# August 19, 1942



## michaelmaltby (Aug 17, 2012)

"... The brutality of Aug. 19, 1942 is contrasted by the *kindness* bestowed upon the raid since, namely its designation as “a rehearsal” for D-Day. The lessons supposedly learned from the disastrous attack are easily refuted, yet are routinely used as justification for the raid. On this subject West was particularly succinct: “Since the time of the Roman legions, it’s been known that there is no possibility of dislodging a well-entrenched enemy without superior fire power. I don’t know of any lessons we learned at Dieppe....."

WW1: Dieppe was a battle doomed to fail for all the wrong reasons | Full Comment | National Post

Proud Canadian


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## syscom3 (Aug 17, 2012)

The sacrifice of the Canadians ultimately ensured the success off D-Day. There's a lot of truth in the saying that you learn more from defeat than from victory.


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## davebender (Aug 17, 2012)

I disagree. There were a bunch of Allied amphibious landings in Africa, Sicily, Italy and the Aegean. Not to mention the Pacific. That's where we learned lessons necessary for the Normandy invasion.

During 1942 the USA was pressing for an early invasion of NW France. Stalin was pressing even harder for a French invasion. Britain sacrificed an infantry division at Dieppe for diplomatic purposes, to show that invading 1942 France was risky business. The Dieppe disaster gave PM Churchill diplomatic leverage to convince President FDR that the military main effort should be North Africa and Sicily. Brutal but that's the way diplomacy works in the real world.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 18, 2012)

*Lesson One:* try not to land on a cobblestone beach - more so if trying to land tanks ...

"... That's where we learned lessons necessary for the Normandy invasion...."

DB, no other amphibious operation in WW2 _remotely_ compares to Normandy - with its pre-fab harbors, piers and pipelines.

The Canadian Government of the time - or some factions of that government - were anxious to sees our boys tested .... Dieppe was _it_.

MM


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## davebender (Aug 19, 2012)

Put that same reinforced Canadian infantry division in Tunisia 8 November 1942 and the North African campaign is likely to be 4 months shorter. If Canada cannot wait three months then why not occupy the Gilbert Islands? During August 1942 the Japanese garrison was tiny so success would be virtually certain. Either way Canada will acquire as much amphibious warfare experience as they got at Dieppe.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 19, 2012)

I watched a new Canadian documentary on History just now .... the thesis being that, first and last Dieppe was a "*pinch raid*" ... to steal updated 4-rotor enigma machines, code books and 4-month code schedules from German Naval headquarters in the Hotel Modern. The _pinch_ was to be achieved by a small commando unit formed by none other than Ian Flemming and (having failed to penetrate the port), this unit was then embedded with Royal Marine units and an attempt was made to penetrate on the beach -- it too failed. The chaos of the larger operation on 5 fronts was expected to conceal the prime objective -- local German naval intelligence - and enigma. 

A 15 minute delay cost the Canadian troops the element of surprise and the cover of darkness for objective 1. It fell apart from there ....


http://www.history.ca/ontv/titledetails.aspx?titleid=274917

MM


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## parsifal (Aug 19, 2012)

A big part of dieppe must be explained with the knowledge of keeping the Russians happy. Uncle joe wanted a second front in western europe vastly increased LL aid, and if he didnt get it was threatening a separate peace with the nazis. dieppe, PQ17, Torch are all only explainable, and justifiable on that basis.


and, there were valuable lessons learned from the whole debacle, and these were not known to the allies (or the germans for that matter) until after the raid. It was the first amphibious attack into europe against a defended port. That had never been tried before, and wasnt attempted again quite so directly. it certainly put the Americans into the picture as to the difficulties of their "direct action" strategy, given the resources available. if it had been successful, the allies would have pursued roundup in 1943, instead they waited abd came up with better solutions to the logistics problem they faced


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 20, 2012)

I don't disagree Parsifal ...

"... a big part of dieppe must be explained with the knowledge of keeping the Russians happy. Uncle joe ......
.. if it had been successful, the allies would have pursued roundup in 1943, instead they waited abd came up with better solutions to the logistics problem they faced"

But non of the above explains or answers THE QUESTION .... *Why Dieppe*? Uncle Joe didn't give a flying fig about Dieppe .... to _satisfy_ Uncle Joe it would have had to be Berlin or Paris ..  ... who cared about Dieppe?

Well ... if you look at the St.Nazaire raid a few months earlier it was a similar Royal Navy raiding pattern ..... run a vessel (HMS Cambleton) into an enclosed and defended port area and take out a specific strategic objective, in the case of St. Nazaire, the Dry Dock that would accommode the German battleships.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St_Nazaire_Raid

I'm convinced by this documentary .... Dieppe was first and last a Royal Navy "show". *The Canadians *were there with their Government's support and approval - and much of their mission was diversionary, or to secure defense assets that could threaten activity inside the harbor -- i.e. *pinching* 

*Dieppe is Canada's single worst day of losses in WW2.*


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## davebender (Aug 20, 2012)

April 1942. U.S. outline for fighting war in Europe.

1. Ferry military units and material to Britain during 1942. This would allow a massive invasion of NW France during April 1943. Code name “Bolero”.

2. If the Soviet Union appeared in danger of collapse a smaller invasion of NW France would take place during the fall of 1942 employing 5 to 10 divisions. Code name “Sledgehammer”.

PM Churchill concurred in principle with this strategy then immediately began backing away.

April 1942.
Planning for Dieppe invasion begins.

June 1942. PM Churchill travels to Washington DC.
British main point was an attempt to convince President FDR to invade French North Africa during the fall of 1942.

21 June 1942.
News of Rommel seizing Tobruk reached PM Churchill while he was meeting with President FDR.

July 1942. USA Chief of Staff Marshall and CNO King meet with President FDR.
“If the British continue to insist on scatterization in North Africa, the U.S. should turn to the Pacific for decisive action against Japan."

