# The Battle For Australia



## parsifal (Sep 6, 2011)

This week marks the official week for celebrating what is known as the "Battle For Australia". Its not a well known celebration. In Australia its an event overshadowed by Anzac day, yet the importance of what it represents should not be dismissed. The week chosen represents that moment in time in 1942 when the Japanese suffered their first clear land defeat in the Pacific War, at a little known place called Milne Bay in new Guinea but the "Battle For Australia, covers a whole range of events from the fall of Singapore to the battles around Buna, Gona and Sanananda. It was a time when Australians felt they stood mostly alone and were forced to face some of their worst fears and nightmares. It was the first time that Australian armed forces, however hesitatingly had to operate under their own resources, and on their own initiative, mostly.

On Sunday February 15, Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita tightened his stranglehold on Singapore city, blasting it with artillery and incessant air assault. He demanded surrender. Malaya Command, with no air support, short of water and petrol and with its force thrust back into a congested city without any effective counter to the enemy battering from the air, capitulated. Singapore’s fall gave Japan her first major victory in the whole campaign just Sixty-nine days after Pearl Harbor. 

Nowhere was the magnitude of this disaster realised so quickly and completely as in Australia. Its suddenness came with the force of a thunderclap. 

“Just as Dunkirk began the Battle for Britain, so does Singapore open the Battle for Australia” declared the Prime Minister (Mr Curtin). “It is now work or fight as we have never worked or fought before. On what we do now depends everything we hope to do when this bloody test has been survived.” 

The Battle for Australia was a struggle never before envisaged in this country but yet much of it still remains unknown. It was a struggle that stretched our national resources to the limit; which saw the bombing of mainland Australia; the attack by midget submarines on Sydney Harbour; and raised the spectre of the threat of a possible invasion through Papua New Guinea. 

Our sailors, soldiers and airmen and those of our allies fought, and many died in the defence of Singapore, the Battle of Sunda Strait, Timor, the Kokoda Track, Milne Bay, the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, in the Solomons and at Savo Island. The men of the Merchant Navy provided invaluable support throughout the island chain and suffered heavy casualties, as did the often unsung heroes, the Coastwatchers.

"THE BOMBING OF DARWIN
The first enemy attack on Australian soil in the history of the Commonwealth of Australia occurred at 9.58am on Thursday 19 February 1942. The small Northern Territory town of Darwin suffered an air-raid attack by 188 Japanese aircraft. At the time of the attack the civilian population numbered less than 2000.

THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA
Fear of Japan’s imperialist designs on Australia had been circulating since the early part of the century when Russia had been defeated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Stories and melodramas such as Randolph Bedford’s play White Australia, or The Empty North red fears of a “Yellow Peril’ invading Australia. During the 1930’s Japanese documents such as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere sometimes mentioned Australia as a possible colony. Access to Japanese records has led to the realisation that this idea, put forward by the Japanese Navy, had been rejected by their High Command. The purpose of attacks on Darwin and other parts of Australia was to weaken the country’s value as an American base. Nevertheless this was unknown to most Australians at the time and a palpable fear persisted.

KOKODA TRAIL I
The Japanese had first landed in New Guinea in March, at Lae and Salamaua. Buna and Gona, where the Japanese landed in July, are south of these areas on the north east coast of Papua. 'As the crow flies' the area is less than 200 kilometres from Port Moresby. It is, however, separated from that town by the steep range of the Owen Stanley mountains. The only way over this range was by foot or air. Their losses at the battle of the Coral Sea and Midway had prevented the Japanese from invading Port Moresby by sea. Their objective in July was to approach the garrison town over the precipitous mountain track. The village of Kokoda was about half way between Port Moresby and Buna.

MILNE BAY
In late August, unable to move further down the Kokoda Trail, the Japanese decided to make a second line of attack on Port Moresby. On 25 -26 August they landed at Milne bay on the extreme eastern tip of Papua, about 370 kilometres from Port Moresby. Although under great logistical stress with the fighting on the Kododa Trail, Allied forces were ready for them. Unlike the protracted Kokoda campaign, the Battle of Milne Bay ended in just over ten days. 

KOKODA TRAIL II
In August while the Japanese were withdrawing from Milne bay, the Australians on the Kokoda Trail were forced to withdraw from Isurava. Under fierce attack from Japanese forces the Australian retreated to Templeton’s Crossing and eventually to lmita Ridge. By this time the appalling conditions and lack of supplies had caused health problems among the Australian troops. Apart from battle wounds and difficulties with adequate medical treatment, soldiers were sick with dysentery, malaria and weakness from insufficient food. The 39th Australian Infantry Battalion had been reduced greatly in strength by death and other casualties. Even those still on their feet were exhausted and under-nourished. 

BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA 
A Japanese convoy of 16 ships, carrying desperately needed reinforcements and supplies to enable the Japanese to maintain their hold on New Guinea, was sighted on 2nd March, 1943. During the next two days planes from a joint Australian-American strike force repeatedly attacked the convoy, and successfully sank or badly damaged all the Japanese ships. This was the last occasion when the Japanese tried to reinforce significantly their forces in Papua and New Guinea.

BATTLE OF THE BEACHHEADS -BUNA, GONA and SANANANDA 
In the mistaken belief that the Japanese were finished General Macarthur, Supreme Commander of South West Pacific Area, ordered an assault by Australian and American troops on the Japanese beachheads. The three villages of Buna, Gona and Sanananda were on the north coast of Papua New Guinea. The Japanese had heavily fortified the villages, and reinforced them with fresh troops. With the sea on one side, and protected by swamps and jungle on the landward side, the 9000 Japanese troops took a heavy toll on the attacking Australians and Americans during the two months of savage fighting that it took to capture the Japanese strongholds. 

