# Did the RAF have designs for a long range escort fighter?



## MikeGazdik (Mar 26, 2013)

The great thread on "Innovative to Obsolete" made me think of this question and I didn't want to muddle up that topic.

Did the RAF have a design or an airplane that could perform the duties the Mustang ended up performing? I know the RAF mostly carried out the night-time bombing of the Third Reich and I guess (ignorant on the information here) they didn't utilize escorts on these missions.

Were they working on, or did they have, a daytime long ranger fighter?


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## stona (Mar 26, 2013)

The RAF bombed by night because,like the Luftwaffe,it had discovered in 1940 that the bomber most certainly did not always get through in daylight against determined and organised opposition. That this came as a surprise and ran counter to doctrine is shown by the complete absence of a capable nightfighter on either side in 1940. Noone thought that bombing would be carried out at night and no serious thought had been given to how such a strategy might be countered.

The RAF's night time raids were not escorted in the true sense of the word,though as tactics developed they were supported by nightfighters hunting the Luftwaffe's nightfighters and attempting to supress enemy nightfighter fields (amongst many other things). These roles were most commonly carried out by Mosquitos.

In the 1930s Fighter Command was developed as a defensive organisation. Dowding and many others made it perfectly clear that the job of RAF fighters was to shoot down enemy bombers. To this end short range interceptors were integrated into a coordinated command and control system. This obviated the need for standing patrols or other endurance operations and worked very well.

This short range made the RAF's frontline fighters useless as long range escorts,a role never envisioned for them and one which they could not perform. Bomber Command's pre war doctrine did not foresee the need for escorts either,so the Air Ministry never developed one. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Air Staff argued that fighter escort was tactically unsound,diverted resources from its beloved bombers and was in any case technically infeasible. This last argument has some merit.Most long range escort fighters designed in the mid 1930s,like the Bf 110,did indeed prove to have insufficient performance to hold their own with the shorter ranged single engined fighters of their era. 

With the adoption of night time bombing no real effort seeems to have been devoted to developing a long range escort capable of tangling with the Luftwaffe's single engined fighters. The experiences and losses of the USAAF as it started daytime operations may have confirmed British prejudices. Aircraft already in existence which might possibly have developed into long range escort fighters,the Whirlwind springs to mind,were never developed in this role.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2013)

I forget the name at the moment (old age) but one of the top British "boffins" had declared that a long range single engine fighter was "impossible" and the RAF trusted him. 

It was darn difficult to do with 1000-1100hp engines or engines of a certain power to weight ratio. But to keep insisting it was impossible as engine power grew a lot for little increase in weight was a big mistake.


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## alejandro_ (Mar 26, 2013)

> I forget the name at the moment (old age) but one of the top British "boffins" had declared that a long range single engine fighter was "impossible" and the RAF trusted him.



The Chief of Staff of the RAF, Marshall Portal, did not believe a single engine fighter with that sort of range could be built, thus no resources were allocated for this purpose.


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## wuzak (Mar 26, 2013)

alejandro_ said:


> The Chief of Staff of the RAF, Marshall Portal, did not believe a single engine fighter with that sort of range could be built, thus no resources were allocated for this purpose.



To be fair, nor did the Americans.


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## vinnye (Mar 26, 2013)

I agree with Stona - maybe the Whirlwind could have been the platform to develop for this role?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2013)

I really like the Whirlwind but I am not sure this is a good idea. The Whirlwind was actually a small airplane with less wing area than a Hurricane. There were schemes to add fuselage tanks but there is only so much room. 

The escort fighter needs enough fuel inside the plane to engage in combat and make it home ( winds are out of the west) after the drop tanks are gone so bigger drop tanks only get you so far.


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## stona (Mar 26, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> I really like the Whirlwind but I am not sure this is a good idea. The Whirlwind was actually a small airplane with less wing area than a Hurricane. There were schemes to add fuselage tanks but there is only so much room.
> 
> The escort fighter needs enough fuel inside the plane to engage in combat and make it home ( winds are out of the west) after the drop tanks are gone so bigger drop tanks only get you so far.



All true but if in 1940,had the British decided that they needed a longer range fighter,I think this is just about their only option,at least as a stop gap whilst something more capable was developed.
Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Mar 26, 2013)

alejandro_ said:


> The Chief of Staff of the RAF, Marshall Portal, did not believe a single engine fighter with that sort of range could be built, thus no resources were allocated for this purpose.



I'm skeptical of such statement.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2013)

UK was on the forefront in development 1800-2500 HP engines, with RR, Bristol, Fairey and Napier having engines flight testing prior P. Harbor.


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## stona (Mar 26, 2013)

They were all far too late.
These decisions were taken in the early/mid 1930s when the aircraft that would fly in the BoB were being developed. The principal protagonists (let's say Hurricane Spitfire,Bf 109,Bf 110 and the various Luftwaffe medium bombers) were already flying when your three examples existed only on paper if at all.

P-38....first flight of XP-38 was Jan 27 1939. Design work didn't start until early 1937. 

F6F.....first flight June 26 1942 following a request of June 1941 for an improved F4F to support the Vought Corsair.

F4U.....results from a proposal submitted by Vought in April 1938. First flight of XF4U-1 prototype was on May 29 1940.

Just possibly a P-38 type aircraft might have made it before the RAF switch to night time bombing in 1940,had the British considered it worth copying. Luckily,given the limitations of the early versions,they did not.

Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2013)

Steve,


> They were all far too late.



Who was too late? And too late for what?


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## stona (Mar 26, 2013)

Those US designed aircraft were too late to influence 1920s/30s British doctrine regarding the feasibility of long range fighters to escort bombers. They would have had to have been flying by 1935/6 at the latest.None were even on the drawing board,let alone flying,then.
Even then I don't think it would have made a difference. The Air Staff would have regarded them as a waste of resources.
Cheers
Steve
Edit: The post I was replying to has gone AWOL


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> UK was on the forefront in development 1800-2500 HP engines, with RR, Bristol, Fairey and Napier having engines flight testing prior P. Harbor.



True but somehow they were viewed as "bomber" engines although things like the Typhoon were equipped with them. And there is another part of the problem, you need not only a big engine but one that has a good power to weight ratio ( and works at altitude) or you are back to not enough performance to get the job done. The Typhoon held 150 imp gallons in it's wing tanks which is what the Allison Mustang and early Merlin Mustangs carried. Trying to feed the Sabre with only 150 gallons of fuel was going to be a problem. 
The Early Vulture, Sabre and Centaurus engines didn't really offer enough better power to weight ratio than the smaller engines. later versions got better and getting rid of that thick wing helped


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2013)

Agreed, 'viewed' and 'being' not always being the same thing 



> The Early Vulture, Sabre and Centaurus engines didn't really offer enough better power to weight ratio than the smaller engines. later versions got better and getting rid of that thick wing helped



The big engine does need to have bigger power to weight ratio as the smaller engine, same ratio will do. The big and powerful engine can make the good long range fighter better/easier than small and non-so-powerful smaller engine. The Sabre, Vulture or Centaurus of 1942 have had the power to be the basis of the 600 miles fighter, reliability aside. Problem is that RAF did not felt the need for such a plane.


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## stona (Mar 26, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Problem is that RAF did not felt the need for such a plane.



Exactly. The Air Staff not only did not feel the need it thought it was technologically impossible,at least in the early/mid 1930s,and would anyway be a waste of money. The bombers were always going to get through!
Hindsight is a wonderful thing.
Cheers
Steve

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## vinnye (Mar 26, 2013)

Maybe if Frank Whittle had been given some support and resources, we may have had the first operational jet fighter?


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## Kryten (Mar 26, 2013)

the RAF did have a long range fighter, the Beaufighter, difference is they had a different design requirement to what we think of as a fighter!


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## MikeGazdik (Mar 26, 2013)

I guess I should have been a little more specific. What I am wondering is once the war began, and it became obvious that daytime bombing needed an escort fighter, was there work then to develop an aircraft?

If for whatever reason the U.S. bailed, couldn't fulfill the mission, whatever and the RAF needed to conduct both day and night bombing.

I knew there was no long ranger fighter (single engine) even really dreamed of by any of the allies. Certainly the U.S. learned this the hard way.


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## Jenisch (Mar 26, 2013)

MikeGazdik said:


> I guess I should have been a little more specific. What I am wondering is once the war began, and it became obvious that daytime bombing needed an escort fighter, was there work then to develop an aircraft?



I think the British problem was economic. The British needed to maintein an already large number of single-seat fighters to defend their island. If escort fighters would also be employed, perhaps it would be beyond of what FC could have. The night bombing strategy of the RAF allowed destruction of the German industry in unescorted bombers. 

But I'm not certain of what I wrote above. Before Germany invaded the USSR, paralell with a strategy to survive, Britain was working to built of force of 4000 heavy bombers to destroy the German industry. The British were not thinking in return to the continent for a long time. I think that in such situation, the British Army would be smaller, and hence more personal could have been asigned to the RAF. I also think that with the Americans supplying fighters such as the P-38, and bombers like the B-17 and the B-24, the British might well have been considerating built a daylight long-range fighter force. However, after the US entered in the war, my view is that the British abandoned immediately the plan to operate a daylight bomber force with fighter escort. My opinion is that the guys of the RAF thought, as they warned the Americans to not fly unnescorted missions in daylight, something like: "ah, the yankees would be slaughtered, but they have long-range fighters, they would just bring them after that".


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## Freebird (Mar 26, 2013)

MikeGazdik said:


> I guess I should have been a little more specific. What I am wondering is once the war began, and it became obvious that daytime bombing needed an escort fighter, was there work then to develop an aircraft?



Well it never was obvious until 1943 was it?
The British gave up on long-range daylight bombing pretty quickly so there was no pressing need for long-range escorts.



> If for whatever reason the U.S. bailed, couldn't fulfill the mission, whatever and the RAF needed to conduct both day and night bombing.



Why?
If the US wasn't there the British would still continue to develop more night bombing strength.



MikeGazdik said:


> I knew there was no long ranger fighter (single engine) even really dreamed of by any of the allies. Certainly the U.S. learned this the hard way.



The Germans didn't have any long-range single engine escorts in the early to mid war either.

However the British *were* in fact working on a long range single-engine fighter - just not for the RAF 

The Air Ministry specification N 9/39, and updated N 5/40 was for the development of a long-range single-engine fighter with a range of over 1,000 miles, which finally became the single-seat Firebrand and the twin-seat Firefly.
The only long range escorted bombing missions would be FAA, not RAF, hence the need for long range fighters


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## mhuxt (Mar 26, 2013)

Martin Baker MB5? Don't know if it was designed as an escort, however it seems to have had both speed and long legs.

I believe the dH Hornet was to be used as an escort for "Tiger Force" bombers, had the Pacific war lasted longer.


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## Jenisch (Mar 26, 2013)

freebird said:


> WIf the US wasn't there the British would still continue to develop more night bombing strength.



It's what I said above: no US, but lots of Lend-Lease planes. A daylight bomber force with fighter escort perhaps would be of the RAF interest here.


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## Freebird (Mar 26, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> I think the British problem was economic. The British needed to maintein an already large number of single-seat fighters to defend their island. If escort fighters would also be employed, perhaps it would be beyond of what FC could have.



Not at all. If they had wanted to develop them they certainly could have done so, there was no economic impediment




> But I'm not certain of what I wrote above. Before Germany invaded the USSR, paralell with a strategy to survive, Britain was working to built of force of 4000 heavy bombers to destroy the German industry. The British were not thinking in return to the continent for a long time. I think that in such situation, the British Army would be smaller, and hence more personal could have been asigned to the RAF. I also think that with the Americans supplying fighters such as the P-38, and bombers like the B-17 and the B-24, the British might well have been considerating built a daylight long-range fighter force. However, after the US entered in the war, my view is that the British abandoned immediately the plan to operate a daylight bomber force with fighter escort. My opinion is that the guys of the RAF thought, as they warned the Americans to not fly unnescorted missions in daylight, something like: "ah, the yankees would be slaughtered, but they have long-range fighters, they would just bring them after that".



No, again not correct. there is no documentation that I'm aware of that the RAF planned large scale escorted daylight bombing during 1941.



Jenisch said:


> It's what I said above: no US, but lots of Lend-Lease planes. A daylight bomber force with fighter escort perhaps would be of the RAF interest here.



The RAF did not ever plan to carry out mass daylight bombing in the event that the US isn't in the war, nor did Lend-Lease factor into the plans, as they didn't know that it was coming.
The British DID in fact get some B-17s in 1941, but they were thought to be unsuitable and were not used.
Had they in fact thought about daylight bombing they would have ordered some more B-17s, rather than rejecting them 
Nor in fact did the US have a long range escort even planned, as pre-war US doctrine was for _*unescorted*_ daylight bombing, as it was thought the heavily armed formations of B-17s could defend themselves.
It wasn't until they actually tried it out that they realized that it didn't work, and they quickly changed plans to include escort fighters


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## Jenisch (Mar 26, 2013)

freebird said:


> there is no documentation that I'm aware of that the RAF planned large scale escorted daylight bombing during 1941.



You not gonna find, because they didn't.



> Nor in fact did the US have a long range escort even planned, as pre-war US doctrine was for _*unescorted*_ daylight bombing, as it was thought the heavily armed formations of B-17s could defend themselves.
> It wasn't until they actually tried it out that they realized that it didn't work, and they quickly changed plans to include escort fighters



This is what I wrote in the previous post. The British were aware of this and they were also aware that the Americans had long range fighters, such as the P-38. Given the British experiences with daylight bombing, including with the use of the B-17, the heavy losses the Americans suffered were not a surprise to them. But as I said the British also knew the Americans had long-range fighters, so they probably would put them into action, and so they did. The RAF then didn't need to worry with a long-range fighter and could continue it's night bombing effort, again as was done historically.


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## Balljoint (Mar 26, 2013)

The P-51 was a British plane outsource to North American. Kindelberger and his German design crew apparently did an end run around the military and strategy/tactics experts. Though the P-51A was an ugly duckling interceptor, it blossomed into a long-range air superiority marvel as the P-51B. The pieces were all there earlier if the need had been recognized. So it was doable.


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## Jenisch (Mar 26, 2013)

Balljoint said:


> The P-51 was a British plane outsource to North American. Kindelberger and his German design crew apparently did an end run around the military and strategy/tactics experts. Though the P-51A was an ugly duckling interceptor, it blossomed into a long-range air superiority marvel as the P-51B. The pieces were all there earlier if the need had been recognized. So it was doable.



Sooner or later they would put the Merlin in that thing, which BTW had the poor altitude performance already expected by the engineers due to the engine used. If the US didn't went to the war and the British could and desired a daylight bomber force, they would have the Mustang avaliable.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2013)

Uh-oh. German design crew designed P-51?


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## The Basket (Mar 26, 2013)

Single seat Defiant.

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## GregP (Mar 26, 2013)

There was nothing inherently wrong with the Allison that including the turbocharger wouldn't cure after some teething problems were ironed out. The problems took about 9 months to fix on the P-38 in the ETO, but they were fixed. The only reason the Allison used a turbocharger was the US Army Air Corps ASKED for it specifically. Allison asked the USAAC twice, if not three times, whether a 2-stage supercharger was desired and the USAAC said, "No!" every time.

So ... the USAAC got exactly what they ordered. When they bought Merlins and paid $6,000 each to Rolls -Royce as royalty, I bet the USAAC wished they had funded the development of the 2-stage supercharger! But they never did. Go figure.

No question the P-51A lacked altitude performance. I just wish they had added the turbo to the P-51A. It might have made quite a difference. In the end, there was and IS nothing wrong with the Merlin P-51 at all; a classic if ever there was one. 

But the Allison P-51 could have been everything the Merlin variant was ... if it had been allowed to be. Alas, it wasn't and isn't except for today when warbirds rarely get above 14,000 feet anyway.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2013)

Balljoint said:


> The P-51 was a British plane outsource to North American. Kindelberger and his German design crew apparently did an end run around the military and strategy/tactics experts. Though the P-51A was an ugly duckling interceptor, it blossomed into a long-range air superiority marvel as the P-51B. The pieces were all there earlier if the need had been recognized. So it was doable.



Aside from the vast number of things wrong here the provision of 180 US gallons of fuel in an AMERICAN design is in no way, shape or form anything out of the ordinary, strange or revolutionary. 

Early P-38s had 400-410 gallons before the fitting of self sealing tanks dropped the capacity to 300 gallons 150 gallons per engine. 
First 33 P-39s had 170 gallons before the fitting of self sealing tanks dropped capacity to 120 gallons.
XP-40 had 158 gallons, inherited from the P-36. Early P-40s had 180-160 gallons. The P-40C dropped to 135 but most of the later ones (except the strippers) had 148-161 gallons. 
P-47 had 305 gallons.
F2A Buffalo had 160-240 gallons 
F4F started with 160 gallons in unprotected tanks. 

The Provision of 180 gallons of fuel may be a little on the high side but nothing really out of the ordinary for an American fighter, especially if you were trying to "up" the competition ( the P-40) to get the contract.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2013)

GregP said:


> When they bought Merlins and paid $6,000 each to Rolls -Royce as royalty, I bet the USAAC wished they had funded the development of the 2-stage supercharger! But they never did. Go figure.



It is easy to figure, Rolls waived the Royalty fee for the duration of the war. Except perhaps for some nominal amount like $1.00 per engine.


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## stona (Mar 27, 2013)

mhuxt said:


> Martin Baker MB5? Don't know if it was designed as an escort, however it seems to have had both speed and long legs.
> 
> I believe the dH Hornet was to be used as an escort for "Tiger Force" bombers, had the Pacific war lasted longer.



The Martin Baker fighters were probably too late. 
The MB 5 prototype didn't fly until May 1944 so that one is definitely out. 
The MB 3 would have had similar range I think,and first flew in May 1942. I suppose if the RAF made a massive volte-face,abandoned three or four years of development of technology and tactics for night time bombing,and adopted daylight bombing,it could have been developed into an escort fighter by 1943. It would have been easier just to use an american option.
Cheers
Steve


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## yulzari (Mar 27, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> It is easy to figure, Rolls waived the Royalty fee for the duration of the war. Except perhaps for some nominal amount like $1.00 per engine.



Once the war ended Rolls Royce made it clear they would now need royalty payments if Packard were going to keep on making Merlins. 

Packard ended production PDQ and the Twin Mustang had to use Allisons, even though the performance was reduced. Rolls Royce went on to sell licences for the Nene, Tay and Spey to the USA.


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## Balljoint (Mar 27, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Aside from the vast number of things wrong here the provision of 180 US gallons of fuel in an AMERICAN design is in no way, shape or form anything out of the ordinary, strange or revolutionary.
> 
> Early P-38s had 400-410 gallons before the fitting of self sealing tanks dropped the capacity to 300 gallons 150 gallons per engine.
> First 33 P-39s had 170 gallons before the fitting of self sealing tanks dropped capacity to 120 gallons.
> ...



My rather broadly painted point is that will rather than technology was the missing factor. Had ether the AAF or RAF desired a long range escort fighter, the A-36 could have been instead the P-51B. The bomber powers that were didn’t want escorts even if they had to fly at night or take horrendous casualties.

Three parameters came together in the P-51; fuel capacity, burn rate and altitude performance. IMO the P-51B was the first to attain the needed balance of these, and did so rather promptly after the need for air superiority and bomber escorts was made clear.


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## Readie (Mar 27, 2013)

Howabout the Westland Welkin - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia ?

There was the Mossie Beaufighter that fitted the 'heavy fighter' with long range specifications for escorting bombers deep into enemy territory.

Other than these, there was no British long range fighter available.
'The bomber will always get through' mantra stifled development.

Cheers
John


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## Shortround6 (Mar 27, 2013)

Balljoint said:


> My rather broadly painted point is that will rather than technology was the missing factor. Had ether the AAF or RAF desired a long range escort fighter, the A-36 could have been instead the P-51B. The bomber powers that were didn’t want escorts even if they had to fly at night or take horrendous casualties.
> 
> Three parameters came together in the P-51; fuel capacity, burn rate and altitude performance. IMO the P-51B was the first to attain the needed balance of these, and did so rather promptly after the need for air superiority and bomber escorts was made clear.



The A-36 proper could not hope to be an escort fighter for B-17s. It used a special low altitude version of the Allison. Other Allison Mustangs _might_ have worked to some extent, But please remember that trying to put a rear fuselage tank in an Allison Mustang is a very doubtful proposition. 
You also give a bit too much credit to the designers/engineers or perhaps to cause and effect. July 42 sees both the British doing preliminary studies for putting a Merlin 61 in a Mustang and North American getting a contract to build TWO Merlin Mustangs. Aug 42 sees metal starting to be cut. Aug 26th 42 sees NA get a contract for 400 P-51Bs (Merlin powered). 

Sept 42 sees the first flight of an A-36
Oct 42 sees first deliveries of the A-36 to the US forces. 
Oct 8th sees North American Dallas get a contract for 1350 P-51Cs
Oct 16th sees first flight of a Merlin powered Mustang in England.
Nov 30th sees the first flight of a XP-51B in the US. Radiator and air scope must be redesigned. 
April 1943 sees 2500 P-51Ds ordered. 
May 5th sees the first flight of a production P-51B. 
The P-51B was designed and ordered in large quantities well before the so called " need for air superiority and bomber escorts was made clear". 
The _NEED_ for air superiority had been clear since well before the BoB. 

To add to this timeline. 

Aug 17th 1942, First 8th Air Force Bombing Mission. 12 -B-17s, escorted by 4 squadrons of Spitfires attack marshaling yards at Rouen and Sotteville in northern France. This was followed by small raids against lightly defended targets in France, Belgium,and the Netherlands. 

Early October 1942 sees the 13th raid ans the first use of the B-24 against Lille. 

Nov/Dec of 1942, the weather turned bad and only 12 more raids were flown. 27 raids total by the end of the year. At this time several thousand B-51Bs &Cs are on order. 

It was as much coincidence that the P-51 was available for escort use as anything else.


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## stona (Mar 27, 2013)

And it was due to the happy coincidence of the presence of the P-51 in the ETO that in 1944 a Luftwaffe fighter was 7 times as likely to be shot down in the west as it was flying a comparable sortie in the east 
Cheers
Steve


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## buffnut453 (Mar 27, 2013)

Great post Shortround. Couple of observations.



Shortround6 said:


> The _NEED_ for air superiority had been clear since well before the BoB.



Entirely agree. I suspect the main problem is that the "bomber will always get through" crowd believed that well-armed bomber formations would provide their own local air superiority. Even with the P-51, air superiority (or at least parity) was only ever temporary, never persistent...not until the Allies were able to forward-base fighters on mainland Europe.



Shortround6 said:


> It was as much coincidence that the P-51 was available for escort use as anything else.



Precisely. The only thing the RAF could have done differently was to envisage the need to obtain air superiority at long-range in the mid/late 1930s. That simply wasn't going to happen because nobody believed there was such a need. Look at the single engine designs that came out of that period (including Me109, Hurricane, Spitfire, P-36/P-40), none of which were viable long-range escort fighters.


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## Balljoint (Mar 27, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The A-36 proper could not hope to be an escort fighter for B-17s. It used a special low altitude version of the Allison. Other Allison Mustangs _might_ have worked to some extent, But please remember that trying to put a rear fuselage tank in an Allison Mustang is a very doubtful proposition.
> You also give a bit too much credit to the designers/engineers or perhaps to cause and effect. July 42 sees both the British doing preliminary studies for putting a Merlin 61 in a Mustang and North American getting a contract to build TWO Merlin Mustangs. Aug 42 sees metal starting to be cut. Aug 26th 42 sees NA get a contract for 400 P-51Bs (Merlin powered).
> 
> Sept 42 sees the first flight of an A-36
> ...





We largely agree. Kindelberger was trying to sell the Brits the B-25, but they wanted a fighter (interceptor) in that they were a bit preoccupied with the BoB at the time. Kindelberger had been to Germany and was up to speed on the LW. There may be some pixie dust in that the design was done by Edgar Schmued, a German who had worked with Willie M. The point being that North American knew what it would take to match up against the LW. But I doubt that long range aspect was a concern. Rather that a damn good design had the elasticity to morph from an interceptor to a long range escort/air superiority fighter.
I wasn’t suggesting that the A-36 be used for escort. But if the effort that went into the A-36 was instead directed to a “long-range, high altitude escort” directive, the P-51B could have been produced earlier. 
We do disagree about recognition of the recognized need, as opposed to the actual need, for escort fighters, at least by the bomber people. When the first P-51Bs went into action, Eaker assigned them to Ninth for tactical operations, though Arnold got them to the Eighth fairly promptly.
As to the RAF and long-range escort question, if they had wanted one they had the bits and pieces around to assembly a P-51B.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 27, 2013)

> The P-51 was a British plane outsource to North American.



Just a few things about the P-51; it wasn't a British design; it was built for a British requirement for P-40s, which the British Purchasing Commission asked Curtiss for and were told to go see NA to build them for the Brits under licence. Kindleberger famously said, "We can build you a better fighter than the P-40" and so the NA-73X was born. 



> Edgar Schmued, a German who had worked with Willie M.



No, he did not. Schmued was German, but never worked for Messerschmitt. The team was led by Raymond Rice and Schmued, but wasn't "German".

Edgar Schmued - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"An urban legend has grown up about Edgar Schmued, possibly related to his German origins, claiming he had once worked for Willy Messerschmitt and that the Mustang was heavily influenced by the Messerschmitt Bf 109. Neither claim is true but the urban legend persists. Just as familiar is the notion that the abortive Curtiss XP-46 was the basis of the P-51 design."

Admittedly from Wiki, but accurate nevertheless.

Don't forget that the Mustang was not originally conceived as a high altitude, long range escort and that it entered service with the RAF first - before the USAAF got their hands on them and even then only when they saw its excellent performance - as an Army Co-operation aircraft (British terminology for close support) working alongside P-40 Tomahawks out of Gatwick in late 1941. Up to twenty RAF squadrons fully or partially equipped with Allison engined Mustangs.

The initial idea that the Mustang should be fitted with a Merlin (specifically 60 Series two-speed, two stage supercharged variant designed for the high altitude pressurised Vickers Wellington Mk.VI and earmarked for Spitfires) came about in Britain after Rolls Royce liaison pilot Ronnie Harker flew the Mustang on 30 April 1942. His flight report stated that he thought;

"The point that strikes me is that a powerful and good engine like the Merlin 61, its performance should be outstanding as it is 35 mph faster than the Spitfire Mk.V"

It's worth noting that at this time Rolls had only experimented with fitting a 60 series Merlin to a Spitfire V airframe the first Merlin 61 Spitfire was still a few months from entering service; the real impetus for a Merlin 61 engined fighter came after the appearance of the Fw 190 in September 1941 as we all know, when Supermarine's put into place development of the HF.VII, F.VIII and the stop-gap Mk.V airframe fitted with a Merlin 61, the Mk.IX. 

Regarding British long range fighters, the Hornet was probably the closest that officially the British came to an escort fighter; there was never any specification released that stipulated the need for one, but the Hornet had F.12/43 (OR.126) written around it as it was a private venture. Designed initially as a long range fighter to oppose Japanese fighters, according to De Havilland A/c since 1909 by A.J.Jackson, the Sea Hornet (built to N.5/44) was to be used as an escort; "A production order was then placed for the Royal Navy's first twin engined long range escort strike fighter, designated Sea Hornet F. Mk.20."


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## Jenisch (Mar 27, 2013)

According to Wik, the Tempest V had a range of (2,462 km) with 90 gal (409 l) drop tanks.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 27, 2013)

Just a wee addition to my post. The myth about Schmued working for Messerschmitt and the P-51 being influenced by the Bf 109 comes directly from the aforementioned Ronnie Harker, who wrote in his test report on the Mustang the day after his test flight;

"This aircraft should prove itself a formidable low and mid altitude fighter. It closely resembles an Me 109F, probably due to its being designed by one of the Messerschmitt designers, who is now with the North American Aeroplane Co."


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## dobbie (Mar 28, 2013)

I think its a shame that the Allison V1710 never got the attention which it deserved for development. It was lighter, produced more hp per pound than the merlin did at low altitude, cheaper to produce and even reversible in rotation without additional parts. And all this from a very small company...at least until GM bought it. And even with the backing of General Motors, Allison was a pretty small division in comparison with Rolls Royce. Clearly, the US was far behind Europe in the design of mechanical multiple stage superchargers, preferring the turbocharger instead. What I like about the turbocharger is that it doesnt take horsepower to make horsepower, but its a plumbers nightmare.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2013)

US was ahead of all the world in development of 'multiple stage' superchargers, the 1st one was designed by Pratt Whitney and used aboard F4F-3. P&W have had the support by the Navy in their two-stage development. Another one was designed by same firm, and was 1st used aboard F4U, then aboard F6F and P-61. Nobody in Europe, apart from RR, was using two or more stages in their engines, prototypes aside.
The turbocharger indeed looks like plumber's nightmare.


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## stona (Mar 28, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> The only thing the RAF could have done differently was to envisage the need to obtain air superiority at long-range in the mid/late 1930s. That simply wasn't going to happen because nobody believed there was such a need. Look at the single engine designs that came out of that period (including Me109, Hurricane, Spitfire, P-36/P-40), none of which were viable long-range escort fighters.



Yes and your dates are important. Assuming a complete doctrinal volte-face any potential long range escort would have had to be on the drawing board in the early 1930s,flying by the mid 30s,contemporary with the British and German examples you give. _Even the P-36/40 is probably just too late._
Some here seem to have lost sight of the fact that the war in Europe began in 1939 
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Mar 28, 2013)

Readie said:


> Howabout the Westland Welkin - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia ?
> 
> There was the Mossie Beaufighter that fitted the 'heavy fighter' with long range specifications for escorting bombers deep into enemy territory.
> 
> ...



I love the Welkin but the clue is in the name. It was built to a 1940 specification for a high altitude interceptor.

To have a long range escort in 1940,when the RAF/Luftwaffe realised that the bomber would not always get through and switched to night time bombing, it needs to be an early 30s design which makes both the Welkin and the other two and just about everything else being suggested in this thread too late.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

The thing was that NOBODY could design a single engine long range escort fighter for most of the 1930s. 

The available power plants would not allow it. 

This is one reason for all the twin engine fighters floating around at the beginning of the war. 

The British especially had a problem in that they were a little late to the game with variable pitch propellers. Part of the problem can be seen comparing Spitfire take-off distances to clear a 50ft obstacle.

with the Fixed pitch prop it was 790 yds.
with a 2 pitch prop it was 490 yds 
with a variable pitch prop it was 370 yds. 

This is for a plane weigh about 6050lbs. 

Please remember that the Merlin III (and earlier versions) was good for 880hp for take-off. 

Adding even a few hundred pounds of fuel is going to affect take-off performance. 

A P-51B with NO rear tank and a pair of 75 gallon drop tanks was carrying over 1900lbs of fuel and had an operational _radius_ of about 450 miles. 

Trying for a late 30s fighter with even 2/3 the amount of fuel is going to give performance problems. More powerful engines were promised but on 87 octane fuel those engines were large, heavy, and thirsty.


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## stona (Mar 28, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The thing was that NOBODY could design a single engine long range escort fighter for most of the 1930s.



Exactly,which is why,way back up near the beginning of the thread I said that the argument that such an aircraft was not technically feasible,propounded by the Air Staff in the early 30s did have some merit.

The Air Staff used the argument to back up their own doctrinal bias. They wanted bombers and lots of them. These men had lived through the slaughter of WWI and envisaged a scenario where a war could quickly be won,from the air,without the need for a single British or Commonwealth soldier to set foot on the European continent.

Who knows what might have been possible had more time,effort and money been put into developing a long range escort fighter,but it wasn't. You have to try and put yourself into the minds of those men,sitting in Whitehall,back in the 1930s. It is difficult not to colour modern opinion with hindsight.

Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
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## aircro (Mar 28, 2013)

How about this design: Gloster F.9/37 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
If not with Merlin XX maybe P&W R-1830?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

aircro said:


> How about this design: Gloster F.9/37 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> If not with Merlin XX maybe P&W R-1830?



Not without a total redesign. The Taurus engine used for those performance figures never went into production and the production engines only gave similar power at low altitudes even then had over heating problems.

Swapping in more powerful engines means adding hundreds of pounds (if not over 1000lbs) about as far forward as you can put it which would really screw up the center of gravity. Maybe you can add enough _stuff_ to the rear of the plane, like lead weight ballast, to get it to fly right but it seems like a long shot. 

The Climb to 28,000 feet (8,500 m): 19 min, 36 sec is a little bit lacking also. A captured 109E was supposed to climb to 30,000ft in 17min, 12 sec, A Hurricane I in 17min,30 seconds, A Hurricane II in 13min, 20 sec and a Spitfire I in 15min,42 sec. 
The Gloster with it's prototype engines has a _service ceiling_ (altitude at which it can climb 100fpm) of 30,000ft. The four fighters named have _operational ceilings_ (altitude at which they can climb 500fpm) from 31,400ft to 34,900ft (the two Hurricanes are the extreme). 

I did a little back of the envelope figuring and the powerplant weight for a Merlin P-51 was about 3565 lbs. Engine cowling, starter, oil system, fuel system etc. For that the 51B got 1380 take-off HP and 1210 hp at 25,800ft, the 51D got 1490hp for take off and 1370hp at 21,400ft. These are Military power, 61 in of boost. 
For a P-40C the powerplant weighed 2847lbs (using the same fuel system weight as the Mustang) for which the Allison gave 1040hp for take-off and 1040hp at 15,000ft. At 25,000ft it was down to about 600hp.

It was not only better engines but the better fuel that allowed the single engine escort fighter to work. A bare R-R Vulture weighed 2450lbs (complete power plant weighs???) and while it offered 2000hp for take off it was only offering 1710hp at 15,000ft on 87 (?) octane with the original 2 speed supercharger.


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## dobbie (Mar 28, 2013)

I do believe it was possible for the RAF to develop longer ranged fighter aircraft with the technology they had in the mid to late 1930s. What was required was higher octane fuels which allowed higher boost on the superchargers and/or higher compression ratios on the engine itself. Both the Merlin and Allison engines were producing 1000 hp on pretty crappy gasoline as it were. TEL and other chemical blends would have allowed this, also allowing revised cam profiles and timing changes for the valvetrain. The addition of internal fuel tanks plus drop tanks would then be possible-the engines would have had the necessary hp to pull the aircraft off the ground. 100 and greater octane fuels were being promoted by James Doolittle who was working for Shell Oil at the time.


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## Balljoint (Mar 28, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Just a few things about the P-51; it wasn't a British design; it was built for a British requirement for P-40s, which the British Purchasing Commission asked Curtiss for and were told to go see NA to build them for the Brits under licence. Kindleberger famously said, "We can build you a better fighter than the P-40" and so the NA-73X was born.
> 
> 
> 
> ...




The AAF design standards, particularly stress specs, use by North American were important to the P-51 in that the later-required fuel loads and hard points were better accommodated. As I recall, a later Mustang model was built to RAF standards with significantly improved performance.
My reference for Schmued would be Donald Miller who does rather exhaustive research. 
But one purpose of posting is to test facts. What about the PBS story about Kindelberger having a ghost midnight shift of illegal Germans during development of the T-6?
When the Mustang was designed, the long range, air superiority fighter was impossibility according to the powers that be, particularly the bomber powers. That was IMO the primary reason the RAF did not consider the need. 
While I argue for the feasibility of an earlier P-51-B, Merlin production was probable the most intractable pacing item for volume production.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2013)

Hi, SR6,

During what time frame the Vulture had such power levels? What would be the name of the variant?
An engine with 1710 HP at 15000 ft, while weighting, bare, 2450lbs, should not have the word 'only' attributed to the power, not if we talk about pre-1944 engines. I'm not convinced that 2 stage R-2800 would provide better performance to a fighter. That power looks as good as 1830 HP at 11500 ft the Typhoon had (here).


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## nuuumannn (Mar 28, 2013)

Hi Balljoint.



> The AAF design standards, particularly stress specs, use by North American were important to the P-51 in that the later-required fuel loads and hard points were better accommodated. As I recall, a later Mustang model was built to RAF standards with significantly improved performance.



I don't doubt AAF requirements were taken into consideration in designing the Mustang; it was, after all an American design by an American team. It's only natural that NA would want the USAAF to operate the type. As for a Mustang (P-51 was a USAAF designation and not officially used by the British) model built to RAF standards, which model Mustang was that? 

Later Mustangs were certainly modified for RAF requirements, such as radio fit and in later Mustang IIIs (equivalent to the P-51C) a 'bubble' hood instead of the earlier bird cage one, but I don't recall a specific late model Mustang built especially for the RAF. The Mustang was actually designed for service with the RAF to begin with, as the RAF was its first customer. Experimental Mustangs were modified by Rolls Royce as test beds for the Merlin, but they were research aircraft only and were not meant for service use. Packard did the design work on the nose to take the Merlin installation.



> What about the PBS story about Kindelberger having a ghost midnight shift of illegal Germans during development of the A-6?



I take it you mean A-36? Can't say I've heard the story, were they production line workers or design team? There's a big difference.



> Merlin production was probable the most intractable pacing item for volume production.



While it's a grand idea, the issue would have been Merlin design rather than production. If the Mustang was to be fitted with the Merlin from early on, like you propose, it would have been something like a Merlin 45 or such like. Thing was, the British Purchasing Commission stipulated the Allison for the fighter for commonality with the Kittyhawks and Tomahawks already in RAF use. 
The 'High Altitude' Merlin 60 came along slightly later and was intended for the Wellington VI. It was Lord Hives of Rolls who asked the question as to whether it was suitable for fitting to a Spitfire. To really take advantage of the Mustang's advanced airframe, the 60 Series Merlin was the only real option.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

The 2 stage R-2800 had 1800hp at 15,500ft but that is in low gear, in high gear it had 1650 at 22,500ft. While the dry weight of the engines was about the same the R-2800 doesn't have around 600+ pounds of radiators/coolant. Of course it is fatter with more frontal area/drag. 

Once Merlin XX series engines are allowed over 9lb boost it doesn't look so good for the Vulture. Granted it was several years after the Vulture's Heyday but 1480hp at 12,500 for 1000lbs _less_of dry engine weight + much smaller radiators and propeller doesn't make the Vulture look good. 

We are talking in the context of an escort fighter which means while the plane doesn't _HAVE_ to be as good as the short range defender it should be close. 10% worse in both speed and climb won't cut it. 
While altitudes did not go up as expected after the BoB the escort fighters do need to keep the defenders from getting positions 3-8,000ft above the bomber formations and diving down through them. The escort fighters _WILL_ have to fight, at least somewhat at 25,000-30,000ft.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

Balljoint said:


> The AAF design standards, particularly stress specs, use by North American were important to the P-51 in that the later-required fuel loads and hard points were better accommodated. As I recall, a later Mustang model was built to RAF standards with significantly improved performance.



That would be the H model. 



Balljoint said:


> When the Mustang was designed, the long range, air superiority fighter was impossibility according to the powers that be, particularly the bomber powers. That was IMO the primary reason the RAF did not consider the need.



I am not sure about the situation when the Mustang was designed but a few years earlier the basic difference between the specifications that lead to the P-38 and the P-39 was that the specification that lead to the P-38 was supposed to have 2 hours of endurance at max cruise speed at altitude and the Specification that lead to the P-39 only needed 1 hour of endurance. Armament, speed and altitude were supposed to be the same. the Actual planes did diverge from the original specification but the fuel for that extra hour seems to have been just a little difficult to get into a single engine plane.


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## Balljoint (Mar 28, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Hi Balljoint.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The specific "A-6" was the T-6 Texan. As best I can recall they were workin on the design/prototype and were "skilled workers".


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## Jenisch (Mar 28, 2013)

I already spoke of the Tempest adequated range. Was it unsuitable to high altitude combat?


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## Ascent (Mar 28, 2013)

As a slightly different question, how come the Americans produced long range fighters?

We've established that the belief existed among all the nations, including the Americans, that the bomber will always get through so why did they see the need for these longer ranged fighters? Or was it just pure chance that they were adaptable to taking more fuel?


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## stona (Mar 28, 2013)

Neither the P-47 nor P-51 had enough range to accompany USAAF bombers all the way to their targets. An unbelievably complicated relay system was used. It got a bit simpler after they were belatedly fitted with drop tanks.
You could argue that the US didn't really produce a long ranged single seat fighter in time for the initial stages of the daylight bombing campaign.

As you say the USAAF too thought that the bomber would always get through when it became involved,even in the face of the evidence from the British and Germans who had already been at it for several years.

Naval aircraft are something entirely different. The US has and had important strategic objectives in the Pacific and that's an awfully big bit of water.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> I already spoke of the Tempest adequated range. Was it unsuitable to high altitude combat?



It is three things. One was that the high altitude performance was a bit lacking.
The second is that Drop tanks can get you into trouble. Combat radius is distance you can make it back from AFTER you drop the tanks, engage in a high speed fight for 15-20 minutes (5 minutes at WEP or Combat rating and the rest at Military power), while allowing for reserves in case of bad weather/head winds to find the home Field. Take-off and initial climb out was done on internal tanks in-case of a problem with the drop tanks so internal tanks werenever 100% full when the external tanks were dropped. If the Drop tanks are too big (ferry tanks) you can get in further than you can get out.
Third is that MAX range with tanks was almost always for some altitude and speed that was useless for escorting bombers. 
Like this : 

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/typhoon/typhoon-ads.jpg

254mph at 15,000ft is useless for escorting bombers, you need to be at 22,000-30,000ft and moving faster in order to be able to respond. Escort fighters flew a weaving pattern so their forward speed over ground some what matched the bombers but that added to actual miles flown and shortened the operational radius.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

Ascent said:


> As a slightly different question, how come the Americans produced long range fighters?
> 
> We've established that the belief existed among all the nations, including the Americans, that the bomber will always get through so why did they see the need for these longer ranged fighters? Or was it just pure chance that they were adaptable to taking more fuel?



For one thing the US is big 

P-36 and early P-40s carried 25-40% more fuel than the Spitfire, Hurricane, 109. They needed just to deploy around the US. 
The P-38 was _supposed_ to be a long range (or high endurance?) _interceptor_. Again, given the size of the United States the need to have fighter fields a few hundred miles apart for thousands of miles of coast line was seen as cost prohibitive. Better to have somewhat fewer fields (and fighters) that could cover a wider area. 

And part of it was chance. 

The fact that the two stage Merlin in the P-51B-D was several hundred pounds heavier and needed a heavier propeller than the plane was originally designed for may have made the installation and flight with the rear fuselage tank a lot easier than it would have been if the Allison had stayed.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The 2 stage R-2800 had 1800hp at 15,500ft but that is in low gear, in high gear it had 1650 at 22,500ft. While the dry weight of the engines was about the same the R-2800 doesn't have around 600+ pounds of radiators/coolant. Of course it is fatter with more frontal area/drag.



The 'engine accesories' (auxiliary supercharger and intercoolers?) weight 300+ lbs in F6F, that item was missing from the single stage Vulture. The weight of cooling system depends much of the execution, the 350 lbs cooling system of the P-36 was able to cool the engine developing 90% of Vulture's power.



> Once Merlin XX series engines are allowed over 9lb boost it doesn't look so good for the Vulture. Granted it was several years after the Vulture's Heyday but 1480hp at 12,500 for 1000lbs _less_of dry engine weight + much smaller radiators and propeller doesn't make the Vulture look good.



At 15000 ft that would be 1300 HP for the Merlin XX? If Vulture's power does not look good, how good is Sabre then?



> We are talking in the context of an escort fighter which means while the plane doesn't _HAVE_ to be as good as the short range defender it should be close. 10% worse in both speed and climb won't cut it.



What planes are in the comparison?



> While altitudes did not go up as expected after the BoB the escort fighters do need to keep the defenders from getting positions 3-8,000ft above the bomber formations and diving down through them. The escort fighters _WILL_ have to fight, at least somewhat at 25,000-30,000ft.



Service ceiling for Typhoon was 33-34000 ft, for Tempest V (the one with same engine, Sabre IIA) was 35-36000 ft, depending on load. The wing area of Tempest was some 10% greater than Typhoon's.

added: the Vulture we're discussing should be Vulture II, capable for 1710 HP at 15000 ft. That would be unrestricted variant, used at Avro Machester, at least according to the ADS Neil Stirling kindly posted. Date of ADS being 14 Aug 1941. The 'fighter' variant was the Vulture V (better performance at altitude? wuzak, help with these Vultures!)


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## buffnut453 (Mar 28, 2013)

Ascent said:


> As a slightly different question, how come the Americans produced long range fighters?
> 
> We've established that the belief existed among all the nations, including the Americans, that the bomber will always get through so why did they see the need for these longer ranged fighters? Or was it just pure chance that they were adaptable to taking more fuel?



'Cos Americans want their aeroplanes to be like their cars (and their women?)...bigger than everyone else's. I think it's a compensation thing. 

Seriously, though...another poster hit the nail on the head - the US is a big place and to enable air mobility, you have to build aircraft that can fly a long way. The happy coincidence is that, by late-1941, engine technology was providing the kind of performance, both in terms of outright thrust potential and fuel efficiency, to give these larger airframes unprecedented combat performance at long range. 

I think a similar happy coincidence, and for exactly the same reasons, revolves around the increasing use of fighters in the ground attack role from 1942 onwards - we see fewer and fewer dedicated light-bomber aircraft and more fighters being used for mud-moving.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> The 'engine accesories' (auxiliary supercharger and intercoolers?) weight 300+ lbs in F6F, that item was missing from the single stage Vulture. The weight of cooling system depends much of the execution, the 350 lbs cooling system of the P-36 was able to cool the engine developing 90% of Vulture's power.



The weight of the auxiliary supercharger is included in the 2480lbs of the R-2800 two stage, the Single stage weighed 2360lb but you are right about the inter-coolers. What cooling system in a P-36? 
If you meant P-63 then you have to include the water injection system (50lbs) plus the weight of the fluid (186lbs for 25 gallons). 




tomo pauk said:


> At 15000 ft that would be 1300 HP for the Merlin XX? If Vulture's power does not look good, how good is Sabre then?



Not good for an escort fighter. And depends on the Sabre, IIA were running at 3700rpm and 9lbs boost while IIBs were running 3850rpm and 11lb boost. IIA was 1830 at 11,500ft while the IIB was 2050 at 13,750 but the II B was a little late in the game. 
What would a _production_ Sabre have been good for in 1942/43 as an escort fighter and a critical altitude of under 12,000ft doesn't look good. 





tomo pauk said:


> What planes are in the comparison?



What ones do you want? It was a hypothetical. If the 109 can do 400mph trying to use an escort fighter than can only do 360-370 isn't going to be real successful, especially if the 109 can out climb it. The escort fighter HAS to be able to equal the defender at something ( or come within a couple of percent, 10% is way to much) even if not so good at something else. 





tomo pauk said:


> Service ceiling for Typhoon was 33-34000 ft, for Tempest V (the one with same engine, Sabre IIA) was 35-36000 ft, depending on load. The wing area of Tempest was some 10% greater than Typhoon's.



The service ceilings are too low. Nobody is fighting at 34-36,000 but those are the altitudes the plane can fly pretty much straight and level and if really lucky, with one other airplane.

In a book from the R-R Heritage trust there is a chart for the 109E, Hurricane I, Hurricane II and Spitfire I. with a few performance figures at high altitudes. It is this kind of thinking that shaped western combat. 


AIrcraft...............service ceiling............oper.ceiling........time to op ceiling......rate of climb/30,000ft.......time to 30,0000ft...........rate of climb 25,000ft.............time to 25,000ft

Bf109E...................35,200ft.....................31,900ft............20min, 23sec..............740fpm........................17min, 12 sec.................1340fpm.............................11min, 39sec
Hurricane I..............35,000ft.....................31,400ft............21min, 15 sec.............660fpm........................17min, 30 sec.................1260fpm.............................13min, 12sec
Hurricane II.............37,600ft.....................34,900ft............19min, 57sec.............1160fpm........................13min, 20sec..................1840fpm............................. 9min, 48 sec
Spitfire I.................37,400ft.....................34,000ft............21min, 33sec.............1020fpm........................15min, 42sec..................1660fpm.............................11min, 33 sec.

Operational ceiling is where they can climb at 500fpm. (and is about what a good 40hp piper cub can do at sea level) and is what is need for a margin of power to maintain _small_ formations. Please note that while the Hurricane I and II are only about 2600ft apart in 'service ceiling' the actual capabilities of the two planes are much further apart. At 25,000ft the MK II is climbing about 3 ft for every 2ft the MK I does. and at 30,000ft it can climb 75% faster. 

Test conditions are not really given but I hope this brings out the point about "service ceilings" It is a nice comparison but in actual fact the planes were fighting 3-6,000ft below their service ceilings in order to be effective. It may also bring home why the P-40 with a service ceiling of 29,000ft or so was judged to be pretty much out of the running for the European theater.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> I think a similar happy coincidence, and for exactly the same reasons, revolves around the increasing use of fighters in the ground attack role from 1942 onwards - we see fewer and fewer dedicated light-bomber aircraft and more fighters being used for mud-moving.



Kind of, In the 1930s with 600-900hp engines if you wanted to lift 1000lb of bombs and fly past the next county (not country) you were going to need a big wing to get off the ground. With 1200-1500hp engines the small wing fighters could do the job (and constant speed props) and with 2000hp engines the fighters could carry 1000lb of bombs a fair distance or more bombs a short distance. Longer runway helped too.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The weight of the auxiliary supercharger is included in the 2480lbs of the R-2800 two stage, the Single stage weighed 2360lb but you are right about the inter-coolers.



Okay.



> What cooling system in a P-36?
> If you meant P-63 then you have to include the water injection system (50lbs) plus the weight of the fluid (186lbs for 25 gallons).



