# Battle of the Bulge.....



## Lucky13 (Jun 20, 2008)

What would have happened if the German forces had succeeded in all its military objectives during the battle of the Bulge...? Where would they've gone from there and what would the allied have done?


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## Messy1 (Jun 20, 2008)

I think the same overall result would have happened. If the Germans had succeeded in the BoB, I think somewhere down the line they still would have been defeated as they were short on almost everything needed it seems to conduct a war, gas, ammo, machinery, etc. I think a victory in the BoB would just have postponed the inevitable.


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## trackend (Jun 20, 2008)

I agree Messy.
The Bulge nearly did succeed even naval personel from Antwerp were being deployed in defensive positions on the ground so the threat of a break through was very real but it would have ran out of steam at some point just through lack of logistics.


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## Messy1 (Jun 20, 2008)

That's along the lines I was thinking of. It took almost all the equipment, fuel, and ammo Germany had left to just get troops and mcahines supplied to start the attack, much less what to do afterwards if the succeeded. I believe Hitler was even going as far as counting on capturing allied fuel dumps to re-supply his troops. How far did he expect to get after that ran out. 

Eisenhower was all to ready to engage the Germans at this point. He looked at the BoB as a opportunity to finally get the Germans out in the open and confront them head on. I do not think a initial victory would have done anything, just pushed things off for a few days or a few weeks.


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## syscom3 (Jun 20, 2008)

The offensive was doomed once the weather cleared and the tactical airforces went on the attack.


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## Lucky13 (Jun 20, 2008)

This is also in the "plans"...they got a hold of that fuel that the allied had stocked up..


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## Njaco (Jun 20, 2008)

> syscom3: The offensive was doomed once the weather cleared and the tactical airforces went on the attack.



Thats why I thought Operation Bodenplatte should been in conjunction with the ground forces during the early phase. Might have given the breather to make Antwerp.


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## syscom3 (Jun 20, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Thats why I thought Operation Bodenplatte should been in conjunction with the ground forces during the early phase. Might have given the breather to make Antwerp.



Nope.

The allies had such a vast advantage in aircraft and aircrews, the LW could only hope to stage a single large harrasing raid once, before they were wiped out.

The Germans had no staying power in the air and on the ground.


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## Kruska (Jun 20, 2008)

I never understood that plan until today. Relying solely on the capture of allied fuel and supply depots in order to reach Antwerp and entrap the allied armies.   

Regards
Kruska


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## RabidAlien (Jun 22, 2008)

If I recall correctly, Hitler never intended on making this a grand and glorious comeback for the German army. He never intended on a sustained offensive. He merely wanted to capture Antwerp, a major supply port (giving him a temporary boost in materiel), and to divide the Allies. I'd have to go look again, but he hit the Allies in the perfect spot for his plan....the Ardenne lines were thinly held by recovering/new divisions, and he hit the line between the British and American armies. He hoped to drive a wedge between the Allies, causing both Brits and Yanks to start squabbling amongst themselves blaming the other for the German breach, which would then (hopefully) allow Germany alot more maneuvering room when he sued for peace. He was simply looking for a cessation of fighting on the Western front, so he could concentrate more troops and material over on the Eastern front to stop the Russians. Looking at it from Hitler's point of view....its actually one of his saner/more brilliant ideas, and might've worked if the Allies hadn't banded together sooner than he thought, put up more resistance than he thought, and if he'd had more resources than he thought he did.


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## Watanbe (Jun 24, 2008)

RabidAlien said:


> If I recall correctly, Hitler never intended on making this a grand and glorious comeback for the German army. He never intended on a sustained offensive. He merely wanted to capture Antwerp, a major supply port (giving him a temporary boost in materiel), and to divide the Allies. I'd have to go look again, but he hit the Allies in the perfect spot for his plan....the Ardenne lines were thinly held by recovering/new divisions, and he hit the line between the British and American armies. He hoped to drive a wedge between the Allies, causing both Brits and Yanks to start squabbling amongst themselves blaming the other for the German breach, which would then (hopefully) allow Germany alot more maneuvering room when he sued for peace. He was simply looking for a cessation of fighting on the Western front, so he could concentrate more troops and material over on the Eastern front to stop the Russians. Looking at it from Hitler's point of view....its actually one of his saner/more brilliant ideas, and might've worked if the Allies hadn't banded together sooner than he thought, put up more resistance than he thought, and if he'd had more resources than he thought he did.



