# What if the Luftwaffe technological gambles worked out?



## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

Inspired by this post:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/optimize-ju88-speed-42985-2.html#post1193328


> 1941-1942 should have been a watershed year for the production of advanced types: the Me 210 should have replaced much of the the Me 110, Ju 88 and Ju 87 fleet. The Ju 288 should have begun replacing much of the Ju 88, He 111, Do 217
> and the He 177 should have been debugged replacing many of the twin engine bombers as well as the Fw 200.
> 
> The He 177 should have been easiest save as the Heinkel firms owner, Earnest Heinkel had begged to develop a 4 separate engine version early enough but was at that time denied. Not much could be done about the DB606/610 engine problems or those of the Jumo 222. Both were essentially solved by 1944 but then it was too late.



Supposing the Ju288 with its Jumo 222 engine, Me210, and He177 with the DB606 engine all worked out by 1941-1942 as planned, what would it have functionally have meant for the Luftwaffe in the second stage of the war?


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## stona (Mar 19, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Supposing the Ju288 with its Jumo 222 engine, Me210, and He177 with the DB606 engine all worked out by 1941-1942 as planned, what would it have functionally have meant for the Luftwaffe in the second stage of the war?



Not a lot. None of them could fly without fuel or aircrew.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

stona said:


> Not a lot. None of them could fly without fuel or aircrew.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



In 1941-1942 they had enough of both, plus the Me210 was less draggy and would cost less fuel per mile flown, while the Jumo 222 was the most fuel efficient piston engine the Germans had:
Junkers Jumo 222 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## stona (Mar 19, 2015)

Not really, been covered before. In July 1942 (at Karinhall) Goering received the unpalatable news that due to fuel shortages for training command only 40% of required fighter pilots and 20% of required bomber crews could be produced.
The average monthly allotment of fuel to training command was 27,000 tonnes in 1941, cut to an average of just 15,000 tonnes in 1942. In September 1942 training command was allotted just 3,000 tonnes for the subsequent five week period which virtually brought all flying training to a halt.
There was also a severe shortage of instructors, many of whom were posted to transport command, flying ill advised missions to their encircled comrades.

Front line Luftwaffe units were not struggling for fuel yet, but they were already struggling for replacements.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

stona said:


> Not really, been covered before. In July 1942 (at Karinhall) Goering received the unpalatable news that due to fuel shortages for training command only 40% of required fighter pilots and 20% of required bomber crews could be produced.
> The average monthly allotment of fuel to training command was 27,000 tonnes in 1941, cut to an average of just 15,000 tonnes in 1942. In September 1942 training command was allotted just 3,000 tonnes for the subsequent five week period which virtually brought all flying training to a halt.
> Cheers
> Steve



Despite that they didn't experience crippling pilot shortages until 1943-44 with the mass slaughters over Tunisia/Sicily/Italy and Stalingrad, the attrition over Italy and Germany, and the final nail in the coffin with the introduction of the P-51D. Despite the training school shortages there was enough for the front until 1944 and the bombing of oil production. Having quality aircraft from 1941-42 introduced would keep the slaughter of pilots to a lower level than it historically was and reduce the pressure on training schools.

Let's not forget too that the USSR training programs never had more than 60% of fuel requirements, yet they produced an air force comparable to the Western Allies in number.


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## stona (Mar 19, 2015)

You're joking, in January 1942 the Luftwaffe was operating with only 54.8% of its authorised aircrew strength (59.6% fighter pilots, 47.2% bomber crews). It never recovered.

The falling quality of Luftwaffe training is reflected in the fact that losses (aircraft written off) as early as 1941 were nearly as many due to accidents as to enemy action (43% to 57%). In January 1942 pilots were sent to front line units a month early, before completion of the training program which was anyway shortened, with flying significantly reduced, shortly thereafter. The Luftwaffe was already in crisis, the advent of the USAAF and its escorts pushed it over the edge. The Luftwaffe, like all German services, showed almost incredible resilience, fighting well into 1944, even early 1945. Most others would have collapsed sooner.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

Given those troubles then, wouldn't technically superior aircraft have been what was needed to maximize the potential of the declining numbers of experienced pilots?


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## GrauGeist (Mar 19, 2015)

Look how much time was lost flogging the corpse of the Me210...

They could have done much better with the Fw187 (fighter) and Ar240 (in lieu of the Me210) as a replacement for the Bf110


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## stona (Mar 19, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Given those troubles then, wouldn't technically superior aircraft have been what was needed to maximize the potential of the declining numbers of experienced pilots?



Yes, but how technically superior was the Me 210/410 to allied fighters? Same goes for everything, with the possible exception of the jets. Who was going to crew the He 177s?
There is a lesson to be learned from experiences on the ground. German tanks, in fact almost all German weapons, were superior to those of the allies (until the late advent of the Pershing et alter) but quality does not necessarily compensate for quantity. The Luftwaffe would have been overwhelmed in any case.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

stona said:


> Yes, but how technically superior was the Me 210/410 to allied fighters? Same goes for everything, with the possible exception of the jets. Who was going to crew the He 177s?
> There is a lesson to be learned from experiences on the ground. German tanks, in fact almost all German weapons, were superior to those of the allies (until the late advent of the Pershing et alter) but quality does not necessarily compensate for quantity. The Luftwaffe would have been overwhelmed in any case.
> 
> Cheers
> ...



In 1941-42 it had a major use, especially compared to the Bf110 and in some uses the Ju88 during daylight. Its major issue was getting into production too late. 

The he177 could be crewed by the guys used on the Fw200, Ju290, and arguably the He111s that were used for strategic bombing. Plus of course the guys that crewed them historically, as there were some 1200 built and several Gruppen formed.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 19, 2015)

The problem with the Me410 (and Me210 had it been problem free from the onset) is that it required additional fighter protection to conduct it's mission.

So instead of being an asset, it was an additional drain on resources.


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The problem with the Me410 (and Me210 had it been problem free from the onset) is that it required additional fighter protection to conduct it's mission.
> 
> So instead of being an asset, it was an additional drain on resources.



How did the Ju88, He111, and Bf110 operate historically? The Me210 was faster than all of the above carrying bombs, even faster than the Do217; that's the point of the design.


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## stona (Mar 19, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> The Me210 was faster than all of the above carrying bombs, even faster than the Do217;



But not many bombs. None of these were game changers.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

stona said:


> But not many bombs. None of these were game changers.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Sure, but the statement wasn't about that, it was about need for escorts and considering we are talking about replacing one for the other clearly slower models were able to survive in that period, so a better performing aircraft would either have escorts or wouldn't need them.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 19, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> How did the Ju88, He111, and Bf110 operate historically? The Me210 was faster than all of the above carrying bombs, even faster than the Do217; that's the point of the design.


In making reference to the Me210, I am talking about like types...

The Bf110 was designated as a "heavy fighter", not a "schnell bomber". The Me210, with all of it's problems, would (in theory) do 350mph (564kph)...load it down with 2,200 pounds (1,000 kg) of bombs and it will be much slower. The Me410 was faster by 30mph, but again load it down with bombs and it pays a penalty in performance.

This is not a world beater.

Additionally, the heavy fighter concept is a notion carried through from the late 20's and 30's...the only way the Bf110 was going to be successfully replaced, is by a type that could produce adequate speed and performance. This would not be the Me210/Me410 by a long shot.


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> In making reference to the Me210, I am talking about like types...
> 
> The Bf110 was designated as a "heavy fighter", not a "schnell bomber". The Me210, with all of it's problems, would (in theory) do 350mph (564kph)...load it down with 2,200 pounds (1,000 kg) of bombs and it will be much slower. The Me410 was faster by 30mph, but again load it down with bombs and it pays a penalty in performance.
> 
> ...



Yes, but considering the speed of the Bf110 fighter-bomber with the same load it was at least 30mph faster, therefore mores surviveable in 1941-43 when it was needed; by 1944 it was dog meat as a heavy fighter, but still solid as a fast bomber, especially in the East and at night.


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## davebender (Mar 19, 2015)

Messerschmitt Bf 162 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Not exactly true. 

Bf-162 fast bomber came first. When that was rejected Messerschmitt modified the design and sold it to Luftwaffe as Me-110 "zerstorer".


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2015)

davebender said:


> Messerschmitt Bf 162 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> Not exactly true.
> 
> Bf-162 fast bomber came first. When that was rejected Messerschmitt modified the design and sold it to Luftwaffe as Me-110 "zerstorer".



That looks a lot like the Pe-2:


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## GrauGeist (Mar 19, 2015)

Zerstorer = Destroyer

The Bf110 was originally developed as a heavy fighter

The Bf162 was spun off the Bf110 design as a light bomber just as the Bf161 was spun off the Bf110 as a high-speed recon platform.

Bf110 V1 first flight: 12 May 1936
Bf161 V1 first flight: 9 March 1938
Bf162 V1 first flight: 26 February 1937


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## kool kitty89 (Mar 20, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Given those troubles then, wouldn't technically superior aircraft have been what was needed to maximize the potential of the declining numbers of experienced pilots?


Exactly why focusing on the likes of the Fw-187, Fw-190 (including emphasizing DB-603 powered variants as soon as such engines were available), and possibly He-100s would have been more significant.



GrauGeist said:


> Look how much time was lost flogging the corpse of the Me210...
> 
> They could have done much better with the Fw187 (fighter) and Ar240 (in lieu of the Me210) as a replacement for the Bf110


Yes, Fw-187 as the LW's definitive long range day fighter and heavy interceptor, possibly fighter-bomber as well, similar to the P-38. (and similarly adaptable to the night fighter role once combat radar units came online)

The Ar-240 in place of the Me 210/410 and possibly displacing the Ju-88, but keeping the latter as a stop gap and backup plan, or taking the conservative route and just focus on improved Ju-88 derivatives outright. (given the quality over quantity necessity, though, taking a chance by investing in supporting the 240 seems reasonable)

Having more twins in service would have complicated training somewhat, but also potentially eased transition to Me-262 fighter units later on too. (not the same, but twin piston to twin jet is better than single piston to twin jet)



Relying on the large, slowly developed and late to service engines for any design was a big problem. Focusing on more practical alternatives from the start would make much more sense. (accounting for less powerful engines and either using more engines or keeping the size/weight down)



Of course, there's also the jets ... but those programs weren't quite the same 'gambles' early on so much as inconsistently supported. (and for all their offensive tactical dreams early on, there was an odd lack of emphasis on high speed jet bombers ... granted, attack and dive bombers are totally impractical due to speed and fuel consumption at low alt, but medium/high altitude level bombers would have been more interesting)

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## wiking85 (Mar 20, 2015)

What use would the Luftwaffe make of the Ju288 as it phases out the Ju88, what will it do with the He177 in lieu of the FW200 and Ju290, while the Me210 takes over from the Bf110 (which remains in night fighter service, but not production), Ju88, and Ju87? Would the Ju88 remain as a night fighter airframe? Would the He219 end up produced with the Jumo 222? Could we see a Jumo 222 engined fighter?


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## GrauGeist (Mar 20, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Of course, there's also the jets ... but those programs weren't quite the same 'gambles' early on so much as inconsistently supported. (and for all their offensive tactical dreams early on, there was an odd lack of emphasis on high speed jet bombers ... granted,* attack and dive bombers are totally impractical due to speed and fuel consumption at low alt,* but medium/high altitude level bombers would have been more interesting)



Look at Henschel's Hs132, purposely designed as a dive bomber.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 20, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> In 1941-1942 they had enough of both, plus the Me210 was less draggy and would cost less fuel per mile flown, while the Jumo 222 was the most fuel efficient piston engine the Germans had:
> Junkers Jumo 222 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



_Most_ aircraft piston engines could get down into the low .50s or high .40s. Even the Merlin which wasn't noted for being a very economical engine could get down to .52-53 lb/hp/hr in certain cruise conditions. That means it used about 10% more fuel per hp/hr than the Jumo 222. Most of the German V-12s could get under .50 lb/hp/hr meaning that they were jumping through a lot of hoops for a very poor return. Even it is true going to that level of complexity for 2-5% hardly seems worth it. 

You also have to read Wiki articles very carefully. 
"The dry weight was 1,088 kg (2,399 lb), only some 17 kg (39 lb) heavier than the air-cooled Double Wasp."

Which is quite true but rather neglects the weight of the radiators and coolant needed by the Jumo 222. Comparing _dry_ weights never looks good for air-cooled engines. As in 

" Even more impressively the power-to-weight ratio was 1.7 kW/kg (1.04 hp/lb) for the 222, whereas the 605 delivered an otherwise excellent 1.4 kW/kg (0.88 hp/lb), and the 801 a fairly poor 1 kW/kg (0.60 hp/lb)."

Now which 605 are they comparing and which 801 and what happens when you add the weight of the radiators and coolant? The Jumo may still come out ahead but not by the landslide the figures given portray.

And of course the 605 and 801 actually powered aircraft that went into service. Jumo 222s were so bad that even after being flown in a few prototypes, later prototypes of the same type/s of aircraft switched back to 801s or 603s or Jumo 213s so they could get flying time on the airframe. Hanger queens with Jumo 222s installed don't tell you how the aircraft flies.

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## kool kitty89 (Mar 21, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> Look at Henschel's Hs132, purposely designed as a dive bomber.


A shallow dive bomber focusing on lob bombing and reliant on a specialized computing bombsight. A more primitive counterpart to that earlier in the war might have been somewhat feasible, but level bombers seem more practical. 

Using jets for low alt attack runs, anti-armor, and strafing would make the fuel consumption issues more pronounced. Granted, the fuel flexibility of jets would make up for some of that in logistical terms (still limits operational endurance/range) 





Shortround6 said:


> _Most_ aircraft piston engines could get down into the low .50s or high .40s. Even the Merlin which wasn't noted for being a very economical engine could get down to .52-53 lb/hp/hr in certain cruise conditions. That means it used about 10% more fuel per hp/hr than the Jumo 222. Most of the German V-12s could get under .50 lb/hp/hr meaning that they were jumping through a lot of hoops for a very poor return. Even it is true going to that level of complexity for 2-5% hardly seems worth it.


If they were going for fuel efficiency, wouldn't investing further into diesel designs make more sense? (not to mention the huge logistical advantages of diesel oil production over gasoline -and reduced fire hazard, among other things)

If they were going to put heavier development into any 'exotic' engine, Jumo's 2-stroke opposed piston diesel engines seem like a more useful direction to pursue. (especially ones that performed more reliably at takeoff/combat power)

4-stroke diesels would be interesting too, follow-on designs to the DB-602 (targeting fixed-wing aircraft) could have been very useful, at very least for bomber and patrol/recon aircraft. (and long-range strategic bombers in particular, more so if they implemented turbochargers)

For that matter, development of smaller, fairly low power diesel engines for use in light aircraft and trainers could have greatly reduced the logistical fuel problems the LW was suffering.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 22, 2015)

The Diesel had a problem with power to weight. The Best the Jumo Diesel did was about 1000hp for 1450lbs dry weight, granted this was for a turbo version which could maintain the power to a considerable height. It still leaves a bit to be desired for take-off though. It also meant running it at at 3000rpm which meant a higher than normal piston speed (although not as high as a Pegasus). 

The Diesel was only going to be useful when the length of the mission meant that the combines weight of the engine _and_ fuel (and diesel fuel weighs more per gallon) was lighter for the diesel than the for the gasoline engine. 

Diesel powered trainers requires a bigger leap of technology than you might think. Trainer engines can be pretty low tech, The Bramo radial weighed about 300lbs, ran on 80 octane gas and gave 160hp for take-off using carburetors. 

The Bücker Bü 181 Bestmann had about a 600lb useful load, "crew" of two plus fuel and oil. The 4 cylinder 105hp (95hp max continuous) Hirth engine weighed 247lbs, 
The Arado 96 had useful load of about 900lbs. The 12cylinder Argus gave 460hp take-off for about 700lbs of weight.


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## Koopernic (Mar 22, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> _Most_ aircraft piston engines could get down into the low .50s or high .40s. Even the Merlin which wasn't noted for being a very economical engine could get down to .52-53 lb/hp/hr in certain cruise conditions. That means it used about 10% more fuel per hp/hr than the Jumo 222. Most of the German V-12s could get under .50 lb/hp/hr meaning that they were jumping through a lot of hoops for a very poor return. Even it is true going to that level of complexity for 2-5% hardly seems worth it.
> 
> You also have to read Wiki articles very carefully.
> "The dry weight was 1,088 kg (2,399 lb), only some 17 kg (39 lb) heavier than the air-cooled Double Wasp."
> ...



The Wikipedia Comparing the Jumo 222A2/B2 to the Pratt Whitney R-2800 "Double Wasp" is unfair, the R-2800 needed 100/130 fuel and Water Injection to exceed 2000hp whereas the Jumo 222 was expected to do 2500hp on 87 octane, levels the R-2800 achieved only in 1944. The Jumo 222 was actually tested with 87 octane + MW50 and produced 2800-2900hp and 3000 with GM1(Nitrous)

A fairer comparison would be the Jumo 222A2/B2 of 1088kg weight with the CW R-3350 "Double Cyclone" of 1212kg. 

The weight of radiator and cooling liquid plus oil on both would lead to equal weight, however the Jumo 222 would have a significant drag advantage.

The R-3350 produced 2200hp in 1945 using 100/130 whereas the Jumo 222A2/B2 was expected to produce 2500hp on 87 octane fuel. 87 octane is equal to about 63 PN. You can see what Junkers was trying to do. Moreover the Jumo 222 would have had substantially less drag, something quite important since its mission profile would involve a great deal of high speed low altitude work where thicker air has an impact. The Ju 288 mission profile was initially very high altitude penetration followed by a dive bombing and low altitude attacks.

One reason the Jumo 222 was preferred over its rival the Daimler-Benz DB604 was that the Jumo 222 promised a very high cruise power and very good cruise consumption. Both were elements that the German engines were characteristically good at probably due to the nature of the airframes and fuels they had. Note they were doing excellent fuel consumption on only 87 octane.

The Jumo 222 didn't fail, it was rescheduled for production on October 1944. The Junkers Ju 288 on March 1944. So what happened?

It was killed by airframe weight growth, planning and resource limitations as much as delays.

Here is a month by month chronology.