P-36?? P-63, indeed.
Why should we include the ADI system into cooling system, pound-per-pound?



> Not good for an escort fighter. And depends on the Sabre, IIA were running at 3700rpm and 9lbs boost while IIBs were running 3850rpm and 11lb boost. IIA was 1830 at 11,500ft while the IIB was 2050 at 13,750 but the II B was a little late in the game.
> What would a _production_ Sabre have been good for in 1942/43 as an escort fighter and a critical altitude of under 12,000ft doesn't look good.



If one saddles the Sabre with thick wing, that has also the wing area just a tad greater than Spitfire, sure enough the performance will suffer, especially the performance at altitude. Back to the other 24 cyl, the Vulture II, bomber engine, was providing some 10% more HP above 15000 ft.



> What ones do you want? It was a hypothetical. If the 109 can do 400mph trying to use an escort fighter than can only do 360-370 isn't going to be real successful, especially if the 109 can out climb it. The escort fighter HAS to be able to equal the defender at something ( or come within a couple of percent, 10% is way to much) even if not so good at something else.


109 was able to outclimb the P-47 and P-51, not that it gave it much edge in fight over Germany. The escorts were already at altitude, they did not needed the climb rate as badly as defenders.
The 360-370 mph is value for Typhoon at 26000 ft, the airplane twice cursed by wing choice. The Sabre-engined fighter with thinner wing (say, 15% instead of 19%) and tad a greater area (300 sq ft vs. 275) should offer 400 mph at 27000 ft. The Tempest's superb wing was enabling 405-425 mph, at Sabre IIA power (9 lbs, 3700 rpm), at 28000 ft.



> The service ceilings are too low. Nobody is fighting at 34-36,000 but those are the altitudes the plane can fly pretty much straight and level and if really lucky, with one other airplane.



Agreed. They should be flying between 25-30000 ft.



> In a book from the R-R Heritage trust there is a chart for the 109E, Hurricane I, Hurricane II and Spitfire I. with a few performance figures at high altitudes. It is this kind of thinking that shaped western combat.
> 
> 
> AIrcraft...............service ceiling............oper.ceiling........time to op ceiling......rate of climb/30,000ft.......time to 30,0000ft...........rate of climb 25,000ft.............time to 25,000ft
> ...



Thanks for the effort to type out the data 



> It may also bring home why the P-40 with a service ceiling of 29,000ft or so was judged to be pretty much out of the running for the European theater.



It was also darn slow, compared with contemporary Spit, 109 and 190.


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## Balljoint (Mar 28, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Hi Balljoint.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I had to think on this a bit. The P-51-H (almost saw combat) was a redesign by NA to RAF stress specs but for the AAF. Timmy had posted on this in another thread.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Why should we include the ADI system into cooling system, pound-per-pound?



Maybe because if you DON'T use the ADI system you DON'T get 90% of the power of the Vulture? You get 1500hp or under. Put it were you want, it has to go into the power plant weight somewhere. 




tomo pauk said:


> 109 was able to outclimb the P-47 and P-51, not that it gave it much edge in fight over Germany. The escorts were already at altitude, they did not needed the climb rate as badly as defenders.
> The 360-370 mph is value for Typhoon at 26000 ft, the airplane twice cursed by wing choice. The Sabre-engined fighter with thinner wing (say, 15% instead of 19%) and tad a greater area (300 sq ft vs. 275) should offer 400 mph at 27000 ft. The Tempest's superb wing was enabling 405-425 mph, at Sabre IIA power (9 lbs, 3700 rpm), at 28000 ft.



The Climb rate has to do with the ability to perform sustained speed turn. It is not one for one but in general the plane with the better climb rate has more surplus energy and can use it for climb or to counter act drag in a turn. A poor climbing plane has little extra power and has a choice of doing wide turns and maintaining altitude or doing a tight turn and trading altitude for speed. Go to the the two Hurricanes in the example. If both are at a high altitude (over 25,000ft) and turning at speed XXX ( Hurricane I is pulling just enough G that it is at full throttle but is neither gaining or loosing speed or gaining or loosing altitude) the Hurricane II has several choices, it can turn at the same speed/radius (G Load) and gain altitude( to be traded later?) or it can pull a tighter radius at the same speed without loosing altitude or it can turn at the same radius but at a higher speed than the MK I without loosing altitude. If the two planes were fighting each other you can see the advantages the better climbing plane has in addition to regaining altitude after a firing pass. Granted both can pull really tight turns and trade several thousands of feet of altitude for a tight turning radius. 
Given a decent radar system the Germans shouldn't have needed fast climbing aircraft to get into firing position. For fighters based in Germany they should have over an hours warning that a raid is coming, granted they don't know WHERE but??? knocking 2-3 minutes of the time to 30,000ft doesn't do much for the intercept. Having a fast climbing fighter may help to evade escort fighters or in the absence of fighters help the interceptors to do multiple firing passes. 






tomo pauk said:


> It was also darn slow, compared with contemporary Spit, 109 and 190.



Not in 1940, the first Tomahawk reached England in Sept of 1940. It was certainly faster than a Hurricane, even a MK II.

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## buffnut453 (Mar 28, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Kind of, In the 1930s with 600-900hp engines if you wanted to lift 1000lb of bombs and fly past the next county (not country) you were going to need a big wing to get off the ground. With 1200-1500hp engines the small wing fighters could do the job (and constant speed props) and with 2000hp engines the fighters could carry 1000lb of bombs a fair distance or more bombs a short distance. Longer runway helped too.



Agreed, kindda. You have to have a structure strong enough to carry the external stores. The Spit, Me109 and P-36/P-40 never really were strong enough, hence they mostly carried bombs on the centreline and hence couldn't really match the weapon load of a light bomber. Larger, stronger airframes, like the P-47, P-51, Tempest, Sea Fury etc could carry heavier external ordnance loads that were comparable to a light bomber (eg the latter 2 could each carry 2000lb in bombs operationally).


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2013)

I don't know how many they broke doing this but;


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## buffnut453 (Mar 28, 2013)

Looks like it's had a few too many - distinct list to port...or is that me?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 29, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Maybe because if you DON'T use the ADI system you DON'T get 90% of the power of the Vulture? You get 1500hp or under. Put it were you want, it has to go into the power plant weight somewhere.



I was talking about the systems that R-2800 had, and the Vulture had not, and vice versa. The P-63 served as an example that a 350 lb cooling system was able to cool the engine developing 1800 HP, so the Vulture's cooling system does need to go to 600+ lbs for 2000 HP.



> The Climb rate has to do with the ability to perform sustained speed turn. It is not one for one but in general the plane with the better climb rate has more surplus energy and can use it for climb or to counter act drag in a turn. A poor climbing plane has little extra power and has a choice of doing wide turns and maintaining altitude or doing a tight turn and trading altitude for speed. Go to the the two Hurricanes in the example. If both are at a high altitude (over 25,000ft) and turning at speed XXX ( Hurricane I is pulling just enough G that it is at full throttle but is neither gaining or loosing speed or gaining or loosing altitude) the Hurricane II has several choices, it can turn at the same speed/radius (G Load) and gain altitude( to be traded later?) or it can pull a tighter radius at the same speed without loosing altitude or it can turn at the same radius but at a higher speed than the MK I without loosing altitude. If the two planes were fighting each other you can see the advantages the better climbing plane has in addition to regaining altitude after a firing pass. Granted both can pull really tight turns and trade several thousands of feet of altitude for a tight turning radius.



Agreed on all accounts. 
The high wing loading (in Typhoon's example) is also detrimental factor there, too. The Vulture II can provide a tad more power at altitude, Vulture V providing again more. The Tornado was reaching max speed at 23,300 ft with Vulture V (FTH at 19000 ft?, no ram).



> Given a decent radar system the Germans shouldn't have needed fast climbing aircraft to get into firing position. For fighters based in Germany they should have over an hours warning that a raid is coming, granted they don't know WHERE but??? knocking 2-3 minutes of the time to 30,000ft doesn't do much for the intercept. Having a fast climbing fighter may help to evade escort fighters or in the absence of fighters help the interceptors to do multiple firing passes.



I was under impression that great RoC was crucial thing for interceptor 



> Not in 1940, the first Tomahawk reached England in Sept of 1940. It was certainly faster than a Hurricane, even a MK II.



Indeed. By Sept 1940, the major offensive for that year was vanning. Both British and Germans have already in pipeline newer better performing planes for 1941, while the Curtiss cannot offer anything like that.

added: a member is quoting the person named Rod Banks, that Sabre, per HP delivered, cost 5 times more than Merlin. The long range fighter with 2 Merlins should cost about same as Typhoon/Tempest?

here


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## Shortround6 (Mar 29, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> I was talking about the systems that R-2800 had, and the Vulture had not, and vice versa. The P-63 served as an example that a 350 lb cooling system was able to cool the engine developing 1800 HP, so the Vulture's cooling system does need to go to 600+ lbs for 2000 HP.



Two things, ADI acts as an internal coolant in addition to the anti-detonation and charge cooling. And the 1800 hp rating of the P-63 was of limited duration. Try sticking a pair of those engines on a medium bomber and climbing a 35,000-40,000lb plane to 25,000ft with a 300lb radiator systems. 

It's _NORMAL_ rating was 1000hp. Max continuous. The Vulture was "supposed" to cruise at 1475-1485hp. That is thing with these "sprint" rated engines, they expected the liquid cooling system to "absorb" the extra heat for a few minutes before the engine cooked. It doesn't mean you can operate 1800hp Allisons, 1800-2000hp DB605s or Merlins using 15+ pounds of boost like you would a _real_ 1700-2000hp engine. Think of them like drag or hill climb engines vs enduro engines  



tomo pauk said:


> I was under impression that great RoC was crucial thing for interceptor



It was when they were depending on a phone call from a spotting station a few miles from the airfield  

15 minute warning vs 60 minute warning? This may have helped Mosquitoes. 8th Air Force bomber groups lumbered across Europe at 180 miles an hour. Granted they dog legged and flew evasive routes but the Germans certainly knew they were going _somewhere_ well before they crossed the German border. Quite a change from 1939/40 when French/British bombers could be based only a few dozen miles from the German Border.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 29, 2013)

Agreed that ADI will act as a coolant, we will need to look at other planes' cooling systems, weight per power. Eg. P-40: 290-300 lbs, up to 1580 HP. P-39: 320-330 lbs, same HP. 
I agree that Vulture was supposed to cruise at bigger power, using either 1480 or 1290 HP, 1st or 2nd gear. With a compact cooling system, like P-40, Tornado or Manchester had, that would be some 450 lbs for cooling system?



> Quite a change from 1939/40 when French/British bombers could be based only a few dozen miles from the German Border.



Hmm, idea for the new thread - Feasibility of CBO starting at April's fools day, 1940?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 29, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> ....
> What ones do you want? It was a hypothetical. If the 109 can do 400mph trying to use an escort fighter than can only do 360-370 isn't going to be real successful, especially if the 109 can out climb it. The escort fighter HAS to be able to equal the defender at something ( or come within a couple of percent, 10% is way to much) even if not so good at something else.
> ....



If I may return on the 360-370 mph speed value. 
There is plenty of F4U-1 tests, both for WER-capable and non-WER capable machines, where the F4U does some 370-380 mph at 27-28000 ft. That would run to the contrary with people saying the F4U-1 was the ideal, yet missed opportunity for the bomber escort in ETO? The service ceiling is listed at 34-35000 ft, ie. somewhere between Typhoon and Tempest.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4u/corsair-II-III-ads-b.jpg


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## tomo pauk (Apr 7, 2013)

The Hawker Tornado was some 10 in longer than Typhoon, the engine protruding more in the front. That would leave more space for fuel tank? The "Centaurus Tornado" giving even more?


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## Aozora (Apr 7, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> The Hawker Tornado was some 10 in longer than Typhoon, the engine protruding more in the front. That would leave more space for fuel tank? The "Centaurus Tornado" giving even more?
> 
> View attachment 230165



The reason for the Tornado's greater length was that the R-R Vulture, which was taller than the Sabre, could not be fitted over the main spar, thus it had to be mounted further forward, in addition to which the wings were mounted 3 in lower on the fuselage cf the Typhoon. Even with the extra room the Vulture and its accessories section was longer than the Sabre and the amount of extra fuel that could have been squeezed in would have been too small to justify the weight and balance issues that would have developed. As it was the Tornado did have better longitudinal stability than the Typhoon.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 8, 2013)

Thanks for the insight, Aozora. 
Do we know length of the Vulture and war-time Sabres (all with accessories)? The Tornado having no 'weight stability issues'?

added: Sabre II V were 82.2in long, according to the pdf available at WIlliams' site.
added 2: image (here) shows Vulture installation in Tornado. Good call, Aozora, the auxiliary systems seem to take much more space than those of Sabre.
added 3: wuzak's info, from another forum:


> I received a reply from the RRHT about the Vulture. The main question about was the overall dimensions of the Vulture, which are:
> 
> Length overall - 87.625in/2226mm.
> Width overall - 35.8in/909mm.
> ...


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 9, 2013)

Forgive the *Wall-O-Text*, but: The RAF had a viable design for a long-range escort fighter: the *Spitfire*.

Sounds odd I know, but it’s not actually that unbelievable. Hear me out.

During 1937-1940, the RAF significantly developed the Spitfire Mk I for PR work, with a range of different fuel options. The PR Mk IB had a 29 gal fuel tank behind the pilot. It was unstable when the fuel tank was full, but once most of the fuel had burned off, the handling of the aircraft was almost as good as a regular Spitfire. 

There was also the PR Mk ID, which had an extra 66 gal in the wings, replacing the armament and giving a total 218 imperial gallons. No rear tank was fitted though, as the aircraft balance was affected. It also had a larger oil tank, somewhat marring the wonderful lines of the nose.

Spitfire Mk Vs shuttled to Malta were successfully flown off aircraft carriers with 29 gal and 33 gal rear fuselage tanks, although they were removed once the aircraft got to Malta. The Mk Vs also flew with 29 gal rear tanks AND the 90 or 170 gal ferry tank (for a total of 284 imperial gallons).

Later in the war (late 1944) the RAF began fitting some Spitfire XVIs and Spitfire IXs with rear fuselage tanks of 41 gal total capacity. Versions with bubbletops had 33 gal.

There was also the PR Mk ID, which had an extra 66 gal in the wings, replacing the armament and giving a total 218 imperial gallons. No rear tank was fitted though, as the aircraft balance was affected. It also had a larger oil tank, somewhat marring the wonderful lines of the nose.

When time came to improve the Spitfire in 1939-1940, Joseph Smith came up with a couple of proposals for the Mk III. One of the main ones, which was eventually rolled into the Mk VII/VIII airframe was the enlarged front tanks, increasing standard fuel capacity from 85 to 95 imperial gallons. The Mk VII/VIII airframe also had two 12.5 gallon fuel tanks, in the leading edge of the wings, near the wing root.

If the airships in the Air Ministry, Portal in particular, hadn't been so opposed to the idea of a long range, single seat, single engine fighter in the late 1930s and early 1940s, then a Spitfire with double the range was practical, even in 1940/1941. 

I believe that the rear-fuel tank is practical in the post-1940 period for the Spitfire, with a bit or re-arranging of some of the rear fuselage accessories:

A regular Mk V had 85 imperial gallons, and a standard range of 480-500 miles at best cruising conditions. With warm up, climb, fast cruise, combat and reserve allowances, the practical combat radius is about 170-80 miles. Rough rule of thumb is that RAF combat radii were between 35% and 37.5% of cruising range, perhaps a little more as range gets longer.

If we go with two concepts available and flying in Spitfires in 1940 – the enlarged nose tank and the rear fuselage tank – then internal fuel goes from 85 imp gal to 124 imp gal, an increase of about 45%. 

Still air cruising range goes up to about 700-730 miles, and combat radius goes up to nearly 250 miles.

However, the big boost comes once you start adding external tankage. Drop tanks were fitted to Spitfire Mk Vbs about half-way through 1941. They came in many flavours, but the standard sizes in 1941 and 1942 were 30 imp gal and then 45 imp gal.

With a 45 imp gal slipper tank, total tankage goes to 169 imperial gallons, or just under double the fuel of a Mk I or Mk II. 

So my theoretical 1941 long-range Spitfire Mk V would behave like this.

Allowances:

Warm-up/taxi/take-off (90 gph): 10 gal, no distance, 159 gallons left

20 minutes climb to 20,000 ft @160 mph (32 gph): 13 gal, 50 miles, 146 gallons left

Combat: 
5 minutes at full throttle (90 gph): 7.5 gal, 30 miles, 138.5 gal left
15 minutes at fast cruise @ 315 mph: (67 gph): 17 gal, 80 miles, 121.5 gal left

Reserve:
30 minutes reserve @ 220 mph (32 gph): 16 gal, no distance [as its reserve], 105.5 gal left

Range cruise: 
3 hours 20 minutes at range cruise @ 220 mph (32 gph): 105.5 gal, 730 miles, 0 gal left.

Total distance: 
Climb – 50 miles
Combat – 100 miles
Cruise: - 730 miles
Total: ~880 miles
Combat radius: ~310 to 330 miles.

For every 5 minutes at full power, you can cut about 60-65 miles off the total range. For every five minutes at fast cruise, you can cut about 30-40 miles off the total range.

880 miles range is not too far off Mk VII/VIII performance (it might actually be understating the range a little). With 120 gal internal, the Mk VIII had still air cruise range of 660-740 miles and with a 45 gal slipper tank it had range of 885-940 miles, depending on whether it dumped or retained the slipper tank. The Merlin 66 also consumed a LOT more fuel at full boost of +18 than the Merlin 45 did at +9/+12. In 1944 Mk VIIs did bomber escort trips of 690 miles (round trip) to La Pallice and Mk IXs and Mk VIIs over 600 miles to Meerbeck and Emden.

You can probably quibble with some of the fuel consumption and speed figures, but I’ve used the RAAF Spitfire Mk Vc figures for 1943 as my baseline. The RAF might have flown at higher boost settings and thus got less range out of their Spitfires.


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## cimmex (Apr 9, 2013)

Don’t forget that your long range Spitfire could meet enemy fighters and I don’t like the idea to have to fight against Fw 190 or Bf 109 in such a plane over Germany.
cimmex


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## Mike Williams (Apr 9, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> ...The RAF had a viable design for a long-range escort fighter: the *Spitfire*. ...



Hello Jabberwocky, Your post reminded me of USAAF flight tests of a Spitfire IX modified for long range:






(click on body of image for full size)


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## Aozora (Apr 9, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks for the insight, Aozora.
> Do we know length of the Vulture and war-time Sabres (all with accessories)? The Tornado having no 'weight stability issues'?
> 
> added: Sabre II V were 82.2in long, according to the pdf available at WIlliams' site.
> ...



The info about the Tornado's flight characteristics vs the Typhoon comes from Crowood's "Hawker Tempest, Typhoon and Sea Fury" by Kev Darling - unfortunately I'm needing a new scanner...


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## tomo pauk (Apr 9, 2013)

No sweat, Aozora, your post # 79 here is spot-on 

The US-modified Spitfire Mk.IX was outfitted with 43 imp gals tank behind pilot, 2 x 16.5 IG in wing leading edges, and was carrying 2 x 62.5 IG drop tanks. 
The Spitfire IX was able to receive the increase of 11 IG for main fuel tanks, ie. from 85 to 96, too. Like it was done for the Mk.VIII from start. The 160-170 IG means ~200 US gallons, that compares well with P-51s without fuselage tanks.


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## Mike Williams (Apr 9, 2013)

Fwiw, here's another document relating to long range Spitfires:





(click on body of image for full size)


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## tomo pauk (Apr 9, 2013)

Unfortunately, the rear fuselage tanks of the Spitfires were being conceived more as a thing that would increase ferry range (removed from the plane after ferry flight), than something that would be, on purpose, used in combat?


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## Shortround6 (Apr 9, 2013)

Part of the problem is not how much fuel you can stuff in the plane but what kind of handling or "G" loading can it take at various fuel loads. And how the different weight locations affect the center of gravity and handling. Flying a ferry flight with a large fuel load and NEVER pulling more than 2 "G"s is one thing. Many of these planes had flight restrictions with full INTERNAL fuel. Mustangs were good for 8 "G"s at 8,000lbs. at 10,000lbs they were SUPPOSED to be restricted to 6.4 "G"s. Throw in the fact that with some tank location/s full tanks overloaded the local structure and had the plane operating at a less than ideal center of gravity situation (Mustangs were SUPPOSED to burn down the rear fuselage tank to 25 gallons BEFORE switching to drop tanks in peace time).


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## Readie (Apr 9, 2013)

What fuel load did the photographic Spitfires have in order to over fly Berlin?
Cheers
John


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## tomo pauk (Apr 9, 2013)

The Spitfire PR Mk IV would took off with 218 IG of fuel, most of the fuel being carried in the leading edge tanks (2 x 66 IG).


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## stona (Apr 9, 2013)

An "overfuelled" Spitfire was hardly combat capable. The PR ID was nicknamed "the flying bowser". It also carried extra oil,something often overlooked when people increase the theoretical endurance of WWII aircraft.

Wing Commander Tuttle.

"You could not fly it straight and level for the first half hour after take-off. Until you had emptied the rear tank,the aircraft hunted all the time. The centre of gravity was so far back you couldn't control it.It was the sort of thing that would never have got in during peace time,but war is another matter."

Cheers

Steve


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## Mike Williams (Apr 9, 2013)

See A. A.E.E. Report on Spitfire LF Mk. IX ML.186, Handling with rear fuselage tank and metal elevators.

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## tomo pauk (Apr 9, 2013)

Reading the report kindly provided by Mike, the Spitfire with 40 imp gals left in the rear fuel tank seem like a combat-worthy airplane?


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## Aozora (Apr 9, 2013)

Getting back to the original question: I've now got a copy of British Aircraft Specifications 1920-1949 by Meekcoms and, after a quick look there were no pre-war or wartime specs issued for long-range escort fighters: some examples of specifications issued were:

F.17/39 which was issued around the Beaufighter:_ The endurance is to be sufficient for 15 minutes at maximum power for level flight, plus 3 hours at most economical cruising speed for duration, plus 1 hour at maximum power for level flight at 15,000 ft._

F.16/40 Vickers-Armstrong fixed cannon gun fighter (Vickers 414): _Permanent fuel for 15 minutes at maximum power plus 2 hours at most economical cruising speed at 15,000 ft. plus 15 minutes at maximum power at 20,000 ft. Eight 20 mm cannon guns mounted to fire forward...
_
F.21/40 Mosquito fighter conversion:_ Fuel shall be provided for 15 minutes maximum power at sea level for take-off and climb, 3 hours at most economic cruising speed at 15,000 ft. for patrol, and 15 minutes at maximum power at 21,000 ft. for attack._


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 10, 2013)

stona said:


> An "overfuelled" Spitfire was hardly combat capable. The PR ID was nicknamed "the flying bowser". It also carried extra oil,something often overlooked when people increase the theoretical endurance of WWII aircraft.
> 
> Wing Commander Tuttle.
> 
> ...


 
If instability for the first half an hour to hour of flight is the only draw-back, I'd suspect the RAF would have gladly accepted it. Only two of the PR MK ID/Mk IVs had the rear fuselage tank anyway. The rest were built without the 29 gal rear tank.

Armed, Merlin powered Spitfires proved capable of operating with more than 210 imperial gallons, on combat missions. Drop tanks were a bit of a game changer. 

In late-build Mk IXs it was found that when the extra rear fuel tanks (44 gal) were fitted, the aircraft became longitudinally unstable above 145 mph - the Spitfire never having the best longitudinal stability anyway. As speed increased, the aircraft became progressively less stable and required constant 'hands on' flying to remain straight and level.

By the time 1/2 the rear tank had been burned off (22 imp gal - about 70 kg) the Spitfire began to return to normal behaviour. It was recommended that a Spitfire not engage in combat before before the rear fuel tank was emptied though.

The implication for this is that the rear tank must be the first used in the aircraft. With my proposed/theoretical long-range Mk V with the 29 gal rear fuel tank, this is actually solved fairly simply by a little juggling of tanks during flight. 

Warm-up, taxi and take off consume around 10 gal. I'd suggest the rear fuselage tank is used for this. 
Climb to 20,000 ft would consume another 13-17 gal. I'd actually suggest that the 30/45 gal drop is used for climb.
Then the pilot switches back to the rear fuselage tank to use up the remainder of the fuel in the tank. The remaining 19 gal is enough for about 35 minutes slow cruising (220-225 mph), or for about 15 minutes at fast cruise (315-330 mph). If form up occurs over the Channel, that means the pilot is still only going to be about 100-120 miles into France, at best.

With the rear tanks used for warm up/take-off and the drop tanks used for climb out/form up, the Spitfire still has full front tanks (95 gal) and either 13 gal or 28 gal left in the drop tanks, around 70% of total fuel load left. Even if the pilots are required to 'pickle' their tanks off early, 95 gal is still enough for 15 minutes at fast cruise, five at full combat power and then another 2 and a bit hours at a cruise speed of 220-225 mph (32 gph), or about 1 and a half hours at a slightly more aggressive speed/fuel setting (45 gph and 285-290 mph).

Its still a 4 hour aircraft, not a seven hour aircraft like the later P-51s, but with the rear tank and drop tank its no slouch. In 1942/early 1943, the Spitfires of the RAF were limited to a combat radius of 200-210 miles and usually operated no further than 175 miles. The P-47 had a radius of about 240 miles, but usually operated no further than 210 miles. By mid-1943 the P-47's practical radius is out to 250-275 miles (with 75 gal external tank), and it takes until late in 1943 before its over 350 miles (with 108 gal tank).

Load up the Spitfire with the big forward tanks and the rear fuselage tanks and all of a sudden you've got a bird with a pratcial 275-300 mile combat radius in late 1941/early 1942. That's far enough to maybe support the 8th AF out to the German border, possibly the Rhur, depending on flight profile/route taken.


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## Juha (Apr 10, 2013)

stona said:


> An "overfuelled" Spitfire was hardly combat capable. The PR ID was nicknamed "the flying bowser". It also carried extra oil,something often overlooked when people increase the theoretical endurance of WWII aircraft.
> 
> Wing Commander Tuttle.
> 
> ...



Now on LR escort mission the Spit would have used the fuel in the rear tank before the contact with enemy fighters in ETO (targets in Eastern Holland, NW Germany). Of course one would not use routes that crossed the Strait of Dover with full rear tank, that would have been too risky, but filled with amount of fuel needed to cross Channel it would still have been useful for range extension.

Juha


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## Milosh (Apr 10, 2013)

P-51 had the same flight restrictions when the fuselage tank was full of fuel. It managed to do OK in the escort job.


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## stona (Apr 10, 2013)

Did I misread this?






Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Apr 10, 2013)

Hello Steve
is that from post-war PN as mine, 1946. In peacetime safety consideration have more weight than in wartime.

Juha


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## stona (Apr 10, 2013)

Juha said:


> In peacetime safety consideration have more weight than in wartime.
> Juha



Maybe,within reason. Is their any evidence that the advice was contarvened during the war? Did those Marks of Spitfire operate _routinely_ with filled rear tanks?
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Apr 11, 2013)

My father was based in Germany Autumn/Winter 1945 on a squadron with Mustang IIIs and IVs and he said that the rear fuselage tank filler and fuel c0ck on the Mustangs was wired closed with a lead seal on. Any aircraft found without the wire and seal and someone was for the high jump. So it seems like the RAF was very anti the rear fuselage tanks, admittedly this is post war but still seems to show the feelings about them.


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## Milosh (Apr 11, 2013)

The Mossie had its MTO weight reduced when the war ended.

Wouldn't the use of the rear tank on the Spits depend on the mission stona?


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## stona (Apr 12, 2013)

Milosh said:


> Wouldn't the use of the rear tank on the Spits depend on the mission stona?



Yes,but those notes imply that the RAF was very nervous about the deliterious effect of the rear tank on the CoG and handling. I just wonder if there is any evidence for their routine use during the war? Did those restrictions,i.e.authorisation from a senior officer for their use (at the very least) still apply?
Cheers
Steve


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## Milosh (Apr 12, 2013)

What is the date of the PN you have stona?

The PN for the IX, XI, XVI I have say Sept 1946. If there is no war being fought then one could understand the restrictions on the use of the rear tank. One would need to look at war time PN to see if the same restriction was in place.


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## nuuumannn (Apr 12, 2013)

> after a quick look there were no pre-war or wartime specs issued for long-range escort fighters



I think I've mentioned that earlier.



> Regarding British long range fighters, the Hornet was probably the closest that officially the British came to an escort fighter; there was never any specification released that stipulated the need for one, but the Hornet had F.12/43 (OR.126) written around it as it was a private venture. Designed initially as a long range fighter to oppose Japanese fighters, according to De Havilland A/c since 1909 by A.J.Jackson, the Sea Hornet (built to N.5/44) was to be used as an escort; "A production order was then placed for the Royal Navy's first twin engined long range escort strike fighter, designated Sea Hornet F. Mk.20."


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## OldSkeptic (May 1, 2013)

There was no technical issue with a long range (LR) Spitfire post mid/late 42 (Merlin 60 series of course).
They were built and tested (Quill's book gives an example of an actual flight he did). The USAAF did their own version and flew them across the Atlantic.

I define LR top be Berlin and back. The Mustang by that definition was a VLR (very long range) fighter.

Rather it was RAF's higher command .. what could you call it ... 'blimpishness?" that stopped any usage.
Portal, as already mentioned, was assuring Churchill even in 43 that a LR fighter was impossible, just before the P51 B came out....

The key was that with a rear tank the Spit was unstable at first (as was the Mustang), so you burn that off first, then burn off the drop tank.
You rendezvous with the bombers as part of a layered defence , so you just cruise there. 
Then combat and return.

The key is the fuel left for combat and being able to return.

Now I did some calculations ages ago that showed if you took a Spit VIII, with a rear 66 (imperial) gallon tank and a 45 or 90 gal drop tank then you could escort to Berlin and back, with a 15min allowance for combat. And still had about 140 miles left for reserve (22% of the trip to Berlin)

You might want to add a bob weight to the elevator control for the LR MK VIII to make it a bit easier for the pilot for the beginning stages, but in the combat zone you had no problems.
And 15 mins combat is a long time, I used that number to allow for re-climbing, fast evasion, etc at higher speeds before returning to cruise speeds for the return.
The numbers I used were from the actual data sheets for the plane. Most economical cruise of 220mph, plus the fuel usage from the data sheets for the different configurations and combat.

So RAF bureaucracy was the issue (or 'clueless management' in today's terms). Even after they fitted rear tanks to late model Mk IXs, XVIs, XIVs and XVIIIs they were hardly ever allowed to use them.
Note this RAF attitude carried on for long after the war. Range has never been an important spec for fighters to them.


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## drgondog (May 2, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> There was no technical issue with a long range (LR) Spitfire post mid/late 42 (Merlin 60 series of course).
> They were built and tested (Quill's book gives an example of an actual flight he did). The USAAF did their own version and flew them across the Atlantic.
> 
> I define LR top be Berlin and back. The Mustang by that definition was a VLR (very long range) fighter.
> ...



The RAF also did not fully utilize the Mustang III block numbers (mid serial no. P-51B-7 which had the 65 gallon tank installed at the factory) with many missions completely fueled up.

For your calc purposes 300-310 mph TAS for the cruise to make a deep R/V might be more useful to predict the actual Spit capability to provide LR escort to Berlin.


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## OldSkeptic (May 3, 2013)

Not disagreeing with you at all as you have made good points. Careful planning would be the key to success. The most economical cruise speeds (of which the Mustang was about 20moh faster) would have been an issue of course, but good planning would help (perhaps a Mosquito to guide?). On the shorter ranged missions naturally faster cruise speeds could have been used.

And, you are (again) correct to bring up weather issues. But bad weather meant that the USAAF bombers were equally limited and tasked to closer targets.

So the issue is, could a LR Spit been a useful escort fighter until the Mustang numbers built up, I think the answer is yes.
After there was sufficient Mustangs the LR Spit would still have been a useful contribution as a 'fill in' fighter, that is covering the intermediate ranges, until the Mustangs met and took over escorting.

More importantly, it would have meant that, when the great slaughtering happened, USAAF bombers would have had escorts over much of Germany in mid to late 43.


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## drgondog (May 3, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Not disagreeing with you at all as you have made good points. Careful planning would be the key to success. The most economical cruise speeds (of which the Mustang was about 20moh faster) would have been an issue of course, but good planning would help (perhaps a Mosquito to guide?). On the shorter ranged missions naturally faster cruise speeds could have been used.
> 
> *Interestingly enough, the Mustang Best Cruise setting with 110 gallon fuel tanks was 32" MP, 2250rpm, 281mph(TAS) at 25000 feet for 57gallons per hour. Once tanks were dropped then 29" 2050rpm, 303mph at 25,000 feet (a 9760 pounds GW plus 2x110x6 for the 110gal tanks =~11080 GW at Engine Start time. With no loitering around waiting for a 48 ship formation to assemble, the Mustang would be at ~ 10900 pounds at 25000 feet (assuming 25+gal burn of internal fuselage tank). Significantly higher cruise settings could be achieved (331mph) with a sacrifice of 1/2 mile pergallon from 4.91mpg to 4.49 for a Stettin/Munich radius mission.
> 
> ...



Very much agree.


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## OldSkeptic (May 3, 2013)

I think we are agreeing totally. 

The LR Spit would have been wonderful in 43 and its role steadily taken over by Mustangs as they came available when it would have allowed even greater range bombing missions.

The LR Spit would have been a great support fighter to them even after they had sufficient numbers. As per the layered escort system.
Numbers help a lot, would have made the mission planers job a lot easier ("use P-47s to here, LR Spits to there, Mustangs thereafter" sort of thing)

The 20mph figure I quoted was at the most economical cruising speed as per the pilots note on the Mustang III (from the same site). 
Just used for maximum range calcs as an example, not as it was used in every mission.

The Mustang in that mission configuration was capable of truly amazing ranges, that's why I call it a VLR aircraft. 
Incredible basically. Boy was it a good plane, not perfect of course (none were or are even now), but very, very good.
I've actually flown in one (P51D in NZ) ... wonderful is not big enough a word.


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## drgondog (May 3, 2013)

Old Skeptic - is it possible you are thinking 'greatest loiter (time in air) time' rather than longest range? The bottom of the Drag Bucket was in the 280-320 mph range depending on altitude and GW..for 25,000 it is 281/303 respectively with the data I supplied above - this is where the highest L/D (~14+) ratio exists for the airframe after tanks are dropped

Your number is closer for SL depending on GW and clean.

Your 220mph figure would consume less gph at 25000 but would not be best for Max Range for the Mustang/Packard Merlin 1650-3 or -7 as the L/D ratio is lower and Induced Drag is greater than Profile Drag at 220mph..

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/P-51D_15342_AppendixB.pdf

This is the cruise setting summary for the P-51D-15 per the tests (average) with +/- 6% deviation according to the report

Did you post the Mustang III link above?


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## OldSkeptic (May 3, 2013)

Sorry drgondog I should have typed +30mph for the Mustang III, not 20mph.

From the Pilots notes: 
Most economical cruise speed at 20,000ft: 253mph.
at MWM: an astonishing 405mph (with the -7 engine, 395mph , for the -3), though that reduced range by 40%.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/mustang-III-ads-3.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/mustang-III-ads-7.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/mustang-IV-ads.jpg

Spit IX was 220mph and 328mph (which reduced range by 45%), as I said you could push it to being a LR fighter, but the Mustang was in a class by itself.

The purpose of my calculations was to work out whether or not you get a Spit as an escort to Berlin. 
The answer is yes, though very careful planning and good fuel discipline would have been necessary (yes I did adjust for the extra fuel consumption caused by the 45 or 90 gallon tank). 
And you would have had to spend most of the time at most economical cruising speed, so that was about the limit you could get.
Closer German targets would have been easier with more options in terms of cruise speed, loiter/combat time.

For the Mustang (whether B or D) you could either go much further on a most economical setting, or run at much higher cruise speeds for the shorter ranges (giving greater tactical flexibility).
Additionally you had far greater loiter/combat time.
The exact choice (as per your links and other data) would depend on the mission, tactical requirements and number of aircraft available.


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## nuuumannn (May 4, 2013)

> There was no technical issue with a long range (LR) Spitfire post mid/late 42 (Merlin 60 series of course).



Interesting, but there might have been more mileage out of building Mustang Is fitted with 60 Series Merlins from the outset instead of Allisons, rather than converting Spits for the long range role. Obviously, the airframes would have to be shipped to Britain for the fitting of Merlins. The first 60 Series Merlin engined Spitfire first flew three weeks after the Fw 190 entered service, so time wise it could be done, hypothetically speaking. Rolls-Royce fitted Merlin 65s to five Allison engined Mustang Is and these were called the Mustang X, first flying in October 1942 and demonstrating excellent performance. One aircraft reached 433 mph at 20,000 ft during testing.


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## OldSkeptic (May 4, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Interesting, but there might have been more mileage out of building Mustang Is fitted with 60 Series Merlins from the outset instead of Allisons, rather than converting Spits for the long range role. Obviously, the airframes would have to be shipped to Britain for the fitting of Merlins. The first 60 Series Merlin engined Spitfire first flew three weeks after the Fw 190 entered service, so time wise it could be done, hypothetically speaking. Rolls-Royce fitted Merlin 65s to five Allison engined Mustang Is and these were called the Mustang X, first flying in October 1942 and demonstrating excellent performance. One aircraft reached 433 mph during testing.



Even fitting Mustangs with Merlin XX series would have made a difference though it would have struggled at bit at the high escort altitudes (but been very useful for other purposes though).

Trouble was the the 60 series Merlins were not available when the P-51A first came out. 
And it took a bit of time for people to twig to the idea. At that time neither the British or the American saw the P-51 as a fighter, let alone a VLR escort fighter. 
So it really was inspired by the small amount of British and North American people who saw its terrific potential and pushed for it (including Rolls Royce, hat tip to them, without their belief in it, it would never have happened).

Note the P51A was a great low level aircraft and the British used it for tac rec right up until they had none left in late '44, a greatly underestimated plane.

The USAAF desperately needed escorts, at least as far as the Ruhr and a bit beyond. A LR Spit, many of which could have been conversions, would have been of inestimable value in the mid-late 43 period.
Took a long time build up Mustang numbers too, even in early 44 they didn't have many. And Packard was struggling to get its 60 series production up to speed (they did a great job, especially since you consider that they were basically just a luxury car manufacturer before the war, got to take your hats off to them).
I think it was (from memory) suggested at one point to use RR Merlins as a stop gap, but the USAAF knocked that on the head, mainly because of maintenance concerns (if anyone can clarify that it would be useful).

So, as usual, it was a numbers game and the LR Spit would have been a great stopgap and support for that crucial 9 month period.
It would have also given the RAF a lot more tactical options too, they would finally have been able to hammer the Luftwaffe in France for example and even enable Bomber Command to do daylight raids for certain types of missions.

The tragic thing was that it was available in the necessary time period, just was ignored. People kept saying you can't make a LR fighter and various people kept putting their hands up going "we've done it with the Spit and we've got an even better one (Mustang) coming along a little bit later' ... and no one lat the top listened. Bizarre.


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## wuzak (May 4, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> I think it was (from memory) suggested at one point to use RR Merlins as a stop gap, but the USAAF knocked that on the head, mainly because of maintenance concerns (if anyone can clarify that it would be useful).



I think Packard Merlins destined for the USAAF had SAE splined output shafts, while those for the RAF and built in Britain had British splined shafts.


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## OldSkeptic (May 4, 2013)

Yes Wuzak that makes sense, but there might have been work arounds. With the usual wonderful 20-20 hindsight we all apply an attempt (which could have failed of course) might have been a good idea.


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## nuuumannn (May 4, 2013)

> Trouble was the the 60 series Merlins were not available when the P-51A first came out.



They were around when the Mustang I was under production, however (The P-51A was not a Mustang I - that type was supplied to the RAF only). The first Mustang I reached the UK in October 1941, at which point the Merlin 61 was already in production for the Spitfire - the first of which, the Mk.III N3297 had already been converted to fit a 61 and flew for the first time on 27 September 1941. Obviously, any supply of Merlin 61s to Mustang airframes sitting about would mean that Spitfire Vs on the production line would not receive them, therefore there wouldn't be any Spit IXs in July 1942. Timewise, since the Spit IX entered service in July 1942, its feasible that refitting Mustang I airframes with the Merlin 61s could be done by mid/late 1942. It also fits with Rolls having their first flying Mustang X (powered by a Merlin 65) in October of that year.



> I think it was (from memory) suggested at one point to use RR Merlins as a stop gap, but the USAAF knocked that on the head, mainly because of maintenance concerns



My proposal is not so far fetched as precisely what I suggested was actually prepared for (although in a later time frame) - 500 engine assemblies for Merlin 61s for fitting to Allison engined Mustang Is were prepared by Rolls at Hucknall, partially because it was feared that the fitting of '61s to Spit Vs on the production line might not last - in the event it went on as the Mk.IX well into 1944. It was proposed that if there was a shortage of Merlin 61s, the Packard built 1,390 hp Merlin 28 was to be fitted to Mustang Is in the USA. Another idea was to assemble Mustang Is in the UK and its likely that this was to be undertaken by Air Services Training at Hamble, with Rolls supplying the engines, of course. Meetings involving NAA personnel and British Air Ministry personnel took place to ratify all this, but in the end, there was doubt about the feasibility of it all. One peculiarity was that at that time Lancasters were receiving Packard Merlins, so the sending of American built airframes to the UK for British engines was considered 'hardly reasonable' according to minutes of a meeting between Lord Hives of RR and Wilfred Freeman in 1943. There were also modification issues between engine and airframe that needed to be resolved between the fitting of Merlin 61s to Allison airframes that were eventually fixed by Packard in redesigning the nose of the Mustang to accommodate the V-1650-7 engine. The first US Mustang to fly with a two-speed two-stage Merlin was the XP-51B, basically a P-51A fitted with a Merlin 61 that had been sent to the USA - to Wright Field for testing, on 30 November 1942. All this also doesn't take into account the urgency of getting the Mk.IX into service to tackle the Fw 190. 



> With the usual wonderful 20-20 hindsight we all apply an attempt (which could have failed of course) might have been a good idea.



Don't ya love it here!

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## OldSkeptic (May 4, 2013)

Good points Nuuumannn and thanks for the information, very useful and great research. I've filed that away and will shamefully steal it for future comments... 

Personally I'd have loved to have seen a Merlin XX series engined Mustang. 
It would have been a hot mid altitude aircraft, more than an equal to the FW-190A series in the majority of flight regimes.


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## nuuumannn (May 4, 2013)

> thanks for the information, very useful and great research. I've filed that away and will shamefully steal it for future comments



You're welcome, glad to be of assistance! (takes a bow...)

I've done a bit of thinking about the period of 1941 to 1942 with the arrival of the Fw 190 on the scene and its implications; it had a dramatic effect on British planning and resulted in the escalation of several important fighter programmes, including the Griffon engined Spit and, of course the Merlin engined Mustang. The two-speed-two-stage Merlin was already on the cards in mid 1941 as the Merlin 60 was originally intended for a high altitude version of the Vickers Wellington with a pressurised cabin, the Mk.VI and it was Hives of RR who asked the pertinent question, "What would be the result if we fitted a Merlin 60 to a Spitfire?" This was before the Fw 190 went into service, so everything was already in place for that engine to take prominence. The Merlin 60 was essentially a Merlin 45 - as fitted to the Spit V, but with the bigger blower, so it was relatively easy to get into quick production once the need arose.


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## drgondog (May 4, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Interesting, but there might have been more mileage out of building Mustang Is fitted with 60 Series Merlins from the outset instead of Allisons, rather than converting Spits for the long range role. Obviously, the airframes would have to be shipped to Britain for the fitting of Merlins. The first 60 Series Merlin engined Spitfire first flew three weeks after the Fw 190 entered service, so time wise it could be done, hypothetically speaking. Rolls-Royce fitted Merlin 65s to five Allison engined Mustang Is and these were called the Mustang X, first flying in October 1942 and demonstrating excellent performance. One aircraft reached 433 mph at 20,000 ft during testing.



The impediment for the Mustang I and II Allison replacement was that a.) the bottleneck in Merlin engine production at Packard which had prioritized production assignments for the Lancaster and were just getting their production runs in early 1941, and b.) as you mentioned the necessity to actually modify and test the Mustang X. It was further complicated with Merlin XX allocations to P-40F in late 1941 and 42... Packard couldn't schedule an engine to NAA. 

You can make a baby with one mother in 9 months but you can't make one in one month with 9 mothers.. there is a gestation period between concept and manufaturing release.. (as you know)

I had conversations with Ed Horkey in the 60's regarding the Mustang Team's consideration of a higher performance Mustang with Rolls Royce engines. It wasn't feasible to design the original airframe to accomodate the Merlin without making changes to the original lines which were well on their way to final design - and there was no sourcing for the Merlin in 1940-41. Further, it was suspected that significant work would have to be accomplished with ducting/radiator changes for the more powerful Merlin (true)

Conceptually, the NAA team was thinking about the preliminary design changes which would be required as RAF informed NAA of their thinking in early 1941 as Mustang I was going into production for delivery to the UK, but no design resources were permitted to detract from the conversion from Prototype to Production phase for RAF deliveries.

The timelines between start of Serious practical thinking at NAA and RAF was somewhere between December 1941 and February 1942. At that time all the Merlin XX built by Packard were prioritized for the P-40F so the Brits took the lead with The Mustang X. 

At the date for Pearl Harbor the USAAF at Wright Pat had flown the XP-51 exactly 1 hour despite having it there in August 1941. The XP-51 had been ready for the Army in April 1941 but it took the Army nearly a year to start testing because they were too busy fooling around with the P-66, the P39, the P-43, and P-38/47 prototypes.

Net - ALL the push for high altitude capability was NAA/RAF, Packard was jammed for Lancaster and P-40F, Allison totally screwed up their commitments for V-1710-39's which delayed NAA and RAF production lines by nearly 4 months.

As a side note, Allison also failed to deliver a.) a V-1710-39 and b.) one with correct wiring harness, requiring NAA to redesign the engine mounts at the time the airframe was ready to first fly. This and subsequent screw ups by Allison (including P-82)created animosity from NAA to Allison that lasted Looooong after WWII ended.

I heard from several sources that when a choice could be made between Allison and Pratt or Wright or GE, that NAA would choose the latter.

The USAAF bears most of the burden for the slow introduction of the P-51B/Packard Merlin marriage..


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## wuzak (May 4, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Net - ALL the push for high altitude capability was NAA/RAF, Packard was jammed for Lancaster and P-40F, Allison totally screwed up their commitments for V-1710-39's which delayed NAA and RAF production lines by nearly 4 months.



I noticed you said the RAF (working with NAA RR) were looking for _high altitude capability_, not long range capability.


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## drgondog (May 4, 2013)

True Wuzak - but long range was an understood existing capability whereas the Allison suffered above 15000 feet.


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## nuuumannn (May 4, 2013)

> The impediment for the Mustang I and II Allison replacement was that a.) the bottleneck in Merlin engine production at Packard which had prioritized production assignments for the Lancaster and were just getting their production runs in early 1941, and b.) as you mentioned the necessity to actually modify and test the Mustang X. It was further complicated with Merlin XX allocations to P-40F in late 1941 and 42... Packard couldn't schedule an engine to NAA.



Indeed, Drgondog. My idea was hypothetical - although it was considered, as I posted earlier. The initial idea behind fitting two-speed-two-stage Merlins to Mustangs came from the British and involved both the shipping of incomplete Mustangs to the UK for fitting the Merlin and production of the Mustang in the UK, these ideas came prior to Packard building the V-1650-3.


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## drgondog (May 4, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Indeed, Drgondog. My idea was hypothetical - although it was considered, as I posted earlier. The initial idea behind fitting two-speed-two-stage Merlins to Mustangs came from the British and involved both the shipping of incomplete Mustangs to the UK for fitting the Merlin and production of the Mustang in the UK, these ideas came prior to Packard building the V-1650-3.



True - with caveats. The primary facts were that NAA was being denied priorities from Packard and NAA entered into speculative production in UK for a RR Merlin modeled P-51 in late 1941. It was only when the combination of RAF initiative, the USAAF waking up to long range fighter need, Col Tommy Hitchcock reporting enthusiastically that the Brits were going to mate the RR Merlin with high expectations - that NAA was given the go-ahead by Arnold's direction to proceed with a Packard Merlin powered 1650-3. This particular project was one example of the best of US/Britain co-operation but most was between Packard/NAA/RR and RAF - not US, until the results came in..Then Arnold was able to exert enormous influence to get the P-51B production into high gear.


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## nuuumannn (May 4, 2013)

> in late 1941.



Don't you mean 1942? It was Rolls-Royce who suggested fitting a Merlin to the Mustang first that year after their liaison test pilot Ronnie Harker suggested it in his Mustang flight report in April '42. Aside from the Merlin 61 suggested by Harker, it was also considered that the Merlin XX be fitted; the V-1650-1, but its performance was calculated to be less than a Merlin 61 engined Mustang, and as you hinted at, Packard didn't seem to be in too much of a hurry. Philip Legarra, NAA's field rep in the UK was very keen on the Merlin XX going into the Mustang and shared this view with Freeman.



> This particular project was one example of the best of US/Britain co-operation but most was between Packard/NAA/RR and RAF



Very much agree. By the amount of correspondence that shuttled between the various individuals involved, it had to be worth it.


