# 65th Anniversary of the Guadalcanal Campaign.



## syscom3 (Aug 7, 2007)

Aug 7th 1942

I wanted to be the first to say it.....hats off to all the veterans who participated in the first allied counter offensive in the PTO.

We also shouldn't forget the ANZAC troops who were fighting their own bloody battles on the Kokoda Trail.


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## syscom3 (Aug 7, 2007)

Here are some pics of the invasion.


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## syscom3 (Aug 7, 2007)

Here's some more.


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## syscom3 (Aug 8, 2007)

We all know that the USN had its collective ass's whooped. 

In memory of those brave bluejackets that again the misfortune to drink from the bitter dregs of defeat, I am posting the USN War college analysis of the battle.

Its one long read, sometimes hard to follow, but its quite detailed about the events.


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## drgondog (Aug 9, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Aug 7th 1942
> 
> I wanted to be the first to say it.....hats off to all the veterans who participated in the first allied counter offensive in the PTO.
> 
> We also shouldn't forget the ANZAC troops who were fighting their own bloody battles on the Kokoda Trail.



amen to both


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 9, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Aug 7th 1942
> 
> I wanted to be the first to say it.....hats off to all the veterans who participated in the first allied counter offensive in the PTO.
> 
> We also shouldn't forget the ANZAC troops who were fighting their own bloody battles on the Kokoda Trail.



 And most of the Marines were fighting the Japanese with Springfield '03s, cranking a bolt for each of their five shots.


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## syscom3 (Aug 9, 2007)

ToughOmbre said:


> And most of the Marines were fighting the Japanese with Springfield '03s, cranking a bolt for each of their five shots.



Youre right!

I wonder if the '03's were more reliable than the M1A's in the jungle?


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## ToughOmbre (Aug 9, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Youre right!
> 
> I wonder if the '03's were more reliable than the M1A's in the jungle?



The '03s were reliable, but I'll take the Garand, jungle or no jungle.


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## drgondog (Aug 9, 2007)

ToughOmbre said:


> The '03s were reliable, but I'll take the Garand, jungle or no jungle.



Count me in.


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## Wildcat (Aug 10, 2007)

Good post Sys!
Some pics from the Aussie side of things on the Kokoda Track.
Australian War Memorial: One of the world's great museums


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## lucanus (Aug 12, 2007)

> The '03s were reliable, but I'll take the Garand, jungle or no jungle.



I talked to a Vet of the Canal and he said that Marines issued with the Reising were not happy campers...especially when they found out that FDR had sent the vast majority of Thompsons to the UK...He also said that if you wanted to have a Reising, then go to the Canal and look in the rivers...Cause that is where those issued them "lost' them and traded back up to the 03.
I was in a little gun shop somewhere in East Texas and they had a Reising in the rack, when I asked the owner what it was he just shrugged and said all he knew was it was .45 cal, he took it as a trade in...before I could get back someone else had nicked it....The owner didn't even know it was an Automatic!!!!


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## syscom3 (Aug 12, 2007)

What is a "reising"?


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## lucanus (Aug 13, 2007)

> Reising M50
> Type Submachine gun
> Place of origin United States of America
> Service history
> ...



From all accounts I have heard...*POS* covers it...


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## Lucky13 (Aug 13, 2007)

Great pics and read fellas....


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Aug 13, 2007)

For the Japanese on those small islands, being bombed means little room to dodge bombs, for the ocean traps you in!


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## syscom3 (Aug 13, 2007)

Soundbreaker Welch? said:


> For the Japanese on those small islands, being bombed means little room to dodge bombs, for the ocean traps you in!



The islands of the Solomons were anything but "small"


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## Wildcat (Aug 13, 2007)

Neither was New Guinea.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Aug 13, 2007)

I meant Tamabogo Island, in the photos! It looks barely a mile across!


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## syscom3 (Aug 13, 2007)

All of the combatants of the war in the Pacific (CBI included) learned early on that the flexible and fibrous husk of coconut tree's absorbed bullets and fragments with unusual efficiency.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Aug 13, 2007)

And they had their rat tunnels too.


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## syscom3 (Aug 21, 2007)

The Battle of the Tenaru, also known as the Battle of the Ilu River, took place August 21, 1942, on the island of Guadalcanal, and was a land battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II, between Imperial Japanese Army and Allied (mainly United States (U.S.) Marine) ground forces. The battle was the first major Japanese land offensive during the Guadalcanal campaign.

In the battle, U.S. Marines, under the overall command of U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, successfully repulsed an assault by the "First Element" of the "Ichiki" Regiment, under the command of Japanese Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki. The Marines were defending the Lunga perimeter, which guarded Henderson Field, which was captured by the Allies in landings on Guadalcanal on August 7. Ichiki's unit was sent to Guadalcanal in response to the Allied landings with the mission of recapturing the airfield and driving the Allied forces off of the island. Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, which at that time numbered about 11,000 personnel, Ichiki's unit conducted a nighttime frontal assault on Marine positions at Alligator Creek on the east side of the Lunga perimeter. Ichiki's assault was defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese attackers. After daybreak, the Marine units counterattacked Ichiki's surviving troops, killing many more of them. In total, all but 128 of the original 917 of the Ichiki Regiment's First Element were killed in the battle.

*Prelude*

Reports to Allied forces from patrols of Solomon Islanders, including retired Sergeant Major Jacob C. Vouza of the Native Constabulary, under the direction of Martin Clemens, a coastwatcher and officer in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force (BSIPDF), along with Allied intelligence from other sources, indicated that Japanese troops were present east of Lunga Point. To investigate further, on August 19, a Marine patrol of 60 men, commanded by U.S. Marine Captain Charles H. Brush, marched east from the Lunga Perimeter. At the same time, Ichiki sent forward his own patrol of 38 men to reconnoiter Allied troop dispositions and establish a forward communications base. Around 12:00 on August 19, Brush's patrol sighted and ambushed the Japanese patrol, killing all but five of its members. The Marines suffered three dead and three wounded. Papers discovered on the bodies of some of the Japanese officers in the patrol revealed that they belonged to a much larger unit and showed detailed intelligence of U.S. Marine positions around Lunga Point. The papers did not, however, detail exactly how large the Japanese force was or whether an attack was imminent.

Now anticipating an attack from the east, the U.S. Marine forces, under the direction of General Vandegrift, prepared their defenses on the east side of the Lunga perimeter. Several official U.S. military histories identify the location of the eastern defenses of the Lunga perimeter as emplaced on the Tenaru River. The Tenaru River, however, was actually located further to the east. The river forming the eastern boundary of the Lunga perimeter was actually the Ilu River, called Alligator Creek by the local inhabitants. Alligator Creek was not really a river but a tidal lagoon separated from the ocean by a sandbar about 7 to 15 meters (25-50 ft) in width and about 30 meters (100 ft) long. Along the west side of Alligator Creek, Colonel Clifton B. Cates, commander of the 1st Marine Regiment, deployed his 1st and 2nd battalions. To help further defend the Alligator Creek sandbar, Cates deployed 100 men from the 1st Special Weapons Battalion with 37mm anti-tank guns equipped with canister shot. Marine divisional artillery, consisting of both 75mm and 105mm guns, pre-targeted locations on the east side and sandbar areas of Alligator Creek, and forward artillery observers emplaced themselves in the forward Marine positions. The Marines worked all day on August 20 to prepare their defenses as much as possible before nightfall.

Learning of the annihilation of his patrol, Ichiki quickly sent forward a company to bury the bodies and followed with the rest of his troops, marching throughout the night of August 19 and finally halting at 04:30 on August 20 within a few miles of the U.S. Marine positions on the east side of Lunga Point. At this location, he prepared his troops to attack the Allied positions that night.

*Action*

Just after midnight on August 21, Ichiki's main body of troops arrived at the east bank of Alligator Creek and were surprised to encounter the Marine positions, not having expected to find U.S. forces located "so far from the airfield." Nearby U.S. Marine listening posts heard "clanking" sounds, human voices, and other noises before withdrawing to the west bank of the creek. At 01:30 Ichiki's force opened fire with machine guns and mortars on the Marine positions on the west bank of the creek, and a first wave of about 100 Japanese soldiers charged across the sandbar towards the Marines. Marine machine gun fire and canister rounds from the 37 mm cannons killed most of the Japanese soldiers as they crossed the sandbar. A few of the Japanese soldiers reached the Marine positions, engaged in hand to hand combat with the defenders, and captured a few of the Marine front-line emplacements. Also, Japanese machine gun and rifle fire from the east side of the creek killed several of the Marine machine-gunners. A company of Marines, held in reserve just behind the front line, attacked and killed most, if not all, of the remaining Japanese soldiers that had breached the front line defenses, ending Ichiki's first assault about an hour after it had begun. At 02:30 a second wave of about 150 to 200 Japanese troops again attacked across the sandbar and was again almost completely wiped out. At least one of the surviving Japanese officers from this attack advised Ichiki to withdraw his remaining forces, but Ichiki declined to do so.

As Ichiki's troops regrouped east of the creek, Japanese mortars bombarded the Marine lines. The Marines answered with 75 mm and mortar artillery barrages into the areas east of the creek. About 05:00, another wave of Japanese troops attacked, this time attempting to flank the Marine positions by wading through the ocean surf and attacking up the beach into the west bank area of the creek bed. The Marines responded with heavy machine gun and artillery fire along the beachfront area, again causing heavy casualties among Ichiki's attacking troops and causing them to abandon their attack and withdraw back to the east bank of the creek. For the next couple of hours, the two sides exchanged rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire at close range across the sandbar and creek.

In spite of the heavy losses his force had suffered in both night assaults, Ichiki's troops remained in place on the east bank of the creek, either unable or unwilling to withdraw. At daybreak on August 21, the commanders of the U.S. Marine units facing Ichiki's troops conferred on how best to proceed, and they decided to counterattack. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell, crossed Alligator Creek upstream from the battle area, enveloped Ichiki's troops from the south and east, cutting off any avenue for retreat, and began to "compress" Ichiki's troops into a small area in a coconut grove on the east bank of the creek.[44] Aircraft from Henderson Field strafed Japanese soldiers that attempted to escape down the beach and, later in the afternoon, four Marine light tanks attacked across the sandbar into the coconut grove. The tanks swept the coconut grove with machine gun and cannon fire, as well as rolling over the bodies, both alive and dead, of any Japanese soldiers unable or unwilling to get out of the way. When the tank attack was over, Vandegrift wrote that, "the rear of the tanks looked like meat grinders."


