# Defeating Bomber Command



## wiking85 (Jul 25, 2014)

Given that the Battle of Berlin was a disaster for the RAF BC was there a chance for the Luftwaffe to inflict such a defeat on BC prior to early 1944? Is there a conceivable situation that BC would have to abandon massed night bombing of German cities permanently during the war (until something like the oil campaign succeeds)?


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## wiking85 (Jul 25, 2014)

I supposed I'll start the discussion off on the potential success of the intruder operations up to October 1941 when Hitler cancelled them. Had that offensive gone on longer it would have hurt the build up of BC into 1942, potentially making the 1000 bomber raids unfeasible until the RAF got their Mosquito night fighters in enough numbers to halt the intruders, which would probably be some time in 1943. Of course by then the Me410 would be available and was a decent intruder itself and fast enough to give the Mosquito issues with interception. Would this have been enough to blunt BC and potentially head off the Baedeker Blitz? Would it make the Luftwaffe night defenses worse due to lack of experience against the heavy BC raids?


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## wuzak (Jul 25, 2014)

What about Beaufighter NFs? I'm sure they could have put up a decent defence against night intuders made up, I assume, mainly of Ju 88s?


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## wiking85 (Jul 25, 2014)

wuzak said:


> What about Beaufighter NFs? I'm sure they could have put up a decent defence against night intuders made up, I assume, mainly of Ju 88s?



Forgot about them. They were barely faster than the Ju88Cs (stripped down and more aerodynamic, thus faster than the Ju88A4 by 35mph) used for the intruder operations (14km faster) making it very difficult to intercept them. In fact by late 1941 when the intruder operations were cancelled they were at their most successful, so I don't think they were successful at stopping them. AFAIK the night operations over Britain really only because dangerous in 1943 and the Beaufighter was phased out for defensive operations in late 1942 when there were enough Mosquitos to take over; the Beaufighters were much slower, but useful as intruders themselves over Germany.


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## wiking85 (Jul 26, 2014)

Here is some info about the historical intruders, which I know Erich writes about on this board:
Axis History Forum ? Intruder Operations Over England


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## davebender (Jul 26, 2014)

Pin pricks. Germany would need a lot more light bombers to make this effective. Cancelling daytime portion of BoB is only way to make enough German aircraft available.

Historical spring 1941 German night bomber losses were less then 1% of sorties. So RAF night air defenses aren't an issue. Luftwaffe lost more night bombers from navigation error then from RAF night fighter aircraft.


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## wiking85 (Jul 27, 2014)

davebender said:


> Pin pricks. Germany would need a lot more light bombers to make this effective. Cancelling daytime portion of BoB is only way to make enough German aircraft available.
> 
> Historical spring 1941 German night bomber losses were less then 1% of sorties. So RAF night air defenses aren't an issue. Luftwaffe lost more night bombers from navigation error then from RAF night fighter aircraft.



That is before the point I mentioned early on and before the Kammhuber really realized BC was a threat they needed to focus on.


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## Glider (Jul 27, 2014)

Clearly a Mosquito is a much better performer than a Beaufighter but I wouldn't be quite so disparaging about the Beau. The intruders are likely to be at cruising speed not max speed and this would make them vulnerable to the Beau which under GC would be able to use all its performance when required. In daylight combat the Beau had a clear advantage over the Ju88 and over the Bay of Biscay the JU88 units were ordered not to tackle the Beaufighter unless they had a clear numerical or tactical advantage and were treated with respect. 

By 1942/3 the RAF defences were in much better shape with the Defiant replaced and German losses I expect would have been higher than in 1941 when the RAF were still learning how to go organise and get the Beaufighter up to strength. Its also worth remembering that the radar on the RAF fighters was more advanced than the Luftwaffe and that in night fighting is a huge plus.


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## stona (Jul 27, 2014)

Interception at night has less to do with the aircraft used and more to do with the GCI and AI radar systems being used. 

The British introduced AI Mk I and II radar prematurely. They barely worked. The first successful AI Mk III interception took place in July 1940 but the gap between ground control and AI performance was too great until the first real GCI was available. AI radar in 1941 (Mk III to later Mk V) had a range of at best two miles. the GCI radar controller had to get the interceptor to within this distance for it to have any chance of 'seeing' the target and closing to within visual range to make an attack.

The first experimental centimetric AI radar wasn't even flown until March 1941. Two experimental sets were available in June. To cut a long story short the RAF lacked centimetric AI radar until late 1942 when the interim Mk VIII sets began to be delivered. Until then the 1.5 meter Mk V was being used to good effect in conjunction with GCI. Conversion to the superior centimetric sets took place throughout 1943.

The earliest GCI radars were essentially based on a modified, mobile, CHL aerial. The first six sets were hand made and handed over to the RAF at the end of January 1941. They must have worked because contrary to what is posted above Luftwaffe losses by night rose significantly. I have a figure of 7% for May 1941.

By the end of 1941 there were 29 GCI radars in operation. In June that year it had been decided to use the AMES Type 7 as the basis for the fixed GCI radar. This was a much superior system but only 2 were operating, plus 2 more experimental stations, by the end of 1942. It is fair to say that due to the reduced threat the programme was wound down. 13 mobile stations and 21 fixed stations were put on 'care and maintenance' at this time. 

Had the threat from the Luftwaffe at night been maintained or increased in 1941/2 it would have been possible for the British to react. They certainly wouldn't have been putting GCI radar stations on 'care and maintenance' regimes.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jul 27, 2014)

stona said:


> The earliest GCI radars were essentially based on a modified, mobile, CHL aerial. The first six sets were hand made and handed over to the RAF at the end of January 1941. They must have worked because contrary to what is posted above Luftwaffe losses by night rose significantly. I have a figure of 7% for May 1941.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz#Sorties_flown
Under 2% losses for May 1941 for the Luftwaffe. Source: "The Night Blitz". It was higher than previous months and for the first time exceeded losses from accidents, but it was a minor set of losses (55 aircraft out of 3800 sortees). The Luftwaffe actually expanded in overall numbers that month despite these loses (which included accidents and losses to AAA). By 1942 the RAF was able to intercept the slow He111s pretty regularly, which is how they inflicted serious losses during the Baedeker Blitz, but were not able to really inflict many losses on the Ju88Cs. It was really only the Mosquito in conjunction with improved ground intercept radar and AI radar that really hurt the LW, but even as late as 1945 the LW was still inflicting intruder losses. 

As to the cruise speed, the Mosquito bombers could be caught by LW NFs in cruise speed, but the problem is that they needed to sight them first and close before the bombers realized they were being followed and took evasive action. Same for the LW intruders, they were able to penetrate British airspace regularly without being intercepted, most being lost to accidents (landing/taking off and running out of fuel) and AAA more so than NFs.


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## davebender (Jul 27, 2014)

By 1942 Luftwaffe Schwerpunkt was on Russian front along with rest of the Wehrmacht. If you want an effective interdiction campaign it needs to happen prior to June 1941.


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## stona (Jul 27, 2014)

In May 1941 twin engine night fighters (that is Beaufighters with Mk IV AI radar) accounted for 25 Luftwaffe aircraft compared with 2 in February. This was due to the development of GCI and AI radar. It had little, or nothing, to do with the night fighter employed.
The figure is more significant because around mid May targets for British night fighters became much more scarce.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Jul 27, 2014)

stona said:


> In May 1941 twin engine night fighters (that is Beaufighters with Mk IV AI radar) accounted for 25 Luftwaffe aircraft compared with 2 in February. This was due to the development of GCI and AI radar. It had little, or nothing, to do with the night fighter employed.
> The figure is more significant because around mid May targets for British night fighters became much more scarce.
> Cheers
> Steve



The sortee rate in February was 1/3rd that of May due to bad weather. Its really had to make interceptions in that. Not only that, but the introduction of the Beaufighter enabled interceptions, because its top speed was about 150mph faster than the He111, which was able to outpace the Blenheim NF. The introduction of better AI radar certainly helped, but the major improvement was in the the quality and speed of the aircraft used as NFs. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz#Potency_of_RAF_night_fighters


> Moreover, the Blenheim struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers.
> The Boulton Paul Defiant, despite its poor performance during daylight engagements, was a much better aircraft in the night fighter role. It was faster and able to catch the bombers, and its configuration was also beneficial. Placing its armament of four machine guns in a turret instead of fixed forward it could (much like German night fighters in 1943–1945 with their Schräge Musik configuration) engage the unsuspecting German bomber from beneath. Attacks from below offered a larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the bomber (so less chance of evasion), as well as greater likelihood of detonating its bombload. In subsequent months a steady number of German bombers would fall to night fighters.[146]
> Better news was in the offing with the Bristol Beaufighter. It would prove formidable, but its development was slow.[146] The Beaufighter had a maximum speed of 320 mph (510 km/h), an operational ceiling of 26,000 ft (7,900 m) and a climb rate of 2,500 ft (760 m) per minute. Its armament of four 20 mm (0.79 in) Hispano cannon and six .303 in Browning machine guns offered a serious threat to German bombers.[147]
> By April and May 1941, the Luftwaffe was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one- to two-percent losses on any given mission.[150] On 19/20 April 1941, in honour of Hitler's 52nd birthday, 712 bombers hit Plymouth with a record 1,000 tons of bombs.[150][150] Losses were minimal. In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters.[150] On 3/4 May, nine were shot down in one night.[150] On 10/11 May, London suffered severe damage, but 10 German bombers were downed.[150] In May 1941, RAF night fighters shot down 38 German bombers.[151]



The quality and speed of the aircraft mattered, which is why the Mosquito was barely shot down at night and the Bf110 was being withdrawn due to its slow speed relative to bombers by 1944.


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## stona (Jul 27, 2014)

I disagree. The major improvement was in the coordinated night defensive system, that was due to the development of the two complimentary radar systems. Without GCI radar and competent controllers the airborne radars of WW2 were almost useless. Having a faster night fighter was obviously an advantage, but not critical.

In any case, to return to he original premise, the Luftwaffe never had the means to defeat Bomber Command at any time during WW2. It came closest when Bomber Command played into its hands and that wasn't in 1941.

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Jul 27, 2014)

When was British ground control radar upgraded to provide height data? That's critical information for a night aerial interception.


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## Glider (Jul 27, 2014)

My understanding was that they always gave a height indication. This at times wasn't that accurate but I believe it was always there.

The Beaufighter was critical as it had all the attributes of a nightfighter, obviously you need the infrastructure as well and one without the other made the whole thing a bit of a waste.


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## stona (Jul 28, 2014)

davebender said:


> When was British ground control radar upgraded to provide height data? That's critical information for a night aerial interception.



Yes. Those first six GCI radars were essentially a CHL aerial mounted on a turntable and modified to give height information. They were hand built at the Royal Aircraft Establishment and the Telecommunications Research Establishment.

They also used Plan Position Indicator (PPI) displays. Earlier displays showed one dimension only, that is slant range to target as a deflection on a time base across the cathode ray tube (CRT). A PPI display showed two, bearing and slant range, by having a time base as a radius on the CRT, pointing in the same direction as the aerial. This will be more familiar to those who have seen more modern radar displays. Returned signals, instead of producing a deflection in the time base were used to brighten up a spot at that part of the time base. By clever jiggery-pokery, turning down the general brightness and fiddling with relative contrast only the bright spot would be seen as the aerial's beam swept over the target, again familiar to those who have seen more modern displays.
Place a gridded map over the display and the geographical position of several targets could be accurately plotted at each revolution of the aerial. Scanning beam radar was born. It seems obvious to us now, but in 1940 this was a huge leap forward in interpreting the raw information coming from the radar.
The AMES Type 7 was introduced in the GCI role particularly because its better aerial had longer range, more accurate height finding and also a gap filling capability. Earlier radars had gaps in their vertical coverage for rather complicated reasons, the maths of which I've struggled to understand for a considerable time  


Back to the Battle of Berlin. Whilst the campaign was a defeat for Bomber Command (whatever Harris later wrote) it never came close to destroying that organisation. The campaign was in two parts, from 20th August to 9th September 1943 and then from 16th November 1943 to the end of March 1944.

In this period 19 major raids went to Berlin, 10,813 sorties, 625 aircraft lost (5.8%)

At the same time 22 major raids went to other targets_ in Germany_, 14,045 sorties, 678 aircraft lost (4.8%)

Berlin was a bloody nose, but not quite the disaster some would have you believe.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jul 28, 2014)

So given that the Mosquito was the only fighter that could reliably catch up to the Ju88C intruder, how would continued intruder operations past 1941 have impacted BC's build up into 1942?


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## stona (Jul 28, 2014)

Not at all without a lot more suitable aircraft which were simply not available. How many Ju 88 Cs were in service between mid 1941 and mid 1942? I can't find a reliable number. I know I./NJG 2 operated a few against England during 1941.
Intruder operations, even by the RAF with a full array of more advanced electronic aids towards the end of the war, never amounted to more than a nuisance.

Also don't forget that had such a threat somehow emerged the British would have reacted to it. 

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jul 28, 2014)

stona said:


> Not at all without a lot more suitable aircraft which were simply not available. How many Ju 88 Cs were in service between mid 1941 and mid 1942? I can't find a reliable number. I know I./NJG 2 operated a few against England during 1941.
> Intruder operations, even by the RAF with a full array of more advanced electronic aids towards the end of the war, never amounted to more than a nuisance.
> 
> Also don't forget that had such a threat somehow emerged the British would have reacted to it.
> ...



Of course they would have reacted, but how long before that reaction becomes effective? AFAIK they were operating a Geschwader in October 1941 of Ju88Cs when the ops were cancelled, not sure thereafter. 960 were built before the Ju88G into online in late 1943, though IIRC the Ju88R, which was the Ju88C with BMW 801.
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Serienproduktion
About 164 Ju88Cs were built prior to the Ju88C6, though the first 40 were converted A-series versions and 60 of the Ju88C4s were converted. 60 Ju88C4s were built as heavy fighters. 4 C5s were built but were not successful, while 900 C6s were built starting in either late 1941 or early 1942 AFAIK. They ended production in late 1943 or early 1944 and switched to Ju88Gs.

According to "Warbird of the Third Reich" 57 were on hand for intruder operations in July 1941, not sure about October 1941 or thereafter; I know they were operating in Geschwader strength in the Mediterranean in 1942 and in April they got their first C6s. 760 C6s were built in 1943, the majority in the last 6 months.


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## BiffF15 (Jul 28, 2014)

stona said:


> The AMES Type 7 was introduced in the GCI role particularly because its better aerial had longer range, more accurate height finding and also a gap filling capability. Earlier radars had gaps in their vertical coverage for rather complicated reasons, the maths of which I've struggled to understand for a considerable time
> 
> steve



Steve,

Could the gap coverage be due to beam width gaps at longer ranges?

Cheers,
Biff


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## stona (Jul 28, 2014)

57 (assuming 100% serviceability) at a time when Bomber Command was still operating on a small scale compared with a year later.

On 92 nights between July and November 1941 Bomber Command flew a total of 11,991 sorties with a 3.5% loss rate. Could intruder operations with 20 or 30 (at best) operational aircraft have dented this?

Between May and August 1942, at the time of the so called 'thousand bomber raids', Bomber Command would fly a similar number of night time sorties, 11,139, in a mere 60 nights. Losses rose to 4.3%. 

