# B-29 Losses



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 3, 2006)

Does anyone know the B-29 losses for WW2?

How many were shot down by Enemy Aircraft if any?

How many were shot down by FLAK?

How many were lost due to mechanical failure?

How many were lost due to other such as weather or pilot error?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 3, 2006)

I believe there were only about 300 B-29 losses due to enemy actions during WW2 - I'll try to find more info...


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 3, 2006)

I found a site that indicates 371 looses from the Marianas, here's a table that has additional losses..

Army Air Forces in World War II

The chart showing "Very Heavy Bombers" for the 20th AF it's safe to assume that this indicates B-29s


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## syscom3 (Jul 3, 2006)

Dont forget the B29's were also flying in the CBI theater.

When I get home tonight I will look at the loss's and see what I can find out.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 4, 2006)

Cool thanks for the info. I did not think it was a lot. It would neat to see though how many were shot down by enemy fighters, flak, etc.


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## DaveB.inVa (Jul 4, 2006)

Bob Mann's book shows 136 XX Bomber Command losses but doesnt have a tally for the XXI Bomber Command. I could go through the entire serial number list and count em all but at the time that seems like too much effort. Bob's book has a list of circumstances for each B-29 but it doesnt go into great detail as to flak, fighters and such. It only indicates where it was lost, youll see lines like ditched north of Guam, exploded over Tokyo, hit by falling bomb, lost over Osaka. Rarely youll see stuff like flak, fighters and such. Its in there but not a lot. If you have any questions as far as specific B-29's Ill look up what I can for you though.


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## Udet (Jul 4, 2006)

Mr. flyboy, hi.

I would not say the number of B-29s lost in action was low. We talk about 
+/-360 bombers lost; such number should be compared with the total number of bombers who reached service in the PTO.

If I recall correctly, the vast majority of missions flown by the super-fortress before having the Marianas available as base were comprised of small number of bombers never reaching 100 planes; a very distant thing when compared to the massed formations of B-17s and B-24s flying over Germany during the same period. (We of course know the differences between both enemy targets and the quality of the air defences).

The fleets of raiders certainly surpassed the 100 planes when operations from the Marianas were commenced in late 1944 (November).

So some rough 360 B-29´s lost in action will not represent a low casualty rate; sustainable of course, but it was not low.

Cheers!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 4, 2006)

Udet said:


> Mr. flyboy, hi.
> 
> I would not say the number of B-29s lost in action was low. We talk about
> +/-360 bombers lost; such number should be compared with the total number of bombers who reached service in the PTO.
> ...


Greetings!

I could agree with you when you look at the numbers up front but considering these looses span from the spring of 1944 to August 1945 and some of the mission were flown at low level (8,000 feet) they are low. Most big B-29 raids hosted about 100 aircraft. The biggest B-29 raid I know of was one of the first Tokyo fire bombing raids which fielded over 300 aircraft at low level. Attached is a table showing 20th AF losses during the period, the numbers reflect the heaviest periods of bombing prior to August 6. 

I believe by the war's end there were 1000 B-29 in the Pacific, 350+ combat losses for this period ranged about 10% depending on the raid (May 1945 saw 91 B-29s lost, the highest loss month of it's deployment). With that a second chart showing losses by month which is a small percentage when compared to the ETO.

I think the final key here is more was done with less because of the weapon - that being the B-29...

BTW 3943 B-29s were built, 562 were lost, including 35 in Korea and these were all causes, combat and "other". If I do my math correctly that shows about a 14% attrition rate (about 10% combat) - not bad for an aircraft that served in 2 wars, fought jets, was the first sword of the Strategic Air Command (which meant being ready to fly 24-7 and continually training for that) and served until 1959.

(I uploaded one chart, go to the link to see the other data)

Army Air Forces in World War II

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 6, 2006)

Thanks for all the info guys. I will have to get that book as well.


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## syscom3 (Jul 7, 2006)

I found some info on the losses.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/aafsd/aafsd_pdf/t165.pdf

20th Bomber Command
80 total, with 22 due to fighters, 7 from AAA and 51 from "other"
breakdown by year is:
1944 70 total, with 20 due to fighters, 5 from AAA and 45 from "other"
1945 10 total, with 2 due to fighters, 2 from AAA and 6 from "other"

21st Bomber Command
334 total, with 52 due to fighters, 47 from AAA, 19 from fighter/AAA and 216 from "other"
breakdown by year is:
1944 25 total, with 4 due to fighters, 1 from AAA, and 20 from "other"
1945 309 total, with 48 due to fighters, 46 from AAA, 19 from fighter/AAA and 196from "other"

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 7, 2006)

Same report different site...

A good portion of those "other" losses were due to weather and mechanical failure.

That site you used is excellent for research.....


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## syscom3 (Jul 7, 2006)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Same report different site...
> 
> A good portion of those "other" losses were due to weather and mechanical failure.
> 
> That site you used is excellent for research.....



Of course its a great site. You found it and let us know about it!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 7, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> Of course its a great site. You found it and let us know about it!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 12, 2006)




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## P38 Pilot (Jul 13, 2006)

The thing Im amazed about is how many losses were fewer compared to B-24s and B17s. Then again, The B-17 and B-24 were used in both theaters of the war while the B-29 was used in one.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 13, 2006)

Also look at how long they were in service for. The B-29 did not start bombing Japan until mid 1944.

German AA guns were better as well and the Luftwaffe was able to put more up to meet the bombers than the Japs were able to.


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## P38 Pilot (Jul 18, 2006)

I know. FLAK 88s as well as good interceptors manage to tear up American bombers by the dozens!


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## 102first_hussars (Jul 19, 2006)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Also look at how long they were in service for. The B-29 did not start bombing Japan until mid 1944.
> 
> German AA guns were better as well and the Luftwaffe was able to put more up to meet the bombers than the Japs were able to.



Well its my understanding B-29 was able to fly to a higher ceiling than anything the Japs had.


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## Gnomey (Jul 19, 2006)

But they didn't, most of the B-29 raids on Japan were low level firebombing raids...


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## syscom3 (Jul 19, 2006)

During the daylight hours, the attacks were from high altitudes. Daylight raids still occured with regularity throughout the campaign. There was no single doctrine of "only" nighttime raids.


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## GregP (Mar 11, 2012)

The B-29 regualrly cruised at 30,000 feet and could get to 33,600 feet with maximum bomb load. At these altitudes it cruised at 320 - 340 mph during the attack phase.

Most Japanese fighters of 1944 - 1945 had difficulty getting to 30,000+ feet and, if they got there, would have to accel;erate for quite awhile to get to 340 mph, aty which speed they could not even catch a B-29. I did an analysis of the lieky intercepts several years ago and concluded taht if a Japanese fighter were to make one head-on pass at a B-29 going 340 mph, and if the fighter could reach 380 mph, it would take over 35 minutes to turn around and catch the B-29, assuming it could even FIND the B-29 after the turn, and assuming it could maintain effective speed during the 180° turn to ctach the B-29. 

That makes a running fight VERY improbable unless the Japanese fighter had the luxury of converging from the rear quarter, with only a 40 mph speed advantage. If so, the B-29's radar-aimed remote guns were very good at defence and any evasive action by the fighter would make for a long chase during which the fighter was more vulnerable to fire from the B-29as the B-29 was to fire from the fighter. With a 40 mph speed advantage, the approach to attack is very slow and predictable to the B-29 gunners, and the fighter appeared to be just hanging there making a great target.

While the Japnese did have a few fighter in the 400 mph+ category, they had the problem of getting to 30,000+ feet in time to make the intercept. Once they got to altitude, the engines were very hot from the extended climb and they didn't have a lot of fuel to make concerted attacks since they needed full ammunition if they were to be effectuive. The only way to lighten the aircraft for fighting at high altitude was to offload fuel, making most of the interceptors short-range aircraft.

Since we DID suffer some B-29 losses, it is apparent that while the Japanese were not completely ineffective. They were not overly effective either. One tactic, as noted above, was to send relatively few bombers from several directions, making attack a chancey operation since the bombers were not massed together.

By way of example, on the Hiroshima raid, there were only seven B-29;s in the entire raid. Three flew ahead as weather spotters. One flew to a staging area to stand by as needed. Two were photographic only and escorted the Enola Gay on the mission. So, in reality, the raid was a 3-plane raid with one or two other planes not in immediate contact with the raid aircraft around the area. They would have been difficult to stop and it would have been difficult to picik the dangerous aircraft out from the rest.

On conventional raids, a 4-plane or 6-plane raid with incendiary bombs would also have been difficult to find and stop, especially if the B-29's broke formation and scattered at 340 mph only to reform and continue some miles later. Another tactic was to fly as though intending to attack one target and turn 90° before the bomb run and attack a target that was not seemingly threatened by any radar track.

So perhaps the low losses of the B-29 Japanese raids were understandable. In Europe, much of the combat happened at 25,000 30,000 feet and the German fighters had another 40 - 50 mph on their Japanese counterparts, but the B-29's were 100 mph faster than the regular B-17 / B-24 / Lancaster attackers, so they would have been much harder targets for Luftwaffe fighters than the bomber employed were. Not saying the losses would have been comparably as low as over Japan, but they would have been much lower than happened in the real war to the real attackers.


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## Milosh (Mar 11, 2012)

Before some get to carried away with the performance of the B-29, http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/B-29_Superfortress_SAC_-_19_April_1950.pdf


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## pinsog (Mar 11, 2012)

GregP said:


> The B-29 regualrly cruised at 30,000 feet and could get to 33,600 feet with maximum bomb load. At these altitudes it cruised at 320 - 340 mph.
> 
> Most Japanese fighters of 1944 - 1945 had difficulty getting to 30,000+ feet and, if they got there, would have to accel;erate for quite awhile to get to 340 mph, aty which speed they could not even catch a B-29. I did an analysis of the lieky intercepts several years ago and concluded taht if a Japanese fighter were to make one head-on pass at a B-29 going 340 mph, and if the fighter could reach 380 mph, it would take over 35 minutes to turn around and catch the B-29, assuming it could even FIND the B-29 after the turn, and assuming it could maintain effective speed during the 180° turn to ctach the B-29.
> 
> ...



Greg,

Would an FW190 'A' model be capable of intercepting a B29 at 30,000 feet plus? Could you do a quick analysis on German fighters attempting to intercept the B29? The 35 minute tail chase by an aircraft doing 380 mph is VERY interesting info.


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## Siegfried (Mar 11, 2012)

I think some of the performance claims of the B-29 seem overstated, certainly the radar assisted rear gun for the B-29 were in use on only a few late war models primarily for night raids; perhaps in the Korean war there was something more sophisticated.

A FW 190A5 and also FW 190A8 will have a speed of about 368mph at 33,000ft and 378mph at 30,000ft which is enough to slightly outrun a B-29 at its best speed altitude.
FW 190 A-5 Performance
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fw190/190a5-level-20-10-43.jpg

The FW 190A-9 would be better due to the BMW 801TS engine.

The FW 190D-9 about 400mph at 30,000ft.

GM-1 (Nitrous Oxide) could be used at these altitudes for a substantial boost in speed for about 15 minutes. It would have been possible to adjust supercharger speeds to improve altitude performance at a cost in low altitude performance.

The Me 198G6AS (from March 44) Me 109G14AS (from June 44) or Me 109K4 (from October 1944) or Me 109G10 (November 44) would be a better canditate for intercepting a B-29 as they had the enlarged supercharger. Even a basic Me 109G6 was probably better over 25,000ft than a FW 190.

The Fw 190A wasn't the ideal aircraft to intercept the B-29 though the FW 190A5 had pressurisation and I believe the FW 190A-10 would have had a new larger wing with a new two stage supercharger. The FW 190D-13, with a two stage supercharger would have had no trouble getting to the B-29's opperational height though the Ta 152H and TA 152C were in service before it.

Certainly the Luftwaffe was better placed to intercept B-29's than the Japanese Army and Navy were.


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## GregP (Mar 11, 2012)

OK, I'll take a crack at it, but won't do an unlimited number of itterations.

1. Let's say the B-29 is at 30,000 feet and knows the attackers are Fw 190's, so they are going 335 mph.

2. Let's say it is a head-on pass with the Fw 190 at 350 mph. He makes his pass and, as they pass each other he snaps into a bank and starts a 180º turn. At 30,000 feet I doubt the Fw 190 can sustain more than about a 35° bank angle in a level turn and let's say the Fw pilot increases power and maintains 340 mph in the turn.

3. His rate of turn would be 2.586°/second and it takes him 69.62 seconds to make a 190° turn. His radius of turn is 2.036 miles and he comes out of his turn displaced 4.07 miles from the track of the B-29. Meanwhile, the B-29 has moved 6.48 miles further along it's track and the Fw 190 is displaced to the side and is a total of 7.65 miles from the B-29.

4. The Fw 190 will take some time to accelerate to his attack speed of 380 mph, but I'll assume he gets there quickly for our first-order approximation. It will take him 11.36 minutes to intercept and his closing speed is only 45 mph, making him a relative sitting duck for the B-29 tail gunner. Any evasive action just makes things take longer as the Fw 190 would decelerate in pulling hard g's.

