# Could the Luftwaffe have done a better job supplying the 6th army at Stallingrad



## rank amateur (Jan 2, 2012)

I have been reading Anthony Beevor's Stalingrad and I can't help wondering if the luftwaffe did put enough effort in supplying general Paulus trapped 6th Army at Stalingrad. I don't have the figures at hand but I recollect that the Luftwaffe never ever managed to deliver even a third of the necessairy daily tonnage. Was that really the best they could considering the circumstances or could they've done better by drawing transport airplanes (or any other) from other fronts?

I hope some one can enlighten me.

Chrzzzzz

Peter


----------



## davebender (Jan 2, 2012)

The Luftwaffe was attempting to supply Rommel's trapped Afrika Korps at the same time. If not for the Africa Korps supply effort 6th Army would almost certainly have received more aerial supply tonnage.

However this evades the real problem. General von Paulus should have evacuated Stalingrad to concentrate on holding Rostov, which was strategically of far greater importance.


----------



## rank amateur (Jan 2, 2012)

That would only have been possible if Paulus would have acted against Hitler's expressed wishes. Which was not very likely at that given time. Hitler never really wanted to give up Stalingrad.
I also recall that Rommel never got the quantities he had asked for. Wasn't the Afrikakorps at that time a much smaller force? The 6th army was something like 280.000 men.


----------



## RCAFson (Jan 2, 2012)

One of the reasons that the Germans starved at Stalingrad is that over a hundred JU-52s were written off during the Invasion of Crete:

Shore, Cull, and Malizia,Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, P.403: _



"During the period 13 May-1 June, the Luftwaffe recorded the loss of 220 aircraft, although only 147 of these were attributable directly to enemy action (80 Ju52/3ms, 55 Bf109s and Bfll0s, 23 Ju88s, Hellls and Do.17s, nine Ju87s). A further 64 were subsequently written off as a result of serious damage. Between 20 May and 1 June the Transport gruppen suffered the loss of 117 Ju52/3ms as total wrecks, with 125 more damaged but repairable (see Page 404 for breakdown of losses by date and cause) The true impact of this loss would not be felt until 1942 when the need to provide air supply to forces cut off on the Russian front came to a head at Stalingrad. Even by then the hard-pressed German aircraft industry had not able to make good this catastrophic wastage.

Click to expand...

_


----------



## davebender (Jan 2, 2012)

Heer army commanders had great latitude in the execution of orders. A tradition going back well before 1900. Good German army commanders such as Rommel, Manstein and Hausser did as they thought best no matter what Hitler said. Unfortunately (for Germany) von Paulus wasn't the brightest egg in the carton.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 2, 2012)

I agree that certain commanders were adept at sidestepping hitlers sometimes insane edicts. However, none of them could ever evade a direct order. And Von Paulus was given a direct order not to evacuate. None of the Generals could have done anything different under those circumstances.

It is intersting to note that Manstein, often toted as the best Army Commander in the German Army supported Hitlers stand fast order at Stalingrad. He understood that any breakout from the pocket would only come at ruinous losses to 6th Army. By the time of the encirclement, 6th Army had a fraction of its required transport. It was understrength in both MT and horsedrawn transport. Most of its units were carrying casualty rates of above 40%, which would have been abandoned in an emergency breakout. If a breakout had been attempted, and had been successful (neither assumption can be assumed as possible), perhaps 30-60000 of the original strength of 250000 might have gotten out. None of the heavy artillery or supporting equipment could have been saved. This was a major consideration for both Hitler and Manstein. 

Manstein believed he could break into the encirclement with a moderate committment of forces. He grossly under-estimated the new abilities of the red army, and over-estimated the abilities of the heer to alter the situation. Perhaps if the DAK had been abandoned to its fait and all resources concentrated on the Stalingrad sector things may have turned out differently, but i doubt it. Stalingrad represents the point where all of Germany's chickens were starting to come back to haunt them. it was the point in the war that the strategic initiative was lost, and never regained....


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 2, 2012)

The simple explanation is that Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek, chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff had said airlift supply was possible and Hitler was inclined to uncritically accept him because he had made a public speach saying there would be no retreat. In likelihood Hitler would have authorised retreat or some other action had he not been offered false hope. Many people such as von Richthoffen and General leutnant Martin Fiebig, in charge of the air corps given the task of keeping Sixth Army alive, repeatedly in sisted it was an impossible mission. His views were ignored.

Jeschonnek tried to correct his mistake, saying he had assumed incorrectly that a SB500 prachute resupply canister could hold 500kg when the the number only refered to the bomb schackle size. However Goering forbad him to do so fearing loss of face before Hitler.

The Ju 52 was not really the the right aircraft for the job due to too short a range and in anycase their engines were worn out which prevented max takeoff power and a full cargo. The Luftwaffe had been trying to replace the aircraft but resource and priority issues had always pevented this.

Losses of Ju 52 at Crete had been very severe since enigma decrypts had disclosed the EXACT parachute drop points and flight paths and these zones had been heavily reinforced. Previous losses in Holland, Demyansk Pocket had also depleted the transport aircraft and their pilots. These factors combined to weaken the fleet far too much.

I would suggest that: Stalingrad An Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift JOEL S. A. HAYWARD is a good read; widely available as .pdf download

I am however thinking that had the Heinkel He 177 succeded then the FW 200 could have been reliaved of its maritime reconaisance duties provided resupply even if a more advanced and faster transport such as the Ju 252 weren't available. A STOL aircraft such as the Ar 232 would also have helped as it also have extremely good rough field performance. Both the Ju 252 and Ar 232 had rear loading ramps to provide for fast turnaround times.

A Ju 252 could have flown several tons of cargo, direct from Berlin, left it at Stalingrad, taken off without refueling and flown back to Berlin with a small number of evacuees. If it were possible to release it from maritime reconaisance duties the FW 200 surely was a better choice than the Ju 52 for some of the llonger airfields the transport units had to fly into.

Flying cargo from forward airflieds only 150 miles away creates a ground handling mess and leaves airfields vulnerable.

The 6th army did almost break out comming within 14 miles of a relief column, however it had been left too late and they ran out of fuel. They could have succeded!


----------



## fastmongrel (Jan 3, 2012)

14 miles between forward units is not very close at all, a well defended corridor would have had to be secured and held for some time to allow an army to pull out. Its probably lucky for the Germans that the relief force didnt get through as the Soviets would quite possibly have snapped up two armies for the price of one.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 3, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> 14 miles between forward units is not very close at all, a well defended corridor would have had to be secured and held for some time to allow an army to pull out. Its probably lucky for the Germans that the relief force didnt get through as the Soviets would quite possibly have snapped up two armies for the price of one.



If a breakout had of been attempted, even with 50% losses the result would have been much better than it was, which was effectively the death in captivity of all who surrendered or were captured. I can see your suspicion that the relieving army would itself be encircled.

Operation Wintergewitter faltered because by the time the 6th Army was told to link up (really a breakout) it had been to weakened and was too short of supplies. Better aerial resupply or an earlier automomous breakout attempt would have been better.


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2012)

No,The Luftwaffe could never have supplied the 6th Army in Stalingrad. With the resources available it did as good a job as it could have done. I don't believe it could have done any better.
Disastrous planning and over optimistic strategy meant that at the time of the Stalingrad crisis the Luftwaffe actually had less transport aircraft in its total establishment than it had at the time of the battle of France. They were now spread over several fronts.
The operation began around 23 November and it became apparent to the man in charge,Wolfram von Richtofen, a very competent officer that in IDEAL circumstances the Luftwaffe might deliver 350 tonnes a day. The 6th army minimum estimated requirement was 650 tonnes.
Aircraft were stripped from other units to increase the lifting capacity. Training units,particularly for multi-engined aircraft and instrument flying were effectively shut down and their instructors started feryying aircraft East. Many training units never operated again after the loss of these experienced men and this would have disastrous consequences for the Luftwaffe later in the war.
By December 8th there were nominally 300 aircraft available to Richthofen. Operational ready rates rarely exceeded 50% and were normally closer to 30%. In bad weather they could fall to nearer 10%. Officers in Berlin simply didn't grasp this and a frustrated Ricthofen wrote that he was "little more than a highly paid non commisioned officer". He also wrote "I no longer telephone Jeschonnek ,since all my recommendations are rejected...........recently I [have] received only crticism rather than directives.Probably the staff in Berlin were themselves without an idea of what to do." Things were obviously not going well!
On December 26th the Soviets got within 6 Km of the main air base at Morozovskaya. Goering's interference and minimisation of the threat drove both Mannstein and Richthofen to despair. Richthofen actually suggested,sarcastically,that Hitler should give control of Luftflotte 4 and Army Group Don to the Reichmarshall.Things were not improving!
In the first week of January the Germans lost Morozovskaya and were forced to operate the airlift,now an air drop, from Novocherkassk,350 Km from Stalingrad.
On January 18th the maintenance situation for the aircraft flying the operation had become hopeless. Remember that it is 2,225 Km from Berlin to Stalingrad. Percentage ready rates were very low. 7% Ju52s,33% He111s,35% He177s and perhaps unsurprisingly 0% of the Fw200s. Milch arrived around this time and did actually improve these rates marginally but it was too little too late.
By the time of the surrender on February 2nd Luftwaffe losses were enormous. They had tried a hopeless task and been utterly defeated. They lost 269 Ju52s,169He111s,9 Fw200s,1 Ju290,5 He177s and 42 Ju86s. This is equivalent to the establishment of an entire Fliegerkorps.

Cheers
Steve


----------



## parsifal (Jan 3, 2012)

> If a breakout had of been attempted, even with 50% losses the result would have been much better than it was, which was effectively the death in captivity of all who surrendered or were captured. I can see your suspicion that the relieving army would itself be encircled.




It could actually be worse for the Germans. There was a point during the Soviet counteroffensive when Manstein relaized that the entire southern front was in danger of collapsing. 1st Pz, elements of 4th Pz were still retreating out of the kaukasus and needed time to get past the Rostov constriction. That time was bought by 6th Army standing where it was and dying a heroic death. If it had attempted a move, it would have lost all of its heavy equipment and most of its personnel. instead of the 28 Soviet Armies needed to contain the hedgehogged 6th Army, they might need 2 or 3 Armies to keep it contained. 25 additional Soviet Armies on the Southern Front would almost certainly have cause the complete collapse of Army Group South and the recapture of territory far to the west than actually happened. This was a far worse outcome than sacrificing the entire 6th Army.


That terrible winter, the Germans faced some very hard choices. Losing 6th Army was better than losing the entire southern front......


----------



## davebender (Jan 3, 2012)

Allied historians like to treat Stalingrad as if it happened in isolation. A clear cut Soviet victory vs Germany. In reality there were multiple operations in progress during the fall of 1942 and Stalingrad wasn't the largest one. Consequently Germany could devote only a small portion of their military resources at Stalingrad.

Afrika Korps at El Alamein and follow-on battles until May 1943.

Soviet Mars Offensive (Rzhev salient). Began Nov 25, 1942. 
.....Six Soviet armies with a total of about 667,000 men.
.....German commanders recorded the destruction of at least 1,500 Soviet tanks.
.....Germans estimated total Soviet casualties close to a quarter million men.

Soviet Uranus Offensive (i.e. Stalingrad). Began Nov 19, 1942.
.....20 German and 2 Romanian divisions trapped in the pocket.
.....Reducing the German pocket tied down the bulk of six Soviet armies for 2 1/2 months.
.....90 to 91,000 German POWs. 3,000 Romanian POWs. about 25% of authorized strength for 22 divisions. Which suggests quite a few 6th Army soldiers were evacuated by air.

German Army Group A attack into and retreat from the Caucasus.
Soviet Saturn Offensive. Goal was to seize Rostov which would trap German Army Group A in the Caucasus.
.....Elements of 9 Soviet armies were involved.
.....von Manstein's primary task was to prevent Army Group A from being cut off. Breaking the Soviet seige of Stalingrad was a secondary objective.

Fighting continued non-stop after von Paulus surrendered Feb 3, 1943. Once German Army Group A was safe the Soviets were allowed to take Kharkov. von Manstein landed a very successful riposte during March 1943 which regained Kharkov and mauled the Soviet forces. Official Soviet records admit the loss of over 1,000 tanks and 100,000 dead.

A bit of trivia.
In terms of casualties, January 1943 was the worst month of the entire war for the Wehrmacht.
164,596 dead and missing. Includes most of the German POWs who surrendered at Stalingrad.


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

> Could the Luftwaffe have done a better job supplying the 6th army at Stallingrad
> I have been reading Anthony Beevor's Stalingrad and I can't help wondering if the luftwaffe did put enough effort in supplying Von Paulus trapped 6th Army at Stalingrad. I don't have the figures at hand but I recollect that the Luftwaffe never ever managed to deliver even a third of the necessairy daily tonnage. Was that really the best they could considering the circumstances or could they've done better by drawing transport airplanes (or any other) from other fronts?



Simply no!
Yes the local LW commanders did their best to do the job! 
The average ts were 104ts from 25. November till 11 Januar. At 3 times to my sources 7. December and 19,20 December they reached 290ts
It was the totaly wrong estimation from Göring and Jeschonnek, both promised something that nobody can do with the given strenght's



> The operation began around 23 November and it became apparent to the man in charge,Wolfram von Richtofen, a very competent officer that in IDEAL circumstances the Luftwaffe might deliver 350 tonnes a day. The 6th army minimum estimated requirement was 650 tonnes.



Operation was beginning at 25 November and the minimum estimated requirement was 300ts and the preferable estimated requirement was 600ts, from original sources of the 6th Army.



> I agree that certain commanders were adept at sidestepping hitlers sometimes insane edicts. However, none of them could ever evade a direct order. And Von Paulus was given a direct order not to evacuate. None of the Generals could have done anything different under those circumstances.



Wrong! Rommel did ignore the order at El Alamein and Hauser ignored the order at Charkow!



> It is intersting to note that Manstein, often toted as the best Army Commander in the German Army supported Hitlers stand fast order at Stalingrad. He understood that any breakout from the pocket would only come at ruinous losses to 6th Army. By the time of the encirclement, 6th Army had a fraction of its required transport. It was understrength in both MT and horsedrawn transport. Most of its units were carrying casualty rates of above 40%, which would have been abandoned in an emergency breakout. If a breakout had been attempted, and had been successful (neither assumption can be assumed as possible), perhaps 30-60000 of the original strength of 250000 might have gotten out. None of the heavy artillery or supporting equipment could have been saved. This was a major consideration for both Hitler and Manstein.



To which timeline you refering here?
At the timeline between 21 November and 25 November the whole quote is absolutely wrong, every sentence!
At the timeline between 19 December and 22 December the Manstein claim is wrong the rest debatable!

At 20 November the fresh and 100% full strenght 29 ID mot. had taken the 57th. soviet army ( inner gripper arm of the south)very hard and forced the 57th to retreat. At 21 November General Hoth wanted to order the 29 ID mot and parts of the IV. Armeekorps to attack the flank of the 51th soviet Army (outer gripper arm of the south). This was denied from Heeresgruppe B (General Weichs). Both the 29 ID mot and the IV Armeekorps take stand at the south between Wolga and Don.
At 22 November Paulus radioed food ,fuel and munition for six days and demanded of getting free hand of action. Free hand was denied from Hitler!
At 23 November after consultation all his commanders he radioed again with demand of Free Hand and the suggestion to break out south west, between Wolga and Don but on the eastside of the Don. All his commanders were supporting him! The XIV and XI Armeekorps were ordered to get back from the Don and get acces with the Nordwestfront. At the Nordwestfront were standing the 14.,16. and 24.Pz. Divisions. The whole 6th. Army had 10000 casualties at 23 November. Free Hand was denied from Hitler.
*Both Hauser and Rommel needed one day to come to grips and ignore Hitler's orders.*
If Paulus had ordered at 23 November to make all preparations to break out at 25 November his whole Army all casualties and most of the heavy material/weapons had a more then good chances to get save at the southwest.
He had a very good stroke formation at the south with the 29 ID mot. and the IV. Armeekorps and his three Panzerdivisions could cover the breakout from Northwest. 
The soviet Army's at the south weren't in best conditions, because they had much problems with the icing of the Wolga and their supply!
That are the military facts between 20-25 November!

Manstein:
Both your claims are wrong. 

Manstein wasn't involved between 20-25 Nevomber at Stalingrad, he took command of the Heeresgruppe Don at 26 November.
His first radio to Paulus was: We will come to get get you *out*, make praparation that the Army can stroke south!
After that he criticised General Weichs hard for his orders (see above) to the 29 ID mot. at the 21 November!

At 19 December Manstein had done the very specific order to Paulus to make preparation that Wintergewitter (shake hands with Hoth) and Donnerschlag (break out of the 6th Army) can go hand in hand. He couldn't order Donnerschlag without Hitler but his plan was that Hitler would be overtaken by events.
At 19 December General Schulz Ia Heeresgruppe Don radioed again to General Schmidt Ia 6th Army to force Wintergewitter as soon as possible (without waiting of Hoth to reach the Businowka) with the preparation that Donneschlag can go hand in hand with Wintergewitter!
That was all what Manstein could do with his power, without to make a kind of suicide! He wanted absolutley the break out of the 6th Army!

What is a correct claim, that Manstein wanted at January 1943 that the 6th Army was fighting as long as possible to bind several soviet army's, but he wanted always the brake out of the 6th Army as long as it was possible (till 21-22 December)!



> Manstein believed he could break into the encirclement with a moderate committment of forces. He grossly under-estimated the new abilities of the red army, and over-estimated the abilities of the heer to alter the situation.


Very wrong! That was alone Hitler's decission. Manstein wanted as much units as possible! Hitler denied more units from France, only the 6th Pz. Division and only Manstein personal intervention was helpfull to get the 17.Pz Div. later, after Hitler had denied this unit for days!

Edit: The whole 6th. Army had 10000 casualties at 23 November
That means the 6th army hat 10000 casualties to transport at a break out!


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2012)

DonL said:


> Operation was beginning at 25 November and the minimum estimated requirement was 300ts and the preferable estimated requirement was 600ts, from original sources of the 6th Army.



The 6th Army started the ball rolling on 21 November. On that day Richthofen warned Paulus and his staff that the Luftwaffe did not have the transport capacity for such an operation. He had lost a lot of aircraft to other theatres in the autumn,and yet more following the collapse in North Africa and " Gymnast/Torch". The warning was repeated by other Luftwaffe commanders on the southern front the next day. Jeschonnek and the general staff agreed to an airlift on the 23rd despite this and that's the date I gave,assuming my notes are correct! ( "Luftflotte 4 vor Stalingrad: unter Gen Oberst Frhr. v. Richthofen).
I assume that as you have a tonnage for the 25th the first flights in were on that date.

My tonnages are from Williamson Murray and I will make a note of your figures from a better source,thanks. 

There was never a snowball's chance in hell of the Luftwaffe supplying the 6th Army and the Luftwaffe officers at the front knew it.They did their best.

We will never know why Goering thought that the Luftwaffe could do the job. Maybe he was hoping for a repeat of the successes of Demyansk and Kholm from the previous winter though they are barely comparable with Stalingrad. Even the army's Chief of Staff (Zeitzler) didn't think it was possible. 

Cheers
Steve


----------



## jim (Jan 3, 2012)

Excellent rsponse Mr DonL
Hausser s actions in Kharkov , set the ideal example of the true Officer-Leader-Commander-Man. Personaly brave,excellent out manouvering the enemy , masterly controlling his men ( some fanatical SS units wanted to frontally attack the city to presented to Hitler for his birthday!), and above all did not avoid his responsibilities when faced the high command ( as the vast majority of German officers did. And after the war they put all the blame to Hitler)


----------



## davebender (Jan 3, 2012)

What else could they do? 

von Paulus declined the opportunity to retreat from Stalingrad. So the Luftwaffe had to support him as best they could.


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> What else could they do?
> 
> von Paulus declined the opportunity to retreat from Stalingrad. So the Luftwaffe had to support him as best they could.




