# Greatest military blunder of WWII



## Thorlifter (May 11, 2007)

Which one do you guys thing was the worst blunder of WWII?


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## timshatz (May 11, 2007)

December 10th, 1941. Hitler declares war on the US. Firstly, it turned a European war into a global war. Before that, it is possible to call the wars going on The Great European War and The Great Pacific War. By declaring war on the US, it truely became a World War (not all the World was in it, but that stretched it all the way around the globe in an intertwined way). 

I was going to add June 22nd 1941 but that was not really a World War situation. It was still part of the Great European war. So Barbarossa doesn't quite make it (stupid blunder that it was).

By declaring war on the US (the only country he actually did that to), Hitler added the last piece in the puzzle that would bring about his downfall. Russia had the Manpower, England had the position, the US had the Manufacturing capacity. US involvement in the European war might've been inevitable, but Hitler's actions only hurried his end.


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## renrich (May 11, 2007)

The worst blunder of the war was when Japan attacked the US at Pearl Harbor. They were absolutely unrealistic to believe that they had any chance to win a war against the US. The second worse was when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.


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## Thorlifter (May 11, 2007)

timshatz said:


> December 10th, 1941. Hitler declares war on the US. Firstly, it turned a European war into a global war. Before that, it is possible to call the wars going on The Great European War and The Great Pacific War. By declaring war on the US, it truely became a World War (not all the World was in it, but that stretched it all the way around the globe in an intertwined way). .



DOH! I meant to add that one. Let me see if I can figure out how to add another catagory.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 11, 2007)

Added it for you.

I think that there are two many different ones that could fall into this catagory.

Out of the list I voted for Dunkirk.

The only reason I would not count the decleration of War on the US as a blunder is because it would have happened anyhow. If Germany had not declared war, the US would have done so eventually.


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## trackend (May 11, 2007)

Its not on the list but I'll go for the defense or rather the lack of defense by the British at Singapore there was adequate men and equipment to have fought off the Japanese but the leadership and planning where appalling.
If I had to pick any other I would say Barbarossa soon as Hitler started on the Russians the whole out come of WW2 was sealed including that of the Japanese. Germany could not defeat Russia and the western powers simultaneously. 
After that the Russians begun their Manchurian campaign which had the A Bombs not been around was the beginning of yet another front that Japan could never hold so their defeat was inevitably on the cards


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## Thorlifter (May 11, 2007)

I'll have to go with Operation Market Garden. I wanted to go with Pearl Harbor because that is what got the U.S. mobilized and lit the fires in the production plants. But if the carriers were at Pearl, it's would have been trouble. Sure you can point out the oil fields were mostly ignored, but other than that, Pearl was a pretty successful attack. 

Operation Market Garden was a cluster F from the word go.

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## comiso90 (May 11, 2007)

renrich said:


> The worst blunder of the war was when Japan attacked the US at Pearl Harbor. They were absolutely unrealistic to believe that they had any chance to win a war against the US. The second worse was when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.



The Japanese weren't trying to "Win a war" with the U.S. . Most high level Japanese knew that they could not win a protracted war with the Americans. They were hoping to kick America out of it's backyard so that they could continue to grow it's empire and reap the resources.

They thought America was soft and would take the bloody nose at Pearl Harbor as a stern warning to get out of Asia.

If there were a mistake by the Japanese, it was the bigger picture of underestimating the Americans determination to fight a long war.

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## Vassili Zaitzev (May 11, 2007)

I voted on Hitler declaring war on the US, but it was a tough one. It was down to Midway, Stalingrad, and babarossa.


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## nutesvagent (May 11, 2007)

Before I came up with my answer, I first had to define "blunder" with regard to WW2 events. It seems to me that if you have a decent plan, get all the available intelligence, have the appropriate forces to commit, and coordinate everything correctly, you should have a decent chance of success. That being said, a case could be made for the attack on Pearl Harbor, the German declaration of war, and just about any other one on the list. Except one. As Thorlifter said, Operation Market Garden was a cluster F from beginning to end. First of all, Montgomery was an idiot. I have no idea how he gained the reputation that he has enjoyed. He never won a single decisive victory except when he had overwhelming superiority in men, material, and terrain, and even then, it took him forever to act on his advantages. Market 
Garden was amateurish in concept. The idea that all those bridges could be seized and that XXX Corps could waltz single file down a single elevated road (like ducks in an arcade game) with no trouble should have been laughed at. When the intelligence came back showing tanks and SS in the area it was ignored. When the radio equipment looked like it might not work, that was ignored. And if these things weren't bad enough, after the whole thing got off to a disasterous start, they still kept dropping troops into the meat grinder. I can't think of a single thing worthy of praise except for the utterly heroic efforts of truly brave men who tried to make something good out of what was really a pile of dog crap. After all was said and done, Monty was knighted. Huh?


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## Cyrano (May 11, 2007)




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## Gnomey (May 11, 2007)

The top three on the list would be the ones that caused the most damage to the Axis, these would be: Japan's failures and Midway, Barbarossa and Hitler's declaration of war on the US. Combined the made it a global war and one that the Axis was never going to be able to win. From there on it was almost certain Allied victory. I would agree with Lee about Singapore which was a humilation for the British but ultimately didn't contribute much as the Japanese were held at the Indian Border. Yes the British could of held out for longer (I have read recently though that there was only 2 days water supply left at the time of surrender) but unless they were resupplied they ultimately would of been starved out by the Japanese and the casualties would of been higher (as well as much of the Island destroyed) had the Japanese had to assault it. Dunkirk is another case of a missed opportunity that although major at the time would of only really resulted in prolonging the war as the British conscripted and trained the replacements for those left in France. Sealoin was just a missed opportunity (the same as Dunkirk) to knock Britain out of the war, had it succeeded (unlikely based on actual events) it would of been a success for a time and perhaps would of brought peace in Europe. Market Garden although messed up in the planning stages and in the intelligence ultimately although it cost a lot of lives achieved all but 2 of its objectives (Arnhem and the crossing of the Rhine) so it was mainly a success rather than a blunder. I would say the Battle of the Bulge was more of a Blunder than Market Garden was as it left the Germans outside of their fixed defences and vunerable to encirclement and destruction.

Overall for me the thing that was the biggest blunder is going to be one of Hitler's decisions - Barbarossa or declaring war on the US. Barbarossa is less of a blunder than the latter because it almost succeeded until it was held at Moscow. So for me the biggest blunder was Hitler's declaration of war in the US, it effectively sealed his fate in Europe in 1941 when it was still 2 and half years until the Allies landed on the continent. Alongside this I would rank Japan's failures at Midway which lost her the majority of her carriers and experienced pilots. (if I could vote twice it would be for Midway and Hitler's war declaration) but as I can only vote once I will vote for Hitler's declaration of war on the US.

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## pbfoot (May 11, 2007)

It would have to be Dunkirk because if the Germans were knocking hard at the door with the Wehrmacht the RAF strength would have been blunted a bit more defending and counter attacking using UK based sqns . After all your not going to let your guys get decimated with air cover so close at hand . But I ''ll wait to vote


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## renrich (May 11, 2007)

I agree with Adler that the Hitler declaration of war was not a blunder. Roosevelt was lookin for any excuse to declare war on Germany and the US would have been at war in Europe in short order. The big miscalculation that the Japanese made was not understanding the psyche of the majority of the population of the US at that time. The Japanese war aims might have been limited but the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor by a race that the average American considered as "inferior and sub human" unleashed a hatred that caused the war in the Pacific to be waged on an entirely different level than the war in Europe. It was a racist war that was exacerbated by the atrocities commited by the Japanese and the US forces countered atrocity with plenty of their own atrocities. There was talk during WW2, especially by the British(and I think they were correct in thinking this way) of negotiations to end the war in Europe. There was never any thought of anything but the complete destruction of the Japanese Empire and their unconditional surrender in the Pacific. If the Japanese had not released that implacable desire for retribution by the Anglo-Celt in the US, Roosevelt would have had a much more difficult job getting the US into the war. You can bet that Roosevelt and especially Churchill both breathed a sigh of relief after December 7, 1941.


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## rogthedodge (May 11, 2007)

It has to be Dunkirk / Barbarossa / Operation Sealion - historically Hitler should have known a 2 front war was beyond Germany and therefore he should have dealt with one front before starting a second. I haven't voted as all 3 are aspects of the same decision

If they'd captured the BEF we'd probably have sought terms and then Hitler would have been free to defeat Russia and the US would have struggled to stage any European inavsion (assuming Ireland would have been garrisoned)


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## syscom3 (May 11, 2007)

What about Hitlers order for the battle of Stalingrad to be fought in the city itself, and captured by flanking movements?


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## Negative Creep (May 11, 2007)

The Germans had already captured the flanks around Stalingrad. I don't think it was a blunder as such; there's no reason for German high command to expect the city to have been any more difficult to take then Kiev or Minsk. Although it was bad planning for the Germans to leave to Romanians to hold the flanks, I tihnk the eventual outcome was more down to good Soviet planning than bad German.


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## Njaco (May 11, 2007)

Definately Barbarossa. As a blunder it was the most devastating. It went way beyond the capabilities of Germany at the time.

I would add two more : 

1. Invasion of Poland - only because most of Hitlers war machine was gearing up for a war around 1942 or nearabouts, went against the advice and planning of his Generals. Yes it succeeded but as a blunder I think it fits because of everything that came after.

2. Anzio - Classic example of well laid plans with poor application.

A third might be the failure to invade Malta. That was a huge sore spot for Germany and Italy.


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## Maharg (May 11, 2007)

I think Hitlers Declaration of War on the US was a huge mistake.


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## 102first_hussars (May 12, 2007)

agreed


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## Soren (May 12, 2007)

Operation Barbarossa was absolutely not a mistake, however declaring war on the US before having defeated the USSR was a big mistake.

Operation Market Garden was a huge mistake as-well, one made by a man who should've known better if what is said about him is true.

Operation Battleaxe is another big mistake.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass was also a huge failure.


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## Njaco (May 12, 2007)

from the book "Military Blunders" by Saul David. Those listed for WWII:

General Percival and the Fall of Singapore
The Dieppe Raid
Arnhem (Market Garden)
Stalingrad
Crete
Kasserine Pass
Italy in North Africa 1940-41


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## Lucky13 (May 12, 2007)

Hitlers decision to start the second world war at all by attacking Poland in 1939.....


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## syscom3 (May 12, 2007)

> General Percival and the Fall of Singapore


This would qualify, as if the Japanese had been held up for a few months longer, the outcome in Burma might have been far different. But aside from losing so many men to an inferior force, I dont see it altering how the war in the Pacific would have unfolded.



> The Dieppe Raid


Not necessarly a blunder as the allies learned all the important lessons that they would put to good use in 1944.



> Arnhem (Market Garden)


Not totally a blunder, more like a draw.



> Stalingrad


Now this qualifies a major blunder as the war on the eastern front was changed because of the loss.



> Crete


A defeat, but it didnt qualify as a war changing defeat.



> Kasserine Pass


Same as Crete. In fact it forced a change in command structure that served the allies well for the rest of the war.



> Italy in North Africa 1940-41


I dont know a lot about this, so I cant really comment on it.


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## Gnomey (May 12, 2007)

It was "Il Duce's" attempt and some glory like Hitler had achieved and it failed badly (they also failed miserably in East Africa/Abyssinia)

Essentially the numerically superior Italian force got routed by the British. The Italian based themselves in so called forts which were isolated from one and other, the British attacked them one after the other forcing an Italian retreat all the way back to Tripoli which was prevented from being a complete rout by the arrival of the Afrika Korps.

More here:The Italian campaign in North Africa and the war in Greece during WW2

Italian Tanks at War - North Africa


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (May 12, 2007)

I so wanted to put Market Garden down, from watching the movie, but I decided on Operation Barbarossa. Hitler turning on his ally was just plain arrogant, dumber than declaring war on the US in some ways, because the Japanese expected it of him since they were partners.

At least Market Garden didn't put us out of the war. But it was overeaching.......


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## Njaco (May 12, 2007)

I think what might help is a definition of Blunder. Mistakes are made and situations go bad but blunders are harmful even though a good outcome may result.

An example I would think would be Montgomery and El Alamein. His attack was failing until the Australians and New Zealanders made gains around Tell el Aqqaquir. That was through sheer strength and not battleplanning. Blunder on Monty's part.

I agree with the Dieppe raid on a whole was not a blunder except for the execution, which was done poorly. Dieppe was meant only as a probing mission and learning experience but someone forgot to tell them about shore batteries.

The blunder of Market Garden was not relying on your recon. When you have intel that says tanks are there, I would tend to factor that into the mission.

Crete may have been war changing in the fact Hitler wa gunshy with paratroops after that. With that Malta soldiered on and used up serious resources of the Axis in the Med.


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## Soren (May 12, 2007)

Market Garden was a complete blunder, esp, considering how Montgomery thought it would've turned out - the Allied forces were desimated. No'where near a draw !

The Battle for Kasserine Pass was an absolute failure for the US, complete disaster - one which prompted some emmidiate changes in command and structure for the US army.

The attack on Stalingrad wasn't a blunder - late in the struggle Göring's decision to drop the supplies the wrong place was however a big blunder.

Operation Barbarossa wasn't a blunder either, it was infact pretty good timing as the USSR was completely unprepared, it was besides highly likely that the USSR was eventually going to attack Germany, so Hitler decided not risk it and attack.

A true blunder, perhaps one of the very biggest of WW2, was Hitler deciding to bomb London instead of the British airfields - that was a war changing blunder for both fronts, east and west, for sure.


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## Njaco (May 12, 2007)

Good one, Soren.Hhave to add London Blitz to my list.


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## syscom3 (May 13, 2007)

How about two blunders in one nights action at sea.....?

The First Battle of Savo Island, Aug 8/9.

The IJN inflicts a one sided defeat on the USN. A total whooping. Blunder by the USN for being caught flat footed and unprepared.

Then the IJN admiral changes course and leaves the area without attacking the unarmed and unprepared allied transports only 30 minutes away. Blunder by the IJN for forgetting what their mission was for.

If those transports were sunk, then the US would have lost Guadalcanal right then and there.....


Battle of Savo Island - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Marcel (May 13, 2007)

Market Garden was a major diaster from the dutch point of view. Holland went through a hunger-winter in which thousands of people died from starvation. Had Market Garden succeeded, or other strategies been followed, war would probably have ended much earlier, preventing these hardships.
But I also agree with Soren. The german command during the BoB changed objectives every time a stategy paid off. The blitz as the finest example. I would say, appointing Goering as head of the LW was the biggest mistake, 'cause it led to the german defeat during the BoB, GB fighting on and eventually leading to Overlord, 3 front war and total defeat of Nazi Germany. So maybe I should say, europeans owe a lot to Herr Hermann then


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## Glider (May 13, 2007)

The greatest blunder in WW2 was when Stalin asked for terms and Hitler turned him down. Huge error, but I admit it was a political error not a military error.

For military I would suggest not finishing the British off in the Middle East before turning on Russia.


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## Njaco (May 13, 2007)

Sys, thats a great one. Savo Island was definately a blunder for both sides. I've read about it and seen PBS specials and I can't understand how someone, somewhere could not have seen what was happening.

I think I'm gonna change my vote from Barbarossa to the London Blitz. Although not earth-shattering, it was a classic blunder in every sense of the word.


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## Snautzer01 (May 13, 2007)

How about not making a real axe and persuade Japan to attack Russia the same time Germany did. No Oeral factory's and a lot of raw materials. 

Regards


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## Negative Creep (May 13, 2007)

I;m thinking it might be the Battle of Britain. Ok, not necessarily the Battle itself, but the implications were massive.

In the short term, it guaranteed Britain's survival, and showed the Luftwaffe was not all powerful. It showed the USA the determination of Britain to fight on, and the peace movement within the UK (which had been quite prominent after Dunkirk) was all but silenced. Although it had little military effect early on, as Hitler left few troops in France after Barbarossa, it still left Britain as a thorn in his side. Later on of course, it would allow the US a base from which the invasion of Europe could be launched. So by not invading Britain, or at least forcing a negotiated peace, the Germans would end up fighting an unwinnable war on two fronts. America would have been unlikely to have entered the European war if Britain was out; they would have no forward base and Hitler would have gained little from declaring war on them.

It could also be argued that the Russians would have received little subsequent lend lease aid, and more Axis troops could have been committed to invading Russia. I'm not saying it would have resulted in an automatic German victory, but failure to deal with one opponent at a time would cost the Nazis dear


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## HealzDevo (May 13, 2007)

Pearl Harbor as it failed to sink the American Carriers as it was planned to do, and brought the US into WW2, not something I think the Japanese were exactly planning on doing. In this respect Pearl Harbor was a strategic blunder by the Japanese with severe consequences for all the Axis...


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## Maharg (May 14, 2007)

Operation Barbarossa itself wasn't a blunder. Changing direction before the initial objectives had been taken was a biggie.

Bombing London out of spite was another blunder. I gave the RAF some breathing space, and the rest is history.

We are lucky Adolf was running the show, otherwise we may have been in trouble.


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## DOUGRD (May 15, 2007)

HealzDevo said:


> Pearl Harbor as it failed to sink the American Carriers as it was planned to do, and brought the US into WW2, not something I think the Japanese were exactly planning on doing. In this respect Pearl Harbor was a strategic blunder by the Japanese with severe consequences for all the Axis...



I voted for Barbarossa, as Maharg said, Hitlers biggest error was changing direction when he did. But I also wanted to interject something here about Pearl Harbor. Like Healzdevo said, it failed to sink the carriers. Interesting fact, why weren't the carriers in Pearl? Why were the West Coast battlewagons like the Arizona on temp duty based at Pearl until further orders? What I'd like to know is, has anyone else read "Day Of Deceit" by Robert B. Stinnett? It's sometimes hard, dry reading but there is some fascinating info here too. He alleges that not only did FDR and the USN expect an attack, it was deliberately provoked through an eight step program devised by the Navy. I'd like to know what other members take on this book is.


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## HealzDevo (May 15, 2007)

I was thinking of it as a really great military blunder as it failed not only to sink the aircraft carriers but it also enraged the US to come swinging out of its pacifist policies and start swinging for Japan and Germany. In that respect it was bad for all the Axis powers. I think there was something about Prime Minister Curtin receiving coded hints from a moderate Japanese Diplomat in the documentary Curtin... Not sure how real those events are though as they are depicted...


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (May 16, 2007)

Pearl Harbor was seen coming......by the radar detector.

I have heard rumors about FDR wanting Pearl Harbor.......sometimes alongside Dubbya Bush wanting 9/11.

But FDR probably was wondering if Japan would have to be fought......just like Dubbya Bush was wondering if Saddam Hussein needed a second pounding.


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## ToughOmbre (May 16, 2007)

DOUGRD said:


> What I'd like to know is, has anyone else read "Day Of Deceit" by Robert B. Stinnett? It's sometimes hard, dry reading but there is some fascinating info here too. He alleges that not only did FDR and the USN expect an attack, it was deliberately provoked through an eight step program devised by the Navy. I'd like to know what other members take on this book is.



*REVISONIST HISTORY*...Reading books like "Day of Deceit" is like reading "Chariots of the Gods". Interesting? Maybe, but total fantasy. One question for the Pearl Harbor conspiracy folks...If in fact "Washington/FDR/George Marshall/take your pick" knew of the Japanese intentions, why would *multiple* "War Warnings" be sent to all Pacific commanders, instructing them to prepare for hostilities in the days leading up to the attack? Do yourself a favor. If you don't like to read watch "Tora! Tora! Tora! One of the most accurate war movies ever made.


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## drogum (May 16, 2007)

You missed one on the list

Battle of Britain and not finishing off RAF when they were against the ropes.


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## Thorlifter (May 16, 2007)

I left the BoB off because it, in itself, was not one of the greatest military blunders. At least it wasn't on the level as most of the ones listed. Hitler's decisions in the BoB were simply a stepping stone on the path to his destruction.....In my opinion.


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## timshatz (May 16, 2007)

I'm going to split a hair here but think it oughta be said. I don't really consider Barbarossa a great blunder of WW2. Great mistake for Hitler, but not of the whole war. 

Here is where I'm splitting the hairs. The war between Russia (Soviets) and Germany (Nazis) was not a global war. They fought between Moscow and Berlin, and extended lines along that range. But it never left the Eurasian land mass. If you look at it from the perspective of history, it was really just the Huns and Slavs going at it for the umpteenth time in their history. Hell, even the campaign was named after a guy in the same fight from 700 or so years before. Now if you take it from the perspective of casualties, you might have an arguement (also the Sino-Japanese war would be a consideration). But from the perspective of a World War, it really had little to do with the rest of the World. The rest of the world affected it (Lend Lease being the obvious example), not the other way around. 

Hitler taking on the US was the Old World going at it against the New World and truely made it a World War. And it qualifies as a blunder. Meets the requirements of the thread.


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## Njaco (May 16, 2007)

I see what you mean Tim but should'nt the fact that Germany was involved in many different theatres qualify Barbarossa as also a "world war"? And Russia did draw in the British and Americans to join on the western flank and to supply with tanks and planes. As a blunder I'm not so sure. And along with the local hostile history, it still involved numerous nations.


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## plan_D (May 17, 2007)

The German invasion of the Soviet Union changed the war, and it was a World War before the U.S joined because Canada is in North America and thus already made it a global conflict. And a blunder is a mistake - whether it had a great effect on the war itself is not up for discussion; the greatest mistakes make the list... if Churchill tripping over his shoe-lace was the biggest blunder in World War II because everyone else was perfect; it would have had no affect on the war - but it'd have been the top blunder ! 

The invasion of Russia was far from a blunder, as Soren pointed out, it caught the Soviets off-guard. If Hitler had left it much longer, the Soviet Union would have been better prepared for the fight. Perfect timing would have been six weeks earlier - but events in the Balkans halted that.
What Hitler then proceeded to do was a mistake. Forget the whole changing direction thing; if Guderian had been allowed to withdraw to Smolensk during the winter of 1941 instead of maintaining the position then the Soviet counter-attack would have been halted and an effective assault toward Moscow could have been resumed in spring.

Syscom, sorry, but you sound like British High Command... those blunders were alright because they were really a good thing for the Allies. I thought only the British took victories from complete defeat. 

Operation _Market Garden_ was a defeat - the Allies took 90% of their objectives but it was all for nought given that the final, and only real, objective was never taken. Without the Arnhem crossing - it was all for nothing. 
Soren, I'm not sure if you're aware, but Montgomery had actually wanted _Market Garden_ earlier and, as we know, if it had been only ten-fifteen days earlier it would have succeeded as the SS Panzer Divisions would not have been present. 

Stalingrad was initially to be left alone, only its northen flank was to be held while the 4th Panzer Army ran riot in the Caucasus. Sending troops into Stalingrad itself was a blunder...through and through, it shouldn't have happened. 

My "favourite" blunder was that of the 21st Army Group ... it may be small; but it had the potential to end the war many months prior and allow the Allies to reach Berlin weeks before the Red Army. 

*THE CAPTURE OF ANTWERP!* 

When they had captured the city and further push would have met no resistance and the Scheldt would have been taken; there were no Germans there at the time. But it was left and Antwerp could not be used as a dock until the Scheldt was taken - but it was now fortified and took months to gain.


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## pbfoot (May 17, 2007)

After the capture of Antwerp the lack of action afterwords was a major error on the part of the allies . Having a fully functional port that they could not use has to rate fairly high on the list


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## plan_D (May 17, 2007)

I meant it may be small to people who rank those on that list as the greatest - but I have to say, as you pb, that it was a major-major **** up.


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## Njaco (May 17, 2007)

Plan, I agree with your take on Barbarossa but with one difference. You even stated it yourself. The failure to start several weeks earlier was probably the "blunder" of the operation. The rest of your argument is excellent. After that it was a mistake.

Stalingrad, to me, was a blunder because of the decision to abandon the drive to Moscow and head for the Caucasus.


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## timshatz (May 17, 2007)

I think we may be putting the cart before the horse with regards to the Soviet/German conflict. The US helped the Soviet Union not because it was allied with it for ideolgical or moral reasons. The US helped the Soviet Union because it was killing Germans. Same thing with England. Roosevelt rightly saw the threat of Nazi German as the greatest to the Free world but he did not value Communism as a replacement. To him, they were more or less both dispicable systems. 

As for Canada joining the war before the US and that bringing North America into the war, that is a debatable point at best. Canada declared war on Germany not as a Country in and of itself (it was not fully divested from Britian until 1982) but as a Dominion. The same can be said of any of the other countries that went to war against Germany due to dominion status. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa were all Dominion states, at various phases on the road to complete independence, but not quite there yet. The debatable point is that the war became global because the Dominions were in it. As independent states, no as they were essentially British States. From a Geographic position, your arguement is stronger. But fighting with the Dominions was very limited because neither the Germans or the Dominons could project much strength.

The US made the war global because of the reach of the US. The Soviet Union had no geographic reach (the GRU and Commitern not withstanding). None or very few Soviet Troops fought in the Desert, Or in the Atlantic, Pacific Islands ect. The war between Germany and Russia was very local in scope, horrible though it was. Meanwhile, US Troops fought all over the globe (with the exception of the war in the East). That is the meat to the arguement that Hitler's declaration of war on the US was a World War Blunder. It made it a World War. 

The 2nd World War was only a world war for the English speaking peoples of the world. For most of the other combatants, it was a relatively local conflict. With the exception of the Italian 8th Army in Russia, the Japanese Carrier Forces, the Spanish Blue Division (an anomoly in itself) and some U-boat and I-Boat operations, the war was fought for all combatants within 1,000 km of their home borders. The exception is the English speaking peoples. They moved and fought everywhere. For them, it was truely a World War. 

You could make an arguement that the involvement of Britian (and specifically it's dominions) made it a World War. But that would only occur when Japan attacked their possesions in the Far East (Hong Kong, Singapore, ect).


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## plan_D (May 17, 2007)

No it wouldn't; simply by the British Commonwealth being in the war - the war stretched across countries from every continent; making it a World War. Before the Japanese attacked the U.S - the war was in the far, middle and near East; Russia; West Europe, north and south Atlantic, North Africa. The only change was now the U.S was involved where Japan was already fighting. I don't know why you're trying to make the point that the U.S alone made it a global conflict - but no one else on this planet agrees with you, except other Americans, fact of the matter is people from all over the world were already involved.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (May 17, 2007)

If the Eskimos had joined the fight before the US, then it would have been a World War sooner. 

Basically, WWI was also still a world war before the US joined it. Even though a lot of the powers fighting were in the European Region. They were the top guns. 

I guess the argument that WWII isn't a world war is that a world war needs all the powerful countries in the world fighting each other. The US was one of the powerful, but we didn't realize that so well before Pearl Harbor. The US was uprepared for war, and we didn't even want to fight. So in 1940, except Great Britain perhaps, probably nobody thought the US was much of a contender and probably didn't feel like it much of an advantage or disadvantage to have us join in or not. Germany and Japan sure regretted it, a lot from our great factory production.

So, saying Canada makes it a full World War is a good bet, and if some other country like Mexico or Brazil had joined in before the US, even better.


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## syscom3 (May 17, 2007)

Before the US got involved, fighting was in:

Europe
Africa
Meditereanean Sea
North Atlantic Ocean
South Atlantic Ocean
North Asia (Manchuria)
China
SE Asia

That sounds like a world war to me!


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## pbfoot (May 17, 2007)

timshatz said:


> As for Canada joining the war before the US and that bringing North America into the war, that is a debatable point at best. Canada declared war on Germany not as a Country in and of itself (it was not fully divested from Britian until 1982) but as a Dominion.
> ).


 Not exactly corrrect in 1931 Britain lost all control of our foreign policy with the Treaty of Westminister. Canada declared war independently of the UK on Sept 10 39 seven days later after an emergency recall of parliment. I believe we beat most to the punch on by declaring war on Japan Romania Hungary and Finland on 7 dec 41.


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## YakFlyer (May 17, 2007)

I disagree with most said, i believe the biggest mistake was during Operation Sealion, when Hitler switched from bombing the RAF to bombing British Cities, if it wasn't for that change Britain would have capitulated, and who knows what would have happened to the USA and the rest of the world at large...


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## pbfoot (May 17, 2007)

plan_D said:


> I meant it may be small to people who rank those on that list as the greatest - but I have to say, as you pb, that it was a major-major **** up.


No I disagree it certainly was a diasaster nationally the Scheldt was a tough wet campaign that may not have been necessary


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## trackend (May 18, 2007)

> the Scheldt was a tough wet campaign that may not have been necessary


I can vouch for that PB my old man said that it was the toughest action he saw in the war and the first waves got slaughtered with LCA's and Buffalo's going up all over the place.
All the dykes had been blown and the squaddies where stuck to slogging it out along the tops of the embankments under heavy MG ART fire. All though not on Omaha he had been at Gold and Juno a few months earlier and later saw action in the far East.


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## timshatz (May 18, 2007)

A couple of points. 

I think the starting point of World War Two is either at one of two dates. Either it starts with the invasion of China by Japan in 1937 or it starts with Hitler declaring war on the US in 1941. The reasoning is either calling it at the first major players getting into it or the last. There is a decent arguement that the WW2 did not really happen as such and is simply an extension of the first. But that is long and involved and really rather not go that far. Suffice to say, if it is a World War (and that is what the topic is about) then either date could work. But to call WW2 start in September of 1939 or June of 1941 is to consider the war greater than it was at that point. 

As for calling Canada's involvement representative of the whole American continent, that is definitely stretching it a bit. While Canada was important to the war effort, at a population of roughly 11 million in 1940, it can hardly be considered the whole continent. There were probably another 200 million people in the Americas not actively involved in the war. That would mean 5% of the population was actual involved. Not really a world war at that point. 

Up to the US involvement in the war, you had several different wars going on at the same time. But all of them were restricted to their geographic area. There was very limited strategic reach. And that is what makes the war a world war. A bunch of wars going on at the same time, with enemies that the players have been fighting for the last 1000 years or so, does not make it a world war. It just makes it a very busy time for arms merchants. 

When the US came in, it satisfied several criteria. First, it was the last major player in the war. There were no other major population or industrial nations that were not in it. Secondly, the reach became global for the English speaking peoples. British, American, Australian, ect troops fought all around the globe. For these units, it was a global war. An American Carrier (or British Carrier) could and did fight in both Oceans (IE, the USS Wasp). The same could be said for Allied Aircrew. While that might happen for a German or Japenese Sub, that would be the extent of it. They fought local (in relative terms) wars.


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## Marcel (May 18, 2007)

Thorlifter said:


> I left the BoB off because it, in itself, was not one of the greatest military blunders. At least it wasn't on the level as most of the ones listed. Hitler's decisions in the BoB were simply a stepping stone on the path to his destruction.....In my opinion.



I would say, the BoB itself was not a major blunder, but the way the germans fought it.


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## DOUGRD (May 19, 2007)

ToughOmbre said:


> *REVISONIST HISTORY*...Reading books like "Day of Deceit" is like reading "Chariots of the Gods". Interesting? Maybe, but total fantasy. One question for the Pearl Harbor conspiracy folks...If in fact "Washington/FDR/George Marshall/take your pick" knew of the Japanese intentions, why would *multiple* "War Warnings" be sent to all Pacific commanders, instructing them to prepare for hostilities in the days leading up to the attack? Do yourself a favor. If you don't like to read watch "Tora! Tora! Tora! One of the most accurate war movies ever made.



I don't think I would shoot it all down as "Revisionist" because some material has only been declassified in the last several years. This Stinnett also includes 11 pages of these "War Warnings" in the book. One of the earliest was on Nov 24,1941 "...A surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Phillippines or Guam is a possibility..." Several warned of possible "subversive activities and sabotage in Hawaii". Off the subject but your comment about tora! tora! tora! reminded me of something. Just after "Top Gun" came out (Good flight deck scenes-lousy plot) the A-6 jocks in Norfolk VA. came out with a great bumper sticker " Fighter pilots make movies, Attack pilots make history" This refers to Top Gun of course and the retalitory strikes after the Marine barracks in Beriut was bombed.


