# Luftwaffe after BoB: strategy, tactics, tecnology?



## tomo pauk (Oct 21, 2014)

Similar to the RAF thread: what steps need to be undertaken by the LW in order to best it's opponents in the up coming years? The time frame is the same, starts in Autumn of '40, ends before '44 starts.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 21, 2014)

Here we have a real fork in the road. 

does the Luftwaffe realize it can't win (something it didn't realize until late 1943 or 44) and go over to the defensive or does it plan for a renewed offensive against the British in 1941/42 or does it go for a better set up for fighting the Russians in 1941/42?


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## tomo pauk (Oct 21, 2014)

Going to a pure defense will allow the Allies to quickly gain the upper hand; the Op. Barbarossa unfolds pretty much as historicallly, and LW is the main Wermacht's asset there. Against the UK, going against SLoC will be more productive than a 'classic' bomber offensive?


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## stona (Oct 21, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Similar to the RAF thread: what steps need to be undertaken by the LW in order to best it's opponents in the up coming years? The time frame is the same, starts in Autumn of '40, ends before '44 starts.



In your time frame nothing. The Luftwaffe had already lost. If earlier we can increase aircraft production and pilot training to the point where it won't find itself fighting on three fronts (Channel, Mediterranean, Eastern) with roughly the same number of aircraft with which it started in Poland it may have a chance.

Alternatively don't invade the Soviet Union until some settlement has been forced on the British and don't declare war on the United States  

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Oct 21, 2014)

Historical German aircraft will work just fine if they have enough fuel for operations and training. Germany must build more hydrogenation plants for production of aviation gasoline. If they start building during fall 1940 and program has top priority the additional fuel should coincide nicely with increased German aircraft production during 1943 to 1945.


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## wuzak (Oct 21, 2014)

davebender said:


> Historical German aircraft will work just fine if they have enough fuel for operations and training. Germany must build more hydrogenation plants for production of aviation gasoline. If they start building during fall 1940 and program has top priority the additional fuel should coincide nicely with increased German aircraft production during 1943 to 1945.



Also would require that they are protected from air attack and that their supply routes are protected.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 21, 2014)

Maybe some cancellations would be in order? Like the Jumo 222 (more effort on the Jumo 211 and 213 instead), whole plethora of DB engines, some complicated BMWs (stick to the 801 and a bit to the 9-cylinders)? What about the Me-210, Ta-154, He-219? Should the machine tools from France be shipped to Germany proper? How about a proper 4-engined job? Centrifugal-compressor jet engines only, or no jets at all?


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## davebender (Oct 21, 2014)

More aviation gasoline will go a long way towards protecting German industry from Allied bombing attack during 1943 to 1945.

If you want to change German aircraft production then put Jumo004A engine and Me-262 fighter into limited production during 1943. These jet jagdgeschwader would be devoted entirely to knocking down heavy bombers during the daytime.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 21, 2014)

Kind of goes back to my post #2.

Do the Germans give up on the bomber "B" program and/or Ural bomber projects? 

Hindsight would say yes, but that is admitting that the Luftwaffe has somewhat limited offensive power even 2-4 years down the road. Granted these projects came to nothing so actual capability would be unchanged. 

The Germans would have been better served to develop some of the planes (and engines) they did have rather than go haring off on some of those technological "Vundar" planes. 

Not speaking so much of the jets but the Jumo 222 and similar over-complicated piston engines.

It wouldn't have changed the outcome much as no matter what German does it cannot out produce The US, Britain and the Soviet Union.


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## wuzak (Oct 21, 2014)

davebender said:


> More aviation gasoline will go a long way towards protecting German industry from Allied bombing attack during 1943 to 1945.



It may delay the destruction of German industry, or reduce its effects, but it won't effect the final result.

Since the major oil offensive didn't happen until after D-Day in the OTL, one wonders if that would have been the case had the Germans started building more hydrogenation plants. It certainly would have been of interest to the planners, and may have moved Oil to the #1 spot during 1943, rather than in 1944.

Disasters such as Schweinfurt would still have happened, but weight of numbers (and the arrival of escorts) would have eventually taken its toll.

And that is not taking into account Bomber Command. If Harris was persuaded (ordered) to attack these sites earlier, even more disruption and destruction could have occurred.

And not forgetting the Transportation Plan in this either. By disrupting road, rail and waterway freight the hydrogenation plants will be starved of the supply of coal required to make fuels and oils. Inland waterways, for example, were extensively mined during the war.

The next question is, was there sufficient coal supply to provide for an increase in fuel production? If so, by how much? Does the increase in production require extra manpower? Where does that come from - slaves?


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## wiking85 (Oct 21, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Maybe some cancellations would be in order? Like the Jumo 222 (more effort on the Jumo 211 and 213 instead), whole plethora of DB engines, some complicated BMWs (stick to the 801 and a bit to the 9-cylinders)? What about the Me-210, Ta-154, He-219? Should the machine tools from France be shipped to Germany proper? How about a proper 4-engined job? Centrifugal-compressor jet engines only, or no jets at all?



With total hindsight they should focus on getting the Do17 out of production, the Do217 in, cancel the Jumo 222, focus on two stage, two speed superchargers, not focus on turbosuperchargers, no Ta-154, focus on the Jumo 213, reduce engine projects, cancel the strategic bombers, make the Jumo 004A, hold Me210 production until the problems are fixed and don't start phasing out the Bf110 until then, no He-219, focus on a Ju88 nightfighter, cancel the Ju288 and focus on the 188 instead, switch to fighter production by the end of 1942, don't stay involved in the African Campaign past the end of 1942, don't strip out flight instructors for missions, rotate out the best fighter pilots to training centers and don't promote them based on kill rates, don't bother with the Do-335, focus on getting the Ta-152 into service, get the FW190D in service ASAP (along with the Jumo 213 issue), and focus on getting SAMs and proximity fuzes into service (fewer projects too). Start work on the V-1 missile in 1940 instead of 1942. Make the Do-26 as your long range naval recon aircraft with the Hohentwiel ASV, don't bother with the Ju290 or Atlantic bomber. BMW only works on the 801. DB works only on the 601 and 603, Jumo works only on the Jumo 004, 601/5, and diesels. Develop R4M and no other rockets; don't weight down fighters with heavy cannons. Cancel work on the 5cm AAA and focus on the 5.5cm Gerat 58.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 21, 2014)

The Do 17 went out of production in 1940, it continued in use quite a bit longer. Not much use putting the Do 217 in production sooner if you don't have engines for it. It _needs_ the BMW 801 or equivalent, an early version with 1940 Jumo 211s is just not going to work. 

Two stage superchargers _need_ high performance fuel. The Germans got there, but not soon enough. Without something like 100/130 in 1942 a two stage supercharger is going to be limited in what it can do (or use _really_ big inter-coolers).

A simple (somewhat) area is _get rid_ of the Ju 52. It sucked up way too much in the way of resources for what it delivered the _majority_ of the time. Too many engines, too much metal and too much fuel for the amount of cargo/troops it delivered over a given distance. Perhaps a small twin engine transport could have been useful (Beech 18/Anson sized?) sooner, the Siebel 204 going into service much too late.


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## kettbo (Oct 21, 2014)

Just sticking to the planes here
Fw190s as Sturm but....30mm cannon only and armor. Weight off so they are not defenseless pigs. The cool thing would be less cannon/MGs, instead racks with R4M! Imagine, decent size forces both sides, escorts turn around and the bombers get are savaged with rocket barrages then follow-up with twin 30mm. Simple, possible, affordable.... Think mid '43 this alone could have turned the tide and put a stop to unescorted deep penetration raids. I cannot imagine a Staffel in their wedge unleashing a barrage of R4Ms on a bomber box. Might not need the 30mm for clean-up. I think the Bf109 could carry R4M also.

Switch off some of the crazy stuff as noted above, make 1944 production rates by 1943.
Put 1944 Bf109s into service earlier; More/sooner /AS, GM1, MW50
Better use of the Fighters in attacking inbound Escorts, mess-up the carefully-coordinated escort plan.

Somehow, get several bombers over the UK to hit the bomber bases, mid '43 on. Many benefits here. Does not have to be many planes but it has to be threat to cause nightly patrols, fear, disrupted sleep as crews would have to go to bunkers. Long range Fw190G with wing tanks and centerline cluster bomb mix of super frag to puncture fuel tanks and incendiary to ignite the spills. Maybe the LW had a operation or two like this, somebody help me here.


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## wuzak (Oct 21, 2014)

I think in terms of technology the effort expended on the V-2 should have been channelled into the Wasserfall and similar anti-aircraft weapons.

Wasserfall - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## parsifal (Oct 22, 2014)

LWs defeat had little to do with the LW itself. It was about the strategic choices that were made for it that eventually killed it. Though tactically the LW was still part of the problem and not part of the solution, though it could have been.

The main tactical problem for the LW was that it made choices such as limits on its tactical bombers and embracing of divebombing that whilst highly effective were also highly costly in terms of own losses.

As far as the so called strategic choices, the old chestnut is that Hitler made a mistake in deciding to attack the Russians in 1941. facts are he had no choice. Evidence now strongly suggests the Soviets were planning their own attacks into southern Europe in the Nazi occupied areas (and strategically vital) such as the Romanian oilfields. The Soviets were looking for a far greater level of co-operation with the germans, something the germans or rather the Nazis were unable to accede to. From that point on, the Soviets and the germans were on a collision course with each other, its just that the germans beat the Russians by about a year. 

Defeating the RAF over Britain was never going to happen, or at least not happen and leave the LW in a position to exploit it. There were some possibilities in southern Eurpoe, but these were not war winning game changers.

What the LW had to do was stop looking for the cheap easy wins, stop with the opportunistic and disjointed war strategies, and knuckle down like the RAF and fight the campaigns that needed to be fought firstly in order to ensure survival and then to ensure the enemy did not gain sufficient air superiority as historically they did. The LW needed to become much more of a team player, particularly with the Navy rather than going off and doping their own thing and leaving vital areas and activities under-resourced

Historically, for a long period, and despite the absolut drubbing the RAF received over france 1941-2, the LW conceded air superiority over the channel and along the coast and put insufficient resources into fleet co-operation. Their training programs and build up of reserves was attrocious and their lack of foresight as to the likely and impending bomber offensives completely under-estimated.

A lot needed to be done, but I wouldn't go so far as to say the LW was a lost cause in 1940. A lot could have happened between 1940 and 1944 when it all came crashing home.....

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## tomo pauk (Oct 22, 2014)

Agreed re. more emphasis on cooperation with Navy, ditto for not spending resources for the V2, but for the SAMs. The V1, a dirt-cheap thing, might be a good thing to have, in 1943 there would be no fighter around able to kill it? It would be a handful also for the non-VT fuses equipped heavy AAA; the LW also needs VT fuses for their Flak.

The need for the hi-oct fuel can be circumvented to a great deal by using the engines of big displacement (Germans already have those), intercoolers (Jumo 211J has it from late 1941/early 1942), water injection (MW 50 is the German variation to the theme). Also, the BMW-801D (or whatever the engine supersedes the BMW 801C), need to get a decreased compression ratio, not increased, so more boost can be used. Once a capable two-stage engine is around, it will get a priority for both airframes and the C3 fuel over the BMW 801D.


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## davebender (Oct 22, 2014)

"Final Results" are determined by politicians. Air force leaders can only attempt to win the air war.


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## wiking85 (Oct 22, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Agreed re. more emphasis on cooperation with Navy, ditto for not spending resources for the V2, but for the SAMs. The V1, a dirt-cheap thing, might be a good thing to have, in 1943 there would be no fighter around able to kill it? It would be a handful also for the non-VT fuses equipped heavy AAA; the LW also needs VT fuses for their Flak.
> 
> The need for the hi-oct fuel can be circumvented to a great deal by using the engines of big displacement (Germans already have those), intercoolers (Jumo 211J has it from late 1941/early 1942), water injection (MW 50 is the German variation to the theme). Also, the BMW-801D (or whatever the engine supersedes the BMW 801C), need to get a decreased compression ratio, not increased, so more boost can be used. Once a capable two-stage engine is around, it will get a priority for both airframes and the C3 fuel over the BMW 801D.



AFAIK the Germans were set to produce enough C3 fuel in 1944 were it not for the RAF and USAAF bombing of oil plants. That, the transport plan, and the campaign against the chemical industry all caused a collapse that a greater German focus on air defense starting in 1942-43 would have blunted to a degree. If the technology and training focus was right then the LW would have been set up to blunt the Allied aerial offensive plans in 1943-44. By 1945 things would have been very tricky, but a better set of strategies and better decisions on technology (not to mention the politics of expanding the war) would have kept the LW viable for much longer than they historically were. Of course much of that was with hindsight and the problems that crept up were also a function of the dysfunctional Nazi political system leaving guys like Hitler and Goering putting their cronies in charge of vital decisions, while also interfering in matters beyond their ken frequently.


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## wiking85 (Oct 22, 2014)

davebender said:


> "Final Results" are determined by politicians. Air force leaders can only attempt to win the air war.



Sure, but the waste of resources on ridiculous schemes cost the LW dearly (Ju288, He177, Me210, Ta-154, various Wunderwaffen projects, research dispersion, etc). 
Even relatively minor things like the V-1 being ready in mid-1943 would have had a massive impact on the course of the war, as the Allies would lack the necessary counters and it would serve to disrupt their ability to operate like they did historically in 1943-44. Operation Gemorrah wouldn't necessarily have been possible in 1943 if the RAF was too busy bombing V-1 launch sites. Also Leningrad and Moscow could have been hit by V-1s in 1943 given German positions in the East (Moscow though would be out of range once Smolensk fell).


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## davebender (Oct 22, 2014)

Hydrogenation plants can be built and operational in two years if given top priority. This scenario start date is fall 1940. Therefore Germany can theoretically be producing enough aviation gasoline during 1943.

Having adequate fuel during 1943 means a lot as Luftwaffe can ramp up pilot training before Allied bombing becomes overwhelming. It also means Luftwaffe will have adequate fuel for Battle of Kursk, Sicily, Southern Italy etc. Difficult to say how much effect this will have but it definitely would be to German advantage.


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## davebender (Oct 22, 2014)

*Historical Production of 12.8cm flak.*
Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945
65 during 1942
298 during 1943
664 during 1944
98 during 1945.

12.8cm was by far the most effect Luftwaffe flak gun vs high altitude heavy bombers due to shell flight time which was 1/3rd that of 8.8cm flak. Historical Luftwaffe didn't get serous about production until 1944 and even then it was about 1/3rd of Luftwaffe 8.8cm flak production. Let's begin Luftwaffe 12.8cm flak production during 1941 with target of 50% of 8.8cm Luftwaffe flak. 

*Projected Production of 12.8cm flak.*
936 during 1941
1,438 during 1942.
2,208 during 1943.
966 during 1944.
.....4,582 12.8cm flak guns guarding German industry against high altitude bombers by January 1944. 4,215 more then historical (i.e. 11 times historical quantity).


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## Aozora (Oct 22, 2014)

davebender said:


> *Historical Production of 12.8cm flak.*
> Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945
> 65 during 1942
> 298 during 1943
> ...



And where are the extra personnel to man (or woman) all of the additional flak guns going to come from? As it was, by mid-1943 the Germans were starting to reach the bottom of the barrel when it came to recruiting able-bodied people for the Flak units - an extra 4,215 flak guns would have presented more than a challenge; chances are a great deal of that extra production would have been wasted.

If anything, the Luftwaffe should have relinquished control of the Flak units in favour of the Whermacht, except, perhaps for units defending Luftwaffe positions. Incorporating control of all Flak into the Luftwaffe was far too wasteful of resources and manpower.


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## wiking85 (Oct 22, 2014)

Ah, totally forgot about the FLAK buff:
Axis History Forum ? 1944: Flak Alone Blasts the Allies out of the Sky
Basically the most effective FLAK shell from late in the war was a double fuze shell that used a tracer component to detonate the shell if it didn't hit anything, but also a contact fuze when they hit what they were aiming at. It was much cheaper than the timed fuzes used for box barrages, didn't require timing settings so was resulted in a much higher rate of fire and a resulting increase of bomber hits, and of course took advantage of the concept of base bleed to increase shell speed and therefore accuracy, while also resulting in a significant altitude increase due to less drag. Implement that shell in 1940 and you got more bombers shot down and a lot cheaper shells:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_bleed
It basically gives the standard 88mm the performance of the 128mm.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 22, 2014)

In case the flak shell did not hit anything, but traveled a bit instead and then self-destructed, the shrapnels would've streaked way above the bomber stream. Even when using such fusing, the Flak arm was been able to kill less than 10 USAF planes per day in 1944; that is for maybe 7-8000 heavy Flak pieces and thousands of light Flak that were used west of Poland. Many more A/C were damaged, of course. 
Luckily, Germany did not have proximity fuses in timely manner.


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## Aozora (Oct 22, 2014)

kettbo said:


> Put 1944 Bf109s into service earlier; More/sooner /AS, GM1, MW50



With the DB 605A, 1.42 ata was not fully available until late 1943 - some 18 months after its operational debut in June 1942. Daimler-Benz should have been forced to concentrate on ironing out all problems with the 605, and much more quickly; that would have been the only way the more powerful AM/AS series might have been made available before mid-1944. As it was, the numbers of obsolescent DB 650A powered 109s being built well outnumbered the AM/AS 109s (about 5 to 1) right through to the end of 1944. To build more AM/AS would have required a major effort on D-B's part.




kettbo said:


> Somehow, get several bombers over the UK to hit the bomber bases, mid '43 on. Many benefits here. Does not have to be many planes but it has to be threat to cause nightly patrols, fear, disrupted sleep as crews would have to go to bunkers. Long range Fw190G with wing tanks and centerline cluster bomb mix of super frag to puncture fuel tanks and incendiary to ignite the spills. Maybe the LW had a operation or two like this, somebody help me here.



The Luftwaffe ditched nightfighter intruder operations in 1941 because Hitler and Göring didn't believe they were making much of an impact. They were wrong; had the Luftwaffe restarted its intruder operations in 1943 it would have caused major problems for the RAF. A few Luftwaffe nightfighters infiltrating the returning bombers over bomber bases would have been very difficult to counter, because the RAF's nightfighters would have been confronted with large numbers of radar returns. Ditto the ground defences.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 22, 2014)

The British were using IFF by the end of 1940. Now IFF is/was nowhere near 100% reliable but it sure cuts down on the number of "bogies" the defending fighters have to investigate. Unless the Germans get real good at spoofing the IFF. The Night fighters would be directed at any 'blips' not showing as 'friendly' to get a visual to see if it was a German or a returning British bomber with a malfunctioning IFF unit (no _blind_ firing). 

Even the airborne radar was often fitted with IFF features to check out intended targets.


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## kettbo (Oct 23, 2014)

orchestration of staging and jockeying 54 planes per bomber field is major undertaking. Throwing airstrikes at them during the night and wee morning hours would pay huge dividends. With the HE and incendiaries, might as well have some delayed action fuses to delay clean-up and to throw off time tables.

Naturally you'd need a coordinated plan to get the strikers through; diversions, deception, jamming...hmmmm cannot recall the LW using CHAFF but what's good for the goose is good for the gander

Let me think what could be best used for this; 
needs the range to get to the bomber bases and back plus diversions
needs to fly fast....low altitude penetration I'm thinking
navigator/second set of eyes
internal bomb bay a plus for speed and range....thinking Me410

WIKI says KG 51 elements flying Me410s between late DEC 43 and May 44 were decimated. Not sure of the tactics here.

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## Aozora (Oct 23, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The British were using IFF by the end of 1940. Now IFF is/was nowhere near 100% reliable but it sure cuts down on the number of "bogies" the defending fighters have to investigate. Unless the Germans get real good at spoofing the IFF. The Night fighters would be directed at any 'blips' not showing as 'friendly' to get a visual to see if it was a German or a returning British bomber with a malfunctioning IFF unit (no _blind_ firing).
> 
> Even the airborne radar was often fitted with IFF features to check out intended targets.



With hundreds of bombers returning over a relatively concentrated area, trying to locate a few Luftwaffe fighters in amongst them would have taken quite a while; even with IFF, it would have been like trying to pick a sultana from a raisin in a fruitcake full of raisins, particularly if the sultana sticks relatively close to some raisins; ie: it would have been time wasted when time was critical.(Not forgetting, too, the Germans had IFF and a very sophisticated radar system - nevertheless, British night intruders were able to penetrate the defenses.) 












http://stelly.com.au/8363-41349-thickbox/sultana-hot-cross-buns-top-mint.jpg

In addition, the German night fighter crews would have had the advantage of knowing that any aircraft that appeared on their radar would have more than likely been British. Another factor was that bomber crews returning from a mission were usually exhausted and their vigilance poor, making them easier targets than when over enemy territory. Even a few night intruders ranging around bomber bases while aircraft were attempting to land would have wreaked havoc.


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## stona (Oct 23, 2014)

People always seem to forget that an enemy will react to any change in the other sides tactics. 
Had the Luftwaffe developed intruder operations against the RAF bomber airfields and/or returning bombers, as opposed to attempting to use it's limited night fighter force to defend its own air space then there were various things the RAF might have tried. Mounting more and different operations against the Luftwaffe's own fields for a start. It would certainly use more of its own night fighters to protect the returning streams and Bomber Command's airfields. The RAF was also blessed with the best night fighter of the war and if required Mosquito production could have been adjusted to produce more. 
Any such Luftwaffe campaign might have proved more expensive than the Luftwaffe could afford, particularly in highly qualified and almost irreplaceable night fighter crews.

The British had a lead in electronic measures which was never lost during the war. Several German systems were based on inferior copies of British technology. The British also had an enormous manufacturing capability across the Atlantic. Late in the war Germany struggled to produce systems in any kind of meaningful numbers.

Cheers

Steve

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## tomo pauk (Oct 23, 2014)

It would take time to introduce the Mosquito. 
By then, LW can use the Ju-88, armed with only internal bombs (50 kg/110 lbs), to shower the airfields with those. Any radar detection and interception vs. a low lying aircraft will be a tough job for a defender, and Beaufighter and Defiant will have as good as no performance edge over a clean Ju-88 (no racks, maybe even with gondola deleted). 

Hopefully, Erich can stop here and add to the discussion?


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## stona (Oct 23, 2014)

The Luftwaffe was no better at bombing small targets at night than the RAF was. It could hit a city particularly if guided there electronically, but an airfield, even if it could find it? 
Cheers
Steve


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## Aozora (Oct 23, 2014)

stona said:


> People always seem to forget that an enemy will react to any change in the other sides tactics.
> Had the Luftwaffe developed intruder operations against the RAF bomber airfields and/or returning bombers, as opposed to attempting to use it's limited night fighter force to defend its own air space then there were various things the RAF might have tried. Mounting more and different operations against the Luftwaffe's own fields for a start. It would certainly use more of its own night fighters to protect the returning streams and Bomber Command's airfields. The RAF was also blessed with the best night fighter of the war and if required Mosquito production could have been adjusted to produce more.
> Any such Luftwaffe campaign might have proved more expensive than the Luftwaffe could afford, particularly in highly qualified and almost irreplaceable night fighter crews.
> 
> ...



By the time new tactics are devised a lot of damage can be done, and there's no guarantee that the new tactics would necessarily work (case in point, the advent of the Fw 190 vs the Spitfire V - how many Spitfire Vs were actually saved by cruising at high speed over enemy territory?).

Of course, the enemy _will_ react, but there's no point in refusing to start - or stopping - an effective strategy for fear that the enemy will eventually find some means of countering it. The RAF had a lot more to lose, had the Germans let loose an effective intruder campaign against the heavy bombers, than the Luftwaffe had to lose between 1941 and 1944. 

