# VK36.01 instead of Tiger and Panther



## wiking85 (Aug 20, 2014)

What if instead of working on the heavy Tiger I and later Panther tanks the German army worked on getting the 40 ton, 88mm gunned VK36.01 tanks into service and kept the Pz IV as the primary tank of the German military starting in 1941? I imagine it could get into production by 1942 and into service by the end of the year. I imagine the numbers produced of both the VK3601 and Pz IV would be much higher than the historical output of the Panther and Tiger, though less survivable. Still they would be much more mechanically reliable and would be able to keep the German Panzer divisions in the black in terms of serviceable AFVs in the field, which is better than the poor serviceability of the big cats, of which they were already too few, even by 1944 when there were the most available. What would the effect be of many more tanks available from 1941 on? 

Details of the chassis:
Achtung Panzer! - Prototypes !
Here is a visualization of the vehicle:


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## davebender (Aug 20, 2014)

Historically Germany didn't fund medium tank production until 1942. If they fund medium tanks a year earlier, including construction of production facilities, they will have medium tanks a year earlier. 

Mass production of German medium tanks a year earlier would have a significant impact on Operation Barbarossa and a huge impact on 1942 operation to seize Baku oil fields. Makes little difference if they are Panzer IVG or a heavier vehicle based on 40 ton VK3601 test chassis. Either vehicle would be a huge performance leap over Pz38(t) and Panzer III light tanks.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 20, 2014)

again with the "Germany didn't fund medium tank production until 1942" stuff?

The MK III and MK IV may not have been medium tanks by 1945 standards(and that is debatable in the case of the MK IV) but they were _most certainly_ medium tanks in 1938-42. 

The MK III was NOT a light tank in 1938-42. 

Germans built 1091 MK IVchassis *before 1942* and _3522_ MK III chassis *before 1942*. 

I guess they got over 4000 18-24 ton tanks for *FREE* up until the end of 1941 since you say they didn't _fund_ them? 

Mighty generous of the German factories that built them. 

BTW in 1942 only 198 PZ 38(t) chassis were completed as tanks. Might have been a useful recon vehicle if they pulled the 37mm cannon and fitted them with 20mm AT rifles instead


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## wiking85 (Aug 21, 2014)

German wikipedia suggests that the Panzer IV production was kept deliberately low: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzerkampfwagen_IV#Serienproduktion
Of course in 1942 when Pz IV production took off it was partly to do with the Nibelungenwerk coming online, but not exclusively; the Nibelungenwerk produced over half of all of their Pz IVs in 1944, two years after coming online, leaving about 1900 Pz IVs produced in 1942-43 and in 1945. Yet Pz IV production doubled from 1941-42 and then nearly quadrupled in 1942-43, before only doubling again in 1943-44. So unless there was a large volume of Pz IV production lines that come into production between 1942-43, existing capacity was underutilized until 1943. 

As to the Pz 38(t) it would have been a fine recon tank other than its two man turret, but the Pz II was worse with 3 crew to the 38t's 4. So keep the Pz 38(t) and drop Pz II production entirely by 1941, retool the lines for more Pz IVs; historically the Pz II remained in production until 1944, peaking in 1942 and continuing at nearly the same level in 1943. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_armored_fighting_vehicle_production_during_World_War_II

In terms of the VK3601, which it seems was developed into the VK4501 due to the increasing weight trying to match the design spec, if the lighter version were kept and the armor spec was compromised to keep it around 40-45 tons (instead of the 55 ton monster it became historically), I imagine there would be a fair bit more produced, especially if the Panther was not produced. It would be much more mechanically reliable and reasonably deadly, especially if available in sufficient quantities and reliable by mid/late 1942. 

Overall what difference would the extra units have made if they were available by 1942 and in larger numbers thereafter without the mechanical issues of the historical models, but without same armor protection? The 40 ton chassis would have made an excellent platform for weapons like the high caliber 105mm cannon or even just the 88mm L70, better than the Pz IV or Pz III/IV. Plus it could handle reasonable sloped armoring like the Jagdpanther and be upgraded later to a sloped version in 1943, rather than the delayed and compromised Tiger II that was supposed to be a sloped version of the Tiger I, but Hitler insisted on a major uparmoring that added another 10 tons of weight.


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## davebender (Aug 21, 2014)

Pz II and Pz 38(t) weigh about 9 tons. Pz IVH weighs about 24 tons. Skoda and BMM assembly lines were designed to build vehicles weighing a maximum of about 16 tons. That's why Germany was forced to design 16 ton Hetzer rather then retooling for more StuG III as desired. I'll hazard a guess Pz II assembly line was also incapable of building 24 ton vehicles without first rebuilding the production facilities.

Prior to 1944 Pz II and Pz38(t) production facilities were rather small. Max production of about 100 vehicles per month at each factory complex. About 1/3rd as many as a full size tank factory.

If you want more medium tanks then don't piddle around. Spend RM 65 million to build an additional Nibelungenwerk size factory complex. You also need feeder plants to provide engines, transmissions, main gun, turrets, etc. so total price tag will probably be more like RM 200 million. That investment gives you an additional 320 medium tanks per month.

This stuff isn't rocket science. If you want tank production facilities then you must pay for them and allow about 18 months for construction and tooling during peacetime. All bets are off during wartime due to shortages and enemy bombing.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 21, 2014)

It looks like ( and I could be way off on this) that the only real saving in the VK3601 compared to the VK 4501 (Tiger I) is the smaller hull ( in large part due to not putting sponsons out over the tracks) and the narrower tracks. You save armor (not cheap but...) and you may save with the narrower tracks (520mm according to one drawing) and perhaps (?) a set of road wheels (the outer ones?).

The engine was a slightly smaller V-12 than used on the Tiger and there isn't much saving in either material or labor in building 19.14 liter V-12 vs a 21.35 liter V-12 engine. The spec sheet says the VK3601 used a gear box with 8 forward gears and 4 reverse which is the same number of gears as the Tiger, same transmission as the Tiger? no real saving there. Maybe you can make it a bit lighter due to the lighter tank but you are trying to put 500hp through it so you can't make it much lighter. If you are going to use the 8.8cm KwK 36 there is no saving there either. Turret traverse mechanism/drive? 

Now you have the problem of how much you can lighten it up by making the hull smaller and/or thinning the armor. Taking the sponsons off may save around 2 1/2 tons or a bit less (25lbs per sqft of the top and bottom of the sponsons). Thinning the sides above the tracks from 80mm to 60mm saves 32lbs per sq ft. or maybe 2800lbs? Going much thinner than 60mm of armor vertical starts making the sides vulnerable to to American and Russian 75-76mm guns at practical combat ranges, seeing as both were rated for around 60mm penetration at 900-1000yds at a 30 degree impact angle. 
Unless you can get a lot of slope you don't get a lot of extra protection for the _weight_ of the armor. Think about it, if you need to armor something 6ft high and 10 ft wide (60 sq ft) you can use 60 sq ft of vertical armor 50 mm thick and have it weigh 4800lbs. 
IF you slope the armor 45 degrees you need 8.48 ft of armor to cover the 6ft height and still 10ft wide or 84.8 sq ft of armor. Keeping the armor weight the same you now have an armor thickness of 36.3mm at 45 degrees. This combination will be more effective than the vertical plate but it is not until you get near 45 degrees that you get real improvement in protection. 60 degress of angle offers around 3 times the protection (as a rough rule of thumb) but the armor weighs twice as much as the vertical plate. Please note that sloped armor doesn't really get much improvement on shaped charge projectiles over the geometrical thickness of the armor. 50mm of armor sloped 45 degrees acts like about 70mm of vertical armor to a shaped charge projectile. (assuming it doesn't deflect any before it detonates. 