Politics raises its ugly head.
Numerous opinion polls showed the American public wanted to know why the country had yet to counterpunch against the Axis. Congressional elections were scheduled for November 1942. President FDR was concerned lack of military action would cost the Democratic Party several congressional seats.

Meanwhile in London….
Communists in Trafalgar Square and elsewhere were chanting “Second Front, Now!” in sympathy with the besieged Russians.

30 July 1942.
FDR announces to his military advisors that as Command in Chief he supported the British proposal. French North Africa was to be invaded at the earliest possible date. His decision was final.
.....Britain had over two weeks to cancel the Dieppe invasion but failed to do so. Why? Without Dieppe Operation Torch would include an additional infantry divsion.

19 August 1942. Dieppe invasion.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 20, 2012)

Once more, I say:

"... non of the above explains or answers THE QUESTION .... Why Dieppe?"

Not disputing your timeline, DB .... but it's only that .... a list of events in sequence - co-incidental or otherwise. 

MM


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## pbfoot (Aug 20, 2012)

If the documentary MM and I watched was correct and I have no need to doubt that it was as the recently released documents proved , it was staged to get 30RM also lnown as 30 Assualt unit in the harbour on a RN vessel so that they and picked up by another RN vessel to escape could steal the Ultra with the 4th wheel , ir was planned or concieved in Feb 42. Red Ryder VC of St Nazaire fame was in charge . The vessel carrying 30RM in was turned back by defensive fire and it was decided to send them in on landing craft which also failed .


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 20, 2012)

Roger that, PB, 

A very fresh look at the subject, I thought ... and .... once you understand the Royal Navy 'm-o' it makes sense. But it failed - failure with Objective One just cascaded down the whole operation.


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## parsifal (Aug 20, 2012)

> But non of the above explains or answers THE QUESTION .... *Why Dieppe*? Uncle Joe didn't give a flying fig about Dieppe .... to _satisfy_ Uncle Joe it would have had to be Berlin or Paris ..  ... who cared about Dieppe?




Your right, Stalin could care less about Dieppe. But you are missing the point.....the Russians didnt care about western Europe, except they wanted a tangible second front in the west. They didnt believe the Allied excuses about the alleged difficulties put forward by the allies. But the Russians did understand the needs of the allies to secure a port as part of their lodgement strategy. Confronted with a manifest failure to capture A Port (which just happened to be Dieppe) and the demonstrably valid butchers bill paid tryng to achieve that objective. Faced with (a) a "serious" effort to go for a port in western Europe and (b) a failure to achieve that objective, the Russians really had nowhere they could go other than back to the task of defeating the germans. Same logic applied to the Summer convoys. Though they persisitently harped on about the lack of support being provided, the destgruction of the convoys showed ample proof that the allies were doing their best to help their Soviet Allies. 




> Well ... if you look at the St.Nazaire raid a few months earlier it was a similar Royal Navy raiding pattern ..... run a vessel (HMS Cambleton) into an enclosed and defended port area and take out a specific strategic objective, in the case of St. Nazaire, the Dry Dock that would accommode the German battleships.



No, there is no similarity between St Nazaire raid and Dieppe. dieppe was essentially a reconnaisance in force, St Nazaire was just a raid, far smaller in scale, with no intention of taking (or holding) ground. 



> I'm convinced by this documentary .... Dieppe was first and last a Royal Navy "show". *The Canadians *were there with their Government's support and approval - and much of their mission was diversionary, or to secure defense assets that could threaten activity inside the harbor



Not that i have seen the doco, and im sure its very good, but like all such reports that purport to contain "revelations" about a particular issue in history, invariably the claims need to be taken with a very bigt grain of salt. Dieppe was a defeat, but it delivered valuable insight and lessons that had a direct and significant effect on Allied operations, and, also was made necessary by Russian demands


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## parsifal (Aug 20, 2012)

For once I agree with Dave on this one, well to a point.....circumstances were the main determinant of the Dieppe operation, not so much a specific operation. I would not be surpised that such an objective might be tacked onto the operation as an afterthought but if so it was not to obtain the fourth wheel of an enigma machine....that was already in possession of the Allies from the preceding April. In any event crashing through the front door like that to get hold of classified german material is not going to achieve anything....the germans would know their security was breached and take appropriate steps, like change the codemaking machines if such an obvious pathways was attempted. Thats why the Allies had to be so careful whilst pinching codebooks and apparatus...the germans had to be unaware their security had been breached. You dont do that with 6000 Canadians following you into battle.....


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## Crimea_River (Aug 20, 2012)

Missed that documentary last night but got it on my PVR. Will watch when I have a quiet (unfortunately = rare) moment to do so. Great to see the vets honoured there. Hope they got the 1st class treatment they deserved.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 21, 2012)

"... Missed that documentary last night but got it on my PVR. Will watch when I have a quiet .... moment"

When you do, please report as to whether or not you think it credible in its (Royal Navy op) thesis ..... Parsifal apparently believes the historical details were _frozen_ back in 1942 at the official post-mortem. .. 

Cheers,

MM


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## pbfoot (Aug 21, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Thats why the Allies had to be so careful whilst pinching codebooks and apparatus...the germans had to be unaware their security had been breached. You dont do that with 6000 Canadians following you into battle.....


apparently others disagree with your thoughts including present day British intelligence cut and pasted from Vancouver Sun ..... Dieppe has always been viewed as a "lambs-to-the-slaughter" military fiasco, said O'Keefe, especially as seen from the Canadian side. "Dieppe is still a disaster," he said, but now the operation can be viewed as something more than simply a botched testing of Germany's Fortress Europe defences.

"One of the most remarkable results is that it provides a true silver lining to this - there's a tangible, legitimate and absolutely critical purpose to this operation," O'Keefe said.

