# The F4F / FM-2 alone would have won the war in the PTO



## Broncazonk (Sep 27, 2009)

After reading several detailed accounts of the carrier battles at Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, and the air combat over Guadalcanal, I'm becoming convinced that the US navy could have achieved TOTAL air superiority over Japan by 1944 with the F4F Wildcat and certainly with the FM-2 alone (The F6F and F4U were completely unneccessary.) Darn near every time the Japanese attacked anything-anywhere they lost 50% of the strike force from the deadly combination of radar - AA fire - the Wildcat CAP.

When a Zero shot up a Wildcat, it seems the Wildcat made it home more often than not. When a Wildcat shot up a Zero, it caught on fire and then the wings fell off killing the pilot. The Vals and Kates were just as bad. 

The attrition of the Solomons destroyed Japanese carrier aviation. After Santa Cruz, Japanese naval aviation in both men and machines were a shadow of it's former self and by 1943, it was a ghost of a shadow.

Bronc


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## syscom3 (Sep 27, 2009)

And what about the allied air units in New Guinea? Did they do anything?

What about the allied air forces in Burma? Just drink tea and eat biscuits?


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## B-17engineer (Sep 27, 2009)

Hi Bronc,

I'm not sure that the F4F/FM-2 could win the war. Do you mean as a fighter and multi-role? Or just a fighter? Plus, Japan had good planes towards the end of the war that could do some damage.


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## Broncazonk (Sep 27, 2009)

The universal utilization of the F4F / FM-2 by all Allied forces in the PTO (regardless of where they were based) would have resulted in complete air superiority by 1944. Hell, I think the P-40 could have done it. 

Bronc


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## lesofprimus (Sep 27, 2009)

I personally think u ate too many purple mushroom caps.... This is one of the silliest things Ive seen on this board....


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## JoeB (Sep 27, 2009)

Wildcats as only carrier fighters would probably not have prevented an Allied victory in the Pacific War, so great was Allied numerical superiority becoming by 1944; but it would have made it a much harder slog, with undoubtedly more carrier losses (note that while CV's operating F4F's at least one CV was seriously hit or sunk in almost every case where carrier TF's came under Japanese air attack, compare that to the F6F period), as well as more losses among escorted attack a/c. The FM-2 handled itself pretty well even against later Japanese fighter types when it met them, in the overall circumstances of combat at that time, but had major deficiencies in speed as interceptor, and in range as offensive fighter, compared to the F6F and F4U, which also meant more risk to carriers.

For land based fighters, range was an even more important factor since getting closer wasn't just a matter of ramping up risk to a carrier by moving it closer to its target but having to seize more islands and bases and bypass fewer of them, since each new base had to be within land based fighter range of the previous one (moving up the coast of New Guinea, for example, carriers generally not available in that theater).

P-40's did widely serve until 1945 in China, and also did well enough, real outcomes in the range of 1:1 or even a bit better against even the later Japanese fighter types, and generally had some advantage over the Army Type 1, their main opponent for most of the war. The Japanese were so outnumbered that 1:1 fighter kill ratio, broadly what they could hope for with the Type 1 and Zero against well flown P-40's and F4F's, wasn't anywhere near good enough from their POV. But from Allied POV, the extra advantage of the later fighters was very welcome in pure fighter combat, and as mentioned it had other important implications such as carrier losses with F4F/FM rather than F6F's and having to stage landings supported by land based fighters at closer intervals with P-40 compared to P-38 (or other long range fighters).

Joe


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## Broncazonk (Sep 27, 2009)

*In battles of Attrition, the side with the most ALWAYS wins.*

In a hypothetical PTO air campaign lets give the Zero a whopping 50% kill advantage over the
Wildcat (it wasn't even 1:1, but just for discussion.) Each side starts the campaign with 100 aircraft 
AND on each day of combat the Zeros down 20 Wildcats. The Zeros are NOT replaced, because
they weren't able to (neither pilot nor machine) but the US is able replace it's loses every day 
(which it did.)

Day 1 - 100:100 - Zeros down 20 Wildcats and Wildcats down 10 Zeros
Day 2 - 90:100 - Zeros down 20 Wildcats / Wildcats down 10 Zeros
Day 3 - 80:100
Day 4 - 70:100
...
...
...
...
Day 9 - 20:100
Day 10 - 10:100
Day 11 - 0:100

In eleven days Zeros downed twice the number of Wildcats, and the loss of Wildcat pilots and 
aircraft caused a temporary strain on local resources, BUT the Japanese lost ALL their Zeros 
AND the campaign. They won every battle, but lost the campaign.

When the Wildcat is given a 1:1 kill ratio (which still shorts the Wildcat) the Japanese situation 
becomes a whole lot worse awhole lot quicker.

Bronc


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Sep 27, 2009)

Sorry Bronc, as much as I love the F4F, there's a slim chance we would've won the Pacific campaign with just it. The Japanese were developing more advanced fighters later in the war. Planes such as the George and Tony could outperform the F4F, not the mention the allied countries in the parts of Asia using second-rate fighters.


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## syscom3 (Sep 27, 2009)

Broncazonk said:


> *In battles of Attrition, the side with the most ALWAYS wins.*
> 
> In a hypothetical PTO air campaign lets give the Zero a whopping 50% kill advantage over the
> Wildcat (it wasn't even 1:1, but just for discussion.) Each side starts the campaign with 100 aircraft
> ...



Where do you get this 50% superiority ratio?


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## Broncazonk (Sep 27, 2009)

Now what are the odds that the Zeros will down 20 Wildcats everyday when their numbers
are decreasing by 10% plus EVERY day? Actual attrition would look something like this...