1 1937 design work begins on Jumo 222A1/B1 (note the R-3350 had run this year).
2 1937 design work also begins on the Ju 288 as EF73 but using a longer running diesel engine known as Jumo 223
3 1938 Powerplant of EF73 changed to Jumo 222 gasoline engine.
4 1939 April first test run of Jumo 222
5 1940 March 2000hp achieved 100 hour test.
6 1940 the Ju 288A had been an 11000kg three man aircraft with a 3 ton internal bomb load, it is now increased to a 4 man crew, cabin is widened to allow side by side seating, weight goes up to 14000 tons empty equipped.
At this point 2500hp is considered essential rather than option. The aircraft is redesignated as the Ju 288B. Three engines are suitable: the Jumo 222A2/B2, the Jumo 222A3/B3 which has improved supercharger hydrodynamics to raise critical altitude from about 5000m to 6000m and the Jumo 222E/F which has a two stage intercooled supercharger with a critical altitude of 9300m.
7 1941 April passes a 100 hour 2500hp test, having already reached 3000hp for short periods.
8 The Ju 288V5, a version of the light weight A series, flew on 8 October 1941 Jumo 222. The V6 also flies with Jumo 222 but crashe lands due to an engine fire.
9December 1941 RLM decides to us DB610 engine instead of Jumo 222. Removal of Jumo 222 from large scale production. Note this engine is paired DB605s (not the DB606 which is paired DB601). This version of the aircraft is known as the Ju 288C and it has increased length, span and weight to compensate for the greater fuel consumption of the DB610. The DB610 never gave any problems in the Ju 288C prototypes and its test pilots spoke highly of it. 
10 1942 June confirmed 3000hp. (probably the enlarged C/D) 
11 Restoration of of Jumo 222 on production program scheduled October 1944 (the program was delayed to Feb 1944 due to need to produce Jumo 213 more urgently)

12 the Jumo 222C/D which had increased volume and had run in 1942 received highest development priority.

As you can see the first flight of the Ju 288V5 is happening the same time the RLM is abandoning the engine in favour of the paired DB610 (itself a seriously delayed engine). Prior to that Ju 288 had flown with the BMW801 (which was adaquet for the smaller 3 man airframe).

So really any serious development effort on the Jumo 222 had stopped by the end of 1941 just as the flight test program was beginning.

A note here, Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union is happening and this is changing priorities as well Jumo 222 supporter Ernst Udet has killed himself while Erhard Milch has taken over and is applying a new approach, perahaps even trying to break up junkers.

The production schedule for the Ju 288 was essentially as follows:

Jan 1942 to December 1943: initially 3 were to be produced per month ramping to 10 per month in December 1942. These were essentially prototypes but would have provides a few dozen operation aircraft for squadron evaluation.

Jan 1943 to December 1943 ramping up from 15 aircraft per month to 285 per month in 5 factories.

The engines designer, Ferdinand Brandner, says the problem with the engine is that it was developed to death due to airframe weight growth with multiple bore and stroke changes and increasing power requirements.

1 Jumo 222A1/B1 135mmm bore by 135mm stroked, this was an early engine 46L capacity
2 Jumo 222A2/B2, Jumo 222A3/B3 and Jumo 222E/F 135mm bore x 140mm stroke. 49L capcity
3 Jumo 222C/D bore 140mm x stroked 140mm (55L capacity)
4 Jumo 222G/H with 36 cylinders with original bore and stroke.

So the Jumo 222 program was really two engine programs the Jumo 222A/B and EF to produce engines in the R-3350 class and the Jumo 222C/D and G/H to produce engines more in the PW R-4360 class.

In fact in Jan 1945 the C/D received high development priority (I know this is delusional in 1945 but a decision like this is based on long terms visions going back to 1942) for use in large scale bomber projects such as the Ju 290 since 3000-3500hp was required. (This is presumably an “Amerika Bomber”)

It seems to me that once the 3000hp DB610 was selected for the Ju 288C which now increased in weight yet again and the Jumo 222A/B engine Jumo 222A/B taken of the production program that it must have been felt a 3000+ class engine would be required.

Given that the engine has passed a 2500hp test in April 1941 and is flying latter that year (October 1941 in 2000hp form) it seems to me it could have produced a reliable 2000hp production engine by the end of 1942 ready for production in early 1943.

So what would a 2000hp 1088kg engine been useful for in 1943. It’s power to weight ratio was the same as the 1750hp Jumo 213A (first service early 1944 on Ju 188A) and DB603A (service in mid 1943 on Me 410 and Dornier Do 217).

The Do 217M would probably be able to fly at 362mph (up from 347mph using a cube root law) perhaps more and cruise at around 340mph. The He 219 could use it as could the Me 264.
The Ju 188, Ju 88S, Ju88G are all possible candidates as is even the Me 410 and one would expect 5% greater speed.
The Fw 190 probably can’t take it but it could fit into the Ta 152 and was slated for the Do 335
The original Ju 288A with 3 man crew would have been viable. 

Eventually the engine should have made it to 2500-2800hp.

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## kool kitty89 (Mar 23, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The Diesel had a problem with power to weight. The Best the Jumo Diesel did was about 1000hp for 1450lbs dry weight, granted this was for a turbo version which could maintain the power to a considerable height. It still leaves a bit to be desired for take-off though. It also meant running it at at 3000rpm which meant a higher than normal piston speed (although not as high as a Pegasus).
> 
> The Diesel was only going to be useful when the length of the mission meant that the combines weight of the engine _and_ fuel (and diesel fuel weighs more per gallon) was lighter for the diesel than the for the gasoline engine.


Yes, so potentially useful for long range transports, bombers, and recon aircraft where the improved fuel economy comes into play. The 2-stroke jumo engines weren't as extremely efficient as some of the contemporary (or slightly older) 4-stroke designs, but came far closer to power:weight of gasoline engines than those others. (so even more extreme long range to be advantageous in terms of total aircraft power to weight ratio)

That's all true until you get into fuel supply logistics. With fuel production being a heavy limiting factor, fuel efficiency becomes even more important (granted weight would come into play there too -too much weight gain and you lose the fuel/power performance gains too where the engine weight takes up a smaller proportion of total weight). But even beyond that you have ability to refine different types of fuel and, unless I'm mistaken, diesel compatible fuel was significantly easier to mass produce with Germany's resources than gasoline, especially high octane aviation fuel. 



> Diesel powered trainers requires a bigger leap of technology than you might think. Trainer engines can be pretty low tech, The Bramo radial weighed about 300lbs, ran on 80 octane gas and gave 160hp for take-off using carburetors.


Right, right, strike that suggestion ... light, usually low compression, low octane fueled engines without fuel injection and used on aircraft with where the engine weight made up a significantly larger portion of total weight. (going in the opposite direction with engines able to run on the more common 70 octane automobile fuel might have been more useful for light aircraft, but there's other trade-offs there, including power/weight and fuel economy)

Using diesels in other areas (mostly large and/or long range/endurance transport/bomber/recon aircraft) would still free up aviation gasoline for other aircraft. Lack of interest in strategic bombers in LW doctrine certainly limits planning for those types, but as it was there still WERE a good number of large, long range or long endurance transport, bomber, recon, and patrol aircraft. Enough that focusing on developing usable, reasonably high power diesel engines on a large scale would make sense.

I'm not sure the Jumo diesels were considered reliable enough for some of the long range/high endurance (especially over water) flights, that along with volume production and maintenance would have been more serious compromising factors than weight. (that's the main reason I suggested it might have been worthwhile pursuing other diesel developments, even if they didn't manage the power/weight of the Jumo designs ... though the BMW 114 would probably have been more worth mentioning than the DB-602)


Admittedly, if jets were in large scale operations, the kerosene/diesel supply would have a plenty big force of fuel-hungry aircraft to feed. (very little likelihood of turbine engines being relevant in service early-war ... maybe mid-war if things went a bit differently)






Edit:
On the Jumo-222: Yes, if anything the early war A/B versions should have been focused on and brought to production even if not at the power levels desired for the super-sized twin engine aircraft being forced out. (so a more useful, practical, realistic design)

If it could enter mass production significantly sooner than the Jumo 213 could, then even more potential for its usefulness. The larger/more complex follow-on designs weren't worth developing in the timescale needed or with the engineering and manufacturing resource limits.

Perhaps a bit too large/heavy to fit well on the Fw-190 airframe ... but if any 222 would have worked there, it'd have been the smallest A1/B1 versions. (the DB-603 was a good fit in any case, plenty of heavy twins the 222 would have fit well on, possibly the Ju-88 itself)


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## Shortround6 (Mar 23, 2015)

The best illustration of power vs octane rating/compression that I know of ( there may be better ones) Is the American Fairchild Ranger engine. 

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgMakeModel.nsf/0/6a586f3a8c564f1a8525670c00523a93/$FILE/E-216.pdf

175hp on 65 octane, 180hp on 73 octane, 190hp on 80 octane and 200hp on 87 octane. Each different power rating required a different compression ratio. 

I would note that the take-off power was also the Max continuous power so they _may_ be a bit under rated compared to some other engines. There may have been cooling problems if pushed. The engine started out as a /370390 cu in engine turning 2150rpm and making 120hp on 57 octane gas.

It would have been a lot easier from an engineering point of view to build a lot more diesel trucks (a few hundred extra pounds of engine weight making a lot less difference) than to fool around with small aircraft diesels. 

While it is nice to talk about _large, long range or long endurance transport, bomber, recon, and patrol aircraft_ in reality the Germans could not build the numbers required to actually affect things much. They could have built more recon/patrol aircraft and coordinated them better with the U-boats but that is about the only significant difference. An extra couple hundred tons per week into Stalingrad wasn't going to change the outcome. It took the allies 4 engine bombers in the *tens* of thousands to bomb Germany. The Germans going from 1000-1200 big bombers to 2400 big bombers wasn't going to change the course of the war. 

If you are not aware of it, this section of the AEHS site has an interesting online book on 1940 diesel engine status/progress. 
Diesels

The Author was a bit of fan of Diesels and may have been using rose tinted glasses. A bit like the sleeve valve proponents. At any given time the Diesel (sleeve valve) may have gotten close to the gasoline (poppet valve) engine but then the gasoline (poppet valve) engine crowd moved the bar. The Comparison of the Guiberson A-1020 Diesel to a Wright R-760 isn't quite fair as you are comparing an engine under going tests in *1939-40* with an engine _designed and first built in *1928*_
, the version they were comparing the Diesel to was first built in 1935. The nine cylinder Whirlwind R-975 didn't weigh than much more than the Diesel and even on 80 octane gas could deliver about 33% more power.

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## wiking85 (Mar 23, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Y
> Edit:
> On the Jumo-222: Yes, if anything the early war A/B versions should have been focused on and brought to production even if not at the power levels desired for the super-sized twin engine aircraft being forced out. (so a more useful, practical, realistic design)
> 
> ...



Best case scenario it would be ready about the same time as the Jumo 213 at 2000hp, perhaps a few months earlier, which means most of 1943 sees a ramp up of production, but heavily delayed, as the 213 was historically, by strategic bombing of Dessau and other Jumo facilities, plus of course the Ostmark problems. So while it could be in serial production by 1944 after a delayed ramp up in 1943, it would only be in limited production like the 213 was.



Koopernic said:


> The Wikipedia Comparing the Jumo 222A2/B2 to the Pratt Whitney R-2800 "Double Wasp" is unfair, the R-2800 needed 100/130 fuel and Water Injection to exceed 2000hp whereas the Jumo 222 was expected to do 2500hp on 87 octane, levels the R-2800 achieved only in 1944. The Jumo 222 was actually tested with 87 octane + MW50 and produced 2800-2900hp and 3000 with GM1(Nitrous)
> 
> A fairer comparison would be the Jumo 222A2/B2 of 1088kg weight with the CW R-3350 "Double Cyclone" of 1212kg.
> 
> ...



What's your source on the Jumo 222?


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## Milosh (Mar 23, 2015)

Jumo 222

Junkers Jumo 222


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## Shortround6 (Mar 23, 2015)

The main problem I have with the Jumo 222 is *when* did they build the bulk of the 270 or so engines built? Stories of the few prototypes to fly with them are full of delays in engine deliveries and a few planes that were supposed to use them apparently never got them. Like the He 219B. Some accounts claim Heinkel had a least one prototype waiting for months in 1944 for a pair of engines. 

Accounts give us the total number of engines built but don't break down the production by different models or year/s. 

Getting _airworthy_ examples seems to have been a real problem. 

Passing a type test is certainly a *step* in going from prototype status to production but the Allies had a number of engines that passed type tests that took several years to straighten out. Passing the type test is NOT a *Guarantee* that the engine will be trouble free in service at that rating.

R&R Vulture passed type test. 
Napier Sabre passed type test in June of 1940
Bristol Centaurus passed type test in 1938
The V-1710-C6 successfully completed the USAAC 150 hour Type Test on April 23, 1937 at 1,000 hp (750 kW) yet the production V-1710-C15 engines had to be derated from 1040hp to 940hp in 1940 until they were re-worked by the factory. 
The Wright R-3350 went through _TWO_ different designs and the 2nd one was in production by Aug of 1942 and yet look at the problems they were having in 1944/45. 

There may well be others.


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## Koopernic (Mar 23, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Best case scenario it would be ready about the same time as the Jumo 213 at 2000hp, perhaps a few months earlier, which means most of 1943 sees a ramp up of production, but heavily delayed, as the 213 was historically, by strategic bombing of Dessau and other Jumo facilities, plus of course the Ostmark problems. So while it could be in serial production by 1944 after a delayed ramp up in 1943, it would only be in limited production like the 213 was.
> 
> 
> 
> What's your source on the Jumo 222?



1 Black Cross Ju 188, 288,388,488 contains statements by Ferdinand Brandner 
2 Junkers Ju 388 by Vernaleken Handig
3 Flugzeug Lorentz, a German Aviation Historian Who Chronicals East German Aviation

These two web pages in German explain a fair bit, you could use google translate etc.
FlugzeugLorenz: Junkers Ju 288
FlugzeugLorenz: Junkers Ju 288
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/re...er_upload/PDF-Junkersbuch/Junkers_166-171.pdf

https://books.google.com.au/books?i...nepage&q=jumo 222 Jumo 205 auto union&f=false


A few more, googling gets a few.

Ferdinand Brandner was forced to work in Soviet Union. He wrote a book "my life between two fronts" once free he developed the E300 engine.


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## Koopernic (Mar 23, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The main problem I have with the Jumo 222 is *when* did they build the bulk of the 270 or so engines built? Stories of the few prototypes to fly with them are full of delays in engine deliveries and a few planes that were supposed to use them apparently never got them. Like the He 219B. Some accounts claim Heinkel had a least one prototype waiting for months in 1944 for a pair of engines.
> 
> Accounts give us the total number of engines built but don't break down the production by different models or year/s.
> 
> ...



The reason is as I say, the engine was cancelled at the end of 1941 as a result of its perceived inability to produce a 2500hp engine in time to power the enlarged Ju 288B, only after it was cancelled did the Ju 288V5 and Ju 288V6 fly with Jumo 222 rated to 2000hp, these were the original light weight Ju 288A airframe. (they flew in last month of 1941). The flight test program and preproduction program had the whole of 1942 before production was supposed to start in Jan 1943. Even before the Ju 288V5 flew in late 1941 the program had already switched over to the Ju 288C with DB610 engines. 

Jumo 222 was never given a chance. It might have produced a viable 2000hp engine at the end of 1942 given that it was flying at the end of 1941.

The He 219 that was setup for the Jumo 222 waited because production didn't resume in October/September 1944 as planned.


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## Glider (Mar 23, 2015)

In response to the original question

Supposing the Ju288 with its Jumo 222 engine, Me210, and He177 with the DB606 engine all worked out by 1941-1942 as planned, what would it have functionally have meant for the Luftwaffe in the second stage of the war? 

My suggestion is not a lot. Earlier production of the Spit IX and an increased urgency given to the development of the Jet engine would cover the problem

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## tomo pauk (Mar 23, 2015)

A better Spitfire does not solve problems for the Soviets. They would have had a hard time to defend their industry, oil fields, marshaling yards.


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## Glider (Mar 23, 2015)

With all respect to the soviets, they were outclassed anyway in 1942 and any extra wouldn't have made a huge difference. Granted there communications and major factories would have been at extra risk but the Luftwaffe had the opportunities to use attack these and didn't so it would need a mindset change on the German High Command and that was unlikely


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## wiking85 (Mar 23, 2015)

Glider said:


> With all respect to the soviets, they were outclassed anyway in 1942 and any extra wouldn't have made a huge difference. Granted there communications and major factories would have been at extra risk but the Luftwaffe had the opportunities to use attack these and didn't so it would need a mindset change on the German High Command and that was unlikely



No, Germany lacked the means to attack them and was planning a strategic campaign in 1943 that lacked the range to hit the targets needed, while demands at the front caused the flexible bombing units to support the army; the He177 really had only one major use so is likely to remain on strategic bombing, rather than be diverted like the more maneuverable medium bombers were.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 23, 2015)

I agree that Soviets were outclassed in 1942. However, the historical LW have had next to zero capability to conduct raids on Tankograd and the like, that was too distant and/or too risky for their bombers. The fully working Ju-288 and/or He-177 would've provided them with better tools for that job.


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## wiking85 (Mar 23, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> I agree that Soviets were outclassed in 1942. However, the historical LW have had next to zero capability to conduct raids on Tankograd and the like, that was too distant and/or too risky for their bombers. The fully working Ju-288 and/or He-177 would've provided them with better tools for that job.



Even just Gorki and the Yaroslav synthetic rubber plant, not to mention Operation Eisenhammer. Not that that would win the war once the US is involved, but it helps in the East.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 23, 2015)

It is 928 miles from Moscow to Tankograd or 842 miles from Stalingrad to Tankograd. It is 900 miles from London to Warsaw. 

Germans are going to need a miracle to bomb Tankograd with any effect and without horrendous losses.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 23, 2015)

ther germans are going to need more than a few technological gambles to run in their favor for the outcome to be any different....delayed yes but different no. unless they can change water into av and tank fuel, exceed the allied production of planes, trains, trucks, tanks and the like....and find some unlimited source of pilots and soldiers...then things might turn around for them. even it the weather favored them....you can only go so far with so much.

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## wiking85 (Mar 23, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> It is 928 miles from Moscow to Tankograd or 842 miles from Stalingrad to Tankograd. It is 900 miles from London to Warsaw.
> 
> Germans are going to need a miracle to bomb Tankograd with any effect and without horrendous losses.



With the full 6 ton payload the operational radius was about 950 miles; with 3 tons it was well within range from bases around Smolensk. What were the fighter/AAA defenses of Tankograd?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 23, 2015)

We have to believe that the _Manufacturer's estimates_ were almost 100% accurate. We also have to believe that the plane would have gone into production as originally proposed with *NO* modifications or added equipment. We also have to believe
that this super-plane can traverse 900 miles or more of enemy airspace while flying singly (or in very small and loose formations) *or* can do what no other aircraft can do and fly in large formations _without_ any loss in range or radius. 

According to charts in the Pilots manual the B-17F was _supposed_ to be able to fly 1900 miles at 222mph at 25,000ft while carrying 6,000lb of bombs. I have my doubts given how much fuel it needed to climb to 25,000ft but obviously how a _single_ plane might perform vrs a formation are rather different things. 

