# Field Marshall Douglas Haig : the Butcher of the Somme



## Maestro (Aug 29, 2009)

Greetings ladies and gentlemen.

Lots of peoples complained about Haig's leadership during WWI. And I can't really desagree with them. So let's settle this matter once and for all...

Haig was a crappy staff officer who looked at new technologies and new tactics as a kid looks at fireworks... "It looks good, but won't do much."



Douglas Haig said:


> It [the machine gun] is a much overrated weapon that could be taken by pure grit and determination.



He was proved wrong when he lost thousands of troops to machine gun fire for very little gain.

He also used tactics of the stone age, telling his troops to "walk slowly in a line toward the enemy"... Making an easy target and giving plenty of time for the machine gunners to reload.

He also never visited the frontline, all the info he got was comming from staff officers serving under him. So, when he ordered a shelling of enemy positions with fragmentation shells in order to cut the barbed wire, and that the operation failed, he didn't know. (Something he would have known if he had been at the frontline.) And when he was told that his first wave had failed, he didn't believe it and just kept sending waves after waves of men ready to die "For King and country". And when he was shown any alternatives, he turned them down.

Also, all of his assaults were preceded by heavy shelling... Which warned German gunners that an assault was coming. A weak point that Germany noticed and modified from its own attack strategies during the Kaiserschlacht in 1918.

The way he trained his troops also lacked realism... And never evolved to reflect the reality of trench warfare. In his training, there were no shells, no enemy bullets, no mud, no barbed wire, no trenches... So his troops were not prepared to face the enemy.

Of course, some points were not under his control, like weather or enemy decisions, which could greatly influence the outcome of an operation. But his lack of vision, his stone age tactics and his attitude toward new technologies made him a nightmare to serve under.


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 29, 2009)

I've never of anybody complimenting the man on anything, so I have to agree with you.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 29, 2009)

You'll see a number of commanders in WWI acting along Haig's mindset.

I'm not sure if these commanders were so set in thier ways of the "old school" of thought, or impervious to the rapid change of technology that WWI brought about. Perhaps a little of both, but they sure cost thier armies dearly in needless casualties.


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## timshatz (Aug 30, 2009)

I am no great fan of Haig. But, to give the guy his due, there really wasn't much of an effective counter to the technology of the day but more technology (tanks airplanes and communications). In 1918, when the German Storm tactics were implemented, they still suffered massive casualties and lost some of their best remaining men. That was two years after the Somme. 

The problem, in the big picture, is the technology of defense had gotten far ahead of the tactics of offense. The machine gun, barbed wire and artillery, along with defense in depth was an impossible problem for attacking infantry. The affect of air support, armored support and call for fires were all well in the future. Haig did try to develop a tactic that would lead to a successful battle. His idea was to pound the enemy to bits using artillery. Then, the infantry, which were not well trained proffessionals but semi-trained "Pals" for the most part, would walk over and occupy the trenches. Given the caliber and the situation, it made sense. Especially when you consider the Germans had tried something similar at Verdun and met with some success. 

However, Haig's failing (IMHO) was not that his plan was horrible. It was a logical plan. It was a problem with ceeding power to make decisions forward to deal with the flow and ebb of a battle. His plan was centrally designed by staff officers in the rear, with limited experience in actual operations. The decisions that needed to be made, after the shelling stopped, had to happen in the front lines and needed to be made by the officers in those lines. That power was not extended to them. They were told when and how to go, even the speed of the march. In developing this plan as such, it stripped all initative from the lower level leaders. When the plan went to pieces and flexibility was required, those officers were not allowed (or trained) to make quick, on the spot decisions. And WW1 was a platoon sized war, even if it took the leadership years to figure it out. 

Haig was no genius as a leader. He was competent and a man of his time. He was an Eduardian Leader, top down, who did adapt as situations occured. A butcher? Probably. The job was such that nobody was going to be able to launch attacks (along the learning curve) and not get scores of men killed. But the problem was, if not Haig, then who should be in command? Lloyd George faced that very problem in the Fall of 1917 and he couldn't think of anyone to replace him (even though he wanted to very much).


