# Tri-Service Aircraft Designation System



## Zipper730 (Jan 25, 2021)

I got a few questions on this one

Why did the attack designation get brought back? The USN used the bomber designation in WWII as well as the USAF, and the difference between attack and bomber is largely semantics except gunships...
It seemed most of the planes were re-designated by chronological order except fighters, which were all over the place.


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## GreenKnight121 (Jan 29, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> I got a few questions on this one
> 
> Why did the attack designation get brought back? The USN used the bomber designation in WWII as well as the USAF, and the difference between attack and bomber is largely semantics except gunships...
> It seemed most of the planes were re-designated by chronological order except fighters, which were all over the place.



1. The "A for Attack" designation had never gone away... the USN used it from 1946 on, while USAAF had used in WW2, and revived it later. 

Douglas A-20 Boston/Havoc
Douglas A-24 Dauntless
Curtiss A-25 Helldiver
Douglas A-26 Invader
Lockheed A-28 and A-29 (Electra)
Douglas A-33
North American A-36 Mustang
Note that the A-26 was redesignated B-26 in 1948 (the Martin B-26 Marauder being out of service by then), but was reverted to the A-26 designation in 1966 to allow the B-26K (now A-26A) to be based in Thailand.


USN examples are:

Douglas Aircraft Corporation
Douglas AD Skyraider (designation changed from XBT2D-1 in late 1946, served with USN until early 1970s, A-1 after 1962)
Douglas A2D Skyshark (assigned 1947, prototypes flew 1950, not produced)
Douglas A3D Skywarrior (1949-1991, A-3 after 1962)
Douglas A4D Skyhawk (first flight 1954, served with USN until 2003)



Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation
Grumman AF Guardian (TB3F until late 1946, served with USN until 1955)
Grumman A2F Intruder (1958-1997, A-6 after 1962)



McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
McDonnell AH-1 Phantom II (USN designation for early version of what would become the F4H [F-4], designated 1954, cancelled 1954 in favor of version emphasizing fighter qualities)



North American Aviation Inc.
North American AJ Savage (1946-1960)
North American A2J (1947 - turboprop AJ, cancelled 1953)
North American A3J Vigilante (1955-1979, A-5 after 1962)



Glenn L. Martin, Inc
Martin AM-1 Mauler (BTM until 1946, served with USN until 1953)



Chance Vought Corporation
Vought AU Corsair (dedicated ground-attack version of the F4U Corsair, USMC 1950-1954)
Vought A2U (proposed ground-attack version of F7U Cutlass, order of 250 cancelled before production began)



There actually IS a significant difference between bombers and attack aircraft - in general, an aircraft designed for attacking the enemy's economy and production/transport networks ("strategic targets"), or area targets, are considered "bombers" - while aircraft that are designed for direct strikes on enemy ground forces, ships, trains, vehicles, etc ("tactical" operations) are considered "attack aircraft".

It was with the advent of the USAAF becoming the USAF that the "A" designation was dropped in that service (the USAF Generals wanted to emphasize the more-glamorous "air-combat" and "nuclear deterrance" roles of the USAF) - with ground-attack aircraft becoming "fighters" (see the F-105 for a glaring example of a "fighter" that had no consideration for air-air combat in its design). Some aircraft intended for the tactical role _were_ designated as bombers - mainly because they were either based on a "bomber" design (Martin B-57 was a US copy of the English Electric Canberra bomber) or were crewed by more than 2 persons (Douglas B-66, a USAF redesign of the USN's A-3).

With the advent of the 1962 Tri-Service system, the USAF was forced to, in 1965, keep the "A" designation when they ordered their own version of the USN's A-7 Corsair... the A-7D.



2. Not really "all over the place" - the 1962 system started all new type numbers over again, but reserved the first 11 numbers for USN fighters that were still in service (or still in official inventory). Here the intent was to make the new numbers match the old as closely as possible:

Old Designation................................ New Designation
North American FJ Fury................. North American F-1 Fury
McDonnell F2H Banshee............... McDonnell F-2 Banshee (numerous late models still held in "war reserve" status for possible emergency use)
McDonnell F3H Demon................. McDonnell F-3 Demon
McDonnell F4H Phantom............. McDonnell F-4 Phantom II
Douglas F4D Skyray........................ Douglas F-6 Skyray (the Northrop F-5 had received its designation 38 days before the Tri-Service system came into effect, and F-6 was the next available number)
Convair F2Y Sea Dart...................... Convair F-7 Sea Dart (although it had been cancelled years earlier, one was still on the official USN inventory list, so...)
Vought F8U Crusader..................... Vought F-8 Crusader
Grumman F9F Panther/Cougar.................... Grumman F-9 Cougar (only training & drone control models still in service, TF-9J retired 1974)
Douglas F3D Skyknight.................. Douglas F-10 Skyknight (the last USMC EF-10Bs were retired in 1970, after serving in Vietnam - replaced by EA-6As & EA-6Bs)
Grumman F11F Tiger....................... Grumman F-11 Tiger (only training and Blue Angels models still in service, Blue Angels' Tigers replaced by F-4s in 1969)

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## pbehn (Jan 29, 2021)

I think such things exist because of pen pushers and budgets, the only reason the A-36 was made was because there was no budget for a "P" but they found one for an "A".

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## special ed (Jan 29, 2021)

The US designations were changed in 1962 because Robert McNamara couldn't figure the Naval system and the USAF system, especially regarding the McDonnell F4H - F-110 situation. He also couldn't see why each service didn't use the same shoes, uniform components, etc. He was after all, one of Kennedy's whiz kids.

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## Zipper730 (Jan 29, 2021)

GreenKnight121 said:


> 1. The "A for Attack" designation had never gone away... the USN used it from 1946 on, while USAAF had used in WW2, and revived it later. . . . There actually IS a significant difference between bombers and attack aircraft - in general, an aircraft designed for attacking the enemy's economy and production/transport networks ("strategic targets"), or area targets, are considered "bombers" - while aircraft that are designed for direct strikes on enemy ground forces, ships, trains, vehicles, etc ("tactical" operations) are considered "attack aircraft".


For the most part, it's still semantics for the following reason

US Army Aviation
WWI to 1926
Early on there wasn't really an attack category: There were aircraft like the DH.4 (which were built in the US under license) which were classified as day-bombers when they weren't classified as general purpose aircraft; there were also designs like the O.100/400 (also built in the US under license), and Martin MB-1's and the improved NBS-1, which were called night-bombers (though I'm not sure what equipment they had to allow them to operate at night).
In the early 1920's there was a Boeing design called the GA-1/GAX which was a large aircraft with a lot of firepower for strafing and armor protection, it was an underpowered turd with poor-stability; there was also an attack group created, though the term "day bomber" seemed formally to be used. There was even a design produced called the Gallaudet DB-1, which while fairly advanced in some ways (monoplane, internally supported wings), it was also flimsy and required extensive rebuilds, and never entered service.

1926 to 1947
The attack designation was created out of some modified observation aircraft that had pylons for carrying bombs, and designed as replacements for the DH-4, which was a day-bomber (a term that would probably be considered a light bomber by some nations).
Usually the designs seemed to fit some characteristics similar to the early dive-bombers (I'm not sure if all of them were stressed for the role, however), though they carried about twice the firepower because of a desire for the ability to carry out some serious strafing.
As time went on, there became an interest in carrying large numbers of blast-fragmentation bombs (15-30 pounds if I recall) which, due to their tendency to produce excessive drag, led to the idea of using internal weapons bays on the attack category. Since the aircraft were seen as slow and clumsy compared to fighter planes (given that they had to fly at least as far as fighters while carrying bomb-loads, with some stressed for similar g-loads, and not always using the most powerful engines), such aircraft were designed mostly for CAS (with the USAAC favoring strategic bombing first, then interdiction, with CAS last), they generally had little interest among the top-brass.
As time went on, this led to an interest in twin-engined designs like the XA-14/A-18 which could keep up with, or slightly outrun current fighters: Early on, they couldn't really procure as many as they wanted due to the Great Depression, so they kept largely procuring single-engined designs until the global situations started to destabilize. This led to aircraft such as the DB-7/DB-7B (aka the A-20), which proved able to carry huge numbers of small blast-frag bombs (though rarely used), about 2000-2400 lb. of bombs early on (later increasing to 4000 lb.), and capable of carrying varying amounts of guns in the nose (about 4 for the bombardier nose, and more for the gunship nose) for strafing.
For a brief period, after the USAAC saw how effectively the Luftwaffe blitzed their way across Europe: They started to take an interest in dive-bomber aircraft, and procured the USN's SBD (A-24) and SB2C (A-25) aircraft. As time went on they also developed the XA-32, and due to political matters (there were some Army personnel who were being obstructive bureaucrats over the fact that the P-51 wasn't built to US demands, corners were cut in the export process, and possibly, that North American end-runned them), the A-36 was developed out of the P-51 (since the A-36 was an American design, this sort of pulled the P-51 along with it).
While they were developing single-engined attack planes, they were also continuing to develop twin-engined configurations such as the A-26 and, eventually the XA-42 (which was later re-designated the XB-42). Owing to the fact that they could carry heavier payloads than single-engined aircraft, often to greater distances (despite not always being as practical for the mission), and the P-47's found themselves quite effective in the ground-attack role, so the largely discontinued single-engined attack category.
While the B-25 and B-26 were classified as bombers, theoretically designed for the strategic bombing mission: They were used almost exclusively for tactical-bombing.


