# Losses in France for British 1940



## The Basket (Jul 25, 2017)

Is there a reference for what British forces lost in the invasion of France and the evacuation of Dunkirk? In terms of loss of tanks or rifles or Trucks?
Did the British have enough weapons that if the Germans did invade in force that they could resist?


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## stona (Jul 25, 2017)

Anthony Newbold's thesis_ "British planning and preparations to resist invasion on land, September 1939 -September 1940"_ may have some useful information. I haven't read it for a while, but it certainly goes into some considerable detail about what was available in the UK after Dunkirk, if not the specific losses. I'll have a look through when I get a chance.

It used to be available online, but I can't find a link to it.

Edit: Yes, I can

https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/2928115/DX199711.pdf

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Jul 25, 2017)

To kick off the discussion, from the BBC

BBC - Press Office - Dunkirk facts & figures

* * The BEF left the following equipment behind in France, much of it to be recycled by the German Army -
o 2,472 guns
o 63,879 vehicles
o 20,548 motorcycles
o 76,097 tons of ammunition
o 416,940 tons of stores


* * 68,111 men of the BEF were captured or killed during Blitzkrieg, retreat and evacuation
* * 40,000 French troops were taken into captivity when Dunkirk fell
* * 126 merchant seamen died during the evacuation
* *Churchill had been Prime Minister for only 16 days when the evacuation began
* * The threat of invasion was so real that on 29 May Churchill proposed laying gas along the beaches of the south coast
* * 1,000 Dunkirk citizens died during air raids on 27 May
* * In the early hours of 29 May the destroyer Wakeful was torpedoed and sank in 15 seconds with the loss of 600 lives
* * 47,081 men embarked from the mole during the devastating air raid of 1 June


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## stona (Jul 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> * * 47,081 men embarked from the mole during the devastating air raid of 1 June



One feels almost churlish busting the myth of the 'little ships' which is a wonderful story.
Officially 239,555 were evacuated from the harbour and 98,671 from the beaches. 
Of these 5,031 returned in 'private motor boats', 4,895 in 'yachts' a total of 9,926. The raw figures overlook the shuttle services run by some of these small vessels to larger vessels lying off shore. 
The majority returned in transports ('personnel vessels') and RN destroyers and torpedo boats, a total of 190,753.
The balance was made up by 'trawlers and drifters' and 'minesweepers (large)'
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Jul 25, 2017)

I agree Steve but the port was jammed and many soldiers were exhausted or injured. I used to have the idea of the beach as a UK holiday beach where you can see both ends, the beaches around Calais Dunkirk Depanne are pretty much continuous, like a sand flat.


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## stona (Jul 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I agree Steve but the port was jammed and many soldiers were exhausted or injured.



I agree that many would have been exhausted and not a few dejected, but according to the official figures only 6,981 of those taken off were wounded. The rest, French and British were, officially at least, 'fit'.

Figures do vary, the lowest total I have to hand is 316,663 evacuated, the highest 338,226. I'm sure others give other numbers, which is why I never get bothered much by some variation. You pay your money and you take your pick 

Cheers

Steve


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## The Basket (Jul 25, 2017)

I will assume a few things

All the heavy equipment in France and Belgium was lost.
No attempt was made to recover any heavy equipment.

It would be interesting to put a monetary value on equipment lost and how much of a percentage of overall equipment was lost and whether the UK could have fought a worst case scenario German invasion with what the had left.


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## stona (Jul 25, 2017)

The Basket said:


> It would be interesting to put a monetary value on equipment lost and how much of a percentage of overall equipment was lost and whether the UK could have fought a worst case scenario German invasion with what the had left.



Newbold's paper covers the plans to counter an invasion. They were many, and changed as the situation on the continent changed.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Jul 25, 2017)

The Basket said:


> I will assume a few things
> 
> All the heavy equipment in France and Belgium was lost.
> No attempt was made to recover any heavy equipment.
> ...


In the immediate days after the evacuation the UK was in no position to resist invasion on the land, fortunately Germany was in no position to mount one.

A lot of information here

British Equipment losses at Dunkirk and the situation post Dunkirk


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## stona (Jul 25, 2017)

For all that I would just mention that on 10th August, at the height of so called 'invasion fever' the decision was taken to reinforce the Middle East from the resources of Home Forces.
Cheers
Steve


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## The Basket (Jul 25, 2017)

Did the RAF attempt any kind of airlift?
Probably not in daylight but a few nightime trips?