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## timshatz (Aug 30, 2009)

A question that has always bothered me about WW1, especially in the West, was how to win it with a minimum number of casualties. That is really the bottom line of this thread. After the battles of the Summer and Fall of 1914 and the race to the sea, what next. The war, in the end, was won because the blockade destroyed the Central Power to wage war. Not because the German Armies were destroyed in the field (something that caused on end of problems later with the "Stab in the Back" myth). 

But, if the 4 years of war really lead to no decision in the field (and this is totally in hindsight), is the best way for the Allies to win the war to simply dig in and wait for the blockade to destroy the Central Powers?


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## trackend (Aug 30, 2009)

Haig was a captive of the times as much as he was a bad leader the tactics employed in WW1 were not confined to just Haig the german and french high commands used the same methods, as for walking towards the enemy it would be interseting to see any troops cover the mile or more of no mans land that consisted of usually a muddy moonscape (some shell holes 15ft deep) carrying their kit at the run then be able to assault trenchs with bullet and bayonet.


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## renrich (Aug 31, 2009)

Pershing and the American commanders made many of the same mistakes during the Meuse-Argonne offenses. Their casualties were awful.


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## olbrat (Aug 31, 2009)

Late in the war, when they developed more accuracy in their artillery, one of the major improvements they did on the straight march across no-man's land was the creeping barrage. Instead of just the bombardment, which also alerted the Germans to the attack, they co-ordinated the advance of the troops with the shelling. They would have a barrage, and systematically creep it forward, toward the enemy, with the soldiers following up closely. If someone miscalculated, it got kind of rough for the soldiers.


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## syscom3 (Aug 31, 2009)

And whats unfathomable was the same types of results (troops marching en mass to trenches against rifle fire) were seen in the US Civil War.

Seems like no commander in any army bothered to study the (recent) historical lessons of warfare.


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## timshatz (Sep 1, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> And whats unfathomable was the same types of results (troops marching en mass to trenches against rifle fire) were seen in the US Civil War.
> 
> Seems like no commander in any army bothered to study the (recent) historical lessons of warfare.



Some of them did. The Prussians in particular, paid attention to the way the troops were moved around via railroads during the American Civil War. 

However, The Euros didn't think much of the war. Von Schliefen once called it "Two armed mobs chasing each other around the country". Seems the Euros really didn't "get" the way the war was being fought.Just wasn't their way of doing things.


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## Colin1 (Sep 1, 2009)

olbrat said:


> Late in the war, when they developed more accuracy in their artillery, one of the major improvements they did on the straight march across no-man's land was the creeping barrage. Instead of just the bombardment, which also alerted the Germans to the attack, they co-ordinated the advance of the troops with the shelling. They would have a barrage, and systematically creep it forward, toward the enemy, with the soldiers following up closely. If someone miscalculated, it got kind of rough for the soldiers.


When did they start implementing this?
I know the French further south in the Allied line used the method with some success but I thought the British never got over warning the Germans that

a. here comes a barrage, it should signal to you that we're on the offensive.
b. the barrage has now stopped, it should signal to you that we've got boots on the ground and they're coming towards your machine-gun positions in a nice, long, convenient line-abreast formation and at a speed where you shouldn't have too much trouble reloading.

Haig may have been a man of his time but it makes it no less acceptable that he sent countless young men on a one-way trip into the killing fields of France. Blame the system or blame Haig and his peers but he had a responsibility at that level of command to move with the times; deploying 19th century tactics against 20th century weapons proved him abysmally negligent in his observance of intelligence, modern warfare and casualty reports vs gains for the engagements thus far.