Day 1 - 100:100 - Zeros down 20 Wildcats and Wildcats down 10 Zeros
Day 2 - 90:100 - Zeros down 18 Wildcats / Wildcats down 10 Zeros
Day 3 - 80:100 - Zeros down 16 Wildcats / Wilcats down 12 Zeros
Day 4 - 68:100 - Zeros down 13 Wilcats / Wildcats down 15 Zeros
Day 5 - 53:100 - Zeros down 10 Wildcats / Wildcats down 20 Zeros
Day 6 - 33:100 - Zeros down 5 Wildcats / Wildcats down 33 Zeros
Day 7 - 0:100 -

And again, the kill ratio DID NOT favor the Zeros by 50%. *It was 1:1 or even worse for the Zero.*

*Attrition means you have to show up EVERY SINGLE day with men and machines or you lose...PERIOD.*

Bronc


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Sep 27, 2009)

Okay buddy, do you mind posting your facts, via link or text. I'm just not fathoming your data.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 27, 2009)

Let's just say, for the sake of the argument, that the U.S. Navy did keep the Wildcat as the backbone of thier fleet. Outliving the A6M by virtue of attrition is a pretty costly decision, both in human lives and material.

You also need to take into consideration that the Japanese did not operate only the A6M series, but had some extremely deadly aircraft being developed and deployed later in the war. Just for example, the KI-61 and KI-100, were very capable of tearing a Wildcat to shreds, and went head to head with the best the Allies had to offer. Fortunately, they were a bit late and too few in numbers (like many later Axis aircraft) to do any good.

Had the Wildcat been kept in service in significent numbers late in the war, instead of allowing newer and more powerful aircraft take the lead, there would have been real trouble for the Allies.


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## Broncazonk (Sep 27, 2009)

I made it up. (Re-read the post.) It's an absurdly inaccurate number used to prove a point. The Zero 
DID NOT even have a 1:1 kill ratio, much less a 2:1 kill ratio.

In warfare QUANITY KILLS QUALITY EVERY TIME.

Mk VI Tiger tank vs. T-34 - Give the Tiger a 20-1 kill ratio.
(It was more like 10-1) The Russians did not care. They showed 
up with a 50-1 advantage in tank numbers EVERY time.

Give the Luftwaffe 3000 Me-262's in operation against 15,000 P-51's, P-47's, P-38's,
Spitfires, Tempests, Typhoons, etc. etc. and it does not matter. The Me-262's are
cleared from the skies in very short order.

If you can't show up EVERY SINGLE DAY in equal numbers, YOU LOSE.

Bronc


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Sep 27, 2009)

Buddy, you still haven't answered my question. And take Grau's statement into consideration.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 27, 2009)

I'm not sure if the "Meat Grinder" style of warfare is all that effective. It's been used time and again over the ages, but you can produce faster results by besting your opponent by having a superior weapon.

That's also a fine balancing act, because German equipment was "too superior" but not in enough quantities. On the otherhand, having superior numbers of inferior equipment eats up manpower and resources that could have been better used elsewhere.

I think that the Wildcat served it's purpose, but the U.S. Navy upgrading it's equipment as it became available, meant that the pilots were better protected and were able to reduce the enemy's numbers while bringing home thier machines. This would be preferable because it's one less aircraft to replace and one less pilot to train...and one less bad guy to worry about.

That's the main objective, afterall...isn't it?


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Sep 28, 2009)

Yup, the US developed superior aircraft to the F4F, such as the Hellcat and the Corsair. It's better to maximize the enemy losses, and minimize your own. And one of those ways is to develop better aircraft, right?


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## claidemore (Sep 28, 2009)

Great theory Bronc, but do you want to be the guy who's life gets wasted so your side can win by attrition? 

Kinda silly when your side could just as easily provide you with a better plane and keep you alive to father the kids who post on these forums?


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## syscom3 (Sep 28, 2009)

Im still waiting to see these 50% supremecy stats.


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## Graeme (Sep 28, 2009)

Broncazonk said:


> The Zeros are NOT replaced, because
> they weren't able to



But they did, at least up until 1944. Aircraft production increased steadily between 1941 and 1944. Your theory may work post 44' but how long will it take and how many extra allied lives?

Dave said it best... 



GrauGeist said:


> Outliving the A6M by virtue of attrition is a pretty costly decision, both in human lives and material.


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## Broncazonk (Sep 28, 2009)

Hey Vassili:

I'm not sure what you want. There is no text or link to post and I have already shown that 
a 2:1 "quality" advantage is absolutely immaterial when your opponent VASTLY out-paces 
you in the replacement of aircraft and pilots.

Sure the war in the Pacific would have been longer and bloodier for the Allies with only the
F4F / FM-2, but the fact remains the outcome would have never been in doubt whatsoever. 
I'm not saying we should have stayed with the Wildcat. I'm just saying we could have.

The Japanese could have been flying limited numbers of Mig-15's / F-86's and still lost control
of the air. A 100 Mig-15's against 1000 Wildcats and it's NOT EVEN CLOSE. The Wildcats
win in a matter of days.

Bronc


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## GrauGeist (Sep 28, 2009)

Broncazonk said:


> ...The Japanese could have been flying limited numbers of Mig-15's / F-86's and still lost control
> of the air. A 100 Mig-15's against 1000 Wildcats and it's NOT EVEN CLOSE. The Wildcats
> win in a matter of days...


The Japanese were on the verge of deploying thier own combat jets...the KI-201 Karyu (The Nakajima Kikka was unarmed)...and that could have spelled disaster for the Wildcat.