BTW the real Tiger I used a lot of the space in the sponsons for ammo storage; not all of it but a fair amount of the 92 rounds. Could be over 64 rounds in the sponsons so if you get rid of them you need to put the ammo somewhere, or carry a lot less ammo.


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## wiking85 (Aug 22, 2014)

For German planners the extra weight of a heavier chassis did make an output difference, see below about the debate between having a ~20 ton chassis vs. a ~30 ton one. Having a heavier chassis was expected to reduce output irrespective of factory upgrades to be able to make the bigger chassis. Plus with the historical Tiger only Henschel had the facility to make them while a lighter 'heavy' tank could be made by other facilities if kept in the 40 ton range. Many other facilities were able to make the 45 ton Panther, rather than the 55 ton Tiger I. Plus 45 ton Panthers were able to be made in much greater numbers than the 55 ton Tiger. The VK3601 would be lighter than the Panther (if it kept to spec), yet you claim it would have, in that case, been produced in no greater numbers than the Tiger I. Empirically we know that it could be produced in much greater numbers due to Panther output.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 22, 2014)

That maybe But tank production is not quite in proportion to the weight of the tank. You do not get five 40 ton tanks for the same amount of money/time/labor as four 50 ton tanks. _ESPECIALLY_ if you are using the same engine, gearbox and gun in both tanks. And if you are using the same number of torsion bar axle stations and road wheels? 
Panther tank used a transmission with 7 forward gears and only one reverse meaning that there were only about 2/3 the number of gear sets in it as compared to the Tiger tank. Granted with the lighter tank you don't need as many gears but it looks like the initial planning of the VK 3601 called for the more complicated transmission. 
While the transmission/steering gear of a tank is small percentage of it's weight it is not as small as some people think. I have no figures for the German tanks but an uprated system (David Brown P40 which can be _retro fitted to the existing Z51_ ) for a Centurion tank weighs 1015kg dry. Dimensions were 788mm long, 822mm high and 1329mm wide. A transmission/steering system for a large tank can weigh more than the engine. 

As far as factory size goes there may have been a bit of smoke blowing going on. 

German Tank Factory - BE027817 - Rights Managed - Stock Photo - Corbis

These are MK IIIs and while the overhead crane/s may not have the capacity to deal with 40 ton tanks the floor space and clearance over the tops of the existing tanks doesn't look like it present too much of an obstacle to building heavier tanks. Granted this is just one factory.



I am not claiming the original Tiger was the only or the best way to go. I just get very suspicious when people claim they could get nearly the same fighting qualities in a tank of 3/4 the weight or less. 

The Germans certainly missed the boat in not putting sloped armor on the MK IV chassis like they finally did on the Jagdpanzer_IV. 

Jagdpanzer IV - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Such a hull with a suitable turret and mounting the 7.5cm/L48 gun would have helped the Germans a fair amount for most of WW II and there was NO technical reason it could not have been done.


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## wiking85 (Aug 22, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> That maybe But tank production is not quite in proportion to the weight of the tank. You do not get five 40 ton tanks for the same amount of money/time/labor as four 50 ton tanks. _ESPECIALLY_ if you are using the same engine, gearbox and gun in both tanks. And if you are using the same number of torsion bar axle stations and road wheels?
> Panther tank used a transmission with 7 forward gears and only one reverse meaning that there were only about 2/3 the number of gear sets in it as compared to the Tiger tank. Granted with the lighter tank you don't need as many gears but it looks like the initial planning of the VK 3601 called for the more complicated transmission.
> While the transmission/steering gear of a tank is small percentage of it's weight it is not as small as some people think. I have no figures for the German tanks but an uprated system (David Brown P40 which can be _retro fitted to the existing Z51_ ) for a Centurion tank weighs 1015kg dry. Dimensions were 788mm long, 822mm high and 1329mm wide. A transmission/steering system for a large tank can weigh more than the engine.
> 
> ...


Retooling in the middle of a war was largely the issue with the sloped Pz IV, which was tried:
Einheitsfahrgestell (Standard Vehicle Chassis) III/IV


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## davebender (Aug 22, 2014)

VK24.01 is the medium tank Heer ordnance department planned to produce before program was cancelled 25 Nov 1941. Without the Panther program it probably would have become the new German medium tank during March 1942.

Unfortunately there are no known surviving blueprints for VK24.01 but we can make some educated guesses as to what it would look like. Panther tank supposedly evolved from VK24.01 so it probably looks like a smaller version. 

VK24.01 was nominally 24 tons just as Panzer III was nominally 15 tons. So it's reasonable to assume VK24.01 will actually weigh about 32 tons. I wouldn't be surprised if MAN VK24.01 chassis was similar to MAN VK30.01 chassis.

18 July 1941. Rheinmetall receives contract to develop 7.5cm/70 cannon. 
VK24.01 medium tank is the logical intended use for this cannon. Initial (1942) production VK24.01 medium tanks would probably have same turret and cannon as historical Panzer IVG. During 1943 VK24.01 would receive the new cannon and a new matching turret.

Daimler-Benz designed a 400hp diesel engine specifically for the Heer medium tank program. Just about the right size for VK24.01.

Initial specifications for VK30.02 (Panther) required 60mm sloping frontal armor. I'll hazard a guess that requirement was copied directly from VK24.01 specification.


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## wiking85 (Aug 22, 2014)

davebender said:


> VK24.01 is the medium tank Heer ordnance department planned to produce before program was cancelled 25 Nov 1941. Without the Panther program it probably would have become the new German medium tank during March 1942.
> 
> Unfortunately there are no known surviving blueprints for VK24.01 but we can make some educated guesses as to what it would look like. Panther tank supposedly evolved from VK24.01 so it probably looks like a smaller version.
> 
> ...



Well there was this chart, which implies the VK2401 bled into the VK3001, which would mean it did not have sloped armor and the VK3002 designs were not impacted by previous VK2401 work.


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## parsifal (Aug 22, 2014)

the problem with all german tanks was the costs of production. this problem was systemic, it applied to al their tanks, but because these heavier tanks were hard for german industry to manage, they were even more expensive relative to a baseline than the smaller, light tanks they were building at the start..

