# Battle of Germany= Could LW have done better?



## drgondog (Nov 24, 2007)

For all intents and purposes the Battle of Germany from an airwar/air superiority standpoint was fought with long range USAAF fighters from December 1943 through May 1944. It was the period when the 8th AF stopped recovering from Schweinfurt and Munster and went back on deep penetration strategic target offensive. 

The LuftFlotte Reich had betwee 400-500 s/e fighters (fw 190 and Me 109) plus perhaps 100 Me 110s and 210s available and operational of which on any day 200-300 could be concentrated on 8th AF attacks in Central, NE and SE Germany to meet 3 Air Divisions of B-17s, B-24s and either P-38s or P-51s past Munster or Stuttgart.

The early period was defined by two operational P-38 groups in 8th AF plus one new Mustang group in the 9th AF. In January one more P-51 Group was added (363rd FG). In February two more Mustang Groups were operational (the 357th and 4th). In March one more Mustang Group and Lightning Group (355th and 364th). In April the 352nd FG converted to P-51s. On April 30th the 339th and in May the 359th and 361st were added to Mustang Target Escort capability.

So, on any given deep penetration one Group of either P-38s or P-51s were available to escort 200-300 bombers in each division from December 1 through mid January.

From Mid January through March two groups of mixed P-38s or P51s could be counted on to support 220-250 bombers near and over the targets.

From mid April to end of May two and occasionally three Mustang and/or Lightning groups could escort bombers past Dummer Lake.

So, operationally speaking with the bugs that both P-51s and P-38s had, each group would actually get 30-35 (average) fighters per group over target area through March and then average 40-45 through April.

The Luftwaffe could achieve numerical superiority of at least 3:1 through March (i.e 220-250 to 70 US fighter escort)... and nearly that much in April.

Boundary conditions for discussion:

1. Given that RAF and 8th AF and 9th AF had overwhelming air superiority in numbers over Luft 4 with JG 26 and JG2 covering the coast.

2. This discussion is all about the battles over Berlin, Brunswick, Leipzig, Posnan, Munich, etc - far beyond range of Spitfire, Tempest, P-47.

3. This discussion includes RAF Mustangs that occasionally were assigned to Deep Withdrawal Support from areas beyond the range of P-47s. They were there occasionally and id a great job at discouraging LW attacks on the way home.

4. This is before D-Day when a lot of LuftFlotte Reich moved west.

Questions;

1. Why did so many Luftwaffe pilots describe this period as one of 'overwhelming number of US Fighters attacking us"

2. Why were the US escort to Luftwaffe s/e ratios so lopsided in favor of US Fighters during this period when the Luftwaffe had local superiority and a lot of experienced fighter pilots... and by all accounts very good fighters in case of Fw 190 and me 109s.

If you have a different opinion regarding the LuftFlotte Reich TO&E or the 8th and 9th AF long range Fighter strength please cite your sources?

Regards,

Bill


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 25, 2007)

I am looking foward to this discussion.

Bill do you have any info on any missions to Stuttgart or the Ansbach area. I no Schweinfurt is not far from here.


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

I think that the local air superiority (German) could be looked at in 2 differing ways....

While the Luftwaffe could send up 200 109's and 190's, it usually was never like that, 200 fighter screamnig into the escort fighters... In many instances, it was Staffels and Schwarms that mixed it up with the -51's and -38's...

I believe that even tho there were more Luftwaffe boys in the air, "locally" they were sometimes outnumbered... Say a Staffel of 10 kites take off to rendezvous with another Gruppe, get seperated, and then someone spots the bomber pulks....

Attack, Horrido, Attack!!!

There are 40 P-51's waiting for them, and the Staffel gets bounced....

Also, take into account that many of the pilots are new... Those that survive the combat land back at base and tell stories on how they were numerically 5:1 outnumbered...

Even Experten made mistakes when estimating local Allied air strength.... Peter Crump once estimated a gaggle of 25 aircraft that bounced him, when it was infact 6-8 Tempests...

As far as the experienced pilots went, even the loss of one Staffelkaptain was enough to jolt the security and balance of that units core... "Man, if Oblt Heilmann get smoked, how the hell am I supposed to stay alive???" The lack of moral gets on a mans brain after awhile...

As in anything, there were engagements where the Allies WERE infact outnumbered, but I fully believe that the Allies had better trained novice/green/noob pilots at their disposal... Given the timeframe ur calling on, it definatly did happen.... Air tactics differed as well... 

I think it all comes down to 2 things Bill... "Local" superiority was never superior, and the nonsense BS stats that have been flowing through the history books, rehashed and rehashed to the point that people believe them... U urself have gone to great lengths to bring the truth of the mattter out, as this thread shows....


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## The Basket (Nov 25, 2007)

Agree with Lesofprimus on this.

Did german fighters make single high speed firing passes on the bombers or did they turn around and have another bite? If so then one pass and game over...back to base they go. 

A fighter is bound to get hit by some 50 calibre just attacking the bombers alone. so damage of some kind is inevitable which must mean that the available fighter numbers day to day must vary.

And since all the American fighters were there to dogfight...some of the German fighters were there to attack the bombers. So I think it was never the idea of shoot down the fighters and ignore the bombers. So German fighters actively going after the fighters would make it even.


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

To get back to the question Bill posed, could the LW do better??? Yes they could have....

If they had targeted the escorts instead of the bombers, maybe things could have been different...


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## Hakenkreuz (Nov 25, 2007)

On the 23 Dec 1943 the strength of Germanys fighter defences was a critically weak,a serviceable strenght of 480 day fighters for defending a line from the Austrian border to the northern tip of denmark and against them were 1,500 US bombers 1,200 fighters. Luftwaffe pilots were in good suppy, but quantity was being sacrificed for quality, and men arriving on the Staffeln had as little as 30 hours on type. Unforunately for the Luftwaffe, Hitler and the Nazi hierarchy refused to recognise the threat posed by the growing Allied bombing offensive. in jan 1944 the Luftwaffe went over to the offensive. NO they could not do better.


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## Erich (Nov 25, 2007)

1. sorry Bill I do not agree that overwhelmingly superiority for that time given, after Normandie yes as that was admitted.......due the losses of territory and radar installations in France, not even all the gruppen were rushed to the French front, many but not all and then moved back into the interrior of the Reich

2. localized it was as not all the Geschwaders due to the areas covered all over Germany could be in place for a US heavy bomber strike nor the night fighters for an RAF strike, it just was not possible during any part of the war.

I'm still fighting the creepin crud so my brain is on overload dis=function


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

lesofprimus said:


> I think that the local air superiority (German) could be looked at in 2 differing ways....
> 
> While the Luftwaffe could send up 200 109's and 190's, it usually was never like that, 200 fighter screamnig into the escort fighters... In many instances, it was Staffels and Schwarms that mixed it up with the -51's and -38's...
> 
> ...



Dan - I think there were in fact 'local superiority' circumstances on both sides. The typical scenario for big battles in that timeframe was really good German controllers directing Fighters to holes (or complete gaps) in Escort coverage.. and the defending fighters were engaged in dribbles, like plugging a leak with a thumb, then toes, then your nose and the leaks kept comin'

Here is an example that Erich and several others helped me research and I find this kind of engagement typical for days when US Fighters scored big on German Fighters but German Fighters scored big on the heavies - because the battle was strung out for a 100 miles and 45-60 minutes. 

This is an example of schwarms, staffels and gruppe's engaging at different points on the track in heavy cloud cover with frantic Mustang leaders trying to piecemeal forces to deflect them while covering 250 B-17s strung out all over the place. Out of six squadrons of Mustangs, only one failed to engae and was the only Target Escort left for the bombing effort on the Do 335 facories.

The Battle Over Munich – April 24, 1944

If I can didg up the same Mission Summeries I would like to do one with Erich on 26 November - to illustrate both the differences in Lethality of the Fw190A8 and the vulnerability of the Fw190A8 when flown by inexperienced pilots against veteran Mustang pilots when caught. But, in my mind the summer and Fall of 1944 were 'different wars' in context of the battle types.

Chris - I think you have seen this one of the Schweinfurt, Augsburg, Munich area. The original attacks on this Task Force on 24 April started with JG11 near Stuttgart which the 4th FG drove off.

To summarize - I think the biggest failure of the Lufwaffe was to not let their Gruppe and Staffel leaders to plan and execute strategies against the escorts early in the cycle (1943) and adjusting to attack escorts before they used drop tank fuel. The first mistake was letting American pilots go somewhat un bloodied and build up combat leaders and replacements to compliment more training time, and the second was to strip target escort from the bombers and continue to inflict Schweinfurt and Munster and Berlin type losses - a political disaster if continued.

Last - in this timeframe the average 'big fight involved one to two squadrons of Target Escorts simply because they were mostly too far apart to coordinate all three to repel a determined German attack - so 12 to 18 to maybe 24 effectives engaging whatever big number the LW put in the same airspace. This is why I have to smile every time I hear 'huge numerical advantage' in these air battles.


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## Glider (Nov 25, 2007)

I have to agree with what Lesoff said in his posting. Locally there is every chance that the LW were outnumbered and the chances of breaking through to the bombers in the sort of numbers that would be required were low. No doubt on some occasions they were able to achieve it but its likely that the pilots in place were unable to make the most of the opportunity.

Could they have done better. Tough question given the equipment they had and the tactical position.
Before June 1944 I think the only chance they had, was to attack the long range escort as soon as the US forces had crossed the coast. Note I don't say the escort for the bombers as I believe these tended to be shorter ranged aircraft who handed over to the long ranged aircraft later. Also note I don't mean to say they should stick around and have huge dogfights. The objective would be to distrupt the escort, make them drop the tanks early, take them away from the bombers or at least distrupt them on the way to the meeting points.
The vast majority of fighter pilots are not good navigators. They can follow the leaders, follow the bombers and fly a course home, little more than that. Break them up and there is a good chance that a good number will either fly home or not make the meeting points with the bombers. This would make life a lot easier for the main group of defenders.
It shouldn't take a large number of fighters to undertake this distruptive task but its a lot easier in theory than in practice.


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Hakenkreuz said:


> On the 23 Dec 1943 the strength of Germanys fighter defences was a critically weak,a serviceable strenght of 480 day fighters for defending a line from the Austrian border to the northern tip of denmark and against them were 1,500 US bombers 1,200 fighters. Luftwaffe pilots were in good suppy, but quantity was being sacrificed for quality, and men arriving on the Staffeln had as little as 30 hours on type. Unforunately for the Luftwaffe, Hitler and the Nazi hierarchy refused to recognise the threat posed by the growing Allied bombing offensive. in jan 1944 the Luftwaffe went over to the offensive. NO they could not do better.