Russia was _not_ exactly a target rich environment for bombers, unlike Europe and England. Once the bombers had penetrated a few hundred miles and their course plotted, the likely targets become rather few. And getting back out again gives the Russians around 2 1/2 hours to set up intercepts on the return journey. 

BTW the _original_ JU-288 had a max bomb load of 3000kg not 6 tons.
If you are referring to the He 177A1 then over a radius of around 950 miles it was good for four 1000kg bombs max or (due to the bomb bay) four 500kg bombs. One wonders what the long range cruise speed was too as the A5/R2 (perhaps due to under wing missiles?) was certainly no speed demon with an economical cruise speed of 210mph at 20,000ft.


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## parsifal (Mar 24, 2015)

Im more than a little bemused by this whole discussion. The Luftwaffe was never really challenged technologically. it wasn't flying biplanes into the face of a vastly superior technologies. What defeated it was numbers and fuel. The attrition it suffered arose from overuse and a wrecked training program, not because anyone was really outflying them. Introduce new types, with all their teething problems, production bottlenecks, training issues, serviceability issues, and you end up making the primary issues dogging the Luftwaffe worse, and not make much of a difference or gain much advantage from the technology.

The issues the LW needed to get to were a better supply of pilots and fuel. Better technologies are nice to have, but make very little difference to the battle problem facing the Germans for most of the war.

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## kool kitty89 (Mar 24, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> It would have been a lot easier from an engineering point of view to build a lot more diesel trucks (a few hundred extra pounds of engine weight making a lot less difference) than to fool around with small aircraft diesels.


Trucks and tanks both. I understand that focusing on petrol driven armored units and heavy transport trucks was in part done to facilitate fueling on the front lines during the Blitz. (using captured fuel reserves from local petrol fueling stations) That may have simplified logistics early war, but continuing that mid/late war cost them much more.

For that matter, development of the BMW 114 might have been more useful as a tank engine.



> While it is nice to talk about _large, long range or long endurance transport, bomber, recon, and patrol aircraft_ in reality the Germans could not build the numbers required to actually affect things much. They could have built more recon/patrol aircraft and coordinated them better with the U-boats but that is about the only significant difference. An extra couple hundred tons per week into Stalingrad wasn't going to change the outcome. It took the allies 4 engine bombers in the *tens* of thousands to bomb Germany. The Germans going from 1000-1200 big bombers to 2400 big bombers wasn't going to change the course of the war.


Isn't that a good argument against pursuing heavy bombers or transports at all? Or, I suppose the likes of the Jumo 290 and He-177 (with 4x Jumo 211s) would have doubled as replacements for the Fw-200 in the long range maritime patrol role. Except the He-177 should have been able to reach service earlier and at lower cost than the considerably larger Ju 290. (similar in size to the Fw 200 but a much more capable combat aircraft)

That said, would there have been any more sense in pursuing the Fw 200 itself more seriously as a long-range bomber? (internal bomb bay capacity seems to have been a major limit there along with the engines employed and structural issues ... perhaps more complicated to address those than move on to newer replacements entirely)




Glider said:


> My suggestion is not a lot. Earlier production of the Spit IX and an increased urgency given to the development of the Jet engine would cover the problem


That assumes the political issues fell into order more favorably and PowerJets got paired with Rolls Royce earlier, avoiding the Rover debacle, and even then the Meteor Airframe went through a lot of teething problems to work though. Putting a higher (and more official) priority on the Vampire+Goblin projects might have been more useful. (or perhaps collaboration between Halford and Rolls Royce early on -prior to or in place of the De Havilland merger, given their larger resources and infrastructure than Dehavilland's engine division)




wiking85 said:


> No, Germany lacked the means to attack them and was planning a strategic campaign in 1943 that lacked the range to hit the targets needed, while demands at the front caused the flexible bombing units to support the army; the He177 really had only one major use so is likely to remain on strategic bombing, rather than be diverted like the more maneuverable medium bombers were.


Didn't the Fw-200 have the range capabilities to pull that off? To manage deep penetration to the Urals, its altitude performance may have been too lacking, so different engines at least. And bombload would be limited at maximum range. Would that all add up to just being too limited to be useful? 

Lack of escorts would be a problem too. Hmm, if they managed a high-altitude variant of the Fw 200, it might be difficult to intercept at all. This might be one of the cases where the high alt Jumo 207 (not to mention fuel economy) might have been useful. In fact, given the size and weight involved (especially if omitting the dive bombing requirements), the 4-engine He-177 airframe might have fit reasonably well with the Jumo 207 in a high alt variant. (granted, turbocharged BMW 801s would make plenty of sense too)




parsifal said:


> The issues the LW needed to get to were a better supply of pilots and fuel. Better technologies are nice to have, but make very little difference to the battle problem facing the Germans for most of the war.


Better logistic management along with more optimal use of technology would both be important. Quality over quantity might have worked better than it did if the quality was actually consistent. Too many mid/late war projects dragging on with resources spread out and not enough standardization on production or improper allocation of resources. (including just betting on the wrong horse design/development wise -often seemingly for arbitrary political reasons) That goes for technology used on the ground and in the air. That and a failure to adapt doctrine ... lack of strategic offensive capabilities or strong defensive capabilities. (lack of the interest they should have had for developing high performance interceptors -piston or jet)

It's more the early-war designs that got delayed, hindered, or canceled outright that are the bigger issues here, including some cases that very well may have reduced pilot attrition. (more resources into potent high performance aircraft at some expense to sheer volumes put out -no use in having lots of weapons without the proper crews and pilots to man them) 

Adopting the Fw-187 as a single-seat fighter as originally intended would be one of the bigger examples I could see. (a high performance long-range fighter and -potentially- heavily armed interceptor with exceptional speed and climb rate and room for growth throughout the war) The RLM took even less serious interest in the single-seat Fw-187 than they did the Jet Fighter program a couple years later. (Udet himself was more supportive of Heinkel's jet fighter and engine programs than he appears to have been towards the single-seat Fw 187)


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## Shortround6 (Mar 24, 2015)

The Jumo 222 was an attempt to get around the limitations of 87 octane fuel. But so were the British sleeve valve engines (and to a limited extent, the Dagger). The, shall we say _mechanical_, improvements were not as great as the improvement allowed by better fuels. 
Using lots of little cylinders gives you more cylinder and head area for cooling for the same displacement engine as fewer large cylinders which helps cut down on hot spots and let you use more compression and/or boost with the same fuel. Using small cylinders also allows for higher RPM so more air moved through the engine in a given period of time. However more cylinders means more weight for the same displacement. It also means a more complicated/expensive engine to build and maintain. 

Some designers came down on one side and some on the other. But as Parsifal says, trick engines are not going to solve basic fuel shortage problems and pilot shortages.
Perhaps a better/different training program could have helped but it would need a total overhaul of the program (and not killing off the instructors by flying supply missions) and not just substituting a trick engine in the existing trainer aircraft.
Perhaps more dual control fighter trainers sooner? May pay off in fewer crashes while new pilots fly their first "operational" missions at the front? saves on both planes and pilots. 
High performance (relatively speaking) fighter trainer? 





240-280 hp Argus or Hirth with high wing loading to keep fuel burn down while getting the pilot more acclimated to handling more difficult aircraft? 

The FW 56 may not have been 'challanging' enough





Fixed gear, open cockpit and low wing loading. 

But no amount of juggling a few % here and there is going to make up for the lack of millions of tons of raw materiel.

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## Shortround6 (Mar 24, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Isn't that a good argument against pursuing heavy bombers or transports at all?



It depends on what you want. The Ju-52 was actually a pretty crappy transport. However useful it may have been as a short/rough field transport it had limited space, short range and low speed for the amount of installed power. 

Imagine the US trying to use Ford Tri-motors instead of DC-3/C-47s. The Germans didn't _need_ trans-oceanic transport capability. 

You don't need super trick aircraft either.




About the same capacity as a Ju-52 and used a pair of 915hp 9 cylinder radial engines. Even this thing, hardly the last word in modern bombers or transport, could cruise about 30mph faster than a Ju-52 (20-25%) and had over double the range. 

For something much more "modern" see the Douglas DC-5. Not used in quantity by the US because they standardized on the DC-3 (already in large scale production), a few were used and a captured KLM airliner was used by the Japanese. 




Capacity: 18-24 passengers

Powerplant: 2 × Wright GR-1820-F62 Cyclone, 900 hp (671 kW) each

Maximum speed: 230 mph (200 kn, 370 km/h) at 7,700 ft (2,345 m)
Cruise speed: 202 mph (176 kn, 325 km/h)
Range: 1,600 mi (1,391 nmi, 2,575 km)

Almost 50% faster than a Ju 52 and triple the range. And easier to load. 



> Or, I suppose the likes of the Jumo 290 and He-177 (with 4x Jumo 211s) would have doubled as replacements for the Fw-200 in the long range maritime patrol role. Except the He-177 should have been able to reach service earlier and at lower cost than the considerably larger Ju 290. (similar in size to the Fw 200 but a much more capable combat aircraft)



Just fix the Fw 200 and have done with it. It got _minimal_ beefing up/modifications because the _next *Vundar Plane*_ was almost ready (sound familiar?) 



> That said, would there have been any more sense in pursuing the Fw 200 itself more seriously as a long-range bomber? (internal bomb bay capacity seems to have been a major limit there along with the engines employed and structural issues ... perhaps more complicated to address those than move on to newer replacements entirely



While the FW 200 might have a made a decent Maritime patrol/recon plane it might have a lot harder to turn it into a heavy bomber. The Fw 200 wasn't just a converted airliner, it was a converted _record breaking_ airliner and strength/capacity margins might have been a bit low to begin with. A plane with a higher payload but shorter intended range might have been a better candidate. 



> Didn't the Fw-200 have the range capabilities to pull that off? To manage deep penetration to the Urals, its altitude performance may have been too lacking, so different engines at least. And bombload would be limited at maximum range. Would that all add up to just being too limited to be useful?



Pretty much. Just finding the target could be a problem  

The radio beacon system won't work, the distance is too far. Lots of "empty" space in Russia (farm fields and small villages. Not much for roads and even rail lines could be hundreds of miles apart. Lots of rivers and lakes in some areas, perhaps too many for easy identification. 



> Lack of escorts would be a problem too. Hmm, if they managed a high-altitude variant of the Fw 200, it might be difficult to intercept at all. This might be one of the cases where the high alt Jumo 207 (not to mention fuel economy) might have been useful. In fact, given the size and weight involved (especially if omitting the dive bombing requirements), the 4-engine He-177 airframe might have fit reasonably well with the Jumo 207 in a high alt variant. (granted, turbocharged BMW 801s would make plenty of sense too)



Well, much like the "bombing" carried out by the JU-86, it could be annoying and drain off assets to counter it but wasn't going to actually do much of anything. High altitude bombing by handfuls of planes doesn't have the impact needed.


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## gjs238 (Mar 24, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> But no amount of juggling a few % here and there is going to make up for the lack of millions of tons of raw materiel.



Hence, Blitzkrieg


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## Koopernic (Mar 24, 2015)

As they say, amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

In terms of transport aircraft having something better than the Ju 52 might have been low hanging fruit.

*One of the reasons the Germans experience severe fuel shortages is that trucks trying to get through Russian quagmire during Barbarossa increased the Army's fuel consumption 10 fold over anticipated requirements.* I've got photographs of Half tracks being used to pull semi-trailers through deep mud or just up a shallow hill with shallow mud. Basic 4WD and 6WD won't even cut it here, you need something with big wheels that looks more like an earth moving machine. Send 200 trucks through an unsealed muddy road and see what happens. That's why rail was so important. Obviously efficient airlift would have been most useful.

A Ju 52/3m could carry about 
1.6 tons for 1100km(660 miles) or
2.5 tons for 800km(480 miles)
This varies significantly as to version since engine power and MTOW weight increased, above being fairly late model.

A DC3 could have carried the same cargo twice the distance with only a little more fuel. On a ton cargo mile per pound fuel usage the DC3 was much better, moreover it offered greater ranges and speeds (more trips, less staging, forward airfields safely further back). The DC3 landing distance was the same, about a 1000ft grass strip could do. The DC3, having been designed as a bunk bed sleeper offered significantly better volume even if its max cargo was little better.

Ju 52/3m did remarkable things. They could transport horses, small vehicles or 8 x 200L drums of fuel (about 4 Me 109 missions). Wedged between the fixed undercarriage could be carried a 50mm PAK high velocity Anti Tank gun that could be parachute dropped using a triple parachute.

The German airline Lufthansa contracted a replacement: the result was the Ju 252 tri motor powered by Jumo 211 engines. For comfort it was pressurised. It was a very fast aircraft.






This aircraft was re-engineered for military use. One innovation was the "trappoklappe" rear loading ramp, a good idea since it would significantly reduce load/unload times and therefore turnaround times. The reengineering took a fair amount of time that some considered unnecessary. When war broke out between France-Germany it was all hands to the pump and the Ju 252 program was delayed. About 15 entered service in 1943.

Compared to the Ju 52/3m carrying 2.5 tons barely 800km the Ju 252 could carry the same 5 ton load 4000km. It could literally have carried several tons direct from Berlin to Stalingrad (1200 miles), landed, offload and returned without refuelling.

Maximum speed was 272 mph (438 km/h) with a maximum cruising speed of 242 mph (390 km/h). The service ceiling was 20,670 ft (6300 m). Range of 2,473 miles (3980 km) with maximum payload. With only 4,410 lbs (2000 kg) of payload range increased to 4,100 miles (6600 km). Empty the aircraft weighed 28,880 lbs (13100 kg), with a normal loadout it weighed 49,560 lbs (22480 kg) and with maximum overload it weighed 52,910 lbs (24000 kg). It had a span of 111 ft 10 in (34.09 m); length 82 ft 4 in (25.10 m); height 18 ft 10 1/4 in (5.75 m) and a wing area of 1,320 sq ft (122.3 sq m).

"Junker Ju 52 in action" gives the fuel tankage of the Ju 252 as 2 x 198 imp gallon tanks outboard of the engines and 1 x 320 inboard so a total of 1432 gallons, about 6000 Litres which would weigh 4300kg/9460lbs. All protected. Possibly other tanks. Using the empty weight and MTOW (non overload) minus Empty weight I get a max payload of 5.05 tons with a full fuel load. Seems to make sense as with the Jumo producing say 900hp at sfc of 0.48 I get 1300lbs/hour or 590kg should given an endurance of 7.2 hours at 240mph. With reduced fuel and in overload cargos of 9-11 tons were possible.

The Reich started experiencing Aluminium shortages so they converted the Ju 252 to wooden construction as the Ju 352. Because the Jumo 211 was still conceived of as too valuable they used The BMW Bramo 323 of 1000hp instead of 1350hp of the Jumo 211F. As a result of this and greater weights the payload range performance halved. The use of C3 during takeoff and water inection was expected to restore some of that but never seems to have happened.

All the fiddling meant the Ju 52 remained the bulk of the transport force and still made of Aluminium.

AFAIKT the Ju 252 would have carried twice the load using the same fuel and crew. It would have actually probably quadrupled the Luftwaffe's lift capacity given that it didn't need to land at intermediate airposts to for any conceivable Luftwaffe missions and that its speed allowed more trips. It also would have been harder to intercept and shoot down due to its much greater speed.

Quite possibly this could have made quite a difference. The Jumo 211 as used on combat aircraft produced death traps such as the Ju 88A4 and He 111 which in 1942-43 could not survice in airspace dominated by 400mph canon armed P-38,P-47, Spitfire IX.

Obviously the Ju 52 was already setup for production, it was easy to setup production (many produced in France) but its performance over the Luftwaffe's extended supply routes was dismal.


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## kool kitty89 (Mar 25, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Some designers came down on one side and some on the other. But as Parsifal says, trick engines are not going to solve basic fuel shortage problems and pilot shortages.
> Perhaps a better/different training program could have helped but it would need a total overhaul of the program (and not killing off the instructors by flying supply missions) and not just substituting a trick engine in the existing trainer aircraft.


Adapting and reorganizing for changing strategies and conditions would have been necessary, yes, but getting into all of that really just points out the fundamental flaws and unrealistic goals the Reich was targeting, without fallbacks or contingency plans for a long-term war (or a potential cold war/stalemate). And if you start expanding on those issues, you might as well go about suggesting an entire alternate history situation with more rational, less radical leadership (or suddenly had a dramatic coup/shift in leadership after the fact) ... which is fun and all, but beyond the scope of the technology-centric discussions like this. (perhaps one of the more interesting scenarios where different/better tech might have been used more successfully and a possible 'point' to some of these hypothetical discussions, but certainly far beyond the technology-centric topic at hand)



> Perhaps more dual control fighter trainers sooner? May pay off in fewer crashes while new pilots fly their first "operational" missions at the front? saves on both planes and pilots.


Purpose-built advanced trainer versions of the 109 or 190 might have been grounds for allocating Jumo 211s to as well, more so the 109. (training in underpowered 190s somewhat defeats the purpose of dealing with the handling characteristics, then again if said pilots were going into 190s it might make sense -lower weight and better specific fuel consumption could be pluses there too ... but the 109 airframe would be even better for the latter as well and more airframes to 'spare' compared to the 190)





> High performance (relatively speaking) fighter trainer?
> 
> 240-280 hp Argus or Hirth with high wing loading to keep fuel burn down while getting the pilot more acclimated to handling more difficult aircraft?


So either have more advanced (full) combat aircraft 2-seat operational trainers or focus more on more challenging single-seat advanced lightweight trainers? (doing both seems a bit redundant when resources are already so tight)

The Go 149 itself is an interesting aircraft (interesting it was tentatively considered as a lightweight emergency defense fighter too given the construction and dimensions are fairly similar to Bell's later XP-77).

Gotha's wooden aircraft all had the appeal of efficient use of construction resources too. A few more of those designs favored over competitors pre-war could have helped to some degree in aluminum shortages. (the Go 146 comes to mind, and given the speed, size, and wing loading, probably a better advanced trainer for twins than the Fw-58 -especially relevant if the Fw 187 had been produced)





Shortround6 said:


> It depends on what you want. The Ju-52 was actually a pretty crappy transport. However useful it may have been as a short/rough field transport it had limited space, short range and low speed for the amount of installed power.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Shortround6 (Mar 25, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Purpose-built advanced trainer versions of the 109 or 190 might have been grounds for allocating Jumo 211s to as well, more so the 109. (training in underpowered 190s somewhat defeats the purpose of dealing with the handling characteristics, then again if said pilots were going into 190s it might make sense -lower weight and better specific fuel consumption could be pluses there too ... but the 109 airframe would be even better for the latter as well and more airframes to 'spare' compared to the 190)
> 
> So either have more advanced (full) combat aircraft 2-seat operational trainers or focus more on more challenging single-seat advanced lightweight trainers? (doing both seems a bit redundant when resources are already so tight)
> 
> The Go 149 itself is an interesting aircraft (interesting it was tentatively considered as a lightweight emergency defense fighter too given the construction and dimensions are fairly similar to Bell's later XP-77).