Simplifying and making smaller the German tank park will always help, but it will not solve this problem. the whole heavy tank thing was a losing strategy for the germans. they couldnt field the numbers, and in the end it was the numbers that counted.

ive always subscribed to rommels opinion. after 1942, with germany on the defensive, he subscribed to the view that all tank production be abandoned and germany concentrate on AT production, both towed and self propelled. a 75mm ATG towed cost something like 12k to build, compared to a tiger 300K 9if you include all the hidden costs. An SGIII cost something like 30K. id rather forego any pretensions of attack and build 10 SGIIIs or 25 75mm ATGs than waste my money on one dodgy heavy tank, whatever its details. This was exactly how the russians defeated the germans....the germans should have won, but allowed their mania for big complicated (and expensive) things to cloud their thinking


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## wiking85 (Aug 22, 2014)

parsifal said:


> the problem with all german tanks was the costs of production. this problem was systemic, it applied to al their tanks, but because these heavier tanks were hard for german industry to manage, they were even more expensive relative to a baseline than the smaller, light tanks they were building at the start..
> 
> Simplifying and making smaller the German tank park will always help, but it will not solve this problem. the whole heavy tank thing was a losing strategy for the germans. they couldnt field the numbers, and in the end it was the numbers that counted.
> 
> ive always subscribed to rommels opinion. after 1942, with germany on the defensive, he subscribed to the view that all tank production be abandoned and germany concentrate on AT production, both towed and self propelled. a 75mm ATG towed cost something like 12k to build, compared to a tiger 300K 9if you include all the hidden costs. An SGIII cost something like 30K. id rather forego any pretensions of attack and build 10 SGIIIs or 25 75mm ATGs than waste my money on one dodgy heavy tank, whatever its details. This was exactly how the russians defeated the germans....the germans should have won, but allowed their mania for big complicated (and expensive) things to cloud their thinking


I've seen the opposite argued, that the Tiger tanks killed far in excess of their numbers and even losses, as something like 50% of losses were due to mechanical breakdown. They remained eminently cost effective. Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II: Christopher W. Wilbeck, Otto Carius, Viktor Iskrov, Ray Holt: 9780971765023: Amazon.com: Books

Now, as to the towed AT gun theory that leaves out the cost of the haulers, the fuel cost of hauling, their vulnerability to enemy artillery, of which the Soviets and Americans had obscene amounts of, and could be maneuvered around, especially in the East (not counting the effects of aircraft strikes on them either).

The Maus and Tiger II I certainly agree with as being major wastes, but the Tiger I was very cost effective. The actual price was meaningless in terms of price, given the Nazi controlled currency and ability to set prices, what mattered were material costs and man hours. The Tiger per kill was by those metrics, even with the large number of mechanical breakdowns, very effective for the cost. The Panther was less so. I personally think Germany would have been better off with lots of StuGs and Pz IVs rather than Panthers, which only became remotely reliable in March 1944. The Tiger was probably worth it compared to the VK3601, but I was curious what people thought about it being lighter and more reliable with the same gun, in effect not being a slugger, but rather a sniper.


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## parsifal (Aug 23, 2014)

> I've seen the opposite argued, that the Tiger tanks killed far in excess of their numbers and even losses, as something like 50% of losses were due to mechanical breakdown.



At Kursk, roughly 100 tigers were committed. after 4 days or so of fighting, they had lost just three tanks to Soviet guns. but many had suffered breakdowns. there were no reserves to hold the soviet reserves, and further, after the Alied invasion of Sicily an entire SS corps was shipped out leaving the southern front gutted and vulnerable. by the end of the month this 100 strong force had suffered 100% loss rates...not temporary losses, they were permanently lust, mostly captured by the rapidly advancing Russians. The "qualities" of the tiger were a direct contributor to the defeat, though given german mismanagement of the whole affair, i doubt nothing could have saved citadel. If the Germans had invested in Stugs rather than Tigers, there would have been no offensive, so the russians would have been able to pisk and choose their timing and placement of offensive. but the germans would have had time to dig in, but more importantly would have had ample reserves to counter the soviet attacks. Instead of 100 tanks, they could have had 1000 SPGs, not concentrated in an offensive position, but spread out and mobile, more than able to deal with the 5000 or so Soviet mediums that they would have had to deal with . there is no evidence that Tigers were any more cost effectivee, actually the evidence is there that with more tanks, there would have been more kills 



> They remained eminently cost effective. Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II: Christopher W. Wilbeck, Otto Carius, Viktor Iskrov, Ray Holt: 9780971765023: Amazon.com: Books



You dont think Carius might be just a little biased? The trouble with these analyses is that they never look at the big picture. they are the "I was there I saw hundreds of burning Soviet Tanks from the guns of our tigers". firstly, the loss claims are unverified, but Im not even going to go there, I dont need to. its what they dont see thats important. because the Soviets had such a massive numbers advantages(and based on their raw industrial power should not have), they could afford to attack and attack. When you attack, statistically, 80% of your losses in vehicles, and 60% of your losses in crews are recovered and returned to service within 30 days. So these discussions of loss rates being 7:1 in favour of the Germans need to be tempered against the fact that the vast majority of soviet losses were all more or less immediately recovered. by comparison, when you are defending, and your defences crack, as the germans repeatedly conceded because they chose or elected not to put sufficient tanks in the field (bedazzled by the technical capabilities of their heavy tanks), nearly 100% of your breakdowns or disabled tanks become losses as well. ..something Cartius chooses never to mention. but its worse than that. Because the Soviets were given the numbers advantage, partly or substantially because the Germans did not understand the importance of numbers and wasted their industrial muscle on fripperies like the Tiger), the overall firepower of their tank formations actually suffered because of the Tiger tank. 

As described above, the German actual losses in Tiger losses were not 3 tanks, they were 100 Tiger tanks. in that period, the Soviets lost about 500 tanks on the souther sector where the majority of tigers were deployed. The tigers may have accounted for 100, maybe, who knows. thats a loss rate of 1:1. 



> Now, as to the towed AT gun theory that leaves out the cost of the haulers, the fuel cost of hauling, their vulnerability to enemy artillery, of which the Soviets and Americans had obscene amounts of, and could be maneuvered around, especially in the East (not counting the effects of aircraft strikes on them either).


Whilst tanks are largely immune to the fire effects of artillery directly, they are definately not immune to the indirect effects, as the Kursk experience clearly shows. Soviet artillery pounding away at the softer support echelons was the main reason for the heavy German losses. if those tanks lose their support, they are lost as well. Tigers are just as vulnerable as ATGs for that reason, and an ATG dug in has a fair chance of survival. If Mansteins ideas had been adopted.....pull back 20 or 30 kilometres just prior to the offensive, which was well within the heers capabilities, but strictly rejected by hitler, the artillery effects would have been nullified, and no ground lost....the ground conceded would have been won back in the inevitable counterattacks by the hoards of stugs supporting the german Infantry as it counterattacked. 

1944 statistics are very revealing as to why most of this stuff about the tiger is mostly post war bunkum



> The Maus and Tiger II I certainly agree with as being major wastes, but the Tiger I was very cost effective.



In fact it wasn’t, and badly so. Krivosheev states that Soviet Tank losses 41-5 ran at 96000, with German losses claimed at 32000. 10000 of that number were surrendered or captured at the end of the war, so the figures are about 96000::22000, or roughly 4.4:1.