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## stona (Jul 25, 2017)

The Basket said:


> Did the RAF attempt any kind of airlift?



Not as part of an organised evacuation.
As it withdrew to the UK it destroyed any aircraft left behind. There's even a picture taken at Merville by none other than Heinrich Hoffmann which shows the tail of a burnt out Armstrong Whitworth Ensign in civilian markings (registration G-ADSZ), operated by BOAC. It was supposedly destroyed in a landing at Merville after being damaged by Bf 109s whilst on a scheduled flight! 
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Jul 25, 2017)

RAF groundcrew and aircrew without a plane who couldn't steal one went back by boat so I don't suppose any airlift was done.


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## The Basket (Jul 25, 2017)

How did Operation Ariel compare?
Odd to talk about evacuation of the British army in France. Hadn't finished yet.
Another odd story is that a number of the evacuated French were sent back.


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## pbehn (Jul 25, 2017)

The Basket said:


> How did Operation Ariel compare?
> Odd to talk about evacuation of the British army in France. Hadn't finished yet.
> Another odd story is that a number of the evacuated French were sent back.


The French were not sent back, they had a right to go back to continue the fight or at least be at home. They were taken back on vessels that were bringing British servicemen and others out from France.


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## The Basket (Jul 25, 2017)

Sent back? Carried on the fight on home soil. 
A better phrase.
Dunkirk ended 4th June and France didn't surrender until 22 June. 
The Lancastria was sunk on 17th June. So Dunkirk was not the end of the evacuation.

In the later evacs it does seem to show an attempt of taking heavy equipment.


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## pbehn (Jul 25, 2017)

The Basket said:


> Sent back? Carried on the fight on home soil.
> A better phrase.
> Dunkirk ended 4th June and France didn't surrender until 22 June.
> The Lancastria was sunk on 17th June. So Dunkirk was not the end of the evacuation.
> ...




Operation Ariel - Wikipedia

This shows some of the efforts, not included there was 185Kgs of heavy water flown out in jerry cans.
Operation Big


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## The Basket (Jul 26, 2017)

I guess 185kg of water is quite heavy. Norway was occupied so a moot point perhaps.
So one of the myths of Dunkirk is the escape of the British army when in fact British army units were still being put in France. And because of the perhaps massive loss of life on the Lancastria things were hushed up. And the news was hidden under the surrender of France.

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## stona (Jul 26, 2017)

pbehn said:


> This shows some of the efforts, not included there was 185Kgs of heavy water flown out in jerry cans.
> Operation Big



"Lew Kowarski, a scientist at the Joliot-Curie laboratory in Paris, convinced Joliot by January 1940 that using heavy water as a moderator was the only practical way to achieve sustainable nuclear fission."

Oh well, you can't be right about everything .

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Jul 27, 2017)

I would suggest that the loss of vehicles was at least as urgently felt as the loss of weapons.Most competent commanders knew that any defence against an invasion depended on mobility, as Brooke noted in August.







A certain then Lieutenant General Montgomery, never one shy of blowing his own trumpet, took credit for developing this idea in his own area of influence, writing in his memoirs long after the events





The shortage of transport to provide the necessary mobility was acknowledged and understood at the time and promoted much debate.

Cheers

Steve

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## The Basket (Jul 27, 2017)

Bicycle is the answer!
It would be very interesting to see what kind of war the British thought they would be facing on home soil in 1940. Tanks would need a port and I doubt the German Navy had the resources to transport them in quantity so infantry? The more you look at a German invasion the more ridiculous the idea is.
The operation could make the Charge of the Light Brigade look like a sensible military exercise


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## stona (Jul 27, 2017)

The Sealion planning allowed for tanks and other armoured vehicles to be landed, either from barges onto the beaches, 'swimming' (not unlike later Allied efforts), or submersible (driving ashore using a flexible snorkel type device).

Most early British planning was for an invasion across the North Sea,landings being made in East Anglia, not across the Channel with landings on the South Coast.

Cheers

Steve


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## The Basket (Jul 27, 2017)

East Anglia?
North Sea. 
I remember reading about an invasion from Norway and thinking er no.
If invasion by the channel was difficult then the North sea was impossible.
Loony toony.


