# Flying Tigers (AVG) and no P-40



## gjs238 (Feb 16, 2011)

What plane would the 1st American Volunteer Group (AVG) have used had the P-40 not existed?

How would the AVG have faired?


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 16, 2011)

Likely this Soviet 'Rata'. Or the Curtiss-Wright CW-21 Demon


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## Jerry W. Loper (Feb 16, 2011)

gjs238 said:


> What plane would the 1st American Volunteer Group (AVG) have used had the P-40 not existed?
> 
> How would the AVG have faired?



Since the American Volunteer Group was sponsored by the American government, they would have flown an American fighter, not a foreign one. I'd say that if P-40s were not available, they would have had to use P-39s. (The Curtiss-Wright CW-21 Demon was designed for export, and IIRC was 50 m.p.h. slower than the P-40, had no armor plating, and was armed with just one .50-caliber and one .30-caliber gun.) At the time the AVG was equipped, the only American made single-engine fighter available that was better than the P-40B Tomahawk was a later model P-40. As for how the AVG would have fared, it still would have been led by Claire Chennault, who still would have trained his pilots to use good tactics, so it should still have fared well.


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## pbfoot (Feb 16, 2011)

I suggest maybe the P36 and they probably would have fared no worse


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 16, 2011)

"... Since the American Volunteer Group was sponsored by the American government, they would have flown an American fighter"

Reasonable, I suppose, but the American Gov't was very late getting into the "volunteer" business in China, compared to the Soviets. 

Had the AVG *not* received the blessing of the US Administration, surely American pilots would have volunteered ....  and they wouldn't have flown American fighters.

Much as I love the P-39, it was technologically quite advanced (many electric controls) and would have been a handful in China, IMHO.

MM


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## davparlr (Feb 16, 2011)

Vultee P-44s, although slightly slower than the P-40 was still quite fast and, flown by the superb pilots of the AVG, would probably have been as effective. Although they would have to be delivered in one piece.


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## T Bolt (Feb 16, 2011)

My guess would be the Republic P-43 Lancer. The Chinese had a few lancers, but didn't use them in combat, preferring the P-40. The P-43s had a persistent problem with the gas tanks leaking which became worse with time. If it were not for this problem, or if it could have been rectified, the AVG probably would have used the P-43 as well as the P-40


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## varsity078740 (Feb 16, 2011)

The 23rd FIGHTER group used some P-43s in combat.

Duane


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## drgondog (Feb 16, 2011)

The AVG wasn't limited to USAAF fighters so why not F4F's?


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## davparlr (Feb 16, 2011)

davparlr said:


> Vultee P-44s, although slightly slower than the P-40 was still quite fast and, flown by the superb pilots of the AVG, would probably have been as effective. Although they would have to be delivered in one piece.



Oops, I meant to say the P-66.


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## davparlr (Feb 16, 2011)

T Bolt said:


> My guess would be the Republic P-43 Lancer. The Chinese had a few lancers, but didn't use them in combat, preferring the P-40. The P-43s had a persistent problem with the gas tanks leaking which became worse with time. If it were not for this problem, or if it could have been rectified, the AVG probably would have used the P-43 as well as the P-40


It is interesting that one of the pictures shows both the P-43 and the P-66. Both aircraft were quite capable and would have been effective in the boom and zoom attacks of the AVG. They were only 5-15 mph slower than the P-40B and much faster than Japanese fighters.


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## davparlr (Feb 16, 2011)

drgondog said:


> The AVG wasn't limited to USAAF fighters so why not F4F's?



Because the AVG pilots were so good, I think they would be effective. However, the AVG boom and zoom would not be as effective with the slower F4F, but the -3 was not bad, the -4 was quite slow.


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## muscogeemike (Feb 16, 2011)

The P-43 went into production in the early spring of 1941 and deliveries began in the late summer. It was available and could have been the AVG’s principle aircraft if they had not used the P-40. 
The AVG did use this plane in combat (and perhaps the China Air Task Force too), although not in great numbers. I’ve read that some AVG pilots liked its high altitude performance but greatly disliked its “wet” wing. Some P-43s were still being used as “hacks” in China in late 1943.
At least two Chinese squadrons flew Combat Operations in the Lancer but not with much effect. 
The Aussies also used some Lancers for Recon in 1942-43.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 16, 2011)

The 100 P-40s the AVG got were origionally ordered by the British, they allowed their order to be taken when they were promised newer model P-40s.

Everything useful coming off the lines was being snapped up by Americas rearming forces, or the British. Anything the AVG got would have probably had to be leftovers that the Americans or British didn't want.


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## T Bolt (Feb 16, 2011)

One of the big problems that Claire Chennalt and the China Air Task Force had was General Clayton Bissell. 

Bissell was the commander of the tenth Air Force which was in charge of the China Air Task Force. Bissell and Chennalt knew each other from the early 1930's and for various reasons disliked each other intensely. It seems that Chennalt's success with the A.V.G irked Bissell to no end, and when put in charge of the Tenth with the China Air Task Force under his command, Bissell did every thing he could to try destroy him. It was Bissell himself who drove off most of the Flying Tigers when there contract with the Chinese ended by telling them that if they didn't sign up with the Tenth AF he would personally arrange for a member of the draft board to meet there ship when it arrived back in the states. The A.V.G pilots were so p!ssed off they stormed out of the meeting and left China. Only 6 remained out of respect for Chennalt, 2 of which later died in combat. 

In his "Book The Day I Owned The Sky" Robert L. Scott, Chennalt's CO of the 23rd Fighter Group stated that Bissell kept supplies and aircraft intended for the China Air Task Force in India "To defend New Delhi" At the time the 23rd FG was struggling to keep 6 or 7 fighters airworthy per squadron, and still managed to fight off a vastly superior number of enemy aircraft. If only they had been allowed to receive a fraction of the aircraft and supplies that were 'Defending New Delhi" it might have been a very different war in China.


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## Ivan1GFP (Feb 16, 2011)

I would guess the AVG would have ended up with Hawk 75s with probably a fixed gear and Wright Cyclone engines because they were cleared for export. Keep in mind that although there were special arrangements made to get US military pilots to "Volunteer" and become mercenaries for the Chinese government, the aircraft required a lot of haggling and maneuvering to deliver and were very inconsistent regarding actual equipment installed.

- Ivan.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 17, 2011)

The P-66 and P-43 were the most likely. One outsider could have been ex-RAF Buffalos from Far East Command, but it's highly unlikely enough would have been made available to equip the entire AVG contingent.


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## P-40K-5 (Feb 17, 2011)

P-400 (P-39). they wouldn't have used any Navy planes cause although
not publicly, the AVG were under USAAF control.


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## JoeB (Feb 17, 2011)

See link, detailed article on the P-43 in China in US and Chinese service, with some mention of the P-66. This author is very knowledgeable and reliable AFAIK. P-43's served as combat a/c in small numbers into 1943, but had little in the way of air combat results either way; from the relatively few combats known from both sides it appears more P-43's were lost to Japanese fighters than vice versa but few, v. Type 1 (Oscar) and Type 2 (Tojo).

But the AVG, 1st AVG or the original Flying Tigers, P-40 volunteer group in action Dec '41-June 42 fought mostly over Burma, Thailand and Indochina. The air war in China proper after the early Japanese advances in South East Asia in 1942, was pretty slow going as far as air combat most of the time. Both sides had pretty limited air forces* in a big theater of operations; the two sides just didn't come across one another that often most of the time, rather there were bursts of air combat activity.

In the AVG's actual campaigns air combat was more frequent, but the bulk of the opposition was Type 97 (Nate) fighters. Most retractable monoplanes including the P-36 or Buffalo would have had a significant speed advantage over the Type 97, although RAF Buffalo's had an unfavorable kill ratio v Type 97 in actual operations. The F4F OTOH generally did better than the P-40 against top line Japanese fighter opposition in 1942, Navy Zeroes, which were never encountered by the AVG. AVG P-40's did pretty well against the limited number of Type 1's they met during early-mid '42, though. As usual it's hard to predict what difference a substitute of equipment alone would have made, if at all comparable a/c.

*see the orders of battle in that article, even in early China Air TF days post AVG, summer of '42, when P-43's arrived, the Japanese fighter force in China wasn't a lot bigger than the Chinese/American force; later on the 14th AF plus Chinese was more and more numerically predominant. In AVG's time in Burma the Japanese fighter force *became* a lot bigger than Allied, started out not a lot bigger Dec 8 1941, but the Allies suffered heavy losses all over (not only in Burma but Malaya, DEI and Philippines) and the JAAF was able to reinforce Burma v shrinking remaining force of Allied fighters there.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/richdunn.htm

Joe


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 17, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> P-400 (P-39). they wouldn't have used any Navy planes cause although
> not publicly, *the AVG were under USAAF control*.



Do you have proof of that prior to the US entry into WW2???


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## renrich (Feb 18, 2011)

There were a number of USN and Marine pilots who volunteered and were allowed to serve in the AVG by their respective services. If F4Fs were available, it would have been superior to the P40. Although slightly slower than the P40, the F4F3 had a much better rate of climb which would have served it well in the interceptor role. The big problem for the AVG using the F4F would have been availability. All of the Wildcats slated to go to the French and British would have probably been diverted to China.


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## P-40K-5 (Feb 18, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Do you have proof of that prior to the US entry into WW2???



well if you look at the shipping manifests, parts supplier, evaluation reports, target evaluation etc.. theres no doubt the USAAF was pulling the strings.
but as far as direct proof, no I don't. so I may have jumped the gun on that a tad.


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## R Leonard (Feb 18, 2011)

USAAF / USN politics would have had nothing to do with whether or not the F4F could have replaced the P-40 for the AVG had no P-40s been available. There were no F4Fs available to create such a contretemps.

Third and fourth quarter F4F production at Grumman was already earmarked for either the Royal Navy or the US Navy, with the British already taking over the undeliverable French (G-36A) and Greek (F4F-3A) purchases. In the months leading up to the war Grumman was starting to produce the F4F-4, though not without some heartburn causing difficulties, most notably in problems with subcontractors. The USN BuAer _Monthly Report, Status of Naval Aircraft, October 1941 _reports: 

“Delays in production of F4F-4 airplanes have been occasioned by difficulty in obtaining wing hinge fittings for folding-wing airplanes. Delay has been caused by a shortage of machine tools to complete processing of these fittings and further complicated by labor difficulties in the plant of a subcontractor (City Machine and Tool Co. of Cleveland, Ohio). Allocation of the limited production of folding wing fighters scheduled for October, November, and early December, has been made to the British. Deliveries of fighters to the Navy cannot be expected until December. Production of fixed wing fighters in the interim could not be continued due to the fact that jigs and fixtures had already been converted to the folding-wing type.”

Generic Wildcat production in that time were: contract 126 for USN F4F-4s, contact 127 for RN G-36Bs (RN version of the F4F-4), and contract 129 for 21 F4F-7s. A large portion of the F4F-4/G-36B type production went to the RN first, not the USN, with 36 G-36B being delivered in October 1941 and 54 more in December. The first production F4F-4s, both of them, were not delivered into USN hands until late November 1941 – barely beating the October BuAer prognostication. (This is not counting the single XF4F-4 which was delivered back in April.) 

There was no production slack to provide a land based foreign unit in far away China with carrier capable and needed aircraft. (And, yes, a “foreign unit” contrary to what is an apparently continuing popular belief. The AVG was part of the CAF, not the USAAF.) 

Of course, the irony is that a slim majority of the original recruited AVG pilots were naval aviators and most of them carrier qualified - my father, in early 1941, was in his first squadron assignment aboard USS Ranger and remembered when the AVG recruiter came around; at least seven Ranger Air Group aviators took the bait, including two from his squadron. 

One might also remember that the P-40s which did go to the AVG were not produced FOR the AVG. There were no undelivered F4Fs lying about which could be shipped to China. The already produced F4F-3s and -3As were already in either in USN or USMC squadrons or in RN service and there was no way F4F-4 production could be siphoned off for AVG purposes.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 18, 2011)

P-40K-5 said:


> well if you look at the shipping manifests, parts supplier, evaluation reports, target evaluation etc.. theres no doubt the USAAF was pulling the strings.
> but as far as direct proof, no I don't. so *I may have jumped the gun on that a tad*.



You did - and did you ever see copies of the "shipping manifest?" If so I'd like to see a copy. Everything else is meaningless, especially if these aircraft, which were destined for the UK were first purchased by the US and then cut loose as surplused or "bailed" government property. The fact that "evaluation reports, target evaluation etc" came from the US is another meaningless situation as the USAAF was the customer who first developed this data. Parts suppliers were determined by the prime contractor (Curtiss) unless there were government directed sources involved. Those components usually consisted of engines, instruments and radios.

The only thing members of the AAF did was allow personnel to talk to Chennault about employment and to resign their commission. Outside of that The AVG was on its own.

Here's the REAL story....

_ "Planes were a tough problem. China had been a long-time, profitable customer for Curtiss-Wright, so my old friend, Burdette Wright, Curtiss Vice-President, came up with a proposition. They had six assembly lines turning out P-40's for the British, who had taken over a French order after the fall of France. If the British would waive their priority on 100 P-40B's then rolling off one line, Curtiss would add a seventh assembly line and make 100 later-model P-40's for the British. The British were glad to exchange the P-40B for a model more suitable for combat.

"The P-40B was not equipped with a gun sight, bomb rack or provisions for attaching auxiliary fuel tanks to the wing or belly. Much of our effort during training and combat was devoted to makeshift attempts to remedy these deficiencies. The combat record of the First American Volunteer Group in China is even more remarkable because its pilots were aiming their guns through a crude, homemade, ring-and-post gun sight instead of the more accurate optical sights used by the Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

"Personnel proved a tougher nut to crack. The military were violently opposed to the whole idea of American volunteers in China. * Lauchlin Currie and I went to see General Arnold in April of 1941. He was 100% opposed to the project.*

*"In the Navy, Rear Admiral Jack Towers, then Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and later Commander of the Navy's Pacific Air Forces also viewed the A.V.G. as a threat to his expansion program. . .*

*". . . It took direct personal intervention from President Roosevelt to pry the pilots and ground crews from the Army and Navy. On April 15, 1941, an unpublished executive order went out under his signature, authorizing reserve officer and enlisted men to resign from the Army Air Corps, Naval and Marine air services for the purpose of joining the American Volunteer Group in China.*

"Orders went out to all military air fields, signed by Secretary Knox and General Arnold, authorizing bearers of certain letters freedom of the post, including permission to talk with all personnel . . ."_

HISTORY: American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers)

The AVG was NEVER under USAAF control until 1942 when the unit was absorbed into the 14th AF and Channault was eventually promoted to General



R Leonard said:


> USAAF / USN politics would have had nothing to do with whether or not the F4F could have replaced the P-40 for the AVG had no P-40s been available. There were no F4Fs available to create such a contretemps.
> 
> 
> There was no production slack to provide a land based foreign unit in far away China with carrier capable and needed aircraft. (And, yes, a “foreign unit” contrary to what is an apparently continuing popular belief. The AVG was part of the CAF, not the USAAF.)
> ...



Here's a link that had 23 former Navy or Naval Aviators as Flying Tigers.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/roster1.htm


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## R Leonard (Feb 18, 2011)

From the same site I count, from 105 individuals identified as pilots with the 1st AVG:
58 naval aviators (USN, USMC)
40 identified as army or former army
5 from the CAF flight school
2 not noted

This does not count 18 USAAF pilots temporarily assigned in June and July 1942 nor 3 CAF instructors recruited at the time of the main AVG recruiting effort who did not serve in the AVG.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 18, 2011)

R Leonard said:


> From the same site I count, from 105 individuals identified as pilots with the 1st AVG:
> 58 naval aviators (USN, USMC)
> 40 identified as army or former army
> 5 from the CAF flight school
> ...



Thanks for the recount - I was falling asleep when I was finishing that post.


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## renrich (Feb 19, 2011)

A lot of the AVG seemed to have been naval aviators. No wonder they were effective. If memory serves some were not currently flying fighters but I believe then that naval aviators were supposed to be qualified in many different types.

According to Dean, "America's Hundred Thousand" the first delivery of Martlets to the British was 81 planes in July, 1940, and a further delivery of 130 in March of 41. I suppose if FDR had wanted to he could have switched those to the AVG. In Lundstrom, "The First Team" I was very surprised to read that the Navy in the early days of the Pacific war had a hard time scraping together enough Wildcats to equip it's squadrons on the carriers and in one case had to operate a squadron with mixed Buffalos and Wildcats and in another had to mix F4F3s and F4F3As. Who knew?


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## davparlr (Feb 19, 2011)

renrich said:


> A lot of the AVG seemed to have been naval aviators. No wonder they were effective.



Hmmm, and your support for this comment is? Just looking at the AVG(Flying Tigers) aces, the Navy vols had 10 aces with average kill of 7.6. The Army had 9 aces with an average kill of 7.3., however, with 45% more pilots, the Navy had a fewer percent of aces, the Navy having 17% of their pilots being aces and Army having 23% of their pilots being aces. Not an overwhelming argument for Navy superiority in effectiveness.


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## davparlr (Feb 20, 2011)

There seems to be a variety of the number of AVG aces. I am not sure my previous post is accurate given the different opinions.


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## renrich (Feb 20, 2011)

Dav, the reason for that remark is that I am under the impression, based chiefly on John Lundstrom's books, that USN trained pilots at that time were among the best trained pilots in the world, particularly in gunnery skills. According to him, " Man for man, the Navy's pre war pilots had far more practical shooting practice than the pilots of other air forces." Page 460, "The First Team." Deflection shooting was a skill the USN sought to specialise in. Page 467, "The First Team" "The pilots of the U S Navy and Marine Corps were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting." A reading of his section in that book on "Fixed Aerial Gunnery" is most instructive. However, one must have very flexible wrists in order to emulate the fighter in a full deflection gunnery run. 

However the P40 was not well suited for deflection shooting so that must have hampered the USN trained pilots. To me, however, it seems obvious that a carrier qualified pilot has to be a somewhat better trained pilot than pilots trained only for operations from land bases.


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## davparlr (Feb 21, 2011)

renrich said:


> However the P40 was not well suited for deflection shooting so that must have hampered the USN trained pilots. To me, however, it seems obvious that a carrier qualified pilot has to be a somewhat better trained pilot than pilots trained only for operations from land bases.



I have not read any of Lundstrom's books but a quick google indicates he has a Navy interest, and, maybe bias, but I won't say he has. I also have no reason to doubt the Navy emphasized deflection gunnery more than the AAF, which, in my opinion, would certainly be an advantage. As far as carrier quals, at least when I was in training, the AF pilot training was for a year. I believe the Navy pilots carrier qualed in 18 months. The Marine pilots in my pilot training class went on to another six months of Navy carrier quals after getting their AF wings. As such, the added flying time and general training would give a newly "winged" Navy/Marine pilot more experience than a newly "winged" AF pilot. I suspect this was also true in WWII. However, in my opinion, carrier qualification in itself does not imply a better trained combat pilot. Carrier qualification is 100% low speed maneuvering and precision flying, probably within 30% of stall. I think this expertise is, for the most part, non-transferable to combat ops at 15k ft and 250 kts. Combat training, on the other hand, helps a lot, as Vietnam proved. And which, by the way, the Navy was quicker than the AF in identifying the need.

My opinion is that if you took well trained and experienced pilots from modern air forces like Britain, Germany, Israel, Air Force, Navy, etc. Put them into similar aircraft, their combat proficiency would all be quite similar, which I think was also true in WWII.


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## Nikademus (Feb 21, 2011)

Lundstrom's books are written primarily from the American viewpoint. While he does utilize Japanese records and documents Japanese methods, the combats are pretty much portrayed from the US side leaving the actions and thoughts of the individual Japanese pilots open to speculation and conjecture. Whether that translates into a bias of sorts is subject to debate. He does note that he felt that the F4F was a better vehicle for DS vs. the A6M so one could argue that acheiving similar feats of DS in an A6M requires "greater" skill at the art. His comments on training methods of other nations is non-specific but in other books i've noted that DS or as the Germans called it "Cross Shooting" was not neglected but neither was it institutionalized. Like the USN i think it came down to actual experience once posted to the squadrons. The USN VF's however were a small bunch like the Kido Butai squadrons so creating an elite force within their ranks was easier than in a larger mass produced airforce such as the RAF, or USAAF at the beginning stages of the war.

Myself....i think he does give the USN side the benefit of the doubt and his viewpoints on USN gunnery training being 'the best' represent his opinion but not indisputable fact. His section on Japanese training vs. American training leaves the question of "who was better trained at deflection shooting" subject to debate but one also has to go beyond the appendixes to realize that what made the USN VF pilots good shooters was NOT their training initially but the post training efforts of the squadron CO's like Thatch who drilled his men relentlessly using IBP's. It was only later in the war that Thatch's innovations in gunnery were made standard in USN training packages. 

As for how the AVG would have done with a different plane. If the circumstances were the same i'd say they'd have done similarily. The plane is only one component and as JoeB pointed out...the Japanese actually fought the bulk of their engagements vs. the AVG in outdated Ki-27....yet the exchange ratio was not severe despite this obsolecence. In the end it comes down to all the factors, ground control, tactics, pilots, early warning etc etc. I think even with Hurricanes the AVG would probably have done decently despite that plane's bad track record in the PTO.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 21, 2011)

I wonder if the Navys deflection shooting would have worked as well against another opponent ?
Or could another opponent have got as good a results ?

The Navys aircraft in most cases were armed with 4-6 fast firing .50 caliber guns firing at aircraft with in most cases no selfsealing tanks, no armor, and lighter weight structures. It didn't take many hits to bring them down.

Turn the tables around with the Japanese. How well would a Zeros armament work in deflection shooting, 2 ineffective .30s, and 2 slow firing, slow velocity 20mms, do against our much better protected aircraft ?
Or in the Flying Tigers case, how successful could a Oscar, with 1 .30 , and 1 .50 cal deflection shoot against a P-40.

My understanding of deflection shooting is you try to put your pattern of bullets where the enemy will be, the more bullets in your pattern, and the bigger the pattern, the better your chanch of a hit. Like skeet shooting.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 21, 2011)

Deflection means shooting at target at angles notably different than 0 or 180deg, ie. different from enemy 6 or 12 o'clock. Any 'normal' plane was capable to do it, of course, but having homogeneous battery (=all bullets/shells follow the same trajectory) is advantageous here. If the armament is centrally mounted too, pilot don't have to worry that left or right group will be firing by the side of enemy plane.
Deflection shooting can cancel out pilot's armor too, since the hits came from side.


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## pbfoot (Feb 21, 2011)

Deflection shooting was emphasised in training in the RFC and much of the gunnery training was performed in Beamsville Ontario , during the winter of 1917 training was transferred to Texas at which point the US was included in the training for their future Air Arm


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## renrich (Feb 21, 2011)

The point that Lundstrom made about the efficacy of high deflection shooting was that, because of the Zeke's good performance and maneuverability compared to the F4F, the US pilot was unlikely to get more than a snap shot at an enemy in passing and their training in deflection shooting helped them have confidence they could make that shot. The full deflection gunnery run also made a bomber's defensive gunners have a very difficult firing solution. Butch O Hare's famous fight with the Betties where he claimed at first six kills resulted in his plane receiving only a single hit from Japanese defensive fire. All or most of his runs were deflection runs.

Lundstrom made another point and we have discussed this before on this forum with many claiming the following made no difference: Because of the layout of the airplane and the long inline engine most European and American fighters did not have the visibility over the nose to make a full, that is 90 degree deflection gunnery run. From memory I believe he said that the cowling of the airplane had to slope away from the windshield by at least 6 degrees in order for the pilot to see where he had to be aiming and also see the target airplane. In trying to understand the full deflection gunnery run diagrams in Lundstrom's book was when my wrist got sore. Once those diagrams made sense to me I understood about the point he made about over the nose visibility. The part that is mandatory to understand is that the full deflection gunnery run is a dynamic situation with the angles between the attacker and the defender continually changing.

In reading some of the Mike Williams papers I seem to remember the USN making the point that the FW190 and the P47 did not lend themselves well to deflection shooting because of poor visibility over the nose. The early jet fighters that still principally used guns in air to air combat all had excellent visibility over the nose. According to Linnekin in "80 Knots to Mach Two" the USN still was putting a lot of emphasis on deflection shooting in the 1945-50 period. He flew a lot of gunnery runs in F6Fs, F8Fs and F4Us during that time.


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## Glider (Feb 21, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> His comments on training methods of other nations is non-specific but in other books i've noted that DS or as the Germans called it "Cross Shooting" was not neglected but neither was it institutionalized. Like the USN i think it came down to actual experience once posted to the squadrons. The USN VF's however were a small bunch like the Kido Butai squadrons so creating an elite force within their ranks was easier than in a larger mass produced airforce such as the RAF, or USAAF at the beginning stages of the war.



I have to admit that I have seen this statment about the USN training pilot more extensively in deflection shooting than other forces but have found no evidence to support it. Pre war USN pilots had more training in combat training but and its a big but, pre war all USN pilots had to train as fighter, dive bomber and torpedo bomber pilots. Due to this they spent longer in armament camps but only because they didn't specialise. From May 1941 the USN realised that this couldn't continue and specialised. From this time on from what I have seen they had similar gunnery training to the USAAF. Certainly the time spent in OCU was similar and FAA pilots who trained on the USN courses didn't comment that the training was much different from that received by pilots trained by the FAA. As you would expect more time was allocated to carrier qualifying

I admit that when I get the time I intend to look at this in more detail so could be wrong but right now this does seem to be the situation.


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## JoeB (Feb 21, 2011)

davparlr said:


> I have not read any of Lundstrom's books but a quick google indicates he has a Navy interest, and, maybe bias, but I won't say he has.
> 
> My opinion is that if you took well trained and experienced pilots from modern air forces like Britain, Germany, Israel, Air Force, Navy, etc. Put them into similar aircraft, their combat proficiency would all be quite similar, which I think was also true in WWII.


If you don't know Lundstrom has a bias, why suggest it?

Your last point might be true of today or recently among 'well trained and experienced pilots' but wasn't usually that relevant in WWII because WWII fighter combat usually didn't pit well trained *and* experienced pilots on each side against one another. The question in WWII wasn't whose well experienced peacetime pilots were better but who could rapidly expand and maintain (in spite of losses) the most effective *fighter units*, and the results were not anywhere near uniform.

Moreover, the circumstances of the war would sometimes pit against one another fighter arms in different stages of the process of expanding, filling in losses, etc, and feature quite different degrees of overall combat experience within opposing air arms, especially when a new combatant entered the war against those already involved for awhile.

If you do actually read Lundstrom's books (on USN fighters, he's written well on other topics too) you won't find much if any editorial or opinion. In fact he's sometimes criticized for that, just telling lots of detailed facts from both sides, with no 'thesis', as some historians feel other historians should have to be really serious historians. I believe his statements of the relative emphasis on gunnery training in USN are factual, not opinions. It's also a fact (though Lundstrom nowhere states it because it's not directly relevant to his narrative) that USN fighters were distinctly more effective than USAAF ones in the Pacific early in the war especially, though the Japanese were of that opinion in general for the whole war. I've seen that stated in Japanese references more than once, and I've never seen the opposite stated. A USAAF tactical manual (of the 5th AF) stated the same conventional wisdom about the Japanese, interestingly: JNAF fighters more effective than JAAF.

The matter of opinion would be whether gunnery training per se was a major reason for that, and Lundstrom doesn't say so (not having even said USN fighters were more effective). But as Nickademus alluded to, the situation of USN in fielding fighter units in 1942 was much different than RAF, which was trying to maintain a force that had grown much bigger relative to prewar size and taken heavy cumulative losses already by late '41. The USN had actually fewer carriers to fill w/ planes as '42 went on, not signficantly more until 1943, not way more till 1944. And it was also different than USAAF which had more pressure to field an expanded force more quickly (with huge demand to create a big bomber force, too), and the USAAF also lacked the leavening of combat experience in contemporary (say 1942) RAF units in the Far East. 

You can easily see the USN v USAAF comparison by studying the pilot and unit info in Lundstrom and compare with the books of his 'counterpart', more or less, Willian Bartsch ("Doomed at the Start" about USAAC/F fighters in PI, his new "Every Day a Nightmare" about DEI campaign). The USN units actually sent a lot of very experienced pilots back to training commands even before the Navy saw any serious action, but still their units had better cohesion and training *as units* than the ill prepared USAAF fighter units in PI, DEI and early New Guinea campaigns. And the USN fighters did much better in fighter combat according to Japanese loss records, than either USAAF or RAF in the Pacific in 1942; did not do better than the AVG but arguably faced considerably tougher Japanese opposition.