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## drgondog (May 4, 2013)

No - with respect to RR Merlin XX the conversations began in very late 1941 as deliveries of the first RAF Mustangs were being run through Acceptance testing. The first ships arrived at Speke in October 1941.. the interim and final reports recommended converting to the Merlin 61 in the Spit IX.. It was the RAF that jumped on the advise and began actual work in April, 1942.

Tommy Hitchcock was paying close attention to the Mustang X team and his recommendations circumvented the 2nd Merlin 1650-3 from the Curtis XP-60 project and move it to NAA sometime between January 29 and February 16th, 1942. In April Ronnie Harker RR flew and raved about the potential with a Merlin -61, as Hitchcock's reports hit the Pentagon.

By the time the approvals from Pentagon to NAA to proceed with the P-51B, the RR team was already doing the Installation drawings. As you know the Mustang X flew in Oct 1942. The P-51B was ready save for numerous problems with the Engine and did not make its first flight until November, 1942 when the first XP-51B flew for first time with Packard Merlin 1650-3.

While production tooling was being prepared, the NAA team worked out the coolant and cooling system problems that plagued the XP-51B project in Sep-Oct timeframe.


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## nuuumannn (May 4, 2013)

> No - with respect to RR Merlin XX the conversations began in very late 1941



Between whom? Rolls-Royce didn't evaluate a Mustang until April 1942 and although the RAF's Mustang Is arrived in October '41, acceptance trials commenced in November 1941 and they got them in service until May 42. Although RAF pilots had flown their first example, AG345 completed in the USA in April 1941, Fighter Command settled on the Spitfire as the RAF's premier interceptor because of the Mustang's poor performance at altitude, this is despite the Mustang I being 35 mph faster than the Spit V at 15,000 ft. The first mention of Merlins in Mustangs was Ronnie Harker's test-flight. Prior to this, there was no consideration of it in Britain since the aeroplane hadn't entered service at that point.



> Tommy Hitchcock was paying close attention to the Mustang X team and his recommendations circumvented the 2nd Merlin 1650-3 from the Curtis XP-60 project and move it to NAA sometime between January 29 and February 16th, 1942.



Surely you are making this up. I've never seen any evidence that the Americans were talking of putting a Merlin into a Mustang that early. The Mustang X did not exist at this time and nor did talk about it; it was an apple in RR's eye. After Harker's test flight on 30 April 1942 in a Mustang I at Duxford, he spoke to Ray Dorey, manager at Hucknall, who wrote a letter to Freeman about the idea and this is how it all kicked off. In late 1941, although the idea was put forward by the Air Staff on Verney's recommendation in November, only one Spitfire had been modified with the Merlin 61, Mk.III N3297, on Hives's request in spring 1941. The next was Mk.I R6700, which did not fly until 6 January 1942. It was Rolls who first suggested the Merlin XX in May 42, in case not enough 61s were available for the Spit IX and the Mustang against fears the Air Staff had. Packard hadn't built their first V-1650-3 in late 41 - your timeline is seriously at variance with reality, or is this your hypothetical reality? Must be.


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## drgondog (May 4, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Between whom? Rolls-Royce didn't evaluate a Mustang until April 1942 and although the RAF's Mustang Is arrived in October '41, acceptance trials commenced in November 1941 and they got them in service until May 42. Although RAF pilots had flown their first example, AG345 completed in the USA in April 1941, Fighter Command settled on the Spitfire as the RAF's premier interceptor because of the Mustang's poor performance at altitude, this is despite the Mustang I being 35 mph faster than the Spit V at 15,000 ft. The first mention of Merlins in Mustangs was Ronnie Harker's test-flight. Prior to this, there was no consideration of it in Britain since the aeroplane hadn't entered service at that point.
> 
> 
> 
> Surely you are making this up. I've never seen any evidence that the Americans were talking of putting a Merlin into a Mustang that early. The Mustang X did not exist at this time and nor did talk about it; it was an apple in RR's eye. After Harker's test flight on 30 April 1942 in a Mustang I at Duxford, he spoke to Ray Dorey, manager at Hucknall, who wrote a letter to Freeman about the idea and this is how it all kicked off. In late 1941, although the idea was put forward by the Air Staff on Verney's recommendation in November, only one Spitfire had been modified with the Merlin 61, Mk.III N3297, on Hives's request in spring 1941. The next was Mk.I R6700, which did not fly until 6 January 1942. It was Rolls who first suggested the Merlin XX in May 42, in case not enough 61s were available for the Spit IX and the Mustang against fears the Air Staff had. Packard hadn't built their first V-1650-3 in late 41 - your timeline is seriously at variance with reality, or is this your hypothetical reality? Must be.



Carefully read Mustang by Ray Wagner and Rolls-Royce and the Mustang and draw your own conclusions - the competing and independent accounts dovetail very well and work well with my conversations with Horkey as I best remember from memory. If you don't like the recounts - make up your own story.


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## nuuumannn (May 4, 2013)

> Rolls-Royce and the Mustang



I have this book and the first mention of Merlins in Mustangs is Harker's test flight report prepared the day after his test flight of 30 April 1942, as you well know. I haven't read Mustang by Ray Wagner, but I'm assuming you have a copy and will provide evidence of Merlin in Mustang activity in the USA that you claim, prior to Harker's test flight, if I ask nicely.


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## drgondog (May 5, 2013)

I will direct you to page 103 and 104 of Mustang Designer in which the XP-60 was flown with the Packard Merlin 1650-1 on September 18, 1941. This is the timestamp Ed Horkey referred me to as the time NAA Mustang team actively petitioned the USAAF for the funding to try the 1650 in the P-51.

On page 104, Ray Wagner details the background of the availability of the 1650-1 used in that test vehicle when the XP-60 project was dropped. This termination coincided with the proposed installation of the new 1650-3 (Merlin 61) on January 29, 1942
for the XP-60D. NAA, according to Horkey asked for the engine in February, 1942 when the reports from RAF trials noted the strong suggestion that the Mustang be fitted with the P-51.

I do not have any documents from NAA to the USAAF for this request - just Horkey's recollection - and he and Schmeud were in direct and persistent contact with the British Acceptance trials team in the October through Feruary, 1942 timeframe.

The final push came from Tommy Hitchcock after April 30, 1942 when Harker flew the Mustang I -- and his urging directly to Arnold, according to Horkey, was the stimulus for the specification release to NAA on June 12 and contract issued to NAA on July 24, 1942. 

In Hitchcock's summary Memorandum dated 8 October states that "The Air Ministry instructed the Rolls people to install five Merlin engines in Mustang airplanes. Simultaneously with this develeopment it was arranged to have North American company to install the Merlin 61 in their Mustang airframe".

Now turn the question back to you.

Why do you think that Merlin/Mustang conversations and activity did Not take place at NAA before Harker's first flight?
NAA had a superior airframe to all US fighters before Brits received their first Mustang I.
NAA was struggling to get a contract for the P-51A as the XP-51 languished at Wright Pat, receiving no attention from USAAF
NAA had not yet secured the contract for the A-36
NAA did know that the Packard Merlin XX offered far superior performance than the V-1710, and knew of the results for Merlin 61 
NAA did not have the funds to fund the P-51B, but knew that the performance of a P-51/1650-3 would be far superior to P-51A
NAA did know that the 1650-3 had 'come available" on the February 2, 1942 cancellation of the XP-60D tests.

Why do You think that the concept of Merlin/P-51 was an epiphony at NAA after Ronnie Harker's test flight and subsequent 'official' recommendation that a Merlin-61 be installed? You think that an incredibly talented design team was satisfied with the dog performance of the 1710 versus the Merlin?

Why do you think that recollections of Ed Horkey were flawed relative to timing of interest at NAA for a Merlin powered Mustang?


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## nuuumannn (May 5, 2013)

Interesting information and conclusions, but the tie-in with the Curtiss XP-60 doesn't in any way imply any reference to the Mustang at all, except for your man Horkey's recollections. It's a bit tenuous, unless you can provide anything other than his word.



> I do not have any documents from NAA to the USAAF for this request - just Horkey's recollection



Now, I knew you were going to say that - Unfortunately without a document or evidence in print at least, it's a bit difficult to prove or justify; having worked in professional research establishments, I know the value of personal recollections, but also how they can not necessarily be relied on for historical accuracy. Now, I can see that its quite likely that NAA could have enquired about putting a Merlin 28 in the Mustang with the USAAF, but clearly nothing was immediately done within the USAAF until the British forwarded interest through the US Ambassador to Britain, John G Winant, who went directly to Arnold in June 1942. 

The question is - and this might help answer some of yours - why has nothing to this effect come out sooner? It's been over 70 years since the Mustang first flew, why has no other researcher cottoned on to it? 

I can accept that NAA reps might have spoken with the USAAF, but not with RAF personnel, simply because there's no evidence of such correspondence that has come to light. You mentioned Rolls-Royce and the Mustang by David Birch; he's done a huge amount of research to produce what is an excellent recollection, using official sources, both from the UK and USA to complete his volume. Wouldn't you think he would have uncovered such correspondence with regards to the RAF side of things? The history of the Mustang is very well covered by a large number of authors and such correspondence would/should have been discovered by now. Any discussions that were held between the RAF acceptance trials people and NAA surely would have pricked up both the Air Staff's and Rolls-Royce's ears at the time, producing a flurry of correspondence, as you'd naturally assume so and as what actually happened when the proposal was put forward by RR. Therefore any written evidence would be kept in the National Archive or perhaps the Air Historic Branch or the Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, for which Birch produced his book. 

I could go on, but I don't see the point. Documentary proof is what's required and until it is produced, the status quo of the last 70 or more years remains, I'm afraid. That's how history works; you should know that.


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## nuuumannn (May 5, 2013)

Just a few points more, Drgondog. 



> NAA had a superior airframe to all US fighters before Brits received their first Mustang I.
> NAA was struggling to get a contract for the P-51A as the XP-51 languished at Wright Pat, receiving no attention from USAAF
> NAA had not yet secured the contract for the A-36
> NAA did know that the Packard Merlin XX offered far superior performance than the V-1710, and knew of the results for Merlin 61
> ...



Those statements are circumstantial and offer nothing to to add to NAA going to the USAAF about Packard Merlins in Mustangs.



> You think that an incredibly talented design team was satisfied with the dog performance of the 1710 versus the Merlin?



Of course they were, there was nothing to suggest the Allison was a dog and had bad performance; the Mustang I could out perform the current British and American fighters in speed and range - as you know, in fact, the only concern, which was raised by the British, not the Americans, was that it couldn't reach the altitudes of combat in Europe, which in 1941 the USAAF did not have any experience with, so I don't agree with this. NAA had very good reason to be happy with their fighter and they were.


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## nincomp (May 6, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Just a few points more, Drgondog.
> 
> ... Those statements are circumstantial and offer nothing to to add to NAA going to the USAAF about Packard Merlins in Mustangs.
> 
> ... - as you know, in fact, the only concern, which was raised by the British, not the Americans, was that it couldn't reach the altitudes of combat in Europe, which in 1941 the USAAF did not have any experience with, so I don't agree with this. NAA had very good reason to be happy with their fighter and they were.



It might (note, I say "might") now be impossible to determine exactly the point at which the Merlin was considered for the Mustang by various people at NAA. I have no doubt, however, that some of the design engineers were thinking about it during the design phase or shortly after the original design was completed. I say this because one of the defining traits of engineers involved in R&D is that they can never leave well enough alone. They are always trying to improve whatever they are working on. They would not be good at R&D if they said "good enough" and never thought about improvement. The plane was being produced for the British, so I find it highly improbable that nobody would ask: "What engines are the British using, how do they perform, and can we fit any of them onto our new fighter?" Remember that no Allison engine was available when the first airframe was completed, so it would be logical to be thinking about a "just in case we can't get enough Allisons" option.

Please remember that there was certainly a big difference between the knowledge and abilities of the leading-edge designers and that of the pertinent officials of the USAAF. Just because the USAAF wasn't yet asking for long-distance, high-altitude fighters, that does not mean that knowledge base for just such a plane was not developing. Work had already been done on the P-38, for example.

Furthermore, even if the USAAF believed that the B-17's were not vulnerable to fighters, the fighter designers knew that this was hogwash. At the first sight of of a B-17, an American fighter designer would immediately ask the question: "How can we shoot these suckers down, since our enemies will likely have something similar soon."

On the other hand, it would not surprise me that some of the "Higher Ups" and production managers of NAA were as nuuumannn stated, "happy with their fighter." Continual changes are typically opposed by those tasked with getting finished products to the client. There is always a battle between the "good enough" camp and the "but it can be better" camp.

In short, there should be a delay between the initial design concepts and the written requests made through official channels. The precise timeline may now be lost to history since those who did the work are now gone.

Oh, and can you tell that I have experience with project development and improvement in industry?


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## drgondog (May 6, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Interesting information and conclusions, but the tie-in with the Curtiss XP-60 doesn't in any way imply any reference to the Mustang at all, except for your man Horkey's recollections. It's a bit tenuous, unless you can provide anything other than his word.
> 
> *This is true. Having said that I had extraordinary access to NAA engineering via Al White, Chief test pilot B-70 and former wing man for my father as well as Jim Brooks another long time NAA sales/test/ace that was a close friend of my father's. I have Nothing regarding written evidence NAA to USAAF, and getting responses from Boeing has been difficult*
> 
> ...



I do know that and I take no offense at the question you pose. One can not prove a negative


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## Aozora (May 6, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Of course they were, there was nothing to suggest the Allison was a dog and had bad performance; the Mustang I could out perform the current British and American fighters in speed and range - as you know, in fact, the only concern, which was raised by the British, not the Americans, was that it couldn't reach the altitudes of combat in Europe, which in 1941 the USAAF did not have any experience with, so I don't agree with this. NAA had very good reason to be happy with their fighter and they were.



It might be of interest to know that, according to Bert Kinzey, when the army ordered 150 P-51s (the 4 cannon version) on 7 July 1941, two - the 93rd and 102nd - were to be set aside for eventual conversion to and testing with the Merlin; this is why the first XP-51B was unarmed and the second had 4 20mm cannon. 












(P-51 Mustang in Detail Scale Part 1, 1996, pages 17-18.)

One possible gripe is that Kinzey refers to turbocharger, not supercharger...but there's no reason to doubt his conclusions because he did go to NAA.


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## Milosh (May 6, 2013)

Somewhere I read that the original P-51s (to USA) from the British order sat around for many months until the USN needed to do some gun testing. The USN pilots raved about the a/c and the USAAF finally took notice of the a/c.


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## nuuumannn (May 6, 2013)

Good to see this is developing beyond our original discussion. Firstly Nincompoop; I think you are taking my "happy with the fighter" quote out of context; the reason I said it was to counter Drgondog's assertion that the Allison engine performance was a dog. Considering the Mustang was faster and had a greater range than any British or American fighter then in service at that time, NAA were happy with it as a fighter and of course they would look at continuing development; goes without saying. Of course the Americans were investigating higher altitude performance in their fighters, XP-60 and P-38 development and also we all know that Allison were working on improving the altitude performance of the V-1710 to reinforce this, but it was the RAF evaluation team that examined the first production examples in the States (the first AG345 flew for the first time on 1 May 1941) that realised its altitude performance was below what was required over Europe, but this still did not seem to deter from the USAAF putting the order in in July '41. And no, I can't tell you have experience with project development and improvement in industry, not that it's relevant or anything.

Drgondog, sounds like you've had some fascinating discussions with people about these things, would have been real interesting to sit in and listen. You're in an enviable position to be able to get access to these guys and the resources you can. I live in the middle of nowhere in a small country on the other side of the world from you! If I was in your position I'd be divorced for neglecting my family, by now! As for conversations between RAF and American personnel about better altitude, you can guarantee they happened; yep, chit-chat makes the world go round, but when you get to something as important and as urgent - remember, at that time (late '41 early 42) the British were struggling to cope with the Fw 190 - and as pertinent as a fighter with exceptional performance it was bound to get tongues wagging and pens writing. These RAF guys with 26 Sqn that received the Mustang in January '42 had encountered the Fw 190, so discussions regarding offering better performance than their foe led to quite a bit of discussion and evidence shows they were real pleased with the performance of the Mustang - altitude performance aside. As it was, the Mustang I could match the Fw 190 on even terms. Regarding Atwood and Schmued, it seems that Legarra and Bouchelle of NAA did much of the leg work from the British side of things; these two guys seemed to have spent some time in the UK, with visits to Hucknall to view progress on the Mustangs being converted there.

Aozora, interesting information and although I hadn't seen that book and it would be interesting to see the rest of that chapter, I was aware that two Mustangs from the original USAAF order were to be kept aside for evaluation, because this was a condition of the approval that a US company was to build aircraft for the British who were at war, since the USA was not at that stage. The decision to evaluate them fitted with Merlins didn't come until later, not when the contract to build was signed. At Wright field there was discussion of fitting these aircraft with the V-1650-1 (Merlin 28 ) supplied by Packard for trials, (this is the crux of the matter) and conventional wisdom states this was in conjunction with the suggestion by Rolls Royce of fitting such an engine, as an interim to allay fears by the Air Staff that there wouldn't be enough Merlin 61s for the Spitfire and the Mustang, in May 1942. British reps from A&AAE Boscombe Down had been to the States (when - sometime earlier than mid May 42?) to discuss the fitting of a Merlin 28 to the Mustang, but their response was not encouraging, correspondence states that "...it did not get any further". By June the Americans had promised that by July they would have a Merlin 28 Mustang in the air, which affirms initial consideration and investigation, but the conversion didn't happen. By August 1942, Kindleberger had contacted the USAAF about the unfeasibility of the Merlin 28 and preference for the 61 instead.

If anyone can supply it, I'd like to see further reference to Wright Field's investigation of the V-1650-1 for the two XP-51s they had; it'll make interesting reading. Would the USAF Museum be a good source for this?


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## nincomp (May 7, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Considering the Mustang was faster and had a greater range than any British or American fighter then in service at that time, NAA were happy with it as a fighter and of course they would look at continuing development; goes without saying.



OK. I was a bit confused by the "happy with the fighter" comment. Thanks. Overall, I think that we basically agree. The official timeline comes down to finding documents.



nuuumannn said:


> And no, I can't tell you have experience with project development and improvement in industry, not that it's relevant or anything.



I thought that maybe my comments about the way that R&D engineers tend to view the world (always tinkering and never leaving well enough alone) might have given me away. I am very familiar with the constant battle between the production group's "stop tinkering and let's build it" versus the R&D group's "but we can improve it more." Some of us simply cannot help wanting to tinker with a design to make improvements.

I would be surprised if the NAA R&D folks had not thought about using a Merlin engine and made informal inquiries, at least to gather data. On the other hand, it does not surprise me that it took the RAF's request to actually get something done about it. At this point, the RAF certainly knew more about what was needed in their theater than did the USAAF. 

My point was primarily that it is very difficult to pin down the exact time when a new idea is considered, especially if there are informal discussions going on among various groups. Determining the date of a formal, documented request is much easier. In the grand scheme of things, however, our quibbling about the exact timing of events that happened long ago is probably not that big a deal. It is fun to do, though.


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## nuuumannn (May 7, 2013)

> Some of us simply cannot help wanting to tinker with a design to make improvements.



Yeah, we have a similar situation where I work; I'm an aircraft engineer who works line maintenance on airliners and some guys get caught in the trap of not knowing what is required of line maintenance and when to down tools and leave work for the next maintenance opportunity.

I guess you're right regarding precise timing and it would be very interesting to find documents or anything else pertaining to investigating the V-1650-1 in American fighters. The XP-60 example that Drgondog raised is a pertinent point and it would seem logical for Packard to put forward the engine to the USAAF for the Mustang, but one thing that is not often taken into account is that in late (until, that is, December 7) 1941, the USA was not at war; things just didn't happen very quickly in a peacetime environment within the military, but as soon as war clouds gather the US military showed it could pick up the pace. Their interest in the Merlin Mustang in 1942 is a case in point.



> tried to add a smiley for its damn happy outlook, but failed.


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## wuzak (May 7, 2013)

When did the USAAC/F first take notice of the P-51 and start to order production aircraft?

When NAA were investigating the Merlin 20-series/V-1650-1 for the P-51/Mustang I, was it intended for the USAAC/F or the RAF?


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## OldSkeptic (May 7, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Good to see this is developing beyond our original discussion. Firstly Nincompoop; I think you are taking my "happy with the fighter" quote out of context; the reason I said it was to counter Drgondog's assertion that the Allison engine performance was a dog. Considering the Mustang was faster and had a greater range than any British or American fighter then in service at that time,



Yes the P51A really came into its own post Normandy as a superb low level photo Rec /tac air plane though it, of course, did tremendous good work in that field before then. It's low level performance was superb.
The 2nd TAF used them right up until they had none left.


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## tomo pauk (May 7, 2013)

That would be the Mustang I (P-51), not the Mustang II (P-51A); the P-51A mostly served in India and MTO. Major difference being the engine with better altitude capability, 4 HMGs in wings only, and wing racks.


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## drgondog (May 7, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Good to see this is developing beyond our original discussion. Firstly Nincompoop; I think you are taking my "happy with the fighter" quote out of context; the reason I said it was to counter Drgondog's assertion that the Allison engine performance was a dog. Considering the Mustang was faster and had a greater range than any British or American fighter then in service at that time, NAA were happy with it as a fighter and of course they would look at continuing development; goes without saying. Of course the Americans were investigating higher altitude performance in their fighters, XP-60 and P-38 development and also we all know that Allison were working on improving the altitude performance of the V-1710 to reinforce this, but it was the RAF evaluation team that examined the first production examples in the States (the first AG345 flew for the first time on 1 May 1941) that realised its altitude performance was below what was required over Europe, but this still did not seem to deter from the USAAF putting the order in in July '41. And no, I can't tell you have experience with project development and improvement in industry, not that it's relevant or anything.
> 
> *Nuuumaann - I did indeed state that the Allison V-1710 was a dog but the comment was in context of future great role as escort fighter. The P-51A was very fast on the deck to 10,000 feet but as stated in various comments in this thread was not deemed 'quite enough' in ETO by RAF. Taken into further context, these RAF evaluations culminated in their suggestion of a mating between P-51 airframe and Merlin 61.
> 
> ...



*I haven't had any luck at USAFHRC on specific correspondence and have re-focused on the Boeing archives.*

Personally I don't think the XP-51s ever had a Merlin installed.


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## drgondog (May 7, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Yes the P51A really came into its own post Normandy as a superb low level photo Rec /tac air plane though it, of course, did tremendous good work in that field before then. It's low level performance was superb.
> The 2nd TAF used them right up until they had none left.



I suppose definition of 'came into its own' needs to be further defined. The P-51A and A-36 had a great record in MTO in 1943and also soldiered well in CBI well before D-Day. IIRC, in the ETO only the 67th TRG had P-51A's for Recce and they were being phased out in D-Day timeframe..


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## nuuumannn (May 7, 2013)

Very interesting post Drgondog, lots of great information, some of it new to me and you've answered a couple of questions I had to ask. Sounds like you've had the dream life hanging about the likes of Palmdale and Edwards and meeting these old guys.



> True but Schmeud and Horkey were visitors in 1940 and early 1942 as well as Atwood.



Yes, sorry, that wasn't meant so much as a contradiction to your comment, but to add to it that the other two guys travelled back and forth during the Mustang X development as well. According to an interview I read with him, Atwood was at RAE at Farnborough in 1939 investigating the Meredith papers. 



> the first RAF Mustang I production model (AG345) rolled off the line in April 1941 and first flown by Lewis Walt on April 23, 1941.



This is news to me since a book I have states that AG345 first flew on 1 May 1941 - ahh, no, just found it in another book I have, yep - 23 April 1941 (or April 23, since we are talking Yankinese).

Here's s letter dated 14/10/42 sent by Jimmy Elor of RR at Packard in Detroit regarding the conversion of the XP-51b that might be of interest;

You have apparently beaten us to it on the flight of the 61 Mustang. Hope the performance is up to expectations. At the request of the US aircraft constructors, the carburettor inlet flange face distance from the crankshaft centreline has been reduced to a minimum in order to facilitate the arrangement of the air intake scoop without its projecting too far into the airstream. The first flight engine is now installed in the aircraft and a flight is expected in about three weeks time but dated by radiator delivery. North American are still keen on installing a number of machines with the V-1650-1 but no decision has reached on this project yet [contrary to the August 28th letter where USAAF personnel mention that Kindleberger stated the Merlin 28 is out].

The first production V-1650-3 is scheduled for December 15th. Packard will start delivery early next yearworking up to 225 engines per month in May. This depends on the supply of machine tools promised by Washington on a high priority. It is thought this figure will be stepped up considerably as the job progresses. No major difficulties have been encountered, but the piling up of endurance runs has been held up due to lack of V-1650 engines. Number One engine is about half way through its final approval runningunder altitude conditions at Wright Field. These tests have been held up by plant failure and the damage to the supercharger when the sludge collected in the rotor shaft recess. The satisfactory completion of these tests is necessary before any machines will be permitted to fly. A second engine will be endurance running at packard and the official Air Corps type test will follow the 50 hours flight development running at Wright Field." 




> When NAA were investigating the Merlin 20-series/V-1650-1 for the P-51/Mustang I, was it intended for the USAAC/F or the RAF?



From the prompting by Rolls Royce it would have initially been for the RAF since RR suggested the Merlin XX as an interm - as stated earlier, although the USAAC/F interest in the type escalated after British interest in pressing for a Merlin powered Mustang, which led to the P-51B, so in the long run for both, really.


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## tomo pauk (May 20, 2013)

Our member (Glider) kindly provided the copy of a document about the increased fuel tankage, along with corresponding ranges for Spitfire IX and Tempests, some time ago. The ranges are achieved under M.E.C. - most economical cruise, so usual caution is needed (= don't fly over enemy territory on M.E.C.). I'll repost it here.
The Tempest received a fuel tank in starboard leading edge, in order to have fuel increased from 162 to 192 IG - am I right about that? The document is dated as of Sept. 7th 1944. The Tempest should behave better with all internal fuel tankage than Spitfire (talking about long range modifications)?


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## Aozora (May 20, 2013)

The Tempest also had the advantage of using two custom designed 45 or 90 Imp gal low drag drop tanks. In operational service with 2TAF it was found that the Tempest lost only about 5-10 mph when carrying the 45 gal versions and it became standard practice not to jettison them when empty. 




(Shores and Thomas 2nd TAF Vol 4, page 595)

Can't find any figures showing how the Spitfire's slipper tanks affected performance.


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## wuzak (May 20, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Can't find any figures showing how the Spitfire's slipper tanks affected performance.



It seems the 9 gal tank knocked 20mph from the speed of a XIV:



> COMBAT PERFORMANCE WITH 90 GALLON LONG-RANGE TANKS
> 
> 50. As the Spitfire XIV has a very short range it has been assumed that when a long-range tank is to be carried, it is most likely to be the 90 gallon tank rather than the 30 gallon or 45 gallon. Pending further instructions, no drops or trials have been carried out with the 30 gallon or 45 gallon tanks. The aircraft's performance with either can be estimated from the results given below of trials with the 90 gallon long-range tank.
> 
> ...



From Spitfire Mk XIV Testing


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## Aozora (May 21, 2013)

wuzak said:


> It seems the 9 gal tank knocked 20mph from the speed of a XIV:
> 
> 
> 
> From Spitfire Mk XIV Testing



Yes, just read that in _The Spitfire Story_ ; looks like Camm's low drag tanks and faired mountings worked quite well - wonder how much benefit they would have conferred on the P-51?


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## wuzak (May 21, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Yes, just read that in _The Spitfire Story_ ; looks like Camm's low drag tanks and faired mountings worked quite well - wonder how much benefit they would have conferred on the P-51?



How much did the P-51's tanks cost in speed?


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## drgondog (May 21, 2013)

wuzak said:


> How much did the P-51's tanks cost in speed?



I linked the flight tests earlier in the Spit vs Hellcat thread. Of course it depends on altitude and cruise speed, but the cruise speeds for various external stores are here http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/P-51D_15342_AppendixB.pdf

If you pick same miles per gallon between racks only (lowest gpm at 4.94gpm) and 2x110 externals (highest gpm =4.92mpg) at 25000 feet - the clean cruise speed 381mph/77gph fro 'clean' is 100mph over the two 110gal best cruise speed 281mph/57gph

Mission planning revolved around a.) distance to target, b.) distance to R/V, c.) distance from R/V to target and back to B/E point, d.) distance from Break escort to base... and weather.

For a really long mission the 25000 281mph/57gpm cruise and escort (while still using the tanks) data would be normally used but if the Fighter Group got off late then best cruise is out the window until they catch up... if the fighters had to wait they would switch to lowest fuel consumption and loiter at lower speed, higher altitude until R/V


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## tomo pauk (May 24, 2013)

If I may return to the Tempest V and it's range vs. speed vs. fuel tankage capabilities.
The Tempest, on 'Most economical cruise' was making 285 mph, and on 'Max weak mixture power', it was 390 mph (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/tempest/tempest-v-ads-sabre-IIb.jpg), all at 20000 ft. On MEC, using 158 imp gals, after subtracting 39 gals of allowance, the range was 680 miles (or 740, with 162 gals, per table posted at post #146 - but no allowances here?). 15 min of combat power subtract 315 miles from that, so the 'return range' is now 365 miles (with no reserves).
Now, the British have modified the Tempest V (unfortunately, too late to matter), adding new fuel tank, the fuel being 192 gals now, range on internal fuel being stated as 890 miles on MEC (same table, post #146). We must allow for fuel used for TO and climb, that should cost us at least 60 miles of range (now: 830 miles). 15 min of combat cost 315 miles - range is 515 miles now; again, no reserves.

added: found it on another forum, by Edgar Brooks: 


> Cruise, for the Tempest Typhoon was set at 3150 rpm, *and for maximum range, the best speed was 210mph IAS*, and it was recommended that boost higher than +3psi should not be used, and rpm could go as low as 2000, though it might be found that the minimum needed (to keep the engine smooth) might be 2150.



210 mph IAS being the speed required by the USAF, and stated at tables describing P-38/47/51 fighters' combat radii. So Tempest fits the need nicely, and with great mileage to boot.


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## drgondog (May 24, 2013)

Tomo - I doubt if any practical escort mission ever used less than 250mph cruise.. doing 210 to escort bombers is like driving 25 in Texas - "You don't ever arrive"


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## tomo pauk (May 25, 2013)

It was 210 mph IAS; the TAS, on Most Economical Cruise setting was, at 285 mph (at 20000 ft).


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## drgondog (May 25, 2013)

Silly little distinction between I and T.....I just had a dyslectic read..


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## stubbsy (Jan 6, 2015)

Jenisch said:


> I'm skeptical of such statement.



Well, it is pretty accurate. See the Journal of Military History article entitled 'A Blind Spot? The RAF and Long-Range Fighters 1936-1944' in the Vol 78 No 2 April 2014. The abstract says: 

This paper examines why the RAF maintained its view that it would be
neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range
fighter escort until the time, late in the day, when the U.S. Army Air
Forces’ trials to increase the Spitfire fighter’s range proved otherwise.
The paper argues that some senior RAF officers, who believed that
long-range fighters were unnecessary, lacked the conceptual dexterity
needed after the RAF's bombers’ vulnerability to single-engined fighters
became apparent, and that these failings were hidden by a culture of
obedience to perceived wisdom that existed within the RAF.


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## stubbsy (Jan 6, 2015)

alejandro_ said:


> The Chief of Staff of the RAF, Marshall Portal, did not believe a single engine fighter with that sort of range could be built, thus no resources were allocated for this purpose.



The reference for Portal's views is John Terraine 'The Right of the Line' which shows how Portal replied to Churchill claiming that "increased rand can only be provided at the expense of performance and manoeuvrability". On 27 May 1941, again in reply to Churchill, Portal wrote 'The long range fighter whether built specifically as such, or whether given increased range by fitting extra tanks, will be at a disadvantage compared with the short range high performance fighter'

A week late on 3 Jun said that long range fighters were suitable for "regular employment only in areas where they will not be opposed by enemy short range fighters".

'A Blind Spot? The RAF and Long-Range Fighters 1936-1944' explains how he came to these conclusions and why the RAF did very little to extend the range of the Spitfire.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 7, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> 'A Blind Spot? The RAF and Long-Range Fighters 1936-1944' explains how he came to these conclusions and why the RAF did very little to extend the range of the Spitfire.


If he does say that, it's rather worrying, since increasing the Spitfire's range was nothing, whatsoever, to do with the RAF; it would have involved (and did involve) the manufacturers, the Air Ministry, Local Technical Committees, and the companies' Resident Technical Officers. 
As a result of this, extra fuel was shoehorned permanently into the VII, VIII, XIV, XVI, XVIII, 21, 22 24. It was also possible to fit temporary tanks into the V IX, which, with the big 170 gallon ferry tank underneath, meant that the IX, at the end of 1942, could fly direct from Gibraltar to Malta without recourse to an aircraft carrier.
The main reason for the need for extra range was Leigh-Mallory's fatuous "Leaning into Europe" policy, which caused the loss, and deaths, of many good pilots; it's probably not generally realised, now, just how much L-M was hated, at the time. One very bitter pilot, in the 1960s, told me how it was felt that he climbed to his promotions on the backs of dead pilots, and there was a general sigh of relief when he died in a crash.


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## drgondog (Jan 7, 2015)

IIRC none of the major powers except Japan specified long range/high performance for a fighter prior to WWII. Considering the low power of the available engines, the fact that it was a radial with higher fuel consumption than equivalent power in-lines, the A6M was a truly spectacular achievement. 

Candidly the belief that it 'couldn't be done' in the late 1930's by the Western Powers military establishment really centered on US and Great Britain as the only two Air Forces with dedication to Strategic Daylight Bombing. Each believed that their aircraft could achieve the goals with acceptable losses without escort, although the US also recognized that fighter aviation technologies were accelerating at an alarming rate in 1940.

What was true in their beliefs (US)is that long range/high performance was only achievable with two engines, requiring big fighter to enable large storage of fuel - and given the technology of the day did not request proposals from the US aviation industry to submit bids for a long range/high performance/single engine fighter in the 1940 The USAAF Pursuit Board over looked the Mustang when considering the "Future Development of Pursuit Aircraft". The concluded that an "all purpose fighter could not be built to fight anywhere and anything" - and concluded that the Army's focus should be to destroy enemy bombers and evade such hostile pursuit as it may encounter".

The earlier Request for Data R40-C (February 1940 when the XP-51 was on the drawing board to propose to RAF) did not reach out to NAA - but did specify latest technologies including invitations for laminar flow wings. From that, several aircraft were propsed, built and tested including the XP-49, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 71 - plus Bell's XP-39E, 59 and 63.

Only the P-61 would ever fly combat with American pilots.

As discussed and re-hashed many times the technology for the long range escort had not come to fruition to solve the following - Very Low Drag, High performance/lightweight engine, large fuel capacity - in 1940. There was no two stage, two speed merlin, or a flying fighter with high performance/low drag airframe and large internal fuel capacity. 

The A6M achieved the goal for medium altitude Naval fighter application by ruthlessly stripping all weight possible, sacrificing aircraft and pilot safety - which was an anathema to Western Allied thinking.

Only two powers had the combination of a.) existing strategic bomber force, b.) commitment to achieve long range bombing results, and c.) the wealth to spend on protecting them and thus drive the technologies to do so with long range fighters. The Brits were doing Ok with Night bombing, night fighters in the form of Mossie's - which were essentially capable against all the LW night fighters except the Me 262 which was way too late.

Near the end of the war the question of diverting critical resources of a nearly bankrupt nation in the case of Britain - the question is "why" when the US have multiple daylight fighter types for daylight bombardment, and long range night interceptors required a two man crew to achieve interception and destruction of night LW fighters. In 1944 and 1945, what was in the conceptual stage that would be so much better than the P-61 and the Mosquito that it was worth diverting funds to reciprocating fighters when Jet propulsion was clearly the next level in performance.

There was no 'solution' for short range (relatively speaking) jet fighter aircraft for long range escort and the existing escorts were doing just fine except for Me 262.. but there was no answer to the Me 262 per se, in either case.

The P-51 was a happy convergence of a.) great design unfettered by AAF bureaucracy, b.) an airframe which could readily adapt to a larger and better engine, c.) dire need to accelerate conversion of the Allison P-51 and production of the P-51B, and the prior planning and implementation of large scale production output of Packard Merlin engines in the US for other airframes (Lancaster and P-40F)

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## Shortround6 (Jan 7, 2015)

I would also note that the A6M actually had a low specific fuel consumption in _cruise_ AND many/most Japanese long range missions took place over water or sparsely populated areas of China and SE Asia. 

This means few, if any, AA guns along the route. It also means few, if any, interceptor fields _along_ the route. A much more economical cruise speed (and fuel consumption) can be used than would be practical in Europe. 

Imagine the Japanese trying to bomb Guadacanal _IF_ the Americans had had air strips on Santa Isabel and/or New Georgia Island/s around 150 miles closer to Rabual? Japanese would have been forced into higher cruise speeds both incoming and out going for several more hours. Putzing along at 160-190mph (indicated) at low/medium levels is a sure way to get 'bounced' as the British found out pretty early in the "lean forward" campaign. 

The USAAF figured a P-51 with 180 US gallons (150 Imp gal) inside and 150 US gallon outside was good for about a 425-450 mile radius. P-51 had less drag than the Spitfire. It is just under 400 miles from Colchester to Hamburg.

Now try to fly not a MK IX Spit but a MK V with a Merlin 45 (about 100 hp less than a Merlin 61 for take off at 12lbs boost) and have the MK V still holding 120 Imp gallons in internal tanks after it drops it's drop tank/s. Trying to build a long range fighter _before_ Hooker (improved single stage superchargers) and on 87 octane fuel (even if they can get constant speed props) and every couple of hundred pounds is really going to affect performance of the fighter.

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## stubbsy (Jan 7, 2015)

Then I think you'll like how 'A Blind Spot?..' deconstructs Leigh-Mallory's thinking on the long-range fighter issue and the American decision to ignore his direction and side-line him at every opportunity after they called him out on the topic. 

I am confused how you come to the conclusion that 'increasing the Spitfire's range was nothing, whatsoever, to do with the RAF, because it had everything to do with the RAF's decision that there was no requirement for a long-range fighter (ref AIR 20/3605, Air Fighting Committee Minutes, 9 Jun 1937 Item II paragraph 50). The Air Fighting Committee was chaired by the DCAS, Sholto Douglas. 'A Blind Spot?..' also explains why the American configuration for internal fuel, together with long-range external tanks for the Spitfire, conducted at Wright Field, were specifically the result of the USAAF's annoyance with Portal and Leigh-Mallory in doing very little to increase the range of the Spitfire. 

The use of the phrase 'lean towards Europe' in 1941 may have been influenced by Leigh-Mallory's memo of 5 Sep 1941 to SASO Fighter Command, in which he said 'I believe that the diversion of even 5% of our heavy bombers to regular "Circus" operations would enable such a high toll of enemy fighter pilots as to embarrass his Eastern Operations' but was actually coined by Trenchard/Portal as described by Sholto Douglas (AOC-in-C Fighter Command at the time) ref. Sholto Douglas, Years of Command (London: Collins, 1966), 113–14] 

Essentially, Trenchard was right on this topic, but only when the Americans used their numerous P-47's with long-range tanks, supplemented with their less numerous P-51's, did the tactic work. The problem with leaning towards Europe was not the concept of offensive activity but the methodology and numbers to achieve the desired effect, something beyond the mental capacity of Sholto Douglas and Leigh-Mallory.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 7, 2015)

It is interesting to note that a 'single stage' Spitfire with extra, say, 50% more fuel, gets plenty of verbal Flak. Yet it is considered acceptable that Hurricane was conceived around a huge thick ~260 sq ft wing, that is going to harm the performance much more than some extra fuel. It was considered acceptable to use it vs. Bf-109 even after BoB proved it lacks performance. Once it received the Merlin XX, the armament weight was upped, and killed most of possible performance gain??
Nobody in RAF was removing fuel tanks from their P-40s, despite their 'low performing' engines. 
It was acceptable to have people flying the Blenheims in 1941-43, or the Spitfire Vs in 1944. 

Further, the LR fighters are not supposed to fly alone, but to provide escort, and then defender has a tough choice of either go for the bombers, or to deal with escorts - either choice has it's disadvantages.
The short range interceptor fighter also has to have better heavier armament than the LR fighter, so whatever weight penalty is in extra fuel, such is also in having a heavier battery. In the P-38, the 20 mm cannon installation and 150 rounds weighted 288 lbs, about same as the full, self sealing tank with 40 US gals? Internal fuel tanks also have no drag penalty, unlike the cannons.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 7, 2015)

You also had had to have the planes _capable_ of carrying out the strategy/tactic _in hand_. Not 6 months or two years down the road. 

For what was _considered *possible*_ by the USAAF and ultimately Lockheed in *1937* please see the P-38 and P-39.

P-38 "the Model 22 won Design Competition X-608 and on June 23, 1937, Lockheed was awarded a contract for one XP-38 prototype (Ser No 37-457). " from Joe Baughers web site.
The _initial_ requirements for the P-38 and P-39 called for _identical_ armament, _identical_ top speed at _identical_ altitude. The difference was that the the X-608 competition called for *twice* the endurance of the X-609 competition which lead to the P-39. Hibbard and Johnson figured they needed a 1500hp engine to meet the requirement with double the endurance of a plane with a single 1000hp engine. With no single 1500hp engine available they went for the twin engines.
Now please remember that the Merlin went from 880hp for take-off in 1937/38 to about 1200hp in 1941 and about 1280hp in 1942 and early Merlin Mustangs were rated at 1380hp for take-off and later ones for 1490hp. Merlin III was good for 1030hp at 16,250ft and some of the single stage Merlins were good for several hundred more HP for very little increase in weight and the two stage Merlins could offer hundreds more HP thousands of feet higher for the weight of the supercharger/ bigger prop and bigger radiators and intercooler. A "long range" fighter with single Merlin just wasn't possible in 1937/38 using existing supercharge technology and fuel ( or rather such an aircraft would have been at a _severe_ disadvantage vs a short range fighter using an equivalent engine. 

The British "brass" may very well have not been able to wrap their heads around the rapidly changing technology and possibilities but just because they wrong in 1942/43 does not mean they were wrong in 1937/38.

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## Balljoint (Jan 7, 2015)

There’s a good bit of truth to the long-range vs short range fighter capability. However, when the interceptor is tasked with avoiding the escort and reaching the bombers, the balance changes. With dissimilar resources, both people and material, the balance further changes. This wasn’t apparent in early 1941. The ugly duckling P-51A was not left to fade away only by its improbable conversion to the A-36.

If foresight is lacking, it helps to be agile –and lucky- on the rebound.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 7, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> You also had had to have the planes _capable_ of carrying out the strategy/tactic _in hand_. Not 6 months or two years down the road.
> 
> For what was _considered *possible*_ by the USAAF and ultimately Lockheed in *1937* please see the P-38 and P-39.
> 
> ...



Thanks for the overview.
USAAF wanted interceptors. Hence the strive for 37mm cannons in the future P-38 and P-39, along with multiple MGs. The 37mm cannon alone was 240 lbs, plus ammo meaning 300 lbs - equal to 40 US gals in s-s tank? We can also recall that XP-39 was to carry 200 US gals, and P-40 180 US gals of fuel. 



> Now please remember that the Merlin went from 880hp for take-off in 1937/38 to about 1200hp in 1941 and about 1280hp in 1942 and early Merlin Mustangs were rated at 1380hp for take-off and later ones for 1490hp. Merlin III was good for 1030hp at 16,250ft and some of the single stage Merlins were good for several hundred more HP for very little increase in weight and the two stage Merlins could offer hundreds more HP thousands of feet higher for the weight of the supercharger/ bigger prop and bigger radiators and intercooler. A "long range" fighter with single Merlin just wasn't possible in 1937/38 using existing supercharge technology and fuel ( or rather such an aircraft would have been at a _severe_ disadvantage vs a short range fighter using an equivalent engine.



The Defiant I was an rater overweight fighter, yet it have had no problems taking off with 880 HP from RAF's standard airstrips. 
As for what fighter is in disadvantage, the surprise, current height speed advantage beat couple of tens of fps every day of the week. Especially if the short range fighter need to kill bombers 1st, and caries a heavier draggier weapons battery than the LR fighter.
If something was impossible in 1937-38, does not mean it was not possible in 1939-41. 



> The British "brass" may very well have not been able to wrap their heads around the rapidly changing technology and possibilities but just because they wrong in 1942/43 does not mean they were wrong in 1937/38.



The Whirlwind was a result of a specification issued in 1935, Gloster F.9/37 from 1937 (?); neither specification included a fuel tankage suitable for long range work. The brass was not interested in it, even when there was enough of horsepower installed.
Brass also have had no objection in a turret fighter, where both weight and drag penalties from the turret installed were much higher than when an extra fuel tank is installed. Despite only half of firepower the Hurricane had.
The time spans quoted leave out the crucial time span of 1939-41 again.

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## stubbsy (Jan 7, 2015)

Except, of course, the 'Brass' were wrong in 1937/38, as at the time they believed that in the next war bombers would not suffer unacceptable losses if not escorted. The experience of the RAF's 9 and 37 sqns over the Heligoland Bight on 18 Dec 1939, exposed the fallacy of the is thinking - though many senior RAF officers analysing the disaster immediately afterwards were so fixed in their thinking that they persuaded themselves that poor leadership - rather than the lack of escorting fighters - was what caused the unacceptable losses. Only when losses continued on similarly unescorted missions did the penny drop.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 7, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> I am confused how you come to the conclusion that 'increasing the Spitfire's range was nothing, whatsoever, to do with the RAF, because it had everything to do with the RAF's decision that there was no requirement for a long-range fighter.


I was talking about the physical (i.e. engineering) aspect of getting extra fuel into the airframe, not the necessity of it in the strategy of air fighting. The RAF could ask, but only the Air Ministry/government could give the go-ahead for the work to be incorporated in the factories.

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## Shortround6 (Jan 7, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> It is interesting to note that a 'single stage' Spitfire with extra, say, 50% more fuel, gets plenty of verbal Flak. Yet it is considered acceptable that Hurricane was conceived around a huge thick ~260 sq ft wing, that is going to harm the performance much more than some extra fuel. It was considered acceptable to use it vs. Bf-109 even after BoB proved it lacks performance. Once it received the Merlin XX, the armament weight was upped, and killed most of possible performance gain??
> Nobody in RAF was removing fuel tanks from their P-40s, despite their 'low performing' engines.
> It was acceptable to have people flying the Blenheims in 1941-43, or the Spitfire Vs in 1944.
> 
> ...



You have to go back to the proposals. The P-38 was not _intended_ to use the 20mm gun. It was _intended_ to have about 1000lbs of armament ( service planes carried 60% more easily). Originally it was _supposed_ to use a 25mm gun ( which never got beyond prototype stage) then the 37mm gun and finally the 20mm gun, Machine gun armament and ammo tended to bounce around quite a bit also but then so did the engines which "grew" from nominal 1000 hp engine to 1090 hp at 13,200 feet in the XP-38 to 1150 hp engines in the YP-38 to 1325hp engines in the P-38F which _start_ to roll out the factory door in March of 1942. That takes you form proposal to first truly combat capable model. Over a 30% increase in power although a there was also a substantial increase in weight. 

The British faced a few _minor_ problems. (sarcasm). 

"Yet it is considered acceptable that Hurricane was conceived around a huge thick ~260 sq ft wing, that is going to harm the performance much more than some extra fuel" 

The Hurricane was "conceived" around that big thick wing in order to get the field performance (take-off and landing distances and speeds) the RAF wanted _at the time._ Hawker had no wind tunnel of their own and believed what the RAE boffins told them, that the thick wing was NOT a drag problem. In 1940/41 you had multiple factories tooled up and spitting out Hurricanes in large quantities. It is not until the summer of 1941 that the Procurement people can say (Wew, The Germans just invaded Russia so we can stop/slow down production of _what ever_ aircraft we are tooled up for and think about something else (better models). Perhaps the British _should_ have tried harder to convert one or more Hurricane assembly plants to Spitfires but 1940 is 5-6 years _after_ the Hurricane was conceived.

Blenheim carried on for far too long because the expected replacements were failures. Doesn't mean the British should have hobbled _more_ of their aircraft to try to push for a certain tactic. 


Speed of the Hurricane II was rather lacking but climb performance received a rather nice boost at certain altitudes (at 28,000ft the climb rate was roughly doubled from 570fpm at 6750lbs to 900-1100fpm at 7400lbs, charts vary ) 

BTW changing the Hurricane I from 6316lbs to 6750lb added over 2 minutes to the time take to go from 20,000ft to 30,000ft. granted the engine was limited to 2600rpm for the test but it is an indication of what 6-7% increase in weight could do (only knocked off 6mph or less from top speed). 20% decrease in rate of climb but only a 2% decrease in speed?? And again, rate of climb is an _indicator_ of a planes ability to do a _sustained_ turn without losing altitude. Doesn't matter that much if you can pull a 6 G turn at a radius smaller than your enemy if you have to lose hundreds of feet of altitude more per 360 turn. 

Hurricane's take-off distance went from 370 yds at 6040lbs with fixed pitch prop to 280 yds at 6363lbs with 2 pitch to 240 yds with Rotol prop at 6316lbs to 280 yds with Rotol at 6750lbs. Rotol Props only came in at the end of 1939/ beginning of 1940 and They were converting the DH 2 pitch props to constant speed in the Summer of 1940, _between_ the Battle of France and the BoB. 
Added weight came from armor, bullet proof windscreens, self sealing tanks and more radio gear (like IFF) some of which also added drag. 



In 1939/40/41 very few people were building "bomber" interceptors" (the US was actually almost alone in that), instead the single seat/single engine fighters were _mostly_ *all* purpose. 

