# Could the P51A been made available for the Battle of Midway?



## pinsog (Jun 22, 2013)

Everything happening as it did historically, could the P51A have been made available to the defenders at Midway in late May of 1942?


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## gjs238 (Jun 22, 2013)

How about P-38's?


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## VBF-13 (Jun 22, 2013)

What could it add, escort our SBDs to Berlin?


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## tyrodtom (Jun 22, 2013)

The USAAF started getting production P-51A's in March 42, getting enough of them, then pilots with useful experience in them, ground crews trained in their maintenance, spares organized, and then get all that to Midway in 4 months would be quite a accomplishment.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 22, 2013)

A small quibble: the P-51 was the 1st model, used by USAF in token numbers. It has been introduced by the RAF, from spring 1942, named Mustang (later Mustang I). 
The P-51A was the new model, produced in 1943, equivalent to the RAF's Mustang II, 1st used during the summer of 1943. Featured the engine with supercharger drive better suited for higher altitudes (but still not as good for hi-alt job as DB-601E/605A, or contemporary Merlin), along with armament changes, and ability to carry drop tanks and bombs. Between these two Mustangs, NAA produced A-36.


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## CORSNING (Jun 22, 2013)

pinsog said:


> Everything happening as it did historically, could the P51A have been made available to the defenders at Midway in late May of 1942?


Just a straight up answer: NO. The NA-73 (Mustang I) maybe. The P-51 (Mustang Ia) not sure.?

Jeff


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## nuuumannn (Jun 23, 2013)

> It has been introduced by the RAF, from spring 1942, named Mustang (later Mustang I). The P-51A was the new model, produced in 1943, equivalent to the RAF's Mustang II, 1st used during the summer of 1943.



The First production Mustangs for the RAF were known as Mustang Is; the first of which flew on 23 April 1941 and the first of which began equipping 26 Sqn at Gatwick from January 1942. The first USAAC/F (The USAAC became the USAAF on June 20th 1941) variant of the Mustang, the P-51, was based on the RAF Mustang IA. The P-51A came after the A-36. Interesting to note that the first USAAC Merlin engined P-51 variants were named XP-78s, later P-51Bs.


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## drgondog (Jun 23, 2013)

Not unless they commandeered all RAF Mk 1


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## Shortround6 (Jun 23, 2013)

As Drgondog says, There were only 138 Mustangs made in 1941 and about another 306 made till the end of April 1942. To get the planes to Midway they have to be accepted (test flown) knocked down and crated for shipment, loaded on a ship, sailed to Hawaii, unloaded, reassembled, test flown and then issued to a unit. Pilots would have zero time in type and mechanics would be reading (hopefully) from the manuals as they attempted their first servicing of the aircraft. 

Any scheme to get Mustangs to Midway would need the RAF planes commandeered 2-3 months before the actual battle which calls for more fore-knowledge than they really had.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 23, 2013)

Guys, I don't understand what P51s could have added to the defense of that island, anyway. Let's just say we had them, there. So what? The Japanese sent 130 planes after that island that were met with 27 fighters and then our anti-aircraft fire, there. What could substituting those fighters with P51s have accomplished? I don't see any different outcome, really.


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## pinsog (Jun 23, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Guys, I don't understand what P51s could have added to the defense of that island, anyway. Let's just say we had them, there. So what? The Japanese sent 130 planes after that island that were met with 27 fighters and then our anti-aircraft fire, there. What could substituting those fighters with P51s have accomplished? I don't see any different outcome, really.



Putting up some kind of reasonable air defence, shooting down some, several, or alot of the incoming attack force without being slaughtered, instead of being slaughtered by the attacking force with only a few kills. Later in the war a small number of Hellcats attacked large formations of Japanese planes and broke up the formations and inflicted significant damage even though greatly outnumbered.

I thought the P51A was the first available Mustang, my mistake. My question should read, could the very first combat capable Mustang have been supplied to Midway in time to take part in the battle.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 23, 2013)

And the answer is no as the first combat capable Mustangs were _OWNED_ by the British, Bought and paid for, not lend lease. At least the first 320, the next 300 are still British but may be lend lease(?) but the first P-51 (aside from the 2 test aircraft) built to a US contract is not delivered until July 1942.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 23, 2013)

pinsog said:


> Putting up some kind of reasonable air defence, shooting down some, several, or alot of the incoming attack force without being slaughtered, instead of being slaughtered by the attacking force with only a few kills. Later in the war a small number of Hellcats attacked large formations of Japanese planes and broke up the formations and inflicted significant damage even though greatly outnumbered.


The Japanese planes enroute to the island were headed off by our fighters just outside the island. They weren't there to have an air conflict but to get to the island. It would have taken a much greater force than just 27 fighters to hold the bulk of those planes off the island.


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## pinsog (Jun 23, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> The Japanese planes enroute to the island were headed off by our fighters just outside the island. They weren't there to have an air conflict but to get to the island. It would have taken a much greater force than just 27 fighters to hold the bulk of those planes off the island.



I think only about 30 of that force were Zero escorts, the rest were dive bombers. Mustangs had the speed to engage the bombers and avoid the fighters. I feel certain that 27 Mustangs or some other fighter of equal performance could have done alot of damage to that incoming raid. I mean come on, anything is better than shooting down 5 planes and losing nearly all the defenders in the first 3 minutes of combat.


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## syscom3 (Jun 23, 2013)

gjs238 said:


> How about P-38's?



P38's had been in production for several months as it was. The available ones were rounded up and shipped to the Aleutians. So yes, P38's could have been flown to thee atoll prior to the battle and given the IJN a nasty reception on June 4th.


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## pinsog (Jun 23, 2013)

syscom3 said:


> P38's had been in production for several months as it was. The available ones were rounded up and shipped to the Aleutians. So yes, P38's could have been flown to thee atoll prior to the battle and given the IJN a nasty reception on June 4th.



Any guess as to how many P38's could have been put there? How many were in the Aleutians?


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## VBF-13 (Jun 23, 2013)

pinsog said:


> I think only about 30 of that force were Zero escorts, the rest were dive bombers. Mustangs had the speed to engage the bombers and avoid the fighters. I feel certain that 27 Mustangs or some other fighter of equal performance could have done alot of damage to that incoming raid. I mean come on, anything is better than shooting down 5 planes and losing nearly all the defenders in the first 3 minutes of combat.


Think of what those fighters were up against. They were outnumbered 4:1. Say they shot down 15 in 1 minute rather than 5 in 3 minutes. That still leaves 115 getting by them. There's no fighter that can shoot down more than one at a time. Say 27 shot down 27. That's still 103 getting by. 

I don't know what you imagine these Mustangs were, but they weren't magic. Different story, again, if it's just an air conflict. When 27 encounter 130, and the 130 are trying to get away, the bulk of them get away, it's as simple as that. That means, regardless, little appreciable difference, that little island is still toast.


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## syscom3 (Jun 23, 2013)

Pisong, according to Shattered Sword; The IJN put up the following forces for the attack on Midway itself.

36 dive bombers
36 level bombers
47 fighters


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## pinsog (Jun 23, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Think of what those fighters were up against. They were outnumbered 4:1. Say they shot down 15 in 1 minute rather than 5 in 3 minutes. That still leaves 115 getting by them. There's no fighter that can shoot down more than one at a time. Say 27 shot down 27. That's still 103 getting by.
> 
> I don't know what you imagine these Mustangs were, but they weren't magic. Different story, again, if it's just an air conflict. When 27 encounter 130, and the 130 are trying to get away, the bulk of them get away, it's as simple as that. That means, regardless, little appreciable difference, that little island is still toast.



Shoot some down, live to fight another day, at least the Mustang gives those poor guys a fighting chance. Either you go down fighting as hard as you can or you roll over and let them kill you. After looking at my copy of "Shattered Sword", the Japanese lost 23% of the attacking force that hit Midway, that includes outright kills by fighters and AA guns and aircraft written off as unflyable/unrepairable that made it back to the carriers. The fighting ability of the defenders of Midway island was not deminished. 


Syscom3 

Thank you. I have that book. Perhaps I should read it again. 

Do you know how many P38's they could have put on the island?


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## altsym (Jun 23, 2013)

Where exactly are these Allison powered P-51's taking off from?


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## pinsog (Jun 23, 2013)

altsym said:


> Where exactly are these Allison powered P-51's taking off from?



My question was could the Marine fighters on Midway be replaced by early P51's if everything was correct in the timeline. So they would be flying from Midway.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 24, 2013)

Maybe US marines are better than the RAF but the RAF got their first Mustangs delivered, by ship, in Oct/Nov of 1941, Flight tests are done in Jan, April sees the first issue to a combat squadron ( #2) and May 10th sees the first combat operation, an air field raid in coastal France. 
You are going to need several months notice to acquire the Mustangs from the British, and either train teh Marines to US them stateside and then ship the unit to Midway or ship the planes to Midway and train the units there. How long did the US KNOW that Midway was the target?


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## syscom3 (Jun 24, 2013)

pinsog said:


> Do you know how many P38's they could have put on the island?



I have to look through my P38 book, but it would be reasonable to say a group could get there in short order. Maybe with a couple months notice, two groups if all P38's in the US were sent to Hawaii.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 24, 2013)

Pinsog, my point was, Mustangs couldn't have held off that incoming wave. And, let's give some credit to these Zekes. They weren't exactly easy to tangle with. 

On your ultimate question, I of course don't know.


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## syscom3 (Jun 24, 2013)

Shortround; Midway was within extreme ferry range for P40's. The early Mustangs would have been able to fly there from Oahu.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 24, 2013)

Folks – just an observation here….

Midway emerged as a very "fluid" battle and as the old saying goes "you go with what you got." Look where some of the resources were by the time US and Japanese forces were lining up and how much time was available to prepare. For P-51As to be in place at Midway, the stars and planets would have had to line up perfectly. Unless there was a reason; and there was no reason historically (in retrospect) to believe that anyone anywhere would have had the inclination to have either P-51As (as they were possible rolling off the assembly line at Englewood) or for that matter P-38s in place at Midway.

Now not trying to totally rain on this parade, let's supposed that either aircraft made Midway in quantity; you still had green crews positioned at the tip of the spear without any defined tactics. If you look at VMF-221s mauling at Midway, aside from having inferior machines, these guys tried to flight the Zero on its own terms and paid the price for it. When the P-38 actually reached the South Pacific, there was at least a good one month period (November/ December 1942) before P-38s were sent out in combat and even then, most of the folks flying them already had experience flying against the Japanese in the P-39 and P-40. That month training along with experienced pilots evolved into a pretty potent force that started exterminating the JAAF in the air over New Guinea.

P-51As or P-38s IMO would not have made much of an impact except if they were able to supplement in quantity the obsolete aircraft that were stationed at Midway, and even then IMO it’s questionable that either aircraft would have been operated in a capacity that assured combat effectiveness unless some of these hypothetical pilots would have had a week or two with Cmdr Thach prior to the battle!