Paulus should have withdrawn on the 19th. The Romanians on his Northern flank had been overwhelmed and with in 24 hours both flanks would have dissolved,completely unhinging his position. Did he decline to do so? Did he really have a chance to do so bearing in mind the desperate transport situation of the 6th army? The then Generaloberst Friederich Paulus was not likely to be a man to take that initiative himself.Hitler ordered him to stay put on the 21st,but he wobbled until the 23rd when he ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad and told him that he would be supplied by air.

The OKH was arguing for Stalingrad to be abandoned. If Hitler had ordered Paulus out he would have gone,no matter what he had to leave behind. Jeschonnek's stance meant there had no support from the air staff in this argument despite the fact that the officers on the ground,including the commander of Luftflotte 4 were saying that the supply of the 6th army by air was an impossible task. Goering (according to Zeitzler in a 1955 letter to Professor Suchenwirth,author of the handily entitled "Historical Turning Points in the German Air Force War Effort") reckoned he knew the 6th army's needs and the Luftwaffe's capabilities better and must shoulder much of the blame for leading Hitler to believe that air supply was possible.

Richthofen's diary notes discussions as late as the 24th in which he,Zeitzler and von Weichs (Army Group B) were urging an immediate break out by the 6th army.

Ultimately,once the decision was taken on the 23rd to attempt the air supply you are entirely correct. The Luftwaffe had to do what it could. As Richthofen wrote ruefully in his diary,with some resignation, on the 25th,"an order was an order".

Cheers
Steve


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

Very good statement stona!



> "an order was an order".



And that's the whole issue!
Graf von Sponeck, Rommel, Hausser, Bittrich, Bayerlein, Guderian all this Generals had ignored direct orders from high command or Hitler, because they thought they knew better, because of their local station or/and of responsibility to their mens/soldiers.
As a Colonel General with the responsibility of 230000 soldiers you should have the nuts to make proper decision!


----------



## davebender (Jan 3, 2012)

*Units in Stalingrad pocket.*
13 x infantry divisions.
1 x Jaeger divsion.
3 motorized divisions.
3 panzer divisions.
.....Plus.
1 Luftwaffe flak regiment.
1 Romanian cavalry division.
1 Romanian infantry division.
1 Croatian infantry regiment.
JG3 detachment (30 ground personnel remained in the pocket to refuel JG3 fighter aircraft).

Everyone knew 6th Army's supply needs as that information was hardly secret. Like everyone else, the Heer calculated logistical requirements for various unit types and published that information in army field manuals. Pull out the field manual and it's simple math to calculate daily supply tonnage requirements for units in the Stalingrad pocket. Hitler's 22 year old secretary (Traudl Junge) could easily have made the calculations if given a copy of the logistical field manual. She could also easily calculate how many Ju-52 transport aircraft were required.


----------



## rank amateur (Jan 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> Heer army commanders had great latitude in the execution of orders. A tradition going back well before 1900. Good German army commanders such as Rommel, Manstein and Hausser did as they thought best no matter what Hitler said. Unfortunately (for Germany) von Paulus wasn't the brightest egg in the carton.



Not obeying direct orders was only 'permitted' if the endresult was an undeniable victory. I guess Paulus had the odds stacked agains him.


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

> Not obeying direct orders was only 'permitted' if the endresult was an undeniable victory.



I have my doubts, that the retreat from Rommel at El Alamein was an undeniable victory from the viewpoint of Hitler!
That's nearly the same situation and I very hardly believe that all soldiers that would got out of the box (6th Army) would have had the viewpoint of undeniable victory, the same as the soldiers of the Panzerarmee Africa after El Alamein.

Edit:
According to many german historians and many Wehrmacht Generals that were asked/interviewed to the issue Stalingrad and break out, many of them strongly believe that General von Reichenau the commanding General of the 6th Army till January 1942, known as a strong Nazi, but with a strong personality and a gifted General, had ignored Hitler's order and had ordered the break out between 21-25 November.


----------



## davebender (Jan 3, 2012)

No such thing in warfare.

As DonL said, a Colonel General should have the nuts to make a decision and accept the consequences. He owes that to his soldiers.


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2012)

Goering's assesment of the 6th army's needs may or may not have followed the manual,I don't know. He is the sort of man who would have made the calculation fit whatever suited him. Frau Junge may have been closer than Goering! Zeitzler implies that Goering's assessment was different to the army officers present,that he knew better.
His assessment of Luftwaffe capabilities was laughable. 
Richthofen's frustration with the Luftwaffe leadership in Berlin was exactly because of these sort of calculations. They sat down worked out that he had x,y or z Gruppen,that they could carry so much materiel and the operation was doable. 
Richthofen,other Luftwaffe officers and even Army officers who were at the sharp end knew this was utter nonsense. 
I've already given an idea of the sort of operational ready rates that the various aircraft of Luftflotte 4 were achieving. It was these sort of facts,along with the weather,vulnerability of the transports,lack of trained crews,lack of spares, eventually a lack of a landing ground in the pocket or an airfield within 350Km of Stalingrad, amongst many others, that were ignored by men like Goering and Jeschonnek doing there back of an envelope calculations back in Berlin. 
That's why Richthofen and many others said it was not an achievable task and continued to argue for alternatives,even whilst they did what they were ordered to do. History has proved them right. At least they tried.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> As DonL said, a Colonel General should have the nuts to make a decision and accept the consequences. He owes that to his soldiers.



Absolutely. Sadly Paulus doesn't seem to have been that kind of man.

Cheers
Steve


----------



## rank amateur (Jan 3, 2012)

DonL said:


> I have my doubts, that the retreat from Rommel at El Alamein was an undeniable victory from the viewpoint of Hitler!
> That's nearly the same situation and I very hardly believe that all soldiers that would got out of the box (6th Army) would have had the viewpoint of undeniable victory, the same as the soldiers of the Panzerarmee Africa after El Alamein.
> 
> El Alamein was most certainly no victory but neither was Dunkirk but it could be sold to the general public as a magical escape performed by the ever popular escape artist Erwin Rommel.
> In other words a glorious victory. You can rest assured that it would have gone in the historybooks as a victory if Nazi Germany had won the war.


----------



## rank amateur (Jan 3, 2012)

stona said:


> Goering's assesment of the 6th army's needs may or may not have followed the manual,I don't know. He is the sort of man who would have made the calculation fit whatever suited him. Zeitzler implies that Goering's assessment was different to the army officers present,that he knew better.
> His assessment of Luftwaffe capabilities was laughable.
> Richthofen's frustration with the Luftwaffe leadership in Berlin was exactly because of these sort of calculations. They sat down worked out that he had x,y or z Gruppen,that they could carry so much materiel and the operation was doable.
> Richthofen,other Luftwaffe officers and even Army officers who were at the sharp end knew this was utter nonsense.
> ...



Which brings me back to my startingpoint: Could Von Richthoven as a repressentative of the Luftwaffe have suggested anything that would have improved the delivered tonnage. And if he could what would it have been?


----------



## davebender (Jan 3, 2012)

I find it difficult to believe Goering didn't have that information in front of him. He had a staff to read readiness reports from the various Luftflotte and keep status boards up to date.


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

> El Alamein was most certainly no victory but neither was Dunkirk but it could be sold to the general public as a magical escape performed by the ever popular escape artist Erwin Rommel.
> In other words a glorious victory. You can rest assured that it would have gone in the historybooks as a victory if Nazi Germany had won the war.






I don't disagree,

but the direct order from Hitler to Rommel was, he should hold the frontline till his army gets a victory or dies!
That was the order, nothing else!

Rommel ignored this and ordered break out and escape. After he has dictated this order he dictated a letter to his wife with last regards and the explanation that he is convinced that he will die for this order! That's documented from primary sources.

He had the nuts to make a decision!


----------



## Sagittario64 (Jan 3, 2012)

how do you supply hundreds of thousands of nearly ammunition and fuel starved troops and vehicles into an area surrounded by even more enemy troops, loads of enemy AA guns, and scores of enemy fighters? its hard to say. the Germans used everything, but..............its an unlikely prospect that you can keep transport losses low enough to keep up the airdrops and subsequent evacuations for more than a week, which is not enough to fly out the entire 6th army and the other axis forces. you're losing airfields to ground forces, having to run transports through the ring of anti-aircraft artillery around Stalingrad, land on the airfields which are under enemy artillery fire, and fly out with the maximum load(still under shell fire), having to be refueled at the airstrips from nearly exhausted fuel supplies. oh and you have to manage not to be shot down by enemy fighters, and you have to be mindful of accidental friendly fire too.
thats in addition to hitler spouting his usual last stand orders, so both enemy and friendly forces worked against the german airlifts and airdrops around stalingrad


----------



## davebender (Jan 3, 2012)

27 June 1942
Rommel drives British forces out of Marsa Matruh, which is located about 100 miles inside Egypt.




28 June 1942.
To: Benito Mussolini.
From: Adolf Hitler.
Subject. Afrika Corps redeployment to Europe.

Herr Mussolini,

Deutsches Afrikakorps has accomplished it's mission to assist your forces in driving Perfidious Albion out of Italian territory. All German army and airforce units currently serving in North Africa will now be withdrawn to Europe. We expect this redeployment to be completed NLT September 1942.

I am confident the gallant Italian armed forces can defend Italian North Africa from any future British attacks. 

Good luck!

Adolf Hitler



Appendix A. Forces to be withdrawn.

Fliegerführer Afrika 
.....JG27
.....StG3
.....ZG1
.....1.(F)/121
.....19th AA Division.

DAK.
.....15th Panzer Division.
.....21st Panzer Division.
.....90th Motorized Division.
.....164th Motorized Division.
.....556th Rear Area Security Command.
.....More logistical units then I care to count.


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

But Dave for what please?

Stalingrad was a child of Hitler, at october it had absolutely no strategical or tatical impact, nor an economy impact, Stalingrad was dead!
You can retreat the 6th army without a problem to the Don/Tschir frontline. Stalingrad was unimportant only at Hitler's ill brain it was important, because his soldiers were standing at the Wolga!

Edit: The danger of the encirclement was well aware to the germans since the beginning of november!
That wasn't a secret but Hitler's thought he knew better!


----------



## Juha (Jan 3, 2012)

Time only for short not notes.

Airsupply could have been made more effective.
a)	better all weather installations on a/fs inside the encirclement
b)	an extra a/f near the city, so deliveries could have continued even after the Soviets tightened their grip.
c)	to do something to Soviet AA guns just outside the encirclement.

Even before the encirclement the supply situation of 6th A was precarious. Weather and soviet air and partisan attacks on the only rail link to Stalingrad had had their effects. So even if Paulus would have tried to break out that might well have ended to disaster, stopped on open steppe the 6th A could not have been able to held out long. That would easily bring the collapse of whole AGs A and B fronts and a catastrophe also on at least part of 1st PzA (parts may have got to Kuban). As Korsun showed, troops getting out of encirclement with only their personal weapons were initially rather useless and had to sent to rear for R&R. Keil’s Stalingrad is an excellent book on the subject lots of info on supply and material situation. 

On obeying or disobeying, in principle easy to answer but von Sponek ended in a military prison and was shot after 20 July 44 assassination attempt. And IIRC it was von Manstein who demanded that he should be put on court martial. Hausser got scot free on harkov but his superior, Gen. Lanz got sacked, as got von Rundstead on Rostov in dec 41, Guderian, Bock etc numerous others for not obeying . Rommel was a special case because of his propaganda status and maybe his former status as a CO of Hitler’s body guard. Also Hitler had had bad times vs AG A commander and his own staff on Caucasus shortly before.

And 6th A never attempted to break out or coming within 14mls from the relief column, it was the relief force, 6th, 17th and 23rd PzDivs + sundry German and Romanian units which did the movements. 

On 6th A forces, 2 Inf.Divs (Mot) were OK, (29th and 3rd?), they had rested and re-equipped for an attack to Baku (so out of touch was the German strategic planning already) but the 3 PzDivs were rather poor state even before the beginning of the Soviet attack, and during it 14th Pz lost most/much of its arty to Russian cavalry etc and their fuel situation was precarious.

Juha


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

> Even before the encirclement the supply situation of 6th A was precarious. Weather and soviet air and partisan attacks on the only rail link to Stalingrad had had their effects. So even if Paulus would have tried to break out that might well have ended to disaster, stopped on open steppe the 6th A could not have been able to held out long.





> On 6th A forces, 2 Inf.Divs (Mot) were OK, (29th and 60th ?), they had rested and re-equipped for an attack to Baku (so out of touch was the German strategic planning already) but the 3 PzDivs were rather poor state even before the beginning of the Soviet attack, and during it 14th Pz lost most/much of its arty to Russian cavalry etc and their fuel situation was precarious.



Which timeline? November or December?
Between 20-25 November the army was intact with food, fuel and munition for six days and the way to Nischne Tschirskaja was absolutely possible as intact formation. 

The 29 ID mot. was 100% fresh with 54 tanks, one whole battalion, and had made "mincemeat" out of the 57th soviet army at 20 November.


----------



## davebender (Jan 3, 2012)

That might be counter productive. You would need additional construction units to build and maintain all weather airfields. More units to supply.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 3, 2012)

> Manstein:
> Both your claims are wrong.
> 
> Manstein wasn't involved between 20-25 Nevomber at Stalingrad, he took command of the Heeresgruppe Don at 26 November.
> ...



You are entitled to your opinion, however, I would point out that your statements are unsubstantiated opinion at this stage. As I have read material from good sources that back up the opinions I have expressed I will defer to those sources in preference to your unsubstantiated claims. 

Principal sources I have used are Beevors book on Stalingrad, Hardesty's book on the Red Air Force, Haywards book on the defeat of the Luftwaffe in 1942-3 and some basic statistics from Costellos book on WWII statistics. Previously I have also used Bartovs book on the German Army as well, as well as the small book by Tsouras (strictly speaking he is just the editor....the authors are German officers) on German army operations on the East Front. 

I am not going to post a comprehensive reply...we both know where that will end up, however just one observation...You claim that 6th Army had only suffered 10000 casualties (thats ten thousand) to the 23 November 1942. I cannot accept 10000 as a credible figure, and at home have source material that will give 6th Army casualties in a fair amount of detail. Typically, for the whole of the eastern front, the heer was running casualty rates of around 40% for its frontline formations, that is units were operating at 60% of their authorised strength...when the system was working correctly, there was a steady rotation of personnel to and from convalesence, with about 20% of the total casualty figures never able to return due to death, capture, excessive wounds and the like. One problem faced by the heer, as detailed in Halders Diary, is that in periods of heavy intensity casualties shipping out of units far exxeeded personnel returning to the front. I need to dig out his diary, but i recall Halder noting that at the time of Operation Typhoon, casualty rates were running at over 30000 per week, whilst returns were running at just 12000. 

In Stalingrad, the system broke down....Germany even before the encirlclement was operating on overstretched lines of communication, with one effect being that the wounded tended to remain close to the front as there was simply not the transport to get them evacuated properly. Moreover the fighting at Stalingrad was exceptionally heavy, and that blanket estimate of 60% strength was greatly exceeded in the battle. Authorised strengths of most units were down to about 40% or less by the time of the battle. As to the claim of just 10000 casualties for the whole of 6th Army, I aasked my father, who was there and decorated twice. I asked him...."did the 6th Army suffer 10000 casualties to the 23 November?". He wants to know what you are smoking. He says that his division alone had suffered more than 10000 casualties by the time of the encirclement (from August through to November). He says he was one of the lucky ones.....he was wounded on the 24th and flown out of the pocket several days later. 

Perhaps you meant 100000 which would still be too low but at least plausible

Also, claiming that military units on the Eastern Front were at 100% full strength is very unuaual. Any movement, any combat was bound to result in losses. In the advance from Minsk to Smolensk, apart from combat losses AGC suffered breakdown rates of up to 50% in its tank formations. Similar breakdown rates were suffered by the Motorized units. In the over-extended environment of Stalingrad, it is simply implausible that ANY unit however fresh would be at completely full strength. I have the unit history of the 29th at home will check its status as at 20 November and get back to you.


----------



## Juha (Jan 3, 2012)

DonL said:


> Which timeline? November or December?
> Between 20-25 November the army was intact with food, fuel and munition for six days and the way to Nischne Tschirskaja was absolutely possible.



late Nov, look Keil's book, it is in German, 14th and one other PzD consumed much of their fuel during the combats against encircling Russians and then during the withdrawal back to the defensive circle



DonL said:


> The 29 ID mot. was 100% fresh with 54 tanks, one whole battalion, and had made "mincemeat" out of the 57th soviet army at 20 November.



As I wrote, 29th was re-equipped [as was pone other, probably 3rd, not 60th as I wrote errously in my earlier message) and what happened during the battle between 29th and 57th depends totally are you reading the German or Soviet story of that battle. Soviet side disagree with that "mincemeat". The 3 PzDivs had worth of a couple coys of modern tanks (Pz III lg, III 75, IV kz and IV lg) each.

Juha


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

@ parsifal

I realy don't know to what are you refering!!!!!!!!!
I haven't said with one word. that the 6th Army had only suffered 10000 casualties, I have said, that at the day of 23 november were 10000 casualties in the box, which must be transported at a break out! That was my statement!



> You are entitled to your opinion, however, I would point out that your statements are unsubstantiated opinion at this stage. As I have read material from good sources that back up the opinions I have expressed I will defer to those sources in preference to your unsubstantiated claims.



Oh I think my statements are very substantiated and very well researched with lot of primary sources from the german units and documents from the Heeresgruppe Don!!



> As I wrote, 29th was re-equipped [as was 16th, not 60th as I wrote errously in my earlier message) and what happened during the battle between 29th and 57th depends totally are you reading the German or Soviet story of that battle. Soviet side disagree with that "mincemeat". The 3 PzDivs had worth of a couple coys of modern tanks (Pz III lg, III 75, IV kz and IV lg) each.



The 29. ID mot. was equipped with Panzer IV and Panzer III.
Then the soviet books can also explain why the IV. mech Korps of Major General Wolskis was stopping at Sety after he heard the catastrophe of the 57th at radio? And he only moved forward late of 22 November after the direct and personal order from Jeremenko?



> Also, claiming that military units on the Eastern Front were at 100% full strength is very unuaual. Any movement, any combat was bound to result in losses. In the advance from Minsk to Smolensk, apart from combat losses AGC suffered breakdown rates of up to 50% in its tank formations. Similar breakdown rates were suffered by the Motorized units. In the over-extended environment of Stalingrad, it is simply implausible that ANY unit however fresh would be at completely full strength. I have the unit history of the 29th at home will check its status as at 20 November and get back to you.



Do this!
The 29th was 100% refreshed at the 20 November at completely full strength! And the 29th suffered minor to no losses against the 57th soviet army!


----------



## Juha (Jan 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> That might be counter productive. You would need additional construction units to build and maintain all weather airfields. More units to supply.



Nope, during russian winter and one would only needed some specialists, workforce was already there, supply units of many depleted divs in static positions had muscle power unutialiazed.

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Jan 3, 2012)

> I realy don't know to what are you refering!!!!!!!!!



Thankyou for admitting that you dont have much clue as to what was happening, because thats precisely what I am referring to. 



> I haven't said with one word. that the 6th Army had only suffered 10000 casualties, I have said, that at the day of 23 november were 10000 casualties in the box, which must be transported at a break out! That was my statement!



Even that statement is erroneous. Just one division had over 4500 casualties billetted within the city awaiting evacuation at the time of the encirclement



> Oh I think my statements are very substantiated and very well researched with lot of primary sources from the german units and documents from the Heeresgruppe Don!!



Well post them if you have them. I know that you think your replies are well researched and substantiated (and by extension...reasonable). I never claimed that you did not have a high opinion of yourself. Trouble is, I dont believe you, and I dont have a high opinion of your "facts". Thats an opinion, incidentally. And note well, i am criticising what you say, not what you are.


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

I have no problem with it, whether you believe me or not!

I challenge you, if I think you give unsubstantiated claimes or quotes and bring forward my arguments!
After that, every member or reader can decide to himself, which arguments are better or which researched opinion is more substantiated!


----------



## rank amateur (Jan 3, 2012)

DonL said:


> I don't disagree,
> 
> but the direct order from Hitler to Rommel was, he should hold the frontline till his army gets a victory or dies!
> That was the order, nothing else!
> ...


 
No disagreement here. But any other general would have suffered the penalty. Eventually so did he.


