# WWII Submarines



## Bigxiko (Jul 6, 2008)

I've always heard and read about the German U-Boats 
but i've only read few refferences to the allies submarines 
i believe that they had them, right?
could anyone provide any information, please?
I would like to know more about them


PS: sorry if this theme was already been discussed


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## magnocain (Jul 6, 2008)

Yes the allies had subs! The American subs choked the Japanese shipping in the PTO. You just never hear about them, like how the Bismarck is still more famous ,then say, the USS Wisconsin.


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## johnbr (Jul 6, 2008)

A good book on the USA in the Pacific is a old book Silent Victory BY Clay Blair.JR.


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## Haztoys (Jul 6, 2008)

The Japanese had lots of sub's...They may have had more then any country.. They just did not use them in the best way.. I would say the Pacific war would of been different ..Not the out come ..If the Japanese had used there sub's right...I wonder why they did not use there sub's in the way the Germans did ...


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## Bigxiko (Jul 7, 2008)

probably because they didn't believed it could be a real threat and so didn't used them


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## SoD Stitch (Jul 7, 2008)

Bigxiko said:


> I've always heard and read about the German U-Boats
> but i've only read few refferences to the allies submarines
> i believe that they had them, right?
> could anyone provide any information, please?
> ...



Yes, it probably has already been discussed, but I am the wrong person to tell you where it is; however, I can give you a reasonably good reference for the history of US fleet subs. There is an old US WWII sub not too far from where I live that is available for tours and overnighters (my Boy Scout troop is planning on doing the overnighter thing sometime this year). Go here for more info:

Maritime Park Association - USS Pampanito Home Page


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## timshatz (Jul 7, 2008)

The Japanese used their subs, initially anyway, as adjuncts of the Battle Fleet. They scouted and were supposed to wear down the opposing Fleet. At least that was the theory behind the Japanese battle plan. The US used this idea as well but they also used their subs as commerce raiders. 

Later in the war, with better torpedoes, the US did a lot better with both rolls although the commerce raider had the best results. 

Japan stayed with the fleet adjunct assignment except in those places where they were used as contact to cut off bases.


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## parsifal (Jul 7, 2008)

There is a new book out on the Japanese Submarines jointly written by a Japanese and American Naval Historians "The Japanese Submarine Force and WWII" Carl Boyd Akihiko Yoshida, Bluejacket Books, 1995 -2002 (reprint)
It dispels nearly all the myths and legends around the submarine force.

The Japanese sub force was wedded very closely to the fact that the Japanese wanted the decisive naval battle fought in the central pacific, and were keenly aware of two things in their prewar planning. Firstly, the naval treaties condemned them to an immediate numerical inferiority in Battleship numbers, which they needed to redress by the use of their light forces, aircraft and submarines to attrition away, as the US forces advanced across the pacific for the decisive Jutland style battle in the Marshalls or the Marianas (the Japanese were right to assume this in their planning, because this was precisely what the Americans intended to do before PH came along). The second was that Japan in a prolonged war against the Americans could not hope to win. The war had to be short, and the naval victory sudden, to shock the Americans to negotiate peace.

Against this background, the Japanese submarine was perfectly designed. The US battleship force had a fleet speed of under 20 knots. So the Japanese designed their big subs to cruise at 24 knots on the surface, and to have very long legs. They also provided aircraft to many of their designs. These features would have allowed the Japanese subs to track the progress of the battle fleet, move ahead of the fleet, and then set elaborate and deadly ambushes for it, as often as torpedoes remained in the magazines.

That was the theory, but two things upset the plan,and the Japanese were very slow to realize it. The first, was Pearl Harbour, which effectively removed the slow moving battle force from the equation. Henceforward, the US was forced to rely on its fast carriers, and its light forces for the prosecution of its war. The carriers possessed two things that made them hard targets, speed (a fleet speed of 30 knots), and aircraft, which allowed the positions of the Japan subs to be often spotted in advance, and avoided.

Later, as the Americans brought into commission new battleships, these were also able to operate at speeds that the Japanese subs were unable to counter. One other factor began to be apparent from the middle of 1943 on wards, was the increasing allied proficiency in ASW warfare. At the beginning of the war, US ASW effectiveness was terrible, but later, as they learned new techniques (taught to them by the British), the weaknesses if the Japanese sub force really started to come to the fore. The weaknesses were both technological and doctrinal. The technological weaknesses were basically the large size (easy to spot on the surface), and slow diving times (longer to seek safety by diving). The doctrinal problems were the forced usage of the subs as transports for the army (a staggeringly large number of subs were lost on these missions, in which ULTRA allowed the allies frequent opportunities to set ambushes), as well as the continued use of the subs to support fleet operations despite its proven failure (this meant the Japanese were often attacking heavily guarded military TFs).

On those occasions where Japanese subs were used on merchant shipping duties, they were effective. They managed to sink, or capture (the ship would be damaged, return to port, and then be captured by the advancing Japanese....this happened very frequently in the Far East, where an estimated 300000 tons affected by sub damage was captured, and re-used by the Japanese). A very large percentage of merchantmen listed as damaged by allied sources, were actually never returned to service after hits by Japanese subs. IN the NEI, off the coast of Australia, and in the Indian Ocean, the Japanese subs proved to be very effective at mercantile warfare. But the commitment to total employment to attacking merchantmen was never there, there was no Donitz in the Japanese submarine arm to force the correct use of the force in its entirety.

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## Bucksnort101 (Jul 7, 2008)

Pick up a book named "Thunder Below!: The USS *Barb* Revolutionizes Submarine Warfare in World War II by Eugene B. Fluckey"

I read this book several years ago and it was very interesting. Pretty much covered one US Gato Class Fleet Submarines operations in the PTO, but was pretty indicative of all US Sub. operations in World War II. 
Goes into some detail of the USS Barb actually landing men on the Japanese mainland which was quite interesting when I read it, but it's been a few years and I do not recall what they actually did. Something like a commando mission.


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## trackend (Jul 8, 2008)

Bigxiko said:


> I've always heard and read about the German U-Boats
> but i've only read few refferences to the allies submarines
> i believe that they had them, right?
> could anyone provide any information, please?
> ...



The Royal Navy had around 90 submarines at the beginning of WW2 with 9 under construction in total 270 were deployed and 80 lost.

This site should help with the RN side of things

*British Submarines of World War Two - A History


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## Bigxiko (Jul 8, 2008)

Thanks guys,
thank you for the information and the links


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## starling (Jul 8, 2008)

yes,never forget the royal navies subs in the shallow med,those boats xploits can or should never be underestimated.starling.


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## renrich (Jul 8, 2008)

If memory serves the IJN had about 63 subs at the time of PH. That does not include midget types. According to Janes, 1945, they lost about 125 subs during the war which was almost all. Their resources as far as new construction were limited so the IJN never had the numbers of subs the US or Germany had.


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## timshatz (Jul 8, 2008)

parsifal said:


> There is a new book out on the Japanese Submarines jointly written by a Japanese and American Naval Historians "The Japanese Submarine Force and WWII" Carl Boyd Akihiko Yoshida, Bluejacket Books, 1995 -2002 (reprint)
> It dispels nearly all the myths and legends around the submarine force.
> 
> The Japanese sub force was wedded very closely to the fact that the Japanese wanted the decisive naval battle fought in the central pacific, and were keenly aware of two things in their prewar planning. Firstly, the naval treaties condemned them to an immediate numerical inferiority in Battleship numbers, which they needed to redress by the use of their light forces, aircraft and submarines to attrition away, as the US forces advanced across the pacific for the decisive Jutland style battle in the Marshalls or the Marianas (the Japanese were right to assume this in their planning, because this was precisely what the Americans intended to do before PH came along). The second was that Japan in a prolonged war against the Americans could not hope to win. The war had to be short, and the naval victory sudden, to shock the Americans to negotiate peace.
> ...




