# Why did the 56th FG stay with the P-47s?



## DSR T-888 (Sep 20, 2014)

I'm curious why the 56th FG didn't transfer to the P-51B. The P-51B had higher top speed, faster rate of climb, better turn time, longer range, better roll rate, higher critical mach speed and nearly half the price. It would seem 100% logical to simply move to the better plane, right? I'd assume they didn't transfer, because of the confidence they had in the P-47, knowing they could out dive and out preform their enemy at high altitude. Also this probably reinforced their confidence after the friendly trainer engagement with the P-47(Robert S. Johnson) vs Spitfire(, which also further proved the superiority of a heavier and faster plane. The 56th FG battle harden and well trained pilots ended their 3 year experience in the P-47 with a Kill/Loss ratio of 5.3. by the end of the war. So in the long run the P-47 was very deadly fighter aircraft and not just used for ground attack. Its always disappointing to hear someone talk about the P-47 as if it were just some ground attack aircraft. They completely forget which fighter planes took on the Luftwaffe at full strength and emerged victorious(big week, early 1944

Please give me your opinions on the why the 56th stayed with the P-47. 







Eventually they would get the P-47M which was arguably one of the best piston engine fighters to see combat in WW2 and easily superior to the P-51D. P-47M being faster at all altitudes and climbing faster at all altitudes. Then the P-47N which is also faster at all altitudes, superior range, quicker roll rate, faster rate of climb(depending on the fuel loading), larger pay load and more durable.

Also, which dived faster, the P-51D or the P-47D, N, M? Preferable an answer with Mathematically factors or actual reports. 




Thank you. 
DSR_T-800


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## stona (Sep 20, 2014)

Maybe the fact that the 56th FG had the longest association with the P-47. Having squadrons based at Bridgeport New Jersey, almost across the road from Republic's Farmingdale plant made them an obvious choice to trial the new fighter and the 63rd FS was the first to get it in May 1942.

It seems that the 56th was offered the P-51 as early as January 1944 but Landry declined. Several officers seem to have influenced this decision, most notably Schilling. After nearly two years with the type it obviously inspired confidence in the more senior officers of the Group.

The Group were still trouble shooting the P-47 in January 1945 with the introduction of the M.

Cheers

Steve


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## drgondog (Sep 20, 2014)

If you wish to compare the P-47M and N to the P-51D, note that both of those came into combat service as the first P-51H was rolling off the production lines - one year after the P-51D production started.

Now compare speed, climb, ceiling, roll, turn?

As to Bob Johnson's account of out climbing and out turning a Spitfire? 
NFW if he was fooling around with a Spit IX. Period. 

The P-47D couldn't out climb or out turn a P-51B below 30,000 feet, and neither the B nor the D nor the H could out turn a Spit IX or XIV at any altitude.

IF Johnson actually had this encounter one can only wonder if an ancient Mk II or V happened to be in the area.

The P-47 was a fine airplane, the 56FG IMO was, along with the 354 and 357 and perhaps the 49th FG's, were the best fighter combat units of the AAF. What makes it difficult to separate them is that the two longest combat units, 56th and 49th were operating in different theatres and far longer than the 354th and 357th. Comparing the 354th and the 56th with only 30 credits separating them despite the 56th engaged 7-8 months earlier against the same enemy is that the 354th had more opportunity during its operations than the 56th because of the range factor - ditto the 357FG. Unfortunately the 354th FG was forced to convert to the P-47 in November 1944 and didn't 'escape' back to Mustangs until mid February 1945. In the two month period, when all the big air battles, the Battle of the Bulge and Bodenplatte the 354FG only got about 9 VC's (I'll have to check) which was the lowest VC run of its history by far.

As to the decision P-47 vs convert to P-51 made in January 1944; 

Bob Landry according to Zemke made the decision when Zemke was home on leave. In "Zemke's Wolfpack", page 130, he cites the P-51B as having the best performance of any US fighter and better than any LW fighter except climb - and that he would have chosen the Mustang.

Zemke further re-iterates his judgment while leading the 479th when he again cites the P-51 as the AAF best fighter with respect to performance and range. I cannot offhand recall a fighter pilot that flew and got victory credits in the P-47, P-38 and P-51 other than Zemke. His opinions must be held in respect.

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## drgondog (Sep 20, 2014)

DSR T-888 said:


> The 56th FG battle harden and well trained pilots ended their 3 year experience in the P-47 with a Kill/Loss ratio of 5.3. by the end of the war.
> 
> *Actually the 56FG ended the war with an air victory to air combat loss ratio (discounting all other types of operational losses) of 11:1 (665.5 to 60). By contrast the 357FG with 595.5 to 55 was about the same - to compare all P-47 to all P-51 for a top Group.
> 
> ...



WWII Aircraft Performance

simple answer - both had placard Vne in Dive not to exceed 505mph true although both were tested up to .85M


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## DSR T-888 (Sep 20, 2014)

Thanks drgondog.

I wasn't exactly compare the P-47M/N to the P-51D, because anyone can just pull out the P-51H card. I'm just saying while the P-51B and D rained supreme throughout late 1943-1944. The 56th FG in late 1944 finally got a competitive aircraft to the P-51D, Bf-109K4 and Fw-190D9, but in this case it was superior in some ways. The P-51 is probably another all time favourite WW2 bird of mine. The P-51D with a 1943 engine was still bringing competitive performance to the playing field all the way up to 1945. 

I just think the P-51 takes a bit too much of the credit sometimes. And other times their is simply way too much anti P-51 rumors.

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## davebender (Sep 20, 2014)

U.S. Army invested in huge P-47 production facilities just as Luftwaffe invested in huge Me-109 production facilities. After making such an investment that's what you will be flying, whether you like it or not.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 20, 2014)

davebender said:


> *U.S. Army invested in huge P-47 production facilities*.



Did they? AFAIK the Farmingdale Facility was privately owned by Republic as was the Curtiss facility in Buffalo. I also believe that Republic owned the tooling, so please tell us your sources...


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## GrauGeist (Sep 20, 2014)

davebender said:


> U.S. Army invested in huge P-47 production facilities just as Luftwaffe invested in huge Me-109 production facilities. After making such an investment that's what you will be flying, whether you like it or not.


That doesn't make much sense, as the P-51 was operated by the USAAF...and the P-38 and the P-40 and the P-39 and the A-36...

So then *IF* we follow that logic, then the USAAF would have only flown one type...


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## Shortround6 (Sep 20, 2014)

Curtiss built a piddling number of P-47s. the rest came from just two factories. The Farmingdale plant the Evansville Indiana plant. I don't know how many sq ft these plants _wound up_ being, and maybe 2 big plants equal 5-6 little plants.

I believe Mr Benders anti-P-47 bias is showing a bit. 

For some reason a German Fw 197 using TWO 12 cylinder engines (combined power 2200-12600hp depending on engines) and weighing 12-14,000lbs would have been the greatest thing since sliced bread but an american 12-14,000lbs SINGLE 18 Cylinder engine airplane was too expensive,too slow, too un-manuverable maneuverable and an all round waste of money


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## GrauGeist (Sep 20, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> For some reason a German Fw 197 using TWO 12 cylinder engines (combined power 2200-12600hp depending on engines) and weighing 12-14,000lbs would have been the greatest thing since sliced bread but an american 12-14,000lbs *SINGLE 18 Cylinder engine airplane was too expensive*,too slow, too un-manuverable maneuverable and an all round waste of money


Perhaps it would have been better to dump the P-47 entirely and build the Grumman XF5F instead?

It only weighed about 9,000 lbs and used two little R-1820s


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## tomo pauk (Sep 20, 2014)

davebender said:


> U.S. Army invested in huge P-47 production facilities just as Luftwaffe invested in huge Me-109 production facilities. After making such an investment that's what you will be flying, *whether you like it or not*.



The P-47 fliers very much liked it, some of them affectionally?

We might remember that, when comparing the P-47 and P-51, especially the P-51B, the P-47 carried twice as much of guns and ammo. 600-700 lbs of extra weight, along with 4 extra gun openings and ejection chutes should've hampered the P-51B's performance a bit, both speed and RoC?

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## vikingBerserker (Sep 20, 2014)

I am currently reading _ An Ace of the Eighth _by Norman "Bud" Fortier and it talks about the P-47 being the preference for ground attack rolls. Was the 56th by chance tasked with this?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 20, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The P-47 fliers very much liked it, some of them affectionally?
> 
> We might remember that, when comparing the P-47 and P-51, especially the P-51B, the P-47 carried twice as much of guns and ammo. 600-700 lbs of extra weight, along with 4 extra gun openings and ejection chutes should've hampered the P-51B's performance a bit, both speed and RoC?



