# Was the self defending bomber really a failure?



## pinsog (Jan 2, 2010)

Most people consider the concept of the "self defending bomber" a failure, but they always cite the ability of the Germans to shoot down B17's and such. What about Japan? US heavy, and even medium bombers were very successful at driving off Japanese fighters, even when greatly outnumbered. I don't think the Italians would have been very successful at intercepting B17's either, if not for Germanany's help. Opinions?


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## Njaco (Jan 2, 2010)

I would say the BoB proved that it wasn't a bad concept.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 2, 2010)

The B-17s and B-24s did not give themselves up easily.

There were many a Luftwaffe pilot that got hammered in thier attempt to down a heavy.


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## Erich (Jan 2, 2010)

Shin could answer this much better than I about Japan I am assuming, but off hand I do not think that japan was ready for the air war poundiing it from the skies. Germany obviously was not either but seemed to create much in the way of ground and air-defenses although still weak against the US 8th and 15th heavies and thier escorts.

was Japan just plain overwhelmed or understrengthened during the bombing over itself, I cannot truly say with certainty, though we know quite well B-29's fell during Japanese fighter attacks


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## Watanbe (Jan 3, 2010)

Erich said:


> Shin could answer this much better than I about Japan I am assuming, but off hand I do not think that japan was ready for the air war poundiing it from the skies. Germany obviously was not either but seemed to create much in the way of ground and air-defenses although still weak against the US 8th and 15th heavies and thier escorts.
> 
> was Japan just plain overwhelmed or understrengthened during the bombing over itself, I cannot truly say with certainty, though we know quite well B-29's fell during Japanese fighter attacks



I think it was a case of altitude being the key defense as well.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 3, 2010)

The answer, I fear, lies in how we measure success or failure. The concept of the heavily-armed bomber that could fight its way to and from a target, and obliterate said target with decisive application of force, has its origins in pre-WWII thinking on the capabilities of air power, as evinced by the likes of Douhet and Seversky. While bombers were able to get through fighter defences, losses were high as technologies (radar, fighter capabilities, development of integrated air defence networks) advanced. Perhaps more importantly, the results of bombing were not as decisive as had been expected. The ability of both British and German civilians to endure "morale-breaking" bomber offensives effectively exploded pre-war views of bomber supremacy. 

However, one only needs to look at the immediate post-war period to see how irrelevant self-protection armament on bomber aircraft became. Only the B-29 and Lincoln really retained WWII-style protective weapons - other, admittedly more tactical, ground attack aircraft followed the Mosquito model of speed, manoeuverability and altitude to protect the bomber from adversary air defences (compare that with the peashooters carried by Blenheims, Battles, H-111s, Do-17s, Ju-88s etc). Over time, only the USAF and Soviet Long Range Bomber fleet maintained bomber fleets with defensive weaponry but even these were made obsolete when air-to-air missiles became the weapon of choice for defensive fighter forces. The self-defending bomber was a technology of its time but was rapidly seen as being largely irrelevant.

Just my two penn'orth...

Kind regards,
Mark


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## parsifal (Jan 3, 2010)

In the context of WWII, the heavily armoed and armoured bomber was a valid and partially successful solution to the problem of defending against interceptors. B-17s, B-24s, even Halifaxes and Lancasters, were the defensive part of the equation. What was needed to work in tandem with the heavily defended bomber was an effective escort, as both the germans in the BoB and the Allies subsequently. If we put the German bombers aside for a minute and concentrate on the US bombers, once they were provided with adequate escort, the heavily defended bomber formations (boxes) could usually defend themselves long enough for the Mustangs to intervene , usually shooting down a gaggle of german interceptors as they did.

People often overlook the achievements of the bomber offensive as well, praising up the more tactical approach of the Germans and Soviet air forces. Yet the bomber offensive soaked up an increasing proportion of German resources, destroyed the german transporet system, crippled her fuel production, guaranteed air superiority over the battlefield outside Germany from mid 1943 on, destroyed or disabled 40% of German production in 1944.....and the list goes on. It wqas a failure if the overblown pre-war claims about achieving complete victory are the measure used to gauge the offensives, but if more realistic measures are applied, they achieved a hell of a lot.

Post war, the equation did change, but during the war, a heavily defended bomber was one way to approach a difficult problem


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## Erich (Jan 3, 2010)

let's face it guys

during ww2 in the ETO the day bombers were at the mercy of the LW fighter both s/e and t/e unless Allied escort fighters were at hand. this is from 1943 through and till wars end. Any US heavy bomber formation could be attacked at will and for a lengthy amount of time if no P-47, P-38 or P-51 fighter group could be of help, it was proven over and over again, so if we take the question literally then yes they were a failure in their own defense in the total scheme even with consdieration of the usefulness of the .50 single and twin and the shooting down of some LW aircraft attacking. The overall % was not high enough in regards to ward off any attack by any LW unit


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## JoeB (Jan 3, 2010)

pinsog said:


> What about Japan? US heavy, and even medium bombers were very successful at driving off Japanese fighters, even when greatly outnumbered.


You have a generally reasonable point that all fighters weren't uniformly successful against all bombers they could easily catch. Depended on the characteristics of the fighters and bombers, and numbers of each. But I think your generalization about Japanese fighters v US bombers goes too far:

-in period of frequent Japanese fighter attacks v US mediums, B-25's especially were sometimes mauled by Japanese fighters; over New Guinea in 1942 the basic conclusion was unescorted B-25's were not viable v Japanese fighters. It was somewhat different for B-26 because the plane was faster, if not intercepted well before bomb release, B-26's could dive away and be pretty hard for their main opponent in that theater, the Zero, to catch. But even in that case the 5th AF recognized the need to escort medium bombers to achieve reasonable % loss rates (one basic issue comparing ETO and early PTO is number of a/c, the flight of the 6 B-25's of 3rd BG essentially wiped out by Zeroes over Lae May 25 1942 has a noticeable impact on the overall loss rate stat for 5th AF 1942, 6 B-17's downed in 1944 over Germany has almost no impact on the overall stats for 8th AF 1944). Another example is 11th AF B-25's (w/ B-24's) v the Kuriles flying from the Aleutians in 1943 unescorted: heavy losses to intercepting fighters, raids discontinued.

-later (1943-45) unescorted US medium bomber missions faced Japanese fighters generally less often. It was heavies mainly, in generally small scale raids by B-24/PB4Y, and later the early-phase B-29 raids over Japan, which flew far enough to have to routinely face Japanese figthers alone. That's not so different from ETO actually (9th AF lost 131 mediums to German fighters, 8th lost 2,452 heavies to German fighters, per USAAF stats). 

-back to numbers, there were many missions in 1942 by B-17's in Pacific where small formations or single a/c avoided losses when intercepted by Zeroes. But the number of Zeroes intercepting was often overestimated, and the number of Zeroes shot down grossly overestimated. Zeroes shot down more B-17's in 1942 than B-17's downed Zeroes in reality, and 1:1 is obviously a much worse exchange rate for single v 4-engine a/c than between fighters. And the B-17 loss *rate* was not necessarily that low. Of course it also depends how much loss each side can afford to take, and morever how effective the bombing is, but unescorted raids by B-17's/24's against Japanese fighter opposition had a mixed record actually. In the more effectice cases, and this was true of mediums too, it was often against ships at sea that the Japanese fighters had a hard time covering continuously; this is once the a/c adopted effective low altitude bombing tactics, which B-24's as well as mediums did as the war went on, even B-17's did in some cases at the end of their Pacific career ca. early 1943. You can't directly compare those missions to bombing stationary strategic targets deep inside Germany,

-or to B-29's bombing Japan. In that case, unescorted day raids mainly from Nov 1944-Feb 1945, the loss rate to fighters was definitely lower than for B-17's against Reich targets in 1943 unescorted (or partly escorted). But the rate wasn't really low absolutely, and the very high altitude bombing which contributed to reducing losses to fighters (and AA) also contributed to unsatisfactory bombing results. The B-29 first became a highly successful unescorted bomber at night, in the devastating night fire raids in March 1945, then afterwards in both and night, but against rapidly diminishing Japanese fighter threat. A few later B-29 raids were escorted by Iwo Jima based P-51's, but mainly the general presence of carrier fighters, P-51's and shortage of fuel caused the Japanese to hold their fighters on the ground more and more in spring-summer 1945. Some later B-29 raids were daylight unescorted again but faced much less opposition.

Joe


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## Butters (Jan 3, 2010)

The 'self-defending bomber' concept was a failure. The laws of physics and the undeniable fact that money is the fuel that drives the engine of war, put paid to that pipe dream.

In a conflict between adversaries of technological and industrial parity, the fact that an effective high performance interceptor a/c can be built and manned at a far lower cost than can a long-range bomber a/c, inevitably results in cost/benefit imbalance that favors the interceptor. Large, long-range a/c capable of carrying a useful bomb load simply cannot match the performance and agility of small, point defence interceptors. Nor can the bombers be built rugged enough to withstand the damage that interceptors can bring to bear. At least if you still want the performance, range, and bombload. 

The original bomber doctrine of the RAF and USAAF was built around the claim that the bombers could fight thru the enemy defences by themselves, make precision attacks upon expressly military targets, and then return. That necessarily required daylight attacks, and it was an utter failure. The RAF, forced by unsupportable losses, resorted to night-time area bombing attacks that usually cost far more than they were worth. The Americans, despite their more heavily armed a/c, were also forced to halt their long-range missions and restrict themselves to targets that were within the range of their escort fighters. Schweinfurt and Ploesti were the bloody refutation of the claim that 'the bomber will always get thru'...

Bombers cannot survive in the presence of equally advanced interceptors.

JL


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## riacrato (Jan 3, 2010)

Yes, they never managed to inflict a good damage-to-losses-sustained ratio.

No, because if accompanied by fighters they formed a deadly combination.


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## stona (Jan 3, 2010)

Depends what you call a failiure. If you are prepared to accept 10%-16% casualties or bomb by night then no.The British didn't think so or we wouldn't have put such massive resources into the bombing campaign,at the cost of other services. 55,000 dead was a hell of a price to pay.
Steve


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## GrauGeist (Jan 3, 2010)

The defenses on a bomber can also deter assault, or at least make the attacker stand off at a respectable distance, which in turn allows a better field of fire from the other gun stations.

If you want, compare the heavy defenses of the bombers to inadequate defenses of transports like the Ju52. A classic example would be the Palm Sunday Massacre. Had the transports had better defenses, the losses may have been much lower.


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## Erich (Jan 3, 2010)

the Ju's obviously needed a better deterent like some Bf 109's as Höhenstaffel, being armed with a puny .30 pea shooter and limited traverse out in the air just isn't going to ward off the enemy to any extent. As for heavy bombers .303's and .50's it can be said with some certainty that the inexperienced LW kid pilot did have to take his time and then set up his attack and during mid-late 1943 the US crews could pretty much expect just such tactics and try as they might defend themselves hoping for the better first shots with the longer range mg's.