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## pbehn (Jul 27, 2017)

The Basket said:


> East Anglia?
> North Sea.
> I remember reading about an invasion from Norway and thinking er no.
> If invasion by the channel was difficult then the North sea was impossible.
> Loony toony.


You obviously didn't hear about the Vikings.


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## stona (Jul 28, 2017)

Until the Fall of France an invasion somewhere on the East Coast was regarded as the only option for the Germans. Even after the Fall of France it remained favorite in many opinions.
The British worried about the prospect of invasion everywhere, even the Shetlands caused an Admiralty panic. If the Shetlands were seized by a German expedition from Norway it was feared that _"it would be a difficult combined operation to turn them out"._ Furthermore, air bases might be established to threaten Scapa Flow and even the whole of Scotland, which at the time was defended only by one Division (9th Scottish). General Kirke was not impressed.
_"The Admiralty is panicking about the Shetlands, which have been strongly reinforced, and preparations have been made to destroy the aerodrome."_
It is impossible to overestimate the uncertainty in British circles when you read things like this in government documents.
_"...an anonymous source has reported that the Germans contemplated extensive parachute operations in Eire, which would then become their base for land and sea operations against the united Kingdom."_
No such plans ever existed, but the British decided to
_"...at all costs avoid swinging Irish opinion against us by taking the initiative in the infringement of their neutrality, for example by the seizure of ports."_
The British did attempt to do a deal with De Valera and the Irish government to establish some kind of cooperation but were rebuffed. De Valera_
"...did not want any assistance whatsoever until Eire had actually been attacked. This would probably be too late."_
The Admiralty even tried to put the wind up the politicians, writing to Attlee







Given that most of Germany's troops were still committed on the Western Front at this time,late May, this seems an unlikely prospect at the very least, but it does illustrate the panicky thinking going on, even at the highest levels in Britain.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Jul 28, 2017)

The Basket said:


> East Anglia?
> North Sea.
> I remember reading about an invasion from Norway and thinking er no.
> If invasion by the channel was difficult then the North sea was impossible.
> Loony toony.



It was the occupation of Holland that reinforced this view.

As early as 10th May, the Chiefs of Staff had determined that the most
vulnerable stretch of coastline to a German landing was between The Wash
and Sussex, and the Home Defence Executive shared their view. The German
capture of the Netherlands redoubled the vulnerability of this area, since
the Dutch, and very soon the Belgian, ports and. estuaries could now be used
to assemble enemy shipping rapidly and secretly, being relatively free from
British aerial reconnaissance, while the previously long sea route was much
shortened. General Kirke warned, in a memoranda written on 15th May, that:

_"in view of the German capture of Holland, a seaborne attack on the
East Anglian and north and east Kent coast carried out in a fleet of fast
shallow draught motor vessels appears to be a possibility. I have no
information as to whether Germany has any such boats or is in the process
of building them, and. request I may be kept informed of any developments of
this nature." 
_
It was not lost on the British that whilst the East Anglian countryside might not exactly be a Russian steppe or North American prairie, it was flat and open land ideal for mobile warfare. 

Cheers

Steve

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## The Basket (Jul 29, 2017)

Your quote saying that Germany may land troops using shallow draught boats which Germany may or may not have is surprising.
Viking was mentioned but the Vikings didn't invade at first. They would raid and the nature of the British Isles was perfect for Viking raiders. Plus the Vikings were a sea power and good sailors in bad weather. 
An invasion needs tanks and a port and shallow draught boats offer neither. And the North Sea is rough. So shallow boats may not offer good stability. Germany lost a good portion of her navy in Norway so an invasion by Germany is looking less and less likely. 
Another factor is that the Germans only had weeks to plan and had no real idea how to do it. Landing the necessary forces to invade UK successfully would have been difficult even in peace time in ideal conditions.