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## HealzDevo (May 20, 2007)

I still say the greatest mistake was Pearl Harbour on the Japanese part because it was a minor victory with great negative consequences for the Axis powers. Yes Japan did win early on but it was fighting superior tanks and superior manufacturing and just couldn't compete. Similarly Germany was outclassed by the speed of Allied Manufacturing. Germany just couldn't produce enough tanks of sufficient quality to really compete against the storm of metal, the Allies were putting against them. Because for almost 100% of the war Germany was fighting alone as an effective force, sure they did have Allies but the effectiveness of these Allies was always questionable on the war... Italians were more of a hinderance to Germany than a help, North Afrika anyone? Ethopia where they were beaten back by tribesmen with spears when they had tanks and Armoured Cars as another example?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 20, 2007)

HealzDevo said:


> Germany just couldn't produce enough tanks of sufficient quality to really compete against the storm of metal, the Allies were putting against them.



Sufficient Quality?


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## HealzDevo (May 20, 2007)

Okay, probably the wrong word, but still I am saying that they were still fielding early tanks late into the war that were intended as training tanks and that these tanks didn't have the same ability in combat to match the later Shermans and the churchills. Also the Italians kept requesting help to dig them out of bad situations like North Afrika, and Greece. This therefore led to Germany having to divert their attention from other theatres.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 21, 2007)

HealzDevo said:


> Okay, probably the wrong word, but still I am saying that they were still fielding early tanks late into the war that were intended as training tanks and that these tanks didn't have the same ability in combat to match the later Shermans and the churchills. Also the Italians kept requesting help to dig them out of bad situations like North Afrika, and Greece. This therefore led to Germany having to divert their attention from other theatres.



?????

The most common and numerous German tank of WW2 was the Panzer IV and it had no problem fighting against Shermans and Churchills.


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## Njaco (May 21, 2007)

> ....these tanks didn't have the same ability in combat to match the later Shermans and the churchills...



from
Tiger Tank , King Tiger
Tiger -The Tiger was a heavy tank (55 tons) with a crew of five. It carried 84 rounds for its killer 88mm gun, and was also armed with two machine guns, one coaxial and one above the front hull, with almost 6000 rounds.

King Tiger - The King Tiger had a crew of five. It was armed with an extremely powerful long-barrelled 88mm gun, even more powerful than that of the Tiger, which fired armor-piercing rounds at a muzzle velocity of 1200 meters per second, about a third faster than those fired by the Tiger.

Sherman - As a vehicle, the M4 Sherman was very reliable, and as such it was superior to the German tanks, but as a tank the M4 Sherman had several problems, especially when compared to its enemies, the German tanks. It was simply inferior to them is most aspects. It had a relatively thin armor, an inferior 75mm or 76mm gun which simply could not penetrate the front armor of the German Tiger tanks even from short range, while they could easily destroy the Sherman from long ranges, and it was very tall, 3.43m, which is taller than the German Tigers, and one meter taller than the superb Russian T-34. It means the Sherman could not hide as well as other tanks, which is likely what its crews wanted to do when German Tigers were nearby. With such inferiority in firepower, armor, and shape, no wonder the Sherman crews saw the German Tiger tanks as a formidable monster. 

Churchill - It was served by a crew of five and mounted two 7.92-millimetre machine guns in addition to its main gun. Its successor, the Mark V, was fitted with a 95-millimetre howitzer, but the Mark VI and VII returned to the format of the 75-millimetre gun. These later Churchills were still outgunned by their German counterparts, but their thick protective armour partly compensated for the inadequacy of their firepower.

It was a matter of quanity vs quality. Germany had the superior tanks just not enough of them.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 21, 2007)

Njaco said:


> It was a matter of quanity vs quality. Germany had the superior tanks just not enough of them.



Exactly...


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## Negative Creep (May 21, 2007)

I was reading a book last night that claimed the invasion of Greece was the biggest mistake. Although a pretty swift victory, it nonetheless delayed Barbarossa by critical weeks. In the author's view, if it wasn't for this they could've been in Moscow by the time winter set in, and the war could've been very different. Opinions?


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## Njaco (May 21, 2007)

Invasion of the Balkans was definately a blunder for upsetting the timetable for Barbarossa.


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## drgondog (Jul 6, 2007)

I lean to Stalingrad and Market Garden as major military blunders with Pearl Harbor and Barbarossa as great Political blunders but great military successes!

Too many casualties at Stalingrad before Paulus Surrendered and *two* bad things about Market Garden 1.) Patton stopped in his tracks by Monty and b.) a great opportunity to capitalize on the greatest Airborne feats of the war and actually get into Germany. Poor intelligence doomed the latter but nowhere/no time in any war did the 'Troopers get it done better than the 82nd, 101st (Puking Buzzards) and Brit/Polish Airborne. 

What a waste and Monty continued to use those chips mercilously after the operation failed.

Barbarossa cost Hitler a future chance of negotiated peace with Britain and perhaps even total security of holding all of Western Europe - Japan simply lost its mind by attacking the US.


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## ToughOmbre (Jul 6, 2007)

drgondog said:


> What a waste and Monty continued to use those chips mercilously after the operation failed.



Well, as Capt. Hamill, speaking about Monty in _Saving Private Ryan_, said to Capt. Miller "That guy's over-rated".


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## timshatz (Jul 6, 2007)

I'm no great fan of Montgomery (when I start of a posting like that on this board, I know I'm asking for it but...) but I think the guy did Ok given his circumstances. He did win the first All British (colonial allies and other countries included) straight battle against the Germans at El Alamain and followed it up with a successful campaign that ended the Axis presence in Africa. Gotta give him credit for that (American troop landings of Operation Torch were very important to the win but his was the main fight for most of it).

Sicily and Italy, so-so. Competent.

Normandy he gets a bad wrap. Depending on your perspective, either rightfully so or he is maligned. He did plan to take Caen in the first day (if not the first several days) of Overlord. Took much longer. Changed his PR from "Being the lead in the offensive" to "taking the German brunt while the Americans broke out". Some of this was Montgomery's ego talking (lead in the offensive) and some of it was the plan (pushing while the US broke out) but when it came to the plan actually being "The Plan" is a good guess. I've heard it both ways (Monty was the lead and Monty holds the flank). 

But he also had a big problem on his hands. His forces were not going to get any larger after Normandy. From June 6 onwards, his forces get steadily weaker while the US forces get stronger. In short, the Brits were running out of men. Yet he had to keep a position in the Allied forces that would not force the Brits aside as a junior partner. He had to husband his manpower and still fight (and win) battles. He did that by fighting set piece battles and using firepower whenever possible. He didn't rush it. He didn't take un-needed chances. 

Montgomery's real failing was his ability to piss off just about anybody he met that he didn't win over. He had a powerful ego (most of the leadership on both sides did) that got the better of him. In a force that was a mixture from all places and races, that can easily be constituted as arrogance and contempt. Not good for an Allied force.


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## timshatz (Jul 6, 2007)

Negative Creep said:


> I was reading a book last night that claimed the invasion of Greece was the biggest mistake. Although a pretty swift victory, it nonetheless delayed Barbarossa by critical weeks. In the author's view, if it wasn't for this they could've been in Moscow by the time winter set in, and the war could've been very different. Opinions?



Have heard that too. Dunno. The Germans were at the end of the line when they got to Moscow. No energy, long supply lines, you name it, they were short on it. The Soviets were short too. But they were falling back on their lines of communications. That helps immensely.

I think, long and short, that the Germans just bit off more than they could chew in Russia. It did to them what it did to everyone. Swallowed them. Swallowed the Soveit Army too. Russia is big enough to bury more than one army at a time. 

Probably why there was no serious plan to Invade the Soviet Union in the Cold war. Containment and let the in inherint contradictions of Communism destroy the Soviets from within. 

Russia is just too damn big.


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## drgondog (Jul 6, 2007)

timshatz said:


> I'm no great fan of Montgomery (when I start of a posting like that on this board, I know I'm asking for it but...) but I think the guy did Ok given his circumstances. He did win the first All British (colonial allies and other countries included) straight battle against the Germans at El Alamain and followed it up with a successful campaign that ended the Axis presence in Africa. Gotta give him credit for that (American troop landings of Operation Torch were very important to the win but his was the main fight for most of it).
> 
> *I agree Monty's importance in North Africa.
> 
> ...



One can only wonder what the outcome would have been if Patton had received Priority instead of Market Garden.

Regards,

Bill


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## Glider (Jul 6, 2007)

timshatz said:


> I'm no great fan of Montgomery (when I start of a posting like that on this board, I know I'm asking for it but...) but I think the guy did Ok given his circumstances. He did win the first All British (colonial allies and other countries included) straight battle against the Germans at El Alamain and followed it up with a successful campaign that ended the Axis presence in Africa. Gotta give him credit for that (American troop landings of Operation Torch were very important to the win but his was the main fight for most of it).
> 
> Sicily and Italy, so-so. Competent.
> 
> ...



Have to agree with every word of this.


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## The Basket (Jul 6, 2007)

Dunkirk was a big blunder. UK would have had to talk terms because our army was gone...our troops and heavy equipment.

End of Churchill and peace terms with Hitler.

We may not have surrendered but Hitler would have had a free hand to attack USSR and the Yanks could not have used UK as airbase.


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## timshatz (Jul 7, 2007)

Going out on a limb here but...

Think Patton's plan had problems as well as Montgomery's. Both plans were based on the idea of a narrow front assault to take key features (Bridges, Cities, ect) and turn the enemy's flank in the larger sense. The problem with both plans is their limited scope for unlimited gains. The time for that was probably over by September of 1944. 

The German collapse and retreat through France/Belguim was a result of 2.5 months of heavy combat in Normandy. The Battle of Normandy was about who could resupply and keep up the pressure faster. The Germans lost. They could not keep feeding in troops or supplies. After long and intense combat, they literally came apart. Thereafter, it was a race for the German border. Everybody headed for home (from the German perspective). 

But at the German Border (or close to it in many cases), the advantages come back to the Germans. The Allies are on the end of a long supply line, the Germans have fallen back on theirs and they are fighting on or close to home soil. A limited front attack allows the Germans to focus their defensive powers on one attack. Either General, Patton or Montgomery, was facing long odds. 

It is also probably that the time of ripost attacks was over. The war had refined itself. An attack by an enemy into your rear no longer led to panic at all levels. People knew what to do (hold the shoulders, delay the advance, attack the follow up elements, cut the supply lines). It was 1944, not 1940. The Blitzkrieg (no matter who was practicing it) was now standard technique. So was the response to it. 

I think Eisenhower figured this out by the time of the Bulge. It was one of the reasons why he did not opt for Patton's 3rd Army attacking into the German rear and told them to go to Bastogne. The war was a broad front war of resources, not a slashing war of Blitzkrieg. The lighting attack could work, but only after the enemy had been worn down by long, expensive and broad front warfare.


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## Soren (Jul 15, 2007)

Patton wasted men where it wasn't necessary, he was overly aggressive.


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## trackend (Jul 15, 2007)

timshatz said:


> I'm no great fan of Montgomery (when I start of a posting like that on this board, I know I'm asking for it but...) but I think the guy did Ok given his circumstances. He did win the first All British (colonial allies and other countries included) straight battle against the Germans at El Alamain



I think General Alexander never got the credit he deserved for El Alamain 
and Montgomery was happy to receive all the praise being the prima donna he was.


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## timshatz (Jul 15, 2007)

trackend said:


> I think General Alexander never got the credit he deserved for El Alamain
> and Montgomery was happy to receive all the praise being the prima donna he was.



Think you're right on that one Trackend. Alexander was on of the very good and overlooked British Generals of the war (IMHO). He, Park, Slim and Auckinleck were very good at their jobs, in varying degrees (Park being the best and Auchinleck the least of the unknowns). If Alexander had a down side, it was leaving too much in the hands of his subordinates (Clark making a run for Rome instead of cutting off the German retreat is a prime example- but I don't like Clark and I think History has pretty much nailed him as a headline grabber). He was the direct opposite of Monty, relaxed, smooth, calming. Over the years, I think historians have been kind to him. 

Park was great during the Battle of Britian and great during Malta. Fought Kesselring (who was very good) twice and beat him both times. When the Brits were having a very tough time with the Germans, Park always won. Granted, he was fighting from the superior strategic position (defensive) but so were the French!

Slim is just plain forgotten. Ran the war in the East and took a broken army, remolded it and sent it back against the Japanese where it eventually triumphed. Like the British effort in the Far East, he is generally not known. 

Auckinleck is the guy who Alexander replaced. Good general, when in charge against Rommel, he kept him in check at El Alamein. Calm, smart, unruffled. But he was a poor jugde of ability and had a tendency to stay loyal to subordinates too long. Cost him his job in the end.


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## ToughOmbre (Jul 15, 2007)

Soren said:


> Patton wasted men where it wasn't necessary, he was overly aggressive.



I sure the brave men of the 101st Airborne Division, defending Bastogne in December '44, would disagree with you.


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## Stupid (Jul 16, 2007)

Eh , I'm the minority and voted for stalingrad because the germans lost the entire 8th army among other things. Hitler would have had to declare war on the US as part of the pact with Japan. I think that was in the pact anyways....


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 16, 2007)

I dont think that Germany had to delcare war because of the pact. Japan was not fighting Russia even though Germany declared war on Russia.


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## Stupid (Jul 16, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Japan was not fighting Russia even though Germany declared war on Russia.



Oh yeah...
Okay I fold.


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## timshatz (Jul 17, 2007)

I'm not positive but I think the pact stated that the members of the Axis were obligated to declare war only in the case of another member being attacked. In other words, only if the Axis member were on the defensive from the start. Japan attacked the US, British, British Colonial and European Colonial possesions in December of 1941. Hence, the Germans were not obligated to declare war. Hitler was an idiot for doing it. 

But it does raise an interesting question. How would the war had turned out if Germany does not go to war against the US in 1941? Granted, it would've happened that the US and Germany would've gotten into it sooner or later. But initially, the US would've focused on Japan (which is where the majority of Americans wanted the forces to go in the first place). Would Lend Lease have continued on the same scale? Would the US Atlantic Fleet have transferred to the Pacific? Would the Japanese expansion stopped earlier? When would the US go to war against Germany? Would the Soviet Union have survived the Winter of 41 and 42 with reduced supplies from the US and no North African Invasion?

An interesting "What If".


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## utgotye (Jul 24, 2007)

Aside from the fact that the decision to go to ware (declare war) is political in nature and that I believe the Germans would have defeated the Russians if they had chosen 1 or 2 goals as opposed to several, I would have to say Pearl Harbor.


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## rogthedodge (Jul 25, 2007)

timshatz said:


> Think you're right on that one Trackend. Alexander was on of the very good and overlooked British Generals of the war (IMHO). He, Park, Slim and Auckinleck were very good at their jobs, in varying degrees (Park being the best and Auchinleck the least of the unknowns). If Alexander had a down side, it was leaving too much in the hands of his subordinates (Clark making a run for Rome instead of cutting off the German retreat is a prime example- but I don't like Clark and I think History has pretty much nailed him as a headline grabber). He was the direct opposite of Monty, relaxed, smooth, calming. Over the years, I think historians have been kind to him.
> 
> Park was great during the Battle of Britian and great during Malta. Fought Kesselring (who was very good) twice and beat him both times. When the Brits were having a very tough time with the Germans, Park always won. Granted, he was fighting from the superior strategic position (defensive) but so were the French!
> 
> ...



Alexander's performance in Burma / India was less than stella though.

I'd say Slim is *largely* forgotten rather than completely. 

His performance in India / Burma (in spite of Alexander Irwin) is rightly regarded as probably the single most impressive by any individual in WW2 - he re-trained his army based on his own doctrine and then led it back. Amazing, especially given the lack of extra resources and the British Armies' general lack of 'new' thinking shown at the time.

Interestingly there are just 3 WW2 generals' statues outside the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall: Brooke, Montgomery and Slim. Slim being the only one shown armed and in 'combat dress' (the other two are 'parade dress' and look a bit snooty, particularly Brooke  )

I'd agree on Clark.


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## timshatz (Jul 25, 2007)

Think the Statue guy got it right on Brooke. He was snooty. Nobody ever called him warm. But, like they say, the job description didn't include "Warm and Fuzzy". He had a tough job. I may be the only one that says that, but keeping Churchill from doing another Gallipoli (what was it about the Med that so facinated Churchill, guy started two campaigns in two wars and both were dogs, don't get it) or thinking up some other crazy idea that wouldn't work kept him buzy all war long something of a minder. Marshall had a much easier time with Roosevelt than Brooke with Churchill. 

The more I read about the Far East Campaign from 12-7-41 on, the more I think there really wasn't going to be anything to stop the Japanese. The Brits/Dutch/Americans/Australians did their best (especially at the rank of Major and below) but there was nothing that was going to stop the Imperial Army/Navy. Slow it down, maybe. But not by much. The Allies had a peace mentality, a truely inept staff in Colonial Capitals and second rate equipment. And everyone knew it. I think that may be one of the reasons Alexander really didn't get the blame for it. It was not a question of "if" in the Far East, but "when". 

Makes Slim's achievement all that more impressive. Also, while he maybe overlooked in England, he is unknown in the US. Don't think it's anything personal, most people in the US don't even know there was fighting in the CBI during WW2 and that Americans were involved. Haven't made a movie about it in 40 years!


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## rogthedodge (Jul 26, 2007)

I know what you mean - when there was a US film made 'Burma Victory' it caused such a stink here it was withdrawn from release.

Books on Slim are thin on the ground, reading 'Slim - Master of War' at the moment - good but largely a re-write of 'Slim The Standard Bearer'. Both suffer from poor mapping and inadequate desrciptions of the battlefields.

Unfortunately Wingate gets a lot of the credit (maybe the zionist link and his penchant for self-publicity) but most forget he was subordinate to Slim. When Wingate cracked it was Slim who ordered him to carry on.

Stilwell famous hated limeys but although Stilwell technically out-ranked Slim he agreed to serve under Slim - a fine endorsement. 

Stilwell was also scathing about Alexander taking the credit for the Burcorps retreat.

I read somewhere that Slim had 500,000 men under his command at the peak (can't find a reliable source for that though). 

If that's the case did he command one of the biggest armies on the allied (non-Russian) side?

The more I read about Slim the more convinced I am he was a much better general than Monty, Patton or Rommel

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

My mistake it was 'Objective Burma!' that caused the stink was withdrawn, 'Burma Victory' was the UK documentary film which gave all of the credit to Mountabatten Alexander and they had to add words about Slim at the end to balance it! Neither was perfect!


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## timshatz (Jul 26, 2007)

rogthedodge said:


> I know what you mean - when there was a US film made 'Burma Victory' it caused such a stink here it was withdrawn from release.
> 
> Books on Slim are thin on the ground, reading 'Slim - Master of War' at the moment - good but largely a re-write of 'Slim The Standard Bearer'. Both suffer from poor mapping and inadequate desrciptions of the battlefields.
> 
> ...



Good post. Agreed.


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## ccheese (Jul 26, 2007)

What if Japan had made another raid on Pearl Harbor ? This time got the
sub pens, the fuel farm, the dry docks ?
What if they had not retreated when they had "Taffey 3" 
bottled up ? Halsey was 800 miles away !

Good question !!

Charles


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## ToughOmbre (Jul 26, 2007)

ccheese said:


> What if Japan had made another raid on Pearl Harbor ? This time got the
> sub pens, the fuel farm, the dry docks ?
> What if they had not retreated when they had "Taffey 3"
> bottled up ? Halsey was 800 miles away !
> ...



If the Japanese (specifically Nagumo) had any guts we would have been in a lot worse shape on December 7th. They might have even been able to catch a carrier or two (Enterprise for sure). A better Pearl harbor strategy by Japan might have extended the war, but the outcome eventually would be the same. Same for Leyte Gulf. If Kurita's forces pressed their advantage against Taffy 3, American casualties would have been far higher in the Phillipines and the war would certainly have been prolonged. But eventually there were destined to be mushroom clouds sprouting over Japanese cities.


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## ccheese (Jul 26, 2007)

I like that part:

_"But eventually there were destined to be mushroom clouds sprouting over Japanese cities."_

Charles


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## Macchi (Jul 27, 2007)

Personally I don't think Japan stood a chance, even if they'd sunk the entire U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl, carriers and all. Every mistake they made after that was just another grain of sand falling in the hourglass of their eventual failure. 

Germany on the other hand, could have pulled off a victory, so I'll pick over three things. Firstly, I don't believe Barbarossa itself to be a blunder, but feel the mistake was in the overconfidence behind it. The German counter-intelligence did such a great job of instilling paranoia in Stalin that he'd liquidated a good part of his own General Staff before 1941. The real blunder was Germany's deactivation of over 40 divisions from the Eastern Front in the autumn of 1941, believing that victory was foregone. Then there was the aspect of not having proper winter clothing and materials available through the 1941-42 season... perhaps also part of their overconfidence. I think the German Army splitting between Moscow and the Caucasus could have succeeded if their original force had been left intact and properly supplied for a slightly longer campaign. With the Russian Front won and closed, Germany would have secured monstrous supplies of raw materials, foods, and their all important oil. They could have then gone back and dealt with England for round two, more dangerous than ever. The failures of Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain were not deal breakers if Russia had been submitted. The worst Germany could have done from that point is a stalemate. With the bulk of the German Army back on the Western Front, D-Day would never have gotten past the beaches. 

Second, aside from vanity, Germany no business being in North Africa, Greece, Crete, or (the eventual) Yugoslavia. These endeavors chewed up occupation troops and resources that could have been used elsewhere. Hungary, Romania and the Bulgaria alliances made sense only to the point they provided troops for Germany in the Russian campaign... which would all have been unnecessary if Hitler had not squandered his advantage from 1941. 

Thirdly, there was Germany's failure around the Enigma system. Germany had a solution to Bletchley Park, despite not being aware the Allies were already reading their mail. The four wheel Enigma machine evolved to become a five wheel device. But because not every machine could be replaced at once, the four wheel units had to be able to read messages sent from the five wheel versions. The five wheel Enigma was essentially a fruitless evolution. If the two versions had been kept entirely separate, the Allies would have been deaf to German Intelligence traffic from mid 1943 onwards. 

Beyond those, throw in a few Luftwaffe crumbs about Goring getting in the way of a good airforce, jet/rocket advances being ignored until it was too late and that Willy Messerschmidt probably should have shot in 1938. Everything was there for Germany to succeed. Thank goodness only hindsight is 20-20.


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## Aussie1001 (Jul 27, 2007)

Honestly i read some Americans saying back there at the start of the thread that Germany's first mistake was declaring war on the states. Rubbish in my opinion Germanys biggest mistake was not finishing the Battle of Britian. The English were stretched so tight with their airforce that another couple of moths at the most would have broken them and then with Uk subdued they would be free to concentrate their might on Russia who without the Atlantic convoys would have been up s**t creek would have been beaten and then Germany and Japan would have been free to take on the states. And don't say that they would not have fallen becuase at the time and indeed through out most of the war Germany was the leader with reguard to technologicial advances and the japs had the determination and the numbers and without scientist like Albert Einstine who was flown out to the states there would have been no A bomb...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 27, 2007)

I happen to disagree with that Aussie because even if they had destroyed the RAF they would not have been able to sustain an invasion of England and all it would have done was bogged down more forces than it allready was.


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## timshatz (Jul 27, 2007)

Also disagree with Aussie on Einstien's contribution to the bomb. His major contribution was in two parts, one in the development of matter into energy (and vice versa) better known as E=M (the C square part is not absolutely needed to get your head around the thing). 

Secondly, Einstien wrote two letters to FDR (not one as is generally thought) about the German Nuclear Potential (not a project, but the potential for creating a bomb). First one was an alert letter and is the one generally known. It said the Germans could build the bomb and the Western Democracies (specifically the US) better get on the stick. The second one was a more threatening one to FDR. It said that nothing had been done since the first letter had been written and if FDR didn't get cracking, Einstien would go public and let the world know what was going on. The Manhatten project started shortly thereafter (in a convoluted way, but it started). 

But Einstein was not really a big deal in the Manhatten project. In truth, he was barely involved. The big names in the project were Oppenheimer, Groves, Lawrence, Kurti, Simon, to some extent- Fermi. The list is pretty long. 

But Einstein's real gift to Physics was pretty much done by about 1920. Thereafter, he pretty much satisfied himself with working on the Unified Force or Field theory that all matter came down to one force that is the grand daddy of all forces. 

Doubtless there are others who have a better line on it that I do on this board but Einstien really wasn't a biggie in the engineering of the actual bomb.


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## Marcel (Jul 27, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> my opinion Germanys biggest mistake was not finishing the Battle of Britian. .



Hmmm, maybe the biggest mistake of Germany was even starting the whole damned war or maybe earlier, alowing Hitler to become their head of state


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## The Basket (Jul 27, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> Honestly i read some Americans saying back there at the start of the thread that Germany's first mistake was declaring war on the states. Rubbish in my opinion Germanys biggest mistake was not finishing the Battle of Britian. The English were stretched so tight with their airforce that another couple of moths at the most would have broken them and then with Uk...


Did you know the RAF was stronger at the end of the BoB than the beginning?
Did you know that the RAF would simply have gone further north and continued fighting?
How many planes could the Luftwaffe lose before giving it up as a bad lot?
Had it gone longer then it would have been autumn and winter and few good flying days.
Even without airpower,the Germans would still have to invade.


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## Hunter368 (Jul 27, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> Honestly i read some Americans saying back there at the start of the thread that Germany's first mistake was declaring war on the states. Rubbish in my opinion Germanys biggest mistake was not finishing the Battle of Britian. The English were stretched so tight with their airforce that another couple of moths at the most would have broken them and then with Uk subdued they would be free to concentrate their might on Russia who without the Atlantic convoys would have been up s**t creek would have been beaten and then Germany and Japan would have been free to take on the states. And don't say that they would not have fallen becuase at the time and indeed through out most of the war Germany was the leader with reguard to technologicial advances and the japs had the determination and the numbers and without scientist like Albert Einstine who was flown out to the states there would have been no A bomb...



There is several great threads on the BoB here, the Germans were never even close to winning the BoB. Also they never could of won the battle even if their navy got involved. Go read those threads and you will understand. Germans never would of won it in 39-40 with the weapons and numbers involved during that period.


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## Aussie1001 (Jul 27, 2007)

Hunter c'mon really where do you get your information read Ginger Lacy's autobiography for one. That should give you some idea on how tight they really were.


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## Desert Fox (Jul 27, 2007)

Starting Operation Barbarossa stretched the Germans too far. Their supply lines were too long, and their forces were strewn across the globe, in not enough concentration to make any head way against the Allies. Attacking the Soviets was the straw that broke the camel's back in my opinion.


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## Hunter368 (Jul 27, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> Hunter c'mon really where do you get your information read Ginger Lacy's autobiography for one. That should give you some idea on how tight they really were.




Trust me, it is a well covered subject. Go research it more. Go to the threads I told you to read. The books you have read have many half truths in them. Go read the threads. I have read countless books on BoB, I have read more books on BoB then years you have been alive. Do more research and you will see the RAF was no where close to being broken in BoB. She was stronger at the end of BoB then she was at the start of it.

Go read the threads, trust me its been covered to death already.


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## Aussie1001 (Jul 28, 2007)

I may sometimes open my mouth without thinking someting through however if you know Ginger Lacy was one of the top scoring aces of the battle of britian shooting down over 20 aircraft. IF he doesn't know then i don't know who does.


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## Aussie1001 (Jul 28, 2007)

Hunter368 said:


> There is several great threads on the BoB here, the Germans were never even close to winning the BoB. Also they never could of won the battle even if their navy got involved. Go read those threads and you will understand. Germans never would of won it in 39-40 with the weapons and numbers involved during that period.



Ok this thing has got a few holes in it 
1) The home guard in the bob were being trained to use pitch forks and shovels for weapons as there was a critical shortage of rifles and indeed almost everything due to dunkirk where all the equiptment was left behinde after being destroyed by the british themselves so the germans could not have it. The british therefore had little arms and armour in the way of armies.
sure they might have been one of the forerunners in navies at the time and maybe they did have an airforce that had so far taken everything the Germans could throw at it but i maintain that the BOB would have been lost if the germans had have kept up their air attacks...


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## mkloby (Jul 28, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> Honestly i read some Americans saying back there at the start of the thread that Germany's first mistake was declaring war on the states. Rubbish in my opinion Germanys biggest mistake was not finishing the Battle of Britian. The English were stretched so tight with their airforce that another couple of moths at the most would have broken them and then with Uk subdued they would be free to concentrate their might on Russia who without the Atlantic convoys would have been up s**t creek would have been beaten and then Germany and Japan would have been free to take on the states. And don't say that they would not have fallen becuase at the time and indeed through out most of the war Germany was the leader with reguard to technologicial advances and the japs had the determination and the numbers and without scientist like Albert Einstine who was flown out to the states there would have been no A bomb...



First off - what's with this anti-American vibe? Japan got rocked 6 ways to Sunday by starting a war with the US. The Germans had absolutely no effective way to take the war to the US across the Atlantic ocean.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 28, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> Ok this thing has got a few holes in it
> 1) The home guard in the bob were being trained to use pitch forks and shovels for weapons as there was a critical shortage of rifles and indeed almost everything due to dunkirk where all the equiptment was left behinde after being destroyed by the british themselves so the germans could not have it. The british therefore had little arms and armour in the way of armies.
> sure they might have been one of the forerunners in navies at the time and maybe they did have an airforce that had so far taken everything the Germans could throw at it but i maintain that the BOB would have been lost if the germans had have kept up their air attacks...




The Home Guard has nothing to do with winning or losing the BoB. The BoB was a battle fought between the Luftwaffe adn the RAF. The RAF was close at the beginning to being destroyed but as Hunter put it, as the end of the battle was near the RAF was far from being destroyed.

Here is why...

1. The Luftwaffe did not have the range to fight for very long over England.

2. The Luftwaffe did not have the range to fight the RAF that would have moved farther north into England had it needed to do so.

3. Stupid mistakes by German upper staff (namely Hitler and Goerring) who ordered the Luftwaffe to concentrate on British Cities rather than targets of strategic importance.

If the Luftwaffe had continued to bomb the factories, airfields and radar sites she had a chance, but as soon as she started the Blitz of British cities and stopped concentrating on the above targets the battle was lost.

Even if Germany had gained air supperiority she would not have been able to launch a successful invasion of England. The Royal Navy was too powerful and I seriously doubt that Germany could logistically sustain the forces required to take and hold England.

As Hunter said go and read the BoB threads. I am sure you will find them interesting and there is some very good discussions in there.


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## renrich (Jul 28, 2007)

Whew, so many opinions, many misinformed. The Adler sums it up nicely though. The Germans never had an air force that could win the BOB and in my opinion BOB is highly overrated as far as a turning point in the war. If it came down to it, the RAF would have, as Basket stated, withdrawn it's fighters further north and west, out of range of the 109s and waited for the invasion. This does not diminish in any way the effort put up by the RAF in BOB. It was magnificent. Actually, I don't believe that Germany ever was really serious about invading England in 1940. Their Generals and Admirals knew they would have had only a slim chance of success. About the same chance of success as the allies would have had had the tried to invade Europe in 1942 or 43. I agree that Slim is a highly underrated commander, perhaps the best field commander of WW2.


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## trackend (Jul 28, 2007)

The only thing I would say about the BOB was that up until that point the German forces had not suffered any major defeats and seemed almost unstoppable the BOB was a defeat for the Germans and a major one this is why it is regarded by some as a turning point it turned from nothing but victory's for the Germans to the first significant defeat and showed that they could be beaten. It did much for the British moral and demonstrated to the world that the UK was not a lost cause. Although probably Mrs Miniver had more effect in gaining US sympathy towards the British even though it was released some time later.


