# More German Aviation Gasoline



## davebender (Dec 1, 2009)

*WWII Coal Production. * Millions of metric tons.
Military production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> Germany = 2,420.3
> United States = 2,149.7
> United Kingdom = 1,441.2
> Soviet Union = 590.8


WWII Germany had essentially an endless supply of coal. 

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/MofFP/ger_syn_ind/mof-secta.pdf
WWII Germany produced 1,950,000 tons of aviation gasoline annually. All but 50,000 tons were produced synthetically via the hydrogenation of coal.

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/MofFP/ger_syn_ind/mof-secta.pdf
The Gelsenberg hydrogenation plant cost 208 million marks to build during 1939. Annual capacity:
.....400,000 tons of aviation gasoline.
.....460,000 tons of motor fuel.

208 million marks per plant sounds like a lot of money. But consider some naval expenditures that contributed nothing at all to the WWII German war effort.
http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/index.html
197 million marks. KM Bismarck.
181 million marks. KM Tirpitz.

Eliminating the Bismarck class battleship program allows Germany to increase aviation gasoline production by 40% (two new hydrogenation plants). And there are plenty more places to save.

92.7 million. KM Graf Zeppelin.
92.4 million. KM Peter Strasser.
Eliminating the two German CVs purchases a third hydrogenation plant.

85.8 million. KM Admiral Hipper.
87.8 million. KM Blucher.
104.5 million. KM Prinz Eugen.
84.1 million. KM Seydlitz.
83.6 million. KM Lutzow.
Eliminating the five German Hipper class heavy cruisers will pay for two more hydrogenation plants with change to spare.

Germany laid down 3 x H class battleships during 1939 @ 240 million marks each. They also built the massive Elbe 17 drydock to accomodate these monster ships. The drydock was completed. The 3 H class battleships were stopped after a few months. You can bet this abortive project soaked up at least a couple hundred million marks.

German aviation gasoline production is now doubled with no negative repercussions. The above naval vessels will not be missed at all.

So why didn't Germany build 5 additional coal hydrogenation plants during the mid to late 1930s? That's what it would take to double the production of German aviation gasoline. They had plenty of money to build the plants and plenty of coal to operate them.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 1, 2009)

Well, Jeschonek commented "what would I do with 360 additional fighters per month". Added that we know their small numbers of pilots in training in 1st 3 war years, plus the Blitzkrieg mentality, it's safe to say that they didn't think new fuel plants are not needed.


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## Bug_racer (Dec 1, 2009)

I would have built more U-boats personally and docks to accomodate them . Germany had no chance having enough surface ships to be able to roam the atlantic freely .

With the gasoline , what are the repercussions with using coal ? Lower octane ? Less hydrocarbons ? hotter burning ?


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## Soren (Dec 1, 2009)

Had the Germans never experienced any fuel shortages during the war then I think it's safe to say that the Allies would've never reached inside Germany. I am however not certain that 5 extra hydrogenation plants could've ensured this, but who knows. 

Another thing which could've helped the Germans was the relocation of war machine factories into mountains or underground as was done way too late during the war.


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## davebender (Dec 2, 2009)

I just finished reading David Glanz's book on the Battle of Kursk. He states Luftwaffe units supporting the German attack had only two thirds of necessary fuel supplies. Consequently they operated at full strength and dominated the battlefield only on the first couple days. After that German air sorties were sharply curtailed. Makes me wonder what would have happened if the Luftwaffe could make a maximum effort in this and other battles.


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## Milosh (Dec 2, 2009)

One can produce all the gas they want but if doesn't get to the end user it is off no use. Germany had a fair bit of avgas at the end but it was sitting in depots or on some railroad track.


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## davebender (Dec 2, 2009)

It takes time for aviation fuel (and everything else also) to move from the place of production to end users. Are you suggesting that Germany was worse in this regard then Britain, Russia and the USA?


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## Milosh (Dec 2, 2009)

davebender said:


> It takes time for aviation fuel (and everything else also) to move from the place of production to end users. Are you suggesting that Germany was worse in this regard then Britain, Russia and the USA?



Yes as the German transportation infrastructure had totally broken down. The only disruption of Allied transportation was with the convoys and the volume shipped was enough to keep operations going.