You just need enough dual control 109/190s for each student to get a few hours in. 6-12 landing and take-offs? I am not a pilot so I don't know what the dividing line would be. Going from a 109C/D (if they were lucky) or a D 520/MS 406 (5-10 hours?) to a 109G might not be good enough. You need some _close_ to the operational aircraft to smooth the transition or show the quirks. 

A small fighter _like_ aircraft could have 1/3-1/4 the fuel burn of a full sized fighter, even an obsolete one. But it needs to be designed as a 'mimic' with a wing loading and landing speed _close_ but not equal to the service fighters. It is still a trainer after all. 

But using things like old He 51s or the Fw 156 Stosser as "fighter" trainers teach the wrong things. They teach maneuver with their low wing loading, with fixed landing gear and no flaps they aren't teaching the landing skills needed. 
The Stosser has a wing loading less than 3% higher than a loaded Cessna 172. 

Something close to the "modern" (1964) SIAI-Marchetti SF.260. Perhaps even a two seater in tandem, but it needs a wing loading in the low 20lbs per ft range, retracting landing gear, flaps, etc. 
Italians had the Ambrosini SAI.7 design but didn't do much with it until post war. 




> I wonder if the He-111 had any merit in being developed further as a transport aircraft. (the operational airliner versions were a bit limited in capacity -worse than the lodestar, let alone DC-3, but the Lodestar itself had been extended from the limited capacity of the Super Electra -or the DC-3 compared to the DC-2, so something along those lines might have been useful)



The He 111 was _very_ limited compared to a Loadstar. The He 111 airliners were 10 seat aircraft. and even then they had two "cabins" one for 4 seats and one for 6 seats. While faster they didn't hold any more people than a Lockheed 10 (which used two 450hp engines) any only a few more people than an early Beech 18. 
The Lockheeds were biased more towards speed, speed was used for advertising to attract customers. ALL airlines in the early 30s were subsidized to a greater or lesser extent (air mail contracts at the least) and the DC-3 was the _first_ airliner that could actually make money carrying passengers. Ticket price/cost would pay operating expenses (fuel/maintenance/payroll) *and* pay back the loan for the aircraft purchase. Note that it took 21-28 passengers in an airplane using two nominal 900hp engines to do this. The 1200hp engines (and higher gross weights) came later. Using a pair 900-1000hp engines to haul 10-12 passengers wasn't going to make money. 
The Lockheeds (14 and 18 ) were faster than a DC-3 using the same engines and went further per gallon but they weren't carrying enough payload to be really profitable. 
Airliners designed for "prestige", like the Fw 200, first land based airliner designed for transatlantic crossings and flying with a subsidized airline are probably not the best choices for an all round or military transport.


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## Koopernic (Mar 25, 2015)

From 1944 Onwards the He 111 H-20/R1 and R2 replaced the Ju 52 in most roles such as transport, glider towing, paratrooper dropping. 16 paratroopers could be carried in addition the bomb racks could carry two ETC1000 parachute containers which contained weapons and supplies for the paratroopers. It doesn't seem so bad compared to the DC-3 which could carry up to 24 paratroopers but frequently had only between 12-18 due to weight restrictions and other cargo. The He 111 did not have much cabin space but was obviously much faster than a Ju 52 or even C-47 something likely to be critical for survivability as well as offering good range.

The 276 or so Fw 200's built and the 60 or so Ju 290's would have better served as transports rather than maritime reconnaissance bombers. The Fw 200 seems to be only about 25% larger in length and therefore volume to the DC3/C47. However it offered substantially greater range and cargo mass. About twice the payload and 80% more range (about 2200miles with full load). It being difficult to determine due to the weight of armament carried. The distance from Berlin to Stalingrad was 1200 miles, North AFrica maybe 800. This gives an indication of the supply problems the Germans were facing. Obviously one would prefer to supply from a rail head much closer but range matters if one is attempting resupply and transport one can't expect to be refuelled at the destination. I probably wasn't as fuel efficient but due to range offered a myriad of options not available to shorter range aircraft. Being back 300 miles instead of 150 miles from the front keeps ones transport airbase away from most fighter bombers for instance.

The DC3/C47 was a surprisingly large aircraft, over 62ft: almost as long as a Lancaster or B-17.

The Arado Ar 232C transport was potentially great utility due to its extremely good rough field performance and extreme STOL capability, runway length 1/3rd that of C-47 and ju 52.

The Luftwaffe's dream transport fleet was probably based mainly around Ju 252, an aircraft which would seem to be economical both over extreme ranges and with heavy loads over short ranges into grass airfields. The Ar 232 would provide STOL when required. Even loaded to 16,000 kg (35,270 lb), it could take-off in 200 m (656 ft). (That with 4 tons of fuel and cargo after a drop off) and shorter with RATO.

Its hard to see what they could have done better, certainly not spent so much effort and time on producing the a handful of belated Ju 352 of wood to no avail while all aluminium ju 52 continued to be pumped out.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 25, 2015)

One often overlooked transport was the Siebel Si204, a twin that was relatively fast for it's time with a range of 875 miles and a max. load of 3,600 pounds. Could be crewed by either one or two personnel and used non-essential Argus As411 engines.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 25, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> You just need enough dual control 109/190s for each student to get a few hours in. 6-12 landing and take-offs? I am not a pilot so I don't know what the dividing line would be. Going from a 109C/D (if they were lucky) or a D 520/MS 406 (5-10 hours?) to a 109G might not be good enough. You need some _close_ to the operational aircraft to smooth the transition or show the quirks.
> 
> A small fighter _like_ aircraft could have 1/3-1/4 the fuel burn of a full sized fighter, even an obsolete one. But it needs to be designed as a 'mimic' with a wing loading and landing speed _close_ but not equal to the service fighters. It is still a trainer after all.
> 
> ...




The transition into a fighter like a -109 would depend on how much or how good the primary training was. Since most aircraft of the day were taildraggers, those who made it out of primary training already had a grasp of some of the issues with flying a taildragger. As far as mastering the aircraft for normal operations so one could at least take off and land safely - wing loading has nothing to do with it IMO. You worry about wing loading when you start flying more aggressive at higher speeds and Gs. 
So, it I was to guess, probably 4 to 5 hours in the pattern with continual take offs and landings to a full stop should be enough to get someone proficient in a higher performance single engine recip. To be on the safe side I would also tack on a few more hours in gusty and cross wind conditions as well. Keep in mind that a pattern in a -109 from takeoff to landing was probably about 6 to 8 minutes.

As far as the DC-3 and a comparison to its peers (especially German), It was the PERFECT transport and IMO one of the best aircraft ever built PERIOD! It wasn't the fastest and didn't carry the greatest payload but it combined all the desirable traits into one package; it was durable, easily flown, easily maintained, RELIABLE and probably the most important thing it had was a good product support line where there were plenty of spare parts to keep the fleet going.

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## parsifal (Mar 25, 2015)

The obvious point about the discussions relating to better transports are the operations in the east, most notably Stalingrad. less well known was the absolute dependence of the armoured deep penetration thrusts by the heer in 41-2. They absolutely needed airborne re-supply to keep the pressure up. Absolutely. Would better transports make a difference. Im really doubtful. For all its shortcoming the "Aunties" were excellent in the rough conditions and poor weather conditions in the east. They kept going when other types just gave it up. A DC-3 probably would have done better, as the Russian DC-3s were to show later, and range did become an issue, especially at stalingrad, but no aircraft could have changed that situation. once the Russians got going in the encirclement, there really was no stopping them.


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## stona (Mar 25, 2015)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The transition into a fighter like a -109 would depend on how much or how good the primary training was. Since most aircraft of the day were taildraggers, those who made it out of primary training already had a grasp of some of the issues with flying a taildragger.



There were NO dual Spitfires or Hurricanes available to the RAF during the war. Pilots were given a copy of the Pilot's Notes to read, a few hints and tips from someone who knew the ropes and told to get on with it. The same applied for those converting from Hurricane to Spitfire or vice-versa (which did happen, sometimes to the dismay of the pilots concerned).
If, and its a big if, the Bf 109 had an unusually high accident rate for newly qualified pilots, then there are factors other than the aircraft's handling that might need consideration. The Luftwaffe seems to have had a poor safety record generally and this was as much due to its procedures, or lack of them, as the aircraft it flew.
Cheers
Steve

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## Shortround6 (Mar 25, 2015)

The He 111 may have been better than a JU 52 at somethings but that hardly makes it a _good_ transport. 

Speed for these aircraft doesn't really matter for combat let alone be "critical for survivability". A Plane cruising at 180-200mph vs one cruising at 220-230mph isn't going to that much more vulnerable to 330-360mph fighters. Pushing the engines to 270mph in the case of the He 111 isn't really going to change the outcome much and how long does it take to accelerate from 230mph to 270mph? 

The Ju 52 was slow (cruise 130-140mph) and short ranged. Long range parachute missions were few and far between unless near suicide commando missions. 
C-47 cabin was 6'5" high, up to 7'8" wide and 27ft long. DC-3/C-47 specs are all over the place due to different engines on commercial models (and Military, several thousand got *two stage* engines for fly the "hump") and the increase (in steps) max gross weight from 24,000lb to 31,000lbs. 

But to show how out of it the JU-52 was an early Beech 18 using 330hp Jacobs engines could carry 100 gals aof gas, a crew of two (170lb each) AND 9 passengers+310lbs baggage. top speed 205mph, cruise at 10,000ft 195mph. Cruise used 35 gallons an hour and with 160 gallons on board range was 800 miles (7 passengers+254lbs baggage). Plane was certified June of 1938 with this engine but was a development of an earlier Wright powered version. 
First DC-3s (Douglas Sleeper Transport) were certified in May of 1936, they used R-1820 Wright engines rated at 930hp for take-off and 850hp at 5800ft max continuous and had a useful load of 8250lbs or a payload (with 650 gals of fuel) of 3475lbs, 16 passengers, 3 crew and 755lbs baggage/mail at a gross weight of 24,000lbs. Max speed 219mph at 11,500ft, cruise 184mph at 10,000ft (75% power) range at 75% power (93.6 gallons an hour) was 1250 miles. Obviously higher powered engines and higher gross weights changed things. 

The C-47 had some capabilities that the Ju-52 and He 111 lacked.










The jeep may have been a stunt (although much photographed) and is hardly the ideal way of carrying a small vehicle but it beats slinging small vehicles/guns underneath the airplane. 

I am not holding out the C-47 as the *ideal* military transport but with the basic airplane flying over 3 years before the attack on Poland it should have been obvious that the Ju 52 left something to be desired.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 25, 2015)

stona said:


> There were NO dual Spitfires or Hurricanes available to the RAF during the war. Pilots were given a copy of the Pilot's Notes to read, a few hints and tips from someone who knew the ropes and told to get on with it. The same applied for those converting from Hurricane to Spitfire or vice-versa (which did happen, sometimes to the dismay of the pilots concerned).
> If, and its a big if, the Bf 109 had an unusually high accident rate for newly qualified pilots, then there are factors other than the aircraft's handling that might need consideration. The Luftwaffe seems to have had a poor safety record generally and this was as much due to its procedures,* or lack of them, as the aircraft it flew.*Cheers
> Steve



I think that was probably the issue


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## Shortround6 (Mar 25, 2015)

stona said:


> There were NO dual Spitfires or Hurricanes available to the RAF during the war. Pilots were given a copy of the Pilot's Notes to read, a few hints and tips from someone who knew the ropes and told to get on with it. The same applied for those converting from Hurricane to Spitfire or vice-versa (which did happen, sometimes to the dismay of the pilots concerned).
> If, and its a big if, the Bf 109 had an unusually high accident rate for newly qualified pilots, then there are factors other than the aircraft's handling that might need consideration. The Luftwaffe seems to have had a poor safety record generally and this was as much due to its procedures, or lack of them, as the aircraft it flew.
> Cheers
> Steve



You do have the comment from one German pilot (Werner Molders?) after flying a captured Spitfire that "they were Childishly simple" to land. 

Most air forces of the time had a rather dismal safety record. The US lost as many or more planes inside the Continental US than it did in combat in WW II. 

The Germans were not the only ones who could have used a better training program, they (and the Japanese) were the ones who could not make up in numbers and hours of flight time, the deficiencies of their programs. 

For the US pilots went through at least 3 different trainers before being turned loose in a fighter type aircraft. 
Factsheets : Flight Training on the Eve of WWII

And at some point in 1943 the US was giving at least some 'fighter' pilots 10-15 hours in P-40s before posting them to P-38,P-47, P-51 squadrons. A P-40 had an approach speed about 20mph slower than the P-47 and not much different than an AT-6. 

The Stosser may have been a fun plane to fly and performed a good service to the Luftwaffe but they built around 1000 of them and for the investment it seems they might not have gotten out what they could have.


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## BiffF15 (Mar 25, 2015)

The Luftwaffe did have some two seat 190's and 109's. We're those late additions for transition help or did they serve another purpose?

When I went thru F15 school they solo'd you on the fourth ride. It was easier and safer than the T38!

Cheers,
Biff

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## kool kitty89 (Mar 26, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Airliners designed for "prestige", like the Fw 200, first land based airliner designed for transatlantic crossings and flying with a subsidized airline are probably not the best choices for an all round or military transport.


I was mostly suggesting its use early on with emphasis on displacing it with the Ju-252 ASAP. (and, preferably, something closer to the DC-3)

The Fw 200 also at least seems favorable to focus on over the Ju 290 and in some respects a proper He 177. (far more over the existing He 177, but still some advantages in time to service and perhaps cost compared to a 4-engine He-177 -especially in terms of logistics of volume production and spare parts) Probably not good as a heavy bomber, more so just long range/endurance patrol, bomber, and transport. (I somewhat doubt it would convert efficiently to a heavy bomber remotely as capable as a ... rational 4-engine He 177, but aside from that you have the Do 217 pulling heavy short/medium range payloads)

A properly structurally corrected Fw 200 as you pointed out before, would be the target there.

The canceled Fw 206 seems to have been targeting exactly that sort of design, but given how early development was halted, it's really hard to tell how it might have worked out. Either way it was late. Something like that should have been flying pre-war, but even so it seems like a more worthwhile target than a good many of the transport designs that were still only on paper (if that) at the outbreak of the war.

The He 111 comments were more pointed towards possible modification too. But fuselage redesign/stretching isn't always faster/simpler than 'whole new aircraft.' (probably much more feasible than ideas like the He-111Z, at least) Modifications like that should have started pre-war though.




Shortround6 said:


> I am not holding out the C-47 as the *ideal* military transport but with the basic airplane flying over 3 years before the attack on Poland it should have been obvious that the Ju 52 left something to be desired.


Intending the Ju 52 as anything more than an interim aircraft to be replaced as soon as possible (with plans focusing on such pre-war) is rather strange. Aside, of course, from using it as a specialty rough-field operating design. (but the DC-3/C-47 managed well or better in most similar conditions as well)






GrauGeist said:


> One often overlooked transport was the Siebel Si204, a twin that was relatively fast for it's time with a range of 875 miles and a max. load of 3,600 pounds. Could be crewed by either one or two personnel and used non-essential Argus As411 engines.


I almost mentioned that aircraft earlier. I had it in mind when I brought up the Go 146 (given it was a competitor to the Fh 104 the Si 204 was based on). Unless I'm mistaken, the Go 146 was also wooden, so material resource advantage there on top of using small Hirth/Argus engines. I was imagining the Go 146 expanded into something closer to the Si 204.

And those engines/construction materials in mind, as well as the issue of airliner passenger capacity, I'm also reminded of the DH.91 Albatross. Gotha might not have been DeHavilland (or have access to the same types of wood),but a transport with nearly DC-3 passenger capacity using 4 AS-410/411(or HM512) class engines and 1000+ mile range (let alone one made of wood) is still interesting.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 26, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> I almost mentioned that aircraft earlier. I had it in mind when I brought up the Go 146 (given it was a competitor to the Fh 104 the Si 204 was based on). Unless I'm mistaken, the Go 146 was also wooden, so material resource advantage there on top of using small Hirth/Argus engines. I was imagining the Go 146 expanded into something closer to the Si 204.
> 
> And those engines/construction materials in mind, as well as the issue of airliner passenger capacity, I'm also reminded of the DH.91 Albatross. Gotha might not have been DeHavilland (or have access to the same types of wood),but a transport with nearly DC-3 passenger capacity using 4 AS-410/411(or HM512) class engines and 1000+ mile range (let alone one made of wood) is still interesting.


Imagine if they had ceased (or seriously cut back) on the Ju52/3m production and focused instead, on the Si204. The materials historically allocated for the Ju52 would have then been available for the Si204 production line. As it is, they only produced about 1,000 Si204 units as opposed to about 5,415 (+/-) Ju52 airframes.

The Ju52 certainly had it's place in history and proved to be a sturdy aircraft, but scaling back it's production after the Si204 was available would have certainly freed up resources.

This is not to say that the Si204 had a better survivability than the Ju52, as was shown during the airlift at Stalingrad, where the majority of Si204 (trainers and transports) were employed and a good number of them fell victim to Soviet interceptors.


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## parsifal (Mar 26, 2015)

something I forgot to mention earlier as well. Not highly known, but the Ju52 was mostly used as a primary bomber trainer by the LW, with its pilots being mostly the instructors used in training. The Ju52 was sometimes diverted to airlift operation, when their losses were heavy (and they usually were), their supply of pilots and other aircrew for the bomber arm took a dive. Ive read that the decision to wind down strike aircraft production was in large measure forced on the germans because they could no longer provide specialist training for their strike aircraft.

So its always worth remembering that the Ju52 replacement had to fulfil more than one role


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2015)

True but since Lockheed 14s were turned into Hudsons, Lockheed 18s turned into Venturas, DC-2s (with more modifications) turned into B-18s, and DC-3 wings, landing gear and other parts turned into the B-23, a "bomber trainer" variant of what replacement for the Ju 52 doesn't seem like a such a stretch. 

Not to mention that using a 3 engine aircraft as a "bomber trainer" seems a bit wasteful. The US and the British managed to do a fair amount of bomber crew training with small twin engine aircraft like Ansons and Beech 18s (AT-7,AT-11).

Bristol Bombay and Handley Page Harrow were not used as trainers very much (more valuable as transports) but if more were available there was no reason they couldn't have been. 