We often tend to think of fighters as single engine or twin engine and disregard the actual size. The reason designers (or air staff) used TWO engines instead of one was _because_ the majority of the time, ONE engine of the available types was NOT powerful enough. Often in the 2-4 years from issue of requirement to plane going into service new engines did become available but this means throwing out large parts of the design work already done and starting over, further delaying service introduction. 

The P-47, rightly or wrongly, was conceived with eight .50 cal machine guns with 425rpg. This is just under 1600lbs of armament or over 3 1/2 times the weight of guns and ammo carried by early Spitfires or Hurricanes. The P-47 (early ones with no drop tanks) also had about double the range of early Spitfires and Hurricanes. 
Most aircraft (or at least fighters) _without_ under wing loads divide up their weight with about 30%, give or take 3-5%, going to 'payload'. Guns/ammo,fuel/oil, pilot/radio/etc. Around 30% (or more to power plant) and around 30% or so to structure. You want 3 times the guns/ammo and twice the range of plane A in Plane B? you are going to need a much bigger airplane with a bigger engine that needs more fuel. Now throw in the requirement that you want it to fight at 25,000-30,000ft instead of 20,000ft and things just go even more complicated (bigger/heavier). 
Also remember that _when_ the P-47 was designed, ordered off the drawing board and was in prototype stage ( and Factories being built) , 100/130 fuel did NOT exist. In fact a Pilots manual dated Jan 20th 1943 gives two different allowable boost pressures for _different_ 100 octane fuels
With 100 octane (amend. #4) fuel Max boost was 47in.
With 100 octane (amend. #5) fuel Max boost was 52in.
This may be a carry over from an earlier edition of the manual. 

Basically, if you want a fighter that carries 1600-2000lbs worth of armament (Including mounts,structure, ammo boxes/chutes, heaters,etc) you don't do it with a 6-8000 lb airplane. 

BTW the Hawker Hurricane IIc was only carrying about 360lbs worth of ammo.

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## swampyankee (Sep 20, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Did they? AFAIK the Farmingdale Facility was privately owned by Republic as was the Curtiss facility in Buffalo. I also believe that Republic owned the tooling, so please tell us your sources...



Complicated question, but I know that post-ww2, much of the production tooling for military engines and aircraft was government-owned. Indeed, much of the furniture when I worked at Lycoming and Sikorsky had US government property tags on it


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## N4521U (Sep 20, 2014)

Do you think it had something to do with their "mission"?


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## GregP (Sep 20, 2014)

None of this makes sense. 

The Group stayed with the P-47 becasue they were not ordered to change. They were in the Military and, in the Military, you fly what equipment you are assigned. The Group has NO say in the matter. They can request, but the decision comes down from above.

The USAAF, like ALL military organizations, is NOT a democracy.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 21, 2014)

swampyankee said:


> Complicated question, but I know that post-ww2, *much of the production tooling for military engines and aircraft was government-owned.* Indeed, much of the furniture when I worked at Lycoming and Sikorsky had US government property tags on it


Depended on the contract. I worked on the P-3, the tooling for that was Lockheed owned. I'm a government contractor right now - we own our own furniture


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## stona (Sep 21, 2014)

GregP said:


> None of this makes sense.
> 
> The Group stayed with the P-47 becasue they were not ordered to change. They were in the Military and, in the Military, you fly what equipment you are assigned. The Group has NO say in the matter. They can request, but the decision comes down from above.
> 
> The USAAF, like ALL military organizations, is NOT a democracy.



But it is not black and white. There is plenty of evidence from several of the senior officers within the Group that they were offered the P-51 in January 1944 and declined to take it preferring to stay with the P-47. Nobody then ordered them to adopt the P-51, though this could have been done and they would have had to take it, and consequently they retained the P-47 until the end of the war. It's the point of the original question.

Oddly during war time military organisations, at least at a senior level, become more democratic (not really the right word) not less, as the opinions of _relatively_ junior but experienced and proven successful officers carries _much_ more weight than in peace time.
An extreme example of this would be that during conferences at the British Air Ministry in 1940 Leigh Mallory brought along very junior officers (notably Squadron Leader Bader) to express their views on operational matters, something inconceivable in peace time.
Competent men of middling ranks were given much heavier responsibilities. Don Bennett was a mere Wing Commander when given the task of developing Bomber Command's Pathfinder Force. 

Cheers

Steve


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## drgondog (Sep 21, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I am currently reading _ An Ace of the Eighth _by Norman "Bud" Fortier and it talks about the P-47 being the preference for ground attack rolls. Was the 56th by chance tasked with this?



Bud Fortier was a close friend of my father, Bert Marshall and they flew combat together in the 355th FG. Fortier was a volunteer to the experimental "Bill's Buzz Boys" attached to the 353rd FG led by Glenn Duncan, which flew P-47s to develop airfield strafing attacks. Fortier then returned to the 355th and started flying Mustangs again. He got a ground score, but the 8th credited it to the 353rd - which pissed him off to no end.

I would have to read the book again to understand the context of that statement - at least in the context of what he specifically said. The 355th FG's first day of airfield strafing was in a P-47 and resulted in the first loss due to airfield flak one week before Bud went TDY to 353rd until mid April.

No, the 56th FG was not tasked for ground support role - but ALL 8th AF FG's pitched in extensively June 6 through August, 1944 with heavy losses to P-47s and Mustangs alike.


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## drgondog (Sep 21, 2014)

GregP said:


> None of this makes sense.
> 
> The Group stayed with the P-47 becasue they were not ordered to change. They were in the Military and, in the Military, you fly what equipment you are assigned. The Group has NO say in the matter. They can request, but the decision comes down from above.
> 
> The USAAF, like ALL military organizations, is NOT a democracy.



Greg - whether it 'makes sense' or not, there are too many pointers to indicate that the narrative that Zemke had regarding Landry's appeal to Kepner to retain the Jug, was a fact. That the 56th continued with the Jug, despite arguably being the most effective US fighter group in the ETO speaks loudly to Command influence to permit them to continue.

You are certainly correct that there was zero Power on the part of 56 FG leadership to make the decision. It also seems clear that Zemke, had he not been on vacation, would have argued for replacing the Jug with the Mustang.


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## drgondog (Sep 21, 2014)

swampyankee said:


> Complicated question, but I know that post-ww2, much of the production tooling for military engines and aircraft was government-owned. Indeed, much of the furniture when I worked at Lycoming and Sikorsky had US government property tags on it



It is pretty much true that if the Contract is awarded to design, tool and produce a 'thing', that the tooling will be invoiced to, and paid by, the Government Contract Agency. One of the reasons is the Gov't reserves the right to re-locate the tooling when the contract is concluded, or breached, so as to reserve the right to have it built somewhere else. Different contracts occasionally treat IP differently, particularly if a product begins as a commercial, non-government, venture - or if the Contractor is far sighted enough to retain either exclusive rights (very rare) or joint ownership (more frequent but still rare)during contract negotiation.

Normally the Guvmint owns what they pay for, pay what they agree to pay for as overhead (depreciation, etc) for tools and other assets purchased by the contractor for other purposes than a specific contract procurement.

Joe, I am surprised that Lockheed owns the P-3 tooling and scratching my head wondering why Lockheed would have purchased such exclusive 'used for' type tooling on their own? Any background on that?

When I was at Bell the Model 206 Jet Ranger was designed before submitting later as OH-6, so they owned all the basic tooling and IP without question. I was later part of the design team which patented and developed the "Node A Magic" pylon to isolate rotor system oscillations from the airframe to lower vibration levels. I know Bell retained all rights to that.


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## stona (Sep 21, 2014)

I think that the January 1944 date is important. This was exactly the period at which the 8th Air Force fighters were beginning to operate more and more frequently at low level, separating from the bombers earlier and further inland. It also coincides with increasing losses to light flak which really started to climb in the early months of 1944. The men commanding the 56th FG would have been well aware of this and also the perceived vulnerability of the P-51 to light flak compared to the P-47. In November 1944 the 56th FG had 9 aircraft damaged by flak when attacking St Omer airfield, but they all managed to get home. This must have been a factor in their desire to stay with the P-47. 
Cheers
Steve


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## drgondog (Sep 21, 2014)

N4521U said:


> Do you think it had something to do with their "mission"?





N4521U said:


> Do you think it had something to do with their "mission"?



The role and Prime Directive for the 56th FG was precisely the same as every other 8th AF fighter group. a.) Provide escort and b.) destroy the LW in the air and on the ground.

They were limited in the role compared to the Mustang because of range deficiencies, resulting in reduced leadership past Brunswick, Kassel, Stuttgart radius until mid summer 1944. But even the additional 60 gallons of fuselage fuel only extended them to the 'potential' of Berlin. By that time only the 56th, 78th, 353rd and 356th FGs still retained the P-47.