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## davebender (Dec 2, 2009)

Not during 1943 when Luftwaffe units supporting the Kursk offensive had only two thirds of gasoline requirements.


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## Soren (Dec 2, 2009)

Milosh, 

What Dave is suggesting is an increase in fuel production starting already in 39. This increase in fuel could've ensured a lot of victories on all fronts which otherwise weren't achieved, and could've also made sure that there were enough a/c flying and vehicles moving to successfully protect the supply lines, preventing them from ever breaking down. Having enough fuel is the nr.1 requirement for success in any campaign, without it you're going nowhere.


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## red admiral (Dec 2, 2009)

Investing very heavily in synthetic oil plants during the 1930s only makes sense if the Germans can see into the future and predict a long war where fuel shortages will be a problem. In addition to costing a lot to build, the synthetic plants cost a lot to run as well. It is in no way cost effective compared to importing oil from Romania and elsewhere. What has to happen is for the Germans to recognise; that consumption is going to massively increase during a prolonged war, the war is going to be prolonged, supplies will be sufficiently interdicted to make an impact.

Is more fuel actually going to get to frontline squadrons than from Romania? That depends on where the supply chain is being attacked. The portion from Romania oil fields to Germany is most likely the safest given the simple range to the target (exempting a couple of expensive long range strikes from Italy). The supply chain is being attacked elsewhere.

Realistically, building synthetic oil plants makes the task of interdiction easier. It concentrates production in a few places, and those places are nearer and so can be subject to more effective strikes. At the same time, the same interdiction strikes further down the supply chain can still be carried out as you still need to get the oil to airfields.

What would more oil realistically effect? North Africa is out, given lack of shipping capacity and port facilities that are compounded by Allied interdiction efforts. More oil could find it's way to the Regia Marina, which would generally help but is unlikely to change the strategic picture. That pretty much leaves the Russian campaign. Can extra fuel (even supposing extra carriage capacity exists) result in a large enough increase in sorties by aircraft to have a strategic affect? (I personally can't remember any fuel shortages radically effecting ground progress) Personally, I don't think it's a reasonable assumption given the hard limits in aircrew and aircraft. It might delay defeat, but it's not going to change the final result.



> Had the Germans never experienced any fuel shortages during the war then I think it's safe to say that the Allies would've never reached inside Germany.



How? It's really quite challenging to see how it would change the result given limitations in aircrew and aircraft. More fuel would only be delaying the inevitable, it doesn't change the strategic picture. 

Now, Japan with an unlimited amount of fuel would have far more interesting implications because increased naval sorties can change the strategic picture in the Pacific.



> But consider some naval expenditures that contributed nothing at all to the WWII German war effort.



Why do you keep on stating this lie after being disproved repeatedly? Please read "The Cost of Seapower" by Pugh. The German surface ships were on a similar level of cost effectiveness to the uboats. 

This of course is assuming that the Mark is actually worth something at this time. Money isn't a good measure of comparison in a bankrupt economy.


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## Soren (Dec 2, 2009)

red admiral said:


> How? It's really quite challenging to see how it would change the result given limitations in aircrew and aircraft. More fuel would only be delaying the inevitable, it doesn't change the strategic picture.



You can't be serious?? 

Take a look at how many LW a/c had to just sit on the ground waiting to be shot up by Allied fighter bombers in the period 44 to 45 because the Germans had nothing to fuel them with. Or how about the hundreds upon hundreds of AFV's and other vehicles being torched or blown up by their own crews as they got stranded without fuel?! These could've all been used to fight the allies with, but instead they played no role at all and ended up being blown to bits by their own to make sure they didn't end up in the hands of the Allies. And all this just because they couldn't be fueled.

Had the Germans had enough fuel then you'd have seen far more LW fighters in air from 43 onwards, plus the German ground forces would've been able to actually complete entire operations and advances without stalling to a standstill midway because of lack of fuel all the time. Take even an offensive as late as that in the Ardennes in Dec. 1944, initially it swept aside all opposition, but then suddenly it ground to a halt, why? NO FUEL. 

