected against 250kg bombs and 127mm shellfire.

16 127mm AA guns. 8 twin mounts.
36 25mm AA guns. 12 triple mounts.

Two aircraft hangers. Three aircraft elevators.
84 aircraft capacity. 
72 operational plus 12 reserve. The reserve aircraft were assembled and could be used.

Aviation Ordinance.
…..45 torpedoes.
…..90 800kg bombs.
…..306 250kg bombs.
…..540 60kg bombs.
…..496 tons of aviation gasoline.

*Yorktown class CV specification.*
(1st CV ordered 1933. 3rd and final CV ordered 1939.)
32.5 knots. 12,500 miles @ 15 knots.

Armor.
2.5” to 4” armor belt.
4” bulkheads,.
4” over steering gear. 
Not sure how this compares to a Shokaku class CV. IMO Japanese armor protection specifications are more logically stated.

8 5” AA guns. All single mounts.
4 quad 1.1” AA guns.
24 .50cal machineguns.
24 20mm AA guns added during February 1942. All single mounts.
.....Inferior to a Shokaku class. Especially prior to the February 1942 upgrade.

Three aircraft elevators. Two flight deck and one hanger deck catapults.
.....Same number of aircraft elevators.

May 1942 CV-5 Air wing.
…..20 x F4F. VF-5.
…..19 x SBD. VB-5.
…..19 x SBD. VS-5.
…..13 x TBD. VT-5.
71 total. One less then CV Shokaku operational aircraft.

U.S.S. Enterprise carried 69 aircraft as of June 1944.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 10, 2011)

You're a little off dave. The Yorktown may have carried 69 aircraft on June 44, she and the other two full size Yorktown class carriers could carry up to 96 aircraft, The larger Essex class could carry 80-100, depending on the individual ship. The Lexington up to 90, the Saratoga up to 80.

There were only two Shokaku class carriers built, and both were sunk in 44.


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## Juha (Dec 10, 2011)

Dave
if you want to compare apples to apples, Shokaku's air component in early May 42 21 Zeros, 20 Vals and 21 Kates = 62 and Zuikaku's 21 Zeros, 21 Vals and 21 Kates = 63, so 9 and 8 less than that of Yorktown, In late Aug 42 Shokaku had 26 Zeros, 14 Vals, 18 Kates and 1 Judy = 59, Zuikaku had 27 Zeros, 27 Vals, 18 Kates = 72 Enterprise had 36 Wildcats, 36 Dauntlesses and 15 Avengers = 87

Juha

According to my source Enterprise had 3 Corsairs, 32 Hellcats, 23 Dauntless and 15 Avebgers = 73 a/c in June 44
Shokaku, Zuikaku and Taiho had then altogether 71 Zekes, 90 Judys, 10 Zeros and 54 Jills = 225 a/c, so Shokaku and Zuikaku probably both had 5-7 a/c more than Enterprise at that point


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## davebender (Dec 11, 2011)

http://www.combinedfleet.com/kojinshavolume6.pdf
I'm quoting from official FY 1937 IJN specifications for Shokaku class aircraft carriers. 

If someone has official specifications for Yorktown class aircraft carriers I'd like to see them. Otherwise all we have to go on are what they actually carried.


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## Juha (Dec 11, 2011)

the designed a/c complement for Yorktown seems to have been 91 according to Norman Friedman's U.S. Aircraft Carriers

Juha


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## davebender (Dec 11, 2011)

Lots of secondary sources including Wikipedia suggest Yorktown class CV airwing size was about 90. Sounds fishy to me, as if they are all just quoting each other. I'd like to see the official USN specifications for U.S.S. Yorktown.

Unlike Japan, the U.S. was not chronically short of aircraft and pilots. So if airwing size was 90 why didn't U.S.S. Yorktown have 90 aircraft prior to the Coral Sea battle?


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## kettbo (Dec 12, 2011)

For surface action, the IJN Cruisers and Destroyers packed effective torpedoes and healthy firepower.
The USN 5"/38 were fast firing once the target was 'locked'
this weapon was also dual purpose. Couple that with proximity AAA ammo, very deadly
The IJN DDs in the later classes had dual purpose weapons
RADAR and RADAR FC gave the Allies tactical advantage
Signal intercepts allowed the Allies to position forces to counter IJN movements
Japanese merchant fleet was wiped-out as the Americans had their codes and the ships reported daily. No wasted patrols


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## Juha (Dec 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> Lots of secondary sources including Wikipedia suggest Yorktown class CV airwing size was about 90. Sounds fishy to me, as if they are all just quoting each other. I'd like to see the official USN specifications for U.S.S. Yorktown.



If you have seen Friedman's books you would know that he rely on orginal plans, specifications and design sketches.




davebender said:


> Unlike Japan, the U.S. was not chronically short of aircraft and pilots. So if airwing size was 90 why didn't U.S.S. Yorktown have 90 aircraft prior to the Coral Sea battle?



Fairly common misunderstanding. That US had plenty of planes and pilots in 44-45 doesn't mean that it had plenty of them in 42. The lack of both was seen still in Guadalcanal, in New Guinea and in Tunisia and if you look Yorktown's AG in May 42 You see that its torpedo sqn was understreght, Big E operated 87 combat a/c in Aug 42.