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## Aussie1001 (Jul 29, 2007)

I know the home guard had nothing to do with the BOB 
however i was just pointing out the if the Germans had managed to gain air superiorty wich they narrowly missed out on due to ****heads like Hitler and Goering they would have had the pomes by the balls.
Even the Royal navy would not be able to do much in the face of total air superiority. And as WW2 definitivly proved that if you ain't got an airforce then your navy is screwed. 
True the BOB was lost because the germans decided to go bomb london and other cities which gave the airforce time to regroup.


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## trackend (Jul 29, 2007)

sorry mucked up my post


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## trackend (Jul 29, 2007)

I disagree Aussie the naval forces would have been hammered by the LW but with the type of junk that was planed to be used for Sea lion it would have only required a few destroyers to survive and it would have been good bye invasion fleet. Even though the LW was powerful the RN in 1939 consisted of

15 Battleships battlecruisers
7 Aircraft carriers
66 Cruisers
184 Destroyers
45 escort and numorous MTB's MGB's
60 Submarines which coincidently was more than twice the number of subs than the Germans had in 1939.
The LW would have had it's work cut out trying to sink even half that number of vessels and thats assuming that the RAF didn't exist at all.
Its only 20 miles across the channel so the Battleships/Cruisers could have engaged the task force almost while still swinging on the hook.

Sorry guys for going off track and the double post I know this has been discussed another thread.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 29, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> Ihowever i was just pointing out the if the Germans had managed to gain air superiorty wich they narrowly missed out on due to



That is the thing, it was only that close in the beginning. By the end of the BoB the British were able to build eneogh aircraft to sustain there losses. It was not as close as you make it seem.


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## renrich (Jul 29, 2007)

As I mentioned earlier am rereading a book by Peter Townsend about BOB. The point that jumps out at you is the time frames involved. The French surrendered in mid June, 1940. At that time the Germans had not firmly decided to invade Britain. Hitler vacillated and Raeder seemed to never be onboard totally because he understood the vast disparity between the RN and KM. Raeder met with Hitler on June 20 and strongly suggested blockade or "seige" with submarines. At that time Hitler was concerned about high losses in an invasion and hoped to talk Britain into an accomodation. THEY HAD NO LANDING CRAFT at this time. The BOB ended in September in failure for the Germans. It is ridiculous to speculate that landing craft would suddenly materialise between June and September when Raeder was suggesting to Hitler that they begin designing landing craft in late June. It took the Allies years to design and build enough landing craft for the Normandy invasion. They were short of landing craft for Torch and it was much smaller than Sealion would have been. Still BOB was a tremendous victory for Britain, the first defeat for Hitler but Sealion in my opinion was never going to be a reality.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 29, 2007)

Agreed


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## syscom3 (Jul 29, 2007)

We had a whole thread dedicated to analyzing a potential German invasion of England at any time.... and it was proven to be impossible to achieve success.


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## glennasher (Jul 29, 2007)

Townsend's book is excellent, by the way.


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## renrich (Jul 29, 2007)

Townsend's book is excellent. I have had it in my library for many years and read it when I first bought it but did not remember until this latest reading that it had as much background material on the LW and the war as it has.


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## Njaco (Jul 29, 2007)

The point at which the Luftwaffe came CLOSE to winning BoB was on Sept. 6 when the RAF was exhausted...but not OUT. Sept 7 change of plans, attack cities, leave airfields alone and therefore by the end of BoB in OCTOBER, yes the RAF was stronger because they could take a breather and resupply. But at the beginning of Sept, about middle of BoB, the Luftwaffe had the RAF on the ropes but didn't complete it. So who knows. Would the Germans have gained air superiority over the skies of England? IMHO it wouldn'y have mattered, they didn't have the land or sea resources for an operation across the Channel.

So up until Sept. 6 you could say the Luftwaffe was beating the RAF. After that it was downhill for them.


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## plan_D (Jul 30, 2007)

Eisenhower's constant push for a broad-front strategy led to blunder after blunder in the North-West European campaign. 

Even the break-out from the beach-head was a blunder as it was long overdue because Eisenhower wanted a British breakout through Caen which wasn't in the original plan; but as Ike wanted his broadfront it led to delays and loss of life in and around Caen that could have been avoided.

As Montgomery had originally planned it; Caen would be taken and held on the first day to threaten a breakout into the open country. In response to this Montgomery hoped the Germans would divert all their strongest divisions to block the breakout; allowing the U.S forces on the Allied right flank to break through weak German lines in their sector. 
As it happened the British failed to take Caen on the first day but the constant pressure applied did force the Germans to divert its strongest forces to the Caen area allowing a U.S breakthrough as originally planned. But Eisenhower being unimaginative as he was kept his broad-front idea and wanted a British breakthrough which allowed the Germans to hold the entire Allied beach-head. The time held up in the beach-head could have been used capturing port facilities long before they actually did and Caen may not have been so devastated by fruitless attempts on it. 

Once again, Ike failed to grasp the idea of strategy during the Ardennes Offensive - opting to push the bulge out of the Allied lines instead of encircling and destroying it. This led to the war dragging on because the German troops managed to escape to set up new lines on the Rhine and further into Germany. 

And his greatest blunder was not taking Berlin; as Ike could only see two feet in front of his face, he had no idea of the bigger picture. Even Germany saw the Cold War coming, along with Patton, Montgomery and Churchill. If Ike had pushed to Berlin, as they so easily could have done then the political triumph of raising your flag above the enemies capital would have been achieved. This would have brought Stalin and his Soviet cronies down a few pegs as a Stars and Stripes above the Reichstag would have given the U.S the political strength to say they did all the work that won the war; just as the Soviet Union did. It would have also showed military strength to the East and may have eased the Cold War - if not completely eradicating it. 

Ike liked to be strong on all fronts but decisive on none - and that's probably one of the *many* great blunders of World War II.

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## mkloby (Jul 30, 2007)

PD - I think you're being rather harsh. It's easy to monday-quarterback scenarios now. I'm not saying he was one of the great operational commanders, but certainly his mistakes do not rank up there in gravity with some of the war changing blunders.


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## Njaco (Jul 30, 2007)

I think was being pressured from Washington. Taking Berlin would've been a political maneuvre as well as a military one. Hence the talking heads from DC in his ear.


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## renrich (Jul 30, 2007)

I believe that a study of the situation in Europe 1944-45 will discover that the strategy adopted by SHAEF was heavily influenced by political considerations. Since the majority of the men and material in Europe were supplied by the US, it was not politically palatable for the UK to have the starring role. When it came to Berlin, it was decided, in order to keep the risk of a confrontation between USSR and US-British forces to a minimum, that the USSR could have the chore of taking Berlin. Roosevelt never considered that the USSR was the menace that Churchill did.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Jul 30, 2007)

But then he did. After the Wussians had half the joint! And Patton then would have done something, but he was fired and car crashed.


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## syscom3 (Jul 30, 2007)

plan_D said:


> ....As it happened the British failed to take Caen on the first day but the constant pressure applied did force the Germans to divert its strongest forces to the Caen area allowing a U.S breakthrough as originally planned. But Eisenhower being unimaginative as he was kept his broad-front idea and wanted a British breakthrough which allowed the Germans to hold the entire Allied beach-head. The time held up in the beach-head could have been used capturing port facilities long before they actually did and Caen may not have been so devastated by fruitless attempts on it.



Montgomery was the worst of the allied generals when it came to the appreciation of fluid (mobile) warfare. He was so cautious, he was essentially paralyzed when opportunities arose. 

And neither the Brits, Americans or even the Germans appreciated just how deadly the hedgerows were untill the battle began in earnest.



> Once again, Ike failed to grasp the idea of strategy during the Ardennes Offensive - opting to push the bulge out of the Allied lines instead of encircling and destroying it. This led to the war dragging on because the German troops managed to escape to set up new lines on the Rhine and further into Germany.



A near collapse of the US army in the center dictated that the bulge be pushed out as soon as possible. And so what if the Germans escaped back into Germany. They were a defeated force incapable of offensive or defensive operations.



> And his greatest blunder was not taking Berlin; as Ike could only see two feet in front of his face, he had no idea of the bigger picture. Even Germany saw the Cold War coming, along with Patton, Montgomery and Churchill. If Ike had pushed to Berlin, as they so easily could have done then the political triumph of raising your flag above the enemies capital would have been achieved. This would have brought Stalin and his Soviet cronies down a few pegs as a Stars and Stripes above the Reichstag would have given the U.S the political strength to say they did all the work that won the war; just as the Soviet Union did. It would have also showed military strength to the East and may have eased the Cold War - if not completely eradicating it.



Politics my friend... politics. Then you also seem to forget that Patton was pushing deep into Austria and Checkelslavakia



> Ike liked to be strong on all fronts but decisive on none - and that's probably one of the *many* great blunders of World War II.



History has recorded him as being among the greatest generals of all time. He alone understood the politics behind everything in the ETO and MTO. And it was his strategy's that ended up winning the war in Europe.


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## renrich (Jul 31, 2007)

I don't believe that Patton was fired near the end of the war but rather before Overlord because of the slapping incident. He died in the auto crash after VE day and there was no question then about war with the USSR.


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## plan_D (Jul 31, 2007)

I don't think I'm being harsh, Ike's blunders changed the lives of many and the politics of world post-war. There were many blunders in the war and in all wars, giving rise to the maxim "War is won by those who make the least blunders." I was just adding yet another to the long line of blunders waiting to be examined by anyone and everyone.

The politics was the deciding factor to Ikes final decision, I'm well aware but politics could have been brushed aside. And many times British and U.S troops advanced against the will of the suits, rubbed the Soviets the wrong way but it showed them the West weren't all about caution.


_"Montgomery was the worst of the allied generals when it came to the appreciation of fluid (mobile) warfare. He was so cautious, he was essentially paralyzed when opportunities arose. 

And neither the Brits, Americans or even the Germans appreciated just how deadly the hedgerows were untill the battle began in earnest."_

Montgomery was a great strategist, he was a large follower of decisive blows but his preparation was slow to make sure victory was certain. His mistakes were few, but big. His caution was in building enough supplies to maintain an offensive - not during the offensive itself. 

Ike wasn't up for decision, Montgomery wanted to hand the baton to the U.S forces during the breakout. He was in command of the U.S forces during that time and aimed for fluid movement in the U.S sector by holding the Germans at Caen. 

_"A near collapse of the US army in the center dictated that the bulge be pushed out as soon as possible. And so what if the Germans escaped back into Germany. They were a defeated force incapable of offensive or defensive operations."_

The U.S Army wasn't in near collapse, in any case even it did the Germans had no reserves. And I'm not sitting here as the only one who knew that because the Allies knew it in 1944. The Germans could have driven all the way to Paris and not achieved anything, Patton and Montgomery knew it. An encirclement of those forces would have eliminated any opposition on the Rhine and brought the war to a conclusion months earlier, with less losses to the Allies and their forces further east.


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## renrich (Jul 31, 2007)

Obviously, there is truth to your statements about SHAEF's mistakes but it may be that you are not giving enough credence to the political angles. Recently read a book where it was pointed out that, during and after Torch, Roosevelt came and met with Ike and praised him highly and then went back to the US and expressed misgivings in public and to Marshall to the point that Ike thought he was going to be fired. All of this because Roosevelt was playing politics at home and doing the old CYA. Suspect that politics played a big role in the action of commanders and the conduct of the war on all sides and that certainly includes all wars including the one we are in now.


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## rogthedodge (Jul 31, 2007)

On Montgomery.

He had many, many faults but I think he is getting a worse press as time goes on. It's easy to accuse him of caution but there's an important factor to consider:

From late '44 the UK forces could only get smaller so one of his primary aims was to conserve manpower for the future wars ahead (Japan and possibly Russia)


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## syscom3 (Jul 31, 2007)

rogthedodge said:


> On Montgomery.
> 
> He had many, many faults but I think he is getting a worse press as time goes on. It's easy to accuse him of caution but there's an important factor to consider:
> 
> From late '44 the UK forces could only get smaller so one of his primary aims was to conserve manpower for the future wars ahead (Japan and possibly Russia)



It was more of his experiences of WW1 which made him over cautious of taking casualties.

He was a great planner and organizer, but not a field commander. He belonged in London on staff duty.


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## rogthedodge (Jul 31, 2007)

I was going to add that but it doesn't make him unique. I'm sure some US senior generals had seen combat in WW1? 

I don't think you can state with any authority 'it was more' due to WW1 than the realities of his situation (and brief).

I'd agree it was combination of both factors.

Not sure about Monty on the staff - not his forte. 

Slim's comments on Monty's time as CIGS were interesting. 
On hearing a long list of whinges problems from Monty when he took over, Slim asked 'And what have you done about it?'. Monty left.


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## drgondog (Jul 31, 2007)

rogthedodge said:


> On Montgomery.
> 
> He had many, many faults but I think he is getting a worse press as time goes on. It's easy to accuse him of caution but there's an important factor to consider:
> 
> From late '44 the UK forces could only get smaller so one of his primary aims was to conserve manpower for the future wars ahead (Japan and possibly Russia)



Gawd I hate to agree with you but I do.

The many complaints about US counterparts in 1944 were our 'Tactical' vs 'Bold' Stike concepts. When examined in a cold light 50 years later the Brits had a vision but not the experience of execution because they were always at parity or less against the Germans.

The US had the enthusiasm and the resources but not the experience - we were learning as we went throughout WWII - ditto USSR.

Where the debate and acrimony exist is in the in-fighting exemplified by Patton and Montgomery in a battle for resources and mission - starting in Sicily and continuing through the end of the war.

Fact - Montgomery did not succeeed in two critical commitments - Caen and Operation Market Garden. Patton failed at Metz. Lucas failed at Anzio and Mark Clark was only 'average' in the northward push in Italy - none of the Allied Commanders could touch Kesslering! 

Hard to allocate blame to a country or leader - but Eisenhower managed all of them.

Falaise, in retrospect was a Monty failure that had huge consequences later in Operation Market Garden because of all the Wermacht resoruces that escaped.

But while the Brits claimed to have the Grand Plan, it was never successful when they had the resources after 1944. We didn't do any better (nor did the USSR or Germans after 1942) - except that we were awesome in defense as the Bulge proved.. small compensation except that we drained both the Luftwaffe and Wermacht in that battle


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## plan_D (Aug 1, 2007)

Not all of Eisenhower's mistakes were brought about through politics, the breakout in Normandy and the Germans Ardennes Offensive were non-political events when it came to planning strategy - all the politicians wanted was success at that time. 

Almost all the Allied Generals were overly-cautious compared to the Soviet and German Generals. It wasn't a matter of experience in wartime but experience at home; their upbringing in a democratic society led to caution against loss of life. The large influence of the people at home led to caution against loss of life. And that was the largest failure of the Allied war machine; caution. Montgomery was cautious but no more, or less, than most other Allied commanders - he's just more famous.

_"Fact - Montgomery did not succeeed in two critical commitments - Caen and Operation Market Garden. Patton failed at Metz. Lucas failed at Anzio and Mark Clark was only 'average' in the northward push in Italy - none of the Allied Commanders could touch Kesslering!"_

Montgomery's failure to capture Caen on the first day wasn't a major setback in his strategy for the break-out. Once it was realised by Montgomery that the Germans were blocking him with their best units, the capture of Caen became unimportant. It was Eisenhower that ordered Montgomery to capture Caen, when it would have been wiser to hand the offensive to the U.S forces on the right which would have broke out and swept away the weak German opposition at their front and led to collapse of German forces around Caen to avoid encirclement. If Montgomery was allowed his strategy Caen would have been taken with ease. 

Operation Market Garden was a great plan but couldn't have been executed at a worse time. If Montgomery had heeded the warnings his intelligence was giving him, Market Garden would have never happened. But it was his failure and a large one at that, but it was bold and decisive plan that really was quite a fantastic idea. 

Patton at Metz was terrible, and tried to push the blame on to his commanders when he was in the wrong all along. The great mobile genius made every mistake Great Britain did with armour in World War I. Splitting the armour up, slowing it down and on top of that trying to be strong on all fronts but inevitably being decisive on none. 

Mark Clark was far less than average - another General that let his arrogance get the better of him. He had the perfect oppurtunity to cut off the German forces in Italy and destroy them; Alexander (the best Allied commander, in my opinion) wanted it and saw a great decisive victory in Italy. But Clark thought it appropriate to boost his ego and turned on the completely unimportant Rome, just so he could say he captured it. If he had sent his forces to east to block the Germans, the would have been no German resistance in Italy. 

It was almost the exact same blunder Howe made when he captured Philidelphia in the War of Independance instead of marching north toward Saratoga and encircling the rebel army. Which as we all know led to the defeat of the British forces at Saratoga; Mark Clark was lucky that Italy wasn't a deciding factor in the war at that time. 

_"But while the Brits claimed to have the Grand Plan, it was never successful when they had the resources after 1944. We didn't do any better (nor did the USSR or Germans after 1942) - except that we were awesome in defense as the Bulge proved.. small compensation except that we drained both the Luftwaffe and Wermacht in that battle"_

The Grand Plan that the British seemed to have was never executed because of American presence; as we all know it's all politics. The Western Allied actions in North-West Europe were painfully slow and indecisive - we were lucky to be facing an exhausted and withered enemy. And as Eisenhower was in charge, it was his whole campaign blunder. He had Generals under him pushing for action, but the action never came. Which probably led to more loss of life.

The Soviets were decisive and knew how to administer a blow to break-through; they were far better prepared strategically and mentally to face off against the Germans than the Western Allies were in 1944. 

But the gold goes to Germany, even after 1942, their fluid defence, striking blows and decisive movements in almost every action throughout the war kept the whole world off balance for five years. Their General Staff was nigh perfection and the whole German war effort was a failing of Hitler, not the men on the ground. Even in the dying days Germany was maintaining its reputation of being the tough nut to crack, the Soviets were suffering mind boggling losses at the hands of movement and the Allies were plodding along at a painfully slow pace - and thrown into panic by the Ardennes Offensive, another failure of Hitler, which was not wanted by the German General Staff. 

The Bulge wasn't a great show of defence, the U.S lines were over-run and the German offensive only came to a halt because of resources and reserves were lacking. Had the Germans been well supplied and had reserves in waiting, they probably would have driven to Antwerp. The Ardennes Offensive showed that the Allied staff hadn't read any history books - because if they had they would have learnt to keep a strong defence even in the Ardennes forest for in June 1940 - only four years earlier - Germany had driven armour through the exact same forest to devestating effect. The Wehrmacht was already drained by then, it just needed to be finished off. The Ardennes Offensive gave the Germany Army in the West to us on a plate , but we merely brushed it aside.


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## renrich (Aug 1, 2007)

The Germans on defense made a lot of chicken salad out of chicken feathers. In some ways their efforts remind me a lot of Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia in 1864-65. One would never get a veteran of The T-Patch or 36th Division to say that Clark was anything but way below average in Italy. The 36th was in combat 336 days, 132 days consecutive, had 16, 828 casualties; 13191 WIA, 3131 KIA, 506 died of wounds, the ninth highest # casualties in WW2 of all American divs in WW2, many of them the result reportedly of Clarks poor generalship.


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## drgondog (Aug 1, 2007)

plan_D said:


> Not all of Eisenhower's mistakes were brought about through politics, the breakout in Normandy and the Germans Ardennes Offensive were non-political events when it came to planning strategy - all the politicians wanted was success at that time.
> 
> *You could hardly call the Ardennes a 'mistake' on the part of Eisenhower. If so, you can lay it on everyone in the chain of command, failure of Ultra or other intelligence assets. The Germans must receive credit for a bold and carefully concealed plan, optimistic in expectations on part of Hitler. *
> 
> ...


*

The 106th Division was crushed at the point of the spear, brand new and ill equipped in every way. That pretty much sums up the German successes per their objectives and timetable... even with suprise and 3+:1 numerical superiority, huge armor advantage and no Allied airpower for two weeks.

So, defense at Bastogne, St Vith, Stavelot, etc or the Engineer's clever and effective small unit defenses at all the bridges in front of German armor was 'irrelevant' - it was all about 'Germans not well supplied and reserves"? You might note that the Ardennes thrust a. caught the Brits and French by suprise in 1940 and it succeeded in routing the Allies but, b. caught Allies by suprise but the American units stopped them in 1944, and ground them up after the intial gains..

I am curious why you dismiss the 27th, the 101st the 82nd and 3rd Army contributions in 'strong' American defense and lay it all on German lack of planning? Was their failure due to not anticipating a capable defense and requiring more numerical superiority before plan execution? That they didn't put their best equipped and most experienced Panzer forces in play?*


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## plan_D (Aug 3, 2007)

_"You could hardly call the Ardennes a 'mistake' on the part of Eisenhower. If so, you can lay it on everyone in the chain of command, failure of Ultra or other intelligence assets. The Germans must receive credit for a bold and carefully concealed plan, optimistic in expectations on part of Hitler._

I didn't blame the Ardennes Offensive on Eisenhower, I said his blunder was his reaction to it i.e not cutting the Germans off, but pushing the bulge out. Everyone in the U.S 1st Army and SHAEF above divisional commander should be blamed for the panic they caused; grown men in high up places left it to the calm and collect divisional and lower commanders to sort out their troubles. 

ULTRA could not be blamed for anything; they knew all about the increase in German concentration and warned the Allied staff of it. It was up to the Allied staff (and Eisenhower) to figure out what it might have been for. 

_"Monty absolutely did NOT want to turn the initiative to the American commanders and held fast to the attack on Caen.. if you want to talk politics this is another item to chew on. It might not have been a setback in 'his' strategy' but it sure was to the overall timetable and plan... Caen was never going to be taken 'with ease' and that was expected from beginning"_

That's just plain wrong. Montgomery's plan for the break-out was for British troops to take Caen on the first day and hold the best German units there while the Americans broke out. His planned remained the same even after the failure to take Caen because German units had already diverted their best units to block the British at Caen. 

Montgomery was egotistical and since he had complete controll of the Allied ground forces during the break-out (with only Eisenhower above) he didn't mind handing the break-out to the Americans because it would have still been his plan. It was Eisenhower that demanded the capture of Caen which held up the U.S break-out. 

_"Would have been a great idea except for the 10th Panzer that was allowed to escape from Normany, and 'found again' at Arnhem, the single elevated road that would only take one vehicle at a time, that everyone on the Dutch side knew about but Monty wouldn't listen because that ONE salient fact would kill the Plan - it would been 'bold and decisive' without those factors but stupid with them"_

Operation _Market Garden_ would have worked in August; the single road caused problems but did not pose a large threat to the offensive. What destroyed the offensive was the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions that were there; with those two divisions present the attack should have been called off. 
The plan itself was bolder and better than anything most other Allied commanders, U.S, British or Canadian could come up with. 

_"You may recall he 'was slowed down' because the fuel priority went to Market Garden and he essentially was Stopped, not slowed down."_

His armour was slowed down by attaching it to the infantry, I'm talking tactical here. Patton made the same mistakes as World War I commanders did, attaching the tanks to infantry and splitting the armour up. His own mistakes had nothing to do with _Market Garden_. 

_"This is a statement beyond the pale - not about Clark but about 'no German resistance in Italy had he sent his forces east'. East of what? Rome? Explain why that would be the master stroke that somehow eluded Clark, Alexander, etc?

As to cutting off the Germans- didn't Monty have that job in Sicily for the 40,000 that got away? Anzio was supposed to be the magic bullet to 'cut them off' but anything else was brutal mountain to mountain fighting"_

The idea of cutting the Germans off did not elude Alexander; it was a plan that had already been laid in front of the commanders in Italy. The British 8th Army was to move north after Monte Cassino while Clark with the 5th Army, after breaking out of Anzio would move east across Italy cutting the German 10th Armee from the rest of Italy. Instead Clark forced his way north to Rome up the west coast, allowing the Germans to retreat up the east coast with the British 8th in pursuit. 

As for the second paragraph, I wasn't aware this was a "play the American commanders off against the British ones,". I'm well aware that Montgomery made his mistakes but that's not something to bring up to try and defend others actions. If you believe that Montgomery made a blunder in Sciliy - how should he have done it? 

Plus in all aspects of Allied failure we must remember German excellence which surpassed all other armies in the field. 

_"If the Brits had their way we probably wouldn't have invaded France until 1948. Churchill fought us every step of the way and Monty supported his contention that June 1944 was 'too risky'. The entire thrust in Italy and the desire to strike in Balkans was Churchill's grand strategy to prevent USSR from gobbling up Eastern Europe. Eisenhower had the most impossible job possible, trying to keep all the huge egos intact, respond to his CiC and keep the Grand Alliance together - still the successes and failures are at his feet"_

I doubt, very much, that Britain would have waited until 1948. Especially since British and, mostly, Canadians had landed on French shores in 1942. It may come as a surprise but many commanders of all Allied nations believed that _Overlord_ was going to fail. So it's hardly surprising they were calling it risky, as it was very risky. 

I don't see a problem with Churchill's attempt to block the Soviet Union; since the benefit of hindsight provides me with information about the Cold War. 

Now you're talking credit for Eisenhower, that was his greatest achievement and what an achievement it was - keeping the egos of all the Allied commanders in check. That is why he was in the position he was , but he should have given more time and thought to his lowers who were smarter when it came to strategy. 

_"Agreed on the mental part- human capital was not an issue for Stalin but was for Allies. I seem to have lost out on the strategic brilliance part of the battering ram approach, however?"_

Well, I advise you read a little more about the Eastern Front. Have you ever heard of "Deep Battle" and "Deep Operation" ? Both ideas created by the Soviet Union before World War II - then lost with officer purges; but regained in late 1942. 

Even the Germans noticed the Soviet's better grasp of armoured warfare compared to the Western Allies. Don't take any offence but do you know a lot of the armoured theories of World War II ? I mean, the Soviets seemed to have grasped it a lot better than anyone else except the Germans.


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## plan_D (Aug 3, 2007)

_"The 106th Division was crushed at the point of the spear, brand new and ill equipped in every way. That pretty much sums up the German successes per their objectives and timetable... even with suprise and 3+:1 numerical superiority, huge armor advantage and no Allied airpower for two weeks."_

As the German armour advantage was reduced by lack of fuel and ammo, we can hardly count it as huge. But given that the German spearhead overran the U.S 1st Army and left the Allied command bringing in the 1st Airborne Army, it's only reserve, I can hardly give credit to the U.S forces in area for a great defence. The soldiers themselves deserve all the credit but to look at the map, there's no credit awarded.

_"So, defense at Bastogne, St Vith, Stavelot, etc or the Engineer's clever and effective small unit defenses at all the bridges in front of German armor was 'irrelevant' - it was all about 'Germans not well supplied and reserves"? You might note that the Ardennes thrust a. caught the Brits and French by suprise in 1940 and it succeeded in routing the Allies but, b. caught Allies by suprise but the American units stopped them in 1944, and ground them up after the intial gains.."_

The defence of of those places was irrelevant, yes. The capture of Bastogne might have allowed the German forces to push a few more miles but no matter how far the Germans got, they were doomed to fail. The U.S forces could have just melted away and allowed the Germans to drive unhindered to Paris and they would have still failed. 
For the Germans, as I stated, had no reserves. The German advance was the spearhead and that's all there was. If that offensive was to have any chance of succeeding there would have been troops following up to overtake the spearhead once it had ran out of steam. In the event, the spearhead ran out of steam (and fuel) which became a retreat. 

I must make some corrections for you, the offensive through the Ardennes in 1940 did not catch the British by surprise - they weren't there to be surprised. And the 1944 offensive was stopped by both the British and American forces, as the British were striking at the north of the bulge. Which led to the 6th Coldstream Guards capturing a fully functioning Panther G which had been abandoned because of lack of fuel. 

_"I am curious why you dismiss the 27th, the 101st the 82nd and 3rd Army contributions in 'strong' American defense and lay it all on German lack of planning? Was their failure due to not anticipating a capable defense and requiring more numerical superiority before plan execution? That they didn't put their best equipped and most experienced Panzer forces in play?"_

I dismiss them all because their actions only brought the German offensive to a halt earlier, the Germans were going to fail anyway. And the U.S 3rd Army was used incorrectly in the counter-attack, Patton himself knew so and stated that he wanted his army to be used to cut the Germans off at their rear. 

The German High Command informed Hitler that the plan was going to fail because of lack of reserves - it's not that hard to understand. I know it must be hard but the U.S forces were only a catalyst to the eventual German failure in that offensive. The German General Staff knew it was going to fail, they wanted the forces in used there to be on the Eastern Front - but Hitler overruled. 

It was all about reserves, the German commanders knew the U.S 1st would collapse, and they did. The defence was poor and ill equipped, if you wanted a defence that is worthy of credit just like at the Soviet defence at Kursk. And even with that the Germans almost broke-through.


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## syscom3 (Aug 3, 2007)

rogthedodge said:


> ....I don't think you can state with any authority 'it was more' due to WW1 than the realities of his situation (and brief)......



I noted that about Monty when I saw the Imperial War Museum exhibit about him.

Unlike the US generals who saw service in WW1, the british generals were participants or witnesses in the great slaughters.


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## syscom3 (Aug 3, 2007)

Plan_D..... youre mixing up "mistakes" with "blunders".

Two entirely different concepts.

Mistakes are recoverable, or dont impact the overall conduct of the battle or campaign.

Blunders are worse, as they do impact the course of events.

We can safely say that Ike made a few mistakes in the war, but none of them blunders. 

Market Garden was a blunder for Monty, but only a mistake in the campaign for Europe.

The Bulge wasnt a mistake or blunder at all, as the US competely recovered and went back on the offensive, while the Germans were a spent and defeated force.


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## drgondog (Aug 3, 2007)

plan_D said:


> _"
> 
> It was all about reserves, the German commanders knew the U.S 1st would collapse, and they did. The defence was poor and ill equipped, if you wanted a defence that is worthy of credit just like at the Soviet defence at Kursk. And even with that the Germans almost broke-through._


_

Now we have another Brit expert lecturing on the myriad deficiencies of the American soldier and commanders. 

I have to sit back and ponder why Europe (and UK) is not speaking either German or Russian. From your point of view it certainly had nothing to do with US contribution.._


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 3, 2007)

drgondog said:


> Now we have another Brit expert lecturing on the myriad deficiencies of the American soldier and commanders.
> 
> I have to sit back and ponder why Europe (and UK) is not speaking either German or Russian. From your point of view it certainly had nothing to do with US contribution..



Calm it down allright. You dont need to say such things about him. He has not insulted you in any way.

You technically are doing the same things about the Brit commanders. *So in that sense are you a "American Expert" lecturing on the myriad of deficiencies of the Brit soldier and comamnders?*

You have no problem dishing out deficiencies of Non American commanders, soldiers and equipment but you cant handle it when someone does the same over American Commanders, soldiers and equipment.

Why do you have to talk to others that way?

Sorry I dont like this from anyone no matter who it is. 

Again I am calling it like I see it...

And dont call me *Anti American* for this post. I am an American....


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## jmf003 (Aug 4, 2007)

Plan_D, you've made some interesting and informed points but I believe the facts run counter to some of your arguments. 



plan_D said:


> I didn't blame the Ardennes Offensive on Eisenhower, I said his blunder was his reaction to it i.e not cutting the Germans off, but pushing the bulge out.



Eisenhower wanted to cut the Germans off. The plan called for the American First and Third Armies to collapse the pocket at Houffalize, well behind the German front. Anyone who looks at a map of the battle will see that capturing Houffalize quickly would have achieved that goal. 

Ike pushed Montgomery to launch the attack on 1-Jan. Monty felt it imprudent to move that quickly and didn't launch his attack until 3-Jan. 

Monty's two day delay wasn't the proximate cause in the German forces escaping the collapsing pocket. A well executed German retreat was. However Monty's slow reaction was much more a contributing factor than Ike's supposed lack of vision. 



plan_D said:


> I must make some corrections for you, the offensive through the Ardennes in 1940 did not catch the British by surprise - they weren't there to be surprised.