Understand that in the European Theater, the P-51D was able to best the Me262 *if* it had the advantage. The Karyu was very similiar to the '262, and that meant superior speed and armament (cannon equipped). Had the Karyu encountered the Wildcat, it wouldn't have been a contest. Unlike the P-51D which had speed and manoverability on it's side, the Wildcat would have been dead meat as soon as the Karyu pilots adjusted thier tactics.

Don't dogfight a jet against a prop job...use your superior speed and firepower to thin 'em out. Shoot 'em up and climb out of trouble...you can pick and choose your fight with those odds.


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## Broncazonk (Sep 28, 2009)

The reason why the Japanese had 4 carriers at Midway instead of 5 is that they couldn't
come up with replacement pilots or aircraft for the undamaged Zuikaku. It's air-group was
decimated at Coral Sea. (Worse than decimated, which is only 10% - the loss was approaching 
50%.) Between the Shōkaku air-group and Zuikaku's, they still didn't have enough.
(Read "Shattered Sword - The Battle of Midway" it's DEFINITIVE as to this point.) 

The reason why the Shōkaku, Zuikaku and Junyo's air-groups were way under-strength at 
Santa Cruz is because of Midway, the air battles over Guadalcanal and the battle of the Eastern Solomons.

The Japanese were having a hard time replacing pilots and aircraft in 1942 and it just got worse and worse in 1943 and it became a disaster in 1944.

BTW.. SYSCOM3... please just glance at my previous posts where I CLEARLY explain the 50% stat -and if you still can't figure it out, send me a PM...!

Bronc


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Sep 28, 2009)

Grau's got it right. 1000 wildcats are no match for your hypothetical Mig-15s.

Edit: read Shattered Sword, it goes into detail why the Zuikaku's air group wasn't replenished in time. Big hint, it wasn't because of a shortage.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 28, 2009)

The Japanese still had considerable land-based assets though...and while they may not have had enough Naval assets to stop the Allies at sea, the Allies still needed access to thier targets, which was over land...

The IJN and IJA were still able to field defenders against Allied bombers and fighter sweeps right up to the end of the war, so while they may have been down, they definately weren't out...


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## Broncazonk (Sep 28, 2009)

Page 10: "In addition to [the Midway carriers], two other carriers ought to have been sortied [Shokaku and Zuikaku.] Zuikaku was nominally operational, *but her air-group was not and would not be fully reconstituted for months."*

Page 90: *"When the war had opened, Kido Butai's air groups had been full strength, although without as many spare aircraft as would have been optimal. But by June 1942, the situation had deteriorated. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Akagi had carried sixty-six aircraft; now she had just fifty-four. Kaga had been cut from seventy-five to sixty-three. Soryu and Hiryu had come down from sixty-three apiece to fifty-four apiece. Nominally, each squadron (fighter, bomber, and torpedo bomber) should have been allotted three spare aircraft, for a total of nine per ship. None were now carried by any ship in Kido Butai, and Kaga was the only ship that still retained an oversized squadron of twenty-seven torpedo bombers. The rest of the ships were all operating eighteen aircraft squadrons, with no spares. In a nutshell, each of the Kido Butai carriers had suffered a 16 percent decrease in their fighting power since December. Any casualties to the operating air groups, even damaged aircraft, would immediately impact the tactical cohesion of the air units, since there were no spare aircraft to feed into the formations. ... Nagumo thus had a grand total of 248 aircraft aboard his ships. By way of comparison, Kido Butai's six carriers had brought around 412 aircraft to the Pearl Harbor operation. Nagumo was thus fighting the decisive battle with only 60 percent of the airpower he might reasonably have expected as recently as May."*

Page 91: *"If the aircraft situation was threadbare in the frontline carriers, it was far worse in the second-line carrier divisions. They were scraping up pilots and aircraft in any way they could to try and cobble together air groups, yet in most cases were falling short. Junyo's case is illustrative. Recently comimssioned, she was designed to carry fifty-four aircraft. Her dive-bonber group seems to have been reasonably intact and was composed of fifteen Type 99 aircraft. Her fighter group, however, was another matter. It was still in the midst of being activated and was in complete disarray. Twelve of the eighteen Zeros on board ship were actually aircraft from the 6th Ku. Yet 6th Ku was itself three planes and several pilots short of its nominal thirty-six plane establishment (the remaining twenty-one aircraft being with Nagumo). Not only that but 6th Ku apparently didn't have enough aviators to man its own aircraft. Nor could Junyo's aviators fill all the gaps. Indeed, Junyo's air group for the battle contained only five of its own pilots. The remainder were four 6th Ku pilots, a trio of aviators (one of whom was fresh out of flight school) on temporary attached duty (TAD) from Shokaku, and two more TAD fliers from Ryujo!"*

* DEFINITIVE* proof I would say ... *and this was BEFORE Midway!!*

Bronc


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## jamierd (Sep 28, 2009)

yes if you send hundreds of ouclaased men and equipment against fewer quality men and equipment you will win .
but can your conscience deal with the fact that you could have saved lives by using better equipment.It is the job of any person in the military to save lives that goes from the bottom to the top ,so if you as a commander have the chance to save lives by using newwer moire advanced hardware you have to take it to save the lives of your troops .It is not just about destroying the enemy you have to achieve that with as few losses to your own men as possible (unless of course your name is Stalin )


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 28, 2009)

The F-4F came out of combats with the early Zeros about even in terms of kills, at least for the first few years of the war.

There was a saying though that when a Wildcat faced a Zero 1:1, it was outnumbered. The US managed to implement superior strategic control and developed tactics to limit the Zero's advantages, nullifying much of its early success.

It is possible to argue that the Wildcat alone may have been sufficient to ensure Allied victory in the pacific, at least as far as US carrier-borne fighters go. The Wildcat airframe/engine development was not pushed as hard as Zero development, but this is probably because the USN had better things coming, while the Japanese had little luck with their Zero replacements, the J2M and N1K1.