Different trainers were not going to change the outcome of the war but different airframes for existing engines are an easier "solution" or answer for some of the Luftwaffe problems than "new" engines like diesels. The JU 52 was a fuel hog for what you got out of it. Wither it is ton/miles of cargo transport or hours of crew instruction per 100 gallons used.


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## kool kitty89 (Mar 26, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> True but since Lockheed 14s were turned into Hudsons, Lockheed 18s turned into Venturas, DC-2s (with more modifications) turned into B-18s, and DC-3 wings, landing gear and other parts turned into the B-23, a "bomber trainer" variant of what replacement for the Ju 52 doesn't seem like a such a stretch.


Converting more He-111s to dual control trainers would seem a reasonable option there too. (beyond smaller/lighter aircraft for general twin-engine training)



> Not to mention that using a 3 engine aircraft as a "bomber trainer" seems a bit wasteful. The US and the British managed to do a fair amount of bomber crew training with small twin engine aircraft like Ansons and Beech 18s (AT-7,AT-11).


Yes, and Germany had the likes of the Fw 56 and Si 204 (and Fh 104). And then there's the Go 146, had it gone into production. (mostly interesting given the wooden construction)

Hmm, something along the lines of the DH.91 would also have been attractive as a 4-engine trainer short of using larger 4-engine aircraft. 
Edit: perhaps the He 116 would fit well in that role?

The Ju-52's tri-engine design might sill have been useful for Ju-252 training, though, but you still don't need a ton of Ju 52s to fill its limited useful roles.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 29, 2015)

> The issues the LW needed to get to were a better supply of pilots and fuel. Better technologies are nice to have, but make very little difference to the battle problem facing the Germans for most of the war.



Yep, I agree. For all the technologically advanced equipment the Germans put into service there were as many that were duds that were unsuccessful, on which resources were wasted (in hindsight). It wasn't superior technology, or lack of it that lost the Germans the war, but managerial incompetence. Besides, had the Germans introduced more novel technologies, perhaps earlier and in larger numbers than they did, that is if they were able to, then you can guarantee the Allies wouldn't have sat back and done nothing. 

This is the counter argument to all the German 'superior technology' debates that crop up from time to time here; firstly, their technological superiority wasn't as 'superior' as many like to believe, as the Allies were often working on the same ideas and had hardware available simultaneously, but were busying themselves with running a war and the priorities that that entailed, and secondly, any measure the Germans were likely to take, the Allies would prepare a counter-measure. This is the nature of warfare and while a minor lead in technology might have been achieved that might have given the Germans a bit of breathing space (the A-4 Rocket for example), the Allies could out produce anything the Germans, and indeed all the Axis powers were capable of, so the end result would have been the same, as others here have stated.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 29, 2015)

Oops, double post - damn slow ass dinosaur powered New Zealand internet.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 30, 2015)

nuuumannn said:


> Oops, double post - damn slow ass dinosaur powered New Zealand internet.


It's been happening to everyone all evening...freakin' server is acting up again


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 1, 2015)

nuuumannn said:


> Yep, I agree. For all the technologically advanced equipment the Germans put into service there were as many that were duds that were unsuccessful, on which resources were wasted (in hindsight). It wasn't superior technology, or lack of it that lost the Germans the war, but managerial incompetence. Besides, had the Germans introduced more novel technologies, perhaps earlier and in larger numbers than they did, that is if they were able to, then you can guarantee the Allies wouldn't have sat back and done nothing.


Poor allocation of resources (logistical) issues and a fair number of poor/odd decisions and mess of bureaucratic issues plagued wartime Germany. That includes engineering and manufacturing resources, and supporting unrealistic projects with unrealistic goals ... or mediocre projects that seem to have some sort of political edge.

I lot of time and resources were wasted on inferior designs, but also on pie in the sky, impractical, extravagant, inefficient designs that weren't strategically or tactically relevant. The Americans and Russians had advantages in terms of sheer raw resources, but the Americans and British also had advantages in logistical management in terms of overall serviceability. (in terms of building, fielding, and maintaining useful equipment)

The Germans were oddly conservative at times, and oddly radical at other times in pretty inefficient and contradictory ways. Compare that to the pragmatism and rationalization used for British manufacturing and engineering with strict limits placed on material production and development. They took a fairly conservative direction in this regard, but they were at least more consistent about that than the Germans. (look at British aircraft engine development compared to german, even taking the larger number of german firms in play, the sheer focus on most war-critical engine types -and similar focus on designing aircraft around those engines- was far higher in the UK with the likes of the Hercules and Merlin getting priority development, many less critical designs being canceled outright, and relatively little hinging on the success of the remaining lower priority high power engines like the Centaurus, Griffin, and Saber -and even then being more akin to the BMW 802, DB-603, and Jumo 213, at least in some respects -the Griffin and 603 probably being the most comperable)

In any case, the Germans had tons of room for improving efficient, practical, pragmatic allocation of resources of all sorts (again that includes intellectual/engineering resources) and plenty of room for being more conservative in some useful areas without even necessarily going as far as the British. (some of the american practices are also relevant, but their vast advantages in material resources skews comparisons somewhat)

Though I wonder, if there'd been similar heavy focus on the Jumo 211 and DB 601/605 as there bad been the Merlin, might adoption of more powerful superchargers and water injection have developed sooner? (having the DB-601 reach AM/ASM level performance earlier and/or bringing the Jumo 211 up to roughly similar performance would have been very useful and perhaps a more attractive trade-off than diverting resources to DB-603 and Jumo 213 development) Still, resources being poured into considerably more risky/farsighted projects would make more sense to cut back on. (and the Jumo 213 and DB-603 might have enough commonality with their smaller, lower powered counterparts that parallel development benefited both types anyway -the Jumo 213 more obviously so given the sheer design commonality)


And that's not even getting into the specific issues of offensive vs defensive weapon development. (or lack of planning regarding defensive technology in particular)


Superior technology + efficient development and utilization of that technology is something the Germans never really had over the allies, not consistently at least. (compared to the Russians, yes, but the British and Americans fairly comprehensively outperformed them as well, aside from perhaps gun design -the British and particularly Americans had quite a few areas of sheer technological superiority in as far as what was actually fielded)


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## stona (Apr 1, 2015)

Much stems from the centralised organisation of the German aircraft industry.

The system originated with Milch (and Werner) in 1941.

This was the so called 'Ring Organisation' of the aircraft industry. For final aircraft assembly there were 13 firms chosen as central controller with a very large number of firms attached. The 13 were Junkers, Messerschmitt, Heinkel(Rostock), Focke-Wulf, Dornier, Arado, Siebel, Henschel, Bohm and Voss, Bucker, Fiesler, Gotha and Klemm. That's already too many and they 'controlled' another 40 companies(which I'm not about to name here!)
In the overall aviation industry there were 92 rings and 5,600 firms.

The Anglo-American systems, which lacked such overall central control, though there was more centralised planning than in peace time, were more efficient. Bang goes another racial stereotype.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Apr 1, 2015)

The British had the benefit of the better fuel when it came to engines. Since it can take 3-4 years to get a "new" engine into service (if you are lucky) you have to _very_ sure of your future fuel supply. Modifications or adaptations of an existing design can be done quicker. But you can be stuck with some basic design features. The Merlin was fairly adaptable but then they didn't change a whole lot of the basic engine. They never changed cylinder size, or valve size or valve arrangement and they never changed the max rpm. Yes they changed superchargers and boost pressures almost as fast as a 3 card monte shuffle but the basic engine didn't change much. 
The Hercules _started_ as a way to get more power/economy from the same fuel (87 octane) but wasn't able to adapt as well to the much higher performance the better fuels allowed. Air cooled engines seldom could due to cooling limits and how much power you could put on a crankpin/crankshaft of a given size. Even in 1956 the Post war Hercules 811 was rated at 2220hp using 14.5lbs of boost and water injection from it's 38,7liters and 2235lbs compared to the 2455hp of a Griffon 57 using 25lbs boost and water injection from 36.7 liters and 2100lbs. Both engines using 100/130 fuel. Griffon has two speed supercharger and contra-rotating prop gear box adding weight but radiator and coolant not added in. A post war Hercules 800 series engine had a _lot_ of changes from a wartime Hercules. 
The Germans were forced to make a lot of basic changes to their engines as they developed them and some of their schemes were trying to make power while still using 87 octane fuel. Changing the RPM not only puts greater stress on the crank and reciprocating parts, it also changes the vibration pattern of the engine and can require new crankshafts and/or different counter weights or bearings or some other measure. 
You can spend 3 years working on engine B to replace engine A only to have the fuel guys introduce Fuel Y to replace fuel X and allow engine A to make 90-95% of the power of engine B with only minor changes. Engine B isn't _quite_ ready to go into production yet. What do you do? 
And unless you know the overhaul lives of some of these engines you _may_ be comparing apples and oranges. How much of the higher power was bought at the cost of reduced time between overhauls? 
In some cases the higher power was also bought at the cost of higher initial cost, higher general maintenance, and higher overhaul cost. (more than 12 cylinders for a liquid cooled engine of more than 14-18 for a radial, or sleeve valves).

And for bombers you need to compare the max continuous power or 30 minute ratings, something other than 1-5 minute peak power ratings as it could take bombers 15-30 minutes to climb to operational heights (or longer depending on overload).


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 2, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The Germans were forced to make a lot of basic changes to their engines as they developed them and some of their schemes were trying to make power while still using 87 octane fuel. Changing the RPM not only puts greater stress on the crank and reciprocating parts, it also changes the vibration pattern of the engine and can require new crankshafts and/or different counter weights or bearings or some other measure.
> You can spend 3 years working on engine B to replace engine A only to have the fuel guys introduce Fuel Y to replace fuel X and allow engine A to make 90-95% of the power of engine B with only minor changes. Engine B isn't _quite_ ready to go into production yet. What do you do?


Wouldn't employing intercoolers/aftercoolers and/or water injection be solutions to the fuel and boost pressure issue without requiring more fundamental redesigns of the engines?

If not for the additional switch from roller bearings to plain bearings on the DB-605, there seemed to be plenty of reasonable options for increasing the existing DB-601's power short of increasing the displacement. (larger or 2-stage supercharger, intercooling, water injection) The Jumo-211 implemented an aftercooler, but still had a good deal of room for improving the basic supercharger as well as using water injection.

The performance jump from the DB-601E to the DB-605A was relatively small, the leap from Jumo 211J/N to 213A/B was considerably larger, as was the gain in weight. Not really an upgrade as much as a new engine more comparable to the DB-603 or Griffin.

Indeed, if not for the bearings (and possibly a few other detail changed made due to material shortages), there'd be a stronger argument for continuing production of the existing DB-601E and similar derivatives and focusing more on getting the DB-603 into production.

The BMW 801 D/G relied on C3 fuel to manage the performance they did without aftercooler or water injection, but that meant it getting priority for that limited fuel grade, depriving it from other engines while not employing other techniques to improve performance.


Good supercharger and intercooler design is what made the merlin adapt so well and lack of that is a big part of what made the V-1710 suffer (including turbo intercooler installation issues). If limited to the same 100 octane fuel being used during the Battle of Britain, the late war merlin models (and Griffin) may not have managed as much power, but they certainly still would have improved a great deal. (or they might have resorted to water injection and had similar power output)


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## Shortround6 (Apr 2, 2015)

The DB 601 was a 590kgA-0 dry weight engine, 1298lbs? I can't find a good weight for the 601E but a 605A was 710KG (1562lbs) so they beefed up some things somewhere. 

Water injection was a useful but somewhat limited option. It works best when used _below_ an engines rated altitude. For a DB601A-0 that was 3700meters. It can cool the intake charge, making it more dense above the rated altitude but that is only worth a few %. It is much more useful at lower altitudes. Things like the P-38 and P-47 excepted as their turbos could supply more air than the engine could use up to around 25-27,000ft in the later models. The 601A-1 used a different supercharger that had a critical altitude of 4500meters. The DB601E used a different supercharger (same as the 605A or???) and then they stuck on the supercharger from the 603. Please note however that bigger superchargers come at a price. At 2600rpm and the Kurzleistung rating the big supercharger _cost_ the DB 605 35PS at sea level. 

Intercoolers are elegant from an engineering standpoint. They allow more power and often less thermal stress and don't consume anything (and thus work at cruise settings) and air to air intercoolers have no moving parts (OK maybe a door/flap on the duct). However for the Germans the benefits are less than for the allies. 
The intercooler removes some (not all) the heat from compressing the air. Since the Germans are compressing the less than the Allies, even 1.42 AtA is about 6lbs of boost, they have less heat to remove. You also have the drag of the intercooler. Cooling the intake air can vary from needing an equal amount of air going to the intercooler for a 40% efficient unit (lowers the the temp 40D/F per 100 degrees of intake temp) to 1.5 times for 50% to 2 times for 60% and 3 times the air for 70%, after that things get really poor. 
Only Junkers thought the intercooler was worthwhile on a single stage (low boost) engine. Perhaps if the Americans/British had been limited to 87 octane fuel they may have changed their minds but on single stage engines it was probably best left to bomber engines. The intercooler gave the 211J about 140hp/PS at 16,5-17,000 ft at 2400rpm/1.25ata (climb rating) over the 211F. 
Using an intercooler on a high boost engine gives much greater results. A DB605A was compressing the air just under 3 times at 1.42 ata at 5700 meters. A Merlin 61 was compressing the air 5.1 times at 23,500ft to get 12lbs of boost. Without the intercooler the Merlin 61 could not have used that level of boost without wrecking the engine even with 100/130 fuel. The Jumo 211J was compressing the air at 17,000ft about 2.41 times. 

Please do not use car intercoolers as a comparison. Unless you are climbing Pike's Peak or racing in the alps if you compress the air even 1.5 times you are running over 22lbs of boost and operating at speeds close to the best climbing speed of an aircraft so the drag is way different. Drag of the intercooler at 320mph is 4 times what is at 160mph. 

Both DB and Junkers _chose_ to use large displacement slow turning engines of about the _same weight_ as the smaller but higher revving Allison and Merlin to get the same power (roughly). Once paths were chosen it was hard to change paths. 

Without better fuel the Germans had two basic choices. Larger engines or higher RPM as max cylinder pressure (boost) was limited by fuel. 

The BMW 801 was limited by the same thing/s that limited ALL aircooled radial engines. The R-2800 engine used in the P-47M/N being the exception that proves the rule, not a standard that any other radial engine ever reached unless you count the Wright turbo compound and that required 3 power recovery turbines hooked to the crankshaft and adding about 550hp for take-off. BTW in the interest of longevity and safety the Turbos compounds left in use for firefighting service are limited to 53in (11.5lbs??) on 100/130 fuel and 2880hp at 2900rpm. On 100LL they are limited to 50In MAP and cannot use high blower (higher intake temperature at the same pressures.) These post war war engines had a lot of changes form even late war B-29 engines.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 2, 2015)

Continued. 

The early JUmo 211s were also engines of 1300lbs or under dry weight. Both German engines were quite competitive with the early Merlin and Allison on a _power to *weight* ratio._ AND that is what matters to aircraft performance and designers. 

It took quite a while for water injection to be adopted as a _routine_ part of operations. Many very late war Military aircraft and postwar commercial aircraft being given "wet" ratings for take-off vs using water injection for emergency combat use only. I don'y know if was just accumulated experience or different materials or different maintenance procedures or a combination. There were fears of corrosion and/or oil problems with early use of water injection. A lot may depend on _when_ in the mission/flight the water injection is used. If used for take-off you have the length of the flight to evaporate any water out of the intake system and oil (blow-by past the piston rings) Using it 20 minutes before landing and using low power settings while descending to land could leave trace amounts of water in the oil. 
In combat you do what you have to do. Planing to use it on every flight is another story. 

I don't know what the Germans did to the DB engines and to the Jumos as the they increased power. A lot of changes are important but subtle. And a lot affect service life at higher power settings. The Allison went though 4 different crankshafts _after_ it was rated at 3000rpm. Only the last is visibly different than the first 3. ALL 3 of the early ones have the same RPM limit and all three will allow the engine to make the same power, at least for a short time. The Allison went through 3-4 crankshaft/counter weight/damper combinations to reach the 3000rpm limit. One of the last of the Pre-3000rpm cranks failed at 116 hours into a test. 
The very first Allison crankshaft was rated a 2400rpm and had *NO* counter weights or much for dampers. Hispano-Suiza Y series engines that ran at 2400rpm had no counter weights. But vibration problems rise quickly, so quickly that solutions that work for small increases in RPM (going from 2400rpm to 2600rpm) fail to work when going to 2800rpm let alone 3000rpm. 
Allison also changed the method they used for casting the engine blocks. Casting is more than just pouring molten material into a mold. Proper control of casting temperatures and cooling can affect grain structure an orientation and vastly change the strength of the same nominal material. Different casting techniques can affect how deep cooling fins on an air-cooled engine are and how thin and closely spaced. Good casting techniques can also result in a part coming out of the mold much closer to the finished dimensions and need much less time being finish machined to desired dimensions. Just because you can build a few prototypes doesn't mean you can manufacture something in mass at a low scrap rate and low cost. 
There is an interesting table in Vees for Victory on page 408 comparing a 1918 Liberty aircraft engine to a 1943 Allison. aside from the obvious differences (400hp to 1425hp) the time between overhauls went for 50 hours to 500+ hours, the crankshaft weight dropped from 105lbs to 95lbs and yet the tensile strength of the crankshaft material only went from 135,000lbs to 140,000lbs. Differences in finishing ( shot peening and nitriding) and inspection (visual vs Magnetic) helping the counter weighting and effective vibration dampers ot allow both the higher power and longer life. details like this are often lacking in histories of other engines. 
Going from the 2400rpm DB601 to the 2800rpm DB 605 is a lot more than just changing counter weights or adding a bit of weight here and there to the crankshaft. The forces involved acting on the crankshaft went up by about 36% and the vibration problems _probably_ change dramatically.

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## tomo pauk (Apr 2, 2015)

Many thanks for the above stuff 



Shortround6 said:


> The DB 601 was a 590kgA-0 dry weight engine, 1298lbs? I can't find a good weight for the 601E but a 605A was 710KG (1562lbs) so they beefed up some things somewhere.



The 601E was at 660 kg dry; with accessories (fuel pump, ignition radio blockade, prop governing device, residual fuel oil, covering plates) was at 710 kg; with all of that plus with starter it was at 720-725kg. Per manual for the DB 601E/G, pg. 23-24. Download of manual (not sure whether it works for non-registred people there): link.



> Water injection was a useful but somewhat limited option. It works best when used _below_ an engines rated altitude. For a DB601A-0 that was 3700meters.
> ...
> The 601A-1 used a different supercharger that had a critical altitude of 4500meters. The DB601E used a different supercharger (same as the 605A or???) and then they stuck on the supercharger from the 603.