Present-day spymasters at GCHQ, Britain's intelligence agency, "reluctantly" agreed to the Canadian researcher's findings, said O'Keefe, who also spoke with the only surviving member of Fleming's assault unit. He said others in the intelligence, military and historical communities sup-port what should now lead to a rewriting of one of the dark chapters of Second World War history


Read more: Secret files shed new light on Dieppe
As for the raid being proposed in April the RN proposed it in February and the 4th wheel for the Naval Ultra
it was introduced in Feb 42 as opposed to your statement that it was in possesion of Allies the previous April ...please note the Feb 42 for introduction of the Naval Ultra and the RN proposal date


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 21, 2012)

Footage: Escape and Aftermath


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZFnS0dNDYV0_

Sad but real.

MM


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## parsifal (Aug 21, 2012)

I wish that i could give the canadian survivors some solace about this sad event but i cannot, at least not to say that their efforts made a huge difference n the itelligence war 

This is how the documentary being discussed is reported in the Leader Post (an online news service)

"Now, after decades of unanswered questions and only guesses as to why the mission was launched and to what purpose the Dieppe slaughter served comes newly unearthed evidence putting the mission in a completely different light.Could the single-biggest raid of the war simply have been a diversion for the real objective — a commando “pinch” operation to steal German naval codes and encryption machines? And playing a leading role in the top-secret mission was legendary spymaster Ian Fleming, who would later gain fame as author of the James Bond 007 series.“What a story this is ... this is like something out of a Hollywood movie,” said David O’Keefe, a Montreal-based military historian who uncovered the mystery over the course of 15 years of research. Himself a former soldier and Department of National Defence employee, O’Keefe gained privileged access to more than 100,000 pages of classified British military archival documents, many of them stamped “most secret” and part of the ULTRA files, the highly sensitive intelligence gathered during the war and only recently starting to be made available to some researchers.O’Keefe said there was no single “eureka!” moment, but rather a series of discoveries that led to his conclusion that the plan, all along, was to slip a specially trained unit into Dieppe under the cover of a bigger operation and recover a German-made Enigma code machine, a very complex electro-mechanical device that used a series of rotors for the encryption of secret messages. The Allies had great success in breaking into German ciphers and codes to help plan their Battle of the Atlantic strategies, but the enemy had recently advanced their Enigma technology and the possible outcome of the war itself was at stake during this pivotal period when the Third Reich was at its peak.Housed inside Dieppe’s Hotel Moderne was the German naval headquarters, the small port city hosted an important radar installation, and Allied intelligence was convinced that trawlers tied up in the harbour were pulling double-duty as spy vessels and contained valuable enemy signals equipment. Waiting offshore for the success of the initial attack were Commander Ian Fleming, who was the personal assistant to the admiral in charge of Britain’s naval intelligence, as well as members of a secretive unit of naval intelligence specialists he helped create known during Operation Jubilee as No. 40 Royal Marine Commando.The previously stated purposes of the raid, as well as lessons learned, remain valid, said O’Keefe, but it’s the newly uncovered intelligence-gathering objective that was “the locomotive driving this thing.”Dieppe has always been viewed as a “lambs-to-the-slaughter” military fiasco, said O’Keefe, especially as seen from the Canadian side. “Dieppe is still a disaster,” he said, but now the operation can be viewed as something more than simply a botched testing of Germany’s Fortress Europe defences.“One of the most remarkable results is that it provides a true silver lining to this — there’s a tangible, legitimate and absolutely critical purpose to this operation,” said O’Keefe.Present-day spymasters at GCHQ….”

Well, possibly, but I am sceptical, since in 1942 the priority objective of the british intell services after april 1942 was cracking KM kurssignale beta codes, and that occurred between October 1942 and December 1942. There was no need to capture an additional Enigma machine. A fourth rotor had been in british possession since at least 1941. What was needed was access to Km procedures and codes

It is more or less ‘routine’ every couple of yearsthat a historian steps up to claim that he has something “new’ on the ultra secret, that “proves” a particular operation was critical, or momentous in the course of the war. Perhaps, but unlikely. Britains SIGINT effort was in fact a never ending contest that is fascinating and complex. I don’t profess to know everything about it, or even most of it, but I am reasonably certain that Dieppe was not the event that turned the corner so to speak. At this point I am even doubtful that it contributed anything to the cracking of kurzsignale beta
more to follow....


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## parsifal (Aug 21, 2012)

Triton Strikes Back
The dropping results in Uboat success in 1941, made Admiral Dönitz suspicious. Although reassured by the Abwehr, German Foreign Intelligence, that Enigma was unbreakable, he insisted on improving the security of Enigma. On 1 February 1942 the famous Enigma M4 model with four rotors and new code books were introduced. The new and more complicated Triton code, designated Shark by Bletchley Park, caused a complete black-out. They could no longer break the U-boat radio traffic and no longer had any idea of the U-boat positions. On top of that, new Wetterkurzschlussel code books were introduced one month earlier. This deprived Bletchley Park completely of any cribs. The Kriegsmarine called the springtime of 1942 Die Glücklichen Zeiten or Happy Times, because of the enormous shipload they sunk. Note that the propaganda term Happy Times is relative, taken in account the dangerous and extreme circumstances the U-boat crews were operating in. The problem was not in the machines being used. betchely park already had afour rotor machine. the problem was in the new codes and new procedures introduced by the KM in february 1942. 

After ten nerve wrecking months of heavy losses, Bletchley Park succeeded in breaking into Shark. This was due to several different reasons (but dieppe was not one of them). An important event was the attack on Kapitänleutnant Hans Heidtmann's U-559 by the British destroyer HMS Petard on 30 October 1942. After taking heavy fire from HMS Petard, the sinking U-boat was boarded by three British sailors. They managed to get the Enigma code books and the new edition of the Wetterkurzschlussel. Two of them returned once more to recover the Enigma M4, but went down with the U-boat. They payed their bravery with their lives, but not without result. This mission proved to be a turning point in breaking Shark. On 13 December 1942, more than ten months after the start of the black-out, Bletchley Park could finally inform the Admiralty again about U-boats positions.