As far as an "escort" being able perform it's mission if it's performance was _not_ close to the interceptors see the Bf 110. It was faster (enough to win a bar bet?) and more heavily armed than the Hurricane, it could not climb or turn as well. 

It is not enough to 'escort' the bombers, the escort mission must also be done at a low enough loss rate to allow continued operations otherwise it is just a matter of weeks or months before there aren't enough escorts left.


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## stona (Jan 7, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> Except, of course, the 'Brass' were wrong in 1937/38, as at the time they believed that in the next war bombers would not suffer unacceptable losses if not escorted. The experience of the RAF's 9 and 37 sqns over the Heligoland Bight on 18 Dec 1939, exposed the fallacy of the is thinking - though many senior RAF officers analysing the disaster immediately afterwards were so fixed in their thinking that they persuaded themselves that poor leadership - rather than the lack of escorting fighters - was what caused the unacceptable losses. Only when losses continued on similarly unescorted missions did the penny drop.



The penny didn't drop for the USAAF in 1939/40, even with the evidence from the British experience to hand.

For the Luftwaffe in 1940 even escorted bombers proved to be too vulnerable in daylight when confronted with a well coordinated and determined defence from the sort of short range interceptors that had been developed in the pre-war years. There is only so much pie to go around, in the 1930s just as now. 

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but those at the Air Ministry in the mid 1930s didn't have the benefit of it. Neither were they alone in lacking foresight.

Cheers

Steve

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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 7, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Yet it is considered acceptable that Hurricane was conceived around a huge thick ~260 sq ft wing, that is going to harm the performance much more than some extra fuel. It was considered acceptable to use it vs. Bf-109 even after BoB proved it lacks performance. Once it received the Merlin XX, the armament weight was upped, and killed most of possible performance gain??.


Actually, the RAF told Tizard 29-4-41 that they considered that the Hurricane was already at the end of any possible development, and that the Typhoon and tornado should take over as soon as possible. There seems to be this general memory loss, that the Hurricane and Defiant were designed around an expectation that they would only have to deal with bombers and the Me110; demanding instant reaction to the unexpected loss of France in 1940, and an immediate appearance of a fighter capable of taking on the Me109 over the occupied territories is somewhat unrealistic. 


> It was acceptable to have people flying the Blenheims in 1941-43, or the Spitfire Vs in 1944.


It was unavoidable, not acceptable; the Spitfire V was considered obsolete in 1942, but there was simply not the factory capacity (not just airframes, but engines as well) to turn out the more capable fighters; the Spitfire XII was built only because of a shortage of low-altitude Merlins, so the Griffon had to come into service before it was really ready.
Eisenhower wanted the Spitfire IX for Torch, but couldn't have them because there still wasn't (yet) a viable tropical air intake/filter.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 7, 2015)

There is also the fact that in Poland in 1939 the Germans were still using _some_ Bf 109Ds with Jumo engines. The Hurricane I, even in April, May, June of 1940 was better than most French fighters and better than any Italian fighters IN SERVICE at the time. May of 1940 also sees the _*first*_ 11 P-40s built/delivered. 

A Hurricane II could expect to take on a Bf 109E-3/4 with a pretty fair chance, it was the F that put the Hurricane into the obsolete category. And even that took a little while.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 7, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> You have to go back to the proposals. The P-38 was not _intended_ to use the 20mm gun. It was _intended_ to have about 1000lbs of armament ( service planes carried 60% more easily). Originally it was _supposed_ to use a 25mm gun ( which never got beyond prototype stage) then the 37mm gun and finally the 20mm gun,



Thanks for the correction.



> Machine gun armament and ammo tended to bounce around quite a bit also but then so did the engines which "grew" from nominal 1000 hp engine to 1090 hp at 13,200 feet in the XP-38 to 1150 hp engines in the YP-38 to 1325hp engines in the P-38F which _start_ to roll out the factory door in March of 1942. That takes you form proposal to first truly combat capable model. Over a 30% increase in power although a there was also a substantial increase in weight.



Let's not forget the P-38D and -E, with 2x1150 HP engines and 1000-1500 lbs of armament ammo. 



> BTW changing the Hurricane I from 6316lbs to 6750lb added over 2 minutes to the time take to go from 20,000ft to 30,000ft. granted the engine was limited to 2600rpm for the test but it is an indication of what 6-7% increase in weight could do (only knocked off 6mph or less from top speed). 20% decrease in rate of climb but only a 2% decrease in speed?? And again, rate of climb is an _indicator_ of a planes ability to do a _sustained_ turn without losing altitude. Doesn't matter that much if you can pull a 6 G turn at a radius smaller than your enemy if you have to lose hundreds of feet of altitude more per 360 turn.



Hawker installed 4 cannons in the Hurricane IIC, that also meant a considerable drop in RoC vs. the IIA/B, yet the extra fuel and more modest armament set-up seem to be a no-no. Granted, expecting the Hurricane to perform a long range work vs. any decent air defense is looking for problems.



> Hurricane's take-off distance went from 370 yds at 6040lbs with fixed pitch prop to 280 yds at 6363lbs with 2 pitch to 240 yds with Rotol prop at 6316lbs to 280 yds with Rotol at 6750lbs. Rotol Props only came in at the end of 1939/ beginning of 1940 and They were converting the DH 2 pitch props to constant speed in the Summer of 1940, _between_ the Battle of France and the BoB.
> Added weight came from armor, bullet proof windscreens, self sealing tanks and more radio gear (like IFF) some of which also added drag.



Unfortunately, Hawker didn't said: we can offer a fighter that uses less than 400 yds to take off and can do 320 mph, and we can also offer a fighter that needs 500 yds and can do 350 mph; what would you (RAF/AM) buy?


> In 1939/40/41 very few people were building "bomber" interceptors" (the US was actually almost alone in that), instead the single seat/single engine fighters were _mostly_ *all* purpose.



Westland was building 4 cannon fighter. Four cannon versions of the Hurricane and Spitfire were also under development, with performance penalty vs. all-Browning and mixed armament versions. 
RAF's fighters 1st role being to kill LW bombers, until France fell?



> As far as an "escort" being able perform it's mission if it's performance was _not_ close to the interceptors see the Bf 110. It was faster (enough to win a bar bet?) and more heavily armed than the Hurricane, it could not climb or turn as well.



Not the Bf-110, however it's technicalities were just a part of it's problem during the BoB. I'd pick the P-40B, Re.2001 and Ki-61 - all aircraft with modest engine power, plenty of fuel and, for the horsepower, decent performance. 



> It is not enough to 'escort' the bombers, the escort mission must also be done at a low enough loss rate to allow continued operations otherwise it is just a matter of weeks or months before there aren't enough escorts left.



If the defender concentrates on the escorts, the inbound bombers can have a field day vs. now undefended ground assets (factories, marshaling yards, military bases etc).
Of course, the defender cannot concentrate all of its fighters against the inbound strike (bombers + excorts), since his fighters are short ranged (see RAF groups during the BoB). Meaning numerical advantage for the attacker.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 7, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Actually, the RAF told Tizard 29-4-41 that they considered that the Hurricane was already at the end of any possible development, and that the Typhoon and tornado should take over as soon as possible. There seems to be this general memory loss, that the Hurricane and Defiant were designed around an expectation that they would only have to deal with bombers and the Me110; demanding instant reaction to the unexpected loss of France in 1940, and an immediate appearance of a fighter capable of taking on the Me109 over the occupied territories is somewhat unrealistic.



The Hurricane being designed before the Me 110 was known publicly? We can recall that Spitfire was a worldbeater when introduced, despite the (German) bombers being the conceivable target.
Escorting own bombers, whether France fights on or it is occupied, was not on the RAF's discussion table IIRC.



> It was unavoidable, not acceptable; the Spitfire V was considered obsolete in 1942, but there was simply not the factory capacity (not just airframes, but engines as well) to turn out the more capable fighters; the Spitfire XII was built only because of a shortage of low-altitude Merlins, so the Griffon had to come into service before it was really ready.
> Eisenhower wanted the Spitfire IX for Torch, but couldn't have them because there still wasn't (yet) a viable tropical air intake/filter.



Sending 3 men into jeopardy with Blenheim was accepted, but sending one in a Spitfire with extra internal fuel was a no-no.
Thanks for the Torch tidbit.


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## pbehn (Jan 7, 2015)

What bombers would an RAF escort fighter escort? They all had weak defensive armament and liquid cooled engines, much more vulnerable than USA bombers in daylight.
The P51 was a magnificent escort fighter in fact really the only one that could do the job. Getting the P51B/C/D into service was a massive investment and also required large numbers of P47s and sometimes even spitfires on big ops. The British couldnt mount daylight raids on their own and after late 1943 would anyone want them to? The British and Americans both mounting daylight raids could be good in overwhelming defences and a disaster if two missions cross each others path.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 7, 2015)

pbehn said:


> They all had weak defensive armament and liquid cooled engines, much more vulnerable than USA bombers in daylight.



Really? So the Stirling, Halifax MkI and MkIII and Lancaster MkII had liquid-cooled engines? Who'd've thunked that?!! 

As for "weak defensive armament", I'll accept that the .303 was less capable than a 50 cal but human-trained weapons, whether in a power turret or on a swivel mount, aren't the most accurate gunnery platform so the likelihood of a successful "kill" is probably about the same for either weapon. The RAF bomber's primary weakness was the lack of a ventral turret but in overall guns-per-aircraft and the employment method of those guns were about on par, if not ahead, of the US aircraft for much of the war...at least until the deployment of the B-17G.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 8, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Sending 3 men into jeopardy with Blenheim was accepted,.


British military history is full of examples of the fighting men being sent into battle inadequately equipped, and it's still going on. When the idea of pilot back armour was first mooted, Sholto-Douglas fought against it, on the Spitfire, because, in his view, it was the fastest thing in the air, so only an inattentive pilot would allow someone to get behind him and shoot him down. 


> sending one in a Spitfire with extra internal fuel was a no-no.


Where's the advantage of putting a 27 gallon tank behind the pilot, which remains full of volatile fumes when "empty," and interferes with the pilot's rear/downward view, against hanging a 30 gallon tank under the fuselage, from where it can be dumped when empty?


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## GrauGeist (Jan 8, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> ...The RAF bomber's primary weakness was the lack of a ventral turret *but in overall guns-per-aircraft and the employment method of those guns were about on par, if not ahead, of the US aircraft* for much of the war...at least until the deployment of the B-17G.



Well, let's see...

The RAF:
Lancaster I - (2) .303 nose turret, (2) .303 upper turret, (4) .303 rear turret
Halifax Mk.III - (1) .303 nose, (4) .303 dorsal turret, (4) tail turret
Stirling I - (2) nose turret, (2) dorsal turret, (4) tail turret
Lincoln I - (2) .50 nose turret, (2) .50 OR (2) 20mm dorsal turret, (2) .50 tail turret

The U.S.:
B-18A - (1) .30 nose, (1) .30 dorsal, (1) .30 ventral
B-17F(early) - (1) .50 nose, (2) .50 "cheek", (2) .50 dorsal turret, (1) .50 radio skylight, (2) .50 waist, (2) .50 ball, (2) .50 tail
B-24D - (3) .50 nose, (2) .50 dorsal turret, (1) .50 tunnel, (2) .50 waist, (2) .50 tail
B-25C/D - (1) .30 nose, (2) .50 dorsal turret, (2) .50 ventral turret, (2) waist (optional), (1) .50 tail
B-26B - (1) .50 nose, (2) .50 dorsal turret, (2) .50 waist, (2) .50 tail

In comparing 4 of the RAF's bombers against 5 of the U.S., I am having difficulty in seeing how the RAF was "on a par" with the U.S. heavy bombers. So I looked at the U.S. medium bombers and lo and behold...the medium bombers were comparable. (Except for the B-18, I just tossed that in for the heck of it!)
Bottom line, the U.S. heavy bombers were heavier armed, both in caliber and quantity, than their RAF counterparts.

With the exception of the Lincoln, the RAF bombers were woefully under-gunned, no matter how you look at it.


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## stona (Jan 8, 2015)

In 1939/40/41 the British certainly were building bomber interceptors.

The reason the earlier versions of the Spitfire and Hurricane had eight machine guns was precisely to enable them to destroy bombers.

The reason the later versions and also later types like the Typhoon and Tempest were armed with cannon was the same. Fighter Command emerged from the RAF command Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB). The clue is in the name.

As Sorley, who was in charge of the Operational Requirement Section at the Air Ministry when the Spitfire and Hurricane were being developed, later wrote.

"After much arithmetic and burning of midnight oil, I reached the answer of eight guns as being the number required to give a lethal dose in two seconds of fire. I reckoned that the bomber's speed would probably be such as to allow only one chance of attack, so it must be destroyed in that vital two second burst."

The move to cannon armament was to allow the destruction of the ever heavier armoured Luftwaffe bombers. All Britain's single seat fighters designed throughout the war were designed primarily as bomber interceptors. When they proved to be not very good in that role, or that role was no longer required, they took on other roles, sometimes with notable success. 

For example in 1941 the idea of the Typhoon as a "cross Channel dogfighter" emerged, it was no more designed for that role (which it never undertook) than it was as a fighter bomber (which it certainly did).

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 8, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> ...
> Where's the advantage of putting a 27 gallon tank behind the pilot, which remains full of volatile fumes when "empty," and interferes with the pilot's rear/downward view, against hanging a 30 gallon tank under the fuselage, from where it can be dumped when empty?



Any fuel tank in any aircraft is full of volatile fumes when half or full empty, that goes also for the fuselage tank of the Mustang III/IV, and LE tanks of the later Spitfires (unless the fumes are purged by CO2 that some aircraft have had).

In case the 30 gal drop tank is attached under fuselage of the Spit V, and there is no extra fuselage fuel, max fuel is 30+84=114 imp gals. If the 29 gal tank is installed, max fuel can be 113 imp gals plus whatever is attached under fuselage (from 30 to 170 imp gals) - from 143 to 283 imp gals.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 8, 2015)

pbehn said:


> What bombers would an RAF escort fighter escort? They all had weak defensive armament and liquid cooled engines, much more vulnerable than USA bombers in daylight.



The armament wasn't that weak, bar for the lack of belly turrets. RAF's LR fighters will be at 1st escorting the Wellingtons, Hampdens and Whitleys, until the 4-engined jobs take over.
The liquid cooled engines might provide troublesome when coupled with lower cruising altitude of non-turbo bombers (15-20000 ft vs 22-25000 for the US heavies), and then coupled with the German Falk gunners having it easier to hit something during the day than during the night. And/or have more accurate bursts of timed shells.
One can envision much more damaged aircraft due to the Flak. 
On the benefit side, it would be much less wandering around the countryside and more bombs on the target, with steeper losses for the LW fighter arm.



> The P51 was a magnificent escort fighter in fact really the only one that could do the job. Getting the P51B/C/D into service was a massive investment and also required large numbers of P47s and sometimes even spitfires on big ops.



The P-47 with bigger internal tanks (370 US gals; available from Spring of 1944) were also very capable to do the escort job. The debugged P-38s (later -J, the -L) were no slouch either. What the Merlin Mustang had was timing, a really important feature.
British introduced the bigger fuel tankage in their Spitfires and Tempests, but too late to matter (second half of 1944).



> The British couldnt mount daylight raids on their own and after late 1943 would anyone want them to? The British and Americans both mounting daylight raids could be good in overwhelming defences and a disaster if two missions cross each others path.



The British did mount daylight raids, with significant losses, and eventually managed to push LW away from the coastline. They used just a trickle of bombers while doing that, and the LW have had options to either respond to the raids or not - not a way to do much the attrition to the LW fighter force.
Don't think it would be a disaster when two missions cross each other, both air forces have had the IFF systems.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 8, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> In case the 30 gal drop tank is attached under fuselage of the Spit V, and there is no extra fuselage fuel, max fuel is 30+84=114 imp gals. If the 29 gal tank is installed, max fuel can be 113 imp gals plus whatever is attached under fuselage (from 30 to 170 imp gals) - from 143 to 283 imp gals.


Not strictly true; I forgot to mention that the fuselage tank could only be used in conjunction with the 170 gallon ferry tank (it's in the A.P.)


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## Shortround6 (Jan 8, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Any fuel tank in any aircraft is full of volatile fumes when half or full empty, that goes also for the fuselage tank of the Mustang III/IV, and LE tanks of the later Spitfires (unless the fumes are purged by CO2 that some aircraft have had).
> 
> In case the 30 gal drop tank is attached under fuselage of the Spit V, and there is no extra fuselage fuel, max fuel is 30+84=114 imp gals. If the 29 gal tank is installed, max fuel can be 113 imp gals plus whatever is attached under fuselage (from 30 to 170 imp gals) - from 143 to 283 imp gals.



And here we get into part of this argument. *Timing*. 
The MK V Spitfire had the good propeller and it had The Merlin 45 engine. The Merlin 45 could hold 9lbs boost to 20,000ft with ram compared to the Merlin III holding 6lb boost to 18,000ft with ram, The Merlin 45 could hold 6lbs of boost to 23,000ft. It also had about 300 more HP for take-off (34%) All for very little increase in weight in the power plant. You now have the power to lug around a bit more weight without taking a big hit to performance. I would note that tests of a "normal" Vb and a MK V with 4 20mm guns show the 4 cannon fighter losing about 340fps (about 10%) in climb and about 1000-1100ft in ceiling. At 28,000ft the loss in climb was about 13-14%. Part _may_ be drag but weight has more influence on climb. 
the 4 cannon MK V climbs about like MK II Spitfire. If that is good enough so be it. 

30 Imp gallons was good for about 1 hour at a very economical cruise speed. A speed that would be near suicidal to use over enemy territory or in enemy coastal waters. Where over the Channel you cut from the higher cruise to speed to the economical cruise speed may be a matter of argument but 20imp gallons may not get you a radius that includes the Ruhr or much of it.

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## stubbsy (Jan 8, 2015)

Steve,

I think most comments in history fora are tinged with a little bit of hindsight, after all we are not facing the difficult decisions faced by the commanders on the spot. Analysing the past is what History is about, and pointing out errors is part of the process. The question on this topic is to compare and contrast what the Americans did when they faced the same problem faced by Bomber Command. You are quite right that the penny didn't drop for the USAAF in 1939/40, but of course they weren't at war then, so it wasn't such a pressing problem for them. The question is how well and how quickly did they respond when they realised the vulnerability of their unescorted daylight bombers. What the USAAF did was learn quicker than the RAF from experience. 

The USAAF started their daylight bombing in August 1942, under the protection of short-range Spitfires and fared quite well, but soon after they engaged in operations further afield they recognised the need for long-range fighters and made plans to get the range of their P-38's and P-47's extended. In 1943 General Arnold demanded the change in focus and acknowledged that he should have been quicker to make the decision. The RAF leaders,such as Portal, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory, in contrast, had decided that long-range fighters could not compete on equal terms with the Luftwaffe short range fighters, and in making this (wrong) decision they were delinquent. The success of POINTBLANK, a predominantly American only event, was so successful that it reduced bomber losses considerably showed how good their judgement was on the topic of long-range fighters. 

Regards


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## stubbsy (Jan 8, 2015)

Good question. I think the answer lies in the the uncombined nature of the Combined Bomber Offensive. 

If the Bomber forces had become combined under a single Coalition Command organisation, headed by the Americans (as they requested), the six months from Jan to Jun 1943 would have focused the attention of the Commander on how best to achieve POINTBLANK and beyond. Portal and Harris demurred as they didn't want to lose the prestige of independent, British led Command. With RAF long-range fighters on board the Luftwaffe would have little or no respite. Even assuming only the same level of success the actual POINTBLANK campaign achieved, which reduced USAAF bomber losses from between 4 to 5% in 1943 to between 1 and 2 % in 1944 to 1945 it would be reasonable to suggest that the more vulnerable Lancaster and Halifax bombers could fly by day with, potentially, even more accuracy. 

The American focus on attacking oil was acknowledged, grudgingly, by Bomber Harris after the war as betting on an outsider that happened to win the race but for the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the USAAF oil was never an outsider; it was always a favourite. With the Americans in charge the campaign against oil may the war may have been shortened considerably. Now this view is certainly counterfactual and laced with hindsight, but hopefully some will find it worthy of the forum.

Regards


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## stubbsy (Jan 8, 2015)

Where's the advantage of putting a 27 gallon tank behind the pilot, which remains full of volatile fumes when "empty," and interferes with the pilot's rear/downward view, against hanging a 30 gallon tank under the fuselage, from where it can be dumped when empty?[/QUOTE]

Edgar, your question reflects British thinking at the time. There were a number of issues with rear fuel tanks, not least the impact on weight and balance of the aircraft. The Vickers trial modification found a full 72 gallon tank behind the pilot prohibitive in terms of aircraft manoeuvrability, but the American modification to the Spitfire at Wright Field only had 42 gallons. Nevertheless it took modifications to mitigate these weaknesses. 

What is perhaps more interesting is that the some of the RAF Mustang III's and some of the USAAF P-51's had rear fuel tanks and little was made of the fumes and volatility problems because the Americans chose to accept the operational risks. When Ops 1A flew with the USAAF in a P-51 in April 1944 his report noted that “The Americans are much more go ahead than we are, and much, as I have observed before, greater realists.” (Ref AIR 20/860, TNA)


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## stona (Jan 8, 2015)

There was considerable inertia in the US system too. The 8th AF's own official history boldly states that:

"The formation of a long range fighter organisation began in early 1942 with the activation of VIII interceptor command...."

In April 1942 General Spaatz sent a memorandum from Bolling Field to General Arnold, then commanding general of all US Army Air Forces.







Yet nearly eighteen months later we can see a communique like this which clearly shows that the USAAF did not have fighters with sufficient range in Europe, and the drop tank conundrum was still not solved.






The problems with the various drop tanks are well documented. Here's a 3rd September 1943 report on the 108 gallon tank as an example:











Testing was carried out in July 1943 on the 200 gallon unpressurised paper tanks. The 75 gallon (actually 84) and 108 gallon tanks were tested in August and September 1943. It was a shortage of sway braces which initially held up their use. It was late in 1943 before they could be made to work satisfactorily. 
The problem was such that at an 8th AF commanders meeting of August 1944 there was a serious discussion of deploying the P-38 as the major escort fighter in the ETO at the expense of the P-47 and even P-51 if a 'droppable 150-gallon tanks, pressurized to an altitude of 30,000ft' could not be made available. At another meeting, when Kepner succeeded Hunter on 29th August, the decision to assemble P-38s became a first priority. It didn't happen because within a month the much wished for drop tanks finally did become available.

In summary, having failed to learn the lessons taught by the unmitigated disaster the RAF had suffered bombing in daylight, it took the USAAF over eighteen months to finally develop the technology to enable its fighters to escort its bombers to and from the target. It knew far earlier that this was required and earlier that this sort of escort was the only way to preserve its bombers, and the men who flew them.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 8, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Not strictly true; I forgot to mention that the fuselage tank could only be used in conjunction with the 170 gallon ferry tank (it's in the A.P.)



Thanks. 
The 170 gal tank was also drop-able. For the Spitfire there was also a possibility of having an under-seat fuel tank installed (closer to the CoG than the rear fuel tank), used on some early PR machines? There was also possibility of 10 extra gals in the front tank(s), that was used to that cause in Mk VIII and modified Mk IXs, among other.



Shortround6 said:


> And here we get into part of this argument. *Timing*.
> The MK V Spitfire had the good propeller and it had The Merlin 45 engine. The Merlin 45 could hold 9lbs boost to 20,000ft with ram compared to the Merlin III holding 6lb boost to 18,000ft with ram, The Merlin 45 could hold 6lbs of boost to 23,000ft. It also had about 300 more HP for take-off (34%) All for very little increase in weight in the power plant.



Think that we could also compare the Merlin III and XII with what was available in 1938-40 in other countries, especially in Germany as a likely adversary. The DB 601A is available from Spring of 1939, prior that Germans cannot compete, the gap in power between Merlin III and Jumo 210 is too great. Germany has problem of timing?
The Merlin III has 1030 HP at 16300 ft, the the early DB 601A has some 900 HP there - Merlin has almost 15% more. Same difference between Merlin XII vs. late DB-601A? There was enough engine power to cancel out the extra 250-300 lbs worth of extra fuel. Merlin XII is also rated at greater take off power than the Mk.III, 1175 HP.
The de Havilland 2-pitch prop was installed in a number of Spitfires prior ww2 broke out, there is a picture of such Spitfire Is at the Morgan Shacklady book, pg. 54, dated 8th June 1939. Constant speed props were installed in 1940?



> You now have the power to lug around a bit more weight without taking a big hit to performance. I would note that tests of a "normal" Vb and a MK V with 4 20mm guns show the 4 cannon fighter losing about 340fps (about 10%) in climb and about 1000-1100ft in ceiling. At 28,000ft the loss in climb was about 13-14%. Part _may_ be drag but weight has more influence on climb.
> the 4 cannon MK V climbs about like MK II Spitfire. If that is good enough so be it.



Thanks.
I'd try to have the Spit V LR having LMGs only.



> 30 Imp gallons was good for about 1 hour at a very economical cruise speed. A speed that would be near suicidal to use over enemy territory or in enemy coastal waters. Where over the Channel you cut from the higher cruise to speed to the economical cruise speed may be a matter of argument but 20imp gallons may not get you a radius that includes the Ruhr or much of it.



Not 1 hour, but closer to 30 minutes; the V-1650-1 in high gear would use 46-58 imp gal per hour in cruise setting (77 imp gph in max continuous setting). 30 min on 300 mph gives 150 miles, quite a boost for the combat radius.


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## stona (Jan 8, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> With the Americans in charge the campaign against oil may the war may have been shortened considerably. Now this view is certainly counterfactual and laced with hindsight, but hopefully some will find it worthy of the forum.
> Regards



I don't believe invasion of northern Europe would have happened significantly sooner than the summer of '44 for a variety of reasons. I do agree that the war might have been shortened by two or three months, to early '45. You might make a case for 'winter' '44.
There are many, many reasons why this was never going to happen, which you touched on above, but as a 'what if' I think it is entirely plausible.
Cheers
Steve

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## buffnut453 (Jan 8, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> Well, let's see...
> 
> The RAF:
> Lancaster I - (2) .303 nose turret, (2) .303 upper turret, (4) .303 rear turret
> ...



It's more complex than just a straight numbers count. For example, only one gun of the 3 in the noses of the B-17F and B-24D could be fired at one time because there was only one guy in there to do the shooting. That takes 2 guns out of commission from your count and puts the B-17F at 10 effective guns and the B-24D at 8 effective guns. Also, of those available guns, 3 in each aircraft were swivel-mounts with relatively limited arcs of fire. The tunnel and radio skylight positions were particularly poor in this regard, while the waist guns probably did more damage to friendly aircraft in their own formation than they did to the opposition. I'd contend that those guns were more for morale than actual combat effectiveness. 

I entirely accept that the 50cal had a longer range and more hitting power than the .303, as I made clear in my previous post.


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## stona (Jan 8, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> I entirely accept that the 50cal had a longer range and more hitting power than the .303, as I made clear in my previous post.



It didn't have a longer _effective_ range and that was due to the sights.






Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Jan 8, 2015)

Thanks Steve. The problem is compounded by the challenges of accurately sighting the swivel-mounted guns. I stand by my statement that there wasn't much effective difference between the gun defences fitted to RAF and USAAF heavy bombers through most of the war. The tide turned with the B-17G while the B-29 was a generation ahead, but prior to that point probably not much in it.


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## stona (Jan 8, 2015)

It's odd that Harris was still complaining in 1944 about the 'pop guns', meaning the .303 machine guns, on Bomber Command aircraft.

Almost every account I've read from the men of Bomber Command reinforces the idea that firing their defensive argument was a last resort, only when they saw a night fighter lining up an attack. It would be combined with evasive manoeuvres. They all seem to have thought that firing their guns otherwise simply gave away their position.
I have read and heard several accounts of instances when a night fighter was seen, but as it clearly was unaware of the bomber it was not engaged. It's only fair to say I know of one instance when a Lancaster actively pursued a Ju 88, but this was very much the exception.

From the other side, most night fighter pilots took the fire from the bomber as a sure indication that they had been seen and would break off to find a less alert target.

Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Jan 8, 2015)

Of course Bomber Command night ops were an entirely different threat environment compared to the USAAF's daylight raids. It probably wouldn't have been too difficult to design new turrets with 50cal machine guns for fitment to RAF heavy bombers but, as we've noted, the change probably wouldn't have qualitatively improved an aircraft's defences.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 8, 2015)

Early on, the B-17 had a reputation with the Luftwaffe as the "fliegendes Stachelschwein" - "Flying Porcupine". The Luftwaffe went to great lengths to defeat the B-17's (and to a certain degree: the B-24) defensive armament. You may have seen photos of the wire-frame "defensive cones" on scale models of B-17s and B-24s in use by the Luftwaffe flight school.

The Germans didn't go to such lengths with the RAF bombers, nor did they show as much concern with the U.S. medium bombers.

As the Germans refined their methods, Boeing countered that...this is why the B-17 grew to the 13 MGs of the B-17G. The chin turret of the B-17F (late) and B-17G actually coming from the B-40 gunship.




buffnut453 said:


> For example, only one gun of the 3 in the noses of the B-17F and B-24D could be fired at one time because there was only one guy in there to do the shooting.


On the contrary, there was room and the Bombadier and the Navigator manned the foreward (nose - cheek) MG positions. The Engineer manned the dorsal turret and the Radio Operator manned the spine position.

And I'll do a little looking through my archives, as I have a photo of two crewmen manning the cheek MGs, it's a bit grainy/fuzzy, since the photo was taken during combat by a "ghost rider".


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## drgondog (Jan 8, 2015)

Balljoint said:


> There’s a good bit of truth to the long-range vs short range fighter capability. However, when the interceptor is tasked with avoiding the escort and reaching the bombers, the balance changes. With dissimilar resources, both people and material, the balance further changes. This wasn’t apparent in early 1941. The ugly duckling P-51A was not left to fade away only by its improbable conversion to the A-36.
> 
> If foresight is lacking, it helps to be agile –and lucky- on the rebound.



It wasn't going to fade. Arnold was just looking for a contract vehicle to continue the P-51 production line. He was already receiving very strong recommendations for the Rolls Royce/RAF modification of the Mark I to the Mark X. Funds were available for a dive bomber without having to go through the politicized Procurement Board. The A-36 and P-51A contracts were let just before the RAF proposal to install the Merlin after Harker flew it on April 30. June saw the contract for the P-51A which stipulated the authority to convert the balance of the P-51A contract to the P-51B contract, to be let in August. 

The P-51A contract was perhaps the most important because it funded high production tooling. The original 1200 order was reduced to 310 P-51A and the balance was funneled into the P-51B order.


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## stona (Jan 8, 2015)

This report is fairly typical.
The Luftwaffe pilots were wary of the defensive fire from the bomber formations, but they would invariably press home attacks on unescorted formations.
This was not the case, particularly late in the war, when escort fighters were present as evidenced by PoW interrogations and wireless intercepts.











Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Jan 8, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The Luftwaffe went to great lengths to defeat the B-17's (and to a certain degree: the B-24) defensive armament. You may have seen photos of the wire-frame "defensive cones" on scale models of B-17s and B-24s in use by the Luftwaffe flight school.



Then again the RAF's bombers didn't have "defensive cones" in the way that USAAF bombers did. The rear turret on RAF heavy bombers could traverse more than 180 degrees and had greater elevation and depression than the rear guns on either the B-17 or the B-24. Same-same for the RAF front turret compared to the nose guns in the B-17F and B-24D.

For your latter point, fair enough...so 2 guns out of 3 could be fired. That's still one gun flopping around doing nothing. Also, changing from one gun to another with 2 crewmen in the nose would have been sporting given the "cosy" accommodations. Again, this is more than just a gun count...it's about applying effective fire on the attacking aircraft.


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## Glider (Jan 8, 2015)

MikeGazdik said:


> The great thread on "Innovative to Obsolete" made me think of this question and I didn't want to muddle up that topic.
> 
> Did the RAF have a design or an airplane that could perform the duties the Mustang ended up performing? I know the RAF mostly carried out the night-time bombing of the Third Reich and I guess (ignorant on the information here) they didn't utilize escorts on these missions.
> 
> Were they working on, or did they have, a daytime long ranger fighter?


Apologies for being late into the thread but in 1944 the RAF did at least one daylight raid from the UK to the Rhur using Halifax bombers escorted by Tempests. The Tempest didn't have the range of the P51 but it had sufficient range to escort raids capable of inflicting significant damage.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 9, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> The 170 gal tank was also drop-able. For the Spitfire there was also a possibility of having an under-seat fuel tank installed (closer to the CoG than the rear fuel tank), used on some early PR machines? .


Not once you put the radio IFF gear back in, plus armour, which the P.R. aircraft normally didn't carry.


> There was also possibility of 10 extra gals in the front tank(s), that was used to that cause in Mk VIII and modified Mk IXs, among other


If you mean the tanks in the leading edges, they couldn't be fitted to the V, and were only on the VII, VIII, XIV XVIII, not the IX (or XVI for that matter.)


> The de Havilland 2-pitch prop was installed in a number of Spitfires prior ww2 broke out, there is a picture of such Spitfire Is at the Morgan Shacklady book, pg. 54, dated 8th June 1939. Constant speed props were installed in 1940?


The props were fitted by de Havilland teams, travelling across the country, just before the start of the Battle.

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## tomo pauk (Jan 9, 2015)

> If you mean the tanks in the leading edges, they couldn't be fitted to the V, and were only on the VII, VIII, XIV XVIII, not the IX (or XVI for that matter.)



Not the LE tanks, but increase in front fuel tank (lower?) volume; total fuel carried between pilot and engine was increased to 96 imp gals; tests of the modifications were carried out in second half of 1944. The Mk. VII and it's 'kin' received the same modification in late 1942.
Kindly provided by our member glider:


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## Shortround6 (Jan 9, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> The props were fitted by de Havilland teams, travelling across the country, just before the start of the Battle.



I believe that is partially part of the Spitfire 'legend'. There is little doubt that de Havilland teams did travel the country either fitting _'new'_ props or modifying the 2 pitch props to constant speed. The two pitch prop already had the pitch change mechanism. it needed a governor/control mechanism/system. The Legend rather ignores the The Spitfires and Hurricanes that had been built _with_ Rotol propellers. The de Havilland teams (and squadron mechanics who did most of the conversions after being shown how by the de Havilland teams) did perform a valuable service in bringing large numbers of the older Spitfires (and Hurricanes) up to the newer standard. 

There seems to be a bit of confusion as to what was happening when. At least two squadrons (19 and 54) had gotten their hands on a least a few Rotol Spitfires by Dec of 1939 even though the RAE _completed_ a performance report in March of 1940.
The RAE compared a Rotol Spitfire to captured Bf 109 in June of 1940 yet a letter from air vice -marshal H.R. Nicholl on June 16 1940 states that to his understanding no Spitfires on the Supermarine production line had Rotol propellers. 
Perhaps Supermarine was using DH props and a shadow factory was using Rotol props?

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## stona (Jan 9, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> .
> Perhaps Supermarine was using DH props and a shadow factory was using Rotol props?



What shadow factory in June 1940? 

A handful were built by Morris around this time, Castle Bromwich didn't produce a Spitfire until July.

Cheers

Steve


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## stubbsy (Jan 9, 2015)

A very interesting file ref picture. Do you know date were the figures provided, as Leigh-Mallory told Portal, on 14/10/1943, [ref AHB The Planning and Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Landings in Normandy (Air Ministry) Appendix I/53, Air 41/66 TNA] that the Spitfire IX, modified with the 45 gal tank, would only have a combat range of 230 miles?

The first American trial on their 'Wright Field' modified Spitfire IX achieved ranges of 1365 and 1241 miles at cruise speeds of 264 and 306 mph respectively, on 29 May 1944, see attached






Later anticipated Vickers modified Spitfire ranges (after the American trials but before Dec 1944) are shown here:


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 9, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The Legend rather ignores the The Spitfires and Hurricanes that had been built _with_ Rotol propellers.
> There seems to be a bit of confusion as to what was happening when. At least two squadrons (19 and 54) had gotten their hands on a least a few Rotol Spitfires by Dec of 1939 even though the RAE _completed_ a performance report in March of 1940.?


I don't know where that came from, but Rotol didn't start manufacturing wooden propeller blades until mid-1940.




The Spitfire was even later, largely because it remained here:-


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## drgondog (Jan 9, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> A very interesting file ref picture. Do you know date were the figures provided, as Leigh-Mallory told Portal, on 14/10/1943, [ref AHB The Planning and Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Landings in Normandy (Air Ministry) Appendix I/53, Air 41/66 TNA] that the Spitfire IX, modified with the 45 gal tank, would only have a combat range of 230 miles?
> 
> The first American trial on their 'Wright Field' modified Spitfire IX achieved ranges of 1365 and 1241 miles at cruise speeds of 264 and 306 mph respectively, on 29 May 1944, see attached
> View attachment 281634
> ...



Combat radius is usually defined by the constraints applied when all external stores are ejected and the aircraft must return solely on the fuel remaining internally. In other words, far less than a straight line, unmolested, ferry flight during which minimal internal fuel is consumed before switching to externals, cruising at best Crusie settings and altitude until the end of the supply is reached.


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## pbehn (Jan 9, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> Really? So the Stirling, Halifax MkI and MkIII and Lancaster MkII had liquid-cooled engines? Who'd've thunked that?!!
> 
> As for "weak defensive armament", I'll accept that the .303 was less capable than a 50 cal but human-trained weapons, whether in a power turret or on a swivel mount, aren't the most accurate gunnery platform so the likelihood of a successful "kill" is probably about the same for either weapon. The RAF bomber's primary weakness was the lack of a ventral turret but in overall guns-per-aircraft and the employment method of those guns were about on par, if not ahead, of the US aircraft for much of the war...at least until the deployment of the B-17G.



I discounted the Stirling as it was a sitting duck on night time raids I doubt if the LW would bother doing anything except keeping the box tight to allow ground fire to blow them away. How many of the 7,400 lancs had air cooled engines 350? 400? The Halifax had approx 30% with hercules engines and what does that mean? How do you make a protective formation with so many different aircraft, the only answer is to fly at the speed and altitude of the lowest performer. Add in the loss of speed and altitude of a ventral turret if fitted to some or all and there is no way the British could mount a daylight campaign without crippling losses. The USA took a time out and came back with a new bomber force and escort fighter force.

I accept the technical argument about gun sights, if you accept that the gunner aims and hits a target. In most cases they fire in the general direction and someone gets a lucky hit, in that case the sight doesn't matter it is the effectiveness of the round.


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## Juha (Jan 9, 2015)

ORBs show the early use of the Rotol propellers in Spits and Rotol had begun the large scale production of its CS propellers with magnesium alloy blades in early 1939 according to an article in 23 March 39 Flight magazine.

Juha


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## Juha (Jan 9, 2015)

pbehn said:


> ... In most cases they fire in the general direction and someone gets a lucky hit, in that case the sight doesn't matter it is the effectiveness of the round.



Source for that, please. Gunners were trained to use their sights and aim individual targets. When Me 262s and Me 163s arrived, they were too fast for the gunnery systems of B-17s and -24s and because of that a sector firing system was developed but before that gunners used aimed fire, at least the turret gunners who were fairly well trained to do just that. And with four faster firing mgs one could put more bullets into target area than with two slower firing. That said IMHO in daylight 2 x .5 was more effective than 4 x .303 against aerial targets. The difference during night probably wasn't so clear because normally short firing distances. One good point in the .5 was its long range.


Juha


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## stona (Jan 10, 2015)

Juha said:


> One good point in the .5 was its long range.
> Juha



Yes but the range of a weapon and the range at which a well trained operator can actually hit anything with it are not the same thing.

Just blazing away in daylight did not work and neither can aircraft carry the amounts of ammunition required to maintain that sort of defence. Experienced Luftwaffe pilots simply used the visible tracer to work out which areas were covered by defensive fire, and presumably avoid them.

At night firing in the general direction of the approaching fighter was often effective. The fighters were looking for a stealthy kill and a bomber that fired at them had obviously seen them. For most night fighter pilots following a corkscrewing bomber, keeping it in sight and manoeuvring into a position to hit it whilst risking return fire was a difficult and dangerous prospect. Far easier to find a less aware target, and there were plenty available in the bomber stream.

Cheers

Steve


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 10, 2015)

Juha said:


> ORBs show the early use of the Rotol propellers in Spits and Rotol had begun the large scale production of its CS propellers with magnesium alloy blades in early 1939 according to an article in 23 March 39 Flight magazine.


Which ones, in particular? In all the ORBs I've read, the propeller never gets a mention, and the only Rotol fitted to (late) Spitfire Is, is the 3-blade 2-pitch Jablo, which wasn't available before 1940.
Some may take the word of the press; I prefer government records:-


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## Elmas (Jan 10, 2015)

And the probability to hit something decrease with distance very, very rapidly....


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## tomo pauk (Jan 10, 2015)

The heavy MG might be better off in hitting something vulnerable, after it punctures the target aircraft skin?


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## stona (Jan 10, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> The heavy MG might be better off in hitting something vulnerable, after it punctures the target aircraft skin?



The problem is hitting the target in the first place. What might or might not subsequently happen isn't the point.

I'd be amazed if the US waist gunners firing over open sights ever hit anything. At least the gunners using computing sights had a chance, up to the limiting range of the sights. I doubt any reliable statistics exist given the level of over claiming by everyone on all sides who had his finger on any kind of trigger.

Cheers

Steve

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## Mike Williams (Jan 10, 2015)

Regarding the constant speed propeller discussion:














































































































































Pitch Panic, Flight, 9 December 1943

The Latest Rotol Airscrew, Flight, 23 May 1940

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## tomo pauk (Jan 10, 2015)

Kudos, Mike 

Granted, the accuracy of the bomber's return fire was abysmal. Dozens, if not hundreds of guns that might be firing on the interceptor were still a dangerous thing, though. 
That prompted various increases in the protection for the Fw-190s (even adding the armored ammo boxes in wings), thus adding the weight to the interceptors. Eventually the Fw-190A-8 lost plenty of performance virtues held by earlier, lighter 190s, thus becoming an even lighter prey to the LR fighters. That is before we even start talking about the 'Sturmbock' examples.

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## Shortround6 (Jan 10, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Which ones, in particular? In all the ORBs I've read, the propeller never gets a mention, and the only Rotol fitted to (late) Spitfire Is, is the 3-blade 2-pitch Jablo, which wasn't available before 1940.
> Some may take the word of the press; I prefer government records:-



pages on Mike Williams site:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/19sqdn-orb-nov39.jpg
Operations record book-No. 19 Squadron collected _one_ Rotol Spitfire Nov 1st. for flying and reliability trials. 
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no54-orb-rotol.jpg
Operations record book-No. 54 Squadron collected 6 Rotol Spitfires on 10/12/39. Three more on 12/12/39. One more on 13/12/39/ and another on 14/12/39.

Spitfire Mk I N.3171 Trials Report
RAE test report of Spitifire I with Rotol propeller, report is dated 19/3/40. Flying was done when?

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/spitfire-1-me109e-rae-comptrials.jpg
Undated on the page but Mr. Williams is claiming that report is from June of 1940. 

Something was going on, perhaps just very small batches? Perhaps Bomber Command was hogging what Rotol propellers there were?
DH had been making constant speed propellers for a number of years. Until the Summer of 1940 they had been being fitted to mainly bombers and a few fighter prototypes. In part this was "policy" as the constant speed "equipment" that could change a 2 pitch prop to constant speed was heavier and more expensive than the two pitch control even though they used the same hub and blades. 
DH certainly stepped up and did an amazing job with the conversions but the idea that the idea for constant speed props on fighters came out of the blue needs a little looking at. As does the idea/legend that DH pulled this ALL out of a hat in just 2-3 weeks. Part of the "hat" was a re-allocation of materials and labor from other contracts-projects. The provision of the constant speed units to the fighters was of great importance and perhaps some bombers had to wait a few weeks for propellers until things got straightened out? Apparently (press not government document) _some_ of the machinery from the Gypsy engine line was used to make parts for the conversions.


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## stona (Jan 10, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Granted, the accuracy of the bomber's return fire was abysmal. Dozens, if not hundreds of guns that might be firing on the interceptor were still a dangerous thing, though.
> That prompted various increases in the protection for the Fw-190s (even adding the armored ammo boxes in wings), thus adding the weight to the interceptors. Eventually the Fw-190A-8 lost plenty of performance virtues held by earlier, lighter 190s, thus becoming an even lighter prey to the LR fighters. That is before we even start talking about the 'Sturmbock' examples.



I'm not suggesting that the defensive fire from the bombers was not a concern to the Luftwaffe. Having read many accounts from the men attacking the bombers it obviously was. The issue is range and in excess of around 600m the defensive fire became inaccurate and inefficient. It might have scared or deterred the less experienced attacker and many did open fire at extreme range, but not a determined expert.To be sure of destroying a bomber the attacking fighter would need to close to well within the 600m effective range of the defensive fire and that is why they became more and more heavily armoured and why the Luftwaffe attempted the development and installation of ever more long ranged weapon systems.

There is a well known reel of gun camera footage from the 'Schiesschule der Luftwaffe' compiled in July 1944 showing numerous attacks. In all the beam, quarter, rear or rear and under attacks the fighter breaks off ('abgang' on the captions) at between 400m and 50m. Somewhere around 200m is about the normal, well within the effective range of the bomber's defensive fire.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Jan 10, 2015)

Juha said:


> Source for that, please. Gunners were trained to use their sights and aim individual targets. When Me 262s and Me 163s arrived, they were too fast for the gunnery systems of B-17s and -24s and because of that a sector firing system was developed but before that gunners used aimed fire, at least the turret gunners who were fairly well trained to do just that. And with four faster firing mgs one could put more bullets into target area than with two slower firing. That said IMHO in daylight 2 x .5 was more effective than 4 x .303 against aerial targets. The difference during night probably wasn't so clear because normally short firing distances. One good point in the .5 was its long range.
> 
> 
> Juha



I have several sources, the first is other posts on this thread, second is the historical need for an escort, third is the statistics of guns and bomber escort. You can read the other posts and the historical need of an escort for WW2 daylight bombers is a "given".

on point 3
consider a marksman with a rifle, to hit, at 600 yards, a man on a horse (man or horse) with a rifle without a telescopic sight would be a fantastic shot. To hit the same man on a galloping horse would be unbelievable. Now put the marksman on a vibrating platform moving in all directions by small amounts and change the man on the horse for an aircraft which relative to the marksman can be doing zero MPH or 600 MPH (200 MPH bomber speed and 400 mph fighter speed in opposite directions) and also it can move in any direction. Additionally in a dorsal or ventral turret the wind speed varies from approximately 200mph head wind, tail wind, side wind and the effect of gravity varies from maximum in a horizontal shot to zero on a vertical shot. The use of a machine gun instead of a rifle is to compensate for inaccuracy, a sniper always uses a single shot rifle.

It is commonly said that a fighter attacking a box of B17s faced a minimum of 100 guns. Those guns were firing a minimum of 10 round per second. If 1000 rounds per second were targeted with anything like accuracy then an escort would not be required. Not to take away from the bravery and courage of the guys who did the business and bought our freedom with their lives but the fact is the gun systems just threw bullets in a general direction. If you consider the speeds involved the aiming and traversing systems used then the defence amounts to little better than early bombing at night or through cloud. The firepower of a bomber box was in theory enough to provide almost complete protection but in practice it wasn't, because the defensive guns could not be brought to bear with anything like the accuracy required.


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## Juha (Jan 10, 2015)

Hello pbehn
so you don't have sources to back up your claim. The need of an escort rose from the inherent advantages of fighters over bombers but that is a different thing than your claim that the gunners didn't aim to individual attacker. And why the LW adopted the more difficult head on attack over the tradiotional stern attack after first contacts with B-17 formations? Why they shunned down individual attacks against the USAAF heavybomber formations and went to formation head-on attacks? If 10 or 25 fighters attacked line abreast there weren't 100 mgs firing at each of them.


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## rank amateur (Jan 11, 2015)

Gentleman, allow me to compliment each and everyone of you about the quality of this thread. There is enough good stuff here to inspire 3 books I would love to purchase.

Chrzzzz


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## stona (Jan 11, 2015)

pbehn said:


> consider a marksman with a rifle, to hit, at 600 yards, a man on a horse (man or horse) with a rifle without a telescopic sight would be a fantastic shot. To hit the same man on a galloping horse would be unbelievable. Now put the marksman on a vibrating platform moving in all directions by small amounts and change the man on the horse for an aircraft which relative to the marksman can be doing zero MPH or 600 MPH (200 MPH bomber speed and 400 mph fighter speed in opposite directions) and also it can move in any direction. Additionally in a dorsal or ventral turret the wind speed varies from approximately 200mph head wind, tail wind, side wind and the effect of gravity varies from maximum in a horizontal shot to zero on a vertical shot. The use of a machine gun instead of a rifle is to compensate for inaccuracy, a sniper always uses a single shot rifle.



A man using a computing gun sight in a turret is not having to make all those complicated calculations and compensations himself. The analogy to a marksman using an iron or optical sight is not relevant. This is also why I said above that I'd be amazed if the gunners in a US bomber who were using iron sights ever hit anything.