In the Japanese calculartions, I assumed the B-29 was going 335 mph and the Japanese fighter could go only 350 mph in chase. It takes 31 minutes to ctach the B-29. The Fw is faster but is still a relative sitting duck and could not easily change that fact given the speed of the B-29. Of course, there ARE special cases where the Fw 190 would be higher than the B-29 and faster, and the time wold come down, but there are just as many cases where the Fw 190 would be lower and slower and the intercept would prove impractical to prosecute due to fuel and other possible priorities.

The speed of the B-29 is the deciding factor most of the time, which is why most B-29 pilots who have given talks at the Planes of Fame have mentioned going in fast for the attack and escape, while cruisng much more slowly to get into position for the attack and escape portion of the flight.

For you technical types, theta is the bank angle in the fighter turn, the rate of turn is found by (1091 * tangent theta) / V, with V in knots. The radius of turn is found by (V^2/(11.26 * tangent theta) with V in knots. 1 knot is 1.15078299 mph.

Milosh, thanks for making my point. Look at the speed versus altitude for the B-29 and you can see that it can get fast. According to B-29 pilots, it DID, especially when anticipating an intercept. The sky over Japan was clear many time, especially at the B-29's altitude, and they could see any fighters trying to get them ... so they accelerated and went past before the defenders could get to the height of the B-29's.

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## Milosh (Mar 11, 2012)

> The B-29 regualrly cruised at 30,000 feet and could get to 33,600 feet with maximum bomb load. At these altitudes it cruised at 320 - 340 mph.



Read the link again Greg.

At max load it could barely get to 24,000'. It was a one way trip from Saipan to Tokyo with max bomb load at the speeds you state.


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## pinsog (Mar 11, 2012)

Milosh,

But GregP stated that pilots who he has spoken to said they flew slowly to the target, speeded up over the target to outrun the fighters, then I'm sure slowed back down and cruised slowly home, just like the F-4 and F-105 pilots did in Vietnam.

GregP, Thanks for doing the math, very interesting. Sounds like the Luftwaffe would have had their hands full with even unescorted B-29's.


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## GregP (Mar 11, 2012)

Milosh, they flew at whatever load was required for the fuel and altitude they wanted to fly.

The procedure was not to go for max load, but to plan the mission for the altitude, speed, load, and range you wanted to fly to minimize the probability of an intercept.

A B-17 could haul about 20,000 pounds aloft, but could not get to Berlin and back with that load. So, they put in the ammunition, fuel and range numbers ... and came up with a 4,000 pound bomb load. The B-29 did no different. They flew high as often as possible because that minimized the Japanese reaction to the raid.

I don't need to read the link again, but thanks anyway. It is what it is and you are certainly entitled to your opinions, as am I. The pilots I have spoken with describe missions to Japan at anywhere from 22,000 to 32,000 feet depending on expected cloud cover and mission requirements. They cruised to the target area at about 220 mph and accelerated to a planned attack speed when in range of Japanese fighters. They stayed fast until they were out of Japanese fighter range and then slowed down and descended a bit to fly home.

Any speculation about the B-29 in the ETO is simply that, speculation ... except for the fact that they existed and were real assets thath could have been redpeloyed if desired. I am quite unfond of "what ifs," but I daresay it would have made an impact in the ETO, being capable of attacking about 100 mph faster than the actual heavy bombers used in the ETO. A 1000-plane raid with 20,000 pound bomb loads would have eliminated an area as a viable place to live.

At least, that is my opinion. Yours, like EPA mileage for a car, may vary and very probably does.

I KNEW someone would beg to differ on my chosen speeds by a little and it makes no difference to the outcome. The Fw 190 would have had a hard time with the B-29 regardless of slight differences in speed and that was the point ... not the exact time of intercept. Fw 190 performance fell off rapdily above 20,000 feet in the radial-powered versions and I doubt an Fw 190A could have caught a B-29 at all myself unless he was in exactly the right place at exatly the right time ... and he might very well have flown into a bullet stream from the B-29 with his slow closing speed.

The point is the situation would have different from that with the B-17's / B-24's/ Lancasters normally intercepted, and it would have been, regardless of assertions of slight speed differences. Reaction times would have been much shorter, and intercept from behind would have been hazardous due to relatively low closing speeds. if the Fw 190's had flown straight and level in trying to ntercept, don't you think they would have attracted the attention of the B-29's escorts?

Perhaps all the above is not quite true for the jets, but certainly for the pistons of all varities. And the jets never sortied very many at the same time. Don't even bring up Ta-152's. There were never enough to sortie more than about 25 at any time in history, and those were never all at the same place for any single mission ever, so thety would make no difference at all in the relative scheme of things. The B-29's, while a "what-if" in the ETO, actually existed and COULD have been sent to the ETO. The Ta-152's never existed in numbers and are a "what-if" without any possibility of being so except for the few operational planes.

In point of fact, the what-ifs are simply fiction. The reality is that the B-29 was difficult for a Japanese fighter to attack at high altitude with any degree of effectivity, and the real-life low loss rate shows it. All the ETO stuff is so much supposition and I will refrain from speculation any further on it unless there is realistic discussion without science fiction overtones.


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## wuzak (Mar 11, 2012)

The B-29 performance in the ETO would depend on tactics. If they followed the mantra of mutual defence and flow in tight formations the B-29s could not have used the extra performance that was available when they were on their own. B-17s and B-24s could certainly fly and cruise faster than they did, but they were constrained by the formation.

If B-29s in the ETO were used the same way as their forebears they would be equally as vulnerable - but with better defensive armament. 

Greg, your calculations are interesting. I think it shows that the idea that Mosquito bombers, particularly the ones with two stage engines, would be very difficult for the Luftwaffe to intercept on daylight raids.

The Mosquito's fast cruise was as fast as a B-29's top speed.

Also, if B-29s were sent to the ETO would there have been a bigger push for the V-3420 powered B-39? The B-39 showed nearly a 50mph increase in max speed over the B-29.


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## pinsog (Mar 11, 2012)

GregP said:


> Milosh, they flew at whatever load was required for the fueal and altitude they wanted to fly.
> 
> The procedure was not to go for max load, but to plan the mission for the altitude, speed, load, and range you wanted to fly to minimize the probability of an intercept.
> 
> ...



Nicely written. I would say that about sums it up.


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## GregP (Mar 11, 2012)

Thanks pinsog, I appreciate it. Wuzak, you have a very good point. The Mosquito was not un-interceptable, but it was a very difficult target. That probably goes a long way to explaining the low interception rate. Since the Mosquito could get up to about 390 mph (never mind the slightly faster variants), it would be VERY difficult to intercept unless the intercepting fighter was already in position and already at speed and altitude. I'm sure that happened, but not frequently. If it started to BE frequent, all the Mosquitos would have had to do was change directions some time before arriving at target, and the defenders would have been out of position to intercept.

Naturally, the other fast aircraft enjoyed the same difficulty of intercept, assuming they didn't suffer mechanical troubles that rendered them slower and vulnerable to intercept. That also assume the interceptor also didn't suffer any mechanical issues making them unsuitable for the intercept. I'm sure that happened, too.

My point was supposed to be that fast aircraft are very difficult to intercept unless the closing velocity is 100 mph or faster. Slower than that makes things very dicey if the target had rearward-firing armament. If so, you, the interceptor, appear to be moving very slowly and you make a very good target. Ditto for the bomber, but the bomber will require a lot more ammunition expended to down than the intercepting fighter with critical components located close together. 5 or 6 hits on a fighter can be SERIOUS, if well placed. On a bomber, that is unlikely but possible. That, of course, assumes MG. Cannons, with explosive shells, can be different.


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## davparlr (Mar 12, 2012)

I think the B-29 would have been very effective in ETO. In addition to the above, the ETO had several advantages to the PTO. One is shorter ranges. B-29 raids from the Northern Marianas 1500+ miles to target with 20k of bombs (?), in ETO half this. This would allow a lot of airspeed/load variables. Also, while the jet stream was a bane to the PTO because they had to fly across them bucking them coming and going, the East/West routes in the ETO would benefit from these winds which neutralize each other coming and going or could be used to advantage riding them at low power setting going in and descending out of them and departing at higher cruise. Exposure time would be significantly reduced.

Also the higher altitude would offer two more advantages. One, Flak foot print would be significantly reduced, almost requiring the aircraft to fly directly overhead in order to be hit. Also, 30-35k is right in the wheel house of the P-47D and P-51D making intercepts even more risky. The Bf-109K would be challenge, but not an over powering one, and the P-47M/N were on the burner if needed.


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## GregP (Mar 12, 2012)

Good points and pretty spot on. The Germans had some very good interceptors, but few and not too many pilots, propellers or gasoline by early 1945. If the B-29 had been employed there, the results would have been good for the Allies. Conversley, the Germans had the best interceotprs in the world to fight the B-29 but, by then, the Allies also had high-altitude, long-range escorts, making the task doubly tough. If the Germans flew straight and level in an attack, they were likely to attract deadly attention from an escort fighter.

I would have been interesting and deadly, but the B-29 superheavy could have done the job ... at least in my estimation.

As it is, the B-17 / B-24 / Lancaster DID the job in the event and did it quite well. Don't want to forget the Hallifax or Sterling either, but they were less numerous.

This is a complete "what-if" anyway, but there is no reason to believe the B-29, with more speed, payload, range, and armament, would fare less well than the planes that ended the ETO war. It was not more vulnerable to fire than the earlier bombers and was considerbly faster and generally higher flying in practice.


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## Siegfried (Mar 12, 2012)

This is a chart comparing FW 190-A8, A9, Tq 152C and Ta 152H
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fw190/fw190-a8-12jan45.jpg

The B-29 is easily within the envelope of both Ta 152's.

The FW 190A9 is significantly supeior to the FW 190A-8 due to the 801TS engine.

I believe this engine was already seeing modest service in 1943. It seem to have been used to power fW 190A6's used as "contact aircraft" ie lightly armed aircraft that reconoitered the bomber formation from afar and reported its disposition. The engine incorporated supercharger advances and ratio changes and used better fabrication methods in some areas such ass very fine vacuum cast cylinder fins.

I would suggest that appearance of the B-29 would lead to a response in the form of this engines production being increased even at the cost of a disproportinate decrease in standard engine production: they would have to accept the cost. GM-1 would also become a standard feature.


GM-1 would seem to add about 6000ft to the full throttle height and about 30-50km/h or 20-30mph.

Historically few german aircraft entered servive with two stage superchargers, in part this was due to reasonably good performanc of their single stage engines.

A few Jumo 213E (on Ta 152), Jumo 213F (on FW 190D-13) maybe 2-3 Ta 152C with DB603LA saw service. The BMW 801F might have had a two stage superchargers. A single Me 109K-14 with a DB605L engine might also have been delivered.

These engine would certainly be brought forward, the question is how much of the holdup was design issues and how much was related to shortages of machine tools to make the more elaborate gearboxes and impellors.


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## GregP (Mar 12, 2012)

Ta-152's are relatively meaningless. There were never more than about 25 in service at any one time, and they were never in the same place for any single mission. It doesn't matter how good a plane was in WWII, if you only had 25 of them, you made no difference to the war effort. We already established their kill record was not very impressive by any standards. They shot down about 7 - 10 enemies and lost 4. The Wildcat did about as well in kill to loss ratio. 

This is no disrespect for the qualities of the Ta-152. They were living desperate days in Germany when the Ta-152 came into being, and the aircraft deployed were service protoypes that were, in fact, prototypes not really ready for service. The mechanics had not been traied and there was no supply line of spare parts. When the war ended, there were only two in service. Tough to change the outcome of even a signle attack with only two working Ta-152's.

The Americans, on the ohter hand, had a LOT of B-29's and they could have actually been deployed. The Wright R-3350 was still being developed, but the planes were flying long lission and doing quite well anyway, in real life. Sure, they had some problems, but so did ALL aircraft, to a point. The fact is, the B=29 was in widespread use in quantity.

GM-1 might add 6,000 feet to the ceiling of an Fw 190, but the aircraft would be out of GM-1 by the time it got there. GM-1 was not something that could be employed for long periods of time (how big is the Nitrous Oxide tank?), and required extended maintenance when used. I can tell you that the Reno racers only use Nitrous Oxide for 2 - 3 laps because of the high tendency to blow the engine. I have used it in a car, but the bottles don't last long. And if anything goes wrong, you blow the tops out of the pistons (that assumes a wet system with solenoid valve). If the system was dry, I havent heard of it before and I believe dry Nitrous systems are a relativelty new development requiring a digital controller.


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## Siegfried (Mar 12, 2012)

One of the reasons the Ta 152 was late into service was that the allied attacks on the oil industry caused the Luftwaffe to insist that its new fighters be able to opperate well on B4 fuel. This had the effect of forcing a redesign of the Jumo 213E into the E-1. The single stage Daimler Benze DB603EM also could have powered the FW 190D-9 and the Ta 152C instead of the two stage DB603LA. Waiting for the introduction of two stage intercooled engines was as much about being able to handle B4 fuel as high altitude performance. As it was the job of keeping up C3 production was quite good and the DB603EM had good altitude performance; in fact it was more powerfull at medium altitudes.

In the event of B-29's the Germans respond in some way. I would say they get the required technology into the air relatively quickly though at the expense in overall production as machine tools and skilled personel are reallocated.

Talking about the 7:4 kill ratio in favour of the Ta 152 as being a small advantage is the wrong way to look at it given the poor performance in that regard of the vastly outnumbered Luftwaffe's other fighters. That the Ta 152 was able to achieve even this is all the more remarkable.