It is true that the BEF wasn't defending at the point of attack. However the BEF's invasion of Belgium was based on an expectation that the French lines would hold. The French collapse left the BEF's flank exposed and directly led to the near disaster at Dunkirk. 

Surely the successful German attack through the Ardennes was a surprise to the BEF in any reasonable definition of "surprise." If not the BEF were completely bonkers to have invaded Belgium while expecting the Germans to make that position untenable. 



plan_D said:


> And the 1944 offensive was stopped by both the British and American forces, as the British were striking at the north of the bulge. Which led to the 6th Coldstream Guards capturing a fully functioning Panther G which had been abandoned because of lack of fuel.



This is more of a niggling point but most reports of the battle put the German troop count at 500,000, the American troop count at 600,000, the British troop count at 55,000, along with a smaller complement of Canadian, Belgian, and French troops. 

With more than 90% of the Allied troops being American, it's not unreasonable for a person to suggest that the Americans stopped the Germans. Certainly 55,000 British troops on their own were not going to stop 500,000 Germans but 600,000 American troops on their own might have.

Stating that "the 1944 offensive was stopped by both the British and American forces" without mentioning the scale of British involvement is a bit misleading. And if it's a matter of honor to give Britain credit for its contributions in a minority role, why mention the British troops without mentioning the other nations? 



plan_D said:


> And the U.S 3rd Army was used incorrectly in the counter-attack, Patton himself knew so and stated that he wanted his army to be used to cut the Germans off at their rear.



Yes, Patton wanted to cut off the Germans but, no, Patton did not feel that his Army was used incorrectly. If you have a quote of Patton saying something to that effect, that would be interesting to read. 

Everything I've read indicates Patton was happy with the Houffalize target but frustrated with his rate of progress.

Best regards,


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## plan_D (Aug 4, 2007)

_*Blunder*_* - A gross, stupid or careless mistake.*

It would be a matter of opinion if a mistake was small or great, but blunder doesn't have to change the course of the war. So, I don't believe I'm mixing anything up, syscom. 

In my opinion Eisenhower made tactical and strategic mistakes which were serious; as the war could have been ended sooner. _Market Garden_ was a serious mistake in the whole European campaign, it cost lives and time. 

The German Ardennes Offensive was a mistake on the German side; I don't believe nor did I ever say that the U.S forces made a mistake. But what I do say is this; the U.S forces didn't show an overall great strength of defence (as has been stated) and the Allied (note: Not soley U.S) counter action was wrong. 

_"Now we have another Brit expert lecturing on the myriad deficiencies of the American soldier and commanders. 

I have to sit back and ponder why Europe (and UK) is not speaking either German or Russian. From your point of view it certainly had nothing to do with US contribution.."_

drgondog,

I can see that you are one of those people that believes the U.S can do no wrong. I advise not to take it personally if someone points out a fault in the U.S. 

From my point of view, I see that you're being childish and turning this discussion into a British vs. American argument about World War II. There's plenty of your fellow Americans on this board that know what my point of view is and I'm not anti-American. I'm not like you, I can give credit to other nations.

The fact of the matter is; you couldn't reply to single one of my comments and had to resort to attacks. Stop being a child.

_"Eisenhower wanted to cut the Germans off. The plan called for the American First and Third Armies to collapse the pocket at Houffalize, well behind the German front. Anyone who looks at a map of the battle will see that capturing Houffalize quickly would have achieved that goal. 

Ike pushed Montgomery to launch the attack on 1-Jan. Monty felt it imprudent to move that quickly and didn't launch his attack until 3-Jan. 

Monty's two day delay wasn't the proximate cause in the German forces escaping the collapsing pocket. A well executed German retreat was. However Monty's slow reaction was much more a contributing factor than Ike's supposed lack of vision."_

jmf003, 

Houffalize would have been a good target to ensure encirclement of a lot of the German forces but Eisenhower gave a target in the centre of the German bulge. His intention was to move to Houffalize from the front and sides which leads to the bulge being pushed out, not surrounded. 

If Eisenhower truly wanted the bulge to be encircled the order would have been to take line from St. Vith - Wiltz. Montgomery shouldn't have delayed - you're certainly right and credit must be given to the German discipline in retreat. But Eisenhower should have given deeper targets than Houfalize but he knew it would lead to the bulge being pushed out. 

_"It is true that the BEF wasn't defending at the point of attack. However the BEF's invasion of Belgium was based on an expectation that the French lines would hold. The French collapse left the BEF's flank exposed and directly led to the near disaster at Dunkirk. 

Surely the successful German attack through the Ardennes was a surprise to the BEF in any reasonable definition of "surprise." If not the BEF were completely bonkers to have invaded Belgium while expecting the Germans to make that position untenable."_

The British were surprised to see the French collapse so quickly. But the BEF wasn't surprised to see an attack through that region; the fact that it succeeded was the surprise. 


_"This is more of a niggling point but most reports of the battle put the German troop count at 500,000, the American troop count at 600,000, the British troop count at 55,000, along with a smaller complement of Canadian, Belgian, and French troops. 

With more than 90% of the Allied troops being American, it's not unreasonable for a person to suggest that the Americans stopped the Germans. Certainly 55,000 British troops on their own were not going to stop 500,000 Germans but 600,000 American troops on their own might have.

Stating that "the 1944 offensive was stopped by both the British and American forces" without mentioning the scale of British involvement is a bit misleading. And if it's a matter of honor to give Britain credit for its contributions in a minority role, why mention the British troops without mentioning the other nations?"_
 
Fair enough statement, I should have mentioned the British in a minority role. As for mentioning every nationality involved in a fight, I'd rather spend my time doing other than things than listing almost every country in the world - I'll just say Allies from now on. 

_"Yes, Patton wanted to cut off the Germans but, no, Patton did not feel that his Army was used incorrectly. If you have a quote of Patton saying something to that effect, that would be interesting to read. 

Everything I've read indicates Patton was happy with the Houffalize target but frustrated with his rate of progress."_

If Patton didn't believe the U.S army was being used incorrectly than I can only reduce my credit for him as a commander. But I'm sure I have read somewhere of his distaste for pushing the bulge, rather than destroying it. I will look.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 4, 2007)

To all sides involved lets not let this thread turn into a name calling session okay.


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## syscom3 (Aug 4, 2007)

Plan_d, every general makes mistakes in a war.

And there is a lot of truth in the old saying "the side who makes the least mistakes in a war will win".

So I think it is very fair to say that Ike made far fewer mistakes than his opponents.

However no one has shown that Ike, Patton or Montgomery "blundered" in any battle or campaign in which the outcome was a defeat.


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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2007)

plan_D said:


> _*Blunder*_* - A gross, stupid or careless mistake.*
> 
> It would be a matter of opinion if a mistake was small or great, but blunder doesn't have to change the course of the war. So, I don't believe I'm mixing anything up, syscom.
> 
> ...



We're delighted that you might re-examine your former contempt for Patton and re-adjust Your view of his reputation as a commander to a new low. It could only cement your reputation as a thoughtful and unbiased historian

Chris - for you I apologise for thinking you were a complete puss. Your last PM had more thought than the first one and I respect the way you handled it.


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## lesofprimus (Aug 4, 2007)

Welcome back Mark, nice 2 see u again after these couple months...


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## lesofprimus (Aug 4, 2007)

Glad u put that there Bill.... U know we cant have strife between the Mods and u lesser beings....


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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2007)

lesofprimus said:


> Glad u put that there Bill.... U know we cant have strife between the Mods and u lesser beings....



Dan - let me tell you that I respect you above all others on this forum. Let me also tell you as a continuation that I bow to no man, no reference to how our parents raised us or passion for the contribution of American troopers in WWII - especially 504PIR or 8th AF. and i will not suffer the abundant fools that denigrate our contibutions in that war or any other.

Airborne all the way with a modest reference and respect to ****ing squid seals. we did it long before you and never failed our mission. If you want to understand why I was so pissed at D-Plan reference this comment.

Regards,

Bill Marshall

and for my sons - Sempi ****ing Fi


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 5, 2007)

Bill if you ever want to vent on something you know how to pm me. I am not the bad guy you may have thought I was. I think you will find we agree on more things than one.

I just have a job here as a moderator and I try to take that seriously.


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## plan_D (Aug 5, 2007)

_"I was the first between us to point out Mark Clark's and Lucas' performances in Italy so your comment regarding me as a US bigot is not just incorrect but continues to be intended insult. I didn't trot out the BS meter when you pontificated how Alexander would have easily defeated Kesslering when the bumbling American Generals traipsed through Rome. You had not one whit of a fact to base that speculation."_

If you find it an insult, that's your problem. The problem I've got here is your continued effort to turn this into American vs. British style of argument; I never stated that Alexander would have easily defeated Kesslering - as Alexander and Keeslering had already faced off at Monte Cassino. 

I have every fact to show the world that Mark Clark made a tremendous mistake in capturing Rome instead of cutting off the German retreat. Just because Mark Clark was American, it doesn't mean you need to take it as an insult. Nor do I believe I ever stated that American generals were bumbling in Italy - albeit I do believe Mark Clark was. A better general in Clark's position would have been William Simpson (who was a great general) - but then the U.S wouldn't have had him as U.S Ninth Army commander. 

The simple fact that I believe the best Allied commander was Alexander, shouldn't be taken as an insult either. I'm sure your personal favourite would be American - while my best overall is German (Heinz Guderian - or maybe, Balck). 

_"You have zero facts to base a comment that Montgomery could have executed Market Garden Successfully in Auguts but I let that pass."_

You mean aside from the fact that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions weren't in Arnhem and Nijmegen in early August? Without them the plan would have been a complete success - as they were the major blocking forces of the opposition. 

I'll leave you with those for now, if you want evidence - just ask for it. Don't get your knickers in a twist. I'm going out now, I'll reply tomorrow ... just look forward to it.

Oh and Dan, thanks. I've been very busy with college and lots of overtime at work; first year went well - I've got extremely high grades (apparently I'm excellent at aerodynamics).


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## syscom3 (Aug 5, 2007)

I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.

Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 5, 2007)

Great to hear about your grades Mark! Keep it up!


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## Marcel (Aug 5, 2007)

plan_D said:


> _"
> "You have zero facts to base a comment that Montgomery could have executed Market Garden Successfully in Auguts but I let that pass."
> 
> You mean aside from the fact that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions weren't in Arnhem and Nijmegen in early August? Without them the plan would have been a complete success - as they were the major blocking forces of the opposition.
> _


_

The general believe in holland is that Market Garden was just too late. Had it been done on september the 5th, the germans would 've been in full retreat. They totally panicked after the capture of Atwerp. It's called "dolle dinsdag", something like "crazy tuesday" in English. They wouldn't have had time to regroup._


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2007)

Marcel said:


> The general believe in holland is that Market Garden was just too late. Had it been done on september the 5th, the germans would 've been in full retreat. They totally panicked after the capture of Atwerp. It's called "dolle dinsdag", something like "crazy tuesday" in English. They wouldn't have had time to regroup.



Marcel, with respect, the problem with that statement and even yours is that is opinion. The prevailing opinion in August and September 1944 among the British and American Planners was that Operation Market Garden was going to succeed in September - but that was wrong wasn't it?

The next question to debate is 1.) why was an earlier date discarded, if even contemplated?, or 2.) was it feasible to plan and stage the forces earlier?

I don't know the answers but I do understand logistics in getting airborne armies educated to objectives, staged and moved - moreso in joint allied attacks. I'm not sure what two weeks meant but suspect more a.) staging fuel, and b.) organizing the airborne assault.

As to August - 

opinion ---------> neither the 82nd or the 10st had absorbed the replacements, had re-equipped and were ready to go after the losses and relatively late departure from Normandy. I am not as familiar with British Airborne state of readiness but recall they disengaged earlier and had many fewer casualties in the Normandy campaign? 

If you play what if game, how about what if the north flank of Falaise had been closed or Patton had not been ordered to stop?


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## mkloby (Aug 5, 2007)

plan_D said:


> I've been very busy with college and lots of overtime at work; first year went well - I've got extremely high grades (apparently I'm excellent at aerodynamics).



Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.


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## trackend (Aug 5, 2007)

I believe that market Garden was far too hastily thought up and executed to have any real chance of total success. I feel that the amount of success achieved is down to the troops determination to carry out their missions despite being dealt a lousy hand from the generals.


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2007)

plan_D said:


> _"I was the first between us to point out Mark Clark's and Lucas' performances in Italy so your comment regarding me as a US bigot is not just incorrect but continues to be intended insult. I didn't trot out the BS meter when you pontificated how Alexander would have easily defeated Kesslering when the bumbling American Generals traipsed through Rome. You had not one whit of a fact to base that speculation."_
> 
> If you find it an insult, that's your problem. The problem I've got here is your continued effort to turn this into American vs. British style of argument;
> 
> ...



So, to be clear. I do not despise Brits. or Germans. or Japanese. I'm not happy about Nazi's or our far left politicians.

I think you (who happen by birth to be a Brit) made multiple unsubstantiated statements, and did denigrate the the actions of the 82nd, 27th, 101st/10 Armored, and the Engineers running around blowing up bridges to foil German Panzers everywhere, --- as 'irrelevant'.

I became angry at the last remark because you did not temper the remarks with a shred of irrefutable proof that those actions were in fact 'irrelevant'.

You have offered no thesis to show that absent such defense against incredible odds that the war would not have lasted at least three months more. 

If you think that could not have been possible and demonstrate irrefutably that the war not only would not have lasted that long but beyond a shadow of a doubt would have resulted in quicker capitulation -

Then I will publically apologise for thinking you a 'expert Brit' that falls way short of being an expert. Remember, in this debate you are the lecturing authority.


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.




Rotary Wing aero is a very specialized subsection of aero as is Ducted Fan.

I actually did my Aero Master's thesis on "The effect of centerbody geomety within a Ducted Fan or Rotor on thrust"..

the math model was all about distributing vortices in a ring/circle and using sources and sinks to provide the centerbody shape - with some interesting (admitted small population of 'interest') conclusions when a velocity distribution is generated..

The math and computer models on rotary wings were not very accurate in the late 60s.

Regards,

Bill


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 5, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.



I found rotary wing very easy. Maybe because I grew up with it and learned about it in a Military School which you are doing as well at this very moment.

If you have any questions about rotary wing stuff you know how to get in touch with me Mark.


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## pbfoot (Aug 5, 2007)

I learnt a lot about various battles here and having a vested interest in Falaise as the Lincoln and Welland Regiment is a local unit and had a uncle with it was heavily involved . My research shows that Bradley ordered Patton to halt
and here is my source with a qoute taken from it I hope I haven't taken this out of context
DECISION AT ARGENTAN 
While the Canadians endeavored to resume their attack toward Falaise, the XV Corps drove north from Le Mans on 10 August and secured Alencon two days later. General Patton had set the corps objective at the army group boundary-north of Alencon and just south of Argentan-so Haislip's forces continued their attack. Since Patton's order had also directed preparation for a "further advance" beyond the army group boundary, and since the army group boundary seemed within reach, Haislip-on the basis of the "further advance" inferentially authorized-established Argentan as the new corps objective. With two armored divisions and two infantry divisions comprising his forces, Haislip judged that he could hold a solid shoulder between Alencon and Argentan, and with the Canadians, who were to reach Argentan from the north, thus encircle the German forces to the west. [13] 

As the XV Corps attacked toward Argentan, General Haislip pointedly notified General Patton that he was about to capture the last objective furnished by the army commander. By implication, Haislip requested authority to proceed north of Argentan if the Canadians were not yet there. He suggested that additional troops be placed under his command so that he could block all the east-west roads under his control north of Alencon. [14] 

Since the Canadians had made no further progress toward Falaise while the XV Corps had moved rapidly, Patton sent word for Haislip to go beyond Argentan. Haislip was to "push on slowly in the direction of Falaise." After reaching Falaise, Haislip was to "continue to push on slowly until ... contact [is made with] our Allies," the Canadians. [15] Attacking toward Argentan on the morning of 13 August, the XV Corps struck surprising resistance. The advance halted temporarily. But as the corps was preparing to make a renewed effort to get to and through Argentan, a surprising message came from the Third Army. General Bradley had forbidden further movement northward. General Patton had to order General Haislip to stop. Instead of continuing to the north to an eventual meeting with the Canadians, the XV Corps was to hold in place. less then 25miles separated Canadians and Americans-the Argentan-Falaise gap, through which the Germans tried to escape. Why Bradley did not allow Patton to let the XV Corps continue north and seal the Argentan-Falaise pocket is the main question of debate


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.
> 
> Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France.



My first reaction is to agree Syscom. I'd have to ponder the after effect of the vacuum on the recently freed Italians. The German Army was not known for having Idle hands.

But Kesslering would not be a threat with no mobility to speak of and no access to move his remaining troops to a useful place except perhaps the Balkans - which might have slowed the USSR.

I suspect the notion was contemplated and rejected for political reasons.

Regards

Bill


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2007)

pbfoot said:


> I learnt a lot about various battles here and having a vested interest in Falaise as the Lincoln and Welland Regiment is a local unit and had a uncle with it was heavily involved . My research shows that Bradley ordered Patton to halt
> and here is my source with a qoute taken from it I hope I haven't taken this out of context
> DECISION AT ARGENTAN
> While the Canadians endeavored to resume their attack toward Falaise, the XV Corps drove north from Le Mans on 10 August and secured Alencon two days later. General Patton had set the corps objective at the army group boundary-north of Alencon and just south of Argentan-so Haislip's forces continued their attack. Since Patton's order had also directed preparation for a "further advance" beyond the army group boundary, and since the army group boundary seemed within reach, Haislip-on the basis of the "further advance" inferentially authorized-established Argentan as the new corps objective. With two armored divisions and two infantry divisions comprising his forces, Haislip judged that he could hold a solid shoulder between Alencon and Argentan, and with the Canadians, who were to reach Argentan from the north, thus encircle the German forces to the west. [13]
> ...



Bradley says in Soldiers Story that he was ordered by Montgomery to halt at the assigned objective and let the Canadians continue toward XV Corps. I'm going to look at Blumenson's Patton Diaries to see if more is said.

Arthur Bryant author of Triumph in the West, based on Alanbrooke's Diaries, goes into great detail regarding the events and dialogues between Monty and Ike and Bradley - but strangely silent on the failure to close the 25 mile gap.


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## syscom3 (Aug 5, 2007)

drgondog said:


> ...
> But Kesslering would not be a threat with no mobility to speak of and no access to move his remaining troops to a useful place except perhaps the Balkans - which might have slowed the USSR.
> ....



I would say having enough troops in Italy to keep the Germans busy would be preferable, but the bulk of the land forces should have been sent to France and used to invade the German homeland (or even drive eastwards and try to cut off Kesselring in the Po valley.)

Either way, once the allied armies were on the German border, Italy became a sideshow and irrelevant.


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## plan_D (Aug 6, 2007)

Syscom,

_"I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.

Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France."_

The original plan of Alexander was for the British 8th Army to move up Route 6 through Cassino and on to Frosione while the U.S II Corps moved up Route 7 toward the U.S VI Corps who were to breakout of the Anzio bridgehead. The U.S VI Corps were supposed to breakout and move east to Route 6 to cut off the German 10th Army who were to be retreating after the battle for Cassino. 
The idea was that an encirclement of the German 10th Army would allow Allied forces to capture the Po Valley with relative ease and then move through the Ljubljana Gap to reach Vienna before the Russians. 

Instead, Mark Clark wanted to gain glory and ordered his men north to capture Rome before the British. He believed that Alexander was trying to rob him of his 'prize'. So insane was Clark that he even ordered his troops to fire on any British trying to reach Rome. Clark got his prize when the U.S 88th Blue Devils division entered Rome, allowing the German Army to escape up Route 6 with the British 8th Army in pursuit. Turning north before Rome the German forces set up the Gothic Line just north of Florence which held the Allies in Italy until April 1945. 

I must point out that in the area of operations only Route 6 and 7 were large enough to take the armies of both sides north with any pace - and were vital for movement. 

I don't know what capturing Vienna would have achieved in the long run, or how Germany would have reacted to this new front but I can safely say that by allowing the German Tenth Army to escape; Mark Clark spent more lives of his men just for glory and allowed a campaign that should have been over before christmas 1944 to drag on 'til the end of the war. 

If drgondog, you want anymore information about Italy - I will happily provide more facts and thoughts. 

On to _Market Garden_ -

_"The prevailing opinion in August and September 1944 among the British and American Planners was that Operation Market Garden was going to succeed in September - but that was wrong wasn't it?"_

You are right, it was wrong. The presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions doomed the operation to failure. 

_"The next question to debate is 1.) why was an earlier date discarded, if even contemplated?, or 2.) was it feasible to plan and stage the forces earlier?"_

Montgomery did consider the operation earlier. The plan of Eisenhower was to clear Pas de Calais and Antwerp to shorten the supply lines, however Patton wanted to advance on the Siegfried Line with greater speed. Eisenhower gave the priority to 21st Army Group but spread the supplies across both Army Groups - allowing no decisive thrust. 

In the event, Montgomery made an advance of 250 miles in one week to take Antwerp and Brussels. He was in a position to proceed with _Market Garden_ then - the 1st Allied Airborne Army was ready on the 4th September. Montgomery made his plan on the capture of Antwerp and proposed it on the 9th; it should have been proposed earlier. 

If Montgomery were supplied a little better, and he urged his troops forward just that little bit more _Market Garden_ could have been ready at least a week earlier. As it was Eisenhower was being indecisive with his supplies and Montgomery failed to make Antwerp operational because 11th Armoured Division failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary. 

The forces were ready but a collection of indecision on the commanders and position of troops at the time made the operation begin on the 17th September. 

_"As to August - 

opinion ---------> neither the 82nd or the 10st had absorbed the replacements, had re-equipped and were ready to go after the losses and relatively late departure from Normandy. I am not as familiar with British Airborne state of readiness but recall they disengaged earlier and had many fewer casualties in the Normandy campaign? 

If you play what if game, how about what if the north flank of Falaise had been closed or Patton had not been ordered to stop?"_

The 1st Allied Airborne Army would have been ready to make the drop by the 4th September; if not earlier. I'm not playing the "what if?" game; I'm simply saying that the plan was a decisive and far reaching idea. If the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions weren't there; we would all be praising Montgomery for a genius idea. He should have listened to his intelligence and called the operation off but for me it shows Montgomery's quality in strategic thought. 

As for the "zero facts" on August part; the only reason the plan failed was because of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer - *if* Montgomery was given priority and pushed his forces over the Seine on the 26th August toward Arnhem - the SS Panzers would not have been present to hold the advance. 

On the college subject; No I haven't done rotary wing yet - that's next year. I did eight units in the first year, achieved merits on six and distinctions on two. It's good to finally get back to the debates - I've been reading about the British Isles naval forces recently from 616 AD - 1815 (I've only just finished the American War though). So I might just start bringing up some subjects about the naval war of the War of Independance (or American War). 

I shall deal with the Ardennes Offensive in another post.


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## plan_D (Aug 6, 2007)

_"1. Demonstrate by fact that the Panzer Divisions would not have gotten past the Muese and on to Antwerp had the American units simply withdrawn and melted away versus what did happen at Stavelot, Bastogne and St.Vith Detail specifically how far the Panzers could go with no resistance until the point you define, as the master strategist, as the El Alemain of Belgium (or Paris). What is your 'coup de gras'?.

Oh, and leave out Patton move as this is about Americans melting away instead of attacking"_

I must not have been precise; the strategy should have been for the U.S 1st Army to melt away to a position favourable for defence - maybe the Meuse crossings. 

I never stated that the German units would not reach the Meuse crossings, on the contrary, without the resistance at Bastogne the German spearhead could have probably reached Namur - if not further. However, the German forces could only go as far as their supplies and reserves would allow. 

In my mind, the U.S 1st Army could have retreated to the Meuse and hold them there. With the Germans drawn into the trap, the U.S 3rd Army and U.S 9th Army could simply aim to meet at Dasburg - cutting the German advance off from Germany. Even if the German forces advanced through Namur, they would only drive themselves further into a pincer. 

If the situation became dire, the British XXX Corps was present to provide a blocking force for the Meuse (as did happen). 

As for _"Oh, and leave out Patton move as this is about Americans melting away instead of attacking"_

I never stated Patton should not have attacked; don't try and dictate the terms of the discussion it'll be fruitless.

_"Demonstrate by fact that the war would not have lasted at least 3 months more in Europe. Expand on the tactics that show beyond a shadow of a doubt that all of the Germans in the Bulge would be trapped and eliminated as you pose. Follow up with Geo Political consequences of a 3-6 month delay if your strategy can't be proven."_

Since the possibilites of a different strategy cannot be 100% proven then that's nigh impossible. I can only give you an idea; and let you think for yourself. 

If the Germans were allowed to continue their meagre five divisions of reserve would not have been enough to hold off the U.S 9th and 3rd Armies at the base of the offensive. If the U.S armies would have met at Dasburg, the German armies in the Ardennes would have had no avenue for retreat. 

I don't see how a couple more days in the Ardennes to destroy an army could result in a 3 - 6 month delay in the war; on the contrary had the Allies encircled the German army it would have shortened the war. 

I'd advise a look at the maps, the position and strength of the German troops would have been hopeless against a concentrated attack at the base of the offensive. The real counter blow was made from the tip and all sides of the bulge, which forced it out. 

_"3. Demonstrate by fact that the Allies could have planned, supplied and trained the soldiers for the Market Garden attack in August - with particular detail on the airborne divisions. Cite references that Allied Planning knew where the 9th and 10th Panzer were in August and the knowledge that they 'were in panicked retreat' - 

To a brilliant strategist like Monty it would have been simple to compel an earlier assault given the above knowledge and available assets? I think so - so why didn't it go forward much earlier? Is it possible that Monty didn't know where they were, and further didn't make that a red flag 'Risk'?"_

I've already given the reasons why the plan didn't go ahead in August. As for the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions, the Allies knew there was armour in Arnhem before _Market Garden_ so it seems that Monty discarded the Panzer Divisions as just another obstacle that can be overcome. It's hindsight that provides the knowledge that the 9th and 10th weren't there in August. 

_"4. Demonstrate by fact how Alexander would have managed the thrust short of Rome to pivot and cut Kesslering off. Asuume you have all the assests available in Italy. Spend some time detailing the differences in terrain from the killing fields from Salerno all the way to Rome and the cleverness of Alexander to demonstrate that he could have managed this coup across the Italian backbone and cite the successes Alexander had against Kesslering in the mountains. Tell us what you do with the forces at Anzio?

Cite as examples other campaigns in other wars as well as WWII where fast attacks across mountains were successful?"_

I've already said what Clark should have done and was told to do. It's obvious that he had the chance as the U.S II Corps crossed over to Route 6 two days before the capture of Rome. Had Clark sent his VI Corps over they would have captured Kesslering. 







The map provided shows the position that II Corps reached on 2nd June, Valmontone. It's clear that the roadways leading to Valomtone were large and VI Corps had every chance to reach the town (and Route 6) to block the German Tenth Army. 

On the 25th May, Clark made the decision to turn north and drive up Route 7 (Highway 7 on the map) to take Rome instead. I can't say much more but if it took II Corps from 25th to 2nd June to reach Valomtone from Borgo Grappa, then isn't it feasible to suggest (as everyone has done since World War II) that VI Corps could have reached that town given a concentrated effort.

It's not a matter of the Italian backbone or fast campaigns across mountains in other wars; just look for yourself. Alexander made the plan, Clark failed to abide by it and the Tenth Army got away - face the facts.


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## Soren (Aug 6, 2007)

Good to hear from you again Plan_D, and I'm happy to hear about your good grades in aerodynamics, the most interesting subject IMO  Keep up the good work !


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## Emac44 (Aug 6, 2007)

You had not added the Malayan and Singapore defeat from December 1941 to February 1942 suffered by the Commonwealth and England. The Fall of Malaya and Singapore. In my mind is the greatest Military defeat in WW2


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 6, 2007)

Emac44 said:


> You had not added the Malayan and Singapore defeat from December 1941 to February 1942 suffered by the Commonwealth and England. The Fall of Malaya and Singapore. In my mind is the greatest Military defeat in WW2



I just completed "Bloody Shambles Vol. I" and I have to agree....


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## trackend (Aug 6, 2007)

I said the same EM at the beginning of this thread I totally agree. A total mess. The storys of commanders drinking tea while the causeway was under attack is one I have heard from a few time serving lads who spent the rest of the war suffering in POW camps under the honorable sons of nippons boots

::The fall of Singapore::


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## syscom3 (Aug 6, 2007)

I would also include the fall of the Philipines as part of the blunders in Malaya and Singapore.


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## trackend (Aug 6, 2007)

I don't think it came on the scale of Singapore conversely the dead opposite can be said about the defense put up at Wake Island one of the great heroic actions of WW2 they could have done with some of those leaders at Singapore.


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## timshatz (Aug 6, 2007)

Flyboy J, if you got to the back of the "Bloody Shambles" book (not sure which of the three it is in, maybe the second), there is a report written by a relatively junior officer (I believe he was a Wing Commander) in the RAAF that is absolutely scathing in it's analysis of the high command in Far East. Very informative.

As for Singapore, definitely a blunder but, oddly enough, not with enormous long term significance. It seems everyone (except Winston) thought Singapore would fall. At least the better officers back in England. From what I've read of the Bloody Shambles series, it was something of a dumping ground for second rate or underperforming officers. And nobody was interested in working hard. Work day was from 7:30 am to noon. Rest of the day was off. Even with the Japanese on the horizon, nothing changed. 

The Phillipines was a different matter. Doug was caught flatfooted. He had changed the strategy around from a long defense in Bataan to forward defense on the beaches. In the end, neither strategy worked (although he did keep Bataan defenses active until April and Corregidor until May) as he was in the middle of the move when the attack happened. Also, the Japanese were on a war footing right away, it took a while for the US forces to get it together. The Japanese had more trouble with the Phillipines than they expected. They thought it would fall faster.


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## trackend (Aug 6, 2007)

You're probably right TS however I think the loss of nearly 100,000 men did have long term effects as they all had to be replaced.


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## timshatz (Aug 6, 2007)

trackend said:


> You're probably right TS however I think the loss of nearly 100,000 men did have long term effects as they all had to be replaced.



Good point. If there is anything that bothers me about Singapore (once I get past the losers who were in command), it's the Australians who got there just in time to surrender. 

It was a monumental failure of command. I think of it less as a blunder than as incompetence in the extreme. Read the "Bloody Shambles" series. Someone recommended it to me on this board and they were right. Great series.


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## syscom3 (Aug 6, 2007)

What was even worse was the waste of men and material in defense of the Dutch East Indies!

BTW, I was the one who first recommended everyone to that book series.


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## Marcel (Aug 6, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> What was even worse was the waste of men and material in defense of the Dutch East Indies!



On that I totally agree. At least from a militairy point of view. They should have withdrawn. The battle of the Java sea was total a waste of men and material. But it's comprehensible considering the position the dutch were in. It was the last of the free dutch soil (colonies of course but considered at the time). They had nowhere to run to, so they tried to make a stand. The dutch owe a lot to those US and Commonwealth soldiers who tried to help them, although it hardly made any difference.


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## timshatz (Aug 6, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> BTW, I was the one who first recommended everyone to that book series.



Then let me be one of the first to say, "Good call".


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## timshatz (Aug 6, 2007)

Marcel said:


> On that I totally agree. At least from a militairy point of view. They should have withdrawn. The battle of the Java sea was total a waste of men and material. But it's comprehensible considering the position the dutch were in. It was the last of the free dutch soil (colonies of course but considered at the time). They had nowhere to run to, so they tried to make a stand. The dutch owe a lot to those US and Commonwealth soldiers who tried to help them, although it hardly made any difference.