Juha


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## MacArther (Dec 18, 2011)

Juha said:


> According to my source Enterprise had *3 Corsairs*, 32 Hellcats, 23 Dauntless and 15 Avebgers = 73 a/c in June 44
> Shokaku, Zuikaku and Taiho had then altogether 71 Zekes, 90 Judys, 10 Zeros and 54 Jills = 225 a/c, so Shokaku and Zuikaku probably both had 5-7 a/c more than Enterprise at that point



Out of curiosity, why would only 3 Corsairs be carried? I would have thought it would have been an even number of Corsairs.


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## syscom3 (Dec 19, 2011)

MacArther said:


> Out of curiosity, why would only 3 Corsairs be carried? I would have thought it would have been an even number of Corsairs.



Don't quote me, but the Corsairs might have been night fighter variants.


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## parsifal (Dec 19, 2011)

USN survivability was due as much to changes in Damage Control procedures as the designs themselves. And whilst it is true that Essex class did not sink as a result of combat, one came perilously close, and was not returned to service after the war....effectively a write off....the USS Franklin.

The great success story for the USN were its contstant improvements in DC, and of course radar. If Lexington I had been hit in 1944 instead of 1942, it most likley would have survived.

As a rough generalization, the IJN carriers were better protected against torpedo attack, and less well protected against D/B attack. 

USN was uniformly superior to IJN in AA, Radar, Damage Control and aircraft handling. USN lagged badly at the beginning of the war in night combat, torpedoes, and surface battle C&C. There was actually little difference in gunnery. Japan held the lead in amphibious warfare, but were overtaken by the USN by 1943. IJN was hopeless at ASW from start to finish.

Even though USN are rightly proud of their fleet destroyers ...Fletcher and Gearing classes in particular, as pure fleet destroyers, they are not as good as either the post '41 Yugumus or the Shimakaze classes. As Aa platforms, they were only better than the Akitsukis because of their radar fits.

Not possible really to compare USN DEs to their nearest Japanese equivalent....the matsu class. Japanese were were faster, and much more heavily armed. 

Also, not possible to compare IJN Light Cruisers with USN CLs. IJN cruisers fulfilled the role of Leaders....part of the torpedo brigade, whilst USN CLs were part of the gunline....a kind of poor mans capital ship. 

Heavy cruisers are an intersting category.....I tend to favour the IJN in this category though the Baltimores are potent ships

Intersting anomalies are the Japanese conversions....the Junyos, the Zuihos, and Chiyodas. I think overall, these ships, whilst lash ups, like the Independance class, were better value than the US conversions.

USN held the clear lead in CVE design and construction. They also held the lead in MTBs. I would also give the USN lead in submarine design, though the IJN failure in this regard is more doctrine related than equipment related. Often overlooked is the successes the IJN subs did enjoy....they sank over a million tons of allied shipping and enjoyed a few significant tactical victories as well.....like the sinking of the Wasp....

Dont know about Battleships. Yamatos were more heavily armed, and armoured but slower, less good at AA and lacked good radar. Really not sure

Battlecruisers I would give to the Japanese. Kirishima versus alaska would have been an interesting fight....


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## Juha (Dec 20, 2011)

MacArther said:


> Out of curiosity, why would only 3 Corsairs be carried? I would have thought it would have been an even number of Corsairs.



I don't remember but I agree with syscom that probably they were a night fighter detachment.

Juha


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## MacArther (Dec 20, 2011)

Juha said:


> I don't remember but I agree with syscom that probably they were a night fighter detachment.
> 
> Juha



Fair enough, thanks for the input both of you.


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2011)

Hello MacArther
checked, yes the Corsairs were F4U-2(N) Corsairs from VF(N)-101, there should have been 4 of them but probably one was lost before the beginning of Marianas Turkey Shoot.

Juha


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## MacArther (Dec 25, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello MacArther
> checked, yes the Corsairs were F4U-2(N) Corsairs from VF(N)-101, there should have been 4 of them but probably one was lost before the beginning of Marianas Turkey Shoot.
> 
> Juha



Interesting! Thanks for the information!


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 26, 2011)

That was pretty interesting, good call syscom.


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## barney (Dec 29, 2011)

Japan had ships and America had ships but only Japan had the type 93 torpedo.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 29, 2011)

I ahve to admit, the Long Lance was one of the better torpedoes in the way.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

USN Light cruisers were armed with 6 inch/47 cal rifles that were _semi-auto_ loading with a firing rate of 8-10 rounds per minute that was triple their IJN counterparts which like virtually all naval rifles of 6 or 8 inch caliber were capable of only 3 or so rpm. USN Light cruisers had a total ordnance throw weight twice that of a heavy cruiser! At Cape Esperance and subsequent Solomon Island naval battles the IJN were shocked by USN _Machine gun cruisers_ with an output of nearly 150 rpm collectively from all 5 turrets. With Radar direction and fire controlthe question is really how could the IJN ever beat the USN in any battle day or night? The answer lies clearly in their Long Lance torpedo.

USN carriers rated aircraft loads typically included disassembled aircraft hung from the hanger overhead. They could comfortably operate about 72 aircraft employing a permanent deck park and a hanger capacity about equal to a deck load launch (anywhere from 37 to 60 aircraft depending on ordnance load.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

During the Doolittle raid in April 1942, the Hornet kept an airwing of about 60 aircraft in her hanger but presumably many aircraft were disassembled and hung from the overhead. It took about 2 days to get the carrier ready to share ASW and search duries with the Enterprise. The Hornet launched a CAP contribution as soon as the B-25's had departed. (Lundstrom's First Team: my major source for almost any question involving CV ops in 1942.)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

I sould have specified that Light Cruiser throw weight was assessed 'per minute.'