E ~


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## buffnut453 (Jan 3, 2010)

GrauGeist said:


> The defenses on a bomber can also deter assault, or at least make the attacker stand off at a respectable distance, which in turn allows a better field of fire from the other gun stations.



Maybe so, but a cannon-armed fighter could stand off outside the range of small-calibre defensive weapons on the bombers and still inflict casualties on the bomber formation with impunity.

The defended bomber concept only truly worked (against a technologically advanced integrated air defence system) when escorted by long-range fighters that had the performance to successfully engage the adversary's defensive fighter screen.

As for the Ju-52s, even with a few defensive weapons, they would be little different to Blenheims or Battles in 1940.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 3, 2010)

The M2 Browning .50 caliber had an effective range of about a mile (1,800 meters)


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## Vincenzo (Jan 3, 2010)

GrauGeist said:


> The M2 Browning .50 caliber had an effective range of about a mile (1,800 meters)



i not think this is a valid effective range in air operations


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## barney (Jan 3, 2010)

If failure is judged by whether you are losing bombers faster than you can replace them, then the armed bomber, both in the daylight and at night, at some point in the war, at least in the ETO, was a failure. I don't need to explain what saved the daylight effort. What saved the night effort was window and radar bombing. 

The German planes, in particular the plane killing 190's were working pretty hard at the altitude the B-17s came in at. What if the bombers were higher and faster? So, on the B-17s for example, strip out and fair over the two or three turrets plus the bulges and blisters - maybe leave the tail gunner. Now you have a much faster plane with a higher service ceiling.


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## Erich (Jan 3, 2010)

the range of the .50 cal mg was greater than the effective range of the LW 2cm cannon. this was reason for the Sturm like attacks from the rear to be used from July 44 till wars to attack and try to knock out the tail turret position offering the rear of the bomber defenseless as it closed with the bomber before banking off right or left at collision speed and range.


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## davparlr (Jan 3, 2010)

It would be interesting to have a good reference of how much the bomber forces aided in the reduction of the german fighter force as compared to fighters. The discredited number of combined B-17/24 kills of 9276 is more than the combined claimed, and probably discredited, P-51/47 air kills. Even so, the number could be substantial.

Also unknown is the number of bombers that would have been lost if the defensive armament was reduced.

Another thought, if the box formation could have had a dedicated intercommunication capability so that a coordinated defense could be made against attackers, ie, all planes would be aware of and target the same aircraft, how much more effective the defense would be. It maybe could have been very formidable, with a minimum of what, eight .50 cals aimed at a single aircraft.


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## JoeB (Jan 3, 2010)

davparlr said:


> It would be interesting to have a good reference of how much the bomber forces aided in the reduction of the german fighter force as compared to fighters. The discredited number of combined B-17/24 kills of 9276 is more than the combined claimed, and probably discredited, P-51/47 air kills. Even so, the number could be substantial.


But you can't just call both 'discredited' as if equally. Plenty of evidence shows bomber credits were much more overstated than fighter credits. Enemy fighter losses to US bombers in WWII era were usually in range of 5-25% of the bomber 'destroyed' credits; enemy losses to US fighters generally in range of 25-75% of fighter 'destroyed' credits. 

In early Pacific it's often easy to see bomber results v Japanese fighters without US fighters around, and with quite complete and detailed Japanese records, and you're talking single digit to 10% accuracy of credits or claims (it wasn't so formal then) by USAAF bombers. For USAAF fighters v Japanse fighters the USAAF claims were like 25-30% accurate.

In late ETO it seemed that USAAF fighter claim accuracy had improved substantially, as high as maybe 75% but no apparent major increase in bomber claim accuracy. But it's very hard to count comprehensively in the ETO, it was so large and some many overlapping combats involving fighters and bombers. In the Korean War it's again easy to count and B-29 claims were around 10% accurate, F-86 claims around 75% accurate. B-29 claims over Japan in unescorted raids were more like 25% accurate, but that was with 'advantage' of suicide rammer fighters whose destruction was obvious.

In USAAF stats digest I added up USAAF fighter credits in ETO/MTO as 9398, heavy bomber credits as 9276, virtually the same, so a reasonably estimate would be that US fighters actually downed several times as many Axis a/c as US bombers did in those theaters, and it would be similar for Pacific, attrition of Axis fighter forces was by US (and other Allied) fighters, not bombers by and large.

Joe


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## Sweb (Jan 3, 2010)

20/20 hindsight builds the most suitable equipment. My Pop was a B-17, P-47 and P-51 pilot, in that order. For reasons of mission requirements, the airplanes and their suitability to them, he had various likes and dislikes for each airplane. 

He never understood why Boeing didn't increase the load capacity of the B-17 to make it a more effective bomber. In the event a few bombers actually hit their intended targets, which was more of an occasion than a rule, the extra tonnage on-target would speak for itself. He didn't completely agree that the defensive armament was justifiable, considering the afore-mentioned, where a crew of 10 men (and their possible loss) ruled in favor of a more effective offensive weapon. He said the trade-off between a greater bomb load vs a large crew and defensive weapons seemed short-sighted. He often cited his own gun crew's inability to hit the broad side of a barn from inside it. He went on to mention that he and his co-pilot could have done the nav/radio operator's jobs. Conversely, he talked about other pilots who wanted as many engines and gunners as they could get on one airplane to ensure their own chances of survival. So, it would seem there was a conflict between those who wanted a weapon that would knock out a target on one trip vs those who preferred to sacrifice effectiveness for personal safety. Which one serves the best interest of shortening a conflict seems obvious. 
He thought the B-17 was a good airplane but short on effectiveness. Actually, he called it either a transport, or a bomber depending on whether they hit the target or not. Oh yea, he also said he froze his assets off in that plane and they could have made provisions for some creature comforts.


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## parsifal (Jan 4, 2010)

Even though I would defend the reasoning of the heavy bomber as a concept, I do agree that the fast light attack bomber might be a better option. Though this doesnt prove anything, consider this......a B-17, with a crew of ten, and four engines , can deliver 8000 lbs of bombs, and might shoot down an enemy aircraft if its lucky. I forget the loss ratio for an unescorted B-17 raidbut it was not uncommon to lose 8-10% of the force in a single raid. The raids on Schweinfurt lost 60 bombers out of 240 despatched from memory. I dont know the speed of a B-17 fully loaded, but its going to be well below 300 knots....say 280 knots (Ill stand corrected when someone who does know speaks up) 

Now compare that to the much discussed Mosquito Bomber, two engines, two crew and a bombload to Berlin of 4000 lbs, no armament, more lightky built than a B-17, and a loaded speed exceeding 370 knots. There will be no bomber related kills, but conversely there will be roughly 2.5 Mosquitoes flying for every 1 B-17, and more to the point the attrition rate for the bomber force would drop from an average of about 5% per raid, to just over 2% per raid....this is importatnt, because it means the strike force would expand 2.5 times faster than with a classic heavy bomber inventory.....the US would have commenced its offensive in August 1943 with about 1200 twins instead of the 400 (roughly) Heavies that she did start the battle with.  Moreover, by all accounts the Mosquito was a precision bomber, with a high percentage of hits on target.

The problem with high speed bomber concept, is that it can be made radpidly obsolete by simply increasing the speed of the defending fighters, transforming those high speed Mosquito types into the flying targets like the Blenheim in a short space of time


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## riacrato (Jan 4, 2010)

barney said:


> If failure is judged by whether you are losing bombers faster than you can replace them, then the armed bomber, both in the daylight and at night, at some point in the war, at least in the ETO, was a failure. I don't need to explain what saved the daylight effort. What saved the night effort was window and radar bombing.
> 
> The German planes, in particular the plane killing 190's were working pretty hard at the altitude the B-17s came in at. What if the bombers were higher and faster? So, on the B-17s for example, strip out and fair over the two or three turrets plus the bulges and blisters - maybe leave the tail gunner. Now you have a much faster plane with a higher service ceiling.



Substituting defensive guns for more bombload i can agree with. For more altitude? No, the altitude was already too. ensure decent hit probability.

Still, if the former is considered, I would ask was the amount of bombs dropped ever considered too low? There's two possibilities to increase bombload: More planes or more offensive load per plane. Clearly the US seemed to favor increasing the number of planes. Some individual crews may see their plane's load as too low, but the question really is, was the combined bombload of the attacking force sufficient.

Regarding a substitution for light fast bombers such as the Mosquito. I like the concept of the fast bomber and I like the Mosquito as a plane. But its advantage of being hard to detect would be compromised if you send in huge numbers. Germans would also adjust their defenses and so on.


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## Waynos (Jan 4, 2010)

Forgive me if I have misread the arguments here but I think it is being argued that guns should be deleted on heavy bombers?

I think for a comparison you could do worse than compare the Lancaster to the Lancastrian. With all guns removed and streamlined fairings over the nose and tail to disguise it as a proper transport it was still slower than a mk 1 Hurricane, I don't think this would been a good idea for the bomber force. I think Parsifals Mosquito idea works much better, until the Do 335 and Me 262 appear. DH did design a Jet Mosquito though so as a what if scenario this may have been produced if the demand was great enough


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## Shortround6 (Jan 4, 2010)

The self defending bomber concept was a failure.

The Idea started in the 20s-30s as a theory and was reinforced by some war games with unrealistic conditions.

When the interceptors were armed with a pair of rifle caliber machine guns they had trouble inflicting damage on the target aircraft. When each bomber gunner station had either a single or TWIN rifle caliber machine gun it looked like the bomber could carry firepower equal to the interceptors. This disregards the difficulty of accurately aiming a a manually powered gun mounting in a moving plane. 

In some cases in the early-mid 30s the bombers were as fast or faster than the fighters which also argued in favor of the bombers. 

When the fighters began to be armed with 4 machine guns or better the problem of fitting enough machine guns in any one gun position on the bomber began to rear it's head. And the idea of comparing a single bomber to a single fighter seems to occupied peoples minds rather than multiple fighters engaging a single bomber or just the bombers on on side of a formation. 

The power turret upped the bombers firepower, both in accuracy and in the number/size of the weapons one gunner could control but by this time the better fighters were carrying 6-12 rifle caliber machine guns, or 4-8 heavy machine guns or multiple cannon. The fire power advantage not only stayed with the fighters, it was increasing.