The FM-2 was decisively better than its opponents, but the most important contributing factor to success was pilot skill. Japanese pilot skill declined as the war pressed on, while US pilot skill only improved. A telling factor in this debate. 

The quality vs quantity argument does have some abstract mathematical advantage, but when you are taking real soldiers into battle, and risking real lives, it quickly becomes meaningless.

There is no point in bringing just quantity, when the US had the luxury of bringing both quantity AND quality.

Mathematically, you could argue that the USN could of done the same job with the F2A, the FB or the FF. Ultimately you could argue in favour of the Wright Flyer armed with a .22 starters pistol. But, would YOU want to go up in combat like that? And, if you were in charge, could you send your troops into battle so armed, knowing there was better equipment out there?

Never discount the effect of morale in warfare.

Turning to the possibility of an all Wildcat USN, you see several major disadvantages:
*
Range:* The F4F is outclassed by both the F6F and F4U in terms of range: Its 830 mile internal fuel range and 1,275 mile range with external tanks gives it a maximum combat radius of about 325 miles.

In comparison, the F6F has a max combat radius of about 375 miles, and the F4U and max radius of about 555 miles. Both can search further, longer for the enemy, an important fact given the distances involved in the Pacific War. 

*Time to height:* The relatively underpowered F4F requires 12.4 minutes to get to 20,000 feet, almost five minutes longer than the F6F (7.7 minutes to 20,000 ft) and more than five minutes longer than the F4U (7.1 minutes).

This is a serious disadvantage in terms of interception potential. While the F4F is still climbing to 20,000 feet, the F4U has covered an additional 12-18 miles of distance in the climb (depending on load), then leveled out and done another 22-26 miles. 

*Fighter bombing:* The F4F is limited to a minute 200 lbs bombload, and its range suffers immensely when carrying bombs. The later FM-2 can carry 2 x 250 lbs. The F4U and F6F were both rated for 2,000 lbs plus, with F4Us known to have conducted missions with 3,000 lbs of bombs, plus drop tanks.

Supporting the troops effectively in landings is going to be vastly more difficult with the Wildcat. 

I'm sure you could add other stuff in, such as speed to intercept, better serviceability of the F6F ect, ect, buyt I hope I've added some talking points.


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## Juha (Sep 28, 2009)

Some thoughs
As JoeB wrote, in fact FM-2 in real world could handle newer JAAF fighters, as it showed in Philippines but it lacked range of F6F and was slower, so USN carrier strikes would have been launched nearer to targets and also CAPs would have been less effective. But FM-2 was better than many seem to think.

Juha


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## Shortround6 (Sep 28, 2009)

Another thing is while with hindsight we KNOW that the Japanese didn't come up with a good replacement for the Zero or even a significantly improved Zero until late in the war, the American war planners could not have depended on that. 
What if we had commited to an all F4F fighter force and the Japanese had decided to Stuff a larger engine in the Zero (see A6M8) and fit selfsealing tanks earlier?
Or what if the Japanese had come out with 1500hp carrier fighter in mid/late 1943 instead of trying to build land based interceptors?


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## Broncazonk (Sep 28, 2009)

Again, after reading Shattered Sword, Carrier Strike, Carrier Battles, Fleet Tactics (among others) I believe the US could have obtained complete air superiority over Japan (not mainland Japan) by the end of 1944 using the Wildcat / FM-2 exclusively. The central idea in all of this is the validity of the * Lanchester Concentration Equation* to aerial combat. 

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/math/pdf/0606/0606300v1.pdf *

(To a mathematical certainty: A commander is better off with twice as many units of force than with units of force with twice the rate of effective firepower.)[*SIZE="2"][/SIZE]

Of-course we should have brought on the F6F and F4U and P-51, P-47, P-38, Spitfire etc. into the game. 

However, the phenomenal effect and ramifications of the Lanchester equation explains how the Russians survived and won in the air and on the ground against the Germans, why Lee, Jackson and Longstreet never stood a chance, and why cancelling the F-22 was a good idea (if we will now buy four F-15E's for the price of a single F-22.)

Bronc [/SIZE]


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## GrauGeist (Sep 28, 2009)

Well, as far as the Russians are concerned, it wasn't as much about over-whelming the Germans with men and materials as it was the German's crappy supply system and equipment designed for European conditions and not soggy Russian terrain...


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## Broncazonk (Sep 28, 2009)

GrauGeist wrote: _"Well, as far as the Russians are concerned, it wasn't as much 
about over-whelming the Germans with men and materials as it was the German's crappy 
supply system and equipment designed for European conditions and not soggy Russian terrain..."_

Wow, is that ever right. The more I read about the limitations of German field logistics and 
the near miracles performed in Russia by German supply staff officers to keep the army 
and Luftwaffe intact.... Amazing...

The German supply system in Russia was essentially based on thousands of horses pulling 
heavily laden wagons across endless miles of muddy/frozen steppe.

Hitler said, "All we have to do is kick down the door and the whole rotten thing will come down." 

Well...

Bronc


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## drgondog (Sep 28, 2009)

BZ - you want to apply your theory of mass versus quality and illustrate say Iraqi T-72's against M-1's, or delve into F-15 in hands of Israeli's vs Arabs..

Your thesis is absurdly simple - make your case for gaining air superiority over Truk, Rabaul, Japan, Okinawa, etc - with just F4-F in play.. literally no land based bomber can penetrate enemy airspace with CAP. The USN can Not gain NUMERICAL air superiority against land based fighters until well into 1944 - simply because there weren't enough carriers.

The losses for air campaigns either land or sea skyrocket, losing too many good pilots to capitaize on number superiority. 