----------



## Juha (Jan 3, 2012)

DonL said:


> The 29. ID mot. was equipped with Panzer IV and Panzer III.
> Then the soviet books can also explain why the IV. mech Korps of Major General Wolskis was stopping at Sety after he heard the catastrophe of the 57th at radio? And he only moved forward late of 22 November after the direct and personal order from Jeremenko?


 
Yes, I know, I have wrote that already twice! In late 42 fully equipped Inf.Div (Mot) usually had a PzAbt. 
Simply saying that it was mostly because of lost of nerves by CGs, German armoured units had put fear into minds of many Soviet commanders who then were overcautious in late 42. According to them Germans greatly overestimated the damage done by 29th.

I'd not say that 29th was 100% fresh but it was rested and 100% equipped, with 16th Inf. Div (Mot.), which also had a PzAbt, for the attack to SE.

Juha


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

I have no soviet sources to this issue!
But the 57th army retreated and my point is, that Paulus, after the order (change of the 29th and IV. Armeekorps from 4th Panzerarmee to the 6th Army at 21 November)from Heeregruppe B (General Weichs), had a full equipped and fresh offensive division at the south!
So if he would/will decide to break out (southwest) he had a very good strike unit at the right point!


----------



## bobbysocks (Jan 3, 2012)

DonL said:


> Stalingrad was a child of Hitler, at october it had absolutely no strategical or tatical impact, nor an economy impact, Stalingrad was dead!



that is the sad part as i understand it. all those troops and equipment wasted for basically a vendetta. it was stalin's name sake so hitler must have it. 

when did paulus take over? wasnt he given command of the 6th with the understanding that something ( basically taking stalingrad ) needed to be done...hence his reluctance in retreating?


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

Paulus took over from General von Reichenau at December 1941 or January 1942, as General von Reichenau (died at January 1942), took over Heeresgruppe Süd, after General von Rundstedt had his issue with Hitler about Rostow!


----------



## parsifal (Jan 3, 2012)

> I have no problem with it, whether you believe me or not!



I know that you have no problem believing your own propaganda, same as Hitler i guess



> I challenge you, if I think you give unsubstantiated claimes or quotes and bring forward my arguments!



Challenge not accepted. 



> After that, every member or reader can decide to himself, which arguments are better or which researched opinion is more substantiated!




According to Hayward, at Page 243, and quoting directly from _Manstein an OKH/Op Abt vom 24/11/1942, betr Beurteilungder Lage Der 6 Armee FS (Abschrift OB Kdo der HGr Don/Ia Nr 4580/42 g Kdo Chefs vom 24.11.1942 ca 1300 Uhr published doc 14 Kehrig 564 _ "Unfortunately for all those opposed to Hitlers "Stand Fast" orders and airlift decision, Manstein made his own assessment of the situation and sent the High Command a more optimistic appraisal. His position was similar to Jodls; while he agreed that a breakout was the safest option, .....he was not convinced by Army Group B's insistence on an immediate breakout. If a relief operation could start in early December, he argued , and if promised reinforcements arrived in time, it was still possible to save the army . Of course he cautioned, if it proved impossible to launch or meet the army's supply needs by airthen it should break out.

Hitlers decision was vindicated (he felt). He (Hitler) highly valued Manteins opinion, and eagerly informed Zetzler (who was the most senior officer to advocate a breakout) and his other advisers that the field marshalls assessments (was aligned to his own). The debate was over, he had won".

So, from a good source, quoting primary material, it seems that Manastein in November supported Hitler in making 6 AQrmy stand fast until relieved. That situation changed, and Manstein fundamental position was not quite the same as hitlers, but to try and argue that Manstein wantefd an immediate breakout in mid November, is manifestly untrue.


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

> It is intersting to note that Manstein, often toted as the best Army Commander in the German Army supported Hitlers stand fast order at Stalingrad. He understood that any breakout from the pocket would only come at ruinous losses to 6th Army.





> , Manstein made his own assessment of the situation and sent the High Command a more optimistic appraisal. His position was similar to Jodls; *while he agreed that a breakout was the safest option*, .....he was not convinced by Army Group B's insistence on an immediate breakout. *If a relief operation could start in early December*, he argued , and if promised reinforcements arrived in time, it was still possible to save the army . *Of course he cautioned, if it proved impossible to launch or meet the army's supply needs by airthen it should break out.*



Please enlighten me, what the first quote have to do with the second?



> So, from a good source, quoting primary material, it seems that Manastein in November supported Hitler in making 6 AQrmy stand fast until relieved.


This is your interpretation!
First Manstein wasn't exactly informed about all issues, because he wasn't on location (arriving on location at 26 November), there is absolutley no word about any estimation about the LW possibilities about air supply, so I think he was getting his information not from the local commander's, *different to the Army Group B* and he makes very clear that the possible supply by air is a fundemental issue to his considerations!

To interpret that is the same opinion as Hitler is adventurous!
Even more if we assume he would get the possibility to talk to General Richthofen before this assessment of the situation!



> I know that you have no problem believing your own propaganda, same as Hitler i guess


Thank you for your compliment and this very nice analogy



> Challenge not accepted.


I don't care about this...................


----------



## davebender (Jan 3, 2012)

Apparently your concept of an all weather airfield is entirely different from mine.

I served 12 years in U.S. Army engineer units of various types. They have a lot of heavy equipment (bulldozers, scrapers, dumptrucks, graders, vibratory rollers, compacters etc.) and people trained to operate that equipment. That's what you need to create a runway with a smooth surface and proper drainage. You also need gravel or crushed stone for the runway base plus concrete or pierced metal planking for the runway surface. You will probably also need some culverts for the drainage system. Airfield lighting would be nice too. And perhaps some heated hangers for servicing aircraft when the temperature is below zero. This all adds up to a lot of stuff.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 3, 2012)

> Please enlighten me, what the first quote have to do with the second?



In relation to this quote, 




> It is intersting to note that Manstein, often toted as the best Army Commander in the German Army supported Hitlers stand fast order at Stalingrad. He understood that any breakout from the pocket would only come at ruinous losses to 6th Army. By the time of the encirclement, 6th Army had a fraction of its required transport. It was understrength in both MT and horsedrawn transport. Most of its units were carrying casualty rates of above 40%, which would have been abandoned in an emergency breakout. If a breakout had been attempted, and had been successful (neither assumption can be assumed as possible), perhaps 30-60000 of the original strength of 250000 might have gotten out. None of the heavy artillery or supporting equipment could have been saved. This was a major consideration for both Hitler and Manstein.




you stated 



> To which timeline you refering here?
> At the timeline between 21 November and 25 November the whole quote is absolutely wrong, every sentence


!

Now i have produced some evidence, which you asked for, that supports the position that manstein supported the stand fast Order in November. You have not refuted that, so should we now assume that your claim " at the time 21-25 November the whole quote is absolutely wrong, every sentence". Are we now to believe that not everyword is incorect. Or are you still claiming that Manstein 21-25 november did not support a stand fast order? 

The first quote are my words, but if you read the whole quote, you will see that hitler used Mansteins assessment as support for his stand fast orders, which Manstein did not object to. 



> This is your interpretation!



Yes it is, and based solidly on primary sources. Yours remain unsubstantiated claims and opinion




> First Manstein wasn't exactly informed about all issues, because he wasn't on location (arriving on location at 26 November), there is absolutley no word about any estimation about the LW possibilities about air supply, so I think he was getting his information not from the local commander's, different to the Army Group B and he makes very clear that the possible supply by air is a fundemental issue to his considerations!



Again this is your unsubstantiated opinion. Hayward is at pains to point out that manstein had made his report on the basis of painstaking and thorough investigation. That suggest that he underestimated the gravity of the situation, not that he was badly informaed, as you are climing in your opinion /propaganda piece. 



> To interpret that is the same opinion as Hitler is adventurous!



Ah no, its interpreting facts and primary sources. Whats adventurous is to believe your uncorroborated statements and fantasies such as "100%" combat ready, or that manstein did not support the Stand fast order.




> Even more if we assume he would get the possibility to talk to General Richthofen before this assessment of the situation!



Its adventurous to dream up apologies for commancders, even for one as good as Manstein, when all of the available information presented thus far in this thread, suggests he simply made a mistake, not that he was lacking information. in any event, as an AG commande, it was still his responsibility to get the information he needed. Why didnt he talk to Richthofen?????. Moreover he stuck to that opinion for some time after the 26th


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

LOL!


> This is your interpretation!





> Yes it is, and based solidly on primary sources. Yours remain unsubstantiated claims and opinion



A assessment of the situation from a just in time designated commanding general (at 24 November), who is thousands of kilometers away from the location, getting only informations about radio/tele typewriter , or do you realy think there was a telephone link, between the 11th Army and the Heeresgruppe B, and from this you think you can derive a established opinion of this commander and then you will claim this as proved from primary sources...........
How on earth do you think he should get informations from the local comanders? There weren't Handy's at this time......... 

Oh and Hitler used anything and everything that comes along with his agenda!



> Are we now to believe that not everyword is incorect. Or are you still claiming that Manstein 21-25 november did not support a stand fast order?


Yes I do, because he hadn't every information he needed to make a realy substained assessment of the situation at 24 November.
Other then the Armygroup B and as he gets all informations he didn't stick to his opinion!

And Mr. Parsifal you shouldn't interpret my statements, because to me it is totaly equal, if he had done a failure, or underestimate the situation, or had hit his head at the time of the assessment! I realy don't care about this, because it is totaly unimportant.
For Hitler it was a assessment of the situation he craved just as the assessment of Jeschonnek and Göring!
And it is more then eye-catching, that this assessments, are all from General Commanders who are not at the location and not close to the facts!
Armygroup B and Luftflotte 4 as the units at location have made fundamental other assessments!
If you want, you can blaime General Manstein but i think the circumstances are important.
And to say my argumentations are unsubstantiated claims and opinions, I realy don't care, because you are the one who claimed that Manstein had had the same opinion as Hitler.
I repeat it again, this is more then adventurous, if you look at all circumstances!

As he was at the location and gets all the informations he needed, he was far away from Hitler's opinion! That's documented by General Schulz Ia of the Heeresgruppe Don at the first meeting of the General Stuff at the location.


----------



## Njaco (Jan 3, 2012)

This will be everyone's ONLY warning. Keep it civil or vacations will be given.


----------



## DonL (Jan 3, 2012)

Sorry i haven't done anything. This time I haven't said any personal wrong word,or have done a provokation.


----------



## Njaco (Jan 3, 2012)

I'm talking about *anyone *who can't be civil, not just one person. Its a good discussion but I can see tempers starting to cloud judgement.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 4, 2012)

DonL

Your initial position was to dismiss my comments as bunkum. You challenged me to produce some evidence, which I have done. Your interpretation of that information is, to say the least novel, but you are no longer dismissing my claims as bunkum, but are now making excuses for mansteins failure, whilst trying to throw up the biggest smokescreen we have seen around herein a while. 

The buck stops at the Army Group Commander. army Group Commanders dont have the luxury of making excuses....they make decisions. thats what they are there for. Manstein accepted the assignment, and if he wasnt ready to make a statement, should not have donte so, because his opinion carried great weight and it was used to silence Hitlers critics. It affected the decision to attempt an airlift to a very significant extent, far more so than poor old Paulus.

I agree, Richthofens and Fiebigs assessments were far more accurate, and should have been listened to. Thats not the issue. The issue (well one of them) was whether Manstein supported Hitlers Stand Fast Order. You initially refuted that, now you are busy making excuses for the man, whilst still trying to cast doubt on the ultimate source of information for this material....the Lage Ost reports. You can laugh all you want, make rude and destabiluizing comments all you want, misinterpret all the plain facts all you want, but the proof is ther for everyone to see. You claimed, initially that Manstein wanted an immediate breakout attempt. clearly that claim is now in tatters, but that does not seem to have any effect on your rose coloured view of the German Army. Now you arent saying that. The goal posts have moved I see. Rather than continually attacking me, how about you put your money where your mouth is and post some supporting information for people to look at. Specifically where is your proof that Manstein supported an immediate Breakout attempt from mid November......good lucki with finding that.... 

Now I have produced evidence as you have requested. People can judge that as they see fit. Time for you to produce your much vaunted evidence and skill to refute the claim, rather than simply producing a lot of opinion, which as you know I see as just so much froth and bubble.

Or, are we in for yet another tirade and insult session....you claim your behaviour is acceptable. I beg to differ on that one as well, though that is opinion. 

And by the way Mr DonL, I am Parsifal to you, not Mr Parsifal. Parsifal incidentally is the slayer of evil, the defender of the truth, purity and the righteous. He is a figure of german folklore, deliberately selected for purposes such as this. Read up on your Wagner.....hope you are enjoying the pointy end of the spear.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 4, 2012)

Njaco said:


> This will be everyone's ONLY warning. Keep it civil or vacations will be given.



I sense there will be "selective reading" by several members in this thread...


----------



## parsifal (Jan 4, 2012)

i am listening, and I hear you guys. I am also trying at keeping the debate focussed. if i am unable to control my temper i will take the hands off the wheel and step back for while.

There is no love lost between me an DonL. There is latent dislike between the both of us. For my part, i say i have previously been the target by internet beatings from this person. nothing to do with the content, a lot to do with the language. Has virtually no effect on me, I will continue to debate the issue as objectively as i can, for as long as I can. But neither am i going to mekly conceede the point in a debate. 

I say....let the debate continue. Let the abuse cease....


----------



## Juha (Jan 4, 2012)

davebender said:


> Apparently your concept of an all weather airfield is entirely different from mine.
> 
> I served 12 years in U.S. Army engineer units of various types. They have a lot of heavy equipment (bulldozers, scrapers, dumptrucks, graders, vibratory rollers, compacters etc.) and people trained to operate that equipment. That's what you need to create a runway with a smooth surface and proper drainage. You also need gravel or crushed stone for the runway base plus concrete or pierced metal planking for the runway surface. You will probably also need some culverts for the drainage system. Airfield lighting would be nice too. And perhaps some heated hangers for servicing aircraft when the temperature is below zero. This all adds up to a lot of stuff.



Different Army and different time. Already during WWII US construction units had much more heavy equipment than Europeans saying nothing on Japanese, but others build a/fs anyway. And as I wrote they needed only upgrade already existing a/fs with better radios beacons and some lightning. To keep them open heavy equipment would have been nice but that was possible also without them if there were men for manual labour available. And one could make a temporary landing ground during Eastern Front winter without earth improvements, of course it would bacome unuseable when the thaw arrived.

Juha


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jan 4, 2012)

This will be everyone's ONLY warning. Keep it civil or _vacations _will be given.

Gardening leave. 

MM


----------



## stona (Jan 4, 2012)

davebender said:


> I find it difficult to believe Goering didn't have that information in front of him. He had a staff to read readiness reports from the various Luftflotte and keep status boards up to date.



I have no idea whether he did or not. I don't believe that his assurances that the encircled army could be supplied from the air were based on sound military advice. He was getting that from Richthofen and many others. He had a staff whose advice he could,and did,ignore.
Anyway there was noone from the air staff arguing against the air supply at the OKH because of Jeshonnek's equivocal stance.

You can never discount the political considerations in the decision making of the nazi leadership,and the propensity of these palladins for interfering in military matters of which they had no detailed understanding.

It's a fundamental difference in leadership that on the allied side the war was run by technocrats to whom the political leadership usually deferred on matters military. I'm not referring to policy but the nuts and bolts of the allied strategy to realise those policies.

Cheers
Steve

I mean the western allies,I don't know enough about Soviet policy and strategy or the individuals involved to have an opinion.


----------



## Just Schmidt (Jan 4, 2012)

I will state the answer to the original question with a paradox, that IF 'the german high command' had realised that it was impossible to deliver the needed tonnage no matter what they did, extreme emergency meassures could be taken at an earlier time, fx the arrival of Milch. This could marginally have raised the supplies to 6th army, but probably also would have incurred an even greater cost on the Luftwaffe without much improvement to the germans overall strategic position.

So the answear is yes, but not enough could have been done.

Then there is the (strictly speaking off topic) question about the chances of a break-out. To me it seems important to keep the overall strategic situation in mind, and though there seem to be little doubt that an immidiate withdrawal after the collapse of the flanks of 6th army would have saved quite a lot of it, it is impossible to know what condition it would have been in, or indeed how many could escape. As time passed the cost would rise steadily.

But looking at the eatern front as a whole this withdrawal might have had grave consequenses (I basicly agree with Juha on this topic), and that is one reason why the commander on the spot should not disobey orders lightly. In a perfect world nobody would have taken orders from Hitler, but a field commander should always keep in mind that he dosn't have the overall picture in front of him. (Neither should the overall commander forget that the field commander might have a more realistic idea about the capabilities of the forces under direct command). When a generals concern for the well being of his troops becomes the first and only priority, he should probably consider changing profession. If on the other hand Paulus' reasons where only worries about being executed for treason, the morally right thing to do was of course to order a break out, at leat while there was a real possibility of getting out a lot of his men.

The German high command (esp Hitler and Göring) failed miserably (also) on this occasion, but even after a successful withdrawal of army group A and B the strategic outlook for germany would have been bleak. In grand strategical terms Germany HAD to defeat the soviet union to win the war, though a defensive stance might have prolonged it somewhat. The improved capabilities (though exactly how improved is open to debate) of the Red Army arguably also came as a shock to Germans throughout their force structure. As I remember Hitler being quoted, he said that he could never get there again (Stalingrad), and even if the city itself was whithout strategic significanse, there seem little reason to believe that the Wehrmacht could have penetrated deep into Soviet held territory to take areas of desisive strategic importance again in 43, at least not on a scale mirroring that of 42, let alone 41.

Anyway I think the discussion shows that it is very difficult to weigh the benefits of holding up considerable Soviet forces versus getting out some divisions, and it should come as no surprise that the germans (from Paulus to Hitler) didn't act fully rational in such an overall hopeless situation. Even with hindsight it seem like we have a hard time agreeing on exactly what was possible and preferrable.


----------



## Njaco (Jan 4, 2012)

stona said:


> I have no idea whether he did or not. I don't believe that his assurances that the encircled army could be supplied from the air were based on sound military advice. He was getting that from Richthofen and many others. He had a staff whose advice he could,and did,ignore.
> Anyway there was noone from the air staff arguing against the air supply at the OKH because of Jeshonnek's equivocal stance.
> 
> You can never discount the political considerations in the decision making of the nazi leadership,and the propensity of these palladins for interfering in military matters of which they had no detailed understanding.
> ...



A lot of their confidence was based on the success of the Demyansk airlift.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 4, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I say....let the debate continue. Let the abuse cease....



Exactly...


----------



## tyrodtom (Jan 4, 2012)

The Demyansk airlift supported about 100,000 encircled men, there were almost 300,000 at Stalingrad, the Soviets evidently learned more from their failure to stop the Demyansk airlift than the Germans did from it's success.

It's almost as if some on the German side couldn't do simple arithmatic. They knew about how many men were encircled, they knew how much tonnage of supplies it took to supply them, and how many aircraft they had, and what they could carry. It's almost as if they though national socialist ardor could enable aircraft to operate around the clock with no maintenance, crews to fly with no rest, or escort. And troops in the encircled positions to fight while starving , freezing, and low on ammo.


The airlift never at no time ever came close to suppling their daily needs, some aircraft somehow got loaded with supplies not even needed, waisting a whole aircraft mission and crew for nothing.


----------



## Juha (Jan 4, 2012)

DonL said:


> Between 20-25 November the army was intact with food, fuel and munition for six days and the way to Nischne Tschirskaja was absolutely possible as intact formation...



Hello Don
what is your source on fuel status of 6.A before the encirclement? I asked this because of according to the history of 14.PzD (by Rolf Grams in 1957) the div ran out of fuel already while withdrawing towards Stalingrad from combats against encircling Soviets and because of that lost most of its heavy equipments. That before and around 27 Nov. And I remembered wrongly, IV./PzArtRgt 4, a FlaKAbt, was overran with its 88s by Soviet infantry not cavalry. And the excellent source on Stalingrad is not Keil’s but Manfred Kehrig’s Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht.. According to Kehrig the catastrophic fuel situation greatly hampered 6.A counter moves against Soviet breakthroughs NW of Stalingrad, ie the movements of 16. and 24.PzDs and 3. and 60. Inf.D(mot)s towards critical sectors. And after Hube (CG of 16.PzD) informed on 22 Nov. that his div was unable to implement his order to attack W of Don because the lack of fuel the AOK gave first orders to began to built ring defence.