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## Glider (Sep 1, 2009)

Haig did in the end learn from his mistakes and his forces were probably the best trained and equipped at the end of the war. 
His forces participation in the final 100 days offensive was impressive. These were a series of co ordinated battles that broke the German Army

Battle Of Amiens 8th August 1918
By the end of the first day a gap 15 miles long had been made in the German lines.

Second Battle of the Somme 21st August 1918
The German forces were pushed back of a 30 mile front forcing the Germans back to the Hindenburg Line

Hindenburg Line 26th September
Initial attacks were launched by the US, Belgian and British 2nd Army which made some progress but lost momentum. 

Hindenburg 29th September
Main attack by Haigs 4th Army called Battle of St Quintain broke through the entire depth of the German defences

So yes he was responsible for dreadful losses for which he cannot be forgiven but in the end he did do some good.


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## davebender (Sep 2, 2009)

> really wasn't much of an effective counter to the technology of the day


That's not true. A decentralized system of command as practised by the German army prior to WWI and most western nations today is the solution to battlefield chaos. Once you implement that the army performs better at all levels of command. However such a sweeping change must be made at the national level. Kitchner would need to introduce it.


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## Ferdinand Foch (Sep 2, 2009)

Well, here I go. To me, Haig should be given a bit more credit for his role in winning the war. Even though he was slow to adapt to the technology of WWI (as many other generals were, like Joffre), I believe that the repeated attacks against the German trenches did help to finally break the German Army (probably not to the same effect as the blockade, but still enough). It did led to a terrible casualty rate, but at the same time it did eat away at the German Army as well. If Haig had the same defeatist feelings as Petain during the French Army mutinies of 1917, and the Ludendorff Offensive of 1918, the war could have taken a much different turn than it did (least that's one theory). Still, between Foch and Haig, I'm gonna have to go with Foch.


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## jamierd (Sep 2, 2009)

despiute the number of deaths laid at the feet of lord haig he is still regarded as somewhat of a hero figure here in the uk,at the time most of the british officers "bought "there commisions which often led to incompetent men being in charge of the troops at the front.so a devolved command structure just would not have worked the only way for haig to make it work would have been for Haig to actually be on the ground during the attacks and see what was happening .This may not have changed anything because in truth we do not know how Haig would have reacted to seeing failure in the field first hand


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## Maestro (Sep 4, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> When did they start implementing this?
> I know the French further south in the Allied line used the method with some success but I thought the British never got over warning the Germans that
> 
> a. here comes a barrage, it should signal to you that we're on the offensive.
> b. the barrage has now stopped, it should signal to you that we've got boots on the ground and they're coming towards your machine-gun positions in a nice, long, convenient line-abreast formation and at a speed where you shouldn't have too much trouble reloading.



The creeping barrage in the British Army was implemented (as far as I know) by Arthur Cury, commander of the Canadian Corps, during the Battle of Passchendaele in 1917. It was one of many requests made by Cury in order to accept the task.

1 - Enough guns (about 120 or 160) for the creeping barrage.
2 - Launch the attack when he (Cury) sees fit.
3 - Take all the time needed to pound the living sh*t out of the Germans in the days prior to the attack.

Haig had to accept those requests or assign the task to an other corps... He chose to accept them.


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## Maestro (Sep 4, 2009)

trackend said:


> ...it would be interseting to see any troops cover the mile or more of no mans land that consisted of usually a muddy moonscape (some shell holes 15ft deep) carrying their kit at the run then be able to assault trenchs with bullet and bayonet.



That is an other thing I never understood... Why did they have to carry all of their stuff during an assault ? Keep your helmet, your weapons and your ammunitions and dump everything else. It should help you to move faster.


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## Glider (Sep 4, 2009)

Maestro said:


> That is an other thing I never understood... Why did they have to carry all of their stuff during an assault ? Keep your helmet, your weapons and your ammunitions and dump everything else. It should help you to move faster.



That was one of the changes that was made during the war. The main packs were left behind.


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## Maestro (Sep 4, 2009)

Ah... Thanks for the info.


