# Tank vs Tank



## schwarzpanzer (Sep 17, 2005)

My basic point was that the Konigstigers armour had no Molybdenum or Manganese content (maybe even no Nickel) so a 122mm round would make a 'scab' fly through the KT (like a HESH round) unless it hit it in the turret which would likely rip it clean off.

That is without it penetrating.

Any other vs ideas?


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## plan_D (Sep 18, 2005)

Likely? But didn't. Read combats against the King Tiger, they all destroy it from underneath, side or rear.


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## Dac (Sep 18, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> My basic point was that the Konigstigers armour had no Molybdenum or Manganese content (maybe even no Nickel) so a 122mm round would make a 'scab' fly through the KT (like a HESH round) unless it hit it in the turret which would likely rip it clean off.
> 
> That is without it penetrating.
> 
> Any other vs ideas?



The sloped armor on the King Tiger deflected many rounds. A full-on hit from a 122mm round would have been devastating, but this was rarely the case.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 20, 2005)

Dac's point is correct; 'shatter gap' and/or 'skate angle' is going to affect the results against the KT's glacis plate.

Shot down with my own weapon  - thanks Dacs!  

Then again this isn't guaranteed... (can't remember the probability)

However against the TigerI, this would not be the case:

http://www.battlefield.ru/is2_3.html

(IS2 vs Panther and Tiger 1 2)

http://www.battlefield.ru/su122.html

(Extremely short-barreled 122mm destroying a TigerI- from a German report!)

BTW: The D25T on the IS2/M was far, far better than this gun that destroyed a Tiger, admitted by Major Gomille, commander of III. (Tiger) Abteilung/Panzer Regiment.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 20, 2005)

Soviet projectiles:

http://www.battlefield.ru/guns/defin_2.html#normaliz

Note; 'Normalisation' - this seems similar to the APCBC principle of Western rounds.

http://www.battlefield.ru/is2_1.html

- Explains the effects of a 122mm HE round destroying a Panthers frontal armour (the AP bounced off!)

Whilst the 122mm AP destroyed a Tigers front at 1200m.

The lesson to remember is; don't judge Soviet designs by Western standards.

- That means you PlanD!  



However, it mentions the IS2 armour quality issue.

To achieve good protection vs the '88' they could either increase armour; quality, thickness or slope - so they did all of them!

It states that the thickness was not changed, but I'm sure it was to 160mm (10mm over the max necessary!)

Also it says IS2M didn't exist WW2, but it's popular nomenclature anyway, so I'll always say IS2M!

It says that the 88mm KwK36 was unable to penetrate point-blank @ 30 degrees, thus making the Pak43 also unable at combat ranges (it doesn't say the latter though)

Again, as I have stated previously, the turret and (to a lesser degree) lower hull could be weak areas, so if the Tiger's gunner was on his mark...

I'd no idea the turret thickness was so little though!


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## Soren (Sep 28, 2005)

I don't know about this Battlefield.ru site, seems highly biased to me.

Anyways...

Fact is there are absolutely no records of the Tiger Ausf.B's frontal armor ever being penetrated, and the 122mm D25-T gun wasnt even close to being capable of penetrating the front glacis on the Tiger Ausf.B. (Btw only nickel alloy was 'scarce' in the Tiger Ausf.B's armor)

As to the Tiger Mk.1 vs the JS-2, well I'd bet my money on the Tiger for sure. Tiger-I crews have reported JS-2 kills at distances of over 2km "Frontal engagements". The excellent sighting system in the Tiger is what allowed this of-cause.

("Reports state that in July of 1944, commander of 3rd company of schwere Panzer Abteilung 506, Captain Wakker, destroyed Soviet T-34 at the range of 3900 meters.")

The JS-2 on the other hand had a really poor sighting system, so the fact that it carried a really powerful gun didnt help it much, as it was unlikely even hitting a Tiger at more than 1000m away. But even at a distance of 1000m, it would be extremely difficult for the JS-2 to actually score a hit. 

Infact the Tiger-I was a serious threat to the JS-2 even at a distance of 2km. The 88mm Kwk36 would afterall punch through 116mm of vertical armor at a distance of 2000m with its standard round, and 91mm at 30 degree's from vertical - U.S. test results.


Against the Tiger Ausf.B (Tiger II), the JS-2 only stands a chance if its a very close engagement where flanking maneuvers can be utilized to expose the Tiger's softer sides and rear. A long-range frontal attack against a Tiger Ausf.B would have been pure suicide, as the Tiger Ausf.B was designed and built exactly for this role, carrying the best AT gun of the war. 



Schwarzpanzer said:


> It says that the 88mm KwK36 was unable to penetrate point-blank @ 30 degrees, thus making the Pak43 also unable at combat ranges (it doesn't say the latter though)



Correction, this was by Russian measuring methods, and thus equals 60 degree's from vertical by western measures.

Infact the Pak43 was capable of cleanly penetrating the JS-2's front glacis at more than 1500m away, while being capable of penetrating the front turret at distances exceeding 4.5km. 
("It is reported that in early March of 1945, Lieutenant Beckmann from sPzJagAbt 88 destroyed Soviet IS-2 at the range of *4600 meters* near Marzdorf.")

Nashorn crews also reported that they were able to knock out Soviet T-34 tanks at distances as great as 4000 meters, aswell as numerous kills of KV and IS-2 tanks as well as SU-152, ISU-122 and ISU-152 assault guns.


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## schwarzpanzer (Oct 3, 2005)

I'd think it was biased, but it isn't.

For eg. it says the early JS2 '44 could be penetrated by the 76.2mm ZiS-3!  

and that the ZiS-3 could only penetrate a TigerI's side armour @ <200m!!



> Fact is there are absolutely no records of the Tiger Ausf.B's frontal armor ever being penetrated



A KingTigers turret front was penetrated by a 100mm and right through the gunsight too by the looks of things - ouch!  

Also from what PlanD said, maybe the hull front too? 
(which was also vulnerable)

Add to that the fact that the Porscheturm KT (1st 50) had a vulnerable shot-trap, like the Panther did 'till the late AusfG.



> the 122mm D25-T gun wasnt even close to being capable of penetrating the front glacis on the Tiger Ausf.B.



At point-blank, the 122mm could break 205mm of armour by sheer penetration.

Or rip the welds apart with HE!

To counter that:



> Dac's point is correct; 'shatter gap' and/or 'skate angle' is going to affect the results against the KT's glacis plate.



However, from range, even a ricochet could be lethal; that big shell was capable of ripping Panther's turrets right off the hull!

Also the bolts holding the radios to the turett walls would go ping-ponging around the turret, mechanical failure would also be likely.

I think crews have been killed by ammo and radios falling on them when this happens?

Also penetration doesn't really matter too much! 
HESH rounds don't work by penetrating armour. 
(IIRC HESH were available for the Soviet WW2 Naval 100mm?)



> (Btw only nickel alloy was 'scarce' in the Tiger Ausf.B's armor)



I know Molybdenum was scarce, I thought nickel wasn't!

PlanD said Manganeze wasn't available, I believe him. (he is from Sheffield after all!  )



> Infact the Tiger-I was a serious threat to the JS-2 even at a distance of 2km. The 88mm Kwk36 would afterall punch through 116mm of vertical armor at a distance of 2000m with its standard round, and 91mm at 30 degree's from vertical - U.S. test results



Well even the earliest IS2's had >120mm hull armour, however as planD said it was very poor quality, also the crews didn't really know how to use the IS2.

The turret was 90mm @ round though, so at 2km, yes it was vulnerable.

- Though some may have been 100mm @ round.

The IS2M was a lot harder to kill though.



> Against the Tiger Ausf.B (Tiger II), the JS-2 only stands a chance if its a very close engagement where flanking maneuvers can be utilized to expose the Tiger's softer sides and rear.



Point blank they are about equal frontally, unless the K-Tiger is a 'quality' version.

The 122mm could penetrate the KT's side/rear armour from quite a distance, say >1,500 km?



> A long-range frontal attack against a Tiger Ausf.B would have been pure suicide, as the Tiger Ausf.B was designed and built exactly for this role


 
Yes, the KT should come out on top there (if it was decent quality). 

It was rarely used this way though.



> carrying the best AT gun of the war.



The best gun of the war? - That is debatable, good contender though.



> Correction, this was by Russian measuring methods, and thus equals 60 degree's from vertical by western measures.



Lots of Western measures get confused on this issue too!

60 degrees would make sense as it is the ballistic 'skate angle'.



> Infact the Pak43 was capable of cleanly penetrating the JS-2's front glacis at more than 1500m away



Possible with APCR or APCBC. 8) 

- But not plain AP. 



> while being capable of penetrating the front turret at distances exceeding 4.5km.



I doubt that, but I will check.

90mm @ round is the same as a T34/85 (daft!) if a T34/85 was invulnerable at ranges >4km, then so was an IS2(M)!

I think the KV/85 and IS1/85 had 100mm of turret armour?

Thats a stupid step back, then again early T34's had 60mm of frontal armour, later to be 45mm!


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## Soren (Oct 4, 2005)

> A KingTigers turret front was penetrated by a 100mm and right through the gunsight too by the looks of things - ouch!



Those are pictures of a stripped down KT being used as a test target, and the armor has been weakened considerably already by multiple hits all over.(Over 100 hits maybe) And as you pointed out yourself, the 100mm projectile hit the gun-sight, a VERY weak spot in the KT's front turret, thus it met very little resistance in the way of armor. Thus that test bares no resemblance what so ever to what the KT could really resist.



> Also from what PlanD said, maybe the hull front too?
> (which was also vulnerable)



The KT's front glacis was not at all vulnerable to any 122mm D25-T round, at 'any' range. But after being hit possibly over a hundred times by other AT guns, weakening it significantly, it was bound to be penetrated at some point.



> Add to that the fact that the Porscheturm KT (1st 50) had a vulnerable shot-trap, like the Panther did 'till the late AusfG.



Very few KT's with Porsche turm's were manufactured.



> At point-blank, the 122mm could break 205mm of armour by sheer penetration.



According to Russian tests, against Russian test plates.  That penetration figure would be quite abit lower against German armor.




> > Dac's point is correct; 'shatter gap' and/or 'skate angle' is going to affect the results against the KT's glacis plate.
> 
> 
> 
> However, from range, even a ricochet could be lethal; that big shell was capable of ripping Panther's turrets right off the hull!



Russian fairytale. The 122mm D25-T would never, under any circumstances, penetrate the KT's front glacis, period. 

And do you know why ? Cause its impossible.



> Also the bolts holding the radios to the turret walls would go ping-ponging around the turret, mechanical failure would also be likely.



Your overestimating the power of the D25-T quite significantly. 

A 122mm D25-T round hitting the KT's front glacis could most likely barely even be felt by the crew, as the noise of the engine and the vibration of the tank running over the terrain almost totally negated the vibration and sound of a round hitting it. 



> I think crews have been killed by ammo and radios falling on them when this happens?



I've certainly never heard of such, as rounds and radio equipment is very safely secured inside the tank, and won't fall down just like that. 



> Also penetration doesn't really matter too much!
> HESH rounds don't work by penetrating armour.
> (IIRC HESH were available for the Soviet WW2 Naval 100mm?)



The IS-2 didn't have HESH rounds.



> The IS2M was a lot harder to kill though.



The IS-2"M" had 100mm of frontal turret armor, and 90mm on the side.



> Point blank they are about equal frontally, unless the K-Tiger is a 'quality' version.



No, the KT is very much superior in every way under such an engagement.



> The 122mm could penetrate the KT's side/rear armour from quite a distance, say >1,500 km?



Yes, even at 3,000m the D25-T could puncture the KT from the side, problem is the D25-T couldn't anything beyond 1200m.  




> Yes, the KT should come out on top there (if it was decent quality).



There is no question whether or not the KT comes out on top, it has all the advantages. The KT's gun for one is much superior in both penetration and accuracy, there's simply no way a IS-2 will win a long range engagement with a Tiger Ausf.B. (The IS-2 can't hit anything beyond 1200m anyway) 



> It was rarely used this way though.



No, it was used quite often this way actually, just sitting and waiting for anything to come within sight of its Kwk43 gun.



> The best gun of the war? - That is debatable, good contender though.



The best "AT" gun put on a tank, it certainly was.



> Possible with APCR or APCBC. 8)
> 
> - But not plain AP.



The KT only carried APCBC.  