Your thesis is a reasonable analogy if say P-40/Spit I are only escort fighters in ETO. 8th BC disappears in a cloud of fertilizer long befor invasion and daylight bombing stops - because the fighters can't go past France and Holland - and will not compete well against LW's progressive development.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 28, 2009)

Bronc, your posts are almost entertaining. Do you have any idea how inaccurate some of your statistics are. Read Bloody Shambles and investigate the TRUE kill loss ratio of the SWPT and I think you might eventually float down to earth.


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## Broncazonk (Sep 28, 2009)

Because the book proves my point rather conclusively.

During the battle of Singapore, British air cover was intially provided by (only 1) RAF No. 232 Squadron, based at Kallang. Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang were in range of Japanese artillery, Kallang was the only operational airstrip left and the other squadrons were withdrawn from Singapore by January. 232 Squadron performed well, but was *outnumbered* and *it suffered severe losses*, both in the air and on the ground during February. The only reliable aircraft left was the Hawker Hurricane, but* only ten were left in Singapore when the Japanese invaded*. 51 Hurricane Mk II fighters had been sent to Singapore with 24 pilots. The Buffalo squadrons having already been overwhelmed. No. 232 Squadron was formed and became operational on 20 January, destroying three Ki-43s that day for the loss of three Hurricanes. However, like the Buffalos before them, the Hurricanes *were out-numbered and began to suffer severe losses.*

During the period 27 January–30 January, another 48 Hurricanes (Mk IIA) arrived with No. 226 Group (four squadrons) on the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable. The staggered arrival of the Hurricanes, along with inadequate early warning systems, meant *Japanese air raids destroyed a large proportion of the Hurricanes on the ground in Sumatra and Singapore.*

On the morning of 8 February, a number of aerial dogfights took place over Sarimbun Beach and other western areas.* In the first encounter, the last ten Hurricanes of 232 Sqn were scrambled from Kallang Airfield to intercept a Japanese formation of about 84 planes, flying from Johore to provide air cover for their invasion force.* Air battles went on over the island for the rest of the day, and by nightfall it was clear that with the few machines Percival had left Kallang could no longer be used as a base. With Percival's assent the remaining Hurricanes were withdrawn to Palembang, Sumatra. No allied aircraft were seen again over Singapore and the Japanese had full control of the skies.

As to the nonsense from *drgondog*, during Operation Mole Cricket, the Israeli airforce launched 96 F-15's and F-16's. The Syrians lanched almost exactly the same number. The Syrians did not have numerical superiority. 

How can this concept be so hard to understand and accept? Just put some variables in the equations and do the math. It's not like I invented Lanchester's equations! They have been around since 1914 and are pretty fundamental to military strategy. 

Bronc


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 28, 2009)

Broncazonk said:


> Because the book proves my point rather conclusively.
> 
> During the battle of Singapore, British air cover was intially provided by (only 1) RAF No. 232 Squadron, based at Kallang. Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang were in range of Japanese artillery, Kallang was the only operational airstrip left and the other squadrons were withdrawn from Singapore by January. 232 Squadron performed well, but was *outnumbered* and *it suffered severe losses*, both in the air and on the ground during February. The only reliable aircraft left was the Hawker Hurricane, but* only ten were left in Singapore when the Japanese invaded*. 51 Hurricane Mk II fighters had been sent to Singapore with 24 pilots. The Buffalo squadrons having already been overwhelmed. No. 232 Squadron was formed and became operational on 20 January, destroying three Ki-43s that day for the loss of three Hurricanes. However, like the Buffalos before them, the Hurricanes *were out-numbered and began to suffer severe losses.*
> 
> ...



Ok - and how does that prove your point?!?!?!?


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## Broncazonk (Sep 29, 2009)

Maybe we should change the subject. Do you like the wings of an airplane or the horizontal stabilizers better?

Bronc


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## lesofprimus (Sep 29, 2009)

Dude, ur a fu*kin retard and about to get ur ass seriously bounced by the high cover....


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 29, 2009)

Broncazonk said:


> Maybe we should change the subject. Do you like the wings of an airplane or the horizontal stabilizers better?
> 
> Bronc



Bronc, I'm giving you a time out - re-evaluate your Prozac dosage and then come back here when you're not going to be a moron


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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2009)

There is a thread over on Tanknet that talks about the "Lanchester's equations".

According to one poster they were designed to deal with liner battlefeilds (ancient battles) with hand weapons and don't work to well with ranged weapons (guns) lt alone 3 dimensional warfare.

Don't know if this is true, but misaplication of formulas does lead to bad resluts.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Sep 29, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> There is a thread over on Tanknet that talks about the "Lanchester's equations".
> 
> According to one poster they were designed to deal with liner battlefeilds (ancient battles) with hand weapons and don't work to well with ranged weapons (guns) lt alone 3 dimensional warfare.
> 
> Don't know if this is true, but misaplication of formulas does lead to bad resluts.



Interesting.


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## DBII (Sep 29, 2009)

The magic number has always been 3:1 for a minimum chance of getting the win. It does not matter what time frame the battle occurs. Weapons systems like aircraft, cmbt engrs, and fascam are called combat multipliers. They are factored into the mix to account for the 3D battle field. The old USSR military were masters at battle field equations. Overall there could be a 3:1 or 4:1 advantage but one command would attack at 1:1 or 2:1 odds in one area in order to get a 7:1 in the main avenue of attack. The formulas are just another planing tool. It is like the OPORD, once you hit the LD you throw it out the window.

DBII


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## Guns'n'Props (Sep 29, 2009)

Hey guys I know I'm the new kid on the block but the Russians used to say something like "there is a certain quality about quantity" which is kind of what"Broncazonk may be trying to say.