We are`talking about the strength of LuftFlotte Reich against the Target Escorts available and effective deep over Germany and Czechoslovakia and Austria where no P-47, Tempest, Spitfire could help... this is strictly about the available fighters (Mustangs and Lightnings) to provide a defense to those 1500 bombers, usually split into three separate tracks.

But in any case the ALLIES did not have more than 150 (3gp), 200(4gp), 300 (6gp), 350 (7gp) total long range escort fighters available to take off in from January 1 through April 30, of which 60-80% would actually reach the R/V point due to mechanical problems. Of the above number in March and April were 3 groups of Lightnings, which were not nearly as effective as the P-51

That meant one group (50 at TO, maybe 30-45 at R/V) per 200-250 bombers (spread over 10-20 miles) available to protect from a concentrated number of German fighters in January (wherever the LW Controller chose to place say, 200) and perhaps two groups to cover 220-250 in April for the same coverage.

And LuftFlotte Reich grew in numbers by May, 1944 over December 1943 to approximately 550 effectives even though attrition in those month severely reduced number of experienced pilots available to fight.

Regards,

Bill


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich said:


> 1. sorry Bill I do not agree that overwhelmingly superiority for that time given, after Normandie yes as that was admitted.......due the losses of territory and radar installations in France, not even all the gruppen were rushed to the French front, many but not all and then moved back into the interrior of the Reich
> 
> *Erich are we talking about this thread or the earlier debate about westward shift of LuftFlotte Reich to Normandie after D-Day? or are you debating the 'level' of Reich versus the quantity of US long range escorts in the Jan-May, 1944 timeframe.*
> 
> ...



Sorry 'bout that E. Hope you feel better soon. 

The German Controllers were good, and a lot of success was achieved in getting 200+ in the same area as one 8th or 15th AF Task Force and punishing them. This thread is all about how could either the Luftwaffe have been more successful in punishing the escorts and freeing up the Me 110s and 410s and later Fw 190A8s to attack unmolested, or use more effective strategy to force the escorts to drop tanks early and accomplish the same thing


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Glider said:


> I have to agree with what Lesoff said in his posting. Locally there is every chance that the LW were outnumbered and the chances of breaking through to the bombers in the sort of numbers that would be required were low. No doubt on some occasions they were able to achieve it but its likely that the pilots in place were unable to make the most of the opportunity.
> 
> *If so, why? Respectfully, give me some specific examples to chew on?*
> 
> ...



I won't disagree but believe it was doable for all the reason I cited in the Goering 'go away' thread.

Regards,

Bill


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## Erich (Nov 25, 2007)

back for only a moment, the truth is in my mind it is about tactics, literally sending enmasse like the Sturmgruppen wedge and line abreast in company waves in late 43 if this is the start of the time frame. the Fw 190A-8 was coming into it's own, the 30mm cannon was coming on the A-7/MK and was a nasty bomber killer.

also the use of the R4M should of been stepped up sooner and easily wooden racks like placed on the Me 262 under the wings for the 109 and Fw 190A besdies the Me 410s. Stepping up the Dora 9 program to intercept the Mustang at higher altitidue would of been essential but this is getting into a hard what-if

I also will go back to the fact the LW could not be everywhere at once, we have to contend also not with just the 8th AF but the 15th AF out of iItaly in November of 43 which also tied up LW reserves and even then they did not have full control over Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary and the general area, Night fighters also flew during day light hours getting clobbered out of the day skies up north as well as NJG 6 in the south


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## Glider (Nov 25, 2007)

I am not an expert on the actual battles that took place between the 8th and the GAF so I cannot give examples. However, I have read a fair bit about combat and the interception of bombing raids and there are some threads that seem common.

Often you read that X number of squadrons were sent to intercept a raid and later only a proportion of those launched made contact with the opposing forces. I don't see why it would be any different in the battles over Germany.

Also I believe the US did send out units to try and distrupt the GAF fighters before they struck the bombers. The chances of these escorts actively seeking and finding these smaller German units, efffectively outnumbering those in the combat, while the Germans are trying to form up into the larger units needed to make effective attacks seem high. 
In these combats the GAF will be on the defensive and as often pointed out, those attacked tend to have an exagerated view of the strength of the attackers. Often its the impression of being outnumbered as opposed to the actuality that counts. Even if you are not outnumbered, if you believe that you are, then you will react one way, normally evade, if you believe that the numbers are even then you will react in a different way.

In other words by being aggressive the escort would have broken up many of the attacks before they fully formed and basically gained local air superiority in those individual combats.
In addition it made the German pilots feel that they were outnumbered even if they weren't and its that mindset that is so valuble.

I hope I explained where I was coming from.


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## Hakenkreuz (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich you hit the nail on the Head. They also had to defend 1,800 mile eastern front.


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

Bill, that link u posted is excellently done, thx for that... I was aware of 24 Apr 44, but now have my fill of it, thx...

I have to admit, my "deep" knowledge and info lies in the latter parts of 44 and 45, as well as the VMF-214 saga, so these spring/summer 44 conversations always get me going...

I have to agree with just about everything being said here, cause its all correct.... I cannot cite specific information like Bill and erich can, but there are some obvious points being made here....

Tacics seem to be the big denominator here... Like Erich and I have said before, taking out the escorts BEFORE the Sturms and Zerosters get there, now theres an idea that could work...

Did they try it??? Of course they did...

Did it work??? On several occasions, yes....

But truth be told, it was ineffective, and waaaaaaayyy too many experienced pilots died in the seats of those heavily armoured up crates... Schroeder stated that it was an utter pig to dogfight with, and he knew what he was doing in the cockpit...

Anyways, getting sidetracked.... Id say that the ground control the LW had was OK at best... Many times, they were routed to the wrong area, either by Allied feint of just plain GCI ineptitude... Then re-routed again... Next thing u know, that little red light is a flashin away, and u got to set it down....

Mission over, no contact made...

Glad we agree about the "local" superiority thing.... It swung both ways... I actually dont think we disagree on anything....


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich said:


> back for only a moment, the truth is in my mind it is about tactics, literally sending enmasse like the Sturmgruppen wedge and line abreast in company waves in late 43 if this is the start of the time frame. the Fw 190A-8 was coming into it's own, the 30mm cannon was coming on the A-7/MK and was a nasty bomber killer.
> 
> also the use of the R4M should of been stepped up sooner and easily wooden racks like placed on the Me 262 under the wings for the 109 and Fw 190A besdies the Me 410s. Stepping up the Dora 9 program to intercept the Mustang at higher altitidue would of been essential but this is getting into a hard what-if
> 
> I also will go back to the fact the LW could not be everywhere at once, we have to contend also not with just the 8th AF but the 15th AF out of iItaly in November of 43 which also tied up LW reserves and even then they did not have full control over Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary and the general area, Night fighters also flew during day light hours getting clobbered out of the day skies up north as well as NJG 6 in the south



I agree all the points, although on the last point the 15th didn't start acquiring the long range escorts (51s) until ~May, 1944 and all the 12th and 15th FC hands were 'full' below Austria... and in all fairness LuftFlotte 2 and LW Kdo Sud Ost were kinda responsible for Italy, Austria, Hungary and Romania. 

So, this is primary reason I use Reich as the central core TO&E to meet the 8th AF long range escorts (with 354 and 363FG attached).

The 8th was hitting Germany's center of Gravity and the LuftFlotte Reich was the primary defensive force. Luft 3 had to contend with 8th/9th and RAF Penetration and Withdrawal while Luft 2 and Sud Ost with Penetration and Withdrawal from South.


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## Erich (Nov 25, 2007)

As Bill pointed out about April 24, 44 as an interesting scenario so to 26 November 44, a different light/different battle and defended differently and everything went wrong for the German Luftwaffe even if JG 301 as a whole shot down 21 B-24's. yes true a bloody day for both the LW and the US bomber formations. If I could ever complete my written documentation of the battle from the LW point of view and subscribe it to Bill for the 8th AF account you would just be shocked in awe but in truth a fantastic comparison note(s) to the April 24, 44 aerial battle.

part of the problem too is the LW political game set and forthwith even with the likes of Addi Galland as he surveyed the work of experimentation of the LW arms aresenal of rockets and cannon of different mm's something should of been given as the "standard" and not all the time wasted to perfect the ~~ perfect bopmber killing machine....... this is very important too as to the outcome

Bill even with no escorts in the south from the 15th and even with the 15th heavies unescorted it still take away portions of 109 equipped JG 27, ZG's 101, 1 and 76............and these were needed full time to take on the 8th heavies. it was spread thin even by January 1, 1944. crazy but even the s/e ground attack Fw's were used against the US 15th AF
back soon


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## pbfoot (Nov 25, 2007)

I've tried to build up a picture in my head about the length of the formations the US forces used in the attacks . This is pretty important for if the formation is relativly small in area 40-50 mile as I would assume it would be to facilitate maximum fighter coverage and mutual fire support amongst the bombers . The escort fighters would never very far from the bombers . 
Now I might be incorrect but I'm going to assume the LW fighter units were not up to strength and very rarely met the fighters from a position of strength as they were not massed and attacked from various bases and at different times . 
I've seen the numbers you've mentioned earlier but LW fighters on the ground does not equate to LW fighters in the air and same area as the USAAF


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

lesofprimus said:


> Bill, that link u posted is excellently done, thx for that... I was aware of 24 Apr 44, but now have my fill of it, thx...
> 
> I have to admit, my "deep" knowledge and info lies in the latter parts of 44 and 45, as well as the VMF-214 saga, so these spring/summer 44 conversations always get me going...
> 
> ...



I don't see any disagreement Dan. This isn't about superior US aircraft and/or inferior German aircraft. 

It is actually about strategy and hindsight - which for me came from many directions growing up, as it did you with your grandfather.

It is also about clowns and REMF screwing up tactical decision making of the leaders with their butts in the seats day in and day out, saying There's gotta be a better way". There are a lot of 8th and 12th and 15th AF bomber crews that can thank God for Goering!


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

Gotta agree 100% with ur last sentence Bill....


> There are a lot of 8th and 12th and 15th AF bomber crews that can thank God for Goering!


Insulting his pilots and commanders, calling them cowards and what not, real stroke of genius if ur trying to alienate ur troops...