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## stona (Jul 29, 2017)

Kirke was worried about the possibility of an invasion of this type. It seems obvious that to land heavier equipment they would have needed to capture a port or ports. This was not, and never was, a German plan. It was just conjecture on the part of the British who were sensibly weighing up all the options vailable to the enemy.
This was the essence of the two defensive arguments, whether to concentrate a static defence on the ports and lamding grounds or establish a mobile defence which could react to any landing and repel it before it could establish a bridgehead, and certainly before it could capture a facility like a port.
Initially the British were looking to defend the hundreds of miles of coast stretching from north of the Wash to the Thames estuary (Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, into North Kent) which was impossible to do with the resources available which gave impetus to the idea of a mobile defence. The biggest problem, apart from a lack of materiel, was that the British army was simply not trained in this form of warfare.
It puts the later German plans into perspective, where the British would only need to defend the south Channel coast form Folkestone to Brighton (essentially Kent and Sussex.)
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Jul 29, 2017)

Basket, I mentioned the Vikings as a joke, however their boats were probably quicker than a towed barge which I read were capable of 2 knots. In 1940 the worry of the British government was that any landing that wasn't immediately repulsed would have the population suing for peace. Lord Halifax seems to have been for surrender at any cost.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 29, 2017)

large numbers of tanks need ports, small numbers might not.




Germans were fooling around with small numbers of MK II and MK III tanks that could "deep wade". How successful they would have been is another story. A few were used in Russia for initial river crossings. 

30-45 ton tanks need more specialized port facilities or landing craft than 6-20 ton tanks. 

German success in Poland and the French campaign gave a rather overblown impression of their capabilities to the British, The Western allies having perhaps underrated them before that. 

Ports were needed for supplies. Even an infantry division could go through several hundred tons of "supplies" per day in hard fighting. Bringing hundreds of tons of supplies per day over beaches is a very difficult job.


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## stona (Jul 29, 2017)

It's all about timing.
By the time of Sealion, say late September 1940, the Germans had barges adapted with ramps which could land Panzer IIs, IIIs and IVs directly onto the beach. In tests it took approximately 20 minutes to construct/emplace the ramp and start unloading the tanks, which might not have been ideal in an opposed landing.
Panzer IIIs and IVs were modified as submersibles. They would be driven down a ramp into water. These were unloaded from a modified type A barge. The tanks could negotiate a ramp at a maximum angle of 30 degrees, so for a 4m water depth an 11 m ramp was required. The front of the ramp was kept afloat by a float and as the tank drove onto the ramp this would sink allowing the tank to set off along the sea bed, before floating again to allow he next tank to exit.
The lighter Panzer IIs were modified as swimming tanks. The floats attached to each side made the ensemble too wide for the Type A barges and a special vessel based on the larger Type C ('Kampinen') barge, 6.6 metres wide, was developed. A modified barge could carry four swimming Panzer IIs.

The Panzer IIs and IVs were considered most suitable for submersible modifications and Kapitan zur See Paul Zieb, who was Director of Equipment at Wilhelmshaven certainly rated the experiments a success and operational use possible. His report concluded

_"The maximum underwater duration of a tank during the trials was an hour. In general, the experiments showed that the tanks were able to travel underwater in sand up to a depth of 7m; the tank commander did not feel it was necessary to test its performance in silt. A demonstration was given on 26th June to a high ranking audience, including Dr Todt, the armaments minister*." _

*He was by this time "Reichsminister für Bewaffnung und Munition".

The Germans certainly planned to land tanks on the beaches.

Cheers

Steve


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## The Basket (Jul 29, 2017)

Timing.
The Germans were going to be on a very sticky wicket if they planned an invasion of the British isles in Autumn and Winter. 
Tanks also need vast quantities of fuel and ammo. I hope the fuel trucks were also amphibious


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## Glider (Jul 29, 2017)

The possibility of a successfull invasion as we now know was close to zero if only because of the state ot the German Navy which was down to appox 10 - 12 destroyers and no one is going to cover an invasion with such limited resources.

As for tanks going underwater for a beach landng not a chance, there is sand and then there is sand. The english channel isn't a river, at Southend where I lived for approx 30 years the tide goes out approximately a mile and there was soft in its consistancy where tanks will almost certainly get stuck. Note- the RNLI station at Southend has a hovercraft as nothing else will get across the sand. 
A number of my friends worked at the Shoebury Firing range and they were always coming in with stories of tanks and other equipment that got stuck in the sand. 
Other beaches are pebble beaches and remember what happened to the Churchill tanks that hit Dieppe.


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## stona (Jul 29, 2017)

Well, there was a lot of optimism, probably misplaced, in the German planning.