The AVG was a different animal altogether, as collection of almost nothing but experienced peacetime pilots, in that one case it's kind of like your assumption. In fact some AVG'ers were outright old by fighter pilot standards of those days, a few proved too old and no longer up to a young man's game. See Dan Ford's "Flying Tigers". The AVG's profile of flying experience, though they had almost no combat experience (one AVG pilot had seen previous combat, in Spain, 'Ajax' Baumler), didn't resemble that of either their Japanese opponents (largely still peacetime type profile, but with a fair amount of combat experience from China), or USAAF or RAF, or almost any other fighter unit of WWII. Which AVG pilots came from the Army v. the Naval services was probably a secondary factor, I agree with that.

Joe


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## Nikademus (Feb 21, 2011)

Glider said:


> I have to admit that I have seen this statment about the USN training pilot more extensively in deflection shooting than other forces but have found no evidence to support it. Pre war USN pilots had more training in combat training but and its a big but, pre war all USN pilots had to train as fighter, dive bomber and torpedo bomber pilots. Due to this they spent longer in armament camps but only because they didn't specialise. From May 1941 the USN realised that this couldn't continue and specialised. From this time on from what I have seen they had similar gunnery training to the USAAF. Certainly the time spent in OCU was similar and FAA pilots who trained on the USN courses didn't comment that the training was much different from that received by pilots trained by the FAA. As you would expect more time was allocated to carrier qualifying
> 
> I admit that when I get the time I intend to look at this in more detail so could be wrong but right now this does seem to be the situation.



Within the pages of Lundstrom's book one found citation of the active duty VF CO's as the real force behind the improved gunnery of the graduated VF pilots. Thatch in particular was cited as drilling his men continuously in mock dogfights, sometimes 'while chewing on an apple' (loved that comment). In contrast, during the Midway chapter, when the new Hornet's airgroup was commented on by the other pilots, it was generally negative in terms of their proficiency and that gunnery needed work in re: the fighter pilots. It was only later in the war that Thatch and his supporters were able to institutionalize his gunnery philosophies directly into the training program before being posted to a carrier.

A friend of mine later supported this by citing an actual training manual from the day he had access too.


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## Glider (Feb 22, 2011)

That would make sense. As you rightly point out there is a lot of difference in Thatch training his people in the operational squadron, and the pilots being trained before being assigned to the combat unit. There are many cases of pilots in all airforces being given more extensive training once they reach the front line, there was nothing special about that.
As for it being later in the war before additional gunnery training being included in the OCU training that also happened in those airforces that had the time, again nothing unusual in that.
The observation that the newly trained Hornet airgroup needed work to improve their gunnery was only to be expected. One benefit of being on a carrier squardon was that you normally had some time before going into combat for additional training. When a pilot joined a land based unit in the front line they were often in combat within a couple of days. Naval air operations were normally different, you joined the ship and the ship had to get to the combat area. As you would expect, there were times when in the middle of a campaign pilots were thrown in the deep end but that was the exception rather than the rule.


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## R Leonard (Feb 22, 2011)

Not to be too terribly obnoxious, but, please, T-H-A-C-H . . . Thach . . . only one T.


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## renrich (Feb 22, 2011)

Thank you, Rich. To me, if one is going to continually mention Thach it makes sense to spell his name correctly. As far as Thach or Flatley being responsible for the emphasis on gunnery after the war began, I quote again Lundstrom, "From the early 1920s on, the US Navy taught it's pilots the art of deflection shooting" page 459. I doubt Thach had too much influence in the 1920s. 
For those who have not had the opportunity to read Lundstrom, IMO, he is the foremost author of well researched and objective books about WW2. I only wish he would finish and publish his next book on the Guadalcanal Campaign in late 1942 and 1943. For those interested, please get his books and enjoy.


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## Nikademus (Feb 22, 2011)

R Leonard said:


> Not to be too terribly obnoxious, but, please, T-H-A-C-H . . . Thach . . . only one T.




oops.

Sorry.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 22, 2011)

renrich said:


> Thank you, Rich. To me, if one is going to continually mention Thach it makes sense to spell his name correctly. As far as Thach or Flatley being responsible for the emphasis on gunnery after the war began, I quote again Lundstrom, "From the early 1920s on, the US Navy taught it's pilots the art of deflection shooting" page 459. I doubt Thach had too much influence in the 1920s.



Renrich,

You're undoubtedly correct that Thach didn't influence events in the 1920s but the USN wasn't the only force that practiced deflection shooting. Any air force that utilises air-towed drogues must employ deflection shooting and many air forces taught their pilots the art of deflection shooting without, necessarily, being "experts" in the field. And in the 1920s, as noted earlier, USN pilots were expected to be generalists who could fly pretty much any aircraft in the inventory rather than being specialised by type or role. Just 'cos Lundstrom said the USN pilots were taught deflection shooting doesn't mean they were proficient in that role and it may well have taken the operational experience of Thach and Flatley to appreciably raise standards at the front line, particularly as the USN and USMC air arms expanded in the run-up to WWII.


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## Glider (Feb 22, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> oops.
> 
> Sorry.



My apologies as well


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## renrich (Feb 24, 2011)

I can't envision any kind of aerial gunnery training of any air force not addressing deflection shooting. However, there might be a difference between teaching a pilot to execute low deflection gunnery runs and focusing strongly on full deflection(ninety degree) runs. The easiest full deflection run is the overhead which does not require as much precise maneuvering and as good a visibility over the nose. In addition to the two overhead runs, the USN taught the high side, flat side and low side runs.


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## bobbysocks (Feb 24, 2011)

deflection shooting was taught and practiced. most bases had a skeet range ( or access to one ) where airmen were encouraged to take a shotgun and go shoot to learn lead and marksmanship.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 24, 2011)

renrich said:


> I can't envision any kind of aerial gunnery training of any air force not addressing deflection shooting. However, there might be a difference between teaching a pilot to execute low deflection gunnery runs and focusing strongly on full deflection(ninety degree) runs. The easiest full deflection run is the overhead which does not require as much precise maneuvering and as good a visibility over the nose. In addition to the two overhead runs, the USN taught the high side, flat side and low side runs.



Renrich,

Those may be pertinent facts but you haven't answered the specific questions. Were these different deflection attacks all commenced in the 1920s? What was the impact of pilots being generalists on their air-to-air proficiency? Also, in the 1920s, the USN certainly was not flying aircraft that had 6-degree over-the-nose visibility. Even later on during WWII, the only aircraft where this was true was the F4F series and, perhaps, the F6F. It certainly was NOT true of the F4U. 

Cheers,
BN


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## renrich (Feb 25, 2011)

BN, with my limited typing skills I am about over quoting from Lundstrom. In his appendix about fixed aerial gunnery he makes a convincing argument about the USN's concentration on full deflection gunnery runs in comparison to other air forces. I am convinced and will remain so until someone else presents some authority with better credentials than Lundstrom that contradicts Lundstrom.

As far as Navy fighters are concerned, I have a book, " The Great Book of WW2 Airplanes" which has drawings of the profiles of the Spitfire, P51, P38, F4F, F6F, F8F, F4U, ME109, and FW190. The Grumman fighters all appear to have a pronounced slope from the bottom of the windshield to the end of the engine cowling. The F4U has a longer nose because of the fuel tank but it too has a rather pronounced slope from the windshield to the cowl and to add to that, after the early F4U1, the pilot's seat was raised 18 inches and the F4U pilot sat so high that I have read that on the ground, one F4U pilot could see the knees of another sitting next to him. The P51 and Spitfire appear to have very little slope, the ME109 none and the FW190 is hopeless because the windshield allowed the pilot only about 6 vertical inches of perspex to look dead ahead. Once again Lundstrom said that, in comparison to the USN fighters, the others had not enough visibility dead ahead for full deflection shooting. He apparently has studied all this and I doubt he would say something that is blatantly inaccurate for it would put in question his whole book"s credibility. That is good enough for me.


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## Nikademus (Feb 25, 2011)

Lundstrom's comments that the F4F was a better platform for DS vs. the A6M should not be construed as an indication that other nations didn't train for it. For one thing, he cites more than one example within the pages of his book of Japanese pilots using full deflection shooting (and hitting) with their wing cannons.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 25, 2011)

Renrich,

Actually, I would ask whether Mr Lundstrom, experienced and qualified historian that he is, has studied in detail the training of fighter pilots in the air arms of all other WWII combatants. Just because Mr Lundstrom says the USN was the best doesn't make it true and to expect someone to cite a source that says, for example, that the RAF was the best doesn't help answer the question. 

My comment about visibility over the nose was actually asking about designs prior to the F4F. You seem entirely wedded to the concept that the USN was always better than everyone else at deflection shooting because of training and visibility over the nose. I am asking whether visibility over the nose for the earlier Grumman biplanes was substantially better than that for any other aircraft, and also whether the USN's persistence in training pilots to fly all combat aircraft rather than specialising as fighters, dive bombers, torpedo bombers etc limited their proficiency in each role. Logic, and personal service experience, suggest that it would and hence it contradicts your view of the situation.

Cheers,
BN


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## pbfoot (Feb 25, 2011)

I believe all the "Top Guns"from most Allied services including USN and USMC held a gun camp in Catfoss in the UK (1944?) to see how thet could improve gunnery. I like to see the results or conclusions drawn by these warriors.


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## JoeB (Feb 25, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> 1. Just because Mr Lundstrom says the USN was the best doesn't make it true
> 2. My comment about visibility over the nose was actually asking about designs prior to the F4F.
> 
> 3. and also whether the USN's persistence in training pilots to fly all combat aircraft rather than specialising as fighters, dive bombers, torpedo bombers etc limited their proficiency in each role.


1. Again Lundstrom does not say 'the USN was best'. However it's a simple fact that in the Pacific fighting of 1941-42 USN fighters were more successful against Japanese fighters than those of other air arms (usually by a lot), the exception being the AVG, but the AVG faced arguably considerably inferior Japanese opposition (though the same Japanese units the AVG faced did well against both USAAF and RAF units in other cases, for example the AVG's main opponent in later part of its career, JAAF 64th Sentai, flying basically the same Type 1, had a much better real kill ratio against RAF Hurricane units in 1943 than against the AVG in 1942, almost always having met the AVG alone in '42, so it's not some question of conflicting claims between AVG and RAF units in the same combats in 1942).

The question is *why* USN fighters were more effective against Japanese fighters in that theater and period than RAF and USAAF, not if. Was gunnery training *the* reason, or *a* significant reason or not? 

2. The Grumman biplanes of the 30's had a similar fuselage shape to the F4F. But I don't really see the relevance of this point. Even if other air arms had a/c in the '30's more suitable for deflection shooting, if their long nosed planes of WWII severely limited (especially high) deflection shooting it would still reduce the rationale for emphasizing it in training. And just because their a/c of the 30's had been better suited to deflection shooting, still doesn't mean they emphasized it in formal training as much as the USN, even then. I think on this board (it might have been another) the profiles of Hurricane and F4F were overlaid and don't appear to differ all that much, but again the question is how much actual training in the technique. And it's not a binary where the USN knew of deflection shooting but nobody else had ever heard of it...it's a matter of degree.

3. The training syllabus adopted in February 1942 featured specialized advanced training in fighters for fighter pilots. The pre-war version had included a general course for all CV pilots at this stage, and a 1944 change also re-emphasized general combat skills (bombing, flak evasion, though also *more* gunnery training) for all CV pilots. But the point here (and others have brought it up already) is not to focus too much on the 'tree' of the training syllabus of a new pilot, but consider the 'forest' of training in a broader context. So for example, USN units of early 1942 had mostly guys who went through the pre-war style of training, which still was relatively a lot of hours compared to syllabi of war time air arms, and they'd also generally flown in their actual unit for up to sevearl years. A lot of the same type RAF guys, who graduated training in late 30's... had died in combat or were in Axis POW camps by the end of 1941, replaced by mass produced WWII pilots, albeit led by combat experienced pilots which the USN intially lacked.

Also, training continued in the unit, in all air arms of course, but subject to vastly different constraints in different cases. The RAF of '41-42 had a war to fight all the time in land theaters, usually losing more a/c and pilots than the Germans (fighting constantly at 1:several kill ratio's v German fighters in North Africa, for example), but still had to keep up numbers. The USAAF up to Dec '41 didn't have that situation, but still pressure to expand led them to field units less well prepared than USN ones. Again the value of Lundstrom isn't that he tells you about everything, but lots of detail of USN fighter units; compare it to the similar detail in Bartsch's books about USAAF units in PI and DEI and you can see there's a difference.

Again the fact from actual combat results in the early Pacific theater was pretty clear edge to US naval services in fighter effectiveness among Allied air arms v Japanese fighters. So even if we can correctly identify something about their training which 'limited their proficiency' (and I don't think you have, actually), something else must have helped it.

It's funny because in past debates some people have gotten pissed at me for persistently suggesting, not even firmly concluding, that the F4F itself was an underrated fighter combat machine and that's perhaps part of the explanation. The counter is always 'the F4F sucked, the stats say so, so it was training or tactics' (the 'it was tactical situations' argument is just historically incorrect, they did not differ systematically, and the F4F's relative success was achieved in a variety of situations). Now it's not training either it seems... But the F4F did achieve around 1:1 kill ratio v Zeroes in 1942, and Buffalo, Hurricane and Spitfire all achieved 1:several ratio's against Zero and Type 1, even in 1943 for the latter two a/c. Something caused that difference.

Joe


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## buffnut453 (Feb 26, 2011)

Joe,

My gripe is that Lundstrom is being quoted when his book provides no quantitative source data for his statement. I agree with you that the F4F was an underrated fighter. I suspect people tend to compare it's rather corpulent appearance to the "sleek" Spitfire and Me109 and assume that it was a worse performer. You and I have gone around before (and probably will do again) on the subject of relative aircraft performance (remember the seemingly never-ending Hurricane -vs- Mohawk discussion?). I hold to the line that, in addition to pilot proficiency and aircraft performance, local tactical conditions have a huge impact on the tactical and operational combat effectiveness of individual aircraft types. I suspect (but please correct me if I'm wrong - the SW Pacific isn't my strong suit) that the majority of USN combats during the early stages of the Pacific War in which both Allied and Japanese losses are known with precision come from the fighting over Guadalcanal. This was a very different tactical proposition (only 3 airfields, all close together, with opportunities for standing patrols, at altitude, to defend all 3 against incoming raids) compared to the vast distances involved in the fighting for Burma and defending India or the challenges of dislocated airfields and lack of early warning in Malaya. I also think your point about combat pilot losses in the British Commonwealth and German air arms has something to do with it. The USN and USMC (and USAAC for that matter) had major problems expanding for WWII but they had an extra 2 years to build up compared to the European combatants, and there were opportunities to learn from the mistakes made in that battle (or the successes, to whit Fuchida's interest in Taranto). Again, I'm not interested in making this a nationalistic rampage, I'm just tired of uncited statements being offered as evidence. As you know, I'm more than happy to delve into the detials, including primary sources, to come up with more justifiable conclusions.

Cheers,
B-N


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## vikingBerserker (Feb 26, 2011)

I'd say if available for their use, perhaps the P-38


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## Nikademus (Feb 27, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> Joe,
> 
> My gripe is that Lundstrom is being quoted when his book provides no quantitative source data for his statement. I agree with you that the F4F was an underrated fighter. I suspect people tend to compare it's rather corpulent appearance to the "sleek" Spitfire and Me109 and assume that it was a worse performer. You and I have gone around before (and probably will do again) on the subject of relative aircraft performance (remember the seemingly never-ending Hurricane -vs- Mohawk discussion?). I hold to the line that, in addition to pilot proficiency and aircraft performance, local tactical conditions have a huge impact on the tactical and operational combat effectiveness of individual aircraft types. I suspect (but please correct me if I'm wrong - the SW Pacific isn't my strong suit) that the majority of USN combats during the early stages of the Pacific War in which both Allied and Japanese losses are known with precision come from the fighting over Guadalcanal. This was a very different tactical proposition (only 3 airfields, all close together, with opportunities for standing patrols, at altitude, to defend all 3 against incoming raids) compared to the vast distances involved in the fighting for Burma and defending India or the challenges of dislocated airfields and lack of early warning in Malaya. I also think your point about combat pilot losses in the British Commonwealth and German air arms has something to do with it. The USN and USMC (and USAAC for that matter) had major problems expanding for WWII but they had an extra 2 years to build up compared to the European combatants, and there were opportunities to learn from the mistakes made in that battle (or the successes, to whit Fuchida's interest in Taranto). Again, I'm not interested in making this a nationalistic rampage, I'm just tired of uncited statements being offered as evidence. As you know, I'm more than happy to delve into the detials, including primary sources, to come up with more justifiable conclusions.
> 
> ...



Hi,

Having been bombarded over the past 5 years with highly charged arguments that have a basis along lines of national contention and yes....racism in some cases when it comes to comparing fighter plane performances, I embarked on a long study of this field using day by day ops within WWII to try to come up with some answers for myself. 

What i concluded after 11 books by Shores alone, along with Lundstrom and a half dozen other others was that ratio exchanges, by which so much is argued over can be fairly predicted. Air combat is highly variable....influenced by a dozen+ factors in addition to plane stats and even pilot abilities. Taking all the variables into account, i concluded that unless one or more major variables are out of wack...one can expect a loss exchange close to 1:1 with a varience of up to 2:1 or 3:1. 

One of the biggest factors why this is so is loss numbers themselves. A typical early to mid war skirmish has an average loss of 1-2 planes. Late war sees it rise to 3-5 planes per skirmish. Aircraft losses in general are not all that great despite the propensity of lead flying around. It mirrors the ground situation. Ground casualties can be massive but when you read about all the firepower flying around, including arty, its always amazed me that more men didn't die in any given battle. If loss totals are nto high...then its pretty hard to get a skewed result. Over time a skewed results can occur but unless one or more of those major variables are out of wack....the statistics tend to even out over time thus again leading one back to an exchange that is close to even.....allowing any sort of arguement to be forwarded.

Depending on whether one is trying to build up or discount the side in question determines the line of argument. For the buildup its simple.....win the exchange ratio and there's your proof of superiority. If attempting to discount the winning side, then a close exchange ratio is proof that there's a "myth" of superiority being fielded. I am sad to report that its the latter that one sees the most, especially in the Pacific area of WWII. My other main board supporting the wargame War in the pacific just experienced yet another racially charged thread involving this. 

Citing an example....a poster (another board) asked what the exchange ratio was for the SRA ops with the A6M. I provided this info to him and at that point the thread devolved into a flame fest whereby the positive exchange ratio favoring the A6M was discounted away as being due to extenduating circumstances outside of plane and pilot. Take those factors away (it was explained) and the plane would do no better than 1:1 at the abosulte best.....and usually below 1:1 in other situations. "Lundstrom" was used as the "proof" with the rest typical Troll bluster.

This line of arguing embodies the old truth that there are three kinds of lies.......Lies, damned Lies and statistics.  It also highlights the point i'm making however....that bereft of a major variable being out of wack (such as experience...plane performance....ground control....vectoring, etc etc) the expected ratio exchange will be close in the tactical and only a prolonged and consistant outlier in one or more of these variables (or air combat factors if you would) will show itself in a campaign total (exceeding 3:1 in any nation's favor)

On paper and in real life the F4F was not a performance winner and it was at a disadvantage "overall" to the A6M in this regards. (again...."overall", i'm aware through long exp with unpleasant trolling threads about the strengths of the F4F and other American fighters in certain situations). But the plane was good enough and had enough positive attributes (such as great firepower and durability) that when flown correctly and with mutual support, it could compete and did so....and the ratios show it.

Same thing with the Battle of Britian. Germany had a great fighter in the 109...and they had combat experience and good training to back it up....yet ultimately they lost the BoB with an exchange ratio that fell within 2:1 with enemy fighters.

The 5:1 exchang ratio in the SRA favoring Japanese fighters was due in part to factors outside the planes and the men...but unlike the trolled thread i alluded too (again....not on this board) to discount the men and machines was as wrong as attributing victory totally to the same men and machines. Its very similar to the Barbarossa campaign....outside variables heavily favored the German side and contributed to the similar 5:1 exchange vs. the VVS but in the end, the pilots and the planes remained a major part of that statistical victory.

When the IJN and USN carrier groups clashed in four carrier battles, there wasn't enough of a varience in the air combat factors to result in a lopsided exchange though even had it been it would still be hard to show it in the stats because unlike a campaign, a carrier battle is usually a single day affair.....that makes it much harder to build a lopsided exchange ratio. Still....Coral Sea saw a clean 2:1 ratio favoring the IJN vs. the USN VF's....but it was actually in what they did during the battle that was more signifigant. Fighter planes are not simply about shooting down enemy fighters. The one sustained campaign in 42 saw only one base being attacked, with numbers of planes far smaller than in other campaigns with multiple bases and targets to attack. The factors in which that one base was to be attacked also heavily favored one side over the other. Thus, IMO at least....the lackluster exchange ratio by itself doesn't do justice to the real campaign.

In conclusion...to me its no suprise the USN VF's....flying F4F's did what they did kill ratio wise. In actuality it was only to be expected. One can argue who was better than who but ultimately it's irrelevent because the planes and the pilots were both close enough in overall performance to be competetive and thus, produce exchange ratios under 3:1 with 1:1 being the most average in tactical combats.

I think the USN VF pilots could have produced similar results even with Hurricanes...despite that airframe's issues with the Japanese. 

Hopefully this bluster will make sense. I think i now for example, understand why even when F4F naval pilots scored competetively or as at Midway "won" the vaunted ratio exchange vs. the A6M could still "urgently request a new better fighter" to replace their mounts and why some USN VF pilots did not like the F4F. Ratio exchanges by themselves never tell the whole story....only a piece of it. It was interesting to read "how" the victories were acheived and in the case of the F4F, many of the victories were scored while fighting defensively and/or due to mutually supporting tactics. What the pilots wanted was a plane that could dicate terms to the enemy, not just a plane that could allow the pilots to survive, fight back (and maybe score) and live to go through it again. 

Main point summary again however.......most WWII air combat evens out over time....unless something is majorly out of wack....like on the Eastern Front where Soviet inexperience and rebuilding helped keep the Luftwaffe on till 43 with the exception of July 42 when they got a shock from the VVS and suffered near 1:1 losses initially.


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## davparlr (Feb 27, 2011)

JoeB said:


> If you don't know Lundstrom has a bias, why suggest it?



When it comes to writings I tend to be very cynical. My first instinct is to find out something about the author and determine if he might have some kind of bone to pick, or a point of view to present. In Lundstroms case, all his books appear to be about the Navy and particular, Naval aviation. Now that implies that he has a keen interest in Naval aviation that he does not have toward other types of aviation and a possible affinity towards Naval aviation and/or Naval aircrews. This certainly can breed a conscious or unconscious bias. Of course I realize that I may be completely wrong about any bias but I log that into “more research required”. I just tended to write what is going on in my brain. This philosophy would also apply to anyone writing only about Air Force aviation.



> The question in WWII wasn't whose well experienced peacetime pilots were better but who could rapidly expand and maintain (in spite of losses) the most effective *fighter units*, and the results were not anywhere near uniform.



This seems just to explain why the Allies won the war. They could replace losses in materiel and manpower at a prodigious rate, the axis could not.



> Moreover, the circumstances of the war would sometimes pit against one another fighter arms in different stages of the process of expanding, filling in losses, etc, and feature quite different degrees of overall combat experience within opposing air arms, especially when a new combatant entered the war against those already involved for awhile.



And this is unique to what war?



> The matter of opinion would be whether gunnery training per se was a major reason for that, and Lundstrom doesn't say so (not having even said USN fighters were more effective). But as Nickademus alluded to, the situation of USN in fielding fighter units in 1942 was much different than RAF, which was trying to maintain a force that had grown much bigger relative to prewar size and taken heavy cumulative losses already by late '41. The USN had actually fewer carriers to fill w/ planes as '42 went on, not signficantly more until 1943, not way more till 1944. And it was also different than USAAF which had more pressure to field an expanded force more quickly (with huge demand to create a big bomber force, too), and the USAAF also lacked the leavening of combat experience in contemporary (say 1942) RAF units in the Far East.



I agree with this. At the start of the war, the Navy had seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available. I suspect that all the pilots assigned to those slots had pretty good experience, both in the Navy and in the air. I have no idea how many Army fighter pilots were assigned to the Pacific, there were about 160 Army fighter planes in the Philippines. I suspect they too had pretty good experience. In the first year of the war the Navy fighter slots requirements started to decline due to carrier attrition (although the Essex was added), going to about 115 by the start of 1943. If you looked at these combat pilots, I think you would find all were well experienced and probably consisted of most of the pilots that started with the war in 1941. In 1943, there were only about 500 fighter slots available. These slots became available over the course of the year, allowing much training. Now if we look at the Army pilots, I am sure there were probably as many experienced pilot available at the start of the war, however, here is where the similarity ends. According to Wikipedia, the Army had sent 81 P-40s and 100 pilots to the Philippines prior to Dec. 7th, 1941. These pilots “all were fresh from pilot training schools and required further training”. This would have been a major dilution of pilot experience that the Navy would not have experienced. If we continue on, I suspect that 1942 was a major build up of Army air force, some would be experienced aviators, especially the P-38 pilots (Richard Bong got his wings in January, ’42 so had about six months flight experience before combat, but he was good) but many, maybe most, would be right out of pilot training and would probably pretty quickly be engaged in combat. Since the Navy could only accommodate fighter pilots on carriers, their build up could be much slower, probably allowing more training and flying experience before being committed to battle as you have stated. At the end of 1942, the Navy had roughly 1700 fighter aircraft built but only 115 fighter slots available. In 1943, the Navy had a total of roughly 8450 fighters available (minus some attrition), but only 500 fighter slots available. All the other aircraft were waiting on Carrier construction. I would expect that, except for instructors, the Navy would assign the best crews available for each new carrier. In 1942, the Army had 8431 fighters available (minus attrition and lend/lease) and in 1943 the Army had about 30,000 aircraft available (minus attrition and lend/lease). Many of these aircraft had combat squadrons slots available waiting on pilots and these were probably filled with what was available. It is obvious that the Navy aviator slots open up much more slowly than the AAF because of having to wait for carrier productions. This would allow much better training period and air time whereas Army combat slots were prodigious and demands required many pilots right out of flight training.
Sorry, this is kind of rambling.

Another possible issue here is that the war in Europe was an Army war and the war in the Pacific was a Navy war. It is likely the Army pilot priority would be Europe. The Army pilots would most likely have thought the Germans were more challenging and want to go where they thought the main action was.




> You can easily see the USN v USAAF comparison by studying the pilot and unit info in Lundstrom and compare with the books of his 'counterpart', more or less, Willian Bartsch ("Doomed at the Start" about USAAC/F fighters in PI, his new "Every Day a Nightmare" about DEI campaign). The USN units actually sent a lot of very experienced pilots back to training commands even before the Navy saw any serious action, but still their units had better cohesion and training *as units* than the ill prepared USAAF fighter units in PI, DEI and early New Guinea campaigns. And the USN fighters did much better in fighter combat according to Japanese loss records, than either USAAF or RAF in the Pacific in 1942; did not do better than the AVG but arguably faced considerably tougher Japanese opposition.



I suspect the much smaller force as the Navy pilot community was would contribute to the better cohesion, as the Marines are more cohesive force than the Army is in general.


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## JoeB (Feb 28, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> Joe,
> 
> 1. I suspect (but please correct me if I'm wrong - the SW Pacific isn't my strong suit) that the majority of USN combats during the early stages of the Pacific War in which both Allied and Japanese losses are known with precision come from the fighting over Guadalcanal. This was a very different tactical proposition (only 3 airfields, all close together, with opportunities for standing patrols, at altitude, to defend all 3 against incoming raids) compared to the vast distances involved in the fighting for Burma and defending India or the challenges of dislocated airfields and lack of early warning in Malaya.
> 
> ...


1. You are saying F4F v Zero engagements were all over Guadalcanal, Nickademus seems to focus just on the combats between the two types in carrier battles. It was both. And there was a good deal of variety in the Guadalcanal engagements as well, many were intercepts of high flying escorted bombers (seeking to bomb Henderson field) others of escorted Japanese anti-shipping strikes, F4F's escorting USN anti-shipping strikes, a couple of cases of Japanese carrier a/c striking Guadalcanal, and if extending past the Nov 15 cut off in Lundstrom's book to the actual end of G'canal campaign in Feb 1943, then also F4F escorted strikes against the new Japanese field at Munda, then past Feb 1943 F4F's still defending G'canal and also based further up the Solomons till the type was phased out of front line service later that year. It's not some small sample of combats that all look alike, but there was a strong central tendency toward an even exchange rate in fighter combat against JNAF fighter units (and JAAF ones in a few cases when JAAF operated in the Solomons for awhile in 1943 where results are known).

OTOH and as I already mentioned, the results for RAF units v 'modern' Japanese fighters (Type 1 and Zero) were also over a long period of time. The specific characteristics of the 1942 Malaya and Burma campaigns themselves, in tactical terms, don't appear to have been the determinant of the Hurricane units' success v Japanese fighters because the ratio was almost exactly the same in 1943 as 1942. And Allied bases in SEA in 1943 were a lot more secure than Henderson field. Even in 1942, Allied fields in the early campaigns didn't suffer naval and field artillery bombardment, for example. And the Spitfire v Zero episode over Darwin in 1943 quite resembled the set piece escorted bomber interception missions at Guadalcanal. The same Japanese fighter unit at Darwin in 1943 even saw action over Guadalcanal (3rd later 202nd AF, lost 8 men in a couple of months w/ part of the unit in the Solomons in late '42 as part of the JNAF fighter force there; lost 3 men over Darwin in the '43 raids with the whole unit there, only JNAF fighter unit there).