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## pinsog (Jun 24, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Folks – just an observation here….
> 
> Midway emerged as a very "fluid" battle and as the old saying goes "you go with what you got." Look where some of the resources were by the time US and Japanese forces were lining up and how much time was available to prepare. For P-51As to be in place at Midway, the stars and planets would have had to line up perfectly. Unless there was a reason; and there was no reason historically (in retrospect) to believe that anyone anywhere would have had the inclination to have either P-51As (as they were possible rolling off the assembly line at Englewood) or for that matter P-38s in place at Midway.
> 
> ...



Your not raining on my parade, if I knew all the answers I wouldn't be asking any questions. I feel the question in this debate has been answered. Very good points FLYBOYJ about the green pilots lack of good tactics. A Spitfire or P51 trying to dogfight with a Zero is just as dead as a Buffalo.


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## stug3 (Jun 24, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Maybe US marines are better than the RAF but the RAF got their first Mustangs delivered, by ship, in Oct/Nov of 1941, Flight tests are done in Jan, April sees the first issue to a combat squadron ( #2) and May 10th sees the first combat operation, an air field raid in coastal France.
> You are going to need several months notice to acquire the Mustangs from the British, and either train teh Marines to US them stateside and then ship the unit to Midway or ship the planes to Midway and train the units there. How long did the US KNOW that Midway was the target?




No self respecting U.S. Marine would be caught dead in an Army fighter.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 24, 2013)

But in May/June of 1942 they would be British fighters, not Army


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## gjs238 (Jun 25, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> <SNIP> and even then IMO it’s questionable that either aircraft would have been operated in a capacity that assured combat effectiveness unless some of these hypothetical pilots would have had a week or two with Cmdr Thach prior to the battle!



Or Claire Chennault ?


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## Conslaw (Jun 25, 2013)

Pinsog, I am going to at least partially agree with your premise, that IF early P-51s were present at Midway, they could have made an impact, even in limited numbers, and even with poorly trained pilots. The actual Marine pilots at Midway were pretty green at the time of the battle, but some turned into first class pilots. Midway was the combat debut of Marion Carl, for example. The natural characteristics of the P-51 would have lead to more survivable tactics against a superior number of first-team piloted Zeros. The P-51 was an energy fighter. The P-51s could boom zoom through the Japanese formation, presenting only fleeting targets to the Zeros. Even if there were four dozen A6M going against 2 dozen P-51, they had a chance at doing disproportionate damage as long as they didn't get into a low-speed turning fight with the escorts. A couple years later, during the American Pacific offensive, it wasn't uncommon for Navy Hellcats to attack larger formations of Japanese planes, usually with great success. Of course by then, US pilots had two more years of tactical lessons and most of the first team of Japanese aviators were gone. Under 20,000 feet, the early P-51 performed at least as well as the F6F except in turn rate. 

I'm hedging a bit with my agreement, because even though the potential for a successful interception was there, in general the lack of experience at all levels for the Midway air defense made the entire effort one marked by underachievement. The P-51s could have underachieved as well.


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## drgondog (Jun 26, 2013)

I believe June 1942 too ambitious to deploy trained P-51A/Mk I squadron to Midway. Not even discussed is the Intelligence alert to Midway invasion by Japanese via Magic that would initiate a mobilization order to any so equipped P-51 squadron, get them to Los Angeles harbor (or San Diego), load them up and set sail, offload at Oahu/Pearl, get them ready to fly - and re-deploy to Midway.. and make Japanese spies at Pearl wonder why such a new airplane would be deployed HERE?

US Intelligence wouldn't risk THAT for any small tactical advantage the 51 might make.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 26, 2013)

drgondog said:


> I believe June 1942 too ambitious to deploy trained P-51A/Mk I squadron to Midway. Not even discussed is the Intelligence alert to Midway invasion by Japanese via Magic that would initiate a mobilization order to any so equipped P-51 squadron, get them to Los Angeles harbor (or San Diego), load them up and set sail, offload at Oahu/Pearl, get them ready to fly - and re-deploy to Midway.. and make Japanese spies at Pearl wonder why such a new airplane would be deployed HERE?
> 
> US Intelligence wouldn't risk THAT for any small tactical advantage the 51 might make.


That's an interesting point. You're saying even if it were possible to throw together some kind of squadron, that rather extreme deployment may have tipped off our hand. I believe we did beef up that island, somewhat, but not to an extreme like that, that would draw that kind of attention.


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## syscom3 (Jun 26, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> That's an interesting point. You're saying even if it were possible to throw together some kind of squadron, that rather extreme deployment may have tipped off our hand. I believe we did beef up that island, somewhat, but not to an extreme like that, that would draw that kind of attention.



Correct. we were already beefing up the island with an assortment of aircraft. Why would they deduce their codes had been broken due to the appearance of several fighters?

As for small tactical advantage? A few P51's, P40's, P39's or P38's ripping through the best carrier bomber pilots in the world would be of immense tactical advantage.


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## tyrodtom (Jun 26, 2013)

The Marine pilots may have been green when it comes to combat experience, but were they low in flight experience too?
Did they have very little time in their Wildcats and Buffaloes ?

If they had some experience in the aircraft they flew, it seems you'd remove the one advantage they might have had if you put them in new aircraft, that they haven't had the chance to become comfortable in.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 26, 2013)

Syscom3, I hear you. But suddenly getting Air Force P51s in there would be a little out of the normal course, and that's why I believe his point may have some merit.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 26, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> The Marine pilots may have been green when it comes to combat experience, but were they low in flight experience too?
> Did they have very little time in their Wildcats and Buffaloes ?
> 
> If they had some experience in the aircraft they flew, it seems you'd remove the one advantage they might have had if you put them in new aircraft, that they haven't had the chance to become comfortable in.


Many of VMF-221s pilots were just out of primary combat training.

"Leadership of the squadron was passed to Major Floyd B. Parks, with Kimes taking command of Marine Air Group 22. Much has been written of the inferiority of the Brewster fighter, particularly with regard to the Midway engagement. Many of Parks' pilots, fresh from flight training Stateside, had very little operational experience. This fact, combined with the overwhelming size and disposition of the Japanese force posed against the atoll's defenses, would have more bearing on the outcome than the operational capabilities of the F2A."

VMF-221 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://www.warbirdforum.com/midwayx.htm


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 26, 2013)

syscom3 said:


> As for small tactical advantage? A few P51's, P40's, P39's or P38's ripping through the best carrier bomber pilots in the world would be of immense tactical advantage.


Providing you were able to get those aircraft rounded up and in place at the right time. Look at the time line when the US discovered the Japanese were attacking Midway, how long it took to reinformce the island, and what resources were made available.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 26, 2013)

Look at it this way, too. Our carriers were some 200 miles North of Midway when they launched at that Striking Force. Those carriers could very well have been parked right off Midway, had we wanted them there. Splitting them from Midway only goes to show how concerned we were about preserving that element of surprise.


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## Conslaw (Jun 26, 2013)

They were able to rush partial B-26 and TBF units to Midway. In both cases there were untried aircraft and partially trained aircrew. It's not out of the sphere of possibility that the Air Force might have wanted to try out the P-51. I recall seeing a picture of an early USAF P-51 (with 4x 20mmcannon) purporting to be taken during the Carolina war games from 10/1941 to 12/1941. Another new plane that participated in the Carolina games was the A-20 Havoc. If I were defending Midway, I would have rather had 20 A-20s than any other aircraft.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 26, 2013)

I don't believe the air defense of Midway was the critical issue here. With oir without F2As, P-40's/P-39s (of which there were evidently plenty in Hawaii), P-38s or P-51s. Midway was still going to be there with its pot holes filled on the return of its aircraft.

Had the F2A-3s on hand been used to escort the strike group, I expect more of both green aircrew and obsolescent aircraft would have survived. They might even have scored a few hits and provided a high altitude smoke plume for CV-Based boys to home in on... With more of both aircrew and aircraft viable at noon. The main purpose of the raid (destroying the aerial offensive capability of Midway island) would have been defeated. JMO...


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## Shortround6 (Jun 26, 2013)

Conslaw said:


> They were able to rush partial B-26 and TBF units to Midway. In both cases there were untried aircraft and partially trained aircrew. It's not out of the sphere of possibility that the Air Force might have wanted to try out the P-51. I recall seeing a picture of an early USAF P-51 (with 4x 20mmcannon) purporting to be taken during the Carolina war games from 10/1941 to 12/1941. Another new plane that participated in the Carolina games was the A-20 Havoc. If I were defending Midway, I would have rather had 20 A-20s than any other aircraft.



Somebody screwed up the caption for the P-51. The ones with the 20mm cannon were the Mustang IAs or P-51s and they weren't ordered until July of 1941 and the first one delivered in July of 1942, First test flight was April 29 1942.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 26, 2013)

Conslaw said:


> They were able to rush partial B-26 and TBF units to Midway. In both cases there were untried aircraft and partially trained aircrew.


Because they were available....

_"Eight B-17E Flying Fortresses of the 431st Bombardment Squadron (11th Bombardment Group) were deployed to Midway on 29 May 1942 and were joined by nine more the next day from the 42d Bombardment Squadron along with five B-26 Marauders (three from the 19th Bombardment Squadron (22d Bombardment Group) that were in Hawaii and two from the 69th Bombardment Squadron (38th Bombardment Group)). The Marauders were equipped to drop torpedoes and were under the command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific. In addition, B-17Es of the 3d and 72d Bombardment Squadrons (5th Bombardment Group) were sent to Midway in preparation for the battle."_


Henderson Field (Midway) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia




Conslaw said:


> It's not out of the sphere of possibility that the Air Force might have wanted to try out the P-51. I recall seeing a picture of an early USAF P-51 (with 4x 20mmcannon) purporting to be taken during the Carolina war games from 10/1941 to 12/1941.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_P-51_variants#P-51.2FMustang_IA_.28NA-91.29

_On *16 April 1942*, Fighter Project Officer Benjamin S. Kelsey ordered 500 A-36 Apaches, a redesign that included six .50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns, dive brakes, and the ability to carry two 500 lb (230 kg) bombs. Kelsey would rather have bought more fighters but was willing instead to initiate a higher level of Mustang production at North American by using USAAC funds earmarked for ground-attack aircraft when pursuit aircraft funding had already been allocated

*On 23 June 1942*, a contract was placed for 1,200 P-51As (NA-99s). _

more on this....

_Since appropriations were available for an attack aircraft, Echols specified modifications to the P-51 to turn it into a dive bomber. The contract for 500 A-36A aircraft fitted with bomb racks, dive brakes, and heavier-duty wing, was signed by Kelsey on 16 April 1942,[6] even before *the first flight of the first production P-51 in May 1942*._North American A-36 Apache - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Look at the dates of when contracts were signed and then the first flights took place. Midway started to erupt on June 5, 1942. Even if someone, somewhere wanted P-51s at Midway, they just weren't available, any other thought of this would just be the makings of a good fiction book....


