# operation sea lion



## The Nerd (Dec 13, 2005)

What might have happened if Germany had sent its entire force of troops in their transports might have been escorted by the German navy along with the air cover by the Luftwaffe? Would the invasion been more successful than the air raids?


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## Jabberwocky (Dec 13, 2005)

A large scale invasion of England in mid 1940 was a logistic impossibility. Never mind total air or sea control or the strength of the German army. In an operation sense, it was totally undoable.

The initial calculations made by the German high command were that the invasion of England would require 34 divisions, and it would take 2 1/2 months to get them disembarked, if they were unopposed. German plans called for the complete control of the English Channel for a minimum of 11 days and a clockwork bus schedule of cargo barges that ignored the infamous Channel weather, to get just 9 1/2 infantry divisions and their equipment across in the initial assault phase, including two airborne divisions and 1 1/2 assault divisions landed on the first day. 

The Sealion plan was then revised down to 11 divisions as they realised that they had less than a third of the transport assets that they required. It was further revised downwards to 9 divisions as the High Command studied the operation and its requirements in more detail. If Dover and the other ports further south were not usable (due to sabotage) or not captured in the first 4 days, it was concluded that Germany would be only be able to support 4 divisions in the field. Given that the ports were among the first things marked for destruction by British forces in case of invasion, it was unlikely that they would of been captured intact.

Unlike the Allied cross channel effort in 1944, Sealion had no provision for paralysis of communications or transport in the landing area, no initial bombardment by heavy bombers, almost 0 organic artillery support (just 36 converted barges with 37mm guns and a 75mm howitler), no naval artillery support (the German Navy was assumed to be fully busy with a RN that outnumbered it 5 to 1 in surface combatants), no specalised beach assault craft and no specalised training for its troops, apart from the 2 mountain divisions detacehed as 'cliff climbing' troops.

Germany never got more than 2/3 the number of barges, tugs and motor launches that it calculated it needed to launch a cross channel invasion. Army commanders were almost self-delusionall about the difficulty of the crossing, terming it a 'river crossing on a wide front'. Coming off the victories in France and Poland there was a pervasive belief that the German army could simply roll up the British army with ease. However, the plans for Operation Sealion didn't include sufficient logistic support to allow large armoured or artillery formations to operate. 

Sealion was a serious possibility only in the early days of May, when there were almost no heavily manned or fixed defensive positions along the southern coast. By August, the British had created a much better defence network on the southern and eastern coastlines. Before that time it may of been possible to land a small raiding force (1-2 parachute and glider divisions and 2-3 infantry divisions) and capture airfields and small ports in southern England intact. Reinforcements could of been brought in, but given the wastage rates of earlier battles, even this small number of divisions would of completely absorbed most of the barge traffic and cargo capacity in Northern Europe .


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## KraziKanuK (Dec 13, 2005)

Some reading material Nerd

http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm


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## Gnomey (Dec 13, 2005)

I agree totally with Jabberwocky, the Germans did not have the logistics that the Allies had in 1944 to attempt an invasion, let alone make it a success.


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## Gemhorse (Dec 13, 2005)

Brilliant post, Jabberwocky...

If I may add...
Up to 15th Sept. 1940, Hitler had been fairly satisfied with the Air Offensive against Britain of Goering's Luftwaffe, which was to prepare the way for invasion, but from that very day on, the heavy losses and with Autumn at hand, it changed his attitude to the Invasion.....

The German Naval Staff hoped ''if the air war and weather conditions develop favourably...'' they may possibly get it off in October...

Goering was thus committed to the unenviable task of continuing the Air Offensive until futher notice, regardless of casualties, and against an increasingly more powerful Fighter Command....

On 12th October Hitler finally decided to bring the fiasco 'Sealion' had become to an end. His invasion fleet had remained a priority target for Bomber Command during the late summer, with the result that much of the original assemblage had been dispersed and 214 barges and 21 transporters sunk in harbour, yet Hitler insisted that a vast number of ships be kept at immediate readiness. At last, repeated pressure from Admiral Raeder and other Commanders had it's effect and Hitler gave permission for Sealion to be abandoned....although vaguely hinting about next Spring or Summer.....He released alot, but kept a 1000 barges around for awhile.....

For Goering, it was the start to a long decline of Hitler's favour, as everything he did henceforth with the Luftwaffe reminded Hitler of his failure of the Battle of Britain.....

When you look at what the Allies had to put into D-Day, Sealion was unrealistic, even back then, the Germans were just still on a 'high' from all their previous easier European conquests right up to the Channel coasts.....

One thought, if the Luftwaffe had have been able to convert their Bf-110's for 109's, that may well have overwhelmed Fighter Command at that crucial phase of the BoB.......

[Commez-vous???]


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Dec 13, 2005)

that's a fantastic site on operation sea lion! and i agree it wouldn't have worked, even if they had made it across, every man and boy in the south east of england would have been ready for them with some sort of weapon.........


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## V-1710 (Dec 13, 2005)

I don't think the German High Command was really serious about Sea Lion. They didn't have the resources to carry it out (maybe the German troops wouldn't need landing craft, they could just jump from deck to deck on the Royal Navy ships that would be in the Channel). I think the plan was to destroy the RAF and bomb civilian targets until the British capitulated.


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## trackend (Dec 13, 2005)

the lancaster kicks ass said:


> that's a fantastic site on operation sea lion! and i agree it wouldn't have worked, even if they had made it across, every man and boy in the south east of england would have been ready for them with some sort of weapon.........



My old man was ready Lanc he spent the first year of the war in the Home Guard before he was old enough to join up. Issued with a Ross rifle and five rounds he asked the Sgt (an old WW1 vet) "what the fuck am I supposed to do with five rounds?". The old boy said "shoot one German as there are 100,000 Home Guards if they all do as I say the invasion will fail".

Seriously though I agree with 1710 even if it had cost a hundred destroyers it would have still left 84, plus 7carriers ,15 battleships 66 Cruisers,60 subs etc etc it was never going to be successful and the German high command knew so they just went through the motions to satisfy Adolf and his cronies.
Barges with the front lopped off are not landing craft.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 13, 2005)

As said logistically it was not possible plus the Germans need complete Air Superiority to pull it off, which they did not have as we know what happened in the BoB.


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## Aggie08 (Dec 13, 2005)

It would have been interesting to see if sealion had been performed, if it had failed or been successful. If it were to fail, that's a huge amount of wasted resources and troops. If it were to succeed, it would have been bad bad news....


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Dec 14, 2005)

but there is absolutely no way it was gonna happen, read the site KK posted, and remember the british would be fighting for their homes unlike the germans on D-Day, we haven't been successfully invaded for nearly 1,000 years, we rather like it that way and would do absolutely anything to stop an invasion "whatever what the cost may be"...........


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 14, 2005)

trackend said:


> My old man was ready Lanc he spent the first year of the war in the Home Guard before he was old enough to join up. Issued with a Ross rifle and five rounds he asked the Sgt (an old WW1 vet) "what the fu*k am I supposed to do with five rounds?". The old boy said "shoot one German as there are 100,000 Home Guards if they all do as I say the invasion will fail".



  - I hope by war's end this Sgt was a General!!!!


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## delcyros (Dec 15, 2005)

Agreed. I doubt that the outcome of BoB influenced these plans heavily. The assoult plans of Barbarossa were closed as soon as late 1940. There was little or no time for any operation concerning england, not to speak of the already mentioned difficulties of missing sea and air surpremacy. I also doubt that the german high command estimated that the France campaign would be as short as it was.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 16, 2005)

Aggie08 said:


> It would have been interesting to see if sealion had been performed, if it had failed or been successful. If it were to fail, that's a huge amount of wasted resources and troops. If it were to succeed, it would have been bad bad news....



It was too much of a risk and even Hitler knew that. If they had launched Sea Lion and it failed which it more than likely would have anyhow, then the end of the war would have been very very very near.


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## Aggie08 (Dec 16, 2005)

That's why it would have been interesting- i don't doubt the brits would have given them hell, and i also have no doubt that an invasion of any sort would have disrupted britain's war effort.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 18, 2005)

No I just truely believe it would have failed. The logistical problem was too great for the Germans. Had it failed the German army would have been devistated and then the war would have been over quite soon.


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## Jabberwocky (Dec 18, 2005)

The problems for German are mainly of preparation and mobility. 

If unopposed, they could land troops quite easily in the assualt phase, no question.

However, they faced opposition from 4 areas. 

First, the initial fixed beach and port defenses, including mines and obstacles, but also troops stationed on or near the assault position.
Second, prepositioned troops inland, who could move in while German forces are still landing
Third, attacks from the Royal Navy on transport and landing operations.
Fourth, attacks from the Royal Airforce on transport and landing operations.

Once a beachead has been established, the German forces then require the ability to carry out operations. For this they need transport and armoured support. Sealion had little provision for both. Just 340 tanks were allotted to be transported the first 9 days, not including the 200 German 'schnorkel' Pz Mk II conversions. Vehicular transport would of alos been in short supply. Most of the formations in the assault phase were light infantry divisions or airborne divisions. It was almost impossible to ship across sufficient transport and logistics vehicles to allow mobile operations. Similarly, French and British forces had always performed best against German forces when their advantages in mobility had been reduced.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 18, 2005)

All goes down to logistics.


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## syscom3 (Dec 18, 2005)

I would surmise that the logistical effort the Allies had to contend with in the first couple of weeks of the Normandy landings is exactly what the Germans would have to contend with. And the Germans wouldnt have the wide variety of naval craft required to discharge men and material on beaches without infrastructure in place.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 18, 2005)

I would agree with you on that, however the allies had an advantage in being able to supplie those troops and reinforce them better than the Germans would have been able to.


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## syscom3 (Dec 18, 2005)

My point exactly. While its possible they could have gotten a couple divisions over there to fight, they would have had a monumental task at hand to reinforce those divisions while being required ot supply ever more supplies.

All it would take is a couple days of bad weather, and a few transports being sunk each day, and soon they would be in a world of difficulty.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 18, 2005)

If they even got that far. The German landing vehicles were nothing more than a hodge podge of small boats and barges.


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## plan_D (Dec 18, 2005)

I think the vast majority of us are in agreement. I think it says it most when _Overlord_s success hung by a thread for days even when the Allied forces out-numbered the Wehrmacht, the Allied air forces had complete air superiority and the Allied navies had complete naval supremecy *and* we'd taken two harbours over there with us *and* laid an oil line across the channel!


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## syscom3 (Dec 18, 2005)

Does anyone have information on how many tons of food/ammo/material a day a british infantry consumed, as well as a british armoured division. That goes for a German inf and armoured division.


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## Jabberwocky (Dec 19, 2005)

The German planners for Sealion ran off an estimated figure of 300 tons of supplies (petrol, oil, ammunition, food, first aid and other consumables) minimum for an infantry division per day of a short campaign (less than 40 days). A British infantry division usually consumed about 350-400 tons a day when engaged in a campaign, or about 15-25% more than the estimated German figure.

So for the 11 division operation that was planned, i.e two airborne and 9 infantry assault divisions, the minimum requirement was for 3,300 tons of supplies, per day. 

Apart from the airborne divisions, the assault divisions were to be split up into 3 seperate beacheads, without the possibility of mutual support. 4 Divisions of 16 Army were to land in the Folkestone-St Leonards area. 2 Divisions of 9 Army were to land in the Bexhill-Eastbourne area. 3 Divisions of 9 Army were to land between Beachy Head and Brighton. The actual assaults were to be carried out only by the lead-echelons of the infantry divisions (some 6,700 men per division), totalling some 60,000 troops. Organic support formations and logistics services were to follow on in the next 9 days.

The Germans only had two main port objectives for the first week of the operation; Folkstone and Dover. Folkstone had an estimated maximum capacity of about 1200 tons per day, and was supposed to be captured on the first day. Dover had a slightly higher capacity of 1400 tons per day, and was supposed to be captured intact. Together they amount to just 2600 tons per day, or about 75% of the minimum supply requirements.

However, another part of the problem here is that neither port was expected to be taken intact, or to operate at full capacity for well past the first week of the operation. German planners assumed that sabotage by the Royal Navy and bombing by the Royal airforce would cut initial unloading capacity by 75% and keep it at around 50% capacity for the first few weeks of the operation. As a result, Folkstone was expected to handle just 150 tons per day for the first few days, building to 300 tons and then to 600 at the end of the first week. Dover was a similar story. The German Army expected to capture the port intact after 5 days, but put its maximum unloading capacity at around 800 tons per day. This is assuming that the RN didn't sink the blockships at the mouth of the harbour but that the derricks were destroyed by sabotage.

So, assumed capacity was to have been about 1400 tons a day for the first 2-3 weeks of the operation. This is around 40% of the minimum supply requirement necessary to sustain an 11 division operation, by infantry forces alone. If supply requirements were just 10% higher than anticipated no more than 4 divisions could of been supplied at minimum levels. In other-words, some 1900 tons would have to be delived to 3 seperate contested beach-heads, without port facilities, over contested beaches, with both RAF and RN interferance in operations.


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## syscom3 (Dec 19, 2005)

Thanks! Thats some usefull logistics info there.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 19, 2005)

Yeap good info there, kind of puts it into perspective.


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## evangilder (Dec 19, 2005)

Great info Jabberwocky! It really does show how impossible it would have been.


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## Gnomey (Dec 19, 2005)

evangilder said:


> Great info Jabberwocky! It really does show how impossible it would have been.


Yes it does. Good stuff Jabberwocky!


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## HealzDevo (Mar 19, 2007)

Also, another factor is how tightly packed are the troop barges? If they are very close together in a dense mass, then a B-17 Flying Fortress can just fly over the top and conduct a carpet bombing exercise on all those unfortunate transports especially if a special timer or altitude thing was put on the bombs so that they burst just slightly above the transports... Also you have the good old Avro Lancaster that could be used if there was enough fighter cover proved in the situation I mention...


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## Civettone (Mar 19, 2007)

This was a nice thread but that last comment rather ruined it ...  





Kris


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 19, 2007)

HealzDevo said:


> Also, another factor is how tightly packed are the troop barges? If they are very close together in a dense mass, then a B-17 Flying Fortress can just fly over the top and conduct a carpet bombing exercise on all those unfortunate transports especially if a special timer or altitude thing was put on the bombs so that they burst just slightly above the transports... Also you have the good old Avro Lancaster that could be used if there was enough fighter cover proved in the situation I mention...





Where do you come up with some of this stuff? Why would the troop barges be massed together in a dense mass?


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## syscom3 (Mar 19, 2007)

Is it April 1st yet?


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## Njaco (Mar 20, 2007)

> As a result, Folkstone was expected to handle just 150 tons per day for the first few days, building to 300 tons and then to 600 at the end of the first week. Dover was a similar story. The German Army expected to capture the port intact after 5 days, but put its maximum unloading capacity at around 800 tons per day.



I hope these aren't the same Generals that figured out how much Stalingrad needed. I would that German expectations and reality were two different things. If 800 tons expected would mean....how much actually would arrive?



> I think the vast majority of us are in agreement. I think it says it most when Overlords success hung by a thread for days even when the Allied forces out-numbered the Wehrmacht, the Allied air forces had complete air superiority and the Allied navies had complete naval supremecy and we'd taken two harbours over there with us and laid an oil line across the channel!



This is the killer for me. Even with all this, the Allies still had trouble those first 24 hours. The Germans could never have gotten far without the air and sea supremacy, proper  landing craft, supply support, etc. They didn't have it!

And lastly I don't think Hitler was into it. He sometimes referrred to the English as of the same stock as Aryans as didn't really want to invade England. His hope was to pressure for peace. Goring just wanted the prestige no matter who the foe was.

Sealion was just not possible ... at least for success.


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## k9kiwi (Mar 20, 2007)

BINGO.

Did Hitler not want to turn his back on England when his main thrust was for room for the true people in the East?

Did he want to be fighting on so many fronts at once?

Did his generals?

Oh the sadness when Britain did not join with him to crush the Bolshevick untermensch.

The confusion when they defended the decadant French, the Puritan Dutch, the idle Belgians, yada yada.

While considering the military scenario faced at the time, you must look also at the political imperatives of the countries leaders, the mental state of the people in general, and the preparadness of them to commit to a plan.

Try running it through a simpe acronym we used to use called SLOPER.

Situation. Invade England
Location. England, invaded from france across a shyte bit of water.
Objective. Break the Military, parliament, and People.
Personel. Insert the number of divisons, air support and Navy you need.
Execution. A broad sweep of your plan.
Recovery. How do you intend to finish, and or "get out of Dodge."

PS to him still Healzing after the bashing. Lancasters flew oprationaly in 1942, check out the first date for b-17's and take the sunglasses OFF.


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## syscom3 (Mar 20, 2007)

k9kiwi said:


> .....check out the first date for b-17's and take the sunglasses OFF.



B17's were operational in 1940.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 20, 2007)

I think he is talking about B-17s flying mission over Germany and the USAAF certainly was not flying missions over Germany in 1940...


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## syscom3 (Mar 20, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I think he is talking about B-17s flying mission over Germany and the USAAF certainly was not flying missions over Germany in 1940...




I know, I just wanted to needle him.


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## k9kiwi (Mar 20, 2007)

it failed, I know you are slower than that. 8)


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## Civettone (Mar 20, 2007)

I agree about the feasability of Sealion but I want to point out that the comparison with Overlord is a bit misplaced. The comparison only goes so far.

Comparing it with the invasion of Norway is not accurate either but it's worth mentioning. 

Of course it depends on what time we're talking about: an early Seelöwe cannot be compared with a late one when British defences were organized.

Kris


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## HealzDevo (Mar 20, 2007)

All I was suggesting was a question about the type of scenario we are talking about. I was suggesting a question on how close the transports were together and I agree it would be foolish to pack them together that closely. I thought that Britain did have some lend-lease B-17Ds at this time that they weren't using because they didn't like the armament. If it came down to it, if those aircraft were there in Britain and there were enough crews, they would have been used, I think. Okay, it was according to Wikkipedia the Mk III Manchester BT308 which first flew on January 9th 1941 which was the first Lancaster and received the name Lancaster Mk I immediately after its first flight. Manchester production continued until November that year although some Manchesters in production were completed as Lancasters. The BOB is regarded by German Historians as ending in May 1941. So therefore when are we launching Operation Sealion in this time-line? Therefore there would have been at least some completed Lancasters that could have carried out bombings on German assets in this naval invasion. Also what about artillery support? How would the Germans have supported their troops in originally creating the bridge-head and making sure that they didn't get pinned-down as almost happened at D-Day? They didn't really have a navy and a lot of the support at D-Day was naval bombardment to soften up targets for the invasion force. Also the troops were able to call in naval artillery strikes on enemy bunkers and machine-gun posts. What ability would the Germans have had for this? These are all questions that need to be solved to create a plausible Operation Sealion where Germany wins...


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## Civettone (Mar 20, 2007)

Lend lease started in 1941.

Using level bombers is not a very good way to take out invasion barges ... or any tactical targets for that matter.

Kris


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## HealzDevo (Mar 20, 2007)

Okay, Lend Lease was a bit late. But if there are enough close 
together and you do an air blast you could potentially swamp them. Especially if they were German. The Germans would have over-engined them...


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## Udet (Mar 21, 2007)

Healzdevo i get your point but also consider this:

During the so called "Dieppe Raids", even with what i assume was a British "naval supremacy", and the support of a signficant RAF force, the landed allied forces were annihilated and slaughtered, and also the RAF received a brutal battering at the hands of JG 2 and JG 26.

I think the naval capabilities of Great Britain during 1940 are greatly overstated; do not forget that all that naval might could not prevent the Germans for succesfully landing forces in Norway, even if they managed to inflict signifcat losses to the Germany navy. 

The naval supremacy of the allies during Overlord is to a very important extent a U.S. Navy contribution.

If we take a closer look into 1940 the Royal Navy was already taking a hell of a beating, during the first half of the year 1 battleship and 2 important carriers, 3 armed merchant cruiser, 2 cruisers plus a high number of destroyers had been sunk by the Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe...in less than one year.

Also during 1940 the RAF was by no means capable of conducting any offensive action against any enemy fleet assembled; not to mention the state of the British army in the islands after getting smashed in France.

If the Germans had seriously planned to invade and conquer England, i am sure they could have done it, succesfully that is. The thing is they did not really saw England as the target and there were no serious plans at all.


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## HealzDevo (Mar 21, 2007)

Okay, but still you understand that for this invasion to be successful you first have to get the troops to the beach destination and have information on Allied Beach Defences. So far as I know the burning oil defences etc. weren't dismantled yet. Britain would have flung everything at this invasion before it reached the beaches. We are assuming that things such as small motorboats guided by wire or just steered on course by set steering would be launched against the German Armada at some stage.


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## Glider (Mar 21, 2007)

Udet said:


> Healzdevo i get your point but also consider this:
> 
> During the so called "Dieppe Raids", even with what i assume was a British "naval supremacy", and the support of a signficant RAF force, the landed allied forces were annihilated and slaughtered, and also the RAF received a brutal battering at the hands of JG 2 and JG 26.
> 
> ...



Udet
Your comments although acurate in detail don't give the correct impression.

Dieppe
The largest ship involved in Dieppe was a Hunt class small destroyer and the one thing that was noticable was that no German warship came anywhere near the ships offshore. To imply from this that the RN was incapable of undertaking offensive operations in the North Sea is a million miles from the truth. The raid using the smallest ships in the RN was an offensive operation and the one force that couldn't defend German Territory, was the German Navy.
The army were slaughtered on the beaches but that says more about the efficency of the German Army and bad planning on the part of the British than anything else.
The German airforce did well but then they they should have done with all the advantages they had. Being on the defensive, with better aircraft and under radar control they should have done. Despite this it wasn't as one way as people believe. It should also be noted that the German airforce didn't have any significant effect on the naval forces involved.

Norway
The German bases were a lot closer than the British bases including the vital airbases, plus Norway was Neutral and threatened to defend itself against any foreign forces British or German. So its not suprising the Germany landed first. 
Desipite all these advantages, including having total control of the skies Germany lost a huge proportion of its Navy including significant damage to its capital ships, neither did it stop the British from driving the Germans out from some of the invasion sites and landing its own forces. If the British had been within range of aircover there is an excellent chance that the Germans would have been beaten facing huge losses in men and morale. It was airpower and the distance from the airbases that made the difference, not the German Army or Navy. 

Naval losses in 1940
The key losses were the aircraft carriers as these were almost irriplacable and were the best conversions that we had. Their impact however was limited by the fact that we didn't have any decent aircraft at the time. The important thing was that the RN could afford these losses. We had a number of other battleships and literally dozens of cruisers and scores of destroyers. 
If you look at the British and German losses in 1940 as a proportion of the active fleets there is no doubt who was slaughtered and it wasn't the British.


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## Njaco (Mar 21, 2007)

Might abetter comparison be Crete? Except in that it was a smaller island. Almost a whole year later and although the Germans barely held on and the Commonwealth forces were weak from Greece, etc., the logistics might be more similar than Normandy.

I'm sure Healzdevo's little operation would have been thought up by somebody in those basements and cellars of London. Would it have succeeded? Who knows. Somebody came up with parachute mines at the time. All kinds of crazy things I'm sure were being looked at.


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## syscom3 (Mar 21, 2007)

Udet still hasnt come to terms with the complete lack of amphibious capability, inability to supply forces on unimproved beaches, lack of a doctrine to land on defended beaches and an iniability to provide nighttime sea and air superiority. 

The Germans weakness throughout the war was logistics. And logistics is what ultimatly wins wars.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 21, 2007)

I agree. As I have stated before I dont see the Germans having been able to Logistically sustain an invasion force. If all the stars were alligned just right they might have been able to establish a beach head but the logistics were not there to susain an invasion force.


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## Udet (Mar 21, 2007)

Syscom3.

Let me re-phrase my viewpoint.

What i meant is that if Germany had indeed planned to invade and conquer England, they would have had the time to get prepared and take it. There were not any winds that might blow to refresh the British in the near future through the whole 1940; 1941 would be more terrible to Great Britain, especially in North Africa and the Mediterranean. 

Also in the Far East the battering occurred in 1941, when the poor HMS Prince of Wales -who survived thanks to Admiral Lütjenz earlier that same year- was sunk virtually upon her arrival to the area by the Japanese alongside HMS Repulse. Only real black clouds in the horizon, except for the very good news the USA had entered the war.

So the Germans could have had the time to devote resources to attempt a more than feasible landing in England.

I have not said nor suggested Germany had the logistical means to land an invading force in England right after the gutting the French Army and the authoritzation given to the BEF to hysterically flee continental France.

That they did not have a doctrine to land on defended beaches can be true, but that view further enhances my idea: they -Germans- did not develop any doctrine on the matter for the very simple reason no military operations of such nature were included in Germany´s plans. On the other hand, why did Germany develop such a brutally efficient doctrine in the deployment of panzers and tactical "flying-artillery" support on the battlefield?

What about you having issues with the notion Germany did not intend to invade England, and all they wanted to achieve was to keep the west in the most "peaceful" mode possible to continue carrying on with plans aiming east?


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## Civettone (Mar 21, 2007)

I don't see anything wrong with that viewpoint. Germany could definitely develop the capabilities to succesfully invade Britain and support the invading forces.

I am getting the impression that some people believe Germany needed the resources of D-Day to invade Britain. One really cannot compare the two. That's why I was also referring to Norway (or Crete) for that matter. To invade Britain something between Normandy and Norway is needed.

Kris


Kris


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## Njaco (Mar 21, 2007)

> That they did not have a doctrine to land on defended beaches can be true, but that view further enhances my idea: they -Germans- did not develop any doctrine on the matter for the very simple reason no military operations of such nature were included in Germany´s plans.



I don't think any nation had a doctrine for amphibious assault at the time. Military doctrine was changing when the war started and Germany had developed some new tatics such as panzer movement and air support. But beach landings? Gallipoli was the yardstick and that didn't turn out too well.

And it was forced upon the Allies. To get back at the Reich at the places where the Reich was, the only option was from the sea.

The Torch landings were necessary because of where it was. Sicily and Italy you just couldn't come through the Alps. And the Western front the only place was from the Atlantic.

The only way to hit back was by the sea. And nobody at the time had all the answers on how to accomplish that. The Allies needed Dieppe, Torch, etc. just to get to D Day.

Germany had none of that experience. Blitzkrieg was perfected through Poland, Norway, Low Countries, France but not amphibious landings.

Sealion would've been a hellava waste.


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## syscom3 (Mar 21, 2007)

Njaco said:


> I don't think any nation had a doctrine for amphibious assault at the time. Military doctrine was changing when the war started and Germany had developed some new tatics such as panzer movement and air support. But beach landings? Gallipoli was the yardstick and that didn't turn out too well.
> 
> And it was forced upon the Allies. To get back at the Reich at the places where the Reich was, the only option was from the sea.
> 
> ...



The USN/USMC and RN had a realistic amphibious doctine in place for many years. There's more to just "land the troops at the beaches". The doctrine also includes gunnery support and logistics.

The Germans didnt though, namely because they are a contiental power, not a sea power.


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## mkloby (Mar 22, 2007)

USMC pioneered modern US amphibious landings in the 1930s. Of course, actual combat operations, such as Tarawa, provided a real eye opener.


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## Glider (Mar 22, 2007)

Civettone said:


> I don't see anything wrong with that viewpoint. Germany could definitely develop the capabilities to succesfully invade Britain and support the invading forces.
> 
> I am getting the impression that some people believe Germany needed the resources of D-Day to invade Britain. One really cannot compare the two. That's why I was also referring to Norway (or Crete) for that matter. To invade Britain something between Normandy and Norway is needed.
> 
> ...



If the Germans were to develop the ability to invade the UK they would have had to do it by reducing their capacity in other areas. The country was at war and there is a limit on the amount that you can produce, man and maintain.
Germany couldn't reduce their airforce as it would be needed to take control of the air, it couldn't reduce the Army or they wouldn't have reached the Atlantic coast and it couldn't reduce the Navy (unless you scrap the U Boat programme) as its the Navy that would need building up.

So two questions remain
1 Where would the resources come from to develop these invasion forces
2 Do you really think that the British would have sat back and done nothing remembering that we could outbuild Germany when it comes to naval forces?


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## Glider (Mar 22, 2007)

Udet said:


> Syscom3.
> 
> And the authoritzation given to the BEF to hysterically flee continental France.



Ouch that hurt, 

Or was it the Hysterical failure of the German forces to follow up the advantage enableing all those hundreds of thousands of troops to get away?


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## HealzDevo (Mar 24, 2007)

I was just trying to look at logically where extra production could come from. Its obvious that it can't come from Germany and the other places and therefore Russia is the only real place it can come from. A real problem though is if you conscripted Russians to fight the British, because the Russians and the British were very close in WW1, but not sure how close they really were by WW2 which could swing things a bit...


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## syscom3 (Mar 24, 2007)

The logistics of this has been covered in detail.

The issue remaining is what time of the year this hypothetical invasion will take place. If it is going to happen, it has to happen from late spring to early fall. That means from a 1941 collapse of Russia, the earliest the Brits can expect an invasion is 1942. That means they have several months to deal with the landing craft and material buildup of the Germans. It also means that the US war machine is spooling up big time and that material will be available.

After 1942, there is nothing the Germans could do about an invasion as the US/UK military might was too much.


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## mkloby (Mar 24, 2007)

Sea Lion was originally "supposed" to have taken place in Sep 1940, with the British Army in shambles, the RAF "knocked out of the sky," and the Royal Navy either driven to Canada or sent to the bottom of the sea.

I'm still not comfortable with "proof" of lack of logistical support meaning the invasion could not have taken place, or lack of amphibs. That in and of itself doesn't condemn the invasion to failure.

That said, if somehow the invasion did occur, it would face extreme challenges, even in the perfect world scenario above that it was supposed to have taken place.


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## syscom3 (Mar 24, 2007)

mkloby said:


> I'm still not comfortable with "proof" of lack of logistical support meaning the invasion could not have taken place, or lack of amphibs. That in and of itself doesn't condemn the invasion to failure.



The failure was inevitable as the Germans didn't have the resources necessary to build and deploy sufficient amphibious craft to not only invade, but to also cover the inevitable loss's through attrition.


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## Civettone (Mar 24, 2007)

Glider said:


> If the Germans were to develop the ability to invade the UK they would have had to do it by reducing their capacity in other areas. The country was at war and there is a limit on the amount that you can produce, man and maintain.
> (...)
> So two questions remain
> 1 Where would the resources come from to develop these invasion forces
> 2 Do you really think that the British would have sat back and done nothing remembering that we could outbuild Germany when it comes to naval forces?


The production thing is a good point but keep two things in mind:
1. Germany was not producing as much as it could. Unlike Britain Germany had not yet geared up for war production. So theoretically Germany could produce many times more than it did, without cutting in other military sectors. 
2. Amount of production is not everything. Germany will use less troops, less tanks and less artillery in the invasion of Britain than it used against Russia. Even if they had the resources the allies had in 1944, Germany could not supply more than 50 divisions. 
British production of ships is also limited: battleships and carriers cannot venture in the Channel, can they? And the entrance to the Channel could have been largely sealed off by mines: just look what happened near Leningrad.

Kris


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 24, 2007)

I would not say that the Germans did not have the recourses to build landing craft. They did not have a shortage of the metals required to build ships.


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## syscom3 (Mar 24, 2007)

I'm referring to building an amphib force from the ground up in less than a year.

Remember that an invading force would have to be 2-3 times larger than a defending force, and the sealift required would have to be planned at worst case scenarios.


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## Civettone (Mar 24, 2007)

> Remember that an invading force would have to be 2-3 times larger than a defending force


Why do you say that? What do you base this on??

Kris


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## mkloby (Mar 24, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Why do you say that? What do you base this on??
> 
> Kris



Traditional military thinking was that you need 3:1 advantage to launch a successful offensive.


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## Ajax (Mar 24, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Traditional military thinking was that you need 3:1 advantage to launch a successful offensive.



What's more, the Germans needed garrisons in all invaded countries _and_ they were about to stroll off to Russia. The Soviets weren't going to be walked over. Attacking Britain would have been a bad move. There would be too much money spent getting there and the Nazi horde would have been stretched. And if they did, maybe *they* would have dragged the USA in.

Plus, the British would have crushed an invasion force as they are the best


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## mkloby (Mar 24, 2007)

Ajax said:


> What's more, the Germans needed garrisons in all invaded countries _and_ they were about to stroll off to Russia. The Soviets weren't going to be walked over. Attacking Britain would have been a bad move. There would be too much money spent getting there and the Nazi horde would have been stretched. And if they did, maybe *they* would have dragged the USA in.



You can't say that - perhaps Germany would have postponed Barbarossa.

Plus, the British would have crushed an invasion force as they are the best
[/QUOTE]

Are they now


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## Ajax (Mar 24, 2007)

mkloby said:


> You can't say that - perhaps Germany would have postponed Barbarossa.



They could have, but I don't think so. The whole idea of Panzer warfare was sweeping across europe before anyone could be bothered to stop them. Postponing things wasn't somthing the Nazis did...


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## mkloby (Mar 24, 2007)

Ajax said:


> They could have, but I don't think so. The whole idea of Panzer warfare was sweeping across europe before anyone could be bothered to stop them. Postponing things wasn't somthing the Nazis did...



Not so fast... Barbarossa was postponed a good 6 weeks in order to clean up the Balkans. Imagine what could have happened if the German forces had 6 more weeks of good weather in 1941..


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## Jabberwocky (Mar 24, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Not so fast... Barbarossa was postponed a good 6 weeks in order to clean up the Balkans. Imagine what could have happened if the German forces had 6 more weeks of good weather in 1941..



The weather in May delayed Barbarossa as much as anything else. On May-15, the original launch date for the operation the Polish-Russian river valleys scheduled be crossed by armoured forces were still flooded and partly impassable as a result of exceptionally heavy rains. The absolute earliest the invasion could of proceeded, without the delay from the Balkans Campaign, and the assembly and use of specialty bridging equipment imported from Germany, was around the 8th of June, and more likely the 14th.

Really, the Germans would of gotten another 1-2 weeks. It hardly mattered as inclement weather got them on both ends. The Russian rains started about 5 weeks early in 1941, delaying the Germans more effectively than the pause for the Balkan campaign ever did. 

Maybe someone was trying to tell them something...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 25, 2007)

Ajax said:


> They could have, but I don't think so. The whole idea of Panzer warfare was sweeping across europe before anyone could be bothered to stop them. Postponing things wasn't somthing the Nazis did...



And what do you base that on. Have you met any "Nazis"?

Oh and by the way try to use the term the "Germans" The Nazis was a political party not all Germans were Nazis. For instance I am not half Nazi...
...Not everyone in the UK likes to be called the British Horde.


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## mkloby (Mar 25, 2007)

Jabberwocky said:


> The weather in May delayed Barbarossa as much as anything else. On May-15, the original launch date for the operation the Polish-Russian river valleys scheduled be crossed by armoured forces were still flooded and partly impassable as a result of exceptionally heavy rains. The absolute earliest the invasion could of proceeded, without the delay from the Balkans Campaign, and the assembly and use of specialty bridging equipment imported from Germany, was around the 8th of June, and more likely the 14th.
> 
> Really, the Germans would of gotten another 1-2 weeks. It hardly mattered as inclement weather got them on both ends. The Russian rains started about 5 weeks early in 1941, delaying the Germans more effectively than the pause for the Balkan campaign ever did.
> 
> Maybe someone was trying to tell them something...



Good point - I didn't think of the late spring that year. I've done exercises before in spring mud. Definitely complicates things beyond imagine. Nevertheless, it was an example off the top of my head of a postponed German operation.


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## trackend (Mar 25, 2007)

By the outbreak of war the Royal Navy had 15 large battleships, 15 heavy cruisers, 46 light cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 181 destroyers and 59 submarines.
This excludes the numerous smaller vessels from mine sweepers to MT MGBs the channel was indeed heavily mined and many are still being discovered in the mouth of the Thames (near my front door unfortunately) but this did not prevent shipping from moving though it and I believe without both air and sea supremacy a sea born invasion was never on the cards and even if delayed for a more sustained build up of materials the domination of the sea (other than the supply lines) never came within the grasp of the Germans.


> ...Not everyone in the UK likes to be called the British Horde.


 I'm one of the ones that like being called a horde Adler ( I must go on a diet)


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## Ajax (Mar 25, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Oh and by the way try to use the term the "Germans" The Nazis was a political party not all Germans were Nazis. For instance I am not half Nazi...
> ...Not everyone in the UK likes to be called the British Horde.



Sorry, but you're not really 'Nazi' unless you beleive in killing all jews. I'll say 'German' from now on.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 25, 2007)

trackend said:


> I'm one of the ones that like being called a horde Adler ( I must go on a diet)


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## Civettone (Mar 25, 2007)

> Traditional military thinking was that you need 3:1 advantage to launch a successful offensive.


Most succesful offensives of WW2 didn't have a 3:1 advantage. I think it's more conservative than traditional.



Ajax said:


> What's more, the Germans needed garrisons in all invaded countries _and_ they were about to stroll off to Russia. The Soviets weren't going to be walked over. Attacking Britain would have been a bad move. There would be too much money spent getting there and the Nazi horde would have been stretched. And if they did, maybe *they* would have dragged the USA in.


If the Germans had 150 divisions and would have used the best 50 against Britain, they still had a 100. I think it's obvious that starting Barbarossa at the same time as Sealion (41/42) would have been out of the question: it would have overstretched the German capabilities for sure. (Reading back on posts, it seems we were assuming Germany had finished off Russia and would now take on Britain. So in 1942. But we can also assume Barbarossa would have been postponed until the defeat of Britain.)



> They could have, but I don't think so. The whole idea of Panzer warfare was sweeping across europe before anyone could be bothered to stop them. Postponing things wasn't somthing the Nazis did...


I think that's a bit simplistic. They were not the Borg, you know  They could actually think rational ... usually 



> This excludes the numerous smaller vessels from mine sweepers to MT MGBs the channel was indeed heavily mined and many are still being discovered in the mouth of the Thames (near my front door unfortunately) but this did not prevent shipping from moving though it and I believe without both air and sea supremacy a sea born invasion was never on the cards and even if delayed for a more sustained build up of materials the domination of the sea (other than the supply lines) never came within the grasp of the Germans.


Trackend, I don't think you've read what this thread is about. Of course you're absolutely right but this is not about what the Germans achieved or didn't achieve. This is what they could have achieved had they taken the time to develop a military force capable of succesfully invading and defeating Britain. 
There were a lot of mines in the Channel but as the Germans still needed access to it (at least until 1942) they could not completely seal it off. I'm thinking of the minefields in the Ostsee/Baltic Sea. Ever heard of the Juminda mine battle? (50 out of 200 vessels were destroyed due to mines .. in a single journey!).

Kris


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## syscom3 (Mar 25, 2007)

Civitonne, it doesnt matter how many divisions the Germans had. The size of the sealift and capacity of your logisitics that dictates how many divisions are available for invasion and then follow on.

After D-Day, even with the vast number of landing craft and transports available to the allies, only a division every two days were landed. And that was also with total and absolute control of the sea and air 24/7. Something problematic with the Germans.

Now look at your Germans invasion scenario's. Just exactly how many troops could be landed on the beaches with enough firepower to stay, and then build up forces faster than the Brits can contain them or throw them into the sea.


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## Glider (Mar 25, 2007)

Civettone said:


> The production thing is a good point but keep two things in mind:
> 1. Germany was not producing as much as it could. Unlike Britain Germany had not yet geared up for war production. So theoretically Germany could produce many times more than it did, without cutting in other military sectors.
> 2. Amount of production is not everything. Germany will use less troops, less tanks and less artillery in the invasion of Britain than it used against Russia. Even if they had the resources the allies had in 1944, Germany could not supply more than 50 divisions.
> British production of ships is also limited: battleships and carriers cannot venture in the Channel, can they? And the entrance to the Channel could have been largely sealed off by mines: just look what happened near Leningrad.
> ...



Kris
You are correct when you say that Germany wasn't working at full capacity but it was when it came to naval forces. As early as 1939 the Germans were cutting back on planned production to make way for other priorities. The Class vessels were cancelled to make way for Submarine production and scrapped on the slips.
The Seydlitz was launched in Jan 1939 and in July 1942 was only 90% completed. Her sisterships were commissioned only 2 years after launch, the delay was because they lacked the resources to complete her. The Lutzow was sold to the Russians in 1940 for the same reason.
M class cruisers and some destroyers were also broken up on the slipway to make way for Submarines.

Compared to building a ship its fairly easy to build an aircraft or tank factory. Shipyards are a different thing entirely.

As for ships entering the Channel, you wouldn't want an aircraft carrier to go their but battleships can and did. The Germans did the channel dash, what makes you think the British wouldn't do the same thing to smash an invasion force.

Re Mines
Lenningrad isn't the same as the channel, its bigger wider with more currents, plus how are you going to lay the many thousands of mines when the RN rule the sea and have literally hundreds of minesweepers. 
The Russian Navy was the worst performing arm of any country large or small in the war. To compare them to the RN, is like comparing a scout troop to the 101st Airbourne.


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## mkloby (Mar 25, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Most succesful offensives of WW2 didn't have a 3:1 advantage. I think it's more conservative than traditional.



Kris - do you have military experience? What is the doctrine that they employ in Belgium?

I can tell you that it's a traditional - not conservative - approach to offensive operations. We still employ it today. Concentrate and attack with overwhelming men, materiel, and firepower against a weaker enemy position.


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## Ajax (Mar 25, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Kris - do you have military experience? What is the doctrine that they employ in Belgium?
> 
> I can tell you that it's a traditional - not conservative - approach to offensive operations. We still employ it today. Concentrate and attack with overwhelming men, materiel, and firepower against a weaker enemy position.



Supress the enemy with heavy fire, then send some troops round the flank to blast their hopelessly exposed be-hinds. Or something like that.


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## mkloby (Mar 25, 2007)

Ajax said:


> Supress the enemy with heavy fire, then send some troops round the flank to blast their hopelessly exposed be-hinds. Or something like that.



That would be the idea behind fire and maneuver.

This has gotten off of Op Sea Lion - back onto topic. Sorry.



syscom3 said:


> Civitonne, it doesnt matter how many divisions the Germans had. The size of the sealift and capacity of your logisitics that dictates how many divisions are available for invasion and then follow on.
> 
> After D-Day, even with the vast number of landing craft and transports available to the allies, only a division every two days were landed. And that was also with total and absolute control of the sea and air 24/7. Something problematic with the Germans.
> 
> Now look at your Germans invasion scenario's. Just exactly how many troops could be landed on the beaches with enough firepower to stay, and then build up forces faster than the Brits can contain them or throw them into the sea.



Sys - do you, or anybody else, know of any statistics pertaining to the number of troops that Germany could have logistically sustained in a cross channel invasion?


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## HealzDevo (Mar 25, 2007)

Yes, and the Germans didn't really have the ability to throw into the mix a lot of naval support. So how would they have been able to protect their troops from things such as MG Bunkers, etc. considering how limited their troops would have been? I mean take the 50 best divisions and you still have to get them onto the British beaches and provide support for them so that they can accomplish their task. I mean the Normandy Invasion involved 47 divisions and then they got reinforced as they swept through France and into Germany. In this it is Germany with 50 divisions, leaving 100 behind and hoping they don't get chopped to pieces...


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## mkloby (Mar 25, 2007)

HealzDevo said:


> Yes, and the Germans didn't really have the ability to throw into the mix a lot of naval support. So how would they have been able to protect their troops from things such as MG Bunkers, etc. considering how limited their troops would have been? I mean take the 50 best divisions and you still have to get them onto the British beaches and provide support for them so that they can accomplish their task. I mean the Normandy Invasion involved 47 divisions and then they got reinforced as they swept through France and into Germany. In this it is Germany with 50 divisions, leaving 100 behind and hoping they don't get chopped to pieces...



One thing the german plans demanded was air superiority. I think the Goering predicted 4 weeks from eagle day the RAF would be effectively downed. Not to mention only German air power could keep the Royal Navy at bay to defend against their interference with a landing. I'm sure the German high command planned on business as usual with Ju 87s providing some of the best CAS around.


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## HealzDevo (Mar 25, 2007)

Still there is a limit to the ability of aircraft to provide good support against certain targets isn't there? Also this fails to take into account that if the Allies lose air superiority, you can bet that every AA gun they have will be pointed up at the sky or even tanks being used for AA if the plane is flying low enough...


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## Civettone (Mar 25, 2007)

Good discussion guys! 

mkloby, I understand that the 3:1 advantage is advisable and as such still very useful. But you seem to be making it into something it isn't: a rule. The 3:1 advantage seems to be the ideal scenario. But like I said before, most succesful offensives in WW2 did not have a 3:1 advantage. In fact, very few did...

Syscom, I didn't say the Germans would have landed 50 divisions. I said they would use at most 50 divisions. This was a reply to someone wondering if Germany would have had enough troops available for the invasion. I said they would use maximum 50 divisions...
I was thinking of landing 5 divisions, and 2 new divisions a day. This would have meant 15 divisions in a week. After this more resources would have to go to supply and only 1 division a day could have been moved. 
At least this was the idea I had in my head. Your comment that the allies could only bring in 1 division every two days makes me wonder if my idea is still valid. 
There are some small differences beween the two though. Allied shipped much more supplies and vehicles to Normandy, basically building up a force which could advance quickly once broken out. German planners also calculated less tons of supplies needed for a division than for instance Americans did. 
What was the reason the allies managed to bring in so many troops in the first 24 hours and brought in so few in the following days?



> The Germans did the channel dash, what makes you think the British wouldn't do the same thing to smash an invasion force.


Glider, battleships are too slow and cumbersome to operate in the Channel. They are too exposed to operate in such a small area. That's why the Channel dash was so exciting. Now can you imagine the Tirpitz sticking around for a couple hours in the Channel? No, it's not called the dash for nothing, you know? She was a sitting duck and the fact that the Luftwaffe was able to protect her was an extraordinary feat! 



> Shipyards are a different thing entirely


In 1943/44 the Germans managed to triple submarine production without diminishing production for the other two military branches. German shipyards were very ineffective compared to allied shipyards until Speer and Dönitz took over. 



> Lenningrad isn't the same as the channel, its bigger wider with more currents, plus how are you going to lay the many thousands of mines when the RN rule the sea and have literally hundreds of minesweepers.


It's not possible to seal off the Channel although the Germans would have tried. Fact remains that it would have been a dangerous place for the RN. 
I disagree with your point on the minesweepers. Minesweeping is a time consuming activity. If the Germans would have started a nocturnal mine dropping campaign few weeks before the invasion, the Royal Navy would not have the time to clean as fast as the Germans could lay mines. I'm talking about thousands and thousands of mines.
And don't forget the German subs...


A final note and one which I have repeated a couple of times: people are constantly referring to D-Day as if this was the 'canon' of invasions. I don't see why the Germans needed to have the superiority of the allies of 1944, if British defences were not like the German defences of the Atlantikwall either. Plus, German invading divisions would have been superior to the defending British forces as they would receive the best men, leaders and equipment. 

Kris


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## HealzDevo (Mar 25, 2007)

Yes, they would but still they would have to overcome the English fighting spirit. England was not about to roll-over and quit. You point out that those divisions would have the best leadership, equipment, etc. but there was only one design that I have seen for tank transport. Therefore the German forces would have been relying on air support to destroy the British infantry tanks, etc. before the British destroyed them with those. CAS would have become very tricky if the British had deployed a lot of their AAs and tanks to that sector. No low flying and high flying would have become tricky due to AA concentration so where does that leave the German Luftwaffe?


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## mkloby (Mar 26, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Good discussion guys!
> 
> mkloby, I understand that the 3:1 advantage is advisable and as such still very useful. But you seem to be making it into something it isn't: a rule. The 3:1 advantage seems to be the ideal scenario. But like I said before, most succesful offensives in WW2 did not have a 3:1 advantage. In fact, very few did...



It is not a rule, and I didn't intend that in my posts. It comes from a doctrine involving attacking, as stated above, with a overpowering forces. I wouldn't say that all offensives enjoyed a 3:1 advantage, but many of the offensives that did have a sharp advantage in manpower/materiel were successful. Also, overall manpower in totality is not the same as an operational advantage. You can concentrate mass and acheive an advantage in a given operational sector. A good example of that is the Fall Gelb and the 44 Ardenne Offensive, although the Battle of the Bulge ultimately failed for the Germans. Speed also has an effect, and it serves as a force multiplier. It's entirely more than tallying up troop numbers on each side of an operation.

This was brought up in the thread a while back on amphibs, but what about the poor state of the British Army following Dunkirk, and the tremendous losses in equipment and materiel. Estimated left behind at Dunkirk were: 2,500 guns, 84,500 vehicles, 77,000 tons ammo, 165,000 tons gasoline, and 416,000 tons of supplies.

The British Army must have taken a considerable amount of time to re-equip and stand up these units as capable fighting forces. Also, reinforcements would not be able to be brought to Britain from the Empire if the Battle of Britain went as planned for the Germans.



HealzDevo said:


> Yes, they would but still they would have to overcome the English fighting spirit. England was not about to roll-over and quit. You point out that those divisions would have the best leadership, equipment, etc. but there was only one design that I have seen for tank transport. Therefore the German forces would have been relying on air support to destroy the British infantry tanks, etc. before the British destroyed them with those. CAS would have become very tricky if the British had deployed a lot of their AAs and tanks to that sector. No low flying and high flying would have become tricky due to AA concentration so where does that leave the German Luftwaffe?



I would tend to think the stategy would be to initially capture a port, largely intact if possible (not that the British would allow that) to reduce rebuild time, and use ships to unload the majority of heavy equipment, men, and materiel.


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## syscom3 (Mar 26, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Syscom, I didn't say the Germans would have landed 50 divisions. I said they would use at most 50 divisions. This was a reply to someone wondering if Germany would have had enough troops available for the invasion. I said they would use maximum 50 divisions...



Think.... how were those divisions going to be staged, transported to the UK , off loaded without the benefit of a port, and then resupplied?



> I was thinking of landing 5 divisions, and 2 new divisions a day. This would have meant 15 divisions in a week. After this more resources would have to go to supply and only 1 division a day could have been moved.



Work out the math. There simply wasn't enough shipping and landing craft available for the Germans to succede. And where do you propose to station all those landing craft?



> There are some small differences beween the two though. Allied shipped much more supplies and vehicles to Normandy, basically building up a force which could advance quickly once broken out. German planners also calculated less tons of supplies needed for a division than for instance Americans did.



History is littered with the results of Military expeditions that failed because of lack of supply and underestimating consumption rates.



> What was the reason the allies managed to bring in so many troops in the first 24 hours and brought in so few in the following days?



It was a matter of landing enough forces to establish a beachhead and then follow up with the supplies later. Plus there weren't any armoured divisions put ashore untill the next day. And those types of divisions take up lots of shipping.



> Glider, battleships are too slow and cumbersome to operate in the Channel. They are too exposed to operate in such a small area. That's why the Channel dash was so exciting. Now can you imagine the Tirpitz sticking around for a couple hours in the Channel? No, it's not called the dash for nothing, you know? She was a sitting duck and the fact that the Luftwaffe was able to protect her was an extraordinary feat!



If an invasion was immenent, the RN would have sacrificed caution to the winds, and attacked the invasion forces.



> It's not possible to seal off the Channel although the Germans would have tried. Fact remains that it would have been a dangerous place for the RN.



And for the KM. Danger works both ways.



> I disagree with your point on the minesweepers. Minesweeping is a time consuming activity. If the Germans would have started a nocturnal mine dropping campaign few weeks before the invasion, the Royal Navy would not have the time to clean as fast as the Germans could lay mines. I'm talking about thousands and thousands of mines.
> And don't forget the German subs...



And where are all the German warships and invasion craft going to come from to provide fire support? Or are your forces just going to take their chances without sea and/or air support?



> A final note and one which I have repeated a couple of times: people are constantly referring to D-Day as if this was the 'canon' of invasions.



Actually operations Olympic and Coronet were going to be even larger. And provide us with an example of an amphibious invasion that was even remotely the size and complexity of Overlord.



> I don't see why the Germans needed to have the superiority of the allies of 1944, if British defences were not like the German defences of the Atlantikwall either.



The British in 1943 had all the advantages of fighting on home ground on interior lines of communications with an immense (and I mean IMMENSE) US war machine ready to go to battle. The Luftwaffe was far from dominate in 1943. They had no heavy bombers, to bust up the UK ports and airfields, the Spitfire was supreme and that doesnt take into account the USAAF aircraft that would have gotten into the fight and shredded the LW and KM. 

If you want an invasion in 1944? Forget it. Theres nothing in the German war machine to match what the allies could put out.



> Plus, German invading divisions would have been superior to the defending British forces as they would receive the best men, leaders and equipment.



Any examples of this alleged superiority?


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## HealzDevo (Mar 26, 2007)

The German Tank superiority by 1941/1942 was that they had swept across in tanks that were meant to be training tanks for their armies. Tanks such as the Panther would have been a big handful to transport across the channel. 

Also the Germans would have been landing in an environment that would be hostile to them. The beachs were heavily mined, some beaches were designed to go up in flames, AA was set up in strategic areas. In addition they had the home guard which had a whole bunch of tactics which might have been effective in doing serious damage to the Germans... 

Also does this include the RAF reserve aircraft which would have been thrown into the fight to stop the Germans? You can be sure that in this case every single machine that was airworthy in the whole of Britain would have been sacrificed to stop the Germans.


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## Jabberwocky (Mar 26, 2007)

To successfully launch Sealion you need these preconditions:

1. Defeat the RAF, FAA and Costal Command as offensive air arms of the UK military (not necessarily the same thing as defeating them).

2. Prevent or delay the RN from carrying out offensive and defensive operations in home waters.

3. Isolate the 3 beachhead areas to allow for the unimpared landing of troops and supplies

Those are pretty lofty goals, just to LAUNCH the operation, let alone conduct it sucessfully.

To sucessfully carry out the invasion you need to:

1. Land your chosen amount of assault formations (original plans is 1-2 1/2 airborne/gliber divisions, supported by lead echelons of a further 4-6 divisions).

2. Supply your chosen assualt formations (assumed MINIMUM rate of 300 tons of supplies per division per day for an infantry division and approximately 25% more for a tank division)

If the initial landing is successful, then you'll need to:

3. Land your second echelon and explotiation formations as well as motorised transport 

4. Supply your second echelon and exploitation formations

Given the physical limitations of materiel build up, transport capacity and supply capacity, its a tough ask unless you can dedicate approximately 24 months to building a small boat fleet and destroying the RAF and RN wholesale. 

This is also ignoring operations conducted by the enemy to interrupt your assault, supply and explotiation operation.

Unlike the British on Crete, or the Germans in Normandy, the Germans are presented with a more complex tactical picture:

They ha ve no control of the skies, and at best aerial parity, so landing paratroopers and glider formations is risky at best, especially given the rise in RAF night fighter operations after September 1940 and the continued application of RADAR to anti aircraft gunnery in the same period (even though it wasn't really operationally effective until mid-1941).

They have no control of the water. At best they are outnumbered about 5:1 in surface combatants and have a 2:1 advantage in submarines, and the RN continued to experiance favourable exchange ratios whenever it faced the Kriegsmarine in a straight fight right through the period. 

Without control of the water, assault operations are risky and supply operations are essentially out of question as a practical enterprise.

They have no control of the battlespace in the UK. The Germans have no method of preventing large scale formations of the British Army assembling, manouvering and striking at their leisure. They have not cut rail and road links and the aerial assault is aimed at capturing inland airfields (cutting it off from the main assault), not preventing the movement of British reinforcements. 

The seaborne assaults were aimed at the densest concentration of British fixed defences (the British essentially having guessed correctly), designed to slow but not stop attackers (unlike the 'Atlantic Wall'), while the Army assembled to strike weighted blows against the assault formation.


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## mkloby (Mar 26, 2007)

Jabberwocky said:


> 1. Defeat the RAF, FAA and Costal Command as offensive air arms of the UK military (not necessarily the same thing as defeating them).
> 
> 
> Unlike the British on Crete, or the Germans in Normandy, the Germans are presented with a more complex tactical picture:
> ...



I disagree with your condition of defeating the offensive capablity or british air assets. The goal of the Germans following the BoB was to destroy British defensive air assets, and take air superiority. By the nature of that, British offensive capabilities to strike German operations would in turn become extremely costly sorties given German control of the air - specifically over the south of England.

If this condition was met, Germany would have air supremacy. German air assets would make RN operations extremely dangerous and likely suffer catastrophic losses if attempts were made to challenge landings.

Also - why would Germany have no capability to conduct any Deep Air Support?


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## Glider (Mar 26, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Good discussion guys!
> 
> I was thinking of landing 5 divisions, and 2 new divisions a day. This would have meant 15 divisions in a week. After this more resources would have to go to supply and only 1 division a day could have been moved.
> 
> ...



Kris
Your right this is a good debate and taking the points one at a time

2 Divisions a day for a week
A weeks good weather in the channel is close to a miracle. Even if the weather stays mild the sea conditions don't. Without the weather you would have huge trouble getting anything across without a proper port.

Battleships are to slow and cumbersome for the Channel
Actually there not. The opening stages of the Battle of Britain were German attacks on the convoys going up the channel. Most of these were colliers carrying coal for the powerstations on the Thames. Despite their best efforts the Germans never stopped a convoy of large, slow (3-5 knots) unmanouverable, almost unarmed colliers. Certainly some were damaged and some sunk but despite a number of attempts they *never *stopped a convoy.
If you cannot destroy a target like that, what makes you think that you can stop a naval fleet intent on attacking a landing area that they know is likely to be the make or break factor of the war. More than enough would get through.

Submarine Production
They did more than triple production but only at the cost of the production of almost any other major shipping project. If you want to build landing forces the point I was trying to prove is that something, in this case submarine production, would have to go.

Nighttime Minelaying
The Channel at night belongs to the RN. We had far more ships, the men and the knowledge (most officers in small forces were amateur sailors who knew the coast). We also had radar direction of those forces. If the Germans had tried to depend on nighttime minelaying then they would have lost. The Germans never dominated the Channel at night. The minelayers would have been attacked and enough of the mines swept. 

Submarines in the Channel
This never worked at any time in WW2 and equally never in WW1. The currents are very strong, the tides are amongst the biggest in the world and the sands the most dangerous. The average high tide is about 17ft and at the likely landing grounds the tide goes out about 2/3rds of a mile. Obviously this depends on the landing site but at Southend its over a 1 1/4 miles.


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## Udet (Mar 26, 2007)

I must insist: do you forget what the conditions of the British Army in England were during 1940?

The BEF had virtually lost all its equipment: tanks, artillery, vehicles and supply stocks, not forgetting the British soldiers dead and captured in France. When they were allowed to escape all they brought with them was their wet clothing.

How is it that i read comments pointing out the fact the divisions landed ashored by the Germans would have endured "very high losses"?

You are not going to compare what the Brits could have oppossed to meet a German invasion -not intended- in 1940 with what the Germans had available to throw against the allies on June 6th, 1944 are you?

I had suggested the very idea, but Mr. Civettone came to correctly elaborate further on that: why do you think Germany needed a "D-day" type of display to successfully land and smash the British in England?


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## Civettone (Mar 26, 2007)

So many reactions to respond to... I'll do my best.

Let me start by saying that what I have in mind is a Sealion in the Summer of 1942, after defeating Russia in 1941. This is not a rule - that's not up to me - but that's what I have in mind when I make these comments. So that means half a year of preparations in which production of all kinds of aircraft and naval transportation devices are being build. I would expect the Germans to prepare for the invasion for half a year, gathering information and drawing up extensive plans. This is all meagre compared to what the allies had in 1944 but as I said before, it doesn't have to be like D-Day. Germany could do with less. 

I've read many references to D-Day like destroying of infrastructure, controlling the skies, etc. I think D-Day is such an icon because it was so incredibly succesful! When you look at it, it was almost a walk-over. Now before you start throwing things at me, let just look at the numbers until the end of July: 50,000 dead out of 2 million men. On D-Day itself 2,500 dead, most on Omaha beach. So besides Omaha beach, D-Day was a walk-over. That's what excellent preparation and numerical superiority lead to. 
But if only half of these advantages were there, I still think D-Day would have succeeded. Not one of the beaches was a failure, not one was evacuated. Even if the allies had just one or two beaches in their hands, they could stil have won the battle and go on to break out of Normandy.

I don't see Germany achieving superiority in the air, on the ground or at sea. But I do see them having control. And I believe this would have been enough to succesfully invade Britain, hold the beaches and eventually break out and defeat the English. 

Let's break this down to those three fields:
Air: if Germany ever had better aircraft than the British it was in 1941/1942 with the Fw 190 and Bf 109F, both of which were superior to the Spitfire V or Hurricane II. Spitfire IX only appeared in the late Summer and in small numbers. British hardly had any attack aircraft, they were stick Blenheims, Beaufighters, no Typhoons or Mosquitos. 
With increased aircraft production - as said above - and with most aircraft pulled back from Eastern Europe and with better pilots than the British (because of superior training hours), Germany would have held the advantage in the air. With the British aircraft primarily attacking targets in the Channel and over the German held beaches, they would no longer have the advantage of flying over friendly territory. Naturally, the Germans would have had the advantage. After a while Germany would have broken the back of the RAF in a battle of attrition like it itself had undergone in 1940. 
Oh yes, I forgot to mention that I do not think it would have been a good idea to start an extensive air offensive before the invasion. That would have failed for the same reasons as in 1940. Surprise would have to be on the German side: paradropping at night and landing the first wave at dawn.

Sea: Although the Channel could not be sealed off, it could have been made difficult for the RN. Sealing off the Channel does not mean mining the Channel itself but the access lanes towards it creating a almost sealed-off area in which the Kriegsmarine and German transport vessels can operate. These mines will be dropped at night by subs and aircraft. (I just found out that wargames conducted at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1974 concluded that it would have taken _a few_ days before the fleet would have arrived coming from Scapa Flow.) On their way they will be attacked by German bombers and submarines, and hindered by extensive mine fields and agressive German Kriegsmarine maneouvres. The Royal Navy will not be able to get to the Channel in strength on the first day and will offer itself piecemeal to all those hundreds of German Stukas and Ju 88s. When the main fleet will arrive from Scapa Flow the German divisions will have increased and have dug in for the awaited British assault, while being supplied by air. Although I see the RN cutting supplies for the German beachhead and attacking it, I wonder how long the Royal Navy would be able to witstand the damage German bombers will inflict on them? It will be a trade off between defeat of the Royal Navy or the defeat of the German invasion army. What will be easiest to rebuild? The Germans had a hundred other divisions... For that reason I don't think the Royal Navy will be holding out for longer than 2 days after which they will count their losses. 2 days in which the elite German divisions will have to hold out. I think this will be the defining moment and IMO it can go both ways, depending on the decision of the British leaders. 

Ground: The German army was overall better trained and more experienced than the British. This advantage can hardly be overestimated. As only few divisions will be needed at first, they can be equipped with the best weapons available. I'm especially thinking of the superior 75mm AT and tank guns, tapered guns with the otherwise rare tungsten cored ammunition. German forces in North Africa have shown that they can push back or at least hold against a larger CW force opposing them.
So perhaps 15 divisons after a week is too optimistic. 10 divisions after a week, opposed to 30? British divisions? 

So that's what I have in mind when I talk about a German invasion. I'm sorry that I'm lacking the time to reply to the many posts. I have tried to answer some of them by restating my views more extensively. I know that these are my own views on "how I would 've done it!" and based on my own thus limited views on the military capabilities of both countries. But as this is a what-if scenario, my guess is as good as any other 
Kris


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## Glider (Mar 27, 2007)

Udet said:


> I must insist: do you forget what the conditions of the British Army in England were during 1940?
> 
> The BEF had virtually lost all its equipment: tanks, artillery, vehicles and supply stocks, not forgetting the British soldiers dead and captured in France. When they were allowed to escape all they brought with them was their wet clothing.
> 
> ...



The German Army didn't have the ability to bring any Tanks, Artillery, trucks in any numbers with them so the ground war would have been a lot more even than you think.
Thats after the significan losses would heve been incurred on the way over. Crete was taken (just) by airbourne forces but all the naval landings were decimated at sea, despite the Germans having all the advantages.


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## Glider (Mar 27, 2007)

early 1942 is an interesting period and well chosen. 
There is no doubt that the 190 was the best fighter in the air by a clear margin or that the British GA aircraft were generally outmoded. It was a period of change in the RAF with P51's starting to be introduced together with the Typhoons, Mossies, Bostons and Lancasters. Daylight raid would still have been undertaken and the RAF losses kept within limits by the simple fact of being over our own territory, but the loss ratio would be in favour of the Germans. 
I don't think training is an issue as by that time I believe that the RAF had inproved its hours.
There is one huge advantage the RAF had, which I hadn't thought of before. By early 1942 we had a very large heavy bomber force. The landing sites would be on UK soil, close to our bases (in heavy bomber terms) and easily identified. They would have been plastered at night at little risk to themselves. 
Beaufighters would have been able to intercept the german nightfighters and operating on their own turf under radar control. German nightfighters would be operating over the UK on their own at a serious disadvantage.

RN
Again I see the night belonging to the RN, our coastal forces are large by this time and dominating the seas around Britain at night. Nothing the Germans could do wold change this.
By day Germany still would have had a lot of trouble stopping a determined attack. Losses even serious losses may be caused by air attack but like the Germans in the Channel dash, the cover would be organised. It should be remembered that a few detroyers could cause significant damage, a couple of cruisers would cause havoc and if its make or break time for the war, the losses would be accepted.

Army
The British Army was much better prepared in 1942. Equipment shortages a thing of the past. German tanks had an advantage certainly, but the fighting in the UK would be different to Russia and the Desert. Ranges are a lot shorter and most German tanks PzIII and Pz IV would be vulnerable to the 2pd and 6pd guns used by the British Army.
Artillery is an area that would come into play and was a strength of the British Army. Germany would be very limited in what they could bring over and would be outclassed/outnumbered.

PS you still haven't said what will carry the German Army and where they would be built


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## Jabberwocky (Mar 27, 2007)

Civettone said:


> So many reactions to respond to... I'll do my best.
> 
> Let me start by saying that what I have in mind is a Sealion in the Summer of 1942, after defeating Russia in 1941. This is not a rule - that's not up to me - but that's what I have in mind when I make these comments. So that means half a year of preparations in which production of all kinds of aircraft and naval transportation devices are being build. I would expect the Germans to prepare for the invasion for half a year, gathering information and drawing up extensive plans. This is all meagre compared to what the allies had in 1944 but as I said before, it doesn't have to be like D-Day. Germany could do with less.



They would have to do with less. 

If they defeated Russia in a 6 month campaign, the Germans then have 3-6 months to transfer their aerial forces and prepare them for an offensive campaign (assuming a start to operations between March and June 1942).

The German army has 3-7 months to prepare, given that the latest date for the original Sealion was the end of September .

Compare this to the 2 years of planning and 18 months of preparation carried out by the Allies before D-Day, with a significantly larger economic base. 



> I've read many references to D-Day like destroying of infrastructure, controlling the skies, etc. I think D-Day is such an icon because it was so incredibly succesful! When you look at it, it was almost a walk-over. Now before you start throwing things at me, let just look at the numbers until the end of July: 50,000 dead out of 2 million men. On D-Day itself 2,500 dead, most on Omaha beach. So besides Omaha beach, D-Day was a walk-over. That's what excellent preparation and numerical superiority lead to.



D-Day was a success because of several factors.

1. The complete aerial interdiction of the Coetetin penninsula and Normandy, combined with complete aerial control

2. The complete control of the sea and supply lanes by Allied naval power.

3. The ability of the Allies to land 8 complete divisions in the first 2 HOURS of the assault (including 3 airborne divisions).

3. The fragility of the German defences (stiff resistance at only 1 of the 5 beaches).

Total D-Day casualties were around 11,000 (including 2,500 killed), while the Allied landed approximately 160,000 thousand troops.



> But if only half of these advantages were there, I still think D-Day would have succeeded. Not one of the beaches was a failure, not one was evacuated. Even if the allies had just one or two beaches in their hands, they could stil have won the battle and go on to break out of Normandy.



The single greatest worry for Montgomery and Eisenhower was that the beacheads remained unlinked or 'reduced' on D-Day. If the Germans had reduced the beacheds from 5 to two, I suggest that the operation would of been called off on D +1, as the tactical picture for the German army would of been IMMENSLY simplified.



> I don't see Germany achieving superiority in the air, on the ground or at sea. But I do see them having control. And I believe this would have been enough to succesfully invade Britain, hold the beaches and eventually break out and defeat the English.
> 
> Let's break this down to those three fields:
> Air: if Germany ever had better aircraft than the British it was in 1941/1942 with the Fw 190 and Bf 109F, both of which were superior to the Spitfire V or Hurricane II. Spitfire IX only appeared in the late Summer and in small numbers. British hardly had any attack aircraft, they were stick Blenheims, Beaufighters, no Typhoons or Mosquitos.
> With increased aircraft production - as said above - and with most aircraft pulled back from Eastern Europe and with better pilots than the British (because of superior training hours), Germany would have held the advantage in the air. With the British aircraft primarily attacking targets in the Channel and over the German held beaches, they would no longer have the advantage of flying over friendly territory. Naturally, the Germans would have had the advantage. After a while Germany would have broken the back of the RAF in a battle of attrition like it itself had undergone in 1940.



Operating over British territory, with the British calling the shots on interceptions and able to assemble and guide their forces uch like the Germans did over France in 1941, the Spitfire V would of been on a much more even footing with the 109F (which is roughly equal in quality) and the 190A4/5 (which is superior).

The Typhoon Ib was in operational service by the end of 1941 and there were seven squadrons operational with the type by the end of August 1942 (Nos 266, 56, 256, 486, 181, 182 and 609). 

Similarly, the Spitfire Mk IX began entering service in July, and there were 4 squadrons (Nos 64, 611, 401, and 402) operational by the end of August.

The other advantage the British have is a more than tripling of the strenght of Anti-Aircraft command by the end of 1941 (figures taken from 'Ack-Ack', by General Frederick A Pile, Commander in-Chief of Anti-Aircraft Command):

June 1940 ADA Defensive guns

Heavy:

4.5 inch: 355
3.7 static; 313
3.7 mobile: 306
3 inch (obsolete): 226

Light:

40mm Bofors: 273	
2 lbr: 140
20mm: 38
3 inch (obsolete): 136

Dec-1941:

Heavy:

4.5 inch: 476
3.7 static: 935
3.7 mobile: 465
3 inch (obsolete): 144

Light: 

40mm Bofors: 1,056
2 lbrs: 71
20mm: 62
3 inch (Obsolete): 8

Plus, AACommand had introduced radar azimuth and ranging detectors, essentially doubling their effectiveness in terms of accuracy and battery fire control.



> Oh yes, I forgot to mention that I do not think it would have been a good idea to start an extensive air offensive before the invasion. That would have failed for the same reasons as in 1940. Surprise would have to be on the German side: paradropping at night and landing the first wave at dawn.



And what happens on the second day, when an undiminished RAF strikes the German beachheads and the supply ships anchored of the coast waiting to unload? 

Coastal Command is hardly impotent, with low level Hampdens, Bostons, Beaufighters and Whitleys to hit the Kriegsmarine.

The RAF is going to have a dream scenario carpet bombing the invasion beaches while Hurribombers go in at low level.



> Sea: Although the Channel could not be sealed off, it could have been made difficult for the RN. Sealing off the Channel does not mean mining the Channel itself but the access lanes towards it creating a almost sealed-off area in which the Kriegsmarine and German transport vessels can operate. These mines will be dropped at night by subs and aircraft. (I just found out that wargames conducted at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1974 concluded that it would have taken _a few_ days before the fleet would have arrived coming from Scapa Flow.) On their way they will be attacked by German bombers and submarines, and hindered by extensive mine fields and agressive German Kriegsmarine maneouvres.



You are forgetting serveral important parts of the British defensive plans: the light costal forces and submarines and the RNs own minfields. 

The RN had approximatley 80-120 light coastal boats in Home Waters at any one time. Unlike their German counterparts, British light boats had radar and were trained to operate both at day and night. Anti invasion plans were to strike at the Kriegsmarines escort ships initially with Motor torpedo boats in the day (which were not as good as German E-boats) and then disrupt landing and resupply operations with Motor Gun Boats at night.

British submarine forces would of had a field day: tightly packed, slow moving assault craft guarded by destroyers while the big ships (crusiers and battleships) rides shotgun, attempting to picket the RN.




> The Royal Navy will not be able to get to the Channel in strength on the first day and will offer itself piecemeal to all those hundreds of German Stukas and Ju 88s. When the main fleet will arrive from Scapa Flow the German divisions will have increased and have dug in for the awaited British assault, while being supplied by air. Although I see the RN cutting supplies for the German beachhead and attacking it, I wonder how long the Royal Navy would be able to witstand the damage German bombers will inflict on them? It will be a trade off between defeat of the Royal Navy or the defeat of the German invasion army. What will be easiest to rebuild? The Germans had a hundred other divisions... For that reason I don't think the Royal Navy will be holding out for longer than 2 days after which they will count their losses. 2 days in which the elite German divisions will have to hold out. I think this will be the defining moment and IMO it can go both ways, depending on the decision of the British leaders.



The RN had a saying around the battle of Crete "It takes three years to build a ship, it takes three centuries to build a tradition". 

The RN may be damaged, even heavily, but neither the LuftWaffe or the Kreigsmarine are going to go home intact either.

The ability of the Luftwaffe to destroy the RN, while stationary and evacuating troops at Dieppe (6 destroyers over 10 days, including 2 torpedoed and one mined) and Crete (2 cruisers, six destroyers) seems a little overrated to me.

You haven't granted control of the skies to the Luftwaffe, and the RN would be operating in home waters, under the umbrella of an undiminished RAF operating over 100 squadrons of fighters. The RN would harely be prey to hordes of bombers.

More tommorow....


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## syscom3 (Mar 27, 2007)

Dont forget the USN was going to contribute quite a few warships to the frey including a couple of carriers.

Interesting scenario.... Daunteless's going after German warships protected by Wildcats. ME-109 vs F4F.

The US could also contribute some fighter's (P40's and maybe a P38 group). And unlike the BOB in 1940, there were plenty of allied pilots available to make good any loss's.

I wish you would get off this idea that you could transport 15 divisions within a week. Its impossible. Period. Try 5 - 6 divisions of light infantry IF the channel remains calm and youre extremely lucky and the Brits/US extremely unlucky.

Lose a port and forget about landing heavy eqmt in numbers and in a hurry. Its highly unlikely that the KM could design and build enough heavy amphib ships within 1/2 year.

Even if this invasion did take place, it was going to be a disaster for the Germans after one week. Not enough logistics, not enough time, not enough air/sea support when needed.


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## Civettone (Mar 27, 2007)

Ok, now for some seperate points. 

About Germany not being able to bring in two divisions a day because the allies couldn't bring in more one every two days. My answer is I don't know why the allies couldn't bring in more. The explanations I've heard so far are unconvincing. If it was because the allies started to bring in more tanks, fuel, supplies and vehicles (like happened in Anzio) then I feel assured that I'm not thinking of bringing in Panzerdivisionen or the extra fuel and supplies they needed. 
But I still don't understand that the allies manage to bring in 10 divisions in the first 24 hours and after that only 0.5 divisions in 24 hours. Someone care to explain? I'm puzzled. 

About German bombers not being able to sink ships. Especially the case of Dunkirk comes to mind but it is often misquoted. Only a part of the Luftwaffe in France was used near Dunkirk. The battle against France was still going on and bombers were also needed elsewhere. Add to that the relatively high losses the German Luftwaffe had already suffered. The bombers were putting too much effort on the beaches and the actual embarking. Yet, it's clear that more could have been achieved. To explain this, one has to remember that German crews were not trained in attacking naval targets. This only started after the BoB after which results improved. I can provide numbers if needed but look at Crete for instance where 10 warships were destroyed by German bombers. Or Pedestal where (mainly) German bombers sunk about 5 ships of a one-way convoy towards Malta. These were all long-range missions. Bombers operating from the Calais area could attack and return to base in half an hour. British fighter interceptors would no longer have the advantage of early warning as they had in the BoB: they would come too late to scramble and intercept bombers attacking targets in the Channel. So let's say we'll have 10 times the number of bombers of Pedestal (100x10) able to fly 5 missions a day (not unusual for a short period, see Kursk) and carrying a much larger bomb load (1000 kg armour piercing bombs!), that means 50 times the sorties of Pedestal but with more bombs. So that would lead to 250 RN ships destroyed and many more taken out of action in a single day. Let's keep in mind British fighter CAPS (though this will mean they won't escort their bombers as they attack the invasion beaches), atttrition, fatigue, bad weather, bad luck, and detract half: that would still mean 100 destroyers and cruisers lost and many more taken out of action a day! 
Add to that: German mines, submarines, surface ships and coastal guns. 

Mines: The Sandhurst war games acknowledged that German main fields could have seriously hindered the RN advance. I believe that the Royal Navy ruled at night, just look at how they defeat the Regia Marina at night. But it's not like they had complete control. This is shown by the fact that the Germans were indeed able to mine the area (though not as much as they could have if they wanted to), even today there are still German mines washing up on British, French or Belgian shores. Coastal submarines anyone? German fast S-Torpedoboats which formed a danger up to May 1944 (remember their attack on the allied invasion fleet exercise?). So add those threats to the Royal Navy and I believe anything between an absolute minimum of 100 warships a day could be sunk and a maximum maximora of 300 ships taken out of action, ... a day.

I believe it was Jabberwocky who said the Bf 109F was on equal footing with the Spitfire V. This was not the case. There's only one aspect in which the Spitfire V was better and that's firepower. Speed, climb rate, acceleration, agility are all in favour of the Friedrich. Plus, up to early 1943 Germans had better pilots than the British (for every German fighter they lost they shot down three British, at the end of 1943 this had turned the other way around!). I already said the Typhoon and Spitfire IX would have only been available in small numbers. Especially the Typhoon was plagued with problems and only got their act worked out in 1943. Up to 1942 they were still thinking of pulling the plug on it. I'm sure you're aware of this. I can also understand that you wanted to leave that out 
In combination with the Typhoon discussion ... although the British AA capability had increased, they had little to throw in against German Fw 190 attacks ... until the Typhoon started to intercept them in early 1943. That says a thing or two about British AA warfare. 
But even then, I don't think it will be that much of an issue. If you read my posts, you'll notice that I'm digging in 'my' German infantry and using all my bombers to take out the Royal Navy. This will result in the entire RAF fighting over hostile territory and the disputed Channel. 

Ground. Not much to add to that. I also don't see many comments on that subject. Only want to add that the 6 Pdr was still rare in the Summer of 1942. Standard AT gun was still the 2 Pdr. I'm sure the British would have had fun using that against the latest German tanks. The advantage of the better German guns is not range, it's penetration values. The 75mm could penetrate every British tank (exception perhaps the rare Churchill tank) while the vast majority of British tanks still had 2 Pdrs. 

In case I forgot to answer to someone's comment, please remind me of them. Right now, my fingers are starting to ache... 

Finally I would like to stress yet again, that in my scenario the Germans would have devoted half a year of preparations to the invasion. Although that's not as much as the allies had for D-day, I think this could have been enough preparation (I mean, why would D-Day be the standard??) and would have meant German manoeuvres, war games, tactics, training, intelligence, and their own Hobbart-funnies to be developed. This Sealion 42 can hardly be compared to that of Sealion 40. 

Kris


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## HealzDevo (Mar 27, 2007)

But then there are too many assumptions still there, which I feel need to be challenged. First of all, how are they planning to do any better in their analysis of the RAF fighter strength than before? It was proved that the German kills were too high, and keep in mind that they wouldn't know still at this stage just how far their kills were over reality. Also I know you are also using the Kriegsmarine but this assumes that the Kriegsmarine has enough firepower to support the German troops and help them establish themselves. As we know there are questions of the availability of this firepower.


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## Civettone (Mar 28, 2007)

I think you're confusing the British with the Germans. It was the British who overestimated the number of German planes shot down. The German count system was the most accurate in the world. It's true that they failed to realize how many fighters the British had but once the BoB had started this mattered little. 

In any case, British fighters are not the prime concern. Over Dieppe the British lost four times the number of fighters than the Germans although they outnumbered them with the same multitude! Same story for the Channel Dash. At the beginning of 1942, Fighter Command had 60 squadrons of Spitfires. Almost all of them were Spitfire Vs which were inferior to at least the Fw 190A and Bf 109G, and IMO also to the Bf 109F-4. In my scenario most of the aircraft would have returned after the defeat of Russia, and would have increased pressure on the RAF from 1942 onwards. Quite contary to what happened in reality. This would also weaken the RAF. As such they would not be as strong as historically true. 

About naval support. I never said anything about it, and I think that answers your questions. It would have been very limited. I only see German warships providing support during the first day after which they would have to be pulled back and engaged in favorable hit and run attacks against the Royal Navy. The German battlecruisers would be sent out on the Ocean which would prevent the bulk of the Royal Navy to be sent to the Channel. I'm also counting on the Italians at least doing some effort to keep Force Z busy...

Of course 1942 is an excellent year as British forces had been split up to fight in North Africa and the Far East. USA would not have been able to give significant support for the British, and given the surprise attack, their reinforcements would probably come too late to force a decision. 
I also feel the Americans would suggest to the British not to let the Royal Navy get decimated. If Britain would fall, the Americans wanted as much as possible transferred to Canada, especially the Royal Navy. Self-interest, you know...

Kris


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## HealzDevo (Mar 28, 2007)

But then even support on the first day you need to get the panzers into the beach so that they can perform as artillery later on. The British really would have resisted the landing and if you take that ground then you still have to get beyond the landing beach and attempt to take that.


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## Glider (Mar 28, 2007)

Kris
Preparation
The Germans would need a lot more than 6 months to prepare. It takes longer than that to build a tank landing craft, let alone design the thing in the first place. This is an area the Germans had no experience in so it wouldn't have been easy. Don't look at the Japanese for help. Their main TLC was the SS class and they didn't start building those until 1942.
Building these in the numbers to transport one division let alone the numbers you are talking about would take a lot longer.
Plus which shipyards are you going to use to build them? 