After breaking a substantial number of messages, the codebreakers realized that the U-boat weather reports, encoded with the WetterKurzschlussel, were sent with the four-rotor Enigma in the less complicated M3 mode (the fourth rotor in A position with ring setting A). This was done to be compatible with the three-rotor Enigma M3, used on weather ships. The Bombes in Bletchley Park, developed to crack the three-rotor Enigma, took more than 20 days to crack the four-rotor Enigma key settings. However, a three-rotor key setting could be retrieved in less than 24 hours. This discovery was an enormous time profit. With the broken meteorological reports from Hut 10 and the recovered Wetterkurzschlussel they finally broke Triton continuously. When a new edition of the Wetterkurzschlussel came into service in March 1943, the seized U-559 Wetterkurzschlussel became useless, resulting in a new black-out. Fortunately, the Kurzsignalheft code book, also recovered from U-559, provided new ways to find cribs in U-boat short-signals and enabled the codebreakers to re-enter shark after nine days. Except for some brief periods, the codebreakers never lost Shark again.
Breaking Kurzsignale

The U-boats used the Kurzsignalheft (short-signal book) to encipher contact messages. The Kriegsmarine converted default tactical expressions with a code table, called Kurzsignalheft, before enciphering them with Enigma. A contact with a convoy could for example be converted into UGKU, an enemy airplane into HKJL, or a meeting point for refueling into KLUG.The use of Kurzsignale was a clever approach. It was harder for Allied Signal Intelligence to trace these short messages with HDFD (High Frequency Direction Finding or Huffduff). Moreover, attempts to decipher these short messages didn't give any readable sentences, and approaching the correct key did not reveal pieces of normal sentences, helping to find the key settings. Also, the conversion of text into four letter codes shortened the cipher text. Less cipher text also provides less statistics to the code breakers. Nothing but advantages...they believed.

Unfortunately for the Germans, the use of Kurzsignale resulted into recognizable patterns in the Enigma messages. A convoy, nearing a U-boat, would probably evoke a contact message. An airplane, spotting a U-boat, would result in a airplane contact message. In Bletchley Park, tactical information was linked to positions, obtained by HFDF and reconnaissance reports, to find out what type of message was sent by that particular U-boat. In combination with the recovered Kurzsignalheft code book, Bletchley Park was able to predict the content of the enciphered messages, thus providing them again with crucial cribs to feed into their Bombes. Meanwhile, new Bombes were developed to deal with the four-rotor Enigma. By June 1943, the first four-rotor Bombes came into action, and by the end of 1943 another fifty four-rotor Bombes went operational at OP-20-G, the American Naval codebreakers. In the fall of 1943, Shark messages were generally broken within 24 hours.
U-boats down

The 'Ultra' information was extremely effective in the strategically very important North Atlantic Ocean. After the initial hard times, Bletchley Park broke the Enigma messages on a daily base. The tide of U-boat war was turned. Except for some brief periods, the entire German communication system was intercepted by a large number of listening stations called Y-stations, and the codes broken in Bletchley Park, with over 7000 employees at its peak. With the positions of the U-boats unveiled, Allied ships were simply re-routed to avoid fatal confrontations with the U-boats, and an active hunt for the U-boats begun. The elite weapon of the Kriegsmarine became decimated, resulting in heavy losses among the U-boat crews. An estimated 700 U-boats and 30,000 crewman were lost at sea. The German command related these losses to new detection techniques like the ASDIC sonar system, U-boat detection planes, and destroyers escorting convoys. This was partially a correct assumption, but they never suspected cryptanalysis of their Enigma encrypted radio traffic. The Enigma machine provided without a doubt a for those days unbreakable encryption. However, unsafe procedures and tactical mistakes turned the Enigma machine into the Achilles heel of the German war machine. Germany kept on using Enigma without any suspicion in all parts of their forces, which resulted in catastrophic consequences for Nazi Germany.
Origins of Kurzsignale 

During the Second World War the German U-boats used Kurzsignale or Short Signals to send their messages. The Kurzsignale were an important part of the complex Kriegsmarine communications system. In general, the Kurzsignale were four letter groups representing all kinds of sentences regarding tactical information such as course, enemy reports, position grids or weather reports.
An important reason for the Kriegsmarine to apply these Kurzsignale was the Allied use of High Frequency Direction Finding, also called HFDF or Huff Duff. This system enabled Allied Forces to accurately determine the position of German broadcastings. This was an important tactical advantage in the Atlantic, revealing the positions of German ships and U-boats. The use of Kurzsignale decreased the length of the morse messages enormously, often reducing broadcasting time to less then one minute. This way, the German Navy made it harder to fix positions with Huff Duff.
Kurzsignale on U-Boats 
The Kriegsmarine procedures on sending messages with the Enigma cipher machine were far more complex and elaborate than the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe procedures. Of course, secure communications were a most vital part of Kriegsmarine ooperations in the Atlantic. The U-boats relied completely on secure communications to receive their orders, coordinate patrolling on sea, and their Wolfpack tactics. If the communications were compromised, this would reveal Germans naval positions and result in Allied tactical countermeasures or active hunt on the U-boats.
During the War, several different Kurzsignale methods were used on U-boats. Until 1942, Alpha signals were used. An Alpha signal was a small message, usually containing a single four-letter groups. From 1942 on, U-boats commonly used the Beta signals. Various editions of Kurzsignalhefte, the Short Signal Codebooks, were applied during the war. Each Kurzsignal message, or Beta signal, had a strict format, containing an introduction, an identification to the key, and the message, encrypted with the Enigma cipher machine.
This knowledge was not known until after October 1942….