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## Soren (Nov 25, 2007)

All it took was the LW deploying the Me-262 in full scale in 1943 and the Allies would've been repulsed completely. Hitler made sure that didn't happen. 

But still, this wouldn't ensure any victory, it would seriously prolong the war though.

PS: I agree completely with Erich, Les Bill on most points - good posts guys!


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich said:


> Bill even with no escorts in the south from the 15th and even with the 15th heavies unescorted it still take away portions of 109 equipped JG 27, ZG's 101, 1 and 76............and these were needed full time to take on the 8th heavies. it was spread thin even by January 1, 1944. crazy but even the s/e ground attack Fw's were used against the US 15th AF
> back soon




True, and when the 15th say, coordinated an attack with 8th and went to Munich or Linz while 8th went to Leipzig then JG27 and ZG26 would probably be on the 15th..


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

pbfoot said:


> I've tried to build up a picture in my head about the length of the formations the US forces used in the attacks . This is pretty important for if the formation is relativly small in area 40-50 mile as I would assume it would be to facilitate maximum fighter coverage and mutual fire support amongst the bombers . The escort fighters would never very far from the bombers .
> Now I might be incorrect but I'm going to assume the LW fighter units were not up to strength and very rarely met the fighters from a position of strength as they were not massed and attacked from various bases and at different times .
> I've seen the numbers you've mentioned earlier but LW fighters on the ground does not equate to LW fighters in the air and same area as the USAAF



Pb - the March 6 Berlin mission had approximately 30 bomb groups in 100mi stream in three Bomb divisions - escorted beyond Dummer lake by two P-38 and three P-51 groups to cover that entire force.

Each Wing, comprised of 4-6 Groups would fly in about 8-10miles of 'boxes'..

But often many Gruppe's of LW fighters were co-ordinated successfully when the Controllers guessed the target correctly and put them together in perhaps a 10 mile space in front of the bomber stream or in the middle or in trail depending on where they thought the escort 'wasn't'. 

Just as frequently individual Gruppe's of 30-100 fighters would hit at different points of this long column, staying for persistent attacks when no escort fighters were encountered or diving away after one pass when the Mustangs were there.


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## Erich (Nov 25, 2007)

in and out today trying to cheer up my beleagured wife

winter drape time with Fw 190A-8/R8's imprinted all over them..you can only see them during late afternoon ................ nah but I wish  

Soren I think it would not of mattered even in 43 with the Me 262's there are so many what-ifs about it's short range, extra fuel tanks, too quick power, how many needed yes full strength staffeln or Geschwader or ? Even with the December 43 arrival of the P-51B of the 9ths 354th fg they were definately making their presence felt as the Mustang was going through the LW pilot circles as the main point to shoot one down damaged and have it shown to all to find it's weak points.

and here is my prime point and an early one at that even though the LW called it a victory for the first Sturmgruppen attack the combined ops of the 8th and 15th on 7.07.1944 was to prove a small disaster for the Lw, they could not be everywhere at once, only if the 15th AF would come into the central zone of Germany like they did could the LW in strength in the Northern sphere be best put to use. the JG 3 and JG 300 Sturms attacked both the 8th and the 15th bombers with 50 kills confirmed. and even in the books how strange and convoluted it was as the Me 410 Geschwaders were given kills-quite a few actually, but in reality they were hit so hard they may have scored 1-2, their ranks of the me 410 fell like flies to the guns of the US fighters.


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

lesofprimus said:


> Bill, that link u posted is excellently done, thx for that... I was aware of 24 Apr 44, but now have my fill of it, thx...
> 
> .



Forgot to mention this, Dan - the primary reason for that piece was to show just how difficult it was to cover five Combat Wings of 250 B-17s attacking three targets in same area. This particular mission had two experienced Mustang Groups who really cared about protecting the bombers.

The secondary reason was to show how flights here, and sections there, were committed to the battle - as contrast with a commonly held point of view that three squadrons of rabid Mustangs all 'lost their minds' and bounced 6 stray 109s. 

The Luftwaffe skillfully stalked the B-17s, attacked, and in turn, were attacked all along the bomber track. After attacking, some of the 51s recovered and climbed back to continue - others headed for home and shot up targets of opportunity... But at the end of the day it was one huge goat for*%*$#n, particularly when one Combat Wing loses sight of lead Wing and wanders off track.


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## Erich (Nov 25, 2007)

question Bill : has Mike Williams started putting together the materials on 26 November 44 from you or have you sent him anything on this engagement ? Neil Page and I had done up something on 7-7-44 on our old web-pages of the Sturmgruppen but that was only part 1, some new things have come to light, but I am waiting for an anticipated book on 14.Sturm/JG 3 to be released before I put up anything more on the net, am also working personally on 21 Novewmber 44 my cousins first hectic mission he flew and that was a bad op for the LW as well


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

Heres Erichs and Neils page for 7-7-44...
Oschersleben Air Battle July 7 1944


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

21 Nov 44 was a bad day for I/JG301, losing 12 pilots killed/wounded.... The loss of Hptm Burggraf, I. Gruppe Commander was a big blow... II. Gruppe lost 6 killed/wounded, and this was ur cousin Siefrieds Gruppe, 5. Staffel IIRC, who lost Heidenreich and Lt Heise to Mustangs... 

Very bad day...


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich said:


> question Bill : has Mike Williams started putting together the materials on 26 November 44 from you or have you sent him anything on this engagement ? Neil Page and I had done up something on 7-7-44 on our old web-pages of the Sturmgruppen but that was only part 1, some new things have come to light, but I am waiting for an anticipated book on 14.Sturm/JG 3 to be released before I put up anything more on the net, am also working personally on 21 Novewmber 44 my cousins first hectic mission he flew and that was a bad op for the LW as well



E ~ I haven't touched bases with Mike lately but will follow up.

I've got some stuff on 355FG for July 7 and I'm trying to dig up the 8th AF Mission Summaries for 16 March, 12 May, 7 July, and 26 November. 

I'll send you what I have on 7 July/355FG via email


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Here is what I have on the 7 July deal from 355FG point of view. As April 24, the 354FS, then 357FS waded in while the 358FS stayed behind and covered.

* July 7

F.O.436. Lieutenant Colonel Kinnard led a Ramrod to support B-24s attacking oil and aircraft assembly targets at Halle, near Leipzig. 

Rendezvous was made with 2nd and 95th CW’s at 0808 near Lingen at 0808 and escorted over and to the IP southwest Leipzig at 0922. .As the formations swung back the north and west toward Halle they encountered the first gaggle of 100 plus single and twin engine fighters about 20 miles west of Leipzig near Querfurt.. The first wave was described as “6-8 in line abreast, 8 plus flights in trail” coming in north to south at 27,000 feet. A high cover of approximately 35-40 Me 109s were flying at 32,000 feet. 

This force was only part of the estimated 300 German fighters that the Luftwaffe control group put in this area and were primarily focused on the 14th CBW with the 44th, 392 and 492nd BG’s who were tasked to bomb Bernburg. The 2nd AD had split the different B-24 Combat Wings near Brunswick with one force turning south then east then north to hit Halle while the 14th and 96th continued onward to Bernburg.

Kinnard bent his throttle to intercept and his lead flight of the 354FS surged way ahead of the rest of the group. The 358FS maintained close escort for the 389th and 453rd BG’s, while the rest of the 354th and the 357FS broke into the Me 410s and Me 109s. One B-24 from 95th CW, 489th BG, was hit and seen to separate from the formation. It later ditched into North Sea. 

Kinnard quickly shot down two ZG26 Me 410s and then shot down a Me 109 to become the 355th's seventh air ace. His wingman, Lieutenant Huish, collided with trailing debris from one of Kinnard’s exploding Me 410s to become the group's first loss of the day. Huish crashed at Bendeleben, west of Halle and north of Merseburg Betounes and Bob Taylor shared a 109 before the rest escaped below. Cross shot down a pair of 410’s and Emil Perry got another before the 357FS caught up

As the 354th and 357FS were engaging, 20mi to the northwest the 20th and 55th FG Lightnings were also engaged in a big fight. 

The Luftwaffe controllers had found the 14th CW attacking Bernburg almost completely undefended. The Luftwaffe had deployed their first Fw 190 “Sturmbock” attack with Fw 190A-8’s heavily armored and equipped with 30mm cannon. In just over a minute 12 B-24s from the 492nd BG went down in flames between Halberstadt and Bernburg. Eight more 14th CW B-24s in the 44th and 392nd BGs would fall to the Fw 190s before the P-38s arrived.

To further complicate the situation, the 2nd and 95th CW’s after bombing Halle targets found themselves in a collision couse with the southeast bound 14th and 96th CW striking for Bernburg! At the end of the day this was not the best day for 8th AF mission planners.

Even though the 55th FG Lightnings were covering the 14th CBW including the 392nd, 492nd and 44th BG, they could not defend against the total of 175 single engine and twin engine fighters the Luftwaffe concentrated on the middle of the 14th CBW. The primary assault was carried out by I. II./ZG26, IV./JG3 and I.&II. /JG300

The downside of the modifications to the Fw 190A-8’s, to be more effective against bombers, was that they were nearly helpless against the Mustangs and Lightnings in the area. They were just too heavy and sluggish at that altitude to escape. They had to have the same escort from Me 109s at high altitude as the Me 410’s.

Captain Minchew led one section of the 357th FS into the scrap about 20+ miles west of Halle. About 25 Me 410s were leaving the battle area in a shallow dive at about 10,000 feet. Minchew quickly shot down two 410s and shared a third with a 55th FG P-38 which cut in front of him. McNeff got a Me 109 which was closing on Minchew’s tail. Minchew then chased after several more Me 410’s of ZG26 and damaged two more heavily SE Nordhausen before running out of ammo.

Haviland, led the second section of 357FS toward the gaggle of Me 410s heading to the southwest. He shot down two 410s immediately and his flight chased 30-40 more Me 410’s south toward Naumburg, where Fuller and Cotter each shot down another Me 410. The Me 410’s were described as flying an efficient formation but only dived to evade. Lieutenant Fuller was closing on a Me 410 near Naumburg A/D but was hit by flak at 7,000 feet. He bailed out 10 mi SSE Weimar and his chute was seen to open but he did not turn up after the war.

The 55th FG scored 19 destroyed for no losses in and around Bernburg. The 4th and 20th and 361st FG engaged remnants of JG300 plus JG3 and JG51 further north and NW of Halle to score 23 more for the loss of two shot down. 