> I doubt that, but I will check.
> 
> 90mm @ round is the same as a T34/85 (daft!) if a T34/85 was invulnerable at ranges >4km, then so was an IS2(M)!
> 
> ...



Schwartzpanzer, the Pak/Kwk43 would penetrate 124mm of vertical armor at a distance of 4.5km, and the IS-2M only has 100mm of vertical frontal turret armor.


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## schwarzpanzer (Oct 4, 2005)

You're thinking about the Kubinka range KT?

- Not that one.




> The KT's front glacis was not at all vulnerable to any 122mm D25-T round, at 'any' range.



Not glacis, I said hull (underneath the glacis).

Anyway, at point blank it's just gonna cave in.



> Very few KT's with Porsche turm's were manufactured.



-


> (1st 50)





> According to Russian tests, against Russian test plates.



No they were UK tests! <100m though.



> Russian fairytale. The 122mm D25-T would never, under any circumstances, penetrate the KT's front glacis, period.



It's possible, but unecessary, the 122mm didn't work by penetration.



> A 122mm D25-T round hitting the KT's front glacis could most likely barely even be felt by the crew



I think not, armour would be chipped away and the steering clutches would likely be shot at the very least.

The whole tank would likely even be forced backwards.



> The IS-2 didn't have HESH rounds.



Similar principle, I actually think a few did (or was that SU-100?  )



> No, the KT is very much superior in every way under such an engagement.



If the IS2's 1st round missed and it didn't get out it was dead!

Also if the KT got the 1st shot in...



> problem is the D25-T couldn't anything beyond 1200m



The KT was a mahoosive target though...



> No, it was used quite often this way actually, just sitting and waiting for anything to come within sight of its Kwk43 gun.



Like it was in the Bulge/Ardennes?

If it was used like that it was near unstoppable, though hard to hide something that big.



> The best "AT" gun put on a tank, it certainly was.



The 90mm and 17 pounder were roughly equal, or better depending on your viewpoint.



> The KT only carried APCBC.



No a variety was carried, the list is quite big; AP, APCBC, HE, APCR, 7.92mm etc, etc



> the IS-2M only has 100mm of vertical frontal turret armor.



90mm of rounded armour actually.


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## Parmigiano (Oct 5, 2005)

Found this link for those who have time and passion to read a 150 pages thesis about the strategic use of the Panzer VI, plus kill ratios, technical data etc.

http://cgsc.cdm.oclc.org/coll2/image/305.pdf

good reading...


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## Soren (Oct 27, 2005)

> You're thinking about the Kubinka range KT?
> 
> - Not that one.



There isnt any other Schwartzpanzer... 

Infact there are no combat records what so ever of the front of a Tiger Ausf.B ever being penetrated, and thats a darn fact Schwartzpanzer.



> Not glacis, I said hull (underneath the glacis).



It wouldnt penetrate that neither Scwartzpanzer.



> Anyway, at point blank it's just gonna cave in.



No, its either going to bounce off, or shatter. ("Alot" of Russian AT projectiles shattered, mainly because of their poor quality)



> (1st 50)



Would you call that alot ?  



> No they were UK tests! <100m though.



Ok, conducted where exactly ? (Please note before you answer, that I know where all UK tests with captured guns were carried out)



> It's possible, but unecessary, the 122mm didn't work by penetration.



Schwartzpanzer, the 122mm D25-T wouldnt cause spalling on the glacis either, if thats what your implying. 



> I think not, armour would be chipped away



Chipped away ?! Schwartzpanzer the round would simply bounce off, leaving only a deep dent in the armor.



> and the steering clutches would likely be shot at the very least.



Your kidding me right ?!  



> The whole tank would likely even be forced backwards.



 

I hope you were joking when you said that...

NO schwartzpanzer, the tank would NOT move backwards, not even an inch.



> Similar principle, I actually think a few did (or was that SU-100?  )



No, they didnt have it.



> If the IS2's 1st round missed and it didn't get out it was dead!
> 
> Also if the KT got the 1st shot in...



Even if the IS-2, under some miracle, got the first shot in, it was still doomed to lose in such an engagement. The 122mm D25-T was simply so inefficient at long ranges, that it posed no threat what so ever to a Tiger Ausf.B in such a scenario.



> The KT was a mahoosive target though...



At long ranges such as 1000m or more, that has almost zero importance.



> The 90mm and 17 pounder were roughly equal, or better depending on your viewpoint.



They weren't even close Schwartzpanzer....



> No a variety was carried, the list is quite big; AP, APCBC, HE, APCR,



No the list isnt big at all Schwartzpanzer. The only AP ammunition carried for the Kwk43 in the Tiger Ausf.B, was the APCBC. The HE ammunition was for infantry targets.

APCR wasnt carried as "There was none!". German tungsten supplies had ran out already in late 43, so the remaining tungsten was issued only to the small AT guns ammunition, as these were worthless without it. 



> 7.92mm etc, etc



Now why the heck would you mention the 7.92mm ammunition while we're talking ammunition for the main gun ?



> 90mm of rounded armour actually.



No, 100mm of armor actually, the sides of the turret were 90mm thick  And rounded armor is also vertical.


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## schwarzpanzer (Nov 9, 2005)

> Infact there are no combat records what so ever of the front of a Tiger Ausf.B ever being penetrated, and thats a darn fact Schwartzpanzer.



I'll get it sometime.



> It wouldnt penetrate that neither Scwartzpanzer.



The hull was not as heavily armoured, though the big 122mm shell would be a disadvantage there.



> No, its either going to bounce off, or shatter.



Those are possibilities, true.



> Would you call that alot ?



Well, no,  but KT production wasn't that large...

They were IIRC used on the Western front only?



> Ok, conducted where exactly ?



Bovington IIRC.



> Schwartzpanzer, the 122mm D25-T wouldnt cause spalling on the glacis either, if thats what your implying.



That is indeed what I'm implying!  



> Chipped away ?! Schwartzpanzer the round would simply bounce off, leaving only a deep dent in the armor.



Even the short 122mm of the S122 (which was far inferior to the D25T) did that to a TigerI (whose armour was far better quality than the KT's).



> Even if the IS-2, under some miracle, got the first shot in, it was still doomed to lose in such an engagement. The 122mm D25-T was simply so inefficient at long ranges, that it posed no threat what so ever to a Tiger Ausf.B in such a scenario.



At less than 600m? The 1st shot would likely win it.



> At long ranges such as 1000m or more, that has almost zero importance.



It doesn't. If t did, every little helps... At range, less 'lead' is needed. The KT was also slow...



> They weren't even close Schwartzpanzer....



The were equal or better IMHO. Penetration, RoF, weight etc.
What do you judge guns on??



> The only AP ammunition carried for the Kwk43 in the Tiger Ausf.B, was the APCBC.



No, APCR and APFDS were rare and very rare respectively. BTW IIRC I don't think HVAP (APCR) was available for the 122mm?

Also retro ammo may be used, '88' KwK36 etc.



> The HE ammunition was for infantry targets.



I know that!  but HE can destroy a light tank or say a Cromwells flank...



> APCR wasnt carried as "There was none!". German tungsten supplies had ran out already in late 43, so the remaining tungsten was issued only to the small AT guns ammunition, as these were worthless without it.



There was _some_. Actually, in '44 all supplies went to machine tool production, it didn't run out in '43.

You're thinking about squeeze-bore, not APCR?



> No, 100mm of armor actually,



Definately 90mm.  



> the sides of the turret were 90mm thick



Honestly can't remember.  



> And rounded armor is also vertical.



No, it gives better protection, look at the IS3's 'inverted frying pan' turret.

- Unless it acts as a shot-trap, of course!


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## Soren (Nov 10, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> I'll get it sometime.



I'll be waiting patiently..



> The hull was not as heavily armoured, though the big 122mm shell would be a disadvantage there.



It was heavily enough armored to stop the 122mm D25-T's shell, I can assure you of that !



> Those are possibilities, true.



No, thats what is going to happen.



> Well, no,  but KT production wasn't that large...



True, but still 50 ain't much at all.



> They were IIRC used on the Western front only?



Yes.



> Bovington IIRC.



No.



> That is indeed what I'm implying!



Well then your wrong.



> Even the short 122mm of the S122 (which was far inferior to the D25T) did that to a TigerI (whose armour was far better quality than the KT's).



 

You must be kidding me Schwartzpanzer !

Your not seriously comparing the 100mm "Vertical" hull armor of the Tiger Ausf.E, with the 100mm "55 degree sloped" hull armor of the Tiger Ausf.B ! 

Don't you know what happens when projectiles hit sloped armor as apposed to vertical armor ??

And btw where have you heard that story of yours about the SU-122 ? 



> At less than 600m? The 1st shot would likely win it.



Not a chance ! 

Unless it hits the KT's gun barrel of-cause  



> It doesn't. If t did, every little helps...



Considering the D25-T's already poor accuracy, it has almost zero importance.



> At range, less 'lead' is needed.



The longer the range, the longer ahead of the targets axis of movement you'll have to aim. (Depending on the targets speed of-cause)



> The KT was also slow...



Thats not going to help the IS-2 at all in a long range engagement, as all the Tiger has to do in such a scenario is to stay put, and open fire at the IS-2 which can do nothing but retreat and try to avoid being blown to pieces.



> The were equal or better IMHO.



If thats what your sources are telling you, then you desperately need to check 'their' sources, cause thats an outright lie !



> Penetration, RoF, weight etc.
> What do you judge guns on??



Penetration at all angles, weight, optics and RoF etc etc.. all these mixed together is what counts.. 

In penetration power the Kwk43 clearly beats the 90mm M3 and 17pdr, no match. (The 17pdr being the closest to the Kwk43) 

As to the optics, well the 17pdr and 90mm M3 both fall awfully short compared to the Kwk43 here as-well.

In weight, well all three weighed alot, the Kwk43 being the heaviest, but the Kwk43's weight is fully outweighed by its performance, that can't be said about the 90mm M3.

In RoF, well they are all pretty equal there. The Kwk43 might be a tad slower because of the large size of its rounds, but its excellent firing system more than compensates for that.

However I must add, for its size the 17pdr was truly excellent, and overall very close to the Kwk43. However the 17pdr lacked the Kwk43's HE capability and advanced optics, both of which are very important on the battlefield.



> No, APCR and APFDS were rare and very rare respectively.



No Schwartzpanzer, I'm telling you the Tiger Ausf.B didnt use APCR rounds (And especially not APFDS cause no Tiger ever used that!), Why ? Cause there was none !.

German tungsten supplies had ran out in late 43, so there was none for the medium-heavy tanks as the little that remained was to be used in ammunition for small AT guns only, cause they were useless without it.



> BTW IIRC I don't think HVAP (APCR) was available for the 122mm?



No thats right.



> Also retro ammo may be used, '88' KwK36 etc.



The Tiger Ausf.E had stopped using APCR rounds already in 43, so there was nothing left for the Tiger Ausf.B to use !

Besides APCBC rounds were much more effective against tanks than APCR rounds anyway, as APCR rounds were "alot" more prone to bounce off sloped armor than the APCBC rounds. The APCR was only really effective against vertical, or lightly sloped armor. Above 35 degree's impact angle, and the APCR's penetration performance drops significantly ! (Same goes for the British APDS round)

Also the APCR didnt explode after penetration, while most APCBC rounds did. And exactly this deadly feature is what would spell instant death for the entire crew of the tank which was penetrated, as the pressure of the explosion would set off the tanks ammunition, blowing it up. (The Germans and Americans both utilized this feature in their APCBC rounds)



> but HE can destroy a light tank or say a Cromwells flank...



Yes, thats right, but apart from that it is mainly to be used against infantry, and AP rounds are also preferred against light tanks, as HE rounds arent nearly as accurate. 



> There was _some_. Actually, in '44 all supplies went to machine tool production, it didn't run out in '43.
> 
> You're thinking about squeeze-bore, not APCR?



Nope.



> Definately 90mm.



No, 100mm. (Some source's even quote 160mm in some places)

The IS-I has 90mm of frontal turret armor.



> Honestly can't remember.



Well, they are. 

And a piece of good advice; Don't rely purely on your memory, thats a mistake far to often made, rather check up on the facts in a book from a respectable source.



> No, it gives better protection, look at the IS3's 'inverted frying pan' turret.



Yes, overall it does provide better protection, but it is vertical at some point, making it very vulnerable to AP rounds.



> - Unless it acts as a shot-trap, of course!



Yes that too.