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## parsifal (Aug 21, 2012)

Part III

The Codebooks 

To apply the Kurzsignale, the Kriegsmarine used several different codebooks. The two most important codebooks were the Kurzsignalheft for all kinds of operational messages, and the Wetterkurzschlussel for weather reports. The Kurzsignalheft contained tables that converted sentences into four-letter groups. All kinds of expressions in many different topics were listed. Logistic matters such as refueling and rendez-vous with supply ships, positions and grid lists, names of harbors, countries, weapons, weather conditions, enemy positions and ships, date and time tables. All possible situations and topics were listed. Another codebook contained the Kenngruppen and Spruchschlussel, resp key identification and message key, that is the start position to the rotors of the Enigma. The codebooks were printed on special paper with red, water soluble, ink . If the codebooks could be captured, they were destroyed by throwing them into water.
Composition of the Kurzsignale 

"It is best to try and explain the operation of Kurzsignale, using as an example a Short Message, encoded with the 1944 edition of the Kurzsignalheft. This edition was more complex than the previous alpha and beta versions. The Kurzsignalheft 44 consisted of two parts, Heft I and II. Heft I contained the Satzbuch or sentence book, to convert sentences into four-figure groups, and the Schlusselzahltafel or key number table. Heft II, called Buchgruppenheft, was used to convert four-number groups into four-letter words. In addition, to sign messages or identify other U-boats in a message, the Kriegsmarine used a codebook called Marinefunknamenliste or Naval Callsign List. This was a list with all existing U-boats and trigrams, three letter words, assigned to each U-boat. Unfortunately for the Kriegsmarine, the more complex 1944 edition didn't came into service on time to change the odds for the decimated U-boat fleet in the Atlantic."

The Kriegsmarine transmission procedures and message format were different from the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe. The key sheets for the Enigma settings were also different. Importantly, Heer and Luftwaffe messages were largely solved by april 1942. With the introduction of the beta code methods, KM and uboats coding procedures remained a mystery for 10 months longer, and attempts to break this code had nothing to do with Dieppe.

The Wehrmacht used one table with rotors, ring settings, plugs for each day of a given month. The Kriegsmarine used various code sheets. The Kriegsmarine TRITON code sheets consisted of two parts.

The first sheet, called Schlusseltafel M Algemein - Innere Einstellung, contained the three rotors and their ring settings, the thin beta or gamma rotor and the reflector, and this for all odd days of a whole month. The second sheet, called Schlusseltafel M Algemein - Aussere Einstellung, contained the plugs and Grundstellung or start position for each day of the month.

The Kriegsmarine Sonderschlussel M, used for private conversations between the Commander of the U-Boat Fleet and a particular U-boat, had a special key sheet with only three inner settings, and three plugboard settings, each for a period of ten days, and a list of Spruchschlussel or message keys, designated by a code word. The Sonderschlussel M was similar to the Schlusseltafel M Offizier from TRITON. Examples of the Kriegsmarine keys on.

In order to prepare the message for transmission, the operator had to encipher the message with the Enigma cipher machine. The internal settings and plugboard of the Enigma would already be set. The operator selected a Kenngruppe and Spruchschlussel from his Kenngruppenheft codebook. A Spruchschlussel or message key was the initial start position of the Enigma rotors prior to enciphering. The Kenngruppe was a trigram to identify the Spruchschlussel. The kenngruppenheft was a fixed codebook, which was not regularly replaced. It had three parts: The first part is the Zuteilungsliste, a table where you could find sets with ranges of numbers, according to the day an radio net. Within a range that was derrived from the table, the operator selected a figure. The second part was Teil A, where you could look-up the figure and find the Kenngruppe and Spruchschlussel behind it. The Spruchschlussel was set as startposition on the Enigma and the Kenngruppe (in our example RDF) was added (not encrypted!) at the beginning of the message to identify the Spruchschlussel. The receiving operator would look-up the Kengruppe in the third part of his codebook, Teil B, and find the figure that was related to that Kenngruppe. With this figure, he could now find the appropriate Spruchschlussel (message key) to decipher his message.

The completed message contained the following information:
a. The introduction signal (beta beta)
b. The Kenngruppe trigram, non enciphered
c. All signal groups, enciphered
d. The signature, enciphered
e. The repeated non enciphered Kenngruppe

An experienced radio operator could easily transmit this little message in morse in about 20 seconds.

At the end, the operator used 7 tables or key sheets to encipher his message! The Kurzsignalheft Heft I with its Satzbuch to convert sentences into four-figure groups and the Schlusselzahltafel to add the key number, Heft II with the Buchgruppenheft to convert the four-figure groups into four-letter groups, the Marinefunknamenliste to identify the U-boats, the two key sheets Schlusseltafel M for inner an outer settings of the Enigma machine and finally the Kenngruppenheft to select the message key. No wonder they were confident their communications were secure. Nonetheless, Allied codebreakers succeeded in breaking into the U-boats communications as you can read in Enigma and the U-boat War.

The Wetterkurzschlussel 

Weather reports were vital tactical information for the Kriegsmarine, and it was through intercepts of the weather reports beginning in june 1942 that the system was eventually and initially cracked (ther was no definitive point where KM codes were finally and completely cracked….it was a never ending battle right to th end of the war). Every few hours, the U-boats had to send detailed weather reports by radio. However, each broadcast from a submarine increased the risk of detection by Allied direction finding systems. Therefore, it was important to put as much as possible information into a message that was as small as possible. The Wetterkurzschlussel or WKS did just that. Each Wetterkurzsignal consisted of 23 or 24 letters, representing a certain weather condition. Thirteen tables determined which letter or letter combination was used for a particular weather condition. These included barometric pressure, clouds, winds, visibility, rain fall and so on. Thanks to the Wetterkurzschlussel a large amount of weather variables was compressed in only a few letters.