On the Dupuy Institute Forum I found a post by Chris Lawrence (yes, THE chris Lawrence) referencing a thesis by a US Major Wilbeck. about the employment of Tiger PzAbt and it effectiveness. He takes figures from Schneider 'Tigers in Combat I II', and gives overall effectiveness as:

Kill ratio in action 1:12.16
Kill ratio total 1:5.44 (this includes Tigers destroyed out of combat)

For both east and west, but not, it appears, including the Tiger companies that were attached to some SS-PDs in 1943 (and after?).
Not quite the East front, but good enough for this discussion. That’s hardly different from the ratios achieved by the average garden variety tanks also employed by the heer. Given that a tiger cost nearly or perhaps even more than twice as much as a panther, and even more compared to a mkIV, and just in steel alone weighed more than twice as much as the latter, that’s hardly a cost effective use of limited german resources. 

Lawrence makes this comment in the discussion “…. _the Tiger's are 100% from German records. So...they are reporting German claims of kills (a pretty imprecise methodology).
…….it is very important that one counts the same thing for both sides (destroyed and damaged vs destroyed and damaged). German claims of Soviet tank kills would by their nature be counting both destroyed and damaged (and maybe a few other things), not just destroyed_.



> > The actual price was meaningless in terms of price, given the Nazi controlled currency and ability to set prices, what mattered were material costs and man hours. The Tiger per kill was by those metrics, even with the large number of mechanical breakdowns, very effective for the cost.



I agree that cost is a very imprecise and dangerous way of measuring actual tank costs , especially against foreign tanks, but if comparing against other tanks of German manufacture, it at least gives some idea of the cost of a particular item. Exclusve of turrets communications and armamenet, a Tiger I cost on averge during the war about RM192K, compared to the cost (fully equipped of about 107 for the MkIV and about 138 for the Panther. In terms of manhours the Panther soaked up about 55000 man hours to build whilst the tiger was nudging an average of just under 100000 manhours per unit. By comparison, by 1945, the Soviets could churn out a T-34 in just over 4000 hours. If you want to compare steel weights, the comparisons are just as discouraging. A Tiger I weighed 121250lbs, the Mk V weighed 98000 lbs and the MkIV about 43000 lbs. And, on average, there was no, or little, difference in the kill/loss ratio of the Mk IV to the Kill/loss ratio of the MkVI. They simply were a waste of money and resources, plain and simple 



> The Panther was less so. I personally think Germany would have been better off with lots of StuGs and Pz IVs rather than Panthers, which only became remotely reliable in March 1944. The Tiger was probably worth it compared to the VK3601, but I was curious what people thought about it being lighter and more reliable with the same gun, in effect not being a slugger, but rather a sniper



Once the myths about it effectiveness are peeled away and the true value of the tiger left for examination what do we have. A piece of machinery that has its combat record vastly overblown and overstated, and not a cost effective weapon system at all, because its combat performance was about the same as every other German tank of the late war. . That should be obvious. But what the tiger could and did do, is in defensive situation soak up a large amount of resources to be brought to ground. Stalking a loan tiger could take many tanks, and many hours of precious time, as the remainder of a defending force made good an escape. Hardly worth the effort and expense of the tank, but still a worthwhile effect worth mentioning.


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## wiking85 (Aug 23, 2014)

Can you demonstrate that one Tiger would in fact result in 5-10 other AFVs? The crux of the argument you're making is that the Tiger could be replaced by enough other equipment to more than make up for its cost, but when you factor in the full elements of the machine, including the engine and transmission among other things, the overall weight and man hours don't directly equal the cost of a lighter vehicle like a StuG, nor take into effect the cost of the extra manpower and transport needed to supply them. As you mention the losses to the supply train badly hurt the Tigers, but how would having StuGs instead change that aspect of combat? Those logistics issues would hurt lighter vehicles just as much, though they might suffer less breakdowns in the aggregate.


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## parsifal (Aug 23, 2014)

to have the same effect as the tiger, in terms of kill/loss ratio, it would be necessary to increase the ratio of tanks by the overall kill/loss ratio achieved by the tiger, divided by the average kill loss ratio achieved overall. assuming no margin of error, the rate is 5.4/4.4, which eaquls 122%. roughly 1400 tigers were built, so to replace them, in terms of what they achieved, you would need 1718 other tanks. To guesstimate the propaganda value of the tiger, you might add another 300 tanks, say 2000. so, to replace the 1400 tigers built, myth and all, you might need 2000 mkivs. just in terms of steel consumption, that represents a saving of 40000 tons of steel.

having a larger tank park does a number of things that vastly improves the logistic situation for the germans. Firstly, it provides sufficient depth and meat on the formations to ensure adequte reserves. Having additional tanks, gives the forces the ability to deliver more firepower over a shorter period, it means that if a part of the force structure breaks down or damaged, there is more possibility to plug in reserves to prevent a breakthrough which is the killer for a successful defence. if the defence can prevent a runaway breakthrough, losses reduce dramatically, reduced losses translates to far better supply situation and reduces the ability of the enemy to rampage into rear areas. and statistically, the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful breakthrough is an increase in the number of barrels of just 7-10%.

Investing in lavish extravagances like the Tiger conceivably (but unlikely) cost the germans the ability to achieve a negotiated settlement on the east front


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## wiking85 (Aug 23, 2014)

That's assuming all else remains the same, such as tactical usage, survivability on the battlefield, and range/penetration power of the main gun. StuGs and Pz IVs had less than the Tiger in all of that and the Tigers were used as sluggers, exposed and trading shots with the enemy for breakthrough operations, rather than maneuver forces in the open for the Pz IV or as ambushers in the case of the StuGs. I also think you're not appreciating the addition burden on the already stretched logistics network to have additional tanks at the front, which I am assuming is more than your calculation due to the above factors.


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## davebender (Aug 23, 2014)

Fall 1941 German Army required all new armored fighting vehicles to have sloping frontal armor. Interim vehicles such as Marder series were exempt from the requirement. So was Tiger I as it was Hitler's favorite project. However an all new medium tank program would almost certainly have to comply with the ordnance department specification. Just as the all new Panther, Tiger II and Hetzer did.


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## parsifal (Aug 23, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> That's assuming all else remains the same, such as tactical usage, survivability on the battlefield, and range/penetration power of the main gun. StuGs and Pz IVs had less than the Tiger in all of that and the Tigers were used as sluggers, exposed and trading shots with the enemy for breakthrough operations, rather than maneuver forces in the open for the Pz IV or as ambushers in the case of the StuGs. I also think you're not appreciating the addition burden on the already stretched logistics network to have additional tanks at the front, which I am assuming is more than your calculation due to the above factors.



In situations where the germans did not have "slugger tanks" which was the usual case, incidentally....a tiger was a rare bird, there was no noticeable difference in kill loss ratios. Its another of those pesky myths that somehow the tiger delivered better loss ratios because of their enhanced firepower. The facts are that they might have improved kill loss ratios by 20% or so, but without them, German tank formations were still achieving kill/loss ratios in excess of 4:1. Thats for the late war. early war, even with nothing but light tanks to fight with, the Soviet exchange rate was much worse....in excess of 20:1.