By 17:00 on August 21, Japanese resistance had ended. Colonel Ichiki was either killed during the battle, or committed ritual suicide (seppuku) shortly thereafter, depending on the account. As curious Marines began to walk around looking at the battlefield, some injured Japanese troops shot at them, killing or wounding several Marines. Thereafter, Marines shot or bayonetted all of the Japanese bodies that they encountered, although about 15 injured and unconscious Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner. About 30 of the Japanese troops escaped to rejoin their regiment's rear echelon at Taivu Point.

*Aftermath*

For the U.S. and its allies, the victory in the Tenaru battle was psychologically significant in that Allied soldiers, after a series of defeats to Japanese army units throughout the Pacific and east Asia, now knew that they could defeat Japanese troops in a land battle.[49] The battle also set another precedent that would continue throughout the war in the Pacific, which was the reluctance of defeated Japanese soldiers to surrender and their efforts to continue killing Allied soldiers, even as the Japanese soldiers lay dying on the battlefield. On this subject Vandegrift remarked, "I have never heard or read of this kind of fighting. These people refuse to surrender. The wounded wait until men come up to examine them...and blow themselves and the other fellow to pieces with a hand grenade."

By August 25, most of Ichiki's survivors reached Taivu Point and radioed Rabaul to tell 17th Army headquarters that Ichiki's detachment had been "almost annihilated at a point short of the airfield." Reacting with disbelief to the news, Japanese army headquarter's officers proceeded with plans to deliver additional troops to Guadalcanal to reattempt to capture Henderson Field. The next major Japanese attack on the Lunga perimeter occurred at the Battle of Edson's Ridge about three weeks later, this time employing a much larger force than had been employed in the Tenaru battle.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

Guadalcanal Landings - 7-8 August 1942

Sections: 
Preliminary 
Action and Flight Records, 7 August 1942 
Flight Records, 8 August 1942 
Personnel 
Material 
Conclusions and Recommendations 

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U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6) 
CV6/A16-3 (95-mmb)
Serial 0019 
August 24, 1942. 

From: Commanding Officer. 
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 16.
(2) Commander Task Force 61.
(Vice Admiral F.J. Fletcher, U.S. Navy). 
Subject: Operations in Support of Occupation of Tulagi - Guadalcanal, August 7 - 8, 1942 - Report of. 
Reference: (a) Articles 712 and 874, Navy Regulations, 1920. 
Enclosures: Track Chart. 
Executive Officer's Report. 
Report of Commander ENTERPRISE Air Group, VT-3, VB-6, VF-6 and VS-5. 


*PRELIMINARY *
The ENTERPRISE, flagship of Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy, Commander Task Force Sixteen, in company with Task Force Sixteen departed Pearl Harbor July 15, 1942, for Nukualofu, Tongatabu. Search, patrol, and training flights were carried out en route. Gunnery and tactical training was stressed as the ENTERPRISE Air Group was composed mainly of relatively inexperienced flying personnel. 
Upon arrival Tongatabu at 1100 July 24, 1942, the ship refueled and provisioned until the sortie that same afternoon at 1500. The sortie was made immediately after that of numerous transports. Task Force Sixteen became the escort for the convoy. Rendezvous was effected with Task Force 61 the following day, July 26, 1942, and the combined force proceeded north toward the Koro Sea. ENTERPRISE Air Group participated in the landing attack rehearsal operations at Koro Island on July 30. 
On August 3, 1942, a flight of aircraft flew in to the U.S. Marine field at Efate and obtained excellent photographs of the Tulagi - Guadalcanal area taken by the Eleventh Bombardment Group, U.S. Army, on August 1, 1942. Copies of these photographs, with a photographic interpretation prepared by personnel of the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, were delivered to the Task Force and Task Group Commanders. Subsequent visual inspection by our occupation forces revealed that the photographic interpretation made by the photographic section in the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE was remarkably accurate. 
After topping off with fuel on August 3, TF-61 proceeded westward to Longitude 158-45 E and then northward to the Solomon area. The weather August 5 and 6 was generally overcast with scattered showers in which the visibility was greatly reduced. Generally speaking, the weather favored the attacking force and made interception by enemy aircraft most difficult. However, one unidentified aircraft, probably enemy, was thought to have sighted the force. The ENTERPRISE arrived in position Latitude 09-39 S, Longitude 159-03 E, the early morning of August 7, 1942, and at 0535 commenced launching aircraft for the attack. 
THE ACTION 
Prior to launching for the attack, each pilot had been provided with charts and photographs showing the exact location of various targets. The first three flights were launched in darkness just prior to dawn. The weather had cleared and only a few scattered cumulus clouds were present. The light of a quarter moon greatly assisted the flight operations. Aircraft were permitted to show only a dim white light on the tail until at least five miles clear of the carrier where they were permitted to turn on running lights in order to expedite the rendezvous. Due to the proximity of the carrier groups and the inexperience of the pilots a certain amount of confusion ensued, and the rendezvous was not as expeditious as desirable. Complete surprise was effected by our aircraft in the intital attack which followed. 
Following is the detailed chronological record of all flights from the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE on August 7 and 8: August 7, 1942


FLIGHT 301 
0535-0539 Eight VF launched. Lieut. L.H. BAUER, leader. 
Mission: Destroy all enemy aircraft in GUADALCANAL area. Strafe and destroy AA installations, PT's, troop concentrations, supply dumps. 
Action: Strafed AA and buildings on LUNGA field. Strafed buildings, small boats, and supplies along beach from TENERU to KUKUM. Little opposition no aircraft or PT's. 
0712-0724 Landing all planes in the Flight 
0711 7-F-26 from the WASP Air Group returned with this flight and made an emergency landing. Was refueled and launched at 0755. 

FLIGHT 302 
0539-0542 Eight VF launched. Lt.(jg) T.S. GAY, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Six VF maintained patrol. One VF joined up with Flight 301 and one VF joined up with Flight 303. (VSB). 
0713-0724 Two VF returned early and landed with Flight 301. 
0805-0818 Six remaining VF landed. 

FLIGHT 303 
0543-0548 Launched nine VSB with 1000# bombs, Lieut. T.E. CALDWELL, Jr., leader. 
Mission: Bomb and strafe targets along SW Coast of TULAGI. 
Action: Dropped all bombs. Strafed enemy positions. 
0805-0818 All planes in the Flight landed. 

FLIGHT 304 
0601-0604 Five VF launched. Lt.(jg) G.E. FIREBAUGH, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Vectored several times to friendly bogies and returned without incident. 
0805-0818 All planes landed. 

FLIGHT 305 
0643-0653 Launched eighteen VSB with 1000# bombs. Lieut. R. DAVIS, leader. 
Mission: Bomb troop concentrations and AA positions on SW Coast of TULAGI Is. 
Action: Eight planes carried out original mission. Seven bombed GAVUTU and three bombed TANAMBOGO upon orders of Group Commander. 
0805-0810 Three VSB landed. 
0908-0934 Fifteen VSB landed. 

FLIGHT 306 
0642-0643 Four VF launched. Lieut. A.O. VORSE, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Maintained patrol without incident. 
0937-0938 Landed all planes. 

FLIGHT 350 
0620-0625 Launched three VTB. Lt.Cdr. C.M. Jett, leader. 
0707-0709 Launched five VTB. (Two duds delayed launching). Seven VTB were armed with 500# bombs and one with a torpedo. 
Mission: To conduct a 200 mile search of sector 270°-030°, point of origin Lat. 9°-44'S., Long. 159° 16'E. 
Action: Covered area assigned with 15 single plane searches. At 0740, 6-T-6, Ens. G. R. STABLEIN, pilot, contacted a small enemy AO seventy five miles west. Released one 500 lb. bomb scoring a near miss. On radio instructions 6-T-8, Ens. F. MEARS, pilot, made an unsuccessful torpedo run on same ship and two strafing runs. On return ship could not be located. No other contacts. Obtained aerial photos of GIZO and TUNNIBULI. 
1035-1039 Landed four VTB. 
1129-1141 Landed remaining four VTB. 

FLIGHT 307 
0755-0757 Eight VF launched. Lieut. L.H. BAUER, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Maintained patrol. 
1023-1034 Landed all planes aboard. 

FLIGHT 308 
0755-0757 Seven VF launched. Mach. D.C. BARNES, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Maintained patrol without incident. 
1023-1034 Landed all planes in the Flight. 

FLIGHT 309 
0801-0803 Launched five VSB with 1000# bombs. Lieut. R. B. WOODHULL, leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI. 
Action: Bombed AA position NE of light on BUNGANA IS. and strafed town and beach HALAVO. 
0939 One VSB landed. 
1023-1034 Four VSB landed. 

FLIGHT 310 
0900 One VT launched. Lt.Cdr. M.F. LESLIE. 
Mission: To act as Air Commander of Air Support Group. 
Action: Observed progress of our attack and directed aircraft in support of landing forces in GUADALCANAL area, through the Air Support Director. 
1810 Landed aboard. 

FLIGHT 311 
0858-0900 Six VF launched. Lt.(jg) T.S. GAY, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Two VF escorted the Group Commander. One of the VF strafed troops in the vicinity of KUKUM. Four VF maintained Combat Patrol.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

FLIGHT 312 
0902-0905 Launched nine VSB with 500# bombs. Lieut. T.F. CALDWELL, Jr., leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI. 
Action: Bombed GAVUTU Island and strafed GAVUTU and TANAMBOGO. 
1124-1128 All planes landed aboard. 

FLIGHT 313 
1011-1015 Five VF launched. Lt.(jg) G.E. FIREBAUGH, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Two VF acted as escort to AGC. Two VF maintained Combat Patrol. 
1035 One VF made deferred forced landing. 
1226-1230 Four VF landed. 