Pretty good post, short, too the point and effective. Good job Parsifal.


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## richardlol (Aug 10, 2008)

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor launched the greatest naval war of all time. The attack was brilliantly timed and executed, but fatally flawed. Many say that failing to catch the U.S. carriers in port was the biggest error. Possibly so. In any case, the carriers weren’t there to be attacked.

The U.S. Pacific ww2 submarine force was there however, and it was totally ignored. Hundreds of Japanese torpedo-plane pilots flew right over—and sometimes next to—the submarine base and it’s munitions dump on neighboring Kuaha. In doing so, they missed a golden opportunity to destroy the one arm of the U.S. Navy capable of attacking the weakest link in the Empire’s chain: shipping.

Japan was an overpopulated island nation totally dependent on imports for everything from rice to oil. The large surface ships either damaged or destroyed at Pearl Harbor were impressive and powerful, but it would have been many months, or even years, before the ships could operate deep into Japanese controlled areas of the Pacific. However on the afternoon of the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, the order was given: Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan. The subs, with their supplies and harbor facilities spared in the attack, were the only forces capable of responding immediately, and respond they did—slowly at first, but with gathering speed.

WW2 Submarine War Patrols - From the Captain's logs


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## syscom3 (Aug 10, 2008)

The shear incompetency of the US sub forces in the first 18 months of the war is amazing. The Japanese didn't need to touch a thing at Pearl because the sub forces were already neutered.


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## RabidAlien (Aug 11, 2008)

I don't know if I would go so far as to call it "sheer incompetency"...we were still learning how to fight this war, we didn't have our wartime industry geared up yet, and our torpedo technology was...well....embarrassing. There were alot of good, and several excellent sub commanders, with great crews, who would fire a perfect salvo, only to watch the torpedos bounce off the hull of their targets. Which then made our subs sitting ducks. It'd be like sending the Army up against Rommel on the Atlantic Wall, armed with blanks.

Bucksnort: read that book, but couldn't remember the title! Thanks for refreshing my memory on that! The mission where they landed the "commando" troops on the island was to plant a mine underneath a railroad rail. They managed to do that without setting off the mine (not bad for a bunch of submariners!), and got an ammo train as a reward. They were still fairly close to the island, on the surface, when the train came along and set off the booby trap, which lit up quite a large area. They got away unscathed, though, without a shot being fired in their direction, because (they found out after the war) the Japanese thought it was an air attack due to the size of the explosion (the mine went off directly underneath an ammo car, IIRC), and directed their attention upwards, instead of out into the harbor.


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## delcyros (Aug 11, 2008)

The british T-class subs are worth to be mentioned, too. 
They performed well in the METO and are excessively armed with torpedo-tubes. Rather a kind of submarine-destroyer. They are technically impressive designs with a good 42 days patrol endurance and large battery capacity for 48 hours at silent submerged running (2.5 Kts).
All together 16 boats out of 52 production boats were lost, 13 of them in the Mediterranean.

My Sources are
"Allied Submarines of World War Two", Poolman, Kenneth, 1990 
"Allied Submarines", Watts, Anthony J., 1977 
"Allied Submarine Attacks of World War Two", Rohwer, Jürgen, 1997 
"Submarine Command - A Pictorial History", Reginald Longstaff, 2002 (2nd ed.)


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## syscom3 (Aug 11, 2008)

Rabid, as events proved:

1) the US Sub doctrine was faulty 

2) The skippers were for the most part overly cautious and mediocre

3) The admirals and their staff were horrible at their jobs.


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## RabidAlien (Aug 11, 2008)

Granted, Sys. Personally, though, when I hear "sheer incompetency", I get the image of everybody involved being total and complete idiots....captains, crew, and HQ. Most of the military was still in 'tween-war mentality, or run by those who had fought during the First World War, and unable/unwilling to adapt tactics and strategies to the evolving machinery of warfare. There were, however, brilliant nuggets amongst the dross. So, I'll agree completely with your last post....I just had issues with the wording of the other one.  Semantics.


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## syscom3 (Aug 11, 2008)

Read "Silent Victory" and tell me you wont get heartburn.

It took the surface fleet 20 months to finally be able to take on the IJN in a night action and win.

It took the sub force even longer to be able to finally have a chance of sinking a single ship while on patrol.

The results speak for themselves.


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## Bigxiko (Aug 14, 2008)

Nice!!
Tanhks guys for the teaching...
I liked very much


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## RabidAlien (Aug 15, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Read "Silent Victory" and tell me you wont get heartburn.



Heh. Anything to do with submarines tends to give me heartburn.


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## Ramirezzz (Aug 16, 2008)

in the 1939 Russians had the biggest submarine fleet in the world (about 330 subs). But since the very beginning of the war most of it was trapped in the Black and Baltic sea by minefields.


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## Milos Sijacki (Aug 17, 2008)

I was always a big fan of the German WW2 subs, U-Boats. Especially, the famous Type-VII B and C and the long range Type-IX. Those were the best.

German U-Boats and Battle of the Atlantic

Try this site, it has pics, info, bios and everything


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## JugBR (Aug 18, 2008)

we have some u-boat´s sunk in brazilian coast also theres a italian submarine sunk here, his name is archimedes.

Artigos: U-boats no Brasil durante a 2ª Guerra Mundial

you can translate using google


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## Ramirezzz (Aug 18, 2008)

a good forum dedicated to all that swims under water:
SubPirates.com - Index page


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## Messy1 (Aug 25, 2008)

Another good book with some excellent WW2 stories, Blind Man's Bluff. Has more to do with the espionage side of subs, but has a few great stories about WW2 raids.


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## renrich (Aug 25, 2008)

On 23 February, 1942, four American DDs won a night surface action at Balikpapan, sinking a patrol craft and four transports. The Nautilus finished off one of the IJN carriers at Midway with a torpedo. Some of the S boats also had some successes in the early going. On the night of 11-12 October, 1942, the USN won a night action known as Battle of Cape Esperance. My uncle was in that one and gave me a first hand account. On the night of 12 November, 1942, a heavily outgunned USN force of cruisers and destroyers engaged an IJN force of BBs and DDs in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and so damaged BB Hiei that she was helpless the next day when attacked and sunk by AC. The next night Washington sank Kirishima in a gunduel. All those victories took place well before the twenty months mentioned.


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## syscom3 (Aug 25, 2008)

renrich said:


> On 23 February, 1942, four American DDs won a night surface action at Balikpapan, sinking a patrol craft and four transports.



Undefended transports sitting at anchor and all they could do is sink 5 ships?



> The Nautilus finished off one of the IJN carriers at Midway with a torpedo.



The torpedo didnt even explode, let alone put a hole in the hull.



> Some of the S boats also had some successes in the early going.



Best war shot was the day after the Battle of Savo Island when one of the IJN cruisers was blown to pieces from an S-Boat using obsolete torpedo's. Other than that ..... it took hundreds of torpedo launches just to sink an occasional ship.



> On the night of 11-12 October, 1942, the USN won a night action known as Battle of Cape Esperance. My uncle was in that one and gave me a first hand account.