GM-1 was not widely used on the FW-190, the Me 109G was probably more often so equiped. However it was a reaonalbly practical system. Consumtion of GM-1 was about the same as consumption of fuel itself so a 30 gallon 130L tank containing 150kg of NOX (330lb) gives a very substantial run time. For instance: assuming a 1200hp output of power consuming fuel at a sfc of 0.55 means 660lbs of fuel is burned. This means a 130L tank might last almost 30 minutues. The runs had to be limited in duration however (eg 10 minute bursts). 

The reno race example of NOX damaging engines is must be taken in the context of it being applied to engines already running at 4000hp and low altitude. NOX was was applied (the way the Luftwaffe used) only above the FTH full throttle height. It was not used to increase rated engine power but only to compensate for altitude. The only stress on the engine would be that it was able to generate much higher power levels at altitudes in which the air was thinner and less able to cool the engine.

The appearance of the B-29 in ETO would illicit a response in the type of aircraft the Germans make; the emphasis on maintaining production levels at the expense of quality would I suggest be abandoned to a greater degree since existing types would be of little use even if they have use in the Easter Front.

For instance the Me 109K-1 was ready for production in late 1943, it had the aerodynamic refinements of the later Me 109K4 though a less powerfull engine. It was not produced in the interests of production despite what much have been a substantial speed advantage.

The Me 109G6ASM available from about April 1944 could manage the following speeds:
9000m (30000ft) 393mph (635kmh)
10000m (33000ft) 387mph (625kmh)
http://kurfurst.org/Performance_tests/109G14_PBLeistungen/files/PBG14_LS_SNplusMW50.jpg
(Me 109G14ASM about the same, it had a larger oil cooler)

No doubt, intereception was going to be difficult but possible.


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## RCAFson (Mar 12, 2012)

Some data on the B-29 range versus payload can be found here:

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/B-29_Superfortress_SAC_-_19_April_1950.pdf

There's no doubt that the B-29 had impressive specs, but in 1944 it was very underdeveloped and the engines were not reliable at prolonged high power, yet to operate over Europe the B-29 would have to climb quickly to cruise altitude of 25 to 30,000 ft and use much more fuel than the SAC mission data suggests. For a mission against Berlin, and carrying a 20,000lb bomb load, I would suggest that TO weight would be 130,000 lbs. Service ceiling at this weight is about 30,000 ft and time to climb to 20,000ft would be about 45 minutes so form-up and climb to cruise would have to be done outside of Luftwaffe flak and Luftwaffe controlled airspace. Formation Cruise speed would be about 275 mph and average cruise altitude would be between 25 and 30,000 ft. These speeds would be higher than previously encountered by the Luftwaffe but neither the average speed or altitude would have been beyond the reach of the Fw-190


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## GregP (Mar 12, 2012)

Nitrous Oxide does NOT burn at the same rate as fuel, particularlty fuel at cruise numbers. Gasoline contains about 24% Oxygen and NO2 (NOX is a brand name) contains about 34% Oxygen. If you burn it at the same rate, you melt your pistons in VERY short order due to running too lean. In a wet system there are two solenoids. One is for the NO2 and the other is for extra fuel to richen the mixture. It burns RAPIDLY. In a car, I could use a 20-pound bottle in about 5 minutes with a 346 cubic inch engine. With a 1650 cubic inch engine, the same 20-pound bottle would be consumed in about 1 minute flat. If I had a 330 pound tank, it would run for about 82.5 minutes ... in my car, not in the Merlin.

The Jumo 213 had 2,132.5 cubic inches and would consume the same 330 pound tank in 13.5 minutes or less since the cylinders are much bigger and burn at a faster rate than mere ratio would indicate.

The speeds for the Me 109 at 30,000+ feet are no doubt WITH GM-1, so it could achieve these speeds for a short time if the airframe were relatively new and the engine was relatively fresh and the prop was in good shape. It might well run out of NO2before closing with the B-29. Either way, it would have a slow closing speed and would face a gunner with an easy shot.

I suppose we just look at this differently. The interception is certainly possible, and I would not claim othersise. But it is MUCH more difficult than for a B-17 / B-24 / Lancaster, and that's all I'm trying to say.

As for the post immediately above, the cruise speed would be in the 250 - 257 mph range as you suggest ... up until the B-29's expected to encounter enemy attack, before which time the speed would ramp up to well over 300 mph, and I daresay they would attack from as high an altitude as possible with a 15,000 pound bomb load (chosen specifically to allow higher-altitude operation) or maybe less to allow higher altitude operation. Just my opinion. 

If I were running the B-29 show (and I KNOW I'm not ...), and if I were assigned to the ETO with the B-29s, I'd take whatever precautions were necessary to exploit the new bomber and give it maximum survival potential, even at the expense of individual bomb loads. In ANY case, the bomb loads would have been more than the B-17 / B-24 / Lancaster when flying from the UK to Berlin and back in the B-29.


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## Siegfried (Mar 13, 2012)

The comsumption of dinitrogen oxide was about 1:1 with the fuel consumtion rate. The Ta 152H had three rates: 50 gramms per 100 gramms, 80 gramms per 100 grams and 130 gramms per 100 grams. Rudiger Kosin's book "The German Figher 1914-1975" quotes the rate as about equal to fuel consumption. I think the book war prizes notes the three settings for the Ta 152H.

Gasoline contains NO oxygen. Small amounts are sometimes included in additives (eg alcahol)

The normal stoichiometric air fuel additon rate is 14:2 parts air to 1 part gasoline. By adding 1 part nitrous oxide one is adding about 7% more mass flow and 10% more oxygen than normal. Because the nitrous oxide is cool (being either compressed or cryogenic at -80) the latent heat of vaporisation should actually reduce the volume of the air at the inlet and reduce both supercharger and compression work. The effect of adding the nitrous at altitude will be cinsiderable as it effectively requires no work to compress due to its "charge cooling" effect. The speeds I gave for the Me 109G14ASM are *WITHOUT GM-1*. The kurfurst site actually has some data on GM-1 runs for the non AS versions of the Me 109G. The "AS" engine like the D engine had a greatly improved supercharger. 

The weight of a nitrous oxide system with fittings, tank compares favourably with the weight and bulk of a turbo-charger or more complicated two stage supercharger.


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## davparlr (Mar 13, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> In the event of B-29's the Germans respond in some way. I would say they get the required technology into the air relatively quickly though at the expense in overall production as machine tools and skilled personel are reallocated.


 
I agree. WW2 was a continuing upgrade to weapons often to counter enemy upgrades and it occurred amazingly fast, and quite equally. Germany would would have had to counter the B-29 and would apply technology to do so. The B-29 would certainly have added complexity to the problem of attacking lumbering bombers. Increases in speed and altitude was probably a geometric increase in complexity for the defense, not only affecting power but of maneuverability and endurance. Another mile or two of altitude and a 25%+ reduction in exposure time would be a significant challenge to defensive forces. The added altitude would have little affect on the bomber in that they were flying straight and level at 20-25k and were also flying straight a level at 30-35k. It was the maneuvering fighters that was impacted. It would have applied more stress to an already stressed war machine.


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## davparlr (Mar 13, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Some data on the B-29 range versus payload can be found here:
> 
> http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/B-29_Superfortress_SAC_-_19_April_1950.pdf
> 
> There's no doubt that the B-29 had impressive specs, but in 1944 it was very underdeveloped and the engines were not reliable at prolonged high power, yet to operate over Europe the B-29 would have to climb quickly to cruise altitude of 25 to 30,000 ft and use much more fuel than the SAC mission data suggests. For a mission against Berlin, and carrying a 20,000lb bomb load, I would suggest that TO weight would be 130,000 lbs. Service ceiling at this weight is about 30,000 ft and time to climb to 20,000ft would be about 45 minutes so form-up and climb to cruise would have to be done outside of Luftwaffe flak and Luftwaffe controlled airspace. Formation Cruise speed would be about 275 mph and average cruise altitude would be between 25 and 30,000 ft. These speeds would be higher than previously encountered by the Luftwaffe but neither the average speed or altitude would have been beyond the reach of the Fw-190


The mission planners still have 10k lbs to play with so adapting the mission to allow penetration altitude prior to entry into enemy airspace should be no problem.


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## JoeB (Mar 13, 2012)

Wow another very old thread resurrected!

But B-29 *formations* in fact were quite interceptable by Japanese fighters. Not as easily as B-17/24 formations, but still, it happened all the time, kind of weirdly ahistorical to discuss how Japanese fighters couldn't intercept B-29's or only with extreme difficulty. Formation speeds were in the mid 200's-mph, not at the plane's nominal maximum speed. And while altitudes started out as high as 30k ft, the bombing was too inaccurate from that high, so the altitudes were progressively reduced, even in daylight bombing, except for the nuclear attacks. Lone F-13's (photo-recon B-29's) were difficult for Japanese fighters to intercept, because not as loaded down and could use the plane's max speed and altitude capabilities. Likewise the nuclear attacks were conducted by a few planes at high altitude, and by that time, August 45, the Japanese weren't usually bothering to try to intercept lone or small groups of B-29's they assumed were recon planes. But B-29 formations were intercepted all the time, and over Germany would also have been, without any super-duper advancements in German fighters, and there would have been the same problem of what the bombers could hit from 30k ft.

A few B-29's very late in WWII were equipped with APG-15 fire control radars for the tail guns, with the optical central fire control (CFC) system and the other turrets removed. This system wasn't used in Korea but rather the standard CFC system with remote turrets and manual tail position. The tail-only radar controlled arrangement was only suitable for night operations (a/c also equipped with apq-7 precision bombing radar) and high altitude nuclear operations (the 'nickel plate' B-29's), not for day formation attacks where again the B-29's weren't going that fast, and many or most of the attackers approached from azimuths other than tail-on, head-on being popular with the Japanese fighters as it was for German fighters v B-17/24's. The Japanese fighters often aimed to ram the B-29's so had to close to zero range, and would brave return fire for a much shorter time doing that head on.

Joe


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## buffnut453 (Mar 13, 2012)

GregP said:


> It doesn't matter how good a plane was in WWII, if you only had 25 of them, you made no difference to the war effort



Beg to differ, old boy! Thinking of 4 FTS in Habbaniyah which, with 64 aircraft (9 fighters and 55 "bombers"), effectively repulsed and ended the Iraqi Revolt in May 1941. Ok, it wasn't 27 aircraft but it's a similar order of magnitude (or minitude if you prefer).


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## pinsog (Mar 13, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Beg to differ, old boy! Thinking of 4 FTS in Habbaniyah which, with 64 aircraft (9 fighters and 55 "bombers"), effectively repulsed and ended the Iraqi Revolt in May 1941. Ok, it wasn't 27 aircraft but it's a similar order of magnitude (or minitude if you prefer).



I believe Greg's point is, 25 fighters won't make a difference against a 1,000 bomber raid escorted by 800 fighters.


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## Siegfried (Mar 13, 2012)

JoeB said:


> Wow another very old thread resurrected!
> 
> But B-29 *formations* in fact were quite interceptable by Japanese fighters. Not as easily as B-17/24 formations, but still, it happened all the time, kind of weirdly ahistorical to discuss how Japanese fighters couldn't intercept B-29's or only with extreme difficulty. Formation speeds were in the mid 200's-mph, not at the plane's nominal maximum speed. Joe



Why was the speed limited? The need to maintain a tight formation or the need to conserve fuel? Once can immagine that an increase to maxium cruise speed to over 300mph would be beneficial but would only be required for about the last 150 miles before the enemy coast was reached. If so the 'planners' may have made a grim calculation weighing up losses against bomb load versus greater fuel for greater speed.


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## Siegfried (Mar 13, 2012)

davparlr said:


> I agree. WW2 was a continuing upgrade to weapons often to counter enemy upgrades and it occurred amazingly fast, and quite equally. Germany would would have had to counter the B-29 and would apply technology to do so. The B-29 would certainly have added complexity to the problem of attacking lumbering bombers. Increases in speed and altitude was probably a geometric increase in complexity for the defense, not only affecting power but of maneuverability and endurance. Another mile or two of altitude and a 25%+ reduction in exposure time would be a significant challenge to defensive forces. The added altitude would have little affect on the bomber in that they were flying straight and level at 20-25k and were also flying straight a level at 30-35k. It was the maneuvering fighters that was impacted. It would have applied more stress to an already stressed war machine.



The Kurfurst site indicates and extraordinary number of simple modifications to the Me 109 that would accumulate to perhaps as much as 20mph speed again (from its lower speed range) fairly simple mods to gun bulges, tailwheel and a general achievable (in mass production) improvement in airframe tollerance and smoothness, probably no better than were routine for the US industry. Yet production requirement drove Me 109 performance down to a more mediocre level. It achieved manhour production requirements of less than 2000 hours in 1944. The oversized supercharger variants could possibly be brough forward likely with restricted boost levels that would impact low altitude performance; there migh also be prop mods. We see a similar situation in regards to the P-38K which supposedly would have given a fantastic improvement in performance for the cost of only 2 weeks of production. 

I am somewhat skeptical over the claim that this was totally short sighted by the USAAF as I believe engine supply was considered an major issue and likely the real issue. I have no doubt however that had high altitude bombers been attacking the USA in 1943 that the K model would see at least limited production.