FLIGHT 314 
1011-1015 Eight VF launched. Lieut. A.O. VORSE, Jr., leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Mission carried out without incident. 
1226-1231 Landed all planes in this Flight. 

FLIGHT 315 
1016-1021 Launched twelve VSB with 1000# bombs. Lieut. R. DAVIS, leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI. 
Action: Bombed GAVUTU and strafed TONAMBOGO. All but one bomb dropped. 
1356-1408 All aircraft landed. 

FLIGHT 316 
1112-1114 Six VF launched. Mach. D.E. RUNYON, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Two VF were escorts for AGC, and four maintained patrol without incident. 
1334-1337 Landed all planes in this Flight. 

FLIGHT 317 
1114-1119 Launched eleven VSB with 500# bombs. Lieut. R. B. WOODHULL, Leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI. 
Action: Bombed and strafed along the NE Coast of TULAGI. 
1356-1408 Landed all planes in the Flight. 

FLIGHT 318 
1215-1217 Six VF launched. Lieut. L.H. BAUER, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Two VF were escorts for AGC. Four VF maintained patrol. Received vectors which took them directly away from enemy attack. 
1408-1414 Landed four VF (Patrol). 
1513-1518 Landed remaining two VF (Escort). 

FLIGHT 319 
1217-1221 Launched eight VSB with 500# bombs. Lieut. G.H. HORENBURGER, leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI. 
Action: No targets assigned - no bombs dropped. One of the rear gunners in formation shot down a Zero which attacked them. 
1415 Landed one VSB. 
1513-1518 Landed seven VSB. 

FLIGHT 320 
1212-1215 Eight VF launched. Lt.(jg) T.S. GAY, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Group ordered to patrol at 18000 feet. At 1300 four VF were vectored to TULAGI. Sighted an enemy formation of about 30 twin-engine bombers protected by an unknown number of Zero fighters at 12,000 feet, going north from south tip of FLORIDA Island. An interception was made. One bomber was shot down by Lt. V.P. DePOIX and four other bombers were probably damaged before the Zeros forced our VF to take refuge in a nearby cloud. 
1408-1414 Five VF landed. 
1513 One VF landed (6-F-4 was badly shot up). 6-F-35, Lieut. V.P. DePOIX, pilot, made emergency landing on the WASP. 6-F-11, Mach. J.A. ACHTEN, pilot, was not observed during the attack and did not return to the ship.

FLIGHT 321 
1311-1313 Six VF launched. Lt.(jg) G.E. FIREBAUGH, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Sighted about 23 enemy bombers and 10 Zeros at SE tip of SANTA ISABEL Island. The Zeros attacked three VF. Results not known as pilots are missing. The other three VF attacked the bombers. Ens. R.M. DISQUE shot down one bomb er, and Radio Electrician T.W. RHODES shot down a Zero. No other result observed before Zeros forced them into the clouds. 
1529 One VF landed (badly shot up). 
1620 One VF landed. 
1744 6-F-34, Ens. R.M. DISQUE, pilot, was very low on fuel and made an emergency landing on WASP. Was refueled and launched to return to ENTERPRISE. Landed aboard at this time.
The following VF did not return from this flight: 6-F-25: Lt.(jg) FIREBAUGH, USN, pilot. 
6-F-21: Mach. W.H. WARDEN, USN, pilot. 
6-F-22: W.J. STEPHENSON, Jr., AP1c, USN, pilot. 


FLIGHT 351 
1313-1320 Fourteen VTB were launched. Lt.Cdr. C.M. JETT, leader. 
Mission: Intermediate Air Patrol, sector 090°-180°, distance 50 miles ahead of Task Force 16. 
Action: Patrolled sector assigned, also sector 285°-345° and made a search of SAN CRISTOBAL Is. and RENNELL Is. 
1730-1747 All VTB returned aboard. 

FLIGHT 324 
1313-1320 Nine VF launched. Lt.(jg) H.E. RUTHERFORD, leader. 
Mission: Special Flight to get planes in the air for attack. Took the place of Flight 324. 
Action: Five VF patrolled over Carriers. Four VF went to TULAGI. At about 1430 Lieut. A.O. VORSE, Jr. sighted three enemy dive-bombers at 10,000 feet, half way between TULAGI and GUADALCANAL. Shot one down in a dive. Remaining VF did not get close enough to open fire. 
1522 Landed one VF. 
1605-1609 Landed six VF. 
1620-1624 Landed one VF. 
1639 Landed one VF. 

FLIGHT 323 
1354-1355 Six VF launched. Mach. D.E. RUNYON, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Screen (Special Flight in place of 323). 
Action: Two VF were escorts for AGC and four maintained patrol. About 1430 enemy dive-bomber attack developed. Just after the attack four dive-bombers were sighted and shot down near LUNGA POINT. Mach. D.E. RUNYON shot down two. Ens. H.A. MARCH, Jr. and PACKARD, AP1c, each accounted for one. 
1605-1609 Two VF landed. 
1620-1624 One VF landed. The other three VF made emergency landings on the SARATOGA about 1530 and were refueled and launched for the Combat Area. 
1844 6-F-12 Ens. J.D. SHOEMAKER, pilot, returned aboard from Combat Area. 
1915 6-F-17, Ens. E.W. COOK, A-V(N), USNR, pilot and 6-F-16, Mach P.L. NAGLE, USN, pilot, were forced to make water landings when fuel was expended on their way back to the ENTERPRISE, between 1830 and 1915. 

FLIGHT 326 
1500-1502 Six VF launched. Lieut. L.H. BAUER, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over the Transport Screen. 
Action: Two VF escorted AGC. Four VF maintained patrol. No enemy planes sighted. 
1730-1747 Landed all planes in the Flight. 

FLIGHT 327-A 
1502 Launched one VSB (6-B-17) Lieut. A.L. DOWNING, pilot. 
Mission: Photographic Reconnaissance. 
Action: Obtained vertical and oblique photos of vital areas along northern coast of GUADALCANAL. 
1857 Landed 6-B-17. 

FLIGHT 327 
1503-1509 Launched twelve VSB armed with 500# bombs. Lieut. T.F. CALDWELL, Jr., leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI. 
Action: Bombed TONAMBOGO and strafed MOKAMBO ISLAND upon order of Group Commander. All bombs dropped. 
1730-1747 Landed nine VSB. 
1808-1810 Landed three VSB. 

FLIGHT 352 
1503-1509 Four VSB launched. 
Mission: Inner Air Patrol. 
Action: Maintained patrol. 
1730-1747 Landed three VSB. 
1808-1810 Landed one VSB. 

FLIGHT 329 (328.) 
1557-1559 Five VF launched. Lt.(jg) T.S. GAY, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Maintained patrol. Vectored for a low bogie and picked up Ens. J.D. SHOEMAKER 18 miles from the ship. 
1818-1820 Landed two VF. 
1841-1844 Landed remainder of the Flight. 

FLIGHT 330 
1600-1604 Launched twelve VSB with 500# bombs. Lieut. R.B. WOODHULL, leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI 
Action: Six bombs dropped on sampans in LUNGA RIVER and along beach near KUKUM. Three bombs on area between prison and hospital, TULAGI. Three bombs on concentration of troops and sampans in TENERU RIVER area, GUADALCANAL. 
1830-1835 Landed nine VSB. 
1851-1852 Landed two VSB. 
1906 Landed last plane. 

August 8, 1942


FLIGHT 301 
0559-0601 Four VF launched. Lieut. A.O. VORSE, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Carried out mission without incident. 
0811-0813 Landed all planes in the Flight. 

FLIGHT 302 
0602-0604 Four VSB launched. 
Mission: Inner Air Patrol. 
Action: Maintained Patrol without incident. 
0927-0928 All planes landed aboard. 

FLIGHT 303 
0700-0701 Four VF launched. Ens. G.W. BROOKS, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Patrolled at 20,000 feet over area. 
0925-0926 All planes in #303 landed. 

FLIGHT 304 
0701-0702 Launched four VF. Mach. D.E. RUNYON, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Carried out mission without incident. 
0933-0935 Landed all four VF. 

FLIGHT 305 
0800-0803 Four VF launched. Mach. D.C. BARNES, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Carried out mission without incident. 
1006-1008 Landed all planes in the Flight. 
1009 Landed 6-F-35, Lieut. V.P. DePOIX, pilot. Made emergency landing on WASP yesterday and returned at this time. 

FLIGHT 306 
0800-0803 Launched eight VF. Lieut. L.H. BAUER, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Carried out mission. 
1009-1012 Landed all planes aboard. 

FLIGHT 342 (Special Search) 
0804-0807 Six VSB launched. Lieut. T.F. CALDWELL, Jr., leader. 
Mission: Searched for VF pilots missing after action of August 7. 
Action: Searched in a scouting line area south and south east of GUADALCANAL (approx. 2,000sq. mi.) 
1110-1112 Landed all planes in the Scouting Flight. 

FLIGHT 307 
0906-0907 Four VF launched. Lt.(jg) T.S. GAY, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Patrolled at 25,000 feet. 
1108-1110 All planes landed.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

FLIGHT 308 
0908-0917 Four VSB launched. 
Mission: Inner Air Patrol. 
Action: Carried out mission. 
1238-1249 All planes landed. 

FLIGHT 350 
0908-0917 Launched eighteen VSB with 500# bombs. Lieut. R.B. WOODHULL, leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI 
Action: Searched for SS between FLORIDA I. and GUADALCANAL. Bombed MBANGI ISLAND. All bombs dropped. 
1238-1249 All planes landed. 

FLIGHT 309 
1002-1003 Three VF launched. Mach. D.E. RUNYON, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Received notice of attack from Black Base. Sighted enemy TB low over the water and not in formation. Attacked and shot down four twin-engine TB and one single-engine plane. Mach. D.E. RUNYON got one TB, and one single-engine plane not clearly identified by probably a Zero fighter. Ens. W.M. ROUSE accounted for two TB, and Ens. J.D. SHOEMAKER, got one TB. 
1249-1250 All planes in the Flight landed. 