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## schwarzpanzer (Nov 11, 2005)

> I'll be waiting patiently..



Hopefully, it'll be sooner rather than later.  (source site is down)



> It was heavily enough armored to stop the 122mm D25-T's shell, I can assure you of that !



I'm meaning under the glacis.



> No, thats what is going to happen.



Not 100% chance, you must admit?



> True, but still 50 ain't much at all.



Agreed.

Thanks for the Porscheturm info.

The _records_ were at Bovington. Ages ago though.



> Well then your wrong.



The Russians said this was only on the KT's of poor quality though.



> Your not seriously comparing the 100mm "Vertical" hull armor of the Tiger Ausf.E, with the 100mm "55 degree sloped" hull armor of the Tiger Ausf.B !



I'm talking about hardness and malleability etc.



> And btw where have you heard that story of yours about the SU-122 ?



I can get the link.



> Not a chance !



Theres a great likelihood, equal on either side.



> Considering the D25-T's already poor accuracy, it has almost zero importance.



It had poor accuracy, but historians inflate it. It was reasonably accurate to >1000m, though the optics weren't in the KT's league and a higher velocity is almost always an advantage for 'sniping'. It's like the AK47 really.



> The longer the range, the longer ahead of the targets axis of movement you'll have to aim. (Depending on the targets speed of-cause)



You've got that the wrong way round.



> Thats not going to help the IS-2 at all in a long range engagement, as all the Tiger has to do in such a scenario is to stay put



A KT cannot manouvre out of an ambush (especially on poor terrain), this claimed many.



> If thats what your sources are telling you, then you desperately need to check 'their' sources, cause thats an outright lie !



All published data says (roughly) the same story. I've never heard too different? though they do vary of course. Some of my sources have died BTW.  



> In penetration power the Kwk43 clearly beats the 90mm M3 and 17pdr, no match. (The 17pdr being the closest to the Kwk43)



I know that, when firing APCBC, the 90mm is superior, though I dunno if that was used much WW2?

SVDS/APDS in the 17pdr is superior to '88' APCBC, except for the reasons you gave.



> As to the optics, well the 17pdr and 90mm M3 both fall awfully short compared to the Kwk43 here as-well.



True, but not too much?



> In weight, well all three weighed alot, the Kwk43 being the heaviest, but the Kwk43's weight is fully outweighed by its performance, that can't be said about the 90mm M3.



True, though the weight/performance ratio of the '88' was bad IMHO.



> In RoF, well they are all pretty equal there. The Kwk43 might be a tad slower because of the large size of its rounds, but its excellent firing system more than compensates for that.



I remember a story of a destroyed Tiger where the deciding factor was a knackered loader!



> However the 17pdr lacked the Kwk43's HE capability and advanced optics, both of which are very important on the battlefield.



Bang-on.  



> No Schwartzpanzer, I'm telling you the Tiger Ausf.B didnt use APCR rounds (And especially not APFDS cause no Tiger ever used that!), Why ? Cause there was none !.
> 
> German tungsten supplies had ran out in late 43, so there was none for the medium-heavy tanks as the little that remained was to be used in ammunition for small AT guns only, cause they were useless without it.



It even had an official designation, PzGr41/43 IIRC?

BTW:


> I'm telling you


 - Try not to use that, it's like a red rag to a bull!  

Cheers for the HVAP info.



> The Tiger Ausf.E had stopped using APCR rounds already in 43, so there was nothing left for the Tiger Ausf.B to use !
> 
> Besides APCBC rounds were much more effective against tanks than APCR rounds anyway, as APCR rounds were "alot" more prone to bounce off sloped armor than the APCBC rounds. The APCR was only really effective against vertical, or lightly sloped armor. Above 35 degree's impact angle, and the APCR's penetration performance drops significantly ! (Same goes for the British APDS round)



I'm in _slight_ disagreement there.



> Also the APCR didnt explode after penetration, while most APCBC rounds did. And exactly this deadly feature is what would spell instant death for the entire crew of the tank which was penetrated, as the pressure of the explosion would set off the tanks ammunition, blowing it up. (The Germans and Americans both utilized this feature in their APCBC rounds)



Yes, but solid shot gives better penetration, research shows that APHE just isn't worth it.



> Yes, thats right, but apart from that it is mainly to be used against infantry, and AP rounds are also preferred against light tanks, as HE rounds arent nearly as accurate.



Yup.



> No, 100mm. (Some source's even quote 160mm in some places)
> 
> The IS-I has 90mm of frontal turret armor.



160mm was the glacis thickness of the late IS2. 

Do you have a source?

e.g. some T34's had 60mm glacis, most 45mm.



> And a piece of good advice; Don't rely purely on your memory, thats a mistake far to often made, rather check up on the facts in a book from a respectable source.



Yes, but when I'm unsure, I always try use language/grammer that makes it known that I'm unsure? but sometimes I know I'm right!  (not here BTW  ).



> Yes, overall it does provide better protection, but it is vertical at some point, making it very vulnerable to AP rounds.



Yes, the IS2's front turret/mantlet is weird; small target but relatively easy to hit.


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## Soren (Nov 23, 2005)

> I'm meaning under the glacis.



Yes, and so am I, its called the "Hull". 



> Not 100% chance, you must admit?



99.999%.



> The Russians said this was only on the KT's of poor quality though.



Yes, thats what the Soviets said 'after' they had bombarded the Tiger Ausf.B with hundreds of shells with different caliber. (The Soviets never were to thorough with their tests)



> I'm talking about hardness and malleability etc.



That made almost no difference, because the Tiger Ausf.B's armor was as highly sloped as it was. And besides the quality of the Tiger Ausf.B's armor wasnt nearly as poor as some believe it to be. 



> I can get the link.



The link ? Would you call that a respectable and reliable source ? 



> Theres a great likelihood, equal on either side.



Absolutely not !



> It had poor accuracy, but historians inflate it.



I havent run across any 'respectable' source who've inflated this at all.

Fact is the 122mm D25-T gun was a 'really' poor shot beyond 800m.



> It was reasonably accurate to >1000m, though the optics weren't in the KT's league and a higher velocity is almost always an advantage for 'sniping'.



Beyond 800m the 122mm D25-T is worth nearly nothing as a AT gun, and can only really be used as an Anti-Personnel gun. 



> It's like the AK47 really.



I don't really know what you mean ?



> You've got that the wrong way round.



No, I've got that exactly right, you've just miss understood it. (Remember I mentioned the targets "Axis of movement" ?  )

Its simple really, as it takes a round longer to reach its target the further away it is, and therefore the more deflection (Aiming ahead) is necessary to insure a hit.

Against a stationary target no deflection is necessary, and the gun only has to be elevated (Lowered/Raised) to hit at the exact range of the target.



> A KT cannot manouvre out of an ambush (especially on poor terrain), this claimed many.



Claims...  

The Tiger Ausf.B was actually surprisingly maneuverable on rough ground for its size, and by no means as cumbersome as some believe. 

Besides we're talking a long range engagement here, so an ambush is impossible.

But I do agree however that the Tiger Ausf.B would be at a disadvantage in a 'close in' ambush, mostly because of its size and long barreled gun.



> All published data says (roughly) the same story. I've never heard too different?



Then you haven't been reading much lately !



> I know that, when firing APCBC, the 90mm is superior, though I dunno if that was used much WW2?



What ?! No !

The 88mm Kwk43 heavily outperforms the 90mm M3 with APCBC rounds ! The 90mm M3 was barely better than the 88mm Kwk36, and equal at best to the 75mm Kwk42.

I mean that shouldn't be to hard figure out by yourself. 

The 90mm M3 fires a 10.9kg projectile only at a mere *853m/s*, compared to the 88mm Kwk43 which fires a 10.4kg projectile in excess of *1000m/s*. Thats a difference of about 1,400 KJ in energy alone ! 

And this difference in power also clearly shows itself in the official armor penetration tests of the two guns; 

88mm Kwk43 penetration data: 
Penetrated 132mm of 30 degree sloped armor at 2,000m - Official German testing with standard Pzgr.39/43 "APCBC" round. 

Penetrated 139mm of 30 degree sloped armor at 2,187y - Official British testing with standard Pzgr.39/43 "APCBC" round. 

Penetrated 178mm of vertical armor at 2,187y - Official U.S. testing with standard Pzgr.39/43 "APCBC" round. 

90mm M3 penetration data:

Penetrated 106mm of 30 degree sloped armor at 2,000y - Official U.S. testing with standard M82 "APC" round. (The only round for the 90mm M3 to be used in WW2)

Penetrated 109mm of 30 degree sloped armor at 2,000y - Official U.S. testing with T33 "APC" round. (This round was developed after WW2)

Not even the cumbersome 'separately loading' 90mm T15 gun on the Super-Pershing could duplicate the 88mm Kwk43's penetration performance with similar AP rounds;

90mm T15 penetration data:

Penetrated 122mm of 30 degree sloped armor at 2,000y - Official U.S. testing with T43 "APBC" projectile. (The APBC projectile had no explosive filler)

---------------------------------------

Note: German conducted tests used a more strict criteria for penetration and were against better quality armor than Allied tests. 

(U.S. conducted tests were of somewhat low criteria, as the round didnt even have to pass completely through the plate to be considered a penetration)



> SVDS/APDS in the 17pdr is superior to '88' APCBC, except for the reasons you gave.



Yes, against vertical armor the APDS round is superior to the APCBC round, penetration wise that is. However the British APDS rounds of WW2 were highly inaccurate, absolutely useless beyond 700m, and would often bounce off armor it should've normally penetrated. 

The 17pdr was much better off just using its already very effective APCBC round, as the gun itself was already powerful enough to threaten almost any German tank at long range with this round. And crews also highly preferred the APCBC round as it did much better against German tanks during the war than the APDS round.



> True, but not too much?



Yes, "too much". The Tiger's optics were very much better.



> True, though the weight/performance ratio of the '88' was bad IMHO.



No ! The 88mm Kwk43 has a excellent weight/performance ratio, much better than the 90mm M3's !



> I remember a story of a destroyed Tiger where the deciding factor was a knackered loader!



Yeah, what a 'story' huh ?  



> It even had an official designation, PzGr41/43 IIRC?



Yes, its Pzgr.40 or Pzgr.40/43.



> BTW:
> 
> 
> > I'm telling you
> ...



Well I didn't mean to offend you Schwartzpanzer, but try to look at it from my point of view... wouldn't you be just a tad irritated if someone persisted not to listen to what you know is the truth and kept stating something which isnt the truth at all ? (Don't take this as me saying your lying, cause I'm not, just saying that your source is faulty)




> I'm in _slight_ disagreement there.



Well thats your choice, Im just presenting the facts.



> Yes, but solid shot gives better penetration, research shows that APHE just isn't worth it.



Whoever mentioned APHE rounds ?

A APCBC round and a APHE round are two completely different rounds, both relying on different ways to penetrate armor.

The U.S. and Germany both used APCBC rounds/Solid shot rounds with small explosive fillers inside which would explode after penetration, and this had no adverse effect on the penetration ability of the round at all, as the round still relies on its KE to penetrate the armor. (Not on a large explosion like the APHE round)



> 160mm was the glacis thickness of the late IS2.



No, that was 120mm sloped at 60 degree's from vertical.



> Do you have a source?



Yes, many. 

Even Battlefield.ru mentions those figures  



> e.g. some T34's had 60mm glacis, most 45mm.



None had a 60mm glacis, they all had a 45mm glacis sloped at 60 degree's from vertical.



> Yes, but when I'm unsure, I always try use language/grammer that makes it known that I'm unsure? but sometimes I know I'm right!  (not here BTW  ).



Ok  No worries  



> Yes, the IS2's front turret/mantlet is weird; small target but relatively easy to hit.



Well it was one the first places German gunners would aim at (along with the lower hull), as a penetration there would almost always insure a 'total' destruction of the IS-2.


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## plan_D (Nov 26, 2005)

I don't need to ramble on in this discussion, I really dislike reading it with the split up quotes and comments. It's quite irritating, but I do agree with Soren. 

I would say though, the King Tiger was open to well thought out ambushes. This was not a fault of the tank, because all tanks are. However, in a position of an ambush - the King Tiger cannot move it's way out because it doesn't need to. That armour, and that cannon allow it to blast it's way out.


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## elmilitaro (Nov 27, 2005)

Hey plan_d, I agree with you if the tiger ever got in an ambush it would blast its way out.