Juha


----------



## Tante Ju (Jan 4, 2012)

IMHO the question was simpe: _Risk_ the 6. Armee or _loose_ the most if not all of Army group South in the Caucasus by letting the 6. Armee try to break out - and in process become a spent force too, loosing most equipment, and leaving the wounded, sick behind for certain death.. IF it succeeds in breaking out. No guarantee there.

Its a simple making of balance choosing between two bad scenerio, one being infinitely worse than first and would lead to complete collapse of German front in the East. Which balance has less cost?

I'd say decision to make the 6. Armee keep Russian busy was correct choice. There would be some chance to save 6. Armee. Demyanks as note was one example, but there were some large parallel Soviet operation to Stalingrad pocket, which were complete failure and costly to Soviet. So some optimism was not badly placed.

Could Luftwaffe provide better job? No, in winter of 1942. They had to use what was at hand, and adopt circumstances.. they gave all. to develop capability to supply entire 300 000 Army from would take year or two preparation, at expense of other areas. I doubt anybody elso could though, given circumstances, especially thing like very limited size, capacity of receiving airfields.


----------



## Juha (Jan 4, 2012)

Hello tyrodtom
one problem was that CoS of LW, Jeschonek, seems to have thought that he must first be a staunt Nazi, to whom Hitler's orders and wishes were God's orders and only secondly a capable staff officer.

Juha


----------



## stona (Jan 4, 2012)

Juha said:


> Hello tyrodtom
> one problem was that CoS of LW, Jeschonek, seems to have thought that he must first be a staunt Nazi, to whom Hitler's orders and wishes were God's orders and only secondly a capable staff officer.
> 
> Juha



He certainly didn't do the Luftwaffe any favours by agreeing to the air lift. The long term consequences for his service,not just those I mentioned earlier,were dire and do not seem to have been given any consideration at the time. 

At the risk of veering off topic I wonder what decisions would have been made over the fate of the 6th Army IF the Luftwaffe/OKH had convinced Hitler that the air lift was not an option. Would it have been withdrawn or left to its fate anyway?

Cheers
Steve


----------



## davebender (Jan 4, 2012)

How do you know that? Do you have a copy of a 6th Army strength report for November 1942?

German 6th Army fought more or less non-stop since May 1942 when they won a huge victory at the 2nd Battle of Kharkov. Six months later and at the end of a very long supply line I'd be surprised if divisions averaged much over 50% of TOE strength for personnel and equipment.


----------



## tyrodtom (Jan 4, 2012)

Just going by Wiki, not the best source maybe, that's 6th Army , with all the other units attached to it, and all their allies. Wiki actually says 291,000, I rounded up to less than 300,000.

If they didn't even make a fairly accurate count of how many personnel they had to supply, how could they ever hope to supply them? Even I will give them credit for the intelligence to do that very soon after they were cut off.


----------



## davebender (Jan 4, 2012)

> didn't even make a fairly accurate count of how many personnel they had to supply


Perhaps they did and perhaps that number came to less then 200,000 soldiers as units were at 50% strength. Under such circumstances aerial resupply starts to look possible. It also explains why the Soviets captured only about 90,000 POWs.


----------



## rank amateur (Jan 4, 2012)

Any one venture a guess about the amount of Hiwi's in Stalingrad?


----------



## tyrodtom (Jan 4, 2012)

Since when does "perhaps" count as a source ?

Even if the figure was 200,000, that's still twice as many as they supplied at Demyansk.


----------



## davebender (Jan 4, 2012)

Axis History Forum • View topic - 6th Army Losses Attacking in Stalingrad Sept-Oct 42
376 ID: 5269 
44ID: 6748
384 ID: 5025
76 ID: 4740
113 ID: 5064
94 ID: 2924
16 PzD: 4855
60 ID (mot): 4812
3 ID (mot): 4498
71 ID: 4331
295 ID: 3459
100 JgD: 4688
79 ID: 4304
305 ID: 2915
389 ID: 4021
Gr. Seydel (14 PzD): 588
24 PzD: 6160
PiBtl 376: 100 
Source: Kehrig, pp. 662-663. 
............................................................
74,501 total
These numbers suggest 6th Army divisions averaged well below 50% of TOE strength. 14th Panzer Division was already destroyed for all practical purposes. 94th Infantry Division and 305th Infantry Division weren't much better.


----------



## davebender (Jan 4, 2012)

Axis History Forum • View topic - Stalingrad


> The 6th army strength report of 13th Nov. 1942 talks about 30,765 Hiwis


Apparently about 25% of 6th Army strength consisted of Ukrainians fighting to liberate their land from Stalin's grip.


----------



## Juha (Jan 4, 2012)

In fact it is the Verpflegungsstärke, the number of mouths needed to feed that was important, on 18 Dec 6.A reported that inside the encirclement its Verpflegungsstärke was 249600 men, incl. Romanians and Hiwis
Source Kehrig p. 671

Juha


----------



## Juha (Jan 4, 2012)

davebender said:


> Axis History Forum • View topic - 6th Army Losses Attacking in Stalingrad Sept-Oct 42
> ...Gr. Seydel (14 PzD): 588
> ...
> Source: Kehrig, pp. 662-663.
> ...



Sorry Gr Seydel was only one KG from 14.PzD, not all what was left from the div. The div, excluding Gr Seydel, had Verpfl.-St. of 10 389men and Gef.-St. 4760men

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Jan 4, 2012)

davebender said:


> Axis History Forum • View topic - Stalingrad
> 
> Apparently about 25% of 6th Army strength consisted of Ukrainians fighting to liberate their land from Stalin's grip.




The percentage I can agree with, the reasons for their fighhting for the germans I am less sure about. My stepfather fought at stalingrad, was a Machine gunner manning an MG42. Though officially hiwis were banned from frontline roles, this was routinely ignored by the frontline units. The no2 on the gun was a giant Ukrainian, who told my Dad he fought for germany for food. he didnt care aboput Stalin, or politics or Ukrainian separatism. he fought to stay alive.

There were other Hiwis that were conscripted, still others in the north particulalry that joined because of tribal hatreds. of course there were some that joined to avenge the murder of family or the displacement from homes and farms, ther were all sorts of reasons why Russians fought for Germany. 

With regard to strengths within the pocket I have a source somewhere (I will dig it out), that estimate strengths at the time of the encirclement as 248000. I will try and find it. Many of that number will be non-combat troops, there were also many wounded (effectively non-combattants) holed up in the city, unable to be moved because of lack of transport (though that is in dispute). 

6th Army was already heavily depleted even before the encirclement. The encirclement simply sped up its destruction. by the time of its surrender, there were just 91000 survivors in the pocket. Not all of them were German.


----------



## davebender (Jan 4, 2012)

What about civilians remaining inside Stalingrad after 6th Army seized it? I suspect there was no shortage of civilian volunteers by 18 December 1942 as that was the only way to acquire food.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 4, 2012)

Stalin did forbid the evacuation of the city, however i strongly suspect that all able bodied Soviets would have been inducted into the city by November. The city was ionitially defended by the 1077 AA Regiment, which because all the able bodied men had already been drafted was a unit fully manned by young women. This unit hung on but took heavy casualties.

The german advance onto the city itself weas rather slow, caused by the traffic jams and logistic issues experienced in ASugust. This would give time for the Soviets to remove everything of value before the city was invested. My suspicion is that only old, very young and infirm individuals would have been left behind by the soviets at the time, despite Stalins orders.


----------



## Jenisch (Jan 4, 2012)

Guys, I don't want to start an alternative history discussion here, but in your opinions Germany could have defeated the Soviets if taked Stalingrad and subsequentely the oil fields? Germany would have logistical capabilities for this? (in certain way this is inside the topic)


----------



## davebender (Jan 4, 2012)

I doubt it.

The objective of American Lend-Lease was to provide the Soviets with whatever their economy lacked. Take away Soviet oil and the USA will make up the shortfall. Just as the USA made up shortfalls in steel, explosives, aluminum, food and a whole lot of other stuff. 

Furthermore German conquest of the Caucasus would almost certainly result in an American army and air force being committed to the Persian Gulf in order to safeguard that Lend-Lease route. By the fall of 1942 we had dozens of army divisions and army air corps units sitting idle so finding units for deployment would not be an issue. Stalin would get his wish to have the American Army in large scale ground combat vs Germany during 1942 or early 1943.


----------



## Jenisch (Jan 4, 2012)

Exactly what I was thinking. Also, the Soviets probably would set fire in the oil fields, which would take many months to be extinguished. If they didn't, the Allies would probably bomb them from Soviet bases. An easy destruction of the highly inflammable land would be ensured. Apparently, Germany really didn't have any safety, if any mean at all, to obtain victory.


----------



## davebender (Jan 4, 2012)

Not from Soviet bases. Stalin did everything possible to discourage American units from operating on Soviet territory. However Caucasus oil fields can be bombed from air bases located in British occupied Iran.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 4, 2012)

There were more than twenty divisions in the US by the end of 1942, but only a very few of them were considered combat ready . Every time a division was worked up to combat readiness, it had to be broken up as cadres to form yet more Divisions. It took a very long time to work up the expanded US army because of its very small starting base.

Torch represented a major committment by the US army and was done only with the direct intervention by the CinC. The brass had wanted to continue its expansion of the army, rather than comitting any part of the army incompletely. a Torch style effort was about the maximum force committment the US could make at that time. 

Operation Roundup was the code name for a 1942 plan for an invasion of northern France by Allied forces during World War II. The plan, for an invasion in the Spring of 1943, and drawn up by then-Brigadier General Dwight Eisenhower, reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe. The British were reluctant to commit to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the Battle of the Somme, they preferred to avoid a direct assault on a powerful enemy. Winston Churchill preferred a strategy of attacking German forces in the Mediterranean instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly"), while other British military leaders hoped to defer an invasion until the Germans had been worn down by fighting on the Russian front. more than anything, ROUNDUP was killed off by the crippling losses in shipping that had been suffered in 1942. Moreover, a division deployed into the Middle East needed roughly five times the shipping that a division deployed to britain would require. Given that ROUNDUP was unrealistic, and had proposed 48 divs in april 1943, and shiiping demands per div were five times greater for a division in the Middle East than into Europe, the maximum number of divs the US could commit would be less than 5.

The Brits had an army in the Middle East for this very purpose, relying on locally raised Indian Troops. The force was around 8 understrength divisions, includng 1 indian Armoured Div, under the aegis of the Indian 10th Army. Its orders were to defend the Middle eastern Oilk resources should the Germans break through in the Caucasus. Contingency plans were also to provide support the Indian 9th Army deployed in Palestine and the Levant against any German incursion by DAK into the Delta.

These two armies were later reorganized into the 12th Army Group. In 1941 they were known as PaIForce. They are often overlooked in "what if" assessments, but they made any ideas of a German domionance in the Middle east a pipe dream. 

Getting back to ROUNDUP, given shortages of merchant shipping, landing craft, and other resources, the plan was unrealistic; it called for a force consisting of 48 divisions and 5800 aircraft, with a landing on broad beachheads between Boulogne and Le Havre.

As acompromise, and following a re-appraisal of Allied logistic capabilities in the latter half of 1942, , the decision was made to carry out Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa. Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch and preparations for Roundup were given lower priority due to the uncertainties of future Allied strategy. The British were as reluctant to fully abandon Roundup as they had been to commit to it, but in November 1942 Eisenhower told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.


----------



## davebender (Jan 5, 2012)

> took a very long time to work up the expanded US army because of its very small starting base


IMO that's a rather lame excuse. 

German army expansion from 100,000 active duty (no reserves) to 36 divisions began during March 1935. Four years later German army expansion still had a long way to go but they were able to put dozens of divisions in the field for the invasion of Poland.

July 1939. U.S. Army Strength.
189,867 active duty.
310,000 National Guard and Army Reserve.

June 1940.
U.S. active duty enlisted strength increased to 375,000. A little over double from July 1939.

September 1940.
U.S. National Guard mobilized.

1940 U.S. Army goals.
1 million man army by 1 Jan 1941.
1.4 million man army by July 1941.
.....27 infantry divisions.
.....4 armored divisions.
.....2 cavalry divisions.
.....54 combat air groups.

December 1941.
U.S. Army strength reaches 1,647,477.

December 1942.
U.S. Army strength reaches 5,397,674.

It's easy to see why Stalin thought we should have a couple armies in Europe during 1942. We had plenty of divisions. If they weren't trained two years after the 1940 mobilization then someone wasn't doing his job.


----------



## Juha (Jan 5, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Guys, I don't want to start an alternative history discussion here, but in your opinions Germany could have defeated the Soviets if taked Stalingrad and subsequentely the oil fields? Germany would have logistical capabilities for this? (in certain way this is inside the topic)



No, because Germans would not have been able to keep them during the winter 42/43.

Juha


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 5, 2012)

davebender said:


> IMO that's a rather lame excuse.
> 
> It's easy to see why Stalin thought we should have a couple armies in Europe during 1942. We had plenty of divisions. If they weren't trained two years after the 1940 mobilization then someone wasn't doing his job.



Germans had about a 9 year jump on the US Army in expanding. Raw figures do not tell the whole story. How much of the US army of the '30s' was coastal artillery? the German Luftwaffe was much larger than the USAAC for most of the 30s. the Germans built many more tanks than the US did during the 30s. Granted they were MK Is and IIs but you have to have something to train WITH. US production of the 105 Howitzer doesn't start until 1940. US was short of heavy weapons and even it's basic infantry rifle. M-1 grands were in short supply in 1941-42. Springfield's and Enfield's made up the difference but without a proper LMG the US squads would have been in trouble. Throwing US divisions into the war much earlier than was done would have accomplished little but showing that the US was willing to sacrifice thousands of troops to "support" Uncle Joe, with no real strategic gain. 
The US was also a bit too obsessed with numbers. They kept breaking up trained units to form cadres for multiple new units.


----------



## Just Schmidt (Jan 5, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Guys, I don't want to start an alternative history discussion here, but in your opinions Germany could have defeated the Soviets if taked Stalingrad and subsequentely the oil fields? Germany would have logistical capabilities for this? (in certain way this is inside the topic)



Stricktly speaking the immidiate problems for the Germans was that they didn't possess forces or logistics to take both Srtalingrad and the oil in the Caucasus region.

My earlier post might give the impression that a german Victory at Stalingrad could have won the war for them, if so it gives the wrong impression. In and by itself stalingrad was of minor importance, the best course of action woulkd probably have been to maski the city and pour all offensive assets into the southern drive. But there's no guarantee that would have led to success.

If it led to success, and if Germany could have consolidated this gain (they just might have, though I doubt it), USSR would have been in a weakened postion.

They would have less oil, but this could have been alleviated through lend-lease.

This lend-lease in itself would have been hampered as most of the lease through Persia would have been cut off.

It would have been possible for the germans to improve their supply of petrol, although how much and how soon is open to question.

On the other hand (providing Turkey remained neutral) german forces at the Caspian sea and in the Caucasus would have nightmarish supply lines, only to be partly offset IF turkey joining the axis.

Still I don't think they would have defeated the USSR. Had they succeeded they would still only have reached (approximately) one of the three points on the AAA line which they (according to shedule) should have reached six weeks after july 22 1941. IMHO the war effectivelyt was lost when the Wehrmacht stalled in front of Moscow, at the wery latest.


----------



## davebender (Jan 5, 2012)

> german forces at the Caspian sea and in the Caucasus would have nightmarish supply lines


Why? 

There are good rail lines extending into the Caucasus from Germany. Certainly better then what an Anglo-American army operating from northern Iran would have.


----------



## Just Schmidt (Jan 5, 2012)

davebender said:


> Why?
> 
> There are good rail lines extending into the Caucasus from Germany. Certainly better then what an Anglo-American army operating from northern Iran would have.



Because with the rail line through Stalingrad unavailable, there is only one line into the Caucasus (with Rostov as obvious chokepoint), and Germany is a long way off. Railways elsewher3e in Russia didn't always suffice. Routes through Perrsia were good enough to handle 30 % of lend lease in 43 (Evan Mawdsley "Thunder In The East" page 192), and at the wery time of Stalingrad it was decided to "upgrade" the supply route from the Persian Gulf (ibid).

Not that I would expect much heavy fighting (but upkeep in itself would pose some demands on supply), the most likely scenario is an outflank of the region from the north against Rostov. If western allies would have prioritised a front in Persia and didn't have sufficient land routes available, they would have far better prospects of arial supply here than the Germans at Stalingrad, although to the detriment of other areas (probably Burma and China).


----------



## davebender (Jan 5, 2012)

Tunnels and bridges on the new Iranian rail line are much better choke points. Germany just needs an airfield within Ju-88 or Me-410 range.


----------



## iron man (Jan 5, 2012)

Just Schmidt said:


> Stricktly speaking the immidiate problems for the Germans was that they didn't possess forces or logistics to take both Srtalingrad and the oil in the Caucasus region.
> IMO? They didn't have the logistic capability to take either...
> My earlier post might give the impression that a german Victory at Stalingrad could have won the war for them, if so it gives the wrong impression. In and by itself stalingrad was of minor importance, the best course of action woulkd probably have been to maski the city and pour all offensive assets into the southern drive. But there's no guarantee that would have led to success.
> But how to support it? The closest railhead that was converted/upgraded to DRG (_Reichsbahn Ost_) standards in November of 1942 was at Stalino.
> ...


_
Cheers!_


----------



## parsifal (Jan 5, 2012)

davebender said:


> Why?
> 
> There are good rail lines extending into the Caucasus from Germany. Certainly better then what an Anglo-American army operating from northern Iran would have.



Not in 1942, at least in working condition. After the abortive Soviet offensive that captured Kharkov in the winter of 41-2, the supply heads for AGS were pushed back several hundred miles. The German Rail Authority was already struggling in the east to keep frontline units supplied by that time, and complete the repairs to the Soviet rail system. Germany had started the war in Russia short of both rolling stock and prime movers, and had found much of its German locomotives and carriages unsuitable for the eastern front. These problems were eventually solved, by modification to both the rolling stock and the trains, but such work was slow. The states of many bridges and rail lines in Russia were found to be extremely poor, and the captured equipment fell apart very raipdly. 

All of these problems were eventaually solved, but it all took time, and time was something germany did not have. moreover the stockpiles of supplies needed to repair or replace sections of track, install water and coaling stations, develop marshalling yards and the like had been basically used up in the 1941 campaign. Replacement supplies of this kind were slow in being produced and brought to the front where needed. moreover the German State Railways were beginning to suffer the first of their acute manpower shortages. They attempted to remedy this by employing local labour, but this proved rather abortive and unsuccessful.

The result of all this was that the advances achieved under Fall blau were not matched by a repair and re-gauging effort much beyond the start lines. This is one reason why Stalingrad, and the advance of 1Pz and 17 Army into the Caucasus became logistic nightmares for the Germans. The rail lines that you are relying on were there, damaged and inoperable, and they basically remained as such until recaptured by the Russians in the winter of 42-3. After the capture of the oilfields in Maikop, the German Supply Ministry (I think it was them) undertook an investigation and found that the oil wells were so badly damaged, it would take an estimated 2-3 years to restore them back to production, and would have required the diversion of military supply arriving by rail into the TO to the tune of a reduction of military traffic by an estimated 50% (I will confirm that figure tonite). Since military supply traffic on ASGS never exceeded 70% of estimated requirements, that means that the whole AG would have needed to reduce its daily military supply expenditursres to about 35% of what it thought it actually required, in order to restore these lines and network to anything like operational condition, and restore the economic infrastructure to working order. In other words, whilst Germany remained locked in combat with the USSR in major operations, it was impossible to extend the working rail network much beyond what it already was. 