In short an ample supply of fuel would've eliminated the following problems for the Germans:
1. The stalling of major offensives in the East West
2. The waste of thousands of vehicles being blown up by their own crews because of lack of fuel in the attempt to prevent them getting in the hands of the enemy
3. Hundreds of LW aircraft standing on the ground unable to take off and intercept enemy bombers because of a lack of fuel
4. Great problems training new pilots, drivers etc etc because there wasn't any spare fuel to allow the training vehicles to operate.
5. Massive logistical supply problems on all fronts due to the fact that all mechanised manners of transport lacked proper amounts of fuel to deliver enough supplies and on time. 

A modern army needs fuel to function red admiral, without it it's nothing. Why do think the Allies were so obsessed with bombing the German fuel industry??


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## red admiral (Dec 2, 2009)

> Take a look at how many LW a/c had to just sit on the ground waiting to be shot up by Allied fighter bombers in the period 44 to 45 because the Germans had nothing to fuel them with. Or how about the hundreds upon hundreds of AFV's and other vehicles being torched or blown up by their own crews as they got stranded without fuel?!



Do you have any sources for this? Hundreds and hundreds seems like hyperbole.



> Take even an offensive as late as that in the Ardennes in Dec. 1944, initially it swept aside all opposition, but then suddenly it ground to a halt, why? NO FUEL.



So with unlimited fuel the German Army carries on to France crushing all before it? Fuel was a contributing factor, but having the Allies fight back and heavily reinforce the sector can't really be overlooked.

I'm not arguing that having more fuel wouldn't help, it's just that the end result wouldn't change. The Germans can only build a finite number of aircraft and afvs, and only have a finite number of people.

At the same time, it's not really clear whether there would actually _be_ more fuel given Allied interdiction efforts throughout the supply chain.

1. Yes, more fuel would reduce the rate of allied advance. It won't stop it. The numbers are just too much in the Allies favour.

2 3. Numbers?

4. Probably one of the most important points, but there still isn't that many aircrew physically. They'd be able to be better trained, not simply more.

5. Being shot at by Allied fighter bombers probably didn't help either. You're also assuming that there were actually _enough_ supplies to be delivered.


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## davebender (Dec 2, 2009)

By 1944 Germany was producing a lot of fighter aircraft per month. Over 1,600 day fighters (1,000 x Me-109 plus 600 x Fw-190). Over 250 night fighters (mostly Ju-88s). Provide them with an adequate quantity of fuel and the allied bombing campaigns will bleed a lot worse.


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## Soren (Dec 2, 2009)

You want sources red admiral? Go read one of the many books on the subject, may I suggest Thomas L. Jentz's excellent series of books, the leading expert on German armour.

You'll probably be stunned to find out that the bulk of the losses suffered by German Tiger tank battalions were due either to Allied air attacks or even more commonly fuel exhaustion forcing the crews to blow up their tanks, the latter esp. being the case when talking about Tiger Ausf.B losses. 

Here's a little excerpt from one of Jentz's books
_"Attached to Panzer Division Herrmann Goering, the 17 Tigers under the 2.Kompanie of the 504th attacked the American landing zone on 11 July 1943, but were neutralized by naval gunfire. Within the first three days ten out of the 17 Tigers were destroyed to prevent capture and a further six Tigers were destroyed later for the same reason. The last Tiger was shipped back across the straits of Messina to Italy."_

Hundreds upon hundreds of German vehicles tanks were lost this way, and so there are plenty more examples to pick from. 

There were also several instances of massive amounts of vehicles and tanks bunched together and torched by the Germans in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Allies. And again because they didn't have fuel to move.


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## Njaco (Dec 2, 2009)

One of the best books I've read about this is "The Last Year of the Luftwaffe:May 1944 - May 1945" by Dr. Alfred Price. from pg 95-96

"Compared with the 175,000 tons of aviation fuel produced in April, in August there was only 16,000 tons and in September a mere 7,000 tons. Throughout the summer the Luftwaffe kept going on its fat - the reserve of over half a million tons of aviation fuel it had accumulated previously. But with consumption running far in excess of production, by the beginning of September more than half this reserve had been consumed; from a high point of about 580,000 tons at the beginning of May, stocks were only about 180,000 tons at the end of September.