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## hartmann (Nov 28, 2005)

I agree 100% with Soren, the 90 mm American gun was inferior to the 88mm in almost all aspects. I have hear that even, the only "Pershing" tank completely disabled in ETO was destroyed by a "Nashorn" at some 250m (single shot) the March 6th of 1945 near Köln, in the town of Niehl with the Pak43/1.


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## Erich (Jan 1, 2006)

well here is a new book that should pop your eyes out at least for actions primarily on the Ost front but also at Normandie.

Das Reich Tiger 1's and then into SS-Schwere Pz ABt 102 and later Königstiger 502 east of Berlin and in the Halbe pocket.

55 Euro's is a super price for a huge monster of a book with over 500 fotos and many maps........

Wolfgang Schneider author


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## plan_D (Jan 2, 2006)

Is it in English? 'Cos I'll have to get it, if it is.


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## Erich (Jan 2, 2006)

plan it is in German, and I cannot seem to see the cover for some reason as a scan on the fourms.

the book might be worth it alone for the pics ......... ?


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## plan_D (Jan 2, 2006)

I'm sure someone will translate it at some point. Plus, at this point in time my attention is diverted to the French Revolution. Man, if Aristocracy had a King Tiger or two.


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## schwarzpanzer (Jan 4, 2006)

Is that due to you being en France D?  

Hope you haven't been burning any cars now.


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## plan_D (Jan 6, 2006)

Oh, yeah ...I remember that...hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha...look how funny schwarz is...oh, and so fresh too.


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## Erich (Jan 10, 2006)

this was copied from the on-line British 9th Royal Tank Regiment book which was cut up severly facing the 102nd W-SS Schwere Panzer Abteilung at Hill 122 in Normandie in July of 44, one of several British units trying to capture that terrible low angled hump, the scene of majore devastation to both British and their German counterparts.............dang what a mess. the first person accounts are quite gripping.

read this slowly

Pressure was kept up on the Germans at all points on the perimeter of the bridgehead, particularly at Carpiquet aerodrome and Caen.

On 4 July the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, supported by the tanks of the Fort Garry Horse and Crocodiles of the 79th Armoured, attacked the village of Carpiquet and the aerodrome. These were defended by 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler Youth) under the command of Kurt Meyer. Though very few in numbers, the teenagers of the Hitler Youth were aided by a few tanks and 88's, very effective artillery and mortar fire, and the fact that Meyer was able to tap into the Canadians radio transmissions. The Germans were forced out of Carpiquet, but not out of the aerodrome.



The next step for the Canadians and the British was a direct attack on Caen. At 2150 hrs on 7 July 2500 tons of bombs were dropped on the northern outskirts of Caen. At 0420 hours on 8 July 1 Corps launched the ground attack of Operation Charnwood, the capture of Caen. The 3rd British Infantry Division was on the left of the British advance, the 59th in the centre, and the 3rd Canadian Infantry were on the right, starting from where they were at Carpiquet. The attack had limited success, in that 1 Corps reached the line of the River Orne running through the centre of Caen, while the Germans pulled back into the industrial suburbs of Colombelles and Faubourg de Vaucelles.



The battle for Caen died down, but Montgomery needed to maintain pressure on the British front. The Americans had been attacking for a week and had made little progress. The 2nd SS Panzer Division, Das Reich, had been moved to the American sector, and Panzer Lehr was on its way.



Operation Jupiter, the plans for which had been drawn up some days before, had the strategic objective of bringing armour back to the British front, and the tactical objective of reaching the River Orne south of Caen. The specific objectives, shown in the map of Figure ____, were: on the right flank of the advance Hill 112; on the left flank of the advance Chateau de Fontaine, Eterville, Maltot, and exploitation to the Orne at Feuguerolles. The British troops taking part in Jupiter were: 43 (Wessex) Infantry Division, plus 46 (Highland) Brigade and a brigade of the 3rd Canadian Infantry division; tank support consisted of 31 Tank Brigade (7 RTR and 9 RTR), and 4 Armoured Brigade; artillery support was provided by the divisional artillery of 43 Wessex, 15 Scottish, 53 Welsh and 11 Armoured, as well as the heavier guns of two Army Groups Royal Artillery (AGRA's).

9 RTR in Operation Jupiter: before and during;

Extracts from the War Diary

Jul 2-7: The Battalion was concentrated north of Cheux and a recce was ordered in conjunction with 130 Brigade (43 Div) of the area Verson - Eterville - Maltot. The recce had two purposes:

to find a suitable route across country, including a crossing of the River Odon, so that tanks could reach the area Fontaine Etoupefour.

to discover suitable forming up points (FUP's) for all squadrons prior to an attack south-east from Fontaine Etoupefour.

No natural route was available, but with the Royal Engineers blasting trees, bull-dozing hedgerows, and fording the river, a route was made and marked.

All troop leaders went forward to know the location and nature of their respective FUP's, and then crawled forward to get a glimpse of the ground over which they might be attacking. During these recces it was possible to see the battle of Carpiquet aerodrome which the Canadians were still trying to capture.

With the recce complete the Battalion, less B Squadron, was ordered to rest and moved to south of Bronay. B Squadron moved to just north-east of Colleville with objects of counter-attacking any enemy advance from east or north-east and of blocking the Caen-Villers Bocage road.

Jul 7: B Squadron rejoined the Battalion and during the evening a heavy raid by 450 bombers on the area north of Caen was watched with a certain amount of excitement.

Jul 9: Reports showed that 1 Corps was breaking into Caen from the north and east. By 1800 hrs all Caen north of the River Orne had been captured; Carpiquet aerodrome and the road Verson-Caen were also reported clear. Operation Jupiter was now possible.

Plan 31 Tank Brigade in support 43 Division

Right – 7 RTR, less B Squadron, with 129 Brigade to attack and capture Hill 112

Left – 9 RTR with 130 Brigade to capture Chateau de Fontaine, Eterville and Maltot.

Phase 1 (9 RTR): B Squadron with 5 Dorsets to Chateau de Fontaine at H-hour

(0500 hrs)



Phase 2 C Squadron with 4 Dorsets to Eterville at H + 75 minutes.



Phase 3 A Squadron with 7 Hampshires to Maltot at H + 180 minutes.



Exploitation 4 Armoured Brigade to move to St. Martin 9760 and Feuguerolles



46 Brigade with B Squadron 7 RTR to advance north east towards Caen



At 2000 hours 9 Jul the Battalion moved to Forward Assembly Area (FAA) north-east of Colleville.

Jul 10: At 0300 hrs the Battalion moved to FUP area Fontaine-Etoupefour. The move was covered by artillery and no difficulties were encountered. Battalion HQ was established at Bas de Mouen, just north of the River Odon.



Phase 1

At 0500 hrs B Squadron advanced with 5 Dorsets and in 15 minutes Les Dauns had been taken and only machine-gun fire had been encountered. It was known that elements of 10 SS Panzer Division threatened the left flank and 12 Panthers were reported roaming in the area of Eterville. A troop of 17-pounder self-propelled anti-tank guns (SP's) took up positions to guard against this threat while B Squadron pushed on to the Chateau. Resistance was still confined to machine-gun fire and snipers, and soon 6, 7 and 8 Troops were working round the Chateau. By 0552 hrs the 5 Dorsets had captured their objective; one tank had been lost on the left flank due to anti-tank fire later discovered to have been a 75/55mm.

At 0614 the objective was reported secure with the infantry firmly established on the line of the road from Fontaine-Etoupefour to Maltot. About 30 prisoners had been taken, a number killed, and at least six machine-gun positions destroyed.



Phase 2

By 0635 hrs C Squadron were advancing to Eterville with 4 Dorsets. As their besa fire tore through the corn the Germans came forward with their hands up. Prisoners were identified as belonging to 1 and 2 Battalions of the 22nd Panzer Grenadier Regiment. As 4 Dorsets neared Eterville B Squadron moved up and gave added support from the right flank, destroying two anti-tank guns.

The threat from the left remained, but a further troop of 17-pounder SP's and 11 Troop of C Squadron were in good positions waiting for the first sign of enemy tanks. By 0735 hrs Eterville had been taken and B Squadron rallied north of Les Dauns. Heavy enemy Mortar fire was concentrated on Eterville.



Phase 3

At 0815 hrs A Squadron advanced between B and C Squadrons supporting 7 Hampshires in their attack on Maltot. B Squadron was in position to provide support from the right flank of A's attack. Up to now the whole attack had gone perfectly, but at 0835 hrs A Squadron was severely worried by anti-tank fire from 4 German SP's in the area of the orchards just north of Maltot. As soon as an artillery concentration was brought down in this area 8 Troop of B Squadron reported anti-tank fire from the reverse slopes of Hill 112 and that 2 tanks had been knocked out.

On the right of 9 RTR 7 RTR were attacking Hill 112 in support of 129 Brigade. They had made substantial progress, but at 0933 hrs a strong enemy counter-attack was made on Hill 112. 7 RTR suffered a number of casualties including their C.O., Lt-Col Gaisford, who lost an eye, and the 2 i/c Major Bob Fleming who was killed. The right flank of 9 RTR's advance was thus enfiladed, and anti-tank fire was also reported from the high ground dominating Maltot to the west of the River Orne. The impetus of the attack was failing – two Tigers were in Maltot making the advance of the infantry extremely difficult and A Squadron's movement was hampered by a troop of Tigers on the southern slope of Hill 112, firing north-east.

At 1156 hrs A Squadron were still struggling to support the infantry in Maltot who were now confronted with another Tiger. The German infantry were now counter-attacking and only nine tanks of A Squadron were left. Major Douglas Ballantine, OC A Squadron, dismounted in an attempt to make contact with the CO of the 7 Hampshires (Lt-Col DWG Ray), but was severely wounded by mortar fire and subsequently died.

By 1200 hrs 2 i/c A Squadron (Capt Bert Mockford) reported that he had only four tanks capable of fighting, and further reports stated that counter-attacks were being made with tanks and infantry from north-east and south-west of Maltot.

The Battalion was disposed as follows:

B Squadron and elements of A in hull down positions on spur south of Chateau de Fontaine with infantry and anti-tank guns dug in.

C Squadron had joined Battalion HQ in forward rally after release by 4 Dorsets. BHQ had been mortared and shelled periodically causing severe casualties among the wounded that had been brought in.

From 1300 - 1600 hrs there was a stale-mate, the enemy making no attempts to push their counter-attack any further. A new plan was devised whereby A Squadron 7 RTR (Major Dick Joscelyne) were to put the 5th Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (5 DCLI) on Hill 112 and C Squadron 9 RTR to put 4 Dorsets into Maltot. B Squadron were to give support from the right in the opening phase. 4 Armoured Brigade were waiting to go through.

The advance began at 1640 hrs and despite anti-tank fire from south west of Maltot C Squadron had put the infantry into the village by 1700 hrs. But ten minutes later C Squadron were being shot at from the rear, for once again enemy tanks had infiltrated under cover of the spur north-east of Hill 112. Eight Tigers were also moving in on the left flank, and the infantry were pulling out of Maltot under pressure.

At 1935 hrs C Squadron was also forced to withdraw under the cover of supporting fire from B Squadron. Mortaring and shelling was almost continuous and at 2030 hrs all tanks rallied at the FUP; later they moved to join A Echelon north-east of Mouen to replenish and collect reinforcements.

During this day the battalion suffered 65 casualties (more than a quarter suffered in the entire NW Europe campaign), of whom 22 were killed, 34 wounded, and 9 taken prisoner. Sixteen tanks had been knocked out, of which six were recoverable.

From the ground and the other side of the hill



When the War Diary was written the diarist did not know exactly what was happening in the infantry brigades and the battalions that we were supporting. And it was not until after the war that we knew what the enemy was doing and suffering "on the other side of the hill". This is how it did seem:



From the ground

The 5th Dorsets under Lt-Col B.A. Coad (with B Squadron) had captured the Chateau de Fontaine and the farm nearby by 0615 hrs. Snipers fought it out to the end amongst the farm buildings, hayricks, high hedges and trees. The attack of the 4th Dorsets (Lt-Col H.E. Cowie) with C Squadron on Eterville went forward with great dash, and casualties at first were light. Seventy prisoners were taken and the battalion started to consolidate. A grim struggle for the far end of the village then developed, and enemy mortar and shell fire rained down. Casualties streamed into the regimental aid post (RAP), which soon overflowed with wounded who could not be evacuated; the only approach to the village for vehicles was a sunken lane which became blocked with blazing carriers, and no ambulance could reach the RAP. However, Eterville was held.