By comparison, the effort put into uprading the Iranian and Persian rail networks is generally unknown, and really quite astonishing. India has a rolling stock reserve bigger than the whole of Germany at this time, and in 1942 something like 45%of Indian rolling stock was moved to Persia for supply operations to support the Russians. The Americans provided very significant levels of prime movers to haul this rolling stock. Vast numbers of railway workers were shipped out from the US to build up the persian rail network. It was an effort far bigger than the Germans were capable of in Southern Russia at that time. The fact that the transfer of the Indian rolling stock probably was a major cause of the 43 famine in bengal (where more than 2million people perished from starvation) is worth noting, but not really relevant to the issue. There is just no way that the germans, despite operating on interior lines could match the logistic effort mounted by the allies into persia in 42-3, neither could a few well placed bombs make much difference, or cause delay to the re-supply activities. The Persian route for Lend lease was far bigger than the murmansk run, and this was a massive effort in itself.


----------



## Jenisch (Jan 5, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Not in 1942, at least in working condition. After the abortive Soviet offensive that captured Kharkov in the winter of 41-2, the supply heads for AGS were pushed back several hundred miles. The German Rail Authority was already struggling in the east to keep frontline units supplied by that time, and complete the repairs to the Soviet rail system. Germany had started the war in Russia short of both rolling stock and prime movers, and had found much of its German locomotives and carriages unsuitable for the eastern front. These problems were eventually solved, by modification to both the rolling stock and the trains, but such work was slow. The states of many bridges and rail lines in Russia were found to be extremely poor, and the captured equipment fell apart very raipdly.
> 
> All of these problems were eventaually solved, but it all took time, and time was something germany did not have. moreover the stockpiles of supplies needed to repair or replace sections of track, install water and coaling stations, develop marshalling yards and the like had been basically used up in the 1941 campaign. Replacement supplies of this kind were slow in being produced and brought to the front where needed. moreover the German State Railways were beginning to suffer the first of their acute manpower shortages. They attempted to remedy this by employing local labour, but this proved rather abortive and unsuccessful.
> 
> ...


 
That's why some people, specially from the wartime, belived that the multi front war cost Germany the defeat. They simply didn't have the capability to maintein the fight against all their enemies.


----------



## iron man (Jan 5, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Not in 1942, at least in working condition. After the abortive Soviet offensive that captured Kharkov in the winter of 41-2, the supply heads for AGS were pushed back several hundred miles. The German Rail Authority was already struggling in the east to keep frontline units supplied by that time, and complete the repairs to the Soviet rail system. Germany had started the war in Russia short of both rolling stock and prime movers, and had found much of its German locomotives and carriages unsuitable for the eastern front. These problems were eventually solved, by modification to both the rolling stock and the trains, but such work was slow. The states of many bridges and rail lines in Russia were found to be extremely poor, and the captured equipment fell apart very raipdly.
> 
> All of these problems were eventaually solved, but it all took time, and time was something germany did not have. moreover the stockpiles of supplies needed to repair or replace sections of track, install water and coaling stations, develop marshalling yards and the like had been basically used up in the 1941 campaign. Replacement supplies of this kind were slow in being produced and brought to the front where needed. moreover the German State Railways were beginning to suffer the first of their acute manpower shortages. They attempted to remedy this by employing local labour, but this proved rather abortive and unsuccessful.
> 
> ...


Martin Van Crevald + Alfred Meiezejewski = The Reality of _Reichsbahn Ost_. Thanks for the "like"; back at ya!

Cheers, Ron


----------



## parsifal (Jan 5, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> That's why some people, specially from the wartime, belived that the multi front war cost Germany the defeat. They simply didn't have the capability to maintein the fight against all their enemies.



The Germans had plenty of fight, but their logistics capability was limited. The germans, as they moved further and further from Germany had greater and greater difficulty in supplying their forces.

Because of this the germans were never going to progress beyond regional power status, whereas the US was in a whole different category. In '42, the US was recovering from the shipping losses it had suffered at the hands of the U_Boats, but once this problem had been overcome, the US ability to project is military power worldwide was unmatched by anyone.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 5, 2012)

iron man said:


> Martin Van Crevald + Alfred Meiezejewski = The Reality of _Reichsbahn Ost_. Thanks for the "like"; back at ya!
> 
> Cheers, Ron




Thanks....that was the book I was trying to remember..... Hayward has a bit of a summary as well on this issue


----------



## Just Schmidt (Jan 6, 2012)

Yes, I think we are in basic agreement.

My post was an 'even if' scenario. I tried (with reservations) to show that only a string of 'miracles' would get the Germans to Baku, and that even this wouldn't be enough. I didn't meen to imply that I saw it as realistic.


----------



## Just Schmidt (Jan 6, 2012)

davebender said:


> Tunnels and bridges on the new Iranian rail line are much better choke points. Germany just needs an airfield within Ju-88 or Me-410 range.



Hawing travelled by train from Narvik through Kiruna I shall freely admit that railroads through mountainous regions can seem very vulnerable, and frankly I don't possess the relevant data for a detailed comparision between these supply lines to a highly hypothetical front in Persia (and therefore I'm gratefull for Parcifals post #93). An (unlikely) german drive into Persia would have ment that soon the Germans would have this tenious link in their rear, equally open to attack from (say) B 25's and P 38's. It dosn't make the distance back to Germany any shorter either.

Even IF the german rail line was theoretically the best of the two, that dosn't prove it was sufficient to their (again hypothetical) needs.

Rostov as choke point was ment in the logistic and strategic sense.

But all of this is becoming a derailment of the post that stated this thread.


----------



## davebender (Jan 6, 2012)

I don't see that happening. The Caucasus Mountains form a natural barrier between Iran and the Soviet Union. If Germany can hold the Caucasus region that's where the front line is likely to stabilize.







The Luftwaffe would have airfields north of the mountains. Britain and the USA would have airfields south of the mountains. Britain and the USA would have a lot more bombers and those bombers have more range. However German Me-410s and Ju-88s can bomb a lot more accurately. Not sure how that would play out as they attempt to destroy each others rail lines.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 7, 2012)

I think the Luftwaffe did very well considering the circumstances. I am sure they would have liked more maitenance technicians, more Ju 52 production and more spare engines but they didn't have these. The problem was making the commitment for airlift and then not rescinding it after it had been studied and after several highly respected officers (von Richthoffen) had said the process was impossible.

It seem it was thought that 1500 aircraft would be required to provide 500 sorties per day supplying 500-600 tons. The over supply of aircraft accounts for serviceabillity issues and combat damage. (Ju 52 had several gun stations for a reason, while DC-3 didn't have them for a reason as well).

Since 1500 aircraft and crew were not available it was attempted to shorten the distances involved and use less aircraft (below 500) flying multiple missions with heavier loads, something which would lead to congestion issues and meant the use of vulnerable airfields.

Winter starts could be extremely damaging to the engines and it seems Ju 52 crews arrived from Nth Africa had not been familiarised with cold starting procedures; something which worsened the engine situation.

I would say that if the Luftwaffes procurment program had of been managed better the Luftwaffe could have had more suitable transports.

If the Heinkel He 177 had of been a sucess in Early 1941 (eg as a He 177) production dedicated to FW-200s could have been turned over to transport use from the maritme partrol role.
He 111 and Do 217 production would also be wound back.

The FW 200 is a efficient transport when long distances are involved: it could just about carry 4 tons from Berlin to Stalingrad and almost fly back without refueling. It would fly faster and carry more load per crew member and reduce the need for pilots. The FW 200 had its faults but I would see them as being limmited and of great use in resupply of stalingrad and nth Africa. Due to its larger load capacity fewe trips would be required, therefore reducing congestion.

The Me 210 program was also a disaster that severely disrupted production of many types of aircraft and consumed resources.

Had the He 177 and Me 210 programs gone to schedule the Luftwaffe can likely afford considerably more transports.

The Ju 252 was simply not developing fast enough so the FW 200 would need to do.

An aircraft known as the Ar 232B likely would have provided a big boost in delivery. This aircraft had a STOL capabillity of 200m runway, less than 40% that of the Ju 52. Even a small number would have made a big difference.

In theory, in order to supply 500 tons of cargo using FW 200's some 125 sorties per day are required assuming 4 tons is carried. However in considerating of combat damage, accidents and general wear and tear one would assume at least twice this number are required perhaps 3 times. Some 125 sorties means one aircraft landing every 4 minutes if we assume 8n hours daylight. Ju 52's could only lift that quantity of cargo over very short distances which neccesitates double handling at combat zone airfields.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jan 7, 2012)

Very sad saga .... for whatever reasons.

MM


----------



## davebender (Jan 7, 2012)

Only because RLM chose to cancel it rather then resuming production during the summer of 1942 after the design glitches were fixed.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 8, 2012)

I agree the Me 210/410 was a fine aircraft worthy of production and its worth noting that
the 'fixed versions' were only about 12 months late in entering service and that it was 
a good peformer once it was in service.

However the disaster is really that several factories had already begun shutting down production
of types such as the He 111, Me 110 and begun converting to Me 210 when they suddenly had to
revert to either Me 110G or worse the Ju 88. This caused a huge loss in production not only of
Me 210/410 but of other types; moreover the factories weren't set up correctly. It would
have been simple to just keep producing the Me 110 as the Me 110G a little longer, which was a good
performer (370 mph for the Me109G2) and could carry a heavy bomb load a decent range (with drop tanks)
albeit without the internal bomb bay of the Me 210/410 and longer range of the 210/410.

The other production problem the Luftwaffe had was the He 177 but I see no reason that
a 4 engined Jumo 211 version, the so called He 177B couldn't be in problem free by mid 1941, a
few months after Lancaster and Halifax entered service.

This then means FW 200 production become available for transport service and aircraft such as
the He 111 can be removed from the production program.

While the FW 200 may not have been perfect for Stalingrad it was likely to be able to 
relieve Ju 52's from supply duty into Nth Africa where its good range would allow it to
deliver a good net cargo.

The problem may have been that although Ernest Heinkel was as suspicious and presicient over the
inadequecies of the DB606 as Roy Chadwick was of the Vulture the political situation with the
engine supplier was different.


Whilst Ernest Hives's Rolls Royce would suffer no loss in sacrificing the RR Vulture in 
favour of the RR Merlin, in fact there would be an overall gain given the difficulties 
with the engine, he would thus be inclined to argue in favour of abandoning the Vulture. 

Daimler Benz (Dr Nallinger) would not be happy to suffer a loss of DB601/606 production in 
favour of the competitors Jumo 211 and so would be likely to argue that the DB606 was
worth perservering with or at least not actually want to throw in the towel in 
regards their own engine as RR did.


----------



## iron man (Jan 8, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> I think the Luftwaffe did very well considering the circumstances. I am sure they would have liked more maitenance technicians, more Ju 52 production and more spare engines but they didn't have these. The problem was making the commitment for airlift and then not rescinding it after it had been studied and after several highly respected officers (von Richthoffen) had said the process was impossible.
> 
> A rather similar situation also occurred within the DRG (Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft) when they were discussing the initial logistic planning for Fall Blau. Those in Berlin and those actively involved "out there" with Reichsbahn Ost had *widely divergent opinions * (as with regards to the ability to meet the anticipated logistic needs for the operation). The difference was that in this case, the folks in Berlin deferred to their "boots on the ground" and were very skeptical about the possibility of delivering the required tonnage that OKW had specified for the operation.
> 
> ...



All in all? We are _largely in agreement_ here; I'm not trying to "tear your post apart". On the other hand?

Just felt like providing "another solution" to the problem at hand...

Hindsight is _always_ 20/20


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 9, 2012)

iron man said:


> All in all? We are _largely in agreement_ here; I'm not trying to "tear your post apart". On the other hand?
> 
> Just felt like providing "another solution" to the problem at hand...
> 
> Hindsight is _always_ 20/20



In general I'm arguing that the Luftwaffe needed more investment in its transport capacity at all levels. In general the Whermacht also needed more trucks and fuel!

However the crux as I see it is that the Luftwaffe needed more *efficient* transports. Aircraft that could carry cargo longer distances, in less time, using less fuel per unit delivered and requiring less crew per ton of cargo delivered. I don't see a fundemental problem with the FW 200 as a transport. It was missused as a maritime patrol bomber and due to heavy combate manouvering at low altitude and in rough weather it suffered from fatigue which manifested itself in the heavier landings it experienced in roughter fields. However the airframe and undercarriage could be strenghtened (as it was in the C-0) and again in C3 and the weight increases could be compensated by the growth in Bramo engine performance. It was a younger airframe than the DC-3. I wasn't a perfect aircraft but it was available and could in theory be improved, which is much better than non existant transports such as the Ju 252 or Ju 352

There were only 276 FW 200 produced. They should have been used exclusively as transports, armed ones and this would have been possible had the He 177B been a success and had a little capacity been freed by the Me 210/410 not being so problematic.

The Empty equiped weight of the Bomber version FW 200 C3 was 17000kg and the MTOW 24.5 tons. Fuel capacity was 6000 Litres which at 0.725kg/L means 4350kg of fuel. This leaves room for 2.65 tons of load. IE it could carry 2 tons of load 2200 miles if 650kg allowances for crew and ammunition are made. A version optimised for the pure transport role would offer better performance.

Of course halve the fuel to 3000L and cargo goes up 2.1 tons to 4.1 tons total and range drops to about 1100 miles. The Ju 52 can't even fly that far and if it delivered a cargo 500 miles it would need to refuel at the destination, this effectively limits its opperational radious range to even less: perhaps only 250-300 miles. Air transport is not much use if you need additional rail or land transports to carry fuel to the destination.

I don't know why the Brama 323 radial would be unreliable: it probably relates to the fact that winter start procedures had not been developed. You can't toy with lubrication at -40C.

The Ju 290, while a much better aircraft was also not really a production item till late 1942. This is far too late to set up mass production and in the context of a reliable He 177B also an unneccesary duplication.

The only new transport I could justify would be the Ar 232 due to its STOL and rough field performance as well as rear loading hatch.


----------



## davebender (Jan 9, 2012)

If Wikipedia is correct the Ju-290 never entered mass production. Only 65 were built so for all practical purposes they should all be considered prototypes. There were also only about 65 Ju-252 / Ju-352 built.

Like the Me-210C, I consider the Ju-252 to be a great missed opportunity for 1942 Germany. The Ju-252 might not be available in numbers great enough to matter at Stalingrad but it would certainly make a difference in Tunisia and various other German air supply operations. Unlike so many other German aircraft programs, there were plenty of engines available for the Ju-252 and Me-210C.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 9, 2012)

davebender said:


> If Wikipedia is correct the Ju-290 never entered mass production. Only 65 were built so for all practical purposes they should all be considered prototypes. There were also only about 65 Ju-252 / Ju-352 built.



In Griehls "Luftwaffe over Amerika" Milch is quoted as saying producing the Ju 290 as a 'prototype' was a good idea as there was no need to invest in tooling and jigs which would go out of date anyway. They clearly weren't thinking of mass production in the immediate future.



davebender said:


> Like the Me-210C, I consider the Ju-252 to be a great missed opportunity for 1942 Germany. The Ju-252 might not be available in numbers great enough to matter at Stalingrad but it would certainly make a difference in Tunisia and various other German air supply operations. Unlike so many other German aircraft programs, there were plenty of engines available for the Ju-252 and Me-210C.



Certainly the Ju 252 was not a risky aircraft: there were no complicated engines, no difficult remote controlled armament schemes to develop. It was a straightforward aircraft to put into production and it would have provided excellent performance: fast, fuel efficient, long ranged, with heavy lift and turn around capabillity much better than the Ju 52s and modified bombers the Luftwaffe actually used. I'm inclined to think that the a 'tactical transport' such as the Ar 232 might have been a more usefull aircraft given the corners the Whermacht got itself into but then it lacked the range and speed to keep distant Army supplied though it was better than the Ju 52.


----------



## davebender (Jan 9, 2012)

I know Messerschmitt was all tooled up to produce the Me-210C before RLM pulled the plug on the program. 

Was Junkers tooled up to manufacture the Ju-252 or was it cancelled before production jigs were built?


----------



## stona (Jan 10, 2012)

davebender said:


> I know Messerschmitt was all tooled up to produce the Me-210C before RLM pulled the plug on the program.



Messerschmitt wasn't just tooled up. The initial decision to "pull the plug" was taken on 9 March '42 but Messerschmitt continued trying to produce the improved version (eventually the Me 410) promising completely unrealistic timetables for completion of the prototypes.
It was only after an inspection of Augsburg by Generalingenieur Roluf Lucht of the RLM on 19 April that the final decision to stop all further work on the Me 210 was taken on 25 April.
At this time 94 aircraft had been completed at Augsburg and 258 at Regensburg. There were a further 540 aircraft at various stages of construction spread across the two plants.
It's hardly surprising that Theo Croneiss,chairman of Messerschmitt AG,entered furious negotiation with Milch and the RLM which,to cut a long story short,resulted in the removal of Prof. Messeschmitt and the eventual production of the Me 410.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## davebender (Jan 10, 2012)

That doesn't sound right. Development of the Me-210 continued to July 1942 when the perfected Me-210C was tested. Unless Messerschmitt paid to develop the Me-210C from the Me-210A using their own funds.

As for the Me-410, that program was doomed from the start by the DB603 engine shortage. A shortage that was known in advance as both RLM and Messerschmitt knew how many DB603 engines were being produced and how many were required by the various aircraft programs.

14 March 1942. Modified Me-210A. Longer and deeper rear fuselage.
July 1942. Leading edge slots added to wings.
…..Taken together these changes fixed the Me-210 handling problems.


----------



## stona (Jan 10, 2012)

Always dangerous cutting a long story short!

9/3/42 the initial decision was taken to terminate the Me 210 program.
Panic at Messeschmitt who had Augsburg,Regensburg and three licence plants set up to produce the Me 210

12/3/42 A meeting is held at the RLM in Berlin and Prof. Messerschmitt concedes that the Me 210 is not ready for operational use. This is when the agreement is made to rebuild the Me 210 with the longer fuselage and slats. Prof. Messerschmitt promised the first of ten prototypes ( German "experimental aircraft") for 1/4/42,an impossible timeline and Messerschmitt knew it. They were desperate to salvage the program. They stood to lose millions. There may have been a war on but business is business.

19/4/42 Milch send Lucht to Augsburg. Lucht reports back on the "desolation" of the Augsburg plant and describes Prof. Messerschmitt as "depressed".

25/4/42 An RLM directive orders all further work on the Me 210 to be stopped.

This is when the Messerschmitt board,and chairman,stepped in to negotiate between Prof. Messerschmitt and the RLM. It must have worked because following a letter of 13/6/42 Messerschmitt (who had continued re-jigging anyway) began work on lengthening 95 fuselages. Regensburg was to deliver 4 in July and 1 in August. Augsburg was to deliver 10 in July/August and then 20 a month from September to December 1942.

I haven't got time now to work out what actually got delivered but in a letter of 4/10/42 Messerschmitt advised the RLM that ten modified Me 210s had been delivered to the Luftwaffe.

The whole debacle is estimated to have cost Messerschmitt RM 38,000,000. Prof. Messerschmitt,whom Milch could barely tolerate,was limited to design and developement only. Croneiss became chairman of the board.

Cheers
Steve


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 10, 2012)

stona said:


> Messerschmitt wasn't just tooled up. The initial decision to "pull the plug" was taken on 9 March '42 but Messerschmitt continued trying to produce the improved version (eventually the Me 410) promising completely unrealistic timetables for completion of the prototypes.
> It was only after an inspection of Augsburg by Generalingenieur Roluf Lucht of the RLM on 19 April that the final decision to stop all further work on the Me 210 was taken on 25 April.
> At this time 94 aircraft had been completed at Augsburg and 258 at Regensburg. There were a further 540 aircraft at various stages of construction spread across the two plants.
> It's hardly surprising that Theo Croneiss,chairman of Messerschmitt AG,entered furious negotiation with Milch and the RLM which,to cut a long story short,resulted in the removal of Prof. Messeschmitt and the eventual production of the Me 410.
> ...



The Me 410 when equiped with the Neptune R2 tail warning radar was possibly the only Luftwaffe aircraft able to opperated with what approached acceptably low losses (6%) over the British Isles in 1943.