The facts are that the Germans seldom liked to use their tanks in that anti-tank role. Their periods of greatest success was when they didnt do that. The German forte was manouvre, and the tiger sacrificed its manouvre for firepower and protection. a completely wrong move for the Germans. If they wanted static defence, they should have spent more on fortification and fixed lines, not spend huge amounts on s few tanks that didnt line up with their mobile warfare doctrines anyway. In many ways, the Tigers were philosophically akin to the French Char B or the British Matilda, and both these tanks finished up not doing so well. Why is the Tiger any different? it had a measure of success, because the germans were able to compensate for its limitations by their expertise, not because the technical excellence of the design delivered them some magical advantage


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## wiking85 (Aug 23, 2014)

parsifal said:


> In situations where the germans did not have "slugger tanks" which was the usual case, incidentally....a tiger was a rare bird, there was no noticeable difference in kill loss ratios. Its another of those pesky myths that somehow the tiger delivered better loss ratios because of their enhanced firepower. The facts are that they might have improved kill loss ratios by 20% or so, but without them, German tank formations were still achieving kill/loss ratios in excess of 4:1. Thats for the late war. early war, even with nothing but light tanks to fight with, the Soviet exchange rate was much worse....in excess of 20:1.


Early in the war the Germans surprise attacked the USSR while they were in the middle of transitioning to new equipment, so still have masses of light tanks themselves, most of it without spare parts or fully mobilized troops. 1941 is a massive outlier that skewed the loss ratios for the first two years of war as the Soviets had to rebuild their institutional knowledge, as they were left with little more than a militia by 1942. By 1943 loss rates changed. 
Christos military and intelligence corner: Tank strength and losses ? Eastern Front
By 1943 the big cats were available in larger numbers and their presence shows, but so too does the presence of the Soviet cat killers.



parsifal said:


> The facts are that the Germans seldom liked to use their tanks in that anti-tank role. Their periods of greatest success was when they didnt do that. The German forte was manouvre, and the tiger sacrificed its manouvre for firepower and protection. a completely wrong move for the Germans. If they wanted static defence, they should have spent more on fortification and fixed lines, not spend huge amounts on s few tanks that didnt line up with their mobile warfare doctrines anyway. In many ways, the Tigers were philosophically akin to the French Char B or the British Matilda, and both these tanks finished up not doing so well. Why is the Tiger any different? it had a measure of success, because the germans were able to compensate for its limitations by their expertise, not because the technical excellence of the design delivered them some magical advantage


The Germans lost their ability to maneuver when on the defensive from 1943-45. They lacked air superiority and enough experienced infantry to really make an elastic defense work, plus also lacked adequate intelligence about Soviet intentions thanks to Maskirovka and huge Soviet combat strength relative to German combat strength. They could overload even an elastic defense with sheer numbers, as Deep Battle Doctrine was designed to do. 

My point though is that the Tigers or a version of them were useful, but the Panther was not due to its limited reliability and numbers. I fully agree that the Pz IV or a sloped armor version that replaced the Pz III chassis entirely (along with the Pz II and 38(t)) would have been ideal when backed up by some heavy tank battalions staffed by a more reliable and lighter heavy hitter like the VK3601H weighing in at 45 tons or so instead of the historical 55 tons. The chassis could then be used for longer range big guns for SP AT like the Steuer Emil, but with a larger chassis that could accomodate the heavy gun better: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sturer_Emil
Even a 105mm high velocity StuG on the VK3601 chassis would be good too (Dicker Max, but with a bigger chassis). 10.5cm K18 auf Panzer Selbstfahrlafette IVa Dickermax

The Pz III/IV chassis was a disaster, so they needed a VK24.02 or 28.01 chassis with sloped armor and bigger layout to do the job.


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## davebender (Aug 23, 2014)

Panzer III specification was for 15 tons.
Panzer IV specification was for 18 tons.
VK3001 test chassis specification was for 32 tons.
VK3601 test chassis specification was for 40 tons.


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## wiking85 (Aug 23, 2014)

davebender said:


> Panzer III specification was for 15 tons.
> Panzer IV specification was for 18 tons.
> VK3001 test chassis specification was for 32 tons.
> VK3601 test chassis specification was for 40 tons.



In reality the 3601 quickly exceeded that 40 ton estimate, so morphed into the VK4501, but even then to keep to spec it jumped up to 55 tons. So they need to drop the weight by cutting armor down.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 23, 2014)

Part of the problem for the Tiger _may_ have been the production rate of 25 tanks per month. Perhaps the necessary tooling (jigs/fixtures, etc) were never built to enable faster/higher volume production/lower costs?

It would still be an expensive tank but perhaps not so extreme in comparison? 

You may be able to build two MK III/IV transmissions for each Tiger transmission. I doubt if you could build 3, maybe 2 1/2? Same for engines, how many 12 liter V-12s for each 23 liter V-12 can you really build? 

The Tiger was never intended for general issue but more of a WW I type "Break through" tank. Something that could attack and penetrate a defended area (proof against 75-76mm field guns firing AP from the sides/rear?) allowing the smaller/faster tanks access to the the less protected enemy rear areas. This may have been a faulty doctrine and in many/most cases the Tigers were not used that way. They were too short ranged to be good in a war of movement. 

The problem with coming up with hypothetical German tanks that are 10-15-20 tons lighter than the real Tiger is that you loose some of the fighting qualities of the Tiger and may not gain enough other qualities. Tank that started this thread _might_ be more comparable to a T-34/85. Giving up hull volume to make the tank smaller and lighter means giving up ammo storage and working room. T34/85 carried 36 fewer main gun rounds and around 2000 round less MG ammo. You need more tanks to get the same amount of ammunition to the battle area. Somebody will probably quote a number for rounds fired _on average_ before a tank is knocked out but remember, to get the _average_ one tank had to fire a crap load of ammo to average out the tank that got knocked out after firing only one or two rounds.
What was the rate of fire for a Tiger compared to the rate of fire for a T-34/85? 
Practical rate of fire for a T-34/85 is sometimes given as 3/4 rounds per minute, what is the rate of fire for a smaller more cramped "Tiger _light_"?
12 Tigers (if loaded to max, book figure) carried over 1100 rounds of 88mm ammo. you need 18 tanks caring 61 rounds each to equal the ammo load. 

The Tiger was NOT the solution to German's tank problems but a Tiger _light_ isn't the answer either unless you can make them in much large quantities. Even 50 a month won't do the job.


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## wiking85 (Aug 23, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Part of the problem for the Tiger _may_ have been the production rate of 25 tanks per month. Perhaps the necessary tooling (jigs/fixtures, etc) were never built to enable faster/higher volume production/lower costs?
> 
> It would still be an expensive tank but perhaps not so extreme in comparison?
> 
> ...



So keep the Tiger the same and drop the Panther. Update the 25 ton medium tanks with a somewhat larger and standardized unit in 1942 and have a standard chassis to work from, while having specialist light and heavy tanks in limited production. A sloped Panzer in the 25-28 ton range would have all the reliability of the standard Pz III and IV while having the same gun, be a better weapons platform, and would have greater production due to standardization and no Panther in production. The heavy tanks are more a bonus than a necessity to my scenario. 

Perhaps I should just restate things as what if instead of the Panther Germany decided to just update their medium tanks and standardize on a 24-28 ton chassis from 1942 on. The Tiger stays the same.