Couple the fire power advantage with the increasing performance advantage of the fighters and the overall defensive advantage of early warning systems (radar vrs binoculars and sound listing devices) to vector interceptors onto incoming raids with more economy of force than in the early 30s and the whole idea of unescorted self defending bombers starts to fall apart.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 4, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Even though I would defend the reasoning of the heavy bomber as a concept, I do agree that the fast light attack bomber might be a better option. Though this doesnt prove anything, consider this......a B-17, with a crew of ten, and four engines , can deliver 8000 lbs of bombs, and might shoot down an enemy aircraft if its lucky. I forget the loss ratio for an unescorted B-17 raidbut it was not uncommon to lose 8-10% of the force in a single raid. The raids on Schweinfurt lost 60 bombers out of 240 despatched from memory. I dont know the speed of a B-17 fully loaded, but its going to be well below 300 knots....say 280 knots (Ill stand corrected when someone who does know speaks up)
> 
> Now compare that to the much discussed Mosquito Bomber, two engines, two crew and a bombload to Berlin of 4000 lbs, no armament, more lightky built than a B-17, and a loaded speed exceeding 370 knots. *There will be no bomber related kills,* but conversely there will be roughly 2.5 Mosquitoes flying for every 1 B-17, and more to the point the attrition rate for the bomber force would drop from an average of about 5% per raid, to just over 2% per raid....this is importatnt, because it means the strike force would expand 2.5 times faster than with a classic heavy bomber inventory.....the US would have commenced its offensive in August 1943 with about 1200 twins instead of the 400 (roughly) Heavies that she did start the battle with. Moreover, by all accounts the Mosquito was a precision bomber, with a high percentage of hits on target.
> 
> The problem with high speed bomber concept, is that it can be made radpidly obsolete by simply increasing the speed of the defending fighters, transforming those high speed Mosquito types into the flying targets like the Blenheim in a short space of time


A bunch of things flawed there.

Do the math to and from target (England to Berlin). You have to factor in weather conditions, fuel burn and time over target to determine if the Mossie could carry 4000 pounds to Berlin. In a strategic role you're stretching the performance and range of the aircraft. In any one of the heavies including the B-17, there was "wiggle room" with regards to bomb load and performance based on weather conditions. Additionally how are you going to deploy your bombs? Drop them at high altitude in a mass formation? Being unarmed you're still setting yourself up for intercept and I don't think any crew would want to be in an unarmed bomber. Go low and you'll have to contend with flack.

A B-17 could take a 6,000 pound bomb load 2500 miles. I think you'll find most Mosquitoes carried a 2000 pound bomb load (the b MK IV). Even with 4000 pounds of bombs you're still looking at 1500 miles max. 

The Mosquito was a great tactical weapon but its roles as a strategic bomber is questionable for a number of reasons.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 4, 2010)

Parsifal 280 knts (~520 km/h) are far away from cruise speed maybe you want talk of miles? (and 280 mph (~450 km/h) for cruise it's high )

p.s. also the 370 kntos (~685 km/h) for loaded Mosquito it's too high (and loaded with a 4000 lbs cookie!)


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## parsifal (Jan 4, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> A bunch of things flawed there.
> 
> Do the math to and from target (England to Berlin). You have to factor in weather conditions, fuel burn and time over target to determine if the Mossie could carry 4000 pounds to Berlin. In a strategic role you're stretching the performance and range of the aircraft. In any one of the heavies including the B-17, there was "wiggle room" with regards to bomb load and performance based on weather conditions. Additionally how are you going to deploy your bombs? Drop them at high altitude in a mass formation? Being unarmed you're still setting yourself up for intercept and I don't think any crew would want to be in an unarmed bomber. Go low and you'll have to contend with flack.
> 
> ...



The usual load of the BIV was 2000 lbs when bombing Berlin, which they did quite regularly. Later Bomber Command deemed the BIVs were best used as Pathfinders, due to their exceptionally low loss rates and high speed. Not all BIVs were so converted

With a 907 KG Bombload, the BIV had a listed range of 1960 km. Carrying that load the type could still travel in excess of 350mph. Later the principal Bomber was the BVI, with an extra 500HP per engine (roughly), the types performance increased to a range of 2390 KM with a bombload of 1814 kg, with a top speed of of around 370 mph (with the bom strapped in) and a cruising speed of 260 mph. 

Mosquitoes were used across the whole spectrum of the range, Long range Fighter bomber, Night Fighter, precision strategic bomber, Pathfinder, Tactical Bomber, to name just some....to put it into the category of "Tactical Bomber" is to deny the type of one of its greatest strengths....as far as accuracy goes, I would say it was one of the most accurate bombers in the inventory, judging by its role as a ppathfinder, and as a point attack bomber. To say it was questionable as a strategic bomber is akin to ordering the tide to change.....its a historical fact they were used as straight strategic bombers...not enough to make much difference, but strategically (in the usual sense) nevertheless. It couldnt flatten whole city blocks like a B-17 formation, but then it didnt need to.....it could hit the target more accurately (by all accounts) and therefore could achieve surgically what the Heavies needed to do with sheer brute force.

I dont get the argtument about their vulnerability, to be honest. From all that Ive read, they boasted the lowest loss rate of any type in BC, despite being given some of the toughest assignements, and often operating unescorted by day, in skies infested with enemy fighters.....I dont understnad how you can say they were vulnerable based on that sort of record to be honest....


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## drgondog (Jan 4, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Even though I would defend the reasoning of the heavy bomber as a concept, I do agree that the fast light attack bomber might be a better option. Though this doesnt prove anything, consider this......a B-17, with a crew of ten, and four engines , can deliver 8000 lbs of bombs, and might shoot down an enemy aircraft if its lucky. I forget the loss ratio for an unescorted B-17 raidbut it was not uncommon to lose 8-10% of the force in a single raid. The raids on Schweinfurt lost 60 bombers out of 240 despatched from memory. I dont know the speed of a B-17 fully loaded, but its going to be well below 300 knots....say 280 knots (Ill stand corrected when someone who does know speaks up)
> 
> *150mph Indicated because the formation had to account for the most beat up ship in the gaggle - closer to 200mph IAS on the return legs. The B-24 ran into the target at 160Mph IAS but slower coming back, despite have a paper advantage in cruise speed.*



It wasn't (at least for US) until the B-29 arrived with all computing gunsights AND higher cruise speed and great altitude that the defensive firepower became a significant factor - but the 29 switched to night and low/medium level and the question became moot.

I agree with you primary points and all of Shortround's.. 

In 1935-1938 the B-17 was cabable of defense against the typical fighter in other nation's inventories... it lost that advantage with Me 109F and beyond performance fighters and tactics evolved to reduce the ability of many bombers to concentrate fire on few fighters.

I question any bomber's ability to defend itself against front line fighters in 1943 to the end of the war.. the Mosquito could make interception difficult but one a firing solution was achieved it was mostly toast.

Two choices for strategic bombing - daylight with escort(capable escort) or night in confusing streams and each had its limitations relative to precision and efficiency.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 4, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Go low and you'll have to contend with flack.
> 
> A B-17 could take a 6,000 pound bomb load 2500 miles. I think you'll find most Mosquitoes carried a 2000 pound bomb load (the b MK IV). Even with 4000 pounds of bombs you're still looking at 1500 miles max.
> 
> The Mosquito was a great tactical weapon but its roles as a strategic bomber is questionable for a number of reasons.



The Mosquito did go in low and successfully attack targets in daylight (see "Low Attack" covering operations by 105 and 139 Sqns) despite flak - the German gunners simply didn't have time to react to a fleeting target coming in at low level.

B-17 could carry a greater bomb load but how many of those bombs actually hit the target? Post war studies indicate that 90% of bombs dropped failed to get within (if memory serves) 10 miles of the target. The whole concept of low-level Mosquito operations was to place the bombs on target with a reasonable degree of precision - certainly greater than could be achieved from medium or high altitudes, even despite the much-vaunted Norden bomb sight.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 4, 2010)

parsifal said:


> The usual load of the BIV was 2000 lbs when bombing Berlin, which they did quite regularly. Later Bomber Command deemed the BIVs were best used as Pathfinders, due to their exceptionally low loss rates and high speed. Not all BIVs were so converted
> 
> With a 907 KG Bombload, the BIV had a listed range of 1960 km. Carrying that load the type could still travel in excess of 350mph. Later the principal Bomber was the BVI, with an extra 500HP per engine (roughly), the types performance increased to a range of 2390 KM with a bombload of 1814 kg, with a top speed of of around 370 mph (with the bom strapped in) and a cruising speed of 260 mph.


All good, but if nothing but Mosquitoes fulfilled the daylight strategic bomber campaign you're still suffering losses and you're still not carrying the bomb load of the B-17 and especially the B-24 to Berlin



parsifal said:


> Mosquitoes were used across the whole spectrum of the range, Long range Fighter bomber, Night Fighter, precision strategic bomber, Pathfinder, Tactical Bomber, to name just some....to put it into the category of "Tactical Bomber" is to deny the type of one of its greatest strengths....as far as accuracy goes, I would say it was one of the most accurate bombers in the inventory, judging by its role as a ppathfinder, and as a point attack bomber.


Do you statistics to back that up????


parsifal said:


> To say it was questionable as a strategic bomber is akin to ordering the tide to change.....its a historical fact they were used as straight strategic bombers...not enough to make much difference, but strategically (in the usual sense) nevertheless. *It couldnt flatten whole city blocks like a B-17 formation,* but then it didnt need to.....it could hit the target more accurately (by all accounts) and therefore could achieve surgically what the Heavies needed to do with sheer brute force.


You made my point. The strategic concept was to flatten city blocks, factories etc. As far as a precision strike, the Mossie was the perfect weapon.


parsifal said:


> I dont get the argtument about their vulnerability, to be honest. From all that Ive read, they boasted the lowest loss rate of any type in BC, despite being given some of the toughest assignements, and often operating unescorted by day, in skies infested with enemy fighters.....I dont understnad how you can say they were vulnerable based on that sort of record to be honest....


They had very low losses but they were not invincible. Do you think a pathfinder force operating at altitude in the daylight would have fared any better on a bombing run through flack while waiting for the lead plane to acquire target and then giving the order to release bombs? They would have presented a smaller target, but I doubt the crews would have had any comfort knowing that for 30 or 40 seconds they had to just "sit there" in their "hot rod" while it lumbered along at 180 knots (the speed required for a precision drop) through a field of flack.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 4, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> The Mosquito did go in low and successfully attack targets in daylight (see "Low Attack" covering operations by 105 and 139 Sqns) despite flak - the German gunners simply didn't have time to react to a fleeting target coming in at low level.
> 
> B-17 could carry a greater bomb load but how many of those bombs actually hit the target? Post war studies indicate that 90% of bombs dropped failed to get within (if memory serves) 10 miles of the target. The whole concept of low-level Mosquito operations was to place the bombs on target with a reasonable degree of precision - certainly greater than could be achieved from medium or high altitudes, even despite the much-vaunted Norden bomb sight.


I think the figure is closer to 60%.

There is no doubt about the effectivness of the Mossie at low level, but you were putting one or two bombs on one or two targets of a given size. What happens when you want to flatten a factory that stretches a mile or two or 10 city blocks?


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## Milosh (Jan 4, 2010)

The typical bomb load to Berlin was less than 5000lb.