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## Negative Creep (Oct 20, 2009)

jamierd said:


> despiute the number of deaths laid at the feet of lord haig he is still regarded as somewhat of a hero figure here in the uk,




I can honestly say I've never heard anyone refer to him as a hero. He seems to be, rightly or wrongly, the personification of wasteful attrition tactics


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## Bernhart (Oct 20, 2009)

just to correct your spelling maestro, it's Arthur Currie


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## timshatz (Oct 20, 2009)

Negative Creep said:


> I can honestly say I've never heard anyone refer to him as a hero. He seems to be, rightly or wrongly, the personification of wasteful attrition tactics



I don't know if he was considered a hero as such, but he was considered competent. And a victor. That was until Lloyd George wrote his history of WW1 ("I tried to tell them it was no good but they wouldn't listen" type of stuff). LG's history of WW1, much like Winston Churchill's history of WW2, set the tone of the memory of that war (at least in England). Those that fought in it tended, at the end of it, to be supportive of the effort. It was for a good cause. That perspective has changed over the years to one which sees WW1 as nothing but a slaughter of innocents, Lions led by Donkeys, that sort of thing. 

The truth is somewhere in the middle and far more complex.


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## Glider (Oct 21, 2009)

timshatz said:


> I don't know if he was considered a hero as such, but he was considered competent. And a victor. That was until Lloyd George wrote his history of WW1 ("I tried to tell them it was no good but they wouldn't listen" type of stuff). LG's history of WW1, much like Winston Churchill's history of WW2, set the tone of the memory of that war (at least in England). Those that fought in it tended, at the end of it, to be supportive of the effort. It was for a good cause. That perspective has changed over the years to one which sees WW1 as nothing but a slaughter of innocents, Lions led by Donkeys, that sort of thing.
> 
> The truth is somewhere in the middle and far more complex.



I agree with this summary, if you want the personification of the term Butcher most would agree that this applied to Kitchener, not Haig.


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## Maestro (Oct 23, 2009)

Bernhart said:


> just to correct your spelling maestro, it's Arthur Currie



Uh... Thanks.


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## Maestro (Oct 23, 2009)

Glider said:


> I agree with this summary, if you want the personification of the term Butcher most would agree that this applied to Kitchener, not Haig.



Oh, and in how was Kitchener worst than Haig ? He wasn't even commanding the forces directly. Haig was doing most of the job.


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## Glider (Oct 23, 2009)

Maestro said:


> Oh, and in how was Kitchener worst than Haig ? He wasn't even commanding the forces directly. Haig was doing most of the job.



You can start with the Boer War when he was responsible for the scortched earth policy against the Boers and the setting up of the original concentration camps. These had a death rate of 34%.

At the start of WW1 he was partly responsible for the decision to limit the number of machine guns in British units. Unfortunately for the troops, the British army high command could see no real use for the oil-cooled machine gun demonstrated to them; other officers even regarded the weapon as an improper form of warfare.
When war broke out in August 1914 the Germans had 12,000 at their disposal, a number which eventually ballooned to 100,000, whereas the British had a few hundred.

In the shell crisis of 1915 he was lucky to survive he uproar as he was responsible for munitions, but was popular with the public, hence he survived.


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## Maestro (Oct 24, 2009)

Glider said:


> You can start with the Boer War when he was responsible for the scortched earth policy against the Boers and the setting up of the original concentration camps. These had a death rate of 34%.



I was reffering to WWI, let's keep other conflicts aside.



Glider said:


> At the start of WW1 he was partly responsible for the decision to limit the number of machine guns in British units. Unfortunately for the troops, the British army high command could see no real use for the oil-cooled machine gun demonstrated to them; other officers even regarded the weapon as an improper form of warfare.
> When war broke out in August 1914 the Germans had 12,000 at their disposal, a number which eventually ballooned to 100,000, whereas the British had a few hundred.



Yeah... And who suggested it ? Haig ! He was seeing the machine gun as "a much overrated weapon that could be taken by pure grit and determination."