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## parsifal (Aug 23, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Early in the war the Germans surprise attacked the USSR while they were in the middle of transitioning to new equipment, so still have masses of light tanks themselves, most of it without spare parts or fully mobilized troops. 1941 is a massive outlier that skewed the loss ratios for the first two years of war as the Soviets had to rebuild their institutional knowledge, as they were left with little more than a militia by 1942. By 1943 loss rates changed.
> Christos military and intelligence corner: Tank strength and losses ? Eastern Front
> By 1943 the big cats were available in larger numbers and their presence shows, but so too does the presence of the Soviet cat killers.
> 
> ...



Much of the history of the relationship between the OKH and Hitler regarding the eastern Front operations 1943-5 was a deep seated conflict between whether to use static line defence or manouvre...so called mobile defence. Hitler, with his WWI experiences and no formal military operations training wanted to hold every yard of territory....the infamous "no retreat" orders. this is more or less what you are now saying was the right thing to do, and the moments when Germany enjoyed its greatest defensive successes. In a perverted sort of way, Hitler did have a point, though his reasons had nothing to do the reasons a static line in some respects was probably the only option available after 1943. And it didnt have to be that way, and building a tank park for that specification was definately not a good idea. And pertinently, Germanys greatest successes defensively were when she was able to exercise mobile defence options.

Hitlers static line was the correct thing to do in some situations, because when either the weather, and/or the military transport shortages prevented or robbed the germans of their greatest asset (ie their mobility), it was disastrous to get caught in the open. But Hitlers dogma had nothing to do with sound military thinking and no place in designing or postulating on the ideal german tank. He was an innately conservative and pedestrian thinker in military matters, and clung to the notion that firepower was the key to all his military problems. i see that thinking is alive and well in the above response. The truly great wehrmacht leaders, like Manstein knew when static line was appropriate, and knew when mobile defence was appropriate. When it came to the panzer formations, it was almost always mobile operations that were the most appropriate. Germany's greatest defensive successes occurred on those few occasions they were allowed (or just took the opportunity) to be creative and hence mobile in their operations. The best methodologies were developed by Manstein. if he got his way, there would be small tactical withdrawals by the frontline Infantry only in those areas where the Russian hammer blow was to fall (and tragically, the Germans generally knew where they about to fall, but were forbidden to act when they needed to). this Infantry would fall back to pre-prepared defences and then just sit there. It was important for the Infantry at the shoulders to of the soviet breakthrough to hold firm....something that failed at both Kursk and stalingrad....Inevitably the firepower the soviets could bring to bear would ensure breakthoughs, but it was here that the Panzer forces, held in reserve at around corps strength, had to deliver decisive counterattacksd to contain the soviet breakthroughs. When these tactics were allowed to be used, the heer enjoyed their greatest successes defensively. When not, disaster was usual outcome. the tiger was designed to reinforce a disastrous military policy, and that is rule 101 in military thinking, you dont design or prepare for a doctrine that you know is going to fail. you work to your strengths, and for the German panzer forces, it was their mobility that was their greatest asset. That was more or less universally acknowledged in the heer, and it was an advantage they could have exploited almost to the very end. They chose not to, or rather hitler chose for them, and the germans paid a heavy price for it. The tiger was built with static line warfare in mind. it had no place and was sub-optimal as a piece of kit for the panzerwaffe

The russians showed repeatedly that in a stand up fight, in which the Germans were denied mobility, they (the Russians) were at their best. they were tenacious and tough fighters, and they had the numbers to win. What they lacked were military leaders able to adapt rapidly to mobile situations. Where things changed rapidly their middle management was just not up to the task. things had to follow a rigid preset plan for success to be achieved. where the situation changed quickly, the Soviets generally fell apart (the US Army was somewhat similar...its army lacked experience and it did show on occasions) . The Germans on the other hand, were at their best in these situations. The prewar policies of overtraining recruits above their intended ranks enabled the heer to be flush with good small and medium sized unit leaders, and this enabled those formations to be flexible and effective under a wide range of situations, but best in mobile rapidly changing situations.

in other words, right up until the very end, mobility was an important factor for the germans. most of the senior leaders wanted to use it far more than they were allowed, Their greatest successes occurred when they did use mobile tactics.

And the Tiger, with its short range, lack of mobility and mechanical unreliability was not suited to that operational condition. It was developed, at least in its effect as a slightly mobile battering ram very much along the lines of Hitlers thinking, but this form of warfare was never going to deliver success. it was the kind of thinking that led to both the Stalingrad and Kursk disasters. 

Its a furphy to argue that by 1943 mobility on the eastern front was dead. Either defensively or offensively there were always possibilities. Germany just suffered so many losses that she was unable to capitalise on them after 1942. Vast sections of the Russian line always remained under-defended until the very end, and the Russians could not afford to lose any more encirclement battles after 1943. they too, were running out of men by then.

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## wiking85 (Aug 23, 2014)

How does my though of not producing the Panther and instead produce a standardized 25 ton chassis with sloped armor conflict with your last comment Parsifal? All I'm saying is to retain the Tiger and concentrate on having more lighter, reliable, maneuverable medium tanks instead of the heavy 'medium' Panther.


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## parsifal (Aug 23, 2014)

ive got no argument with a 25 ton tank, but its the tiger component that is the problem. A 25 ton tank is presumably a mobile, reliable long range tank with some protection good optics and communications. Despite the lure of having a heavy support component in the form of a tiger attachment to a division, this in fact is an expensive distraction to the main issue. What was needed in 43-45 was just one tank of simplified construction, able to be churned out in maximum numbers. in that regard, you are on the money. there were already two tanks that had elements of these characteristics, but unfortunately both had issues of their own, and both were not German....the t-34 and the Sherman. it was not really practical to construct or copy the T-34 for German resources....the aluminium cast engines were beyond the reach of an aluminium starved germany. And the lightweight engine meant that more could be spent on other things, like armour. still the t-34 model was probably the way to go for germany. Speer wanted to either copy the t-34 or Sherman it is claimed (not sure how true though). Building SPGs costs roughly 30% less than a turreted equivalent, so in my opinion, probably the best option was some form of redesigned MkIV, and StugIII. perhaps the standard '44 pz Div might have a Pz regt attached each with 2 x improved mkIVs Abts and 1x StugIII, or vice versa, and as heavy support and ATG (towed) battalion of 2x 75mm and 1 x 88mm bans. For the tracked compponent, that would givbe about 135 vehicles per div, only two types of AFV and a significant saving due to the use of SPGs as an integral part of the TOE.

as far as halftrack production, I would zero in on just one type, perhaps the opel and phase out all the others. they were very capable, but expensive for what they were. I would also be ruthless in yet more simplification of the truck park. I would forego short term benefits of milking the European economy dry, and try and get some sort of EU style economy going with french and dutch produced soft skinned vehicles....not great but better than nothing. Atillery i would try and reduce the number of types as well


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## Shortround6 (Aug 24, 2014)

The down part of this is that a 25 ton tank won't do what you want in 1943-45. A 25 ton tank mounting a 43-45 class gun is _not_ going to as mobile as a 25 ton tank mounting a 1941-42 class gun. _Everything_ in a tank is a trade off. There ain't no such ting as a free lunch. 
The Sherman grew from 66,900lbs to 74,200lbs from M4 to M4A3(76) and the M4A3E8 maybe even heavier? The Sherman used 375-450hp engines and the gasoline powered versions had 636-662liters of fuel compared to the MK IVs 470 liters. Granted the Sherman used most of it's extra fuel to move it's extra weight. However the Sherman had to armor the volume needed by the extra 166+ liters (think 8-9 jerry cans under armor).
Newer guns not only weighed more but they are bulkier and use bulkier ammo. Reduced ammo capacity? reduced rates of fire? 

