# Custer and the Little Big Horn



## imalko (Mar 25, 2009)

George Armstrong Custer (1839-1876) is one of the most controversial figures of 19th century American history. Graduated last in his class at West Point but emerged from Civil war as a national hero and celebrated Boy-General. Made Brigadier General at the age of 23 in June 1863 just before battle of Gettysburg and then later during the war promoted to Brevet Major General, Custer was the youngest General in US Military history. He was also a protegee and favorite cavalryman of Phill Sheridan, commander of Union Cavalry.

But his exploits during the Civil war are greatly overshadowed by his death and annihilation of entire cavalry battalion under his immediate command at the hand of hostile Indians at the battle of Little Big Horn.

After locating the Indian camp, Custer divided his regiment to three battalions. (Arguably not a wise decision in face of the enemy of unknown strength and disposition, but one should note that at the time of Indian wars cavalry commanders were ever fearful that the hostile Indians would scatter and flee and simultanious attack from three directions was intended to prevent this from happening.) Battalion under major Reno attacked the village but was driwen back, suffering casualties, retreated across the river and then entrenched on so called Reno Hill. Battalion under captain Benteen was sent to the southwest with orders to scout the ridges and prevent escape of Indians in that direction, then report back to the main command. Custer's immediate command (five companies - over 200 men) went to the right of the Little Big Horn river. They engaged the hostiles, but were overwhelmed and annihilated to the last man.

At one point at the beginning of the battle, Custer send written orders to Benteen to rejoin the main command. That's the famous order written by the regiments adjutant Lt. W.W.Cooke: 

_" Benteen
Come on. Big Village.
Be quick. Bring packs.
W. W. Cooke
P.S. Bring Packs."_

This order was not obeyed. Benteen, after reaching the Reno Hill, advanced no further, even when from his position the sound of firing from the site of Custer's Last Stand further downstream could be heard.

So, there you have it. My question is - was Custer betrayed at the Little Big Horn on that fatefull Sunday June 25th 1876 or was he already doomed by his own actions? If Benteen had resumed his advance towards the sound of the firing, would that have saved Custer and his men, or only add more names to the casualty list? Note that after destruction of Custer's battalion members of Reno-Benteen command survived Indian siege for few days until reinforcements of general Terry arrived. 

Benteen's personal hatred for Custer was well known. Could that influence his decisions? When asked by general Terry few days after the battle why he disobeyed Custer's order to _"Come on..."_ and _"Be quick..." _Benteen simply replied: _"I thought Custer can take care of himself."_

Here is oppinion of one of the Little Big Horn veterans:

_"Reno proved incompetent and Benteen showed his indifference – I will not use the uglier words that have often been in my mind. Both failed Custer and he had to fight it out alone." 
Little Big Horn veteran William Taylor, letter to Lieutenant Godfrey, February 20, 1910 _

I would like to hear other people opinions on this matter.

Sorry if my introduction is too extensive, that was for those people who are not familliar with this subject.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 25, 2009)

Hmm, to my knowledge Custer had screwed himself with his deployment. He had divided his command against a numerically superior enemy, assuming they would run, instead of turning and fighting.


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## comiso90 (Mar 25, 2009)

Custer was over-confident, flamboyant and cocky... that's what killed him and his troops.

Wasn't he last in his WP class?

They say he was offered a Gatlin gun but turned it down.

.


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## Bill G. (Mar 25, 2009)

I am not going to go into the debate. I am just going to add some triva.

My Guard Company trains part of the time at Fort Custer here in Michigan. 
My Dad was inducted into the Army in WWII at then Camp Custer.
My Mom's Dad was a soldier at Camp Custer in WWI. It was a Cavalry Post. He was trained to be a blacksmith. The Sergeant in charge of training told his students there was a Blacksmith in town who was really good and they should go and watch him. He did. He feel in love with the Blacksmith's daughter, my Grandma.

What is the All Ranks Club at Fort Custer called??? Custer's First Stand!

My mobilization training was at Fort Riley, Kansas. That is where Lt. Col Custer left from on his way to the Little Big Horn.

General Custer, like me is a Michigander. That is from Michigan.

Thank you, and I return you to the debate.

Bill G.


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## Colin1 (Mar 25, 2009)

At the time
the Gatling would have been a support weapon of massive significance, surely he didn't turn one down? If he chose to divide his battalions up like that, I'd have had six, one on each corner of the battalion positions - the approach to the battalion frontal area would have been a slaughterhouse.

That's as deep as I'm prepared to let myself get into 'armchair general' mode...

If Benteen got to Reno's position and between them held it for several days, then they must have consolidated in strength, or been in a very defendable position. Maybe both.

If they were in strength, they had an obligation to relieve Custer's predicament which places Benteen's judgement in cold-blooded contempt of the 200 men that died as well as Custer. 
If their position was all that was keeping them from annihilation as well, then their options were limited. 
It's really down to what shape Benteen and Reno were in.

200 men = 5 companies? They were pretty damn small companies in those days!


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## comiso90 (Mar 25, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> the Gatling would have been a support weapon of massive significance, surely he didn't turn one down? If he chose to divide his battalions up like that, I'd have had six, one on each corner of the battalion positions - the approach to the battalion frontal area would have been a slaughterhouse.



A battery of Gatlin guns!

_*Critics point out that Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign, refusing the use of a battery of Gatling guns and General Terry's offer of an additional battalion of the 2nd Cavalry led by Capt. James S. Brisbin. Custer's reasoning was that the Gatling guns would impede his march up the Rosebud and hamper his mobility. Considering his rapid march en route to the Little Big Horn, averaging almost 30 miles (48 km) a day, this was an accurate assessment. Each gun was hauled by four horses and it often became necessary for soldiers to drag the guns by hand over obstacles. These problems do not change the fact that the Gatling guns would have been a decided equalizer in the face of Indian superiority, and that elsewhere in the Indian wars, the Indians often reacted to new army weapons by breaking off the fight.*_

Battle of the Little Bighorn - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

.


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## Colin1 (Mar 25, 2009)

comiso90 said:


> _*Critics point out that Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign, refusing the use of a battery of Gatling guns and General Terry's offer of an additional battalion of the 2nd Cavalry led by Capt. James S. Brisbin. Custer's reasoning was that the Gatling guns would impede his march up the Rosebud and hamper his mobility. Considering his rapid march en route to the Little Big Horn, averaging almost 30 miles (48 km) a day, this was an accurate assessment. Each gun was hauled by four horses and it often became necessary for soldiers to drag the guns by hand over obstacles. These problems do not change the fact that the Gatling guns would have been a decided equalizer in the face of Indian superiority, and that elsewhere in the Indian wars, the Indians often reacted to new army weapons by breaking off the fight.*_


He was getting assets thrown at him! 
Problems getting assets to the battlefield are something a General should overcome second-nature; solving the problem by leaving the problem at base camp is no solution at all.
Came last in his class, the youngest General in history, the Little Big Horn - there's a message in there somewhere...


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## pbfoot (Mar 25, 2009)

I was driving down I90 in a heavy fog one evening got tired a said I'll catch a nap at the rest stop I woke up to my surprise looking at a Cairn that had been placed indicating the site of the Little Big Horn


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## syscom3 (Mar 25, 2009)

All Benteen would have added to the fight is additional casualties. 

Custer picked a fight with numerically superior force, and paid the price.


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## wheelsup_cavu (Mar 26, 2009)

Very interesting topic.
Fits most of what I have read about Custer and how his decisions doomed his men.

Wheelsup


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## renrich (Mar 26, 2009)

I think Sys nailed it. Benteen would have just added to the casualties. Custer was vainglorious and a braggart. Just finished reading a biography of JEB Stuart and they resembled one another in always looking for the limelight and tooting their own horn, except that Stuart really knew how to manage a battle as at Sharpsburg and even more at Chancellorsville. There were a lot of Indians and in some cases were armed better than the US troopers. Custer cared not about Gatling guns because they were a defensive weapon and he did not plan on being on defense.


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## imalko (Mar 26, 2009)

I believe renrich is right regarding the Gattling guns and why Custer refused them. We are talking here about cavalry warfare against a highly mobile enemy and battle of the Little Big Horn was battle of a swift manouvers on both sides and over a rough terrain, up until the Last Stand phase at least. In that kind of action, when Custer wasn't expecting to be on defense at all, these guns would have only hampered his movements.... But they would have made a difference in defence of the Last Stand Hill though.

So, in light of Custer's intentions, terrain difficulties he had to face and high mobility required, the decision not to accept Gattling guns would be a correct one, but in light of what had really happened it was completely wrong. On the other hand, his decision not to accept additional troops from 2nd Cavalry can not be explained with rational reasons.


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## Amsel (Mar 26, 2009)

Gatling guns would have made all the difference in the fight. They would have caused enough casualties to shock the Lakota and Cheyenne out of their anger. But if Custer split his force then who knows if they would have even been available to him on the hill. If Benteen would have rode to the rescue I think his command would have been massacred also. The 7th Cav kicked up a hornets nest and threatened a huge amount of people causing a fierce response. They say that the Cheyenne relatives of Custer poked his ears with awls after the massacre so he would listen better in the next life. The Cheyenne said that they warned Custer that they were going to kill him years before.


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## Ferdinand Foch (Mar 27, 2009)

Amsel said:


> The Cheyenne said that they warned Custer that they were going to kill him years before.



He, Guess Custer wasn't a big fan of prophecies (might have done wonders for him), unless it was him becoming the top general in the army.


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## imalko (Mar 30, 2009)

Since we started talking about weapons in some previous posts.... 

At the battle of the Little Big Horn US troopers were armed with Springfield Model 1873 carabines and pistols, each soldier carrying 100 rounds of carabine and 25 rounds of pistol ammunition. Additional ammunition and 15 days rations were carried by the pack train on mules. But there is one interesting detail - sabers were stored and left behind. So at the battle soldiers weren't armed with sabers.

Any oppinions about this? Why sabers weren't to be used in this campaign?

Here is another interesting detail about the battle - they died (among others) at the Little Big Horn:

- Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. *George Armstrong Custer*
- C Company commander Capt. *Thomas Custer *(brother of G.A.Custer and r*ecipient of two Medals of Honnor*)
- L Company commander - 1st Lt. James Calhoun: Custers brother in law 
- *Boston Custer*: brother of George Thomas, Forager for the 7th
- Henry Armstrong Reed: Nephew of Custer's, Herder for the 7th


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## comiso90 (Mar 30, 2009)

Also, many of the Indians had Henry Repeating Rifles.

With a 16 bullet tube magazine... im sure it did damage.

.


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## imalko (Mar 30, 2009)

Hi comiso90!

I wasn't expecting comment so quickly. What would be your opinion about the sabers? Why were they left behind?


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## comiso90 (Mar 30, 2009)

Hello..
Custer was consumed with speed and intimidation... he probably figured that the Indians would run scared at the sight of the 7th CAV standard..

His arrogance killed his men.

.


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## imalko (Mar 30, 2009)

comiso90 said:


> Custer was consumed with speed and intimidation...



I'm not denying that. I'm just wondering is there any real "military" reason not to take sabers on the campaign. 7th was a Cavalry regiment after all.