As it was, even with their advanced equipment - including the Mosquito - the RAF night fighters didn't have it all their own way, as witness C. F Rawnsley's (John Cunninham's R/O) account of late 1943 from _Night Fighter_;














An effective intruder campaign would not have been a war winner, but it could potentially have done a lot of damage to the RAF's heavy bombing campaign and, possibly, to the bomber crews' morale.



stona said:


> The Luftwaffe was no better at bombing small targets at night than the RAF was. It could hit a city particularly if guided there electronically, but an airfield, even if it could find it?
> Cheers
> Steve



There would have been lots of aerial targets for Luftwaffe intruder crews to choose from, plus the RAF's bomber airfields were usually lit up like Christmas trees, thus easy to find. With intruders around all those airfield lights would have had to be switched off. Imagine the effects of that with lots of low on fuel, or damaged, heavy bombers trying to land? Still a win-win, even if the bombs themselves didn't do a lot of damage.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 23, 2014)

About the weaponry: what to develop further? 
The MG 151 is in the works, with MG 151/20 following shortly. The MG 131 is also in the development. Maybe go for a 'mid-power' 30mm, instead of the 'low-power' MK 108? Ie. something around 650-700 m/s muzzle velocity, with muzzle brake (so the weight can be within suitable limits; muzzle brake might not be necessary for the prop-firing installation), 500-600 rpm. Here might an V-12 engine come in handy for the Fw-190 - a powerful cannon in the centreline, and either two similar cannons outboard (in case they use the 'open bolt' firing) of the prop disc, or two cannons inboard (if the design is of 'closed bolt' firing) the prop disc. Until the production is in high gear, the 20mm can be installed instead of wing-mounted 30 mm, trajectories would be similar, unlike what was the case for the MK 108. 
As a further design for aerial targets, perhaps neck-out the MK-101/103, to fire a 600-700 grams shell at ~650 m/s? One weapon for the V-12 powered Fw-190, plus either 20mm or 30 mm in the wings.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 23, 2014)

It is not even a question of open bolt or closed bolt. The bigger cartridge cases (with their much larger powder charges) suffered from inconsistent timing from _firing pin strike_ to _round exiting the muzzle_. Electric ignition helped a bit but the big cases were never adapted to a synchronized system. Result of a failure is also rather severe. A 12.7-13mm machine round hitting the prop may give you some problems. Depending on the prop even a 20mm round might not take the plane down (at least in catastrophic fashion). A 30mm projectile hitting/exploding in contact with the prop? Heck, even the prop just colliding with a 330gr projectile could cause some major problems. 

BTW a 10% increase in velocity often needs 20% more propellant so a 20% increase is going to need over 40% more. Throw out everything and start over? 

For a gun that is used to best effect _only_ on a V-12 powered Fw 190 airframe? 

Germans had enough trouble with different guns and ammo as it was. FW units got electric primed 20mm ammo and 109 units got percussion (one reason for not mounting a single 20mm gun in a pod under the fuselage of the 109). 

German Luftwaffe had 7.9mm, 13mm, 15mm, at least FOUR kinds of 20mm and at least 2 types of 30mm ammo in service in large numbers, not including experimental stuff. Fascinating to read about but a supply officers nightmare. Lets throw in the different types of projectiles for each ammunition type.
Lets also remember that the the Army used some different 20mm ammo.
Perhaps only the Japanese had such a complicated supply situation.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 23, 2014)

Yep, maybe it would be the best to keep the 30mm away from the prop disc. BTW, there was a picture or two that supposedly showed the wing root installation of the MK 103 in the Fw-190 wing root?



> BTW a 10% increase in velocity often needs 20% more propellant so a 20% increase is going to need over 40% more. Throw out everything and start over?



It is late 1940 - meaning a new gun for the new cartridge, ie. no historical MK 108.



> For a gun that is used to best effect only on a V-12 powered Fw 190 airframe?



Nope - also for the Bf-109 and heavy/night fighters.



> Germans had enough trouble with different guns and ammo as it was. FW units got electric primed 20mm ammo and 109 units got percussion (one reason for not mounting a single 20mm gun in a pod under the fuselage of the 109).



Opt for electrically-only primed MG 151/20 as soon as possible (it was available from Autumn of 1941?), should solve the case in reasonable time.



> German Luftwaffe had 7.9mm, 13mm, 15mm, at least FOUR kinds of 20mm and at least 2 types of 30mm ammo in service in large numbers, not including experimental stuff. Fascinating to read about but a supply officers nightmare. Lets throw in the different types of projectiles for each ammunition type.
> Lets also remember that the the Army used some different 20mm ammo.
> Perhaps only the Japanese had such a complicated supply situation.



Nah, Soviets were the champions here - 3 LMG types, 2 HMG types, 2 x 20mm, 2 x 23 mm and 2 x 37mm, all service guns, for aircraft. Indeed a nightmare for the supply officer.
Anyway, the MG 151 (15 mm) gets canceled once the 20mm variant is in. The percussion-primed MG 151/20 will follow the suit soon. Not sure what to do with MG FF and MG 131 - the MG 151 cannot fit at any place where those can? MG 131 is actually running rather late for pre-1943 Luftwaffe - maybe neck it soon enough out to receive the 15mm shell?


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## wiking85 (Oct 23, 2014)

Why focus on cannons if they have R4Ms? Beyond that why not have a Sturmböcke type FW190F for ground attack with the MK108? It would have made a big mess against any soft ground target.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 23, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Yep, maybe it would be the best to keep the 30mm away from the prop disc. BTW, there was a picture or two that supposedly showed the wing root installation of the MK 103 in the Fw-190 wing root?



I believe it was a test rig, never flown? It may be where they discovered the problem of the big cases? 



> It is late 1940 - meaning a new gun for the new cartridge, ie. no historical MK 108.



Ok, but leads to.......



> Nope - also for the Bf-109 and heavy/night fighters.



Mk 108 weighed 58kg, MK 103 weighed 141kg (down from the MK 101s 180kg) and a step up from the MG 151/20s 42kg. 60 rounds of short 30mm ammo weighs 28.8 kg, 150 rounds of 20x82 mine ammo weighs 27.5kg. 60 rounds of MK 103 ammo 46.8 kg. Japanese had some experimental 30mm guns but you are going to be dong very good to get the performance you want plus a decent rate of fire (something the Japanese guns lacked) for under 70-75kg and it may be closer to (or over) 80kg. Ammo will jump from 480 grams a round (not projectile) to around 600-650 grams a round. 
Off course if your new gun merely splits the difference in weight between the MK 108 and MK 103 (100kg ?) you wind up with a bit of burden on the 109 and the lower powered night fighters. At least until you can get the DB 605 straightened out. 



> Opt for electrically-only primed MG 151/20 as soon as possible (it was available from Autumn of 1941?), should solve the case in reasonable time.



May depend on raw materials. Why didn't they go with the single under fuselage pod on the 109s? two 20mm and two mg 131s with less weight and drag than the 'gunboats'? of course ALL the twin engine aircraft got percussion primed ammo. 



> Nah, Soviets were the champions here - 3 LMG types, 2 HMG types, 2 x 20mm, 2 x 23 mm and 2 x 37mm, all service guns, for aircraft. Indeed a nightmare for the supply officer.



I was giving you different ammo _types_, not different guns. While different guns are a pain, if they use common ammo things are a lot easier. The 20mm MG FF cannot use MG FF/M ammo and vice versa. Granted some types of ammo were used only at the beginning of the war and faded quickly. 


_Anyway, the MG 151 (15 mm) gets canceled once the 20mm variant is in. The percussion-primed MG 151/20 will follow the suit soon. Not sure what to do with MG FF and MG 131 - the MG 151 cannot fit at any place where those can? MG 131 is actually running rather late for pre-1943 Luftwaffe - maybe neck it soon enough out to receive the 15mm shell?_

even if the small 13x64 case will hold the 15mm projectile you don't have enough powder capacity to drive it at a worthwhile speed. 





From Tony Williams Website.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 23, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Why focus on cannons if they have R4Ms? Beyond that why not have a Sturmböcke type FW190F for ground attack with the MK108? It would have made a big mess against any soft ground target.



The rockets might make sense if one wants to kill bombers, but far less so for dealing with enemy fighters.



Shortround6 said:


> I believe it was a test rig, never flown? It may be where they discovered the problem of the big cases?



Might be; hopefully, some day the test results would surface.



> Mk 108 weighed 58kg, MK 103 weighed 141kg (down from the MK 101s 180kg) and a step up from the MG 151/20s 42kg. 60 rounds of short 30mm ammo weighs 28.8 kg, 150 rounds of 20x82 mine ammo weighs 27.5kg. 60 rounds of MK 103 ammo 46.8 kg. Japanese had some experimental 30mm guns but you are going to be dong very good to get the performance you want plus a decent rate of fire (something the Japanese guns lacked) for under 70-75kg and it may be closer to (or over) 80kg. Ammo will jump from 480 grams a round (not projectile) to around 600-650 grams a round.
> Off course if your new gun merely splits the difference in weight between the MK 108 and MK 103 (100kg ?) you wind up with a bit of burden on the 109 and the lower powered night fighters. At least until you can get the DB 605 straightened out.



Thanks for the numbers. The aim should be at approx 80 kg for the mid-power 30 mm cannon. FWIW, the MK 101/103 were using some 3.5 times as much of propellant as the MK 108 (110 grams vs. 30 g; both for the Mine shell ammo); casings were at 350 g vs. 115 g. An extra 15 g of propellant and maybe 70 g of the casings will make a new cartridge maybe 570 grams heavy?



> May depend on raw materials. Why didn't they go with the single under fuselage pod on the 109s? two 20mm and two mg 131s with less weight and drag than the 'gunboats'? of course ALL the twin engine aircraft got percussion primed ammo.



Maybe it was due to the raw materials, electrically primed guns and ammo will require copper for some parts.



> I was giving you different ammo _types_, not different guns. While different guns are a pain, if they use common ammo things are a lot easier. The 20mm MG FF cannot use MG FF/M ammo and vice versa. Granted some types of ammo were used only at the beginning of the war and faded quickly.



VVS used their, British and US light MGs; their and US heavy MG; their and British 20mm etc - that was my point. Multiplies by different ammo types for most of the guns.



> even if the small 13x64 case will hold the 15mm projectile you don't have enough powder capacity to drive it at a worthwhile speed.
> .



Yep, the 13mm was not that fast to begin with - 710 m/s for the 38.5 gram projectile, propellant weight 7.1 g. With 57 g heavy 15mm shell, we would be lucky to be above 600 m/s.


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## wiking85 (Oct 23, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The rockets might make sense if one wants to kill bombers, but far less so for dealing with enemy fighters.


Why do you need anything over 20mm for fighter killing?


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## tomo pauk (Oct 23, 2014)

20mm is fine vs. fighters, but less than 2 or 3 might not suffice to kill a bomber. Carrying 3 or 4 x 20mm will impose a greater drag and weight penalty, while being less capable to bring down the said bomber than one or two 30 mm. 
If we plan to carry, say, 2 dozens of R4M rockets and 2 x 20 mm, a sudden appearance of enemy fighters will force us to fire off the rockets instantly, in order to lessen the weight and drag; once those fighters are gone, the 20 mm will fail to make an impression to the bombers.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 23, 2014)

One 20mm gun _will_ kill a fighter *IF* you can get keep the gun on target long enough to get 3-5 hits. Two 20mm guns means you have to have the _perfect_ firing solution for 1/2 the time. Four guns means.........

The Germans found that the *average* pilot's gunnery ability was such that they needed over 1000 rounds of 20mm ammo _*fired*_ to kill a bomber. 
1000 rounds of ammo weighed about 194kg (not including links) and you needed enough guns to allow the pilot to fire 1000 rounds of ammo in a reasonable number of firing passes of reasonable length. Not 10 different 10 second firing passes at the same target using a single gun. Obviously some compromises needed to made (10 guns are out of the question) and also obviously the 20mm wasn't a good solution no matter what compromise was reached.


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## kettbo (Oct 23, 2014)

Intruders as fighters to cause mayhem over RAF flight paths and airdromes
Intruders finding USAAF fields and dropping some bombs on them should not be a problem most of the time. Not trying to blowup the world, just cause mayhem. Cause fear. Cause delays. There are these things called RIVERS that you can guide from. Airfields are not particularly tiny. Failures will cause uncertainty, one or two successes would be worth the effort, cause a multitude of precautions, SOP changes. EVERY attempt will be looked-at, analyzed, preventions planned or executed thus tying up personnel and resources.

LW Fighters with R4M to hit the bombers *after* the escort have to turn back, ala 1943. Really stupid hunting ducks with a single shot weapon (21cm missile) when a shotgun is the better choice (R4M or similar barrage rockets).


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## parsifal (Oct 24, 2014)

Steve (Stona) has really hit the nail on the head. Some of you guys really need a dose of reality. Germany already tried intruder operations on a small scale. RAF reacted, and losses (for the Nacht Jagd) went up. They tried sending small numbers of bombers to harass and disrupt. Worked a bit, but the RAF reacted crash tackling the effort along the way. Trying to deny enemy air operations by using disruptive tactics over enemy territory, in this case britain, is a very poor strategic choice, when you are working with inferior resources. Britain did it, with superior technology, with very limited levels of success. Their intruder ops, including serrate and standing patrols over known nightfighter airfields during raids, had some success, but at best it can only be described as somewhat successful. Germany, with decidedly inferior airborne radars is going to have a hard time if they commit large numbers to enemy dominated airspace, day or night.


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## Aozora (Oct 24, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Steve (Stona) has really hit the nail on the head. Some of you guys really need a dose of reality. Germany already tried intruder operations on a small scale. RAF reacted, and losses (for the Nacht Jagd) went up.



Apart from your somewhat condescending remark about a "dose of reality", you have missed the point; yes, the RAF was able to counter small-scale intruder operations, at a time when there were few allied aircraft around at night to muddy the waters. Of course the advantage went to the RAF. 

The problems of locating and destroying said intruders would have been multiplied exponentially, had the intruders infiltrated with the hundred of bombers returning from their night raids, to well lit airfields. As already pointed out, the RAF nightfighters were not having everything their own way over Britain in late 1943, even with their superior technology - a properly timed and executed intruder campaign could well have stretched them even more. 



parsifal said:


> Britain did it, with superior technology, with very limited levels of success. Their intruder ops, including serrate and standing patrols over known nightfighter airfields during raids, had some success, but at best it can only be described as somewhat successful.



The campaign was still successful, and it led to a distinct shakiness amongst Luftwaffe nightfighter crews, because they never knew when they were likely to become targets. The success isn't just measured by the number of aircraft shot down. How many Luftwaffe nightfighters were destroyed or damaged because of the fear of sudden attack? How often were exhausted crews diverted to another airfield because there was a Mosquito lurking nearby? It all adds up. The returning RAF bomber crews were never faced with the same challenge.

As I said, intruder operations over Britain might not have won the war, but it could have made life even more difficult for the RAF bombers at a time when life was already tough, and it would have forced the RAF to allocate extra resources, and devise new tactics.

Such an intruder campaign could have been a bust. It could have been a resounding success; the Germans didn't try, so we'll never know.

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## pbehn (Oct 24, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Apart from your somewhat condescending remark about a "dose of reality", you have missed the point; yes, the RAF was able to counter small-scale intruder operations, at a time when there were few allied aircraft around at night to muddy the waters. Of course the advantage went to the RAF.
> 
> The problems of locating and destroying said intruders would have been multiplied exponentially, had the intruders infiltrated with the hundred of bombers returning from their night raids, to well lit airfields. As already pointed out, the RAF nightfighters were not having everything their own way over Britain in late 1943, even with their superior technology - a properly timed and executed intruder campaign could well have stretched them even more.
> 
> ...



I visited RAF Elvington which was a victim of some of these attacks, from memory they were Ju88s joining the returning bomber stream, the problem with this type of raid is that after using the bomber stream for cover going in but they must then get home, at night it is a long flight from northern England and by day it is a very very dangerous flight in daylight from southern England

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## Aozora (Oct 24, 2014)

pbehn said:


> I visited RAF Elvington which was a victim of some of these attacks, from memory they were Ju88s joining the returning bomber stream, the problem with this type of raid is that after using the bomber stream for cover going in but they must then get home, at night it is a long flight from northern England and by day it is a very very dangerous flight in daylight from southern England



Elvington - a brief history



> On the night of 3rd March 1945, German night-fighters launched Operation Gisela against the 450 heavy bombers of 4, 5 6 Groups RAF Bomber Command returning from a raid on the synthetic oil plants at Kamen, in the Ruhr and the Dortmund Canal. At around midnight 100 Junkers 88’s crossed the English coast from the Thames to Yorkshire and infiltrated the returning bomber streams. Two hours later at least 24 bombers had been shot down and a further 20 damaged.



According to *The Blitz Then and Now Vol 3*, during _Operation Gisela_, some 70 Luftwaffe nightfighers were able to roam at will over Britain for 3½ hours. Three aircraft were lost over Britain; one hit a tree, another hit the ground, while the last one hit a car it was attacking. The majority of the Luftwaffe losses (12) were due to crashes caused by bad visibility over their bases. If the, admittedly complacent, late-war British night defenses couldn't cope with 70 nightfighters in 210 minutes, how would they have been able to deal with a few well-trained, dedicated intruders in, say, mid-1943?

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## parsifal (Oct 24, 2014)

Looking at what the Lw might have been able to do in 1945, is of course not relevant, or at best, less relevant to the issue. The issue is mid war strategy tactics and equipment, or what the LW might do after the BoB. In terms of night intruder operations, the Germans historically mounted their blitz raids up until the end of may 1941, and beyond that on a much reduced scale. We get some idea of what might have happened if we choose to to look at the result of the raids mounted in that last month of the big attacks...that is May 1941. 

in those raids, the LW mounted all manner of attacks, including night fighter sweeps, attacks on airfields, raids on "strategic" targets, even night attacks on shipping. across the board, and universally, the tables were turning against the LW. They were losing aircraft consistently at higher rate relative to the forces committed, though outright numbers sometimes went in their favour. here are a couple of examples, taken from Foremans book "The Turning Tide"

2/3 May: A few I/NJG2 intruders were over England and Lt Feuerbaum claimed a "hereford"....actually a 77 sqn Whitley as it made its final approach to topcliffe. Sgt Mills still managed to land safely, but the aircraft was damaged. Oberfelwebel Hahn claimed a stirling at oakington, where RAF records confirm a stirling from 7 sqn crashed in flames. Britian countered these incursions with corresponding British intruders over france and the north sea, a 23 sqn NF destroyed a He 111 of 4/KG53 at vendeville. meanwhile, over Britiain, the main focus of LW strategic strikes was Merseyside, again, and here the RAF NFs had some success .an a/c from 604 shot down a Ju88 bmbr of 8/KG77, near Lyndhurst, whilst a an a/c from 151 sqn destroyed another Ju88 bomber of 1/kg30. There was one further loss, written to unown causes, but now believed to be lost to British fighters, a He 111 of III/KG40 which crashed off St Agnes Head, observed at the time to be on fire and crashing into the sea.

Altogether that night the RAF lost 1 stirling, 1 hampden, 2 Spits, 3 whitleys, 1 Blen, 1 defiant, 3 wellingtons , 1 Manchester and 1 Hurricane. Thats a total of 14....9 were lost in landing or takeoff accidents, 4 were simply lost and did not return. 2 were the result of LW intruder interference. . In contrast, the LW lost 5 a/c, all bombers, of which 3 were the result of RAF night fighters. 

3/4 May, there were further offensive operations by both sides. This time, the losses were far more one sided. RAF losses amounted to 2 wellingtons, 3 whitleys, a spitfire and a defiant. Both fighters were shot down by LW intruders, To achieve that result, the LW lost 14 a/c...4 NJGs on Intruder operations, the rest weree bombers. Of the LW losses 6 failed to return, 2 crash landed (one due to flak damage) and 6 were the subject of RAF fighter and NF attentions. Thats an exchange rate for the fighters of 6 for 2, even the bomber to fighter exchange rates are poor by the standards achieved later in the year by the far more outnumbered day fighters remaining in france.

We can look at night after night in that May period, and the results are remarkably consistent. Sending NFs over enemy territory when you dont have a clear advantage in numbers, or your radar is no better, or more usually worse, is not a recipe for success. It will lead to elevated losses, as the Germans found in early 1941.


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## kettbo (Oct 25, 2014)

Parsifal

Let me tell YOU about *"dose of reality"* sometime mister.

To NOT raid is to free the enemy to do what they will. I can tell you this as a career soldier, Ops NCO, and combat vet. 

You were talking mid '41. Ya know what? There was still lot of war to fight. We're discussing ideas for future operations, tactics, and weapons. 
I think that the LW OPS and ANALYSIS guys did not argue the case that the night missions then ('41) were LW thus easy to identify as LW. Aozora makes a good point. The more bombers the RAF puts up, the easier it is for intruders. Seems to me that someone pulled out the files and re-looked the situation.

Succeed or fail, this leads to more stress on the bombers and ground crew. Civilians too. Intrusions do not have to be daily or even weekly. Mix long gaps between attacks, then do some back-to-back. Tie up the enemy. Do some probes, gather intel, plan more, then strike hard. The next time, make it a whole different operation. With some planning, deception, even some day strikes at dawn should be in the mix.


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 25, 2014)

Aozora said:


> If the, admittedly complacent, late-war British night defenses couldn't cope with 70 nightfighters in 210 minutes, how would they have been able to deal with a few well-trained, dedicated intruders in, say, mid-1943?


Your comments are increasingly coming across as being highly contemptuous of the wartime U.K. Far from being "complacent," Bodenplatte, V1s V2s had kept the RAF concentrated on the job in hand. By 1941/2, bombers were fitted with rearward-shining low-voltage lights, which were not to be used outside the coastal limits, and were designed to help our nightfighters differentiate between friendly and enemy aircraft. By 1944, these "resin lamps" had been converted to infra-red, and N.F. Mosquitoes were equipped with I.R. scopes, again to identify enemy from friend.


> The problems of locating and destroying said intruders would have been multiplied exponentially, had the intruders infiltrated with the hundred of bombers returning from their night raids, to well lit airfields


"Well lit?" Sorry, but you really are wide of the mark, and it's obvious you do not know the meaning of the word "blackout," which ruled U.K. thinking throughout the war. This nation was black, with not a chink of light allowed to be seen (wardens patrolled throughout the night, and "Put that light out" was not just a figment of "Dad's Army.") 
During 1940, a house near Bristol used to enrage a local A.A. guncrew, by continually having a bedroom window brightly lit during German air raids; complaints, and authority, had no effect, so they eventually put a Bofors round through the window, which finally solved the problem.
The only lights showing on a bomber base would have been the flarepath, which, on a permanent runway, consisted of lights angled so that they were visible only to landing aircraft, not from above; grass runways were "illuminated" by "goose-neck" lamps, which were paraffin lamps, with a cloth wick, which had to be individually lit by an airman usually on a bicycle. 
When I visited Alconbury, in the 1970s, we were escorted to the control tower, and were shown a large brass button, which was a relic from WWII (and still worked,) which, when hit, switched off every light on the airfield. As well as radar, watchers would be out, on the airfield, listening, and any sound of the (very distinctive) unsynchronised beat of German engines, would ensure all lights were doused.


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## Aozora (Oct 25, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> By 1941/2, bombers were fitted with rearward-shining low-voltage lights, which were not to be used outside the coastal limits, and were designed to help our nightfighters differentiate between friendly and enemy aircraft. By 1944, these "resin lamps" had been converted to infra-red, and N.F. Mosquitoes were equipped with I.R. scopes, again to identify enemy from friend.



Interesting - that type of technology is still in use. Is there any information as to what arc the low intensity lights covered? I would guess the ranges at which they would be visible would vary a lot, depending on conditions. Ditto the I.R lamps.



Edgar Brooks said:


> When I visited Alconbury, in the 1970s, we were escorted to the control tower, and were shown a large brass button, which was a relic from WWII (and still worked,) which, when hit, switched off every light on the airfield. As well as radar, watchers would be out, on the airfield, listening, and any sound of the (very distinctive) unsynchronised beat of German engines, would ensure all lights were doused.



And if the lights are continually being doused when a squadron of bombers are landing? Disruptive, and possibly dangerous; intruders don't cause disruption just by shooting down aircraft.


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## parsifal (Oct 25, 2014)

kettbo said:


> Parsifal
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## tomo pauk (Oct 25, 2014)

A little bit about techincalities, namely the engines. 1st, the DB V-12s. 
Currently the DB-601N is being installed in the fighters, while the DB-601E is in the pipeline. The 601N was allowed for 2800 rpm during the late 1940/early 1941, to the best of my knowledge. So for the 601E, the priorities are to follow suit, from 2500 rpm, to 2700 (both values as historically) eventually to 2800 rpm - should almost equal the power of the DB-605A. Other possible improvements might include the installation of intercooler (in similar fashion as the Jumo 211J), MW 50 system, installation of a bigger supercharger, or a two-stage supercharger. With some of those improvements, we can skip the DB-605. The suitability for hi oct fuel (C3) also need to be explored, and engine up-rated according to that.
The DB-603 is the next. The work need to be resumed on it, so the engine is in a more usable state than it was historically case in 1943. Advantage over the BMW 801 will include a bit more power at all altitudes, less drag, ability for a S/E fighter to mount a powerful cannon to fire through the prop; usage of B4 fuel instead of C3. Disadvantage would be that 801 was, historically, a more 'mature' engine in 1943; should be a less of an issue with a more concentrated funded effort on the account of the DB 603. Once the 603 is in production, most of the improvements listed for the DB 601 can be applied for the 603.


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 25, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Read the page from _The Blitz Then and Now_ I posted, along with the extracts from Rawnsley's book,.


No, thank you, I do my research by reading the files (dozens of them) held in our National Archives, so I have some idea of what the Air Ministry were trying to do. Perhaps you need reminding that it was you who said they were being complacent, which is hardly complimentary in my book. 