An interesting comparison is the Post war M-41 tank, with a gun with the same _performance_ as a 76mm Sherman they got the weight down to 51-52,000lbs and the speed way up using a 500hp engine (that had fire problems, 1/2 the engine used in the M-47 but pushing a lot more power per liter of displacement) ) and they lost very little ammo capacity, they did loose one crew member, use technology not available in WW II, and essentially armored the vehicle with cardboard. Only the hull nose and the mantlet exceeded 26mm in thickness. Good for recon? as a battle tank?

Assault guns or even jagdpanzers are NOT tanks. They cannot fulfill _all_ the roles of tanks. Some yes, in fact perhaps many, but not ALL.


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## wiking85 (Aug 24, 2014)

Yeah the StuGs are a defensive weapon mostly or a break in assault weapon like the Tiger. 
Basically the 25 ton chassis would be more about using sloped armor with a 75mm L48 gun on a bigger chassis so that it could also act as a weapons carrier that was better than the historical Pz IV or III/IV chassis. It could have the basic 1942 L48 gun, while also having large sniper type weapons in the weapons platform version like the Nashorn to support the standard Panzers. I still think a heavy tank is necessary though as a support vehicle, especially an updated version with sloped armor, though not the historically uparmored Tiger II. Having a larger chassis for heavier weapons is crucial, as the Soviets and US demonstrated later in the war. They too had their heavy vehicles and in Germany's case they would have their utility. The Panther was a nice idea, but it wasn't practical for what it was. Too heavy, not reliable enough, and too late.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 24, 2014)

As a further consideration it is not just a question of fitting a gun to chassis. Some tanks/vehicles had more combat duration than others. Granted some of the Marders used different ammo than the MK IV tank and the Stugs but the performance was about the same.

However:

Vehicle..........7.5cm ammo.............MG ammo

Marder H............38........................600
Marder M............27........................600
Hetzer...............41........................600
Stug IIIF............44........................600
Stug IIIG ...........54?.......................600
Stug IV.............63?.......................600
Stug IV Neuer....79.........................600
MK IV G............87........................3000

How long can some of those vehicle stay in combat before having to pull out to reload? 
How many more vehicles do you need to equal the SAME combat power of the MK IV tank? 

Price or man hours per vehicle carrying the same gun does not tell the whole story. The lack of a co-ax gun on the vast majority of non turret vehicles means that they have trouble performing some of the infantry support role/s the tanks could do. 

Germans had a problem in that the MK IV was one of the first tanks to carry a 75mm gun in a rotating turret and while it was more upgradeable than some tanks of it's generation it was getting a bit long in the tooth in 1944. Still useful but pretty much maxed out. Try putting it up against T-34/85s and see what happens, no Panthers to share the load. Or M4s with 76mm guns. The US fell down getting the M-26 into service(both in timing and engine). It was late more due to doctrine/production decisions rather than technical problems. British should have had the Comet (or equivalent) in production sooner. It is only the allies lack of introducing new types of tanks that allowed the MK IV to carry on as well as it did let alone the hodge-podge of lashups the Germans used.


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## wiking85 (Aug 24, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> As a further consideration it is not just a question of fitting a gun to chassis. Some tanks/vehicles had more combat duration than others. Granted some of the Marders used different ammo than the MK IV tank and the Stugs but the performance was about the same.
> 
> However:
> 
> ...



Ultimately it was the demands of war that prevented the introduction of major new types that would enable a 25 ton chassis to soldier on, provided it had sufficient upgrade potential. A chassis designed for 25 tons could probably make it up to 30 tons in weight and mount a 75mm long gun by 1944, but be stuck at 50mm sloped armor. Early German turrets for the Panther and Tiger were handicapped by being designed for other older vehicles and pushed into production to save time, so when purpose built turrets with modern designs were tested they were lower weight. Take the Panther II schamturm, it ended up saving weight and being easier to make, while also being a smaller target and eliminating the shot trap of the earlier design. An upgraded medium tank chassis would have the extra room for extra ammo, while having a better layout and upgrade potential; the Pz IV soldiered on due to the Panther being a bridge too far in terms of design, having all the modern features of a tank of the future, but lacking reliability, production numbers (for a variety of reasons including allied bombing of factories and machine tool production backlogs), and being overweight. 

Germany needed to balance the need for a superior future tank design with the needs of satisfying production demands for the massive war they were in by 1942. They went overboard rather than seeking proper balance; having a modernized medium tank that would be easier to phase into production without a massive retooling that the Panther required, plus satisfying the demand for standardization and some upgradability for the near future would have been a better choice. Mobility, reliability, and survivability were all key to German tank demands, but a proper balance was needed, which the Panther did not satisfy. The Tiger was a boutique item that didn't really cost that much in resources, so could be kept to supplement German firepower and provide a tough rearguard, but they needed masses of medium tanks that met the above requirements. Ideally Germany would have had a reliable 30-35 ton medium tank that the Panther was supposed to be, but ran into all sorts of design issues that prevented it from being that tank, but a 25-30 medium could have had that by keeping the existing caliber of Pz IV tank gun and later designing a lower weight turret with proper protection like the schmalturm with a 75mm L70.

By 1944 or so a 25 ton chassis, as designed, could be upgraded to a 30 ton AFV with a Schmalturm, while in the meantime the standardization of all medium chassis vehicles on one design would offer nothing but benefits.
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=138939


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## davebender (Aug 24, 2014)

> 3601 quickly exceeded that 40 ton estimate, so morphed into the VK4501



VK3601 40 ton chassis morphed into 55 ton Tiger I chassis because Tiger tank program manager belatedly realized Germany had a copper shortage. Hence the otherwise perfectly adequate Porsche Tiger chassis with electric drive motors was unacceptable. That's the sort of design flaw someone in Heer ordnance department should have caught early on.


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## wiking85 (Aug 24, 2014)

davebender said:


> VK3601 40 ton chassis morphed into 55 ton Tiger I chassis because Tiger tank program manager belatedly realized Germany had a copper shortage. Hence the otherwise perfectly adequate Porsche Tiger chassis with electric drive motors was unacceptable. That's the sort of design flaw someone in Heer ordnance department should have caught early on.