I don't think there was anything a few tens of intruders, trying to cover airfields across the east of England, at night, could have done to prevent the build up. It didn't stop there either. By August to December 1944 Bomber Command was flying 43,189 sorties on 115 nights with a loss rate of 1.1%. That's an average of 530 sorties per 24 hours. I only quote these later figures to put the puny Luftwaffe effort into context.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jul 28, 2014)

You are ignoring the efforts against British training efforts that forced the RAF to move night training away from the East Coast. Does the loss rate you quote include accidents too? Apparently, just as later with the RAF intruder operations, there was a lot fear and anxiety during landings due to the intruder ops, so accident rates went up. So assuming the historical Geschwader strength of the intruders transferred to the Mediterranean (about ~120 aircraft) thats a doubling of the July 1941 numbers and historically they weren't operating in 1942 when there was double the fighters and more target rich evenings during the 1000 bomber raids, there would a significant chances to divert British resources into countering the intruders while inflicting heavier losses. Obviously its not going to shatter BC, but it would be a drain that would reduce effectiveness until the intruders can command greater resources starting in 1943. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Gisela#Intruder_history


> In 1941, the German night fighter intruders began achieving substantial successes. British ground defences, which had taken their toll on the German units in 1940, were now side-stepped by a decision to shift the area of operations to the North Sea, by the English coast. In June German night fighter units claimed 22 RAF aircraft; 18 over the sea. In 19 July British aircraft were claimed for four losses. By October 1941 British loss records list 54 aircraft of all types destroyed and a further 44 damaged in these operations to all causes. German losses amounted to 27 destroyed and 31 damaged to all causes.[20]
> 
> While the number of losses incurred against German night fighters was not significantly large the psychological damage was substantial. A high number of crashes owed much to nervous bomber pilots who did not feel safe over their own airfields and consequently landed too hard and fast or refused to go around a second time for fear of enemy intruders. Just as it appeared night intruder sorties were showing promise Adolf Hitler ordered a cessation of operations. For propaganda purposes, he thought that the morale of the German people would be better served by seeing British bombers destroyed and wrecked over German territory. Hitler was also recitent owing the fact there had been no noticeable reduction in British air raids and the RAF had not adopted these methods during The Blitz. This order came into effect on 12 October 1941.[21][22][23] Kammhuber would unsuccessfully lobby to have intruder operations reinstated and his efforts to expand the intruder force beyond a single unit were thwarted by a disinterested High Command[15] which was inundated with requests for reinforcements in other theatres.[24]


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## Glider (Jul 28, 2014)

I admit to not understanding why the Beaufighter isn't considered to have the performance to be a serious threat to the Ju88 c fighters when they had a clear advantage in daylight fighting over the Bay of Biscay. I would appreciate it if someone could expand on that theory, particularly as the Beau would have a better radar and be operating over home territory.

edit - the only performance figures I can find for the Ju88c6 are a max speed of 300 mph and a climb of about 1000 ft/min Any more information more than welcome as mine is very sketchy


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## wiking85 (Jul 28, 2014)

Glider said:


> I admit to not understanding why the Beaufighter isn't considered to have the performance to be a serious threat to the Ju88 c fighters when they had a clear advantage in daylight fighting over the Bay of Biscay. I would appreciate it if someone could expand on that theory, particularly as the Beau would have a better radar and be operating over home territory.
> 
> edit - the only performance figures I can find for the Ju88c6 are a max speed of 300 mph and a climb of about 1000 ft/min Any more information more than welcome as mine is very sketchy


The Ju88C had 300mph with the C4, while the C6 had 313mph:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Ju_88_C-6_.281942.E2.80.931944.29

The Beaufighter was around 1941-42 at 320mph in the night fighter version, so despite being somewhat faster at top speed at night the problems are magnified by being weighed down by radar gear and actually using it to spot the enemy aircraft; it isn't easy; even during daylight SE fighters had a hard time catching up to Mosquitos despite having a higher top speed. The NF has to have a speed significantly higher than the enemy aircraft so that it could close with it, but not be too fast to overshoot it.


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## stona (Jul 28, 2014)

The losses are all operational losses which would include accidents whilst on operations.

Bomber Command lost 104 aircraft operationally in June 1944 and there is no way I can match as many as 22 with intruders. Night fighters claimed 5 of the 14 lost on the Bremen raid of 27/28 June but that is not intruder operations.

I don't buy the psychological effect of intruders causing additional accidents at all. There are far too many other factors involved, principally the weather, to make such bold claims. I've not yet read a first hand account in which intruders were mentioned as a serious problem by a Bomber Command airman, though there may be one somewhere. 

Bomber Command lost 7,862 aircrew in non operational accidents (plus 244 missing) which would largely be during training. I'm unaware of any falling to intruders.

I've never read that intruder operations forced training to move. the initial training units were spread from Cornwall to Cumbria (you didn't fly here, these were effectively a 10 week selection course) and by 1941 potential pilots would find themselves on their way across the Atlantic for a 20 week (200 hour) flying training course. On returning to the UK a typical pilot in 1941/2 would find himself, and a crew, flying Wellingtons at an OTU for several months before ultimately transferring to an HCU for a four week conversion to the four engine heavies. From initial training/selection to flying a four engine bomber operationally could take 18 months.
These OTUs and HCUs were often away from the east of England which was thick with operational air fields. They were often in the Midlands and the North. The idea that a few intruders somehow inconvenienced, let alone interfered with, Bomber Command training is far fetched to be polite.

Cheers

Steve


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## Erich (Jul 28, 2014)

it's all a what-if isn't it not, LW and BCses and claims are not all confirmed stats are nonsense to me.............proven already had the NJG's been on board and I mean all of them they would of done much damge US bomber fields would of been chosen deeper into England the stats if you will were surprising in march of 45 when G-1 and G-6's attacked BC fields even though BC sources knew the raids were eminent. back to 41 with only NJg2 the first gruppen involed the success's were staggering for just one small gruppe, had they been enlarged, well whom knows. waiting till 44-45 was fatal for the LW they ahd the means they were not wiped away like many think during that time period, but as noted pin pricks don't work


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## wiking85 (Jul 28, 2014)

Erich were the effects of the intruder missions confirmed? I mean both in terms of increased accidents and actual RAF losses.


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## stona (Jul 28, 2014)

Erich said:


> back to 41 with only NJg2 the first gruppen involed the success's were staggering for just one small gruppe, had they been enlarged, well whom knows.



How were they staggering? Most Bomber Command narratives don't even mention them. I've struggled to find a reference in the official history but need more time. 

The claim for the psychological effect on Bomber Command, repeated on Wikipedia and elsewhere, originates with Theo Boiten. He suggests this was caused by 'I./NJG 2's continuous presence over England' but that is not exactly the case and he offers no other evidence to support his contention.
As for suspending night time training in some areas, this also originates with Boiten and I haven't checked it, so what? There were plenty of other places to do it and by the time a crew was at an OTU they might take part in some 'real' operations, albeit mining or leafleting.

I cannot tally the Luftwaffe claims given in this thread (I don't know the source) with Bomber Command losses for the months in mid 1941 that I've looked at. The three areas covered by I./NJG 2 covered East Anglia, Yorkshire and the Midlands. The heavy losses inflicted on the 'Fernnachtjagd' forced them to operate out over the North Sea rather than over England from June 1941. Between January and October 1941 I./NJG 2 _CLAIMED_ 125 RAF aircraft for the loss of 55 of their own. The claims are definitely optimistic, as evidenced for claims submitted for aircraft that we know in fact survived. The losses are those the Luftwaffe admitted itself.

One of the reasons given for the suspension of operations by the 'Fernnachjagd' in October 1941 was that there had been no noticeable decline in Bomber Command raids on Germany.

The title of the thread was 'Defeating Bomber Command'. This was definitely not the way to do it. It made no difference at all to operations over Europe such as they were in 1941.

'Staggering', I think not.

Cheers

Steve


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## Erich (Jul 28, 2014)

yes staggering for the I./NJG 2 gruppe - the amount of claims/kills for an inturder unit the only one at the time. Boiten has other info like myself that will be included in his NF volumes 5 to be exact or at least what he told me. as per claim kill totals nothing will be seen as definitive for both sides this is part of much lost information. no I./NJg 2 was pulled from ops not due at all from not enough damge but because of a fools order to send them to the Med, this from Heinz Rökker and several other pilots/crews in I. gruppe.


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## wiking85 (Jul 28, 2014)

Stona, so the answer perhaps had to do with other means, perhaps not ordering the Me210 in 1939 phasing out the Bf110 in 1941? Would uninterrupted Bf110 production from 1941-43 have provided the Nachtjäger enough means to hurt BC enough? IIRC starting from 1940 output of Bf110s was about 1000 units, which dropped to ~560 in 1941, ~500 in 1942, and ~650 in 1943. So assuming no other production resources add in and natural increases in output due to experience gained and rationalized production methods on the older airframe, even with upgrades, we could well see 1200 in 1941, 1400 in 1942, and depending on the status of the Me410 some 800-1600 in 1943. That's at least about 1500 extra Bf110s, most of which would end up with the night fighters, starting with the extra 600 or so in 1941, 900 in 1942, and 150-950 in 1943.


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## stona (Jul 28, 2014)

I just wanted to put the 125 (January to October 1941) _claims_ (these are _definitely not _all losses) by I./NJG 2 into perspective. In January 1941 alone, in the worst of winter weather, Bomber Command managed just shy of 1,000 sorties. Over the ten month period in question it managed many thousands though I can't be arsed to go through the records and add them all up 

The 'Fernnachtjagd' was simply ineffective at interfering with Bomber Command's campaign, even the limited efforts of 1941.

I believe the comment about a lack of results being one of the reasons for the suspension of the campaign is attributed to Hitler by Kammhuber himself.

Cheers

Steve

Edit: From January to November 1941 Bomber Command flew about 25,000 night time sorties and I./NJG 2 claimed 125.They probably destroyed less than half that number.


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## stona (Jul 28, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Stona, so the answer perhaps had to do with other means, perhaps not ordering the Me210 in 1939 phasing out the Bf110 in 1941? Would uninterrupted Bf110 production from 1941-43 have provided the Nachtjäger enough means to hurt BC enough? IIRC starting from 1940 output of Bf110s was about 1000 units, which dropped to ~560 in 1941, ~500 in 1942, and ~650 in 1943. So assuming no other production resources add in and natural increases in output due to experience gained and rationalized production methods on the older airframe, even with upgrades, we could well see 1200 in 1941, 1400 in 1942, and depending on the status of the Me410 some 800-1600 in 1943. That's at least about 1500 extra Bf110s, most of which would end up with the night fighters, starting with the extra 600 or so in 1941, 900 in 1942, and 150-950 in 1943.



It's really a question of where you apply your limited resources. The Luftwaffe generally was spread too widely and too thinly, particularly after the start of the Russian campaign(s). Should a greater emphasis have been put on the night fighter, including intruders, as a means of countering Bomber Command's night time offensive? Yes, but where would the resources be drawn from?

The night fighter arm was never really defeated it was simply overwhelmed and eventually nullified by British technological advances so that by mid 1944 they were much less effective. Fritz Habicht of 3./NJG 1 summed it up nicely:

_"Our adversary jammed our radio communications to a considerable degree and had effectively rendered our SN-2 AI radar useless. The bombers on the other hand could detect us with their warning devices and fiercely defended themselves with their ten to twelve machine guns, and unfortunately frequently with success. The British long range night fighters, the Mosquitos, were faster than we were and tracked us with AI radar with an effective range of 16 Km and were equipped with IFF. Thus we, the successful hunters, had been turned into the hunted." _

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Jul 28, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> The Ju88C had 300mph with the C4, while the C6 had 313mph:
> https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Ju_88_C-6_.281942.E2.80.931944.29
> 
> The Beaufighter was around 1941-42 at 320mph in the night fighter version, so despite being somewhat faster at top speed at night the problems are magnified by being weighed down by radar gear and actually using it to spot the enemy aircraft; it isn't easy; even during daylight SE fighters had a hard time catching up to Mosquitos despite having a higher top speed. The NF has to have a speed significantly higher than the enemy aircraft so that it could close with it, but not be too fast to overshoot it.



So we have the Beaufighter faster than the Ju88 and with a much better climb. The target Ju88 will be operating at cruising speeds which I am guessing would be approx. 260mph and the Beau when on an intercepts will be able to go at 320 until it got close which as you rightly point out will be more than sufficient, as closing too fast was a real problem in NF. I don't know the impact on the Ju88 performance carrying the radar but it might have been significant with those large aerials. Whatever it's faults the installation on the Beaus was very tidy in comparison. So in brief I feel that the beau had more than sufficient an advantage to combat the Ju88C.

Interestingly I believe that German intruder raids would have had a significant impact beyond any losses incurred. Just flying around making airfields shut down their lights, letting the RAF know that the Luftwaffe were around would have had an impact of morale.


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## wiking85 (Jul 28, 2014)

Glider said:


> So we have the Beaufighter faster than the Ju88 and with a much better climb. The target Ju88 will be operating at cruising speeds which I am guessing would be approx. 260mph and the Beau when on an intercepts will be able to go at 320 until it got close which as you rightly point out will be more than sufficient, as closing too fast was a real problem in NF. I don't know the impact on the Ju88 performance carrying the radar but it might have been significant with those large aerials. Whatever it's faults the installation on the Beaus was very tidy in comparison. So in brief I feel that the beau had more than sufficient an advantage to combat the Ju88C.


How long could radial air cooled engines (less fuel efficient than inline liquid cooled engines like the Jumo 211) stay at top speed and how much fuel would it burn when operating well over economical cruise speed? German engines could manage between 5-30 minutes at top speed, not sure about the Beau's engines.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 28, 2014)

Fuel efficiency has got nothing to do with how long an aircraft engine could run at full/military/combat power. 

It _might_ have something to do with how long it could run at max continuous power (which is a name that is not quite accurate itself. Max continuous was often for only 30-60 minutes) but that rather depends on when in the flight the engines are pushed. 

The JU 88 bomber was rather notoriously short ranged and required bomb bay tanks and external bomb stowage do get decent range. Of course external bomb stowage does nothing for speed. 

When used as a "fighter" or intruder you have several things affecting performance of the Ju 88. One is the drag of the radar equipment which is not usually counted in the specifications on some websites ( not to mention that the the first radar equipped JU 88 _may not_ have flown until late 1942). The other is the performance numbers are often given for a plane carrying 369 imp gallons of fuel (wing tanks) and not carrying the bomb bay tanks. One source (Green so?) says the fighter Bombay tanks were 105 IMP gal and 230 IMP gal which is different than the A-4 bomber tanks( smaller). 

Ju 88 performance is going to be all over the place. If they are running light for speed they don't have enough fuel to cruise at high speeds (at least for long) and may not have the range/endurance needed to find some of the bomber fields. Night missions seldom went straight to and from the targets; If the Ju 88s are carrying extra fuel ( and they probably don't need both bomb bay tanks) then they may not have the speed/climb some sources credit them with. 

The Beaufighter was supposed to carry 550 imp gallons in the wings. It is operating over home territory unless pursuing over the channel. The Chances of A JU 88 running one out of fuel depend on _when_ in each aircraft's flight the encounter takes place and that has little to do with the actual capacity of the aircraft. A Beaufighter that is several hours into a "patrol" may be run out of fuel much easier than one that is only 30 min into it's patrol. 

BTW the Hercules was supposed to be fairly fuel efficient, one of the claims of the sleeve valve. Wither it was or not I don't know.


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## wiking85 (Jul 28, 2014)

The Ju88C did not use radar for intruder operations. It used the internal bomb bays for fuel and were a cleaner airframe due to no ventral gondola and an improved nose layout. Ordnance was carried externally. By the time they are over Britain they will be at altitude and speed, which the Beaufighters have to climb to altitude and loiter while searching at multiple altitudes and in all directions looking for the intruders.


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## nuuumannn (Jul 28, 2014)

Another issue worth considering that the Lw faced with regards to intruder raids was that they had little ability to quantify their results. fresh photographic recon was largely denied to the Germans post Battle of Britain - with exceptions of course, so how the LW expected to assess what damage the intruders had done makes the case for defeating Bomber Command weak. In Lincolnshire, where BC had the majority of its front line bases, there are airfields every mile or so, so many of them that it would be extremely dificult to assess precisely which airfield had been hit by intruders and how much damage had been done without post raid photographic recon. It's not as simple as gathering together a whole lot of night capable intruders and sending them across to attack airfields.