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## drgondog (Sep 21, 2014)

stona said:


> I think that the January 1944 date is important. This was exactly the period at which the 8th Air Force fighters were beginning to operate more and more frequently at low level, separating from the bombers earlier and further inland. It also coincides with increasing losses to light flak which really started to climb in the early months of 1944. The men commanding the 56th FG would have been well aware of this and also the perceived vulnerability of the P-51 to light flak compared to the P-47. In November 1944 the 56th FG had 9 aircraft damaged by flak when attacking St Omer airfield, but they all managed to get home. This must have been a factor in their desire to stay with the P-47.
> Cheers
> Steve



Not likely Steve. The first ground victory credits were awarded to 353rd on January 14 with no losses and next by 78th FG on February 6, both within the first four weeks after Doolittle issued his famous directive. To put a point on this, nobody in 8th (or 9th AF) really had a clue what LW airfield flak would produce as a danger to strafing attacks until March. The leading ace in the ETO, 353rd ace Walter Beckham, was flying a P-47 when shot down by airfield flak while strafing on February 23, 1944.. 

Additionally, with no losses in Mustangs while strafing until March 21 (4th FG lost five strafing), any fears regarding vulnerability (or relative advantages for air cooled engine over in-line) would have been idle speculation in January and February and probably even March, 1944. 

Airfield strafing picked up in March with the 4th FG and the 355th FG flying Mustangs as the leaders.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 21, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Joe, I am surprised that Lockheed owns the P-3 tooling and scratching my head wondering why Lockheed would have purchased such exclusive 'used for' type tooling on their own? Any background on that?
> 
> When I was at Bell the Model 206 Jet Ranger was designed before submitting later as OH-6, so they owned all the basic tooling and IP without question. I was later part of the design team which patented and developed the "Node A Magic" pylon to isolate rotor system oscillations from the airframe to lower vibration levels. I know Bell retained all rights to that.



I am not sure how much of the tooling was carried over from the Lockheed 188 Electra airliner? An often forgotten aircraft.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 21, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Joe, I am surprised that Lockheed owns the P-3 tooling and scratching my head wondering why Lockheed would have purchased such exclusive 'used for' type tooling on their own? Any background on that?



Yup! Because it's the same tooling that built the Electra (L-188 ). The government never purchased or "force purchased" the tooling. 

During the early 1980s then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman threatened to take the P-3 production contract away from Lockheed because of a payment and production cost dispute and have another contractor build P-3s. Lockheed then threatened to destroy all the tooling. It's obvious that a settlement was negotiated!

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## stona (Sep 21, 2014)

drgondog said:


> To put a point on this, nobody in 8th (or 9th AF) really had a clue what LW airfield flak would produce as a danger to strafing attacks until March. The leading ace in the ETO, 353rd ace Walter Beckham, was flying a P-47 when shot down by airfield flak while strafing on February 23, 1944.



The first loss to _light flak _was Lt. Col McCollum (353th) whilst dive bombing on 25th November 1943. I believe the 78th lost a P-47 strafing an airfield before the loss of Beckam but its splitting hairs. 2 of the 5 aircraft lost on 23rd February were to heavy flak, one was at 28,000ft when hit.

In February 1943 the 8th AF recorded 14 fighters of all types lost to flak of all types. 

In March this rose to 32, including 4 P-47s and 10 P-51s whilst strafing airfields. 

In April this rose to 43, including 2 P-38s, 14 P-47s and 17 P-51s whilst strafing air fields. 

The figures are from the 8th AF's own statistics.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that the 56th saw as early as November '43 which way the wind was blowing and that low level air to ground operations were going to become more commonplace. I don't think anybody in the USAAF realised in January just how dangerous light flak was going to prove, but the writing was on the wall. Anyone who had talked to an RAF colleague may have been aware of the 'rules' already introduced the previous year in that service for both the avoidance of flak and specifically attacking heavily defended targets like airfields.

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Sep 21, 2014)

Perhaps so but I would bet Republic had large purchase orders in hand before making such a massive investment in factory construction. Same applies to plants and plant expansions for P-47s R2800 engine. Plus the dozens of firms building sub components for P-47 program. You don't turn P-47 production off by flipping a switch. Nor do you double P-51 production by flipping another switch.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 21, 2014)

No you don't turn production on and off by flipping switches. Look at how long it took to turn of the P-40 Switch 

On the other hand nobody says you have to use all three major types in every theater you are fighting in. And they didn't. One more P-51 Group in England may just mean one more P-47 group in the Med or in the CBI theater.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 21, 2014)

davebender said:


> Perhaps so but I would bet Republic had large purchase orders in hand before making such a massive investment in factory construction.


I had relatives who worked there. The plant grew as the government awarded more and more contracts to Republic, bottom line, the government didn't own the factory.


davebender said:


> Same applies to plants and plant expansions for P-47s R2800 engine. Plus the dozens of firms building sub components for P-47 program. You don't turn P-47 production off by flipping a switch. Nor do you double P-51 production by flipping another switch.


 Having worked on aircraft production lines myself, I believe no one is disputing that.


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## drgondog (Sep 22, 2014)

Respectfully Steve - there was no history available to the 56th Group leaders to suggest that the P-47 offered better solution than the P-51B in January 1944. There were no operational statistics or data to compare operations profiles and losses other than the 354th FG. The new group, equipped with a new 'hot' fighter was going a lot farther into Germany and shooting down 52 German aircraft before the end of January, 1944.. a feat that required six months of combat operations by the 56th FG to achieve - and the 38.5 air victory credits by the 354th in January topped the 38 VC's by the 56th.

There was no rational reason for the 56th to choose to operate the P-47 over the P-51 simply because pilots and leaders were very much motivated by records and performance.

I don't know if Landry truly swayed Kepner, as Zemke states, but it could not have been based on perception that the P-47 was more survivable against either the LW or airfield strafing in January, 1944


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## davebender (Sep 22, 2014)

Fighter aircraft in those areas spent a lot of time at medium and low altitude. Not what P-47 was designed for.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 22, 2014)

davebender said:


> Fighter aircraft in those areas spent a lot of time at medium and low altitude. Not what P-47 was designed for.


By 1943, the P-47 was operating with the 12th AF out of Italy and in service with the 348th FG based out of Brisbane...


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## Shortround6 (Sep 22, 2014)

davebender said:


> Fighter aircraft in those areas spent a lot of time at medium and low altitude. Not what P-47 was designed for.




True but then we have the advantage of using the "retro-spectro-scope" to examine things with. The P-47 was _ordered_ in Sept of 1940, while the BoB was in full swing. First flight was May 6th 1941, *7 months* before Pearl Harbor. 

Who, at the time, could guarantee that the Germans or Japanese would NOT develop high altitude fighters by 1943 or 1944? 

If you _wait_ for your enemy to deploy a new weapon or aircraft before starting work on your own you are usually too late.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 22, 2014)

davebender said:


> Fighter aircraft in those areas spent a lot of time at medium and low altitude. Not what P-47 was designed for.



Lovely thing about the P-47 was that it's engine, when outfitted with water injection, was making 300-600 HP more than previously available 2000 HP. Combined with a better prop, the performance under 20000 ft improved considerably.


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## BiffF15 (Sep 22, 2014)

Tomo,

How long did the water last?

Cheers,
Biff


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## Conslaw (Sep 23, 2014)

The P-47M was a limited production aircraft. It was produced to work the bugs out of the R-2800 engines with the "C" turbocharger. The task with the "M" was to match the new engine in the existing chassis of the P-47D. By the time the first "M" came off the assembly line, work on the "N" with its larger, wet, wing was pretty far along. The "N"s were Republic's answer to the long-range bomber escort problem. It just made sense to keep a P-47 unit in theater so they would be ready for the P-47N when it arrived.


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## wuzak (Sep 23, 2014)

Conslaw said:


> The P-47M was a limited production aircraft. It was produced to work the bugs out of the R-2800 engines with the "C" turbocharger. The task with the "M" was to match the new engine in the existing chassis of the P-47D. By the time the first "M" came off the assembly line, work on the "N" with its larger, wet, wing was pretty far along. The "N"s were Republic's answer to the long-range bomber escort problem. It just made sense to keep a P-47 unit in theater so they would be ready for the P-47N when it arrived.



All P-47s had C-series superchargers.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 23, 2014)

The "M" used the R-2800 *C* Series engine. All previous P-47s used *B* series engines of various types.


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## davparlr (Sep 23, 2014)

BiffF15 said:


> Tomo,
> 
> How long did the water last?
> 
> ...



How long does the fuel last in the F-16 using full afterburner?