I agree with you. I view the BOB as absolutely essential though.


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## Thorlifter (Jun 24, 2008)

Maybe true Rabid, but that's a LOT of "if's". If your military decisions are planned with "if's", your doomed.


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## Lucky13 (Jun 24, 2008)

Could they and should they have done some things differently? If so what should they have done instead?


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## Thorlifter (Jun 24, 2008)

The only thing they should have done differently, IMO, is not attack England and take care of the Eastern front first.

But as for this battle, nothing. If what Rabid said is true, about Hitler just wanting to capture Antwerp and just be a pain in the a$$ to the allies, he would have had to pull supplies from the east and that would have been fatal even faster. The Battle of the Bulge was just a desperate act by a doomed regime and while it was momentarily successful, it was a failure. 

All those supplies would have been better served as a defense around Berlin.


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## RabidAlien (Jun 24, 2008)

True. But I don't think he pulled troops from the Eastern Front. He wanted to take them from the Western front and move them East, thus the hope that he could put the Brits and Americans into a holding pattern at the conference table. That was his plan. He used units that were stationed around Berlin and the outlying areas (not completely stripping his defenses, but thinning them considerably), he conscripted boys ages 14-ish and up, as well as old men into their 60s and men who were previously "exempt" from military service for physical reasons. I dunno if he pulled any troops from the Italian Front, but I'm wanting to say he did. It was a gambit, and might have worked, had he considered that the British and Americans were true allies, with a stronger bond to each other than the Germans and the Italians shared. In my opinion, Hitler looked at the trust he had towards the Italians, and assumed that all alliances were as shaky. He couldn't've succeeded in dividing the Allies with each side trying to blame the other for the breakthrough...all the Allies would've done would be to assign areas for various groups to attack, cutting off the pocket and pushing the Germans back. Which is what we did. 

If Hitler had held off from attacking the Russians until he had Britian under control, the outcome would have been a whole lot different. His first fatal mistake was trying to fight two different nations on three different fronts. He divided his forces too thin. They had excellent equipment and sufficient manpower, but when split up, he weakened his armed forces to the point that they were (relatively speaking) easier to overcome. Imagine how hard breaking the Atlantic Wall would've been if Rommel would've had most of the Western Front forces/supplies/material available to him. Or how fast Rommel would've been able to roll over N. Africa with the same support behind him.

As far as the Battle of the Bulge, and Hitler's tactics in general, I've noticed that they are technically brillian, although thoroughly riddled with "if"'s. The biggest problem with Hitler's strategies was Hitler himself. He relied too much on the "if" factors, continuing to hold on to the Nazi superman myth far beyond the point where the Russians and the British soundly proved him wrong at Stalingrad and in the skies over England. Once you realize that the big bad wolf growling in the bushes is nothing more than a starving mangy mutt, your outlook changes, and if the starving mangy mutt doesn't realize that, he's gonna get his butt kicked rather quickly. 

So, yes, there's alot of "if" in there. But Hitler wasn't sane, either. I just thank God that he did rely on the "if", and not on his generals.


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## Erich (Jun 24, 2008)

I'd would of said to the German high command - "Wachs auf !" you freaking tards, now that you are on the coast now what ? you are bloody surrounded and you're going to have to fight out of the Cauldron ............. AGAIN


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## syscom3 (Jun 24, 2008)

Erich said:


> I'd would of said to the German high command - "Wachs auf !" you freaking tards, now that you are on the coast now what ? you are bloody surrounded and you're going to have to fight out of the Cauldron ............. AGAIN


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## Messy1 (Jun 24, 2008)

It sure was a waste of machine, and many men died for no apparent gain at all.