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## renrich (Mar 31, 2009)

I believe that by then Custer realised that sabres were an anachronism. The troopers were not going to get close enough to the Indians to use them and at close range the pistols were more effective. In a fight on horseback, many of the Indians would have lances which would put sabres at a disadvantage and Indians would not fight in disciplined formations like regular cavalry would. I don't believe that Buford's cavalry in the States War carried sabres either. Some of the Indians carried repeaters, Henrys, Winchesters, Spencers. The troopers with the Springfield were badly overmatched in that type of fight. To add to the difficulties the fired cases became difficult to extract after the rifles got hot with a pocket knife needed to get them out. Ironically, many Union troops were armed with repeaters at the end of the States War and the Confederates suffered accordingly. Why the Springfield was adopted over the Spencer can only be chalked up to stupidity and false economy.


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## Njaco (Apr 1, 2009)

Custer's fault - shouldn't split your army before a numerically superior enemy. Only Lee could do that. Custer was arrogant.


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## Milos Sijacki (Apr 2, 2009)

After reading all the posts, my opinion is that it was Custer's fault for losing that battle, also the Indians were better armed ( with bolt action rifles ), while the US troops were armed with old, one bullet Springfield rifles.

I don't think that the sabres would have done any good. Also, it was Custer's arrogance and ambition that got better of him and, unfortunately, of his soldiers.

Heard about this on History Viasat once, and they said exactly the same thing.

Cheers


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## imalko (Apr 2, 2009)

Horse of Captain Myles Walter Keogh named _Comanche_ was the only survivor of the Custer's fight for the U.S. Army. Near death with arrow and bullet wounds, the horse was found on the battlefield on June 27. The animal was nursed back to health and proclaimed by special orders of the Seventh Cavalry as the very embodiment _"Of the desperate struggle against overwhelming odds, of the hopeless conflict, and heroic manner in which all went down that day."_

Comanche's remains are now enshrined at the University of Kansas.


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## Amsel (Apr 2, 2009)

Custer was a great cavalry officer. That is forgotten alot these days. He was chosen to lead the 7th because he would pursue the indians and fight. This was needed on the great plains because the indians moved fast and it could take weeks to pursue them and start a fight. 

I don't think anyone was expecting the Lakota and Cheyenne camp to be so big and the Indians so numerous. Custers command also had the worst terrain in the area to fight; rolling terrain covered with gullies. The Indians were down on the river plain allowing them to mass their forces quickly while Custer's men and horses were tiring out crossing the gullies.


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## BombTaxi (Apr 2, 2009)

Doesn't Custers decision to fight in such circumstances betray poor leadership and competence? To give battle to the enemy on terrain that gives him the advantage is one of the most basic no-no's in military theory. Surely Custer should have used his speed and mobility to engage the enemy on better ground, or to draw the enemy away from his camp and divide his force into elements which could be defeated in detail?


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## imalko (Apr 2, 2009)

I have watched documentary on Little Big Horn recently, and they mentioned interesting theory that *Custer was actually on the verge of victory at the Little Big Horn.* Theory goes that his goal was to lure Indian warriors out of the village with Reno's attack and then attack village from the other end and capture Indian women and children. By taking noncombatants hostage Custer would force warriors to accept his terms and return to the reservations. It was tactics used succesfully by Custer before, most notably at the Washita and that's also the reason for sending Benteen to scout southern ridges and prevent escape of noncombatants in that direction. However, when he reached the river and realised true size of the village Custer send orders to Benteen to join him becouse he needed more troops to execute his plan. While waiting for Benteen arrival, Custer attemped to find suitable crossing point over the river, deploying skirmish line on the bluffs above to protect the crossing. He encountered resistance but was still in offensive mode. But after Reno's unexpected and premature withdrawall across the river, all Indian warriors were now free to engage Custer's force... and we all know what hapened next.

Interesting theory, isn't it?


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## mkloby (Apr 2, 2009)

Amsel said:


> Custer was a great cavalry officer. That is forgotten alot these days. He was chosen to lead the 7th because he would pursue the indians and fight. This was needed on the great plains because the indians moved fast and it could take weeks to pursue them and start a fight.
> 
> I don't think anyone was expecting the Lakota and Cheyenne camp to be so big and the Indians so numerous. Custers command also had the worst terrain in the area to fight; rolling terrain covered with gullies. The Indians were down on the river plain allowing them to mass their forces quickly while Custer's men and horses were tiring out crossing the gullies.



Of course it's a lot easier to armchair this scenario over a hundred years later...

But a commander should only commit his forces if he can bring about decisive action. He sure had aggressiveness, but he did not shape the battle to his advantage, and seemingly attacked into the enemy strengths with a badly outmatched force. Custer didn't assess the enemy situation properly. However, I'm sure he didn't know what he was about to get into, which is always the problem. That doesn't seem to be actions of a great officer.

If I got all my Marines killed by engaging in an action quite similar...


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## renrich (Apr 2, 2009)

Milos, the Indians did not have bolt action rifles. In fact the bolt action rifle was generally not in service anywhere in the world at that time. Some did have lever action repeating rifles. The Trapdoor Springfield did fire a heavy bullet with a lot of knockdown power, but the action had to be opened after every shot, the case extracted(and many were stuck) a new round chambered, the action closed and the hammer cocked before a new round could be fired. Custer was an arrogant officer and let his alligator mouth overload his aspirin ass.


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## BombTaxi (Apr 2, 2009)

mk, it is of course easy to armchair the scenario, but what I have read here so far suggests that Custer got himself into something he shouldn't have and didn't have to. I would have to say his course of action shows a mismatch between his abilities and his perception of his abilities. Like you say, it certainly wasn't the work of a great officer...


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## mkloby (Apr 2, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> mk, it is of course easy to armchair the scenario, but what I have read here so far suggests that Custer got himself into something he shouldn't have and didn't have to. I would have to say his course of action shows a mismatch between his abilities and his perception of his abilities. Like you say, it certainly wasn't the work of a great officer...



I would tend to agree with that. He had mobility to avoid an engagement on unfriendly terms...


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## imalko (Apr 2, 2009)

Everybody points out Custer's arrogance... but that is not necessary a bad characteristic. He was a succesfull commander in Civil war and a brave one too. Not that I want to argue about this. Of course, he was comanding officer at the Horn and made wrong decisions on false presumptions and with disasterous consequences.

But what about conduct of other senior officers involved, most notably Reno and Benteen. Of course it's easier from historical distance to judge their behavior and say: Yes, Benteen was a smart one and wisely avoided annihilation of his command and saved Reno at the same time. But he didn't had our perspective on the battle. Fact is that Benteen disobeyed direct and written order of his commanding officer to "Come on.." and to "Be quick..." He even disregarded well known military axiom to always march to the sound of the guns. Failure of marschal Grouchy to do the same at Waterloo greatly contributed to Napoleon's defeat.


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## Colin1 (Apr 2, 2009)

imalko said:


> He was a successful commander in Civil war and a brave one too...
> 
> ...Of course, he was Commanding Officer at the Horn and made wrong decisions on false presumptions and with disastrous consequences


If you're not ready for the position
that's the difference between following orders and giving them...

difficult to know what was going through Benteen's head, maybe he was just more shrewd and tactically savvy than Custer and didn't want to lead his own men to certain death but you can't ignore the fact that Custer turned down an extra battalion and a battery of Gatling guns - with the obvious benefit of hindsight, madness.


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## imalko (Apr 2, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> you can't ignore the fact that Custer turned down an extra battalion and a battery of Gatling guns...


 
I'm not ignoring that at all. As I wrote in one of my previous posts, decision not to take Gattlings was correct in light of Custer's intentions, terrain difficulties and high mobility required, but completely wrong in light of actuall events. Decision not to accept additional troops from 2nd Cavalry I can not understand and even less explain. More so becouse Custer expected to be outnumbered, although to the lesser extent. Reportedly he said to his officers during officer's call day before the battle that they may expect to face over 1000 warriors. Some historians today estimate number of Indian warriors around 1500 (noncombatants are not included in this number). The 7th numbered 647 soldiers in total.


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## renrich (Apr 3, 2009)

Custer at the Little Big Horn kind of reminds me of the Bronco's new 32 year old general, Josh McDaniels. In over his head.


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## Amsel (Apr 3, 2009)

He also ignored repeated warnings from his Crow scouts telling him that they have never seen a remuda of horses that large ever. The Lakota/Cheyenne encampents' herd was massive.


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## Amsel (Apr 3, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> Doesn't Custers decision to fight in such circumstances betray poor leadership and competence? To give battle to the enemy on terrain that gives him the advantage is one of the most basic no-no's in military theory. Surely Custer should have used his speed and mobility to engage the enemy on better ground, or to draw the enemy away from his camp and divide his force into elements which could be defeated in detail?


You won't be able to get me to say that Custers performance at the Little Bighorn was satisfactory. I was merely pointing out why he had a job to begin with. Besides the cavalry can't come to rescue in every instance in real life.


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## BombTaxi (Apr 3, 2009)

I completely agree Amsel. I feel that Custer's decisions on that fateful day were rash and arrogant, and not at all in keeping with the usually irreproachable professional standards of the US armed forces. It is a tragedy that men always have to pay the price of such poor decisions - although Custer also paid his due that day, of course.


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## imalko (Apr 5, 2009)

*PART 1*

After fallowing with attention the course of this thread about Custer and Little Big Horn, I would like to write some of my views on the battle, although this will probably spark another debate on the issue...

First I think we had all agreed about Custer’s reffusal of Gattling Guns and aditional troops. Decision not to take Gattlings can be judged both as wrong or as a correct one (it depends on arguments you take in consideration), but refusal of aditional troops was surelly wrong. Period!

Now, let us see what could have been done with assets at Custer’s disposall on 25th of June 1876 at the Little Bighorn - and that were 647 soldiers of 7th U.S. Cavalry, armed with Springfield carabines and pistols.

*Custer’s plan*

Custer was arrogant... this had been written many times in previous posts. Yes, he was. And his agresive style of warfare, will to take risks and his personal bravery served him well in his career, both in Civil war and in fighting Indians up to that point. 
Custer’s decision to attack hostile village from three directions wasn’t rash, it was straight from the book. In fact it was common Cavalry tactics during Indian wars to flank the enemy when ever possible and prevent them to scatter. Custer had limited knowlege of terrain ahead of him but he didn’t greatly underestimated number of hostile Indians. He told his officers that they will probably face over 1000 warriors and actual number of wariors is now estimated to be around 1500. In fact Custer's plan of attack at Little Bighorn (Custer's plan was this: Reno in the front of the village, Benteen in the center and Custer in the extreme opposite) has been supported by such figures as US general in chief Nelson Appelton Miles, the most successful Indian fighter in US history, in his writings.