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## Glider (Jul 29, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> How long could radial air cooled engines (less fuel efficient than inline liquid cooled engines like the Jumo 211) stay at top speed and how much fuel would it burn when operating well over economical cruise speed? German engines could manage between 5-30 minutes at top speed, not sure about the Beau's engines.



Tearing around trhe sky at max speed isn't a viable option, endurance would be hit and unless you think 30 mins is good enough for the mission (it isn't) the fact still remains, the Beaufighter had sufficient performance to better the Ju88. In case you think the weight of the radar on the beau would slow it down the Beau *carrying a torpedo still went faster and climbed better than a Ju88c. *


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2014)

To exploit the advantages of speed, the Ju88, or any other aircraft needed to be able to detect enemies or targets. aircraft at night dont just zip around the sky at full tilt. They need some cue to tell them when to open the throttles and go for it. They could rely on visual target acquisition, and was probably the main method pre-1941. it was the method used for night interceptions dating all the way back to 1917, but visual interceptions need assistance usually, in the form, most often of searchlights, starshell or similar. Later, variuous gizmos were available to assist in blind interceptions. the allies developed AI radar to a very high degree, whilst the germans tended to concentrate on passive detection systems....things that homed in on enemy radars.

But regardless of what target acquisition method was used, it wasnt the speedor the manouverability of the aircraft that dictated success in night air combat. it was the ability to acquire and hold the target. Interceptions at night were not the diving, swooping, high speed jinking affairs that characterised daylight operations. generally, aircraft flew no faster than bomber speeds, and tried very hard to keep the target on a constant bearing and that meant flying straight and level at a slower, measured speed.

For the intruders over Britain, where the targets were rich in number, the Germans enjoyed some measure of success, but they suffered heavy losses because the british defences were strong. a Beafighter, or indeed a Defiant was more than enough to deal with a Ju88C because the Ju88 was too busy emulationg the bombers it was trrying to catch, and that meant flying slowly.

Mosquitoes suffered far less from these constraints than just about any other aircraft with the possible exception of the later marks of Ju88 NFs. it was fast, with high accelaration, great manouverability, devastating firepower, and exceptionally high sustained cruising speed. It was fitted with very good airborne interception radars, that after June 1944, when finally released for use over the continent, enabled them to fly rings around all their opposition. The advantages of the radar equipped mossies is just one of those untold, unappreciated stories. Numbering never more than 150 fighters in BC, and mostly a lot less, in 1944 they managed to claim over 600 German aircraft, and I belioeve most of these were real losses. These aircraft really could use boom and zoom tactics, unlike this fantasy argument, and really did scare the bejeezuz out of the opposing german night fighters . it took the British just over four years to achieve that happy state of affairs, but here we are arguing that the germans, being the superhuman masterrace that they are so often claimed to be, could do it with inferior aircraft, using no radar, or inferior radar 4 years before the british could


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## wiking85 (Jul 29, 2014)

Glider said:


> Tearing around trhe sky at max speed isn't a viable option, endurance would be hit and unless you think 30 mins is good enough for the mission (it isn't) the fact still remains, the Beaufighter had sufficient performance to better the Ju88. In case you think the weight of the radar on the beau would slow it down the Beau *carrying a torpedo still went faster and climbed better than a Ju88c. *


Which mark of the Beaufighter, the 1944 version or the 1942 one? Which version of the Hercules engine, or the early Merlin engined Beau?


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## stona (Jul 29, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Beaufighters have to climb to altitude and loiter while searching at multiple altitudes and in all directions looking for the intruders.



No they didn't. That's the whole point of a coordinated GCI and AI radar system. The British night fighters could be vectored to a target by the GCI radar controller, only making the final approach to visual range over the last two miles or so using their AI radar. They didn't need to loiter and they didn't search for intruders at all heights and in all directions, that was done by the GCI radars, each of which could now track several targets.
What sort of altitude would the attacks on assembling or landing aircraft be made? It seems that attacks were made on aircraft 'in the circuit'. It seems unlikely that the Beaufighters would need to get up to a great altitude to find the intruders and they would receive the altitude of their target from the GCI radar controller.

The intruders proved very vulnerable to interception. It was losses over the winter of 40/41 that forced them to suspend the first and last of their three phase operation (attacking aircraft as they took off and returned) and concentrate on the middle phase (interception over the North Sea). 
In June 1941 I./NJG 2 made 20 interceptions, 18 of them over the sea. To put those twenty interceptions (not claims and certainly not losses) in perspective, in June 1941 Bomber Command flew nearly 4,000 sorties. 
Over land non-radar equipped intruders might find bombers assembling or returning with navigation lights on circling over illuminated airfields making a relatively easy target. Not so over the sea.

Cheers

Steve


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## mhuxt (Jul 29, 2014)

Good info on German intruders in "Intruders Over Britain" by Simon Parry.


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2014)

> The Ju88C did not use radar for intruder operations.



I know, and irrelevant to the issue. Visual or blind, target acquisition at night does not require a fast moving or jinking aircraft. Quite the opposite. It requires a slow moving target operating at normal to low altitudes, flying a straight line searching the sky methoddically.

Intruder operations are notoriously dangerous operations. You need an exceptionally well equipped and high performance aircraft with the very latest detection systems to be any good at it, and no-one except the british possesed that capability until 1944, in the form of the Mosquito. ther is one other element, equally as important as the technology. you need the people with the experience and temperament to undertake these operations. Necessarily this kept the numbers available low for both sides, and rendered intruder ops essentially of nuisance value only until the very end of the war. 

. 


> It used the internal bomb bays for fuel and were a cleaner airframe due to no ventral gondola and an improved nose layout. Ordnance was carried externally. By the time they are over Britain they will be at altitude and speed, which the Beaufighters have to climb to altitude and loiter while searching at multiple altitudes and in all directions looking for the intruders.



This is good for the fairytale or wet dream value and nothing else really. Germany did not mount anything comparable to this until 1942 when a handful of Ju88s were employed in that very role. They had some sucess, with certain exceptionally brave and audacious Night fighter pilots following the bomber streams home and tearing into them as they came in to land basically, but theeir own losses were very heavy as well, when expressed as a proportion of the force structure. as an example three Ju88s operating in the very capacity you describe (albeit carrying bombs) on the 8th March were caught by 5 beafighters in the new night Ranger Patrols (there was no difficulty for British radar to determoine both bearing and height....the difficulty was that once within 3.5 miles of the target the Beaus needed to rely on visual target acquisition, and this often caused them difficulty). On this night, 3 Ju88s were sent, and three were lost. The next night the first German aircraft was lost to a mosquito, again being a Ju88 off Manston. The aircraft was flown by Pilot Officer Arbos of 85 Sqn 

Further Intruder operations by the germans were not attempted again until 26th March when a lone Do217 was intercepted and shot down by Hurricanes operating over Einhoven and gilze Rijn. soi confident and skilled were the british fighters by this time they were operating over enemy territory as well, taking the "Intruder " concept to the absurdity that it was. ABeafighter operating in the same role and in the same general area, was lost when it crashed near Morpeth. On the 6th April another Ju88 intruder was intercepted and shot down by a Beafighter in the Thames estuary. A hurricane also operating in this area was damaged on landing

There are no gaps or successes in this period for the Germans. every intruder they sent out was intercepted and either shot down or damaged. no exceptions. Later the Germans got a bit wiser and adopted tactics that made them more successful, but this took time for them to learn the right techniques. 


Given also that the British relied on single seat fighters for point defence, similar to the German wild sau ops, and had access to the Spitfire VII very high altitude fighter at this time, ther is absolutely no hope of them being able to get any altitude advantage on a regular basis


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## stona (Jul 29, 2014)

Determining height with radar based on Chain Home was a tricky business. Without going mad with science it depended on comparing signals received by different elements of the receiver at different heights above the ground. It could be done and very accurately by experienced operators. Unlike during the BoB such people were becoming available in numbers by 1941.

British AI Mk III and IV radars showed a target on two CRTs. One for elevation and one for azimuth (left/right). Both showed range (unlike later German systems). It was this that was used in the last 2-3 miles of an interception leading up to a visual attack.
The need for the pilot to control the final stages of an approach, not relying on a commentary from his operator, led to the introduction of a further CRT known as the pilot's indicator, on the AI Mk V system. The pilot could refer directly to this display, a distant ancestor of the modern HUD.

I say again, whereas the night fighter was at the sharp end of the system it did not need stellar performance. It just had to be able to catch the target. It was the system of control and the radars that provided the information for that control which were the most important elements in the coordinated system.

With the help of the GCI chain and improvements in the delivery of Beaufighters and AI radar sets, the number of enemy aircraft destroyed rose during the late winter and spring of 1941. Three were destroyed in January, four in February, twenty-two in March, forty-eight in April and ninety-six in May. Not all these losses were down to radar equipped night fighters. It was these mounting losses which forced I./NJG 2 out over the North Sea and away from mainland Britain. I would suggest that the Luftwaffe's first intruder campaign was far from 'staggering'. It was in fact defeated before it really got going.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jul 29, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> The Ju88C did not use radar for intruder operations. It used the internal bomb bays for fuel and were a cleaner airframe due to no ventral gondola and an improved nose layout. Ordnance was carried externally. By the time they are over Britain they will be at altitude and speed, which the Beaufighters have to climb to altitude and loiter while searching at multiple altitudes and in all directions looking for the intruders.



I seemed to be a bit confused as to what method/s of intruder attack the Germans are supposed to be using. 

Following the bombers 'home' and shooting them down as they land with illumination from lit airfields and or landing lights? 

Precision bombing from medium-high altitude and high speed? at night? 







Most JU 88c _did_ retain the ventral gondola, although in modified form. And you can't have it both ways, you either carry bombs inside and have high performance or you carry them outside and accept the performance loss, at least on the run into the target. 

" By the time they are over Britain they will be at altitude and speed" Goes back to just what kind of attack are you planning? the returning British bombers are _NOT_ at altitude and speed having started descending before reaching the British coast. If you are engaging with guns you have descend to where the targets are. 

Beaufighters had an endurance (range) roughly 3 1/2 times that of a Spitfire or Hurricane without drop tanks. While standing patrols with Spitfires or Hurricanes made little sense (incoming raid isn't plotted until the standing patrol had used up 1/2 of it's 80-90 gallons of fuel?) the question changes somewhat with the much longer endurance (and slower climbing) Beaufighter. And has been mentioned, the Beaufighters are _not_ doing the searching. They are simply in position to respond quickly to to directions from ground controllers.


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## stona (Jul 29, 2014)

The plan was to attack the bombers taking off, intercept them on their way to and from the continent and attack them again when they were landing. They were to carry bombs to drop on the RAF airfields. Several fields were in fact bombed and strafed. 
The plan was VERY optimistic, given that between August 1940 and October 1941 there were rarely more than 20 aircraft available as intruders. There were never more than 30 serviceable aircraft for I./NJG 2 at Gilze-Rijen.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Jul 29, 2014)

stona said:


> With the help of the GCI chain and improvements in the delivery of Beaufighters and AI radar sets, the number of enemy aircraft destroyed rose during the late winter and spring of 1941. Three were destroyed in January, four in February, twenty-two in March, forty-eight in April and ninety-six in May. Not all these losses were down to radar equipped night fighters. It was these mounting losses which forced I./NJG 2 out over the North Sea and away from mainland Britain. I would suggest that the Luftwaffe's first intruder campaign was far from 'staggering'. It was in fact defeated before it really got going.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


Where are your loss numbers coming from, they are much higher than I've seen for the Blitz in 1941.


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## stona (Jul 29, 2014)

Ian White's Short History of Air Intercept Radar and the British Night-Fighter. There are varying totals published. Price gives the figures for those last three months as 27, 45, 67. The important point is that as the GCI radar controlled night fighters with their Mk III or IV AI radars came online Luftwaffe losses by night rose dramatically. We can argue about the relative merit of various sources but the trend is undeniable.
Again, in neither set of numbers are all those Luftwaffe losses due to radar equipped night fighters.

This is a dead end. The Luftwaffe never had the means to defeat or even do more than cause a minor nuisance to Bomber Command with intruder operations in 1940/41. 

Later some commanders had grandiose plans, involving hundreds of intruders, for delivering hammer blows to Bomber Command by this method. It all amounted to so much hot air. Operation 'Gisela' was the closest they came. Here is not the place to discuss that operation, suffice to say that 142 Ju 88 Gs were committed. They did intercept two separate forces comprising a total of over 450 bombers and managed to shoot down 24 allied aircraft (13 Halifaxes, 9 Lancasters, 1 B-17 and 1 Mosquito) . For this meagre haul they lost, to all causes, 33 of their Ju 88s. Not quite the hammer blow the Luftwaffe was hoping for.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jul 29, 2014)

stona said:


> Ian White's Short History of Air Intercept Radar and the British Night-Fighter. There are varying totals published. Price gives the figures for those last three months as 27, 45, 67. The important point is that as the GCI radar controlled night fighters with their Mk III or IV AI radars came online Luftwaffe losses by night rose dramatically. We can argue about the relative merit of various sources but the trend is undeniable.
> Again, in neither set of numbers are all those Luftwaffe losses due to radar equipped night fighters.
> 
> This is a dead end. The Luftwaffe never had the means to defeat or even do more than cause a minor nuisance to Bomber Command with intruder operations in 1940/41.
> ...


So then what about my other idea of never taking the Bf110 out of production and maximizing output of those from 1941-44, so that there are well over a thousand extra for night defense during the period of 1941-44?


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## Shortround6 (Jul 29, 2014)

Those numbers are mentioned in the book "Nightfighters" by Bill Gunston but I have no idea where he got them from. 

I would note that Gunston writes that the 96 victories in May ( and they be just claims and not confirmed losses) were in the first two weeks alone. One pilot claimed two victories in one night twice and a total of seven aerial victories, one probable and one damaged between 13 March and 9 July 1941. It took a while for things to come together (and better weather/shorter nights helped) but the Germans were not going to be able to operate over England in the summer/fall/winter of 1941 like they did in the fall/winter of 1940. 

The Night Blitz also used a large number of He 111s. 

There is no real reason why the JU 88 fighter could not have been built in larger numbers sooner (trading them against bombers?) but in early 1941 you are going to be dealing with early Ju 88C-2 aircraft with Jumo 211B-1 engines. Speed is given as 295mph at 18,050ft and range as 1130 miles at max continuous _cruise_ using a forward bomb bay tank. (internal load 10 50kg bombs in rear bay?) The C-2 also had a single 20mm cannon and three 7.9mm mgs out the front. the three 20mm armament had to wait for the C-4 version. I would note that _max continuous cruise_ is *not* the same as the climb rating. 
A Jumo 211F was good for 1340hp/PS for take-off at 2600rpm/1.4ata (many old sources don't make the distinction between HP and PS), climb (30 minutes?) 1120HP/PS at sea level and 1060hp at 17,000ft at 2400rpm/1.25ata and a max continuous cruise of 910HP/PS at sea level and 920HP/PS at 19,500ft at 2250rpm/1.15ata.
The older Jumo 211B engine was good for max continuous cruise 800HP/PS at 14,700ft at 2100rpm/1.1ata. The Jumo 211J was good for max continuous cruise 1000HP/PS at 16,700ft. 

The C-4 was based off the A-4 with the bigger wing and heavier landing gear but doesn't _start_ to show up until the autumn of 1941 with Jumo 211F engines and the spring of 1942 sees the Jumo 211 J engines installed and the _start_ of C-6 production.


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## stona (Jul 29, 2014)

The problem was always a lack of resources. I./NJG 2 were sent off to the MTO at the end of 1941, just as many other units were withdrawn for operations in the east following the launch of Barbarossa in June (41).

Bomber Command, in fact Britain, was not a priority for the Germans. It is well known how ineffective Bomber Command operations were at this time, why would the Germans devote resources that were sorely needed elsewhere to countering it?

The war against Britain was being pursued elsewhere and by other means, not least in the Atlantic Ocean.