Deaths as a result of the Kokoda Track and Beachhead battles totalled more than 12,000 Japanese, 2,165 Australians and 930 Americans. More Australians died in Papua than in any other campaign of the war, but the Japanese defenders were virtually eliminated."

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## Njaco (Sep 7, 2011)

Thanks Parsifal! I wasn't really aware of al the engagements going on. Is it possible to provide a map with these locations? I always have a hard time seeing exactly where these battles took place and how it fed the bigger picture.


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## Wildcat (Sep 7, 2011)

Here's a good doco on the Kokoda campaign for those interested

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BDgvy-SIBcM_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdNb1Jz-n0Q_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_wRxqWDSZU_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Vv_gwXXIQg_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngPP22P98JE_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BoxUJ8u3k2k_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xg8zUp8K7gE_

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmiXwTCUbAk_


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## davebender (Sep 7, 2011)

Apparently China and Manchuria don't count as part of the Pacific War.

Anyway I agree that Milne Bay was an important victory. Perhaps more important then the better known American landing on Guadalcanal during August 1942.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 7, 2011)

Why is davebender so consistently and repetitiously anti British and Commonwealth - thread after thread. Tell us us Dave ... enquiring minds want to know .

MM
Northern Good Neighbour


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## davebender (Sep 7, 2011)

I'm not. But neither do I think the world revolves around Britain.

WWII in the Pacific was mostly fought on the Asian mainland. Japanese forces and battles on New Guinea were tiny by comparison.


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2011)

davebender said:


> Apparently China and Manchuria don't count as part of the Pacific War.
> 
> Anyway I agree that Milne Bay was an important victory. Perhaps more important then the better known American landing on Guadalcanal during August 1942.



The battles on the chinese mainland prior to 1941 are not officially part of the "Pacific War". Further from 1937 to 1941 the japanese army did not actually suffer any outright defeats that I know of, they did however suffer what at best can be described as miltary stalemates. I guess, in a way, this might be construed as a defeat, since their lack of progress in China was one factor that induced the Japanese to directly attack the west (the other being the discreditation of the "Strike North" camp, ad the apparently imminent collapse of the SU)


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2011)

davebender said:


> I'm not. But neither do I think the world revolves around Britain.
> 
> WWII in the Pacific was mostly fought on the Asian mainland. Japanese forces and battles on New Guinea were tiny by comparison.



Its true that in tems of land forces engaged the lions share of the Japanese army was depoloyed in China and Manchuria. Yet the defeat of Japan originated from the battles in New Guinea.

Im curious, whilst I agree that the world does not revolve around Britain, implicit in your reply is that it does revolve or did revolve around another country, if so who might that country be?


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Thanks Parsifal! I wasn't really aware of al the engagements going on. Is it possible to provide a map with these locations? I always have a hard time seeing exactly where these battles took place and how it fed the bigger picture.




Not great but hopefully this will give you somne idea. I have some maps of the milne Bay battlefield somewhere....


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 7, 2011)

From June 1940 until June 1941 - while Britain and the Commonwealth were the *only* active, unconquered opponents of Nazi Germany - the world DID revolve around England. After that - Russia and the USA took over the baton in their various roles. I am missing something here, DB  ?

MM


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2011)

Guys I might have a look at a book that I have "Japanese Army Operations In The South Pacific Area (New Britain and Papua Campaigns) translated by Steven Bullard ISBN 9788 0 9751904 8 7 AWM press 2007, that looks at the Papuan campaigns from a Japanese Army perspective. I was ratyher hoping one of the other Aussies here might give the Australian perspective to these same battles, if not I'll have to do that as well


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## RabidAlien (Sep 8, 2011)

Amazon.com: The Ghost Mountain Boys: Their Epic March and the Terrifying Battle for New Guinea--The Forgotten War of the South Pacific (9780307335975): James Campbell: Books

"The Ghost Mountain Boys" by James Campbell....tells the story of the battle for Papua/NewGuinea from the American POV, but it'll give you an idea of what all the troops involved went through. And even though it doesn't give a minute-by-minute account of the Australians' campaign, Mr. Campbell gives credit where credit is due.


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## mikewint (Sep 8, 2011)

Battle of the Coral Sea
Excellent thread Parsifal. While a lot of American are not familiar with the Coral Sea battle I have always been quite interested in it for a number of reasons.
Battle
May 1st: Fletcher’s Yorktown fleet joins Fitch’s Lexington fleet which has sailed from Pearl
May 4th Fletcher learns of the Japanese invasion of Tulagi and immediately sails north where his fleet bombs the invasion group forcing them to retreat.
May 7th Japanese aircraft locate two American ships which they identify as a carrier and its escorting cruiser. Japanese planes attack and sink the smaller ship and badly damage the flat-topped larger ship. In actual fact the ships are the flat-topped collier Neosho and its escorting destroyer Sims. Additionally Allied forces are driven from Burma cutting the Burma Road to China and the US Fleet remains crippled at Pearl. This is the low point in the Pacific War.
May 8th Japanese forces and American forces finally locate each other. Japanese planes locate the American Fleet under clear skies. They sink the Lex and severely damage the York. American planes locate the Japanese ships but the skies are heavily overcast. The carrier Shokaku is moderately damaged and the Zuikaku receives no damage.
Both fleets retire to lick their wounds.
My Reasons
1. This battle marks the first time in the history of Navel warfare that the surface fleets never saw each other and the battle was determined by carrier launched aircraft.
2. The Japanese had a tactical victory BUT the American strategic victory would prove more telling in the end.
(a) the Japanese invasion force headed for Port Moresby turns back after approaching the Jomard Pass in fear of the presence of the American Fleet
(b) the first time Allied forces have caused a Japanese retreat. A tremendous morale boost.
(c) Most importantly the two Japanese carriers, the damaged carrier Shokaku and the Zuikaku which though undamaged has lost a large number of planes and pilots are unable to participate, one month later, at the Battle of Midway. Had the Japanese had these two carriers present, in addition to the four which were sunk, the Midway Battle could have ended quite differently for the Allies


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2011)

no doubt the Coral Sea battle was unique and stratefically important, in fact critical. Agree on all points. might be interesting to go through the battle blow by blow and anayse reasons for the outcome.