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## Vincenzo (Jan 17, 2012)

the 6/47 was not semi-auto, has around 2 times of japanese 155 gun. was one with higher rof in 6" categoty but none of this firing 3 rpm


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

Vincenzo, You are correct on both counts.

I should have specified semi-fixed ammo (shell and single powder cannister) with a semi-auto sliding breech which probably contributed to the high rate of fire. I am not a gunnery expert so these features may be more common in other navies than I recognize. 

I rated the USN LC rof only vs the IJN heavy cruiser 20 cm rifles because they were the foe USN light cruisers most commonly faced and neglected to consider that IJN LCs I was ignoring were mainly armed with more rapid firing 5.5 inch weapons. The 15 cm rifle equipped IJN light cruiser seems to have been a rare beast but as you point out, that rifle does indeed appear to have had a rof about half that of the USN counterpart. I also incorrectly assumed the IJN 6 inch rifles possessed the same pre-war rof as their 8 inch counterparts. 

It seems the IJN LC were more like destroyer leaders than USN LC's. 

I was surprised to learn that later in the war, USN 8 inch rifles were upgraded to a similar high rof. Thanks for the correction.


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## bowfin (Feb 12, 2012)

I am going to say that the Long Lance torpedo multiplied the firepower of the Japanese cruisers to the point that I think they were superior to the American cruisers, both light and heavy.

Any comparison of weight of firepower should include both ship's spread of torpedoes, as demonstrated in several battles off of Guadalcanal.


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## Juha (Feb 16, 2012)

bowfin said:


> I am going to say that the Long Lance torpedo multiplied the firepower of the Japanese cruisers to the point that I think they were superior to the American cruisers, both light and heavy.
> 
> Any comparison of weight of firepower should include both ship's spread of torpedoes, as demonstrated in several battles off of Guadalcanal.



I disagree, one must remember that the downside of the powerful torpedo armament of Japanese cruisers was increased vulnerability, torpedowarheads and airvessels were much poorer protected than ammo magazines and several IJN cruisers were crippled by explositions of their torpedoes when hit. After USN learned the right ways to use radar cruiser torpedos lost much of their utility.

Juha

Juha


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## renrich (Feb 29, 2012)

Generally speaking, the USN in WW2 had ships with more endurance ( longer range) and with more reliable machinery than any other navy. The Pacific Fleet had a chronic shortage of air craft in the early going. Even by Midway, there were not enough fighters to satisfy the needs. That is the reason why you see the low numbers of aircraft embarked on the carriers.

Just rereading Lundstrom, "The First Team" and noticed something I never noticed before. After the engagements near Rabaul ( where O Hare did his stuff) and Lae, Salamaua, the Lexington went into dry dock to have the 8-8 inch guns removed and more A/A installed. I never realised that the Lex or Saratoga saw combat with those guns. I think that Saratoga had those guns removed during the refit just prior to December 7. Removal of those guns must have made a huge difference in top weight and created a lot of space below decks. Installation of 4-twin 5 inch-38s would certainly not make up the difference and fewer personnel would be required also.


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## renrich (Mar 4, 2012)

Am reading a book, "The Twilight Warriors," about the battle for Okinawa. Never knew this but Spruance sent his bombardment unit, some elderly pre war BBs, including his flagship, New Mexico, to intercept the Yamato and it's consorts in case the air groups were unable to make the stop. Would have been most interesting if those old BBs had engaged the giant, modern Yamato.

By the time of Okinawa many of the US carriers were equipped with Corsairs and the versatility of the design was amply demonstrated. Some of the squadrons were designated fighter bomb and would go on strikes against the Japanese home islands or Okinawa loaded with bombs and rockets and after dropping the ordnance reverted to the fighter mode quite effectively. Some were even called into the CAP against kamikazes on the way back to the carriers which in some cases meant missions of as much as 5.5 hours. Interesting that in some cases the CAPs included Corsairs, Hellcats and FM2s. It was a desperate and bloody battle.


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## model299 (Mar 23, 2012)

The site has been referenced earlier in the thread, but CombinedFleet.com conducted an interesting battleship comparison, that not only included the Yamato and the Iowa, but includes 5 other ships from the various combatants.

You can check out that comparison here.


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## meatloaf109 (Mar 24, 2012)

renrich said:


> Generally speaking, the USN in WW2 had ships with more endurance ( longer range) and with more reliable machinery than any other navy. The Pacific Fleet had a chronic shortage of air craft in the early going. Even by Midway, there were not enough fighters to satisfy the needs. That is the reason why you see the low numbers of aircraft embarked on the carriers.
> 
> Just rereading Lundstrom, "The First Team" and noticed something I never noticed before. After the engagements near Rabaul ( where O Hare did his stuff) and Lae, Salamaua, the Lexington went into dry dock to have the 8-8 inch guns removed and more A/A installed. I never realised that the Lex or Saratoga saw combat with those guns. I think that Saratoga had those guns removed during the refit just prior to December 7. Removal of those guns must have made a huge difference in top weight and created a lot of space below decks. Installation of 4-twin 5 inch-38s would certainly not make up the difference and fewer personnel would be required also.