The USN crossed the IJN "T" and only managed to sink two ships (and heavily damage a 3rd). Poor employment of the DD's was the blame for that.



> On the night of 12 November, 1942, a heavily outgunned USN force of cruisers and destroyers engaged an IJN force of BBs and DDs in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and so damaged BB Hiei that she was helpless the next day when attacked and sunk by AC. .....



Poor employment of the DD's, lack of effective use of radar, no battle doctrine or strategy nearly made the first nights battle a debacle. If anything, it was a draw tactically speaking. The next nights encounter went good, all things considered.

But then we can also mention the Battle off of Tassafaronga that was an embarrassment of the highest magnitude.


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## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Aug 25, 2008)

You can also use this website. It has a huge listing with photos of just about all of the U.S. subs ever commissioned.Photo Archive Main Index Hope this helps.


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## Messy1 (Aug 26, 2008)

Aaron, thanks for the link to that site! I'll have to explore it more when i get a chance! Looks like a very nice site!


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## renrich (Aug 26, 2008)

"20 months before the USN could take on the IJN in a night surface action and win." I just named several night surface actions where all historians would say the USN won well inside of twenty months. Perhaps your definition of win is different from most. Morison in "USN Operations WW2" stated the torpedo from Nautilus finished off one othe IJN carriers. Perhaps later and more accurate accounts than Morison's paint a different picture. It seems to me that your appraisal of the USN efforts might be overly critical. There were undoubtedly tactical mistakes made and sometimes the strategy was faulty but, on balance, during the portion of the war where the odds were even or tilted toward the IJN, the USN acquitted itself well in my view.


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## timshatz (Aug 26, 2008)

renrich said:


> "20 months before the USN could take on the IJN in a night surface action and win." .



I think, whomever wrote that, had the general line right. The US Navy took a long time getting it together to the point where they used their advantages against the Japanese disadvantages. Pointedly, using radar directed gunnery in such a way as to negate the advantages of the long lance and enter a surface action with greater than average chance of success. It was well into 1943 before that happened. 

Cap Esperence, mentioned on the preceeding page, was as much luck as tactical decisions. Right turns at the right place led to capping the T. Guadalcanal, first night, was, to use the description of one of the captians in the fight, "A bar room brawl with the lights shot out". The US force tactically collided with the Japanese force with both sides intermingled. Nobody teaches that one at their war colleges. 

It was not until 1943 when the US managed a long range (12,000yds+) naval battle at night using smoke screens, radar directed gunnery and distance to win.


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## syscom3 (Aug 26, 2008)

renrich said:


> ....Morison in "USN Operations WW2" stated the torpedo from Nautilus finished off one othe IJN carriers. Perhaps later and more accurate accounts than Morison's paint a different picture. ....



Japanese survivors off of the carrier emphatically state that the torpedo failed to explode.

Naval engagements that the USN was on the short end of the stick:

*Savo Island* ... a debacle of monumental proportions.

*Cape Espearence* .... on paper a narrow win, but tempered by a dismal employment of DD's and failure to capitalize on perfect tactical opportunities.

*Naval Battle of Guadalcanal night #1 * A mauling on the USN, due to poor planning, poor employment of DD's and the failure to capitalize on radar.

*Naval Battle of Guadalcanal night #2 * A clear win (finally)

*Tassafaronga* A debacle a monumental proportions.

*Komodorski Islands* A draw.

*Kula Gulf* A draw, although 3 cruisers and 4 DD's should have defeated the IJN force of 10 DD's.

*Vela Gulf* Finally a clear cut USN win.

*Battle off Horaniu* A draw, if it could be called that.

*Battle of Vella Lavella* A Loss

*Battle of Empress Augusta Bay* A clear cut USN victory, and they would not lose another one for the rest of the war.

I count one clear cut win after 20 months and two clear cut wins after 23 months. Not an impressive showing.

I am not counting Balikpapen as it was DD's versus merchant men, and the force only inflicted minor losses on the IJN when they had tactical surprise and gunnery supremecy, all at point blank range.

As for the sub forces ..... only one word can describe them ..."pathetic".


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## renrich (Aug 26, 2008)

Komondorski a draw, even though it was 2 CAs against one?


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## timshatz (Aug 27, 2008)

renrich said:


> Komondorski a draw, even though it was 2 CAs against one?



Didn't the Japanese Admiral end up getting fired and the US Admiral get promoted after that one?


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## renrich (Aug 27, 2008)

I do think the IJN task force commander was fired and perhaps Soc McMorris, who was the USN TFC was decorated although it probably should have been the Salt Lake City CO who should have gotten the honors. McMorris was in the US CL during the battle and a memoir I read of a sailor on the USS Dale, one of the US DDs, said that the USS Richmond, the CL, stayed out in front so far, since it was a running gun battle, that she was out of range of the Japanese guns for the most part. SLC fired around 800 rounds of 8 inch shell, ran out of AP stuff and the numbers 3 and 4 turrets ran out of ammo and had to be resupplied with shell from the forward magazines. Must have been difficult moving 250 pound projectiles from the forward magazines several hundred feet aft in sub freezing weather at 28 knots. Much of her electronic gear quit working because of the concussion from firing and light bulbs all over the ship were broken. Just imagine that although the majority of the firing was from the after turrets, 800 rounds amount to 80 ten gun salvos. The battle was fought for the most part at about 18000 yards. The IJN cruisers were bigger than SLC but had ten gun 8 inch batteries also.


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## parsifal (Sep 3, 2008)

The two battles of Guadacanal are admittedly regarded as a USN defeat in the first battle, and a clearcut victory in the second battle. Yet I challenge that. Both battles resulted in the loss of IJN battleships in both battles. TGhe material losses in 1st guadacanal were without a doubt heavier for the USN, but by the end of these battles, the Japanese were drawn to the conclusion that they had lost the battle for guadacanal island. though the Army took a bit longer to convince, the navy lost all heart, ad were reduced to mostly submarine transport relief efforts for the besiegers.

So, in my view ther were three victories.

Moreover the victories that went to Japan were never strategic in their effect. Even Savo island was flawed, because Mikawa lost his nerve and withdrew without having sunk the Watchtower transports. If he had, Guadacanal would have been immediately lost. At best the Marines would have been forced into a humilating withdrawal (presumably abandoning all their equipment), because there simply was not the transport available in the theatre to replace any significant losses in the assault fleet. Thanks to Admiral King and his abysmal handling of the US MS fleet assets in the Atlantic.....


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## syscom3 (Sep 3, 2008)

The 1st Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (Nov 13th) has always considered to be a tactical defeat on the USN and a strategic victory in that it stopped Japanese plans.

Dont forget that the next day also saw the USS Juneau being blown to tiny pieces by a well placed torpedo.


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## stug3 (Jan 25, 2013)

Images from U-123 dated January 1942 with a merchant ship in the distance. This may well be the CULEBRA which was attacked from a position facing the stern. The photographer on board U-123, Seaman specialist Toelle, was badly injured during the attack when a shell misfired.







A close up view of the deck gun on U-123 taken from the same sequence. Gunfire from the Culebra passed between the conning tower and the gun - the Royal Navy gun crew were unlucky not to have caused more damage.


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## vinnye (Jan 25, 2013)

I would have thought that the reliability problems of their torpedoes would have seriously reduced the effectiveness of the USN Submarines?
This makes their rewards poor for their bravery and skill in getting into a shooting position.