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## soulezoo (Sep 23, 2014)

^^^ depending on the fuel load profile 6-8 min is a good estimate/average. T-38/F-5 was half that. 

Your point is well taken however.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 23, 2014)

BiffF15 said:


> Tomo,
> 
> How long did the water last?
> 
> ...



Browsing through the 'America's 100000', I was not able to find a definitive answer to that question. It can be read there, however, the the P-63 would use up 25 gals of ADI mixture in 15 minutes of operation. The P-47D was outfitted with either 15 or 30 gal tanks with ADI mixture (water + alcohol) - we're looking at maybe 7-8 or 15 min of duration?


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## javlin (Sep 23, 2014)

Interesting read(s) their fellas and a very good question by the original poster


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## BiffF15 (Sep 23, 2014)

davparlr said:


> How long does the fuel last in the F-16 using full afterburner?



Not being a Viper guy I will guess half as long as an Eagle at the same altitude, and with similar engines (not always a safe assumption)...


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## BiffF15 (Sep 23, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Browsing through the 'America's 100000', I was not able to find a definitive answer to that question. It can be read there, however, the the P-63 would use up 25 gals of ADI mixture in 15 minutes of operation. The P-47D was outfitted with either 15 or 30 gal tanks with ADI mixture (water + alcohol) - we're looking at maybe 7-8 or 15 min of duration?



Thanks!


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## gjs238 (Sep 23, 2014)

davebender said:


> Fighter aircraft in those areas spent a lot of time at medium and low altitude. Not what P-47 was designed for.



Couldn't you also argue that using 2-stage Merlin powered aircraft was a waste in these areas as well?
Or the turbocharged P-38 for that matter.


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## gjs238 (Sep 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> By 1943, the P-47 was operating with the 12th AF out of Italy and in service with the 348th FG based out of Brisbane...



Brisbane... bet they would have appreciated the longer legs of the P-51 (or P-38)


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## tomo pauk (Sep 23, 2014)

The P-38 was in short supply for a better part of the war - abundant quantities being available after mid 1944? The lack of second (and capable) source was certainly felt. The production of the P-47 overtook the production of the P-38 in second half of 1943.
P-51A, 1st version of that fighter that was produced for the USAF in more than token numbers, was still built in relatively low numbers (310 pcs), and part of them was issued to the RAF. P-51A took part in operations in CBI and Italy. Production really hit the stride during the winter of 1943/44, with the P-51B/C.

As for waste of the 2-stage Merlins in low level ops - the P-51B/C was having more HP between SL and 15000 ft than the P-51A with single stage V-1710. Ditto for the turbocharged V-1710 vs. 1-stage V-1710.


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## snowmobileman (Sep 23, 2014)

Regarding P-47 water injection, Mike Williams' site lists consumption at 2.1 gallons/minute(See Water Injection on P-47D Airplanes).


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## tomo pauk (Sep 23, 2014)

Thanks for pointing us to the source 
It is 2.1 gal per minute, though - or circa 14 min for 30 gals aboard.

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## snowmobileman (Sep 23, 2014)

Sorry, my mistake! Big difference...


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## vikingBerserker (Sep 23, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Bud Fortier was a close friend of my father, Bert Marshall and they flew combat together in the 355th FG. Fortier was a volunteer to the experimental "Bill's Buzz Boys" attached to the 353rd FG led by Glenn Duncan, which flew P-47s to develop airfield strafing attacks. Fortier then returned to the 355th and started flying Mustangs again. He got a ground score, but the 8th credited it to the 353rd - which pissed him off to no end.



Oh like you've written a book on the 355th FG......


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## GrauGeist (Sep 23, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> Oh like you've written a book on the 355th FG......


LOL!!

Yeah...355th who?

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## davparlr (Sep 24, 2014)

BiffF15 said:


> Not being a Viper guy I will guess half as long as an Eagle at the same altitude, and with similar engines (not always a safe assumption)...



I would guess this is only a few minutes. I think a P-47 at max power (water) is operationally similar to an F-15 at max power (AB), only a bit slower (but so is the enemy).


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## tomo pauk (Sep 24, 2014)

A simple question - maybe someone knows how much power the R-2800 'B' in the P-47D was delivering when operating on 70 in Hg (ie. while using 150 grade fuel + water injection)? On 56 in (130 grade + WI) it was ~2300 HP, at 64 in (130 grade + increased amount of WI) it was ~2535 HP. On 52 in (130 grade, no WI) - 2000 HP.

added: seems like that at 66 in Hg, 2600 HP was available (here)


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## drgondog (Sep 24, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> Oh like you've written a book on the 355th FG......



Lol - yeah, two and working on 355th TFW now. and I have to include the 355FW for Afghanistan/Iraq and Syria days now

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## drgondog (Sep 24, 2014)

Norman "Bud" Fortier - a hand salute to a great fighter pilot, husband and father. Don't always get all three.

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## windswords (Oct 3, 2014)

"The P-51B had higher top speed [It was a little faster than the 47, not enough to make a big difference], faster rate of climb [how much after the paddle blade prop was installed? Again it might be a little, but a little does not translate into a decisive advantage in combat], better turn time, [don't get me started on the whole maneuver fighter vs energy fighter thing, I think the Japanese could tell you how much maneuverability means in combat!] longer range [no argument here, although 47's eventually flew all the way to Berlin, and if the N model had been deployed they would have flown to Budapest], better roll rate [I always heard the 47 could roll with the best and N model with clipped wings was even better], higher critical mach speed [what is the advantage in combat? The 47 was already one of the fastest divers around - it would seem rather than the critical mach that the acceleration in a dive would be the decisive factor] and nearly half the price. [Pilots and group commanders don't know anything about price, unless the 56th group had an accountant in the command staff!]"

"added: seems like that at 66 in Hg, 2600 HP was available"

I read an account of a pilot (who flew both 47's and 51's in combat and preferred the P-47) that they would often overboost the the engine of the M and N models to 3000+ hp. I'm not an engineer so I don't know if this is even possible but he seemed to know what he was talking about.

Wasn't there a saying that went something like this: "If you want to look good fly a Mustang, if you want to come home in one piece, fly a Thunderbolt".


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## drgondog (Oct 3, 2014)

windswords said:


> "The P-51B had higher top speed [It was a little faster than the 47, not enough to make a big difference], faster rate of climb [how much after the paddle blade prop was installed? Again it might be a little, but a little does not translate into a decisive advantage in combat], better turn time, [don't get me started on the whole maneuver fighter vs energy fighter thing, I think the Japanese could tell you how much maneuverability means in combat!] longer range [no argument here, although 47's eventually flew all the way to Berlin, and if the N model had been deployed they would have flown to Budapest], better roll rate [I always heard the 47 could roll with the best and N model with clipped wings was even better], higher critical mach speed [what is the advantage in combat? The 47 was already one of the fastest divers around - it would seem rather than the critical mach that the acceleration in a dive would be the decisive factor] and nearly half the price. [Pilots and group commanders don't know anything about price, unless the 56th group had an accountant in the command staff!]"
> 
> "added: seems like that at 66 in Hg, 2600 HP was available"
> 
> ...



Maybe another saying is in order "if you want to be an ace, fly a Mustang" The air to air ratio of P-51 vs LW victory credits using the same formula and evaluation techniques was 50% higher (in favor of the Mustang)lending some speculation that surviving in air combat vs the LW favored the Mustang.

So maybe the old saying should be "if you want to look good AND survive air combat with the LW, fly a Mustang"


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## gjs238 (Oct 3, 2014)

.


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## Timppa (Oct 4, 2014)

drgondog said:


> The air to air ratio of P-51 vs LW victory credits using the same formula and evaluation techniques was 50% higher



Can you elaborate on that. I have always thought, that the success of of the P-51 was mainly because of its greater range, giving more shooting and strafing opportunities, especially when Germans were perhaps not expecting fight so far east.


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## Mike Williams (Oct 4, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> A simple question - maybe someone knows how much power the R-2800 'B' in the P-47D was delivering when operating on 70 in Hg (ie. while using 150 grade fuel + water injection)? On 56 in (130 grade + WI) it was ~2300 HP, at 64 in (130 grade + increased amount of WI) it was ~2535 HP. On 52 in (130 grade, no WI) - 2000 HP.
> 
> added: seems like that at 66 in Hg, 2600 HP was available (here)



Tomo, check Power in Level Flight P-47D 42-26167 for power of a P-47D equipped with a R-2800-63 operating at 70" Hg using 100/150 grade fuel with water injection.

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## drgondog (Oct 4, 2014)

Timppa said:


> Can you elaborate on that. I have always thought, that the success of of the P-51 was mainly because of its greater range, giving more shooting and strafing opportunities, especially when Germans were perhaps not expecting fight so far east.