Air
109F vs Spit V. There was a long thread on this but at the end of the day the main agreement was that the training and experience of the crew and tactical position was what counted.
By 1942 the Germans had trained crews in attacking Naval targets so the Dunkirk failure was a thing of the past. 
Pedastal doesn't help the German case much. Sinking five or six ships from a slow moving convoy, after a number of air attacks, over a period of days, with zero aerial opposition and plenty of time to prepare, is hardly a record to be proud of. 
Crete, Similar but these were naval forces in isolation in most cases unable to support each other in the same way a fleet would.
Your statement that the Germans could and would have an increased sortie rate is no doubt accurate but the RAF would have been able to defend the RN.
By 1942 the RAF was a lot bigger than the GAF and it wouldn't have sat back and done nothing. In May 42 the GAF had around 5,700 aircraft, in May 1940 it was 5,350 a small increase (both all aircraft including training and transport). I don't have the RAF figures but I do know the number of front line squadrons had increased by around 100, say 16 planes a squadron call it 1,500 aircraft. 
Its fair to assume that if the GAF concentrated on the invasion, so would the British.
PS you still seem to have forgotten the RAF Heavy Bombers hitting the invasion area at night, *if *they had got ashore.

German Coastal forces were way outclassed by the RN. I agree the S Boat was the best design of the war, but when it came to fighting the British were all over them. We had the people and the numbers, the invasion fleet would have been decimated if caught at night.

German Battlecruisers breaking out. Simple counter would be to give each of the convoys an old R class BB as escort. These would have been of limited use in the Channel as they had the poorest AA defence and limiter deck armour. 
However the Germans wouldn't attack them with a BC, This did happen on one occaision when the Schornurst tured away from a convoy when an old BB was spotted. To attack would be to risk serious damage even if they won the fight and to be damaged in the Atlantic is to face almost certain loss getting home. 

Tanks
The new German tanks of May 42 was the PzIVf and PzIIIj. These were better than anything we had but their armour was I believe about 50mm. The few that the Germans could get ashore would have been vulnerable at the sort of ranges common in the UK. They would have the advantage and destroyed more British tanks than they lost but the UK is very different to the Desert or Russia. Max Ranges of 300 yards are quite common sometimes longer, often shorter. 

There is I suggest a huge hole in your scenario.

You build prepare and concentrate huge forces for an invasion and launch a *Suprise *attack. This isn't possible. The tides and the weather dictate the time of the landing and the British can work those out as well as anyone.


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## Jabberwocky (Mar 28, 2007)

Civettone said:


> I believe it was Jabberwocky who said the Bf 109F was on equal footing with the Spitfire V. This was not the case. There's only one aspect in which the Spitfire V was better and that's firepower. Speed, climb rate, acceleration, agility are all in favour of the Friedrich.



Fundamentally disagree. 

The 109 was faster and climbed better (although climb advantage was marginal), but the Spitfire was considered more manouverable and agile by both sides, as captured Luftwaffe pilots readily attested to.



> Plus, up to early 1943 Germans had better pilots than the British (for every German fighter they lost they shot down three British, at the end of 1943 this had turned the other way around!).



By the end of 1941 British pilots were experiancing better training and more operational time in aircraft than their Luftwaffe counterparts, while Luftwaffe training was beginning to decline.









Examine the situation around Malta in 1942 for a different picture to the usual kanalkampf.

Spitfire pilots shot down 1.5 German fighters and 3 German or Italian aircraft in total for each of their own losses in the March to December 1942 period. 

This is with a situation of Luftwaffe aerial domiance: the Spitfire Mk Vs being heavily outnumbered (and supposedly outclassed) and not having sufficient fighter cover or AAA for landing operations. Of Spitfires shot down in combat over Malta in 1942, almost 20% were caught in the landing pattern over Talagi (Tal'Qali), Luqa or Hal Far.

Imagine this situation writ large over the UK in the same period. The RAF gets the benefit of better ground control, equality or even an advatage in fighter numbers, large numbers of reserve aircraft and pilots, breathing space for rotations in and out of the battle space, better defensive AAA and better facilities to operate from (i.e. pilots aren't going into battle with dysentry or short of food)

In a BoB 1942 scenario the RAF enjoys all the tactical advantages that the Luftwaffe did over France in 1941/1942, except that the defences are more concentrated and the defenders more numerous.


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## Civettone (Mar 28, 2007)

Glider said:


> Kris
> Preparation
> The Germans would need a lot more than 6 months to prepare. It takes longer than that to build a tank landing craft, let alone design the thing in the first place.


Are you saying the Germans couldn't have transported tanks? 



> Plus which shipyards are you going to use to build them?


I said before that the Germans managed to triple U-boat production in 1943. They did this with the existing shipyards. How did they do this? The same way the Americans managed to increase their production. By building prefab parts in factories and let the shipyards assemble them. Germans managed to reduce construction time of a U-boat from 11.5 to 2 months!! Oh yes, they also managed to double production of PT-boats and minesweepers.
Knowing that the Germans thought they would have enough transport vessels for landing 13 divisions in 3 days back in 1940, I don't think they'll have a shortage of vessels if they'll get the opportunity to produce tow and transport ships during an extra half year. I don't think a lack of transport vessels will be the bottleneck of Sealion 42.



> 109F vs Spit V. There was a long thread on this but at the end of the day the main agreement was that the training and experience of the crew and tactical position was what counted.


If that's so, then the Germans held the advantage: training, experience and tactical position (finding over their own territory).



> Sinking five or six ships from a slow moving convoy, after a number of air attacks, over a period of days, with zero aerial opposition and plenty of time to prepare, is hardly a record to be proud of.


They also sunk or damaged destroyers so I don't think that'll make much difference. 
Zero aerial opposition? You're misinformed: there were 30 carrier fighters until Malta fighters took over. These intercepted 7 out 8 attacks on the fleet. They usually faced Italian escort fighters or German Bf 110s. But the German bombers over the Channel would fight with sufficient German escort 109 and 190 fighters protecting them. 
Time to prepare? Didn't the English have even more time? They were the ones planning Pedestal for a long time. In the end, the Germans/Italians didn't know when the convoy was coming. 




> By 1942 the RAF was a lot bigger than the GAF and it wouldn't have sat back and done nothing. In May 42 the GAF had around 5,700 aircraft


I already said a couple of times that aircraft and naval production would have to be increased. Plus, there would be no more fighting in Russia in 1942. From around 250 fighters against the British, you'll get a thousand more leading to a decrease of RAF strength.



> you still seem to have forgotten the RAF Heavy Bombers hitting the invasion area at night


I'm not forgetting it but using RAF Heavy Bombers would inflict more losses on their own sides than on the German sides. What was their accuracy over Germany? 3 miles?? 
So I would love to see them bombing the crap out their own boys. Saves the Germans a lot of time and effort. More bombers to attack the RN.



> German Coastal forces were way outclassed by the RN.


 I agree. That's why I'm talking about hit and run attacks: staying close to the French shore and attacking whenever a favorable opportunity appeared. But never taking on the Royal Navy head-on. Just enough to hinder them and keep them fragmented. 



> We had the people and the numbers, the invasion fleet would have been decimated if caught at night.


Yes. If. I never said anything about invading at night. It's at dawn. The bulk of the Royal Navy was far away from the Channel. 

I agree with you on the battlecruisers. But the British would also have use other warships to defend their convoys. But it's not only about the convoys. The Royal Navy would never take a defensive stand, they would go out hunting for the Gemans ships. They would use several warships to achieve this. In any case, many RN ships would never be used in the Channel because of this. 



> The few that the Germans could get ashore would have been vulnerable at the sort of ranges common in the UK. They would have the advantage and destroyed more British tanks than they lost but the UK is very different to the Desert or Russia. Max Ranges of 300 yards are quite common sometimes longer, often shorter.


Of course. 

But I don't think there will be that many German tanks anyhow as I would take a rather defensive stand. (Only attacking the first couple of days, to take advantageous positions as well as a couple of ports.) AT capability will have to come from towed 50mm, 75mm and tapered bore guns. 



> You build prepare and concentrate huge forces for an invasion and launch a *Suprise *attack. This isn't possible. The tides and the weather dictate the time of the landing and the British can work those out as well as anyone.


Was this any different for the Germans on D-Day? They knew the allies were coming and when they could come but they were still caught off guard .. and not because of the bad weather. 
Anyway, I don't think the British would have expected an invasion without another air battle prior to an invasion, do you?



> The 109 was faster and climbed better (although climb advantage was marginal), but the Spitfire was considered more manouverable and agile by both sides, as captured Luftwaffe pilots readily attested to.


Are you saying there weren't any Luftwaffe pilots claiming the opposite? 
You make the mistake of identifying agility with turn rate. It has nothing do with that. Agility is a broad term which refers to speed, acceleration and agressive maneouvres. This is what matters in combat, not sustained climb rate or turn rate. The Bf 109F/G was better in the vertical as well as in the horizontal, it could engage and break off the fight at will. It held the advantage over the Spitfire V. I'm not aware of any previous discussions about it, but I'm more than willing to start it all over again!



> By the end of 1941 British pilots were experiancing better training and more operational time in aircraft than their Luftwaffe counterparts, while Luftwaffe training was beginning to decline.


That's also what I said. But it's important to understand that in 1941 training hours were increased but these pilots were only becoming available in 1942. And only in 1943 was the overall pilot quality of the RAF superior to that of the Luftwaffe.



> Spitfire pilots shot down 1.5 German fighters and 3 German or Italian aircraft in total for each of their own losses in the March to December 1942 period.


Really? How many Bf 109F/Gs fighters? Can you provide some figures to back this up? 

Kris


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 28, 2007)

Civettone said:


> I'm not forgetting it but using RAF Heavy Bombers would inflict more losses on their own sides than on the German sides. What was their accuracy over Germany? 3 miles??
> So I would love to see them bombing the crap out their own boys. Saves the Germans a lot of time and effort. More bombers to attack the RN.



_"In 1943 the Norden M-series was delivered to the USAAF. It is estimated that this version was 6 to 8 times more precise than the RAF Mk XIV bombsight. It is estimated that the RAF was capable of putting only *5% of its ordinance within a mile of their aiming point under combat conditions.*"_
WW II Encyclopedia -- Norden Bombsight


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## syscom3 (Mar 28, 2007)

Allied bombers operating at night would have advantages in that the targets (the ports or beaches) would be completely undefended and so close to England, that the attacks would be far more accurate.

Civitte is completely ignoring the contributions the US were capable of. Two carriers, two fast battleships and several cruisers and destroyers. More than enough to take on the KM.

US contributions for the airwar? Well admittedly not much material other than a P38 group and a couple of P40 groups, a B26 group. Even B17's could be used in a limited role. However, there was a plethora of pilots available by summer, and if needed, many could be retrained to fly the Spitfire.

US contribution for ground troops? A couple of infantry divisions, maybe one tank division. Not a lot, untrained of course, but they would still be forces the Germans would need to deal with.

Civitte.... do you realize how much shipping is needed to transport a single tank division and then keep it supplied? And factor in that there would be no ports available to offload, and you have a complex logistics issue. The KM could not have designed from scratch and then build in quantity the ships they needed for this. Forget about using those invasion barges because they were not "sea going" and could easily get swamped or held up by moderate sea states or strong currents.

And those 15 division's the Germans figured they could deploy? Look closer at their origional plans and the folly and assumptions they were working under. Everything was based on best case estimates that was not valid after the summer of 1940. Those divisions that could be transported were nothing but light infantry. Forget about landing bulk goods, transports or tanks or artillery as there were no ports to unload on.

Youre making a classic mistake in planning and assumptions on what you want your opponants to do, rather then what your opponants had the capability to do.


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## renrich (Mar 28, 2007)

A Sealion in the summer of 1942? All of the successful amphibious invasions of WW2 that I can think of presupposed complete naval superiority as a prerequisite. Of course that also implied that the enemy would not have air superiority. There have been many good arguments advanced on this thread about the German lack of landing craft for the original Sealion and the difficulties of logistical support for their army if they did force a lodgement in Britain. However, I believe that the major sticking point for any invasion of Britain unless Germany has complete control of the air is their inability to protect their invasion force from the RN. Remember, the Allies ALWAYS knew they would control the waters in the channel and felt certain they would also control the air for D-day. I have a copy(original) of Janes for 1942 in front of me and tried to count the ships in the RN and KM(it wasn't easy for the RN, there were so many.) RN-4 mod BB, 2 Nelson BB, 1 BC, 4 QE BB, 4 R class BB, 8 carriers, 30 CL, 8CA, 18 second class CL, 100 or so DD, 73 SS. This does not include Commonwealth ships. KM- 1 BB, 2 BC, 2 pocket BB, 4 CA, 12 DD, 100 or so SS. If Germany was building up for an invasion of Britain I have to believe at least 50% of the RN would be ready to use as a striking force against an invasion. If Fighter Command provides at least a standoff in the air, the best LW anti shipping a/c is the JU87 but they will sustain heavy losses just as they did in the BOB. Can anyone imagine the carnage among the landing force's ships when the RN is virtually unopposed. There will be British naval casualties but they will not hold back when their island is being invaded. For a foretaste of what would happen review the ABDA forces around Java in 1942 with almost no air support. At Balikpapan at night the poorly led and coordinated allied forces with WW1 4 piper DDs sank a number of Japanese transports and at Sunda Strait the Perth and Houston accidently ran into the Japanese landing force and did much damage before being sunk. I don't see how the Germans could ever invade Britain as long as the RN was intact unless the LW had complete air superiority over the channel.


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## Bernhart (Mar 28, 2007)

The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, as the first component of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, embarked for the United Kingdom on 17 December 1939 and arrived at Greenock, Scotland on 25 December. It moved to Aldershot on arrival, but was sent to Northampton on 29 May 1940. It returned to Aldershot on 8 June 1940. The brigade moved to France on 1213 June 1940 and left there on 16-17 June for Aldershot. When the division moved to Oxford on 1819 June 1940, the brigade remained at Aldershot until 16 July 1940, when it rejoined the division in the Guildford-Westerham area of Surrey. The brigade was rotated to the coast of Sussex for coast defence duties. By the autumn of 1941, it moved to the Sussex coast and remained with the division in Sussex until 3 June 1943, when it prepared to embark for Sicily. It embarked on 25 June and landed in Sicily on 10 July 1943.

2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade embarked for the United Kingdom on 22 December 1939 and arrived at Greenock, Scotland on 30 December. It moved to Aldershot on arrival. A force of two battalions of the brigade (PPCLI and Edmonton Regiment) were selected for possible operations against Trondheim in Norway. This force left Aldershot on 18 April 1940 and moved to Dunfermline, Scotland on 19 April, but it was not used and returned to Aldershot. The brigade was sent to Northampton on 29 May 1940. It returned to Aldershot on 8 June 1940. It moved to Oxford on 1819 June 1940 with the division, but left there on 2 July 1940 for Guildford-Westerham area of Surrey. The brigade was rotated to the coast of Sussex for coast defence duties. The brigade (less the Seaforths) was mobilized for operations against Spitzbergen by 3/4 August 1941. It moved to Glasgow on 56 August from Surrey, but by 16 August most were returned to Surrey. Details of the brigade (some Edmontons, Saskatoon LI and 3rd FC, RCE) left for Spitzbergen on 19 August and returned to the Clyde on 7/8 September. By the autumn of 1941, it moved to the Sussex coast and remained with the division in Sussex until 3 June 1943, when it prepared to embark for Sicily. It embarked on 28 June and landed in Sicily on 10 July 1943.

3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade embarked for the United Kingdom on 8 December 1939 and arrived at Greenock, Scotland on 17 December. It moved to Aldershot on arrival, but was sent to Northampton on 29 May 1940. It returned to Aldershot on 8 June 1940. The division moved to Oxford on 1819 June 1940 and then to the Guildford-Westerham area of Surrey on 2 July 1940. The brigade was rotated to the coast of Sussex for coast defence duties. By the autumn of 1941, it moved to the Sussex coast and remained with the division in Sussex until 3 June 1943, when it prepared to embark for Sicily. It embarked on 27 June and landed in Sicily on 10 July 1943

2nd Canadian Infantry Division arrived on 2 August 1940. I Canadian Corps HQ was finally needed in the United Kingdom on 25 December 1940. 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade embarked for the United Kingdom on 23 July 1940 and arrived at Gourock, Scotland on 2 August. [The Royal Regiment of Canada left 9 June 1940 for Halifax and then served on Iceland from 16 June 1940 to 31 October 1940. It arrived at Greenock, Scotland on 3 November 1940 and rejoined the brigade at Aldershot. The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa left Canada on 30 June 1940 and arrived in Iceland on 7 July 1940, where it remained until 27 April 1941.] The brigade moved to Aldershot on arrival. It moved to Surrey on 7 September 1940 and came under command of VII Corps to replace the recently departed New Zealand contingent. The brigade did its turn on the Sussex coast until the autumn of 1941, when the Canadian Corps moved into the Sussex coast, with 2nd Division replacing 55th British Division in East Sussex in July and August 1941. The brigade moved to the Isle of Wight on 18 May 1942 to prepare for Dieppe and landed there on 19 August 1942. It returned to Sussex and remained in Sussex through June 1943. It landed in France on 5 July 1944. 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade with the Calgary Highlanders, embarked for the United Kingdom on 27 August 1940 and arrived at Gourock, Scotland on 4 September. [1st Black Watch was sent to Newfoundland on 21 June 1940 and remained there until 11 August 1940. It rejoined the brigade at Halifax on 13 August. Les Fusiliers Mon-Royal left the brigade on 7 July 1940 and arrived in Iceland on 9 July 1940. It officially left the brigade on arrival in the United Kingdom] The brigade moved to Aldershot on arrival. Starting in September 1940, the brigade did its turn on the Sussex coast until the autumn of 1941, when the Canadian Corps moved into the Sussex coast, with 2nd Division replacing 55th British Division in East Sussex in July and August 1941. It remained in Sussex through June 1943. It landed in France on 7 July 1944. 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade embarked on 16 December 1940 and arrived on 25 December 1940 in the United Kingdom. It moved to Aldershot on arrival and was joined there by Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal from Iceland on 3 November 1940. The brigade did its turn on the Sussex coast until the autumn of 1941, when the Canadian Corps moved into the Sussex coast, with 2nd Division replacing 55th British Division in East Sussex in July and August 1941. The brigade moved to the Isle of Wight on 18 May 1942 to prepare for Dieppe and landed there on 19 August 1942. It returned to Sussex and remained in Sussex through June 1943. It landed in France on 7 July 1944.

During 1941, two additional divisions arrived in the United Kingdom: the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (7th, 8th and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigades) on 29 July and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division (1st, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades and 5th Support Group) in November. They were preceded by the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade on 30 June. The 1st Canadian Anti-Aircraft Brigade was created in the United Kingdom on 1 October 1941. 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade left Halifax on 24 August 1941 and arrived in Gourock, Scotland on 1 September 1941. It moved to Aldershot on arrival. Soon after arrival, the division moved to the south of England and remained there until it landed in France on 6 June 1944. 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade left Halifax on 21 July 1941 and arrived in Gourock, Scotland on 29 July 1941. 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade left Halifax on 21 July 1941 and arrived in Gourock, Scotland on 29 July 1941. In September 1941, the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade left Warminster for Surrey. Shortly after arriving in Surrey, the regiments were sent to the coast. (11th-Brighton, 12th-Worthing, and 14th-Seaford). The 1st Canadian Anti-Aircraft Brigade was formed at Colchester in Essex and all the Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments came under command as they arrived in the United Kingdom. It later moved to the south of England as part of Army Troops of 1st Canadian Army with 2nd Heavy AA Regiment, RCA and 7th, 11th Light AA Regiment, RCA. It was disbanded on 1 March 1944.

The final major formation to arrive in the United Kingdom was 4th Canadian Armoured Division. This division had been formed from 4th Canadian Infantry Division in the Maritimes on 26 January 1942 and consisted of 3rd and 4th Canadian Armoured Brigades and 4th Canadian Support Group on arrival in the United Kingdom in August and September 1942. The 1st Canadian Army was raised in England on 1 April 1942 and by September 1942 most of its formations had arrived in the United Kingdom. Add seventeen squadrons of
planes and about 100 ships of various sizes, the brits had some help already there


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## Civettone (Mar 28, 2007)

> Allied bombers operating at night would have advantages in that the targets (the ports or beaches) would be completely undefended and so close to England, that the attacks would be far more accurate.


No. First, the lousy accuracy was not due to enemy actions. Second, the targets would not be completely undefended as every German division had AD guns. Plus, German nightfighters knew exactly where to be, unlike their normal duties over the German fatherland.



> Civitte is completely ignoring the contributions the US were capable of. Two carriers, two fast battleships and several cruisers and destroyers. More than enough to take on the KM.


They would come too late. And also the other American reinforcements would come too late. 
Everyone seems to agree that the real difficulty for the Germans was to get their troops across the Channel and keep supplying them. The battle would be decided in the first couple of weeks.



> Civitte.... do you realize how much shipping is needed to transport a single tank division and then keep it supplied?


Where did I mention a tank division? Germany never had a tank division... but never mind that, I suppose you mean a Panzerdivision? Someone wrote it needed 25% more supplies than a Infantry Division... 

I'm basing much of my stuff on the original German plans. The KM said they were capable of transporting the forces required by the army. In hindsight we can all say they didn't have the capacity ... but in all honesty who are we to judge this? I think we're looking at this too much from a D-Day point of view, as if the Germans would need as much vessels as the allies needed for the same amount of troops... 
Here's what I know: Germans wanted to transport 13 divisions in 3 days. KM said they would be able to do so. (Of course they assumed the RN would have been neutralized.) Now, even if they were wrong in the assesment of their own transport capabilities, I think an extra 6 months would be able to fill that gap. This is not wishful thinking, this is logic ... or at least to me...




> And factor in that there would be no ports available to offload


 German plans acknowlegded that the harbours would have been sabotaged. That's why they would send along engineers to get the ports ready ASAP. I'm thinking of how long it took for the Americans to repair Cherbourg, Toulon, ... and see at least part of the captured British ports being kept operational. 



> Forget about using those invasion barges because they were not "sea going" and could easily get swamped or held up by moderate sea states or strong currents.


Really? I am starting to get the impression that this sinking of barges is becoming an urban legend...
I don't know exactly what Beaufort 6 entails but that's apparently what the barges were cleared for when taken over by Yugoslav forces after the war... 



> I don't see how the Germans could ever invade Britain as long as the RN was intact unless the LW had complete air superiority over the channel.


Good post, Renrich. I agree with what you're saying. I come to the same conclusion you do. But my calculation of British ships being taken out by German bombers makes me conclude that most of the British ships could be taken out (after which the transport would resume.) I myself am surprised by the result of that calculation and half already divided it by two, to be on the safe side.

Again, unlike the BoB, the British would not be one step ahead of the Germans when fighting over the Channel as it lies in between France and England. I have tried to show that German fighters and fighter pilots were superior to the British and that when aircraft production would go up and when most of the Luftwaffe was called back from Russia, the German fighters would get the upper hand over the Channel (just look at Dieppe!) and that a 1000 German bombers flying 5 missions a day would have a DEVESTATING effect on the Royal Navy. 

Kris


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## syscom3 (Mar 29, 2007)

Civettone said:


> No. First, the lousy accuracy was not due to enemy actions. Second, the targets would not be completely undefended as every German division had AD guns. Plus, German nightfighters knew exactly where to be, unlike their normal duties over the German fatherland.



And now you are inventing night fighters to operate over England?



> They would come too late. And also the other American reinforcements would come too late.
> Everyone seems to agree that the real difficulty for the Germans was to get their troops across the Channel and keep supplying them. The battle would be decided in the first couple of weeks.



And obviously you didnt read my 65th anniversary thread because on this day in 1942, a USN task force consisting of the BB's did arrive in England.



> Where did I mention a tank division? Germany never had a tank division... but never mind that, I suppose you mean a Panzerdivision? Someone wrote it needed 25% more supplies than a Infantry Division...



So now youre saying that only a few panzers are going to be landed? And try +200% more tonnage than light infantry because of the fuel and ammo requirements.



> I'm basing much of my stuff on the original German plans. The KM said they were capable of transporting the forces required by the army. In hindsight we can all say they didn't have the capacity ... but in all honesty who are we to judge this? I think we're looking at this too much from a D-Day point of view, as if the Germans would need as much vessels as the allies needed for the same amount of troops...



And the brits in 1942 were in a far better position to repel an invasion than in 1940. What part of that don't you understand? An allied invasion of Europe in 1942 was going to fail big time, and vice versa.



> Here's what I know: Germans wanted to transport 13 divisions in 3 days. KM said they would be able to do so. (Of course they assumed the RN would have been neutralized.) Now, even if they were wrong in the assesment of their own transport capabilities, I think an extra 6 months would be able to fill that gap. This is not wishful thinking, this is logic ... or at least to me...



What part dont you understand of the following:
1) What the KM said they could do in 1940 was not exactly the truth as it was based on extremely unlikely best case scenario's on what the brits were going to do vs. what they were capable of doing.
2) The KM in the space of 4 months was going to design and build all sorts of ships and vessels needed to perform a complex invasion all without a doctrine or practice.
3)The RN and RAF (and the US units) were all going to self destruct and not interfere with your buildup or invasion and not notice your sailing from the ports.
4) The German army had no need to worry about logistics because it didnt count.




> German plans acknowlegded that the harbours would have been sabotaged. That's why they would send along engineers to get the ports ready ASAP. I'm thinking of how long it took for the Americans to repair Cherbourg, Toulon, ... and see at least part of the captured British ports being kept operational.



And it took the allies thousands of ships to supply their forces, 24/7 under absolute maritime and aerial supremecy. And you certenily dont know your German army very well because engineering/logistics was not a high point for them at all during the war.



> Really? I am starting to get the impression that this sinking of barges is becoming an urban legend...
> I don't know exactly what Beaufort 6 entails but that's apparently what the barges were cleared for when taken over by Yugoslav forces after the war...



And where did you discover this little gem of a detail thats been overlooked by thousands of historians?



> Good post, Renrich. I agree with what you're saying. I come to the same conclusion you do. But my calculation of British ships being taken out by German bombers makes me conclude that most of the British ships could be taken out (after which the transport would resume.) I myself am surprised by the result of that calculation and half already divided it by two, to be on the safe side.



Once again, why is it the KM suffers no damage and only the allies? 



> Again, unlike the BoB, the British would not be one step ahead of the Germans when fighting over the Channel as it lies in between France and England. I have tried to show that German fighters and fighter pilots were superior to the British and that when aircraft production would go up and when most of the Luftwaffe was called back from Russia, the German fighters would get the upper hand over the Channel (just look at Dieppe!) and that a 1000 German bombers flying 5 missions a day would have a DEVESTATING effect on the Royal Navy.



Try to understand something about the aerial war.....both sides were evenly matched. The LW had to be the aggressor to gain air superiority and it was going to suffer irreplacable losses. Its irrelevant that the -109 may have had marginal superiority over the Spit because in a macro sense, they weer going to be shot down over the UK with the loss of the pilot. At nighttime, it wasn't going to stop the RAF from bombing its targets. And you're conveniently forgetting the US war machine that was spooling up to make good any losses the RF had.


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## Civettone (Mar 29, 2007)

I could do with a bit less sarcasm, thank you very much. 



syscom3 said:


> And now you are inventing night fighters to operate over England?


I'm not inventing anything. I just hadn't mentioned this before as I hadn't talked about night warfare yet. On the other hand, I am inventing a whole lot of things. It's a what-if scenario so I can come up with whatever I believe was possible. Using nightfighters over the Channel is possible. 




> And obviously you didnt read my 65th anniversary thread because on this day in 1942, a USN task force consisting of the BB's did arrive in England.


I only read this from time to time. Very interesting though, I appreciate the effort you put into it! 
Point taken on the BB's!




> So now youre saying that only a few panzers are going to be landed?


Where did I say the opposite?




> And try +200% more tonnage than light infantry because of the fuel and ammo requirements.


Like I said, someone else mentioned the 25% rule. I believe it was this thread. Browse back if you want to find out who said it.
In any case, no Panzerdivisions in the early phase of the invasion...




> And the brits in 1942 were in a far better position to repel an invasion than in 1940. What part of that don't you understand? An allied invasion of Europe in 1942 was going to fail big time, and vice versa.


Nice to see you've got it worked out. 
I agree that the Brits were in a better position. But with Russia defeated, their air force drawn back to the west, and with 6 months of preparation so were the Germans. 




> What part dont you understand of the following:
> 1) What the KM said they could do in 1940 was not exactly the truth as it was based on extremely unlikely best case scenario's on what the brits were going to do vs. what they were capable of doing.
> 2) The KM in the space of 4 months was going to design and build all sorts of ships and vessels needed to perform a complex invasion all without a doctrine or practice.
> 3)The RN and RAF (and the US units) were all going to self destruct and not interfere with your buildup or invasion and not notice your sailing from the ports.
> 4) The German army had no need to worry about logistics because it didnt count.


I think you got confused here...




> And it took the allies thousands of ships to supply their forces, 24/7 under absolute maritime and aerial supremecy.


That was one of the main reasons why it was such a success. Now, what if they didn't have this total supremecy but only a minor superiority? Would D-Day have failed? I doubt it. 
Like I said, "the Germans could do with less".




> And you certenily dont know your German army very well because engineering/logistics was not a high point for them at all during the war.


Oh boy, that story again. Besides specialized engineers, the German army had 'pioniere' units (under divisional or regimental level) which were capable of basic engineering (blowing up bridges, boobytraps, demining, etc). They performed wonderfully in WW2. At the end Sturmgruppen were created out of these Pioniere units. 
You should really read "Military Improvisations", a post-war publication based on accounts of German commanders. It becomes clear just how important engineering was for the Germans, and how resourceful they were. 
And of course it's true that they never gave it enough resources but then again ... what section of German armed forces did have enough?




> And where did you discover this little gem of a detail thats been overlooked by thousands of historians?


You're making the classical mistake "I read this everywhere so it must be true." 
Well, I still read everywhere that the Bf 109F had a maximum speed of 600 km/h. I still read everywhere that the Me 163 suffered a horrible number of accidents, incinerating its pilots, ... but it doesn't make it any more true. 
In tests with the 17. division the barges proved much more seaworthy than originally hoped for. The minimum spec. was for sea state 2 (which isn't much). However, rebuilt barges were towed in sea state 6-8 with very few damages. This was also the experience when these were towed Westwards. (I don't know if sea state is the same as Beaufort...)




> Once again, why is it the KM suffers no damage and only the allies?


Who said it wouldn't? I didn't say the German troops would suffer losses, I didn't say the Fw 190s would suffer losses. Does that make you believe I think they wouldn't? 
All I'm saying is that the KM would be held back and only used in situations where they held the advantage, and without going for the Royal Navy head-on. If you had read my posts, you would have seen it. I also explained it as hit-and-run attacks. But in fact the Kriegsmarine would have the primary role to lure the Royal Navy away from the invasion beaches, while itself staying close to the French coast and fighter cover. All that time 1000 German bombers escorted by most of the available fighters would pound on the Royal Navy during two or three days. If the British still wanted a Navy to protect itself against future invasions, it would have to pull it back or face complete annihilation of its naval forces. Knowing that in that case, all the Germans had to do was get another 10 divisions ready and invade England again and again and again. In such a war of attrition the British would lose.




> Its irrelevant that the -109 may have had marginal superiority over the Spit because in a macro sense, they weer going to be shot down over the UK with the loss of the pilot.


See, you didn't read my posts. Why do you even comment on them? I specifically said that the German fighters would be escorting bombers over the Channel and protecting the invasion beaches, so they're not flying over England like in Sealion 1940. The British would now face the opposite, they would have to fight over the German held beaches and over the Channel. Gone is the home advantage of 1940. This is one of the main reasons why I see the Germans winning this battle of aircraft attrition.




> At nighttime, it wasn't going to stop the RAF from bombing its targets.


And its own troops with it!




> And you're conveniently forgetting the US war machine that was spooling up to make good any losses the RF had.


Doesn't matter. The battle would be decided in a week or two. Any help the Americans would offer should already be in place. The critical moment is the first week when the Royal Navy needs to be neutralized.

Kris


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## Hop (Mar 29, 2007)

> I specifically said that the German fighters would be escorting bombers over the Channel and protecting the invasion beaches, so they're not flying over England like in Sealion 1940. The British would now face the opposite, they would have to fight over the German held beaches and over the Channel. Gone is the home advantage of 1940. This is one of the main reasons why I see the Germans winning this battle of aircraft attrition.



Are you aware that a lot of the fighting in 1940 was over the Channel?

The first phase of the BoB, from early July until early August, is known as the Channel phase because it involved German attacks on British shipping, mostly coastal convoys.

Wood and Dempster in the The Narrow Margin sum up this phase as:


> Throughout July the Germans probed and sparred with little achievement. They sank eighteen small steamers and four destroyers, and shot down 145 British fighters for the loss of 270 planes





> Oh boy, that story again. Besides specialized engineers, the German army had 'pioniere' units (under divisional or regimental level) which were capable of basic engineering (blowing up bridges, boobytraps, demining, etc). They performed wonderfully in WW2. At the end Sturmgruppen were created out of these Pioniere units.
> You should really read "Military Improvisations", a post-war publication based on accounts of German commanders. It becomes clear just how important engineering was for the Germans, and how resourceful they were.



German battlefield engineers certainly performed well, but German logistics left a lot to be desired.

It's worth noting that in the desert war, the British shipped all their supplies around Africa and up the Red Sea, a round trip of about 14,000 miles.

The Germans shipped theirs through Italy and across the Med, a round trip of about 1,400 miles.

And yet it was the British who managed to build up their supplies at the front line, because they improved their ports, and built a railway from the docks to the border. The Germans had supplies piling up on the dockside in Tripoli, and relied on enormous numbers of trucks, a hugely inefficient way of operating.



> All that time 1000 German bombers escorted by most of the available fighters would pound on the Royal Navy during two or three days. If the British still wanted a Navy to protect itself against future invasions, it would have to pull it back or face complete annihilation of its naval forces.



That's exactly the situation the British faced in 1940, and they didn't withdraw their navy, or see it annihilated. 

In 1940, it was Ju 87s and 88s facing Spitfires and Hurricanes armed with rifle calibre machine guns. 

In 1942, it would be the same Ju 87s and 88s, but facing Spitfires armed with 20mm cannon. If the German bombers couldn't survive the first time, how are they going to cope in 1942?


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## Glider (Mar 29, 2007)

Kris
Landing Tanks. Yes I am saying that the Germans couldn't land any tanks. They had no Landing Craft for the job or designs, and neither did the Japanese the only country who would be likely to assist them with the design of such a vessel. The Japanese SS type of 1942 only carried small tanks or trucks. 

Building Them
Germany did triple the building of U Boats but *only *at the cost of halting all other major building projects. If you are going to build the Landing Craft then something has to give because all the shipyards are working at maximum capacity. Its easy to build a tank factory but a shipyard is a different thing entirely.

Pedastal
I will have to admit to being wrong about air cover of the convoy but 30 Naval fighters of 1942 would presumably have been Sea Hurricanes, not exactly the cutting edge of performance. Spit V would have been far more dangerous.
The performance is still poor. Eight attacks and the convoy still got through.

Heavy Bombers
Now I know your kidding. 3 mile radius would be sufficient unless the German Landing has already failed. If the beachhead is less than 3 miles then the entire area is under fire from all british artillery and Germany are in deep deep trouble. Remember Anzio?
Besides you and I know this was caused by navigation problems, 3 miles out at a range of 1000 miles plus. Compared to 200 mile range call it a 1 mile error. More than enough to destroy or distrupt almost anything that landed.

Coastal Forces
Germany cannot hit and run if your defending a landing site, you have to protect it day and night. If you don't, then you leave it wide open to attack, the RN being more than capable of bombarding at night totally nullifying the GAF from the equation. 

Battlecruisers
I believe the RN would take a defensive stand. As long as they are not attacking convoys they are not doing any harm. The old BB's will stop them attacking the convoy and all they do is burn fuel. Apart from trying to find and tail them by air that is all I would do.

Attacking at dawn
To attack at dawn you need to sail at night then the coastal forces will have them. If you sail at dawn you will have a number of vessels at sea at the end of the day and again they are wide open.

Dates of the Landing.
The Germans were caught off guard because of the weather, they knew the likely dates. It was the same in 1940. Britain and Japan both knew the likely dates for the German invasion. A high tide is a requirement and a full moon is helpful.


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## renrich (Mar 29, 2007)

The Fleet Air Arm fighters embarked on the carriers in Pedestal were Fulmars. An early version of the LST.


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## Civettone (Mar 29, 2007)

Hop said:


> The first phase of the BoB, from early July until early August, is known as the Channel phase because it involved German attacks on British shipping, mostly coastal convoys.


Not quite. Yes, it involved attacks on British shipping but the Channel phase was more than that. (I know you're not saying it wasn't but at first read it comes across as if you do.) This first phase was called the Channel Phase because it attacked targets *along* the Channel. So that means attacks on ports and on the coastal radar installations. As this was a first probing phase - so only part of the Luftwaffe participated - the Germans still made the error of not escorting all their bombers. Especially thinking of the tragedy of those Stuka's attacking radar along the coast and getting decimated by RAF fighters. This also stopped further use of the Stuka in the BoB.
Btw, I think your book is wrong: 145 British fighters shot down seems to be too much. I think it's even less! (Fair's fair.)




> German battlefield engineers certainly performed well, but German logistics left a lot to be desired.


That's it! Engineering was not always given the attention it deserved. But nevertheless, they did wonderful things with the resources they had. They were incredibly ingenious! 
If I interpret Syscom's words as that engineering never was a high point for the Germans, then yes, I agree. But that in no way means that they would not send engineers to the British docks. They used engineering work when they thought it was necessary. In North Africa they wrongly assumed it wasn't...



> That's exactly the situation the British faced in 1940, and they didn't withdraw their navy, or see it annihilated.


The Royal Navy was never attacked by a thousand bombers. So it wasn't the same situation. It _could_ have been had the invasion actually happened.
And don't forget my point on training on naval targets since BoB.



> In 1942, it would be the same Ju 87s and 88s


They were? 
The Ju 87D got more armour and could carry three times the load of the Ju 87B of the BoB.
The Ju 88A-4 got more armour and was more suited for dive bombing than the Ju 88A-1 and A-5 of the BoB.



> Yes I am saying that the Germans couldn't land any tanks


Oh c'mon, the Germans were definitely going to transport tanks over the Channel in 1940. And don't forget the Tauchpanzer.



> Germany did triple the building of U Boats but only at the cost of halting all other major building projects.


Completely untrue! You apparently didn't read my post on how the Germans managed to triple production: it was by prefab production away from the shipyards. That resulted in producing a U-boat in 2 months where before it would have taken 11.5 months! And I also said that Speer managed to double production of PT-boats and minesweepers. By 1942 there was no longer any big warship construction going on.



> I will have to admit to being wrong about air cover of the convoy but 30 Naval fighters of 1942 would presumably have been Sea Hurricanes, not exactly the cutting edge of performance. Spit V would have been far more dangerous.


Most of the intercepts were done by Maltese Spitfire Vs. 
Carried based Sea Hurricanes, Martlets and Fulmars were used before that. All of them good enough to shoot down bombers. They hardly encountered enemy fighters (because of the range). The Maltese Spits had only few Bf 109s to fight, most fighters were Italian or Bf 110s. 



> The performance is still poor. Eight attacks and the convoy still got through.


I got a joke for you. It's not as good as actually telling it but well...
Three guys were going swimming in a lake. An American, a Brit and a Belgian. They made a bet on who would reach the other side first. So they started swimming. But about halfway the American shouted "I'm tired, I can't go on any more!" and he drowned. Three quarters of the distance swum, the Brit shouted "I'm tired, I can't go on any more!" and he drowned. The Belgian swam on but when he was just 10 metres away from the bank he complained "I'm tired ... I'm going back!"

My point is, once you've crossed most of the distance, it's worse to turn back! 

brb 
Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 29, 2007)

> If the beachhead is less than 3 miles then the entire area is under fire from all british artillery and Germany are in deep deep trouble. Remember Anzio?


Wasn't Anzio succesful? Didn't they manage to hold their ground against overwhelming odds? 



> Besides you and I know this was caused by navigation problems, 3 miles out at a range of 1000 miles plus. Compared to 200 mile range call it a 1 mile error. More than enough to destroy or distrupt almost anything that landed.


Oh no, that's not what is meant by navigation problems. Read the classic 'Bomber offensive' by Noble Frankland. 
What you're saying should indicate that the BC bombers were less accurate over (for instance) Brest and (most) inaccurate over Berlin. That's obviously not the case as was shown in the BC offensive against Brest in late 1941 and early 1942 when they failed to destroy the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. In 1941 only 1/3 of the bombs were dropped within 5 miles from the actual target. In 1942 there was a radar guidance system called Gee and this worked up to western Germany (Ruhr) which helped find the targets. But accuracy remained a big problem.
This only improved when in August 1942 the first pathfinder groups were created and when in late 1942 and early 1943 Oboe and and H2S were introduced.
So with 500 bombers operational and an accuracy of 1/3 within 5 miles I'm not all that much worried. And don't forget that these bombers had to fly at low altitude where the German army AD could barrage fire at them.



> Germany cannot hit and run if your defending a landing site, you have to protect it day and night.


I never said they would be defending the landing site. I specifically said that the KM would stay close to the FRENCH coast to draw away Royal Navy ships, and only engage in favourable circumstances, after which they would retreat to the French coast again.



> I believe the RN would take a defensive stand. As long as they are not attacking convoys they are not doing any harm. The old BB's will stop them attacking the convoy and all they do is burn fuel. Apart from trying to find and tail them by air that is all I would do.


I know that during operation Neptune most of the Home Fleet was reserved for countering the Tirpitz and other German warships. Very unlikely they would have broken out, yet the allies went out of their way to prevent this happening. 
That makes me conclude that the British would definitely hold back several BBs and other warships to counter the German BCs.



> To attack at dawn you need to sail at night then the coastal forces will have them. If you sail at dawn you will have a number of vessels at sea at the end of the day and again they are wide open.
> Dates of the Landing.
> The Germans were caught off guard because of the weather, they knew the likely dates. It was the same in 1940. Britain and Japan both knew the likely dates for the German invasion. A high tide is a requirement and a full moon is helpful.


I think you've got a point here. So far I have relied on two elements: surprise and local Kriegsmarine strength. As the bulk of the Royal Navy wasn't in the Channel, I think the Kriegsmarine should have been able to deal with them. Like I said before, I would use the KM on the first day after which I would pull them back. I think they could have contained the coastal RN ships. But I'm less certain about the surprise element. The British would know when the possible dates were and would have seen the Kriegsmarine assembling in the weeks prior to the invasion.
Good point!

Kris


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## Bernhart (Mar 29, 2007)

An added thought, you would need time to assemble enough transport to move enough men for an invasion, and a number of operational ports. I would think that word would get to the allies quite quickly from the resistence
(after all the germans are operating in a hostile country) and there was constant recon flights that woulds also pick up the build up. this would take time allowing the allies to build up forces, move them along the coast. the Americans would step up thier deployment of troops and ships, and airplanes. 

you could direct the night bombers and fighters to the costal ports and areas of troop build up and bomb them. The navy could send enough ships to shell these areas also. There would be huge air battles over the area as each side met, the germans after the navy and the allies trying to protect them. The allies would probably hold back enough squadrons I would think to meet an invasion should it still happen, they had already done this during battle for France. If the germans do get air superiorty as clivetone believes it would be a a cost, with the Brits and Yanks still holding back some reserves


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## renrich (Mar 29, 2007)

I still think there is an underestimation of the strength of the RN. I don't believe after the first day there would have been any KM left, if they had been commited to the battle. In WW1 the High Seas fleet never wanted to confront the Grand Fleet belly to belly and the disparity in strength was not nearly as great in 1914-1918 as it was in in 1942. If the KM was as potent as some seem to think it was, why did not they put up an effort to prevent the evacuation from Dunkirk. As far as I know there was no action from the KM beyond a few E-boats. I would not be fooled too much by the British debacle off Malaya where the Repulse and Prince of Wales were lost. They had no air cover and they were up against probably the best anti shipping air force in the world at that time. Also at that time the RNs fire control system against a/c was notoriously poor. In the channel in the summer of 1942, if all the KM was commited there would be 2 King George Vs to take out the Tirpitz, 2 more King George Vs to handle the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the Renown with some County class CAs would ruin the Hippers and others of that class. The RN still have the Nelson and Rodney in reserve plus all the R class for convoy duty and the Queen Elisabeths in the Med. The RN does not need any carriers since they have plenty of land based air to cope with the JU 87s and 88s and to help sink ships. A few of the Colony class should dispose of all of the KM Cls nicely. That leaves the Leanders and DDs to sink all the transports and most of the landing craft. Of course this ignores the fact that the British have emplaced many coastal guns that would take there share of the shipping available for targets.


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## renrich (Mar 29, 2007)

I neglected the two pocket battleships in my earlier post. One of the King George Vs would sink those two and the Renown would help with the KM battle cruisers and there would need to be perhaps a couple of the Newcastle class along with the County class CAs to overwhelm the Hippers.


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## Civettone (Mar 29, 2007)

We've been through most of what you said though they are still good points. You're right about it being impossible to keep the invasion secret. I acknowledged this in my last post. 

I like your idea of a pre-emptive strike. It's quite likely the British would go at it if they would think the invasion was imminent. But as the night bombers were unable to destroy the ships in the drydocks of Brest, I don't see them achieving much against the invasion fleet. So they would have to go at it during the day. But all I have to say is: Channel Dash. 250 German fighters managed to hold off 75 RAF squadrons. British fighters were good but their day bombers were aweful. In the end, a pre-emptive strike would weaken the British FC, BC and RN while the Germans could still postpone the invasion by a day (or two). 


Even though the British would know of a future invasion and would photograph the Germans assembling their forces near the ports, they would still be uncertain about the actual D-Day. Everyone would expect the Germans to start an air offensive first (like in 1940). The embarking itself would have to happen under the cover of darkness and like the Channel Dash the British would perhaps only find out that the invasion fleet was underway once it was already in the Channel. The Germans were no fools and would know how to keep a lid on the operation. 
And besides that, the English still didn't know where the Germans would land!

The only thing I really disagree with is what you're saying about the Americans. They were building up their army as fast as they could. Sending in non-operational divisions for a possible German invasion in the future would not happen. They would only send them if the invasion had actually taken place, ready or not. 
Kris


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## syscom3 (Mar 29, 2007)

In 1944, the Germans managed to get a few E-Boats in amongst an American amphib training excersize near Slapton Sands and savaged the US ships.

That was a good example on how these small patrol boats would savage the German amphib ships in 1942. All it takes to throw an invasion into chaos is for a few PT boats to run amok.


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## bigZ (Mar 29, 2007)

Wouldn't Bletchley Park be able to blow the lid on an operation in 42?


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## renrich (Mar 29, 2007)

BigZ very good point. Of course!


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## Glider (Mar 29, 2007)

Let me try and sum things up.

*Tanks*Germany had no LCT or designs and would not be able to bring any on line with only 6 months. A 6 month timescale is impossible, no country ever managed this not even the USA. 
Result
As a result the Germans wouldn't be able to use Tanks or other large transport. 

*Building an invasion fleet*
Submarines were built in prefabricated sections but were assembled in shipyards. You still need to work out where the invasion ships are going to be built. You either replace the Submarine production, or the minesweeper programme. S Boats are different and are built in boatyards not shipyards as they are only around 125-150 tons.
Result
Something has to give either the U Boat or Minesweepers both critical to the success of the invasion

*Protecting the Invasion (air)*
Using the Channel Dash as your example. 250 planes defended 2 modern, well armed, fast BC's who were running, not hanging around to fight. How many would be needed to defend an entire invasion fleet(s) if your landing in more than one place, spread over many miles over a period of days. Remembering that the invasion fleet are slow large, ill armed targets.
The Channel dash wasn't attacked by 75 squadrons, had they done so then they would have gone down by weight of numbers. An invasion fleet would have been attacked with everything in our airforce and the defences swamped. 
The 109 was equal to the Spit V, the 190 clearly better, but the 190 was a small minority of the force available. Also the Germans would have to spend longer over the target to defend it. The RAF would be able to launch hit and run attacks and escape if the fighting got too hot. Very similar to Dieppe. The RAF would be more numerous than the Germans at Dieppe.
Result
Losses would be high on both sides and the German losses to the invasion fleet serious.

*Defending the Invasion (Sea night)*
If the Germans land the German Navy is not going to defend the beaches at night but stay in French waters coming out when the advantage is on their side. This wouldn't happen. The German vessels would be open to interception and attack on the way over.
Result
The Invasion beaches are wide open to attack and bombardment by night.

*Defending the Invasion (Sea Day)*
The RN is more than willing to take serious losses to hit the invasion force because if we lose, the war is over. 
The German Navy cannot face the RN by day so must rely on the GAF. As explained this will have to cover the invasion fleet and attacks on the RN. The RAF will be able to distrupt these attacks due to the points above ie quality of the planes and the numbers. German bombers are the same as in the BOB. They may have some more armour and carry a larger bombload but the Spits now have 20mm not LMG and the German bombers still have a similar performance as before. When attacked they will suffer badly. Minelaying will be countered to some extent by the distruption of the minelaying and the minesweepers available to the RN. 
Result
RN losses would be significant but managable. Germany never stopped a convoy with air attack alone, why should they destroy a Naval attack that can form up at night and launch the attack at daylight. In a similar manner no submarine ever operated in the channel with any success or stopped a Naval Fleet, why should they now.

*Heavy Bombers*
These would pulverise the landing area at night. To argue that we couldn't hit the landing area which would be miles across, because we couldn't hit the German BC's in dock, is comparing chalk and cheese. The RAF only have to hit the landing area's not the ships. With well over a thousand bombers available (Hampdens and Hudsons up to Lancasters) there is no reason to doubt that the RAF could launch 300 to 400 bomber sorties a night, every night with little loss to themselves. German nightfighters will be operating on their own without radar control and the RAF Beaufighters were as good as the best and operating under their own fighter direction
Result
Anything landed would be either distrupted or destroyed.


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## bigZ (Mar 29, 2007)

If the Germans did manage to invade and everything goes SNAFU. We can allways rely on these boys. 

As Lance Corpaoral Jones would say ""I may be old but I can still give them the old cold steel, and they don't like it up'em, you know, they do not like it."


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## Civettone (Mar 29, 2007)

Glider said:


> Germany had no LCT or designs


Why do you keep repeating that? Germans were going to embark tanks on the barges. 




> You either replace the Submarine production, or the minesweeper programme.


They managed to triple production of the subs and double production of PT boats and miesweepers by using the same shipyards. So ok, now they'll just double production of subs and keep that third bit for transport boats. What's the problem?




> The Channel dash wasn't attacked by 75 squadrons, had they done so then they would have gone down by weight of numbers.


The British used over 700 aircraft (amongst them 400 fighters) against 250 German fighters and achieved nothing! Their ships in the Channel achieved nothing, not even a German MTB was lost. Yet, this is going to be the force that is going to annihilate the German invasion fleet? 
Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Cerberus" - The Channel Dash




> How many would be needed to defend an entire invasion fleet(s) if your landing in more than one place, spread over many miles over a period of days.


If you would have read my posts you would have seen that they would land on the first day and retreat until the Royal Navy would retreat. IMO this would have lasted two days.




> The 109 was equal to the Spit V, the 190 clearly better, but the 190 was a small minority of the force available.


The Bf 109 was better than the Spit V and I already explained this. If you disagree, please tell me why and back this up with figures. I also said aircraft production would increase: more Fw 190s. 




> If the Germans land the German Navy is not going to defend the beaches at night but stay in French waters coming out when the advantage is on their side. This wouldn't happen.


 Well, according to my plan they do. 




> The Invasion beaches are wide open to attack and bombardment by night.


True




> The RN is more than willing to take serious losses to hit the invasion force because if we lose, the war is over.


If you lose, the war is over. Sounds logical 




> The German Navy cannot face the RN by day so must rely on the GAF. As explained this will have to cover the invasion fleet and attacks on the RN.


No, on the first day the Kriegsmarine will escort the invasion fleet. It could take on the MTBs and DDs during the Channel Dash so they could do it again, this time warding them off before they reach the invasion fleet. British MTBs are no match for German S-Boote (or E-boats as you call them) so you can forget Slapton Beach where the LSTs were unprotected.




> Minelaying will be countered to some extent by the distruption of the minelaying and the minesweepers available to the RN.


You cannot sweep mines as fast as the enemy can lay them. 




> These would pulverise the landing area at night.


And what will that achieve? Strategical bombers are useless against tactical targets, especially when dug in. 




> To argue that we couldn't hit the landing area which would be miles across, because we couldn't hit the German BC's in dock, is comparing chalk and cheese. The RAF only have to hit the landing area's not the ships.


Reminds me of Hitler's order to have Me 262s to attack the invasion beaches. He literally said they would just fly over the beaches and drop a bomb on them. I think he would have been glad with you backing him up 


Anything else? 
Kris


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## syscom3 (Mar 29, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Why do you keep repeating that? Germans were going to embark tanks on the barges.



And just how were these tanks going to be off loaded in choppy sea's on unimproved beaches? Oh, and a minor question for you..... how many tanks does each barge carry? 



> They managed to triple production of the subs and double production of PT boats and miesweepers by using the same shipyards. So ok, now they'll just double production of subs and keep that third bit for transport boats. What's the problem?



The problem is you thinking the shipyards can design new ships and then mass produce them in basically a matter of weeks. 



> The British used over 700 aircraft (amongst them 400 fighters) against 250 German fighters and achieved nothing! Their ships in the Channel achieved nothing, not even a German MTB was lost. Yet, this is going to be the force that is going to annihilate the German invasion fleet?



Famous last words of many a combatant. They didnt touch me before, therefore they cant touch me now.



> The Bf 109 was better than the Spit V and I already explained this. If you disagree, please tell me why and back this up with figures. I also said aircraft production would increase: more Fw 190s.



The -109 and -190 were not going to gain air superioity in a matter of weeks. If anything, it was the brits who were going to end up controlling the skies because they would not lose pilots like the LW would. And what will happen to your plans if the RAF decides to pull its fighters back out of range and amass its forces? Will you have air superiority on invasion day?



> No, on the first day the Kriegsmarine will escort the invasion fleet. It could take on the MTBs and DDs during the Channel Dash so they could do it again, this time warding them off before they reach the invasion fleet. British MTBs are no match for German S-Boote (or E-boats as you call them) so you can forget Slapton Beach where the LSTs were unprotected.



Once again, your KM will fend off everything from bombers and the RN. You will do the impossible that the USN in 1945 was never able to do against the Japanese. Provide 100% defensive success against air/surface/sub threats without the aid of modern fire control. Even your mine sweepers will perform their duties without hindrance and 100% success. Tell us, is there anything in your scenario's that allows the RN/USN/RAF to actually inflict damage to your fleet? 



> You cannot sweep mines as fast as the enemy can lay them.



Exactly, which means your invasion fleet will run into the allied mine fields. Oooooppppssss.... I forgot... In your scenario, they dont work and will not impact your plans.



> And what will that achieve? Strategical bombers are useless against tactical targets, especially when dug in.



But landing craft and barges massed in port and/or on the beaches are an inviting target, plus they can also easily be swamped by near misses. One funny thing about your scenarios..... if you're not bringing along trucks, have no capability of offloading from the larger ships right to inland dumps...... where are you going to store your material?


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## Civettone (Mar 29, 2007)

Heya Syscom!



syscom3 said:


> And just how were these tanks going to be off loaded in choppy sea's on unimproved beaches?


I don't know, I never thought about it. Didn't really see the need to question this as the German plans explicitely mention transporting tanks over the Channel. Who are we to question their ability to do so 67 years after date? They could be wrong about winning battles but I think they would know how to unload tanks from barges...



> Oh, and a minor question for you..... how many tanks does each barge carry?


Well, most barges could carry at least 200 tons (the common 'Belgian' type barges). Although these could carry several tanks, they would probably only have carried one or two, and use the rest of the valuable space for lighter objects and for soldiers.

As it seems you're interested, let me also add that in 1940, they had 2,318 modified (with bow ramps) barges - I don't know how many unmodified barges - and 155 freighters (carrying capacity of totally 700,000 ton) and about 2000 auxiliary vessels, motor boats, motor sailers, etc.
All of this was apparently sufficient for their needs as Raeder told Hitler in a meeting on Sept. 15th where he advertised that the KM would be ready by the 21st [to unload 13 divisions in 3 days]. 




> The problem is you thinking the shipyards can design new ships and then mass produce them in basically a matter of weeks.


Yeah, barges are really complex! 




> Famous last words of many a combatant. They didnt touch me before, therefore they cant touch me now.


I could turn that around. "You couldn't invade us in 1940, so you can't invade us now!" 




> The -109 and -190 were not going to gain air superioity in a matter of weeks. If anything, it was the brits who were going to end up controlling the skies because they would not lose pilots like the LW would. And what will happen to your plans if the RAF decides to pull its fighters back out of range and amass its forces? Will you have air superiority on invasion day?


You've not been reading my posts. Yet, I will reply to this. I specifically said there would not be an air campaign prior to the invasion (unlike 1940). This would surprise the British but it would also mean that the British would no longer have the advantage of fighting over friendly territory: they would have to fight over German held beaches and the Channel. So in a war of attrition the (better trained) German pilots (in better aircraft) would hold the advantage.
So no, I don't expect the Luftwaffe to have air superiority. I just expect them to have the upper hand. Superiority will come later.




> Tell us, is there anything in your scenario's that allows the RN/USN/RAF to actually inflict damage to your fleet?


Read my posts. I never said the KM would not suffer losses. I'm saying it would be used on the first day before the Royal Navy would arrive in the Channel at strength, after which it would be pulled back near the safety of the French coast and only be used in a few hit and run attacks if it could get an advantage. That's not the same as the RN which would be wide open in the Channel. 




> Exactly, which means your invasion fleet will run into the allied mine fields.


Strange. When I mention German mines keeping the RN at bay, it's criticized. But apparently the British mines are now an unsurmountable obstacle? 
What did the allies to disable the mines along the coasts of Normandy?




> But landing craft and barges massed in port and/or on the beaches are an inviting target, plus they can also easily be swamped by near misses. One funny thing about your scenarios.....


Forget the swamping thing. Or do you really believe that story of wakes of a destroyer sinking barges? I said this before, but I'll explain it a bit more:
_All barges had to meet following naval requirements…
- Able to handle open water up to sea state 2 [Significant wave height of 1.4 feet or 0.4 meters], which was the basic English channel sea state.
- Able to land on beaches with slope of 1 degree
- Able to transport a 25 ton tank
- Able to use all Dutch Belgian and French canals.

However the barges exceeded these figures , here’s a quote from Schenk “Invasion of England 1940” Translated 1990, pp 70:

"For the first criteria it was calculated that the barges would need a freeboard of at least 2 m and would have to be in a good state of repair. As it turned out , the barges were more seaworthy than expected, shipping little water during exercise in winds of force 4 to 5 and coping well with waves. Even at wind forces of 6 to 8 only two barges reported damage to external bow doors during one exercise with the 17th Infantry Division."_




> if you're not bringing along trucks, have no capability of offloading from the larger ships right to inland dumps...... where are you going to store your material?


I don't know. Never thought about that. During the first days the allies stored most of their stuff on the beach.
Difference was perhaps that the Germans would have to tow it in place while the allies drove it there. That's better in the long run as you can use those trucks later on for the outbreak but a waste at first. Just look at Anzio: 17,000 vehicles for 70,000 men. Hey, you just made me realize THAT is the real difference between Allied and German landings. Thanks (I mean it!).

I look forward to your next post! 
Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 29, 2007)

The following is from Paul Lakowski, some of you might know him. Really interesting.

_Schenk notes there were 1336 x type A1 "Péniche" barges @ 39 meters long 5 m ; wide 2.3m high , with a capacity of 360 tonnes. In addition there were 982 larger "Kampinen" type A2 barges @ 50 meters long 6.6m wide 2.5m high and a capacity of 620 tonnes [able to carry 4 tanks] .

Most barges were towed and about ~ 1/3 of these barges were already motorized with 6-7 knts speed, however it was reckoned that in some cases 30% of the barges were so old and worn as to be unusable, while the rest were damaged due to untrained crews. If this is applied across the board the 2400 barges would net 1600 usable barges of which maybe ¼ were motorized.

The historical conversion task was massive and between August and early September 2400 barges and 400 motorboats were assemble. By early September about 1269 barges were converted and by September 24th about 1552 converted towed landing barges had arrived at the embarkation points, including another ~ 330 in reserve. When the task was completed some months later the total had swollen to 1939 converted landing barges.
[P Schenk “Invasion of England 1940” , pp 65-114].

By early September at least 225 motorized landing barges had been acquired , while power units were added to another 25 towed barges. In October the Heer and Luftwaffe erected another 50-100 engineering rafts , each employing 2-3 surplus 500-750hp engines from a total of 2000 such surplus engines. These modified Sieble/Herbert Rafts could cruise across the channel at ~ 6knts and dash to the shore at ~ 10knts. Contrary to perception they apparently were quite seaworthy in coastal waters and ‘the channel’.
[P Schenk “Invasion of England 1940” , pp 115-129].

The ~ 800 remaining unconverted barges were instead modified into supply barges and employed to warehouse fuel oil , diesel gasoline as well as water and other supplies. Most of these barges were powered barges that had ‘broken down’ and treated as towed barges. Their total load capacity was around 225,000 tons while the gross transport tankerage was 130,000 tons in 39 tankers and 75 ‘lighters/barges’ . The expected daily consumption was thought to be about 10-12,000 tons at full strength, so on at most only 1/10th of the tankers [ 4 tankers and 7 lighters] had to cross the channel each day to feed the two armies logistical needs. [ “The Invasion of England 1940” , Peter Schenk, pp 174-175].

The barge sortie rate only envisaged the use of 2/3 of the barges on the first sortie, while a mere 400 barges were needed for each of the following 7 sorties to sustain the offensive and transport follow on waves. Since turnaround time was at best 4 days, at most 100 barges would need to make the crossing each day to sustain campaign at full strength.[ “The Invasion of England 1940” , Peter Schenk, pp 232-235].


In practice Wehrmacht logistics through out the war , were never run at full strength or anything like capacity. This rarely slowed offensives since combat doctrine and tactics were more important. While lack of logistics did crimp operations and slow tempo, it didn’t prevent operations even when the delivery rate fell below 50% of capacity, as was the case when the Germans moved further and further into Russia in 1941. It was always a combination of effects that terminated campaigns against the Germans, only part of which was logistics.


50 Naval gun ships
New Zealand Coastal Shipping - Dutch Coasters
Its reported roughly 100 “Coaster” vessels were also employed in the Sea lion plan. Coasters were miniature freighters of 100-400 tons able to haul large loads from small coastal ports to larger ports for mass shipment overseas on larger Freighters. They have limited range and facilities but large cargo space and hoist. Plan was to convert ~ 50 coasters each with a pair of light flak guns and to mount one 6” gun on each of twenty heavier coasters , while three 3” gun were to be mounted on each of 27 smaller coasters.

These boats had sand added to ballasts to increase stability and provide limited below water protection . In addition concrete was added to the wheelhouse and each gun mount had thin armored shield . This provided small arms resistance and splinter protection all round. In addition each ship was degaussed against magnetic mines.

Historically only 5 of 20 heavy 6” gun coasters were converted and 27 lighter 3” gun coasters were converted. But another 200 guns/howitzers were made available for usage on such improvised gun ships. Although the ships were quite small they had high free boards allowing operations in ‘sea state 6’ or 3-4m waves and 40-50kph winds. [P Schenk “Invasion of England 1940” , pp 46-48].

Pioniersturmboot 39
It was planned to convert and deploy hundreds of fishing boats to land assault troops with each wave. The plan was to mount them on ramps on either side of the hundreds of fishing boats, Trawlers ,Coasters and Minesweepers. These boats were able to haul a 50-75 troops plus light arms and deploy them ashore @ 25kph [15knts] through a pair of assault boats launched and deposit and recovered through ramps mounted on the side of the boat. It was shown through trial and error that these fishing boats could launch the assault boats quite well traveling at ½ speed [IE 5-6 knts]. The assault boats were the Pioniersturmboot 39 , of which about 500 out of planned 1500 had been delivered in time for Sealion. By December about 800 had been assembled for this task, when the effort was halted.

[P Schenk “Invasion of England 1940” , pp 48-58].

Each invasion group had a leader boat 10knts speed, plus two tugs to tow one powered and one unpowered barge. At a prearranged point the barges would be detached and the powered barge would tow the un powered barge into shore. Most barges had a light flak gun mounted amid ship , although hundreds mounted either 3" howitzers or Pak guns. While useless at hitting ships [3 near misses on 100 test shots @ 600-1000m range], they were thought to be very important in contributing fire support to landing troops, while vulnerable on the beaches.

While the build up was rushed massive and impressive one is left with the impression that given enough time the cross channel invasion would certainly have worked. There is clear evidence that the Germans had been experimenting with amphibious assaults since 1925 and plans for such an invasion of UK had been in the works since 1938 ...but Hitler would hear nothing of these developments due to his believe in England as an ally.

Finally the plan didn't envisage the need to attain air supremacy over England prior to any invasion as is commonly reported, instead all that was required was air superiority over the channel, which was achieved in September 1940. [P Schenk “Invasion of England 1940” , pp 246].At the end of the day the decision to go or not to go rested with Hitler himself and he could not throw his belief that the Brits would cave with draw from the war and allow him free hand in the east. He played each service branch off against each other since it served his purpose to put the pressure on the UK to fold. Schenk notes the following in conclusion pp 357-358.




"If conditions had been right , the German air superiority over southern England should have sufficed for a German landing operation. However, Germany had still hoped to bomb Britain into submission,".....

"In the autumn of 1940 the navy had the chance to end the conflict with Britain with one lightning combined arms operation. While it was able to amass a hugh transport fleet in a Herculean effort , the navy considered it impossible to protect. Ansel contradicts this notion, regarding it conceivable that a British attack on the fleet could have been thwarted given sufficient measures on the part of the navy and Luftwaffe. if all the factors are taken into consideration-Luftwaffe attacks on the Royal navy, mine barriers , coastal artillery and the deployment of the German navy in its entirety- then Ansel could be right. Sealion was cancelled primarily for political and not military reasons".

Click to expand...

_
8) Kris


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 30, 2007)

Interesting info there, thanks.


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## Civettone (Mar 30, 2007)

Ok then, some more...
From Crete to Sealion

_In the Crete operation the 5th German Mountain division was to be transported by small fishing boats/barges from Greece ~ 300km to the Island of Crete in 3 days. Just before they reached the shores of Crete RN squadrons intercepted them, but failed to wipe them out. 

In the initial clash a small convoy of 5 merchant ships transporting 600 troops apiece escorted by 3 Italian destroyers, each with ½ dozen 4.7” guns. This was pursued by a flotilla of 4 x RN destroyers each with Radar and 8 x 4.7” guns. When they finally spotted the Convoy on Radar, they closed with and sank the entire Italian/German convoy plus escorts with minimal loss[“The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943” Jack Greene Alessandro Massignani; pp162-164]. 

Clearly this is an example of the risk that merchant convoys would take transporting troops, however it should be noted that in this case the RN had advanced warning the time of the troop convoy sailing and the route they intended to take allowing for the idealize definitive interception attack to be made under the best conditions [At night with Radar against an enemy with no radar and no warning]. Few warships had radar in 1940 and by 1941 the British intelligence situation had turned around with the Ultra decrypts being intercepted, meaning the RN had what they would lack in 1940. 

In Crete on the 21st of May 1941 two RN groups would intercept these amphibious groups at Cape Spada and near Retimo on the next day. RN Group C had 5 x Light Cruisers and 3 Destroyers , while Group D had 3 Light Cruisers and 4 Destroyers. These groups would arrange an over night interception of the amphibious fleets heading towards Crete, while 2 RN battleships would patrol the eastern approaches incase any Italian capital ships showed up. 

Over night the RN Group C was able to sneak to about 2km range and ambushed the Cape Spada convoy of 20 small ‘Caique’ boats carrying about 2300 German troops and escorted by a single Italian Torpedo Boat. While the lone Italian put up a fight, hitting one of the destroyers, it was sunk along with 10 of the ‘Caique’ boats. Prompt actions by the surviving ‘Caique’ boats, meant only 300 of the 2300 troops were lost. It was in this action that some of the Greek Caique boats were reportedly swamped by passing warships [“Hitler’s Mountain Troops” James Lucas, pp 74] , but as can be seen , it was far from a fool proof method of attacking convoys, since it took a sweep of 7 Destroyers and Cruisers to just sink 10 ‘Caique’ boats and an escort , while the other 10 ‘Caique’ got away. 

The next morning RN Group D intercepting a squadron of 30 x ‘Caique’ boats escorted by another Italian Torpedo Boat near the Retimo. This time the Italian Torpedo boat aggressively put down a smoke screen to cover the ‘Caique’ squadron and charged the approaching RN group, that was also under heavy air attack by Luftwaffe bombers. This combined action drove off the British squadron allowing the second convoy of mountain troops to escape with the loss of only one ‘Caique’, but the amphibious Squadron was forced to return to Greece. Later another convoy would arrive with troops at Crete. Overall it should be noted that over the 6 days, only one coordinated attack by the RN was attempted in which a total of RN 8 cruisers and 7 destroyers assaulted a group of up to 50 x ‘Caique’ boats, ½ dozen warships and a dozen troops ships, sinking ¼ of these boats with 10% RN loses and driving off ¾ of the invading Axis ships/boats. 


This is an interesting comparison with “Operation Sealowe”, since these German amphibious squadrons planned to deploy about 50-150 x barges and ferries at a time that on paper could only be escorted by a couple of torpedo boats. In practice however they had 433 Auxiliary patrol craft and planned draw for escorted by up to 2 dozen Minesweepers/Vorpostenboote gun boats each armed with 1-2 x 88mm/4” guns, with considerable Luftwaffe fighter and bomber coverage. 

If the Crete action is any indication the Germans will be able to fend for themselves. Problem is that each such RN sweep can only be conducted once every few days when the threat is every day. In desperation it could be done every day but with diminishing returns. What’s more with two dozen German barge squadrons on the go at all times, at most ¼ would be in the water during any given RN sweep. Of those ½ dozen invasion groups hit by sweeps in any given day, maybe 3-4 would be driven off while the last couple get through suggesting , overall almost 90% of these groups should get through… an observation that Churchill himself also made. 

Worse still if the RN sweeps ignore these squadron escorts and swamp the barges, they risk being bombarded with hundreds of shells per minute, to say nothing of Luftwaffe intervention. At short range such shells will seriously damage any destroyers they hit possibly preventing them from returning for days or weeks. In Crete ½ the RN attacking ships charged the Axis escorts while the rest chased down the barges. The KM would have enough escorts to meet each of these threats to the squadron. In such cases these KM escorts will no doubt suffer badly in such exchanges, but the inability of the attacking RN warships at Crete to ensure the destruction of only a couple of escorts brings into question the success of such RN tactics, especially in the ‘larger picture’. There would just be too many Axis invasion groups and too few RN sweeps doing too little damage to dramatically alter the out come. 


While all the above mentioned invasion forces and counter invasion forces clash at sea , air battles would rage overhead along the lines of the historical “Battle of Britain”. The direct impact of airpower on naval action however may not be as significant as some imagine. Early in the war anti shipping air attacks were not very effective at all. During the historic evacuation from Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe threw 300 bombers at the British fleet for about a week. 

In that case the 300 bombers [He-111/Ju-88/Ju-87] sunk/damaged 45 warships 66 transport ships and 80-100 smaller boats sunk. Any ship that is heavily damaged would take weeks or months to repair and bring back to service, so in that context of any invasion of the UK , they are out of the battle and would only exist as enhancements to the existing Harbor defenses. 

In terms of air attacks, both sides expected the Luftwaffe to maintain air superiority over the immediate channel crossing areas, however port invasions groups around the country may not be protected at all from the air, other than indigenous flak defenses of the escort ships involved. 

The RAF had 660 bombers ‘available’ in mid 1940 with some heavier ‘Whitley’ Bombers carrying up to 7000 Lbs loads [compared to 4000lb maximum for the German bombers]. This suggests the RAF should more than double the Luftwaffe kill rates [adjusting relative delivery to about 2.3 times the German delivery rate]. However the RAF bombers were level bombers with at best a CEP of 200-400m compared to the German bombers at Dunkirk many of which were Stuka Dive bombers with a CEP of 30m. 

It maybe that the RAF would be no more effective at sinking the German fleet , as the Luftwaffe was at sinking the Dunkirk rescue fleet. Worse still while the RAF did contest the German bomber attacks at Dunkirk, it was little more than 300 sorties a day and about 30-40 fighters at any time. By comparison the Luftwaffe could draw on up to 1300 Me-109s and 1500 Bombers, of which only about ½ could reach over southern England. That means roughly speaking the other half should be available to cover the channel . Thats >600 x Me-109s fly about 1 sortie a day in reserve to counter RAF attacks over the channel. In other words while the Luftwaffe outnumbered the RAF over the sky’s of Dunkirk up to 6:1 , the RAF would at best match the Luftwaffe 1:1 over the English Channel during ‘Sealowe’. In that situation RAF Bomber Command are likely to suffer severe attrition to the Me-109 , which after all where the best interceptors of their day. 

If we are extremely generous to the RAF it could translate into them sinking roughly ~ 250 German ships/boats each week [Luftwaffe success based on “Hitler’s Blitzkrieg Campaign”, pp 258]during the amphibious assault phase in the Kent region, that’s about 6% of the invasion force per week. Per day that’s ~36 x warships /merchants / trawlers and smaller patrol boats and towed barges. At that rate of destruction, it would statistically take > 16 weeks of uninterrupted RAF bomber attacks to completely destroy/sink the entire amphibious fleet, and 8 weeks to reach the 50% German imposed cut off point. Mean while, during the same time period, the ~600 Luftwaffe bombers should be able to sink/damage 90 ships/boats per week with the same level of uninterrupted bombing attacks. 

So if we intergrate these two experiences we get 250+ 100 German boats/barges/warships lost each week against 90 +12 RN warships. Roughly 3.5 :1 kill ratio. The germans can count on upto 3400 boats barges and warships suggesting 50% level would be reached after 5 weeks of contineous success, however the RN anti invasion fleet can only count on maximum 90 Cruisers and Destroyers backed up by 40 minesweepers and maybe 300-400 armed trawlers ....maybe 450-500 warships . RN could reach the 50% kill rate after 5 weeks , but would cost their entire anti invasion fleet. But that presupposes that German ground troop action doesn't significantly alter the battle calculus, which it should._


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## Civettone (Mar 30, 2007)

And because I couldn't all fit it in the previous one, here's the rest.

_(...) the primary strategy for usage of German capital ships was to draw off the Home fleet and ensure it didn't meddle in the channel. Churchill was aidding the Germans here by insisting that no battleships would enter the channel unless German battleships went their first. Further the RN Admiralty feared mostly the German capital ships savaging the convoys and always held the battlefleet and cruiser squadrons on standby for precisely that mission. 

A combination of surge of Uboat fleets and Capital ships into the North Atlantic convoys would have stripped off "Home fleet" and if Forbes had his way, 1/3 of the "Anti invasion fleet"....leaving a mere 60 crusiers/destroyers to cover the entire British coastal defenses. They would be aided by 50 minesweepers and several hundred armed trawlers.... but with 3000km front to cover, that left at most 50-60% to cover the channel. 

Despite what some will tell you, atleast 1/3 of that force would be down for long term overhaul maintenance and the rest would have to rotate deployments meaning at most 1/3 would be available. Given that the Germans had more such auxiliary warships to concentrate on the south coast suggests problems for the RN. Running warships continuously for periods of more than weeks exhausts the force involved, so its important for the Germans to trigger the RN surge weeks ahead of any cross channel operation. 

The RN crusier/destroyer elements could remain on standby for alert , but again would be unlikely to sink more than one enemy barge/boat per sortie. The danger there is timely Luftwaffe port bombing and minning ops could sufficently delay such sorites to allow KM surges across the channel or Uboat ambush to be set up. No where in the Sealowe plans is there mention of the role of the German Torpedoboot/Zestroyers and Light cruiser mission. All the escort missions for the invasion fleet are Minesweepers/Sperrbrecher/Vorpostenboot/Rboot . I suspect the warships could be used to intercept such RN crusier/Destroyer sweeps before they reach the channel/crossing area. 

Historically such clashes between RN/KM flottilas usually ended up even with both fleets heading for home at the conclusion of the clash. Mind you at night it was most of the battle just to find the enemy warships, since few if any warships had radars and most of those were with the "Home Fleet". If the german capital ships could decoy the homefleet away for several weeks ahead of any cross channel invasion , they would have served their purpose._





And about the Sandhurts wargame:

_The 1970s wargame is plain silly and unfortunately typical of many 1970s games. With out any explaination 50% of the German invasion fleet is wiped out in one day!!! Given that the 1st day invasion fleet counted 100 merchants and 1550 barges plus 400 tugs similar number of coasters to say nothing of 180 minesweepers/VBoot/RBoot, that would require sinking atleast 750 barges 50 merchants and 200 coasters. No doubt they would have to do this after they had destroyed a sizable section of the escorts and tugs etc. No one seems to be able to point to any realistic historical event that can be used as a yard stick with which to measure the validity of such claims. Crete proves the RN would have to be several times its historical size to achieve even a fraction of this. 

Again given that in the entire war period the combined commonwealth/American fleets facing the AXIS in Europe, only sank 4200 vessels including merchants listed at 100 tons or more, during the entire 5 years of fighting during the war. We are left to ponder how on earth would the south coast section of the anti invasion fleet [200 trawlers , 1/2 of which would be armed, plus ~60 DD/CL], be able to achieve this in a day. RAF air power was only able to sink/destroy 65 barges/merchants in ~ 900 sortie in the week prior to the 'Planned Sealion' start.The word phantasy comes to mind. 

There is no doubt that the German invasion would have taken longer than planned and cost them hugh in loses and had numerous problems ; but 7 sortie were planned with 2-4 days round trip adding up to 2-4 weeks. No invasion ever works exactly as planned and the fog of war plays a key role . What determines the out come is often the adaptablity and leadership of the invading army. The hugh disparity in expected training /expericence levels of the two armies would figure prominatly in this event. 

lwd , what I reported was all that was there. However the barges all recieved concrete/steel/wood constructions to adapt the barges to landing mission. The amount of this averaged about 75-100 tons. In one exercise a merchant was unloaded on to the beach through 24 barge sortie in 14 hours and averaged about 40 tons per load. Its possible the weights listed were gross weight including cargo....but would concrete weight 1000kg/ cubic meter? I thought is was more like 2500kg per cubic meter? 

The plan envisaged 1500 barge trips in the first day followed by 400 per sortie for seven consequtive trips. Atleast 400 barges were to remain on each side to help load and unload merchants to the beach. 

As some one who was born and raised in the UK , even as a child the idea that the weather in the channel would make any crossing impossible , seemed absurd. Any who bases his National Security on such a unpredictable weather happening is plain irresponsible._


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## Civettone (Mar 30, 2007)

And finally some other interesting points but this time more related to my 1942 scenario:

_The Kriegsmarine personnel rose from 190,000 in 1940, to 404,000 in 1941 and 570,000 in 1942._

and

_Air superiority was not a requirement of Sealowe...that was political. Raeder had always said it was doable even up until second week in september provided the Luftwaffe bombarded the RN ports and Coastal RAF feilds prior to launch. Luftwaffe doctrine never ever required airsuperiority prior to attack, as long as they suppress the enemy long enough to gain forced entry that was enough. When Goering Hitler elected to go for London instead of filling Raeders requirement the whole thing became moote and it was obvious Hitler was favoring Goerings terror war instead of invasion. That was his choice._


_(...) the primary strategy for usage of German capital ships was to draw off the Home fleet and ensure it didn't meddle in the channel. Churchill was aidding the Germans here by insisting that no battleships would enter the channel unless German battleships went their first. Further the RN Admiralty feared mostly the German capital ships savaging the convoys and always held the battlefleet and cruiser squadrons on standby for precisely that mission._

Kris


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## syscom3 (Mar 30, 2007)

> If the Crete action is any indication the Germans will be able to fend for themselves. Problem is that each such RN sweep can only be conducted once every few days when the threat is every day. In desperation it could be done every day but with diminishing returns. What’s more with two dozen German barge squadrons on the go at all times, at most ¼ would be in the water during any given RN sweep. Of those ½ dozen invasion groups hit by sweeps in any given day, maybe 3-4 would be driven off while the last couple get through suggesting , overall almost 90% of these groups should get through… an observation that Churchill himself also made.



1) Comparing the situation at Crete is like comparing Guadalcanal with Leyte. Totally dissimilar.

2) In a 1942 scenario, the RN could keep its patrol boats in action for as long as supplies were available. plan on 24/7 coverage. In addition, you are not factoring in available USN assetts.



> Worse still if the RN sweeps ignore these squadron escorts and swamp the barges, they risk being bombarded with hundreds of shells per minute, to say nothing of Luftwaffe intervention. At short range such shells will seriously damage any destroyers they hit possibly preventing them from returning for days or weeks. In Crete ½ the RN attacking ships charged the Axis escorts while the rest chased down the barges. The KM would have enough escorts to meet each of these threats to the squadron. In such cases these KM escorts will no doubt suffer badly in such exchanges, but the inability of the attacking RN warships at Crete to ensure the destruction of only a couple of escorts brings into question the success of such RN tactics, especially in the ‘larger picture’. There would just be too many Axis invasion groups and too few RN sweeps doing too little damage to dramatically alter the out come.



1) Your barges are not exactly the most maneuverable of ships. Theyre either being towed and at the mercy of the elements or even if self propelled, they moving at a very slow pace. Your escorts are primarily small patrol craft, auxiliarries and mine sweepers. None of which had the capability fo putting up much of a coordinated fight. 

2) referring to comment #1, your barges are either going to be grouped up close together ready for group destruction, or scattered around the channel from currents and weather, just waiting to be picked off one at a time.

3) And if they are caught at night, then your covering ships wont be able to do much at all.

I think you should pay attention to the IJN and USN nighttime encounters in the Solomons between PT Boats and Japanese landing ships. It was generally a one sided affair.



> In terms of air attacks, both sides expected the Luftwaffe to maintain air superiority over the immediate channel crossing areas, however port invasions groups around the country may not be protected at all from the air, other than indigenous flak defenses of the escort ships involved.



The LW didnt have air superiority during inclimate weather, nor at night. Once an invasion is begun, the attackers have to follow through. Even if a landing boat gets through to land, if its sunk or badly damaged on the way back, thats a decrease in the logistics capacity for the army. 