Plus it wasn't Kitchener's idea to send the troops *walking slowly* across the battlefield... It was Haig's idea.

Rapid rate of fire + slow moving target = slaughter !

It was also Haig's idea to proceed to an heavy shelling in the minutes prior to an assault, warning the ennemy of their arrival.

Now, add that to the equation above and you get a disaster !



Glider said:


> In the shell crisis of 1915 he was lucky to survive he uproar as he was responsible for munitions, but was popular with the public, hence he survived.



You're right on this. I can't argue against that.


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## Hop (Oct 30, 2009)

The creeping barrage was first used at the Somme in 1916. As an example, from 7th division, XV corps orders, 18 June:



> During the advance of the infantry a barrage of artillery fire will be formed in front of the infantry according to the timings shown on the tracings issued to those concerned. The lines shown on the tracings indicate the nearest points on which the guns will fire up to the hour indicated. At the times shown heavy guns will lift their fire direct to the next barrage line. The divisional artillery will move their fire progressively at the rate of 50 yards a minute. Should the infantry arrive at any point before the time fixed for the barrage to lift, they will wait under the best cover available and be prepared to assault directly the lift takes place



It wasn't in use everywhere on the front, and in many places it proved ineffective, but the intent was certainly there. On the 16 July GHQ issued the following:



> One of the outstanding artillery lessons of the recent fighting has been the great assistance afforded by a well-directed field artillery barrage maintained close in front of the advancing infantry. It is beyond dispute that on several occasions where the field artillery has made a considerable "lift," that is to say has outstopped the infantry advance, the enemy has been able to man his parapets with rifles and machine guns. It is therefore of first importance that in all cases infantry should be instructed to advance right under the field artillery barrage, which should not uncover the first objective until the infantry are close up to it (even within 50 or 60 yard)





> despiute the number of deaths laid at the feet of lord haig he is still regarded as somewhat of a hero figure here in the uk



I haven't heard anyone refer to Haig as a hero, either. In fact he is roundly vilified in the UK, where the perception is the British generals were the worst in the war. 

It's unfair imo. Mass casualty assaults were hardly unique to the British army. In fact, by the end of the war, the forces under Haig were the best in the world.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 30, 2009)

The whole idea of an artillery barrage before and attack was used by countless armies and not just an idea by Haig. It is still done in modern times as well.


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## parsifal (Oct 30, 2009)

It was the germans who first cottoned on to how to use artillery in the modern sense. The allies tended to try and eliminate all opposition with their artillery, and would pound a position for weeks to try and eliminate the defences in that sector completely. Certainly the creeping barrage went some way to affording protection to the advancing Infantry, but this was only a part of the issue, and remained a relatively minor aspect to the application of artillery by the allies.

The Germans realized that a better method was to use artillery in a much more concentrated form, their barrages were using less guns, but on a smaller sector of the front. They also relaized that the best way to use artillery was with a rapid barrage lasting just a few minuts, to dislocate the defences, rather than overpower them. A barrage of short duration allowed maximum force to be applied at the decisive point and prevented the movement of reserves by the defnce. Concentrated barrages of small duration meant that the defence was often left dazed and dislocated.

I see Haig as representing a failure for a number reasons. He represented the very worst of British leadership for a number of reasons

1) His total disconnect to the relaities at the front. He did not know (whether by omission or disdain) what was happening to his men at the front, and did not make any attempt to improve morale by visits to the front.

2) His well known failure to embrace technology to find ways around the deadlock. The adoption of tanks was achieved despite Haig, not because of him. 