Berlin on 9 March 1944, 361 B-17s despatched, 332 credited
with attacking, average bomb load *4,630 pounds.*

Berlin on 22 March 1944, 474 B-17s and 214 B-24s despatched
621 bombers credited with attacking Berlin, average bomb load
*4,425 pounds* (around 80 bombers attacked other targets, including
32 the Berlin/Basdorf industrial area)

Berlin on 29 April 1944, 446 B-17s and 233 B-24s despatched,
581 bombers credited with attacking Berlin, average bomb load
*4,900 pounds.*

Berlin on 7 May 1944, 600 B-17s despatched, 525 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load *4,810 pounds.* The
B-24s sent to Osnabruck average bomb load 5,435 pounds.

Berlin on 8 May 1944, 500 B-17s despatched, 384 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load *4,765 pounds.* The
B-24s sent to Brunswick average bomb load 4,790 pounds.

Berlin on 19 May 1944, 588 B-17s despatched, 493 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load *4,325 pounds.* The
B-24s sent to Brunswick average bomb load 5,710 pounds,
or around 1,000 pounds more than 11 days earlier.

Berlin on 24 May 1944, 616 B-17s despatched, 459 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load *4,500 pounds.*

Berlin on 21 June 1944, 866 B-17s and 366 B-24s despatched,
to many targets, 560 bombers credited with attacking Berlin,
average bomb load *4,900 pounds.*

Berlin on 3 February 1945, 1,093 B-17s despatched, 934 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load *4,890 pounds*


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 4, 2010)

Trying to compare an aircraft like the Mossie to the B-17 to me is trivial. Why? They were two different kinds of aircraft for two different kinds of missions. In my opinion, Joe has it right here.


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## Milosh (Jan 4, 2010)

BOMBING ACCURACY
With less than 5/10ths cloud coverage an average B-17 Group could be expected to place 32.4% of its bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point when aiming visually.

The average B-24 Group under the same conditions could be expected to place 30.4% of its bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point.

One box of bombers could contain from 3 to 18 planes. Formations with a three plane frontage could be expected to be 45% more accurate than formations with a nine plane frontage. A six bomber front would be only about 10% more accurate than a 9 bomber front.

The percentage of boxes which could be expected to place at least 10% of their load within 1000 feet of the aiming point depends upon how many other boxes passed over the target beforehand.

ORDER OF BOXES PERCENTAGE
1st 82%
2nd 60%
3rd 48%
4th 47%
5th 30%


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## davparlr (Jan 4, 2010)

JoeB said:


> But you can't just call both 'discredited' as if equally. Plenty of evidence shows bomber credits were much more overstated than fighter credits. Enemy fighter losses to US bombers in WWII era were usually in range of 5-25% of the bomber 'destroyed' credits; enemy losses to US fighters generally in range of 25-75% of fighter 'destroyed' credits.
> 
> Joe



I stated that incorrectly. I didn't intend to imply that the "discredit" was equal. Confirmation criteria was much more difficult for the fighters, and more trustworthy.

However, at 25%, this would account for 2319 fighters shot down which would not have happened if the planes were unarmed. Not a a insubstantial number.


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## Snautzer01 (Jan 4, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> There is no doubt about the effectivness of the Mossie at low level, but you were putting one or two bombs on one or two targets of a given size. What happens when you want to flatten a factory that stretches a mile or two or 10 city blocks?




Send more Mossies. Completly destroying factories isnt very economical. Laying waste to key components will do the job quite nicely. Like cruise missile strikes 

However. Strategy chosen was what it was. Formed on the idea of the 30's they went for it and only tweaked it a bit to get to victory.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 4, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I think the figure is closer to 60%.
> 
> There is no doubt about the effectivness of the Mossie at low level, but you were putting one or two bombs on one or two targets of a given size. What happens when you want to flatten a factory that stretches a mile or two or 10 city blocks?



The problem is that "officially" bombers were aiming at strategic facilities (factories, railyards etc) that were pinpoint targets but lack of accuracy and precision meant, inevitably, bombs were splattered all over the countryside/conurbation. 

Your quote of 60% may be more accurate than my memory (which gets worse with each passing year...oooops! Another one just went by - say goodbye to more brain cells). However, I'd like to see the source, per another post, for the claim that 30% of a bomb group's munitions would land within 1000ft of a target. Sorry, but I just don't buy those figures given that the entire group would drop in unison when the lead bomb aimer dropped his load. There is a compression problem here in getting the aircraft close enough together to ensure the bombs hit the target (unless your target is the entire metropolitan Berlin area). 

I think the discussion has diverged slightly from the merits, or otherwise, of self-protection for bombers into the broader topic of strategic bombers -vs- tactical bombers (because, in the 1940s, this equated to defended -vs- undefended aircraft). Inevitably, strategic bombing in total war meant flattening anything that contributed to the enemy's war effort, and this happened to align quite neatly with the inability of 1940s technology to achieve the required levels of precision and accuracy. However, in terms of delivering a combat effect, the "drop and hope" strategic bombing offensive was very costly in terms of personnel and aircraft lost, bombs wasted being thrown into fields, and collateral damage inflicted on areas surrounding "targets". 

However, the ultimate question (on this thread) is not about how many bombs an aircraft could carry (B-17 or Mosquito), but rather whether the concept of the self-defending bomber fighting its way to and from a target was a success or failure. Based on evidence, the answer has to be a failure.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 4, 2010)

Snautzer01 said:


> Send more Mossies. Completly destroying factories isnt very economical. Laying waste to key components will do the job quite nicely. Like cruise missile strikes.


Even with the use of a precision bomber like the Mossie, you didn't have the luxury to destroy "key components." The only way to get to a major target was to ensure total and utter destruction.



buffnut453 said:


> The problem is that "officially" bombers were aiming at strategic facilities (factories, railyards etc) that were pinpoint targets but lack of accuracy and precision meant, inevitably, bombs were splattered all over the countryside/conurbation.


They did, but how big do you think factories and railyards are? read below...



buffnut453 said:


> Your quote of 60% may be more accurate than my memory (which gets worse with each passing year...oooops! Another one just went by - say goodbye to more brain cells). However, I'd like to see the source, per another post, for the claim that 30% of a bomb group's munitions would land within 1000ft of a target. *Sorry, but I just don't buy those figures given that the entire group would drop in unison when the lead bomb aimer dropped his load. There is a compression problem here in getting the aircraft close enough together to ensure the bombs hit the target (unless your target is the entire metropolitan Berlin area). *


*

And toward the end of the war that's exactly what many of the raids were doing. I think you fail to realize how much land an aircraft factory or an oil refinery makes up. Additionally you have to remember that sometimes targets were hit in waves to ensure total destruction of the target. The flight of bombers would be adjusted to ensure that bombs from all flights within the formation put their bombs on the target, or so that was the plan.


buffnut453 said:



Based on evidence, the answer has to be a failure.

Click to expand...


In the end I'd have to agree.*


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## parsifal (Jan 4, 2010)

Joe I think I understand your point now....basically that the Mosquito could not carry the tonnage of bombs that the B-17 could....and that as a result of that could not undertake the "strategic bombing" mission, as you see it. If I am reading you right essentially you are saying that the B-17 was a true strategic bomber, and a Mossie was not.

However, I see a couple of flaws in that line of thinking. Firstly, your definition of what consitutes "strategic bombing", is far too narrow. You seem to equate strategic bombing as a concept with the mass destruction of cities enmasse, that is not the only definition of strategic bombing campaigns. If you have a factory, that has one piece of machinery needed to halt the entire program, you can either level the factory, with B-17s, or you can take out the piece of machinery, using a precision bombing attack, and in this I think the Mosquito was superior to the B-17. The point I am making is that the term "strategic bombing" is pretty wide....there was more than one way to bring German industry to its knees...

According to Jurgen Brauer from Augusta State University

_What is strategic bombing? In the memorable language of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS),
... strategic bombing bears the same relationship to tactical bombing as does the cow to the pail of milk. To deny
immediate aid and comfort to the enemy, tactical considerations dictate upsetting the bucket. To ensure eventual
starvation, the strategic move is to kill the cow (USSBS, 1947, p. 5).
Less originally, consider the following two definitions:
Strategic bombing ... is aimed at the systematic destruction of those resources which will most weaken the enemy
by denying him the materials or weapons he needs to prosecute the war (USSBS, Jan. 1947, p. 2, pt. 2).
Strategic bombing is best defined as the use of air power to strike at the very foundation of an enemy’s war effort
– the production of war material, the economy as a whole, or the morale of the civilian population – rather than
as a direct attack on the enemy’s army or navy. A strategic air campaign almost always requires the defeat of the
enemy’s air force, but not as an end in itself. While tactical air power uses aircraft to aid the advance of forces on
the ground or on the surface of the ocean, usually in cooperation with those forces, strategic air power usually
works in relative independence of armies and navies ... (Levine, 1992, p. 1).
In the hope that military efforts will be starved, strategic bombing, the first definition suggests, is
about bombing of non-military assets. One shoots at the economic cow that (re)fills the military’s pail.
The focus on the ultimate objective – the opponent’s ability to prosecute the war – is operationally
vague and is at any rate restricted to the physical inputs to war-making, neglecting human capital and
institutional aspects. The definition also lacks operational clarity. The second definition helps to
separate out strategic from tactical bombing and identifies three operational objectives: (a) the
opponent’s actual arms production; (b) the enemy’s potential to produce civilian and military goods;
and (c) the morale of the adversary’s civilian population. The definition also suggests that strategic
bombing is to achieve certain war outcomes by itself, to avert the need for a land-based invasion of
the opponent’s territory, the capture of its capital, and the deposing of its leaders._

I believe a mass deployment of fast light bombers like the Mosquito could achieve that stated definition, perhaps a luittle differently to a Heavy Bomber like the B-17, but still achieve the mission objective of economic dislocation on the enemy.....

Secondly, I still dont get why a mass raid by Mosquitoes could not be used for mass destruction. The Mosquito could carry a single 4000 lb bomb or 4 x 500 lb bombsor even 2 x 1000 lb bombs....Dont know what the ordinance types for the B-17 are, but I doubt they are heavier than those I have just listed. A 4000 lb bomb is more than enough to destroy structures, you just have to drop enough of them. And to drop enough of them, you need numbers. If, instead of 400 B-17s attacking a target, each dropping 6000 lbs of bombs, (for a total drop of 2.4 million lbs) you had a Mosquito force of 1000 Mosquitoes, each dropping 4000 lbs, you are going to drop 4 million lbs in that comparison raid....this never was attempted in the war, so its all just theary, but to me I cannot see how 4 million lbs of explosive dropped by Mosquitoes would not do the same hob and more as 2.4 million lbs of explosive dropped by the B-17s......and the fleet costs are going to be similar I think. 

As for accuracy stats, no I dont have any, but I think it worth noting that the Mosquito was the weapon of choice for precision raids, where the neeed to hit targets precisely was a priority. And they were used as Pathfinders, night and day, in this regard i still dont see the point you are trying to make.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 4, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Even with the use of a precision bomber like the Mossie, you didn't have the luxury to destroy "key components."



I think Amiens proved that precision strike could achieve desired objectives. Then there's that incredible attack by 633 Sqn on the heavy water plant in Norway! 