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## davebender (Jan 25, 2013)

Circular torpedo runs
It's readily apparent U.S. torpedo defects were not solved before the end of WWII. We sank a considerable amount of tonnage despite defective weapons.


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## vinnye (Jan 26, 2013)

Just think how much more they could have sunk had they had a good long range reliable torpedo?


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## davebender (Jan 26, 2013)

> how much more they could have sunk had they had a good long range reliable torpedo?


With reliable torpedoes results should have been dramatic during December 1941. USN Asiatic Fleet had 29 boats forward deployed in the Philippines. They should have wrecked havoc on Japanese convoys in the western Pacific.


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## vinnye (Jan 27, 2013)

That is why just looking at bare facts is a little misleading. The context of the data is vital.
Those guys in the subs got themselves into the positions to make an attack and were let down by their equipment. That is not their fault. Living in a tin can sweat box in fear of being bombed or deapth charged for long periods takes ahell of a lot of guts, respect is due!


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## parsifal (Jan 28, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Just think how much more they could have sunk had they had a good long range reliable torpedo?



US Sub launched torpedoes were solved and improved at the end of 1943 and early 1944. In 1944, the notable advance in US torpedo technology was the introduction of a wakelesss electric torpedo. Not as fast as a conventionally powereed torpedo, but untrackable, especially at night. 

The other big problem for the USN was the faulty exploder they were using. It took over 20 months to work this problem out. 

There were other problems. US tactical doctrine was faulty, subs tended to approach from the wrong angles which meant many targets simply walked away from the slow moving, short ranged "S" class subs. Many of the prewar skippers were repoprtedly too timid in their attacks, breaking off well before they should.

Lastly the higher levels of leadership were apparently fairly ordinary in their strategic management of their submarine flotillas., poor placement, a fialure to identify problems of equipment and training being among them

Japanese ASW training was woeful. It did show some signs of improvement from 1943 onward. In 1941 it was very poor however. On the other hand, Japanese shipping losses were very minor until August 1942. Ther Japanese captured more shipping then they lost in the initial campaigns.

US subs based in the Phillipines suffered an early, fatal blow in the campaign when the supply of torpedoes was destroyed very early on with a bomb hit at the Cavite Navy Yard.


After the fall of the far east, the majority of US subs lacked the range and endurance to be effective. It required the large scale introduction of the longer ranged Gato class subs to solve this problem. 

Once the problems were solved US employment of submarines was nearly faultless. The USN had a clear understanding of where their subs could be best utilised (ie sinking the Japanese merchant fleet), and went about it with calculated efficiency


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## R Pope (Jan 28, 2013)

I read an article about a German U-boat crew captured off New York, the crewmen had American cigarettes and movie theater ticket stubs in their pockets. Anyone else heard that story?


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## johnbr (Jan 28, 2013)

Yes I have heard that story but for the east coast of Canada.


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## stug3 (Feb 10, 2013)

A surfaced U-boat is straddled by depth charges from a Coastal Command Liberator.


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## stug3 (Feb 16, 2013)

From IWM Sound Archive 011745:

On 16 February 1942 north of Crete, in the Mediterranean, HM Submarine Thrasher, after attacking and sinking a supply ship, was itself attacked. Thrasher was subjected to a three hour depth charge attack and aerial bombing. She managed to get away and was lying submerged when her captain was disturbed by a most unwelcome noise:
_ I was asleep in my bunk about midnight, and I was woken up by something going ‘bonk, bonk, bonk’ overhead, clearly something rolling about in the casing.

Well, this was anathema to any submariner: something making a noise like that, which could give your position away to anyone listening for you, so I told the Officer of the Watch on the bridge to send somebody down to see if he could find out what it was and secure it to stop it rolling around.

I got a rather startled report back that there was what appeared to be a bomb lying on the fore-casing just under the gun, and there was a hole in the casing which seemed to indicate that something had gone into the casing and which might be causing this noise.

I went up on the bridge myself and went down to investigate, and there, sure enough, there was a bomb lying on the casing – about two feet long it was. I reckoned about a 50lb – 100lb bomb, and there was a hole in the side of the gun casing that looked as though it had been made by another bomb, from its size; and on further investigation, sure enough there was another bomb inside the casing._

Two unexploded bombs needed to be dealt with. Yet extricating them would be no easy task and if the submarine were attacked whilst this was taking place, they would be forced to dive. The subsequent citation for the Victoria Cross describes the situation well:
_Lieutenant Roberts and Petty Officer Gould volunteered to remove the bombs, which were of a type unknown to them. The danger in dealing with the second bomb was very great. To reach it they had to go through the casing, which was so low that they had to lie at full length to move in it.

Through this narrow space, in complete darkness, they pushed and dragged the bomb for a distance of some 20 feet until it could be lowered over the side. Every time the bomb was moved there was a loud twanging noise as of a broken spring which added nothing to their peace of mind.

This deed was more gallant as HM Submarine Thrasher’s presence was known to the enemy; she was close to the enemy coast and in waters where his patrols were known to be active day and night. There was a very great chance, and they knew it, that the submarine might have to crash-dive while they were under the casing. Had this happened they must have been drowned._


Damage to the casing of HM Submarine THRASHER after two bombs struck her off Crete on the night of 15/16 February 1942. Neither exploded and both were removed by two members of the crew.
A – where bomb penetrated the gun platform. A1 – the position where the bomb was discovered inside the casing. B – Position where 2nd unexploded bomb was discovered lying on the casing, bomb represented by the tin can. C – Petty Officer Gould, VC, standing in the casing-hatch through which bomb from A1 was dragged. Note: THRASHER was at periscope depth, 34 feet, and going deep when the bombs struck her.






The British T class submarine HMS Thrasher under way. She survived the exceptionally hazardous Mediterranean war and went on to successful operations in the Far East, sinking over 20,000 tons of Japanese shipping.


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## stug3 (Feb 23, 2013)

Oblique photographic-reconnaissance aerial of the German warships, ADMIRAL SCHEER and PRINZ EUGEN lying in Lo Fjord (Drontheim), Norway. Lying in the lee of a snow-covered bluff, nearest the camera, is ADMIRAL SCHEER, protected by a torpedo boom. In the middle of the fjord is PRINZ EUGEN, also protected by a boom, undergoing repairs to her stern and rudder after being seriously damaged by a torpedo fired by HMS TRIDENT on 23 February 1942. She is attended by the repair vessel HUSCARAN, tugs and a sheer-legs platform aft, where some 30 feet of her after section have been cut away. A Spitfire from RAF No.1 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit was able to get this image.






HMS Trident


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## stug3 (Mar 23, 2013)

Forward view from the conning tower of HMS TRIBUNE running on the surface in Scottish waters.


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## vinnye (Mar 27, 2013)

Amongst other theatres, the T class and U class submarines were used in the MTO where they sank vital Italian transports, warships and both German and Italian subs.


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## stug3 (Apr 2, 2013)

U-124, her original Edelweiss emblem is visible as well as the Frog that was added by Korvettenkapitän Johann Mohr when he assumed command. Sunk by the sloop HMS Black Swan and the corvette HMS Stonecrop with depth charges, April 2, 1943






The sloop HMS Black Swan






The Flower class corvette HMS Stonecrop


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## stug3 (Apr 17, 2013)

K-Gun Depth Charge Projector fired from USCG. Cutter SPENCER






Explosion of a depth charge seen from the USCG. Cutter SPENCER






Forced by a depth charge, a U-Boat breaks surface as the Cutter SPENCER bears down on it






Effect of the SPENCER’S fire are visible in this closeup shot of the U-Boat. 
he Coast Guard boarding team were the first Americans to board an enemy vessel underway at sea since the War of 1812.