The early DB 601A have had rated altitude at 4 km, later ones were at 4.5 km; both for 1020 PS. The DB 601Aa (a = ausland = intended for export; many LW aircraft carried it nevertheless) have had rated altitude of 3.7 km, but for power of 1100 PS. 


> Only Junkers thought the intercooler was worthwhile on a single stage (low boost) engine. Perhaps if the Americans/British had been limited to 87 octane fuel they may have changed their minds but on single stage engines it was probably best left to bomber engines. The intercooler gave the 211J about 140hp/PS at 16,5-17,000 ft at 2400rpm/1.25ata (climb rating) over the 211F.



Looks like it was not 140 PS at 16.5-17 kft - 1140 PS vs. 1060 PS (30-min power). The 211J was having ~140 PS advantage between ~10 kft and ~16 kft.




> Going from the 2400rpm DB601 to the 2800rpm DB 605 is a lot more than just changing counter weights or adding a bit of weight here and there to the crankshaft. The forces involved acting on the crankshaft went up by about 36% and the vibration problems _probably_ change dramatically.



The DB 601N was allowed for 2800 RPM already in late 1940, the DB 601A up to 2600 (2800 in mid 1941) rpm in same time (above rated height for both engines). Granted, the lower settings and take off ratings received no benefits of that.
link

added: the DB-605L (two-stage supercharger) used MW 50 both on 1.43 ata and 1.70 ata - the inter-cooler would've indeed come in handy?


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## rinkol (Apr 2, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Converting more He-111s to dual control trainers would seem a reasonable option there too. (beyond smaller/lighter aircraft for general twin-engine training)
> 
> 
> Yes, and Germany had the likes of the Fw 56 and Si 204 (and Fh 104). And then there's the Go 146, had it gone into production. (mostly interesting given the wooden construction)
> ...




After JU 86 bomber production was cancelled, there was a scheme to use up stocks of parts to complete the planes for training purposes, but this seemingly sensible idea was quashed. 

Another possibility would have been to build the SM 82 under license, perhaps with 3 Bramo 323 engines. This would have certainly provided a lot more capability than the Ju 52.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 2, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The DB 601 was a 590kgA-0 dry weight engine, 1298lbs? I can't find a good weight for the 601E but a 605A was 710KG (1562lbs) so they beefed up some things somewhere.
> 
> Water injection was a useful but somewhat limited option. It works best when used _below_ an engines rated altitude. For a DB601A-0 that was 3700meters. It can cool the intake charge, making it more dense above the rated altitude but that is only worth a few %. It is much more useful at lower altitudes. Things like the P-38 and P-47 excepted as their turbos could supply more air than the engine could use up to around 25-27,000ft in the later models. The 601A-1 used a different supercharger that had a critical altitude of 4500meters. The DB601E used a different supercharger (same as the 605A or???) and then they stuck on the supercharger from the 603. Please note however that bigger superchargers come at a price. At 2600rpm and the Kurzleistung rating the big supercharger _cost_ the DB 605 35PS at sea level.
> 
> ...


I was referring to both intercooling and water injection as technologies used to allow higher boost levels on lower octane fuels in the hypothetical context of German engines focusing more on supercharger boost performance and less on increasing RPM or swept volume.

That includes use of larger or higher speed superchargers to supply higher boost at higher rated altitudes. (thus making intercoolers more useful) That said, water injection would probably be more useful to introduce first with intercooling following later.

Jumo's use of aftercoolers on the 211 would have been more useful if higher altitude supercharger gearing was used (or used more frequently at least). Somewhat odd that that wasn't the case, but I suppose the demands for most aircraft using those engines preferred lower speed superchargers with a bit more power on take-off. (short of resorting to larger or 2-stage superchargers, I believe the existing single stage impellers were suitable for being pushed to higher speeds than most 211s used -I forget specifics, but this topic has come up before, at least briefly)




> Both DB and Junkers _chose_ to use large displacement slow turning engines of about the _same weight_ as the smaller but higher revving Allison and Merlin to get the same power (roughly). Once paths were chosen it was hard to change paths.


I wasn't suggesting changing that, but rather avoiding some of the more difficult engineering issues you mentioned in regards to increases in RPM and further increases in volume with a greater emphasis on supercharger boosting. Granted, some components will need to be strengthened either way due to sheer power level increases. (keep RPM the same, and all that stress goes into torque)

Now, it may have been that the existing RPM increases (and other changes) to german engines were able to be achieved quickly enough that using engineering developments closer to the likes of the Merlin wouldn't have been much or any faster anyway, but that would totally nullify the points you were making regarding British engine development.




> The BMW 801 was limited by the same thing/s that limited ALL aircooled radial engines. The R-2800 engine used in the P-47M/N being the exception that proves the rule, not a standard that any other radial engine ever reached


I was referring to the BMW 801's later models gaining more from boost increases and less from volumetric or RPM increases by relying on higher octane fuel WITHOUT intercooling or water injection (initially) more like allied engines were doing in general.

Additionally, I think the C-series 2-stage supercharged R-2800s are worth mentioning as well. They had less output power, but they also lacked the benefit of a huge turbocharger providing most of the boost pressure. The engines on F4F-4s (and especially F4F-5s) would apply.

The R-2800 was the only radial engine (possibly the only engine) in the US to see any serious development of big, high boost, high altitude, intercooled, water injected multi-stage supercharging and turbocharging. Then again, it was also the only radial engine being pushed into the cutting edge high performance fighters demanding that range of performance. Even the earlier model R-2800s were pushing volumetric performance beyond nearly any contemporary radial engine design, at least when water injection was used.

The BMW 801 F was coming close to that same range of performance, if not better in some respects, as were some Japanese designs. (particularly considering the material resource limitations compared to the Americans)





Shortround6 said:


> It took quite a while for water injection to be adopted as a _routine_ part of operations. Many very late war Military aircraft and postwar commercial aircraft being given "wet" ratings for take-off vs using water injection for emergency combat use only. I don'y know if was just accumulated experience or different materials or different maintenance procedures or a combination. There were fears of corrosion and/or oil problems with early use of water injection. A lot may depend on _when_ in the mission/flight the water injection is used. If used for take-off you have the length of the flight to evaporate any water out of the intake system and oil (blow-by past the piston rings) Using it 20 minutes before landing and using low power settings while descending to land could leave trace amounts of water in the oil.
> In combat you do what you have to do. Planing to use it on every flight is another story.


Using it for take-off and emergency power only would be the context at hand. (also significant given the bulk and weight of WM/50 tanks, you wouldn't really want to employ it for significantly longer periods than take-off and emergency ratings are limited to)

Automatic boost control that locks maximum boost pressure when water injection is disabled (or has run dry) would be important to avoid easily damaging the engine with rapid detonation onset from overboosting.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 6, 2015)

Since the thread is more or less engines-related:
Whenever the next type/variant of engines was introduced with C3 fuel in mind, German engine producers upped the compression ratio. That added a tiny bit of power at all altitudes, while lowering consumption, but made overboosting of the engine problematic, hence killing off plenty of advantages of using hi-oct fuel in the 1st place. For example, the Merlin III went to +12 psig boost on early 100 oct fuel (CR 6:1), the DB 601N went to 1.42 ata (circa +5.5 psig, CR 8.2:1) with early C3 fuel (96 oct?). The DB-601A was at 6.9:1, the 601E at 7.2:1.

Even once 1.80 ata was reached (late war C3 fuel, roughly equivalent of Allied 100/130?), that was still just under +11 psig. The compression ratio of the DB 605D was at 8.5/8.3:1 (from 7.5/7.3:1 on the 605A), 2-stage DB 603L have had the same CR.

Jumo engines were featuring a lower CR, 6.5:1 for B4 fuel (that includes 213 series), but also 8.5:1 when C3 fuel was aimed for. I'm not sure whether any engine was produced with such high CR, though. 

An early incorporation of Polikovskiy's device (swirl throttle sub type, reverse engineered from captured Mikulin engines) on the DB 605 line might also be interesting, adding perhaps 100-120 PS under the rated height, even with B4 fuel? Can somewhat substitute the MW 50 or intercooler. 
The Jumo 213 series have had it (ie. swirl throttle) incorporated.


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## Koopernic (Apr 6, 2015)

"An early incorporation of Polikovskiy's device." 

So what is this "swirl throttle" thing, how does it work and why would it work in a direct fuel injected engine. Perhaps the Soviet Engines were indirect multipoint injection?

AFAIKT a swirl device is an adjustable throttle applied to one intake port of a 2 intake port design to induce a certain amount of swirl at the cost of some losses. I would also question how applicable it would be to DB engines given the variable length inlet manifold.

Early C3 was 93-94 RON according to British Tests. The ratings of 96 or so came latter, certainly by 1943. There is a possibility that German C3 fuel improved again sometimes in 1944 or 1945 but we would have to find tests. It is a moot point however given the difficulties the Germans had in guaranteeing a secure supply of this complex to make product at that time. Most books I read of late war German aircraft mention a 2nd generation of Daimler Benz DB603 and Jumo 213 engines abandoned for a 3rd generation that could operate more successfully on B4 fuel. For instance the DB603EM (powered by C3 + MW50) might have powered the first Ta 152C however it required C3 fuel to reach its higher power levels and this was one reason that the Ta 152H with Jumo 213E1 was first to see production.

The Juners Jumo 213 aimed at RPM as high as 3700, much higher than the Merlin or Griffon.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 7, 2015)

Swirl throttle was installed just before impeller in Mikulins and Jumo 213s, also on the DB 603L. Mikulins and Klimov engines have had carbs between impeller and cylinders, it was not much of trouble to install the swirl throttle on fuel injected engines.
More about the stuff:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/engines/superchargers-mikulins-klimovs-jumos-etc-40086.html

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## Koopernic (Apr 7, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Swirl throttle was installed just before impeller in Mikulins and Jumo 213s, also on the DB 603L. Mikulins and Klimov engines have had carbs between impeller and cylinders, it was not much of trouble to install the swirl throttle on fuel injected engines.
> More about the stuff:
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/engines/superchargers-mikulins-klimovs-jumos-etc-40086.html



I would call these a variable inlet guide vane, they would allow a degree of variability of the supercharger outlet pressure without the impairing of efficiency caused by throttling the air flow or the possible complexity of variable speed drive. Interesting that the Jumo 213 incorporated them.

They were known to Daimler Benz. 
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/en...628-a-28270.html?highlight=daimler+benz+DB628

The DB628 (a DB605 derivative) had a two stage supercharger. 

The second stage was transversely mounted as usual in DB and Junkers A12 engines but the first stage was mounted coaxially to the gear box and had a variable inlet guide vane. It seems both the inlet guide vanes and impellor was variable pitch. The large size reflects that the engine was meant to operate at around 50000ft and would be taking in very thin air.

The 627 was a version based around the 603.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 7, 2015)

Indeed, the variable inlet guide vanes act as throttle, as noted from both Soviet and German reports.


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## Koopernic (Apr 7, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Indeed, the variable inlet guide vanes act as throttle, as noted from both Soviet and German reports.



The suggestion there is that throttling of the air flow *before* the super charger is more efficient than throttling *after* the supercharger. In fact where did the German fuel injected engines throttle their air flow?
I was also under the impression that the carburettor on the Merlin was before the supercharger so as to obtain a charge cooling effect?

I also suggest that the variable incidence inlet guide vanes may have looked like throttling from a fuel preparation point of view it was a more efficient process that alleviated supercharger load.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 7, 2015)

The DB engines throttled the air after the S/C, until 2-stage engines emerged, those giving away that throttle and using 'swirl throttle' located at the 'entrance' of the S/C. The BMW 801 have had 2 throttle plates, located before S/C.

Back to the lowering compression ratio vs. increase of it: 
With 5.5:1 compression ratio, the AM-42 engine was pulling manifold pressure of 1565 mm Hg (61.6 in Hg, a bit more than 2 ata, or about +15 psig) when using merely 95 oct fuel, no ADI, no inter/after-cooling. That was for take off and emergency at low level, making 2000 CV there. 
The altitude performance of the AM-42 was nothing to write home about, though - the single-stage supercharger was with a single-speed gearing that was engineered for low alt performance.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 7, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> The suggestion there is that throttling of the air flow *before* the super charger is more efficient than throttling *after* the supercharger. In fact where did the German fuel injected engines throttle their air flow?



The manual for the AM-42 notes that pressure just behind the supercharger was 1720 mm Hg, while just behind carbs was down to 1565 mm Hg (= manifold pressure, 'useful' for cylinders) when engine was in take off or emergency regime at low altitude. So the carb lowered the pressure by 155 mm Hg, or 6.1 in Hg - quite a bit of the loss, worth maybe 150 CV down low? Of course, the impeller needed/consumed more power to drive to supply 1720 mm Hg than for 1565 mm Hg. 
To the best of my knowledge, the Jumo 213 was using only the swirl throttle for all the throttling (no carb what so ever, of course), so the throttle-related it's losses should be lower than at Mikulins?

With DB engines, we can see that supercharger was delivering, say, 1.7 ata at sea level, yet it was throttled down to 1.3 ata (here). 'Geblasedruck' is the pressure delivered by supercharger, 'Ladedruck' is manifold pressure ie. pressure after the supercharged air is throttled down. Of course, any surplus amount of 'Geblasedruck' vs. 'Ladedruck' means that a bit of engine power is wasted. The discrepancy between Geblasedruck' and 'Ladedruck' is much lower above full throttle height.



> I was also under the impression that the carburettor on the Merlin was before the supercharger so as to obtain a charge cooling effect?



Maybe it was a happy coincidence? An engine with single big carb (RR engines, V-1710) should be an easier thing to design, produce and maintain than an engine featuring multiple smaller carbs (Hispano V-12s, Kllimov and Mikulin V-12s). Single carb in front of the S/C might also need protection from icing, along with installation of backfire screens if greater manifold pressures are aimed for. Those two items might eat up any advantage provided by fuel acting as charge cooler.


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## wiking85 (Apr 7, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> I would call these a variable inlet guide vane, they would allow a degree of variability of the supercharger outlet pressure without the impairing of efficiency caused by throttling the air flow or the possible complexity of variable speed drive. Interesting that the Jumo 213 incorporated them.
> 
> They were known to Daimler Benz.
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/en...628-a-28270.html?highlight=daimler+benz+DB628
> ...



Do you have the rest of the patent on that link?


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## Koopernic (Apr 8, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> The manual for the AM-42 notes that pressure just behind the supercharger was 1720 mm Hg, while just behind carbs was down to 1565 mm Hg (= manifold pressure, 'useful' for cylinders) when engine was in take off or emergency regime at low altitude. So the carb lowered the pressure by 155 mm Hg, or 6.1 in Hg - quite a bit of the loss, worth maybe 150 CV down low? Of course, the impeller needed/consumed more power to drive to supply 1720 mm Hg than for 1565 mm Hg.
> To the best of my knowledge, the Jumo 213 was using only the swirl throttle for all the throttling (no carb what so ever, of course), so the throttle-related it's losses should be lower than at Mikulins?
> 
> With DB engines, we can see that supercharger was delivering, say, 1.7 ata at sea level, yet it was throttled down to 1.3 ata (here). 'Geblasedruck' is the pressure delivered by supercharger, 'Ladedruck' is manifold pressure ie. pressure after the supercharged air is throttled down. Of course, any surplus amount of 'Geblasedruck' vs. 'Ladedruck' means that a bit of engine power is wasted. The discrepancy between Geblasedruck' and 'Ladedruck' is much lower above full throttle height.
> ...



Clearly the DB605A hydraulic variable speed drive lacked sufficient range of operation at sea level to reduce the supercharger output to the 1.3 ata manifold limit. Running the supercharger faster than necessary and thereby generating 1.7 bar of pressure only to have to throttle it back to 1.3 bar manifold limit is clearly a source of inefficiency.

The DB603N was to have the two mechanical gears plus the hydraulic variable speed drive and presumably also variable pitch inlet guide vanes. The gears sets could easily be changed to adjust ratios for different missions.

Some method to is required to measure or estimate the air mass flow in an engine so that the fuel supply can be proportioned in at the approximate stoichiometric ratio of 14:1 for air fuel mixtures. the classic method is a venturi or orifice plate to generate a pressure differences which can be measured or which can be used to draw in fuel from a float chamber by a capillary tube.

Such a venturi obviously will lead to an pressure loss that is undesirable at times that the engine is to generate maximum power or at least it represents work the supercharger is performing to no purpose.

An alternative method is to measure ambient or exhaust pressure temperature and use a 'map' (say via a cam if you don't have a computer) of say inlet static pressure versus engine RPM to estimate the fuel flow and then apply the resultant mechanical deflection to a variable displacement pump (cam on the BMW 801 to operate individual plunger pumps or swash plate pumps on late Merlins)

The ideal system of flow control of the air would be if the throttling would be one in which there were no suction losses:
1 Adjustable supercharger via infinitely variable drive and or variable inlet geometry to allow adjustment from 1 bar ambient pressure with no losses in the supercharger drive all the way to maximum allowed manifold pressure with no losses in throttling back the pressure.

2 For manifold pressures below ambient fairly radical idea would be to not have a throttle valve but instead have a variable pitched fan that could change from being a compressor to being a turbine that adds power back into the main shaft. Thus the energy lost in restricting airflow then some of the the 'suction losses' of a internal combustion engine are recovered. 

I suspect that, to a limited degree, that these variable pitch inlet devices can be conceived of as working somewhat this way: they restrict the inlet flow but also make that flow impinge on the compressor inlet in such a way that it actually perhaps a certain degree part of the compressor becomes a turbine that adds back power to alleviate the power drawn by the main compressor portion.

My understanding is that the 1st stage of USN two stage PW R-2800 navy fighter engines could be declutched to 'free wheel'. Imagine if throttling were achieved via extracting power from this 1st stage via a dynamo/generator. I suspect that this is in fact what the electric superchargers on some Ford cars do.


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## Juha (Apr 8, 2015)

stona said:


> There were NO dual Spitfires or Hurricanes available to the RAF during the war. Pilots were given a copy of the Pilot's Notes to read, a few hints and tips from someone who knew the ropes and told to get on with it. The same applied for those converting from Hurricane to Spitfire or vice-versa (which did happen, sometimes to the dismay of the pilots concerned).
> If, and its a big if, the Bf 109 had an unusually high accident rate for newly qualified pilots, then there are factors other than the aircraft's handling that might need consideration. The Luftwaffe seems to have had a poor safety record generally and this was as much due to its procedures, or lack of them, as the aircraft it flew.
> Cheers
> Steve



Yes but one reason might be that the jump from Ar 96 (485hp, MTOW 1750kg) to Bf 109 was bigger than from Miles Master Mk II(870hp, 2528kg)/NA Haward (550hp, 2404kg) to Hurricane (very easy a/c to fly for a first-line fighter) or to Spitfire (markedly easier plane to t/o and land than 109 even if as a pure flying machine 109 was fairly pilot friendly).