> The RAF had 660 bombers ‘available’ in mid 1940 with some heavier ‘Whitley’ Bombers carrying up to 7000 Lbs loads [compared to 4000lb maximum for the German bombers]. This suggests the RAF should more than double the Luftwaffe kill rates [adjusting relative delivery to about 2.3 times the German delivery rate]. However the RAF bombers were level bombers with at best a CEP of 200-400m compared to the German bombers at Dunkirk many of which were Stuka Dive bombers with a CEP of 30m.



And a few hundred bombers at 15,000 feet over a port area will saturate the heck out of it and destroy or damage the naval assetts. A single heavy bomber dropping 7000 lbs of bombs on a barge assembly area will have far more impact than a Stuka with a 1000 pound bomb rying to hit a warship.



> It maybe that the RAF would be no more effective at sinking the German fleet , as the Luftwaffe was at sinking the Dunkirk rescue fleet. Worse still while the RAF did contest the German bomber attacks at Dunkirk, it was little more than 300 sorties a day and about 30-40 fighters at any time. By comparison the Luftwaffe could draw on up to 1300 Me-109s and 1500 Bombers, of which only about ½ could reach over southern England. That means roughly speaking the other half should be available to cover the channel . Thats >600 x Me-109s fly about 1 sortie a day in reserve to counter RAF attacks over the channel. In other words while the Luftwaffe outnumbered the RAF over the sky’s of Dunkirk up to 6:1 , the RAF would at best match the Luftwaffe 1:1 over the English Channel during ‘Sealowe’. In that situation RAF Bomber Command are likely to suffer severe attrition to the Me-109 , which after all where the best interceptors of their day.



Again, why are you comparing the situation in spring 1940 with the probable situation 2 years later. The Brits in 1942 not only have plenty of first class aircraft, but lots of trained aircrews. And thats not even counting the USAAF and USN air assetts that could be brought into the fight.

Now what are your german fighters going to do when Spitfires are on their tails? Ignore them and go for the bombers? Thats a recipie for a short lifespan.



> If we are extremely generous to the RAF it could translate into them sinking roughly ~ 250 German ships/boats each week [Luftwaffe success based on “Hitler’s Blitzkrieg Campaign”, pp 258]during the amphibious assault phase in the Kent region, that’s about 6% of the invasion force per week. Per day that’s ~36 x warships /merchants / trawlers and smaller patrol boats and towed barges. At that rate of destruction, it would statistically take > 16 weeks of uninterrupted RAF bomber attacks to completely destroy/sink the entire amphibious fleet, and 8 weeks to reach the 50% German imposed cut off point. Mean while, during the same time period, the ~600 Luftwaffe bombers should be able to sink/damage 90 ships/boats per week with the same level of uninterrupted bombing attacks.



You dont understand that for the Brits to win, all they have to do is disrupt the invasion timing so the germans arrive piecemeal or without supplies, at a level that keeps them incapable of offensive action. This isnt hard to do considering there wont be any ports available for offloading heavy material, there will be little if any support during the night or inclimate weather. 

Any amphib operation is a difficult undertaking even under the best of circumstances. And an amphib invasion of Britain with very poor logistics, few purpose built amphib craft, and no guarentee of heavy firesupport at the beaches or air superiority over the channel, means your invasion will fail, even before it has started.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Mar 30, 2007)

> No I just truely believe it would have failed. The logistical problem was too great for the Germans. Had it failed the German army would have been devistated and then the war would have been over quite soon.



Too bad the Fuhrer wasn't more stupid. But then all the later war birds of WWII would likely never have come into existence. (Horrendous reason to be sad, I suppose.) Unless Japan still attacked the United States. They might have not cared if Hitler had lost already.


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## Udet (Mar 30, 2007)

Civettone, just an idea humbly submitted for your consideration:

Some guys here, even when discussing in the "what if" mode, have what they believe is the soundest of the opinions regarding the outcome of the war. 

They seem to have no problem with Poland, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway and France...afterwards their mindsets indicate "no matter what" Germany would have lost the war. That simple: it is the "no matter what" operational mode.

The fact Germany lost the war in an overwhelming manner, gives them that certain type of self-reliance to believe they can either easily counter or ridicule any argument that might indicate things could have occurred in a different manner -that would have favoured Germany of course-.

I knew some of the information you posted here; it´s because of that and several other factors that i believe that if Hitler had indeed seriously thought of occupying England, it could have been more than attained.

Finally, if land based Japanese planes promptly sent both HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse to the bottom, i find the assumption German bombers could not have made a similar work with RN large vessels trying to destroy an alleged German invasion force crossing the channel weird to say the least. I assume syscom will have the proper response to suggest the lack of validity of this assertion, or "no matter what".

Cheers!


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## syscom3 (Mar 30, 2007)

> the primary strategy for usage of German capital ships was to draw off the Home fleet and ensure it didn't meddle in the channel. Churchill was aidding the Germans here by insisting that no battleships would enter the channel unless German battleships went their first. Further the RN Admiralty feared mostly the German capital ships savaging the convoys and always held the battlefleet and cruiser squadrons on standby for precisely that mission.



So in 1942, the KM was not going to see action in the channel? That means your invasion forces wont have heavy firesupport at the beaches. Thats a plus for the Allies. A few well protected bunker and pill boxes would have a field day taking shots at the barges. In 1942, the USN was also in action, so add those forces into the equation. Keep them at the ready to go after the German raiders, allowing the RN to release a few more capital ships.



> A combination of surge of Uboat fleets and Capital ships into the North Atlantic convoys would have stripped off "Home fleet" and if Forbes had his way, 1/3 of the "Anti invasion fleet"....leaving a mere 60 crusiers/destroyers to cover the entire British coastal defenses. They would be aided by 50 minesweepers and several hundred armed trawlers.... but with 3000km front to cover, that left at most 50-60% to cover the channel.



OK, the RN and uSN go for the KM raiders. In the meantime, intell will be developed to show the invasion fleet beginning to assemble and sortie. No problem redeploying the RN ships as the invasion details are narrowed down.



> Despite what some will tell you, atleast 1/3 of that force would be down for long term overhaul maintenance and the rest would have to rotate deployments meaning at most 1/3 would be available. Given that the Germans had more such auxiliary warships to concentrate on the south coast suggests problems for the RN. Running warships continuously for periods of more than weeks exhausts the force involved, so its important for the Germans to trigger the RN surge weeks ahead of any cross channel operation.



What makes you think the RN will be in constant non stop motion for the several weeks before the anticiapted invasion. Plenty of time to keep them maintained and in fighting trim. Theyre stationed at some of the finest naval installations in the world. Where do you come up with a figure of "1/3"? If I knew an invasion was going to take place when my country's life was ata stake, I would have all ships ready to fight and kept close enought to bring to the fight when required. And stop putting so much faith on the capacity of your auxilliaries to fight in a major conflict. Theyre small and just what their name says..."auxiliaries". They are not warships nor transports.



> The RN crusier/destroyer elements could remain on standby for alert , but again would be unlikely to sink more than one enemy barge/boat per sortie. The danger there is timely Luftwaffe port bombing and minning ops could sufficently delay such sorites to allow KM surges across the channel or Uboat ambush to be set up. No where in the Sealowe plans is there mention of the role of the German Torpedoboot/Zestroyers and Light cruiser mission. All the escort missions for the invasion fleet are Minesweepers/Sperrbrecher/Vorpostenboot/Rboot . I suspect the warships could be used to intercept such RN crusier/Destroyer sweeps before they reach the channel/crossing area.



Only one barge per sortie? 
A surge across the channel at 5 - 7 knots?
RN subs not sitting in ambush?
RN mining not causing problems for the KM?
RAF/RN hitting the invasion barges at nighttime?



> Historically such clashes between RN/KM flottilas usually ended up even with both fleets heading for home at the conclusion of the clash. Mind you at night it was most of the battle just to find the enemy warships, since few if any warships had radars and most of those were with the "Home Fleet". If the german capital ships could decoy the homefleet away for several weeks ahead of any cross channel invasion , they would have served their purpose.



This time its for keeps. Not a small island in the Med, but the home islands. The RN will fight with tenacity and resolve, simply because failure would be a disaster. And go ahead with your KM raiders sortieing into the Atlantic. Just means the BA/RAF and RN will have an easier time with the unprotected invasion craft.



> And about the Sandhurts wargame:
> The 1970s wargame is plain silly and unfortunately typical of many 1970s games. With out any explaination 50% of the German invasion fleet is wiped out in one day!!! Given that the 1st day invasion fleet counted 100 merchants and 1550 barges plus 400 tugs similar number of coasters to say nothing of 180 minesweepers/VBoot/RBoot, that would require sinking atleast 750 barges 50 merchants and 200 coasters. No doubt they would have to do this after they had destroyed a sizable section of the escorts and tugs etc. No one seems to be able to point to any realistic historical event that can be used as a yard stick with which to measure the validity of such claims. Crete proves the RN would have to be several times its historical size to achieve even a fraction of this.



You dont need to sink an amphib vessel in order to destroy it. All it takes is enough damage so it cant perform its role, and then its useless.... as good as destroyed. Think about the impication of needing tugs to bring in your barges. Tugs are not warships and can be easily damaged. If its not capable of towing its barge(s), then that barge is useless. 



> Again given that in the entire war period the combined commonwealth/American fleets facing the AXIS in Europe, only sank 4200 vessels including merchants listed at 100 tons or more, during the entire 5 years of fighting during the war. We are left to ponder how on earth would the south coast section of the anti invasion fleet [200 trawlers , 1/2 of which would be armed, plus ~60 DD/CL], be able to achieve this in a day. RAF air power was only able to sink/destroy 65 barges/merchants in ~ 900 sortie in the week prior to the 'Planned Sealion' start.The word phantasy comes to mind.



Comparing apples to oranges. The KM (except u-boats) was not a primary factor in the war. After 1944, there really want any KM surface ships to sink.
maybe you should compare this to some of the battles in the Pacific where there were hundreds of ships clustered in a small area.



> There is no doubt that the German invasion would have taken longer than planned and cost them hugh in loses and had numerous problems ; but 7 sortie were planned with 2-4 days round trip adding up to 2-4 weeks. No invasion ever works exactly as planned and the fog of war plays a key role . What determines the out come is often the adaptablity and leadership of the invading army. The hugh disparity in expected training /expericence levels of the two armies would figure prominatly in this event.



Also add logistics. The Brits were far better prepared at all levels in 1942 as in 1940. The question is whether the KM could transport enough troops, follow up forces and *THEN SUPPLY THEM *faster than the brits could stop them. 



> what I reported was all that was there. However the barges all recieved concrete/steel/wood constructions to adapt the barges to landing mission. The amount of this averaged about 75-100 tons. In one exercise a merchant was unloaded on to the beach through 24 barge sortie in 14 hours and averaged about 40 tons per load. Its possible the weights listed were gross weight including cargo....but would concrete weight 1000kg/ cubic meter? I thought is was more like 2500kg per cubic meter?



And if they are combat loaded, then the payload is even less. And none of that unlading can take place under inclimate sea states. 



> As some one who was born and raised in the UK , even as a child the idea that the weather in the channel would make any crossing impossible , seemed absurd. Any who bases his National Security on such a unpredictable weather happening is plain irresponsible.[/i]



Thats why the allies in 1944 planned their logistics on resupply under every type of weather, and had the ships (LST's and LCI's) that could do this.


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## Civettone (Mar 30, 2007)

Eum Syscom ... you do understand that these are not my words, but those of Paul Lakowski, right? Most of it is about Sealion 1940 and has nothing to do with my Sealion '42 scenario. I posted this because Adler also found it interesting, so I thought "why not post some more?". 

If you insist, I will go deeper into this but I just want to be sure you're understand the reason why these posts are in italic and why they are much more eloquently written than mine!  

Kris


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## daishi12 (Mar 30, 2007)

Hi Kris,

Could I just recap on some of the things which you have talked about in previous posts?


You prepose that as a precondition for the invasion of Britain that from early 1942 to Sept 1942 Germany has total control over Russia and there is no significant miltary action in Russia, this in turn frees up resources to plan, develope and build a large number of landing barges and other neccessary equipment. Surely if Russia has been pacified then the Werhmacht would have taken losses to achieve this, also, troops would need to be left in Russia as garrison troops.

You have mentioned that 150 divisions would be available, but I would contend that a fairer figure would be derived as follows :- If there were minimal losses you would still be talking at about 10-15 divisions either destroyed or not combat ready. Given the size of Russia, the amount of garrison troops would need to be approximately 65 divisions. This leaves approx 65 divisions, of whom probably 75% would not be up to full combat readiness. I make the figures to be about 15 divisions who would be fully combat ready.

You have stated that to land heavy equipment in the captured ports the Werhmacht would use the field pioneers. It is my understanding that the field pioneers usually consisted of penal battalions who cannot be considered to be the most reliable of troops.

With regard to wind conditions and specifically the wind state, a Beaufort scale of 4 - 5 is classed as a moderate to fresh breeze with waves up to 1.2m.

In the channel in September the average is 1 in 4 days have rain and fresh breeze would be exceeded on a fairly regular basis. You have stated that of the available barges approx a quarter suffered damage, some with damage to the bow ramp. If the bow ramp is damaged/open on a landing barge there is a good probability that the barge will sink.

You have also stated that the inital attack will take place starting at night to land at dawn in absolute secrecy in order to gain tactical surprise.

How will this happen? If you want the barges to land in the correct area you MUST train the crews, it is not something that an untrained sailor can do without training. You must also load the troops and equipment at the last possible moment. The French resistance would let Bletchley Park know what was going on within at the most an hour of the troops being loaded. The RAF, USAF, RN, USN and everyone else would be on full alert ready to repel borders.

In short I believe that while you do have the right to your own opinion, please try to understand that the invasion of Britain could realisticaly have occured in either 1940 or 1942.


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## renrich (Mar 30, 2007)

Udet, In an earlier post I wrote that the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales off Malaya and for that matter the Hermes and Cornwall in the Indian Ocean is probably not comparable to a situation that would obtain during a cross channel invasion in 1942 UNLESS the Germans achieved COMPLETE air superiority like the allies did in 1944. Off Malaya and in the Indian Ocean the Japanese had no air opposition whatsoever and were free to make runs at their leisure except for not very effective triple A because of the abominable RN fire control system. The Japanese at that time also had the finest antishipping bombing and torpedo units in the world. With absolutely no background in amphibious operations I cannot imagine how the Germans could have been successful in an invasion of England. I still wonder why did not the KM sweep down the channel and stop the evacuation at Dunkirk if they were as battleworthy as represented in this discussion. Another advantage the British would have had is better fore knowledge of the weather(since the weather comes from the west) Even without Ultra(which they would have had) Britain would have known about the invasion at least generally as it was impossible to hide that amount of concentration of troops not to mention the French underground spying on and transmitting the information. With an invasion imminent the USN would have been present in some kind of force. Remember, the invasion of North Africa was slated for November 1942. If an invasion of England seemed imminent do you think for one minute the allies would not have shifted the Torch forces to England?


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## Glider (Mar 30, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Why do you keep repeating that? Germans were going to embark tanks on the barges.
> 
> _A tank on an open barge with a speed of what 3-5 knots, across an open sea of at least 35 miles, for between 7-12 hours at best. Under attack at night for some of the time, a sitting wallowing duck if picked on by day. Would never work, not in a million years. _
> 
> ...



Over to you Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 30, 2007)

Anyone seen Udet?

Renrich, you're making the assumption that the German amphibious landing will fail because they have no experience in it. Well, did the Americans have experience in tank warfare before November 1942? Did the Japanese have experience in attacking enemy fleets with aircraft? 
IMHO that's being shortsighted. The Germans were going to train for amphibious landing. They hardly had time to do this in 1940, yet they did some exercises in the limited time frame they had. Thinking that the Germans would invade Britain unprepared after 6 months of planning is folly and it's an underestimating of the professional nature of the German armed forces. 

The Japanese were well trained against naval targets. In 1940, the Germans weren't. In case of a Sealion '42 they would have been. They had better aircraft for the job than the Japanese. Or do you believe the Val is as good as the Stuka and the Ki-21 as good as the Ju 88? 

About the secrecy, if you go back a page you'll see me recognizing TWO times that the invasion could not have been kept a secret as the British would notice the Germans assembling and preparing a fleet. BUT, the Germans would no doubt have cleared the coastal area (like the Sperrgebiet at the time of D-Day) and the British would have expected - as all of you - that the Germans would invade after an aerial campaign. 

Ultra? I'm really amazed even shocked by this... 
Let me make crystal clear that Ultra did not enable the British to decode all the German transmission. This is often quoted on the internet and in publications but the idea itself is proposterous. 
The first reason is that the amount of messages is simply too great. Given the small amount people who actually knew of Ultra limited the amount of messages which could be decoded. 
Second, the big majority of the decoded messages contained unimportant information (weather reports, observation reports, etc). There were several examples where Ultra failed. I'll use two examples from the German surface boats: the Bismarck and the Channel Dash. 
Third, the Germans routinously spread false information as a precaution to allied interceptions. This lead to confused intelligence (as happened in the Battle of the Bulge). 
In conclusion, Ultra is not a deliberate search for information. It's taking out some messages and hoping there's useful information in them.
Here's from answers.com in case you don't believe me: _Ultra staff and technology successfully decoded over *50 messages a week*. However, by 1942, German radio and wire traffic increased exponentially. The 1,200 member staff of Bletchley Park could not efficiently decipher the thousands of intercepts received daily._

Renrich, Torch was in November 1942. I'm talking about May to July 1942, half a year before Torch could have happened. As such, it's completely irrelevant.


Daishi, welcome to the discussion. You're making some calculations on how many divisions would have been combat ready, which are - let's face it - based on your own views. With all due respect, but the idea that Germany would only have 15 fully operational combat divisions ready is ... well ... 

I would like a source for the pioniere consisting of penal batallions. Sounds very unlikely!

I also don't know what you're saying about Beaufort 4 to 5. I said the barges could stand Beaufort 6 (and if needed even Beaufort 8!)



> In the channel in September the average is 1 in 4 days have rain and fresh breeze would be exceeded on a fairly regular basis.


No one said anything of September but more in the period May-July. Weather in the Channel was ok up to September. I live close to it to know.



> You have stated that of the available barges approx a quarter suffered damage


_I_ did? 



> In short I believe that while you do have the right to your own opinion, please try to understand that the invasion of Britain could realisticaly have occured in either 1940 or 1942.


Nice to know I have that right.  
But unless you can provide me with some substantiated information instead of your biased opinions, I don't have to try to understand anything! Capisce?

 Kris
But


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## syscom3 (Mar 30, 2007)

Civit, the Germans had zero experience in an amphib invasion even a fraction of the size of what Sealion '42 was going to be. Learning on the job is dangerous thing to do in highly complex military maneuvers like invasions over an unpredictable sea.

The USN/USMC learned some hard facts about it at Tarawa and the Brits at Dieppe. 

And the allies didn't need to decrypt all of the Ultra intercepts in order to deduce something was going to happen. All they had to do is know which 4 or 5 days per month were optimal for an attack, and then watch for the invasion troops begin to mass at the ports and the material get loaded.

There's also a question of coordination. The KM was going to stage from multiple ports and the furthest ones had to sail early in order to assault the beaches at roughly the same time as the forces in the nearer ports. Once those forces sail, you know the show has begun and you have a couple of days warning.


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## Civettone (Mar 30, 2007)

Those are good points Syscom. It would indeed have been a difficult task for the Germans. But you have to admit that it would not have been a guarantee for failure either. Else every time an army would do something for the first time, it would fail. That's obviously not the case. I'm aware that they are not the same but you can hardly deny that the Germans wouldn't have picked up several good ideas from Norway and Crete.

And like I said, the British would know the Germans were preparing an invasion but that's not enough. Just look at what the allies did in 1944: fake transmission and plans. Germans were pretty good at that game too. Remember the Ardennes? Germans were masters in organising and improvising. 

I don't know how long it would take between the first and the last barge to get seaborne. I thought it would have been possible to do in 12 hours. Again, Germans were masters in organising and improvising. 

In conclusion, I'm not all suggesting the British would suddenly have Germans on their beaches and wondering where the hell they came from. No, the British would know an invasion was possible on that day but not sure if it would actually happen or not. It would take until the invasion fleet was spotted (and identified!) and this would happen somewhere during the night. Destination would only be certain at dawn. 
Kris


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## Udet (Mar 30, 2007)

renrich said:


> Udet, In an earlier post I wrote that the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales off Malaya and for that matter the Hermes and Cornwall in the Indian Ocean is probably not comparable to a situation that would obtain during a cross channel invasion in 1942 UNLESS the Germans achieved COMPLETE air superiority like the allies did in 1944. Off Malaya and in the Indian Ocean the Japanese had no air opposition whatsoever and were free to make runs at their leisure except for not very effective triple A because of the abominable RN fire control system. The Japanese at that time also had the finest antishipping bombing and torpedo units in the world. With absolutely no background in amphibious operations I cannot imagine how the Germans could have been successful in an invasion of England. I still wonder why did not the KM sweep down the channel and stop the evacuation at Dunkirk if they were as battleworthy as represented in this discussion. Another advantage the British would have had is better fore knowledge of the weather(since the weather comes from the west) Even without Ultra(which they would have had) Britain would have known about the invasion at least generally as it was impossible to hide that amount of concentration of troops not to mention the French underground spying on and transmitting the information. With an invasion imminent the USN would have been present in some kind of force. Remember, the invasion of North Africa was slated for November 1942. If an invasion of England seemed imminent do you think for one minute the allies would not have shifted the Torch forces to England?



renrich, hi.

I agree with your comment the HMS _Prince of Wales_ and HMS _Repulse_ had zero aerial cover when they got intercepted and sunk. But i still fail to see why you think *complete* air superiority is essential to see He 111s and Ju 88s and more importantly Stukas hitting warships...

In my view, nothing like air superiority is an essential requirement to see the Luftwaffe battering RN units...for as long as there are Bf 109s around, and even BF 110s, the Stukas and the Ju 88 can inflict severe damage to enemy ships. I´d certainly rule out the He 111 to carry on with this type of attacks; but you do not want to mess with the Ju 88 and Stukas if you are the crewman of warship if squadrons of these 2 types of planes are based in the sector.

If such a brand new battleship like the HMS _Prince of Wales_ could not do anything to save herself when attacked by the Japs, you do not want to see the vintage/ultra slow sector of the Royal Navy menu (namely HMS _Rodney_ and _Nelson_ and the _Queen Elizabeth_ Class ships) trying to manouver in the Channel and getting intercepted by 40 Stukas protected by 2 staffel of Bf 109s. Such view should cause anyone to throw up.

Come on renrich, please notice that when you talk about Stuka pilots, you are calling the best of the best; experts only. You have to believe that if a flight of Stukas spot and caught the old/slow HMS _Rodney_ sailing through the channel, a 500kg cucumber is inserted into the guts of the battleship, and i do not think she finds her way out of that.

I agree the Japs surely had the very best pilots and crews trained for the very specific and specialized task of pounding enemy warships, but those were Japan´s plans, an island, with battlefields projected across thousands and thousands of square kilometers across islands and atolls; Germany is a continental power.

Just like in the case of air superiority, i am not sure why you think this particular point is so important. Germany never planned to invade England, ever, but if it becomes necessary, why do you think pilots and crews of Ju 87s and Ju 88s have any significant trouble in gutting ships?

Weren´t they brutally successful against the RN in the MTO only a few months later?

So it would seem to me that if the Royal Navy will have that many action trying to intercept and destroy a German invasion force in the Channel, they will have to do it all with heavy light cruisers, destroyers, sloops and other minor escort vessels. Not forgetting the whole 1940 is a year when the U-boat force attracts the attention of the admiralty and a significant number of these non-capital vessels is needed elsewhere.

Germany wins, easily.


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## syscom3 (Mar 30, 2007)

Udet said:


> renrich, hi.
> 
> I agree with your comment the HMS _Prince of Wales_ and HMS _Repulse_ had zero aerial cover when they got intercepted and sunk. But i still fail to see why you think *complete* air superiority is essential to see He 111s and Ju 88s and more importantly Stukas hitting warships...
> 
> ...



Udet, I agree with nearly everything you said about dive bombers able to hit their targets.

But..... in 1942, the USN was going to have to carriers available to attack the KM..... so factor in a pair of highly trained SBD squadrons available for use.


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

Carriers in the Channel?  I don't think so!

Out of curiosity, which of the American aircraft carriers was near England around the Summer of 1942? 
And most importantly, what could their outdated dive or torpedo bombers contribute to the battle? SBD, TBD, F-4F coming to save the day?  


Udet, I know you're aware of this but don't forget to mention that in 1942 the Stuka could carry 1400kg armoured-piercing bombs. And He 111s could carry torpedo's for which they were quite suited. 
Kris


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## syscom3 (Mar 31, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Carriers in the Channel?  I don't think so!



Who says they have to be in the channel? Lots of scenario's for having the carriers out at sea and stage through land bases. 



> Out of curiosity, which of the American aircraft carriers was near England around the Summer of 1942?



Wasp and Hornet were in the Atlantic.



> And most importantly, what could their outdated dive or torpedo bombers contribute to the battle? SBD, TBD, F-4F coming to save the day?



Read prior thread of the F4F vs -109....... an even match at low and middle altitudes

TBD? Well, I suppose having something available is better than nothing.

SBD? Ever hear of their war record? Better than the Stuka in many aspects.


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## Hop (Mar 31, 2007)

> Not quite. Yes, it involved attacks on British shipping but the Channel phase was more than that. (I know you're not saying it wasn't but at first read it comes across as if you do.) This first phase was called the Channel Phase because it attacked targets along the Channel. So that means attacks on ports and on the coastal radar installations.



There were very few attacks on land targets in July.

Wood and Dempster give a one line summary of each day's operations, for July 10th - July 31st they are:

10 Convoy raids off North Foreland and Dover
11 Convoys attacked off Suffolk. Portland harbour raided.
12 Attacks on convoy off Norfolk-Suffolk coast, shipping off the Isle of Wight and Aberdeen
13 Shipping attacks off Dover and Portland
14 Shipping attacks off Dover and Swanage
15 Shipping attacked off Norfolk coast and the Channel. Yeovil bombed.
16 Very little activity
17 Search for shipping off Scottish and East coasts
18 Shipping off south and east coasts attacked
19 Dover raided. Defiant squadron largely destroyed
20 Convoys and shipping at Dover attacked
21 Raids on convoys in Channel and Straights of Dover
22 Shipping off the south coast attacked
23 East coast shipping raided
24 Convoys and shipping in the Channel attacked
25 Convoys and shipping in the Channel raided
26 Shipping off south coast attacked
27 Raids on shipping and naval targets in Dover harbour and straights
28 Shipping attacked off Dover and south coast ports
29 Convoy off Dover raided
30 Raids on convoys off Orfordness, Clacton and Harwich
31 Widespread attacks on shipping in south, south east and south west coastal waters. Dover balloon barage

Not many attacks on land targets there, and I suspect in the event of invasion, the Luftwaffe are going to have a lot more targets along the coast, and some way inland.



> As this was a first probing phase - so only part of the Luftwaffe participated - the Germans still made the error of not escorting all their bombers.



I don't know of many un-escorted bombers at this time in the south east. Small numbers of bombers operated un-escorted in the north and west, beyond the range of Luftwaffe fighters, but they didn't suffer unduly because single aircraft often escaped interception.

Even at this stage of the battle, the Luftwaffe were flying approx 3 fighter sorties for every bomber sortie.



> Especially thinking of the tragedy of those Stuka's attacking radar along the coast and getting decimated by RAF fighters. This also stopped further use of the Stuka in the BoB.



That wasn't until the second phase. The big disaster for the Stuka's was on the 18th August, when just over 100 set out to bomb several targets on the Isle of Wight and around Southampton. 16 were destroyed, several more seriously damaged.

And they weren't unescorted. They had no less than 150 Bf 109s as escort. 



> The Royal Navy was never attacked by a thousand bombers.



Never would be, either.

Historically, the Germans found that 3 fighters per bomber was the minimum escort force needed. Bomber sorties were limited by fighter availability. It's going to be the same in 1942, as well.

Coupled with that, there are limits to how many bombers you can send against warships, which are constantly moving. Trying to find a moving target with a thousand bombers, and a few thousand fighters in escort, is not going to be easy. You'd be lucky to get a fraction of your force bombing.



> And don't forget my point on training on naval targets since BoB.



Don't forget the large increases in AA armament for warships, and the fitting of air gunnery radar.



> Oh no, that's not what is meant by navigation problems. Read the classic 'Bomber offensive' by Noble Frankland.
> What you're saying should indicate that the BC bombers were less accurate over (for instance) Brest and (most) inaccurate over Berlin. That's obviously not the case as was shown in the BC offensive against Brest in late 1941 and early 1942 when they failed to destroy the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.



They damaged them both, though. And Prinz Eugen. 

Attacking warships in dock, camouflaged and heavily protected by AA, is far harder than attacking enemy merchant ships lying off your beaches.

A better example would be the German barges in the channel ports in 1940, with up to 80 being sunk on some nights, and the KM describing the situation as "unacceptable". 

And again, attacks on the same barges off British beaches would be easier.



> I never said they would be defending the landing site. I specifically said that the KM would stay close to the FRENCH coast to draw away Royal Navy ships, and only engage in favourable circumstances, after which they would retreat to the French coast again.



You either launch your invasion, or you don't. Embarking the troops, sending them out, then calling them back, is a recipe for disaster even in a well organised fleet. When you have civilians and poorly trained soldiers manning towed barges, it's going to turn in to a farce.

The RN are not going to jump the gun. The German invasion "fleet" is slow, it will takes many, many hours to cross the channel and get in to position. Indeed, German planning was for the western elements to set out 24 hours before the landing, and spend the entire day at sea. The RN will undoubtedly send some destroyers to investigate at night, in 1940 they were even entering the outer harbours at Calais etc to see what was going on. But they are not going to commit substantial forces until the targets are at sea.

And you haven't explained what is going to happen at night. Just how good were the Luftwaffe at sinking warships at night? Can you name some?

And the third point is target identification. When the RN forces get close to the German forces, it's going to be hard for the Luftwaffe to tell them apart, and it's certain that every ship in the German "fleet" is going to be firing at every aircraft they see.



> That makes me conclude that the British would definitely hold back several BBs and other warships to counter the German BCs.



No doubt. But on the other hand, if the Germans do manage to land, expect the battleships to sortie against the German beachheads. Tirpitz loose in the Atlantic is far less a threat than the Germans advancing on London.

What do the Germans do about battleships shelling their beachheads at night? What do you think is going to happen to the merchant ships and tugs and barges anchored off shore waiting their turn to land, or run up on the beaches as they are off loaded?



> So far I have relied on two elements: surprise and local Kriegsmarine strength. As the bulk of the Royal Navy wasn't in the Channel, I think the Kriegsmarine should have been able to deal with them.



Are you aware of just how few KM warships were serviceable in the summer of 1942? And the size of the RN Home Fleet, and American reinforcements?

To give an example, the escort force for convoy "pedestal" to Malta:

2 battleships
4 aircraft carriers
7 cruisers
16 destroyers

That single convoy escort force was more powerful than the entire seaworthy Kreigsmarine fleet.



> But all I have to say is: Channel Dash. 250 German fighters managed to hold off 75 RAF squadrons.



No. The RAF didn't use anything like that force.

What happened in the Channel Dash is that the Germans took advantage of poor weather that restricted operations. Some of the planned RAF bombers couldn't take off because they were snowed in. 

There is a huge difference between a surprise operation in early February, and an invasion, which has to be conducted in good weather.

The first British aircraft to attack were 6 Swordfish of the FAA. They were supposed to have 3 squadrons of Spitfires as cover, but due to delays they actually had an escort of 11 Spitfires, which were engaged by the Luftwaffe.

All 6 Swordfish were lost. The Spitfires claimed 3 Fw190s for no loss.

By the time the RAF bombers arrived on the scene, the cloud layer was down to 600ft, and visibility at sea level was around 1,000 yards. Only torpedo bombers have a chance of attacking in those circumstances, and none of the allocated torpedo bomber squadrons arrived in time.

5 old British destroyers (WW1 vintage, I believe) attacked with torpedoes and gunfire, 1 of the British ships was damaged, but all returned to port. It's a measure of the weather conditions that the 5 destroyers got to within 4,000 yeards of a German battleship and heavy cruiser, escorted by several much larger German destroyers, and all 5 survived.

The invasion could only have happened in good weather in the late spring or summer, and it's silly to take the RAF performance in appalling weather conditions in February, and apply it to the good conditions the invasion required.


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## Hop (Mar 31, 2007)

> Even though the British would know of a future invasion and would photograph the Germans assembling their forces near the ports, they would still be uncertain about the actual D-Day. Everyone would expect the Germans to start an air offensive first (like in 1940). The embarking itself would have to happen under the cover of darkness and like the Channel Dash the British would perhaps only find out that the invasion fleet was underway once it was already in the Channel.



Embarking that many troops would take time. If you look at the German plans for 1940, they were to sail the lead elements of the invasion fleet a day before the landings. The rest of the force was to set sail at night to be ready to land at dawn.

The problem is that the German barges were slow, and the Channel has strong currents. Many of the ships would have to travel up to 100 miles, which means 10 hours or more. And because Britain is so far north, in the summer then nights are very short. In the middle of June, for example, sunrise at Dover occurs at 3.45 am, sunset at 8.15. 

If you want to land at dawn, as the Germans did, you have to set out in daylight the day before, which means embarking troops from at least the previous morning. Heavy equipment like tanks and artillery would have to be loaded days in advance.



> You cannot sweep mines as fast as the enemy can lay them.



There's a problem with this. The British had both far more mine laying capacity, and far more mine sweeping capacity. 

If mines are going to be a major factor, they will favour the British, not the Germans.



> I specifically said there would not be an air campaign prior to the invasion (unlike 1940). This would surprise the British but it would also mean that the British would no longer have the advantage of fighting over friendly territory: they would have to fight over German held beaches and the Channel. So in a war of attrition the (better trained) German pilots (in better aircraft) would hold the advantage.



What, like they did in 1940


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## Glider (Mar 31, 2007)

Kris
You didn't reply to the posting probably because I messed it up. This should be easier to understand.

Originally Posted by Civettone 
_Question_, Why do you keep repeating that? Germans were going to embark tanks on the barges. 

_Reply _A tank on an open barge with a speed of what 3-5 knots, across an open sea of at least 35 miles, for between 7-12 hours at best. Under attack at night for some of the time, a sitting wallowing duck if picked on by day. Would never work, not in a million years. 

_Question _They managed to triple production of the subs and double production of PT boats and miesweepers by using the same shipyards. So ok, now they'll just double production of subs and keep that third bit for transport boats. What's the problem?

_Reply _No problem, but you have now reduced U Boat production by a third. The U boats will have to either abandon the N Atlantic ensuring that the UK can get supplies and free up more destroyers, frigates etc or support the invasion. Your choice


_Question _The British used over 700 aircraft (amongst them 400 fighters) against 250 German fighters and achieved nothing! Their ships in the Channel achieved nothing, not even a German MTB was lost. Yet, this is going to be the force that is going to annihilate the German invasion fleet? 
Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Cerberus" - The Channel Dash

_Reply _I read the article which was first class. The force was attacked by the following.
5 MTB during the day
6 swordfish
35 high level bombers
1 squadron of Beauforts
1 squadron of Beauforts different attack
3 Beauforts
6 WW1 destroyers

All the above attacks above with the exception of the first squadron of Beauforts made their attacks on the BC's. The Germans were not able to stop the attacks, an invasion fleet would have been huge, targets sitting ducks compared to the German BC's. German losses would have been inevitable. The BC's got away with it because they were not spotted and communication poor. An invasion fleet would have been spotted and attacked by 75 british squadrons not the above. Note, even a straffing run by a Spit could decimate a landing barge

_Question _If you would have read my posts you would have seen that they would land on the first day and retreat until the Royal Navy would retreat. IMO this would have lasted two days.

_Reply _I read your posts, always do. Why on earth would the RN retreat? They dominate at night leaving the landing grounds wide open to bombardment and any Geman vessels caught at night would be at grave risk. As explained the RN at day could impose itself at key moments at a cost but a cost that we could live with.


_Question _The Bf 109 was better than the Spit V and I already explained this. If you disagree, please tell me why and back this up with figures. I also said aircraft production would increase: more Fw 190s. 
Well, according to my plan they do. 

_Reply _Look up the thread about 109F vs Spit V its goes into far more detail that we can here. The best example was Malta. Germany had 109F and early 109G the British Spit V. Germany had numbers, initiative, secure airfields, spares, workshops, reserves, experience, targets within easy reach, spare fuel even. Why weren't the Spits shot out of the sky?
PS if your allowed to magically improve 190 Production, can the British can do the same for Spit IX

_Question _True
If you lose, the war is over. Sounds logical 
_Reply _We agree on something


_Question _No, on the first day the Kriegsmarine will escort the invasion fleet. It could take on the MTBs and DDs during the Channel Dash so they could do it again, this time warding them off before they reach the invasion fleet. British MTBs are no match for German S-Boote (or E-boats as you call them).

_reply _The German fleet and airforce failed to sink the 5 MTB's in daylight, unsupported and didn't even stop them launching their attack. Why do you think you can stop dozens of MTB's at night? Leave the daylight to the larger ships.

_Question _You cannot sweep mines as fast as the enemy can lay them. 

_Reply _True but we can sweep most of the ones in the path of the fleet, not the entire N Sea and remember when we get to the invasion there will be no mines or the Invasion will hit them. You akso forget that the UK can lay mines. Once we know where the landings are we can place mines between them and the German ports.

_Question _And what will that achieve? Strategical bombers are useless against tactical targets, especially when dug in. 
Reminds me of Hitler's order to have Me 262s to attack the invasion beaches. He literally said they would just fly over the beaches and drop a bomb on them. I think he would have been glad with you backing him up 

_Reply _Think big picture. Your stores, transport, communications, ammo dumps, roads, landing sites, fuel dumps are all over the place. The men in the fox holes are safe but everything else would be at severe risk. We are talking about 350 bombers (minimum) a night, every night, dropping on average about 6,000lb bombs each, in an enclosed area at minimum risk. It would look like the moon after a few days. Nothing could land or move.
Not exactly the same as droping a few bombs from 262's at serious danger to themselves.

Anything else? 
Kris

Over to you 
David


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

Hi Syscom;


> Wasp and Hornet were in the Atlantic.


In the Atlantic... It would take two days to sail from Scapa to the Channel. Do I need to go on?
Like I said, American reinforcements would come too late. 

SBD was NOT better than the Stuka. First of all, it could not dive vertically (see Eric Brown for that) and thus was not that accurate. Second, the SDB destroyed more ships because it was used in a shooting alley. With the Stukas the Americans would have done even better.

The F-4F was inferior to the Bf 109F. If you want, you can direct me to that thread and prove to me I'm wrong. 

-------

Unrelated to that disussion, some images of those barges:

Kris


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## Kurfürst (Mar 31, 2007)

Hop said:


> Historically, the Germans found that 3 fighters per bomber was the minimum escort force needed. Bomber sorties were limited by fighter availability. It's going to be the same in 1942, as well.



An awfully silly notion, even from you. Apart from of course the 'there must be 3 fighters per bomber' story is just a farce. 1000 fighters deny the same amount of opportunity to the enemy wheter there are 1000 or 3000 bombers around. En masse operation of bombers will precisly ensure much more bombers will get through every single time simply because their numbers, and the loss rate per sortie will be much lower as well.



> Coupled with that, there are limits to how many bombers you can send against warships, which are constantly moving. Trying to find a moving target with a thousand bombers, and a few thousand fighters in escort, is not going to be easy. You'd be lucky to get a fraction of your force bombing.



It's rather easy to find an enemy task force with radar - the Freya was just made for that task and was already put into coastal installation during the BoB, and was used effectively in this role.

Besides, the Channel is really not much of an area to control.



> Don't forget the large increases in AA armament for warships, and the fitting of air gunnery radar.



Both Prince of Wales and Repulse was sunk without much trouble by a moderate number of land based aircraft without much cost to the Japanese. They had air gunnery radar, but that's pretty useless since it can only direct the big AAA guns, with which without a proximity fuse are completely useless against small, fast targets. They were originally meant against level bombers, but this went back to the 1920s when big, slow level bombers were the only types around capable getting airborne with an effective bombload. By the 1930s and 1940s, dive bombers and torpedo bombers replaced them as threat, and those were just too fast moving targets for large caliber AAA. Not to mention British shipboard AAA guns left something to be desired, having poor elevation, and too slow RoF - their caliber was poorly choosen.

That leaves the British warships with their notoriously useless pom-poms and other jokes onboard. I trying hard to think of a single case when a British warship was attacked by air power and could fend it off, or even make the attackers job just difficult.

At Dunkerque they lost a good number of destroyers, even though German aerial sorties were not too numerous, nor concentrating on the warships but the evacuation 'fleet'. At Crete the RN was subjected to more determined air attacks and they suffered heavy losses in short time, and soon realized that the only option was to pull back and leave the waters around Crete to the LW. The only operations they continued were evacuating the island (not very successfully, most still become PoWs) under the cover of darkness, and Cunningham had to fight High Command even to allow RN ships to operate under such risky conditions. It sums up conviningly how much caution was shown by the RN top brass in face of possible air attacks on their ships.

In our hypothetical scenario however, the butchers would the U-boots holding a perimeter defense behind minefields, if any RN commander would be reckless (or more like, stupid) enough to re-enect Thermopulai on the confined waters of the La Manche against an invisible enemy. Even single U-boot that gets into an ambush position can cause a lot of damage to capital ships, and teven the knowladge of and countermeasures against U-boot presence can turn upside down a naval operation. They feared the U-boot threat - and with a good reason -, so much that at Skagerrak the whole Grand Fleet turned upon a single (false) sighting of a periscope, fearing of a submarine ambush. Shore batteries at Calais with their big guns would also contribute somewhat.



> They damaged them both, though. And Prinz Eugen.
> 
> Attacking warships in dock, camouflaged and heavily protected by AA, is far harder than attacking enemy merchant ships lying off your beaches.



After flying an astronomical number of sorties.. even though they attacked in the most favourable conditions - a ship in a dock is just a 200+ meter big, stationary target. It's not hard to hit, yet they continously managed to miss them. Attacking evading 30 knot,warships with level bombers, without any training for it (that the Bomber Command Sqn never had, neither it had fitting quality bombsights) is much harder. It was not done during WW2 by anyone with too much success. The tough part for the British, that they lack any kind of precision bombing aircraft ike dive bombers and good torpedo bombers.

On the other hand, the biggest problem to the Germans would be to find a good reason why to even bother invading and occupying England. There was little gain in them doing that. As a military threat, Britain alone was non-existant ever since Dunkerque. If the British alone could not land on the continent with a chance of success, generally they were the least of the German's concerns.


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## syscom3 (Mar 31, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Hi Syscom;
> In the Atlantic... It would take two days to sail from Scapa to the Channel. Do I need to go on?
> Like I said, American reinforcements would come too late.



Why assume they are at Scapa Flow? Why not hanging off of Ireland? Dont you suppose the US forces are already in the area?



> SBD was NOT better than the Stuka. First of all, it could not dive vertically (see Eric Brown for that) and thus was not that accurate. Second, the SDB destroyed more ships because it was used in a shooting alley. With the Stukas the Americans would have done even better.



Be cautious in your quoting Eric Brown. More than one aviation enthusiest has questioned his figures and competance. When it came to ship killing records, the SBD has the Stuka beat. Its performance in the Pacific was legendary. And one other thing.... SBD's can operate from either carriers or land. The Stuka cant do that.



> The F-4F was inferior to the Bf 109F. If you want, you can direct me to that thread and prove to me I'm wrong.



I will try to find it for you. The F4F's did meat the -109's up in the North Sea a couple of times, and came out the better of it.

-------

Unrelated to that disussion, some images of those barges:

Kris[/QUOTE]


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

> There were very few attacks on land targets in July.


That's completely untrue. Either your source is wrong, or you're making a deliberate attempt to hold back information. Which is it? I hope it's not the latter, that would really disappoint me!
To say that the German Luftwaffe only flew a couple of bombing missions over England is BS! If you want, I'll back it up (as I always try to do). But I'm hoping you'll correct it yourself. 



> Historically, the Germans found that 3 fighters per bomber was the minimum escort force needed. Bomber sorties were limited by fighter availability. It's going to be the same in 1942, as well.


Following your previous statement, I also doubt if this is true. I can hardly remember any missions where the Germans used three times as many fighters as bombers. 



> Trying to find a moving target with a thousand bombers, and a few thousand fighters in escort, is not going to be easy. You'd be lucky to get a fraction of your force bombing.


Searching the vast spaces of the Channel with just 1000 bombers? What was I thinking...



> Don't forget the large increases in AA armament for warships, and the fitting of air gunnery radar.


Good point. But did they all have increased AA armament and an air gunnery radar? 




> Attacking warships in dock, camouflaged and heavily protected by AA, is far harder than attacking enemy merchant ships lying off your beaches.


Camouflaged? Says who? Just yesterday I saw a aerial photograph of those ships and they were not camouflaged. What's the point in camouflaging the ships if you can't conceal the docks? 
And like I said, I don't plan on leaving the invasion fleet on the British beaches. They have to be pulled back. As such, there won't be a German fleet along the British coast when the Royal Navy appears. That's the core of my scenario which I have repeated like 5 times already. 




> A better example would be the German barges in the channel ports in 1940, with up to 80 being sunk on some nights, and the KM describing the situation as "unacceptable".


I remember one night, there were 40 sunk. Don't remember the details. Will look it up! 




> You either launch your invasion, or you don't. Embarking the troops, sending them out, then calling them back, is a recipe for disaster even in a well organised fleet.


One more time, this time a bit less complicated: 1.Send out the entire fleet. First wave supported by warships.
2.Disembark the troops. 
3.Send the fleet back. 
4.Royal Navy arrives from SF. 
5.Attack the RN with bombers (and other means)
6.RN retreats or gets annihilated.
7.Send the second wave supported by warships.




> And you haven't explained what is going to happen at night.


Nothing.




> And the third point is target identification. When the RN forces get close to the German forces, it's going to be hard for the Luftwaffe to tell them apart, and it's certain that every ship in the German "fleet" is going to be firing at every aircraft they see.


Now you're holding on to threads. 
Barges don't look like destroyers. Stukas don't look like Spitfires. 




> What do the Germans do about battleships shelling their beachheads at night?


Churchill said he would not committ battleships in the Channel.



Hop said:


> Embarking that many troops would take time. If you look at the German plans for 1940, they were to sail the lead elements of the invasion fleet a day before the landings. The rest of the force was to set sail at night to be ready to land at dawn.


There were forces coming in from Ostend and other remote places. Those had to be launched first.
I don't think it will be that difficult to confuse the British: it could also be an exercise. Or the Germans would have staged a couple of manoeuvres prior to the real one. Plus, false radio traffic. Plus, double agents. Enough to confuse the British.
I already said a couple of times that I don't expect the British to be caught off guard. But I doubt they will send their navy from Scapa Flow before they're absolutely sure the invasion is underway. 




> The problem is that the German barges were slow, and the Channel has strong currents. Many of the ships would have to travel up to 100 miles, which means 10 hours or more.


Those from Ostend maybe? But 50 miles is a better average. And that's 5 hours according to your calculations? Or do you want me to attach a map of the Channel? 



> If you want to land at dawn, as the Germans did, you have to set out in daylight the day before, which means embarking troops from at least the previous morning. Heavy equipment like tanks and artillery would have to be loaded days in advance.


Days? What do you base this on? Why not one day? Just as long as the bulk of the fleet doesn't leave the docks during the day I think it's ok. Like I said, French resistance or Enigma are not going to help you that much. The British will only be sure of the invasion during the night.



> There's a problem with this. The British had both far more mine laying capacity, and far more mine sweeping capacity.


So? Did the British have to seal off the Channel? The Germans were quite capable of mining the Channel. Even in 1944 the British were still minesweeping the Channel. You're clearly underestimating the German minelaying capability.
I'm not underestimating the British minesweeping capability. I'm just saying that the British cannot sweep them as fast as the Germans can lay them. 



> What, like they did in 1940


You didn't read what I wrote. I specifically said that the British would no longer have the advantage of flying over friendly territory, and that's why the situation was different from 1940. The Germans would win this battle of attrition. As such, your comment of "like they did in 1940?" makes no sense.

Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

Hi David! 


Glider said:


> Kris
> You didn't reply to the posting probably because I messed it up. This should be easier to understand.


Did you get my PM about it?



> A tank on an open barge with a speed of what 3-5 knots, across an open sea of at least 35 miles, for between 7-12 hours at best. Under attack at night for some of the time, a sitting wallowing duck if picked on by day. Would never work, not in a million years.


It seems this is more criticizing barges in general than their ability to carry tanks. My impression was that you would think they couldn't be disembarked but now I see you believe the barges would become unstable?? Am I right in this observation? 




> but you have now reduced U Boat production by a third.


No. I said the Germans could have tripled U-boat production as they did in 1943. But if they had only doubled it, they could have used that third bit for construction of other ships. 
In fact, I don't see a problem with the transport capacity as such. I would simply improve the existing barges and make them self-propelling.




> 5 MTB during the day
> 6 swordfish
> 35 high level bombers
> 1 squadron of Beauforts
> ...


This only reinforces my opinion about the striking power of the British. The article also states that the British used over 700 aircraft (amongst them 400 fighters) against 250 German fighters. Yet, they only managed to get in a few bombers? They couldn't get them escorted by fighters? Why would things have been different during an invasion? I agree that the targets would have been easier to find but nevertheless, it still says a lot about British capabilities. 




> As explained the RN at day could impose itself at key moments at a cost but a cost that we could live with.


Where did you explain this? I said I believed between 150 and 300 British ships would be sunk or at least neutralized a day. And that was already dividing the result of my calculations into half. 




> Look up the thread about 109F vs Spit V its goes into far more detail that we can here. The best example was Malta.


No, it wasn't. If you're so sure why don't you take out the best examples of that thread and present them to me. IIRC I already replied to someone's claims about Maltese Spitfires beating German Bf 109s. I'm still waiting for a reply. I have the loss figures of the German Bf 109s ready... But let me just say this first: from May 1942 the British had more fighters than the Germans opposing them: 5 Spitfire squadrons against just one Bf 109 Gruppe. (Perhaps also some Bf 110s).



> if your allowed to magically improve 190 Production, can the British can do the same for Spit IX


Increasing production is not magical. Making aircraft operational sooner is.
And Germany could decrease production of army equipment in favour of navy and AF. I don't see how or why the British would do such a thing.




> _Question _True
> If you lose, the war is over. Sounds logical
> _Reply _We agree on something







> The German fleet and airforce failed to sink the 5 MTB's in daylight


Sorry I lost you. Which MTB's are we talking about?




> Once we know where the landings are we can place mines between them and the German ports.


Hadn't thought about that. That would be a great action!
But otherwise, the Germans would know exactly where to sweep mines: in front of the beaches they want to invade. The British would have a much larger area to cover: the entire entrance lanes to the Channel.




> Your stores, transport, communications, ammo dumps, roads, landing sites, fuel dumps are all over the place. The men in the fox holes are safe but everything else would be at severe risk.


I think you're making the same mistakes as many AF leaders made in WW2: use level bombers for tactical missions. They tried this several times yet I can only think of one single time where I actually had success. And there (Normandy) the troops weren't even dug in.
Your plan sounds wonderful but I don't think it would have mattered much. Their accuracy would even have made it as dangerous for their own troops as for the Germans. What was it again? One third in a 5 mile area? And the German nightfighters would have had a field day, knowing exactly where to find the British bombers. No need for radar. 

Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Why assume they are at Scapa Flow?


Because Scapa Flow was the main RN base to direct and protect convoys to Murmansk, and to react to a Tirpitz outbreak. Your TF 99 (or TF 39 as you called it) was also there.



> Dont you suppose the US forces are already in the area?


Well, those two carriers weren't. One was on the American eastcoast and the other was in the South Pacific (Argentina, Africa).




> Be cautious in your quoting Eric Brown. More than one aviation enthusiest has questioned his figures and competance.


I participated in the last discussion about Brown, so I'm quite aware of his limitations. Fact remains that the Stuka was the better dive bomber. 



> When it came to ship killing records, the SBD has the Stuka beat. Its performance in the Pacific was legendary.


Like I said, the SBD was in a shooting alley. It had more opportunity to attack ships than the Stuka.



> And one other thing.... SBD's can operate from either carriers or land. The Stuka cant do that.


Yes, it can. Ever heard of the Ju 87C or E? 
I know the Germans never had an operational carrier but that doesn't say anything about the Stuka.




> I will try to find it for you. The F4F's did meat the -109's up in the North Sea a couple of times, and came out the better of it.


There were three encounters IIRC, mainly by British FAA pilots. In any case, not a statistically solid record. With just a couple of encounters, _chance_ is too big a factor. One which only gets filtered out after dozens of encounters.

Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

> A better example would be the German barges in the channel ports in 1940, with up to 80 being sunk on some nights, and the KM describing the situation as "unacceptable".



As promised, I looked it up:
“…By September the following shipping was lost or damaged by enemy action: 
51 barges* sunk or so badly damaged that they were useless 
163 barges damaged 
12 steamers sunk or completely lost through damage 
9 steamers damaged 
4 tugs sunk 
1 tug damaged.” 

(* Out of almost 3000 barges** of which only 1250 were going to be used in the first wave)
(Source is post-allied report: http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/numbered_studies/468155.pdf)

(** together with:
450 tugs 
155 freighters (2.000-7.000 tons) 
300 motor boats and motor sailers (50-200 tons) 
1.200 small motor boats (approx.) 
250 naval and auxilliary vessels (not counting the covering forces proper)
Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

Oh this is a beauty:
_By the end of 1942 the German nightfighter force numbers 389 aircraft_
(German Defences)

And like I said before, those NFs would know exactly where to find the British bombers. Ein fest für die Nachtjäger!
Kris


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## renrich (Mar 31, 2007)

Kris, the US Marines had been planning and practising amphibious doctrine for quite some time prior to WW2. To my knowledge, the Germans had not. To compare an amphibious attack in mass on a well defended shore to tank warfare is I believe not relevant. I remember having read on numerous occasions that a mass amphibious landing is the most difficult military evolution of all. The Repulse and Prince of Wales were not sunk by bombing principally. They were hit by 1 bomb and 5 torpedoes and 1 bomb and 6 torpedoes respectfully. No, I don't believe that the LW ever attained the level of lethality that the Japanese had with their torpedo a/c in the early days of the Pacific war. Another opinion about Sealion. From the West Point Atlas of American Wars, Vol. 2, " A plan was developed-and changed several times-amidst constant bickering between the Army and Navy; but it was never destined to be implemented, because the vital requirement for air superiority could not be met." To think that a Sealion would have a better chance of success in the summer of 1942 than it would have in 1940 seems ludicrous to me. To argue about the relative merits of fighter a/c seems beside the point. The LW could not meet the requirement for air superiority in 1942 anymore than they could have in 1940. If memory serves the RAF began a series of offensive fighter sweeps after the BOB called Ramrods. They had higher pilot losses then than in the BOB but it shows how aggresive they were and never overlook that the British were never reluctant to sacrifise blood and bone in either World War. Another point, to dismiss the possible influence of the forces in Torch does not seem realistic to me. Torch began on Nov. 8, 1942 with landings from the Atlantic and the Med. Torch did not spring full grown suddenly into action. It took months of planning and accumulation of weapons and supplies as well as training to bring it off just as a Sealion II would have. The Allies would have known that the Wehrmacht was massing for an invasion against England. Can there be any doubt that Torch would have been canceled and some of the naval and army assets intended for Torch diverted to England. One last point and I don't mean to disparage German military prowess by this observation. The Wehrmacht infantry and armor in WW2 were some of the finest in all of history. There infantry historically probably only equalled in ability and fortitude by the infantry of the Southern Confederacy. The LW as a tactical air force at their peak were superb. But Germany was not a maritime nation. Great Britain and Japan were. I doubt that had positions been reversed Germany would have ever been able to pull off an evacuation of 338,000 men from the beaches as Britain did at Dunkirk. They simply had not the experience, background and heritage. That certainly played a role in the cancellation of Sealion I. If they had been able to invade England at that time then the war is over and they could deal with thr Soviets at their leisure. They could not do it then and to accomplish a Sealion against a much stronger and better organised and equipped Britain with the US alongside and with the stakes that invasion would have represented doesn't seem like a remote possibility to me.


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## syscom3 (Mar 31, 2007)

> Because Scapa Flow was the main RN base to direct and protect convoys to Murmansk, and to react to a Tirpitz outbreak. Your TF 99 (or TF 39 as you called it) was also there.



But it doesnt mean it has to, does it?



> Well, those two carriers weren't. One was on the American eastcoast and the other was in the South Pacific (Argentina, Africa).



That reflects the actual reality of 1942, not what would happen in this hypothetical scenario.



> I participated in the last discussion about Brown, so I'm quite aware of his limitations. Fact remains that the Stuka was the better dive bomber.



Open to debate. 



> Like I said, the SBD was in a shooting alley. It had more opportunity to attack ships than the Stuka.



Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Rabaul a shooting gallery?



> I know the Germans never had an operational carrier but that doesn't say anything about the Stuka.



The US carriers could hit the invasion fleet by the southern flanks.



> There were three encounters IIRC, mainly by British FAA pilots. In any case, not a statistically solid record. With just a couple of encounters, _chance_ is too big a factor. One which only gets filtered out after dozens of encounters.



Fact remains that they held their own.


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## daishi12 (Mar 31, 2007)

"As it seems you're interested, let me also add that in 1940, they had 2,318 modified (with bow ramps) barges - I don't know how many unmodified barges - and 155 freighters (carrying capacity of totally 700,000 ton) and about 2000 auxiliary vessels, motor boats, motor sailers, etc."

I will assume that as you have stated that Russia is not a problem that the ship building yards in the Baltic states bgecome available to Germany and that they are able to go into full production. I will be generous and add 40% to that total to give a rough estimate of approx 9240 vessels .... this brings me neatly to an additional comment ..."Second, the SDB destroyed more ships because it was used in a shooting alley." I will assume that this is a 'Target Rich Environment'

"You're making some calculations on how many divisions would have been combat ready, which are - let's face it - based on your own views. With all due respect, but the idea that Germany would only have 15 fully operational combat divisions ready is ... well ..."

With respect Kris, the calculations that I have made take into account, IMO, that Russia either surrenders or is forced into a situation where it cannot mount effective resistance to the German invasion. It would be logical to assume that the fighting in Russia would have been more bloody and that therefore losses on both sides would have been much greater. You also need to assign troops to retain territory once the country is captured. As I said, I would estimate that appox 15 divisions would be combat ready, by that I meant that the divisions would have between 90% and 98% of theoretical maximums.

Does anyone know roughly how many divisions were assigned garrison duty in France, the Low Countries and Poland from early 1942 to late summer 1942?

"I would like a source for the pioniere consisting of penal batallions. Sounds very unlikely"

The idea about the Penal battalions being made into pioneer units was actualy first brought to my attention by Sven Hassel, who was a Dane who served in an SS penal unit. I will admit to the fact that I do not fully trust his accounts, but I will say that I do understand the idea that prisoners could be considered expendable when it came to mine/booby trap disposal.


"One more time, this time a bit less complicated: 
1.Send out the entire fleet. First wave supported by warships.
OK.. approx 9000 barges, tugs, freighters and assorted small craft embarking troops and equipment and then crossing the channel at approx 4 knots (a convoy can only safely travel at the speed of the slowest vessel) This will take approx 7 to 9 hours to just get across the channel assuming that EVERY single phase of the loading takes place like clockwork and that EVERY single vessel is in the right place at the right time.

2.Disembark the troops.

OK.. This would need to happen in less than 36 hours.. The reason being that it is approx a 2 day run from SF, and you need the invasion fleet to be back in French waters before the RN arrives.


3.Send the fleet back. 

Again, this would need to be like clockwork, assuming that EVERY vessel is in the right place at the right time.

4.Royal Navy arrives from SF. 
5.Attack the RN with bombers (and other means)
6.RN retreats or gets annihilated.

I would like to take points 4, 5 and 6 together if I may, RN arrives from SF, starts bomarding the landing zones, there is NO KM involvement because the entire invasion force is back in French waters trying to draw the RN into a stand up fight in home waters. This will NOT happen because the RN will try to slaughter as many invaders as possible on the beaches. The attacks with bombers and other means is equally a non-starter as the RAF will fly fighter missions against the Luftwaffer bombers and bombing missions against the invadihng force.

Admittedly during 1942 U-Boats had their happy time, but it must be remembered that the U-Boat was going against disorganised convoys in mainly the North Atlantic and Irish Sea. The Channel is shallower which makes U-Boats slightly easier to spot and hence destroy. 

I trust that you remember that of the 40,000 submariners that were sent to sea over 30,000 did not return; I salute their memory and bravery, even though my Grandfather was a merchant seaman throughout the war.

7.Send the second wave supported by warships."

Fair enough, the second wave of the invasion fleet puts to sea after leaving the beachhead nearly unsupported for between 2 and 4 days. This agian assumes that EVERYTHING goes like clockwork, the RN is neutralized as an effective force, the RAF is neutralized in less than 6 days and that there is no resitance on the landing grounds. I would contend that the RN was a tougher nut to crack than you anticipate, the RAF/USAF would put up spirited resitance and that the British Army and Home Guard would be fighting tooth and nail to protect Britain.

You assume that the LW and U-Boats would be able to inflict grevious losses on the RN and that aircraft carriers and battle ships could not comfortably operate in the channel.

Please bear in mind that the KM, LW and Werhmacht would also inevitably suffer serious losses.


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

renrich said:


> Kris, the US Marines had been planning and practising amphibious doctrine for quite some time prior to WW2. To my knowledge, the Germans had not. To compare an amphibious attack in mass on a well defended shore to tank warfare is I believe not relevant. I remember having read on numerous occasions that a mass amphibious landing is the most difficult military evolution of all.


Renrich, you're absolutely right, it's damn difficult. But what do you want to conclude from that? That the Germans would fail? I say German ingenuity, improvisation and organisation coupled with existing experience in Norway and Crete would have enabled them to pull it off. I think they would have suffered less losses had they been more experienced but to go as far as to say they would have failed, in my opinion. Your argument is valid but it only goes so far. 



> The Repulse and Prince of Wales were not sunk by bombing principally. They were hit by 1 bomb and 5 torpedoes and 1 bomb and 6 torpedoes respectfully. No, I don't believe that the LW ever attained the level of lethality that the Japanese had with their torpedo a/c in the early days of the Pacific war.


Yes, you're right again! But again ... what's your point? IIRC PoW and Repulse were brought up to counter the argument that the British ships had strong AA capability, as well as to show that they were not destroyed by level bombing but by torpedoes.
I suppose - and correct me if I'm wrong - that you're implying that the Germans would have been less succesful because they didn't use torpedoes or weren't as succesful as the Japanese when they did use them. If so, I'll tell you that dive bombing is at least as powerful as torpedo bombing. It's level bombing which is problematic (at least in 1942).



> but it was never destined to be implemented, because the vital requirement for air superiority could not be met.


The number of theories about Sealion are very high. Having air superiority is great but IMO not essential. Did the Americans and Japanese always have air superiority during their succesful invasions in the Pacific? No. But they did have air control. And that's what I'm crediting the Germans for.



> The LW could not meet the requirement for air superiority in 1942 anymore than they could have in 1940.


The RAF had the advantage of fighting over friendly territory. If that wasn't present in 1940, they would have lost.



> If memory serves the RAF began a series of offensive fighter sweeps after the BOB called Ramrods. They had higher pilot losses then than in the BOB but it shows how aggresive they were and never overlook that the British were never reluctant to sacrifise blood and bone in either World War.


Again, you're right but again, what's your point? That the Germans would lose because the British had fighting spirit? 
But I'm glad you realize that the RAF would have suffered higher losses when fighting over hostile territories. 



> Torch began on Nov. 8, 1942 with landings from the Atlantic and the Med. Torch did not spring full grown suddenly into action.


I think I know the planning of Torch quite well. Half a year earlier there was nothing there to invade North Africa. The American troops were still in the US, their divisions weren't ready, their air squadrons weren't ready. You would have to get all of this over from the US while they weren't operational. 



> Can there be any doubt that Torch would have been canceled and some of the naval and army assets intended for Torch diverted to England.


They weren't ready. Plain and simple. I'm sure you're just dying to see American save the day yet again. But I'm sorry, too early. Do you think I chose Summer of 1942 by accident? 



> But Germany was not a maritime nation.


What do you call the U-boats then? I'm sure the allied sailors would have laughed at the guy saying "don't worry, Germany is not a maritime nation."

Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

Hi Syscom


syscom3 said:


> But it doesnt mean it has to, does it?(...) That reflects the actual reality of 1942, not what would happen in this hypothetical scenario.


Ok, I get it. In a way you're right but this goes to the essence of "what-if" scenarios. How far do you go in your hindsight?
Let me explain. I've written a 70 page document on how Germany could have avoided losing the war had a dramatic leadership change occured in October 1943 (the latest date possible IMO to change things around before it was too late.) Now, regardless of the possiblity of such a scenario, I have to ask myself the question of how far to go with this what-if scenario. I allow myself to know that the Me 262 and Ar 234 would have been successful while I would cancel the V-2 and the Maus tank. But in October 1943 this would have been far from clear. I only know this because I can looking back from what was the future in 1943. YET I do not allow myself to concentrate all my forces in Normandy, to move Tirpitz just hours before getting bombed, nor do I allow myself to change the Enigma codes. 
So I try to look at what could have been likely even without me pushing events in a certain direction. 
Wasp was called back to the US for repairs and was going to cross the Panam Canal to fight in the Pacific where it was urgently needed. The other CV was primarily used to transport Spitfires and P-40s to Africa and Malta. Changing both courses could have dramatically changed the outcome in other fields. I don't know that much about the Pacific but I'm sure you know what the result could have been of Wasp stuck in the Atlantic. 
But sure, you could use TF 39 for dealing with the planned German invasion. Here's what you wrote about it: _Rear Admiral John Wilcox commanding Task Force 39 with the battleship USS Washington (BB-56), the aircraft carrier USS Wasp (CV-7), the heavy cruisers USS Wichita (CA-45) and Tuscaloosa (CA-37) and six destroyers, sails from Portland, Maine, for Scapa Flow, the major British fleet base in the Orkney Islands. These ships will protect British
home waters for the duration of Operation Ironclad -- the British invasion of Vichy French controlled Madagascar. This is a reflection of the heavy Allied losses in capital ships to Japanese action in the Pacific._
So I suppose you would cancel the invasion of Madagascar then? 
But comparing TF 39 to the whole Home Defence, what would TF 39 with its 9 ships have contributed? And would Roosevelt be willing to sacrifice a battleship and two heavy cruisers when things were already problematic in the Pacific? I don't know...




> Open to debate. (...) Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Rabaul a shooting gallery?


SBD did not dive vertically and could not carry as much as the Stuka. Therefor it was less lethal. Both were vulnerable against enemy fighters. SBD was the better carrier aircraft but this was no issue for Sealion. Same goes for the F-4F. None of them mattered in a Sealion environment. 
Shooting gallery was not a correct term. It implies that there were no dangers. Daishi used a much more appropriate term: target-rich environment! 

Btw, I think the CV would probably have been used to hunt the German battlecruisers. But this is personal opinion, not based on actual sources...
Kris


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

daishi12 said:


> As I said, I would estimate that appox 15 divisions would be combat ready, by that I meant that the divisions would have between 90% and 98% of theoretical maximums.


No Daishi. Combat ready does not require 90%. In that case there were 0 operational divisions in Germany. It's all irrelevant as forces could have been transferred from one division to another. 
Oh btw, there weren't 150 German divisions in 1942. There were 250 of them.



> Does anyone know roughly how many divisions were assigned garrison duty in France, the Low Countries and Poland from early 1942 to late summer 1942?


27 in France and the Low Countries. Don't know about Poland.



> The idea about the Penal battalions being made into pioneer units was actualy first brought to my attention by Sven Hassel, who was a Dane who served in an SS penal unit. I will admit to the fact that I do not fully trust his accounts, but I will say that I do understand the idea that prisoners could be considered expendable when it came to mine/booby trap disposal.


Aah, now you're getting personal. I absolutely adored Sven Hassel ... until I found out he was never in the German army... My world shattered when I read about it. All made up! Try wikipedia, I'm sure there's an article about him.
In any case I wonder what this has to do with it. Sven Hassel supposed to have served in a Sonderabteilung, not a Pioniere batallion. 



> at approx 4 knots (a convoy can only safely travel at the speed of the slowest vessel)


4 knots? Where do you get this figure from? 
_Modified Sieble/Herbert Rafts could cruise across the channel at ~ 6knts and dash to the shore at ~ 10knts. Contrary to perception they apparently were quite seaworthy in coastal waters and ‘the channel’.
(P Schenk “Invasion of England 1940” , pp 115-129)._
And I disagree that the speed is limited by the slowest element. They could leave first and get caught up by faster vessels. 
Germans were great organisers, not amateurs.



> OK.. This would need to happen in less than 36 hours.. The reason being that it is approx a 2 day run from SF, and you need the invasion fleet to be back in French waters before the RN arrives.


Correct! 



> Again, this would need to be like clockwork, assuming that EVERY vessel is in the right place at the right time.


I don't know. I think they would leave as soon as they're unloaded.



> I would like to take points 4, 5 and 6 together if I may, RN arrives from SF, starts bomarding the landing zones, there is NO KM involvement because the entire invasion force is back in French waters trying to draw the RN into a stand up fight in home waters. This will NOT happen because the RN will try to slaughter as many invaders as possible on the beaches. The attacks with bombers and other means is equally a non-starter as the RAF will fly fighter missions against the Luftwaffer bombers and bombing missions against the invadihng force.


Dieppe and the Channel Dash showed that the German fighters were superior to the British ones. Overall loss-kill figures by JG1 from 1941-1943 also indicates this. 
British fighters would also have to escort British bombers over German held territory which would mean they could not be recuperated. The Royal Navy will try to shell the German invaders which means they would be immobilized targets for German (dive) bombers. Unlike 1940, British fighters would no longer have the time to intercept in time. They would have to fly constant CAPs which they cannot support. Remember that most radar installations were along the coast which is now under German possession or under German assault. 
Pedestal was done with few German aircraft against few British aircraft and few British ships. Sealion would be much bigger but with the same comparisons. 




> The Channel is shallower which makes U-Boats slightly easier to spot and hence destroy.


Why is that?




> the RN is neutralized as an effective force, the RAF is neutralized in less than 6 days and that there is no resitance on the landing grounds.


Neutralized perhaps. Better to see it as 'contained'. This does not apply to the British army. 

The 10 German divisons on the ground will have had hell to endure for 2 or 3 days while they get attacked by the Royal Navy, the RAF and the British army. They will have run out of supplies and amphetamines 
The second and third wave will follow after which 25 divisions will be on the island ready to break out. 
Out of 3000 barges 1250 barges were to be used in the first wave which would transport 9 divisions (according to German plans). That means than 1/3 of the barges (=1000) were expendable. 



> Home Guard would be fighting tooth and nail to protect Britain.


One word for you: Volkssturm.



> aircraft carriers and battle ships could not comfortably operate in the channel.


Correct



> Please bear in mind that the KM, LW and Werhmacht would also inevitably suffer serious losses.


I have said so in my very first post. Perhaps I give the impression that I think the Germans would have had their own Overlord. I think it would have been the bloodiest battle the Germans had experienced up till that time. 

But it would have been the only way to get Britain out of the war. And 1942 was the last year to do so. After that the Americans would grow in strength, invade North Africa, knock Italy out of the war, and drop the A-bomb on Germany. 
Once war was declared upon the US, Germany had no other choice than to neutralize Britain. 

Kris


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## Glider (Mar 31, 2007)

Kris
Quote 
It seems this is more criticizing barges in general than their ability to carry tanks. My impression was that you would think they couldn't be disembarked but now I see you believe the barges would become unstable?? Am I right in this observation? 

No. I said the Germans could have tripled U-boat production as they did in 1943. But if they had only doubled it, they could have used that third bit for construction of other ships. 
In fact, I don't see a problem with the transport capacity as such. I would simply improve the existing barges and make them self-propelling.

Reply
Barges can carry anything. Getting them to the beach is something else. My sons girlfriend is a sailing instructor off Southend. The currents are fierce, the sands dangerous and tides vicious in the Channel and North Sea. You will need more than a barge with a motor to make it across the Channel. The currents are often more than 5 knots which is faster than barges can go. When the Germans did a test of their plan to tow barges it was a disaster. At best they would be sitting ducks, in all probability they would also be scattered across the sea, at worst a large proportion will run aground and or be sunk due to the weather.

Quote
This only reinforces my opinion about the striking power of the British. The article also states that the British used over 700 aircraft (amongst them 400 fighters) against 250 German fighters. Yet, they only managed to get in a few bombers? They couldn't get them escorted by fighters? Why would things have been different during an invasion? I agree that the targets would have been easier to find but nevertheless, it still says a lot about British capabilities

Reply
Due to the confusion and lack of time as the BC’s were going like the clappers to run away, the British were unable to organise a co-ordinated attack. A landing is very different. It’s a lot bigger, its in the same area. In all likelihood the first few attacks would have been spontaneous responses but it wouldn’t take long to organise heavy co-ordinated attacks.
However the point I was making was that despite the Germans being well prepared they didn’t stop any of the small uncoordinated attacks taking place, neither did they sink any of the attacking ships. Even the 5 MTB’s attacking on their own, in daylight, made it in and out. Hardly a ringing endorsement of the Germans ability to stop a serious attack by the Home Fleet.

Quote
Where did you explain this? I said I believed between 150 and 300 British ships would be sunk or at least neutralized a day. And that was already dividing the result of my calculations into half.

Reply
I believe your assumptions to be false. The RAF was a lot bigger than the GAF in 1942. The extra 100 squadrons the RAF had by 1942 excluded RAAF, CAF, SAAF squadrons a number of which were in the UK. True we had a number in the Med and Far East but the Far East were obsolete and no threat to the GAF and the ones in the Med would have been compensated by squadrons of the above air force’s in the UK. Germany also had planes in the Med and would have had to leave some in Russia.
The RAF would have at least matched the GAF in numbers and we had the advantage of attacking and retreating at will. The fight would have been very tough and the GAF on the defensive having to defend the convoys or the bombers attacking the RN. In addition GAF would need standing patrols over the invasion area during the daylight hours to stop hit and run attacks. This would eat up the available planes hours. Barges, tugs and transports are sitting ducks. To defend from a wing of 3 squadrons of Spits with 2 covering one in the FB role who could attack the area and be on the way home in 10 minutes would require huge resources every minute of the day.
Your assumption that Germany would increase its production and that the British wouldn’t at least concentrate its forces to match the threat is optimistic at best. Also to assume that we wouldn’t include all combat aircraft in the country including the US forces is even more optimistic. 

Quote
British laying mines after the landings. Hadn't thought about that. That would be a great action!
But otherwise, the Germans would know exactly where to sweep mines: in front of the beaches they want to invade. The British would have a much larger area to cover: the entire entrance lanes to the Channel.

Reply
With what would the Germans sweep the mines? By the end of 1941 the whole GN only had about 50 minesweepers capable of operating in enemy waters. With other requirements you would be lucky to get 2/3rds in the area. Try sweeping at night and the RN coastal forces and Navy will have you, by day you are still at grave danger.

Quote
I think you're making the same mistakes as many AF leaders made in WW2: use level bombers for tactical missions. They tried this several times yet I can only think of one single time where I actually had success. And there (Normandy) the troops weren't even dug in.
Your plan sounds wonderful but I don't think it would have mattered much. Their accuracy would even have made it as dangerous for their own troops as for the Germans. What was it again? One third in a 5 mile area?

Reply
We would be a lot more accurate over the short distance to the Landing sites. Plus the landing sites would be easily identifiable, if nothing else the British could fire star shell into the centre of the target area and aim at that. I am not treating this as a tactical mission; a carpet bombing mission would do the job. A 3-5 mile scatter would be acceptable as the landing zone would have to be that size to be safe. Any less and the Germans would be in danger (Anzio wasn’t a case of the Allies beating superior forces. It was the Germans holding off vastly superior forces largely because the landing zone was too small for the Allies to operate from and covered by German artillery.)
PS its better to be on the edge of a target area than in the middle and if the German troops wouldn't be killed in large numbers, why would the British on the edge?

Quote
And the German nightfighters would have had a field day, knowing exactly where to find the British bombers. No need for radar

Reply
British night fighters were at least as good and as numerous as the Germans, plus would be operating under ground control. The Germans would be at a significant disadvantage and the Hunter would become the Hunted.
David


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## Civettone (Mar 31, 2007)

Glider said:


> You will need more than a barge with a motor to make it across the Channel. The currents are often more than 5 knots which is faster than barges can go.


And yet the British used them too for the invasion of Normandy. 



> in all probability they would also be scattered across the sea, at worst a large proportion will run aground and or be sunk due to the weather.


They were tested and this did not happen. I already mentioned that. Only few received damage at BF 8.




> Due to the confusion and lack of time as the BC’s were going like the clappers to run away, the British were unable to organise a co-ordinated attack.


Yet, they were aware it was going down. It was high priority! They knew so weeks in advance. And yet, when they heard the news their organisation tumbled. Lack of time? Still no reason for the organisational mess. And that was just a couple of ships. And you want an even bigger challenge? You want 2500 planes to fight instead of 250? 

From: ::Operation Cerberus::
_The British very quickly became aware of increased Germany activity not only in Brest but also along the French northern coastline. The French Resistance reported that former French coastal airbases were being more and more used by the Luftwaffe. The Royal Navy concluded that they knew the ships would be leaving Brest at night – they just did not know when! In response to this, the Royal Navy tried to predict the route the ships might take and laid more mines – a total of 1000+ British mines were already placed in the English Channel.

A study of weather predictions led the Navy to conclude that the ships would sail between February 10th and 15th 1942, as cloud cover would make such a journey much safer. Coastal Command, the Fleet Air Arm, Fighter Command, etc were all put on the alert. A submarine, the ‘Sea Lion’, had been positioned off of Brest – its task was to watch the harbour as opposed to attacking the ships.

The Germans had put a great deal of thought into Operation Cerberus. British coastal radar had been jammed as a matter of course – but by February 1942, the success of the jamming had become extensive._

And from: Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Cerberus" - The Channel Dash
_In spite of Ciliax's insistence on security and his efforts to mislead, there was no lack of clues. It was noticed that the destroyers that had escorted Tirpitz to Trondheim had not remained there, but had departed for a destination in the south. On 8 February aerial photographs of Brest revealed the three big ships in the harbour, four large destroyers and a number of Schnellboats and minesweepers. Photos taken on the following day brought the score of destroyers up to six.

The forces detailed to oppose the progress of Ciliax's fleet were slender enough in all conscience. Six destroyers equipped with torpedoes had been loaned to Admiral Ramsay by the C-in-C Nore. They were normally stationed at Sheerness and Harwich, but they should have been at four hours' notice in the Thames Estuary. In fact, at the crucial moment, they were out in the North Sea off Orfordness, practising gunnery. In addition to this, there were the Hunt class vessels which had been built for escort work. They had no torpedoes and consequently were virtually useless in this instance. Finally there were thirty-two motor torpedo boats that were no match for the German Schnellboats (Fast boats).

So far as aircraft were concerned, Coastal Command had agreed to provide three squadrons of Beaufort torpedo bombers. The Fleet Air Arm was able to contribute one squadron of Swordfish torpedo-carriers. Bomber Command had 300 bombers on stand-by, and there was the promise of considerable fighter support. Ideally the torpedo-carrying aircraft would have made a concerted attack with fighter cover. But this was impossible. For one thing, the Swordfish had a cruising speed of 153 kilometers per hour (95 mph) whilst the Beauforts were very much faster. For another, there was the question of bringing them all together. One Beaufort squadron was stationed at Leuchers in Scotland, another at St Eval in Cornwall, and the third at Thorney Island near Portsmouth._

And you want to attack an invasion fleet many times bigger than that, escorted by over a 1000 fighters? I admire your optimism.




> However the point I was making was that despite the Germans being well prepared they didn’t stop any of the small uncoordinated attacks taking place, neither did they sink any of the attacking ships. Even the 5 MTB’s attacking on their own, in daylight, made it in and out. Hardly a ringing endorsement of the Germans ability to stop a serious attack by the Home Fleet.


That was not their mission. What would you have expected them to do? Turn the ships around and start attacking those unimportant British vessels? 
I think the following quote says it all:
_To the men on board Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the engagement had been no more than a small inconvenience. It had not even consumed very much antiaircraft ammunition as the action had largely been in the hands of Galland's fighter pilots. The sailors had watched with fascination and awe as the fragile biplanes flew towards them._




> I believe your assumptions to be false. The RAF was a lot bigger than the GAF in 1942.


There are not many differences in my scenario. But one of them is an increase in ship and aircraft production. What's more the bulk of the Luftwaffe would return from Russia and put pressure on the British again. As such, the RAF would have suffered more losses up to Sealion '42. 




> In addition GAF would need standing patrols over the invasion area during the daylight hours to stop hit and run attacks.


No, their job was simple: first defend the fleet. After the invasion fleet is returned, escort the bombers. Only a minority would be used for CAPs over the invasion beaches. Instead, it would be the RAF that would have to fly constant CAPs to protect the Royal Navy! 



> Barges, tugs and transports are sitting ducks. To defend from a wing of 3 squadrons of Spits with 2 covering one in the FB role who could attack the area and be on the way home in 10 minutes would require huge resources every minute of the day.


Don't forget that all the barges had AA armament and were steel and concrete strengthened. 
And if you start using the valuable Spitfire for these tasks you cannot use them all for attacking the German bombers or for escorting the British bombers. You too have to make a choice! 



> Your assumption that Germany would increase its production and that the British wouldn’t at least concentrate its forces to match the threat is optimistic at best. Also to assume that we wouldn’t include all combat aircraft in the country including the US forces is even more optimistic.


Go ahead and give up North Africa. Give up the Battle of the Atlantic. Get non-operational American troops killed. 




> With what would the Germans sweep the mines? By the end of 1941 the whole GN only had about 50 minesweepers capable of operating in enemy waters.