*The true size of the Indian village*

The village of Little Bighorn was never "five miles" long as the myth says... Lieutenant Oscar Long's early map from 1878 showed that the village was 1.32 miles long, not extending past Medicine Tail Coulee ford, which pretty much matches Grinnell's (based on Soldier Wolf's testimony) Ricker's (based on Respects Nothing's account) maps. The Indians moved north after the first day of fighting, giving the post-battle observers (General Terry's men) the impression of one continuous larger camp.
There were 1500 warriors and unknown number noncombatants in the village. We can speculate if Custer’s plan was actually to take noncombatants hostage or not... maybe it was maybe it wasn’t. Fact is that Indian village was not as large as sometimes claimed but still large enough for Custer to realise that he will need more troops and additional ammunition. This is the point when he sent orders to Benteen to join him and bring ammunition packs.

*Reno’s fight*

Reno’s attack opened the battle. After charging across the valey into the striking distance of the hostile village, Reno ordered a halt and deployed a skirmish line across portion of the valey. After warriors started to appear in growing numbers (note that this still wasn’t the entire Indian force that Custer will later face), soldiers took better position in the timber by the river. Lieutenant Hare, of Reno's batalion, later said that holding the timber was evidently made to support Custer's flank attack against the village. But Reno left the timber (which was highly defendable position) after only 30 minutes of light fighting.

Here is description of this event by one of the participants:

_"...I always felt that Major Reno utterly failed in his part in the valley attack in the disposition of his command when he fell back in the old stream bed; that he failed to exercise any fire control; *that he could and should have held that position...* Having made the decision to retreat, he made no disposition to cover that retreat or to properly inform the command of such decision; that he in person led a panic, straggling retreat, hereby sacrificing many lives and the morale of his command. The shock from the killing of Bloody Knife at his side or near him seems to have bereft him of the sense of official responsibility and to impel him to seek safety in flight. "

Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, Company K, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn (letter to Agent Asbury in 1929)​_
The witnesses make clear that after reaching Reno Hill, Major Reno wasn't under fire anymore. The warriors left him almost immediately, because they were watching the arrival of Captain Benteen and, close to him, the pack train.


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## imalko (Apr 5, 2009)

*PART 2

Benteen's behavior*

Benteen was approximately at the 3 mile distance from Custer when he received written order to join him.
Even when message suggested utmost urgency he apparently took his time to execute it. He proceeded slowly and even watered his horses along the way. He reached Reno's position one hour later when most Indian warriors were allready gone to fight Custer. So at that point Reno's battalion was not in any danger. Joined Reno-Benteen commands, together with the pack train (which was escorted by one reinforced company and arrived soon after Benteen), now numbered 7 companies - 380 men - and had at their disposal 24000 rounds of ammunition. They consolidated in strenght and what is more important at that moment were unoposed by any number of Indians. Some junior officers suggested to continue advance towards sound of the guns but Benteen refused. Captain Weir disobeyed this order and march out with his company anyway. He haven’t reached Custer however but observed last moments of Last Stand from what is now known as Weir Point. Benteen eventually followed Weir 30 minutes after his departure. Arriving on a hill named Weir Point, Benteen took a look on Custer's position, then ordered (according to Private George Glenn) to fall back. Contrary to the myth, the only Indian force Benteen was facing at that point was Low Dog's small band of warriors. As Lieutenant Edgerly stated : _"The Indians didn't repulse us. The order was to fall back and we fell back."
_
I think that Benteen’s personal hatred towards Custer is overlooked as significant factor in previous posts in this thread, but it could explain much of his behaviour, which was highly questionable to say the least. After all, these are Benteen’s own words:

_"What a big winner the U.S. government would have been if only Custer and his gang could have been taken. The Lord, in his own good time, had at last rounded the scoundrels up, taking, however, many good and innocent men with them!"
Letter by Captain Benteen to Lieutenant Maguire​_*How the Last Stand looked like*

One of probably most accurate portrayals of the Last Stand (see the picture in attachment taken from "The Custer Album") shows 42 men behind 39 dead horses, in a 30-feet circle. This is also the place where most of 200 Indian casualties fell. At this point when organized resistance of Custer’s battalion was at an end and when most of the command had already been whiped out, Benteens arrival probably wouldn’t change much, but would only added more casualties. Or would it? Who knows, maybe Indians, supprised by the attack from behind, would have retreated. One could only speculate, but General Miles believed that this is exactly what would happen.

One thing is certain, as Sioux chief Sitting Bull stated : _"The soldiers were looking on the hills in the East, and in every direction. They were looking for the other soldiers on the hills, hoping that these soldiers would come and help them."_

They were hoping in vain.... Reno and Benteen remained on Reno hill unopposed (at that moment), while Custer took his Last Stand.

But what if Benteen had executed his orders with urgency which was expected of him by his comanding officer? Entire battle lasted for two and a half hours. Had Benteen arrived on the scene at the point when Custer’s forces were still deployed in skirmish lines above the river and when all-out Indian attack still haven’t began, I think it would made a difference. Not that it would resulted in victory but it would probably saved Custer’s command from destruction. 

It has been suggested that Indians were armed with repeating rifles and thus gained advantage over US troopers armed with Sprigfield carabines. But Springfield had one significant advantage - greater range. Concetrated volley fire by the troopers, which would be possible if Benteen reinforced Custer as ordered, would keep any number of Indians at the distance and prevent them to use the advantage of repeating rifles. In that case, joined Custer-Benteen batalions could have executed fighting retreat in good order to more defendable position, posibly even to Reno’s hill. Sure Indians would have probably scatered and escaped after that, but at least lives of meany US troopers would be saved. And who knows, if Custers plan was really to take hostage Indian noncompatants while warriors were engaging Reno, battle could have even ended with his victory.

*Conclusion*

Custer took his most trusted officers with him - his brother Captain T.W.Custer (recepient of two Medals of Honnor), Keogh, Calhoun, Yates... Had any one of them been in Benteen’s place, he would have fallowed his orders and joined Custer without delay. And I believe this would made a difference in the fight. Custer made several mistakes at the Little Bighorn and putting Benteen in charge of one of three batalions was one of the greatest.

*For officers oppinion on Custer’s plan at the Little Bighorn see the fallowing link:* custerwest


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## Amsel (Apr 5, 2009)

I think that splitting his force was his downfall and ultimately led to his death. I say this because of knowledge of other tough fights against superior Indian forces on the plains. Even without extra troopers or Gatling guns I think his unit in full strength would have repelled numerous attacks. As with any look at history I cannot be 100% sure.
Indians were not proffessional soldiers but guerrilla fighters who chose hit and run tactics most of the time. They would generally not stick around and take too many casualties. Once the Indians began taking casualties they usually scattered at high speed. This was the norm on the plains and southwest deserts. Another good example of this is the Adobe Walls fight in Texas. Some buffaloe skinners held out with their Sharps rifles against an overwhelming force, using long range shooting and even killing old Roman Nose.


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## imalko (Apr 6, 2009)

Amsel said:


> *I think that splitting his force was his downfall and ultimately led to his death.* I say this because of knowledge of other tough fights against superior Indian forces on the plains. Even without extra troopers or Gatling guns I think his unit in full strength would have repelled numerous attacks. As with any look at history I cannot be 100% sure.
> Indians were not proffessional soldiers but guerrilla fighters who chose hit and run tactics most of the time. They would generally not stick around and take too many casualties. Once the Indians began taking casualties they usually scattered at high speed. This was the norm on the plains and southwest deserts. Another good example of this is the Adobe Walls fight in Texas. Some buffalo skinners held out with their Sharps rifles against an overwhelming force, using long range shooting and even killing old Roman Nose.



I agree on your opinion Amsel but I believe that Custer realized and tried to rectify his mistake when he ordered Benteen to join him and to be quick about it. This never happened due to the questionable behavior of his senior subordinates. Even late arrival of joined Reno-Benteen commands to the Custer's battlefield could have possibly change the final outcome as General Miles suggested. More so, becouse at that time entire Indian force was fighting Custer and wasn't expecting attack to the rear, thus Reno-Benteen's advance would be virtually unopposed.

Splitting forces and poor choice of battalion commanders were two mistakes that cost Custer the battle and led to his death and death of 210 troopers who were with him.


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## imalko (Apr 6, 2009)

So my final conclusion is as fallows:

Was a decision to split forces a mistake? Yes, it was, but not irreversable and not a fatal mistake at that point. In my oppinion *Custer realized his mistake and tried to rectify it*, but both *Reno and Benteen *(for whatever reasons they had) *ignored direct orders and failed to do their duty.* They had an obligation and opportunity to support Custer but they didn't. This contributed to chain of events which ended with massacre of 210 men of the 7th Cavalry. Custer is not the only one to be blamed here. Actions or rather inactions of two senior subordinate officers ensured the disastrous outcome of the battle.


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## Milos Sijacki (Apr 9, 2009)

renrich said:


> Milos, the Indians did not have bolt action rifles. In fact the bolt action rifle was generally not in service anywhere in the world at that time. Some did have lever action repeating rifles. The Trapdoor Springfield did fire a heavy bullet with a lot of knockdown power, but the action had to be opened after every shot, the case extracted(and many were stuck) a new round chambered, the action closed and the hammer cocked before a new round could be fired. Custer was an arrogant officer and let his alligator mouth overload his aspirin ass.



I know, stupid of me to use the term BOLT ACTION rifles. Thanks for the correction.


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## imalko (Apr 10, 2009)

From _Kansas Collection Books_ here is a link to the book "My Life on the Plains" written by General G.A. Custer

My Life on the Plains, by Gen. G. A. Custer


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Apr 14, 2009)

> Failure of marschal Grouchy to do the same at Waterloo greatly contributed to Napoleon's defeat.



I like that, it reminded me of it too.


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## renrich (Apr 18, 2009)

Just finished reading a book picked up specifically to refresh my memory about the Custer fight so as to make more comments on this thread. The book is "Custer's Last Campaign," by John S Gray. Published in 1991 and the interesting thing about the book is that many modern history books seem to have the mission to prove a certain viewpoint and often can be characterised as "revisionist." This book does not try to assess performance, except secondarily, and makes use of all the eyewitness testimony in conjunction with time and motion studies and with recent forensic evidence to determine who was where when and possibly why during the battle. It seemed that none of the major commanders involved, Terry, Crook or Gibbon distinguished themselves during the campaign which may explain partly why Custer did so poorly. None of them seemed to be well versed on Indian fighting. However, it seems clear that Custer violated every rule in the book which resulted in his debacle. Firstly, he badly misjudged the character, will, capabilities and intentions of his enemy. He had capable scouts to recon the enemy and the terrain but ignored much of their advice and devised a battle plan without knowing the location and strength of his opponent and was absolutely ignorant of the ground the action was to take place on. It seemed that his biggest concern was keeping any of the Indians from getting away and when told numerous times by his scouts that he was going to have more Indians in his lap than he could handle, he scoffed at them. His best scout, Mitch Boyer, knew they were getting in over their head and were doomed to the extent that he told a 17 year old friend, a scout also, to clear out before it was too late. The 17 year old did so and got away. Custer split his command without knowing exactly where the enemy was and in what strength( although if he had listened to the scouts he might have been more cautious.) He sent Reno and his battalion ahead in to attack the south end of the village and told Reno that he, Custer, would support him if need be. Meanwhile Custer had no idea if the terrain would allow him to make a flank attack on Reno's Indians. As it turned out, it would not and Reno had to make a fighting withdrawal. Furthernore, Reno's men spotted Custer on the opposite side of the river as they began their withdrawal so Custer must have seen they were in trouble but Custer continued down river, abandoning Reno and his men. Recent evidence indicates that Custer was in heavy fighting before he got into the area where the last stand took place. Prudence would suggest that, at that point, Custer should have executed a retrograde movement back to where Reno was fighting and perhaps most of his command could have been saved. From my point of view, it is too bad that some Johnny Reb did not take Custer down during the States War. It would have saved a lot of heartache later.