I read Stanley Johnsons book "Queen of the Flat-tops" when I was a boy. He was onboard during the last cruise of the Lexington. I recall something about a near miss from a Japanese bomb that would have taken out the bridge were it not for those 8" turrets being gone!


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## Ruud (Mar 26, 2012)

As has been said before (and from all i have read, i agree with), the USN had better battle damage control (it was good and got much better), better range, and very reliable equipment. USN CVs being able to carry more planes early in the war might have to do with the fact that the F4F was not big and even smaller with the wings folded. The IJN had good fire control, but lacked good radar, probably the best torpedoes in the war, and tough capital ships (they seemed to take a lot of extra punishment to get them to sink).

CV's - edge to the US. The IJN CVs had issues with the smoke stacks not clearing the smoke away from the CV. The airwings favor the US. Maybe not in 1941-42, but once the F6F and Avengers came on board... It goes without saying that the IJN pilot shortage and/or lack of quality doomed the effectiveness of their CVs.

BB's - hard to say, the IJN had only 2 modern BB's, while the USN had 4 and up to 6 pretty quickly. The two night time BB vs BB battles had USN radar pummeling the IJN BB(s). The old USN BBs that were sunk on 12/7/41 were mostly rebuilt (5 of 7 IIRC), a testament to their design? Or lucky enough to be sunk in shallow waters with just enough damage to sink them? Personally i think that the IJN just did not know what to do with their BB designs. Huge pagoda masts/towers (imagine a few rounds hitting one of those...), going for the biggest design ever (biggest guns, tonnage, armor), then rebuilding 2 into quasi CVs...

CAs - The IJN CA's were fast, well armored, and very well armed. Not having kept to the treaty restrictions helped a lot. Most of their classes seemed very similar on paper (the Aoba class with 6 X 8in being the odd duck). The Mogami's started as CLs so as to stay within the # of ships that the Treaty dictated, they were built to be CAs. The USN Treaty CAs where pretty fast, okay armed and so-so armored. The Pensacola's had poor protection, the NHs just a bit better. The NOs class were good ships, but looking at the loss ratio would make you think otherwise... One wonders how the Wichita would have fared in the Guadalcanal campaign. The Baltimore's were built with a whole new look into design constructions. The IJN did not build any new CAs during the war.

CLs - different ideas of use and design. You can't really compare the two. The Helena class are essentially CAs with 6in guns. I don't recall if they were build within the parameters of the Treaty or not. Other than the main guns, USN CAs and CLs did not have much to fall back on (until the 5/38 dual purpose guns came on board). The USN build some bigger DD's to be leaders (Porter class IIRC). These also do not compare to the IJN CLs. Take away the IJN long lance from their CLs and they become a lot less effective. I like to think that their CAs would still do fine in the daylight, but their CLs...

DD's - different ideas of design and use (though not as much as with the CLs). Most of the IJN DDs had 8 or 9 long lances. Many had reloads for them as well. That ties up a lot of your design to just that weapon. They also often had 6 X 5in guns. Early in the war the USN new DD was armed with just 4 X 5in and 5 smaller torpedoes with reloads. In playing the old PC game "Warship" with my brother, i would always wish i had IJN DD's and i was glad to have some RNethN or RN DD's (just to have some working torpedoes). It seems like USN DDs were built to be jack of all trades (vs. air, sea, and undersea targets) whereas the IJN DDs were mainly designed to kill surface ships with the long lance and preferably at night.

Imagine if the mk.14 detonator and depth control would not have been an issue. Imagine if a few of the battles during the Guadalcanal campaign would have been fought in the day light. Imagine the IJN not starting on the Yamoto class and instead some more CAs and CVs. Yes, the Long Lance was a CA killer, but would a IJN CA have handled a hit from them any better? Ah to ponder what could have been.

(all of the above is quoted directly from memory, so feel free to correct me where my brain has faltered).


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## parsifal (Mar 27, 2012)

Just one correction. The Japanese did have an outstanding DD designed specifically for AA work, the Akitsuki class. the big failing for Japanese DDs was in their ASW capabilities. Then again USN DDs sucked at this as well until later in '43.

What made the USN designs seem to overtake the japanese designs was a matter of age......USN Fletcher class were built 1942 to 1944 and were fighting many DDs designed and built 15 years older than they were.

Both the USN and the Japanese really failed in producing designs that were adequate seaboats. Particulalry true for the American carriers, which to this day continues to be their Achilles heel. Both the Japanese and the Americans were almost as besotted with firepower as were the Germans, and this made their ships anything but satisfactory when the weather was poor


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## Ruud (Mar 28, 2012)

Yeah, USN ships got rather top heavy with all the AA and radar that was added. More than a few older CAs had a catapult removed just to save a little weight.

The USN had the advantage of getting "sneak peeks" at the new ways to wage war from the RN. That really gave them a head start on the anti-sub stuff.

RN CVs did have the best design for taking on the weather and the sea, but i'm not sure that their BBs were any better than the USN NCs and NDs. The Iowas did have it better. I've never read much about the Cleveland and Baltimore classes. At least they were better designed to handle all the additional equipment that ships got as the war went on.