FLYBOYJ said:


> They did, but how big do you think factories and railyards are? read below...
> 
> And toward the end of the war that's exactly what many of the raids were doing. I think you fail to realize how much land an aircraft factory or an oil refinery makes up. .



Actually, I do realise. During my days in uniform, I spent some time as a targeteer undertaking target systems analysis. You don't need to obliterate a target to neutralise it - you just need to destroy the key components.



FLYBOYJ said:


> Additionally you have to remember that sometimes targets were hit in waves to ensure total destruction of the target. The flight of bombers would be adjusted to ensure that bombs from all flights within the formation put their bombs on the target, or so that was the plan.



Entirely agree - but you don't need formations of 4-engined aircraft with 10 men each onboard to achieve the same objective. It just took some time for the Allies to figure out that strategic effect could be delivered by something other than a big strategic bomber with a huge crew.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 4, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> I think Amiens proved that precision strike could achieve desired objectives. Then there's that incredible attack by 633 Sqn on the heavy water plant in Norway!


I'm well aware of 633 Sqn and their strike, and I think its an understatement to say that more than "key components" were destroyed.



buffnut453 said:


> Actually, I do realise. During my days in uniform, I spent some time as a targeteer undertaking target systems analysis. You don't need to obliterate a target to neutralise it - you just need to destroy the key components.


And again, do you actually think you had to luxery to do that, especially during WW2??? When targets like Schweinfurt were hit, you think 8Th AF planners were concerned whether they were hitting the primary machine shops or material stores? The objective was to flatten everything and most of the time the "shot gun" effect was not very effective.



buffnut453 said:


> Entirely agree - but you don't need formations of 4-engined aircraft with 10 men each onboard to achieve the same objective. It just took some time for the Allies to figure out that strategic effect could be delivered by something other than a big strategic bomber with a huge crew.


True - but it took time for other technologies to mature so you could build a bomber that not only carried a large bomb load but could do it effectively and safely. After WW2 big bombers were still being built with fairly large crews, but the mission changed for the crew. Instead you had crew members manning radar and ECMs in lieu of guns - in some respects you still had a large bomber that was self defending, but it was doing so in a whole different scale.

Look at bomber aircraft today - they are still "self defending" but they are defending themselves through speed, stealth and ECMs that are easily operated by a minimal crew.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 4, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Joe I think I understand your point now....basically that the Mosquito could not carry the tonnage of bombs that the B-17 could....and that as a result of that could not undertake the "strategic bombing" mission, as you see it. If I am reading you right essentially you are saying that the B-17 was a true strategic bomber, and a Mossie was not.
> 
> However, I see a couple of flaws in that line of thinking. Firstly, your definition of what consitutes "strategic bombing", is far too narrow. You seem to equate strategic bombing as a concept with the mass destruction of cities enmasse, that is not the only definition of strategic bombing campaigns. If you have a factory, that has one piece of machinery needed to halt the entire program, you can either level the factory, with B-17s, or you can take out the piece of machinery, using a precision bombing attack, and in this I think the Mosquito was superior to the B-17. The point I am making is that the term "strategic bombing" is pretty wide....there was more than one way to bring German industry to its knees...


Ok - point taken - but show me where any WW2 aircraft was ever used to take out one piece of equipment...


parsifal said:


> Secondly, I still dont get why a mass raid by Mosquitoes could not be used for mass destruction. The Mosquito could carry a single 4000 lb bomb or 4 x 500 lb bombsor even 2 x 1000 lb bombs....Dont know what the ordinance types for the B-17 are, but I doubt they are heavier than those I have just listed. A 4000 lb bomb is more than enough to destroy structures, you just have to drop enough of them. And to drop enough of them, you need numbers. If, instead of 400 B-17s attacking a target, each dropping 6000 lbs of bombs, (for a total drop of 2.4 million lbs) you had a Mosquito force of 1000 Mosquitoes, each dropping 4000 lbs, you are going to drop 4 million lbs in that comparison raid....this never was attempted in the war, so its all just theary, but to me I cannot see how 4 million lbs of explosive dropped by Mosquitoes would not do the same hob and more as 2.4 million lbs of explosive dropped by the B-17s......and the fleet costs are going to be similar I think.


What you say is true but as stated, if you were going to deploy 1000 Mossies (I doubt you'd ever get that many up at once) to do the job of 400 B-17s, you're still going to deliver them the same way unless you have a thousand Mossies attacking a target at low level at all different directions, and I doubt that would produce the same results than if you showered a target from altitude. To do that with the Mossie, you're basically flying a high altitude pathfinder mission, with a bombadire in the lead plane. On the bombing run as such, you don't bomb at 350 knots at altitude, you're doing so at well under 200 knots. As I said earlier, you think Mossie drivers would want to sit in a large formation being pelted by flack for 40 seconds until the lead plane gives the order to release their bomb load?


parsifal said:


> As for accuracy stats, no I dont have any, but I think it worth noting that the Mosquito was the weapon of choice for precision raids, where the neeed to hit targets precisely was a priority. And they were used as Pathfinders, night and day, in this regard i still dont see the point you are trying to make.


And agree 100% about their accuracy, as far as my point - you didn't drop bombs at altitude and expect results if you were flying 350 knots.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 4, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I'm well aware of 633 Sqn and their strike, and I think its an understatement to say that more than "key components" were destroyed.



Actually, from a systems perspective, it was a "key component" that was destroyed - it was the fuel (not heavy water...my mistake...must now watch 633 Sqn 20 times in a row as a penance!). Without the fuel, the rockets were useless so the 633 Sqn raid counts as a very successful form of target systems analysis.



FLYBOYJ said:


> And again, do you actually think you had to luxery to do that, especially during WW2??? When targets like Schweinfurt were hit, you think 8Th AF planners were concerned whether they were hitting the primary machine shops or material stores? The objective was to flatten everything and most of the time the "shot gun" effect was not very effective.



They weren't concerned for 2 main reasons:

(1) Vengeance - stamp on the aggressive exansionism of the Axis powers.
(2) Inability to hit targets with such precision and accuracy from high altitude using the Norden bombsight and large group formations. 

The objective was to destroy Germany's war-machinery which, to use the 633 Sqn analogy, could have been accomplished just as easily by preventing munitions leaving factories as it could by plastering acres and acres of industrial cities and sending thousands of bombs down to do nothing more than churn dirt. However, items (1) and (2) above both militated against such an approach. Undoubtedly, the strategic bombing campaign had a massive impact but I think the resources expended were disproportionate to the results achieved - German fighter production continued to increase despite the Allies' growing air superiority.



FLYBOYJ said:


> After WW2 big bombers were still being built with fairly large crews, but the mission changed for the crew. Instead you had crew members manning radar and ECMs in lieu of guns - in some respects you still had a large bomber that was self defending, but it was doing so in a whole different scale.
> 
> Look at bomber aircraft today - they are still "self defending" but they are defending themselves through speed, stealth and ECMs that are easily operated by a minimal crew.



Valid points, although the systems are as much about identifying the threat as they are about neutralising it...and there are other platforms which form the modern analogy of the escort fighter (eg AWACS, WIld Weasel, CAPS....and, yes, good old traditional fighter escort (at least for large gorilla packages), albeit a rather Cold War layaway in tactical terms). Stealth is the classic form of passive self-protection but methinks both this and the ECM topic diverge from the object of the thread which was about self-protection of bombers during WWII which, in the context of the question, was rather more...shall we say, active?

Ultimately, though, I think we both agree that the fundamental principle of an armoured porcupine flying unescorted over enemy territory was unsuccessful.

Regards
Mark


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 4, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> The objective was to destroy Germany's war-machinery which, to use the 633 Sqn analogy, could have been accomplished just as easily by preventing munitions leaving factories as it could by plastering acres and acres of industrial cities and sending thousands of bombs down to do nothing more than churn dirt. However, items (1) and (2) above both militated against such an approach. Undoubtedly, the strategic bombing campaign had a massive impact but I think the resources expended were disproportionate to the results achieved - German fighter production continued to increase despite the Allies' growing air superiority.



But a 633 Squadron analogy was not going to put a facility like Schweinfurt or Ploesti out of action. The only reason why strategic bombing didn't do much to fighter production was because by later in the war most assembly lines were moved out traditional factories and as we all know were found in forests, caves or even underground. For the technology at hand at the time, the large 4 engine bomber was the way to go despite the inefficiencies, the Mosquito concept was the wave of the future when eventually mated with radar ECMs and higher performing, higher load carrying airframes.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 4, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> But a 633 Squadron analogy was not going to put a facility like Schweinfurt or Ploesti out of action.



I think we're pretty much saying the same thing but using different words. I'm not suggesting a single-unit attack like 633 Sqn would have put a Schweinfurt or a Ploesti out of action, I'm merely stating that greater use of more precise delivery means coupled with better target systems analysis (which Allied PR and imagery analysts certainly COULD do) might have achieved the same (or better) results as massed formations of heavy bombers carpeting the landscape.



FLYBOYJ said:


> The Mosquito concept was the wave of the future when eventually mated with radar ECMs and higher performing, higher load carrying airframes.


 
Agree entirely.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 4, 2010)

I know the Mosquito has a special place in most folk's mind, as a great alternative to heavy bombing, but in reality, how would it have fared against the German anti-aircraft that was able to bring a great deal of damage to the heavies?

Thier need for lower altitues in order to conduct thier precision bombing would have put them right into the "sweet spot" of the 88 batteries. The Mossie's speed was an advantage to it, but loaded down with ordinance would have also hampered it's abilities to evade the Fw190's, which even unloaded, would have difficulties getting away from, especially the Fw190D. If a B-17 had a chance of surviving a round from the Mk108 (or Mk103), how would a Mosquito fare?

If the German defenses were able to deal with the high altitude bomber stream, don't you suppose that they would adjust thier tactics once they realized that smaller, high-speed inbound bomber groups were coming in at lower altitudes?


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## buffnut453 (Jan 4, 2010)

Valid point, GrauGeist, although I doubt the Flak 88 would be the weapon of choice, at least not against fast aircraft coming in at treetop height. I suspect smaller-calibre weapons with much higher firing rate would be more appropriate. As always, any new tactic or technology would, sooner or later, be overcome by a countermeasure or superior technology. Simply ringing every target with hundreds of light AAA guns would create severe problems for attacking bombers no matter how low or fast they flew, although it would, to an extent, depend on early warning of the incoming raid.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 5, 2010)

Some things to consider:

Stripping guns from the 4 engine bomber increases cruise speed. This reduces the time for interception by the fighters and reduces their intercept rate. It decreases AA accuracy and should reduce AA losses over the course of the mission and smaller crews mean fewer casualties. It might also allow for an increased bomb load. Against this is a probable decrease in bombing accuracy. Enemy fighter losses from defensive fire might be lowered, but this must be balanced against the increase in time that the fighter is exposed to the remaining guns, especially the tail gun. The bomber defensive box formation creates self limiting bomb accuracy, since by definition the bomb pattern will be same size as the formation.