Sad chapter in the history of WW2 but once the Japanese took over French IndoChina (without any fighting), the writing was on the wall for the rest of the European colonies out there. At least for anyone who studied the Japanese and their actions from the start of the century. They were going after the Malay Penisula as well as Borneo and other islands of Indonesia. The Dutch really had nowhere to go. They had no industrial base, no real income, next to nothing. They did the best they could with what they had, and continued to fight the Japanese throughout the war in the Pacific. But they were up against the wall from the start. 

I've read that Roosevelt would've let them invade and take those possessions without a fight if they did not attack the US or US Possessions (ie, the Phillipines). In 1941, the US was playing for time. Needed all we could get. Turns out, we didn't get enough.

While Roosevelt would've let the Japanese attack past the Phillipines, I doubt the Japanese had any serious considerations of doing so. With the PI directly astride their lines of communications (and held by the largest power in the Pacific), it was one of the first places that had to be attacked.


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## Bernhart (Aug 6, 2007)

Not sure this could be considered a milatary blunder but Hitler taking over operations all by his lonesome has got to be a huge mistake.


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## Njaco (Aug 6, 2007)

Thats a good one. Missed it. definately a major blunder.


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## renrich (Aug 6, 2007)

A blunder which did not have huge consequences(unless you were one of Wake's defenders) was the failure of the Task Force commanded by Fletcher to follow through and attack the IJN invasion fleet. If they had been audacious and struck swiftly, they could have decimated the IJN invasion fleet, relieved Wake and given the IJN a serious setback and bloody nose. My uncle was in one of the ships in that TF and never understood the reason for turning back.


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## Trautloft (Aug 6, 2007)

i go with Dunkirk. At that time,that stage of war,i believe it could make the British fall.
If they advance immadiately,concentrate all of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to cause heavy losses to the weakening RAF and RN ,not letting time to regroup,recover and prepare and start a 'Blitz-D-Day' aka Operation Seelöwe,the Invasion of Britain seems more as possible


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## syscom3 (Aug 6, 2007)

renrich said:


> A blunder which did not have huge consequences(unless you were one of Wake's defenders) was the failure of the Task Force commanded by Fletcher to follow through and attack the IJN invasion fleet. If they had been audacious and struck swiftly, they could have decimated the IJN invasion fleet, relieved Wake and given the IJN a serious setback and bloody nose. My uncle was in one of the ships in that TF and never understood the reason for turning back.



At that month of the war in the Pacific, noone wanted to needlessly expose the carriers to attack.


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## plan_D (Aug 7, 2007)

The Bloody Shambles series was written by Christopher Shores - don't miss his other works; he has an excellent three volume series on the 2nd TAF and the airforces over the Balkans.


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## timshatz (Aug 7, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> At that month of the war in the Pacific, noone wanted to needlessly expose the carriers to attack.



The Admiral in charge of the Task Force (I think it was a guy named Pye or something like that) never got another fleet command. He was sent home, most likely quietly. 

While the arguement of not wanting to expose the carriers is a good one, it didn't cut it with the guys who were in charge. Pye had a chance to fight, to inflict damage against an enemy that didn't know he was coming and he folded up. Like Hooker at the Wilderness, it came down to the character of the man. He didn't have it. 

Hooker later admited it. I don't know if Pye ever did. But he probably knew.

All that being said, I don't know if was really that big of a deal. The battle that would've come out of it probably would've looked like Coral Sea and not a later, better organized battle like Eastern Solomans or Phillipine Sea. Nobody really knew what they were doing in the first Carrier battle. They figured it out fast (as evidenced by Midway), but the first one was all over the place. A lot more punches were thrown than landed. By the time Phillipine Sea came around in '44, everybody knew what they were doing and most strikes had a good chance of making contact.


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## timshatz (Aug 7, 2007)

plan_D said:


> The Bloody Shambles series was written by Christopher Shores - don't miss his other works; he has an excellent three volume series on the 2nd TAF and the airforces over the Balkans.



Thanks for the info. Going on my reading list. Read the first series and they were worth it.


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## timshatz (Aug 7, 2007)

Bernhart said:


> Not sure this could be considered a milatary blunder but Hitler taking over operations all by his lonesome has got to be a huge mistake.



Good point. It was a blunder. At one point, Hitler was reporting to himself as Army Commander to Chief of Staff to Head of State. In short, he took out the top three spots in the Chain of Command and made them all under his control. 

If the Democratic nations of the world ever go to war again like they did in the 40s, we should keep in mind the lessons learned of fighting against a Meglomaniac (AKA, Akmadenijad or Chavez). These guys have to be "the one" at all times and that leads them to a ton of mistakes. Mistakes they never admit. So the mistakes never get fixed. 

It is a very useful advantage.


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## renrich (Aug 7, 2007)

Pye was the commander of the Battle Force when Pearl was attacked. The TF commander that was to relieve Wake was Frank Jack Fletcher and they were very close to Wake(less than a days sail, I think) with an over whelming force when Fletcher got cold feet and retreated. Pye commanded nothing after PH and Fletcher went on to be overall commander of the US forces at Midway although Spruance made most of the critical decisions. I am not sure but Fletcher was relieved from command later.


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## timshatz (Aug 7, 2007)

Actually, we're both wrong. Got this from Wikipedia (often wrong but never in doubt?):

"[edit] Task Force 14
The projected U.S. relief attempt by Admiral Wilson Brown’s Task Force 14 (TF-14) consisted of fleet carriers Saratoga and Lexington, the fleet oiler USNS Neches, the seaplane tender Tangier, the cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, and ten destroyers. The convoy carried the 4th Marine Coastal Defense Battalion, the VMF-221 fighter squadron equipped with F2A “Brewster Buffalo” fighters, along with 9,000 five-inch (127 mm) rounds, 12,000 three-inch (76.2 mm) rounds, and 3,000,000 .50 cal. (12.7 mm) rounds as well as a large amount of ammunition for mortars and other battalion small arms.

On December 22 at 21:00, the task force received controversial orders signed by Vice Admiral William S. Pye, the Acting Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, to return to Pearl Harbor for fear of losses, so no naval battle took place. After Wake Island and Midway-in which Pye ordered his Battleships to sortie but never fought the enemy- Pye never commanded forces in battle again."


Here's the link:

Battle of Wake Island - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Njaco (Aug 7, 2007)

> If the Democratic nations of the world ever go to war again like they did in the 40s, we should keep in mind the lessons learned of fighting against a Meglomaniac (AKA, Akmadenijad or Chavez). These guys have to be "the one" at all times and that leads them to a ton of mistakes. Mistakes they never admit. So the mistakes never get fixed.



We still are, its alittle different in that each and every soldier in the field and in high command are Meglomaniacs. We just have to figure out their mistakes and capitalize on them. And that might be their interpetation of their religion is a mistake.

Correction: Just read where you clarified it as "Democratic" nations. I just take back all that nonsense I just blathered!


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## renrich (Aug 7, 2007)

tim, it appears that wikipedia may be in error, I suspect not for the first time. According to Lundstrom in "The First Team" the commander of TF 14, the Wake relief force was R Adm Frank Jack Fletcher in Astoria. He also cites Samuel Eliot Morison for taking Fletcher to task for not being more aggressive which must be where I got my notions about the mission. Lundstrom does not agree with Morison. I would tend to go with Lundstrom as I do not know of any writer who has better researched the action in the Pacific. Brown commanded TF 11 which was to attack Jaluit in the Marshalls.


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## timshatz (Aug 7, 2007)

Pye was in overall charge of the mission, not Fletcher. He was the guy who called a halt to the run for Wake. Here are couple of exerts from American Heritage Magazine. First, a description of Pye and his taking command from Kimmel on the 15th of December:

"Pye was a careful officer. Nimitz, the kindest and most gently spoken of great war admirals, once described him as a “great brain but no guts.” In an operation where other men saw opportunity, Pye was the sort of man who naturally saw difficulties. In looking over the operational plans of the departed Kimmel, Pye saw difficulties aplenty. In a single gambler’s toss Kimmel, who had lost much of the Pacific Fleet in one afternoon, was sending the rest of it piecemeal into waters that the Navy did not control to engage an enemy whose position and strength he did not know. No, Pye didn’t like the plan at all. Prudently he ordered Admiral Brown’s Lexington to turn north away from the Marshalls to give Fletcher closer support. "


Second, the situation that lead to the recall orders:

"There was not much doubt in Pye’s mind any longer. He had never liked the plan in the first place, and Cunningham’s message indicated it was too late to relieve Wake anyway. But should he let the Saratoga force sail on and engage whatever enemy could be found? Pye didn’t like that idea much either. A captain sailing into a sea battle ought to have some idea what he was getting into, but as one staff officer commented, “we had no more idea than a billy goat” what was going on at Wake. Pye radioed Fletcher, telling him to break off and return to port.

Fletcher was 425 miles from Wake when he got Pye’s message. His task force had already suffered several frustrating delays. Had Fletcher made straight for Wake, he probably would have arrived about the same time as Kajioka, but not wanting to steam into battle with half-empty destroyers, he had paused to refuel. The refueling was snafu from the start. Seven oil hoses ruptured, and a number of towlines parted in the rolling seas. In ten hours only four destroyers were filled while the fleet actually drifted farther away from Wake. During the voyage Pye sent Fletcher a series of conflicting dispatches, each more cautionary than the previous one. It is likely Fletcher was glad to finally get a direct, explicit order from Pearl Harbor. He complied swiftly."

Lastly, the situation onboard the ships when Pye's order came through. 

"The American people did not know a fleet had been ordered to Wake until much later, so there was no public reaction to the withdrawal. But within the Navy and Marine Corps, the reaction was immediate and bitter. Officers on the Saratoga, some of them weeping, pleaded with Fletcher to put Nelson’s blind eye to the telescope and sail on in spite of orders. The talk became so heated that Admiral Fitch left the bridge of his own ship because he did not want officially to hear his officers speaking in terms that were close to mutinous, particularly when they expressed sentiments he agreed with. One officer aboard the Enterprise scribbled furiously in an unofficial log, “It’s the war between two yellow races.”

The incident marred Fletcher’s long and honorable naval career. He was frequently referred to thereafter as “Fueling Jack Fletcher” and chastised for lack of resoluteness in combat. In fairness Admiral Fletcher did not win the Medal of Honor because he was squeamish about fighting, and to divide one’s forces in the face of a numerically superior enemy, as he was to do five months later at the Battle of Midway, is not the mark of a timid admiral. The worst that can be said about Fletcher is that he was not Nelson."

The entire article can be read here:

AmericanHeritage.com / THE DEFENSE OF WAKE


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## syscom3 (Aug 7, 2007)

Its easy for us to be armchair admirals on this one, since we have 65 years of facts to dwell on.

But put yourself in Pye's shoes..... only the four carriers were what was left of the striking power of the USN. Sometimes prudency *is* the better part of valor. 

Pye was right in withdrawing his forces untill the USN and USMC were reorganized to reflect the realities of the war in the Pacific.


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## mkloby (Aug 7, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Its easy for us to be armchair admirals on this one, since we have 65 years of facts to dwell on.



Good call. Everyone seems to forget that, as you have all these cubicle commandos ripping apart decisions that a military leader made. Military decisions are always made with incomplete intelligence, and very often it is the delay of action, or inaction, that can prove most disastrous.


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## lucanus (Aug 7, 2007)

My 2 cents says the lack of offense by the French in 1940...Their
tanks could have decimated the panzers if the French command
had not been in the Rear...I sometimes think that at any point
prior to Sept 1939, if the powers that were had showed a little
backbone towards the Lil Corporal, he would have backed down.

+ 8 cents:
I read somewhere that Hilter's Army Commanders had wanted him to
wait 5 years to begin his onslaught...And that if he had done so
he would have still caught most of the world with their proverbial
trousers down....Going what was that  (as a german jets zoomed
overhead) 

Anyone out there ever wonder what the Marines on the Canal
felt like when the Navy sailed away....?


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 7, 2007)

Didn't the germans have a jet engine in '38 ????


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## lucanus (Aug 7, 2007)

Yea but think how many more they would have had if they had properly
utilized the tech


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 7, 2007)

But Hitler wasn't interested in the Air force or the navy was he? He just left it to goering didn't he ?
Isn't it true though that the british also had jet technolegy at the same time ?
I read somewhere that the meteor made it into service as the first jet in service anywhere a week before the 262 got in.


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## Michael (Aug 8, 2007)

Greatest blunder? OK I will give my 2 cents. The greatest blunder was giving back Japan her nation. She was nation building and had taken most of Asia. That included killing 30 million Chinese and a few million other Asian folks. She surrendered UNCONDITIONALLY and the allies treated her better than she had or would have any nation she defeated.


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## syscom3 (Aug 8, 2007)

Michael said:


> Greatest blunder? OK I will give my 2 cents. The greatest blunder was giving back Japan her nation. She was nation building and had taken most of Asia. That included killing 30 million Chinese and a few million other Asian folks. She surrendered UNCONDITIONALLY and the allies treated her better than she had or would have any nation she defeated.



We've been at peace with that country for 62 years now.

Far from a blunder.


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## Marcel (Aug 8, 2007)

Michael said:


> Greatest blunder? OK I will give my 2 cents. The greatest blunder was giving back Japan her nation. She was nation building and had taken most of Asia. That included killing 30 million Chinese and a few million other Asian folks. She surrendered UNCONDITIONALLY and the allies treated her better than she had or would have any nation she defeated.



In what way was that a mistake? We have peace with them nowadays, haven't we? They don't threaten other nations anymore, do they? With your logic, you shouldn't have treated germany so well and they wouldn't have been one of your most loyal ally during the cold war.
To show mercy is to show one's greatness


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## lucanus (Aug 8, 2007)

The occupation of Japan was controlled by MacArthur, since he was
the 'specialist on Japan'....He is the one who protected Hirohito and mandated
that the Japs set up a 'Democracy'....You know one of the things about 
MacArthur was that he berated the command staff in the Phillipines for
surrendering....Of course he, left and went to Aussieland, under 'orders
from the President' taking his whole family including the nanny...Nobody else
got to take their families...If he was such a great guy, why did his only son
change his name and work as a saxophone player?


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## Njaco (Aug 8, 2007)

Aussie,
The He 176 was the first rocket propelled plane and was ready for testing in summer 1938.

He 178 was first jet propelled and flew on 24 August 1939.

Me 262 became operational after EKdo 262 was formed in December 1943. Long training for the piston pilots meant the unit didn't see action until July 1944.

Gloster Meteor became operational on 12 July 1944 when RAF No 616 Sqdn recieved 2 Meteor F.1s flying their first sorties on 27 July.

Looking over this thread, I would have to say Hitler taking over the High Command was the greatest blunder of Germany during the war. Every mistep came from him.


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## plan_D (Aug 8, 2007)

Lucanus, where have you heard that the German General Staff wanted to wait five years to begin the onslaught? Guderian states in his memoirs that the German General Staff never wanted a war; only the minute few 'looked forward' to the prospect of war. 

In any case, if Germany had waited five years then the Soviet Union would have had a developed military machine which would have inflicted many millions more casualities on the German Wehrmacht in the event of a war between the two. 

I agree that the French made some of the greatest blunders in World War II - the use of their armour as infantry support was a Great War mistake which cost them their country.


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## timshatz (Aug 8, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Good call. Everyone seems to forget that, as you have all these cubicle commandos ripping apart decisions that a military leader made. Military decisions are always made with incomplete intelligence, and very often it is the delay of action, or inaction, that can prove most disastrous.



I don't agree. And what's more, his contemporaries didn't agree. While my opinion doesn't mean much, others who knew him at the time felt the same way. 

I agree with your points about armchair generals and making decisions with incomplete information. They are good and very valid points. But you need somebody, WE needed somebody, who would fight. And you will never have complete information. Doesn't matter if you are running a business or running a war. Most decisions are made in a fog. Make the right decisions, fame and fortune come your way (depending on which you want). Shy from it, and somebody else will come in to do it. Make the wrong decisions and you end up broke, disgraced and forgotten. 

Wake was relatively insignificant in the scheme of things. It was a single island out in the middle of the Pacific. No great offensives were launched from it. It was not even deemed important enough to take back by the powers that be. Was liberated until the end of the war. But there was an opportunity there in 1941. Kimmel saw it, Pye saw only the down side.


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## Njaco (Aug 8, 2007)

Plan, I also read ...can't remember the source, will check...that there was a tenative plan to have things ready for war by 42 or 43. May have not come from the Army Commanders but I believe that when they realized Hitler was serious they suggested those years as the earliest they would be ready to stage a war. Will check what I got.


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## syscom3 (Aug 8, 2007)

timshatz said:


> Was liberated until the end of the war. But there was an opportunity there in 1941. Kimmel saw it, Pye saw only the down side.



There were only three carriers in the Pacific in Dec 1941. That was the whole USN offensive capability in that ocean untill the Yorktown and Hornet could get there.

Pye was right in withdrawing. Better to lose that island than to lose a carrier and be really ******.


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## timshatz (Aug 8, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> There were only three carriers in the Pacific in Dec 1941. That was the whole USN offensive capability in that ocean untill the Yorktown and Hornet could get there.
> 
> Pye was right in withdrawing. Better to lose that island than to lose a carrier and be really ******.



Neither his predecessor (Kimmel) or the subsiquent commander (Nimitz) saw it that way. I can see how I read it wrong. No worries. But those guys sat in the same chair. They knew the risks, had the same responsibility. If they say Pye dropped the ball, wouldn't it follow that their perspective lends credibility to the assessment?


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## syscom3 (Aug 8, 2007)

timshatz said:


> Neither his predecessor (Kimmel) or the subsiquent commander (Nimitz) saw it that way. I can see how I read it wrong. No worries. But those guys sat in the same chair. They knew the risks, had the same responsibility. If they say Pye dropped the ball, wouldn't it follow that their perspective lends credibility to the assessment?



They formed their opinions after some of the needed intelligence was developed.

From what everyone knew on the exact dates in question, Pye was right to be concerned and ultimatly proven right by preserving the carriers for future battles.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 8, 2007)

Michael said:


> Greatest blunder? OK I will give my 2 cents. The greatest blunder was giving back Japan her nation. She was nation building and had taken most of Asia. That included killing 30 million Chinese and a few million other Asian folks. She surrendered UNCONDITIONALLY and the allies treated her better than she had or would have any nation she defeated.



And that my friends is an example of ignorance....


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## mkloby (Aug 8, 2007)

timshatz said:


> I don't agree. And what's more, his contemporaries didn't agree. While my opinion doesn't mean much, others who knew him at the time felt the same way.
> 
> I agree with your points about armchair generals and making decisions with incomplete information. They are good and very valid points. But you need somebody, WE needed somebody, who would fight. And you will never have complete information. Doesn't matter if you are running a business or running a war. Most decisions are made in a fog. Make the right decisions, fame and fortune come your way (depending on which you want). Shy from it, and somebody else will come in to do it. Make the wrong decisions and you end up broke, disgraced and forgotten.
> 
> Wake was relatively insignificant in the scheme of things. It was a single island out in the middle of the Pacific. No great offensives were launched from it. It was not even deemed important enough to take back by the powers that be. Was liberated until the end of the war. But there was an opportunity there in 1941. Kimmel saw it, Pye saw only the down side.



I wasn't validating or disagreeing with the decision one way or another. I was simply commenting on syscoms statement regarding armchairing this crap. Making a decision regarding something you have almost all information regarding, plus obviously the historical outcome, cannot be compared to the individual making the decision at the time.

What bothers me is that Joe Dirt in Bumble----, Oklahoma reads a military book and suddenly he could have run the war better than Eisenhower, Halsey, etc. and smashes these individuals that did their best to serve their country.


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## mkloby (Aug 8, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> And that my friends is an example of ignorance....



You think??? I was hoping nobody would respond to that one...


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## timshatz (Aug 8, 2007)

mkloby said:


> What bothers me is that Joe Dirt in Bumble----, Oklahoma reads a military book and suddenly he could have run the war better than Eisenhower, Halsey, etc. and smashes these individuals that did their best to serve their country.




I agree with ya'. It is easier to be critical than correct and a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. I see it sometimes on the board, that somebody was inept. Saw both Montgomery and Eisenhower get that tag recently. Don't think either one deserves it. In truth, given the cirumstances of the time, they both did a pretty good job. I suscribe to the idea that the side that makes the fewest mistakes while pursuing their plan-wins. 

Far too often, you get a post saying, "If so and so had done such and such, the war would've ended 6 months eariler". Such posts usually don't understand that doing "such and such" was not practical for a mulitude of reasons. But by looking at a map (and only a map), it seems simple. 

Another problem Armchair Strategiest have is they rarely make any weighty decisions themselves. With little experience in making the decisions, it amazes them that something was not done "the obvious way".


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## Marcel (Aug 8, 2007)

timshatz said:


> I agree with ya'. It is easier to be critical than correct and a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. I see it sometimes on the board, that somebody was inept. Saw both Montgomery and Eisenhower get that tag recently. Don't think either one deserves it. In truth, given the cirumstances of the time, they both did a pretty good job. I suscribe to the idea that the side that makes the fewest mistakes while pursuing their plan-wins.
> 
> Far too often, you get a post saying, "If so and so had done such and such, the war would've ended 6 months eariler". Such posts usually don't understand that doing "such and such" was not practical for a mulitude of reasons. But by looking at a map (and only a map), it seems simple.
> 
> Another problem Armchair Strategiest have is they rarely make any weighty decisions themselves. With little experience in making the decisions, it amazes them that something was not done "the obvious way".



Agreed, but I think on a board like this you must be able to analyse things and talk about what could have done differently. That's the whole purpose of these treads, isn't it. I don't mean burning a general to the ground, but just analysing if his descision was right or wrong given the information we have now.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 8, 2007)

mkloby said:


> You think??? I was hoping nobody would respond to that one...



Sorry please explain? If I do not understand you correctly I apologize it is rather late and I am very very tired.


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## mkloby (Aug 8, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Sorry please explain? If I do not understand you correctly I apologize it is rather late and I am very very tired.



 That's ok. I was agreeing with you that that post was ridiculously... inept or ignorant (probably both). It was one of those posts that was so much so I was hoping nobody would even dignify it with a response.


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## mack (Aug 8, 2007)

timshatz said:


> December 10th, 1941. Hitler declares war on the US. Firstly, it turned a European war into a global war. Before that, it is possible to call the wars going on The Great European War and The Great Pacific War. By declaring war on the US, it truely became a World War (not all the World was in it, but that stretched it all the way around the globe in an intertwined way).
> 
> I was going to add June 22nd 1941 but that was not really a World War situation. It was still part of the Great European war. So Barbarossa doesn't quite make it (stupid blunder that it was).
> 
> By declaring war on the US (the only country he actually did that to), Hitler added the last piece in the puzzle that would bring about his downfall. Russia had the Manpower, England had the position, the US had the Manufacturing capacity. US involvement in the European war might've been inevitable, but Hitler's actions only hurried his end.


I agree,without the US things would have been tougher for England and Russia>


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 8, 2007)

I must post a hypothetical post....
If hitler hadn't broken the treaty he had with starlin he would have made it easier for him although at that stage he had already made some screw ups....
it is all very easy for us to comment though at the time the decisions might have seemed a good idea although some would argue that hitler was a bit coo coo.......


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## Njaco (Aug 8, 2007)

I been thinking that also Aussie but as much as I try a scenario without Russia, I realize it can't happen. Hitler's idealology was totally against the Soviets which he considered subhuman. He would never have ignored Russia and very unlikely have made any trades or deals even to get oil or such. I just can't seem to get past that point. Its inherent in National Socialism.

Besides at some point I think Japan, which was a war partner, wouldve pressured to do something to help their end of the world. Japan and Russia were enemies at the time.

But a neat little head scratcher. WWII without the Eastern Front.


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 8, 2007)

Yes hitler considered everyone else apart from his "super race" 
however if he had have put this aside and not invaded russia......well it would have been interesting.
But would starlin have invaded instead i mean he wasn't very rational either was he?


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## Michael (Aug 9, 2007)

Ignorant. Wow. I thought everyone was entilted to an OPINION. The fact that you do not agree does not neccessary make me ignorant. How is it that a whole nation followed a man that wanted to exterminate an entire religious faith (apparently got 6 million)? Ignorance? Arrogance? Fear? Self-righteous Indignation? Blind obedience?
Maybe they just didn't see letting any other OPINION have a chance or give it a germ of credence. After all majority rules and might makes right.
BTW Marshall was the plan man after Japans defeat.
Question. Why was McArthur considered a hero when he lost a whole US territory when Kimmel and Short were ostracized for losing the fleet at Hawaii?


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## syscom3 (Aug 9, 2007)

Michael said:


> Ignorant. Wow. I thought everyone was entilted to an OPINION. The fact that you do not agree does not neccessary make me ignorant. How is it that a whole nation followed a man that wanted to exterminate an entire religious faith (apparently got 6 million)? Ignorance? Arrogance? Fear? Self-righteous Indignation? Blind obedience?
> Maybe they just didn't see letting any other OPINION have a chance or give it a germ of credence. After all majority rules and might makes right.
> BTW Marshall was the plan man after Japans defeat.
> Question. Why was McArthur considered a hero when he lost a whole US territory when Kimmel and Short were ostracized for losing the fleet at Hawaii?



I don't think many words really describe you. Arrogant is one of them. Bizarre is another.


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## Marcel (Aug 9, 2007)

Michael said:


> Ignorant. Wow. I thought everyone was entilted to an OPINION. The fact that you do not agree does not neccessary make me ignorant. How is it that a whole nation followed a man that wanted to exterminate an entire religious faith (apparently got 6 million)? Ignorance? Arrogance? Fear? Self-righteous Indignation? Blind obedience?
> Maybe they just didn't see letting any other OPINION have a chance or give it a germ of credence. After all majority rules and might makes right.
> BTW Marshall was the plan man after Japans defeat.
> Question. Why was McArthur considered a hero when he lost a whole US territory when Kimmel and Short were ostracized for losing the fleet at Hawaii?



You're ignorant, because you obviously never heard of the versailles treaty, which is a great example of what happens if you treat de defeated country the way you described: you'll get another war. The US didn't make that mistake at the end of WW2 and we must all be glad they didn't.


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## bomber (Aug 9, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> We've been at peace with that country for 62 years now.
> 
> Far from a blunder.



Mmmmmm 

The Germans in WWII tried to destroy the UK's industrial base through droping bombs they failed...

Yet 62 years of peace has left it in a far worse condition

Shooting war.... economic war.... spot the common denominator ?

Simon


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2007)

bomber said:


> Mmmmmm
> 
> The Germans in WWII tried to destroy the UK's industrial base through droping bombs they failed...
> 
> ...


Boy your a freaking optimist - I'd hate to see you at a suicide prevention clinic.


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## timshatz (Aug 9, 2007)

Marcel said:


> Agreed, but I think on a board like this you must be able to analyse things and talk about what could have done differently. That's the whole purpose of these treads, isn't it. I don't mean burning a general to the ground, but just analysing if his descision was right or wrong given the information we have now.



Marcel, you are right. I was thinking the same thing last night before I went to sleep. The board is where these things are tossed around, analysed and generally considered. It's a good thing to take a decision apart, ramifications considered. We all post here because we like doing it and......snnnnoooooorrrrrreeeeeee 

Well, I had a good thread going in my head before I fell asleep.


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## timshatz (Aug 9, 2007)

Michael said:


> Ignorant. Wow. I thought everyone was entilted to an OPINION. The fact that you do not agree does not neccessary make me ignorant. How is it that a whole nation followed a man that wanted to exterminate an entire religious faith (apparently got 6 million)? Ignorance? Arrogance? Fear? Self-righteous Indignation? Blind obedience?
> Maybe they just didn't see letting any other OPINION have a chance or give it a germ of credence. After all majority rules and might makes right.
> BTW Marshall was the plan man after Japans defeat.
> Question. Why was McArthur considered a hero when he lost a whole US territory when Kimmel and Short were ostracized for losing the fleet at Hawaii?



I don't believe the call of ignorance is based on your having an opinion but the caliber of the opinion. If you were to go on to an astronomy board and declare the moon was made of cheese, the same thing would happen. 

As for your question, it is a good one. My guess would be the loss of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor negated War Plan Orange's early design. There was no fleet to come across the Pacific and relieve or resupply McArthur. Hence, his loss was less unexpected. 

Further, the McArthur publicity machine was running at full tilt. The US was running into defeat after defeat (Java Sea, Wake Island, Guam, ect) and the last thing we needed was another, relatively famous, General turning out to be a loser. Especially one that ran Public Relations as well as he did. If he had been a dud, he would've been eased out like Ghormley was during the Guadalcanal Campaign. But he turned out to be pretty good, if vain, in running the War in he SW Pacific.


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## timshatz (Aug 9, 2007)

Adler, just for fun and games...

The above poll has settled down to three major responses. Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor and Hitler Declaring war on the US. Is it possible to break down the responses based on Nation? Not on name, but where a person is from. It might be interesting.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 9, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> I must post a hypothetical post....
> If hitler hadn't broken the treaty he had with starlin he would have made it easier for him although at that stage he had already made some screw ups....
> it is all very easy for us to comment though at the time the decisions might have seemed a good idea although some would argue that hitler was a bit coo coo.......



Hitler and Stalin hated each other. It was only a matter of time before Stalin invaded Germany so it really did not matter.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 9, 2007)

timshatz said:


> Adler, just for fun and games...
> 
> The above poll has settled down to three major responses. Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor and Hitler Declaring war on the US. Is it possible to break down the responses based on Nation? Not on name, but where a person is from. It might be interesting.



You would have to start the poll all over again or go through each one and see what country they came from. Sorry but I dont want to take the time for that.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 9, 2007)

Michael said:


> Ignorant. Wow. I thought everyone was entilted to an OPINION. The fact that you do not agree does not neccessary make me ignorant. How is it that a whole nation followed a man that wanted to exterminate an entire religious faith (apparently got 6 million)? Ignorance? Arrogance? Fear? Self-righteous Indignation? Blind obedience?
> Maybe they just didn't see letting any other OPINION have a chance or give it a germ of credence. After all majority rules and might makes right.
> BTW Marshall was the plan man after Japans defeat.
> Question. Why was McArthur considered a hero when he lost a whole US territory when Kimmel and Short were ostracized for losing the fleet at Hawaii?



No you are correct, you are entitled to an opinion. 

Would you like to hear my opinion?

Your opinion was pretty ignorant...

I am sure just about everyone here will agree with me.


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## drgondog (Aug 9, 2007)

Michael said:


> Question. Why was McArthur considered a hero when he lost a whole US territory when Kimmel and Short were ostracized for losing the fleet at Hawaii?



It might have something to do with the defense at Bataan when the US Navy had no option but to let the Marines and Army fight and die. Usually when you have lost complete control of the Sea and Air and subject to overwhelming odds on the ground and ponded from sea with zero hope of rescue or re-supply - folks will forgive.

I could be wrong.

He did conduct a masterful strategy in recapturing lost ground and the Phillipines with losses less than Normandy campaign - in contrast with the horrific losses the USMC took under Nimitz (and NO I am not taking a shot at Nimitz - just different approaches in isolating and destroying the Japanese.

It is sometimes hard to imagine that 8th AF, and USA (each) at the Bulge, had about the same number of casualties as entire USMC during WWII... and all three a lot more than McArthur's losses.

William Manchester, as a Marine, expressed his contempt and disdain for McArthur prior to researching American Ceasar but came away with enormous respect for him after he wrote his book.

Regards,

Bill


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## timshatz (Aug 9, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> You would have to start the poll all over again or go through each one and see what country they came from. Sorry but I dont want to take the time for that.



Cool. Just curious about it. If there were an easy way...but there ain't.

Thanks for the response.


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## syscom3 (Aug 9, 2007)

Say what you want about MacArthur, but his success's after his defeat in the PI negated all his short comings and vanities.