> And if the lights are continually being doused when a squadron of bombers are landing? Disruptive, and possibly dangerous; intruders don't cause disruption just by shooting down aircraft


Aircraft came back singly, not in Squadrons, and there was a control caravan stationed at the end of the runway, able to contact the aircraft with radio and signal lamp, so they could tell them when it was safe to try again, relight the runway, or, alternatively, advise them to buzz off to another airfield.
It's easy to be critical of defenders, after the event, but the advantage is always with the attacker, since only he knows where, when, and how he will attack. The Ardennes in 1940, the Luftwaffe switching to London, Pearl Harbour, El Alamein, Torch, Sicily, D-day, all succeeded because of secrecy.


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## pbehn (Oct 25, 2014)

Running night intruder operations is not just a question of getting experienced pilots, you need an experienced air force with the equipment and infrastructure, navigation aids, landing aids, weather intelligence over the target and forecast for landing times.. The British AND the Americans learned some hard lessons in the early days. Trained pilots from the USA and Canada fell victim to foul weather over the UK. I would throw open the question that an inexperienced but trained pilot with an experienced navigator is a better combination that an experienced pilot with a rookie navigator on a night time op. From what I read the guy who gives the go ahead for a mission must take account of the prevailing conditions or he can cause a disaster for almost no loss to the enemy.

The referenced sneak raids were just 9 weeks before the war ended. It was like a night time Bodenplatt with the same result, losses out of any proportion to damage caused. The LW never had enough aircraft/pilots/fuel throughout the war, to win against the British and Americans they would need to inflict losses at a massively high ratio. Those raids were a success in terms of surprise and a disaster in terms of the losses sustained. In view of the weather which caused most losses the raids shouldnt have gone ahead but the guys who dreamed up the mission simply didnt care. If such raids were repeated they would have been counterred


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## Aozora (Oct 25, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> No, thank you, I do my research by reading the files (dozens of them) held in our National Archives, so I have some idea of what the Air Ministry were trying to do. Perhaps you need reminding that it was you who said they were being complacent, which is hardly complimentary in my book.



Edgar, please read the extract from Ramsay, before jumping down my throat:








> The element of surprise caught the British defences napping, having become *complacent* that no further attacks would be made by manned aircraft over Britain.





Edgar Brooks said:


> It's easy to be critical of defenders, after the event, but the advantage is always with the attacker, since only he knows where, when, and how he will attack. The Ardennes in 1940, the Luftwaffe switching to London, Pearl Harbour, El Alamein, Torch, Sicily, D-day, all succeeded because of secrecy.



Exactly my point! A first-rate, frontline officer of the RAF, who was part of one of Britain's finest nightfighter crews, made it quite clear that in late 1943 the defences were being stretched (note: *not complacent*). Had the Luftwaffe chosen such a time to mount a series of intruder raids against the heavy bombers, and their bases, they may well have created real problems. 

How, exactly, has mooting such a possibility been turned into the sweeping generalisation that I am "highly contemptuous of the wartime UK"?


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## pbehn (Oct 25, 2014)

Oh please .....from the article "in the worst incident in Ipswich 2 bombs demolished houses, 3 people killed in Gainsborough and 3 trains attacked in Yorkshire home security reported 13 killed and 28 injured" this cost the LW 21 Ju88 lost and another 11 damaged. Today I went to the Town Hall in Hanover, there are three models one of today one from 1945 and one from medieval times ....about 7000 civilians were killed in Hanover alone which is a very open city and difficult to bomb of the main city centre only the Town hall really remains. The sneak raids in 1945 were a surprise in England but the attacks weren't repeated,the losses were completely unjustifiable. i am sure on a lower level on the ground 9 weeks before the war ended many others in the Army and Navy were similarly complacent they may not have seen any action for months or years. My father went to the Pacific because there was nothing for his RN destroyer to do in 1945.

In the dog days of the war a few planes sneaked through the UK defenses and caused more harm to their own miitary than the enemy, it wasnt Singapore Pearl Harbour Stalingrad or Taranto.

Please compare the damage/losses of the sneak raids by the LW with the damage/losses inflicted by the raids they were infiltrating

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## gjs238 (Oct 25, 2014)

I wonder if some of these comments are coming across as being highly contemptuous of wartime Germany?
I say that tongue-in-cheek, as the Germans weren't idiots - it seems that they tried these tactics and, evidently, found them unprofitable.
Otherwise they would have tried them more often.

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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 26, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Edgar, please read the extract from Ramsay, before jumping down my throat: How, exactly, has mooting such a possibility been turned into the sweeping generalisation that I am "highly contemptuous of the wartime UK"?


I'm sorry; I said that's how you were coming across, but I didn't realise you were quoting from someone else's writings.
I don't know when he wrote that, but there's a lot of information, which has become available recently (after 1975, at least,) which is putting a new slant on all sorts of things. 
There have been authors saying that Germany lost the Battle of Britain due to Enigma intercepts giving us advance notice, but Dowding was not on the list of approved recipients, so he was not allowed to read them; this makes Park's achievements all the more remarkable, and shows how lucky we were to have him.
There have been all sorts of fanciful theories about the reasons for not allowing the Meteor into Germany, but it's now known that we didn't want to present the Germans with a free sample of our metal technology, in the event of one coming down; eventually, of course, as the end came closer, it no longer mattered.
Can we start again?


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## GregP (Oct 26, 2014)

People write books to sell them and they must be populated with interesting wording ... neat wording does not make it true. I seriously doubt complacent was the word to use.

If a country declares war, they do NOT become complacent, they merely get surprised when an attack comes at an unexpected time or from an unexpected direction. Then they start planning for those contingencies, too, once burned by them. People who go into combat for the first time are not very well equipped to do so, even when coached by former combat verterans. After awhile, they die or learn that the old vets were pretty much right most of the time unless a new technology comes into play.

But it they're fighting in hedgerows and house-to-house, then it's all been done before, and there are no real surprises unless you don't listen to the voices of experience.


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## kettbo (Oct 26, 2014)

Mini Blitz day 1, "Let's bomb London"
most of the following nights late '43-spg '44 "let's bomb London"
very creative


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## Elmas (Oct 26, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> ............
> It's easy to be critical of defenders, after the event, but the advantage is always with the attacker, since only he knows where, when, and how he will attack. The Ardennes in 1940, the Luftwaffe switching to London, Pearl Harbour, El Alamein, Torch, Sicily, D-day, all succeeded because of secrecy.



Taranto, Matapan can be added as events when the attackers, with minimum forces at least for the Taranto case, could easily smash the unaware defenders.
From the opposite side, the sinking of the battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth in Alessandria, XII-18-1941.


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## Njaco (Oct 26, 2014)

Lets keep the sarcasm to a minimum - everybody. Last warning.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 26, 2014)

Aready during the the BoB, the weaknesses of the Ju-87 are apparent. For all it's qualities as an accurate and un-expensive bomb delivery system, it need the air supremacy to operate successfully. So what to do with the Stuka for 1941-43 time frame? How much the Hs-129 brigs to the table?


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## pbehn (Oct 26, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> I wonder if some of these comments are coming across as being highly contemptuous of wartime Germany?
> I say that tongue-in-cheek, as the Germans weren't idiots - it seems that they tried these tactics and, evidently, found them unprofitable.
> Otherwise they would have tried them more often.



I am certainly not contemptuous of wartime Germany I hope it doesnt seem that way with my posts, I am contemptuous of the regime (Hitler and Goering)who seemed to cause mayhem whenever they interfered. At the time the Gislea raids were mounted it is fair to say the British at home were complacent. I visited Eden Camp museum an old WW" POW camp, at the time of the raids even the Germans were not under lock and key, the guards would go to the pub and if anyone visited a "prisoner" would come to get them on the bicycle provided. One night two officers were visiting the camp in a car and had to be shown through the fog where it was by 2 German POWs on bicycles. 


During the BoB some put forward the idea of mounting raids against LW airfields in the Pas de Calais, whereas it was a target rich environment in modern parlance it was also full of anti AC flak and soldiers with machine guns.

You could not mount a sneak raid using the Americans without having captured bombers, I believe this was tried and was not a success, it would only ever be a success one time. Mounting sneak raids against night time raiders (bomber command) faces many problems. I frequently fly from an ex WW2 airfield,Middleton St George to Amsterdam, the approximate route that German raiders would have taken. At certain times of the year you take off in the dark and land in broad daylight with a flight schedule of exactly one hour. All BC have to do is schedule the raids to land at dawn and anyone using the stream must get home in daylight. The Chain home radar reached out about 100 miles from the coast meaning any raiders on North England must stay under radar control or fly towards Norway to avoid it. On a clear day you can see "the wash" with East Anglia and Kent in the far distance with the European coast ahead. Any raider to North England would have a long slow flight home at the mercy of radar guided and equipped AC, they would be toast so long as the defenders were alerted to the danger.

Discussion of activities in 1945 must take account of the fact that the regime was not only desperate but knew whatever it did would have no actual effect. 9 weeks before the end of the war they could have destroyed every 4 engined bomber every battleship and killed Churchill Eisenhower Montgomery and the whole chiefs of staff it still would not have changed the outcome, just the aftermath.

A one off raid always has a chance of success but repeating it puts the advantage more and more with the defence, this was learned at cost by Bomber Command with the "Battle of Berlin" it is not really a basis for a strategy. Pearl Harbour was a successful (in qualified terms) sneak raid any attempt to repeat it would have been a disaster.

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## Aozora (Oct 26, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> I'm sorry; I said that's how you were coming across, but I didn't realise you were quoting from someone else's writings.



No problem - I could have worded some things more clearly.



Edgar Brooks said:


> I don't know when he wrote that, but there's a lot of information, which has become available recently (after 1975, at least,) which is putting a new slant on all sorts of things.



Clarification: Ramsay was the editor of The Blitz Then and Now series - volume 3 is dated 1990. The article itself was written by Bob Collis in 1988. The defences were caught napping by_ Gisela_, but it's hard to know whether that was because of complacency, or because (for instance) frontline operations in Europe had absolute priority when it came to allocating resources and manpower.



Edgar Brooks said:


> There have been authors saying that Germany lost the Battle of Britain due to Enigma intercepts giving us advance notice, but Dowding was not on the list of approved recipients, so he was not allowed to read them; this makes Park's achievements all the more remarkable, and shows how lucky we were to have him.



Thank goodness the Brits had us colonials to lean on...



Edgar Brooks said:


> There have been all sorts of fanciful theories about the reasons for not allowing the Meteor into Germany, but it's now known that we didn't want to present the Germans with a free sample of our metal technology, in the event of one coming down; eventually, of course, as the end came closer, it no longer mattered.
> Can we start again?



That's one I haven't seen, but it makes sense; why gift the Germans new materials when they could already do so much with the ones they were forced to use.


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## pbehn (Oct 26, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Thank goodness the Brits had us colonials to lean on...
> 
> 
> 
> That's one I haven't seen, but it makes sense; why gift the Germans new materials when they could already do so much with the ones they were forced to use.



Park was a Brit only post war is it considered he wasnt he served with distinction in WWI, in the operations of the BoB I dont think they would have been much use to Park (or indeed Dowding) by the time they were de coded and passed around they were literally yesterdays news and much of it was couched in what they wanted Goering to hear.

I have read that the meteor wasnt allowed to operate in forward positions for fear of an engine falling into german hands but in my mind the real fear was it eventually falling into Russian hands. Laughable in view of what happened later a change of government and we gave Russia an engine to copy.


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## gjs238 (Oct 26, 2014)

pbehn said:


> I have read that the meteor wasnt allowed to operate in forward positions for fear of an engine falling into german hands but in my mind the real fear was it eventually falling into Russian hands. Laughable in view of what happened later a change of government and we gave Russia an engine to copy.


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## KiwiBiggles (Oct 26, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Park was a Brit only post war is it considered he wasn.



Hmmm. Born in NZ, educated in NZ, joined the NZ Army, lived his last years in NZ, died in NZ. No, I think is one we can honestly claim as a New Zealander.

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## pbehn (Oct 27, 2014)

KiwiBiggles said:


> Hmmm. Born in NZ, educated in NZ, joined the NZ Army, lived his last years in NZ, died in NZ. No, I think is one we can honestly claim as a New Zealander.


I didnt mean that he wasnt a New Zealander I meant that it didnt matter where he was from. At the critical time of the battle a New Zealander controlled the key sector and an Angla Canadian was in charge of production. Its a pity those days are past IMO.


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## stona (Oct 27, 2014)

Park was undoubtedly a Kiwi, but something of an expatriate. He happened to be back in NZ in July 1946 when his father died in Oamaru. It was the first time he'd been back for more than thirty years.

There were many capable and successful officers from the 'Old Commonwealth' who served with immense distinction with the RAF. Men like Park, Coningham, Benett and many more whom we were fortunate to have on our side. The junior service seems to have had a particular attraction for these forward thinking and adventurous men who might have struggled in the more (much more) traditional structures of the Army or Royal Navy.

Cheers

Steve


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## Koopernic (Oct 27, 2014)

This is an interesting thread.

There were serious shortfalls in the Luftwaffe's performance in as number of areas. *Procurement* was one, lack of time and expectation for preparation for a long term long range war over the vastness of Africa, the Soviet union and the Atlantic was another.

*Procurement:*

*1 The Focke-Wulf Fw 187*. This was a private venture aircraft developed in the wake of Focke Wolfe's loss to Messerschmitt's Bf 109. It flew in 1938 and was over 100km/h (62mph) faster than the Bf 109 or Bf 110 when using the same Junkers Jumo 210 engines. It had always been planed to use the larger DB601/DB605 series engines in this aircraft. It was capable of easily carrying 4 x 20mm guns. Range was about 70% greater than the Bf 109 and about 45% greater than the Bf 110. This indicates that practical operational radii of over 420 miles as opposed to 240 miles for the Bf 109.

What went wrong? The Luftwaffe couldn't see the value of a lightweight, twin engine high power to weight ratio aircraft fully able to compete with single engine fighters and exceed them in some areas such as speed and range. It kept trying to turn it into "zerstoerer" like aircraft similar to the Me 110, something which would of course ruin the performance, some proposals ended up with rearward facing guns, raised cockpits etc. A two seat night fighter version with a second tandem forward facing cockpit made sense because even though the standard Luftwaffe night fighter radars the Lichtenstein and SN2 were a little big the Germans developed an excellent night fighter radar from their FuG 216 "Neptune" series tail warning radars that with lobe switching was small enough for even the Me 109 and Fw 190.

The aircraft was cancelled in 1942 in favour of the Heinkel He 219, a much larger more powerfull aircraft able to carry more equipment. Because the 219 required 2000hp class engines such as the DB603, Jumo 213 (it really needed the 2500hp Jumo 222) Focke-Wulfs Ta 154 was seen as an interim solution as it could use the smaller 1500hp Jumo 211N which was as a dvelopment of the Jumo 211J in widespread availabillity. However with this engine the aircraft could not in theory cope with the British Mosquito and had to wait for the 1750hp Jumo 213A. The Ta 154 Moskito had great problems with its wooden construction, being regarded as unsafe in a crash landing, when a suitable plywood was found, Tego film the factory was lost to bombing. 

The irony is that the Fw 187 could have made outstanding use of the Jumo 211, which was producing more power than even the DB605 and was at no disadvantage when a pressurised cooling circuit was introcued. Dietmar Hermann estimates its speed as 750km/h (463mph) with late war German fighter engines such as the DB605ASM and DC/DB. Surely it would have made as much trouble as the RAF Mosquito.

*Strategic Bombers Ju 89 and Dornier Do 19.* These were cancelled, as was argued by Albert Kesselring, because the resources didn't exist to produce them without compromising the Luftwaffe's ground support role severely. The aim was to defend against bordering nations France and Poland not conduct a war against the UK.

However it's clear that a small number of long range bombers opperating in the Maritime role would have had a significant impact on the Battle of the Atlantic. The Ju 89 was developed via way of the Ju 90 into the impressive Ju 290 and without the burden of its 'transport' fueselage would have been more impressive: far more capable of opperating in an environment with carrier based fighters due to the speed and rear turret.

*This also leaves the Fw 200* free for transport roles: invaluable for supply extended supply routes to North Africa and the Soviet Union where the Ju 52 was very poor. The Luftwaffe needs something as good as the C54/DC-3. Perhaps more Fw 200, or Ju 252.

*Strategic Bomber He 177.* No problem working out what is to be done here: the coupled engines should be replaced with individually mounted Jumo 211, DB601, DB605, DB603, BMW 801, Jumo 213. This was recomended by Ernst Heinkel in 1940 who begged for this tom be done when he sensed the problems with these engines. When an aeronautical engineer who owns the company is 'begging' one should listen. Had his advice been followed this transition might have been as smooth as the Mancheter to Lancaster.

Really if only one aircraft was developed Ju 89, Do 19, He 177, HE 277 or Me 264 would have had a considerable impact.

*Ju 288 and Jumo 222 engine. * Although the Jumo 222A1/B1 passed a 100 hour @ 2500hp test serious problems such as cases cracking and errosion soon developed in some examples. Without this engine the Ju 288 super bomber could not be built as weight growth had precluded derating to 2000hp.

Ultimatly there was nothing wrong with this engine. The problems had been solved so that it was scheduled for production in the second half of 1944 for use in the Ju 388, He 219, Me 264 "Amerika Bomber" and latter Ju 488 and Do 335.

Document for its production are reproduced in Christoph Vernalaken Martin Handigs's majestirial 400 page book "Junkers Ju 388 Development, Testing of the Last Junkers High altitude aircraft." Due to the allied invasion it became more imortant to disperse Jumo 213 production facilities and so the Jumo 222 original September 1944 production start was delayed by around 4 months to Feb 1945 under RLM engine production program 326/III by which time it was too late. Production of the Ju 222A2/B2 was scheduled in September 1944 as it was considered debugged.

No Allied engine or German engine was designed, produed and debugged in under 6 years. Had the Germans managed a 2500hp engine running of 87 octane in 1942 they would have been miracle workers. Having said that there was an test runs of the 30% bigger Jumo 222E/F (nearly 60L displacement instead of just over 45) which seemed a diversionary waste of time. It nevertheless remained of interest as a even bigger 3500hp class engine. Not sure what to do here? The alternative coupled engines, DB606 and DB610 had their own problems. Perhaps 4 separate engines. 

Nearly every German aircraft scheduled for production in 1945 would have used the Jumo 222.

*Me 264 "Amerika Bomber".* This aircraft's design was initiated in 1940 a little after the B-36 was started. It was a bold attempt to produce an aircraft 70% the size of the B-29 which could nevertheless fly 15000km/9300miles so as to attack the Eastern Seaboard of the USA to a depth of a few hundred miles from German and French bases. Deeper with in flight refueling. 

The aircraft was conceived arund 4 x 2100hp DB603H engine using C3 fuel and would have required 2048m of runway, 1400m with RATO. It flew in December 1942, problems related to heavy controlls and control surface flutter. Nothing too serious. It had been hoped (rather quixotically) that it could perform its mission with the 1500hp Jumo 211P, but this proved impossible. The aircraft suffered polical problems and lack of support in the form of provision of the neccesary hanger space. I suspect Milch's antipathy with Professor /willy Messerscmitt. A version with the 2050 hp BMW 801E (which was in production in its fighter form in June 1944 for the Fw 190A-9's BMW 801TS. However this engine has a little more drag and fuel consumtion and barely could do the mission. The Jumo 213A reached 2100p in productionn in November 1944 on B4 fuel only but could have done so earlier on C3.

Had focus been maintained nuiscence raids on the US Eat Coast could have diverted massive US resources to Homeland protection by the end of 1944. Versions with the Jumo 222 would have had enough power to do the mission without RATO.

*Me 210/410.* The aircraft was late due to handling issues, because it was urgently needed it was ordered into production before its test flight. This meant production tooling and jigs were built, while production of other types was shut down. Waiting for thee flight test program to complete was not an option since something needed to be ramped up for production.

I put this down to bad risk managment. Its likely Willy Messerschmitt was at fault for intervening in the design process and shortening the tail. After this Messerschmitt began assesing the risk with each item and develop in parrallel alternatives (eg longer tail, with slats bigger slats) etc to ensue that issues were quickly resolved.

It was an excellent aircraft. Some could carry a 1000kg SB1000 / 410 bomb in the bomb bay.

*Heinkel He 280.* Build the small version of this fighter even if it is short ranged and underarmed with 3 x 20mm canon.


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## stona (Oct 27, 2014)

The root problem with the Me 210/410 seems to have been a misunderstanding at the RLM of what Messerschmitt AG was offering. The RLM was expecting a direct derivative of the trusty and reliable Bf 110, hence the order now seemingly premature order for 2,000 aircraft. Messerschmitt were planning an entirely new design and had come to the conclusion that this was required some time in late 1937 or early 1938, certainly before the RLM issued the contract for the type.

Where the blame lies I know not, but many seem to lay it at Messerschmitt's door, and specifically Messerschmitt himself. This seems a bit unfair as the RLM must have been made aware that Messerschmitt were preparing an entirely new design but failed to appreciate how far removed from the old Bf 110 it was going to be.

The problems were not quickly resolved. The type was designed in 1938, first flew in September 1939, but was still not a 'significant player' (Milch's own words) in 1942. Messerschmitt AG promised 95 completed and modified airframes by the end of 1942 and that is indeed an insignificant number. It took four years to really rectify the problems.

Cheers

Steve


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 27, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Thank goodness the Brits had us colonials to lean on...


There's more; it's now thought that Leigh-Mallory saw him as a threat to his own path of promotion, so had him shifted out to Malta, which should have been the end of him. Park proceeded to completely reorganise things, and the rest, as they say, is history. 
He realised that "Woody" Woodhall was a sick and broken man, after his time on the island, so had him sent home to rest.
It had been practice to send the fighters south, to gain height, before returning to the fight, but this meant that the bombing was over before they arrived; Park sent them in different directions, including north, east and west, so that they could turn and converge on the attack before it reached the island.
He also agitated for conversion sets, to get rid of the large Vokes filter on the Vc, so that it could regain some speed; by this he reckoned they could cope with the 109G (raids were normally at medium height, where the V was more of a threat.) He also managed to wangle some IXs to be flown direct from Gibraltar, using ferry tanks; they had been earmarked for the desert, but he got them.
Although it's more for modellers, I can give you an example of how new information is coming to light; for years there's been controversy over the blue Spitfires delivered by Wasp to Malta. We've known, for some time, that Malta asked for "sea camouflage" on fighters, and thought this meant RN colours, but, only a few months ago, in a file on Malta Hurricanes, I found a note that, by "sea camouflage" Malta meant (presumably Dark) Mediterranean Blue; this means that Wasp's captain didn't paint them blue on a whim, he knew that was the colour Malta wanted.


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## stona (Oct 27, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> We've known, for some time, that Malta asked for "sea camouflage" on fighters, and thought this meant RN colours, but, only a few months ago, in a file on Malta Hurricanes, I found a note that, by "sea camouflage" Malta meant (presumably Dark) Mediterranean Blue; this means that Wasp's captain didn't paint them blue on a whim, he knew that was the colour Malta wanted.



Now that is interesting. Like many I've assumed that "sea camouflage" probably meant the TSS, so it's good to know that was a false assumption.
Does this imply that Dark Mediterranean Blue paint was supplied to _Wasp_? I've always found it hard to believe that some kind of ship's paint was slapped on. 
Cheers
Steve


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## Milosh (Oct 27, 2014)

What is the difference between Dark Mediterranean Blue and the dark blue use on USN a/c?


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## stona (Oct 27, 2014)

They are both dark blue colours, but they are not the same colour. When I said 'ship's paint' I was referring to the opinion held by some that some sort of non-aviation paint, as used for painting the ship, was used. This just doesn't sound likely to me. A USN aviation paint may or may not have been a possibility, I don't know. The information above _might_ imply that the correct British colour was used.
Cheers
Steve


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 27, 2014)

stona said:


> Does this imply that Dark Mediterranean Blue paint was supplied to _Wasp_?


Others have gone through copies of the ship's manifest, and found no evidence of non-American paint (or any paint, for that matter) being taken on board. 
It has long been believed that all the aircraft had to be repainted (which would have put a heck of a strain on the stores,) but a memo from a senior mandarin of the Air Ministry says that he has been able to get any, as yet undelivered, aircraft repainted at the factory, so only those already in Scotland would need to be painted there, _or on board the carrier_. 
This implies (maybe, possibly) only a few, which, if the paint was well thinned (there are some showing the original pattern through the top coat) could have gone onto, and been accepted by, the paint already there.


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## Just Schmidt (Oct 27, 2014)

The most effective alterations are of course the utopian ones, like crusially not attacking the USSR before a 'solution' was found to the British problem.