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## imalko (Apr 22, 2009)

Hello Renrich,
First let me say that this book you mentioned seem to me like interesting read. However I can't agree with some of your conclusions. I won't repeat my agruments since I have extensively wrote about them several post before, when I gave my view of the battle. I would just like to make few comments.



renrich said:


> It seemed that none of the major commanders involved, Terry, Crook or Gibbon distinguished themselves during the campaign which may explain partly why Custer did so poorly. None of them seemed to be well versed on Indian fighting.



Terry and Gibbon were quite inexperienced, while Crook seen his share of Indian fighting. However, I would say that Custer was most experienced of this four commanders mentioned. He spent 10 years on the plains fighting Indians...



renrich said:


> However, it seems clear that Custer violated every rule in the book which resulted in his debacle..... It seemed that his biggest concern was keeping any of the Indians from getting away....



Custer actually did everything by the book... Flanking the enemy was then common Cavalry tactic as stated in US Cavalry regulations of the period.
Custer's biggest concern was keeping Indians from getting away becouse this is what they usually did when faced by Cavalry. Custer was just acting on his previous experiences in Indian fighting.



renrich said:


> ...he badly misjudged the character, will, capabilities and intentions of his enemy.



True, but again he was acting on his previous experiences in Indian fighting.



renrich said:


> Custer split his command without knowing exactly where the enemy was and in what strength( although if he had listened to the scouts he might have been more cautious.) He sent Reno and his battalion ahead in to attack the south end of the village and told Reno that he, Custer, would support him if need be. Meanwhile Custer had no idea if the terrain would allow him to make a flank attack on Reno's Indians.



Only partially true...Custer did have limited knowledge of the terrain he would have to face, but didn't greatly underestimated number of warriors. He was expecting to face over 1000 warriors, and the actual number of Indian warriors was around 1500.
Custer did made flank attack on the Indians. He deployed skirmish lines on the bluffs above the river further downstream, while trying to find crossing point and while waiting for Benteen's arrival. This is one of the reasons as why Indians disengaged Reno in the first place.



renrich said:


> ...Reno had to make a fighting withdrawal. Furthernore, Reno's men spotted Custer on the opposite side of the river as they began their withdrawal so Custer must have seen they were in trouble but Custer continued down river, abandoning Reno and his men.



Reno haven't made a fighting withdrawal - it was a rout, a panic and disorganized retreat. Only repositioning of his forces to the more defendable position in the timber by the river early in the fight can be judged as fighting withdrawal or, rather, redeploying of forces. But after 30 minutes of fighting in timber Reno led panic retreat back across river to so called 'Reno hill'. Just read in one of my earlier post how Lt.Edward Godfrey, Little Big Horn veteran, described this event. It appears that Reno lost his nerve becouse one of the scouts Bloody Knife was killed while standing next to him, with parts of scouts brain splashing into Reno's face.

When Reno's men spotted Custer on the opposite side of the river, they were still deployed in skirmish line in the valley, fighting Indians. At that time they weren't in trouble, and only thing Custer could see was that Reno began the fight and managed to lure warriors out from the village, so now was the time for his (Custer's) flanking attack. Reno's men couldn't see Custer during their retreat across the river and for sure not while they were still fighting in timber.



renrich said:


> Recent evidence indicates that Custer was in heavy fighting before he got into the area where the last stand took place. Prudence would suggest that, at that point, Custer should have executed a retrograde movement back to where Reno was fighting and perhaps most of his command could have been saved.



Yes, Custer was in heavy fighting before he got into the area where the last stand took place, but at first Custer's force managed fight of Indians for a time. However, the "Last Stand Hill" wasn't located further downstream but in opposite direction. Only when his lines collapsed and Calhoun's position was overrun, Custer actually retreated towards the "Last Stand Hill". But one thing we must keep in mind when talking about Custer's actions - he didn't knew what happened to Reno's command, but *for all this time*, from beginning to the end of Custer's fight, *he was expecting Benteen's arrival.* I think this can explain as why Custer didn't retreated towards Reno's position as you suggest. 



renrich said:


> From my point of view, it is too bad that some Johnny Reb did not take Custer down during the States War. It would have saved a lot of heartache later.



I disagree. Custer was successfull and capable cavalry commander during Civil war and indeed in Indian wars up to the Little Big Horn campaign. Yes, he had his ups and downs, but as Adler stated in one other thread, you can not judge a commander only by one engagement.

I don't consider myself a "Custer appologist". I only think that he was better then people give him credit for. It is too easy a way out just to blame Custer for everything that went wrong during this battle. The battle itself was not a simple affair and conduct of other senior officers involved was highly questionable. Yes, Custer made some mistakes, but as I wrote before Reno's and Benteen's actions ensured the disastrous final outcome.


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## Colin1 (Apr 22, 2009)

imalko said:


> It is too easy a way out just to blame Custer for everything that went wrong during this battle. The battle itself was not a simple affair and conduct of other senior officers involved was highly questionable. Yes, Custer made some mistakes, but as I wrote before Reno's and Benteen's actions ensured the disastrous final outcome.
> 
> ...but didn't greatly underestimated number of warriors. He was expecting to face over 1000 warriors, and the actual number of Indian warriors was around 1500...


Custer was blue forces (pun intended) battlefield commander, why shouldn't he be blamed for what happened, he 

i. routinely dismissed his scouting reports regarding enemy strength
ii. was not fully intimate with the topology of the battlefield
iii. rejected decisive assets as unnecessary
iv. based on the above, split his forces (as it turned out) disastrously

if you're on Last Stand Hill with what's left of your command and 1500 choctaws are engaging you instead of the expected 1000, I'd call that a major underestimation (66%) of your enemy's field-able strength

Custer sounded like a vainglorious hot-head, he wasn't ready for the big chair


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## imalko (Apr 22, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> i. routinely dismissed his scouting reports regarding enemy strength



Not true, how else could he know that he is about to face over 1000 warriors.



Colin1 said:


> ii. was not fully intimate with the topology of the battlefield



True, but not a decisive factor.



Colin1 said:


> iii. rejected decisive assets as unnecessary



True, when additional troops are concerned, arguable regarding the Gattling guns(read previous posts).



Colin1 said:


> iv. based on the above, split his forces (as it turned out) disastrously
> 
> if you're on Last Stand Hill with what's left of your command and 1500 choctaws are engaging you instead of the expected 1000, I'd call that a major underestimation (66%) of your enemy's field-able strength



Spliting forces was not by itself disastrous (anyway the decision was made on previous Custer's experiences in Indian fighting). What made it disastrous was disobedience of orders by two senior subordinate officers. That is why Custer is not the only one to be blamed here. 

*Custer couldn't won when two thirds of his total force was out of the battle after 30 minutes of fighting and contrary to his orders.* I'm talking about battle on 25th June of course and not the "siege" that joint Reno-Benteen's commands endured in two fallowing days.



Colin1 said:


> Custer sounded like a vainglorious hot-head, he wasn't ready for the big chair



Partly true, and that is why he wasn't a General after 1865 but only a Lt.Col. 
Maybe he "wasn't ready for for the big chair" maybe he was, but he for sure wasn't totally incompetent as sometimes portrayed.


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## renrich (Apr 22, 2009)

I think you mischaracterise Reno's fight. He dismounted his troops and put them into a line of skirmishers and advanced on the village. When the Indians outflanked him on the left, he withdrew into the woods along the river and when it began to be obvious he was going to be overrun he forded the river and staged a fighting withdrawal to the hill. His command was probably saved at that time by many of the Indians leaving to go get Custer. It seems sure that Custer had knowledge of the Rosebud Fight on June 17 where Terry with more than a thousand men was barely able to hold off the Indians. One would think that Custer would allow that knowledge to guide his actions. My thinking is that both Reno and Benteen knew that Custer was going to get them in over their head and they showed more common sense than he did. The facts are not arguable. Custer split his forces without knowing the strength of the enemy or how they were disposed or what the terrain was like where he would fight. Every decision he made showed how arrogant and wrongheaded he was. It is probably fortunate that Reno and Benteen were more levelheaded than Custer. He got away with a lot of his harebrained activities during the States War because the Union Army was usually better armed and mounted and outnumbered his enemy and the terrain over which they fought was well known. It is a shame that Stuart was killed and Custer was not. Stuart would have done much better at the Little Bighorn.


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## BombTaxi (Apr 22, 2009)

On that note (although slightly OT), would Stuart have been allowed to hold high rank a decade after the Civil War? I just wonder - I have no idea myself how long it took to re-integrate ex-rebels into the forces (or government, for that matter).


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## renrich (Apr 22, 2009)

Joe Wheeler, a Confederate General held that same rank in the US Army postwar. Stuart's first post after graduation from West Point was at Fort Davis in Texas fighting Indians, I think in 1854-55.


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## BombTaxi (Apr 22, 2009)

Thanks ren, something else learned today! 8)


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## imalko (Apr 22, 2009)

Regarding the Reno's "fighting withdrawal to the hill", here is once more a description of this event by one of the Little Big Horn veterans:

_"...I always felt that Major Reno utterly failed in his part in the valley attack in the disposition of his command when he fell back in the old stream bed; that he failed to exercise any fire control; that he could and should have held that position... *Having made the decision to retreat, he made no disposition to cover that retreat or to properly inform the command of such decision; that he in person led a panic, straggling retreat, hereby sacrificing many lives and the morale of his command.* The shock from the killing of Bloody Knife at his side or near him seems to have bereft him of the sense of official responsibility and to impel him to seek safety in flight. "
Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, Company K, 7th cavalry​_​
Regarding the Rosebud Fight on June 17 - commanding officer there was Crook and not Terry. It could be said that with more than a thousand men Crook was barely able to hold off the Indians. And Crook's casualties in this fight were 10 soldiers killed and 21 wounded. Indian casualties are estimated at less the 100. However, Crook was surprised by Indian's aggressiveness so on 18th June his entire column returned to the Goose Creek Camp to await reinforcements.

Custer and his 7th Cavalry separated from General Terry and Montana Column at noon on 22 June. Since Crook had send no words to Terry's Montana column about his withdrawal, I fail to see as how "it seems sure" that Custer had any knowledge of these events.

Custer split his forces knowing approximately the strength of the enemy... 

I don't feel at all that "Reno and Benteen... showed more common sense than Custer." In fact Reno completely lost his nerve and his conduct of retreat across the river is proof of that. Further more this was his first campaign against Indians, so he was also completely inexperienced. On the other hand, Benteen was known to openly defying Custer in the past and deliberately disobeyed his orders at Little Big Horn. General Nelson Miles openly critisized both Reno and Benteen in his writings for their behaviour.