A Mosquito based strategic bombing would greatly reduce the time for possible interception, reducing losses from fighters. The Mosquito cruising speed is better matched to that of potential fighter escorts so they could still escort missions. The Mosquito's speed reduces flak effectiveness as does it's much smaller radar cross section. Higher speeds will reduce bombing accuracy but tighter formations may be able to offset this. The Mosquito may also be able to fly several sorties per day against the same target to increase its effective bomb load. 

Overall I suspect that a large scale escorted daylight Mosquito bombing campaign would have been more cost effective and and just as costly to the Luftwaffe as the historical campaign.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 5, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> I'm merely stating that greater use of more precise delivery means coupled with better target systems analysis (which Allied PR and imagery analysts certainly COULD do) might have achieved the same (or better) results as massed formations of heavy bombers carpeting the landscape.


Agree - but you looking at a "would have, should have" that was more than likely not even given a thought till the war was well over. To try to take out a massive target like Ploesti for example at low level would have meant more aircraft being used during the raid with hopes that all goes according to plan with several hundred aircraft over the target at one time. Look what happened when the USAAF tried to bomb Ploesti at low altitude.



dunmunro1 said:


> Some things to consider:
> 
> Stripping guns from the 4 engine bomber increases cruise speed. This reduces the time for interception by the fighters and reduces their intercept rate. It decreases AA accuracy and should reduce AA losses over the course of the mission and smaller crews mean fewer casualties. It might also allow for an increased bomb load. Against this is a probable decrease in bombing accuracy. Enemy fighter losses from defensive fire might be lowered, but this must be balanced against the increase in time that the fighter is exposed to the remaining guns, especially the tail gun. The bomber defensive box formation creates self limiting bomb accuracy, since by definition the bomb pattern will be same size as the formation.


No matter what you're stripping off the bomber to make it faster, during WW2 all precision bombing runs at altitude were done at speeds between 150 - 180 mph if my memory serves me correctly and the bomb run could last as long as 2 minutes. Over the target you would probably be more vulnerable to fighters in a Mosquito than you would be in a B-17 or any other heavy because you didn't have the defensive armament to shoot back. Even the B-29 with more advanced bombing systems coupled with the Norden commenced a bombing run at 210 mph according to my references.


dunmunro1 said:


> A Mosquito based strategic bombing would greatly reduce the time for possible interception, reducing losses from fighters. The Mosquito cruising speed is better matched to that of potential fighter escorts so they could still escort missions. The Mosquito's speed reduces flak effectiveness as does it's much smaller radar cross section. Higher speeds will reduce bombing accuracy but tighter formations may be able to offset this. The Mosquito may also be able to fly several sorties per day against the same target to increase its effective bomb load.


You're still looking at 2000 pounds per aircraft less when compared to a B-17


dunmunro1 said:


> Overall I suspect that a large scale escorted daylight Mosquito bombing campaign would have been more cost effective and and just as costly to the Luftwaffe as the historical campaign.



Disagree - the Mosquito if deployed in the same manner as any heavy would have come across the same problems over target. The advantage would have been the time in and out of target which I agree, but at the cost of less of a bomb load. You would have needed way more aircraft to do the same job and in the end may have expended the same effort if going with a large 4 engine bomber. Lastly the Mosquito was not an easy aircraft to repair as a result of battle damage and had other operational and logistic issues that would have burdened any effort to deploy it in the numbers needed.


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## riacrato (Jan 5, 2010)

Not to even mention the logistical effort to guide 2-2.5 times the bombers to their target and at a lower altitude.


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## gjs238 (Jan 5, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> Overall I suspect that a large scale escorted daylight Mosquito bombing campaign would have been more cost effective and and just as costly to the Luftwaffe as the historical campaign.



Did the Allies ever try conducting a pilot study of such operations to gauge results?
A series of pilot studies would seem appropriate: Mosquitos strategic bombing in daylight, night time, high level, low level, etc.


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## davebender (Jan 5, 2010)

That would be suicide. WWII Germany had excellent light flak and it just kept getting better. There's a reason Allied heavy bombers stayed as high as possible even though it greaty reduced bombing accuracy.

25,000 marks. Approximate price for 8.8cm Flak41
5,000 marks. Approximate price for 3.7cm Flak43.
If the RAF start bombing from treetop height then Germany starts building 5 x 3.7cm Flak43 for each 1 x 8.8cm Flak41 that got purchased historically.

3.7 cm FlaK 43 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
It's worth noting the 3.7cm Flak43 was a superb weapon. Probably the best of it's type during WWII. It was also inexpensive, designed for mass production under wartime conditions. It could be manually directed or slaved to radar. A single 3.7cm shell is likely to cause mortal damage to a RAF Mosquito.

Ideally you take out German light flak with heavy bombers operating at 20,000 feet. Then send in Mosquitos at treetop level. Unfortunately the RAF cannot bomb accurately from 20,000 feet so most of the German 3.7cm flak are likely to survive. An unsolvable problem with WWII era bombing technology.


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## Milosh (Jan 5, 2010)

But the Mosquito took less bombs to destroy a V-1 site, Dave.

Mosquito - 39.8t
B-17 - 165.4t
B-25 - 182t
B-26 - 219t


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 5, 2010)

Milosh said:


> But the Mosquito took less bombs to destroy a V-1 site, Dave.
> 
> Mosquito - 39.8t
> B-17 - 165.4t
> ...


Poor comparison.

How many sorties were involved? How many aircraft per mission? Bomb load per aircraft? That's like saying it took 200 B-29s to level Tokyo but one to level Hiroshima and not saying that an atomic bomb was used!


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## drgondog (Jan 5, 2010)

I can't help but think the discussion goes down a rathole in trying to extrapolate the possible efficiency improvements had the Mossie replaced the B-17 and B-24 for Strategic Bombing campaign.

It isn't as simple as strapping a Norden into the Mossie and have it perform with a bombardier in daylight missions. I first think about the P-38 with Droop Snoot mods as well as P-38 dropping en masse on a lead Droop Snoot. One could certainly cruise into the target with higher cruise speed but accuracy per se for the individual Mossie shouldn't be greater at same altitude than a B-17 (or the aforementioned P-38). I could be convinced that a Mossie had good bomb run stability and equal the B-17 as a bomb platform but have to see facts.

So, if the Mossie individually isn't deemed a more capable precision bomber at high altitude, take it down. No question highly trained crews could hit targets with precision on the deck but for heavily defended targets like Ploesti or Berlin or Misburg each approach run would have ALL the available flak batteries along a vector in play (8mm to 122mm and everything in between)

Could you 'do' Ploesti at night? Dunno, finding the general area is bad enough, finding the Catcracker would be very difficult.

Escorted precision attacks? sure, but is that really the way Mossies would bomb in daylight and would it be better to go entirely unsupported by large formations (no real defense so why 'bunch up'). The higher you go the less effective precision bombing, the lower you go, the less range - and more exposure.

In the latter role at medium altitudes, is the Mossie more effective than a A/B-26 or B-25? Can't see why it would be.

So, make the case for Mossie Strategic attacks at night on the deck.


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## pbfoot (Jan 5, 2010)

Milosh said:


> But the Mosquito took less bombs to destroy a V-1 site, Dave.
> 
> Mosquito - 39.8t
> B-17 - 165.4t
> ...


my goodness I don't think they were thatt accurate in Vietnam, in WW2 I believe the CEP was in the hundreds of metres


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## drgondog (Jan 5, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> Some things to consider:
> 
> Stripping guns from the 4 engine bomber increases cruise speed. This reduces the time for interception by the fighters and reduces their intercept rate. It decreases AA accuracy and should reduce AA losses over the course of the mission and smaller crews mean fewer casualties. It might also allow for an increased bomb load. Against this is a probable decrease in bombing accuracy. Enemy fighter losses from defensive fire might be lowered, but this must be balanced against the increase in time that the fighter is exposed to the remaining guns, especially the tail gun. The bomber defensive box formation creates self limiting bomb accuracy, since by definition the bomb pattern will be same size as the formation.
> 
> ...



Not enough data to make that judgment. 

The Mossie HAS to be as accurate a bomb platform as a B-17 travelling 100kts slower - proof? 

It has to have the range at the higher cruise speeds to make the long range Oil/Chemical campaign successful. I don't have a feel for this as my recollection was about 1200 mile round trip range w/2000 pounds... if greater than this thge longer range Poland and Czechoslovakia and Rumania targets are in play.

If those two criteria are provavble, even for only a 2000 pound bomb load, it might be worth looking at because it WAS a lot less expensive (crew and airframe) and might be as easy to protect with escorts to reduce the shoot downs that Might be greater than the heavily gunned B-17/24s


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## drgondog (Jan 5, 2010)

pbfoot said:


> my goodness I don't think they were thatt accurate in Vietnam, in WW2 I believe the CEP was in the hundreds of metres



The LGB's were extremely accurate in the latter half of Vietnam with F-4 and F-105s.. Paul Dhoumer Bridge survived a LOT of iron bomb missions but went down with first Mk84 LGB package delivered by 355th F-105D's.

BUF on the other hand wasn't so very accurate w/ Mk 82's and 83's but a LOT better than WWII and Korea..


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## pbfoot (Jan 5, 2010)

drgondog said:


> The LGB's were extremely accurate in the latter half of Vietnam with F-4 and F-105s.. Paul Dhoumer Bridge survived a LOT of iron bomb missions but went down with first Mk84 LGB package delivered by 355th F-105D's.
> 
> BUF on the other hand wasn't so very accurate w/ Mk 82's and 83's but a LOT better than WWII and Korea..


and the dumb bombs in Viet nam were still far more accurate then in Korea or WW2 IIRC thats why 1000's were sent to a sindle target and the Brits went to area bombing because of the inaccuracies


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## drgondog (Jan 5, 2010)

pbfoot said:


> and the dumb bombs in Viet nam were still far more accurate then in Korea or WW2 IIRC thats why 1000's were sent to a sindle target and the Brits went to area bombing because of the inaccuracies



Absolutely true. BUFs attacking North during Linebacker II were very effective with iron bomb Mk 82 and Mk83s.


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## vinnye (Jan 6, 2010)

I love the Mosquito - a beautiful design that had good performance. But it could not really fulfill the strategic bombing missions only specific pinpoint missions at low level. As has been pointed out by others - large targets could not be destroyed by the Mossie - without there being hunderds of them at low level all at the same time! The logistics of that don't bare thinking about!
Low level attacks were very useful during the earlier years of the war - but were geting costly later on due to the lighter AA gund being deployed. An example of this is the attacks on Me262' as they were taking off or landing. Allied fighters would lurk nearby and hit them during this vulnerable period. The air defences were increased around these bases and proved to be quite effective. Resulting in these missions being pulled.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 6, 2010)

Hi Vinnye,

Having raised this thorny subject, I largely agree with you, although there is a world of difference between fighters "lurking" near airfields at sufficient altitude to detect, identify and engage aircraft taking off and landing and a fast, hit-and-run attack dropping bombs on a specific target.