Col Glenn Duncan, outstanding leader of 353rd FG was shot down by flak over Holland and fought three months with Dutch Underground before getting back to Allied lines. 

Claiborne Kinnard received the 355th FG’s second Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership and courage in this day's action.

Final score 14.5-0-4 for two losses 


*


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## Erich (Nov 25, 2007)

sure send away Bill, Les pointed out the older posting on the Sturm site, the US 8th AF 492nd and two other B-24 outfits got hit pretty hard on the 7-7-44 date.

E


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

Yea, the only recorded victory is a B-17 shot down near Madgeburg... However, the Americans admitted the loss of 33 4 engined bombers and 15 escorts, with 12 bombers and 9 fighters lost over Thuringia...


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

lesofprimus said:


> Yea, the only recorded victory is a B-17 shot down near Madgeburg... However, the Americans admitted the loss of 33 4 engined bombers and 15 escorts, with 12 bombers and 9 fighters lost over Thuringia...



Dan - My primary source for losses are Mighty 8th War Diary and Mighty 8th Combat Chronology. Just purely for the discussion around Merseburg/Halle/Leipzig Task Forces during July 7 this is what I have (cross referenced with Miller on 8th FC losses)

They both (M8WD and M8CC) agree 28 total B-24s lost for 2nd Div. For air to air losses (including mid air combat collisions plus ditch on way back)) there were 23 lost to fighters, 1 C/L after take off to form up over Channel coast outbound, and 4 lost to flak. 

LW awards were for 54 B-24s to 23 actually lost air to air in 8th AF records.

The 1st and 3rd lost 0 air, 4 flak and 9 'other' B-17s (C/L on TO, M/A while forming or outbound over Channel). 

LW awards were 5 B-17s shot down air to air to the zero contained in 8th AF records

From Kent Miller and my own research, 8th FC lost 2 Mustangs to air collisions with Me 410 debris, one P-38 shot down by a Me 410 and one P-51 shot down by Me 109 plus one P-51 and one P-47 to flak. 

LW awards were 6 P-51s, 7 P-38s to the 3 P-51s and 1 P-38 actually lost in air combat, and two of those were to debris from a blown up Me 410..

The two worst things (from USAAF perspective) is that the 353rd lost Col Glen Duncan shot down by flak over Holland - even though he evaded and returned months later - and the Fw 190A8 proved devastating if 'unmolested'

There were nearly 2.5x the awards of bombers shot down by LW in Tony Woods/Les Butler tables than actually shot down by fighters.. Erich and I have scratched our heads over awards of Me 410s' credited to 8th AF in this battle also.

I suspect that the rest of the 'missing fighters' out of the 15 you mention were 9th AF in France during Ground support??

Overclaiming on both sides


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich said:


> sure send away Bill, Les pointed out the older posting on the Sturm site, the US 8th AF 492nd and two other B-24 outfits got hit pretty hard on the 7-7-44 date.
> 
> E



The 492nd lost 12 of 12 to the Fw 190s and/or Me 410s - probably the Fw 190A8s. The 389th lost 5 of 7 to German fighters, the 392nd lost 3 air and 1 C/L on Take Off, the 44th lost 3 - all air.

Bad day for the 492nd. Bad day for anyone that was KIA that day.


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## Erich (Nov 25, 2007)

I personally think that there was more than 12 B-24's of the 492nd lost due to chatting several times with the bomb group historian of the outfit who also wrote a book on the unit A. Blue. 50 bombers were conseded by both the 8th and the 15th AF in the official losses listing which I need to pull for the resource document heading. Some 25-30 bombers were shot down by IV.Sturm/JG 3 alone one reason of the unusual visit by Geschwader Kommodroe Walter Dahl and stab to congratulate the pilots of JG 3 upon their return of their first organized Sturm attack from the rear. we still do not have all the details from the US official losses as some are being mislead as to the true details as there are more than what have been released. Literally the US bomber crews really never had seen anything so organized and massive the 492nd was cut through like hot kniofe to butter while the Fw 190's went straight ahead and tore through the other B-24 pulks ahead of the 492nd doing the same damage until US escorts woke up to what was going on. The Me 410's tried to make an attack but failed having to fight it out with US P-51's, Is official sources state that at least 5 Bombers fell to Me 410 guns..........actually none fell to the twin engines they were cut off and shot to pieces, all bombers were s/e kills, when the Sturms of JG 3 and JG 300 left the 8th they went an attacked the 15th AF bombers which is really another story altogether and little if anything has been written about this portion of the monster air battle


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

Interesting, very interesting information bein shared here.... Great stuff...

I pulled my info out of Willi's JG301/302 book....


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

lesofprimus said:


> Interesting, very interesting information bein shared here.... Great stuff...
> 
> I pulled my info out of Willi's JG301/302 book....



Dan - gotta laugh my ass off. 

Every time I see a reference to US losses in context of 'admitted' it is usually found in a book by either a German author or about Luftwaffe (like Caldwell)..

It is almost like there was a conspiracy to keep losses 'quiet'. On one hand the papers weren't fed a steady stream of losses when we got clobbered but our records are pretty good, and all survived the war... and the Macr's tell the tale of the missing. 

Where I agree the possible distortions is that we had so many heavily damaged that returned - but either in the shop for a long time or salvaged- that's kinda like a 40-60% 'damaged' on hte Luftwaffe side - it got the hell shot out of it and crash landed but maybe repaired - so 'no loss' in the books.

When ours crash landed in Germany or Holland or France with 40-60% damage it was LOST because that crew wasn't landing in friendly territory

It's much tougher to find accurate German records because so many were lost at the end of the war... and our historians are more prone to really look at the damage unless they have some kind of agenda.


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## lesofprimus (Nov 25, 2007)

Agreed 100% Bill.... It really is too bad that the Russians took Berlin, and the loss of all those documents that could have shed some decent light for us that went up in flames...


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich said:


> I personally think that there was more than 12 B-24's of the 492nd lost due to chatting several times with the bomb group historian of the outfit who also wrote a book on the unit A. Blue. 50 bombers were conseded by both the 8th and the 15th AF in the official losses listing which I need to pull for the resource document heading.
> 
> *Erich - I have no problem with your thesis, but as I noted to Dan there ain't no lyin in the Macr's. That will tell the tale on ships that did not return. I have done random samples, and while I find errors in MAWD and M8CC the NUMBER of losses if not the Reason is close to the number of MACR's
> 
> ...



E- I would be interested regarding another solid reference for 8th AF losses. So far I rely on:

Mighty 8th War Diary, Mighty eighth combat chronology, fighter units and pilots of 8th AF, the Macr database on armyairforces.com for combat losses plus different historical references including my own. Once again all have errors but not 2x errors by any stretch..and my primary LW is Woods and Butler plus all the Prien and Caldwell etc sources plus you and Leo Etgen, etc.

I have found that the 8th AF Mission Summaries also coincide with the M8WD and M8CC pretty closely so I suspect Roger Freeman depended heavily on 8th AF records. Wish he was still around

Regards,

Bill

I'm always looking for 'truth' (whatever the hell that is)..


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich said:


> I personally think that there was more than 12 B-24's of the 492nd lost due to chatting several times with the bomb group historian of the outfit who also wrote a book on the unit A. Blue. 50 bombers were conseded by both the 8th and the 15th AF in the official losses listing which I need to pull for the resource document heading.
> 
> *Erich - I have no problem with your thesis, but as I noted to Dan there ain't no lyin in the Macr's. That will tell the tale on ships that did not return. I have done random samples, and while I find errors in MAWD and M8CC the NUMBER of losses if not the Reason is close to the number of MACR's
> 
> ...



E- I would be interested regarding another solid reference for 8th AF losses. So far I rely on:

Mighty 8th War Diary, Mighty eighth combat chronology, fighter units and pilots of 8th AF, the Macr database on armyairforces.com for combat losses plus different historical references including my own. Once again all have errors but not 2x errors by any stretch..and my primary LW is Woods and Butler plus all the Prien and Caldwell etc sources plus you and Leo Etgen, etc.

I have found that the 8th AF Mission Summaries also coincide with the M8WD and M8CC pretty closely so I suspect Roger Freeman depended heavily on 8th AF records. Wish he was still around

Regards,

Bill

I'm always looking for 'truth' (whatever the hell that is)..


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## Erich (Nov 25, 2007)

a couple of brief notes Bill and others Les Butler/tony Woods claims listing and even the losses listing for day/night fighters - many errors, transcribing from copies and even the originals has not been good for years nor real good for those of us wishing to have sensible copies and readable ones at that, this from Tony Woods mouth to me on two separate occassions by email(s).

I cannot remember in the past 10 years whom the contact person is for the lists of MACR's but was told as I was looking for in fact a list of MACR's for the 491st bg complete of the B-24's shot down by the JG 301 unit, was told they were not all there ! ah ok how about...............sorry it is not included.

have found because of this the best source and is it ever tedious, but the best source of all is the historians of the individual US fighter/bomber units and hopeful they will share what they have database wise through complete mission reports..............if they are complete and that is a big what-if covering the individual missions which you know full well Bill.

E ~


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Erich said:


> a couple of brief notes Bill and others Les Butler/tony Woods claims listing and even the losses listing for day/night fighters - many errors, transcribing from copies and even the originals has not been good for years nor real good for those of us wishing to have sensible copies and readable ones at that, this from Tony Woods mouth to me on two separate occassions by email(s).
> 
> I cannot remember in the past 10 years whom the contact person is for the lists of MACR's but was told as I was looking for in fact a list of MACR's for the 491st bg complete of the B-24's shot down by the JG 301 unit, was told they were not all there ! ah ok how about...............sorry it is not included.
> 
> ...



E ~ don't have a clue relative to individual bomb groups (other than sources I have cited) but Maxwell AFB ought to have them. I 'll contact Rich Mueller and Lynn Gamma and see what they can pull for 7 July.

Thinking it through however implies that all that is available through three separate source coinciding with each other implies (not proof) that the data presented is as complete as is available? Doesn't make it so.

On the other hand I have often found conflicting info from one Squadron History to each other as well as to Group. I have resorted to 'tie breakers' - lol!


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## Erich (Nov 26, 2007)

Bill we may never really get to the bottom of all the claims and losses it probably means in effect gaps with both some never recorded, a fact for the LW on a definate basis during 1945 when nobody actually cared nor had the time to make out the paper run as the LW was on the move.

I'm going to insert on this day of the anniversary of the terrible battle on 26 Nov. 44 my cousins little article about his grave and old cross that was replaced. geez 63 years ago today hard to believe, JG 301 lost some 40 pilots an air battle with these losses the JG never got over.........