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## cherry blossom (Apr 1, 2012)

There is some reason to doubt if the South Dakota class were able to fight in all conditions judging from the damage suffered by U.S.S. Massachusetts in February 1943 [email protected] - BB-59 USS Massachusetts Storm Damage, 1943 or NC class = 12 X 14"/50 or KGV class = 1 14"/45 -35K tons? in Battleship Vs Battleship Forum. It is possible that those problems could be corrected and in support of this, Scharnhorst was much less damaged by heavy seas in 1943 than in 1940. However, it looks as if a South Dakota would have been fairly useless at North Cape in its pre-February 1943 condition.

Japanese ships as initially built were often very vulnerable to storm damage. However, after the events of 1934-5 Axis History Forum • View topic - 4th fleet incident, www.sozogaku.com/fkd/en/hfen/HB1011022.pdf , Japanese ships were modified to be able to fight in most conditions.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 3, 2012)

I find the USN pre-war light cruisers are a particularly interesting ship design, in part because of the combination of their rapid firing 6"/47's and the sheer number of barrels firing. Their 15 gun broadside throw weight exceeded that of an 9 x 8" gun heavy cruiser until the advent of the rapid firing guns of the Baltimore class. Add the situational awareness available due to the SG Radar with its PPI scope and the accuracy provded by the fire control radars and these ships were really formidable. It might be argued that this class (the Boise and Helena) was instrumental in the 'close' victory at Cape Esperance and (the Helena) in the holding action during the bloody November 13th cruiser vs IJN Battleship action that prevented the second BB bombardment of Henderson field. The Long Lance really gave the IJN an advantage that somewhat neutralized the advantage of RADAR. The pre-war treaty cruisers suffered from poor leadership at Guadacanal, where the slim advantages of RADAR went largely unexploited, in part due to many ship commanders being unfamilar and untrained with its use; at least until the arrival of the Washington on November 14th. _*Neptune's Inferno *_is a gripping account of Savo Island and the subsequent naval battles.

IIRC neither the Boise or Helena were hit by Long Lance during the Guadacanal campaign. (Although the Helena was ultimately sunk by one much later.) That despite the fact that USN task group commanders withheld opening fire until the ships were inside LL range. Crazy as it may seem, I believe the capability of the LL wasn't completely understood or accepted until well after the Guadacanal Campaign. The SG RADAR of the two ships were tracking their IJN opponents at 30K yards while the LL had a range of 20K yards. It was a cause of consternation for the Helena's fine commander Capt. Gil Hoover, to realize he could plaster the enemy at 26,000 yards which (unknown to him) would have wrecked the IJN heavy cruisers due to the vulnerability of their unlaunched torpedoes.


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## parsifal (Apr 3, 2012)

I would have to challenge the notion that Radar was decisive for the americans in the battles around Guadacanal in 1942, except for the battleship action at the very end of the year. The Americans showed a marked inability to use the technology to any significant advantage in this period. There appear to be two main reasons for this, crew inexperience, and an inability for the equipment to cope with the coastal conditions evident in the waters around guadacanal. Radar assisted the Americans, but it did not give them much advantage, and any advantage they did gain was largely negated by the poor showing of their crews and commanders in the night battles. that was not from a lack of courage or even ability, but night fighting is a slowly aquired skill in which instinct, initiative and above all teamwork are paramount. The Japanese showed this in spades and the fact that their ships were not radar equipped whilst the Americans were ended up being no penalty at all for them during this period. The fact that the Americans were on ocasion able to fight the japanese to a draw, and ocasionally achieve tactical victories can be attributed to as much the fact that the Japanese were often preoccupied with a mission other than surface engagement and therefore had competing mission priorities. On the few occasions where the japanese could concentrate on fighting the Americans, they invariably came away the victors.

American cruiser superiority is one of the most overrated "advantages" put forward in naval discussions. The USN ships had a theoretical advantage, but this seldom translated into anything tangible. they demonstrated advantage in battleship actions, but seldom in any of the cruiser actions. this has less to do with the ships and more to do with the philosophy behind US surface engagements. Whereas the correct way to view the enagement was the Destroyers providing the main protection for the gun line the americans viewed things the other way around, with Destroyers seen as some kind of optional afterthought. For them it as the cruisers that led the destroyers into battle and protected them, not the other way around. That is precisley the wrong way to use your ships and precisely the opposite way to the way the IJN and the RN viewed how to fight night battles. The USN were similar to the KM in that respect, and both showed a conspicuous lack of success in their earlier night battles.

Eventually the Americans did realize the value of their destroyers and went on to win some impressive victories when men like Arleigh Burke were put in charge. With gun line besotted admirals like callaghan in charge they tended to blunder around in spectaculalry unsuccessful fashion.