You might say that in May 1942, he knew exactly what needed to be done to defeat the Japanese and implimented it with astounding efficiency.


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## drgondog (Aug 13, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Say what you want about MacArthur, but his success's after his defeat in the PI negated all his short comings and vanities.
> 
> You might say that in May 1942, he knew exactly what needed to be done to defeat the Japanese and implimented it with astounding efficiency.



He`was the one I voted for..


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2007)

Aside from what could be said about MacArthur, my wife's grandfather Capt. Frank Grady was on his staff. Grady spoke very favorably about MacArthur even though he spent 4 years as a POW. 

Amazon.com: Surviving the Day: An American Pow in Japan: Books: Frank J. Grady,Rebecca Dickson


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## Michael (Aug 17, 2007)

Thanks for the well thought out answers. On the same note, What did Wainwright think of MacArthur? (after) I remember seeing old news reels that showed Mac had him on the Missouri for the signing, didn't he?


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 18, 2007)

I know adler note though that i did say hypothetical


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## lucanus (Aug 18, 2007)

Before Dec 7th, '41, General Macarthur was a Field Marshal in the pay
of the Phillipino Government...Having already retired from the US Army.
Hence the fancy _Cover_ (Jarhead for 'hat') he is always seen in.

Has anybody in here ever heard of the of the Morgenthau Plan? Makes
an interesting counterpoint to the Marshall Plan...



> The Morgenthau Plan was a plan for the occupation of Germany after the Second World War that advocated harsh measures intended to remove Germany's ability to wage war ever again.
> 
> In the original proposal this was to be achieved in three main steps.
> 
> ...



Morgenthau Plan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## timshatz (Aug 18, 2007)

Yeah, heard of the Morgenthau plan. Something cooked up by a guy name Henry Morgenthau, Head of the Treasury (I think, going on memory). Pretty much neutered the German state. It was one of a bunch of ideas floated that had no real chance of realization. 

On the down side, Goebbels got hold of the outline and used it as a propaganda tool. Bummer, it was a dud idea that was more useful to the Nazis than anyone else.


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## The Basket (Aug 18, 2007)

Everybody...even the Soviets themselves thought the Germans were easy winners on the eastern front.

Didn't work out but the plan was sound and it may have been a good idea at the time.

The German generals were for Barbarossa and they may have changed their minds after the war but they certainly had no problems at the time.

Unlike Pearl Harbour where Yamamoto predictions of future disaster came true.


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## ArrowZero (Sep 5, 2007)

I don't know much about all these battles, did the planning people just send people to be killed to test defences. Like in Dieppe just to test the German defences for a later invasion... Was not a blunder because it help planning D-Day in a better way. In dieppe Germans were waiting for the soldier to arrive, and the allied soldiers in the beach didn't have a lot of cover.


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## Emac44 (Sep 6, 2007)

Ok many blunders occured before during and after the fall of Malaya and Singapore. The British totally ignored or discounted the Japanese Military in S.E.Asia. When troop increases occured in French Indo China would have given some inidication as to what the Japanese were up to. But this was ignored. Warning signs of build up of the Japanese Navy should have given insight to what Japan was doing in the Far East and Asia. It is not likely that Japan's military increases would have gone unnoticed by some one in England dealing with intelligence and Military development etc. When actual landings took place in East Coast West Malaya. Plans were placed before Percival to outflank the Japanese via Southern Thailand to also blunt attacks coming from and via French Indo China. But all these plans were rejected by Percival at the time. These plans mostly came from the office of Australian General Gordon Bennet. Malaya virtually fell within weeks of the landings. An unmitigated failure of reading the enemy capabilty on behalf of Allied Command. When Singapore was threatened these same Allied Command Staff had learnt nothing in the short period of time and with the eventual fall of Singapore proved beyond doubt how bizzare the lack of Generalship was in Far East Command. I am still going to go with in this poll that the Fall of Malaya and Singapore and with consquent the Fall of Dutch East Indies was the greatest disaster and Military Blunder the world had witnessed


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## syscom3 (Sep 6, 2007)

EMAC, i suspect youre right.

The generalship of the commonwealth troops in malaya and Singapore was horrible. It was a peacetime colonial mindset. Its a shame that the ANZAC forces lost so many good troops for nothing! They would have been invaluable in the coming months in NG and the Solomons.

The allies did better in the NEI, but it was hopeless from the onset due to a lack of troops/airpower/naval power to stop the Japanese advance.

Quite simply, the Japanese used superior tactics, supurb light infantry and naval forces and took advantage of the many Allied blunders all throughout SE Asia.


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## Konigstiger205 (Sep 6, 2007)

Stalingrad was a harsh wake up call for the germans and for my country too...we lost 158,854 men (dead, wounded and missing) between 19 November 1942 and 7 January 1943 and the total losses for the Axis side was 740,000 killed or wounded....to be honest the war itself was a huge blunder...


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## Emac44 (Sep 7, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> EMAC, i suspect youre right.
> 
> The generalship of the commonwealth troops in malaya and Singapore was horrible. It was a peacetime colonial mindset. Its a shame that the ANZAC forces lost so many good troops for nothing! They would have been invaluable in the coming months in NG and the Solomons.
> 
> ...



Thank you Sys. ANZACs (AUSTRALIA) lost a whole division the 8th because of that blunder. I suppose I feel it more because my own Uncle was a POW for 3 1/2 years in Changi and I view it more personal then I should. And yes Sys Malaya and Singapore should never had happened. But it did. And it was down to bloody minded Generalship on Percivals account and that of his Staff. There was no excuse. For the lack of professionalism in Far East Command. The men fought the Japanese well but every advantage was thrown away by bloody fools in High Command. And thousands of men paid the price alongside civilians who endured 3 1/2yrs of brutal captivity from the Japanese


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## Thorlifter (Sep 7, 2007)

Emac44 said:


> Ok many blunders occured before during and after the fall of Malaya and Singapore. The British totally ignored or discounted the Japanese Military in S.E.Asia. When troop increases occured in French Indo China would have given some inidication as to what the Japanese were up to. But this was ignored. Warning signs of build up of the Japanese Navy should have given insight to what Japan was doing in the Far East and Asia. It is not likely that Japan's military increases would have gone unnoticed by some one in England dealing with intelligence and Military development etc. When actual landings took place in East Coast West Malaya. Plans were placed before Percival to outflank the Japanese via Southern Thailand to also blunt attacks coming from and via French Indo China. But all these plans were rejected by Percival at the time. These plans mostly came from the office of Australian General Gordon Bennet. Malaya virtually fell within weeks of the landings. An unmitigated failure of reading the enemy capabilty on behalf of Allied Command. When Singapore was threatened these same Allied Command Staff had learnt nothing in the short period of time and with the eventual fall of Singapore proved beyond doubt how bizzare the lack of Generalship was in Far East Command. I am still going to go with in this poll that the Fall of Malaya and Singapore and with consquent the Fall of Dutch East Indies was the greatest disaster and Military Blunder the world had witnessed



Very good point Emac. I know there are a few good ones that were left off the list, and this is one of them.


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## timshatz (Sep 7, 2007)

Without a doubt Singapore was a blunder. And the fault was definitely at the feet of the generals. The place was a castoff area for second rate (in general) officers. The Anzacs that surrendered there, some of the who had litterally just shown up, were thrown away. It is sad. As has been noted in other spots on this board, those guys would've been very useful later in NG and other places. 

But it wasn't a war winning/losing blunder. It was a battle, poorly fought and a stupid defeat but the loss of Singapore did not doom ANZAC to Japanese occupation. Given the relative strengths of the Japanese versus the Allies, it was probably a foregone conclusion that Malaya and Singapore would fall.

But it could've been handled much better.


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## syscom3 (Sep 7, 2007)

And dont forget that the Canadians sent a brigade to Hong Kong that had absolutely no chance of slowing down any type of Jaoanese attack.

The problem was the colonial mindset of the British govt and military command. They had to defend the indefensible just for political reasons.

I can just imagine all those wasted ANZAC troops being used effectively in the NEI around the oil refineries, denying the Japanese an easy victory and slowing down their exploitation of that vital resource.


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## 16KJV11 (Sep 10, 2007)

Barbarossa. Hitler should never taken on another front without knocking Britain out of the war. 
The biggest blunder of the war, which I believe cost it for Hitler, was when he changed the Luftwaffe's mission from destroying RAF fighter bases to trying to destroy London.
Had he stayed the course in destroying RAF bases, he could have proceeded w/ operation Sea Lion and brought England to her knees.
Thank God he was ignorant, psychopatic and egotistical.


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## Hop (Sep 12, 2007)

> The biggest blunder of the war, which I believe cost it for Hitler, was when he changed the Luftwaffe's mission from destroying RAF fighter bases to trying to destroy London.



Hitler didn't change the Luftwaffe's tactics. He _allowed_ the Luftwaffe to change their own tactics. They wanted to change because their losses were far too high in attacks on RAF airfields, and they were frustrated by the RAF's ability to meet their raids with small forces of fighters. They thought they would achieve better results if they could suck the RAF in to large battles over London.

The war diary of the Wehrmacht High Command puts the failure in the Battle of Britain down to the delay in attacking London, complaining that they could not get permission for such an attack for a long time, and when permission did come the weather turned bad shortly afterwards.



> Had he stayed the course in destroying RAF bases, he could have proceeded w/ operation Sea Lion and brought England to her knees.



Had the Luftwaffe stayed the course, their forces would have dwindled even more rapidly throughout September. They could not keep up the same level of pressure with smaller forces.


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## plan_D (Sep 13, 2007)

Syscom, Singapore was not indefenisble - it just wasn't defended correctly.


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## timshatz (Sep 13, 2007)

plan_D said:


> Syscom, Singapore was not indefenisble - it just wasn't defended correctly.



But considering the Leadership the Brits sent there, the quality of the equipment, the distance from the sources of supply, level of training, level of commitment and the enemy forces arrayed against them, it was very, very difficult to defend. 

The further the Japanese got away from Japan, the less effective they became. The same can be said for the British Forces, but not to the same degree. Also, the Commonwealth Forces were not ready to fight at Singapore (training, supply, equipment, ect). By the time they got to New Guinea, the odds were starting to stack less against them. 

But Singapore, while not indefensible, was in no way ready to defend itself in December of 1941 from any serious attack.


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## syscom3 (Sep 13, 2007)

timshatz said:


> But considering the Leadership the Brits sent there, the quality of the equipment, the distance from the sources of supply, level of training, level of commitment and the enemy forces arrayed against them, it was very, very difficult to defend.
> 
> The further the Japanese got away from Japan, the less effective they became. The same can be said for the British Forces, but not to the same degree. Also, the Commonwealth Forces were not ready to fight at Singapore (training, supply, equipment, ect). By the time they got to New Guinea, the odds were starting to stack less against them.
> 
> But Singapore, while not indefensible, was in no way ready to defend itself in December of 1941 from any serious attack.



Ultimatly, it was the mindset of the British military and local political leaders.

They had a colonial peacetime mindset, and couldnt adapt to the realiities of the fight. A complete utter dismal performance. The troops fought well considering all things....... but in the end, the leadership failed and they were defeated.


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2007)

Timshatz;

_"But considering the Leadership the Brits sent there, the quality of the equipment, the distance from the sources of supply, level of training, level of commitment and the enemy forces arrayed against them, it was very, very difficult to defend."_

Not one thing on there makes Singapore difficult to defend. Singapore was quite easily defensible - the problem lies solely with the command and strategy of defence. I'm certainly not having a go, so don't get the wrong idea. 

I think syscom has said it best; _"A complete utter dismal performance."_

Singapore could have been held if Great Britain had planned to hold it; rather than hope for some divine intervention - which it seems they did for that pathetic excuse for strategy. Don't hold back in having a go at the British command on Singapore... it was bloody appalling.


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## timshatz (Sep 14, 2007)

Plan D, you might want to think this one through a bit. 

Singapore was (and still is) thousands of miles from England. At the time, the Brits were in a struggle for their national existence. Resources, both material and personel, were limited in what can be spared. This is further brought out by the caliber of equipment used in that theatre until about 1944. Even as late as the fall of 1943, the Commonwealth Air Forces were using the Curtiss P36 (called the Mohawk) as a front line fighter. There was simply nothing else to use. In short, the lines of communication for the Brits were very long and would've required substantial drawdowns to the three fronts (England, North Atlantic and North Africa) to equip. It was simply not going to happen. 

Second, the Japanese had probably the best Naval Air Force in the world in Fall of 1941 and the Spring of 1942. The RNAS was using aircraft a generation or two behind them. As Singapore is an island, it is susceptable to blockade. The Royal Navy could not break that blockade with the equipment available. This is further proven by the strategic withdrawl of British Forces from the Bay of Bengal in the spring of '42 when Nagumo's carrier forces went on a rampage in that area (sinking, amongst other ships, the HMS Devonshire and HMS Cornwall). The RNAS Carrier arm was not a factor of importance in this fight. 

Another point, Malaya is a penninsula. As noted above, the Japanese controled the waters. Given that, no matter where the Commonwealth troops decided to fight (assuming they had the training and support to do so effectively), the Japanese always had the option of flanking them by using amphib landings (as they did so effectively on the land).

Singapore was on the end of a long supply line, staffed by second or third rate officers (in general) with no really effective and tested plan for defence. It is a sad thing that so many good troops were lost there. They might've (and probably would've) been far more effective fighting in Java or PNG. But that's the breaks. 

The Brits were living on reputation in Singapore towards the end of 1941. While there was a slow buildup going on, it was nowhwere near the caliber needed to counter the Japanese threat.


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## Frankster_P (Nov 3, 2007)

Italy Getting involved in the war at all.
Should have stayed neutral like Spain.

Then we could have kept our colonies.
All that lovely Lybian oil.


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## Instal (Nov 4, 2007)

rogthedodge said:


> It has to be Dunkirk / Barbarossa / Operation Sealion - historically Hitler should have known a 2 front war was beyond Germany and therefore he should have dealt with one front before starting a second. I haven't voted as all 3 are aspects of the same decision
> 
> If they'd captured the BEF we'd probably have sought terms and then Hitler would have been free to defeat Russia and the US would have struggled to stage any European inavsion (assuming Ireland would have been garrisoned)



Saved me allot of typing Rog


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## Instal (Nov 10, 2007)

I have not read the entire post so forgive me if this has been mentioned before. I think the greatest blunder of WW2 was made by one man. Not as you might think, a man of great military rank or political influence. In fact he was a navigator in a Luftwafe bomber. He would be the man that got off course and accidentaly dropped his payload on London. The British had no way of knowing this was a mistake so a raid on Berlin followed. This prompted Hitler to order the Luftwafe to bomb London instead of British airfields giving fighter command enough time to regroup and eventually win the Battle of Britain thus preserving the only launching pad for the invasion of Europe and the defeat of Nazi Germany. The rammifacations of this one error in navigation are astounding.


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## GunSmoke (Nov 10, 2007)

Pearl Harbor! They didn't get the oil supply, that would have ended it!!!!!! for the Americans simply couldn't carry on a war thet far overseas.


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## syscom3 (Nov 11, 2007)

Instal said:


> I have not read the entire post so forgive me if this has been mentioned before. I think the greatest blunder of WW2 was made by one man. Not as you might think, a man of great military rank or political influence. In fact he was a navigator in a Luftwafe bomber. He would be the man that got off course and accidentaly dropped his payload on London. The British had no way of knowing this was a mistake so a raid on Berlin followed. This prompted Hitler to order the Luftwafe to bomb London instead of British airfields giving fighter command enough time to regroup and eventually win the Battle of Britain thus preserving the only launching pad for the invasion of Europe and the defeat of Nazi Germany. The rammifacations of this one error in navigation are astounding.



Interesting observation.


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## david johnson (Nov 11, 2007)

hitler, himself, is the greatest military blunder of the war.

dj


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## Emac44 (Nov 11, 2007)

timshatz said:


> Plan D, you might want to think this one through a bit.
> 
> Singapore was (and still is) thousands of miles from England. At the time, the Brits were in a struggle for their national existence. Resources, both material and personel, were limited in what can be spared. This is further brought out by the caliber of equipment used in that theatre until about 1944. Even as late as the fall of 1943, the Commonwealth Air Forces were using the Curtiss P36 (called the Mohawk) as a front line fighter. There was simply nothing else to use. In short, the lines of communication for the Brits were very long and would've required substantial drawdowns to the three fronts (England, North Atlantic and North Africa) to equip. It was simply not going to happen.
> 
> ...



Tim we know all that in the Commonwelath. We are taught reasons why and how and when and everything you have mentioned and quiet frankly I totally agree with what all you have said. But for one thing Singapore was a Bastion of the might of the Empire. Yes it was in hind sight which is a wonderful thing to have a Paper Bastion, But many consider the Fall of Singapore and that of Malaya as one of the most singular blunders of the British Empire. It also lead to the Fall of Burma and the threat to India. As well of the loss for the Dutch East Indies ( Indonesian Island Chain). To us it was the toppling of a house of cards if you can understand my meaning Tim. And further after the War Tim had far reaching effects with British Colonialism and its fundamental end in the region. The Fall of Singapore and Malaya Burma Dutch East Indies and if you like put in French Indo China Philippines and India in certain aspects led to Nationalism in the region by the Native People who lived in the region. It wasn't just the Fall of Singapore per say but an end of Empire. So not only was it one of the biggest military blunders in modern history and warfare Tim. It was the death knell for an Empire that the sun wasn't meant to go down on and also effected the Dutch and the French in various ways as well.

And other effects that occured after WW2 was the Malayian Campaign and in some cases Vietnam War with the French losing control over time after WW2 of French Indo China and consquent events leading up to intervention of the US into Vietnam Cambodia and Laos. Also border clashes between Malaya and Indonesia in Borneo. Its just that people living in the Commonwealth see it differently to you Tim. We look more so at the after effects of the Fall of Singapore and Malaya and how it effected the entire region at various stages in the region. And we have to also take into consideration that the Dutch lost control of Dutch East Indies and Nationalism rising there. 

As for the Philippines Tim that in itself was different. In my opinion the US was a pseudo Colonial Power. US was what appeared to be like a Colonial Power but not in the same sesne as the British French and Dutch. Having taken the Philippines away from the Spainish. But US had problems with the Moro Independance Movements. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines and the US and Phillipine Military were defeated had similar aspects to rest of the region but the after effects after the War were different Tim. Yes it was one of the singular military blunders the US and Philippines experienced but the overall effects on the Philippines and her gaining total independance from the US after WW2 was totally in a different sphere and outlook for the other Colonial Powers in the region of South East Asia.

I really think Tim and please don't take offense as to what I am about to say. Is that those of us who were brought up in a Commonwealth Country or in the UK itself view it differently as regards to Fall of Singapore then to some one from the US. I think we look more so into the Fall of Singapore and how it effected not only the UK but the rest of the Commonwealth over a longer period or how the region changed due to the Fall of Singapore. One can even say that it had further reaching effects to India Pakistan Burma and even into the Colonies in Africa. I would include HongKong in this but that was different again too. As England had a 99 yr lease on HongKong and that HongKong was ceded back to China when the lease run out. So I hope you see Tim it wasn't just a complete and utter Military Blunder but a complete and utter change in aspects to an Empire after the loss of Singapore to the Japanese


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## syscom3 (Nov 11, 2007)

Emac, well stated. I'm in complete agreement with you this.

Except for one thing.

The US hardly could be considered a pseudo-colonial overlord. 
Partial autonomy (commonwealth status) was granted in 1935, preparatory to a planned full independence from the United States in 1946.


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## Marcel (Nov 11, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Emac, well stated. I'm in complete agreement with you this.
> 
> Except for one thing.
> 
> ...



Ever read Flyboys, Sys? The writer disagrees with you I think


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## syscom3 (Nov 11, 2007)

Marcel said:


> Ever read Flyboys, Sys? The writer disagrees with you I think



Disagree with what?


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## Trogdor (Nov 11, 2007)

Barbarossa convinced the Japanese to attack the US, removed a key resource country for Hitler and resulted in the two-front war for Germany. Without these, and with the USSR as an partner of some sort, things might have resulted in a Nazi victory and peace with the US.


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## Emac44 (Nov 12, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Emac, well stated. I'm in complete agreement with you this.
> 
> Except for one thing.
> 
> ...



Sys that was the phrase I was looking for and stumbled around thinking of the correct meaning. Thanks


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## Marcel (Nov 12, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> The US hardly could be considered a pseudo-colonial overlord.
> Partial autonomy (commonwealth status) was granted in 1935, preparatory to a planned full independence from the United States in 1946.



What I read in Flyboys was that the Americans acted like a colonial suppressor in the Phillipine-American war when the philipines tried to standup against the American suppression.


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## syscom3 (Nov 12, 2007)

Marcel said:


> What I read in Flyboys was that the Americans acted like a colonial suppressor in the Phillipine-American war when the philipines tried to standup against the American suppression.



We're talking about the second world war, not the PI insurrection. We commited plenty of atrocities then. But unlike the European powers, the US was well underway in letting the PI have their freedom.


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## Freebird (Nov 13, 2007)

rogthedodge said:


> Alexander's performance in Burma / India was less than stella though.
> 
> I'd say Slim is *largely* forgotten rather than completely.
> 
> ...



About General Brooke (C.I.G.S.) he was the best strategic commander in the Allied US/UK high command (IMHO) His greatest accomplishment was to *prevent* the GREATEST MILITARY BLUNDER of WWII - "Sledgehammer". This was the proposed 1942 landing in France, which was being strongly pushed by the US high command, Stimson Marshall. There can be no doubt this would have been a MAJOR disaster, likely resulting in 100,000+ casulties (mainly captured)


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## Emac44 (Nov 14, 2007)

Marcel said:


> What I read in Flyboys was that the Americans acted like a colonial suppressor in the Phillipine-American war when the philipines tried to standup against the American suppression.



Marcel I will have to agree with Sys on the issue about the Philippines. Philippines at the time of MacArthur leaving Corrigadore for Australia. Philippines had their own elected President. I think it was President Sergio Osemena was at the landings at Letye in 1944. Dutch East Indies Malaya French Indo China and Singapore had regional governors who were either British French and Dutch respectfuly. Malaya did have its own Royal Family but were not actively involved to some extent in day to day affairs of the Malaya British Colony

MacArthur prior to the Japanese invasion had left the US Army and was a General in the Philippine National Military Forces. The US was at the time prior to Japanese invasion had already transferred automony to the Philippines Government. Something the British Dutch and French had not considered in their respective colonies. And would not have considered even if the Japanese had not invaded. So Sys is correct in what he has said.

Prior to the 1920s the US did act like Colonial Super Power in the Philippines. But you are forgetting the insurrections by the Moro in Southern Philippines towards the US. But the Moro had also rebelled against Spanish Rule which was an on and off rebellion for 400 years until the US had defeated the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay and consquently occupied the Philippines after that event. To the Moro it was just a simple matter of transferring one Colonial Master for another and consquent Rebellions.

Though there were insurrections in Malaya Singapore Dutch East Indies and French Indo China and as such the insurrections were for self rule in those Colonies by the Native People etc. Britian France and Holland had no intention of granting self rule to their colonies, But the US had a different ideas regarding the Philippines and had already done so by 1935

Here is a list of Philippine Presidents up from 1898 to 1965

Emilio Aguinaldo 1898 1901 First Republic Philippines. Fought against Spanish and later US
Manuel Quezon Nov 1935 Aug 1944 Commonwealth of Philippines
Sergio Osemena Aug 1944 May 1946 Commonwealth Phillipines
Jose Laurel Oct 1943 August 1945 2nd Republic Philippines (Jap Puppet Govt)
Manuel Roxas May 1946 July 4 1945 3rd Republic Phillippines
Elpidio Quirino April 1948 Nov 1953 3rd Republic Philippines
Ramon Magsaysay Dec 1953 March 1957 3rd Republic Philippines, People's President. Suspected as being assasinated Plane Crash Cebu 
Carlos Garcia March 1957 December 1961 3rd Republic Philippines. Also General President to United Nations
Diosdado Macapagal December 1961 December 1965 3rd Republic Philippines. Father of present President of Philippines

Philippine Presidents from 1965 to 2007 and Republics of Philippines 
Macros has a special listing as well 
Ferdinand Marcos December 1965 December 1973 3rd Republic Philippines
8 years under Marcos from 1973 June 1981 Martial Law. Diplomatic Pressure from the US and elections to take place
Ferdinand Marcos June 1981 February 1986 4th Republic Philippines

Corazon Aquino February 1986 June 1992 5th Republic Philippines. Ninoy Aquino (Husband to Corazon) assasination led to down fall of Marcos
Fidel Ramos June 1992 June 1998 5th Republic Philippines Cousin to Marcos
Joseph Estrada 1998 -2001 Charged with Corruption and former film star 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo 2001 to present date

That is now getting right of track off original thread. But reality Marcel is a bit different to what is written in Flyboys as to how the Govenrment of the Philippines was in accordance with the US Policies at the time. Even though there was a gap of 34 years between Presidents Emilio Aguinaldo 1901 to Manual Queazon 1935 and in that 34 year gap there had been rebellions and insurrections by the Moro. The US Governments had all intentions of transferring self rule to the Philippines and had done so virtually by 1935


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 14, 2007)

freebird said:


> About General Brooke (C.I.G.S.) he was the best strategic commander in the Allied US/UK high command (IMHO) His greatest accomplishment was to *prevent* the GREATEST MILITARY BLUNDER of WWII - "Sledgehammer". This was the proposed 1942 landing in France, which was being strongly pushed by the US high command, Stimson Marshall. There can be no doubt this would have been a MAJOR disaster, likely resulting in 100,000+ casulties (mainly captured)



While that may be a great thing, if that was his greatest accomplishment than I am sure that there were great allied commanders who accomplished more.


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## Freebird (Nov 14, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> While that may be a great thing, if that was his greatest accomplishment than I am sure that there were great allied commanders who accomplished more.



The thread was "Greatest Blunder" and "SledgeHammer"would have been the worst. As for his accomplishments, how about his leadership of British II corps in May 1940, which allowed the British to escape at Dunkirk? It was his own initiative in not following High Command directive to "wait for further orders" but instead quickly stabilizing the right flank of the BEF, preventing the Germans from capturing Dunkirk before the BEF could retreat into it. At the time the leadership of the BEF (Lord Gort) was in paralysis, if Brooke had not been there to order an immediate fighting retreat into Dunkirk, the entire BEF would have been trapped. (350,000+ men) Can you name any other commander who played such a critical role? 

Also he convinced Churchill not to leave the rest of the British Army in France (Brittany), but to evacuate before the French surrender. (at which time the British would have been interned, as per the French armistice)


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 15, 2007)

freebird said:


> The thread was "Greatest Blunder"



Really?



freebird said:


> and "SledgeHammer"would have been the worst. As for his accomplishments, how about his leadership of British II corps in May 1940, which allowed the British to escape at Dunkirk? It was his own initiative in not following High Command directive to "wait for further orders" but instead quickly stabilizing the right flank of the BEF, preventing the Germans from capturing Dunkirk before the BEF could retreat into it. At the time the leadership of the BEF (Lord Gort) was in paralysis, if Brooke had not been there to order an immediate fighting retreat into Dunkirk, the entire BEF would have been trapped. (350,000+ men) Can you name any other commander who played such a critical role?
> 
> Also he convinced Churchill not to leave the rest of the British Army in France (Brittany), but to evacuate before the French surrender. (at which time the British would have been interned, as per the French armistice)



And what would have happened if Hitler had not ordered the German Armour to halt and not attack. I think you can thank the Germans just as much for the successful evacuation.

Dunkirk was a major blunder but I think you can thank the Germans for it more than you can give Brooke's credit for it.


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## Civettone (Nov 15, 2007)

Always an interesting topic!

I'll stick to the axis actions as the axis itself was already a failure.

Pearl Harbor definitely is a candidate. Not only because starting a war with the US was not a good idea, the attack on Pearl Harbor itself was a failure. The carriers got away. The infrastructure on the island (especially the oil reserves) was kept intact. Most of the ships were repaired. 
In fact, had the Japanese fleet been spotted, the American fleet may well have sailed and be completely destroyed. 
The Japanese should have gone the extra mile and invade the islands. Logistically, they would never have been able to hold it. So a landing to completely destroy the infrastructure and the ships which were laying at the bottom would have set the Americans back for at least a year. No Midway needed. Guaranteed success in New Guinea and probably even against Australia. 
The end would have remained the same as the Americans would still have recovered sooner or later. 

Barbarossa? I am convinced the Red Army could have been defeated up to 1942. So I don't consider that a failure at all. Mistake was to do it when Britain was still active. They should have started a Mediterranean campaign, capturing the Suez and the Egyptian oil fields, and invading Palestina. Then in 1942, they could either have invaded Britain after careful preparations - as in the discussion I had a few months ago - or invade Russia in the Spring of 1942.

Stalingrad was definitely a mistake though one can wonder what the mistake was. Storming this city without surrounding it, instead of going full throttle to the Caucasus was the mistake. That the 6th Armee was eventually surrounded and captured is a result of the failure of its allies to hold the line. Pulling back would then have been the best thing to do but I can imagine it being difficult to do when you already have 90% of the city in your hands. And the rescue attempt was close to success: Stalingrad would then have been held, 6th Armee saved and the situation for 1943 would have looked quite differently.

Sealion itself never took place so cannot really be considered a failure.

There's uncertainty about Dunkirk. Apparently it's also possible that German Panzers ran out of petrol and were forced to stop. Plus, the British and French threw up some impressive defensive stands.

Battle of the Bulge was doomed to failure but was definitely the best chance of any German success on the Western Front. They had to try something!

Kamikazes didn't change the outcome but achieved more than conventional bombers would. There was no fuel nor experienced pilots left. And a good way to get rid of those old aircraft 

Finally, the German declaration of war on the US - the only German declaration of war by Germany during the war ! - was definitely unnecessary. But what would have happened if Hitler and Mussolini hadn't declared war? The US economy and military would have geared up for war anyway. And this would have taken them at least a year. In that year it's quite likely that the US would have gotten at war with the full axis anyway. Roosevelt had always been looking for a reason to get in the war. A new Lusitania. The US was in fact already involved in the war by the Lend Lease and by actively hunting down and attacking German subs. They would have continued these provocations until the Germans would give the Americans the smoking gun. Before 1943 the Americans would be at war with Germany no matter what, and by then their army and industry would be ready. As such the outcome would have been exactly the same!

So again, I look at Pearl Harbor because that was what got the Americans in the war. Without Pearl Harbor it's doubtful that there would be a popular support for a war against Japan, Italy and Germany.

Kris


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## Freebird (Nov 15, 2007)

Der Adler I must respectfully disagree, the Germans did not blunder at Dunkirk, if they had tried to force the canal line around Dunkirk with the Panzers they would have taken some heavy losses, as the Panzers had very little infantry support, having travelled so quickly. The Germans were already concerned about the heavy fighting they had witnessed around Arras on the 20th of may. They tried to push into the beachead with infantry which was the correct option. And the actions taken by Brooke were BEFORE the halt was ordered, if the BEF had not acted quickly to begin the retreat into Dunkirk the whole question would have been moot, as the port would have been taken with minimal resistance by the allies.


Civettone said:


> Always an interesting topic!
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The order for the tanks to halt was given by Von Rundstedt on the night of the 23rd/24th, Hitler DID in fact authorize the German armour to move again on the 25th, but Von Rundstedt did not order it to proceed, even after Hitler had given the OK. The area around Dunkirk was not very good terrain for tanks (canals, wet ground) so there was quite a bit of concern in the German High command that there would be heavy tank losses. Remember that "Dunkirk" was not the only battle, the Germans still expected to fight the rest of the French army. The Germans also had concerns because the had had some sharp resistance from the BEF by Franklyn's division around Arras, losing quite a few tanks. Unlike most the French/Belgian army the British were willing to put up a fight. Also remember that the German Pz Is Pz IIs were vulnerable to the British standard antitank guns (no Panthers or Tigers here obviously). The Germans did not "halt" outside of Dunkirk, there was constant pressure on the BEF lines from German infantry artillery, but not tanks, which was the correct method to use. The Germans could not afford to risk the heavy losses in tanks at this point in the war.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 15, 2007)

You are correct about the Panzer however I believe it was still a German blunder. They had the BEF trapped and Goerring insistance that the Luftwaffe could destroy them was utter nonsense.