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## drgondog (Nov 26, 2007)

Erich said:


> Bill we may never really get to the bottom of all the claims and losses it probably means in effect gaps with both some never recorded, a fact for the LW on a definate basis during 1945 when nobody actually cared nor had the time to make out the paper run as the LW was on the move.
> 
> I'm going to insert on this day of the anniversary of the terrible battle on 26 Nov. 44 my cousins little article about his grave and old cross that was replaced. geez 63 years ago today hard to believe, JG 301 lost some 40 pilots an air battle with these losses the JG never got over.........



RIP for him and all the '17-20 something' guys that never had a family or lived to see their grand kids.


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## Erich (Nov 26, 2007)

from both sides of the conflict and that was a horror story often repeated as the war drew to a close


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## lesofprimus (Nov 26, 2007)

Yea, real bad times... Thanks for the article Erich...


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## drgondog (Nov 26, 2007)

Glider said:


> Also I believe the US did send out units to try and distrupt the GAF fighters before they struck the bombers. The chances of these escorts actively seeking and finding these smaller German units, efffectively outnumbering those in the combat, while the Germans are trying to form up into the larger units needed to make effective attacks seem high.
> 
> *This tactic, while employed often by RAF and 8/9th AF with P-47s in 1943 was useful but not highly productive along the Coast, until enough Mustang units were in ops to enable one to range out front deep into Germany where the LW was concentrating.
> 
> ...



Yep


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## Erich (Nov 27, 2007)

just in researching todays date 63 years ago, Nov. 27, 44 there is a ton of action with bad losses ............ gag. All in all November 44 was a terrible month for the LW day fighters


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## lesofprimus (Nov 27, 2007)

Yea Erich, November was really bad... I really think the severe bleeding they took in quality leaders during that month was one of the downfalls of the dayfighter arm...

They just could recover.... Even having 50 former bomber pilots with the Knights Cross couldnt help...


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## drgondog (Nov 29, 2007)

November 29, 1944. Following relief of Escort duties to Hannover, Lt. Col. Marshall led the 355th on a low level sweep for tagets of opportunites. After destroying two trains inbound to a marshalling yard a third train on a hidden parallel track dropped sidings on its flak cars and blasted WR-B 44-14799 "Jane IV". 

Lt. Royce Priest, flying Marshall's wing escorted his smoking and shot up Mustang away from the target area and back toward England. When they reached Allied lines over Belgium they talked about making an emergency landing there but pressed on.

Royce Priest was also flying with Marshall on August 18 when a German flak train shot him down North and East of Paris, then landed next to him to pull off the first Piggy Back Rescue.

Marshall lost all hydraulics over the channel and Priest noticed that the smoke drom the aft fuselage was heavier, then finally stopped.

At Steeple Morden, Marshall pulled the canopy back and made a 140kt belley landing with relatively little additional damge. Despite over 200 holes including one 40mm hole (unexploded) through the aft fuel tank and several 20mm hits in fuselage and tail, the aircraft was repaired and brought back to service with the 358FS of the 355th FG.

Marshall kiddingly told Priest that he wasn't gonna let him fly wing anymore - ever again. This was Priest's and Marshall's last mission of their first tour. Royce Priest went home to become an instructor and Bert Marshall came back in late February for his secound tour and I was born in September.

I owe my life to Royce Priest.


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## Erich (Nov 29, 2007)

well Bill and I could write up quite a story on the 26 November 44 mission and please continue to add Bill, am going to try and think clearly after taking my meds on Monday I hope to add to this thread, right now little girls getting in all the Christmas decorations today and over the weekend......ah grandkids


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## Udet (Dec 3, 2007)

In brief, my summary of reasons -extratcted from other threads- which might have had the Luftwaffe in a far stronger position to confront the -fundamental- allied aerial threat in the form of the 8th, 9th and 15th Air Forces:

(i) Gradual disbandment of ALL _Zerstörergruppen_ and MOST _Kampfgruppen_, commencing in late 1943.

This would have represented the following:

- A more efficient allocation of human and material resources for producing MAINLY -if not only- the type of plane that was needed the most at the front lines: Single Engined Fighters. (Late Bf 109s and Fw 190s, Ta 152s, and even more jets).

- A greater number of pilots and airmen become available for either conversion for single engined fighter pilots or screening prior to admittance into fighter plane schools.

- Also efficiency is brought in with regard to the following issues: (a) an easier program for producing and handling spare parts for planes in the Jagdgeschwadern; (b) ground crews; and (c) FUEL.

(ii) By the second half of 1943, no more funding nor any other type of help, assistance, or support from the RLM to any of those numerous German aerial designers who were still trying to develop ships that would never be ready for combat in the near future. During this period of time every pound of raw materials, every single facility, every worker represented valuable items Germany could not afford spending in ventures that would never represent any true and measurable help for confronting the enemy.

Germany´s situation demanded a more cohesive and unified effort of brains, arms and raw material administration, and not that lose scenario, where every rower seemed to row in whatever direction he thought i´d be cool to, with a direct negative impact on the direction of the boat. 

Do not pretend you are still the rich guy in the Neighborhood when the family´s finances are on the verge of collapse.

(iii) A different type of strategy to confront the allied aerial menace; with the measures described on (i) implemented, the Luftwaffe becomes stronger in numbers; perhaps more fully equipped Jagdgeschwadern are formed and brought forward to welcome the allied aerial fleets.


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## drgondog (Dec 4, 2007)

Udet said:


> In brief, my summary of reasons -extratcted from other threads- which might have had the Luftwaffe in a far stronger position to confront the -fundamental- allied aerial threat in the form of the 8th, 9th and 15th Air Forces:
> 
> (i) Gradual disbandment of ALL _Zerstörergruppen_ and MOST _Kampfgruppen_, commencing in late 1943.
> 
> ...



Udet - all excellent points. Criteria necessary? eliminate Hitler and replace Goering.

On the USAAF and RAF side. Start the oil campaign and ball bearing campaign in mid to summer 1943 and bomb them out of existance - take whatever losses are necessary to destroy those two industries. In the case of Schwinfurt particularly, heavier bombs and repeated attacks. The USAAF would have taken far heavier losses but the RAF could have made a huge contribution by allocating 25-40% of its strength to support the daylight raids.

Whether we could take those losses politically speaking is another question... but that campaign at that time would pre-empt at of German options.


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## Civettone (Dec 9, 2007)

Of course it depends on when you can start implimenting changes.

The biggest reasons why the Battle of Germany was lost or would be lost is the quality of the pilots. Of course you have a group of super pilots but that will only go so far. 
In Britain and the US it was only natural to look at pilot training before implimenting production increases. When the US got in the war, the first thing they did was raise the number of trained pilots. 

This takes time. By 1944 the Germans were doomed. No matter what aircraft you build, if you don't have well trained pilots, you're already dead and buried before you know it.

The German officials were complete idiots when it came to assessing pilot training. As soon as they needed extra pilots or aircraft they stripped it from the training squadrons and often didn't return them afterwards. It's a surprise it got them as far as it did. Training should always remain first priority. Just look at Finland for instance: more superpilots than aircraft, and those without aircraft simply stayed in training. 

Given that you'll need a year to train a good pilot, the last chance Germany had was in early 1943, in time for Big Week in 1944. 
Had other circumstances changed like a failed invasion of Normandy, it would have bought the Germans time for another year. Maybe. Certainly a capable leader instead of Hitler would have allowed the Germans to perform better at the Eastern Front where needless troops and materiel were lost due to Hitler's irrational decisions. The moron... 
In that case late 1943 would have been the last chance. This coincides with the surrender of Italy and the capture of one or two thousand (depends on source) Italian trainer aircraft. Though the real problem is instructors, and by midd 1944 fuel. That last bit could be partially overcome by installing training centres in Romania, closer to the oil source. I would also order Caudron to start mass production of the C.690M. This was a light fighter training aircraft which could be powered by the Argus As 10. This engine used 80 octane fuel and this would be more available than the high grade aviation fuel which was so badly needed by the Luftwaffe combat units.

Training and tactics should be adapted to the new situation. As there's no way of coming up with new aircraft by February 1944, unless one starts implimenting changes before 1944, the Bf 109s and Fw 190s will suffer high losses against the Mustangs and Lightnings with their well trained American pilots. 
Existing tactics definitely fell short against the American escort. Going for the escorts leads to nothing and going for the bombers lead to a turkey shoot and even more shooting practice for the flyboys. A combination of both tactics soon proved to be the best option. Two Gruppen formed escort for one Gruppe that attacked the bombers. This doesn't seem to be the right tactic to me. First, I wonder why this happened with Gruppen. Why not within Staffeln? Anyway, using only one out of three fighters to attack the bombers is insufficient. And yet, even then many German fighters fell to American guns. This was mainly because of badly trained fighter pilots. So why waste those fighters for escorts? Instead I would reserve the best pilots for the escort aircraft such as the Bf 109G-6/AS and give the other pilots the Bf 109G-6/R6 'gunboats'. (According to Kurfürst's document this configuration only resulted in a 8 kmh speed decrease.) These pilots would have to be given adapted fighter training. There's no need for them to learn all combat manoeuvres. Simply make them decent pilots (decreasing non-combat losses) specialized in gunnery and evasion manoeuvres. 
The top pilots should not be used against bombers as bomber gunnery fire is just as effective against them as against novice pilots. No need to lose them like that!

I already mentioned leadership. This should be brought through all ranks in the Luftwaffe. Many were politically appointed. A internal or external audit could weed out the incapable ones. Milch as head would be a good choice. (Now you know who the guy in my avatar is.) Luftwaffe doesn't have to be an independent branch of the military but at least the Reichsverteidigung department has to be autonomous so it can develop itself to a well lead streamlined organisation. 

I strongly oppose converting all aircraft production to fighter production. First, I already explained that more aircraft won't solve the problem. Second, it would mean the end of the Luftwaffe as a tactical air force, thereby only delaying the inevitable and that would be defeats on the battlefield. Instead, I would continue production of tactical bombers and restart production of the Hs 123. Emphasis should however go to fighter aircraft and they should get priority for the fuel reserves.
As a side note I would also increase deliveries to the allies like the Croats, Slowaks, Hongarians, Romanians and Finnish as they at least still had good pilots in reserve. Especially the Finnish and Croats were excellent!