There is a simulation I used to play put out by the Strategic Studies Group (SSG). There is also Gary Grigsbys War In the South Pacific. For commerical simulations, these are very detailed and accurate IMO. Statistically Japan wins the battle, tactically and strategically, 6.5 times out of 10. Its a testament to US efforts then that they won the real battle and fought the japanese to a standstill.

I may also look at the battle from the Japanese army pers[ectiive, using that source I posted earlier


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## mikewint (Sep 9, 2011)

My initial thought is that chance: who found who first; and weather: Americans fighting under heavy cloud cover - Japanese clear skys were the decisive factors.
Had the American fleet sunk both Japanese carriers the result would have been the same though I'm not sure how the Lex and Yorktown, undamaged would have played out.  Most likely they would have hastened the Allied victory.
Japan's eventual defeat was a foregone conclusion when they botched the Pearl attack by (1) failing to get the carriers; (2) Not launching the 2nd wave which would have taken out the fuel storage areas; (3) Not backing up the air attack with a land invasion


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## buffnut453 (Sep 9, 2011)

I think Japan's defeat was a foregone conclusion from the moment they decided to attack the Western nations. Japan never had the industrial capacity to take on Britain and America, and singularly failed to gain much from the territories taken so rapidly in late-41 and 42. Even had Japan obliterated the US fleet at Pearl and invaded, the end result would have been the same. It might have taken longer but US industrial production was so far in excess of Japan's that the latter never would have caught up. One only has to look at the relative production rates for cargo ships to see how Japan's manufacturing capacity simply could not keep up with combat losses.

That said, Coral Sea is still a fascinating battle, as are the others that Parsifal listed. It's a shame that so little attention is focussed on Kokoda etc.


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## mikewint (Sep 9, 2011)

Buffnut, don't know if I agree with that. Yes, without a doubt, like Germany, Japan could not match the US industrial might BUT, the western Nations had never really cared much about what the Asian nations were doing. Attacking across the width of the pacific would have been quite a task plus an entire fleet would have had to be re-built. Possible but very expensive and time consuming especially with the European war in full swing. The Pacific war was the Second war as long as Germany was a threat. As long as Japan posed no direct threat to the west coast the US might have accepted the invasion as a fait accompli and Japan would have had the time to consolidate its Pacific conquests. Yamamoto knew that Japan had one chance in the Pacific and they failed. "I fear we have only wakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve"


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## parsifal (Sep 9, 2011)

Guys

In relation to whether Japan could win outright, I think both of you have valid points to make, so in a sense i agree and disgree with both of you.

The fact that Japan was completely outclassed industrially cant be denied. In a war of attrition, the japanese could not hope to cope if they were faced with the entire might of US industrial power. By the same time the continued existence and viability of the United States Navy in the Pacific was crucial to the Allies both in the defence and attack phases of the war. 

Now, Japans strategic management of the war was pretty hopeless, but it did have at least some logic in it. They never planned to take on the US completely, they always assumed that a portion of US production and manpower had to be diverted to the ETO. At the time they decided on war with the west, it was expected that the germans would knock the Russians out of the war, so amuch greater proportion of US resources would have been required in the ETO. As it was the US devoted about 30% of its military outputs to the pacific.

If the Japanese had manged to achieve a clear victory over the Americans in 1942, and the germans managed to defeat the russians, ther is every chance that the war might turn out differently. Lets say that Midway and Coral Sea had been successful, and it was the US that had lost their main carrier force and not the japanese. The Americans may have struggled on without carriers for a few weeks or months, losing a disproportionate amount of surface vessels along the way, but eventually they would have had to face facts and abandon most of the pacific to its fate, returning in late 1943. In the meantime the Japanese would have rampaged in the pacifc, and in the Indian Oceans, with consequences we can only guess at. it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Australia might fall, or India, or both, that the campaign in North Africa might collapse because of the threats to its supply lines, or that the southern route to the Soviet Union, via Persia might be cut (and this route was by far the most important LL route). The Japanese would have had more time and resources to prepare their island bases, prepare their merchant fleets (with no effective US sub campaign to affect them, because of a shortage of appropriate forward bases....like Midway, Brisban and Perth), time to train replacement aircrews more ships, more merchantman, entrenched land garrisons, a whole range of advantages that may well make a return to the theatre for the US a much more difficult prospect than it was historically. The victories achieved by the USN in 42 made possible the early demise of the Japanese. If the japanese could get time and some sanctuary by defeating the USN (and if I can venture this....the Australians), there is no telling what effect that might have had...