Unless two combat records of different fighter units were amassed under scientifically controlled identical conditions (which never happened), one can always point out any difference between the conditions, no matter how minor, to explain any difference in results, no matter how large, and not be categorically disproved. In this case the difference in result is quite large, and the difference in conditions a very unconvincing explanation, considering the variation in conditions among various RAF cases was pretty large but didn't seem to drastically impact results (eg. 'no warning hard pressed' 1942 Hurricane units in early '42 didn't do a lot differently than Hurricane or Spit units in '43 with ostensibly much more favorable set up). Likewise F4F situations varied, and individual combats came out differently of course, some in favor of Zeroes some in favor of F4F's, but it was a constant tit for tat back and forth, familiar pattern of evenly matched fighter opponents in many cases in WWII, including cases involving the RAF in other theaters and periods, but not v the Japanese in '42-43.

2. It seems to be contradictory to imply on one hand that 'tactical circumstances' differed too much to draw a conclusion about effectiveness, then go right into agreeing the RAF was a much harder pressed air arm in terms of producing quality fighter units, everywhere, than the USN was in 1942, which is one reason the USN did very noticeably better. And it wasn't that the USN had two extra years to build up, it's more like that it *didn't* (have to) build up, all that much, so the units still more resembled peacetime units. USN fighter units actually rotated a significant % of the most experienced pilots to training commands between Dec 41 and May 42, IOW when USN fighters had still seen very little air combat. But what remained was still a more even mix of higher flying experience than greatly expanded air arm that had suffered heavy losses, like the RAF. The Japanese situation combined the best aspects of both, a good deal of combat experience, but not enough losses to seriously thin out the ranks of relatively experienced pilots.

Of course, greatly expanding their air arms was eventually a huge plus for the Allies where Axis fighters often found themselves hopelessly inferior numerically in later campaigns, not so much in individual engagements as in the air forces accomplishing their overall goals. The fact that the Allies often deployed unprepared units early in the war could be viewed partly as payment then for a later gain. But again, as the chips actually fell USN units tended to be better better trained, in the overall view, even though not combat experienced, than other Allied air arms early in the Pacific War and it would seem this was a significant contributing factor to their better performance v Japanese fighters in 1942-43.

3. What 'uncited' statements?

Joe


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## buffnut453 (Feb 28, 2011)

Joe,

I'll post a more comprehensive reply once I've had chance to digest your comments. The uncited statements are those made by Lundstrom as quoted by Renrich, "According to him [Lundstrom], " Man for man, the Navy's pre war pilots had far more practical shooting practice than the pilots of other air forces." Page 460, "The First Team." Deflection shooting was a skill the USN sought to specialise in. Page 467, "The First Team" "The pilots of the U S Navy and Marine Corps were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting."" Lundstrom does not support these statements with references, citations or any other evidence.

Cheers,
B-N


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## renrich (Mar 1, 2011)

To add fuel to the fire  Page 467, Lundstrom, "The First Team" 
"The pilots of the USN and Marines were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting. With the partial exception of the IJN, no other air forces during WW2 taught their pilots how to make full deflection shots. For the USAAF, the RAF, the LW, the Red Air Force, and all the rest, stern and head on approaches with their minimal deflection angles comprised the primary attacks. Only a tiny minority of their pilots realized the potential of deflection shooting and taught themselves the techniques, usually after extensive combat experience."

Very early in this thread, I made the statement that "it was no wonder that the AVG was effective because a lot of the pilots were USN trained" or something like that. That statement stirred up a whirlwind of discussion. It seems that my remark got the hair up on the back of advocates for all the other air forces and that is one of the beauties of this forum. With respect to all, I have enjoyed the many well thought out observations.

One of the collateral benefits of this discussion is that I have been led to go back and reread Lundstrom and "The First Team." One of the facts that jumps out at me is the fortitude, bravery and downright guts it took in early 1942 for those naval aviators to take off from carriers to seek out the enemy. Knowledge about weather conditions was scanty. Navigation over water, sometimes in instrument conditions must have been harrowing. There was not much intelligence either about the enemy and it's equipment. One of the first pilots to sight an A6M thought it was a VB because of the canopy. The Wildcats in some squadrons did not match in performance. They were very short ranged, the fuel gauges almost useless, the self sealing tanks sometimes caused fuel line stoppages. There were no survival kits and the pilots raided the galleys for knives and meat cleavers. Sometimes pilot armor was iron under the seats applied on board. Some of the planes had IFF and homing devices, some did not and sometimes the homing devices did not work and the radios were faulty. What a gift to us that one of the pilots who played a major role in that early goings has a son on this forum who shares with us. His father is mentioned often in Lundstrom with numerous photos and he was an accomplished deflection shooter.

Another interesting point, at least to me, relates to the many debates we have held about the efficacy of the M2 50 cal and how many were needed. In the prelude to the Battle of the Coral Sea a raid was mounted on the Japanese invasion of Tulagi. The F4F3s in the escort engaged some float planes and then strafed some naval vessels. Those F4F3s mounted 4-50 cals with 420 rounds for each gun. Two F4Fs strafed a Japanese DD, damaged her severely, killed and wounded many of her crew and put her out of action. So much for the debate about whether the 50 cal was lethal enough and whether the F4F4 with six guns and only 240 rounds per gun was a good idea.


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## Nikademus (Mar 1, 2011)

JoeB said:


> 1. You are saying F4F v Zero engagements were all over Guadalcanal, Nickademus seems to focus just on the combats between the two types in carrier battles. It was both. And there was a good deal of variety in the Guadalcanal engagements as well, Joe



We have discussed this component before. I was not focusing just on carrier combats. I stated that in all of 1942, there were 4 x one day carrier clashes (in terms of actual exchange of strikes) followed by one sustained campaign that occured over one single base....with the F4F's fighting primarily defensively...over their own base vs. an opponent that had to fly with limited numbers a distance greater than England to Berlin. (I am also aware of the late-campaign development of Buin and Buna as emergency fields/small fields but the main component remained Base Air Force at Rabaul.) 

I 'do' tend to focus on 42 as this was the pivitol year for the A6M as a front line fighter as well as the climax of both the carrier engagements and the result of the struggle for Guadalcanal. Missions with F4F's did occur into 1943 but by this point the conflict was decided and the IJNAF had suffered a level of attrition that signifigantly impacted it's efficiency. I understand you disagree on how big an impact this was in 43 but there we've agreed to disagree.

Had the Japanese the opportunity in 42 to fight an additional campaign without the impediments stacked against them as listed in both Lundstrom and Richard Frank's account of Guadalcanal, they might well have scored better in the vaunted kill ratio....but more importantly, they might have won the campaign itself which is what ultimately counts.


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## davparlr (Mar 1, 2011)

renrich said:


> As far as Navy fighters are concerned, I have a book, " The Great Book of WW2 Airplanes" which has drawings of the profiles of the Spitfire, P51, P38, F4F, F6F, F8F, F4U, ME109, and FW190. The Grumman fighters all appear to have a pronounced slope from the bottom of the windshield to the end of the engine cowling. The F4U has a longer nose because of the fuel tank but it too has a rather pronounced slope from the windshield to the cowl and to add to that, after the early F4U1, the pilot's seat was raised 18 inches and the F4U pilot sat so high that I have read that on the ground, one F4U pilot could see the knees of another sitting next to him. The P51 and Spitfire appear to have very little slope, the ME109 none and the FW190 is hopeless because the windshield allowed the pilot only about 6 vertical inches of perspex to look dead ahead. Once again Lundstrom said that, in comparison to the USN fighters, the others had not enough visibility dead ahead for full deflection shooting. He apparently has studied all this and I doubt he would say something that is blatantly inaccurate for it would put in question his whole book"s credibility. That is good enough for me.


 
Using a bit of hocus pocus and guesstimations, and some hand measuring from internet drawings, I calculated some downward viewing angle of various WWII aircraft. There was some problem establishing the design eye position. The only available source on this was photographs.

P-51B 2 degrees
Spitfire IX 3.4
Tempest II 3.4
Spitfire 21 4.0
P-51D 4.6
Ta-152H 4.6
F4U-1 4.6
P-51H 5.1
Fw-190A 5.1
F4F 5.7
F4U-4 6.6
F6F 7.4


As has been noted in previous postings, Naval aircraft have better over the nose vision than most land base aircraft. However, this appears to be a requirement for carrier landings more than for deflection shooting. Outside the Navy, deflection shooting seems to be a non-issue. A look at the last ETO fighters, the Spitfire 21, Tempest II, P-51H, and the Ta-152H, all show between 3.4 to 5.1 degrees of over the nose vision. These aircraft must have included all the lessons learned during the very intense air-to-air European combat. My opinion, based on nothing particularly solid, is that deflection shooting was a rather spray and pray happening and the probability of success was not worth the aero impact of a high design eye. As has been said, this at least seems to apply to Europe with better armored aircraft. In the Pacific, maybe deflection success would be higher against the notoriously poorly armored Japanese aircraft.

Note: accuracy of my measurements is shaky in that design eye position, aircraft centerline, and drawing precision are of concern, but the overall trend is certainly accurate.

Those ETO aircraft that were mentioned are VERY successful and deadly aircraft.


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## tyrodtom (Mar 1, 2011)

According to a book I have " The Complete Book Of Fighters" the F4U-1A had the cockpit raised 7 in ( 18 cm), not 18 inches, when the bubble canopy was fitted.


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## davparlr (Mar 1, 2011)

renrich said:


> To add fuel to the fire  Page 467, Lundstrom, "The First Team"
> "The pilots of the USN and Marines were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting. With the partial exception of the IJN, no other air forces during WW2 taught their pilots how to make full deflection shots. For the USAAF, the RAF, the LW, the Red Air Force, and all the rest, stern and head on approaches with their minimal deflection angles comprised the primary attacks. Only a tiny minority of their pilots realized the potential of deflection shooting and taught themselves the techniques, usually after extensive combat experience."



Did Lundstrom have the data telling how many more high deflection kills verses engagements were made by the Navy/Marines compared to all the lesser trained pilots in the world.



> Very early in this thread, I made the statement that "it was no wonder that the AVG was effective because a lot of the pilots were USN trained" or something like that. That statement stirred up a whirlwind of discussion. It seems that my remark got the hair up on the back of advocates for all the other air forces and that is one of the beauties of this forum. With respect to all, I have enjoyed the many well thought out observations.



A study on comparison of Navy/Marine pilot kill rates per hour flying vs. other pilots would be more convincing.



> One of the collateral benefits of this discussion is that I have been led to go back and reread Lundstrom and "The First Team." One of the facts that jumps out at me is the fortitude, bravery and downright guts it took in early 1942 for those naval aviators to take off from carriers to seek out the enemy. Knowledge about weather conditions was scanty. Navigation over water, sometimes in instrument conditions must have been harrowing. There was not much intelligence either about the enemy and it's equipment. One of the first pilots to sight an A6M thought it was a VB because of the canopy. The Wildcats in some squadrons did not match in performance. They were very short ranged, the fuel gauges almost useless, the self sealing tanks sometimes caused fuel line stoppages. There were no survival kits and the pilots raided the galleys for knives and meat cleavers. Sometimes pilot armor was iron under the seats applied on board. Some of the planes had IFF and homing devices, some did not and sometimes the homing devices did not work and the radios were faulty. What a gift to us that one of the pilots who played a major role in that early goings has a son on this forum who shares with us. His father is mentioned often in Lundstrom with numerous photos and he was an accomplished deflection shooter.



This is a great post! I am glad you presented very clearly the dangers facing those Navy and Marine pilots every day and the bravery they had. I shudder at the thoughts of having to do that. All were heros. I would only add that there were many similar heroes in the air war, just a couple that need mentioning is the bomber crews in England early in the war having to fly into fighter swarms and antiaircraft fire and with low probability of return. Coming home, going to bed and knowing you would have to do it all again tomorrow. And, the little known war in Alaska, where AAF pilots had to fly great distances over water so cold life would be sucked out in a few seconds, and in weather that was unimaginable to any other theaters of war. P-40 pilots had to worry about losing that one engine, P-38 pilots had to worry if that bullet hit caused a fuel leak, and all had to worry about getting lost, visibility and wind on landing, or running into an incredible weather front, in addition, of course, to the enemy. In this case God was not the copilot, death was.

Amazing courage, all.



> Another interesting point, at least to me, relates to the many debates we have held about the efficacy of the M2 50 cal and how many were needed. In the prelude to the Battle of the Coral Sea a raid was mounted on the Japanese invasion of Tulagi. The F4F3s in the escort engaged some float planes and then strafed some naval vessels. Those F4F3s mounted 4-50 cals with 420 rounds for each gun. Two F4Fs strafed a Japanese DD, damaged her severely, killed and wounded many of her crew and put her out of action. So much for the debate about whether the 50 cal was lethal enough and whether the F4F4 with six guns and only 240 rounds per gun was a good idea.



I agree with all of this.


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## Glider (Mar 2, 2011)

Just an observation but the debate over angle of view over the nose and the impact this has on deflection shooting could be misleading. Nost deflection shooting would happen when the target is being approached from ahead or from the side. As the target crosses in front of the fighter it will of course start firing. The angle over the nose has no bearing on this type of combat as the attacking aircraft will have to keep the target in sight at all times but its coming from the side. The angle of view over the nose will only become important if the fighter has to chase the target and allow for deflection or trajectory and the target is below the eye line over the nose. Even in these cases with the short effective range this wasn't normally a problem unless it was a fighter vs fighter combat and both were in a turning combat.

Re Lundstroms comments
_The pilots of the USN and Marines were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting. With the partial exception of the IJN, no other air forces during WW2 taught their pilots how to make full deflection shots. For the USAAF, the RAF, the LW, the Red Air Force, and all the rest, stern and head on approaches with their minimal deflection angles comprised the primary attacks. Only a tiny minority of their pilots realized the potential of deflection shooting and taught themselves the techniques, usually after extensive combat experience_
This is both accurate but misleading. It is certainly true that pre war RAF pilots had fixed fighter attack tactics called unimaginatively Type 1 Attack, type 2 attack and so on. However these were dropped very quickly once combat had been joined over the UK as they were fundamentally flawed for a whole variety of reasons and by the BOB at an estimate about 50-60% of the squadrons had dropped them. One thing the RAF were very poor at was imposing changes from above in particular in the field of tactics and harmonisation or all the squadrons would have changed.
The RAF and FAA quickly learned the lessons and poured a lot of effort into training their pilots in this dark art. Its worth remembering that it was the British who developed that sophisticated sights that came into use in the second half of the war specifically to improve deflection shooting to a new level, not the USA. These advances were quickly taken up by the USN and the USAAF


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## renrich (Mar 2, 2011)

tyrodtom, you are correct. I had said eighteen inches from memory but after research the seat was raised eight inches, not the cockpit. The cockpit in the Corsair was commodius, partially because the chief test pilot was six foot four inches tall. Glider, in a snap shot where the attacker's nose is pointing at the spot in space where the defender will be when the bullets get there, visibility over the nose is not as important but that is an extremely rare situation and the amount of rounds put on the target would be small. In order to pull and hold lead so that more rounds can be put on target the attacker must be in a turn with the tightness of the turn decreasing as the angle to the target decreases. The tighter the turn the steeper the bank and the more important the visibility over the nose.


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## R Leonard (Mar 2, 2011)

Davparlr -

If we can back up a little, I’m curious as to how you arrived at your figures for “fighter slots” and your statement regarding the limitation of USN fighter operations to carrier operations. My counting is a little different. You wrote:



> _At the start of the war, the Navy had seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available._



In December 1941 there were nine CV type VF squadrons - VF-2, VF-3, VF-5, VF-6, VF-8, VF-41, VF-42, VF-71, and VF-72. The average fleet carrier fighter squadron up until the middle of May 1942 had 18 aircraft and billets for approx 23 pilots. This would let us arrive at a number of 'fighter slots" slightly less than your 210 count while serving serving in two more squadrons. 

Between mid May and the beginning of June 1942, with the change from the F4F-3 to the folding winged F4F-4, VF squadrons increased in size from 18 to between 27 to 29 depending on aircraft availability. Fighter pilot billets increased accordingly to an average of around 35, although one usually sees a couple of those left unfilled in each squadron. Within months, shipboard fighter complements were to rise to 36 aircraft and at least 42 pilots. 

I’m unsure as to how you draw your conclusions on the number of “fighter slots” available or required to be filled. If you are basing your count on 1 VF squadron per carrier deck, then that is not how navy squadron organization works. Just because one’s ship gets sunk or damaged does not mean the VF squadron evaporates. Of those original nine CV type VF squadrons at the start of the war three survived to the end of the war in one incarnation or another, others were disestablished as time went on.

- Lexington Air Group VF-2 went through a couple of reorganizations, but was finally disestablished on 1 July 1942. A later VF-2 established on 1 June 1943 had no direct lineage.
- Saratoga Air Group VF-3 survived, but only after some identity shifting wing VF-6, being so redesignated on 15 July 1943.
- Yorktown Air Group VF-5 was disestablished on 7 January 1943. The subsequent squadron numbered VF-5 had no direct lineage with the VF-5 at the start of the war. VF-5 never served aboard USS Yorktown (CV-5) during the time that ship was in combat. A later VF-5 had no direct lineage with the VF-5 at the start of the war. 
- Enterprise Air Group VF-6 survived but was redesignated as VF-3 on 15 July 1943; see VF-3
- Hornet Air Group VF-8 was disestablished on 28 August 1942, mostly, and probably a good idea, because of the operational losses incurred at Midway. The subsequent squadron numbered 
- Ranger Air Group VF-41 was redesignated VF-4 on 4 August 1943 and so carried on through the war
- Ranger Air Group VF-42 was disestablished on 22 June 1942 and from the records, for a couple of weeks was to reform in CVG-11. The VF squadron in CVG-11 designation changed to VF-11 in July. VF-42’s combat cruises were aboard USS Yorktown (CV-5) vice VF-5.
- Wasp Air Group VF-71 operated land based in SoPac for a while after the loss of USS Wasp (CV-7) and then came back stateside to be disestablished on 7 January 1943
- Wasp Air Group VF-72 operated off USS Hornet after the loss of Wasp and after the loss of Hornet the remainder of its SoPac time was spent operating both from ashore and aboard USS Nassau. VF-72 returned stateside to be disestablished on 29 March 1943.

Is should also be noted that the change of VF-41 to VF-4, VF-42 to VF-11 and the disestablishments of VF-71 and VF-72 had as much to do with the change from named air groups to numbered air groups than anything else. The parent air group for VF-71 snd VF-72 (WAG) no longer existed. VF-41 was becoming VF-4 and increasing in size, there was no plan to put VF-42 back on Ranger or in CVG-4, not to mention that squadron had just completed what was essentially a 6-month combat deployment which included the almost all the major actions in the Pacific up to that point.

What also seems to be missing from your count are squadrons established and reforming during the period. Just because a carrier has not yet started work-ups does not mean it does not have squadrons assigned and already working up. Using official aircraft location reports and looking at which squadrons remained in service and which were subsequently established, redesignated, and, yes for a couple, disestablished, and their normal complements, up through 1943, a monthly count of your USN “fighter slots” looks more like:

Feb-42 = 207
Mar-42 = 212
Apr-42 = 220
May-42 = 253
Jun-42 = 412
Jul-42 = 432
Aug-42 = 465
Sep-42 = 530
Oct-42 = 565
Nov-42 = 591
Dec-42 = 642
Jan-43 = 792
Feb-43 = 792
Mar-43 = 1006
Apr-43 = 1072
May-43 = 1145
Jun-43 = 1283
Jul-43 = 1430
Aug-43 = 1535
Sep-43 = 1789
Oct-43 = 1885
Nov-43 = 2308
Dec-43 = 2425

A considerable difference from your calculations, and probably a little on the conservative side, but is based on actual squadrons and does not take into account billets for fighter pilots assigned to CASU, advanced training units, fleet air units, or other flying duties requiring fighter experience/rating.

Regards,

Rich


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## R Leonard (Mar 2, 2011)

Davparlr - 

Still on the “fighter slots” issue, it would appear from your writing that you seem to want to confine USN fighters to carrier duty. Obviously from the count in my previous you were not considering a very large number land based, fighter equipped units, mostly those working up for deployment, but, also more than just a few actually in combat theaters. You wrote:



> _Since the Navy could only accommodate fighter pilots on carriers, their build up could be much slower, probably allowing more training and flying experience before being committed to battle as you have stated. At the end of 1942, the Navy had roughly 1700 fighter aircraft built but only 115 fighter slots available._



Not sure that is an accurate description of what was going on, especially in light of the above. Further, in the South Pacific Theater, where the vast majority of USN fighter aircraft were seeing action were doing so, from the end of 1942 up through the introduction of the Essex class carriers into Pacific action, say, from 17 December 1942 to 16 November 1943, a quick look at aircraft location reports shows (and then taking into account what was actually happening in the theater that, on the average there were twice as many USN fighter equipped squadrons operating from land bases as from carriers, the average for carrier based squadrons per report being 2 and land based being 4:

Report Date - Carrier-based vs Land-based fighter equipped USN squadrons, SoPac Theater:
(Note that in the few instances were a squadron was split into land based and carrier based detachments in a report, the detachment with the largest complement of aircraft prevailed; e.g., on 1 Jan 43 VF-10 had 24 F4Fs aboard Enterprise and 12 ashore at Espiritu Santo, the squadron is counted as carrier based. On the other hand, when in the 28 Apr 43 report the same VF-10 shows 24 F4Fs ashore at Guadalcanal, 11 F4Fs aboard Enterprise, and 1 F4U ashore at Espiritu Santo, then the squadron is counted as land based)

17 Dec 42 - 4 carrier-based; 1 land-based 
6 Jan 43 - 6 carrier-based; 0 land-based 
10 Jan 43 - 6 carrier-based; 0 land-based 
28 Jan 43 - 6 carrier-based; 0 land-based 
17 Feb 43 - 6 carrier-based; 0 land-based 
24 Feb 43 - 2 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
4 Mar 43 - 3 carrier-based; 6 land-based 
11 Mar 43 - 5 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
24 Mar 43 - 1 carrier-based; 8 land-based 
4 Apr 43 - 1 carrier-based; 8 land-based 
21 Apr 43 - 0 carrier-based; 9 land-based 
28 Apr 43 - 1 carrier-based; 8 land-based 
5 May 43 - 2 carrier-based; 5 land-based 
12 May 43 - 0 carrier-based; 6 land-based 
20 May 43 - 0 carrier-based; 6 land-based 
31 May 43 - 0 carrier-based; 6 land-based 
8 Jun 43 - 2 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
15 Jun 43 - 1 carrier-based; 5 land-based 
21 Jun 43 - 1 carrier-based; 5 land-based 
28 Jun 43 - 3 carrier-based; 3 land-based 
6 Jul 43 - 2 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
14 Jul 43 - 2 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
21 Jul 43 - 1 carrier-based; 5 land-based 
28 Jul 43 - 0 carrier-based; 6 land-based 
3 Aug 43 - 1 carrier-based; 7 land-based 
9 Aug 43 - 1 carrier-based; 7 land-based 
17 Aug 43 - 0 carrier-based; 7 land-based 
24 Aug 43 - 2 carrier-based; 1 land-based 
7 Sep 43 - 0 carrier-based; 2 land-based 
14 Sep 43 - 0 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
21 Sep 43 - 0 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
28 Sep 43 - 0 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
12 Oct 43 - 0 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
19 Oct 43 - 0 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
26 Oct 43 - 0 carrier-based; 5 land-based 
2 Nov 43 - 1 carrier-based; 5 land-based 
9 Nov 43 - 5 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
16 Nov 43 - 5 carrier-based; 4 land-based 
Average report - 2 carrier-based; 4 land-based 

Based on the squadron locations, the number of “fighter slots”, that is, the squadron complements for fighter pilots can also be roughly determined:

Report Date - Carrier based vs Land based Fighter Pilot Billets – SoPac Theater
17 Dec 42 - 117 Carrier based billets; 42 Land based billets 
6 Jan 43 - 159 Carrier based billets; 0 Land based billets 
10 Jan 43 - 159 Carrier based billets; 0 Land based billets 
28 Jan 43 - 159 Carrier based billets; 0 Land based billets 
17 Feb 43 - 159 Carrier based billets; 0 Land based billets 
24 Feb 43 - 67 Carrier based billets; 117 Land based billets 
4 Mar 43 - 109 Carrier based billets; 75 Land based billets 
11 Mar 43 - 159 Carrier based billets; 96 Land based billets 
24 Mar 43 - 42 Carrier based billets; 213 Land based billets 
4 Apr 43 - 42 Carrier based billets; 213 Land based billets 
21 Apr 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 255 Land based billets 
28 Apr 43 - 42 Carrier based billets; 213 Land based billets 
5 May 43 - 90 Carrier based billets; 105 Land based billets 
12 May 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 189 Land based billets 
20 May 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 189 Land based billets 
31 May 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 189 Land based billets 
8 Jun 43 - 67 Carrier based billets; 134 Land based billets 
15 Jun 43 - 25 Carrier based billets; 176 Land based billets 
21 Jun 43 - 25 Carrier based billets; 176 Land based billets 
28 Jun 43 - 75 Carrier based billets; 126 Land based billets 
6 Jul 43 - 50 Carrier based billets; 151 Land based billets 
14 Jul 43 - 50 Carrier based billets; 151 Land based billets 
21 Jul 43 - 25 Carrier based billets; 176 Land based billets 
28 Jul 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 214 Land based billets 
3 Aug 43 - 42 Carrier based billets; 263 Land based billets 
9 Aug 43 - 42 Carrier based billets; 261 Land based billets 
17 Aug 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 261 Land based billets 
24 Aug 43 - 67 Carrier based billets; 42 Land based billets 
7 Sep 43 - 42 Carrier based billets; 42 Land based billets 
14 Sep 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 134 Land based billets 
21 Sep 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 134 Land based billets 
28 Sep 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 134 Land based billets 
12 Oct 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 134 Land based billets 
19 Oct 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 134 Land based billets 
26 Oct 43 - 0 Carrier based billets; 176 Land based billets 
2 Nov 43 - 25 Carrier based billets; 176 Land based billets 
9 Nov 43 - 186 Carrier based billets; 127 Land based billets 
16 Nov 43 - 186 Carrier based billets; 127 Land based billets 
Average report - 58 Carrier based billets; 141 Land based billets 

While admittedly billets here are calculated using the squadron type (CV type VF, CVL type VF, CVE type VGF or VC type) and standard aircraft complement plus a fudge factor depending on squadron type, to account for spare pilots to arrive at a total complement, these are probably pretty close to squadron pilot complement authorized levels. If anything, they may be a tad low. Having counted noses a few times in the past, they look pretty close to me. And, surely and most certainly, there were times, probably most of time once operating in theater, when a squadron’s roster was nowhere near completely filled, but that happens in all units and has nothing to do with actual authorized billets. 

Anyway, as can be seen, land based USN fighter billets, as with squadron assignments as shown above, generally out number carrier based billets during this period in the USNs primary operating theater. The places where one could generalize fighter equipped carrier based squadrons, and, hence, their number of fighter pilot billets, as exceeding land based squadrons only appear in the first eight weeks of the period, before the USN land based units really ramped up in theater; in the 24 August 43 report, during a unit transition period with units leaving the theater and others arriving but not yet operational; and, finally, at the end when the Essex class carriers and some of their Independence class consorts arrive on the scene for a brief operational period. 

On a weekly average, operating squadrons in just the SoPac Theater, the total of calculated fighter billets is about 73% higher than your calculated 115 for the entire navy; and there are only but two reports (24 August and 7 September 1943) from which the data would lead to the conclusion that there were less than 115 fighter billets in theater.


Regards,

Rich


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## Glider (Mar 2, 2011)

renrich said:


> Glider, in a snap shot where the attacker's nose is pointing at the spot in space where the defender will be when the bullets get there, visibility over the nose is not as important but that is an extremely rare situation and the amount of rounds put on the target would be small. In order to pull and hold lead so that more rounds can be put on target the attacker must be in a turn with the tightness of the turn decreasing as the angle to the target decreases. The tighter the turn the steeper the bank and the more important the visibility over the nose.


We agree that in a tight turn then the angle over the nose becomes important, but as we both know tight turning combats were the exception, not the rule. Also deflection shots were normally not snap shots, a snap shot is something quite different. Most deflection shots were deliberate and with sufficient distance to take the shot without worrying about the angle over the nose.

If I can add to my previous posting its worth remembering that the RAF started combat in Sept 1939, the USN in December 1941. By the time that the US started combat operations the RAF had dropped its pre war training and pre war attack tactics.