Timppa - here is the 8th AF summary roll up of all the individual Fighter by Fighter, Group by Group including Scout Forces from beginning of operations in 1942 to VE Day for the 8th AF. These data are extracted from USAF Study 85 for air victory credits, 8th AF Victory Credits Board - June 1945 and Missing Aircrew Reports and Accident Reports for 8th AF FC.

It represents approximately 30 years of research and published along with other tables in my recently published book "Our Might Always - History of the 355th FG in WWII" from Schiffer

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## tomo pauk (Oct 4, 2014)

Mike Williams said:


> Tomo, check Power in Level Flight P-47D 42-26167 for power of a P-47D equipped with a R-2800-63 operating at 70" Hg using 100/150 grade fuel with water injection.



Thanks, Mike 
Topping 2800 HP at lower altitudes, ie. 2840 HP at ~10000 ft. 

Mike, would you be so kind to check out the power of the engine from the P-47M/N, ie. the 'C' series R-2800 at 72 in (150 grade + WI)?


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## drgondog (Oct 4, 2014)

Timppa said:


> Can you elaborate on that. I have always thought, that the success of of the P-51 was mainly because of its greater range, giving more shooting and strafing opportunities, especially when Germans were perhaps not expecting fight so far east.



Timppa - I posted the wrong table. Here is what I wanted to post - which is the aircraft type summary for 8th AF.

This is a summary rollup of 8th AF only for the 4 types of aircraft. The loss data was extracted from Macr's. Where aircraft were lost strafing, whether hitting a tree or colliding with an aircraft on the ground or another a/c in the air or lost coolant after strafing, etc - or "unknown cause' following strafing - I assigned the loss to "Strafing'.

For losses during an air to air, or 'unknown' in which enemy air activity was encountered, or lost coolant or had mechanical failure after a fight, I assigned the loss to "Enemy Air". Also included are mid air collisions between US and German fighter, mid air collisions between US fighters breaking to engage, and several that were simply unknown but Macrs stated a found wreckage at a time and place that coincided with a LW victory credit on Tony Wood List.

I do Not claim perfection in the numerical results of my assignments with actual causes for all circumstances but I did the best I could to err on the higher side of the loss due to enemy action for each of the losses that had either a Macr or an Accident Report. These totals do Not include aircraft lost crash landing or on take offs around the respective bases nor does it include aircraft salvaged for any reason that made emergency landings at bases like Manston as those records are practically silent regarding cause (air battle or flak or fuel or mechanical of any type)

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## Timppa (Oct 11, 2014)

You said:
"victory credits using the same formula and evaluation techniques was 50% higher"

I said :
"success of of the P-51 was mainly because of its greater range"

Your tables don't give any evidence one way or the other. i understand that taking account of the range (of the credits) is very difficult, if not impossible.


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## drgondog (Oct 11, 2014)

Timppa said:


> You said:
> "victory credits using the same formula and evaluation techniques was 50% higher"
> 
> *To reset the quote above. The victory credits of the P-51 vs LW compared to losses against the LW in air to air combat was 50% higher (10.3:1) than the P-47 (7.3:1) really says nothing regarding range comparisons. I would say range advantage gave the Mustang more Opportunities over the P-47 to Engage in air combat but does not give the P-51 a performance advantage once engaged with the LW.*
> ...



There is an additional factor working Against the Mustang, which is range related - namely internal fuel remaining when drop tanks are punched to engage. The internal fuel for the P-47D, prior to June 1944 were all 305 gallons whereas the Mustang was 269 gallons.

The Mustang burned perhaps 5 gallons for warm up and take off from the left main, then switched to burn 0-25 gallons from the fuselage tank depending on the range. The P-47 would burn 50% more for same warm up/take off before switching to Drop tanks so best case for maximum internal fuel in ~ 295 gallons and the Mustang for best case maximum internal fuel is not to burn any fuselage tank fuel and have 264 (269 less 5 gallons) gallons.

The fuel remaining after dropping tanks is 
P-51 - 264x6#/gal = 1584 pounds. The Gross weight less external tanks then is about 9260 pounds for P-51B will full ammo and 264 gallons of fuel. The Fuel wt. to mission wt. = 1584/9260 = 17%

P-47D - 295x6# = 1770. The Gross weight less external tanks then is about 13340 pounds for full ammo and 295 gallons of fuel. The Fuel wt to Mission wt. = 1770/13340 = 13%

Under the assumptions that engagement begins before all external fuel has been consumed and nearly full internal fuel remains for both ships, the P-51B is paying a heavier price relative to proportionate maneuverability based on fuel remaining.

Back to the question - Does range potential help or hinder the Mustang more than the P-47 in air to air combat during Penetration to the target where most air to air combat occurred? I would say yes and that the explanation for the higher air to air ratio's to losses for the Mustang is due to inherent greater maneuverability - not range. 

Clearly my example is Not a proof.


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## drgondog (Oct 11, 2014)

FYI - while overall air to air ratio for collectively All Mustang groups was 10.3:1 and the collective ratio for All P-47 groups was 7.3:1 the 56th FG individual ratio was 11.1:1. It also accounted for 42% of all 8th AF P-47 air victory credits - so they had the effect of Raising the overall P-47 performance.

A better illustration of the Mustang as a 'difference maker' is the 355th FG which had a 3.5:1 P-47 ratio and a 10.3:1 P-51 ratio.

Another item to contemplate regarding the swing of air victory credits. Post January 1, 1945 the air battles and victory credits plummeted as the LW moved east to defend against the Russians. Prior to that period there were many combats in range of P-47s, although not as much as with P-51s.


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## Timppa (Oct 12, 2014)

> Performance advantage of P-51 over the P-47, IMO, is the reason for the higher victory credit to loss ratio.



This is where I disagree. 4 points to consider:
1. The quality of German pilots plummeted at the same time when all of the 8AF FG's (save one) were being equipped with the P-51.
2. At the same time the numerical superiority of the Allied AF's increased from manageable to impossible.
3. It is said that most of the pilots did not see the attacker who shot them down. So the performance difference obviously does not matter in these cases.
4. Relating the above, the P-51 pilots had more opportunities to such attacks (due to that very range), when German pilots were taking off, climbing, landing, not expecting to be attacked.

Sidenote:
You have a habit to put your answers inside other peoples posts. This makes direct quoting impossible. Just FYI.


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## stona (Oct 12, 2014)

Timppa said:


> 1. The quality of German pilots plummeted at the same time when all of the 8AF FG's (save one) were being equipped with the P-51.



The most salient point. 
The Luftwaffe the allies were fighting in 1944/45 was not that the RAF had taken on in 1940/41. It annoys me when people make Spitfire/P-51 comparisons ignoring the quality of the most critical component of any air force, its pilots
Cheers
Steve


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## drgondog (Oct 12, 2014)

Timppa said:


> This is where I disagree. 4 points to consider:
> 1. The quality of German pilots plummeted at the same time when all of the 8AF FG's (save one) were being equipped with the P-51.
> 2. At the same time the numerical superiority of the Allied AF's increased from manageable to impossible.
> 3. It is said that most of the pilots did not see the attacker who shot them down. So the performance difference obviously does not matter in these cases.
> ...



1. Between Dec 1, 1943 and May 30. 1944 the quality of the German forces in LuftFlotte Reich was as high as it ever would be with the great influx of experienced pilots and leaders from both Ost and Sud fronts as entire squadrons were transferred for the Defense of the Reich. Units such as III./JG 54, II. and III./JG 27, all of JG 3, all of JG 11, JG 1, II and III./JG 53, JG 300, JG 301, I.and II./JG 5, II./JG 51 (IIRC) - plus the ZG 26 and ZG 76 plus NJG 2, 5, 7 and I. &II./NZG 101, I. II./NJG 102. This doesn't include the formidable JG 2 and JG 26 units.

The point may be that the LW relatively speaking was less experienced on the average compared to 1942 but it was equally experienced to the 8th AF average pilots - most of which had not seen combat until the ETO while the LW units flowing into LF Reich were all experienced for some time fighting in Russia and against the Brits and US in the MTO. Replacements were less skilled on the average but not the pilots within the transferring squadrons.

2. The force structure and sorties flown by Mustang units was a small percentage of escort Groups in the 9th and 8th AF. During Big Week February 20, 1944 there were two operational FG's - the 354 (1/43) and 357 (2/43). By the end of the first week of March there were five (4th, 355th, 363rd) plus three P-38 FG's (55th, 20th, 3634th) compared to (56, 78, 352, 353, 356, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 368). At May 1, eight more P-47 groups were operational plus two more P-38 groups plus 339 and 352nd FG Mustang groups were operational...by May 1, the 36, 50, 371, 404, 405, 406 P-47 groups were added and the 352nd converted to Mustangs.