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## parsifal (Aug 21, 2012)

Part IV

The Kurier System 

In August 1944 the Kriegsmarine began testing an experimental system called "Kurier", designed as a counter-measure against the High Frequency Direction Finding. It was a system, based on a principle now known as burst-encoding. The Kurier device was connected to a radio transmitter. The main component of Kurier was the pulsgenerator KZG 44/2, a drum with 85 small adjustable bars. Each bar represented a signal pulse. When started, an arm with a magnetic pickup element made one single rotation, passing the 85 pre-set bars. Each pulse was 1 millisecond long and there was a 3 milliseconds gap between each pulse. Together with start pulses and pauses, the complete transmission of the short message took never more than 460 milliseconds! The Kurzsignal that had to be sent was converted into Morse code. Each dot was set on the Kurier device as one puls, a dash was two pulses. Between dots and dashes there was a pause of one pulse length, and between letters two pauses. The Kurier receiver KGR-1 converted the pulses into a lightbeam that was projected on a rotating drum with photosensitive paper 

The Kurier system was to be used to transmit Kurzsignalen and Wetterkurzsignalen, and combined with a complex schedule of frequency changes with frequency shifts of plus or minus 200 KHz. Each Kurier Wetterkurzsignalen was seven letters long. Each letter of the Kurzsignal stands for a value, obtained from a table in the Kurier book. For instance: if the first letter of the Wetterkurzsignal is G this means 1034 millibar. As always with kurzsignalen, each message was to be enciphered with Enigma prior to transmission with the Kurier device.
By the end of 1944 Berlin made the Kurier tests a top priority but the program was interrupted before the Kurier system was operational on the U-boat fleet. Events would finally catch up with the program and the end of the war stopped further experiments. Had the Kurier system been operational at an earlier stage of the U-boat war, it could have resulted in serious consequences. Allied intelligence would have been deprived of direction finding and monitoring kurzsignal messages. This would not only mean loss of U-boat positions but would also deprive the codebreakers in Bletchley Park from the essential cribs to break the Enigma keys, used to encrypt the Kriegsmarine message traffic. This could have changed the outcome of the war in the Atlantic.


And the above four parts is just a fraction of the overall battle


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 21, 2012)

"... Dieppe was not the event that turned the corner so to speak."

You're reading meaning and intent into this that is not intended. No one - not me, not PB. not O'Keefe has said a word about turning any corners ... only interested in one question "Why Dieppe?". I notice that you conveniently side-step that question.

And a side-bar not mentioned until now ..... why were (many) Canadian troops carrying hand-cuffs ....? There were clear thoughts that if the mission was "successful" there were going to be "prisoners" going back to GB -- and you can bet they weren't intended to be German "grunts".

I don't care whether or not they were after enigma wheels, radar vacuum tubes, or Frau Gobbels' schnitzel receipe, Parsifal, Dieppe was a* pinch* raid - and the 5,000 Canadians didn't follow the RM Commando group in --- they LED. They were the tip .... of something else.

*Dieppe *had German Naval HQ, it had advanced radar, and it was home port to a large fleet of trawlers which were suspicious ....

As for this, Parsifal, _"... I wish that i could give the canadian survivors some solace about this sad event but i cannot, at least not to say that their efforts made a huge difference n the itelligence war"._

Didn't you learn anything about _presumption_ during your service in the Navy ....?

MM


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## psteel (Aug 21, 2012)

The doc was good and showed the lengths the Admiralty was willing to go to pinch the material needed. It does look like the orders came from the top and were designed to get the enigma material they needed. But key to any such op was to make it look like 'the pinch' was just a lucky 'happenstance'. There were numerous occasions when KM had good reason to question enigma security , but like or not the Germans always fell back on their believe in the infallibility of the machine system. I gather that after the war the Germans were truly shocked to learn how much the allies knew, showing the misinformation campaign worked well.

To bad they had to use so many canucks to sacrifice. Next time do your own dirty work.

I wonder if there will be a book coming from this?


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## parsifal (Aug 21, 2012)

"... Dieppe was not the event that turned the corner so to speak."



> You're reading meaning and intent into this that is not intended. No one - not me, not PB. not O'Keefe has said a word about turning any corners ...




O'Keefe says exactly that...he claims that dieppe was the event that turned the corner in the "enigma war". Provided it is accepted that all except the M4 issue were basically under control in 1942, he is clearly the one "reading too much into the issue". There was no progress in cracking the Kurzsignalle Beta Codes until after October, and that progress did not require thye acquisition of the M4 enigma machine 



> only interested in one question "Why Dieppe?". I notice that you conveniently side-step that question.



No, I am not sidestepping the issue, neither is it of great interest to me, and neither is it incumbent on me to prove that. im not the one pedalling a conspiracy theory that the war was won by the actions at Dieppe, or that Dieppe was chosen because of Intell requirements. What I am saying is that Dieppe failed to produce such results, and, more to the point was unlikely to have ever had this as its primary objective, because breaking down the front door of an enemy to get Intell in the end compromises that Intell. Finally, the stated reason by Okeef, for the raid, namely to acquire an M4 Enigma machine was not needed as the the british already possessed that technology (I( do stand corrected here....they didnt actually posses an M4 machine, but they were reading traffic generated by the M4 (by the army and the LW) well before April 1942). 



> And a side-bar not mentioned until now ..... why were (many) Canadian troops carrying hand-cuffs ....? There were clear thoughts that if the mission was "successful" there were going to be "prisoners" going back to GB -- and you can bet they weren't intended to be German "grunts".




In the sense that the whole operation was one big overblown raid, that doesnt surpise me. the claim being made by OKeefe is much more than that. he is claiming that significant benefits or information and equipment crucial to the oputcome of the Battle Of The Atlantic was being sought. Thats the bit i am disputing. 



> I don't care whether or not they were after enigma wheels, radar vacuum tubes, or Frau Gobbels' schnitzel receipe, Parsifal, Dieppe was a* pinch* raid - and the 5,000 Canadians didn't follow the RM Commando group in --- they LED. They were the tip .... of something else.