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## renrich (Mar 3, 2011)

Glider, with respect, I don't believe that you understand what is involved in a full deflection gunnery run as practised in training and in combat by the USN. I had hoped to avoid this because of my poor typing skills but I am going to quote from "80 Knots to Mach 2" by Richard Linnekin(since I am sure that you are tired of hearing from Lundstrom) who spent 45 years as a pilot. His first gunnery training was in 1946 and he was flying a F6F. These evolutions are exactly as described in Lundstrom. The tight turns have nothing to do with tight turning combat.

Here goes: " There were four classic runs or approaches, in which we were obliged to become proficient: low sides, flat sides, high sides and overheads. Why all this attention to flying "canned" maneuvers against a towed sleeve, when it is generally accepted that over 90% of all aerial kills were accomplished from directly behind the victim? With the victor firing at close range and the victim unaware that he was under attack until the bullets started coming? There are a couple of reasons."

"First, the runs were tactically valid, especially against horizontal bombers that carried self protection swiveling and turret guns. An attacking fighter presents a difficult target to defending gunners if he properly executes a firing run. He minimizes his exposure to enemy fire while retaining a high kill probability against the enemy." (If Lundstrom is correct and high deflection shooting was not practiced by the RAF, a lot more LW bombers would have been killed and a lot less RAF pilots would have been killed in 1940)

"Second, the runs we practiced were an excellent tool for teaching pilots to shoot accurately at moving targets. In particular, the end game 90 degree deflection shots featured high angle rates and range rates, the most difficult problems to solve in any kind of gunnery. If one could shoot accurately out of our array of firing runs, one should be able to shoot accurately in the more benign tactical scenarios that can also occur in combat." (He goes on to say that the top scorers like O Hare and McCambell were excellent shots and often used small amounts of ammo for each kill which allowed them to get multiple kills on one flight.) 

"With the exception of the overhead run, all runs in plan view had essentially the same shape, a kind of asymmetrical "S" To shorten this, I am now trying to paraphrase. The high side is the attacker is above the defender, flat side is level with defender, low side is below the defender. Obviously the high side is preferable because of performance issues The goal is to commence firing when the angle to the target line of flight is 90 degrees and the range selected by the USN was about 1000 feet. Ideally, in a high side run, the attacker begins the run at about 5000 feet above the target and off to one side. If the run is from the right side of the target, the attacker is well in front and banks into a left turn(toward the target) until he has reversed so that he is almost traveling parallel but on the opposite course of the target and still ahead . At the right moment he begins to reverse again with the goal of arriving at the firing point.

Linnekin: " The only thing that matters is that however you approach the target, try to be instantaneously approaching the target in a 90 degree or beam aspect when you start to shoot-"instantaneously" because this is a dynamic situation. You can't stay there; you just pass through. That is what makes it tough. You have to pass through this magic point in space wherein you are approaching exactly sideways to the target-90 degrees- at a range of roughly a thousand feet, while holding the appropriate lead, which is initially 80 or 90 mils."

Now the point about visibilty over the nose. The attacker is turning, rolling back to his right letting his pipper drift back in order to achieve the proper lead, about 80 mils. Linnekin: " Now you are going to apply increasing back stick pressure to keep the lead where you want it. YOUR BANK ANGLE IS INCREASING TOWARD 90 DEGREES. Yor speed is increasing. It is imperative that that this be smooth, ball-in -the-center, coordinated flight." 

The reason I put the caps is to demonstrate that when the firing point is reached the attacker is in a turn, almost in a 90 degree bank and pointing well in front of the target. That is when the visibility over the nose is critical. As soon as firing is commenced the range begins to decrease and so does the lead angle but it "takes increasing g-forces to hold the lead angle because of decreasing range and increasing angular rates."

I am played out but hope this helps some.


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## R Leonard (Mar 3, 2011)

maybe this will help?

View attachment Fix Gun Combat Tactics 2 - Gunnery Approaches.pdf


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## R Leonard (Mar 3, 2011)

Or this, and maybe read it first, though there is a page missing.

View attachment Fix Gun Combat Tactics 1 - How to get hits w illuminated sight.pdf


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## Glider (Mar 3, 2011)

First I must thank you for the effort that went into the typing. I agree with almost everything that you say and that the documents support that. Commenting on the previous posting I think we all agree that deflection shooting isn't snap shooting.
Alos nothing in the documents implies that at the point of shooting the target is out of sight of the pilot. Indeed all the doucuments comment on the amount of lead that you should give the target and this is normally in the view of the gun sight and by definition within the view of the pilot as they can see all the gun sight.
The only area I can see where the angle over the nose helps is in a turning dogfight as the 'lead' would be much greater. Also I can also see that having a better view could assist in the approach but I have never read of any fighter pilot who had a major problem with this in any fighter. The bank and angle of the fighter isn't an issue, what matters is if you can see the target.

I certainly do and have agreed that had the RAF modified their tactics before the BOB had begun the results would have been improved but a good number of the squadrons had changed, a point often forgotten. Its worth remembering that by Dec 1941 all the RAF squadrons and training had changed. What would be interesting is if the USN were further advanced on this in Sept 1939 or did they learn the lessons of the RAF and apply them in the two years grace that the USA had.


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## davparlr (Mar 3, 2011)

R Leonard said:


> Davparlr -
> 
> If we can back up a little, I’m curious as to how you arrived at your figures for “fighter slots” and your statement regarding the limitation of USN fighter operations to carrier operations. My counting is a little different. You wrote:
> At the start of the war, the Navy had seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available.
> ...



I now realize that my post was not as clear as it should have been. My conclusion on “fighter slots” was base on the number of fighter aircraft that were “shooters” where a shooter is an aircraft or pilot combat ready and is deployed in such a manner as combat is probable. I considered all commissioned carriers as having shooter fighter aircraft, they are mobile and can be deployed anywhere. This would also apply to all forward airfields such as Guadalcanal. Fighter squadrons based in Hawaii, for example, even if combat ready, would not be considered shooters. I do understand that lost carriers did not mean that the pilots or aircraft assigned to that carrier are lost, and that many pilots recover on other aircraft carriers or land based airfields, say, Midway. It does mean that there is a reduction in shooter billets. The number of aircraft now able to engage the enemy is reduced. While the aircraft and aircrews may have been recovered from the Lex at Coral Sea, they were not available for combat at Midway unless they were predispositioned at Midway. I will admit I am ignorant of land base naval forces. My assumption was that all land based assets were Marines. So, by the December 17, 1942, I would accept that there were 159 Navy shooter billets, like you show.




> What also seems to be missing from your count are squadrons established and reforming during the period. Just because a carrier has not yet started work-ups does not mean it does not have squadrons assigned and already working up. Using official aircraft location reports and looking at which squadrons remained in service and which were subsequently established, redesignated, and, yes for a couple, disestablished, and their normal complements, up through 1943, a monthly count of your USN “fighter slots” looks more like:
> 
> Dec-42 = 642
> 
> Dec-43 = 2425



This can’t be. You and I just showed that in December, 1942, there were only 159 shooter billets, not 642. In my opinion, fighter pilots were either a shooter or in training/practicing to be a shooter. Most of the 642 must have been the latter as there was very limited shooter assets available, and a lot of training/practicing was going on.

Also, in Dec, ’43, there were 10 carriers operational; three of these were Lexington class. If all 10 carriers had 40 fighter pilots that would be 400 shooter slots. You show four land based squadron which would, if each land base squadron is equal to a CV squadron, bring that to 560 shooter slots available. That’s a long way from 2425.



> A considerable difference from your calculations, and probably a little on the conservative side, but is based on actual squadrons and does not take into account billets for fighter pilots assigned to CASU, advanced training units, fleet air units, or other flying duties requiring fighter experience/rating.



Remember that my hypothesis was that the Navy had a small quantity of shooter slots available through 1943, allowing them more time for training and practice before being committed to combat whereas the Army shooting slots were opening up much faster requiring often filling slots with pilots right out of flight training school and diluting Army experience. The typical Navy pilot being assigned to a carrier would have more time in the air and training under the belt than the typical Army pilot arriving at his combat squadron. At the Philippines 100 pilots were coming with the P-40s being delivered, all were right out of pilot training. I would be willing to bet that there were no right-out-of-pilot-training Navy pilots manning the fighters at the Coral Sea or Midway. I suspect this level of experience advantage for the average Navy fighter pilot would exist for entire war.




> Still on the “fighter slots” issue, it would appear from your writing that you seem to want to confine USN fighters to carrier duty. Obviously from the count in my previous you were not considering a very large number land based, fighter equipped units, mostly those working up for deployment, but, also more than just a few actually in combat theaters. You wrote:


This post is confusing to me. When you show 0 carrier based, does that mean the all the carrier aircraft are assigned land-based even when actually on the carrier?



> On a weekly average, operating squadrons in just the SoPac Theater, the total of calculated fighter billets is about 73% higher than your calculated 115 for the entire navy; and there are only but two reports (24 August and 7 September 1943) from which the data would lead to the conclusion that there were less than 115 fighter billets in theater.



Okay, but I still think that only allows a small number of shooters available relative to the Army requirements.


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## renrich (Mar 5, 2011)

Many thanks, Rich. Glider, you are welcome. It is not so much the actual typing but since I am "a hunt and peck" typer who has to look at the keyboard, trying to duplicate what is in a book is onerous. Having said that, here is more from "The First Team".

"Aside from lack of knowledge of the proper ways to make deflection shots, tangible reasons existed why other air forces had trouble emulating the USN. The most important was visibility over the nose of the attacking fighter. When executing overhead and side runs from a full deflection angle (60 to 90 degrees), the attacker had to place his point of aim well ahead of the target, the distance depending on the target's speed. To shoot accurately and obviate risk of collision, the pilot had to see ideally both the target and where his tracers were going; thus both the target and the aiming point had to appear in his gunsight. This required excellent visibility over the nose of the attacker's aircraft. Otherwise when allotting sufficient lead for full deflection, the pilot would lose sight of his target when it disappeared under the nose of his own plane.

"Among it's other qualities, the Wildcat with its radial engine under a sloping cowling and cockpit installed high over a mid wing fuselage had the necessary visibility over the nose. a down angle of 6.5 degrees required for full deflection shooting. This quality of good vision forward and below evolved also in connection with carrier landings.Thus, naval fighter pilots came to expect that attribute as necessary for good shooting and good carrier landings. land based fighters often sacrifised good visibility for streamlining. Their pilots sat so low and so far back in the aircraft that visiblity over the nose was very poor, making deflection shooting extremely difficult even if the pilots knew how to do it."

Now, another point which may (or may not), demonstrate something about gunnery training of USN pilots, especially early war. Was browsing through "Table 1, Consolidated Summary of Navy and Marine Carrier and Land Based Air Operations and Results for Entire War By Model of Aircraft Employed" and learned something interesting and startling, (at least to me).
Navy SBDs flew only a total of 6048 action sorties from carriers in WW2.
There were 43 losses to E/A (enemy aircraft).
In turn those SBDs were credited with shooting down 31 bombers and 75 fighters. I assume all those figures come from the PTO.
To begin with, because of Lundstrom's exhaustive research, I assume that the credits are inaccurate on the high side.
Never the less, the SBD looks as if were a fairly lethal aircraft in air to air combat.
Probably, the fighter credits largely belong to the rear gunner but the bomber credits should almost all belong to the pilot with his twin 50s.
Early in the war, many of the USN pilots who flew VTs and VBs had received fighter training also and their gunnery skills must have stuck with them. Early in the war, SBDs were used in the CAP role because of the shortage of fighters and those SBD pilots were pretty aggressive.

Navy and Marine piloted SBDs flew a total of around 46000 land based action sorties in WW2, the vast majority by Marines, had 36 losses to E/A and were credited with 32 enemy fighters shot down.


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## Glider (Mar 5, 2011)

OK the white flag of truce (not surrender) is going up over here. If only because if the angle over the nose as so critical the Corsair wouldn't have been nearly as good as it was. 
However with that parting shot I now withdraw.


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## drgondog (Mar 5, 2011)

Glider - one of the reasons the Corsair (Spit, Mustang, Jug, etc - pick one) was so successful is that its performance gave it an edge in most tactical situations and high deflection gunnery was the exception rather than the rule. Remember also that when the 51H was designed it had significantly better forward visibility over the cowl by dropping the engine axis and giving the H more 'droop' - for just this reason as well as slightly better taxi visibility.

Every good fighter pilot that I talked to about this specific subject recall that they had to pull through the opponent's flight trajectory when shooting at 70-90 degrees deflection - and often fired as the prey was lost to sight 'under the cowl'


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## renrich (Mar 5, 2011)

Glider, truce works for me(not surrender) and Bill's explanation makes a lot of sense. However Richard Linnekin, author of the book I quoted from earlier said that he became a good gunner finally when flying those high deflection runs in a Corsair. He said the Corsair seemed to him to have better contol modulation than the F6F and the F8F and he could fly a smoother pattern in it. At a glance the Corsair does not appear to have good visibility over the nose and we know it does not at high AOA as in a carrier landing but maybe it is different in a gunnery run. The pilot does sit really high in a Corsair cockpit.


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## Glider (Mar 5, 2011)

Thank you one and all, always willing to learn, says he in a serious sulk


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## renrich (Mar 5, 2011)

This has been a nice discussion and I have enjoyed trying to contribute. As mentioned, it has led me to go back and study some of my books again and it is a joy to reread Lundstom and reflect on how fortunate us Americans were to have the dedicated men of the USN to bring us back from the debacle of Pearl Harbor in only about six months to the resounding victory of Midway. Lundstrom's books are so well researched to the point where he actually matches up the different pilots, where possible, as to the names of the US Navy and IJN and who shot down who. His books are not easy to digest because they are so detailed but if one sticks to them they are unparalleled, IMO, for accuracy and thoroughness.

Going back to the Navy and Marine statistics, I was shocked at the number of landbased action sorties that were flown by the Marines in SBDs. I have always pictured the SBD as a Navy carrier based VB that was a work horse in the PTO but the SB2C, the Beast, flew more than three times as many action sorties from carriers as the SBD did with 18,808 sorties. But 40, 872 action sorties by Marines from landbases in SBDs makes me wonder, where and when? Can anyone explain that?


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## drgondog (Mar 5, 2011)

Glider - come back! abandon grief and 'sulk state'. Visualize shooting skeet - but you have to rotate your shotgun (i.e bank the sucker so that 12 O'clock over the shotgun must traverse the path of the bird, swing through it and pull the trigger when you 'feel' the lead is right.

When you shoot an O/U or side by side, the bird is ALWAYS visible because both of your eyes are above the barrels. The barrels traverse either through but parallel to the line of flight with your eyes seeing the clay 100% of the time or find a lead ahead of the bird -and shoot. Either way you see the target above the barrels and the plane of symmetry of the shotgun is vertical.

If you had to rotate your head to the same reference point alignment over the rib, rotate the gun 90 degrees so that the plane of symmetry of the shotgun is the same as the flight path of the clay (horizontal), the entire shotgun would obscure the target as it pulled through the line of flight and in front of the target.


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## R Leonard (Mar 5, 2011)

No, what I said was that there were 159 (117 carrier based and 42 land based) of your “fighter slots” in the *South Pacific Theater* on 17 December 1942, not in the entire USN as, yes, your original post clearly implied.

In the entire USN on 17 Dec 42, and, again, not counting the training commands, where experienced fighter pilots were in great demand - Jimmie Thach at NAS Jacksonville comes to mind; the CASUs, where there were a plenty of fighters to be driven for one purpose or another; the ACTGs on both the east and west coast; and, really, plenty of other reasons to have fighter drivers around for various purposes; no, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for “fighter slots” and a standardized number of billets in each:

6 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 133 billets
7 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 160 billets
15 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 386 billets
28 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 679 (I found where I missed two in my initial count).

By 7 Dec 1943 the picture was decidedly different, again, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for “fighter slots” and a standardized number of billets in each:

23 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 708 billets.
33 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 786 billets.
28 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 961 billets.
84 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 2455 (and I found where I missed one the first time through here, too).

One of the reasons I stopped my counting in the previous post in November 1943, was to just get to where I could account for the first entry of Essex class carrier in the South Pacific Theater. 

One must always remember that not all carriers, and, yes, that even includes Essex class carriers, were in places such as the South Pacific theater on 7 Dec 1943; any more that all squadrons operating from land were safely ensconced away at NAS Olathe, Kansas. 

Your results are obviously quite different and I suspect we'll have to leave it at that. 



> _. . . ‘fighter slots’ was base on the number of fighter aircraft that were ‘shooters’ where a shooter is an aircraft or pilot combat ready and is deployed in such a manner as combat is probable. I considered all commissioned carriers as having shooter fighter aircraft, they are mobile and can be deployed anywhere. This would also apply to all forward airfields such as Guadalcanal. Fighter squadrons based in Hawaii, for example, even if combat ready, would not be considered shooters._



Am I to conclude from your definition that, say, a fighter pilot who was in on the Lae-Salamaua raid of 10 Mar 42, and went on to score air-to-air credits at Tulagi on 4 May, at Coral Sea on 8 May, and again at Midway on 4 June, by virtue of being assigned to a fighter squadron stationed at NAS Maui, and thus not in combat deployed squadron on 17 Dec 42, was not filling a “fighter slot”? That filling a position in an established fighter organization, does not define a “fighter slot”? Or that a naval aviator of the fighter persuasion might find himself in NAS San Diego as FO in one working up squadron and then a week later find himself as XO of another squadron in action on the other side of the ocean and, yet, was not filling a “fighter slot” in the first, but is filling a “fighter slot” in the second? 

If that is how you are defining “fighter slots,” then I can only say, my, what a curious point of view. I’d further suggest that your arbitrary definition would have, for, indeed, most of them are now gone so I use the past tense, been the cause of (a) much hilarity, (b) indignation, or (c) heavy sighs of resignation, on the part of the fighter aviation type practitioners of the period.



> _Also, in Dec, ’43, there were 10 carriers operational; three of these were Lexington class. If all 10 carriers had 40 fighter pilots that would be 400 shooter slots. You show four land based squadron which would, if each land base squadron is equal to a CV squadron, bring that to 560 shooter slots available. That’s a long way from 2425._



There was only one Lexington class carrier still around in Dec 1943, Saratoga. I presume you mean Essex class. There were 24 carriers operational at sea in the report of 7 Dec 43. Eight were CVs (including 5 Essex class), seven were CVLs, and the balance were CVEs of various stripes.
VF-2; USS Enterprise; aboard
VF-5; USS Yorktown; aboard
VF-9; USS Essex; aboard
VF-16; USS Lexington; aboard
VF-18; USS Bunker Hill; aboard
VF-22; USS Independence; aboard
VF-23; USS Princeton; aboard
VF-24; USS Belleau Wood; aboard
VF-25; USS Cowpens; aboard
VF-30; USS Cabot; aboard
VF-31; USS Chenango; aboard
VF-37; USS Sangamon; aboard
VF-60; USS Suwannee; aboard
VC-33; USS Coral Sea; aboard
VC-41; USS Corregidor; aboard
VF-4; USS Ranger; aboard
VF-8; USS Intrepid; aboard
VF-29; USS Santee; aboard
VF-32; USS Langley; aboard
VF-50; USS Bataan; aboard
VC-6; USS Core; aboard
VC-19; USS Bogue; aboard
VC-55; USS Card; aboard
VF-12, nominally assigned to USS Saratoga, operating from ashore, NAB Tarawa, while Saratoga returned to the west coast.

_



At the Philippines 100 pilots were coming with the P-40s being delivered, all were right out of pilot training.

Click to expand...

_
Really? All of them? Squadron COs, XOs, OpOs, all their flight leaders? Everyone? Admittedly, I don’t read much about the Army Air Corps, for (a) I've no particular interest and (b) I worry about the slanted writing one might encounter when reading a work concentrating on the AAF, but I find the concept of all these 2d LT types running around without any leadership a bit hard to believe. Almost enough to stir my poor bones to check out their manning and cross check with the army register . . . well, maybe not, a lot of effort for not much reason.



> _I would be willing to bet that there were no right-out-of-pilot-training Navy pilots manning the fighters at the Coral Sea or Midway. _



How much do you have? 

Four pilots reported to Lexington's VF-2 on 11 April 1942, straight from ACTGPac, Ens William Wileman, Ens John Bain, Ens George Hopper, and AP2c Robert Kanze, just in time to depart for Coral Sea on 15 April. And, yes, they all saw action as fighter pilots at Coral Sea three weeks later.

The least experienced pilots in Yorktown's VF-42 (the squadron on which I have the most information on file) at Coral Sea were Ens Harry Gibbs, Ens John Baker, and Ens John Adams, all of whom had joined the squadron on 6 December 1941 upon completion of training. On the eve of the Coral Sea action Gibbs had but 274.4 total hours, including all training hours; Baker, 340.3; and Adams, 396.0. Those compared to the ensign with the most flight hours, Leslie Knox, who had been in the squadron since 14 March 1941 with 811.6. All saw action at Coral Sea; Baker and Knox went MIA on 7 May 42 and declared killed in action on 8 May 1943.

Joining VF-3 on 20 May 1942, straight from ACTGPac and just in time for the 28 May Midway deployment aboard Yorktown, were Ensigns Horace Bass, Mark Bright, Harold Eppler, Robert Evans, Van Morris, Daniel Sheedy, and Milton Tootle. Evans, Morris, and Eppler did not fly in the battle, but, I suppose could be considered to be occupying “fighter slots”.

Regards

Rich


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## Glider (Mar 5, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Glider - come back! abandon grief and 'sulk state'. .


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## R Leonard (Mar 5, 2011)

Naval Aviation Combat Statistics does, indeed, report 116 enemy aircraft shot down by “somebody” in an SBD. A closer examination of the record done by Frank Olynky (historian for the American Fighter Aces Association) in his USN Credits for the Destruction Of Enemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Combat World War 2 comes up with 95.5 shoot down credits, 13 probables and 17 damaged, as is usually written, 95.5/13/17. Of these, 41.5/5/13 were credits which went to rear gunners and 54/8/4 went to pilots. This does not include any credits which could have been awarded to Marine Corps pilots and rear gunners, though Frank has a tome on the subject of Marine Corps credits, I don’t have a copy.

The Marines had SBD squadrons in action right up until the end of July 1945. I suppose one could work some magic with the NACS data on monthly sorties per operating area and then go back to the aircraft location reports and determine which squadrons were flying where. On the other hand, and much easier on the eyes, I’d recommend Barrett Tillman’s The Dauntless Dive Bomber of World War Two, Robert Sherrod’s History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II and some quick runs over to

75 Years of Marine Corps Aviation

and

http://www.usmc.mil/news/publicatio...ation of the Philippines PCN 19000314300.pdf
 
and maybe

VMSB-243 Flying Goldbricks


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## renrich (Mar 6, 2011)

Bill, mighty fine explanation regarding deflection shooting as regards wing shooting ( or clay targets). I was thinking of trying to use wing shooting as an example and kept remembering a method described in an "American Rifleman". It was a Britisher who called his method: " Butt, belly, beak, bang" I had a smile on my face thinking about using that method on a fence line, September 1st in Texas with doves, since the distance between the butt and beak on a dove is so small. It really gets small when the dove is doing forty mph with a tail wind. What you so aptly described with a shotgun is at odds with what I think many on this forum believe is deflection shooting in a fighter. I remember seeing on the Military Channel ( or maybe the History Channel) an example of deflection shooting, supposedly a real event where it showed a Hellcat, wings level, with a Zeke crossing in front at exactly 90 degrees. The Hellcats nose was pointed slightly in front and the Zeke was clearly visible. The Hellcat pilot triggered his guns and the Zeke ran into the bullet stream and blew up. Deflection shooting? Baloney! Something like that can happen just like a dove hunter can stick his barrel in front of a flying bird, pull the trigger and sometimes get lucky. I would not count on getting a limit that way, though. It is a dynamic situation with distance and angles continully changing and the gun needs to be swinging all the time. Actually, at least one of the pilots on the flight deck of Yorktown at Midway during the Japanese attack was practising his deflection shooting with a 45 automatic. Wonder if he hit anything?

I am not going to get into transcribing Lundstrom again but he clearly outlines the experience level of the Fighting Squadrons at Coral Sea and Midway and, of course, Rich has it right. In fact, I believe that in Thach's uneven fight with the Zeros at Midway, his wingman, Dibb, was a rookie and was in his first combat. He did well!


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## parsifal (Mar 7, 2011)

Very intersting discussion guys. One thing I would point out is that the discussion on the relative success of the navy air arm v the AAF versus the AVG versus the Commonwealth air forces is failing to consider in a glaringly obvious fashion, even from such highly knowledgable people as yourselves. You all seem to be looking at just one side of the equation. In fact there are innumerable variables other than deflection shooting training that could go into explaining a lop sided combat result. Most importantly, there seems to be this assumption that the Japanese were uniformly consistent enemy. Wrong. There were any number of variables here, including the experience level of the formations and individuals, the quality of their equipment (something alluded to by Joe B), the extent to which they had rested and the degree they were outnumbered. Then there are other variables such as the geographic location, the weather conditions and so on and so on. 

Judging by what I have seen so far, i think it highly questionable to state categorically that USN training in defelection shooting was a major, or even any sort of factor in determining kill ratios. There are so many other variables at work here as to make such conclusions highly questionable.

Comparing a naval battle outcome , that invariably in 1942 saw numbers evenly matched, with fully rested crews, sometimes with crucially important intell advantages to affect the outcome, to a grinding, months long campaign being undertaken at arms length from each other, in which the fatigue of the pilots, the wer and tear of the aircraft, the target distance, the lack of intelligence wre all additional factors not even being mentioned here


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## renrich (Mar 8, 2011)

The IJN pilots of bombers, recon planes and fighters at Coral Sea and Midway were mostly pretty experienced and highly trained. The USN pilots on a number of occasions used their proficiency at deflection shooting to achieve victories with minimal risk to the precious USN pilots and their airplanes. A study of Thach's fight against overwhelming odds at Midway illustrates how his knowledge of deflection shooting helped he and his two wingmen to survive and shoot down several Zekes.


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## parsifal (Mar 8, 2011)

doesnt translate into anything of importance. At least not before Midway, when i grant you, something Strategic could be argued, though I still think it a major stretch to say that this strategic shift was due to the USNs ability to shoot sideways. 

At Coral Sea, the Japanese lost about 88 aircraft to 60 USN aircraft. I dont have the figures on me right now (coffee break at work....), but Ill bet a greater proportion of Japanese aircraft were lost on the ground, in comparison to the Americans. My hypothesis here is based on the fact that the japanese Shokaku and Shoho were both divebombed, which had the effect of knocking the flight deck out more or less immediately (and thereby trapping the planes on that deck), whereas the lethal damage to Lexington was done by torpedoes, and continued to operate for some time, despite the fatal hits. This gave the Americans time to offload some of the aircraft on the lex before she succumbed. I would be very surprised if the Americans could claim a 1:1 exchange ratio or even that the efforts of her fighters were of decisive importance in the outcome of the battle. They were a factor, a significant factor even, but I am doubtful they were a critically important factor. 

Lastly, even though the CAGs of CarDiv5 were experienced, they were far from the most experienced, as their role at Pearl demonstrates. Shohos CAG was probably less well trained than either of the USN carriers. And lastly, during the battle, the USN fighters were operating defensively, whereas the Japanese were on the attack. These situations invariably confer major advantages to the defender, so the comparison is skewed by any number of factors, many of which I have not even mentioned.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 8, 2011)

".... though I still think it a major stretch to say that this strategic shift was due to the USNs ability to shoot sideways. "

Interesting how this thread has evolved. Very informative.

For what it's worth, Parsifal, the unspoken question in this whole deflection shooting thingy is this: "does being proficient in 'shooting sideways' bestow competitive advantage on a dog-fighter?". The answer is for the most part "yes". Buzz Beurling the Canadian Malta spitfire ace was a skilled bird hunter. So was Chuck Yeager (grub in the pot dirt poor Arkansas). Stanford Tuck in his pre-RAF days was a merchant seaman who amused skippers by "offing" sharks (that's deflection shooting through _water)_.

You get my point ... and I'm sure each-of-you has examples of great marksman-hunters who were successful fighter pilots. 

By 1939 the USN had learned a great deal about naval (peacetime) operations. They did a great job training. The proof is in the results at Midway. And it wasn't just the pilots. It was overall naval aviation ops.

Hunters make great fighter pilots. So do sportsmen -- especially hockey players. .

MM


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## drgondog (Mar 8, 2011)

renrich said:


> Bill, mighty fine explanation regarding deflection shooting as regards wing shooting ( or clay targets). I was thinking of trying to use wing shooting as an example and kept remembering a method described in an "American Rifleman". It was a Britisher who called his method: " Butt, belly, beak, bang" I had a smile on my face thinking about using that method on a fence line, September 1st in Texas with doves, since the distance between the butt and beak on a dove is so small. It really gets small when the dove is doing forty mph with a tail wind. What you so aptly described with a shotgun is at odds with what I think many on this forum believe is deflection shooting in a fighter.