3) His failure to develop methods and training regimes to break the deadlock. Whilst the Australians, the Canadians and some British units developed themselves into "shock" troop status, with the training, techniques and elan to push forward to break defensive positions, the majority of the allied armies remained mass conscipt armies, of relatively low levels of traiing. The idea of professional mass armies was an anathema to Haig, and he resisted this concept tenaciously. In contrast the Germans embraced it, and nearly won the war with it

Ultimately, the war was won by the Royal Navy rather than the British army. Haig failed to realize, fundamentally, that his great offensives were really not winnng anything, and were losing a great deal. I think a better option until proper offensive techniques were worked out, would be to stay on the defensive, rather than throw millions to their deaths, because Haig wanted to fight a war in cerrtain way


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## Maestro (Oct 31, 2009)

Hop said:


> The creeping barrage was first used at the Somme in 1916. As an example, from 7th division, XV corps orders, 18 June[...]



Ah, thanks. You just proved what I suspected... that Canadian historian Norm Christie doesn't tell all the truth.

But what else could I expect from a guy who used the motto of the British Army (_For King and country_) as the title of his show on _Canadian_ warfare ?


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## pbfoot (Oct 31, 2009)

"British and French doctrine treated the common soldier as cannon fodder not to be trusted with personal initiative. Currie convinced Byng this approach was wrong, particularly given the independent nature of Canadians. What Currie envisioned were platoons that could lose commanders and still function. He also reorganized the platoons so riflemen, bombers, and machine gunners were incorporated in one body rather than isolated into separate platoons that were not trained to work together.

The two generals also [I]improved the creeping barrage technique [/I]developed during the Somme where artillery fire progressed a short distance ahead of the advancing infantry. If the artillery adjusted fire forward in accordance to carefully timed lifts it could walk the infantry right into the enemy trenches behind a curtain of protective fire. New explosives and concentration plans were developed to enable the artillery to rip holes in German barbed wire. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew McNaughton invented a means to pre-sight German gun positions so that the Canadian artillery could destroy them quickly in the attack’s opening moments. Another Canadian, Brigadier General Raymond Brutinel propagated using machine guns for indirect fire by spraying repeated and concentrated bursts over the heads of the enemy rather than firing at specific targets. The intent was to deny the Germans easy movement inside their own lines. The final requirement Currie and Byng sought before approving the attack was that the RFC gain air superiority over the battlefront. Throughout April 1917 an air war raged overhead as almost 400 Allied fighters tangled daily with a German force that was only about 150 strong but equipped with better planes and arguably more skilled pilots. The attack was set for Easter Sunday, April 8 but soon pushed back to Easter Monday, April 9.

For two preceding weeks the Germans were subjected to a ceaseless barrage by 480 18-pounders and 250 howitzers and heavy guns supplied with 50,000 tons of shells — more than 1 million rounds. On the last day most guns turned against the massive tangles of barbed wire fronting the German line. At dusk on April 8 when the firing slowed the Germans rushed to their defences, but no attack materialized. The Germans stood down.

At 5:30 a.m. on April 9, 983 guns and mortars rained explosives down on the German line for three minutes with Brutinel’s machine guns adding to the storm. All four Canadian divisions advanced behind this wall of fire with the leading elements sweeping through large gaps in the barbed wire and into the forward trenches before the defenders emerged from their protective shelters. This first wave had been instructed to immediately move on to the second trench system and leave mopping up to the second wave which took thousands of dazed prisoners still stumbling from their shelters. Meanwhile McNaughton’s artillery spotting technique proved itself as the Canadian gunners managed to eliminate 176 of 212 German batteries. Unable to direct artillery against the Canadians the Germans could do little to stem the advance."

and for the very first time 

"Heavy guns were calibrated with electronics so they could hit
enemy targets from map coordinates on the first shot but
artillery officer’s culture had to change to accept the new
technology. Wear on the gun barrel, topography, wind and
weather had to be considered. A new design of artillery fuses
cut barbed wire defenses allowing infantry to advance across
No-Man’s-Land. Geophones and electromagnetic sensors, a
pre-cursor of EM methods, were used to spy on enemy
communication."
Would you believe that prior to t0 Vimy the guns were not calibrated for barrel wear and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew McNaughton was mocked and derided for wasting time in doing so


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