FLIGHT 310 
1002-1004 Four VF launched. Ens. G.W. BROOKS, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Mission carried out without incident. 
1231-1233 Landed all four VF. 

FLIGHT 311 and 352 
1101-1105 Thirteen VF launched. Lieut. L.H. BAUER, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Patrolled over Carriers at various altitudes. 
1407-1417 All planes landed. 

FLIGHT 353 
1105-1107 Launched five VSB with 500# bombs. Lieut. C.H. HORENBURGER, leader. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI 
Action: Bombed western side of TANAMBOGA ISLAND. All bombs dropped. 

FLIGHT 354 
1101-1105 Six VF launched. Lt.(jg) T.S. GAY, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Carried out mission. 
1407-1417 Landed all VF from the Flight. 

FLIGHT 355 
1224-1226 Launched six VSB. 
Mission: Inner Air Patrol. 
Action: Maintained patrol. 
1518-1530 All planes landed. 

FLIGHT 357 
1342-1343 Launched four VF. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Maintained Patrol. 
1407-1417 Landed all planes in the Flight. 

FLIGHT 356 
1343-1347 Launched nine VSB with 500# bombs. 
Mission: Air Support Group - TULAGI. 
Action: No targets assigned, no bombs dropped. 
1550-1554 Landed all planes in the flight. 

FLIGHT 314 
1347-1354 Fourteen VTB launched. Lt.Cdr. C.M. JETT, leader. 
Mission: To conduct a 200 mile search of sector 270°-015° from Point Xray (Lat. 09°-32' S, 159° 30' E.) and a 200 mile search of sector 345°-090° from Point Yoke. (Lat 09°-50' S, 160°-56' E.) 
Action: Searched sectors assigned. 
1741-1749 Landed twelve VTB. 
1835-1839 Landed two VTB. 

FLIGHT 358 
1444-1447 Six VF launched. Lieut. L.H. BAUER, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Transport Screen. 
Action: Carried out mission without incident. 
1741-1759 Landed all planes in Flight 358. 

FLIGHT 360 
1513-1515 Six VF launched. Mach. D.E. RUNYON, leader. 
Mission: Combat Patrol over Carriers. 
Action: Carried out mission. 
1556 One VF made deferred forced landing. 
1737-1740 Landed remaining five VF. 

During the operations involved in the occupation of Tulagi - Guadalcanal, the ENTERPRISE launched 237 aircraft on 7 August and recovered 230, and on 8 August there were 135 launchings and 136 landings. The operations on 7 August were the most extensive that this carrier has ever conducted in a single day. 
During the night of August 8 - 9, Task Force 61 retired to the southeast.

*PERSONNEL *
The personnel of the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE carried out their duties in a highly satisfactory manner. The performance of plane handling personnel on the flight and hangar decks was magnificent, and the plane handling crews carried out at double time all duties involving re-spotting of the deck. The stamina of these crews, who have been hardened by continuous service in war, is worthy of mention. 
The performance of duty of Machinist D.E. Runyon, U.S. Navy, is considered outstanding in that he shot down four enemy aircraft with short deadly bursts and received no hits on his plane from return fire of enemy aircraft. In separate correspondence Machinist Runyon is being recommended for promotion to Chief Machinist and the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. 
Fighting Squadron SIX under the command of Lieutenant L.H. Bauer, U.S. Navy, displayed aggressiveness and skill in all contacts with the enemy. The pursuit and determined attacks of the enemy horizontal bombers protected by fighters on 7 August by fighter sections led by Lieut(jg) T.S. Gay and Lieut(jg) G.E. Firebaugh, U.S. Navy, were carried out in such manner as to indicate a complete disregard of the personal hazard from the enemy's defensive firepower. From subsequent information it is believed that these attacks were very effective and that more enemy bombers were shot down and damaged than were claimed. 
As a result of the operations of 7 and 8 August, the following personnel were missing:

Lieut.(jg) G.E. Firebaugh, USN 
Ensign E.W. Cook, A-V-(N), USNR 
Machinist W.H. Warden, USN 
Machinist J.A. Achten, USN 
Machinist P.L. Nagle, USN, and 
W.J. Stephenson, AP1c, USN 

Subsequent information reveals that Lieut.(jg) Firebaugh, Machinist Achten, and Machinist Warden made forced landings and were picked up by friendly personnel. Machinist Achten has been returned to this vessel. 

On August 2, 1942, Lieut-Cdr. W.E. Townsend, USN, Lt.(jg) G.E. Douglas D-V-(G), USNR, Ensign P.L. Ross, A-V-(S), USNR, and three radiomen, with necessary radio equipment, were transferred to the staff of Rear Admiral R.K. Turner in the U.S.S. McCAWLEY. These officers and men set up the communications necessary for direct control of the air support force assigned to Group Xray of TF-62. This group was given the radio call "Orange Base" and later on handled all radio traffic between the ground forces and the supporting aircraft overhead. 

*MATERIAL *
There were no engineering casualties in the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE during the operations in connection with the attack on the Solomon Islands. The arresting gear and all equipment assigned to the Air Department functioned without incident. There were no known forced landings which resulted from material failures of aircraft. The ordnance equipment in all aircraft functioned satisfactorily except for minor stoppages in the .50 caliber guns of the F4F's from undetermined causes. The following ammunition was expended: 41,350 rounds .50 cal. ammunition 
10,550 rounds .30 cal. ammunition 
79 500-lb. bombs 
51 1000-lb. bombs. 

Enemy aircraft destroyed by aircraft of the ENTERPRISE Air Group on 7 - 8 August were as follows: Shot down by VF 
5 dive bombers, type 99. 
6 twin-engine horizontal bombers, type 97, Mitsubishi (4 used as torpedo planes). 
2 fighters, type Zero Zero 
Shot down by VSB 
1 fighter, type Zero Zero 

Aircraft losses sustained by ENTERPRISE Air Group on 7 - 8 August were as follows: F4F4 #5235 Missing in action. 
F4F4 #5228 Missing in action. 
F4F4 #5082 Missing in action. 
F4F4 #5236 Missing in action. 
F4F4 #5071 Night water landing returning from operations. 
F4F4 #5068 Night water landing returning from operations.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

*CONCLUSIONS*
It is considered that the outstanding weakness of the air operations was the lack of direct communication between the attacking ground forces and the air support. The fact that twelve 500-lb and two 1000-lb bombs on August 7, and twenty-three 500-lb bombs on August 8, were returned to the ENTERPRISE after having been held in the air over good enemy targets is offered in substantiation of this conclusion. It is believed that if the forces on the ground had been able to call for and receive direct air support, such as the Germans employed in their attack on Crete, our losses in personnel would have been reduced and the time required for subjugating the enemy forces on Tulagi, Tanambogo, and Makambo materially shortened. It appears logical that the most desirable employment of air support for a landing force is immediate delivery of heavy caliber bombs on focal points of enemy resistance followed immediately by charges of our ground troops. It is most essential that our forces completely mop up objectives as they advance, as Japanese permit advancing troops to penetrate and then attack them from the rear. Any attempt to handle requests for immediate bombardment through a third party, such as a transport out of visual communication with troops on the ground, is bound to be inefficient. 
Our forces operated in such close proximity to high land areas that the effectiveness of search radar was greatly reduced. 
The F4F-4, considering equality of pilots, is no match for the Japanese Zero fighter in a dog fight, plane for plane, due to the superiority of the Zero in climb, speed, maneuverability, and endurance. However, in its ruggedness, ability to "take it", and fire power the F4F-4 is superior to the Zeros. These factors of superiority, combined with an apparent superiority of our pilots in deflection shooting, give the F4F-4 a reasonable chance of attaining a successful outcome in an engagement in which there are several fighters involved on both sides. The principal weaknesses of the Zero are (1) inability to absorb hits, and (2) ineffective fire power. The modification of the design of either airplane toward that of the other probably would result in a fighter superior both to the F4F-4 and the Zero. 
It is now believed that the best defense for F4F's against Zero attack is for each plane of the two plane element to turn away and then turn immediately toward each other and set up a continuous "scissors". Thus, when a Zero bears on one of the F4F's the other F4F is in position to fire on the Zero. A short accurate burst from the F4F is generally sufficient to knock down the Zero whereas the F4F can absorb almost unbelievable punishment from the Zero. 
The Japanese Zero pilots have a very healthy respect for the free gun fire from our SBD's. 
The free gunners in our SBD's believe that they are more than a match for Zero fighters. 
The .50 and .30 caliber incendiary ammunition is not effective in setting wooden houses and canvas tents on fire. 

*RECOMMENDATIONS*
It is recommended that - 
Landing forces be provided with pyrotechnics such as rockets which may be fired toward enemy focal points of resistance to indicate a request for dive bombing attack. 
Our landing forces be provided with distinctive flags or colored panels to insure instant recognition by friendly aircraft. 
Landing forces be provided with radio communication such as "walkie-talkie" sets supplied to civil police forces in the United States. 
An officer experienced in conduct of operations of ground warfare be airborne in the combat area and in direct radio communication with the airborne director of the air support flights. 
The following sub-paragraph be added to Article 712, U.S. Navy Regulations: 
"(4) Commanders of carrier Air Groups and of carrier based squadrons will submit the battle report outlined above to the commanding officers of aircraft carriers to which assigned. These reports will be forwarded as enclosures to the reports of the commanding officers of the aircraft carriers"

*(Signed) A. C. DAVIS.*


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

Battle of the Eastern Solomons - 24 August 1942 

Sections: 
Events of 23 August and forenoon 24 August. 
Enemy Attack and Notes on Defense. 
Damage, Losses and Casualties. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE 
CV6/A16-3/(10-My)
Serial 008 
September 5, 1942. 