 
I have to say without a lot of bragging that I am a pretty good shot with a shotgun. I was second alternate (Poston was 1st) to Satterwhite and Bauer at 76 Olympics in International Skeet. Neither of us made Montreal but I am a NRA Lifetime Expert at International Skeet and Trap. Having said this, 1976 was my last registered clay target competition as I became enamored with Flyers - both Hand Thrown and Box birds and have shot pigeons in Argentina, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Monaco (before it was banned in Italy and Monaco), Texas, California, Georgia, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. When there is big money all the top clay target shooters go to the game. I don't claim to be 'top' but I am pretty good.

IMHO the Brit was dead on (Harry Lawrence from Purdey's?). I simplify it to 'see the bird, shoot the bird' as a 'swing through shooter'. The American Skeet champions see the bird, swing along in front until they see a specific lead and pull the trigger - it is described as 'sustained lead'. This is a close analogy to a fighter pulling through an opponent, getting the nose out in front and hosing him down - ala Gunther Rall or Hans Marseille.

Anything that moves fast (like a west Texas dove in a 30 kt tail wind) requires a fast move through the bird and at some point your computing gunsight brain tells you that you have the barrel moving through the flight path, see a necessary 'gap' - an pull the trigger. Ditto a hand launched pigeon suddenly at 50 mph and NOT flying in a straight line. You have zero time to do the 'sustained lead' thingy. I teach those that care to listen that you focus on the 'beak' (what I mean by 'see the bird') and that it will tell you the line, and what you have to do is follow the 'line as you bring your shorgun into your face and shoulder - and bang - the shot actually takes place shortly therafter as you swing through.

With a Flyer you have to see both the beak and the angle of the wing of a quartering away bird - that will tell you about additional deflection. My father was a good shot, but I was actually a better one.


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## renrich (Mar 9, 2011)

mm, add another good wing shooter who may have been the best fighter pilot in US service in WW2. Joe Foss reportedly had a lot of experience growing up as a bird hunter. He had, I think, 26 kills, all in the F4F4 in the Solomons. At that time the IJN still had many of those highly experienced, elite pilots from the beginning of the war. The Wildcat he flew was inferior in performance to the Zeke, although more rugged and better armed. The conditions Joe and his fellow pilots and the ground personnel fought in were rugged, as far as food, clothing and shelter were concerned and maintenance of the airplanes must have been a nightmare. I feel sure that Foss was a good deflection shooter.

Bill, I used to have the knack for wing shooting but as my depth perception has gone away, my wing shooting ability has declined. But, when I walk here in Arizona I often flush covies of quail and in my imagination I swing my Browning Double Automatic with the skeet barrel, pull lead and bang. I am still getting some hits but quail are an easier shot than doves. The human brain coupled to the eyes are marvelous things.


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## drgondog (Mar 9, 2011)

Ren - I often tell my students that everything is about the gun mount, the swing through the trailing wake and the beak - it is all about not defeating the best analogue fire control system on this earth.. head and neck relaxed, bring the stock to the cheek, eyes level, eyes focused on the beak..


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## Nikademus (Mar 11, 2011)

parsifal said:


> doesnt translate into anything of importance. At least not before Midway, when i grant you, something Strategic could be argued, though I still think it a major stretch to say that this strategic shift was due to the USNs ability to shoot sideways.
> 
> At Coral Sea, the Japanese lost about 88 aircraft to 60 USN aircraft. I dont have the figures on me right now (coffee break at work....), but Ill bet a greater proportion of Japanese aircraft were lost on the ground, in comparison to the Americans. My hypothesis here is based on the fact that the japanese Shokaku and Shoho were both divebombed, which had the effect of knocking the flight deck out more or less immediately (and thereby trapping the planes on that deck), whereas the lethal damage to Lexington was done by torpedoes, and continued to operate for some time, despite the fatal hits. This gave the Americans time to offload some of the aircraft on the lex before she succumbed. I would be very surprised if the Americans could claim a 1:1 exchange ratio or even that the efforts of her fighters were of decisive importance in the outcome of the battle. They were a factor, a significant factor even, but I am doubtful they were a critically important factor.
> 
> Lastly, even though the CAGs of CarDiv5 were experienced, they were far from the most experienced, as their role at Pearl demonstrates. Shohos CAG was probably less well trained than either of the USN carriers. And lastly, during the battle, the USN fighters were operating defensively, whereas the Japanese were on the attack. These situations invariably confer major advantages to the defender, so the comparison is skewed by any number of factors, many of which I have not even mentioned.


 
The fighter vs. fighter exchange ratio at Coral Sea was 2:1 in favor of the Japanese. Looking beyond the stats, The Shoho fighter groups performance was lackluster. Part of this was due to most of their numbers flying A5M but primarily it was that they were heavily outnumbered. The first "Zero" kill by an F4F was an ambush from above and behind on one that never saw his attacker and was flying low having recently scrambled. The F4F performance during the attack on Shokaku was more impressive and was a rare situation of good escort by the F4F's (protecting the bombers on offensive missions was not a high point for the F4F VF's in 42.....a fact not displayed by the raw stats)

The Japanese VF performance was most impressive over Lex and York. In addition to not losing any of their numbers and shooting down several F4F's...they protected their charges to the best of their abilities and generally put the defenders on their back heels...forcing one entire CAP section into a defensive Luffberry circle. They also bagged five SBD's flying on "torpedo defense CAP"...a bloody result which was largely responsible for the USN ultimately abandoning that tactic in favor of putting more genuine fighters on their carriers, leaving SBD's to bomber and scout duties.

Midway saw the stat war go in favor of the US VF...mainly due to Thach's incredible effort....however it should be noted that this was borne by the fighters being entirely on the defensive, with no impact on the US bombers that they were supposed to escort. It was also indicated from my readings that Thach and his mates benefited from the defending fighters being out of cannon ammo. Japanese VF performance overall at Midway was impressive. They shot down over 40+ enemy bombers....and again on escort duty, despite being outnumbered, they gave better than they received during the torpedo run that ultimately led to Yorktown's demise, most importantly they tied up defending fighters. (not all of course....too many defenders....but enough)


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## pbfoot (Mar 14, 2011)

Been following this and adding the odd chirp about US Naval training and RAF (RCAF) training of the same period. I have done a little basic research of those that expierienced both systems as I feel these genntlemen are the ones most qualified to comment 
Holley Hills 1st ever P51 (414 Sqn RCAF) kill over Dieppe and 4 Japanese aircraft in Marianias Turkey shoot (must be only guy to fight in largest air battle ETO and PTO ) no comment on difference
Chalmers (Slick) Goodlin RCAF USN same guy who flew X1 stated There can be no doubt RCAF training particularly in Instrument flying served me well and was second to none
George Suttom flew PBYs with both RCAF and later USN stated there was little difference in training except for the fact SNR USN Offivers held A belief that US training was superior when it was not
There are others (will reaqquire the Names)and the opinions are usually that the RCAF provided an equal if not superior training syllabus particularly and with much empahsis on better Instrument flying however there was no comment by any source on better USN gunnery training


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## Glider (Mar 15, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> Been following this and adding the odd chirp about US Naval training and RAF (RCAF) training of the same period. I have done a little basic research of those that expierienced both systems as I feel these genntlemen are the ones most qualified to comment
> Holley Hills 1st ever P51 (414 Sqn RCAF) kill over Dieppe and 4 Japanese aircraft in Marianias Turkey shoot (must be only guy to fight in largest air battle ETO and PTO ) no comment on difference
> Chalmers (Slick) Goodlin RCAF USN same guy who flew X1 stated There can be no doubt RCAF training particularly in Instrument flying served me well and was second to none
> George Suttom flew PBYs with both RCAF and later USN stated there was little difference in training except for the fact SNR USN Offivers held A belief that US training was superior when it was not
> There are others (will reaqquire the Names)and the opinions are usually that the RCAF provided an equal if not superior training syllabus particularly and with much empahsis on better Instrument flying however there was no comment by any source on better USN gunnery training


 
This ties in with what I have found out with the added proviso that the RAF/RCAF training also put more ephasis on aircraft recognition.


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## drgondog (Mar 15, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> Holley Hills 1st ever P51 (414 Sqn RCAF) kill over Dieppe and 4 Japanese aircraft in Marianias Turkey shoot (must be only guy to fight in largest air battle ETO and PTO ) no comment on difference


 
What is the estimate of the total number of fighters over Dieppe? And how does that stack up to the fighter forces on either Bodenplatte or November 26, 1944?


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## renrich (Mar 15, 2011)

I suspect that a pilot would always believe his training was at least equal to the training of all other pilots, just as the airplane he flew was at least equal to the other guy's airplane. Hard to get an objective opinion. The only good way to compare training is to get a copy of the training syllabus and then what was the follow up training once a pilot went to an operational unit. A pilot trained in a patrol aircraft would hardly undergo the same gunnery training a fighter pilot would.


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## pbfoot (Mar 15, 2011)

Ren I'm under a little duress and lost the other names i accrued for my little study,but will relocate. 
Bill my question for you is how many Allied pilots were sober suring Bodenplatte


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## buffnut453 (Mar 15, 2011)

renrich said:


> I suspect that a pilot would always believe his training was at least equal to the training of all other pilots, just as the airplane he flew was at least equal to the other guy's airplane. Hard to get an objective opinion. The only good way to compare training is to get a copy of the training syllabus and then what was the follow up training once a pilot went to an operational unit. A pilot trained in a patrol aircraft would hardly undergo the same gunnery training a fighter pilot would.


 
Which is precisely the point I've been making all along regarding Mr Lundstrom. His statements about the quality of USN air gunnery training are only valid if he has taken the steps you outline and, sadly, there are no indications that such extensive research was undertaken.


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## drgondog (Mar 16, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> Ren I'm under a little duress and lost the other names i accrued for my little study,but will relocate.
> Bill my question for you is how many Allied pilots were sober suring Bodenplatte


 
I confess I have no idea. I would suspect however that while the Battle of the Bulge is only two weeks old that all pilots on the Continent were in a lot better shape than the ones based around London. Having said this, apparently drunk or sober the Allies acquitted themselves well.

Was the number of sober pilots exceeded by the ones in the air over Dieppe?


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## pbfoot (Mar 16, 2011)

most accounts I've read and overheard conversations indicate that it was quite a bash on most airfields, but I suspect not mamy pilots would pass aobriety tests on New Years DAy 45


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## renrich (Mar 16, 2011)

If one reads Lundstrom, there is little doubt that his research was extensive and thorough with massive amounts of backup. In the absence of some other historian's well documented research, which has not been posted on this thread, to my knowledge, it seems to me that his conclusions have a lot of credibility. Since few if any of us were participating in WW2, the only way we can learn about it is by researching the material ourselves or reading something from someone who has done the research. To claim that Lundstrom has a bias and is in error about his conclusions seems not very persuasive to me.


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## parsifal (Mar 16, 2011)

drgondog said:


> What is the estimate of the total number of fighters over Dieppe? And how does that stack up to the fighter forces on either Bodenplatte or November 26, 1944?


 
Hi Dg

Am at work so havent access to reference material

However 48 Allied squadrons were committed to the battle, the majority of which were Spit Vs. This included the first substantial US fighter committment to the ETO.....3 squadrons of Spit Vs attached to the 31st Pursuit Gp. 

Allied losses were 106 aircraft lost

The Germans committed two JGs (JG2 and 26), almost in their entirety, plus some independant squadrons

The JGs were almost exclusively equipped with FW 190 A-3s. These were measurably superior in performance to the Spit Vs equipping the allied fighter squadrons at that time (there was only one squadron of Spit IXs) 

The JGs were assisted by some Zerstorer staffels, some recon elements and some ground attack stafelns. Some of the ground attack formations were equipped with FW 190 FBs which appear to have been pressed into service as emergency fighters.

The outcome was heavily in favour of the germans, who enjoyed perhaps their best aerial victory in the west in over two years, and this day probably represented the zenith in the supremacy of the FW 190. Still, the numbers are misleading, since the timne over the target area for the allied fighters was severely limited. since they had to maintain a constant air patrol over the invasion, they were always limited to about 1/3 their force structure at any given moment. Roughly speaking that probably gave the germans near parity at the times they chose to intercept. Still, the german forces were commanded in a very superior manner. 


I am not sure of German aircraft losses, but according to this website: http://www.luftwaffe.cz/dieppe.html the germans lost 48 aircraft to 88 Allied fighters and a total of 106 aircraft alltogether. I know they lost 14 pilots outright and a similar number injured, after being shot down. german loss and victory reports are worth noting....they appear to be very accurate on this occasion. Allied claims and loss reports are not as clear


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## pbfoot (Mar 16, 2011)

I believe that most squadrons flew 2-3 sorties that day with some up to 4


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## buffnut453 (Mar 16, 2011)

renrich said:


> If one reads Lundstrom, there is little doubt that his research was extensive and thorough with massive amounts of backup. In the absence of some other historian's well documented research, which has not been posted on this thread, to my knowledge, it seems to me that his conclusions have a lot of credibility. Since few if any of us were participating in WW2, the only way we can learn about it is by researching the material ourselves or reading something from someone who has done the research. To claim that Lundstrom has a bias and is in error about his conclusions seems not very persuasive to me.


 
Renrich,

I'm not disputing that Lundstrom did excellent research but his sources are all US-based. There is not one cited documentary source in "The First Team" from other countries' archives. Thus his uncited comment about the USN being the most proficient in the world as regards deflection shooting is wholly without substance. As someone who has done extensive primary source research including the UK, Australia, NZ and the USA, and have had said research published and accepted for a postgraduate dissertation, I know of what I speak! Just because Lundstrom wrote it does not make it so, particularly if he doesn't back up his assertions with source documentation. You can continue to offer his opinion as fact until the cows come home but that doesn't alter the truth that, in reality, he was expressing an opinion and there is no comparative data upon which to base the assertion.


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## parsifal (Mar 16, 2011)

I have to side with buffnut on this one. I fail to see the evidence of a vastly superior performance by USN fighter pilots until well after Midway, and even then, I just cannot see evidence that provides clear links that any such enhanced performance was conclusively the result of being able to undertake deflection shooting. Defelction shooting is such an inherently essential ability a a fighter pilot that it is hard to imagine everybody else ignoring it, or underrating, whilst the USN presses on with a secret and unique ability that nobody else cares about. it is, frankly, unbelievable.


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## Glider (Mar 17, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Hi Dg
> 
> Am at work so havent access to reference material
> 
> ...


 
I know that I have said this before and apologise if it should like a scratched record but I would contend that the Luftwaffe didn't do as well as the figures (which I don't disagree with) show. The reasons are simple.

a) Their fighters were vastly superior to the RAF with the exception of one squadron of Spitfire Mk IX who were as good as but not better than the FW190.
b) They were over home ground
c) They had the benefit of radar control
d) They could pick the time and place of their attacks
e) The RAF was tied to defending the fleet and the troops on the ground.
f) The Luftwaffe utterly failed in their primary task of attacking the fleet before the landings, during the landings or in the withdrawal from the beaches.

Of the above (F) is the most important. The RAF achieved what is set out to do, not one large landing craft was sunk by air attack before, during or after the raid and only one escort was sunk in what was almost the last Luftwaffe attack of the day despite the escort only consisting of a handful of Hunt class destroyers.
With all the advantages the Luftwaffe had, they may have done reasonably well, but they should have done a lot better.


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## JoeB (Mar 17, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> We have discussed this component before. I was not focusing just on carrier combats. I stated that in all of 1942, there were 4 x one day carrier clashes (in terms of actual exchange of strikes) followed by one sustained campaign that occured over one single base....with the F4F's fighting primarily defensively...over their own base vs. an opponent that had to fly with limited numbers a distance greater than England to Berlin. (I am also aware of the late-campaign development of Buin and Buna as emergency fields/small fields but the main component remained Base Air Force at Rabaul.)
> 
> I 'do' tend to focus on 42 as this was the pivitol year for the A6M as a front line fighter as well as the climax of both the carrier engagements and the result of the struggle for Guadalcanal. Missions with F4F's did occur into 1943 but by this point the conflict was decided and the IJNAF had suffered a level of attrition that signifigantly impacted it's efficiency. I understand you disagree on how big an impact this was in 43 but there we've agreed to disagree.
> .


'Agree to disagree' is appropriate only in matters of opinion. In this case it's a fact that kill ratio's of both USN and British units flying 'early' types v the Japanese didn't change much between 1942 and 1943, or the part of the 1943 that's relevant (in terms of a/c like the F4F being used at all in front line service) so there's really no reason to exclude 1943 results; in fact it's quite illogical to consider the 1943 results for say the Spitfire v JNAF and Hurricane v JAAF/JNAF, and exclude 1943 results for F4F's because 'the Japanese were too attrited by then'. And in fact, results in the Solomons at least in early 1943 were not a lot different than in 1942.

Likewise, many of campaigns among which we would compare *Allied* fighter performance involved the Allied a/c on the defensive near their own bases and Japanese fighters at long range. The defenses of Darwin in 1942 (by USAAF P-40's) and 1943 (by Spitfires) was quite similar to Guadalcanal (distance was 500 miles, with never any emergency or staging bases nearer by). The Philippines, and some Malayan and DEI operations also saw Zeroes at close to max range over Allied fields, and many Army Type 1 operations early in the war (Malaya, DEI, Burma) likewise (considering the Type 1's shorter range even with drop tanks, and the tanks sometimes not available), same. And again, in cases where F4F's were themselves operating further from base (relative to their similarly short range to other Allied fighters pre P-38 ), carrier battles, antishipping escorts from G'canal, Munda strikes, etc their kill ratio also averaged close to 1. 

So the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F's shoes in the Guadalcanal campaign.

I don't think you've made a convincing point, nor has it been made by others so far, that F4F operations were so non-comparable to other Allied fighter ops that the (pretty widely) differing results don't show they were more effective. So arguments about training and a/c characteristics are about *why* the F4F units were more effective than other Allied fighter units, not if they were.

Joe


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## renrich (Mar 18, 2011)

Another point which seems to get lost is the effectiveness of the F4F and it's pilots against Japanese bombers and recon planes. How the F4F did against the Zeke is fun and sexy to contemplate but at least of equal importance was how the USN pilots in their Wildcats did against the IJN bombers and torpedo planes trying to sink our ships or disable our airfields and how they did against the recon planes trying to locate targets. The F4F through November, 1942, was at least pretty even against the Zeke but at that same time and later was very effective against the other types. O Hare used high side deflection runs to kill three bombers and badly damage more and Leonard, in the prelude to Coral Sea killed two observation types using deflection tactics. The USN pilots in Wildcats were very effective against IJN aircraft other than VFs and even more effective when they later got better performing AC such as the F4U and F6F. That those pilots did well in short ranged Wildcats that were not dominant in performance must have had something to do with training and gunnery skills.


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## pbfoot (Mar 18, 2011)

Fred Avery and Henry Miller USMC were both trained by RCAF and served with Boyington on Guadalcanal


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## Nikademus (May 10, 2011)

JoeB said:


> 'Agree to disagree' is appropriate only in matters of opinion. In this case it's a fact that kill ratio's of both USN and British units flying 'early' types v the Japanese didn't change much between 1942 and 1943, or the part of the 1943 that's relevant (in terms of a/c like the F4F being used at all in front line service) so there's really no reason to exclude 1943 results; in fact it's quite illogical to consider the 1943 results for say the Spitfire v JNAF and Hurricane v JAAF/JNAF, and exclude 1943 results for F4F's because 'the Japanese were too attrited by then'. And in fact, results in the Solomons at least in early 1943 were not a lot different than in 1942.



Estimated kill ratios can be called ‘facts’. A person or person’s interpretation of said facts however constitutes an “opinion.” Past discussion showed that we have marked differences in “opinion” regarding the meanings behind the ratios, the need to drill down into that debate again was not necessary IMO hence; “Agree to Disagree” in this context was appropriate as a measure of politeness. i.e. we don't agree....lets move on.....more so given you somehow interpreted my past comments as focusing on the carrier battles alone, which was incorrect. 

However with Pandora’s Box reopened, I stand by my earlier view that it’s illogical to compare the British situation in mid 1942-43 to the USN situation in Guad as similar when in my opinion they were very different. I further feel it is illogical to include 1943 (post Guad campaign) as highly relevant because the situation there did not highly change in regards to the disadvantages faced by the JNAF after it’s losing and highly costly battle against the singular base at Henderson field. The major change that did occur was further to the USN’s advantage….deployment of more powerful fighters in large numbers as well as holding the initiative whilst the primary bases of the JNAF remained concentrated in the Northern Solomons



> Likewise, many of campaigns among which we would compare *Allied* fighter performance involved the Allied a/c on the defensive near their own bases and Japanese fighters at long range. The defenses of Darwin in 1942 (by USAAF P-40's) and 1943 (by Spitfires) was quite similar to Guadalcanal (distance was 500 miles, with never any emergency or staging bases nearer by). The Philippines, and some Malayan and DEI operations also saw Zeroes at close to max range over Allied fields, and many Army Type 1 operations early in the war (Malaya, DEI, Burma) likewise (considering the Type 1's shorter range even with drop tanks, and the tanks sometimes not available), same. And again, in cases where F4F's were themselves operating further from base (relative to their similarly short range to other Allied fighters pre P-38 ), carrier battles, antishipping escorts from G'canal, Munda strikes, etc their kill ratio also averaged close to 1.



There are more variables at work than simply “long distance” and posture. Burma saw the UK performing many offensive patrols, ground support missions and TacR missions as well as escort duty. Coupled with the huge size of Burma and it’s numerous airfields this helped foster an environment where one never could predict when and where (and from what direction) an enemy force might come. The JAAF also enjoyed greater numbers in many of their missions. It is interesting to note that “kill ratio” wise the best Allied performer was the ex-AVG P-40’s…..better than even 2nd generation planes. Shall we conclude that the P40 is better than these planes? It is interesting to note that the same factors that led to success over Lunga existed these ex AVG’ers. Very long range missions to a singular target - Kumming with plenty of warning for the defenders with the additional tactic borne of experience of ambushing the strike well after it completed its mission and was on the way back. On at least two occasions the latter tactic led to major JAAF defeat kill ratio wise (though in fairness it could be also said that they succeeded in their mission (attacking the airbase))
The SRA campaigns were indeed made possible by the long range abilities of the A6M…it was after all the first strategic fighter and this is a pro that is often forgotten or discounted when discussing this fighter. Like Burma however, a key difference vs. Lunga was that Japanese efforts were not canalized by the location and number of enemy bases, the number of friendly bases, the extremeness of the distance (effectively beyond even the A6M’s range and finally the early warning net in place. These factors represented Force Modifiers that greatly enhanced the Allied fighter defense and made it possible at all for the F4F’s to defend competitively vs. the attackers. A major part of Lunga’s uniqueness. The Darwin situation does not totally match this situation or its intensity. Another difference was training. It has been written in more than one account that the Spit pilots had a learning curve to overcome. This is reasonable given UK fighter performance in other areas, notable North Africa in comparison to the USAAF performance using the same fighter types. 




> So the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F's shoes in the Guadalcanal campaign.



I don’t agree. With the other variables exactly the same, I feel that even had the USMC pilots been manning Hurricane II’s, they could have achieved a similar feat. Wg Cmdr Paul Ritchie came to a similar conclusion when he investigated the lopsided losses Hurricane squadrons were suffering in Burma in 43. There was no technical reason, in his experienced mind why the Hurricane II, which possessed similar pros and cons to other 1st gen planes like the P-40 and F4F, could not, if *fought properly*, compete with the Type 01 fighter plane. Based on my research, I agree with him. Your logic from past threads suggests that somehow, someway the F4F has a key quality, albeit one you cannot identify that makes it “superior” to other 1st gen Allied fighters. My study of multiple day to day air combat situations suggests the opposite. Kill ratios are impacted by too many internal and external conditions and it is rare for any one plane to be so superior to other types that this one variable (plane performance) alone accounts for a deviation from the usual 1:1 up to 3:1 overall ratio that results from sustained combat ops. Even on the Eastern front, other variables besides plane performance contributed to the 5:1 or better ratio the Jagdwaffe enjoyed initially…and later at the start of Blau suffered a near 1:1 loss ratio….until the pool of trained VVS fighter pilots were killed off or wounded. The fact of the matter as i see it, is that a ratio closer to "1" is common whilst disjointed results (greater than 3:1) are the exceptions and there is often if not always more than one reason behind it. 



> I don't think you've made a convincing point, nor has it been made by others so far, that F4F operations were so non-comparable to other Allied fighter ops that the (pretty widely) differing results don't show they were more effective. So arguments about training and a/c characteristics are about *why* the F4F units were more effective than other Allied fighter units, not if they were.



I’m ok with that….because in my opinion I don’t think you’ve made a convincing point either. The F4F's performance is not unusual when taken within the context of it's situation and how it was utilized. There is no magic variable involved with the plane.


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## parsifal (May 11, 2011)

An excellent post Nikodemus....well thought out and expressed. 

Will be very interesting to see the reply


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## davparlr (May 18, 2011)

R Leonard said:


> No, what I said was that there were 159 (117 carrier based and 42 land based) of your “fighter slots” in the South Pacific Theater on 17 December 1942, not in the entire USN as, yes, your original post clearly implied.


I was not implying the entire Navy, only those at the point of the spear. Do not misinterpret my lack of clarity for implication. 



> In the entire USN on 17 Dec 42, and, again, not counting the training commands, where experienced fighter pilots were in great demand - Jimmie Thach at NAS Jacksonville comes to mind; the CASUs, where there were a plenty of fighters to be driven for one purpose or another; the ACTGs on both the east and west coast; and, really, plenty of other reasons to have fighter drivers around for various purposes; no, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for “fighter slots” and a standardized number of billets in each:


You can have a hundred men on your football team, but only eleven can play in the game. These players are called “shooters”.


> 6 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 133 billets


What carriers? On December 7, 1942, the Navy had three aircraft carriers available for war, the Saratoga, the Ranger and the Enterprise, with maybe 100 fighter billets available. The Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, and Hornet had all been sunk. The Essex was five months away from appearing in the Pacific with an air wing, the Yorktown seven months and the Intrepid was a year away. I am not sure but I suspect the Independence did not pick up its air wing until July. I am sure most of their aircrews of the sunken carriers were not lost but now did not have carrier billets, except maybe training and land based support/reserve or assigned to air wings for anticipated carriers. Do the lack of deck space, there is a backlog of experienced naval aviators at this stage in the war, all being trained or training others, but not available for combat. 


> 7 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 160 billets
> 15 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 386 billets
> 28 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 679 (I found where I missed two in my initial count).


There has never been an argument over the quantity of naval fighter billets available during this period. The only issue is that there was a very limited slots available aboard any aircraft carrier. This meant that many naval aviators were getting training and obtaining flying experience and not shooting at the enemy. Army pilots on the other hand, were quickly filling shooter slots. In 1942 Army overseas airfields increased from 31 to 358, while I really don’t know, it is reasonable to assume most of these new fields would contain shooter units. Of course, many of these were bomber type fields. During that same period, the Navy went from seven carriers to three. The experience level of the Navy was condensed, the Army’s was diluted.



> By 7 Dec 1943 the picture was decidedly different, again, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for “fighter slots” and a standardized number of billets in each:
> 
> 23 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 708 billets.


By then the Army AF had 559 overseas airfields with 81,000 officers, most of whom were pilots.



> 33 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 786 billets.
> 28 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 961 billets.
> 84 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 2455 (and I found where I missed one the first time through here, too).


These guys were riding the bench, right? They certainly were not pulling triggers against the enemy.



> One must always remember that not all carriers, and, yes, that even includes Essex class carriers, were in places such as the South Pacific theater on 7 Dec 1943;


Of course not, that is why I included all carrier pilots as shooters.


> any more that all squadrons operating from land were safely ensconced away at NAS Olathe, Kansas.


Navy pilots based on forward based airfield and involved in combat, as the Marines were at Guadalcanal, would of course be considered shooters. I don’t know enough about land based naval units to identify the quantity involved in combat.



> Am I to conclude from your definition that, say, a fighter pilot who was in on the Lae-Salamaua raid of 10 Mar 42, and went on to score air-to-air credits at Tulagi on 4 May, at Coral Sea on 8 May, and again at Midway on 4 June, by virtue of being assigned to a fighter squadron stationed at NAS Maui, and thus not in combat deployed squadron on 17 Dec 42, was not filling a “fighter slot”? That filling a position in an established fighter organization, does not define a “fighter slot”? Or that a naval aviator of the fighter persuasion might find himself in NAS San Diego as FO in one working up squadron and then a week later find himself as XO of another squadron in action on the other side of the ocean and, yet, was not filling a “fighter slot” in the first, but is filling a “fighter slot” in the second?