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## ToughOmbre (Jun 24, 2008)

Thorlifter said:


> The Battle of the Bulge was just a desperate act by a doomed regime and while it was momentarily successful, it was a failure.



Couldn't have said it better myself. My old man was there, described it the same way.

TO


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## Watanbe (Jun 24, 2008)

I reckon they had to try it. I think it was essentially a good stratergy, Remember the Germans had almost no avaliable airpower at this stage. Sure, perhaps it would have been better to use the resources in the defence of Germany, but if they could capture some ground and put some pressure back on the allies, it gave them greater flexibility to do so, could draw the war out longer, as the Allies would need to prepare another offensive and could give the Germans better cards when it came to sueing for peace.


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## Njaco (Jun 24, 2008)

> Remember the Germans had almost no avaliable airpower at this stage.



Don't know what you mean by this. The German aircraft industry just came off its highest production months in years (Sept and Oct) and the same for oil reserves being brought back up. A lack of quality pilots or at least pilots of 1939-40 vintage but I don't think a lack of aircraft and the means to wage war with them.


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## syscom3 (Jun 24, 2008)

The LW was dwarfed by combined might of the RAF and AAF.

They might as well as didnt exist as they lacked quality pilots and the ability to shape the battlefield.

And that doesnt even take into account the overwhelming might of the Soviets.


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## Njaco (Jun 24, 2008)

You'r correct and I'm not forgetting that but to say they had almost no available air power is misleading IMHO.


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## syscom3 (Jun 24, 2008)

The allies could fly 4000 sorties in a single mission over Luxembourg (with the 9th and their counterparts in the RAF able to fly multiple sorties), and the LW could put up a couple hundred at one time.

I'd say its as close to being non-existant as you can.


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## Watanbe (Jun 25, 2008)

Njaco said:


> You'r correct and I'm not forgetting that but to say they had almost no available air power is misleading IMHO.



What I mean is that, there air power they did have was occupied in small time raids and in defence of Germany. They had almost no air power to launch or support an offensive. I think Syscom understands my point, it is also relative to the power of the Allies.


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## Njaco (Jun 25, 2008)

I will concede the point. To conduct an ongoing offensive , the LW was entirely incapable, I agree.


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## RabidAlien (Jun 25, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> The allies could fly 4000 sorties in a single mission over Luxembourg (with the 9th and their counterparts in the RAF able to fly multiple sorties), and the LW could put up a couple hundred at one time.
> 
> I'd say its as close to being non-existant as you can.





Heh. Tell that to the crew of the B-17 who were classified as "negligible losses" on that mission.

Kinda hard to compare the effectiveness of the air forces of a nation who's industrial might is being pounded mercilessly every day, as opposed to the combined might of TWO nations, one of which is seperated from the conflict by a 1500 mile stretch of open ocean agressively patrolled by friendly navies. At the time of the BoB, I'd say that the Luftwaffe was no longer much of a concern, but they were still able to put up a determined, if ineffective in the long run, resistance. Remove all outside distractions, put their best pilot in their best plane (prop-driven) up against the Allies' best pilot in our best plane (prop-driven), and I'd say it would be a battle to behold!

But I'm just rambling this morning. At what point does one call in to work and tell them you're incapacitated by a raging migrane? I figger if I'm coherent enough to call in, I can go in.....owey....


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## Thorlifter (Jun 25, 2008)

From one migrane sufferer to another, I feel for you R.A. I don't get them too often anymore (knocking on every piece of wood I can find).


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## Lucky13 (Jun 25, 2008)

Thorlifter said:


> (knocking on every piece of wood I can find).



Will you PLLEEAASSEE stop knocking on my head TO.....not funny!


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## syscom3 (Jun 25, 2008)

Rabid, losses are inevitable and the Allies could absorb far more material and aircrew losses than the LW. 