Of course a war with the USSR was inevitable in the longer perspective. At the beginning of negotiations for the Molotow-Ribbentropp pact, the latter suggested it should be set to run for a hundred years. The russians protested that, as they had been very publicly enemies of the worst sort till then, nobody would believe that to be serious, therefore setting 10 years as the duration. Of course neither party probably intended it to be that long, and both parties probably realised the intentions of the other party. It was simply opportunism all round. That leaves the question when, and who, to break it. Traditional geostretics would dictate at the latest when Germany was at peace with everybody else. 

Personally I don't believe Stalin planned a break in 41, the forward deployment of russian forces can be explained by the USSR's emphasis on an offensive defensive strategy. In my assassment I go with Evan Mawdsley (Thunder in the East) which also 
offers the crusial observation that Stalin, far from being afraid of a German attack, believed he was negotiating from a position of strength. On paper it is easy to see why. The reason not to attack Germnany (or germany's vassals in the east) was that it was more economic to have the capitalist countries weaken themselves as much as possible first. And in contrast to the nazis Stalin was not a romantic when it came to war, it was simply politics.

Hitlers restless romanticism probably doomed die Luftwaffe to the campaign it could not win, the discrepansies in resourses was simply to big. The alternative was simply refusing to loose, thereby in the end facilitating a settlement, especially after the entry of the USA (which probably could have been delayed considerably, but not avoided in the long run).

Anyway, the strategy would be to husband the strenght of all forces, not least die Luftwaffe. But then I agree that more bombers should have been deployed against shipping, and less over Britain. On the other hand die luftwaffe was far to eager to act as fire-brigade on the eastern front. There a more modern 1 engined ground attack aircraft than the Ju 87 would have been very usefull. And a decent replacement for the Ju 52 should also have been found. But I suspect that no new aircrafts could turn the tide, the discrepansy in awailable ressourses was simply to big. As it were, the Germans did pretty well in quite a few areas, even if it is easy to point to blunders. Any kind of truly strategic bombing campaign should be ruled as beyond the awailable ressourses, though a nuicanse raid should be tried once in a while. For one thing, they cost a lot of fuel, and synthetic plants are no free lunch. They have to be build instead of something else, and somebody have to work in them instead of somewhere else. Again we reach the conclusion that the axis simply didn't possess enough materials and manpower, they were WASTLY outnumbered.

How they could have acted to better the chance of a draw (from sheer exhaustion, however unlikely it was) is pretty well covered in the thread, though some suggestions are hard to judge. Personally I like the Fw 187, but it was quite a narrow airframe, some of the instrumants were mounted on the inside of the engine nacelles. Maybe something more adaptable would have been needed? And I often (to my surprise) see the Me 410 classified as quite fast, surely that must be as a bomber? Was it really the best 2 engined multipurpose aircraft they could get to serve in numbers in 44? Were they even better than the later Ju 88's? At the end of the day, I'm sure that some improvements to material could have been achieved.

A must is not wasting pilots flying supplies into Stalingrad and North africa. Many instructors, at that. Even Kholm and Demyansk might have been worth less than the cost. Husbanding, feinting and occasionally consentrating the forces for big blows, not wasting at the perifery.

On big issue that haven't been commented on is perhaps slightly off topic (just as 'don't attack Russia and USA), but probably would have helped more than anything except these two:

For gods sake realise that the enemy is reading much of your signal traffic!


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## gjs238 (Oct 27, 2014)

Just Schmidt said:


> For gods sake realise that the enemy is reading much of your signal traffic!


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## stona (Oct 27, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> This implies (maybe, possibly) only a few, which, if the paint was well thinned (there are some showing the original pattern through the top coat) could have gone onto, and been accepted by, the paint already there.



But does that mean that they would have used some US paints or did some British paint sneak its way on board? I can imagine a few cans shoved in the cockpits along with the wing tips 

Cheers

Steve


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 27, 2014)

stona said:


> But does that mean that they would have used some US paints or did some British paint sneak its way on board? I can imagine a few cans shoved in the cockpits along with the wing tips


Incidentally, that's another myth that's been dispelled by later research; the removal of the wingtips very much a last-minute operation, and wasn't planned. Wasp couldn't get far enough up-river to where the Spitfires were waiting, so they had to go to her. Each one was put onto a Queen Mary trailer, but the tips had to be removed to negotiate the narrow Glasgow streets. 
If there hadn't been time to complete the painting, and there was paint available from Abbotsinch, who can say what might have happened? In early 1942, standard cellulose/oil-based paint was still in use; the synthetic variety didn't come in until August 1942.

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## parsifal (Oct 27, 2014)

Reading signal traffic was a two way street, and a question of resources in the end. B-Dienst was delivering about 80% of Allied fleet movements at the beginning of the war, whereas at that point in the war the allies had virtually no idea. What made the difference were the resources put into the post intercept analysis. of that 80% that was read, perhaps 10% could be acted upon or rather, reacted to. The Germans simply could not put the resources into analysing then acting upon the intelligence they had gathered, and this was poorly co-rdinated anyway. there were many different agencies for the various services, and some others as well, virtually not talking to each other,and not co-ordinating their efforts at all. Inter-service rivalries also often prevented the sharing of intell between the services. B-Dienst was a navy outfit, but I doubt much of that information was shared on an inter-service basis. Sharing of information on the Axis side between services, or nations was virtually never done


In contrast to that, the allies started from a fairly poor base, but they pooled their resources, even between nations, and even from a very early point in the war. moreover the resources thrown at processing that intelligence was staggering in comparison to the german effort, and in the end, well co-ordinated. At the beginning of the war, about 10% of German signal traffic was being read, and little of it acted upon in a timely fashion. by midwar, that gap had been closed, percentage of signals read was up, but more important;ly, that intell was being analysed closely and used approipriately. That in itself took vast resources by the allies, but it was a cost well worth the effort in the end. 










.

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## wuzak (Oct 27, 2014)

Wasn't it the case that the Allies, the British in particular, were reluctant to act on intelligence unless it was thought that the Germans would believe thatthe information came through a method other than their signals being read?


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## Aozora (Oct 27, 2014)

stona said:


> But does that mean that they would have used some US paints or did some British paint sneak its way on board? I can imagine a few cans shoved in the cockpits along with the wing tips
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



In 1942 the standard USN top surface colour for aircraft was Non-Specular Blue-Gray, M-485; there would have been stocks on USS Wasp. It certainly seems to have been used on BR124 2-U and I cannot see any reason why it wouldn't have been used on others.







Keith Park in his Spitfire VB - Malta:






A totally gratuitous diversion:


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 27, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Wasn't it the case that the Allies, the British in particular, were reluctant to act on intelligence unless it was thought that the Germans would believe thatthe information came through a method other than their signals being read?


Hmmm, we're getting into the world of the niceties of the English language. It was rather a case of reacting in such a way that the Germans felt it was chance, rather than advance knowledge, which caused things (from their perspective) to go wrong. Our ships just happened, by pure luck, to find the U-boat "Milk cows."
There is an accusation, regularly trotted out, that, to save Bletchley Park's security, Churchill allowed Coventry to be destroyed, and that he sat and did nothing while it occurred; he didn't, in fact he was on his way to Chequers, when word came through, and he immediately turned round and went back to London, to coordinate the response. The Germans used two-letter codes for British towns and cities, and, although we could work out that the intended target was a Midlands town, we didn't know which one. With the main Spitfire factory at West Bromwich, an educated guess was made that it was where the Germans would attack, but it was wrong.


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## kettbo (Oct 28, 2014)

Aozora beat me to it. You guys thinking USN SHIP paint and not USN Aircraft paint. The ship should have some on board. Thin that and spray it.


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## Njaco (Oct 28, 2014)

Careful Aozora...........


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## stona (Oct 28, 2014)

kettbo said:


> Aozora beat me to it. You guys thinking USN SHIP paint and not USN Aircraft paint. The ship should have some on board. Thin that and spray it.



I've always thought that a USN aviation paint was a possibility in the absence of the correct British paint. I've never subscribed to the view that they took some kind of ship's paint and slapped that onto the valuable (very valuable in the context of the state of Malta's air defences at the time) Spitfires. I've seen USN deck paints suggested but these were formulated for an entirely different purpose and it makes little sense to apply them to a high performance fighter aeroplane.
The finish and the maintenance of the finish on British aircraft, particularly 'high speed' aircraft like the Spitfire was the subject of considerable regulation.
Cheers
Steve


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## Just Schmidt (Oct 28, 2014)

I wasn't implying that only the allies could break codes, what i specificly meant was that the Germans, or at least most of them, seemed so sure that their codes simply couldn't be broken. And that kind of arroganse was all round an important reason the war was lost so 'quickly'.

Still, cred is to be given to the decision to channel ressourses into intelligence, and not acting in a way that beyond doubt showed the german codes to be compromised. Even if that is sure to have cost allied lives in the short run on many occasions.


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## gjs238 (Oct 28, 2014)

Aozora said:


> The Luftwaffe ditched nightfighter intruder operations in 1941 because Hitler and Göring didn't believe they were making much of an impact. They were wrong; had the Luftwaffe restarted its intruder operations in 1943 it would have caused major problems for the RAF. A few Luftwaffe nightfighters infiltrating the returning bombers over bomber bases would have been very difficult to counter, because the RAF's nightfighters would have been confronted with large numbers of radar returns. Ditto the ground defences.



Apples Oranges, but the Finns used these tactics successfully against the Soviets.

From Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Finnish_Air_Force

_One of the more remarkable missions was a bombing raid on 9 March 1944 against Soviet Long Range Aviation bases near Leningrad, when the Finnish aircraft, including Ju 88s, followed Soviet bombers returning from a night raid on Tallinn, catching the Soviets unprepared and destroying many Soviet bombers and their fuel reserves, and a raid against the Aerosan base at Petsnajoki on 22 March 1944.[43]_


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## Shortround6 (Oct 28, 2014)

Hmmm, ....
What did the Russians have for ground radar, iff equipment, and patrolling nightfighters at the time/ locations?


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## parsifal (Oct 28, 2014)

after 1943, several hundred radar sets supplied under LL. They did not have an integrated air defence system, but they did have the largest flak arm in the world, and a good part of their industry several thousand miles away from the front.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 28, 2014)

On the Stuka, 1st to complement it, than to replace it - how about the Fw-190 with dive brakes? Much like the P-51 became A-36. 
Then - how much the Hs-129 is an asset? What would be an expedient way to have a capable tank buster, provided that is a really good use of German resources?


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## Shortround6 (Oct 28, 2014)

Thank you,
As this is in reference to intruder operations, the ability of intruders to penetrate a non-intergrated air defense system (did Russian bombers have IFF?) That lacked radar equipped night fighters patrolling near the bomber bases doesn't mean the same tactic would work against England.
An intruder campaign would only work IF it raised Bomber Command's losses to around 10% while keeping their own losses (from all causes) a bit lower than 10% in order to keep up the campaign.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 28, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> On the Stuka, 1st to complement it, than to replace it - how about the Fw-190 with dive brakes? Much like the P-51 became A-36.
> Then - how much the Hs-129 is an asset? What would be an expedient way to have a capable tank buster, provided that is a really good use of German resources?


Dive bombing lost a lot of it's attraction as AA defences got better. The dive bombing attack profile gives the AA gunners more aiming and firing time than low level attacks and a more predictable flight path.

Hs-129 used French engines so saved German resources in that way. You could make a better tank buster but if needed German engines......??


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## tomo pauk (Oct 28, 2014)

Looking at the specs of the Hs-129, it was been able to carry 6x50= 300 kg of bombs, vs. the Ju-87 carrying vastly more, up to 1800 kg in -D 'line', and up to 1000 kg in the -B line. Of course, Stukas were also able to carry multiple bombs; not all the targets require 1 ton bombs. The Hs-129 does not offer much of a save - we need anywhere from 3 to six of them to deliver the punch the Stuka was capable for, that is 3 to 6 times as number of pilots*, and 6 to 12 times the number of powerplants.
Ju-87Ds were also available as 'assault aircraft', that is without dive brakes, and with cannons, and the armor was bolstered when the -D was introduced.

*Stukas have/need rear gunners, though; Hs-129 also need a gunner, but can't have it


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## gjs238 (Oct 28, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Similar to the RAF thread: what steps need to be undertaken by the LW in order to best it's opponents in the up coming years? The time frame is the same, starts in Autumn of '40, ends before '44 starts.



Is there any technology or manufacturing capability/capacity from other Axis, occupied or neutral countries that might be better utilized?


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## tomo pauk (Oct 28, 2014)

In Czechoslovakia, there is the 'Avia' company, design production of fighters (B.35, B.135 - almost as good as SPitfire I and Bf-109E), production of B.71 (license of the SB-2, a Soviet design); country also has license for the HS 12Y and Mercury engines. In Poland, there are substantial production lines, also Mercury produced under license. 
In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, there is another lot of production lines. In Yugoslavia, there were Ikarus and Rogozarski factories, that produced either own designs or licensed stuff.

Germans have used some of the production lines for their needs during the ww2, but I'm not sure that was something that was run efficiently. The Germans themselves did not fully switched to the wartime production until some time in 1942?


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## Shortround6 (Oct 28, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Looking at the specs of the Hs-129, it was been able to carry 6x50= 300 kg of bombs, vs. the Ju-87 carrying vastly more, up to 1800 kg in -D 'line', and up to 1000 kg in the -B line. Of course, Stukas were also able to carry multiple bombs; not all the targets require 1 ton bombs. The Hs-129 does not offer much of a save - we need anywhere from 3 to six of them to deliver the punch the Stuka was capable for, that is 3 to 6 times as number of pilots*, and 6 to 12 times the number of powerplants.
> Ju-87Ds were also available as 'assault aircraft', that is without dive brakes, and with cannons, and the armor was bolstered when the -D was introduced.
> 
> *Stukas have/need rear gunners, though; Hs-129 also need a gunner, but can't have it



A little 'selective' in the warload Tomo? 

The Early Ju-87s had 'normal' bombload of one 250kg bomb and four 50kg bombs, The Early Hs 129s could carry one 250kg bomb and two 50kg bombs. Doesn't seem like a big advantage for the Ju-87, granted the Ju-87 can go to heavier bombs and ditch the under wing bombs. Of course the Hs 129 was carrying TWO 20mm MG 151s and TWO MG 17s at the same time as the bomb load compared to the JU-87s TWO MG 17s. DO you think the 20mm cannon (with 125rpg) just might be worth the two extra 50kg bombs? The Hs 129 had better cockpit armor too. 
For _most_ battlefield targets the heavy bombs weren't needed (both planes had options to carry extra machine guns for strafing) and they didn't do the same job a lot of the time. By late in the war the majority of the Ju-87 were operating at night while the Hs 129s were operating by day. 

The 3-6 comparison is only valid if your are trying to sink battleships or take-out large concrete fortifications. 

Later versions of both planes changed armament a bit and the Ju-87 got more power. 



> In Czechoslovakia, there is the 'Avia' company, design production of fighters (B.35, B.135 - almost as good as SPitfire I and Bf-109E), production of B.71 (license of the SB-2, a Soviet design); country also has license for the HS 12Y and Mercury engines. In Poland, there are substantial production lines, also Mercury produced under license.
> In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, there is another lot of production lines. In Yugoslavia, there were Ikarus and Rogozarski factories, that produced either own designs or licensed stuff.



There is also a big difference between a _production line_ than is set up to make a dozen or two dozen engines a month and one that can make two dozen engines a day. Many of the smaller countries had a licence to produce and a 'factory' or shop that turned out engines by the handful per month. 

From wiki:

" Production of the P.11c started in 1934 and 175 were produced. The first series of approximately 50 P.11c aircraft were fitted with Mercury V S2 of 600 hp (447 kW), the rest with Mercury VI S2 of 630 hp (470 kW).[1]"

Please note that it does NOT say how long it took to produce the 175 aircraft. this is followed by,

"Even without the new WP2 plant at Mielec, the PZL works could produce at least 10 fighters every month"

Or look at the Romanian IAR 80 series, it took from Dec of 1939 until sometime in 1944 to build 346 planes. Granted their were starts and stops in production due to supply problems with guns (Germans weren't exactly forthcoming with even war booty guns) but with a production rate that low (average of under 10 planes a month although any one month might well have been double the average) the 'production line' for engines didn't have to be very big. 

Some of these countries made some nice airplanes during the 30s but never in enough numbers to really compare to what the major countries were doing in peace time let alone when the shooting started. A years production form some of these factories might make up for a weeks worth of losses in a heavy combat week.


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## Njaco (Oct 28, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Thank you,
> As this is in reference to intruder operations, the ability of intruders to penetrate a non-intergrated air defense system (did Russian bombers have IFF?) That lacked radar equipped night fighters patrolling near the bomber bases doesn't mean the same tactic would work against England.
> An intruder campaign would only work IF it raised Bomber Command's losses to around 10% while keeping their own losses (from all causes) a bit lower than 10% in order to keep up the campaign.



I believe on the Eastern Front, the so-called "intruder" missions were very different from that on the Western Front. Most of the a/c use were bi-plane types that bombed and patrolled at night almost ground level. I think the obsolete Hs 123 was the plane of choice for the LW for these type of operations over the Eastern front. and no radar that I am aware of.


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## Koopernic (Oct 29, 2014)

stona said:


> The root problem with the Me 210/410 seems to have been a misunderstanding at the RLM of what Messerschmitt AG was offering. The RLM was expecting a direct derivative of the trusty and reliable Bf 110, hence the order now seemingly premature order for 2,000 aircraft. Messerschmitt were planning an entirely new design and had come to the conclusion that this was required some time in late 1937 or early 1938, certainly before the RLM issued the contract for the type.
> 
> Where the blame lies I know not, but many seem to lay it at Messerschmitt's door, and specifically Messerschmitt himself. This seems a bit unfair as the RLM must have been made aware that Messerschmitt were preparing an entirely new design but failed to appreciate how far removed from the old Bf 110 it was going to be.
> 
> ...



In Frank Vann's biography of Willy Messerschmitt he reproduces some stenographic minutes of a meeting where Erhardt Milch forces Willy Messerschmitt to modify the Me 210 airframes to the new standard (lengthened tail slats).Milch makes a point of saying they should be "modified to Woldemar Voigts orginal design" to rub it in. It sent Messerschmitt's company broke and lead to Messerschmitt losing control of his own company. The aeronautical engineer Rudiger Kosin (he designed the Ar 234 and invented the Kruger Flap) in his book "The German Fighter" claims that the engineer test pilot for the Me 210 came out of the first flight 'pale' and immediately stated on landing that the aircraft required a longer tail and slats. He also repeats that supposedly Willy intervened in the design process to shorten the tail and remove slats (which had to be added in again). Unfortunatly tooling had been made, aircraft produced.

The problem was fully solved by June 1942 when the Me 210A1(long) entered service.

Of course Messerschmitt was trying to do the best. Basically Willy Gambled, the Luftwaffe Gambled, the RLM Gambled and they lost. I guess they should have just taken it philosophically but the recriminations set in. Nothing peculiar German or Nazi about that. I've seen the same happen when big projects have gone to pot. The recriminations probably damaged a lot of otherwise talented people.

The 'black up' Arado 240 also had problems, they tried a laminar flow profile I think which was troublesome, but they identified too short a tail as well. It was starved of resources and funds even during the prototype stage so the problems were only slightly partially with. It was faster than the Me 210 and managed to fly over the UK unopposed as a recon though it lacked a bomb bay.


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## stona (Oct 29, 2014)

Reservations were expressed about the characteristics of the Me 210 V1, according to Wurster, after the very first flight (2nd September 1939) he said that the fuselage would have to be lengthened by a metre to which Messerschmitt replied that he wasn't about to throw away '3 million jigs'.
Nonetheless on 15th September Wurster reported:

_"At present no essential changes are required. The minor complaints listed in the flight reports were remedied."_

It's this sort of self deception which seems endemic across the German aviation industry that led to all the subsequent problems.

The first lengthened fuselage was the V17. The work was carried out in October 1941 and the aircraft was used for testing until February 1942. It was eventually fitted with DB 605 engines and became in effect the C series prototype.

The idea that the Me 210 was 'fixed' by 1942 is a moot point. The first test reports on the modified aircraft were issued on 27th April. These were reinforced with the results based on 140 test flights issued on 5th May, they too were positive. Despite this on 27th April Milch had emphasised that the decision to stop all work on the type and to divert the sub contractors to other work stood. Nearly 100 short framed Me 210s parked at Obertraubling were earmarked for destruction and in June 1942 some were actually chopped up. The decision to produce 95 of the improved version, taken on the 19th of that month, probably saved the rest. Some sources indicate that about 180 'long' Me 210 A-1s were produced from the 354 Me 210 A-1s finished with the short fuselage from both Augsburg and Regensburg plants. According to documents from the BAL only 160 were converted, which agrees with your source above. You takes your choice!
There were a further 108 unassembled aircraft and 98 in the initial stages of production which is from where the often quoted total of 540 airframes derives. 

By September the designation Me 410 starts to appear, the first five were delivered on 8th December. The Luftwaffe was originally supposed to have had 210 (with DB 603) of them by the end of 1942, so things weren't exactly running to the plan, though RLM minutes describe those 8 as being on schedule. They were probably the first batch of the updated plan to modify only 95 airframes.

The modification of an Me 210 to the lengthened and slatted version cost Messerschmitt AG 3,400 man hours per airframe. The total cost of the fiasco to the company has been estimated at 38,000,000 RM. The RLM would not foot the bill, which is hardly surprising. That's why Prof. Messerschmitt was removed from his management role.

Without going into all the details of the chaos at the various production facilities, lines being built and disassembled, thousands of workers effectively unemployed for periods, train loads of jigs and partially completed airframes heading for Augsburg, it is worth pointing out that between October and December 1941 _not a single Bf 109 left the Regensburg plant_. Regensburg was supposed to produce 250 Bf 109s per month, but this figure wasn't reached for many months.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Oct 29, 2014)

ouch!


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2014)

I confess not knowing much about the Me210 or 410. The 210 had an obvious troubled history. Yet the Hungarians built quite a few of them, and used them extensively. they were apparently very happy with them. Why is that?


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## wiking85 (Oct 29, 2014)

parsifal said:


> I confess not knowing much about the Me210 or 410. The 210 had an obvious troubled history. Yet the Hungarians built quite a few of them, and used them extensively. they were apparently very happy with them. Why is that?



They built the 210C variant that corrected all the problems, while in the meantime Germany upgraded the engines to the DB603 and renamed it the Me410.


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## stona (Oct 29, 2014)

The Hungarians built 302 Me 210s. The exact number varies slightly from source to source, but not by much. 

Hungarian production started late in 1942 and they built the modified version with DB 605 engines. They also reduced the armament and removed all the extra armour the Germans were putting in their version making a lighter aeroplane.

The modified Me 210 did for the most part overcome the problems that had been plaguing the type since 1939. The Luftwaffe finally got an aeroplane which could be flown by service pilots, but more than two years late.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Oct 29, 2014)

So, after all the trouble, how does the Me410 stack up against the competition?


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## tomo pauk (Oct 29, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> A little 'selective' in the warload Tomo?
> 
> The Early Ju-87s had 'normal' bombload of one 250kg bomb and four 50kg bombs, The Early Hs 129s could carry one 250kg bomb and two 50kg bombs. Doesn't seem like a big advantage for the Ju-87, granted the Ju-87 can go to heavier bombs and ditch the under wing bombs.



The early Hs-129 could not carry any meaningful bomb load, the Argus engines were simply of a too low power, so the Hs-129A never flew a combat sortie. Unlike the Ju-87B that is, by the time the French radials installed, almost three years in service, with Ju-87D in production for more than half a year. 
Basically, Henschel was a much more important asset for the German war effort between 1939 to mid 1942with the biplane Hs-123 than with Hs-129.



> Of course the Hs 129 was carrying TWO 20mm MG 151s and TWO MG 17s at the same time as the bomb load compared to the JU-87s TWO MG 17s. DO you think the 20mm cannon (with 125rpg) just might be worth the two extra 50kg bombs? The Hs 129 had better cockpit armor too.



The Ju-87D have had the increased armor protection installed. One of the bomb loads included 3 x 250 kg of bombs, while the 1x500 kg and 4x70 kg was also an option. All while 2 MG-151 cannons are carried, once introduced on with the Ju-87D-5.
The Ju-87 also carried another crew member, with his gun and ammo, that kinda equalizes the weight of 2 cannons ammo the Hs-129 had. 
Even on the best case scenario for the Hs-129B vs. Ju-87D, carrying a same bomb load on a same distance means the Germans need to train 2 times as much of pilots and use twice as much fuel - both resources where Germany was much more thin, then on aircraft. 



> For _most_ battlefield targets the heavy bombs weren't needed (both planes had options to carry extra machine guns for strafing) and they didn't do the same job a lot of the time. By late in the war the majority of the Ju-87 were operating at night while the Hs 129s were operating by day.