I'm also going to re-state that I'm not suggesting using the Mosquito in the traditional sstrategic vision of heavy bomber usage - ie flattening everything at a target. I'm suggesting destroying the key elements of a target so that the strategic effect is delivered. The 633 Sqn analogy is highly appropriate:

*Problem: * Germany has developed lethal rockets that could prevent the invasion of Europe by the Allies. The Allies need to stop these rockets being launched.

*Potential Solutions and Issues: * 

1. Bomb the factories making the rockets. The issue is that the rockets have already been built and distributed but are awaiting fuel.

2. Bomb all the rocket launch sites. Potentially feasible but would necessitate attacking multiple launch sites that must first be identified - not an easy task, involves use of large numbers of aircraft and still runs the risk of leaving a few sites operational that could still infliect heavy Allied casualties on D-Day.

3. Attack the Fuel Factory. This is a point target and, although well defended and hard to attack, could be destroyed.

Taking a systems analysis approach, it is feasible to destroy choke points and still achieve the same strategic result (removing the threat or supply means) without flattening acres of urban areas and using only a fraction of the aircraft and bombs compared to "traditional" carpet bombing by high-flying heavy bombers. 

I agree that my approach is not valid for every target, and I also accept that there are countermeasures. However, for even light AAA to be effective, the gunners have to know the aircraft are coming to their target. It's notoriously difficult to determine final destination of aircraft flying at very low level - radar couldn't help and visual observation is very fleeting (because the aircraft are so low) making positive determination of course and final destination very difficult. So, a far smaller number of aircraft operating at very low level could, with surprise, engage some (not all) targets to neutralise key components and achieve the same (or better) strategic effect as hundreds of heavy bombers plastering the ground with a CEP measured in miles. 

All that said, this is a hypothetical discussion and is quite a tangent from the original subject which is self-defending bombers and whether they were a success or a failure. I still contend they were a tactical failure because they needed escorting fighters to be effective, but they were the accepted way of doing business in the early 1940s to deliver strategic effect at long range (despite the heavy costs on both sides).


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## Shortround6 (Jan 6, 2010)

No true gunless heavy bomber was built during WW II. Trying to compare a small bomber like the Mosquito to planes like the B-17 and B24 and Lancaster is a bit unfair. The Mosquito with it's 2 engines is not going to compete with a 4 engine bomber. 
With out a real airplane to get numbers from a good comparison is hard to make but a gunless 4 engine bomber design (or minimal guns) might show quite an advantage over the armed bombers. 
Not just stripping the guns out but a plane designed from the start not to have gun turrets and gunners.

Compared to a B-17 you can loose 6 crewmen easy for 1200lbs, loosing the 13 .50 cal guns means another 900lbs or better not including mounts, turrets, feed ways and other stuff. 4000 rounds of .50 cal ammo is over 1200lbs. All told you could probably reduce the payload by around 2 tons or more. This could mean a smaller wing for the same wing loading and a smaller fuselage. A smoother more aerodynamic design means less drag along with the smaller wing means more performance for the same power. 
Is this enough to get the performance to a point where the losses would be no worse than the armed bomber?


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## parsifal (Jan 6, 2010)

I was interested to find out that the Commander of the Fast Attack Group, Group Captain Bennett, following the submission of the Butt report, strongly advocated the adoption of the Mosquito as the principal Bomber of BC. The submission was never adopted, and mass raids by Mosquitoes on strategic targets not implemented until late in the war (they were of course used for tactical strikes, path finder missions, small scale precision nuisance raids). The Mosquito was never used enmasse, I think the Fast Attack Group reached a peak strength of about 10 squadrons, and at the end of the war the group was delivering mass raids in its own right of 60-100 aircraft.

I think there were two main reason as to why the Mossie was not adopted as per Bennetts recommendations, one very valid, and one not valid. The valid reason was that at the time of the Butt report, the Mosquito was still experiemental, and far from its enviable loss records of the later war period, was actually experiencing attrition rates of around 8% compared to the force average around 5%. Its understandable why the brass were not prepared to take the risk on the Mosquito

The second reason is not valid. There was an enormous amount of latent distrust regarding the Mosquito, as the RAFs experience with the "fast light" bomber concept as epitomised by the Blenheim, showed just how quickly todays revolutionary uninterceptable bomber could become tomorrows flying deathtrap. For years the RAF had veered away from this concept to the idea of the heavily defended, slow moving heavy bomber carrying heavier bombloads....That the RAF heavy bomber concept in daylight had proven to be a deathtrap as well seems to have escaped people like Harris


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## gjs238 (Jan 6, 2010)

Schnellbomber - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## buffnut453 (Jan 6, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> No true gunless heavy bomber was built during WW II. Trying to compare a small bomber like the Mosquito to planes like the B-17 and B24 and Lancaster is a bit unfair. The Mosquito with it's 2 engines is not going to compete with a 4 engine bomber.
> With out a real airplane to get numbers from a good comparison is hard to make but a gunless 4 engine bomber design (or minimal guns) might show quite an advantage over the armed bombers.
> Not just stripping the guns out but a plane designed from the start not to have gun turrets and gunners.
> 
> ...



RJ Mitchell's final design was for a 4-engined fast bomber much along the lines you describe. Mitchell's untimely death and the destruction of the mock-up in a German bombing raid effectively halted the project. The problem with the big bomber is lack of manoeuverabilty at low level, which was the only way of delivering bombs with any degree of precision (except dive bombing but that needed air superiority to be effective) during WWII.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 6, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> So, a far smaller number of aircraft operating at very low level could, with surprise, engage some (not all) targets to neutralise key components and achieve the same (or better) strategic effect as hundreds of heavy bombers plastering the ground with a CEP measured in miles.



That's the theory and a worth wild goal but in reality with WW2 technology that concept could not be consistently undertaken IMO, at least not to the point to "Neutralize Key components of a target." I ask you, how could one determine if that was achieved during WW2 when the only way you're going to analyze mission results is through aerial photography and by spies on the ground, and the latter of the two weren't always available? 

To achieve the results required to end the war, you would have had to have thousands of aircraft like the Mosquito operating 24-7. I think you do do the math, consider loss mitigation and determine risks, it was better to send hordes of heavy bombers over Germany around the clock as was done by the allies. Bill makes excellent points in identifying factors questioning this.

I could see half the forests across Canada gone in an attempt to build that many Mosquitoes to support using that aircraft in lieu of all the allied heavies!


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## buffnut453 (Jan 6, 2010)

As I've said before, Joe, I have no fundamental problems with what you're saying. I'm just positing a different perspective on the problem...and it's generating some interesting discussion. One final point, although I've been banging the Mosquito drum, it could equally apply to other fast medium bombers - B-26 without dorsal turret, B-25 (this would be great in the role) etc. I simply selected the Mossie 'cos it was a fundamentally different design philosophy - a totally unarmed bomber - that truly was groundbreaking.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 6, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> As I've said before, Joe, I have no fundamental problems with what you're saying. I'm just positing a different perspective on the problem...and it's generating some interesting discussion. One final point, although I've been banging the Mosquito drum, it could equally apply to other fast medium bombers - B-26 without dorsal turret, B-25 (this would be great in the role) etc. I simply selected the Mossie 'cos it was a fundamentally different design philosophy - a totally unarmed bomber - that truly was groundbreaking.


And agree - I think the solution to your points came several years later with the Canberra.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 6, 2010)

think that it could be argued that Canberra is an extension of Mosquito, as far as design operational philosophies go.

On a related note, would the USAF fared better with their bomber OPs with, say, triple the Canberras instead of historical number of their B-52s vs. N. Vietnam?


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## Waynos (Jan 6, 2010)

It absolutely was Tomo. Not only the Canberra but also the TSR 2 and Tornado too. The Mossie had a profound effect on RAF thinking. That effect is also why the V Bombers had no defensive guns whilst US and Soviet bombers of the same era retained rear gun positions.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 6, 2010)

Agreed with all you say, with one additional point. I believe the Vulcan possessed better manoeuverability than the US and Russian equivalents - according to one book I have on the tin triangle, the Vulcan's defensive manoeuvre, which was not dissimilar to that of the Lancaster corkscrew and proved highly effective until the arrival of the F-16. Allegedly, the first time a Vulcan tried the manoeuvre against an F-16, the V-bomber crew were surprised to find the adversary fighter formating with the Vulcan on the _inside_ of the manoeuvre. It's also worth pointing out that the defensive armament on the Buff was removed later on in its career.


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## Colin1 (Jan 6, 2010)

The USAF bombed extensive areas of jungle during Vietnam
Do you think the Canberra, even triple the number, could have handled a carpet-bombing job better than the king of the carpet-bombers?


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## davebender (Jan 6, 2010)

It appears to me that radar directed light flak helps a great deal. I don't have numbers at hand but I've read dozens of first hand accounts of low level strike aircraft being shot to pieces.


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## drgondog (Jan 6, 2010)

By far the highest losses in 8th AF FC was due to airfield flak - which was a) attacked by fighters a lot faster than Mossies on the deck, and b.) not near as heavily defended as targets like Ploesti or Misburg or Merseburg refineries.


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## JoeB (Jan 6, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> think that it could be argued that Canberra is an extension of Mosquito, as far as design operational philosophies go.
> 
> On a related note, would the USAF fared better with their bomber OPs with, say, triple the Canberras instead of historical number of their B-52s vs. N. Vietnam?


The USAF used 'Canberras' ie, B-57's in Vietnam. The most notable were 'Tropic Moon' program conversions to, for then, highly advanced night vision and laser guided bomb capability (LGB use in SEA was first highly publicized in 1972 from F-4's, but it started eariler during the 'bombing halt'). 

But basically the answer is definitely not, for replacing B-52's with B-57's. The overwhelming majority of B-52 bombing sorties were against essentially undefended targets. The 15 or so losses to Vietnamese defenses late in the war comprised a tiny per sortie loss rate over all sorties in SEA (though 2% of those over NV duing that short period). In the typical B-52 mission in SEA, a bigger plane simply had better economies of scale, and no reason to substitute a smaller one.

Even against a SAM-defended target, a plane like B-52 had substantial ECM capability to defeat the attack. Remember that most of the B-52's lost in Linebacker II were B-52G's which while newer as planes had less advanced ECM fit than B-52D's in SEA did at the time. Eliminating losses in the later LB II missions was partly achieved by not assigning 'G's' to the toughest targets.

Back to WWII, an 'undefended' bomber concept is one thing, it might be realistic (or not, I think not but it's reasonably debateable). Where things can get clearly unrealistic is assuming that the bombing accuracy issue can be easily solved by low altitude operations. Light AA could easily make this prohibitively costly if it was the main method of attack. In the actual situation, there was *some* targets not well defended by any AA; naturally, 'he who tries to defend everything defends nothing'. But those targets had to be selected carefully, true of either Mosquito low level attacks, or A-20 low level attacks pre D-Day (latter were always v non-Reich occupied territory former often were), but in either case it was by definition against somewhat marginal targets, those not heavily defended by light AA. Later in the war there were attractive dispersed targets like for example Type XXI U-boat module fabrication sites, but these had been dispersed *because* of heavy bomber operations against conventional shipyards. If you assume no conventional bombing campaign, the defense can react in ways that make low level bombing implausible as the main method. 