From: The Commanding Officer. 
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
Via: The Commander, Task Force SIXTEEN. 
Subject: Action of August 24, 1942, Including Air Attack on U.S.S. ENTERPRISE; Report of. 
Reference: (a) Articles 712 and 874, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
(b) PacFlt. Conf. Ltr. 24CL-42 of June 21, 1942. 
Enclosures: Track Chart. 
Executive Officer's Report. 
War Damage Report; Copy of.(less photographs). 
Medical Officer's Report. 
War Diary for August 24, 1942; Copy of. 
Fighter Director Report, with Track. 
Set of Photographs. 
One Reel of Motion Pictures of Actual Bomb Impacts (one only, under separate cover, to CincPac). 
CEAG conf. ltr. A16-3/Pb/051 of 9/2/42. 
CEAG conf. ltr. A16-3/Pb/052 of 9/2/42. 


In compliance with references (a) and (b), a report of the action which took place August 24, 1942, including the air attack on the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, is submitted herewith. 

*PRELIMINARY *
Following the operations in support of the successful occupation of TULAGI-GUADALCANAL by United States forces on August 7-8, 1942, the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, flagship of Commander Task Force SIXTEEN, Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy, in company with Task Force SIXTY-ONE, was continuously employed in the NEW CALEDONIA-NEW HEBRIDES-SOLOMON area to protect our lines of communication and to destroy enemy forces encountered. 
On August 23, 1942, ENTERPRISE was duty carrier for Task Force SIXTY-ONE (Task Forces ELEVEN and SIXTEEN were present), and conducted the early morning search. Search planes sighted two enemy submarines on the surface, one in latitude 06-48 S, longitude 163-20 E, and the other in latitude 07-30 S, longitude 162-15 E. Both were proceeding southward at high speed and both were attacked by bombs with undetermined results. The afternoon search, launched at approximately 1450, made contact with another enemy submarine in latitude 08-54 S, longitude 162-17 E, also on the surface and also headed south at high speed. This submarine was attacked with bombs and machine-gunned, and was unquestionably damaged. 
The discovery of three enemy submarines east of the SOLOMON ISLANDS and head south on the surface at high speed pointed strongly to the possibility of a considerable enemy movement to the southward along the track of the advancing submarine screen. 
During the afternoon of August 23, an enemy carrier, probably the RYUJO, with supporting ships was reported by a patrol plane to be northeastward of the TULAGI area. SARATOGA launched an attack group to search for and destroy this force but the group did not make contact, probably because of long delay in patrol plane report of a radical change of enemy course shortly after the initial report. The group landed at GUADALCANAL where it remained overnight. 
At 1200, August 24, when in latitude 09-04 S, longitude 162-59 E, Task Force SIXTY-ONE, now consisting of Task Forces ELEVEN and SIXTEEN (Task Force EIGHTEEN had retired to refuel), changed course to the north to close the enemy which had been reported advancing on GUADALCANAL from the northeastward. During the early forenoon the weather cleared and the visibility improved to a marked degree. Generally speaking, the weather was fine and the flying and operating conditions excellent. 
The early morning search conducted by ENTERPRISE to a distance of 200 miles made no contact with enemy forces and the planes landed aboard without incident. Later on in the forenoon and in the early afternoon radar made contact with several snoopers and they were shot down. These enemy planes undoubtedly reported the position of Task Force SIXTY-ONE tot the enemy aircraft carrier task forces, making possible the attack which followed late that afternoon. Several submarines also were attacked in the vicinity of our force. This makes it likely that the apparent screening employment of submarines by the enemy paid dividends in information as to our positions and movements. 
During the forenoon a patrol plane reported the RYUJO (at 1005) and its accompanying vessels some 275 miles north of TULAGI. The SARATOGA launched an attack group at about 1400 to intercept and attack that force, which was again reported at 1440 by ENTERPRISE search planes. At 1309 ENTERPRISE launched 23 planes for a 250 mile relative search, sector 290-090°(T), from origin at latitude 8-56 S, longitude 163-03 E. Point Option: course 000°(T), speed 10 knots. The search flight which remained airborne until after the attack, made contacts with enemy forces as follows: 
At 1440, the RYUJO, 1 CA, and 3 DD were sighted bearing 317°(T), distance 198 miles, from our position at that time. The report of this contact was not received by ENTERPRISE until 1548. This was probably due to its being drowned out by fighter director transmission in the same general frequency band and to the high level of local interference developed around this frequency when the ship is making high speed. 
At 1500, 2 CV, 4 CA, 6 CL, and at least 8 DD were sighted bearing 340°(T), distance 198 miles, from our position at that time. Report of this was not received by ENTERPRISE, probably for the same reasons that delayed reception of the report in (a) above. 
At 1510, 4 CA, 3-5 DD were sighted bearing 347°(T), distance 225 miles from our position at that time. This report was received. 
Between 1300 and 1330 an Inner Air Patrol of 6 VSB and a Combat Air Patrol of 16 VF were launched by ENTERPRISE. The VSB remained in the air until after the attack. The VF were landed, serviced, and re-launched by SARATOGA at about 1530. At 1440, ENTERPRISE launched an additional 8 VF which remained airborne throughout the attack. At 1540, ENTERPRISE launched another 8 VF which also remained airborne throughout the attack. 
From 1430 ENTERPRISE had ready an attack group consisting of 7 VF, 11 VSB and 7 VTB. Final orders to launch this group were not received until about 1655 and the last plane on board was launched at 1708. At 1710 this group, less VF, was ordered by voice radio to proceed to attack RYUJO, with alternative landing thereafter at GUADALCANAL. 

*THE ACTION *
The ENTERPRISE had been directed by Commander Task Force SIXTY-ONE to "take over all duties on return of search planes," which was about 0945. Consequently the ENTERPRISE maintained inner air patrols for Task Force ELEVEN and Task Force SIXTEEN, conducted the afternoon search, and exercised fighter direction control. At 1630 the bearing of the sun was 325°(T); there were a moderate southeast wind and moderate seas. There were 25 ENTERPRISE and SARATOGA fighters in the air and 20 fighters were ready on deck in SARATOGA. At 1632 radar detected a large unidentified flight bearing 320°, distance 88 miles. This echo immediately faded from the screen and no further indications of the presence of those planes were picked up for 17 minutes. The altitude had been estimated as 12,000 feet from the radar altitude calibration curve. SARATOGA was informed and asked to launch the planes she held in readiness. 

At 1641 our search group was warned to keep clear of the area as an enemy attack on our force was imminent. This was not received by some of our scouts. 

At 1649 a large unidentified flight was detected by radar bearing 320°, distance 44 miles. The altitude was again estimated to be 12,000 feet. This group appeared to be the same enemy attack group previously detected, and the ship and task force were warned again of the incoming attack. 
At this time there were 38 fighters in the air over the force, two sections having landed on and five having taken off from SARATOGA since 1630. At 1655 a fighter section sighted the enemy bearing 300°, distance 33 miles from ENTERPRISE, comprising about 36 bombers with many Zero fighters above and below. All of our fighters were informed. Enemy torpedo planes escorted by fighters also headed in for attack from the same general direction, but their total number is not certain. 
After the initial contact between our VF and the enemy, the radio discipline was bad. At many times two or more pilots were trying to talk simultaneously and much of the traffic was non-essential. The air was so jammed with these unnecessary transmissions that in spite of numerous attempts to quiet the pilots, few directions reached our fighters and little information was received by the Fighter Director Officer. It is the impression in ENTERPRISE that the radio discipline of ENTERPRISE fighters was better than that of SARATOGA fighters, probably because of special caution given to all pilots that day. It must be expected that this confusion described here will always develop where there has not been ample opportunity to develop radio discipline by use of the radio in drills. 

About this time, SARATOGA launched two sections which she had re-serviced, making a total of about 53 fighters in the air. At 1659, when about 25 miles from the ship, the enemy group split into numerous sections and moved around to the north.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

When about 14 miles from the ship, the enemy group was reported by an unidentified fighter to be at 16,000 feet altitude. This information was re-broadcast to the fighters and was put on the warning net. Attacks by our fighters, though prompt and expert, had delayed effectiveness because of the interposition of enemy Zero fighters. As a result, many enemy dive bombers reached diving position before they could be intercepted. 
The large enemy attack group was tracked continuously from 1649 all the way in and then when the attack did not immediately follow, Radar Plot reported: "The enemy planes are directly overhead now!" The last ENTERPRISE plane had been launched three minutes before and the ship (and Task Force), already making 27 knots, had begun radical maneuvering with maximum rudder. 

The enemy dive bombing attack on the ENTERPRISE commenced at 1711. Enemy planes were being engaged by our fighters as they commenced their dives. The number of enemy bombers which dove on the ENTERPRISE, variously estimated between 20 and 40, was probably about 30. The dives were commenced at an altitude of 16,000-18,000 feet. Some planes were seen to spiral to lower altitudes before diving. The dives were steep, estimated at 70°, well executed and absolutely determined. The releases were made at about 1,500 to 2,000 feet. All of the dives were from the port side of the ENTERPRISE, and most of them from the port quarter. This relative direction was maintained even though the ship was turning rapidly to starboard. The attack planes came in at intervals of about seven seconds for a period of about four minutes. During this time there were two short lulls of 20-30 seconds duration.

Throughout the attack the anti-aircraft fire of the ship, particularly with automatic weapons, was most gratifying. Target after target was taken under literally tremendous fire concentration. This, together with the excellent anti-aircraft assistance from other ships in the Task Force and our radical turns at high speed, was responsible for the small percentage of bomb hits.

No torpedo planes reached their objective as all were intercepted approximately 60 miles away and were either destroyed or driven off. 
The SARATOGA was not attacked. She was ten or fifteen miles on the disengaged side. Had she been as close as usual, or had the large attacking group used the good judgement to divert some of its planes onto SARATOGA, the enemy planes that got away might have gone home happier. 
The attacking group is thought to have been composed of approximately 75 aircraft including dive bombers, torpedo planes, and their fighter escorts. At least 20 bombs were dropped in the vicinity of ENTERPRISE. Three were hits aft and starboard, causing fatalities and injuries as well as substantial damage to the ship. In addition there were three near misses, causing substantial damage in one case and superficial damage in two cases. There were several other misses near enough to deluge the ship with water, and two blazing planes came close to landing on the flight deck. Fires were soon checked and brought under control. 