My figures show much more minesweepers than that. They had 90 ready for Sealion in 1940. Don't think this dropped to 50 a year later as production was still going on. Besides that they had dozens of other auxiliary ships which could be used for minesweeping. 
I do consider the British mines a problem. Perhaps the biggest problem. I see them minesweeping that very night, under the cover of the Kriegsmarine. But just as I don't see the mines stopping them but only holding them up, I see the same thing happening for the British: holding them up. 





> We would be a lot more accurate over the short distance to the Landing sites. Plus the landing sites would be easily identifiable


That has nothing to do with it. That's not why British bombs were inaccurate. Do you think they couldn't see the ships in Brest? They had lousy bombsights. 




> I am not treating this as a tactical mission; a carpet bombing mission would do the job. A 3-5 mile scatter would be acceptable as the landing zone would have to be that size to be safe.


It is a tactical mission even if you use carpet bombing. Problem is that carpet bombing is a lousy way to achieve a tactical objective. 



> It was the Germans holding off vastly superior forces


Is that so? 
_22 Jan 1944: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles versus 20,000 German soldiers. 
End May:150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns versus 135,000 German soldiers._




> British night fighters were at least as good and as numerous as the Germans, plus would be operating under ground control. The Germans would be at a significant disadvantage and the Hunter would become the Hunted.


Ground control is unnecessary, David. Ground control only guides you to an area where the enemy is. It's not accurate enough to pinpoint the enemy. That came later. 
Same thing for the Geman NFs: they knew where the British bombers would be. 
Both parties would have to look for the enemy by visual contact. In fact, up to 1945 visual contact was still necessary for both sides. 
Yet, you have to understand that it's more difficult to intercept a fighter than it is to find a big and slow Sterling. Because the Bf 110 had a speed advantage, the Bf 110 could have avoided the Beaufighter and attacked the British bombers. 

Kris


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## daishi12 (Mar 31, 2007)

Hi Kris, 

just checked wikipedia, Sven Hassel apparently served in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, and also the 11th and 27th Panzer Regiment (6th Panzer division) on all fronts except the African front -- Sven Hassel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia -- however Erik Haaest stated that Sven Hassel was a pseudonyme and never actualy served on the eastern front. My original point still stands that the Werhmahct did use penal battalions as expendable troops.

The point I keep trying to explain in regard to the divisions coming back from the Russian front is this:-

You have made an assumption that the Werhmacht would have been able to invade Russia starting in June 1941 and absolutely pacify/render Russia as unable to carry out combat operations against Germany no later than Feb 1942. This allows you six months to build up naval operations to design, develope and build a significant naval force in France, the Low Countries and the Baltic states. You need to also take into account the following factors:-

If Russia was neutralized, as you contend, there would have been no requirement for the USA and UK to send supplies o the USSR, those supplies would have been stockpiled in the UK to deal with an invasion threat. Please also consider that the UK would have increased production capacity on all fighting equipment from the time it was perceived that the USSR was not able to mount a significant threat to the Werhmacht/Luftwaffe. Even if the RAF recieves aircraft like the Mk1 Hurricane, The Hamdon, The Spit Mk2, and the Wellington, the defficiences are offset by the combat radius and number of aircraft that would be available.

If the USSR was neutralized, Germany would have received heavy operational losses to both the Werhmacht and the Luftewaffe (the reason being that the fighting to subdue the USSR would have been much heavier than was experienced during operation Barbarossa), The Wehrmacht would have needed to garison the USSR as well. This cuts down on the available number of divisions.

Your arguement that Britain used barges during operation Overlord, does not (forgive the pun) hold water. The vast majority of the initial operations used LSVP's which where loaded with troops approx 5 miles from the beach landing zones. The larger vessels such as the LCT's came in after the beachead was secured.

The barges that the German invasion fleet had to hand would not have been steel and concrete reinforced, the pictures that you posted earlier show that they were effectively river barges which had had the bow cut away to provide a ramp. The AA that would have been available would have been, at best, a quad 20mm mount and maybe a couple of mg42's. The speed of the convoy would have been crucial as well ... probably no more than 4 knots. If the barges are not protected by war ships, they effectively become targets. (please check the opening sceens of Enemy At The Gates to see what happens to improvised water transport under air attack)

Germany did not have a seafaring tradition, and as such the invasion fleet would have fallen prey to getting lost, ramming, and random sinkings that they did not have the training to cope with.


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## syscom3 (Apr 1, 2007)

> ]Renrich, you're absolutely right, it's damn difficult. But what do you want to conclude from that? That the Germans would fail? I say German ingenuity, improvisation and organisation coupled with existing experience in Norway and Crete would have enabled them to pull it off. I think they would have suffered less losses had they been more experienced but to go as far as to say they would have failed, in my opinion. Your argument is valid but it only goes so far.



Norway and Crete were far different than an invasion of Britain. See my point about the difference between the invasion of Guadalacanal and the invasion of Leyte.



> Yes, you're right again! But again ... what's your point? IIRC PoW and Repulse were brought up to counter the argument that the British ships had strong AA capability, as well as to show that they were not destroyed by level bombing but by torpedoes.



Youre absolutley right.... the KM had just as poor AA and would have been chopped up by the Britas and USN.



> The number of theories about Sealion are very high. Having air superiority is great but IMO not essential. Did the Americans and Japanese always have air superiority during their succesful invasions in the Pacific? No. But they did have air control. And that's what I'm crediting the Germans for.



Famous last words...... great to have but not essential. BTW, the allies in the PTO always had theater or local air superiority in every invasion. Guadalcanal was different as it was at the long end of the IJN range and they didnt have much to counter the invasion fleet the first couple of weeks.



> I think I know the planning of Torch quite well. Half a year earlier there was nothing there to invade North Africa. The American troops were still in the US, their divisions weren't ready, their air squadrons weren't ready. You would have to get all of this over from the US while they weren't operational.



That reflected the reality of 1942, not a hypothetical situation we are discussing. Your invasion plans will be known and a couple of US infantry divisions could be sent to the UK prior to the invasion. Again, you plan your invasion on how you want the allies to perform, not for how the allies could do it.



> They weren't ready. Plain and simple. I'm sure you're just dying to see American save the day yet again. But I'm sorry, too early. Do you think I chose Summer of 1942 by accident?



Just by being in reserve free's up a few british forces.lus fighting on the defense helps a bit.


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

Hi Daishi


daishi12 said:


> My original point still stands that the Werhmahct did use penal battalions as expendable troops.


I thought your point was that pioniere batallions were made out of penal troops...



> If Russia was neutralized, as you contend, there would have been no requirement for the USA and UK to send supplies o the USSR, those supplies would have been stockpiled in the UK to deal with an invasion threat.


It makes it very interesting, that's for sure. Lend lease was limited until 1942. The stuff that went to Russia was along Russian requests. Giving the British even more copper, grain or aircraft wouldn't have changed much. The British were limited by their manpower as they were already fully mobilized. As such production could not be increased and they flew as many aircraft as they could train. Stating that all the stuff that went into Russia would have gone to Britain is a bit simplistic.



> Please also consider that the UK would have increased production capacity on all fighting equipment


See above. In fact, it doesn't make much sense. If Japan had surrendered in 1943, would the Germans have increased war production as a result of this? Clearly not. Britain was getting the max out its industry and armed forces. I agree that they could have changed production, so only increasing one branch by decreasing another. 




> If the USSR was neutralized, Germany would have received heavy operational losses to both the Werhmacht and the Luftewaffe (the reason being that the fighting to subdue the USSR would have been much heavier than was experienced during operation Barbarossa)[/quotes]This I don't understand.
> In any case, I advice you to drop the division shortage argument. It really doesn't hold water. No pun intended but I don't think anyone will agree with you. (If there is someone, I'll shut up.)
> 
> 
> ...


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

Hi Syscom


syscom3 said:


> Norway and Crete were far different than an invasion of Britain.


I acknowledged that these were different. You disagree that the Germans learned valuable lessons from these operations? 
Do you think that Guadalacanal didn't help in any way with Leyte?




> the KM had just as poor AA and would have been chopped up by the Britas and USN.


I think the KM had even worse AA.
But the Britas didn't have aircraft of the same level as the Germans to destroy ships. And the USN was hardly present at all. 



> BTW, the allies in the PTO always had theater or local air superiority in every invasion.


If the allies always had air superiority, how do you know their invasions would have failed without it? You say it's a necessity, so that logically implies that their invasions would have failed without air superiority. 



> Again, you plan your invasion on how you want the allies to perform, not for how the allies could do it.


But they couldn't! The Americans were getting their military geared up as fast as they could. They were barely in time for Torch. And you want to cut off another half year? From 11 months to 6 months?? 
Look, I know you're proud of American achievements but in this scenario ... the US will have to sit it out. 

Kris


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## mkloby (Apr 1, 2007)

Civettone said:


> No Daishi. Combat ready does not require 90%. In that case there were 0 operational divisions in Germany. It's all irrelevant as forces could have been transferred from one division to another.
> Oh btw, there weren't 150 German divisions in 1942. There were 250 of them.



Going into combat with less than 90% of your TOE is not desirable. It's an issue in the military today, just as it was years ago.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 1, 2007)

renrich said:


> The LW could not meet the requirement for air superiority in 1942 anymore than they could have in 1940. If memory serves the RAF began a series of offensive fighter sweeps after the BOB called Ramrods. They had higher pilot losses then than in the BOB but it shows how aggresive they were and never overlook that the British were never reluctant to sacrifise blood and bone in either World War.



Do you know Tony Wood's site? He list all RAF sorties per day, look it up. You'll find Ramrods and RAF daylight operations in the West in general after BoB is an evidence for anything but not British willingness to sacrifice blood; true that their loss rates were even less favourable than in BoB, when the RAF was on defense with all the known advantages, but overall the Ramrods, Circuses et co. were very small scale operations, which would be best referred to as nuisance raids. They were trying to bait the German fighters, that were left in France (just two JGs, shows the level of the 'threat') into disadvantagoues combats, but the LW didn't quite took the bait and turned the tables, attacking only when there was gain in it. The relative losses were very much in favour for the LW. The RAF sortie rate in those raids compared to what they put up during BoB was marginal, and so were the losses_ in absolute numbers._ In short, it's hard to say the RAF was trying to hard to confront the LW in the air after 1940 for about 2-3 years, at least over Western Europe.




> The LW as a tactical air force at their peak were superb.



Have you've read Corum's Luftwaffe book? He makes a very good case for refuting that old myth. Really the LW was positioning it's doctrine between tactical and strategical levels : on the operational level. Tactical would be attacking the enemy directly, ie. on the battlefield, strategical would be 




> But Germany was not a maritime nation. Great Britain and Japan were. I doubt that had positions been reversed Germany would have ever been able to pull off an evacuation of 338,000 men from the beaches as Britain did at Dunkirk. They simply had not the experience, background and heritage. That certainly played a role in the cancellation of Sealion I.



I think you underestimate German maritime potential. Germany was certainly no newcomer to the sea - the Hansaetic Leage was the first large maritime union of the World, and dominant in trade until the Great Explorations. The North German big ports like Hamburg, Brema, Lubeck etc. certainly had a tradition of sea. The German navy in WW1 was the second largest in the World., not speaking of the submarine arm here, but the surface units. They certainly had the experience, background, and heritage.

What they did not have for Sealion I was the neccesary preparations - the whole idea of Sealion came out of nowhere, it was not planned before the war as a possible scenario at all, nor was there much political will to actually implement it. Simply to put, 'Sealion I' was proposed halfheartadly and never considered very seriously, the hardships were obvious. It's just not possible to pull out an invasion fleet from a hat just a month after the French campaign concluded - just look at Dunkerque in comparison, the British, being an island nation and with far more interest at sea could pull together a decent transport fleet, just a ragtag collection of barges, small steamers and such on which they could - let put it as it was, throw away everything and flee. 




> If they had been able to invade England at that time then the war is over and they could deal with thr Soviets at their leisure.



I disagree. In 1940 they were unprepeared for such an operations. Such operation would be unneccsarily risky, and simple as that, the Navy could simply not guarantee the conditions that were minimum requirements for such an operation. Pulling off such an operation was simply stupid in a military sense. Politically, the situation was that Britiain was beaten and could not hope to interfere with the Germans on the continent, as a threat, as seen in 1940, they were neutralised for the time being. And, as Hitler put it, there would be little gain for Germany in crushing the British Empire, only that the US and USSR could feed on the corpse. Far more threat was coming from the East, with the USSR's expansionist foreign policy begun to threaten vital German interests in the region, and tension was growing between the two powers. And the USSR, which silently built up the largest army in the World under Stalin, was certainly a greater threat, to be dealt with first than Britain, which was already bankcrupt by 1940-41, fighting merely to survive.


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## syscom3 (Apr 1, 2007)

> Hi Syscom I acknowledged that these were different. You disagree that the Germans learned valuable lessons from these operations? Do you think that Guadalcanal didn't help in any way with Leyte?



The difference is the US and it's Allies learned from their experiences and implemented the changes in doctrine and material support (read logistics). The Germans didn't seem to learn the lessons or just ignored it. Just look at the KM's plans for direct fire support. Pretty much nothing at all. Thats why the invasion was going to fail.



> I think the KM had even worse AA.
> But the Britas didn't have aircraft of the same level as the Germans to destroy ships. And the USN was hardly present at all.



Again you put complete faith in the LW having air supremamcy at all times, which they wouldn't have during the night, or under poor weather. The USN contribution is a pair of carriers that could attack at will from the flanks. The Channel is a highly constricted space (as you know) and the opportunities for quick coordinated attacks from over are plentiful. You simply cant have all your forces protecting your naval assets without opening up your bombers for attack and destruction.



> If the allies always had air superiority, how do you know their invasions would have failed without it? You say it's a necessity, so that logically implies that their invasions would have failed without air superiority.



Because the Allies learned their lessons well on the need to control the air. Too many ships were lost at the onset of the war because of that simple fact.



> But they couldn't! The Americans were getting their military geared up as fast as they could. They were barely in time for Torch. And you want to cut off another half year? From 11 months to 6 months??



The US had a couple of good divisions that would have performed well in a reserve role. And its far easier to introduce fresh troops to a defensive role first, rather than the more complicated attack roles. 

Again, you plan your scenario to what you want the allies to do, rather than what we were capable of.


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

> Going into combat with less than 90% of your TOE is not desirable. It's an issue in the military today, just as it was years ago.


Agreed. 
But German divisions were rarely at 90+% and from 1942 onwards none of them were. 
Standard compositions of military units started to fade away over the years as a result of over-flexibility. Generals started having problems recognizing the weaknesses or strengths of each unit. A problem which the allies didn't have.



> Tactical would be attacking the enemy directly, ie. on the battlefield, strategical would be


I have a feeling that sentence wasn't finished quite yet, Kurfürst. 
Impressive post as always...

Kris


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## plan_D (Apr 1, 2007)

The Royal Navy would hold the invasion fleet of Germany at bay during any invasion attempt. The Germans could not field an effective naval screen as seen during _Overlord_, they did not have the numbers to provide it. 

This idea of the Luftwaffe being able to render the Royal Navy inoperable is nice, but has no weight. Every attempt by the Luftwaffe to remove the Royal Navy from any zone was a failure. There was too much to the Royal Navy for Ju 87s to destroy. Even with DD losses at Dunkirk the Royal Navy just kept coming back. 

BBs can operate in the Channel, they operated there during Operation _Neptune_. HMS _Ramillies_ and _Warspite_ were used to suppress gun positions on _Juno_. 

All this is not important, however. As the Wehrmacht seemed unable to perform the kind of interdiction needed to secure a successful invasion. For _Overlord_ the 9th and 8th U.S Air Forces along with the 2nd Tactical Air Force and RAF Bomber Command dedicated months to sealing off the Normandy battle ground. 
German generals commented constantly on the lack of their ability to move to the battle due to 90% of the rail and road bridges being knocked out over the Loire and Seine rivers. 

If the Germans really thought the invasion through, the Luftwaffe should have been pounding the airfields (as the Allies did in 1944, all those within 130 miles of the invasion area), marshalling yards, rail and road bridges and road junctions. The British rail system seemed to remain largely intact during 1940, while the Allies managed to reduce the French rail system from being able to cope with extra needs to being unable to supply the garrison troops. 

If the Luftwaffe was an amazing tactical airforce, the doctrine would have been written down for extensive interdiction of the British road and rail system. The Luftwaffe strikes against Britain seemed to be a strategic assault, which not only would have not aided any invasion but also was a complete waste of resource since the bomber numbers, and size of bombers themselves were not large enough.


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> The Germans didn't seem to learn the lessons or just ignored it. Just look at the KM's plans for direct fire support. Pretty much nothing at all. Thats why the invasion was going to fail.


Now you're mixing up things. First you say that the Germans didn't learn from their lessons. And then you give the example of KM's plans for direct fire support which I presume are the plans for Sealion '40.  




> Again you put complete faith in the LW having air supremamcy at all times, which they wouldn't have during the night, or under poor weather.


I never said anything about air supremacy at night, nor did I say the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy at night.
You guys keep repeating that the invasion had to take place under good weather so...




> The USN contribution is a pair of carriers that could attack at will from the flanks.


Well, first they have to be in the area which none of them were. The Wasp went for repairs to the US Eastcoast after which it was sent to the Pacific where a CV was more needed than in England which was one big carrier.
Your notion of attacking from the flanks doesn't make sense. The RAF could just as well make flanking attacks by flying in an arch. This isn't the Pacific you know?




> You simply cant have all your forces protecting your naval assets without opening up your bombers for attack and destruction.


I assume you're talking about the invasion day. Bombers will indeed support the invasion forces as they advance. As both are fighting the same targets the German fighters will be able to protect both. 
This is no longer the case when the battle against the Royal Navy starts. Then most fighters will be escorting the bombers while only a part will fly CAPs over the dug in German troops which will be hard pressed. 




> The US had a couple of good divisions that would have performed well in a reserve role.


Like I said, the Americans won't come and save the day. Why you keep stressing American involvement is beyond me.  




> Again, you plan your scenario to what you want the allies to do, rather than what we were capable of.


I'm always talking about what both the allies and the Germans were capable of. That's why we're talking so much about Dieppe, the Channel Dash and Pedestal. 

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

plan_D said:


> The Royal Navy would hold the invasion fleet of Germany at bay during any invasion attempt. The Germans could not field an effective naval screen as seen during _Overlord_, they did not have the numbers to provide it.


Different times. The Kriegsmarine could handle the British Channel forces as shown during the Channel Dash.




> Every attempt by the Luftwaffe to remove the Royal Navy from any zone was a failure.


When did they ever try? 
The relatively few German bombers used near Dunkirk were mainly directed against the transports and beaches. 




> BBs can operate in the Channel, they operated there during Operation _Neptune_.


Different again. The Channel was in complete hands of the allies. BBs were not at risk from German aircraft, subs or Schnellboote. During Sealion they would have been. That's why Churchill himself forbade their use in the Channel.




> As the Wehrmacht seemed unable to perform the kind of interdiction needed to secure a successful invasion.


If you would go back a couple of pages I already explained that Sealion '42 would not have to be a copy of D-Day. The Germans could do with less. Interdiction is fine but not necessary. Would D-Day have failed without the interdiction. Clearly not as the major reinforcements were not ordered to be brought in anyhow. And those divisions that were brought in had no real problems getting there. PlanD, name one unit that didn't manage to get to Normandy. 
_As long as motorized units had ample fuel and were not hampered by conflicting orders they could move quite rapidly over France, despite allied air power. Furthermore, they did that without undue losses._
Kris


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## syscom3 (Apr 1, 2007)

> Now you're mixing up things. First you say that the Germans didn't learn from their lessons. And then you give the example of KM's plans for direct fire support which I presume are the plans for Sealion '40.



If they learned anything, it would be the requirement for large numbers of capital ships providing direct fire support. Now what is your KM going to do..... sortie into the N Atlantic to draw away the RN (and then by default, not be around for fire support), or go into the channel for a few days and be boxed in by subs, mines and aerial attack and unable to do anything. And obviously they didn't learn any lessons because none of the purpose built amphib vessels were even on the drawing boards (like LST's, DUKW's", Higgins Boats, LCI's....blah, blah blah)




> I never said anything about air supremacy at night, nor did I say the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy at night.
> You guys keep repeating that the invasion had to take place under good weather so...



And inclimate weather is the last thing the KM needs because of the small size of its fleet. A little bit of wind and all your unpowered barges and slow moving barges will be scattered. Night time will belong to the bombers and strafing fighters. The RAF will have a field "night" attacking your fleet.



> Well, first they have to be in the area which none of them were. The Wasp went for repairs to the US East coast after which it was sent to the Pacific where a CV was more needed than in England which was one big carrier.



Why do you dwell on what was the actual situation of 1942 rather than what this hypothetical scenario is? If an invasion of Britain was a certienty in in summer of 1942, the US would have committed those two carriers, simply because it was written down the the war in Europe was going to come first before the Pacific. And why those two carriers? Because their aircrew's were expert ship killers. Your KM was going to come under attack by skilled dive bomber crews (and a few lucky torpedo planes) that will inflict damage on you. 



> Your notion of attacking from the flanks doesn't make sense. The RAF could just as well make flanking attacks by flying in an arch. This isn't the Pacific you know?



A North Sea or Bay of Biscay attack on the ports. Even if they are kept far from the fray int he channel, they will be more than useful in sinking your subs.



> I assume you're talking about the invasion day. Bombers will indeed support the invasion forces as they advance. As both are fighting the same targets the German fighters will be able to protect both.



You are making the classic case of attempting to defend everything and end up protecting nothing.

You have your choice in the daytime.... protect your invasion fleet, or ... protect your capital ships.... or protect your bombers. At night, all of your naval assets are at risk so you might as well plan for heavy loss's, which further complicates your invasion scheme.



> Like I said, the Americans won't come and save the day. Why you keep stressing American involvement is beyond me.



Better to have some reserve than no reserve.



> I'm always talking about what both the allies and the Germans were capable of. That's why we're talking so much about Dieppe, the Channel Dash and Pedestal.



Dieppe proved the need for logistics and 24/7 fire support. Something the Germans didn't have.


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## mkloby (Apr 1, 2007)

Kurfürst said:


> Have you've read Corum's Luftwaffe book? He makes a very good case for refuting that old myth. Really the LW was positioning it's doctrine between tactical and strategical levels : on the operational level. Tactical would be attacking the enemy directly, ie. on the battlefield, strategical would be



I love it when we get into specific military talk! As viewd by the US:

Strategic - overall national strategy which utilitzes national power to secure objectives. Another component is military strategy, which is application of military force to secure objectives.

Operational - level linking strategic and tactical such that tactical results acheive the desired strategic ambition.

Tactical - art and science of winning engagements through the application of combat power.


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## Glider (Apr 1, 2007)

Kris
Quote Re the use of Barges
And yet the British used them too for the invasion of Normandy.

Reply
Not for the invasion assult. Also as far as I know the barges used to supply the aftermath were carried over and launched on the French coast. Can you tell me which ones were sailed over under their own power?

Quote Re Barges being seaworthy
They were tested and this did not happen. I already mentioned that. Only few received damage at BF 8

Reply
Again we have a fundamental difference. The only tests that I know that took place were a total failure with serious damage to a large number of the improvised vessels. I also know that the Japanese who were asked to comment on the invasion preparations considered them to be totally inadequate and quite ill prepared. This was a report from Specialist Officer Major Sakurai who with other specialist Japanese Naval and Army officers reviewed the preparations at the invitation of Goering.

Quote
Referring to the BC dash. And you want to attack an invasion fleet many times bigger than that, escorted by over a 1000 fighters? I admire your optimism

Reply
Happily. The escort given to those BC’s was everything the Germans could muster. An invasion fleet is hundreds of times larger in sea area, with far more targets which would be sitting ducks and the escort would be about the same size would be spread very thin.

Quote
That was not their mission. What would you have expected them to do? Turn the ships around and start attacking those unimportant British vessels? 
I think the following quote says it all:
_To the men on board Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the engagement had been no more than a small inconvenience.

Reply
Of course it was. They were in 30,000 tons BC’s going as fast as they could going the other way. Put the same guy in a large 3 knot barge wallowing at sea armed with a couple of light AA guns with torpedoes coming in his direction, 4.7in guns firing at him and multiple 2pds joining in, then ask him then if it’s a small inconvenience. The answer may differ a touch. 

Quote
Referring to the role of the GAF. 
No, their job was simple: first defend the fleet. After the invasion fleet is returned, escort the bombers. Only a minority would be used for CAPs over the invasion beaches. Instead, it would be the RAF that would have to fly constant CAPs to protect the Royal Navy.
Reply
I dont think you get it. Landing an invasion fleet isn’t a one off task. It needs supplies, reinforcements, back up. You don’t just land it, then go home and leave it unsupported. You have to land on the beaches, fight your way inland to give the follow up forces space to land and organise themselves. This takes time. 
CAPs isn’t a minority role. To keep 1 unit constantly on CAP needs at least three units to be involved. 
Without CAPs you are leaving your forces wide open to attack. I would use every Hurri bomber, I could lay my hands on. If you catch them they will suffer, without CAPs you wouldn’t catch them very often. Flying low they would be in, attack and out, in 10 minutes tops. Without CAPs you would have to identify them, take off, cross the sea, find them by eyeball and then intercept. By which time they would be gone before your half way across the sea. 
In May 42 without the threat of invasion the RAF had 12 squadrons of Hurricanes, 2 of Typhoons, 2 of Whirlwinds and 5 of P51’s available for GA work. (Source Squadrons of the RAF). With an invasion threat this would have been increased.

Quote
Go ahead and give up North Africa. Give up the Battle of the Atlantic. Get non-operational American troops killed

Reply
You misread my point. Germany would have had to leave aircraft in North Africa as would the RAF. However my figures (including the ones above) exclude RCAF, RAAF and SAAF aircraft who would bolster the numbers in the UK or N Africa. The GAF would have to rely on the Italians. My money isn’t on the Italians.

Quote
My figures show much more minesweepers than that. They had 90 ready for Sealion in 1940. Don't think this dropped to 50 a year later as production was still going on. Besides that they had dozens of other auxiliary ships which could be used for minesweeping.

Reply
I was using the German production figures for all minesweepers launched until the end of 1941 to allow time for completion, including pre war ships. Auxiliary ships can be used in local waters but in the front line of an invasion I don’t think so. My guess is that the Germans would have included trawlers converted to minesweepers to bolster the numbers. I do have the list of similar British conversions but the list is huge. 

Quote
Re Accuracy of bombing
That has nothing to do with it. That's not why British bombs were inaccurate. Do you think they couldn't see the ships in Brest? They had lousy bombsights. It is a tactical mission even if you use carpet bombing. Problem is that carpet bombing is a lousy way to achieve a tactical objective

Reply
No their bombsights were as good as most. They could see the ships in Brest (and hit them a couple of times) and they plastered the area around it. That is good enough for what I am after. Using a carpet bombing approach, to achieve a tactical aim, the disruption of the forces that have landed. The place would look like the moon and any stores would be at severe danger and transporting them around close to impossible.

Quote
Re Opposing forces at Anzio
22 Jan 1944: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles versus 20,000 German soldiers. 
End May:150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns versus 135,000 German soldiers

Reply
When the USA landed they had a huge advantage in numbers and were slow to extend the bridgehead. The Germans held them and recovered because of the size of the bridgehead and the area wasn’t safe from bombardment. What saved the Allies was the shore bombardment from the BB’s breaking up the German attacks.
By landing and leaving the Germans in your scenario, your making the same mistake plus the Germans don’t have any old BB’s to use for shore bombardment and will be open to heavy air attack at night far beyond anything the Allies suffered from Germany at Anzio. 

Quote
Ground control is unnecessary, David. Ground control only guides you to an area where the enemy is. It's not accurate enough to pinpoint the enemy. That came later. 
Same thing for the Geman NFs: they knew where the British bombers would be. 
Both parties would have to look for the enemy by visual contact. In fact, up to 1945 visual contact was still necessary for both sides. 
Yet, you have to understand that it's more difficult to intercept a fighter than it is to find a big and slow Sterling. Because the Bf 110 had a speed advantage, the Bf 110 could have avoided the Beaufighter and attacked the British bombers.

Reply
Ground control directs the fighter to a range behind the enemy aircraft where the fighters radar can take over. The aircrafts radar then takes the fighter to visual range where the attack takes place.
Without the first phase the Germans are stumbling around hoping their short range radar will find something. With the first phase the British nightfighters will be directed onto the german nightfighters and have a significant advantage. The hunters become the hunted.
Top speed is almost irrelevant. Both planes fly at cruising speed and the first moment you normally know that you have been spotted, is when the guns start firing, which is to late in most cases. It isn’t a case of avoiding the fighters and concentrating on the bombers, you have no idea what the blip is on the screen until you get to visual.

Over to you Kris

Have Fun_


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## Glider (Apr 1, 2007)

Just looked up some books on the Barges used by the British. There were two main groupings Dumb and Powered and numerous versions within those groups. 
The key phrase is
The conversions were kept simple and with two exceptions were armed with 2 x LMG. They proved an excellent substitute for landing craft but were to large to be handled by anything other than a heavy derrick. The powered versions were able to be make their own way up and down the beaches, but were not seaworthy in open waters.

As an aside the versions were huge, from floating bakeries to carrying army light AA guns, workshop lorries and anything else you could dream of.


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> If they learned anything, it would be the requirement for large numbers of capital ships providing direct fire support.


You're confusing two things: what is required and what is available. Likewise, Germany also knew it needed carriers. Yet it didn't have them but continued anyway. 
Fire support is ideal but not essential: think of Crete. Many losses but the objective was achieved. 
But like I said, I do envision fire support on the first day when it is most needed. 
You make the same mistake over and over again: everything which is not like D-Day or the Pacific invasions is wrong and doomed to fail! 



> Now what is your KM going to do..... sortie into the N Atlantic to draw away the RN


If you would have read my posts, you would have known. In any case, the answer is given above.



> And obviously they didn't learn any lessons because none of the purpose built amphib vessels were even on the drawing boards (like LST's, DUKW's", Higgins Boats, LCI's....blah, blah blah)


I think this shows how narrow-minded you are in this discussion. Allies used DUKWs, LSTs, ... and for that reason the Germans should also! 
You keep repeating this yet you fail to deliver any evidence on why the Germans would have failed to transport and deliver the forces needed by using barges. Are you forgetting that the British also used barges in Overlord?



> A little bit of wind and all your unpowered barges and slow moving barges will be scattered.


Again, you're just talking away without realizing that the barges were very capable of crossing the Channel up to Beaufort 6 without significant problems. 



> Night time will belong to the bombers and strafing fighters.


Once again. The bombers were not capable of hitting anything, plus they would be under attack by an even number of German night fighters.
And strafing fighters at night? What are you smoking?



> If an invasion of Britain was a certienty in in summer of 1942, the US would have committed those two carriers, simply because it was written down the the war in Europe was going to come first before the Pacific.


You're contradicting yourself. First you say how air support lacked for Guadalcanal, and now you're suggesting removing Wasp? 



> Because their aircrew's were expert ship killers.


What's your source for this? 




> they will be more than useful in sinking your subs.


What? Out of all the things you've said this is really the ... Have you ever heard of the "Second happy time". Read up on it. Basic books on WW2 mention it...



> You are making the classic case of attempting to defend everything and end up protecting nothing.


This is absolutely nonsense. What did the carrier fighters do near Guadalcanal? They protected the carriers, the invasion fleet and the marines on the ground. 
What you also fail to understand is that the best way to escort or protect is to fly ahead of your force to catch up any interceptors before they reach your friends. That's the doctrine perfectioned by Galland as explained in his book. He is also the one behind the Channel Dash air cover which humiliated the RAF. If he doesn't know how to prevent the British from engaging German targets, then I don't know who does. 
Now you may continue to rejoyce in your predestined thinking but I propose you use some actual facts and serious sources instead.

Kris


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## Glider (Apr 1, 2007)

Re bombing accuracy the following may be of interest. Its a summary of the bombing accuracy on plants as reported by the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Showing that on average British night bombing was more accurate than US day bombing.

Under the conditions created in Germany by heavy flak, fighter opposition, bad weather, and effective smoke screening, it was necessary in a high percentage of the attacks to use instrument bombing, which proved to be far less accurate than visual bombing. As a result, tremendous tonnages had to be flown from England in order to hit vital parts of plants with a relatively small tonnage. Detailed plant records for three plants (Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Zeitz) show that, of 30,000 tons of bombs dropped, only 3,781 tons hit within the plant fences. Different aiming techniques gave the following results:

Air Force and Technique Percentage of Hits Within the Plants 
8th AF visual aiming 26.8 
8th AF, part visual aiming and part instrument 12.4 
8th AF, full instrument 5.4 
RAF, night Pathfinder technique 15.8 
Weighted average 12.6


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## renrich (Apr 1, 2007)

The object of having control of the air for the Germans in 1940 over the channel was to help the German navy keep the RN from sinking all of the invasion boats and ships and drowning all the soldiers while they were trying to get ashore during Sealion. Even then the KM could assure the army that they could control the sea only on a narrow beach head. The army wanted a landing on a broader front which was part of the squabbling that went on between the different German commands. In the Pacific the US always made sure that they could maintain local air superiority as well as superiority on the sea during an opposed amphibious landing. The landing at Guadalcanal was unopposed but the allies controlled the air and sea until the troops were landed and many of the supplies were ashore. Of course that was a very small scale compared to a Sealion. The only time in the Pacific that the allies did not have total air superiority during an amphib operation was at Okinawa because of the kamikazes and there was no enemy surface fleet to threaten the landing. The only time the IJN really threatened a landing with surface ships was at Leyte and if Kurita had kept his nerve he could have really done some damage. I am not claiming by any means that the US is going to pull Britain's chestnuts out of the fire in case of a Sealion II in 1942 but I am saying that with the knowledge of an impending invasion of England by enemy forces abundantly clear the US would have attempted to reinforce the Brits in every way possible probably with combat ships some troops and a few a/c and it is unrealistic to assume otherwise. I am aware that the Kaiser built an impressive navy prior to WW1. After all he was Queen Victoria's grandson and there were some impressive ships although built for a different mission than British and American vessels. Good ships don't necessarily make for a good navy and the High Seas Fleet never was able to defeat even a portion of the Grand Fleet and after Jutland was largely a non-factor in the war and in fact was untrustworthy at the end of the war. I think we have an impasse here in this spirited and well contested discussion somewhat like another discussion about the best recip. engined fighter of all time. It all boils down to opposing opinions that can't be proven. My opinion is that the LW could not achieve air superiority over the channel long enough to deny the channel to allied naval forces that would brush aside the KM(while sinking most of it) and then proceed to sink enough of the supply ships and landing craft that a landing force if any got ashore would be stranded and would be either captured or killed by British forces.


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## HealzDevo (Apr 1, 2007)

Also you are talking about a narrow bridge head. Wouldn't that make it easier for aircraft to fly overhead and drop bombs? Especially the big aircraft such as the Manchester and Lancaster to destroy the troops.


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## plan_D (Apr 1, 2007)

_"Different times. The Kriegsmarine could handle the British Channel forces as shown during the Channel Dash."_

It's not a matter of different times. My mention of _Overlord_ was simply to point out that any invasion would require a naval screen of the English Channel. 

You cannot use the Channel Dash as a point for the Kriegsmarine being able to hold the Royal Navy. Your reasoning behind this, I cannot quite work out. The Channel Dash saw the Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and Scharnhorst with six escort DDs charging through the Channel at full speed, under the cover of fog and cloud with a ceiling of 700 feet. 

The convoy had no aim to engage the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy never actually engaged the convoy head-on. Admiral Ramsey didn't realise the convoy had sailed until thirteen hours after it had, even then the only Royal Navy vessels sent against the convoy were MTBs and DDs. 

I'm sorry but your reasoning that the Channel Dash proves the Kriegsmarine could stand up to the Royal Navy just doesn't cut it. 

The invasion would not have been able to sail under the terrible weather encountered on Feburary 12/13th so it would have been wide open to Bomber Command and Coastal Command. And the Royal Navy would have sent a lot more than a few DDs against any invasion attempt in 1942. 
The Home Fleet and anything from Gibralter would be sent to the invasion area. The Kriegsmarine didn't have the power to project in a naval screen capable of stopping the Royal Navy. In a fleet engagement, the Kriegsmarine would have lost. And the Kriegsmarine would have been drawn into a fleet engagement had an invasion attempt been made. 

The German naval command knew they could not attempt a large fleet action against the Royal Navy, hence the concentration on U-boats and fast raiding BCs. 

_"When did they ever try? 
The relatively few German bombers used near Dunkirk were mainly directed against the transports and beaches."_

The Luftwaffe tried to halt the Royal Navy at Crete, when the Royal Navy managed to destroy the first wave of assault ships with the escort _Luzo_. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe attempted to destroy the same Royal Navy ships while they evacuated the British Commonwealth troops off Crete. 

The Luftwaffe tried to halt the Royal Navy in Norway, while they captured German supply ships, bombarded the shore and then evacuated British and French troops. 

The Luftwaffe tried to stop the evacuation at Dunkirk attacking the "transports" which were DDs, mostly. Again, they failed. There was too much of the Royal Navy for the Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe to deal with. 

_"Different again. The Channel was in complete hands of the allies. BBs were not at risk from German aircraft, subs or Schnellboote. During Sealion they would have been. That's why Churchill himself forbade their use in the Channel."_

Different again? I was simply making the point that during _Overlord_ Battleships were used in the English Channel, it was a counter to a point made earlier that they could not. 
If any invasion attempt was made on Great Britain, Churchill would have gladly lifted any kind of ban to throw everything he had at the invasion. The Germans would have any and every ship from Aircraft Carrier to Motor Torpedo Boat thrown at them. 

_"If you would go back a couple of pages I already explained that Sealion '42 would not have to be a copy of D-Day. The Germans could do with less. Interdiction is fine but not necessary. Would D-Day have failed without the interdiction. Clearly not as the major reinforcements were not ordered to be brought in anyhow. And those divisions that were brought in had no real problems getting there. PlanD, name one unit that didn't manage to get to Normandy. 
As long as motorized units had ample fuel and were not hampered by conflicting orders they could move quite rapidly over France, despite allied air power. Furthermore, they did that without undue losses."_

I have been back all the pages and I find the idea that the Germans would not need as much for their invasion as we did for ours, quite foolish. Your aerial strategy for any support of this 1942 invasion is flawed, and if you were in charge of this operation it'd be the biggest foul up in military history. 

"D-Day" may not have failed without interdiction, but Operation _Overlord_ would have been a tragic loss for the Allies without interdiction. 

With quotes such as;

_"Railway transportation is impossible because the trains are observed and attacked in short order."_ - 11 June 1944. 

_"Troop movements and all supply traffic by rail to the army and within the army sector must be considered as completely cut off."_ - 11 June 1944

And the 9th US Air Force claiming 24 bridges, 12 trains, 79 locomotives, 427 R/R Cars, 22 tanks, 1288 Motor Transport, 14 Guns, 12 Dumps and 1 Power House in the month of June alone. I can hardly believe that without interdiction the operation would have been a success. 

I didn't say any German unit failed to reach the battlefield, I said they struggled. While you believe their losses were low, the time wasted was much more important. 

7th Germany Armee, 6 July:

_"...the transportation situation makes it impossible to forecast when the 275th Infantry Division, one combat team of which is already committed, can be brought up."_

19 July:

_"The army supply situation must still be regarded as strained. It is true that there has been a slight decrease in the rate of gasoline consumption at the present time among the troops fighting in Normandy. However, since we cannot count on any supply worth mentioning for the next few days, and since gasoline trains have not yet arrived, we must figure on a decreased supply. In consequence of the failures of rail transportation because of the long periods of heavy fighting, a decrease in ammunition supply below the base quota is inevitable...If the ammunition trains do not appear, a serious ammunition crisis must be expected within three or four days."_

The Economic Warfare Division recorded for 6 June to 26 July:

_"Destruction of bridges over the Seine forced elements of five enemy divisions to make the crossing by ferry. Some divisions coming from Holland, Rumania or the USSR detrained in the Paris area and moved on foot to the battle area. Six to seven days were required by the 16th GAF Division to make a march of 150 miles in late June, while the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions detrained at Versailles and other points just west of Paris and proceeded by night marches on secondary roads. One unit arrived after two days, while others consumed two weeks in their movement."_

To believe _Overlord_ would have been a success without the Allied air forces is naive, at best. 

For any invasion of Great Britain, the Luftwaffe needed to do a lot more than cover the invasion fleet on its approach. 

It needed to secure the battlefield, by cutting all lines of transport around what would be the beach-head. All airfields within 100 miles would have needed to be put out of action, and put under constant pressure. 
On the day and the weeks following, the Luftwaffe would need to provide fleet cover while continuing harassment of moving British forces, trains and transportation. Attacks on supply dumps would be essential and continual assaults on the artillery positions and, in this case, naval assets of Great Britain would be paramount. 

I do apologise but I do not believe that the Luftwaffe single handedly would be up to the task of achieving all that. We must be reminded that the Allied air forces over France were considerably larger than anything the Luftwaffe could dream of, the US 9th Air Force alone was the largest tactical air force ever fielded. And the targets for the Allied air forces didn't include, at the time, the largest navy in the world. Nor did the Allied Air Forces encounter an air force actually capable of stopping them.


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

Hi David
I must thank you for doing the effort of looking up stuff and backing up your arguments.



Glider said:


> Not for the invasion assult. Also as far as I know the barges used to supply the aftermath were carried over and launched on the French coast. Can you tell me which ones were sailed over under their own power?


Don't really understand why you are enquiring about the "own power" notion. All I'm saying is that river barges were succesfully used by the British.

_With so few purpose-built landing craft available for what would be a largely-British operation, one of his first tasks was to requisition 1000 ‘dumb’ (unpowered) Thames barges. They were to be fitted with stern ramps, towed to the French coast by minesweepers and beached using tugs and launches. Many were later engined and armed. "Slegehammer" and "Round-up" were soon cancelled, but by the time of the Normandy landings in June 1944, 400 barges were to take part manned by 3,500 men. Making up only ten percent of total amphibious vessels, their role was nevertheless of major importance. Apart from providing fuel, water, prepared food, repairs and maintenance to the many hundreds of landing craft serving both the American and British beaches, their specialised cargo-carrying and beach-landing characteristics meant they moved immense quantities of supplies from ship-to-shore.

Trials and Early Exercises - The first trials of a Thames barge fitted with a ramp had been held earlier in October 1941, and included landing exercises with three trucks. Following Lord Mountbatten’s appointment and starting in April 1942, 1000 barges were towed by trawlers and tugs in around 50 convoys to south coast of England ports for conversion in Operation "Consular". This movement was completed by September 1942 without loss. The first exercises were held at Salcombe, Devon in September 1942 with five converted barges. The first major supply exercise involving barges (36 in 3 flotillas), 36 coasters and other forces, took place at Tenby, South Wales in July/August 1943 in Exercise "Jantzen". As part of the preparation for sailing across the English Channel for the Normandy landings, "Jantzen" meant "dumb" Thames River barges sailing from the south coast of England around Land’s End and across the Bristol Channel under their own power. They subsequently made even longer coastal voyages.
_
Let me also add that they were used in horrible weather while everyone seems to convince me that Sealion had to take place in good weather...




> Again we have a fundamental difference. The only tests that I know that took place were a total failure with serious damage to a large number of the improvised vessels.


17th division tested them, as I said before. It is mentioned in the "Halder diaries" as well as the recent work of Schenk. 



> I also know that the Japanese who were asked to comment on the invasion preparations considered them to be totally inadequate and quite ill prepared. This was a report from Specialist Officer Major Sakurai who with other specialist Japanese Naval and Army officers reviewed the preparations at the invitation of Goering.


Thank you for adding this wonderful piece of information. It's completely new to me that the Japs were given a grand tour. 
On the other hand, I don't know what to conclude from it. I can imagine the Americans also being unimpressed when they would have seen it. It however does not mean they would have been unsuccesful. I also wonder what exactly those preparations are. What do they refer to? Do you have an online source for this so I can read up on it?? 



> n invasion fleet is hundreds of times larger in sea area, with far more targets which would be sitting ducks and the escort would be about the same size would be spread very thin.


The Germans had 250 fighters for that job. In my scenario (with increased production and the fighters withdrawn from the Ostfront) they would have had 5 times more fighters, if not more.




> Put the same guy in a large 3 knot barge wallowing at sea armed with a couple of light AA guns with torpedoes coming in his direction, 4.7in guns firing at him and multiple 2pds joining in, then ask him then if it’s a small inconvenience. The answer may differ a touch.


The Kriegsmarine was quite capable of dealing with the British Channel Fleet. 
And I'm just wondering if torpedoes wouldn't go underneath barges?? 




> I dont think you get it. Landing an invasion fleet isn’t a one off task. It needs supplies, reinforcements, back up. You don’t just land it, then go home and leave it unsupported. You have to land on the beaches, fight your way inland to give the follow up forces space to land and organise themselves. This takes time.


Well, that's exactly what I'm planning on doing. If the Germans can hold on to Stalingrad, they can also hold on to the British beaches for a couple of days.



> CAPs isn’t a minority role. To keep 1 unit constantly on CAP needs at least three units to be involved.


Even more than three units! So with only 1/5 (or so) of the German fighters destined for CAPs they would form a truly minimal CAP while the bulk of the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy. That's the choice I'm making, that's the gamble. With the bulk of the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy, the RAF would have to choose too. Attack the troops or attack the German dive bombers. My guess is that they would probably try to do both. Do you agree? 



> Without CAPs you are leaving your forces wide open to attack. I would use every Hurri bomber, I could lay my hands on.


That's also what I would do. Yet I believe the German troops would hold on.




> However my figures (including the ones above) exclude RCAF, RAAF and SAAF aircraft who would bolster the numbers in the UK or N Africa. The GAF would have to rely on the Italians. My money isn’t on the Italians.


Where are you going to get those Australians from? Australia decided that its troops would fight in the Pacific. SAAF was already in Africa. So if you pull back the RAF I can also pull back the Luftwaffe? 
As such I don't think pulling back your units will do you any good. 




> My guess is that the Germans would have included trawlers converted to minesweepers to bolster the numbers. I do have the list of similar British conversions but the list is huge.


I don't care what the British are capable of. You said the Germans didn't have the minesweepers needed. I showed they did. 




> No their bombsights were as good as most. They could see the ships in Brest (and hit them a couple of times) and they plastered the area around it. That is good enough for what I am after.


Read Kurfürst post: BC tried for months and couldn't destroy their target!! And you say it's good enough? 




> When the USA landed they had a huge advantage in numbers and were slow to extend the bridgehead.


Don't change your point. You said the Allies were outnumbered. Do you take this back or not? 



> By landing and leaving the Germans in your scenario, your making the same mistake plus the Germans don’t have any old BB’s to use for shore bombardment and will be open to heavy air attack at night far beyond anything the Allies suffered from Germany at Anzio.


Exactly. And I said this already in my very first post! 
But if the Allies could hold on for months, I think the Germans could hold on for a couple of days, don't you? 




> Ground control directs the fighter to a range behind the enemy aircraft where the fighters radar can take over. The aircrafts radar then takes the fighter to visual range where the attack takes place.


You're missing my point: because the Germans knew exactly where the bombers were, they didn't even need ground control (even though they did have the Liechtenstein radar).
British night fighters were not very succesful in engaging German night fighters. Ask Erich if you don't believe me. In those early days the equipment was not advanced enough to have accurate positioning of the enemy, and the Beaufighter was not as good as the Mosquito. You have to remember one very very very important thing about nightfighting, and it's something which Erich taught me: the eyes are the most important weapons of nightfighters. Once within visual range that's all you got. German Bf 110s had 6 eyes.



> Top speed is almost irrelevant. Both planes fly at cruising speed


I'm jus saying that the Germans didn't need to fear the Beaufighters. They didn't fear them when escorting their own bombers, so why would they fear them now? This is not my personal opinion, this is looking at loss figures of German nightfighters prior to the arrival of the Mosquito. 

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

Glider said:


> Re bombing accuracy the following may be of interest. Its a summary of the bombing accuracy on plants as reported by the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Showing that on average British night bombing was more accurate than US day bombing.
> 
> Under the conditions created in Germany by heavy flak, fighter opposition, bad weather, and effective smoke screening, it was necessary in a high percentage of the attacks to use instrument bombing, which proved to be far less accurate than visual bombing. As a result, tremendous tonnages had to be flown from England in order to hit vital parts of plants with a relatively small tonnage. Detailed plant records for three plants (Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Zeitz) show that, of 30,000 tons of bombs dropped, only 3,781 tons hit within the plant fences. Different aiming techniques gave the following results:
> 
> ...


What period? IIRC USSBS deals with 1943-1945. Before 1943 the British didn't have H2S and improved bomb sights.

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

renrich said:


> The object of having control of the air for the Germans in 1940 over the channel was to help the German navy keep the RN from sinking all of the invasion boats and ships and drowning all the soldiers while they were trying to get ashore during Sealion. Even then the KM could assure the army that they could control the sea only on a narrow beach head. The army wanted a landing on a broader front which was part of the squabbling that went on between the different German commands. In the Pacific the US always made sure that they could maintain local air superiority as well as superiority on the sea during an opposed amphibious landing. The landing at Guadalcanal was unopposed but the allies controlled the air and sea until the troops were landed and many of the supplies were ashore. Of course that was a very small scale compared to a Sealion. The only time in the Pacific that the allies did not have total air superiority during an amphib operation was at Okinawa because of the kamikazes and there was no enemy surface fleet to threaten the landing. The only time the IJN really threatened a landing with surface ships was at Leyte and if Kurita had kept his nerve he could have really done some damage. I am not claiming by any means that the US is going to pull Britain's chestnuts out of the fire in case of a Sealion II in 1942 but I am saying that with the knowledge of an impending invasion of England by enemy forces abundantly clear the US would have attempted to reinforce the Brits in every way possible probably with combat ships some troops and a few a/c and it is unrealistic to assume otherwise. I am aware that the Kaiser built an impressive navy prior to WW1. After all he was Queen Victoria's grandson and there were some impressive ships although built for a different mission than British and American vessels. Good ships don't necessarily make for a good navy and the High Seas Fleet never was able to defeat even a portion of the Grand Fleet and after Jutland was largely a non-factor in the war and in fact was untrustworthy at the end of the war. I think we have an impasse here in this spirited and well contested discussion somewhat like another discussion about the best recip. engined fighter of all time. It all boils down to opposing opinions that can't be proven. My opinion is that the LW could not achieve air superiority over the channel long enough to deny the channel to allied naval forces that would brush aside the KM(while sinking most of it) and then proceed to sink enough of the supply ships and landing craft that a landing force if any got ashore would be stranded and would be either captured or killed by British forces.


Hi Renrich,
I already replied to most of these points, so I apologize for the short answer.
Yes, the Americans were the best at amphibious landings. No doubt about that. However, the question is: are they the standard? Does everyone have to do it the "American way"? I don't believe so. I think the Germans could do with less. They would suffer many more losses but they would have pulled it off. One third of the river barges were expendable. 
Now, you go on about the RN destroying the KM though I already said like 5 times already that the KM was going to be retreated once the Royal Navy would enter the Channel. That would be on the second day (or perhaps even the night before). So your opinion of the KM being brushed aside and the invasion fleet being sunk is invalid.

Your opinion about the High Seas fleet is also invalid. Just because they had a much smaller fleet doesn't mean it wasn't a good navy. 
Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

plan_D said:


> I'm sorry but your reasoning that the Channel Dash proves the Kriegsmarine could stand up to the Royal Navy just doesn't cut it.


Not the Royal Navy, but the Royal Navy ships of the Channel. Those are the ones which would be used against the first wave. These could be contained by the KM and LW.




> The Home Fleet and anything from Gibralter would be sent to the invasion area.


But wouldn't get there until the first wave was unloaded. 



> The Luftwaffe tried to halt the Royal Navy at Crete


Halt or hold off? 



> If any invasion attempt was made on Great Britain, Churchill would have gladly lifted any kind of ban to throw everything he had at the invasion.


No, he said it in anticipation of the invasion. He said no BB would be used in the Channel as long as the Germans wouldn't commit theirs. A wise decisions as BBs in the Channel are a prize target. 




> and if you were in charge of this operation it'd be the biggest foul up in military history.


That's your opinion. I also get that opinion of many others who post here but I keep that opinion to myself. 



> I can hardly believe that without interdiction the operation would have been a success.


Perhaps you need to start looking at the invasion from a German point of view, instead of from an allied one.



> To believe _Overlord_ would have been a success without the Allied air forces is naive, at best.


Can you prove it? All you've shown so far is that the reinforcements and supplies came in slower. Where do you get the evidence that the invasion would have been stopped if these reinforcements came in faster? 
And where is your evidence that the invasion would have failed had the Germans have had 1000 aircraft operational? 
I agree it would have made the job more difficult for the Allies but there's NO WAY you can prove it would have failed. As such there's no way you can prove to me that it was necessary for the Germans.

Kris


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## HealzDevo (Apr 1, 2007)

The question remains because it would be a question of priorities. At this stage the desert war is still ongoing and bleeding the British. Therefore there is a question over whether Sealion could succeed. Hostile territory, a narrow bridge-head and potentially a lot of bombers dropping loads on the Germans. It doesn't really sound like the Luftwaffe could really get the better of Britain. I know you said that Germany would attempt again to crush the RAF but there are still a lot of Airfields like Ireland and Scotland from which to marshall new pilots and aircraft out of the range of Luftwaffe bases in France. Build that up, lure in Germany and then strike and you have a situation that could totally destroy Germany.


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## plan_D (Apr 1, 2007)

_"Not the Royal Navy, but the Royal Navy ships of the Channel. Those are the ones which would be used against the first wave. These could be contained by the KM and LW."_

How can you prove that would be so? There's no case in World War II where the Kriegsmarine achieved success in fleet action against any part of the Royal Navy. What possible proof can you bring forth that can give the idea that the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe could contain the Home Fleet? 

_"But wouldn't get there until the first wave was unloaded."_

The Home Fleet would arrive while the first wave was unloading. But that is unimportant, the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe would need to hold the Royal Navy off completely for days. If the Royal Navy were to break into the Channel, which they undoubtedly would, the invasion fleet would be shattered. 

_"Halt or hold off?"_

I do not know what you're trying to imply with this picky question. Nor do I see reasonable argument when you're picking out minor, unimportant points. It makes no difference which words you use, either way the Luftwaffe failed to protect the first invasion flotilla sailing to Crete. 

_"No, he said it in anticipation of the invasion. He said no BB would be used in the Channel as long as the Germans wouldn't commit theirs. A wise decisions as BBs in the Channel are a prize target."_

Even if that were the case, the BBs would be used to breakthrough any naval screening that the Kriegsmarine would try. This would allow any BC, CA or CL squadrons the Home Fleet would want to send in. 

_"Perhaps you need to start looking at the invasion from a German point of view, instead of from an allied one...Can you prove it? All you've shown so far is that the reinforcements and supplies came in slower. Where do you get the evidence that the invasion would have been stopped if these reinforcements came in faster? 
And where is your evidence that the invasion would have failed had the Germans have had 1000 aircraft operational? 
I agree it would have made the job more difficult for the Allies but there's NO WAY you can prove it would have failed. As such there's no way you can prove to me that it was necessary for the Germans."_

I have looked at the invasion from both German and Allied points of view, thank you. 

I do not see what could be considered solid evidence of an Allied failure without interdiction. We could spend all year shouting "Can you prove it?" at each other over this. But I won't. 

As I say, I cannot solidly prove that the invasion fail just the same as you cannot prove your invasion would succeed. But I can say this;

Time was one of the most vital things for the Wehrmacht in June/July 1944, every moment wasted provided the Allies with more time to bring in reinforcements and fresh supplies. The Germans were out-numbered and the longer they were delayed, the greater the disadvantage in men and material became. The interdiction campaign made every delay, and shortened the Germans own supply. It didn't only slow reinforcement and supply, but also destroy guns and vehicles of the Wehrmact - along with the men that manned them. 

If the Luftwaffe could have fielded 1,000 planes, as unrealistic as that is, it would have made no difference. The Allied air forces would have over-whelmed them, and still continued to destroy all airfields within 150 miles of the invasion beaches. This campaign would have rendered Luftwaffe numbers useless as they would have been farther from the beaches than the Allied fighters, which would be closer to home and in much larger numbers. That said, the toll on Allied forces would have been much larger given the increase in Luftwaffe activity. 

Kris, there's "NO WAY" you can prove that invasion of Great Britain by Germany would have been a success. So just don't drag the argument to that level.


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## HealzDevo (Apr 1, 2007)

My point is that the RAF could just withdraw some of its newer pilots to Scotland and Wales, further from the French coast and wait for the Germans and then rush them up once the Germans make a crucial move. Then it would be difficult to see the Luftwaffe as having credibility in this instance when an organization thought to be destroyed bounced back a second time...


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## Udet (Apr 1, 2007)

Just as it did occurr in the skies of Europe, without the support of the US Navy in the Atlantic, Great Britain goes nowhere against the Germans.

It was good news for Great Britain they were not fighting against a naval power. Before the end of 1941, the Kriegsmarine had already destroyed and sent to the bottom 2 battleships (*HMS Royal Oak* and *HMS Barham*), 1 battlecruiser (*HMS Hood*), 2 large carriers (*HMS Glorious and HMS Ark Royal*), plus several cruisers, and dozens of destroyers and minor escort vessels sent to the bottom, not including other capital ships, such as three battleships badly mauled during the Battle for Crete -Luftwaffe victims-, and *HMS Malaya*, which took severe battle damage spending many months in repairs, meaning they were not available to fight.

Also let´s not forget some other embarrasing episodes, which in my view, are simply unacceptable in the case of a nation that once made one of the greatest naval powers in history:

(a) Commencing the war losing a battleship inside the very Scapa Flow, and
(b) The incident of *HMS Prince of Wales* during her engagement against the Bismarck...that "onboard her were civilian workers" for the amazing reason some significant part of her equipment was not entirely operational.(!!)

Knowing their refined and well earned tradition for concealing information, is that i believe Great Britain should have concealed this particular part which -amazingly- is brought forward to "explain" or "justify" the performance of the British force in that particular engagement. Sorry but i call that utmost mediocrity, and in some cases, utter stupidity. I will go deeper, you should not only have concealed this piece of information, it should have been erased forever. It is terribly embarrasing to read that part in the records of one of the greatest naval powers in history.

Whatever the British naval tradition might have been it was well into the decay phase by the time World War Two had commenced. There in fact some episodes when British seamanship showed in battle, but also the German did it, and did it in a manner to surpass the Brits several times.

Just like Kurfurst correctly pointed out: you are confusing naval power with naval tradition; German was no longer a maritime power during WW2, but they had a tradition.

The Brits unshield the sword and yell their horrible losses "are irrelevant" for the ships "are there to put up a fight and get the job done even if lost". Very emotive, but it in the end you have to admit that without the extensive aid of the Us Navy in the Atlantic then you cant know what could have happened.

Also do not forget the hammer delivered by the Japs on December, 1941, when the main -and only- capital ships of the Royal Navy in the area were promptly sunk in the same engagement. 

The U.S. Navy in the Pacific did not have anything that might come close to resemble the type of losses endured by the Brits in the Atlantic/Mediterranean, and see the type of naval opponent faced by the Navy in the PTO.

Want to call a Navy call the US Navy; that was a Navy in the broad sense of the term. They more than came back, recovering from the initial losses, completely swallowing the Japanese navy, and made them pay dearly.

Do not forget Dunkirk is a DEFEAT. The Royal Navy was not the main target of the Luftwaffe in those days. Had it been the target, you have to believe it would have been one of the most horrifying blood chilling killing grounds in the history of war. This is so real, Hitler made a peace offering after that.

Norway: another defeat. Yes, high losses were inflicted to the German navy, but again, all that naval might and alleged superb intelligence were not enough to defeat the Germans.

Crete: not only a defeat; it was another slaughter. It is interesting to notice there are guys here implying losing 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers in the same battle, plus 3 battleships, 6 cruisers and 6 destroyers more damaged (some of them heavly damaged) is an acceptable balance.


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## syscom3 (Apr 1, 2007)

HealzDevo said:


> Also you are talking about a narrow bridge head. Wouldn't that make it easier for aircraft to fly overhead and drop bombs? Especially the big aircraft such as the Manchester and Lancaster to destroy the troops.



Exactly. The Germans had the choice of a broad front with the result that air support and sea support would be non existant at many times.

Or they could have a narrow front, in which they would be grouping their barges and auxiliaries together for group destruction.

The allies at Normandy didn't have that problem because the sea and air was under complete control.


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## Civettone (Apr 1, 2007)

plan_D said:


> How can you prove that would be so? There's no case in World War II where the Kriegsmarine achieved success in fleet action against any part of the Royal Navy.


 Channel Dash is an example where the KM achieved success against the Royal Navy.




> What possible proof can you bring forth that can give the idea that the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe could contain the Home Fleet?


Just compare the forces of the Royal Navy in the Channel with the Kriegsmarine.
Sure you could bring in more destroyers or other small vessels but then the British would have lost the Battle of the Atlantic. Germany wouldn't even have had to invade the island.




> "But wouldn't get there until the first wave was unloaded."


I think that's where we disagree. The bulk of the Royal Navy would not have arrived until the next day (being held up by mines, subs and aircraft) when my invasion barges and the KM have already made their way back to France. 




> _"Halt or hold off?"_
> I do not know what you're trying to imply with this picky question. Nor do I see reasonable argument when you're picking out minor, unimportant points. It makes no difference which words you use, either way the Luftwaffe failed to protect the first invasion flotilla sailing to Crete.


Yet, the second one came through unharmed. I think Crete was a good learning lesson for the Germans. 
About the halt of hold off, what I meant is that the Luftwaffe didn't try to halt the Royal Navy. I don't see them coming full stop. Most important is to hold them off which means contain them, neutralize their threat. That's what the Luftwaffe in the end managed to do. Or why else was the RN pulled back? 




> Even if that were the case, the BBs would be used to breakthrough any naval screening that the Kriegsmarine would try. This would allow any BC, CA or CL squadrons the Home Fleet would want to send in.


 It's folly to send BBs to the Channel. They are way too vulnerable! Why else did the British never use them in the Channel until they had complete control of the waters and sky of the Channel in 1944? 
I thought this was common knowledge. At least Churchill knew...




> As I say, I cannot solidly prove that the invasion fail just the same as you cannot prove your invasion would succeed.


I reluctantly admit 




> Time was one of the most vital things for the Wehrmacht in June/July 1944, every moment wasted provided the Allies with more time to bring in reinforcements and fresh supplies.


This is off-topic but out of curiosity - do you believe that the Germans could or would have defeated the allies if the German transport system was not shot to pieces and they could bring in reinforcements much faster? (I just want to know, I'm not going to use it in this discussion.)




> If the Luftwaffe could have fielded 1,000 planes, as unrealistic as that is, it would have made no difference.


Don't get me wrong. I didn't say that to show that the Germans could have stopped the Allied AFs. I just wanted to know your opinion about what would have happened if the allies didn't have air superiority. That's why I gave the example of a 1000 planes.

Kris


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## Hop (Apr 2, 2007)

> There were very few attacks on land targets in July.
> That's completely untrue. Either your source is wrong, or you're making a deliberate attempt to hold back information. Which is it? I hope it's not the latter, that would really disappoint me!
> To say that the German Luftwaffe only flew a couple of bombing missions over England is BS! If you want, I'll back it up (as I always try to do).



Go on then. I have posted the summaries from Wood and Dempster. Certainly there were some attacks on land targets in July, but shipping strikes predominated.

And as I pointed out earlier, if the Germans did actually invade, they are going to have a lot of targets on land, unless they abandon the army to it's fate.



> Following your previous statement, I also doubt if this is true. I can hardly remember any missions where the Germans used three times as many fighters as bombers.



ER Hooton gives the German sortie numbers. For 1st July - 8th August they are 1150 daylight bomber sorties, 3350 fighter sorties.



> Searching the vast spaces of the Channel with just 1000 bombers? What was I thinking...



Not searching. Coordinating 1000 bombers in attacks on small numbers of warships.

Coordinating 1000 bombers attacking a big fixed target like London is difficult enough. Trying to do the same against small numbers of warships, especially when you have freindly warships in the area, is a nightmare.

That's why it never happened during the war.



> Good point. But did they all have increased AA armament and an air gunnery radar?



Pretty much. AA defences on destroyers and small craft increased hugely as the war progressed.



> Camouflaged? Says who?



The page you linked to. They have photographs showing the camouflaging work being carried out.



> What's the point in camouflaging the ships if you can't conceal the docks?



Docks tend to cluster together. A ship takes up a very small part of most docks.

Do you have Google earth? Brest is in fairly high res. I count about 9 dry docks, miles apart, and a lot of wet berthing areas.



> And like I said, I don't plan on leaving the invasion fleet on the British beaches. They have to be pulled back. As such, there won't be a German fleet along the British coast when the Royal Navy appears.



This is getting silly.

Unloading heavy equipment and vehicles from barges and freighters, over beaches, takes a long time. Barges, many of which couldn't even reach 10 mph, take a long time to cross 100 miles of water. And just as long to return.

Then there are the problems of landing things in the correct order on the beaches, taking them inland to free up room for the next cargo etc.

The larger freighters will take literally days to unload.



> I remember one night, there were 40 sunk. Don't remember the details. Will look it up!



From the War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command, 19th September, translated by Klee for the USAF:


> "strong British air raids against the Channel coast, 80 barges sunk, an
> ammunition train with 500 tons of explosive blown up.
> <snip raids on Germany>
> The Torpedo Boat T 11 received two hits the T 3 sunk last night owing to a bomb hit".





> One more time, this time a bit less complicated: 1.Send out the entire fleet. First wave supported by warships.
> 2.Disembark the troops.



Disembarking troops will take a few hours from powered barges, quite a few hours from unpowered craft. 

Unloading tanks, trucks, artillery, ammunition etc will take days. 



> 3.Send the fleet back.



Whilst a few of the boats might make it back the same day, the vast majority are still going to be in place the next day, and the next. And the follow on supplies will be arriving by then, as well.



> 4.Royal Navy arrives from SF.



What about the RN in Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and the host of other bases?

The RN operated cruisers and destroyers in the channel throughout the BoB.

You might not get the battleships and heavy cruisers attacking the invasion fleet the first night, although I wouldn't count on it. But cruisers and destroyers are going to make short work of barges and tugs.

And if the few German heavy ships are actually down south, and not skulking in Norway like in the real world, then expect the RN heavy units to be further south too.



> Now you're holding on to threads.
> Barges don't look like destroyers. Stukas don't look like Spitfires.



You'd be surprised. When you are in a boat and you think there are hostile aircraft, you shoot at anything that flies. When you are in an aircraft looking for enemy warships, anything that floats is your target.

And it's not just barges on the German side and destroyers on the British. Both sides had converted trawlers etc as gunboats in fairly large numbers.



> Those from Ostend maybe? But 50 miles is a better average. And that's 5 hours according to your calculations? Or do you want me to attach a map of the Channel?



Look at a map of the proposed landing sites from 1940. They intended landing as far west as Portsmouth. Portsmouth - Le Harve is 103 miles as the crow flies.

And none of those speeds allow for currents, which can reach more than 5 mph in the Channel

And "averages" don't cut it. The lead elements have to set out at least 10 hours before they are due to land. In the actual plan, the Germans had some ships setting out 24 hours before they were due to land, so I'm really giving your plan the benefit of the doubt by saying 10 hours, especially as few of the barges could make 10 mph.



> Days? What do you base this on? Why not one day?



Reality. Ever beached a boat? Ever tried unloading over a beach? Ever tried it with people shooting at you, aircraft bombing you, and artillery shelling you?

Unloading will take days even without enemy interference. 



> So? Did the British have to seal off the Channel? The Germans were quite capable of mining the Channel. Even in 1944 the British were still minesweeping the Channel. You're clearly underestimating the German minelaying capability.
> I'm not underestimating the British minesweeping capability. I'm just saying that the British cannot sweep them as fast as the Germans can lay them.



And the Germans cannot sweep them as fast as the British can lay them. So what happens to your tugs and barges and gunboats?



> You didn't read what I wrote. I specifically said that the British would no longer have the advantage of flying over friendly territory, and that's why the situation was different from 1940.



And I pointed out to you that in the fighting over the Channel in 1940, the British came out on top.

And there are a few more points to consider.

If the Luftwaffe does not reach the British coast, then the German beachheads have no air cover. The British soldiers do not have to worry about air attack. 

The invading forces will be light on artillery (it's heavy, so is the ammo). The British will outgun them by a considerable margin. The British will be able to bomb the Germans ashore with impunity.

The problem for the Germans is that the Luftwaffe has 4 separate tasks, all of which they _have_ to carry out.

Firstly, because the Kreigsmarine is so weak, it's up to the Luftwaffe to protect the invasion fleet from the RN.

Secondly, because the invasion forces will be light on artillery and armour to begin with, the Luftwaffe has to support the army.

Thirdly, because it's easier and quicker to get troops to the front by road and rail than by ship and barge, the Luftwaffe has to interdict the British road and rail network. Otherwise the few German divisions struggling ashore are going to be overwhelmed by the 40+ divisions based in Britain.

Fourthly, because a seaborne invasion is very vulnerable to air attack, and the advancing German troops will be light on AAA, the Luftwaffe has to protect them from the RAF.

Now the Luftwaffe has to do all these tasks at once. That's why in the real world, the absolute prerequisite for the invasion was the defeat of the RAF. Trying to do all 4 tasks at once, with thousands of RAF fighters and bombers opposing them, is not going to work.


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## Hop (Apr 2, 2007)

> This only reinforces my opinion about the striking power of the British. The article also states that the British used over 700 aircraft (amongst them 400 fighters) against 250 German fighters. Yet, they only managed to get in a few bombers? They couldn't get them escorted by fighters? Why would things have been different during an invasion?



Because an invasion wouldn't be taking place in stormy weather in February?

The Germans picked the weather for the Channel dash _because_ it was bad. 

You might just as well argue that the allied air forces didn't do much during the first day of the Battle of the Bulge, therefore couldn't have performed well at Normandy. It's a silly argument.

And the numbers are wrong, too.

Tony Wood has the Fighter Command records for the period. 

Squadron / number type / result
825 - 6 Swordfish - all lost
72 - 11 Spitfire - claimed 3 for no loss
124 - 12 Spitfire - claimed some damaged for no loss
401 - 12 Spitfire - claimed 2 for 1 loss
64 - Spitfire - delayed by poor weather at base
411 - Spitfire - delayed by poor weather at base
303 - Spitfire - uneventful patrol
315 - Spitfire - uneventful patrol
316 - Spitfire - uneventful patrol
1 - 11 Hurricane - 2 lost to flak
125 - 12 Spitfire - claimed 1 damaged for 1 loss
607 - 10 Hurricane - attacked unrelated coastal targets, 1 loss
607 - 8 Hurricane - second sortie. Attacked enemy warships, 3 losses
32 - Hurricane - attacked unrelated coastal targets
32 - Hurricane - second sortie. Attacked enemy warships
41 - 11 Spitfire - escort for 607 32 squadrons. Claimed 3 for 1 loss
3 - Hurricane - made straffing attacks on enemy destroyers. no losses
313 - Spitfire - straffing attacks on enemy flak ships. no losses
485 - 14 Spitfire - straffing attacks on enemy warships. 4 enemy aircraft claimed, no losses
452 - Spitfire - straffing attacks enemy warships. no claims or losses
602 - Spitfire - straffing attacks enemy warships. no claims or losses
65 - 12 Spitfire - 1 claim, no losses
111 - 11 Spitfire - 1 claim, no losses
137 - 7 Whirlwind - anti shipping strike. 4 losses
222 - 12 Spitfire - anti shipping strike. claimed 1 damaged, no losses
403 - 9 Spitfire - anti shipping strike. claimed 1 destroyed, no losses
234 - 12 Spitfire - anti shipping. claimed 2, lost 2
118 - 12 Spitfire - anti shipping. lost 1

That's the entirety of Fighter Command operations. It totals 20 Spitfire squadron sorties (probably about 220 sorties), 6 Hurricane squadron sorties, 1 Whirlwind squadron. The Hurricanes and Whirlwind were attack aircraft by this stage of the war. 5 of the 20 Spitfire sorties didn't encounter the enemy, meaning about 170 Spitfires actually saw combat.

In terms of fighter sorties, Hooton notes the Luftwaffe flew "over 300", the RAF as shown above almost exactly the same number (even counting the ground attack Hurricanes as fighters). The Luftwaffe fighters of course knew where their own ships were, many of the RAF squadrons failed to find the action.

Edit: As regards the claims of German superiority, the Spitfires of Fighter Command made 18 claims (actual German losses were 22). 6 Spitfires were lost.



> I agree that the targets would have been easier to find but nevertheless, it still says a lot about British capabilities.



What does it say about the German capabilities? 5 British destroyers and 3 MTBs made attacks on 2 German battleships and a heavy cruiser, escorted by multiple German destroyers/torpedo boats. And not a single one of the British ships was lost. The Luftwaffe joined in with repeated bombing/straffing attacks on the destroyers as well, and failed to sink any.


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## Hop (Apr 2, 2007)

> It was good news for Great Britain they were not fighting against a naval power. Before the end of 1941, the Kriegsmarine had already destroyed and sent to the bottom 2 battleships (HMS Royal Oak and HMS Barham), 1 battlecruiser (HMS Hood), 2 large carriers (HMS Glorious and HMS Ark Royal), plus several cruisers, and dozens of destroyers and minor escort vessels sent to the bottom, not including other capital ships, such as three battleships badly mauled during the Battle for Crete -Luftwaffe victims-, and HMS Malaya, which took severe battle damage spending many months in repairs, meaning they were not available to fight.



The British should have done what the Germans did, try to keep their warships out of harms way.

Let's face it, by the end of 1941 the British had sunk a much larger proportion of the rather small German fleet. What was left in 1942 and later spent the rest of the war hiding in port.

Whilst the Germans might have sunk 3 British capital ships by the end of 1941 (out of the 15 Britain started the war with), the RN had sunk 4 German and Italian capital ships, out of the 9 they started the war with.



> b) The incident of HMS Prince of Wales during her engagement against the Bismarck...that "onboard her were civilian workers" for the amazing reason some significant part of her equipment was not entirely operational.(!!)
> 
> Knowing their refined and well earned tradition for concealing information, is that i believe Great Britain should have concealed this particular part which -amazingly- is brought forward to "explain" or "justify" the performance of the British force in that particular engagement. Sorry but i call that utmost mediocrity, and in some cases, utter stupidity. I will go deeper, you should not only have concealed this piece of information, it should have been erased forever. It is terribly embarrasing to read that part in the records of one of the greatest naval powers in history.



Hardly. PoW was still undergoing work, she had been rushed in to service to make up the numbers. The British were having to fight against 2 European navies, and face threats from the Japanese, meaning the battleships were stretched thin. In particular, the RN was having to carry out the task of the French Mediterranean fleet as well as it's own duties.



> Just like Kurfurst correctly pointed out: you are confusing naval power with naval tradition; German was no longer a maritime power during WW2, but they had a tradition.



Yes, they had a tradition of hiding their major ships in port in WW1 as well  

You can get a measure of just how much time they spent hiding in port by looking at the fates of the German capital ships. Of the 4, two were lost at sea (both sunk by the RN), two in harbour (both by the RAF).



> The U.S. Navy in the Pacific did not have anything that might come close to resemble the type of losses endured by the Brits in the Atlantic/Mediterranean,



They lost 4 battleships, 2 carriers and half a dozen cruisers in the first year of the war.



> that was a Navy in the broad sense of the term. They more than came back, recovering from the initial losses



The RN started the war with 15 battleships and battlecruisers. They ended it with 15. They started with 7 carriers, and ended with 55, 66 cruisers and ended with 67, 184 destroyers and ended with 308, 60 submarines and ended with 162.



> Do not forget Dunkirk is a DEFEAT. The Royal Navy was not the main target of the Luftwaffe in those days. Had it been the target, you have to believe it would have been one of the most horrifying blood chilling killing grounds in the history of war. This is so real, Hitler made a peace offering after that.
> 
> Norway: another defeat. Yes, high losses were inflicted to the German navy, but again, all that naval might and alleged superb intelligence were not enough to defeat the Germans.
> 
> Crete: not only a defeat; it was another slaughter. It is interesting to notice there are guys here implying losing 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers in the same battle, plus 3 battleships, 6 cruisers and 6 destroyers more damaged (some of them heavly damaged) is an acceptable balance.



Actually none of these is a defeat for the RN. At Dunkirk they evacuated far more men than anyone thought possible. In Norway they did enough damage to the Kreigsmarine to cripple it for the rest of the war, and to ensure that Sea Lion was an impossibility. In Crete they stopped _any_ German seaborne forces reaching the island, and evacuated the allied troops at the end.


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## plan_D (Apr 2, 2007)

Excellent posts, Hop, especially the last. I couldn't have done better myself. 

Kris:

_"Channel Dash is an example where the KM achieved success against the Royal Navy."_ 

The "Channel Dash" was the Kriegsmarine running away from the Royal Navy. It cannot be considered a fleet action because there was no actual conflict between opposing fleets. 

Had the Home Fleet caught that convoy then it would have been destroyed, or at least put out of action. If the Royal Navy thought it was required, any invasion attempt would have been met by the Home Fleet and Force H from the Med. 

_"Just compare the forces of the Royal Navy in the Channel with the Kriegsmarine.
Sure you could bring in more destroyers or other small vessels but then the British would have lost the Battle of the Atlantic. Germany wouldn't even have had to invade the island."_

Why are you only comparing the forces in the Channel? All those forces around the British Isles will arrive at the battle area within days. The Kriegsmarine would have to hold all of them off because if any were to break into the Channel, the invasion would fail. 

_"I think that's where we disagree. The bulk of the Royal Navy would not have arrived until the next day (being held up by mines, subs and aircraft) when my invasion barges and the KM have already made their way back to France."_

So, the invasion barges and Kriegsmarine have left on the second day. Can I ask how you aim to supply and protect your troops? You cannot just land troops then abandon them. There'd need to be logistical support and the Kriegsmarine would need to give artillery support, so it cannot leave. 

_"Yet, the second one came through unharmed. I think Crete was a good learning lesson for the Germans. 
About the halt of hold off, what I meant is that the Luftwaffe didn't try to halt the Royal Navy. I don't see them coming full stop. Most important is to hold them off which means contain them, neutralize their threat. That's what the Luftwaffe in the end managed to do. Or why else was the RN pulled back?"_

Kris, the first invasion fleet was destroyed. The Luftwaffe had not been able to prevent this, proving that air power alone cannot halt a navy. 

The Royal Navy dispatched the Light Cruisers HMS _Dido_, _Orion_ and _Ajax_ with the DDs HMS _Janus_, _Kimberley_, _Hasty_ and _Hereward_ to attack the _Lupo_ and its convoy. This convoy was destroyed and turned back. 
This second "unharmed" convoy, escorted by _Sagittario_ was held back at first. And didn't arrive unharmed because it lost three transports. The attack was made by four light cruisers and three destroyers. 

The Royal Navy pulled back when the evacuation was completed. The Luftwaffe did do serious damage, I will not deny that, but the point made is the Luftwaffe alone could not keep the Royal Navy from attacking the invasion convoys. 

_"It's folly to send BBs to the Channel. They are way too vulnerable! Why else did the British never use them in the Channel until they had complete control of the waters and sky of the Channel in 1944? 
I thought this was common knowledge. At least Churchill knew..."_

You don't need to use the BBs in the Channel, they can simply operate at the edges against any screen the Kriegsmarine sets up. If the Kriegsmarine operates in the Channel, then its Battlecruisers become targets for the coastal guns, Bomber Command and Coastal Command. The Royal Navy would send in every other ship to stop the invasion and even BBs if desperate. 

_"This is off-topic but out of curiosity - do you believe that the Germans could or would have defeated the allies if the German transport system was not shot to pieces and they could bring in reinforcements much faster? (I just want to know, I'm not going to use it in this discussion.)"_

I believe the Germans could have defeated the Allies in Normandy had they been able to move around quicker and were better supplied. Had the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions been able to detrain closer to the front, instead of at Paris, then the Allies would have faced a counter-attack toward the beaches. The Wehrmacht wanted to counter-attack but it never had the chance. 

_"Don't get me wrong. I didn't say that to show that the Germans could have stopped the Allied AFs. I just wanted to know your opinion about what would have happened if the allies didn't have air superiority. That's why I gave the example of a 1000 planes."_ 

If the Germans had achieved air superiority over the Allied invasion area, then the invasion would have failed. Just as much as I believe if the Germans would have been able to protect their entrance routes and supply columns, they would have been able to defeat or at least suppress the Allies much longer. 

In the event of a German counter-attack in early June, the only way of survival for the Allied forces would have been with the aid of naval bombardment from those ships in the Channel.


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## Glider (Apr 2, 2007)

Kris
Quote
The various info regarding the testing of the british barges and their seaworthiness.

Reply
Many thanks for the info, I need to amend my views, but, and it’s a big but, they were not assault craft. It’s a huge risk. The quote was from Ian Allen book British Warships of WW2 re the use of derricks and seaworthiness.

Quote
Re the Japanese comments on the invasion plans and preparations

Reply
Its not on line but in a book called the Burning Blue ISBN 0-7126-6475-0. The book is supposed to be about the BOB which contains nothing new but it does have some comments on the American and Japanese views of the BOB including a section on the aftermath including the comments mentioned re the invasion.

Quote
Re the resources assigned to the Channel Dash
The Germans had 250 fighters for that job. In my scenario (with increased production and the fighters withdrawn from the Ostfront) they would have had 5 times more fighters, if not more.

Reply
I realise this, but the area covered is hundreds of times larger and the resources are going to be thin, very thin even with 5 times the aircraft. You yourself said that to keep one unit overhead on a CAP requires 5 in total, I was allowing for a surge due to the invasion. 
Using the 1 to 3 ratio 1500 fighters will give you 500 overhead all day and that is pushing it.
If you want to hold back a reserve to support bombers attacking a key area or a RN attack then you have less overhead. 
The RAF in May 42 had 42 squadrons of Spits (Squadrons of the RAF) call it 650 planes a number that would have increased with the threat of invasion. 650 alone would be sufficient to give your 500 planes overhead a very hard time as they can attack and retreat at will, choosing their moment. Not forgetting the 21 attack squadrons of fighter bombers mentioned before. 
*Remember *these were in place and are minimum numbers. An invasion threat would have pulled out all the stops.
*Remember *these numbers exclude the RCAF who were in the UK at the time.