You misunderstand my position. “Fighter slots” can be anywhere, in a training squadron, in units in reserve, etc. However, this does not make them a shooter. The pilot you described at NAS Maui would indeed be filling a fighter slot but he became a “shooter” only after he was assigned to the Yorktown or Lexington and could climb into the cockpit of an F4F-3, fly off and pull the trigger on four 50 cals aimed at an enemy aircraft, something he could not do at Maui. At the end of 1942, the typical naval fighter pilot could only compete for 100 shooter spots on the three available carriers, one of which was the Ranger in the ETO. There is a possibility of Naval shooter slots available in forward land bases. I don’t know. Right now I am only counting carrier based Naval assets.

The term “shooter” is not my term but a rather a recognized modern term related to the execution of a mission as represented in the following site.
JOINT CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE (JCMD) - FY01 Activity


> shooter assets (fighter aircraft, Patriot, Aegis, etc.), and all the other principal systems resident in a theater that can perform one or more JIADS (Joint Integrated Air Defense System} functions





> Really? All of them? Squadron COs, XOs, OpOs, all their flight leaders? Everyone? Admittedly, I don’t read much about the Army Air Corps, for (a) I've no particular interest and (b) I worry about the slanted writing one might encounter when reading a work concentrating on the AAF, but I find the concept of all these 2d LT types running around without any leadership a bit hard to believe. Almost enough to stir my poor bones to check out their manning and cross check with the army register . . . well, maybe not, a lot of effort for not much reason.



The source is a reference Wikipedia site, Far East Air Force.


> Far East Air Force (United States) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> Since 10 February 1941, FEAF had received 203 new pilots (140 of which became pursuit pilots), but all but 28 were fresh from flight schools and required further individual training, which cut into needed unit tactical training.[33]


The reference note is interesting which support my original premise.


> Bartsch Doomed, pp. 7, 12–13, 25, 28–29, and 434–440. The AAF decided to use its experienced pilots in the United States as training cadre for newly-created units rather than reinforce overseas units. As a result FEAF pilots were unusually young and inexperienced when war began. The 1941 pilot levies were: 10 February: 24 from Class 40-H; 8 May: 39 from Class 41-B; 24 June: 96 from Classes 41-C and 41-D; 23 October: 16 from Class 41-G. While 22 of the 28 pilots of the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, who arrived 20 November, were from these same classes, they had experience flying P-40 aircraft before deployment to FEAF.


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## davparlr (May 18, 2011)

Continued



> How much do you have?



That’s why I never gamble!



> Four pilots reported to Lexington's VF-2 on 11 April 1942, straight from ACTGPac, Ens William Wileman, Ens John Bain, Ens George Hopper, and AP2c Robert Kanze, just in time to depart for Coral Sea on 15 April. And, yes, they all saw action as fighter pilots at Coral Sea three weeks later.
> 
> The least experienced pilots in Yorktown's VF-42 (the squadron on which I have the most information on file) at Coral Sea were Ens Harry Gibbs, Ens John Baker, and Ens John Adams, all of whom had joined the squadron on 6 December 1941 upon completion of training. On the eve of the Coral Sea action Gibbs had but 274.4 total hours, including all training hours; Baker, 340.3; and Adams, 396.0. Those compared to the ensign with the most flight hours, Leslie Knox, who had been in the squadron since 14 March 1941 with 811.6. All saw action at Coral Sea; Baker and Knox went MIA on 7 May 42 and declared killed in action on 8 May 1943.



I was surprised to read this when I read “The First Team”. Typical Army pilot out of advanced training had 200 hrs. so the carrier quals of 70+ hours seems about right.

Here is some clarifications of my post.

A “fighter slot” would be any position that requires a fighter pilot e.g. carrier fighter pilot, States based fighter instructors, land assign fighter squadron pilot, etc.

A “shooter” would be any pilot manning a plane in a position to take the war to the enemy.

My overall premise is that the typical Navy pilots on the carriers in 1942 and 1943, were more experienced with more flying hours than their Army counterpart due to lack of carrier availability. If the Navy had produced carriers at the rate the Army produced air bases (not feasible), they also would have experienced a diluting down of experienced pilots.


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## fibus (May 19, 2011)

If the AVG had the P39 they would have done better with it using the same tactics. Like the P40 it was altitude limited by the same engine.
So if the P39 had been available that would have been the plane to use and it was in the same time frame.
It would be worthwhile to read the comparison of the P39 and the Zero written by Grumman test pilot Corky Myer. Again in that same time frame Yeager thought he could beat any other aircraft at low altitude.


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## Shortround6 (May 19, 2011)

fibus said:


> Again in that same time frame Yeager thought he could beat any other aircraft at low altitude.



Yeager didn't graduate flight school until March 10th, 1943. While he did many remarkable things and is an amazing man making pronouncements on the combat capability of an earlier model aircraft that he may never have flown probably isn't one of them. He did fly P-39s but the ones available in the summer/fall of 1941 used a different model engine and had a variety of equipment problems that kept them from being combat worthy.


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## tyrodtom (May 19, 2011)

Yeager never flew the P39 in combat, and never went up against a hostile zero. Good as he was, even he could give unqualified opinions.

As a sidenote, I was on the flightline at Pleiku in late 67 or early 68 delivering bombs for B-57s, when the groundcrew of one pointed at a pilot doing his walk around on a nearby B-57.
He asked if I knew who that pilot was ? I looked, just saw a Col. in a flightsuit. He said that's Col. Yeager , and I yelled back, you mean Chuck Yeager ? 
We both sort of stopped, you didn't call unfamiliar Colonels by their first names, but the flight line was so noisy nobody noticed.


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## gjs238 (May 19, 2011)

Would Chuck Yeager even fit in a P-39?!
Edit: How did he get in a P-39?!


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## tyrodtom (May 19, 2011)

Chuck Yeager flew the P-39 in training in the US before he went overseas.

He was just the average size guy then. When I saw him in the late 60s, he looked shorter than me, i'm 5' 11".


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## gjs238 (May 19, 2011)

OK, guess I saw bad info on the internet - I saw 6'2"


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## tyrodtom (May 19, 2011)

He was 20-30 feet away, but I could judge his height by the aircraft. I'm pretty sure he was no taller than me.

I too expected a hero and a Colonel to be a giant . 

But most air forces probably have a minimum and maximum height for pilots, there's only so much adjustment in the controls and seats for different sizes.


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## Nikademus (May 19, 2011)

parsifal said:


> An excellent post Nikodemus....well thought out and expressed.
> 
> Will be very interesting to see the reply



Thank you sir. I do try.


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## JoeB (May 21, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> 1. However with Pandora’s Box reopened, I stand by my earlier view that it’s illogical to compare the British situation in mid 1942-43 to the USN situation in Guad as similar when in my opinion they were very different. I further feel it is illogical to include 1943 (post Guad campaign) as highly relevant because the situation there did not highly change in regards to the disadvantages faced by the JNAF after it’s losing and highly costly battle against the singular base at Henderson field. The major change that did occur was further to the USN’s advantage….deployment of more powerful fighters in large numbers as well as holding the initiative whilst the primary bases of the JNAF remained concentrated in the Northern Solomons
> 
> 2. There are more variables at work than simply “long distance” and posture. Burma saw the UK performing many offensive patrols, ground support missions and TacR missions as well as escort duty. Coupled with the huge size of Burma and it’s numerous airfields this helped foster an environment where one never could predict when and where (and from what direction) an enemy force might come. The JAAF also enjoyed greater numbers in many of their missions. It is interesting to note that “kill ratio” wise the best Allied performer was the ex-AVG P-40’s…..better than even 2nd generation planes. Shall we conclude that the P40 is better than these planes? It is interesting to note that the same factors that led to success over Lunga existed these ex AVG’ers. Very long range missions to a singular target - Kumming with plenty of warning for the defenders with the additional tactic borne of experience of ambushing the strike well after it completed its mission and was on the way back. On at least two occasions the latter tactic led to major JAAF defeat kill ratio wise
> 
> 3. I don’t agree. With the other variables exactly the same, I feel that even had the USMC pilots been manning Hurricane II’s, they could have achieved a similar feat. Wg Cmdr Paul Ritchie came to a similar conclusion when he investigated the lopsided losses Hurricane squadrons were suffering in Burma in 43. There was no technical reason, in his experienced mind why the Hurricane II, which possessed similar pros and cons to other 1st gen planes like the P-40 and F4F, could not, if *fought properly*, compete with the Type 01 fighter plane. Based on my research, I agree with him. Your logic from past threads suggests that somehow, someway the F4F has a key quality, albeit one you cannot identify that makes it “superior” to other 1st gen Allied fighters.


1. I think you should review more the campaigns in the Solomons, though unfortunately they haven't been covered well in print from both sides (nor the non USN aspect of the G'canal campaign, or the post Nov 15 '42 period; I would recommend Frank's 'Guadalcanal' for strictly Marine actions and those after 11/15/42 in G'canal campaign proper, a few of which were F4F v Type 1 combats as JAAF briefly appeared in Solomons in early '43). The totality is a fair degree of variation of mission types, and the tendency in 1943 was sometimes (as in the Japanese April '43 raids on G'canal) to themselves put up unprecedented numbers of fighters, not generally true that they suffered greater numerical inferiority in the portion of the post Nov 15 '42 fighting which still involved the F4F. I agree the '43 fighting involving F4F doesn't show us anything radically new, but it extends the same general results while adding more combats which do not fit the mold of 'defending a single base Henderson' (which of course the '42 carrier battles don't either, nor F4F escorts of strikes on convoys, etc), and also tended toward parity in fighter-fighter combat result.

The point here being, the characterization of F4F v Zero/Type 1 as basically a single scenario is just not historically correct. Yet the results didn't seem highly sensitive to the scenario.

2. I see my original point being somewhat distorted. I never said that characteristics of a/c determined outcomes. I said that non-obvious characteristics of a/c *might* affect outcomes, and the F4F's results v other 'first generation' Allied planes might be an example of this. P-40 units in Burma post AVG 42-43, AVG's successor 23rd FG as well as other units, per results in 'Air War Over Burma', had a kill ratio v Type 1of around 3:1, compared to Hurricane's ratio bigger *in the other direction* in the same period, and ratio of USAAF P-51A and P-38 units in a few missions over Rangoon was <1 (note that Japanese loss results in that case are incompletely given in that book, but even if P-51A/P-38 claims were 100% accurate they still didn't do very well). But, as has been legitimately argued in case of Mohawk v Hurricane results in Burma, those are really quite small samples, especially P-51A (P-38's were hardly involved and later demonstrated different results). 

And as far as comparing *success* v JAAF fighter units (P-40 Burma 1943) to parity against JNAF fighter units (F4F), the likelihood of superiority of the JNAF v. JAAF must be considered. Whereas in comparing *lack of success* v JAAF fighter units (Hurricane, consistently for a long time) to parity (F4F) v JNAF fighter units, it's easier to say that that demonstrates greater effectiveness by the units attaining parity v JNAF (plus we have direct Zero v Hurricane and Spit combats with kill ratio pretty heavily in Zero's favor, but results for P-40 v JNAF in 1942-43 period were nowhere near the results of P-40's in CBI v JAAF). 

So no, I don't think the results of USAAF P-40's in Burma trip up my general *suggestion* that less tangible 'plane' characteristics were perhaps part of the F4F's relative success, which is what I've said in all these debates, never mentioned any magic factor. I certainly never excluded training and other human factors as big determinants of fighter combat outcomes. You mention operational concepts of the P-40 units; of course those had an effect on results, but the P-40 Burma experience really is pretty small and narrow in scenario, F4F experience much larger and considerably more varied, and against the JNAF.

3. Note that you've halfway sidestepped my point there. I said "the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F..in.. Guadalcanal campaign." But you answer in terms of Marines flying Hurricanes. Again, you seem to caricature my argument to be that the F4F was a sole determinant, which I never said. Again and again I've appended *units*, F4F units, Hurricane units, Type 1 units, etc. including in the quote you responded to. If you say Marines/Navy would have done as well with Hurricanes, I disagree if I had to guess. If you counter my actual statement and say Hurricane *units* would have done as well, I think that's more clearly at odds with the evidence, though nothing of this sort is absolutely provable. Anyone can always seize on any difference in combat situations, which exist in virtually any comparison, and say those differences explained the difference in combat results no matter how wide. I think that's fairly obviously implausible if you compare a composite of similar Burma 43/Darwin 43 RAF results to those of F4F's in Solomons in 1942-43, kill ratio difference a factor of *several* against similar opposition, to say the underlying Allied fighter unit effectiveness was the same and that bid difference was just circumstances or luck. (Darwin '43 more similar to Burma 43 than Darwin defense was to Solomons actions? it's hard to believe someone without an ax to grind would try to claim that, and it's not clear to me how 'lack of intensity' of Darwin ops you mentioned would be just in the JNAF's favor not Allies, and less frequent but larger raids also figured into Japanese ops in Solomons in '43). But, can someone who says the difference was *all* due to circumstances and nothing to do with either plane *or* human factors be absolutely *proven* wrong? no.

So IMO there was pretty clear difference in unit effectivness, F4F units superior v JNAF of '42-43 (more so v RAF Hurr/Spit units, USAAF units achieved ~parity v Zeroes in late 42-43 combats, RAAF Kittyhawk units too). And yes some of it was human factors, can you find a quote where I said otherwise? However I believe some of the difference was probably also due to intangible factors of the a/c involved, ie F4F was a more effective combat a/c than it appeared on paper. Of course it can't be completely known, because we don't have evidence of USN/USMC units with Hurricanes, or RAF pressing Martlets into service in Burma. I think the Mohawk example (and better results of H75 than Hurricane over France, see "Battle of France Then and Now", and F4F v same H 75 units in BoF, see link to post #17 on this Tanknet thread, synthesizes the most recent sources in French and English; Shores' 1970's accounts are dated in this case) tend to suggests my thesis has merit, but I accept that Hawk related evidence is far from definitive. I don't OTOH know of any evidence indicating the contrary, besides a single anecdote of mock combat between F4F and Hurricane that comes up time to time. Also I believe someone here tried to argue relative Martlet/Sea Hurricane results in 'Pedestal', proved something in Hurricane's favor but I don't see that that they do, either way.

WW2-era USN aircraft vs. the Luftwaffe - how would they fare? - Tanknet

Joe


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## renrich (May 23, 2011)

In combat against Japanese fighters with the Hurricane, Spitfire, P40, P39 and Wildcat, I suggest that at least some of the apparent advantage in effectiveness the Wildcat had against the A6M, which the AVG in P40s probably never encountered, was that the Wildcat was more resistant to gunfire than the others. Grumman had the reputation for building rugged aircraft and the radial engine of the Wildcat as opposed to the liquid cooled engines of the others was by all accounts less likely to be put out of action by enemy fire. The early A6Ms only carried 60 rounds of ammo for each cannon and the Navy and Marine pilots were aware that the Wildcat could take a lot of hits from the six o clock position from the rifle caliber Mgs and still keep flying with a functioning pilot.

As for those who would discount Lundstrom's assertion that the US Navy pilots were trained more thoroughly in gunnery than any other air force's pilots, I would certainly like to see some references noted which show that the pilots of the other air forces were as extensively trained in deflection shooting as those trained by the USN. It is difficult for me to believe that a historian like Lundstrom would make those statements without having studied the training of the other air forces.


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## pbfoot (May 23, 2011)

Ok I'll bite what experience did this Lundstrom guy have working with other militaries that helped him make his blanket statement .


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## RCAFson (May 23, 2011)

JoeB said:


> The defenses of Darwin in 1942 (by USAAF P-40's) and 1943 (by Spitfires) was quite similar to Guadalcanal (distance was 500 miles, with never any emergency or staging bases nearer by).


Actual distances (from Google Earth)
Rabual to Guadalcanal = 564 nm x 2 = 1128nm
Kupang, Timor to Darwin = 444nm = 888nm
Palau Jako, Timor to Darwin = 326nm = 652nm!

So the mission distance for the longest possible mission from Timor to Darwin is still 250nm less than Rabual to Guadalcanal, while the minimum distance is 476nm less.


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## RCAFson (May 23, 2011)

JoeB said:


> I don't OTOH know of any evidence indicating the contrary, besides a single anecdote of mock combat between F4F and Hurricane that comes up time to time. Also I believe someone here tried to argue relative Martlet/Sea Hurricane results in 'Pedestal', proved something in Hurricane's favor but I don't see that that they do, either way.
> 
> WW2-era USN aircraft vs. the Luftwaffe - how would they fare? - Tanknet
> 
> Joe


 
Eric Brown flew Sea Hurricanes and Wildcats:



> _F4F-4 Wildcat Versus Sea Hurricane lIC
> Here were two fighters almost evenly matched in combat perform-
> ance and firepower, with the British fighter holding the edge. The
> Hurricane could exploit its superior rate of roll, the Wildcat its steeper
> ...



Brown states that the Wildcat was similar in performance to the Hurricane IIc, but we know now that this was simply not true and the Sea Hurricane had completely superior performance, even without using WEP.

The Martlet performed poorly compared to the Sea Hurricane I during Pedestal, just as the stats suggested that it would. 

In nearly identical tactical situations, Hurricanes over Ceylon on April 09 1942 performed much better than the F2A/F4Fs defending Midway in June 1942, despite the much less favourable numbers for the Hurricanes. 

When we find similar tactical situations, not surprisingly, the aircraft with superior performance has a better combat record.


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## renrich (May 23, 2011)

Pb, he is a highly respected historian and his books are exhaustively researched. For instance, if you go on the Battle of Midway Roundtable online you will see he is well represented there. If I am not mistaken, one of the members of this forum, who is very well informed is acquainted with Lundstrom, perhaps personally. If an author like Lundstrom publishes something where he makes statements like I have quoted him on in no uncertain terms, then he will lose all credibility. It seems incredible to me that he had not researched the training of all air forces before making statements like he made in the appendix of his book. I hope that if someone on this forum can furnish evidence that contradicts Lundstrom, he will furnish it, so I can become more informed. I will say that if someone scoffs at Lundstrom and his credibility and has never even read his books, then I question that person's objectivity. I have been around a long time, have read countless books about warfare and especially WW2 and own many of those books and I have never read any books other than Shores' "Bloody Shambles" that come close to being as credible as Lundstrom's and that includes Samuel Elliot Morrison and John Keegan. I own many of their books.


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## renrich (May 23, 2011)

Hmmmm, Brown on combat between Wildcat V 109F; "The Wildcat, although faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane, was still some 60 mph slower than the German fighter. The lower the altitude the less the odds favored the 109F. The Wildcat also had a heavier punch to deliver." Page 66, "Duels in the Sky". Brown's work is highly suspect although his credentials seem impeccable. I don't believe that he ever let being objective stand in the way of his bias.


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## pbfoot (May 23, 2011)

renrich said:


> Pb, he is a highly respected historian and his books are exhaustively researched. For instance, if you go on the Battle of Midway Roundtable online you will see he is well represented there. If I am not mistaken, one of the members of this forum, who is very well informed is acquainted with Lundstrom, perhaps personally. If an author like Lundstrom publishes something where he makes statements like I have quoted him on in no uncertain terms, then he will lose all credibility. It seems incredible to me that he had not researched the training of all air forces before making statements like he made in the appendix of his book. I hope that if someone on this forum can furnish evidence that contradicts Lundstrom, he will furnish it, so I can become more informed. I will say that if someone scoffs at Lundstrom and his credibility and has never even read his books, then I question that person's objectivity. I have been around a long time, have read countless books about warfare and especially WW2 and own many of those books and I have never read any books other than Shores' "Bloody Shambles" that come close to being as credible as Lundstrom's and that includes Samuel Elliot Morrison and John Keegan. I own many of their books.


I ain't no spring chicken and have been into aviation since the late 50's , now I've never heard of Lundstom and the local libraries do not have his books and I have no intention of making the purchase since I am not really interested in the PTO. I'm sure his research is well done but the last guy that was perfect could walk on water.


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## RCAFson (May 23, 2011)

renrich said:


> As for those who would discount Lundstrom's assertion that the US Navy pilots were trained more thoroughly in gunnery than any other air force's pilots,


 

I would suggest that the average USN fighter pilot in 42/43 would have had more total time and more time on type, which would certainly be an advantage, even if the training regimen is similar to the RCAF/RAF. The USN simply had more time to prepare for war (from 39-42), while not suffering a high attrition rate. Additionally, the USN carrier fleet actually contracted from 1942 to mid 1943, but without corresponding high pilot losses, therefore there was no need to dilute front-line squadrons with low time on type pilots.


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## RCAFson (May 23, 2011)

renrich said:


> Hmmmm, Brown on combat between Wildcat V 109F; "The Wildcat, although faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane, was still some 60 mph slower than the German fighter. The lower the altitude the less the odds favored the 109F. The Wildcat also had a heavier punch to deliver." Page 66, "Duels in the Sky". Brown's work is highly suspect although his credentials seem impeccable. I don't believe that he ever let being objective stand in the way of his bias.



Exactly, he was highly biased in favour of the aircraft in which he scored his combat kills, namely the Martlet. Yet, even Eric Brown had to admit that the Sea Hurricane IIC (the heaviest Sea Hurricane variant) was better in a dogfight than the F4F-4.


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## R Leonard (May 23, 2011)

renrich said:


> As for those who would discount Lundstrom's assertion that the US Navy pilots were trained more thoroughly in gunnery than any other air force's pilots, I would certainly like to see some references noted which show that the pilots of the other air forces were as extensively trained in deflection shooting as those trained by the USN. It is difficult for me to believe that a historian like Lundstrom would make those statements without having studied the training of the other air forces.


 
Or the flip side . . . 

As found in FM 1-15, Army Air Force Field Manual – Tactics and Technique of Air Fighting – April 19, 1942

_SECTION III
COMBAT TACTICS

80. GENERAL. - a. In the performance of its defensive mission in antiaircraft security, pursuit aviation in all circumstances adopts the most strenuous tactical offensive. Combat tactics are based on the infliction of the maximum casualty effect upon the enemy forces with minimum losses to its own forces.
b. In the direct defense of other aviation forces, pursuit provides security by escort. Combat tactics are based on providing the freedom of action required by the escorted force in the execution of its mission.

81. PHASES OF COMBAT. - a. Approach to combat. - The approach to combat has a greater influence on the result of the combat than any other phase of operations. Surprise affords a tremendous advantage. Approach to attack from the most vulnerable or blind sector of the hostile formation confuses the enemy as to the proper counteraction to be taken. Fighter pilots must be thoroughly familiar with the military characteristics and most vulnerable sectors of enemy aircraft and formations. When the enemy is sighted, the attack or the maneuver for attack position should be initiated without delay.
b. The combat. - The combat must be carried out with speed and determination. The first blow is very important. Sustained fire beginning at ranges where effective fire or hits may be reasonably scored and continued through to close ranges is most effective. Every effort is made to maintain the organization of the force and prevent the development of the engagement into a melee of individual combats.
c. Exploitation or withdrawal. - Determined effort is made to take advantage of any confusion and dispersion of the enemy force which may result from the initial assault. If the assault has been indecisive or unfavorable, a withdrawal is effected in such manner as to minimize losses while regaining the tactical advantage.

SECTION IV
INDIVIDUAL OFFENSIVE TACTICS

82. GENERAL. - Thorough training of the pilot in the fundamentals of individual combat tactics is of vital importance. The pilot must be prepared to conduct individual air fighting missions under one or more of the following situations: 
a. In pursuit versus pursuit action when the forces become temporarily disorganized and out of tactical control.
b. When tactical unity of a formation has been disrupted through adverse weather or visibility conditions.
c. As a result of dispersion caused by surprise attacks or an attack by overwhelming numbers.
d. When separated from his formation and a target of opportunity presents itself.
e. In night pursuit operations.

83. FUNDAMENTALS OF COMBAT.-All successful pursuit combat is performed by the application of four fundamentals -
a. Surprise.-Strike the enemy first-
(1) By taking advantage of the sun's rays, clouds, and visibility conditions.
(2) By approaching the enemy's most vulnerable quarter.
(3) By taking advantage of enemy preoccupation.
b. Offensive.-The pursuit pilot must attack with energy and determination, pushing the attack until either the enemy is destroyed or his own ammunition exhausted. Should he be placed on the defensive, he must by his own skill strive to regain the offensive as soon as possible.
c. Concentration of fire.-Fire of all guns is directed at the most vulnerable parts of the airplane, that is, personnel, fuel tanks, controls, or other vital parts. In most airplanes these are all contained in a relatively small portion of the fuselage and may be protected by defensive armament. To deliver destructive fire on this target demands extreme accuracy. Successful attacks require concentration of fire at effective ranges.
d. Security.-For adequate security, compatible with his mission for himself and his equipment, the pursuit pilot must-
(1) Be always on the alert, watching especially the upper rear hemisphere. Observation of the air for enemy aircraft must be rapid, systematic, and thorough, always covering first the more dangerous regions above followed by the regions below.
(2) Never needlessly sacrifice the advantage of superior altitude in an attack.
(3) Never fly straight at any enemy when within effective range of his guns except when actually firing.
(4) Follow through in an attack beyond effective range of hostile defensive fire.
(5) Never lose sight of the opponent.

84. ATTACK ON A SINGLE-SEATER.- a. The best position from which to attack a single-seater airplane is from above and to the rear of the target. In this position the attacker has the advantage of speed and power of maneuver gained from superior altitude.
b. In the execution of a surprise attack, care must be exercised to avoid overrunning the opponent, as this will result in placing him in a favorable position to fire on the attacker or to escape by quickly turning before the attack can be resumed.

85. ATTACK ON A TWO-SEATER.- It is more difficult to gain surprise for attack on a two-seater than on a single-seater airplane. The best position for launching the attack will be dependent upon the blind angles of the two-seater, though the most vulnerable sector usually is found by approaching from the rear and below. Forcing the two-seater to execute rapid maneuvers to avoid the attacker's fire will greatly reduce the accuracy of defensive fire power of the rear seat gunner.

86. ATTACK ON A MULTISEATER.-An attack on a multiseater by a single pursuit airplane will be hazardous if all possible approaches to it are effectively covered by defensive machinegun fire. A determined following attack may be made from the rear at the same level or slightly below the target. The rear gunner in the multiseater is the initial target. Concentrated fire at close ranges may be necessary to destroy multiseater aircraft. Withdrawal from such attack should be made in a manner to avoid the defensive fire of the hostile aircraft, preferably to the rear._

Pretty straight forward, fly up their fannies let 'em have it.

Rich


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## R Leonard (May 23, 2011)

davparlr said:


> comments from various posts from long ago


Certainly there were three FLEET carriers in commission in the month December 1942 (and if you want to count the last day of the month, there were actually FOUR fleet carriers in commission), but, generically, there were far more available than just the three carriers you mention:

In the last week of December 1942 –
Format: Squadron | rated fighter pilot complement | assigned carrier/station | other status

At sea -
VF-6 | 46 | USS Saratoga | aboard
VF-10 | 32 | USS Enterprise | aboard
VF-72 | 24 | USS Nassau | aboard
VGF-26 | 24 | USS Sangamon | aboard
VGF-27 | 24 | USS Suwannee | aboard
VGF-28 | 24 | USS Chenango | aboard
VGF-29 | 24 | USS Santee | aboard
VGS-9 | 24 | USS Bogue | aboard
VGS-11 | 18 | USS Altamaha | aboard
VGS-30 | 10 | USS Charger | aboard

Golly, every time I look at the returns I manage to squeeze out a few more . . . now, as of 31 December 1942, at least 250 slots for fighter pilots on carriers at sea presuming typical aircraft complement based on squadron type. 

Further, at the end of December 1942, as shown above, only two fleet carriers were at sea and one of those, Enterprise, without its full fighter complement. The other two, Ranger and Essex, were in port, see below. Standard USN practice, unto today, is to move squadrons, fighter and otherwise, ashore when the carriers to which they are assigned are in port. This practice allows for continued flight operations for training and proficiency; thus:

VF-10 (det) | 14 | USS Enterprise | operating from ashore, Espiritu Santo
VGS-13 | 18 | USS Core | operating from ashore, NAS Seattle
VGS-20 | 18 | USS Barnes | operating from ashore, NAS Alameda
VGS-21 | 18 | USS Block Island | operating from ashore, NAS Alameda
VGS-23 | 18 | USS Breton | operating from ashore, NAS Alameda
VGS-25 | 18 | USS Croatan | operating from ashore, NAS Alameda
VF-41 | 46 | USS Ranger | operating from ashore, NAS Norfolk
VF-9 | 46 | USS Essex (commissioned 31 Dec 42) | NAS Norfolk 

One presumes from the presented “shooter” qualifier that the not inconsiderable percentage of aviators assigned to VF-41 and Essex’s VF-9 and who had flown combat off USS Ranger in the invasion of North Africa were no longer qualified to be known as fighter pilots because their ships were tied up at Norfolk NOB, right? Were the pilots of VF-10 (det), ashore at Espiritu Santo in that last week of December 1942 and therefore extremely unlikely to be engaged in combat - indeed they did not during this period - also not fighter pilots either because they were not actually aboard Enterprise? Enterprise was not particularly in harms way at the time, were the people who fly the fighter planes and aboard the ship to be counted in some other category, but not as fighter pilots?