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## davparlr (Mar 13, 2012)

JoeB said:


> Wow another very old thread resurrected!
> 
> But B-29 *formations* in fact were quite interceptable by Japanese fighters. Not as easily as B-17/24 formations, but still, it happened all the time, kind of weirdly ahistorical to discuss how Japanese fighters couldn't intercept B-29's or only with extreme difficulty. Formation speeds were in the mid 200's-mph, not at the plane's nominal maximum speed. And while altitudes started out as high as 30k ft, the bombing was too inaccurate from that high, so the altitudes were progressively reduced, even in daylight bombing, except for the nuclear attacks. Lone F-13's (photo-recon B-29's) were difficult for Japanese fighters to intercept, because not as loaded down and could use the plane's max speed and altitude capabilities. Likewise the nuclear attacks were conducted by a few planes at high altitude, and by that time, August 45, the Japanese weren't usually bothering to try to intercept lone or small groups of B-29's they assumed were recon planes. But B-29 formations were intercepted all the time, and over Germany would also have been, without any super-duper advancements in German fighters, and there would have been the same problem of what the bombers could hit from 30k ft.



Tinian is 1500 miles from Tokyo. Those planes bombing Tokyo were maxed out with bombs and fuel on takeoff and probably needed optimum cruise continuously to make it back. The Jet Stream was mostly abeam of their flight path giving the aircraft a reduced flight vector along the flight path both coming and going. Berlin is 600 mile from London, less than half the distance, with much less fuel required, high combat cruise speed can maintain for quite a while, and riding the Jet Stream could help. As far as accuracy is concerned, I suspect that it wasn't speed or altitude that affected accuracy so much as it was cross wind velocity. Trying to aim a bomb with a 30 degree drift has got to be almost impossible. I had to fly final once with 30 degree drift angle and I am telling you even that was a fight. However, with a 125 mph direct tailwind, accuracy should be reasonable if the bomb sight can handle the ground speed, and the B-29 had the endurance to flight plan weapon approach along the Jet Stream. And, if it was still too inaccurate, they could make a descending approach down to 25k probably 150 mph faster than a B-17/24. Egress could be planned away from the Jet Stream.

For the ETO, the B-29 would give a huge increase in options to the war planner over the B-17/24s in speed, altitudes, ranges, and bomb loads. Options cause problems for the defenders.

Joe[/QUOTE]


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## davparlr (Mar 13, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Why was the speed limited? The need to maintain a tight formation or the need to conserve fuel? Once can immagine that an increase to maxium cruise speed to over 300mph would be beneficial but would only be required for about the last 150 miles before the enemy coast was reached.



High speed formation flying should not be an issue.



> If so the 'planners' may have made a grim calculation weighing up losses against bomb load versus greater fuel for greater speed.



Very astute. More bombs verses higher altitude. More bombs verses faster bomb run. More bombs verses dead crewmen. I not sure Curtis LeMay would tend to the crew survival side!


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## GregP (Mar 13, 2012)

I never said B-29's were "uninterceptable," I said it was difficult if the B-29 guys used their airplane to make it so. The low loss rate shows that interception of a B-29 did not equal a shootdown.

The Ta-152 made no impression during the war, so, to me, it is an interesting anecdote in aviation, nothing more. As anyone who knows me will tell you, I like obscure planes and prototypes, so I like the Ta-152 series. But if I were going to war, I'd take a proven performer with a solid war record over a prototype any day of the week.

Many peoplpe like the late-war German planes a LOT, and they are entitled. I am interested, but not all that impresed because they didn't DO what they were designed to do in the real-life, actual war. They showed signs of having the potential to do so, but didn't get the job done. It may well be through no fault of the aircraft themselves, but the facts remain.

Hey, it happen in modern times, too. The Northrop F-20 Tigershark qwas abslutely the best fighter never to win a production contract, and it would outfly an F-16 ... but resembled the F-5 too much for PR purposes. Doesn't mean the F-20 wasn't a top candidate for the bets foghter ... it WAS, in spades. It just never made it and is an interesting footnote in fighter history, nothing more. I bet it will remain the LAST time a company funds a modern figher on their own money!


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## buffnut453 (Mar 13, 2012)

pinsog said:


> I believe Greg's point is, 25 fighters won't make a difference against a 1,000 bomber raid escorted by 800 fighters.



Maybe what was meant but not what was said. Doesn't matter...I was simply being contrary. )


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## tyrodtom (Mar 13, 2012)

davparlr said:


> I not sure Curtis LeMay would tend to the crew survival side!


Doing maximum damage to the enemy the over a shorter period of time might result in less crew being lost overall.

Lemay didn't believe in "***** footing around", he belived in hitting hard right from the start. Real "shock and awe".


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## GregP (Mar 14, 2012)

True about Lemay! In spades. He was tough to work for.

Sometimes I like to be contrary, too (maybe too often?), but I don't mean any insult to anyone. A lively discussion seems like a pretty good goal.

For instance, I put out a number thaht amounts to kills per month for an aircraft type as measure of success. It was pooh-poohed by some people.

I think a better number would be [(number of action sorties) * (4 x kills) - (2 * losses) / number of aircaft in the area] / time period.

The problem is getting the information for the types you want to compare. I have a VERY involved formula that takes almost all aspect into account, but the data are almost impossoble to get! So I suppose that while it is a very good comparison number, it is almost incalculable for most types. So, that makes it almost ueslees although it WOULD be a good comparison number otherwise.

Statistics for the figthers, bombers, recon, etc. are HARD to get as far as action sorties, kills, losses due to combat and losses due to other, number of that type in the area, time of employment, and types of missions. If we had the data, maybe some of the lesser thought of types would look much better in retrospect due to their employment and mission. Due to lack of data, we are left with impressions formed from less than good information.


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## JoeB (Mar 14, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Why was the speed limited? The need to maintain a tight formation or the need to conserve fuel? Once can immagine that an increase to maxium cruise speed to over 300mph would be beneficial but would only be required for about the last 150 miles before the enemy coast was reached. If so the 'planners' may have made a grim calculation weighing up losses against bomb load versus greater fuel for greater speed.


Save fuel, moreover save engines and therefore save airplanes from operational losses: the B-29's engines were not very reliable circa late 1944-early 1945, got better in the final months of the war, but prolonged operation at high power, besides takeoff when unavoidable, might well have increased total losses beyond any tactical benefit. And just the nature of formation flying: that is, if a formation changes direction, the planes on the outside of the turn have to throttle up relative to those on the inside, which creates a limitation on the average speed if there is to be margin to maneuver, catch up if straggling for some reason, etc. Also, again the proposed idea is a combination of high speed and altitude when it was shown in the actual campaign in late 44 early 45 that 30k ft bombing altitude didn't work well in terms of accuracy or engine strain even at realistic cruising speeds.

And flying at far below max speed when in formation was not something unique to the B-29 over Japan. B-17/24's almost always flew well below maximum speed in formation. IMHO it's rather implausible to assume planners would have slapped their foreheads and said 'why I didn't I think of that!?!' if they could read web board posters suggesting max speed formations 60-some years later 

So in the real world, B-29 formations were not highly difficult to intercept over Japan, which is what *was* implied. It wasn't said that it was 'impossible'... but I didn't say that was said.  It was said or implied it was very difficult, but in fact it was wasn't tremendously difficult at least for the mid-late Japanese fighter types (Type 3 aka Tony, Type 2 aka Tojo, Type 2 two-seat aka Nick, and the types introduced in '44-45, like Type 4 and 5, Shiden, Raiden etc). A brief reading of any good resource on the campaign should clarify that. 

The altitude of the early raids v the aerodynamic capabilities of Japanese fighters cut down the losses somewhat compared to what B-17/24's would suffer unescorted, but there were also simply fewer operational Japanese fighters than say over Germany, and a less well developed integrated defense system. The B-29's defensive systems were also somewhat more capable, and the firepower of the Japanese fighter types typically lower than German, especially versions of German fighters with specially enhanced anti-bomber armaments. OTOH again a significant % of B-29 losses to fighters were from ramming, around 40% in the sample of late 44-early 45 daylight raids described in detail from both sides in Sakaida's "B-29 Hunters of the JAAF". 

Also note that B-29 losses to fighters in WWII seem to be somewhat understated in sources like the USAAF Statistic Digest. A/c which made it a good way back to the Marianas but ditched or crash landed seem to have fairly often been counted in the operational category in those stats, regardless of original cause of damage. So the official numbers of 74 B-29 lost to Japanese fighters and 19 to a combination of AA and fighters may be a significant understatement. But AFAIK no one has tallied an accurate plane by plane loss analysis for B-29's over Japan. Plane by plane analysis of B-29 losses in Korea shows: 1953 Stats Digest gives 17 B-29's lost in air combat, one in July 1950 which was to a Yak-9, the other 16 from Nov 1950 would be to MiG-15's, a few of which were write offs of a/c which did return to base. But it omits 2 RB-29's (albeit column heading is ‘B-29’) and 1 B-29 outright loss shown in detailed records, 1 a/c believed lost to AAA which may in fact have been lost to MiG's, 1 a/c written off due to MiG damage, 2 a/c which may have been written off due to MiG damage (seriously damaged by MiG’s, their Individual A/c Record Cards cannot be found), 1 a/c which may have been written off to either AAA or MiG. So perhaps 21-25 B/RB-29 were actually lost due to enemy fighter action in Korea v 17 in the Stats Digest. My anecdotal impression is that B-29 losses to fighters in WWII in the USAAF stats digest may be more understated than that.

Joe


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## muscogeemike (Mar 14, 2012)

Maybe of relevance, maybe just a side note, but B-29’s were also lost in the Korean war.


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## Southron (Mar 14, 2012)

Actually, the great "Killer" of B-29's and their crews in 1944 1945 WAS NOT JAPANESE FIGHTERS NOR JAPANESE AA, but the Curtiss-Wright corporation!
Thanks to wartime secrecy, even today most people don't realize what a flying disaster World War II B-29's were. 

Curtiss-Wright produced the R 3350 Engines that still had a lot of "Bugs" in them. The standard "accident sequence" was that one of the R 4450's would catch on fire, and since the casing of the engine was magnesium-it would burn at white hot temperatures thereby causing the wing spar to heat up and fail OR the gas in one of the wing tanks to explode, either way the B-29 went down in a hurry and often the crew did not have a chance to bail out.

One of the problems was that Curtiss-Wright had very poor "quality control" procedures at their engine factory and if I recall correctly, several Curtiss-Wright executives were prosecuted by the War Department and went to federal prison for fudging inspection and test data on some of the 3350's used on the B-29's.

Finally, the "Bugs" were worked out of the R 3350's and they became fairly reliable engines, so much so that in the post-war era of the 1950's they powered prop airliners like the DC-7's and Lockheed Connies. Matter of fact, R 3350's were even installed on the AD-1`Skyraiders of Viet Nam War fame.

Interestingly enough, the SINGLE MOST EXPENSIVE WORLD WAR II project undertaken by the U.S. Government WAS NOT the Manahttan [atomic bomb] Project. The Manhattan Project was only #2 in terms of expense. The most expensive project was development and manufacture of the B-29! Too bad Curtiss-Wright failed their part of the B-29 project so abysmally. That might explain that while Curtiss-Wright is still around today, they have very little to do with aviation (at least compared to their World War II activities.)


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 14, 2012)

Southron said:


> Actually, the great "Killer" of B-29's and their crews in 1944 1945 WAS NOT JAPANESE FIGHTERS NOR JAPANESE AA, but the Curtiss-Wright corporation!
> Thanks to wartime secrecy, even today most people don't realize what a flying disaster World War II B-29's were.
> 
> Curtiss-Wright produced the R 3350 Engines that still had a lot of "Bugs" in them. The standard "accident sequence" was that one of the R 4450's would catch on fire, and since the casing of the engine was magnesium-it would burn at white hot temperatures thereby causing the wing spar to heat up and fail OR the gas in one of the wing tanks to explode, either way the B-29 went down in a hurry and often the crew did not have a chance to bail out.
> ...



I'd like to know your references for the first statement as far as jail time is concerned. There were government investigations of Curtiss Wright

The Curtiss-Wright Corporation

Curtiss Wright didn't secure any post war contacts and in the end got out of the airframe manufacturing business. The company downsized and found it's niche in manufacturing accessories.

The B-29 was problematic but by the spring/ summer of 1945 many of the bugs were worked out and the aircraft served its role well. Talk to some of the men who flew them, but then again it was a jump ahead in technology.


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## model299 (Mar 14, 2012)

Southron said:


> .......even today most people don't realize what a flying disaster World War II B-29's were.



I think that's engaging in a fair amount of hyperbole to call them "flying disasters." 

Compared to the B-17, the B-29 was a huge leap forward in term of aeronautical technology in just about every aspect.

Part of the problem was the wartime rush to get it into production and active service, while still working out a lot of problems the designers were encountering for the first time.

I also think it's exaggeration to lay the deaths of airmen "At the hand of the Curtiss Wright Corp." Remember that a lot of the overheating problems were due to the tight engine cowls used by Boeing. 

Add to those problems the fact that production workers whose idea of "high tech" was a Philco tube radio with pushbuttons were getting on the job training using tools and techniques they'd never encountered before in their lives.

EDIT: Spanked by FLYBOYJ!