Quote
Even more than three units! So with only 1/5 (or so) of the German fighters destined for CAPs they would form a truly minimal CAP while the bulk of the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy. That's the choice I'm making, that's the gamble. With the bulk of the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy, the RAF would have to choose too. Attack the troops or attack the German dive bombers. My guess is that they would probably try to do both. Do you agree?

Reply
The British have 650 plus fighters to escort the RN and 21 squadrons plus of GA planes to run amok attacking your troops, support vessels anything they can find against minimal opposition. They would have a field day

Quote
The Kriegsmarine was quite capable of dealing with the British Channel Fleet. 

Reply
With what?, the BC’s are in the Atlantic and you have a handful of cruisers and destroyers. The RN has KGV’s, Nelsons, Queen Elizabeth class, numerous cruisers and compared to the Germans, almost unlimited numbers of destroyers. All intent on death and destruction and hang the losses as this is make or break time for the war.

Quote
And I'm just wondering if torpedoes wouldn't go underneath barges??

Reply
Actually they wouldn’t go under, but it doesn’t matter, one 4in or 4.7in shell would do the job. Torpedo’s would be a waste but the MTB’s would use them.

Quote
Well, that's exactly what I'm planning on doing. If the Germans can hold on to Stalingrad, they can also hold on to the British beaches for a couple of days.

Reply
Then Germany lose, big time. The key to an invasion, any invasion, is that you build up your forces faster than the enemy. 
If the defender wins the race, the Invasion forces are trapped and unable to move against dug in defenders with support.
If the invader wins the race, they break through and get into the rear of the enemy forcing a retreat. 
Give the British 2 days and you are trapped, with nowhere to go.

Quote
Where are you going to get those Australians from? Australia decided that its troops would fight in the Pacific. SAAF was already in Africa. So if you pull back the RAF I can also pull back the Luftwaffe? 
As such I don't think pulling back your units will do you any good.

Reply
You have said it yourself. If the GAF pull out of North Africa then the RAF can leaving the Italians to face the SAAF. Fair comment on the RAAF but my money is on the SAAF.
It gives the RAF an additional 10 squadrons of Hurricanes, 3 of Spitfires and 4 of Kittyhawks. You now have 31 squadrons of GA planes causing hell while your CAP is close to zero. The German army is going to love you.

Quote
I don't care what the British are capable of. You said the Germans didn't have the minesweepers needed. I showed they did.
Reply
Not quite. You showed me a number which I didn’t disagree with, plus I gave a suggestion as to how the difference could have been made up and the basis for my number. I have done more digging and the Germans had a class of Motor Minesweepers called R Boats and these are small naval vessels designed for the job and more likely to have been the cause of the difference. Basically these were the size of an S boat but slower and used for a number of roles including minelaying and escort.
The British equivalent was the Fairmile B, and both were considered as part of coastal forces by the German and British navies.

Quote
Re the ability to destroy the BC in dock
Read Kurfürst post: BC tried for months and couldn't destroy their target!! And you say it's good enough?

Reply
As per my last posting yes, that’s good enough for me. 350 bombers would play merry hell in the enclosed landing area. 
By the way this is based on Sterlings, Halifax’s, Manchesters, Wellingtons, Whitleys and Lancasters in front line squadrons, so my original assumption of 6000lb a plane as payload is on the low side by some margin, its probably around 8-9000lb. 
Nowhere have I included the Bostons, Hampdens, Hudsons, Blenhiems who would have done something. Also the first 1000 bomber raid was in 1942 so the 350 assumption is also way down on what would have been possible.

Quote
Re opposing forces at Anzio
Don't change your point. You said the Allies were outnumbered. Do you take this back or not?

Reply
Sorry but I never said the allies were outnumbered. My whole point has been that the Allies had the greater numbers but couldn’t get off the beach as the area was under artillery fire and to small to manoeuvre in. Please point out where I made this statement and I will change it.

Quote
Re ability of nightfighters. 
In essence you are saying that my premise that having Ground Radar under local control directing the defending British nightfighters onto the incoming German nightfighters wouldn’t be a great advantage. This is because the ground radar at the time is not accurate enough to direct the defending fighter to with the radar range of the incoming German planes. 
Also that the Me110 had little to fear from the Beaufighter, as few 110 nightfighters were lost to Beaufighters.

Reply
I am absolutely confident that Erich would support my premise because the British had been using this basis for interceptions since Oct 1940 and by May 1942 it was well practiced and very successful. German losses on raids at night over Britain were alarming as a percentage of the planes involved which backs up the scenario.

Over to you, enjoy

David


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## Udet (Apr 2, 2007)

Hop said:


> The British should have done what the Germans did, try to keep their warships out of harms way.
> 
> Let's face it, by the end of 1941 the British had sunk a much larger proportion of the rather small German fleet. What was left in 1942 and later spent the rest of the war hiding in port.
> 
> ...




Hop, nobody but yourself could have showed up dragging in this type of response.

Still, my list was incomplete: HMS Courageous, another large carrier, was sunk before the end of 1941.

Unlike you i do not live in a constant state of denial. I have acknowledged the fact the Kriegsmarine took high losses against the Royal Navy early in the war, also stated British seamanship showed in battle action.

Your part regarding HMS Prince of Wales is entertaining: so you are suggesting sending a battleship that is not fully battle worthy to clash with Bismarck does not smell like the type of decision highly related to terrible management of naval affairs? Interesting notion.

Knowing your fashion is that i can say you made a mistake in that last posting of yours: your words seem to agree with the notion Royal Navy losses and capabilities to cover all theathers were becoming nearly unbearable as early as in mid 1941. Does not sound too powerful.

Also stop twisting the words of others, i did not say Dunkerque was a "Royal Navy" defeat...since you like playing the smart guy, you ought to know i was referring to a complete allied defeat in continental europe, and that the Royal Navy was not the main target the Luftwaffe had in its directives.

Also as Kurfurst correctly pointed out, although the achievement of evacuating some 330,000 troops is of course remarkable, the means utilized by Great Britain did not seem too much professional, at all: any type of floating devices, military and civilian alike, were used during the evacuation. Yes, the goal was achieved but not in that very professional manner you constantly remark the Germans were uncapable of achieving to have an invasion force crossing the channel and landing on British beaches (and do not forget the succesful evacuation was made possible thanks to the German orders to let it happen). So it is utterly ridiculous when you try to make fun of the German inabilty to assemble an invasion fleet right after the end of the battle for France; not even the major western naval power was capable of attaining such a thing.

Also how many millions of troops and civilians did the Kriegsmarine evacuated during 1944/45 to save them from the advancing red army?

Now i go to another piece of jewelry from you Hop: Crete was not a Royal Navy defeat because they ensured the small German naval force that would land troops was intercepted? This is a delicacy.

Well, Crete was conquered, and the Royal Navy had to flee the surrounding waters leaving 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers with some 2,400 seamen dead behind, not fogetting a large number of badly damaged units which also took part in the action.

By that time the war was more than in progress, so no "surprise" factor can be claimed. If the Royal Navy was so powerful, why didn´t they have the sufficient carriers in the area to ensure proper aerial cover of their ships in the waters around Crete? Possibly because they were pretty much uncapable of doing it.

Crete occurred when the war had almost entered its 2nd year of bloody combat; do you see the Japanese conducting a similar type of attack against some island in the Pacific by late 1943, where the U.S. Navy would not have had a sufficient number of carriers in the area to ensure the Japanese fighters and bombers must first be engaged in fierce air combat? 100% unlikely.

Just a little difference between the Royal Navy and the US Navy for you to have some extra-entertainment.


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## plan_D (Apr 2, 2007)

Udet,

The Crete invasion saw the Royal Navy face off against the Luftwaffe. In the circumstances the Royal Navy managed to stop any seaborne invasion of the island and evacuate 15,000 men. 
While the Royal Navy is considered defeated at Crete, the fact remains that the Royal Navy held onto the Med throughout the entirety of the war. Which was its point of existance in the theatre. Which is a victory in naval terms. 

Your mention of the IJN vs. USN is quite confusing. Had Great Britain wanted to give the Luftwaffe a meeting in the air, surely they would have kept the fighters on the island of Crete rather than use aircraft carriers? 

By the way, HMS _Formidable_ was in the area. But the Royal Navy were aiming to stop seaborne invasion and evacuate troops. 

Tell me, if the United States Navy were in the Med...do you think they'd have used carriers? No, you'd use the island bases to send up fighters. But Britain practically abandoned the island.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 2, 2007)

Hop said:


> Let's face it, by the end of 1941 the British had sunk a much larger proportion of the rather small German fleet. What was left in 1942 and later spent the rest of the war hiding in port.



It fails to account though for the loss of the HMS Edinburgh, sunk by German destroyers, the loss of the Scharnhorst on it's operative sortie against North Sea convoys, the actions of the Prinz Eugen after 1941, battle of the Barents Sea involving Admiral Hipper and Lutzow in the end of 1942, Admiral Scheer also engaged in the North Sea and the Baltic etc.

You simply live in an alternate reality appearantly.



> Whilst the Germans might have sunk 3 British capital ships by the end of 1941 (out of the 15 Britain started the war with), the RN had sunk 4 German and Italian capital ships, out of the 9 they started the war with.



Well let's see those 3 capital ships sunk :

Royal Oak, sunk 1939. 
Courageous, sunk 1939.
Glorious, sunk 1940.
Hood, sunk 1941.
Barham, sunk 1941.
Ark Royal, sunk 1941.
Queen Elizabeth, sunk 1941.
Valiant, sunk 1941.
Prince of Wales, sunk 1941.
Repulse, sunk 1941.

More like 8, 10 if we count the IJ efforts, as you were kindly including Italian losses, why not apply the same here..

And what '4 German and Italian capitol ships' were sunk by the end of 1941? Bismarck, for one, at the cost of the Hood and the fiasco at Crete and the loss of 20 000+ troops as half of the Royal Navy was sent against Bismarck (a single ship...  ). A single German capital ship lost so far.

The Italians? The British managed to sink the old WW1 Battleship Conte di Cavour at Taranto, but even that one was raised before the end of the year and sent to repairs and refit. A mere week later the Italians came out slightly on top at Cape Teulada in naval combat. A month later the Italians sank _two_ older British Battleships on their anchor in Alexandria in return.

So that's 8 (or 10) Royal Navy capitol ships lost in exhange for 1 German, 1 Italian (temporary loss). Hardly something to boast about.



> Yes, they had a tradition of hiding their major ships in port in WW1 as well



Well, on the other hand the British had the tradition of loosing their major ships in their ports and at the sea - amazing the Germans could achieve that while hiding in their ports ! 8) 

Skagerrak still hurts, I guess.  Thinking of it, just about every naval engagement between the Germans and the British, if between roughly equal forces, was won by the Imperial navy or the Kriegsmarine, and Britain lost some 30 million GRT of it's merchant shipping in the two wars. I wonder where and why the Nelsonian spirit disappeared by WW1.



> You can get a measure of just how much time they spent hiding in port by looking at the fates of the German capital ships. Of the 4, two were lost at sea (both sunk by the RN), two in harbour (both by the RAF).



Well, which two German capital ships were sunk in port, can you name them? 



> The RN started the war with 15 battleships and battlecruisers. They ended it with 15. They started with 7 carriers, and ended with 55, 66 cruisers and ended with 67, 184 destroyers and ended with 308, 60 submarines and ended with 162.



I wonder why they built so many submarines, if they did nothing through the war.



> Actually none of these is a defeat for the RN. At Dunkirk they evacuated far more men than anyone thought possible.



They lost well over 250 ships in the proccess, though, and some 10 000 men drowned at the sea. To what? A meager number of LW attacks, while both the LW and the Heer was concentrating on the French, while the British fled as fast as they could. 

It's difficult to sea *a rout* than anything else it was, anyway.



> In Norway they did enough damage to the Kreigsmarine to cripple it for the rest of the war, and to ensure that Sea Lion was an impossibility.



While still loosing. Pity that the RN's job was not to make harder for the Germans _to invade Britiain_. It was to prevent the Germans from successfully landing in Norway, and to ensure the British invasion of Norway. We all know the results - they miserably failed on both objectives, despite having a far larger force at sea, whereas the small KM detachments successfully completed their landings almost everywhere, and sunk an aircraft carrier and a couple of smaller RN vessels on the top of that.

As for crippling KM for the rest of the war, laughable, they lost a couple of destroyers to the British and a light cruiser as I recall, about as many the British lost to the KM, plus a carrier of course - hardly a crippling loss.



> In Crete they stopped _any_ German seaborne forces reaching the island, and evacuated the allied troops at the end.



Garrison of Crete :

United Kingdom:
15,000
Greece:
11,000
Australia:
7,100
New Zealand:
6,700
Total:
40,000

Casualties
Official British figures:
3,500 dead
1,900 wounded
12,000 captured
5,255 Greek Captured

Hmmm... According to Hop, Crete was a successfull evacuation by the Royal Navy : Out of a defending force of 40 000, 22 655 troops were lost, *17 255 men captured was stranded on the island.* Beaten by half the force of paratroopers btw.

76% of the losses occured because the RN failed to evacuate them - the LW prevented them doing so, and with meager forces : only 280 bombers, 150 dive bombers, 180 fighters were employed, ie. about 1/4 of the bomers, and half of the dive bombers employed in BoB, under a much shorter time. In less than week, the LW destroyed three cruisers (Gloucester, Fiji and Calcutta) and six destroyers (Kelly, Greyhound, Kashmir, Hereward, Imperial and Juno). Seven other ships were damaged, including the battleships Warspite and Valiant, and the cruiser Orion. The RN fled to Alexandria as quickly it could, leaving most of the troops behind.


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## renrich (Apr 2, 2007)

The sinking of the Queen Elisabeth and the Valiant will I am sure come as a surprise to the crew of those ships that are still alive as well as to the Admiralty since they were not sunk.


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## Civettone (Apr 2, 2007)

Hop said:


> Go on then. I have posted the summaries from Wood and Dempster. Certainly there were some attacks on land targets in July, but shipping strikes predominated.


From Battle of Britain Diary of Events 1940, here's a summary of the first days. The following days show the same thing but it takes too long for me to summarize the entire month. 
_10. The main attacks concentrated on shipping ... Later in the day enemy raids took place along the West, South and East coasts with the largest being nearly 70 bombers attacking Falmouth Swansea.
11. Between 0600hrs 0900hrs small raids were reported. 1100hrs a large raid, of 50 plus Ju87's Me110's, to attack Portland and a convoy off the coast. Later that day, 1745hrs, a raid, consisting of He111's and Me110's, attacked bombed Portsmouth. After 2100hrs raids were reported and bombs were dropped in South Wales, Somerset, Bristol, Portland, Dorchester, Plymouth, Hull, Ipswich, Harrogate, Doncaster, Colchester and Harwich areas.
12. raids reported in the Portland area and off East coast. The largest raid, Do17's He111's approached convoy leaving Thames Estuary. ... around 1640hrs when bombs were dropped on Weymouth, Falmouth and St. Eval. ... an attack off the Essex coast on a trawler.
13. two small raids approach the South Coast ... 50 enemy aircraft are sighted off Portland ... by Ju87's, as the convoy passed through the Dover Straits ... Dover Harbour was attacked at 1730hrs by Ju87's ... another raid of about 20 aircraft, at 1800hrs 15 miles off Dover.
During the night mines were dropped 
14. Activity during the morning was low with a few raids reported near Poole, Swanage, Dungeness and Lands End. The action increased into the afternoon with an attack over Dover around 1500hrs and a large attack by Ju87's and Me109's on a convoy off Eastbourne. Mines dropped.
15. Once again bad weather hampered the German offensive with a few small raids reported during the morning on Brighton, the Cardiff area and off the Norfolk coast. The afternoon saw raids over Liverpool, Drem in Scotland, St. Athan in Wales, a convoy off the Norfolk coast, the Westland Aircraft factory near Yeovil was bombed and railway lines near Avonmouth. 15 Do17's made one of the largest raids of the day over the Thames Estuary at about 1415hrs. Mines dropped._

And so on and on... 
Attacks were both on inland targets as on coastal targets. And if they attacked naval targets, these targets were along the English coast. 

And as I pointed out earlier, if the Germans did actually invade, they are going to have a lot of targets on land, unless they abandon the army to it's fate.




> ER Hooton gives the German sortie numbers. For 1st July - 8th August they are 1150 daylight bomber sorties, 3350 fighter sorties.


Is this was you base your comment that _Historically, the Germans found that 3 fighters per bomber was the minimum escort force needed. _ on? 




> Coordinating 1000 bombers in attacks on small numbers of warships.


So now you're essentially saying the Germans have too many bombers to succesfully attack the Royal Navy? 
What's next? There were too many seagulls in the sky?




> Pretty much. AA defences on destroyers and small craft increased hugely as the war progressed.


Any naval expert will tell you that the weakest element of British ships was their weak AA. Until they learned from the US Navy how it should be, the Royal Navy thought its destroyers could get by with 40° or 50° guns; later, a fit of frenzied magnanimity gave rise to 55° elevation. This official contentment with low-angle DD guns evolved within the context of prewar fleet AA doctrine, a pleasant but impractical notion in which destroyers needed only to account for torpedo planes and other low-altitude aircraft while the high-angle guns of heavier ships delat with targets overhead. 
46 out of 120 British destroyers lost were caused by air attack.




> Docks tend to cluster together. A ship takes up a very small part of most docks.












> The larger freighters will take literally days to unload.


What's your source? 
I've got one for you: Feldgrau.net :: View topic - German Navy's Aircraft Carrier
_in one exercise a merchant was unloaded on to the beach through 24 barge sortie in 14 hours and averaged about 40 tons per load _




> From the War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command, 19th September, translated by Klee for the USAF:






> Disembarking troops will take a few hours from powered barges, quite a few hours from unpowered craft.
> Unloading tanks, trucks, artillery, ammunition etc will take days.


What is this based on? Why does it take hours for troops to get of their barge? 
Why does it take days for a tank to get of a barge?? Days for a tank???



> The RN operated cruisers and destroyers in the channel throughout the BoB.


Where were they during the Channel Dash which received top priority from Churchill? 



> You'd be surprised. When you are in a boat and you think there are hostile aircraft, you shoot at anything that flies. When you are in an aircraft looking for enemy warships, anything that floats is your target.


So that means there's just as much chance of the British shooting down their own Spitfires? And their cruisers start sinking their own trawlers? 
I think you're really looking for arguments just to make one. And if you can't find one, you just repeat your old ones.

Kris


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## renrich (Apr 2, 2007)

Civettone, Not a problem with your brief reply. Appreciate all the effort you put in to your discourse. My point about the High Sea's Fleet in WW1 was that in only one major engagement, Coronel, did the Kaiser's ships come out the victor. In the rest of the engagements they wound up in retreat.


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## Glider (Apr 2, 2007)

I sense the temperature rising in some areas. To be objective can I observe that the Queen Elizabeth and Valient were sunk leaving the Med almost defensless, but they were fairly easily repaired. The important thing was that Germany and Italy didn't know this or if they did, totally failed to make anything of the oppertunity.

Not a lot of credit to either side apart from the Italians who carried out the attack showing considerable skill and courage.

Re Norway
Germany lost the 
Heavy Cruiser Blucher one of only three in the Fleet
Light Cruiser Konigsberg one of only five in the fleet
10 destroyers Z2, Z9, Z11, Z12, Z13, Z17, Z18, Z19, Z21 and Z22 out of 20 destroyers in the fleet. Two Z1 and Z3 had already been sunk by the German airforce in error off Borkum on 22/2/40.
In addition the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had met the unescorted Renown at sea and run away receiving damage. 

There can be little doubt that this was a crippling loss to Germany. No one, is going to invade anyone, let alone Britain, with only ten destroyers.


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## Civettone (Apr 2, 2007)

Final word on the British fighters:
In 1942 272 German day fighters were lost for (from all causes) for 574 RAF day fighters destroyed.




> The sinking of the Queen Elisabeth and the Valiant will I am sure come as a surprise to the crew of those ships that are still alive as well as to the Admiralty since they were not sunk.


They were sunk. They were raised afterwards.




> Appreciate all the effort you put in to your discourse.


That means a lot to me. Thank you, Renrich! 
Kris


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## Kurfürst (Apr 2, 2007)

A few comments :

The Destroyers were replaced - since most of them lost at Narwik, that new class become the 'Narwik' class of destroyers - 8 of these were commissioned by the end of 1941 the replace the lost ones, 3 of these before the calander turned 1941, followed by 7 of the Type 36A(Mob) class and 3 Type 36B(Mob).

Blucher was one of the 6 Heavy Cruisers the Germans had. Graf Spee was lost already by that time, but all the others survived up to 1945. Blucher was lost the Norwegian shore defenses anyway.

As for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau..

a, Renown wasn't unescorted, it had _nine_ destroyer escorts
b, S's and G's mission/orders were to protect the own invasion force, and avoid engagement with major enemy units unless neccesary. They succeeded in their mission.
c, Superficial damage was sustained by G (one hit to a turret's optic, another to the radar), and it meant both could successfully operate in June 1940, with the known results - a British carrier and both of it's escort DDs sunk.


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## Udet (Apr 2, 2007)

plan_D said:


> Udet,
> 
> The Crete invasion saw the Royal Navy face off against the Luftwaffe. In the circumstances the Royal Navy managed to stop any seaborne invasion of the island and evacuate 15,000 men.
> While the Royal Navy is considered defeated at Crete, the fact remains that the Royal Navy held onto the Med throughout the entirety of the war. Which was its point of existance in the theatre. Which is a victory in naval terms.
> ...



Plan_D:

I insist, British seamanship is akcnowledged; that they managed to evacuate part of the troops that were on Crete is remarkable for sure if we see the circumstances of the engagements. Also i am not suggesting anything like the Royal Navy got kicked out of the Mediterranean.

Rather what i am trying to remark here is the fact a nation that by the time was still considered a major naval power, failed to provide their warships with sufficient and proper aerial cover during a very important battle. This should be significant. If they had a doctrine regarding naval operations, how come the Royal Navy units operated around the island with almost zero aerial cover? Non-existant coordination between naval and ground based forces? Should not this element be part of the "doctrine" in the manual of a naval power?

If battle action occurs on an island, therefore, naval means are most likely to be involved.

The Royal Navy surely was around Crete to deal with whatever naval menace the axis could bring forward to the battle, and i can accept they fared well -not that great though, as commented by Civettone- in that department, but again, see what my point is: there are people here trying to ridicule any idea which might suggest the Kriegsmarine was capable of mounting succesful and professional operations, insisting on the idea the Royal Navy had a "doctrine" on amphibious operations as well as in any other department involving naval action, something that according to them the Germans lacked.

Again, all the experience and doctrine regarding naval warfare did not show up too brilliantly around Crete; Hop says the Royal Navy saw the end of the war with more carriers in service than there were at the beginning of the war. 

I know HMS Formidable was there, but what were the results? Where were the rest of the carriers while the Royal Navy was getting slammed by the Luftwaffe around Crete? 

Does not anyone believe it is one the duties of carriers to ensure proper aerial cover to their own fleet while conducting operations? Or what was the purpose of having HMS Formidable around the island?

I refuse to believe the Royal Navy was brought forward to a battle zone where the enemy had strong aerial forces committed knowing there would be almost zero aerial cover. Smells like Kamikaze, and Britain did never operate like that.

Finally, i brought up the IJN-US Navy to the discussion to give an example of what a highly competitive navy can be. After almost 2 years in the PTO, wherever the IJN and US NAVY clashed it became increasingly nasty to the Japs. The US Navy had learned, but not just that, their performance showed critical improvements: wherever the met after two years of war the Navy attained adequate and sufficient presence to given them a very unpleasant time. We can not tell the same in the case of the Royal Navy after almost 2 years of fight in the Atlantic/Channel/Mediterranean.

I am not sure how the US Navy would have operated a carrier force in the Mediterranean though, but what is it that you mean? That there was no purpose in deploying carriers in the Med or what?


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## Civettone (Apr 2, 2007)

This discussion is going so fast it's difficult to keep up. I'm not going to reply to everything, only the stuff directed to me. I like to see my bed before sunrise 



> The "Channel Dash" was the Kriegsmarine running away from the Royal Navy. It cannot be considered a fleet action because there was no actual conflict between opposing fleets.


Sure it was. Two fleets shot at eachother. It was a conflict between opposing fleets. 



> Had the Home Fleet caught that convoy then it would have been destroyed, or at least put out of action.


Had the Home Fleet been used for this then they could no longer have guarded the North Sea. 
U-boats would also have liked to see Royal Navy presence diminished in this area.



> You cannot just land troops then abandon them. There'd need to be logistical support and the Kriegsmarine would need to give artillery support, so it cannot leave.


Let me guess? The allies did so, so the Germans must do the same.
Can't you understand that the German invasion forces are the bait? Open your mind and see what would have happened to the Royal Navy.



> Kris, the first invasion fleet was destroyed. The Luftwaffe had not been able to prevent this, proving that air power alone cannot halt a navy.


That's not proving it. What do you call Midway then? 

The Feldgrau site gives a more accurate view on Crete. (The Invasion and Battle for Crete)

_Seaborne Invasion (20-22 May)

During the night of May 20-21, a British light naval force broke through the German aerial blockade and searched the waters north of Crete. Admiral Schuster thereupon decided to call back to Milos the first naval convoy, which was approaching Crete under escort of an Italian destroyer. At dawn on May 21, German planes sighted the British ships and subjected them to heavy air attacks. One destroyer was sunk and two cruisers damaged. At 09:00 the waters north of Crete were cleared of enemy ships and the convoy was ordered to continue its voyage in the direction of Maleme. During the day German dive bombers based on Skarpanto and Italian planes flying from Rhodes scored several hits on British ships returning to Crete waters, thereby preventing them from intercepting the Axis convoy. The German troops on the island were anxiously awaiting the arrival of artillery, antitank guns, and supplies, but poor weather conditions so delayed the convoy that it could not reach the island before darkness.

When it finally came around Cape Spatha at 23:00, a British naval task force suddenly confronted the convoy, which was on the way to Suda Bay to land reinforcements and supplies. The British immobilized the Italian escort vessel and sank most of the motor sailers and freighters. Many German soldiers, most of them mountain troops, were drowned. Sea rescue planes, however, picked up the majority of the shipwrecked. The second convoy, which had meanwhile reached Milos, was recalled to Piraeus to save it from a similar fate. No further seaborne landings were attempted until the fate of Crete had been decided.

*On the morning of 22 May, VIII Air Corps started an all-out attack on the British fleet, which was forced to withdraw from the Aegean after suffering heavy losses. The battle between the Luftwaffe and the British Navy ended in the victory of German air power*, which from then on dominated the air and waters north of Crete. _




> the point made is the Luftwaffe alone could not keep the Royal Navy from attacking the invasion convoys.


Point taken but it's your point. My point is that the Luftwaffe defeated the Royal Navy as shown by the Feldgrau article.




> If the Kriegsmarine operates in the Channel, then its Battlecruisers become targets for the coastal guns, Bomber Command and Coastal Command.


No, German battlecruisers would head out for the Ocean. We can debate about this but I don't think it's a fact that the British won't use their BBs to give chase. A fleet of three German BCs and a bunch of submarine Wolfbacks could destroy every convoy it desired. What's the point in defeating the invasion and losing the biggest part of your Navy when it means you'll lose the Battle of the Atlantic? 



> Just as much as I believe if the Germans would have been able to protect their entrance routes and supply columns, they would have been able to defeat or at least suppress the Allies much longer.


Fascinating.  

Kris


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## syscom3 (Apr 2, 2007)

> Any naval expert will tell you that the weakest element of British ships was their weak AA. Until they learned from the US Navy how it should be, the Royal Navy thought its destroyers could get by with 40° or 50° guns; later, a fit of frenzied magnanimity gave rise to 55° elevation. This official contentment with low-angle DD guns evolved within the context of prewar fleet AA doctrine, a pleasant but impractical notion in which destroyers needed only to account for torpedo planes and other low-altitude aircraft while the high-angle guns of heavier ships delat with targets overhead.
> 46 out of 120 British destroyers lost were caused by air attack.



And the German AAA was even worse. 




> Feldgrau.net :: View topic - German Navy's Aircraft Carrier
> _in one exercise a merchant was unloaded on to the beach through 24 barge sortie in 14 hours and averaged about 40 tons per load _



14 hours? heheheheheh. 14 hours at anchor being a sitting duck.

I asked my neighbor ( he served on an LST in the pacific) next door awhile ago on how long it took to unload his ship, and he replied.... less than 1 hour depending on how critical the time element was. He saw training films where the LST's could be unloaded in a HURRY if they had to.



> What is this based on? Why does it take hours for troops to get of their barge?
> Why does it take days for a tank to get of a barge?? Days for a tank???



Tjhat does sound rather long, but the point is without a port to unload, it takes a long time if the barge has to unload off shore onto lighters.



> Where were they during the Channel Dash which received top priority from Churchill?



Why do people keep bringing up the channel dash for? it was a KM sortie to get their ships from one port to another as fast as possible. A channel invasion would mean they would have to stick around and await their inevitable fate.... being disabled and out of action, or sunk.


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## renrich (Apr 2, 2007)

I have consulted my copy of "Janes" 1944-45 and "British and Dominion Warships" WW2 and neither of them show Valiant or QE sunk. May we compromise and call them heavily damaged and repaired?


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## Civettone (Apr 2, 2007)

Hi David. I'm going to rush through things. From what year is "Burning Blue"? And what does the title refer to?




> I realise this, but the area covered is hundreds of times larger and the resources are going to be thin, very thin even with 5 times the aircraft. You yourself said that to keep one unit overhead on a CAP requires 5 in total, I was allowing for a surge due to the invasion.


Spot on! Germans will have to be using CAPs on the first day but if the Channel Dash was an indication, the British were easily taken by surprise and not very well organized. That makes me conclude that on the first day the British won't be able to muster all their aircraft. 
From the second day onwards the German fighters will mainly be used to escort the bombers, so no more CAP. (Except for the 250 or so over the beaches). I am thinking about the possibility of forward escorting though. As the Royal Navy would place itself in firing range of the beaches, the German bombers would attack them and the German fighters in their forward escorting style as favoured by Galland would in effect be flying over the beaches. This is not wishful thinking from my point - well that too - but it's the only way it could have gone down.
In any case - given the fact that the British lost twice as many fighters as the Germans in 1942 - I think the Germans would have been able to seriously reduce the threat of the RAF. I also said before, that 1/3 of the barges were expendable (of course after delivering their loads). I don't think this is such a wild assumption. 



> The RAF in May 42 had 42 squadrons of Spits (Squadrons of the RAF)


Are you sure? I think they had more of them (over 60 in August) though I could be mistaken. Unless you mean 42 in Britain alone? 



> Remember these numbers exclude the RCAF who were in the UK at the time.


Ok. How many RCAF squadrons were there by 1942?




> With what?, the BC’s are in the Atlantic and you have a handful of cruisers and destroyers. The RN has KGV’s, Nelsons, Queen Elizabeth class, numerous cruisers and compared to the Germans, almost unlimited numbers of destroyers.


Please David, I already explained this more than 5 times. The KM would protect and support the invasion of the first day after which it would retreat. As such it will only have to fight the forces which are already in the Channel. The bulk of the Royal Navy was at least a day away from the Channel. 


> Torpedo’s would be a waste but the MTB’s would use them.


German E-boats were far superior to the British MTBs.



> Then Germany lose, big time. The key to an invasion, any invasion, is that you build up your forces faster than the enemy.
> If the defender wins the race, the Invasion forces are trapped and unable to move against dug in defenders with support.


I agree.
But let's take Anzio as an example again. The allies failed to exploit their numerical advantage and soon they were up against an enemy as strong as they were. They were hard pressed to hold on but they did, for months! I'm only asking the Germans to hold on for two-three days. And in the end ... the Allied army broke through the German lines and conquered central Italy within weeks.



> It gives the RAF an additional 10 squadrons of Hurricanes, 3 of Spitfires and 4 of Kittyhawks. You now have 31 squadrons of GA planes causing hell while your CAP is close to zero. The German army is going to love you.


I don't think the German army is going to love me anyhow as I plan on using them as a bait for two-three days.  
In any case, German AF was capable of holding off the CW AF in North Africa, so I think moving both forces to the Channel will result in the same stalemate. 

Quote



> I have done more digging and the Germans had a class of Motor Minesweepers called R Boats and these are small naval vessels designed for the job and more likely to have been the cause of the difference. Basically these were the size of an S boat but slower and used for a number of roles including minelaying and escort.
> The British equivalent was the Fairmile B, and both were considered as part of coastal forces by the German and British navies.


So these German boats couldn't have been used along the English coast during the invasion?




> Also the first 1000 bomber raid was in 1942 so the 350 assumption is also way down on what would have been possible.


No, it's not. I told you that Bomber Command had less than 500 bombers available in the middle of 1942. The 1000 bomber raids were a result of saving of bombers and use them once every month. So sure, you could use 1000 bombers once. Normal availability however was less than 500. 
And again, the British bombers would suffer the heaviest night time losses ever, with 300 German night fighters knowing exactly where to find them! 




> Sorry but I never said the allies were outnumbered. My whole point has been that the Allies had the greater numbers but couldn’t get off the beach as the area was under artillery fire and to small to manoeuvre in. Please point out where I made this statement and I will change it.


My sincere apologies David, I must have been confused or tired when I wrote this... You said the Germans were outnumbered and I wanted to refer to that but then I remembered it as you saying the Allies were outnumbered ... Where's that rock to crawl under? 




> German losses on raids at night over Britain were alarming as a percentage of the planes involved which backs up the scenario.


Losses on the German bombers was high but not on German night fighters, and that's what I was talking about!

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 2, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> And the German AAA was even worse.


That's not the point. I was talking about the Royal Navy getting attacked by over a 1000 bombers. 



> Tjhat does sound rather long


That's my point. 




> Why do people keep bringing up the channel dash for?


 Because it shows the inability of British naval forces and air force. The powerful Royal Navy can't stop a small German fleet crossing its backyard. Something which hadn't happened since the 17th Century. 
The British used 700 aircraft and only a fraction was able to find those ships. No hits were recorded. 
This around the same time 'my' invasion fleet is going to be ripped apart by the invincible Royal Navy and Royal Air Farce. 




> May we compromise and call them heavily damaged and repaired?


Ok because the HMS QE, _She was mined and sunk by an Italian human torpedo attack on 18 December 1941 in shallow water in the harbour at Alexandria, Egypt. Although low in the water, her decks were clear and the Italian crews were captured. She was able to maintain the illusion of full operational status, concealing the weak British position in the Mediterranean, until raised and patched up for the journey to the United States Navy Yard in Norfolk, Virginia where she was repaired._

Kris


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## pbfoot (Apr 2, 2007)

I'm shocked at what Canada had in 41 in the UK 2sqn x p40 
3 x hurricane
4 x spit
3 x Beaufighter

And 1 each of Wellington,hudson, Manchester, Catalina ,Beaufort, Boston. hUDSON.


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## Civettone (Apr 2, 2007)

Well, I suppose every little bit helps. I did another try at looking it up and this is what I found:
_The first unit formed overseas was No. 403 Fighter in March 1941. Seventeen more squadrons were formed in 1941, ten in 1942, four in 1943, and nine in 1944, so that by the end of the war the number of squadrons in the overseas 400 series had grown to 44_
It still doesn't say how many of these overseas squadrons were based in Britain... 

And this is also interesting:
_During this war, however, Canada would still not control its own squadrons, which did not have majority Canadian ground crews. Eight Canadian fighter squadrons were involved in the air battle over Dieppe on 19 August 1942 - which was virtually separate from what was taking place on the ground - without even the support or knowledge of the senior Canadian air force officers posted to Britain. It is often forgotten that the RAF used the Dieppe raid to provoke the biggest air battle over the European continent. Although aircraft losses were two to one in Germany's favour, the Germans could no longer manage to build as many planes as they were losing, whereas the Allies could easily make up their losses._

PBfoot, as you're Canadian, I have an off-topic question which you might be able to answer. Did the Canadians have to buy their British built aircraft (before they could build their own) or were they handed over to them? And what about the RAAF and SAAF?


I also wanted to comment on Britain increasing its aircraft production as a result of the German invasion plans. I have my doubts about this. First, like in 1940 aircraft production was limited by the number of pilots available. The crisis of 1940 was over, and thousands were in training in Canada and the rest of the CW. But the British had increased training hours so the output was still limited. If they would have increased aircraft production in 1942, they would have had to limit training hours as more pilots would have been needed immediately. 

On the other hand, they wouldn't have had to increase production. Simply stopping deliveries to the Russians would have freed up hundreds of aircraft. Unfortunately these were mainly second-rate aircraft (Kittyhawks, Airacobras, Hurricane Is).

Kris


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## pbfoot (Apr 2, 2007)

All the 400 series squadrons were overseas 413 was in Ceylon and 417 was in North Africa the rest in the UK


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## Civettone (Apr 2, 2007)

Are you able to answer my question on the "buying" of British aircraft? 
I know that the Belgians were able to buy their British built weapons but that's not CW...

Kris


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## plan_D (Apr 3, 2007)

Udet;

I believe that Crete was abandoned by Great Britain in 1941; Malta was the island to keep. And Germany made the mistake of using its efforts against Crete instead of Malta at that time. 

You're right, air support should have been provided for the fleet but in all fairness to the Royal Navy, at the initial stages it wasn't the full fleet. Only CLs and DDs were sent to stop the seaborne invasion, there was no need to risk the larger vessels. 

While this was not mentioned by you, it's always funny when people forget to mention the airforce when talking of the invasion of Crete. How the Germans took the islands with half the troops; without talking of the fact that the island had no aerial defence, and the Luftwaffe were smashing it to pieces. 

I will admit, right now, that the Royal Navy was over-stretched in World War II. I believe the USN in the same situation would have found itself over-stretched, but would have performed better. 

The major problem, in my opinion, with the Royal Navy was not the ships themselves. Nor the usage of the ships, but the FAA. If the carriers of the Royal Navy had the likes of the Wildcat, Hellcat and Corsairs onboard in Europe then the fleet carriers would have been able to provide good air cover. 

I don't think there was a need to operate carriers in the Med continually like the Royal Navy did. The Med is a small sea and I believe the British should have used airfields on Malta, Gibraltar and in North Africa as their air cover and the CVs should have been used in the Atlantic, North Sea and even the Indian Ocean. 

Kris;

_"Sure it was. Two fleets shot at eachother. It was a conflict between opposing fleets."_

No fleets fired on each other during the Channel Dash. The RAF attempted to bomb the convoy, and an MTB squadron attacked but that was it. 

_"Had the Home Fleet been used for this then they could no longer have guarded the North Sea. 
U-boats would also have liked to see Royal Navy presence diminished in this area._

The Royal Navy would not have to use the entire Home Fleet as Force H could be used from Gibraltar. The North Sea could be maintained to some degree by Coastal Command. 

_"Point taken but it's your point. My point is that the Luftwaffe defeated the Royal Navy as shown by the Feldgrau article."_

I've read the Feldgrau article, try reading others. The fact remains that the Royal Navy halted the seaborne invasion with only DDs and CLs under intense Luftwaffe bombardment. In the Channel there were DDs and CLs which would be ready to attack any seaborne invasion on the coast. If the Luftwaffe couldn't stop them at Crete, where's the evidence that they'll stop them in the Channel?

_"No, German battlecruisers would head out for the Ocean. We can debate about this but I don't think it's a fact that the British won't use their BBs to give chase. A fleet of three German BCs and a bunch of submarine Wolfbacks could destroy every convoy it desired. What's the point in defeating the invasion and losing the biggest part of your Navy when it means you'll lose the Battle of the Atlantic?"_

What exactly do you hope to defend this invasion fleet with, the Luftwaffe alone? 

_"Let me guess? The allies did so, so the Germans must do the same.
Can't you understand that the German invasion forces are the bait? Open your mind and see what would have happened to the Royal Navy."_

First off, the German High Command would not agree to this suicidal act. More importantly, however, you aim to send a force across to the British Isles as a diversion to draw the Royal Navy in to be destroyed by the Luftwaffe. 

Great Britain had already broken the German codes by then, they would be fully aware of your intention. As the U-boats and Battlecruisers of the Kriegsmarine are not going to protect the invasion fleet, then the Royal Navy would not need to use the Home Fleet as a defence force. The reserve CLs and DDs in the Channel would be enough to wash away the invasion forces, even under heavy bombardment from the Luftwaffe. The losses to the Royal Navy would be heavy, I agree, but they'd come out to meet the movements of Germany. 

If you plan on moving those Battlecruisers through the North Sea, the Home Fleet would aim to repeat the chase of the Bismarck. Meanwhile, the forces in the Channel are dealing with the unescorted invasion fleet. And the RAF continues the attacks on any German fighters overhead. 
In reality, the Germans lost less than the RAF in 1942 simply because the RAF was operating more over France. But in your invasion attempt it would be back to the Battle of Britain, the RAF would be operating in its best area - home. The home side always has the advantage if numbers are equal, or even when not.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

Udet said:


> Hop says the Royal Navy saw the end of the war with more carriers in service than there were at the beginning of the war.



That's a _Hoppian_ - he probably counts the escort carriers the same as fleet carriers. Most of these were small sized vessels with limited capability, usually built by the USA and lend-leased to Britiain, or a few were converted from small merchant ships into 'carriers'. Ie. one of these :

"HMS Miralda was a merchant aircraft carrier (MAC) of the Royal Navy. She was originally a tanker of the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company (later Royal Dutch/Shell) launched in 1936. She was purchased by the Royal Navy in 1943, entered service as a MAC in January 1944, and served in World War II.

She displaced 8,000 tons."

Not quite the same as a true fleet carrier.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

plan_D said:


> Great Britain had already broken the German codes by then, they would be fully aware of your intention.



I fear that's a bit of wishful thinking or at least a logical flaw - first of all there was no such thing as 'German code'. Different brances of the Army, Navy, subs all used different, and these were periodically changed. The British could only attempt to break what they actually intercepted, this rules out information via land lines or liason officers which would be the rule. 

A good illustration of how much German naval code was 'broken' is the outbreak of Bismarck or the channel dash - in neither case British intel could reveal the operation.


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## plan_D (Apr 3, 2007)

First of all, the term "German Codes" was a general term. It would really be a waste of my time to right, "We'd captured the Engima machine, and had the ULTRA team working 24 hours a day cracking each encoded message picked up from Germany". 

And a good indication of how well the ULTRA did was the sinking of the Bismarck. As the ULTRA team picked Admiral Lutjens message indicating he was short of fuel and heading for Brest. 

In fact, we seemed to know a lot of what the Germans were doing.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

This is my post form another board but I find the issue interesting, so I repost it:

the real problem for the Germans in 1940 was their lack of naval capacity. They had 2 big surface ships, the battlecruisers of the Scharnhorst class, both under repairs at the time and unavailable long with other big ships. They also lost 10 destroyers in Norway.

By 1942, their position would improve considerably. Th 2 battlecruisers were repaired, their crew had good experience, and while they lost Bismarck, Tirpitz was ready for operations. The destroyer losses were replaced as well by that time. The biggest change is the U-boots though. In 1940, there were about 50-60 around in service, many of these being small Type II coastal boats, and they were operating from North German bases. By mid 1942, there are over 350 U-boots in service, and they're operating from French bases nearby, and most of them are of the capable VII and IX classes. The relative strenght ratio was much better the KM than in 1940, though still vastly outnumbered. An idea of submarines forming a protective cordon is rather likely, though - with so many submarines available, you can place subs literally next to each other, dangerours waters indeed! I wonder about the Italian fleet, which had 3 good and modern Battleships at ready, plus a number of older WW1 battleships that were forming the bulk of the British battleship force. They would have to break through Gibraltar - this either means the British need to split their naval forces to reinforce Gibraltar to keep the Italians in the med, or let them join up with the Kriegsmarine, and form a very potent task force of 3 German, 3 Italian modern BBs, and 2 old Italan BBs plus support vessels - 8 available in total. The RN had 15 BBs a the start of the war, 3 new were commissioned (KGV, POW, DOY) up to 1942, 6 were lost. That's about 1.5 : 1 in battleships, same was the case at Jutland. Carriers don't play much of a role here, so near to the continent.

The Royal Navy having suffered considerable loss at that time, loosing the following capital units ;

Up the start of 1942, they lost :

Royal Oak, sunk by U-boot, 1939.
Courageous, sunk by U-boot, 1939.
Glorious, sunk Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, 1940.
Hood, sunk by Bismarsck 1941.
Barham, sunk by U-boot, 1941.
Ark Royal, sunk by U-boot, 1941.
Queen Elizabeth, sunk by Italian frogmen 1941.
Valiant, sunk by Italian frogmen 1941.
Prince of Wales, sunk by Japanese aircraft 1941.
Repulse, sunk by Japanese aircraft 1941.

They commissioned a new BB, Duke of York ever since 1940, while PoW sunk already. Anson and Howe was coming in the summer of 1940, though, but the British had commitments elsewhere, with capital ships simply being far away on the Indian ocean and elsewhere.

The naval scenario is very interesting, now that I look at it in detail.


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## pbfoot (Apr 3, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Are you able to answer my question on the "buying" of British aircraft?
> I know that the Belgians were able to buy their British built weapons but that's not CW...
> 
> Kris


 I'm 99.9% positive the aircraft were bought and maintained by canada , possibly in the early years the ground crew were Brit but later Canadian


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## Hop (Apr 3, 2007)

> And so on and on...
> Attacks were both on inland targets as on coastal targets. And if they attacked naval targets, these targets were along the English coast.



Of course there were scattered attacks on other targets. The point is, the bulk of operations were over the Channel. According to Hooton, 70% of all sorties in July were anti shipping attacks.

This argument seems a bit silly. If the Germans are going to invade Britain, the Luftwaffe are going to be carrying out operations over the British coast, more so than they did in July 1940.



> So now you're essentially saying the Germans have too many bombers to succesfully attack the Royal Navy?



No, I am pointing out you cannot attack small numbers of moving warships with 1000 bombers. 

Luckily for the Luftwaffe, of course, they had plenty of other targets that needed bombing, like RAF airfields, British roads and railways, coastal defences, etc.



> Any naval expert will tell you that the weakest element of British ships was their weak AA.



Certainly. It improved throughout the war, though. In particular, large numbers of 20mm guns were fitted in 1941 and early 1942, large number of 40mm in 1942.



> I've got one for you: Feldgrau.net :: View topic - German Navy's Aircraft Carrier
> in one exercise a merchant was unloaded on to the beach through 24 barge sortie in 14 hours and averaged about 40 tons per load



So in an exercise a single merchant ship, not under attack, managed to unload in 14 hours? And you think you can unload the 100 merchants the 1940 plan called for in the first wave in less than a day, whilst under attack?



> What is this based on? Why does it take hours for troops to get of their barge?



It's takes only minutes for troops to get out of _a_ barge. But when there are 1500 barges, which have to take turns running up on to the beach (and some have to be pushed), it takes hours for them all to take their turn.

And that's just for the troops to get off the barges. It will take longer to get the barges off the beach. Some will have turned broadside, others will be stuck until the next tide. 

And what do the troops do, just run up the beach? What about the mines (any beach suitable for landing on was heavily mined). What about the guns shooting at them from pill boxes?

Let's put it another way. Specialist landing craft can be unloaded even more quickly. Yet in Normandy, the allies were still landing over the beaches weeks later. 

The idea the invasion fleet can come and go in a day is preposterous.



> Why does it take days for a tank to get of a barge?? Days for a tank???



Days for _a_ tank? No. Days for _lots_ of tanks? Yes. And artillery, and ammunition, and all the other supplies an army needs.



> Where were they during the Channel Dash which received top priority from Churchill?



It didn't receive top priority. Why on earth should it have? If they had been coming down the channel from Germany to the French coast, it would certainly have been top priority, because the Atlantic convoy system would have been threatened.

But 3 German warships _retreating_ to Germany, where they could no longer threaten Britain, is hardly top priority. Especially when you consider the effort it would take them to break out again.

As Churchill wrote to Eisenhower:


> The naval position in home waters and the Atlantic has been definitely eased by the retreat of the German naval forces from Brest. From there they threatened all our Eastbound convoys, enforcing two battleship escorts. Their squadron could also move either on to the Atlantic trade routes or into the Mediterranean. We would far rather have it where it is than where it was. Our bomber effort, instead of being dispersed, can now be concentrated on Germany. Lastly, as you may have learnt, Prinz Eugen was damaged and both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were mined, the former twice. This will keep them out of mischief for at least six months, during which both our Navies will receive important accessions of strength. Naturally, we were very sorry we did not sink them, and an inquiry is being held as to why we did not know at daylight they were out.



Sinking them would have course been nice, but top priority for the RN was guarding against enemy attacks, not pursuing retreating enemies.



> So that means there's just as much chance of the British shooting down their own Spitfires?



Yes. 

The big advantage the British have is that they will be operating proper warships, not have thousands of seasick troops in barges blazing away at anything that moves. 

The best action for the British would be to fly their fighters as top cover, where they are largely out of the range of light AA. But dive bombers have to get lower, and when they do _everyone_ will be shooting at them.



> And their cruisers start sinking their own trawlers?



There's less chance of that because the navy usually has their recognition sorted quite well. There would almost certainly be collisions, though.



> I think you're really looking for arguments just to make one. And if you can't find one, you just repeat your old ones.



I'm trying to get you to understand some of the difficulties involved. It's not an exercise. It doesn't all go smoothly. In fact, almost nothing goes to plan. Everything takes longer than expected. 

In short, it's the real world.

You show a similar tendency to simply ignore realities you don't like by continuing to assume the events of the Channel dash, in early February storms, would play out again in summer. Not even recognising the difference between attacking barges in good weather and battleships in bad weather is simply ignoring reality.



> They were sunk. They were raised afterwards.



No, they were not sunk.

From The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean by Titterton and Brown:



> At 6:06 an explosion occurred on the port side of Valiant between A and B turrets. Flooding was confined to A magazine and shell room and some compartments between 29 and 52 bulkheads. There were no casualties. She was heavily down by the bow.
> <snip bit about QE repeated below>
> The Valiant's damage extended over about 80ft. She was taken in to the floating dock on the 21st, and it was estimated she would take 2 months to repair temporarily, and 3 more months to complete



As for the Queen Elizabeth:


> At 6:10 there was an explosion under Queen Elizabeth which immediately flooded A, B and X boiler rooms, many adjacent compartments and cut off all light and power. Two submarines were ordered alongside to provide power. She listed badly to starboard, but this was corrected by counter flooding.



Neither ship was sunk, in any sense of the word.

As to German destroyers, of the 22 completed by the end of Sept 1939, their fates were:

Sunk at Narvik: (Z2, Z9, Z11, Z12, Z13, Z17, Z18, Z19, Z21, Z22)

Sunk by the Luftwaffe: (Z1, Z3)

Of the 22 German modern German destroyers in existence up to Spring 1940, 12 had been lost.

By summer 1942, the Germans had added another 9 destroyers, but lost another 3 (Z7, Z8, Z26) taking their total to 16 destroyers. (note not all were operational at any one time, they had a terrible serviceability record)



> By 1942, their position would improve considerably. Th 2 battlecruisers were repaired, their crew had good experience, and while they lost Bismarck, Tirpitz was ready for operations.



Scharnhorst was damaged whilst in Brest in 1941. She was patched up, but not fully seaworthy, for the Channel dash. She hit two mines, went in to dry dock for repairs, and wasn't fully operational until the end of 1942. Certainly not fit for an invasion in 1942.

Gneisenau was hit by a torpedo in Brest, and wasn't fully seaworthy for the channel dash. She hit a mine returning to Germany. In February, whilst having that damage repaired, she was bombed, she never became operational again.

Neither of the battlecruisers was available for an invasion in 1942.



> The destroyer losses were replaced as well by that time.



22 at the start of the war, 16 by the summer of 1942.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

Hop said:


> No, they were not sunk. Neither ship was sunk, in any sense of the word.



Snippets and selective quoting. Both ships were mined and sunk in the harbor down until they hit the port's bottom and rested on it.

HMS QE class:

_"Queen Elizabeth missed Jutland, but took part in the Dardanelles Campaign in World War I. In World War II she* was mined and sunk by Italian frogmen at Alexandria in 1941. She was subsequently raised, *repaired, and served in the far east until 1945.

Valiant astonishingly received no hits at Jutland. In World War II, she took part in the destruction of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, and *was mined and sunk at Alexandria in 1941. She was subsequently raised,* repaired, and served in the far east until 1944."_

Why raise a ship that has not been sunk..?

I am still waiting for those 3 Italian BBs that were allegadly sunk by the British. Obviously Hop claims the ships at Taranto were all sink, the reality is that 2 took torpedo damage that was repaired, the 3rd one, the CdC sank on anchor like the QE and Valiant in Alexandria, raised within a month and sent to repair and refit. 



> As to German destroyers, of the 22 completed by the end of Sept 1939, their fates were:
> 
> Sunk at Narvik: (Z2, Z9, Z11, Z12, Z13, Z17, Z18, Z19, Z21, Z22)
> 
> Sunk by the Luftwaffe: (Z1, Z3)



Neither Z1 or Z3 was sunk by the LW, I wonder where you get your info from. 



> Of the 22 German modern German destroyers in existence up to Spring 1940, 12 had been lost.
> 
> By summer 1942, the Germans had added another 9 destroyers, but lost another 3 (Z7, Z8, Z26) taking their total to 16 destroyers.



More like 13 was added.

By summer 1942, Z23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37 was commissioned. 10 destroyers, one being lost (Z26). In addition, 3 Dutch, French and Greek destroyers were also put into service. There was a larger number of T class Frigates available, not just destroyers.



> (note not all were operational at any one time, they had a terrible serviceability record)



I don't think so - you have terrible record of making up things or exaggevating then.



> Scharnhorst was damaged whilst in Brest in 1941. She was patched up, but not fully seaworthy, for the Channel dash. She hit two mines, went in to dry dock for repairs, and wasn't fully operational until the end of 1942. Certainly not fit for an invasion in 1942.



A Hoppian - Scharhorst had finished it's repairds by July 1942 when it was tested. The rest of the year she spent working up and training - hardily unoperational if needed. It was simply in no rush.



> Gneisenau was hit by a torpedo in Brest, and wasn't fully seaworthy for the channel dash. She hit a mine returning to Germany. In February, whilst having that damage repaired, she was bombed, she never became operational again.



Somkescreen - Gneisenau was damaged by a bomb, and it was seen a proper time, as the ship is under repais anyway, to refit her with 15" guns. The fact that she did not become operational again was a decision (U-boots were doing the same job better and cheaper), rather than something neccesiates by the level of damage to her unarmored bow section. She could move on their own even in this condition.



> Neither of the battlecruisers was available for an invasion in 1942.



Scharnhorst definietely was. Gneisenaue may or may not have been repaired in time, remember, in this scenario the Germans need surface ships a lot and quick, in real history they didn't.




> 22 at the start of the war, 16 by the summer of 1942.



No, 22 at the start of the war, 19 by the summer of 1942.
16 were lost, 10 were built, 3 were captured and used.


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## Bernhart (Apr 3, 2007)

How long would it take to build up the invasion fleet? Or assemble the troops or weapons your needing to invade? I wouls assume it would take months? you can't keep such a build up quiet, so would think the allies would also start better preparing thier defenses, building more planes, moving ships airplanes closer. The Yanks would also probably build up thier forces. I don't remeber ever hearing the Germans training for sea born invasions at any grand scale either.


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## Hop (Apr 3, 2007)

> Your part regarding HMS Prince of Wales is entertaining: so you are suggesting sending a battleship that is not fully battle worthy to clash with Bismarck does not smell like the type of decision highly related to terrible management of naval affairs?



You fight a war with what you've got. The British had a lot of other commitments, they didn't have enough ships to go around. Who did?



> Knowing your fashion is that i can say you made a mistake in that last posting of yours: your words seem to agree with the notion Royal Navy losses and capabilities to cover all theathers were becoming nearly unbearable as early as in mid 1941.



Of course they were. They were fighting the Germans and Italians, and having to guard against the Japanese.

Britain had about half the population of Germany, about the same as Italy, and half that of Japan. If you think the RN was not strong enough, then what would you say about the German and Italian navies?



> Does not sound too powerful.



It was powerful enough to take on the largest power in Europe at the time, and their Italian allies, whilst still maintaining forces elsewhere in the world.

It might have been a stretch, but they still got the job done. PoW and Hood might not have sunk the Bismarck, but the RN did. And when you look at the outcome, the RN lost one of their old WW1 battlecruisers, the Germans lost their newest, most powerful battleship. Pretty fair trade, I'd say.



> So it is utterly ridiculous when you try to make fun of the German inabilty to assemble an invasion fleet right after the end of the battle for France; not even the major western naval power was capable of attaining such a thing.



Well, the British could have put together a much more convincing invasion fleet, but I agree it would still have been inadequate. Which should say something to those that think river barges and armed trawlers are all you need.



> By that time the war was more than in progress, so no "surprise" factor can be claimed. If the Royal Navy was so powerful, why didn´t they have the sufficient carriers in the area to ensure proper aerial cover of their ships in the waters around Crete?



I don't know anyone who's claiming the RN was all powerful, or even as powerful as they'd like to have been. But once again, the facts are the RN stopped any naval resupply of Crete, and took off the soldiers when the decision to evacuate was taken. The salient point for the proposed invasion of Britain is that the Luftwaffe did not manage to stop the RN doing their job. 



> Crete occurred when the war had almost entered its 2nd year of bloody combat; do you see the Japanese conducting a similar type of attack against some island in the Pacific by late 1943, where the U.S. Navy would not have had a sufficient number of carriers in the area to ensure the Japanese fighters and bombers must first be engaged in fierce air combat? 100% unlikely.



No, of course not. But then again, the US had twice the population of Japan, whereas Britain had half the population of Germany. Britain was always going to be on the back foot to begin with, fighting a much larger enemy that had begun preparing for war earlier.



> I wonder why they built so many submarines, if they did nothing through the war.



Actually, the RN submarine fleet was the second most successful in the war, in terms of tonnage sunk for boats lost, after the US. That's remarkable when you consider the Germans had the Atlantic to hunt in, for most of the war out of the range of land based aircraft, whereas the RN operated mainly in coastal waters and the Med, shallower and in range of land based aircraft.

Figures from Submarines of WW2, by Erminio Bagnasco:

Germany
1060 boats lost
14,333,082 tons sunk
2840 merchant ships sunk
150 warships sunk

*2.8 ships sunk per boat lost*
*13,521 tons sunk per boat lost*

Britain
75 boats lost
1,524,000 tons sunk
493 merchant ships sunk
169 warships sunk

*8.8 ships sunk per boat lost
20,320 tons per boat lost*



> Snippets and selective quoting. Both ships were mined and sunk in the harbor down until they hit the port's bottom and rested on it.



Um, no. Websites make notoriously poor resources. The book I quoted is one of the official histories of the RN.



> Neither Z1 or Z3 was sunk by the LW, I wonder where you get your info from.



German destroyers in WW2 by M J Whitley. 

What's certain is that Z1 was bombed by the Luftwaffe, and heavily damaged. She began firing her anti aircraft again a few seconds before two more explosions that sank her. 

Z3 was sunk shortly afterwards, although in their panic the the Germans were reporting multiple aircraft and submarines firing torpedoes.

The German court of inquiry concluded that both had been sunk by the Luftwaffe. However, British mines were in the area, and may have been responsible for sinking Z3.



> More like 13 was added.
> 
> By summer 1942, Z23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37 was commissioned. 10 destroyers, one being lost (Z26).



Z37 wasn't completed until mid July 1942. Working up will mean she's too late for the invasion.

Z26 might be the only one of the new batch lost, but Z7 and Z8 had also been lost. Result, 31 destroyers completed by that point, 15 lost. 16 destroyers operational.



> In addition, 3 Dutch, French and Greek destroyers were also put into service.



No. 

The only Dutch destroyer the Germans put into service was the Gerard Callenburgh, and she wasn't commissioned until October 1942, and didn't actually become operational until October 1943, far too late for the proposed 1942 invasion.

The Greek destroyer was the Vasilevs Georgios. She was commissioned in March 1942, but as she was in Greece, had no chance of taking part in any invasion.

AFAIK, none of the French destroyers captured was ever made operational by the Germans.

That leaves, as I said, 16 destroyers for any proposed invasion in 1942. 



> A Hoppian - Scharhorst had finished it's repairds by July 1942 when it was tested. The rest of the year she spent working up and training - hardily unoperational if needed.



Most definitely non-operational.



> Somkescreen - Gneisenau was damaged by a bomb, and it was seen a proper time, as the ship is under repais anyway, to refit her with 15" guns. The fact that she did not become operational again was a decision (U-boots were doing the same job better and cheaper), rather than something neccesiates by the level of damage to her unarmored bow section.



Un armoured bow section? Even A turret was burnt out. Didn't German armour extend to cover the turrets? 



> No, 22 at the start of the war, 19 by the summer of 1942.
> 16 were lost, 10 were built, 3 were captured and used.



I'd love to hear the names of these 3 destroyers no-one else has ever heard of.


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## Glider (Apr 3, 2007)

Kurfürst said:


> A few comments :
> 
> The Destroyers were replaced - since most of them lost at Narwik, that new class become the 'Narwik' class of destroyers - 8 of these were commissioned by the end of 1941 the replace the lost ones, 3 of these before the calander turned 1941, followed by 7 of the Type 36A(Mob) class and 3 Type 36B(Mob).
> 
> ...



Misleading
To invade in 1940 the Germans only had 10 fleet destroyers, that was crippling which ever way you look at it.
By May 42 which is the second invasion date we seem to be looking at, the Germans had also lost Z7, Z8, Z26, which gives the Germans a total of about 20 destroyers allowing 6 months for completion from launch dates (I don't have commisioning dates). Hardly enough to go against the scores of destroyers available to the RN.

Re Heavy Cruisers I was counting the Pocket BB's as a different class, but understand your comment.

Re Renown the Escort played no part of the battle as they couldn't keep up in the seas at the time. 
The Germans had a funny idea about protecting their invasion force by running away. There is no doubt that had the British been in command of the German vessels and the Germans the Renown the Renown would have been sunk. They had the Renown bang to rights and that was the major problem with the German Naval Command, the ships were as good as the best but leadership was pitiful. To leave an enemy capital ship running loose in the area of an invasion fleet when you easily had the power to destroy it for good is foolishness of the highest order. 

A Carrier and its two destroyer escort was a loss we could afford. The Germans couldn't afford the losses they suferred in Norway and that was the difference.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

Hop said:


> It might have been a stretch, but they still got the job done. PoW and Hood might not have sunk the Bismarck, but the RN did. And when you look at the outcome, the RN lost one of their old WW1 battlecruisers, the Germans lost their newest, most powerful battleship. Pretty fair trade, I'd say.



Except of course that since the failure of the single British ships to combat Bismarck caused the entire Royal Navy and it's carriers swarming around the Atlantic to try to catch Bismarck, leaving the island of Crete without any air cover that could have been easily provided by carriers hunting Bismarck. Lack of air cover resulted in 22 000 men lost, and a significan defeat for the RN at Crete plus the additional prestige loss of the RN's general incompetence dealing with a single German capitol ship, and the fear of Tirpitz. 
Yes I agree it was a pretty fair trade.



> But once again, the facts are the RN stopped any naval resupply of Crete, and took off the soldiers when the decision to evacuate was taken.



Again, tell about that successfull evacuation to those 17 000 souls left behind and becoming PoWs.



> The salient point for the proposed invasion of Britain is that the Luftwaffe did not manage to stop the RN doing their job.



Well the RN had to get as far away from Crete, and was forced to leave much of the British defenders behind because of the fraction of the bomber force the LW deployed was being too much of a threat.



> Actually, the RN submarine fleet was the second most successful in the war, in terms of tonnage sunk for boats lost, after the US.



Well in absolute terms they achieved very little, but I am sure there's some sort of statistics that can be shown them not only the second best, but the best. Say, number of tea-bags on board per crew member compared to USN or KM vessels. Number of knighted skippers. Number of members from the British aristocracy, who married their own cousins, per boat. Whatever. Meaningless statistics.



> That's remarkable when you consider the Germans had the Atlantic to hunt in, for most of the war out of the range of land based aircraft, whereas the RN operated mainly in coastal waters and the Med, shallower and in range of land based aircraft.



Actually, that's not remarkable, about what the Italian submarines achieved. The RN were facing the smaller Italian ASW, the Axis didn't have many aircraft in the MTO and didn't use them for sea patrols much either. 

The Atlantic was an easy ride for U-boots, operating undistrubed by aircraft. Interesting.  




> Figures from Submarines of WW2, by Erminio Bagnasco:
> 
> Britain
> 75 boats lost
> ...



In-credible figures, just by looking on the silly claim of '169 warships sunk' - unless it counts the last armed fishing boat with a pop gun on it.. I doubt Germany and Italy combined had as many warships at all in their fleets. It's silly, really. The loss-ratio tells a lot more about that they lacked agressiveness and didn't face that much of an ASW threat as their Axis counterparts.

In any case, they had available about 1/5th the boat the Germans had and managed to sink 1/10 of the tonnage, under much easier conditions.

The British started with 62 subs, built 165 during the war and lost 76 (or around 80, depending what you count).




> Um, no. Websites make notoriously poor resources. The book I quoted is one of the official histories of the RN.



Well, the fact remains both Queen Elisabeth and Valiant sank to the bottom of the harbor. The ships sunk, wheter you or the 'official history' likes it or not, and they need to be raised, which did not occur until April-May 1942. 

It's also a fact that you claimed 3 Italian BBs lost, and since you didn't comment on the names so far. Which were those 3 Italian BBs the British allegadly sunk, for the 4th tme...?



> German destroyers in WW2 by M J Whitley.
> 
> What's certain is that Z1 was bombed by the Luftwaffe, and heavily damaged. She began firing her anti aircraft again a few seconds before two more explosions that sank her. Z3 was sunk shortly afterwards, although in their panic the the Germans were reporting multiple aircraft and submarines firing torpedoes.
> 
> The German court of inquiry concluded that both had been sunk by the Luftwaffe. However, British mines were in the area, and may have been responsible for sinking Z3.



Well, Gordon Williamson states both run on mines. Anyway, irrelevant.



> Z37 wasn't completed until mid July 1942. Working up will mean she's too late for the invasion.



Z37 was commisioned in mid-July 1942.



> Z26 might be the only one of the new batch lost, but Z7 and Z8 had also been lost. Result, 31 destroyers completed by that point, 15 lost. 16 destroyers operational.



16 German plus 3 captured destoreyers, that's 19. Plus the T-class ships.



> Most definitely non-operational.



Wishful thinking, I say. 



> Un armoured bow section? Even A turret was burnt out. Didn't German armour extend to cover the turrets?



Well the bombs hit the bow section in front of the citadal AFAIK, setting improrperly stored ammunition on fire there. In any case, the structure damage is seen at the extreme bow, far away from A turret, which might be burned as a result of fires spreading.



> I'd love to hear the names of these 3 destroyers no-one else has ever heard of.



Well a bit of a conflict with yourself, since you yourself listed some of them above, yet did not include them in the count.. 

Collenburgh, L'Opiniatre, Hermes, for a total of 19 destroyers in service.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

Glider said:


> Misleading
> To invade in 1940 the Germans only had 10 fleet destroyers, that was crippling which ever way you look at it.
> By May 42 which is the second invasion date we seem to be looking at, the Germans had also lost Z7, Z8, Z26, which gives the Germans a total of about 20 destroyers allowing 6 months for completion from launch dates (I don't have commisioning dates). Hardly enough to go against the scores of destroyers available to the RN.



Granted the RN was building on quantity rather than quality, that was never challanged they had numerical superiority - I wonder how many destroyers were available to the British for home defense, not being in the Med, India, or PTO, or on escorting vital merchant convoys against the ever-present Uboot threat.. The point being the Germans had better naval background in 1942 than in 1940.



> Re Heavy Cruisers I was counting the Pocket BB's as a different class, but understand your comment.



The 'pocket BB' was never term used by the Germans, it was Allied pressed that dubbed them so; they first regaded them as 'armored ships', kind of an Armored cruiser I guess, later simply redesignated them Heavy cruisers, which is probably the best solution, since they were really just heavy cruiser hulls, with big guns though.



> The Germans had a funny idea about protecting their invasion force by running away.



Well how many of the invasion force was sunk by the British then...? 



> There is no doubt that had the British been in command of the German vessels and the Germans the Renown the Renown would have been sunk. They had the Renown bang to rights and that was the major problem with the German Naval Command, the ships were as good as the best but leadership was pitiful. To leave an enemy capital ship running loose in the area of an invasion fleet when you easily had the power to destroy it for good is foolishness of the highest order.



Well, the German Naval Command's plan was to invade Norway. They did. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau's mission was to protect the invasion fleet, minimize risking the big ships - they did. Renown's mission was to destroy the invasion fleet - she failed.

For them, there would be no point risking their ships - as you noted they'd feel it a lot more. Perhaps some British commanders would put glory ahead of the actual weighting of gains and losses, the Germans were certainly more calculative and tactical.



> A Carrier and its two destroyer escort was a loss we could afford. The Germans couldn't afford the losses they suferred in Norway and that was the difference.



Well, they still won, despite the fact they had far less of a force at hand, an amazing achievement. And that was all that mattered. They could afford the losses more than loosing Norway.


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## Civettone (Apr 3, 2007)

plan_D said:


> No fleets fired on each other during the Channel Dash. The RAF attempted to bomb the convoy, and an MTB squadron attacked but that was it.


What about HMS Worcester?
_The attacks from the British destroyers were concentrated on Gneisenau. Two hits were claimed. The crew of Worcester said they heard big underwater explosions. There must have been some other reason for the sounds. None of the torpedoes found their targets.
Worcester was the last to deliver her attack. By this time the gunners in Gneisenau had got the range right and the little ship received a fearful battering. The first salvo to hit her removed the starboard side of the bridge. The next two exploded in number 1 and 2 boiler rooms. As she was helplessly round by the tide she presented herself broadside on to Prinz Eugen. Four more shells crashed into her. Nearly all her guns were put out of action. She was now on fire and listing dangerously. _




> The Royal Navy would not have to use the entire Home Fleet as Force H could be used from Gibraltar. The North Sea could be maintained to some degree by Coastal Command.


Interesting, especially in relationship to your previous post of how overstretched the Royal Navy already was. First Syscom asks for the USS Wasp and now you're calling back Force H. That leaves Malta unprotected.
Not to mention how long it would have taken Force H to get to the Channel. 
And you will leave a part of the Home Fleet in the north although it was much closer to the Channel than Force H was? Interesting to say the least.




> The fact remains that the Royal Navy halted the seaborne invasion with only DDs and CLs under intense Luftwaffe bombardment.


 Intense? From what I've read is that most of the German bombers were used to attack land targets. 
_On the morning of 22 May, VIII Air Corps started an all-out attack on the British fleet_
which suggests it wasn't an all-out attack before. 




> In the Channel there were DDs and CLs which would be ready to attack any seaborne invasion on the coast. If the Luftwaffe couldn't stop them at Crete, where's the evidence that they'll stop them in the Channel?


Compare the British fleet around Crete with the Channel Fleet. Compare the number of German aircraft in Greece with the number which would have been assembled in France.




> What exactly do you hope to defend this invasion fleet with, the Luftwaffe alone?


Are you saying the Kriegsmarine consisted solely of battlecruisers?




> First off, the German High Command would not agree to this suicidal act.


What a joke. Since when did German HQ have anything to say? Since when did they care about losses?




> Great Britain had already broken the German codes by then, they would be fully aware of your intention.


I think it's a pity you don't take the effort to read my previous posts. Bletchley Park and Enigma has already come up. And as nobody mentioned it since, I think my arguments were convincing that British Intelligence wasn't that all-knowing. They could decode about 20 messages a week. They failed to know about the Channel Dash or the outbreak of the Bismarck.



> If you plan on moving those Battlecruisers through the North Sea, the Home Fleet would aim to repeat the chase of the Bismarck. Meanwhile, the forces in the Channel are dealing with the unescorted invasion fleet.


I'm struck by lightning. You're actually believing the Kriegsmarine had nothing but battlecruisers?? 



> But in your invasion attempt it would be back to the Battle of Britain, the RAF would be operating in its best area - home.


Wrong! That's one of my essential arguments: they would no longer have the home advantage. If you would have read at least some of my posts, you would have read it as I already explained this 10 times.
The British aircraft would have to fight over the German held beaches and over the Channel which is not exactly friendly territory. Unlike the BoB the British squadrons would not be able to scramble in time as the Germans would be flying over the Channel when the RAF would take off.
Just like the Germans lost the BoB due to attrition, now the British will lose it for the same reason.

Kris


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## syscom3 (Apr 3, 2007)

Bernhart said:


> How long would it take to build up the invasion fleet? Or assemble the troops or weapons your needing to invade? I wouls assume it would take months? you can't keep such a build up quiet, so would think the allies would also start better preparing thier defenses, building more planes, moving ships airplanes closer. The Yanks would also probably build up thier forces. I don't remeber ever hearing the Germans training for sea born invasions at any grand scale either.



It would be impossible for the Germans to keep the loading up of the barges secret. All of their barges would be based in occupied countries, and there were plenty of "eyes" from the resistance to keep the Allies informed.

Even air recon was going to show something was up, simply because the barges had to be moved from their mooring points over to the docks.

And then the shear number of ships means it would have to be distributed over many ports, which means different sailing times for each force.

Then you couple into these "inconvenient" facts..... the invasion dates are pretty much predetermined by tides. Because the fleet is also entirely made up of small vessels, weather also dictates whether a possible invasion date is possible.

You couple all of these together and the germans would have no advantage of surprise and the Brits hade the luxury of 1-2 weeks warning.


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## Civettone (Apr 3, 2007)

Hop said:


> Of course there were scattered attacks on other targets. The point is, the bulk of operations were over the Channel. According to Hooton, 70% of all sorties in July were anti shipping attacks.


Then that probably included the attacks on ships in the British ports. 




> No, I am pointing out you cannot attack small numbers of moving warships with 1000 bombers.


Small numbers? You're sending over the bulk of the Royal Navy and that's small numbers?
And all in all it's ridiculous to think that the Luftwaffe wasn't capable of directing a 1000 bombers. If the British can launch 1000 bomber raids on a single target, then I don't see why the Germans couldn't. They used hundreds of aircraft against the British in 1940, around Kursk, around Stalingrad. 



> Certainly. It improved throughout the war, though. In particular, large numbers of 20mm guns were fitted in 1941 and early 1942, large number of 40mm in 1942.


What's the point if you can't shoot them at a high angle. They would be defenseless against the German dive bombers. 




> So in an exercise a single merchant ship, not under attack, managed to unload in 14 hours? And you think you can unload the 100 merchants the 1940 plan called for in the first wave in less than a day, whilst under attack?


I don't see why the number of merchants would matter. When trained, soldiers can execute their orders under fire. In any case, the freighter will be unloaded and back in the Channel the next night.




> But when there are 1500 barges, which have to take turns running up on to the beach (and some have to be pushed), it takes hours for them all to take their turn.


No, that's why the Germans wanted to land on a broad front in the first place. For exactly that reason.




> And what do the troops do, just run up the beach? What about the mines (any beach suitable for landing on was heavily mined). What about the guns shooting at them from pill boxes?


The first assault will happen by assault forces in 1,400 Sturmboote. On the first day, they will be supported by the German warships and bombers. 




> Yet in Normandy, the allies were still landing over the beaches weeks later.


Well, no one was able to explain to me why they managed to get 150,000 men ashore in the first 24 hours, and after that only 1 division every two months.
My guess is that they were concentrating on bringing in supplies and transport vehicles, to mass them together for the final outbreak.




> The idea the invasion fleet can come and go in a day is preposterous.


I'm sure that's what critics said about the assault on Eben-Emael. There's a fine line between preposterous and "eheum" genius!  




> It didn't receive top priority. Why on earth should it have?


Churchill said: "*At all costs *the ships must be intercepted and made to pay dearly for their audacity." That makes me conclude it was top priority. Having two BCs going through your backdoor must have been as important as a single BC going in the Atlantic. 




> Sinking them would have course been nice, but top priority for the RN was guarding against enemy attacks, not pursuing retreating enemies.[/quoting]A loser rarely admits his loss.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Civettone (Apr 3, 2007)

Bernhart said:


> How long would it take to build up the invasion fleet?


In reality the Germans already hd their invasion fleet ready in 1940. They had close to 3000 river barges assembled together with hundreds of other supporting and transporting vessels. 




> Or assemble the troops or weapons your needing to invade? I wouls assume it would take months? you can't keep such a build up quiet, so would think the allies would also start better preparing thier defenses, building more planes, moving ships airplanes closer.


Of course they would but there's a limit to what you can do. The British were already producing at 100% and overstretching their forces in 1942. If they would have to give more resources defending against the invasion, they would have to take those resources away from something else. And they would have to do that starting in early 1942, long before the invasion would take place. This would have had a result on either North Africa, Malta, Atlantic Ocean or the Far East. 



> Yanks would also probably build up thier forces.


They were building them up as fast as they could. And by diverting more forces to Britain, they would get in trouble either over the Atlantic or in the Pacific, perhaps losing the fight over Guadalcanal or the Solomons. 




> I don't remeber ever hearing the Germans training for sea born invasions at any grand scale either


That's a good point and something which most people don't really grasp. If the Germans would have been planning the invasion for months, they would surely conduct exercises. They were miticulous planners. Especially thinking of Kursk where they achieved a tactical victory although the Russians were building up their defences all along.

Kris


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

I am wondering about a simple scenario. The Germans came up with a simple plan - they have about 350 submaines by mid-1942. They simply set those up in ambush position north of the channel, say a 70 nautical miles-long line between Ipswich and Ostende. 5 subs for every nautical mile.

I wonder who'd get through down to the invasion fleet..

Just illustrating the size and power of the submarine force by that time.


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## syscom3 (Apr 3, 2007)

> I don't see why the number of merchants would matter. When trained, soldiers can execute their orders under fire. In any case, the freighter will be unloaded and back in the Channel the next night.



And a freighter unloading is a freighter thats standing still. A perfect target for a sub or attacking plane.



> No, that's why the Germans wanted to land on a broad front in the first place. For exactly that reason.



Which violates miltary doctrine of concentration of force. Your broad front is doomed to failure from the start because you dont have any capital ships to provide fire support, and the LW cant be everywhere at all the time. And stop with this hogwash about your BB's and CA's being there because they will have been disabled early on by mines, torpedo's or gunnery. 

British artillery will be firing on preregistered beaches with deadly effect. And theres nothing your LW or KM could do to stop them.



> The first assault will happen by assault forces in 1,400 Sturmboote. On the first day, they will be supported by the German warships and bombers.



And all this will happen without air or sea superiority, on a defended beachhead, with your enemy having interior lines of communications, and you without the possibility of providing support at nighttime.



> Well, no one was able to explain to me why they managed to get 150,000 men ashore in the first 24 hours, and after that only 1 division every two months.
> My guess is that they were concentrating on bringing in supplies and transport vehicles, to mass them together for the final outbreak.



Because hauling armoured divisions takes a lot of shipping. And then you have bring in ever more supplies to keep an ever expanding number of men fed, clothed and armed. And its even more amazing the allies did it using the most advanced logistical methods available knowing they had absolute 24/7 superioity in the air and sea. 

Youre also not understanding the problems the Germans had in moving their supplies quickly from the beachhead inland to depots. You had no Higgins boats, LST's or DUKW's. Quite simply, youre just going to jam the beaches with material and it will sit there and be destroyed from British bombers and arty.

The KM also had no "beachmasters" which were the single most important men during an invasion. You have no one with amphib experience in which to direct the loading and disembarkment or incoming men and material. 

Everything you have written about this invasion fails to account for the logistics of the matter. Everything so far has run the gamut from "best case sceneario" all the way to the absurd. Youre projecting your invasion on what you want the allies to do, not what they were capable of. And when inconvenient details get in your way, you quote meaningless skirmishes from 1940 and 1941 which were totally different from what was prevalent in 1942.

Remember what I said about trying to compare the invasions of Guadalcanal in 1942 and Leyte in 1944? It certeinly applies here. Tactics and weapons changed rapidly and theres a worlds of difference between an invasion of Crete against a poorly equiped British force and an invasion of England against a vastly larger force that only had to travel a short distance to engage your invasion forces. The channel dash by your BB's? Big F***ing deal. This invasion in 1942 means they will be having to stay and fight and learn some important lessons.....

And supposing that even if all your KM is intact (extremely unlikely) you have so few ships to provide support to your broad front, your invasion force would be at the mercy of the accuracy of the british guns. Hardly an inspiring way to start your invasion.

Think that your LW will always be around for air support? Hah..... a little bit of low hanging clouds and your air support goes to crap. All of your aircraft will take no loss's? Hah..... think again. The allies never had a problem shooting down your medium bombers. Think your LW will be around to cover your KM? Think again. Off Okinawa, the USN had thousands of fighters and an effective radar vectoring system AND still the Kmaikazi's got through. It will be no different in the channel.

Speaking of kamikazi's, ever plan on what would happen if the Brits did ask for some volunteers to actually do that? If my homeland was about to be invaded by a bunch of barbarians, and the only hope of disrupting the invasion would mean for me to crash my plane into a warship or freighter, I certeinly would entertain the thought.

Again, all your plans assume 100% performance from your forces and the Allies to follow your plans to the letter. Your weapons and tactics work all the time, and Allies fail all the time.

Amatures talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics.


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## Civettone (Apr 3, 2007)

Hop said:


> I don't know anyone who's claiming the RN was all powerful, or even as powerful as they'd like to have been.


Well, I do read alot of how the Royal Navy would decimate the landing barges, kill of the Kriegsmarine and destroy the invasion forces.
Given their large size, the Royal Navy performed poorly against the Germans. 




> Actually, the RN submarine fleet was the second most successful in the war, in terms of tonnage sunk for boats lost, after the US.


Kurfürst made the valid argument that the British built so many U-boats to do little with it and you reply by saying they sunk a lot compared to the losses they endured. That's got nothing to do with it. 

Btw, how many British submarines operated in the Far East?




> Um, no. Websites make notoriously poor resources. The book I quoted is one of the official histories of the RN.