RM 3/c Julius Petrella was killed by shrapnel from a boat davit that had been hit by friendly fire, probably from one of the guns manned by the Naval Armed Guard on board nearby merchant vessels. Ironically shrapnel from that hit to the davit also holed the Spencer’s powered monomoy lifeboat. As such the cutter’s boarding team had to launch the pulling lifeboat and that, of course, slowed their attempt to board the U-boat. 
The Spencer crewman in the dark coat administering aid to RM 3/c Petrella is Pharmacist’s Mate 1/c Daniel Jack Horton.






K-Gun Depth Charge Projector


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## stug3 (May 6, 2013)

Anti-Submarine Weapons: Hedgehog, a 24 spigot anti-submarine mortar. Sailors loading the Hedgehog on board the Greek Corvette HHMS TOMPAZIS whilst others watch. This spigot mortar hurls as many as 24 bombs into the air at once towards the spot where the U-boat is lurking.





A salvo of 24 Hedgehog bombs in flight.






On the target. A full 24 pattern just fired from the Greek Corvette HHMS TOMPAZIS, seven of the bombs have already hit the water, while seventeen more can be counted in mid-air about to strike the water.












HMS Westcott


















Hedgehogs in Mark 11 Launcher on a Netherlands Predator class frigate
The fuze caps have not been removed.


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## parsifal (May 7, 2013)

Great photographic recod Stug


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## stug3 (Jun 12, 2013)

Some resources:
U-boat Archive - U-118
http://www.uboat.net/all


DB splashes straddle U-118 – taken by O. L. Scholl, ARM2c, in Lt.(jg) Fryatt’s plane






LTJG Fryatt’s depth bombs straddle U-118. Splashes from his turret guns can be seen as the Avenger pulls away after the attack. Two crewmen can be seen seeking shelter behind the conning tower. U-118 is trailing oil after previous attacks by LTJG Stearns and LTJG Fowler.











U-118 blows up throwing large amount of oil and debris of all sorts high in the air. Lt.(jg) JOHNSON was flying at 600 feet, and says the spray went up higher than he was.






Lt.(jg) HEIM is circling scene in F4F. Note the zig-zag oil streak showing U-118 last effort to evade attack.






USS Bogue (ACV-9)


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## stug3 (Jul 15, 2013)

U class submarine HMS/M UNITED underway in Plymouth Sound






At the Malta submarine base, three submarines: HMS UNITED (left) and HMS UNISON (right). Bows of HMS UNSEEN in the foreground, 1943






HMS UNISON, passing HMS TAKU (nearest camera) on her way out on patrol from Malta.


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## Civettone (Jul 15, 2013)

stug3 said:


> U-124, her original Edelweiss emblem is visible as well as the Frog that was added by Korvettenkapitän Johann Mohr when he assumed command. Sunk by the sloop HMS Black Swan and the corvette HMS Stonecrop with depth charges, April 2, 1943
> 
> 
> 
> ...


What exactly is a sloop? Is it something in between a corvette and a destroyer? A frigate then??

Kris


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## Shortround6 (Jul 15, 2013)

The exact definition changed (sometimes back and forth) and at times ships were moved from one category to the other. In sailing days a sloop of war was smaller than a Frigate and called for a lower level of rank to command. 

Sloops and frigates were "junior cruisers" of a sort with more range/endurance than true destroyers, at least until you get to things like the Tribal class destroyers. The Destroyer class was a late comer, 1890s and the ships grew 4-5 fold even before the Tribals.


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## parsifal (Jul 16, 2013)

In sailing terms a sloop is a word derived from the Dutch sleop, which in turn was derived from the French "Chelope" 9not sure of the spelling). They referred to small single masted vessels in which the foresheets were inher4ently smaller than the main rig. In the 17th century the French developed the sloop concept for fast blockade running ships with variable rigs really. But they generally retained the idea of small, fastt, lightly armed high powered warships.

In modern naval terms, "sloop" is not a well defined term. And it varies from navy to navy and nation to nation as to what is meant by the term. But in general it refers to small lightly armed warships, somewhere between a frigate and a corvette. Typically they have lost their speed advantage, but reatain relatively long range, and have become mostly ASW platforms...

Sloops vessels were common during the age of steam, but ships of this type were becoming obsolete by the Second World War. The Royal Navy used sloops, revived the sloop as a quick fix to the ASW escort role which had been badly neglected, and used them in numerous roles, including both fleet and convoy escort duty. 

More modern defintiions are perhaps, Corvette and Frigates. In the RN, frigates are larger, more capable ASW vessels. I would consider frigate appropriate to apply to ships less than 28knots speed, in 1000-2000 ton range. Corvettes are smaller, and usually somewhat slower, so as to retain adequate range and endurance. Typically they would be 500-1000 tons, with top speeds of about 20 knots, but with considerable range.

Other navies might have different classification criteria, Its a loose categorisation process. No single answer, and no right or wrong answer


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## stug3 (Jul 20, 2013)

HMS GRAPH (ex U-Boat U 570) at Holy Loch on the completion of a trial trip, passing by a depot ship. In the foreground are the conning towers of HMS STURGEON (left) and HMS TIGRIS. Submarine P 42 (later renamed HMS UNBROKEN) can be seen in the background.


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## stug3 (Aug 7, 2013)

U-boat Archive - U-117 VC-1 ASW-6 2-43


Avengers flying out of Fort Lauderdale, 1943






DBs strike water to starboard of U-117 - U-66 is on the left of the photograph






DCs explode obscuring U-117 






U-boats maneuvering






DCs exploding 






DBs strike water to port of U-117


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## stug3 (Aug 8, 2013)

USS Card (ACV-11) underway in the Atlantic on 15 June 1943, with seven TBF-1 Avenger torpedo bombers and six F4F-4 Wildcat fighters of Squadron VC-1 parked on her flight deck.






U-664 met its end later on 9 August 1943 when attacked by three more aircraft from the escort carrier Card. This took place in clear weather under broken cloud. The first was a TBF-1 Avenger, flown by Lieutenant (jg) G.G. Hogan, which dropped two 500-lb depth bombs with contact fuses in two separate attacks. Between these attacks Lieutenant N.D. Hodson in his F4F-4 Wildcat raked the U-boat with gunfire. Then Lieutenant (jg) J.C. Forney dropped another depth bomb from his TBF-1 Avenger. He refrained from dropping the other when he saw the crew abandoning the U-boat. Eight of the crew were killed but forty-four were picked up and taken prisoner by one of the destroyer escorts. Kapitanleutnant Graef was one of the survivors. The Swordfish emblem on the conning tower of the U-boat was that of the 9th Flotilla at Brest.






U-664 sinking as its crew abandon ship and inflate life rafts. 






U-664 POWs were transfered from USS Borie to USS Card on August 10, 1943, the day after the sinking - here a wounded POW is transfered in a stretcher.






U-664's Engineer Officer, Leutnant (Ing) Martin, steps out of a cargo bag






Some annotated I.D. photos of U-664 POWs















More here- U-boat Archive - U-664


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## stug3 (Aug 12, 2013)

12 August, 1942- Italian submarine AXUM’s torpedo strikes the tanker OHIO on her port side during attack on Operation Pedestal


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## stug3 (Aug 21, 2013)

Engine room of HMS TRIBUNE






HMS Storm


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## stug3 (Aug 26, 2013)

U-564 is resupplied with torpedoes from another U Boat whilst in the Caribbean in early August 1942.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 29, 2013)

> The Royal Navy used sloops, revived the sloop as a quick fix to the ASW escort role which had been badly neglected, and used them in numerous roles, including both fleet and convoy escort duty.