IMO the unescorted defended bomber concept mainly failed, undefended day light unescorted bomber concept would have failed also, escorted bomber that could take care of itself against limited intensity and duration of fighter attacks (ie B-17/24 types, they generally could) was the right concept.

Joe


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 6, 2010)

JoeB said:


> The USAF used 'Canberras' ie, B-57's in Vietnam. The most notable were 'Tropic Moon' program conversions to, for then, highly advanced night vision and laser guided bomb capability (LGB use in SEA was first highly publicized in 1972 from F-4's, but it started eariler during the 'bombing halt').
> 
> But basically the answer is definitely not, for replacing B-52's with B-57's. The overwhelming majority of B-52 bombing sorties were against essentially undefended targets.* The 15 or so losses to Vietnamese defenses late in the war comprised a tiny per sortie loss rate over all sorties in SEA (though 2% of those over NV duing that short period).* In the typical B-52 mission in SEA, a bigger plane simply had better economies of scale, and no reason to substitute a smaller one.
> 
> ...



As usual, great post Joe and you beat to some points about the Buff in Vietnam. Also remember that although Nixon "pulled out all stops" there were still some idiots who were in charge of planning the Linebacker II missions where the B-52s flew the track in and out of NVN, so they were basically giving the SAM sites a "shooting gallery" that could predicted on almost a daily basis.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 6, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> On a related note, would the USAF fared better with their bomber OPs with, say, triple the Canberras instead of historical number of their B-52s vs. N. Vietnam?


NO. When the B-52s were unleashed with no restriction during Linebacker II it was like using a steam roller to crush a peanut. In the end those strikes brought the North Vietnamese leadership back to the Paris Peacetalks and ultimately ended the war.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 6, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> The USAF bombed extensive areas of jungle during Vietnam
> Do you think the Canberra, even triple the number, could have handled a carpet-bombing job better than the king of the carpet-bombers?



No I don't but then again I could never see the point of the activity you describe. What exactly did all that carpet bombing of jungle achieve in terms of progressing the military objectives of the campaign? Did it stop the NVA or Viet Cong operating? Did it stop the resupply route along the Ho Chi Minh Trails (and, yes, I used the plural deliberately)? Did it in any way reduce the warmaking capacity of the adversary? I believe the answer to all 3 questions is a resounding "NO". However, it did achieve some things. It annoyed the hell out of thousands of locals and probably greatly assisted NVA and VC recruitment. It expended thousands of bombs blowing up highly aggressive trees and paddy fields, and it explosed expensive large strategic aircraft and their crews to unnecessary threat (although, to be fair, the Buffs did not penetrate as far north as the tactical fighters - how's that for a contradiction of WWII strategic bombing theory...the small guys operating at longer range than the big multi-engine (and self-protected!) strategic bomber).

Sorry of this comes across as overly harsh but I really do fail to see what the carpet bombing of jungle achieved. The most effective bombing during the conflict was the increased employment of LGBs during LINEBACKER which achieved more success against North Vietnamese lines of communication with 155K tons of bombs than was achieved in all of ROLLING THUNDER and four-times the expenditure of munitions.


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## gjs238 (Jan 6, 2010)

JoeB said:


> IMO the unescorted defended bomber concept mainly failed, undefended day light unescorted bomber concept would have failed also, escorted bomber that could take care of itself against limited intensity and duration of fighter attacks (ie B-17/24 types, they generally could) was the right concept.



Ah, but what about escorted, undefended "Schnellbomber"?
I.E., send in the Mossies (or whatever plane) w/escorts.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 6, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> No I don't but then again I could never see the point of the activity you describe. What exactly did all that carpet bombing of jungle achieve in terms of progressing the military objectives of the campaign? Did it stop the NVA or Viet Cong operating? Did it stop the resupply route along the Ho Chi Minh Trails (and, yes, I used the plural deliberately)? Did it in any way reduce the warmaking capacity of the adversary? I believe the answer to all 3 questions is a resounding "NO". However, it did achieve some things. It annoyed the hell out of thousands of locals and probably greatly assisted NVA and VC recruitment. It expended thousands of bombs blowing up highly aggressive trees and paddy fields, and it explosed expensive large strategic aircraft and their crews to unnecessary threat (although, to be fair, the Buffs did not penetrate as far north as the tactical fighters - how's that for a contradiction of WWII strategic bombing theory...the small guys operating at longer range than the big multi-engine (and self-protected!) strategic bomber).
> 
> Sorry of this comes across as overly harsh but I really do fail to see what the carpet bombing of jungle achieved. The most effective bombing during the conflict was the increased employment of LGBs during LINEBACKER which achieved more success against North Vietnamese lines of communication with 155K tons of bombs than was achieved in all of ROLLING THUNDER and four-times the expenditure of munitions.



All true BUT in some of the Buff strikes on open jungle did alleviate pressure on US forces operating close to the strike (my brother witnessed this first hand)

The carpet bombings of the Vietnamese jungle did not do much to the over all war effort, but that wasn't because of the aircraft. The political meddling in the war hampered any chance of really establishing a victory from the south. As mentioned, once Nixon unleashed the B-52 in full force, the North Vietnamese was very quick to return to the peace table.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 6, 2010)

Entirely agree with your comments, Flyboy. My point was that bombing jungle was largely irrelevant to the overall war effort irrespective of the aircraft type used to drop the munitions. There were all sorts of political issues associated with the employment of the BUF, I suspect due to fears of a COMINTERN (probably an inappropriate term but you get the drift - international communist comunity) backlash to a nuclear-capable strategic bomber being employed against the NVA/VC. The 5000-mile political screwdriver was thoroughly utilised by DC throughout the conflict.

Agree, too, about the success of LINEBACKER, although I thought it was the more widespread use of LGBs that caused the real damage - the BUF was predominantly the big stick to show what would happen if the NVA/VC didn't come to the negotiating table.

Again, nothing against the BUF - I always used to marvel walking around the example at Duxford - it wasn't the aircraft that was at fault, just the dumb tasking to blow up flora and fauna.


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## Demetrious (Jan 7, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Maybe so, but a cannon-armed fighter could stand off outside the range of small-calibre defensive weapons on the bombers and still inflict casualties on the bomber formation with impunity.



I'm sorry, but I have to disagree with this heartily. 

Against a plane mounting sufficient defensive armament (that is to say, multiple .50 caliber guns, and twin mounts in key locations,) if you and some of your friends try to sit on a bomber's tail at 400 or 500 yards, (which is pushing it, even for a high-velocity cannon,) you're still well in effective range of their tail guns, and they have a much more stable firing platform as well as more ammo. They'll happily hose you down until you cop one in the radiator. Multiply twin tail guns vs. 20 bombers and then things start to get fun.

So this, naturally, leads to the employment of the high-sides attack, or head-on attacks, to minimize your exposure to defensive fire. Given the closing rates involved, long-range benefits of cannons become nil. 

Not to mention, ammo loads on most cannon-armed fighters were very limited, so you couldn't afford to hose rounds at long range and hope for hits, and many cannons of the war had very poor ballistics compared to .50 cal (the Japanese early 20mm and the German 30mm cannons, for example,) and a shorter effective range.

As for the effectiveness of self-defending bombers, those citing high casualties of the unescorted groups need to remember what they were attempting- to fly over 2,000 miles of enemy-held territory and bomb their rear-most areas, and then fly back out. To expect unescorted bombers to do this with low casualties is tantamount to expecting them to steamroll over the enemy, and Germany was not a weak or technologically deficient enemy whatsoever. The brutal attrition of the early bombing campaign is what you'd expect from a military fighting a foe of similar capabilities.

In any case, raw loss rates don't help us much because they don't tell us how many bombers were knocked down by flack, which to my memory was more dangerous by far then interceptor fighters.


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## parsifal (Jan 7, 2010)

Hi Guys


I thought it might be useful to know that the DH 98 was designed as a High Altitude Recon Bomber, but as the war progressed the emphasis on bombing started to overtake the PR roles. It had no problems bombing from High altitude, or low altitude, day or night, and this included attacks against what many consider to be the most heavily defended target for AA - Berlin.

As the war progressed ther were two specific subtypes further developed and refined for the High level bombing role, details as follows:

B.Mk IX For high altitude with one bomb of 1814 kg.

B.Mk XVI With pressurized cabin newer version of the B.Mk IX

As far as bombing aids were concerned, I have not yet uncovered the type of bombsight installed, but for night the Mosquito was fitted with the full range of night time blind bombing aids, including H2S and the far more accurate OBOE.


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## Glider (Jan 7, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> All true BUT in some of the Buff strikes on open jungle did alleviate pressure on US forces operating close to the strike (my brother witnessed this first hand)
> 
> The carpet bombings of the Vietnamese jungle did not do much to the over all war effort, but that wasn't because of the aircraft. The political meddling in the war hampered any chance of really establishing a victory from the south. As mentioned, once Nixon unleashed the B-52 in full force, the North Vietnamese was very quick to return to the peace table.



I remember reading a review by a NV officer who said that for all the air attacks in Vietnam, only two worried them.
One was the B52 because if they were on target there was nowhere to hide. The second were the attack helicopters as they seemed personal, able to winkle out the target. The vast majority of other attacks achieved little.
This was no doubt some propaganda but it had the ring of truth.


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## drgondog (Jan 7, 2010)

JoeB said:


> The USAF used 'Canberras' ie, B-57's in Vietnam. The most notable were 'Tropic Moon' program conversions to, for then, highly advanced night vision and laser guided bomb capability (LGB use in SEA was first highly publicized in 1972 from F-4's, but it started eariler during the 'bombing halt').
> 
> 
> 
> Joe



TI's Paveway I actually started combat ops in 1968. I was not involved in that design but I was 'loaned' to TI in 1971 during the II development which added the bigger aero surfaces to extend slant range but brought higher failure rates due to the lowered bomb impact angle. 

The FMU -81 fuse/wlock ring assy connecting the bang bang control module to the Mk 83/Mk84 was being sheared before detonation. I did a full blown NASTRAN model which was pretty simple per se comared to AH-1 or SR-71 but still useful in gaining insight to the failure mode.


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## Colin1 (Jan 7, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> No I don't but then again I could never see the point of the activity you describe. What exactly did all that carpet bombing of jungle achieve in terms of progressing the military objectives of the campaign?


I think Joe covered it
that wasn't really my point because that isn't the point of the thread.
Regardless of the success of the campaign, someone decided that it was a good idea at the time, the bombing footprint of even one B-52 ensured that, if there was something under it, chances of survival were nil.

The _effectiveness_ of the bombing of Vietnamese jungle is the subject for another topic


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