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 26, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> _*Midway started to erupt on June 5, 1942*_. Even if someone, somewhere wanted P-51s at Midway, they just weren't available, any other thought of this would just be the makings of a good fiction book....



Minor detail correction that does not invalidate your point in the least... In fact accentuates it. Battle fought from June 3 (starting with PBY attack on Akebono Maru) to about June 7th, with final preparations for battle (plane reinforcements, Rapid repair ( changes to air wing composition) of Yorktown beginning around May 27th if I recall. They fought with what they had immediately available, not what could be delivered in a month's or even a few weeks time.


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## drgondog (Jun 26, 2013)

Conslaw said:


> They were able to rush partial B-26 and TBF units to Midway. In both cases there were untried aircraft and partially trained aircrew. It's not out of the sphere of possibility that the Air Force might have wanted to try out the P-51. I recall seeing a picture of an early USAF P-51 (with 4x 20mmcannon) purporting to be taken during the Carolina war games from 10/1941 to 12/1941. Another new plane that participated in the Carolina games was the A-20 Havoc. If I were defending Midway, I would have rather had 20 A-20s than any other aircraft.



The P-51 sent to Wright Patterson in very late 1941 languished at Wright Pat, unflown, until ~ April 1942.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jun 26, 2013)

At low altitudes (Below about 15,000 feet), the P-51A was the fastest version of the Mustang until the P-51H came along.
Problem is that Maximum Speed is usually quoted at 25,000 feet and the Mustang Mk.II made its best speed 409 mph at about 12,000 feet.
Another problem is that there were only about 300 of them ever built.

It is one of my favourites.
- Ivan.


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## glennasher (Jun 30, 2013)

What warps my mind is that the Mustang sat around Wright Patterson for FOUR months before someone got in it and flew it. Surely some pilot walking down the flight line saw it sitting there and begged someone to let him fly the thing. It had to generate a LOT of interest sitting there. NO pilot sees what appears to be a fast little plane sitting around and doesn't want to get in it and see what it does.
Yes, I know the Army had it's priorities, and that flight-testing had to be done to iron out bugs and see what makes them tick, etc., etc. but surely someone had to know they had a lot of potential sitting there. I know the Army was really busy at the time, but it HAD to have had pilots drooling to fly it.


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## Conslaw (Jun 30, 2013)

The first truly combat-ready P-38s were the F models. Per America's Hundred Thousand, production of -F models started February 1942 and deliveries began March 1942. The first E models sent to the Pacific Theater were sent to Elmendorf, Alaska May 29, 1942. Using just a little bit of imagination, those Alaska-bound aircraft could have been diverted to Midway. I'm sure other folks will have opinions about whether those -E models were ready for combat or not. It seems to me that the Air Force did not bust their buns to try to get the Es into combat, so it seems like the folks in charge didn't think they were ready. I think if the -E would have confined their tactics to "boom and zoom" they might have been okay. If they would have tried to dogfight, it wouldn't have been pretty. In the big picture, defense of Anchorage, Alaska was probably more important than defense of Midway Island.


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## Aozora (Jul 1, 2013)

glennasher said:


> What warps my mind is that the Mustang sat around Wright Patterson for FOUR months before someone got in it and flew it. Surely some pilot walking down the flight line saw it sitting there and begged someone to let him fly the thing. It had to generate a LOT of interest sitting there. NO pilot sees what appears to be a fast little plane sitting around and doesn't want to get in it and see what it does.
> Yes, I know the Army had it's priorities, and that flight-testing had to be done to iron out bugs and see what makes them tick, etc., etc. but surely someone had to know they had a lot of potential sitting there. I know the Army was really busy at the time, but it HAD to have had pilots drooling to fly it.


 
With 20/20 hindsight and 70 years knowing how effective the P-51s turned out to be.

However, in late 1941-early 1942 things would have been very different. For one thing the Mustangs would have looked like just another pursuit plane, not much different to the P-40; they might have received some second looks, but chances are no-one would have given them much thought. The USAAC/USAAF was still relatively small and was only just changing from a peacetime basis to a war footing. Priority would have been given to testing and approving bombers and attack aircraft. Long story short, Wright was probably short-staffed with a very long list of things to do. Like it or not testing another pursuit plane, when the P-40 was only just establishing itself, and the P-38 was still a work-in-progress, would have been down the pecking order. As it was the RAF's first Mustang Is were delivered to an operational unit in February 1942 and flew their first operations in July, so even if the Mustangs at Wright had been given top priority there's no way P-51s, let alone P-51As could have been operational with the USAAF or any other American unit until well after Midway.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 1, 2013)

Conslaw said:


> The first truly combat-ready P-38s were the F models. Per America's Hundred Thousand, production of -F models started February 1942 and deliveries began March 1942. The first E models sent to the Pacific Theater were sent to Elmendorf, Alaska May 29, 1942. Using just a little bit of imagination, those Alaska-bound aircraft could have been diverted to Midway.




I think people are a little too used to modern deployments. 

Also using AHT, it took the 1st Pursuit group, the only fully equipped P-38 group at the time, From Dec 8th ( initial elements arrive) until Dec 22 (movement complete) to from Selfridge Field ( just outside Detroit Michigan) to San Diego, California, Just under 2000 air miles. Ground elements of the group, (mechanics, cooks, support personnel, parts equipment) much more likely than not moved by train. The Air Corp NOT having a large number of big transport planes at the time. 

ANY over seas deployment is going to take weeks (a lot more than 2) if not months to put into effect. Even if you can fly the P-38s using 75 gallon drop tanks the rest of the squadron/group is going to be traveling by ship ( even to Alaska).

To put any sort of Army fighters (or other aircraft) onto Midway that are not already in Hawaii in April/May of 1942 is going to _require_ the US have several MONTHS fore knowledge of the Japanese plans.

The American code breakers confirmed Midway was the Target on May 21 or 22.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 1, 2013)

Conslaw said:


> The first E models sent to the Pacific Theater were sent to Elmendorf, Alaska May 29, 1942.





Shortround6 said:


> The American code breakers confirmed Midway was the Target on May 21 or 22.



25 P-38 were sent to Alaska, remember there was a diversonary attack against Alaska. Moving resources from Alaska might have given the Japanese suspicions or even tipped the American's upper hand.


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## bobbysocks (Jul 1, 2013)

i think you would have been better off with A36s than 51As. you could harass and bomb the fleeing japanese fleet for a few more hundred miles where they thought they were home free. but i dont think the 36s were even off the assembly line until later that fall.


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## davparlr (Jul 3, 2013)

P-51s could have been deployed to Midway for the battle and could have been effective and so too the B-26s *IF*


US emphasized PTO
AAF recognized the potential of the P-51
Post Dec. 7, '41, P-51s diverted from delivery to England to the Philippines, re-diverted to Hawaii.
1st AVG reassigned to Hawaii. Claire Chennault in command of P-51 deployment and training. Only experienced AAF and Navy/Marine pilots assigned P-51s.
Predisposition 40 P-51 to Midway, end of April. 
Divert 20-30 B-26s to Hawaii and convert to torpedo capable. Man with Navy torpedo trained pilot (or train them) and AAF pilot. No need to predispostion. Deploy after Midway identified as target
Have torpedoes that work.

With a cover of 20 P-51s to harass the zeros, the 20 B-26s along with the Midway TBFs and SBDs (three out of the four B-26s at Midway, with no escorts, got close enough to launch torpedoes) could have put a world of hurt on the Japanese strike fleet.

Lotta incredible lfs and we won the battle anyway.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 3, 2013)

davparlr said:


> P-51s could have been deployed to Midway for the battle and could have been effective and so too the B-26s *IF*
> 
> 
> AAF recognized the potential of the P-51




That's the biggest of of this "IF" scenerio


davparlr said:


> [*]Post Dec. 7, '41, P-51s diverted from delivery to England to the Philippines, re-diverted to Hawaii.


I believe there were about 55 Mustang Is at the factory built to British specs, the US did divert that batch, all were fitted with .50 cals (4)


davparlr said:


> [*]Predisposition 40 P-51 to Midway, end of April.


No one knew for sure Midway was the target then


davparlr said:


> Lotta incredible lfs and we won the battle anyway.


Yep! I just had to poke holes in a few of them though!


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## davparlr (Jul 3, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> That's the biggest of of this "IF" scenerio
> 
> I believe there were about 55 Mustang Is at the factory built to British specs, the US did divert that batch, all were fitted with .50 cals (4)



And that is the reason for the first "if". If the US government felt that Japan was a higher threat to attack the US, which it was, than Germany was, and considered the defense of Hawaii as a priority, then diverting the British order to Hawaii would make sense. Also, the second "if", recognizing the value of the P-51, must happen also.



> No one knew for sure Midway was the target then



If PTO is emphasized then shipping these to Hawaii ASAP would make sense in that they would be available for defense of Hawaii or support other PTO efforts such as Midway, or Guadalcanal. Same with the 1st AVG. interestingly, the P-51 ferry range is just about 50 miles short of the distance to Midway from Hawaii. They had no drop tank capability. Therefore they would have to be repositioned by ship beforehand. 



> Yep! I just had to poke holes in a few of them though!



I don't mind the pokes. Makes me think.


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## bobbysocks (Jul 3, 2013)

werent the avg's first group of p-40s supposed to go to the uk but got redirected?


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## Shortround6 (Jul 3, 2013)

I am not sure about "redirected".

A lot of the British planes being _delivered_ in 1941/early 1942 had been _ORDERED_ by the British *PRE Lend-Lease.* The Americans had very little say in redirecting these aircraft. What could be done was 'relinquish' a batch of planes to be replaced by a batch from future production. This depended on how badly the British needed the aircraft at the time. In the Summer of 1941 the BoB was well over with and the pointy nose P-40s were not what the British wanted for _fighter_ planes. Giving up 100 of the pointy nose aircraft for 100 "E"s to be delivered a few months later wasn't a big deal. The British did NOT give up the engines though. The Engines for the Chinese (AVG) planes had to be obtained separately. 

The Mustangs being delivered for most of the Spring of 1942 were the original two batches of planes which the British ordered BEFORE lend-lease. ONLY 2 planes were to be handed over to the USAAF. 
Without the British agreeing to a deal of some sort the US would find itself in opening a real can of worms trying to redirect British owned aircraft.


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## gjs238 (Jul 4, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Without the British agreeing to a deal of some sort the US would find itself in opening a real can of worms trying to redirect British owned aircraft.



Are we talking about sailing up the Potomac and burning Washington?


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## davparlr (Jul 4, 2013)

We could always trade them some AIM 9Ls to be provided at some future date!