The Flower Class sloop HMS _Saxifrage_, launched in 1918, is moored on the Thames in London and has been renamed HMS _President_.






https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_President_(1918)


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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2013)

I wonder why it was thought necessary to rename her.....


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## Shortround6 (Aug 29, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I wonder why it was thought necessary to rename her.....



Explained in the Wiki article, She became a reserve drill ship and took the name of the previous reserve drill ship at that location, a not uncommon practice in the RN.


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## Glider (Sep 2, 2013)

These might be of interest


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## tyrodtom (Sep 2, 2013)

That looks like the U-505 in Chicago.
I toured that in 1957, they had it outdoors then. At the Museum of Science and Industry.
They had one of the deck guns mounted on a concrete pad, and anybody could operate the traversing and elevation wheels, kids included.
It wasn't as nearly in as good a shape then as is is now, inside and out.
At the entrance to that museum, soon as you walked inside, there was a Stuka, hanging from the ceiling, pointed right at you as you stepped thru the door. 
Quite a adveture for a 10 year old.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 3, 2013)

If anyone in Britain wants to see a U Boat get yourself down to Birkenhead U-boat Story - Historic Ship in Birkenhead, Birkenhead - Wirral Its been sectioned so you can see inside, you used to be able to go inside on a guided tour but she needed a lot of preservation work and it wasnt really safe enough for modern legislation.





England - Birkenhead - The U-Boat Story - U-534 - 5th October 2010 -15.jpg by Redstone Hill, on Flickr


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 4, 2013)

I should be checking out the U-505 in Chicago next week. While my wife is attending a lecture there at the Shed Aquarium. I will head over to the Museum and tour the U-Boot.

Got to see the Type XXI in Hamburg, Germany when I was there. Unfortunately the ship was closed at the time. Here is a pic I took. I took more if I can find the rest...


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## nuuumannn (Sep 6, 2013)

Nice photos, guys. There's a U-boat in Finland as well. Anyone got any photos?



> U-124, her original Edelweiss emblem is visible as well as the Frog that was added by Korvettenkapitän Johann Mohr when he assumed command.



There's a great book about U 124 called _Grey wolf, grey sea_, very well worth looking out for. Excellent story.


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## stug3 (Sep 6, 2013)

HMS TRIBUNE in Scottish waters, possibly at Campbeltown September 1942.






Forward view from the conning tower of HMS TRIBUNE running on the surface in Scottish waters. 






The First Lieutenant, R Bulkeley at the forward periscope of HMS TRIBUNE. Helmsman at the wheel, messenger on the telephone and a rating.


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## parsifal (Sep 12, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I should be checking out the U-505 in Chicago next week. While my wife is attending a lecture there at the Shed Aquarium. I will head over to the Museum and tour the U-Boot.
> 
> Got to see the Type XXI in Hamburg, Germany when I was there. Unfortunately the ship was closed at the time. Here is a pic I took. I took more if I can find the rest...




A great looking ship, and I think a design with great potential to cause an upset if introduced earlier


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 12, 2013)

I don't think it would have changed much even earlier. A great design, but there was no chance at turning the tides.


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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2013)

Its arguable I admit. However, on the assumption that the Type XXIs were entering service from middle of '43, and the germans were not rupturing on the Eastern Front, the Type XXI would have meant the battle of Atlantic was not decided as it was from March 1943. A failure to bring the KM to heel in the Atlantic puts the whole second front strategy in doubt, a more fl;exible response in the East, more realistically matched to german capabilities, instead of overstretching to the Stalingrad conclusion, means the Russians may well be forced to the peace table...

There are a lot of ifs, at the top of which has to be put Hitler and his leadership team. they were incapable of thinking in these terms, and therein lies your reasons for the germans defeat. And of course, the fact that Germansy allowed herself to fight too many wars at the same time, with insufficient resources


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## stug3 (Sep 14, 2013)

Shuttle service for shipwrecked persons from the RMS Laconia between U156 (foreground) and U507 (background) as they redistribute the rescued men between them on 15th September 1942. Picture taken by Oblt. z. S. Leopold Schuhmacher.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> A great looking ship, and I think a design with great potential to cause an upset if introduced earlier



If (Big If) the KM could have got a large number of XXIs at sea they would have caused trouble. However even if the production line had got rolling in 43 the XXIs arent going to be in service for probably 6 months to a year and by early 44 I think the Allies had enough carriers, escorts and merchantmen to deal with anything the KM could throw at them. Sinkings and casualties would go up but I cant honestly see a third Happy Time happening. The XXI would need to be in service in large numbers well before mid 43 to have any hope of effecting the Battle of the Atlantic.


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## DonL (Sep 14, 2013)

Debatable!

From what we know today and the very detailed tests of the US Navy and also from the tests with the Guppy program (which submarines weren't as advanced as the XXI), a lot of chaos would be at the Atlantic, if Gerrmany could manage to bring hundreds of submarines in action. D-Day would be very questionable.
Conventional ASW wasn't this effective against the XXI, also a/c's and their radar needed a lot of luck to detect a snorkeling XXI.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...-really-wonder-weapon-32612-2.html#post904635


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## fastmongrel (Sep 15, 2013)

DonL said:


> Debatable!
> 
> From what we know today and the very detailed tests of the US Navy and also from the tests with the Guppy program (which submarines weren't as advanced as the XXI), a lot of chaos would be at the Atlantic, if Gerrmany could manage to bring hundreds of submarines in action. D-Day would be very questionable.
> Conventional ASW wasn't this effective against the XXI, also a/c's and their radar needed a lot of luck to detect a snorkeling XXI.
> ...



I agree with everything you say but its a question of tonnage can the German shipyards build XXIs fast enough and early enough. The XXI was nothing revolutionary if each part of it was taken individually but putting everything together and building them in the numbers required isnt going to happen in 42 which is when the boats have to be built then crews trained to get them into service in large numbers for say late 43. By late 43 Allied (look for pictures of Kaisers west coast yards) shipyards are churning out hulls like shelling peas. Can German U Boats sink enough merchant hulls to stop D Day I dont think so, delay it not sure there either the Torch Landings went ahead when the U Boats were sinking lots of hulls. 

By 44 the USN could if required pull carriers and escorts from the Pacific (Adm King would have blown a fuse) and there would be so many escort groups that Wolf Pack tactics arent going to work, any boat using its radio is going to be triangulated with HuffDuff and be chased deep by VLR aircraft, carrier aircraft and hunter groups of ASW vessels. Even if the Allies couldnt sink many XXIs they can disrupt them enough to get sufficent convoys through. After all even during the Happy Times 90% of convoys got through pretty much unscathed. 

Its a numbers game and a brutal game but I dont believe the KM had the numbers to stop or delay D-Day substantially even with say Walther boats and the latest Electric fish. Its the old Sherman v Panther numbers again it might take 5 Shermans to kill a Panther but if one side has 10,000 Shermans and the other has 1,000 Panthers who comes out on top.


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## stug3 (Sep 15, 2013)

The Free French submarine FFS JUNON at a buoy in Plymouth Sound. She was now operating alongside the Royal Navy and was selected for Operation Muskatoon mission in Norway because her profile was closer to a U-boat than British submarines. It was hoped that if she had to surface in the shallow waters into the Fjords she was less likely to cause alarm.