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## mikewint (Sep 12, 2011)

Parsifal, you stated it much better than I but we are in total agreement. It had always amazed me that Japan's Pearl Harbor attack was so half-hearted. Part of that was their amazement that the US had been taken totally by surprise as the declaration should have been delivered in Washington just before the attack.
Failure to launch 2nd and third waves left the vital fuel storage farms untouched. However the Japanese fleet had never intended a land invasion which could easily been accomplished at the time.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 12, 2011)

Throughout its history after the "re-opening" to the West, Japan's weapon of choice has always been preemptive strike - and it always worked pretty much. In 1939 when they launched Culkin Gol (Nomonhan) they expected the Communist USSR to fold under pressure in the far east. It didn't and Japan was out-matched by Soviet resources. 

Same at Pearl. PH seems faint-hearted because it didn't achieve the needed results (destruction of carriers and oil storage) but it was a daring raid nonetheless.

Preemptive stikes only work to a point - if you're weak and teetering. If you're strong you may step back for a spell, but will return stronger -- which is what the USA and USSR did.

MM

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## syscom3 (Sep 12, 2011)

mikewint said:


> However the Japanese fleet had never intended a land invasion which could easily been accomplished at the time.



Incorrect. The IJN did not have the shipping needed to invade Hawaii *AND* the PI, Malaya and Guam. Logistics was always the weak point for Japan and it got continually worse as the war progressed.


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## mikewint (Sep 12, 2011)

Syscom, I need to state more correctly, by easily I meant that after the attack the islands were wide open to attack by land. both the army and navy were in total disarray. With their carriers off shore they easily had air superiority over the islands. As to available shipping, the devastation of the attack and the state of the land and naval forces would have allowed almost any type of shipping to ferry troops and land them ashore. Would dedicated landing (LST) really been needed?


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## buffnut453 (Sep 12, 2011)

So let's say the Japanese went the whole enchilada and occupied the Hawaiian Islands. Then what? It was just another island-chain outpost that was vulnerable because of Japan's inability to resupply, plus it could easily be by-passed using Australia as a starting point to push up through Guadalcanal. The fundamental problem was that Japan's leadership entirely misjudged American resolve in the face of attack. Had the entire Pacific Fleet been sunk, I'm certain America would have rolled up its sleeves and rebuilt it. It would have taken time but it would have happened and no amount of breathing space would have enabled Japan to catch up industrially. Like I said, the war would have been longer but the ultimate result would have been the same - defeat for Japan.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 12, 2011)

"... The fundamental problem was that Japan's leadership entirely misjudged American resolve in the face of attack. "

And THAT is it in a nutshell. And they had misjudged the Soviets in 1939.

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 12, 2011)

delete


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## syscom3 (Sep 12, 2011)

Mike, the Japanese never had the shipping needed to invade Hawaii. Not to mention there is a big difference between a fast carrier group sneaking up on Hawaii from the north and a huge fleet chugging up slowly from the south.


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## parsifal (Sep 12, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> So let's say the Japanese went the whole enchilada and occupied the Hawaiian Islands. Then what? It was just another island-chain outpost that was vulnerable because of Japan's inability to resupply, plus it could easily be by-passed using Australia as a starting point to push up through Guadalcanal. The fundamental problem was that Japan's leadership entirely misjudged American resolve in the face of attack. Had the entire Pacific Fleet been sunk, I'm certain America would have rolled up its sleeves and rebuilt it. It would have taken time but it would have happened and no amount of breathing space would have enabled Japan to catch up industrially. Like I said, the war would have been longer but the ultimate result would have been the same - defeat for Japan.



Hi BF

Many times Ive played a simulation called "War In The Pacific" (WITP). A monster game, easily the most detailed simulation on the subject designed by Richard Berg and Jim Dunnigan. These guys are legends. Dunnigan for example is no longer a simulations designer, he is considered far too valuable for that. The US pentagon snapped him up some time ago as a strategic analyst. Hes one of those guys working in the backrooms advising the US brass on how to fight and win their wars. Bergy is still a game designer AFAIK, and IMO considered the best in the business. Its not so much a "game" in the sense of a computer sim as a serious historical study. To give you some idea of the scale of this thing it has nine (yes nine) A1 sized map sections, over 10000 counters, and a rule book over 150 pages long and CRT tables booklet over 40 pages long. In additiona to the main theatre maps, there are over 100 tactical maps that depict most of the main island groups (like Guadacanal Iwo, Okinawwa) at the most tactical scales possible. Normally on the TO maps you deply at divisional or regimental level (occasionally at battalion level). On the tactical maps, depending on the scale of the map, you break your parent units into company strength or even smaller.

In China, the chinese forces are depicted at army size units (since they have over 300 divisional sized units, and thats just the KMT). 

Warships are depicted as individual ships down to destroyer sized, below that you have multiple hulls per counter. Aircraft are deployed as "points" with varying chanracteristics for each type. Each point represents 10 aircraft.

Play is on the turn based but with simulataneous movement/combat, on the basis of a 1 week passage of time per turn, but there are impulses for air and naval activity that roughly equate to 2 days of time per impulse.....and air battles can slow down to even a single moment of time. Its one of the most innovative methods of time and distance scaling that I have ever seen. It works, and works well. When you dont need all that much detail, such as occurred in China, you dont get bogged down in cludge and fiddle....but when the fate of the war depends on 5 minutes of combat, and the deployment of a few hundred soldiers, the systems allows for that. 

If you constantly engage your air and sea assets for every 2 day period they burn out really quickly....you need time to rest these units, refit, and absorb replacements in the case of the air formations ( a big problem for the Japanese, who simply do not have enough land based formations to cover all the territory.

The game takes into account Japanese Pilot quality, their crappy replacement system, superior night fighting skills, superior land tactics/training/morale at the beginning of the war. Gradually these skills advantages disappear as Allied experience and success mounts, and the Japanese take losses they simply cannot afford to absorb.