I was referring to the Henschel design that became the Tiger I. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Design_history


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## parsifal (Aug 24, 2014)

> Germans had a problem in that the MK IV was one of the first tanks to carry a 75mm gun in a rotating turret and while it was more upgradeable than some tanks of it's generation it was getting a bit long in the tooth in 1944. Still useful but pretty much maxed out. Try putting it up against T-34/85s and see what happens, no Panthers to share the load.



the problem with the mkIV was that it was somewhat too light to be considered adequatetly protected. At 19 tons it was simply too light by 1944.wsomething based on the mKIV but with upgraded engine and more protection, armouring better shaped and redistributed, would have been more than adequate for the fighting in 1944-5. Even as is, the MKIV did well against the T-34 in tank versus tank engagement (something it was not designed for). The average kill loss ratio of the MKIV to all Soviet tanks (which is almost T-34) is about 4.4:1. In combat it was around 8 or 9:1. there was never a problem for the germans to win gunfights. The problems arose because they were unable to field sufficient numbers. In the actual battles, the germans were able inflict significant and generally one sided loss rates on the Russians. This occurred both before and after the wide scale introdution of Panther, against more or less the same sorts of enemy tanks. The small numbers of tigers were never statistically significant. Where the Russians redressed the loss rates was in the subsequent break throughs. once through the Soviets would keep pressing forwar, overrunning repair workshops, and preventing the recovery of disabled vehicles. it was at this point that the German loss rates reduced, on average down to that figure of 4.4:1. This was a figure remarkably consistent for all types fielded. it mattered not if the tank was a Tiger or a Panther or a MkIV or even a MkII. once through, the Soviets were going to wreak havoc on the Germans in terms of losses. And this they achieved time and again.

The solution to this was not to have ever bigger, or newer tanks. Every time you increase the size or complexity of your tank park, your availability will suffer. What they needed was numbers. Foreget the pursuit of ever increasing quality in the wartime context.find a design easy to build and churn em out like hotcakes. Once you get the numbers, the pressure on your logisitc network decreases because the Soviet breakthroughs are no longer as dramatic. Once you do that, you are on the way to stabilising your front, and from there...who knows.The germans never achieved their impressive kill/oss ratios because of their superior tanks. they achieved it because of their superior unit leadership training and all arms integration. I expect the same would apply against the Americans as well 



> Or M4s with 76mm guns. The US fell down getting the M-26 into service(both in timing and engine). It was late more due to doctrine/production decisions rather than technical problems. British should have had the Comet (or equivalent) in production sooner. It is only the allies lack of introducing new types of tanks that allowed the MK IV to carry on as well as it did let alone the hodge-podge of lashups the Germans used.




I have to disagree. The allies (incl the soviets) realized that in the wartiome situation, above technical proficiency, numbers were what counted. if they could get a new type into service without affecting numbers, then fine....a better tank is a help, dont get me wrong. but better tanks are a relatively minor issue compared to numbers. Having the numbers meant you could absorb losses and your front remainined stable. Having a stable frontline meant you never suffered catastrophic losses overall, and enable you to maintain the pressure and hence put the enmy on the wrack so far as losses were concerned. 

The germans never had the numbers game, but they did have a priceless advantage....experience. Kepping the numbers up meant they were actually less likley of losing that advantage, not moreso. At least slosing the numbers gap meant they had some chance of containing Allied breakthroughs, and thereby avoiding the lop sided encirclement battles that cost them the war.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 24, 2014)

The Americans, at times, were short of trained tank crewmen and were operating Shermans with less than 5 man crews _in spite_ of drafting infantrymen to help man the tanks. Why? because of high crew losses in the numbers of tanks knocked out by the Germans. Of course using partially crewed tanks with untrained crewman just means higher losses. 
You can overwhelm an enemy using poorer tanks but it cost both blood and treasure. The US didn't have 76mm armed Shermans in Numbers for far too long in Europe because of faulty doctrine, not because of manufacturing problems. The same is somewhat true for the M-26. 

The trick is to build a sufficiently advanced tank _without_ exceeding the countries ability to construct them in the numbers needed. Building the _same_ tank for 2-3 years is a bit like building the same fighter planes for 2-3 years _without_ improving the engine or armament. 

Anybody what to argue that Spitfire MK Vs would have been "good enough" if used in large enough numbers in 1944? Bf 109Fs? P-40Es? 
What cost in trained pilots? 

The Germans went a step too far, the allies didn't go quite far enough.


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## parsifal (Aug 24, 2014)

Manpower was always THE issue for the US Army. As Napoleon once said, "we have plenty of men, but too few soldiers". The problem was that the army had grown from a force of about 100000 to several millions in under two years. The training schools had been greatly expanded, but were still not enough to cope with even normal wastage.

By comparison, the heer had started as a force in 1939 of about 60 divs, but with fully trained reserves able to expand out to 120 divs in a short space of time. Plus the Germns, since Von seekt had over trained their NCOs and Junior officers, so that they could be rapidly upskilled. this paid enormous dividends for them, though by 1944 it was starting to come apart as well. The germans found they could reduce recruit training to almost nil, but it was critical to retain solid cadres, and even more important to retain that high standard of small unit leadership. German squad, platoon, company and bn leadership was without equal . The germans found they could just about put monkeys into the recruit slots, but they needed to retain good leadeship to get much out of those raw recruits. same deal for the Panzers. in the fighting around Metz, interrogation of captured germans showed the average training time of panther crews operating there was les than three weeks and most driver training was done with static instruction. Despite this, with the crew and tank leaders, they were still able to extract a stiff toll on the Americans .

In regard to your point about matching production to capacity, i couldnt agree more. with regard to fighter aircraft, I think it a slightly different situation. In the air, it was more about the individual, and how much he could get out of the equipment provided to him. Give the man mediocre or obsolete equipment and you cannot expect outstanding results. even here though there were exceptions. In the case of the VVS, it made conscious decision retain obsolete equipment, and to implement new production of types that were barely adequate. the last i-16s were produced in 1942, the last LAGG-3 in 1943 and they were still in service in 1944. The Soviets decided that they would build their fighters as cheaply as they could, with minimal equipment, and for much of the war with absolute minimum time spent on training. The average training hours for the forces committed to Kursk was about 40-60 hours. Moreover, the Russians never made it a priority to winning air supremacy over the eastern front. it was "nice to have" but never essential to fight the war they needed to fight. All they needed to achive was effective overwhelming ground strikes over the point of main effort, and for their fighters to keep the Germans busy whilst they did that. they achieved all that, with poorly skilled pilots, and average to poor equipment. Losses were staggering, but after 1943, never critical. it was a different approach and not aceptable to anyone except the Soviets, but the Soviets configured the VVS to work to their strengths....numbers, numbers and yet more numbers!


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## Juha (Aug 25, 2014)

parsifal said:


> ... In the case of the VVS, it made conscious decision retain obsolete equipment, and to implement new production of types that were barely adequate. the last i-16s were produced in 1942, the last LAGG-3 in 1943 and they were still in service in 1944. ..



Sorry this is OT but I-16 was small and very nimble plane, it was a difficult opponent. In fact when VVS high command studied their a/c in early 1942 they found out that I-16 was one of the most survivalable fighter they had if not the most survivalable and thoughtat first to continue its production but then looked what the I-16 units had achieved and noted that in that kategory it did badly, so they did decide to drop it from production. Nimbleness might help pilots to survive but if the plane is weakly armed and slowish that wasn't good for effectiveness. Late LaGG-3s on the other hand were not bad fighters, La-5F/FNs were simply better and so displaced the LaGG-3s in production like P-51B displaced P-51A. What was substandard VVS fighter in 44 was Yak-9M.

On tanks IMHO 30-35 tonnes vehicles were optimal MBTs, they were more suited to the technologies and infrastructures of the time and so had greater operational mobility than the heavier and more powerful tanks.


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