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## stug3 (Sep 23, 2013)

X-Craft 25 underway in Loch Striven, near Rothesay with Lieut J E Smart, RNVR, the Commanding Officer on deck by the conning tower. 4 X Craft attacked battleship TIRPITZ at her anchorage in Alten Fjord in Norway, 9/22/43. X6 and X7 had successfully dropped their charges, disabling the the Tirpitz until April 1944.






Sub Lieutenant K C J Robinson, RNVR, of Crosby, Liverpool, a Commanding Officer in an X-craft at the periscope whilst sailing in Rothesay Bay. 






HMS Truculent, one of the conventional submarines that towed the X craft across the North Sea for the attack.






An aerial reconnaissance photograph of Alten Fjord showing the German battleship TIRPITZ at her anchorage where the Tirpitz was attacked and damaged by British midget submarines. Note the L shaped torpedo net around the ship.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 23, 2013)

Went and saw U-505 this weekend in Chicago. 

Wow!


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## parsifal (Sep 23, 2013)

worth seeing then I take it..... any shots???


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 23, 2013)

Yeah I will post some up in the next few days.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 23, 2013)

Great photos stug but one teensy little gripe Lt Robinsons home town Crosby is near Liverpool and has it as its current postal town but it has never been part of Liverpool and at the time the correct address would have been Crosby Lancashire. Us pedants are such a pain


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## stug3 (Sep 28, 2013)

USS Sculpin (SS-191) off San Francisco, California, on 1 May 1943, following an overhaul.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 13, 2013)

Went and saw the U-505 in Chicago a few weeks ago. Type IXC U-Boot. Very, very, very impressive how they restored her and set her up in the Museum. 

Did not get to go inside the U-Boot because the tickets for going inside of it were sold out. That's okay though, because my wife was not able to go to the Museum, so we have to go back. We will just buy the tickets to go inside in advance and check it out again in the next few months.

Here are some pics that I took...

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## silence (Oct 15, 2013)

If you haven't read R.Adm. Daniel Gallery's book on the U-505, pick up a copy. He commanded the ASW group that captured her. Its a helluva story: fencing, fighting, torture, revenge, giants, monsters, chases, escapes, true love....

U-505 (Original Title: 20 Million Tons Under the Sea): Daniel V. Gallery: 9780446320122: Amazon.com: Books


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## GrauGeist (Oct 15, 2013)

We have photos stored away somewhere of the subs my Uncle Fred served aboard in the PTO (USS Grayling-SS209 USS Cavalla-SS244)

I'll see if I can dig them up scan them


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## parsifal (Oct 15, 2013)

thanks for posting Adler


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## vinnye (Oct 18, 2013)

I love the photos!
Just looking at the gun platform behind the conning tower - must have caused some drag, maybe evn noise?


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## meatloaf109 (Oct 18, 2013)

The last time I saw the U-505, she was still outside and looked a little worse for wear. They have done a magnificent job of protecting and preserving a one of a kind intact U-boot!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 18, 2013)

You are correct, I bought a book in the gift shop that talks about the history if U-505 from beginning to its final resting spot inside the museum. Right up into the 80's she was sitting outside falling apart.


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## meatloaf109 (Oct 19, 2013)

I think it was in 1975. My memory is fuzzy. 
I remember touring the "boot" with my dad. He was sunk as a merchant marine sailor three times. Once he spent over thirty days in a lifeboat. The weird thing is he held no rancor for the Germans. When he joined the U.S.N. and was subjected to kamikaze attacks, but wasn't sunk, he held a hatred for all things Japanese until the end of his days.
Go figure.....


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## GrauGeist (Oct 19, 2013)

meatloaf109 said:


> The weird thing is he held no rancor for the Germans. When he joined the U.S.N. and was subjected to kamikaze attacks, but wasn't sunk, he held a hatred for all things Japanese until the end of his days.
> Go figure.....


Both my Mom's older brothers served with the USN in the Pacific, one aboard Destroyers, the other (mentioned above) served aboard Subs. My Uncle Fred, the submariner survived his sub being sunk and never had an issue with Japanese. My other Uncle had his destroyer sunk during the battle of the Solomons and later survived kamikaze attacks aboard other destroyers. He, unlike his older brother, disliked anything Japanese for the rest of his life.


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## meatloaf109 (Oct 19, 2013)

Anything and every thing even remotely Japanese.


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## Messy1 (Oct 24, 2013)

I saw that boat many years ago during a small family vacation. I was in 1st or 2nd grade at the time. And it was sitting outside. Looks like they have done a remarkable job restoring it and bringing it inside. 

Attempting to finish up a good book about submariners in WW2. The Depths Of Courage by Flint Whitlock and Ron Smith. Pretty good book, not a lot of technical details, but a very enjoyable read. Check it out of you get a chance.


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## mikec1 (Oct 25, 2013)

.
.
.
Greetings DerAdlerIstGelandet;





Nice post, and an excellent set of photos .............. 






Mike
.
.
.

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## mikec1 (Oct 26, 2013)

.
.
.
Greetings Folks;



Some photos of the capture of U-505.


After the U-boat was depth charged and forced to the surface the crew abandoned
the boat. Before they left they opened the Sea Cocks in an attempt to sink the
boat.

Capt. Gallery, ((In the US Navy) a Captain is equivalent to a Colonel in the USAF), other personnel boarded
the boat to search for classified material. In the mean time the sailors had secured the Sea Cocks and done
a quick estimate of the damage done to the U-boat. It was determined that with emergency repair work, and
by using portable pumps they might be able to keep her from sinking.

As a bonus they recovered the Emaga message coding machine, maps, and two large sacks of classified material.
With the Emaga the US Navy could un-code the messages that where sent to, and from the German Naval
Command.

Note: in these photos how close the U-boat came to sinking ............ 


Photographs............ US Naval Archives 



Enjoy,


Mike
.
.
.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 26, 2013)

*ENIGMA* coding machine...

It also was not the first Enigma coding machine that was captured by the allies.


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## mikec1 (Oct 26, 2013)

.
.
.
........ Correct, the British already had one. But this was still a great recovery for the United States
Naval Intelligence.



Mike
.
.
.


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## redcoat (Oct 26, 2013)

mikec1 said:


> .
> .
> .
> ........ Correct, the British already had one. But this was still a great recovery for the United States
> Naval Intelligence.


The British and US had been able to read the codes of the naval 4 wheel rota Enigma since the capture of a machine and code books on the 30 October 1942 from the U-559.
The capture of the U-505 actually caused the code breakers a few sleepless nights as they feared the Germans might find out and change their codes
Admiral King at one point considered court marshaling the commanding officer of the destroyer group who captured her for bringing her back to port, instead of sinking her after the removal of any valuable code material and equipment.


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## Wurger (Oct 26, 2013)

redcoat said:


> The British and US had been able to read the codes of the naval 4 wheel rota Enigma since the capture of a machine and code books on the 30 October 1942 from the U-559.



To be honest it isn't exactly true. British have been able to read the Enigma codes because they had received it from Polish MI before the war started. Also I agree with DerAdlerIstGelandet's post #106 above.


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## fastmongrel (Oct 26, 2013)

Wurger said:


> To be honest it isn't exactly true. British have been able to read the Enigma codes because they had received it from Polish MI before the war started. Also I agree with DerAdlerIstGelandet's post #106 above.