The Hs-129s that remained until the end of the war were armed with anti tank guns, and indeeed were operating during the day. The Ju-87G, anti tank versions of the Stuka, was also operating (exclusively?) during the day.



> The 3-6 comparison is only valid if your are trying to sink battleships or take-out large concrete fortifications.



No problems about that. I'm trying to point out that most, if not any mission that was performed by the Hs-129 can be performed by the Ju-87. Vice-versa was not possible, like installing drop tanks and a worthwhile bomb load on the same time for the Henschel.



> There is also a big difference between a _production line_ than is set up to make a dozen or two dozen engines a month and one that can make two dozen engines a day. Many of the smaller countries had a licence to produce and a 'factory' or shop that turned out engines by the handful per month.
> ...
> Some of these countries made some nice airplanes during the 30s but never in enough numbers to really compare to what the major countries were doing in peace time let alone when the shooting started. A years production form some of these factories might make up for a weeks worth of losses in a heavy combat week.



Agreed all the way. Those factories needed a smart expansion program early on, if the Nazis want to harvest benefits. Again, Nazi Germany went too late into war footing in Germany proper, that expansion of foreign factories will not going to happen until German factories are expanded.


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> So, after all the trouble, how does the Me410 stack up against the competition?



From what ive read, it had a hard time against the LR US escorts like P-51, but did pretty well in the East, mostly in the GA role. It was fast and heavily armed, a familiar theme for German aircraft, but like all twins, not as manouverable as it needed to be.


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## stona (Oct 30, 2014)

parsifal said:


> From what ive read, it had a hard time against the LR US escorts like P-51, but did pretty well in the East, mostly in the GA role. It was fast and heavily armed, a familiar theme for German aircraft, but like all twins, not as manouverable as it needed to be.



I'd agree with that. 

It suffered from one of the other typical German problems that even once a decent aeroplane had been resurrected from the ashes of the original Me 210 nobody could make up their mind what exactly should be done with it. A familiar theme.

It also suffered from the usual political interference, for example its use as a 'fast' bomber even though Pelz made it quite clear that he didn't want it. Another familiar theme which echoes the experience of some other types.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Oct 30, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Agreed all the way. Those factories needed a smart expansion program early on, if the Nazis want to harvest benefits. Again, Nazi Germany went too late into war footing in Germany proper, that expansion of foreign factories will not going to happen until German factories are expanded.



Expansion of _any_ factories (over and above adding 2nd/3rd shift) requires floor space (steel beams and concrete), machine tools ( of which Germany was *a* primary source for many nations in the world) and workers. 

The Germans did have _plans_ for Gnome-Rhone engines. The French workers managed to get the production _down_ to about 1/4 of the German plans without provoking any major reprisals. Not sure what happened to the Hispano factory, looted for tools or just passed over? Some French factories built Argus air cooled engines and subcontracted BMW 801 parts. 
Radial engine 'factories' (or shops) in occupied countries might be better off building BMW 132 or Bramo 323s (or parts for them) rather than continuing to build old Mercury or G-R engines. Simplify the spare parts and training problems rather than introduce new problems.


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## stona (Oct 30, 2014)

Expansion on older factories, particularly in and around European cities was often not an option. The establishment of new ones was often a more viable alternative and this required substantial investment including not just building the factory and warehousing facilities but housing for the workers (the Germans called these 'siedlung' or housing colonies, those at Regensburg cost more than 4 million RM), transport links (typically rail) and in the case of aircraft manufacturers an airfield. 
It was often the local authority that would have to provide other vital amenities, electricity, water and gas and, just as today, deals had to be done to secure them. The cronyism endemic in Nazi government certainly didn't help here. Often trade schools were attached to train the skilled workers required. There was a shortage of such people in the pre-war period as workforces across the sector expanded. There no point having a factory without the suitably qualified and skilled people to man it. Skilled people were moved from one place to another, sometimes from one company to another, a classic case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, and exactly the type of short term and short sighted solution so beloved of Nazi administrators.

It is easy to write about a 'smart expansion program' but not so easy to do. 
In 1939/40 Germany's premier fighter, the Bf 109, was being manufactured across the aviation industry by AGO, Arado, Fiesler and Focke-Wulf as well as at Messerschmitt's own plants and this despite the rapid expansion of facilities represented by the building between 1936 and 1938 of the Regensburg plant.

Cheers

Steve


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## Koopernic (Oct 30, 2014)

Expansion of factories or the addition of 2nd or 3rd shifts wasn't going to happen. You need labour both to man factories or to add shifts. Germany could do neither as it had a labour shortage.

Putting German women into the workforce also wasn't going to happen either. The pre war participation rate of German women was already higher than Britains, limiting the gains possible. The other reason was that Germany had to rely on growing her own food, which she could achieve barely 80% self sufficiency. Britain had a more "modern" trade economy and could achieve only 50% self sufficiency and obtained her food from the USA/Canada and ultimately lend lease since she was in trade deficit and out of gold. German women, mothers, daughters, wives worked the farm while conscriptable sons and husbands were of to war.

The only effective way was automation, mass production etc which requires tooling, investment and time to setup. It was this that produced the so called "armaments miracle" in 43/44. Relatively low German productivity prior to 1941/42 is explained by the fact that the labour was still building the tools and factories.

Foreign workers, indentured labour was of course one way to go and systems were set up, many young Dutch or Norwegian men ended up doing apprenticeships in Germany. French companies produced many components and some complete aircraft eg Ju 52. Though it was possible to get engineering done in France production was often mediocre for more elaborate aircraft. Speer wanted to win the French over to higher motivation but Sauer argued that French labour was far more productive if used in Germany so a contracts system was set up which late war eventually became compulsive conscriptive. Some compulsion was used to temporarily divert French voluntary labour building Atlantic wall defences to clear up the mess left by the dam busters operations for a while and this subsequently made it hard to attract labour.


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## stona (Oct 31, 2014)

Yes. There is much romanticisation of the Women's Land Army in the UK, and I am certainly not denying the valuable jobs that those women did, but there were never more than about 80,000 of them and considerably fewer for most of the war.
Substantially more went into industry, worked on the railways etc. More than 2 million extra women entered the work force between 1939 and 1945. They were cheap too, paid on average just 53% of the wage of a man doing the same job. 
I once interviewed a lady for a living history project who had gone from being a shop assistant at a co-operative store to sewing the covering on Spitfire elevators in the space of a couple of days!
Cheers
Steve


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## Koopernic (Nov 2, 2014)

stona said:


> Yes. There is much romanticisation of the Women's Land Army in the UK, and I am certainly not denying the valuable jobs that those women did, but there were never more than about 80,000 of them and considerably fewer for most of the war.
> Substantially more went into industry, worked on the railways etc. More than 2 million extra women entered the work force between 1939 and 1945. They were cheap too, paid on average just 53% of the wage of a man doing the same job.
> I once interviewed a lady for a living history project who had gone from being a shop assistant at a co-operative store to sewing the covering on Spitfire elevators in the space of a couple of days!
> Cheers
> Steve



Theoretically I should have been possible for Britain to feed herself but it would require a great deal of manpower and it would have to be quite intelligent and well directed. They would need to know exactly what they were doing, which is the hard part. Some permaculturists have achieved incredible densities of food production. The best Ive heard is 180 sqm per person as supplying enough calories (vegetarian). Meat production can be surprisingly efficient if done properly, though one has to ignore the vegan/animal lib 'propaganda' out there when seeking information. I imagine it would be a sort of 18th century Irish diet of colcannon: Potato + Leavy Green such as cabbage/spinach mixed with milk.

The Problem with the Me 210(long) re-entering production in June 1942 is that this also marks the introduction of the 412mph Spitfire IX with the two stage intercooled Merlin 61 running on 100/130 which was producing 1565hp. The DB605B was capable of only 1300hp on B4 87 octane at the time and at a lower full throttle height and so the aircraft managed only 360mph. Had the aircraft entered service 1 year earlier it would have been a troublesome bomber to deal with for the Spitfire V and its slower speed of 370mph or so. In General the Messerschmitt fighters suffered a huge power disadvantage, over 20%, compared to the Spitfire and Mosquito.

The aircraft however eventually received the 1750hp DB603A, though it was a 900kg engine. I see nothing wrong with the aircraft had it been employed within its limits. It could have been used somewhat as a Beufighter was. Though it lacked the range/warload of the Ju 188/Do 217 it still outranged the Me 110 and did not slow down due to its internal bomb bay.
1 Dive Bomber to replace Ju 87 and Ju 88 for long range and maritime strike missions.
2 Torpedo bomber, with external torpedo and radar.
3 Night fighter with radar. The aircraft never received radar as due to its modest size it required repackaging of the electronics and as the required electrical engineers were urgently required it was decided not to divert them.

Again, even with the DB603A the aircraft could have used more power. Some 1900hp was possible simply by using C3 fuel. The late war DB603 and Jumo 213 had over 2200hp available with good altitude performance and jet thrust.

Me 410 came into service when the tide was turning against the Luftwaffe and it was facing overwhelming odds.


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## stona (Nov 2, 2014)

What the British did was bring far more land into the production of cereal crops. 

The amount of arable land producing cereals in the UK rose from just over 5 million hectares in 1939 to about 8 million in 1945. That given over to wheat almost doubled to 1.5 million hectares. 

More labour was required and the number of agricultural workers rose by about 100,000 during the war to a 1945 total of 800,000.

Livestock numbers fell sharply, including poultry. Numbers of pigs saw the biggest decline. This might be partially explained by a story my mother told me about her and her sister having to hide piglets from 'the Ministry man' on the farm on which they were working part time as teenaged school girls 

Cheers

Steve

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## tomo pauk (Nov 3, 2014)

Back a bit about the engines, this time the Jumos. Cancel the 222 and 223 (24 cylinder diesel), work on the 211 and 213 exclusively. Inc case the bigger powered diesel is needed, maybe convert the 211 for diesel fuel?
The intercooled Jumo 211J is in the pipeline, step up the work on a 2700 rpm version (as per historical 211N version), a two-stage compressor (should go well with inter cooler) 'fighter engine' (permitting the prop shaft cannon). 
The Jumo 213 should be also aimed for fighters 1st, at least the 3000 rpm mark is hopefully achieved by some time mid 1943 service machines, also intercooler and prop gun capability. The 3250 rpm and two stager versions should be tested before 1943 ends, by that time also including the MW injection system.

The 'proper' airframe for the 211 line should be the modestly-sized night fighter, among others. The Fw-190 might be a costumer for 2-stage 211s and all 213s, at least until the production ramps up.

Once the Polikovsky's device is known in Germany (from captured Mikulin engines), modify the mainstream engine models to include it, since it adds quite a bit of power under the engine's rated height, including the take-off regime.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 3, 2014)

It is very difficult to convert gas engines to diesel (not impossible) Because the peak pressures inside the diesel are much higher than for a gas engine (even a supercharged one). The _average_ pressure is lower which is why they put out less power but with compression ratios of 14-18:1 the peak pressures are very high. The Block, heads, pistons, rods and all the bolts holding things together have to be able to stand up to the pounding which is why all those diesel truck engines weigh so much. 
Two stage engine is going to need much larger intercooler than a singe stage engine. It can certainly be done but just because you have "an" intercooler doesn't mean it works in every application.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 4, 2014)

Indeed, the pressure ratios provided by the decent 2-stage compressor would be between 50 and 100% greater than even an excellent 1-stage S/C was able to provide, meaning much more raise of the manifold tempearture. We can also remember that the 2-stage V-1710 in the P-63 was without the intercooler, it's rated altitude for military power (1125 HP) being 6-9000 ft greater than the best 1-stage variant.

BTW, for the 2-stage Jumo 213 - no need to bother with a 3-speed gear, should save us some time.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 5, 2014)

One of the things not touched by this thread - a proper long-range fighter for the LW? If it did anything, the BoB underscored that LW lacks such an item. Despite the addition of a drop tank to the Bf-109. 
The upcoming needs for the Mediterranean and Eastern front need to be addressed.


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## gjs238 (Nov 5, 2014)

Steal the designs for and manufacture the NA-73X


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2014)

Strap the DB-601N or E on the Mustang and you have some fighter indeed.

As for more dow-to-earth proposals, here are some:
- dust off the Fw-187, this time with either DB-601 or Hispano Suiza Y12 engines. Main shortcoming is the cost, both to produce and operate it; in case DB engines are installed something else does not get the engines, with HS engines the performance would not be that sparkling. Benefit is the great fuel tankage, possiblity to install heavy weapon load, can double as fast bomber
-install the rear tank on the Bf-109, on the place where the GM-1 or MW-50 tank was located in future versions of the 109. A straight forward thing, though it might get tricky to fly until a good deal of that fuel is not consumed. Alernative for that might be a modification of the wing, outboard of wheel wells, in order to install fuel tanks there. Shortcoming is that it would take some time for the modification, the wings of the Friedrich were not that strong to begin with.
-wing tanks in the Fw-190, more than double the fuel tankage. Shortcoming is the late introduction of the Fw-190, that, coupled with low reliabilty of it's powerplant, meaning it would be available for such tasks only in late 1942. The BWW 801 is not that frugal with fuel as the DB either.


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## stona (Nov 6, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> One of the things not touched by this thread - a proper long-range fighter for the LW? If it did anything, the BoB underscored that LW lacks such an item. Despite the addition of a drop tank to the Bf-109.
> The upcoming needs for the Mediterranean and Eastern front need to be addressed.



The Luftwaffe did have such an item in the zerstorer concept and that was the Bf 110. It struggled to cope with the RAF's single seat fighters, particularly as they were fighting on their own terms, but did pretty well elsewhere.

If it's successor had worked then the Me 210 would have been a fairly formidable aircraft in 1941/42. I should have been available in plenty of time for the second summer of fighting in the east. Experienced pilots, who had not yet become the rarity that they would after 1942, liked the Me 210 very much. Johannes Kaufmann of ZG 1 recalled his disappointment when the Me 210 was withdrawn.

_"The Me 210 was withdrawn, and we had to revert back to the Bf 110 and go along with it to Russia in the summer offensive of 1942. The whole airfield was gripped with deep disappointment."_

The problem was not that the RLM/Luftwaffe hadn't planned for a suitable long range aircraft, it was that the aircraft in question didn't work.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2014)

Hence my proposals


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## stona (Nov 6, 2014)

This means you're proposing a suitable aircraft developed in the light of the Me 210 debacle. The true nature of the fiasco didn't become apparent until late 1941/early 1942 so that is your starting date. Why that was the case is due to the dishonesty of Messerschmitt and the incompetence of the RLM.
By late 1942 (when the first modified Me 210s were delivered to the Luftwaffe) how can you hope to have a viable alternative ready to deliver to the Luftwaffe?

The impact of the Me 210 fiasco is often underestimated. Not only did it leave the Luftwaffe without a replacement for the Bf 110, and limited options, it had a severe impact on other production. In 1941-2 only 94 Me 210s were produced at Regensburg and no Bf 110s at all. Between October 1941 and March 1942 not a single Bf 109 left Regensburg for the front line, the nine produced in the first three months of 1942 went to Rechlin. The RLM suddenly discovered that not only did it have no replacement for the Bf 110 but that it was short of at least 200 Bf 109s!

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2014)

But I'm not counting on the Me-210 debacle. I'm counting on the fact that a main fighter, the Bf-109, proved to be incapable to provide a wide footprint over enemy territory that was several hundred Km away. LW will need a long range fighter already in 1941, no much point to wait for 1942.
Mtt can surely go with a replacement for the Bf-110, but that must be a smaller and lighter airframe, not just featuring the short fuselage, if we want it to compete with S/E opposition on equal footing. So forget the bomb bay, engineer a thiner wing, don't bother with barbettes, also forget the LMGs and go straight with cannons.


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## Njaco (Nov 6, 2014)

> .....The true nature of the fiasco didn't become apparent until late 1941/early 1942 so that is your starting date....



The true nature was apparent and revealed during test trials in late 1939. The LW didn't "believe" them until 1941/1942.

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## stona (Nov 6, 2014)

Njaco said:


> The true nature was apparent and revealed during test trials in late 1939. The LW didn't "believe" them until 1941/1942.



Absolutely right, that would be the bit I wrote about Messerschmitt's dishonesty and the RLM's incompetence 

Cheers

Steve

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## wiking85 (Nov 6, 2014)

Well then guys we need a change in LW leadership prior to the BoB. Say have Walter Wever live and you then probably get the FW187, as it was under Udet that the project was first changed into a zerstörer and then dropped altogether; that was primarily a function of Richthofen leaving the Technical Branch when Udet was promoted. Wever and Richthofen understood as early as 1935-36 that they needed a long range escort fighter and the Bf110 was not that aircraft; in fact Wever was adamantly against the Zerstörer concept according to E.R. Hooton's books on the LW, but Goering wouldn't let go of the idea, being his baby and all. However if Wever lives and Udet does not replace Wimmer in the TB, then Richthofen stays in the Development Department and continues to push the single seat long range escort fighter in the form of the Fw187 (and no dive bombing requirement for everything else too).

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## parsifal (Nov 6, 2014)

Just about everybody in Europe believed a long range escort with SE fighter agility was impossible to achieve. you see that in spades in both the RAF and LW procurement. Spitfire and ME109 were both fantastic aircraft, except in one area....range. Eventually both had their ranges improved, but compared to a Zeke or a P-51 they were just not in the race.

So what is it that made it possible for the japanese, and then the Americans, able to build very effective long range fighters, able to travel hundreds of kilometres and still fight effectively against the opposition. For the Japanese it was a matter of compromises....small engine size for economic cruise, ultra light weight construction, and an absence of excess weight including fire suppression and other protection. US were able to produce a rather more balanced approach, but not in 1940....it was 1943 before that was possible. 

So, by extrapoltion, my guess is that the RAF or the LW could have a long range fighter option with adequate manouver in 1940 only by sacrificing something else in their designs. Try for an everything package, and you are likely to lose everything...sacrifice something and you get something that might compensate for that other weakness.

So what weakness can the RAF or the LW afford to get a long range fighter?

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## Shortround6 (Nov 6, 2014)

Part of it depends on what you call long range. Even with drop tanks you can only fight and return home over a certain distance with 90-100imp gallons of internal fuel. 

Since engines (and the entire powerplant) is pretty much a constant, and the pilot/cockpit can't be shrunk you are left with cutting structural weight, protection, performance or firepower. Or some combination.

While your performance doesn't have to be _better_ than the defenders it can't be inferior by very much. Question starts to become by how much. 5-10mph might be OK, 15-20mph might be iffy, 25-30mph and maybe you shouldn't be there? Same with climb or turn. 
How much armament can you sacrifice? The escort fighter doesn't need a heavy cannon armament but it does need enough to take-out (at least heavily damage) an enemy interceptor without having to chase it all over the sky, taking multiple firing opportunities getting out of position and burning too much fuel. 

As the war went on engines improved so they were giving more power per pound/kg of powerplant weight. This opened up opportunities that didn't exist in 1938-40 as it changed the power to weight ratio of the entire aircraft. A Merlin 63 for example was giving a bit over 50% more power (at 18lbs boost) a bit higher up than the Merlin III gave but the entire power plant (engine, prop, radiators, oil system etc) didn't weigh 50% more. It allowed the plane to weigh about 50% more with the only real loss in performance being the turning circle. For the Germans a DB 605A offered just about 50% more power at 6,000 meters ( at ata 1.42) than a DB601A-1 did. Once again installed weight did NOT go up 50%.


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## KiwiBiggles (Nov 6, 2014)

I wonder how possible it is to make an effective long-range fighter in Europe before about 1943. Nothing to do with aircraft technology as such, it's just that if you're going to range out to 500 miles across cloud-covered Europe, you'd better have some pretty good navigation systems in place.

By 1943-1944, the Allies had a significant infrastructure of electronic navigational aids installed, reaching all the way to Berlin. A single-seat pilot out by himself somewhere over Germany had at least a reasonable chance of finding his way home. Without these aids, you'd really need at least a part-time navigator tucked in behind you, to help you get back. So we need two seats, and the weight starts to go up. None of the attempts at single-engine two-seat fighters (prior to the Firefly, anyway) were very successful, so take it that we have to go with two engines. And you're looking at the Bf 110 (or Me 210 or whatever).

I just don't think making a long-range fighter to project right across Europe is simply a matter of pouring a whole lot more petrol into it.

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## stona (Nov 7, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Just about everybody in Europe believed a long range escort with SE fighter agility was impossible to achieve. you see that in spades in both the RAF and LW procurement. Spitfire and ME109 were both fantastic aircraft, except in one area....range.



And neither side needed them in any projected scenarios. 

The Spitfire was a point defence fighter which emerged as a compromise of the two types used in the old 'Fighting Area' and ADGB.The operative word is defensive, they were supposed to intercept and shoot down enemy bombers IF the RAF's bomber force had failed to deter an attack. RAF bombers were not going to be escorted. The RAF didn't see a need for a long range fighter and the Government certainly didn't want to pay for one.
British defence procurement was governed by Lloyd George's 1919 'Ten Year Rule' which had told the service chiefs that they need not anticipate another major war in the next ten years. In 1928 they were told that the ten year rule renewed itself each morning! It was only revoked in 1932.

The Bf 109 might have been designed with a more offensive role in mind but this did not involve operating at range across bodies of water. It involved operating over or close to the front from forward airfields, something the Luftwaffe was particularly adept at doing.
Luftwaffe bombers were to be accompanied by 'zerstorer' which did therefore have more range but have evidently not been classified as long range fighter in the terms of this thread.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2014)

FWIW, here some fighters that no one considered as push-overs, their engines of 1939-40 vintage, no great shakes in aerodynamics, while offering a useful combat radius:
-Re.2001, 540 liters (143 US gals) internal fuel, 545 km/h (339 mph)
-Ki.61, 199 US gals internally + drop tanks, 360 mph
-P-40B, 160 US gals int fuel, 350 mph
-D.520, range on internal fuel 777 miles, 330 mp/h, later almost 350 mph due to aerodynamic refinements.

Since our long range LW fighter will enter service some time in 1941, the Germans have better engines to offer, like the DB-601N and -E, closely followed by the BMW 801, that was offering some 30-50% more power than what was available in 1939/40. Both the 601N and -E (in 1941) offer almost 20% more power above 5 km than the DB-601A.

The Fw-190 with, say, 800 liters, instead of 525 would still be a great performer, but with a far greater range capability. Ditto for the Bf-109F-4 with 600 instead of 400 liters, especially vs. Soviet and N.African opposition.


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## Njaco (Nov 7, 2014)

> Part of it depends on what you call long range....



How about starting with from capital to capital? That was much of the focus (along with other targets) during attacks. If I can make it to your capital................


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## gjs238 (Nov 7, 2014)

Fuel also provides endurance, it's not just an issue of range.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 7, 2014)

PLease, please, please......

No pushovers? maybe not push overs but some on that list were certainly second rate and some were barely considered suitable for combat in 1941. 

A P-40B? rudimentry self sealing tanks and a poor armament. Performance at altitude is hardly up to European standards in 1940 let alone 1941. Many combats in the BoB _started_ with one side or the other (or both) at some altitude between 25,000 and 30,000ft. A lot didn't but allowing the enemy interceptors to bounce your fighters (and bombers) with a 5,000ft (or more) height advantage is going to bring your operational losses to an unsustainable level pretty quick. 

Did the D.520 even have self sealing tanks? without them your escort fighters could be on a one way trip from only a few 7.6-8mm bullet holes. Performance for the D.520 is all over the place due to different engines, different power quotes even for the same engine. Very little data that has _solid_ support and a lot of wild speculation on the web and from old books ( like this in wiki: "the 12Y-45 and -49s fitted to production D.520s used either 92 or 100 octane fuel.")

Now where the French were going to get 100 octane fuel is not mentioned. Nor is there any mention of what performance improvements there might be, and the Hispano design was getting pretty close to maxed out. The engines in the D520 may have require 91 octane fuel not the 85-87 octane of some of the earlier Hispano engines. ( most of the 860hp engines used a 5.8 compression ratio and ran on 85 octane, most of the over 900hp engines used 7:1 compression ratio and needed the 91 octane) The Hispano company had a lot of prototype engines or very low production number engines during the summer of 1940 and trying to figure out which airplane had which engine resulting in what for performance numbers is rather difficult. 

And just so we are all on the same page here:







US 55 gal drum, 208 liters. 55 US gallons of fuel is about 330lbs or 150kg.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 7, 2014)

Njaco said:


> How about starting with from capital to capital? That was much of the focus (along with other targets) during attacks. If I can make it to your capital................



Not even capitols, At the beginning 1936 the British didn't have a _bomber_ that could fly from England with a 500lb bomb, drop it _*anywhere*_ in Germany, like the western Ruhr area/French border and make it back to England. A bit over 200miles (although that might have been a bit of an exaggeration) and British 1935 bombers were pretty much about 1930 left overs. 