US Naval Aviation
1922 to 1946
The USN didn't have attack planes during this period, but instead had torpedo/level-bombers (TB) and dive-bombers (B) which were carrier based and patrol-planes (P), and eventually patrol-bombers (PB), of which the first two were generally carrier-based, and the last two were sea-based initially owing to preferences and possible restrictions on using land-based bombers.
While there might have been a twin-seat fighter design or two (not sure if the point was something like the Fairey Fulmar, or other), and a proposed fighter-bomber designation (the BFC/BF2C which was an improvement to the F11C pre-war): The dive-bomber and scouting categories would be combined into a scout-bomber (SB) category.
The torpedo-bomber's level-bombing capability was often seen as being of little use except for catching a bunch of ships in the harbor and hammering land-based locations, and some saw the carrier-based scouting capability in the scout-bomber as being unneeded, and this would give rise to the bomber-torpedo (BT) category, which was essentially a dive-bomber that could carry a torpedo. In the interest of improved performance, the rear-gunner was removed.
The torpedo-bomber's large size, versatility in equipment made it usable for other roles, however, such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), airborne command-post (AEW), and carrier onboard-delivery would prove a decent fit.

1946 to 1962
The B, TB, and BT roles were all folded into the Attack (A) role: The attack role included everything from dive/torpedo bombing & tactical-bombing (AD, A4D), strategic bombing (AJ and A3D), and designs that were a bit of both (A3J), largely indicating the whole matter of semantics.
The PB designation would largely be reclassified as P, despite generally being able to carry bombs.


The only real exception I could think of where bomber/attack weren't really overlapping would be a gun-ship design that had no bombing capability. Prior to the AC-130 (1966), the only aircraft that fit the bill was the XA-38 Grizzly: It featured a forward-firing 75mm cannon, and 2 x 0.50" for strafing, and a pair of turrets (upper/lower) for defense. Otherwise the attack/bomber designation is just semantics. The USN's attack category included strategic bombing.


> It was with the advent of the USAAF becoming the USAF that the "A" designation was dropped in that service (the USAF Generals wanted to emphasize the more-glamorous "air-combat" and "nuclear deterrance" roles of the USAF)


Actually, the XA-44 and XA-45 were just redesignated as XB-53 and XB-51, with neither designed to carry nuclear bombs. Early on, nuclear weapons were heavy and large, though that changed. The B-57 was given a bomber designation because the attack designation no longer existed, and the A3D was a strategic bomber as used by the USN.

It's my speculation that the USN liked the attack designation and wanted to keep it for one reason or another, but off the bat, I could see the following

Because I Can: It's possible they wanted to keep at least some part of the designation system that was theirs.
Bomber Criteria: The USAF generally wanted bombers to be multi-engined machines, whereas the USN was fine with either; the USAF generally had higher payload and range requirements than the USN had. It's possible they wanted a category where their designs could be built practically: The USN had more size and weight requirements than the USAF; the USN didn't need quite as much range as they could move the carrier over as need be; the USAF preferred strategic bombing which favored large and long-ranged aircraft; the USN was more tactically geared and needed maneuverable aircraft that performed well (even if payload was to have taken some hits).


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## Zipper730 (Feb 2, 2021)

I had actually planned to getting on this, but I wanted to make sure I was remotely right


GreenKnight121 said:


> Not really "all over the place" - the 1962 system started all new type numbers over again, but reserved the first 11 numbers for USN fighters that were still in service (or still in official inventory). Here the intent was to make the new numbers match the old as closely as possible


I didn't know that there was a specific goal from McNamara to keep it as close to the existing ones.