As for J.E.B. Stuart, my knowledge about him is limited. I know he was celebrated commander of Confederate Cavalry and that he was killed at Yellow Tavern. If he had lived I don't believe he could hold any rank in postwar Federal cavalry. Is there any example on Confederate officer who continued service in postwar Union army with retaining his rank?


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## imalko (Apr 22, 2009)

I see my question about Confederate officers already has been answered... 8)


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## renrich (Apr 22, 2009)

Anecdotal testimony by one man doesn't prove much. I suspect that the testimony at the Reno Inquiry was basically an expose of different peoples opinions of different officers. Custer was popular with some elements in the army. Before Custer's battalion got to the Last Stand area, many of his troopers had to be restrained from charging forward in front of the bulk of the battalion, they were so eager to get at the Indians. I am sure they felt differently later. As I said, this book by Gray does not attempt to place blame anywhere but is just a chronicle of what happened. Reno's actions seem to have been correct under the circumstances. Many of his men survived, even though Custer never supported him as he had promised to do. There is this quote from the book however, "Reno's abrupt halt short of the village was clearly well advised. At that moment he had no support at all and there was no way his 140 soldiers could expect to survive a charge through a village of 1000 lodges and 2000 fighting men. Even the minority of warriors who poured out to attack him made bad enough odds. The Indians soon began to turn the left flank of the open skirmish line, forcing it to take a better defensive position just within the timber. The men were safe there for a time, but the perimeter of the timber was so long as to spread them quite thinly. Worse yet the ammunition the troopers carried on their persons and saddlebags was fast diminishing, spelling imminent disaster. Reno's officers and men fully accepted the necessity of the retreat but much criticism was leveled at it's management. All the men were not formed before it began, nothing was done to cover the running retreat, the jammed up river crossing, or the exposed climb up the bluff. The casualties were indeed heavy and missing men many. The only thing that saved them was the failure of the Indians immediately to pursue the disorganized men across the river." Sounds like at the last it was a bug out. Having seen the number of enemy they were facing, it is no wonder they were disorganized. Having said this, the performance of Reno and Benteen, adequate or not, would seem to make little difference to the outcome. The bottom line is that some of Reno's men and Benteen's men survived. None of Custer's did!


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## renrich (Apr 23, 2009)

I misspoke when I said that Joe Shelby served as a Confederate general and US Army general. It was Joe Wheeler. He was a cavalry general during the States War in the Army of Tennessee and served as a general in the US Army in the Spanish American War. I don't know how many other Confederate officers served later in the US Army but suspect it would have been unlikely but possible, if Stuart had lived, that he would have served in the US Army after the war.


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## imalko (Apr 25, 2009)

Well Renrich, it appears that you and I agree that facts and sequence of events at Little Big Horn are undeniable, but somehow always manage to make slightly different conclusions. This is probably becouse we have different starting premises on the matter. You dismiss Custer as terrible commander from the outset while I do not. He was by no means outstanding and his promotion to General during the Civil war was result of circumstances and luck as much as his own ability. But, in my opinion, he was brave, aggressive and capable enough to be successful commander more or less throughout his career. 

His decisions at the Little Big Horn were based on usual tactics used by the US Cavalry of the period, informations he received from his scouts and before everything else on his previous experiences in fighting Indians. And decision to split forces, clearly a mistake as it was, would not be fatal if Benteen obeyed his orders and joined Custer with urgency that was expected of him. (Why I think so, I have explained in detail in posts #38 and #39 on page 3 of this thread). 

Also you keep repeating that Custer never supported Reno as he promised. But the fact is that he did. How else would you call Custer's flanking attack on Indian village from the East, which saved Reno's command from destruction after their panic retreat across the river. In light of your last post where you quoted a paragraph from your book, I hope we can now agree that this was indeed a disorganized retreat and not "fighting withdrawal" as you previously called it. And why it was so disorganized - becouse the number of enemy they were facing or becouse of Reno's incompetence or probably both - we can debate on it, but I must point out that Reno's was not facing at any moment during that fight the entire Indian force of 1500 warriors. I don't know exact figure but I suspect that Reno faced up to several hundred warriors. So, in my opinion number of warriors which Reno faced was not decisive factor, but rather his own inexperience and incompetence (and this is not "anecdotal" opinion of only one man I quoted but many other Little Big Horn veterans, same as general Miles). 

Custer's flank attack forced Indians to disengage Reno and this is also exactly what would happen if Reno had hold his position in the timber. Indians would be forced to ease pressure on Reno's command but not to disengage him completely as in that case they would left southern edge of the village unprotected. On other side, Custer with Benteen joining him, would have to deal with a lot less warriors with a larger force at his hand and would held tactical initiative on the battlefield. Even in case of failed attack on the flank of the village he would still be able to stage fighting withdrawal in good order...

So, in conclusion...



renrich said:


> ...the performance of Reno and Benteen, adequate or not, would seem to make little difference to the outcome.The bottom line is that some of Reno's men and Benteen's men survived. None of Custer's did!



For the record, I believe that performance of Reno and Benteen were inadequate and that this made the difference to the outcome... 

Some Reno's men survived despite his poor conduct of retreat across the river due to Custer's support which he provided by attacking hostile village from the flank... All Benteen's men survived becouse they virtually haven't been involved in any fighting on 25th June in the first place... All Custer's men died, becouse they faced entire Indian force (thanks to Reno's retreat) and were left unsupported by Benteen, which was clear defiance of Custer's orders... 

However, disastrous outcome of this battle is rather the result of combination of factors: aggresivness, number and untipical behavior of Indians; some wrong Custer's decisions (including splitting of forces) made on his previous experiences on the plains and informations available to him; Reno's incompetence and unexpected retreat (which was arguably justified or not); Benteen's indifference and disobedience of orders, etc. All this factors combined paved "a road to disaster".

As a side note, I don't know who was better commander - Stuart or Custer - and frankly I don't care since this is not the issue here. However, you must admit that they both were killed in battle, so they were equal at least in that sense. 

And in the end, I bring to your attention this interesting link, which you might have overlooked in one of my previous posts. It contains opinions on the battle of Little Big Horn of some officers including *Gen. Nelson Miles*, (most succesfull Indian fighter who studied the Battle during 22 years, interviewing witnesses, exploring the field), *Confederate Major General Thomas Rosser*, (a favorite of J.E.B. Stuart) and some others. 

custerwest


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## Amsel (Apr 25, 2009)

It is interesting to see what "Bearcoat" Miles said on the issue. It makes alot of sense and casts Reno and Benteen in the proper light deserved I believe. Ignoring lawful orders may have contributed as much to the decisive loss and massacre as Custers bold behavior.


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## renrich (Apr 25, 2009)

Custer has been described as an experienced Indian fighter on this thread on a number of occasions. To my knowledge, he commanded in only one major Indian fight prior to the LBH, the Washita Battle. Beyond that he was mainly invoved in skirmishes, mostly bloodless. If one studies the Washita, one is struck by the similarities to LBH, except that Custer got away with his poor generalship at Washita by attacking a peaceful village. He attacked the peaceful village and prevailed because he did not bother to do thorough scouting and did not know that the hostile and much larger village was downstream. Is there a pattern here? Apparently he learned nothing from his experience at Washita for it seems he repeated the same mistake at the LBH. There seems to be no doubt that Custer did not command the respect of some of the officers in his regiment and some may have been incompetent. One would think that he would have gotten rid of the disloyal and incompetent ones. I still have a hard time with Reno being criticised for his actions. I live only a long day's drive from the LBH and have spent much time riding and hunting on horseback in the western part of the US, and served in the US Army. Trying to visualise what Reno faced, proceeding down an unfordable(except in a few places) river in June(when we usually have high water) with 140 troopers to attack an Indian village of unknown size(although scouts have insisted there were many, many Indians.) Having the main command on the other side of the river. Being cautious and correctly forming a dismounted line of skirmishers, where every fourth man is a horseholder. Finding out that many hundreds of braves are swarming out of the village with your right flank anchored in the trees along the river but your left flank is hanging in the air and about to be outflanked and you have a little over 100 rifles in your line. Swinging your command back into the trees where they have cover. No help in sight and your line is too thin to hold and the bluffs on the opposite side of the river are steep. You find a retreat ford barely negotiable. How do you communicate to all the men scattered in the trees and organize a rear guard and have an orderly retreat? No radios. Your men are scattered and some of the officers and NCOs are down. You are in danger of being overrun and there is only this one spot to ford the river which means that a lot of the troops are far from the ford. Sounds very difficult to me!


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## Amsel (Apr 25, 2009)

I really hate to critisize Reno and even more Benteen. But I take alot of stock into what Miles stated. He was the premier Indian fighter and was highly respected by both sides in the "Plains Wars" as well as the "Apache War". I probably need to look into what Bearcoat Miles said a little more. I have also spent alot of time in Montana and worked in Crow Agency for a bit. Beautiful country, but rough. With the mud, creeks , and ravines it is still tough country today. Big ol' muleys everywhere though. "Gods country".


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## imalko (Apr 25, 2009)

I wrote about Custer as an experienced Indian fighter in my posts becouse he spent 10 years on the plains fighting Indians. To my knowledge he participated in general Hancock's campaign of 1967, the Winter Campaign of 1868 (including Battle of the Washita), he also led an expedition to the Black Hills in 1874 and there were numerous skirmishes in between, but how bloody or bloodless these were I really don't know.

Let me say gentlemen that I consider a privilege to discuss this topic with you. I have started this thread with my opinion on this matter already formed since this I my second most favorite subject after the aviation of course... And I haven't changed my mind yet. 8) 

But I find it fascinating to hear other people opinions... We may disagree but we present our views, thoughts and less known informations on the subject, which is great.

If I ever travel to your part of the world I would very much like to visit the site of the Battle of the Little Big Horn and see this beautiful and rough country myself. However, since I had never rode a horse in my life I might need some lessons first.


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## renrich (Apr 25, 2009)

Agree with you about this country, Amsel. Reason I live here instead of my beloved Texas. Matter of fact, where I live is about 100 yards from the Animas river. Was walking along it this afternoon and looking at the river and the steep banks and the steep ridge on the other side. No way I would try to take a horse across it and I could never wade it right now. I would wind up in New Mexico, drowned. Direct quote from Phil Sheridan in 1864 on Reno, " one of the most promising young cavalry officer's of this army." "the cavalry service has no better officer than Capt. Reno." Did he change that much since 1864? It seems his scout to the Rosebud before the LBH was well done and showed a lot of initiative, but also prudence and good judgment. imalco, The privilege is mine. A lovely discussion.


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## Amsel (Apr 25, 2009)

> Last Stand Hill on the Custer Battlefied, four of the 7th Cavaly’s
> Crow scouts pay tribute to those who fell with Custer. L-R: White-Man-Runs-Him,
> Hairy Moccasin, Curly and Goes Ahead. (photograph by Rodman Wanamaker, 1913.)