----------



## davebender (Jan 10, 2012)

> Me 410 when equiped with the Neptune R2 tail warning radar was possibly the only Luftwaffe aircraft able to opperated with what approached acceptably low losses (6%) over the British Isles in 1943.


I don't doubt it. However RLM undercutting of the DB603 engine program from 1937 onward ensured there would never be enough for the Do-217 and Me-410 aircraft programs. Not to mention the Fw-190C proposal which was dead on arrival.


----------



## davebender (Jan 10, 2012)

This sounds like craft work to modify existing Me-210A. Not production of new aircraft on an assembly line.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 10, 2012)

Change of topic, slightly back on topic....I wonder if the LW would have been any better or worse off, in terms of its transport capability, if, like the Japanese and the Soviets, it had opted to licence produce the DC-3, and had used the Dakota, rather than the Ju-52 as its main operational transport type. Would the LW , for exampe, have suffered a lower attrition rate in the lead up and during the Stalingrad relief effort?


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jan 10, 2012)

".... if, like the Japanese and the Soviets, it had opted to licence produce the DC-3, and had used the Dakota, rather than the Ju-52 as its main operational transport type."

Ironic, isn't it .....  but, no. Unless the LW had vast numbers and aircrew to match, the Dakota wouldn't have made a difference, IMHO.

The Berlin Airlift, however, showed the Germans that it _could _be done. 

MM


----------



## parsifal (Jan 10, 2012)

I was hoping to get some idea of cold weather performance of the dak. I know that post war the Australian antarctic Service used DC-3s to proviode service to our Antarctic research station. They were preferred over the C-130 because of their good cold weather performance, simplicity and ruggedness. i also believe the DC-3 had better range over a Ju-52, so might have been able to operate further back, where supply issues were far less chaotic. DC-3s generally flew unarmed, but I am thinking the overall performance of the Dakota was better.

The key issue will be serviceability. Can aircraft readiness rates be improved if using a DC-3 over a Ju-52 in these conditions. even if the aircraft have similar reliability and serviceability rates, if the DC-3 can be billetted further back from the forward bases compared to a Ju-52, its going to benefit from a higher servicibility, if nothing else because better maintenance can be undertaken (more hanger space, less congestion at the airfields etc). 

I still dont think the DC-3 would be enough to make a difference to the overall result given similar numbers , but if i had 300 DC-3s instead of 300 Ju52s,, it is my opinion that a higher tonnage of supplies would have reached stalingrad.


----------



## davebender (Jan 10, 2012)

What makes you think German production of the DC-3 would be less expensive then mass production of the Ju-252?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 10, 2012)

I dont. but the DC-3 is available prewar, and could have been in mass production more or less instead of the Ju52. The Ju252 was however a new type, with all the development costs associated with that. Added to that is the fact that it was a wartime prototype, which adds to the cost and development issues that go with any new type.

in addition, given the rate of output for german transports per annum....about 4-500 units per year, optimistically might expect series production from about the end of 1941 for this type. That means at most you may have 1-200 Ju252s as they are phased into production replacing gradually the Ju52s on the line. if you attempt a rapid replacement faster than that, you are going to end up with less transports overall as production holdups from the forced/rushed service introduction are bound to have an effect on total output. You have to introduce new types gradually and well in advance if you dont want hold ups in delivery rates.

by comparison, a licence built DC-3 can be adopted at least two years earlier, and is an established, proven type with all the kinks ironed out. All it would take, IMo, is for Junkers to re-tool their lines to produce the Dakota rather than the ju52....no development costs, no hold ups, no down time in the mid war as the new type moves to replace the old. all of that happens under peacetime conditions.

Just the same it would be intersting to compare unit costs of the 252 to that of a DC-3. Probably will need to estimate.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 11, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I dont. but the DC-3 is available prewar, and could have been in mass production more or less instead of the Ju52. The Ju252 was however a new type, with all the development costs associated with that. Added to that is the fact that it was a wartime prototype, which adds to the cost and development issues that go with any new type.
> 
> .



The Ju 52/1m Ju 52/3m was running about 1.5 maybe 2 years ahead of the DC-2 DC-3 in terms of first flight. The Ju 52 represented the end of the line of corrugated metal construction that Junkers had pioneered in WW1 and Junkers was already working on modern stressed skin aircraft. In fact Junkers single handedly developed all metal aircraft. The other thing to note is that Erhard Milch pushed the production of (about 800) Ju 52 as bombers at a time that Junkers had already established its smooth stressed skin technology in serveral aircraft (eg the Ju 86 almost a contemporary of the DC-3) simply because he though it could be easily built in such massive numbers despite its placement of main spar making for a poor bomber. The Ju 52 was very well established as a mass production item however the Ju 86 and several other modern smooth skin aircraft from other German makers, which were as up to date as the DC-2/DC-3 did not get such a large order.

There is no doubt the DC-3 or even DC-2 was a superior logistics platform but it would seem that the timming was just bad luck for the Germans. The Ju 52 entered service and performed extremely well in terms of reliabillity and its abillity to opperate in harsh weather often flyung to Britain in storms that shut down every other airline. The attempt to produce a more economic replacement just fell foul of other priorities and its replacement was continiously delayed by the RLM (this was not a commercial decision). It's worth noting the in the inter war period that Germany developed strong trade links to China and Sth America and German airlines were making inroads into the Sth American market. A hostile Roosvelt administration developed a Bill to subsidise US airlines to drive the Germans out of buisiness. This comes from Anthony Kay's "junkers aircraft and their engines". The subsidies proved unneccesary as the DC-3 better economics simply made airlines opperating 52 uncompetitive except on shorter routes. The opperating economics of the DC-3 were forged under commercial pressures. The economics of the Ju 52 and its lack of replacement were forged under the priorities of military expansion economics and opperating costs. Also note that a Ju 52 was fine for carry passegners from say Berlin or Hamburg to southern destinations such as Munich, Stuttgard, Zurich.


----------



## davebender (Jan 11, 2012)

The Ju-52 was designed to carry 17 passengers. The DC-3 was designed to carry 21 passengers and cost twice as much. IMO that's not enough of a performance improvement to justify the cost increase. The U.S. Government subsidized American airlines but they certainly aren't going to subsidize Lufthansa procurement of the DC-3.

The Ju-252 was designed to carry 32 passengers. 52% more then a DC-3. Total aircraft payload was greater too and it had a proper rear cargo ramp. If 1930s German were serious about replacing the Ju-52 why not just begin Ju-77 / Ju-252 development two years early (1936 ILO 1938 ) and give the program proper financial support? It would probably enter service as early as a German copy of the DC-3 and you get a more capable transport aircraft. Germany would leap ahead of the competition rather then just strugging to keep up.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 11, 2012)

This tells me that the Ju52 was a successful airliner, though not as successful as the DC3. Saying that German industry of any kind was not subsidised whereas the US was subsidised is something i simply dont believe. Nazi Germany provided lavish subsidies to its various commercial enterprises (to the point of gross innefficiency and nearly bankrupted the country there were so many snouts in the trough), including the commercial airline, though I accept the Americans were at it as well.

However, commercial success is not a great way to measure the success of any given type from a military stanpoint. On that basis, the boeing 747 or the tupolev 141 should be considered the best military transports of the modern era, when clearly they are not. Neither is measuring the usefulness of a workhorse transport simply on the basis of its payload. thats a factor, and in fact from your own figures we now know the DC-3 could carry 25% more personnel compared to the Ju52. Other factors are just as important in determining the relative merits and capability of the transport. there are other factors to consider....its range reliability stol capability, performance, resistance to weather, to name just a few.

And i dont believe the Ju52 was half the price of a DC-3. To make that comparison, one would have to find a country that produced both types, and see which one was cheaper to build in that country. German economic management was so "out there that it is virtually impossible to make valid comparisons of unit costs. Perhaps if man hours per unit could be found, that might be a valid method of comparison. 

I think it significant that both Japan and the USSR chose the DC-3 as their main military transport over the Ju52. Whatever the excuse, it shows that these military establishments at least thought the DC-3 a superior aircraft at the time of their decision.


----------



## Milosh (Jan 11, 2012)

> Germany would leap ahead of the competition rather then just strugging to keep up.



Would it? The DC-4/C-54/R5D flew only a few months after the Ju252.


----------



## davebender (Jan 11, 2012)

*DC-4.*
4 x 1,450hp engines.
19,640kg empty weight.

*Fw-200.*
4 x 1,200hp engines.
17,005kg empty weight.

*Ju-252.*
3 x 1,322hp engines.
13,127kg empty weight.

I think the DC-4 was built for the same market as the Fw-200. I don't think either would make an effective tactical transport aircraft.


----------



## davebender (Jan 11, 2012)

Just for fun...

Could the modern day Luftwaffe do any better? It's a foregone conclusion Typhoon fighter aircraft would sweep the VVS from the sky but does modern day Germany have enough transport aircraft to keep 6th Army supplied for three months?


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 11, 2012)

There is a lot more to transport capacity than just comparing seat numbers. Airline economics come down to the cost per seat per mile. The DC-3 is widely known as the first airplane that could make money hauling passengers without a subsidy. Not only could it carry more passengers than a JU-52, it do it about 40/50% faster for about the same fuel burn. In a given period of time (week or month) it could make more trips making for a faster return on investment and on each trip it could carry more passengers and cargo for the same crew cost and fuel costs meaning higher profits per trip. 
As a Military transport it could fly longer stages while caring the same or greater loads and fly more missions (subject to weather or mechanical problems) per day or week. 
The JU-52 may have been an improvement on the Ford "tin goose" but is far from state of the art by the late 30s.
In 1939/40 initial design work was being done on the Lockheed Constellation. Not a combat transport but the idea that the JU-52 was a viable commercial aircraft in the late 30s is laughable. Many older planes do go on to perform well in "bush" service in extreme locals but they were purchased at low used prices and don't have to turn enough profit to repay the loans a new aircraft would have cost.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jan 11, 2012)

"... It's a foregone conclusion Typhoon fighter aircraft would sweep the VVS from the sky"

Is it? .... just asking 

MM


----------



## davparlr (Jan 11, 2012)

davebender said:


> I think the DC-4 was built for the same market as the Fw-200. I don't think either would make an effective tactical transport aircraft.


The Fw-200 and Ju-252 were closer to the often ignored and very capable C-46 than to the the half generation better and historically significant C-54. A look at empty weight to max gross weight tells an important story for transports (load carrying is a range-cargo trade-off).
Fw-200 13k lbs
Ju-252 14k lbs
C-46 16k lbs
C-54 25k lbs
As for as tactical airlift, the Ju-252 certainly has an advantage due to its innovative loading system. However the much greater load carrying capability of the C-54 would reduce exposure significantly. There is no contest in regards to strategic airlift as proven at Berlin only a few years later.


----------



## Glider (Jan 12, 2012)

When comparing the Ju52 and the DC3 its easy to think of things such as the number of passengers they could carry and payload, but the biggest difference is the space in the cabin. I have been in the Ju52 at Duxford and was horrified how small the cabin is. When you think of the things you could get inside a Dakota, the Ju52 isn't even close. 
I would love to see someone try and carry a load of say mules in a Ju52 let alone a cut down 25pd gun or jeep.


----------



## Glider (Jan 12, 2012)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... It's a foregone conclusion Typhoon fighter aircraft would sweep the VVS from the sky"
> 
> Is it? .... just asking
> 
> MM



If they had F15's

I will now hide in a deep hole


----------



## davebender (Jan 12, 2012)

Are you suggesting the Eurofighter is no good?


----------



## Glider (Jan 13, 2012)

I tried (and failed) to imply that if the VVS had F15s the Typhoon would would sweep them from the sky.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2012)

Glider said:


> When comparing the Ju52 and the DC3 its easy to think of things such as the number of passengers they could carry and payload, but the biggest difference is the space in the cabin. I have been in the Ju52 at Duxford and was horrified how small the cabin is. When you think of the things you could get inside a Dakota, the Ju52 isn't even close.
> I would love to see someone try and carry a load of say mules in a Ju52 let alone a cut down 25pd gun or jeep.



There are pictures of both interiors on the internet and while the DC-3 was initially designed as a 21 seater later gross weight increases (and/or shorter stages) allowed for 28-32 seat interiors in airline configuration and not just troop transport. Dc-3 initially had 3 abreast seating 2+aisle+1 which with skinnier seats was changed to 2+2. No way was a Ju-52 going to 4 across and even 3 is doubtful.


----------



## davebender (Jan 13, 2012)

*Empty Weight.*
6,510kg. Ju-52/3m
8,225kg. C-47B.
13,127kg. Ju-252A.

The Ju-52 was a relatively small aircraft designed in 1930 when engines produced 600hp. Nobody is suggesting it had any growth potential. The Ju-252 was twice the size with a cargo compartment large enough to take full advantage of engines producing 1,200+ hp.


----------



## Glider (Jan 13, 2012)

There was no chance of going three across in a Ju52, I just wish I had taken some pictures inside it.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> *Empty Weight.*
> 6,510kg. Ju-52/3m
> 8,225kg. C-47B.
> 13,127kg. Ju-252A.
> ...



The problem with the 252 isnt so much with the design, though to my mind it is a half generation behind its contemporary US counterpart. The problem is in its timing and availability. To ,make a difference at Stalingrad, it had to be in quantity production, and a fully developed service type by the beginning of the war. Left any later, and it will simply get in the way and actually reduce LW transport capability because overall force size will be affected by production bottlenecks and possibly teething troubles. Given that it flew in either 1939 or 1940 (im reading conflicting reports) thats precisely what it would have done....got in the way and actually reduced overall LW capability.

To improve LW capability, a workable alternative to the Ju52 had to be in service, operational and in quantity production by 1939 at the latest. Any other suggestion is just wishful thinking.


----------



## davebender (Jan 13, 2012)

That's not going to happen as production facilities had to be built from scratch during the 1930s. However there's no reason the Ju-252 couldn't enter mass production by 1941. 

Production of Jumo 211 engines began during 1937. RLM could have ordered development of a new transport aircraft to take advantage of the powerful (for that time) new engine.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 13, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The problem with the 252 isnt so much with the design, though to my mind it is a half generation behind its contemporary US counterpart.



The Ju 252 had pressurisation and it had a rear loading ramp. Both were absent in the larger DC-4/C-54 both are critical advances. 

The trimotor arrangment might make it look archaic but it is a configuration that works well from the point of view of engine safety and economics. I see no advantage to the lack of tricycle undercarriage unless you are planning on landing hot and hard due to a high wing loading and using brakes to stop.

The Germans seem to have invented the smooth stressed skin form of construction. Junkers has a history in currugated constrution going back to the first world war, however smooth skin construction was later widely used by the "Rhorbach" company and Dornier (Claudius was an ex Zeppelin emplyee). There was no underlying theory for smooth skin stressing or design (people winged it by testing) untill Herbert A Wagner developed the theory in 1929 and others added, thereby earning Rhorbach company enormous royalties. (German patent 547642). Wagners earlier theories and ideas had allowed Willy Messerschmitt to produce the succesfull M-18 in 1926 (which used smooth stressed skin construction).

One needs only to look at aircraft such as the He 111, Ju 86, the Me 108, Dornier flying boats, all of them from 1935 and contemporaires of the DC-3 and the only slightly latter FW-200 (a most elegant aircraft) to be puzzled as to the extraordinary longevity of the Ju 52, which surviced in French and Spanish production till 1953 or the fact that it wasn't replaced with something better in say 1937.

I suspect the answer lies in the Ju 52's relative ease of construction which kept costs down and made mass production easy. This then inspired Erhardt Milch to order some 800 of these airliners as bombers, to rapidly build up the Luftwaffe. These aircraft proved vulnerable and inadaquet aircraft during the Spanish Civil War however they could be turned into transports.

This no doubt rusted the Ju 52 on to the Luftwaffe. But which airforce had better logistics aircraft in 1940 than the Luftwaffe with several hundred Ju 52? Consider that the Ju 52 was introduced into service only 1 year after the Handley Page H.P.42.

One also only needs to look at the Ju 90, the spectacular Ju 290 (unmatched by any allied aircraft in all parameters AFAIKT) or the FW 200, the He 111 airliner, to see that the Germans could have come up with a spectacular design that could have been produced.

However Milch was pulling the shots at Lufthansa and latter the Luftwaffe.

The FW 200 was an outstanding transport, a little too optimised for long range work to be as ubiquitous as the DC-3 but certainly it would have been perfect for the Luftwaffes North African and Soviet/East logistics problems. It however had the advantage of being set into production.

This is the Ju 77, which was rejected as not enough of an advance on the Ju 52:
Junkers Ju-77 | Flickr - Photo Sharing!

The bulky fueselage was probably designed for pressurisation but would also have provided plenty of volume, the rectangular planform wings, without taper, would have been easy to make.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 13, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> I see no advantage to the lack of tricycle undercarriage unless you are planning on landing hot and hard due to a high wing loading and using brakes to stop.


Tail dragger aircraft, although a norm during WW2 were inherently harder to fly and were and always will be subjected to higher accident rates. Their only advantage is better grass or dirt field handling. Wing loading or landing fast or braking has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that this configuration eventually went away on larger multi-engine aircraft after WW2 as it was safer to operate large multi-engine aircraft in a tri-cycle configuration.


----------



## davebender (Jan 13, 2012)

Most forward area Army airfields are grass or dirt right up to the present day. So wouldn't that be a significant advantage for a tactical transport aircraft?


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> Most forward area Army airfields are grass or dirt right up to the present day. So wouldn't that be a significant advantage for a tactical transport aircraft?


In today's world a C-130 or C-17 can land in forward area providing there's a dirt strip long enough to accomodate them. During WW2 this would be an advantage but you have an increased risk for accidents by operating a tail dragger tactical transport, but again that was the norm for that era.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Tail dragger aircraft, although a norm during WW2 were inherently harder to fly and were and always will be subjected to higher accident rates. Their only advantage is better grass or dirt field handling. Wing loading or landing fast or braking has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that this configuration eventually went away on larger multi-engine aircraft after WW2 as it was safer to operate large multi-engine aircraft in a tri-cycle configuration.



It was starting to go away before WW II. The Douglas DC-4E (predecessor to the DC-4/C-54), DC-5 (small production run ahead of the normal DC-4), Lockheed Constellation, the A-20, B-19, B-24, B-25, B-26 were all in the planning stages before the US got into WW II. Plus others I may have skipped. The US also had a number of light planes with Tri-cycle gear before WW II including at least one Waco biplane.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 13, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> It was starting to go away before WW II. The Douglas DC-4E (predecessor to the DC-4/C-54), DC-5 (small production run ahead of the normal DC-4), Lockheed Constellation, the A-20, B-19, B-24, B-25, B-26 were all in the planning stages before the US got into WW II. Plus others I may have skipped. The US also had a number of light planes with Tri-cycle gear before WW II including at least one Waco biplane.


Yep!!! I think in the pre war years the writing was on the wall, especially when many modern airfields were being built.


----------



## davebender (Jan 14, 2012)

That's fine for a civilian passenger liner or a military heavy bomber. However army troops that need aerial resupply are often in the middle of nowhere. No purpose built airfield and even a level field might be difficult to find. 

Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I think something like LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) would have been a huge advantage for WWII Germany at Stalingrad. The key requirement (besides aircrew training) is a rear cargo ramp such as the Ju-252 had.


----------



## Njaco (Jan 14, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Tail dragger aircraft, although a norm during WW2 were inherently harder to fly and were and always will be subjected to higher accident rates. Their only advantage is better grass or dirt field handling. Wing loading or landing fast or braking has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that this configuration eventually went away on larger multi-engine aircraft after WW2 as it was safer to operate large multi-engine aircraft in a tri-cycle configuration.



Its nice to see where you're going when taking off. Just saying.....


----------



## parsifal (Jan 14, 2012)

Some of the things we did with Caribous makes me question whether tricycle gear is that much of a disadvantage on rough strips anyway


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 14, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Some of the things we did with Caribous makes me question whether tricycle gear is that much of a disadvantage on rough strips anyway


If properly designed and operated an aircraft (like the Caribou) can do just as much on a dirt as a tail dragger.