Contrast this with the way the japanese designed and used their Light cruisers. despite their age and apparent lack of firepower, these ships were highly successful at what they did. They were not viewed as part of the gunline, but neither were they there to protect the destroyers. they were there to lead them, and provide immediate gunfire support against the enemy destroyers, with the Japanese gunlines and destroyers freed up to engage these vaunted US cruisers, which they did with a great deal of success


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## Juha (Apr 3, 2012)

Hello Parsifal
I'dn't be so hard on USN, remember Battles of Cape Esperanca and Empress Augusta Bay. If Scott had been in command at 1st Guadalcanal instead of Callaghan the results might have been different. Also USN usually fought with ad hoc formations during Guadalcanal campaign so crews were without much knowledge on the other crews/ships capabilities and unfamilar with tactics of the formation commander

Juha


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 3, 2012)

parsifal said:


> *I would have to challenge the notion that Radar was decisive for the americans in the battles around Guadacanal in 1942, *except for the battleship action at the very end of the year. The Americans showed a marked inability to use the technology to any significant advantage in this period. *There appear to be two main reasons for this, crew inexperience, and an inability for the equipment to cope with the coastal conditions evident in the waters around guadacanal.* Radar assisted the Americans, _*but it did not give them much advantage,*_ and any advantage they did gain was largely negated by the poor showing of their crews and commanders in the night battles. that was not from a lack of courage or even ability, but night fighting is a slowly aquired skill in which instinct, initiative and above all teamwork are paramount. The Japanese showed this in spades and the fact that their ships were not radar equipped whilst the Americans were ended up being no penalty at all for them during this period. The fact that the Americans were on ocasion able to fight the japanese to a draw, and ocasionally achieve tactical victories can be attributed to as much the fact that the Japanese were often preoccupied with a mission other than surface engagement and therefore had competing mission priorities. On the few occasions where the japanese could concentrate on fighting the Americans, they invariably came away the victors.
> 
> American cruiser superiority is one of the most overrated "advantages" put forward in naval discussions. The USN ships had a theoretical advantage, but this seldom translated into anything tangible. they demonstrated advantage in battleship actions, but seldom in any of the cruiser actions. this has less to do with the ships and more to do with the philosophy behind US surface engagements. Whereas the correct way to view the enagement was the Destroyers providing the main protection for the gun line the americans viewed things the other way around, with Destroyers seen as some kind of optional afterthought. For them it as the cruisers that led the destroyers into battle and protected them, not the other way around. That is precisley the wrong way to use your ships and precisely the opposite way to the way the IJN and the RN viewed how to fight night battles. The USN were similar to the KM in that respect, and both showed a conspicuous lack of success in their earlier night battles.
> 
> ...



Didn't mean to suggest that Task Group use of RADAR was a decisive element in any Guadacanal engagement *except November 14 with Lee and Washington. * However, Gil Hoover and Mike Moran knew how to fight their ships, while for all Scott's pre-battle preparation he really hadn't absorbed the advantage his technology provided. He didn't use the full assets he possessed and it was a closer thing than it might have been. If you remove Helena's Boise's SG radar, and replace their rapid firing guns with standard prewar firing rates I suspect the victory goes to the Japanese. It wasn't that the RADAR was a critical element, I submit that the CL class weapon system and how it was fought was a critical element. Harder to prove but seems likely to me, IMO.

You say above that RADAR was an unrealized or theoretical advantage. I have to agree. But my own reading indicates that fact had nothing to do with crew preparation although Coastal shadowing did prove a handicap to its most effective operation in many encounters. The white hats and JOs seem to have been adequately trained but typically couldn't get their superiors to pay attention or absorb the implications. That may be wrong, but it's the impression I get from what I've read. IIUC, Hoover and Moran knew exactly how to use the radar. Scott had the night fighting preparation going for him better than prior USN commanders, but he didn't recognize the potential advantage RADAR provided that might have overcome his hesitancy to open fire. As perceived today, choosing the wrong, less capable flagship is a huge gaff and bespeaks a tendency to adhere to tradition as having greater importance than weapon system technology. IMO, that was a lesson that could and should have been learned earlier. Some people had evidently learned it quite well. They just weren't in charge until Lee arrived.

IMO the advantage provided by superior situational awareness is huge. SG provided it to the USN and added to that of fire control by radar, the combined technology should have been a game winner in most engagement between SG equiped ships and their IJN counterparts. SG not only saw further than the IJN's night vision glasses it saw the entire battlescape except of course that obscured by Radar shadows and inherent system blockages. 

USN Cruiser advantage may appear to be overrated but IMO its got nothing to do with the weapon systems. If anything, USN task group commanders may have been so wrapped up in notions of their assumed technological superiority that they thought they had the latitude to ignore some of their advantages. With the IJN as skilled as you correctly point out, no USN advantage could be ignored without being defeated.

I agree there was mishandling of the light forces (DD's) but the DD's led the way and paid heavily at Esperance and during the Naval Battle of Guadacanal on both nights. Of course an equal number of DD's trailed (probably uselessly) behind. In contrast, Lee deployed his DDs ahead and they fortunately absorbed the brunt of the initial long lance volley, IIRC.

The point Juha makes is very important and it's IMO purely a fault of leadership. Scott prepared for night fighting as best he could, but even he had much to learn. All that experience was lost when Halsey pulled him from command because of Callahan's few week's seniority.

Much maligned F. J. Fletcher faced with a similar choice, selected experience over seniority.