Cheers

Steve

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## Erich (Jul 29, 2014)

well Steve you have agreed with me as to why the intruder ops stopped the movement of the only NF unit completing the task and sent to the Med. Gislea in fact was one of several intruder raids in 45 there were also at least 1-2 in 1944. gislea consumed the men flying they loitered too much over England many getting lost and ran out of fuels and crashed MIA for some, as pointed out in old materials like Parry's work and even Boitens 2nd volume getting revised as we speak. you mention lack of resources and of course this is bonafide truth nothing can get around this re for my communique' of all the ANJg's should of been involved in this type of mission, but much of what we speak is a total what-if.


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## stona (Jul 29, 2014)

These were piecemeal attacks like the long pursuit operations of 1943 and the occasional intruder effort later, but rarely by more than twenty aircraft. 

Schmid was quite keen on intruder operations when he replaced Kammhuber but not as a prolonged campaign. He never really got the support for his idea of mounting a few big attacks. These operations always smack of desperation to me, a bit like 'Bodenplatte' by the day fighters. 'Gisela' was intended to be such an operation, a surprise attack involving hundreds of aircraft, until Pelz got involved. There was a reason why a surprise attack was preferred and that reason was the strength of the RAF's defences.

Cheers

Steve


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## Erich (Jul 29, 2014)

Gisela was known as a fact by British sources it was just the date was not known, really a bad plan many pilots had not a clue where they were going even with directional maps in the Bordfünkers hands as H. Rökker and several others that flew on this mission told me, maybe just too late in the war. Peltz and I will say it was a dumb ass


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## stona (Jul 29, 2014)

Erich said:


> Peltz and I will say it was a dumb ass



He certainly messed up 'Gisela'.

I should have said that Schmid preferred a few 'surprise' attacks rather than a long campaign because of the PERCEIVED strength of the RAF's night defences. In fact, by the period in question, these had to a large extent been wound down. The Luftwaffe's intelligence was as poor as ever.

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Jul 29, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Which mark of the Beaufighter, the 1944 version or the 1942 one? Which version of the Hercules engine, or the early Merlin engined Beau?


I am so tempted to say the one that carried a torpedo. The TFX engine Hercules XVII which developed 1,725hp. The major version of the Hercules was the VI which developed 1,650hp As for the performance difference speed at 3,500 ft was the same with both engines but below that the XVII gave an extra 9mph
Max speed carrying the torpedo was 308mph, max climb carrying the torpedo 1,460 ft/min


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## Koopernic (Aug 11, 2014)

Glider said:


> I am so tempted to say the one that carried a torpedo. The TFX engine Hercules XVII which developed 1,725hp. The major version of the Hercules was the VI which developed 1,650hp As for the performance difference speed at 3,500 ft was the same with both engines but below that the XVII gave an extra 9mph
> Max speed carrying the torpedo was 308mph, max climb carrying the torpedo 1,460 ft/min



AFAIKT the production Hercules was only ever a single stage single speed engine. The Junkers Jumo 211 had a two speed supercharger from the 1200hp Jumo 211B version onwards. The result was that the Beaufighter was a beast of low altitude where it had quite stunning performance, hardly any slower than single engine fighters up to the end of 1943 but rather unremarkable at higher altitudes. Improvements with the 1350hp Jumo 211F was a more heavily pressurised cooling circuit that prevented boil of a the low pressures of high altitude and with the 1420hp Jumo 211J came an intercooler.

The Ju 88A4 with the Jumo 211J engine with dive brakes removed, with bomb external shackles removed was 317mph. There were two rather large bomb bays adjacent to each other where the wing was, however it must have been subdivided because of the wing spar or structural reasons. The forward bomb bay could carry 18 x 50kg/110lbs bombs while the rear bay could carry 10 x 50kg/110lbs: that's 1400kg or 3100lbs, not too shabby. In this configuration range was just over 1100 miles at max cruise. Two shackles could be added under each wing a 500kg/1100lbs one and a 1000kg/2200lb unit. A 900L (200 Imp gallon) tank could be carried under each wing. The ventral bondola, apart from providing for a pair of machine guns, egress/ingress also had a window on the front for the Lotfe 7 bomb sight. If the bombsight was not required a single 20mm canon could be fitted there. In the event of emergency exit requirements or in event of an engine failure the bondola could be jettisoned.

I would suggest that the Ju 88C4/C5/C6 would have had the same speed as the Ju 88A4; 317mph. I would say 3000lbs of bombs and single bomb rack fitted to carry a single 900L drop tank would make the Ju 88A4/C4/C6 difficult to catch by the Beaufighter depending on altitude. The Hercules engine was more powerful and the beaufighter smaller but the Jumo 211 had less drag and a better/equal altitude performance.

The problem with this configuration is perhaps that 28 x 50kg bombs is a good bomb load the bombs are a little small for causing serious damage to heavy items such as machine tools, bridges it will destroy most single story buildings and factory wharehouses. 

The max cruising speed of the Ju 88A1 with only 1200hp from the Jumo 211B with 4 x 250kg (1000kg or 2200lbs bombs) carried externally at maximum sustained cruise was around 385kph(238mph).
Beim-Zeugmeister: Page 6 - Ju 88 A-1, set-up state B, loading case 5

Wikipedia gives the Ju 88A4 as capable of maximum speed of 271mph with 4 x 500kg (4400lbs) carried externally, probably with dive brakes. The speed of the Ju 88 carrying bombs externally was no less than that of other contemporary aircraft with bomb bays: obviously installing a bomb bay thickens the fuselage and slows the aircraft down. Ju 88 was also one of the few aircraft able to carry two torpedos.

The flaw in the Ju 88 seems to be the subdivision of the bomb bay which because they were next to each other might have formed a rather large contagious unit, more or less the length of the wing root chord. I don't know what the designers were thinking: I would say the requirements for dive bombing forced this upon them.


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## Greyman (Aug 12, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> Wikipedia gives the Ju 88A4 as capable of maximum speed of 271mph with 4 x 500kg (4400lbs) carried externally, probably with dive brakes. The speed of the Ju 88 carrying bombs externally was no less than that of other contemporary aircraft with bomb bays: obviously installing a bomb bay thickens the fuselage and slows the aircraft down.



Wikipedia seems very optimistic in this case. According to what I have the Ju 88 with external bombs was about 255 mph at about 17,000 feet.

A Blenheim IV and DB7/Boston are faster - the DB7 by a huge margin.

I don't have real tests on the types but the LeO 451 and Tupolev SB certainly appear faster as well.

With 4 x 500 kg external bombs the Ju88's speed is actually more in the region of a Fairey Battle (without external), Hampden (without external) and Wellington II.


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## wuzak (Aug 12, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> AFAIKT the production Hercules was only ever a single stage single speed engine.



Some had 2 speed engines.

Check Table II: FTH MS 4,600ft, FS 12,100ft for climbing
and Table IV: FTH MS 8,500ft, FS 15,600ft all out level speed.

http://spitfireperformance.com/beaufighter/x7542speed.gif


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## Koopernic (Aug 12, 2014)

Greyman said:


> Wikipedia seems very optimistic in this case. According to what I have the Ju 88 with external bombs was about 255 mph at about 17,000 feet.
> 
> A Blenheim IV and DB7/Boston are faster - the DB7 by a huge margin.
> 
> ...




Which Ju 88?
Ju 88A1 with 1200lb Jumo 211B
Ju 88A5 with enlarged wings and 1200hp Jumo 211B
Ju 88A4 with enlarged wings and 1350hp Jumo 211F 1941
Ju 88A4 with enlarged wings and 1420hp intercooled Jumo 211J early 1942
with or without dive brakes fitted? It's a complicated area.

The time period we so far have been focused on is about is 41/42.

The speed given is actually 269mph, probably with 4 x 500kg bombs, possibly they were SD (armour piercing) rather than SC (light case)

Early 1943 period Ju 188 started to appear with the BMW 801 engine and a new fuselage with a more flexible bomb arrangment. The Ju 88S and G received the new engines and enlarged tail and wings but retained the slimmer fuselage. The Ju 88R fighter was basically a Ju 88C but with the more powerful BMW 801 engine, it was in limited supply due to the BMW 801's value to the Fw 190 program. 1942 also sees the Dornier Do 217 which had a rather large and sensible bomb bay. A direct application of the BMW 801 to the Ju 88A4 bomber does not seem to have been done though it was possible given the Ju 88C to Ju 88R transformation for the fighters.

Of course the Ju 88's trick was dive and slide bombing and carrying a pair of torpedos, most other light bombers could do non of these as well and certainly not with an internal bomb bay. The A-20 Boston itself went through engine upgrades starting out with R-1830.

The point I suppose I am making is that were the Luftwaffe content with attacking with only 28 x 50kg/110lbs of bombs (3100lbs) in its internal bomb bay then the Ju 88C might have been rather hard to intercept given the performance of the Beaufighter night fighter at that time.

One factor which turned out to be rather important was the amount of armour carried and the Ju 88 was fairly well protected, Even the gunners glass was bullet resistant, otherwise the Blenheim and battle would have continued service throughout the war.

Progression of the type:
Ju 188E 310mph
Ju 188A 322mph
Ju 88G1 344mph with gun pack
Ju 88S1 388mph with GM-1, Ju 88S2 with turbocharged BMW 801TQ, probably about same speed but no need for GM-1.
Ju 88G6 about 365 with Jumo 213A engine
Ju 88G7 about 400mph with Jumo 213E (two stage intercooled)
Ju 388L about 388mph with BMW801TQ service ceiling 44000ft. Large bomb bay.
Ju 388L3 with Jumo 222E/F about 444 mph. Large bomb bay.


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## Koopernic (Aug 12, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Some had 2 speed engines.
> 
> Check Table II: FTH MS 4,600ft, FS 12,100ft for climbing
> and Table IV: FTH MS 8,500ft, FS 15,600ft all out level speed.
> ...



Serves me right for using Wikipedia. What date did these enter service, it seems 1942? According to Wikipedia the Hercules was effectively what in US parlance was an R-2400 while the BMW 801 would have been an R-2600. Somewhat surprisingly the Hercules has an larger overall diameter despite its smaller swept volume and not requiring rockers and rocker covers due to the sleave valve. This is probably an indication of how much BMW squeezed in to that engine and why they used forced cooling and why the Hercules was unattractive as a single seat fighter engine despite its power. Nevertheless in its niche of powering the beufighter and giving that aircraft good low to medium altitude performance while carrying a great deal of load justified this engine.


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## wuzak (Aug 12, 2014)

Wiki's Hercules page is a bit short on info, particularly variants.


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## wuzak (Aug 12, 2014)

Hercules I, 1936, single speed, single stage
Hercules II, 1938, single speed, single stage
- Beaufighter I
Hercules III, 1939, two speed, single stage
- Beaufighter I
Hercules IV, 1939, single speed, single stage
Hercules V, 1939, single speed, single stage - civil version of IV, not developed
Hercules VI, 1941, two speed, single stage
- Beaufighter I, VIC, VIF, TFX
Hercules VII - similar to VI, but cancelled
Hercules VIII, single speed, single stage - high altitude version of II
Hercules X, 1941, two speed, single stage - development of III
- Beaufighter I
Hercules XI, 1941, two speed, single stage - development of III
- Beaufighter I
Hercules XII, 1941, two speed, single stage - development of VI with separate induction pipes
- Beaufighter I
Hercules XIV, 1942, single speed, single stage - civil development of IV
Hercules XVMT, 1942, single speed, single stage - high altitude version of II with turbo
Hercules XVI, 1942, two speed single stage - similar to VI
- Beaufighter VIC, VIF, TFX

etc

From Lumsden, _British Piston Aero Engiones and their Aircraft_


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## Juha (Aug 12, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> ... I would suggest that the Ju 88C4/C5/C6 would have had the same speed as the Ju 88A4; 317mph. I would say 3000lbs of bombs and single bomb rack fitted to carry a single 900L drop tank would make the Ju 88A4/C4/C6 difficult to catch by the Beaufighter depending on altitude. The Hercules engine was more powerful and the beaufighter smaller but the Jumo 211 had less drag and a better/equal altitude performance....



A bit optimistic, max speed for Ju-88 C-6 with SN-2 antennas at 11,5 to was 460km/h, add the speed loss by antennas (22km/h) one got 482km/h (300mph) and I doubt that with 1.400kg bomb load Ju 88 C would have been heavier and slower.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2014)

I am having a bit of trouble with the range figures for the JU-88 also. 

" In this configuration range was just over 1100 miles at max cruise."

Figures from an old book by William Green ( who did make a few mistakes, so correction welcome) are for.

A-1, range with 369imp gallons (all that fit in the wing) 620 miles at 217mph at 18500ft. With 268imp gal tank in forward bomb bay, 1055 miles. 
A-4, _normal_ range with 637 imp gal (forward bomb bay tank) 1112 miles. 
C-6c, with 369imp gal, 645 miles, with one 105 imp gal and one 230 imp gal fuselage (bomb bay) tanks 1230 miles. 

Please note that these are NOT at maximum cruising speeds. Economical cruise for the A-4 is given as 230mph at 17,390ft and max cruise as 248mph at 16,405ft. Max speed at 30,865lbs was 269mph at 14,765ft and max speed at 27,557lbs was 292mph at 17,390ft. 
The C6c was faster but then the performance figures are for a plane weighing 26,125lbs. Please note that full internal fuel (tanks in the bomb bay) for the C6c weighed about 5070lbs with doesn't leave much for a bomb load even on under wing racks once you put crew, ammo and oil on board. 

It would seem that the JU-88 would have trouble reaching targets with a significant bomb load unless it is out side the plane with impact on speed and range. 

Figures for the JU-88S are given a bit different, but are as follows. 
Max continuous cruising speed 328mph at 18,000ft. economical cruising speed 289mph altitude not given.
Endurance with 369 imp gallons of fuel 1 hour 40 minutes at max continuous and 2hr 45 min at economical. 
Endurance with 637 imp gallons of fuel 2 hours 50 minutes at max continuous and 4hr 40 min at economical.
Endurance with 787 imp gallons of fuel 3 hours 25 minutes at max continuous and 5hr 45 min at economical.

Plane could carry 14 143lb SD 65 bombs internally in the forward bay with the rear bay housing a 149.6imp gal fuel tank, of course if you want to use the GM-1 power boost system *IT* went in the rear bay and weighed 400lbs empty and another 900lbs when full. Granted the plane was pretty zippy when clean (no bombs underneath) and using the GM-1 system but that makes for either a very short range range bomber or one with very little payload. 

I have no idea what the speed and range are if you stick a fuel tank in the forward bay, GM-1 in the aft bay and hang a pair of 2205lb bombs under the wing roots. 

However, and rather obviously, _any_ use of the GM-1 system blows the range/endurance figures totally out of the water.


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## Koopernic (Aug 12, 2014)

Juha said:


> A bit optimistic, max speed for Ju-88 C-6 with SN-2 antennas at 11,5 to was 460km/h, add the speed loss by antennas (22km/h) one got 482km/h (300mph) and I doubt that with 1.400kg bomb load Ju 88 C would have been heavier and slower.



According to other posters in this thread the Ju 88C series used as night intruders during that period did not carry forward looking radar, presumably it was too secret, that's why I suggested it would have the same performance a the Ju 88A4 minus dive brakes and bomb shackles. The two bomb bays that were fitted with fuel tanks could be retasked as pure bomb bays if desired. The speed of 317 mph seems quit reasonable with a full clean MTOW internal bomb load, it really isn't that much of a load for 2840hp of power. I don't think we even need to make deductions for fuel burned off.

The Luftwaffe did maintain a desire to continue night intruder operations i.e to attack RAF night bombers on their air fields and on their way home to base. It required an aircraft of exceptional range, speed and of course radar fit out. All of these were starting to come together in late 1944 and 1945.