There is also no disputing the fact that (in Dec 1944) the LW could neither defend Germany itself, or go on meaningfull offensive operations. It doesnt matter the reasons for it, its just that "it was".


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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2008)

Hitlers expectations regarding Wacht Am Rhein WERE the total defeat of the allies. Moreover it was his plan basically from start to finish. Although the detailed planning was of course the product of his staff, the drive to have it implemented was all his own.

Rundstedt, the man tasked to execute the plan, had absolutely no faith in it. He described it as "the most ridiculous plan I have ever seen....if we should make it to to the Meuse, let alone Antwerp, we should get down on our knees and give thanks to God" he is reported as saying.

OKW kept recommending the "short hook" throughout the planning stages, that was much less ambitious, and might have yielded a Corps or at most two, for the Germans. This of course would not deliver outright victory, but it might have given the hard pressed Germans some negotiating and manouvering room in which to reach some sort of peace with the allies (although I very much doubt it). Hitler rejected this option as totally inadequate to his war aims. He wanted total victory, but this was totally unachievable.


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## Erich (Jun 25, 2008)

with all due respect guys but the LW was still a very capable force in December 1944 due to the attrition they gave to the US heavies of the 8th and B-26's of the 9th AF. some of the cruelest aerial battles were during this month for both sides fighting for the skies.
Bodenplatte was a failure of high command not the lower fledglings that suffered during air combat, had the LW been in itself in control and offered to exploit all its JG gruppen for Bodenplatte on at least 1 Heavy bomber strike in December the overall effects would of been far more felt that the air/ground debalcle on 1-1-45


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## RabidAlien (Jun 25, 2008)

I agree, Syscom. It sounds cold and callus, but losing ten B-17's on a mission would be considered a light day, later in the war (and an easy day early in the war, when they were losing 1 in 3), and there were so many replacement crews and brand-new planes rolling off the lines that it was hardly a hickup in the system for the Allies. Those same ten planes/crews for the LW, though, would've been a much MUCH more telling blow. Yes, they were still building planes, but their output was (I believe....and I'm no expert on production numbers) quite a bit less than the combined might of England and the US. Kinda like saying both me and Bill Gates earn a paycheck.....his, however, can support buying a BMW every week. Mine can't.


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## Erich (Jun 25, 2008)

side notation :

LW A/C production was at it's highest in late 1944..................go figure


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## drgondog (Jun 25, 2008)

Erich said:


> side notation :
> 
> LW A/C production was at it's highest in late 1944..................go figure



Of course you are right about LW still having formidable force - as Bodenplatte demonstrated.

Speer continued to raise fighter production priority from Feb 1944 through Dec - which meant fewer resources toward Tigers, etc.. and his decentralization efforts started paying divedends. But he knew the LW had to TRY to stop the attacks on Oil.


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## syscom3 (Jun 25, 2008)

Of course the LW produced lots of aircraft in the later part of 1944.

But how many quality aircrews did they have? If you only have a few hundred high quality pilots, then the size of your AF is only really only a few hundred. Anything else is just a soon to be target.

After the spring of 1944, there was nothing the LW could do that could materially effect a battle or campaign. It was a spent force. Was it capable of drawing blood on occasion? Yes. Could it do it often enough to make a difference? No.


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## drgondog (Jun 25, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Of course the LW produced lots of aircraft in the later part of 1944.
> 
> But how many quality aircrews did they have? If you only have a few hundred high quality pilots, then the size of your AF is only really only a few hundred. Anything else is just a soon to be target.
> 
> After the spring of 1944, there was nothing the LW could do that could materially effect a battle or campaign. It was a spent force. Was it capable of drawing blood on occasion? Yes. Could it do it often enough to make a difference? No.



Pretty much true - hence the huge ground scores in April, 1945 - lots of a/c -no fuel/few skilled pilots..

The comment that I made was that Bodenplatte demonstrated they weren't kaput during the Bulge - however ineffective Bodenplatte was.


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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2008)

But the allied juggernaut, especially in the air, WAS unstoppable by December 1944


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