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## parsifal (Apr 3, 2012)

Good replies and points well taken guys


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 4, 2012)

Pars, I wanted to fill out my own understanding of events discussed in this thread by reading Richard Frank's purportedly more detailed description of the individual actions (naval and ground) than that provided by my prior _primary source:_ Neptune's Inferno. The latter is a great read but lacks some of the detail of the former. I read Franks description of Wiilis Lee's Battle on November 14, 1942. I came away in much greater agreement with the point of view you expressed. Without Lee's radar expertise, he is unlikely to have walked away from the action scene unharmed and having sunk a IJN BB, but RADAR and expertise in its use by itself did not give him the significant advantage I had inferred from reading NI. The IJN fired a very large number of LL torpedoes at SODAK and Washington and evidently NONE of them scored. As previously mentioned, Lee's DD screen absorbed the most effective initial LL launch. However, after that initial salvo, many more were launched and every one of them missed, failed to explode, or exploded prematurely. Some the the LL failed due to good ship handling by the Washington's CO. Considering what happened with the LL, even Lee with the combination of technology and skill in its use needed substantial luck to come out on top. IJN commanders were so astonished at the failure of the LL that night that there was widespread belief that the torpedo system had an unknown flaw or the USN possessed a secret counter weapon. This is such a departure from the usual LL peformance that it devalues the victory in the most general sense regarding RADAR's importance under the best of cicrumstances. _*RADAR provded a technical advantage that was better on paper than in practice.*_ Evidently so. I think that was your quote or at least your point. I am forced to reluctantly agree.


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## parsifal (Apr 5, 2012)

I think the failure of LL that night was just dumb luck to be honest. Just the same lees command that night was really a cut above all that happened before. For reasons not quite clear to me, the USN was proficient with BB actions, but not as proficient with its cruisers. I dont know the reason, just am looking at the results. IJN were excellent with cruisers, average with BBS, in contrast. Again the reasons are not clear


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 5, 2012)

Interesting observation. Hadn't looked at it that way, but it seems you are right. I was thinking about doing a break-out description of the 4 naval battles based on Frank's detailed description and analysis which seems insightful to me. 

Taking Lee's November 14th battle as an example:

Good day night aircraft recon (something the IJN typically did VERY well) provided observers on both sides information about what to expect. Both sides were anticipating encountering enemy and had a general idea of force composition. 

Lee deploys his DD's in line, about 5000 Yards ahead. He steams north of Savo and then returns to the South of the island as the IJN units arrive transiting the channel between Florida and Santa Isabel Islands.

(IIUC) Lee is blind to initial approach of IJN due to Florida and Savo Island Radar shadow. IJN initially detects Lee south of Savo at long range via night vision (probably ~ 25-35,000 yards!!! comparable to SG range!). Approaching Savo from North on a slightly SW course, Kondo splits formation into three groups to pursue and engage USN whose ships are moving generally SE, south of Savo. IJN Light forces to use LL to engage and clear opposition (sweep) for planned Henderson bombardment. 3 DDs come due south, east of Savo, another group (1 CL 4 DDs) circles to the west of Savo as Kondo's screen. 

Lee changes course to due west. Lee's SG RADAR now picks up IJN light forces east of Savo Island at ~18,000 yards. *Washington and SODAK commence firing!* (Near LL Limit). This unit of 3 DDs immediately turns and heads away laying smoke, *without launching LL*! USN BB's cease fire. *NO HITS SCORED!* One of this DD's is detached to aid a sinking IJN DD while the other 2 DD's eventually head straight for Henderson to complete their sweep. This puts them out of the fight as battle has moved rapidly to NW. 3 DD's worth of LL's removed from fight. 

*USN DDs have no working SC or SG and only one had a working FC unit *which detects IJN DD and CL units coming out of SAVO's RADAR shadow to take up a southern course. At 2322 USN DDs open fire on lead IJN light units. Gun duel goes to IJN: USS Gwin hit hard and *USS Preston sunk by 5" 5.5" fire!*. ~ Simultaneously, *First LL salvo* launched and damages one USN DD and sinks another. 

Washington retaliates and sinks offending IJN DD. SODAK suffers massive, self-induced, electrical stroke and is out of the fight except to act as a sort of well-padded attack dummy for all IJN ordnance launched in her direction. USN BBs split apart to avoid USN DD wreckage. SODAK goes east and becomes excellent back-lit target and into Lee's blind spot, Lee goes west and becomes an invisible, phantom with virtually complete battle scape revealed by SG and tracking everything EXCEPT SODAK! However, completely unengaged by IJN Units and with his SG RADAR, Lee is now _stalking_ the very numerically superior IJN forces. IJN heavy units launch *second LL salvo* (their first), all at SODAK and illuminate in preparation for what they expect to be a fatal heavy bombardment of SODAK. 27 hits later, SODAK is not severely damaged but has to retreat due to lack of situational awareness necessary to target and engage enemy. 

At about this time, Washington at 8,400 yards unleashes repeated broadsides of 5 and 16 inch fire aimed at BB Kirishima and Kondo's flagship CA Atago. CA Takao is unengaged. Kirishima is out of the fight and sinking while the CA's fire *3rd and subsequent salvo of LL at 4,000 yards. All LL and IJN gunfire miss*! Lee, who with his damaged units retreating, is pursuing Kondo's heavy units while heading away from the potentially dangerous LL wielding light screening units, who have not yet reloaded after their first deadly salvo. These IJN Units will be unable to get optimal LL firing geometry during the remainder of the battle. Lee, by pursuing the heavy units has interposed his BB in the path of the IJN Tokyo Express and thwarts its resupply mission and is now on the more open sea to the NW of Guadacanal. With a clear view of the Battle scape, and recognizing the eventual approach of the dangerous IJN light units, Lee breaks off pursuit and retires having provided a screen for his damaged units to leave the area. In the meantime, Kondo having no, or at least a very poor, sense of the battle scape including the location of his own forces, decides to disengage and delays the Tokyo express.