Only the P-51B was in the ETO, only seven Mustang and five P-38 Groups were operational - but seventeen P-47 groups were operational - so the forces of the two combined US Air Forces (8th and 9th) were 29. Interesting but a.) Half had no more than two months of combat experience, only 12 could go near Berlin, only five could go to Poland and Czechoslovakia or far southeast Germany.

Of that group of seven Mustang groups, only two P-51 Groups could be allocated for target support of up to seven boxes of 50 bombers each over a trail of 30+ miles. Yes good planning and Control by the ground controllers could and did put enormous relative strength at the point of attack where only one, perhaps two Mustang groups, could engage the LW attackers.

3. "Some Say" that a lot of lousy shooting was involved by both sides, creating an opportunity to evade given skill and performance advantage of some form... meaning that maneuverability was still important for survival when placed in a dangerous situation - bot sides are replete with reports of 'escape'

4. True - which made the Mustang the most critical fighter in the battle for daylight supremacy in preparation for the Required air superiority over the beaches during the critical landing and consolidation phase, June 6 -June 20


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## stona (Oct 12, 2014)

Your point 1 is simply not true. Throughout 1942 Luftwaffe training programmes were curtailed, redesigned and cut back or in some cases completely suspended. They never recovered to anything like the programmes they had previously been. I covered this with relevant data, particularly about fuel shortages in the training programme and lack of instructors elsewhere. I have data about the drastically shortened courses somewhere. It was not possible to turn out pilots of the quality of those trained in the pre war and first two years of the war in such circumstances.

Of course there were some experienced and formidable pilots still present, there were still a few left at the end of the war, but the overall quality of the Luftwaffe's pilots had declined sharply.

It is interesting that by 1944 both British and US combat reports start to mention Luftwaffe pilots bailing out as soon as they were shot at, or even before combat was joined. That didn't happen earlier. It was by no means common place, but it is a clear reflection of the low morale and lack of fighting ability of some young pilots. I for one will not judge them for that, some of them could barely fly the aircraft they were supposed to fight.

Between September and December 1943 the Luftwaffe lost 2,967 fighter pilots, 141% of its average strength of 2105 for that year. Between January and May 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 2,262 fighter pilots. That's 99% of its average strength of 2,283. Such figures would be inconceivable to the RAF or USAAF. Is it any surprise that Luftwaffe morale was fragile?

By 1944 the average Luftwaffe fighter pilot had a total of about 120 hours flying hours, 20 on front line types if he was lucky. His US counterpart had nearly 400 hours total, about 150 on front line types. That is no contest.

Cheers

Steve


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## drgondog (Oct 12, 2014)

stona said:


> Your point 1 is simply not true. Throughout 1942 Luftwaffe training programmes were curtailed, redesigned and cut back or in some cases completely suspended. They never recovered to anything like the programmes they had previously been. I covered this with relevant data, particularly about fuel shortages in the training programme and lack of instructors elsewhere. I have data about the drastically shortened courses somewhere. It was not possible to turn out pilots of the quality of those trained in the pre war and first two years of the war in such circumstances.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Steve - I have no argument regarding the quality of the REPLACEMENT pilots. What I detailed in length was the mass migration of skilled and experienced units whose replacements were bloodied in the East and South - in contrast to the REPLACEMENT pilots that came from the flying schools in January and February and March to fill in the attrition.

Somehow you seem to take an implied position that all those units somehow transformed their TO&E with all new rookies as they moved to LuftFlotte Reich.

Second point - the US pilots that came into the ETO, beginning with 56th and 78th FG were combat rookies - only the 4th FG was populated by combat veterans that transferred from Eagle Squadron. They immediately came into combat with experienced vets of the LuftFlotte 3 JG 26 and JG 2. While they whittled them down somewhat both of those organizations managed to absorb new rookies fairly well.

You might also recall that we were sending back experienced pilots after first tour to go home and train so there was always an influx of raw flight school grads from the states that frequently got killed or captured before 10 missions.

Quoting statistics of the replacements of the January through May timeframe is interesting but not as interesting as the experience and the skill injected into LuftFlotte Reich from the other fronts to confront the rookies coming into 8th and 9th AF ETO combat teams.

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## stona (Oct 13, 2014)

When you have sustained losses like those of the Luftwaffe in late 1943 and 1944 then your units will have a preponderance of inexperienced or replacement pilots. Because statistically the more experienced pilots had a better chance of survival they will be likely to survive longer, but they were not immune to this appalling attrition. Look at any list of Luftwaffe aces to see how many were killed between 1943 and 1945.

Whilst it is true replacement US and British pilots were arriving at their units with 300-400 hours flying time and 100-150 hours on operational types this bares no comparison with the numbers for Luftwaffe replacements. Allied pilots had more hours on operational types than their Luftwaffe counterparts had in total. Allied air forces also provided 'on the job' training to their replacement pilots. In the RAF these were usually in the form of the so called 'sector training flights' carried out at the operational squadron. The Luftwaffe simply lacked the means to do anything like this.

The Luftwaffe in defence of the Reich, unlike the RAF during the BoB, did not have the luxury of creating different classes of squadrons and putting those non-operational ones out of harm's way. The quality of all their units was degraded.

It is interesting to note that both US and British combat reports sometimes make a specific comment that a Luftwaffe pilot must have been experienced due to the way he fought his aeroplane. Such comments are few and far between.

Cheers

Steve


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## BiffF15 (Oct 13, 2014)

drgondog said:


> There is an additional factor working Against the Mustang, which is range related - namely internal fuel remaining when drop tanks are punched to engage. The internal fuel for the P-47D, prior to June 1944 were all 305 gallons whereas the Mustang was 269 gallons.
> 
> The Mustang burned perhaps 5 gallons for warm up and take off from the left main, then switched to burn 0-25 gallons from the fuselage tank depending on the range. The P-47 would burn 50% more for same warm up/take off before switching to Drop tanks so best case for maximum internal fuel in ~ 295 gallons and the Mustang for best case maximum internal fuel is not to burn any fuselage tank fuel and have 264 (269 less 5 gallons) gallons.
> 
> ...



Drgndog,

I agree with your numbers based on the assumption that both the Mustang and the Thunderbolt fly the same distance prior to engaging enemy aircraft (EA). However, I think there is another way to interpret your fuel numbers. Based on the assumptions that the Mustang is flying the deepest/furthest portion of the bomber escort missions, carries more fuel weight and gets better fuel mileage than other US products. I "think" it would stand to reason that not only would it get more time aloft (or in the more heavily defended areas and thus more trigger time), but would get the more "high risk of Luftwaffe showing up" missions. FYI this is just a hypothesis.

On another vein of the same front (why some aircraft had more kills than others) I think ease of flying should get at least a cursory nod. The Lightning introduces complexity in the form of 2 of everything (several years older cockpit layout), slow roll rate as compared to it's adversaries, dreaded compressibility at a lower mach, and some MX issues. The Thunderbolt has size against it as far as long range tally ho's go, less maneuverability as compared to it's adversaries at the altitudes most likely to encounter EA, and shorter range (less play time in target area). Both of these aircraft required a definite game plan for handling a smaller, more maneuverable aircraft (Fw-190 / Me-109). The Mustang had the legs, maneuverability (as long as fuel was properly managed), and fuel mileage to give it staying power in the target area at normal combat altitudes.

Layered on top of the last point is all the discussion regards the state of the Luftwaffe pilots fuel and the timing around and amount of Mustangs showing up. I can also honestly say a guy will be more confident and aggressive if he believes in his mount and understands how to fight with it. I put forward that the Mustang, with how they taught tactics and flew combat, was probably easier to use in the ETO than the other US products. Once again this is all hypothesis and open for spear chucking.

Cheers,
Biff

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## drgondog (Oct 13, 2014)

BiffF15 to Drgndog,

I agree with your numbers based on the assumption that both the Mustang and the Thunderbolt fly the same distance prior to engaging enemy aircraft (EA). 

*My illustration wasn't quite clear, Biff. The point is that external tanks were critical to get both the P-51 and P-47 to the route point for which the combat radius assumptions are relevant and drive the differences in range depending on the internal fuel remaining after 20 minutes of MP and 5 WEP which has to be enough to get back with 30 minutes reserve for bad weather. In fact none of the P-47D models had enough internal fuel to match the P-51 as the fuel flow was about 3.3:2 meaning the P-47 didn't have the ability to get closer than 100 mi Radius versus the max 51 combat Radius.