I agree, but thats not the claim at issue. the claim is that an Enigma M4 machine was targetted and that the raid was crucial to the outcome of the battle of the Atlantic. An M4 was not crucial at that stage, as other means and machinery were available, and the result or objectives of the raid were not critical to the outcome of the BOTA. 



> *Dieppe *had German Naval HQ, it had advanced radar, and it was home port to a large fleet of trawlers which were suspicious ..


..

And the laast thing the allies would want to do was attract attention to the fact that they were very interested in their activities. the RN had already captured a trawler/weather ship in June, and would not want to arouse any suspicion that they were very interested in these ships by blundering about in the middle of the enmy HQ, or home port. Donitz was already suspicious that his intell was compromised...the British would not want to arouse theose suspicions further. 



> As for this, Parsifal, _"... I wish that i could give the canadian survivors some solace about this sad event but i cannot, at least not to say that their efforts made a huge difference n the itelligence war"._
> 
> Didn't you learn anything about _presumption_ during your service in the Navy ....?



What has my service got to do with anything on this issue.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 22, 2012)

" .... *Not that i have seen the doco*.." ... but I have a predetermined opinion about it. and I don't have to see it cause I've read the reviews.

Enough said. 

MM


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## parsifal (Aug 22, 2012)

I havent seen the documetary, thats true, and im only relying on one review. thats true as well. And I would even concede that the issue is not really resolved until i do rectify those problems.

However, having conceded all those points, it is not valid to conclude that I cannot criticise or make observation about these sorts of claims. i have been very specific about what it is I dont agree with, and I base that on a bit more than seeing just one documentary, or relying on just one opinion or source. I am comparing what i know or have learned from other sources, and there are many, to the small amount that I know about OKeefes work. Okeefe is known around the traps incidentally, and he does have a bit of a reputation of being a sensationalist. His claim here is very much sensationalist, and from what i know of it, Im not buying it. thats based on a lot of other source material that is in direct contravention to his claims. not all that source material is old. Some is, but that does not necessarily make it unimportant. 

Things that I havent done is view the original source material, but I have read a lot from peope that were right in the thick of the Enigma war, and do have more than a few friends includig a former professor at Oxford who have specialised in this field of research. We have had many discussions over the years about the origins and progress of the enigma story. Its complex, and I no longer believe that one single point in time or event led to the allied victory. it was a complex menage pf events, but never before has the Dieppe raid been offered as a factor, much less a major factor in that story. 

Im not completely dismissing the claim, but it is far from proven, on the basis of one documentary. There is simply too much very good contrary evidence to allow that claim to stand.


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## fubar57 (Aug 22, 2012)

Another article about the Dieppe Raid.
Secret radar mission little known success story of disastrous WWII Dieppe raid

Geo


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## parsifal (Aug 22, 2012)

The article is not supportive of okeefe. it claims that a british radar expert was sent in to take a look at the freya radar. ive heard similar accounts, and other missions of the same kind were carried out in brittany some time previously i believe.

That is entirely plausible but unproven. The british needed the operating frequency(ies) that the freya operated on to develop effective countermeasures needed to view the equipment to determine that.

but thats an entirely different claim to the one okeefe is making. hios claims are very specific, and very unproven. Moreover every raid undertaken by the british had intell gathering as secondary objectives. It would not be unusual for Dieppe to be the same. But intell on the enigma codes and enigma machines was simply far too sensitive to risk compromising by such an overt claim as is made by okeefe


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## fubar57 (Aug 22, 2012)

Not arguing for or against anything, it's just an article.

Geo


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 22, 2012)

*Ian Fleming and the 30 Assault Unit*

During the Second World War, Ian Fleming — the legendary author of the James Bond spy series novels — acted as a personal assistant to Britain’s head of naval intelligence, Admiral John Godfrey.

He, along with other naval intelligence specialists, created the No. 30 Commando or the 30 Assault Unit (30AU) — a team of special commandos that were put into the Dieppe operation under the unit name No. 40 Royal Marine Commando.

According to the newly-discovered files, while Fleming and the 30 AU were looking to hit various German vessels that were in Dieppe’s harbour, their primary target was the German headquarters, located at Hotel Moderne near the main harbour in Dieppe.

A search plan revealed that British naval intelligence considered Hotel Moderne to be the German naval headquarters and control centre. They believed the hotel room would house Enigma coding machines and a safe with enough material regarding German war operations for the next six to eight months.

On August 18th, the *30AU was put on the British ship HMS Locust, whose mission was to breach the inner channel and deliver the Royal Marine Commando into port. *Despite several attempts to reach the harbour, the unit was later sent in on landing craft that also failed to reach the main beach.

HMS Locust (T28) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Meanwhile, *Fleming was located on the destroyer HMS Fernie with instructions to return to British port with any material the 30 AU unit obtained. *No pinched material reached HMS Fernie and Fleming and the ship returned to Britain empty-handed.

Had the pinch raid been successful, Beal believes it would have had a substantial effect on the war.

Several months after the failed operation in Dieppe, the minds at Bletchley Park broke the code of the four-rotor Enigma machine.


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## pbfoot (Aug 22, 2012)

the guy that was to land ref the radar was a Brit named Jack Nisenthal he landed with a platoon of the South Saskachewan Regiment the platoon was under the orders to kill Nisenthal if he was in ganger of becoming a prisoner
World War II: RAF Flight Sgt. Jack Nissenthall's Secret Role in Operation Jubilee at Dieppe


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## psteel (Aug 22, 2012)

Its kind of odd to argue about a documentry when you've never even seen it?


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## Crimea_River (Aug 23, 2012)

Having now found a quiet moment to view the film, I'm intrigued about this fresh view of the raid. The use of archival documentation was impressive revealing that although some elements of the raid could have been viewed as a diversion, at least two forces are purported to have had clear roles in direct support of the pinch operation. The landing on blue beach to the east by the Royal Regiment of Canada was assigned to take out the guns protecting the harbour to allow the "Locust" to slip into the harbour to unload the pinch party. The Essex Scottish on red beach had the trawlers as objectives presumably to capture intelligence documents and equipment on board.