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## Shortround6 (Jul 4, 2013)

gjs238 said:


> Are we talking about sailing up the Potomac and burning Washington?



Stealing planes that the British paid for with the last of their actual cash/gold is hardly going to foster future co-operation. 

Like equipping two US fighter groups with Spitfires and keeping them equipped for just under two years to the tune of almost 600 Spitfires supplied. Or the provision of Beaufighter and mosquito night fighters to US units. Provision of 100/150 octane fuel. 

The British agreeing to a deal is one thing, just taking aircraft (or any other equipment) that are on US soil because the US _thinks_ it's needs are greater without taking into consideration British needs or plans is hardly to the way to forge an alliance.


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## davparlr (Jul 4, 2013)

I tend to think that after all Roosevelt did to manipulate US emotions to provide vital assets to England before US involvement in the war, Churchill would be quite compliant to a Roosevelt request for support.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2013)

How compliant?

The US had already "requisitioned" almost 200 P-39s (P-400s) that the British had paid cash for (British had ordered 675 P-39s for cash almost 11 months before lend-lease was signed). British had another 150 ordered lend-lease. Either gave them to the Russians or relinquished claims on production. 

In April 1940, the Anglo-French Purchasing Committee ordered 667 P-38 fighters. The British took over the entire order. "...the original contract was amended to provide for the delivery of 143 Lightning Is (British military serials AE978/999 and AF100/220) with the originally-specified V-1710-15 un-turbosupercharged engines, with the remaining 524 aircraft (serials AF221/AF744) to be delivered as Lightning IIs (Model 322-60-04) with turbosupercharged V-1710-F5L and -F5R engines."

"The remaining 140 Lightning Is of the British contract were completed by Lockheed and were taken over by the USA and designated P-322"

"Twenty-eight other British-ordered aircraft were completed as P-38F-13-LO for the USAAF, 121 as P-38F-15-LO, 174 as P-38G-13-LO, and 200 as P-38G-15-LO."

Granted these two aircraft did not come up to British expectations But it seems the British were willing to help the US to some extent by giving up aircraft (or places in the production queue) they didn't want/need. Not sure what happened to the money. 

There was quite a bit of swapping around deliveries of lend-lease aircraft but then the British hadn't actually paid for those. 

Swiping their Mustangs may have been going a bit too far. And to do any real good at Midway they would have had to have been swiped in Feb-March in order for training to happen, both for pilots and mechanics, and for the deployment on the squadrons/group.


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## tomo pauk (Jul 5, 2013)

Hi, SR6,

Could you please provide some further info about British Lightning II? Never delivered to them? Plus, seems like the claim that USA was unwilling to sell turboed engines is proven as a myth?


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2013)

Tomo, Please see:

Lightning I for RAF

In spring/summer of 1940 the US may have been unwilling to sell the turbochargers ( or simply unable to supply the needed amount)but apparently by the summer of 1941 things had changed. Of course actually _Delivery _ might not have occurred until 1942 or 43. 
On Page 137 of AHT there is a chart of Lighting orders. Model number 322-60-19 is listed as an export model and British 524 aircraft "canceled". 1 plane "delivered" April 1942.

How production was to be divided up I have no idea but obviously the US got _some_ benefit from the British order, long lead items, allocation of materials, expanded work force etc. In Oct of 1940 Lockheed held orders for 1000 Lightnings (including British) but had delivered only 80.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 6, 2013)

What I think we need to do here is get a grip on things. Supposing they were available. So what? Do we really think subbing them for our F4Fs would have held off that incoming wave to Midway? They hit that wave, they'd have been running like rats. Even if they'd have stuck, they'd have been shot down to the last plane, and the bulk of that wave would have got through. Simply put, they wouldn't have saved that island. Neither would they have been of any use to us against those carriers.


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## davparlr (Jul 6, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> How compliant?
> 
> 
> Swiping their Mustangs may have been going a bit too far. And to do any real good at Midway they would have had to have been swiped in Feb-March in order for training to happen, both for pilots and mechanics, and for the deployment on the squadrons/group.


 
Yes. I would assume the decision to prioritize defending the PTO would have happened not long after Pearl Harbor.

I didn't say it would be easy. I said all the "ifs" were incredible, meaning not believable to happen.



VBF-13 said:


> What I think we need to do here is get a grip on things. Supposing they were available. So what? Do we really think subbing them for our F4Fs would have held off that incoming wave to Midway? They hit that wave, they'd have been running like rats. Even if they'd have stuck, they'd have been shot down to the last plane, and the bulk of that wave would have got through. Simply put, they wouldn't have saved that island. Neither would they have been of any use to us against those carriers.



The P-51 is *60 MPH* faster than the Zero, and the F4F, from SL to 15k and is a better climber than the F4F, 40 mph faster at 20k. The Zero is difficult to turn above 250 mph. All the 1st AVG pilots, who would think they were in hog heaven being in a P-51, would have to do is keep their speed up, which they know to do thanks to Chennault who would have taught them that, as they attacked the bombers. The Zeros could not catch them nor turn with them as they cut up the bombers, as they actually demonstrated in China, although not against Zeros, but against similar performing Army fighters.


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## pinsog (Jul 6, 2013)

The P-51 is *60 MPH* faster than the Zero, and the F4F, from SL to 15k and is a better climber than the F4F, 40 mph faster at 20k. The Zero is difficult to turn above 250 mph. All the 1st AVG pilots, who would think they were in hog heaven being in a P-51, would have to do is keep their speed up, which they know to do thanks to Chennault who would have taught them that, as they attacked the bombers. The Zeros could not catch them nor turn with them as they cut up the bombers, as they actually demonstrated in China, although not against Zeros, but against similar performing Army fighters.[/QUOTE]

I believe this hit the nail on the head.

You don't have to shoot down the entire raid to be successful. You could shoot down a few and break up the raid, or ruin their accuracy, harrass them. Plus, even if you only shoot down a few, every one you shoot down is one less that will be back to bomb Midway or attack a US carrier or defend a Japanese carrier. Attrition and lack of resupply is huge in carrier warfare. A carrier that is low or out of aircraft is a moot point.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 9, 2013)

The F4Fs weren't as helpless against the A6Ms as historians perhaps who have but a speaking acquaintanceship with same would have us believe. Still, I want to be in a P51, too, there's no question. But that island was a goner, P51s or no P51s. The P51s could engage strengths the F4Fs didn't have. Conceded. In the final analysis, though, that outcome would have been just the same.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 9, 2013)

From Wiki;
_
"In all, 7,860 Wildcats were built. During the course of the war, Navy and Marine F4Fs and FMs flew 15,553 combat sorties (14,027 of these from aircraft carriers), *destroying 1,327 enemy aircraft at a cost of 178 aerial losses,* 24 to ground/shipboard fire, and 49 to operational causes (an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 6.9:1)."_


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## GregP (Jul 9, 2013)

According to the US Navy WWII Summary Report dated 1946:

Wildcats flew 15,553 action sorties, lost 86 to AAA, 191 to enemy aircraft, and 125 oeprational losses on action sorties for a total of 402 losses on action sorties. 

Meanwhile they lost 395 on other flights, 139 on ships or on the ground, and 534 on non-action sorties for a total of 936 lost not on action sorties.

They destroyed 612 enemy bombers and 715 enemy fighters for a total of 1,327 aerial victories and dropped 154 tons of bombs.

That gives a kill to loss ratio of 6.9 : 1 for air-to-air losses to enemy aircraft and kill to loss ratio of 3.3 : 1 for all combat losses including enemy aircrft, AAA, and action sortie operational losses. Most people, regardless of nationality, stick with the kill to loss ratio for enemy aircraft only. While I happen to have the numbers for the US Navy and USAAF, I do NOT have the same numbers for the British, German, Japanese, Italians, Soviets, or anyone else.

For combat losses, I tend to stay with action sortie numbers only, while the overall losses figure into aggregate ratios including combat, training, operations, losses on ship that sunk on destroyed on the ground in attacks, and losses while being ferried into a or out of a combat theater of operations.

If you add in ALL the losses, including non-action sorties losses, training, etc., you'd get 1,327 victories and 1,338 total losses for an overall kill to loss ratio of 0.992. 

Of course, if you figure it that way the Ta-152 had 7 victories and 4 losses in combat, but only two were flyable when the war ended out of 43 delivered. So you have 7 kill and 41 total losses to all causes including mechanical failure for an overall kill to loss ration of 0.171, making the Wildcat about 5.8 times better than the vaunted Ta-152 overall. Interestingly the data for victories and losses is at least somewhat available for the Ta-152 but I have never seen data on Ta-152 operational losses, other than a mention in a couple of books that only two Ta-152C's were left flyable when the war ended in Europe. 

Since it is somewhat ludicrous to suppose the Ta-152 was about 1/6 as effective as a Wildcat, I submit that the kill ratios be confined to either losses against enemy aircraft only or losses on combat action sorties only as a means for a fair comparison. Now if we could only get these data for Axis and Soviet operations!

However you decide to put it, the F4F wasn't a bad little fighter and was a tough customer for it's opponents to shoot down, but apparently had its own weaknesses operationally, as did ALL the WWII fighters. Normal operations took a toll on ALL war equipment including rifles, ships, tanks, etc. 

Go buy a family car today and drive it for 4 years; I bet you'd have a few failures to deal with, too. And that isn't even CLOSE to combat. To make it closer to combat, assume there are no roads and you have to cross streams, sand, and rocky fields with your family car. Now how many failures would you think in 4 years? 

So operations are not "easy" on equipment ... just easier on equipment than combat.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 9, 2013)

GregP said:


> Go buy a family car today and drive it for 4 years; I bet you'd have a few failures to deal with, too. And that isn't even CLOSE to combat.


Hey, Greg, I must respectfully disagree. You've never driven with my 17-year-old nephew in the driver's seat.


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## GregP (Jul 9, 2013)

Hah! 

No I haven't, maybe that IS close to combat ...


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## bobbysocks (Jul 10, 2013)

that is why most fighters were "war weary" after only 300 hours of flight. my wife did drive her car for over 4 years and only replaced wiper blades a couple of times. an off road atv or dirt bike might be a better comparison....they take a good honest beating.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 10, 2013)

GregP said:


> If you add in ALL the losses, including non-action sorties losses, training, etc., you'd get 1,327 victories and 1,338 total losses for an overall kill to loss ratio of 0.992.


Non-combat related accidents (including training) is known as attrition and is not included in the overall combat record of an aircraft, at least in today's military bean counting world, I strongly suspect it was similar if not the same during WW2.


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## GregP (Jul 10, 2013)

Attrition huh? I like that word and think it should definitely not be counted in combat statistics.