There was a new wave of radars for instance which could tolerate being compromised. Gebhard Adders in his history of the German night fighter force deals somewhat with these specifications. In more colloquial terms the "Luftwaffe secret project" series also does. Apart from Jets such as the Arado 234P there was the Dornier 335 with microwave radar built into the leading edges, they actually built the wing with the dielectric covers for one. The 400mph Ju 88G7 might have done a reasonable job, advanced variants of the He 219 and the Ta 154, had it not been cancelled.

The SN-2 radar is a late war radar, I'm surprised if many C6 were equipped with it as the more capable Ju 88R and Ju 88G1 had been around by then. Shortages of BMW 801 engines aside.


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## Koopernic (Aug 12, 2014)

Fuel burns, fuel capacities for various speeds and bomb configurations are given for the Ju 88*A1* here. In German at this point. I'll try a translation next weekend or so.
Beim-Zeugmeister: Page 6 - Ju 88 A-1, set-up state B, loading case 4 with 2 x 500kg bombs
Beim-Zeugmeister: Page 6 - Ju 88 A-1, set-up state B, loading case 5 with 4 x 250kg bombs
In the above configuration, at max cruise speed, the fuel burn rate is 510 Litres per hour, tank capacity is 3580 Litres. Cruise Speed at best altitude is 385 with bombs and 430 without.

Data is given for speed in a climb on those tables. That gives 7 hours endurance x an average of 407kmh = 2849km (about 1770 miles) . Deduct 2 hours or 31% for reserves, combat and climb out comes to about 1250 miles with 1000kg/2200lbs external bombs.
Drop the power of the engine and fuel consumption drops about 22% but speed about 11% so about a 10% increase in range (1375 miles). External tanks could be carried with the external bombs.

The A5/A4 with different wings and engines would be different. The Ju 88A4 load out is here http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/we...oadouts-individual-bomb-sizes-makes-9040.html.

Removing both internal bomb bay tanks sacrifices 1220 + 680 Litres (total 1900L) which can effectively be restored by carrying 2 x 900L drop tanks which of course would ideally be jettisoned.

The above calculations are certainly with dive brakes fitted though with the appearance of the Stuvi 5B and BZA computing shallow dive bombing sight the dive brakes could be removed.

Carrying 4 x 250kg bombs seems to have only a modest impact on cruise speed 430kmh->385kmh (about 10%). One might expect a similar deduction in max speed: about 310mph (without dive brakes) -> 279mph.

By 1942 the Luftwaffe had the Do 217E which could carry 2000kg/4400lbs internally with uncompromised fuel load at a speed of 322mph, a little more if armour piercing bombs were used and external carriage was allowed. It could still be fitted out with 2 x 900L tanks.

The faster Ju 88S was used for path finding and target marking. For certain roles such as dive bombing and torpedo bombing external carriage is de rigour and that is what the Ju 88 excelled at. It's worth pointing out that not a single ship was sunk by level bombers during WW2, skip bombing aside.

The Ju 88 was used as a tank destroyer, simply using its dive bombing capability and the Stuvi 5B to do the job. A pair of 500kg bombs sufficed but the more skilled Finnish pilots liked to use a pair of SC-1000. The dive would commence at 8000ft, pull-up complete at 5000ft, speed reached 400mph, accuracy good enough to destroy a tank.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2014)

See above, a JU-88 running clean has a real problem with fuel, You either have enough to reach the targets _and_ go fast but no bombs *or *you carry bombs and either can't reach the target AND go fast. Not without turning it into a one way mission. 

Drop tanks may help but getting bounced on the way _to_ the target may mean aborting the mission. The JU-88S having a range of 544 miles at MAX CONTINUOUS cruise wing wing tanks only. Use of full power or GM-1 will shorten that considerably. Granted MAX cruise is not needed for the entire return flight.


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## wuzak (Aug 12, 2014)

And the Ju 88S would likely run into later model Mossie NF - maybe even XXX.


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## Glider (Aug 12, 2014)

So I think its fair to sum up by saying that the Beaufighter is more than capable of dealing with the majority of the Ju88 combinations at night. When the later enhanced versions are on line the Mosquito has a comfortable advantage. So whilst it was probably worth trying every now and again a constant intruder campaign would be unsuccessful.


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## Juha (Aug 12, 2014)

Hello Koopernicyes, I'm aware that the intruder Ju 88 Cs didn't have radar, thats why I corrected the max speed of the radar equipped C-6 with the info got from the same flight test report on the effects of the SN-2 antennas (460km/h+22km/h=482km/h) to get the true speed of a radarless Ju 88C-6 at 11.5 tonnes weight. 
Now according to Mackay's Junkers Ju 88 (the nearest source I have others but didn't bother to dig them out) the AUW of the Ju 88A-4 was 13,995kg, so I think that a Ju 88 C with 1,400kg bomb load would be heavier and slower than that Ju 88 C-6. And if we believe Mackay the max bomb load of a C-6 was 500kg, he doesn't give the possible bombloads of the other C versions.

PS I looked Mackay's book a little more carefully, C-2, 316gal fuel tank in the forward bomb bay, so IMHO max 500kg of bombs in the rear one, C-4 bomb equipment delated.


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## Glider (Aug 12, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> The faster Ju 88S was used for path finding and target marking. For certain roles such as dive bombing and torpedo bombing external carriage is de rigour and that is what the Ju 88 excelled at. It's worth pointing out that not a single ship was sunk by level bombers during WW2, skip bombing aside.



Its only a small point but a lot of ships were sunk using level bombing Blenheim's, Condors, Hampden's and a number of others were used in this role. If you include submarines lost by all nations to bombing the list is significant as low level bombing isn't skip bombing. I think you are talking about high altitude bombing in which case you are probably correct.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2014)

The 500KG of bombs in the rear bay was pretty much ten 50kg bombs, at least most (all?) English sources don't give a different alternative (pair of 250KG ?) 

The JU 88 was a rather adaptable airplane but unfortunately a number of on-line sources ( or hastily produced books) tend to print MAX capabilities like range with full internal fuel without noting it. Or full bomb load on early versions was twenty eight 50kg bombs inside and four 100kg bombs outside, total 1800kg but the external stowage cuts into range/speed. Swapping internal bomb stowage for fuel and carrying bigger bombs outside boosts range and keeps bomb load up, or increases it but hurts speed. 

I will readily admit I don't speak or read German (many of you who have suffered through my mis-spellings and typos are wondering about my English) but the two charts provided by Koopernic seem to be a bit off. Perhaps it is just me but using identical boost and rpm on the engines at 6000 meters and flying at just 10kph difference in speed the fuel consumption is listed as being 110 liters an hour different (only 82% of the fuel burn). At a given boost setting and rpm the fuel burn _should_ be identical with the speed being the thing that changes due to drag/load. The plane with more drag/load _may_ be able to "cruise" as fast as the lower drag airplane by using more fuel but unless the plane is shifting from lean to rich in order to do so I doubt it would be at identical rpm and boost.


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## Juha (Aug 12, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The 500KG of bombs in the rear bay was pretty much ten 50kg bombs, at least most (all?) English sources don't give a different alternative (pair of 250KG ?) ...



At least the Ju 88 A-4, on which Ju 88 C-6 was based, could carry only 50kg bombs (or with special adaptors SD 2 "bundles", but IIRC that was stopped soon after 22 June 41 because of number of fatal accidents with SD 2s) in its bomb bays. 250kg SC 250 at least was too big for 88 A-4's bomb bays.


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## Greyman (Aug 12, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> Which Ju 88?



Here's the data I got in a hasty-photoshop chart:







The A1 is from 'Janes', not from a flight test.
The A4 is from a German wartime manual.
The A5 is from an actual British flight test.

Brown is a Sterling I, blue is a Blenheim IV, purple is a french DB7. All A&AEE performance trials. The DB7 wasn't fully loaded, other two were full load.

Reactions: Like Like:
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## Glider (Aug 13, 2014)

It makes the Blenheim look good


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## mhuxt (Aug 13, 2014)

Glider said:


> It makes the Blenheim look good



And the Stirling too - wouldn't have picked that. Are those 88s really at Notleistung / highest speed? Not trying to stir the pot, but slower than the Stirling?


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## parsifal (Aug 13, 2014)

doesnt surprise me at all. German aircraft under combat loads and conditions frequently did not perform to spec. if for no other reason than there ere time when engine overhauls could be fewer and more widely spaced than in the allied camps


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## Juha (Aug 13, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> ... It's worth pointing out that not a single ship was sunk by level bombers during WW2, skip bombing aside.



It's not because it is not true, level bombing wasn't very effective against moving ships but still sank ships now and then. And stationary ships were sunk from BB Tirpitz downwards.



Koopernic said:


> The Ju 88 was used as a tank destroyer, simply using its dive bombing capability and the Stuvi 5B to do the job. A pair of 500kg bombs sufficed but the more skilled Finnish pilots liked to use a pair of SC-1000. The dive would commence at 8000ft, pull-up complete at 5000ft, speed reached 400mph, accuracy good enough to destroy a tank.



That was what pilots claimed but what really happened is more difficult to establish, anyway not the most effective way to kill tanks.


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## Juha (Aug 13, 2014)

Glider said:


> It makes the Blenheim look good



But when one looks the bomb loads, probably only the max internal for the British Mk IV 454kg/1000lb, not so impressive. FiAF Blenheims could carry max 800kg internally but still far cry from Ju 88 A's max bomb loads. Stirling is entirely different case max 14,000lb/6,350kg internally.

Juha


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## Koopernic (Aug 13, 2014)

mhuxt said:


> And the Stirling too - wouldn't have picked that. Are those 88s really at Notleistung / highest speed? Not trying to stir the pot, but slower than the Stirling?



There is some dispute as to what the speed of the Ju 88A4 is with external bombs: some sources give 269mph for the Ju 88A4 with 1420hp Jumo 211J the above shows a Ju 88A4 with 1350hp Jumo 211F (different full throttle height) at 255 mph. Another factor is whether the dive brakes are fitted which they would be for an early war maritime attack but not on a Ju 88A4 being used at night over the UK or a Ju 88C6 (Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J with solid nose and 3 x 20mm canon). The 14 mph difference might be accounted for by the dive brakes, 4 removable external bomb shackles and perhaps flame dampers as well as the weaker F instead of J engines.

Clean with no external bombs, no external bomb shackles the speed of a Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J would be 317mph and I suggest the same for the Ju 88C6 fighter variant without radar. In this situation there is a forward bomb bay which can carry 18 x 50kg bombs or a 1280L fuel tank and a rear bomb bay which can carry a 680L tank or 10 x 50kg bombs. Any combination possible. Other loads might include 70kg target makers or 700 x 2kg anti personnel butterfly bombs with time delays and disturbance triggers: a sort of anti personnel and area denial weapon that might be suitable for attacking an Bomber Command Air field during a return mission. There are 4 external bomb shackles that can be fitted, one or two to carry a 900L drop tank wouldn't impair speed by much.

If the Luftwaffe is happy to operate the Ju 88A4 or C6 with only 3100lbs of internal bombs (small ones only) with maybe a drop tank or two the Ju 88 speed will be around 310mph and more like that of the DB7 curve.

Of course this thread started as question about defeating bomber command early in the war which drifted to night harassment operation by Luftwaffe night fighters (Ju 88C) on returning RAF bombers and then drifted into discussion of the speed of the Ju 88 vs the Beufighter. The Ju 88c is more suitable as a night fighter than a bomber if big bombs need to be carried.

The Dornier Do 217E3 with a pair of 1560hp BMW801ML engines is in production from the first month of 1941 starting at about 15/month from January. With this engine the Do 217 can fly at 320mph and carry a full internal bombload, around 4400lbs (say 4 x 500kg bombs) with uncompromised fuel. The 1560hp BMW801ML runs on 87 octane B4 fuel whereas the 1700hp BMW801D2 runs on 96/125 octane C3 fuel. I would suggest that had the Germans committed enough C3 fuel that the Dornier Do 217 equipped with a BMW801D2 would have managed around 330mph max speed and presented the Beaufighter considerable difficulties to intercept. I would suggest that comparing the Ju 88 with externals bombs with the Beaufighter is a bit of a false dilemma since a night intruder, I don't think, would be burdened with that configuration; the Germans would be inclined to use the Do 217 for that roll. Shortages meant that He 111 and Ju 88 soldier on well beyond a desirable use by date.

The BMW801 equipped version of the Ju 88C was the Ju 88R and was available at this time, 1942. I would suggest that without a heavy load of night fighting equipment such as radars this type would manage 344mph (the Speed of the larger Ju 88G1 night fighter), at least one source gives 369mph clean with BMW801D2. Both the BMW801 and C3 fuel was rationed so little of this high quality aircraft was seen in 42. The radial had more power and a little more drag but was thus both faster and moreover less sensitive to external loads.

When comparing the Ju 88C6 and the Beaufighter one is comparing a 2 man 20000lb aircraft with a 3 man 28000lb aircraft. Because of the heavy electronic countermeasures the Luftwaffe found itself under it found a 3 man aircraft essential to operate the large variety of electronic equipment. During the baby blitz the Luftwaffe also used Drupel/Window aluminium foil jamming and closed down part of RAF radar system: had they used larger numbers of aircraft or larger types with more load they might have succeeded but that takes a large scale effort.

I would suggest that should the Luftwaffe had been directed enough of its more advanced types such as the Ju 88R and Do 217E with the BMW801 engine using C3 fuel it could have conducted a technically quite aggressive and advanced fight over Britain at night against RAF bases. If it was understood what a monster bomber command become this might have been perused.

The weakness of the Luftwaffe in offensive operation I think should be understood in terms of the General difficulty of building up production plant and the resources drawn up by the war in the east. 

However procurement failures played their part. 1941 should have seen the start of production of the Me 210. This aircraft eventually did become excellent. it was able to fly at 369mph, had a range on internal fuel of 1100 miles and could carry loads such as a single 1000kg/2200lb bomb, 2 x 500kg or 8 x 50kg in its internal bomb bay. It had dive brakes and a computing bomb sight, remote controlled rearward firing guns which could shoot back even while the observer was under heavy g load and if the enemy fighter was behind and below in a turning fight pursuit.

I would suggest this aircraft would have given the RAF real problems in 1941/1942.

What had happened is this: the aircraft was designed by Dr Woldemeir Voigt, Willy Messerschmitt personally intervened in the design process to have the tail shortened and the slats removed (to make the aircraft faster). The RLM with Messerschmitt's agreement then ordered the desperately aircraft into production, factories retooled and all, before the test flight. The handling was disastrous. It took a long time to sort out the issues but by then the Luftwaffe's production program was in disarray. The Me 210 was supposed to replace both Me 110, Ju 88 (in many rolls) and Ju 87 and all these programs were in disarray as well.

The solution turned out to be slats and a lengthened tail (seemingly known by even the test pilot) but production was cancelled, those that were produced however were completed off with the lengthened tail and slats. (there were a few other minor changes eg in wing twist) but the opportunity to tool up and ramp up Me 210 production had been lost. The Me 410 with more powerful DB603 engines and a deeper fuselage turned out to be a fine aircraft.

Messerschmitt went broke over the issue, the company now more or less run by the Government, probably more poorly managed.

The Me 210 fiasco could have been avoided, it was merely poor project/risk management. 

The Ju 288 also should have been in production by 1942, it failed because of its Jumo 222A/B engines could not achieve 2500hp and there was no adequate plan B.

The Luftwaffe thus found itself with the wrong kit.


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## wuzak (Aug 13, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> The Dornier Do 217E3 with a pair of 1560hp BMW801ML engines is in production from the first month of 1941 starting at about 15/month from January. With this engine the Do 217 can fly at 320mph and carry a full internal bombload, around 4400lbs (say 4 x 500kg bombs) with uncompromised fuel. The 1560hp BMW801ML runs on 87 octane B4 fuel whereas the 1700hp BMW801D2 runs on 96/125 octane C3 fuel. I would suggest that had the Germans committed enough C3 fuel that the Dornier Do 217 equipped with a BMW801D2 would have managed around 330mph max speed and presented the Beaufighter considerable difficulties to intercept.