Now the harsh realities of the shortfall in fuel production could be avoided no longer. Operations by medium and heavy bombers were sharply curtailed; the use of aerial reconnaissance was limited; air operations in support of the Army were permitted only in 'decisive situations'; and the number of night fighter sorties was cut back. Only day fighter operations in defense of the Reich were allowed to continue at their previous level."


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## Juha (Dec 3, 2009)

Hello Soren
Quote:"Here's a little excerpt from one of Jentz's books
"Attached to Panzer Division Herrmann Goering, the 17 Tigers under the 2.Kompanie of the 504th attacked the American landing zone on 11 July 1943, but were neutralized by naval gunfire. Within the first three days ten out of the 17 Tigers were destroyed to prevent capture and a further six Tigers were destroyed later for the same reason. The last Tiger was shipped back across the straits of Messina to Italy.""

Now What happened to 2./504 had nothing to do with fuel shortage. The reason of the losses was low performance of HG infantry, which failed to support the Tigers adequately. And you should know that because it is stated clearly in Jentz book, and in all other books on the subject I'm aware. And also in Ardennes fuel was a factor but far from the only reason of the failure of the attack.

Juha


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## red admiral (Dec 3, 2009)

I'm not arguing that fuel supply wasn't a problem, just that it's not going to change the end result. Do you really think that having a few hundred more tanks and aircraft available is going to change the course of the war?


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## davparlr (Dec 3, 2009)

davebender said:


> By 1944 Germany was producing a lot of fighter aircraft per month. Over 1,600 day fighters (1,000 x Me-109 plus 600 x Fw-190). Over 250 night fighters (mostly Ju-88s). Provide them with an adequate quantity of fuel and the allied bombing campaigns will bleed a lot worse.



In 1944 the US was producing 3000 day fighters a month, England was producing 2167 aircraft per month all aircraft and Russia an unknown huge number. Germany would never be able to out produce the allies. To assume that Germany, with enough fuel, could withstand the unlimited manpower of the Soviet Union and the unlimited war materiel of the US is a daydream. Yes the war would have been extended, but the end was inevitable. In fact, if all allies wanted to do to defeat the Germans was just to pump all the war resources into the Soviet Union and then just stand back and watch the carnage. Of course, the Soviet Union would have gone all the way to Spain.


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## davebender (Dec 3, 2009)

I agree. In fact I don't know anyone who would argue the point.

WWII Germany will be a lot tougher if they have enough aviation gasoline for both pilot training and combat operations. I believe that goal to be achievable if Germany makes different economic decisions during the mid 1930s. Fixing the aviation gasoline shortage will have a far greater effect then tweeking the Me-109 or other German aircraft programs.

And Bronc doesn't need to shoot anyone to make this happen.


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## Soren (Dec 3, 2009)

Further German tanks lost due to fuel exhaustion, this just in August September 1944 in Normandy:

*12th SS Pz.Dv.Hitler Jugend:*
3 Tigers blown up by their own crew, 2 due to fuel exhaustion and 1 due to mechanical failure caused by lack of motor oil between the 20th 21st of August 1944. 

*SS Pz.Abt.102:*
6 Tiger's blown up by their own crew due to fuel exhaustion between the 25th of August 1st of September 1944.

In all 9 Tigers in Normandy alone lost due to fuel exhaustion or mechanical failure caused by lack of motor oil between the 20th of August 1st of September.

A similar thing happend in the period between June 24th to July 4th in 1944 on the eastern front, with S.Pz.Abt. 501 losing 8-10 Tiger's due to fuel exhaustion or mechanical failure caused by lack of motor oil. Another 10 were lost in accidents and combat related incidents.

And the list goes on and on... it was far from just the heavy tank battalions who lost lots of material due to fuel oil exhaustion, not to mention the lack of spare parts which couldn't be brought up because the supply chain had run out of fuel as-well.

Also interesting to note is that not even 1/6th of the Me-262's produced during the war ever made it to enter combat due to lack of fuel and pilots to fly them. The LW could hardly afford to train pilots in the new aircraft because of the fuel shortages which had already ensured that the majority of the jets were delegated to just sitting on the ground.