The main reason why some of use online sources is because they can be consulted by all participants in the discussion. I could easily browse through my books and quote what is written. But who can tell that I'm not making it up? 
I've actually seen an image of either the QE or the V (can't remember) where she is shown to be resting on the bottom of the port. But she did not submerge totally. Does that mean she sunk? 
What's the definition of "to sink"? 



> What's certain is that Z1 was bombed by the Luftwaffe, and heavily damaged. She began firing her anti aircraft again a few seconds before two more explosions that sank her.


The He 111 made two attacks on the 2. Zerstörerflottille. The Z3 sank while it was trying to rescue the men of the Z1. 

Kris


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## Hop (Apr 3, 2007)

> Small numbers? You're sending over the bulk of the Royal Navy and that's small numbers?



It's not going to be the bulk of the RN. It's going to be scores of destroyers, a handful of cruisers, and lots of smaller craft.

But they are going to be operating in small groups, not in one mass.



> And all in all it's ridiculous to think that the Luftwaffe wasn't capable of directing a 1000 bombers.



Can you name a single case in their entire history when they did?

The most they ever managed against Britain was just over 500.



> If the British can launch 1000 bomber raids on a single target, then I don't see why the Germans couldn't.



There's a big difference between a city and a few warships. Cities don't tend to move as much.



> What's the point if you can't shoot them at a high angle. They would be defenseless against the German dive bombers.



Huh? Are you suggesting the 20mm, the 2lbrs and the 40mm guns couldn't be fired at high angle? Where on earth did you come up with such an idea?

Bofors mounts almost always had 90 deg elevation, Oerlikons 80+



> Well, no one was able to explain to me why they managed to get 150,000 men ashore in the first 24 hours, and after that only 1 division every two months.



Supply, and teeth and tail.

The men who landed on the first day were mostly front line soldiers. The field hospitals, storemen, clerks, drivers etc tended to come later. In other words, parts of several divisions landed on day 1, the rest of the same divisions on subsequent days.

Secondly, supply. All the artillery shells, bullets, grenades, field dressings, food, etc used on day 1 had to be landed again on day 2. And again on day 3, and on day 4, and on and on and on. You can't just land your troops and abandon them.



> Churchill said: "At all costs the ships must be intercepted and made to pay dearly for their audacity." That makes me conclude it was top priority.



He said that when he heard they were actually passing through the channel. Bit late to concentrate forces then. 

The point is the RN were concerned about Tirpitz breaking out into the Atlantic, not about 3 damaged ships running back to Germany.



> Which events? The only thing that I remember is the small force the British had in the Channel and the tumbling organization of the British when faced with a sudden threat.
> Both of these elements would probably still be around in the Summer, regardless of the weather.



You think if the Germans have beaten Russia, and are massing troops, aircraft and ships inFrance, the British aren't going to react? 

If you change the situation, the response will change. 



> If you assume the British would have brought in reinforcements for the anticipated invasion, I can also think about what would have happened without Russia in the war and with an invasion of Britain planned. As the Germans would now have 5 times as many fighters in France, As the Germans would now have 5 times as many fighters in France, I don't think they would have moved their BCs to the North Sea.



They moved them to Germany because they kept getting damaged in Brest. If they hadn't moved to Germany, they wouldn't have incurred the damage they did on the Channel dash, but then again the RAF would have continued bombing them. With the threat of a German invasion, they'd have been much higher priority targets, too.

The problem with "what ifs" is that you have to apply the changed circumstances to both sides. If the Germans had won in Russia in 1941, of course they'd have reacted differently. But so would the British.



> Compare the British fleet around Crete with the Channel Fleet. Compare the number of German aircraft in Greece with the number which would have been assembled in France.



And compare the RAF presence on Crete (0) with the RAF presence in Britain (many thousands)

The RN operated with no air cover in Crete, against over 600 German combat aircraft. In the Channel they'd be operating against perhaps 5 times as many aircraft, but with far more ships, and an infinitely greater RAF presence.



> I think it's a pity you don't take the effort to read my previous posts. Bletchley Park and Enigma has already come up. And as nobody mentioned it since, I think my arguments were convincing that British Intelligence wasn't that all-knowing. They could decode about 20 messages a week.


Source for the 20 a week figure?

From The Second World War by Horner:


> The first regular decryption of Luftwaffe signals began on 21 May 1940 but beginning in the summer of 1941 this success was extended to the Enigma keys used by the German Navy, Army and High Command. As a result the number of enemy signals decrypted rose steadily from a few hundred a week during the winter of 1940-41 to 4,000 a day by the end of 1942, and remained at that level until the end of the year.



Edit: Hinsley, in the official history of British intelligence in WW2, notes that 140,000 Abwehr (German intelligence) Engima messages were decrypted (that's just Abwehr messages, and excludes the army, Luftwaffe, KM, high command etc)



> They failed to know about the Channel Dash or the outbreak of the Bismarck.



They actually knew about both, of course. 

The first hint the British had that Bismarck was about to break out was Enigma decrypts from Luftwaffe Condors, paying unusually close attention to the position of the edge of the Arctic ice sheet.

Next, a Spitfire photographed Bismarck and PE 2 hours after they arrived in Bergen fjord.

Another recce aircraft confirmed next day that both ships had left Bergen.

And the British knew about the Channel Dash, too, although not the date. 

First, Enigma decrypts from December 1941 revealed that the gun crews of the 3 ships had been sent for firing practice about German heavy cruisers in the Baltic, indicating they were about to break out. 

On 3rd Feb an Admiralty message said "Most probable course now will be for all 3 ships to break eastwards up the Channel towards their home ports"

In both these cases the British knew _exactly_ what the Germans were up to, and even knew approximate dates. And that's when only a few ships were involved. An invasion is going to involve thousands of ships, thousands of aircraft, and hundreds of thousands of men.

It's not going to be a secret.


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## Udet (Apr 3, 2007)

Hop: i really do admire your style of dicussing. I am serious here, meaning i am not joking. Some postings made in response to your comments -although not expressly offensive- try to ridicule your idea, and yet your response always seem to be peaceful, laid back that is. 

I admire that.

While you make some good points, there are other of your points which really have no grounds. Perhaps you should accept you do not know everything, and that you can not have a response to everything. Also accept the fact the Royal Navy performed poorly during the war. Also notice there are several good points when dicussing "what ifs" that favour Germany.

I believe the fact Great Britain ended the war in the victorious side makes some people overlook significant details regarding the actual performance of the armed branches of the empire.

Just my thoughts.


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## Glider (Apr 3, 2007)

Kurfürst said:


> Granted the RN was building on quantity rather than quality, that was never challanged they had numerical superiority - I wonder how many destroyers were available to the British for home defense, not being in the Med, India, or PTO, or on escorting vital merchant convoys against the ever-present Uboot threat.. The point being the Germans had better naval background in 1942 than in 1940.
> 
> Well how many of the invasion force was sunk by the British then...?
> 
> ...



Taking it one at a time
I don't know how many would be available but the Home fleet always had its escort which wasn't committed to convoy escort. Generally those used for convoys were the early A-I class, not all of them and it was a changing situation. However the RN had large numbers of the Hunt Class (62 launched by end of 1941) designed for North Sea duties and well armed with DP and AA guns. These would be a significant boost to the British forces. There is no way you can say the Germans had a beter naval background in 1942 compared to 1940. A small number of destroyers against a much larger RN in a situation where to defend an invasion you would have to stand and fightm not run away.

Dumb luck we didn't find the invasion fleet. It was a significant risk and one the Germans were rash to take. The safe option would be to sink the Renown which was well in there capability.

The difference in Norway was airpower. The Germans had it, the british didn't.


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## Glider (Apr 3, 2007)

Udet said:


> Hop: i really do admire your style of dicussing. I am serious here, meaning i am not joking. Some postings made in response to your comments -although not expressly offensive- try to ridicule your idea, and yet your response always seem to be peaceful, laid back that is.
> 
> I admire that.
> 
> ...



This made me smile. How you can say that the RN performed badly during the war and the Germans did well with a straight face and no facts, did make me smile.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

Glider said:


> Taking it one at a time
> I don't know how many would be available but the Home fleet always had its escort which wasn't committed to convoy escort. Generally those used for convoys were the early A-I class, not all of them and it was a changing situation. However the RN had large numbers of the Hunt Class (62 launched by end of 1941) designed for North Sea duties and well armed with DP and AA guns. These would be a significant boost to the British forces. There is no way you can say the Germans had a beter naval background in 1942 compared to 1940. A small number of destroyers against a much larger RN in a situation where to defend an invasion you would have to stand and fightm not run away.



Of course they were in a much better position. They'd have 3 capital ships ready for support, when in 1940, they had 0. They have 19 destroyers ready vs the 10 they had in 1940. Not sure about the number of T-boote. They would have over 350 U-boots, operating from the French bases and Norway, being mostly of modern ocean-fairing types, vs. the about 50 they had in 1940, with half of those being small coastal Type IIs. All the torpedo fuse problems they had in 1940 was long fixed. They'd would have powerful coastal batteries at Calais with 15" and 16" guns.

The subs are simply the scariest prospect for the RN. Since there are about 2 subs available for every destroyer the British may have, spread all over the world, I'd say it would be damn near impossible to get through that cordon in one piece. A single destroyer just cannot chase two subs at one time. If just half a dozen subs manage to get into firing position, the RN losses go up increadibly fast.



> Dumb luck we didn't find the invasion fleet. It was a significant risk and one the Germans were rash to take. The safe option would be to sink the Renown which was well in there capability.



It wasn't dumb luck, it was missing the train. Most of the invasion fleet already detached from the protective cover of S+G, the last group departed about 8 hours before in the evening before in the morning S+G run into Renown. I'd guess if Renown shows up a day before, where the transports are still around, they wouldn't disengange, but with their mission accomplished, it would be foolish to risk the only two capital ships of the KM for the gain of what - sinking an old British battlecruiser, one of the many? Especically as both S and G had technical troubles coming up during the engagement with the FC gear. IMHO tactically and strategically, they did the right thing. Even if they would sink Renown, a few hits would be unavoidable, putting out the ships out of action for some time, at the time absolutely nobody knew how's the Norway campaign is going to continue.


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## Udet (Apr 3, 2007)

Mr. Glider: i am glad to know i can make a person smile.

Where in my posting did i say the Germans did well? 
I assume you were referring to my ideas in previous posting within the thread. 

In short, what i have come to suggest is that the performance of the Kriegsmarine was not as bad as many guys wanto to point out here.

There were several German naval operations which were successful; so i find amazing to read several comments that either ridicule or make fun on the Kriegsmarine potential, warning on some "imminent" and "definitive" Royal Navy intervention that would come to crush any German naval attempt.

Do not forget the value of British seamanship is included in my postings, but i do not see any indication the British were capable of sustaining the naval fight all by themselves.

As you might have noticed there are guys here which simply ridicule any idea which might indicate the Germans could have been capable of launching an invasion force against England.

On the other hand, i have presented facts and opinions to illustrate a bit further on the fact the performance of the Royal Navy, the great western naval power of the time, is far from brilliant as some tend to forget, and that Britain´s handling of naval assets was also full of tragedies, mishaps and desperate/foolish decision making.

Only that Mr. Glider


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## Hop (Apr 3, 2007)

> They have 19 destroyers ready vs the 10 they had in 1940.



Just to be clear, the Germans had 16 destroyers in the summer of 1942, not all of which will be serviceable.

Kurfurst is adding 3 more destroyers:

Z37, which was commissioned in mid July 1942. However, commissioning is when a warship is handed over to the navy. It takes some months after that before it is operational.

Gerard Callenburg, a Dutch destroyer captured in 1940. She was commissioned in October 1942, too late for an invasion, but didn't become operational until October 1943 (due to the fact all the equipment was Dutch, and unfamiliar to the Germans)

L'Opiniatre, a French destroyer captured in Bordeaux in 1940. However, she wasn't finished in 1940 when the Germans captured her, and indeed was never finished. All work on her stopped in 1943. 

Hermes, a Greek destroyer. Whilst she was operational at the correct time, she was in Greece, and had no way of reaching the Atlantic.

And as for serviceability, Whitley gives the record of 1 German destroyer as an example, Erich Steinbrinck. She underwent a refit and repairs until 22nd March 1942. From then until 12th May she was undergoing trials. On 12th May she suffered turbine damage, and had to go in for a new turbine, which took until 5th August. On 3rd September, she ran aground. Repairs took until 1943.

So in the period in question, she was serviceable from the 22nd March to 12th May, and from 5th August until 3rd September.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 3, 2007)

Any claim is as good as the credibilty of it's claimer. Did you find the names of those 3 Italian BBs sunk by the British - as you claimed?

You fail to address your _previous_ false claims. Why would I believe _anything_ you claim?


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## Glider (Apr 3, 2007)

Kurfürst said:


> Of course they were in a much better position. They'd have 3 capital ships ready for support, when in 1940, they had 0. They have 19 destroyers ready vs the 10 they had in 1940. Not sure about the number of T-boote. They would have over 350 U-boots, operating from the French bases and Norway, being mostly of modern ocean-fairing types, vs. the about 50 they had in 1940, with half of those being small coastal Type IIs. All the torpedo fuse problems they had in 1940 was long fixed. They'd would have powerful coastal batteries at Calais with 15" and 16" guns.



U Boats never operated in the North Sea either in WW1 or WW2 without huge losses as the waters are too dangerous. There shallow apart from certain lanes, fast flowing with dangerous sandbanks. Its narrow and recharging batteries alone would be a nightmare as the seas would be crawling with coastal forces who could be guided by radar. Plus of course you are leaving the Atlantic wide open freeing up a lot more destroyers and escorts.

Coastal Batteries never hit a thing and are only good for defence at short ranges, ie the British batteries. Big mistake to rely on them to help you out. 



> The subs are simply the scariest prospect for the RN. Since there are about 2 subs available for every destroyer the British may have, spread all over the world, I'd say it would be damn near impossible to get through that cordon in one piece. A single destroyer just cannot chase two subs at one time. If just half a dozen subs manage to get into firing position, the RN losses go up increadibly fast.



Half a dozen subs would only get half a dozen shots, not all of which are going to hit. 



> It wasn't dumb luck, it was missing the train. Most of the invasion fleet already detached from the protective cover of S+G, the last group departed about 8 hours before in the evening before in the morning S+G run into Renown. I'd guess if Renown shows up a day before, where the transports are still around, they wouldn't disengange, but with their mission accomplished, it would be foolish to risk the only two capital ships of the KM for the gain of what - sinking an old British battlecruiser, one of the many? Especically as both S and G had technical troubles coming up during the engagement with the FC gear. IMHO tactically and strategically, they did the right thing. Even if they would sink Renown, a few hits would be unavoidable, putting out the ships out of action for some time, at the time absolutely nobody knew how's the Norway campaign is going to continue.



On this we will have to differ


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## Glider (Apr 3, 2007)

Udet said:


> Mr. Glider: i am glad to know i can make a person smile.
> 
> Where in my posting did i say the Germans did well?
> I assume you were referring to my ideas in previous posting within the thread.
> ...



I admit to being one of those that doesn't believe that German had any chance of launching an invasion in 1940 or 42 but I try not to ridicule, I try to point out the optimistic assumptions and bend my views when my information is incorrect or imcomplete.

Both Germany and the UK made errors in the handling of their forces but my view is that the majority of the British errors were forced on the Navy by the actions of others. Crete is a good example. Someone should have decided that we either 
A) defend it properly in which case it needed proper fighter forces and integrated defences or
B) abandon it
The powers that be fudged it and the RN was left with doing what it could to help protect the island and ended up evacuating what they could under what were very difficult circumstances. What they did they did as well as any other navy in the world put in the same situation and better than most.
Norway and Dunirk were similar situations


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## Civettone (Apr 3, 2007)

Hop said:


> It's not going to be the bulk of the RN. It's going to be scores of destroyers, a handful of cruisers, and lots of smaller craft.


Oh? Given the good weather and having a 1000 bombers flying up to 5 missions a day, I see this force eradicated in two days max. 




> But they are going to be operating in small groups, not in one mass.


Which makes them even more vulnerable against bombers as you would no longer have concentrated AA fire. Guess what would have happened if the Pacific TFs would have been split up into smaller groups? 




> Can you name a single case in their entire history when they did?
> The most they ever managed against Britain was just over 500.


So that makes you conclude that they couldn't manage to handle a 1000? It's not up to me to prove that they could. It's up to you to prove that they couldn't. Give me a reason why you think they couldn't. I don't see any indication for this. If the allies can do it, so can the Germans.




> There's a big difference between a city and a few warships. Cities don't tend to move as much.


1000 (mostly) 4 engined bombers at night compared to more agile aircraft during the day. Remember, that there would be good visibility. As you know you can see Dover from Calais. From the sky you can see groups of ships over a distance of what? 50 miles? Hundred miles? And don't forget that the Germans had specialized reconaissance aircraft with radar to locate these groups. 




> Huh? Are you suggesting the 20mm, the 2lbrs and the 40mm guns couldn't be fired at high angle?


No, but the DP guns couldn't. That means that the destroyers only had short range weapons with would have meant that their losses against dive bombers would have been unacceptably high: the bombers couldn't be destroyed until they had entered their dive pattern.





> The men who landed on the first day were mostly front line soldiers. The field hospitals, storemen, clerks, drivers etc tended to come later. In other words, parts of several divisions landed on day 1, the rest of the same divisions on subsequent days.
> Secondly, supply. All the artillery shells, bullets, grenades, field dressings, food, etc used on day 1 had to be landed again on day 2. And again on day 3, and on day 4, and on and on and on. You can't just land your troops and abandon them.


I'm still not convinced. The big majority of troops were soldiers, not docters, storemen, clerks and drivers. Also the supply bit I don't understand. If the amount of troops hardly increased, why would they need more supplies than on the first day? So the amount of supplies for the first-day-troops were already being delivered on the first day and should hardly increase on the following days. 
I really don't understand why they managed to go from 100,000 soldiers on the first day to 10,000 on the next. 




> The point is the RN were concerned about Tirpitz breaking out into the Atlantic, not about 3 damaged ships running back to Germany.


Bomber Command had been bombing Brest for months. The Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the heads of Coastal, Fighter and Bomber Commands had planned to monitor and intercept the ships: Operation Fuller.

[/i]The British had watched the Germans preparing the ships for sea, and realized that there was a possibility of the large Kreigsmarine ships breaking out, and even recognized the possibility of them trying to ruinn the Channel. However, early 1942 was a lowpoint in the war, and the British Military was spread rather thin. Force Z had been destroyed by aircraft, Singapore was about to fall, the war in North Africa was not going well, aircraft carriershad been lost or damaged in the Med. The British response options were... limited.

Admiral Pound had decided that capital ships would not be called in the event of a breakout up the channel. He was concerned about what would happen if battleships came under the Luftwaffe's air umbrella. The Royal Navy's response was limited to:

a gathered flotilla of MTBs from alongthe Channel Coast 
One squadron of old destroyers in Harwich 
The RAF could offer 

Fighter Command units for escort (for which they seldom trained) 
Bomber Command's Light, Medium, and Heavy bomber units (which had not trained for Maritime attack) 
Coastal Command had three Beaufort squadrons. These were stationed in St.Eval (against a breakout into the Atlantic), Thorney Island, and one moved from Scotland to Coltishall. 
FAA could offer a half-squadron of Swordfish torpedo bombers (no. 825) that was training up since the sinking of the Ark Royal. These were moved to the fighter base at Manston. 
The selected repsonse plan included a joint operation of torpeedo bombers and MTBs in the Channel at night, which was when they British assumed the Germans would tryto run the Channel, with a backstop of a squadron of old destroyers from Harwich.

Most the on-alert forces were released the morning of 12-Feb-42, since there had been no breakout since the beginning of February.

The RAF ran both night and day patrols up and down the channel. The night patrols were equipped with ASV Mk II, an early surface search radar. As luck would have it, all three aircraft had radar problems that evening/night/morning. A replacement aircraft was sent off Ushant, but by the time it arrived (three hours after the breakout began), the German flotilla was nearly 90 miles away and undetected.

The German Flotilla was only discovered after daylight at 10:00 AM, already approaching Dover. The British scrambled to respond. All thought of a coordinated attack went out the window, as time for coordination was gone.[/i]

Naval forces assigned to Operation Fuller were:

_SUBMARINES: Admiral Sir Max Horton, flag officer 

HMS H.34 
HMS Sealion—Lt. Cdr. G.R. Colvin, off Brest replaced one other H class on 6th February, with the discretion to go inside Brest Roads. 

5th Submarine Flotilla, Portsmouth: 
1 “U” class 
1 “T” class 
3 “S” class, including Sealion 
1 Porpoise class 
1 “R” class 
1 “P” class 
1 ex Turkish 
1 R. Nor. N. 
4 Free French 
H.M.S. Graph 

7th Submarine Flotilla, Western Approaches: 
2 “O” class 
2 “L” class 
7 “H” class 
3 R.Net, N. 
1 R. Nor. N. 
1 Polish 

HOME FLEET: 

Sir John Tovey refused to risk the one effectively available battleship, HMS King George V, in the Channel, so close to the U-boats bases and Luftwaffe bomber bases. 

Of the Home Fleet battleships available in the second week of February 1942: 
HMS King George V was watching the Tirpitz; 
HMS Duke of York was working up and would not join the Fleet until the end of the month; 
HMS Rodney was too slow to catch Scharnhorst, Gneisenau or Prinz Eugen, and was in need of another refit; 
HMS Renown (Force H) was in the UK to escort a troop convoy to the Middle East. 

PLYMOUTH AND PORTSMOUTH COMMANDS: 

At Devonport 
HMS Manxman (fast minelayer) 
HMS Plover, controlled minelayer 
HMS Cardiff, Gunnery Firing Cruiser, Western Approaches 
HMS Belfast, refitting at Devonport 
1st Destroyer Flotilla and 15th Destroyer Flotilla, employed as coastal convoy escorts. The use of these ships to attack the German Squadron was not considered because of their low speed (25 knots), and the lack (on some ships) of torpedo tubes. 

At Dover 
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, flag officer, Dover: 
HMS Welshman (fast minelayer) 
Dover Flotilla—Lt. Cdr E.N. Pumphrey: 
MTB 221—Lt. Cdr Nigel Pumphrey 
MTB 219—Lt. Mark Arnold-Foster 
MTB 45—Lt. Hilary Gamble DSC 
MTB 44—Lt. Richard Saunders RAN 
MTB 48—Lt. Anthony Law, RCN 

MGB 43—Lt. P.F.S. Gould, DSC 
MGB 41—Lt. R. King 

ASB 31 

Ramsgate Flotilla 
MTB 32—Lt. D.J. Long 
MTB 18—Sub Lt. I.C. Trelawney, RNVR 
MTB 71—O.B. Mabee, RNVR 

At Harwich 
21st Destroyer Flotilla—Capt. Mark Pizey Harwich, reporting to Admiral Ramsay 
HMS Campbell—Captain Pizey 
HMS Vivacious—Lt. Cdr. Alexander 

16th Destroyer Flotilla—Capt. J.P. Wright, Harwich, reporting to Admiral Ramsay 
HMS MacKay—Capt. J.P. Wright 
HMS Whitshed—Lt. Cdr. W.A. Juniper 
HMS Walpole—Lt. Cdr. John Eadon 
HMS Worcester—Lt. Cdr. Colin Coates 
The destroyers formed as follows: 
1st Division: HMS Campbell, Vivacious, Worcester; 
2nd Division: HMS Mackay, Whitshed, Walpole. _

Having all these forces put on alert is not caring about three ships sailing through the Channel?
Hop, I don't understand how you draw the conclusions you draw from rather clear-cut information? 




> You think if the Germans have beaten Russia, and are massing troops, aircraft and ships inFrance, the British aren't going to react?


Where did I say this?
I'm saying that the British were in a lot of problems in 1942: on the Atlantic, in the Far East and in North Africa. They only overcame these when America started to bail them out. 
I am more than willing to assume that the British would have reacted differently but hardly anyone comes up with alternative stories. I already gave some explanations on what would have happened if they had given more resources to their own defence. They might lose the battle of the Atlantic or would leave Malta unprotected. Another one is El Alamein. I think it's likely that the British would have lost this battle and with it control of the Suez Channel. 




> They moved them to Germany because they kept getting damaged in Brest.


 That's incorrect. That would have meant that they would have withdrawn all the other surface vessels too as they were just as exposed to the RAF. 
Of course it's an argument which played a part but it's not THE reason and I think you know that. The real reason was that Hitler wanted a stronger naval presence in Norway. In all honesty, I do not think that they would have been withdrawn in case of an invasion and with 5 times more fighters to protect the fleet. 

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 3, 2007)

(message was too long so here's the rest)



> If the Germans had won in Russia in 1941, of course they'd have reacted differently. But so would the British.


Once again, give me some examples. And don't leave out what they would have given up.




> And compare the RAF presence on Crete (0) with the RAF presence in Britain (many thousands)


Many thousands? You're a bit too enthusiastic 
And what makes you conclude that the outcome would have been different if the British had fighters? The Germans had about 200 fighters which remained unopposed. 
You're logic is flawed as you cannot support that the outcome would have been any different. As such you cannot support that the outcome of Sealion 42 would have been different.




> Source for the 20 a week figure?


Well, it was 50...

_Here's from answers.com in case you don't believe me: Ultra staff and technology successfully decoded over 50 messages a week. However, by 1942, German radio and wire traffic increased exponentially. The 1,200 member staff of Bletchley Park could not efficiently decipher the thousands of intercepts received daily._

Only with the arrival of Colossus were the British able to decode enough. Why were the British unable to predict when the Bismarck and the Scharnhorst/Gneisenau were going to leave port?
I think that clearly shows that the British could not direct their required information. The messages they decoded sometimes held important information, sometimes it didn't. They were able to get little indications but rarely direct information. Your examples support this: _The first hint the British had that Bismarck was about to break out was Enigma decrypts from Luftwaffe Condors, paying unusually close attention to the position of the edge of the Arctic ice sheet.(...)First, Enigma decrypts from December 1941 revealed that the gun crews of the 3 ships had been sent for firing practice about German heavy cruisers in the Baltic, indicating they were about to break out. 
On 3rd Feb an Admiralty message said "Most probable course now will be for all 3 ships to break eastwards up the Channel towards their home ports"_




> In both these cases the British knew _exactly_ what the Germans were up to, and even knew approximate dates. And that's when only a few ships were involved. An invasion is going to involve thousands of ships, thousands of aircraft, and hundreds of thousands of men.


The Germans also knew exactly what the allies were up to in 1944: they knew an invasion was coming and knew the approximate dates...
The Germans were going to be well prepared and use many decoys and tricks to lure the British into confusion. Thinking of something simple like the Channel Dash, I don't think that will be too difficult. If they couldn't even handle such a small scale operation, I doubt they could deal a full-scale battleplan which would take the British by surprise as they wouldn't expect an invasion without a preliminary air campaign.
I don't see any reason why the Germans wouldn't be able to fool the British even if the fact that there would be invasion was clear well in advance. They still wouldn't know if it wasn't an exercise, a distraction manoeuvre or what the target of the invasion would be. 

Like Udet said ... _it is the "no matter what" operational mode_ which prevents you from seeing things which could actually have happened but which in historical reality didn't.

Kris


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## Udet (Apr 4, 2007)

This thread has been very interesting so far, but i´ll rest my case now. This ought to be my farewell here.

I would insist on the very fact the Royal Navy, all that size, tradition and experience, was not capable of handling the war all by itself, at all.

As i said, as early as in late 1941 the Royal Navy observed clear exhaustion symptoms; losses had been just too high against an enemy whose navy is most frequently ridiculed and put down.

Facts more than prove it turned out nearly impossible to the Royal Navy to properly guard and secure British operations in the North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean...add the Far East and the whole business smells like a nightmare. The Navy of an Empire with overseas possessions that becomes incapable of securing those possessions and operations while in a state of war is a force in decay.

Before you commence throwing eggs, lettuces and rotten tomatoes, i know they had their fine episodes for sure, but it was far from being enough.

Evacuating British forces can be one of the responsibilities included on the Royal Navy procedure manual, but it is not the only one. Prior to the entrance of the USA into the war, the Royal Navy spent a good deal of time evacuating British troops that got beaten on the battlefield.

Do you guys forget the Dieppe Raid? Where was the Royal Navy "doctrine" and "experience" regarding amphibious operations, as claimed by syscom?

It seems like the Royal Navy with all those battleships and cruisers did a lousy job in softening the German defences before the arrival of the invasion troops; upon landing they were promptly annihilated. 

Following the logic of some guys here (the Kriegsmarine is a miniscule force, badly battered by the time Dieppe occurred, incapable of mounting any signigicant operations) is that i assume the Royal Navy had "absolute control" of the sea areas around the stormed beaches and there "was absolutely nothing to fear" from the Kriegsmarine. Unbelievable. A critical failure. 

I know the RAF was far from being in a comfortable position, since the Luftwaffe had fearsome units in the sector, but what the RAF certainly had was the numbers to put up a braver fight to support the failed invasion attempt. We now the RAF too got beaten, big time. The RAF is awarded the donkey ears too.

In fact, it would seem like Dieppe is the only 100% British-Commonwealth amphibious invasion attempt in the ETO:100% a failure. Not what you´d call a good record.

Again i will bring forward the experiences of the US Navy in the Pacific in the form of a question:

Was there any amphibious operation carried out by the Navy that ended with the extermination of the Marine force landed? I believe the answer to this simple question should be a loud "NO".

As i seem to recall not a single US amphibious operation failed, ever...and please notice i am not referring to Okinawa or Iwo Jima which occurred in a time when the IJN had virtually ceased to exist or was battered in such a manner it no longer implied any sort of significant risk against the amphibious operations. No. The amphibious operations of the Navy in the Pacific were successful even in times when the IJN was still a formidable naval army, including the presence of significant Japanese aerial forces. Not without mistakes, mishaps and losses (that were certainly high), but successful in the end. 

Why the success? Sufficient numbers at the right time in the right place and proper coordination between warships, aircraft and the landed troops. 

Akcnowledged are the differences between naval warfare in the Pacific and Europe. There is, however, one element that should be common whatever the theather of operations: victory. And it was victory that the Royal Navy proved incapable of contributing to attain without the critical aid of the US Navy in Europe.


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## Civettone (Apr 4, 2007)

That's a worthy final post  

I also think we've pretty much repeating our arguments in these last posts. This has been a rollercoaster discussion, at least a page a day!

But I have a feeling it ain't over yet! 
Kris


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 4, 2007)

Lets take a look at the Dieppe raid and wonder if the Germans would of/could of done better (or worse) in a Sealion invasion, where they faced a more difficult tactical situation:

The RN attached no vessles larger than a destroyer to Operation Jubilee, and then only 8 of those (out of the 70 or so available in Home Waters), as well as 45 smaller vessels. The destroyers did not have the weight of fire to destroy German defences, or permission to close to shallower waters to provide direct fire support (which would of been difficult as there were no ship to shore communications). Even with such a small naval force, the KM made no more than a token appearance.

The operation required over 200 landing craft for just 1 division, 1 battalion and 3 small commando units. Despite an MGB/ML escort one of the LCT cloumns got scattered and took losses from a by German S-boat patrol, while another was broken up through a combination of poor naviagtion at night and heavy seas. The German's would have a thinner defensive screen for far more lading craft and face heavier naval opposition than the Allies did at Dieppe.

At the actual landings fixed beach defences managed to inflict significant casualties, preventing the landing forces from advancing and eventually prompting them to retreat. The S-boats that had encountered the landing craft had warned the German defences, so that they were prepared. There was no element of surprise. If the original Sealion landing plans were to be followed, the Germans would arrive in a similarly thick defensive belt (around Dover and Folkestone). Given that the LW and WM signal traffic was compromised, having the element of suprise for a 1942 Sealion is unlikely. 

Despite overwhelming aerial superiority (70 squadrons of fighters) the Allies lost in the air at a roughtly 2:1 ratio (91 Allied fighters lost vs 48 LuftWaffe aircraft lost ). Pilot losses were far worse: 64 Allied pilots lost, compared to 14 pilots lost from JG 2 and JG 26. The Allies could not completely prevent fighters from straffing the beaches and landing vessels either, as the Luftwaffe began to use the advantages of radar, ground co-ordination and local superiority when they arrive (i.e. picking their fights). The RAF would enjoy a similar advantage over home territory. 


Germany is going to face these problems, plus the additional handicaps of no numerial aerial superiority and no numerical naval superiority. Do you really believe they can just brush aside the aerial, naval and land defences with a wave of the Furher's hand?


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## Hop (Apr 4, 2007)

> Oh? Given the good weather and having a 1000 bombers flying up to 5 missions a day, I see this force eradicated in two days max.



And in good weather, with 1,000 bombers, in a month in 1940 the Luftwaffe managed to sink a few destroyers and a handful of coasters.

I foresee, given good weather, the AA gunners of the RN warships shooting down all 1,000 German bombers in two days max.

Of course, that's about as realistic as your prediction, but hey, if we are basing things on what could possibly happen, rather than on historical performance...



> Which makes them even more vulnerable against bombers as you would no longer have concentrated AA fire.



And yet in Crete, with _no_ air cover, small groups of warships operated under German attack for days. Some were lost, the rest carried out their duties.



> So that makes you conclude that they couldn't manage to handle a 1000? It's not up to me to prove that they could.



On the contrary. As the Luftwaffe never managed a thousand bomber raid against any target, ever, it's very much up to you to prove they could. Especially as no air force has ever managed a thousand bombers against a fleet in a day, ever.



> If the allies can do it, so can the Germans.



The allies never flew 1000 bombers against a fleet of warships.



> 1000 (mostly) 4 engined bombers at night compared to more agile aircraft during the day. Remember, that there would be good visibility. As you know you can see Dover from Calais. From the sky you can see groups of ships over a distance of what? 50 miles? Hundred miles?



A hundred miles? Where do you come up with such figures?



> And don't forget that the Germans had specialized reconaissance aircraft with radar to locate these groups.



No. The Germans entire stock of ASV radar aircraft in 1942 was a single He 111, fitted with a captured British radar, and operating in the Mediterranean. 



> I'm still not convinced. The big majority of troops were soldiers, not docters, storemen, clerks and drivers.



According to Dupuy, in US infantry divisions 50% were front line troops, the other 50% were support staff. In German infantry divisions, 60% were front line troops.

However, that's just infantry divisions. Armoured units had far fewer front line, and a much longer "tail". And headquarters units, engineering units etc were all tail.



> Also the supply bit I don't understand. If the amount of troops hardly increased, why would they need more supplies than on the first day?



They'd need a bit more in the way of supplies to replace broken equipment. However, the main point is that even with the same supplies each day, you have far less capacity.

Don't forget, the "self loading cargo" (people) is the easy bit. They get off by themselves, and make their way off the beach. The difficulty is the supplies and equipment they need. And they need the same supplies, and some equipment, every day.



> Naval forces assigned to Operation Fuller were:





> Having all these forces put on alert is not caring about three ships sailing through the Channel?



I don't think you are reading what the source is saying. Those are the forces present in the area, and some forces that weren't even in the area at all. Few of those were "put on alert".

To take a few examples, HMS Belfast is in that list. In Feb 1942 she was in dry dock being repaired and refitted. She didn't become operational until November 1942. How do you put a ship in dry dock, in the middle of a refit, "on alert"?

4 battleships are listed, but the source points out none of them were used for Fuller.



> Hop, I don't understand how you draw the conclusions you draw from rather clear-cut information?



The clear cut information is very different from how you are trying to portray it.

Card on the table. Can you tell me the source for the list of British naval forces you posted? Because doing a Google search for one of the lines "HMS Plover, controlled minelayer " comes up with only one site:
Order of Battle - Operation Cerberus - 11-13 February 1942

Now, I haven't bothered going through the list to see if there are discrepancies, but one thing jumps out. You listed all these vessels under the heading:

*Naval forces assigned to Operation Fuller were:* 

That site lists them as:

*NAVAL FORCES*

Nothing about "assigned to operation fuller". *That smacks of a deliberate attempt to mislead.*

I'd really, really like to see a different site you quoted from, that says exactly what you quoted.

As to what was actually assigned to operation Fuller. From Engage the Enemy More Closely by Barnett:


> Both the Admiralty and the Royal Air Force began to put into operation contingency plans matured over a whole year for dealing with a German dash up the Channel and through the Straits of Dover. Air squadrons were placed at indefinite short notice, while the C-in-C Nore (Vice Admiral Sir George H D'O. Lyon) was requested to reinforce Dover Command with *six destroyers* and up to *six motor torpedo boats*. The Admiralty also placed the minelayer Manxman under Dover's orders. The Naval Staff History rightly comments that the striking power of these naval forces *"was not great"*. At the request of the Vice Admiral, Dover (still Bertram Ramsay), *six Swordfish* of 825 squadron, Fleet Air Arm, at Manston in Kent were placed at his disposal.



That's about it for the naval forces. 



> That's incorrect. That would have meant that they would have withdrawn all the other surface vessels too as they were just as exposed to the RAF.



It's exactly correct. They withdrew all their major surface vessels, everything destroyer sized and above.



> Once again, give me some examples. And don't leave out what they would have given up.



If the Germans were planning an invasion, a few simple changes would be decreased RAF bombing of Germany, and increased attacks on the channel ports, and in particular Brest.

Another would have been moving the fleet out of Scapa Flow if German heavy units were in the south to support an invasion.

Another would be even more mining of the beaches, and even more mining of the channel.



> Well, it was 50...
> 
> Here's from answers.com in case you don't believe me: Ultra staff and technology successfully decoded over 50 messages a week. However, by 1942, German radio and wire traffic increased exponentially. The 1,200 member staff of Bletchley Park could not efficiently decipher the thousands of intercepts received daily.



Answers.com is a mirror for wikipedia. Anyone can go in and change any of the figures. As such, it's not very reliable. 

Can I ask you a question?

You claim that the Channel Dash, a quick run through the Channel by German warships in poor weather in the short nights of February proved the British couldn't stop a German invasion by barges and freighters.

What does the _daily_ running of slow convoys of merchants through the channel in July 1940 prove about German capabilities to stop the RN?

Because those convoys, which ran almost every day in July, are a damn sight easier targets than RN warships at speed. And the German naval force in February was a damn sight harder target than a load of barges and freighters approaching the British coast would be in July.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 4, 2007)

Hop said:


> And in good weather, with 1,000 bombers, in a month in 1940 the Luftwaffe managed to sink a few destroyers and a handful of coasters.



Well that's the usual boasting statement but where are the facts?
How many destroyers, how many steamers were sunk? How many of those 1000 bombers were flying sorties _against shipping_, what % of it's force the LW was committing into the attack? A tiny fraction at best, the attacks on shipping were chiefly performed by dive bombers, and during the July a mere 12 of those were lost to enemy action, and generally German losses being slight, which gives you the idea on the 'scale' of the operations, or rather, initial skirmishes.

Of course your story changes every time. I've seen you argue that the Germans were waging vast scale terror bombing campaign in July 1940 against te British mainland, now when it fits you claim actually they were concentrating on shipping in all July with full strenght. The fiction changes according to the needs.

The evacuation of Dunkeque, which lasted only a few days and saw limited LW action, resulted in 9 destroyers sunk (5 to air attacks), 19 being damaged and put out of service, and over 250 other smaller vessels sunk. That was achieved by, IIRC apprx. 1000 or less bomber sorties flown, in less than 4 days operation.



> And yet in Crete, with _no_ air cover, small groups of warships operated under German attack for days. Some were lost, the rest carried out their duties.



In fiction. In reality, the first air attacks were pressed against RN units around Crete on the morning of 21st May 1941. At around 04:30 on the 23rd Cunningham was force to recall all forces to Alexandria.

At this time Cunningham was very conscious of the exhausted state of his men, and the dangers from the air. He signaled the Chiefs of Staff that it was his view that the fleet could not operate off Crete in daylight. The view of the Chiefs of Staff was that the situation on the island could not be allowed to deteriorate further, and the fleet must operate in daylight to prevent the Germans from strengthening their position.

Losses so far in the 3 days; 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 1 battleship out of action, 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers seriously damaged. A signal from Middle East to London gave the situation; "Situation with navy critical. Unable to reinforce or supply Crete except by fast warships at night." 

That caused by a fraction of the LW's bombers operating against shipping.




> On the contrary. As the Luftwaffe never managed a thousand bomber raid against any target, ever, it's very much up to you to prove they could.



Hop, even you should understand that if the LW has well over 1000 bombers at hand (closer to 1500 in fact),_ then it can be done._

Of course, there's hardly any military target that would require a concentration of _1000 bombers_. That's not to say 1000 bomber sorties are not possible.



> What does the _daily_ running of slow convoys of merchants through the channel in July 1940 prove about German capabilities to stop the RN?



Well you still owe the facts regarding those convoys to make your point.

Cunnigham found that after 2 days of continous LW attacks performed by a fraction of the LW bombers, he could no longer operate in daylight due to air attacks. Men were utterly exhausted, AA munition was all used up - these are the realities of ships vs. endless air attacks.


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## Glider (Apr 4, 2007)

Before everyone signs off can I ask anyone else who thinks that the Germans could have pulled off an invasion to reply to this posting that I entered a few days ago.
They say silence is golden but these points are pretty important and as far as I can tell often ignored as the those in favour of the invasion working tend to ignore the airforces available to the UK whilst making some big assumptions as to how they are going to increase the number of aircraft available to their own forces.

Kris
Quote
The various info regarding the testing of the british barges and their seaworthiness.

Reply
Many thanks for the info, I need to amend my views, but, and it’s a big but, they were not assault craft. It’s a huge risk. The quote was from Ian Allen book British Warships of WW2 re the use of derricks and seaworthiness.

Quote
Re the Japanese comments on the invasion plans and preparations

Reply
Its not on line but in a book called the Burning Blue ISBN 0-7126-6475-0. The book is supposed to be about the BOB which contains nothing new but it does have some comments on the American and Japanese views of the BOB including a section on the aftermath including the comments mentioned re the invasion.

Quote
Re the resources assigned to the Channel Dash
The Germans had 250 fighters for that job. In my scenario (with increased production and the fighters withdrawn from the Ostfront) they would have had 5 times more fighters, if not more.

Reply
I realise this, but the area covered is hundreds of times larger and the resources are going to be thin, very thin even with 5 times the aircraft. You yourself said that to keep one unit overhead on a CAP requires 5 in total, I was allowing for a surge due to the invasion. 
Using the 1 to 3 ratio 1500 fighters will give you 500 overhead all day and that is pushing it.
If you want to hold back a reserve to support bombers attacking a key area or a RN attack then you have less overhead. 
The RAF in May 42 had 42 squadrons of Spits (Squadrons of the RAF) call it 650 planes a number that would have increased with the threat of invasion. 650 alone would be sufficient to give your 500 planes overhead a very hard time as they can attack and retreat at will, choosing their moment. Not forgetting the 21 attack squadrons of fighter bombers mentioned before. 
Remember these were in place and are minimum numbers. An invasion threat would have pulled out all the stops.
Remember these numbers exclude the RCAF who were in the UK at the time.

Quote
Even more than three units! So with only 1/5 (or so) of the German fighters destined for CAPs they would form a truly minimal CAP while the bulk of the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy. That's the choice I'm making, that's the gamble. With the bulk of the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy, the RAF would have to choose too. Attack the troops or attack the German dive bombers. My guess is that they would probably try to do both. Do you agree?

Reply
The British have 650 plus fighters to escort the RN and 21 squadrons plus of GA planes to run amok attacking your troops, support vessels anything they can find against minimal opposition. They would have a field day

Quote
The Kriegsmarine was quite capable of dealing with the British Channel Fleet. 

Reply
With what?, the BC’s are in the Atlantic and you have a handful of cruisers and destroyers. The RN has KGV’s, Nelsons, Queen Elizabeth class, numerous cruisers and compared to the Germans, almost unlimited numbers of destroyers. All intent on death and destruction and hang the losses as this is make or break time for the war.

Quote
And I'm just wondering if torpedoes wouldn't go underneath barges??

Reply
Actually they wouldn’t go under, but it doesn’t matter, one 4in or 4.7in shell would do the job. Torpedo’s would be a waste but the MTB’s would use them.

Quote
Well, that's exactly what I'm planning on doing. If the Germans can hold on to Stalingrad, they can also hold on to the British beaches for a couple of days.

Reply
Then Germany lose, big time. The key to an invasion, any invasion, is that you build up your forces faster than the enemy. 
If the defender wins the race, the Invasion forces are trapped and unable to move against dug in defenders with support.
If the invader wins the race, they break through and get into the rear of the enemy forcing a retreat. 
Give the British 2 days and you are trapped, with nowhere to go.

Quote
Where are you going to get those Australians from? Australia decided that its troops would fight in the Pacific. SAAF was already in Africa. So if you pull back the RAF I can also pull back the Luftwaffe? 
As such I don't think pulling back your units will do you any good.

Reply
You have said it yourself. If the GAF pull out of North Africa then the RAF can leaving the Italians to face the SAAF. Fair comment on the RAAF but my money is on the SAAF.
It gives the RAF an additional 10 squadrons of Hurricanes, 3 of Spitfires and 4 of Kittyhawks. You now have 31 squadrons of GA planes causing hell while your CAP is close to zero. The German army is going to love you.

Quote
I don't care what the British are capable of. You said the Germans didn't have the minesweepers needed. I showed they did.
Reply
Not quite. You showed me a number which I didn’t disagree with, plus I gave a suggestion as to how the difference could have been made up and the basis for my number. I have done more digging and the Germans had a class of Motor Minesweepers called R Boats and these are small naval vessels designed for the job and more likely to have been the cause of the difference. Basically these were the size of an S boat but slower and used for a number of roles including minelaying and escort.
The British equivalent was the Fairmile B, and both were considered as part of coastal forces by the German and British navies.

Quote
Re the ability to destroy the BC in dock
Read Kurfürst post: BC tried for months and couldn't destroy their target!! And you say it's good enough?

Reply
As per my last posting yes, that’s good enough for me. 350 bombers would play merry hell in the enclosed landing area. 
By the way this is based on Sterlings, Halifax’s, Manchesters, Wellingtons, Whitleys and Lancasters in front line squadrons, so my original assumption of 6000lb a plane as payload is on the low side by some margin, its probably around 8-9000lb. 
Nowhere have I included the Bostons, Hampdens, Hudsons, Blenhiems who would have done something. Also the first 1000 bomber raid was in 1942 so the 350 assumption is also way down on what would have been possible.

Quote
Re opposing forces at Anzio
Don't change your point. You said the Allies were outnumbered. Do you take this back or not?

Reply
Sorry but I never said the allies were outnumbered. My whole point has been that the Allies had the greater numbers but couldn’t get off the beach as the area was under artillery fire and to small to manoeuvre in. Please point out where I made this statement and I will change it.

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Re ability of nightfighters. 
In essence you are saying that my premise that having Ground Radar under local control directing the defending British nightfighters onto the incoming German nightfighters wouldn’t be a great advantage. This is because the ground radar at the time is not accurate enough to direct the defending fighter to with the radar range of the incoming German planes. 
Also that the Me110 had little to fear from the Beaufighter, as few 110 nightfighters were lost to Beaufighters.

Reply
I am absolutely confident that Erich would support my premise because the British had been using this basis for interceptions since Oct 1940 and by May 1942 it was well practiced and very successful. German losses on raids at night over Britain were alarming as a percentage of the planes involved which backs up the scenario.

Over to you, enjoy


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## Civettone (Apr 4, 2007)

Hop said:


> And in good weather, with 1,000 bombers, in a month in 1940 the Luftwaffe managed to sink a few destroyers and a handful of coasters.


Strange how you come up with information the next day and disregard it the other. During that Channel Phase you were talking about you gave the figure of a 1000 bomber sorties of which 70%* were directed against naval shipping (which to me also meant attacks on ports). I'm talking about 5000 sorties a day and this with better bombers and better crews. I just look at Pedestal (or even Crete?), look at the number of warships sunk by the Luftwaffe with a fraction of those sorties and see the number go up, even with British fighters. 
How you can foresee the AA gunners of the Royal Navy shooting down ALL 1000 German bombers in two days ... isn't even funny anymore.




> Of course, that's about as realistic as your prediction, but hey, if we are basing things on what could possibly happen, rather than on historical performance...


I am basing it on historical performance: the RAF lost twice the number of fighters although confronted with a smaller amount of German fighters. The LW sank quite a lot of ships in Pedestal, Crete and even Dunkirk. I just make the calculation. That's basing it on historical performance. 

(* I very much doubt that 70% was against shipping. Because although I quoted the BoB diares, I left out the night bombing as this was not relevant to the discussion we had at that time. What I can tell is that at least 70% of the missions were not against shipping. Not the same thing as missions of course...)




> A hundred miles? Where do you come up with such figures?


I didn't. It was a question. How far can you see from the air? All I know is you can see the British coast from the Belgian coast on good weather. Isn't that a 100 miles? Of course a ships, even a convoy, is too small to be seen at just a distance. 




> No. The Germans entire stock of ASV radar aircraft in 1942 was a single He 111, fitted with a captured British radar, and operating in the Mediterranean.


That doesn't make sense as the Germans found the H2S so much better than their own Rostock radar. Wouldn't that mean that the Fw 200C-4 (with Rostock) was already operational by then?




> However, the main point is that even with the same supplies each day, you have far less capacity.


I understand that but I still don't see how they come from 100,000 men to 10,000 men a day.




> I don't think you are reading what the source is saying. Those are the forces present in the area, and some forces that weren't even in the area at all. Few of those were "put on alert".


Well, all I did was take a OOB. And coupled with _The RN went on immediate notice every night from the beginning of February, against a nighttime passage through the Straits of Dover._ then that makes me conclude the Channel Fleet was put on alert. 




> Nothing about "assigned to operation fuller". *That smacks of a deliberate attempt to mislead.*


Well, that reminds me of that list of targets you listed during the Channel Phase. I also asked if you were deliberately misusing information. I also had the feeling when you came up with 3 fighters for every bomber. That's finding information and using it for your purpose. I haven't said anything more about it because I shouldn't doubt your intentions. Likewise, you shouldn't question mine. I interpreted the way I did. No bad intentions.




> If the Germans were planning an invasion, a few simple changes would be decreased RAF bombing of Germany, and increased attacks on the channel ports, and in particular Brest.


Doesn't matter. Most of the Luftwaffe would be send to France. 
And moving British night bombing to France would result in a move of German nightfighters and Flak. 




> Another would have been moving the fleet out of Scapa Flow if German heavy units were in the south to support an invasion.


I doubt it. Tirpitz was still in Norway. 




> Another would be even more mining of the beaches, and even more mining of the channel.


Ok, taking the German minesweepers from the Baltic, including those from the double minesweeper production. 



> Answers.com is a mirror for wikipedia. Anyone can go in and change any of the figures. As such, it's not very reliable.


It is not reliable, ergo it's wrong? 




> What does the _daily_ running of slow convoys of merchants through the channel in July 1940 prove about German capabilities to stop the RN?


Like in the beginning of my post. A 1000 sorties all through July. And only half of them against shipping? And that's with untrained crews and less suited German bombers. 

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 4, 2007)

David, can you edit your post? It seems you copied and pasted an older post in your new post... 

Kris


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## renrich (Apr 4, 2007)

Udet, You make some good points about the US Navy and the Pacific Amphib. landings. However, in doing so I believe you undermine your own arguments. To begin with, the Dieppe Raid was a raid not an invasion. It had very limited objectives, the resources utilised by the British were limited and although a fiasco, to censure the British and the RN severely seems to be excessive to me. If you look at the major amphibious invasions carried out by the Allies in WW2 both in Europe and the Pacific you will notice particular characteristics. The first one is that the Allies controlled the sea almost exclusively. The second one was that they controlled the air above the sea totally or almost totally. The exceptions to that were that the Allies had not total control of the air at Sicily, Salerno and Okinawa. They had total control in N. Africa, Anzio, Normandy and Southern France(all of which the British played a large role in) and in the rest of the Pacific landings. In those landings where absolute air supremacy was not obtained however there was no enemy naval forces of any importance to deal with. If the Allies had had to deal with serious opposition in the air as well as a powerful enemy naval force then those landings might have failed or may have never been attempted. Let us remember that the US politicians and commanders were pushing for a cross channel invasion of France in 1943. They were dissuaded by the British because the Brits knew that the Allies could not muster enough landing craft by 1943 to do the job and air supremacy would have been problematical at best. Let us examine an amphibious invasion in the Pacific that came close to failing. Guadalcanal was unopposed in the landing and the US had air and sea supremacy. The Navy pulled back their carriers and control of the air was lost so the supply ships left without unloading all the supplies necessary to sustain the landing force. Also the IJN sent a TF down the Slot and decimated the covering force of cruisers( Battle of Savo Island, worst naval defeat in US history, one of my uncles was on the only surviving Allied cruiser) The issue was in serious doubt but the Japanese had not enough troops on the island to take advantage of the situation. Control of the sea teetered back and forth as well as air control with the IJN landing reinforcements at night and the Allies having a tenuous control of the air in the daytime. The Henderson Field fliers kept the IJN at bay in the daytime as well as fighting the land based Japanese bombers to a standoff. The Marines barely hung on by teeth and toenail. If the Japanese had been able to concentrate and coordinate their forces they could have prevailed but were never able to do so. To reiterate if the Japanese had been able to attain air supremacy by knocking out Henderson Field and suppressing the US carriers then their naval forces could have denied the Marines any reinforcement and resupply and the battle was over. That would be the situation I would see in a Sealion II except the landing would not be unapposed and I doubt the ability of the Wehrmacht to gain much more than a beachhead.


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## pbfoot (Apr 4, 2007)

I'm not sure if this has been mentioned but the RN did not wish to espose any heavy units for the Dieppe raid for fear of losses the same can be said for the heavy bombers that were available but not used


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## Hop (Apr 5, 2007)

> How many destroyers, how many steamers were sunk?



I posted the quote from Wood and Dempster earlier in this thread.



> Of course your story changes every time. I've seen you argue that the Germans were waging vast scale terror bombing campaign in July 1940 against te British mainland,



Source for this? (Note to other readers, Kurfurst likes to make up quotes by other people)

I've never said anything of the sort. German bombing of Britain was light in 1940, although they did bomb at night. It wasn't until late August they really began stepping up night bombing of British cities.



> In fiction. In reality, the first air attacks were pressed against RN units around Crete on the morning of 21st May 1941. At around 04:30 on the 23rd Cunningham was force to recall all forces to Alexandria.



No, Cunningham ordered Force A to return to Alexandria. The rest returned briefly for ammunition.

RN losses by this point were:

Juno (destroyer)
Greyhound (destroyer)
Gloucester (cruiser)
Fiji (cruiser)

The last of the ships sunk wasn't until the 1st of June.



> Hop, even you should understand that if the LW has well over 1000 bombers at hand (closer to 1500 in fact), then it can be done.



Can it? The Luftwaffe had well over 1,000 bombers to hand in the BoB, they never once managed 1000 bomber sorties in a night, let alone a day.



> Well you still owe the facts regarding those convoys to make your point.
> 
> Cunnigham found that after 2 days of continous LW attacks performed by a fraction of the LW bombers, he could no longer operate in daylight due to air attacks.



But he did still operate in daylight. On the 26th May, Force A was about 50 miles due south of Crete at 1.30 in the afternoon. The next day at 9 am they were heading for Kasos island, NE of Crete.

The Glenroy, Coventry Stuart and Jaguar were attacked by stukas at 6.20 on the 26th,



> Strange how you come up with information the next day and disregard it the other. During that Channel Phase you were talking about you gave the figure of a 1000 bomber sorties of which 70%* were directed against naval shipping (which to me also meant attacks on ports). I'm talking about 5000 sorties a day and this with better bombers and better crews.



I'm trying to point out that 5,000 sorties a day is utter fantasy.

In the BoB the Germans deployed about 1,900 bombers and dive bombers against Britain. Their peak number of sorties in a week was just over 2,100, day and night. Only 3 weeks during the BoB did they manage to fly over 2,000 sorties a week.

And you suggest they fly 5,000 a _day_?



> How you can foresee the AA gunners of the Royal Navy shooting down ALL 1000 German bombers in two days ... isn't even funny anymore.



I agree. It's as ridiculous as them sinking all RN ships in 2 days, or the Luftwaffe flying 5,000 bomber sorties a day.



> I am basing it on historical performance: the RAF lost twice the number of fighters although confronted with a smaller amount of German fighters.



But flying totally different missions. The Luftwaffe were flying interceptions of small bombing raids, that were attacking targets the Germans didn't really care about. As such, the Germans had the advantage, to a far greater extent than the RAF possessed during the BoB (the RAF were defending targets they _had_ to defend during the BoB)



> The LW sank quite a lot of ships in Pedestal, Crete and even Dunkirk. I just make the calculation. That's basing it on historical performance.



No, it's not. Take Crete. 600 Luftwaffe combat aircraft managed to sink 9 RN warships over 10 days. With no air cover.

During the BoB, 3,000 Luftwaffe aircraft managed to sink about 20 ships (nearly all small merchants) over a period of a month. 



> I very much doubt that 70% was against shipping.



That's what Hooton says. Considering that practically every figure you have come up with has been wrong, I know which source I'll trust.



> I didn't. It was a question. How far can you see from the air?



Depends what you are looking at, and the visibility. The smaller the target, the harder to see. 



> All I know is you can see the British coast from the Belgian coast on good weather. Isn't that a 100 miles?



At it's closest point, on the Belgian/French border, the distance is almost exactly 50 miles. At the most distant point, on the Belgian/Dutch border, the distance is just over 80 miles. Ostend is about 65 miles.

That's looking towards Kent. If you look towards East Anglia, the distance is about 80 miles.



> That doesn't make sense as the Germans found the H2S so much better than their own Rostock radar. Wouldn't that mean that the Fw 200C-4 (with Rostock) was already operational by then?



The Germans didn't capture an H2S set until Feb 1943, and it was some time before they understood what the badly damaged device was. So it wasn't until much later in 1943 they could compare it with their own radars, and Rostock was in service by then.

Hooton gives the following detailas of Luftwaffe surface search radar.

Fug Atlas tested July 1941
Fug Neptun-S tested some time later. Both "disappointing". Captured ASV Mk II tested against both German radars July 1942, and found to be "far superior". Rostock in development at this time, but production so low that by November 1942 only 5 surface search radars in use in the west, and one of those was the captured ASV II.

That means the Luftwaffe might have had 1 effective radar just coming into use in the summer of 1942, but that's not going to be much use in a battle, as it takes time to integrate the radar, learn to use it properly, etc.



> Well, all I did was take a OOB.



But you labelled it "assigned to Operation Fuller" when it wasn't, and the source didn't say it was.



> And coupled with The RN went on immediate notice every night from the beginning of February, against a nighttime passage through the Straits of Dover.



It wasn't. Barnett goes into more detail about the alert status:



> Both the Admiralty and the Royal Air Force began to put into operation contingency plans matured over a whole year for dealing with a German dash up the Channel and through the Straits of Dover. Air squadrons were placed at indefinite short notice, while the C-in-C Nore (Vice Admiral Sir George H D'O. Lyon) was requested to reinforce Dover Command with six destroyers and up to six motor torpedo boats. The Admiralty also placed the minelayer Manxman under Dover's orders. The Naval Staff History rightly comments that the striking power of these naval forces "was not great". At the request of the Vice Admiral, Dover (still Bertram Ramsay), six Swordfish of 825 squadron, Fleet Air Arm, at Manston in Kent were placed at his disposal.


<snip bit>


> He could not expect his "slender forces" to remain on standby indefinitely, and therefore must determine as best he could the likely time of German arrival in the Straights of Dover.


<snip more about speculation on when the Germans would transit the straights>


> Ramsay's plan was to launch combined attacks by Swordfish and motor torpedo boats in the straights, in order to cripple the enemy while he was in range of British shore based batteries and radar; and later to launch a destroyer attack beyond the Straight to the eastward where the destroyers would have freedom to manoeuvre unconstrained by British minefields or enemy shore batteries



Ramsay had control of all the naval forces for the operation, and that was it. MTBs, 6 destroyers, 6 Swordfish. No mention in his planning of cruisers, battleships, submarines etc.



> It is not reliable, ergo it's wrong?



It's not sourced. It's simply a claim, by an unknown person.

Even more, the wording 


> Ultra staff and technology successfully decoded over 50 messages a week. However, by 1942, German radio and wire traffic increased exponentially.



Suggests 50 messages a week was before 1942. They go on to describe the increase in message traffic, and methods used to keep up with it.



> Like in the beginning of my post. A 1000 sorties all through July. And only half of them against shipping? And that's with untrained crews and less suited German bombers.



But that's the point. How much anti shipping training did the bulk of the Luftwaffe have? Those Stuka units operating in the heart of Russia would not have been well trained in anti shipping operations, would they?

You keep suggesting that the whole Luftwaffe bombing force, or most of it, would be making multiple attacks a day against the RN. But that's _your_ fantasy, not mine, I am basing my objections on the historical realities, not on fantasies the Luftwaffe was never capable of.

Lets give another example. You claim 10,000 anti shipping sorties in a day.

In August 1940, the Luftwaffe launched their all out offensive against the RAF, with bombing raids all over Britain, day and night (although concentrated in the SE, of course). Did they open with 10,000 bomber sorties on the first day? No, far less than 1,000.

In fact, it took them from 12th August to about the 17th September to make 10,000 bomber sorties. The entire critical period of the Battle, from Eagle day to after Battle of Britain day, from the German hopes of smashing the RAF in 3 days to Hitler postponing Sea Lion, occurred in the time it took the Luftwaffe to fly 10,000 bomber sorties.

If it took the Luftwaffe in 1940 over a month to fly 10,000 bomber sorties, of all sorts, day and night, how are they going to fly 10,000 anti shipping sorties in 2 days?


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## plan_D (Apr 5, 2007)

_"What about HMS Worcester?"_

What about it? You consider a few torpedo attacks by Royal Navy DDs against German BCs a fleet action? It makes me wonder what you consider the clashes between the IJN and USN as, "Super mega fleet actions"? 

Face it, the Channel Dash did not pitch fleet against fleet as the Royal Navy never met the convoy with a fleet. 

_"Interesting, especially in relationship to your previous post of how overstretched the Royal Navy already was. First Syscom asks for the USS Wasp and now you're calling back Force H. That leaves Malta unprotected.
Not to mention how long it would have taken Force H to get to the Channel. 
And you will leave a part of the Home Fleet in the north although it was much closer to the Channel than Force H was? Interesting to say the least."_

It does not leave Malta unprotected and even if it did, the German war machine seems to be so geared up for an invasion of Great Britain it would not matter. But, in reality, you forget about the fleet in Alexandria. 

It didn't take too long for Force H to sail from Gibraltar to the Bismarck, so it wouldn't be that long of a delay. In any case, it'd only be required in the event of the Kriegsmarine using its BCs. 
It's not that interesting, since the Royal Navy wouldn't need to use all the Home Fleet and could keep some left in Scapa Flow. Using some of Force H and some of the Home Fleet allows the Royal Navy to trap the entire force in the Channel. Stopping any retreat to Brest or Wilhelmshaven. 

_"Intense? From what I've read is that most of the German bombers were used to attack land targets. 
On the morning of 22 May, VIII Air Corps started an all-out attack on the British fleet
which suggests it wasn't an all-out attack before."_

The Royal Navy only sailed against the first invasion fleet the day before. Implying that the Royal Navy was being attacked when it first entered battle, and then suffered an "all out attack" the next day. 

_"Compare the British fleet around Crete with the Channel Fleet. Compare the number of German aircraft in Greece with the number which would have been assembled in France."_

So, the German numbers will be greater as will the RAF numbers. At Crete the RAF had no planes, so even a single Hurricane in Britain would have given them more strength than what they had on Crete. 

_"Are you saying the Kriegsmarine consisted solely of battlecruisers?"_

So, what else are you going to use? The out-gunned DDs or the vulnerable U-boats? 

_"What a joke. Since when did German HQ have anything to say? Since when did they care about losses?"_

The Germans cared about losses, this is summer 1942 ... not winter 1944. 

_"I think it's a pity you don't take the effort to read my previous posts. Bletchley Park and Enigma has already come up. And as nobody mentioned it since, I think my arguments were convincing that British Intelligence wasn't that all-knowing. They could decode about 20 messages a week. They failed to know about the Channel Dash or the outbreak of the Bismarck."_

I think it's a pity you don't have more of a clue. Your numbers are wrong; and the simple fact that ULTRA were critical in sinking the Bismarck (as I have mentioned) just makes this pathetic argument null and void.
Instead of looking at what you think ULTRA didn't know about, how about what they did know about? Every invasion made by the German war machine was known by Britain weeks before it happened, and that includes Barbarossa. 

_"Wrong! That's one of my essential arguments: they would no longer have the home advantage. If you would have read at least some of my posts, you would have read it as I already explained this 10 times.
The British aircraft would have to fight over the German held beaches and over the Channel which is not exactly friendly territory. Unlike the BoB the British squadrons would not be able to scramble in time as the Germans would be flying over the Channel when the RAF would take off.
Just like the Germans lost the BoB due to attrition, now the British will lose it for the same reason."_

My word, how can you just announce that it's wrong? Just because the Germans have set foot on the British sands it doesn't make the RAF fighters instantly lose home advantage. The British fighters had their radar cover, had the shortest distance to fly and had more chance of getting back to safe terrority. 

Have you even looked into the Battle of Britain? The Luftwaffe formations were often spotted over the Channel, and the RAF would still scramble in time. 

You would be throwing the Luftwaffe into the exact same situation they encountered in the Battle of Britain. Whoever is defending has the better position, fact. The only way to overcome that position is surprise, and an invasion like the one you're attempting wouldn't have surprise in any sense of the word.


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## daishi12 (Apr 5, 2007)

Hi Kris, could I just ask a quick question as to what basis do you have that the LW would be able to withdraw a significant proportion of it's forces from the Ostfront?

As far as I can see, there has been an assumption that Russia would have been neutralized as a threat. It is my opinion that for this to happen, the Werhmacht would have needed to have invaded and occupied several hundred thousand square kilometers of land including Murmansk, Kiev, Stalingrad, Moscow, Archangel, Kursk and the Crimea.

Given the depth of feeling that the Russians had for the invading Germans I would anticipate that there would be scattered large scale engagements and also continuous partisan activity.

How many men, tanks and aircraft could be pulled back from the Ostfront without giving Russia the opportunity for an overwhelming counter offensive?


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## Civettone (Apr 5, 2007)

Hop said:


> Can it? The Luftwaffe had well over 1,000 bombers to hand in the BoB, they never once managed 1000 bomber sorties in a night, let alone a day.


You draw the wrong conclusion. Just because they didn't use a 1000 bombers in one go, doesn't mean they couldn't. I've never eaten jumped off a bridge before, but that doesn't mean I wouldn't manage. 





> I'm trying to point out that 5,000 sorties a day is utter fantasy.


Are you saying 5 missions a day is impossible? The German Stukas and Bf 109 pilots managed just that on several occasions against the Russians under often difficult circumstances and with an inadequate supply system. 




> The Luftwaffe were flying interceptions of small bombing raids, that were attacking targets the Germans didn't really care about. As such, the Germans had the advantage


No, that's still not the reason why the Germans shot down twice as many fighters as the British did. What's the difference in dogfighting over Britain or dogfighting over France? I see three differences: fighting time, AA ground fire and pilots being captured when shot down. Only the first one could in some way give the advantage to the Germans. But all in all, the Spits were defeated by the German Bf 109s and Fw 190s fair and square. And it's not just France, just look at North Africa.


And another thing. A couple of people tell me that I don't take into account that the British would have done things differently than they historically did. I think that's true, they would have done things differently. I probably fail to think about this but the arguments of what the British would have done differently so far have not convinced me. 
But in all honesty, I also believe you guys are making the same mistake. You're thinking of a RAF which was there in 1942. But as I said, the bulk of the Luftwaffe would have been called back from the Ostfront and have confronted the RAF. As the Germans shot down twice as many as they lost, and they only had 250 fighters in France, you can imagine what that means when they have 1250 fighters. I'm not going to state that the British would have lost 5 times more fighters but I don't see how one can disagree that British losses would have been much higher.
Same thing goes for the British shipping and other targets. 5 times more bombers, 5 time more sorties.




> 600 Luftwaffe combat aircraft managed to sink 9 RN warships over 10 days.


Another example of how you bend the facts to represent what you want. First, it was not a target rich environment which makes it difficult to actually find targets and given the long distances, they could fly less sorties. Second, those Luftwaffe combat aircraft you mention did not have a primary goal of destroying the Royal Navy and attacking them for 10 days, what is what you're suggesting. And third, those 600 combat aircraft also include 1/3 fighter aircraft. 




> During the BoB, 3,000 Luftwaffe aircraft managed to sink about 20 ships (nearly all small merchants) over a period of a month.


Now you make it sound as if 3,000 aircraft were trying to sink ships over a month. Their primary mission was not to sink ships and how many of those aircraft were bombers capable of sinking ships?
And again, they weren't trained in anti-shipping.

And against Russia, fewer bombers were more succesful in sinking ships.




> Ostend is about 65 miles.


Good call. It was Ostend where I saw England's shore. So to come back to my point. I can imagine me seeing 50% further when I would be flying in an aircraft over Ostend.
As such visibility could be up to a 100 miles. Naturally one cannot see a ship from that distance but that's not what I was claiming.




> Rostock in development at this time, but production so low that by November 1942 only 5 surface search radars in use in the west, and one of those was the captured ASV II.


Thank you for the information. I'm not to proud to admit that I wasn't aware of this. All I knew was that the Germans compared the H2S with the Rostock so I assumed it was already operational. 




> But you labelled it "assigned to Operation Fuller" when it wasn't, and the source didn't say it was.


Fair enough. I did assume that the OOB meant these forces were available to Ramsay. 



> But that's the point. How much anti shipping training did the bulk of the Luftwaffe have? Those Stuka units operating in the heart of Russia would not have been well trained in anti shipping operations, would they?


Several units were trained in attacking naval targets. Those that weren't would have had months to train. 




> You keep suggesting that the whole Luftwaffe bombing force, or most of it, would be making multiple attacks a day against the RN. But that's _your_ fantasy, not mine, I am basing my objections on the historical realities, not on fantasies the Luftwaffe was never capable of.


It seems you make the BoB the standard for all Luftwaffe operations. The BoB was going to last for a longer period. If the Germans were planning on keeping up the offensive, they couldn't fly too many sorties. Same thing with Kursk, it was to be a short offensive of days not weeks. 
German bombers could fly up to 5 short-range missions a day. That's perhaps not your reality but unfortunately it's historical reality. I suggest you read up on Luftwaffe operations on the Eastern Front. 

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 5, 2007)

plan_D said:


> You consider a few torpedo attacks by Royal Navy DDs against German BCs a fleet action? It makes me wonder what you consider the clashes between the IJN and USN as, "Super mega fleet actions"?


Now now PlanD, you don't have to be right all the time. It's ok to just admit that it was a fleet action. So what if you forgot about Worcester? Big deal, it happens to the best of us. 




> It does not leave Malta unprotected and even if it did, the German war machine seems to be so geared up for an invasion of Great Britain it would not matter.


I thought you would say that but that's a problem in your reasoning. You think about moving units back to Britain for defending the island but you don't know when it's going to happen. As you (or Hop?) said, the British would prepare themselves as soon as Russia was out of the war, so starting in late 1941/early 1942. As the Germans were going to invade somewhere in April-July, they would have half a year of advantages. You make the logical error that the Germans will have to divert forces like the British would but in fact, the bulk of their forces would simply be withdrawn from Russia so they could keep up their presence elsewhere. 




> But, in reality, you forget about the fleet in Alexandria.


I wouldn't be too sure about that. I see Rommel winning in El Alamein and taking Alexandria and the Suez Channel. 




> The Royal Navy only sailed against the first invasion fleet the day before. Implying that the Royal Navy was being attacked when it first entered battle, and then suffered an "all out attack" the next day.


So? The Luftwaffe didn't all out attack the Royal Navy and lost an invasion fleet because of it. Then they attacked the Royal Navy and didn't lose an invasion fleet after that 




> So, the German numbers will be greater as will the RAF numbers. At Crete the RAF had no planes, so even a single Hurricane in Britain would have given them more strength than what they had on Crete.


You don't get it. The Germans had fighter aircraft in Greece. As the British didn't have fighters, these fighters were unopposed. If the British did have fighters, it wouldn't mean things would have been different: the Germans could have protected their bombers. 




> So, what else are you going to use? The out-gunned DDs or the vulnerable U-boats?


So now you're saying Germany only had battlecruisers, destroyers and U-boats? No cruisers, torpedoboats, Schellboote? 
And what do you mean by outgunned DDs? German destroyers had many weaknesses but at least their guns were bigger than those on British destroyers. 




> The Germans cared about losses, this is summer 1942 ... not winter 1944.


The Germans cared about losses? Did Hitler care about losses? Did Göring care about losses? Did German HQ have anything to say? 




> I think it's a pity you don't have more of a clue.


Yeah, I would probably also think it's a pity. But like you said I don't have a clue. So I don't even know I don't have a clue and should think it's a pity. Poor me...  




> and the simple fact that ULTRA were critical in sinking the Bismarck (as I have mentioned) just makes this pathetic argument null and void.
> Instead of looking at what you think ULTRA didn't know about, how about what they did know about?


 It's pretty clear cut to me. ULTRA provided the British with lots of information but not the whole story. They had to go on by indications like your example of the Bismarck showed. The British didn't decode a message saying when the Bismarck would sail. They didn't decode a message when the G&S would sail. And that's only naval matters. There are several more army related matters which the British failed to foresee. 
So to call my idea that the British might not decode a message that would tell them when the invasion would take place, pathetic is ok by me. But I think it's clear overestimation of British capabilities and underestimating the German ones. 
And don't forget that the Germans would have done their best to deceive the British by sending false information and using decoys. That's not wisful thinking from my part, that's logic thinking.




> The British fighters had their radar cover, had the shortest distance to fly and had more chance of getting back to safe terrority.


As many radar installations were close to the shore, I don't think they would have lasted that long. The British would have to move or rebuild some of them. 
The fighting would have taken place in two areas. 
One is the Channel. The British didn't have the distance advantage and as it would have been a contested area between both sides, the British would no longer have the home advantage. 
Two is the invasion area. The British would have the distance advantage but I already said there would be a CAP over the territory (with the disadvantages that come with it), so British scramble time is of less importance. But the British would have the disadvantage of flying and crashing over German held territory. Sure, they could try and fly back the friendly territory but usually you don't have a choice. You bail out because you have to. This will usually lead to landing over enemy territory. And if not, there's as much chance of drowing in the Channel as landing in British held territory.




> Have you even looked into the Battle of Britain? The Luftwaffe formations were often spotted over the Channel, and the RAF would still scramble in time.


And would intercept them over the Channel? 
I'm sure this happened but most fights did take place over land. 




> You would be throwing the Luftwaffe into the exact same situation they encountered in the Battle of Britain.


I already explained what the differences are. Fighting would no longer be over hostile territory. That is the main reason why the Germans lost the Bob: they lost because of attrition. This time, it'll be the RAF that will lose it.
And as you don't intend to use the entire Home Fleet to destroy my invasion fleet, I don't think those Royal Navy units will last long against against a thousand well-trained and well-suited dive bombers. Especially now that I know you'll be sending in Force H all the way from Gibraltar which is over 2,000 km away. 




> Whoever is defending has the better position, fact.


So my invasion troops that have dug in, are in a better position. My plan keeps on getting better and better. 

Kris


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## Glider (Apr 5, 2007)

As requested I have tried to edit your posting.



Civettone said:


> Hi David
> I must thank you for doing the effort of looking up stuff and backing up your arguments.
> 
> Don't really understand why you are enquiring about the "own power" notion. All I'm saying is that river barges were succesfully used by the British.
> ...



Many thanks for the info, I need to amend my views, but, and it’s a big but, they were not assault craft. It’s a huge risk. The quote was from Ian Allen book British Warships of WW2 re the use of derricks and seaworthiness.




> Thank you for adding this wonderful piece of information. It's completely new to me that the Japs were given a grand tour.
> On the other hand, I don't know what to conclude from it. I can imagine the Americans also being unimpressed when they would have seen it. It however does not mean they would have been unsuccesful. I also wonder what exactly those preparations are. What do they refer to? Do you have an online source for this so I can read up on it??



Its not on line but in a book called the Burning Blue ISBN 0-7126-6475-0. The book is supposed to be about the BOB which contains nothing new but it does have some comments on the American and Japanese views of the BOB including a section on the aftermath including the comments mentioned re the invasion



> The Germans had 250 fighters for that job. In my scenario (with increased production and the fighters withdrawn from the Ostfront) they would have had 5 times more fighters, if not more.



I realise this, but the area covered is hundreds of times larger and the resources are going to be thin, very thin even with 5 times the aircraft. You yourself said that to keep one unit overhead on a CAP requires 5 in total, I was allowing for a surge due to the invasion. 
Using my 1 to 3 ratio 1500 fighters will give you 500 overhead all day and that is pushing it.
If you want to hold back a reserve to support bombers attacking a key area or a RN attack then you have less overhead. 
The RAF in May 42 had 42 squadrons of Spits (Squadrons of the RAF) call it 650 planes a number that would have increased with the threat of invasion. 650 alone would be sufficient to give your 500 planes overhead a very hard time as they can attack and retreat at will, choosing their moment. Not forgetting the additional 21 attack squadrons of fighter bombers mentioned before. 
*Remember *these were in place and are minimum numbers. An invasion threat would have pulled out all the stops.
*Remember *these numbers exclude the RCAF who were in the UK at the time




> The Kriegsmarine was quite capable of dealing with the British Channel Fleet.
> And I'm just wondering if torpedoes wouldn't go underneath barges?? .



With what?, the BC’s are in the Atlantic and you have a handful of cruisers and destroyers. The RN has KGV’s, Nelsons, Queen Elizabeth class, numerous cruisers and compared to the Germans, almost unlimited numbers of destroyers. All intent on death and destruction and hang the losses as this is make or break time for the war.

Actually they wouldn’t go under, but it doesn’t matter, one 4in or 4.7in shell would do the job. Torpedo’s would be a waste but the MTB’s would use them



> Well, that's exactly what I'm planning on doing. If the Germans can hold on to Stalingrad, they can also hold on to the British beaches for a couple of days..


 
Then Germany lose, big time. The key to an invasion, any invasion, is that you build up your forces faster than the enemy. 
If the defender wins the race, the Invasion forces are trapped and unable to move against dug in defenders with support.
If the invader wins the race, they break through and get into the rear of the enemy forcing a retreat. 
Give the British 2 days and you are trapped, with nowhere to go




> Even more than three units! So with only 1/5 (or so) of the German fighters destined for CAPs they would form a truly minimal CAP while the bulk of the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy. That's the choice I'm making, that's the gamble. With the bulk of the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy, the RAF would have to choose too. Attack the troops or attack the German dive bombers. My guess is that they would probably try to do both. Do you agree? ..



The British have 650 plus fighters to escort the RN taking on your 500 and 21 squadrons plus of GA planes to run amok attacking your troops, support vessels anything they can find against minimal opposition due to your withdrawn/minimal CAP. They would have a field day and the resources to do both.



> Where are you going to get those Australians from? Australia decided that its troops would fight in the Pacific. SAAF was already in Africa. So if you pull back the RAF I can also pull back the Luftwaffe?
> As such I don't think pulling back your units will do you any good. ..



You have said it yourself. If the GAF pull out of North Africa then the RAF can leaving the Italians to face the SAAF. Fair comment on the RAAF but my money is on the SAAF.
It gives the RAF an additional 10 squadrons of Hurricanes, 3 of Spitfires and 4 of Kittyhawks which will certainly help. You now have 31 squadrons of GA planes causing hell while your CAP is close to zero. The German army is going to love your plan




> I don't care what the British are capable of. You said the Germans didn't have the minesweepers needed. I showed they did. ..



Not quite. You showed me a number which I didn’t disagree with, plus I gave a suggestion as to how the difference could have been made up and the basis for my number. I have done more digging and the Germans had a class of Motor Minesweepers called R Boats and these are small naval vessels designed for the job and more likely to have been the cause of the difference. Basically these were the size of an S boat but slower and used for a number of roles including minelaying and escort. The British equivalent was the Fairmile B, and both were considered as part of coastal forces by the German and British navies. 
Germany definately didn't have 90 fleet minesweepers and I was trying to help you out of our hole.



> Read Kurfürst post: BC tried for months and couldn't destroy their target!! And you say it's good enough? ..



As per my last posting yes, that’s good enough for me. 350 bombers would play merry hell in the enclosed landing area. PS the ships were not destroyed but they were hit a number of times, one by 5 bombs and the other 4. 
By the way this number is based on Sterlings, Halifax’s, Manchesters, Wellingtons, Whitleys and Lancasters in front line squadrons, so my original assumption of 6000lb a plane as payload is on the low side by some margin, its probably around 8-9000lb. 
Nowhere have I included the Bostons, Hampdens, Hudsons, Blenhiems who would have done something. Also the first 1000 bomber raid was in 1942 so the 350 assumption is also way down on what would have been possible.
*Remember *these are actual figures on planes in place. The German figures are based on huge assumptions




> Don't change your point. You said the Allies were outnumbered. Do you take this back or not? ..



Sorry but I never said the allies were outnumbered. My whole point has been that the Allies had the greater numbers but couldn’t get off the beach as the area was under artillery fire and to small to manoeuvre in. If the Germans outnumbered could hold the Allies then the Bitish outnumbered could hold the Germans.
Please point out where I made this statement and I will change it



> You're missing my point: because the Germans knew exactly where the bombers were, they didn't even need ground control (even though they did have the Liechtenstein radar).
> British night fighters were not very succesful in engaging German night fighters. Ask Erich if you don't believe me. In those early days the equipment was not advanced enough to have accurate positioning of the enemy, and the Beaufighter was not as good as the Mosquito. You have to remember one very very very important thing about nightfighting, and it's something which Erich taught me: the eyes are the most important weapons of nightfighters. Once within visual range that's all you got. German Bf 110s had 6 eyes.
> 
> I'm jus saying that the Germans didn't need to fear the Beaufighters. They didn't fear them when escorting their own bombers, so why would they fear them now? This is not my personal opinion, this is looking at loss figures of German nightfighters prior to the arrival of the Mosquito. ..