I just found it interesting that the fighter-designations were totally out of sequence, and the attack planes were in sequence. Here's a listing that I've compiled (and I might very well be wrong here...)







The four items on the right side was based on chronological order, as I wasn't sure how one would chronologically order such things otherwise.

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## Zipper730 (Apr 21, 2021)

special ed said:


> He also couldn't see why each service didn't use the same shoes, uniform components, etc. He was after all, one of Kennedy's whiz kids.


I thought the whiz kids worked under McNamara?


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## special ed (Apr 21, 2021)

Before his time messing up the military big time, McNamara was at Ford where he came up with the Edsel. Named for Henry's son Edsel, when it flopped, McNamara was gone. When McNamara was an Army 2nd Lt assigned to Ike's staff, he was given the task to determine how many reserves would be needed. When no report was forthcoming, Ike contacted McNamara and was told the plan was so good that reserves were not needed. I won't be able to find the source for his 2nd Lt ability as it was a brief filler in an issue of Air Force magazine many, many years ago. After the White House, he became the head of the world bank and for the first time in their history, found itself in financial trouble.

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## Zipper730 (Apr 22, 2021)

GreenKnight121


Are you sure McNamara's mandate stipulated the designation scheme be similar to the old USN designations (i.e. F3H to F-3; F4H to F-4; F8U to F-8), or was that something that the committee he convened had ultimately decided on?


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## special ed (Apr 22, 2021)

There had been complaints that the whizz kids couldn't understand the designation systems of the USN vs USAF. For instance, in the beginning the USN F4H-1 was the F-110 in the USAF. They figured if it was the same airplane, it should have one designation. They apparently could not grasp that a C-121 was also an R7V. They thought the military was trying to put something over on Congress regarding funding. So, The A2F-1 became the A-6. That's very clear, right?


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## tyrodtom (Apr 22, 2021)

special ed said:


> Before his time messing up the military big time, McNamara was at Ford where he came up with the Edsel. Named for Henry's son Edsel, when it flopped, McNamara was gone. When McNamara was an Army 2nd Lt assigned to Ike's staff, he was given the task to determine how many reserves would be needed. When no report was forthcoming, Ike contacted McNamara and was told the plan was so good that reserves were not needed. I won't be able to find the source for his 2nd Lt ability as it was a brief filler in an issue of Air Force magazine many, many years ago. After the White House, he became the head of the world bank and for the first time in their history, found itself in financial trouble.



McNamara was never a 2nd Lt, he entered the USAAF as a captain, in 43, awarded the Legion of Merit and discharged as a Lt. Col in 1946. He must have done something right.
And blaming him for the Edsel is just plain wrong.
Mc as always, was for simplification, he didn't think FoMoCo needed several cars lines. He was all for discontinuing it.
He was instrumental in introducing the Falcon in 1960, and without the Falcon there would have been no Mustang.
I'm not a McNamara fan either, but to say that everything he did turned to shit, is not right.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 22, 2021)

special ed said:


> There had been complaints that the whizz kids couldn't understand the designation systems of the USN vs USAF.


When I joined the Navy in 1970, Macnamara though long gone, was still the object of ridicule and hatred.
"Chief what's this whizz kid thing all about?"
"Well, son, it's an ancient naval term referring to an arrogant young idiot with all kinds of degrees who doesn't know his ass from his elbow."
"Yeah, but what's with the 'whizz'? I don't get it."
"Ya know what it means 'to take a whizz'?"
"Yeah, well?"
"What we do to them!"
"Oh..."


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## swampyankee (Apr 22, 2021)

special ed said:


> There had been complaints that the whizz kids couldn't understand the designation systems of the USN vs USAF. For instance, in the beginning the USN F4H-1 was the F-110 in the USAF. They figured if it was the same airplane, it should have one designation. They apparently could not grasp that a C-121 was also an R7V. They thought the military was trying to put something over on Congress regarding funding. So, The A2F-1 became the A-6. That's very clear, right?


It’s more likely they quite well understood they were the same aircraft, but also thought the only reason for differing designations was service parochialism. Incidentally, there were cracks in the designation schemata before McNamara. Witness the T-28, which never received a USN designation despite entering USN service by 1954.