Now whether or not to include losses to AAA or operational losses while on action sorties is another matter. I wouldn't argue too hard about including or not including either in combat statistics, but we probably SHOULD arrive at a preferred method ... as soon as data other than US data appear broken out into the various categories. At that time, maybe we could agree on the best method for comparison. Until we have something to compare the US data with, though, the question is probably moot. 

I'm still digging.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 10, 2013)

GregP said:


> Attrition huh? I like that word


That word is even used when weather or maintenance prevents a mission from being flown.


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## GregP (Jul 10, 2013)

At least we don't have a lot of people who want to include attrition in the victory to loss ratio.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 10, 2013)

GregP said:


> At least we don't have a lot of people who want to include attrition in the victory to loss ratio.


Don't give bean counters any ideas!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 11, 2013)

I'll introduce some heresy into the discussion. I doubt the P-51/Mustang would have done any better than the 'obsolete' F2A-3's everyone seems so anxious to dump into the ocean to make room for a 'real non-obsolescent fighter'. First let's consider the mission. The F2A-3s, for better or worse, were committed to act as interceptors. I submit that speed is one of the least useful attributes of an interceptor. In order of importance I'd list 

1. *Rate of climb*: I can't say it any better than Bedford Forrest: "get thar fustus with the mostest" Not fastest, just fustest. How long does it take the Mustang I to climb to the enemy aircraft altitude before it can accelerate to its speed advantage? I believe the F2A-3 and Mustang had very similar to nearly the same rate of climb to the altitude of the engagement. Above that altitude, advantage F2A-3. Shocking, I know but the lighter weight F2A-3 had a single stage, 2 speed supercharged Wright 1830 radial engine of 1,200 SL hp. The Mustang/P-51 was laboring with an Allison 1710-39 engine of 1,150 SL hp with a single stage, ONE-speed supercharger. 
2. *Ceiling*: This is not a critical factor at Midway since the combat was fought at intermediate altitude (I think about 20,000 '), but in general you want to get an interceptor high so it can quickly convert that potential energy into kinetic when it sees the enemy, but the tendency would be to maintain the climb as long as possible until you have to engage. 
3. *Acceleration*: Once you've engaged in a first pass, the interceptor is going to find itself in a fur ball when the enemy escorts jump you. If you've built up speed so much the better, but I suspect that may be problematic in an interception. What you need before speed is to get to max speed quickly. The Mustang (2 cannon version) is about 1,000 lbs heavier than an F2A-3 (the 4 cannon mustang is nearer 1,500 lbs) with a similar powered engine. Simple physics says the same force applied to a smaller mass will accelerate it faster. I admit that the F2A's higher drag limits this advantage and its ultimate speed. But in the pinch, I suspect the P-51 is going to be bit slower off the mark. Not a good thing vs the IJN Vet piloted A6M.
4. *Maneuverability*: I expect the F2A may have held an edge over the Mustang but they were both at a disadvantage compared to the A6M. 

I see raw speed as having relatively less importance in an interception than these other attributes. Consider that the worst raw-performing fighter (and oddly the most successful) flown at the Battle of Midway was not the F2A-3 but rather the F4F-4 but it turned out to be a superb interceptor at Guadalcanal as well as a solid bar-room-brawl fighter. The Fairey Fulmar was no speed demon but it was a decent interceptor in the circumstance. I submit (and I believe the limited data suggests) that the few marine F4F-3s were probably better interceptors than the F2A, F4F-4 and probably even the P-51/Mustang. If you are going to exchange F2A-3s for an aircraft, I'd suggest replacing them with more F4F-3s. There was a recently deposited supply at Pearl Harbor that had been tapped for the 7 Wildcats sent aboard the _Kitty Hawk_ to reinforce Midway. If the _Kitty Hawk_ could have carried more aircraft, I expect it would have been F4F-3s. 

On its return from Coral Sea, I believe the Yorktown had about 12-15 flyable F4F-3 on board when it entered Pearl Harbor on May 27. That would have taken a herculean effort to get them to Midway by June 3. Beyond that, I imagine many of the F4F-3 turned over to the USMC VMF units went to Samoa and other islands in the Pacific, so perhaps the 7 actually sent were all that were immediately available. Kitty Hawk departed Midway on the 29th arriving PH on June 1. It was only a two day trip (Ooops.. miscounted! A 4 day 1 way trip!!) so it seems unlikely that more of these F4F-3s could have been subsequently shipped to arrive on or before June 3. Even if accomplished, there's that pesky matter of pilot training in an unfamiliar type.

USS Kitty Hawk, AKV-1 photo from Wikipedia, carrying a folded wing F4F on deck in October 1942.


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## davparlr (Jul 12, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I'll introduce some heresy into the discussion. I doubt the P-51/Mustang would have done any better than the 'obsolete' F2A-3's everyone seems so anxious to dump into the ocean to make room for a 'real non-obsolescent fighter'. First let's consider the mission. The F2A-3s, for better or worse, were committed to act as interceptors. I submit that speed is one of the least useful attributes of an interceptor. In order of importance I'd list



Well, to avoid any heresy, let’s look at some data.



> 1. *Rate of climb*: I can't say it any better than Bedford Forrest: "get thar fustus with the mostest" Not fastest, just fustest.



Forrest got there fustus because he was fastus (he was a cavalry man). To correct history however, he did not say this. His quote was, in answer to a question, "Ma'am, I got there first with the most men." He was certainly an impressive man and ferocious warrior. 



> How long does it take the Mustang I to climb to the enemy aircraft altitude before it can accelerate to its speed advantage?



At Midway, PBYs reported Japanese inbound to Midway at 5:45 AM. Marine fighters engaged the Japanese at 6:20 AM, or 35 minutes after contact. P-51s could reach 20k in 10 minutes, 25k in 17 minutes giving them plenty of time to reach combat speed at altitude.



> I believe the F2A-3 and Mustang had very similar to nearly the same rate of climb to the altitude of the engagement. Above that altitude, advantage F2A-3. Shocking, I know but the lighter weight F2A-3 had a single stage, 2 speed supercharged Wright 1830 radial engine of 1,200 SL hp. The Mustang/P-51 was laboring with an Allison 1710-39 engine of 1,150 SL hp with a single stage, ONE-speed supercharger.



No argument here but not relevant since there was sufficient time as already discussed.



> 2. *Ceiling*: This is not a critical factor at Midway since the combat was fought at intermediate altitude (I think about 20,000 '), but in general you want to get an interceptor high so it can quickly convert that potential energy into kinetic when it sees the enemy, but the tendency would be to maintain the climb as long as possible until you have to engage.



Again, sufficient warning was given for the fighters to obtain desired airspeed and altitude.



> 3. *Acceleration*: Once you've engaged in a first pass, the interceptor is going to find itself in a fur ball when the enemy escorts jump you.


1st AVG did not do this. They were warned by Chennault to avoid this type of combat. Slash and run was used and proved effective. P-38s also perfected this combat.



> If you've built up speed so much the better, but I suspect that may be problematic in an interception. What you need before speed is to get to max speed quickly. The Mustang (2 cannon version) is about 1,000 lbs heavier than an F2A-3 (the 4 cannon mustang is nearer 1,500 lbs) with a similar powered engine. Simple physics says the same force applied to a smaller mass will accelerate it faster. I admit that the F2A's higher drag limits this advantage and its ultimate speed. But in the pinch, I suspect the P-51 is going to be bit slower off the mark. Not a good thing vs the IJN Vet piloted A6M.



The F3A-3 will do 284 mph with 1200 hp at SL and the F4F-4 would do 279 mph with the same engine. The P-51 will do 340 mph with 1150 hp at SL. The F3A and F4F-3/4 will use far more hp to maintain any given airspeed than the P-51 and thus the P-51 will have much more power excess to aid in acceleration. In fact the P-51 cruised (307mph) at almost the max speed of the F4F-4 (312mph). However, if the P-51 is flown correctly and maintains airspeed, acceleration is a moot point.



> 4. *Maneuverability*: I expect the F2A may have held an edge over the Mustang but they were both at a disadvantage compared to the A6M.



The Mustang was very maneuverable at high speeds. The Zero was very poor at speeds above 250 mph. It the P-51 pilot keeps his airspeed high and avoids turning fights, he will have little trouble with the Zero as he attacks the heavily loaded bombers, they will not be able to catch them nor turn with them as they make hit and run attacks against the bombers.

I believe your arguments are unsupportable. There was plenty of time, 35 minutes, for P-51s to obtain fighting altitude and airspeed. If flown by well trained and experienced pilots as was the 1st AVG, and flew the AVG doctrine in the much better P-51, the outcome would be the same as experienced in China.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 12, 2013)

Just a little summary on what we’re talking about. From the interception of that incoming wave (0616) to the first bomb dropped (0630) only 14 minutes had elapsed. That incoming wave was a locomotive. Here’s the source for the summary:

THE ENEMY ATTACK ON MIDWAY
The Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942.

0415 Search planes take off.
0545 Patrol plane reports "many planes heading Midway."
0552 Two enemy carriers sighted.
0600 All Midway planes in air.
0616 Fighter group intercepts enemy bombers.
0630 First bomb falls on Midway.
0715 Our fighter planes called in.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 12, 2013)

I thought the Bedford Forrest quote added some 'color' to my attempt to point out that it's not the *level speed* of the aircraft that's important but _how fast it goes up hill_ to get thar fustest. The fastest airplane is clearly the P-51, an attribute that certainly yields significant benefits. However, its climb to intercept altitude (~ 17k' according to Ch 6 of Cressman et al.'s *Glorious Page*) takes about the same time as the F2A so it doesn't get there any faster than the F2A with the following considerations about the time line. That was one of my main points. 

With respect to the time line it was tighter than I think you may realize and the tactics they evidently used might have pleased Chennault, at least up to a point...

Although Bates states that the aircraft were launched at the RADAR report of 0553, when the IJN aircraft were at 93 miles, Chapter 6 of the later Cressman book, says they _*began*_ launching at 0600. According to Prange, the delay from the 0553 warning to the 0600 initial A/C launch was due to the fact that the Fighters had their engines running and couldn't hear the siren so a pick up truck had to run down the flight line to provide the order to launch. 24 fighters (21 F2A-3 and 3 F4F-3, 2 more F4F-3 followed later) launched (and rendezvoused by division) before heading to intercept. Cressman reports that 2nd Lt Hughes finds he is lagging passing 16,000 ft and aborts. Bates says that the VALs and Kates were at 11,000' with escorts at 14,000 while the Marines apparently reached 17,000' before 1st contact. At 0605, the FDO vectors the fighters to an intercept. However, as ordered, 13 A/C of the 2nd and 3rd divisions briefly hold and maintain their altitude at below 14,000', while the remaining three divisions of 11 A/C lead the intercept. According to Bates, the first group makes contact at 0615. Figure the time to climb to 17k' for the F2A and P-51 is about 8 minutes with perhaps a slight edge to the F2A in terms of T/C, based on interpolations in part from AHT and other sources. So with time consumed to launch 24 fighter A/C and then perhaps a few minutes to form up as divisions once airborne, followed by a climb of something less than 8 minutes while perhaps making a bit over 3-4 miles per minute ground speed, the marines meet the Japanese about 30-40 miles out, having just reached Angels 16.5 to 17 (depending on the source) the first one calls out "_Hawks at angels 12!_" Escorts are agreed by all sources to be about 3K' above and behind the bombers. So it appears you are correct that there was sufficient time, but it was a very close thing as the fighters have evidently *just * reached their somewhat superior altitude in time to engage the bombers. Park's First division of 5 F2A-3s inflicts some serious harm on the Hiryu Kates, but not one of his first division pilots survives (save one who aborts). The second group consisting of Carey's division of three F4Fs does well in their one pass but is forced to retire by the escorts. Likewise for the two F2As of the 4rth division. So the 'AVG'-like tactic they were able to employ works about as well as might be expected until the Marines attempt to reengage for a second pass. The second group of 13 fighters belatedly enters the furball trying to climb to meet the enemy who have apparently now climbed to 14k' during their approach to Midway.