One disappointment I found in the documentary was that, whereas it was acknowledged in the first half that it was of utmost importance to pinch the code books, logs, and even a 4 wheel enigma without the Germans knowing these were taken, ultimately O'Keefe, at least in this 90 minute film, did not reveal archival evidence of how this would have been done. Not sure how you disguise a raid on German naval headquarters as anything but an attempt to steal intelligence. But then 15 years of research compressed into 90 minutes can not be easy an invariably something will be left out of the thesis.

I'd be interested to hear comments from reputable historians about how they view O'Keefe's findings rather than what newspapers seem to think. I've not yet read some of the links above but will do when I have some time. At the moment I'm prepared in the absence of any refuting argument to give this documentary the benefit of the doubt.


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## parsifal (Aug 23, 2012)

psteel said:


> Its kind of odd to argue about a documentry when you've never even seen it?



We arent arguing or discussing the documentary directly. it was fed into the debate subsequent to the topics definition. 

Post 1 of the Thread stated



> August 19, 1942
> 
> "... The brutality of Aug. 19, 1942 is contrasted by the kindness bestowed upon the raid since, namely its designation as “a rehearsal” for D-Day. The lessons supposedly learned from the disastrous attack are easily refuted, yet are routinely used as justification for the raid. On this subject West was particularly succinct: “Since the time of the Roman legions, it’s been known that there is no possibility of dislodging a well-entrenched enemy without superior fire power. I don’t know of any lessons we learned at Dieppe....."




There was also a link to a rather flimsy book review unreferenced and a cutting from a populist online newspaper

At Post 6 Michael stated



> I watched a new Canadian documentary on History just now .... the thesis being that, first and last Dieppe was a "pinch raid" ... to steal updated 4-rotor enigma machines, code books and 4-month code schedules from German Naval headquarters in the Hotel Modern. The pinch was to be achieved by a small commando unit formed by none other than Ian Flemming and (having failed to penetrate the port, this unit was then embedded with Royal Marine units and an attempt was made to penetrate on the beach -- it too failed. The chaos of the larger operation on 5 fronts was expected to conceal the prime objective -- local German naval intelligence - and enigma.
> 
> A 15 minute delay cost the Canadian troops the element of surprise and the cover of darkness for objective 1. It fell apart from there .



Which does kinda refine what his sources are. They are not the only sources in this issue. So, the object of the debate is not directly the doco. Its the reasons and value if any of the Dieppe raid. I dont have to see Okeefes documentary to comment on that, there are other sources, for which there are some very partisan attempts being made here to shut down th debate. Being the dumbass I am, I didnt realize this thread was a propaganda rave not designed to discuss the issue intelligently, rather an exercise in Canadian Xenophobia. 

Just to be clear, this is the point I am making. I am not convinced there is good evidence that the primary mission of the Dieppe raid to capture an M4 Enigma machine. I am not convinced that the primary mission was to penetrate the (U-Boat)"Naval Headquarters" at Dieppe (which it wasnt, incidentally, that was at St Nazaire and Lorient). I am happy to concede that intell gathering of a general nature was a secondary mission for the operation. I am also happy to accept that one special op that is plausible is the gathering of information on Freya operating frequencies.

Despite all the abuse that has been hurled at me for not accepting lock stock and barrel the claims made by OKeefe, no-one has produced really good alternative evidence to support his claim. Maybe that will emerge with time as Okeefes findings are new, but until then, his claims are just that, claims, and i prefer to be cautious and stick to the mainstream history rather than run around believing every gossamer thin story and legend that people can dream up ...does not mean I wont change my view, doesnt mean I am rejecting Okeefes hypothesis. just means that there is a larger, well researched and supported body of evidence that needs some strong refuting before it just melts away to nothingness.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 23, 2012)

Your point about the original thread is certainly a fair one, Parsifal. An anniversary post, no more, no less.

However, your prose on this point is ... well ... _vivid_ (trying for PURPLE here) "... Despite all the abuse that has been hurled at me for not accepting lock stock and barrel the claims made by OKeefe.."

The word I used was "fresh" to describe O'Keefe's work ... not jaw dropping or world changing or gob smacking, Fresh.

And - as stated previously - I don't care what the assets to be "pinched" were specifically - IMO they may well have been enigma operators, human assets, and they would be extracted with the RM commando. What I DO care about is knowing there was an OBJECTIVE - a purposeful objective to the raid and not just some mumbo jumbo c*ck-a-mimmi, after-the-fact story about testing German defenses. The Ian Flemming connection is not trivial or casual. Flemming never went on missions he planned - but - he was off-shore on HMS Fernie on this one. That says to me that the "catch" was very likely human. A machine or a code book wouldn't change much between capture and analysis back in the UK. But a human - might be wounded - might not survive - etc.

I am usually supportive of your lengthy, detailed rebuttals, Parsifal, but on this topic you piled on the fuel - 3 lengthy posts worth of fuel - all related to enigma. And only enigma. So you are knowledgeable about enigma - good on you, pal - but you bullied us all the way to 1944 with you enigma posts yet haven't seen the controversial documentary .... maybe ... if you were nice to Mr_C River he'd dub you a copy of the video and I'll pay postage .... .

Chairs,

MM


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## parsifal (Aug 23, 2012)

I do apologize Michael. i did not realize that you were posting a tribute thread. i thought that you were posting a discussion about the reasons for Dieppe, and suggesting that the reason was to gather information about enigma. 

Ill get clear so you can carry on with your tribute mate


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 23, 2012)

No need to apologize or clear out, Parsifal .... I wasn't even aware of the documentary in discussion, when I first posted the thread and then the doc showed up ....

chairs,

MM


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