Net - the Jug pilot was flying four hours at about the same cruise speed while the 51 was flying seven*

However, I think there is another way to interpret your fuel numbers. Based on the assumptions that the Mustang is flying the deepest/furthest portion of the bomber escort missions, carries more fuel weight and gets better fuel mileage than other US products. I "think" it would stand to reason that not only would it get more time aloft (or in the more heavily defended areas and thus more trigger time), but would get the more "high risk of Luftwaffe showing up" missions. FYI this is just a hypothesis.

*I think it is the correct hypothesis but maybe for a different reason - the LW kept pulling assets farther away from England so that the shorter range (P-47) would not be able to 'pile on', leaving the defense of the 8th and 15th AF entirely to the more limited combat strength of the P-51 and P-38*

On another vein of the same front (why some aircraft had more kills than others) I think ease of flying should get at least a cursory nod. The Lightning introduces complexity in the form of 2 of everything (several years older cockpit layout), slow roll rate as compared to it's adversaries, dreaded compressibility at a lower mach, and some MX issues. The Thunderbolt has size against it as far as long range tally ho's go, less maneuverability as compared to it's adversaries at the altitudes most likely to encounter EA, and shorter range (less play time in target area). Both of these aircraft required a definite game plan for handling a smaller, more maneuverable aircraft (Fw-190 / Me-109). The Mustang had the legs, maneuverability (as long as fuel was properly managed), and fuel mileage to give it staying power in the target area at normal combat altitudes.

*I agree all this but would add the greater speed advantage of the Mustang for the altitude envelopes of 29,000 to SL.*

Layered on top of the last point is all the discussion regards the state of the Luftwaffe pilots fuel and the timing around and amount of Mustangs showing up. I can also honestly say a guy will be more confident and aggressive if he believes in his mount and understands how to fight with it. I put forward that the Mustang, with how they taught tactics and flew combat, was probably easier to use in the ETO than the other US products. Once again this is all hypothesis and open for spear chucking.

Cheers,
Biff

*Biff - I would agree everything except 'taught combat tactics' in ETO/PTO/MTO. IF we taught any air to air it was solely at the individual (and informal) "clobber Colleges" set up at the Group/Wing level for say, 8th FC. What our flight schools taught was familiarity with the Type in Fighter School after Advanced, in which gunnery both at towed flags and ground were taught. My father came to ETO out of AAF Fighter Training in a P-40K and had 1.5 hours at Goxhill familiarizing himself in the P-51B and had six combat hours before shooting his first a/c down.

While I agree with Steve, above, the US and Commonwealth FLIGHT training was superior to LW in mid 1943 forward, there was really no combat training except rat races on an individual basis. NOTHING remotely looking like Top Gun or Red Flag. Having said that, not having to 'think out a maneuver' which can only come from experience (and talent)is critical to air to air combat. So, our replacements were better prepared than theirs.

What I took issue with in debates that I frequently have with folks that think or assume that all the good LW pilots were killed before the Mustang arrived, is that so many LW combat units were transferred intact - that had Not been in combat with P-47s, including a lot of BoB "pro's", that were the core of LuftFlotte Reich in January 1944 through May, 1944 in prep for D-Day.*


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## drgondog (Oct 13, 2014)

BiffF15 to Drgndog,

I agree with your numbers based on the assumption that both the Mustang and the Thunderbolt fly the same distance prior to engaging enemy aircraft (EA). 

*My illustration wasn't quite clear, Biff. The point is that external tanks were critical to get both the P-51 and P-47 to the route point for which the combat radius assumptions are relevant and drive the differences in range depending on the internal fuel remaining after 20 minutes of MP and 5 WEP which has to be enough to get back with 30 minutes reserve for bad weather. In fact none of the P-47D models had enough internal fuel to match the P-51 as the fuel flow was about 3.3:2 meaning the P-47 didn't have the ability to get closer than 100 mi Radius versus the max 51 combat Radius.

Net - the Jug pilot was flying four hours at about the same cruise speed while the 51 was flying seven*

However, I think there is another way to interpret your fuel numbers. Based on the assumptions that the Mustang is flying the deepest/furthest portion of the bomber escort missions, carries more fuel weight and gets better fuel mileage than other US products. I "think" it would stand to reason that not only would it get more time aloft (or in the more heavily defended areas and thus more trigger time), but would get the more "high risk of Luftwaffe showing up" missions. FYI this is just a hypothesis.

*I think it is the correct hypothesis but maybe for a different reason - the LW kept pulling assets farther away from England so that the shorter range (P-47) would not be able to 'pile on', leaving the defense of the 8th and 15th AF entirely to the more limited combat strength of the P-51 and P-38*

On another vein of the same front (why some aircraft had more kills than others) I think ease of flying should get at least a cursory nod. The Lightning introduces complexity in the form of 2 of everything (several years older cockpit layout), slow roll rate as compared to it's adversaries, dreaded compressibility at a lower mach, and some MX issues. The Thunderbolt has size against it as far as long range tally ho's go, less maneuverability as compared to it's adversaries at the altitudes most likely to encounter EA, and shorter range (less play time in target area). Both of these aircraft required a definite game plan for handling a smaller, more maneuverable aircraft (Fw-190 / Me-109). The Mustang had the legs, maneuverability (as long as fuel was properly managed), and fuel mileage to give it staying power in the target area at normal combat altitudes.

*I agree all this but would add the greater speed advantage of the Mustang for the altitude envelopes of 29,000 to SL.*

Layered on top of the last point is all the discussion regards the state of the Luftwaffe pilots fuel and the timing around and amount of Mustangs showing up. I can also honestly say a guy will be more confident and aggressive if he believes in his mount and understands how to fight with it. I put forward that the Mustang, with how they taught tactics and flew combat, was probably easier to use in the ETO than the other US products. Once again this is all hypothesis and open for spear chucking.

Cheers,
Biff

*Biff - I would agree everything except 'taught combat tactics' in ETO/PTO/MTO. IF we taught any air to air it was solely at the individual (and informal) "clobber Colleges" set up at the Group/Wing level for say, 8th FC. What our flight schools taught was familiarity with the Type in Fighter School after Advanced, in which gunnery both at towed flags and ground were taught. My father came to ETO out of AAF Fighter Training in a P-40K and had 1.5 hours at Goxhill familiarizing himself in the P-51B and had six combat hours before shooting his first a/c down.

While I agree with Steve, above, the US and Commonwealth FLIGHT training was superior to LW in mid 1943 forward, there was really no combat training except rat races on an individual basis. NOTHING remotely looking like Top Gun or Red Flag. Having said that, not having to 'think out a maneuver' which can only come from experience (and talent)is critical to air to air combat. So, our replacements were better prepared than theirs.

What I took issue with in debates that I frequently have with folks that think or assume that all the good LW pilots were killed before the Mustang arrived, is that so many LW combat units were transferred intact - that had Not been in combat with P-47s, including a lot of BoB "pro's", that were the core of LuftFlotte Reich in January 1944 through May, 1944 in prep for D-Day.*


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## drgondog (Oct 14, 2014)

I just did a sample research set on many of the 355FG air to air aces. Two very high first pilot hours - both IP before escaping Training command - Bert Marshall and Gordon Graham with 1845 and 2478 hours respectively 1st pilot time. Two others with service in AAF from before WWII Kinnard (1350 hrs and Stewart 1170 hrs including 280 in PTO.

Every other pilot was pretty much the same with ~ 200 hours student, but ranged from 108 hours (Priest), most others in the 200-230 hours 1st Pilot and Fred Havilland at 617 hrs.

Basically, five of the 21 aces had more than six hundred first pilot time before coming to the 355th, and 15 had more than 175 and less than 250 hours, and one had 108hrs of 1st pilot time.

Everett Stewart as a PTO vet flew P-40 for 280 hours before transitioning and flying P-47s. Clay Kinnard was an IP in which most of his 1st pilot time was in BT-13s, AT-6, ditto Graham and Haviland. Marshall ditto as an IP but he also had 250 hours as 1st pilot in B-26B. All had 50-100 hours Advanced Fighter school in P-40K's.

Virtually all other aces had 50 hours of their total 1st pilot time in P-40s in Advanced Fighter School in States plus 10 hours in Mustang (or P-47 before March 1944) at 496FTG before assignment to 355th FG. 

So take what you want - the key metric is that ALL had student time of 200-230 hours before 1st pilot time, which is one primary difference between US and LW in 1944, but few had significant time in the fighter they would take to war in 1944.

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## stona (Oct 14, 2014)

Which is my point. The USAAF pilots had hundreds of student flying hours including 50-100 hours at an Advanced Fighter School on the P-40.