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## rinkol (Apr 8, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> Clearly the DB605A hydraulic variable speed drive lacked sufficient range of operation at sea level to reduce the supercharger output to the 1.3 ata manifold limit. Running the supercharger faster than necessary and thereby generating 1.7 bar of pressure only to have to throttle it back to 1.3 bar manifold limit is clearly a source of inefficiency.
> .......
> .




I think the real reason for the pressure differential was to provide a rapid throttle response - if you tried to replace the throttle with a variable speed supercharger drive, the result would be a poor throttle response because of the time required to increase the supercharger speed. The swirl throttle avoided this problem.


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## Koopernic (Apr 8, 2015)

Juha said:


> Yes but one reason might be that the jump from Ar 96 (485hp, MTOW 1750kg) to Bf 109 was bigger than from Miles Master Mk II(870hp, 2528kg)/NA Haward (550hp, 2404kg) to Hurricane (very easy a/c to fly for a first-line fighter) or to Spitfire (markedly easier plane to t/o and land than 109 even if as a pure flying machine 109 was fairly pilot friendly).



Compared to the Fw 190 the Me 109 required extra instruction time to deal with the more difficult take-off and landing. The poor rearward vision also required extra instruction to ensure the paired wing men had developed good habits to cover each others tail. The more difficult takeoff and landing was considerably improved when the extended tail yoke was introduced. Take-off and landing accidents reduced as did taxiing incidents. I'm surprised that this took so long to introduce as the extended tail yoke was interchangeable with the shorter form. The enlarged tail also likely improved things.

A statistic I recall from the wild boar era of single engine night fighter training in Germany is that these pilots were suffering a 40%-50% casualty rate in training compared to their already experienced and skilled Finnish counterparts, receiving training in Germany at the same time, at less than 10%.

The rearward visibility was improved with the clear view ERLA haube(canopy hood) which removed much of the cockpit framing and the Galland Panzer which was the replacement of the pilots head armour with a plate of armour glass across virtually the entire canopy width.

Nevertheless without a bubble canopy or rear view mirror they must have been restricted to using flying procedures to avoid being jumped unawares. This seemingly simple aspect is actually quite significant.

German flight instructors were somewhat disappointed that the Luftwaffe had found itself dependant on the Me 109 even in 1944. Obviously the Luftwaffe had done a good job in introducing the Fw 190 and the aircraft showed excellent development potential but it had limitations at high altitude. History might have changed had the DB603 not been put on 'hold' between 1937 to 1940. It had been offered to the RLM/Luftwaffe as a 1500hp-1600hp engine in 1937. Development did continue at a slow rate, presumably as a Daimler Benz project. Obviously the options available to German designers and manufacturers change dramatically if the engine is available in 1940.

The Me 309, which flew in early 1942 had a laminar flow wing, 80% more range than the Me 109, Me 262 style bubble canopy, tremendous fire power, tricycle under carriage, reverse pitch propeller. It might have addressed the take-off/landing issues of the 109. Supposedly it was less manoeuvrable than the Me 109 but reading between the lines I think this was entirely a power to weight ratio issue. The first prototype had the DB603 but the subsequent ones seemed to receive the relatively tiny DB605, suggesting that a production problem with the DB603 was the cause. Of course ramping up from first flight in early 1942 to production might take 2 years if the handling suggested that airframe design needed adjustments and 1 year if it was good from the begining. It might have entered service at the time of the British Tempest in 1944. Either way the size of the aircraft demanded an engine of around 2000hp. Throwing away the 109's widely dispersed productions and sub supplier system would have seemed unattractive.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 9, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> Compared to the Fw 190 the Me 109 required extra instruction time to deal with the more difficult take-off and landing. The poor rearward vision also required extra instruction to ensure the paired wing men had developed good habits to cover each others tail.
> 
> Nevertheless without a bubble canopy or rear view mirror they must have been restricted to using flying procedures to avoid being jumped unawares. This seemingly simple aspect is actually quite significant.


I wonder if the He 100 would have fared better in those categories given the wider track landing gear configuration and higher visibility canopy design.

The high wing loading might have complicated matters though, assuming the wing design of the D-0/D-1 series went unchanged. (at least assuming significant weight increases on hypothetical later models)



> German flight instructors were somewhat disappointed that the Luftwaffe had found itself dependant on the Me 109 even in 1944. Obviously the Luftwaffe had done a good job in introducing the Fw 190 and the aircraft showed excellent development potential but it had limitations at high altitude. History might have changed had the DB603 not been put on 'hold' between 1937 to 1940. It had been offered to the RLM/Luftwaffe as a 1500hp-1600hp engine in 1937. Development did continue at a slow rate, presumably as a Daimler Benz project. Obviously the options available to German designers and manufacturers change dramatically if the engine is available in 1940.


Again, the He 100 might have filled the role of an aircraft more deserving of the DB-601/605. (as might the Fw 187, purely hypothetical designs aside)

But as for the Me 309, I think the Fw-190 airframe itself would be a more deserving target for that engine. (more than the bombers and heavy fighters it was actually going to as well) Accelerated development earlier on would have been great, but as it was it would have made much more sense to focus on supplying the limited number of DB-603As to Fw-190 derivatives.

A DB-601/605 with the larger 603's supercharger could/should have been developed sooner as well. (in the case of the 605, an earlier DB 605AS coupled with a lightened, high-alt optimized airframe might have been attractive as well -as would be the potential motor cannon mounting -an earlier 605ASM would be even better, but I'm not exactly sure what held up water injection development)


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## Shortround6 (Apr 9, 2015)

Both the Me 309 and the He 100 show some of the problems with trying to get too tricky. 

Me 309 maneuverability _may_ not have been helped by being under powered but the fact that it was as heavy or heavier than a P-51 Mustang with a wing only 77% as big certainly didn't help either. 

Trying to shove a quart (liter) into a pint (500ml) pot doesn't work too well. And that is the story of the He 100. Some of it's features were better than the 109 but the plane had been designed a little too carefully to be as small as possible for the engine it used. It's wings were about 90% the size of the 109s wings and held most of the fuel (or all depending on version) which meant large area flat tanks. These were not self sealing on the prototypes/early series aircraft. A large weight increase/range reduction on a version with protected tanks. A similar problem with the oil cooling system. Oil cooler was suspended in an alcohol tank with the alcohol running to surface radiators in the turtle deck, horizontal stabilizers and vertical fin. A lot of square footage of vulnerable area. It also means engine upgrades are going to harder to do or increases in performance are going to be harder to achieve. Increasing engine power(not peak but climbing power) by 30% means you need 30% more cooling capacity for both the radiators and oil cooling system. If you run out of skin area you need to use higher drag regular cooling systems. 
A service version even in 1941 comparable to a Bf 109F would have seen a sizable jump in weight.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 9, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Trying to shove a quart (liter) into a pint (500ml) pot doesn't work too well. And that is the story of the He 100. Some of it's features were better than the 109 but the plane had been designed a little too carefully to be as small as possible for the engine it used. It's wings were about 90% the size of the 109s wings and held most of the fuel (or all depending on version) which meant large area flat tanks. These were not self sealing on the prototypes/early series aircraft. A large weight increase/range reduction on a version with protected tanks. A similar problem with the oil cooling system. Oil cooler was suspended in an alcohol tank with the alcohol running to surface radiators in the turtle deck, horizontal stabilizers and vertical fin. A lot of square footage of vulnerable area. It also means engine upgrades are going to harder to do or increases in performance are going to be harder to achieve. Increasing engine power(not peak but climbing power) by 30% means you need 30% more cooling capacity for both the radiators and oil cooling system. If you run out of skin area you need to use higher drag regular cooling systems.
> A service version even in 1941 comparable to a Bf 109F would have seen a sizable jump in weight.


It seems like a lot of the problems were being resolved on the He 100 D-1 variant, at least as far as abandoning the surface cooling entirely. I'm not sure if that would have freed up any more wing space for fuel (or enough to make up for the reduction in capacity for self-sealing tanks -weight gains aside).

The under-fuselage radiator position would have precluded a belly rack, so limiting things more in line with the Hurricane or P-51 (or Ki-61 or some Italian fighters) with underwing racks or nothing at all. 

Wing extensions/redesigns might have been needed at some point (the Ki-61 adopted such over the Ki-60), though I wonder if underwing/wing-tip drop tanks (or even fixed fuel tanks) might have changed things somewhat too. The wings are small enough to make that somewhat attractive over underwing tanks, but aside from that you have the advantages of winglet-like improvements to lift:drag and effective aspect ratio. (not fully understood at the time, but the 'endplate effect' was at least known and one of the reasons for using twin-fin tail designs, so at least more reason to consider that than a potential happy accident in hindsight)


All that said, a Fw-190 variant optimized for the DB-605 might have made more sense than either the He 100 or Me 309. (should at very least have been lighter than the 309 with the same engine and had more flexible armament configurations, cockpit visibility, handling, and landing characteristics than the 109, but still probably a lower power:weight ratio than the 109, even with possible weight reductions -then again, the P-51 generally had lower power:weight as well)

A DB 601E powered 190 probably wouldn't have gained enough to be worthwhile ... maybe close to (or better than) the P-51A, but the trade-offs compared to the 109 might have been too much to be worthwhile. (at least in fighter vs fighter performance ... not sure how the other advantages might factor in)

The DB-601AS AM and especially ASM would be the most interesting to consider, but the latter in particular was late. (had water injection or -especially- a larger supercharger been introduced earlier, use on the larger Fw 190 airframe would be more interesting -possibly to the extent of making the DB-601E more attractive ... a DB-601ES or ESM, if you will)

That and, if provided with the same C-3 fuel some of the 801 powered Fw-190s were receiving, the boost limits on the DB-605A might have been more forthcoming too. (possibly the 601 as well)


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## stona (Apr 10, 2015)

Resources, resources, resources.

The Luftwaffe NEVER had anything like the resources it needed to fulfil existing production plans. This is something that started before the war. Production Plan 11 was introduced in early 1939 and reduced the total aircraft production to what was then considered more realistic levels than the earlier plans. It called for 7,748 bombers rather than the 10,900 of the previous plan for example.

Even Production Plan 11 proved unrealistic. 

On 12th April the RLM reported that due to changes in aircraft and equipment types and other shortages Plan 11 could not be completed on time. In May Milch informed Goering that aircraft production plans were in trouble due to a lack of steel, aluminium, copper and other metals. He proposed a reduction of 35% in the plan.
To cut a long story short (there were also shortages of fuel, ammunition, bombs etc) Plan 12 was introduced cutting targets by 20%. Engine production was running at between 3% and 37% below target, depending on manufacturer. 

*This is all before a shot has been fired in WW2*.

In August 1939, after the start of hostilities the Luftwaffe requested priority for the Bf 109, He 177, Ju 88 and Me 210. This was agreed at a meeting of Goering, Jeschonnek, Milch and Udet.
My point is that as early as 1939 a lack of resources was causing concentration on a few types. Technological gambles are all well and good if they can be _properly_ financed and resourced. The Germans couldn't do it in 1939/40 and they were even less able to do it later when resources were diverted to the V weapons, a technological gamble that didn't pay off, and other projects, some of which, with hindsight, verge on idiotic.

There is a common misconception that the Germans somehow had an over arching technological lead over the Allies. They certainly didn't and in many fields they had fallen somewhat behind by the end of the war. Radar would be a good example of this. The Germans pushed some technologies (rocketry for example) further than the Allies because they felt had to. There were obviously ideological rather than pragmatic reasons for this. It did result in rare technological successes, but never anything that came close to altering the course of the war.

Cheers

Steve

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## kool kitty89 (Apr 10, 2015)

stona said:


> There is a common misconception that the Germans somehow had an over arching technological lead over the Allies. They certainly didn't and in many fields they had fallen somewhat behind by the end of the war. Radar would be a good example of this. The Germans pushed some technologies (rocketry for example) further than the Allies because they felt had to. There were obviously ideological rather than pragmatic reasons for this. It did result in rare technological successes, but never anything that came close to altering the course of the war.


Mismanagement of what resources they did have (material and intellectual) was a big part of that problem, but then so were unrealistic (or even insane) plans or goals be it strategic or tactical, military or fundamental economic planning. (sticking with the purely technical side of things and not getting into the bigger social/political picture)

Nazi economic planning and management (or lack thereof) was one of their fundamental flaws. Honestly, the majority of the technical discussions on here with any emphasis on better emphasis on X engineering project or X distribution of resources only start to get hypothetically plausible if you start skewing the history of Nazi doctrine/policies in general.

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## gjs238 (Apr 10, 2015)

stona said:


> Resources, resources, resources.
> 
> The Luftwaffe NEVER had anything like the resources it needed to fulfil existing production plans. This is something that started before the war. Production Plan 11 was introduced in early 1939 and reduced the total aircraft production to what was then considered more realistic levels than the earlier plans. It called for 7,748 bombers rather than the 10,900 of the previous plan for example.
> 
> ...



Yet the Germans were highly dependent on horses.
How many UK and US horses were deployed during the war?


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## stona (Apr 10, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Yet the Germans were highly dependent on horses.



Again a reflection of resources (or lack thereof). The Germans obviously had the technology to build motorised transport, just not the means to build the quantity that could be turned out of US factories in particular.

Prior to D-Day 140,000 transport vehicles were parked at depots around the south coast of England. There were 100,000s more to follow. What the Germans would have given for them.

Worthwhile technological advances need not necessarily be huge leaps. 34% of British armoured losses after the Rhine was crossed i.e. east of that river, were due to the cheap and cheerful 'Panzerfaust'. That compares with just 6% in Normandy and 9% in Belgium and Holland. It was a weapon much superior to the US 'bazooka' or laughable British PIAT, was manufactured in large numbers and handed out to just about anyone that could hold one.

Cheers

Steve

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## Koopernic (Apr 10, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Both the Me 309 and the He 100 show some of the problems with trying to get too tricky.
> 
> Me 309 maneuverability _may_ not have been helped by being under powered but the fact that it was as heavy or heavier than a P-51 Mustang with a wing only 77% as big certainly didn't help either.



The Me 309 had full span leading edge slats, those on the 109(like many aircraft) covered only the aileron area. That in itself would increase CLmax by 40% such that the 77% wing area compared to the P-51 becomes 108% lift loading. Although slats increase CLmax considerably they do so by allowing far higher angles of attack before airflow becomes detached. Although these higher permisable angles of attack provide the desired extra lift they do so at a lower Lift to Drag ratio. These is more drag. Hence power to weight ratio is important in such aircraft: they are efficient at level flight but under conditions of high load will have more drag.

The Me 309 flew in Early-Mid 1942 around the time the Me 210/410 issue had damaged Messerschmitt's reputation and had sent the company insolvent. The extra workload in the Drawing and Engineering office was such that Messerschmitt had to forgo development of the Me 264 transcontinental bomber.

These issues and perhaps Milch's animosity may have played their part. The powers that be also wanted Messerschmitt to focus on the Me 262.

It is difficult to find terribly much information on this aircraft. It was flying May-June 1942. If one assumes a 3 month flight test program, then a few months of modifications say a lengthened tail(say a 75cm plug), enlarged empennage and perhaps slightly enlarged wings one ends up with an aerodynamically debugged aircraft by mid 1943. A few moths after that A0 series pre production aircraft can begin squadron testing, perhaps undertaking combat, developing tactics and training manuals. Production thus feasibly begins in early 1944. A key problems will be the engines: either DB603 or Jumo 213. Neither seems to have exceeded 1750hp in production form until well into the second half of 1944. The Fw 190D9 itself had lacklustre performance until the increased boost modification increased power from 1750 to 1900hp in October and the MW50 addition to 2100 around November.

The Me 309 certainly seems to have had good performance on the 1750hp engine. It reputedly did 452 mph on 1725hp and supposedly around 462 on 1900. Moreover it had many features of what the Luftwaffe needed, a bubble canopy with spectacularly good rear vision, enormous fire power, improved range.

It seems more likely it was the victim of circumstance and timing. A completely new aircraft entering mass production in 1944 would have been a challenge for any nation.

It seems more likely that it was abandoned due to the circumstances around it.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 10, 2015)

stona said:


> Again a reflection of resources (or lack thereof). The Germans obviously had the technology to build motorised transport, just not the means to build the quantity that could be turned out of US factories in particular.
> 
> Prior to D-Day 140,000 transport vehicles were parked at depots around the south coast of England. There were 100,000s more to follow. What the Germans would have given for them.


I'm not sure it's pure material resources that limited a transportation evolution/revolution in Germany, but at very least the overwhelming issues with industrial management (and overall economic planning/management) would come into play here.

German logistical management and transportation network were a bit of a mess in many areas, that extended to the bulk of the military transport aircraft used during the war (the shortcomings of the outdated Ju 52 and lack of a suitable replacement in production came up recently in other discussions).




> Worthwhile technological advances need not necessarily be huge leaps. 34% of British armoured losses after the Rhine was crossed i.e. east of that river, were due to the cheap and cheerful 'Panzerfaust'. That compares with just 6% in Normandy and 9% in Belgium and Holland. It was a weapon much superior to the US 'bazooka' or laughable British PIAT, was manufactured in large numbers and handed out to just about anyone that could hold one.


There's a lot to be said about elegance in simplicity and efficiency. The Volkswagon design philosophy fit in pretty well there too. (on the topic of transportation)

There are some cases where the Germans favored overly conservative development/production that hindered flexibility and adaptation (the distribution of DB-601/605 and 603 engines would be one example -limiting possible replacements for the 109/110/210/410 -and others- that would render allocation of engines to those aircraft superfluous anyway), in other cases they funded far too broad an array of newer/bigger/more complex/costly designs rather than paring them down to the most efficient/effective designs. That was particularly true for offensive weapon investment over defensive. (bombers, attack aircraft, armored fighting vehicles, the V weapons)

Low priority for transport aircraft development/production was one of the more serious logistically crippling faults as well.

Then you had the overall economic strategy for the war barring things like stockpiling material resources in case of shortages, or any sort of contingency planning in the case of prolonged conflict.







Koopernic said:


> The Me 309 had full span leading edge slats, those on the 109(like many aircraft) covered only the aileron area. That in itself would increase CLmax by 40% such that the 77% wing area compared to the P-51 becomes 108% lift loading. Although slats increase CLmax considerably they do so by allowing far higher angles of attack before airflow becomes detached. Although these higher permisable angles of attack provide the desired extra lift they do so at a lower Lift to Drag ratio. These is more drag. Hence power to weight ratio is important in such aircraft: they are efficient at level flight but under conditions of high load will have more drag.