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## model299 (Mar 14, 2012)

When I volunteered at the now-closed Planes Of Fame museum at Flying Cloud Airport, I had the chance to meet a group of B-29 crewmembers who were having a mini-reunion, and were touring our facility. I talked to several pilots, and to a man, they all professed their love of the aircraft and admiration of its capabilities.

One told me that when fully (Usually over-) loaded with fuel and ordinance, they used every inch of the Marianas runways to get in the air. Then getting up to cruising speed and altitude took careful flying as well. But, he also told me that when rid of the bombs and ammunition, and with a reduced fuel load, the plane "was a delight to fly. Fast and responsive to a light fingertip touch on the yoke." That was his direct quote. I remember it well. He also said that since the war, he always flew on Boeing products if he had anything to say about it.


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## buffnut453 (Mar 14, 2012)

Ask any pilot and he'll defend his aircraft against all-comers. I'm not discounting the accounts of these veterans, simply stating a fact. A pilot who doesn't like his aircraft isn't effective in his job. Look at the accounts from pilots of "less able" aircraft such as P-39s and most, if not all, will evince affection for their steeds. This is a truism that's as alive today as it was back in WWII.


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## model299 (Mar 14, 2012)

I'm quite aware of that. I was just relating an experience of mine.


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## GregP (Mar 14, 2012)

The B-29 had 371 combat losses in 34,000 sorties. 

Methinks your namiong of Curtiss-Wright as "killers" is a bit of unrealistic. That is basically a 1.1% loss rate, counting actual combat losses. Not too bad in ANYBODY's book in WWII.


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## Jabberwocky (Mar 15, 2012)

GregP said:


> The B-29 had 371 combat losses in 34,000 sorties.



371 losses is for the XXI BC only. The XX BC also operated B-29s. 

USAAF statistical digest gives 501 first line B-29 losses (combat and accident) from 31,387 total sorties and 29,153 effective sorties for the Twentieth Air Force (XX and XXI bomber commands) as a whole.

That's a loss rate of 1.57% per sortie and 1.72% per effective sortie.

Of the losses:

36.25% of the 130 losses for XX BC were due to enemy action. Of this percentage, 75.9% of losses were due to enemy fighters, the remainder to AAA.

35.3% of the 371 losses for XXI BC were due to enemy action. Of this percentage, 44.1% were due to fighters, 39.8% to AAA and the remaining 16.1% to a combination of both.

May 1945 was the worst month for B-29 losses, with 88 aircraft lost. 

In return, B-29s claimed kills for a total of 1128 enemy aircraft. Of those, 914 were claimed as aerial kills.

Of the non-effective sorties, 73.6% were caused by mechanical issues, 26% due to 'other issues' and the remaining due to weather.


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## GregP (Mar 15, 2012)

Still not a bad loss rate overall. Many OTHER aircraft also had relative high operational (non-combat) losses, too.

Also, earlier in this thread, someone said the germans would have stepped up the production of the Ta-152 if the B-29 had been assigned to the ETO.

I must heartily disagree. The B-29 was first deployed in march 1944 and would probably never have made the ETO until at least summer 1944, even if they wanted to use it there. By summer 1944, even teh germans knew the war was lost. They were getting pounded day and night by bombs. Don;t you think they put all their efforts into the Ta-152 that could be assigned? With national survival at stake, I don't think they held any effort in reserve so they could make great fighters in a post-war Germany. They DID put all their efforts into fighter development and they delivered about 43 Ta-152s.

The arrival of the B-29 would not have changed that at all becasue there was nothing more they could do.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 15, 2012)

The B-29 was never intended for Europe. It was planned to have the B-32 replace both B-17 and B-24


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## JoeB (Mar 15, 2012)

Jabberwocky said:


> 371 losses is for the XXI BC only. The XX BC also operated B-29s.
> 
> USAAF statistical digest gives 501 first line B-29 losses (combat and accident) from 31,387 total sorties and 29,153 effective sorties for the Twentieth Air Force (XX and XXI bomber commands) as a whole.
> 
> ...


Here's the actual page for Stats Digest on losses from which I was quoting earlier. It's similar to but doesn't exactly agree with what you said. Note it includes both XX and XXI BC's and also 20th AF Fighters. For just 'Very Heavy Bomber', which would be B-29's, as I mentioned officially 74 were lost to enemy fighters and 19 to AA and fighters, besides 54 to AA and 267 to other causes on combat missions, 414 total on combat missions. However as I mentioned, the 267 would appear to include at least a fair number of a/c damaged by fighters or AA which ditched far from Japan or were destroyed in crashlandings, and it's not apparent whether any of the totals include a/c which were written off despite less than total destruction in crashlandings, or were converted to training-only status, which seems to have happened in some cases as well. The % of true of operational losses is not clear. Again see my analysis of B-29 losses to air action in Korea, where going through case by case in the original records, the total of loss/write offs related to or possibly related to enemy fighter action comes up somewhat higher than the total that was given in the USAF Stats Digest for that war. 

For context note that the total combat mission loss rate of B-17's and B-24's in WWII was only slightly higher than that quoted for the B-29, 1.6-some % for both. We're accumstomed perhaps to thinking of the very difficult missions of those earlier bombers over Germany in 1943-44 with significantly higher loss rates, but they were also used against weaker opposition over occupied Europe, weak in some cases in the Pacific, and often weak in 1945 in all theaters. And the opposition to B-29 operations in summer 1945, when the B-29 force was much bigger than it had been in late 44-early 45, got to be quite weak.

The B-29 was not crippled in its effectiveness by bad engines in 1944-45. The really crippling engine problems were what delayed the plane until then. But the residual engine problems were a serious factor in mission planning well into 1945, and alone enough to discard the idea of using the planes in 'high speed formations'. That idea isn't necessarily practical for any WWII bombers, but the B-29's of the early campaign v Japan could not take any unecessary stress on the their engines without elevating losses to probably wipe out any benefit. As it was, operations evolved to lower altitude, even in daylight, to reduce engine strain, though also to get better accuracy. B-29 operational loss rates in Korea were considerably lower than in WWII, but even then very high compared to what we're accustomed to for later generation a/c. Engines like the R-3350 were highly complex machines compared to either earlier a/c piston engines, or fundamentally simpler gas turbine engines later.

Army Air Forces in World War II

Joe


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## Vincenzo (Mar 15, 2012)

Are available the losses in not combat mission?


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## davparlr (Mar 15, 2012)

JoeB said:


> For context note that the total combat mission loss rate of B-17's and B-24's in WWII was only slightly higher than that quoted for the B-29, 1.6-some % for both.



We must remember that the B-29 carried over 3 times the typical bomb load of the B-17/24 so the loss per lb of bombs delivered is significantly less.



> but the B-29's of the early campaign v Japan could not take any unecessary stress on the their engines without elevating losses to probably wipe out any benefit. As it was, operations evolved to lower altitude, even in daylight, to reduce engine strain, though also to get better accuracy. B-29 operational loss rates in Korea were considerably lower than in WWII, but even then very high compared to what we're accustomed to for later generation a/c. Engines like the R-3350 were highly complex machines compared to either earlier a/c piston engines, or fundamentally simpler gas turbine engines later.



Again, the missions to Japan, by definition, was highly stressed at max performance. ETO missions would have been different. They could be flown with 10,000 lbs less weight and less than half the flying time per mission. Trading off the stress accumulated on a mission to Tokyo in comparison a mission to Berlin, the Berlin aircraft performance could significantly be improved without exceeding the accumulated stress of a Tokyo mission.


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## wuzak (Mar 15, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The B-29 was never intended for Europe. It was planned to have the B-32 replace both B-17 and B-24



Is this really the case, or was the B-32 simply a backup in case the B-29 program hit problems?


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## Southron (Mar 15, 2012)

I have absolutely no doubt that many B-29 pilots that survived the war will speak highly of the B-29. That is kinda like the stories among sailors that dolphins would find shipwrecked sailors in the water and push them to the beach-saving their lives. These sailors would praise dolphins and credit them with human like intelligence.

Then someone realized that dolphins are just "playful animals" and they like to push things around in the water. Of course, the sailors that got pushed out to sea by dolphins were never heard from again!!!! 

Sadly, a lot of B-29 crew members died because of the problems with the early Curtiss-Wright R 3350's and they aren't around to tell us what happened to them or what a killer the airplane they were in was.

There is a reason the Curtiss-Wright company "downsized" following World War II and those early R 3350's had a lot to do with it!

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## JoeB (Mar 15, 2012)

davparlr said:


> 1. We must remember that the B-29 carried over 3 times the typical bomb load of the B-17/24 so the loss per lb of bombs delivered is significantly less.
> 
> 2. Again, the missions to Japan, by definition, was highly stressed at max performance. ETO missions would have been different. They could be flown with 10,000 lbs less weight and less than half the flying time per mission. Trading off the stress accumulated on a mission to Tokyo in comparison a mission to Berlin, the Berlin aircraft performance could significantly be improved without exceeding the accumulated stress of a Tokyo mission.


1. Sorry, that doesn't make basic sense. The *number* of losses was smaller per lb of bombs dropped, but a % is a %. At 1.6% loss per sortie you've got to produce a whole new set of airplanes every 62 missions (to keep the bombing force constantly the same size), whether big planes or small planes. And while the big plane carries more bombs, it obviously also costs more to make. And the B-29 cost an extremely large amount of money to develop, by the standards of that time, as opposed to the earlier types, or evolutionary developments thereof (the B-32 was more along that line, an evolution of earlier Consolidated designs).

Anyway loss rate is very heavily influenced by opposition, obviously. It's just interesting that the B-17 and B-24 loss rates were practically identical, and also about the same as the B-29. That doesn't itself prove that all three planes were equally vulnerable in the same exact conditions; they didn't necessarily experience the same conditions on average, though the loss rates did come out about the same.

2. The answer here also relates to point 1. The B-29 was justified mainly by its ability to range from the Marianas to Japan and back with considerable payload, not by its speed or max payload, and again the money spent on developing the B-29 was extravagent even by US WWII military spending standards. OTOH that range was just not required in the ETO, and the theoretically greater speed and altitude capablities of the B-29 would have been only moderate advantages in Europe: bombers couldn't practically formate at near their top speeds, and B-29's proved they were too inaccurate from 30k ft in the campaign against Japan, and would similarly have been in ETO.

If the USAAF didn't have a plane like the B-29, bases would have had to have been seized considerably closer to Japan than the Marianas to start the bombing campaign against Japan in earnest. That's the big difference between the B-29 and sticking w/ the earlier generation US bombers; that plus ability to lift the then very heavy early A-bombs.

Joe


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## wuzak (Mar 15, 2012)

JoeB said:


> and B-29's proved they were too inaccurate from 30k ft in the campaign against Japan, and would similarly have been in ETO.



Would that be any different than B-17s bombing from 30k feet?

One thing is for sure - if crews in the ETO had B-29s to replace their B-17s fewer men would have suffered from frostbite.


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## Siegfried (Mar 15, 2012)

The B-29 has a kind of Consolidated herritage as well. George Schairer was instrumental in getting the Davis wing put into the B-24. He was hired into Boeing by the test pilot Edmund T. "Eddie" Allen who latter lost his life a B-29 that crashed due to an engine fire. Schairer then went on to do the wing on the B-29 and of course was responsible for getting swept wings on to the B-47. In some cases wars can go differently but for people like these.


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## GregP (Mar 16, 2012)

The B-32 was ostensibly produced in case the B-29 failed, at least that is the popular claptrap.

It may well have been the planeed replacement for the B-17 / B-24's but, if so, was overtaken by the development of jet engines. Once the B-45 flew, almost every piston design for a bomber was more or less put "on hold" to allow the maturation of jet engines. Naturally the military wanted the jets, and would wait for them to be "practical."

Still, I think the B-32 would have been a good aircraft.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 16, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Would that be any different than B-17s bombing from 30k feet?



i think not, but B-17 not bombing from 30k, maybe around 25k, somewhere there were statistical data but i can't find it


edit, for clear it's not that B-17 can not bombing from 30k but that commonly not bombing from so high altitude


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## Shortround6 (Mar 16, 2012)

GregP said:


> The B-32 was ostensibly produced in case the B-29 failed, at least that is the popular claptrap.
> 
> It may well have been the planeed replacement for the B-17 / B-24's but, if so, was overtaken by the development of jet engines. Once the B-45 flew, almost every piston design for a bomber was more or less put "on hold" to allow the maturation of jet engines. Naturally the military wanted the jets, and would wait for them to be "practical."
> 
> Still, I think the B-32 would have been a good aircraft.



I am not so sure about the "claptrap" except in the case of the B-32 being put on "hold" once the B-45 flew.
B-45 didn't fly until March of 1947? A little late to put a hold on the B-32 program which effectively stopped in Oct 1945 when production was halted with the 118 aircraft. By that time most of the bugs had been worked out of the B-29 and the B-29/B-50 could hold the peace time Air Force until the jets showed up.


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## JoeB (Mar 16, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Would that be any different than B-17s bombing from 30k feet?


No, but B-17's didn't bomb from 30k ft in Europe, typically more like low-mid 20's which also eventually became typical for B-29's over Japan (on daylight bombing missions, night fire bombing and minelaying missions were flown at much lower altitudes). B-17's in theory could bomb from 30k. The plane's turbocharged engines gave it excellent altitude performance, and B-17's did fly that high on some early missions in the Pacific, to avoid fighter interception, but lacked adequate accuracy. 