Rules are in play for production and shipping. Shipping is depicted in lots of approximately 100000 deadweight ton lots. There are optional rules for captured Allied shipping in the Indies, which helped the japs somewhat. Rules are also in place to reflect such issues as US torpedo failures, Long Lance, and the cockeyed use of Japanese subs. There are also rules for the US intell advantages that affected the conduct of ops so dramatically. 

In a word, this simulation is without any doubt super detailed and super accurate. The general line up is usually to have either 5 or 8 players, and with a dedicated time committment will usually take about 250 hours to play. So it aint no fantasy or beer and pretzels lightweight, i can assure you. We have tested this sim using average results from the CRTS, following as closely as possible the operational movements of each side. Played as history, the game delivers pretty much historical results. We have never been more than a week or two out in terms of japanese surrender.

So what happens when you give players a free reign to explore their own strateegies. To be fair, we usually dont restrict Japanese submarines operations completely. They get some use out of their subs to sink Allied shipping as Yoshida Akira has shown. We also assume Japanese industry starts the awar at their post Midway production levels....slightly more than their outputs at December 1941. 

There is no doubt in my mind, with the experience of WITP behind me, to say that an invasion of hawaii is nearly impossible to pull off. However an invasion of Midway in December 1941 is not. This has major implications on tracking of the US Fleet. (we now have a house rule that prevents this preemptive strike until January 1942....to give the US time to reinforce its position there). The overarching shortage that dictates and dominates Japanese planning and operations is a shortage of shipping. They simply dont have enough of it to do everything. However, if they can corner and inflict a one sided naval defeat(s) on the USN in 1942, of sufficient magnitude (meaning they sink all or most of the US carriers for small or no loss to themselves....an almost impossible task, but possible, if the US make mistakes) the pendulaum swings and its the allies who cant effectively stop the Japanese. A few months of defeats in 1942 will dictate in large measure what happens in later parts of the war. And one sided victories in the pacific will have flow on effects in other TOs, like North Africa, and Russia. 

The game is not so naive as to assume that the Japanese can achieve unconditional surrender, but it does have a neat system to postulate US war weariness and priotities (principally Europe first). If the US was faced with a rampaging European Axis, and no real prospect or result in the pacific, faced with a choice of either making a peace in the pacific, or losing the war outright, the assumption is the US will opt for a truce with Japan. Ive argued that this could only ever be considered a temporary truce....once the Europe first strategists had recovered position in Europe, the US would return to clear up the Pacific situation. But IMO this is also outside the parameters of a 1939-46 conflict timeframe. It might not be until 1947-8 that the US could return to the theatre with amuch reduced reputation. It would be a different war a different world really.


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## mikewint (Sep 12, 2011)

Parsifal, again sir said so much better than I. As I said in post #17, the US is not defeated by Japan but merely accepts the status quo after Pearl. Since the Pacific war was always a number #2 priority. I'll bow to your knowlege about land invasion of Hawaii. I always felt that transport ships behind the carrier group could have followed up on the initial attack if successful or turn and ran if not. I was also surprised that the Japanese carrier group did not "hang-out" for a few days to see if the US carriers would return to Pearl. They were in little danger with Pearl destroyed.


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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2011)

Thanks for the compliment Mike, but its undeserved. I am not saying that a direct assault on Hawaii was impossible, but it would be difficult, uncertain, and occupy a big percentage of Japans very limited ampibious assault assets. Even though the hawaii garrison was unprepred, it was quite big, and could rely on more or less immediate reinforcement from the mainaland. The japanese invaders would have no land based support, and limited carrier based support. After a couple of days they would have been left to their own devices, whilst the fleet withdrew to replenish. Neither did the Americans have much in the way of logistic support but then, they would be operating much closer to home. It would have been Guadcanal, on steroids, allover again.

The scenarios that Buffnut and Sys are describing are far more reality based than what im suggesting. What i am postulating, is based on an unrealistic pre-requisite.....that the US sufferes heavy, repeated defeats in the 1942 naval battles. The only point I am making is that the continued engagement by the US fleet in 1942 was critical to containing the japanese, and hence the argument "we only needed to sit back and outproduce the Japanese" is just as flawed as saying "production was an unimportant elementof allied victory". In fact allied victory was anchored on a whole range of issues.....production, manpower, tactics, training, naval and aerial engagement, and just plain luck


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## buffnut453 (Sep 13, 2011)

Hi Parsifal,

Great posts! I was never postulating that an invasion of Pearl Harbor was a feasible option for the Japanese - their focus was on the Dutch East Indies. Despite all the focus on the Pearl Harbor raid, all it really was a side-show to remove a flanking threat and provide the IJN with freedom of manoeuvre. Japan's major focus was getting oil and other natural resources (tin, rubber etc) from the territories it captured. That said, I agree with your last statement entirely - the timing of the Allied victory depended on all of the listed items. However, I still maintain that the US would never, ever have considered even a truce with Japan after the former's "sneak attack" on Pearl. 

One of the key problems for Japan was their own expansionist policy. Every time they were faced with a choice to escalate or maintain the status quo, Tojo and his cronies chose to escalate. However, every island that was occupied was yet another drain on the scarce shipping resources available to Japan (plus a military resource drain putting troops and aircraft beyond the mutual support of other locations). One almost gets the sense of Tojo, looking at a map of the Pacific in May 1942 and seeing huge areas "owned" by Japan but, in reality, all that was controlled were a few rocky islands, the rest being a porous area in which the USN's Pacific Fleet were (relatively) free to roam. There really was nowhere for Japan to go from Jun 1942 onwards because there were insufficient resources to tackle Australia, India or America, thus Japan was stuck owning lots of islands but with no real means of adequately exploiting or defending her gains.