At 1816, the ship was making 24 knots and the deck was again ready to receive aircraft. The first plane landed at 1819. Twenty-five aircraft were landed aboard before a steering casualty occurred at 1851. The remainder of the ENTERPRISE planes then in the vicinity were landed aboard the SARATOGA. The ENTERPRISE attack group did not, because of darkness, locate the RYUJO group, and at about 2100 the 11 VSB of the attack group landed at GUADALCANAL. The 7 VTB chose the alternative of returning to the ship. At 2158, we began landing those planes aboard, but when the second plane, with its windshield fouled with oil, crashed into the No. 2 crane a long delay was foreseen. Therefore, the remaining planes were sent to the SARATOGA and landed by her. 

*DEFENSE BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES *
In spite of continuous search radar reports, the enemy planes were not picked up by either director, and were not sighted by the sky lookouts until the planes were in their dives. As the approach of the enemy planes was from almost astern, they were in the blind angle of the fire control radar which is mounted on the forward director. It appears, however, that F.C. radar should have been able to pick up the enemy group when it was close in at high altitude, some planes being ahead of this ship, since there was an appreciable delay between the time search radar reported the planes overhead and the time the dives commenced.

At about 1709 the Battery Officer on 20mm Battery No. 4 sighted a puff of smoke high on the port bow and soon thereafter made out a dive bomber coming down. One gun commenced firing immediately, although the range was about 4,000 yards. This firing, while beyond the range of the gun, brought the attack to everyone's attention. Guns were left in local control and open sights were generally used. 

The 5-inch bursts from this ship appeared to be under the bursts of other ships firing and generally well in line and ahead of the planes. Several planes were noticed attempting to pull away from bursts and others were seen to emerge from bursts on fire, while three planes were reported to have disintegrated as though directly hit. (The use of influence fuzes on 5-inch projectiles would make them devastating against a dive bombing attack). 
After the first bomb hit, all power failed on the 5-inch guns aft and they had to be trained, elevated and loaded by hand. Hand ramming reduced the rate of fire of these guns by more than half. 

Local control, employing sights and tracer spotting, was used on the 1.1 mounts. Some difficulty was experienced in picking up the targets and getting the fire on the planes because the hand train is not fast enough to keep up with the turning of the ship. Opening of fire on mounts No. 1 and No. 2 was delayed a few seconds because the pointer pressed his foot firing pedal before the safety lever had been thrown. 

Numerous bomb fragments struck 1.1 mounts No. 3 and No. 4. One gun in mount No. 3 was put out of commission. The cooling water line to mount No. 4 was severed and three of the cooling jackets were punctured. Water from near misses flooded the mounts knee deep and made it difficult for the crews to retain their footing. The 1.1 mounts were greatly handicapped when shooting to port because of the limited arc of train.

Local control, with tracers, was used on the 20mm guns. Since the dives were steep, there was practically no deflection and the fire was very accurate and in heavy volume.

*DAMAGE SUSTAINED (SHIP)*
The damage to the ship caused by three bomb hits and two of the near misses is briefly described below. A full and detailed report of damage appears in the War Damage Report, Enclosure (C). 

One large bomb hit the forward starboard corner of No. 3 elevator, passed through various decks and bulkheads, and exploded in the chief petty officers' messroom near the starboard side, starting a stubborn fire and causing the following damage: 
The after 50 feet of the hangar deck was raised to a crown of approximately 2 feet. 

Second deck - 16 foot hole, deck buckled, and all compartments wrecked between frames 157 and 173; watertight bulkhead at frame 173 ruptured; stubborn fires in bedding and clothing. 

Third deck - 16 foot hole tangent to the side of the ship, starboard side; fragment holes in side plating; watertight bulkheads between frames 157 and 173 badly damaged and the included compartments wrecked; stubborn fires in bedding, clothing, and furnishings. 

No. 3 elevator machinery badly damaged and rendered out of commission; small fire in pump room. 

Fourth deck - several holes in starboard plating between frames 169 and 172; largest hole 5' x 2' at waterline; 15' hole in deck; watertight bulkhead at frame 165 holed by fragments; moderate fire in storeroom between frames 157 and 165. 

First platform deck - storeroom starboard side between frames 162 and 173 open to the sea and completely flooded. 

One large bomb hit at frame 179, starboard side, and exploded in the gun gallery between the flight deck and the gun gallery deck near the inboard bulkhead, causing high fatalities and heavy damage as follows: 
Ready powder for Gun 5 burned.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

Group III AA guns out of commission. 

Ready aviation issue room wrecked and burned, and aviation metal shop wrecked. 

Flight deck to starboard of No. 3 elevator raised approximately two feet. 
One medium bomb struck the flight deck at frame 137 starboard. It exploded (probably a low order detonation) before it had completely penetrated the flight deck, starting a small fire in the parachute loft and causing the following damage: 
Fragments damaged No. 2 elevator and put it out of commission; damage probably not serious. 
Several fragment holes in hangar deck and bulkhead 
A near miss under the port fantail caused the following damage: 
Corner of flight deck, port side aft, raised approximately one foot; minor deflection of side plating at third deck, and deflection of about one foot at fourth deck. 

Third and fourth decks sprung. 
Probable minor under-water damage, as indicated by a slow leak in one void. 
All degaussing cables for a length of 30 feet around port counter were carried away from moorings; many leads apparently severed. 

A near miss at frame 80, port side, resulted in numerous fragment holes in that location, all above the water line. 

Additional damage was sustained as follows: 
One fire main riser and one damage control riser damaged. 
After sections of the gasoline mains were ruptured. 

The starboard steering motor grounded out, causing the rudder to jam. 
No. 1 and No. 2 arresting wires and the first barrier were damaged. 
The fires started by the bombs near No. 3 elevator were stubborn and persistent, due principally to the large amounts of inflammable materials in the aviation issue storeroom and in the chief petty officers' quarters. After all fires were apparently extinguished, small fires recurred, and it was after midnight before the last fire had been put out. Being aware, from damage reports in other ships, of this tendency, the ship had concentrated on thorough and continuous fire watch, with valuable results. 
Various bomb fragments, including nearly a complete bomb fuze, are being forwarded under separate cover to the Officer-in-Charge, Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for examination and further shipment to the Bureau of Ordnance if deemed advisable. 

A serious steering casualty resulted indirectly from the bomb explosion on the gun gallery. The exhaust ventilator trunk coming from the steering engine room was carried away at the gun gallery level. Incident to the fire fighting in this vicinity, water and foamite poured into the trunk and ran directly down to the steering engine room, flooding the steering motors and grounding the electrical control panel. At 1850, with the wheel amidships, steering control was lost and the rudder continued to move full right until it came up against the stop, and finally jammed at 22° right. The ship was making 24 knots, and the sudden steering casualty made danger of collision with our supporting ships real and imminent. The emergency signal was made by whistle and all engines were immediately backed full. The ship cleared the BALCH by an extremely small margin. When the situation had eased, a speed of ten knots was set in order to reduce the hazard of submarine torpedo attack. Smoke entered the steering engine room and several of the men succumbed because of heat and lack of air. It was 38 minutes before the standby steering unit, by heroic and intelligent work on the part of ship personnel (described in enclosure (B), could be made operative and steering control regained. 
There was no damage to the main propulsion plant. 

*LOSSES - AIR GROUP* 
Aircraft losses sustained by ENTERPRISE Air Group were as follows: Missing (probably shot down) 
2 VF, 1 VTB. 
Water Landings (out of fuel): 
1 VF, 2 VSB, 2 VTB. 
Damaged in action (beyond repair; expended): 
1 VF, 1 VTB. 

The crews of 2 VF and 1 VTB are missing. 
CASUALTIES - SHIP'S PERSONNEL 
Killed: 
2 officers and 72 men. 
Wounded: 
6 officers and 89 men. 

It is doubtful that two bombs exploding anywhere else in the ship could have caused such a large number of casualties as the ones which hit the ship near No. 3 elevator. The explosion in the gun gallery pocket was virtually at the focal center of the gun gallery and killed all personnel present on that battery. The explosion in the third deck compartment resulted in nearly all of the remaining casualties, as it occurred amidst another unavoidable personnel concentration which included personnel in the elevator pump room, a sub-division of a repair party, and an ammunition handling party. 
The Medical Department proved to be entirely self-sufficient and handled the situation without calling for aid from the remainder of the ship's company. No attempt was made to move wounded personnel from battle dressing stations to the sick bay until fires in the vicinity of the sick bay had been extinguished, the area cleared of smoke, and material condition "Baker" set. The excellent treatment given to the wounded is attested by the fact that with the exception of four men who died from multiple extreme injuries soon after the action, there have been no subsequent fatalities among the casualties. 

*ENEMY PLANES DESTROYED. *
ENTERPRISE Air Group claims to have destroyed the following enemy aircraft: 
By VF-6 - - - - - - - - - - 26 
By VS-5 - - - - - - - - - - 1 
By VT-3 - - - - - - - - - - 1
Total - - - - 28 

It is impossible to state the number of enemy aircraft destroyed by ENTERPRISE anti-aircraft fire inasmuch as all ships of Task Force SIXTEEN were firing at the same targets. Ships of Task Force SIXTEEN claimed enemy planes shot down by anti-aircraft batteries as follows: 
ENTERPRISE - - - - - - - - 15 
NORTH CAROLINA - - - - - - 6 
PORTLAND - - - - - - - - - 2 
ATLANTA - - - - - - - - - - 1
Total - - - - 24 

It is very probable that some of these claims are duplications, and some planes shot down by our fighters may also be included in the above figures. On the other hand, no "probables" or "possibles" are included in any of these claims. 

It is understood that the SARATOGA Group shot down approximately 18 planes, making the grand total of enemy aircraft probably destroyed at the scene of action approximately 70. It is believed that others may have failed to return to their carriers. Certainly it is a fair assumption that the air groups that attacked ENTERPRISE had little remaining combat effectiveness when the action was finished. 

*AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES. *
By Aircraft: .50 caliber - 13,000 rounds. 
.30 caliber - 1,500 rounds. 
500 lb. bombs - 35 (ten dropped on targets, others jettisoned). 
1000 lb. bombs - None (11 delivered to GUADALCANAL). 
Torpedoes - 7 (jettisoned). 