With respect to the relative maneuverability of the two aircraft, i based my statement on two perceptions. The first is the report by the USAAF that judged the original P-51 as slightly inferior to the P-40F in a dogfight. P-51 Mustang (Allison Engine) Performance Trials

The second is the perhaps unwarranted assumption that some element of the F2A's heritage of reputed superior maneuverability survived in its bloated progeny. 

With respect to acceleration you may be right, but it seems the Allison is putting out a bit over 800 hp at 15k' while I believe the Wright is still ~ 900+ hp. The bluff Buff is a lot lighter airframe (~ 3/4 of a ton) so it seems something that might require a detailed analysis to reveal. 

In general, I think a detailed analysis indicates the June 4 air battle over Midway went about as well as might be expected and would not have changed substantially by the replacement of F2As by P-51s except in one important aspect. I expect many more of the pilots would have survived in P-51s, assuming they used their speed wisely to disengage after their first pass, which is apparently what the surviving pilots did , and that more P-51s would have been operational at battle's end although I understand the P-51 was a somewhat fragile airframe/powerplant combination, due to its cooling system while the radial engine showed itself to be fairly resilient with battle damage.

It seems to me tactics employed (and Pilot experience) played a huge role, larger than aircraft quality in the lopsided outcome. So you have to assume that the P-51s would be deployed differently than were the VMF aircraft to significantly change the outcome... But that would also be true for the aircraft that actually fought the battle, including the F2A.


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## stug3 (Jul 12, 2013)

> although I understand the P-51 was a somewhat fragile airframe/powerplant combination, due to its cooling system while the radial engine showed itself to be fairly resilient with battle damage.



people on this site constantly harp on this dubious "flaw" of the Mustang, yet it somehow never caused it to suffer crippling or disproportionate losses or prevented it from becoming the most decisively advantageous fighter of the war.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 12, 2013)

stug3 said:


> people on this site constantly harp on this dubious "flaw" of the Mustang, yet it somehow never caused it to suffer crippling or disproportionate losses or prevented it from becoming the most decisively advantageous fighter of the war.



Without better supercharging, the Allison powered P-51 wasn't going to be a war winner whatever its strengths. The Packard-Merlin Powered Mustang had strengths to overcome whatever flaws may have been inherent in its engine system. The P-51 was a design at the very beginning of its long and illustrious career. The F2A was at the end of its life with thankfully no where else to go but the training command.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 12, 2013)

An interesting set of first hand accounts confirming the 0600 departure of the initial 24 VMF from Midway although some quoted times and altitudes appear to be estimates as they are not necessarily mutually consistent. The fog of war and the memories of guys who are too busy to be cockpit historians. I suspect many of you have seen this already:

Midway 1942 : Documents : Commanding Officer, Marine Fighting Squadron 221. Action report. June 6, 1942.


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## stug3 (Jul 12, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Without better supercharging, the Allison powered P-51 wasn't going to be a war winner whatever its strengths. The Packard-Merlin Powered Mustang had strengths to overcome whatever flaws may have been inherent in its engine system. The P-51 was a design at the very beginning of its long and illustrious career. The F2A was at the end of its life with thankfully no where else to go but the training command.




I was referring to the "fragility" of the radiator/cooling system, not the performance of the Allison.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 12, 2013)

just noticed reading the first hand accounts that apparently the third division lead by Capt. Armistead, that had their intercept delayed by a few minutes were able to climb to 17k' to make an initial high speed attack from above. The second division, also delayed, evidently was the one that didn't get to the same advantageous altitude and apparently suffered nearly the same fate as the first division with only one aircraft and two pilot survivors.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 13, 2013)

davparlr said:


> I believe your arguments are unsupportable. _*There was plenty of time, 35 minutes, for P-51s to obtain fighting altitude and airspeed.*_ If flown by well trained and experienced pilots as was the 1st AVG, and flew the AVG doctrine in the much better P-51, the outcome would be the same as experienced in China.



Looking over the AHT drag and acceleration tables 96 and 104, it looks like you are right, the P-51D is, as expected, much cleaner with a drag coefficient of 0.0176 (I assume the P-51 would be similar) compared to the F2A-3 with 0.3, nearly a factor of two. For acceleration at SL, the Allison P-51 has drag of about 800# while the F2A-3 is at just over 1,100#. However, I note that the F2A has 50 more HP at SL and I estimate (without good data) on the WAC engine, ~100 hp more at 17k ft. The AHT also cites the heaviest weight for the F2A I've ever seen, by about 1-200#. So while the P-51 exhibits a SL acceleration of about 2.13 ft/sec2, compared to the F2A of 1.44 ft/sec2. I would expect the margin to be a bit narrower at 17,000 ft but still advantage to the P-51. However, acceleration of the F2A was better than the P-40E and F4F-4 at SL. Max diving speed of the F2A was probably a good bit over 400 mph and it is reputed to accelerate quickly in a dive. The ceiling of course of the F2A was higher than that of the P-51 but , as acknowledged, that was not a factor in this Pacific air battle. I really can't find much else in the way of numbers quantifying other performance attributes of the F2A but assume that, in general, the P-51 would shine in comparison. 

One decided advantage of the P-51 would have been its armament. The 4 20mm cannon might have contributed significantly to a an improved USAAF vs IJN score. 

But the bottom line is that the time-line barely allows either of the two aircraft types to achieve altitude superiority which either could then use effectively in essentially the same way. The slow speed of the F2A in comparison to the P-51 was not a significant a factor in the initial intercept since both would probably have been moving at over 400 mph during the initial attack. Attempts to boom and zoom with the F2A during the interception were apparently frustrated by the rapid climb rate of the A6M. Perhaps, having built up more speed in the initial interception, the P-51 would have been a bit more successful in evading the A6Ms during a re-attack, but I don't see this as changing the outcome in any significant way.


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## stug3 (Jul 13, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> One decided advantage of the P-51 would have been its armament. The 4 20mm cannon might have contributed significantly to a an improved USAAF vs IJN score.



Didnt the Americans experience many problems with the 20mm of 1942 being prone to jamming and otherwise not very reliable? I think they would have been better of with the 4 .50s of the P-51A/B. Those models certainly got good results with them.

From P-51 Tactical Trials posted by drgondog below- 

_h. Armament.

(1) The present armament is considered adequate, but is functionally unsatisfactory. It is believed that four (4) caliber .50 (high rate of fire) guns would furnish ideal fire power for the P-51 airplane. _


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## drgondog (Jul 13, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> With respect to the relative maneuverability of the two aircraft, i based my statement on two perceptions. The first is the report by the USAAF that judged the original P-51 as slightly inferior to the P-40F in a dogfight. P-51 Mustang (Allison Engine) Performance Trials
> 
> The Report stated "The mustang was superior in speed to all (P-40F, P38F, P-39D, P-47C) below 15000 feet, superior to all except P-38F and P-47C above 15000 feet". "The P-51 was superior in climb to all except P-38F and superior in dive acceleration to all". "The P-51 could easily engage or disengage in a dogfight, but IF it persisted it (Mustang) would be at a slight disadvantage to the P-40F".
> 
> ...



You need to re-read the entire report....

P-51 Tactical Trials


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 13, 2013)

drgondog said:


> You need to re-read the entire report....
> 
> P-51 Tactical Trials



"If neither aircraft attempts to leave the combat the P-40F is considered to have a slight advantage" I didn't use the exact phrasing in the sentence, but I understood what I wrote have essentially the same meaning. Is that your issue?


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## drgondog (Jul 14, 2013)

The issue was the preceding statement(s) which most importantly stated that the P-51 could disengage at any time - which followed the several stated attributes of speed, dive, climb (except for P-38) advantages over P39D, P-38F, P40F and P-47C up to 20000 feet where the P-38 and P-47 were faster.

In the same context, nothing the US had, or would have, would have been a good choice to linger with a Zero when not choosing to 'leave the dogfight' if it could.. or a P-40 lingering with an Me 109F when the 109F could do everything except out turn(maybe) the P-40.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 14, 2013)

drgondog said:


> The issue was the preceding statement(s) which most importantly stated that the P-51 could disengage at any time - which followed the several stated attributes of speed, dive, climb (except for P-38) advantages over P39D, P-38F, P40F and P-47C up to 20000 feet where the P-38 and P-47 were faster.
> 
> In the same context, nothing the US had, or would have, would have been a good choice to linger with a Zero when not choosing to 'leave the dogfight' if it could.. or a P-40 lingering with an Me 109F when the 109F could do everything except out turn(maybe) the P-40.



With respect to the report's statement of the P-51's ability to disengage at will, that's why I used the word '_persisted_'. To me, that indicated a conscious choice by the two pilots NOT to disengage. _I assumed the ability of the P-51 to disengage at will to be common knowledge and needed no further comment. _

I _also_ assumed it would be understood that I wasn't arguing that the F2A was a better fighter than the P-51. That actually never occurred to me (unthinkable?), although in retrospect it may seem that's what I was arguing. Given a choice about which aircraft, I'd have preferred in that, or any other situation, hands down, the P-51. My point was that, used strictly as an interceptor at Midway, in the critical climb capability, the F2A was comparable (and perhaps slightly better?) than the Allison powered P-51 leading to my conclusion that introduction of the P-51 would not have significantly changed the outcome. 

If that seems to contradict my comment about the advantage that might accrue with the use of 20mm armament, I didn't anticipate more IJN aircraft being hit with the 20 mm (assuming that, in a perfect world, the cannons worked at least as reliably as the 0.5" guns), just that those many that were hit may have been more likely to have suffered fatal damage. 

I've acknowledged my error in assuming the lighter aircraft would be able to overcome its drag deficit and accelerate more quickly. 