The 7th Hampshires (Lt-Col D.W.G. Ray) advanced through the gap between Eterville and Chateau de Fontaine and down towards the orchards and houses of Maltot in the hollow beyond. Intense fire from mortars and 88's came down on the advancing companies, but the battalion entered the village and reported that it was in their hands. In fact they had merely superimposed themselves on a very strongly defended enemy locality. Part of that strength consisted of Tiger tanks of the 502 SS Heavy Tank Battalion, and amongst the houses and orchards companies fought independent actions against the tanks. The wireless truck at the Hampshires' BHQ received a direct hit, and communication with brigade was cut off.



It was not for some hours that the desperate position of the Hampshires was realized. During this time the 4th Dorsets in Eterville had been relieved by the 9th Cameronians, thus freeing 4 Dorsets for a further advance.



The plan to restore the situation at Maltot was for 4 Dorsets to advance to support 7 Hampshires. This they did, but the two leading companies, expecting to take over from the Hampshires in the village, advanced straight into the enemy position and were surrounded. Enemy tanks worked round to the rear of the remainder of the battalion, which lay out in the fields exposed to fire from every direction.



Meanwhile on the ridge to the north Col. Coad of 5 Dorsets had realized the seriousness of the situation in Maltot. He organized the defence of the reverse slope of the ridge, and was joined by 7 Somerset Light Infantry, 1 Worcesters, and the 17-pounders of 59 Anti-Tank Regiment. The gains of the morning were thus made secure.



The position of 4 Dorsets was now hopeless, and Col. Cowie was given permission to withdraw what remained of his battalion; five company commanders had been lost. The remnants withdrew up the slope to the ridge and collected in the area of the Chateau de Fontaine.



From the other side of the hill

The Germans defending the attacks of Operation Jupiter consisted of the 12 SS Panzer Division (Hitler Youth), 10 SS Panzer Division (Frundsberg), and the 9 SS Panzer Division (Hohenstaufen), which was being relieved by 277 Infantry Division. Fortunately for all of them, they had just been joined by the 502 SS Heavy Tank Battalion, the Tiger battalion of II SS Panzer Corps. This battalion arrived at St. Martin, 3 km south of Maltot, at 0245 hrs on 10 July after eighteen days on the road from Holland.



The Tigers first moved up to the ridge close to Hill 112 and caused many casualties to 7 RTR, 4 Somersets, and 4 and 5 Wiltshires who were attacking the ridge at that point.



Later in the morning, at the time when the Hampshires and A Squadron attacked Maltot, the British progress was plotted by the commander of 10 SS Panzer Division. He brought down a heavy curtain of artillery and mortar fire to prevent the British from developing their attack on Hill 112, and at the same time sent forward the armoured battalion of 22 SS PGR and the 10th SS Recce Battalion with the Tigers of the 502 Battalion to counter-attack at Maltot.



During the whole day the Tigers were active around Hill 112 and Maltot. Their position just to the south of the 112 ridge enabled them to enfilade the attacks on Maltot, as well as any positions taken up by British troops south of the ridge in the area of the Chateau de Fontaine. And their presence in and around Maltot made that village an extremely difficult nut to crack.



Personal recollections of 10 July

This day was the worst day for the 9th in the whole campaign, and we incurred more than a quarter of all the casualties we sustained in NW Europe on that one day. And the severity, at 34% killed, was well above the normal ratio of killed to total casualties. How did the day seem to the individual? Not good, as the following accounts testify.

Battalion HQ: Capt. AEW (John) Hodges, Adjutant:

"Attack on Maltot area and pt 112. In the morning B Squadron attacked Chateau de Fontaine from just south of Verson. Attack was successful and was exploited to the high ground 500 yards beyond. C Squadron then attacked Eterville and all went well. About 1100 hours A Squadron formed up with 7th Hampshires to pass through these positions and capture Maltot. The tanks reached the orchards surrounding the village and the Infantry entered. At this stage everything seemed to go wrong. The tanks were caught in a murderous cross fire from beyond the river on their right and from woods and the reverse slope of 112, the latter being the objective of 7 RTR who failed to take it. Very heavy mortar fire came down and the inevitable counter attack with tanks came in. The Hampshires were reduced to company strength and at this stage only four tanks out of eighteen were left to fight. These joined up with B Squadron who succeeded in holding the general line chateau and Eterville. About 6pm C Squadron attacked Maltot with a fresh set of Infantry – as before the outskirts of the village were reached – but no further progress could be made.

This was a disastrous day for A Squadron. Young George Hendrie was killed early on. An 88mm shell struck the commander flap and decapitated him. The crew managed to bring the tank back to the start line and he was buried by the Padre together with an Infantry soldier under an elm tree near Verson at 965646. He was a very popular young officer and his death was a great shock to us all. Major Ballantine also died of wounds on this day. I heard his last message over the wireless saying, quite cheerfully, that his tank had been hit three times and that he was trying to get through the hedge into the orchard".

The story of Duggie Ballantine's death, as recounted by John, was given in the Overture to this history.



A Squadron

The 9th's total casualties on 10 July were 65; of these 41 were in A, 14 in B, 8 in C, and 2 in HQ. And of the 41 casualties in A, 16 were killed. Among those killed were the Squadron leader Duggie Ballantine, Troop Leader of 1 Troop, George Hendrie, and Troop Sergeant of 2 Troop, Jock Smith. Among the wounded were Capt. Ronnie Kirby, Lieut. Shep Douglas, Squadron Sergeant-Major Monty Bradley, and Sergeants Frank Quinn, Gray, and Nobbie Norman. It was a grievous blow. Ray Gordon's account of the deaths of Jock Smith, Bill Morris, Dickie Knight, and Jack Hutchinson, and his own wounding was also given in the Overture to this history.

Jim Hutton was George Hendrie's driver in 1 Troop.

"Anyway, getting away from there we moved on then to Maltot and I remember Sergeant Norman and his crew coming up on the A set and he called out that he was in trouble, that the Germans had surrounded him and he came on the air and said "What shall I do. I am surrounded by Germans", and somebody - some bright spark over the air called out "Stick your bloody hands up!" (chuckle). Anyway he was taken prisoner there and if you look in a book called "Hill 112" you will see that Sergeant Norman and his crew were taken prisoner by the German SS and there's quite a good picture of them being interrogated. The other thing was a bit hair raising; somebody came up on the air and called out, "To my left there are 50 Sherman tanks approaching, to my left." "Say again, over". "50 Sherman tanks". "Did you say Sherman or German?" (chuckle) and he said "Sherman". "Oh", he said "thank goodness for that".

The second part of Jim's recollections of that day are not nearly so cheerful:

"Now at Hill 112 I never forget on the Sunday Lieutenant Hendrie had his birthday. He was 21 on the Sunday and we all got drunk on Calvados had a good knees up and a good singsong and all that. Anyhow, Monday morning first light, we were briefed to go into Maltot towards our objective which was between C Squadron and B Squadron, A Squadron was to come through the middle and take a feature but we got hit so badly, I think out of 18 tanks there wasn't many, I think only 5 of us managed to make it. But we got hit on the turret and it hit dead centre of the turret ring and the main armament couldn't traverse and water in the canteen splashed all over the place because that's the side it came in. I felt this cold water over the back of my neck and I couldn't make out what it was but then the tank commander Lieutenant Hendrie called out "We'll carry on with the front machine gun" cause the main armament couldn't be traversed.

So we carried on firing the front machine gun and the next shot hit the cupola and took Lieutenant Hendrie's head - decapitated him and his body fell down into the turret. I felt warm liquid on the back of my neck, which I knew was blood and on turning around I spotted his body with no head and I didn't know whether the rest of the crew were alive or dead in the back. By this time I decided to swing left and swing right cause I knew they had got a beeline on us and they were out to destroy us so I swung hard left and then stopped; swung hard right and moved forward, swung left, right and done a complete swing around. We had a hit on the side, on the right-hand pannier door, my side, and it hit there and ricocheted off scooping about half the metal out and we swung around and we had another hit on the back which was on the louvres, on the metal chocolate bar on the louvre, nearly penetrated the petrol tanks but it managed to bounce off. Finally I did a complete turn, which I thought was a complete turn and we had one hit the back which hit the top of the gear box and ripped the top of the selectors off, the cover for the selectors. We managed to keep going and we drove for about a mile, a mile and a half and we stopped and we hadn't a clue where we were and Busty Cliff, that was my co-driver - Corporal Cliff - he said "Which way do we go now?"

So I looked at a compass, I said "Well if we go that way we are going north towards England so that's the way we want to go" and just as we were about to move we saw a column of tanks coming along a hedge with the rally flags flying and the guns traversed rear which was C Squadron was returning from an action, the same action and we managed to join in with them. We saw the OC and he said tag on the back and we'll take you back to your squadron. When we returned to the forward echelon Sergeant Major Bradley and a padre came over and asked us if we had any casualties and we said Yes, I think there's three in the turret; but on looking they found there was only one, Lieutenant Hendrie was dead and the other two were more or less dumbfounded, more or less just struck dumb and they managed to come out and we were all OK eventually. Sergeant Major Bradley said Get yourselves some tea and get some sleep and try and get over it which we did and that was quite an experience there. We found out that the squadron had taken a hell of a bashing. And I never forget Sergeant Major Bradley, he was a marvellous man. They got the webbing slings in the turret and managed to take Lieutenant Hendrie's body out and they buried him. That was quite an experience".

SSM Monty Bradley was remembered as a marvellous man by many people including Jim. Harry Hurt of 5 Troop recalls: "Nobby Clark of 5 Troop told me that Monty was wounded at Fontaine-Etoupefour on 10 July. Some wounded tank crew, of whom Nobby was one, were waiting at the FUP to be evacuated. A stonk came down, Monty threw himself on top of a tank crew member to protect him from further wounding, and was himself wounded as a result".



Bob Taylor was gunner to Cpl Fred Armstrong, Troop Corporal of 5 Troop commanded by Lieut. Gerry Wells. His tank started from the orchards around the Chateau de Fontaine.



"We left the orchard and proceeded across fields looking for enemy positions when we saw our Troop Sergeant Tony Griffith and his crew taking shelter at the rear of their tank, which had been knocked out by enemy fire. He signalled to us to give us some idea where the enemy were firing from. Vic Mills, our operator and loader shouted "Traverse Left". As I did I saw a flash from I presume a German 88mm and I fired at the flash. But we had been hit in the turret where the 2 inch smoke rounds were stored and in the next instant we were on fire, flames were coming up from the turret floor and I shouted to the crew to bail out.



The driver and co-driver got out OK, and Cpl Fred Armstrong, the Tank Commander got out suffering with burns to his face and hands. I proceeded to bail out, but my pistol lanyard got caught on the arm rest of the six pounder gun and in the process of getting my lanyard free the flames burnt my hands and face. Eventually I got out of the tank and joined the rest of the crew at the rear of the tank, as we were being machine gunned by the enemy. It was then I was told that Vic Mills, our operator, had been killed as the 88 shot had entered his side of the turret. The tank was well alight by now and there was nothing we could do as the ammo started to explode.



We waited for a while then we started to make our way back to the orchard, which meant that we had to cross a field of tall wheat or corn. We had to keep bobbing up and down to find our direction to the orchard, and to keep out of sight from the German infantry, as they were in the same field.



As we got near the road we came upon a wounded German soldier sitting against the hedge. When he saw us he lifted his rifle and pointed it as us so we pointed our pistols at him and he slung his rifle to one side and raised his hands in surrender.



But we were more concerned with getting treatment for our burns. We got back to the orchard and were given first aid, then Fred Armstrong and myself were taken to Bayeux and shipped to England for hospital treatment".

B Squadron

B Squadron moved off at 0500 hrs. Their first objective was Les Dauns and the final one the ridge just beyond the Chateau de Fontaine. John Powell was the wireless-op in the troop sergeant's tank of 7 Troop; his account starts after the end of the Epsom battles:

"The lull in operations lasted just a few days until we were told to prepare for the next action. Details are hazy but I remember moving up to the start line ready to support the Hampshires and Dorsets in their advance on Chateau de Fontaine and Maltot. As always we moved off at first light and fairly rapidly achieved our first objective, whatever that may have been.