Production of aircraft and other military equipment should be rationalized so more could be build with less resources. Fighter aircraft were already quite rationalised as there were relatively few in production: the Bf 109, Fw 190, Me 410 and later the Me 163 and Me 262. 
Another major problem of the Luftwaffe was its serviceability of its aircraft. People like Hitler only cared for production figures and didn't understand that tanks and aircraft need spare parts and qualified personnel to operate. Better to produce two aircraft with spare parts than three aircraft without spare parts or technical crews. So no 14,000 Bf 109s in 1944: 10,000 with spare parts would come down to exactly the same number of operational aircraft. 

(...)

Kris


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## Civettone (Dec 9, 2007)

(...)

As the Fw 190A was rather bad at higher altitudes I would only use them as Sturmbock. Also for every Fw 190A two Bf 109s could be build (in terms of manhour). As such I would not increase production of the Fw 190 but only of the Bf 109. 
But Tank should have been given to go ahead on the Fw 190C-1 with the DB 603 engine. This bird already flew in late 1943 and the DB 603A was sooner available than the Jumo 213A. I see no reason why the Fw 190C couldn't have been in service half a year before the Dora. The Fw 190C would have been slightly inferior to the D but still good enough. Plus, it could carry an extra cannon through the spinner. The Sturmbock versions could also be replaced by an up-armoured Fw 190C with 5 cannons! Sweet...

The Ta 152 was a great fighter but by 1945 it would have been inferior to the jet fighter and not much better than the Fw 190D-12. The Ta 152H was designed for high altitudes in anticipation for the B-29 which didn't turn out to be a high-altitude bomber (sic!). No reason to stop production of the Fw 190 for this version. Only a small production would suffice. 

The Bf 109G was far from outdated. The G-6 was no match for the P-51 but with the arrival of new engines in the Spring (the AM, AS and combined the ASM) the Bf 109 found its breath again. But only with the arrival of the Bf 109K at the end of 1944 did the Bf 109 become superior to the allied escort fighters. As such the Bf 109 would have been in trouble for most of the year. The only thing which could remedy this was better training or higher numbers. As already explained, a combination of both would have been the best option. 

Zerstörer were on the way out. However the Fw 190 Sturmbock and Bf 109G-6/R6 basically took over their role as heavy fighter, and later the Me 262. 
But to me, the Bf 109Z would have been the best stopgap measurement. This aircraft was a Zerstörer like the Me 110 or Me 410 but faster then the P-51 or any other fighter at the time! Armed with up to 5 cannons it could have been highly succesful, and still a cheap option as it would be much cheaper than the Me 410 and have about the same manhours and the Fw 190.

Me 262 was a good fighter aircraft but needed time to get operational in numbers. Full priority should be given to this aircraft. Or ... another option would be to go for another jet aircraft. A jet aircraft build out of cheap material, easy to fly, decent armament, easy to maintain, and with a single jet engine, a Volksjäger, but then a year earlier. Also not with that dramatic time frame of a couple of months. Let's give it a year. There were several single-engined jet designs in 1943, like the Focke Wulf P II and P II projects, the Messerschmitt P 1095, the Arado E ??? and perhaps the best choice of all, the Lippisch P 20. Based on the Me 163 but with a landing gear and a turbojet engine, and with 4 guns, it would have been an excellent yet cheap jet interceptor! Best option would be to power it with the more reliable and cheaper BMW 003 which was availabe in the latter half of 1944. 

Messerschmitt Me 163 was used in a wrong way in which its limited endurance limited its operations. It should have been placed in areas which saw the most air combat. Place it close to the Ruhr area and that way it can intercept every bomber which bombs this industrial area. Another option are the Hamburg-Bremen-Kiel zone, the München-Nürnberg-Schweinfurt zone and the Northwestern Italian industry zone (Milan, Turin). Instead of building a new Me 163C and Me 263, a standard Me 163B should be used with the new dual-chambered HWK 109-509C engine which at least would have increased endurance by 50%! This version could have been in service before the end of 1944. 

The real Wunderwaffe would have been the Natter though this would have appeared much later. The main advantage is that it didn't need trained pilots at all. Its aircraft were expendable and so were their pilots. And yet their rockets would have been very effective (as proved by the JV 44). Thousands could have been produced and placed near all major cities and industrial zones. Their real value is that they would have freed up the other fighter aircraft of the Reichsverteidiging which could then be redeployed to regular frontline units. 

Then my notion of continued bomber/attack aircraft comes into play. These could then be equiped with the Panzerblitz or guided bombs and rockets. Now escorted by well trained and experienced fighters they could be used to turn the tide on the front. It would have been the only chance to come out of the war in favorable terms. 

Finally, a word on Flak guns. They proved to be very ineffective until the arrival of new ammunition and improved guidance. The biggest problem was that they used an excuberant amount of shells, plus the fact that those guns and personnel could also have been used on the frontlines. 
They were mainly used in such high numbers because of Hitler and their popularity among the civilian population. Their main use was to keep the allied bombers from spending more ToT and often disrupting their formations and accuracy. 
However, production should be limited in favour of field artillery.
Later Flak guns could be replaced by the Taifun and guided missiles.

Kris


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## Erich (Dec 9, 2007)

important thoughts Kris, good post some interesting info that I should like to comment on once my migrane disappates.

now let me clear the air once and for all you have brought up the myth about the TA 152H and the B-29. Nowhere in factual history of the Ta and JG 301 or any other unit that was to fly the hot rod is there mention of facing the US B-29 in Europe. 1st it was not considered to fly in Europe, # 2 and the most important JG 301 veterans had never heard of the B-29 during the war so how could it even be remotely possible the a/c was designed for use against the high flying 4 engine when the crew piloting the Ta as well as the design team never even heard nor knew of the B-29 ???

sometimes you just need to more factual evidence that the net especially and some books do not provide. I had answered another persons posting on this very same matter last year and he was adamant that several web-site included this erroneous information and it had to be true since so many sites indicated this...................nope ~ the design was for a creation against the US P-51 D and K


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## Glider (Dec 9, 2007)

I am sorry Kris but most of your posting is I believe a fantasy. As for saying that the Natter is some sort of ace in the hole is unbelieveable. A one shot scatter weapon, with a range that made the Me163 look like a long range fighter, that has to be replaced after every flight, clogging up what few transport links the Germans had. That is your wonder weapon?
You may be able to build them, but getting them to where they are needed is another thing.

It also ignores the aircraft that the allies had in production or development that matched planes that you mention, some of which only existed in mock ups.
As for relying on guided missiles. With all the pressures of the cold war these didn't become reliable until the 60's at best and even that is being kind. The concept of reliable working models in the late 40's just isn't on, despite what the scientists say with their carefully controlled test samples.


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## HoHun (Dec 9, 2007)

Hi Erich,

>Nowhere in factual history of the Ta and JG 301 or any other unit that was to fly the hot rod is there mention of facing the US B-29 in Europe. 1st it was not considered to fly in Europe, # 2 and the most important JG 301 veterans had never heard of the B-29 during the war so how could it even be remotely possible the a/c was designed for use against the high flying 4 engine when the crew piloting the Ta as well as the design team never even heard nor knew of the B-29 ???

Though I'd not expect the story of the Ta 152H having been conceived as a B-29 interceptor to be true, here is an interesting quote from Ethell/Price, "The German Jets in Combat" (German Edition):

"On an armament conference in Berlin on 19th of January [1944], he [Milch] stated with regard to the newly developed aircraft of the enemy that were to be expected: 'In this year, the new types B-29 and B-32 will arrive. These machines attack at an altitude of 11 to 12 km. There is no flak gun that reaches these heights. The only antidote we have is the fighter programme. If we don't proceed with it to reach these heights at all ... currently our fighters are not capable of fighting an enemy at these altitudes.'"

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Civettone (Dec 9, 2007)

Erich, the Germans very much believed the B-29 was to be used against them, there are several documents which can attest that. One of them I have even gives the altitude of 10 km at a cruising speed of 600 kmh. This is what the Germans thought the new bomber would be capable of. But they were looking ahead, and also projected the possible use of bombers flying even higher than that. For that reason they started developing Höhenjäger like the BV 155. 

The Ta 152H was very much designed to be a Höhenjäger as you know. This was with the B-29 in mind. Of course the JG 301 pilots didn't know this because by the time of its arrival the Ta 152H was no longer intended to fight against the B-29 which also turned out to be flying at regular altitude. 

Or perhaps I'm mistaken. Why do you think the Germans thought they needed a Höhenjäger so badly? 


Glider, you say that most of what I'm writing is fantasy. Yet you only pick out just the last bit about the Natter and the SAMs. 
I'm more than willing to discuss the Natter if you want me to. Just open a new thread. You also need to do some reading up on the subject as they were not intended to be single shot weapons. It was far from operational but the concept is fully workable and their armament would have been devestating to enemy bombers. I also don't understand what you mean by problems of getting them to where they are needed. They will be used as pinpoint defences like the Ruhr areas. These are small, detachable and light aircraft and I don't see any reason why they wouldn't get to the areas which they are supposed to defend, or not any more than other weapons which are being sent to the front. 

Also, don't forget that this scenario only applies if the allies are stopped on their way to Germany. As soon as the allies enter Germany as they did in late 1944, it's no longer possible to regain air control over Germany because of the vicinity of allied aircraft over Germany and the collapse of an effective radar system.

As to the SAMs, I only said that they could replace Flak guns 'later'. I base my information on the more modeate German claims as to when these would have been operational. Also, with more resources these could have become operational much sooner. There's no doubt about the Taifun and either the Enzian or the Schmetterling becoming operational by 1946. How effective they would have been, is another thing. But these SAMs are hardly the core of my propositions as I merely said they would 'later' replace Flak guns.
Kris


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## Erich (Dec 9, 2007)

funny with Ethell book which is not correct and the so called LW hierarchy as I said the Ta was not design to take on the B-29, read my last line of my previous posting this was indeed the design for -----------taking on the P-51..this was told to me by a veteran of the unit that I have referred to in the past as just one instance.

the high altitude fighter was to be jet driven to take on higher flying bombers. for the summer and fall of 45 only JG 301 and parts of another JG were to have the Ta and in fact much of JG 300 was destined to have the Me 262 for Reich defense.

the 262 and similar jet propelled units were the wave of the future not prop driven


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## HoHun (Dec 9, 2007)

Hi Erich,

>funny with Ethell book which is not correct 

Hm, do you mean Milch never said what Ethell/Price attribute to him? Or do you mean Milch was not correct? 