The SG FC radars certainly played a vital role in the battle, but so did the luck that spared the USN BBs from hits. Of course it could be argued that the US also had bad luck. The IJN approached along a RADAR shadowed corridor, but would have probably been revealed at much longer range had they arrived just a bit earlier when Lee's forces were north of Savo. If SODAK had not suffered its 'stroke' and made the wrong course change that revealed it to the IJN would the USN have done even better? I would guess so. Luck always plays a role in battle. In this case, the combination of IJN bad luck and effective use of USN technology saved its bacon.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 8, 2012)

To elaborate on the capabilities of ship's RADAR that were unexploited at two Guadacanal naval battles (Cape Esperance and the cruiser action of November 13). 

At Cape Esperance, Adm Norman Scott, evidently largely ignorant of the enhanced capabilities of the new SG radar on his ight cruisers Helena and Boise, orders his lower frequency SC units (equipping all DDs and the CAs flagship San Francisco and SLC) turned OFF for fear of IJN monitoring. *Helena's SG unit picks up the IJN formation at 27,700 yards.* SLC disobeyed Scott and its SC picked up the IJN at a slightly shorter distance about 3 minutes after Helena. At this distance, well within the range of the USN's fire control RADAR and 6" 8 " guns, Scott could have opened fire. He withheld the order due to some confusion in his formation, until all units were in mutual view at about 5,000 yards. LL's weren't fired immediately because Goto initially thought the USN ships were his _Tokyo Express_ units. Opportunity lost and the battle almost given away. possibly a Helena or Boise salvo hits CA Furotaka's unfired LL torpedo mount and does heavy damage which along with some *90+ heavy caliber hits* dooms her. 

On November 13, Callaghan even less familiar than Scott and without the benefit of Scott's dedicated night-fighting training regimen or actual experience is placed in command by Turner (endorsed by Halsey). Halsey withholds *CA Pensacola's 10 x 8" barrels *to reinforce Enterprise Task Force. Callahan assumes flag on CA San Francisco. *3 of 4 SG Radar equipped ships are placed BEHIND the SC radar equiped SF*, including *CA Portland, CL Helena, CLAA Juneau, and DDs Fletcher.* 3 x SC equipped DDs and CLAA Atlanta with Scott aboard are in the van and ultimately in a cross fire. *Helena picks up Abe's jumbled formation at 27,100 yards*. TBS is essentially saturated and no action taken until the disorganized IJN formation essentially collides with the USN line. A barroom brawl ensues in the dark at point-blank range in which Hiei and Atlanta are mortally wounded and many destroyers sunk. RADAR totally unnecessary at ranges ship vs ship engagements are conducted. 

RADAR could have provided a decisive edge in these battles but command failures prevented realizing its full advantage.

The battle of Savo Island is a whole other story of command failure.


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## ColesAircraft (Apr 18, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I would have to challenge the notion that Radar was decisive for the americans in the battles around Guadacanal in 1942, except for the battleship action at the very end of the year. The Americans showed a marked inability to use the technology to any significant advantage in this period. There appear to be two main reasons for this, crew inexperience, and an inability for the equipment to cope with the coastal conditions evident in the waters around guadacanal. Radar assisted the Americans, but it did not give them much advantage, and any advantage they did gain was largely negated by the poor showing of their crews and commanders in the night battles. that was not from a lack of courage or even ability, but night fighting is a slowly aquired skill in which instinct, initiative and above all teamwork are paramount. The Japanese showed this in spades and the fact that their ships were not radar equipped whilst the Americans were ended up being no penalty at all for them during this period. The fact that the Americans were on ocasion able to fight the japanese to a draw, and ocasionally achieve tactical victories can be attributed to as much the fact that the Japanese were often preoccupied with a mission other than surface engagement and therefore had competing mission priorities. On the few occasions where the japanese could concentrate on fighting the Americans, they invariably came away the victors.
> 
> American cruiser superiority is one of the most overrated "advantages" put forward in naval discussions. The USN ships had a theoretical advantage, but this seldom translated into anything tangible. they demonstrated advantage in battleship actions, but seldom in any of the cruiser actions. this has less to do with the ships and more to do with the philosophy behind US surface engagements. Whereas the correct way to view the enagement was the Destroyers providing the main protection for the gun line the americans viewed things the other way around, with Destroyers seen as some kind of optional afterthought. For them it as the cruisers that led the destroyers into battle and protected them, not the other way around. That is precisley the wrong way to use your ships and precisely the opposite way to the way the IJN and the RN viewed how to fight night battles. The USN were similar to the KM in that respect, and both showed a conspicuous lack of success in their earlier night battles.
> 
> ...




It's very refreshing to see the Japanese Navy getting credit where credit is due. From Savo Island to Tassafaronga the Japanese Navy fought most of their battles with destroyers alone against superior American forces. Those destroyers were further hampered by dual missions (usually protecting a resupply effort, or being used as transports themselves) and often sailed with lower than normal ammunition supplies. That they performed so spectacularly should speak more loudly in support of the superiority of the ships, their crews included, than anything that can be gleaned from stats on paper.


Ron Cole


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## parsifal (Apr 18, 2012)

stated far more clearly and diplomatically than I can ...thanks


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