Anyway a lot of the discussion on thread is about the altitude challenge B-29's presented to Japanese fighters or would to German fighters, but the basic problem that's being ignored there is proven inadequate accuracy bombing from that high up. B-29's would have had to abandon very high altitude bombing in ETO just like they did over Japan, to hit stuff, the main idea of bombing. So the altitude capabilities of the plane were not practically speaking a big advantage, as far as conventional bombing anyway.

Joe


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## davparlr (Mar 16, 2012)

JoeB said:


> 1.	Sorry, that doesn't make basic sense. The *number* of losses was smaller per lb of bombs dropped, but a % is a %. At 1.6% loss per sortie you've got to produce a whole new set of airplanes every 62 missions (to keep the bombing force constantly the same size), whether big planes or small planes. And while the big plane carries more bombs, it obviously also costs more to make. And the B-29 cost an extremely large amount of money to develop, by the standards of that time, as opposed to the earlier types, or evolutionary developments thereof (the B-32 was more along that line, an evolution of earlier Consolidated designs).



Unit cost is certainly an issue, however, so are lives, development cost were already justified in the PTO. Per cent loss per sortie is not relevant unless efficiency of sortie is included. Since the B-29 can carry over three times the bomb load of a B-17, and the number of bombs on target is critical (it has been reported that 7% of bombs will fall into 1k ft circle), then for equal number of bombs released, therefore an equivalent target kill probability, less than one third B-29 sorties would be required. 300 B-29 sorties would have the same target destruction effectivity as 1000 B-17 sorties. On that particular mission, 16 B-17s and 160 crew members would be lost, whereas 5 B-29s and 55 crewmembers would be lost.



> 2.
> 
> Anyway loss rate is very heavily influenced by opposition, obviously. It's just interesting that the B-17 and B-24 loss rates were practically identical, and also about the same as the B-29. That doesn't itself prove that all three planes were equally vulnerable in the same exact conditions; they didn't necessarily experience the same conditions on average, though the loss rates did come out about the same.



Yes, but for identical opposition, the B-29 is going to be far more effective in that it is higher, faster cruising , and has a faster combat run. Flak coverage would be significantly reduced to almost pin points. Interceptor performance, needing to go five to ten thousand feet higher, would be affected by time and fuel use to get up them, would be significantly reduced in maneuver with reattacks virtually impossible, and have limited time to engage due to ingress and egress being significantly less. It is not realistic to believe their loss rates would be equal to the B-17 or B-24 in the same environment. 



> 3.	OTOH that range was just not required in the ETO, and the theoretically greater speed and altitude capablities of the B-29 would have been only moderate advantages in Europe: bombers couldn't practically formate at near their top speeds,


I don’t see a problem here. As long as normal rate power was maintained or time limits on Mil power was adhered to, high speed formation flying should be no problem. Mission planning for bombers did not include rapid changes in direction, not necessarily due to engine limitations but rather keeping vast herds of bombers together. I am not sure where you get this.



> 4. and B-29's proved they were too inaccurate from 30k ft in the campaign against Japan, and would similarly have been in ETO.


I disagree with this. Over Japan the Jet Stream flows mainly west to east while the attack route is South to North. With strong cross winds, accurate weapon release is extremely difficult. In Europe the attack route is roughly west to east so small cross winds can be handled and targeting resolutions should be much simpler.

The B-2 bomber was designed to drop dumb bombs (these bombs had funny little yellow and black decals on the side) from much higher altitudes and strike targets much more accurately than that required in WW2, all the while, blind. While the B-2 has a sophisticated astro-inertial guidance systems and radar, neither of these would have been more accurate than the optical system on the B-29. Of course the bombs of the B-2 were aerodynamically designed and defined whereas the WW2 bombs were not, which would certainly affect accuracy. In any event, properly planned and properly flown, bombers in Europe should have been reasonably accurate from 30+ ft, which was most likely impossible over Japan due to the strong cross wind and lack of mission planning options.


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## JoeB (Mar 17, 2012)

davparlr said:


> 1. Unit cost is certainly an issue, however, so are lives, development cost were already justified in the PTO. Per cent loss per sortie is not relevant unless efficiency of sortie is included. Since the B-29 can carry over three times the bomb load of a B-17, and the number of bombs on target is critical (it has been reported that 7% of bombs will fall into 1k ft circle), then for equal number of bombs released, therefore an equivalent target kill probability, less than one third B-29 sorties would be required. 300 B-29 sorties would have the same target destruction effectivity as 1000 B-17 sorties. On that particular mission, 16 B-17s and 160 crew members would be lost, whereas 5 B-29s and 55 crewmembers would be lost.
> 
> 2. Yes, but for identical opposition, the B-29 is going to be far more effective in that it is higher, faster cruising , and has a faster combat run.
> 
> ...


1. My point was that it's nonsense to directly compare a similar loss ratio to a larger bomb load and conclude the plane with the bigger bomb load is automatically more effective per loss. The bigger plane will cost more, depends how much more. I'm not ruling out that the B-29 would be more effective in the long run if you took all the correct factors into account. 

But you leave out the biggest 'cost' of the B-29 program in context of WWII, which was time. Time is money in the economy, but time is even more critical in all out war. In real history, by the time B-29's were available in significant numbers in truly operational units, the bombing campaign in Europe was basically over. Even the B-29 force flying from the Marianas in Nov 44-Feb 45 in the initial high altitude campaign was small by 8th/15th AF standards, and the bombing campaign in ETO mainly won by then; the earlier B-29 force flying from China from mid 44 smaller still.

Sometimes we get going on 'what ifs' excluding/modifying certain facts of real history, then make other statements selectively using actual history which don't really make sense, and I think that's what you are doing here. It doesn't make much sense to point out the eventually higher efficiency of the mature B-29, which is typical of any larger plane, 'economy of scale' , but to ignore the fact that in real history the protracted development and debugging of the B-29 took too long for the plane to have been of much use in the war in Europe. 

2. This is just repeating an assertion which has already been refuted with historical facts:
-it was seldom practical for bombers to fly formations close to their max speeds, and especially dicey for the B-29 with immature R-3350's especially prior to around late spring of '45, when the war in Europe was over.
-bombers with WWII bombing technology could not hit accurately from 30k ft.

3. This is not correct. Although the targets in Japan lay mainly north of the Marianas, the bombers were able to choose initial points relative to the targets in order to have (what they believed were) the most favorable heading relative to the wind. Bomb runs were not made with known crosswinds. This is in another category of web board silliness, assuming the planners in WWII ignored obvious and easy solutions to problems.

4. This is entirely irrelevant, besides being debateable. B-2's always use JDAM's to get adequate conventional bombing accuracy from high altitude, but in any case WWII bombers had WWII technology, not the B-2's. A slightly more relevant comparison might be B-52's in combat in Vietnam with conventional unguided bombs, where bombing altitudes exceeded 30k ft, and accuracy was adequate using strictly radar bombing techniques. But even those radar bombing systems were far superior to those available in WWII. 

5. There is not only no evidence to support that statement, but it's specifically contradicted by operational history in both Europe and the Pacific. The 8th/15th AF's struggled mightily to attain what they viewed as adequate accuracy in European conditions even bombing from the mid 20's kt; any lower elevated vulnerability to AA fire too much but raising bombing alt would have been quite out of the question, on accuracy grounds. A given bombing technology is going to miss by more the higher the plane flies, simple physics, and the B-29 in general didn't have revolutionarily better systems than late war B-17/24's (an exception was B-29's fitted with APQ-7 which attained radar bombing accuracy comparable to [practically achievable, not theoretically achievable] daylight bombing, but even those a/c bombed from less than 20k ft at night, a small % of the B-29's in the final weeks of the Pac War). There's a huge literature on the USAAF's struggles with bombing accuracy in the ETO, perhaps you should read some of it. 

And the direct evidence of B-29 operations over Japan shows that the initial altitudes sometimes exceeding 30k were reduced to more like 27k after LeMay took over in late January 1945. Then when B-29's returned to some day missions in April (after the night fire raids in March) altitudes were more like 24-5, similar to the older bombers in Europe: one big reason was to hit stuff, and the other was to reduce engine strain and resultant operational losses even with ~230-250mph typical cruise speeds, again putting paid to the idea of prolonged military power operations by B-29's at that time. "Blankets of Fire" by Werrell is a good book on the B-29 over Japan.

Joe


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 17, 2012)

Korean War: The Boeing B-29 Superfortress Served Throughout the Air War

Interesting narrative on B-29 operations during* the Korean war * -- by 1950 the USAF had mastered the complexities of the B-29 and moved on to even more complicated (sophisticated) systems. Korea was a real test of the B-29 crews and bombing strategy.

Worth reading.

MM


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## GregP (Mar 17, 2012)

JoeB, your #4 staement is incorrect, as far as I know. The B-29 WAS deisgned to bomb from 30,000 feet with accuracy. The issue over Japan WAS the jetstream.

That is from B-29 crewmembers. When they combed lower, it was at night, mostly ... or ina high-speed descent from 30,000+ feet to gain speed over the target and in egress in the slight dive. The B-29 performed VERY well, espcially considering it was ordered off the drawing board into production with basically no service prototypes flying to "debug" ... it went straight into production. Sure, they had a few issues. So dd the P-51. the P-38, the B-17, the B-24, the He-177, Fw 190, etc. Nothing to write home about, and all issues were corrected.


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## Ratsel (Mar 17, 2012)

$3,000,000,000+ in todays american dollars for the B-29 losses.. Thats alot of scratch!


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## GregP (Mar 17, 2012)

Ratsel, the B-29 unit cost was $639,188 each. If you plug that into an inflation calculator, it equal $7,835,386 (7.835 million dollars) in 2010 dollars, the most recent year I found ... not 3 billion dollars. F-22 Raptors cost the taxpayer $150 millon each and are flying with our armed forces now, which is more than 19 times the cost of a B-29.

I didn't add up the total war losses above, just the unit cost. But, then again, I never added up the total war losses for ANY type before, either. We lost 371 B-29's to combat, so the cost iin today's dollars would be $2.9 billion, close to your number. Good thing we had such a low loss rate, huh?

The B-17 cost us $238,329 each in 1944 dollars, which is $$2.921 millon each in today's dollars. We lost 4,754 in WW2, adding up to $13.888 billon! or about 4.78 times the cost of the B-29 losses.

So, what is your point? Yes, the war was expensive, but the B-29 losses were WAY down on the list.


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## Ratsel (Mar 17, 2012)

GregP said:


> Ratsel, the B-29 unit cost was $639,188 each. If you plug that into an inflation calculator, it equal $7,835,386 (7.835 million dollars) in 2010 dollars, the most recent year I found ... hardly 3 billion dollars. Maybe you missed a decimal place? F-22 Raptors cost the taxpayer 150 millon each and are flying with our armed forces now, which is more than 19 times the cost of a B-29.


$3,000,000,000 *TOTAL* (todays scratch) for the *300+ B-29's loss*. I guess about 8mil each in todays scratch. Or am I still wrong?


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## GregP (Mar 18, 2012)

No, you're not. Did you even read my reply above? 

I stated above the cost was about $7.835 million each (close to your $8 million figure), and that the cost of B-29 losses were only about 21% of the cost of B-17 losses (1 / 4.78 ). So, the B-29 was way far from the most expensive bomber in LOSSES and delivered about 2.5 - 5.0 times the payload per aircraft of the B-17, depending on range of mission. I'd say it was WAY more effective and a much better bomber overall.

So, you are correct, it is a lot of money. But so was the entire war, which is one reason we tried our best to stay out of it. If we had followed the WWI Treaty of Versailles example and had asked Germany to pay for the entire war, they could never get it paid and would still be in poverty. France and the Soviet Union never paid us for war debt, either, but we're not still complaining about it. 

Live and learn. If they get into trouble in the future as far as national survival goes, they shouldn't count on the U.S.A. to bail them out with that track record. At least, if I were in charge, I wouldn't. 

Of course, the government does what it does, and usually doesn't take into account the opinions of the citizens, so you never know.


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## Ratsel (Mar 18, 2012)

Well I did read your reply, I don't think you read mine first post though. Like I said, 3 billion today's dollars for all those b-29 losses. Over and out, cheers.


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## GregP (Mar 18, 2012)

OK, cheers, and it IS a lot of money. 

Of course, I don't know of any cheap airplanes, especially of the military variety.

Hey, the cost of Grumman G650 bizjet is more than 6 times the cost today of a B-29! I don't know what that says about people who fly them, but it must say something, don't you think?

Maybe the B-29 was bargain at $8M in today's dollars.

Wish an F-22 or F-35 was only $8M!


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2012)

The money circulation growt up with time so inflaction calculator not give a actual money value, the error go larger with the time, try to converter in gold 638k $ of 1945 and reconvert the gold in 2012 $.
the losses of B-29 program was not only that in combat, hundreds of B-29 were losses not in combat


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2012)

300+ B-29s were lost during WW2, about another 100+ in Korea to "all causes" (chime in anytime JoeB), and there were almost 4000 built. If any of the numbers are correct this combat/ other operation attrition rate will be about 11 - 13% which is still pretty remarkable considering the way the aircraft was rushed into production, the lack of prototype aircraft, the jump in technology this aircraft brought to the table and the different roles this aircraft was deployed in.