Here's a picture of a 'Schwimmpanzer II' in a flat calm. Not, I would suggest, a lot of freeboard!






How that would fair in an even moderate sea must be open to question. I know I wouldn't fancy my chances.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Jul 29, 2017)

Trials on 10th August 1940 showed that submersible tanks could be launched, in this case from the modified Peniche Hans Herbert.











Cheers

Steve


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## The Basket (Jul 29, 2017)

I did know the Viking thing was a joke.
However...the Vikings were far better equipped for amphibious warfare than the Kriegsmarine. 
It would be interesting... hypothetically speaking of a big push from Germany into the UK would have given the Soviets pause...road to Berlin would be very empty.


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## pbehn (Jul 29, 2017)

The Basket said:


> I did know the Viking thing was a joke.
> However...the Vikings were far better equipped for amphibious warfare than the Kriegsmarine.
> It would be interesting... hypothetically speaking of a big push from Germany into the UK would have given the Soviets pause...road to Berlin would be very empty.


The old English were very cooperative in the start with the Vikings, they stuffed Lindisfarne full of riches, it is surrounded by water twice a day at high tide and is one of closest sites to Norway in the UK. The Vikings actually entered by rivers. What is now the Louvre museum in Paris was originally a fortification to stop them


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## stona (Jul 29, 2017)

pbehn said:


> The old English were very cooperative in the start with the Vikings,



The landings were also unopposed and there was no mobile reserve 

When Harold (Godwinson) did get an army up north to oppose Harald Hardrada and Tostig Godwinson's army things didn't go so well for the invaders. This was the kind of defence envisaged 900 odd years later, not stopping them on the beaches, or rather the banks of the Ouse (as you correctly note they tended to come up rivers rather than land on sea coasts) but inland. 

Cheers

Steve


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## The Basket (Jul 29, 2017)

Defending the isle the size of Britain against amphibious invasion is a monstrous undertaking and impossible to guard every inch. 
You need to know main invasion point as the enemy will probably have dummy invasion landings to keep you guessing.
Once the main invasion route is known you then have to throw everything at them to push them into the sea. The Germans for thier part have to go inland as quickly as possible and need a major port and either occupy or build an airbase.
I would hope any invasion would have been fought tooth and nail. Making a separate peace with Hitler is one thing... surrendering is quite different. It is surprising that the British Army seemed that we were under threat of invasion when it was logical that we were not. Although over estimating the enemy does have its perks.


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## stona (Jul 30, 2017)

The Basket said:


> Defending the isle the size of Britain against amphibious invasion is a monstrous undertaking and impossible to guard every inch.
> You need to know main invasion point as the enemy will probably have dummy invasion landings to keep you guessing.



Fortunately, living on an island inspired the English (later British) to establish a first line of defence in the Royal Navy, which could seriously mess up an invader's plans before he even reached the coast. This option has worked three times (including 1940) since 1588.
In the context of 'Sealion' that same navy could prevent re-supply of any forces that did manage a landing, cutting them off and allowing them to be mopped up as and when a sufficient concentration of defending forces (those mobile forces so beloved of Kirke and others) could be established against them. This is the invariable outcome of 'Sealion' when played out, as it is from time to time, at various military institutions, staff colleges etc., even when weighted in favour of the initial invasion. The weighting is to allow the Germans to get ashore in sufficient strength to make a game of it.

The feints for 'Sealion', attempts to divert the heavy units of the Home Fleet into the North Sea were laughable, not even the Germans thought they would really work. There was no resemblance to the much more complicated and sophisticated operation(s) mounted to confuse the Germans by the Allies in 1944.

Cheers

Steve


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## The Basket (Jul 30, 2017)

The Germans had days to organise Sealion so poor planning can be expected. D-day took about 2 years.
Navy could be an issue in the channel as they would be in range of Stukas so unless the RAF was fully operational in the channel then could be in bother. If the Germans had air superiority over the beaches then this mythical invasion could take place..
So in war games the German lands in force? Dieppe or Anzio?


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## stona (Jul 30, 2017)

The Basket said:


> The Germans had days to organise Sealion so poor planning can be expected. D-day took about 2 years.
> Navy could be an issue in the channel as they would be in range of Stukas so unless the RAF was fully operational in the channel then could be in bother. If the Germans had air superiority over the beaches then this mythical invasion could take place..
> So in war games the German lands in force? Dieppe or Anzio?