By AA Batteries: 5"/38 AA common - 97 rounds. 
1.1 - 1,500 rounds 
20 mm - 12,280 rounds. 
.50 caliber - 880 rounds. 

*PERSONNEL *
The conduct of ENTERPRISE personnel was superb. Not a single instance of panic or fear was observed. The coolness, initiative, and devotion to duty displayed by all hands were in keeping with the highest naval traditions. There were numerous cases in which individuals performed their duties in an exceptional manner. These are fully set forth in the Executive Officer's report, enclosure (B). The recommendations contained therein as to promotions, advancements, citations, and commendations are strongly concurred in. Where letters of commendation by the Commanding Officer are recommended, such letters will be prepared and delivered. Favorable action is particularly urged in the recommended promotion of the Damage Control Officer, Lieutenant Commander H. A. Smith, U.S. Navy.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

*COMMENT, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. *

Communications. 
Once again, as in the past in the Coral Sea and at Midway, communications have been shown to be weak to the point of danger. Due to lack of proper training, reporting pilots in all commands continue to transmit vague, ambiguous, and confusing contact reports, frequently omitting several of the vital components of a complete contact report and often failing to continue to report. 
Lack of discipline in the matter of radio transmission by aircraft in contact with the enemy has been the subject of detailed comment by the Fighter Director Officer in enclosure (F). Radio silence should not be imposed on such occasions because responsible leaders of flights can and should furnish valuable information to Fighter Director Officers and to the Task Force Commanders, but there should be little necessity for inter-plane transmission except by the squadron and division commanders, and this should be limited to the minimum necessary for the prosecution of the attack. The intolerable confusion caused by unrestrained transmission is difficult to eliminate, for war conditions reduce to zero the experience, prior to action, of the majority of pilots in the use of voice radio. There can and must be improvement, however. 
An even more serious fault in existing communications was the delay in receipt of contact reports which originated with our shore and tender-based aircraft. Sometimes as many as six to twelve hours elapsed from the time of contact to the time of receipt of the report of contact by the interested commander, even though such reports were in the urgent priority category. 
In the matter of finding, accurately reporting the position of, and tracking units and groups of enemy forces, we suffer by comparison with the enemy. With the development of radar by the Japanese for fighter direction, the present effectiveness of our seaplane scouts and patrols will be reduced. In the future these vital operations will require fast, long-range, airplanes with heavy defensive armament. In other words, the Navy must have large numbers of landplane bomber-type aircraft on which it has first call and complete control. 
Steering Casualty.
The steering casualty which occurred at 1850 on August 24, following the attack by enemy dive bombers and resulting indirectly therefrom, was most serious. Had conditions been only slightly worse, this casualty might easily have led to the loss of the ship. As it was, the ship was forced to steam in a circle for 38 minutes while control was being regained. It is recommended: 
That ventilation and cooling of the steering engine room be improved as covered in enclosure (C), and 
That means of freeing the rudder from the steering gear, preferably remotely controlled, be provided in order that the rudder may be brought amidships and the ship steered by its engines in the event of an irreparable casualty to the steering engine or gear. 
Air Group Personnel. 
Shortly before sailing on the current mission, the ENTERPRISE Air Group was formed of hastily collected remnants of squadrons from three previously existing air groups. The majority of the pilots were very inexperienced, and although an intensive, last minute, training schedule was conducted, the time available was definitely insufficient for adequate progress. Except for the fighting squadron, the state of gunnery and bombing proficiency of the Group when it embarked was extremely low and the Group had not had opportunity to become a cohesive striking unit. 
Although every opportunity to train was utilized during passage to the Coral Sea, with much obvious improvement, and although there was much more training opportunity than could normally be expected after a task force departs on a specific mission, the lack of gunnery training and indoctrination of the Group as a whole was keenly felt. This condition obtained to a lesser degree in the fighting squadron, which had had more previous training than the others and which, in the preliminary and final engagements, accounted for the destruction of a large number of enemy aircraft while sustaining relatively small losses itself. 
These conditions are pointed out in no spirit of criticism, for it is realized that the need for best possible preparedness and training of carrier air groups is recognized by all concerned. The demands of the strategic situation, coupled with an unavoidably inadequate initial backlog of trained carrier squadrons, have almost literally left us no choice in the matter to date. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be too often reiterated nor too strongly stressed that conditions that have had to be accepted to date are really serious and that we must take care not to underestimate the vital urgency of improvement. 
The squadron should not be considered a separate entity which may be shifted from one group to another at will. The group should be the unit, and no group should normally be sent aboard a carrier for active combat with the enemy until it has had at least four months of intensive gunnery, tactical, and scouting training as a unit and in an area in which training is not unduly interfered with by the necessity for security and defensive measure. This can be termed old stuff. It is very true, however. The sooner it is possible to do it the sooner we shall become not merely more effective by enormously more effective in both offense and defense. Meanwhile, employment of a carrier in combat areas with less than the best possible air group can be justified only by most urgent strategic demands; and the possible price of merely average effectiveness, or even less, must be not only accepted but recognized. 
Identification, Friend or Foe.
The performance of IFF equipment in all planes, both shore-based and carrier-based, is generally unsatisfactory. There results an excessive number of false reports of enemy aircraft and reports of unidentified aircraft which must be considered enemy until investigated. This causes unnecessary fighter direction transmissions, fighter investigation, time loss, and reduction in effectiveness of combat patrols. The condition has a deleterious effect upon alertness and fighting efficiency. The fault with the IFF is not known. If it is one of maintenance, then suitable maintenance instructions should be issued and personnel properly trained. If the fault is one of design, other or modified equipment should be procured. This is of highest urgency. 
Anti-Aircraft Protection. 
The fire control radar in ENTERPRISE was ineffective. It is not known whether or not other vessels in the Task Force obtained acceptable results from their corresponding equipment, but the fact remains that no 5-inch fire from any vessel in the Task Force was commenced while the enemy aircraft were at the high altitudes at which these guns were the only ones having the necessary range. The 5-inch fire was commenced only after that of ENTERPRISE small caliber weapons, and after the first attacking planes were in their dives. 
Unquestionably the personal element looms large in the operation of the fire control radar, and improved results can be obtained with additional training. It has been reported, however, that the fire control radar equipment is of extreme sensitiveness and requires the reasonably accurate predetermination by other means of range, elevation, and azimuth in order to pick up the target. If this is to a degree which is not likely to be possible of attainment in the tense, hurried, atmosphere prior to and during battle, the existing equipment should be replaced with other equipment that can fulfill its purpose under all conditions.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

Supporting vessels cannot wholly protect an aircraft carrier from a determined dive bombing attack from high altitude, and their fire is apt to be less effective than that of the carrier herself due to deflection problems. The 20mm guns, while probably the most effective anti-aircraft guns against dive bombers, have not sufficient range to prevent determined attacking planes from reaching an effective release point. Well trained 20mm batteries can, however, prevent low releases and can take a heavy toll in attacking dive bombers which pull out at low altitudes. The 20mm gun is considered to be a generally excellent and effective weapon, and it is recommended that these guns be installed in every available space on all ships. Well directed fighting planes in large numbers still remain the most effective defense against attack by enemy aircraft. 
Torpedo Planes. 
As previously stated, not one enemy torpedo plane penetrated our fighter screen to reach its dropping point. This, together with our own heavy torpedo plane losses in the Battle of Midway, indicates the vulnerability of this type in good visibility against adequate fighter defense. It may be, therefore, that serious consideration should be given to torpedo plane use of the carrier torpedo-bomber only under special favorable conditions such as moonlight, low visibility, or for finishing off cripples. 
On the other hand, there has not yet been any real test of our new torpedo-bomber, the TBF. Its superiority in speed, maneuverability, armor, and armament to both enemy torpedo planes and our own earlier version of this type may produce quite different results. This is more likely if the torpedo plane attack is well handled, with good timing, coordination and fighter protection. Furthermore, the superiority of the torpedo attack over high altitude bombing, both in accuracy and damage effect, is so great that torpedo plane use should not be limited on the basis of experience to date. 
Tests to date would appear to offer promise of relatively high accuracy of our torpedo-bomber when used as a glide bomber instead of a horizontal bomber. It is recommended that this development be continued in view of the limited accuracy of horizontal bombing against a maneuvering target and because of the weight reduction that will be possible if glide bombing can profitably be substituted for horizontal bombing as a torpedo-bomber mission. 
The TBF plane, because of its size and weight, is at present a serious potential liability on board aircraft carriers. Too large a number can reduce flight and hangar deck flexibility and slow up flight deck operations at crucial times. A TBF crash on deck can be handled only after long delay and this might well be fatal under certain conditions. It is recommended that the total number of TBF planes in a carrier of the ENTERPRISE type be limited to 12, resultant space being used for fighters and scout bombers, and that crane tractors capable of hoisting a TBF be provided immediately for all carriers operating this type of plane. The latter recommendation is of urgent importance. 

*Ship's Ordnance. *
The rates of elevation and train of the 1.1 mounts should be further increased. 
It is recommended that 1.1 gun mounts Nos 1 and 2 be moved farther forward and mounts Nos. 3 and 4 farther aft in order to increase the unobstructed arcs of fire of these guns to port. 
It is recommended that additional 20mm guns be installed in every suitable available space at the earliest practicable date. 