A Native American point of view, written by Mitakuye Oyasin


> Of all the Indians present at the Little Big Horn (and estimates run as high as 10,000), only the Cheyenne had had any significant dealings with Custer. About eight years before, Custer had made his reputation as an Indian fighter by attacking a peaceful Cheyenne encampment on the Washita River. They were so peaceful that their chief even flew an American flag outside his tepee. Some warriors and others escaped, but Custer, after killing their herd of horses, dragged the remaining prisoners back to his fort. There is some evidence that he developed a conjugal relationship with one of his prisoners and that she mothered a blond-haired boy. While he was married, he was still considered a relative of sorts by the Cheyenne women who knew of his relationship with one of their own.
> 
> Custer never really had any other big ''victories'' over any other tribes, mostly because he could never catch them. They would hit, run and scatter, and he would be left with men ready to desert. Finally, he bravely set a meeting with some Cheyenne chiefs and went to their tepee by himself. In that encounter, they smoked the pipe together and he vowed never again to attack the Cheyenne. One of the chiefs emptied the pipe on Custer's boot and left no doubt that Custer would be like those ashes if he ever broke his promise.
> 
> ...


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## imalko (Apr 26, 2009)

I was wondering when Custer's alleged violation of Terry's orders will be mentioned... I stand firmly in my belief that orders were disobeyed at Little Big Horn, but not by Custer.

Here is an extract from Terry's written instructions for Custer issued on June 22nd, 1876:

_"Headquarters of the Department of Dakota (In the Field)
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory June 22nd, 1876
Lieutenant-Colonel Custer,
7th Calvary

Colonel: The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. *It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were is not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy.* He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that *you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them...*" _

In regard of the Washita battle and this "flag waving myth" I think that this has been cunfused with *The Sand Creek Massacre* that occurred on November 29, 1864, when Colorado Territory militia attacked and destroyed a village of Cheyenne and Arapaho encamped in southeastern Colorado Territory. Indian chief at Sand Creek was also named Black Kettle and he flew an American flag over his lodge since previously he had been assured that this practice would keep him and his people safe from U.S. soldiers' aggression. The Indians at Washita could not been waving any flag since they were attacked at dawn and "caugth while napping". 

And on behaviour of Custer and his men at Washita I will quote two historians:

Historian Jerome Greene wrote a book about the battle in 2004, for the National Park Service, concluding: _"Soldiers evidently took measures to protect the women and children."_

Historian Paul Hutton: _"Although the fight on the Washita was most assuredly one-sided, it was not a massacre. *Black Kettle's Cheyennes were not unarmed innocents living under the impression that they were not at war.* Several of Black Kettle's warriors had recently fought the soldiers, and the chief had been informed by Hazen (General William B. Hazen commanding at Fort Cobb) that there could be no peace until he surrendered to Sheridan. The soldiers were not under orders to kill everyone, for Custer personally stopped the slaying of noncombatants, and fifty-three prisoners were taken by the troops."._


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## renrich (Apr 26, 2009)

Loyalty is a great virtue but I fear imalko has chosen the wrong horse to back in this debate. The issue at Washita is not so much that he may have attacked peaceful Indians but that he attacked without proper intel about his enemy. There was a much larger village downstream that Custer did not know about and it is possible that Custer and his men could have been surprised and overwhelmed while ransacking the first village by the Indians downstream. As for Custer disobeying orders, that is not relevant because everyone knew that if Custer found Indians he would charge them regardless of orders. The man was a headline hunter, did not hold the Indian's fighting qualities in high regard and was arrogant to the extreme. He got his headlines though. The first rule in military intel is to judge your enemy on capabilities, not on his intentions. Custer thought the Indians would always run. Custer's judgment and command decisions were, IMO, criminal.


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## imalko (Apr 26, 2009)

And we return to the issue - was Custer a terrible commander or not?  
Renrich, we both spoke our mind on that question already...

As for Washita... Its true that there was satellite hostile villages downstream that Custer did not know about and actually the 7th was surprised and threatened by warriors from this villages. However, Custer saved himself without combat and returned to his base camp in good order by taking hostage noncombatants from the Black Kettle's village. Warriors didn't attack becouse they didn't wanted to threaten their own noncombatants.

There is one theory that this is exactly what he tried to do at Little Big Horn too. By taking noncombatants hostage while warriors were lured out of the village by Reno's attack, Custer would forced them to break off the fight and maybe return to reservations. Becouse the size of the village Custer needed more men to execute this plan and therefore send orders to Benteen to rejoin the main command. His plan didn't materialized due to the Benteen's failure to join him quickly and Reno's premature and unexpected withdrawal.
I find this theory intriguing. I watched a documentary once, where they spoken about this possibility...


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## renrich (Apr 27, 2009)

Any theory about hostages doesn't take into account the Indian structure. There were numerous bands of Sioux with numerous chiefs plus other tribes. Taking hostages from one band might influence that band but not the others. The warriors fought as individual contractors and only followed a leader if they currently believed in him and his "medicine." How was Custer going to get into the village to take hostages. He never got to the village. There was only one way to handle the situation. Custer needed to wait until Benteen and the pack train came up, establish a secure area where the pack train could be left with guards. Attack the next morning(as was the plan) with his entire command after doing the requisite recon, keeping his command largely together. And be able to retreat to the pack train area and defend if in danger of being overwhelmed. He did not do that and paid the price.


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## imalko (Apr 27, 2009)

You are probably right regarding Indian tribal structure, since this is subject I'm not too familiar with. But even by taking hostages from some of the tribal bands and not all of them, wouldn't that brake the cohesion in Indian combined forces? Maybe even cause some kind of conflict among Indians themselves as some bands would continue fighting while others would be eager to protect their families which were taken hostage. 
Whatever Custer's plan was it apparently depended on Benteen's quick arrival and support... And Benteen never came...


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## renrich (Apr 27, 2009)

A hostage plan first depended on getting to the women and children. How is he going to get them if he can't get to the village? If he could have gotten to the village he might have prevailed but there were too many Indians. Even if he had not split his command in the face of an overpowering enemy, he probably could not have kept from being decimated if he charged the village without a plan to withdraw. Benteen did get there but Custer had already left. I have done some packing in the mountains during long hunting trips and a pack train cannot be hurried and will not move as fast as mounted horsemen. Another factor that Custer should have been aware of was that his regiment was a far cry in training, morale and quality of soldier from when he was in the States War. Many of them could barely sit a horse and most were woeful in marksmanship. He was going into battle on tired horses and with poor quality overall soldiers. In fact, the whole US Army in 1876 was not nearly as proficient(or numerous) as it had been in 1865.


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## imalko (Apr 27, 2009)

I'm not sure I understand your point. What do you mean - he couldn't get to the village? Becouse of Indian resistance or becouse you think that it was imposible for him to find suitable crossing point over the river? There were crossing points over the Little Big Horn river. Indians used them and so could Custer. With part of Indian force fighting Reno and with Benteen's support, it was possible for Custer to get to the village and take hostages. But I'm not arguing that he would have been victorious against all odds. I case of the repulse during this flanking attack, Custer with additional troops at his disposal in form of Benteen's battalion could have made a fighting withdrawal to some defendable position from where he could fight off Indian attacks, same as Reno and Benteen eventually did. I'm not sure what would happen with Reno's command in that case, though...

To return to more realistic scenario - after the initial repulse and joining of Reno-Benteen commands,they were obligated to support Custer. More so becouse at that time entire Indian force was fighting Custer and their advance would be virtually unopposed. So the battle would not be victory in that case but it would not be a massacre either. 
I have the oppinion of general Miles to back me up on this one... 8) 

You also wrote that "Benteen did get there but Custer had already left". And where was that? Benteen never advanced beyond "Weir point" and even this point was reached only after unacceptable delay and wasting of time, so by that time Custer's fight was already over.


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## imalko (Apr 27, 2009)

renrich said:


> ...his regiment was a far cry in training, morale and quality of soldier from when he was in the States War. Many of them could barely sit a horse and most were woeful in marksmanship. He was going into battle on tired horses and with poor quality overall soldiers. In fact, the whole US Army in 1876 was not nearly as proficient(or numerous) as it had been in 1865.



No arguments against that... I'm sure Custer was aware of weaknesses of postwar army and he knew that his soldiers were tired. That is why he planed the attack for dawn of 26th June and changed his mind only when he was informed that their presence had been discovered by Indians...


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## renrich (Apr 27, 2009)

The reason that Benteen did not join Custer was that Custer ran off and left him and when Benteen and Reno decided to join Custer, they looked at the situation, used good judgment and decided discretion was the better part of valor. Miles was a good friend of Custer's, was similar to Custer and was not there. His opinion means nothing. For goodness sake, think about the situation. Custer in his idiocy split his command into 4 units. How is he going to get into the village to capture squaws and papooses with all those pissed off Indians between him and the village. He nor anyone else got into the village. Even if he had kept all 500 or so men together he probably would have not been able to wade through all the warriors to get into the village. It would have been different if the Indians were surprised but they were not. There were upwards of 2000 warriors there, and they meant to fight. If you think that Reno's charge distracted a bunch of Indians, there were still plenty to take care of Custer, even if he had Benteen's men with him. All this talk about blaming Benteen for being late is BS. Benteen wasn't there when some say he should have been there for a very good reason. He had the pack train to bring along with him. The pack train was vital and it needed protection. The mules could not be hurried. Have you ever tried to get a mule to do something he did not want to do? I have and it does not work. In some ways they are smarter than we are and they a helluva lot stronger. My positon is that Custer had an impossible task but he was too stupid and arrogant to figure it out. Reno and Benteen were not. It is well and good to quote Rosser and Miles(who weren't there) but the official US Army position is that Reno and Benteen did their jobs.


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## renrich (Apr 28, 2009)

One slight advantage the troopers had over the Indians was that the Springfields had a longer range than most of the weapons the Indians had. This advantage was tempered a great deal by the fact that most of the cavalry were poor shots, just as most of the Indians were. However, if the cavalry charged into the village, two factors would emerge. If the troopers were on horseback, they had one shot from their carbine and then five or six from their pistol(and obviously most of the troops would have a hard time hitting a barn at 40 yards with a pistol, particularly from atop a horse) and then they would be harmless. If they came in dismounted, they would be able to discharge their carbine and reload but every fourth man would be a horseholder and unable to fire. In either case the closer the cavalry got to the Indians, the more the range advantage would disappear. Inside two hundred yards, the Indians with repeaters would have a distinct edge and a little closer and the arrows would begin to tell. Those factors would act as a force multiplier for the Indians who already had a big edge in numbers. The fact is that the days of horse cavalry making charges were over with. That was the reason that during the States War, cavalry engagements often resulted in few casualties especially compared to infantry engagements and cavalry was largely ineffective except for recon, raids, etc. The "shock" value against well trained infantry was laughable. An example was(from memory,) at Gaine's Mill in 1862, the Texas Brigade(infantry) was charged by a Union cavalry unit which was decimated by accurate fire while the Texans thought that they were having great sport. That was the reason that Buford had his troopers discard sabers and pistols and had them fight dismounted. He had experience fighting Indians pre war also. I am not saying that the Indians were as well trained as a good infantry unit but their fire power advantage at close range would have been huge along with their numbers advantage.