First meetings at which the feasibility of a landing in England were discussed were on 20th June. Hitler did not seem very interested and Raeder assumed that the issue was not of current interest, nonetheless Rear Admiral Fricke was already working on such a plan and an earlier study from November 1939 was revived and developed. On 30th June General Jodl produced a report on the continuation of the war against 'England' which argued that preparations for a 'sea-strike' against Britain should be made to exert political pressure on Britain to remain inactive, however, the actual invasion should be a last resort. The Germans were preparing for months, not days, but I agree that three or four months was far too little time for such a undertaking, the magnitude of which everyone, with the possible exception of the Kriegsmarine, underestimated. What the Germans achieved in that time was remarkable.

The Luftwaffe could only be effective against British shipping (assuming some degree of local air superiority could have been achieved, and the Germans never came close to it) in reasonable weather and in daylight. Just how effective the Luftwaffe might have been is debatable. Simulations are usually based on RN losses at Dunkirk and the Norwegian campaign in which the dive bombers were not as effective as the mythology would have us believe. The destroyers would also have plenty of sea room, manoeuvering in the Channel. 
The Royal Navy could operate against the beaches and against any supply convoys by night when almost any kind of Luftwaffe operations would have been impossible. It took years for Coastal Command to develop tactics for attacking shipping by night and the Luftwaffe had none in 1940. It would be impossible for supply convoys to sail, unload and return in the hours of daylight.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 2, 2017)

I've just been reading some of the details of the November 1939 study commissioned by Raeder for an invasion of England. It envisioned a landing by only 7,500 men initially and is essentially pessimistic. Called 'Study Red' it makes the point that if the conditions for a successful invasion were met, that is the defeat or containment of both the RAF and RN, then Britain would already be defeated and an invasion would not be necessary, which is a fair point 

It was the army that rejected the study and in its own invasion plan, coded 'Study North West' envisaged a far more ambitious undertaking involving 100,000 men.
This was the genesis of the arguments between the navy and army about what could and could not be achieved, the eventual compromise was of course 'Sealion'.

Incidentally the Luftwaffe agreed with the navy. In a December report the OKL expressed the view:

_"A combined operation with a landing in England must be rejected. It would only be the last act of a war against England which had already taken a victorious course, as otherwise the conditions required for the success of a combined operation do not exist."_

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 2, 2017)

pbehn said:


> * * The BEF left the following equipment behind in France, much of it to be recycled by the German Army -
> o 2,472 guns
> o 63,879 vehicles
> o 20,548 motorcycles
> ...



I have very similar figures. I guess under 'stores' would be the 165,000 tons of petrol. Not everyone came home with a rifle, 90,000 were left behind. I also have a figure of 615 tanks, though which tanks I don't know.
The Chiefs of Staff complained that losses in guns, artillery and anti-tank, amounted to 60% of overall stocks.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Aug 3, 2017)

In another thread I recommended Peter Schenk's 'Invasion of England 1940' for a detailed view of German preparations and planning for Sealion.
If you don't want to plough through papers like the Newbold one I have already quoted, then by far the best British perspective can be had from Leo McKinstry's 'Operation Sealion'. This also covers the military and political situation in the preceding period, including,obviously, the losses at Dunkirk.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2017)

stona said:


> I have very similar figures. I guess under 'stores' would be the 165,000 tons of petrol. Not everyone came home with a rifle, 90,000 were left behind. I also have a figure of 615 tanks, though which tanks I don't know.
> The Chiefs of Staff complained that losses in guns, artillery and anti-tank, amounted to 60% of overall stocks.
> Cheers
> Steve


I hope that 165,000 tons of fuel were not left behind, surely it is easy to put a match to it.

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## stona (Aug 4, 2017)

You'd hope so, but there was a lot of confusion. The Germans captured really substantial quantities of French fuels, so who knows what British stocks_ might_ have been among that.
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Aug 29, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I hope that 165,000 tons of fuel were not left behind, surely it is easy to put a match to it.



I once watched as a friend tried to get a slightly damp bonfire lit with the help of a can of petrol from his lawnmower. The resultant 50 foot column of flame makes me think you would need a very long match.


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