*Damage Control.*
Discussion, comments, and recommendations concerning Damage Control material and personnel matters are contained in the War Damage Report, enclosure (C). 
Tactical and Strategic Considerations. 
Discussion and recommendations under this heading are not altogether limited to the action of August 24. They include opinions resulting from operations leading up to that point. They are all, however, associated directly or indirectly with the battle itself. No criticism, other than constructive, is intended. The aim is to offer ideas, whether obvious or not, for what they may be worth, in the hope that the constant effort of the entire Fleet - the production of more effective results - may in some degree be furthered. 
The very heavy attack sustained by ENTERPRISE, although resulting in temporary loss of her availability for offensive action, has encouraging features. There could hardly have been a more serious test for an aircraft carrier. Results demonstrated that fighting planes, anti-aircraft, ship maneuvering, damage control, and indomitable spirit on the part of the crew can accomplish considerably more, and against greater odds, than had generally been thought possible. 
Since war cannot be fought without risk and since the strategic situation demands, and will continue to demand, the utmost in effective offensive employment of our aircraft carriers, it has to be accepted that other carriers in the future will be exposed to attack, no matter how successful we may be in improving our own proficiency. It is valuable, therefore, to know that even heavy attack is by no means necessarily fatal and that it is actually possible under such conditions to exact a heavy toll from the enemy. 
However, our defensive capabilities, whatever they may be, must remain secondary to improvement by every conceivable means of the offensive potentialities of our carrier task forces. 
As elsewhere stated, the carrier air group cannot be too highly trained. Good enough is by no means good enough. Anything other than clear-cut superiority can at any time make all the difference between decisive victory and decisive defeat. In aircraft carrier employment it is continuously proved that the ability of a single individual can make or break the entire situation. As obvious examples, we have only to consider the far reaching effect of a crash on deck at a critical time, or inaccurate navigation by a scout, or an incomplete or incorrect contact report, or mediocre skill in aerial combat, or inaccurate bombing and torpedo dropping, or poor judgement of all varieties. The demands in basic capacity (including flying skill, intelligence and judgment) are such that otherwise adequate special training periods are not enough. Only the best student graduates should be assigned to carrier aviation. Elimination should be ruthlessly continued thereafter. Where any doubt exists as to the superiority of a given pilot, he does not belong in carrier aviation. 
The Japanese have provided striking examples of the importance of rigid selection. The writer is convinced, from personal observation and from general familiarity with Pacific war developments to date, that Japanese naval aviation was initially composed of very expert and highly trained personnel. Of late, however, there have been increasingly frequent and more and more definite indications of deterioration in their overall competence and their combat proficiency. In some cases, literally astonishing ineptitude has been displayed. Clearly, the Japanese have not currently been able to develop enough suitably expert pilots to cancel their losses and they are unquestionably paying for their failure to do so. This emphasizes our own necessity for drastic selection and intensified training. We must simultaneously avoid and take advantage of the weakness the enemy is now showing. We must get ahead, and stay ahead, in the vital race for superiority of the individual. 
Much has been said of the value of our own land-based air "umbrella" when in the combat area. Much remains, however, to be done to exploit this advantage. More and better planes for long range coverage are obviously essential. No less obvious is the need that still exists for far better individual training of personnel in making accurate, complete and continuous reports. The same applies to communication arrangements that will result in the immediate reception of search and contact information by carrier task forces. 
These points are even more important than they may seem, for it is clear that the strategic factors of the Pacific war will, until the war is finished, make it necessary to employ carriers largely in such a manner that an effective air umbrella will always be needed. With less than perfection in the functioning of long-range search, our striking force effectiveness will be meager and our Fleet units will be unduly jeopardized. No criticism whatever is here intended of the excellent performance to date, under severe handicaps, of our patrol plane arm. More and better planes would solve nine-tenths of their troubles.


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## Lucky13 (Aug 22, 2007)

It must be expected that the enemy will continue to make expert use of his own air umbrella. The strategic situation may often be such that there is no satisfactory counter to this. It is submitted, however, that it may often be possible to obtain an important advantage by remaining outside the fringes of the enemy's long range air search while still in effective striking position and under coverage of our own shore or tender-based search. The carrier game calls for playing the percentage at every turn if success in the long run is to be attained. The present situation in the SOLOMONS area appears to offer the opportunity briefed here. 
Another factor in the supremely important problem of obtaining accurate and timely information while denying information to the enemy is the employment of submarines. In the SOLOMON ISLANDS operations of the past month the Japanese have employed their submarines extensively with their fleet forces. They have used them in large numbers for screening and for distant scouting and observation. Submarine sightings in the area extending generally south and east from TULAGI have been altogether too numerous to be accounted for except by the conclusion that large numbers were present and that they were required to obtain information of our forces even at some considerable exposure of and risk to the individual submarine. Similar use of our own submarines, in the area of enemy approaches to the SOLOMONS would be valuable. It is realized that the number at present readily available is small. It should be increased by diversion as necessary from missions assigned to date. The information that could be furnished would be of the highest importance. Their potentialities for damaging major enemy fleet units would, at the same time, be increased. The Fleet needs them. 
During the past month the strategic situation has required long continued presence of carrier task forces in limited areas within at least approximate range of the enemy. Such risks, of course, must be accepted. They should, however, be minimized in every possible way. The percentage should always be played. The widest possible variation should be made in general location from day to day while still meeting strategic requirements. Higher speeds, even at some increase in fuel expenditures, should be used. There should be no hovering during a given day in the same general vicinity. Retirements for fueling should be made to widely different points and to greater distances than those used to date, even though again at the cost of additional fuel expenditures. Occasional departure, whenever the strategic picture permits, entirely away from the area should be undertaken so as to leave the enemy guessing where we have gone and when and where we will appear next. It may be said that the only way to remain continuously ready to meet emergencies during the present situation is to remain constantly on the spot. But serious losses, with consequent inability to meet those emergencies, are far too apt to occur if the enemy, through his long range search planes and his submarines, is allowed to remain continuously informed of at least our approximate locations and actions. 
The joint operation of carrier task forces has been thoroughly tested. The advantages of operating at least two carriers in the same vicinity are too numerous and positive to be denied. The writer is convinced, however, that we must concentrate on elimination or reduction of the disadvantages that at present still result from joint carrier task force operation. 
The joint operation of more than two carrier task forces is too unwieldy. This applies to both the inherent lags in visual communications and the lags and complications in tactical handling. It is doubtful if any amount of indoctrination and training can reduce these inherent disadvantages sufficiently to meet the criteria of battle emergency. 
The senior task force commander should also be Commander Air. Delegation of this task to the next senior task force commander, as has been done, may appear to be a logical decentralization. In practice, however, it bears too close an analogy to the well recognized fallacy of having the commander of a carrier task force elsewhere than in the carrier itself. Separation of the commander of the entire force and Commander Air inevitably results in complication and misapprehension as to orders and plans. It also injects the very serious probability of delay in emergency when minutes are precious. The surface and air components of carrier task forces are necessarily so closely interwoven that best results can only be produced by a single command. The increase in staff that may be necessary to meet this requirement should, of course, be provided. 
When carrier task forces are jointly operating, their combination into composite formations should seldom be necessary and should always be avoided if possible. In emergency there should be no delaying factor that could have been anticipated. Flexibility and speed of operation are reduced by composite formations. We should not be so formed up that, when the need for instant action arises, we are in trouble if we change formation and in trouble if we don't. 
Furthermore, it should unquestionably be the exception rather than the rule that carrier task forces operating jointly be less than ten miles apart, and this distance should be of the order of fifteen or twenty miles when action is thought to be imminent. The point is that joint support causes joint exposure when separation is small. Had SARATOGA not, somewhat fortuitously, been well separated from ENTERPRISE on the afternoon of 24 August, it is hard to suppose that she would not also have been attacked. 
Standard Cruising Instructions for carrier task forces should be expanded to cover the many features of joint task force operation that now necessitate frequent explanatory and detailed signals. 
A factor of the highest importance in determining success or failure of a carrier task force is the striking range of its air group. To excel in this will be a tremendous advantage. More should be done to produce this result. There will always be a gap between theoretical airplane performance and what is actually practicable in war operations. Much can be done, however, to lessen the present gap. There must be concentration on individual training and instruction in detailed operation of the power plant and handling of the airplane so as to produce the greatest possible fuel economy under all circumstances. The range of the current fighting plane should be increased, if possible, by increasing the capacity of its belly tank, for fighting planes must accompany attack groups for reasonable assurance of success. Doctrine and training must be developed to such a point that immediate decision can be made, whatever the circumstances, as to whether or not an attack group can reach its objective, and so that the navigational problem can either be worked out more promptly aboard ship or in the air after departure. Special selection and adequate training of pilots, elsewhere recommended, should, furthermore, make it possible to employ night operation for either launching or landing without hesitation or undue risk. 
There should be serious reconsideration of the entire current doctrine of search and attack by carrier groups, bearing in mind once more the percentage viewpoint that the force that gets the jump on the other is the force, other things being equal, that stands to win. Hence the importance, elsewhere discussed, of our shore-based long range search. The carrier's own search is necessarily so limited in range that its results cannot remain conclusive for a sufficient length of time, certainly not overnight nor even between early morning and late afternoon searches. Furthermore, the longer the range and the wider the sector, the fewer planes remain available for striking. Where our air umbrella is sufficiently effective, the carrier air search should be limited to establishing relatively local security and to guiding the attack group by sweeping a limited sector enroute to the enemy contact reported by long range search. As a highly important corollary to this, clearly evident on 24 August, every possible step should be taken to achieve immediate decision and action with respect to launching an attack group. Delay to confirm by our own search a contact report from other sources, particularly if visibility is good, is nearly bound to jeopardize fatally our chances of success. The enemy is fast. We must be faster! 

*(Signed) A. C. DAVIS 
Distribution:

Cincpac (original 2) 
CTF-16 (4)*


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## stug3 (Sep 8, 2013)

This photograph, taken shortly after the Marines captured the Guadalcanal airfield, shows a Marine ground crew extinguishing a burning Wildcat, set on fire by a Japanese attack on the hangar in the background. Marines pulled the plane from the hangar and extinguished the flames. The damage was minimal, and the plane was soon back in the air.






Wreckage of a SBD scout-bomber after it was destroyed by a Japanese air attack on Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, 1942. 






Henderson Field in August 1942, after U.S. aircraft had begun to use the airfield. The view looks about northwest, with the Lunga River running across the upper portion of the image. Iron Bottom Sound is just out of view at the top.
Several planes are parked to the left, and numerous bomb and shell craters are visible.


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## stug3 (Feb 18, 2019)

Gunfire damage sustained by USS South Dakota (BB-57) in the Naval battle of Guadalcanal Nov. 14-15 1942


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