As I said above atleast half of the credit does not go to Brooke but to the Germans themselves.


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## Freebird (Nov 15, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> You are correct about the Panzer however I believe it was still a German blunder. They had the BEF trapped and Goerring insistance that the Luftwaffe could destroy them was utter nonsense.
> 
> As I said above atleast half of the credit does not go to Brooke but to the Germans themselves.



Maybe the Germans could have done better, but nothing in war is certain. At the time the choice was made (the 24th 25th May), the Germans were very worried about their shortage of infantry on their southern wing (the panzers - 15 Pz corps Kliest) and since there was a hole opening up on the BEF northern flank along Belgian coast between Ostend and Lille (because the Belgians were about to surrender) it was decided by the Germans to push through this hole with the 6th army and get behind the British into Dunkirk, this was I think the best plan. The later assertion that the Germans had halted to let the Luftwaffe do the job was not correct, there was constant pressure on the BEF from both sides of the salient that entire week. It was Brooke's quick action to plug the hole along the coast that prevented the Germans from getting behind the BEF. Yes the Germans COULD have tried to force the Panzers across the canal on the south, but it would be a gamble and probably have resulted in heavy tank losses, without getting into Dunkirk.


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## Pflueger (Dec 5, 2007)

So many blunders, so little time...

I believe the Germans should have (shoulda/woulda/coulda) put all available resources into pounding the BEF. Brooke's swift action no doubt would have prevented complete annihilation, but total committment on the German side would have surely resulted in the destruction of much/most of the BEF.

I would add as my favorite inexcusable blunder the failure of the axis (both Germans and Japanese were totally guilty) in protecting codes. The arrogance/ignorance/carelessness of the Germans in believing that the allies were incapable of cracking their codes has always been shocking to me. May have been a different war if the axis would not have laid out sub locations/fleet strategies for the allies. The tide of the Battle of the Atlantic would certainly not have changed for several more months and who knows what may have happened at Midway or for that matter Coral Sea.


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## timshatz (Dec 5, 2007)

Pflueger said:


> I would add as my favorite inexcusable blunder the failure of the axis (both Germans and Japanese were totally guilty) in protecting codes. The arrogance/ignorance/carelessness of the Germans in believing that the allies were incapable of cracking their codes has always been shocking to me. May have been a different war if the axis would not have laid out sub locations/fleet strategies for the allies. The tide of the Battle of the Atlantic would certainly not have changed for several more months and who knows what may have happened at Midway or for that matter Coral Sea.



That's a good one that hasn't come up so far. The Germans did an average job (at best) with signals security. Naval codes were compromised almost on a routine basis. But that happened to all the players in the war. Just more widespread and more players working at decoding German signals. 

Pretty interesting idea.

It is also interesting that German Naval Codes were compromised in both World Wars and, in both cases, the Naval High Command refused to believe their messages were being read by their Enemies. Even after review by intelligence agencies.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Dec 5, 2007)

I'm going to vote Operation Barbarossa as the worst blunder. 

The now famous "halt" order, as I understand, was meant for the Panzers and not the infantry. Even when the "halt" order was rescinded, much of the evacuations were still to take place, and by that time, the perimeter and defenses of Dunkirk had been given time to be prepared, which by then was almost an entirely French affaire, and not forgetting the rearguards at Lille as well.

However, has anyone noticed that the British losses in North Africa far exceeded the number of British troops evacuated at Dunkirk? My question is, had the BEF not been able to escape at Dunkirk, as bad as it may have been, would it have crippled the UK?


Even if the "halt" order had been given, and the BEF had escaped, had Hitler not invaded Russia, I think he could have dealt with England by commiting all the resources that otherwise were dumped into Operation Barbarossa. More U-Boats, more ships, more planes of all kind, certainly more troops, more of _everything_.

As far as I am aware, I can see no indication that Stalin was going to breech the Non-Agression Pact signed with Germany ( on the very eve of WW 2 ). I also don't think that Stalin would have lifted a finger to help England in the event that Germany would have launched an invasion. For all we know, Stalin viewed Churhill as a staunch Western anti-communist who was a threat. I think Stalin would have been only to pleased to let Hitler deal with England, thus eliminating a potential threat while he sat and read about it in the Kremlin.


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## Freebird (Dec 5, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> I'm going to vote Operation Barbarossa as the worst blunder.
> 
> The now famous "halt" order, as I understand, was meant for the Panzers and not the infantry. Even when the "halt" order was rescinded, much of the evacuations were still to take place, and by that time, the perimeter and defenses of Dunkirk had been given time to be prepared, which by then was almost an entirely French affaire, and not forgetting the rearguards at Lille as well.
> 
> ...



Yes and perhaps why he was so furious that Germany decided to wipe him out first.

I don't think Barbarossa was a blunder, it was inevitable that Russia Germany would come into conflict. I can't see Communism Fascism co-existing in Europe for long. Hitler was correct to attack when he did before Stalin rebuilt his army. Hitlers mistakes cost Germany the chanse to win the war though.


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## Pflueger (Dec 6, 2007)

Agree that USSR/German conflict was inevitable and that Babarossa had a chance to succeed were it not for a parade of bungles (delaying onset, failure to winterize, questionable changes in objectives, wasting of resources in other theaters, etc.). Perhaps Barbarossa might best fit on a poll titled "Worst Military Bungles of WW2," this thread might also include Op Market Garden, the Anzio beachhead flinch, Op Diadem (Clark's mad dash) = plans which woulda/coulda/shoulda, but were nixed by human flaws/bungling.


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## Freebird (Dec 7, 2007)

Pflueger said:


> Agree that USSR/German conflict was inevitable and that Babarossa had a chance to succeed were it not for a parade of bungles (delaying onset, failure to winterize, questionable changes in objectives, wasting of resources in other theaters, etc.). Perhaps Barbarossa might best fit on a poll titled "Worst Military Bungles of WW2," this thread might also include Op Market Garden, the Anzio beachhead flinch, Op Diadem (Clark's mad dash) = plans which woulda/coulda/shoulda, but were nixed by human flaws/bungling.



Dont forget France 1940 and Dieppe in the "Bungled" list. Or the air defence on Dec 7 1941


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## F-14 (Feb 2, 2008)

According to me the German mistakes at stalingrad was pivitol in the Europen Theater of operations Hitler had made a lot of blunders @ StalingardThe failure of the German Army was nothing short of a disaster. A complete army group was lost at Stalingrad and 91,000 Germans were taken prisoner. With such a massive loss of manpower and equipment, the Germans simply did not have enough manpower to cope with the Russian advance to Germany when it came.

Despite resistance in parts – such as a Kursk – they were in retreat on the Eastern Front from February 1943 another factor that the Hitler and his generals failed to take in to consideration (Due to the blind optimism that 
they would have a Quick victory ) the winter for which the Germans were Ill prepared Temperatures dropped to well below zero and food, ammunition and heat were in short supply. added to this Hitlers Adment orders to fight till the last as shown in this communication with von Paulus dated January 24th 1943 



> *Supreme Commander to 6 Army, January 24, 1943
> 
> "Surrender is forbidden. 6 Army will hold their positions to the last man and the last round and by their heroic endurance will make an unforgettable contribution towards the establishment of a defensive front and the salvation of the Western world."*



this ment that the German were horrible traped and were doomed to oblivion at stalingrad


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## Njaco (Feb 2, 2008)

Some good points, F-14 but Stalingrad would never had happend if Barbarossa had never happened. The major battles were a result of the major decision to invade. Stalingrad, Kursk, Leningrad just proved how poor a decision it was.

And in my opinion, if adherence to orders wasn't so prevalent in the Wehrmacht, von Paulus just might have pulled a Rommel, ignored orders and gotten his men outta there.


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## Freebird (Feb 2, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Some good points, F-14 but Stalingrad would never had happend if Barbarossa had never happened. The major battles were a result of the major decision to invade. Stalingrad, Kursk, Leningrad just proved how poor a decision it was.



Njaco, I don't think you can call Barbarossa a blunder because Hitler really had no other choice, he had to attack USSR before they re-organizrd the Soviet army. Stalin would have attacked Germany in 1942, Hitler was quite astute in realizing this. (no honor among thieves?) Once Britain France upset the German plan by declaring war, Hitler was stuck. I think he made the correct choice by attacking, it was just the application that was bungled 



Pflueger said:


> Agree that USSR/German conflict was inevitable and that Babarossa had a chance to succeed were it not for a parade of bungles (delaying onset, failure to winterize, questionable changes in objectives, wasting of resources in other theaters, etc.). Perhaps Barbarossa might best fit on a poll titled "Worst Military Bungles of WW2.





Njaco said:


> And in my opinion, if adherence to oders wasn't so prevalent in the Wehrmacht, von Paulus just might have pulled a Rommel, ignored orders and gotten his men outta there.



In this i agree, if Hitler had a capable leader in charge (Manstein, Guderian) they could have had a totally different outcome at "Stalingrad", and we might be debating what a brilliant move Barbarossa was. (Although we might be debating in German...  )


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## F-14 (Feb 2, 2008)

thank you for the Comment .But if you remember Op Barbarossa would have been a success if the Wehrmacht prepared well enough the success that they (Read : the Wehrmacht ) with out preparing much had achived in the Begennig of the operation was enormus While the Russians were well aware of German preparations, and were tipped off to the impending invasion by both their own intelligence, as well foreign sources, the Germans achieved total surpriseCoupled with the element of surprise, the Germans possessed better training, more extensive experience, and were able to obtain decisive superiority at the points selected for attack. The Russians had large amounts of obsolete equipment, were poorly deployed to meet the attack, and lacked defensive positions. As a result, the Russian frontier was quickly overrun and the Germans achieved penetrations in many places. By 16 July, 1941, the Germans had captured Smolensk, which was less than 250 miles from Moscow, and Army Group Center alone had captured about 600,000 men and 5,000 tanks.so from this postion to the varge of total defate at the hands of the Russian Red army . The conner stone of this german defeat lie at Stalingrad


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## plan_D (Feb 3, 2008)

I don't believe the defeat of the Wehrmacht lay at Stalingrad; I don't believe there was a single blunder on the Eastern Front that turned the war against the German nation - it was a collection of blunders that became too large to overcome. 

The first blunder on the Eastern Front was the movement against Moscow in the winter of 1941. Guderian should have been allowed to winter in Smolensk where defensive positions could have been erected which would have been capable of halting the Soviet counter-offensive that in reality forced the Wehrmacht away from Moscow as they tried to dig into open, frozen, ground. 

The second blunder was moving armoured forces away from the Moscow push to Kiev. This spread of forces gave Guderian no mobile punch and slowed the chase. With this armoured force at hand Guderian could well have taken Moscow in the winter of 1941, or at least held up against the Soviet offensive. 

If, with the armour at hand, Guderian was allowed to move back to Smolensk then the Soviet counter-offensive would have failed and Moscow would have fallen in the spring of '42 - plunging the Soviet rail network into confusion and slowing Soviet reinforcement on all fronts.


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## Njaco (Feb 3, 2008)

Ok, I can see the point about Barbarossa but if it was necessary then how the blunder of not being actually prepared to take on such an endeavour? Just from the Luftwaffe standpoint, no long range bombers for the massive movements of factories out of range.


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## F-14 (Feb 3, 2008)

I agree with Najco if you look at the Inventroy of luftwaffe there was not a single long range Bomber like the ones that allies had this factor saved the soviet industries and as soon as the soviets were reorganized the Number of tanks and other munitions of war including manpower was easily available this lack of Long range bombers was due to the fact that the Gremans depended a bit to much on the Ju stutka


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## Freebird (Feb 3, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Ok, I can see the point about Barbarossa but if it was necessary then how the blunder of not being actually prepared to take on such an endeavour? Just from the Luftwaffe standpoint, no long range bombers for the massive movements of factories out of range.



I like Pflueger's distinction between "Blunder", a strategic decision or plan that was badly flawed from the beginning {such as Operation "Lustre" the intervention in Greece 1941, or "Sledgehammer" the planned 1942 Allied invasion of France} as opposed to a "Bungle" which is a generally sound plan that fails because of the execution. I would put "Barbarossa" in the latter category, it could have worked, save for some mistakes carrying it out {S ome of which Plan D has listed}



plan_D said:


> I don't believe the defeat of the Wehrmacht lay at Stalingrad; I don't believe there was a single blunder on the Eastern Front that turned the war against the German nation - it was a collection of blunders that became too large to overcome.
> 
> The first blunder on the Eastern Front was the movement against Moscow in the winter of 1941. Guderian should have been allowed to winter in Smolensk where defensive positions could have been erected which would have been capable of halting the Soviet counter-offensive that in reality forced the Wehrmacht away from Moscow as they tried to dig into open, frozen, ground.
> 
> ...



I think one of the greatest failings was a failure of the Germans Japanese to make joint plans, like the Allies did. # 1 on the list would have been a combined U-boat campaign in the Pacific Atlantic starting immediatly after "Pearl Harbour". A solid combined effort in this regard might have forced the British to concentrate shipping escorts to protect the vital North Atlantic routes, leaving Africa the Far East vulnerable. If the Axis could have broken the British control of Egypt/Persia/India, then their chance of success improves dramatically in Russia.

I posted some of these strategic outcomes in another thread.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...lize-us-war-effort-combined-attack-11317.html


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## Bakshi (Feb 3, 2008)

In my many years in historical aviation history, I met many living (aviation)legends, one in particular was a German high ranking general officer. This question of blunders did come up.

He summed it all very simply when he said (paraphrasing)..."the ONLY reason the Allies won the war, is that we Germans outbungled them!"


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## Njaco (Feb 3, 2008)

Thats a good one.


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## Freebird (Feb 3, 2008)

Another one I heard was quoted from a captured German officer in the desert. "Your men (British Aust.) fight like lions, too bad they are led by asses (donkeys).


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## Njaco (Feb 3, 2008)




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## F-14 (Feb 4, 2008)

> Another one I heard wasquoted from a captured german officer in the desert. "Your men (British Aust.) fight like lions, too bad they are led by asses (donkeys).


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## plan_D (Feb 4, 2008)

_"Equipping the Wermacht with winter clothes would have helped too... "_

That's too easy for people to say when talking about the war in the East. The Red Army suffered from the ferocious winters too; plus Germany suffers from its own bad winters and many Germans gained winter clothing from dead Soviet soldiers. 

Winter clothing would not make the German troops able to dig into the ice outside Moscow nor would it have made up for the lack of armour. 

Winter clothing would have made a massive difference in Stalingrad; but in 1941 the Germans would have still been pushed away.


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## Freebird (Feb 4, 2008)

True enough Plan, I also agree with your point about the concentration of the Panzers. In fact, I would say that they could have concentrated them in the north or south, but to split them up doomed both advances to fail the objectives in 1941. 

As for winter clothes it was typical on all nations in WWII underestimating the enemy, the Japanese underestimated the US production capacity, and the Allies underestimated the Japanese ability. I just read another book about Singapore, it was then common belief that the "Japanese were not good at aircraft"


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## renrich (Feb 11, 2008)

IF Japan had not attacked the US, the US would not have been in the war as soon as they were. IF Germany had not attacked Soviets but rather waited on defense (the Wehrmacht was excellent on defense.) Germany could have possibly worked out a compromise with Britain that would have ended the war. Hitler would probably have to contain his hatred for Jews. Lots of ifs. Once the US was in the war the outcome was foreordained.


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## fly boy (Feb 11, 2008)

whats operation market garden?


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## plan_D (Feb 11, 2008)

Operation Market Garden was the Allied attempt at capturing an intact bridge over the Rhine river in september 1944. The 1st Allied Airborne Army (U.S 82nd, 101st and British 1st Airborne) were to drop infront of the British XXX Corps to secure its passage to Arnhem where the Rhine was to be crossed. 

There were many canals to cross before reaching the Rhine river, all the crossing points were targets for the airborne. The major crossing for the 101st was the Son bridge which was destroyed by the Germans, the major crossing for the 82nd was Nijmegan which was not captured until XXX Corps provided support and the point for the 1st Airborne was Arnhem itself. 

The idea was that XXX Corps would be rolling over Arnhem bridge after 4 days at the most. In the end 1st Airborne were surrounded on the north side of Arnhem and unable to capture both sides - they eventually retreated back across the river with the aid of Polish paratroopers after ten days against the 9th SS Panzer Division. 

While the operation was 90% complete (XXX Corps did come within a few miles of Arnhem) it was all for nought as the Rhine was not crossed, which was the goal. The losses suffered by the Allies, especially the 1st Airborne, were not expected and painfully high. The 1st Airborne was decimated for the 10,300 that landed at Oosterbeek (1st Airborne LZ) only 2,500 escaped back to Allied lines.

Operation Market Garden September 17 - 27 1944

There's a good site for you.


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## Freebird (Feb 11, 2008)

plan_D said:


> Operation Market Garden was the Allied attempt at capturing an intact bridge over the Rhine river in september 1944. The 1st Allied Airborne Army (U.S 82nd, 101st and British 1st Airborne) were to drop infront of the British XXX Corps to secure its passage to Arnhem where the Rhine was to be crossed.
> 
> There were many canals to cross before reaching the Rhine river, all the crossing points were targets for the airborne. The major crossing for the 101st was the Son bridge which was destroyed by the Germans, the major crossing for the 82nd was Nijmegan which was not captured until XXX Corps provided support and the point for the 1st Airborne was Arnhem itself.
> 
> ...



However I think it should be said that the plan could have succeeded, unlike "Sledghammer" {the Allied plan to invade Nazi-held France in 1942} Market Garden was not impossible, but like any bold plan has some chance of failure. Imagine if the US had heeded the radar warnings on Dec 7 1941, and had all their aircraft airborne AA ready to decimate the Japanese. We would be talking about how stupid it was for the Japanese to even try an attack on Pearl

1.) The British tanks were clearly outmatched by the Germans, about 6 German JagdPanthers were able to hold up several Allied Firefly-equipped battalions at the outset, because they could pick off the Allied tanks, while their armour was too heavy to be penetrated from long range. The Allies really needed a heavy tank like the King Tiger or Jagdpanther, that could withstand enemy fire in a full assault. The ideal tank for this would have been the Tortoise, unfortunately its development was not pushed more quickly.

2.) When the 1st airborne ran into stiff resistance, the commander of XXX corps, Gen Horrocks, asked for a push to another bridge about 15 miles west of Arnhem, which as it turned out was almost undefended. {as all re-inforcements were rushed to Arnhem

3.) There was some faulty organization too, as bridging equipment was too far back in the column, and caused delays as it was brought up, trying to weave its way past several miles of Allied vehicles strung out on the road. 


Lastly, although the operation didn't cross the Rhine, it passed the major rivers Maas Waal, and it forced the Germans to rush reserves to Arnhem, reducing those available elsewhere.


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## plan_D (Feb 12, 2008)

There was a lot more that went wrong in Op. Market Garden. Don't take me wrong, I think Op. Market Garden was an excellent idea - an extremely bold move. I was simply saying what really happened. 

The plan was excellent but I think Colin Powell was the man who said "No battle plan survives contact with the enemy". It was just another of those failures in war - albeit the Allies had chance to halt that upon hearing of 10th and 9th SS Panzer divisions presence.


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## A4K (Feb 12, 2008)

Germany's invasion of Russia. Hitler should have studied up on Napolean a bit more first

'Those who don't learn from history usually end up repeating it'
(---can't remember the author, but it's a good quote.)

A refresher course in good logistic management wouldn't have gone a miss either.


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## Gundrium (Feb 12, 2008)

renrich said:


> The worst blunder of the war was when Japan attacked the US at Pearl Harbor. They were absolutely unrealistic to believe that they had any chance to win a war against the US. The second worse was when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.


I would like to point out that the reasons BEHIND the Japanese nation attacking the good old U.S. of A is shrouded in mystery, some believe that the Japanese simply attacked to get jet tech, others believe they just did it to get on the Hitler’s good side, yet there is evidence that the Japanese were actually FORCED to attack, under threat of conquest from the third rich. personaly, while I think it WAS a BAD idea, I think the two worst were when The third rich declared war on U.S.A, and the incident at pearl harbor. (Truthfully, I think the WORST blunder was Hitlers Beginning the war IN THE FIRST PLACE!!!)


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## timshatz (Feb 12, 2008)

Gundrium said:


> I would like to point out that the reasons BEHIND the Japanese nation attacking the good old U.S. of A is shrouded in mystery)



Nothing shrouded about it at all. Japan invaded and occupied French IndoChina in September of 1940, taking advantage of the weakness of French forces due to their capitualation to Germany. The US issued an embargo on Oil (in the middle of 1941) to the Japanese as a protest and to get them to withdraw. It left Japan with a little more than a year's worth of Oil in reserve (some figures say 6 months). The US also, as part of the Embargo, made it a condition that Japan leave China as well (which it had invaded in 1937 after the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident")

Further, it should be pointed out that between 1931 and June of 1942, the Japanese empire attacked or invaded every country surrounding them with the exception of Canada (which was a little on the distant side). 

The arguement that the US forced the Japanese to attack them is a little like saying a Cop forced a Criminal to shoot back when faced with arrest.


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## renrich (Feb 12, 2008)

Right on Tim! If the Japanese had not had a desire to dominate their part of the world they would not have gotten themselves in the fix they got in. Their problem was that their leaders were extremely myopic and really had no idea what they were getting themselves into. They had a view of the world that was absolutely unrealistic!


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## ToughOmbre (Feb 12, 2008)

The Japanese greatly underestimated the will and resolve of America. And the execution of their attack plan was flawed. If they really thought that the complete destruction of the Pacific fleet at the outset of hostilities was necessary to force the US to sue for peace, then they should have hit Pearl with at least another wave, and then gone after their priority targets, the American Carriers. Nagumo was too conservative and the Japanese were too rigid in their plan. It would cost them six months later in the Battle of Midway as well. The Japanese could never have defeated the US regerdless of how well they executed their attack, but the fact remains that their strategy doomed the empire.

TO

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## Njaco (Feb 12, 2008)

Could it be said that Midway was the blunder that doomed the Japanese as well as Stalingrad for Germany?


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## timshatz (Feb 12, 2008)

renrich said:


> Right on Tim! If the Japanese had not had a desire to dominate their part of the world they would not have gotten themselves in the fix they got in. Their problem was that their leaders were extremely myopic and really had no idea what they were getting themselves into. They had a view of the world that was absolutely unrealistic!



Good point. That sort of thing, the myoptic viewpoint, often happens with island peoples. Well, in the past it did. I am not sure how much anyplace can be closed effectively anymore. But back then, especially in the orient, it was more common to be isolated and have a warped view of reality. 

On another note, the Japanese outlook was also shaped by a Government that was not truely effective as a representation of the Japanese people. The Govt of Japan in the 30s and 40s was one with three branches, Civilian, Army and Navy. It was very unusual in that a military service had say in the affairs of the Nation. In Democracies, which we are most familiar with, it is the other way around. 

The Japanese Military cowed the Civilian Govt with a combination of threat and open assasination. What was structured to be a Govt that kept itself in check (as most Govts are) ended up with the Army and Navy doing whatever they wanted while the Civilian Govt was ignored. Hence the invasions throughout the Orient. Most were Army shows, usually initiated by some crackpot Colonel, where the Government (both Navy and Civilian) were told afterwards and nothing happened to the perpetrators. 

Given such a situation, it was only a matter of time before one or both of the Military Branches oversteped their authority to the extent Japan was in a fight it had no chance of winning.


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## Marcel (Feb 17, 2008)

freebird said:


> Market Garden was not impossible, but like any bold plan has some chance of failure.



Market garden would have succeeded if the British would have listened to intel provided by the dutch resistance. The presence of the SS panzer division in Arnhem was told to them, but they paid no attention. Furthermore, landing sites were chosen very badly, again not listening to the dutch. The heathland near Wolfheze was way to far from the bridges. Also the operation was carried out *after* it was reported that the panic flight of the germans was over and the had regrouped themselves. Had the operation taken place a week or so earlier it still might have succeeded. Again very bad planning from the part of the allies. I would say it *was* a blunder.

Another candidate for major blunder was the german offensive near Koersk, great blundering from their part.


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## Freebird (Feb 18, 2008)

timshatz said:


> Further, it should be pointed out that between 1931 and June of 1942, the Japanese empire attacked or invaded every country surrounding them *with the exception of Canada* (which was a little on the distant side).



Tim they got us too!   {not quite on the same scale as "Pearl" though...}



Wikipedia said:


> On June 20, 1942, the Japanese submarine Japanese submarine ''I-26'', under the command of Yokota Minoru, fired 25-30 rounds of 5.5" shells at the Estevan Point lighthouse on *Vancouver Island in British Columbia, Canada* but failed to hit its target. This marked the first enemy shelling of Canadian soil since the War of 1812.





Marcel said:


> Market garden would have succeeded if the British would have listened to intel provided by the dutch resistance. The presence of the SS panzer division in Arnhem was told to them, but they paid no attention. Furthermore, landing sites were chosen very badly, again not listening to the dutch.



Anyways what would the Dutch know about Arnhem? {Oh yeah, they live there...}   



freebird said:


> "Your men (British Aust.) fight like lions, too bad they are led by asses" (donkeys).



And you thought that upper-class twits were only in a Monty Python skit...


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## plan_D (Feb 18, 2008)

It wasn't just the Dutch resistance which informed the British command about the Panzer divisions - in fact the solid proof came from RAF PR aircraft. 

Market Garden would have been a complete success in August, but Montgomery wanted to make sure that the supply was ready for any future operations. Even if the British planners had listened to the Dutch, the plan would have failed - the SS panzer divisions were present; the operation should have never happened with their presence.


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## Marcel (Feb 18, 2008)

plan_D said:


> It wasn't just the Dutch resistance which informed the British command about the Panzer divisions - in fact the solid proof came from RAF PR aircraft.
> 
> Market Garden would have been a complete success in August, but Montgomery wanted to make sure that the supply was ready for any future operations. Even if the British planners had listened to the Dutch, the plan would have failed - the SS panzer divisions were present; the operation should have never happened with their presence.



Agreed, the tactical planning was a great blunder.


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## Oreo (Jul 22, 2008)

Another you could have listed (maybe someone already mentioned it) is Hitler's decision to use the Me 262 as a bomber. That lost very valuable time, when they might have stopped the US bomber flow in its tracks. Maybe not won the war, but it was still an incredible blunder.

I voted for Barbarossa. Not the wrong decision, but wrong details overlooked.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2008)

This talk about the fall of Singapore, the Phillipines, and burma ignores a fundamental and crucial part of the equation. in 1941 and early 1942, the japanese were unstoppable. Even when confronted with superior numbers, and decent troops, their advanced infiltration tactics and elan would nearly always win the day. The allies had fundamental problems at this stage of the war. they thought in terms of a european war, that is, if you are threatedned with encirclement, you have to withdraw. The British, in particular, had virtually no concept of what was required in the Jungle. Evidence exists of men being thrown into the jungle with 80lb packs, and and slippery hobnailed boots. The Japanese, on the other hand carried their light artillery into battle with them, took basically only ammunition as their load, worried little about flanks, or encirclement, and issued personal kit that wa much more suitable to jungle. it would be the latter part of 1942 before the Australians developed techniques in the Jungle to counter this, 1944 for the brits, and the Americans never mastered the concept (except in the SWPac).

The japanese innovations went further. they were quick to relaize that tanks could operate in the Jungle (despite the famous footage of them being cut up in Malaya, this use of tanks cause major consternation for the allies, and above all else, their firm understanding that despite the losses, it was imperative to maintain forward movement at all costs.

The main reasons that Malaya fell so much quicker than Corregidor, IMO can be traced to Japanese actions rather than Allied. The japanese in Malaya were led by a ruthless and brilliant gneral, in Yamashita. His tactical concepts and handling of his forces was textbook.

Homma, on the other hand was abysmal in the way he handled his troops. Piecemeal committment, a failure to maintain pressure at the right times, a lack of appreciation as to the significance of the Bataan peninsula all contributed to a very long drawn out affair. Admittedly, Macs handling of the retreat was superb, but for the first few days he was in real danger of encirclement


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## seesul (Jul 22, 2008)

My vote goes for Operation Barbarosa


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## Bigxiko (Jul 22, 2008)

Operation Barbarosa 
for men was the greatest blunder of the hole war


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## P-Popsie (Oct 27, 2008)

trackend said:


> Its not on the list but I'll go for the defense or rather the lack of defense by the British at Singapore there was adequate men and equipment to have fought off the Japanese but the leadership and planning where appalling.



This is true even to the extent that the Brittish were allowing Commonwealth troops to land after it was obvious that they were going to relinquish the position to the enemy. This resulted in Thousands of combat ready troops to be tortured to death either in Changi prison or building a railway to nowhere in the jungles of Burma. 

[/QUOTE]
If I had to pick any other I would say Barbarossa soon as Hitler started on the Russians the whole out come of WW2 was sealed including that of the Japanese. Germany could not defeat Russia and the western powers simultaneously. [/QUOTE]

This i also have to agree with so long as the russian campaign as a whole is considered i mean the loss of 600 000 combat experienced soldiers was no small contribution to the whole downfall of the Reich.

I would however like to bring another of Hitler's monumental and numerous mistakes. This being the demand he placed on Herman Goering to flatten London rather than allowing the commander of his Air force to do what he knew was needed, destroy the RAF's capacity to field defensive A/C and remove their ability to controll the sky. 

This one domino i beleive if it had fallen would of resulted in the result of WWII being very different indeed. Air Marshal Dowding himself conceded to Churchill that he only expected the Fighter command Airfields to remain operational for another three days more during the heaviest period of the bombing of the Fighter fields. The change in tactics at Hitler's behest allowed the breathing space the fighter squadrons needed to regather and face the threat streaming over from occupied France


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## Messy1 (Oct 27, 2008)

Operation Barborossa!
I think the greatest blunder of the war, was Hitler invading and attacking Russia, and starting a two front war without winning the war in Europe first. I think that was the greatest blunder as it insured Germany's defeat. It was a blunder on many issues, Hitler underestimating Russia, not having enough foresight to plan for a winter offensive, etc. I would consider Stallingrad a part of this. It just seems to me Hitler shot himself in the foot by attacking Russia. I just cannot think of any other blunder bigger than this one, as Hitler actually thought he could win a two front war, or he would not have invaded Russia.
I do not consider Pearl Harbor a massive blunder, the high up military officials knew that Japan could not win a all out, prolonged war with the U.S. and England, they were only hoping to stagger us enough and shock us enough to take the fight out of us so they could negotiate for a peace treaty favorable to Japan.


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## kool kitty89 (Oct 27, 2008)

Then again, had they gone straight to Russia in spring/summer of 1940 instead of attacking Britain it may well have gone more sucessfully. (at the same time doing all they could to keep the US and UK out of the war in Europe for as long as possible. -including cutting ties with Japan or even declaring war on them after Pearl Harbor)

They may have not only been able to push the Soviets back to the Urals, but possibly done so fast enough to minimise the implementation of the Russian scorched earth policy. (and capture much of the resourses and industry intact)

The Blitzkrieg strategy working as well here (possibly better) than it had over Western europe.