4-5 years later people want single fighters that can go from, say London to Hanover or Frankfurt? 424-396 miles

Lille to Birmingham is 248 miles and Lille to Liverpool is 325miles. 

Canterbury to Cologne is 256 miles. 

Granted the US liked to fly higher and faster than some other countries might need to but a P-38J with 410 gallons had an operational radius of 275miles, A P-47 with with 370 gallons was good for 225 miles and a P-47 with 305 inside and 300 gallons outside was good for 425 miles (Might make Hanover or Frankfurt?) A P-51 with 184 gallons inside was good for............150mile radius, the climb and form up can be killers for radius, Sticking in the rear tank got you to 375miles OR using two 75 gallon drop tanks got you 450-460 miles. 

Canterbury to Cologne is 256 miles. 

Sticking an extra 50 gallons in a Spitfire or 109 AND sticking another 75-80 gallons in a drop tank is NOT going to get you even 400 mile radius planes.

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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> PLease, please, please......
> 
> No pushovers? maybe not push overs but some on that list were certainly second rate and some were barely considered suitable for combat in 1941.
> 
> A P-40B? rudimentry self sealing tanks and a poor armament. Performance at altitude is hardly up to European standards in 1940 let alone 1941. Many combats in the BoB _started_ with one side or the other (or both) at some altitude between 25,000 and 30,000ft. A lot didn't but allowing the enemy interceptors to bounce your fighters (and bombers) with a 5,000ft (or more) height advantage is going to bring your operational losses to an unsustainable level pretty quick.



The P-40B was using a technology of 1940 (and earlier), it's armament was far more suitable for long range duties than of the Bf-109E, it's protection was on par, if not better than of the BoB trio. At 15000 ft it was good for 350 mph, that compares well with Bf-109E, if not with Spitfire I/II. If we assume the P-40B will be long range fighter flying escort, it will already be at 20000 ft, the presumed lack of RoC is hardly an issue. It is a defender that must climb.

The Ki-61 was surely fit for combat when introduced. 



> Did the D.520 even have self sealing tanks? without them your escort fighters could be on a one way trip from only a few 7.6-8mm bullet holes. Performance for the D.520 is all over the place due to different engines, different power quotes even for the same engine. Very little data that has _solid_ support and a lot of wild speculation on the web and from old books ( like this in wiki: "the 12Y-45 and -49s fitted to production D.520s used either 92 or 100 octane fuel.")



Who had the s-s tanks in 1940, that are of comparable quality with what was available in 1944? I'd say no-one, but will bow to the superior data.



> Now where the French were going to get 100 octane fuel is not mentioned. Nor is there any mention of what performance improvements there might be, and the Hispano design was getting pretty close to maxed out. The engines in the D520 may have require 91 octane fuel not the 85-87 octane of some of the earlier Hispano engines. ( most of the 860hp engines used a 5.8 compression ratio and ran on 85 octane, most of the over 900hp engines used 7:1 compression ratio and needed the 91 octane) The Hispano company had a lot of prototype engines or very low production number engines during the summer of 1940 and trying to figure out which airplane had which engine resulting in what for performance numbers is rather difficult.



The reasons of the improved performance of the D.520 'Ameliore' (= Improved) were: going to individual exhaust stacks (ie. one per cylinder), introduction of boundary layer splitter to the radiator housing, introduction of a a 'hidden' oil cooler, installation of main wheel well covers.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The P-40B was using a technology of 1940 (and earlier), it's armament was far more suitable for long range duties than of the Bf-109E, it's protection was on par, if not better than of the BoB trio. At 15000 ft it was good for 350 mph, that compares well with Bf-109E, if not with Spitfire I/II. If we assume the P-40B will be long range fighter flying escort, it will already be at 20000 ft, the presumed lack of RoC is hardly an issue.* It is a defender that must climb.*



The last is a common misconception. If your climb rate at 20,000ft or so is significantly worse than the defenders it means you get _one_ firing pass at them and then you are out of the fight. It is also a misconception because it assumes that the defenders have a limited amount of warning time and are struggling to reach combat altitude as the bombers and escorts arrive. It is 165miles from Dover to Birmingham, over 45 minutes at the cruising speed of many bombers. Granted the defenders may not know which target/s the raid is going after but even without radar, deep penetration raids are going to find interceptors in the air and above them.

And like I keep saying, climb rate is an indicator of how well a plane can maneuver and fight at a given altitude. Many countries figured you needed a climb rate of 500 fpm just to fly in formation, let alone fight. Squadron of planes does a 180 degree turn at 25,000ft and above, outside planes have to speed up to maintain formation, using more power, all planes loose lift as they bank and need more power just to hold altitude as they turn. To actually engage in combat might require a climb rate of 1000fpm and a tight turn (anything around 2-3 Gs depending on altitude) _will_ cause you to loose either height or speed. 

P-40s were faster than F4Fs even above 20,000ft. They just slowed down faster or lost altitude quicker (or both) once the fight started.





> Who had the s-s tanks in 1940, that are of comparable quality with what was available in 1944? I'd say no-one, but will bow to the superior data.



I don't care if the quality was the same, I do care if we are comparing planes with self sealing tanks to planes without them, And the P-40C gained a lot of weight (and lost fuel) with it's self sealing tanks which were hardly of a 1944 type. Adding several hundred pounds of self-sealing tanks to some of these planes _will_ affect their performance, climb and turn.



> The reasons of the improved performance of the D.520 'Ameliore' (= Improved) were: going to individual exhaust stacks (ie. one per cylinder), introduction of boundary layer splitter to the radiator housing, introduction of a a 'hidden' oil cooler, installation of main wheel well covers.



Thank you, apparently the Bf 109 was a real dog when it came to aerodynamics as it is about the same speed as a D.520 despite having around 20% more power. The D.520 carried more armament (weight) and more fuel for greater range too. Good thing for the Germans not many got into service.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The last is a common misconception. If your climb rate at 20,000ft or so is significantly worse than the defenders it means you get _one_ firing pass at them and then you are out of the fight. It is also a misconception because it assumes that the defenders have a limited amount of warning time and are struggling to reach combat altitude as the bombers and escorts arrive.



One thing is to measure the climb rate with all internal fuel, another thing is to measure it after, say, 1/3rd was used up. For the P-40B, that would mean arriving at combat with 100+ gals aboard, a 300+ lbs difference. The Spitfire has 100 US gals aboard prior the take off, and will burn, say, 20 gals until it is at 20000 ft?
The defender cannot use the maximum power, but will instead climb at a lower power setting.



> It is 165miles from Dover to Birmingham, over 45 minutes at the cruising speed of many bombers. Granted the defenders may not know which target/s the raid is going after but even without radar, deep penetration raids are going to find interceptors in the air and above them.



The attacker can throw all of their LR fighters in an approximate area where the bombers will be flying. Would all of the defenders be able to concentrate on the attackers? I'd say no, we can look at the BoB and inability of different groups to help the neighbor from another group.
Then, what will the defenders do, once they see the attackers? Forget about the escort, go after the bombers, only to be killed by the escorts (= LW in 1944)? Or deal with the escort, so the bombers can go unmolested? 
What was the alternative to the LW anyway in 1940? Bf-110 - no go vs. the Spitfire, struggles with Hurricane, not enough of them any way. Unescorted bombers? Another no-go. Night bombing? Healthier for the bombers, but they will not kill the RAF.
We should look at a whole air force needs, not just whether one fighter is 5-10 mph slower than the other.



> And like I keep saying, climb rate is an indicator of how well a plane can maneuver and fight at a given altitude. Many countries figured you needed a climb rate of 500 fpm just to fly in formation, let alone fight. Squadron of planes does a 180 degree turn at 25,000ft and above, outside planes have to speed up to maintain formation, using more power, all planes loose lift as they bank and need more power just to hold altitude as they turn. To actually engage in combat might require a climb rate of 1000fpm and a tight turn (anything around 2-3 Gs depending on altitude) _will_ cause you to loose either height or speed.



As above - an attacker that burned 1/3rd of it's fuel will climb much better than with its full fuel.



> I don't care if the quality was the same, I do care if we are comparing planes with self sealing tanks to planes without them, And the P-40C gained a lot of weight (and lost fuel) with it's self sealing tanks which were hardly of a 1944 type. Adding several hundred pounds of self-sealing tanks to some of these planes _will_ affect their performance, climb and turn.



I care, since we are debating the abilities of planes that were using pre-1941 technology (though the P-40B was from 1941). 



> Thank you, apparently the Bf 109 was a real dog when it came to aerodynamics as it is about the same speed as a D.520 despite having around 20% more power. The D.520 carried more armament (weight) and more fuel for greater range too. Good thing for the Germans not many got into service.



The Bf-109*E* was a dog, aerodynamics-wise. The Bf-109F-0, with same DB-601A engine, was faster some 25 km/h, just due to the aerodynamic refinements (front of the plane, retractable tailwheel, no struts on the tailplane, wider shallower radiators, also one cannon less).


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## Shortround6 (Nov 7, 2014)

title of thread is "Luftwaffe after BoB: strategy, tactics, tecnology?"

After the BoB The Germans, British, Americans all figured that planes without self-sealing fuel tanks/armor were operational trainers. French are already out of it (D520 with smaller, heavier fuel tanks has range of ????Performance of???), Japanese didn't change and lost how many pilots and and aircrew? 

Escorts may burn off fuel, they can't burn off the weight of the empty (or part empty) self sealing tanks. The P-40 gained 250lbs in weight just due to the extra weight of the self sealing tanks while empty. WHile the first P-40Cs don't show up (at the factory) until April/May of 1941 the Army had ordered the first P-40Ds in Sept of 1940 (middle of the BoB) 
And escorts need enough fuel to fight for 15-20 minutes then fly 150-250 miles to 'neutral' airspace (say the channel) and then still need to cross the channel, find friendly field and land. The flying back from the target area to the channel CANNOT be done at 190-220mph at 10-15,000ft unless they want to provide target practice for the defenders. 
I will assume that the escorting was done in relays so one group of fighters are not tied to the bombers for the entire flight. Going by the chart for the P-40D/E a P-40 would burn about 60 gallons an hour at 2300rpm map 28in (lean) to go about 280mph at 15,000ft. It would also burn 43-45 gallons to reach 20,000ft taking off at 8100lbs. Taking off at 8700lbs increase fuel to 20,000ft to 46-51 gallons. 
Climb rate for a P-40E at 20,000ft was 950fpm at 7500lbs, 800fpm at 8100lbs and 650fpm at 8700lbs, At 25,000ft it was 550fpm, 400fpm and 250fpm for the three weights. Yes you burn off some fuel before engaging in combat but even an extra 500-600lbs has a significant impact on climb at the high altitudes. The P-40E at 25,000ft is climbing at 3/4s the climb rate at 8100lbs as it would at 7500lbs. At 5,000ft the heavier plane is climbing at about 89-90% of the lighter one so the difference is nowhere near as great.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2014)

Problem with the P-40 is that it gained weight, via installation of heavier armament, protection, structure and fuel system, while there was no gain in engine power. We cannot blame only the heavier fuel system for what it lost in the RoC vs. the lighter predecessors. 
The European counterparts gained, sometimes, armament weight, a bit of protection, but they received more engine power every year, if not half a year, like sometimes the Bf-109 received. The Spitfire V with two cannons and 4 Brownings (= interceptor) should weight more than a Spit V with Brownings only and an empty self-sealing 30 imp gal rear tank (= longer range fighter), and would be also a bit draggier.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2014)

Back to the engines again, this time BMW. 
Forgetl the 802 and other bigger engines. All effort to the 801 model, but the fraction of the resources to slightly improve the Bramo 323 and BMW 132. The next step from the 801A/C might remain with a lower compression ratio, so there is less problems once the C3 fuel is used with greater manifold pressure? 
Should also enable easier earlier over-boosting, above 1.60-1.70 ata, at a cost of some altitude power vs. the historical 801D, but still a bit better than the 801C, due to increased S/C gearing (from .
Improvements for the BMW 801 - the bigger S/C, a 2-stage S/C, both with or without intercoolers, explore the water injection application. Also the Polikovsky's 'swirl throttle', the increased power under 5-5.5 km (incl. take off) would be much appreciated by the bomber fighter-bomber A/C. Would also allow to have more power while remaining on the B4 fuel.
The compact turbo-supercharger, employing the turbine with hollow blades, looks interesting, too.

added: translation/additions/corrections by yours truly:


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## Milosh (Nov 8, 2014)

Wasn't the first shipments of 100 octane fuel the Brits got suppose to go to the French? But, then the French were over run and capitulated.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 8, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Problem with the P-40 is that it gained weight, via installation of heavier armament, protection, structure and fuel system, while there was no gain in engine power. We cannot blame only the heavier fuel system for what it lost in the RoC vs. the lighter predecessors.
> The European counterparts gained, sometimes, armament weight, a bit of protection, but they received more engine power every year, if not half a year, like sometimes the Bf-109 received. The Spitfire V with two cannons and 4 Brownings (= interceptor) should weight more than a Spit V with Brownings only and an empty self-sealing 30 imp gal rear tank (= longer range fighter), and would be also a bit draggier.



Just using the P-40 to help illustrate the point. But lets try something, still using the P-40D/E since it is a bit easier to get numbers for, granted in climbs like a pregnant hog but it's speed is pretty good for it's power which means it's drag isn't that far off. AND the P-40D/E has 123imp gallons of internal fuel and can take 43.3imp or 62.5imp drop tanks. Or use the P-40F. 
Now figure out you combat radius;

1. Warm up and take off allowance.
2. Climb to altitude and form up allowance.
3. Combat allowance (5min military power and 15min max continuous) 
4. reserve allowance (20-30min at most economical).
These are pretty much fixed and won't change much from mission to mission.

For a particular mission (and like the 8th airforce, lets assume you are escorting in relays) you need to figure:
5. cruise to meeting point with bombers. 
6. Cruise speed while escorting bombers (if the bombers are doing 180-200 the fighters _have_ fly faster and weave or else they will be flying to slow to quickly respond) and air miles flown vs ground distance covered due to weaving.
7. Separation point from bombers. Worst/best case is over the bomber target, Fighters defend and then break for home as Fresh fighter squadrons show up to escort bombers on return leg. What cruise speed and altitude is needed to minimize risk/losses as fighters withdraw from enemy airspace? It will NOT be most economical cruise.
8. At what point can you throttle back from "combat cruise" to something less as the danger of being bounced by fresh enemy fighters fades (like crossing the channel).

Some of these change depending on _when_ in the war we are talking about. In 1940-41 the Channel was somewhat contested. You are NOT safe as soon as you are over water. Lets also remember that while the Channel was pretty narrow in the Dover - Calais area over much of it's length it is closer to 100 miles wide and for the British to hit Germany, they have to fly over Belgium or Holland. Germans have it a bit easier once they take France/Low Countries. 

Now for the P-40 in US gallons 1 2 come up to about 40-50 gallons (lighter planes should do better, and perhaps in summer less warmup is needed?).
3. is about 38 gallons 
4. is 11 gallons for 20 minutes. 

So we are up to about 89 gallons already. 

Now at about 233mph at 12,000ft it takes a P-40 23-24 gallons to fly 133 miles (distance from Ipswich to the Hague. And since you need to go both ways that is 135 gallons total, Granted the trip over will be done on the drop tank Or at leas t partially. Yo know have 13 gallons left plus drop tank for actual _penetration_ into enemy territory while escorting bombers. The P-40 can do 280mph at 15,000ft on 60 gallons an hour or 4.33miles per gallon (engine is running lean, much faster and it has to go to rich. With a 52 US gallon drop tank you can theoretically penetrate about 140 miles past the The Hague but that does not count weaving. 
IF you decide your fighters need to cruise faster for better response to an attack the P-40 does 297mph at 15,000ft but burns 85 gallons an hour running rich for 3.49miles per gallon. P-40D/E can do 316mph at 12,000 as long as the fuel holds out (max continuous) but is burning 112 gallons an hour or 2.82mpg. 

Obviously other planes may differ a bit, especially as to altitude and max lean cruising speed but the general performance area is there. For the British an extra 20-30 US gallons inside and a US 50 gallon drop tank are barely going to get you to the German Border if you are formation flying and weaving over bombers and maybe not even that. Germans are a bit better off as they don't have to cross 100-150 miles of formally neutral countries to get to important targets.


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## parsifal (Nov 8, 2014)

A word of caution on ranges. They are just not comparable between types and are often misleading. Manufacturers specs dont usually lie, but when a range is quoted, you cant know the operation state of the aircraft. 

I was once involved in a simulation design and it was stated how superior the ranges of french aircraft were compared to both British and US. Then we started to look a little deeper...how far could an MS406, or a D520 go under combat conditions. turns out that 750 mile published range is a crock for operations. The D520 is marginally better than a Spit when operating in a combat role.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 8, 2014)

Milosh said:


> Wasn't the first shipments of 100 octane fuel the Brits got suppose to go to the French? But, then the French were over run and capitulated.



Britain had been getting 100 octane from refineries in Venezuela, the Caribbean and Persian Gulf from about 1936 onward. US 100 octane was bought during the early years before Lend Lease but the majority of RAF fuel came from British owned refineries. I cant remember the exact figures but Britian had stocks of about 80,000 tons of 100 octane by May 40 which had almost doubled by Sept 40.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2014)

This might help, in order to roughly calculate the range of the Bf-109 (unrelated to the topic: the length of the DB-601A is 1852mm, not 1352mm). The consumption is the last column, liter per hour:


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## Aozora (Nov 8, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> PLease, please, please......
> Did the D.520 even have self sealing tanks? without them your escort fighters could be on a one way trip from only a few 7.6-8mm bullet holes. Performance for the D.520 is all over the place due to different engines, different power quotes even for the same engine. Very little data that has _solid_ support and a lot of wild speculation on the web and from old books ( like this in wiki: "the 12Y-45 and -49s fitted to production D.520s used either 92 or 100 octane fuel.")
> 
> Now where the French were going to get 100 octane fuel is not mentioned. Nor is there any mention of what performance improvements there might be, and the Hispano design was getting pretty close to maxed out. The engines in the D520 may have require 91 octane fuel not the 85-87 octane of some of the earlier Hispano engines. ( most of the 860hp engines used a 5.8 compression ratio and ran on 85 octane, most of the over 900hp engines used 7:1 compression ratio and needed the 91 octane) The Hispano company had a lot of prototype engines or very low production number engines during the summer of 1940 and trying to figure out which airplane had which engine resulting in what for performance numbers is rather difficult.
> ...



The Hurricane and Blenheim units of the AASF of the RAF in France were being supplied with 100 Octane fuel;

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/AASF-Fuel.pdf

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/RAF-Component-15may40.pdf

the table below, dated 24 February 1940, lists supplies of 100 octane fuel "Overseas (West of Suez)" at 5,300 tons (or 12,720,000 lbs, or roughly 42,400 55 gal drums) as of 8th Feb. No doubt some of this was being transported, but I do know that there were tankers carrying avgas, from British oil refineries, that regularly docked at French ports, prior to May-June 1940 






This table, dated 17 March, shows 6,200 tons as of 7 March






It doesn't take much of a stretch to think that the French AF may well have been able to get supplies of 100 Octane fuel from the British.

Also, what fuel did the French Curtiss 75s require?


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## Shortround6 (Nov 8, 2014)

Thank you for the tables.

The thing with 100 octane fuel and _some_ engines is that you just can't pour the the stuff into the tank, twiddle the boost limit nut and magically get a few hundred extra HP. 

Some engines will do very well if you do that, others tend to break real quick. Please note that _anybody_ who developed the Hispano-Suiza 12-Y engine type to make significantly more power also increased the weight of the engines a considerable amount. The Swiss version used a crankshaft that weighed 30kg more than the French originals. 

IF the french were planning on building hundreds of D.520s (and they were) then they had to plan to build hundreds of Hispano-Suiza 12-Y-45/49 engines (and they did) and they had to make these plans in 1939. So the question is NOT wither a few British tankers docked in France in 1940 with 100 octane fuel but where France _thought_ it was going to get enough 100 octane fuel to run hundreds of planes on back in 1939 when they made their production plans. 

The P&W engines used in the French Hawks would run on 87 octane and the Wright R-1820 G200-5 would run on 91 octane (or 91/96) and give 1200hp for take-off. 

The P &W information can be found here;

http://www.enginehistory.org/P&W/R-1830/R-1830Index.pdf

and some Wright Cyclone information can be found here;

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgMakeModel.nsf/0/158515e26a46ef168525670b006c2d21/$FILE/E-219.pdf


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## wiking85 (Nov 9, 2014)

As an aside what could the LW have built if using our hindsight they don't produce the Me210 until its fixed, same with the He177, and the Ju288 is cancelled when the Jumo 222 runs into its 1940 problems? How about the effect of building the Ostmark engine facility around the Jumo 213, which would get the full support of the RLM once the Jumo 222 is dropped and probably be available a year or so earlier as a result? Or not gearing up for the Ta-154? https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Ta_154#Produktion
Perhaps more Ju88Gs with earlier Jumo 213s? Or would we see more He-219s with Jumo 213s? Perhaps an earlier Ar234P for night fighting, or an earlier Me262B?


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## Glider (Nov 9, 2014)

I am pretty sure that the French Airforce didn't have any 100 octane fuel. It only started to be used by the RAF in France in May 1940 and I do know that the French were asking to access it in April/May. I cannot be certain but I doubt that they would have had time to acquire, test and distribute it before the Germans rolled over everything in Europe.


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## Greyman (Nov 9, 2014)

Glider said:


> I am pretty sure that the French Airforce didn't have any 100 octane fuel. It only started to be used by the RAF in France in May 1940 and I do know that the French were asking to access it in April/May. I cannot be certain but I doubt that they would have had time to acquire, test and distribute it before the Germans rolled over everything in Europe.



The RAF was using it before then. Heck, the first RAF fighter kill in the war (Oct 30, 1939) was achieved with +12 boost.

My knowledge of French aircraft is quite low, but I have some information on the D.520:


*Aircraft**Engine**Fuel*D.520 (1st 2nd prototypes)12 Y 25/2985/100 octaneD.520 (2nd 3rd prototypes)12 Y 3185 octaneD.520 (1940 production)12 Y 4592/100 octaneD.520 (1942 production)12 Y 4992/100 octaneD.523 (1 prototype)12 Y 51100 octaneSE 520 Z (1 prototype)12 Z (2)92 octane


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## Shortround6 (Nov 9, 2014)

Thank you for the information on the D.520 Hispanos. 

Unfortunately it seems to open as many questions as it might answer.

From "Hispano Suiza in Aeronautics" by Manuel Lage:

*Engine*.............*RPM*............*HP/altitude*........*HP/take-off*...........*compression ratio*............*compressor/ turning ratio*.

12-Ydrs2.........2400...............930/950...................992..............................5.8....................................HS/8.31
12-Ycrs...........2400...............860/3300.................835..............................5.8....................................HS/10.0
12-Y-21..........2400...............910/3600.................880..............................7.0...................................HS/10.0
12-Y-27..........2400...............900/850...................950..............................5.8...................................HS/8.33
12-Y-29..........2400...............920/3600.................910..............................7.2...................................HS/10.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12-Y-31..........2400...............860/3250.................830..............................5.8...................................HS/10.0
12-Y-33..........2400...............955/2250.................960..............................7.0...................................HS/10.0
12-Y-37..........2400...............960/1250...............1050..............................7.0...................................HS/8.33
12-Y-45..........2400...............920/4200.................935..............................7.0...................................SP/10.0
12-Y-49..........2400...............910/5250.................910..............................7.0...................................SP/11.46
12-Y-51..........2500..............1000/3260..............1100..............................7.0...................................SP/11.46

Engines above the line use the old style connecting rods and have no crankshaft damper. Engines below the line have the new rods and dampers.
under compressor HS stands for Hispano-Suiza and SP stands for Szydlowski-Planiol. The SP supercharger was supposed to lower the intake temperatur by 60o​ C

The 12-Y-51 was supposed to have bigger intake valves, the extra 100rpm (which required stiffer camshafts ?) and reinforcement of the upper and lower crankcases for about a 10KG increase in weight.
Unfortunately the book makes very few references to fuel, and little or no mention of boost pressures. 

The 12-Z got 4 valves per cylinder, ran at 2600rpm and went back to an HS supercharger. Only a couple of engines were flown before the surrender and at the time were using the same six carburetor set up as the earlier engines (or at least the same configuration, don't know if the same model carbs were used) 

One _could_ speculate that the 5.8:1 compression ratio engines ran on 85 octane and the others on 92 octane, what advantage the 100 octane brings I don't know as there is no mention of it and from the tables no real need of it (could very well be wrong on that) until you get to the 12 Z going back to the HS supercharger (or a modified one?) with it's higher intake temperature.