The use of an automatic weapon rather than a single shot in the context of aerial combat is not to compensate for inaccuracy. It is to try to ensure enough hits to destroy the target. One hit will knock a man of a horse, it almost certainly won't knock an attacking fighter out of the sky.
The British leapt through all sorts of hoops in the 1930s to work out how many rifle calibre machine guns were required in their fighters to ensure enough hits on a bomber (their intended target) to destroy it with a two second burst. It's why the Spitfire and Hurricane carried eight machine guns.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 11, 2015)

I have often wondered if a semi fixed armament was considered. Work out what position in the Box the bomber would be in and set each gun to only fire in one direction. Set the guns of the whole Box of bombers so that an attacking fighter has to fly through at least several streams of bullets to get into a firing position. The gunner doesnt aim the gun he simply fires on command of a lead gunner and obviously doesnt fire if he is in danger of hitting a friendly. If the bomber becomes detached from the box or loses its position obviously the gunner would be able to take over and use his sights. It would have taken fantastic organisation and flight and crew discipline for it to work and I can see many drawbacks but someone must have thought of it.


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## stona (Jan 11, 2015)

You'd need thousands of guns to cover all the sky through which fighters could approach. 

The fields of fire you propose are fixed and predictable, to the Luftwaffe as well. 

Aircraft cannot carry enough ammunition to lay down what an infantryman would call supressing fire for more than a few minutes, never mind the hours they might be exposed to attack. There were many instances of bombers running out of ammunition as it was, and also carrying more than officially permitted. This when individual gunners were only engaging individual targets.

The bomber 'boxes' actually encompassed _far_ more sky than most imagine and flying the kind of formations proposed is impractical. The 54 aircraft of a wing box occupied a volume of sky about 1000m vertically, 650m across and over 2000m deep. 

The command and control required for such a scheme was beyond the technology of the day.

What would the psychological effect be on a gunner who could not swing his gun to follow a target attempting to kill him, how ever ineffective his fire actually was ?

Apart from that it's a brilliant scheme 

Cheers

Steve


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## Elmas (Jan 11, 2015)

In my youth I had the pleasure to have long chats with a former RAF Navigator that flew in Lancs during the war. 
In this photo taken not far from Tobruk, 1967, he is in the upper row, third from left.







A thing that I clearly remember is the very poor consideration he had about YB 40s.....


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## BiffF15 (Jan 11, 2015)

stona said:


> A man using a computing gun sight in a turret is not having to make all those complicated calculations and compensations himself. The analogy to a marksman using an iron or optical sight is not relevant. This is also why I said above that I'd be amazed if the gunners in a US bomber who were using iron sights ever hit anything.
> 
> The use of an automatic weapon rather than a single shot in the context of aerial combat is not to compensate for inaccuracy. It is to try to ensure enough hits to destroy the target. One hit will knock a man of a horse, it almost certainly won't knock an attacking fighter out of the sky.
> The British leapt through all sorts of hoops in the 1930s to work out how many rifle calibre machine guns were required in their fighters to ensure enough hits on a bomber (their intended target) to destroy it with a two second burst. It's why the Spitfire and Hurricane carried eight machine guns.
> ...



Steve,

Pardon my lack of knowledge on this, but did any of the bombers have computing gun sights for the turret mounted guns? I know that the B-29 had a fire control system (GE IIRC) which I "think" had some sort of compensated aiming system (since the gunner was not in the turret or looking down the barrel). 

As for the offensive perspective (fighter pilot / plane) I have been operating under the assumption that tracer rounds were put in to help the pilot "fly" his rounds onto the target. Is that a good assumption? Also reference the 600 yard sniper shot versus a fighter firing his weapons there are some pro's con's there. First, a sniper is usually shooting at something stationary from a stationary position using an advanced sighting system with no bullet dispersion. Prior to the lead computing gun sight fighter guys were doing a bit of Kentucky windage with a dynamic (moving) gun platform against a dynamic target with feedback coming from tracer rounds and or strikes on the target aircraft (with the target sometimes obscured by the nose of the aircraft) with a weapon that has some bullet dispersion (inaccuracy) built in. 

The problem in my opine was teaching guys how to hit what they were shooting at. Modern fighters have a feedback mechanism built into the Heads Up Display (HUD) or Helmet (F35) that will teach you where to point in order to properly lead fire and compensate so that when you don't have a radar lock you can still hit something. It's actually quite simple as it often boils down to "put him here and squeeze the trigger" and you will hit him. I do have the luxury of having been "trained" with both radar feedback as well as a computing (no radar lock) gun sight video, which means I'm looking "backwards" at their problem. However, if a guy watched a lot of successful guns tracking films I think he would have been able to increase his accuracy. 

Cheers,
Biff


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## stona (Jan 11, 2015)

They did. It was manufactured by Sperry and designated (from memory) K-4, but I can't look up the details at the moment. It was supposed to be saved from the ball turret in the event that it had to be jettisoned, so the Air Force put considerable value on them.
The K-4 was a genuine computing gun sight, not like the earlier compensating sights.
Cheers
Steve

Edit:
I guess this is the bit that was supposed to be saved.


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## stona (Jan 11, 2015)

BiffF15 said:


> As for the offensive perspective (fighter pilot / plane) I have been operating under the assumption that tracer rounds were put in to help the pilot "fly" his rounds onto the target. Is that a good assumption? Prior to the lead computing gun sight fighter guys were doing a bit of Kentucky windage with a dynamic (moving) gun platform against a dynamic target with feedback coming from tracer rounds and or strikes on the target aircraft (with the target sometimes obscured by the nose of the aircraft) with a weapon that has some bullet dispersion (inaccuracy) built in.
> Cheers,
> Biff



That's correct. I'm not sure that there was always time to 'walk' the projectiles to the target but they were certainly to indicate where the fire was going.

The biggest problem in gunnery training for all air forces before the more sophisticated sights arrived in fighters towards the end of the war was teaching pilots to estimate angle off and hence the required deflection. The second and nearly equally serious problem was estimating range to the target.

The first RAF gun camera footage showed that on average pilots were under estimating angle off by at least 50%. Unsurprisingly they couldn't hit anything with any kind of deflection shot and this is reinforced by research carried out on downed Luftwaffe aircraft which showed that the vast majority of strikes were fired from within 10 degrees of dead astern.
These are examples of exercises and examples which an RAF pilot was supposed to complete in an effort to help him better estimate those two most important parameters, angle off and range.











For a waist gunner in a US bomber the target, or attacking fighter(s) would most likely be following some kind of pursuit curve and at some considerable speed relative to the bomber. I reckon that makes it a nigh on impossible target for someone firing over iron sights whilst battling the slip stream of his own aircraft.

I've seen gun camera footage of Luftwaffe fighters making all sorts of attacks, but head on seems to minimise the chance of being hit by the bombers defensive fire whilst also making for a very short window in which the fighter can engage. Obviously the Luftwaffe 'shooting school' film only shows the ones where the fighters hit the bomber, usually in the cockpit area.

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Jan 11, 2015)



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## BiffF15 (Jan 11, 2015)

Steve,

The three things needed to effectively employ the gun is, "in range, in plane and in lead". 

Here is a pretty good paper on the K-14. Of note is the pictures on the last page showing how to track a target once you have the wingspan / sight dialed in. If you look at the pictures you will also notice a small plus sign, which according to the paper is called the cross. 

In the aircraft I have flown that is the point where the guns are harmonized, or where the bullets will be at a certain range. In the F-15 the gun is in the right wing root, canted up and in, and the bullets hit that cross at a known range at 1g.

The way to use the cross with the computing gun sight on is to put it (the gun cross) in front of the target (in lead), along in his plane of motion, IOW "in plane" (or along his flight path), with him filling the sight (in range). 

To determine his plane of motion draw an imaginary line from his tail through the prop hub out the front and beyond (it's where he is flying). In use, with the gun sight in computing mode, imagine and elastic string going from the gun cross to the reticle. If you pull positive g's, the gun sight will move away from the cross as if pulled down (it is compensating for a higher g, which requires being further in lead to hit the target). If you push forward on the stick it will move closer to the gun cross.

Practical use will eventually get a shooter to where he dail in the size, then will put the cross in lead on the bandits flight path, put the pipper over his cockpit, wait one second and then squeeze the trigger. As with shooting a gun, one must be smooth on the trigger as you can actually be too aggressive when "pulling" the trigger to cause a miss. It's called squeeze to remind you to be gentle or smooth.

It sounds like a LOT to do, but you can get good at it quickly with practice. I will never forget the first time I merged head on with a different type of plane (F-16C), maneuvered to a guns position, and whaled on him. 

There is no kill like a guns kill.

Cheers,
Biff

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## stona (Jan 11, 2015)

It's easy to see why gunnery accuracy increased so much with the introduction of the more sophisticated gun sights. Many pilots simply couldn't make the correct and by no means easy calculations/estimations themselves.
There were few successful WW2 pilots in the early years who employed deflection shooting. They simply out flew or surprised their targets and engaged from minimal angle off hence minimising or eliminating the deflection required.
There were of course some notable exceptions. Many of Marseille's comrades commented on his ability to score hits at high angles off for example.
Cheers
Steve


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## BiffF15 (Jan 11, 2015)

The guys who could shoot high deflection shots probably shot skeet, or hunted birds (practiced lead computing). Same concept, shoot where the target will be in a moment and if you time it right there will be a collision of rounds / pellets and the target. The slower the target the closer to its nose you shoot, the faster it's going the farther ahead you shoot (range also factors into this). 

Some guys quickly master the "be the plane", and learn to aim it instinctively. Others require some practice, and a few never really get it.

From what I have read of Marseille he was quite a shot (I wonder if he hunted prior to the military), plus he did "min range maneuvering" and employment. The process which was described sounded to me like a guy doing a methodical training to define the inner edge of what he and his machine could do. 

The high angle (high aspect) shots aren't hard after some practice. The downside to them is the amount of rounds you will get on target do to it's rapid movement through your shower of lead. Stabilized shots (you have closure under control, in range, plane and in lead) are the best for achieving a kill however you have to be cognizant of foreign object debris(FOD)from his plane hitting yours (even more so for jets as their engines really only like air going through them).

High angle shots are also good for when you are leaving the fight. Maximize heading crossing angle, shoot at him to get him off his game, and select full power and leave using gravity if required to help build speed / increase range.

Cheers,
Biff


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## Juha (Jan 11, 2015)

Hello Biff
in fact RAF got its first pre-production gyro sights, Mk I GGS, in 1941 but after trying FC turned it down because it was a bit like a scope and so it was thought it gave too restrictive view for a fighter pilot, BC turned it down because it didn't suite for night use but some CC sqns elected to use it. BC began fairly widespread use of the improved GGS Mk IIC gyro sight in early 45, it was a turret version of the Mk IID, which also USAAF accepted as K-14 and USN as Mk 18 sight. 

Juha

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## stona (Jan 11, 2015)

I'd like to point out from a jingoistic point of view that the Sperry K-14 was a US version of the Gyro Gun Sight Mk II developed in the UK by Ferranti 

By 29th May 1944 300 Mk IX Spitfires were fitted with the Mk II gun sight. Installation was not easy, requiring various 'black boxes' and a new throttle system with the control that altered the diameter of the sighting graticule (to match the wingspan of the target aircraft) on it. The wingspan had been entered in the sighting system and thus the sight could calculate the range.

The gyroscope measured the attacking aircraft's rate of turn which is proportional to the deflection required to make a successful shot. A mirror tilted to move the sighting graticule to allow for this deflection.

For the result see the K-14 attachment in Biff's post above.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Jan 11, 2015)

Juha said:


> Hello pbehn
> so you don't have sources to back up your claim. The need of an escort rose from the inherent advantages of fighters over bombers but that is a different thing than your claim that the gunners didn't aim to individual attacker. And why the LW adopted the more difficult head on attack over the tradiotional stern attack after first contacts with B-17 formations? Why they shunned down individual attacks against the USAAF heavybomber formations and went to formation head-on attacks? If 10 or 25 fighters attacked line abreast there weren't 100 mgs firing at each of them.



The company front head on attacks were as much a response to the escorts as bomber defensive fire and from posts I have read here were in retrospect probably a mistake.
Are you saying that using 25 fighters to attack a formation of 1000 bombers is "ungentlemanly conduct" Squadrons of fighters fight together, 25 fighters is half of the Big Wing used by the RAF in 1940.


If the guns were aimed as accurately as you say then they would hit the target frequently and an escort would not be required because any aircraft coming within 600 yards would be hit and between 5 and 8 hits (I read here) would normally destroy the attacker. Despite all the "computerized" gun sights no deep penetration raid was attempted after the disastrous losses suffered. That you could say is my "source"

I didnt mean that bullets were thrown up at random but that the aiming even with so called computerised sights was not good enough to hit enough fighters to repel attacks, again I say that if the aiming was accurate an escort would not be needed, it was introduced because a bombers defensive fire was not as good as everyone from the "bomber doctrine" thought it would be. In this conflict it was hard for a bomber to destroy a LW plane and even harder to kill a LW pilot but relatively easy for a LW fighter to destroy a bomber and crew. Germany was losing the war but without escort fighters they would have won the daylight bombing battle IMO.

As far as night fighter defense goes I think a different game played out. A night fighter was in a different position, it is almost impossible to make a forced landing at night and parachuting out in complete darkness is no picnic either, any bomber showing an alert rear gunner was avoided and an easier target looked for. Schrage music put an end to that.


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## pbehn (Jan 11, 2015)

stona said:


> A man using a computing gun sight in a turret is not having to make all those complicated calculations and compensations himself. The analogy to a marksman using an iron or optical sight is not relevant. This is also why I said above that I'd be amazed if the gunners in a US bomber who were using iron sights ever hit anything.
> 
> The use of an automatic weapon rather than a single shot in the context of aerial combat is not to compensate for inaccuracy. It is to try to ensure enough hits to destroy the target. One hit will knock a man of a horse, it almost certainly won't knock an attacking fighter out of the sky.
> The British leapt through all sorts of hoops in the 1930s to work out how many rifle calibre machine guns were required in their fighters to ensure enough hits on a bomber (their intended target) to destroy it with a two second burst. It's why the Spitfire and Hurricane carried eight machine guns.
> ...



I agree steve but even with the assisted aiming it just decreased a very large margin of error. The most sophisticated system was on the B29 which could concentrate 3 turrets on one target, good if it is working and targeted well but if it isnt then all three are off target. I am well aware of the discussions about how many hits were required to take down a bomber. There was a very informative diagram posted here about harmonisation of guns on RAF fighters. The RAF and the FAA had different philosophies, do you concentrate the fire on a single point 200 or 400 yards ahead or have the guns firing in a pattern so you get some hits based on the accuracy of the average pilot. That is on guns nominally all firing in the same direction, do you try to hit a point and destroy it or lay out an area of fire to have the best possibility of serious damage.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 11, 2015)

pbehn said:


> I discounted the Stirling as it was a sitting duck on night time raids I doubt if the LW would bother doing anything except keeping the box tight to allow ground fire to blow them away. How many of the 7,400 lancs had air cooled engines 350? 400? The Halifax had approx 30% with hercules engines and what does that mean? How do you make a protective formation with so many different aircraft, the only answer is to fly at the speed and altitude of the lowest performer. Add in the loss of speed and altitude of a ventral turret if fitted to some or all and there is no way the British could mount a daylight campaign without crippling losses. The USA took a time out and came back with a new bomber force and escort fighter force.
> 
> I accept the technical argument about gun sights, if you accept that the gunner aims and hits a target. In most cases they fire in the general direction and someone gets a lucky hit, in that case the sight doesn't matter it is the effectiveness of the round.



Just because you "discounted the Stirling" doesn't make your statement about all RAF heavy bombers having in-line engines any more correct. Rather like your question on "How do you make a protective formation with so many different aircraft?" Bomber Command didn't fly in formation during night missions because it was impossible. I also fail to understand the point you're trying to make with "there is no way the British could mount a daylight campaign without crippling losses". The RAF had already decided that daylight operations were impractical, hence the switch to night ops. There was never any consideration of flying in daylight.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 12, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> The RAF had already decided that daylight operations were impractical, hence the switch to night ops. There was never any consideration of flying in daylight.


The first bombing missions by BC were in fact, daylight raids. And they suffered terribly for a couple reasons:
First, this was early in the war and BC was using older types (Battles, Wellingtons, and so on).
Secondly, they were unescorted in airspace that was, at this stage of the war, dominated by the Luftwaffe.

Virtually all of the daylight missions BC conducted ended with a serious mauling of the bombers.

Even later, when the USAAF initially started thier daylight mission3, they suffered such losses that the missions were stopped while the brass evaluated the situation.

The RAF's decision to move their bombing missions to night-time was a sound move, but it wasn't the original plan.


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## Airframes (Jan 12, 2015)

RAF Bomber Command carried out quite a number of daylight missions later in the war, with 'heavies', apart from the costly Augsburg and Le Cruesot ops, albeit in more favourable conditions, due to Allied air superiority. Although Harris fought against it, his Command was tasked with transport and troop targets, as well as 'No Ball' sites, prior to D-Day, and a continuing campaign after June 6th, 1944, against troop concentrations, transport etc., which involved quite large daylight 'gaggles', not all of which were fully escorted.


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## stona (Jan 12, 2015)

Head on attacks were adopted by some Luftwaffe units because of the bombers defensive , it had nothing to do with escort fighters. 

This method of minimised two factors, the number of guns the formation could bring to bear on the attacker(s) and the time of exposure to those weapons. Both these work in favour of the attacker. It also minimised the time that the attacker could line up and engage his target. This made it a difficult attack to carry out successfully particularly for less experienced pilots. This worked in favour of the bombers.

Having a computing sight of the type used in WW2 does not guarantee hits on the target. It had to be used correctly, tracking the target smoothly for long enough for the computing to be done, and various inputs had to be made correctly too. It was by no means a simple or fool proof system.

Not everyone thought a head on attack was a good idea, particularly flying an Me 262 when the closing speed must have been astronomical!

_"I did not understand the attack tactics of many other pilots who attacked a close formation of such 'flying fortresses' from the side, below or the front. Only if you fly in the direction of the bomber stream and attack from above, can you moderate somewhat the effect of their concentrated firepower. Although the bomber gunners could fire at us effectively from 700m, we had to close to 300m for our four MK 108 cannons to be effective." _
*Oblt. Walther Schuck 3./JG7*

Head on attacks were not the norm and reading many combat reports and pilot accounts, they were not the most frequent method of attack. Sometimes, when more than one pass was made at a formation, different methods were used.

_"After I had twice attacked the leading Pulk of the formation from the front, I made my third attack from the low rear."_
*Fw. Herbert Zimmer 8./JG3*

Even when a head on attack was intended it was not always possible.

_"The enemy's altitude was reached in quadrant CQ-5. The prolonged turn of the enemy formation made a head on attack impossible, so the Gruppe prepared an attack from the high rear."_
*Unit Combat Report JG 11*

The attack from the front was an officially sanctioned tactic, but it was not the only one. It was a method developed by Hauptmann Mayer of JG 2 in conjunction with other commanders of the units of Luftflotte 3. Mayer argued that such an attack stood the best chance of hitting the cockpit of the bomber and killing its crew, thus effectively destroying the bomber. He also reckoned that the defensive armament of the bombers was weakest in this area. Being an active combat pilot he put his theory to the test and reported to Galland.

As a result Galland sent the following memo to all Luftwaffe fighter units. It was titled 'Kamfanweisung fur die Jagd und Zerstorerverbande', Roughly 'Battle instructions for the fighter and destroyer units'.

_"1. The diving attack from the front by Hptm. Mayer was very effective and resulted in the immediate destruction of a B-17.

2. His Nos. 2 and 3 were seriously damaged when they pulled up behind the formation after the attack. This is not recommended.

3. Hptm. Mayer's second attack was also successful. In this case he dived in front of a bomber, pulled up to make his attack, and dived away in a tight bank, climbing back up ahead of the formation. He received no defensive fire.

4 General conclusions.

a. Attacks from the rear on close formations are seldom successful and bring heavy losses. If it is necessary to attack from the rear, fire at engines and fuel tanks from a steep bank.

b. Attacks from the side can be effective. These require training and a good firing angle.

c. Frontal attacks at low speed from straight ahead, above, or below are the most effective of all attacks. Prerequisites for success are flying skill, good aim, and continuous fire up to the closest possible distance.

d. Withdrawal is permitted only by a tight diving bank in the direction of the attacked bomber. This maximises the angular velocity and makes it impossible for the enemy gunners to draw the correct lead.

e. It is essential that fighter units attack repeatedly in great strength and mass. The defensive fire will then be dispersed and the bomber formation can be split apart." _

You could say that the head on attack was favoured but it was not the only option open to a commander.

Note that attacks from ahead and astern do not involve the estimation of angle off and deflection shooting, or at least minimise these parameters. Attacks from the side do and Galland's point in 4b above about such attacks requiring training and a good firing angle refer to this perpetual problem for all WW2 air forces.

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Jan 12, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The first bombing missions by BC were in fact, daylight raids. And they suffered terribly for a couple reasons:
> First, this was early in the war and BC was using older types (Battles, Wellingtons, and so on).
> Secondly, they were unescorted in airspace that was, at this stage of the war, dominated by the Luftwaffe.
> 
> ...



I think its also worth noting that the RAF bombers in the early part of the war had no armour or even more importantly self sealing fuel tanks and finally were often outnumbered.
In the Battle of Heligoland Bight 24 bombers were up against (I think) 40 fighters. RAF losses were heavy about 19 bombers were shot down or crash landed, but the fighters didn't get away scot free. Three 109's were shot down, three 109/110 badly damaged and eight more damaged. If you were to put up 24 unescorted B17 against 40 late war German fighters I doubt the result would be very different.


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## Milosh (Jan 12, 2015)

> If you were to put up 24 unescorted B17 against 40 late war German fighters I doubt the result would be very different.



Yes Glider, the Bloody 100th didn't its nick name for no reason.


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## stubbsy (Jan 12, 2015)

This picture shows the internal, rear fuselage, fuel tank fitted at Wright Field for the Spitfire IX. It had an approximate 42 gallon capacity, as opposed to the Vickers modification which provided 72 gallons. The extra weight affected the fuel/weight balance characteristics, which required adjustment to the elevator, to make it easier to fly. Whereas the RAF saw this as a problem, the Americans thought it was operationally acceptable if the rear fuel tank was used in the first part of the transit to France.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 12, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The first bombing missions by BC were in fact, daylight raids. And they suffered terribly for a couple reasons:
> First, this was early in the war and BC was using older types (Battles, Wellingtons, and so on).
> Secondly, they were unescorted in airspace that was, at this stage of the war, dominated by the Luftwaffe.
> 
> ...



I'm aware of that GrauGeist, indeed the Fortress MkI first undertook daylight bombing missions with the RAF in 1941...and it was a dismal failure.

The context of my post was PBehn's original claim that "all RAF bombers had inline engines" which is clearly incorrect, and then his assertion that BC aircraft like the Lancaster would have failed in daylight missions but, by the time the Lanc came into service, BC had switched almost entirely to night missions so PBehn's comment is moot at best. As noted by Tony, BC did carry out a number of daylight raids late in the war once air superiority was pretty well established.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 12, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> This picture shows the internal, rear fuselage, fuel tank fitted at Wright Field for the Spitfire IX. It had an approximate 42 gallon capacity, as opposed to the Vickers modification which provided 72 gallons. The extra weight affected the fuel/weight balance characteristics, which required adjustment to the elevator, to make it easier to fly. Whereas the RAF saw this as a problem, the Americans thought it was operationally acceptable* if the rear fuel tank was used in the first part of the transit to France*.



This is part of the problem with an _escort_ fighter. The Problem is *NOT* getting _into _ France or Germany _BUT_ getting *OUT*. 

going back to the Merlin 45 for a moment, it could burn 2 1/2 gallons a minute at 16lbs boost. Lets _assume_ you get to your "target" with 90 imp gals of fuel. You used drop tanks/extra internal tanks/pixie dust to get there. 
5 minutes combat is 12.5 gallons. The Melrin 45 could burn 88imp gallons an hour at 3000rpm and 9lbs of boost. It used 70 imp gallons an hour at 2650rpm and 6lbs boost. So 15 minutes of Max continuous is what? 80 Gals an hour? 15 minutes needs 20 gallons. You need about 1/2 hour's worth of fuel as reserve to find home base and land after reaching the English coast (at a minimum) and that is at about 200mph IND using about 30gal an hor or 15 gallons. _SO_ 47.5 gallons are already accounted for. That leaves 42.5 gallons to _get home_ with and if you are over German held territory you _can't_ putz along at 200mph ind. At 20,000ft and 300mph the fuel consumption is around 46-48gph.

Practical 'radius' of Spitfire would be 300 miles or _less_. Now this certainly much better than a Spitfire without extra tanks and/or drop tanks but is it what was wanted or needed? It is 247 miles from Ipswich to Dusseldorf.
Distance Ipswich ? Dusseldorf - Distance between Ipswich and Dusseldorf

Most countries did _not_ start up, warm up or take-off on drop tanks. The internal tanks had a more reliable fuel feed and take-offs were done on the internal tanks to prevent accidents. Switch over to drop tanks was done at a "safe" altitude so the plane could abort the mission and return to field if the drop tanks failed to feed. 10-20 gallons of internal fuel could be used up getting to the switch over point (big honkers like the P-47 could use 25-35 gallons of fuel). Some planes, like the P-51, stayed on the internal tank/s longer in order to solve CG problems. So figure need internal tankage on that. You want the Spit to have 90 gallons to fight and get home? it needs 100-110 gallons of internal tanks to take-off, very few countries fitted fuel pumps or systems to transfer fuel from external tanks to internal although an internal tank was the "overflow" tank for the return line from the fuel feed system. Another reason for using 10-20 gallons _before_ switching to drop tanks. With full internal tanks any fuel returned from carb/injectors would go out overflow vents and not only be lost but create a fire hazard. 

Also please note that The Spitfires going into combat during the BoB and in 1941 had burned off around 20 gallons or more just warming up, taking off and climbing to altitude. They were NOT entering combat with 84-87 gallons of fuel on board. They were around 300lbs lighter than 'nominal' take-off weight. 

This is a test of a Spit V with a 90 gal external tank, just look at the climb numbers (and split the difference) to see what kind of effect even 45 imp gallons extra fuel might have. 
Spitfire Mk.VB (Tropical) AB.320 Report

Add around 1 minute to 20,000ft? cut climb rate at 20,000ft by 12%? 
Granted it is a tropical version but the Spit V was having enough trouble in the 2nd half of 1941 with 109Fs and Fw 190s without sticking another 250-500lbs of fuel in it.

MK VIII and MK IX may be better but the British had to wait for the 2 stage Merlin and the 100/130 fuel (Merlin 45 was designed/built to use 100/115-120).

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## pbehn (Jan 12, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> I'm aware of that GrauGeist, indeed the Fortress MkI first undertook daylight bombing missions with the RAF in 1941...and it was a dismal failure.
> 
> The context of my post was PBehn's original claim that "all RAF bombers had inline engines" which is clearly incorrect, and then his assertion that BC aircraft like the Lancaster would have failed in daylight missions but, by the time the Lanc came into service, BC had switched almost entirely to night missions so PBehn's comment is moot at best. As noted by Tony, BC did carry out a number of daylight raids late in the war once air superiority was pretty well established.



The point was not the engine configuration but that the majority were water cooled. The discussion was daylight raids, the Stirling was mincemeat on night raids purely due to its low altitude and lack of speed. Protecting a water cooled engine is difficult and adds a lot of weight, which must be subtracted from the payload the chief advantage of the lancaster especially.

The Lancaster was used on a raid in 1942 on Augsberg, despite diversionary raids and returning mostly in darkness out of 12 AC 7 failed to return. That was a surprise low level raid which to my knowledge wasn't repeated. 
RAF - Augsburg, 17th April 1942


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## stona (Jan 12, 2015)

The Augsburg raid was one of Harris' experimental raids, using the new Lancaster bomber. The MAN factory was selected by Harris for tactical reasons. The Ministry of Economic Warfare would have preferred a different target and the correspondence and recriminations, which included the Air Ministry and Prime Minister, went on until May 2nd.
Despite the heroism of the men of Nos. 44 and 97 Squadrons the raid was far too costly and, as you say, the experiment was not repeated.

On the same night 214 sorties were flown by Wellingtons, Stirlings, Halifaxes and Manchesters which bombed Hamburg in what was a more familiar role for Bomber Command. 10 aircraft or 4.7% of the attacking force was lost.

Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Jan 12, 2015)

pbehn said:


> The point was not the engine configuration but that the majority were water cooled. The discussion was daylight raids, the Stirling was mincemeat on night raids purely due to its low altitude and lack of speed. Protecting a water cooled engine is difficult and adds a lot of weight, which must be subtracted from the payload the chief advantage of the lancaster especially.
> 
> The Lancaster was used on a raid in 1942 on Augsberg, despite diversionary raids and returning mostly in darkness out of 12 AC 7 failed to return. That was a surprise low level raid which to my knowledge wasn't repeated.
> RAF - Augsburg, 17th April 1942



I don't want this to get into another of these constantly evolving arguments. You said that all RAF heavy bombers had inline engines. That's just plain wrong. Period.

I don't understand your point about protecting inline engines. Are you suggesting that Lancasters operating in daylight would have needed additional protection for their engines? If so, that's ok but bear in mind that the Lancaster would still have had a decisive lifting advantage over USAAF heavy bombers, particularly the B-17. Was there any wartime discussion of the need to enhance armour protection for Merlin engines on heavy bombers?

Unescorted daylight raids by heavy bombers did not succeed until the advent of long-range escorts, which is the whole thrust of this thread. Whether they were British Lancasters or American B-17s, unescorted deep-penetration raids were simply bound to fail. The RAF adapted to the issue by moving to night bombing while the USAAF persevered in daylight but the early USAAF missions were typically much shorter-range thru all of 1942 and much of 1943. By the time a suitable long-range escort came along, in the form of the P-51C and D, the die was set and Bomber Command was fully occupied on night bombing. Trying to move from night to day would have resulted in stopping operations which would have given Germany needed breathing space...and that's a foolish thing to do in wartime.

You reference the Augsberg raid from April 1942 but that was only undertaken in daylight because of the point-nature of the target and the desire to increase the chances of hitting the target. Note that the USAAF didn't fly a mission into Germany until January 1943 and even then it was a port not a deep-penetration raid. 

The combination of day and night bombing provided no let-up for German defences and undoubtedly contributed to shortening the war but I still see nothing in your statements that shows any marked difference in overall capability between the heavy bombers of the RAF or the USAAF in the 1942-1944 timeframe. Tactics and employment were different, and that led to different technical solutions to problems. However, the USAAF's daylight efforts were not a success until long-range escorts arrived on the scene. The RAF never tried long-range escorted daylight missions for its heavy bombers because, by the time a suitable escort fighter was available, it would simply be too difficult to change the tactical employment...plus "round the clock bombing" was seen as a positive thing from an enemy attrition perspective.


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## stona (Jan 12, 2015)

Very early in the Lancaster's career, July 1941, the Air Staff called for an investigation into the possibility of developing removable armour to be fitted to the Lancaster for daylight operations. It was to protect the tail turret, flying controls, fuel tanks and engines and was expected to weigh about 2,000lbs. That's a lot of armour.

Sorley and Freeman at the Air Ministry were very keen on the idea and hoped to use armoured Lancasters in daylight missions in 1942. Trials were completed in April 1942 and the conclusion was that the armour offered_ "a fair degree" _of protection.

Subsequently 12 of these special Lancasters were sent to 5 Group. Freeman told Harris to allocate them to a squadron that would be freed from night bombing and told to _"devote its whole attention to a technical and tactical study of daylight raiding."_ 

So keen was Freeman that he ordered a further 100 of these special Lancasters, although he was aware that Harris wasn't keen. He wrote to Harris:

_"I know you do not like the specially armoured Lancasters but I want you to give them a very thorough trial. The lessons we hope to learn from them about daylight attack may be of enormous value and affect the whole range of tactical doctrine."_

He underestimated Harris who despised the whole idea. Not only did it take one of his squadrons away from night operations, it reduced the bomb load carried and it seemed to Harris that Freeman was using his men as guinea pigs in a dangerous experiment. There followed a bad tempered exchange of letters in which Harris openly accused Freeman of gambling with his men's lives, a accusation which Freeman rejected, finishing by writing:

_"It is possible, for example, that our casualties on the Augsburg raid might have been 50% less if the armour had been carried by our aircraft. Instructions have been given to for the armour to be made as far as possible detachable and I should now be glad if you would carry out the orders given to you."_

Again, he underestimated Harris who simply refused. He wrote back saying:

_"If this armoured Lancaster proposal is to stand I must ask for an official directive to which I can register my official protest."_

Harris had his way and in October the detachable armour was placed in permanent storage. Freeman wrote wistfully that _"it may be possible to introduce them [armour plates] at some time into future production."_

So, yes, there was a plan to armour the Lancaster for daylight operations. It never happened because Harris simply refused to countenance the idea and was anyway committed to the night time campaign.

Cheers

Steve

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## buffnut453 (Jan 12, 2015)

Thanks Steve. That's interesting stuff. Agree 2000lb is a lot of armour but I presume not all was used solely for the engines. That said, it's still one seventh of a reasonably standard load which still leaves the Lanc carrying more than its USAAF counterparts.


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## stona (Jan 12, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> Thanks Steve. That's interesting stuff. Agree 2000lb is a lot of armour but I presume not all was used solely for the engines. That said, it's still one seventh of a reasonably standard load which still leaves the Lanc carrying more than its USAAF counterparts.



Not all for the engines, though they were to be well protected. I have a drawing somewhere which shows all the major components of the armour. It was intended primarily as protection from fighter attack and I think the US experience probably showed that Harris had been right to reject the idea, hence the plate languishing in storage for the rest of the war.

It was barely more than a proposal in any case, but that is due entirely to Harris' opposition, some might say intransigence!

Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Jan 12, 2015)

Harris certainly could be...I think the polite phrase is "single-minded".


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## stona (Jan 12, 2015)

One of the paradoxes of Arthur Harris is that he demanded and expected complete loyalty and obedience from his subordinates whilst adopting a more 'flexible' attitude towards the orders of his own superiors.

The copy of the letter asking Harris to follow the orders he had been given that Freeman sent to Sorley bears the hand written note, "The only way to deal with Bert [Harris] is to treat him rough." He was wrong. He should have fired him, but never did.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 12, 2015)

If I may cut in:



Shortround6 said:


> This is part of the problem with an _escort_ fighter. The Problem is *NOT* getting _into _ France or Germany _BUT_ getting *OUT*.



Very true.



> going back to the Merlin 45 for a moment, it could burn 2 1/2 gallons a minute at 16lbs boost. Lets _assume_ you get to your "target" with 90 imp gals of fuel. You used drop tanks/extra internal tanks/pixie dust to get there.
> 5 minutes combat is 12.5 gallons. The Melrin 45 could burn 88imp gallons an hour at 3000rpm and 9lbs of boost. It used 70 imp gallons an hour at 2650rpm and 6lbs boost. So 15 minutes of Max continuous is what? 80 Gals an hour? 15 minutes needs 20 gallons. You need about 1/2 hour's worth of fuel as reserve to find home base and land after reaching the English coast (at a minimum) and that is at about 200mph IND using about 30gal an hor or 15 gallons. _SO_ 47.5 gallons are already accounted for. *That leaves 42.5 gallons to get home with and if you are over German held territory you can't putz along at 200mph ind. At 20,000ft and 300mph the fuel consumption is around 46-48gph.*



Re. the bolded part - having extra 25 imp gals (give or take) of internal fuel really means something for the frugal Spitfire IMO.



> Practical 'radius' of Spitfire would be 300 miles or _less_. Now this certainly much better than a Spitfire without extra tanks and/or drop tanks but is it what was wanted or needed? It is 247 miles from Ipswich to Dusseldorf.
> Distance Ipswich ? Dusseldorf - Distance between Ipswich and Dusseldorf



Negates the threat of the LW fighters based in Abeville and Gilze Rijen, ie. in France and Netherlands/Low countries? 



> Most countries did _not_ start up, warm up or take-off on drop tanks. The internal tanks had a more reliable fuel feed and take-offs were done on the internal tanks to prevent accidents. Switch over to drop tanks was done at a "safe" altitude so the plane could abort the mission and return to field if the drop tanks failed to feed. 10-20 gallons of internal fuel could be used up getting to the switch over point (big honkers like the P-47 could use 25-35 gallons of fuel). Some planes, like the P-51, stayed on the internal tank/s longer in order to solve CG problems. So figure need internal tankage on that. You want the Spit to have 90 gallons to fight and get home? it needs 100-110 gallons of internal tanks to take-off, very few countries fitted fuel pumps or systems to transfer fuel from external tanks to internal although an internal tank was the "overflow" tank for the return line from the fuel feed system. Another reason for using 10-20 gallons _before_ switching to drop tanks. With full internal tanks any fuel returned from carb/injectors would go out overflow vents and not only be lost but create a fire hazard.



The British have had a system, installed in Fairey Fulmar, where the drop tank fuel was used to fill the internal fuel tank. So pretty early in the war. Had anybody wanted it, same system would be installed in a Spitfire (as would better props earlier on, or two-speed Merlins etc.). 
The F6F-6 and F4U-4 were also outfitted with similar systems, but not the earlier variants. 



> Also please note that The Spitfires going into combat during the BoB and in 1941 had burned off around 20 gallons or more just warming up, taking off and climbing to altitude. They were NOT entering combat with 84-87 gallons of fuel on board. They were around 300lbs lighter than 'nominal' take-off weight.



20 imp gals @ 7.2 lb per gallon makes 144 lbs. Granted, some fuel was also used in shorter or longer horizontal flight in some cases.

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## Juha (Jan 12, 2015)

pbehn said:


> The company front head on attacks were as much a response to the escorts as bomber defensive fire and from posts I have read here were in retrospect probably a mistake.
> Are you saying that using 25 fighters to attack a formation of 1000 bombers is "ungentlemanly conduct" Squadrons of fighters fight together, 25 fighters is half of the Big Wing used by the RAF in 1940.
> 
> 
> ...



E.g. 6 March 44 the first LW head-on attack against the Mission 250 was made by 107 109s and 190s, they hit the 3rd Bomber Division. Of course not all 107 attacked in one massive line abreast formation but in several smaller line abreast formations one after another.

I haven't say anything on the accuracy of defensive fire of bomber formations, only that according to gunner training manuals I have seen gunners aimed at individual planes, aiming isn't a synonyme for hitting.

Escort was essential for bomber formations, that was learned by all major air powers by hard way. But US heavy bombers were at first difficult targets for LW fighters because their resilience and heavy fire power, but by giving their fighters heavier firepower and improving their attack tactics they got upper hand and only LR escorts saved USAAF daylight bombing campaign.

Schrage music didn't put an end to that. It just made much easier and safer to attack bomber's underside. It is much easier in nighttime to see an a/c against sky than against dark earth but if the rear gunner saw the attacking fighter in time, most of the experts went to look an easier target, whether their fighter had Schrage music armament installed or not.

Juha


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## pbehn (Jan 12, 2015)

Juha said:


> I haven't say anything on the accuracy of defensive fire of bomber formations, only that according to gunner training manuals I have seen gunners aimed at individual planes, aiming isn't a synonyme for hitting.


Of course they aimed at individual targets but at 600 meters 1 degree is about 5 metres, range is estimated and varying by 100s of meters per second and you must estimate the lead on a target which unhelpfully is piloted not to be hit.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 12, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Re. the bolded part - having extra 25 imp gals (give or take) of internal fuel really means something for the frugal Spitfire IMO.



perhaps: lets look at two data sheets (if any one has a better one for the spitfire please post)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit8adsaussie.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/mustang-III-ads-3.jpg

Please note that the Mustang, with it's extra 30 gal of fuel is good for a "nominal" extra 210 miles range at economical speed ( which is 33mph faster than the Spitfire). USAAF rated the Mustang at a 150 mile radius with that much fuel and NO drop tanks and 460 miles (?) with about 120/125 IMP gallons worth of drop tanks. Data sheet says the Mustang is good for 1710 miles of "range" with that fuel load. the MK VIII is good for a 'nominal' 1265 miles with a 90 gallon drop tank. Granted if escorting British bombers the escorts won't have to cruise quite so high and less fuel is burned getting to altitude and perhaps cruise is a bit better (?). 
See this page for difference in climb for a MK IX with and without a 30 gallon exterior tank.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/bf274climb.jpg

If you can afford the performance "hit" so be it. 30 gals of fuel is closer to 300lbs of weight including tankage. 



> Negates the threat of the LW fighters based in Abeville and Gilze Rijen, ie. in France and Netherlands/Low countries?



Yes and no. It may help negate the threat to the bombers somewhat but it means the Fighters, even if operated in relays and not tied to the bombers from beginning to end _have_ to maintain a high cruising speed ( 50%-100% higher fuel consumption per hour) to help avoid being bounced themselves, both in going and out going. You have to keep the rate of attrition low for BOTH the bombers and fighters. 



> The British have had a system, installed in Fairey Fulmar, where the drop tank fuel was used to fill the internal fuel tank. So pretty early in the war. Had anybody wanted it, same system would be installed in a Spitfire (as would better props earlier on, or two-speed Merlins etc.).
> The F6F-6 and F4U-4 were also outfitted with similar systems, but not the earlier variants.



American system shows up too late to do any real good. 





> 20 imp gals @ 7.2 lb per gallon makes 144 lbs. Granted, some fuel was also used in shorter or longer horizontal flight in some cases.



Plus the weight of the tank/s. and 20 more gallons is only 104 gallons? 20 gallons won't run the engine for more than 30 minutes even at moderate cruise speeds(if that, about 17 minutes at max cruise or about 100 miles at max cruise at 20,000ft). It requires very careful juggling of cruise speeds to gain any real benefit from 20 gals unless the goal is to bomb further into the low countries and leave Germany untouched.


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## pbehn (Jan 12, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> I don't want this to get into another of these constantly evolving arguments. You said that all RAF heavy bombers had inline engines. That's just plain wrong. Period.
> 
> I don't understand your point about protecting inline engines. Are you suggesting that Lancasters operating in daylight would have needed additional protection for their engines? If so, that's ok but bear in mind that the Lancaster would still have had a decisive lifting advantage over USAAF heavy bombers, particularly the B-17. Was there any wartime discussion of the need to enhance armour protection for Merlin engines on heavy bombers?
> 
> ...




This already is a circular argument and it is driving me nuts. This is a thread entitled "Did the RAF have any designs for a long range fighter escort"? I asked the simple question "what would an RAF long range escort, escort" To my mind no RAF bomber was ever capable of it in daylight except the mosquito. They didn't have the defense or the altitude performance. However I have been convinced by the technical arguments. 0.303mm brownings mounted in turrets were ample to defend a formation and so there was no reason for the RAF shouldn't mount daylight raids with their Stirlings, Halifaxes and Lancasters as and when available, it must be a mystery why they didn't. Additionally there was no reason for a long range escort for the US daylight bombers. I presume the US was just too full of aluminium merlins and pilots.

In answer to the thread question, long range escorts were never necessary so the RAF didn't bother.
Source: This thread

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## Mike Williams (Jan 12, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> perhaps: lets look at two data sheets (if any one has a better one for the spitfire please post)
> http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit8adsaussie.jpg
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/mustang-III-ads-3.jpg




I don't know if this spitfire data sheet is "better", but it may be of interest as it shows range info: Spitfire H.F. VIII Aircraft data Card.


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## stubbsy (Jan 13, 2015)

So this brings me to the next question, if Leigh-Mallory's team assessed a Spitfire IX with a 45gal external tank had an operational range of 230 miles, how was it that the Mustang with only 30 extra gallons more fuel than the Spitfire and NO drop tanks was, according to Shortround6, rated by the USAAF to fly 460 miles?

The answer, I believe, is in the willingness of the respective RAF and USAAF communities to accept the operational risk. If every worst-case argument defines the figures the commander chooses not to accept the risk. This is what I think Leigh-Mallory did. Whereas the USN fighters in the Pacific (flying up to 600 miles – mostly over the sea ref: Gregory Boyington, Baa Baa Black Sheep, London, Putnam, 1958, p. 147-148) and those of the USAAF, led by Kepner had a totally different perspective; they was much more aggressive and, therefore, willing to take the operational risk.

For instance the Americans learned not to drop their drop tanks at the first sight of other aircraft, as the Germans had realised the P-47 vulnerability in this regard quite early. 

Indeed, AIR/556 FC/S.29970/Ops.1 dated 28 Dec 1944 recognised this noting that ‘navigation by fighters, once they are airborne is purely D.R. ‘and that such dead reckoning 'navigation is very satisfactory and is uniformly better than the bombers''. Indeed, it was 'so good that unless the weather is appalling, little use is made of the homing facilities, which are first class.

‘Drop tanks are never dropped unless positive identification of the Hun has been made.’

‘Training consists almost entirely of instrument flying and formation, at which they are much better than we are. The weather makes little difference except for landing and they will land in much worse conditions than we will. It should be noted that the fighters will take off, land and operate in worse weather than the bombers without any blind approach facilities. No gunnery training, no night flying and practically no cross-country training are undertaken.' Finally in the Conclusions the report assessed the Americans as 'much more go ahead than we are' and 'much greater realists'. 

The Americans asked 'if there is any real need for night flying training for the amount of night flying' they did. 'If they are going to crash at night in operational aircraft why not let them do it operationally, why practice.' and "I know its no fun to fly with the fuselage tank full but if we can lets do it, in any case no war is fun and we gain operationally'

So the difference, in my opinion comes down to leadership and risk management; something the Americans handled better than the British.


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## stona (Jan 13, 2015)

A very limited man power reserve will always lead to a more cautious approach to accepting casualties. Nonetheless, I think you make a valid point.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> So this brings me to the next question, if Leigh-Mallory's team assessed a Spitfire IX with a 45gal external tank had an operational range of 230 miles, how was it that the Mustang with only 30 extra gallons more fuel than the Spitfire and NO drop tanks was, according to Shortround6, rated by the USAAF to fly 460 miles?
> 
> The answer, I believe, is in the willingness of the respective RAF and USAAF communities to accept the operational risk. If every worst-case argument defines the figures the commander chooses not to accept the risk. This is what I think Leigh-Mallory did. Whereas the USN fighters in the Pacific (flying up to 600 miles – mostly over the sea ref: Gregory Boyington, Baa Baa Black Sheep, London, Putnam, 1958, p. 147-148) and those of the USAAF, led by Kepner had a totally different perspective; they was much more aggressive and, therefore, willing to take the operational risk.
> 
> ...



I believe you read the sentence wrong. It may be my fault for the way I arranged it.

"USAAF rated the Mustang at a 150 mile radius with that much fuel and NO drop tanks and _460 miles (?) with about 120/125 IMP gallons worth of drop tanks._ 

The 460 miles had very little to do with "operational risk". It had a lot to do with having 120-150imp gallons left in the inside tanks _at the start of a fight._

Navy ranges in the Pacific are rather useless comparisons because slower cruise speeds (more economical) and lower altitudes could be used as there were rarely extra enemy bases _between_ the attackers base and the defenders base. It can take several minutes to go from around 200mph to close to max speed in level flight and if enemy fighters attack from above they are attacking at higher than level speed. The British and Americans found that in areas that were _likely_ to have enemy fighters the allied fighters should keep their speeds _over_ 300mph and this cut into the range. Granted many times the fighters that escorted on the way in were relieved by fresh squadrons on the way back and no longer had to weave to keep station with the slower bombers (burning more fuel) and could fly relatively straight courses home, dodging known flak concentrations and known fighter fields. 

Losing planes (and pilots) that have to come from factories 3-5000 miles away (for the US) due to running out of gas (poor planning) is not "risk management". The Americans did do a pretty good job of it, but that report fails to take into account several things or at least to put them into proper perspective. Like 'If they are going to crash at night in operational aircraft why not let them do it operationally, why practice.' Again those "operational aircraft" had to be brought from the US aboard ships. It may also ignore the amount of training the US pilots got in the US before being sent overseas. Many US pilots got 10-20 hours on Planes like P-40s before being sent to combat squadrons, some got at least a few hours on P-47s and P-51s states side before going overseas. Any fuel for training flights has to be brought from the US. US pilots did cross country training in the US.

as a further view on the Spitfire as a long range escort compare it to a P-47. The P-47 was perfectly capable of flying over 800 miles on internal fuel at _economical_ cruising speeds (no reserve but take-allowance). The trouble with the combat radius came in with huge increase in fuel consumption at combat or near combat powers. Book or yard stick ranges sometimes bare little resemblance to Yardstick ranges. 
The British might have been able to turn the Spitfire into a long range escort but not an effective one (or available in numbers ) until very late 1942 or early 1943, ( MK VIII went operational in June of 1943)


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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> perhaps: lets look at two data sheets (if any one has a better one for the spitfire please post)
> http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit8adsaussie.jpg
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/mustang-III-ads-3.jpg
> 
> ...



Thanks for the listed data.
The 2-stage Spitfires were much better climbers than the Fw-190s (main threat in the West from early 1942 on), and at least as good as Bf-109F4/G1/G2, especially above 20000 ft, so the extra 30 gal tank will not be that much of a harm to the actual performance difference. 2-stage Spitfire also climbs better than the US long rangers (P-51, -47, -38). For mid 1943, the better Merlins are available (63, 66, 70 series) than the Mk.61; Spit VIII never used the Merlin 61?
The Spitfire Mk.VIII, with extra 50 gals in rear fuselage tank, would be the best most useful Allied fighter in 1943, had that extra tank was installed. And cheap, as icing on the cake. 



> Yes and no. It may help negate the threat to the bombers somewhat but it means the Fighters, even if operated in relays and not tied to the bombers from beginning to end _have_ to maintain a high cruising speed ( 50%-100% higher fuel consumption per hour) to help avoid being bounced themselves, both in going and out going. You have to keep the rate of attrition low for BOTH the bombers and fighters.