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## MIflyer (Apr 22, 2021)

The USAAF had Attack aircraft in WWII. But late in the war the Ultimate Attack Aircraft was built, the XA-41. It used an R-3350, looked a lot like an AD Skyraider, and had four 37MM guns in the wings. An awesome machine, but tests at Eglin AAF showed that the fighters of the day, the P-51 and P-47, could do just about as well in the attack role and unlike the XA-41 could defend themselves against enemy fighters, even if they had to jettison their bombs. The XA-41 could not defend itself very well against fighters.

So the approach became to use fighter bombers instead of attack aircraft. This proved to have some serious problems in Korea; the P-47 was gone, the P-51 was very vulnerable to damage, and the F-80 and F-84 too short ranged. But it was Vietnam, where enemy air opposition was minimal and CAS urgent that finally led the USAF to adopt a version of the USN A-7, the A-7D, for the attack role. And of course the ex-USN A-1 was adopted by the USAF as well.

By the way, some Douglas B-26's and Martin B-57's were designated "A" in order to enable Thailand to say it had no bombers based on its soil.


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## tyrodtom (Apr 22, 2021)

MIflyer said:


> The USAAF had Attack aircraft in WWII. But late in the war the Ultimate Attack Aircraft was built, the XA-41. It used an R-3350, looked a lot like an AD Skyraider, and had four 37MM guns in the wings. An awesome machine, but tests at Eglin AAF showed that the fighters of the day, the P-51 and P-47, could do just about as well in the attack role and unlike the XA-41 could defend themselves against enemy fighters, even if they had to jettison their bombs. The XA-41 could not defend itself very well against fighters.
> 
> So the approach became to use fighter bombers instead of attack aircraft. This proved to have some serious problems in Korea; the P-47 was gone, the P-51 was very vulnerable to damage, and the F-80 and F-84 too short ranged. But it was Vietnam, where enemy air opposition was minimal and CAS urgent that finally led the USAF to adopt a version of the USN A-7, the A-7D, for the attack role. And of course the ex-USN A-1 was adopted by the USAF as well.
> 
> By the way, some Douglas B-26's and Martin B-57's were designated "A" in order to enable Thailand to say it had no bombers based on its soil.


 
I can't remember what they said when they lengthened the runway at Utapao and started operating B-52's from there in 66 or 67.
They certainly didn't start calling it a A-52.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 22, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> I got a few questions on this one
> 
> Why did the attack designation get brought back? The USN used the bomber designation in WWII as well as the USAF, and the difference between attack and bomber is largely semantics except gunships...



I don't agree that the distinction between bombers and attack aircraft is semantics. Sure, they're both laying ordnance on the ground, but the missions are very different and usually require different specs and planforms. I think that's why fighters were more easily modified to attacking (Corsair, T-bolt) than bombers. Surviving in low-altitude contested battlefield airspace has different requirements than level-bombing from altitude.

For this reason, I think it's fair to differentiate the two sorts. Of course, and noted above, the USAF (and USN, with the A-5 Vigilante) often muddled the designations anyway.


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## Zipper730 (Apr 22, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> When I joined the Navy in 1970, Macnamara though long gone, was still the object of ridicule and hatred.


He hadn't been gone very long (he resigned in '68). Still, his handling of Vietnam was quite remarkable. I'm curious how much of Vietnam's policies were his or Johnsons?

I remember reading the book "Going Downtown" (I finished it a few days ago), and it explained something to the effect that McNamara figured the war would be unwinnable unless the war was taken to the population (as had been done in WWII and Korea).



MIflyer said:


> The USAAF had Attack aircraft in WWII. But late in the war the Ultimate Attack Aircraft was built, the XA-41. It used an R-3350, looked a lot like an AD Skyraider, and had four 37MM guns in the wings.


Actually, it used an R-4360 with a three-speed supercharger (eventually a variable-speed system was tested), used 4 x 37mm cannon & 4 x 0.50". The 37mm's that were employed was the M9 instead of the M4 which used a bigger cartridge (possibly a bigger shell) and a higher muzzle velocity (it was around 400 pounds per gun).

The aircraft could turn inside a P-51B, but it couldn't fly as fast, or climb as well. That said, the AD-1 gave a good account of itself, and had a top speed of around 375 mph, and didn't have the most spectacular climb-rate in the world. That said, the XA-41's top speed was around 333 mph at 0', about 354 mph in the middle-gear, and 363 mph at 10000-15000' in high gear. I'm not sure what refinements could've been used to eke out more performance, but the need for 4 x 37mm wasn't necessary from a practical standpoint, and the removal of 2 x 37mm would have shaved off 400 pounds per gun, and the ammo that went with it. I suppose one could have used a supercharger that was geared for around 22000'-24000' with ram compression (The F7F-1 had similar figures with a single-stage supercharger), but Vultee tended to produce lots of clunkers when it came to aerodynamics (the only exception I could readily see was the XP-54 and its designer died).