Now I agree with other points mentioned like The USN were steadily getting better pilots / planes whilst the Japanese could not keep the pace. Again it may also be possible that the F4F / FM2 had the measure of what was left of the IJN / JAF but as some others said 
1.)we know all this in hindsight 
2.)why waste the lives when you have more effective weapons. 

So theoretically if I was Nimitz / MacArthur with 100 Million pilots and F4Fs to spare well why not.
Thankfully reason prevailed 

BTW Broncazonk I really liked the Civil War analogy.


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## Messy1 (Sep 29, 2009)

I do not think this is a totally false statement as other have said, I just think it would have been too costly in human lives overall for many reasons to have just stuck with the Wildcat. The Japanese stuck with the Zero way too long after it was outclassed by many Allied fighters, and because of this lost most of their experienced pilots due to this after the Zeros weaknesses had been found out, and after faster, more maneuverable planes had been developed and introduced by the Allies.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2009)

Japanese may have stuck with "unimproved" models of the Zero or only minor improvements much too long.

It would not have really altered the course of the war but instead of getting limited design and engineering staff to design the "NEXT" great leap forward in fighter design they might have spent more effort in refining what they did have.

Easy to say now

But look at the number of other fighters that entered service in 1940 that were improved over the years.
While the Zero was changed and went through modifications they were of minor natures.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 30, 2009)

If the Japanese had at least upgraded thier fuel tanks with self-sealing tanks, that would have slowed the catastrophic losses both in pilots and aircraft.

I know the armor issue had been addressed and they were reluctant to add armor because of the compromise in performance, although some folks say the lack of armor was accepting that thier aircraft was inferior, I believe the former was more accurate.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 30, 2009)

The Zero was used by Japanese Navy units. How about all the other fighters introduced by the IJN as well as the JAAF? Could the Wildcat or FM-2 supported the tactical air to ground campaign over Rabaul and New Guinea carried out by the AAF 5th AF???? Could it had supported the tactical air to ground role performed at Saipan, Iwo, or Okinawa? There's more to this than just comparing the air to air role the Wildcat and FM-2.


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## syscom3 (Sep 30, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The Zero was used by Japanese Navy units. How about all the other fighters introduced by the IJN as well as the JAAF? Could the Wildcat or FM-2 supported the tactical air to ground campaign over Rabaul and New Guinea carried out by the AAF 5th AF???? Could it had supported the tactical air to ground role performed at Saipan, Iwo, or Okinawa? There's more to this than just comparing the air to air role the Wildcat and FM-2.



And could the Wildcat handle the Kamikazi threat? The Hellcat and Corsair had all they could handle for that role, let alone an inferior AC like the Wildcat.


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## Nikademus (Oct 1, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> And could the Wildcat handle the Kamikazi threat? The Hellcat and Corsair had all they could handle for that role, let alone an inferior AC like the Wildcat.



Nope. Climb rate and speed was the premiums when dealing with that threat.


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## JoeB (Oct 1, 2009)

As already mentioned, the FM-2 could handle later Japanese fighers, in the overall circumstances at the time. That was shown in operations in the Philippines where CVE's were left pretty much on their own. The FM-2's claimed result for all of Sep '44-end of war, v the Type 3 (Tony) for example was 29:0, a claim but OTOH Type 3's proved unable to down FM-2's. FM-2's also downed Type 4's (Frank). And the FM-2's overall claimed fighter v fighter ratio was 26:1 v 15+ for both F6F in F4U in that same period, Sep 44-end of war. Many of the claims in all cases were fighter types serving as kamikazes, but there's no evidene the FM-2 was a much less capable fighter combat a/c in actual practice, against those opponents at that time. Only around 15-20% of F6F and F4U fighter combat losses were against the latest types (Frank, George, Jack) per USN stats, most of the opposition remained the older types, anyway.

Intercepting kamikazes OTOH was a weakness of the FM-2, although again it could do it, in the Lingayen Gulf landings the CVE's alone protected the landing force, which underwent intense kamikaze attacks and suffered a number of hits, but numerous enough kamikazes always had some successes. So the FM-2 could and did perform that role, but its slow speed was a definite practical weakness, whereas in fighter combat it was also a weakness in theory, but it's hard to find evidence it made much difference in practice.

FM-2's served as ground support fighter bombers more often than CV/CVL based F6F's. The FM-2 carried a lighter load, but fighter bomber results against land targets, especially well concealed Japanese field fortifications, were not usually very dramatic anyway. The main effect was on morale of friendly ground forces. And F6F's and F4U's didn't sink many ships. So, the FM-2 was a lesser fighter bomber but I don't think that makes much difference.

The problem with intercepting fast attackers is the most serious deficiency of the FM-2 in late war operations, especially since it wouldl ikely lead to higher ship losses. 

Joe


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## R Leonard (Oct 1, 2009)

There is probably no bigger F4F booster on the board than yours truly - wouldn't be here without it.

I agree with Dan, this is a silly proposition. Bring on the Hellcats and Corsairs!!!

Rich


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## Heartattack (Oct 1, 2009)

After reading this post I cant help but wonder what the guys who flew from Henderson Field would have done if the F4U and the P-38F had not shown up when they did. Japanese aircraft as a whole where very good aircraft and more than a match for nearly every type they flew against, American or Allied. Yes they were lightly built and were not as well armored as ours, but you miss the only point that matters. PILOT QUALITY The japanese could not replace the experienced pilots and by the end of the war the average training given to the student pilot was little more than learning how to take off. Our war in the Pacific was a bloody, savage battle that cost thousands of dead and wounded. 

Heartattack out.