With all the Spitfires having a bit greater internal fuel tankage, the Germans in the ETO will have to withstand both them and bombers' defensive fire. Since the LW would not be able to concentrate the fighters located in different occupied countries in the West, plus different parts of Germany, the RAF would have enjoyed the numerical superiority, 2:1 or better? That beats the 5% difference in RoC handily. Plus we have the bombers defensive fire to the RAF's advantage. 



> American system shows up too late to do any real good.



Unlike the British 



> Plus the weight of the tank/s. and 20 more gallons is only 104 gallons? 20 gallons won't run the engine for more than 30 minutes even at moderate cruise speeds(if that, about 17 minutes at max cruise or about 100 miles at max cruise at 20,000ft). It requires very careful juggling of cruise speeds to gain any real benefit from 20 gals unless the goal is to bomb further into the low countries and leave Germany untouched.



On the return leg, the fighter can cruise at 300 mph, the extra 20 gals means there is enough fuel to make it from Continental coast (Belgium, Neth.) to the base.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2015)

pbehn said:


> This already is a circular argument and it is driving me nuts. This is a thread entitled "Did the RAF have any designs for a long range fighter escort"? I asked the simple question "what would an RAF long range escort, escort" To my mind no RAF bomber was ever capable of it in daylight except the mosquito. They didn't have the defense or the altitude performance. However I have been convinced by the technical arguments. 0.303mm brownings mounted in turrets were ample to defend a formation and so there was no reason for the RAF shouldn't mount daylight raids with their Stirlings, Halifaxes and Lancasters as and when available, it must be a mystery why they didn't. Additionally there was no reason for a long range escort for the US daylight bombers. I presume the US was just too full of aluminium merlins and pilots.
> 
> In answer to the thread question, long range escorts were never necessary so the RAF didn't bother.
> Source: This thread



We can recall that British were fighting in the MTO from mid 1940 on, and in SE Asia from late 1941. There the long range was essential, hence a very attractive feature an aircraft could posses. The LR escort will escort whatever Allied bomber needed escorting. The situation in MTO even meant that USAF pressed the A-36 (yes, the dive bombers) to escort their B-25s. Long range fighter would be able to provide defense for the Malta convoys, and put further pressure on Italian and LW assets once the invasion of Sicily and Italy is planed and beyond.
The RAF was also involved in prolonged struggle vs. LW in the ETO from early 1941 on, and more range was one of the things desired. Especially once the better LW fighters emerged, and the pilots being advised to cruise fast (so they don't get easily bounced), rather than slow, that burned more fuel than slow cruise.


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## stona (Jan 13, 2015)

Don't want too much of a diversion, but weren't Beaufighters used to protect the Malta convoys? 

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2015)

I've asked that question some time ago, but the never get the worthwhile answer. I'd appreciate it if someone has some good data on this.


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## stubbsy (Jan 13, 2015)

*"In answer to the thread question, long range escorts were never necessary so the RAF didn't bother.
Source: This thread*

Well, Churchill, when he wrote to Portal on 7 Oct 1941, suggested that the RAF ought to provision LR fighters to denude enemy AD and enable a daylight bombing campaign to resume. Portal's reassurance that fighter protection would be required implicitly acknowledged the limitations of not provisioning a LR fighter. 

Moreover, Donald Stephenson, AOC No2 Bomber Group, in Sep 1941 wrote to Pierce, AO C-in-C Bomber Command, and Slessor AOC No 5 Bomber Group seeking 'Fighter Command, or someone else gets busy and thinks out the right kind of equipment and tactics to carry the bomber offensive safely through an enemy air defence system in daylight.

So *a requirement was articulated* from the very top and by someone at the operational level, only it didn't get past the Portal/Sholto Douglas/Leigh-Mallory strategic/operational divide.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2015)

stona said:


> Don't want too much of a diversion, but weren't Beaufighters used to protect the Malta convoys?






tomo pauk said:


> I've asked that question some time ago, but the never get the worthwhile answer. I'd appreciate it if someone has some good data on this.



This may depend on what is meant by "escort" pr "protect" as Beaufighters could certainly cause a lot of problems for Italian or German bombers trying to hit the convoys but then the Axis bombers could very well be operating _beyond_ the range of axis single engine fighters or at the edge of the single engine fighters effective range. 
A bit like the Fulmars doing a good job of Fleet/convoy defense when put up against SM 79s and such. Not so good a job if they faced Single engine fighters escorting the bombers.


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## Glider (Jan 13, 2015)

stona said:


> Don't want too much of a diversion, but weren't Beaufighters used to protect the Malta convoys?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Yes, but only because there was nothing else and the importance of the convoys were paramount. They modified the Spitfire V to carry 2 x 45gallon drop tanks and installed a 20mm in the nose of the Blenheim IVf, almost anything to help the convoys.


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## stubbsy (Jan 13, 2015)

So to sum up where I am coming from; Did the RAF have designs for a long range escort fighter?

1. Not really, because Portal, Sholto Douglas and Leigh-Mallory were convinced the Spitfire, modified with LR tanks, couldn't compete with its LW adversaries.

2. But, a strategic requirement had been set by Churchill (see above) and supported by Stevenson (see above).

3. The only aircraft the RAF had that was available in sufficient numbers and could fulfil this requirement, in terms of dog-fighting/air-to-air combat, was the Spitfire. 

4. Extra internal fuel could have been incorporated into the Spitfire design; to the rear of the cockpit and in the wing leading edges, providing an extra 40/72 and 32 gals respectively. The RAF was lethargic in defining this requirement as a priority because of 1 above.

5. What would the Spitfire's operational range have been with these modifications. This is where the experts on this forum would be a great help, to come up with an agreed number in n/miles.

6. So What? Well, if my rough - finger in the air - assessment of the figures is right the bombers could have been escorted to ranges which means they didn't have to bomb France, maybe into Germany.

7. So What? Well, the point raised above that the RAF didn't have sufficient fighters to do the escorting and make an effective contribution is worthy of discussion. But what if they were ready to do so when the American LR fighters came on line in mid to late 1943 - and the Americans hadn't been diverted by the idea of the YB-40, an idea that chimed a little too closely with Sholto Douglas's view on self-protecting bombers. POINTBLANK's objectives could have been achieved earlier, with greater RAF support, and precision daylight bombing by the RAF and USAAF could have taken place before they were required to support OVERLORD. Certainly, the LW had downsized in the West after Barbarossa and would have needed to reconfigure to try and stop the bombing. This would have eased the pressure on the Russian front, helping our allies.

8. What about external fuel for the Spitfire; either the 45 gallon or the 2 x 62 gallon tanks? These would have made a significant difference to the range of the Spitfire and although the figures for what was needed to return to the UK - in posts above from other contributors - would limit the operational range of aircraft so equipped, the effectiveness of the joint counter-air campaign would have defined the parameters for the operation risk/benefit equation, requiring a leadership decision on what risks to take. As the Fighter Command Ops 1a officer commented, above, the Americans were less averse to the risk, which was tough on their pilots admittedly, but war is war, and tough decisions had to be made. Kepner certainly made them wrt LR fighters, Leigh-Mallory didn't. 

Thoughts?


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## stubbsy (Jan 13, 2015)

A good question on what escort and protect meant. The minutes of the Air Fighting Sub Committee discussed this issue in 1937, see below:

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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> ....
> 
> 8. What about external fuel for the Spitfire; either the 45 gallon or the 2 x 62 gallon tanks? These would have made a significant difference to the range of the Spitfire and although the figures for what was needed to return to the UK - in posts above from other contributors - would limit the operational range of aircraft so equipped, the effectiveness of the joint counter-air campaign would have defined the parameters for the operation risk/benefit equation, requiring a leadership decision on what risks to take. As the Fighter Command Ops 1a officer commented, above, the Americans were less averse to the risk, which was tough on their pilots admittedly, but war is war, and tough decisions had to be made. Kepner certainly made them wrt LR fighters, Leigh-Mallory didn't.



The Spitfire have had a variety of drop tanks, most notably the one with 90 imp gals, along with 170 imp gals size. Those are mounted under fuselage. 
The 62 imp gals are the US produced tanks - 75 US gals. Two were installed under wings, on the US modified Spitfire IX. Need also new plumbing, and it will impose some drag/speed penalty, like it was the case in P-51A/B/C (12 mph cost was there, due to the wing racks). So I'd stick with historical British gear for the drop tanks facility.

The US modified Spit, along with other variations to the theme: link.

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## Mike Williams (Jan 13, 2015)

I have to admit, I'm not seeing the point of all the debate. That said, this is what comes to mind regarding RAF fighters and and long range day escort.

65 Squadron was first RAF unit to convert to Mustang III, this occuring in December 1943 - around the same time as the 354th and 357th Fighter Groups (9th AF at the time) first went operational with the P-51B.
RAF units to use the Merlin Mustang in the ETO and MTO were 65, 122, 19, 306, 315, 129, 316, 541, 234, 309, 64, 126, 165, 118, 611, 303, 112, 213, 249, 260; RCAF:- 441, 442. 

Here's an example of RAF Mustangs operating with 8th AAF Mustangs escorting 8th AF bombers.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fo-312-map.jpg

For example, here' a combat report that I have handy showing Mustang IIIs escorting Lancasters to Germany.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/combat-reports/129-davis-23march45.jpg

There were 1006 Mustang III and IVs on strength with the RAF as of 26 April 1945.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/RAF_Strength_26april1945.pdf

I happened to have these on hand, but these documents show that Spitfire XIV were escorting Lancasters and Halifaxs to Germany by day as of September 1944. I'm sure other documents are available showing earlier day escorts of RAF heavy bombers by other units.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/350-ORB-11Sept44.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/130_Oprep-12Sept44.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/402-Form541-12Sept44.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/610-ORB-1sept44.jpg

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## Glider (Jan 13, 2015)

I do like reading these original documents, you pick up things that you don't expect. I notice on the last paper on the 3rd September they reinstalled the 303 guns. It looks as if they were taken off for the anti diver missions. A little something I didn't anticipate

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## stubbsy (Jan 14, 2015)

Mike Williams said:


> I have to admit, I'm not seeing the point of all the debate. That said, this is what comes to mind regarding RAF fighters and and long range day escort.
> 
> 
> I happened to have these on hand, but these documents show that Spitfire XIV were escorting Lancasters and Halifaxs to Germany by day as of September 1944. I'm sure other documents are available showing earlier day escorts of RAF heavy bombers by other units.
> ...



Mike,

From my perspective the point of the debate surrounds a issues of ethics and morality and a number of counterfactuals or what if's. 

Firstly, the RAF bombed by night to avoid German fighters because when in bombed by day, as they had planned before the war, without fighter escorts the RAF had deemed it didn't need, it suffered unacceptable losses. Moreover, until 1943 when night bombing technology improved sufficiently it bombed (generally) inaccurately and Bomber Command, despite Harris latching on to any and all elements of positive INT reports on the accuracy and damage caused by bombing, while simultaneously choosing to ignore or disparage the detractors. So, in my opinion, by choosing not to have LR fighter escorts from 1937 onwards, until Sep 1944, the RAF implicitly accepted the inaccuracies of its night bombing campaign, along with the civilian casualties caused as a necessary method of waging war. Richard Overy covers the ground excellently in his 2013 book '_The Bomber War_'.

Secondly, by doing nothing to create LR fighters from 1939 to 1943 the RAF chose to continue with a night bombing campaign. Discussion may centre on what exactly LR means. For me, in WW2, this meant having an operational range of around 400 miles. In this context the operational range of the Mustang III reached that target in 1944, but even the later model Spitfire's stuggled to reach this target.

Thirdly, the RAF didn't see its fighter role in supporting POINTBLANK to any great degree, instead they deferred to the USAAF to achieve its aims. But, if the RAF had a LR fighter, POINTBLANK could have been concluded earlier and RAF and USAAF bomber and fighter raids could have been coordinated, by day, concurrently, against strategic targets with precision in late 1943 or very early in 1944. Attacking Oil with precision, as Harris later acknowledged though he still considered oil to be an 'outsider' target, could have been decisive and stopped the German land fighting machine as it did in 1945. Finishing the war almost a year earlier would have saved a lot of lives.

Fouthly, the issue of 90 gallon slipper tanks and the RAF taking part in daylight escort missions from September 1944 is very interesting. Why? Because on 5 September the RAF stopped the trials at Boscombe Down on the USAF modified Spitfires (though they resumed later - see earlier post for such trials in 1945)w hich had achieved cruise ranges of 1240 and 1365 miles. I think the embarrassment the USAAF caused resulted in the decision to start a larger programme to escort RAF bombers over Germany. It is therefore coincident that the Spitfire of 610 Sqn flew such mission of 6 September, albeit to a target to the West of Germany, using a 90 gallon slipper tank. When resupplying Malta it had been deemed too dangerous to allow the Spitfires to fly armed with 90 gallon slipper tanks as it was thought the aircraft would be at a disadvantage against LW short-range fighters, so they were advised to avoid, rather than engage, the LW. See Geoffrey Wellum,_ First Light_. So, why the change in Sep 1944? Quite simply, the risk had diminished because the USAAF had largely destroyed the fighting power of the LW from Jan to April 1944 in POINTBLANK. I see the report showed no contact made with the LW in the sqns maiden trip to Germany. 

Hope this synopsis helps the case for the discussion?


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## drgondog (Jan 14, 2015)

By definition (for me), the discussion of Long Range Fighter should be coupled with planned maximum Combat Radius.

The discussions surrounding external tanks is relevant to the extent that the long range tanks will get that fighter, in escort role, to its maximum distance and a.) drop them, b.) engage in combat solely on internal fuel, and c.) return in a straight line back to base with a reserve amount sufficient for at least 30 minutes in case of bad weather or other delays.

Thus - any discussion regarding a Spitfire VII or P-47D-11 or P-51B-1 or P-38J-5 in the context of Combat Radius looks to the maximum practical reserve of internal fuel remaining after start, warm up, taxi, assemble before switching to external fuel tanks. From a planning standpoint that is all the remains to fight for 20 minutes and return home at the farthest practical escort distance.

Before the P-51B obtained field modification 85 gallon tank, or the P-38J-15 arrived with extra leading edge 110 gallons, or P-47D-25 arrived with extra 60 gallons of internal fuel, even these 'long range escorts' had not achieved their potential.

I find it curious that RAF withheld Spitfires equipped with 'Slipper Tanks' from daylight escort based on some notion that they 'might be attacked' by coastal LW units - US fighters always confronted that possibility and shrugged it off... if it happened, they dropped tanks, engaged and made an assessment regarding how much further they could go - and returned then while the unmolested escorts continued as planned.

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## Mike Williams (Jan 14, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> Fouthly, the issue of 90 gallon slipper tanks and the RAF taking part in daylight escort missions from September 1944 is very interesting. Why? Because on 5 September the RAF stopped the trials at Boscombe Down on the USAF modified Spitfires (though they resumed later - see earlier post for such trials in 1945)w hich had achieved cruise ranges of 1240 and 1365 miles.



stubbsy, I wouldn't get hung up on that 610 Squadron mention of 90 gallons tanks in September. Other Spitfire XIV units were already using 90 gallon drop tanks in the spring of 1944, see for example:

91 Squadron Diary, 11 May 1944

322 Squadron Operations Record Book, 19 May 1944

If memory serves, Spitfire VIIIs and IXs were using them earlier than that.


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## stona (Jan 14, 2015)

As of 1942, and Harris' arrival, it is true to say that Bomber Command chose the night time option. Harris rejected any attempts to divert him from his campaign. Before then I don't think it was a choice. It was forced on Bomber Command and nobody seems really to have worked out what to do. The Command was anyway in denial about the abysmal results it was actually achieving. In all the eventual agonising about the inaccuracies of night time bombing the possibility of returning to a day time campaign is rarely mentioned (I can't actually think of a single instance) in 1941/42/, nor therefore is the possibility of fighter escorted missions, excluding of course the aptly named 'Circus' operations which served, badly, an entirely different purpose. _Unescorted_ daylight missions by specially adapted bombers were briefly on the agenda
Cheers
Steve

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## tomo pauk (Jan 14, 2015)

Mike Williams said:


> ...
> 
> If memory serves, Spitfire VIIIs and IXs were using them earlier than that.



And Spitfire Vs even earlier.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 14, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> From my perspective the point of the debate surrounds a issues of ethics and morality and a number of counterfactuals or what if's.
> Hope this synopsis helps the case for the discussion?


Unfortunately you make too many assumptions:-
First, the RAF didn't "implicitly accept" anything, tactics were dictated by the Air Ministry, and the RAF did as it was told. Bombing aids H2S, Oboe, Gee-H were in use long before September 1944, in fact they were offered to the USAAF in September 1943. Also the civilian casualties were a deliberate policy, introduced in September 1941 to destroy morale (didn't work, of course.)
Second (really an extension of the first) the RAF did not choose to continue the bombing campaign, neither did they choose to do without a long-range fighter. As always, they did as they were told; nobody ever explains how you escort individual aircraft (bombers never flew in Groups, never mind Squadrons,) when every gunner is itching to open fire on twin, or single, engine fighter he sees one, or the pilot, acting on a sighting report, corkscrews down, and out of sight.
Third, you really should check on how often Spitfires were sent out to cover the return of USAAF bombers, after they'd had their original escort drawn away, and suffered a mauling.
Fourth, trials on the U.S.-modified Spitfires were halted because the "work" done on the wings had, in the Air Ministry's view, weakened the structure enough to make the aircraft not combat-worthy. The U.K. worked with flexible tanks, aka "Mareng bags," which enabled the wings to retain their integrity. 
Aircraft, heading for Malta, were not told to avoid combat due to fear of the danger, but because the authorities wanted them to hang on to the ferry tanks, and preferably land with them intact, since there was a shortage, and they could be returned to Gibraltar for future re-use.


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## pbehn (Jan 14, 2015)

The strange thing about this thread and the question it poses is that I don't think any country designed a long range escort. The P51 Mustang was such a beautiful plane and so fantastic at the job of escorting bombers that it is difficult to believe it wasn't designed for the job. The P51 was commissioned by the British purely to be a fighter better than the P40. It is a pure and happy coincidence that the original Allison engine could be replaced by a merlin, and that the merlin could be boosted to massively increase its original 850BHP and its impressive internal fuel load could be increased internally and externally and . and.... and ....and it is a long story.
The P47 was designed as an interceptor but in its N version was a very good long range escort.

The role of long range escort sprang up quickly and was solved very quickly. The British started bombing at night and the US was convinced until proved otherwise that bombers could protect themselves. The British could have stretched the Spitfire in the same way the Corsair was having a larger main tank in a longer fuselage or perhaps rearranged the wing. The Spitfires wing had leading edge tanks which were conversions of the evaporated cooling system abandoned long before the war started. The bays were still pretty much still as originally laid out, why not a re design with 2 x 0.5in mgs in the outer part of the wing and the inner part for extra fuel, with an extra tank behind the pilot and drop tanks, it could be useful. The Mustang would always hold the upper hand because of its low drag. However for much of the war the British were occupied with getting the better of the FW190 and later Bf109s, putting bigger tanks inside a bigger fuselage wouldn't do that.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 14, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> ...
> Third, you really should check on how often Spitfires were sent out to cover the return of USAAF bombers, after they'd had their original escort drawn away, and suffered a mauling.



They also covered the bombers on the 'outbound' part of the sorties. Spitfires giving at least as they got vs. the LW in such missions/tasks?


> Fourth, trials on the U.S.-modified Spitfires were halted because the "work" done on the wings had, in the Air Ministry's view, weakened the structure enough to make the aircraft not combat-worthy. The U.K. worked with flexible tanks, aka "Mareng bags," which enabled the wings to retain their integrity.



The Supermarine also installed double skinning, above and under the leading edge tanks, so the wings retain their shape as the fuel is consumed. 



pbehn said:


> ...
> The British could have stretched the Spitfire in the same way the Corsair was having a larger main tank in a longer fuselage or perhaps rearranged the wing.



IIRC the Corsair retained the length, but the cockpit was moved further back to accommodate fuel tank between engine compartment and cockpit. Spitfire already had such an arrangement, though.



> The Spitfires wing had leading edge tanks which were conversions of the evaporated cooling system abandoned long before the war started. The bays were still pretty much still as originally laid out, why not a re design with 2 x 0.5in mgs in the outer part of the wing and the inner part for extra fuel, with an extra tank behind the pilot and drop tanks, it could be useful. The Mustang would always hold the upper hand because of its low drag. However for much of the war the British were occupied with getting the better of the FW190 and later Bf109s, putting bigger tanks inside a bigger fuselage wouldn't do that.



I'd say that technicalities were a far smaller obstacles than current doctrine 
Once the Spitfire received 2-stage engines, it was at least as good as LW fighters*, and it is unfortunate that bigger internal fuel tankage was not higher on the priority list (while acknowledging the increase in fuel the Mk. VII and VIII received). The 2-stage engines provided the edge in RoC above 20-25000 ft vs. LW.

* not forgetting the 1939-early 1941 period, too.


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## pbehn (Jan 14, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> IIRC the Corsair retained the length, but the cockpit was moved further back to accommodate fuel tank between engine compartment and cockpit. Spitfire already had such an arrangement, though.
> 
> *I used it as an illustration, just stretch the main tank so that the CoG is not massively disrupted*
> 
> ...



I agree, it is a matter of history how quickly the Mustang and Mosquito were designed built and put into service, if there was ever a real need for a long distance spitfire it could have been built, it is mainly hindsight that says this was an oversight or misguided, extra fuel is extra weight in combat. Others maybe can correct me but I dont believe the P51 was routinely troubled when not actually acting as a bomber escort, did they often drop tanks to engage and fight with a full rear tank on their way to the RV?


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## bobbysocks (Jan 14, 2015)

this was probably already stated but i dont think a LR escort was seriously considered because no one thought france would have been over run in the early goings like it was. the raf would have had air strips in france...close enough to the front and some of the industrial regions of germany to be effective. a war with germany was thought to go along the same scenario as ww1 with the maginot line keeping invasion forces from gaining too deep a foothold in french territory. with your enemy's forces all concentrated within 0 - 20 - 30 miles of the front why even think of something with a 500 mile operational envelope? as the war progressed and the completion changed you are not going to stop production of your essential aircraft if you can buy something off the shelf that is offered by another country....like the mustang.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 14, 2015)

Actually if you re-read some of the documents provided by Stubbsy in Post #270 it seems that the RAF (or air ministry) was _thinking_ about escort fighters back in 1937. They just couldn't agree on which avenue to pursue. They seemed to want flying flak batteries to accompany the bombers (turret fighters) that would keep station with the bomber formations (remember 1937, not how it was actually done 3-5 years later) or perhaps move from one side of the formation to the other. Single seat fighters being ruled _out_ as they would be forced out of 'position'. 
Now with the benefit of hind sight they did reach some rather strange conclusions but the story that they 'ignored' the problem does not stand up.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 15, 2015)

> The Spitfires wing had leading edge tanks which were conversions of the evaporated cooling system abandoned long before the war started The bays were still pretty much still as originally laid out, why not a re design with 2 x 0.5in mgs in the outer part of the wing and the inner part for extra fuel, with an extra tank behind the pilot and drop tanks, it could be useful..


.
The only "Spitfire" with evaporative cooling was the prototype K5054, in its hand-built wings, and it was removed before K5054's first flight. There were no tanks left in the wing's leading edge of service aircraft, in fact the Vb Vc had hot air pipes, from the engine's exhaust stubs, passing through the leading edge, and out to the pair of .303" Brownings; I doubt that a combination of fuel and hot air, in that area, was ever considered.
There was no spare space, in the leading edges, until the twin-radiator design (Mk.VII and onwards) could provide enough heat for each wing on their own. 
The early fighter versions of the Spitfire could not fly with a tank behind the pilot; even with the Mark V, the tank had to be used in conjunction with the 170-gallon ferry tank, and had to be emptied first.
The Air Ministry were never going to consider a longer heavier, slower-firing gun, with less ammunition, until they were certain that a pilot would hit what he aimed at, and that didn't happen until the gyro gunsight arrived in 1944.


> The Mustang would always hold the upper hand because of its low drag.


Not until they put a British engine into it 


> However for much of the war the British were occupied with getting the better of the FW190 and later Bf109s,


Which was achieved in 1942.


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## stubbsy (Jan 15, 2015)

Mike Williams said:


> stubbsy, I wouldn't get hung up on that 610 Squadron mention of 90 gallons tanks in September. Other Spitfire XIV units were already using 90 gallon drop tanks in the spring of 1944
> 
> Thanks Mike,
> 
> ...


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## stubbsy (Jan 15, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Unfortunately you make too many assumptions:-
> First, the RAF didn't "implicitly accept" anything, tactics were dictated by the Air Ministry, and the RAF did as it was told. Bombing aids H2S, Oboe, Gee-H were in use long before September 1944, in fact they were offered to the USAAF in September 1943. Also the civilian casualties were a deliberate policy, introduced in September 1941 to destroy morale (didn't work, of course.)
> Second (really an extension of the first) the RAF did not choose to continue the bombing campaign, neither did they choose to do without a long-range fighter. As always, they did as they were told; nobody ever explains how you escort individual aircraft (bombers never flew in Groups, never mind Squadrons,) when every gunner is itching to open fire on twin, or single, engine fighter he sees one, or the pilot, acting on a sighting report, corkscrews down, and out of sight.
> Third, you really should check on how often Spitfires were sent out to cover the return of USAAF bombers, after they'd had their original escort drawn away, and suffered a mauling.
> ...



Sorry Edgar, but I think you are too accepting of the previous historiography on this topic and appear averse to discerning what happened from the evidence. You will note that I try to provide evidence for each of my posts. 

In this case, for example, I note that the minutes I posted earlier from the Air Fighting sub-committee meeting on 9th June 1937 discussed the topic of LR fighters as a 'hardy annual' (i.e. showing minor irritation that it has appeared on the agenda again). As you point out the Air Ministry, not the RAF made these decisions. So, lets look at the composition of this sub-Committe. It was chaired by none other than Sholto Douglas, not Dowding the highest ranking officer. In all, at the meeting I count 24 RAF officers, 3 RN officer, 2 army officers - no civil servants. All of those speaking on the topic of LR fighters were RAF officers; none of which wanted LR single-seat fighters. So, in 1937 the topic of LR fighters was put to bed by an Air Ministry sub-committee decision, as discussed by senior RAF officers, who had described it as a hardy annual. From then on Sholto Douglas (who became AOC-in-C Fighter Command after managing to get Dowding sacked) and Leigh-Mallory, who was known to work hard but lacked the ability to think conceptually, were not going to seek a change in the Air Ministry policy on this topic and their subordinates were not apt to propose something they knew their bosses didn't want. 

Reference your second point about the RAF doing what it was directed to do in bombing. Semantically correct, but my point is that they didn't propose an alternative solution. It is a bit like the Leigh-Mallory point here; it appears that many were hamstrung/conceptually unable to propose alternative solutions.

Reference your third. Please provide your evidence as to the number of times the USAAF bombers were mauled after their own fighters had been drawn away, if you have such detailed evidence it would help the debate. My view on this is that it was a learning curve issue. The Americans adjusted their tactics when they recognised the problem and they did it pretty quickly. See McFarland and Newton, _To Command the Sky_, pp.137-195.

Fourth, it is pretty clear that there should have been an option of using the 'Mareng bags' in the wings together with 40 or 72 gallons of extra fuel behind the pilot and a 45 gallon drop tank much earlier than 1944 as it would have provided much greater range for the Spitfire for their Circus, Rodeo missions. Wellum describes the negative influence a lack of fuel had on these missions in _First Light_ pp. 275-280. After all, Jeffrey Quill flew in a similar configuration, albeit without wing Mareng bags, at low level from High Post on Salisbury Plain to the Moray Firth and back. This could have, and should have, been achieved much earlier than 1944 and would have opened up the option of considering daylight bombing together with the USAAF in a truly combined and planned operation. As one of the above posts shows a Spitfire with a 90-gallon drop tank game back from a mission over Western Germany with 50 gallons of fuel! So, with say 16,16,40 and 45 = 117 extra gallons a significantly greater range could have been achieved. 

What you say wrt to return ferry tanks from Malta makes perfect sense (please provide ref), but that was not what Geoffrey Wellum was told. See _First Light_ p.316.

Regards


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## buffnut453 (Jan 15, 2015)

Stubbsy,

You make some valid points but please remember you're looking at the issue from a position of hindsight. In 1937, the entire concept for "the next war" was that British forces would forward deploy to the continent, just as they had done in 1914-1918. Nobody considered the possibility of Britain fighting alone with all of Europe occupied by the Nazis. Furthermore, the idea of a long-range, single-engined fighter was simply impractical in the 1937 timeframe. We can point to the P-51 but that was developed very rapidly starting with a paper proposal in early 1940. It still took a further 2 years before Merlin-engined variants appeared in numbers. That's a 5-year period during which tremendous advances were made in aeronautics. Criticizing the Air Ministry of 1937 for not knowing what would happen in 1940 is a little harsh. The RAF's response to the problem of providing long-range strategic bombing during wartime was to switch to night ops. These were initially woefully ineffective but Bomber Command evolved, brought in new tactics and technology, and ultimately became a highly capable force. The USAAF went in another direction but both were valid.

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## Shortround6 (Jan 15, 2015)

From the papers in post #270 it appears that the idea had been _considered_ and rejected by some members. Others kept bringing it up. Now in 1937 we have to remember that the Defiant was considered a _very viable_ project. The Gloster F.9/37 had started as a rival to the defiant as a twin engine turret fighter (F.34/35) and there were other proposals for for turret equipped bomber destroyer. The British were also behind the curve in adopting constant speed props which put many British designs behind in performance. Too many ideas seem to have hung on too long, like fighters _need to be *light*_ which meant even when they changed from fixed pitch props they were denied constant speed props and instead fitted with the lighter weight 2 position props. The props actually weighed the same but the 2 position prop wasn't equipped with the speed governor, different pumps, etc. 
Given the lousy propellers, the high state/altitude of supercharge in the Melrin III which meant low take-off power weight was very important. Unfortunately it was a self fulfilling prophesy of shorts, A better prop would have both allowed better use of the power and allowed higher rpm (more power in the first place) to be used which would have more than compensated for the increase in weight. this meant that fitting enough fuel into the single engine fighter in 1937-39 for long range work was not going to happen. 
You also had to fight against the totally unrealistic notions that pilots would be unable to cope with the high closing speeds, and that future airfighting, unlike WW I, would be conducted by fleets (formations) of aircraft flying near parallel courses firing "broadsides" at each other. 
The papers presented _seem_ to hold out for some sort of "escort" that _could_ accompany the bombers and defend them from attacks from the rear by use of a flexible battery or turret. You also have to remember that in 1937 the Bristol Blenheim was the _fastest_ bomber _known_ to be in service and it was considered that any enemy fighters would be unable to attack from ahead or from the beam. 
You also have the 'argument' over close and distant escort which continued in a number of nations for quite a number of years. It appears the 1937 British view of distant escort meant escorts shouldn't even get out of gun range of the bombers they were protecting without being called "distant" escort let alone get several miles from their charges (30 seconds flight time?). 

To have a decent chance of success the "idea" of a long range single engine single seat escort fighter needed a change in thinking about what was possible or practical in air fighting tactics in addition to changes in technical qualities of engines, props and airframes.

I would note that the French, Russians, Italians and Japanese were all working on or building twin engine long range fighters at this time because they didn't believe a single engine fighter could carry enough fuel and perform well enough to be effective. 

The British were certainly not alone in believing it could not be done at that point in time.


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## stubbsy (Jan 15, 2015)

Buffnut453 and Shortround6, 

I think the outcome of the 1937 meeting entirely rational given the facts at the time. My argument is that given the reality of the ineffectiveness of daylight bombing in 1940-1941, without LR fighter support, two options could have been run in parallel: first, to switch to night bombing to avoid losses and continue the fight, and second to adjust or procure a LR fighter capable of competing with the LW short-range fighters to enable daylight bombing. 

It is the inertia that surrounds doing nothing about the second option, because they (Air Staff/Senior RAF leaders involved) had convinced themselves in 1937 that LR fighters would not be effective and, despite evidence to the contrary, they maintained their 1937 position that I am questioning. I don't think this is hindsight as the decision could have been made on the evidence available at the time. Effectively, it is what the USAAF did, though it took them 18 months as posted earlier by another contributor. The RAF took 48 months to come to the same decision.

Cheers


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## Shortround6 (Jan 15, 2015)

The US was also starting from a point in having much longer ranged fighters to begin with. The P-38, P-40 and P-47 having roughly double the range/endurance of a Spitfire to begin with if flying at most economical speeds. And the P-47 held 100 imp gallons more in it's internal tank/s than a Hawker Typhoon (254 imp gal to 154 imp gal) for over 40% more range at most economical. 

So the British have to put roughly 40-50% more fuel _inside_ the Spitfire *plus* drop tanks to equal the combat radius of the initial *short* range US escorts. 

Granted the P-40 would have been a lousy escort in Europe but I hope it gets the idea across. The Americans fitted not only drop tanks but bigger internal tanks in the P-47 (21% increase to 308imp gallons) and P-38s (36% increase) which were accompanied by more powerful engines and better propellers in order to come up with the "escorts" that the P-51 *replaced*. 

Sticking 30-40 imp gallons in a 1941 Spitfire would not have resulted in enough greater radius (regardless of drop tanks) to hit very much of Germany in daylight leaving you with a split bombing campaign in any case. Daylight against France, the low countries and a narrow strip of Germany with night attacks against the rest of Germany? 
Granted it took a while for the Fw 190 to really have an impact but do you really want your MK V Spits saddled with an extra 200-250lbs of fuel and tanks while fighting FW 190s until the MK IX comes along?

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## tomo pauk (Jan 15, 2015)

One of the recommendations for the Spitfire V pilots, when Fw 190 was recognized as threat was to cruise faster than they did before, so they don't get bounced while in low speed. Faster cruising means greater consumption. Extra fuel were were needed, if just to restore the previous range/radius.
We can recall that there was a big 'chunk' of 1941 when the Fw-190 was not around.

Re. prop-related issues: in case anybody was interested, there was some 2000+ of 2-pitch props installed in the Fairey Battlles?


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## Shortround6 (Jan 15, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> One of the recommendations for the Spitfire V pilots, when Fw 190 was recognized as threat was to cruise faster than they did before, so they don't get bounced while in low speed. Faster cruising means greater consumption. Extra fuel were were needed, if just to restore the previous range/radius.
> We can recall that there was a big 'chunk' of 1941 when the Fw-190 was not around.



and that is where a lot of the difference between "book" range and actual operational radius went. The FW 190 may not have been around for a good part of 1941 but increasing numbers (slowly) of 109Fs were and the later 109Fs had better engines than the early ones. 



> Re. prop-related issues: in case anybody was interested, there was some 2000+ of 2-pitch props installed in the Fairey Battlles?



True but so did the early Defiants, Bristol Blenhiems and a number of other early British bombers. 

Somebody once compared a 2 pitch prop to using 1st and 4th gears on a 4 speed car. Much better than using 3rd or 4th gear alone but still leaving a gaping hole in performance between the two settings. I believe that in most (all?) set ups the pilot had to manually switch back and forth which may be alright in bombers (except in an engine out emergency) but having fighter pilots trying to remember when to switch back and forth in a dogfight seems to be setting up more than few pilots for problems.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 15, 2015)

stubbsy said:


> Sorry Edgar, but I think you are too accepting of the previous historiography on this topic and appear averse to discerning what happened from the evidence.


It rather depends on your sources, and, since I refuse to accept only "historiography," mine are the files held in our National Archives.


> Fourth, it is pretty clear that there should have been an option of using the 'Mareng bags' in the wings together with 40 or 72 gallons of extra fuel behind the pilot and a 45 gallon drop tank much earlier than 1944 as it would have provided much greater range for the Spitfire for their Circus, Rodeo missions.


 It does, if you haven't done any research into what was needed to carry out the alterations. 


> This could have, and should have, been achieved much earlier than 1944 and would have opened up the option of considering daylight bombing together with the USAAF in a truly combined and planned operation. As one of the above posts shows a Spitfire with a 90-gallon drop tank game back from a mission over Western Germany with 50 gallons of fuel! So, with say 16,16,40 and 45 = 117 extra gallons a significantly greater range could have been achieved.


Permit me to explain to you what was required, in order to fit the extra tanks into the Spitfire XVI.
First, the extra weight decreed that some equipment had to be removed from the fuselage, to try to keep the CoG within acceptable limits, or the aircraft would rear up, and stall, on take off.
The extra flight time meant a need for extra oxygen, and the XVI had 3 bottles fitted, so two had to be resited. The compressed-air bottles could not be fitted in the usual place, since the tank was in the way, so they, too, had to be resited.
The only place where the bottles could go was in the wings, so they replaced the four Brownings; this meant reconfiguring the wing to "E" armament, and the Air Ministry refused to allow the (in their view) lesser armament until the gyro gunsight was fitted, and that was not available until 1944.
The gyro gunsight needed a modified throttle (a sort of early HOTAS system.)
The sight also had to be fitted before the fuel tank, because there were black boxes and wiring which had to be installed first.
Because of the extra weight, the XVI needed a hard runway, and the majority of airfields were all grass; with a hard runway, the wheel tracking had to be changed, and that caused problems with the wheels/tyres scrubbing on the wings' upper surfaces, so the wings needed a bulged modification.
The extra weight meant that the XVI needed the pointed rudder of the Mk.XII, but that wasn't generally available until 1944; the weight also need metal-covered elevators.
As soon as the war was over, use of the fuel tanks was banned, and the filler point was ordered to be wired shut.
Put simply, if that much modification was needed for the longer, heavier 60-series Merlin, there was never a chance of doing it with the shorter Merlin III/XX/45.


> What you say wrt to return ferry tanks from Malta makes perfect sense (please provide ref), but that was not what Geoffrey Wellum was told. See _First Light_ p.316.


The "reference" to the Malta tanks is open to view in the N.A. files, and service personnel were not normally privy to all instructions issued by the Air Ministry. "Need to know" was, and still is, very much the watch word in the forces.

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## Zipper730 (Jan 30, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> I forget the name at the moment (old age) but one of the top British "boffins" had declared that a long range single engine fighter was "impossible" and the RAF trusted him.


I take it they weren't willing to entertain a twin-engine?


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## wuzak (Jan 30, 2019)

I miss Edgar.

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## Clayton Magnet (Feb 1, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Sticking 30-40 imp gallons in a 1941 Spitfire would not have resulted in enough greater radius (regardless of drop tanks) to hit very much of Germany in daylight leaving you with a split bombing campaign in any case. Daylight against France, the low countries and a narrow strip of Germany with night attacks against the rest of Germany?
> Granted it took a while for the Fw 190 to really have an impact but do you really want your MK V Spits saddled with an extra 200-250lbs of fuel and tanks while fighting FW 190s until the MK IX comes along?


What about (revisionist history in 3, 2, 1...) the Spitfire Mk.III? With its improved drag characteristics, could it have been saddled effectively with extra fuel, with a corresponding increase in combat radius?


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## Zipper730 (Feb 1, 2019)

S
 Shortround6


Your thoughts on this?
Escort Spitfire - a missed opportunity for longer reach? - Royal Aeronautical Society


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## Zipper730 (Feb 1, 2019)

QUOTE="Clayton Magnet, post: 1458489, member: 52873"]What about (revisionist history in 3, 2, 1...) the Spitfire Mk.III?[/quote]Well, off the bat -- the smaller wing area when saddled with extra fuel would potentially have turning characteristics that would readily decline.



stona said:


> One of the paradoxes of Arthur Harris is that he demanded and expected complete loyalty and obedience from his subordinates whilst adopting a more 'flexible' attitude towards the orders of his own superiors.


That attitude is quite common among dominant personalities. That said, there was a chaplain who didn't view the bombing of civilians positively, and in fact one time referred to a movie on "the ethics of bombing" as "the bombing of ethics" 

Amazingly, he managed to avoid getting into trouble for it, Harris knew his views, and let him stay.


> The copy of the letter asking Harris to follow the orders he had been given that Freeman sent to Sorley bears the hand written note, "The only way to deal with Bert [Harris] is to treat him rough." He was wrong. He should have fired him, but never did.


That's correct, if he won't follow orders -- he should be relieved of command.


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## Clayton Magnet (Feb 1, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> the smaller wing area when saddled with extra fuel would potentially have turning characteristics that would readily decline.


but with greatly increased rolling performance. Even with the same fuel load as a Mk.I, the slipperier Mk.III should have cruised at a much higher speed, with increased range as a result


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## Shortround6 (Feb 2, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> S
> Shortround6
> 
> 
> ...




I believe there is another thread (at least one) on this article. Basically they make some poor assumptions and/or the Spitfire is going to need more modifications than they think.

Just like the P-51 was only an 8 G rated fighter at 8,000lbs and a 7.1 G fighter at 9000lbs. A Spitfire carrying an extra 100 gallons internal is going to be 10% over weight (or have it's G load rating reduced by 10%) unless the structure is beefed up. ANd that assumes you can get the 100 gallons in the plane without screwing up the center of gravity, which the rear fuselage tanks did. 

Cruising at 240mph over Europe makes you a target, there is are reasons the US fighters planned cruise at 210mph* IAS *(305-310mph true) at 25,000ft. It was the same reason the British learned with the MK V Spit back in the "Lean forward into France" days of 1941. It could take a Spit V about two minutes to accelerate from a cruise speed in the low two hundreds to full speed and by that time the Spit was either full of holes or the German fighters had come, shot up the bombers and gone. You need to be "cruising" much faster so as to not give up the initiative from the start. 

it doesn't matter how much fuel you can strap under a fighter, what matters is how much fuel you have over Berlin or Munich AFTER you drop the external tanks, fight for 15-20 minutes (and that may include several minutes just climbing back up to altitude after a fight, not every minute being full combat) and then get home. 

Photo Recon Spits did carry large fuel loads, they also ditched the guns, had sometimes squirrely handling and were restricted in flight maneuvers until a lot of the fuel was burned off, not exactly what you want in your escort fighters. 

More could have been done with the Spitfire but that article is using some rose tinted glasses. Very rose tinted.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 2, 2019)

Clayton Magnet said:


> What about (revisionist history in 3, 2, 1...) the Spitfire Mk.III? With its improved drag characteristics, could it have been saddled effectively with extra fuel, with a corresponding increase in combat radius?



SPitfire III always gets high marks by me  thus I agree with idea. It already had 100 imp gals aboard vs. 84 the Mk.I/II/V carried.


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## stona (Feb 2, 2019)

The need for escort fighters only became apparent after the beginning of the war. All these discussions are using hindsight.

In 1936 the DDOps (then Richard Peirse) wrote of events in Spain that _"While I still feel it would be a confession of weakness and a waste of effort on our part to even consider the use of fighters in this way _[to escort bombers]_ , I cannot help feeling that we ought to be prepared for such an eventuality."_

On 30th November the Director of Staff Duties (then Sholto Douglas) commented that _"My own feeling on the matter is that the bombers should be able to look after themselves without the addition of an escort of fighters; although certain of the bombers might be more heavily armed than the remainder at the expense of their bomb load."_

The Americans would try that later, and it didn't work.

In response the DCAS (then Christopher Courtney) listed a set of concerns about escorts that reflected pre-war RAF thinking. Specialised escorts would demand resources which might otherwise be put into bombers. ; they would be tied to their formation; they would not necessarily be better armed than the aircraft they were escorting. He concluded that _"The whole concept of fighter escorts is defective."_

In June 1937 the Air Fighting Committee decide that it was not the right time for requirements for special escort fighters to be drawn up.

In the summer of 1938 Ludlow-Hewitt, then Chief of Bomber Command, confronted with the prospect of a real war, suddenly got cold feet about the certainty of the 'bomber will always get through' concept, and argued that the Air Staff's policy on escorts should be reconsidered. His appeal fell on deaf ears.

In an April 1939 meeting on Bomber Command readiness the Director of Operations reported that further discussions on the issue of escorts had resulted in the opinion that the defence of bombers would be better undertaken _"by bomber aircraft carrying fewer bombs, but more ammunition and guns."_

Did I mention that the Americans would later try that? Fortunately the British never did. What was envisaged was more an escort bomber than an escort fighter. Air planners were handicapped *(unlike us)* by their inability to come to a consensus on how to predict the increasingly complex and uncertain future of aerial warfare.

That's why the RAF did not have designs for a long range fighter. Everything else is hindsight.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Feb 2, 2019)

I have written before that with the state of the art in Britain the single engine escort fighter wasn't technically feasible in the mid/late 30s. Not to come down to harshly on the British it wasn't technically feasible in most (all?) countries. The Merlin was the best single engine for fighters in 1938. The DB 601A shows up at the end of 1938. The Allison is almost 2 years from mass production. The Hispano needs a discreet vail pulled over it. 
The P-36A with the P&W R-1830-13/17 has 900hp at 12,000ft running on 92 octane fuel. 100 octane will increase performance below that height, not above it. 

Yes, better engines are being offered/promised. for the British we know how the Centaurus, Sabre, vulture saga turned out. 
for the Americans we know how the Lycoming O-1230, Continental ???-1430, and Wright Tornado turned out too. (much less successful than the British three, they powered zero production aircraft) 

Easy to pick winners now  

For the Japanese the Ki-43 was a bit late getting started (into production) and showed up in the fall of 1941 with a single speed supercharger and a two blade, two position prop. 
Yes it held more fuel than a Spitfire but it's great range was only achieved at around 200-220mph at altitudes that would have been impractical in Europe. A pair of 7.7mm machine guns might not have the been best choice either. 

The state of the aeronautical art changed in 1940-42. 

Which leads us back to 1936-38. What could reasonably have been expected to be the result of an escort fighter specification from those years using "safe" technology(betting on the Sabre gets you zero aircraft in service in 1941-42). Improvements to the Merin are an _unexpected _bonus. 

It is no wonder that the men in charge thought that the only solution (and a poor one) was some extra bombers toting extra guns and ammo. 

Lets also remember that the Japanese army requested that Kawasaki start work on a twin engine fighter in 1937 that lead to the Ki-45, first prototype flew in 1939 and after much (much, much) revision finally made it into production in late 1941/early 1942. it was used as a bomber escort early in it's career but was no match for the single engine, single seat interceptors it faced. Point is that even the Japanese, while working on the Ki-43, didn't believe the single engine, single seat fighter was the answer to the long range escort problem.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 2, 2019)

stona said:


> <snip>



Thank you for posting the excerpts. From them we can concude that a): escort fighter was not being equaly discarded by all members of brass, and b): that people in charge never actually tested whether escort fighter works or not. That leads us to c): decision to not to proceed with escort fighter project was based on 'I feel' rather on 'it is fact, borne out from tests'. 
Seems like we also don't have d): results of tests of RAF fighters and whole FC (including GCI) ability to intercept RAF bombers in second part of 1930s.


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## Zipper730 (Feb 2, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> I believe there is another thread (at least one) on this article. Basically they make some poor assumptions and/or the Spitfire is going to need more modifications than they think.
> 
> Just like the P-51 was only an 8 G rated fighter at 8,000lbs and a 7.1 G fighter at 9000lbs.


That's ultimate load?


> A Spitfire carrying an extra 100 gallons internal is going to be 10% over weight (or have it's G load rating reduced by 10%)


From what I remember it's max load was around 9-10.5g right?

As for the issues with the center-of-gravity, that was an issue that affected the P-51's as well, but they were willing to put up with it anyway -- the problem went away once the tanks were drained. That said, the speed seems to be the biggest issue -- and I had a hunch about that, but wanted to make sure of it -- I figured the 240 mph cruise speed would mean it'd face off against an enemy that would start off with superior speed, could out accelerate it (the Fw190 was good in that regard) in level flight, and in a dive.

How much did the Spitfire VII/VIII/IX range increase with the Merlin 60's?


> Photo Recon Spits did carry large fuel loads, they also ditched the guns, had sometimes squirrely handling and were restricted in flight maneuvers until a lot of the fuel was burned off, not exactly what you want in your escort fighters.


Were they escorted by other fighters due to this limit? Also, how fast did they cruise?


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## buffnut453 (Feb 2, 2019)

No idea about the cruising speed for PR Spitfires but they were never escorted by fighters. They were "alone, unarmed and unafraid"...ok, perhaps not the latter.


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## pbehn (Feb 2, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> No idea about the cruising speed for PR Spitfires but they were never escorted by fighters. They were "alone, unarmed and unafraid"...ok, perhaps not the latter.


Approx 50% of Spitfire Mk XIVs carried a camera. They weren't supposed to fight just equipped to get out of a place the enemy didnt want them to see.


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## Greyman (Feb 2, 2019)

PR cruise speeds:

Spitfire X & XI (at 30,000 ft)
most econ: 260 mph​max weak mix: 388 mph​
Spitfire XIII (at 5,000 ft)
most econ: 175 mph​max weak mix: 280 mph​
Spitfire XIV (at 35,000 ft)
most econ: 290 mph​max weak mix: 393 mph​
Spitfire XIX (at 35,000 ft)
most econ: 360 mph​max weak mix: 405 mph​

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## Shortround6 (Feb 2, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> That's ultimate load?



No, that is the service load. The Ultimate load was supposed to be 12 Gs. The extra 50% is the _safety margin!_ 



> From what I remember it's max load was around 9-10.5g right?



That kind of depends. One list has a MK IX at 7240lbs having an ultimate load of 10.0 G's. Different countries had different rules. But cut that to about 6.7 Gs for a service load? 
How much beefing up was done I don't know but some of the older/lighter Spitfires may have had a bit higher G rating. 





> As for the issues with the center-of-gravity, that was an issue that affected the P-51's as well, but they were willing to put up with it anyway -- the problem went away once the tanks were drained.