Still, other fighter squadrons were ashore, awaiting their turn at bat, or their next turn, as the case might be. Note the first on the list, VF-3, in those days commanded by Lieut Comdr Edward “Butch” O’Hare, who, by your measure, was then something other than a fighter pilot. The next on the list, VF-11, had not a few pilots who had flown combat at Coral Sea or Midway, and at least one at both, but I guess, by your definition, they can’t be fighter pilots filling slots in fighter squadrons either, right? And I suppose the same would apply to those combat worn pilots of VF-71 on their way back stateside from their tours at sea on USS Wasp and ashore from Guadalcanal, right? None of these gents would be qualified as fighter pilots under your circa 2001 “shooters” definition. 

VF-3 | 35 | NAS Kaneohe 
VF-11 | 46 | NAS Maui
VF-12 | 46 | NAS San Diego
VF-16 | 46 | to USS Lexington | organizing work-up, NAS Quonset Point
VF-17 | 46 | to USS Bunker Hill | organizing work-up, NAS Norfolk
VF-22 | 28 | to USS Independence | organizing work-up, NAS Norfolk
VF-23 | 28 | to USS Princeton | organizing work-up, NAS Willow Grove
VF-24 | 28 | to USS Belleau Wood | organizing work-up, NAS Norfolk
VF-71 | 32 | Enroute NAS San Diego
VGS-1 | 18 | NAS San Diego
VGS-12 | 18 | NAS San Diego
VGS-16 | 18 | NAS Pearl Harbor
VGS-18 | 18 | NAS Seattle
VGF-39 | 18 | NAS Norfolk
VGS-30 | 18 | NAS Norfolk

The wiggle from fighter slots to “shooters” is duly noted, but the discussion started, however, , with an accounting of USN fighter pilot slots, not the contemporary parlance of “shooters.” When discussing events of 70 years ago I try to avoid the alfa, bravo, charlie, delta, echo, etc of more recent times and stick to the able, baker, cast, dog, easy, etc of the period in question as it tends to keep the terminology straight. In discussions with more than just a handful of USN fighter pilots (and other communities as well) from those war years the term “driver” was occasionally heard; mostly, though, the descriptive word heard was the simple “pilot,” or, from sticklers for the proper word, “aviator.” Your “shooter” on the other hand is a true anachronism in terminology, nomenclature, and usage; it seems a little odd to insert the term at this point as some sort of qualifier. 

If you want to claim a lack of clarity, okay, fine, but clarity certainly would have precluded a lot of discussion. Consider for example, this statement:



> _ “At the start of the war, the Navy had seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available” _



This seems to me to be very clear, unambiguous, and devoid of qualifiers. This statement, as pointed out in an earlier response, was not exactly the case, and thus fostered the rest of the discussion. I would hate to think I need spend future evenings in remedial English.

So then, does your new definition mean that a pilot at the tip of your spear who is not scheduled to fly and does not fly on a given day is not a fighter pilot for that day? 

What shall we do with the customary usage for Task Groups and Task Forces with more than one carrier, rotating “the duty” between carriers from day to day? Does your definition mean that on the “down” day the fighter pilots of the “down” carrier are not fighter pilots if not scheduled for operations?

Were the pilots assigned to fly fighter aircraft residing aboard a carrier passing through the Panama Canal not fighter pilots because they were not operating during the passage? 

Since carriers usually started at Point A and proceeded across miles and miles of ocean, more often than not without an enemy in sight, to do their business at Point B, were the people who fly the fighter planes and aboard the ship not fighter pilots until arrival at Point B? Were they in some other status up to that point? What would that be? And if not fighter pilots while ashore at Point A pre-deployment, when does their status change? 

Does such parsing mean that, say, picking someone not necessarily at random, George W Anderson, Jr., CNO from 1 August 1961 to 1 August1963, who received his wings in October 1931, served in VOS-1 thereafter, then in Flight Test, then VF-2, then pre-comm crew USS Yorktown (CV-5), then VP-44; and during the war served successively on BuAer staff, Plans Division; USS Yorktown (CV-10), Navigation Officer; ComAirPac staff, Plans; CinCPac/POA staff, Asst to Deputy Commander; and CominCh staff, Strategic Plans could not be called a Naval Aviator because he held no flying billet during the war? 

To what excruciating semantic extremes shall we go in order to fit this arbitrary “shooters” mold? 

References to USAAF bases and pilots are noted, though I fail to see where their mention is cogent to the original statements regarding USN fighter squadron complements. The USAAF expansion was more than an order of magnitude greater than USN expansion. From the beginning of 1940 to the end of 1945 the NATC produced 65,478 designated naval aviators; this includes USN, USMC, USCG, and some non-US types. The USAAF training command produced 768,009 pilots in the same period. 1944 was the biggest year for both; NATC with 21,067 compared to the USAAF turnout of 299,405. Any comparison is something of a non-sequitur. 

As to the contention that the average USN fighter pilot was better prepared than the average USAAF fighter pilot, with the exception of carrier operations qualifications, I have seen no empirical data which would either lend support to or prove false the theory. 

What I find odd is that I see is an attempt to arbitrarily establish a label, or, more accurately, deny a label, based on some personal preference rather than the historical context. Okay for you, but the premise does not even come close to working for me.


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## renrich (May 24, 2011)

The F4F4 was the worst performing Wildcat. The FM2 finally regained the performance of the early F4F3s, but with protected tanks and armor. In Brown's description of a dogfight beween himself and a Wildcat, we don't know who was in the Wildcat. I suggest that the Sea Hurricane and Wildcat were close enough in performance that pilot skill would have a lot to do with the outcome. If Brown had been flying his Hurricane against O Hare, Foss, Thach, or some others I doubt he would have had much success. An example of pilot skill with combat experiece is as follows: Boone Guyton, Vought chief test pilot of the Corsair, former Navy dive bomber pilot and with more hours in the Corsair than anyone in the world at that time, took on Ken Walsh, Marine ace in the Corsair, in a mock dogfight. Guyton was in a brand new F4U with a 60 gallon water tank for WEP. Walsh was in his "personal" brand new F3A with the standard water tank of 10.3 gallons. Walsh "shot" him down three times. Guyton also flew gunnery runs on a sleeve with Joe Foss and Guyton had little or no success while Foss riddled the sleeve.

Lundstrom's assertion was that USN pilots were trained extensively in full deflection gunnery skills where as other air force's pilots were not with the partial exception of the IJN. He seemed to believe that this training helped the USN trained pilots to become overall better gunners even though most kills were low deflection shots. I believe he felt that the experience in full deflection shooting helped the Navy pilots when they were on the defense also.


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## RCAFson (May 24, 2011)

renrich said:


> Walsh was in his "personal" brand new F3A with the standard water tank of 10.3 gallons.


 
F3A?


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## R Leonard (May 24, 2011)

RCAFson said:


> F3A?


 
Under license, Brewster built F4U Corsair. Goodyear built under license, too, the FG-1. All looked pretty much the same to the casual observer.


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## Rivet (May 25, 2011)

I'm in agreement with Jerry's statement that the P-39 might have been the alternate mount for the AVG had not the British Lend-Lease P-40's not been readily available. 

The Republic P-43 Lancer was flown from AVG fields and is mentioned in "God is My Co-Pilot" as being flown by Americans.

Here's a thought. Shipment and usage by the AVG of the Chance-Vought F4U-1 for service evaluation early in the game.

Regards


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## Shortround6 (May 25, 2011)

Rivet said:


> Here's a thought. Shipment and usage by the AVG of the Chance-Vought F4U-1 for service evaluation early in the game.



First 2 production F4U-1s are delivered from factory almost year after the AVG P-40s are unloaded in Rangoon.


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## Rivet (May 25, 2011)

On 1 October,1940 the XF4U-1 became the first single-engine U.S. fighter to fly faster than 400 mph by setting an average ground speed of 405 miles per hour during a flight from Stratford to Hartford, Connecticutt. On December 2, 1940 sixteen preproduction examples of the F4U-1 are in various stages of assembly and are used to size the production line. The premise of use of the F4U-1 in early service testing was feasible, though the license production mentioned would and did take more time to bear fruit. Regards

Edit: The major problem in getting the F4U into the hands of the AVG would have been logistical. The aircraft was a Naval project.


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## Shortround6 (May 25, 2011)

Rivet said:


> On December 2, 1940 sixteen preproduction examples of the F4U-1 are in various stages of assembly and are used to size the production line. The premise of use of the F4U-1 in early service testing was feasible, though the license production mentioned would and did take more time to bear fruit. Regards



A source would be nice. In Dean's AHT we have a sequence of Feb 25 1941 seeing the completion of Navy acceptance tests of the XF4U-1. Mar, 3 1941 the Navy issues a letter of intent to to enter into a production contract. In April Vought finishes up contract negotiations and on June 30, 1941 the Navy places a contract of 584 F4U-1s. 
I wonder what happened to those 16 airframes that were being used to size the production line over 6 months before the production contract is issued? Did it take Vought another year (18 months after the production line was being sized) to actually finish them or is the source that says the production line was being sized in 1940 have a misprint and meant Dec of 1941? Which is a still a stretch. First Production plane doesn't fly until June 25 1942 and still has to be "delivered" to the navy. 

As for actual production:


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## renrich (May 25, 2011)

Bringing up the subject of Eric Brown, I read up on him in wiki. Quite interesting in that the article indicated he is still alive which would make him about 91. Amazing to have a career in aviation as long as he and still be alive. From the article, he was credited with two FW 200s early in the war flying off a carrier. Did not say what type he was flying but it might have been a Martlet. Does anyone know and is he still alive?


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## R Leonard (May 25, 2011)

Brown is the world leader in carrier traps, something in the neighborhood of 2400. 

Both of his FW 200 shoot downs were in Martlets. From my tiresome standard boiler plate missive on Wildcats outside the Pacific:

- - - 802 Squadron (Lieut Comdr JM Wintour, RN), specialized in FW 200's. Operating off HMS Audacity escorting Convoy OG-74, the first encounter was early on 21 September 1941, when one was brought down under the combined attack of Sub-Lieut's Patterson and Fletcher. Later, in the early afternoon, a Ju 88 was driven off with damage. Shortly thereafter another section chased down a radar contact only to find the Lisbon to Azores Boeing 314 Clipper … they let it go. This was the interception where Sub-Lieut Brown was photographed by the Clipper’s pilot flying in formation with his section, with his Martlet inverted. On 8 November, now escorting Convoy OG-76, Lieut Comdr Wintour and Sub-Lieut Hutchinson attacked and shot down another 200, but, in the process, Wintour was killed by return fire. Later that day, Brown shot down a second FW 200 in a head-on pass and Sub-Lieut Lamb drove off a third. 

At sea again with still another convoy, HG-76, 802 was now commanded by Lieut DCEF Gibson, DSC, RN. On 14 December, Sub-Lieut Fletcher was shot down and killed strafing surfaced U-131. His action, however, enabled three escorts to close range and take the submarine under fire until her crew was forced to abandon ship. On 19 December, in another head-on pass, Brown brought down his second FW 200; Lieut Comdr Sleigh, using Brown’s proven head-on method, shot down another; and Lamb, again, drove off a third with damage. Audacity was torpedoed by U-751 on 21 December and sank with heavy losses, including many pilots. - - - 

Rich


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## RCAFson (May 25, 2011)

Yes, Brown scored his kills with the Martlet, and his bias in favour of Martlet/F4F is very evident in his writings.


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## R Leonard (May 26, 2011)

I'd hesitate to use the word 'bias' as it has a somewhat negative connotation (unless that's your point). Certainly the Martlet was as good as, if not better, than any carrier based fighter the FAA was already using . . . the RN was certainly eager to acquire as many as they could, swooping in to scarf up the undelivered French and Greek contracts as well as forging their own.

Brown, like most F4F variant drivers to whom I've ever spoke, acknowledges that the plane was fun to fly. Most of those with experience in both preferred the straight wing -3's to the stow-wing -4's in terms of overall performance, and those with experience with the entire gamut of prooduction acknowledged the FM-2 as superior to any of the F4F predecessors in performance. None of which means they'd take the F4F-FM production craft over an F6F or F4U if going in harm's way and given a choice (more is almost always better), it simply means that for a craft of it's day it was a pretty good steed. My father, one of those who had flown both the -3's and -4's in combat and often the FM-2 while training others in the fighter pilots' trade always maintained that the 'sweetest' of the lot was the -3, a solid performer, good handling, no surprises, and filled the dance card when needed.

I read Brown as expressing a 'fondness' for the F4F rather than a 'bias". Since that's the plane he took into combat during some pretty bad times and with some success, that expression is unsurprising.

Rich


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## renrich (May 26, 2011)

Many, many thanks, Rich. Always good to hear from somone truly well informed. Brown remarked many times is his book about the heavy armament of the Martlet, (Wildcat) either four or six 50s. I believe that it is important for all of us "experts" to recognise that there were fairly major differences in the performance of the several variants of Wildcats.

Brown's longevity is truly remarkable, given his profession. I have always enjoyed his book, "Duels in the Sky" although there are serious inconsistencies in his appraisals of some of the aircraft. In a book I have about Marion Carl, Brown and he seemed to be fairly close friends. I wonder if they ever had any debates about the relative merits of WW2 fighters, especially the Corsair.


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## davparlr (May 26, 2011)

R Leonard said:


> Certainly there were three FLEET carriers in commission in the month December 1942 (and if you want to count the last day of the month, there were actually FOUR fleet carriers in commission), but, generically, there were far more available than just the three carriers you mention:
> 
> In the last week of December 1942 –
> Format: Squadron | rated fighter pilot complement | assigned carrier/station | other status
> ...


The Ranger? Card, Core?
So, the Navy went from seven carriers in December, 1941, all fleet, to three fleet, and eight escort carriers for a total of 11 (13?) carriers in December, 1942, a total increase of four carriers (six?). By the way, commissioning does not mean a carrier is combat ready. The Essex was several months away from having a carrier wing. During this same period, the AAF increased its overseas bases from 61 in Dec ’41 to 656 in Dec ’42, a total increase of 595 overseas airfields, of which I would suspect most were in the combat zone. Officer totals, mostly pilots, went from 24,521 to 127,267, or a total of over 100,000 increase.



> Golly, every time I look at the returns I manage to squeeze out a few more . . . now, as of 31 December 1942, at least 250 slots for fighter pilots on carriers at sea presuming typical aircraft complement based on squadron type.


Trivial numbers in comparison to what the Army was trying to fill.



> One presumes from the presented “shooter” qualifier that the not inconsiderable percentage of aviators assigned to VF-41 and Essex’s VF-9 and who had flown combat off USS Ranger in the invasion of North Africa were no longer qualified to be known as fighter pilots because their ships were tied up at Norfolk NOB, right? Were the pilots of VF-10 (det), ashore at Espiritu Santo in that last week of December 1942 and therefore extremely unlikely to be engaged in combat - indeed they did not during this period - also not fighter pilots either because they were not actually aboard Enterprise? Enterprise was not particularly in harms way at the time, were the people who fly the fighter planes and aboard the ship to be counted in some other category, but not as fighter pilots?


Let me try another definition that may help you to understand what I am trying to say. I will admit that my incompetence in expressing myself initially has led to your confusion. It is probably the most important concept needed by any commander, what are the resources I have right now to engage the enemy. Put yourself in Admiral Nimitz position and you need to support Guadalcanal. This is what you need to know. What fleet carriers are available, can I use escort carriers, how many aircraft can be put into the combat area including Henderson field, how many pilots are available to support these aircraft? You are not interested in trained pilots in San Diego preparing for a new carrier. You are not interested in pilots at Oahu who have no aircraft available for the battle, except maybe as reserve crews. You are not interested in carriers going through the Panama Canal without an air wing. You are interested in the number of aircraft you can put into the battle area and the pilots, no matter where they are right now, that you can put into those specific cockpits. In the Navy this aircraft number is most importantly dependent on the decks, and sometime land fields, available that can be engaged in the battle. The term I used to identify those assets is “shooters”. A term that I suspect is still used in military planning, but no matter what you call it, it is a critical number. 
So, applying that criteria, is VF-41 still assigned to the Ranger, do they have aircraft on the Ranger to fly into combat, is the Ranger combat ready. If the CincAtlantic wanted to raid a North African coast would they and their aircraft be available. If yes, they are shooters. If VF-9 is not on the Ranger and is awaiting the Essex, they would not be shooters. No aircraft carrier available. The pilots at Espiritu Santo are definitely in a hostile environment and would be shooters even if they were not engaged in battle at any given time just as the AAF fighter pilots stationed in England and North Africa would be shooters.



> Still, other fighter squadrons were ashore, awaiting their turn at bat, or their next turn, as the case might be.


If they meet the criteria of being assigned to a carrier or land field in a combat arena and have an aircraft available to fight in battle, then they are shooters. If all those slots are already filled, then no, they are not shooters, only as possible reserve crew.



> The wiggle from fighter slots to “shooters” is duly noted,


Immature comment. I am not deceitful and I am not trying to wiggle out of anything.


> but the discussion started, however, , with an accounting of USN fighter pilot slots


This is incorrect. It started out with the comment “At the start of the war, *the Navy had seven front line carriers, *on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available.” I started out by talking about carriers available and the pilot assigned to these carriers. If instead of “makes 210 fighter slots available” I had put in “210 fighter slots available on those carriers”, it would have been much clearer what I was talking about. I never had the intention of including all possible positions where fighter pilots would be assigned, as I continue to repeat myself



> “If you want to claim a lack of clarity, okay, fine, but clarity certainly would have precluded a lot of discussion. Consider for example, this statement:
> At the start of the war, the Navy had *seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters *(in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available”


At the time I wrote that it was clear to me that I was talking about fighter slots on carriers. It apparently was not clear.



> This statement, as pointed out in an earlier response, was not exactly the case, and thus fostered the rest of the discussion. I would hate to think I need spend future evenings in remedial English.


Immature and abusive statement. This adds nothing to the discussion.



> So then, does your new definition mean that a pilot at the tip of your spear who is not scheduled to fly and does not fly on a given day is not a fighter pilot for that day?


Apply my criteria. Is there a combat capable aircraft he could climb into? Could he be deployed into combat in that aircraft by the commander?



> What shall we do with the customary usage for Task Groups and Task Forces with more than one carrier, rotating





> Were the pilots assigned to fly fighter aircraft residing aboard a carrier passing through the Panama Canal not fighter pilots because they were not operating during the passage?


While in the Panama Canal and are unable to operate I am sure would be listed at Nimitz’s headquarters as unavailable for combat.



> To what excruciating semantic extremes shall we go in order to fit this arbitrary “shooters” mold?


This is not a difficult concept. Every commander has a list of all assets he can utilize for combat. For Naval aviation it would be combat ready aircraft carriers available, combat ready aircraft available, and combat pilots available. The assets available to execute a mission would be termed “shooters” as I have defined it. If it is not called shooters now, it is called something else, but I assure you that this concept exists. Carriers available tend to be limiting factor in combat assets available.






> As to the contention that the average USN fighter pilot was better prepared than the average USAAF fighter pilot, with the exception of carrier operations qualifications, I have seen no empirical data which would either lend support to or prove false the theory.
> 
> What I find odd is that I see is an attempt to arbitrarily establish a label, or, more accurately, deny a label, based on some personal preference rather than the historical context. Okay for you, but the premise does not even come close to working for me.



I haven’t proven it, however just the fact that the vast amount of Amy combat assets in 1942, over 600 overseas bases created and huge quantities of pilots trained and deployed compared to the relative little increase in Naval air combat assets, maybe six carriers, all of these escort carriers, would indicate a massive dilution of combat experienced pilots in the Army verses the Navy. This seems intuitively obvious.

General comment. You seem to think I am lying when I try to clarify what I was saying without even knowing me and then critize me for not being clear. Your tone tends to be abusive and does not lend itself to a professional discussion.


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## RCAFson (May 26, 2011)

R Leonard said:


> I
> I read Brown as expressing a 'fondness' for the F4F rather than a 'bias". Since that's the plane he took into combat during some pretty bad times and with some success, that expression is unsurprising.
> 
> Rich



However, if you read all that Brown had to say about the Martlet/F4F except the results of the mock combats and then had to predict the outcome of a mock combat between the Martlet/F4F and Sea Hurricane, one would be led to conclude that the Sea Hurricane would have no chance. OTOH, if you looked at things like climb rate, power to weight and wing loading, it would be obvious that the Sea Hurricane would win - and it did. 

Brown also says things about the Sea Hurricane that are contradicted by real world data - for example that it is a death trap when ditching, yet the Catapult launched Sea Hurricane 1A only lost one pilot out of 8 operational sorties, and he may have been hit by return fire. Also I can find no evidence that the Sea Hurricane had a higher operational loss rate than the Martlet, and in fact, it might have had a lower operational loss rate, which is also not predicted by Brown's comments about the Sea Hurricane's deck landing characteristics, except for the comment that it had a lower all down stall speed - 57 knots for the Sea Hurricane and 79 knots for the Martlet/F4F. Brown's comments about the Martlet's climb rate (3300ft/min initial) is unsupported by any documentation that I can find save for the manufacturer's specs for the F4F-3, and real aircraft fell a long ways short of those numbers.


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## renrich (May 26, 2011)

Please read Dean, "America's Hundred Thousand" if you have doubts about Brown's citing of climb rate of Wildcat. Lots of documentation there. Also read my post about the varying performance figures of the different Wildcat models.


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## RCAFson (May 27, 2011)

renrich said:


> Please read Dean, "America's Hundred Thousand" if you have doubts about Brown's citing of climb rate of Wildcat. Lots of documentation there. Also read my post about the varying performance figures of the different Wildcat models.


 
There is lots of info here:

F4F Performance Trials

and none of it even remotely supports the F4F-3 having a climb rate of 3300fpm, except that it was in the manufacturers specs, but actual trials of two f4F-3 aircraft:
Airplane No.	------------1845-1848 
Full load weight (lbs.)	6260	7065

fails to show a climb rate anywhere close to 3300fpm:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845-performance.jpg
(the above appears to have a climb rate of 3150 fpm faintly pencilled in, but this weight is far below the combat weight of an F4F-3 except with nearly empty tanks and no ammo.
and
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1848-performance.jpg

the USN's own Standard aircraft characteristics:

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F4F-3_Wildcat_(Land)_PD_-_14_August_1942.pdf

only shows a rather optimistic climb rate of 2450fpm using military power.

The USN's own testing of actual F4F-4 aircraft, #5262 and #4058 only shows a climb rate of 1850fpm:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-5262.pdf

while testing of F4F-4 #02135 only shows 1850 fpm with military power.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-02135-performance.jpg

Extrapolating from the above data, it is impossible to demonstrate the potential for a 3300fpm climb rate for an F4F-3 at any reasonable combat weight.


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## Nikademus (May 27, 2011)

> . I see my original point being somewhat distorted…..
> 
> . Note that you've halfway sidestepped my point there……
> 
> Again, you seem to caricature my argument to be that the F4F was a sole determinant, which I never said…..



Here’s what I see; You have pretty much ignored the bulk of what I wrote previously, choosing instead to regurgitate your viewpoints and opinions, using just enough of what I wrote to attempt to reinforce your opinions/views along with the typical exercises in verbal gymnastics about what you really meant to say etc etc…..while accusing me of being less than intellectually honest as the above gemlike quotes highlight. In other words, your talking past me, not too me. 

In the old days, I would have jumped right back into it and thus completed the duo that the following true-ism immortalizes….”that it takes two parties for there to be two people talking past each other.” So for the sake of brevity and succinctness……I will attempt to keep my responses short and to the point.



> I think you should review more the campaigns in the Solomons, though unfortunately they haven't been covered well in print from both (nor the non USN aspect of the G'canal campaign, or the post Nov 15 '42 period; I would recommend Frank's 'Guadalcanal'



Thanks for the suggestion. I have. That’s why I disagree with your attempts to dilute the significance of the Guadalcanal campaign. Your statement about the totality of the missions being a fair degree of variation does not change the fact that the primary mission of the Wildcats was interception whilst defending a singular location, nor does it address a good number of points I made in my last reply, which I won’t bother repeating since you ignored them entirely. Thanks also for the book recommendation. Coincidently, I just happened to finish my third run through with Mr. Frank’s book. In particular I found additional specific citations re: the substantial drop in Japanese skill well before 1943 and the end of the Guad campaign, along with other specific outside variables that impacted the kill ratios and made the F4F's performance possible. Given your continued “focus” on the F4F and what you believe is the key “non obvious” factor that explains the ratios, I would suggest respectfully that maybe you should read the book again.



> The point here being, the characterization of F4F v Zero/Type 1 as basically a single scenario is just not historically correct.



You again attempt to characterize my arguments as revolving around a single scenario. First it was the 1942 carrier battles you said I was focusing on. Now you’ve switched to me saying it was only the Guad battle. Wrong on both counts. It does remain true though that Guad was the only *sustained* aerial campaign whereby the F4F was the principal fighter for the US side during all of 1942



> 2. I see my original point being somewhat distorted. I never said that characteristics of a/c determined outcomes. I said that non-obvious characteristics of a/c *might* affect outcomes, and the F4F's results v other 'first generation' Allied planes might be an example of this.



In other words…..your *focus* remains fixated on the plane itself in large part and you support this view with the kill ratios. Like all statistics however, one can interpret them in a variety of ways Me…..I’m looking at all the variables of each unique campaign, then looking at the planes, then the men who flew them and the tactics involved……looking for patterns, force modifiers etc etc. Hence my conclusions are radically different from yours. You say you do the same....fine....then based on that I'd say a primary difference betweenst us is i weight the outside variables more strongly than you do in comparison to the paper stats of the machines. 

It’s true that the ex-AVG’ers mission impact on Burma was quite small. However the totality of P-40 operations in Burma included non-AVG/23rd FG ops. It can be said that the Thunderbolt ops were limited in nature, not so the case with P-51A and P-38 ops. It’s interesting that you’re using the small sample argument to try to weaken the example I showed re: kill ratios after having argued so strongly that the Mohawk vs. Type 01 results were relevant. However used in this context, it’s a straw man. It’s a fact that aircraft enthusiasts tend to compare planes above all else when discussing air campaigns and matchups, and often the Type 01 is derided as, to quote one old poster, “Rubbish” due mainly to its slow max speed, poor armament and flimsy protection. So based on that, even with the admittedly “small” sample in Burma, the Thunderbolts should have wiped the walls with the rubbish plane 01 almost if not every time. They didn’t. That’s telling to me. It shows once again that air combat is way more multi-dimensioned than simply comparing paper stats among planes. Another good example is the 01's performance against 4E's in Burma. Paper stat arguments belie their respectable record against these beasts. 



> 3. Note that you've halfway sidestepped my point there. I said "the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F..in.. Guadalcanal campaign." But you answer in terms of Marines flying Hurricanes.



And you didn’t read my post very well.



> If you counter my actual statement and say Hurricane *units* would have done as well, I think that's more clearly at odds with the evidence, though nothing of this sort is absolutely provable.



Verbal gymnastics….Gotta love em. I stand by what I wrote. Given the factors present at Guadalcanal as well documented by authors like Frank, Lundstrom and Bergerud, yep…..there’s nothing to say that USMC pilots flying other 1st gen fighters like the Hurricane, couldn’t have done a similar job…..and in case you want to take me out of context, that “similar job” means…..successfully defend the base which is what the battle was really about. As long as the pilots could compete, could frustrate and disrupt Japanese attacks and most of all, bleed the enemy, they were bound to win in the end….and they did. Their overall negative a2a kill ratio slightly in favor of the A6M (per Lundstrom) suffered by the marine/navy pilots does not in any way diminish that victory, nor did their slight ratio victory serve as a balm to the frustrated Japanese. They didn’t fight for kill ratios. They fought to win. They lost. Frank and Lundstrom are very specific on WHY they lost. Frank's top three reasons did not involve the F4F's paper attributes.....obvious or non-obvious.



> Anyone can always seize on any difference in combat situations, which exist in virtually any comparison, and say those differences explained the difference in combat results no matter how wide. I think that's fairly obviously implausible if you compare a composite of similar Burma 43/Darwin 43 RAF results to those of F4F's in Solomons in 1942-43, kill ratio difference a factor of *several* against similar opposition, to say the underlying Allied fighter unit effectiveness was the same and that bid difference was just *circumstances or luck*.



I think it’s pretty implausible that you continue to ignore and discount the very specific factors that made the Guadalcanal battle in particular unique. Further, your attempt to paint me as being into “Chaos theory” and that I was suggesting that differences in ratio results were merely ‘circumstances’ (unnamed) and ‘luck’ qualifies as an good example of the distortion of which you accused me of. 



> Of course it can't be completely known, because we don't have evidence of USN/USMC units with Hurricanes, or RAF pressing Martlets into service in Burma. I think the Mohawk example (and better results of H75 than Hurricane over France, see "Battle of France Then and Now", and F4F v same H 75 units in BoF, see link to post #17 on this Tanknet thread, synthesizes the most recent sources in French and English; Shores' 1970's accounts are dated in this case) tend to suggests my thesis has merit, but I accept that Hawk related evidence is far from definitive.