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## vanir (Oct 1, 2009)

GrauGeist said:


> If the Japanese had at least upgraded thier fuel tanks with self-sealing tanks, that would have slowed the catastrophic losses both in pilots and aircraft.
> 
> I know the armor issue had been addressed and they were reluctant to add armor because of the compromise in performance, although some folks say the lack of armor was accepting that thier aircraft was inferior, I believe the former was more accurate.



Just a question, perhaps you could confirm. I've been reading from 1942 onwards the JAAF were routinely installing self sealing tanks and improved pilot armour, that is on the Ki-43-II onwards (Ki-61, Ki-44, Ki-84).
But that the IJN Zero famously didn't begin this practise until very late production, but that N1K, J2M were similarly well equipped.

So essentially the frailty of Japanese a/c was mostly exhibited and made infamous with their zeroes and bombers throughout the war, which was very bad, but even from the mid war period small numbers of contemporary new models were better protected particularly among JAAF. This muted by overwhelming Allied air superiority, force interdiction and descending pilot quality (for army forces as much a result of poor accommodation in SEA as combat losses, pilot interveiws of the Solomons army fighter pilots indicate they often flew when they should've been in hospital recovering from the tropical diseases excacberated by very poor logistical support, low morale and arrogant totalitarian leadership).

Methinks the Japanese situation wrt inadequacy was far bigger than fighter type comparisons, and whilst a contributing factor these were only one of many and not an overwhelming one under all specific examples.


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## Nikademus (Oct 2, 2009)

vanir said:


> Methinks the Japanese situation wrt inadequacy was far bigger than fighter type comparisons, and whilst a contributing factor these were only one of many and not an overwhelming one under all specific examples.




From my readings, i'd say thats the case in all situations. Air combat is impacted by such a deleriously large number of variables, many of them outside the pilot+plane combination that it can make one's head spin. Unless one or more of these variables is badly out of wack (including plane/pilot), the kill ratio comparison is usually competetive. The Malta thread highlights this point. BoB....Hurricane didn't do bad, but put it over Malta and it got roughly handled by the Luftwaffe. The Japanese over Burma did a similar job.

This thread kind of reminds me of the whole eternal Sherman tank vs. Panther/Tiger argument. Statistically speaking, the ground exchange was competetive even though the Sherman was obsolecent....hence many arguments rage about the Sherman's quality with arguments similar to those seen here. Going behind the numbers, yes....the Sherman ended up being "good enough" as part of an overall military/industrial machine complex that as a whole was greatly superior to the Germans in the West circa 1944-45 (esp when one cites Air Superiority), but what some authors have argued most forcefully (such as Belton Cooper, author of "Deathtraps"), is that much bloodshed could have been saved had the US Army upgraded it's main battle tank instead of sticking to the mass produced Sherman. Either way, the war would have been won....it just comes down to a matter of human cost and arguably...the pace of the war itself.


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## renrich (Oct 2, 2009)

Really good post Nik, many thx.


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## Juha (Oct 2, 2009)

I'd say that F6F and F4U were not essential to US victory but made it clearly easier. F4F/FM-2 could have prevailled but with greater cost.

On ground attack role, now one main mission of air units of CVE s in Pacific was to provide ground attack support to amphipious landings, that was mostly done by Avengers but also FM-2s did that.

Juha


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## AvengerFights (Feb 12, 2014)

I agreed with Broncazonk that FM-2 and F4F will have win the fight in PTO. The mass claim of Japanese Planes loss by Hellcat and Corsairs proved that poorly trained japanese pilots were the main cause rather than their machines. The Wildcat can downed 29 Ki-61 without losses.([url]http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=65&t=91733&sid=a24c83751976632720b83509cb25ab7c)[/URL]. IJN Aces Saburo Sakai and Hiroyoshi Nishizawa could downed Hellcat using their inferior Zeroes. The reason of Wildcat having a lower ratio compared to Hellcat and Corsair is because they fought against the best IJN and IJAAF pilots. The US Navy wanted Hellcat and Corsair to engage in multiple role such as night fighter to attack other targets like ships instead of just airplanes alone as Wildcat are incapable of such roles. As a fighter role, the wildcat perform well and the they even downed Zeroes while saving the F4U in May 1943 over Guadalcanal. (Ace Vern Graham )Aces in Combat - Eric Hammel - Google Books


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## bobbysocks (Feb 12, 2014)

you do know this thread is 5 years old.....


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## GregP (Feb 12, 2014)

The Germans made a great big mistake by not replacing the Bf 109, the Japanese made a big mistake by not replaving the Zero with a more robust plane, and this guy wants the USA to commit the same mistake the other way!

5 years old or not, the notion is ridiculous. Why force the war to drag out longer by stubbornly producing obsolescent aircraft?

Thank heaven he wasn't a military leader in the war.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 12, 2014)

Looking back with 20/20 hindsight and _KNOWING_ the _mistakes_ the the Japanese made the idea does stand up. But _DEPENDING_ on your opponent to _keep making_ essentially the same fighter/s for 4-5 years with few improvements so you can do the same is very poor planning.


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## Garyt (Feb 12, 2014)

I actually see where Bronc is coming from on this one, and I largely agree with him. If it were "The US could win the Pacific Theatre with only the Wildcat as a carrier based fighter if the Japanese fighters did not advance past the Zero and Oscar, even the later model Zero's on Oscar's", I would fully agree.

Even with Japanese late model planes - these were pretty much all army planes, the Sam never made it in time. So carrier vs carrier, the Wildcat's are OK. The later land based planes of the Japanese would have been tougher - but with B-29 Bombings and Sub warfare, would they have been able to make enough of these planes, supply (above and beyond fuel, a big issue as well) all these planes, and even harder for them, train the pilots for all these planes, or at least enough of them to make a difference?