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## pbfoot (Mar 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> 300+ B-29s were lost during WW2, about another 100+ in Korea to "all causes" (chime in anytime JoeB), and there were almost 4000 built. If any of the numbers are correct this combat/ other operation attrition rate will be about 11 - 13% which is still pretty remarkable considering the way the aircraft was rushed into production, the lack of prototype aircraft, the jump in technology this aircraft brought to the table and the different roles this aircraft was deployed in.


Seems good to me if you compare other large aircraft of the period maybe even lower then most


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## tyrodtom (Mar 18, 2012)

Compared to some other weapon systems of the time $7.8 million might not be so bad .
Each V2 rocket costs the equivilent of $3.8 million , plus 30 tons of potatoes had to be used to make the ethanol for each launch. That's the 1944 cost of a V2, that early 1945 cost was about half that, $ 1.7 million.

Did 4 average V2s manage to do as much damage as a average B-29 in it's service life?


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## cimmex (Mar 18, 2012)

Rockets are still in service, B-29 not
cimmex


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## tyrodtom (Mar 18, 2012)

cimmex said:


> Rockets are still in service, B-29 not
> cimmex


V2 rockets ?? Only in static displays.
There's a B-29 still flying.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> 300+ B-29s were lost during WW2, about another 100+ in Korea to "all causes" (chime in anytime JoeB), and there were almost 4000 built. If any of the numbers are correct this combat/ other operation attrition rate will be about 11 - 13% which is still pretty remarkable considering the way the aircraft was rushed into production, the lack of prototype aircraft, the jump in technology this aircraft brought to the table and the different roles this aircraft was deployed in.



414 were losses in combat mission in WWII [table 165], an other 87 were losses in accidents from 20th air force and an other 105 were dropped to 2nd line (one of this was loss for accident) [table 101], an other 119 were losses in accidents in continental US [table 214], an other 10 were losses en route from US to theaters [Table 108]. So total B-29 losses all cause in WWII were almost 631, for true higher because all VH Bomber losses were 772 [table 99] and not other losse can go from other models

adding
B-29 bomber production in WWII 3,763 [table 76]
and checking B-32 was not considered VH only H so all the 772 losses are for B-29. the alone plane in VH category, not B-29, it's the B-19 prototype


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## Siegfried (Mar 18, 2012)

GregP said:


> Ratsel, the B-29 unit cost was $639,188 each. If you plug that into an inflation calculator.



OK, where did you find that app?


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> 414 were losses in combat mission in WWII [table 165], an other 87 were losses in accidents from 20th air force and an other 105 were dropped to 2nd line (one of this was loss for accident) [table 101], an other 119 were losses in accidents in continental US [table 214], an other 10 were losses en route from US to theaters [Table 108]. So total B-29 losses all cause in WWII were almost 631, for true higher because all VH Bomber losses were 772 [table 99] and not other losse can go from other models
> 
> adding
> B-29 bomber production in WWII 3,763 [table 76]
> and checking B-32 was not considered VH only H so all the 772 losses are for B-29. the alone plane in VH category, not B-29, it's the B-19 prototype



So if we throw in the 100+ from Korea the attrition rate goes to about 23% for both combat and non-combat losses. I bet if you compare that rate to other bombers of the day you'll probably find similar numbers. Also consider that the B-29s were flying the longest distances of the war over oceans.


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## GregP (Mar 18, 2012)

Sorry about the errant post earlier about Nitrous Oxide and Gasoline. My foray into Nitrous Oxide was about 10 years ago and I got a couple of things wrong.

I said Nitrous Oxide contained about 34% Oxygen. To be accurate, it is 33%.

I said gasoline had about 24% Oxygen and it has none. To be accurate, AIR has about 21% Oxygen.

So, instead of 24% and 34%, it is actually 21% and 33% Oxygen when burning Nitrous Oxide instead of an air-gasoline mixture.

The result is the same, you get very LEAN on Nitrous Oxide unless you compensate by adding extra gasoline when Nitrous Oxide is introduced in the intake system. The valve to do this is usually actuated by a solenoid. If the wet system gasoline solenoid fails to actuate, you destroy the engine within seconds. I've seen a Corvette do it on a dynamometer, and it isn't a nice thing to watch, or cheap.

I do not believe the Germans had digital fuel controller in WWII; their system was mechanical. Nitrous consumption is RAPID in a large displacement engine. At Reno, they usually go through a tank in 2-3 laps. Of course the tanks are not overly large in racing aircraft, but the butn rate is tremendous. I doubt serriously the Germans could use GM-1 for more than 8 - 10 minutes without running out of Nirtous Oxide, but that is just my opinion.

The sum of all this makes me doubt the ability of a GM-1-equiped Fw 190 (or other fighter) to catch a B-29 if the Superfort is at high speed and if the Fw depends on the extra speed produced by GM-1 use, unless the Fw 190 is in a great position to start with. That is, I doubt the Fw 190 would have enough GM-1 to climb, say, 5000 feet and then accelerate and catch the fast-moving B-29. Now if the Fw 190 was already at the same altitude or higher, then the GM-1 could be used to simply accelerate and catch the B-29. 

The point is the B-29 is is a game changer if it attacks fast. If it attacks at 220 mph, then it is as vulnerable as the B-17 / B-24's were.

If the B-29 cruise-climbs to 30,000+ feet at 220 mph and stays at that power but starts a descent on the way to the target, it can arrive at the target at over 300 mph while not running the engines much harder than for a 230 mph cruise, using the descent to speed up. Again, the speed makes a harder target for teh defending fighters. Not impossible, but harder to find and attack than a B-17 or B-24. Plus, it drops more than twice and many bombs per aircraft. All that makes for a tough job for the Luftwaffe, who were already in some difficulty with the existing attackers.

So, the B-29 was not impossible to attack successfully ... it was simply a harder target moving faster, thereby making for fewer attack passes and tougher interception. In real life, the B-29 never attacked in the ETO, but the above was also true for defenders where it DID attack.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2012)

Heavy bomber production (june 40 to august 45) 31,000 (B-172432)
Heavy bomber losses 14,280 (this is comparable with 772 for B-29)
Heavy bomber effective missions 500,139 (with the exception of ETO, only from jan 43)

B-29 production 3,763
B-29 losses 772
B-29 effective missions 29,153

so HB loss/prod 0.46, loss/missions* per thousand 28.6 overstimed because absence most '42 missions
VHB loss/prod 0.20, loss/missions* per thousand 26.5

* this is indicatve of cost not capability to survive to mission, are all losses not combat mission lost.

HB missions from '43 499,385, losses from '43 13,837 losses/missions per thousand 27.7


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> Heavy bomber production (june 40 to august 45) 31,000 (B-172432)
> Heavy bomber losses 14,280 (this is comparable with 772 for B-29)
> Heavy bomber effective missions 500,139 (with the exception of ETO, only from jan 43)
> 
> ...



I assume these numbers are from the USAF AAF historical database...

I have a problem with "effective mission." What defines that? The bombers hitting their target or by their shear presence causing the enemy to surrender, retreat of change tactics? The numbers still show how the "VHB" compared to the B-17 and B-24 (and I know the B-32 was removed from the equasion)

Again, not taking anything away from the ETO, give me the English Channel over the Pacific Ocean any day!

No matter how you look at it the B-29 was a super weapon worth the cost and was probably the 2nd most potent aerial weapon of WW2 next to the atomic bomb.


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## Ratsel (Mar 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> No matter how you look at it the B-29 was a super weapon worth the cost and was probably the 2nd most potent aerial weapon of WW2 next to the atomic bomb.


Only in PTO/CBI. In the MTO and ETO is wasn't worth the paper it was designed on.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2012)

GregP said:


> If the B-29 cruise-climbs to 30,000+ feet at 220 mph and stays at that power but starts a descent on the way to the target, it can arrive at the target at over 300 mph while not running the engines much harder than for a 230 mph cruise, using the descent to speed up. Again, the speed makes a harder target for teh defending fighters. Not impossible, but harder to find and attack than a B-17 or B-24. Plus, it drops more than twice and many bombs per aircraft. All that makes for a tough job for the Luftwaffe, who were already in some difficulty with the existing attackers.
> 
> So, the B-29 was not impossible to attack successfully ... it was simply a harder target moving faster, thereby making for fewer attack passes and tougher interception. In real life, the B-29 never attacked in the ETO, but the above was also true for defenders where it DID attack.



Great points - and for the record - just because you have a fighter that has a top speed of 400 mph + intercepting a bomber at 230 mph at 30K doesn't mean you're going to be able to catch the target and get a firing solution. You're also fighting winds aloft that may slow (or enhance) your climb as well as the bombers taking advantage of winds aloft as well. Combine that with running at max power in the climb plus max fuel consumption and yes, you have a MAJOR game changer.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> Only in PTO/CBI. In the MTO and ETO is wasn't worth the paper it was designed on.


Your opinion for what its worth, but then again you show little or nothing to back up your adolescent claims


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## Siegfried (Mar 18, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> V2 rockets ?? Only in static displays..



Time for the discovery channel to fund a V2 missile recreation and launch. It's the one good thing that comes out of pay TV.


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## Ratsel (Mar 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Your opinion for what its worth, but then again you show little or nothing to back up your adolescent claims


I'm sorry but I though those two WMD's were not used in Europe during WWII (1 at least to my knowledge, was never ever used in Europe). My humblest appologies if they were. Also, if they were, I would very much like a reference so I can read up on it. Many thanks!


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2012)

Ratsel said:


> I'm sorry but I though those two WMD's were not used in Europe during WWII (1 at least to my knowledge, was never ever used in Europe). My humblest appologies if they were. Also, if they were, I would very much like a reference so I can read up on it. Many thanks!


Tell you what - because you're such a little [email protected] I'm going to give you two weeks to read up on the B-29 and see why they weren't NEEDED in the MTO or ETO, probably because the writing was on the wall, but then again I'll let you research that. Let me know what size dunce cap you need.
EDIT - I forgot about your last outburst, you are now a permanent fixture in cyberspace


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2012)

Flyboyj
numbers came from "Army air forces statistical digest- world war II" same of the JoeB link but from a complete pdf 
effective "one wich carries out the purpose of mission" i think for bomber drop the bombs or the mines on the "target" (that they thinked was the target).

i don't think is a super weapon, is a superior bomber, and the newest heavy bomber of war, but numbers don't show a super weapons, same loss rate, true more laod but also more expensive to build, sure safe crews


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> Flyboyj
> numbers came from "Army air forces statistical digest- world war II" same of the JoeB link but from a complete pdf
> effective "one wich carries out the purpose of mission" i think for bomber drop the bombs or the mines on the "target" (that they thinked was the target).


Yes - that's the one, thanks!


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## wuzak (Mar 18, 2012)

I need some clarification.

B-17s in the ETO cruised at a slower speed than they were capable of - I always assumed this was to do with the need for close formations.

Did the B-17 formations speed up on the bomb run? I believe that, except for the first few raids, B-17s maintained their formation through the bomb run.

Did the tactics for teh B-29 ovr Japan differ from the B-17 in the ETO? That is, did they use looser formations, allowing for higher speeds, and did they bomb individually, or in formation?


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## Siegfried (Mar 18, 2012)

JoeB said:


> SNIP
> 
> Anyway a lot of the discussion on thread is about the altitude challenge B-29's presented to Japanese fighters or would to German fighters, but the basic problem that's being ignored there is proven inadequate accuracy bombing from that high up. B-29's would have had to abandon very high altitude bombing in ETO just like they did over Japan, to hit stuff, the main idea of bombing. So the altitude capabilities of the plane were not practically speaking a big advantage, as far as conventional bombing anyway.
> 
> Joe



Hi Joe, Love your website.

There was a considerable USAAF program to develop guided weapons, the AZON perhaps being the best known. The ones that a I know of and that saw use were:

1 AZON (AZimuth ONly) ie a command line of sight flare tracked bomb that could only be controlled left-right. Used mainly in the Paciffic from B-24's with the guidince controller often not in the B-24 but in a P-38 flying higher and further back.

2 BAT a radar guided glide bomb used against japanese shipping, it used a track locking radar. (Not much different from the track locking radar of the SCR-584 I Immagine)

3 The TV-guided "GB-4" radio controlled bomb which was used in combat, limited in use due to poor contrast for it BW nose camera. I believe the lack of gyrostabalised optics was another flaw.

4 TDR-1 a small piston engined color TV remote controlled RPV used against AAA sites on remote 'hoped' islands held by the Japanese.

Most of these weapons seem to have been at a deployable state around mid 1944 and apart from the BAT were built on small budgets. (this site gives the R+D costs of the BAT as greater than the Manhatten project: BatHead

Extraordinarily none of these techniques seem to have been used with B-29s: a free fall TV guided glide or vertical fall weapon likely would have been effective given the superior light conditions in the pacific.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2012)

wuzak said:


> I need some clarification.
> 
> B-17s in the ETO cruised at a slower speed than they were capable of - I always assumed this was to do with the need for close formations.
> 
> ...



B-17s cruised at lower speeds for formation purposes and conserving fuel AFAIK. Formation flying is not an easy feat especially in a multi engine aircraft. Over the target the bombardier is actually "flying" the aircraft through the bomb sight and autopilot system. Those following behind flew the same speed and held formation. Later in the war only the lead plane had a bombardier, the rest carried a "toggler," an NCO who just threw a switch on command.