All seemed quiet and we were awaiting our next move, feeling confident and probably slightly complacent at our initial success when the tank was hit in the engine compartment. The impact was unmistakable but not as horrifying or noisy as had previously been imagined. During the second or two that we were adjusting to this situation another round penetrated the left side of the turret, presumably igniting the ammo as the tank started to 'brew-up" immediately. An intercom. and visual check quickly revealed that tragically our greatly liked and respected young gunner, L/Cpl Johnny Foden, had taken the full force of the projectile and was beyond help. He must have perished mercifully quickly. The tank was now burning furiously and the rest of us needed to abandon ship smartly. Machine-gun rounds were striking the side of the turret so we waited for a lull, hoping that the machine-gunner would need to change belts. The remaining four of us jumped out. Our troop-leader's tank was nearby and, being pointed in the right direction towards our own lines, we started to trudge back. Tankies without their vehicles are a bit like shell-less tortoises on the battlefield and we felt strangely vulnerable.

The noise of battle sounded increasingly distant as we crossed the open Normandy fields. On our way we came across a young German infantryman, SS as I remember, who had a leg wound. On being offered a cigarette he showed what he thought of it all by spitting at us! A stretcher was found from somewhere by someone and we took turns at carrying the unhappy young man back with us.

Like I said, we were unused to being on a battlefield without inches of armour plate around us. Some mortar rounds or shells started whistling around and we dropped. Too late. When I returned to consciousness the others were getting up but I couldn't move. I tried to shout but only a whisper came out. The others noticed my plight and our sergeant examined me, turned me over and put a field dressing on my back. I couldn't feel my legs but was assured that they were still there. Someone went to get help while I was given a cigarette to keep me occupied. My very brief war was certainly over". John records what happened after that: "Flown back in a very bumpy Dakota for further attention to my spinal injuries, I spent months and months in hospital recovering some use of my legs. Eventually I was invalided out".



Peter Beale was commanding 8 Troop with Taffy Jones as his troop sergeant and Johnnie Walker as his troop corporal. They reached the objective beyond the Chateau de Fontaine without any difficulty, and waited there while C Squadron successfully attacked Eterville. When A Squadron began to experience difficulties in Maltot B Squadron moved a little further south over the ridge, with 8 Troop on the right flank. At this stage no one realized that 7 RTR's attack on Hill 112 had been repulsed by the Tigers of 502 SS Battalion, and that these same Tigers were prowling round up there looking for new targets.

Ronnie Larner was Taffy Jones' driver. What's going on, Sarge, asked Ronnie. Nothing at all, Ronnie, says Taff, we're safe as houses here. Five minutes later, Peter was standing in his tank.

"I was looking ahead through my binoculars in the direction of Maltot, trying to see what was happening down there. Suddenly I caught a flicker of movement to my right. Good God! Both Taffy's and Johnnie's tanks are on fire. Shot must be coming from the right, Hill 112. Haven't the 7th got that? Whatever, John, hard right, face up the ridge, Norman, smoke; message to Bob, two have gone, putting down smoke, backing off ridge; Reg, take the tank back off the ridge, I'll go and see if I can help the others.

So I got out of the turret and down on to the ground and walked towards the blazing tanks. The Tigers on the reverse slope of 112 were still firing in our direction, and their shots were low enough that I could see them snickering through the corn. Going as they were at slightly over 800 metres per second, they looked most unhealthy.

The only person I could find was Roy Barber, who had suffered burns. I helped him back towards the Chateau and the RAP. As we were level with the Chateau we heard an incoming Moaning Minnie stonk. In the ditch, I said. And from the ditch I saw a mortar land 60 metres away, then another 30 metres away, the two making a straight line aiming directly at us. Not good odds, I thought. But the next two were some way behind us, and before too long Roy had got back to good hands at the RAP".



C Squadron

C Squadron had two major actions during the day, as the War Diary has related. Trevor Greenwood was the troop sergeant of 15 Troop, which was commanded by Seymour Francis. As they were moving off on the night of 9 July Seymour's tank suffered a broken bell crank in the gear box. Seymour changed to Trevor's tank. There was no spare in the fitter's truck, so the Battalion Technical Officer (BTO) had to return to base to get one. Trevor's narrative starts very early on the morning of 10 July.

"Probably one of the worst days I will ever know...B.T.O returned about 1.00am...having had to return to St. Gabriel for new part. Something of a feat to make return journey in darkness...no lights, no roads etc. Job finished about 2.30a.m......and we moved off to find the squadron: only a hazy idea of their location, but we found them eventually...about 3.30a.m. Just in time to form up for march to Verson and FUP. It was a horrible journey. Cold - hunger - fear: terrible fear....these were only a part of the nightmare. I suppose the journey was about 3 miles, but it seemed longer. The territory was only newly occupied...and there were the usual obvious signs...visible even in the dark. Dead cattle...almost always lying with legs pointing upwards...usually one or more legs blown off by blast or shrapnel; a horrible sight.

Vehicles, both ours and German, dumped in ditches along roadside; villages...completely ruined and desolate; silent but for our noise. Sentries and guards standing at road junctions etc...very much on the alert...waiting...listening...peering...snipers everywhere.

Our FUP was just south of Verson – from where we were scheduled to launch an attack on Eterville with 4th Dorsets: zero hour for us was 6.15am. As we neared Verson, the noise became worse...terrifying. An enormous barrage was being laid down close by for "B"...who were going further west at 5.00am.

At Verson, ruins as usual and we did more damage to walls and houses...unavoidable in the narrow lanes and darkness. Enemy only just cleared out of the place.

We were in Verson about 5.30am: our FUP a field immediately south of village, just below hill crest. We were now able to see fairly well, but it was not fully daylight. As we manoeuvred into position, I noticed a tremendous barrage falling on our left flank...about a quarter mile away. This was a grand sight: it was the smoke screen promised: without it, our left flank would have been completely exposed. Right flank was OK....B had already gone in there.

But the barrage was not the only activity. Jerry was sending over tons of mortar. It was falling around us, literally plastering the corn field. There was so much machine-gun fire...both coming and going:...Jerry machine-guns were still only a few yards ahead of us. Kept my head down as much as possible!

At 6.00am, our infantry were in position, to our rear: the mortar fire must have been terrible for them, but they seemed unconcerned. I cannot describe my own reactions about this time. I am always too much afraid for cohesive thought just prior to action:....mentally paralysed with fear, I suppose. But my physical behaviour was quite normal. Up to now, I haven't even experienced any trembling! Queer, that!

At 6.15, the major's order came over the air "advance". We commenced to move up the gentle slope...into what? Eterville lay half a mile beyond the crest, in a shallow valley.

The air was very busy: B had been fighting for an hour on our right, and seemed to have reached their objective: that was some consolation. And on the left flank, we had our white wall of smoke: I felt very secure from that quarter...and I knew that this smoke would continue for four hours: I felt very grateful for the artillery. By now, I had become quite normal: deadly calm and unworried: it is not natural. Every fibre of my being was concentrated upon the one think...enemy gun flashes:...miss them, and...there may not be a second chance. Most of my observation was done thro' the periscopes: too much machine-gunning over the top. Closed down occasionally when mortar became too concentrated around us.

We reached the crest...and there were the enemy running for cover...towards Eterville and the trees ahead. Our besa opened up...every bush and shrub: every tree: every haystack: anything and everything that could hide a body....was raked with machine gun fire.

Our infantry were now amongst and ahead of us...and soon, prisoners started to come in: odd couples of Jerrys popping up from the corn, hands raised...scared to death.

At least three haystacks were now on fire from our incendiary machine gun fire. The smoke from them was a bit of a nuisance, blowing across our front. Ahead, lay the trees immediately in front of Eterville: they were my worry. Jerry has a habit of concealing Tigers and Panthers in the woods. They usually open fire when we are too close to take evasive action...and one hit from an 88 at 400 yards....!

Very soon, we opened up with H.E. on the village...there were as yet no signs of any 88's. The infantry kept steadily on.....walking warily through the deep corn, but always going forward...forward. Our Besa fire passed over them, but it must have been uncomfortably close. Grand fellows those infantry lads: so brave and calm.

I felt terribly grateful towards them when I saw them amongst the trees: they would report any hidden A.T. guns and tanks. My vehicle was behaving well...and putting down smoke fire: crew worked splendidly: damned hard work too. And how we smoked cigarettes! Pedder solved the match problem by getting his lighter to work with gun buffer oil! And in the midst of an action! Mortars were still troublesome: as good as any air force to Jerry!

Time has no meaning during action: some time during the fight, Very lights were seen from the village, and we knew the infantry were "in": they had done a grand job and occupied the place with remarkable speed. We just remained on the high ground...keeping on the alert from any armour...and a possible counter-attack.

Meanwhile, the smoke was still literally pouring down on the left: B had done their job on the right, and now our front seemed reasonably safe: The tension was less acute...but always there was the mortar and snipers and the necessary vigil for lurking Tigers and Panthers.

Later, when the village had quietened down, we withdrew to original start point...and replenished our depleted ammo racks...the SSM was there waiting for us.

Mortar was now quite regular and all around us: we hadn't lost one in the action! Thank goodness it was over: we seemed to have been fighting for many hours...but it was only 10.00am.

And now we had time for a brew and a few biscuits and a little rest, in spite of continual mortaring. We were very exposed, in the middle of a large cornfield, but we couldn't withdraw further in case we were needed to repel a counter-attack. The hours passed...maybe two or three...and we were all hoping for the order to withdraw. My crew, in particular were dreadfully tired, having had no sleep the previous night owing to the breakdown. And the awful tension of the action had had its effect. And then...the colonel's voice over the air to the major: another "party" was being arranged for us: stand by for further action!! God! What dreadful depression!

Shortly, we learned about the "party".

A had passed through C and B to carry out a further attack to the south on Maltot...and things weren't going so well. It appeared that A had been hammered pretty badly. We were scheduled to launch a further attack on Maltot with fresh infantry. And we had been complimenting ourselves upon our neat little action in taking Eterville so quickly and without loss to ourselves. But now!?

Once again that terrible fear...Well....we went in...via scenes of recent action...dreadful scenes. As with Eterville, we plastered the woods around Maltot with machine gun fire and plenty of H.E. My gunner asked permission to have a go at the church spire, just visible above the hill crest: he was given permission, and got two lovely hits with H.E. – The steeple toppled. It might have harboured an enemy observer.

Once again, we were assisted by the artillery laying a grand smoke screen on our left flank. The infantry seemed to have little difficulty in entering the woods...and so down to the village. We did not follow: remaining on the high ground on the alert for enemy armour. We knew there were at least three Panthers in the village...or in the vicinity.

Occasional burst of machine-gun fire from enemy dug outs, and a few snipers, but we dealt with them. We must have passed an hour or two on that crest...and then came the major's voice over the air appealing to the Colonel for further assistance in the village for the infantry. Things seemed to happen rapidly: 3 S.P's were promised...but it seemed a poor response.

And then I noticed one of our tanks on fire. What on earth was happening? There were no signs of enemy on the hill, and our infantry were in the woods and village. It seemed like a counter-attack in force, judging by Major Holden's further appeal. He had somehow contacted the infantry commander.

Suddenly I heard some heavy gunfire...and the swish of shells. Hells Bells! My tank was being fired at. Two misses! Darned if I could see any gun flashes or tanks. I peered frantically through the periscope...there seemed to be at least one more tank in difficulties and several smaller vehicles on fire.

And then the major's voice...he wanted help...smoke. He got smoke...all of us poured it out as fast as we could. In a matter of seconds, our former peaceful hill crest was pretty well littered with burning vehicles, – and smoke...a dense fog. I noticed one or two nearby vehicles moving away, but where to? Soon I couldn't see a thing but smoke, but gave the driver orders to advance: better to go anywhere than stay and be shot up. Eventually found my way back to lower ground away from the danger zone...but I was still hazy about the situation. All the same, I felt convinced that something pretty bad had happened.

Very soon, infantry appeared running towards us...and away from Maltot. Were we withdrawing? Some sort of retreat seemed apparent. We were too far ahead to re-group and deploy for further action, so we withdrew to our laager north of Eterville...the latter being now well consolidated by the infantry.

And there we waited...being fiercely mortared meanwhile. Ultimately, and without warning, we turned about and withdrew...accompanied by terrific mortar fire: it seemed certain that we were under observation, so accurate was the mortaring.

Through Verson...and fields and orchards and lanes to a point about 2 miles north-west of Verson. A rather hectic journey and rather bewildering. Arrived after dark – in a field – our final halt for the day.