> So the approach became to use fighter bombers instead of attack aircraft. This proved to have some serious problems in Korea


And afterwards too -- the F-105 was based around requirements that would have been fitted to the earlier attack category before the USAF largely dictated two-engines as a requirement and often sought payload and range figures that often produced oversized aircraft.

As for the P-47, there were some that served in Korea, but most were kept in Europe due to the fear that the USSR could come pouring across Europe. When it came to Vietnam, the A-7 was largely McNamara's doing. I'm not sure if he forced the A-1's down the USAF's throat, or they adopted it for some reason.


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## swampyankee (Apr 22, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> He hadn't been gone very long (he resigned in '68). Still, his handling of Vietnam was quite remarkable. I'm curious how much of Vietnam's policies were his or Johnsons?
> 
> I remember reading the book "Going Downtown" (I finished it a few days ago), and it explained something to the effect that McNamara figured the war would be unwinnable unless the war was taken to the population (as had been done in WWII and Korea).
> 
> ...



...and the generals. Don't forget Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Creighton Abrams. There was more than enough blame to go around.


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## special ed (Apr 22, 2021)

I had planned not to comment further because my bias may be showing. President Kennedy had begun troop with drawls and wanted less U.S. involvement. After his death, when Johnson took over he was easily led into sending thousands more troops. He was a product of the time of WW2 and believed man power and technology could win over a small undeveloped country. This, I believe, was because of the pushing of McNamara who also had seen the power of technology and troop strength in WW2. Having lived through that time and lost friends, hearing the stories of other friends who were there, seeing more recent video interviews with those in charge then, my beliefs are that McNamara is responsible for most of the 58 thousand dead Americans. I guess it's just me.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 22, 2021)

special ed said:


> I had planned not to comment further because my bias may be showing. President Kennedy had begun troop with drawls and wanted less U.S. involvement. After his death, when Johnson took over he was easily led into sending thousands more troops. He was a product of the time of WW2 and believed man power and technology could win over a small undeveloped country. This, I believe, was because of the pushing of McNamara who also had seen the power of technology and troop strength in WW2. Having lived through that time and lost friends, hearing the stories of other friends who were there, seeing more recent video interviews with those in charge then, my beliefs are that McNamara is responsible for most of the 58 thousand dead Americans. I guess it's just me.



The responsibility for the casualties belongs to the president who made the decision to remain in the fight.

I'm no fan of McN, but aligning service nomenclature and logistics is logical, insofar as the equipment can get the job done. Using similar equipment reduces training and resupply costs, and using similar terminology reduces misunderstandings.

I'm not defending the political aspects of the war, just saying that operationally, simplification is usually a good thing.

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## tyrodtom (Apr 22, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> As for the P-47, there were some that served in Korea, but most were kept in Europe due to the fear that the USSR could come pouring across Europe. When it came to Vietnam, the A-7 was largely McNamara's doing. I'm not sure if he forced the A-1's down the USAF's throat, or they adopted it for some reason.



There were no P-47's in Korea, under USA control, the only remote possibility is from RCAF , Taiwan, we gave them about a 100 in the late 40's.
No P-47's in Europe either under USA control, unless you're counting the hundreds we gave or sold to France, Portugal, Turkey.
The only P-47's the USA had was in ANG units in the continental US, during the Korean war era.

If you have any proof otherwise , I think several would like to see it.

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## swampyankee (Apr 22, 2021)

I suspect that McNamara and his "whiz kids" understood the USN (and USAF and USA) designation systems quite well; they may not have understand _why_ the three services needed distinct designation systems, but they understood how the systems work.

The reason, of course, the whiz kids couldn't understand the logic of the need for three distinct systems was because there wasn't any.

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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 23, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> When it came to Vietnam, the A-7 was largely McNamara's doing.


For USAF, yes. USN had already launched ITSELF down that primrose path.


Zipper730 said:


> I'm not sure if he forced the A-1's down the USAF's throat, or they adopted it for some reason.