That Japanese airforce, naval and army for most of the war hit a death spiral of which there was no escape, and of which the later superior US planes were only a portion of.

The Japanese lost their airforce in the Solomon's campaigns - before extensive deployment of the Hellcat, and the Corsair influenced this mostly on the tail end. I think with Wildcats only the result would have been roughly the same. The damage the Japanese air force suffered in the Solomon's was well indicated by their lack of production in the Marianas Turkey shoot. The Hellcat helped of course, but the Japanese would have been hurting without the Hellcat.

The Zero was the better fighter - the Wildcat was far more survivable. Look at Japanese Air casualties in the Coral Sea, Midway, and Santa Cruz battles. This was roughly 50/50 (Not counting the planes/pilots lost when their carriers were destroyed/damaged - this is roughly even, with the Japanese having well trained pilots and the Zero vs. Wildcats.

The US had far better AA, with their 5"/38 probably the best dual purpose weapon of the war - Japanese dual purpose guns did not have as high of a rate of fire, many suffered from low traverse and elevation speeds, and the primary Japanese destroyer 5" was dual purpose in name only, with a low rate of fire, in ability to load while at a high angle of fire and slow traverse speeds made it useless as an AA weapon. 

The US 20mm Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors were also both far more effective than the Japanese standard 25mm Light AA weapon.

Add this to the proximity fuze in 43 or so, and with radar controlled AA fire and the US has far superior AA fire.

When you combine this with many Japanese planes that did not have self sealing fuel tanks you can see why there were far more Japanese planes lost to AA fire 

Most Japanese fighters had the same shortfalls, at least until later in the war. Lack of armor and self sealing tanks meant that the manuverable Zero was a fair amount less likely to make it home than the Wildcat.

Then again we look at how both sides could replace (trained) pilots. With limited fuel, the Japanese could not put out nearly the trained pilots the US could, and again this was starting to show before large scale introduction of the more advanced US craft.

Some important advantages the US had that are often overlooked relating specifically to the air war - A big one is vectoring of CAP. The US used it's radar to a huge advantage early in the war - they were able to vector their CAP better, which was in essence a force multiplier. The Zero was a better plane - but the Wildcats could be in a better tactical position with more numbers. The US plane radios were also more efficient than their Japanese counterparts, which also helped with better vectoring. The inability to vector CAP properly is largely what caused the Japanese carrier losses at midway - had they known the altitude and approaches of the Dauntless' they would not have been chasing the Devastators at sea level and been useless against the bombers. Of course, if their AA was better they might have had a chance as well.

Would the US have lost additional men, planes, and ships? Yes. We likely would have lost another carrier or two. But at the Marianas, the US had over 950 carrier based planes available to the Japanese 450 - and these 450 had far less training.

This reminds me of the question "If the US lost the Battle of Midway, would the US still have won the war?

Answer is most certainly yes. Would have taken a year or two more and cost more lives and equipment - but yes. Look 1.5 years after Midway and look how many carriers each side would have had, even with a US Midway loss, and it's pretty plane to see.


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## GregP (Feb 12, 2014)

Let's say I'm glad that I don't usually participate in alternate history threads.

Because for every premise, there is a counter.

I seriously doubt the Japanese would abandon development and if we couldn't come upo with anything better than the Widcat, who can say what might have happened? The development of the R-2800 was begun before we got into WWII. I cannot see developing such a good engine and not using it.

But in an alternate history, anything seems to be possible.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 13, 2014)

> 5 years old or not, the notion is ridiculous. Why force the war to drag out longer by stubbornly producing obsolescent aircraft?



Precisely. The idea is missing the whole point of going to war to _defeat_ the enemy in the first place. Measure versus countermeasure is as vital to success as fielding numbers. The advance of technology is relentless in warfare and employment of new technologies on battlefields and campaigns has proven to have been a decisive factor in their coutcome throughout history.


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## Garyt (Feb 14, 2014)

> 5 years old or not, the notion is ridiculous. Why force the war to drag out longer by stubbornly producing obsolescent aircraft?



I don't think there was any opinion expressed stating that the US SHOULD HAVE produced only the Wildcat, merely it was stating that the US could have won the Pacific war without the Hellcat and the Corsair.

I took it as a statement of what problems the Japanese Air arm had in compared to the US Air arm, and that the advantages the US has in area other than the quality of the fighter craft could have won the war.

At least that is how I took it.


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## Juha (Feb 14, 2014)

On Japanese naval AA, they also had the excellent 10 cm/65 (3.9") Type 98. Excellent ballistics and high rof.

Juha


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## Garyt (Feb 14, 2014)

> On Japanese naval AA, they also had the excellent 10 cm/65 (3.9") Type 98. Excellent ballistics and high rof.



That was a good gun. Probably not quite comparable to the US 5"/38 (only due to shell size, the 3.9" had a similar if not a bit better ROF).

But it was not radar directed fire (or if it did it was behind the US by a few years), and no proximity fuses. I've seen a few different listing regarding the effectiveness of the proximity fuse - and would have to say it probably at least doubled the effectiveness of AA fire.

And the other problem - not enough of them. The US had the 5"/38's on about everything - The 3.9"'s were only used on a few ships, the Taiho, I don't believe any BB or CA's used these, and one class of destroyers used them. There were a lot of ships on the drawing board to use the 3'9"'s, but most never entered service.

That's one problem the Japanese had as well - their state of the art ship were mostly late 30's - the U.S. state of the art ships were early 40's. And a lot was learned during that short period of time, and extensive re-fitting of the Japanese Navy was not really an option during war time. They would update radar from time to time and add a lot of 25mm guns, but that was about it.


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