My crew had been in the tank almost continuously for about 28 hours! And no meal in the period: but we had biscuits, and one "brew up". Heard alarming rumours about casualties etc. but things were too obscure to worry about. Bed was imperative. Rolled myself in a couple of blankets, and slept beneath the tank".


Ronnie Holden commanded C Squadron throughout the whole day with one break, which he describes:

"In the afternoon C Squadron were alerted to attack Maltot in support of 4 Dorsets. As far as I could see there were two options:

to obey orders and support the infantry into Maltot

to attack the enemy tanks which dominated Maltot

I chose the second option and set out from higher ground to the new sight that we had of the Tigers. Here I got a direct hit in Incredible's engine which promptly caught fire: CO2 bottle to the rescue, fire out, but only half an engine. Coinciding with this set-back I received a message by scout car ordering me to report personally to the Commander of 43 Div (Major-General Ivor Thomas) at once. So into the scout car, but not before giving orders to pin the Tigers from hull down positions about 150 yards back from even higher ground. The ride to Div HQ was quite a way and my meeting with General Thomas was further delayed by the arrival of the Corps Commander.

After my meeting with the generals I had to report back to our Colonel, Paddy Everard, and so took no further part in the action at Maltot which ended with disastrous consequences. Two lessons are to be learned from this:

never reinforce failure

never take a squadron leader away from his squadron during a battle he has been given to fight".

4.2 >After Jupiter: 11-25 July 1944

The broad picture



The 43rd Wessex Division remained on Hill 112 and the ridge with furious counter-attacks from Germans and British alternately. The Churchills of 31 Tank Brigade were in place further north of the ridge to repel German advances over the ridge.

Montgomery continued to hammer at different parts of the German front, and the next major effort was towards the ridge to the west of 112. The 15th Scottish plus a brigade of Royal Welsh Fusiliers (53 Div) with 34 Tank Brigade in support executed Operation Greenline. This had as its objectives the villages of Esquay, Evrecy, Gavrus and Bougy. The latter two were taken, the former two not; but the Germans were kept busy and engaged from 15 to 18 July. During this time preparations were being made for Operation Goodwood, a thrust to the south on the eastern side of Caen. This was made by all three armoured divisions at that time in Normandy, 7th, 11th, and Guards; it started on 18 July.



The attack was preceded by a massive air bombardment. But the Germans had very effective anti-tank forces in depth, and the British tanks ground to a blazing halt on 20 July.



On that day, far away to the east, a bomb exploded at 1242 hrs. Adolf Hitler did not die, but the repercussions of the explosion caused uncertainties and hesitations to run down the chain of the German higher command. In a short time this showed benefits to the allied forces, but not to the Canadians who assaulted the Verrieres ridge in Operation Spring on 25 July. Sixty men of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry reached the summit, 15 came back, and 342 lay dead or wounded on the ridge's forward slopes. It was much the same for the other Canadian units.



But on this same day the allied strategy triumphed. Goodwood might have been a tactical failure, but strategically it succeeded. The Germans, expecting a further assault, brought in fresh troops from east of the Seine and shifted a Panzer division east from the Caumont sector. There were now seven panzer and seven infantry divisions facing fourteen British divisions, while twenty-one American divisions faced two panzer, one panzer grenadier, and six infantry divisions. Operation Cobra was launched at Saint-Lô on 25 July. During the period 11-25 July 9 RTR as part of 31 Tank Brigade remained in a counter-attack role, mainly just north of the Hill 112 – Chateau de Fontaine ridge.

The War Diary

July 11/12

Battalion remained in the same location north-east of Mouen, obtaining reinforcements and replacements which included ten Mark VII Churchills, at the same time standing by to assist 7 RTR who were still in the area Hill 112 in a counter-attack role. Major P.N. (Berry) Veale, M.C., was promoted and transferred to be CO of 7 RTR, who had lost both their CO and 2 i/c on 10 July.



July 13 to 16

Battalion moved to Les Saullets just north of Cheux to rest, and on the night of July 16 moved to relieve 7 RTR in counter-attack role at Chateau de Fontaine and Hill 112. 129 Brigade (43 Div) were the infantry in that area. Battalion moved into position in the area of Gournay at last light, and all crews began digging deep holes in which to sleep.

Just after 2300 hours, following mortar and shell fire, the harbour area was machine-gunned and bombed by six Junkers 88's. The CO, Lt-Col Paddy Everard, was wounded in the head and back, Trooper Stan Agar was killed, and Troopers Bell, Edmunds, Sharpe and Wright were wounded, as well as L/Cpl Cunningham and Cpl Cove. Major Bob Warren took over command.

Shelling and mortaring continued throughout the night.



July 17

At first light HQ, B and C Squadrons moved out to an area about one mile due north of Hill 112, squadrons deployed with two troops up. Mortaring continued throughout the day, and in retaliation a shoot was carried out by all 75 and 95mm guns, resulting in the silencing of a machine-gun that had been worrying the infantry.

An SP was forced to disclose its position and infantry reported a Panther set on fire, but no confirmation was available. At 1930 hrs a further shoot was made on the centre of St. Martin which drew heavy retaliation from enemy mortars resulting in three minor casualties.



Jul 18/19

Very similar to July 17 – intervals of mortar and shell fire. Recces and plans were made for counter-attack roles. Shoot carried out on a wood on Hill 112 reported to harbour three Tigers. Lt-Col P.N. Veale was transferred back from 7 RTR and assumed command of the Battalion.



July 21

At 1430 hrs an enemy counter-attack threatened and B Squadron moved up to the crest to give moral support to the infantry. Heavy mortaring resulted in Major Bob Warren being wounded in the right hand and side, his wireless -operator Sgt. Mick Tito having his right hand blown off, and Cpl Reg Southern and Bert Wilcox also being wounded.

No counter-attack developed, but a party towed away a number of dead cows whose stench did more to lower morale than persistent mortaring and shelling.

7 RTR were brought up into the area to attack Maltot corresponding with a Canadian attack on Etavaux. Following the attack and corresponding with a Canadian attack on St. Andre sur Orne 9 RTR were ordered to be prepared to attack Feuguerolles sur Orne and St. Martin.



July 22

1815 hrs. Support given to 7 RTR attack on Maltot with 75 and 95mm fire aimed at nebelwerfers in area 70 ring contour just north of St. Martin. First shoot drew heavy mortaring but there was no reply to the second shoot. During this time Major Holden got mixed up with his slidex and reported "dead". Persisting in this report, he was advised to call skeleton O groups.

[Note: Slidex was a system for coding map references and other information to keep them secure from the enemy].

July 23/25

The intensity of mortaring and shelling decreased and a further shoot was carried out on an 88 located on Hill 112, but no further orders were received concerning attack on Feuguerolles and St. Martin. On 25 July, after watching rocket-firing Typhoons brassing up enemy position south of Caen, the Battalion received orders to move to Fontenay Le Pesnil.

After nine days of air attack at night and shelling and mortaring at all times during the day and night, no one was sorry to leave.

The attack on Feuguerolles and St. Martin which was to have been done down a valley dominated on both sides by enemy positions had not promised to be the best of adventures either.



Personal recollections 11-25 July

The War Diary records the continuous bombardment of the area just north and east of Hill 112. This was a constant theme in all the accounts of these few days. John Hodges:

"16 July:

We moved up at dusk to take over a counter-attack role from 7 RTR at Gournay just north of pt 112. Here we remained until 26th July, losing each day three or four men from mortar fire. During the whole of this period the place was mortared and shelled all day long and we lived in holes beneath the tanks. At night there was always a visit from German bombers and heavy shelling, so one way or another there was little sleep. On the first night we had hardly stopped the engines before the bombers were over dropping flares and bombs. One landed between the CO's tank and mine. He was underneath his with two of the crew. One was killed and the CO badly spattered with shrapnel and was evacuated. Geoff Brewer, who was standing on top of the CO's tank, was blown off but suffered little more than a severe shaking!

Altogether it was a most unpleasant night and our casualties were four killed and a score injured. I joined forces with Bob Warren who took over command. On the 19th July Berry Veale came back to us as CO from 7 RTR.

B Squadron had to go forward as a counter-attack was reported. A mortar bomb fell on Bob Warren's operator's flaps making a pretty good mess of Sergeant Tito. Bob wasn't too bad but will probably lose a couple of fingers. Mike Reynell took over B Squadron".



During the shoots carried out by the Battalion between 22 and 24 July the Recce Officers of the Squadrons acted as forward observation officers. Taffy Leyshon explains how it was with C Squadron:

"Hill 112 all the tanks were lined up as if ready for attack, no camouflage, shelling and mortaring morning, noon and night. C Squadron HQ Troop had Major Holden's and Capt Link's 95mm howitzers. Capt Kidd who was my officer had a scout car and a tank. Once I drove the scout car with Trooper Patchett towards the German lines and hid behind a knocked out tank. Capt Kidd then crawled out with field glasses and intercom and sent messages to Patchett; Major Holden's tank would fire a shot, two adjustments then Capt Kidd crawled back. Get out quick he said.

We used the gun next day to support an infantry patrol. A spandau machine gun opened up on them, Major Holden was in communication with the officer, and three shots put the spandau out".



Jock Cordiner was upset and embarrassed by mortars:

"Mortar bombs gave me the creeps. On Hill 112 I had gone some 200 yards to the loo, that delightful hole in the middle of nowhere topped with a wooden seat and surrounded by a canvas screen. No sooner was I comfortable than a moaning minnie attack started. I dashed for cover, my pants around my legs and my shirt tail flapping in the breeze, jeered and cheered by half the squadron. Just before that, while still with HQ, Brad and I had dug holes and were asleep behind the lines. It was raining hard and our holes were sodden, but safe. We were awakened by the Duty Officer and ordered to drive to Hill 112 with something very urgent. We were groping our way along the black lanes when a severe air attack started. We both dived out of the Humber into a ditch on top of a few startled infantrymen. When the raid moved on we did also. As we came uphill towards the tanks a bomb or shell caught an ammunition dump just off the road and almost simultaneously another hit a fuel dump on the other side of the road. We were silhouetted, roasted, and in severe danger of being blown apart. I never knew a Humber could be driven so fast".



In the confusion of this sort of action, and because of casualties and transfers, it happened sometimes that people were left very much to their own devices. Almost invariably they did their very best to get back to where they could be useful. Jack Woods:

"My next taste of action was during the Maltot battle. After a lengthy journey seemingly all over the bridgehead the echelon decided to laager in a field strewn with enemy slit trenches, guess what? surprise, surprise, we were heavily stonked, suffering casualties including some fatalities so off we went again on another joy-ride finally catching up with the tanks where they had laagered for the night and servicing them in the dark. The next day, I was off again, this time to Brigade Workshops with a tank requiring an engine change and where I was instructed to stay with it until it was repaired. Needless to say nobody else had heard of that order and once the A.R.V. had dumped me in a field near the workshops, I was forgotten about for a day or two, eating and sleeping with the fitters and nobody the least bit concerned about who I was and what I was doing there and where for all anybody cared I could have nicely sat out the rest of the war. I soon got cheesed off with that however, there was nowhere to go as everything was mined so I reported in for further orders much to the surprise of the R.E.M.E. bods who quickly shipped me off to the Forward Delivery Squadron".



Sitting on the reverse slope of Hill 112 was not a totally painful recollection for everyone. John Stone remembered two items connected with food:

"At one place round there we were in a potato field. All we had to do to get fresh spuds was to do a neutral turn in the field, and hey presto, a bucketful. Somehow we seemed to have plenty of time to experiment with food. The compo packs (a box containing tinned and similar food for fifteen men for one day) were really quite good. There was a problem with the tea, however. A tin contained pre-mixed powdered tea, powdered milk and powdered sugar. The question was, how to brew it? The tea needed infusing and the milk simmering, and a proper compromise seemed unattainable. We tried all sorts of ways, but our favourite was to brew it for 30 minutes, and then add three spoonfuls of sugar per cup. The original Sergeant-Major's tea!"

Trevor Greenwood describes some of the food his crew obtained, and then the problem of disposing of the end product.

"Boiled chicken for lunch: didn't have any myself. Have no stomach for local poultry or livestock. Everything seems diseased and lifeless, but this must be my imagination. My four colleagues really enjoyed the chicken....with boiled potatoes, grown locally. Most of the crews now seem to have a dead chicken hanging on their tanks. There are many more running wild in nearby village, also many tame rabbits. Know of at least one crew, in B, who have shot a young calf...and had veal!