I am absolutely confident that Erich would support my premise that the British having Ground Radar Control would be a significant advantage because the British had been using this basis for interceptions since Oct 1940 and by May 1942 it was well practiced and very successful. German losses on raids at night over Britain were alarming as a percentage of the planes involved which backs up the scenario. Germany also used the same tactics over Germany with similar success.
It was very unusual for nightfighters to take each other on at this stage of the war. Both sides tended to fight over home ground hence the realative lack of losses on both sides.


Hope this helps and I await a reply with interest. Have Fun


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## bigZ (Apr 5, 2007)

I think the problem with a succesful invasion of Britain in 42 in this thread relies on too many suppositions. Like any plan it is only as good as its weakest point.

By 42 Bletchley park could easily read Luftwaffe and Heer messages using the Bombe. The Kriegsmarine was the toughest as operator procedure was stict unlike the other services but still could be cracked with Banburismus. By 43 it took 2 minutes to crack any Kriegsmarine message.


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 5, 2007)

> So my invasion troops that have dug in, are in a better position. My plan keeps on getting better and better.



Interesting definition of "better and better".

The Germans, facing the problem of assembling divisions on enemy soil to pursue an INVASION, decide to dig in.

Doesn't make any sense to me.

If the Wehrmarcht is dug in statically after the first day, then all they have is their initial lodgement area with which to marshall the follow up forces. No room to maneouver, deploy armour, artillery, field hospitals, HQ areas, ammunition dumps or build airfields and supply depots. 

Looking at similarly sized opposed landings (Salerno, Dragoon, Normandy, Nth Africa) in WW2, infantry forces advanced a maximum of about 1-3 miles inland while heavily or moderately opposed, 3-5 miles while lightly opposed and 6-8 miles while unopposed. Suppose the initial landings are only lightly opposed and the Germans advance about 4 miles inland and then dig in to wait for reserve divisions.

This puts their entire beach head under the guns of the RRA (not to mention the RN).

In June 1942 there were 52 light/field regiments (25lbrs or some with older QF3.7 inch Howitzers) of 3 x 8 guns each, 15 Medium regiments (4.5" or 6", some with the new 5.5" or older 60 lbrs on new carriages) of 2 x 8 guns and 5 heavy regiments (5.5", 6" and 2 regiments with the new 7.2") of 2 x 4 guns. That is a total of approximately 1,500 guns, of which about 1,100 are in central or southern UK, with the rest at training commands or in Wales and Ireland. 

This, of course, discounts the "super heavy" and fixed costal emplacements in the south of England and the Anti-Tank regiments, some of which were equipped with 2 x 3.7" AA guns in an anti-tank role, in addition to the 2 pounders or 6 pounders. The 3.7" gun were never almost used for AT work though, and they were converted back into the AAA role. 

(There are other such interesting abberations in the RRA anti tank regiments deployed to the home forces in 1941. Concerned that the 6lbr wasn't being delivered fast enough, some 100 3" inch guns were converted for anti tank duties and mounted on modified 25 lbr carriages, which had actually been recently redesigned to accomodate the 17 pounder AT gun. 50 of there were then passed on to the Home Guard, who promptly mounted them in pill boxes because they didn't have big enough trucks to transport them. Unfortunatley, performance details on them are scanty at best, but in 1942 a 12.5 lbs AP shell at 2,100 fps is going to hurt whatever it hits.) 

Even if only 10% of these guns are available on the first day, every sucessive day is going to see a rapid build up of artillery, infantry and armour to oppose the landing while the Home Guard and local divisions aim to fight a delayinng battle. 

The Germans need WEIGHT if they are to succed with Sealion. Weight of numbers in infantry and armour, weight of supply, weight of reinforcements. If you go static in the initial phase (fisrt two or three days), then its VERY difficult to build up any sort of weight, because the small lodgement is going to get bombed, shelled and bombarded into oblivion. The Germans need to be willing to sacrifice large numbers of infantry casualties (say, the initial elements of the assault divisions) against static defences in the first 72-96 hours, and to advance at least 10-15 miles inland, to put the landing sites out of the range of British artillery.


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 5, 2007)

RAF Fighter Command order of battle for operation Jubilee:

51 Spitfire squadrons (including USAAF 31st FG)
8 Hurricane squadrons (mostly 'Hurribombers')
4 Mustang squadrons
3 Typhoon squadrons
2 Whirlwind squadrons

At 12 aircraft each thats 720 single engine dayfighters available, and this is not the entire strength of Fighter Command. RAF 'establishment' strength was 18-20 aircraft per squadron, of which 12 usually flew. Additional aircraft and pilots could be used however. 

I'll have a proper OOB for FC month by month in 1942 by tomorrow (when I go and get a new book  ).


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## syscom3 (Apr 5, 2007)

Jabberwocky, in additon to what you said, we need to add the effect of bombing of the RAF on the beachheads.

Of course the Germans would need to go to the defense so soon, because they don't have the capability to unload heavy eqmt on unimproved beaches in the numbers needed to make an offense work.

The RAF would simply carpet bomb the beaches and wipe out the barges and infrastructure. And all this can be done at night when the LW and KM cant provide any support (he does avoid that little detail doesn't he).


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## Civettone (Apr 5, 2007)

> I think the problem with a succesful invasion of Britain in 42 in this thread relies on too many suppositions. Like any plan it is only as good as its weakest point.


Fair enough. All I'm proving is that it was possible, not that it would definitely succeed. People tell me it's impossible no matter what. To that I disagree. The Germans pulled off more impressive stuff than that in Belgium, France, Russia, North Africa, ... If they hadn't happened I'm sure no one would have believed they were possible. 




Jabberwocky said:


> If the Wehrmarcht is dug in statically after the first day, then all they have is their initial lodgement area with which to marshall the follow up forces. No room to maneouver, deploy armour, artillery, field hospitals, HQ areas, ammunition dumps or build airfields and supply depots.


True.




> Suppose the initial landings are only lightly opposed and the Germans advance about 4 miles inland and then dig in to wait for reserve divisions.


Ok




> That is a total of approximately 1,500 guns, of which about 1,100 are in central or southern UK, with the rest at training commands or in Wales and Ireland. (...)
> Even if only 10% of these guns are available on the first day, every sucessive day is going to see a rapid build up of artillery, infantry and armour to oppose the landing while the Home Guard and local divisions aim to fight a delayinng battle.


All I'm asking is that they hold on for three days. The Germans were faced with a similar opposition in Stalingrad for weeks and they held out. And it's not that the Russians weren't trying to defeat them.

As the landing area is very wide - some German plans show 150 miles - there is a whole lot of beach to shell. I don't see the British assembling all of their artillery in the first two days after which the second wave would land. Having maximum 10 guns per mile against them I think the Germans could succeed in getting the second wave ashore. And after that the third.
I think this could be accomplished by concentrating assault and supporting fire from the Kriegsmarine and a 1000 German bombers on certain breakthrough points. Most of the British artillery would be located on other positions and would not be easily moved from one place to another. 
I think this is the main advantage of having such a wide landing zone. It makes up a bit for the depth (as there are always guns with a range sufficient to get to the beaches).

But yes, this will be very costly for the Germans. But this is what I said in my very first post. 



> At 12 aircraft each thats 720 single engine dayfighters available, and this is not the entire strength of Fighter Command. RAF 'establishment' strength was 18-20 aircraft per squadron, of which 12 usually flew. Additional aircraft and pilots could be used however.


Against the 1250 German fighters I proposed. And don't forget that these fighters are in France from 1942 onwards which would theoretically multiply the British losses by 5. So the aircraft numbers that you mention would be significantly less. 
And simply getting additional pilots is not that easy as pilots were still the bottleneck for British fighter numbers, not production. They could get them but they would not be experienced or even trained properly.

And I don't consider the Typhoon fully operational in the Summer of 1942. It still had many bugs: in Dieppe they lost two due to structural tail problems with nothing to show for it. 




> The RAF would simply carpet bomb the beaches and wipe out the barges and infrastructure. And all this can be done at night when the LW and KM cant provide any support (he does avoid that little detail doesn't he).


Syscom, can I help you can't read?? 
I have already explained this several times, so why do you say that I avoid the subject? First, carpet bombing is not suited for tactical missions. Second, British accuracy was horrible. Third, 300 German nightfighters to attack 500 British bombers, and knowing exactly where they were. It would have been the highest number of night bomber loss ever. 

Kris


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## syscom3 (Apr 5, 2007)

> I have already explained this several times, so why do you say that I avoid the subject? First, carpet bombing is not suited for tactical missions. Second, British accuracy was horrible. Third, 300 German nightfighters to attack 500 British bombers, and knowing exactly where they were. It would have been the highest number of night bomber loss ever.
> 
> Kris



Ive read quite a bit of what you have written and its obvious your blind to some basic points. 

Carpet bombing beaches is not a difficult thing to do. Drop some flares and dump your bombs. You hit barges on the beachline and all of a sudden they're a beach obstacal that your invading army must clear. Put a bunch of holes in the sand and its another obstacal your vehicals and tanks must navigate through to get ashore.

Ever wonder why the allies didn't carpet bomb the beaches at Normandy? For that exact reason. The need to get troops and eqmt off the beach as soon as possible. 

And then there's the delusion you have that your KM will stay afloat for days on end to provide fire support. Of course your navy will not be touched and will sink the RN without effort.

And of course your minefields will keep the RN out yet inexplicably, the Allied minefields neither work nor harm your ships.

And of course the RN subs will fire every torpedo they have at your ships and fail to hit a single target.

And of course, you will be able to maintain 100% sortie rate even when hit by the RAF, and never take a single loss because we all know the -109 is magnitudes better than the Spit.

And your night fighters will operate with impunity and inflict 100% damage on the RAF! And of course they have so much fuel endurance, that they can maintain CAP from sundown to sunrise. 

And never mind that you will not have an intact port in which to unload your heavy eqmt, because magically, all your invasion barges (most of them unpowered) will appear when they're needed and unload the eqmt. faster than the allies LST's and LCT's managed to do in 1944.

Plus you have these magical "sleds" that will move the eqmt off the beaches inland at a rate better than what the allies managed to do with purpose built craft.

And of course we must allow you to have complete surprise in this invasion. No one sees your barges being loaded and no one notices the increase in military traffic. Everything is magic. Even though multiple ports need to be used, all with different times needed to get the ships sortied, no one notices a thing happening.

And of course we must also believe that your magical forces can bring in divisions across the sea in a daily basis faster than what the Allies can do on interior lines of communication over land. (You do understand what interior lines of communications means dont you)?

Simply amazing.

If you want to argue the case for your invasion for 1940 or 1941, its possible. If you want to argue the case for this for 1942, you are very hard pressed to prove it.

You argue tactics, I'm arguing logistics. I dont care if your KM is twice or 3X better than the RN because it doesn't matter. The RN would win a battle of attrition with you because there were more ships to send into battle. Same with your LW. It will take just as bad losses as in 1940, except in this case, you have far more at stake.

Your arguments carry the same similar flaws. You dictate the outcome on what you want the allies to do, not what the allies were capable of.


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## Civettone (Apr 6, 2007)

> Drop some flares and dump your bombs. You hit barges on the beachline and all of a sudden they're a beach obstacal that your invading army must clear. Put a bunch of holes in the sand and its another obstacal your vehicals and tanks must navigate through to get ashore.






> Ever wonder why the allies didn't carpet bomb the beaches at Normandy? For that exact reason.


Source?





> And then there's the delusion you have that your KM will stay afloat for days on end to provide fire support.


No, only the first day. Then retreat until the Royal Navy is defeated. I never claimed that the KM would not suffer losses.




> And of course your minefields will keep the RN out yet inexplicably, the Allied minefields neither work nor harm your ships.


Didn't say that either. But will those minefields stop the entire invasion fleet? 



> And of course the RN subs will fire every torpedo they have at your ships and fail to hit a single target.


Everybody keeps repeating that subs couldn't operate in the Channel? You're disagreeing with them?



> And of course, you will be able to maintain 100% sortie rate even when hit by the RAF, and never take a single loss


Never said that.




> And your night fighters will operate with impunity and inflict 100% damage on the RAF! And of course they have so much fuel endurance, that they can maintain CAP from sundown to sunrise.


Never said that.



> And never mind that you will not have an intact port in which to unload your heavy eqmt, because magically, all your invasion barges (most of them unpowered) will appear when they're needed and unload the eqmt. faster than the allies LST's and LCT's managed to do in 1944.


You didn't read my posts in which I wrote about German Pioniere engineers. I also said that the divisions would be infantry divisions. And in 1940 most barges were unpowered but this wouldn't be the case in 1942.



> Plus you have these magical "sleds" that will move the eqmt off the beaches inland at a rate better than what the allies managed to do with purpose built craft.


Nothing magical about them. The Germans land along a wider front.



> And of course we must allow you to have complete surprise in this invasion. No one sees your barges being loaded and no one notices the increase in military traffic. Everything is magic. Even though multiple ports need to be used, all with different times needed to get the ships sortied, no one notices a thing happening.


No complete surprise but at least confusion. The British could have been mislead by spreading wrong information, by decoys and by the fact that the British would expect an air offensive to preceed the landings. And the British wouldn't know where the landing would take place. I don't think complete surprise could be achieved but at least the British would only be sure hours before the actual landing. But why am I explaining this to you? You don't read what I write.



> And of course we must also believe that your magical forces can bring in divisions across the sea in a daily basis faster than what the Allies can do on interior lines of communication over land. (You do understand what interior lines of communications means dont you)?


I didn't say that.




> Your arguments carry the same similar flaws. You dictate the outcome on what you want the allies to do, not what the allies were capable of.


You do something similar. You compare what the Germans might have done in 1940 with what the allies did in 1943/1944. The latter you present as the standard.

Kris


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## syscom3 (Apr 6, 2007)

Civettone said:


>



Seems tough for you to comprehend that BC would be bombing at night on the beaches? And flak isnt going to be a problem because you neglected to bring them for your invasion.



> Source?



Various publications on the bombing strategy for the 8th and 9th AF on the runup to the invasion and the morning of the invasion.

SHAEF specifically told the AF's (of the Brits and US) not to bomb the beaches themselves as it would create obsticals for the trucks and tanks, and for follow on landing craft.



> No, only the first day. Then retreat until the Royal Navy is defeated. I never claimed that the KM would not suffer losses.



So your forces will not have any direct fire support on a broadly invaded coastline after the first several hours. Hardly a grand way to support your invasion. And what are your forces going to do at night for heavy artillery? And what will your forces do during the daytime when low hanging clouds limit the LW? I can see the RN (and even the USN) sail a few warships right up to the beach and have them use your unprotected forces for target practice.



> Didn't say that either. But will those minefields stop the entire invasion fleet?



It would give everyone problems, with the RN coming out for the best of it. They can lay minefields within their coastline with impunity. You cant clear mines untill the day of the invasion in which your forces will be at high risk. And once your forces retreat for the night, the allies can sail right on in and mine them again.



> Everybody keeps repeating that subs couldn't operate in the Channel? You're disagreeing with them?



The RN could station subs in the channel to be used solely for anti shipping. Hazardous, but well worth the risk.

Other points:
Why is your LW not degrading as a force after intense combat and sortie rate?

Why is your LW able to defend on a broad front, both your bombers and your own ports and the KM at sea? 



> You didn't read my posts in which I wrote about German Pioniere engineers. I also said that the divisions would be infantry divisions. And in 1940 most barges were unpowered but this wouldn't be the case in 1942.



Your divisions are all light infantry. Capable enough to grab a beachhead, but incapable of offensive movement against prepared defensive lines.



> Nothing magical about them. The Germans land along a wider front.



And the allies win, because you cant concentrate force on a specific point. Youre immediatly on the defensive hoping heavy eqmt shows up on time and enough quantity to blunt an allied attack that can be formed up in hours.



> No complete surprise but at least confusion. The British could have been mislead by spreading wrong information, by decoys and by the fact that the British would expect an air offensive to preceed the landings. And the British wouldn't know where the landing would take place. I don't think complete surprise could be achieved but at least the British would only be sure hours before the actual landing. But why am I explaining this to you? You don't read what I write.



The Germans wont have any surprise. Theres only a few specific dates you can invade, the weather and sea state dictates whether you sail or not, the resistance will tell the allies whether your forces are boarding the barges, etc, etc.

And no air offensive before the invasion? Hehehehehhehe........ youre landing light infantry on defended beaches, on a broad front, with prepared defensive lines that will essentially be intact on invasion day. Plus your KM fire support wont be around after day 1, theres no guarentee that the allied navies wont be able to bust through a thin defensive line your navy has set, with the bulk of your invading army supplied by slow moving barges that will need 1/2 a day to get to their landing points (at the shortest points). And to top it off, you have no amphib forces to facilitate the rapid movement of supplies from off shore directly inland off the beach.



> You do something similar. You compare what the Germans might have done in 1940 with what the allies did in 1943/1944. The latter you present as the standard.



I'm not doing that at all.

In 1940, your scenario was possible. 1941, risky. 1942, failure was guarentee'd.

I see what your capabilities are, as being limited by follow on support and 24/7 fire support for the first few days.


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## Glider (Apr 6, 2007)

Kris

Silence as they say is golden and Udet seems to have gone quiet as well.

Still looking forward to your reply

Good Luck

David


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## plan_D (Apr 6, 2007)

_"Now now PlanD, you don't have to be right all the time. It's ok to just admit that it was a fleet action. So what if you forgot about Worcester? Big deal, it happens to the best of us."_

Kris,

I see you're resorting to childish behaviour without actually facing the challenge. My point: one ship attacking does not make it a fleet action. Why? Because for it to be a fleet action two opposing fleets must meet in battle, one ship does not make a fleet. 

_"I thought you would say that but that's a problem in your reasoning. You think about moving units back to Britain for defending the island but you don't know when it's going to happen. As you (or Hop?) said, the British would prepare themselves as soon as Russia was out of the war, so starting in late 1941/early 1942. As the Germans were going to invade somewhere in April-July, they would have half a year of advantages. You make the logical error that the Germans will have to divert forces like the British would but in fact, the bulk of their forces would simply be withdrawn from Russia so they could keep up their presence elsewhere."_

Defeating the Soviet Union would not increase the German naval assets elsewhere. The Kriegsmarine would number exactly the same in the Med as they did in reality, next to none. A diversion of Royal Navy forces from there would not make a difference.

I must point out that you only quoted some of my posted; as I mentioned it would take a few days for Force H to sail to the Channel. So, they would not need to be returned as soon as Soviet Russia was defeated. 

_"I wouldn't be too sure about that. I see Rommel winning in El Alamein and taking Alexandria and the Suez Channel."_

I'm sure you do. Pray tell your wonderful plans for shipping your exhausted troops from Soviet Russia and through the Med, past all those roaming Royal Navy and RAF assets? 
It would be nice to increase the numbers Rommel had, but the fact of the matter is you'd have to prepare the exhausted soldiers and ship them to North Africa before the battle. 

_"So? The Luftwaffe didn't all out attack the Royal Navy and lost an invasion fleet because of it. Then they attacked the Royal Navy and didn't lose an invasion fleet after that"_

The Luftwaffe were attacking the Royal Navy upon its entrance to the battle, even with the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy sunk the first invasion fleet. 
Under this "all out attack" the Royal Navy still damaged the second invasion fleet and turned it back. On top of that, the Royal Navy evacuated thousands of troops. 

_"You don't get it. The Germans had fighter aircraft in Greece. As the British didn't have fighters, these fighters were unopposed. If the British did have fighters, it wouldn't mean things would have been different: the Germans could have protected their bombers."_

It would have been completely different had there been a squadron of Hurricanes or two on Crete. Given that the Luftwaffe used close escort the air battles would rage around the bomber formations, which means the raids would have been disrupted and bombers would have been shot down. 

_"So now you're saying Germany only had battlecruisers, destroyers and U-boats? No cruisers, torpedoboats, Schellboote? 
And what do you mean by outgunned DDs? German destroyers had many weaknesses but at least their guns were bigger than those on British destroyers."_

How old are you? It's like "discussing" with a child. No, I didn't say all the Kriegsmarine had was Battlecruisers, Destroyers and Submarines. 

The German E-Boats being used as a defensive screen, are you kidding me? And the German cruisers and destroyers were out-gunned, simply because the Royal Navy would bring more to the battle. The Royal Navy would deploy more guns, meaning the Kriegsmarine would be out-gunned.

_"The Germans cared about losses? Did Hitler care about losses? Did Göring care about losses? Did German HQ have anything to say?"_

Of course, how silly of me. I seem to have forgotten that Germans were all suicidal and losses were nothing of importance. Is that why the heavy Fallschirmjager losses at Crete, around 50% (KIA and WIA), caused a big upheavel in German High Command and with Hitler? Because they didn't care about losses ... or, maybe, because Hitler didn't like the nice German uniforms getting dirty, right? 

_"It's pretty clear cut to me. ULTRA provided the British with lots of information but not the whole story. They had to go on by indications like your example of the Bismarck showed. The British didn't decode a message saying when the Bismarck would sail. They didn't decode a message when the G&S would sail. And that's only naval matters. There are several more army related matters which the British failed to foresee. 
So to call my idea that the British might not decode a message that would tell them when the invasion would take place, pathetic is ok by me. But I think it's clear overestimation of British capabilities and underestimating the German ones. 
And don't forget that the Germans would have done their best to deceive the British by sending false information and using decoys. That's not wisful thinking from my part, that's logic thinking."_

Do you even read your own words? Seriously, to proclaim that an invasion would go through without the British having a single idea about the time or place is beyond belief. Are you aware that every invasion made by the Germans after that of Poland was known to the British ULTRA team? 
It's not an overestimation of British capabilities, and I doubt you actually think. It's surprising you don't fall over more often given that your sense is wandering. 

_"As many radar installations were close to the shore, I don't think they would have lasted that long. The British would have to move or rebuild some of them. 
The fighting would have taken place in two areas. 
One is the Channel. The British didn't have the distance advantage and as it would have been a contested area between both sides, the British would no longer have the home advantage. 
Two is the invasion area. The British would have the distance advantage but I already said there would be a CAP over the territory (with the disadvantages that come with it), so British scramble time is of less importance. But the British would have the disadvantage of flying and crashing over German held territory. Sure, they could try and fly back the friendly territory but usually you don't have a choice. You bail out because you have to. This will usually lead to landing over enemy territory. And if not, there's as much chance of drowing in the Channel as landing in British held territory."_

Of course, Kris, all those radar installations would be destroyed just like they weren't in the Battle of Britain. If you look at the Battle of Britain in some more detail instead of simply reading the part about how Britain won, you'd see that the Germans took great effort in destroying the radar chain and didn't do it. 

The RAF would be able to intercept the German formations over waters closer to home, giving them a range advantage. Any flight toward Britain would be picked up and the RAF would be able to scramble in good time. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe would be flying blind, wasting hours and fuel, looking for RAF bomber formations. 
Actually a lot of the time aircraft would be able to fly some distance before crashing. This gave pilots chance to get back to friendly terrority before bailing. Drowning in the Channel would be a problem for both air forces. 

_"So my invasion troops that have dug in, are in a better position. My plan keeps on getting better and better."_

Digging in to a beach under constant attack, does give you a better position. Plus the British would not need to advance on you, it's the invasion that has to move. If you're contained and dug-in on the beach, you've lost the battle.


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## syscom3 (Apr 6, 2007)

> Digging in to a beach under constant attack, does give you a better position. Plus the British would not need to advance on you, it's the invasion that has to move. If you're contained and dug-in on the beach, you've lost the battle.



Yes!


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## Civettone (Apr 6, 2007)

David, I still don't really understand. You copied an older post of yours to which I already replied. See on this page:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/operation-sea-lion-2795-15.html





syscom3 said:


> Seems tough for you to comprehend that BC would be bombing at night on the beaches? And flak isnt going to be a problem because you neglected to bring them for your invasion.


You didn't read my posts. Flak would come along as was planned in Sealion 40. No Luftwaffe Flak but the Flak attached to the divisions.




> SHAEF specifically told the AF's (of the Brits and US) not to bomb the beaches themselves as it would create obsticals for the trucks and tanks, and for follow on landing craft.


That sounds strange as the beaches were already obstructed by concrete/metal anti-tank constructions. 




> And what are your forces going to do at night for heavy artillery?


Digging in.



> And what will your forces do during the daytime when low hanging clouds limit the LW?


Blaim the weather guy who told them the weather would be good and try to make to most out of it. 




> And once your forces retreat for the night, the allies can sail right on in and mine them again.


Yes




> The RN could station subs in the channel to be used solely for anti shipping. Hazardous, but well worth the risk.


Got ya! The Germans could place their submarine force in the Channel and sink every Royal Navy that the Luftwaffe fails to sink/neutralize. 




> Why is your LW not degrading as a force after intense combat and sortie rate?


For the second time in a row, I didn't say it's not degrading. But so is the RAF. And as most combat will happen over the Channel and the German held beaches, the RAF wil lose more pilots per shot down plane than the Germans.



> Why is your LW able to defend on a broad front, both your bombers and your own ports and the KM at sea?


I didn't say the LW would protect the troops over a broad front. I said the LW would protect the bomber and only a part would be used for CAPs over the beaches.




> Your divisions are all light infantry.


 Why are they light? 




> The Germans wont have any surprise. Theres only a few specific dates you can invade, the weather and sea state dictates whether you sail or not, the resistance will tell the allies whether your forces are boarding the barges, etc, etc.[/quotes]D-Day was to be a surprise yet the Germans also knew when the weather and sea state would have been right. In that case, no invasion is ever a surprise.
> The British wouldn't know for sure that the invasion would take place. Until they have certainty their units will stay where they are. Else they'll be moving back and forth every week.
> 
> 
> ...


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## Glider (Apr 7, 2007)

Kris
My mistake I missed it. Time to find me a rock to hide under.



Civettone said:


> Hi David. I'm going to rush through things. From what year is "Burning Blue"? And what does the title refer to?



It refers to the BOB in 1940. The part I am referring to was written by the Japanese military diplomats based in Germany and the UK, obviously the review of the German invasion preparations was from the German reps.



> Spot on! Germans will have to be using CAPs on the first day but if the Channel Dash was an indication, the British were easily taken by surprise and not very well organized. That makes me conclude that on the first day the British won't be able to muster all their aircraft.
> From the second day onwards the German fighters will mainly be used to escort the bombers, so no more CAP. (Except for the 250 or so over the beaches). I am thinking about the possibility of forward escorting though. As the Royal Navy would place itself in firing range of the beaches, the German bombers would attack them and the German fighters in their forward escorting style as favoured by Galland would in effect be flying over the beaches. This is not wishful thinking from my point - well that too - but it's the only way it could have gone down.
> In any case - given the fact that the British lost twice as many fighters as the Germans in 1942 - I think the Germans would have been able to seriously reduce the threat of the RAF. I also said before, that 1/3 of the barges were expendable (of course after delivering their loads). I don't think this is such a wild assumption.



So from day 2 of the invasion you abondon the CAP over the beaches and in effect give control to the RAF GA squadrons all 31 of them to do hit and run attacks.
As they say in all the bad movies, *For You the War is over*.
Don't mistake the escort of a bombing raid with a CAP the two are different. The raid lasts an hour or two, the CAP an all day affair taking three units to keep one in the air. 
*Remember *to keep 250 over the beaches takes up 750 of your fighters 




> Are you sure? I think they had more of them (over 60 in August) though I could be mistaken. Unless you mean 42 in Britain alone?



Certain, the 42 squadrons in May 42 were only those in the UK at the time. 



> Ok. How many RCAF squadrons were there by 1942?



I don't know, which is why I didn't try to guess or estimate or try to include them.



> Please David, I already explained this more than 5 times. The KM would protect and support the invasion of the first day after which it would retreat. As such it will only have to fight the forces which are already in the Channel. The bulk of the Royal Navy was at least a day away from the Channel.
> German E-boats were far superior to the British MTBs.



As mentioned before if you abandon the support for the beaches from day two *then For You the War is Over*

E Boats are technically better than the British boats But when it came to fighting they didn't perform and the British had the advantage and initiative for the whole war. 



> I agree.
> But let's take Anzio as an example again. The allies failed to exploit their numerical advantage and soon they were up against an enemy as strong as they were. They were hard pressed to hold on but they did, for months! I'm only asking the Germans to hold on for two-three days. And in the end ... the Allied army broke through the German lines and conquered central Italy within weeks.
> 
> I don't think the German army is going to love me anyhow as I plan on using them as a bait for two-three days.
> In any case, German AF was capable of holding off the CW AF in North Africa, so I think moving both forces to the Channel will result in the same stalemate. .



You have just agreed that the Germans by stalling for two/thee days would be trapped. 
*Remember *the level of air attack suffered by the Allies at Anzio was nothing compared to that the Germans would suffer on the coast of the UK.
*Remember *that the UK could bring in reinforcements more easily that German could at Anzio
*Remember *that the Allies at Anzio had overwhelming fire support from the sea, which the Germans wouldn't have.
Dare I say it *For You the War is Over*



> So these German boats couldn't have been used along the English coast during the invasion?.



I think they could have done but would be vulnerable to attack being small slow wooden vessels.




> No, it's not. I told you that Bomber Command had less than 500 bombers available in the middle of 1942. The 1000 bomber raids were a result of saving of bombers and use them once every month. So sure, you could use 1000 bombers once. Normal availability however was less than 500.
> And again, the British bombers would suffer the heaviest night time losses ever, with 300 German night fighters knowing exactly where to find them!



Be fair Kris, All I have ever said was that my assumption is 350 heavy bombers a night, which is more than achievable with 500 available.

Re bomber command losses. Think about it. On the 1000 bomber raid the Germans had hours to track the incoming raid and many hundreds of miles to vector their fighters onto the bomber stream, plus the advantage of Ground director control, plus heavy AA fire and they only shot down 40 bombers. Why on earth would the RAF lose heavily when the Germans have minutes of warning before the planes are overhead, little AA fire and no ground control.
Plus, the Beaufighters would be able to intercept the incoming German fighters.



> Losses on the German bombers was high but not on German night fighters, and that's what I was talking about!



I understand this but the RAF nightfighter losses were also small over this period. Sir Issac Newton caused far more losses than enemy fire (accidents) at this time


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## Civettone (Apr 7, 2007)

plan_D said:


> I see you're resorting to childish behaviour without actually facing the challenge. My point: one ship attacking does not make it a fleet action. Why? Because for it to be a fleet action two opposing fleets must meet in battle, one ship does not make a fleet.


Yes, childish to loosen up a bit. You may call it whatever you want but one ship out of a fleet attacking another ship out of a fleet is a fleet action. Is there a clear-cut definition of "fleet action"? 




> Defeating the Soviet Union would not increase the German naval assets elsewhere.


Were we talking about Royal Navy or about reinforcements in general? Weren't we talking about moving RAF units from Africa to Britain? Divisions and tanks maybe? 




> as I mentioned it would take a few days for Force H to sail to the Channel. So, they would not need to be returned as soon as Soviet Russia was defeated.


I don't get it. You'll retreat Force H because the SU is defeated? 



> I'm sure you do. Pray tell your wonderful plans for shipping your exhausted troops from Soviet Russia and through the Med, past all those roaming Royal Navy and RAF assets?


Exhausted troops? What's this all about???? They fought in Russia so they can't be transferred? 
And what about moving troops past Royal Navy and RAF? How did they get troops and supplies to North Africa before? 
From all the posts you made ...



> It would be nice to increase the numbers Rommel had, but the fact of the matter is you'd have to prepare the exhausted soldiers and ship them to North Africa before the battle.


What? What are you on about? Sending two extra divisions will mean victory at El Alamein and close down Alexandria and the Suez. And in time, the end of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean due to attrition and finally retreat. 



> It would have been completely different had there been a squadron of Hurricanes or two on Crete. Given that the Luftwaffe used close escort the air battles would rage around the bomber formations, which means the raids would have been disrupted and bombers would have been shot down.


Would the outcome have been different? Can you guarantee that less ships would be sunk? 



> How old are you? It's like "discussing" with a child. No, I didn't say all the Kriegsmarine had was Battlecruisers, Destroyers and Submarines.


Well, I didn't ask you to discuss with me. The last thing I need is a Brit thinking Britain is still an Empire.   
And you were implying that the Germans didn't have cruisers and destroyers as you said the Germans didn't have anything to defend the invasion fleet when its battlecruisers were sent out. How else should I interpret this? 



> The Royal Navy would deploy more guns, meaning the Kriegsmarine would be out-gunned.


On the first day?




> Is that why the heavy Fallschirmjager losses at Crete, around 50% (KIA and WIA), caused a big upheavel in German High Command and with Hitler?


You may know your stuff about British forces, you really need to read up on Hitler and German HQ. Do you really think Hitler cared about those dead soldiers? The only thing it caused was him concluding that FJs weren't as effective as he had hoped. He drew the opposite conclusion of the allies who promptly stepped up the paratrooper program.





> Do you even read your own words? Seriously, to proclaim that an invasion would go through without the British having a single idea about the time or place is beyond belief.


I never said they wouldn't have a single idea. I say they could have been tricked and confused by spreading false information, including in the decoded messages. There's nothing sci-fi about that, these are simple precautions which hardly take effort. You have a very limited view of German ingenuity as if they were completely incapable of ingeniouty, always thinking they'll walk right in to whatever trap the British have waiting for them, never giving them any credit to beyong that what you're aware of. 



> It's surprising you don't fall over more often given that your sense is wandering.


Friendly. Can't win the discussion so why not start that way? 



> Of course, Kris, all those radar installations would be destroyed just like they weren't in the Battle of Britain. If you look at the Battle of Britain in some more detail instead of simply reading the part about how Britain won, you'd see that the Germans took great effort in destroying the radar chain and didn't do it.


Took great effort? I already dug up the day-by-day air missions and don't see a very concentrated attempt to knock them out. The Germans tried to knock them out but when they saw that the British were still scrambling their fighters in time, they gave up. As many of those radar installations are close to the shore, many would be taken by German forces or at least shelled by them while others could be attacked by German bombers once they had finished neutralizing the RN. That means that the British radars would have to moved to other locations which would surely take time. A similar thing happened in Germany in 1944 when the allies conquered territory up to the Rhine giving away German early radar warning for western Germany. 



> Actually a lot of the time aircraft would be able to fly some distance before crashing. This gave pilots chance to get back to friendly terrority before bailing. Drowning in the Channel would be a problem for both air forces.


Of course many aircraft would make it back to British territory. But the majority of shot down planes go down instantly which is indicated by the fact that half the pilots of shot down planes are killed.




> If you're contained and dug-in on the beach, you've lost the battle.


What about Anzio? They were contained for months and broke out? And it's not like my troops will be contained on the beaches. I was thinking of advancing up to 5 miles in certain areas. 
Remember, that these are elite forces as I already said in my first post. This is the most important thing. Numbers don't say it all, it's the training, leadership and experience of troops which matter most.

Kris


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## syscom3 (Apr 7, 2007)

Civettone said:


> You didn't read my posts. Flak would come along as was planned in Sealion 40. No Luftwaffe Flak but the Flak attached to the divisions.



More and more goodies are brought along.




> That sounds strange as the beaches were already obstructed by concrete/metal anti-tank constructions.



The metal and concrete obsticals were going to be blown up in place. bringing in specialized bulldozers needed to fill in craters on water saturated soils or in surf was not something the allies wanted to deal with.

But of course you knew that.



> Digging in.



Fixed in place and waiting to die. 



> Blaim the weather guy who told them the weather would be good and try to make to most out of it.



I suspected as much.


Yes




> Got ya! The Germans could place their submarine force in the Channel and sink every Royal Navy that the Luftwaffe fails to sink/neutralize.



Perhaps. They might be running for their own lives once the shooting starts. I foresee the RN subs ambushing your subs to deadly effect.



> For the second time in a row, I didn't say it's not degrading. But so is the RAF. And as most combat will happen over the Channel and the German held beaches, the RAF wil lose more pilots per shot down plane than the Germans.



Your bombers will by default be over english territory. Did you realize that? And of course, I forgot..... all your pilots are going to be magically blown right into hands of your troops on a small beachhead. So what is it.... your bombers patrolling the sea's for allied ships, or over English territory supporting the invasion? 



> I didn't say the LW would protect the troops over a broad front. I said the LW would protect the bomber and only a part would be used for CAPs over the beaches.



Well what is it... a broad invasion or a narrow invasion? And now that your dividing your fighter forces, then thats improving the odd's for the allies isnt it.



> Why are they light?



Because you dont have the amphib necessary to bring in heavy eqmt in numbers on the first day (small numbers, yes). Plus you have no way to resupply them ona reliable 24/7 basis.



> D-Day was to be a surprise yet the Germans also knew when the weather and sea state would have been right. In that case, no invasion is ever a surprise.
> The British wouldn't know for sure that the invasion would take place. Until they have certainty their units will stay where they are. Else they'll be moving back and forth every week.



D-Day was a total surprise for the Germans because they didnt know that there was going to be a weather reprive for a couple of days, and thought the storm was going to last a week. And no big deal for the brits to move their forces around on a weekly basis. youre only moving the troops around and not their eqmt.



> With the ships the British had in the Channel? I doubt it.



The allies had the warship advantage and if they're willing to suffer the losses, they could send their ships up to your undefended beaches at night and blast you. And then in the morning, your barges and auxilliaries will have to run a gauntlet to get to the beaches. In fact I would plan on an RN task Force sortie from the from the north to engage your KM, and a second task force to come down through the Irish sea and then up to the channel for a night attack on your beaches. Id even have the carrier dive bomber and torpedo bombers stage through land bases and hammer your forces in an sunrise attack prior to your fighters being able to get to station int he morning.



> Now that's interesting. Why were things easier in 1941 than they were in 1942?



Playing dumb now? 



> Syscom, if you don't have anything new to add, don't bother to post. I'm tired of repeating the same and pointing out that you don't read my post and that you keep putting words in my mouth.
> Kris



Youre right. Your arguments for your invasion are pathetic, ill considered, poorly thought out and amaturish. And I will keep adding my comments if I damn well like to.


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## plan_D (Apr 7, 2007)

_"Yes, childish to loosen up a bit. You may call it whatever you want but one ship out of a fleet attacking another ship out of a fleet is a fleet action. Is there a clear-cut definition of "fleet action"?"_

Fleet against fleet defines fleet action, not one ship vs. fleet. 

_"Were we talking about Royal Navy or about reinforcements in general? Weren't we talking about moving RAF units from Africa to Britain? Divisions and tanks maybe?"_

I never mentioned moving RAF units from Africa to Britain. The RAF was already larger than in Britain than it was 1940. The Luftwaffe would not have been larger in ratio to the RAF during your so-called invasion attempt. Divisions and tanks in the millions in France make no difference to the invasion if you can't get them across the Channel. 

_"I don't get it. You'll retreat Force H because the SU is defeated?"_

I can see why you don't get it, I said Force H *wouldn't* need to be pulled back because the Soviet Union was defeated. If, or when, an invasion attempt was made ULTRA would be aware of the general time and date - if considered Force H could be there in a few days.

_"Exhausted troops? What's this all about???? They fought in Russia so they can't be transferred? 
And what about moving troops past Royal Navy and RAF? How did they get troops and supplies to North Africa before? 
From all the posts you made ..."_

I never said they cannot be transferred, but they would need rest and refit which can take weeks. Since they would have suffered heavily in Russia, it may have taken months. 

Those supplies going to North Africa suffered heavily at the hands of the Royal Navy, RAF and USAAF. You propose sending more shipping through, which is going to get hit just the same. I'm pointing out the simple fact that while you propose to send all that to North Africa, most will not make it - just like real life.

_"What? What are you on about? Sending two extra divisions will mean victory at El Alamein and close down Alexandria and the Suez. And in time, the end of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean due to attrition and finally retreat."_

Two extra divisions? Infantry? Motorised? Armoured? What kind of divisions are you proposing to send? And I see you're 100% sure that two extra divisions (of what, we don't know) will secure victory in North Africa. No, it doesn't work like that. Rommel was out-numbered in tanks and artillery, even two extra panzer divisions would render his tank numbers and artillery numbers less than that of the 8th Army. Since Rommels divisions in N.Africa were under-strength by El Alamein. 

_"Would the outcome have been different? Can you guarantee that less ships would be sunk?"_

I cannot guarantee that less ships would be sunk because there's no way to test it. However, with two squadrons of Hurricanes on Crete the Luftwaffe would not have been unopposed. 
With opposition the bombing raids would have been less accurate and transports, bombers and fighters would have been shot down. It's only reasonable to assume that the Royal Navy would have not been hurt as much as it was. 

_"Well, I didn't ask you to discuss with me. The last thing I need is a Brit thinking Britain is still an Empire. 
And you were implying that the Germans didn't have cruisers and destroyers as you said the Germans didn't have anything to defend the invasion fleet when its battlecruisers were sent out. How else should I interpret this?"_

Since when did I say Britain still maintained an Empire? 

No, I wasn't implying such a thing. But I didn't think it was required to list every type of vessel the Kriegsmarine floated. Obviously I was wrong to assume you'd be reasonable. 

_"On the first day?"_

Yes, the Royal Navy would out-gun the Kriegsmarine from day one to end day. 

_"You may know your stuff about British forces, you really need to read up on Hitler and German HQ. Do you really think Hitler cared about those dead soldiers? The only thing it caused was him concluding that FJs weren't as effective as he had hoped. He drew the opposite conclusion of the allies who promptly stepped up the paratrooper program."_

No, pal, you need to read up on Hitler and the German High Command instead of listening to the clichéd stories of them not caring about life. During the Russian conflict, Hitler constantly complained about the losses suffered right up until he became practically insane in 1944. 

And the German High Command always considered high losses unfortunate. While they may not have cared about individual people, any military leader wishes for lower losses. The difference between German command and the West was the simple fact the Germany was willing to suffer heavy losses to achieve its goals. 

_"I never said they wouldn't have a single idea. I say they could have been tricked and confused by spreading false information, including in the decoded messages. There's nothing sci-fi about that, these are simple precautions which hardly take effort. You have a very limited view of German ingenuity as if they were completely incapable of ingeniouty, always thinking they'll walk right in to whatever trap the British have waiting for them, never giving them any credit to beyong that what you're aware of."_

I'm most surprised about the "hardly take effort" part. Have you read about the deception effort the Allies made for _Neptune_? 

You have a very limited view of reality. Germany never knew about ULTRA until after the war, they continued to maintain that their enigma was unbreakable. Because of this the German High Command never took great effort to be deceptive, for that reason the ULTRA team knew about every invasion made by the Germans. 

Your invasion would be exactly the same, the British would know. It might be hard to stomach that fact, but Britain knew what Germany was doing and Germany didn't have a single idea about it. 

You have the benefit of hindsight, you know about the British ULTRA but Germany didn't. Just think, if you had an encoder that was believed to be unbreakable - why would you bother with deception? 

Plus, I'd like to point out that the RAF had the best PRUs in the war. The PR Spitfires took more pictures of Europe than any other aircraft. How do you propose stopping them taking pictures of your invasion build-up and reporting it?

_"Took great effort? I already dug up the day-by-day air missions and don't see a very concentrated attempt to knock them out. The Germans tried to knock them out but when they saw that the British were still scrambling their fighters in time, they gave up. As many of those radar installations are close to the shore, many would be taken by German forces or at least shelled by them while others could be attacked by German bombers once they had finished neutralizing the RN. That means that the British radars would have to moved to other locations which would surely take time. A similar thing happened in Germany in 1944 when the allies conquered territory up to the Rhine giving away German early radar warning for western Germany."_

The Germans gave up because they good not destroy the radar chain. Radar towers are easily repaired, you need to bomb them day after day to keep them down. 
Most of the radar stations were further inland than 5 miles. And since there were chains in Dover and far around, you aren't going to capture them all. 

_"What about Anzio? They were contained for months and broke out? And it's not like my troops will be contained on the beaches. I was thinking of advancing up to 5 miles in certain areas. 
Remember, that these are elite forces as I already said in my first post. This is the most important thing. Numbers don't say it all, it's the training, leadership and experience of troops which matter most."_

What about Anzio? The Allies at Anzio were constantly supplied and supported by air and sea. Any counter-attack made by the Germans was smashed by naval bombardments. You have already said you would abandon your troops after the first day. 

Elite forces mean nothing when they don't have the heavy weaponary and support. Your forces would be contained and starved out, as you foolishly abandon them in the hope of destroying the Royal Navy. 
Your forces would be human like everyone else, storming up a beach is suicidal for anyone. Then you propose shoving these men five miles inland and digging in. 

For all the leadership, experience and training - the German troops would be against determined defence, dug in frontline troops, heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. Then you'd abandon them and watch them starve. I'm not saying these troops, if they did make it across the Channel wouldn't be able to push off the beach - but I'm saying that you'd abandon them - and they'd wither and die. 

You can't dig in during an invasion, you have to capture ports or bring your own. You have to supply the station and push far enough to start bringing in the heavy guns and armour before the enemy brings there's in. Just because you believe your men are super, British armour would wipe them from the beach unless you get yours in first or provide some kind of artillery support. 

Sorry pal, but you'd waste these people.


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## Civettone (Apr 7, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> More and more goodies are brought along.


If you would have bothered to read my posts, you would have known about it. 




> Playing dumb now?


Does that mean you don't think I'm smart but just playing dumb? 



> Youre right. Your arguments for your invasion are pathetic, ill considered, poorly thought out and amaturish. And I will keep adding my comments if I damn well like to.


Go ahead, just don't expect me to respond. Goodbye Syscom...

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 7, 2007)

plan_D said:


> I never mentioned moving RAF units from Africa to Britain. The RAF was already larger than in Britain than it was 1940.


Must have been someone else who suggested that. I can't remember who said what. 




> I said Force H *wouldn't* need to be pulled back because the Soviet Union was defeated. If, or when, an invasion attempt was made ULTRA would be aware of the general time and date - if considered Force H could be there in a few days.


Ok. And I consider them to arrive too late if they arrive in a few days. If you're going to send the Royal Navy in bit by bit, I think it's easier to take these ships out. 




> I never said they cannot be transferred, but they would need rest and refit which can take weeks. Since they would have suffered heavily in Russia, it may have taken months.


No, German divisions were usually moved from one front to another without R&R. German HQ didn't require their divisions to up to full strength. They would rather take two divisions at half-strength than to get one up to full strength. And that worked out fine. 




> Those supplies going to North Africa suffered heavily at the hands of the Royal Navy, RAF and USAAF. You propose sending more shipping through, which is going to get hit just the same. I'm pointing out the simple fact that while you propose to send all that to North Africa, most will not make it - just like real life.


This is simply not true. You're probably confusing it with late 1942 when the allies stopped supplies reaching Tunisia. 
And especially with Malta being isolated (again), I don't see much in the way of getting more forces across with less losses during transfer. 




> Two extra divisions? Infantry? Motorised? Armoured? What kind of divisions are you proposing to send? And I see you're 100% sure that two extra divisions (of what, we don't know) will secure victory in North Africa. No, it doesn't work like that. Rommel was out-numbered in tanks and artillery, even two extra panzer divisions would render his tank numbers and artillery numbers less than that of the 8th Army. Since Rommels divisions in N.Africa were under-strength by El Alamein.


I was thinking of one PzDiv and one InfDiv. How many divisions did Rommel have in 1942? How close was he to victory with those?



> It's only reasonable to assume that the Royal Navy would have not been hurt as much as it was.


Two squadrons versus 200 German fighters as escort? Disrupting the bombers at the same time they're attacking the ships? I think the result would have been negligable.



> Since when did I say Britain still maintained an Empire?


Just a joke. I'm childish, remember?



> No, pal, you need to read up on Hitler and the German High Command instead of listening to the clichéd stories of them not caring about life. During the Russian conflict, Hitler constantly complained about the losses suffered right up until he became practically insane in 1944.


The only reason why he complained about losses was because it reduced the battle strength of the army. 
Here's one word for you: Stalingrad.




> The difference between German command and the West was the simple fact the Germany was willing to suffer heavy losses to achieve its goals.


That's what I was saying!!



> I'm most surprised about the "hardly take effort" part. Have you read about the deception effort the Allies made for _Neptune_?


Again, a typical example of how you make Neptune a standard. Had the allies done half of their deception the same result would have been achieved. 135 out 136 SS intelligence reports said the invasion would take place outside of Normandy. 
But how much resources did it take for the allies? How many divisions and tanks were given up to achieve this goal? 
All I'm saying is that the Germans could have deceived the British without too much effort. 



> You have a very limited view of reality. Germany never knew about ULTRA until after the war, they continued to maintain that their enigma was unbreakable. Because of this the German High Command never took great effort to be deceptive, for that reason the ULTRA team knew about every invasion made by the Germans.


Didn't they change the Enigma a couple of times? Germans after the war said they thought it would have been possible to break the code but that the allies wouldn't go to the trouble of decoding all of their messages. 
Tell me, did the allies know EVERYTHING which was wired by the Germans? The answer is no though you're 100 % sure the British would know everything about Sealion 42.
On the Eastern Front the Germans did their best to deceive the Russians as to where their troops were, about commanders, about false reports. I'm also thinking of the great deception plans prior to May 10 when they spread false plans in Belgium (together with the real ones one time by mistake.) To believe that the Germans didn't go to great lengths to deceive enemy intelligence, makes it clear to me that you know little 



> How do you propose stopping them taking pictures of your invasion build-up and reporting it?


We've been through that before. I do think the British would have photographed the lot. But then there's the matter of interpretation. The British would know the Germans were going to invade and that they were assembling their invasion forces. I already said that. But the Germans could deceive the British. To name one way, they could sail a couple of times before as an exercise. 




> The Germans gave up because they good not destroy the radar chain. Radar towers are easily repaired, you need to bomb them day after day to keep them down.
> Most of the radar stations were further inland than 5 miles. And since there were chains in Dover and far around, you aren't going to capture them all.


Typical. So now I need to destroy all of them to get a result? Why were there so many radar installations if only a few were needed?
And how many were in range of artillery and naval guns?



> What about Anzio? The Allies at Anzio were constantly supplied and supported by air and sea.


And yet I'm only saying the Germans would have to hold out for two-three days. To say that it was the naval guns that saved them is simplistic. It contributed but it was not the main factor. Infantry and aircraft were more important. 




> Elite forces mean nothing when they don't have the heavy weaponary and support. Your forces would be contained and starved out, as you foolishly abandon them in the hope of destroying the Royal Navy.


Starved after two days? Elite forces mean nothing if they don't have support? You're getting desperate in your arguments.

Kris


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## daishi12 (Apr 7, 2007)

Hi Kris,
Just checked through the latest posts, could you please reply to my post on page 18 of this thread?


As an alternative theory for the invasion of Britain in 1942, in my opinion, the following criteria would need to be met:-

1/ Churchill has either stroke or heart attack in 1938 and died then.
2/ Goering is removed as head of LW at about the same time and is replaced with someone as brilliant as Doenitz
3/ Germany invades Poland, France, the Netherlands, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Norway.
4/ Britain ignores the treaty of Versaille and carries on the appeasement policy and as such does not have a force in Northern France during the invasion.

The above preconditions allow Germany to strengthen all aspects of it's military, including a massive increase in it's U-boat fleet and surface ships.

During the late part 1941, Germany declares war against Britain and launches massive anti-shipping raids to force a near capitulation of Britain due to lack of supplies.

During the summer of 42 a massive invasion is launched utilising all the men and equipment which had either been saved from not invading Russia or from the build up of the military from 1939.

As I say this is just my opinion which would give Germany the best opportunity to invade the UK


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## Hop (Apr 7, 2007)

> Are you saying 5 missions a day is impossible?



For very small numbers of aircraft, for very short period, on very short missions, it's possible. For large numbers, no.



> No, that's still not the reason why the Germans shot down twice as many fighters as the British did. What's the difference in dogfighting over Britain or dogfighting over France? I see three differences: fighting time, AA ground fire and pilots being captured when shot down.



The biggest difference is what you do when you don't have advantage. I read recently of a British squadron sent to intercept a German raid during the BoB. There were over 100 bombers, and over 100 fighters escorting them, and 9 British fighters. They were also below the Germans.

3 fighters were climbed to engage the German fighters, the other 6 climbed to engage the bombers.

The reason for semi-suicidal actions like that is the British had to defend against the German raids. In France in 1941 and 1942, the Germans didn't have to defend. If they couldn't attack with advantage, they didn't attack at all.



> But as I said, the bulk of the Luftwaffe would have been called back from the Ostfront and have confronted the RAF. As the Germans shot down twice as many as they lost,



Whilst the British were carrying out fighter sweeps over France. That's likely to be one of the first things that changes if the Germans bring the rest of the Luftwaffe back to France.



> and they only had 250 fighters in France,



They didn't. Hooton in Eagle in Flames gives the German day fighter force in Western Europe as a low of 430 in Sept 41, rising steadily to 636 by the end of 1942. There were 564 in mid 1942.

Hooton also gives sortie figures. For the second half of 1941, Fighter Command flew 20,495 offensive day fighter sorties, the Luftwaffe scrambled 16,150 day fighters in response.



> I'm not going to state that the British would have lost 5 times more fighters but I don't see how one can disagree that British losses would have been much higher.



Only they had that many fighters in July 1940, and still lost. And Fighter Command had expanded greatly since the BoB.



> Now you make it sound as if 3,000 aircraft were trying to sink ships over a month. Their primary mission was not to sink ships and how many of those aircraft were bombers capable of sinking ships?
> And again, they weren't trained in anti-shipping.



Exactly the same will be true in 1942.



> It seems you make the BoB the standard for all Luftwaffe operations. The BoB was going to last for a longer period.If the Germans were planning on keeping up the offensive, they couldn't fly too many sorties.



The BoB was planned to destroy the RAF in a matter of days (5, iirc).



> German bombers could fly up to 5 short-range missions a day. That's perhaps not your reality but unfortunately it's historical reality. I suggest you read up on Luftwaffe operations on the Eastern Front.



Maximum effort is not the same as average effort. Hooton quotes a British study on Luftwaffe efforts on the eastern front. The Luftwaffe rarely had more than 2500 aircraft in Russia between June and October, but averaged 1,200 sorties a day. Sometimes as many as 2000 sorties were flown per day.

Stuka units sometimes averaged 75% sortie rate (ie 75 sorties per day per 100 aircraft available), fighter units 60% and bomber units 40 - 45%.

Now if you want to argue a couple of units might manage several missions a day, you'd be correct, but that's not the case for large numbers of units.

If you take those figures and apply they to the BoB in 1942, the Germans with a force of 1500 bombers and dive bombers could make about 900 sorties a day, but that doesn't take into account the availability of escorts.



> I see Rommel winning in El Alamein and taking Alexandria and the Suez Channel.



The problem for Rommel is he didn't pay enough attention to logistics.

At El Alamein, Rommel is about 900 miles by road from his main port, Tripoli. All supplies have to be brought by road. A typical 3 ton truck could carry 3 tons, but went about 8 miles to the gallon. That means the 1800 mile round trip required about 225 gallons of fuel, which weighs just over a ton.

That means 1 truck can transport at most 2 tons to the front, without counting it's own spare parts, water, oil etc. 

There were two closer ports, Benghazi and Tobruk, but both had very low capacity, and couldn't handle many supplies.

Van Creveld goes into this in some detail in Supplying War. His conclusion is that a German advance into Egypt was an impossibility because of the North African infrastructure:


> Given that the Wehrmacht was only partly motorized and unsupported by a really strong motor industry; that the political situation necessitated the carrying of much useless Italian ballast; that the capacity of the Libyan ports was so small, the distances to be mastered so vast; it seems clear that, for all Rommel's tactical brilliance, the problem of supplying an Axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble. Under these circumstances, Hitler's original decision to send a force to defend a limited area in North Africa was correct. Rommel's repeated defiance of his orders and attempts to advance beyond a reasonable distance from his bases, however, was mistaken and should never have been tolerated.





> You don't get it. The Germans had fighter aircraft in Greece. As the British didn't have fighters, these fighters were unopposed. If the British did have fighters, it wouldn't mean things would have been different: the Germans could have protected their bombers.



Look at the record of Stuka operations against Britain, which were well escorted, but still suffered horrendous losses. And with air cover, bombing accuracy tends to go down, because the bombers are more worried about protecting themselves than hitting the target.


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 7, 2007)

Civettone said:


> And yet I'm only saying the Germans would have to hold out for two-three days. To say that it was the naval guns that saved them is simplistic. It contributed but it was not the main factor. Infantry and aircraft were more important.
> 
> Kris



If we go with the original Sealion plan, then after three days there will be a total of 6 German infantry and 2 airborne divisions in the UK, supported by 140 tanks and a further 200 armoured vehicles, if everything goes to plan.

If we enlarge this by 50%, to take account for more German resources in a 1942 hypothetical, then there are an additional 3 divisions landed. One for each of thee landing areas? If the German focus on armour transport, they could possibly more than double the numbers of tanks with the landing forces. Lets say 300 tanks and 500 armoured vehicles?

I don't see how these three two-three division sized formations, supported by batallion/regiment sized armoured forces, are really going to make significant headway against determined opposition and fixed defences. The TA is hardly going to roll over onto its back as the sight of German infantry, and the RAF is going to be causing chaos on the widely spread, narrowly held, bridgeheads.

If the German landings are widely spaced, then they have no mass. The TA can assemble behind the front and counterattack on the second or third day. The LW is going to be A. Covering the beachheads. B. Covering the Channel. C. Covering the ports in France. D. Escorting dive bombers to support the beach heads E. Escorting bombers to hit the RN. F. Escorting day bombers to destroy British defensive strong points. Adding ground attack missions 20-30 miles inland to that list in order to disrupt the British Army is a hard ask.

I think the best (read: only feasible) German plan would be to advance as hard as possible in the first 72 hours, say 8-12 miles inland and secure the best possible space for resupply before even thinking of digging in. If the precondition of suprose is achieved (extreemly dubious proposition in my mind), then the initial forces are going to be relatively better off than the following forces, which would have to deal with RN and RAF attacks in the Channel and British artillery hitting the bridgeheads. Its these 4-6 divisions that would have to do the most work of the entire invasion force, in order to create a favourable position for the Phase II landing of the heavy follow-on forces (which were originally planned for NINE days after the initial landings). 

If one of these inital assault formations are halted, or even driven back, in the first 48-72 hours, without significant progress, then I would be inclined to write off and withdraw from that particular bridgehead (unless it was the centre, anchoring landing) and divert supply and reinforcements to one of the other two and have a go with enlarge assault formations of 4 divisions or more.


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## Civettone (Apr 7, 2007)

Hop said:


> For very small numbers of aircraft, for very short period, on very short missions, it's possible. For large numbers, no.


Why would number of aircraft matter? Most German aircraft flew several missions a day near Kursk. For a short period and very short missions, which I have in mind for Sealion '42.



> 3 fighters were climbed to engage the German fighters, the other 6 climbed to engage the bombers.[/quoted]Finnish fighter training was the first to stress how a small number of fighters can hold the initiative against a much larger force. They did this by a loose finger-two formation. This was later adopted by the Germans.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Civettone (Apr 7, 2007)

Daishi, I didn't reply to your mail because I considered it to be off-topic. I don't want to discuss Barbarossa in this thread. I made the premise that Russia was neutralized. Does it mean it is defeated? Does it mean the non-agression pact still remains? I don't know and I don't really care.

But if Russia was defeated back in 1941, it must have been because Stalin made a deal with Hitler. Stalin had discretely asked what the terms for a ceasefire were. If a peace agreement had been signed, then the Germans would need less troops to occupy and guard what they had than when they first had to conquer it. The Germans would also build defensive lines. 


I enjoyed your alternative scenario. 

I do wonder why you want to invade Hungary? Is it to get Romania on your side? And how will the other countries react when you attack the Netherlands? I can't see Britain not going to war over Holland and Norway when they did go to war over far away Poland. As a suggestion, I think you should wait for the invasion of Holland and Norway until 1941 and immediately launch the offensive against Britain from your newly conquered airports. 

And if you're looking for a brilliant successor to Göring, may I suggest the guy in my avatar: Erhard Milch?? 8) 
Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 7, 2007)

Jabberwocky, although you're criticizing my plan, I have to say that I admire your plan, your logic and the way you present it. 

I don't agree with everything you say but I'm going to think about incorporating your constructive thought into my plan. I will get back to you!

Kris


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## plan_D (Apr 8, 2007)

_"Ok. And I consider them to arrive too late if they arrive in a few days. If you're going to send the Royal Navy in bit by bit, I think it's easier to take these ships out."_

In the event of Great Britain knowing about the invasion, Force H could be moved into position along the western entrance to the Channel before the invasion begins. 

_"No, German divisions were usually moved from one front to another without R&R. German HQ didn't require their divisions to up to full strength. They would rather take two divisions at half-strength than to get one up to full strength. And that worked out fine."_

Wrong. 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were in Holland in September 1944 because they were resting for the up and coming December Ardennes Offensive. German forces rested, just like anyone else. 

_"This is simply not true. You're probably confusing it with late 1942 when the allies stopped supplies reaching Tunisia. 
And especially with Malta being isolated (again), I don't see much in the way of getting more forces across with less losses during transfer."_

I'm not confusing it with anything. The Allies were cutting Rommel supply all through the N.African campaign and keeping Malta supplied. 

15 June, HALRPO B-24s with two 160 Sqdn. Liberators attack Italian fleet with no losses and damage to BB _Littorio_. The Italian fleet is forced to abandon its attack on a supply convoy heading for Malta. 

21 June, nine B-24Ds attack Benghazi.

24/25 June, ten B-24Ds hit Benghazi. 

25th and 26th, HALPRO B-24s hit Tobruk.

28th June, B-24s hit motor transport on Sollum-Matruh road.

2nd July, B-17Es and B-24Ds of USAMEAF attack Tobruk.

3rd July, Tobruk is attack by USAMEAF.

4th July, USAMEAF attack Med convoy, setting a tank alight.

5/6 July, Benghazi harbour is attack with ammo ship probably destroyed. 

9th July, B-24s attack another convoy losing one to Bf 109s but claiming two air kills. 

21st July, two ships hit at Suda Bay, Crete.

25th July, ship damaged in Tobruk by USAMEAF B-17s.

28th July, two ships hit in open sea off Suda Bay.

30th July, B-24s sink supply ship in Navarino Bay.

In total, 21 attacks were made by USAMEAF against Tobruk and Benghazi alone during the month of July, 1942. All this in direct support of the British 8th Army. That does not include the operations of the RAF, especially the 160 Sqdn. Liberators operating in the same fashion. 

_"I was thinking of one PzDiv and one InfDiv. How many divisions did Rommel have in 1942? How close was he to victory with those?"_

Rommel had 21st and 15th Panzer divisions and 90th Light division from Germany. He also had under his command the X and XXI Italian Corps, and XX Motorised Corps along with 133rd Armoured Division _Littorio_. 

How close to victory was he? 70 miles away from it with a withering supply line, no flank to go around, several miles of minefield to go through with the 8th Army out-numbering him in gun and tank. 

_"Two squadrons versus 200 German fighters as escort? Disrupting the bombers at the same time they're attacking the ships? I think the result would have been negligable."_

You're contradicting yourself here. In every other argument you go on about how smaller numbers of aircraft can, in fact, disrupt larger formations. The RAF went up against similar odds in the Battle of Britain, why assume they'd mean nothing over Crete? 

_"The only reason why he complained about losses was because it reduced the battle strength of the army. 
Here's one word for you: Stalingrad."_

I'm glad you've actually realised he cared about losses. Hitler actually believed he could win Stalingrad, hence the reason he threw people in there. Your plan doesn't have any sense of victory for the troops on the beach, you said yourself that you're abandoning them. 

_"Again, a typical example of how you make Neptune a standard. Had the allies done half of their deception the same result would have been achieved. 135 out 136 SS intelligence reports said the invasion would take place outside of Normandy. 
But how much resources did it take for the allies? How many divisions and tanks were given up to achieve this goal? 
All I'm saying is that the Germans could have deceived the British without too much effort."_

Neptune is the best example of the problems involved when organising an invasion force across the Channel. Unless you want to use the Norman invasion of Great Britain in 1066 as a starting point? 

I realise that's all you're saying and there's problem, you're just saying it. There's no evidence from the real world that suggests Britain could be so easily duped. 

_"Didn't they change the Enigma a couple of times? Germans after the war said they thought it would have been possible to break the code but that the allies wouldn't go to the trouble of decoding all of their messages. 
Tell me, did the allies know EVERYTHING which was wired by the Germans? The answer is no though you're 100 % sure the British would know everything about Sealion 42.
On the Eastern Front the Germans did their best to deceive the Russians as to where their troops were, about commanders, about false reports. I'm also thinking of the great deception plans prior to May 10 when they spread false plans in Belgium (together with the real ones one time by mistake.) To believe that the Germans didn't go to great lengths to deceive enemy intelligence, makes it clear to me that you know little"_

Yes, Germany changed the Enigma quite often. They increased the number of turns a couple of times. Germany didn't have a clue that the Enigma had been broken, that's a fact. 
No, Great Britain didn't know every single detail about Germany's private life. But it found out more than it needed to know about events in Germany, and concerning Germany. 

I never said Britain would know everything about Sealion '42, I'm saying that Great Britain would know the invasion was going to happen and at generally what date. You might say you'd be deceptive, and you probably would be given you know that ULTRA has your codes cracked. 

I never said that Germany didn't attempt to deceive the enemy. But the fact remains that ULTRA, even in its infancy, knew about the German invasion of France. ULTRA knew about the invasion of Russia, and knew about the Kursk offensive in 1943. 

Great Britain knew about every invasion attempt made by the Germans, what makes you think we wouldn't know about yours? 

_"Typical. So now I need to destroy all of them to get a result? Why were there so many radar installations if only a few were needed?
And how many were in range of artillery and naval guns?"_

You need to destroy a sufficient amount to secure holes in the system, yes. 

I will answer your second question with a question; why do you think there's three hydraulic lines in the DC-10 all doing the same job? 

You haven't got artillery ashore, there's not enough room. And what naval guns have you got that's going to fire that far inland? 

_"And yet I'm only saying the Germans would have to hold out for two-three days. To say that it was the naval guns that saved them is simplistic. It contributed but it was not the main factor. Infantry and aircraft were more important."_

Obviously the infantry were important, without them there was actually no beach-head - what a silly statement. Without the naval gunfire and artillery support, the Anzio beach-head would have been overrun by the 14th Armee. 

_"Starved after two days? Elite forces mean nothing if they don't have support? You're getting desperate in your arguments."_

How is that desperate, stating a fact. No matter how elite you claim your forces are, if they have no food to live or ammo to kill - then they're useless. 

What's a tank without its crew? A lump of expensive metal.
What's a soldier without his rifle? A clerk. 

You have to maintain your troops through supply, you cannot drop them ashore and abandon them. Or they will be starved into surrender, not literally starve to death ...if that's what you thought I meant.


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## Civettone (Apr 8, 2007)

plan_D said:


> Wrong. 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were in Holland in September 1944 because they were resting for the up and coming December Ardennes Offensive. German forces rested, just like anyone else.


It's wrong because you know divisions that were resting? I'm saying German divisions were usually given no R&R when they were ordered to move from one front to another. This is a bit typical of German forces: pulling units back for R&R unless they're decimated and needed to be rebuild. British and Americans managed their units better, especially the air units. 



> The Allies were cutting Rommel supply all through the N.African campaign and keeping Malta supplied.


They were interfering but IIRC 80% of all supplies went through unharmed. This would even be less with Malta being cut off. 



> The RAF went up against similar odds in the Battle of Britain, why assume they'd mean nothing over Crete?


I simply disagree with the outcome being different. The odds in Crete would be 1:10 fighters which is worse than Britain 1:2. And contradict me if I'm wrong but I don't remember the British building a radar network in Crete.



> I'm glad you've actually realised he cared about losses. Hitler actually believed he could win Stalingrad, hence the reason he threw people in there.


 But how did we start this? You said he wouldn't sacrifice those men in an invasion of Britain although my plan suggests heavy losses. Clearly that won't be the case. 



> Your plan doesn't have any sense of victory for the troops on the beach, you said yourself that you're abandoning them.


I never said that. I would leave them without reinforcements for two days.




> There's no evidence from the real world that suggests Britain could be so easily duped.


Everyone can be duped. You overestimate Britain.



> I never said Britain would know everything about Sealion '42, I'm saying that Great Britain would know the invasion was going to happen and at generally what date. You might say you'd be deceptive, and you probably would be given you know that ULTRA has your codes cracked.


Well, you're treating Ultra as being the wonderweapon it wasn't. And I'm not implying that the Germans magically know about it.




> I never said that Germany didn't attempt to deceive the enemy. But the fact remains that ULTRA, even in its infancy, knew about the German invasion of France. ULTRA knew about the invasion of Russia, and knew about the Kursk offensive in 1943.


And didn't know of other German offensives. Yet you're absolutely sure the British would know of Sealion 42. That's where I disagree. I say it's possible but not certain. That's the difference.



> Great Britain knew about every invasion attempt made by the Germans, what makes you think we wouldn't know about yours?


But what if the Germans send out false information? Germany never planned anything like Sealion 42. Let's compare it to other offensives where Germany did manage to deceive the enemy. Barbarossa is one. The British may have found out but the Russians with their extensive intelligence did not manage to find out about the biggest invasion of WW2. I didn't know the British found out about it by Ultra, I thought it was a spy (or the Lucy Ring?) who told them. But I can imagine that the secrecy was not the same towards Britain as towards Russia. The only case where I can remember the Germans doing their best to deceive the western allies was the Ardennes. Oh yeah, and ULTRA couldn't save Market Garden from defeat because it didn't know of that SS division that moved there just days before. 



> You haven't got artillery ashore, there's not enough room.


I don't have artillery? A German division without artillery? I don't think so. The German plan talked about full German divisions, so with its AD, AT and Arty. 




> You have to maintain your troops through supply, you cannot drop them ashore and abandon them. Or they will be starved into surrender, not literally starve to death ...if that's what you thought I meant.


Oooh... that's what you meant. (Let me delete a long reply about German rations and Stalingrad.... ) 
I think this is a matter on which we won't agree upon. I am thinking beyond conventional strategy. Leaving those troops without reinforcements (some supplies would get through) to lure in and defeat the Royal Navy and secure the logistics from then onwards.

Kris


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## plan_D (Apr 8, 2007)

_"It's wrong because you know divisions that were resting? I'm saying German divisions were usually given no R&R when they were ordered to move from one front to another. This is a bit typical of German forces: pulling units back for R&R unless they're decimated and needed to be rebuild. British and Americans managed their units better, especially the air units."_

All German units received R R when redeploying, especially in 1942. Even this suicidal German Command knew that resting your troops was vital to success. Those two divisions I mentioned off the top of my head are an example of two units moving from East to West, and resting inbetween. 

_"They were interfering but IIRC 80% of all supplies went through unharmed. This would even be less with Malta being cut off."_

Rommel's supply was being sunk in the Med, smashed in the ports and trashed on the roads. From Germany to the front-line, a lot less than 80% arrived. Most of the aerial assaults on Rommels supply were coming from Eygpt and Palestine, not Malta. 

_"I simply disagree with the outcome being different. The odds in Crete would be 1:10 fighters which is worse than Britain 1:2. And contradict me if I'm wrong but I don't remember the British building a radar network in Crete."_

Of course there's going to be a difference. Less ships would have most likely not suffered damage, the Fallschirmjager would have suffered more, and German planes would have been shot down. Even 24 aircraft providing air cover for the Royal Navy would have made a difference.

_"But how did we start this? You said he wouldn't sacrifice those men in an invasion of Britain although my plan suggests heavy losses. Clearly that won't be the case."_

Hitler wouldn't throw troops onto British beaches in the hope of destroying the Royal Navy. At Stalingrad there was a large chance of success, your proposed invasion depends on so many British blunders and blind luck ...it'd be a considered a complete waste of manpower. But this is a waste of time, since you're going to do it in this hypothetical situation.

_"But what if the Germans send out false information? Germany never planned anything like Sealion 42. Let's compare it to other offensives where Germany did manage to deceive the enemy. Barbarossa is one. The British may have found out but the Russians with their extensive intelligence did not manage to find out about the biggest invasion of WW2. I didn't know the British found out about it by Ultra, I thought it was a spy (or the Lucy Ring?) who told them. But I can imagine that the secrecy was not the same towards Britain as towards Russia. The only case where I can remember the Germans doing their best to deceive the western allies was the Ardennes. Oh yeah, and ULTRA couldn't save Market Garden from defeat because it didn't know of that SS division that moved there just days before."_

_"Well, you're treating Ultra as being the wonderweapon it wasn't. And I'm not implying that the Germans magically know about it."_

First off, the ULTRA team were a wonder "weapon" for the British. Many lives were saved because of British decoding efforts. 

ULTRA knew about Operation Barbarossa, the information was handed to Stalin but believing that Britain was trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany; ignored it. 

Fragments of the Ardennes Offensive were known about by ULTRA, SHAEF ignored the information because they didn't believe the Germans had any fight left. 

You've stated a common myth about _Market Garden_; it seems easy to mention bad intelligence alongside _Market Garden_. However, documents released in 2002 actually showed that ULTRA knew all about the presence of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Holland, this was on top of the pictures taken of the SS armour in the area. 

_"I don't have artillery? A German division without artillery? I don't think so. The German plan talked about full German divisions, so with its AD, AT and Arty."_

You don't invade with a division just like that. The infantry make the gains; spread out and then capture the space to set up your heavy weapons. The Allies had to push miles inland before heavy guns were brought in and deployed. Your assaulting forces would be relying solely on aerial and naval support. 

_"Oooh... that's what you meant. (Let me delete a long reply about German rations and Stalingrad.... ) 
I think this is a matter on which we won't agree upon. I am thinking beyond conventional strategy. Leaving those troops without reinforcements (some supplies would get through) to lure in and defeat the Royal Navy and secure the logistics from then onwards."_

How many landing craft and support vessels (not combat) do you suppose you will have during the landing, then supply?


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## Civettone (Apr 8, 2007)

Apparently the Germans did have landing craft.

Landungfahrzeuge

The Naval Landing Crafts - called "*Marinefährprahm*" in German were the largest landing craft used by the Kriegsmarine. Although required for Operation Sealion (Invasion of England) in 1940, the first of this transport ships were delivered in 1941. They were mainly used for transport and supply duties and not for their initial invasion role and could transport 200 Soldiers or 100ts of equipment, including tanks. They were armed with a 7,5 cm gun and a 2 cm gun. Maximum speed was 10 knots.











With a length of nearly 35 meters, the *Marine Artillerie Leichter *(MAL) were the smallest landing craft in Kriegsmarine services. Designed after the requirements of the German Army, those small vehicles should be used during Operation Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union. Their projected operational area was the Caspian Sea where the MAL should be used to attack Soviet oil transports from Baku to Astrakhan. 
It carried two 8,8 cm guns and eight 2 cm guns.






*Artilleriefährprahm* (AFP) : Based on the Marinefährprahm Type D, those Artillery Ferries were used for several different kind of operations. Although being first though as a provisional design, they took over the role of gunboats in various operational areas, including the British Channel, Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
Besides their use as escort vessels, they were also occasionally used for shore bombardments and mine laying, they proved to be very usable crafts.
The ferries had a light armor protection, 20 mm armor steel and up to 100 mm concrete armor at the superstructures and ammunition stores.
250 - 380 Ton, length 50m, 2 x 88mm, 1 x 37mm Flak, 2 x 20mm Flakvierling and 2 x 20mm Flak, 8 knots. 



[B]Siebel Fähre[/B]: During the preparation for Operation Seelöwe - the invasion of England - it soon got clear, that the Kriegsmarine needed a high number of landing crafts. Therefore all branches of the German Army made proposals for such a craft - the Luftwaffe proposal was is known as the Siebel-Fähre (Siebel Ferry) named after its inventor, Oberst Siebel.
The Siebel-Ferries were constructed from existing material, pioneer pontoon originally used to build auxiliary pontoon bridges. Two of those pontoons were connected side-by-side, a propulsion unit with BMW aircraft engines was added in the back and a large platform mounted on top of the pontoons was used to carry the payload. Vehicles could enter or leave the craft over a ramp on the bow of the ferry.
There were multiple version of those crafts build, from transport crafts over artillery ferries to staff command ships or hospital ferries.
[ATTACH=full]388813[/ATTACH]


[B]Land-Wasser-Schleppe[/B]: In 1936, Rheinmetall Borsig AG was approached by the German army general staff to build a special amphibious tracked vehicle for landing operations. The tractor would be able to two behind it a floating trailer capable of accommodating vehicles or other cargo weighing up to 18,000kg. On water the tractor would function as a tug for the floating cargo trailer. After landing the tractor would still have to move the trailer to a safe place to unload the cargo.
Rheinmetall tackled the project and the product became known as the Land-Wasser-Schlepper (land-water tractor) or LWS. The LWS was actually and simply a motor tug built with tracks. It was a large and strange machine that nonetheless turned out to be a rugged vehicle (or boat?). There were two long sets of tracks, one on the flat bottom on each side of the LWS. There were four pairs of roadwheels suspended from leaf-spring suspensions on each side. The boat part of the LWS had a clean, pronounced bow, and on top there was a compartment for the crew of three and extra room for another 20. The funnel-like structure on top of the cabin was actually the engine's air intake. Two large propellers were installed at the rear, or stern, for propulsion in water. To make the LWS more boat-like there were portholes on both sides of the crew cabin.
On land the floating trailer looked like a large slab-sided vehicle, and was supported by wheels on one forward axle and two rear ones. On the back side a ramp could be opened for unloading. A typical load was an SdKfz 9 18-tonne halftrack, and the crew would be housed in the LWS for the aqueous leg of the journey.
The LWS and trailer idea was tried and tested quite slowly and leisurely until "Seelöwe" (Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Great Britain) was to become reality after the fall of France. The LWS and trailer could certainly be used in such an amphibious operation, but they were more suited for calmer waters of inland water bodies, not the tempestuous English Channel. The LWS program was for a while carried out with more urgency, but was never materialized. By 1941 the project was dropped, when the prospect of Seelöwe was overshadowed by the much more serious Operation Barbarossa.
[IMG]http://wilk.wpk.p.lodz.pl/~whatfor/cnowe/landwasserschlepper_02.jpg
And in 1942 they developed a version on the Pz IV chassis:



And saving the best for last: the *Pionierlandungsboot*



Kris


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## plan_D (Apr 8, 2007)

All very interesting, and I certainly won't say I knew about them in any kind of detail. But the question remains; how many do you propose to have during this invasion?


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## Civettone (Apr 8, 2007)

Damn man, that post took forever!! Half of those images couldn't be hotlinked. Then I had to find others and when that didn't work I had to upload them myself. 

As to your question on how many I'm planning on using, I don't know. I just found out about German landing craft this evening. Apparently many were build in anticipation of Sealion in 1941 but production slowed down after the cancellation and Barbarossa. I also found out that they could have been built by the existing shipyards (not the ones for U-boats). 
In fact I was quite happy about the river barges but when such an opportunity arises... 
How many do you think I need??




plan_D said:


> All German units received R R when redeploying, especially in 1942. Even this suicidal German Command knew that resting your troops was vital to success.


Well, that's rather contrary to Hitler's orders to immediately transfer units from Russia to Italy or to France in 1943 and 1944. Until then there was only one front (North Africa not really being a real frontline). So for 1942 I can only think of the transfers along the Eastern Front. As things were getting desperate near Stalingrad, Hitler ordered divisions from other parts to get in the fight. And let me tell you, he didn't allow even half a day rest. This is from the top of my head but I can look up specific divisions if you want me to.




> Rommel's supply was being sunk in the Med, smashed in the ports and trashed on the roads. From Germany to the front-line, a lot less than 80% arrived. Most of the aerial assaults on Rommels supply were coming from Eygpt and Palestine, not Malta.


That seems to be a bit of an exaggeration. Smashed, trashed? I think I have figures of the losses somewhere. If I forget to post them tomorrow, please remind me of it. 




> Even 24 aircraft providing air cover for the Royal Navy would have made a difference.


They would have to fly CAPs as they wouldn't have radar early warning as in Britain. That means that even less would take it up against 200 German fighters.




> Hitler wouldn't throw troops onto British beaches in the hope of destroying the Royal Navy. At Stalingrad there was a large chance of success, your proposed invasion depends on so many British blunders and blind luck ...it'd be a considered a complete waste of manpower. But this is a waste of time, since you're going to do it in this hypothetical situation.


And it wouldn't be the first time that Hitler believed in an impossible situation. He let the 6th army be surrounded believing they would hold out. I honestly don't think that's taking a bigger chance than my invasion plan.



> ULTRA knew about Operation Barbarossa, the information was handed to Stalin but believing that Britain was trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany; ignored it.
> Fragments of the Ardennes Offensive were known about by ULTRA, SHAEF ignored the information because they didn't believe the Germans had any fight left.
> You've stated a common myth about _Market Garden_; it seems easy to mention bad intelligence alongside _Market Garden_. However, documents released in 2002 actually showed that ULTRA knew all about the presence of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Holland, this was on top of the pictures taken of the SS armour in the area.


This I find interesting: I see a certain weakness in ULTRA. Even though ULTRA said one thing, the allies didn't follow it all the time. This confirms my suspicion that the allies could be fooled. If ULTRA says one thing, but other intelligence another, it apparently causes confusion... I didn't know this until just now.




> The infantry make the gains; spread out and then capture the space to set up your heavy weapons.


But does artillery need to be heavy? What about the sIGs and the 12cm mortars?


Finally Plan_D, I'm sorry that I reacted a bit harsh in the previous discussions. Won't happen again...  
Kris


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## syscom3 (Apr 8, 2007)

Some of these are indeed quite interesting and usefull.

But not all are true sea going vessels, and would not be able to handle high sea states (maintain steerage or acceptable speed).


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## mkloby (Apr 9, 2007)

Civettone said:


> But does artillery need to be heavy? What about the sIGs and the 12cm mortars?
> Kris



sIG 33 was almost 4000 lbs. I'm not sure what the 120mm mortar weighed, but I'm guessing that it was no less than 500lbs and not able to be manpacked.

I don't know if you have ever had experience with artillery, but you definitely are not squeezing these babies in anywhere and firing from a position 10ft behind your lines...


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## plan_D (Apr 9, 2007)

_"As to your question on how many I'm planning on using, I don't know. I just found out about German landing craft this evening. Apparently many were build in anticipation of Sealion in 1941 but production slowed down after the cancellation and Barbarossa. I also found out that they could have been built by the existing shipyards (not the ones for U-boats). 
In fact I was quite happy about the river barges but when such an opportunity arises... 
How many do you think I need??"_

Operation _Neptune_ had 4,126 landing ships and craft, 864 Merchant ships, 736 Ancillary ships and craft and 1,213 Naval combatant vessels. 