----------



## davebender (Jan 14, 2012)

The Ar-232 is the direction German tactical transport aircraft were heading towards. The Ju-252 would probably have been the last German tail dragger.
Arado Ar 232 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia





Tricycle landing gear plus 20 smaller wheels (10 per side) under the fuselage. The small wheels kept the fuselage from hitting the ground in the event the main gear broke off in a shell hole.

de Havilland Canada DHC-4 Caribou - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 14, 2012)

German designs were being pushed in the direction or tricycle gear by the appearance of jet engines. I believe even the He 219 was designed with the possibillity of jet propulsion in mind so this may have influenced their choice of tricycle undergear. A perusal of the "Luftwaffe Secret Pjoects: Bombers" or Manfrid Griehls twin volum "German Jet aircraft" shows a larger number of piston engined junkers and focke wulf transports that were projected in the late 30s and early 1940 with tricycle layouts, indicating that German aeronautical engineers had accepted the layout advantages. The Extreme STOL Ar 232 of course also used the tricyle gear, indicating that it was suitable undercarriage for STOL as did the Gotha Go 244 transport. Either way I don't think the tail dragger layout of the Ju 252 was going to be a major disadvantage and there are supposedly advantages.

An interesting aside: many tricycle engine aircraft had poor escape systems for the crew eg B-24 and B-26 (I think the B-25 may have been OK). The nose undercarriage blocked the possibillity of an escape hatch while the fact that the forward part of the crew sat well ahead of the props caused prop impact issue on emergency egress.

One reason that the He 219 eventually received ejection seats is because unless the props were carefully feathered emergency egress could mangle the crew.

It's worth pointing out that apart from the Ju 52, some 290 FW 200's that the Luftwaffe had some 213 Me 323 giantw produced and these had a 15 ton load.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> That's fine for a civilian passenger liner or a military heavy bomber. However army troops that need aerial resupply are often in the middle of nowhere. No purpose built airfield and even a level field might be difficult to find.
> 
> Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> I think something like LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) would have been a huge advantage for WWII Germany at Stalingrad. The key requirement (besides aircrew training) is a rear cargo ramp such as the Ju-252 had.



One item of technology that was developed in Germany at the time was the high speed ribbon droque parachute. It came into use for such diverse tasks as slowing down Arado 234, slowing down the Me 163 in preperation for emergency egress and stopping assault gliders (with the droque deplyed in flight) and also I suspect sewing aerial mines.


----------



## davebender (Jan 14, 2012)

Aerial supply drops were somewhat common during WWII but first hand accounts I have read suggest they were lucky if 50% of supplies reached friendly forces. Dropping an entire pallet at very low altitude would ensure the cargo lands where it's supposed to. But you need a rear cargo ramp for that sort of drop.





I think the post-war American C-119 resembles the Ar-232. 

Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> In December 1950, after Chinese PLA troops blew up a bridge [N 1]at a narrow point on the evacuation route between Koto-ri and Hungnam, blocking the withdrawal of U.N. forces. Eight U.S. Air Force C-119 Flying Boxcars flown by the 314th Troop Carrier Group[4][N 2] were used to drop portable bridge sections by parachute. The bridge, consisting of eight separate sixteen-foot long, 2,900-pound sections, was dropped one section at a time, using two parachutes on each section. Four of these sections, together with additional wooden extensions were successfully reassembled into a replacement bridge by Marine Corps combat engineers and the US Army 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, enabling U.N. forces to reach Hungnam.



What was the altitude for this Korean War equipment drop?


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> I think the post-war American C-119 resembles the Ar-232.



Actually it rather resembles the C-82 from 1944.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 14, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> An interesting aside: many tricycle engine aircraft had poor escape systems for the crew eg B-24 and B-26 (I think the B-25 may have been OK). The nose undercarriage blocked the possibillity of an escape hatch while the fact that the forward part of the crew sat well ahead of the props caused prop impact issue on emergency egress.



Are you coming up with this based on facts or by looking at a cut away of the aircraft?!?! Have you ever been in any of these aircraft to make such a statement?!?!?!?!


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 14, 2012)

B-24 escape...


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 15, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> B-24 escape...



The B-24 statement I got from Wikipeidia:

_"The B-24's spacious slab-sided fuselage (which earned the aircraft the nickname "Flying Boxcar")[15] was built around a central bomb bay that could accommodate up to 8,000 lb (3,629 kg) of ordnance. The bomb bay was divided into front and rear compartments and had a central catwalk just nine inches wide,[16] which was also the fuselage keel beam. A universal complaint arose over the extremely narrow catwalk. The aircraft was sometimes *disparaged as "The Flying Coffin"* because the only entry and exit from the bomber was in the rear and it was almost impossible for the flight crew and *nose gunner *to get from the flight deck to the rear when wearing parachutes. "_

It may not be that quick to wind down a nose wheel in an emergency.

The B-26 egress difficulty I'm pretty sure I got from a B-26 Bombardier, but will check before quoting name.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 15, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The B-24 statement I got from Wikipeidia:
> 
> _"The B-24's spacious slab-sided fuselage (which earned the aircraft the nickname "Flying Boxcar")[15] was built around a central bomb bay that could accommodate up to 8,000 lb (3,629 kg) of ordnance. The bomb bay was divided into front and rear compartments and had a central catwalk just nine inches wide,[16] which was also the fuselage keel beam. A universal complaint arose over the extremely narrow catwalk. The aircraft was sometimes *disparaged as "The Flying Coffin"* because the only entry and exit from the bomber was in the rear and it was almost impossible for the flight crew and *nose gunner *to get from the flight deck to the rear when wearing parachutes. "_
> 
> ...



Wikipedia... 

If you look at the diagram and if you were ever INSIDE a B-24 you would find the bomb bay is right behind the pilots. If a crew member is inside one of the turrets (nose or tail), that's another story but then again any multi engine aircraft of the war would present difficulty during egress and has absolutely nothing to do with the aircraft having a nose landing gear. Had the B-24 been a tail dragger, bail out would have probably been the same. Egress was very similar from inside a B-17 and parachutes were always an issue for aircrews regardless.


----------



## tyrodtom (Jan 15, 2012)

You don't have to wind the nose gear down. It retracts FORWARD in a B-24, just hit the manual release, gravity and slipstream do the rest.
Normal and emergency exit for the bombardier, navigator, and front turret gunner were the front wheelwell hatch, and they were all stationed within a few feet of it.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 15, 2012)

From rec.aviation.military:
B26 Aircrew Personal Armor? - rec.aviation.military | Google Groups
Subject: Re: B26 Aircrew Personal Armor?
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
By Art Kramer (B-26 Bombardier)


"Let me tell you my sadstory of moving through a B-26, especially if you were a
Bombardier. Do you know how a bombardier entered and exited the nose? He had to
crawl on his hands and knees in front of the copilot who had his seat ssid back
and helped the bombardier through without getting his parachute harness
tangled on the engine controls. I could only exit the nose with the help and
consent of the copilot. He had to slide his seat back and guide me through as I
crawled out. If the copilot was hit and a fast exit was needed, the bombardier
alnmost never got out. And if the copilot had been hit, escape from the nose
was impossible. Now let's look at the overall situation. If I have to fly a 5
hour mission where I can be killed by a flak fragment at any moment, I sure has
hell an not going to fly without my flak suit and helmet, Unless of course I
have lost all judgement and good sense. I think that anyone who flies a mission
where he knows he will go through heavy flak and won't wear his armor, I would
say he has flown one mission too many. But please don't tell me how tough it
was to get out of Lancasters. My heart bleeds for those guys. But I had
troubles of my own And I think the Lanc guys had a much better chance of
escape than I ever did."


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 15, 2012)

And this has what to do with the B-26 having a nose landing gear????? Look where the NLG wheel well was located and look where the bombardier was positioned. The Lockheed Hudson series had the same situation as far as the crew member in the nose having to crawl under the co-pilot or a very small crawl space, typical of MANY WW2 aircraft, both allied and axis, again nothing to do with your assessment of aircraft have a NLG or the reasoning why that configuration vanished in the post war years, so please apply some real world assessments to your analysis; you're "over engineering" again!






Egress systems in a WW2 multi-engine aircraft - Get your parachute on and get to the first opening as fast as you can, that simple...


----------



## parsifal (Jan 16, 2012)

The photos tell a lot of words in my opinion


----------



## davparlr (Jan 17, 2012)

I have always been impressed by how small these planes actually are. I have not been on a B-24, but I have crawled around a B-17 at March field and I am frankly amazed that anyone got out of those planes. They were very cluttered and narrow with small ramps. Just getting into and out of a seat seemed difficult. Now throw into the mix a buffeting, twisting aircraft, and I just shake my head.

Ease of escape is a function of design, and I do not think it was given any serious thought for these aircraft, nose wheel or not.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jan 17, 2012)

"... Ease of escape is a function of design, and I do not think it was given any serious thought for these aircraft, nose wheel or not."

Truth.

MM


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 17, 2012)

davparlr said:


> Ease of escape is a function of design, and I do not think it was given any serious thought for these aircraft, nose wheel or not.


100% correct.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 17, 2012)

For procedural fairness, do we have any information on the escape arrangements for tail dragger aircraft say the ju88 and the He 111. Were they better or worse, and does the presence or absence of a tricycle configuration make any difference to that ease of escape. I would think not.


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 18, 2012)

parsifal said:


> For procedural fairness, do we have any information on the escape arrangements for tail dragger aircraft say the ju88 and the He 111. Were they better or worse, and does the presence or absence of a tricycle configuration make any difference to that ease of escape. I would think not.



Tricycle aircraft have two disadvantages.

1 The crew sits ahead of the propellers. They can get mangled on exit and may need to spend precious time feathering.
2 The nose wheel can block an exit port, the Liberators use of the area for both undercarriage and escape hatch aside.

The Luftwaffe provided ejection seats for this reason on the He 219. Dornier Do 335 had ejection seats as well as explosive bolts to detatch the vertical fins (speratatly controls for upper and lower) and rear airscrew blades to enhance safety in ejection and belly landing


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 18, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Tricycle aircraft have two disadvantages.
> 
> 1 The crew sits ahead of the propellers. They can get mangled on exit and may need to spend precious time feathering.
> 2 The nose wheel can block an exit port, the Liberators use of the area for both undercarriage and escape hatch aside.


That could be inherent in ANY multi engine aircraft.


Siegfried said:


> The Luftwaffe provided ejection seats for this reason on the He 219. Dornier Do 335 had ejection seats as well as explosive bolts to detatch the vertical fins (speratatly controls for upper and lower) and rear airscrew blades to enhance safety in ejection and belly landing


Designers considered egress during the design of these aircraft. There were many combat aircraft designed before and after these aircraft where air crew egress wasn't a consideration and egress procedures were usually developed by the operator in conjunction with recommendations from the manufacturer.


----------



## Juha (Jan 18, 2012)

Hello Siegfried
You have seen the picture of exit routes from B-24 but I repeat, B-24 was a high wing plane and the exits for front fuselage crew members were underside of the plane, so it is difficult to see how the propellers could be a danger in emergency.
Secondly, have you ever see pictures on Do 17 and Do 217 or He 177? Clearly part of the crew could have sit ahead of propellers also in taildraggers.

JUha


----------



## Tante Ju (Jan 18, 2012)

Juha said:


> Secondly, have you ever see pictures on Do 17 and Do 217 or He 177? Clearly part of the crew could have sit ahead of propellers also in taildraggers.



On Do 17/217 the crew may sit before the propellor, but they definite exit behind propellor line (I believe through rear open of ventral gondola, behind propellor). I am not sure any other exit, but it seems pretty quick and easy to do. Certain much more easy that to crawl back in fuselage of downing plane..







Ju 88 was similar: exit through top-rear window of rear gunner after blow it off, and also ventral gondola door of lower gunner. Both behind propellor.






I am not sure the He 177. Here crew and exit is both ahead of propeller line, exit is about 1 meter from it, so I think very unlikely someone hits propellor (ie. fall backwards 1 meter while sideways 2 meter at same time.. also exiting person drops out of plane about same height of propellor lower tip, as wing/engine was mounted high on 177.. was there other exit for crew from front?


----------



## tyrodtom (Jan 18, 2012)

You've got the whole crew exiting thru one hatch on the Do 17/217, and Ju88, i'm not so sure that's superior to the B-24's multiple exit's.

I can imagine the scene in a falling Luftwaffe bomber being like a old Henkel and Jenkel cartoon, "You first. No I insist, you first" then they both try to go thru at the same time.

Let's face it, neither side of the airwar gave a lot of critical thought to crew survival by bailout, when it came to bombers.


----------



## TheMustangRider (Jan 18, 2012)

Interesting discussion, I must wonder if the B-29 by being a late war bomber resolved any of the crew bail out issues found on earlier multi-engined bombers.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 18, 2012)

When an aircraft is designed, anytime you install a door, opening, or removable panel you are creating a potential stress point. In many cases engineers will limit the size of doors and access holes just because of this. In many cases some doors and panels may actually carry a structural load and it could dangerous to fly without them. With that said, designing an aircraft with a spacious egress door would have been a luxury or an event dictated by luck. Great - you can fit out the door with your parachute - look at some of the space inside WW2 aircraft. It would have been a challenge to either put your chute on during an emergency or function within the cabin while wearing a parachute. AND THIS COULD HOLD TRUE FOR BOTH AXIS AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT. Even in the post war years, many larger combat aircraft were workspace challenged, especially those NOT built from an airliner.


----------



## tyrodtom (Jan 18, 2012)

A B29, if it was at high altitude, would have to release it's internal pressure before bailouts. But if it's damaged enough to require bailout, it's probably already lost it's pressure. On several pressureized aircraft i've seen the hatches open inward, against the pressure. I doubt they're all that way though. Either way, I wouldn't want to be the first one to open a hatch, if there was still pressure, you wouldn't have a orderly exit.

The B29 flew a lot of the late war mission low enough that it wouldn't have been pressureized. As long as men had to walk, climb, crawl, or claw, their way to exit a aircraft that's falling out of the sky, at who knows what attitude, there's just no fail-safe way out.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 18, 2012)

Even some post war aircraft had less than stellar escape setups. Some American aircraft having downward firing ejector seats. Fine for bailing out at high altitude but since most non-combat aircraft losses are during take-off and landing being shot out the bottom of the aircraft at high speed into the concrete runway was less than ideal for crew survival.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 18, 2012)

The Canberra is a perfect example of this...


----------



## Milosh (Jan 18, 2012)

Didn't the F-104 have a downward ejection early in its life?


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 18, 2012)

I believe so, also one of the three crew in the B-47 and 2 of the crew in the B-52?


----------



## tyrodtom (Jan 18, 2012)

One of my CO's in the USAF was a former B-52 navigator, he joked that navigators were considered disposable. They had the downward ejecting seats in both the B-52, and B-47.


----------



## Juha (Jan 18, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> On Do 17/217 the crew may sit before the propellor, but they definite exit behind propellor line (I believe through rear open of ventral gondola, behind propellor). I am not sure any other exit, but it seems pretty quick and easy to do. Certain much more easy that to crawl back in fuselage of downing plane...



I know, but Siegfried claimed that the crew sitting ahead of propellers was something specular to nosewheel planes, I just wanted to show that even in some LW taildraggers most of the crew sat before the propellers. There was of course also other exit in Do 17Z, think on ditching, opened by jetisoning part of the canopy. In a hurry at least the W/O/air gunner used it. With badly wounded ventral gunner the Do 17/Ju 88/He 111 ventral door wasn't so easy way out. And if you look the B-24 exits you will notice that front fuselage crew didn't have to crawl back in fuselage, they had 2 exits, one through nose wheel well, front of the propellers but underside the fuselage just as in He 177 and probably as safe and the other out from front bombbay behind the propellers.

Juha


----------



## Siegfried (Jan 18, 2012)

Juha said:


> I know, but Siegfried claimed that the crew sitting ahead of propellers was something specular to nosewheel planes, I just wanted to show that even in some LW taildraggers most of the crew sat before the propellers. There was of course also other exit in Do 17Z, think on ditching, opened by jetisoning part of the canopy. In a hurry at least the W/O/air gunner used it. With badly wounded ventral gunner the Do 17/Ju 88/He 111 ventral door wasn't so easy way out. And if you look the B-24 exits you will notice that front fuselage crew didn't have to crawl back in fuselage, they had 2 exits, one through nose wheel well, front of the propellers but underside the fuselage just as in He 177 and probably as safe and the other out from front bombbay behind the propellers.
> 
> Juha



In the He 177 there is rather a lot of clearance even ahead of those engines, furthermore egress is not so far ahead of the props nor are the nose crew confined. Some He 177 had ejection seats for some crew members. Ju 88's blew of the entire top back of the canopy as in a fighter aircraft. Ju 288 were to have complete escape module with the whole pressurised nose section detached and lowered by parachute F-111 style. The Luftwaffe actually did seem to think a fair bit about escape.

If the aircraft is in a spin exiting from the bottom may not help you clear the propellers at all.


----------



## tyrodtom (Jan 18, 2012)

If the aircraft is in a spin, exit from behind the props may not make a difference either. When a aircraft is in a spin, or falling apart, there is no fail-safe way out, it's like a dice game.
I think the top being blow from the back of the cockpit in a Ju 88 was for water landing exit, just like most allied aircraft used a top exit for the same situation. Using a top exit in flight would subject the crew to the same dangers as the top exit did for most fighter aircraft, the tail.


----------



## Juha (Jan 18, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> In the He 177 there is rather a lot of clearance even ahead of those engines, furthermore egress is not so far ahead of the props nor are the nose crew confined. Some He 177 had ejection seats for some crew members. Ju 88's blew of the entire top back of the canopy as in a fighter aircraft. Ju 288 were to have complete escape module with the whole pressurised nose section detached and lowered by parachute F-111 style. The Luftwaffe actually did seem to think a fair bit about escape.
> 
> If the aircraft is in a spin exiting from the bottom may not help you clear the propellers at all.



Hello Siegfried
take a fresh look on B-24 and He 177, the foremost exit of B-24 is appr as far from propellers than the ventral hatch of He 177. It's a bit fanny that you claim that in a German plane it was a safe way to jump but in a US plane a death trap.
Which versions of He 177s had ejection seats and for which crew members?
On Ju 88, I know, FAF used them and I have read reports and memoirs on jumping out of Ju 88. I think all planes have ways to exit from topside of the plane, simply because there had to be way out after belly landing or ditching.

It was usually very difficult to get out of spinnig plane, no matter where the exit was before ejection seats

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Jan 18, 2012)

The only way to do this is to produce some figures on survivors per aircraft shot down (expressed as a percentage of the total crew.


anyone got any figures that even remotely looks at that issue?


----------



## Juha (Jan 18, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> If the aircraft is in a spin, exit from behind the props may not make a difference either. When a aircraft is in a spin, or falling apart, there is no fail-safe way out, it's like a dice game.
> I think the top being blow from the back of the cockpit in a Ju 88 was for water landing exit, just like most allied aircraft used a top exit for the same situation. Using a top exit in flight would subject the crew to the same dangers as the top exit did for most fighter aircraft, the tail.



Hello tyrodtom
Yes that was a problem in Ju 88, in Do 17Z not so much because of its twin fin but at leat one W/O/AG hit the tail of Do 17Z. If we look FAF's experience, it was not very easy to survive if Ju 88 came down and it seems that the crews used the ventral hatch when they managed to jump. It seems that crew had better chances to get out from Do 17Z if they needed to jump and at least sometimes at least W/O / AG used the upper exit.

Juha


----------



## davparlr (Jan 18, 2012)

Juha said:


> It was usually very difficult to get out of spinnig plane, no matter where the exit was before ejection seats
> 
> Juha



You are right, many times the crew cannot overcome the g forces associated with a gyrating aircraft.

A sidelight on bailing out. Flying the C-141, the only time we carried parachutes was when we were practicing Combat Air Missions (CAM), parachute drops. The parachutes were on a parachute rack in the cargo area. We egressed out the rear crew doors aft of the wings. So, the procedure was to unbuckle yourself, climb down to the cargo floor, remove the parachute, put it on, walk 30 ft to the door and jump. All of this had to happen while the damaged aircraft was flying itself at 1500 ft. Like that was going to happen.