With respect to the relative maneuverability of the two types (F2A vs P-51), I don't think we know for sure except that its obvious from the report that ithe P-40F and P-51 appear to have been fairly similar. I have been unable to uncover any quantification on F2A-3 maneuverability but assuming that it retained some of the reputed extraordinary handling qualities of the earlier F2A-2 seemed reasonable and to a limited extent supported by some reports from SE Asia for the export version. However, the latter reports are at best confusing because there are so many variants flown by pilots of different nationalities with a wide range of experience. The weights of the F2A-3 fighter is about 300# heavier than the F2A-2 (in overload fighter configuration) but then of course, there are the impact of changes in the airframe to consider. In what weight-configuration did the Marine pilots at Midway fight and how did that effect their expectations going in to the fight? I don't know. As long as I have chosen to be an apostate, I'll risk offending our commonwealth cousins and say, to me, the question of relative maneuverability was somewhat similar to choosing the more maneuverable aircraft between the Gloster Gladiator or the P-51. I'd expect the Gladiator to be more maneuverable. It doesn't mean I'd ever prefer to fight in a Gladiator instead of a P-51 . 

Reconsidering my prioritized list of interception performance attributes, I'd insert level speed into the number 3 spot assuming any aircraft with decent dive capability can efficiently convert altitude to excess airspeed. 

In any case, I completely agree with your last statement.


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## davparlr (Jul 15, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I thought the Bedford Forrest quote added some 'color' to my attempt to point out that it's not the level speed of the aircraft that's important but how fast it goes up hill to get thar fustest.



I didn’t intend to criticize you in your use of Bedford Forrest’s commonly accepted quote (I was just trying to correct history), but rather point out that he favored speed to allow him to get there first.



> In general, I think a detailed analysis indicates the June 4 air battle over Midway went about as well as might be expected and would not have changed substantially by the replacement of F2As by P-51s except in one important aspect. I expect many more of the pilots would have survived in P-51s, assuming they used their speed wisely to disengage after their first pass, which is apparently what the surviving pilots did , and that more P-51s would have been operational at battle's end



One of the problems the F2A/F4F was their inability to disengage with the Zero. Initial attacks with high energy were generally successful, however, the escorting Zeros were quickly on their tail and they could not get separation. The Zero was faster, climbed better, and turned better and quickly dispatched the defending fighters. Other than its speed, the major advantage of the P-51 was that it would have been able to disengage at any time from the Zero by diving and accelerating away (the P-51 could out accelerate the Zero, even in level flight) climb unimpeded back to attacking attitude, re-establish initial high energy level (the P-51 could always establish higher energy levels than the zero) and re-enter the conflict. This could be repeated many times and do severe damage to the Japanese attack aircraft.



> although I understand the P-51 was a somewhat fragile airframe/powerplant combination, due to its cooling system while the radial engine showed itself to be fairly resilient with battle damage.



I think this opinion is more subjective than objective. While I do think the radial engine fighters were generally tougher than liquid cooled fighters, especially during ground attack missions, it is often more than offset by performance increases. I’m not sure statistics support this strong a conclusion.

Here is an interesting general comment (by the author?) in AHT,


> Below 22,000 feet the Allison P-51 had the best all-around fighting qualities of any fighter.


While reasonably overshadowed by the Merlin powered P-51, it is easy to see why Britain, and America, after they realized the performance of the Allison P-51, wanted to get some high altitude power into the P-51.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 15, 2013)

I answered too soon...  I need time for more head scratching on this.  TTYL


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 15, 2013)

Late edit: this post entitled: "Dawn breaks over marble head"



davparlr said:


> I didn’t intend to criticize you in your use of Bedford Forrest’s commonly accepted quote (I was just trying to correct history), but rather point out that he favored speed to allow him to get there first.



No worries on that account. 



davparlr said:


> I One of the problems the F2A/F4F was their inability to disengage with the Zero. Initial attacks with high energy were generally successful, however, the escorting Zeros were quickly on their tail and they could not get separation. The Zero was faster, climbed better, and turned better and quickly dispatched the defending fighters. Other than its speed, the major advantage of the P-51 was that it would have been able to disengage at any time from the Zero by diving and accelerating away (the P-51 could out accelerate the Zero, even in level flight) climb unimpeded back to attacking attitude, re-establish initial high energy level (the P-51 could always establish higher energy levels than the zero) and re-enter the conflict. This could be repeated many times and do severe damage to the Japanese attack aircraft.



As you suggest, and as emphasized in drgondog's earlier post, the ability to disengage at will is certainly an important attribute whose lack was evidently a factor in the deaths of too many of the Marine pilots at Midway. Upon reading the pilot reports more carefully, I noted that virtually all the surviving VMF pilots, like their USAAF P-40E flying counterparts in the PI, Java and Oz used the apparently superior diving ability of the US aircraft to effectively disengage when they quickly realized how badly the odds were stacked against them. What surprised me and has caused my belated conversion was the unexpected number of F2A pilots who successfully or nearly so reengaged after their first attack! Humberd alone nearly got three passes in before being dispatched by the Zekes. If an F2A could do that well, what would a P-51 have done? Clearly much better. That lead me to the conclusion that you may actually be underselling the re-attack capability of the bird which I was ready to question because of how fast an air battle seems to move on, leaving some participants behind. Diving away? How is a Zero going to catch a P-51 going flat out (exploiting an initial altitude advantage) through the formation with a little nose down attitude? As you indicated, convert that speed to altitude and its back in business for another go. I'd expect three successful and uninterrupted passes from a section or division of P-51s would not be out of the question and in the end damage done limited by ammunition supply more than anything else. No bigger zealot than a convert.



davparlr said:


> I I think this opinion is more subjective than objective. While I do think the radial engine fighters were generally tougher than liquid cooled fighters, especially during ground attack missions, it is often more than offset by performance increases. I’m not sure statistics support this strong a conclusion.


 dunno... was just a thought in making the comparison, there aren't too many advantages one can list for an F2A and that seemed a potentially unconsidered aspect. 



davparlr said:


> I Here is an interesting general comment (by the author?) in AHT, While reasonably overshadowed by the Merlin powered P-51, it is easy to see why Britain, and America, after they realized the performance of the Allison P-51, wanted to get some high altitude power into the P-51.



indeed.

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## Greg Boeser (Aug 18, 2016)

The most important fact that has been overlooked in this thread is the fact that the Navy HAD requested Army fighters for its outlying island bases and the Army said they couldn't do it because their pilots were not trained in over water navigation.
Plus they were extremely reluctant to part with anything that would slow down the build up for the offensive against Germany. Throughout 1942 the Army consistently shortchanged the promised commitment to the Pacific.


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## pinehilljoe (Aug 19, 2016)

An interesting what if, the Corsairs first flight was May 1940, two years before the big carrier battles of 1942. What if more priority and funding was put into the development, and it was deployed to the Fleet and Marines, in time for Coral Sea and Midway.


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## gjs238 (Aug 19, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> An interesting what if, the Corsairs first flight was May 1940, two years before the big carrier battles of 1942. What if more priority and funding was put into the development, and it was deployed to the Fleet and Marines, in time for Coral Sea and Midway.



As a land-based aircraft?


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## pinehilljoe (Aug 19, 2016)

gjs238 said:


> As a land-based aircraft?



Land based with the Marines, it could have been deployed in place of the Marine Wildcats and Buffalos at Midway . With the Fleet in place of Wildcats.


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## drgondog (Aug 19, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> Land based with the Marines, it could have been deployed in place of the Marine Wildcats and Buffalos at Midway . With the Fleet in place of Wildcats.



Impossible for F4U and P-51 to be at Midway based on the development process prior to Dec 7, 1941.

The production F4U wasn't flown until June 25, 1942. 

The Contract for the P-51A was not let until June 23, 1942.

The AAF was so desperate to get the P-51 into combat that they didn't start evaluating the XP-51 until March 1942 at Wright Pat, some four months after delivery.

Only the Mustang I was in production in sufficient numbers had the AAF snatched them from RAF before Pearl Harbor, deployed in one to two squadron strength for training, and cunningly sent immediately to Hawaii/Midway in time for the battle. Would have to replace a P-40 FG, so as to capitalize on Allison maintenance experience

The P-51-1, which later became F6, first flew in May 1942.

The ONLY possibility for a P-51 to fight at Midway would have been if the AAF a.) recognized the value immediately and tested immediately for tactical evaluation, and b.) acceptable modifications immediately acted upon by NAA, and c.) diverted them to a ready to deploy P-40 FG, and d.) deployed them in the March 1942 timeframe to Hawaii.

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## pinehilljoe (Aug 19, 2016)

drgondog said:


> Impossible for F4U and P-51 to be at Midway based on the development process prior to Dec 7, 1941.
> 
> The production F4U wasn't flown until June 25, 1942.
> 
> The Contract for the P-51A was not let until June 23, 1942.



Of course, these are merely what ifs. But the Corsair did fly 2 years before Midway, if funds were provided and red tape cut, its an interesting what if.


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## Peter Gunn (Aug 19, 2016)

I think the only way the Mustang or the Corsair for that matter to get into the Battle of Midway is if the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor at a much later date, six to eight months later. That would push the Midway contest further into the Mustang (and Corsairs) development cycle, so that and a couple of bucks will get you a cup of coffee.

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## GrauGeist (Aug 19, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> Of course, these are merely what ifs. But the Corsair did fly 2 years before Midway, if funds were provided and red tape cut, its an interesting what if.


Then the Corsair would have been plagued with problems and would have most likely cost not only lost aircraft, but lost pilots as well.

Several types were cursed like this, the Typhoon, the Me210 and so on.

As it stands, the P-40's performance was on a level of the P-51/P-51A by the battle of Midway, so the P-51's presence may have been more of a liability than a blessing.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 19, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> Of course, these are merely what ifs. But the Corsair did fly 2 years before Midway, if funds were provided and red tape cut, its an interesting what if.



I am not sure on the red tape? The Navy got the prototype to test in late Oct 1940, it completed testing at the end of Feb 1941. Within 6 days the Navy had issued a letter of intent to enter into a production contract. While the contract is not placed until June 30th this may (or may not) have to do with budgets. There were hundreds of changes requested from the prototype. Production started in July (of the first was the end of June) but the first squadron to see combat doesn't see combat until the middle of Feb 1943. 
You would have to cut 8-9 months out of the development/production time. 1st squadron to see combat didn't see their first F4U until late Sept 1942. From Wiki:
" VMF-124 was formed on September 2, 1942 at Camp Kearney, San Diego, California. They were declared fully operational on December 28, 1942 even though the squadron’s pilots had only an average of 25 hours each in the plane."
The Corsair was built in Stratford CT, almost 2500 miles from San Diego. I don't know if the planes were flown cross country, shipped by rail or sent by ship through the Panama Canal.
Getting planes into service quicker in some of these "what ifs" seems to rely on cutting into training time for pilots and ground crews which would rather blunt the effectiveness hoped for. 
The first Navy squadron to get Corsairs, VF-12, lost 14 pilots killed in training flights before getting to the south Pacific. They gave their Corsairs to the Marines and re-equipped with F6Fs.