Believe we are moving "in" again this evening: to relieve 7th who are standing by on Hill 112. Troop officers out on reccy this morning. Have done a reccy myself, with Bill Geary. Neither of us are partial to "rears" in full view of everyone. And our present lav. is about the worst we have had so far. We explored the ruined village...but too many troops about. Went as far as a wood half a mile away...but everywhere there are troops, hoards of them. Eventually, we had to swallow our pride...and perform very publicly. I was amused by the easy going manner in which my crew solved the urinary problem on Monday during the action. We were several hours at a stretch inside the vehicle...and even back in the forward rally, it was really dangerous to leave the vehicle owing to mortar and snipers. The problem was solved by using a small empty oil tin...this being passed up to me for emptying through the hatch, at intervals.

At one of those forward rallys, I had a more urgent need, and simply had to leave the tank. I crawled beneath the rear with a spade and dug a hole...I felt fairly safe from mortar...but just as I was hitching up my pants, there came the ominous "whining", followed by crashes dangerously near. I simply dived head first further beneath the tank...and stayed there, literally with my pants down!"

CHAPTER 5: BREAK OUT

5.1 Break-out from the bridgehead

The broad picture



On 25 July the Americans launched Operation Cobra at Saint Lô. The attack was preceded by a bombardment of the German positions by 3000 aircraft, and was itself on a six-thousand-yard front with an assault force of three infantry, one motorized, and two armoured divisions.



The first day's advance was slow, but by nightfall US VII Corps Commander, General "Lightning Joe" Collins, guessed that his corps was practically through the German defences. Early next morning he launched his exploiting force, and here began a campaign of rapid movement. By 30 July VII Corps had reached Avranches, nearly 40 miles from Saint Lô, and through this gap poured General George Patton's 3rd US Army, fanning out west, south, and east. By 6 Aug Patton was approaching Le Mans.



To attempt to stem this flood the Germans transferred forces from the eastern or British sector of the bridgehead, and to keep the pressure on the Germans Montgomery attacked south from the area of Caumont in the direction of Vire on 30 July. Another prong of this attack by the 43rd Wessex was directed south east, and on 6 Aug the commanding height of Mont Pinçon was taken. Further to the east again the 59th British Infantry (Staffordshire) Division was directed to establish a bridgehead across the River Orne in the area of Goupillieres, north of Thury-Harcourt. This they did on the evening of 6 Aug.



The War Diary

26 Jul:

After a night march the Battalion concentrated at Fontenay le Pesnil and here came under command 59 Div. The Battalion had the task of supporting 176 Infantry Brigade in counter-attack roles on four positions: Haut de Bosq, Rauray, Point 126 and Brettevillette.

The country in this area had been heavily mined by the enemy and, consisting of small fields bounded by thick hedgerows and ditches, was undoubtedly the most difficult tank country that the Battalion had yet encountered. The field of vision was generally less than 100 yards and in any deployed movement there could not be any visual contact between troops. Large tree stumps, torn and gashed by shell-fire, together with the deep ditches provided natural tank obstacles.

It was essential that each area was very carefully reconnoitred so that should an emergency arise each tank commander would know beforehand the exact line of advance of each tank. These areas were under constant shell and mortar fire, which added to the difficulties, and at 1800 hrs B Squadron suffered a most unfortunate disaster.

The troop leaders of this squadron went forward for a rendezvous with Major Reynell, who was then making his plan just north of Brettevillette. Dismounting from the half-track an S-mine was exploded, resulting in the deaths of Lieut Smart, Lieut Wolskel, and Sgt Nicholls. Lieut Beale and Lieut Cargill were wounded and the latter died in hospital a few days later.

31 July

The reconnaissance and forming of plans for these counter-attack roles lasted four days and on 31 July a demonstration was given by two troops of C Squadron with a company of 7 Norfolks of the method that had been adopted in clearing this type of country.

Since 29 July 197 Brigade (59 Div) had been patrolling in strength, sometimes assisted by tanks of 7 RTR. The general impression gained from prisoners of war was that the enemy were withdrawing under the pressure of concentrated artillery fire, together with lack of food, sleep and at times ammunition.

1 Aug

1700 hrs: orders were received that 59 Div with 31 Tank Brigade in support would capture point 213, 1 mile north east of Villers Bocage on the road to Caen.

The main plan was in two phases:

Phase 1: 197 Brigade with two squadrons of 7 RTR in support and two troops of C Squadron 22 Dragoons under command to feel forward and contact the enemy

Phase 2: On contact, attack to be made with two brigades up

Right: 176 Brigade with 9 RTR in support

Left: 177 Brigade with one squadron 7 RTR in support 26 squadron ARE, 2 troops 22 Dragoons and 304 Anti-Tank SPRA under command.

9 RTR plan was as follows:

To attack with two squadrons up supporting two battalions.

Right: C Squadron in support of 7 Norfolks with flail and AVRE support

Left: A Squadron in support of 7 S. Staffs with flail and AVRE support

B Squadron with 6 N. Staffs to give right flank protection while one squadron 7 RTR secured the left flank by attacking area point 142.

2/3 Aug

197 Brigade continued to patrol forward, meeting little oppositi


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## Praga (Jan 3, 2009)

Guys guys...why are you doing this? Why do you anatomize this so much? No offense, but you all act like you were in WW2. And Im sure you weren´t. I have nothing against discussions like this, but this is too much. And what more, useless. I know it is hard to find authentic source which says truth but something you say here is only wild theories. I hope you catch the point of my reply. (By the way, 17 pd gun with APDS-SV shell have better penetration than KwK43 - if we talk clearly only about penetration. I havent energy to reply at all of your opinions, sorry)


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## Marcel (Jan 3, 2009)

Look at the dates of the posts Praga, this was 2 years ago. Thread dead and buried long ago.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 3, 2009)

Praga said:


> Guys guys...why are you doing this? Why do you anatomize this so much? No offense, but you all act like you were in WW2. And Im sure you weren´t. I have nothing against discussions like this, but this is too much. And what more, useless. I know it is hard to find authentic source which says truth but something you say here is only wild theories. I hope you catch the point of my reply. (By the way, 17 pd gun with APDS-SV shell have better penetration than KwK43 - if we talk clearly only about penetration. I havent energy to reply at all of your opinions, sorry)



Sorry pal, but that's what makes this site so unique and as long as the discussion is civil we welcome the detailed discussion as well as strong opinions. You're welcomed to stay but if you're offended or really don't like what you see, click the escape button on your computer and move on.

From your friendly moderator.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 4, 2009)

Praga said:


> Guys guys...why are you doing this? Why do you anatomize this so much? No offense, but you all act like you were in WW2. And Im sure you weren´t. I have nothing against discussions like this, but this is too much. And what more, useless. I know it is hard to find authentic source which says truth but something you say here is only wild theories. I hope you catch the point of my reply. (By the way, 17 pd gun with APDS-SV shell have better penetration than KwK43 - if we talk clearly only about penetration. I havent energy to reply at all of your opinions, sorry)



You felt it necessary to post this in a 2 year old thread?


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## Kurfürst (Jan 4, 2009)

schwarzpanzer said:


> My basic point was that the Konigstigers armour had no Molybdenum or Manganese content (maybe even no Nickel) so a 122mm round would make a 'scab' fly through the KT (like a HESH round) unless it hit it in the turret which would likely rip it clean off.
> 
> That is without it penetrating.
> 
> Any other vs ideas?



Hi,

German armor specifications were standardized for the the duration of the war, with different specifications existing for different armor plate thickness.

In case of the Tiger II, the armor type specs E40 of March 1944, E41 of June 44 (125-160mm plates) and E43 (165-200mm, also June specifications) can be applied.

Armor composition and alloys, in %:

E 40 (March 1944, 125-160mm)
C = 0.32-0.42
Mn = 0.30-0.65
Si = 0.15 - 0.50
Cr = 2.00 - 2.40
Ni = -
Mo = 0.15 - 0.30
V = -
P&S = ~0

E 41 (June 1944, 125-160mm)
C = _0.30-0.40_
Mn = *0.60-0.90*
Si = *0.20* - 0.50
Cr = 2.30 - 2.70
Ni = *1.00 - 1.50*
Mo = _0_
V = *< 0.15*
P&S = ~0

E 43 (March 1944, 165-200mm)
C =_ 0.28-0.33_
Mn = 0.60-0.90
Si = 0.15 - 0.50
Cr = *2.80 - 3.20*
Ni = 0.90 - 1.10
Mo = 0
V = -
P&S = ~0

So it would it would appear to me that Manganese was used at all time, and in higher content in later plates, which also added nickel and vanadium as an alloy. The thickest plates used less nickel (which may be related to that nickel IIRC hardens the steel and this isn't advantagous with very thick plates, which should rather be softer/tougher than harder/more brittle), and especially higher amounts of cromium.

The use of vanadium is interesting. AFAIK Vanadium is a very expensive and one of the most effective alloying element, and the Germans probably relied on this expensive alloy because of the more limited availabilty of less expensive alloys.


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## Matt308 (Jan 4, 2009)

Praga said:


> Guys guys...why are you doing this? Why do you anatomize this so much? No offense, but you all act like you were in WW2. And Im sure you weren´t. I have nothing against discussions like this, but this is too much. And what more, useless. I know it is hard to find authentic source which says truth but something you say here is only wild theories. I hope you catch the point of my reply. (By the way, 17 pd gun with APDS-SV shell have better penetration than KwK43 - if we talk clearly only about penetration. I havent energy to reply at all of your opinions, sorry)



.


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## Praga (Jan 4, 2009)

So my mistake, i did not realize this is so old...


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## Matt308 (Jan 4, 2009)

It wasn't the fact that the thread is old. It is the fact that your first post in a forum about WWII military technologies was condescending and off-putting. You chastise forum members for carrying on a discussion that includes too much technical minutia, then you follow it up with your own technical "factoid".

Your comments are welcome. Your insults are not. Stick around and contribute. You might even learn something.


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## LA5FN (Jan 10, 2009)

just a reminder...


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## hartmann (Jan 11, 2009)

Hello to all ¡
According to a lot of IS2 Obr1944 (aka straight glacis) inspected after the war in Museums as well as some destroyed and inspected/captured in Berlin by US and British forces, the glacis doesn´t have 120 mm of thickness, It only (nominally by the own factories) has 90 mm at 60º in welded glacis and 100 mm at 60º (varying betwen 95 to 105 mm) in casted steel glacis. This thickness in the drawing is not correct for the last model. 
Only the IS2 Obr1943 (aka, the steped glacis) had 120 mm of thickness, and only in a very reduced portion, inclined at only 30º. I hope this may help.

Best regards


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## Soggy (Dec 17, 2010)

Soren said:


> Fact is there are absolutely no records of the Tiger Ausf.B's frontal armor ever being penetrated


Wikipedia has a photo of a B with a front turret penetration, likely a 17-pounder. 

Belton Cooper's book described the fate of a B which had its turret blown off by a US 155mm self-propelled howitzer firing at point blank range. That gun (and other big artillery pieces) could knock out the B at very long ranges by plunging projectiles into the relatively thin roof armor. 



> A long-range frontal attack against a Tiger Ausf.B would have been pure suicide


An M36 knocked out a Panther at 4000 yards and a Tiger B would have be vulnerable, too, as both had relatively light roof armor and the projectiles would be plunging into it at steep arcs.



> Nashorn crews also reported that they were able to knock out Soviet T-34 tanks at distances as great as 4000 meters, aswell as numerous kills of KV and IS-2 tanks as well as SU-152, ISU-122 and ISU-152 assault guns.


Too bad for the Soviets they didn't have their IS3 ready in time; its frontal armor was so formidable that in the 1967 war, the Israelis had to close to 500 yards to penetrate it with their space-age L7 105mms firing high-tech ammunition. Good luck with a Kwk 43.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 17, 2010)

Soggy said:


> An M36 knocked out a Panther at 4000 yards and a Tiger B would have be vulnerable, too, as both had relatively light roof armor and the projectiles would be plunging into it at steep arcs.



At 4000 yds the descent angle would be small. unless the German tank was caught driving down a steep hill the impact angle would would be under 10 degrees from the horizontal.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 17, 2010)

Hitting tanks with heavy artillery shells was either desperate thing, or sheer luck. Not something any military was counting on.


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