They didnt get the Naval 4 rotor Enigma from Poland. They got an Army 3 rotor machine iirc from the Polish via the French.


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## Milosh (Oct 26, 2013)

Does Wiki need some corrections?

_The Navy was the first military branch to adopt Enigma. This version, named Funkschlüssel C ("Radio cipher C"), had been put into production by 1925 and was introduced into service in 1926.[27]

The keyboard and lampboard contained 29 letters—A-Z, Ä, Ö and Ü—which were arranged alphabetically, as opposed to the QWERTZU ordering.[28] The rotors had 28 contacts, with the letter X wired to bypass the rotors unencrypted.[9]

Three rotors were chosen from a set of five[29] and the reflector could be inserted in one of four different positions, denoted α, β, γ and δ.[30] The machine was revised slightly in July 1933.[31]

By 15 July 1928,[32] the German Army (Reichswehr) had introduced their own version of the Enigma—the Enigma G, revised to the Enigma I by June 1930.[33] Enigma I is also known as the Wehrmacht, or "Services" Enigma, and was used extensively by German military services and other government organisations (such as the railways[34]), before and during World War II.

The major difference between Enigma I and commercial Enigma models was the addition of a plugboard to swap pairs of letters, greatly increasing cryptographic strength. Other differences included the use of a fixed reflector and the relocation of the stepping notches from the rotor body to the movable letter rings. The machine measured 28×34×15 cm (11 in×13.5 in×6 in) and weighed around 12 kg (26 lb).[35]

By 1930, the Army had suggested that the Navy adopt their machine, citing the benefits of increased security (with the plugboard) and easier interservice communications.[36] The Navy eventually agreed and in 1934[37] brought into service the Navy version of the Army Enigma, designated Funkschlüssel ' or M3. While the Army used only three rotors at that time, the Navy specified a choice of three from a possible five.[38]

In December 1938, the Army issued two extra rotors so that the three rotors were chosen from a set of five.[33] In 1938, the Navy added two more rotors, and then another in 1939 to allow a choice of three rotors from a set of eight.[38] In August 1935, the Air Force introduced the Wehrmacht Enigma for their communications.[33]

A four-rotor Enigma was introduced by the Navy for U-boat traffic on 1 February 1942, called M4 (the network was known as Triton, or Shark to the Allies). The extra rotor was fitted in the same space by splitting the reflector into a combination of a thin reflector and a thin fourth rotor.

There was also a large, eight-rotor printing model, the Enigma II. In 1933 the Polish Cipher Bureau detected that it was in use for high-level military communications, but that it was soon withdrawn, as it was unreliable and jammed frequently.[39]

The Abwehr used the Enigma G (the Abwehr Enigma). This Enigma variant was a four-wheel unsteckered machine with multiple notches on the rotors. This model was equipped with a counter which incremented upon each key press, and so is also known as the "counter machine" or the Zählwerk Enigma.

During World War II the Abwehr used these machines to control and report the locations of submarines in the Atlantic and to pass information about bombing raids, the movement of military units, and the location and cargo of military supply ships. Before Enigma Britain was in danger of being starved into submission and after it the roles were virtually reversed. The British moved one step ahead of the Germans and began sinking submarines faster than they could be built._


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## silence (Oct 26, 2013)

with all those options and changes no wonder it was called "enigma"


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## GregP (Apr 11, 2016)

The German Kriegsmarine U-Boats came very close to bringing the Allies to their knees. They lost 75% of their boats during the war.

The US Navy, on the other hand, had a total of only 311 submarines or so and only lost 62, or 17% during the war. While they may not have been brilliant at the start of the war, that loss rate is among the best of the war, and they operated in all oceans.

I'll certainly grant we weren't anywhere near the head of the class at the start of the war, but either our our luck was phenomenal (unlikely) or our skippers were good but inexperienced at attack and attack strategy. They seem to have been among the best at self-preservation and evasion.

Of course, it could also be that the Japanese didn't have very good sub-hunting abilities for most of the war. We already know there weren't many German ships at sea in the Atlantic hunting our subs. So, it is possible the opposition was simply not equipped to hunt our subs very well and we DID have extraordinary luck.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 19, 2016)

It is a combination of everything. Part of the early war problem was unrealistic training in the pre-war years. 
The Umpires in the war games/exercises were biased against the submarines and declared them "killed" or knocked out at a very high rate which breed extreme caution in commanders. Getting your boat sunk repeatedly even in war games didn't do much for promotional chances. Likewise the damage the submarines were estimated to do was under played. 
It took _almost _wholesale replacement of the commanders in charge at the beginning of the war to get an aggressive command mind set. Of course the whole torpedo debacle placed a premium on escape and evasion, trading a Fleet boat for dud torpedo bouncing off a small freighter was never a good trade 

The Japanese never came up to the western standards of anti-sub warfare ( granted they started several years later and didn't have any WW I experience to speak of). This was due, in part, to the size of the Japanese industry. They just couldn't build the numbers of escorts needed although they tried with a late start.


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## parsifal (Apr 20, 2016)

Enigma was a critical element in the end to allied victory over the uboats, but in the end it was just one part of the victory and for quite long periods it was quite ineffective.

At the beginning of the war, the intelligence advantages were firmly in favour of the germans. it was they who had access to Royal Navy transmissions and advance warning of allied intentions. It was a gradual process for the allies to firstly seal off the intelligence leaks in their own camp and then be able to read those of the Kriegsmarine.

After March 1941, there was never a period where the allies could not read KM communications, its just that it took time to decode messages, and Allied resources were limited. if codes were hard to read, it took longer to decipher them and only a small percentage could be read. If the codebreaking was easy, a larger volume of traffic could be read and information obtained more quickly.

Moreover, sigint was not found to be of great help in sinking uboats, rather its main advantage was found to be re-routing convoys away from known concentrations of enemy uboats. a Uboat was a relatively stationary hunter, except if it could travel on the surface. its a misnomer to call WWII subs a "submarine", better to describe them as "submersibles". Enigma enabled convoys to be re-routed, air cover denied uboats the ability to surface and relocate. Between them, these elements denied the uboat much of its offensive capability.

What caused the sinking rate of Uboats at the hands iof the allies to increase? Greater and better escorts, improved weapons and detection systems, radar on the escorts, better and dedicated ASW warfare training. The realization that it is best to form and keep together escorts as tight knit escort groups. the formation of mobile reserves, the so called hunter killer groups, roaming freely to suppress Uboats and reinforce convoys that needed it. The Leigh Light, ASV radar, effective long range air cover to give plenty of warning about approaching wolfpacks. Ahead Throwing weapons, radar with sufficient high resolution to detect even just a snorkel or periscope, but earlier at least the conning tower of a surfaced uboat trying to penetrate to the inner screen of the convoy. And most importantly, the production capacity to swamp and overwhelm the sinking capabilities of the uboats

Victory over the uboats simply cant be attributed one event or time. It was a painful slow and multifaceted process and each element really was vital to that victory. moreover, without a victory over the Uboats, nothing else was possible. It was the decisive battle of WWII. no other battle, not Midway, or Coral Sea, Alamein, Stalingrad, battle for Germany, came anywhere near it as far as importance was concerned. The losses being suffered in the Atlantic also had the potential to affect the US almost as badly as it could the UK. It is a battle underappreciated and misunderstood today as ever, I suspect because it was unglamorous and without a single decisive moment or turning point (although the March 1943 battles do come close).


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