Over Japan LeMay changed tactics and B-29s bombed at lower levels with incendiaries


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## tyrodtom (Mar 18, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Most of these weapons seem to have been at a deployable state around mid 1944 and apart from the BAT were built on small budgets. (this site gives the R+D costs of the BAT as greater than the Manhatten project:
> 
> I think you need to read that again, it says exceeded only by the Manhatten Project, then gives the cost as 700 million in 2004 dollars.
> The Manhatten Project cost 1.8 billion up to Oct. 45, and that is in 1945 dollars. 24.4 billion in todays dollars. There would have to be many, many, projects that would have fit in between the cost of those two projects.


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## GregP (Mar 18, 2012)

Shortround, RE post 75 or so, the B-45 may well have flown in 1947, but the design development was begun in 1944, and the USAAF, shortly to become the USAF, was certainly aware of the development of the B-45, having issued the requirement. I say the B-32 (and others) WAS put on hold by the B-45.

If you disagree, you are free to do so.


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## wuzak (Mar 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> B-17s cruised at lower speeds for formation purposes and conserving fuel AFAIK. Formation flying is not an easy feat especially in a multi engine aircraft. Over the target the bombardier is actually "flying" the aircraft through the bomb sight and autopilot system. Those following behind flew the same speed and held formation. Later in the war only the lead plane had a bombardier, the rest carried a "toggler," an NCO who just threw a switch on command.
> 
> Over Japan LeMay changed tactics and B-29s bombed at lower levels with incendiaries



This is what I am trying to point out. If B-29s had been sent to Europe, it is likely that the same, or very similar, tactics as those for the B-17 would have been used. Thus the higher potential speeds of the B-29 would have been negated by the formation flying needs.


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## davparlr (Mar 19, 2012)

JoeB said:


> 1.	My point was that it's nonsense to directly compare a similar loss ratio to a larger bomb load and conclude the plane with the bigger bomb load is automatically more effective per loss. The bigger plane will cost more, depends how much more. I'm not ruling out that the B-29 would be more effective in the long run if you took all the correct factors into account.



Everybody seems to rate performance on tonnage dropped. Of course bombs on rice paddies typically are not useful. I happen to think that it is nonsense to compare similar loss ratio to a larger bombload and conclude the plane with the bigger bomb load is not more effective per loss. As far as cost is concerned, using GregP data on B-29 cost (post #82) verses B-17 cost, 1000 B-17 sorties would lose a average of 16 B-17s at a cost of $238,329 each for a total of $3,813,264. B-29s, flying 300 sorties, would lose an average of 5 B-29s at a cost of $639,188 each, for a total cost of $3,195,940, or a cost savings of $617,324. So for the same tonnage and loss rate the B-29 would save $617,324 and 105 lives. Seems cost effective to me.



> But you leave out the biggest 'cost' of the B-29 program in context of WWII, which was time. Time is money in the economy, but time is even more critical in all out war. In real history, by the time B-29's were available in significant numbers in truly operational units, the bombing campaign in Europe was basically over. Even the B-29 force flying from the Marianas in Nov 44-Feb 45 in the initial high altitude campaign was small by 8th/15th AF standards, and the bombing campaign in ETO mainly won by then; the earlier B-29 force flying from China from mid 44 smaller still.



I agree with all of this.



> It doesn't make much sense to point out the eventually higher efficiency of the mature B-29, which is typical of any larger plane, 'economy of scale' , but to ignore the fact that in real history the protracted development and debugging of the B-29 took too long for the plane to have been of much use in the war in Europe.



And this.



> 2. This is just repeating an assertion which has already been refuted with historical facts:
> -it was seldom practical for bombers to fly formations close to their max speeds, and especially dicey for the B-29 with immature R-3350's especially prior to around late spring of '45, when the war in Europe was over.



I can certainly understand not wanting to fly formation near max speed, one must be capable of varying airspeed to accommodate perturbations such as turns, but the max speed of the B-29 was 358 mph. Flying formations within 10-15 mph of max normal power speed should be no problem. I would guess 300+ is reasonable if fuel usage is tolerable. 


> -bombers with WWII bombing technology could not hit accurately from 30k ft.



True at 20-25k. Late war techniques such as bombing on cue improved accuracy. In any event, B-29s could descend at speed to lower levels and still be tough to intercept.



> 3. This is not correct. Although the targets in Japan lay mainly north of the Marianas, the bombers were able to choose initial points relative to the targets in order to have (what they believed were) the most favorable heading relative to the wind. Bomb runs were not made with known crosswinds. This is in another category of web board silliness, assuming the planners in WWII ignored obvious and easy solutions to problems.



This is probably not true. B-29s in PTO were pretty well maxed out in range performance and planners would have had very limited options in setting up bomb runs and making it back, in addition they probably had poor Jet Stream data. The Norden bomb sight had a limited cross wind capability.



> 4. This is entirely irrelevant, besides being debateable. B-2's always use JDAM's to get adequate conventional bombing accuracy from high altitude, but in any case WWII bombers had WWII technology, not the B-2's.



Only debatable to those who are unfamiliar with the B-2 program and strategic bombing concepts. The B-2 performance requirements was specified and contracted in the early 80s as a strategic bomber capable of penetrating advanced defense systems and delivering nuclear warheads. This was well before GPS was completed, 1994, and the JDAM operational date, 1997. Accuracy requirements established at this time were very high, both at high altitude and, later, low altitude. As a strategic bomber, navigation and weapon delivery was required to be AUTONIMOUS, not dependent on any external aids, which could only be considered deniable by the enemy. This certainly includes GPS. As far as I know, these requirements still exist. 



> A slightly more relevant comparison might be B-52's in combat in Vietnam with conventional unguided bombs, where bombing altitudes exceeded 30k ft, and accuracy was adequate using strictly radar bombing techniques. But even those radar bombing systems were far superior to those available in WWII.



The Vietnam era B-52 weapon delivery system does not include an optical sighting system rather it relied on a poor-to-medium resolution radar and most likely a Doppler radar aided, i.e., ground speed and drift, navigation system and interface to the flight control system through the autopilot. Now, the B-52 radar system was not great and did not have high resolution modes like synthetic aperture radar modes found on the B-2 (when AF SAC crews reviewed the radar imagery of the B-2 they were stunned!).

The B-29 relied on optically identified and tracked targeting system interfaced to the flight control system through the autopilot. Both systems require operator input, the B-52 Bombardier/Navigator is required to visually identify target on the radar and input to the navigation computer by designating, maybe continual tracking, manual or automatic (?), for the B-29, the bombardier must acquire the target visually through a telescope and provide continual tracking inputs. I doubt the bomb delivery accuracy of the B-52, with its poor radar resolution, poor displays, and early dead reckoning computer was any better than that of the optical system of the B-29. Indeed, I suspect the B-29, in the optical mode, was equivalent to the high resolution radar and high resolution displays of the B-2. In addition, continual visual tracking has to be better than drift prone nav systems.

This does not apply to the early radar bomb delivery modes of the B-29.

It is easy to say that the old mechanical computers and optical systems of WWII were crude but they often performed quite well. When the late model battleships were being upgraded in the 1980s, there was a plan to install laser range finders for the main guns. The Navy found out, however, the original optical rangefinders on the battle ships were more accurate than the proposed laser system so they stuck with them. Also, if I remember correctly, the original electromechanical gun laying computer was retained because of its accuracy.

I was going to say one advantage the B-52 did have was modern aerodynamically designed bombs, but I remember hearing somewhere that they used a lot of WWII bombs. Does anyone know?



> 5. There is not only no evidence to support that statement, but it's specifically contradicted by operational history in both Europe and the Pacific.


You said the poor radar systems on the Vietnam era B-52s provide adequate accuracy whereas I believe the optical bomb laying system on the B-29 would have done better with the same bombs and flight planning.



> There's a huge literature on the USAAF's struggles with bombing accuracy in the ETO, perhaps you should read some of it.



And, again, the B-29s could use high altitude to provide a high speed descent and weapon delivery to the lower altitudes flown by the B-17s. I doubt if they would need to given the amount of area bombing that was apparently done.



> one big reason was to hit stuff, and the other was to reduce engine strain and resultant operational losses even with ~230-250mph typical cruise speeds, again putting paid to the idea of prolonged military power operations by B-29's at that time. "Blankets of Fire" by Werrell is a good book on the B-29 over Japan.



Again you disregard the significant difference in distance which has major impact on engine usage and target planning. ETO would be an almost completely different environment.


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## davparlr (Mar 19, 2012)

wuzak said:


> I need some clarification.
> 
> B-17s in the ETO cruised at a slower speed than they were capable of - I always assumed this was to do with the need for close formations.



I tend to doubt that slower airspeed was due to formation flying. They certainly would not fly at max speeds and most likely flew at max range speed. In addition, like the naval convoys, they had to move en masse at the speed of the slowest aircraft. This could be quite slow if the models were mixed. The B-17E had a cruising speed of 195 to 223 mph but the B-17G had a cruise speed of 195 mph so, if they were flying in the same formation, how fast do you think they would fly? Even variations between aircraft had to be planned for.

While a C-141 is a jet and jets tend to be more stable than prop jobs (at least to me it seemed that way), I have flown Combat Airlift Missions in formation at around 290 mph and it didn't seem difficult. We flew extended fingertip which is probably all the bombers ever did.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 19, 2012)

Just wanted to say, this is a really informative thread... Great discussion folks!


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 19, 2012)

wuzak said:


> This is what I am trying to point out. If B-29s had been sent to Europe, it is likely that the same, or very similar, tactics as those for the B-17 would have been used. Thus the higher potential speeds of the B-29 would have been negated by the formation flying needs.


 Not really - the slower speeds not only involved formation flying but also involved keeping the defensive box for protection against fighters. Speaking hypothetically, I think the B-29 could have defended itself better against attacking fighters than the B-17 did


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## Shortround6 (Mar 19, 2012)

GregP said:


> Shortround, RE post 75 or so, the B-45 may well have flown in 1947, but the design development was begun in 1944, and the USAAF, shortly to become the USAF, was certainly aware of the development of the B-45, having issued the requirement. I say the B-32 (and others) WAS put on hold by the B-45.
> 
> If you disagree, you are free to do so.



My objection is the timing among other things. 

The B-32 is claimed to be a back up to the B-29 which makes a certain amount of sense given that they are started at the same time. The priority given the B-32 may have waxed and wained depending on well the B-29 program was going at any given time. The B-32 itself was far from a simple aircraft and did not progress as fast as was hoped for. The Production of the B-32 was ordered in small numbers (compared to the B-29) and not canceled until after Japan surrendered. Seeing as how many aircraft programs were canceled ( including thousands of B-29s) or put on hold with the end of the war because with halt in fighting they just weren't needed it is a little difficult to see the B-45 as the reason for the halt in the B-32 program. 
Put that together with most of the problems with B-29 having been solved and the B29D/B-50 lurking in the wings B-32 program went away that have nothing to do with the B-45. 
The B-36 wasn't cancelled although it was cut back quite a bit. 

You of course are free to believe What you wish.


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## TheMadPenguin (Mar 19, 2020)

Question to all on a point where "opinions differ". I'm not searching for opinions, but fact-based inferences:
AIUI, men died in B-17s, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The enemy was more likely to kill you than the plane was.
AIUI, men died in B-24s, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The enemy was more likely to kill you than the plane was.
AIUI, men died in B-29s, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The plane was more likely to kill you than the enemy was.
My resources are very limited (no room for books and little cash for travel). Is my understanding in conflict with y'alls knowledge?

(p.s. Shortround: "Florida" and "Highlands" do not coincide.)


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## Shortround6 (Mar 20, 2020)

TheMadPenguin said:


> (p.s. Shortround: "Florida" and "Highlands" do not coincide.)



Humor. In Florida if you are 100ft above sea level you _may _be in the Highlands

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


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## TheMadPenguin (Mar 20, 2020)

Shortround6 said:


> Humor. In Florida if you are 100ft above sea level you _may _be in the Highlands



True. I live in Panama City. Our last mountain migrated to Georgia a few eons ago.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 20, 2020)

TheMadPenguin said:


> Question to all on a point where "opinions differ". I'm not searching for opinions, but fact-based inferences:
> AIUI, men died in B-17s, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The enemy was more likely to kill you than the plane was.
> AIUI, men died in B-24s, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The enemy was more likely to kill you than the plane was.
> AIUI, men died in B-29s, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The plane was more likely to kill you than the enemy was.
> My resources are very limited (no room for books and little cash for travel). Is my understanding in conflict with y'alls knowledge?



As others have said, sometimes you have to take circumstances into account.
AIUI, men died in Lockheed Hudsons, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The plane was more likely to kill you than the enemy was?
AIUI, men died in A-W Whitley's, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The plane was more likely to kill you than the enemy was?
AIUI, men died in C-54s, some at enemy hands and some because the plane quit flying. Ratio? The plane was more likely to kill you than the enemy was?
There are others, long over water flights in heavily loaded aircraft, especially twins, did not always end well.
some other planes also had engine problems, look up the Martin PBM series. Somewhat prone to inflight engine fires, one was lost looking for flight 19 of Bermuda triangle fame.
Only production US plane to use fan cooled engines (in one model) in an attempt to solve power and overheating problems.

We may want to look up any number of carrier planes. Including take-off and landing accidents quite a number of them killed more pilots/crew than were shot down by the enemy.


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