The problem is that the Do 217 would not be flying at its maximum speed. The Beaufighter could run at higher speeds because they have less need to watch their fuel usage, and they are radar directed (from the ground and on-board). The Do 217 does not at that time, as far as I am aware, have electronic warning devices so possibly would not have time to pour on the speed before it was too late.




Koopernic said:


> However procurement failures played their part. 1941 should have seen the start of production of the Me 210. This aircraft eventually did become excellent. it was able to fly at 369mph, had a range on internal fuel of 1100 miles and could carry loads such as a single 1000kg/2200lb bomb, 2 x 500kg or 8 x 50kg in its internal bomb bay. It had dive brakes and a computing bomb sight, remote controlled rearward firing guns which could shoot back even while the observer was under heavy g load and if the enemy fighter was behind and below in a turning fight pursuit.
> 
> I would suggest this aircraft would have given the RAF real problems in 1941/1942.
> 
> ...



When and in what format was the Me 210 able to do 369mph?

The Me 410 with DB 603 and substantially more power was only capable of 380mph.


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## Juha (Aug 13, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> ...Clean with no external bombs, no external bomb shackles the speed of a Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J would be 317mph and I suggest the same for the Ju 88C6 fighter variant without radar...If the Luftwaffe is happy to operate the Ju 88A4 or C6 with only 3100lbs of internal bombs (small ones only) with maybe a drop tank or two the Ju 88 speed will be around 310mph and more like that of the DB7 curve...
> The Dornier Do 217E3 with a pair of 1560hp BMW801ML engines is in production from the first month of 1941 starting at about 15/month from January. With this engine the Do 217 can fly at 320mph and carry a full internal bombload, around 4400lbs (say 4 x 500kg bombs) with uncompromised fuel. The 1560hp BMW801ML runs on 87 octane B4 fuel whereas the 1700hp BMW801D2 runs on 96/125 octane C3 fuel. I would suggest that had the Germans committed enough C3 fuel that the Dornier Do 217 equipped with a BMW801D2 would have managed around 330mph max speed and presented the Beaufighter considerable difficulties to intercept. I would suggest that comparing the Ju 88 with externals bombs with the Beaufighter is a bit of a false dilemma since a night intruder, I don't think, would be burdened with that configuration; the Germans would be inclined to use the Do 217 for that roll. Shortages meant that He 111 and Ju 88 soldier on well beyond a desirable use by date...



Of course you can suggest what you want but the fact is that in a German test Ju 88 C-6 managed to achieve only 460km/h (286mph) at 11,5 tonnes with SN-2 (speed loss 22km/h) but without flame dampers (which would have took of 10-15km/h of the speed), so without the antennes but with flame dampers appr. 470km/h (292mph). And according to Mackay max bomb load of C-6 was 500kg.

Juha


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## Juha (Aug 13, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> ...I would suggest that should the Luftwaffe had been directed enough of its more advanced types such as the Ju 88R and Do 217E with the BMW801 engine using C3 fuel it could have conducted a technically quite aggressive and advanced fight over Britain at night against RAF bases. If it was understood what a monster bomber command become this might have been perused...



And from where all this C3 would have come, grounding all Fw 190 units or what? During the summer 43 there was not enough C3 for full use of 190s but LW had to limit their use.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 13, 2014)

> Clean with no external bombs, no external bomb shackles the speed of a Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J would be 317mph and I suggest the same for the Ju 88C6 fighter variant without radar. In this situation there is a forward bomb bay which can carry 18 x 50kg bombs or a 1280L fuel tank and a rear bomb bay which can carry a 680L tank or 10 x 50kg bombs. Any combination possible. Other loads might include 70kg target makers or 700 x 2kg anti personnel butterfly bombs with time delays and disturbance triggers: a sort of anti personnel and area denial weapon that might be suitable for attacking an Bomber Command Air field during a return mission. There are 4 external bomb shackles that can be fitted, one or two to carry a 900L drop tank wouldn't impair speed by much.



OK, why would would a 900 liter drop tank have less drag than an 1100lb bomb? 








Jumo engines could use .462lb/hp/hr at cruise at sea level. Even using that figure for the climb rating of a 211J (1200hp at 2400rpm/1.25Ata) means you are using about 1100lbs an hour for both engines. About 2.4 hours of flight time on the wing fuel after the the tank/s are dropped. Using full power is going to use fuel even faster and operating at higher altitudes with the supercharger in high gear is going to use more fuel per HP/HR, as does using higher rpm (internal friction) You also take off on the internal tanks, unless there is a system to fill the internals from the drop tanks. 

And if you stick on drop tank shackles what happens to the speed? 



> The Dornier Do 217E3 with a pair of 1560hp BMW801ML engines is in production from the first month of 1941 starting at about 15/month from January. With this engine the Do 217 can fly at 320mph and carry a full internal bombload, around 4400lbs (say 4 x 500kg bombs) with uncompromised fuel. The 1560hp BMW801ML runs on 87 octane B4 fuel whereas the 1700hp BMW801D2 runs on 96/125 octane C3 fuel. I would suggest that had the Germans committed enough C3 fuel that the Dornier Do 217 equipped with a BMW801D2 would have managed around 330mph max speed and presented the Beaufighter considerable difficulties to intercept. I would suggest that comparing the Ju 88 with externals bombs with the Beaufighter is a bit of a false dilemma since a night intruder, I don't think, would be burdened with that configuration; the Germans would be inclined to use the Do 217 for that roll. Shortages meant that He 111 and Ju 88 soldier on well beyond a desirable use by date


.

You keep focusing on *top* speed. Time at *top* speed is limited by three things. One is the limit in the flight manuals, based of engine life and likelihood of breaking the engine/s. two is fuel consumption, and three, also mentioned in the flight manuals, is the temperature of the engines. Granted in combat "you do what you got to do" but over heating the engine cooks the oil and a lubrication failure ends the mission really quick. Most manuals have a little sentence saying the higher powers (climb and all out) are subject both to the time limit AND temperature. Exceed the temperature limit, even if short of the time limit and you should cut power (or open cooling flaps). Granted if you are being shot at it is a gamble as to which will kill you quicker but _planning_ to cruise at higher than recommended cruise settings to lessen the chance of interception is going to mean shorter overhaul life for the engines and increased engine failures per 100/1000 missions. 

While a DO 217E was rated at 320mph TOP speed it was also rated at 258mph cruising speed at the same altitude and 245mph economical cruising speed. With BMW 801 engines not being noted for long life (especially the early ones) running around at even 290mph for very long (without enemy plane in sight) might not be a very good operational plan.



> However procurement failures played their part. 1941 should have seen the start of production of the Me 210. This aircraft eventually did become excellent. it was able to fly at 369mph, had a range on internal fuel of 1100 miles and could carry loads such as a single 1000kg/2200lb bomb, 2 x 500kg or 8 x 50kg in its internal bomb bay. It had dive brakes and a computing bomb sight, remote controlled rearward firing guns which could shoot back even while the observer was under heavy g load and if the enemy fighter was behind and below in a turning fight pursuit.



Dive bombing at night is NOT a real good idea, And sending even sorted out Me 210s over England in daylight in 1941/42 is also not a real good idea. Chances of pursuing fighter being behind and below in a turning fight pursuit means the Me 210 was out turning it's pursuer. Me 210 can out turn a Spitfire or Typhoon?


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## Milosh (Aug 13, 2014)

Juha said:


> And from where all this C3 would have come, grounding all Fw 190 units or what? During the summer 43 there was not enough C3 for full use of 190s but LW had to limit their use.



Juha, could you expand on this statement with some details please. Thanks


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## Juha (Aug 14, 2014)

Hello Milosh
according to Gen Friedrich Kless, the CoS of the Lfl 6, the lack of C3 hampered the operations of 190s during the Zitadelle (the Kursk operation) and especially during the defence of the Orel bulge in the summer of 43.

Juha


PS I did some rereading and the reasons for not have been able to fully employ 190s, especially during the defence of the Orel bulge were, besides inadequate supply of C3, the scarcity of spare BMW 801s and other spare parts.


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## Elmas (Aug 15, 2014)

Juha said:


> It's not because it is not true, level bombing wasn't very effective against moving ships but still sank ships now and then.
> ....................



HMS Juno (F 46) of the Royal Navy - British Destroyer of the J class - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net


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## Balljoint (Aug 15, 2014)

Juha said:


> It's not because it is not true, level bombing wasn't very effective against moving ships but still sank ships now and then. And stationary ships were sunk from BB Tirpitz downwards.


Level bombing, while not particularly effective against ships, was effective as a tactic. Such bombing would cause ships to break formation while taking evasive action. This would reduce the effective defense against rather exposed but effective skip bombing by isolating individual ships.


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## Koopernic (Aug 18, 2014)

Elmas said:


> HMS Juno (F 46) of the Royal Navy - British Destroyer of the J class - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net



There is controversy over this. See link below.
Juno
" In a recent email from Rod Wise (Australia) he quotes his uncle (John aka 'Jack' Wise) who was on board a ship with Juno, Rod's uncle says he saw three 'Stukas' which he thought would hit them, but hit the Juno. Rod says that his uncle is no longer alive for him to definitively say that his uncle could recognise a Stuka from a Cantz, but the Stuka had become a familiar shape to servicemen in the Med."

What attack profile would the CANT have followed.


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## Juha (Aug 18, 2014)

CANT Z1007s were level bombers, see HMS Juno, destroyer for some details of the attack.
Few other ships sunk by level bombers: IJN CL Abukuma, German DD Z1, German TB T13, IJN ammo ship Nichii Maru, ocean liners SS California and Dutchess of York.

Juha


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## stona (Aug 18, 2014)

Level bombers most definitely did sink or damage ships at sea, though dive bombing was much more effective.

This table shows the relative success of the various types of bombing on various types of ships in the early part of the war (that'll be pre-war for our American friends).






A successful attack was deemed to be one which a ship was either sunk or forced 'to seek extensive repairs over weeks or months'. It does not include ships at anchorage because it was unclear whether the ships or dock installations were the target and such attacks were further considered 'unrepresentative' for war ships specifically because they would be static. Ships re-fitting were not included as these were not considered to be operational.

We are all familiar with vessels manoeuvring frantically when under air attack but the Admiralty's 'Air Defence Instructions, 1939' forbad fast avoiding action against bombers as it was considered likely to decrease the efficiency, accuracy and concentration of anti aircraft fire. Some Captains thought otherwise and the matter was referred to the director of the Naval Air Division in October 1939. In reply the deputy director G.M.B Langley (later a Vice Admiral) pointed out that the ship displacement during time of fall of the bomb was small but conceded that high speed avoiding action might increase bombing error. He also reiterated that trials had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of low speed avoiding action. Everything depended on the speed and manoeuvrability of the ship and the skill of the pilot. His conclusion was that such action should not be taken at the cost of throwing out the AA fire. Despite this it soon became standard practice for Captains of lighter vessels to undertake high speed evasive action when attacked from the air.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 19, 2014)

This table needs to be considered with certain caveats, and the summary about RN AA tactics, is correct in a very general way only.

Turning to British shipping losses to aircraft, the problem is that the period in which the sample is taken is statistically skewed, and not very representative of the overall axis performance. in that period there were a number of main events or activities that affected allied shipping losses. the first is that in that period the germans were on the attack, and frequently caught enemy ships (mostly those of unprepared neutrals underway but still close to port). then we have a number of major disasters such as Dunkirk and Norway that again, in no way can be seen as typical, or rrepresentative of the true effectiveness of certain types of attacks. Perhaps counterbalancing that are the efforts of the long range attackers like the FW200. lastly it is worthwhile to note, that until well into 1942, the germans did not possess any meaningful or effective air launched torpedo force which again skews the reult considerably. by 1942, the torpedo had become a favoured anti-shipping weapon in the German repoitoire

The overwhelming air launched weapon that did by far the most damage to allied shipping was the mine, and this by far was delivered by level bombing.

in 1939, just 10 ships were sunk or damaged by aircraft, all of them from mines. In 1940, this figure shot up to 192 vessels lost, of which 80 were lost to level bombing and mining attacks delivered by the Condor group. this immediately throws into question the accuracy of that table, though my figures are losses, not just attacks, so the results of the table and the results of my statisitcs are not really comparable.

It is worth mentioning as well, that level bombing compared to divebombing was a relatively safe method of delivery for the aircraft, and this safety or survivability increased as the war progressed. two reasons accounted for this. asllied countermeasures ended up being most effective against divebombing, which by 1943 was considered an obsolete method of attack because of the risks it posed. this was accentuated by the introduction of stand off weaponry such as Fritz by the Germans. 

As far as tactics and countermeasures are concerned, Allied light ships were unable to fulfil area defence very effectively because of the limitations on their armament and targetting systems. they were reasonably well equipped with CIWs, but their long range gins were just not up to the task. CIWs dont need much in the way of aiming or fire control....you generally just point and shoot, relying on barrage effects to try and do as much disruption as possible. for that reason RN light ships could both manouvre and fire, without much loss of accuracy, and not much effect om mission priority either. British light ships could only offer very limited area defence, until the introduction of dedicated l/r aa guns. They never really solved the limitations of their fc systems, and this in turn dictated their area defence escorts sail straight and on a predictable course. this was perhaps the most significant weakness in RN pre-war preprations, thei choice of HAA fire control was very unfortunate.
On just about every occasion that RN ships were tasked with defending a high value target, like a carrier a BB or even a convoy, they would adopt controlled manouvre tactics, manouvering as a group to maximise the effectiveness of their LR gunnery. This didnt happen until the general introduction of radar controlled gunnery and the introduction, in numbers of suitably armed escorts. throughout 1940, neither of these pre-requisites existed, but increasingly in 1941 and beyond, it did.


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## stona (Aug 19, 2014)

parsifal said:


> This table needs to be considered with certain caveats, and the summary about RN AA tactics, is correct in a very general way only.



Agree 100% with your first point and as for the RN AA tactics, the summary had better be correct as it is taken, paraphrased, from the Admiralty report. RN officers _generally_ did what they were told if they knew what was good for them and their career 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 19, 2014)

The admiralty orders are one issue, and certainly worth noting and appreciating in this discussion. In the context of 1939-40 i think it a fair assesment to say that light ships would adopt manouvre over massed firepower. And at the very beginning, the RN entered the war in the mistaken belief that its AA protectiuon was adequate and effective. later as systems and weaponary was increased and upgraded, there seems to have been a variable approach. There were times when light ships manouvred, and times when they stayed in a fixed formation and maintained station relative to the TG core assets. These observations are not orders based, they are based simply on the observed facts....how the RN reacted at various times. And there were limits to admiralty control believe it or not. The group i am most familar with is the BPF, 1945, wherein its AA procedures against Kamikaze attacks were worked out by Fraser and his staff, not the Admiralty. He eventually submitted his battle orders to the admiralty, who dutifully approved them, but only after the BPF had been action for nearly a month already. By 1945 the RN was well equipped with 1st class stand off weaponary, and had more modern AA FC systems. The decision was taken for the escort to hold station and provide maximum firepower over the vital carrier assets. The results of these tactics were tangible and immediate. British AA effectiveness went from some way behind the USN in terms of rounds per kill, to being roughly twice as efficient.

The point Im making isnt to disagree blanketly to the idea that RN ships used manouvre as a primary means of defence. Particularly in the early war period i think this is very true. further, neither am i disputing the Admiralty orders. Not aware of the orders, but it makes sense that they would make such a call at the times indicated. the admiralty went into the war with a false sense of security regarding the threat of air attack. that rapidly changed as their weapons systems were exposed as having serious flaws. But just as forcefully, the actual reactions to air defence issues were so varied and changed as the war progressed within the RN as to challenge the notion that there was a standard or particular response applied to every situation....it simply did not work out that way.