The latter is be obvious as the B-29 was not employed against Germany, but it still could have influenced their development programmes if they thought it would be.

>as I said the Ta was not design to take on the B-29, read my last line of my previous posting this was indeed the design for -----------taking on the P-51.

I thought the P-51 made a relatively late appearance, so how did it influence the development of the Ta 152H? Focke-Wulf received a contract over 6 prototypes for the Ta 152H on 6th of December, 1944 - by which time the P-51 had hardly made an impact on the Luftwaffe.

>the high altitude fighter was to be jet driven to take on higher flying bombers. 

Hm, considering that the Germans were aware that the early jet engines' technlogical characteristics did not include great high-altitude performance, that comes as a bit of a surprise.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Erich (Dec 9, 2007)

I think the quote is incorrect.

the P-51 came out from December 1943 plenty time to work on high alt projects. the TA 152H was already in front line service with 35 of them in III./JG 301 in January of 45, according to the log buchs of JG 301 vets the P-51 unit was from the 9th AF 354th fg, Bill can confirm even much more so that his fathers 355th fg made a huge impact on the LW during the winter of 44 onward

as to the jets development the Me 262 was to be phased out and other projects come in, several of the FW designs had promise, Arado was another contender

all of this is documented via German archivs


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 9, 2007)

HoHun said:


> I thought the P-51 made a relatively late appearance, so how did it influence the development of the Ta 152H? Focke-Wulf received a contract over 6 prototypes for the Ta 152H on 6th of December, 1944 - by which time the P-51 had hardly made an impact on the Luftwaffe.



P-51D's arrived in Europe in the Winter of 1943/1944 and were escorting large bomber formations in early 1944.


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## HoHun (Dec 9, 2007)

Hi Kris,

>Erich, the Germans very much believed the B-29 was to be used against them, there are several documents which can attest that. One of them I have even gives the altitude of 10 km at a cruising speed of 600 kmh. This is what the Germans thought the new bomber would be capable of. 

Not so far off actually ... here is a graph a prepared a while back, showing the various B-29 power settings.

Basis is standard day, 6° cowl flaps, 90000 lbs weight. The data is from "The B-29 - Airplane Commander Training Manual for the Superfortress". There might be slight inaccuracies from reading the original graphs, or in the original graphs themselves, leading to the somewhat unsteady overall impression.

Power Setting 8 as indicated in the graph is Maximum Continuous, showing that 600 km/h at 9 km (not quite at 10 km) was about right. While for maximum range (and maximum engine life - the B-29 was a bit problematic in that regard) you'd normally use lower power settings, Germany was not so far off to force the B-29 to slow their speed. Engine life might have been more of a concern, though.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Dec 9, 2007)

Hi Erich,

>I think the quote is incorrect.

Hm, do you mean the content of the quote or the text of the quote? Quite a difference there ...

>the P-51 came out from December 1943 plenty time to work on high alt projects. the TA 152H was already in front line service with 35 of them in III./JG 301 in January of 45

Roger that, I made a typo there - the 6 prototypes were ordered on 7th of December 1943, according to Hermann's "Focke-Wulf Ta 152 - Der Weg zum Höhenjäger".

The corrected date explains why I doubt that the P-51 had made much of an impact for the genesis of the Ta 152H.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Erich (Dec 9, 2007)

all my data is buried on the TA 152H at the moment, but inception and career are being covered. I'm not at all impressed with Dietmars efforts on the Ta, for one his ops are not quite correct and there is so much more..........another reason why I am working on more for JG 301

the alternative to the H was an overblown Fw 190 like D with a huge copy-cat Mustang air receiver under the fuselage. techs and design crews were needed in early 44 to put together a competitor for the P-51 something above the ordinary A-8 and A-9 Fw. The Dora was a stop gap only


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## Glider (Dec 9, 2007)

Civettone said:


> (...)
> 
> As the Fw 190A was rather bad at higher altitudes I would only use them as Sturmbock. Also for every Fw 190A two Bf 109s could be build (in terms of manhour). As such I would not increase production of the Fw 190 but only of the Bf 109.
> But Tank should have been given to go ahead on the Fw 190C-1 with the DB 603 engine. This bird already flew in late 1943 and the DB 603A was sooner available than the Jumo 213A. I see no reason why the Fw 190C couldn't have been in service half a year before the Dora. The Fw 190C would have been slightly inferior to the D but still good enough. Plus, it could carry an extra cannon through the spinner. The Sturmbock versions could also be replaced by an up-armoured Fw 190C with 5 cannons! Sweet...


This whole section is full of the word, could. Unfortunately Kurt Tank wasn't given the go ahead and the rest didn't happen.



> The Ta 152 was a great fighter but by 1945 it would have been inferior to the jet fighter and not much better than the Fw 190D-12. The Ta 152H was designed for high altitudes in anticipation for the B-29 which didn't turn out to be a high-altitude bomber (sic!). No reason to stop production of the Fw 190 for this version. Only a small production would suffice.


I don't disagree with this section at all. 



> The Bf 109G was far from outdated. The G-6 was no match for the P-51 but with the arrival of new engines in the Spring (the AM, AS and combined the ASM) the Bf 109 found its breath again. But only with the arrival of the Bf 109K at the end of 1944 did the Bf 109 become superior to the allied escort fighters. As such the Bf 109 would have been in trouble for most of the year. The only thing which could remedy this was better training or higher numbers. As already explained, a combination of both would have been the best option.


There is a slight contradiction here. In effect the 109G - 6 was outdated until the new engines arrived which only went some way to making up the difference. Only the K version truely made up the gap and the jury is out re it being better than the P51D. Its also worth noting that it was while the G-6 was outmatched that a lot of damage was done and the USAAF was able to build its strength.
As a match the allies had the P51H, P47N, MB5 ready for production, Tempest VI, Tempest II, Spit 21 and 18. These could also match the Ta152. 



> Zerstörer were on the way out. However the Fw 190 Sturmbock and Bf 109G-6/R6 basically took over their role as heavy fighter, and later the Me 262.


I agree with this


> But to me, the Bf 109Z would have been the best stopgap measurement. This aircraft was a Zerstörer like the Me 110 or Me 410 but faster then the P-51 or any other fighter at the time! Armed with up to 5 cannons it could have been highly succesful, and still a cheap option as it would be much cheaper than the Me 410 and have about the same manhours and the Fw 190.


The 109Z as far as I am aware never flew. If it was half as good as it was supposed to be then why wasn't it flown? The prototype was destroyed but that is no excuse for a plane that was supposed to be so easy produce and there were plenty of airframes around. Its another could have/might have that never happened.
Even if it did the Hornet was in production.



> Me 262 was a good fighter aircraft but needed time to get operational in numbers. Full priority should be given to this aircraft. Or ... another option would be to go for another jet aircraft. A jet aircraft build out of cheap material, easy to fly, decent armament, easy to maintain, and with a single jet engine, a Volksjäger, but then a year earlier. Also not with that dramatic time frame of a couple of months. Let's give it a year. There were several single-engined jet designs in 1943, like the Focke Wulf P II and P II projects, the Messerschmitt P 1095, the Arado E ??? and perhaps the best choice of all, the Lippisch P 20. Based on the Me 163 but with a landing gear and a turbojet engine, and with 4 guns, it would have been an excellent yet cheap jet interceptor! Best option would be to power it with the more reliable and cheaper BMW 003 which was availabe in the latter half of 1944.


Again nice ideas that never happened, but the P80 and Vampire did happen.



> Messerschmitt Me 163 was used in a wrong way in which its limited endurance limited its operations. It should have been placed in areas which saw the most air combat. Place it close to the Ruhr area and that way it can intercept every bomber which bombs this industrial area. Another option are the Hamburg-Bremen-Kiel zone, the München-Nürnberg-Schweinfurt zone and the Northwestern Italian industry zone (Milan, Turin). Instead of building a new Me 163C and Me 263, a standard Me 163B should be used with the new dual-chambered HWK 109-509C engine which at least would have increased endurance by 50%! This version could have been in service before the end of 1944.


50% of not a lot = not a hell of a lot but the basic problems would remain and no doubt the accident would still be very high. 



> The real Wunderwaffe would have been the Natter though this would have appeared much later. The main advantage is that it didn't need trained pilots at all. Its aircraft were expendable and so were their pilots. And yet their rockets would have been very effective (as proved by the JV 44). Thousands could have been produced and placed near all major cities and industrial zones. Their real value is that they would have freed up the other fighter aircraft of the Reichsverteidiging which could then be redeployed to regular frontline units.


My understanding of the Natter must be flawed but I understood that it was launched from a fixed structure, flew for a very short time using a rocket motor, fired one volley of rockets, pilot leaves the battle, fires the bolts seperating the front from the back, pilot thrown out of the cockpit and depends on his own parachute. Engine comes down on a parachute and the airframe crashes to the ground and is scrap.
Hence my view that its a one shot weapon with a minimal range, and needs to be replaced (airframe).
Its totally impractical. 


> Then my notion of continued bomber/attack aircraft comes into play. These could then be equiped with the Panzerblitz or guided bombs and rockets. Now escorted by well trained and experienced fighters they could be used to turn the tide on the front. It would have been the only chance to come out of the war in favorable terms


Agree that its the only chance but a very faint one. 



> Finally, a word on Flak guns. They proved to be very ineffective until the arrival of new ammunition and improved guidance. The biggest problem was that they used an excuberant amount of shells, plus the fact that those guns and personnel could also have been used on the frontlines.
> They were mainly used in such high numbers because of Hitler and their popularity among the civilian population. Their main use was to keep the allied bombers from spending more ToT and often disrupting their formations and accuracy.
> However, production should be limited in favour of field artillery.
> Later Flak guns could be replaced by the Taifun and guided missiles.


The problem with guided weapons has already been mentioned. I wold be interested as to how you believe that they would work given the problems that all nations had in real life.

David


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## HoHun (Dec 9, 2007)

Hi Erich,

>I'm not at all impressed with Dietmars efforts on the Ta, for one his ops are not quite correct and there is so much more..........

Well, the specific question at hand is whether his date for the order of six prototypes is correct. If it is, it would be hard to maintain the point of view that the Ta 152H was designed to fight the P-51.