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## Aozora (Nov 9, 2014)

Greyman said:


> The RAF was using it before then. Heck, the first RAF fighter kill in the war (Oct 30, 1939) was achieved with +12 boost.



Indeed, approval to use 100 octane fuel in Spitfires and Hurricanes, and constant-speed propellers for the latter, was issued on 24 September 1938.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/24sept38-spitfire-100oct-approval.jpg

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg

Paragraph 5 of the latter:


> The operational limitations of Merlin engines when run on 100 octane fuel must be strictly observed.



The Merlins couldn't run at +12 lbs boost until they were equipped with modified cylinder heads and boost cut out controls and , although they were capable of using 100 octane fuel.

Is it possible the late 12-Y series engines were being modified to use 100 octane fuel, but had not yet been able to realise their full potential without more (possibly pending) modifications that were stymied by the surrender? It may well be the French had access to enough 100 octane to at least test the Hispanos, but not enough to use operationally.


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## Glider (Nov 9, 2014)

Greyman said:


> The RAF was using it before then. Heck, the first RAF fighter kill in the war (Oct 30, 1939) was achieved with +12 boost.


The RAF were using it before then I agree but not in France. Hurricane Squadrons in France started using 100 octane in May, No 1 Sqd starting on the 18th May at Berry-Au-Bac

On a slightly different note but I would be interested to know which unit had the first kill in Oct 1939 using 100 octane. I say this as the use of the fuel depended on the supply of the fuel. In November formal approval was still not given for the use of the fuel and on the 7th December the RAF were yet to start distributing the fuel. The first instances that I am aware of the fuel being used in is Feb 1940.


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## Greyman (Nov 10, 2014)

Glider said:


> On a slightly different note but I would be interested to know which unit had the first kill in Oct 1939 using 100 octane.



1 Squadron. I think the action is detailed in Richey's "Fighter Pilot", my copy is not with me at the moment.


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## Glider (Nov 10, 2014)

Thanks for this but according to the No 1 Squadron records they didn't get the fuel until May 1940 as mentioned before so something has gone wrong somewhere


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## Shortround6 (Nov 10, 2014)

Aozora said:


> The Merlins couldn't run at +12 lbs boost until they were equipped with modified cylinder heads and boost cut out controls and , although they were capable of using 100 octane fuel.
> 
> Is it possible the late 12-Y series engines were being modified to use 100 octane fuel, but had not yet been able to realise their full potential without more (possibly pending) modifications that were stymied by the surrender? It may well be the French had access to enough 100 octane to at least test the Hispanos, but not enough to use operationally.



One of the limiting factors (and a big factor) is the Hispano lacked the strength to withstand much of an increase in power, at least not without shortening it's service life.
Please note the modifications (and increased weight) of the Russian Hispano's, the VK series. The Russians used 95 octane and accepted (in some models) a shorter engine life. 
The French may well have _tested_ one or more Hispanos on 100 octane fuel but there was no big boost of power waiting to be unlocked.


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## stona (Nov 10, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> As an aside what could the LW have built if using our hindsight they don't produce the Me210 until its fixed, same with the He177, and the Ju288 is cancelled when the Jumo 222 runs into its 1940 problems? How about the effect of building the Ostmark engine facility around the Jumo 213, which would get the full support of the RLM once the Jumo 222 is dropped and probably be available a year or so earlier as a result? Or not gearing up for the Ta-154? https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Ta_154#Produktion
> Perhaps more Ju88Gs with earlier Jumo 213s? Or would we see more He-219s with Jumo 213s? Perhaps an earlier Ar234P for night fighting, or an earlier Me262B?



It wasn't like the Luftwaffe wasn't the Nazi's favourite child. Following Goering's announcement in October 1938 of the Reich's new re-armament plan the RLM submitted it's first draft for its expansion on 26th October.
It was to build 45,700 aircraft by Ist April 1942 at a cost of 60 billion RM. _That's equivalent to the entire defence budget from 1933-1939_. In early 1942 the Luftwaffe was to have 10,300 operational aircraft with 8,200 in reserve.
People wonder why the poor old Kriegmarine's 'Plan Z' was postponed until 1948!

On 15th November 1938 the RLM announced details of the aircraft to be built:

7,327 Ju 88 
702 He 177
2,000 He 111
900 Do 17
2,002 Ju 87
4,331 Bf 109
3,320 Bf 110/ Me 210, proportion not yet fixed, dependent on Me 210 development.

This would require 230,000 MORE workers and expansion of the RLM at a cost of 2.2 billion RM. New machine tools would cost another 327 million RM and the cost of equipment needed from abroad would be another 125 million RM. 
In ADDITION another airframe plant of 20,000 employees would be required.

This all went into 'Production Plan No.9' which was unattainable before it even started. The impact of aircraft like the He 177 and Me 210 was minimal at this time, though allowances were made in the next plan (No.10) of December 1938. Delays with the He 177 and Ju 88 were noticed and production of the Do17 and He 111 extended to cover this.

It's not like the Luftwaffe didn't have the opportunity in the immediate pre-war period. The planning was unrealistic and typical of the Nazi state. Simply writing a plan doesn't make it happen, even with 60 billion RM to back it. The issues with the He 177 and Ju 88 were indicative of things to come. 'Production Plan No.10' which covered the period from 1st January 1939 through 30th June 1941 (30 months) included 43 different types and sub types made at plants all over the Reich. The Bf 109 alone was being manufactured at five different locations. 

What was urgently needed was some kind of rationalisation of the various programmes but this never happened. In fact it got even more complicated and expensive.

All this led directly to the Luftwaffe's first 'defeat'. Between July and December 1940, the period including the Battle of Britain the Germans produced 1219 fighter aircraft (Bf 109), the British 3,225 (Spitfire, Hurricane). In 1940 the RLM built on average 139 S/E fighters per month. In July 1940 alone the British built 490.
Between January and April 1941 the figures are 5,216 for the British and 2,510 for the Germans. This is before American production becomes a major contributing factor.

It wasn't a lack of planning that was the problem but an inability to properly organise the aero industry as a whole in a way which could make the plans realisable. Political interference didn't help. The Germans seem to have been incapable of making a plan _and then sticking to it._In June 1940, just when the Germans should have been going all out to increase production it was decreased and aircraft exports were restarted! Plans were made to stop production of many types by late 1941! This in direct contradiction to the immediate pre-war production plans.

Between May 1933 and March 1945 more than 100 General Staff requirements were given to the RLM. In response the Technical Office produced 42 Beschaffungsprogrammen (procurement programmes). Some had one or two variations. Of these programmes 36 were issued to the aviation industry as Lieferplanen (production plans). Production Plans included legal contracts and were supposed to allow the various firms of the aviation industry to plan facilities, procure man power and raw materials and, if they wanted to, sub- contract for parts. The problem was that there were many plans creating a set of ever moving goal posts at which the various individual companies were supposed to aim.
In August 1941 there were still more than 40 types in production, Messerschmitt alone had 11, Heinkel 10.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Nov 10, 2014)

Stona that's all great info, but the problem is it doesn't address my point; part of the reason historically the LW had issues with production was by wasting a lot on projects that didn't pan out even after they were shown to be duds and needed modifications to be worthwhile or were complete wastes of time; the Me210 fiasco cost about 2000 aircraft due to wasted time, effort, and materials, while the He177 program turned out nearly 1200 useless bombers. Beyond that the tooling costs for the Ta-154 cost an unknown number of aircraft, same with the major investments in the Ju288, which was one of the most expensive projects in LW history, with great numbers of highly specialized large machine tools being scrapped in the process. 
So whatever the unrealistic pre-war plans were and the issues with early war production, partly the problem of Udet's and Goering's awful production planning, not helped by Goering poaching the LW's production planner for the 4 Year Program (Fritz Loeb) in late 1936, the issues with wasted effort on massive scale, plus the proliferation of research projects, especially in the engine department, cost the LW major amounts of aircraft during the war. I'm just trying to figure out how to quantify the Me210, He177, Ju288, and Ta-154 losses.


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## stona (Nov 10, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> I'm just trying to figure out how to quantify the Me210, He177, Ju288, and Ta-154 losses.



I don't think that there is any easy way of doing that. 

Take the Ta 154. It was one of three designs developed by Tank in September 1942. Contracts to build 13 prototypes of what the RLM now designated the Ta 154 were issued in November 1942. So far things have moved quickly. The Ta 154 V1 flies on 1st July 1943, so far so good. Even before this, on 18th June, the RLM has ordered a first batch of 250 Ta 154 night fighters and started to organise mass production at Breslau, Erfurt and Posen (built with the help of 2,000 Jewish 'workers' who were then promptly sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau).

Deliveries were to start in January 1944 and by November there was to be a combined monthly output of 250 aircraft rising to 500 by the summer of 1945. This posed some problems but late in 1943 the production centres were increased to aid the mass production. The Focke-Wulf Cottbus plant was added to the programme to make cockpits and fuselages. Famo opened a new facility at Bunzlau where 1,500 inmates from the Gross-Posen concentration camp worked to build components for the Ta 154. The Erfurt plant was expanded by acquisition of the Holzflugzeugbau Gotha plant a mere 24 Kms from Erfurt.
In March 1944 the following short term delivery schedule was implemented for the Ta 154. By May Posen-Kreising would deliver 37, Erfurt 21 and Breslau 5. 

What went wrong?

I've read a lot about glues and other technical problems, but this is what happened.

First the destruction of the Goldmann firm at Wuppertal on the night of 20/21 May 1944, ironically by RAF Mosquitoes, completely stopped the production of the Tego-Film adhesive vital to Ta 154 production. The failings of the alternative from Dynamit AG at Leverkusen-Schlebusch are well documented. Credit is rarely given to acts of sabotage committed by some of the 245 French and Belgian prisoners/workers at this plant. They risked their lives to do this just as surely as the allied airmen bombing the other facilities.

On 9th April and 29th May Posen was bombed by the USAAF. The first Posen built aircraft didn't fly until 30th June 1944. By August Posen and Cottbus had built only 57 aircraft. On 11th April Cottbus was bombed.

Erfurt also struggled. Along with the Gotha works it assembled just 64 aircraft, most were never flown. Erfurt was bombed on 20th July 1944.

Famo didn't complete an aircraft until May 1944.

Because of the priority of the Ta 154 programme further facilities were utilised at the underground Focke-Wulf plant at Salzbergwerk-Bremen and the Flugzeugwerk-Mielec in Poland. The latter was staffed by about 5,000 workers, including 2,000 Jewish prisoners for whom a camp was specially built. The facility soon developed a reputation for sabotage. Despite the relatively large workforce the plant built just 14 fuselages before evacuation in August 1944 the face of Soviet advances. 

The Ta 154 programme was cancelled in August 1944.

The Luftwaffe received just 8 production night fighters, 4 in June and 4 in July of 1944. The allies did not find a single intact Ta 154 at the end of the war.

Most of the problems of producing the Ta 154 are simply those of attempting to build anything when you are losing a war, being bombed into next week and using labour which is at best uncooperative and at worst actively sabotaging your efforts.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 12, 2014)

A bit on the drop tank installation for the Bf-109, per Prien Rodeike: the fuel was forced, by the compressed air, to flow from the drop tank into the fuselage tank. The limiter prevented overfilling of the fus. tank. So our Bf-109 can enter the combat on full internal fuel, since any fuel used up for warm up, take off and initial climb will be topped up by the fuel from the drop tank.

The Bf-109F modified for longer range work would still need to carry more fuel, be it with extra fuselage tank (in lieu of where the GM-1 tank was on some 109F-4s), or a longer fuselage/main tank - those modifications should mean maybe 500 (roughly 130 US gals) instead of 400 liters aboard. The wing tanks should add maybe another 150 liters (roughly 40 US gals). Or, in imp gals, total of some 140 gals.The larger drop tank would be also useful, at least 400 liters there.
That should be the principal variant for use in SU and MTO.

For the ETO - armament upgrade. Eg. go with installation of the MG 131 as much as supply allows. Another option is the pair of the MG FFM in the wings. Not as drastic as the Galland's machine, that had both (more about it: link), but certainly with a great punch. The MG 131 installation in the Galland's 109F was, outwardly, a much less bulky thing than at the later Gustavs. 
Get the cranking on MG 131 production (would be needed for the LG 109s, too), as well as on the earlier introduction of the 90-rd drum for the MG FFM, it is almost of same size as the 60-rd one.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2014)

The question of next-gen bombers.
The He-177 is in works, the 1st prototype flew a year ago from our starting point here. My suggestion is to redesign the wing ASAP to take 4 individual engines (the DB does only the 601 and 603, not the 606/610 and 604, even while the 606 is the derivative of the 601E), rather than 2 coupled ones. Should make 'German Lancaster+', rather than 'German Manchester+'. We give up some speed, but earn a lot in decreased engine problems, along with the ability to use any of the the 1300-1700 HP engines Germany had in volume production. One lucky hit will not 'delete' half of available power either. The use of smaller prop would enable a shorter stronger landing gear, so less accidents in landings than historically.

The twin engine bomber category is to be filled with two reasonably new bombers, the Ju-88 (already in service) and Do-217 (to enter service). Both have shortcomings - Ju-88 has a too restrictive bomb bay, forcing the bombs bigger than 50 kg to be carried outboard, that cut both in the speed and range. Maybe the bomb bay could be redesigned to carry bombs vertically, like it was the case for the He-111 - eight 250 kg bombs it carried internally? Not sure it could dive bomb with bombs carried like that, though.
Another option is the earlier introduction of the wooden bomb panier, cut some drag with big bombs carried under fuselage. The redesigned fuselage section where the wing was attached, so the wing is relocated in the 'shoulder' position, might also allow for a less restricted bomb bay.
The Do-217 needs ASAP better engines than the BMW 801A/L, so it might be an early recipient of the DB-603 engines, along with BMW 801D/MG. The 603 should benefited from the cancellation of the a number of DB engine projects in Autumn of 1940, so more resources can be spent on the 603. For the BMW 801D, I've suggested keeping the compression ration on the ballpark with the 801C, so there is hopefully less problems when introduced (the cost is a bit of altitude power), and the over-boosting will be tested introduced earlier, with major benefits for bombers fighter-bombers.
After those, the Ju-288. The Jumo 222 gets cancelled, the Ju-288 remains with small wing and gets tested with BMW and DB-603. Against the Ju-88, it offers far better bomb bay and fuel tanks layout, better defensive armament, so it will progresively replace the Ju-88 as a bomber.

A non-conservative design, if I may - a 3-engine bomber, with two engines on the wings and 3rd engine in fuselage, as a pusher. Rear-facing MGs installed at the rear end of the nacelles, like at Fw-191.


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## stona (Nov 16, 2014)

Heinkel, Oranienburg was a plant with one of the largest number of 'workers' used from concentration camps (5,939 are listed from a projected total of 6,500 from the Sachsenhausen camp). They were all involved in He 177 production and that can cause problems. See above.
Lets not lose sight of who and why we were fighting.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2014)

The use of slave labor to in aircraft industry is a self-inflicted wound, apart from what that did to the slave workers themselves.
BTW, the He-177 was also produced by Arado and Heinkel-Sud (Wienna).


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## stona (Nov 16, 2014)

Not just slave labour, imported labour and more pertinently unskilled labour.
In January 1933, before the expansion started the German airframe and aero-engine industries employed 2,813 and 1,175 workers respectively
In July 1944 these figures were 342,601 and 202,999 respectively.
It was an impossible situation for the Germans. At the Messerschmitt plant at Kematen the percentage of skilled labour had dropped to 23% by early 1943. Across the Henschel organisation it fell to only 11% by as early as 1942.
Is it any wonder the quality of production suffered? The more complicated the aeroplane, and the He 177 was a very complicated machine, the worse the problem. By 1942/3 the aircraft industry would really struggle to develop these types, as is demonstrated by the historical figures. 
Quantity was less of a problem. In 1944 2.33 million workers produced 40,593 aircraft, four times the number produced by 1.2 million workers in 1940. The fallacy of the "production miracle" is that the vast majority of the late war production was of single engine types, much smaller and easier to produce than larger aircraft.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2014)

The He 177 with individual engines would be a less complicate plane. There is no much sense to build the He 111s from late 1942 on, they would be easily killed by Hurricanes Is or Yak-1s, let lone by the contemporary Allied fighters. The force of the He 177s that would use, say 1000 Jumo 211 engines would carry more ordnance further away than the force of He 111 that use same 1000 of Jumo 211s. It would do that on higher cruising speed (especially if the bigger bombs need to be carried), and while carrying greater defensive armament. The targets the He 111 can tackle, the He-177 also can, while vice-versa does not apply. The engine-out situation does not mean an immediate return to base. The crew needed would be also smaller, 250x6 vs. 500x5 men - 1500 vs. 2500.
Of course, the escort fighter would be needed either way, the higher cruising speed of the He-177 vs. He 111 makes the job for the escorts easier.


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## stona (Nov 16, 2014)

Well there were plenty of Jumo 211 engines around. Over 68,000 were built and they were attaching engines_ from the reserve stock _ to Ju 88 Gs as late as March 1945.

You seem to be suggesting that the He 177 should have been built to the original proposal in which the Jumo 211 was one of six engines suggested. The problem is that the aircraft that would have resulted could only carry 2,000Kg of bombs.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Nov 16, 2014)

stona said:


> Quantity was less of a problem. In 1944 2.33 million workers produced 40,593 aircraft, four times the number produced by 1.2 million workers in 1940. The fallacy of the "production miracle" is that the vast majority of the late war production was of single engine types, much smaller and easier to produce than larger aircraft.
> Cheers
> Steve


Yes, but in the face of a massive bombing campaign that made any production very difficult. It was a miracle anything got built. It would have been much higher without strategic bombing and only rose to those numbers because they were smaller, easier to make aircraft, rather than 1942 build priorities.


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## wiking85 (Nov 16, 2014)

stona said:


> Quantity was less of a problem. In 1944 2.33 million workers produced 40,593 aircraft, four times the number produced by 1.2 million workers in 1940. The fallacy of the "production miracle" is that the vast majority of the late war production was of single engine types, much smaller and easier to produce than larger aircraft.
> Cheers
> Steve


Yes, but in the face of a massive bombing campaign that made any production very difficult. It was a miracle anything got built. It would have been much higher without strategic bombing and only rose to those numbers because they were smaller, easier to make aircraft, rather than 1942 build priorities.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2014)

stona said:


> Well there were plenty of Jumo 211 engines around. Over 68,000 were built and they were attaching engines_ from the reserve stock _ to Ju 88 Gs as late as March 1945.
> 
> You seem to be suggesting that the He 177 should have been built to the original proposal in which the Jumo 211 was one of six engines suggested. The problem is that the aircraft that would have resulted could only carry 2,000Kg of bombs.
> 
> ...



Why would the 4-engined bomber with 4 Jumo 211s carry less bombs than the one with 2 same engines? What version of the Jumo 211 is in the question there, ie. what power is available?


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## wiking85 (Nov 16, 2014)

stona said:


> You seem to be suggesting that the He 177 should have been built to the original proposal in which the Jumo 211 was one of six engines suggested. The problem is that the aircraft that would have resulted could only carry 2,000Kg of bombs.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Based on what? The coupled engine and twin props only saved 3-4% in drag, which while significant isn't anywhere near reducing it from 6 to 2 tons of bombs. The Lancaster used 1200hp engines (same as Jumo 211B) and had a much heavier payload a longer ranges while being the same weight as the He177A. In fact the He177B would have been lighter over all if it had not have the upweighting due to the dive bombing requirement. So with the same weight or less and same engine power and roughly similar dimensions there is no way the He177B would be restricted to 2 tons of bombs.


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## stona (Nov 16, 2014)

It was due to the narrow fuselage of the original proposal. It was smaller than what became the He 177, a four or five man crew, but I don't have the details to hand. It would have been the A series engine at the time.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2014)

Thanks. 
The Jumo 211A was with 1000 PS for take off. By Autumn of 1940, the 1200 HP Jumo 211B is long available, the 1340 PS 211F is in the pipeline, the fuselage can remain as historically it was on the He 177. 
By late 1941, the intercooled 211J is there, 1420 PS for take off.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 16, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The He 177 with individual engines would be a less complicate plane.



A bit less complicated than the real He 177 in some ways, a bit more complicated in others. And a 37,000lb airplane is _always_ going to be much more complicated than a 19,000lb airplane to build. More than a simple comparison of weights. 



> There is no much sense to build the He 111s from late 1942 on, they would be easily killed by Hurricanes Is or Yak-1s, let lone by the contemporary Allied fighters.



A few problems here,
1. the He 111 always seemed to be on the short of the stick when it came to getting engine upgrades.
2. the He 111 always seemed to be on the short of the stick when it came to getting defensive weapon upgrades.
3. The He 177 wasn't going to survive in daylight against those fighters either. Both bombers would have had to operate by night in order to keep losses to an acceptable level. 




> The force of the He 177s that would use, say 1000 Jumo 211 engines would carry more ordnance further away than the force of He 111 that use same 1000 of Jumo 211s. It would do that on higher cruising speed (especially if the bigger bombs need to be carried), and while carrying greater defensive armament.



Everybody always wants to introduce a new airplane/tank/ship with the armament it carried after several years of service. The armament carried by the He 177A-1s was not very good, and like a number of German bombers, had one crew man responsible for guns pointed in different directions so actual firepower was less than the list of weapons carried. 

According to Green (corrections welcome) the _standard_ weapons fit for an He 177 A-1 was a single MG 81 out the nose [one man], a 20mm MG FF out the front of the gondola (how effective this was for air defense I don't know)[2nd man], a remote control barbette with a single 13mm MG 131 on top controlled by gunner from behind the pilot [3rd gunner], single 13mm MG 131 out the tail with the 4th gunner. Pilot makes 5 man crew. 
A variety of extra weapon sets were available. A pair of MG 81s in the rear of the gondola to protect the belly (maned by who? the 20mm gunner? the gunner for the remote control barbette?), This position could also be used as a sighting station for a ventral barbette for a single 13mm gun. A manned dorsal turret (behind the bomb bay)with a single 13mm MG 131 was also available (manned by extra gunner? or tail gunner runs back and forth?). This is hardly great defensive armament in 1942. 



> The engine-out situation does not mean an immediate return to base.



Actually it does, sort of. The plane with engine out will NOT be able to keep up with the formation unless it does something like drop it's bomb load, even then??? depends on speed altitude of the formation?? And if operating single or in a bomber stream flying further into enemy territory with one engine already out means if a 2nd one quits the plane is pretty much lost (yes, US and British bombers _sometimes_ made it back on two engines but it was by no means a guaranteed thing).

Stick better engines in the He 111, stick 13mm Mg 131s or twin MG 81s in some of it's gun positions. It won't be _better_ than a He 177 but the difference will be closer.

edit: An _early_ He 177 is going to be stuck with the same MG 15s as the He 111, Do 17 and Ju 88s used.


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## stona (Nov 16, 2014)

The He 177 was doomed from the start and not just because of the infamous dive bombing requirement. Many other early design features simply over stretched the ability of the engineers to make them work. Now I'm not saying having to abandon an evaporative cooling system would necessarily be a disaster (think Spitfire) but it is illustrative of the sort of poor decisions taken at the outset of the design process. Heinkel had already had equivocal results with such systems on much smaller aircraft like the He 100 and He 119. The increased drag of radiators was one of the contributing factors that led to the two engine design winning out.

It's amazing to think that on 22nd June 1937 Heinkel promised to deliver the first pre-production aircraft to the RLM on 1st October 1939, almost in time for the start of WW2.

A four engine version was actually proposed again in mid 1939, but Udet cancelled it in September 1939, 11 days after the invasion of Poland. There's no way it would have been ready for operational service in 1940 even had the process gone ahead.

Everything that followed regarding actual production targets for the He 177, starting with Udet's initial order for 120 aircraft a month from June 1940, is pure fantasy.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> A few problems here,
> 1. the He 111 always seemed to be on the short of the stick when it came to getting engine upgrades.
> 2. the He 111 always seemed to be on the short of the stick when it came to getting defensive weapon upgrades.
> [_moved up_]Stick better engines in the He 111, stick 13mm Mg 131s or twin MG 81s in some of it's gun positions. It won't be _better_ than a He 177 but the difference will be closer.



Installation of better engines does not solve the problem the He-111 had - the external carriage of bigger bombs (above 500 kg). The He-111 with, say, BMW 801s aboard will have to cut the range and/or bombs tonnage carried - the Do-217 can do anything similar already, and it can carry big bombs internally. Neither of those has the capability to have a bigger firepower than He 177 was capable to carry in it's tail.



> 3. The He 177 wasn't going to survive in daylight against those fighters either. Both bombers would have had to operate by night in order to keep losses to an acceptable level.



Hmm - I've suggested the escort fighters. The He 177 cruised as fast as the He 111 was doing flat out, without bombs and 1/2 fuel.