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## BiffF15 (Aug 19, 2016)

Or the USN / USMC could have set up the F-4U school house in CT. Would have cut down out all the shipping time / delays...


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## Shortround6 (Aug 19, 2016)

I think a few of the later squadrons did train in Rhode Island. But you still need to get the planes from New England to somewhere in the Pacific to go into action.
Perhaps they should have sent the Corsairs to Europe and the P-51s to the Pacific. Each factory would have been 2500miles closer to the front lines. 

British Mustangs did go as deck cargo from Los Angles through the Panama canal and up the east coast to be formed into trans-Atlantic convoys.

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## pinehilljoe (Aug 20, 2016)

I think someone said earlier, the P-40 at Midway is more plausible. Imagine two P-40 squadrons at Midway. But Europe First prevented that.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 20, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> I think someone said earlier, the P-40 at Midway is more plausible. Imagine 2 P-40 at Midway. But Europe First prevented that.


The P-40 was in Hawaii, China, Philippines and the Dutch East Indies before the Battle of Midway.

But because of the island's distance from other airfields, only Navy fighters were on hand. The Army did contribute B-17 and B-26 aircraft for it's defenses, but getting an Army fighter onto a predominately Navy controlled installation was not going to be very likely at this early point in the war.


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## wuzak (Aug 20, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> As it stands, the P-40's performance was on a level of the P-51/P-51A by the battle of Midway



Was it?


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## drgondog (Aug 20, 2016)

By Midway the only P-51 types were the Mark I with the 1710-39 engine. It was faster than the P-40 but it didn't have the improved ailerons and would not roll as fast or turn as well as the P-40. The Merlin version was the one that made the P-51B far superior to the P-40K/N - except in turn and equal/near equal in roll.


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## drgondog (Aug 20, 2016)

SR - Most of the P-51s that went to UK went to Newark to load up - then on to Liverpool.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 20, 2016)

Thank you, I read that the first ones to England went via the Panama Canal.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 20, 2016)

In the Summer of 1942 you had a mishmash of P-40s. You had a number of the -Es floating around with the -39 Allison. You had the -F with Merlin which started production in Jan 1942 but numbers may have been small in the spring and the -F was slated for North Africa. The -K with the -73 engine started production in May of 1942, replacing the -E but a P-40 in Buffalo New York in May is _never _going to make it to Midway by June. 

Things were pretty thin in the Pacific even in late spring/early summer of 1942. As an example on March 18th 1942 it was reported that total of 337 P-40s had reached Australia. Out of these 125 had been lost in the fighting around Java, some by accidents, 75 were given to the RAAF, 74 were undergoing repair, 100 are waiting for assembly and only 92 are in commission (+85 P-39s out of 190 arrived). 

The numbers do not add up but the Langley was sunk with 33 33 P-40s on board while trying to reinforce Java and the Sea Witch did deliver 27-P-40s in crates but they were dumped in the sea still crated to avoid capture by the Japanese. 

Point is that jumping though hoops to change time lines to get 12-24 brand new fighters with barely familiar pilots and ground crews and little or poor back up for parts didn't have much chance of changing the out come of a 1-3 day battle. 
Also the Army fighters (P-40 and P-39) weren't sitting around doing nothing, they were actively engaged in several areas from China to the Aleutian islands at around the time of Midway (even if not engaging on the same day/s).


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## drgondog (Aug 20, 2016)

SR - I'll get the IARC. The very first one was crated and sent through the Canal but the process was changed to crate them in Newark. That said I am not sure when the change took place but guessing Dec 7 might mark the 'change'.

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## Glider (Aug 20, 2016)

An interesting thought would be if the Ki44 was available for the Midway era


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## Greg Boeser (Aug 20, 2016)

First Ki-44s were in action in Malaya and Burma in early 1942. One independent chutai. They were recalled to Japan for home defense after the Doolittle raid. Production was slow and the first Ki-44s to reappear outside the Home Islands, were a handful that trickled into China in mid '43. Of course, the Ki-44 was an army plane. Not going to see them on carriers.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 21, 2016)

While I don't have confirming figures, It seems like the one '_superior performing'_ aircraft that might have been available in numbers roughly equal to those of the marine F2A-3 were F4F-3 and perhaps a few F4F-4s based at Pearl Harbor. 7 of those F4F-3s were sent on the Wright but cargo space was limited due to the 16 SBDs she also carried. If a few F4Fs had been sent out to Midway on each of the carriers assuming they came within range during their sortie to the Northwest of the island, then perhaps they could have replaced or been added to bolster the number of F2A-3s flown by the same marine pilots who ferried them in from the carriers.

I think as big an issue preventing the replacement or addition of better fighter types was the space available on the island, and perhaps a reluctance to change the fighters due to the USMC pilot's familiarity with F2A. VMF-221 were trained and familiar with flying and fighting (in practice at least) in the F2A. Statistically the F4F's did a bit better than the F2As but not much better and only in the rather critical but not battle winning parameter of numbers of pilot's who survived. As big an issue may have been the Naval Command's mistaken belief that the F2A-3s flown by US Pilots were at least on a par with machines flown by the IJN, despite or because of, the limited number of reports in the prior 5 months. Midway's panning of USN fighters was still in the future. Maybe not, but we know what was done and what might have been done and perhaps, in retrospect, what should have been done... (push the F2A-3 into the sea as soon as possible to make room for F4F's or P-40s whenever they could be made available) which in the case of the P-40 was what ultimately happened, if I recall.


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## Glider (Aug 21, 2016)

Greg Boeser said:


> First Ki-44s were in action in Malaya and Burma in early 1942. One independent chutai. They were recalled to Japan for home defense after the Doolittle raid. Production was slow and the first Ki-44s to reappear outside the Home Islands, were a handful that trickled into China in mid '43. Of course, the Ki-44 was an army plane. Not going to see them on carriers.


True of course but then so is the P51.


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## Greg Boeser (Aug 21, 2016)

The appearance of the Ki-44 in China came as a nasty shock to Chennault's boys who up to then had had a field day with the Ki-27s and Ki-43s. They considered it better than the P-51.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 21, 2016)

Greg Boeser said:


> The appearance of the Ki-44 in China came as a nasty shock to Chennault's boys who up to then had had a field day with the Ki-27s and Ki-43s. They considered it better than the P-51.


Who's they?

It couldn't have been the AVG/23rd FG, because the P-51 didn't reach the PTO until much later in the war and by the time the P-51 did get into China, it's main adversary was the KI-84.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 22, 2016)

First P-51s and A-36s showed up in the summer and fall of 1943 and yes the 23 fighter group got some and the 23rd was a decedent of the Flying tigers. Why the pilots thought the Ki 44 was superior to the P-51A might be interesting though. 
Merlin Mustangs (-Bs) don't show up until April-June of 1944.

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## drgondog (Aug 22, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> First P-51s and A-36s showed up in the summer and fall of 1943 and yes the 23 fighter group got some and the 23rd was a decedent of the Flying tigers. Why the pilots thought the Ki 44 was superior to the P-51A might be interesting though.
> Merlin Mustangs (-Bs) don't show up until April-June of 1944.


The Ki 44 could outclimb and out turn a P-51A. Above 15,000 feet the P-51B/C closed the climb rate, was close to turn and much faster above 15000 feet


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## Greg Boeser (Aug 22, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> Who's they?
> 
> It couldn't have been the AVG/23rd FG, because the P-51 didn't reach the PTO until much later in the war and by the time the P-51 did get into China, it's main adversary was the KI-84.



No less a personage than Colonel "Tex" Hill, after losing two P-51As from the 76th Fighter Squadron, 23rd FG, over Hong Kong on 1 Dec, 1943 to a detachment of the 85th Sentai, is quoted as saying: "I don't think we can beat these new Japs in the air." Chennault replied: "Don't worry about it. just hit them on the ground." (Molesworth, _Sharks over China_)

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## gjs238 (Aug 22, 2016)

Greg Boeser said:


> No less a personage than Colonel "Tex" Hill, after losing two P-51As from the 76th Fighter Squadron, 23rd FG, over Hong Kong on 1 Dec, 1943 to a detachment of the 85th Sentai, is quoted as saying: "I don't think we can beat these new Japs in the air." Chennault replied: "Don't worry about it. just hit them on the ground." (Molesworth, _Sharks over China_)



Gotta wonder if they tried dog fighting


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## Shortround6 (Aug 23, 2016)

The Ki-44 was much different than the K-43. Actual wing loading difference between the Ki-44 and an Allison Mustang might depend on amount of fuel and ammo each has on board. The 161sq ft on the Ki-44 meant it didn't turn like other Japanese fighters. Actual turning ability of the Ki-44 vs the Mustang depends on the combat flap on the Ki-43 and the actual lift co-efficient of the wings, especially at high angles of attack.
However conventional boom and zoom didn't work so well against it as it not only had a high climb rate, it dove better than the other Japanese fighters. While not as fast as the P-51 it was much faster than the Ki-43 and Zero. 335mph at sea level and 376mph at 17,000ft. tactics that worked against the other Japanese fighters either didn't work or would be much slower in showing results against the KI-44. AS in diving away would still have the P-51 out diving the Ki-44 but the question is, is the difference in dive speed (or dive acceleration) _enough _to get out of range quickly and limit the Ki-44s firing opportunity?
I don't know which one accelerated better in level flight. The Ki-44 was about a ton lighter and had a more powerful engine.
The Allison P-51 may have been able to come out on top of the Ki-44, it just was going to need a lot of adjustment on the part of the pilots to meet the threat of a plane that did not behave the way most/all Japanese fighters had behaved up until then.

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## Timppa (Aug 25, 2016)

's


Greg Boeser said:


> No less a personage than Colonel "Tex" Hill, after losing two P-51As from the 76th Fighter Squadron, 23rd FG, over Hong Kong on 1 Dec, 1943 to a detachment of the 85th Sentai, is quoted as saying: "I don't think we can beat these new Japs in the air." (Molesworth, _Sharks over China_)



P-51A pilots from 530th Fighter Squadron probably disagreed. It met Ki-44's from 87th Sentai three times. That unit was transferred from Sumatra to Meiktila, Burma on 8 May, 1944.
11 May : 5 Ki-44's shot down with 4 pilots killed
12 May : 2 Ki-44's shot down with 2 pilots killed
14 May: 1 Ki-44's shot down

The 530th squadron had no losses in these combats.

After this short and disastrous stay in Burma 87th Sentai was withdrawn back to Palembang, Sumatra on May 21, 1944.
(Shores, _Air War for Burma_)

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## Greg Boeser (Aug 25, 2016)

What a difference six months makes.


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