Cheers,
B-N


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## buffnut453 (Sep 13, 2011)

Hi Parsifal,

Great posts! I was never postulating that an invasion of Pearl Harbor was a feasible option for the Japanese - their focus was on the Dutch East Indies. Despite all the focus on the Pearl Harbor raid, all it really was a side-show to remove a flanking threat and provide the IJN with freedom of manoeuvre. Japan's major focus was getting oil and other natural resources (tin, rubber etc) from the territories it captured. That said, I agree with your last statement entirely - the timing of the Allied victory depended on all of the listed items. However, I still maintain that the US would never, ever have considered even a truce with Japan after the former's "sneak attack" on Pearl. 

One of the key problems for Japan was their own expansionist policy. Every time they were faced with a choice to escalate or maintain the status quo, Tojo and his cronies chose to escalate. However, every island that was occupied was yet another drain on the scarce shipping resources available to Japan (plus a military resource drain putting troops and aircraft beyond the mutual support of other locations). One almost gets the sense of Tojo, looking at a map of the Pacific in May 1942 and seeing huge areas "owned" by Japan but, in reality, all that was controlled were a few rocky islands, the rest being a porous area in which the USN's Pacific Fleet were (relatively) free to roam. There really was nowhere for Japan to go from Jun 1942 onwards because there were insufficient resources to tackle Australia, India or America, thus Japan was stuck owning lots of islands but with no real means of adequately exploiting or defending her gains.

Cheers,
B-N


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## mikewint (Sep 13, 2011)

Parsifal, richly deserved without a doubt. Nagumo had failed to execute Yamamoto's plan. His failure to launch the 3rd wave left vital fuel, machine shop and drydock facilities untouched. I understand his actions as it was getting dark and his torpedo and dive bombers had suffered disproportionate losses. Not lingering to get the carriers fell into the same cautious frame of mind though his DEs were getting low on fuel
Yamamoto could not have known that the US had already decided not to fight in the Pacific. Admiral Stark had already devised Plan Dog which assigned Kimmel's Pacific fleet to keeping Japan out of the Eastern Pacific and protecting the sealanes to Australia.
Midway was the deciding battle and Coral Sea had knocked out 2 IJN carriers. Yamamoto's Midway plan though rushed failed for a number of reasons though mostly because US codebreakers had cracked Navel Code D plus some very uncharacteristic Yamamoto errors: The May nuisance attack by flying boats which caused the vital recon mission not to be flown thus Yamamoto did not know whether the carriers were at Pearl; He dispatched his carriers too early or his subs too late so his vital sub picketline was not in place and the IJN carriers sailed into Nimitz's ambush


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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2011)

If the USN had been comprehemsively defeated, in '42, and the Germans had achieved more success in Europe, the Americans might be forced to make a peace, of sorts with the japanese if only temporarily. If they did not make this peace, they, and the allies may well have lost the war. 

What your saying effectively, is that there was no way that the US could lose the war, no matter what they did, and no matter how badly things went for them. There are many books and authors that echo that sentiment, but I have to say I dont agree. Allied industrial power was just one ingredient in the crucible of victory, but not the only one. The Americans, could, and did, suffer heavy casualties, and bounce right back, however there were certain things that absolutely had to be achieved to maintain that economic dominance, as well as put into place the other necessary ingredients for victory. 

Without control of the oceans, or at least without challenging japanese control of them, two things were likley to happen. Firstly, an allied retreat out of the Pacific and east asia is going to allow the Japanese to grow stronger, faster than she did. The Japanese could be expected to ramp up their production to their peak 1944 levels in perhaps half the time that they did........which means japanese production might peak as early as the end of 1942Shortages were the main reason why Japan lagged industrially behind the allies, and these shortages only got worse as their merchant fleet went rapidly to the bottom. However without those insignificant island bases like Midway in Allied hands, or ports isolated and short of supply, the allies would not be able to mount any effective sub campaign against the japanese. If the Allies lost their ability to challenge the Japanese fleet, because they lost their carriers, the allies wouold effectively lose control of the oceans.......a decreased Japanese loss rate is one of those effects. 

However loss of control of the oceans is going to have quite significant effects on the allies as well. The US economy is very resistant to seaborne interdiction, but not completely so. Access to world markets, both imports and exports are still a key to US economic exapansion. Mount a successful interdiction campaign because the allied navies are no longer able to operate, and all of a sudden the unbeatable US economy becomes very threadbare. Ive read some accounts that estimate that without the freedom of the oceans, the US economy would only reach about 60% of its historical outputs. 

If you assume that Japan has an economy roughly 50% larger than its wartime efforts and an American economy 40% smaller than historical, plus you have a major unanswered emergency in the ETO, the prospects of an allied defeat loom very large indeed. 

My opinion (and bear in mind this is all speculation, so there are no "right" answers here), is that the Allied leadership, faced with such a harsh possibility as actually losing the war, or making a pact with the devil and making peace (temporary) with the japanese, are going to swallow their pride and make peace. 

How long such peace would last, who knows, but not long IMO....about as long as it takes to get the situation under control. 

The key thing I am trying to say, however, is that Allied victory was anchored on a number of different factors. Economic strength was one of them. But continued control or dispute of the oceans was another. There were pleanty of others, but these two are of the most interest to the PTO


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## Messy1 (Sep 13, 2011)

Excellent posts Parsifal!