After all the blood, sweat, and tears that went into creating the OV10, the mission it was supposed to fulfill had already grown beyond its capabilities. It was supposed to be the do-it-all machine to defeat the Viet Cong, but by the time it arrived the opponent was the NVA and the scale of weaponry and scope of the mission had escalated. The Bronco wasn't up to protecting Jolly Greens on deep penetration aircrew recoveries and recon insertions along the HCMT or in Laos or The North. The Nav was retiring A1s at the time, trading for A7s, so Mac prodded USAF to once again swallow its pride and adopt another "tailhooker".


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 23, 2021)

special ed said:


> my beliefs are that McNamara is responsible for most of the 58 thousand dead Americans. I guess it's just me.


You're not alone, brother! He wasn't lacking in smarts, just in wisdom and in humility.

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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 23, 2021)

swampyankee said:


> The reason, of course, the whiz kids couldn't understand the logic of the need for three distinct systems was because there wasn't any


"Oh, come on! We've always done things our own way; it's just plain logical. We invented it, and we've always done it this way."

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## Zipper730 (Apr 24, 2021)

swampyankee said:


> ...and the generals. Don't forget Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Creighton Abrams. There was more than enough blame to go around.


I'm curious what problems did Taylor and Adams cause? From what I remember, Westmoreland's seemed to be a guy who was unequipped for counter-insurgency operations, and felt as if adopting a "kill 'em all, let God sort it out" mentality was what would work (well, if you kill _everybody_ on the other side -- it sort of does, but there might be some reasons you _might not_ want to do that...).



special ed said:


> President Kennedy had begun troop with drawls and wanted less U.S. involvement.


I was under the impression that he initially started to increase aid in 1961. Now, for all I know, he might have begun the steps to start scaling things back. You are correct though, Johnson generally was whole-heartedly in support of scaling things up.



Thumpalumpacus said:


> I'm no fan of McN, but aligning service nomenclature and logistics is logical, insofar as the equipment can get the job done. Using similar equipment reduces training and resupply costs, and using similar terminology reduces misunderstandings.


I can agree with that.


> I'm not defending the political aspects of the war, just saying that operationally, simplification is usually a good thing.


Generally, to a degree -- that is correct. It's much easier to do things when you can understand everything.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 24, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> I was under the impression that he initially started to increase aid in 1961. Now, for all I know, he might have begun the steps to start scaling things back.



He may have wanted a larger US presence in 1961, but by 1963 he'd already issued NSAM 263 with the stated goal of winding down our involvement by 1965. LBJ reversed that in one of his worst decisions. Some historians argue that NSAM 263 was not a harbinger of withdrawal, and there's some truth to the idea that 263 was more an attempt to pressure Diem's government into reforms. 

I still believe that under its original conditions (both Kennedy and Diem alive) it would have resulted in our early withdrawal. Once both leaders were killed, I think, 263 was doomed to be dead letter no matter what.

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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> He may have wanted a larger US presence in 1961, but by 1963 he'd already issued NSAM 263 with the stated goal of winding down our involvement by 1965. LBJ reversed that in one of his worst decisions.


I think LBJ came from a constituency that was more prone to commie-phobia and domino-think than Kennedy, and was more middle America oriented and less cosmopolitan in his thinking.



Thumpalumpacus said:


> I still believe that under its original conditions (both Kennedy and Diem alive) it would have resulted in our early withdrawal. Once both leaders were killed, I think, 263 was doomed to be dead letter no matter


I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government. If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.
I was still in high school when the first conventional troops went ashore after the Tonkin Gulf charade, and my sense of optimism about the Vietnam situation vanished.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I think LBJ came from a constituency that was more prone to commie-phobia and domino-think than Kennedy, and was more middle America oriented and less cosmopolitan in his thinking.



Much agreed. I also wonder how much information Kennedy shared with Johnson, given their distaste for and distrust of each other.



XBe02Drvr said:


> I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully be saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government.



Indeed, and this is why I believe there's some truth in the assertion that NSAM 263 was intended to pressure Diem. Not just Kennedy, but our intelligence community as well understood that Diem was an obstacle to peace, given the corruption and brutality of his regime.



XBe02Drvr said:


> If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.



Not to mention that Johnson of course had his focus on his domestic agenda, and never gave the problems in SE Asia the thought they demanded if we were to remain.



XBe02Drvr said:


> I was still in high school when the first conventional troops went ashore after the Tonkin Gulf charade, and my sense of optimism about the Vietnam situation vanished.