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## Soren (Dec 3, 2009)

Juha,

Schwere Panzer Abteilung 504 lost abit over 90 Tigers in all during the war, of that more than 46 Tigers either due to fuel exhaustion or mechanical failures caused by lack of oil or spare parts. That's roughly half.


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## olbrat (Dec 3, 2009)

quote: "208 million marks per plant sounds like a lot of money. But consider some naval expenditures that contributed nothing at all to the WWII German war effort"

How many allied spys, aircraft, ships, personnel, equipment, money etc. were tied up in locating and destroying the Bismark and Tirpitz alone? The Bismark wreaked havoc with all ships it engaged. Under a number of conditions the Allied ships may have failed to locate or trap the Bismark. What if the Germans managed to get close enough to land to get air cover? Under any number of conditions the British torpedo bombers might have failed. With Bismark, Tirpitz and other commerce raiders on the high seas, combined with submarines, the war would be completely different story.


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## Juha (Dec 4, 2009)

Hello Soren
on spare parts, main reasons for losses because of lack of spare parts were the deliberate choice by Germans to boost the production of complete vehicles by reducing the number of spare parts produced and harassment of German supply nets by Allied and Soviet AFs. And of course also the fact that Tiger was so heavy and because of that difficult to recover had impact.

On Me 262, yes the fuel shortage hampered pilot training but IIRC one of the plusses for Me 262 was that jet fuel situation was better than that of high grade aviation petrol. And Allied bombing destroyed lot of Me 262s before they were handed over to LW and at least part of those losses would have happened in any case. IIRC it was c. 1/5th of the Me-262s produced during the war that saw combat And the main reason for that was the general chaos and the destruction of Germany's surface transportation system but fuel shortage played its part also.

Juha


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## davebender (Dec 4, 2009)

Sinking a WWI era RN battlecruiser makes a nice newspaper headline but does nothing to help Germany win the war.


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## Juha (Dec 4, 2009)

Hello Soren
Quote:” Juha,

Schwere Panzer Abteilung 504 lost abit over 90 Tigers in all during the war, of that more than 46 Tigers either due to fuel exhaustion or mechanical failures caused by lack of oil or spare parts. That's roughly half.”

According to Schneider’s Tigers in Combat I, sPzAbt 504 lost 109 Tigers during the war, and very very few because of fuel starvation, most of the non-combat losses were because of Allies forced Tigers to withdraw along windy mountain roads which were too much to Tigers’ powertrains, they got stuck in bomb craters, in both cases a contributional factor was scarcity of recovery assets, or because of bridges were destroyed.

And of course the 16 lost by 2./504 in Sicily were lost because of failure of infantry of HG div and because of higher HQs were incapable to provide the coy with reasonable maintenance assets.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 5, 2009)

Hello Soren
Quote: ” 12th SS Pz.Dv.Hitler Jugend:
3 Tigers blown up by their own crew, 2 due to fuel exhaustion and 1 due to mechanical failure caused by lack of motor oil between the 20th 21st of August 1944.”

Did HJ have Tigers in Normandy? What is Your source?

Quote: ” SS Pz.Abt.102:
6 Tiger's blown up by their own crew due to fuel exhaustion between the 25th of August 1st of September 1944.”

According to Schneider’s Tigers in Combat II one of the last Tigers, 001, comes off the ferry and sunk into Seine, another was lost while trying to deep-wade across, most of the remaining were blown up at Seine, the last one made it to Genval, where it run out of fuel and was abandoned by its crew, which disabled the main gun. But the book is somewhat unclear, because there are some discrepancies between the text and the loss table in case of this battalion. So according to the text only one was lost because of fuel exhaustion but there were some losses on 30 Aug 44 in the table without reason, so 6 is a possibility, but if the tanks were at the left back of Seine that didn’t mean anything because there was no way to get across at that time, but if on right bank then the reason might have been the general scarcity of fuel or simply the chaos of general withdrawal with enemy in hot pursuit. What is your source?

ADDITION: Did some checking and as I suspected the Tigers serving under HJ seemed to be from sPzAbt 102 as was logical and probably were counted as tanks of 102 in loss table but were not counted among tanks under sPzAbt 102 control in the text, that would solve the discrepancies between the text and the loss table.

Juha


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