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## pattle (Nov 9, 2013)

I only really know the bare bones of what went on in the war between Japan and Australia so be patient with me. If things had gone more Japans way in that the American Navy had not taken such a high toll of their carriers and other shipping and if the Japanese had of defeated the Australians in New Guinea, then how possible was it that Japan could have successfully invaded Australia?


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## Shinpachi (Nov 9, 2013)

I may need more careful research but have never heard of any invasion plan of IJA/IJN into Australia except riveting Australian troops inside their territory. The Commonwealth was not potential enemy.


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## pattle (Nov 9, 2013)

I have heard that the Japanese Navy had a desire to invade Australia, but I think that serious planning for such an invasion wouldn't have been worth while at least until New Guinea was fully in Japanese hands and that a number of other conditions would have been needed to of been met before it could be seriously considered.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 9, 2013)

There's little question in my mind that had the U.S. been out of the way Australia would have fallen had that been the plan.


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## merlin (Nov 10, 2013)

There's a possibility Darwin would have been taken. But after that the priorities would be to cut of US supply routes - so the the thrust would have gone south-east i.e. if Midway was successful.


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## pattle (Nov 10, 2013)

I would say that Australia would have been a valuable prize for Japan but I have no real idea of what kind of forces would have been needed to take and hold a vast country such as Australia, from what I understand Australia was largely undefended in 1942 with most of it's forces fighting abroad.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Nov 10, 2013)

davebender said:


> Apparently China and Manchuria don't count as part of the Pacific War.
> 
> Anyway I agree that Milne Bay was an important victory. Perhaps more important then the better known American landing on Guadalcanal during August 1942.



No...I believe that they were separate. China and Manchuria should fall under the Second Sino-Japanese War, not Pacific War.


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## parsifal (Nov 10, 2013)

There was a conference by the army and navy in march or april of 1942. The purpose was to plan and resource what the japanese called their "2nd operational phase". Despite successes beyond their wildest dreams, the americans had not surrendered and overall allied resistance was continuing.

At this conference (and also at other more subordinate discussions, such as the meeting of 17 area Army and 8th fleet at Rabaul), the japanese considered a number of options. one was an attack into india and the middle east. Another was the invasion of Australia, another was to cut the lines of communication to australia, capturing Fiji, noumea and other islands in the south west pacific. Yammamoto was represented at these meetings, and rightly pointed out that the key to everything was the decisive defeat of the USN. These were the foundations of midway, and to a lesser extent Coral Sea. Ultimately these two battles blunted and eventually led to events that turned the tide, but had midway and coral Sea been whitewash victories for the japanese, they would have proceeded with some form of further conquest. 

To undertake a direct invasion of australia, the Japanese calculated they needed at least 10 full infantry divisions, Armour, 500 aircraft, and more than 1 million tons of shipping. the army was very reluctant to pull that many troops out of China, and also would not release much of the home army reserves. The navy simply did not have the rserves of shipping to throw at the operation. The projected invasion of Australia dies before it got any further than that.

nobody knew that at the time, however. Nobody knew also that the japanese lacked the shipping to take and hold midway, or the southwest pacific for thast matter. Not even the japanese themselves. they were simply drunk with success and failed to realize they had reached the absolute limit of their logistics even before the 2nd operational phase began


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## Shinpachi (Nov 10, 2013)

I have found no invasion plan against Australia in my local Google. Even if it had been taken place, IJA would have been less cooperative with IJN as they were busy enough in China, Russian border and had to be prepared for the coming invasion into India.

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## pattle (Nov 10, 2013)

The mood in Australia in 1942 must have been similar to the mood in Britain in 1940 when invasion was threatened, I wonder though if the Australians realised this early on in the war exactly what occupation by the Japanese would have meant.


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## syscom3 (Nov 10, 2013)

The IJA were planning to invade Australia, although this was done as a planning exercise and not a full up detailed plan. It was seen as a natural follow on to the taking of Port Moresby. The events of the summer of 1942 altered this though.


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## parsifal (Nov 12, 2013)

This link gives some outline of the japanese plan to invade Australia. it was a concept never fully embraced, especially by the army 

Proposed Japanese invasion of Australia during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

this link gives a somewhat better overview

http://www.pacificwar.org.au/battaust/AustInvasion/JapNavy_AustInvasion.html


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## Shinpachi (Nov 12, 2013)

In early 1942, IJA seems researching not only Australia but South Africa, New Zealand and possibly others, to evaluate British endurance before advancing into India.
There are some confidential reports at National Archives of Japan and one of them clearly says "This report has been made for the purpose of invasion into India".


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## pattle (Nov 12, 2013)

I would have thought that South Africa would of been completely out of the question for Japanese invasion, Ceylon would have been a better candidate.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 12, 2013)

Shinpachi said:


> In early 1942, IJA seems researching not only Australia but South Africa, New Zealand and possibly others, to evaluate British endurance before advancing into India.
> There are some confidential reports at National Archives of Japan and one of them clearly says "This report has been made for the purpose of invasion into India".


Whatever the course in SE Asia, and beyond, the way I'm seeing it, now, is, if you could have taken Midway, you could have kept us bottled-up at Pearl, and that would have taken us out of your way. Pearl was our sanctuary, where we licked our wounds. San Francisco and San Diego were five-day drives from there. That was the significance of your putting whatever pressure you could on Pearl. You had a big Occupation Force coming into Midway, we also turned back. That's how I'm now seeing the bigger picture at Midway. I'm curious what you or anyone thinks of that.


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## parsifal (Nov 12, 2013)

Shinpachi said:


> In early 1942, IJA seems researching not only Australia but South Africa, New Zealand and possibly others, to evaluate British endurance before advancing into India.
> There are some confidential reports at National Archives of Japan and one of them clearly says "This report has been made for the purpose of invasion into India".