 Actually on the P-51Ds they preferred to keep 25-35 gallons in the rear tank. The Americans still used the rear tanks post war and into the 50s. The British wired the fuel fillers shut in peace time and you needed written orders from the squadron commander to unseal the tank/s and fill them. Again, different rules or perhaps the two planes didn't really respond the same to large amounts of fuel behind the pilot. 



> How much did the Spitfire VII/VIII/IX range increase with the Merlin 60's?



In general the range went down. That assumes the planes had the same size fuel tanks. The VIIIs got the wing tanks.
If you are making extra power you are burning extra fuel. You_ might _eek out a bit more range due to the lower drag at higher altitude but you are using more power/fuel to drive the two stage supercharger. A lot depends on speed and altitude. 



> Were they escorted by other fighters due to this limit? Also, how fast did they cruise?


AS answered above these were solitary missions. 
Photo recon was done at both high and low altitude. In general they used the highest speed they could that would give the desired range to make interception as difficult as possible.
There were a number of long tail chases that ended with the Spitfire getting away (and few that didn't?), dodging into any handy cloud also helped.


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## stona (Feb 3, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> Thank you for posting the excerpts. From them we can concude that a): escort fighter was not being equaly discarded by all members of brass, and b): that people in charge never actually tested whether escort fighter works or not. That leads us to c): decision to not to proceed with escort fighter project was based on 'I feel' rather on 'it is fact, borne out from tests'.
> Seems like we also don't have d): results of tests of RAF fighters and whole FC (including GCI) ability to intercept RAF bombers in second part of 1930s.



There was an assumption that ADGB's zone fighters would intercept bombers at night, it is why they were specified with a day/night capability. The reality was that they could not, yet another abyss between the reality and rhetoric.

The RAF was doctrinally committed to the aerial offensive, but never stopped thinking about fighters and other methods of home defence. Dowding did not invent the concept of integrated air defence. General E B Ashmore, who had directed Britain's air defence in WWI, argued after the war for the development of an information network to aid the interception of bombers. This took advantage of observers and dedicated telephone lines to support fighters and anti aircraft artillery. Eventually improvements in radio telephony would be incorporated and, eventually, radio direction finding.
It was the inability of British fighters to intercept British bombers in the 1934 exercises that gave impetus to the development of radio direction finding/radar. It seemed that the future Prime Minister's fears, expressed in 1932, might be justified.

As late as March 1938 Slessor (then Deputy Director of Plans) requested an overview of the effectiveness of fighter defence from the Air Staff. He needed information for a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee (the British LOVE a committee) and asked about the likelihood of bomber interception, the value of defensive armament on bombers, and the margin of speed between fighters and bombers (which was closing alarmingly). The Air Staff reply was upbeat, supposing that 60% of day and 40% of night raids could be intercepted. This was palpably nonsense. The Air Staff was at pains to point out that an increase in the number of fighters was tied to the development of a German bomber force and that British offensive strategy had not changed. _"It is not enough to avoid losing a war...a boxer cannot fight if he does no more than parry an opponent's blows, he must have an equivalent punch, he must be able to deliver it at the right time and place; and he must be able to keep on punching until his opponent is out."_ There was a concession that the case that the bomber will always get through might have been overstated.

In November 1938 the Air Staff circulated a memorandum stating that the counteroffensive had not been abandoned or replaced by a defensive orientation.

There is a clear contradiction in RAF policy and doctrine. On the one hand it argued that its bombers would get through and deliver a devastating counteroffensive in the case that Britain was attacked. This was nothing less than wishful thinking, events from 1939-1942 would prove it so. On the other hand it imagined that it might prevent the enemy bombers from getting through. In daylight at least this proved almost accidentally correct. It is Overy (with whom I seldom entirely agree) who wrote _"To admit that there was a defence against the bomber was to question the whole basis on which an independent air force had been built."_ In this case he is absolutely right. The RAF had a tendency, as do many organisations, military or otherwise, to preserve its fundamental assumptions whenever possible. This prevented a proper examination of the evident tension that is inherent in simultaneously believing that it could fend off a Luftwaffe attack and also prosecute a successful offensive against Germany.

Cheers

Steve

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## buffnut453 (Feb 3, 2019)

I think you're being a tad harsh there, Stona, because you're assuming that all bombers are created equal. In 1938 the RAF was (AFAIK) the only air force that was equipping its bombers with power-operated turrets, and the Wellington carried a far greater weight of bombs than any other German bomber. If RAF senior leadership believed that power turrets enabled their bombers to better survive attacks by defensive fighters, and if RAF bombers could deliver a more powerful punch per-aircraft, then it's perhaps not surprising that this contradiction in RAF strategy might occur. 

That said, I do agree that there was a lack of truly objective critical thinking...but the RAF wasn't alone in that. The Luftwaffe and the USAAF equally suffered their fair share of mis-steps from 1935 thru 1945.

Arguably, the true shortfall was in accurately understanding the limits of air power. The "shock and awe" of Guernica seemed to point the way to a future where entire cities could be cowed by aerial attack. The reality is that, until the advent of the atomic bomb, air power alone could not subdue a city entirely. It could disrupt factories but it never resulted in the mass breakdown of morale that Guernica seemed to presage.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> I think you're being a tad harsh there, Stona, because you're assuming that all bombers are created equal. In 1938 the RAF was (AFAIK) the only air force that was equipping its bombers with power-operated turrets, and the Wellington carried a far greater weight of bombs than any other German bomber. If RAF senior leadership believed that power turrets enabled their bombers to better survive attacks by defensive fighters, and if RAF bombers could deliver a more powerful punch per-aircraft, then it's perhaps not surprising that this contradiction in RAF strategy might occur.



Wellington IA and IC carried 4500 lbs max, same as Heinkel 111 with Jumo 211 engines of 1939-40. Number of bombers also counts, not just punch-per-aircraft.



> That said, I do agree that there was a lack of truly objective critical thinking...but the RAF wasn't alone in that. The Luftwaffe and the USAAF equally suffered their fair share of mis-steps from 1935 thru 1945.



Agree all the way. We can toss air forces or air services of France, Italy, Soviet Union and Japan here.



> Arguably, the true shortfall was in accurately understanding the limits of air power. The "shock and awe" of Guernica seemed to point the way to a future where entire cities could be cowed by aerial attack. The reality is that, until the advent of the atomic bomb, air power alone could not subdue a city entirely. It could disrupt factories but it never resulted in the mass breakdown of morale that Guernica seemed to presage.



Very true.


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## pbehn (Feb 3, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Point is that even the Japanese, while working on the Ki-43, didn't believe the single engine, single seat fighter was the answer to the long range escort problem.


You could say that planes like the Typhoon and P-47 were twin engine fighters but with one propeller. They were the cost weight and complexity of earlier twins. Both the Vulture and Sabre engines were two engines joined together in some way.


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## stona (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> I think you're being a tad harsh there, Stona,



Not really. The whole concept of an offensive bomber force was predicated on its ability to launch a devastating counter offensive in the event of, in fact to deter, any aggression.

The gulf between this declared objective and reality was demonstrated in the first eighteen months of the war. In September 1939 the RAF had nearly 1,500 first line aircraft including 536 bombers. What did they do? They carried out mainly maritime operations and supported the Army in France. Maritime operations might be justified, supporting the Army was something the RAF had consistently resisted and argued against since the day of its foundation. The operations that Bomber Command did carry out met with extremely limited success. The demoralising outcomes of operations in the first three months of the war began to cast doubt on the theory that the bombers will always get through. Anthony Verrier summed it up well, writing,_ "Few aspects of this phase of the strategic air offensive are more striking in retrospect...than the claims made for and the hopes entertained about mass bombing before 1939 and the virtual absence of all reference to it at the highest policy making levels for many months thereafter."_
In fact the RAF pulled back from prospective plans for even a limited offensive against Germany. In January 1940 Ludlow-Hewitt expressed severe doubts about plans to mount attacks against power plants in the Ruhr, arguing that the loss of 50% or more of the attacking forces would not only demoralise the bomber crews, but also kill the men who might later fly more capable bombers.

The mythologizing of WWII by the British tends to obscure just how incapable Bomber Command was. In September 1939 the Air Staff authorised the dropping of leaflets, hoping to persuade the German population that the war was a jolly bad idea and they would be better off not pursuing it. Equipped with maps, astro-sextants and directional radio crews were expected to find their way by night. So many bombers crews accidentally over flew or crashed in neutral Dutch, Belgian and Danish territory that even the leaflet raids were suspended. 

Tami Davis Bidell has written of British attitudes in 1940, _"Britain was in a desperate situation: the bombers provided the only means of offensive action against Germany. Looking stoically ahead, the British kept themselves from despair by cultivating a selective blind spot."_ That is an American assessment with which it is hard to disagree. Sebastien Cox wrote more succinctly that, _"The Air Staff, and indeed the government, were sustained by a faith wholly at variance with the known facts of the situation."_

Cheers

Steve

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## buffnut453 (Feb 3, 2019)

Steve,

You're applying the retrospectroscope again by discussing what actually happened after the outbreak of war. My observation is that the apparent contradiction in RAF thinking that RAF fighters would succeed in defending against enemy bombers while our bombers would, somehow, get through to the target and succeed. My contention is that the perceived (or, perhaps, over-confidence in) technological superiority of the RAF (power turrets, ground-based radar warning, fighter control organization etc) may have led to the type of pre-war thinking you describe. Rather than blame the pre-war planners for having insufficiently attuned crystal balls, I'm trying to understand why they failed to comprehend the reasons for the contradiction in strategic thought.


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## stona (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> You're applying the retrospectroscope again by discussing what actually happened after the outbreak of war. My observation is that the apparent contradiction in RAF thinking that RAF fighters would succeed in defending against enemy bombers while our bombers would, somehow, get through to the target and succeed. My contention is that the perceived (or, perhaps, over-confidence in) technological superiority of the RAF (power turrets, ground-based radar warning, fighter control organization etc) may have led to the type of pre-war thinking you describe. Rather than blame the pre-war planners for having insufficiently attuned crystal balls, I'm trying to understand why they failed to comprehend the reasons for the contradiction in strategic thought.



The pre-war British air planners lacked intelligence and information about the purpose of the Luftwaffe and about aircraft performance, guns and bombsights. They simply assumed that its role would not be very much different to the role they envisioned for the RAF. Their was a near panic during the Munich crisis, as war became inevitable. The British were really worried about a massive German air strike aimed at producing a quick British surrender. They were still worried that the Luftwaffe's bombers would get through, and assumed that their own would, despite the simultaneous hope that Fighter Command could somehow prevent the Germans. There is no evidence anywhere that I have seen that shows the British distinguishing between their bombers and others.
British defence was really predicated on the counter offensive. A highly influential paper by the Joint Planning Committee in 1936, which was heavily influenced by the Air Ministry's representative, a certain Group Captain Arthur Harris, summed it up. The committee supposed that the Germans would launch unrestricted attacks on Britain to persuade the population that _"surrender was preferable to the continuation of the attacks"_. The working classes were considered particularly likely to be unsteady in the face of a German onslaught. The committee accepted that defensive measures might mitigate the effects of such an attack but admitted that_ "they had been unable to discover any method of direct defence sufficiently effective to guarantee the security of objectives in the country"_, believing that_ "the only real answer lies in a counter offensive of at least similar effectiveness". _RAF air planners 'mirror imaged' assumptions about the Luftwaffe's likely role in wartime. As Wesley Wark wrote, _"Nothing distilled from the sources that became available in 1937 challenged the Air Ministry's preconceptions about the Luftwaffe's strategic air mission. The picture indicated instead that the German air force would have both an army support and a strategic bombing role. On this basis, a German knock-out blow could not be discounted."_

Bomber Command was utterly incapable of delivering such a counter offensive in 1936 and equally incapable in 1939. The entire premise of Britain's air defence was very nearly built on a fallacy. In fact it was the ability to prevent the bombers from getting through, fortuitously and unintentionally aided by the economic consequences of the Inskip report (which gave some members of the Air Council apoplexy) that would save the day. The Air Ministry and RAF deluded themselves throughout the 1930s and continued to do so after war was declared. They did it, and argued it in government and in public, for selfish reasons, principally the preservation of the RAF as an independent service. *They believed that their bombers would get through not because of some notion of their superior armament, or any other technical advantage, but because they had to believe it. If they didn't, then what was the point of the RAF?*

Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Feb 3, 2019)

stona said:


> The pre-war British air planners lacked intelligence and information about the purpose of the Luftwaffe and about aircraft performance, guns and bombsights. They simply assumed that its role would not be very much different to the role they envisioned for the RAF. Their was a near panic during the Munich crisis, as war became inevitable. The British were really worried about a massive German air strike aimed at producing a quick British surrender. They were still worried that the Luftwaffe's bombers would get through, and assumed that their own would, despite the simultaneous hope that Fighter Command could somehow prevent the Germans. There is no evidence anywhere that I have seen that shows the British distinguishing between their bombers and others.
> British defence was really predicated on the counter offensive. A highly influential paper by the Joint Planning Committee in 1936, which was heavily influenced by the Air Ministry's representative, a certain Group Captain Arthur Harris, summed it up. The committee supposed that the Germans would launch unrestricted attacks on Britain to persuade the population that _"surrender was preferable to the continuation of the attacks"_. The working classes were considered particularly likely to be unsteady in the face of a German onslaught. The committee accepted that defensive measures might mitigate the effects of such an attack but admitted that_ "they had been unable to discover any method of direct defence sufficiently effective to guarantee the security of objectives in the country"_, believing that_ "the only real answer lies in a counter offensive of at least similar effectiveness". _RAF air planners 'mirror imaged' assumptions about the Luftwaffe's likely role in wartime. As Wesley Wark wrote, _"Nothing distilled from the sources that became available in 1937 challenged the Air Ministry's preconceptions about the Luftwaffe's strategic air mission. The picture indicated instead that the German air force would have both an army support and a strategic bombing role. On this basis, a German knock-out blow could not be discounted."_
> 
> Bomber Command was utterly incapable of delivering such a counter offensive in 1936 and equally incapable in 1939. The entire premise of Britain's air defence was very nearly built on a fallacy. In fact it was the ability to prevent the bombers from getting through, fortuitously and unintentionally aided by the economic consequences of the Inskip report (which gave some members of the Air Council apoplexy) that would save the day. The Air Ministry and RAF deluded themselves throughout the 1930s and continued to do so after war was declared. They did it, and argued it in government and in public, for selfish reasons, principally the preservation of the RAF as an independent service. *They believed that their bombers would get through not because of some notion of their superior armament, or any other technical advantage, but because they had to believe it. If they didn't, then what was the point of the RAF?*
> ...



Fair enough but what then of the USAAF which wasn't an independent air force but wore similar blinkers when it came to strategic bombing? Bottom line is that there isn't a single air force (independent or otherwise) that was accurately and adequately prepared for the Second World War. To single out the RAF in that regard still seems a little harsh. Yes, senior RAF officers were trying to justify the independence of the service...but how well prepared would Britain have been if the RAF was disbanded back into the RFC and RNAS? What chance the defence of Britain in 1940 under those circumstances? 

To your point "The committee supposed that the Germans would launch unrestricted attacks on Britain to persuade the population that _"surrender was preferable to the continuation of the attacks"_"...isn't that what happened? Both sides held off bombing civilian targets until the Luftwaffe accidentally bombed London (And why did that happen? Because the Germans weren't much (if any) better than the Brits at night-time navigation). Once the gloves came off, the effort expended by the Luftwaffe against British cities resulted in a considerable lessening of pressure on Fighter Command airfields and installations. However, the Luftwaffe was neither configured nor equipped for this strategic role. Ergo, it could be argued that the RAF did deliver on its strategic promise (your quote _"the only real answer lies in a counter offensive of at least similar effectiveness"._) it's just that the Luftwaffe attack wasn't particularly effective from a strategic perspective...and the RAF's response was equally ineffectual.

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## Reluctant Poster (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> Fair enough but what then of the USAAF which wasn't an independent air force but wore similar blinkers when it came to strategic bombing? Bottom line is that there isn't a single air force (independent or otherwise) that was accurately and adequately prepared for the Second World War. To single out the RAF in that regard still seems a little harsh. Yes, senior RAF officers were trying to justify the independence of the service...but how well prepared would Britain have been if the RAF was disbanded back into the RFC and RNAS? What chance the defence of Britain in 1940 under those circumstances?
> 
> To your point "The committee supposed that the Germans would launch unrestricted attacks on Britain to persuade the population that _"surrender was preferable to the continuation of the attacks"_"...isn't that what happened? Both sides held off bombing civilian targets until the Luftwaffe accidentally bombed London (And why did that happen? Because the Germans weren't much (if any) better than the Brits at night-time navigation). Once the gloves came off, the effort expended by the Luftwaffe against British cities resulted in a considerable lessening of pressure on Fighter Command airfields and installations. However, the Luftwaffe was neither configured nor equipped for this strategic role. Ergo, it could be argued that the RAF did deliver on its strategic promise (your quote _"the only real answer lies in a counter offensive of at least similar effectiveness"._) it's just that the Luftwaffe attack wasn't particularly effective from a strategic perspective...and the RAF's response was equally ineffectual.



You beat me to the punch. Actually the US was far worse. They had observed over 2 years of war which quite clearly showed that unescorted bombers were siting ducks and yet they convinced themselves that their aircraft and tactics were superior and they that would succeed where everyone else had failed. Even after several spectacular failures they continued to delude themselves that success was just around the corner. "The cornered wolf fights hardest." Of course believing your own BS was a big help in that regard. 6 Me 109s shot down for very B17 lost. The magic number of 300 bombers per would solve the problems, etc.
And of course we should never forget the YB-40 escort "fighter" which was an idea that never should have seen the light of day.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> Fair enough but what then of the USAAF which wasn't an independent air force



Quite true, it wasn't independent _but it wanted to be!!!_

And from that wish to independent (and equal) to the Army and Navy flowed some of the decisions. 

And lo and behold, they did become equal (if not a bit more equal at times).


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## buffnut453 (Feb 3, 2019)

Reluctant Poster said:


> The Americans were actually far worse. They had the examples from over 2 years of war showing quite clearly that bombers were sitting ducks. Even after their own experiences they were still delisional.
> 
> 
> You beat me to the punch. Actually the US was far worse. They had observed over 2 years of war which clearly showed that the bombers needed escort and yet they convinced themselves that their aircraft and tactics were superior and they that would succeed where everyone else had failed. Even after several spectacular failures they continued to delude themselves that success was just around the corner. "The cornered wolf fights hardest." Of course believing your own BS was a big help in that regard. 6 Me 109s shot down for very B17 lost. The magic number of 300 bombers per would solve the problems, etc.
> And of course we should never forget the YB-40 escort "fighter" which was an idea that never should have seen the light of day.



I would agree with many of your sentiments. The visceral animosity within the USAAF between the "bomber boys" and anyone taking an interest in pursuit caused no end of problems, including the loss of some quality senior leaders (everyone knows about Chennault but there were others). It could be argued that the internal squabbles had a significant impact on fighter aircraft development, hence in 1941 the USAAF's most modern fighter was the P-40C which couldn't even get close to the altitudes that B-17s could fly at...hence self-reinforcing the pre-war view that "the bomber will always get through".


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## tomo pauk (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> I would agree with many of your sentiments. The visceral animosity within the USAAF between the "bomber boys" and anyone taking an interest in pursuit caused no end of problems, including the loss of some quality senior leaders (everyone knows about Chennault but there were others). It could be argued that the internal squabbles had a significant impact on fighter aircraft development, hence in 1941 the USAAF's most modern fighter was the P-40C which couldn't even get close to the altitudes that B-17s could fly at...hence self-reinforcing the pre-war view that "the bomber will always get through".



The most-modern US fighter in 1941 was P-38, followed by P-43. Both capable flying & fighting at B-17 altitudes.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 3, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> The most-modern US fighter in 1941 was P-38, followed by P-43. Both capable flying & fighting at B-17 altitudes.



Both those types only entered service in 1941...that doesn't make them operationally ready. Let's jump back to 1939 so we're comparing apples to apples as regards the RAF entry into combat. What was the front-line USAAF fighter then? Bottom line is that the USAAF woefully neglected fighter development, the refusal to require installation of engines with 2-speed superchargers being but one glaring example.

My basic premise here is that there are plenty of criticisms to throw around when it comes to pre-war strategic thinking.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> Both those types only entered service in 1941...that doesn't make them operationally ready. Let's jump back to 1939 so we're comparing apples to apples as regards the RAF entry into combat. What was the front-line USAAF fighter then? Bottom line is that the USAAF woefully neglected fighter development, the refusal to require installation of engines with 2-speed superchargers being but one glaring example..



I was not the one drawing out the B-17 
Is there actually such a thing as 'refusal to require'? The 2-speed superchargers were not present on Hurricanes and Spitfires until the BoB (on Spitfires until 2nd half of 1942).
1-speed S/C on Merlin III, let alone on Merlin 45 was vastly better than 2-speed S/C on VK-105 or the S/C with infinite number of speeds on DB 601A or 601N. 1-speed S/C on V-1710-33 was no worse than S/C with infinite number of speeds on DB 601A.
Having XP-37, XP-38, XP-39, XP-40, XP-42, XP-46, XP-43, XP-47 in development phase within 3 years does refute the claim that USAAF woefully (or in any way) neglected fighter development.



> My basic premise here is that there are plenty of criticisms to throw around when it comes to pre-war strategic thinking.



I've agreed with that a page before.
Faults of USAAF or any other air service/force do not mean that other air services/forces are exempt from analysis.


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## pbehn (Feb 3, 2019)

Between 1939 and 1940 there was an awful realisation that bombing a civilian population to sue for peace required an lot more bombing than had previously been thought. The British held a strange view on this, while they were certain they would never surrender to bombing of cities they still maintained Germany would. A count of the tonnage of bombs dropped on Coventry and London produced a calculation of the number of bombers and payloads required, it was clear in 1940 the RAF couldn't do what they wanted to. To this day it still hasn't been established that a population can be bombed into surrender.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 3, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> Faults of USAAF or any other air service/force do not mean that other air services/forces are exempt from analysis.



I'm not saying that. I just don't see the point of knocking the RAF for lacking a viable strategic bombing capability when there wasn't a single air force on the planet that DID have such a capability. It's fair game to ding individual air forces on their specific weaknesses (eg the Luftwaffe on its lack of a strategic capability, the RAF's lack of tactical support to the Army, the USAAF's predilection for precision bombing that was impractical in the real world etc). I just don't see the point of singling out one service for its lack of strategic capability when every late 1930s air force was weak in that area.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> I'm not saying that. I just don't see the point of knocking the RAF for lacking a viable strategic bombing capability when there wasn't a single air force on the planet that DID have such a capability. It's fair game to ding individual air forces on their specific weaknesses (eg the Luftwaffe on its lack of a strategic capability, the RAF's lack of tactical support to the Army, the USAAF's predilection for precision bombing that was impractical in the real world etc). I just don't see the point of singling out one service for its lack of strategic capability when every late 1930s air force was weak in that area.



People, at least in this thread, were mostly questioning whys and whynots with regard of UK-designed LR escort fighters. The RAF movers and shakers, some more (Trenchard) and some less, were claiming that bombers on their own will be decisive in a future war.
Both RAF and LW have had substantial strategic bomber force in 1939/40, but without proper and numerous LR escorts neither force was able to prosecute a bombing war envisioned pre-war.

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## BiffF15 (Feb 3, 2019)

pbehn said:


> . To this day it still hasn't been established that a population can be bombed into surrender.




I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...

Cheers,
Biff

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## Shortround6 (Feb 3, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> Bottom line is that the USAAF woefully neglected fighter development, not least by refusing to require 2-speed supercharger being but one glaring example.



There are two speed superchargers and there are two speed superchargers (and the engines they are attached to).

For the US there were only two viable fighter engines _ready to go and in production _in 1939. The Wright R-1820 9 cylinder and the P & W R-1830 14 cylinder radial. 
Allison delivered 46 engines in 1939 and 29 of them were for the twin engine YFM-1. Allison also had to take back and rework 277 P-40 engines in 1940 in order for them to make rated power and still meet the original overhaul life. Mucking about with a two speed supercharger was only going to delay something else. 

for most companies using a two speed supercharger was a way to increase take-off power without hurting altitude performance. 
Most 1939 engines had full throttle heights around 13,000ft (4,000 meters) give or take a bit (1500ft?) . The Merlin III was far and away the exception. 
The superchargers were maxed out at around that altitude and spinning them faster with a higher gear wasn't going to get you much. The impeller tips were already getting close to exceeding the speed of sound inside the supercharger. 

Even with RR the big advantage of the Merlin X over the Merlin III was the extra 200 or so hp for take-off using 87 octane fuel rather than the extra 1500ft or so of full throttle height. 

The US had gone to 100 octane before the British (and had gone through the intermediate 91/92 octane) and that allowed the Allison ( and the two radials) a bit of breathing room on the take-off ratings without using a 2 speed supercharger. 
Please note that the P & W R-1830 was good for about 950-1000hp at 14,500ft in high gear if it had two speeds and the same if it had one speed and used the high ratio.
I would also note that in the P-36 the low altitude engine was the -17 and the experimental single speed high altitude engine (14,500ft) was the -23 version. The US allocated the -19 model number to an experimental two *stage* engine that gave 1050hp at 17,500ft. The two speed production engine with the lowest type number is the -33 used in the P-66 Vanguard and some early non turbo B-24s. 

I would note that the US had built more turbo charged aircraft than the rest of the world put together by 1939/40 (something like about 100) although that includes the 50 P-30 two seat fighters. The US was hardly ignoring high altitude engines or fighters. ( see the YP-37s, The YFM-1 was supposed to use turbos and the P-38)

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## Shortround6 (Feb 3, 2019)

BiffF15 said:


> I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff


 The Toyko raid of March 9/10 was the first that _might _have forced a surrender. It destroyed more square miles and killed more people than either atomic raid. 
It just took 279 bombers over the target to do it (325 total took off). 

Even without the Atomic bomb the handwriting was on the wall. But 300 plus B-29s would have been a delirious dream to the war planers of 1936-38.

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## pbehn (Feb 3, 2019)

BiffF15 said:


> I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff


You can make an argument for that, but there were many in the Japanese military who wanted to fight on, I don't believe the civilian population were demanding surrender. The fire bombings of Tokyo actually killed more people and that didn't provoke surrender. As I understand it the Emperor intervened on behalf of his people, but that requires a man with some sense, Adolf wouldn't have done the same, he didn't.

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## BiffF15 (Feb 3, 2019)

I would argue that once the word gets out that a single bomb from a single plane did the damage associated with an atomic bomb, and he general population would get involved or start raising their collective voices.

Cheers,
Biff


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## pbehn (Feb 3, 2019)

BiffF15 said:


> I would argue that once the word gets out that a single bomb from a single plane did the damage associated with an atomic bomb, and he general population would get involved or start raising their collective voices.
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff


On many of the islands taken by US forces men women and children would commit suicide rather than surrender, crouching around the last grenade or just jumping off cliffs. The notion of bombing a nation into surrender is a throwback to European siege warfare, but in many sieges almost all the residents of a city died without opening the gates.


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## stona (Feb 4, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> I'm not saying that. I just don't see the point of knocking the RAF for lacking a viable strategic bombing capability when there wasn't a single air force on the planet that DID have such a capability. It's fair game to ding individual air forces on their specific weaknesses (eg the Luftwaffe on its lack of a strategic capability, the RAF's lack of tactical support to the Army, the USAAF's predilection for precision bombing that was impractical in the real world etc). I just don't see the point of singling out one service for its lack of strategic capability when every late 1930s air force was weak in that area.



The issue is that the RAF was claiming a strategic bombing capability that it did not have. Many senior officers and members of the Air Council KNEW that it couldn't do it, but kept claiming it and arguing for funds to do it because it was the raison d'etre of the RAF as an independent service. It was an exercise in self delusion (if we are being kind) or dishonesty (if we are not).
Though there was a doctrinal hangover from WWI regarding attacks on that most ephemeral and unmeasurable quality of the enemy, its morale, there was not an express intent for the RAF to attack it in official inter-war policy. Many senior airmen saw it [enemy morale] as a legitimate target, but it did not feature in any public pronouncements, nor in any pre-war target planning.

Whilst it is true that the first bombing of London was a mistake, the subsequent 'Blitz' was an entirely intentional campaign, forced on the Germans by the failure of the Luftwaffe to attain any of the objectives set out for it in Fuhrer Directive 17, though the Luftwaffe deluded itself in believing some had in fact been achieved. It was an attack carried out in a last ditch attempt to force Britain out of the war in 1940, by negotiation. Nazi Germany had more pressing and ideologically driven business to undertake in the East. The Luftwaffe campaign against London (and other British cities) was precisely the scenario in which the pre-war air planners had envisaged the RAF mounting a counter-offensive of at least equal ferocity. What happened? The RAF despatched about 50 aircraft to bomb Berlin on the night of 25/26 August. The only bombs falling within the Berlin city limits destroyed a summer house, two people were injured. Most bombs fell into country areas south of the city, many in 'Stadtguter', large farms owned by the City of Berlin. Berliners joked, 'Now they are trying to starve us out'. 3 Hampdens were lost and 3 more ditched in the sea on the return flight, a strong head wind on the outward journey had caused them to run out of fuel. That was the RAF's counter-offensive, while large tracts of London would soon burn. It is not possible to argue that no air force had the capability to successfully attack cities when Warsaw, Rotterdam and now London burned, soon to be joined by other major British cities. Coventry, where I happen to be going later today, had its city centre destroyed in November *1940.*

Cheers

Steve

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## swampyankee (Feb 4, 2019)

BiffF15 said:


> I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff



Except this was after four years of war, including a submarine campaign, augmented by minelaying, that radically impaired Japanese imports of food, fuel, and raw materials. Japan was also being defeated at sea and heavily pressured on land. The bombing campaign, including the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, certainly contributed to Japan’s defeat, but could not have done so alone, which was the pre-war position of many advocates of strategic bombing.

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## stona (Feb 4, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> My basic premise here is that there are plenty of criticisms to throw around when it comes to pre-war strategic thinking.



It depends how far back you want to go. After WW1 the Americans, separated by two oceans from potential enemies and after that war more determined than ever to stay that way, took a far more complacent view of developments in aviation. They could afford to. Their perspective on bomber aircraft and the future of air war was more distanced and far less visceral than that of their British colleagues. Unlike the British they were not going to be bombed themselves in a future war.

The Americans did see the bomber as an offensive weapon, but the official American national security posture was distinctly defensive in orientation and bomber aircraft were given a defensive role; to find and attack naval threats to the US Coastline. This did not stop American airmen from posing and discussing hypothetical scenarios for strategic bombing, but it was a very, very, long road from the early inter-war position to attempted implementation and failure of a precision bombing doctrine in N W Europe, the fire bombing of Japanese cities and, ultimately, the dropping of the ultimate 'area' weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (using, with supreme irony, the 'precision' sight developed by the USN).

Cheers

Steve


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## BiffF15 (Feb 4, 2019)

swampyankee said:


> Except this was after four years of war, including a submarine campaign, augmented by minelaying, that radically impaired Japanese imports of food, fuel, and raw materials. Japan was also being defeated at sea and heavily pressured on land. The bombing campaign, including the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, certainly contributed to Japan’s defeat, but could not have done so alone, which was the pre-war position of many advocates of strategic bombing.



Swampyankee,

You have a valid point, and totally agree that those two bombs were but the icing on the cake. 

However, under different circumstances, say zero or almost zero bombs had been dropped on Japan (or any country), and your opponents roll in and hit your major cities, one after another, with an Atomic weapon. Combine this with mass leafleting and radio (yesterday’s version of the internet). Probably not much reaction until the conclusion is drawn that you are facing extermination. It is then that, in my opine, there would be a push for survival that would encompass at a minimum, a change in direction from leadership if not out right removal and replacement.

Cheers,
Biff


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## Ascent (Feb 5, 2019)

stona said:


> It depends how far back you want to go. After WW1 the Americans, separated by two oceans from potential enemies and after that war more determined than ever to stay that way, took a far more complacent view of developments in aviation. They could afford to. Their perspective on bomber aircraft and the future of air war was more distanced and far less visceral than that of their British colleagues. Unlike the British they were not going to be bombed themselves in a future war.
> 
> The Americans did see the bomber as an offensive weapon, but the official American national security posture was distinctly defensive in orientation and bomber aircraft were given a defensive role; to find and attack naval threats to the US Coastline. This did not stop American airmen from posing and discussing hypothetical scenarios for strategic bombing, but it was a very, very, long road from the early inter-war position to attempted implementation and failure of a precision bombing doctrine in N W Europe, the fire bombing of Japanese cities and, ultimately, the dropping of the ultimate 'area' weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (using, with supreme irony, the 'precision' sight developed by the USN).
> 
> ...



And yet with more than two years of war they still thought that it would be different when they did it and they'd succeed where others failed using the same tactics.

Not that that makes them unique, look at European reaction to the Russo-Japanese war and what it suggested about the direction of warfare at the start of the twentieth century.


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## stona (Feb 5, 2019)

Noble Frankland argued (to an American audience, after the war) that there were three reasons why the US clung so tenaciously to the daylight bombing of selected targets.

1. They believed that the B-17 was better suited to daytime operations than to night time.

2. They were unimpressed with the British effort.

3. They were determined to operate their own forces independently.

He was right on all three counts. Also, the Americans had developed a precision daytime doctrine in the inter-war years, which they were hardly likely to abandon because the British told them that it wouldn't work.

Cheers

Steve


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## Kevin J (Feb 5, 2019)

stona said:


> Noble Frankland argued (to an American audience, after the war) that there were three reasons why the US clung so tenaciously to the daylight bombing of selected targets.
> 
> 1. They believed that the B-17 was better suited to daytime operations than to night time.
> 
> ...


I think the problem for the Americans related to the weather conditions of Western Europe. While precision high altitude bombing may have worked fine in practice in the continental US, over here we have something called clouds, which you can't see through at any altitude. You will always get a few clear days but not many. The RAF tried a few high altitude bombing runs with Flying Fortresses before the USAAF arrived but they still got intercepted, and by high altitude, I mean 30000 feet plus or 10000 feet higher than the 8th Air Force was flying.


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## stona (Feb 5, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> I think the problem for the Americans related to the weather conditions of Western Europe.



Self evidently the bomb sights they would use, principally the Norden Mod5/M-7, M-9 and M-9B, were optical sights. If you couldn't see the ground and target you didn't have a sighting system at all.

US bombing using radar (H2X) was woeful, the results were often worse than those admitted by the British in the Butt Report. There are several reasons for this, beyond the scope of a concise reply.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Feb 5, 2019)

I always thought that the obvious flaw to a daytime precision bombing raid was that if you use 600 bombers targeting the same point they will all release at the same point.


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## stona (Feb 5, 2019)

pbehn said:


> I always thought that the obvious flaw to a daytime precision bombing raid was that if you use 600 bombers targeting the same point they will all release at the same point.



Yep. The USAAF obviously tried to work out better ways of bombing. One of the factors leading all but the first Group(s) bombing to be less accurate was the obscuring of the aiming point by smoke and dust raised by the first bombs to fall.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Feb 5, 2019)

Lets face it, _AS PRACTICED _precision bombing in the WW II by large formations meant hitting the right city. In 1939-42 even that could not be guaranteed, especially at night.

Test results under optimum conditions were never going to be duplicated in service.

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## stona (Feb 5, 2019)

To their credit the Americans still tried to target 'military targets' within cities. You will see marshalling yards as a typical aiming point. The reality was, even in good visual conditions, that a lot of bombs missed even such a large target.

In the last three months of 1944 just 14% of the 8th AF's bombing effort was carried out under conditions described as 'Good to Fair Visibility'. Under such conditions, an average of 33.4% of bombs fell within 1000' of the aiming point. This is pretty good, but of course two out of three bombs missed by a wider margin.

In non-visual conditions the results were awful. Bombing through 10/10 cloud, *a worst case scenario but representing 35% of the effort for this period*, the average circular error in pattern centres (not individual bombs) was 2.48 MILES. 42% of pattern centres were measured as more than 5 MILES from the aiming point.

Cheers

Steve

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## Clayton Magnet (Feb 5, 2019)

Ascent said:


> Not that that makes them unique, look at European reaction to the Russo-Japanese war and what it suggested about the direction of warfare at the start of the twentieth century.


And the resulting Battle of the Frontiers. Truly a grotesque spectacle


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## Hop (Feb 6, 2019)

stona said:


> To their credit the Americans still tried to target 'military targets' within cities. You will see marshalling yards as a typical aiming point. The reality was, even in good visual conditions, that a lot of bombs missed even such a large target.



Richard G Davis, who was (may still be) the official historian of the USAF, says that the USAAF deliberately changed the "city area" category to "marshalling yard" as a means of claiming they weren't area bombing, but continued to carry out area attacks anyway. From his biography of Spaatz:

_A further look at Eighth Air Force operations has revealed two egregious
examples of the gap between bombing practice and stated bombing policy: the
target categories “city areas” and “marshaling yards.” The two most cited Eighth
Air Force statistical summaries that cover the entire war do not list a target cate-
gory “city areas” or “towns and cities.” Both summaries were prepared from
the same set of data within a month of the end of the war in Europe.
Monthly statistical summaries of the Eighth’s operations prepared during the
war, almost contemporaneously with the events they recorded, tell a different
story. The Eighth Air Force Monthly Statistical Summary of Operations, gener-
ated at the end of each month from May 1944 to April 1945, listed a “city areas”
target category. For calendar year 1944, the summary reported that the Eighth
dropped 43,611 tons on “city areas.” Nor did these reports make any bones
about their targets. The report for the May 8, 1944, Berlin raid baldly states,
“Berlin city area attacked. Bombing raid done through 10/10 undercast on PFF
markers. Believed that the center of Berlin was well hit.” After reaching a
high of 9,886 tons (41 percent incendiaries) in July 1944, when the Eighth con-
ducted a series of H2X raids on Munich, the monthly “city area” totals steadily
declined to 383 tons in December.
A summary in a working paper from a USSTAF file, “Review of Bombing
Results,” shows a similar dichotomy according to time period. From January
1944 through January 1945, the Eighth dropped 45,036 tons on “towns and
cities.” From February 1945 through the end of the war, this summary
showed not a single ton of bombs falling on a city area. Unless the Eighth had
developed a perfect technique for bombing through overcast, such a result was
simply impossible. Obviously, the word had come down to deemphasize reports
on civilian damage. For instance, when Anderson cabled Arnold about USSTAF’s
press policy on the Dresden controversy in February 1945, he noted, “Public rela-
tions officers have been advised to take exceptional care that the military nature
of targets attacked in the future be specified and emphasized in all cases. As in
the past the statement that an attack was made on such and such a city will be
avoided; specific targets will be described.”_

Davis also points out that incendiary bombs were not normally used against marshalling yards because they were completely ineffective. The RAF didn't use them, the 15th AF didn't use them, even the 8th AF didn't use them against marshalling yards in occupied countries, or even against marshalling yards in Germany when the target was a marshalling yard as part of the transport plan. But in attacks on "marshalling yards" when the 8th AF used radar bombing against German cities, they used close to 40% incendiaries:

_Of the 9,042 tons of bombs dropped on
French rail yards, mostly during the pre-OVERLORD transportation bombing
phase, when the Americans took scrupulous care to avoid French civilian casual-
ties, 90 percent were visually sighted and only 33 tons were incendiaries.
Even over Germany itself, during Operation CLARION, when the Eighth bombed
dozens of small yards and junctions in lesser German towns, it dropped, over a
two-day period of visual conditions, 7,164 tons of bombs in all, but less than 3
tons of fire bombs.
In contrast, using H2X, the Eighth pummeled marshaling yards and rail sta-
tions in large German cities with high percentages of incendiary bombs. For
example, rail targets in at least four major cities garnered the following percent-
ages of fire bombs out of all bombs dropped on them: Cologne, 27 percent;
Nuremberg, 30 percent; Berlin, 37 percent; and Munich, 41 percent.
“Marshaling yards” undoubtedly served as a euphemism for city areas. Because
the yards themselves were not good targets for incendiaries, the prime purpose
in employing such weapons was to take advantage of the known inaccuracy of
H2X bombing in order to maximize the destruction of warehouses, commercial
buildings, and residences in the general vicinity of the target. Large numbers of
planes scattering their bombs around their mostly unseen and unverifiable aim-
ing points surely would cause great collateral damage to any soft structures
located nearby.
The AAF never officially acknowledged that it had bombed German city
areas as a matter of policy. Analysis of the Eighth’s bombardment policy, of its
employment of incendiary bombs, and of its targeting of “city areas” and “mar-
shaling yards” clearly reveals that, despite denials, it did engage in the deliberate
bombing of German population centers.
_
Davis goes on to point out that there were a couple of differences with the RAF, whereas BC considered area attacks to be the prime method of attacking Germany, for the 8th AF they were a second choice, and the 8th AF didn't put as much effort in to maximising the effects of area bombing as BC did. But the 8th AF carried out deliberate area bombing attacks and used the category "marshalling yards" to disguise the fact for political reasons.

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## stona (Feb 7, 2019)

_"The AAF never officially acknowledged that it had bombed German city
areas as a matter of policy. Analysis of the Eighth’s bombardment policy, of its
employment of incendiary bombs, and of its targeting of “city areas” and “mar-
shaling yards” clearly reveals that, despite denials, it did engage in the deliberate
bombing of German population centers."_

The Americans wanted to dissociate themselves from the British effort, and in Europe were prepared to be very economical with the truth. This went all the way to the top. 

When Eisenhower told Spaatz to prepare plans for 'Thunderclap' the latter protested that it would compromise American *claims* regarding _"precision"_ targeting of military objectives. Eisenhower replied that while he too had always insisted that _"US Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets"_ (he had not), he was prepared to try anything that _"gives real promise of ending the war quickly."_ This was to be an attack on the morale of the people of Berlin. Spaatz instructed Doolittle to be ready to bomb Berlin _"indiscriminately"_. Maybe because 'Thunderclap' had originated with Portal and the British Spaatz also protested to Arnold, _"There is no doubt in my mind that the RAF want very much to have the US tarred with the morale bombing aftermath which we feel will be terrific." _He either wrote that with an eye to posterity, or in an act of self delusion. 

Le May finally dropped all pretence with the low level, night time, incendiary raids on Japanese cities, but that was bombing Asian people. In Europe the pretence was maintained, and many still believe it today.

On 9th March 1945 Le May said with reference to the incendiary raids, _"If the war is shortened by a single day, the attack will have served its purpose." _One cannot help but be reminded of Harris' plagiarising of Bismarck when he said, _“personally I do not regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier.”_

Cheers

Steve

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## Zipper730 (Feb 7, 2019)

stona said:


> There was an assumption that ADGB's zone fighters would intercept bombers at night, it is why they were specified with a day/night capability. The reality was that they could not, yet another abyss between the reality and rhetoric.


How did they plan to do this? Use radar to get them to within visual range? The angular accuracy probably wasn't good enough -- if I recall they were sometimes off by as much as 2000 feet in altitude alone...


> The RAF was doctrinally committed to the aerial offensive, but never stopped thinking about fighters and other methods of home defence. Dowding did not invent the concept of integrated air defence. General E B Ashmore, who had directed Britain's air defence in WWI, argued after the war for the development of an information network to aid the interception of bombers.


I thought it was General Smuts, though he did push for the creation of the RAF among others


> There is a clear contradiction in RAF policy and doctrine. On the one hand it argued that its bombers would get through and deliver a devastating counteroffensive in the case that Britain was attacked. This was nothing less than wishful thinking, events from 1939-1942 would prove it so. On the other hand it imagined that it might prevent the enemy bombers from getting through. In daylight at least this proved almost accidentally correct.


It's weird how people can have such gaps in thinking -- it seems we all have blind-spots like this. On one hand they argue the bomber will always get through... then they argue they can shoot them down.


> It is Overy (with whom I seldom entirely agree) who wrote _"To admit that there was a defence against the bomber was to question the whole basis on which an independent air force had been built."_ In this case he is absolutely right. The RAF had a tendency, as do many organisations, military or otherwise, to preserve its fundamental assumptions whenever possible.


When doctrine goes against facts -- stick with doctrine unless absolutely forced to agree with facts -- then after the war's over -- go back to doctrine. 

At least that's what the USAF did back in the states.


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## stona (Feb 7, 2019)

They didn't really have a plan for night interception. I would say that there was wishful thinking going on.

It was Ashmore who laid the basis for an integrated system. It was several relatively small steps from connecting observers with fighter stations and artillery to the sophisticated system developed in the 1930s. Ashmore obviously didn't have radar, nor had he developed the data processing system, via a filter room to the Groups and Sector stations etc. for which Dowding takes credit. If you can't process the information received from observers, radar etc. and get it to the right people, in the right place, at the right time, then it is useless. Doing just this was Dowding's greatest contribution, and then allowing his Group Commanders to fight the Battle.

Cheers

Steve


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## fliger747 (Feb 12, 2019)

Yes, in the event the "Bomber always got through". However at the time this theory was espoused, it was thought that the destruction that would be wrought would justify the losses in many of the bombers getting through. However the resistance of populations and industry to the bombing efforts of the time were greatly underestimated. Perhaps an effort was needed one or two orders of magnitude greater than envisioned by the pre war theorists.

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## Greyman (Feb 12, 2019)

As much as everyone chortles at Stanley Baldwin's (and Douhet's) expense, they were -- and are -- 100% correct. With regard to the one line anyway.

As I've said before, it's gotta be one of the most misunderstood quotations in aviation. He didn't mean that every bomber that takes off will make it through the enemy's air defences unscathed -- he meant that no matter what a government does with regard to defence, it wont be able to prevent its citizens from being bombed.

That said ... he, like most others at the time, might have overestimated the effects of that bombing.

Though as I've also mentioned, we luckily never got the full test. Things might have gone differently if everyone's cities were also contaminated with phosgene, mustard, etc. for weeks/months on end in addition to being blown apart and burned (as pre-war theorists had every reason to suspect was a possibility).

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## Zipper730 (Feb 13, 2019)

Hop said:


> Richard G Davis, who was (may still be) the official historian of the USAF, says that the USAAF deliberately changed the "city area" category to "marshalling yard" as a means of claiming they weren't area bombing, but continued to carry out area attacks anyway.


That's a common strategy when the policy becomes unpalatable -- sanitize. 

The other strategies I've heard to gloss over such things would be censorship (after all if you can legally make it illegal to publish, it usually cancels out the truth long enough that anybody who was involved would be dead or dying), and officially end a practice/program while creating a new one that does the exact same thing (an example would be the Phoenix program, it was ended in 1971, and a new program was called F-6 in its place).



stona said:


> _"The AAF never officially acknowledged that it had bombed German city areas as a matter of policy. Analysis of the Eighth’s bombardment policy, of its employment of incendiary bombs, and of its targeting of “city areas” and “marshaling yards” clearly reveals that, despite denials, it did engage in the deliberate bombing of German population centers."_


Well, saying _"We'll be carrying out a systematic policy of killing civilians by bombing and setting fire to the towns and cities they live in under the presumption that, if we create enough pain, suffering, and death, they'll do anything to make it stop"_ tends to be viewed kind of negatively...


> The Americans wanted to dissociate themselves from the British effort


I think it's more than that -- generally, the idea is to paint the enemy as completely and totally evil, and to paint your side as totally good, or at least reasonable and fair. 

When your side does something that would be viewed as objectionable, the goal usually is to cover it up, as many fear that it would cause a damaging debate that could either be harmful to the nation, or at least reduce the popularity of the war (this is more likely in this case).


> When Eisenhower told Spaatz to prepare plans for 'Thunderclap' the latter protested that it would compromise American *claims* regarding _"precision"_ targeting of military objectives. Eisenhower replied that while he too had always insisted that _"US Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets"_ (he had not), he was prepared to try anything that _"gives real promise of ending the war quickly."_ This was to be an attack on the morale of the people of Berlin. Spaatz instructed Doolittle to be ready to bomb Berlin _"indiscriminately"_. Maybe because 'Thunderclap' had originated with Portal and the British Spaatz also protested to Arnold, _"There is no doubt in my mind that the RAF want very much to have the US tarred with the morale bombing aftermath which we feel will be terrific." _He either wrote that with an eye to posterity, or in an act of self delusion.


Eye to posterity: The original plan for Thunderclap called for using the USAAF to wreck around 2-3 square miles of city with 5,000 tons of ordinance with a day-raid, followed by a night-raid by bomber-command (I would not be surprised if sector bombing would be used for this, as it had been employed in Darmstadt a month earlier).

As a rule of thumb the USAAF had little compunction with bombing civilians, they just were deathly afraid of looking bad doing it, and the effect that this would have on their "legacy" -- maybe they thought it'd prevent their wet dream of gaining an independent service. There was only one General, Charles Cabell, who seemed to express any real issue about the morality of such bombings, though there was an image based concern that it would leave a blot on the USAAF, he also seemed to feel that the raids were "baby-killing schemes" that were aimed more at "retaliation and intimidation for the future", than simply ending wars rapidly, and that he had doubts that world peace could come about by killing more women and children (all in caps are basically his exact words, the source of these quotes were from "Wings of Judgement").

I'm not sure about "retaliation", as it seemed that all independent and wannabe independent air-arms wanted to not just bomb cities, but launch first strikes (first attack the airfields, then bomb, burn, and gas the population). Intimidation for the future does sound about right -- General Frederick L. Anderson even basically said that he didn't think Operation Clarion would end the war any faster, but that having thousands of bombers and fighters striking Germany all over would be passed down from father to son, and prove a firm deterrent from waging war again.