> Everybody always wants to introduce a new airplane/tank/ship with the armament it carried after several years of service. The armament carried by the He 177A-1s was not very good, and like a number of German bombers, had one crew man responsible for guns pointed in different directions so actual firepower was less than the list of weapons carried.
> ...



The bomber with 4 engines can more easily 'swallow' the addition of defensive armament. You are right re. He-177A-1 guns, the A-3 introduced heavier guns, and more powerful engines. 




> edit: An _early_ He 177 is going to be stuck with the same MG 15s as the He 111, Do 17 and Ju 88s used.



En early He-117B (= 4 engines) will not be available in force before early 1942, since the redesign of the wings will start in Autumn of 1940, per this thread original premise. By then it can have better stuff than the MG 15s.


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## stona (Nov 16, 2014)

The wing was redesigned time and time again. It was first redesigned to accommodate extra fuel tanks after the evaporative cooling system was abandoned in order to compensate for the loss of range that would have been incurred due to the drag of the radiators. Then it was redesigned because of the infamous dive bombing requirement. That in turn led to a complete redesign of the undercarriage to accommodate the extra weight....and so it went on until virtually the end of the war.
It was a lame duck and the RLM should have abandoned it (and any number of other projects) to concentrate on projects that might actually work and be useful.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2014)

Hmm - what other design was able to offer the capability to hit the factories Soviets relocated, along with capability to be a competent long range marine patrol bomber? The dive bombing requirement need to be cancelled ASAP.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 16, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Installation of better engines does not solve the problem the He-111 had - the external carriage of bigger bombs (above 500 kg). The He-111 with, say, BMW 801s aboard will have to cut the range and/or bombs tonnage carried - the Do-217 can do anything similar already, and it can carry big bombs internally. Neither of those has the capability to have a bigger firepower than He 177 was capable to carry in it's tail.



Better engines for the HE 111 won't do much for speed but may improve the bomb load over distance figures IF the landing gear can handle the higher take-off weight. 

He 177 had some restrictions of it's own with the bomb bay. The high figures are only hit using odd ball combinations of oddball bombs. When carrying small bombs the He 177 doesn't show that big of an advantage. And carrying the big bomb loads cuts into the range substantially. _RANGE_ not radius, when carrying the max bomb load is given as 745miles(?). Max being 5600KG (?)

A more "normal" load is 3000kg and if made up of 12 SC 250lbs it is carrying only 50% more than the He 111. It appears that the He 177 could trade the four forward SC 250 bombs for extra space for fuel bringing to down to eight bombs (2000kg) but it's range may have been enough to equal a He 111 caring only four bombs (using 1/2 it's bomb bay for fuel) I haven't tried working out exact numbers. Performance charts for the He 177 seem a bit scarce. Here are links to two interesting manuals if you haven't seen them already, They are for the A-3 and are in German. The second one is a detailed description of the defensive armament. Please look at the elevation and traverse limits of some of the 20mm installations.
Description of He 177 A-3: http://www.deutscheluftwaffe.de/arc...ng He 177 A-3/Kurzbeschreibung He 177 A-3.pdf

He 177 A-3 defensive gun manual: http://www.deutscheluftwaffe.de/arc...nkel/He 177/He 177 A-3 Schusswaffenanlage.pdf



> Hmm - I've suggested the escort fighters. The He 177 cruised as fast as the He 111 was doing flat out, without bombs and 1/2 fuel.



The early ones? and which cruise speed? MAX cruise or most economical? Most economical for an A-5 was 210mph (although that might be with under wing loads)


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## wiking85 (Nov 16, 2014)

stona said:


> The wing was redesigned time and time again. It was first redesigned to accommodate extra fuel tanks after the evaporative cooling system was abandoned in order to compensate for the loss of range that would have been incurred due to the drag of the radiators. Then it was redesigned because of the infamous dive bombing requirement. That in turn led to a complete redesign of the undercarriage to accommodate the extra weight....and so it went on until virtually the end of the war.
> It was a lame duck and the RLM should have abandoned it (and any number of other projects) to concentrate on projects that might actually work and be useful.
> Cheers
> Steve



How was it any more lame than the Manchester before the Lancaster redesign?


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2014)

The 1st link is for a must-have doc. I'll start the thread about the German bombers, both historical ones and the ones that are not, in a short while.


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## stona (Nov 16, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Hmm - what other design was able to offer the capability to hit the factories Soviets relocated, along with capability to be a competent long range marine patrol bomber? The dive bombing requirement need to be cancelled ASAP.



So now you want the Luftwaffe to develop a strategic bombing force. The reason the British and Americans deployed thousands of four engine bombers is because they needed that many to be sure of damaging German production. To hit a 200' by 200' structure they needed, statistically, to drop nearly 1000 bombs. It worked, the Anglo-American campaign seriously curtailed German production, we can argue about the figures, but at a cost that the Germans simply could not afford.
There is no point in building a few hundred strategic bombers and going after Soviet production, you won't do enough damage. Many facilities, or their infra structure like machine tools, were very resilient against bombing. If the Soviets react by dispersing production in the vast expanses of the USSR you'll be lucky to find it, even with thousands of bombers.
It's a complete dead end. The RLM had limited resources and had to martial them to best effect. Strategic bombers were a waste of those resources.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Nov 16, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> How was it any more lame than the Manchester before the Lancaster redesign?



The Germans kept the size of their bombers small (low drag) by trading bomb space for fuel space. Granted other people used the bomb bays for fuel but in planes like the He 177 two thirds of the bomb bay could be blocked off by fuel tankage for the long range mission. The British tended to keep their bomb bays clear a provide enough tankage elsewhere. Although it might mean a bigger/higher drag airplane. No freebie, the British still had to trade bomb weight for fuel weight so they couldn't fill all the available volume in the bomb bay. It might depend on your bombs and tactics as to which was better (incendiaries tend to have a low weight to volume ratio).


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## vinnye (Nov 16, 2014)

I think the LW should adopt the tactics used by the RAF to win the BoB. Instead of concentrating your fighters to make one big hit at the escorts and bombers, hit them with smaller groups - but more often.
I believe the LW bomber crews hated the knowledge that the RAF would come at them at any time - nerve shredding stuff!
If the LW can get its fighters up high enough to boom and zoom - then that's what hey should do - leave the escorts alone if possible.


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## stona (Nov 16, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> How was it any more lame than the Manchester before the Lancaster redesign?



The two are not really comparable.

The Manchester was not a 'dog' despite being somewhat under powered by its Vulture engines. Chadwick was already working on what would become the Lancaster as the Manchester went into production. The start of Manchester production allowed Chadwick to 'liberate' about 30 experienced design draughtsmen to work on the Type 683. As early as mid 1939 Chadwick knew that a four engine type would be required, though work on the Type 683, that would become Lancaster, was kept largely in the firm for another year. Switching to Merlins and adding 11' to the wings was not that big a deal because the original design was itself sound. This is supported by letters from Chadwick to Rowe and minutes from Farren at the MAP.
It was also important that Avro fiercely resisted any moves to have them build the Halifax.
None of this applies to the He 177. Once again the Air Ministry, Ministry of Aircraft Production, RAF and Avro demonstrated that cooperation in a common cause could result in a successful aeroplane, even rooted in the disappointment of the Manchester. The RLM/Luftwaffe/ aircraft industry in Germany never seems to have been capable of this.
Cheers
Steve


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## Glider (Nov 18, 2014)

My understanding is that the crews certainly considered the Manchester to be a 'Dog'. That said the rest of the posting I totally agree with


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## stona (Nov 19, 2014)

Glider said:


> My understanding is that the crews certainly considered the Manchester to be a 'Dog'. That said the rest of the posting I totally agree with



The report on the Manchester from Boscombe Down as tested there with a maximum a.u.w. of 52,000lbs due to limitations imposed whilst awaiting full clearance of the Vulture engines describes the aircraft as "extremely pleasant to fly."
The only modifications requested by the A&AEE related to the turrets, ammunition feeds and the arrangement of bomb loading stations.

There is no denying the difficult job that No. 207 Squadron undertook in working the Manchester up into operational service, but these were almost entirely caused by the engines. The problems with the lubrication and cooling systems of the Vulture are well documented and it was these that prevented operational restrictions being lifted from the Manchester and also led to periods of grounding.
Even the men of No.207 Squadron, assembled with experienced hands (the initial six operational crews included a DSO, six DFCs and seven DFMs) suffered from a lack of confidence in the engines.

The Manchester was not in any sense a dog of an aircraft. Once modified to fly with four Merlins rather than two Vultures it easily became the Lancaster, the problems left with the engines. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the He 177.

The Lancaster was based on a good aeroplane in the Manchester, it's why the conversion was so easy. Putting four engines on the He 177 was just polishing a turd. They polished long and hard for years but _never got a meaningfully operational aircraft out of it._
Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 19, 2014)

stona said:


> ....
> 
> The Manchester was not in any sense a dog of an aircraft. Once modified to fly with four Merlins rather than two Vultures it easily became the Lancaster, the problems left with the engines. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the He 177.
> 
> ...



The He 177 was a vastly better bomber than the Manchester was. Especially once the DB 610 engines were installed, and at least then it was every bit an operational aircraft. Manchester needed the 4 individual engines much more than He 177.


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## stona (Nov 19, 2014)

How many He 177s were ever operational at one time? How much damage was inflicted on Germany's enemies by He 177s? How can you justify the investment in the He 177 over many years in light of the return on that investment?

The He 177 would have been a better aircraft than the Manchester, but the point is that the British fixed the Manchester and produced the Lancaster.

The Manchester/Lancaster was the mainstay of Bomber Command from mid war onwards. Well over 7,000 were built and they flew a total of 156,192 of Bomber Command's 389,809 sorties for the entire war, including before the type entered service.

I'd love to see some comparable statistics for the wonderful He 177. 

The Lancasters DNA, and hence the Manchester's, is evident in the Shackleton which served operationally until 1991. Hardly a dog.







I don't know how you quantify what makes a good aeroplane but the 'clunker' (in Col. Watson's words) that was the He 177 never was one. Whether it ever could have been is a moot point because the Germans couldn't make it work properly in significant numbers, despite all that polishing.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 19, 2014)

Think you are confusing the capabilities of an aircraft with the capability of an airforce, or at least with the capability of one of it's important branches.



> How much damage was inflicted on Germany's enemies by He 177s?



How much the combined effort of Whitley, Wellington and Hampden was instrumental in defeating the UK's enemy? The He 111, while on paper either equal or worse vs. RAF's counterparts, was instrumental in defeating Poland, Norway, Low Countries and France. Are we to conclude that RAF's bombers were lousy aircraft? 



> The He 177 would have been a better aircraft than the Manchester, but the point is that the British fixed the Manchester and produced the Lancaster.



He 177 was a better aircraft than Manchester. Even than the fixed Manchester. 




> The Manchester/Lancaster was the mainstay of Bomber Command from mid war onwards. Well over 7,000 were built and they flew a total of 156,192 of Bomber Command's 389,809 sorties for the entire war, including before the type entered service.



All fair. The Lancaster was introduced when UK Commnwelth were fighting the Germany with USA and USSR, the 3:1 odds are usually more favorable in war, than the 1:3 odds. Despite the Italian and Japanese siding with Germans.



> I'd love to see some comparable statistics for the wonderful He 177.



It would be cool to see just who was claiming that He 177 was wonderful. It was capable to lift a comparable weight of fuel and bombs, and to fly faster than Lancaster, let alone Manchester.
When UK was building Lancasters as much as they could, Germany was ramping up the fighter production, not the bomber production. No bombers produced = no sorties flown = no bombs dropped.



> I don't know how you quantify what makes a good aeroplane but the 'clunker' (in Col. Watson's words) that was the He 177 never was one. Whether it ever could have been is a moot point because the Germans couldn't make it work properly in significant numbers, despite all that polishing.



When modified, including the better installation of a better engine, it worked. See above about the numbers, or lack of those.


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## stona (Nov 19, 2014)

You have misinterpreted my first point.

Essentially the question is what was the return on the investment for the He 177. The project started in 1936, a mock up was completed and approved by the RLM in November 1937. The first operational sorties were flown in November 1943!
That's six years of work and investment, who knows how many man hours and millions of Reich Marks, to produce an aircraft, in relatively small numbers, which still didn't work very well.

At this time there were still serious problems not just operating the aircraft but with production. There is a report from the special maintenance unit (Feldwerft Abteilung zbV 1) which was attached to II./KG 40 listing the problems with newly delivered aircraft that does not make pretty reading.

It is noticeable that on operations like 'Capricorn' and 'Steinbock' the supposedly fixed He 177 was still suffering early returns, losses in emergency landings and yes, you guessed it, at least one engine fire. There were on going problems with tyres causing many aborted take offs, oil leaks and fuel pipe breakages, all listed by the Feldwerft Abteilung. The He 177s anyway made up an almost insignificant number of the aircraft deployed.

To return to the original topic, Luftwaffe strategy after the BoB should not have involved a project like the He 177 at all.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Nov 19, 2014)

Sounds like you are describing the B-29 Stona.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 20, 2014)

A bit on the next iron in the fire, the Fw-190. While I admire most of the ww2 aircraft, the Fw-190 is one of my all-time favorites. 
The 1941 will see the introduction in the 'Western front', with engine requiring plenty of work to became a reliable powerplant. The small changes in the airframe also helped to decrease the probability of engine overheating, or worse. A change from the 801C to 801D, it's S/C geared for higher altitudes, higher CR and rated for greater boost means better performance at all altitudes.
So, once there is enough of cannons the 190 can have 4 installed, delete the 4 LMGs. That would save ~105 kg/230 lbs, slightly benefiting the RoC and speed, while not taking away much from the firepower. When the limitations of the internal intakes are known for hi-altitude tasks (historically already in 1942), install the external ones - should give another 10-15 km at 7 km and above. External tasks also facilitate the installation of air filters.
By early/mid 1943, the engines with two-stage compressors, either from Jumo 211 or BMW 801 line should come in service. A version of the BMW 801 with enlarged 1-stage S/C might also be interesting, akin to the historical DB-605 AS versions. 
The Jumo 213 following suit shortly after, 1st with single stage compressor, along with the DB 603 with a 2-stager.


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## stona (Nov 20, 2014)

The only thing I'd question there is the need for four cannons. Such armament wasn't required until those pesky American bombers started arriving in numbers
Whether your other proposals were actually practical I'd have to check, but I don't disagree with them.
The Fw 190 was one of the great aeroplanes of WW2, no doubt about that.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 20, 2014)

stona said:


> The only thing I'd question there is the need for four cannons. Such armament wasn't required until those pesky American bombers started arriving in numbers



Yep, we can remember that Bf-109F1 to G4 carried just one cannon as standard outfit - no wonder it the 109F4 was able to handily out-climb the Fw-190A-2! 
Two MG 151/20 in wing roots would've probably sufficed for most tasks before 1943 in the West; historically the outer pair of cannons was listed as 'Ruszatz' for the Fw-190s for a long period of time (from A-2 until A-5).


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## tomo pauk (Nov 21, 2014)

Here is what the Fw 190A3/U7 was capable for, second half of 1942. The U7 factory mod involved deletion of much of pilots protection (almost 50 kg worth, including head back armor), along with removal of fuel tank protection (another 50 kg worth). The fuselage mounted MG 15s their ammo were also removed (100+ kg). Result was the top speed of almost 700 km/h (694 km/h, 431 mph) at 7400 m (24,278 ft), for the take off weight of 3640 kg. The external intakes were installed, for better use of ram effect.
The report notes that the installed supercharger happened to be an excellent example, the full throttle altitude with run-on-the-mill superchargers was expected to be at 7000-7100 m, for some speed loss.

Obviously, we want the fighter to carry the protection, so 'our' hi-altitude Fw 190 would be at ~3750 kg. Speed of some 680+ km/h at 7000m - equal or better than any Bf 109 prior 1944, still with decent firepower for fighter vs. fighter job. Or, comparable with the Fw-190D-9.

Link to the test: here.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 22, 2014)

What about the jet engines and aircraft? Prioritize the centrifugal compressors, not the axial ones? Build 1st the fighters, or bombers, or equal priority?


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## nuuumannn (Sep 16, 2020)

Shortround6 said:


> Not even capitols, At the beginning 1936 the British didn't have a _bomber_ that could fly from England with a 500lb bomb, drop it _*anywhere*_ in Germany, like the western Ruhr area/French border and make it back to England.



Hmm, someone's got their Stars and Stripes flavoured underpants on again. Entering service in 1937, the Handley Page Harrow had a range of 1,250 miles. The Heyford, the primary British bomber in the mid 1930s could carry a 1,600lb bomb load with a range of 920 miles. Its predecessor the Handley Page Hinaidi had a range of 850 miles; Germany was well within range of British heavy bombers in the 30s and beforehand. Lets go back to 1919 and the V/1500, with a range of 1,300 miles and an endurance of 17 hours.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 16, 2020)

On the subject of the Manchester, it was certainly troublesome and had its fair share of issues, such as troublesome electrics, aerodynamic problems caused by lack of vertical surface area, odd shaped turrets and things, not to mention its initially troublesome engines, but the thing with the Manchester is that the problems it had were rectified - the aerodynamics, the electrics and eventually the engines, which were then cancelled owing to the Air Ministry rationalising engine supply. The basic design was good and quite advanced for its day, the Lancaster did not suffer anywhere near the problems of the Manchester because they were sorted before or largely before it entered service.

Yes, many aircrews did not like the Manchester, but it's relative as its predecessors were well liked and more reliable - I did meet an old boy many years ago who flew Manchesters and Lancs with Bomber Command and he said the Manchester was nice to fly, very powerful, but the fear the engines would conk out kept him on edge throughout the duration of an operation! For comparison, the Halifax, derived from a design to the same spec as the Manchester _was_ a dog - it was terribly underpowered and as a result, too heavy, too slow, and couldn't reach its calculated figures, not only that, it suffered rudder overbalance that killed crews operationally and in testing. HP worked over two years to rectify its problems and even by the time the Halifax III entered service, it still suffered from problems. The Lancaster didn't help - it demonstrated excellent load carrying, better speed and altitude and higher serviceability rates compared to the Halifax.

The He 177 was an inspiring and advanced concept plagued with design troubles, serviceability issues and troublesome engines, which, in short meant that the RLM had bitten off more than it could chew in its requirement for the bomber. It was found to be unstable in the air and required its fuselage lengthened, suffered from vibration and had weak undercarriage and throughout its service career remained unreliable, with maintenance issues keeping aircraft on the ground on a frequent basis. Despite partaking in several heavy bombing raids, notably on the Eastern Front, it was all too little too late; not enough serviceable examples to really make a difference and its unhappy childhood continued through to service use. An aircraft doesn't get the nickname "The Flaming Coffin" from excellence and reliability.

It is hard to be kind about the He 177, less hard to be kind regarding the Manchester though, considering the outcome.

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## Shortround6 (Sep 16, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Hmm, someone's got their Stars and Stripes flavoured underpants on again



No, just bad memory.

The date was Jan 1st 1935 not 1936 and the bomb was not 500lbs but_ larger than_ 500lbs. I also left out the qualifier "in service"

From the British bomber since 1914 by Mason. page 263.

"Much more significant, perhaps, is the fact that no British bomber in service on this date could reach the nearest point in Germany, drop a bomb larger than a 500-pounder, and return to it's base in the United Kingdom."

You may want to check the flavor of your own underwear, however. 

The Harrow was not in service in either 1935 or 1936. 
It had been a number of years since the HP V/1500 had been in service. 
The Hinaidi's max bomb load is given as two 520lbs and four 112lb bombs, the 840 mile range is for "half bomb load" whatever that was. 
Standard bomb load for the Heyford was 10 250lbs bombs, max was 14, it could carry the weight, could you really fit larger bombs on/in the plane? eight or ten of the bombs were carried in internal cells in the lower wing. Max load required 6 bombs on external racks. 

I will post the other comments from the same page of the stars and stripes underwear wearing Mr. Mason when I get back from work

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## Shortround6 (Sep 16, 2020)

On Jan 1st 1935

"1, Not one monoplane bomber was yet in Service with Royal AIr Force.

2. Among the heavy bombers in service, none was of a design less than five years old, and most were twelve

3, The one and only medium day bomber Squadron was part-equipped with a 'new' aircraft,the Overstrand, that was fundamentally some _eight_ years old

4. None of the light bomber and general purpose squadrons was flying aircraft whose design was less than six years old. "

Above from Mason

Granted there had been a world wide depression which had tended to limit military spending in many countries but the above are the facts as to where Britain stood at that particular point in time. It is not a reflection on what Britain had done in the past or what they would do in the Future. There were only 15 regular RAF bomber squadrons based in the UK with another 13 bomber squadrons in the Auxiliary Air Force. One of which flew the HP Hinaidi mentioned above.





top speed 127mph. 

of course this was an improvement over the planes that equipped 5 of the eight heavy bomber squadrons on that date.
The Vickers Virginia X




top speed 108mph. 
Things did get better, slowly.

The Fairey Hendon monoplane went into service in Nov 1936 with No 38 squadron 
The first Blenheim was delivered to a service squadron (no 114) March 10th 1937
beating the first Vickers Wellesley by a month. 
March of 1937 had seen the delivery of the first Whitleys to No 10 Squadron, the 3rd Whitley squadron was equipped in Oct of 1937.
These Whitleys had the Tiger engine 
May of 1937 saw the first Battles delivered to No 63 squadron.
Sept of 1938 saw No 49 Squadron get the first Hampdens
Wellington Is were first delivered to No 99 squadron in Oct 1938 replacing Heyford biplanes. 

The British did evolve a very powerful bombing force, it just took time and some relearning of the lessons of WW I, as to worthwhile bomb loads and the need for large bombs.

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## nuuumannn (Sep 16, 2020)

Shortround6 said:


> You may want to check the flavor of your own underwear, however.



Nah, my undies are multicoloured... I get a bit peeved with your constant sweeping statements rubbishing British equipment, often with considerable bias. It gets old real quick.

Mr Mason has been known to say the odd faux pa here and there. The figures I quoted show that his statement is incorrect. These aircraft could reach Germany with a greater load than 500lbs. Thetford in Aircraft of the Royal Air Force provided me with my figures, and just flicking through a single reference book proves that the RAF could reach Germany with a larger bomb load than 500lbs in the 1930s. Germany isn't just Berlin, there's a whole country west of it.



Shortround6 said:


> The Harrow was not in service in either 1935 or 1936.



This I know, it was included as a matter of course.


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## Tkdog (Sep 17, 2020)

Their best strategy would be to kill Hitler, stage a coup and beg for terms of surrender.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 17, 2020)

> Mr Mason has been known to say the odd faux pa here and there. The figures I quoted show that his statement is incorrect. These aircraft could reach Germany with a greater *load* than 500lbs. Thetford in Aircraft of the Royal Air Force provided me with my figures, and just flicking through a single reference book proves that the RAF could reach Germany with a larger bomb load than 500lbs in the 1930s. Germany isn't just Berlin, there's a whole country west of it.



The word *load *was not in my original statement or the quotes from Mason. If you want to add words and change the meaning of the quotes then we are not going to get very far. The quotes (Masons and mine) are correct as they stand with one minor exception. The RAF apparently had some left over 520lb light case bombs and perhaps some 550lb heavy case bombs so yes, technically they did have bombs heavier than 500lbs and a few aircraft that could carry them without modification. 

The ability of the smaller bombs (250lbs and under) to cause significant damage to industrial buildings/targets was known. At the end of WW I plans were set up to manufacture 750 of the 230lb bombs per week, 250 of the 520lb bombs and 500 of the 550lb lb, also per week. this is judged against only 54 of the 550lb bombs being dropped in the last 13 months of the war out of 665 tons. Eleven 1650lb bombs were also dropped but these big bombs (including the 520/550lb) seemed to just about disappear during the 20s and early 30s. 

Bomb damage assessments were conducted both at the end of WW I and during the campaigns in Iraq. A Flt Lt Horace Bowen made a report on nearly 20 villages bombed with a variety of air dropped weapons. 

Perhaps Mason was using hindsight with his singling out larger than 500lb bombs, but the experience of WW I seems to have been forgotten. 



nuuumannn said:


> Nah, my undies are multicoloured... I get a bit peeved with your constant sweeping statements rubbishing British equipment, often with considerable bias. It gets old real quick.



I try to use british sources when "rubbishing British equipment" perhaps the British authors were biased? 

I believe I have defended the british a number of times, like the constant idea that they should have adopted the Browning .50 cal or that the Merlin wasn't a good engine. I may have even defended the Mercury engine at times. Saying an engine was outdated in WW II when it was around 10 years old might not be bias? 



> This I know, it was included as a matter of course.


Why, it had no bearing on either my mistake or Masons original statement. 

BTW I have just starting reading this. StackPath

dismal reading in spots in the first two chapters so far.

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