It blew up before I was born. I've always been a student of history, so I've done some reading on it.


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## Zipper730 (Apr 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government. If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.


Did LBJ realize the benefits of special forces? I remember a guy handling diplomatic affairs in Thailand(?) was basically overseeing most matters, and wouldn't allow proper training for jungle-warfare teams.

Honestly, I remember there were three basic proposals for dealing with Vietnam, of which one was Rolling Thunder, and the other two I forgot. I remember reading "Going Downtown", and Broughton was pretty straight forward in saying that the second battle in the Gulf of Tonkin was basically bullshit and understood to be so shortly after the event occurred, but Johnson saw it as an opportunity.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 24, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> Honestly, I remember there were three basic proposals for dealing with Vietnam, of which one was Rolling Thunder, and the other two I forgot.


Keep reading. There's always more to the picture.


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## Zipper730 (Apr 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Much agreed. I also wonder how much information Kennedy shared with Johnson, given their distaste for and distrust of each other.


That's a good point...


> Johnson of course had his focus on his domestic agenda, and never gave the problems in SE Asia the thought they demanded if we were to remain.


The Civil Rights & Great Society stuff? You'd think he'd be able to delegate, but he micromanaged things like you wouldn't believe. Honestly, I think he was terrified that there'd be people who would escalate everything to nuclear war if they weren't watched like hawks.

It seemed there were people involved in the diplomacy issue (UK & US, which appeared to have talked now and then) about the effects of military operations in Vietnam on the morale of the population.



XBe02Drvr said:


> Keep reading. There's always more to the picture.


Well, those scenarios were mostly regarding aviation operations. There's probably more, of course. I just forgot what the (at least two) were.

I think one was an all-out bombing campaign.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 24, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> Honestly, I think he was terrified that there'd be people who would escalate everything to nuclear war if they weren't watched like hawks.



Absolutely. That's also basis for the ridiculous restrictions placed upon air ops in the war: Johnson's fear of escalation.


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## special ed (Apr 24, 2021)

In a Kissinger video interview done a few years back, he admitted that attacks on Hanoi targets were given to NVA leaders the day before the attack. The routes were also given. This was a result of the Paris peace talks so "civilian casualties are minimised". In addition, our troops on the ground could not take advantage of an unexpected opportunity in battle. A Captain or above had to radio for permission to attack if such an incident occurred. The signal went to the White House and back in about 20 minutes during which time the opportunity was lost. Johnson is alleged to have bragged. "They can't blow up a shithouse with out me."

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## tyrodtom (Apr 24, 2021)

special ed said:


> In a Kissinger video interview done a few years back, he admitted that attacks on Hanoi targets were given to NVA leaders the day before the attack. The routes were also given. This was a result of the Paris peace talks so "civilian casualties are minimised". In addition, our troops on the ground could not take advantage of an unexpected opportunity in battle. A Captain or above had to radio for permission to attack if such an incident occurred. The signal went to the White House and back in about 20 minutes during which time the opportunity was lost. Johnson is alleged to have bragged. "They can't blow up a shithouse with out me."



He may have thought that, but he was full of it.
My experiences is from after Johnson's era, but some of their policies remained.
Ever hear of free fire zones ?
And do you think if someone saw a " target of opportunity " We asked for permission.
Heck, we knew even a one minute delay would mean it would disappear, we weren't idiots.
We took care of whatever it was, then, maybe, asked for permission, if it was required. 
Or maybe we didn't say anything.
Very few of us were career military, or had any interest in it. There wasn't satellites looking over our shoulders.
We did the job as we saw it.

I served with many troops who had been there in the late 60's, what we were doing in 70-71 was more or less the what they did in 66-69.
According to them.

There's " policy" and there's the real world.

All this trying to blame McNamara, Johnson, Kissinger, etc. etc. is just trying to shift the blame.
We all made mistakes.

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## Zipper730 (May 22, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I don't agree that the distinction between bombers and attack aircraft is semantics. Sure, they're both laying ordnance on the ground, but the missions are very different and usually require different specs and planforms.


Attack planes usually require more agility, but a bomber with agility is also quite beneficial.



swampyankee said:


> ...and the generals. Don't forget Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Creighton Abrams. There was more than enough blame to go around.


I don't know much about Taylor and Abrams. What was wrong with them?


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 22, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> Attack planes usually require more agility, but a bomber with agility is also quite beneficial.



The difference is in the mission, no matter how agile the aircraft.


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