> Le May finally dropped all pretence with the low level, night time, incendiary raids on Japanese cities, but that was bombing Asian people. In Europe the pretence was maintained, and many still believe it today.


We viewed the Germans as humans that went bad; many viewed the Japanese as subhuman (General Hansell actually said more or less that he thought there was some sort of unwritten rule that the Japanese were viewed as subhuman -- I admire his candor actually, though I don't think it's right to view people as subhuman).



Greyman said:


> As much as everyone chortles at Stanley Baldwin's (and Douhet's) expense, they were -- and are -- 100% correct. With regard to the one line anyway.
> 
> As I've said before, it's gotta be one of the most misunderstood quotations in aviation. He didn't mean that every bomber that takes off will make it through the enemy's air defences unscathed -- he meant that no matter what a government does with regard to defence, it wont be able to prevent its citizens from being bombed.


If that's correct, then you're right. More bombers actually were blipped-out on their way _out_ of enemy territory than on their way _in_.


> That said ... he, like most others at the time, might have overestimated the effects of that bombing.
> 
> Though as I've also mentioned, we luckily never got the full test. Things might have gone differently if everyone's cities were also contaminated with phosgene, mustard, etc. for weeks/months on end in addition to being blown apart and burned (as pre-war theorists had every reason to suspect was a possibility).


The death tolls would probably have been greatly higher (I have no idea by how much, but phosgene is remarkably deadly and, from what I remember, the amount needed to kill is below the amount one can smell) and damage to the cities would likely have also been worse because the fires would have spread more (you can't put out fires if you're dead).

I'm frankly amazed that nobody did employ poison gas during the war, though I'm kind of relieved about the matter.


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## Zipper730 (Feb 13, 2019)

Disclaimer, since you need one or everything these days: The bulk-post that I created above was not intended in anyway to ignite political discussions -- some of what I wrote was more insights on the behavior or some people.


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## pbehn (Feb 13, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> Well, saying _"We'll be carrying out a systematic policy of killing civilians by bombing and setting fire to the towns and cities they live in under the presumption that, if we create enough pain, suffering, and death, they'll do anything to make it stop"_ tends to be viewed kind of negatively...
> I think it's more than that -- generally, the idea is to paint the enemy as completely and totally evil, and to paint your side as totally good, or at least reasonable and fair.
> .


That was exactly what Churchill said he would do in July 1941 and was applauded by all at the time. (my bold)
"We ask no favours of the enemy. We seek from them no compunction. On the contrary, if to-night the people of London were asked to cast their vote whether a convention should be entered into to stop the bombing of all cities, the overwhelming majority would cry, "*No, we will mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us*." The people of London with one voice would say to Hitler: "You have committed every crime under the sun. Where you have been the least resisted there you have been the most brutal. It was you who began the indiscriminate bombing. We remember Warsaw in the very first few days of the war. We remember Rotterdam. We have been newly reminded of your habits by the hideous massacre of Belgrade. We know too well the bestial assault yon are making upon the Russian people, to whom our hearts go out in their valiant struggle. We will have no truce or parley with you, or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst and we will do our best." Perhaps it may be our turn soon; perhaps it may be our turn now.

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## Zipper730 (Feb 13, 2019)

pbehn said:


> That was exactly what Churchill said he would do in July 1941


He didn't explicitly say what I said -- not as overtly anyway.

The RAF often had a tendency to pussy-foot around the issue interestingly -- when pulled in front of Parliament, they would often say that the bombing policy hadn't changed, and things to that nature. The only person that seemed to come remotely close to telling the truth (in the RAF anyway) was Harris, interestingly.


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## pbehn (Feb 13, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> He didn't explicitly say what I said -- not as overtly anyway.
> 
> The RAF often had a tendency to pussy-foot around the issue interestingly -- when pulled in front of Parliament, they would often say that the bombing policy hadn't changed, and things to that nature. The only person that seemed to come remotely close to telling the truth (in the RAF anyway) was Harris, interestingly.


My uncle was in Bomber Command, it was a war, the Germans had been singing "bomben auf Engeland" quite cheerfully, the meaning of Churchills speech is quite clear. as far as he was concerned it was unrestricted warfare. This apart from the fact that you cant choose what you hit from 20,000 ft at night. As far as I am concerned revenge was part of the motive and de housing was part of the strategy, whether that is judged lawful or unlawful in retrospect doesn't concern me at all. V1 and V2 weapons were launched on London until they couldn't launch any more and as far as I know they were all targeted on Tower Bridge.

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## Zipper730 (Feb 13, 2019)

pbehn said:


> As far as I am concerned revenge was part of the motive and de housing was part of the strategy


There was one book either "Among the Dead Cities" or a book by Richard Overy which mentioned that right after Rotterdam, he wanted to know the public view of the event. This leads me to suspect that he wanted to carry out similar raids at that point in time. 

It was stated that as the BoB started, plans for what would become Abigail Rachael were drawn up (though would not be implemented until December, 1940). As for dehousing, it seemed that was more a matter of several ideas coming together

Fire was realized as the best method of causing massive destruction to cities
The idea of houses being destroyed as a morale-killer came from Lord Cherwell who claimed it was in the Hull & Birmingham reports (ironically the reports supposedly said that morale wasn't affected by any raid or sequence of raids -- but it's not who writes the report, it's who reads it).
Working-class neighborhoods had lots of houses close together that would ignite easily
Saying one's goal is the morale of the civilian population, in particular, the working population sounds better than just saying the goal is the morale of the civilian population.


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## Clayton Magnet (Feb 14, 2019)

At that point in time, the British people literally and/or figuratively had a boot on their neck, with total destruction looming and no help in sight. Perhaps they chose to kick their attacker in the balls in retaliation, and claw at his eyes, but what was the alternative?

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## stona (Feb 14, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> There was one book either "Among the Dead Cities" or a book by Richard Overy which mentioned that right after Rotterdam, he wanted to know the public view of the event.



Full title is 'Among the Dead Cities - Is the Targeting of Civilians in War Ever Justified?" It's written by A C Grayling, who is a philosopher, not a historian.

Anyone interested in the moral question of WW2 bombing should read it. I don't agree with most of Grayling's conclusions, but he makes some good moral arguments. Grayling sums up thus:

Was area bombing necessary? No. 
Was it proportionate? No. 
Was it against the humanitarian principles that people have been striving to enunciate as a way of controlling and limiting war? Yes. 
Was it against general moral standards of the kind recognised and agreed in Western civilisation in the last five centuries, or even 2,000 years? Yes. 
Was it against what mature national laws provide in the way of outlawing murder, bodily harm, and destruction of property? Yes. 
In short and in sum: was area bombing wrong? Yes. 
Very wrong? Yes.

Like I said, you don't have to agree with him, but you should read his book.

If people like Grayling were in charge of fighting our wars, then we would lose them all. I would argue that the most immoral thing we could have done in WW2 would have been to lose it.

Cheers

Steve

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## buffnut453 (Feb 14, 2019)

With all due respect to Mr Grayling, his nice clean distinction between military and civilian targets gets awfully blurred the closer one gets to Clausewitz's concept of Total War. Arguably (depending on the nation), WW2 was the closest we've ever come to Total War, where the entire resources of nation states are pitted virtually exclusively towards the prosecution of the war. What, then, the role of civilians under those circumstances? Those civilians who make munitions, grow food that feeds soldiers, take on jobs so healthy, military-age men can be conscripted etc etc? 

Frankly, t's easy to think of war purely from the post-WW2 perspective...in other words, a period where we in the west haven't even come close to Total War. Warfare has become separated from the civilian experience, except for that (relatively small) proportion of the population directly impacted because they have serving relatives. It's easy to make the case that military and civilian targets must, of need, be treated differently when we're not in a Total War, in other words when we aren't fighting to preserve our way of life. However, that only goes for the countries who aren't fighting for survival. Take North Vietnam, for example. Its war against America absolutely was a fight for national survival. Conversely, Vietnam was not a strategic schwerpunkt for America. Total War can exist in the modern world but it's all down to your perspective.

Sadly, WW2 was much, MUCH closer to Total War for all major nations involved than any war before or since (WW1 could claim an exception to this statement). If the entire resources of the nation are being put towards prosecution of the war, it could be readily argued that every aspect of the nation state then becomes a viable target...and that includes the civilian population.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 14, 2019)

Well, the moral distinction between killing a factory or shipyard worker when he is on the job (clocked in) and when he is home (clocked out?) seems to be a rather fine one. 

Once factories, shipyards, railroads and means of transportation became "legitimate" targets then the housing for the workers and indeed the workers themselves seems to be a very small step indeed. Killing is killing wither it is done on avenue A on the job or on avenue E when off shift.


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## stona (Feb 14, 2019)

You have to remember that Grayling is a philosopher, not a historian. He examines and makes moral arguments for and against the sort of strategic bombing carried out during WW2. His attempts to put it into a historical context, or understand the competing doctrines of air power that led to it are, frankly, rather weak.
Cheers
Steve


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## Peter Gunn (Feb 15, 2019)

I started to watch a series on Amazon Prime called "Science and the Swastika", I got through 2/3rds of the first episode and had to stop because I was totally d i s g u s t e d.*
I literally had to watch two Band of Brothers episodes to put things on an even keel.

WWII was fought against one of, if not THE most immoral evil empire this planet has ever seen. Losing to the Nazi's was (and still is) unthinkable, the darkness that would have descended over humankind is too horrible to think about.

To me, everything in Nazi Germany was fair game, maybe I'm just a cold hearted bastard, but that country could NOT be allowed to succeed with the regime it had.

I'm certain there were good Germans who did not go along with the Nazi philosophy and policies, for those I feel genuinely sorry as they were caught in a maelstrom not of their making or desire.

I try to keep an open mind, but in Band of Brothers, one of the characters says, "Been in Germany x months, met a lot of Germans, still not one Nazi".

My mothers brother was on the ground at the business end of the Allied advance through Europe. I got virtually no war stories from him ever, except to echo that line from Band of Brothers. He suspected there were far more volk that were Nazi's than were willing to admit.

Not trying to start a political debate or even whether the average German was a Nazi. But to not go after Hitler's Germany with EVERY means imaginable is utter poppycock. That regime needed to be put down and HARD, so Sons of Bitch's like that would never get a second chance.

Sorry for the rant, no offense to anyone intended.

* Stupid editor keeps changing the word d i s g u s t e d to a smilie.

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## Ascent (Feb 15, 2019)

The trouble I have with that argument though is what we knew when the fighting was going on and what we discovered as the war was drawing to a close. With hindsight it obvious what kind of state Nazi Germany was but during the conflict itself, although a little was known, the full extent of what the state was doing was hidden.

Saying all out, anything goes to defeat such a state is applying a degree of hindsight.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 15, 2019)

stona said:


> You have to remember that Grayling is a philosopher, not a historian. He examines and makes moral arguments for and against the sort of strategic bombing carried out during WW2. His attempts to put it into a historical context, or understand the competing doctrines of air power that led to it are, frankly, rather weak.
> Cheers
> Steve



Yeah, I know. And my post was in no way a dig at you, Steve. I just get frustrated by this rather one-sided evaluation of the situation. What was the UK supposed to do in 1938-1940...let Herr Hitler do whatever he wanted? Were we supposed to go to war with one arm (or both arms) tied behind our backs against one of the most evil and repressive regimes in history? Sometimes you have to fight fire with fire. The trick is not losing one's own moral compass while accepting that nasty, perhaps sometimes hideous, deeds must be perpetrated to squash a tyrant.

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## stona (Feb 15, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> Sometimes you have to fight fire with fire. The trick is not losing one's own moral compass while accepting that nasty, perhaps sometimes hideous, deeds must be perpetrated to squash a tyrant.



If someone takes an almighty dump in your living room you are bound to get your hands dirty clearing up the mess 

To be fair to Grayling he does acknowledge this, though in more erudite words.

_"First, it is unquestionably true that if Allied bombing in the Second World War was in whole or part morally wrong, it is nowhere near equivalent in scale of moral atrocity to the Holocaust of European Jewry, or the death and destruction all over the world for which Nazi and Japanese aggression was collectively responsible: a total of some twenty-five million dead, according to responsible estimates. Allied bombing in which German and Japanese civilian populations were deliberately targeted claimed the lives of about 800,000 civilian women, children and men. The bombing of the aggressor Axis states was aimed at weakening their ability and will to make war; the murder of six million Jews was an act of racist genocide. There are very big differences here....nothing in this book should be taken as any form of revisionist apology for Nazism and its frightful atrocities, or Japanese militarism and its aggressions, even if the conclusion is that German and Japanese civilians suffered wrongs."_

Cheers

Steve

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## Peter Gunn (Feb 15, 2019)

I admit, my tirade has a fair bit of hindsight in it, but I think many leaders at the time had an inkling of what Hitler was up to. And they knew it was pretty evil.


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## KiwiBiggles (Feb 15, 2019)

Ascent said:


> The trouble I have with that argument though is what we knew when the fighting was going on and what we discovered as the war was drawing to a close. With hindsight it obvious what kind of state Nazi Germany was but during the conflict itself, although a little was known, the full extent of what the state was doing was hidden.
> 
> Saying all out, anything goes to defeat such a state is applying a degree of hindsight.



No retrospectroscope is required.

Churchill speaking *before *Battle of Britain:

What General Weygand has called the Battle of France is over ... the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be freed and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands.​​But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.​
Not much room for doubt there. 

Churchill was fully aware of what Germany had become, and that the only moral value that mattered was stopping it. Suggesting that reference to Germany's crimes was an _ex post facto_ rationalisation for the Allies' actions during the war is insulting to the people who stood up to evil when they saw it.

For Britain and the Commonwealth, WWII was a moral crusade right from the start. There was never any possibility that Britain would emerge from the war better off than they were at the start, but they fought it anyway, because Germany had to be stopped, by any means necessary.

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## buffnut453 (Feb 15, 2019)

Ascent said:


> The trouble I have with that argument though is what we knew when the fighting was going on and what we discovered as the war was drawing to a close. With hindsight it obvious what kind of state Nazi Germany was but during the conflict itself, although a little was known, the full extent of what the state was doing was hidden.
> 
> Saying all out, anything goes to defeat such a state is applying a degree of hindsight.



Not really. The number of Jewish evacuees from Germany in the late 1930s gave some indication of the state of things at that time. Resistance movements would have reported the rounding up of Jews in occupied countries. Plus, according to this article, the Allies knew as early as December 1942 that over 2 million Jews had been murdered. 

All that being said, the extent of German horrors still isn't the prime driver behind the point I'm making, which is that Britain perceived itself to be in a fight for its very survival. Intelligence reporting spoke of how quickly Germany had re-armed prior to hostilities, and also showed the force imbalance during the early stages of the war...and imbalance that was exacerbated by tactics against which the Allies had little answer (at least in 1940). Then there's the experience of Czechoslovakia and Poland. 

Bottom line is that, while British leaders may not have known EVERYTHING that was going on under Nazi rule, they probably knew enough to make a pretty accurate assessment.

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## buffnut453 (Feb 15, 2019)

stona said:


> If someone takes an almighty dump in your living room you are bound to get your hands dirty clearing up the mess
> 
> To be fair to Grayling he does acknowledge this, though in more erudite words.
> 
> ...



Steve...I entirely agree with your first point.

The quote from Grayling is the classic weasel-wording of an academic who's only too willing to point the finger about how bad humanity is but won't/can't offer any useful ways to resolve complex problems involving multiple players with competing objectives. It's very easy to sit on the sidelines and criticize (with the benefit of hindsight, no less) those who are making decisions and doing the job. 

I'm pretty sure the men of Bomber Command didn't like the idea of bombing mothers and small children but, equally, it was Hitler who militarized the youth and who put rifles in the hands of 8 year-old boys in a last vain attempt to maintain power. I'd have a lot more respect for Mr Grayling if he offered alternatives for how the war could have been successfully prosecuted without the extensive efforts to reduce Germany's industrial-military complex...ah, but he's not a historian so he can't do that, can he?

Sorry...letting my frustration vent out here. I think I'll leave this subject for a while so I can cool down.

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## pbehn (Feb 15, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> Bottom line is that, while British leaders may not have known EVERYTHING that was going on under Nazi rule, they probably knew enough to make a pretty accurate assessment.


The British people knew or at least strongly suspected, there may be moral differences between a bombing raid targeted on a dock setting urban areas alight and a gas chamber, the result is the same. To my uncle it was a simple choice, them or us, the only rational choice is "them" that's what my uncle said and did and a milder, softer tempered more reasonable man you couldn't wish to meet.

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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Actually on the P-51Ds they preferred to keep 25-35 gallons in the rear tank.


Why would you do that?


> The British wired the fuel fillers shut in peace time and you needed written orders from the squadron commander to unseal the tank/s and fill them.


I thought the British Mustangs didn't have a center-tank?



Reluctant Poster said:


> You beat me to the punch. Actually the US was far worse. They had observed over 2 years of war which quite clearly showed that unescorted bombers were siting ducks and yet they convinced themselves that their aircraft and tactics were superior and they that would succeed where everyone else had failed.


Their belief seemed to be driven by the fact that they could fly higher and were better defended (more defensive armament, and higher caliber).

The B-17's did better than I'd have expected (I'd have figured they'd have gotten skewered operating alone -- when I was younger I'd have thought the guns were simply a last line of defense when the fighters failed to take out attackers).


> And of course we should never forget the YB-40 escort "fighter" which was an idea that never should have seen the light of day.


That idea was dumb -- they had however pursued that idea for a ridiculous period of time: Early on they thought fighters with a rear-gunner would provide a flying gunship effect, with the agility of a fighter.

Then they just thought of having bombers with no bombs and more firepower to simply hose down more enemy fighters, and then from there they developed the YFM-1. I'm amazed the P-30 didn't remove their faith in that idea...



buffnut453 said:


> I would agree with many of your sentiments. The visceral animosity within the USAAF between the "bomber boys" and anyone taking an interest in pursuit caused no end of problems, including the loss of some quality senior leaders (everyone knows about Chennault but there were others).


Yeah, the bomber boys got a lock on things and then they made sure that anybody who didn't drink the kool-aid didn't get promoted or got bounced out on his ass.

As a result it meant that the people who had the ability to develop effective tactics for bomber escort, and specifications for practical escorts would never be able to do so... until bombers started getting cut-apart left and right.


> It could be argued that the internal squabbles had a significant impact on fighter aircraft development, hence in 1941 the USAAF's most modern fighter was the P-40C which couldn't even get close to the altitudes that B-17s could fly at...hence self-reinforcing the pre-war view that "the bomber will always get through".


That's not entirely true, there were both fighter and bomber-guys who are big proponents of high-altitude capability.

The problem was that the USAAF had little interest in twin-stage superchargers, and focused almost totally on turbochargers. They did work well in producing high critical-altitudes, but they can be kind of bulky compared to superchargers and, as a result, they wouldn't always fit properly in the aircraft.

Examples I can readily recall would be

Y1P-37: What the P-40 was actually intended to be: A P-36 with a V-1710 and turbocharger. Unfortunately the radiator and intercooler configuration produced an aircraft with absurd proportions, and to avoid excessive length, the cockpit had to be shoved back along the fuselage. Sitting on the ground, there was virtually no forward visibility, and the wings blanked anything the nose failed to succeed in doing. I know many tail-draggers had visibility that let a bit to be desired, but this was too much. The P-40 was built instead with a conservative set-up as it could be guaranteed with what existed already.
XP-39: Intended with a turbocharger like the P-38, but there wasn't enough room for an effective turbocharger installation combined with the radiators and intercoolers (as an intellectual exercise, me and 

 P-39 Expert
pretty much thought up nearly every possible way to shoe-horn such a configuration in and we came up without any realistic set-up). It instead used a single-stage supercharger and, while the P-63 would ultimately use a practical twin-stage supercharger, the intercooler design hadn't been worked out, so it simply made use of a whole lot of ADI.
The P-38 and P-47s were successful installations, though both had their own problems -- but they could stuff the desired equipment inside them.

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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2019)

Buffnut453 said:


> I just get frustrated by this rather one-sided evaluation of the situation.


Uh, I never meant what I said as being some kind of one sided evaluation. In fact, it was my opinion that this policy (bombing cities and civilians) was a policy that was practiced by seemingly all sides in WW2. This policy started, arguably, before WWI (the Germans planned to use Zeppelins for this in 1911 from what I remember hearing), and continued through the interwar period, gaining additional supporters and proponents (Mitchell and Douhet), there were cases of this being carried out during the interwar period

UK
Used poison gas on a village
Dropped bombs, poison gas, and incendiaries on colonies

Japan
Among possibly others, Chongqing was attacked as early as 1938 (though some raids would continue past 1939-1941)

Italy
Bombed villages
Dropped poison gas on villages and over towns

Germany
Guernica & Madrid




> With all due respect to Mr Grayling, his nice clean distinction between military and civilian targets gets awfully blurred the closer one gets to Clausewitz's concept of Total War. Arguably (depending on the nation), WW2 was the closest we've ever come to Total War


When you reach the point of Total War, everything becomes an acceptable target, and all practical methods can be used (by practical I mean the only restraint are things that would destroy you too -- though some don't even draw that line).

Of course, my position is that this desire traced from ideas that took place long before WW2, and what happened in WW2 was basically the logical result of these ideas.


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## stona (Feb 16, 2019)

If you have any evidence that the British used poison gas anywhere, including the colonies, after WW1 a lot of people would love to see it. 

Diphenylchloroarsine was probably used against the Russians in 1919.

There are allegations about use in Iraq in 1920, but little hard evidence to support them.

Such agents were certainly not used in what was then India after WW1, there use being expressly forbidden.

Cheers

Steve

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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2019)

stona said:


> If you have any evidence that the British used poison gas anywhere, including the colonies, after WW1 a lot of people would love to see it
> 
> . . . .
> 
> There are allegations about use in Iraq in 1920, but little hard evidence to support them.


Didn't Churchill push extensively for the use of poison gas in the middle-east? There's this article (Comment: Gas, chemicals, bombs: Britain has used them all before in Iraq) which I'm not terribly fond of because it has that classic "blame the west for every iniquity in the world" quality about it -- that said -- if it's accurate.


> Diphenylchloroarsine was probably used against the Russians in 1919.


That I can believe...


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## Greyman (Feb 16, 2019)

It was tear gas. Of course the article fails to mention it.

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## stona (Feb 16, 2019)

What is true from that article is:

"An uprising of more than 100,000 armed tribesmen against the British occupation swept through Iraq in the summer of 1920. In went the RAF. It flew missions totalling 4,008 hours, dropped 97 tons of bombs and fired 183,861 rounds for the loss of nine men killed, seven wounded and 11 aircraft destroyed behind rebel lines."

While it is true that Churchill advocated the use of poison gas against what he called 'uncivilised' enemies, even the article, despite the title, does not actually suggest it was used in Iraq at this time. It can't, because there is no evidence that it was, much as the author of the article might wish it.

Cheers

Steve


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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2019)

Greyman said:


> It was tear gas. Of course the article fails to mention it.


So, my hunch was right that it was kind of a "blame the west for all ills" kind of thing. Okay, I'm glad that's sorted out.

It still has to be noted that the other descriptions of events involving attacks on populations during the interwar period appear valid, regardless: It's merely indicative of the doctrine of the times, one that was adopted and accepted by a number of nations that seemed to be playing out of the same text-book.


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## Greyman (Feb 16, 2019)

Pulling on this thread a bit and poking around wiki ...

Alleged British use of chemical weapons in Mesopotamia in 1920 - Wikipedia
_"It has been alleged that the British used chemical weapons in Mesopotamia in 1920, during the Iraqi revolt ... However no tear gas and no poison gas was actually used in 1920-22."_


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## stona (Feb 16, 2019)

Greyman said:


> It was tear gas. Of course the article fails to mention it.



Diphenylchlorarsine (DA) is a sternutator. It was not developed in time for use in WW1 but it was supposed to penetrate the respirators then in use, causing a violent coughing/vomiting fit and the victim to remove his respirator, potentially exposing him to something even more unpleasant. The German respirator had no filter against such a particulate (neither did the British small box respirator for that matter). 

Cheers

Steve


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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2019)

stona said:


> Diphenylchlorarsine (DA) is a sternutator. It was not developed in time for use in WW1 but it was supposed to penetrate the respirators then in use, causing a violent coughing/vomiting fit and the victim to remove his respirator, potentially exposing him to something even more unpleasant. The German respirator had no filter against such a particulate (neither did the British small box respirator for that matter).


Oh, I just figured "arsenic is poison" and assumed it killed on it's own.


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## Greyman (Feb 16, 2019)

stona said:


> Diphenylchlorarsine (DA) is a sternutator.



I was referring to the type (skillfully omitted) of gas used in Iraq, or were you as well?

One of the works cited in that wiki article writes: "_Like Sherlock Homes's supposed use of the expression "Elementary, my dear Watson", or the notion that Humphrey Bogart instructed Dooley Wilson to "Play it again, Sam" in the film _Casablanca*_, the proposition that the British were the first to use chemical weapons in Iraq in the 1920s has attained the status of common knowledge."_

Makes me feel slightly better about being wrong all these years.

*apropos of nearly nothing, I have one to add -- did you guys know no one ever actually said the line "beam me up, Scotty" in Star Trek?


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## Shortround6 (Feb 16, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> Why would you do that?
> I thought the British Mustangs didn't have a center-tank?.


Because the balance wasn't quite right on the Merlin powered P-51s, you did add several hundred pounds of engine and a larger heavier propeller to the front of the aircraft.
The Balance/CG wasn't bad, just perhaps not all that might be desired. It also made fuel management simpler. fuel for landing was in the _rear _tank, not fuel in _one_ wing tank (you didn't select both wing tanks at once) so a steep bank when landing (a no-no but they happened) didn't cause fuel starvation. Please note that Merlin powered P-40s also landed using the rear tank while Allison powered P-40s landed on either the forward wing tank (if present) or on the rear wing tank (which was still forward of the rear tank) if the P-40 was a stripper model with the front tank removed.





> Then they just thought of having bombers with no bombs and more firepower to simply hose down more enemy fighters, and then from there they developed the YFM-1. I'm amazed the P-30 didn't remove their faith in that idea...



the P-30 idea wasn't quite the same, nobody thought a single RCMG was that big a deal fire power wise. (they were using twin guns in WW I after all) but the P-30 did put an end to single engine two seat fighters in the USAAC.





> As a result it meant that the people who had the ability to develop effective tactics for bomber escort, and* specifications for practical escorts* would never be able to do so... until bombers started getting cut-apart left and right.



The bolded part is a bit of problem. The P-38 is a perfect example. As originally conceived it was a _bomber interceptor _not interceptor with the same armement and performance as as another specification that lead to the P-39 (at this stage both had turbos) *but with twice the endurance. * There was no single engine with enough power being offered when design work started so they had to go to twin engines. For a *specification for a practical escort, *you needed a powerful enough engine that was light enough and didn't gobble fuel at a huge rate (or an airframe that was low enough drag while carrying the required armament and fuel).
Please remember that in general US bomber specifications had much longer ranges than most (all?) european bomber specifications. Even the B-23 which was pretty much a warmed over B-18 with fresh icing drizzled over the top was supposed to carry 4000lbs about 1400miles and first flew in the summer of 1939. So please come up with an escort fighter that could fly a 500 mile combat radius mission in 1939/early 1940 using existing engines of the time before you cast too many stones. Please note that an early P-38 without self sealing tanks (400 gallons internal) can't fly 1400 miles at 210-220mph at altitudes in the mid-teens, please also note that the only way the early P-38s (YP-38s and P-38Ds) got 1150hp engines was by using the turbo, the base engine used 6.44 supercharger gears instead of the 8.77 gears in the P-40 engines and that is what allowed for the extra 110hp for take-off.
That's not entirely true, there were both fighter and bomber-guys who are big proponents of high-altitude capability.



> The problem was that the USAAF had little interest in twin-stage superchargers, and focused almost totally on turbochargers. They did work well in producing high critical-altitudes, but they can be kind of bulky compared to superchargers.



that is true but rather ignores the state of the art, such as it was, in supercharger design in the late 30s or 1940. P & W does't get two stage superchargers flying in prototype form until late 1938/early 1939 which is obviously much later than the USAAC was flying turbo charged planes. One Seversky and one Curtiss Hawk show up at the 1939 fighter trials with these engines. The army was apparently not impressed with the performance at that time as they went for the turbo Seversky instead (P-43). Please note the difference in bulk was minor was the two stage P & W engines used intercoolers and at least some ducting.


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## stona (Feb 16, 2019)

Greyman said:


> I was referring to the type (skillfully omitted) of gas used in Iraq, or were you as well?



No. DA was used against the Red Army in 1919, not in Iraq (and nor was anything else).

I'm not sure why it was used in isolation. The reason it wasn't used in WW1 was because the delivery/distribution method was not effective. The intent then was definitely to use it in combination with more lethal agents like phosgene. I wonder if the British use against the Russians was not a rather nasty experiment.

Cheers

Steve


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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2019)

stubbsy said:


> Churchill, when he wrote to Portal on 7 Oct 1941, suggested that the RAF ought to provision LR fighters to denude enemy AD and enable a daylight bombing campaign to resume. Portal's reassurance that fighter protection would be required implicitly acknowledged the limitations of not provisioning a LR fighter.
> 
> . . .
> 
> So *a requirement was articulated* from the very top and by someone at the operational level


Because they didn't believe the Spitfire fitted with LR tanks could hack it against the Me-109's and Fw.190's?


> The only aircraft the RAF had that was available in sufficient numbers and could fulfil this requirement, in terms of dog-fighting/air-to-air combat, was the Spitfire.


I wouldn't say so in the short term -- it wouldn't be able to fly fast enough while flying far enough. Later in the war, the ability to stretch the Spitfire's range was doable, particularly when drop-tanks were added. The USAAF also proposed a modification of a Spitfire IX that had modifications including more fuel-capacity in the wings, possibly additional fuselage capacity and nice big drop-tanks. Eventually, the Spitfire would use the Mareng bags and that would further increase internal load.


> What would the Spitfire's operational range have been with these modifications. This is where the experts on this forum would be a great help, to come up with an agreed number in n/miles.


Well, I'll make my computations in statute miles and then compute that into nautical miles.

USAAF Spitfire IXC modification supposedly had a 1600 mile range
Provided that is not combat range, your combat range is typically about 2/3 the normal range: 1066-2/3 statute miles
The Avro Lancaster cruises at around 225-240 mph: Cruising around 225-240 would put you in a situation where you would be unable to accelerate up to combat speed fast enough either in a straight-line or in a dive -- you'll get killed; you have to cruise at around 300 mph to be effective.
To allow you to fly at 300 mph while the bombers do 225-240 mph would require you to fly a repetitive S-weaving motion (essing for short) which basically allows you to eat-up more distance while staying with the bombers: This means your range will only be 75-80% of flying in a straight-line.
This yields an effective range of action of 800-853-1/3 miles; radius is theoretically half of that or 400-426-2/3 miles
If, however you used a relay system, which allowed one to cruise a straight-line up to rendezvous; then s-weaved with the bombers either the rest of the flight or until the next relay came through; then cruised back, theoretically you'd only be essing half the flight and your range would be, in theory 933-1/3 to 960 miles, with a radius of 466-2/3 to 480 miles
Computing this all into nautical miles, you'll get approximately the following
Non-Combat Range = 1600 mi, or 1390.362 nm
Combat-Range = 1066-2/3 mi, or 926.91 nm
Combat-Radius = 533-1/3 mi, or 463.45 nm
Combat-Radius w/ S-weaving = 400-426-2/3 mi, or 347.59-370.76 nm
Combat-Radius w/ S-weaving 1/2 flight: 466-2/3 to 480 miles, or 405.52-417.11 nm



> A good question on what escort and protect meant. The minutes of the Air Fighting Sub Committee discussed this issue in 1937


It would seem that they didn't want a single-seat fighter, and preferred fighters that had rear-aiming firepower (turrets?) that would be used as close-escort or roving escort, with multiple crew-members, and possibly be a converted bomber (similar to a proposal of ours in the US of a modified B-10), which at least is comforting to know that we weren't the only ones to come up with ideas like that.



bobbysocks said:


> this was probably already stated but i dont think a LR escort was seriously considered because no one thought france would have been over run in the early goings like it was. the raf would have had air strips in france...close enough to the front and some of the industrial regions of germany to be effective


That's actually a very good point.

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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2019)

drgondog said:


> I find it curious that RAF withheld Spitfires equipped with 'Slipper Tanks' from daylight escort based on some notion that they 'might be attacked' by coastal LW units


The concern was the performance penalty, it would appear. Ironically, it is likely not a serious problem and, one could compensate by having two sets of fighters of which one would be the primary escort and carry the slipper/drop tanks, and the other set would go without tanks. Because the other set would maneuver better, they could best take care of the LW coastal units, though all could definitely defend themselves if need be. This set would turn back as they'd have a shorter radius of action.

Now, I'm not a war-planner...



stona said:


> In 1936 the DDOps (then Richard Peirse) wrote of events in Spain that _"While I still feel it would be a confession of weakness and a waste of effort on our part to even consider the use of fighters in this way _[to escort bombers]_ , I cannot help feeling that we ought to be prepared for such an eventuality."_


So, he would prefer the bombers to go it alone, he did think they should be prepared to develop escort fighters if the need arose?


> In response the DCAS (then Christopher Courtney) listed a set of concerns about escorts that reflected pre-war RAF thinking. Specialised escorts would demand resources which might otherwise be put into bombers


In the US, there was also a desire to avoid developing escorts to build more bombers. They didn't believe that an escort was impossible, but uneconomical. That said, there did seem to be seriously warped ideas on what an escort should be.


> The whole concept of an offensive bomber force was predicated on its ability to launch a devastating counter offensive in the event of, in fact to deter, any aggression.


Of course, but the RAF seemed to switch from heavy city-busting raids to aims that seemed more aimed at specific targets at first -- my guess is they didn't think they could successfully carry out such a raid in the face of enemy strength, and might have had restrictions as to what kind of bombing the politicians would allow them to carry out.


> Tami Davis Bidell has written of British attitudes in 1940, _"Britain was in a desperate situation: the bombers provided the only means of offensive action against Germany. Looking stoically ahead, the British kept themselves from despair by cultivating a selective blind spot."_


What do you mean "cultivate a selective blind spot"?


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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Because the balance wasn't quite right on the Merlin powered P-51s, you did add several hundred pounds of engine and a larger heavier propeller to the front of the aircraft.


So the merlin P-51's were a bit nose-heavy compared to the V-1710's?


> The Balance/CG wasn't bad, just perhaps not all that might be desired. It also made fuel management simpler. fuel for landing was in the _rear _tank, not fuel in _one_ wing tank (you didn't select both wing tanks at once) so a steep bank when landing (a no-no but they happened) didn't cause fuel starvation.


Now _that's_ interesting: I'd have figured that under normal conditions selecting the wing-tanks would drain both tanks evenly unless you were deliberately trying to shift fuel from one tank to another.


> the P-30 idea wasn't quite the same, nobody thought a single RCMG was that big a deal fire power wise. (they were using twin guns in WW I after all) but the P-30 did put an end to single engine two seat fighters in the USAAC.


I was kind of under the impression that they wanted gunners in fighters as a way of giving them the ability to disrupt a Lufbery circle, and/or bomber-escort. I'm not exactly sure the rationale for the P-24 (which gave rise to the P-30), though if I recall it was based on a Lockheed Altair.


> The bolded part is a bit of problem. The P-38 is a perfect example. As originally conceived it was a _bomber interceptor _not interceptor with the same armement and performance as as another specification that lead to the P-39 (at this stage both had turbos) *but with twice the endurance.*


The P-38 & P-39 were designated as interceptors because of a way to circumvent inflexible requirements in pursuit aircraft (at least according to Kelsey).

They wanted a pursuit aircraft with high performance at high and low altitude, a 1000 pound armament (the USAAC wanted only 500 max), and the possibility of having two-engines instead of one (with only one crew -- a no-no). Since Lieutenants can't override the limits set by Colonels and Generals, they decided they'd call the design an interceptor because it wasn't used in the US and if they could create a new category, they could produce their own specifications. The P-39 seemed to be an insurance policy if the P-38's twin-engined, single-crew layout wasn't accepted.


> There was no single engine with enough power being offered when design work started so they had to go to twin engines. For a *specification for a practical escort, *you needed a powerful enough engine that was light enough and didn't gobble fuel at a huge rate (or an airframe that was low enough drag while carrying the required armament and fuel).


Well the specifications were often the problems: They hobbled themselves with specifications they didn't need.


> Please remember that in general US bomber specifications had much longer ranges than most (all?) european bomber specifications.


Uh, what about the Wellington? It had a 2500 mile range...


> that is true but rather ignores the state of the art, such as it was, in supercharger design in the late 30s or 1940. P & W does't get two stage superchargers flying in prototype form until late 1938/early 1939 which is obviously much later than the USAAC was flying turbo charged planes.


I should point out that this ignorance of state of the art didn't affect the USN...


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## Shortround6 (Feb 17, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> Now _that's_ interesting: I'd have figured that under normal conditions selecting the wing-tanks would drain both tanks evenly unless you were deliberately trying to shift fuel from one tank to another.



Fuel selector plate.





You can only select one at a time. Pilots often switched back and forth between the left and right wing (or drop) tanks to keep the plane balanced. Flying combat on one wing tank wasn't a problem if it was on the full side, steep banks with only 15-20 gallons left might be a problem, you would have to ask a Mustang pilot. It depends where the fuel pick ups are. 

On the Allison Mustangs one tank (the left?) had two fuel pick ups, one was the "standard" pick up and the 2nd was the reserve. 
Principle was like a motorcycle fuel switch.




You draw the gas from the taller tube (valve is on it's side in the picture) until the engine sputters and then you switch the lever to short tube and look for a gas station. 



> I was kind of under the impression that they wanted gunners in fighters as a way of giving them the ability to disrupt a Lufbery circle, and/or bomber-escort. I'm not exactly sure the rationale for the P-24 (which gave rise to the P-30), though if I recall it was based on a Lockheed Altair.



I am not sure of the rational except that it was a replacement for the Berliner Joyce P-16 




It used the same engine as the P-30 ony without the turbo charger. 



> They wanted a pursuit aircraft with high performance at high and low altitude, a 1000 pound armament (the USAAC wanted only 500 max), and the possibility of having two-engines instead of one (with only one crew -- a no-no). Since Lieutenants can't override the limits set by Colonels and Generals, they decided they'd call the design an interceptor because it wasn't used in the US and if they could create a new category, they could produce their own specifications. The P-39 seemed to be an insurance policy if the P-38's twin-engined, single-crew layout wasn't accepted.



The difference was that one specification called for two hours endurance and the one leading to the P-39 called for one hour endurance. Kelly Johnson figured he needed a single 1500hp engine to meet the specification for the two hour endurance but since a single 1500hp engine wasn't available he had to go with two 1000 hp engines. 



> Uh, what about the Wellington? It had a 2500 mile range...


with 4000lbs of bombs?
The B-23 had max range of 2750 miles. 
and the bomber requirements weren't standing still, the requirement that lead to the B-26 called for 3000lbs to be carried over 2,000 miles. This requirement was issued about 2 months before the Army placed their first production order for the P-40. They didn't get close to the range they wanted in the B-26. 



> I should point out that this ignorance of state of the art didn't affect the USN...



oh but it did. The early F4F-3s had a lot of trouble with rumbling and surging in the ducts. P & W couldn't build the engines fast enough leading to 91 F4F_3A being built with simple two speed superchargers. These two speed engines accounted for about 1/3 of Wildcat production before the F4F-4 showed up.
And the Navy/Grumman two stage supercharger had a critical altitude around 6-7000ft lower than the army turbo charger.


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## Zipper730 (Feb 17, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Fuel selector plate.


Fascinating layout

I'm curious how often they'd have to shift left to right?


> On the Allison Mustangs one tank (the left?) had two fuel pick ups, one was the "standard" pick up and the 2nd was the reserve.


So this is redundancy?


> I am not sure of the rational except that it was a replacement for the Berliner Joyce P-16


So, that raises a question: What was the motive for the P-15?


> The early F4F-3s had a lot of trouble with rumbling and surging in the ducts.


I didn't know that


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## Greyman (Feb 17, 2019)

For 2,500 miles a Wellington would be down to about 1000lb of bombs.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 17, 2019)

"...this was probably already stated but i dont think a LR escort was seriously considered because no one thought france would have been over run in the early goings like it was. the raf would have had air strips in france...close enough to the front and some of the industrial regions of germany to be effective" 

"That's actually a very good point."

It might be a good point, if there was not a simple fact present: Belgium was over-run back in ww1 - just 20 years before Nazis started with sabre rattling. Why gamble that Belgium will not be over-run the next time, too, thus providing staging ground for German fighters close to England?


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## pbehn (Feb 17, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> "...this was probably already stated but i dont think a LR escort was seriously considered because no one thought france would have been over run in the early goings like it was. the raf would have had air strips in france...close enough to the front and some of the industrial regions of germany to be effective"
> 
> "That's actually a very good point."
> 
> It might be a good point, if there was not a simple fact present: Belgium was over-run back in ww1 - just 20 years before Nazis started with sabre rattling. Why gamble that Belgium will not be over-run the next time, too, thus providing staging ground for German fighters close to England?


It might be a point if the Maginot line included or excluded Belgium, it did neither, it just stopped.


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## KiwiBiggles (Feb 17, 2019)

pbehn said:


> It might be a point if the Maginot line included or excluded Belgium, it did neither, it just stopped.


Didn't Belgium have its own version of the Maginot Line? Forts like Eben-Emael? Although of course they were no more effective than their French counterparts.

The point is that if Britain felt that the Maginot Line made France reasonably secure, they almost certainly felt the same about Belgium.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 18, 2019)

KiwiBiggles said:


> Didn't Belgium have its own version of the Maginot Line? Forts like Eben-Emael? Although of course they were no more effective than their French counterparts.
> 
> The point is that if Britain felt that the Maginot Line made France reasonably secure, they almost certainly felt the same about Belgium.



This is the thing - they almost certainly felt. Let's rewind to 1914, when German and Austrian heavy cannons have beaten numerous Belgian forts into a pulp. link
Calculating the future defense upon a feel, rather than upon a very fresh history is about as dubious as possible.


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## Ascent (Feb 18, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> This is the thing - they almost certainly felt. Let's rewind to 1914, when German and Austrian heavy cannons have beaten numerous Belgian forts into a pulp. link
> Calculating the future defense upon a feel, rather than upon a very fresh history is about as dubious as possible.


Except of course that the Maginot line was built under the inspiration of Verdun where the forts held out and were not easily captured when defended properly.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 18, 2019)

Ascent said:


> Except of course that the Maginot line was built under the inspiration of Verdun where the forts held out and were not easily captured when defended properly.



Belgium was not defended by Maginot line.


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## drgondog (Feb 18, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> Because they didn't believe the Spitfire fitted with LR tanks could hack it against the Me-109's and Fw.190's?
> I wouldn't say so in the short term -- it wouldn't be able to fly fast enough while flying far enough. Later in the war, the ability to stretch the Spitfire's range was doable, particularly when drop-tanks were added. The USAAF also proposed a modification of a Spitfire IX that had modifications including more fuel-capacity in the wings, possibly additional fuselage capacity and nice big drop-tanks. Eventually, the Spitfire would use the Mareng bags and that would further increase internal load.
> Well, I'll make my computations in statute miles and then compute that into nautical miles.
> 
> ...



Don't get too wrapped up in the above calculations for combat radius vs straight line range"

The straight line range for AAC/AAF was calculated and tested for take of, climb to 10,000 feet - set cruise at 2/3 power to destination with minimum margin for saftety/loiter of 20min to descend and land. Extrapolating to Combat radius were calculations which included warm up, taxi and climb to cruise altitude, set MP and RPM to test results at proscribed altitude, straight line cruise to 'destination radius', fight 5 min at WEP, 15 min at MP, turn around and cruise back at proscribed altitude and in a straight line to base - with 30 minutes of reserve

At the end of the day that radius resulted in about 30% (or less - for example the P-47 would be closer to 20%) of the total range. In actual practice for an escort mission, the planners had to take into account the time to take off, circle the base while forming up in twos or fours into squadron - then circle when second and third squadrons assembled, then climb to cruise altitude, proceed in straight line to R/V at cruise speeds based on attaining R?V at planned time (often faster because of perception of being late), arrive at R/V (without loiter waiting for late bombers), disperse per Group plan (i'e. one squadron essing over top of assigned boxes, one squadron running up and down on one flank, maybe another sweeping in front. In the case of planning, the key factor was Time in escort because velocity of the bomber formation was less than the fighters because a.) fighters kept speeds up usually around 300 TAS w/o tanks (i.e. Return) and 270 TAS with external tanks, b.) fighters were usually returning or staying with the bombers until breaking R/V - the fast/economic cruise home, descend, loiter in bad weather and land. No fight? plenty of fuel. Fight? maybe not enough. Headwinds? CO needs to be aware and order RTB early. Bad weather over England pre-D-Day - RTB early and hope that some airfields will be open?

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## Zipper730 (Feb 18, 2019)

drgondog said:


> Don't get too wrapped up in the above calculations for combat radius vs straight line range"


Sorry, I was just making estimates based on what I knew. I then converted the figures into nautical miles as he asked.


> The straight line range for AAC/AAF was calculated and tested for take of, climb to 10,000 feet - set cruise at 2/3 power to destination with minimum margin for saftety/loiter of 20min to descend and land. Extrapolating to Combat radius were calculations which included warm up, taxi and climb to cruise altitude, set MP and RPM to test results at proscribed altitude, straight line cruise to 'destination radius', fight 5 min at WEP, 15 min at MP, turn around and cruise back at proscribed altitude and in a straight line to base - with 30 minutes of reserve


What about if you were flying at 25000-30000 feet?


> At the end of the day that radius resulted in about 30% (or less) of the total range.


So total range was 60% or slightly below, not 2/3?


> In actual practice for an escort mission, the planners had to take into account the time to take off, circle the base while forming up in twos or fours into squadron - then circle when second and third squadrons assembled, then climb to cruise altitude, proceed in straight line to R/V at cruise speeds based on attaining R/V at planned time (often faster because of perception of being late), arrive at R/V (without loiter waiting for late bombers)


I assume circling the base as the squadron forms in twos and fours was routine, but as you were forming up groups of two or fours into whole squadrons and air-groups this became a lengthly exercise?


> disperse per Group plan (i'e. one squadron essing over top of assigned boxes, one squadron running up and down on one flank, maybe another sweeping in front.


You mean some ran a race-track pattern, doing full 360's? Or did they just speed up and slow down?


> In the case of planning, the key factor was Time in escort because velocity of the bomber formation was less than the fighters because a.) fighters kept speeds up usually around 300 TAS w/o tanks (i.e. Return) and 270 TAS with external tanks


I thought they were cruising at 300 TAS wtih or without tanks... interesting detail


> No fight? plenty of fuel. Fight? maybe not enough. Headwinds? CO needs to be aware and order RTB early. Bad weather over England pre-D-Day - RTB early and hope that some airfields will be open?


So they took some liberties that resulted in some pilots having to find a decently flat piece of land or a road to plunk it in, or bail-out


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## pbehn (Feb 18, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> So they took some liberties that resulted in some pilots having to find a decently flat piece of land or a road to plunk it in, or bail-out


Bad weather could mean fog or very low cloud over much of the UK, there were some early disasters with many loses on aborted missions despite no enemy action. Huge resources were put into FIDO and emergency landing strips plus ever increasing recon solely for the weather.


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## Airframes (Feb 18, 2019)

A typical *summer *day in the UK. This is Duxford ..............

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## drgondog (Feb 18, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> Sorry, I was just making estimates based on what I knew. I then converted the figures into nautical miles as he asked.
> What about if you were flying at 25000-30000 feet? *Less range than at 10,000 feet*
> So total range was 60% or slightly below, not 2/3? *1000 mi straight line (P-51), 300 Combat Radius (is easier) - P47 800 mi straight line, 200 combat radius - no external tanks for both - 184 gallons P-51B w/o 85 gal fuse tank, 305 gallons P-47C/D*
> I assume circling the base as the squadron forms in twos and fours was routine, but as you were forming up groups of two or fours into whole squadrons and air-groups this became a lengthly exercise? *About 5-7 minutes from first takeoff to Group assembled and climbing.*
> ...


*Yes. often ditchings in Channel were due to fuel starvation coming home.*


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## Zipper730 (Feb 18, 2019)

drgondog said:


> Less than at 10,000 feet


No that's not what I meant: What I meant was what effect did flying at 25000-31000' have on mission planning? I ask because bomber escort missions often did entail flying at those altitudes.


> 1000 mi straight line (P-51), 300 Combat Radius (is easier) - P47 800 mi straight line, 200 combat radius - no external tanks for both


Fascinating: I didn't know the effects varied so much, but I gotta say one thing -- the P-47 gets it rough.


> About 5-7 minutes from first takeoff to Group assembled and climbing.


Okay, I understand you


> Race track at 180IAS


I'm amazed they were able to stay with them all the way to Berlin...


> Yes. often ditchings in Channel were due to fuel starvation coming home.


That must have been costly


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## drgondog (Feb 19, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> No that's not what I meant: What I meant was what effect did flying at 25000-31000' have on mission planning? I ask because bomber escort missions often did entail flying at those altitudes.



The AAF developed Range tables for The P-38/47 and 51. Look up the P-51B/D Operating data Range Tables and parse to the bottom section for data on 'clean', w/75 gallon external. 110 gal external by altitude.

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## Milosh (Feb 19, 2019)



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## pbehn (Feb 19, 2019)

Just a historical reminder that during the Battle of the Bulge the battle was fought by ground forces because the whole region was fog bound for days, there was a lot of weather like that at the time.


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