Well here again we disagree. I own the book you’ve mentioned (BoF: Then and now) though I haven’t distilled all the info from it yet. I have distilled Shores’ work on it. Your comment about his work being dated is a straw man. Lundstrom’s work could also be called “dated” as well. Just because a historical work is “old” doesn’t invalidate either its raw data or the specific points that the author makes…which in my view, your ‘thesis’ largely ignores. (Shores made some telling comments comparing performance of the H-75 to the early 109D’s as well as the later E variant.) If you’re going to try bashing Shores again, you’ll need to do better, otherwise, don’t bother with the source bashing.

The BoF book “is” valuable though in that it covers the Blitzkrieg period as well as the Sitzkrieg era whilest Shores only covers the latter. That’s why I bought it. The ratios experienced in the Sitzkrieg period were not unusual when I looked at all the factors and read the comments of the author as well as the pilots who flew the planes. Similar patterns exist on other battlefields but there as with every battlefield, there are a set of unique qualifyers as well. I do feel that much of the surprise that comes from the good competitive performance of the H75’s in 1940 is due to an underlying and persistent prejudice that often comes up anytime French military performance in WWII is touched upon. In other words….they never get any street cred.


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## renrich (May 27, 2011)

Page 473, Dean, "The fastest and lightest Wildcat was the F4F3 which touched 335 MPH at 22000 feet. In addition the climb rate of the early F4F3 was over 3300 fpm at SL, very sprightly performance for it's time. The heavier F4F4, in contrast, could make less than 2500 FPM at SL and as the curve shows the performance decreased rapidly at the higher altitudes to little over 1500 FPM at 15000 feet in spite of using the two stage supercharged engine," " Though not shown on this chart, the final FM2 model from Eastern retrieved most all the F4F3 climb performance; it took 3.7 minutes to make 10000 feet and 8.0 to 20000." The graph is from manufacturers and USN data. It is little wonder that the USN fighter pilots were less than enthusiastic about the F4F4.


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## slaterat (May 27, 2011)

Dean is being very generous regarding the performance of the F4F. The prototype could do 334 mph at 20,500 ft. American Navy testing showed much more modest results. The F4F-3(285 built) making 330 mph and < 2400 ft/min climb rate. The F4F3a(95 built) , lacking the two stage supercharger showed decreased performance of 312 mph.

The F4F-4(1,195 built)became the most common F4F in 1942. It featured folding wings, 6 mgs, pilot armor and self sealing tanks. Weight went up and performance went down. F4F-4s doing about 320 mph and climb rates of <2000 ft/min.

The Martlets of the FAA generally had lesser performance than the Wildcats largely due to the export engines they were stuck with,ie the Wright cyclone and the S4C4-G twin wasp Typical performance was top speeds of 300 mph and climb rates about 1600ft/min.


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## slaterat (May 27, 2011)

I really don't believe that the F4F had some intangible quality that made it a better combat combat aircraft than the Hurricane or the P 40. The greatest intangible asset it had in 1942 , when compared to the Hurricane and P 40 was operating from an aircraft carrier. There's a reason why combatants use carriers. Its a complete mobile weapons platform . It comes with command and control, EWS, radar ,scouting patrols, full logistics, fuel, ammo, spares, ground crew, repair crew, tools, anti aircraft defense ect. Hurricanes deployed in Singapore, Sumatra, Java and Burma lacked all of these. Additionally Hurricanes operating out of Singapore were outnumbered on a combat by combat basis on the average of 3.75 to 1, counting fighters only. I don't think Wildcats were up against those type of odds when operating from carriers.

RCAF son made a good point regarding Sea Hurricanes. They enjoyed a better K/D ratio than any other Hurricanes despite their decreased performance when compared to their land based Hurricane counterparts. How come? I believe its largely because of the above mentioned factors.


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## RCAFson (May 27, 2011)

Tthe F4F-3 specs called for these weights and climb rates:
Gross weight (lbs.)	6895/6891/7432 lbs 
Initial rate of climb at sea level (ft./min.)	3300/3180/3070 fpm

but the reality was a climb rate that fell far short of these numbers and at 7432lb, the combat climb struggled to exceed 2000 fpm. 

But lets look at the basic physics of the F4F-3: it was a 7400lb aircraft with only 1200 hp and it had 260sq ft wing area. The numbers are just hopelessly optimistic and when the F4F-4 specs were drawn up (an aircraft with exactly the same engine) they were revised downward:
F4F-4 specs:
Gross weight (lbs.)	7426/7424/7972 lbs
Initial rate of climb at sea level (ft./min.)	1920/1810/1690 fpm
Time to climb to 10000 ft. (min.) 5.7/6.0/6.5 min
Time to climb to 20000 ft. (min.) 12.7/13.1/14.7 min 

F4F-3 specs:

Gross weight (lbs.)	6895/6891/7432 

Initial rate of climb at sea level (ft./min.)	3300/3180/3070 
Time to climb to 10000 ft. (min.) 3.5/4.1/4.2
Time to climb to 20000 ft. (min.) 7.6/8.1/8.4 

*now compare the F4F-4 at 7426 lbs versus the F4F-3 at 7432 lbs:

F4F-4/F4F-3 (same engine!)

SL climb rate 1920/3070 fpm

time 10K ft: 5.7/4.2 min

time to 20K ft: 12.7/8.4 min

The F4F-4 numbers reflect the reality of actual aircraft testing, whereas the F4F-3 numbers are pure fantasy, never to be realized by actual aircraft.
*
The myth of the spritely F4F-3 is just that, a myth, and one that has no basis whatsoever in fact, and it is time to kill this myth, because it seriously distorts the reality that faced F4F-3 pilots in actual combat. 

F4F Performance Trials


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## renrich (May 27, 2011)

Your problem, among other things, is that when you compare the F4F3 at 7432 lbs to the F4F4 at 7426 lbs is that you are comparing apples to oranges. The fighter weight of the F4F3 is 7150.7, not 7432 whereas the fighter weight of the F4F4 IS 7426. The so called myth of the good performance of the F4F3 compared to the F4F4 is not a myth but reality. The USN pilots were dismayed when an aircraft they felt was fairly competitive with the A6M was replaced by one with decidedly less performance. One pilot compared the F4F4 to a TBD with a torpedo. Maybe a slight exaggeration. Eric Brown says in his book that the Wildcat had a climb rate of 3300 fpm and the Wildcat II could get 328 mph at 19500 feet. Those are in the same ball park as Dean.

The F4F3 had the R1830-76(SC2-G) engine
The F4F4 had the R1830-86(S5C7-G) engine
Martlet I and Martlet IV had the R 1820-40(G205A)
Martlet II and III had the R-1830-90, the same engine as the F4F3A
Martlet VI had the same engine as the FM-2


The argument that shipboard fighters have a built in advantage over land based fighters does not make much sense. To begin with a ship board version of a landbased fighter has to be structurally stronger and thus weigh more. It also has to be protected from corrosion which adds weight and complexity and requires more maintenance. Depending on mission requirements carrier fighters often must carry less fuel. ammunition and other ordnance than a land based aircraft. It is no accident that the A6M had a combat radius of around 300 miles from a carrier but 500 miles from a field. Most overwater fighters carry a life raft and survival gear which add weight. Often, especially in 1942, some of the aircraft were not equipped with homing devices and many that were so equipped found they did not work and were very short ranged. Getting back to home base for a carrier aircraft was often very problematical. often home base was not where it was supposed to be. Plus the pilots had to be better navigators and weather reports in the Pacific were much less reliable than for land based fighters. The factors go on and on. The fact is that until November, 1942, the Wildcat held it's own with the A6M and after that did even better. I don't believe that can be said for the P40 or Hurricane.


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## RCAFson (May 27, 2011)

renrich said:


> Your problem, among other things, is that when you compare the F4F3 at 7432 lbs to the F4F4 at 7426 lbs is that you are comparing apples to oranges. The fighter weight of the F4F3 is 7150.7, not 7432 whereas the fighter weight of the F4F4 IS 7426. The so called myth of the good performance of the F4F3 compared to the F4F4 is not a myth but reality. The USN pilots were dismayed when an aircraft they felt was fairly competitive with the A6M was replaced by one with decidedly less performance. One pilot compared the F4F4 to a TBD with a torpedo. Maybe a slight exaggeration. Eric Brown says in his book that the Wildcat had a climb rate of 3300 fpm and the Wildcat II could get 328 mph at 19500 feet. Those are in the same ball park as Dean.
> 
> The F4F3 had the R1830-76(SC2-G) engine
> The F4F4 had the R1830-86(S5C7-G) engine
> ...



I know what Brown says and also know what actual performance testing of F4F-3 and -4 aircraft reveal, which is why I stated that Brown was biased in favour of the Martlet/F4F.

The basic physics simply don't add up. An aircraft with 260 sqft wing area, 7200lb and only 1200 hp simply cannot climb at ~3300fpm. It is physically impossible.

These two engines are both 2 stage, 2 speed and have exactly the same normal power rating at low altitude of 1100hp until 2500 ft for the -76 and 3300 ft for the -86. The T/O rating is also 1200hp for each. later variants of the F4F-3 used the -86 engine:
http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F4F-3_Wildcat_(Land)_PD_-_14_August_1942.pdf

F4F-3 #1848 (with a -76)was tested at 7300lb and the initial climb rate was 2025 (normal) and 2450 fpm (military - pencilled in):
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1848-performance.jpg

F4F-3 #1845 (with a -76)was tested at 6262lb and the initial climb rate was 2450 (normal) and 3150 fpm (military - faintly pencilled in):
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845-performance.jpg

FM-2 (wildcat VI) at 7049 lbs and 1300hp = 3120 fpm (combat)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-VI-ads.jpg


I hope you are not suggesting that a less than 200lb drop in weight will increase the climb rate from about 2450fpm to over 3000?


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## RCAFson (May 27, 2011)

renrich said:


> Depending on mission requirements carrier fighters often must carry less fuel. ammunition and other ordnance than a land based aircraft. It is no accident that the A6M had a combat radius of around 300 miles from a carrier but 500 miles from a field.



I suspect that the difference in combat radius is mostly due to the fact that a carrier fighter has to allow for lengthy loiter times forming up and landing.


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## Lighthunmust (May 27, 2011)

Does anyone posting here have primary documentation of why the F4F-4 was produced with 6 guns and less rpg? Did the folding wing design interfere with storage of the same rpg of a -3 if the -4 had four guns. The only source I have is secondary, AHT, saying the British influenced Grumman to make the change.


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## RCAFson (May 27, 2011)

Lighthunmust said:


> Does anyone posting here have primary documentation of why the F4F-4 was produced with 6 guns and less rpg? Did the folding wing design interfere with storage of the same rpg of a -3 if the -4 had four guns. The only source I have is secondary, AHT, saying the British influenced Grumman to make the change.


 
I don't have primary documentation, but IIRC, it was because the UK found that the "average" pilot came back with ammo remaining and was unlikely to make repeated firing passes. Accordingly it was better to have more guns to produce a higher kill rate per firing pass.


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## Shortround6 (May 27, 2011)

I have voiced this theory before and have nothing to back it up but here it is again.

In 1939 and part of 1940 the American .50 cal cycled at 600rpm and that is on test stands. In actual aircraft the cycle rate some times fell to 500rpm and that is for UN-synchronized guns. At some point in 1940 the guns were up-graded to the 800-850rpm rate of fire standard. 
It might depend on WHEN the British made their request for the 6 guns. Six X 10rps= 60 rps. four X 14rps= 56rps. Given the number of months it took to get a modification for drawing board to service squadron some overlap of when the guns were upgraded might be an explanation.


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## Lighthunmust (May 27, 2011)

I am late to this thread, and only skimmed through some of the postings. Many great postings regarding the AVG. If someone already answered with the information below, I apologize for the redundancy.

I pulled out "Flying Tigers" by Daniel Ford and "The Great Book of Fighters" by William Green and Gordon Swanborough. If the P-40 never existed: they would probably use Curtis Hawk 75s with a fixed gear. The Chinese had already assembled a version of this called the 75-M. Chennault had been flying one for a while before the creation of the AVG. 

Chennault did not like inline engines, but the speed advantage of the P-40 and availability convinced him to request them. The P-43s arrived in China during April 1942. Chennault thought they were death traps due to lack of pilot armor and self-sealing tanks so the AVG did not use them and they went to the CAF. The AVG disbanded three months latter.

TGBofF has a photo of a fixed gear H-75.


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## Lighthunmust (May 28, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> I have voiced this theory before and have nothing to back it up but here it is again.
> 
> In 1939 and part of 1940 the American .50 cal cycled at 600rpm and that is on test stands. In actual aircraft the cycle rate some times fell to 500rpm and that is for UN-synchronized guns. At some point in 1940 the guns were up-graded to the 800-850rpm rate of fire standard.
> It might depend on WHEN the British made their request for the 6 guns. Six X 10rps= 60 rps. four X 14rps= 56rps. Given the number of months it took to get a modification for drawing board to service squadron some overlap of when the guns were upgraded might be an explanation.


 
From my posting in the Alternately Armed P-38 thread is another possibility I would like confirmed or dismissed:

"I have found a secondary sources without specific documentation of this information, just a list of sources. I checked Tillman's "Wildcat" and all I found was that at one time there were two separate production lines at Grumman for F4Fs and Martlets. According to Dean in AHT page 494 Gun Platform and Weapon Performance there were many complaints from USN aviators such as "The reduction of rounds per gun cut the firing time by at least five seconds. That doesn't seem like much, but can be a lifetime in combat". Dean writes "The FM-1 and the FM-2 versions by Eastern went back to four guns with more ammunition per gun. THE BRITISH, WHO INSTIGATED THE SIX GUN ARRANGEMENT THE -4 VERSION USED FOR COMMONALITY OF MANUFACTURE, STAYED WITH THIS CONFIGURATION." (capitalization added for emphasis) Dean is a respected source. I think Grumman, who would soon stop making Wildcats to concentrate on Hellcats, decided to make a production decision to reduce the costs of running two production lines and the USN Brass did not care."


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## renrich (May 28, 2011)

RCAFson, with all due respect but I don't know where you took physics and math but the difference is not "less than 200 pounds" but rather almost 276 pounds. I had to take physics to get a degree in Geology but I certainly never liked it and only did enough to get by However there is more than simple physics and weight to explain the climb rate of aircraft. For instance, the P39Q-1 at 7570 pounds took 1650 feet of runway to get off the ground. The F6F3 at 7543 pounds only took 690 feet so obviously the two aircraft with similar weight and similar power climb differently.

Having said all that, I agree that weight plays an important role in climb rate and a 276 pound difference is not a major factor although it does have some impact. You say that Eric Brown may be biased for the Wildcat(Martlet) since he shot down two FW200s with it but in his book, he makes no bones about the Wildcat being a more lethal fighter than the Sea Hurricane. The way I read it however is that he is being objective, not biased.

As for the "myth" about F4F performance and your exercise in physics, I say "garbage in, garbage out" because there are huge variations in the weight of various F4Fs, (just like I stated in an earlier post.) Take a look at these figures:
From the Williams site- F4F3 # 1845 weighed 6260 pounds during the performance tests and got 331 mph (this could be where the good numbers, climb and Vmax for the F4F3 came from)
Dean states that the F4F4 picked up about 350 pounds empty weight over the F4F3. That is a significant weight gain and could have a fairly big impact on performance.
The F4F3 fighter gross weight was 7150.7, the F4F4 overload fighter weight was 7972.5 with the six guns. Big difference of more than 800 pounds. I believe that all the F4F4s at Midway carried the six guns.
The F4F4 fighter weight was 7426 pounds but that was only with four guns.
One can readily see that when quoting performance of the F4Fs it is vital to match performance to the weight of the aircraft tested.

There is no doubt that the F4F4 with six guns( because the Brits insisted on the six) was a mistake and it was rectified later when the Wildcat went back to four guns with more ammo per gun.

As to the idea that carrier based planes have a built in advantage over land based explaining why the Wildcat seemed to have been more effective than the P40 or Hurricane against the A6M, consider this. I know of few if any instances where land based fighters had to deal with more adverse circumstance than the F4F4s did at Henderson field in 1942 and early 1943. The pilots and ground crewman were sleeping often in slit trenches in the mud. They were being sniped at by Japanese riflemen. They were under long ranged artillery fire from the island. They were shot at from the ground on takeoffs and landings.They often endured bombardments at night from BBs and CAs. They were being bombed from the air. They suffered from malnutrition and all sorts of tropical diseases and the horrible tropical climate and sometimes they were given an 03 and told to go to the front lines and help out. The airplanes were suffering from all of the above too. Yet, the Wildcats and the pilots did an incredible job. Maybe it was a case of exceptional pilots or an exceptional airplane or a mixture of both but the record is there to be examined.


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## RCAFson (May 28, 2011)

davparlr said:


> Using a bit of hocus pocus and guesstimations, and some hand measuring from internet drawings, I calculated some downward viewing angle of various WWII aircraft. There was some problem establishing the design eye position.


 
The Hurricane seems to have 7 to 8 degrees of view over the nose, based upon my measurements of drawing and photos.


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## RCAFson (May 28, 2011)

renrich said:


> The F6F3 at 7543 pounds only took 690 feet so obviously the two aircraft with similar weight and similar power climb differently.
> 
> 
> The way I read it however is that he is being objective, not biased.
> ...


 
The P39 only has 213 sq ft of wing area versus 260 on the F4F while only being slightly lighter. 

Brown's views on the Martlet/Sea Hurricane are contradictory. For example on Page 66 of Duels in the Sky he states that the Wildcat was faster and more manoeuvrable than the Sea Hurricane, but then in the mock combat on page 210 he admits that *the Sea Hurricane IIC could out-turn, out-roll and out dive the F4F*...and while he states that the Wildcat could outclimb it, we know that this simply isn't true, since the Sea Hurricane IIc could climb to 20K ft, using normal power, several minutes faster than any variant of the F4F, using military power, except the FM-2. Flying side by side the Sea Hurricane, the Martlet did not exhibit any sign that it was a more deadly fighter.

The Standard Aircraft Characteristics chart, dated Aug 14 1942 states 7556 lbs for an F4F-3. However, I am heartened to see that you admit that the 3300 fpm climb rate claims have no basis in fact. 

Yet, the F4F-4 probably scored the majority of F4F kills. This would imply that tactical advantages of height, surprise and firepower were more important than other factors.

OTOH, the IJN's A6Ms were flying at the extreme end of its range, and according to Lundstrom, many pilots held on to their drop tanks and ditched their radios, while their ability to use their engines at combat power and engage in lengthy pursuits was severely limited and these factors gave the F4F an additional tactical advantage. Flying out of Burma, NEI or Malta was no picnic either.


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## renrich (May 28, 2011)

Don't put words in my mouth. I am sorry you won't be heartened because I never said the 3300 fpm climb rate had no basis in fact. I go by what Dean said. I believe his credentials are substantially better than anyone's on this forum. The whole pupose of this thread is to identify an airplane which could have served the AVG if the P40 had not been available. My opinion is that, if it had been available, the Wildcat could have served very well. If you want to really become informed about American fighters in WW2, get a copy of "America's Hundred Thousand" and you will see that your Standard Aircraft Characteristics chart only gives part of the picture.

The point about Brown which you won't admit is that when he had a mock dogfight with one Wildcat the pilot of the Wildcat may have been a rookie with no combat experience. He was comparing the Hurricane IIC with the F4F4 which was the worst performing Wildcat, thanks to the Brits. It is clear that when Brown gives his opinion about the Sea Hurricane I V the FW200 and the Wildcat V FW200, that the Wildcat is the more lethal fighter.

"You can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink."


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## RCAFson (May 28, 2011)

Well, I am disappointed because the evidence is pretty overwhelming that 3300 fpm was out of reach of the F4F-3 even at 6262 lbs, which is far below a typical combat weight. 

Brown states (in the quote from p210, that I posted earlier) F4F-4 Wildcat Versus Sea Hurricane lIC: *"Verdict: This is a combat I have fought a few times in mock trials." * He doesn't state which aircraft he flew in, and it is quite probable that he alternated between the two types. OTOH, the Sea Hurricane IIC was heavier than any other Sea Hurricane variant. I take Brown's comments regarding the FW-200 to indicate a rough parity between the Sea Hurricane and the Wildcat. Certainly the Sea Hurricane I had no problems with the FW-200, being the first to bring one down (or later the Ju-290), other than what would be expected in attacking such heavily armed aircraft.


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## tomo pauk (May 29, 2011)

Dean states RC of FM-2 as 3200 ft/min @ SL, yet the F4F-3 has 3300 ft/min. Wonder how is that possible, since the FM-2 have had almost 20% more power available, while being only 20lbs heavier (empty weight 5426 vs 5448lbs for FM-2 (NavAir data))?


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## Shortround6 (May 29, 2011)

I think part of the problem maybe that not only were some of the early F4F-3 figures estimates or optimistic, but they were based off conditions that were never going to happen in a war zone. The F4F-3 in "fighter" configuration was not carrying a full load of ammunition. It was also not using full internal fuel. This can 'shave' 400lbs from the weight of the F4F-3. And if you are comparing the performance of an "Early" F4F-3 to later F4F's you also have no armor or self-sealing tanks which may save another 300 or more pounds. There is almost a 10% difference in the weight of "clean" F4F-3s right there. Weight charts are listed for the "bomber" mission which require the removal of 2 of the .50 cal guns and their ammo. Now was any combat unit in the SP really going to fly with only a single .50 in each wing to carry a pair of 100lb bombs or were they going to stay on the runway a little longer?


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## tomo pauk (May 29, 2011)

In other words, the quoted climb performance of the F4F-3 was achievable only by a plane that could hardly been declared as combat worthy?


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## Shortround6 (May 29, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> In other words, the quoted climb performance of the F4F-3 was achievable only by a plane that could hardly been declared as combat worthy?



Sort of!!! 
Timing is everything.
The first 54 F4F-3s for the Navy are ordered Aug 8th 1939. Nobody's planes had armor or self sealing tanks.
French place an order for 100 aircraft in Oct 1939, these will become British Martlets.
July of 1940 sees the 2nd production F4F delivered and mad scrambles in Europe to fit protected tanks and armor not only to new planes but planes already in service. It takes a bit longer for the US to catch up. 

Weights for some of these configurations are on the WW II performance website and in Dean's AHT. The reduced fuel for the F4F-3 may be 110 US gallons, which, while less than a full load is about as much as a Spitfire, Hurricane or 109 carried when full. The reduced ammo load still leaves 280-300rpg, again, while not a full load is more than some army planes (P-40s) carried for their guns a couple of years later.


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## RCAFson (May 29, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Sort of!!!
> Timing is everything.
> The first 54 F4F-3s for the Navy are ordered Aug 8th 1939. Nobody's planes had armor or self sealing tanks.


 
Even at 6262lbs, which is far below the combat weight of an F4F-3 without armour or SS tanks, the plane cannot achieve 3300 fpm:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845-performance.jpg

and you can see where the military power climb rate has been faintly pencilled in. This aircraft had no armour, SS tanks and was equipped with 2 x .3" and 2 x .5" MGs: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845.pdf and no USN F4F-3 ever went into combat in this configuration. 3300 fpm for the F4F-3 is a myth that seems to have arisen from the fact that it was in the original F4F-3 specs but was never achieved in an actual F4F-3.


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## davparlr (May 30, 2011)

Sorry to return to a previous diversion.

Some comments on deflection shooting.

First, it seems as inconceivable to me that deflection shooting would not be taught to fighter pilots as not teaching a quarterback to lead the receiver in football. Of course it is inconceivable that the Navy and AF would not teach dissimilar combat to its fighter pilots prior to the Vietnam War.

Second, it does seem someone in the army is concerned about over the nose deflection shooting. In a military review of the P-51A in Dec, 1942, these comments, in Spitfireperformance, were recorded.



> f. The view downward over the nose is not sufficient to allow full deflection shooting in a turn.





> (3) Every effort must be made to increase the angle of view over the nose. At present the view over the nose is restricted to 3° 4’ below the sight line.



Third, I am not sure how much advantage view over the nose is for a successful fighter. The highly successful Bf-109 had almost zero over the nose vision. A two degrees difference, slightly less than the difference between the P-51B and the F4F, and at a thousand feet, the linear distance viewed is 37 ft., or about one aircraft length, at five hundred feet., half an aircraft length. That doesn’t seem to me to be significant, helpful, yes. Some performance is typically lost, neither the F4F nor the F6F were considered greyhounds, but I don’t think the over the nose viewing was completely to fault. Both the F4U and P-51 increased downward viewing by increasing pilot position, apparently without significant impact to airspeed.

Forth, Lundstrom, in an otherwise well referenced and written book, was strangely delinquent in references to non-Naval deflection shooting. My gut reaction was that he used only Naval sources for references regarding Naval uniqueness in deflection training, otherwise he would have referenced them. Without that, his comments regarding this are weak. It doesn’t help that the book was published by the Naval Institute Press. I am not saying he is wrong, or trying to be deceitful, or even trying to slant the information, only that, in order to really be convincing considering all his sources and the publisher, he really needed to reference other sources such as AAF, RAF, etc., training syllabuses. As it is, to me, it is just a statement of a Naval position.


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## Shortround6 (May 30, 2011)

Well, there is being taught something in class and practicing it once or twice a year (or once or twice before going into combat) and being taught something and practicing it a lot. Give me an hours class room instruction on the golf swing and 15 minutes on a practice and I guarantee you the ONLY safe place on the course will be the green 

Thach had been a Naval aviator since 1929 and for a number of years was an instructor and known gunnery expert. How much flying and gunner practice did some of these pre-war Navy pilots get?
Pre-war for US is pre-Pearl Harbor which might have loosened the purse strings for training of existing pilots a bit before the big influx came.


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## renrich (May 31, 2011)

Dav, your post is well considered, IMO and perhaps right on the mark. I do think there needs to be the distinction made that there is a difference between deflection shooting and FULL deflection shooting. (my caps) The USN, according to Lundstrom put a lot of emphasis on learning full deflection shooting. Those type of gunnery runs( high side, low side and flatside along with the overhead) are mentioned frequently in combat in his books but I don't, in my reading, hear them being mentioned in other books about other airforces. If you look at the post by Leonard of the AAF discussion of air fighting, there is no mention of full deflection shooting. Also there, AFAIK, have been no posts on this forum that demonstrate how other air forces trained their pilots in full deflection gunnery runs. Our friend Bill(Dragondg) (sp?) who probably is the best informed member of this forum on USAAF WW2 has not commented much about AAF gunnery training in deflection shooting.

To me, there is no doubt that trying to execute a full deflection gunnery run was very difficult and the other air forces may have thought it not worth the trouble to teach. On the other hand some deflection shooting theory had to be taught because every attack could not be either directly from the six o clock position or head on with zero deflection but there is a big difference in the lead required for a ten or twenty degree angle off and a ninety degree angle off. It may be that Lundstrom never thought that his assertions about naval aviator gunnery would be subjected to as much scrutiny as they have been here in this forum

My last comment on the F4F3 performance is as follows, although I know that Dean does not have much credibility with some members: Page 597, "America's Hundred Thousand" "The FM2, had both more power and greater weight than earlier machines, but succeeded in getting climb time capability almost back to best F4F3 performance. Climb to 20000 feet in that aircraft took about eight minutes."

One notices that Dean said "best F4F3." All F4F3s were not created equal. One can quibble about whether the best climbing F4F3 was combat ready with the load carried but there is no doubt in my mind that some F4F3s had very good climb characteristics.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 2, 2011)

Excerpt from the pdf posted @ Fulmar vs. Wildcat thread:


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## Lighthunmust (Jun 2, 2011)

The comments about USN training for deflection shooting bring to mind another topic discussed on this forum. What is firepower? Short amounts of devastating power or long amounts of sufficient power? Could it be that this USN deflection training resulted in the need for firing bursts longer than 2-3 seconds to allow for aiming errors to be corrected by length of projectile stream? Same concept as the way shotgun pellets fly through the air not in a wide short fan but in a widening stream for most efficient target destruction. Could the use of this deflection training in combat explain some of the complaints USN Aviators had with the shorter firing times of the F4F-4 in comparison to the F4F-3?

As I posted earlier, Chennault preferred radial engines to inlines. He was very familiar with the fixed gear Hawk 75 from flying one in China. If both the P-36 and the F4F-3 were available, he would have had a hard choice to make. Go with what he knows or go with an unknown that promises better performance. Chennault would be aware of the Zero's debut in China in 1940, but have little definitive knowledge of it capabilities. Considering his lengthy supply chain, poor quality landing fields, and some Chinese mechanics familiar with Curtis products and none with Grumman; I'm guessing he would go with the P-36. Most of his adversaries would be Nates and Oscars, so the P-36 would be competitive. With good tactics and flying skills the P-36 could shoot down Zeros, as it did with USAAF pilots in the first days of December 1941.


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