----------



## Glider (Jan 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The only way to do this is to produce some figures on survivors per aircraft shot down (expressed as a percentage of the total crew.
> 
> 
> anyone got any figures that even remotely looks at that issue?



Only a few for the Lancaster, Sterling and Halifax

Out of a crew of 7, the average number who survived were 

Lancaster 1.3 (19%)
Sterling 1.8 (26%)
Halifax 2.45 (35%)

Figures from the Book 'Berlin Raids'

Another interesting stat
It is correctly stated that the Lancaster had a lower loss ratio than the Halifax. However, once the Halifax III entered service it had a lower loss ratio than the Lancaster


----------



## Juha (Jan 19, 2012)

Glider said:


> Only a few for the Lancaster, Sterling and Halifax
> 
> Out of a crew of 7, the average number who survived were
> 
> ...



Hello Glider
yes, but one must remember that to the end of the war sometimes Lanc units were sent to more dangerous targets and Hali units got "easier" targets.

BTW, in Hali more of the crew sat front of the propellers than in Lanc, so that fact doesn't explane the better survival rate of Hali crew members in case that they had to jump, of course the reason was the longer bombbay in Lanc so longer distance to escape hatch especially for the navigator and for the W/O.

Juha


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jan 19, 2012)

davparlr said:


> A sidelight on bailing out. Flying the C-141, the only time we carried parachutes was when we were practicing Combat Air Missions (CAM), parachute drops. The parachutes were on a parachute rack in the cargo area. We egressed out the rear crew doors aft of the wings. So, the procedure was to unbuckle yourself, climb down to the cargo floor, remove the parachute, put it on, walk 30 ft to the door and jump. All of this had to happen while the damaged aircraft was flying itself at 1500 ft. Like that was going to happen.


Great "REAL WORLD" perspective on this from an individual who was ACTUALLY a military aircraft crewmember, your input is always appreciated Dave.

I think this should give an indication of what it was like during WW2 when one was dealing with aircraft with a tighter fuselage and a lot less advanced than a C-141. It's always great to hear from the "real deal" rather than making wild assumptions and speculations based on pictures and little real word experience.

With that said, let's try to get this thread back on track...


----------



## stona (Jan 19, 2012)

I've just been ploughing through a USAF historical study with the imaginitive title "German Airlift Operations". I don't want to enter another debate about tonnages,effectiveness or even feasibility I have found one outstanding positive from the entire Stalingrad debacle. The evacuation,over the seventy or so days of the operation,of 24,910 wounded men. Most of them would almost certainly otherwise have perished in the pocket. They may not have made it despite being evacuated,but they did get a chance.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## davparlr (Jan 19, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Great "REAL WORLD" perspective on this from an individual who was ACTUALLY a military aircraft crewmember, your input is always appreciated Dave.
> 
> I think this should give an indication of what it was like during WW2 when one was dealing with aircraft with a tighter fuselage and a lot less advanced than a C-141. It's always great to hear from the "real deal" rather than making wild assumptions and speculations based on pictures and little real word experience.
> 
> With that said, let's try to get this thread back on track...



Thanks for the compliment. You seem to have an amazing experience in aviation.

I remember when I was in that B-17. Just to move around you had to duck, bend over, avoid items like M2 machine guns on your left, then your right, walk a gang plank in the bomb bay, step around the belly gun turret, top gun turret, etc. I almost didn't make it myself without some injury and I wasn't wearing a flak jacket, parachute, or heated flight suit. Of course in time of need you do what you gotta do. A quick story here I have told before. In pilot training in the T-38 one of the students lost control on landing and drifted off the runway. He sheared the gear and the plane went up on its nose, flipped around and fell back on its belly. The student quickly jumped out of the plane leaving the engines running. Impressed with the speed at which the student got out, the debriefing crew asked him how he got out so fast. "Fast?" he said, "I tried three times before I was successful!". You gotta do what you gotta do.


----------



## Glider (Jan 19, 2012)

Juha said:


> Hello Glider
> yes, but one must remember that to the end of the war sometimes Lanc units were sent to more dangerous targets and Hali units got "easier" targets.
> 
> BTW, in Hali more of the crew sat front of the propellers than in Lanc, so that fact doesn't explane the better survival rate of Hali crew members in case that they had to jump, of course the reason was the longer bombbay in Lanc so longer distance to escape hatch especially for the navigator and for the W/O.
> ...



I cerrtainly admit to not knowing why the Halifax crew had a better chance of getting out alive but there is no doubt that the did, these are not marginal differences. 

As for the better loss ratio of the Halifax III vs Lancaster, the target chosen would obviously have a major bearing. However the earlier Mk II was largely withdrawn from the night bombing at the end of February 1944 and the change in loss ratios in favour of the Halifax started immediately. The difference wasn't great but there was a difference and I doubt that BC were selective that early on in the boming campaign. 

What happened in the last nine months of the war I don't know and would only be guessing.


----------



## stona (Jan 19, 2012)

Glider said:


> I cerrtainly admit to not knowing why the Halifax crew had a better chance of getting out alive but there is no doubt that the did, these are not marginal differences.



Size and accessibility of the escape hatch(es).

From a Canadian,Sgt.Soderstom 434 Sqn.RCAF.

"There are four avenues of escape in the Halifax; a small hatch above the pilot's head. A second narrow escape hatch, a trap door will lift out in the front lower section between the flight engineer`s/navigators area and the aircraft nose. The third exit is the main door located behind the left wing underside. The bomb-aimer, navigator, and wireless operator make sure all escape hatches are open on their levels. The rear gunner has the fourth exit, which is optional, he can climb out of his turret, strap on his parachute, reenter the turret, rotate it 180 degrees then fall clear from the aircraft."

Don't fancy the routine for the rear gunner!

The Lancaster had a rear door but the forward escape hatch,in the floor of the bomb aimer's compartment,is only 23"x26"! I can't imagine trying to get through that wearing a parachute along with the bomb aimer,engineer,wireless operator,navigator and ultimately the pilot.

Steve


----------



## Glider (Jan 19, 2012)

Thanks for that Steve. I do know that on the few bombers fitted with the rear twin 0.5 the rear gunners chances improved considerably as he could wear the shute inside the turret.


----------



## fastmongrel (Jan 20, 2012)

The Lanc had the main spar in the way of easy movement did the Halifax have the main spar in the way in a similar fashion.


----------



## davparlr (Jan 20, 2012)

stona said:


> Size and accessibility of the escape hatch(es).
> 
> From a Canadian,Sgt.Soderstom 434 Sqn.RCAF.
> 
> ...


 
Just think about the ball turret gunner in the B-17!


----------



## stug3 (Dec 29, 2012)

Heinkel He-177A-5 from the I. / KG 50 at the airport in Kiev used to supply German forces encircled in Stalingrad.


----------



## stona (Dec 29, 2012)

Seven aircraft from I./FKG 50 were transferred to Saporoshje in the Ukraine. They were fitted with a special supply-dropping modification and thrown in to the relief effort. They proved typically unreliable.

13th January,first operation,E8+FK crashed on landing due to fuel pump failiure.
16th January,E8+FH caught fire and crashed in flames near Poljakowa.
17th January W.Nr 5242 (codes?) destroyed by fire at Saporoshje.
20th January W.Nr 5241 (codes?) completely destroyed when tail assembly collapsed on landing at Kirovograd.

More than half the original total lost in just over a week!

A couple of days later the last airfield in the pocket,Gumrak,was overrun by Soviet forces and the remaining He 177s returned to flying bombing missions in support of the army. The He 177s flew a total of nineteen missions into the pocket.
On 31st January Major Schlosser of I.FKG/50 reported that

"......engine fires in mid air have been responsible for the loss of five [He 177s]-a casualty rate of 26%.
.......The Group lost at least two aircraft through in flight fires during the last 14 days,including one total loss as well almost certainly two more aircraft that failed to return.Due to the location of the engines to the rear of the pilot,fires are not generally discovered until it is too late."

General Martin Fiebig,commanding VIII.Fliegerkorps reported that the type was useless as a transport aircraft. The type could carry only 8 x 250 Kg containers into the pocket,the round trip used 4 tonnes of fuel.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## rank amateur (Dec 30, 2012)

Only 2000kg? Are you sure? Seems to me the he177 should be capabele of more.
Nice to see an old tread revived 

Chrzzzzz


----------



## stona (Dec 30, 2012)

rank amateur said:


> Only 2000kg? Are you sure? Seems to me the he177 should be capabele of more.
> Nice to see an old tread revived
> 
> Chrzzzzz



That's what Fiebig said. I haven't been able to find out exactly what the supply dropping adaptation entailed.

In the context of the Stalingrad airlift the nineteen He 177 missions into the pocket were fairly irrelevant no matter what they carried 

Interesting for us today, but not at the time.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 30, 2012)

A supply container may be much bulkier for it's weight than bombs. While there maybe room in the fuselage (or not, depending on fuel tanks):

http://img35.imageshack.us/img35/2922/heinkelhe177a5greifarti.jpg

Getting any real amount of supplies though the _existing_ hatches and passageways may have been a real problem. 

Good transports have large volume in addition to good weight capacity. High performance bombers have small fuselages (small volume).


----------



## davparlr (Dec 30, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> A supply container may be much bulkier for it's weight than bombs. While there maybe room in the fuselage (or not, depending on fuel tanks):
> 
> http://img35.imageshack.us/img35/2922/heinkelhe177a5greifarti.jpg
> 
> ...


 
And that is exactly why they stretched the C-141. It typically was full of cargo well before any weight limit was met. They increase the cargo volume capacity 30%, but interesting enough, increased max weight from 325k lbs to 342k lbs without changing the wings or the engines. It was obviously overpowered when I flew it, which is not bad at all, you never have too much thrust. It was originally designed to carry one minute man ICBM.


----------



## stona (Dec 31, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> A supply container may be much bulkier for it's weight than bombs. While there maybe room in the fuselage (or not, depending on fuel tanks):
> 
> http://img35.imageshack.us/img35/2922/heinkelhe177a5greifarti.jpg
> 
> Getting any real amount of supplies though the _existing_ hatches and passageways may have been a real problem.



A good point. 

The statistics for the He 177 are even worse than my original post. It could carry eight 250Kg containers (2000Kg) but this only amounted to 1,120 Kg of supplies,according to Fiebig again. I'm not surprised he considered the four tonnes of fuel needed to deliver this a poor investment 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## rank amateur (Dec 31, 2012)

It only struck just me now. The HE177 might not have been the best choice as a transport but it could have been usefull towing gliders. I wonder how many Go242 or Me 321 were available in that timeframe. I'm not saying it would have been the best option, towing overloaded gliders thrue heavy defended airspace, but it might have given some relief. Anyway would it have been a viable option if enough gliders were available?


----------



## stona (Dec 31, 2012)

rank amateur said:


> The HE177 might not have been the best choice as a transport but it could have been usefull towing gliders.



It's an interesting thought but I think other types might have been better glider tugs. The He 177 wasn't structurally a very robust aircraft. 

I've never seen any mention,or suggestion of gliders for Stalingrad but someone may know more.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 31, 2012)

Towing gliders can be very tough on engines. The engines have to put out more than usual power for extended periods of time at low airspeeds which can lead to cooling problems. Some planes did better than others at this. It is not just the power to weight ratio of a particular plane but the cooling system of the plane. Planes with marginal cooling to begin with probably make lousy glider tugs.


----------



## rank amateur (Dec 31, 2012)

I think cooling wasn't exactly the strongpoint of the db610. So bye bye He 177. What else can we use to drag these gliders?


----------



## stona (Dec 31, 2012)

rank amateur said:


> I think cooling wasn't exactly the strongpoint of the db610.



True,but a lot of He 177 engine fires were caused by fractured or abraided fuel lines leaking their contents which pooled in the nacelles with predictable results. The problem was much ameliorated,though not solved,by simple remedies like improved servicing schedules. 
The engines were difficult to service and access. Being fitted to some extent inside inside the wing meant that space was limited. Walter Baist,who was responsible for the He 177 engine testing programme at Rechlin remembers the maze of fuel,oil and hydraulic lines and electrical and instrument leads as a "sardine can" arrangement. He also remembered that there were problems with leaks at connection points. Oil fires were caused due to oil foaming (a familiar Daimler Benz problem) leading to a loss of lubrication. The resultant engine failiures often,with con rods through the side of the engine after little end bearing failiures,led to the loss of oil which then caught fire on the exhausts.

I do agree with Shortround that they were far from ideal glider tugs.

Cheers
Steve


----------



## tyrodtom (Dec 31, 2012)

A aircraft pulling a glider has very limited manuverability, they wouldn't be able to jink around much to avoid the flak batteries the Soviets installed soon after surrounding Stalingrad. A transport pulling a glider, low level, would be a very easy target, for flak, and of course for fighters too.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 1, 2013)

You guys are so much more patient than I. I looked back on the history of this thread, and saw an ungly, unseemly, and fo me, an embarassing stouche. You guys have put some semblance of respect back into the discussion. Keep it up.


----------



## Njaco (Jan 1, 2013)

Some interesting tidbits I've compiled from several books....

*January 9 1943 Saturday*: A new sight greets the defenders of the city. At 0930 hours the first of seven Fw 200 ‘Condor’ four-engined aircraft lands in the snow at Pitomnik airfield. The ‘Condors’ are from a group of eighteen reconnaissance bombers, taken from KG 40 on the Atlantic coast and thrown into the Stalingrad airlift with the designation Kampfgruppe ZbV 200, led by Major Hans Jurgen Willers. The reconnaissance aircraft-turned-transports are based at Stalino, some 300 miles away from the battle area. The seven Focke-Wulf converted transports bring four and a half tons of fuel, nine tons of ammunition and twenty-two and a half tons of provisions on their first flight. On the return flight they take out 156 wounded. But the ‘Condors’ suffer losses. One aircraft has to return with engine trouble, and another is unable to take off. Two more 'Condors' are hit by Russian anti-aircraft fire and a fifth goes missing with twenty-one wounded on board.

*January 10 1943 Sunday*: In a desperate gamble to increase the airlift to Stalingrad, Major Willers of the new KGzbV 200 makes use of two Ju 290 heavy bombers, known as ‘flying furniture vans’. The first flight into the city is made by Hptm. Hanig who returns successfully. These large aircraft are able to bring ten tons of supplies and take out about eighty wounded men.

*January 13 1943 Wednesday*: At Pitomnik airfield, a Ju 290 heavy bomber takes off from the airbase with eighty wounded on board, rolls over and crashes. Only one person survives. The survivor explains to officials that as the plane took off in the steep climb from the airfield, the unstrapped wounded men inside slid to the back of the aircraft and overloaded the tail, making it uncontrollable.

*January 16 1943 Saturday*: The Luftwaffe abandons Pitomnik airfield as the Russian offensive advances. Six Ju 87 Stukas and six Bf 109s, volunteers from JG 3 acting as airfield defense, are able to take off as the airfield is attacked by Soviet infantry. The fighters, led by Hptm. Germeroth and Hptm. Kurt Ebener, are ordered to the airfield at Gumrak. But the airfield is not ready for the fighters and as they land, disaster strikes. The first Messerschmitt overturns in a snow drift. Four more of the fighters hit bomb craters as they land, leaving only one flyable Bf 109 left, flown by Oblt. Lukas. Lukas decides that the airfield is too dangerous and flies off to the west. 

Gumrak airfield is also supposed to be the airfield for the numerous transports bringing supplies. But the wreck-strewn airbase forces the Ju 52 Gruppen, led by Oberst Morzik, to land in a maize field near Sverevo. A bombing attack on the field later by the Russians destroys fifty-two of the transports on the field.

Back at Pitomnik airfield, the Russians use abandoned German direction finding equipment to mislead the German aircrews. Several pilots are deceived into landing at the airfield and are taken prisoner.

*January 18 1943 Monday*: Lt. Hans Gilbert, flying one of the remaining Fw 200 ‘Condors’, lands at snowbound Gumrak airfield. Although he breaks his tail skid on landing, he is able to take off with General Hube of the armoured force, as per his orders to evacuate the General. Later a He 111 lands at Gumrak with Major Thiel, Gruppenkommandeur of III / KG 27. He is sent by VIII Fliegerkorps to report on the condition of the airbase – described by radio message’s as “day-and-night operational.” Major Thiel reports, 


> “The airfield is easy to pin-point from 4,500 – 5,000 feet owing to its rolled runway, its wreckage and the numerous bomb craters and shell holes. The landing cross was covered with snow. Directly my machine came to a standstill the airfield was shot up by ten enemy fighters – which, however, did not come lower than 2,500 – 3,000 feet owing to the light flak that opened up on them. Simultaneously it was under artillery zone fire. I had just switched off the engines when my aircraft became an object for target practice. The whole airfield was commanded by both heavy and medium guns situated – so far as one could judge from the open firing positions – mainly to the south-west . . .
> “Technically speaking, the airfield can be used for daylight landings, but at night only by thoroughly experienced aircrews. . . Altogether thirteen aircraft wrecks litter the field, in consequence of which the effective width of the landing area is reduced to eighty yards. Especially dangerous for night landings of heavily laden aircraft is the presence of the wreck of a Bf 109 at the end of it. Immediate clearance of these obstacles has been promised by Oberst Rosenfeld. The field is also strewn with numerous bomb canisters of provisions, none of them saved, and some already half covered with snow . . .
> “ When I returned to my aircraft (after reporting to General Oberst Paulus) I found that it had been severely damaged by artillery, and my flight mechanic had been killed. A second aircraft of my section stood off the runway in like condition. Though I had landed at 1100 hours, by 2000 hours no unloading team had appeared, and my aircraft had neither been unloaded nor de-fueled despite the crying need for fuel by the Stalingrad garrison. The excuse given was the artillery fire. At 1500 hours Russian nuisance planes (U-2s) began to keep watch on the airfield in sections of three or four. From the outset I made it my business to look into the air control system and established that before 2200 hours it was quite impossible to land a single plane. . . If one approached, the seven lamps of the flare path would be switched on, offering a target visible for miles, whereat it would be bombed by the nuisance raiders above. The only possible measure was a short flash to enable the aircraft to position its bomb canisters . . .”


----------



## rank amateur (Jan 1, 2013)

You might conclude that the Russians gave it any effort to prevent Stalingrad from being supplied from the air. In retrospect I should have opened a second topic: could the German grond forces have done a better job aiding the luftwaffe in supplying the 6th army at Stalingrad?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 1, 2013)

well that opens a whole new debate. To what extent was 6A controlling the situation. In my opinion by the time of the Russian counteroffensive the Germans were losing control of the situation, and could do little to prevent the encirclement. If they cannot prevent the encirclement, and the logistic situation in the rear areas remains the same (ie no decent airfields forward, a rail supply situation stretched to the limit, no Black Sea transport to speak of etc), I cant see much changing at all


----------



## rank amateur (Jan 2, 2013)

I don't think the 6th controlled anything outside of Stalingrad. Not when they were surrounded by the Russians anyway. Despite all the desperate attempts, the used resources and individual acts of heroism I still have the feeling that the overall effort lacked coordination. Germany had lost the inititive. Maybe Hitler even needed the loss off the 6th and Stalingrad to start over with a clean slate ( I was gonna write tabula rasa but my latin is lousy) like they did months later.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 2, 2013)

Its getting off topic, but in my view, the whole 1942 offensive was a mistake. After the bitter fighting of the winter 1941-2, the German army was not really in good condition to undertake a general offensive. They chose instead to strip out 2 out of the 3 front commands and continue a limited offensive on the southern front. But whilst that achieved a temporary solution for a part of their front by doing that, the very fact that they could not undertake a general front wide offensive says volumes on the limited manpower, equipment and above all logistic limits they were operating under.

I think a strategic defence/offence was the best answer for the heer by 1942. Use the Summer to consolidate, rebuild the frontline strengths, improve the levels of logistical support behind the front. Fortify as much as possible. Perhaps even with a mind to falling back to the Dnepr. Defeat Soviet incursions by intelligent counterattacks and mobile warfare tactics. In that way defeat the Soviets in a type of battle (fluid mobile operations) that they were still not good at. A set piece, general offensive with such limited resources as the germans possesed smacked of megolomania and was never going to end well. Stalingrad in my opinion was a reward reaped for an offensive ill considered and under resourced.


----------