Personally I do not believe that the Ta 152H was specically designed to combat the B-29 either, but there is that Milch quote, dating less than a month after the prototype order was given, and obviously Milch is quite concerned about the B-29 ... that's at least food for thought.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Erich (Dec 9, 2007)

I'll say this again as the last time until my book is published. I asked a question to W. Reschke through Roman here on the forums, and that was "what was the Ta 152H built and used for?" His answer was to engage the P-51 at high altitude. to say that other Allied a/c whether in existance or only in prototype could thus match the TA 152H in performance is plain ridiculous unless you or we/all of us have the ww2 combat reports in hand. And in truth the Mustangs were encountered once in aerial combat with one being shot down. there were no losses of TA 152H's to aerial combat but to mechanical failures ............

alright then now you guys hand onto your bootstraps

nothing more, nothing less await for something then next year that will hopeful clear the air once and for all


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## Soren (Dec 9, 2007)

The Allies had no piston engined fighter in development which would've been able to match the Ta-152H's equipped with the EB engine, this engine was very close to being fielded before the end of the war. As it was the Ta-152H out-classed any piston engined fighter in the air until the end of the war.

I myself believe that the Ta-152 wasn't meant to fight any specific Allied a/c, but just as a super high performance air superiority fighter with a high enough agility, performance ceiling to allow it to easily engage and outfight any a/c the Allies might have fielded. Tank clearly succeeded in reaching this goal.

The future clearly was the Me-262 though..


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## Glider (Dec 9, 2007)

Can I ask what the performance of the TA152 was to be with the EB engine? 
I say this because as you say the piston engine was at its height at this time and I doubt that the TA 152 would have much if any advantage over the allied aircraft I listed.


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## HoHun (Dec 9, 2007)

Hi Erich,

>I asked a question to W. Reschke through Roman here on the forums, and that was "what was the Ta 152H built and used for?" His answer was to engage the P-51 at high altitude. 

I'm confident that is what Reschke was convinced of. However, how would he know? As far as I can tell, he was very far from the circles that conceived the Ta 152H. He is simply repeating the information that was given to him, and it probably didn't come directly from a member of those circles either.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Soren (Dec 9, 2007)

Glider said:


> Can I ask what the performance of the TA152 was to be with the EB engine?
> I say this because as you say the piston engine was at its height at this time and I doubt that the TA 152 would have much if any advantage over the allied aircraft I listed.



With the Jumo 213E the Ta-152H boasted a 5,000 + ft/min climb rate, reaching 10km in 10.1 min, and had a top speed of 760 + km/h and a 15.1km service ceiling. With the Jumo 213EB this already unmatched performance would've been increased considerably at high alts, only SL performance would've remained the same.


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## drgondog (Dec 12, 2007)

Soren said:


> With the Jumo 213E the Ta-152H boasted a 5,000 + ft/min climb rate, reaching 10km in 10.1 min, and had a top speed of 760 + km/h and a 15.1km service ceiling. With the Jumo 213EB this already unmatched performance would've been increased considerably at high alts, only SL performance would've remained the same.



At the end of the day, had the war been extended several months, the Ta 152H would have been confronted with P-51H, P-47N, P-80, Gloster, Spit XXI, Tempest V and maybe an F8F.

Maybe a marginal performance advantage but not overwhelming in the piston arena... and the 262 whether superior or equal to P-80 is also marginal.

Is this the time to discuss numbers and pilot skill out of training command available for combat? Or fuel supplies or security of any airfield in Germnay - day or night - from 50 Fighter groups from RAF and USAAF- day or night?


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## Glider (Dec 12, 2007)

drgondog said:


> At the end of the day, had the war been extended several months, the Ta 152H would have been confronted with P-51H, P-47N, P-80, Gloster, Spit XXI, Tempest V and maybe an F8F.
> 
> Maybe a marginal performance advantage but not overwhelming in the piston arena... and the 262 whether superior or equal to P-80 is also marginal.
> 
> Is this the time to discuss numbers and pilot skill out of training command available for combat? Or fuel supplies or security of any airfield in Germnay - day or night - from 50 Fighter groups from RAF and USAAF- day or night?



Its also worth adding the Hornet, Spiteful, Tempest VI, Tempest II to the list as these were in production before the wars end. 

To assume that the TA152H would have ruled the sky is a massive assumption


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## drgondog (Dec 13, 2007)

I think from my own perspective and some pretty clever ideas presented for example by Udet on solving pilot shortage problems, I would have selected the following as "Changes to be Made"

1. Convert most of LW bomber pilots (not all) but perhaps 75% to fighter pilots in early 1943. Focus twin engine bomber production on Ju 88 series followed by Ar 234 starting in 1942.
2. Immediately fly night intruder missions to attack airfields all over Britain and Italy when 8th and 9th and 12th and 15th AF started ops, as well as follow RAF back to their airfields. To be done by existing twin engine fighter force primarily
3. Dedicate proportionate force of daylight fighters with best high altitude performance at the time to attack and harass daylight escorts.. This would be initially Me 109s but supplanted by 190Dora or Me 262s as each came into production
4. Put the Me 262 into production as soon as possible as a day fighter and make sure they are concentrated to protect key industries and targets such as Ploesti and Merseburg, etc
5. Discard Dive Bombing spec and let Heinkel build the best strategic bomber they could build as early as possible but in production no later than 1941 to support ops in Russia beyond Moscow
6. Quit building all twin engine fighters except for those that had best night fighter capability and keep them in that role
7. Except for transition Me 109s named in 3. above, concentrate all piston engine development from 1942 forward in Focke Wulf line and derivatives

Kill Hitler and Goering in 1940 - before BoB. (Have to assume war has started)

On other lines of thought - don't bother with surface fleet of Cruisers/Pocket Battleships - dedicate all of that production and focus to U-Boats starting in 1935-1938. Have 100-150 U-Boats ready when WWII starts. Develop drop tanks for Me 109 in 1939 so that they had 200 mi longer range or more than 1 hour of loiter beyond London before BoB starts


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## Erich (Dec 13, 2007)

Bill your numero # 2 is vital, and most of the members here and on other forums that I have expressed this statement on do not seem to have a clue, except to say the RAF/Allies would of come up with the Mossie nf earlier to defend the airfields, .......but I say what airfields as they would of been continually potholed if not wrecked.........

one of Hitlers major bungles during thew ar was to removed NJG 2 from that scenario and not allow the whole NJG units to come to fruition on these attacks

also develop ground to air rocket defense, although if # 2 would of been in effect totally there would not have a need for ground to air rocketry.

I'm hoping we do not then continue the silly what if's on the TA 152H and other Allied counterparts that were not even in circulation yet as we have countless threads that turn into this out of sheer un-knowledge of the true facts.......


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## drgondog (Dec 13, 2007)

Erich said:


> Bill your numero # 2 is vital, and most of the members here and on other forums that I have expressed this statement on do not seem to have a clue, except to say the RAF/Allies would of come up with the Mossie nf earlier to defend the airfields, .......but I say what airfields as they would of been continually potholed if not wrecked.........
> 
> one of Hitlers major bungles during thew ar was to removed NJG 2 from that scenario and not allow the whole NJG units to come to fruition on these attacks
> 
> ...



I actually did consider the ground to air rockets E, except that all the guidance system technologies available before 1944 rendered them just another flack battery and maybe less accurate. I could be wrong of course but think earlier development of R4 more efficient than surface to air?

If B-29 comes into theatre, flak would be less effective and then surface to air maybe required to compliment high altitude fighters... I dunno

On number 2.) I can think of different countermeasures but none (barrage ballons, night fighters, etc) would have been very effective against say pairs of Me 110/210 or Ju 88's flying all over Britain after sundown and before sunrise looking for airfields. 

RAF vulnerable on return, USAAF heavies vulnerable on hardstands and take off pre-dawn. Big mess potentially.

PS - I'm copying 355 mission summaries and encounter reports for July 7 and November 26 for you - I have quite a few that aren't on Mike's website.


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## Erich (Dec 13, 2007)

geezo well once I get those copies I'll be burdened underground for 3 months...........thanks in advance.

yes the rockets of all sizes would be sent up as forward Flak taking out the initial B-17/B-24 boxes, literally a full scale barrage.

As to the Fernenachtjagd yes I have some other earlier info that will be in our book that I cannot share right now, but the airfields were quite well known but only NJG 2 with a meager alotment of Ju 88's were fulfilling the requirements but they of course were not desired, should of come in low over the ocean and right on top of land which they did when the March 45 raids became effective for Op Gisela and 2-3 others of too small a size but the Austrian had his fat ugly nose in everything and warped out eh LW Nachtjagd, Fatty was inept as he knew nothing of how to defend the Reich at night let alone take an offense to the British

though there is no doubt in my mind that British would of made it top priority to increase their own AA defenses by 50 %


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## Glider (Dec 13, 2007)

Obviously it would depend on when the Germans tried to take the battle to Britain but the British defences shouldn't be underestimated. The flak guns alone had a good success rate against V1's with radar direction and proximity fuses. Whilst the nightfighters were very strong.


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## drgondog (Dec 15, 2007)

Erich said:


> geezo well once I get those copies I'll be burdened underground for 3 months...........thanks in advance.
> 
> yes the rockets of all sizes would be sent up as forward Flak taking out the initial B-17/B-24 boxes, literally a full scale barrage.
> 
> ...



Erich - the reason for me sending you a lot of the ones that Mike doesn't have is to help you (and me) get a sense on the times and locations for each of the squadron's engagements - both for July 7 and Nov 26.

I finally figured out the July 7 massacre at Bernburg. The 8th 'forked out' too many separate attacks that day for the Long Range escorts to adequately cover.. The Leipzig Task Force from 2AD was covered by 355th and the Bernburg by the 4th - but the 4th was positioned to the center and rear and the entire focus it seems was the LW controllers laid a two pronged attack of me 410s on the Bernburg effort. The 4th was able to turn back beat off the attack on the rear but the lead CW's got hammered by the second force. 

I asked Dr. Muller at Maxwell to help me find the 7 July and 26 November Mission Summaries for 8th - the same that we had for 24 April.


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## Freebird (Feb 3, 2008)

Soren said:


> All it took was the LW deploying the Me-262 in full scale in 1943 and the Allies would've been repulsed completely. Hitler made sure that didn't happen.
> 
> But still, this wouldn't ensure any victory, it would seriously prolong the war though.
> 
> PS: I agree completely with Erich, Les Bill on most points - good posts guys!



Presumably they could have had the 262 operational in the fall of '43, what was the production capacity then? How much longer would it take to train LW pilots on the jet?


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## Njaco (Feb 3, 2008)

Any thoughts on the V-1 or V-2 or were they too late for this scenario?

Stopping production and developement on inferior or outlandish designs I think would help immensly, as you say drgn.


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