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## stona (Aug 20, 2014)

There was certainly an over confidence in anti aircraft defences prevalent in the RN between the wars and in the early part of the second war. Some relatively junior officers did express doubts. Lieutenant Commander J.A.J Dennis recalled the effects of a fleet barrage on a radio controlled Queen Bee radio controlled target during a 1939 exercise whilst he was serving on the destroyer HMS Griffin. He was appalled to see the target fly straight, level and slowly through the barrage unscathed. He considered the anti aircraft defence to be 'pathetic'. (Dennis' papers are held at the IWM).
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Aug 20, 2014)

The Queen Bee wasnt supposed to be shot down they were too expensive for that. The ships fired practice rounds with reduced firing charges and dummy shells that burst short of the target. Gunnery referees then noted where the round burst and calculated a hit, a damage or a miss.

Any gunnery officer who accidently shot down a QB drone was in for a very tense interview with the Fleet Gunnery Officer at Whale Island and might find his next posting was the Falkland Islands.


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## stona (Aug 20, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> The Queen Bee wasnt supposed to be shot down they were too expensive for that. The ships fired practice rounds with reduced firing charges and dummy shells that burst short of the target. Gunnery referees then noted where the round burst and calculated a hit, a damage or a miss.
> 
> Any gunnery officer who accidently shot down a QB drone was in for a very tense interview with the Fleet Gunnery Officer at Whale Island and might find his next posting was the Falkland Islands.



Maybe Dennis didn't know that. He was certainly unimpressed with the barrage. I have a reference somewhere in my files for his papers at the IWM if anyone wants to look them up for themselves.

Edit. It also occurs to me that Dennis wrote 'unscathed'. Whether he meant literally or that no hits were awarded by the umpires I know not. I only have access to notes I made several years ago, not to the original documents.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Aug 20, 2014)

It shouldn't have taken a rocket scientist to figure out that a pair of WW I 2pdr pom-poms on hand worked mounts or a pair of hand worked quad .5in Vickers guns were NOT adequate AA Armament for a destroyer. Or that single 12pdr or 4in gun in local control (cartwheel sight and gun captains eye and wetted finger held high for fire control) weren't going to be satisfactory either no matter how steady a course the ship steered. 

The vast majority of British destroyers at the beginning of the war had pretty much only maneuver to depend on.


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## Glider (Aug 20, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> It shouldn't have taken a rocket scientist to figure out that a pair of WW I 2pdr pom-poms on hand worked mounts or a pair of hand worked quad .5in Vickers guns were NOT adequate AA Armament for a destroyer. Or that single 12pdr or 4in gun in local control (cartwheel sight and gun captains eye and wetted finger held high for fire control) weren't going to be satisfactory either no matter how steady a course the ship steered.
> 
> The vast majority of British destroyers at the beginning of the war had pretty much only maneuver to depend on.



Be fair the newer destroyers from the Tribal on had the quad 2pd and two quad 0,5 which clearly isn't huge but a lot more than most navies had. US destroyers of the same period normally had 4 or 6 x 0.5, German destroyers did well with 4 x 37mm (but only semi automatic) and 4 - 7 20mm, and the Japanese 4 x 25mm. 
I think it would be fair to say that all pre war destroyers depended on their ability to manoeuvre, and that the US vessels were worse off than most.


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## stona (Aug 21, 2014)

When did the 'Dido' class of cruisers come in? Their role was primarily anti-aircraft, they weren't much good for anything else.

What about the 'Hunt' class destroyers? I thought their 4" guns were capable of high elevations. There must have been some in service by 1940.

I think the Admiralty was aware of the threat that aircraft posed but as Cunningham said _after_ the Battle of Crete, "The hasty conclusion that ships are impotent in the face of air attack should not be drawn from the Battle of Crete."

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Aug 21, 2014)

The Dido class was a class of sixteen (including the Bellona sub-class) light cruisers built for the Royal Navy. The design was influenced by the Arethusa-class light cruisers. The first group of three ships was commissioned in 1940, the second group (six ships) and third group (two ships) were commissioned in 1941–1942. The Bellona-class ships commissioned between 1943 to 1944.

More info 
Dido class Light cruisers - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net
Bellona class Light cruisers - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net


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## fastmongrel (Aug 21, 2014)

stona said:


> When did the 'Dido' class of cruisers come in? Their role was primarily anti-aircraft, they weren't much good for anything else.



The Didos werent AA cruisers they were Light cruisers with Dual Purpose armament. I think the original idea was they would act as Destroyer flotilla Leaders and Fleet Scouts. The AA cruisers were the modified Cs and there were plans for the Ds and Es to be modified as AA cruisers as well but there was never the time or equipment apart from HMS Delhi which was rebuilt in the USA.


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## parsifal (Aug 21, 2014)

There were four main sub-classes of Hunt Class, and each one was different. The Type Is began to appear from early 1940 and were very heavily armed for AA work. The weapon suite as designed was 4 x 4/45 QF guns Mark XVI high Angle (HA) guns, 4 x 2pdr in a quad mount. They were originally intended to carry 6 x 4in guns but were dangerously top heavy and from the outset most were finished with four guns. To try and improved stability for AA work they were fitted with stabilisers by Denny but this actually made them worse, because the steady roll of the unstabilised ships became a violent jerking motion that threw the gun predictors out of whack badly. Very late in the war, the quad pom poms were replaced by a twin 40mm bofors, greatly increasing the efficiency of their LAA. Many had 20mm and 50 cal MGs fitted as well.

The type IIs were generally introduced from 1941, were given more beam and displacement increased to 1600 tons. these ships were able to mount the intended 6x 4/45. they were probably the most successful of the Hunts, and many were given priority for radar fitouts 

Type IIIs gave up 2 x 4/45s in favour of a torpedo mount . they also mounted a pair of 2 pounder ATG bowchasers because like all the hunts their fatal weakness was a lack of range that prevented them from operating in blue ocean areas. Consequently they spent a lot of time in inshore waters battling E boats and the like.

only 2 type 4s were built, both in 1942, and had the displacement increased to 1800tons, and carried all 6 guns, plus 3 x TT

The most successful early war AA destroyers in the RN until well into 1942 was the L&M DDs finished as air warfare DSDs with 4in guns. These included some familiar names that figured very prominently in some critical AA battles.....gurkha, Lance Lively and Legion. In the latter part of 1942, through to the end of the war, most survivors shipped an additional 10 or so oerlikons additional to the quad 2 pdr they carried from the beginning. 

From 1943 new DDs began universally to receive the new 4.5 inch DP gun, vastly superior to the 4in and much more effective over the 4.7

The ASW escorts in the 1940-43 period when air attacks were most prevalent generally were heavily armed for AA work, given their small sizes. The Black Swans were the best armed with 6x4/45 and 4 2pdrs and other guns. The slops and below were lightly armed, but were never really challenged because of where they operated

well before the Diso classes were the AA conversions of the C class Light cruisers. Generally they carried 8x4/45, and initially 6 x 2pdr guns, these were generally augmented by about 10 x 20mm by late 1942. 1944-5 these ships generally received another 4 x 40mm bofors, which meant they ended the war very heavily armed. they also received the first air warfare radars in the RN and were fitted with advanced predictors and FC systems. the RN used them extensively 

The Didos were meant to be newer more heavily armed CLAAs with some anitsurface capability as wel. They bore a striking similarity to the US atlantas. As designed, it was always intended to give them 10x 5.25 DP weapons, but there were many variations to this. They were designed to carry 8 x 2 ponders with their main anti surface capability derived from the 6xTT they carried. The 5.25 was a DP weapon with semi-automatic capability. One of their disadvantages was their large TD, which meant they had top keep their distance in tyhe AA escort role. Bonaventure was completed may 1940, with additional units completed in July and September. 

The similar Bellona class overcame the TD issue 

most ships in this class received 6-8 bofords during the war, and 16-22 20mm guns. Spartan was hit by a Hs293 flying bomb and sunk


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## stona (Aug 21, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> The Didos werent AA cruisers they were Light cruisers with Dual Purpose armament.



I understand that they were to have 'greater flexibility' with their 5.25" guns than the older cruisers which were re-equipped to serve as stop gap anti aircraft vessels. I suppose that would indeed have made the Dido class 'dual purpose'. They seem to have been used extensively in an anti aircraft role.

High speed 'dodging' was a vital defence for smaller ships, particularly destroyers with their woeful anti aircraft defences. Some who were there felt that HMS Gurkha was sunk during the Norwegian campaign because her Captain was a gunnery officer who believed in the efficacy of the AA system and consequently maintained a steady gun platform 'without weaving'. Gurkha had also 'detached from screen to improve arc of fire' thus losing the protection of mutual fire from other ships.

Rear Admiral Hamilton wrote in May 1940 from the cruiser HMS Aurora: "From my experience, I think that provided one has sea room and independence of manoeuvre in a ship of this size, one is most unlikely to be hit."
He wrote this to Admiral Forbes and it was an opinion that might have had dire consequences for any attempted German cross Channel expedition in 1940.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Aug 21, 2014)

The Didos did indeed operate as AA cruisers but the original intention was a better Arethusa class. Though we know what happens to pre war plans the first time contact was made with the enemy&#128513;


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## Shortround6 (Aug 21, 2014)

The Dido class didn't start to show up until the summer of 1940 as did the Hunts. The early Hunts had two twin 4in mounts and the quad 2pdr. Later Hunts had three twin 4in and the quad. The first few war emergency DDs after the J,K,Ls had low angle (40 degree) main guns (mostly, shortages meant some ships had single 4in guns on HA mounts). 

The Dido class was biased a bit too much toward surface action. The rate of fire of the 5.25in guns was a bit low. The 80lb shells and separate loading meant the rate of fire often failed to meet the book rate depending on weather conditions. A more stable battleship might show a better rate of fire than a light cruiser. Rate of fire in sheltered waters might be a bit higher than rate of fire in a seaway (same for all guns but the heavier shells, cartridges suffer a bit more).


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## Koopernic (Aug 24, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> OK, why would would a 900 liter drop tank have less drag than an 1100lb bomb?



I'll use my reply to your post to answer others

In regards to the Ju 88 bombload range scenario. The Ju 88 had sufficient range to conduct interdiction above the UK. Try this thought experiment. The fuel capacity of the Ju 88 is 3580Litres which at 0.72kg/Litre works out at 5681lbs of fuel. At a sfc of 0.55lbs/hp/hr the 1420ps/1400hp Jumo 211J would get a theoretical endurance of 3.7 hours at full seal level emergency power, an unrealistically challenging scenario.
The ranges this gives would be
@255mph = 943 miles (this is the speed of a Ju 88A4/Jumo 211F with dive brakes and 4 x SC250 (2200lbs of 550lbs bombs). One could assume the operational radius was 40% of that since after bomb release speed would increase.
@317mph = 1172 miles (this is the speed of a Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J without dive brakes, no bomb racks. If 1400kg/3000lbsof bombs were carried by removing the bomb bay tanks fuel and range would halve to 600 miles. This scenario would in many instances require one or two bomb racks in order to carry jettison tanks and might drop top speed by 10mph.
@260mph = 962 miles (this is the speed of a Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J with dive brakes and 4 x SC250 (2200lbs of 550lbs bombs). 
@269mph = 995 miles (this is the speed of a Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J without dive brakes and bombs, the bombs appear to be 4 x SD500 (4400lbs)

The published ranges for Ju 88A4 are 1680 miles without bombs and 1260 miles with external bombs. Speed with bomb racks and dive brakes usually seem to come to 297 mph for the Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J. Two drop tanks might have allowed a fighter version to operate to nearly 2400 miles. 

By carrying bombs under the port wing and a 900L tank under the starboard would give an extra endurance i.e. 1600 miles with bombs and drop tank.

The Ju 88C6 series night fighters offer clean speeds of around 307 to 312 mph.

It's invalid to compare the Ju 88A4/A5 to aircraft such as the B-25/B-26, A-24 or Beaufighter. Apart from the fact that the Ju 88 precedes these aircraft into service by one or two years and can dive bomb to 60 degrees the other reason being that the Ju 88A paid the price for the supply of BMW 801 engine and the German lack of C3 fuel which might have allowed Jumo 211J engines an easy 8% more power by simply increasing compression ratio, without consequence to FTH, and another 15% on top of that at low altitude if a rich mixture is injected into the supercharger and the engine over boosted. 

For the record the Ju 88C3 was intended to be a BMW 801ML based fighter (1560hp using B4 fuel) but did enter production due to engine supply. A Ju 88/BMW801 engine did appear in 1943 in the form of the Ju 88R, the speed is generally published as 570km/h (353mph). More than enough to outrun a Beaufighter, the data on wwiiaircraftperformance.org shows the Beufighters performance as slower but note these aircraft were tested without flame dampers, IFF aerials, long range radio aerials or radar. 

If the Luftwaffe do wish to take on the RAF over Britain in 1941/42/43 they need to commit Ju 88's with BMW801 engines and C3 fuel. This is possible from late 1940 and certainly early 1941.

The Germans were extremely slow in supplying Ju 88C fighters. Early Ju 88C were a very poor modification with little more than a single 20mm gun and a trio of rifle calibre machine guns. Mostly Ju 88A4/A5 equipped with a 20mm MG FF mounted in place of the bombsight were used to protect U-boats against allied ASW aircraft a role they were inadequately equipped for.

Part of the reason, apart from the fact that the German navy didn't have its own air arm, is that the Me 110 had been specifically built for airfield interdiction and 'bad weather' fighting. 

The Me 109G2 (DB605F engines) had a speed of 369mph, faster than a beaufighter.

In regards to the claims about bomber maximum speed. The following arguments apply to the Do 217 but also in principle to the Ju 88.

The Dornier Do 217E had a maximum speed of 515kmh/320mph.

While the cruising speed is presented as 415kmh/258mph this does not represent the penetration speed of the aircraft. The Do 217N J night fighter with the same engine had a slightly slower speed of 495kmh/310mph (due to the night fighting equipment) but its cruising speed is 470kmh/300mph. So what is going on here? The latter 'cruising speed' is clearly at what for Luftwaffe engines is usually referred to as climb and combat power. In allied parlance military power. It would be at least a 30 minute rating and often an indefinite rating so long as engine temperature limits were observed. The Do 217E could thus penetrate, for 30 minutes, at over 300mph.

A 'cruise rating' whether maximum cruise rating is somewhat arbitrary but I suggest observe the following:
1 Mixture of the air fuel ratio is lean.
2 It is at a altitude and power setting where the throttle is near full throttle height, supercharger likely in first (low gear) so that there are no suction losses in the engine.

Much higher sustained speeds are possible at expense of fuel efficiency. 

Speeds of the Me 210 are:
Me 210A1/A2 with DB601F 350mph. This was the version with the short tail and handling issues.
Me 210C with DB605B 360mph. This was the version with the lengthened tail and slats that solved handling issues. No Me 210C were new built, they were reworked Me 210A2 excepting the new build Me 210Ca Hungary built.
Me 110G2 with DB605B had a speed of 369 mph.

The Me 210C had 2.2 x the range and could carry 2200lbs of bombs in its bomb bay with unimpaired speed. I did make a mistake saying the speed was 369 (confused with Me 110).

The Me 410 had a speed of over 388mph on a pair of 1750hp DB603A engines. Engines such as the DB603E (1800hp 1.8km higher FTH), DB603G 1900hp, DB603EM (2260hp) and DB603LA (2260-2400hp) were never fitted.

These aircraft were as fast as contemporary single stage and two stage Mosquito night fighter when weighed down with 20mm guns and radar at the altitudes in question (Mosquito used nitrous at low altitude to catch Me 410). 
The failure here for the Luftwaffe was the failure of its engines to keep up in power: the Merlin simply offered 20% more power at higher full throttle height than the DB engines.

Although the Me 410 was capable of steep diving attacks the use of the Stuvi 5B and BZA computer made shallow dives at night practical.