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## imalko (Jun 25, 2009)

25th June... Today is the 133rd anniversary of the Battle of the Little Big Horn.
To the memory of all who fought and lost their lives on that fatefull Sunday in 1876.


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## Colin1 (Jun 25, 2009)

imalko said:


> ...that fateful Sunday in *19*76


The US Army's sure come a long way in 33 years...


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## imalko (Jun 25, 2009)

Typing error...I will edit my post.
And by the way, I have started reading "The official Record of the Reno Court of Inquiry". Don't know when I will finish this read but so far I haven't found anything that would make me change my mind... Still believe that Reno and Benteen are as much to blame for the disastrous outcome of the battle as Custer.


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## renrich (Jun 26, 2009)

Imalko, good call!


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## bikll (Dec 13, 2009)

I have enjoyed reading this discussion 


Custer was lucky most of his career. He was bottom of his class at WP and only got an active field commission because of the war, otherwise he would have some dull frontier post. He got respect from his men by leading from the front and being an energetic and enthusiastic leader.

For me the LBH disaster was a combination of happenings.

It seems he/they knew they would be up against vastly superior numbers, hence the offer of Gatling's and extra companies. Also at this point the arrogance of the Army expected Indians to run rather than fight when against an organized force, so doubtless this was the mindset. Also not forgetting, unlike infantry, cavalry can get out of trouble as quick as they got into it, all things equal. An important thing here,I think, is that a week before LBH General Crook had engaged the Indians that defeated Custer and the result some would say was a draw. Crook was stunned at how large, how fierce and cunning the Indian attacks were. Also he was amazed that the Indians were willing to take heavy casualties. 

A few historians say that if it was not for the Indians being tired from riding all night and the early fierce engagement by Indian allies that Crook would have been defeated. This attack lasted 6 hours or so and Crook expended 25,000 rounds of ammunition. Now here is the thing. Crook withdraw back to camp for reinforcements so wouldn't be meeting Terry, Custer etc as planned. However, he never told ANY of them about his engagement. Terry and more importantly Custer, with his little command, had no idea what they were getting into. Crook had an army of 1,300 cavalry, mule mounted infantry and scouts and in 6 hours couldn't defeat the Indians, from what was really a defensive position (although it was a very poor one).

It is certainly possible that Custer intended a personal triumph given his character. He is reputed to have said back at the Fort that he was going to break loose first chance he got. Custer needed this feather in his cap. He had fallen out with President Grant who only let him on the campaign after Custer cried and pleaded with his seniors. Until he resumed command Reno was the man for the job, so despite peoples criticisms the Army must have thought him capable of the job. Custer's career depended on a successful campaign. Grant and others had had enough of the guy. People talk of Benteen ignoring orders....well Custer was arrested for disobeying AND had gone AWOL, while on duty, just to see his wife!! I think it is obvious that the Army back then was not the disciplined tight bunch of guys Hollywood have us believe.

Custer, ignored his scouts, did not know the terrain well enough..he underestimated hostile forces possibly by 60% plus (although if Crook had passed the information on..who knows?) ....and set a battle plan on ground the enemy knew. Not only did he underestimate the numbers but also the will to fight. 

So he splits his forces as we all know. I read an account where a Sergeant said that as Reno set up the skirmish the Indians rode in a circle laying on the other side of their horses, so they could not be directly shot at. This maneuver was gradually encircling the lines at about the time the Indians started to break a flank (left?) . At this point they made a withdrawal/run. I think Reno saw 500 plus Indians coming at him, some with repeaters and was genuinely shocked. Reno was engaging with just three companies, Custer had five and asked for reinforcements!! 

People say Benteen dawdled towards Custer after he received the "bring packs" note from Martini. Custer was already heavily engaged with the Indians as Martinis' (the messenger) horse had got shot on the way to find Benteen. As I see it, first he had to find Benteen, then Benteen had to find the pack train. Then it is a slow ride with all those mules anywhere. Regarding joining Reno instead of Custer, I think there was a choice, leave Reno (survivors do say that they were saved by Benteen and the pack train turing up) or ride a slow moving pack train through the Indian positions under constant attack. If you look at the LBH maps and see the supposed positions you can see that Benteen would have had an almost impossible task of getting slow moving pack animals to Custer. Whether by accident or design, I think he made the right choice. If Reno stayed his ground he would have been wiped out, followed by Custer. 

A lot is said about the weapons. The Indians did have a mixture of repeaters and other arms. The 7th did have the Spencer a few months before LBH but it holds 7 rounds, has less range and accuracy and of course takes longer to reload...while you have your head down putting in seven more rounds, what would the enemy be doing? The Springfield carbine had better range and (provided it was operating OK) could put out more sustained fire...that is it is continually shooting. The problem with the Springfield I gather was the cheap ammunition it was using, causing blockages. Also it had no rod for barrel cleaning, like the Springfield rifle variant...and also...no bayonet!!!! So if it jammed or was up close it was only a club!! 

Also there were stories of troopers emptying their pistols and throwing them away because they had no time to re-holster or reload them (this was at the Reno fight). What I had never thought of before was that the Colt the guys were carrying is a gated loader, meaning that you have to open the gate and take out each round individually and put them in individually, not easy on a horse!! I have read that often officers would purchase better weapons than issued and that Custer had several guns. It is possible that he was carrying his Webley RIC at LBH, this weapon breaks to load and is much quicker to do so.

Also I think that the marksmanship of the troops was not good. It is OK having a rifle that can shoot hundreds of yards but the trooper has to be able to use it. After LBH troops had to practice twice a week, I think that says all that is needed lol In defense though it would be hard to judge range in that terrain on a static target let alone moving ones!!!

It is possible weapon failure, tactics, no saber, no bayonet, no Benteen and whatever contributed to Custers' defeat but for me it was splitting his forces that done for him. His brigades were to far from one another to support each other. Sending Benteen off as he did was crazy, I believe he should have been on the other side of the hill in reserve...what commander commits all forces on an unknown number of mobile enemy? But it is all conjecture, the only people who knew what happened to Custer are the Indians and they mostly stayed quiet about the events that day...and what has been said is contradictory. No for me, Custer had enough men to defeat the Indians head on even but splitting his force lost mutual support. 

I shudder when I think of Benteen trying to ride his three companies and slow moving pack mules through 1,500 Indians, I have little doubt he would have been lost and the pack train. That would have left the Indians with tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition and all of Benteens carbines, Custer would still have died, but quicker maybe...and Reno Hill would be Reno Cemetery today...

Many thanks.......


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## B-17engineer (Dec 13, 2009)

Personally, I think Custer's thirst for victory clouded his tactical judgement.


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## renrich (Dec 13, 2009)

bikill, nice analysis. Custer was rash, over confident and did not use good judgment. Other than that, he was a good commander, LOL For his men's sake, it is too bad that some Johnny Reb did not remove him during the War of Nothern Aggression.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 13, 2009)

Custer's arrogance was his downfall. He acted on a number of flawed assumptions, and his Civil War experiences should have served him better in the Sioux Wars, but his way of thinking was that the Indians were just a bunch of savages and could be beaten easily...

Crazy Horse and Gall worked out a sharp plan of battle that involved concerted foot and horse troops that kept Custer off balance. Even if Custer had Gattling guns with him, he would have needed time to deploy them once engaged, and that may or may not have been possible, given the ferocity of the battle.


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## B-17engineer (Dec 13, 2009)

like bikill said Custer didn't wait to get numbers. He took his estimate that there were only 1500 Natives and in reality it was 8,000. 3,000 of which were warriors.


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## imalko (Dec 13, 2009)

But there were actually "only" 1500 warriors and unidentified number on non combatants. Custer estimated he will be facing more then 1000 warriors. His main mistake was not so much in underestimating the number of hostiles but in misjudging their attitude and willingness to fight...
*
Edit:* Had he anticipated that Indians would stay and fight and not run, I seriously doubt he would separate his forces the way he did. Depending on this one assumption the battle may took completely different direction. But his experience was working against him this time (that coupled with no knowledge of Crook's engagement). According to what I've read about Indian wars its my impression that they always scattered and evaded direct and large scale confrontation with the cavalry.


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## Amsel (Dec 13, 2009)

Great first post Bikll. 


Imalko, I hope that one day you get to come visit Montana, and see the country for yourself. It is magnificant and you would really enjoy it.


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## imalko (Dec 14, 2009)

Hope to do so one day Amsel. There's several places and historical sites in Europe and North America I would like to visit one day, Montana and the Little Big Horn battlefield being one of them.


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## RabidAlien (Dec 14, 2009)

Dunno how accurate these are, but I ran across them today while surfing:


ETA: dangit. Something's up, I can't attach a PDF. I'm really hating this version of Firefox...


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## RabidAlien (Dec 14, 2009)

Ahhh....finally.


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## claidemore (Dec 23, 2009)

Some thoughts about the LBH fight. 
We can't forget that Reno was wounded. The death of Bloody Knife is often speculated as causing Reno to exhibit poor judgement, but the head wound he recieved would seem to be the more likely cause. If you look at a battle map, Renos 'retreat' was over a longer distance than Custers, over tougher terrain (woods, river, steep bluff). His withdrawal was poorly executed, but it was ultimately successful.

Benteen is criticized because he didn't come to Custers aid 'quick' enough. Martini was sent with the 'orders' for Benteen at approx 3:20. In the movies Marintini is shown galloping his horse away,(which he maybe did for a minute or so) but given that he had to go about 5 miles to find Benteen, he would have been riding primarily at a fast trot, over broken country. So 8-10 miles per hour, or at least 20 minutes before he gets to Benteen. Benteen arrived to reinforce Reno at approx 4:20...and he arrived independantly of McDougall who was in charge of the packs. That means Benteen coverd a minimum of 4 miles in 40 minutes, or about 6 mph, which is a slow trot, a resonable speed to move 3 companies of cavalry on tired horses.

Note: Custer would have been engaged by the Sioux a little before Martini handed his orders to Benteen, and Benteen would have been about 6 miles from Custers position at that time. 

At a little after 5:00 pm Weir and Benteen advance to Weirs Point, arriving there approxim 5:20 (one hour after reinforcing Reno). Too late, Sioux and Cheyenne are already leaving Last Stand Hill (2 miles from Weirs Point) and advancing towards them. This action was IMO merely posturing.

Custers retreat after initial contact at Medicine Tail Coulee, was away from Reno and Benteen, with Last Stand Hill being about 3 miles from Renos Hill. If Benteen had advanced at a canter (unlikely on tired horses) towards Custer as soon as he arrived at Renos Hill, it would have taken 10-15 minutes to reach LSHill. There is a possibility that a few of Custers command might have still been alive at that time, but then Benteen would have been in the same situation as Custer, with fewer men. Some of them might have made it back to Renos position, Benteen would have been a hero for 'rescuing' Custer (or whoever was still alive), but he would have lost a big part of his command. 

Benteens actions on that day while not heroic, were certainly practical. 

Splitting the command, and underestimating enemy numbers and desire to fight are definately a big part of what caused Custers defeat, but the distances involved and the time to cover those distances given the physical limitations of horses, were huge factors.