U.S 4th Infantry division on UTAH. 23,250 landed, 200 casualties.

D,E and F companies of 2nd Ranger battalion landed 225 men at Pointe Du Hoc, 125 causualties from 6 - 8 June. 

U.S 1st Infantry Division on OMAHA. 34,250 landed, 3000 casualties. 

British 50th Division on Gold. 24,970 landed, 400 casualties. 

Canadian 3rd Division on Juno. 21,500 landed, 1000 casualties.

British 3rd Division on Sword. 28,845 landed, 630 casualties. 

_"Well, that's rather contrary to Hitler's orders to immediately transfer units from Russia to Italy or to France in 1943 and 1944. Until then there was only one front (North Africa not really being a real frontline). So for 1942 I can only think of the transfers along the Eastern Front. As things were getting desperate near Stalingrad, Hitler ordered divisions from other parts to get in the fight. And let me tell you, he didn't allow even half a day rest. This is from the top of my head but I can look up specific divisions if you want me to."_

When shifting troops from the East to West and vice versa, they were rested. Even on the Russian front, when permitted, the German troops were rested. 
When Hitler ordered units from, say, in front of Moscow to attack Kiev they didn't rest because it was all part of the same offensive. 

_"They would have to fly CAPs as they wouldn't have radar early warning as in Britain. That means that even less would take it up against 200 German fighters."_

British fighters were flying off Malta in the same fashion and achieving success against the Luftwaffe and Italians. The Luftwaffe escort doctrine was flawed so any interception would always take place around the bomber formation, causing losses to the bombers.

_"This I find interesting: I see a certain weakness in ULTRA. Even though ULTRA said one thing, the allies didn't follow it all the time. This confirms my suspicion that the allies could be fooled. If ULTRA says one thing, but other intelligence another, it apparently causes confusion... I didn't know this until just now."_

Operation _Market Garden_ had no intelligence sources clashing. Dutch resistance, ULTRA and aerial photography all showed that there were SS Panzer Divisions in and around Arnhem. 

ULTRA will find out about your invasion, aerial photography will find out and the French resistance will find out. The Allied intelligence operation in Europe was massive - it would not go unnoticed.

_"But does artillery need to be heavy? What about the sIGs and the 12cm mortars?"_

It certainly does if you plan on matching British heavy guns.


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## Civettone (Apr 9, 2007)

plan_D said:


> When shifting troops from the East to West and vice versa, they were rested. Even on the Russian front, when permitted, the German troops were rested.


If they were rested it was because they were awaiting transport and refit. Refitting was done not to bring the unit back up to strength but because moving the heavy equipment wasn't worth it. For instance, the SS Leibstandarte was moved from Kursk to the Italian front with a stop in Austria to get their new equipment. They did not fill up their ranks but did get a chance to rest. It's however a different thing that they were drawn back for rest until they were ready to move to France.



> When Hitler ordered units from, say, in front of Moscow to attack Kiev they didn't rest because it was all part of the same offensive


At times units had to move a thousand kilometers along the Eastern Front. Yet they weren't given R&R though it could take weeks for them to get there. And these were cases where it wasn't the same offensive. (Kiev and Moscow wouldn't be part of the same offensive IMO) 





> British fighters were flying off Malta in the same fashion and achieving success against the Luftwaffe and Italians. The Luftwaffe escort doctrine was flawed so any interception would always take place around the bomber formation, causing losses to the bombers.


But Malta had radar, didn't it?
And what do you mean by flawed escort doctrine? Galland sorted that out but Göring interfered. The result was 1/3 close to the bomber, 1/3 above and 1/3 way in front.




> Operation _Market Garden_ had no intelligence sources clashing. Dutch resistance, ULTRA and aerial photography all showed that there were SS Panzer Divisions in and around Arnhem.


So the allies weren't surprised to find that new German elite division?



> It certainly does if you plan on matching British heavy guns.


I didn't really have counterfire in mind as the Germans couldn't match the British accuracy and numbers. I would use the artillery for fire support, and that's why I was thinking of the 7,5 cm leichte IG and 8 and 12 cm mortars. These were light enough to be towed by their crews.


And I found out something about those German convoy losses. In October 1942 the British started an air and sea offensive (ships, ports, roads) which resulted in 40% of the supplies not arriving. That means that before this time it was considerably less. I don't know how much but couldn't be more than 30% or what I thought, 20%. In my alternative scenario this could no longer be the case for obvious reasons. Also the Italian air force would be bigger as they would no longer be needed in Russia.

Kris


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## mkloby (Apr 9, 2007)

Civettone said:


> I didn't really have counterfire in mind as the Germans couldn't match the British accuracy and numbers. I would use the artillery for fire support, and that's why I was thinking of the 7,5 cm leichte IG and 8 and 12 cm mortars. These were light enough to be towed by their crews.



Tactically speaking, manually towing 120mm mortars is impractical. Especially in the offense where they would need to continally be advanced to support the infantry. 120mm mortars are generally used as a towed or mounted weapon system. It is much more feasible to manpack small and medium mortars, but that's not a real substitute for an arty regiment. Enemy counter-battery fire would likely smash your fire support positions to pieces.


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## Civettone (Apr 9, 2007)

Well, the way I saw it was that the 120mm mortars would act as substitute artillery while the smaller 50 and 80mm mortars could be carried by the infantry to give them their close support. I also prefer mortars as they form smaller and more mobile obstacles and the enemy has more difficulty getting a position on them.

Kris


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## Kurfürst (Apr 10, 2007)

mkloby said:


> sIG 33 was almost 4000 lbs. I'm not sure what the 120mm mortar weighed, but I'm guessing that it was no less than 500lbs and not able to be manpacked.



The sIG 33 would be indeed a bit too much, but there was also 7,5cm infantry guns which were rather compact and light at around 400 kg, and can be easily manhandled even on tough terrain. 

A possible invasion's first wave would be probably supported by 8cm and 12cm mortars (the latter has wheels, and weights 285/600kg, so it can be manpacked as well), the usual 7,5cm IGs of the infantry, and recoil-less rifles that were first used on Crete, submersible tanks and such. That should suffice for the first waves, after all, the Allies landed and broke through MUCH more fortified defenses than the British would ever manage to build with lighter gear.


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## mkloby (Apr 10, 2007)

Kurfürst said:


> The sIG 33 would be indeed a bit too much, but there was also 7,5cm infantry guns which were rather compact and light at around 400 kg, and can be easily manhandled even on tough terrain.
> 
> A possible invasion's first wave would be probably supported by 8cm and 12cm mortars (the latter has wheels, and weights 285/600kg, so it can be manpacked as well), the usual 7,5cm IGs of the infantry, and recoil-less rifles that were first used on Crete, submersible tanks and such. That should suffice for the first waves, after all, the Allies landed and broke through MUCH more fortified defenses than the British would ever manage to build with lighter gear.



400kg may not be much in terms of weight of arty, but it certainly is not light. Easily manhandled across tough terrain, like mud, sand, and the like? I'm not saying it couldn't be done, but the tactical efficiency of such action makes it impractical. Again, the delays involved in staging and deploying weapons in such an action is not going to be effective.

Manpacking 120mm mortars is also just, tactically speaking, ridiculous. we train manpacking our 60 and 81mm mortars today, and the increase in fatigue and strain they cause is rough. And what about all the ammunition? We're humping them too...

My whole point is that this is the worst fire support plan, and horribly ineffective. The issue of british counter battery fire has not even been brough up.


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## Glider (Apr 10, 2007)

mkloby said:


> 400kg may not be much in terms of weight of arty, but it certainly is not light. Easily manhandled across tough terrain, like mud, sand, and the like? I'm not saying it couldn't be done, but the tactical efficiency of such action makes it impractical. Again, the delays involved in staging and deploying weapons in such an action is not going to be effective.
> 
> Manpacking 120mm mortars is also just, tactically speaking, ridiculous. we train manpacking our 60 and 81mm mortars today, and the increase in fatigue and strain they cause is rough. And what about all the ammunition? We're humping them too...
> 
> My whole point is that this is the worst fire support plan, and horribly ineffective. The issue of british counter battery fire has not even been brough up.



Have to agree with everything in this posting. British Artillery was as good as the best overall and some say the best in WW2 in terms of flexibility. To abandon any counter battery fire and let British fire without hinderance is simply asking for trouble.

Mortars have a role but anything over 81mm isn't man portable in practical terms.


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## plan_D (Apr 10, 2007)

_"If they were rested it was because they were awaiting transport and refit. Refitting was done not to bring the unit back up to strength but because moving the heavy equipment wasn't worth it. For instance, the SS Leibstandarte was moved from Kursk to the Italian front with a stop in Austria to get their new equipment. They did not fill up their ranks but did get a chance to rest. It's however a different thing that they were drawn back for rest until they were ready to move to France."_

In terms of time, it's the exact same. It took weeks to move from the East to the West, fact. And it would take even longer to move from the East to Africa. 

_"But Malta had radar, didn't it?
And what do you mean by flawed escort doctrine? Galland sorted that out but Göring interfered. The result was 1/3 close to the bomber, 1/3 above and 1/3 way in front."_

I've never seen Malta has having radar, the Royal Navy around it had radar which could be used to direct air support. The same would apply for Crete. 

The Luftwaffe never adopted the escort doctrine that prevented the fight taking place around the bomber formation; roaming escort. Galland encouraged more fighter sweeps but, as you say, Goring made it close escort and Goring told the Luftwaffe what to do, not Galland.

_"So the allies weren't surprised to find that new German elite division?"_

New? The SS divisions in Holland were resting and being re-equiped because of the damage done to them in Russia. The only people surprised to see two SS divisions in Holland were the poor paratroopers who hadn't been warned. All of High Command knew about them, as I said, ULTRA, Dutch Resistance and Photo Recon had told them. I even have a Dutch report of Arnhem from the time (a copy, of course) which talks about the numbers of SS troops. If you really want, I'll quote that!

_"I didn't really have counterfire in mind as the Germans couldn't match the British accuracy and numbers. I would use the artillery for fire support, and that's why I was thinking of the 7,5 cm leichte IG and 8 and 12 cm mortars. These were light enough to be towed by their crews."_

Well, mkloby and Glider had pointed out the flaw in this. The British couter-battery fire would destroy your artillery positions with ease, as they would out-gun and out-range you. 

_"And I found out something about those German convoy losses. In October 1942 the British started an air and sea offensive (ships, ports, roads) which resulted in 40% of the supplies not arriving. That means that before this time it was considerably less. I don't know how much but couldn't be more than 30% or what I thought, 20%. In my alternative scenario this could no longer be the case for obvious reasons. Also the Italian air force would be bigger as they would no longer be needed in Russia."_

What obvious reasons? You would be making the Med a more target rich environment, the U.S 9th Air Force and Desert Air Force would find more targets when over the Med. The Italian Air Force was a poor excuse in 1941-1942 and their numbers would hardly grow because of a Soviet victory.


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## Hop (Apr 10, 2007)

> Is Western Europe the same as France?



Is Britain the same as the Channel Coast? The RAF had fighter squadrons in Northern Ireland, the north of Scotland, Wales, the north of England etc that didn't participate at all in the fighting.



> As I said before, having more fighters doesn't result in winning air battles. In the end, the Bf 109 shot down more British fighters than lost,



But the British target was the bombers. As Bungay points out, the German fighters achieved about a 1.2 to 1 victory rate, whereas the British fighters achieved 1.8 to 1. They had different tasks.



> I don't know where you got that from but I have accounts of Luftwaffe units flying up to 5 missions a day on the Eastern Front.



And yet on average they flew much less than 1 sortie per day, as the figures show.



> Van Creveld is interesting. I read his work back in '03. It really opened my eyes as I had never really considered logistics to be important. Since then I have adopted some other views and have noticed that Van Creveld is an expert on logistics but is not really accurate when it comes to German doctrine and capabilities. For all the criticism he puts down on them, the Germans still managed to advance at a speed unmatched in WW2.



But failed to hold on to their advances, which is the point.



> They weren't fully motorized and lacked pretty much everything, yet they arrived near Moscow and Leningrad in a matter of weeks.



And never managed to get beyond them.



> Rommel moved 644 km in 36 days. His troops were exhausted and out of fuel but he got there and held the initiative.
> You say he had to be supplied from Tripoli yet I wonder why you leave out Benghazi and Tobruk. Don't worry, I'm not going to accuse you of deliberately giving false information again.



I did mention them:



> There were two closer ports, Benghazi and Tobruk, but both had very low capacity, and couldn't handle many supplies.





> Von Creveld states that Tripoli had a "comfortable" capacity of 50,000 tons per month, Benghazi had a theoretical capacity of 81,000 tons per month, and Tobruk's capacity is put at 20,000 tons per month, out of a
> theoretical capacity of 45,000 tons per month when the Italians
> were using it.



Are you sure? In Supplying War, Van Creveld says of Tripoli:


> This was Tripoli, the largest Libyan harbour by far, capable of handling - under ideal conditions - five cargo ships or four troop transports simultaneously. Its capacity, as long as no unforeseen explosions wrecked the quays, and the largely local labour-force was not driven off by air raids, amounted to approximately 45,000 tons per month.



Benghazi:


> Though theoretically capable of processing 2,700 tons a day, Benghazi was well within reach of the RAF and suffered accordingly. With an unloading capacity of 700-800 tons only exceptionally reached



Tripoli:


> The port was theoretically capable of unloading 1,500 tons a day, but in practice rarely exceeded 600. When consulted about its use, the German navy dismissed it as a disembarkation port for large ships, and bluntly told OKH that it would do well to rely exclusively on Tripoli and Benghazi to keep Rommel supplied. Since in this period (July-August 1941) insufficient coastal shipping was available even to utilize Benghazi fully, Rommel's scheme for solving his supply difficulties by capturing Tobruk seems highly impracticable.





> hat's really strange is that they stopped doing this when it was already too late: after the Allies landed in Algeria. Suddenly they moved and supplied 300,000 men to Tunisia only to get their ships sunk by the new warships and aircraft and the ones from Malta.



Capturing Tunisia gave them a much better port, and much shorter supply lines once unloaded. More from Supplying War:


> After the war in North Africa was over, Rommel bitterly commented that, had he received but a fraction of the troops and supplies that Hitler poured into Tunisia in a hopeless attempt to hold it, he could have thrown the British out of Egypt many times over. This claim has since been echoed by many other writers. However, it ignores the fact that the Axis' presence in Africa had been put on an entirely different basis by Rommel's retreat and by the Allied landings in North West Africa. Having seized both Bizerta and Toulon, as well as the French merchant fleet, the Axis now possessed the means with which to send reinforcements to Africa at a rate Panzerarmee had never known. Even so, however, they did not succeed in maintaining them there for very long.





> But Rommel did manage to get to El Alamein and get his troops supplied.



He managed to reach Alamein. He did not manage to adequately supply his forces there.



> Given that in early 1942 Rommel would have gotten more resources and two extra divisions (practically doubling his force!) he would have taken Tobruk much earlier and could have advanced towards El Alamein when the British were unprepared and weakened.



No, the whole point is he could not have supported those forces. From Supplying War:


> The only way out of the predicament was to attack and capture the port of Tobruk. However, Rommel had to concede that his requirements for such an operation would be no less than four German armoured divisions - precisely the number originally envisaged by von Thorna. This, however, was an impossible demand. Not only were Germany's forces now fully committed against Russia, *but to grant Rommel's request meant that DAK would need another 20,000 tons a month, for which unloading facilities were not available.*





> Look at the record of Stuka operations against Britain, which were well escorted, but still suffered horrendous losses.
> 
> Horrendous losses? How many did they lose? 40? 50?



It was 69 on operations, and another 18 not on operations. And how many sorties did they fly?

If you look at the final nail in their coffin in the BoB, the raid that convinced Goering to stop using them in the main attack, 109 Stukas escorted by 150+ Bf 109s. 8 109s were lost, 17 Stukas, with another 7 Stukas damaged. The RAF lost 5 fighters.

That's a loss rate of about 15% for the Stukas. Sustainable losses would have been on the order of 2 or 3%.



> What do you base this on? Does this also apply to the American 8th AF?



Yes.


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 10, 2007)

Kurfürst said:


> That should suffice for the first waves, after all, the Allies landed and broke through MUCH more fortified defenses than the British would ever manage to build with lighter gear.



British fortifications were not designed to stop the German advance, but simply to slow and obstruct it. To that point British defensive doctrine in the south of England relied on networks of smaller fixed defensive pillboxes in depth, rather than single massive strong points.

There were no 'Hillman' or 'Morris' style fortified divisional command posts as encountered in Normandy. Rather, covering networks of 3-6 pillboxes were erected, sometimes supported by larger weapons pits for crew served gus (artillery, flak or AT) further inland.

The fixed fortifications built between 1940 and 1942 were meant to canalise inland advances away from transport arteries and into corridors where the TA and British land forces could meet the invaders. Garrison and fixed forces were to fight delaying actions, preventing the Germans from advancing inland to the best of their ability, while regular army forces assembled. 

The British never really put their faith in concrete and rebar to stop the invasion. It was counter attack and control of the sea that were seen as the vital keys to destroying any invasion force.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 10, 2007)

I somehow missed this when reading through all the posts, but Civettone, look at a map please. France is in Western Europe....


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## Kurfürst (Apr 10, 2007)

Hop said:


> Is Britain the same as the Channel Coast? The RAF had fighter squadrons in Northern Ireland, the north of Scotland, Wales, the north of England etc that didn't participate at all in the fighting.
> 
> But the British target was the bombers. As Bungay points out, the German fighters achieved about a 1.2 to 1 victory rate, whereas the British fighters achieved 1.8 to 1. They had different tasks.



The problem is with your figures, that the British admitted the loss of 1140 of their fighters, whereas the LW curiously only knows about 1385 of it's combat aircraft _of all types_ (even coastal aircraft and such counted) being lost to enemy action during the Battle of Britiain, no small number to ship and land AAA, balloons and not fighters.

As for the LW fighters record, they lost something like 502 s-e, and 224 t-e fighters to enemy action of all kinds, vs. the said 1140 British fighters lost (not counting damaged).

Either your math is very poor or you're selling poo here again - btw, did you manage to find out the name of those 3 Italian phantom BBs you claimed the RN sent to Davy Jones locker..? About 6th time I ask, is it?

Then this regular trash-talk about Stukas, you seem to be very fond of spreading the same old myth over and over again?



> It was 69 on operations, and another 18 not on operations.



Read : The LW was loosing 59 Stukas during the whole BoB due to enemy action, the rest is just pumping the numbers up.

Other than that, the truth is the RAF could did bloody nothing against the Stukas that happily sinking British coastal sinking en-masse during July and August. Ju87 units were active over both Channel convoys and southeast England from July. Losses suffered over the two month period were: 

July 14 - 1; 
July 20 - 2; 
July 25 - 1; 
July 27 - 1; 
July 29 - 4; 
August 11 - 1; 
August 12 - 5; 
August 14 - 4; 
August 15 - 7; 
August 16 - 9; 
August 18 - 14. 

In that two month period the Ju87s

sank 1 ainti-aircraft ship - the Foylebank 
sank 1 destroyer - the Brazen 
damaged five destroyers - Beagle, Boadicea, Bulldog, Boreas, Brilliant 
forced the Dover Destroyers to be withdrawn 
sank 4 small warships - Warrior II, Kingston Galena, Roding, Gulzar 

sank 14 merchant ships 
damaged 29 merchant ships 
forced Channel convoys to be halted during daylight 

damaged 7 airfields - Detling, Hawkinge, Lympne, Tangmere, Lee-On-Solent, Ford, Thorney Island 
destroyed 49 aircraft on the ground - 22 at Detling, 15 at Tangmere, 12 at Lee-On-Solent 
damaged three radar stations (putting them off air for a short period) - Ventnor, Poling, Dover. 



> And how many sorties did they fly?



Overall during the two month period the Ju87's suffered a 7.9% loss rate - hardly the massive losses the British claimed. And achieved an remarkable amount in that period.



> If you look at the final nail in their coffin in the BoB, the raid that convinced Goering to stop using them in the main attack, 109 Stukas escorted by 150+ Bf 109s.



He must have meant August 18, which British mythology had declared as the day after Stukas were withdrawn due ot mounting losses. It has no basis, it's part of the BoB-folklore.

The Ju 87 was not withdrawn from the so-called Battle of Britain. When the targets changed from coastal targets to inner-Britain targets, the Ju 87 groups were redirected to attack the coastal merchant ships, since they lacked speed and range. Kesselring's urging due to the fact that the Battle was entering a period where level bombers would be the main thrust, not dive bombers. He believed the Ju87 units should be held in reserve for when air supremacy was gained and could be used to stike at the RN when Operation Sealion was implemented. The Sturzkampfgeschwader were retained at their bases in northern France and Belgium after August 1940, but they were no longer assigned daylight targets _in the coastal counties of southern England._ They continued to effectively suppress any trade with coastal naval vessels on the British SE and S coasts. They continued to do so till spring 1941, longer than the level bomber campaign lasted. The Achte Fliegerkorps, to which most of the Sturzkampfgeschwader belonged, was to play a key role in supporting Seelöwe until the operation was indefinitely postponed and von Richthofen's Fliegerkorps ordered from France to Romania in January 1941. From September to December, the Sturzkampfgeschwader flew some dawn and dusk attacks on coastal shipping in the Thames Estuary and along the southeast English coast, but mostly they trained and waited for Seelöwe and then their next assignment. The unit histories for St.G. 2 and St.G. 77 bear this out, as does a careful examination of the daily loss reports for all four Geschwader along with scattered ULTRA intercepts and occasional references in the surviving Heer AOK records for northern France and Belgium for fall 1940. The Ju 87 groups were withdrawn from the frontline in spring 1941 for refreshment, as preparation for the attack on Russia. 

This is supported by the fact that up to 18 August, 33 Stukas had been lost; however, some 51 were lost on operations in total up to the end of August, and 2 more on operations in September etc.



> 8 109s were lost, 17 Stukas, with another 7 Stukas damaged.



Compared to that, the RAF reported 37 Stukas destroyed, 2 probably destroyed, 2 damaged.



> The RAF lost 5 fighters.



RAF records tell of 22 for that day.



> That's a loss rate of about 15% for the Stukas. Sustainable losses would have been on the order of 2 or 3%.



That's the loss rate of one mission, where they had considerable losses as opposed to the avarage of next to zil losses for week after week - a mere 12 Stukas being lost to enemy losses in the whole July, for example. Speaks a lot of the RAF's capability to stop anti-shipping strikes, isn't it..?

It's curious though that now you pick the atypical losses of a single day, and try to apply that to the whole picture, when just recently you were arguing that the LW would not be able to amount a large number of sorties on avarage, and 'it doesn't matter' if they occasionaly did. Now it's a different song, the single worst sortie of the Stukas is representative of their whole operations.

I'd say it's a curious attitude, but since I know you for such a long time, I say it's just the same old old tricks.


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## Civettone (Apr 10, 2007)

Glider said:


> British Artillery was as good as the best overall and some say the best in WW2 in terms of flexibility.


Flexibility? I think it will be hard to beat the Finnish and the Americans in that sector.
The British artillery could start firing fast but this was at the cost of accuracy as they didn't take external factors into account as the Germans did like height, wind, temperature, etc. This lack of accuracy can also be deducted from North Africa where British artillery failed to take out the feared German 88mm guns.




> Mortars have a role but anything over 81mm isn't man portable in practical terms.


The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon. 






Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 10, 2007)

plan_D said:


> In terms of time, it's the exact same. It took weeks to move from the East to the West, fact. And it would take even longer to move from the East to Africa.


Ok. Plenty of time to rest. But you can forget that only full-strength divisions were committed. If the unit was largely wiped out, sure. But Germans didn't care that much if a unit didn't have their full strength. This is all the more strange as they did form new divisions instead of bringing the old ones up to strength. This became even worse in 1944/1945 when they didn't even bother to strengthen the old ones leading to several good commanders to stick to shrinked little units which could do nothing but watch those new divisions being ripped to pieces. But that's another thing...




> I've never seen Malta has having radar, the Royal Navy around it had radar which could be used to direct air support. The same would apply for Crete.


BBC - WW2 People's War - Keeping the Radar Functioning in the Med




> The Luftwaffe never adopted the escort doctrine that prevented the fight taking place around the bomber formation; roaming escort. Galland encouraged more fighter sweeps but, as you say, Goring made it close escort and Goring told the Luftwaffe what to do, not Galland.


According to Galland's memoirs, he had to give in to Göring as he got complaints from the bomber crews. So what Galland did was keeping 1/3 of his fighters close to the bombers where they would have been useless (his own words) while the rest stayed above and in front. 
Göring relinquished command of the Luftwaffe. He refused to deal with petty affairs like that. That's not me saying so, for instance read the biography of Milch. What makes it worse is that Göring occasionaly took decisions without knowing what it was all about. Sometimes he hadn't even heard of a specific aircraft though it was already flying with the RLM closely monitoring the progress. 





> The only people surprised to see two SS divisions in Holland were the poor paratroopers who hadn't been warned. All of High Command knew about them, as I said, ULTRA, Dutch Resistance and Photo Recon had told them.


Why weren't they informed? 




> Well, mkloby and Glider had pointed out the flaw in this. The British couter-battery fire would destroy your artillery positions with ease, as they would out-gun and out-range you.


That's why I'm going for mobile mortars and light artillery. The British could only give suppressing fire over a large area. A thousand guns isn't enough to completely kill off the German forces. During Zitadelle the Russians had sectors of 450 guns per km though the Germans still advanced through it. A 1000 guns may seem a lot but given the large area (100 miles wide, 5 miles across) which they have to cover it isn't something which the Germans can't withstand for TWO days!




> What obvious reasons?


That in this scenario Rommel would be advancing towards El Alamein half a year earlier. Several British units would be pulled back to defend England leaving behind a weakened force while the Germans will have two extra divisions and more Italian logistical support. The British would not have those American guns, tanks and Desert AF.



> The Italian Air Force was a poor excuse in 1941-1942 and their numbers would hardly grow because of a Soviet victory.


What do you mean by poor excuse? They held their own and could definitely take the fight against those Kittyhawks and Blenheims.

Kris


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## Hop (Apr 10, 2007)

> The problem is with your figures, that the British admitted the loss of 1140 of their fighters, whereas the LW curiously only knows about 1385 of it's combat aircraft of all types (even coastal aircraft and such counted) being lost to enemy action during the Battle of Britiain, no small number to ship and land AAA, balloons and not fighters.



As Kurfurst is fairly new to this forum, just a word of warning about how he distorts things.

Note how he compares British fighters "lost", with German aircraft "lost to enemy action". Note that the British figure includes aircraft lost to accidents, the German one does not.

Here is a similar example of his methods from a month or so ago:


> The Luftwaffe lost in total 663 fighters (in comparison 1140 Fighters lost by the RAF, Cat.3).
> *502* of these fighters were due to enemy action on operation, further
> 98 on operations, but not related to the enemy, and
> 63 not on operations.



Note those figures. 502 fighters IN TOTAL lost to enemy action.

Now look at his post in this thread:


> As for the LW fighters record, they lost something like *502* s-e, and 224 t-e fighters to enemy action of all kinds



See the same 502 figure? Only a couple of months ago he was trying to pass off German single engined fighter losses as TOTAL losses. After he was called on it, he tried to claim the Bf 110 was not a fighter.



> As for the LW fighters record, they lost something like 502 s-e, and 224 t-e fighters to enemy action of all kinds, vs. the said 1140 British fighters lost (not counting damaged).



Once again he repeats it. British losses to all causes, German losses only to enemy action.

Wood and Dempster in The Narrow Margin give German losses as 

600 single engined fighters on operations
63 single engined fighters not on operations

235 twin engined fighters on operations
17 twin engined fighters not on operations

835 fighters lost on operations, 915 lost in total



> (not counting damaged).



He says that as if German figures count damaged aircraft, but of course they don't. 



> Read : The LW was loosing 59 Stukas during the whole BoB due to enemy action, the rest is just pumping the numbers up.



No, it's actually 69 on operations, and the reason for including the non operational losses separately is both to show total losses, and to highlight the fact non operational losses are not counted.



> Overall during the two month period the Ju87's suffered a 7.9% loss rate - hardly the massive losses the British claimed.



Is that the total loss rate, or just the loss rate to enemy action? Because if 59 losses = 7.9% loss rate, then 69 losses on operations would equal about 9.2% losses.

To put those figures in perspective, USAAF heavy bomber losses in Europe in October 1943 (the month of Schweinfurt) were 6.6% of sorties flown. No wonder the Stuka was withdrawn from major combat operations in what remained of the BoB.



> When the targets changed from coastal targets to inner-Britain targets, the Ju 87 groups were redirected to attack the coastal merchant ships, since they lacked speed and range.





> He believed the Ju87 units should be held in reserve for when air supremacy was gained





> From September to December, the Sturzkampfgeschwader flew some dawn and dusk attacks on coastal shipping in the Thames Estuary and along the southeast English coast, but mostly they trained and waited for Seelöwe and then their next assignment.



Translation: Ju 87s were too slow and vulnerable to operate over Britain, and played little further part in the battle.



> This is supported by the fact that up to 18 August, 33 Stukas had been lost; however, some 51 were lost on operations in total up to the end of August, and 2 more on operations in September etc.



Made up numbers again. Note that the totals Kurfurst posted earlier in his post show 40 Stukas lost in August up to the 18th. 

Note also that now it suits his purpose, he is including operational losses, that he has excluded in all his figures so far.


> 1385 of it's combat aircraft of all types (even coastal aircraft and such counted) being lost *to enemy action*





> 502 s-e, and 224 t-e fighters *to enemy action*





> 59 Stukas during the whole BoB due *to enemy action*





> some 51 were lost *on operations*



See the difference? Normally he wants to minimise German losses, so he excludes operational losses not due to enemy action. But when he wants to claim Stuka losses occured after 18th August, he uses the higher figure of aircraft lost on operations.

I try to use operational losses throughout, because they are a more accurate measure of what's going on, and accuracy requires consistency.

16 Stukas were lost on operations in July, 51 in August, 2 in September.

The August losses amount to _at least_:

8th - 9
11th - 2
13th - 6
14th - 1
15th - 4
16th - 9
18th - 17

That leaves a _maximum_ of 3 lost on operations in the rest of August.



> The RAF lost 5 fighters.
> 
> RAF records tell of 22 for that day.


The 18th saw more than just the Stuka operations. The RAF lost 5 fighters against 109 stukas and 150+ 109s, the rest were lost in other actions. In total the Luftwaffe lost 71 aircraft that day.


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## bigZ (Apr 10, 2007)

"Why weren't they informed? "

If I remmember rightly they where informed. But a bit of ego came into play. Various airbourne offensives had been cancelled due to the rapid advance of the allies plus this was a last crack at a narrow front for Monty for an end of hostilties in 44. If he didn't do it now the resoures would be distributed on the wide front of which he was critical.

Generals sometimess act like Prima donnas.

Going back to ULTRA. Although the British could read German codes quickly. It is not the whole story. Very rarely would any single encryption say for example the time and location of an invasion. But instead the intelligence would be gathered from a variety brief messages that had been stored and filed and then systamatically organised into a coherent whole.


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## Glider (Apr 10, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Flexibility? I think it will be hard to beat the Finnish and the Americans in that sector.
> The British artillery could start firing fast but this was at the cost of accuracy as they didn't take external factors into account as the Germans did like height, wind, temperature, etc. This lack of accuracy can also be deducted from North Africa where British artillery failed to take out the feared German 88mm guns.



Kris
Flexibility has a lot more to do with organisation than the individual gun. British Artillery was organised in such a manner that allowed the individual spotter the ability to call down whatever fire was needed without having to ask permission of a higher authority. As a result the responce to a call for fire was faster and it arrived in greater numbers than any other army. There was even an emergency call that could be used, although it was only used a couple of times, that call any artillery up to Army Level that was within range of the target. No other army gave their spotters such flexibility.
Re the Guns the British Army had, well with the 25pd, 4.5 and 5.5 in guns didn't have to apologise to anyone for the weapons at their disposal. More than a match for any of the other forces in Range, ROF and weight as well as having the best tractors around as standard issue.
Re your claimed lack of accuracy of the British fire that is total bull.




> The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon.



It was indeed an excellent weapon but that isn't the point. Now work out how many rounds you are going to allow it to fire over your initial 2-3 days when the Army are left to fend for themselves, mulitiply it by the weights involved (gun, ammo, sights, communications equipment, food, personal weapons ect) and work out how many men you have in the unit and then how long it would take to move it a mile.

That in real terms is what is meant by portable


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## mkloby (Apr 10, 2007)

Civettone said:


> The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon.



I'm not sure you're understanding the reality of actual operations. You seem to just be quoting statistics and figures. 400lbs is NOT LIGHT!!! Broken down into 3 pieces makes is mobile and able to be humped? As a grunt, you carry your pack, your rifle/carbine/sidearm, and other miscellaneous gear plus your helmet. How much do you think that weighs??? We'd go out humping with about 100-120lbs of gear, and we were just leg infantry, not a weapons company. Also throw in your field radios - which are heavy as well. Now, on top of that, you want to manpack "very mobile" 120mm mortars? Plus the ammunition for the tubes, which were probably about 35lbs each? Look at what you'd be asking your bubbas to do... The mortar, I'm guessing, probably has a max effective range of only a couple clicks, I'd say maybe 6-7. With such a short range, a static firing position is not a possibility. This further aggrevates the problem of relying upon a heavy mortar as your primary means of fire support. Your idea might sound good and feasible, but it has serious flaws. I would be dressed down for coming up with a fire suport plan such as that to support my offensive operation.

Glider - good info. In the USMC, all officers receive training in fire support and call for fire. I believe all grunts receive training for call for fire as well. It's important to be able to have many troops that can act as a spotter, as then any man that can man the field radio can control the fire support.


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## Civettone (Apr 10, 2007)

Hop said:


> Is Britain the same as the Channel Coast? The RAF had fighter squadrons in Northern Ireland, the north of Scotland, Wales, the north of England etc that didn't participate at all in the fighting.


That's not the point Hop! You disagreed with the number of fighters in France by showing a figure of Western Europe.



> But the British target was the bombers.


Yes and no. RAF fighters split up to attack both. 




> And yet on average they flew much less than 1 sortie per day, as the figures show.


Irrelevant



> But failed to hold on to their advances, which is the point.


Due to logistics? I don't think so! Unless you consider Stalingrad essentially a logistical defeat.




> And never managed to get beyond them.


Irrelevant. This was not due to logistical problems but mainly the weather. That had an effect on logistics too but it's not the root cause.




> There were two closer ports, Benghazi and Tobruk, but both had very low capacity, and couldn't handle many supplies.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Civettone (Apr 10, 2007)

Hop said:


> As Kurfurst is fairly new to this forum, just a word of warning about how he distorts things.


How friendly of you to warn us. Especially because you're supposed to be completely free of distorting information, right?

And what's that stuff what he says about your phantom ships?




> USAAF heavy bomber losses in Europe in October 1943 (the month of Schweinfurt) were 6.6% of sorties flown.


I see, of all sorties flown? How many did they lose on the raid to Schweinfurt itself? I think that's what stopped the bombing. You're doing the same distorting you accuse Kurfürst of.

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 10, 2007)

bigZ said:


> Going back to ULTRA. Although the British could read German codes quickly. It is not the whole story. Very rarely would any single encryption say for example the time and location of an invasion. But instead the intelligence would be gathered from a variety brief messages that had been stored and filed and then systamatically organised into a coherent whole.


Tell me this: would it have been possible for the Germans to release conflicting information in such a way that the British intelligence would be confused?

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 10, 2007)

Glider said:


> Re your claimed lack of accuracy of the British fire that is total bull.


No, it isn't. The British had the advantage of rapid fire but the aiming of fire wasn't as sophisticated as the German or American artillery which used more accurate data and more variables. This was why the German artillery wasn't as rapid as the British although they also used forward observers. The British forward observers simply gave a position on the map and the British fired at that point without taking into account the terrain, height, wind, temperature, ... Leaving all of this out saved a lot of time. 



> work out how many men you have in the unit and then how long it would take to move it a mile.


Doesn't the same apply to lighter mortars? The only difference is the mortar itself. Ammo is also heavier but is shot at a slower RoF. 



> The mortar, I'm guessing, probably has a max effective range of only a couple clicks, I'd say maybe 6-7. With such a short range, a static firing position is not a possibility. This further aggrevates the problem of relying upon a heavy mortar as your primary means of fire support.


Strange, because that's EXACTLY what the Russians used them for, and with great success. You should look beyond American and English warfare tactics. 

And don't forget that the Granatwerer 42 had a two-wheel carriage to be towed. If there wasn't enough manpower, a simple Kettenkrad was more than sufficient for this. 

Kris


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## mkloby (Apr 11, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Strange, because that's EXACTLY what the Russians used them for, and with great success. You should look beyond American and English warfare tactics.
> 
> And don't forget that the Granatwerer 42 had a two-wheel carriage to be towed. If there wasn't enough manpower, a simple Kettenkrad was more than sufficient for this.
> 
> Kris



It's not strange. You are just plain wrong. Are you claiming that Soviet armies pinned their primary method of fire support on the shoulders of man-packed 120mm mortars??? That is utter nonsense. A typical 1943 Guards Div had about 160 mortars. Same for Rifle div. Sources show 18 120mm tubes and 12 120mm tubes, respectively. The vast majority of mortars are owned at Bn and Co level, and are medium/light mortars. Reason being they are relatively light and can be humped. However, that is way off subject.

Civ - you simply do not understand military operations. You're right in that I am a product of the US military, and I have training in doctrine and tactics as employed by the USMC. However, that doesn't mean that the US does not study other methods. What training are you bringing to the table? I'm sorry, but you cannot read a book and look at figures and just make up some ludicrous scheme of maneuver supported by a fantastical fire support plan, then support your claims with a completely unrelated and plainly false "proof" from the eastern front.


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## daishi12 (Apr 11, 2007)

I still want to know where Kris gets the amount of men and materials he needs for an invasion. It has been stated on a number of occassions that the army and LW can be brought back from the Eastern front after Russia has been neutralized as an effective fighting force. I do not see Stalin agreeing to the non-agreesion pact after the Motherland has been invaded by the hated Nazis. 

Btw Kris you cannot state that YOUR scenario for the non-agreesion pact is valid when you also state that the LW has had extensive training attacking RUSSIAN targets.

As I have said before, in order that you neutralize Russia, you would need to take and hold hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of land, the biggest cities in Russia and both the Artic and Black sea coasts. 

I am sure that you are aware that in Stalingrad alone the Reich lost 870,000 men. Even allowing for lower casualties figures for other cities (because Russia would not be able to mount offensive actions on as large a scale as Stalingrad to defend/counter attack numerous cities) I would say that you would suffer between 1.2 and 1.5 million casualties just taking and holding the 6 cities I mentioned on page 18. This does not take into account other losses that the Reich would suffer in other actions.


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## plan_D (Apr 11, 2007)

I didn't know about the Maltese radar network; I'll have to look at it in more depth in future. The Royal Navy would still be able to deploy vessels to act as warning ships; Germany did the same and the RAF nicknamed them _Squealers_.

_"According to Galland's memoirs, he had to give in to Göring as he got complaints from the bomber crews. So what Galland did was keeping 1/3 of his fighters close to the bombers where they would have been useless (his own words) while the rest stayed above and in front. 
Göring relinquished command of the Luftwaffe. He refused to deal with petty affairs like that. That's not me saying so, for instance read the biography of Milch. What makes it worse is that Göring occasionaly took decisions without knowing what it was all about. Sometimes he hadn't even heard of a specific aircraft though it was already flying with the RLM closely monitoring the progress."_

Galland was right; close escort was useless. The Allied escort doctrine in 1943-1945 put emphasis on roaming escorts that cleared the way in front of the bomber formation. This type of escort was what Galland wanted but never fully achieved. 

_"Why weren't they informed?"_

I don't know. Maybe High Command didn't think it required to tell the troops there was armour in the region; it was good to keep them in high spirits. It took the airborne divisions to find out for themselves what the ULTRA team and Dutch resistance already knew. 

_"That's why I'm going for mobile mortars and light artillery. The British could only give suppressing fire over a large area. A thousand guns isn't enough to completely kill off the German forces. During Zitadelle the Russians had sectors of 450 guns per km though the Germans still advanced through it. A 1000 guns may seem a lot but given the large area (100 miles wide, 5 miles across) which they have to cover it isn't something which the Germans can't withstand for TWO days!"_

The Wehrmacht was extremely efficient at counter-battery fire against the Soviets, this was the reason the Soviet artillery doesn't seem too effective and the troops could advance into it. 

You seem to be forgetting that your supply ships and landing craft would be coming under fire from this artillery as well. The British artillery may not cover the whole front; but in many sectors your advance will be broken up. The German front was constantly moving in Russia making it harder to hit, and when not moving they'd use skeleton look outs to draw the artillery fire on empty trenches. On the beaches of England you wouldn't have effective bunkers and you'd be stuck on the beach, under a heavy, constant barrage.

_"That in this scenario Rommel would be advancing towards El Alamein half a year earlier. Several British units would be pulled back to defend England leaving behind a weakened force while the Germans will have two extra divisions and more Italian logistical support. The British would not have those American guns, tanks and Desert AF."_

How would Rommel be advancing half a year earlier? Britain had enough forces to hold of German invasion, so there'd be no need to send troops back. 

Italian logistical support would not be increased to any great extent. And even with a slight increase it wasn't enough to supply both the German and Italian armies. 

Why wouldn't Britain get American guns and tanks? Just because Germany isn't at war with the Soviets; it doesn't mean the U.S won't join in. And the Desert Air Force was British, not American. The U.S aircraft arrived for a raid on Polesti and stayed to aid the 8th Army. 

_"What do you mean by poor excuse? They held their own and could definitely take the fight against those Kittyhawks and Blenheims."_

The Italian Air Force did not hold their own in N.Africa; they rarely held their own over Italy. The Italians rarely intercepted the USAMEAF and RAF 160 Sqdn. Liberators and B-17s.


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## Hop (Apr 11, 2007)

> That's not the point Hop! You disagreed with the number of fighters in France by showing a figure of Western Europe.



Why France? What's wrong with the fighters based in Belgium and Holland? They were just as much part of the battle.



> Yes and no. RAF fighters split up to attack both.



Primary target was bombers.



> Due to logistics? I don't think so! Unless you consider Stalingrad essentially a logistical defeat.



To a large extent it was. If the Stalingrad pocket had been able to get proper supplies, a breakout would probably have been possible.



> Yes, and your quotes confirm this. It's a theoretical capacity for sure but that's what I'm talking about: it was theoretically possible.



Theoretically possible doesn't cut it in war, and that perhaps is the crux of this argument. What's possible and what's practical are two very different things.



> That they failed to use the ports like they should have, can be avoided.



Actually they did use the ports as well as they could. As Van Creveld said:


> the problem of supplying an Axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble





> He thought it would have been sufficient for a short and powerful offensive. After the October air and sea offensive, 40% of his supplies were stopped.



Van Creveld again:


> In all the confusion, one fact was entirely overlooked. Despite everything, the Italians succeeded in putting an average of 72,000 tons - or just above Rommel's current consumption - across the Mediterranean in each one of the four months from July to October. Rommel's difficulties, therefore, stemmed less from a dearth of supplies from Europe than from the impossible length of his line of communications inside Africa. Thus, for example, the German commander discovered that he needed fully ten per cent of his precious fuel simply to transport the other ninety per cent. If Panzerarmee's fuel is put at about one third of its total requirements (excluding water and personnel), then it would be a reasonable guess that thirty to fifty per cent of all the fuel landed in North Africa was wasted between Tripoli and the front. Obliged to cover 1,000 miles of desert each way, thirty-five per cent of the vehicles were constantly out of repair. Under such conditions, any supply service was bound to break down.





> So how did he take Tobruk then?



He did it anyway with what he had, helped greatly by Fellers.



> Strange you still come up with that after you used it in vain at the axis history forum.



In vain? It's completely true. 

Hooton:


> The same day ended Stuka daylight operations over England when four fighter squadrons slaughtered Major Clemens, Graf von Schonborn's StG 77 during an attack upon Poling radar station, with 16 Stukas last and two damaged beyond repair (21% of the force) in what Seidemann justly described as "a black day"



Wood and Dempster:


> August 18th was the virtual death knell of the Ju 87s over Britain. Losses had been mounting at an alarming rate and, apart from a few isolated sorties, they were pulled out of the battle



Bungay:


> Most unusually, Luftflotte 3's post-action report the next day (always called an Erfolgsmeldung - literally a "Success Report") commented on the losses of the Stukas. It attributed them to "British fighters gaining a local superiority due to particularly favourable weather conditions" and carrying out a pursuit up to 30km over the the Channel. StG 77's air corps commander, von Richthofen, confided to his diary that a "Stuka Gruppe has had it's feathers well and truly plucked".
> 
> What really struck von Richthofen were not the overall losses of the Stukas, which at 15% were high but bearable in the short term if they were achieving results, but the near destruction of one Gruppe, whose losses ran at 50%. This was on top of the losses of nearly 30% to another single unit, I/StG2, in the Tangmere raid on the 16th, and the loss of 70% of one Staffel of II/StG2 on the 13th. Earlier losses, such as those over convoy Peewit, had been heavy but acceptable. It was becoming clear, however, that any unlucky Stuka unit caught without its escort would be almost wiped out. It was also becoming clear there was at least one such unlucky unit on every major sortie. Some rethinking was called for.



Bungay goes on to quote Goering on the 19th:


> "Until the enemy fighter force has been broken, Stuka units are only to be used when circumstances are particularly favourable." With this withdrawal of the Stukas from general operations, the only precision bombing instrument the Luftwaffe had left was Erpro 210





> So you're actually saying that bombing accuracy was reduced due to enemy fighters?


Yes.



> I see, of all sorties flown? How many did they lose on the raid to Schweinfurt itself? I think that's what stopped the bombing. You're doing the same distorting you accuse Kurfürst of.



Um, no. Compare either the month's operations against the Stukas for a month or two in the BoB, or a single operation against a single operation.

Comparing a single raid, Schweinfurt, against a month and a half of Stuka operations is not comparing like with like.

I compared Luftwaffe operations during the BoB as a whole, (using Kurfurst's figures) against the worst month of the 8th AF. That's a fair comparison.

Comparing the *worst* raid for the USAAF against an *average* for the Stukas is not a fair comparison.

If you compare like with like, the worst month for the 8th saw 6.6% of their heavy bombers lost, Stuka operations in the BoB saw 7.9 - 9.2% lost. The Schweinfurt raid saw 20.7% bombers lost, according to Murray, the Thorney Island raid suffered 35% losses, the Stuka operations for the day suffered 16% losses.



> No, it isn't. The British had the advantage of rapid fire but the aiming of fire wasn't as sophisticated as the German or American artillery which used more accurate data and more variables. This was why the German artillery wasn't as rapid as the British although they also used forward observers. The British forward observers simply gave a position on the map and the British fired at that point without taking into account the terrain, height, wind, temperature, ... Leaving all of this out saved a lot of time.



Can I ask the source of this claim?

Might I suggest you read Site Directory

It might take some time, as it goes into British artillery methods in great detail. See in particular METEOR


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 11, 2007)

Civettone said:


> The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



You want to try pulling that two wheel cart under fire...

Not very mobile and not very smart.

Now granted you probably would not use them on the front because you are going to be hitting targets from the rear several clicks behind. But in this scenerio of using them on the beach head, how is that going to work? Not very well. Just listen to mkloby because he has experience in this matter because he played with morters as a leg infantry in the USMC.


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## bigZ (Apr 11, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Tell me this: would it have been possible for the Germans to release conflicting information in such a way that the British intelligence would be confused?
> 
> Kris



No doubt the Germans would release conflicting information to confuse the inteligence. But I would think they wouldn't do it through the enigma encryptions as they where sure it was secure. 

But in order to confuse the British The Germans would have to make sure that the majority of messages encrypted(even down to unit level) would substantiate the hoax. I am no ULTRA expert but the resources and the brains pumped into it are staggering.

Canaris may also be a problem?


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## syscom3 (Apr 11, 2007)

Fundamentally, there is nothing the Germans could have done to confuse the Allies.

A build up of landing craft at ports is a pretty good indication that an invasion is planned. And since the smaller landing craft cannot be expected to cover long distances, whichever ports they are stockpiled at, is close to wehere the intended invasion will be.

Plus the capabilities of the Germans were such, that they could conceivably cross the channel at the narrower points, but they could not at the wider points.

Then there are those actual days of the month that are favorable for invasion. 

Taken as a whole, the Allies would have 2 - 3 months of warning that an invasion will happen, and then 72 hours or more that an invasion is underway.

One material fact that civette cannot explain away, is the dispersal his invasion fleet will need among several ports, and the different sailing times means different loading dates and sailing times. The further the port is from the invasion beach, the sooner it must sortie.


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## Civettone (Apr 12, 2007)

mkloby said:


> It's not strange. You are just plain wrong. Are you claiming that Soviet armies pinned their primary method of fire support on the shoulders of man-packed 120mm mortars??? That is utter nonsense.


I'm just saying that the Russians used the 120mm mortar as a substitute for artillery. And it was the only country which did this to my knowledge. Red Army doctrine authorized massing mortars from many units under a central command, and the Soviet 120mm mortar was so good that the Germans copied it.




> Civ - you simply do not understand military operations. You're right in that I am a product of the US military, and I have training in doctrine and tactics as employed by the USMC.


Your opinion is duly noted. But I disagree that your or the USMC has it right all the time. Theirs is by no means the standard of military doctrine. My scenerio may be unorthodox but these are often succesful as they take the enemy off guard. 

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 12, 2007)

daishi12 said:


> I still want to know where Kris gets the amount of men and materials he needs for an invasion.


Daishi, this is the last time I will come back to this as it is off-topic. 



> I do not see Stalin agreeing to the non-agreesion pact after the Motherland has been invaded by the hated Nazis.


Well, the guy wanted to make peace with Germany in late 1941, so why not?



> Btw Kris you cannot state that YOUR scenario for the non-agreesion pact is valid when you also state that the LW has had extensive training attacking RUSSIAN targets.


Of course I can. 



> As I have said before, in order that you neutralize Russia, you would need to take and hold hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of land, the biggest cities in Russia and both the Artic and Black sea coasts.


No, you don't. Neutralizing is not the same as occupying. I am ok with leaving up to 150 divisions behind to guard the occupied territories and prevent the Russians from restarting the war. 



> I would say that you would suffer between 1.2 and 1.5 million casualties just taking and holding the 6 cities I mentioned on page 18. This does not take into account other losses that the Reich would suffer in other actions.


You build your case on wrong premises. The offensive against Russia would be stopped at the end of 1941. There would be no more taking of cities. 

And again, I said Russia would be neutralized which can mean two things: it's defeated or Barbarossa is cancelled and the NAT is still valid. In both cases I'm thinking of leaving behind 150 out of 250 divisions and a few hundred aircraft behind to guard the Russian bear. Plus, the armies of the German allies.

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 12, 2007)

plan_D said:


> I didn't know about the Maltese radar network


I'm always happy when I can pass over some useful information to other members!  





> This type of escort was what Galland wanted but never fully achieved.


 You're right. Galland's solution was a compromise, basically misusing 1/3 of his fighters. 



> The Wehrmacht was extremely efficient at counter-battery fire against the Soviets, this was the reason the Soviet artillery doesn't seem too effective and the troops could advance into it.


That's true but it's not the whole picture. The threat of those guns was mainly neutralized by their own accuracy, the German armoured advance and the Luftwaffe.



> You seem to be forgetting that your supply ships and landing craft would be coming under fire from this artillery as well.


But those 1000 guns wouldn't be assembled and installed on the first day. 



> The British artillery may not cover the whole front; but in many sectors your advance will be broken up.


Again, I agree. But that's also why I am going along with the original German plan of a broad front. 
Yesterday I was reading up on the German offensive on the Dutch Beveland- islands. While under fire from artillery and 2 navy ships they managed to get from one island to another and defeat the French/Dutch forces there. Surely not the same thing but it's not like the Germans will be shell shocked from a relatively low number of British guns. I'm also thinking of the 650 guns near El Alamein which failed to give the British their breakthrough. At least in the beginning. 
I also don't really understand why it's such a problem to use artillery from the beaches as the allies also took artillery with them on the first day. 
Sure, it's a lot of work to get it all ashore and operational but it's not like the British were going to unleash hell on the first day. It's going to be tough but let's not make it into an impossibility. At the time nobody knew how to fight under fire like the Germans did. They had the best lead and most experienced army in the world. 

I think they could have done quite a bit of good with their LeG 40 guns (both the 75mm as the 105mm models) which were very light and still had a good range. German doctrine states that artillery positions must be dug in unless the ground is unsuited for digging or unless the position will be held for only a very short time. 




> How would Rommel be advancing half a year earlier? Britain had enough forces to hold of German invasion, so there'd be no need to send troops back.


Well, here's where it becomes confusing. I'm replying to some people (maybe Hoppian?) pointing out that the British would pull back their divisions and squadrons to defend Britain. I responded that this could lead to the AK moving up to Alexandria and the Suez Channel. 



> Italian logistical support would not be increased to any great extent. And even with a slight increase it wasn't enough to supply both the German and Italian armies.


With the Italian army no longer fighting in Russia, there would be more resources and trucks available. Half of the Italian shipping was used to supply their forces in Yugoslavia and Greece. This could also be done by road (of course then that's where those trucks would go to). In any case, the Italians weren't using their full capabilities until late 1942 when they used all their shipping for supplying their forces in Tunesia. 



> Why wouldn't Britain get American guns and tanks?


Because I'm talking about the Spring of 1942. They were delivered in the late Summer IIRC. 



> The Italian Air Force did not hold their own in N.Africa; they rarely held their own over Italy. The Italians rarely intercepted the USAMEAF and RAF 160 Sqdn. Liberators and B-17s.


Perhaps that's because they didn't have a radar chain nor nightfighters? 
But the Italian pilots were well respected by their Commonwealth opponents over the African desert.

Kris


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## Civettone (Apr 12, 2007)

bigZ said:


> No doubt the Germans would release conflicting information to confuse the inteligence. But I would think they wouldn't do it through the enigma encryptions as they where sure it was secure.


Well, just look at Wacht am Rhein which ULTRA failed to recognize. To maximize secrecy the Germans basically stopped radio traffic. 

And there have also been cases where ULTRA was mistrusted. And even though these occasions never became known, I can imagine that there were also instances where the guys at Bletchley Park drew the wrong conclusions from the information obtained by ULTRA. As said before, ULTRA rarely found the exact orders for an offensive but found indications which were then puzzled together. There's a human weakness in this process. 
All you need is confusion to hold off the British anti-invasion plans for a few hours more. 



> Canaris may also be a problem?


Why is that?

Kris


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## plan_D (Apr 12, 2007)

The British artillery would capture the German forces in the open; unlike that at El Alamein. The best comparison of artillery against an invasion is _Neptune_ - the Allied command recognised the potential of the German artillery batteries and took great effort to destroy them. All those guns that did remain come D-Day Operation _Neptune_ laid heavy fire on the beaches and caused great problems. 

I don't recall the Allies landing heavy guns on the beaches during the first day, especially not during the assault. In the seaborne invasion, the Allies relied on the naval fire support and roaming TacAir to neutralise the enemy gun positions. However, it must not be forgotten that many German large batteries were knocked out by the airborne divisions during the night and day of June 5th/6th.

_"With the Italian army no longer fighting in Russia, there would be more resources and trucks available. Half of the Italian shipping was used to supply their forces in Yugoslavia and Greece. This could also be done by road (of course then that's where those trucks would go to). In any case, the Italians weren't using their full capabilities until late 1942 when they used all their shipping for supplying their forces in Tunesia."_

The number increase would be a benefit to the Italian fighting unit, but the extra transport capacity would be the greatest increase and help. If, however, the situation was recognised as being dire in North Africa then Great Britain would not divert forces to the Far East and may even pull some home. 
Britain thought of Burma and India as being the holding point for the Suez Canal but were thinking otherwise by mid 1942. If Italy and Germany had proved to Great Britain that there was more at stake by putting more weight, then Britain has the resources to pull back from the Far East. 
Rommel was only able to reach North Africa in the first place because Britain moved troops to Burma when on their last march to Benghazi and victory in 1941. The Italians could have been expelled from North Africa then, and Germany would have never landed. 

_"Because I'm talking about the Spring of 1942. They were delivered in the late Summer IIRC."_

I cannot remember exact dates when American equipment began to arrive, however I know it would be a race. Even with solely British equipment the DAK was out-numbered in guns and armour, the U.S supply just made it moreso. 

Will the increase in transport be able to keep an extra armoured and extra infantry division supplied? How many transports have you got available for the cross channel invasion, is it enough to move your assault force in one day? What if the Soviet Union starts pressurising Romania and Hungary, are you going to react by reinforcing the east?


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## Civettone (Apr 12, 2007)

plan_D said:


> The British artillery would capture the German forces in the open; unlike that at El Alamein.


Correct. That's why I see the Germans advancing in the beginning but needing to dig in when the British get their guns into position.



> great problems.


Did the allies really encounter great problems other than those at Omaha? 



> I don't recall the Allies landing heavy guns on the beaches during the first day, especially not during the assault.


No, not heavy guns but that's not what I was talking about. 




> German large batteries were knocked out by the airborne divisions during the night and day of June 5th/6th.


Aaah, nice to hear. The Germans were going to paradrop 2 divisions. We haven't discussed this before. I think it will be a difficult endeavour but they can prove to be very valuable to the German offensive.





> then Britain has the resources to pull back from the Far East.


Interesting. But I have difficulty imagining the British giving up on their Empire. The Far East Forces were crying out for reinforcements.




> Rommel was only able to reach North Africa in the first place because Britain moved troops to Burma when on their last march to Benghazi and victory in 1941. The Italians could have been expelled from North Africa then, and Germany would have never landed.


That doesn't make sense, Plan_D: Rommel landed in the Spring of 1941, long before Burma was in danger. 
At the end of 1941 Rommel made a tactical retreat because of logistics. The British didn't have the troops, weapons nor logistics to kick the Germans out of Africa.




> Even with solely British equipment the DAK was out-numbered in guns and armour, the U.S supply just made it moreso.


Sure, but that's nothing new. That was also the case during Rommel's advance. He was outnumbered yet defeated the British at Sidi Barrani, Benghazi, Wadi al something, ... 




> Will the increase in transport be able to keep an extra armoured and extra infantry division supplied?


As the Italians only used half of their naval transport capacity and the ports of Tobruk was capable of handling more than it actually did, I think supporting two extra divisions wouldn't have been such an obstacle. 



> How many transports have you got available for the cross channel invasion, is it enough to move your assault force in one day?


In 1940 the Germans had enough river barges to move 9 divisions in the first wave. And that's without the Sturmbooten and Fährprämen they later built. 



> What if the Soviet Union starts pressurising Romania and Hungary, are you going to react by reinforcing the east?


There's a book called 'Icebreaker' about Russian plans to attack Germany when it was occupied in the invasion of Britain. Perhaps you've heard of it. That takes into account that Germany would committ most of its forces against Britain. I already said that I would hold half of my divisions guarding the Russian bear. I think Russia would better lay low in case Britain would be defeated. 

Kris


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## mkloby (Apr 12, 2007)

Civettone said:


> I'm just saying that the Russians used the 120mm mortar as a substitute for artillery. And it was the only country which did this to my knowledge. Red Army doctrine authorized massing mortars from many units under a central command, and the Soviet 120mm mortar was so good that the Germans copied it.


It can act in its stead in LIMITED circumstances. VERY LIMITED.



Civettone said:


> Your opinion is duly noted. But I disagree that your or the USMC has it right all the time. Theirs is by no means the standard of military doctrine. My scenerio may be unorthodox but these are often succesful as they take the enemy off guard.



OK pal, I'll stay out of this too, because as you have shown in all threads, you know better than all. You are even better versed in military affairs, tactics, and doctrine than professional military officers and enlisted personnel.


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## Civettone (Apr 12, 2007)

Why do you even post in a forum? Wouldn't a blog better suit you? That way you can educate all readers to what the truth is. You basically back up all your claims by either stating you know the truth because you're a pilot or because you're a professionally trained marine. That doesn't cut it for me. Do you see me using the same thing by saying I'm a master in international affairs and conflict management? How easy it would be for me to say you know nothing about international politics. But I refuse to think that way and I consider your opinion to be as much worth as my own. 

So, if you want to convince me that heavy mortars cannot replace light artillery, explain to me why not instead of simply stating that the USMC told you so...

Kris


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## mkloby (Apr 12, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Why do you even post in a forum? Wouldn't a blog better suit you? That way you can educate all readers to what the truth is. You basically back up all your claims by either stating you know the truth because you're a pilot or because you're a professionally trained marine. That doesn't cut it for me. Do you see me using the same thing by saying I'm a master in international affairs and conflict management? How easy it would be for me to say you know nothing about international politics. But I refuse to think that way and I consider your opinion to be as much worth as my own.
> 
> So, if you want to convince me that heavy mortars cannot replace light artillery, explain to me why not instead of simply stating that the USMC told you so...
> 
> Kris



Just read up the pages, master civettone. Reason upon reason has been listed as to why your fire support plan isn't worth a darn, yet you dismiss it all. It's the same as in all the threads. You are right, and you are always right. You don't have heavy mortars replacing just light arty, you have it replacing virtually all arty! You have no 105s, 150s, or 170s! I'm guessing your divisions will be engaging without their artillery regiments. Do you understand military orgranizational structures? Which assets are owned at which levels. Don't give the "Your a US Marine" deal, because it's fairly standard throughout the world.

Let's review:
- The weight of the heavy mortar, although you seem to think it's light and extremely mobile, even though you have *NO EXPERIENCE*! I know you think that studying books makes you Clausewitz incarnate, but guess what... your armchair analysis isn't worth much when you're talking guys that have actually participated in these types of ops and exercises. Even if it has a trailer, we're going to tow that thing under fire to a point just behind our lines since our range is so limited...
- Again, the range of mortars is limited! I feel like a broken record. I don't know the exact specs, but I would guess that a 120mm heavy mortar has a MER of about 6 clicks or so.
- Due to your lack of arty, you have no means to answer British counter battery fire, which will likely smash your mortar positions to pieces well out of range.
- When your infantry advances, your firing positions will continuously have to move as well. The same problem keeps cropping up, relating to the weight of the weapon system, and it's range.
- Your accuracy is not going to be as great as arty. I have crewed a US M2 105mm gun. The position we were firing at was miles away, and after the first round, the forward observer adjusted, and we received "fire for effect."
That isn't going to happen with the mortar. This is the type of fire that will be falling on your forces. British 5.5" will lob 100lb shells on you, in contrast to your 35lb rounds, with a much greater casualty radius.
-Speaking of your 35lb(or so) rounds, how are we going to keep this ammo in supply? In addition to your pack, weapon, and other gear weighing in at let's just say 100lbs, we're going to hump the field radios and toss in a mortar shell for each man to carry as well, I imagine.


Mortars are great weapons. But, they are best used as infantry weapons, at the Bn and Co level. In typical fashion you back nothing up. You have NO REASON WHATSOEVER to think that heavy mortars can replace divisional arty. You haven't given any, except a misplaced statement about russian tactics - which was unrelated.

Of course, I haven't stated anything in this post except that I'm a US Marine and that's why your fire support plan is nonsense. I didn't give any reasons.


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## Civettone (Apr 12, 2007)

At least now you're explaining yourself instead of simply presenting me with your statement and forcing me to blindly accept it.

I think you made several valid points which makes me agree with you. But note that I never said the Germans could get counterfire ready. That's a big disadvantage, I admit. And that's why I'm essentially asking them to dig in for two days, including their mortars and light artillery. Aren't mortars great for defensive operations like in Kursk? Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943
Russians used twice as many as the Germans (given the total size of the division). 

Kris


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## Udet (Apr 13, 2007)

Mkloby: read the comments of syscom and Glider and do not skip Hop´s thoughts...it is more than reasonable to assume they are permanently right as well -especially Hop-. You seem to be right too.

Seems like a debate is occurring. When discussing a what if, one can push ideas to the limits, limits which seem to set you off.

I can say something very similar regarding most views portraying a pro-British scenario in the event of an alleged German invasion of England: they are ridiculous.

If you read my comments within the thread you might notice i have not gotten that involved in discussing such detailed things like mortars and artillery, nothing wrong with that at all though.

The bulk of my ideas here were based on facts...people see some sort of mighty Royal Navy force that will definetly come to destroy a German invasion force launched across the Channel; how come? 

The record does not seem to indicate such a thing could happen for sure: Channel Dash again but more importantly Great Britain losing a battle where naval assets played a major role: Norway.

Also there is Crete, a brutally sound case which has been ridiculously dismissed by pro-Brit discussers in here; the German paratroopers attacked with virtually ZERO artillery support and won. Save the details, i know Merkur like the palm of my hand, and if victory was attained on Crete, it could very well have been attained on England. (Thou shall not believe Churchill´s "estimates" regarding German losses on Crete). Period.

Civettone made a fine point when saying unorthodox plans can succeed. If Unternehmen Merkur had not really occurred as it did, the proposal of the same plan when discussing a what if would most likely prompt reactions like yours Mkloby: "you know nothing..." or "you have no experience".

But since Merkur did take place is that we see pro-Brit discussers whining about the "awful" equipment and overall situation of the defenders on the island; on the other hand -again- if Merkur had not occurred you would be telling me "Crete defenses were sufficient to regard any German intention of invading suicidal". 

Well guess what? The overall situation of the British forces in England after _Fall Gelb_ and _Fall Rot_ including a good part of their equipment could reminescence Great Britain forces on Crete. Perfect.

Now a brief "what if": beg your pardon but England ain´t the Soviet Union, no western version of Stalingrad will occur, ever. If the Germans succeed in landing troops on one or two beaches, plus Fallschirmjäger landing and securing some positions, England seeks peace -promptly-.

Now reality, Germany did not intend to invade England.


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## mkloby (Apr 13, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Aren't mortars great for defensive operations like in Kursk? Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943
> Russians used twice as many as the Germans (given the total size of the division).
> Kris


Mortars do work very well in defensive positions. One of big advantages of this is that you positions are relatively static. This, in part, minimizes the problem associated with their short range. Ideally, you'd have your divisiona arty to reach out and touch the enemy while still beyond the range of your mortars. Infantry Bn's and Co's are able to use their organic mortars to support their operations - w/o having to go higher up, where divisional arty may be supporting a higher priority.



Udet said:


> Mkloby: read the comments of syscom and Glider and do not skip Hop´s thoughts...it is more than reasonable to assume they are permanently right as well -especially Hop-. You seem to be right too.


They were read, although not commented on.



Udet said:


> Civettone made a fine point when saying unorthodox plans can succeed. If Unternehmen Merkur had not really occurred as it did, the proposal of the same plan when discussing a what if would most likely prompt reactions like yours Mkloby: "you know nothing..." or "you have no experience".


Civ did make a good point. There is nothing wrong with an unorthodox plan. It wasn't the overall plan or scheme of maneuver that I had a problem with, it was the fire support plan - which was very problematic at best. I was getting frustrated. My apologies.
[/QUOTE]


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## Glider (Apr 13, 2007)

Civettone said:


> No, it isn't. The British had the advantage of rapid fire but the aiming of fire wasn't as sophisticated as the German or American artillery which used more accurate data and more variables. This was why the German artillery wasn't as rapid as the British although they also used forward observers. The British forward observers simply gave a position on the map and the British fired at that point without taking into account the terrain, height, wind, temperature, ... Leaving all of this out saved a lot of time.





Sorry Kris but you are talking bull here. As early as 1916 the British were using air pressure, wind speeds temperature etc in their artillery fire. Observers observe, the artillery battery fire and did the calculations to ensure that they hit the target.
Speed of response is about organisation. In the FSR (field Service Regulations) for the Army in WW2 but written in 1936 on Artillery fire and its use, the word control is used once. Its only mentioned once and that is to to explain that to control, is by definition limiting. The entire FSR conctrates on flexibility, and trust in the observer.
The German Army observers worked under differing rules and could sometimes get a faster responce as they tended to be directly linked to a battery normally of 4 guns. The British observer could get a similar responce from 24 guns. Both figures depend on the structure at the time and this varied through the war and by type of division. _Here I am talking about 105/25pd guns. _
Most importantly the British observer had access if required to more batteries or higher level batteries than a German observer could. The whole ethos from the top down was in this direction.



> Doesn't the same apply to lighter mortars? The only difference is the mortar itself. Ammo is also heavier but is shot at a slower RoF.



Your the one saying that the 120mm batteries are mobile not me or anyone else.
The 3in to 81mm mortar were used by all armies in a flexible role there is nothing to prove, as they all did this successfully. No one but no one used a 120 in the manner your suggesting. You have to prove that it could.
The 81mm mortar is lighter and easier to carry. Re ammo it wasn't unheard of for para units to give every man one bomb to carry in the same way that every infantry man in the British army could carry ammo for the Bren gun even though one one team had a Bren. Are you going to give everyone a 120mm mortar bomb weighing what 35pds?


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## Udet (Apr 13, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Mortars do work very well in defensive positions. One of big advantages of this is that you positions are relatively static. This, in part, minimizes the problem associated with their short range. Ideally, you'd have your divisiona arty to reach out and touch the enemy while still beyond the range of your mortars. Infantry Bn's and Co's are able to use their organic mortars to support their operations - w/o having to go higher up, where divisional arty may be supporting a higher priority.
> 
> 
> They were read, although not commented on.
> ...


[/QUOTE]

Mkloby, hi.

My comment was not to say your arguments regarding the fire support plan are incorrect; i do not doubt your views on that particular matter can be valid, precise and correct. Rather, my idea was to illustrate you most posters believe their views are very correct here.


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## syscom3 (Apr 13, 2007)

Theres nothing wrong with an unorthodox plan, as long as it isnt based on a bunch of unlikely events to occur.

regardless on your plans, it ultimatly mut be based on your capabilities and your enemies capabilities.


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## Civettone (Apr 13, 2007)

I think I was misunderstood. I see the 120mm mortar as a more mobile replacement of artillery. I still stand by that. I don't consider it as a man-packed weapon.

I disagree that the German army had the advantage of fast response. None was faster than the British; they were obsessed by speed. Accuracy came on the second place. In 1940 the British were unhappy with the accuracy of their guns in France. Perhaps they improved this later on? You were right on the weather aspect though. That was me guessing why they were less accurate. 

MKloby, is it true that mortar fire is more difficult to counter fire?
Kris


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## Glider (Apr 13, 2007)

Kris
Can I ask what AA you are going to take with you. The Army are on their own for 2-3 days and the RAF have around 30 squadrons of GA making life hell for them with the GAF of limited help as the CAP has been withdrawn or kept at minimal levels.
British Artillery will outrange your mortars and be able to operate with minimal distruption pounding your area and at night the Heavy Bombers will run free.

Some form of AA defence is a requirement and I don't see the normal army level of protection being nearly good enough


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## Glider (Apr 13, 2007)

Udet said:


> Mkloby: read the comments of syscom and Glider and do not skip Hop´s thoughts...it is more than reasonable to assume they are permanently right as well -especially Hop-. You seem to be right too.
> 
> Seems like a debate is occurring. When discussing a what if, one can push ideas to the limits, limits which seem to set you off.
> 
> ...



Udet
There are some good comments here but you are selective to a point. In particular Crete and Norway. 
What turned these around was airpower pure and simple. The Germans had it, The British didn't and the result inevitable. 
Even then, the German Naval Losses in Norway were dreadfull and German Parachute units in Crete very heavy. Neither Arm was able to function again in its traditional form against the Western Allies again, ever. The Navy did operate against the Russian Navy, that I grant but to compare The Russian Navy against the RN is chalk and cheese.

To pretend that the same situation would happen over Britain in May 42 is clearly unrealistic. The numbers quoted already prove that the forces in place in May 42 *without *any assumptions could almost match those proposed *with *major assumptions 
To pretend that because the Channel Dash could take place with suprise would mean that a whole invasion could launch a suprise invasion is unrealistic
To pretend that the channel dash was a major success with the ships being undamaged when, at the end of the day all the major ships were damaged and most out of action for months is blinkered at best.
To then pretend that the British wouldn't take precautions against an impending invasion is equally unrealistic.

I commend Kris on some of his ideas in particular the landing craft, I believe these are huge risks but ones that original thinking can come up with.


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## mkloby (Apr 13, 2007)

Civettone said:


> MKloby, is it true that mortar fire is more difficult to counter fire?
> Kris



It's taking 4 hours now for this post between the baby fussing and people calling...

I have a couple of thoughts on this. Keep in mind, I'm not an artillery officer, and an arty man could probably go into much more detail than I could, especially when it comes to counter-battery fire (which is out of my league).

Due to the short max effective range of mortars, it would be easier to narrow down where the fire came from... talking of a couple clicks rather than miles.

However, it is relatively easy for mortars to dig-in. All you'd need is a few hours, and you would have a nice basic fighting hole. Of course, that's not going to protect that position from a 155mm shell plunging directly on target, but it will offer decent protection with respect to splintering fragments. It will be much more difficult to prepare a defensive position for arty pieces weighing several tons.

Another thing that comes to my mind is that your light (60mm+ mortars) and medium mortars (80mm+) can be easily broken down and manpacked. You available options for choosing your fire support position are not as restrictive as arty, in the sense that you can hump them over rough terrain, across unimproved terrain, across streams and such. Divisional arty, towed by trucks/halftracks, is obviously going to be more restricted in it's choice of firing position.

Also, keep in mind about various methods used for detecting enemy firing positions. Forward observers, recon patrols, aviation recon will all have a more difficult time picking up a mortar position vice massive arty pieces. Not to mention that mortars can move their position in a matter of minutes. This can mitigate the risks posed via counter-bat fire, but can also vastly diminish the effectiveness of your own fire. It can prove advantageous if you position is spotted by, say, a patrol.

I believe in WWII they were able to use radar to identify mortars while in flight, but I am not sure how effective this method truly was in identifying a probable firing position.

In some aspects, mortars are more vulnerable to counter-bat fire, but they also have several advantages as well... Perhaps someone that has served in arty can expand on this.


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## plan_D (Apr 14, 2007)

Kris,

While believing your idea is bizarre, at best, I have maintained a certain respect for your "out of the box" thoughts. There is too much certainty and reliance upon what the Germans could do without actually considering what the British could do. I maintain my position on the basis that it would be more likely, given the strength of the Royal Navy, RAF and British Army that the invasion would fail - that's not to say I'm one-hundred percent sure it would. 

I have to ask, are you aware how close Germany came to defeat in Norway? It was only luck and bad weather that prevented the German invasion fleet heading for Norway being bombed and destroyed on April 3rd - 8th when the _Hipper_,_ Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ finally reached a zone out of 2 Group range, along with the supply and invasion flotilla. 

I make that point because on all those days it was weather that turned the Blenheims back; for an invasion on the beaches it needs to be a reasonable day (at least), and on these days the RAF would fly. I don't think the tune of Norway would be sung for Germany had the weather permitted 2 Group to do its duty. I'm not saying 2 Group would sink all the ships, but I think the German invasion would suffer a big blow.

The same goes for the Kriegsmarine, as the _Admiral Scheer_ was attacked on September 4th, 1939, and was hit with three bombs that bounced overboard because of 11 second delays. Imagine if, on that day, the RAF used torpedo bombers - the tune in Berlin would be "...we made a mistake." If, of course, the bombers made the run and hit the target - (in real life, the Luftwaffe made no appearance and the AA only opened up after bombs had been dropped.)

I also have quote here from someone who acquired more in-depth knowledge of the German Wehrmacht and War Machine, its workings and capability than anyone on this forum could ever dream of...

_"...for only the capture of the British Expeditionary Force could have influenced the English towards making peace with Hitler or could created the conditions necessary for a successful German invasion of Great Britain."_ - Heinz Guderian


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## Civettone (Apr 15, 2007)

Hey Plan_D, thank you for the kind words. I'm not certain the German invasion would succeed either. I also never said I was. But I do see it's possible. That you see it more likely that it would fail than succeed, is quite understandable and you may very well be right.

About Norway, I disagree with your view on the invasion. First, I think the KM got beaten quite badly in Norway and this was a result of bad planning which could have been avoided just the same. I'm thinking of those German destroyers lost, I'm thinking of the plan with KM positions falling in the hands of the British but I'm especially thinking of what happened to Blücher, what a stupid way to lose a heavy cruiser! I can see the KM doing better just the same as I can see the Royal Navy doing better.
Second, I don't think the examples you gave would have resulted in a failure to invade Norway. As the south was in German hands, the rest of the country would fall sooner or later as neither the British nor the French could have continued the fight in Norway for much longer. The French dropped out and the British needed every soldier to defend Britain.

Kris


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## plan_D (Apr 15, 2007)

I believe that if the weather was right for those five days, then 2 Group Blenheims and Coastal Command Hudsons would have put a large dent in the German invasion, and quite possibly a massive dent in the Kriegsmarine surface fleet. 

Even with the success of the Kriegsmarine during World War II, I don't think it was large enough to over-whelm any large attempt by the Royal Navy to engage. And during an invasion of Britain, unlike Crete and Norway, the Royal Navy would have the RAF for support.


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## Kurfürst (Apr 15, 2007)

Hop said:


> As Kurfurst is fairly new to this forum, just a word of warning about how he distorts things.



I will not bother to address Hop's usual lies point by point - suffice to say evereything he tries to sell as my position is wanton lies on his part - I know him for 6 years now, he can't show me anything new.


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## lesofprimus (Apr 15, 2007)

And pissing contests like the one u two nerds are having aint for this here board... Take it to PM or another board, cause its old....


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 15, 2007)

Kurfurst and Hop I have told you guys before in another thread to quit you bitching to one another. I closed that thread because of it, do you want me to close this one as well?! 

*As Les said if you want to act like Children then do it in PMs okay.*


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## Kurfürst (Apr 15, 2007)

Well maybe you guys should have done something about it before - you had days to edit the post that started the pissing contest, before I replied to it - why nothing happened?

If you edit the reply, edit the post that got around the question itself and started ad hominem attacks as well.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 15, 2007)

Kurfurst we are not here 24/7. I have not been online since Friday so dont start questioning my motives okay! I just read the posts and I am telling you both to quit this childishness!


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## royal744 (Apr 17, 2007)

Gemhorse said:


> Brilliant post, Jabberwocky...
> 
> 
> When you look at what the Allies had to put into D-Day, Sealion was unrealistic, even back then, the Germans were just still on a 'high' from all their previous easier European conquests right up to the Channel coasts.....
> ...



I think Sealion was more hope, bluff and bluster than anything else. It could be that Hitler thought that by assembling a few barges in channel ports he could "frighten" the British into taking him seriously. Fat chance. A lion fighting on its own territory with nowhere to go is unlikely to start swimming the Atlantic and is far more likely to stiffen its back and extend its claws. It has nothing to lose at that point.
But it bears pointing out that Germany had neither the air force to ensure any sort of strategic advantage, nor any sort of navy that could seriously challenge the Home Fleet. Moreover, even the fine fighter aircarft that Germany possessed didn't have the range or staying power to fight decisive battles in the air over England. They didn't have the fuel and had to turn back only minutes after they arrived. Add to that the fact that German pilots who were shot down over England became prisoners; British pilots shot down over England were still active duty pilots. German bombers were pathetically weak sisters compared to English 4-engine _strategic_ bombers and didn't compare favorably to the DeHavilland Mosquitoes which could fly to Berlin and Back and pin the label "Meyer" on Goering's ample chest.
Let's see: no strategic air force; no navy capable of holding a corridor and commanding a beach head, and nothing in the way of naval assault vessels - sounds like a recipe for precisely nothing to me.
Hitler really wanted the British to "just capitulate" and there was a contingent of frightened titles that wanted to do just that, but by then, they had been surpassed in their own country.
The Battle of Britain _was the first time in WWII that the German air force came up against an opposite air force that was morally equipped to fight it, backed up by being materially equipped to fight it on even or better terms, with a radar system and fighter command and control system in depth. Before this, the Germans had been fighting enemy air forces that were like so many ducks in a barrel. The German reputation of invincibility was characterized by a series of swift victories over ill-prepared enemies flying antiquated equipment with no command and control systems and whose airfields were quickly overrun on the ground. None of this applied to Great Britain. 

So consider that the very first time the Germans encountered a real enemy in the sky, they could hurt him, maul him and bleed him, but never really had a chance to beat him, and that should have given the thick-headed Germans a clue that things would never be the same again._


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## royal744 (Apr 17, 2007)

Civettone said:


> Well, just look at Wacht am Rhein which ULTRA failed to recognize. To maximize secrecy the Germans basically stopped radio traffic.
> 
> And there have also been cases where ULTRA was mistrusted. And even though these occasions never became known, I can imagine that there were also instances where the guys at Bletchley Park drew the wrong conclusions from the information obtained by ULTRA. As said before, ULTRA rarely found the exact orders for an offensive but found indications which were then puzzled together. There's a human weakness in this process.
> All you need is confusion to hold off the British anti-invasion plans for a few hours more.
> ...



Yes. ULTRA wasn't perfect; Mongomery, it is know, din't like ULTRA, but one suspects this might have had more to do with losing his own 'omniscience' (read, ego); nor, in the beginning, was it particularly fast or efficient. All these thingscame with time.

With regard to the so-called operation Sea Lion, it seems even more clear in retrospect than it did at the time to the fearful Admirals of the German navy, that opening even a tiny corridor and holding it for weeks was simply another term for Suicide of the German Navy. And, the Germans would have had to move with great speed as the British were even then deploying pipelines to the seacoast with a view to setting the landing beaches on fire.

It is undisputably true that the British Army was a weak sister following Dunkirk, but the British were making huge strides in rearming and re-armoring their battered divisions. I find it interesting and fascinating that throughout WWII, the British were always more mechanized than their German counterparts which relied very heavily on horse-drawn transport. The excellent German armor that made up the spearpoint of the German army was backed up by miles of plodding horse-drawn supply trains.

The Army may have been weakened (but recovering), but there was nothing weak about the RAF, or the Navy which I firmly believe would have cut a German invasion force to shreds under a strong RAF umbrella. When you fight the ultimate battle, everyhting, including the kitchen sink is thrown into the cauldron.

But, having failed to gain control of the air with an air force wholly unsuitable for strategic bombing and a fighter force that had great planes and pilots but no stamina over England- all this was a recipe for failure. Five or ten minutes over England doesn't cut it.


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