The fact that they had limited hours on the P-51 is not the point. A Luftwaffe pilot finishing training might have 20 hours on an 'operational type' at a 'C school' if he was lucky, but this would not be what he would fly at his unit. He would have flown an older or obsolete dash number, or even sub-type, of the Bf 109 or Fw 190 at the training unit. Since the Luftwaffe only really operated these two single engine fighters this was inevitable.

Cheers

Steve


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## drgondog (Oct 14, 2014)

You said "_By 1944 the average Luftwaffe fighter pilot had a total of about 120 hours flying hours, 20 on front line types if he was lucky. His US counterpart had nearly 400 hours total, about 150 on front line types. That is no contest._

The 150 hours in 'front line' types is grossly exaggerated, For example through November 1944 there were not enough Mustangs to give advanced students any time in a P-51. All advanced fighter training was done in a P-40 and rarely were more than 40-50 hours accumulated before rotation to ETO/MTO/PTO and CBI. Only ETO had "clobber Colleges or the FTG in place for transition training.

Additionally - the total time averaged 200 Student time with instructor, and 100-250 hours of combined Advanced (AT-6) plus Fighter Training (P-40)

The Student time advantage of the US counterpart was an advantage but those were not nearly the same as flying without an instructor which is the 200+ plus first pilot time for all the flight school replacements from 1943 into 1945. 

As I reflect on my own experiences as a student pilot to a rating, familiarity with processes and protocols took more time than familiarity with flying. Formation flying, weather and flying wing would be the next step in the growth process. US students in WWII stateside training got some formation/wing training in Advanced - before Fighter Training school. At most of the 8th AF Operational Fighter Groups, nobody was assumed to be competent in any of those skills and set up individual programs in the Clobber Colleges. 

My father presided over the Instrument re-training as well as check rides for all new pilots at the 355th.

Operationally the 8th AF air to air losses were similar to the LW, namely most such losses occurred in the population of 10 or fewer combat missions.

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## stona (Oct 14, 2014)

The P-40 used at the Fighter Training Schools for US pilots is equivalent to the Bf 109Fs and old Fw 190As used at the Luftwaffe 'C Schools'. In 1943 some still had some clapped out old 'Emils' on the books.
The term 'advanced trainer' can mean many things. Miles Master anybody?

When Dieter Kragelow took of in a Fw 190 D-9 on Operation Bodenplatte it was only the fifth flight he had made with JG 26, and his fifth in a D-9. Theo Nibel, who was famously brought down by a bird strike in his Black 12, was on only his third flight, and third in a D-9, since joining JG 54 about two months earlier.
This is absolutely typical for late war Luftwaffe pilots. Not only did they leave the training schools with few hours and poorly trained, they received no further training at their units. Many units seem to have preserved these young men by not allowing them to fly operationally unless absolutely necessary. Fuel shortages were a good excuse.

If you have lost nearly 150% of your fighter pilots in a three month period, followed by another 99% in the next three months then there will be an awful lot of pilots who fall into your '10 or fewer combat missions' category.
In what six month period did the RAF or USAAF lose well over 4,000 fighter pilots? There really is no comparison.

Cheers

Steve


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## drgondog (Oct 15, 2014)

stona said:


> The P-40 used at the Fighter Training Schools for US pilots is equivalent to the Bf 109Fs and old Fw 190As used at the Luftwaffe 'C Schools'. In 1943 some still had some clapped out old 'Emils' on the books.
> The term 'advanced trainer' can mean many things. Miles Master anybody?
> 
> When Dieter Kragelow took of in a Fw 190 D-9 on Operation Bodenplatte it was only the fifth flight he had made with JG 26, and his fifth in a D-9. Theo Nibel, who was famously brought down by a bird strike in his Black 12, was on only his third flight, and third in a D-9, since joining JG 54 about two months earlier.
> ...



Steve - the debate is late 1943 through May 1944 prior to the invasion - not 12 months to 5 months later - particularly after the great losses in September and November, 1944.

And the debate is about the percent of experienced LW staff which came to the Defense of the Reich starting in summer 1943 and reaching a peak in April, 1944 in battle with the few experienced and many stateside replacement/new fighter group influx in late 1943 to form the P-38 and Mustang groups which battled LuftFlotte Reich.


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## drgondog (Oct 15, 2014)

stona said:


> The P-40 used at the Fighter Training Schools for US pilots is equivalent to the Bf 109Fs and old Fw 190As used at the Luftwaffe 'C Schools'. In 1943 some still had some clapped out old 'Emils' on the books.
> The term 'advanced trainer' can mean many things. Miles Master anybody?
> 
> When Dieter Kragelow took of in a Fw 190 D-9 on Operation Bodenplatte it was only the fifth flight he had made with JG 26, and his fifth in a D-9. Theo Nibel, who was famously brought down by a bird strike in his Black 12, was on only his third flight, and third in a D-9, since joining JG 54 about two months earlier.
> ...


Steve - the debate is late 1943 through May 1944 prior to the invasion - not 12 months to 5 months later - particularly after the great losses in September and November, 1944.

And the debate is about the percent of experienced LW staff which came to the Defense of the Reich starting in summer 1943 and reaching a peak in April, 1944 in battle with the few experienced and many stateside replacement/new fighter group influx in late 1943 to form the P-38 and Mustang groups which battled LuftFlotte Reich.


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## stona (Oct 16, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Steve - the debate is late 1943 through May 1944 prior to the invasion - not 12 months to 5 months later.



Between September 1943 and May 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 4,368 pilots. That's a loss of nearly 200% the average strength (2,194) for this period. If you've had to replace all your pilots twice (statistically, not literally) then obviously there will be a preponderance of replacement and inexperienced pilots.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Oct 16, 2014)

Would the 56th (or any other outfit escorting bombers with P-47's) have had better results with the F6F or the F4U?
The salient feature being range.

How did F6F and F4U range compare to P-47's in use during the period when the P-38 was suffering and the P-51 had either not arrived on the scene or was available only in low numbers?


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## Shortround6 (Oct 16, 2014)

We have been over this in other threads. The F6F and the F4U do not:

1, Have the needed range *at* _the altitudes and speeds_ that the missions in Europe required. 

A. Mission radius is *dependent* on fuel in the internal tanks _after_ the drop tanks (however many are used) and both the F6F and F4U had less internal protected fuel than the early P-47s. 
B. The P-47 needed *less* fuel to cruise at the *high speeds* (just over 300mph true) at over 20,000ft that were common for escort missions in Europe. This was the advantage of the turbo-charger.

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## drgondog (Oct 17, 2014)

stona said:


> Between September 1943 and May 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 4,368 pilots. That's a loss of nearly 200% the average strength (2,194) for this period. If you've had to replace all your pilots twice (statistically, not literally) then obviously there will be a preponderance of replacement and inexperienced pilots.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


Steve - I understand that.

My thesis is that despite the losses incurred by the LW in that period that the Defense of the Reich was infused by experienced squadrons inbound from the other theatres - not the fighter training schools or bomber crew infusion as a high percentage until the newly arrived experienced pilots were crunched in the February through April timeframe.

If you have proof that the 'experienced' staffel from JG 3, 5, 27, 53, 51, 54 flowing from Sud and Ost were more 'newbies' than experienced pilots - trot 'em out. You might be able to better parse JG 2 and JG 26 losess thusly as they were entrenched in LuftFlotte 3 on the Channel coastline and except for III./JG 54 they were largely infused with pilots from training schools to replace losses during that period.


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## stona (Oct 17, 2014)

Why would the units coming from elsewhere be unscathed?

In the preceding period in the MTO the Luftwaffe lost 888 single engine fighters (63% of its force structure) and presumably a proportionate number of pilots. For the first few months of 1943 aircrew losses ran at about 6% to 9% per month. This rose to 12% in May and 16% in June as a direct result of heavy fighting in North Africa. 

Between January and November 1943 it lost 1,176 single engine fighter on the Eastern Front, again with corresponding pilot losses. 

This was the very time that 'experienced' pilots were supposed to move to the west. It was in June that Milch wanted to quadruple the fighter forces in the west and wanted one full month's production of Bf 109s and Fw 190s to go to the west.
This is hardly surprising given that in early 1943 Luftflotte 3 fielded less than 300 fighters spread along the North Sea and Channel coasts of continental Europe. Like their counterparts in other theatres they were getting badly mauled by mid 1943.

A good indication of the use of poorly trained pilots is the increase in non operational losses seen from around June 1943 onwards. Pilots who can hardly fly or navigate properly were much more accident prone. I have some figures for this somewhere but can I find them? can I f*ck! 

The attrition was not solely in the west but had a debilitating effect on the Luftwaffe everywhere from 1942 onwards. To me the really remarkable thing is that the Luftwaffe was able to mount any kind of coherent defence at all in the period leading up to the invasion.

Cheers

Steve


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