Aside from greater drag and energy loss in maneuvers (high G mid/low speed ones that actually approach CL-max at least) you'd also have difficulty with visibility on landing due to the nose high angle at low speeds. On the positive end, you'd also have the ability to pull more lead on a target without stalling out. (important for instantaneous maneuvers, so potentially outside the unattractive realm of sustained, high energy cost turning)



> The Me 309 flew in Early-Mid 1942 around the time the Me 210/410 issue had damaged Messerschmitt's reputation and had sent the company insolvent. The extra workload in the Drawing and Engineering office was such that Messerschmitt had to forgo development of the Me 264 transcontinental bomber.


Again, given the timing, it still seems like investing in alternate engined variants of the Fw 190 around the same time (or sooner) would have been smarter. For that matter, adapting the original smaller Fw 190 V1 airframe to test with a DB 601/605 might have been very useful as well.


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## stona (Apr 11, 2015)

Until mid 1941 all armaments contracts were annual contracts on a 'cost plus financing' basis. It means that the company is immune from losses if for example a weapon takes extra time to develop and get into production. There is also no incentive to produce more, faster or more efficiently. This is just one example of the malaise that lay at the heart of the Nazi government's cosy relationship with industry in general.

It has been estimated that the German motor industry was still operating at less than 50% capacity for military vehicles in 1942. The huge Steyr Werkes in Austria was still unoccupied in 1943!

Hoarding of raw materials was an endemic problem within industry and the aircraft industry was one of the worse offenders. This was partly due to the quota system exercised by the RLM. Companies consistently over estimated their needs assuming they would get less than whatever they asked for and then stockpiled any excess against future shortage.
There is some evidence that raw materials intended for the armament and related industries were diverted into consumer goods production. In 1942 the production of consumer goods in Germany was running at a rate only 3% lower than before the war. Corruption was rife in the Nazi system. 

There was also considerable wastage due to inefficient techniques (one report estimates that a staggering 700Kg of aluminium was 'wasted' in the production of one aero engine) and inappropriate uses. Messerschmitt was still using aluminium to manufacture pre-fabricated barracks for the Navy and ladders for vineyards in 1943.

Other 'technological gambles', even those which did enjoy some success were fraught with problems. In November 1943 2,000 partially completed V-1s were scrapped due to 'structural weaknesses'.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Apr 11, 2015)

stona said:


> Until mid 1941 all armaments contracts were annual contracts on a 'cost plus financing' basis. It means that the company is immune from losses if for example a weapon takes extra time to develop and get into production. There is also no incentive to produce more, faster or more efficiently. This is just one example of the malaise that lay at the heart of the Nazi government's cosy relationship with industry in general.
> 
> It has been estimated that the German motor industry was still operating at less than 50% capacity for military vehicles in 1942. The huge Steyr Werkes in Austria was still unoccupied in 1943!
> 
> ...



Steyr was producing things for the war effort during WW2:
Steyr-Daimler-Puch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Steyr Daimler Puch â€“ Wikipedia


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## stona (Apr 11, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Steyr was producing things for the war effort during WW2:



I'll be more specific. The new built factory at Graz was still unoccupied in 1943 (Vajda and Dancey).

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Apr 11, 2015)

stona said:


> I'll be more specific. The new built factory at Graz was still unoccupied in 1943 (Vajda and Dancey).
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



My understanding was that that factory wasn't completed until 1943.


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## stona (Apr 11, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> My understanding was that that factory wasn't completed until 1943.



It was started in 1941 and still not operational in 1943. Whether it was complete or not after those two years I don't know, but it wasn't in use.

This was a minor inefficiency in the German aviation and manufacturing industry, cited merely as an example. 

The result of the poor planning and inefficient practices was the damning figures for aircraft available to the Luftwaffe. In September 1939 the Luftwaffe started the war with 1,125 S/E fighters (870 serviceable). April 1945 it finished the war with 1,637 S/E fighters (serviceable number unknown). In the meantime they lost somewhere in the region of 42,000 of this type. For the entire war production barely kept pace with losses. The figures for other types are proportionally even worse. Put those numbers against the Western Allies or the Soviet Union and it is not difficult to divine why the Luftwaffe lost the air war. No technological gamble, however successful, was going to change this.

As I said above...resources, resources, resources.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Apr 11, 2015)

stona said:


> It was started in 1941 and still not operational in 1943. Whether it was complete or not after those two years I don't know, but it wasn't in use.
> 
> This was a minor inefficiency in the German aviation and manufacturing industry, cited merely as an example.
> 
> ...



Sure, a serious issue with the German war economy was overbuilding factories and ending up running only single or double shifts due to lack of labor, in the process overburdening the machine tool industry among others and sucking up labor building all the facilities that were never used. Ostmark is a prime example of a good idea that was just not feasible given the situation as it developed after it was ordered. Simply put it was planning that was never able to come to fruition due to unforeseen war circumstances later on. Obviously part of that was silly notions like Russia being defeated in 1941, which if it had happened would have made the production planning of 1940-41 in terms of factories make a lot more sense, but were totally out of step with reality in 1943.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 11, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> The Me 309 had full span leading edge slats, those on the 109(like many aircraft) covered only the aileron area. That in itself would increase CLmax by 40% such that the 77% wing area compared to the P-51 becomes 108% lift loading. Although slats increase CLmax considerably they do so by allowing far higher angles of attack before airflow becomes detached. Although these higher permisable angles of attack provide the desired extra lift they do so at a lower Lift to Drag ratio. These is more drag. Hence power to weight ratio is important in such aircraft: they are efficient at level flight but under conditions of high load will have more drag.



Any drawing available on the net shows 1/2 span slats, not full span slats. I'd appreciate a superior information that would confirm the size of slats.
With that said, the slats do anything on low AoA (here) and on high speed. Expecting from the heavy Me 309 to compete in maneuverability with Bf 109 or Spitfire is an unrealistic proposal.



> ... A key problems will be the engines: either DB603 or Jumo 213. Neither seems to have exceeded 1750hp in production form until well into the second half of 1944. The Fw 190D9 itself had lacklustre performance until the increased boost modification increased power from 1750 to 1900hp in October and the MW50 addition to 2100 around November.



The Jumo 213A with increased low- and mi-alt power (due to MW 50 or similar additions) will still mean that high-alt performance is as it was before. However - main problem the Fw-190D-9 had was timing, not extra 10 mph of performance. Both DB 603A and Jumo 213A have had plenty of power at all altitudes, while not being too draggy or heavy,. It was RLM/LW's own goal not to have Fw-190 powered by those engines already in winter of 1943/44.



> The Me 309 certainly seems to have had good performance on the 1750hp engine. It reputedly did 452 mph on 1725hp and supposedly around 462 on 1900. Moreover it had many features of what the Luftwaffe needed, a bubble canopy with spectacularly good rear vision, enormous fire power, improved range.



The speed figures should be good - plenty of power on a small and probably well streamlined aircraft. Do we know whether the prototypes were armed when speed runs were made?



> It seems more likely it was the victim of circumstance and timing. A completely new aircraft entering mass production in 1944 would have been a challenge for any nation.
> It seems more likely that it was abandoned due to the circumstances around it.



Germany, and some other nations, succeeded in introducing new aircraft (not just fighters) in 1944. The Me 309 was a victim of it's own design bureau, rather than other circumstances.


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## stona (Apr 11, 2015)

In February 1940 Goering perfectly expressed the ineptitude of Nazi planning when he said, _"the only projects considered as vital are those that will be completed in 1940 to 1941, at the latest..."_ His decision was an economic one, not a technical one. It was once again a short term plan to marshal resources.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Apr 11, 2015)

stona said:


> In February 1940 Goering perfectly expressed the ineptitude of Nazi planning when he said, _"the only projects considered as vital are those that will be completed in 1940 to 1941, at the latest..."_ His decision was an economic one, not a technical one. It was once again a short term plan to marshal resources.
> Cheers
> Steve



Yet they were working on multiple facilities that weren't completed until 1943 like the tank plant expansions, Niebelungenwerke, Ostmark, and several others. Goering was not known for being good at managing the economy and that is why Speer took over in 1942.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 11, 2015)

Re. engine production. Granted, UK and Soviet air forces were in combat before USAF/USN, but here is about the US vs. German 'major' engines:
Allison produced 62000+ V-1710 engines prior 1945 (1940-44). Production peaked to +2000 pcs per month in early 1944, dwindling down to ~1000 per month in Nov 1944, due to cancelling out P-40 and P-39 (P-63 was never a priority). Packard built ~27000 single stage V-1650s and ~18500 2-stagers. That is two sources, granted big factory complexes. Makes a total of 107500 V-12 engines produced prior 1945. 
Germany produced ~75000 of DB V-12s prior 1945 (1936-44), that includes ~4200 of 'double engines' (DB 606, 610). 68000+ Jumo 211 engines was produced, and 9000 Jumo 213s (a part of what was made in 1945). Makes 152000+ 'major' V-12 engines.

BMW 801 was produced in ~30000 copies, 1945 included. Almost 70000 R-2600s was produced, and 82000+ R-2800s; combined 152000, both designs for prior-1945 time span.

We can add ~30000 turbo set ups just for P-38 and P-47, for a good measure. Addition of turbos, along with suitable improvements, made the R-1820 and 1830 still viable engines in late war; 155000 of R-1830s and 80000 of R-1820s was produced prior 1945. 21000+ of BMW 132 engines was produced, and 5500 pcs of Bramo 323.

These numbers when combined with UK and Soviet production tend to show what Germany was against in ww2 from 1941 on. Italian and Japanese production notwithstanding.

edited: not 18800 BMW 801s, but ~30000 was produced


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## stona (Apr 11, 2015)

There were over 75,000 Jumo V12s built too. 68,200 211s.

Edit: I agree with your point, it's just that there tends to be a concentration on Daimler Benz engines and large production of the Jumo 211 gets overlooked 

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Apr 12, 2015)

I've added 4200 of W-24 DB engines to the German total of V-12s, sorry. Without those, it is about 147800 of major V-12 engines produced.

For the Soviet production, the 'TsAGI book'* states 'more than 33000' of Shvetsov's radial engines ( 9-cylinder M-62IR, 14-cylinder M-82 family) were produced during ww2; granted, Wikipedia lists 70000 of M-82 family engines  
Aircraft powered by Mikulin V-12 engines were produced in 'more than 41000 examples' for ww2 and post war, along with 8000 pcs for pre-war, so total number of engines should be a bit over 50000? Wikipedia lists 36000+ of AM-38/38F produced, the AM-35/35A is probably at ~4000 pcs. Wikipedia lists 10500+ of AM-34 engines produced.
As for Klimov's V-12s, the M-105 was produced in 'more than 48000 pcs', the VK-105PF and PF2 and VK-107 were produced in 'more than 28000 pcs'. Pre-war production of M-100 and M-103 engines amounted to 13000 pcs. 
Tumansky's M-88 was produced in 'more than 12000 pcs' during the war, pre-war production of M-85 to M-88 line was 4000 pcs.
AM-34xy, AM-35A, AM-38/38F and Klimov's engines total production for 1940-45 is probably at 125-130 thousand? AM-42 replaced the AM-38F at production lines in early 1945.

Hopefully someone will post credible numbers for UK production 


*Same source lists 'more than 70000' of Svetsov's radial engines for pre-war, ww2 and post war production.


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## stona (Apr 12, 2015)

I believe about 170,000 Merlins (including Packard production) alone were built. When you consider the extensive use of radial engines, particularly by the USAAF and even more so its bombers, it puts things into perspective.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Apr 12, 2015)

A major blow to the BMW 801 production happened in March 1944, when Munich production lines were hit by Allied bombers. They just reached 1000 produced engines in February there. Production dropped to ~650 engines in April, looks like another bomb raid (raids?) in June 1944 cut monthly production to under 500 pcs. Subsequent successful raids were in October, production dropped down to 300+ pcs in Oct and November. All these bombings cost Germany perhaps more than 5000 of BMW 801 engines in 1944 alone.
Production in Berlin area was low, maximum of 300 engines per month was achieved during 7-8 months in 1944.
The earlier blow to the BMW production was in March 1943, bomber hits at Milbertshofen (Munich area; undertaken by RAF BC? - help) cut the production from 400 pcs in Feb down to 100 engines produced in April 1943. Between Aug 1942 and March 1943 only 2484 BMW 801s were produced. 100 engines per month were managed for the 1st time in March 1942.

In 1942, USA produced almost 30000 of R-2600 and R-2800 combined, and in 1944 there was 45259 of R-2800 only produced. Between June 1944 and March 1945, there was only 4655 BMW 801s produced in Munchen area, and under 2000 in Berlin area.

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## Juha (Apr 12, 2015)

Hello Tomo
9/10 March 43 264 British bombers attacked München/Munich, B.M.W. aero-engine assembly shop was put out of action for 6 weeks.

Source: The Bomber Command War Diaries by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt

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## wiking85 (Apr 12, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> A major blow to the BMW 801 production happened in March 1944, when Munich production lines were hit by Allied bombers. They just reached 1000 produced engines in February there. Production dropped to ~650 engines in April, looks like another bomb raid (raids?) in June 1944 cut monthly production to under 500 pcs.


You sure about that time frame?


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## stona (Apr 12, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> bomb raid (raids?) in June 1944 cut monthly production to under 500 pcs. Subsequent successful raids were in October, production dropped down to 300+ pcs in Oct and November.
> 
> In 1942, USA produced almost 30000 of R-2600 and R-2800 combined, and in 1944 there was 45259 of R-2800 only produced. Between June 1944 and March 1945, there was only 4655 BMW 801s produced in Munchen area, and under 2000 in Berlin area.



Between June 1944 and March 1945 only 4,655 BMW 801s were built in the Munich plants. 

Albert Speer to the USSBS:

_"We were surprised for a long time that you attacked airframe production and not the motor production. we were always worried that you would attack the Bayerische Motorenwerke and others. There were only a few big factories...if you had attacked the motor factories at first and not the airframes we would have been finished."_

The Munich area facilities of BMW were not attacked by the US 8th AF until July 1944 when a concerted effort was made. Munchen-Albach was hit on the 11th, 13th, 21st and 31st of July 1944. Munchen-Oberwisenwald was hit on 31st July 1944.
I guess that other raids may have been by the RAF, but I'm not about to go through the Bomber Command War Diaries page by page to find out  I'm unconvinced that bombing of the Munich BMW plants was the direct cause of earlier falls in production. Of course bombing elsewhere may have caused problems.

Berlin-Basdorf was hit on 21st June 1944 and Berlin-Spandau on 28th March and 6th October 1944. Other plants were intermittently hit from June 1944 onwards, mainly in September 1944, with the exception of an early, 9th February 1944, raid on the Eisenbach facility.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Apr 12, 2015)

stona said:


> Between June 1944 and March 1945 only 4,655 BMW 801s were built in the Munich plants.
> 
> Albert Speer to the USSBS:
> 
> ...



Bombing of Germany during World War II - Metapedia
Its not complete, but its a start


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## tomo pauk (Apr 12, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> You sure about that time frame?



I've used this graph, from von Ghersdorff et al:






Full line is the documented production in Munchen area, dashed is assumed/calculated production in Munchen area, dotted is assumed/calculated production in Berlin area. If I'm reading the caption right, it says that 350 engines made by Argus in 1942 need to be added, along with production by Kloeckner in Hamburg and Bruenn/Brno. 30000 pcs of BMW 801 is supposed to have been produced, so my math of 18800 is way off the mark  Will edit previous post.
Same source says that production in Munich area (Allach, Milbertshofen) was 14605, and in Berlin/Spandau 4213 engines produced by war's end. 
Richard Faltermair in 'Flugzeug Classic' 10/2003 stated production from 1940-1944:
-233
-1708
-5225
-8658
-12222

January 1945 brought another 631 engine, Allach factories produced 310 engines in Feb 1945, 375 in March '45.

Von Ghersdorff et al note the highest month output of 1450 engines in May 1944, however that number is in collision with their own graph, yet in accordance with USBSS graph.

BTW, metapedia seem to be holocaust revision/denial site. FWIW.

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## wiking85 (Apr 12, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> BTW, metapedia seem to be holocaust revision/denial site. FWIW.



Good to know, didn't check it out beyond the bombing info.


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## parsifal (Apr 13, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Yet they were working on multiple facilities that weren't completed until 1943 like the tank plant expansions, Niebelungenwerke, Ostmark, and several others. Goering was not known for being good at managing the economy and that is why Speer took over in 1942.



Ah, no. Speer took over from Fritz Todt, who was killed in an airplane accident in February 1942. Goring undeniably was not a good detail manager, which was what was exactly required for economic and military planning issues. However, he was just typical of the whole Nazi approach to governance issues. Rotten to the core, more about building personal fiefdoms and power bases. Goring was just flamboyant and one of the worst, thats all. The problems for the LW were not just restricted to one man, they were systemic and affected virtually the whole orgabisation. There were a few that were the exceptions. men like Speer and Todt, and Milch who really knew what needed to be done. Its just the machinery of the Nazi system that stifled them, not just one man. Goring was pretty much out of the picture by 1941, the Germans still couldnt make a fair go of it.


"couldnt run a chook raffle at a Bingo night" is about how I would describe LW planning and strategic management for the most part.


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## stona (Apr 13, 2015)

And to add to that Speer's success was not based solely on his own capabilities. It was largely on his ability to cut out the party b#llsh#t. He had direct access to Hitler, much to men like Bormann's annoyance. He once famously threatened a meeting of Gauleiters, by a well understood inference, with concentration camps. The old Nazis were both outraged and threatened because they knew of Speer's personal relationship with Hitler.
Speer was Teflon coated. Anybody else would have been executed by Hitler towards the end of the war, and he should have been executed by the Allies after the war, given the criteria by which others (particularly Sauckel) were condemned. 
Some cats have ten lives.
Cheers
Steve

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## Juha (Apr 13, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> ...BTW, metapedia seem to be holocaust revision/denial site. FWIW.



IHMO worse than that, I tried to find an article 'Bombing of Great Britain', not surprisingly in view of the terminology used in Germany article, nothing. Same results with 'Bombing of Warsaw' etc. Then looked the article 'London' and that was even worse than I have expected.


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## fastmongrel (Apr 13, 2015)

Juha said:


> IHMO worse than that, I tried to find an article 'Bombing of Great Britain', not surprisingly in view of the terminology used in Germany article, nothing. Same results with 'Bombing of Warsaw' etc. Then looked the article 'London' and that was even worse than I have expected.



I had to google metapedia didnt I, I knew it would be bad but what the f**k is wrong with some people how can they write and believe this cr*p.


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## wiking85 (Apr 13, 2015)

Now I am deeply embarrassed about posting it.


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