The way those links depict it, the Indian Ocean was not seen as a credible option because it did not force the USN into the "decisive battle". The incursions into SW Pacific struck at vital political interests for the US. Isolating Australia, or conquest of Australia was seen as one way of forcing the as yet elusive USN into battle before it was ready. So too was Midway. Historically, the Japanese undertook a spoiling raid into the Indian Ocean, undertook mercantile Submarine operations off Madagascar, attempted to capture Port Moresby (the MO operation) which was a precursor to the RY (Noumea), RO (Ocean and Nauru) and MI (midway operation). There was also an operation called FS which i think was the capture of Fiji and Samoa, but need to check its details. 

All of these operations, and others, were designed to force the USN into battle, where it was expected the IJN would annihilate it. The projected invasion of Australia was put on the back burner until Naval supremacy had been achieved, and the army agreed to the commitment of forces needed. Neither pre-requisite presented itself. The Japanese were heavily defeated at midway and checked at Coral Sea. Thereafter all other operations requiring deep penetrations of enemy controlled seas were cancelled. 

If Midway had gone the way as expected, the japanese might have gained a further year of unfettered offensive operations, and that may well have seen some form of invasion occurring. as it stood, the precursors were never achieved, so the invasion never went ahead


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## parsifal (Nov 12, 2013)

This is a news story that I found, claimng that a map exists from a japanese source, detailing one of the invasion points for the proposed Army invasion plan. Its from the ABC (national broadcaster) with an image of the map, that can be magnified. Hard to tell its actual source but from the contents of the article, it does sound like its from a Japanese source. 

There is admittedly strong debate as to whether the Japanese seriously considered invasion or not. But what is clear, is that the Japanese intended and set in motion various initiatives designed to force Australia to the negotiating table....in other words, surrnder.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-24/did-japan-plan-wwii-invasion-of-coffs-harbour3f/4030716


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## Shinpachi (Nov 13, 2013)

The Battle of Midway had shown inability of IJN Commander Nagumo. He should have flown more reconnaissance planes to find the US task force immediately and should not waste time for his decision. Nagumo was so ordinary in crisis.

IJN may have been aggressive about Occupation of Australia but IJA.

The ABC map looks an ordinary maritime one equipped with merchant ships.


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## parsifal (Nov 13, 2013)

> IJN may have been aggressive about Occupation of Australia but IJA.



I dont think either service ended up supportive of a direct invasion. the Navy were concerned about the shipping needed, which explains why they wanted a limited, small invasion. the army never liked the navy's proposal. I think they correctly deduced that a limited invasion would not cause the surrender of Australia, would not prevent US reinforcement and the build up of Australia as a major base of operations, and would be very likley to end badly for Japan. They favoured a large scale invasion, but were very relactant to provide the necessary troops 




> The ABC map looks an ordinary maritime one equipped with merchant ships.



I agree, it looks like a naval chart. But that is also what i wouold expect. the chart is too small to see any details on it, it may well have invasion details, like shipping lists and navigational issues written onto the chart. I would expect very little information on the countryside would have been available to either the IJA or the IJN. Dont forget, the Japanese had no maps on which to base their operation MO or the invasion of Tulagi either


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## Shinpachi (Nov 13, 2013)

IJA researched the Commonwealth nations in early 1942 but not interested in invasion into any of them except India. 

IJN asked IJA to deploy some troops toward Guadalcanal to cut connection between US and Australia. 
IJA refused once, or more, but accepted finally as IJN insisted US Navy would not come till next year(1943).

To exclude western powers from Asia and build up "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was their, including IJN, first job. 
Invasion into Australia might have come but it would not have been before it.

I don't deny invasion as any imperial nations in the history tried to expand their territory step by step.


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## parsifal (Nov 14, 2013)

Shinpachi said:


> IJA researched the Commonwealth nations in early 1942 but not interested in invasion into any of them except India.
> 
> IJN asked IJA to deploy some troops toward Guadalcanal to cut connection between US and Australia.
> IJA refused once, or more, but accepted finally as IJN insisted US Navy would not come till next year(1943).
> ...




All I can say Spinpachi san is that it is untrue that Japan had no interest in invading Australia. They had an interest, realized it was too hard, and came up with alternatives to isolate Australia, and thereby force her to surrender, and certainly to neutralize Australia as an effective base of operations. Events overtook the japanese to completely eclipse all those issues. 

The AWM has a number of references and maps that clearly show the Japanese were considering invasion, and went even further to undertake some basic operational studies. One of them was produced by Peter Stanley, a naysayer of the invasion theorists and reproduced below, along with some others that provide a range of different viewpoints and assessments. I recommend you have a look. Even mr Stanley, only goes to the extent of denying that it was not feasible. He does not claim that it was never considered. in fact he shows that a number of options were considered, some of them in detail.

http://www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2002/stanley_paper.pdf

Japanese Army rejects limited invasion and demands full control of Australia

https://cliojournal.wikispaces.com/Did+Japan+Intend+to+Invade+Australia?

http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp06.pdf


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## Shinpachi (Nov 14, 2013)

Thanks for your interesting information, parsifal.

I am not reading all yet but this map was made by Chinese at least.
I find no Japanese there.

Page 6 of ‘“He’s (not) Coming South”: the invasion that wasn’t’


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## Shinpachi (Nov 14, 2013)

I have fully understood how nervous Australian government was in 1942 and I perfectly agree with Duncan Grey's analysis.
Japan had no intention to invade Australia or was unable to do so during the ww2.
Thank you very much.


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