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## renrich (Dec 25, 2009)

Nice well spoken info Claidemore. I read a book which laid it out pretty much as you did. The fact is that horses are better than men's legs for covering ground by not by as much as might be expected and they take a lot on maintenance.


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## claidemore (Jan 25, 2010)

Since posting on this thread a couple weeks ago I've been doing some reading and research. 
-According to Lt Godfrey, Benteen was watering their horses when the first messanger from Custer, Sgt. Kanipe, arrived with orders for Cpt. McDougall with the pack train. Martini arrived later with the written note from Lt. Cooke. So the criticism that Benteen took time to water his horses after he got orders from Custer to 'come quick', does not hold water.  
-Godfrey mentions that when he and Benteen arrived at Renos Hill, they were still under attack by hostiles. It was only after those hostiles left that Weir decided to reconoiter towards Custers presumed position. Weir did not disobey orders from Reno and Benteen to 'not take his company towards the sound of firing', his 2nd in command mistook Weirs recon movements and followed him with their company. 
-Different writers word their account of Benteen and Reno following Weir to make it look like they did so reluctantly because they were either timid or did not want to support Custer for personal reasons. It is far more likely that they moved from Renos Hill to support Weir. Godfreys testimony indicates that Weirs men were being threatened by native forces already, the other companies were moved to support them, and in fact were engaged as they retreated back to Renos original position. 
-At Weirs point they saw groups of natives on horseback, either moving or sitting still. They saw some warriors firing into the ground, but also heard firing further in the distance. This would have been the last 40 or so men who made a rush for the river and the protection of the brush. They assumed at this point that Custer had been repulsed (as Reno had been) and was retreating. It never entered their thinking that his force would have been annihilated, particularly since Reno with about half as many men, had (more or less) retreated successfully. Consequently, they did not rush to 'rescue' him. 
-There is a very strong likelihood that Custer was hit when E Company tried to cross the river into the village. The Sioux warrior White Cow Bull stated that he hit one trooper and one officer on a sorrel horse with four white socks. Yates and the rest of E Company rode grey horses, Custer rode a sorrel with four white socks. Having made my living riding horses for 28 years, I know that horses with four white feet are not favored. Their feet are soft and don't hold shoes well, and are susceptable to stone bruises. They also have a reputation for untrustworthyness (I can personally attest to that!). A well known quote goes like this..." One or two white feet buy him, three white feet try him, four white feet deny him!" 
A 'chromed up' horse like Custer rode would be unusual and stand out from the crowd. 
-Various reports of Custers wounds list the chest wound as either below or above the heart and 'instantly fatal'. I'm not so sure that a lung wound would be instantly fatal, and even if it were, his body would not be abandoned. Most of his closest friends and relatives were found near him on Last Stand Hill, and historians have always wondered why they were there instead of with their companies. The loss of their commander would explain the loss of cohesion and direction of parts of his command and the shift from offence to defence.
-Reno lost over 1/3 of his command (missing, wounded or dead) before reaching Renos Hill. Military strategists consider a force to have lost it's fighitng ability at much lower loss rates than that. They would not have been able to even protect the pack train if the rest of the force had left them and gone to find Custer. They were basically a stone around the neck of Benteens battallion. 

Too many people (including myself most of the time!) look for what was done wrong, who was to blame, what should have been done differently, instead of looking at what was done right and what could not have been done differently due to the circumstances and resources at hand.


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## claidemore (Jan 27, 2010)

I'd like to answer the original question in this thread, pertaining to whether or not Benteen let Custer down by directly disobeying orders. 

For Benteen to disobey the written order delivered by Martini, we have to make an assumption about what Custer meant by the order. We have to assume that Custer wanted Benteen to come to him, and I believe that is an erroneous assumption that we base on hindsight, knowing as we do that Custer eventually needed help. 

Custers last verbal orders to Reno were that he would support Renos attack _with the entire regiment_. This was one of the first things Reno told Benteen when Benteen joined him on Renos Hill. 

Custer already knew that Reno's "charge" had faltered, and that Reno had deployed in a skirmish line. It's possible he knew Reno had retreated into the trees as well, though we have no testimony about that. 

Custer was quite aware that Renos positon was between him and Benteen. He also knew that Benteen never backed down from a fight, so when Benteen saw or heard Reno fighting, he would advance towards him. Benteen did this, at the trot, with pistols drawn, (according to Godfrey) until he saw that Reno had retreated onto the bluffs. 


*IMO Custer intended for Benteen to support Reno, which is what Benteen did*. 


In reading through this thread, I noticed several comments that the native forces had broke off their attack on Reno before or at the same time that Benteen arrived on Renos hill. This is not true. Benteens 3 companies dismounted and deployed alongisde Renos men to fight off attackers immediately. As some of the warriors began to break off to go fight Custer, Reno tried to go recover Hodgsons body, but could not because there was still heavy fire from the Indians.

A brief comment on speculation that Custer should have replaced Reno and Benteen with other more 'trusted' officers: Reno and Benteen were the senior officers, both had excellent combat records, particularly Benteen. In light of the fact that both men managed to preserve their commands against 1500 to 2000 warriors tells me that confidence in them was justified.
Besides, it wasn't Custers call, Sturgis was the actual commander of the 7th.


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## renrich (Jan 28, 2010)

Nice posts Claidemore, enjoyed them and they pretty well jibe with what I have gleaned from late books. IMO Reno thought that Custer would support him as promised but Custer in his haste and hubris failed to do what he said he would do. I would like to go to the battlefield to actually see the ground.


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## al49 (Mar 13, 2010)

Not a real participation on the debate, but just my view on some people involved in the fight between two very different worlds.





























Yes, before I restarted with plastic aeroplanes, I spent some years assembling and painting figurines, mostly in white metal and mostly in the 90 mm size.
I did many more subjects, mainly Napoleonic; if someone is interested I can find the right thread to post them.
Cheers
Alberto


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## RabidAlien (Mar 16, 2010)

Excellent work there, Alberto!


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## claidemore (Mar 20, 2010)

I've read several more books on the subject of Custer and the Little Big Horn in the past couple months and gleaned some useful and interesting information. 

Forensic archeologists have identified 69 different Springfield carbines used by Custers immediate command. He had approximately 200 men with him so this represents a 34% sampling. 34% because every inch of the battlefield has not been surveyed (it was done on a grid) and artifacts have been lost to trinket hunters and some artifacts are in museum possession and have not been examined forensically. 

If we used the same ratio to try to determine how the native forces were armed, we get some interesting numbers. 108 .44 Rim Fire Winchesterr66/Henry rifles have been identified. Add another 66% to that number and there could very well have been upwards of 320 Win66/Henrys present. 

Using the same formula, the Sioux/Cheyenne should also have 100+ Sharps rifles of various calibers (mostly .50-70). There were 40+ other weapons of various makes and calibers in lesser numbers(including 20+ of the newest Winchester 1873's), but even without considering those weapons, Custers 200 men were operating under a 2-1 defficiency, Win66/Henry/Sharps versus Springfield carbine. 
Custer was outgunned, both in firepower(win66/Henry), and in range (Sharps/Remington/Ballard).

Custer knew very well that he would be opposing well armed warriors. His criticism of the Indian Dept is well documented and he stated that often the Indians were better armed, and carried more ammunition than US soldiers. The Indian dept was convinced that the 'savages' did not stockpile ammunition, so they issued a steady stream of it for 'hunting'. Yet another example of arrogantly assuming that a primitive culture is a stupid one.

There was some significant command and control and use of tactics exhibited on the native side, particularly from Gall and Crazy Horse. Gall actually held warriors back from rushing Renos skirmish line in the valley, telling them to "wait till we have more guns." Once sufficient numbers were present they flanked Reno and forced him into the trees. Reno actually had a very strong position in the trees, there was an old river channel that his men took position in, basically a 'trench'. Gall (or one of the other leaders) instructed the wariors to open up a retreat route for Reno because they were having a hard time getting at the soldiers. Reno took the bait, retreated and suffered most of his losses during that retreat. 

Crazy Horse initiated movement of warriors that divided Custers forces, preventing them from reinforcing one another and causing them to be overwhelmed in three separate stages. According to native accounts, the majority of casualties from their side was younger warriors who rushed the soldier positions while they were still in unit cohesion. More experiencee warriors fired from cover until they achieved fire supriority, then when the soldiers retreated they rushed them. Pretty standard infantry tactic.
Outgunned and outgeneralled.


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## renrich (Mar 26, 2010)

Claidemore, you have done some interesting research. Do you think that some of the Indians could have been armed only with bows and arrows or muzzleloaders? I notice you have not mentioned pistols. I believe each soldier had a 1873 Colt and several reloads. Those would have been pretty effective at close range, 50 yards or so.


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## Night Fighter Nut (Mar 29, 2010)

I've actually been to little big horn. Very grassy and lots of rolling hills.


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## claidemore (Mar 29, 2010)

Hi renrich, yeah every cavalryman and each scout had a .45 Colt revolver and 24 rnds of ammunition. Archeologist found evidence of 12 different .45 Colts used by the soldiers at Custers location, which using the 33% sampling ratio would indicate about 36 of his men used their revolvers at some point. Artwork done by native participants show pistols in use. 

There were also numerous other handguns in use, S&W Americans, Colt cartridge conversions and 1872 Open Tops and percussion pistols. Custer himself gives testimony that the Indian Dept contractors who were supposed to supply guns to the natives for 'hunting' were buying Civil war surplus revovers for pennies on the dollar, with a sprinkling of new percussion rifles, and issuing these weapons to the Cheyenne and Kiowas. We don't often picture native warriors as carrying pistols, but they were in common use and there are accounts by some Sioux participants who had only a pistol, or a pistol and bow. 

The Arikari and Crow scouts had .45 Colts (mentioned above) but it seems their longarms were .50-70 springfield "3-band" muskets. Not the handiest thing on horseback. The Arikari scouts had some losses during Renos fight, but several of them actually came out of it with a bunch of captured Sioux horses. Two Crow scouts who were lagging well behind Custers group actually went to the river bluffs and fired down into the village, possibly alerting the village to the presence of enemy forces on the bluffs. 

Bows and arrows were estimated by officers at the Reno/Benteen end of the battle as being carried by about half the warriors. There was one point in the Custer fight where arcing volley fire from arrows was used from the cover of a coulee against a cavalry position. Probably not accurate fire but definately discouraging on the receiving end. Plains indian bows run the gamut from 20 lb pull weight to 50/60 lb pull weights so their effectiveness was pretty varied. It was customary to fire arrows into the bodies of slain enemies, and this was done to Custers men. I have made my own arrows, both modern type and plains indian type arrows, and it's a lot of work. They must have had a very strong belief that enemies had to have arrows in them to prevent them from fighting again in the afterlife to 'waste' an arrow in that manner. 

There is evidence of muzzleloaders, but they seem to have been largely replaced by more modern firearms. There is limited evidence of Spencer rifles as well, they also having been replaced by Winchesters and Sharps/Remingtons. It seems that after 10 years of fighting the Indians had managed to arm themselves pretty well, which if we look at the weapons used by guerrilla and terrorist forces now, should be no surprise.


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