The performance of the Ju 88S series was:
Ju 88S1 374 mph at 6000m/20000ft, this aircraft was available from 1943 onwards.
Ju 88S1 with GM-1 at 8000m/26000ft 388mph
Ju 88S2 with turbocharged BMW801TQ engines 384mph at 10000m/32800ft. This aircraft was available from Feb 44.. It didn't need GM-1. It also used a Ju 188 fuselage which meant it had a more flexible bombay. There was also an Ju 388S3.

These speeds, at the altitudes in question, are the same as a corresponding Mosquito night fighter.

The night fighter version, Ju 88G-7, with the two stage intercooled Jumo 213E engine seems to have matched the Mosquito. 

The recon versions of the above were known as the T series (eg Ju 88T-1).

Both were replaced by the Ar 234.

When Ju 88G1 were used as supplementary night bombers the rear bomb bay was used, this sacrificed about 600L (18%) of total internal fuel. It appear that if bomb racks were fitted at all there was only 2.

Very few Ju 88S were converted from Ju 88 airframes. Given their role as pathfinders I doubt the kind of light loads they were to carry would have impaired speed.
Typical loads might include
Schwann-See radio maker buoys, dropped direct into the sea to help navigation and provide makers for Luftwaffe bombers.
Schwann-Luft radio marker buoy but descending on a parachute to 'sky mark' the target.
Schwann-Land radio marker buoy which was deposited on land (eg an field).
Parachute Flare bombs, marker bombs.

For instance in February the Luftwaffe attempted to decimate the RN fleet at Portsmouth with a night time attack of Fritz-X radio controlled bombs. The Flare dropping pathfinders turned up 20 minutes late and the raid disintegrated though had coordination and naviagation been there it might have worked.

Juha, you seem to be down on the Ju 88 as a dive bomber, even in Finnish service. The Stuvi 5B/BZA dive bombing sight was a very advanced exact sight. The pilot needed the experience to dive at the right moment. The Stuvi 5B calculated the impact point of the bombs and moved the cross hairs of the sight. It was an exact solution, no guess work, good standoff distance.


The Ju 88C6 with SN-2 radars is an anachronism as by mid 1943 the Luftwaffe was converting over to the faster Ju 88R and Ju n88G with BMW engines.

For the Luftwaffe in the east bombs were its most effective tank killers. A 500kg or 1000kg bomb within 15-20m of a tank will destroy it, not just score a mobility kill.

As far as I know there were no allied twin engine dive bombers though some were used as such with mixed success.

Back on topic.

If the Luftwaffe is to take the fight to Bomber command in 1941/42/43 it needs to invest in giving its crews the right aircraft. The best they've got is BMW engine Ju 88 with a properly tidied up airframe. I believe the aircraft if appropriately modified can take on a Mosquito if the advantage of the Ju 88 in having 3 crew and more electronics is exploited. A serious effort would require the development of a radar to use over British airspace that would not compromise the Luftwaffe's radar. I suggest they simply use the UK Army 50cm AMES frequency so that RAF attempts to home or jam on it are thwarted by interference with their own systems.


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## stona (Aug 24, 2014)

The Me 410 could carry certain loads of 1000 kg but not others. For example one SD 1000 would fit but the SC 1000 would not. Plans were made in early 1943 to modify either the SC 1000 or the 410's bomb bay but came to nothing. 
Two SD or SE 500s would fit but two SC 500s meant flying with a 10cm gap between the bomb bay doors which unsurprisingly had a deleterious effect on range and performance. There were plans to develop a special version of the SE 500 specially for the Me 410. The soon to be discontinued SD 500 was already reserved for the Me 410.
The Luftwaffe/RLM was jumping through hoops because it was committed to the Me 410 and its bomb bay was too small.
Oberst Pelz, who was having the type foisted on him as a bomber, is on the record stating that the Me 410 had remarkably poor range and offered little as a bomber. Night fighters need endurance too. He wanted Ju 188s and I don't blame him.
Cheers
Steve


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## Juha (Aug 24, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> ...
> Juha, you seem to be down on the Ju 88 as a dive bomber, even in Finnish service. The Stuvi 5B/BZA dive bombing sight was a very advanced exact sight. The pilot needed the experience to dive at the right moment. The Stuvi 5B calculated the impact point of the bombs and moved the cross hairs of the sight. It was an exact solution, no guess work, good standoff distance.



That's in theory and as in the case of the Norden, sometimes it worked in real combat situation, sometimes not. The problem is that according to the Soviet data, the air attacks had minimal impact on the Soviet tank losses during the summer of 44 battles.




Koopernic said:


> The Ju 88C6 with SN-2 radars is an anachronism as by mid 1943 the Luftwaffe was converting over to the faster Ju 88R and Ju n88G with BMW engines.



Anachronism or not, I gave the info from the original German flight tests from which one can cancalculate the real max level speed of the "clean" Ju 88C6 with and w/o the flame dampers.



Koopernic said:


> For the Luftwaffe in the east bombs were its most effective tank killers. A 500kg or 1000kg bomb within 15-20m of a tank will destroy it, not just score a mobility kill.



Same as in the first part of my answer, sometimes Soviet data confirmed German claims of the effective air attacks on Soviet tanks, sometimes not.

Juha


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## stona (Aug 24, 2014)

The 2nd TAF's ORS discovered that tanks (specifically) were not destroyed by near misses. A bomb falling 15-20m away did not destroy a tank. They required a direct hit to ensure their destruction. Many tanks were claimed as destroyed by aircraft, both by bombs and rockets, but in fact only about 1% could be confirmed by the ORS on the battlefield. It's interrogations also confirmed that tanks which had received a direct hit were not considered, by the Germans, to be worth recovering which means that the ORS teams definitely counted them.
Heavy bombers were also very bad at destroying tanks as they rarely attained the concentrations necessary to ensure direct hits. This again was confirmed by at least two ORS reports I know of.
Cheers
Steve


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## wuzak (Aug 24, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> These aircraft were as fast as contemporary single stage and two stage Mosquito night fighter when weighed down with 20mm guns and radar at the altitudes in question (Mosquito used nitrous at low altitude to catch Me 410).



I know the Mosquito used nitrous to catch V-1 flying bombs - did they actually do that for the Me 410? Bearing in mind that the V-1 could fly somewhat faster at low altitude than the Me 410.


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## mhuxt (Aug 24, 2014)

wuzak said:


> I know the Mosquito used nitrous to catch V-1 flying bombs - did they actually do that for the Me 410? Bearing in mind that the V-1 could fly somewhat faster at low altitude than the Me 410.



I know of two Mossie claims vs Me 410s (of the 68 total, though since these are claims, a number of those 68 will actually have been Ju 88s) in which nitrous was involved. The NO2 was also used in some claims against Fw 190s.

I'd doubt very much that a 410 could match any two-stage Merlin Mosquito for speed, especially with night-time flame dampers. The Hornisse is not my area of expertise though, so I'd be open to seeing some evidence.


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## Koopernic (Aug 24, 2014)

In regards to my statement that no ship was sunk by level bombers. I believe this statement to be correct in the sense that *no warship* was sunk by level bombers. The exclusion being ships in unusual circumstances such as being in dock, harbour etc. For instance German DD Z1 was a blue on blue (Luftwaffe sank it) and it clearly wasn't defending itself, IJN ammo ship Nichii Maru was a munition ship, ocean liners SS California and Duchess of York were ocean liners.

It's worth looking at the sinking of Duchess of York and SS California by Luftwaffe Focke-Wulf Fw 200C in July 1943. The Report of the attack on Convoy "Faith" by the Commander W.B.L Holms of the HMCS Iroqois ( a tribal class destroyer) is here.
Convoy Faith
Convoy Faith - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The fast 14 knot convoy consisted of 3 ships: Two liners pressed into service as troopships HMS Duchess of York and SS California and a Freighter SS Port Fairy.
The escort consisted of two destroyers, one of which was a large modern tribal class, another a 1918 era HMS Douglass Admiralty Leader Class (built as a command centre) and a river class (1500 ton) sloop HMS Moyola.

The convoy was attacked by 3 Fw 200C Condors from 15000ft (some accounts give 12000 and 10000).

The first attack was on SS Duchess of York by a single Fw 200C. The aircraft dropped a stick of 4 bombs (4 x SC250 kg) of which bombs 2 and 3 hit directly amidships. Bomb 1 and 4 straddled.
The second attack was on SS California was similarly attacked a few moments latter with a similar result.
Both ships were ablaze and sinking and were scuttled by torpedoing.

The 3rd attack was on SS Port Fairy. Only 2 bombs instead of 4, they straddled amidships. 

The 4th attack was on the already hit Duchess of York, two bombs straddling across her bow.

The 5th attack was on the HMCS Iroqoise from lower altitude, about 6000ft. This brought the Fw 200 within range of the 40 mm 2 pdr Pom Poms and the attack was driven of. It's possible the Luftwaffe pilots did not realise they were dealing with a destroyer rather than a sloop.

The 6th Attack was likely on Iroqois or Fairy. The two bombs missed the Iroqoise as the 36 knot ship accelerated and turned.

The Variant of the Fw 200C4 which had the gyrostabilised Lotfe 7D computing bombsight installed. This could track the motion of the target and compute a solution.

The Escorts were equipped with Type 291 air warning radar, a 1.4m radar with a 56 degree beam width, a PPI display that had been developed from the RAF's 1.4m ASV radar by way of an intermediate type known as type 286 (which was hard to maintain on a ship).

It was a well liked radar that gave plenty of warning but was not a AAA fire control radar though it could provide slant range (seemingly not so accurate).

The RN fire control system was known as HACS (High Angle Control System) which gets a poor write up, unfairly so in my opinion. Given the position of the target aircraft as given by optics and also an estimate of target speed and direction HACS would calculate and aim point, fuse setting time, firing time as well as track the aircraft if it went behind cloud. For years the USN had used the MK 24 which was supposedly tachymetric (speed measuring), was in the 5 inch DP turret which was pointed directly from the Mk 24 via RPC remote power control at a very high traverse rate in a turret able to elevate to vertical instead of merely 40 or 55 degrees.

However HACS was modified with GRU (Gyro Rate Units) which in convert with type 285 radar made HACS tachymetric but this seems to have made it only on cruisers and above.

However even in 1943 the modern tribal class destroyers didn't have Type 285. Type 285 was a 50cm radar that gave range to RN AAA both heavy AAA and the pom poms.

The pom pom defences used in RN ships were actually quite formidable. They were aimed by a computing sight however the gun itself was trained by follow the pointer manual control. The 40mm round was deadly and the quad and octuplet guns were water cooled and could sustain fire.

The defect was a relatively low velocity. The 40mm Bofors had a round nearly twice as heavy and a velocity 25% greater and thus nearly 2.5 times the range. This type of gun was truly the most effective.

The Germans had a semi automatic single shot 3.7cm gun with ballistics intermediate to the pom pom and bofors in which a pair of guns must sustain 60rpm. However they became reliant on the 20mm quad FLAK. This has ballistics similar to the POM POM. The gun had a good rate of fire and because two 40 round clips could by loaded while the other gun fired more or less continuous fire was possible. The Japanese used a 25mm triple gun with 15 round clips. They lacked a 37 or 40mm gun. The 25mm gun was a disaster due to its small clips and inability to sustain fire. This is probably why skip bombing worked in the east.

It's obvious that level bombers could hit moving ships especially if equipped with a computing bomb sight. However the fall time of a bomb from 3000m/10000ft is about 30-35 seconds and gives time for warship to turn and avoid.

It's interesting to consider that had the He 177 been in reliable service on schedule in 1941/42 their higher performance compared to the Fw 200 might have allowed them to sink many merchant ships thought their success against warships would have been negligible unless the never activated dive bombing capability came into use.


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## Glider (Aug 25, 2014)

Before I comment on certain parts of this can I thank you for the effort that you clearly put into this and other responses. Its really appreciated and a lot of it I cannot disagree with. That said I have a few observations. 



Koopernic said:


> I'll use my reply to your post to answer others
> 
> 
> The Ju 88C6 series night fighters offer clean speeds of around 307 to 312 mph.
> ...


I believe it is valid to compare these aircraft as they were in active service at the same time doing a similar role. They approached it in a different manner but the role was very similar.


> For the record the Ju 88C3 was intended to be a BMW 801ML based fighter (1560hp using B4 fuel) but did enter production due to engine supply. A Ju 88/BMW801 engine did appear in 1943 in the form of the Ju 88R, the speed is generally published as 570km/h (353mph). More than enough to outrun a Beaufighter, the data on wwiiaircraftperformance.org shows the Beufighters performance as slower but note these aircraft were tested without flame dampers, IFF aerials, long range radio aerials or radar.


By 1943 you are up against the Mosquito which was more than enough to combat the Ju88


> If the Luftwaffe do wish to take on the RAF over Britain in 1941/42/43 they need to commit Ju 88's with BMW801 engines and C3 fuel. This is possible from late 1940 and certainly early 1941.


But in 1940/41 the Ju88 would not have the radar which gives the Beaufighter a serious advantage


> The Me 109G2 (DB605F engines) had a speed of 369mph, faster than a beaufighter.


Again when you are talking about the introduction of the G2 you should compare it against the Mosquito to get a good timeline comparison.


> The night fighter version, Ju 88G-7, with the two stage intercooled Jumo 213E engine seems to have matched the Mosquito.


Again to keep similar timelines I think the Mosquito Mk 30 should be the comparison which had a number of advantages over the Ju88G series. Three squadrons of which had a huge impact on the night war over Germany despite operating without ground control. If the Ju88 had been a close competitor the Luftwaffe wouldn't have put significant scarce resources into the hunt to find anything that could take on the mosquito at night.


> As far as I know there were no allied twin engine dive bombers though some were used as such with mixed success.


I don't now of any allied dive bombers used in Europe. Again its tactics the Allied air forces achieved the same goal using different tactics.


> If the Luftwaffe is to take the fight to Bomber command in 1941/42/43 it needs to invest in giving its crews the right aircraft. The best they've got is BMW engine Ju 88 with a properly tidied up airframe. I believe the aircraft if appropriately modified can take on a Mosquito if the advantage of the Ju 88 in having 3 crew and more electronics is exploited. A serious effort would require the development of a radar to use over British airspace that would not compromise the Luftwaffe's radar. I suggest they simply use the UK Army 50cm AMES frequency so that RAF attempts to home or jam on it are thwarted by interference with their own systems.



There is no doubt that the Luftwaffe would need to equip its aircrew with the right tools but in my mind the Ju88 was never a contender to take on the Mosquito. Generally it lacked speed and if it was 'tweeked' these normally added weight which in turn would impact the performance. It also lacked a comparable radar.

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## Juha (Aug 25, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> In regards to my statement that no ship was sunk by level bombers. I believe this statement to be correct in the sense that *no warship* was sunk by level bombers. The exclusion being ships in unusual circumstances such as being in dock, harbour etc. For instance German DD Z1 was a blue on blue (Luftwaffe sank it) and it clearly wasn't defending itself, IJN ammo ship Nichii Maru was a munition ship, ocean liners SS California and Duchess of York were ocean liners...



In fact Z1 was sailing with other DDs at night when the He 111 saw them and two of the DDs openned fire first (not Z1) and the AA fire was the final proof to the He 111 crew that the DDs were hostile. But it is true that when the He 111 made its first attack on Z1, which 1st officer had identified the bomber as friendly, the DD openned fire too late. But during the second, fatal attack Z1 openned fire when it saw the bomber.

Light cruisers like Abukuma are definitely war ships, as were torpedo boats (they were like small DDs, not to be confused with the motor torpedo boats).

And newer RN sloops had better AA than an average RN DD. See e.g. Bittern, Egret and Black Swan classes


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## Juha (Aug 25, 2014)

On Ju 88G-7, according to Aders' History of the German Night Fighter Force 1917 - 1945 p. 186 it was not mass produced, only 10 - 12 were made and it never served in an operational unit, after completing tests some were flown by a Factory Defence Flight.

And you have not answered my earlier question, from were you would have got the BMW 801Ds and the C3, by limiting 190 production and use or...?

Juha


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