In the case of Russia's air force in particular, it wasn't until 1941 that they had any modern high performance fighters available in quantity, prior to this the best they had in mid 1940 was the I-16. (the Yak-1 MiG-1/3 entering production in 1940, and still working through the development "kinks" with the LaGG-3 not entereing service until well into 1941)


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## Marcel (Oct 31, 2008)

kool kitty89 said:


> Then again, had they gone straight to Russia in spring/summer of 1940 instead of attacking Britain it may well have gone more sucessfully. (at the same time doing all they could to keep the US and UK out of the war in Europe for as long as possible. -including cutting ties with Japan or even declaring war on them after Pearl Harbor)



The French would have taken the opportunity to invade Germany which would have been disastrous for the Germans. Further more, I think the German Army was not really fit for attacking Russia in 1940 either, having to cover the vast distances.


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## Amsel (Oct 31, 2008)

Attacking Stalingrad was the worst blunder in WWII. The Sixth Army should have attacked the Kaukuses in full strength instead of wearing itself down in the urban fighting that ensued in Stalingrad. Hitler should not have become obsessed with holding "Fortress Stalingrad" and underestimating the Soviet soldiers.
The entire Sixth Army was encircled and cut off from its supply lines but was still a formidable force. Had Hitler given the order to tactically withdraw from the kessel the Sixth Army would have been saved. Paulus often takes too much of the blame for losing an entire army but the blame should be shared between Hitler, Goerring, and Manstein also.
Had the Sixth Army been ordered to withdraw and link up with Hoths' 4th Panzer Army the outcome of the Eastern front might have been quite different.


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## kool kitty89 (Nov 1, 2008)

Marcel said:


> The French would have taken the opportunity to invade Germany which would have been disastrous for the Germans. Further more, I think the German Army was not really fit for attacking Russia in 1940 either, having to cover the vast distances.



I meant after the battle of France, but before direct attacks on British territory. 

And in the second case, perhaps, but the Luftwaffe would certainly be in much better shape.


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## Juha (Nov 1, 2008)

KK
with armistice going into effect on 25 june 40 it would have been too late in that summer before WM would have been be ready to attack SU. And they didn't even have plans for the attack at that time. 
If you think all the maintenance, integrating the replacements into their units etc needed after 6 weeks of intensive fighting and then all the troop transfers to the east you see that most of the summer would have gone before attack would have been possible. 

Juha


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 5, 2008)

This is the sort of thread that calls for long and informed posts. 

What most people who study WW II don't fully appreciate is the Stalin and the Red Army had their backs to the wall in 1942. The tremendous production rate of the T-34 and Il-2 was not yet there in mid 42, much of the Red Army had shortages of equipment even down to the humble rifle, and Stalin's prestige in the Red Army and Communist Party had taken a tremendous whack. 

A stunning German victory in 1942 could well and plausibly have triggered the collapse of both the Red Army and the Communist Party. And, despite the logistical nightmare that was Russia, it was possible for Hitler to have achieved his war aims in 1942 - if only he could make up his mind. 

Caucasus? Or Stalingrad?

He should have gone for Stalingrad first. With Stalingrad taken, the physical and moral shock would have shattered the communist regime.


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## 109ROAMING (Dec 14, 2008)

Burmese Bandit said:


> This is the sort of thread that calls for long and informed posts.
> 
> What most people who study WW II don't fully appreciate is the Stalin and the Red Army had their backs to the wall in 1942. The tremendous production rate of the T-34 and Il-2 was not yet there in mid 42, much of the Red Army had shortages of equipment even down to the humble rifle, and Stalin's prestige in the Red Army and Communist Party had taken a tremendous whack.
> 
> ...



but he did try and take Stalingrad though and it failed miserably???

He would of been better off fully focussing on the Caucasus ,if that was done then securing the area's natural resources would of put Germany in a better position to take Russia


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 14, 2008)

109, there's a large problem with the idea you posted...

Russia's Geography, and the strategic implications thereof.

Conquering the Caucasus in 1942 would have availed the Germans little if their lines of communication were cut at Stalingrad ( and indeed this is what nearly happened in 1942 - they were on the verge of winning the oil fields of Baku when they had to turn tail and run like hell before the Red Army pincers strangled their neck!)

Not to mention that the Russians had demolished what installations the Germans were able to capture so thoroughly that it would have taken about half to one year before the Germans could be able to exploit those oil wells...

WHEREAS, if they had decided to take Stalingrad, and disregard the Caucasus for the time being, they would have

(a) struck a terrible blow against the morale of the Red Army and especially against Stalin's prestige (Losing the city named after you is as low as you can go!)

(b) from the strategic point of view, the fall of Stalingrad would have led to a rupture of communications between the rest of the Russian Front and the Caucasus Front, which in time would have left the armies of that Front to "wither along the vine" in the same way as the isolated garrisons of the Japanese held islands of the Pacific in 1944.


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## 109ROAMING (Dec 14, 2008)

righto,if you say so

I'm not convinced though


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## Amsel (Dec 14, 2008)

That is what happens when you let a corporal run one of the best armies in the history of the world. Blunder after blunder. In my opinion Stalingrad was not important enough strategically to lose over a million well trained and motivated troops. By splitting the Sixth Army the "little corporal" ensured if not defeat, a drawn out battle in urban settings. we know today from recent experience that this is worst type of terrain to assault and occupy. The Panzers and Stukas had no advantage in Stalingrad.

The Red's made a wise tactical decision and used barely enough resources to hold the Werhmacht in place while they built a huge battle group to encircle and starve out the Germans.

Paulus seemed shocked and indecisive about the encirclement. In my opinion he should have disobeyed orders and withdrwn to the southwest before December. Hauser did the same thing in Kharkov and saved his battle group and even won Kharkov back. Hauser had to endure the wrath of Hitler but his victory saved him.


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 15, 2008)

Regarding the Red's so-called wise tactical decision, Amsel...

Actually it was more luck than anything else. 

Both Stalin and Hitler made blunder after blunder by micromanaging their wars, but while Stalin slowly learned later to trust his generals, especially Zhukov, Hitler only increased his meddling as the War went on.

In the beginning of 1942 Stalin was absolutely convinced, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the Wehrmacht would attack towards Moscow, and he grouped all his reserves there and refused to release any towards the southern attack. He believed that the southern attack was only a clever trick designed to lure his reserves away from the capital. 

It was only when the germans were on the verge of capturing both the oilfields and Stalingrad that Stalin conceded - grudgingly - that he might have been wrong after all, and ordered Stavka to release the reserves that led to the pincer movement against Stalingrad.

If during the time of Stalin's obstinacy, a decision to capture Stalingrad and not split the Sixth Army had been made....it would have succeeded.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Dec 15, 2008)

Amsel said:


> That is what happens when you let a corporal run one of the best armies in the history of the world. Blunder after blunder. In my opinion Stalingrad was not important enough strategically to lose over a million well trained and motivated troops. By splitting the Sixth Army the "little corporal" ensured if not defeat, a drawn out battle in urban settings. we know today from recent experience that this is worst type of terrain to assault and occupy. The Panzers and Stukas had no advantage in Stalingrad.
> 
> The Red's made a wise tactical decision and used barely enough resources to hold the Werhmacht in place while they built a huge battle group to encircle and starve out the Germans.
> 
> Paulus seemed shocked and indecisive about the encirclement. In my opinion he should have disobeyed orders and withdrwn to the southwest before December. Hauser did the same thing in Kharkov and saved his battle group and even won Kharkov back. Hauser had to endure the wrath of Hitler but his victory saved him.



True Amsel, but it also didn't help that Paulus had the reservist divisions protecting his flanks, which caved in quickly during the Russian's offensive.


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## parsifal (Dec 16, 2008)

Actually blaming Hitler or Stalin for the failures is one of the the great lies of the war. Sure, these men wielded a huge influence on the conduct of operations, but their respective staffs supported many of these decisions, and only after the war were they suddenly emboldened to say "I told him but he didnt listen" In fact many of these detractors were actually ardent supporters of the fateful decisions at the time.

Dont get me wrong, I am not trying to defend either Hitler or Stalin, but it is just untrue that both of them single handedly lost battles or the war.

The truth, if you really want to look at the german situation objectively, was that the 1942 offensives should never have gone ahead at all. The Germans simply lacked the logistic tail, or the reserves to continue like they did. The biggest single loss that the Germans had suffered in the 1941 campaign was in trucks, followed closely by horses. They had started the Barbarossa campaign with roughly 500000 trucks. By December they had written off more than 60000 outright, with a further 275000 in the repair shops. the average return rate of these damaged vehicles was only 5000 per month, and once mobile operations commenced again in the Summer, the nett deficit effect started allover again. In terms of horses the Germans had lost about 180000 in the previous summer campaign, and over the winter, mostly to exposure and overwork. Replacements were trickling in, but only at the rate of about 3-5000 per month....less than the number needed to re-equip a division...

Logistically, the german army was bankrupt in 1942. The sweeping advances envisioned and supported by OKH could not be sustained. Halder knerw this....but did nothing other than whinge to his diary.

In fact the war had been lost in the terrible winter of 1941-2, although nobody knew it at that time. that is not to say that the Germans could not achieve a negotiated peace with the Russians. The Russians were certainly considering it, although they wanted a return to the 1941 boundaries, and never intended to allow the ceasefire last longer than about 1 year at most.

But a series of defensive victories would have provided the Heer with the much needed rest that it required, not overstreteched the logistic services of the army, and had more effect on the Russians than the pointless advances into the Steppes that the Fall Blau called for....The advance into the Kaukasus was a waste of time....the Russians had undertaken such thorough demolitions of those wells captured by the germans that it would have been at least mid 1944 before any of them would make a reasonable return of oil for the Germans. If Stalingrad was not properly covered, the Russians would simply attack where the Germans were weak. If Stalingrad was covered, the germans had not the resources to do this and provide adequate forces for the advnace into the Kaukasus region as well....it was a no brainer, but the General Staff, and Hitler, simply refused to see the issues sensibly....


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 16, 2008)

You know, parsifal, I'd like to take you up on one or two points on that, but I suspect that once again you've done your homework much more thoroughly than I have. But you mentioned logistics, and a thought suddenly popped into my head.

Was it possible that the greatest blunder of WW II was not any battle at all, but the mind-boggling decision by Hitler to cut back on production of tanks and aircraft immediately after Dunkirk??!!??


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Dec 16, 2008)

Burmese, you may be right on your post. Didn't Germany not gear up for total war until 1943?


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 16, 2008)

Yep - and LATE 1943 at that!!!!


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Dec 16, 2008)

Like how late are we talking Burmese, November, October? 

Another point, Germany should have spent more resources building the Panzer IV's then Tigers. Don't get me wrong, the Tiger was more armed and armored then the Panzer IV, but they only made 1300 of them.


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 16, 2008)

See Albert Speer's illuminating postwar book on WW II for exactly HOW late. And as for Panzer production in WW II, there are many excellent persons on this forum with great knowledge on that....like...say, Parsifal! 
I think the "Achtung Panzer" site has a good section on production rates...and there's another site which gives the exact costs of production for each mark of panzer. I'll see if I can find it.


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## 109ROAMING (Dec 16, 2008)

Pretty sure Germany was gearing up for war a decade before 43


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Dec 16, 2008)

That may be true Roaming, but I'm pretty sure that Germany didn't gear up for total war until 43. What I mean by that is, the Germans didn't start saving resources for war production, ie rubber, metal, until 43. I believe the nazi party didn't want to panic the population.


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## parsifal (Dec 16, 2008)

Sorry, but another misconception. The Germans tooled up for war at the maximum that their fragile pre-war economy could take them. Overy has done perhaps the best analysis of this. In 1933, when Hitler took over, the German economy was even more on its knees than those of other western nations. Wheras the US, and even Britain and France, had some reserves (or in the case of the british and the french, their overseas empires) on which to fall back on to tide them through the depression, the Germans had no such resources. they had been sucked dry by the repressive reparations of WWI, and the massively destructive effects of the hyper-inflation of 1923-24. Germany entered the depression in a terrible state.

People often ask "where is the socialism in national socialism". Well look at the reconstruction programmes of 1933-39, and you will see why. Hitler borrowed immensely, mostly from the US, but rather than pouring it into long term economic reconstruction he instead poured the money into short term re-armament. There simply was not the money in the pre-war to re-arm any faster than they did. 

People often wonder why Germany went to war in 1939 rather than 1943-4, when militarily Germany would have been far more capable. Its not the only reason, but one reason was that ecomically he had to. Pre-war germany was living in an economic fools paradise, with the creditors starting to get nervous, wanting their money, and Germany not having the means to pay the debts she had rung up. Conquering Europe allowed the germans to fix the exchange rate at artificially advantageous levels for germany, which in turn enabled them to refuel their flagging economy.

The Germans could have ramped up their economy in late 1940, but instead delayed that decision until the beginning of 1942. After that, they introduced increasingly austere rationing, and began the forced labour programs, along with the most ruthless exploitation of their own allies) that sustained and enlarged the German economy to the levels it reached in 1944-5. however, as Speer points out, this level of production was simply unsustainable for germany. Even if the Allies had sat back and done nothing in 1944, there would have been massive reductions in German output, as once again economic realities caught up with the Nazis


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## Amsel (Dec 16, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Actually blaming Hitler or Stalin for the failures is one of the the great lies of the war. Sure, these men wielded a huge influence on the conduct of operations, but their respective staffs supported many of these decisions, and only after the war were they suddenly emboldened to say "I told him but he didnt listen" In fact many of these detractors were actually ardent supporters of the fateful decisions at the time.
> 
> Dont get me wrong, I am not trying to defend either Hitler or Stalin, but it is just untrue that both of them single handedly lost battles or the war.
> division...


 As I stated in an earlier post the blame game should not be rested on Paulus but Hitler, Goerring, and Von Manstein also. These three men tried to wash their hands of this defeat when in all actuality they played a big role in the loss of over a million men in the Stalingradkessel. 

I do agree about the logistical problem the Werhmacht faced. Though I believe the German frontier could have been set at the Volga and the Communists were very close to defeat. Barbarossa was doomed to fail for another reason also. Hitlers hate for the Slavs. The amount of volunteers from the Ukraine and Russia was a great embarrassment to the USSR. They have gone to great lengths to hide the fact that in the collectives the Germans were thought of as liberators. The actual numbers of Russians in the werhmacht is a closely guarded secret that we may never figure out. Hitlers heavy handedness with the Russians was a folly of immense proportions. He could have won the "hearts and minds" of the Russians but he picked up where Stalin had left off in the massacre of the Slavs and Russians.
Barbarossa was a just campaign in theory but it was muddled by bigotry and murder. While the atrocities commited by the Werhmacht are large they pale in comparison to the homocides by the Stalinists.


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## parsifal (Dec 16, 2008)

I think a fortified Dnieper line was a better option after the collapse of the 1941 campaign. An advance to the Volga was in theory a better option, but it simply would strain the germans to get there. This was strain they simply could not afford. 

I firmly believe that a better option would be to complete the conquest of the Crimea, fortify around the mius, perhaps even Rostov, and undertake local counterattacks as opportunities arose. Put out the peace feelers, wait for the Russians to immolate themselves on the front line, and pray that you were still scary enough to convince them to make a peace

Your right about the actual numbers of russians grafted into the wehrmacht. But some estimates go as high as 1 million by mid 1942 of the so-called Hiwis Hitler had forbade their use on racial grounds, but the front line units had ignored this directive out of necessity. Mostly they were used for support roles, but according to my stepfather, and even some written accounts, the Hiwis were also used in combat capacities.

The ability of the germans to enlist more tangible support in the Byelorussian, Baltic States and the Ukraine is something still debated today. The extent of support they could have achieved is an open question,. I personally believe that Hitlers racial policies on the Slavics of Eastern Europe cost him about 40 divs of troops. I believe however that Hitlers racial policies of exploitation and extermination were more than a little driven by economic expedients that had been anticipated by the Germans, although it is perhaps ironic that the germans got virtually no economic benefits from their occupation of European Russia.


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## Amsel (Dec 16, 2008)

parsifal said:


> I firmly believe that a better option would be to complete the conquest of the Crimea, fortify around the mius, perhaps even Rostov, and undertake local counterattacks as opportunities arose. Put out the peace feelers, wait for the Russians to immolate themselves on the front line, and pray that you were still scary enough to convince them to make a peace


That would be more strategically sound. Adolf Hitler was a brilliant man in many ways, economically and politically, but was extremely overconfident of the Reichs' military abilities to take on the whole N. Hemishere.


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## Amsel (Dec 16, 2008)

The second biggest blunder would be the Ardennes offensive in my opinion. And the failure to send troops to bolster the Eastern Front. Hitler knew he was defeated and should have sued for peace while sending all troops to the Vistula instead of the Western Front and Hungary.


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 16, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Sorry, but another misconception. The Germans tooled up for war at the maximum that their fragile pre-war economy could take them. Overy has done perhaps the best analysis of this. In 1933, when Hitler took over, the German economy was even more on its knees than those of other western nations. Wheras the US, and even Britain and France, had some reserves (or in the case of the british and the french, their overseas empires) on which to fall back on to tide them through the depression, the Germans had no such resources. they had been sucked dry by the repressive reparations of WWI, and the massively destructive effects of the hyper-inflation of 1923-24. Germany entered the depression in a terrible state.
> 
> People often ask "where is the socialism in national socialism". Well look at the reconstruction programmes of 1933-39, and you will see why. Hitler borrowed immensely, mostly from the US, but rather than pouring it into long term economic reconstruction he instead poured the money into short term re-armament. There simply was not the money in the pre-war to re-arm any faster than they did.
> 
> ...



Parsifal, I am as always impressed by you, but here I must beg to differ. I shall post a much longer post later, but here I will make only an outline of the reasons why I think you are wrong -

(1) Slave Labour. Could have been done in 1940.
(2) Complete underutilization of female workforce 1933-45 for ideological and prestige reasons.


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## Messy1 (Dec 17, 2008)

Could we make this a simpler answer to this question? I feel Both Germany and Japan's biggest mistake was underestimating the resolve, fight, industry, and determination of their enemies, and their over confidence in the skill and superiority they believed they possessed over the rest of the world. I feel a vast portion of their mistakes were because they believed themselves both to be superior to all their enemies. I know this is a broad answer to this question, but it seems to me most of the mistakes made were from not looking at the situations realistically. Weather it was Japan believing that their bushido spirit was all they needed to outfight a enemy with the capacity to out produce Japan with both men and machine. Or Germany who ended up in the same situation, where even something as simple as logistics which has been brought up in this thread, could not even produce or maintain enough trucks and trains to deliver supplies to their troops. Or could it be that they both just never could imagine the amount of men, ships, weapons, tanks, planes, etc. that their enemies could produce.
A simple answer, but I feel this is the underlying reason for many of the biggest mistakes made by the Axis. The U.S. too made many of our own mistakes from overconfidence or from underestimating their enemy.


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## parsifal (Dec 17, 2008)

Germany and Japan were both aggrieved at being left out of the of the colonial era. They both had weak democratic traditions, and strong military traditions. As the economic crises of the 20's and 30's hit the post war world, and the markets for manufactured goods started to dry up, each in their own way sought to redress that imbalance by force. They were, in essence, applying their own military and social experiences to solve their economic problems.

The military traditions of these countries led to the development of highly trained military elites in each country. The idea behind this was the achievment of quick victories that would dishearten the opponents, and make recovery of those conquests prohibitive....The Japanese had applied this formula aginst China in 1895 and Russia in 1904, and had had it applied to them by the US in 1854.

The Germans were a bitter nation that emerged from WWI with many believing Germany had been somehow betrayed. The imperious behaviour of the alies at Verailles did not help. These events made Germany a nation eger for revenge, which in turn influenced the ugly nature of Nazism. 

The Soviet Union was another nation ostracised and outcast from the family of nations because of its political system. Italy was also treated as an outcast, and because of its mediocre performance in WWI did bot share in the spoils of war very much (at least thats how they perceived it....in relaity I think they did quite well out of the peace treaty)


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Dec 17, 2008)

Messy1 said:


> Could we make this a simpler answer to this question? I feel Both Germany and Japan's biggest mistake was underestimating the resolve, fight, industry, and determination of their enemies, and their over confidence in the skill and superiority they believed they possessed over the rest of the world. I feel a vast portion of their mistakes were because they believed themselves both to be superior to all their enemies. I know this is a broad answer to this question, but it seems to me most of the mistakes made were from not looking at the situations realistically. Weather it was Japan believing that their bushido spirit was all they needed to outfight a enemy with the capacity to out produce Japan with both men and machine. Or Germany who ended up in the same situation, where even something as simple as logistics which has been brought up in this thread, could not even produce or maintain enough trucks and trains to deliver supplies to their troops. Or could it be that they both just never could imagine the amount of men, ships, weapons, tanks, planes, etc. that their enemies could produce.
> A simple answer, but I feel this is the underlying reason for many of the biggest mistakes made by the Axis. The U.S. too made many of our own mistakes from overconfidence or from underestimating their enemy.




I think a mistake from the U.S. would be Kasserine Pass, where we let our guard down.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 2, 2009)

Amsel said:


> .... He could have won the "hearts and minds" of the Russians but he picked up where Stalin had left off in the massacre of the Slavs and Russians.
> ...



Sorry for nitpicking, but Russians as Slavs too.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Feb 2, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Italy was also treated as an outcast, and because of its mediocre performance in WWI did bot share in the spoils of war very much (at least thats how they perceived it....in relaity I think they did quite well out of the peace treaty)



Yeah, it is interesting why Italy decided to go with Hitler. It was probably Mussolini's fault, and perhaps that the two countries had similar goverment?

Franco at least, was wise enough to keep Spain out of the war. Their great civil war had been fought in the 1930's, and the whole country had been torn apart by it.


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## dragonandhistail (Feb 3, 2009)

Hitler's declaration of War on the US was by far the biggest blunder. Followe closely by Pearl Harbor. THis move sealed Hitler's fate and ensured Britain would survive. Barbarossa is often cited but with just the Russians to fight? Who knows. It is the subject of endless speculation.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 3, 2009)

dragonandhistail said:


> Hitler's declaration of War on the US was by far the biggest blunder. Followe closely by Pearl Harbor. THis move sealed Hitler's fate and ensured Britain would survive. Barbarossa is often cited but with just the Russians to fight? Who knows. It is the subject of endless speculation.



The US would have entered the war at some point anyhow.

What really sealed the fate of Germany, was the failed invasion of Russia. Germany probably could have fought off the Western Allies. Remember they had to land first. If the Germans had not been fighting the Russians in the east, they very well could have possibly prevented D-Day from being successful.

The massive Russian army was what overpowered the Germans, that and poor mistakes by Hitler.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 3, 2009)

True, Germany couldn't win a two front war. They could've won if they were just facing the west, or if they were just facing the Russians, but not both.


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## Ferdinand Foch (Feb 3, 2009)

Funny, you think that Hitler would have rethought his idea about fighting on two fronts, considering the toll it took on Germany during the First World War. Anyway, yeah, Germany should have concentrated on one front at a time. I wanna say that if they had all of their men from the West (guarding against Britain), and had them partake in Barbarossa, then the German Army could have fought its way to Moscow before the winter set in in 1941. If the capture of Moscow didn't have Stalin's government surrender, at least it could have shaken up the Russian chain of command until spring of 1942, when the German Army could really begin to advance.


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## Waynos (Feb 3, 2009)

I have often thought about why Hitler would have chosen to do that and, referring back to an earlier discussion of the Battle of Britain, I wonder if Hitler still thought that Britain would negotiate a peace settlement leaving him to fight Russia alone?


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 3, 2009)

Waynos said:


> I have often thought about why Hitler would have chosen to do that and, referring back to an earlier discussion of the Battle of Britain, I wonder if Hitler still thought that Britain would negotiate a peace settlement leaving him to fight Russia alone?



I don't think Britain would've negotiated a peace, Churchill was pretty adamant in fighting Hitler, one of his biggest strengths was his resolve. 

Now, if you had Neville Chamberlain still in power, he would have jumped first chance he had to negotiate.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 3, 2009)

Waynos said:


> I have often thought about why Hitler would have chosen to do that and, referring back to an earlier discussion of the Battle of Britain, I wonder if Hitler still thought that Britain would negotiate a peace settlement leaving him to fight Russia alone?



I think this is something that we will never know for sure. I for one think that could very well be true however. I do not think that Hitler ever truly wanted to fight England.


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## Ferdinand Foch (Feb 3, 2009)

True, Vassili, but not everyone in his War Cabinet though otherwise. Churchill was a great leader, but he could have been put in a dire position if some of his cabinet wanted to put Chamberlain back in power (least I think, if I'm wrong, please correct me). Thank god Churchill stayed, though, or half of Europe could be speaking German right now.


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## Waynos (Feb 3, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I think this is something that we will never know for sure. I for one think that could very well be true however. I do not think that Hitler ever truly wanted to fight England.



From what I have seen that is exactly right, I'm sure I read that he regarded Russia as the common enemy of Germany AND Britain which might have influenced his thinkng, talk about calling it wrong!

Vassili, I think Chamberlain is much misunderstood and it is all too easy to judge with hindsight. One has to remember that during the late 1930's the horrors of WW1 were all too fresh in the memory and it wasn't just Chamberlain who was deserate to avoid a repeat of that, it was everyone. When the munich 'piece of paper' was waved at Croydon he was heralded as a hero around the world and the editorials of Flight (which you can read online for free) and the Aeroplane immediately after Munich illustrate that feeling very well.

It was Chamberlain who facilitated Dowdings Fighter Command structure that later proved so vital ( and which was nowhere near ready in 1938 ) by redirecting resources away from Bomber Command in the face of massive opposition and it was Chamberlain who finally declared war when it became transparent that nothing else would stop Hitler.

The 'would be' successor to Churchill was Lord Halifax and it was a commons revolt that I feel Hitler was counting on to get his peace settlement because he knew all too well that Churchills speeches were not mere words.


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## BombTaxi (Feb 4, 2009)

Indeed, Churchill inherited many of the structures with which Britain would eventually win her war. It must also be added that while Churchill was a great war leader, public feelings about him were ambivalent, to say the least. Many would remember his meddling at the Admiralty in 1914, and his instigation and 'planning' of the disastrous Dardanelles campaign in 1915. Even in 1940, he tried to resurrect the 'Baltic Project' which he had called for in WW1. The details of this scheme are widely available in print and online, so suffice it to say that had it actually occurred in either war, it might well have lost the whole game for Britain - especially so in WW2.

And the British public showed their estimation of Churchill as a post-war leader by evicting him in favour of Clement Attlee before the war was even over. Perhaps their memory of his role in the General Strike of 1926 influenced that.

He was a great orator and a great wartime leader, but Churchill had many failings in his past which have tended to be buried under his admittedly inspirational wartime record.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 4, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> Indeed, Churchill inherited many of the structures with which Britain would eventually win her war. It must also be added that while Churchill was a great war leader, public feelings about him were ambivalent, to say the least. Many would remember his meddling at the Admiralty in 1914, and his instigation and 'planning' of the disastrous Dardanelles campaign in 1915. Even in 1940, he tried to resurrect the 'Baltic Project' which he had called for in WW1. The details of this scheme are widely available in print and online, so suffice it to say that had it actually occurred in either war, it might well have lost the whole game for Britain - especially so in WW2.
> 
> And the British public showed their estimation of Churchill as a post-war leader by evicting him in favour of Clement Attlee before the war was even over. Perhaps their memory of his role in the General Strike of 1926 influenced that.
> 
> He was a great orator and a great wartime leader, but Churchill had many failings in his past which have tended to be buried under his admittedly inspirational wartime record.




Whoops, forgot about that about Churchill. Didn't he also screw up with Admiral Christopher Cradock in the Falklands in 1914?


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## BombTaxi (Feb 4, 2009)

He meddled in almost everything, TBH. Even when he got back into the Admiralty in 1939, he was meddling just as he had in 1914.

As an aside, Cradock's case is an interesting one. He knew he had almost no chance against von Spee, but no doubt felt that after Milne's disgrace for failing to intercept _Goeben_, that he had no choice but to fight against the odds. This led to a truly tragic and totally unnecessary waste of life at Coronel. This was less a Churchillian problem than one with the attitude of the Royal Navy of the time, which was rather mired in a romantic vision of Trafalgar, than a sober appraisal of how war at sea would be fought in the dreadnought age.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 4, 2009)

I gotcha, thanks for the info. I did find it odd, seeing as how Cradock's _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ were outclassed by Spee's _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, yet he still opted to fight.


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## Fokker D21 (Feb 4, 2009)

Personally, I thinks Germany's biggest blunder is not a military one, but one of producing in too small numbers early in the war. Even the UK outproduced Germany by 1940. With Germany going into full scale war production no later than 1938 they might very well have defeated the USSR before the US involvement became too serious.

As for the Japanese, they never thought they could defeat the US. Instead they hoped to force the US to agree with there posession of conquerred territories. The japanese didn't expect (and could not have known) the US would make a comeback so soon (within 6 months).


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## drgondog (Feb 4, 2009)

I voted for Germany declaring war on US but Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor was truly the worst mistake for the Axis. 

Had Japan not attcked US it is not inevitable that we come into the war given the isolationist perspective. We had to be very angry and Japan achieved just the right 'tone' to set us off.


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## parsifal (Feb 6, 2009)

drgondog said:


> I voted for Germany declaring war on US but Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor was truly the worst mistake for the Axis.
> 
> Had Japan not attcked US it is not inevitable that we come into the war given the isolationist perspective. We had to be very angry and Japan achieved just the right 'tone' to set us off.



In fact DG, I would have to disagree with that. The Americans knew that their embargo was going to force the Japanese to pull the trigger, what came as a surprise was when the attack occurred, and its extensive nature (ie the attack on Pearl).

Rossevelt and his administration were expecting that the Japs would launch their attack around March or April of 1942, and would limit their attacks to the Philipinnes and Malaya. They believed that B-17s in the Philipinnes would have massive strategic effect, that would enable the Americans to implement their Plan Orange counterattack. Nobody took much notice of Claire Chennaults reports on types, tactics and pilot skills, all of which came as a major shock. The effect of the Zero, with its range, firepower and other performance characteristics, had, for a time, a strategic impact on the war in the pacific, though it of course was eventually defeated. 

I agree that the Japanese decision was national hari kari, and many Japanese officers mistakenly and grossly under-estimated US determination, however, it is also untrue to suppose that by 1941, the Japanese had any real choice about going to war. What was needed was a defeat of the Russians by Germany, and then a renewed focus in the Atlantic. If that had occurred, the Japanese may have gotten their negotiated settlemen t (though I doubt it).


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## Valo300 (Feb 10, 2009)

Thorlifter said:


> Which one do you guys thing was the worst blunder of WWII?


Besides actually starting the war to begin with, the dumbest move of WWII was launching operation Barbarossa before the Brits surrendered(not that they were ever likely to in any case).


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## jag.rosso (Jul 18, 2009)

this is my thinking....i am from germany....
the best hitler had done was to declare usa the war.this usa troops was the onlyone who was able to stop the russian invasion in middle of germany.without them the red army will stop at atlantic coast and get hole europe.this usa troops let the people in west berlin survife...bring us freedom+democraty...and helped and allowed us to build a new germany!!!
biggest blunder???
-let 200K-300K british soldiers getting home in calais
-not directly attack england after wining in france (wait until england industry was able to create a modern high tech army)
-starting operation barbarossa 2 month later than planed (because of helping bullshit italy troops by attack greece)...the result was that the hard winter coming before the wehrmacht arrive at river wolga
-japanese attack usa instead of attack russia from the second side (nice friends ;-( )
-but the biggest blunder was the person hitler who think he is a god of strategy and not listen what the really super german gernerals say to him by stategy of war
-and wy a third front in **** north africa

that´s my thinking
sorry for my bad english
andre


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## Njaco (Jul 18, 2009)

Your English is fine and you made some good points.

My opinion is the NA problem was not totally invading Malta.


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## jag.rosso (Jul 18, 2009)

ok,malta???i not really understand this operation.maybe one of many black outs from adolf.but not a place where you can win or loose a world war.
we loose this war by attacking our "friends" russia.
our "achse" germany-russia-japan-italy-rumania etc. together.....nobody in the world in this time would be able to stop this gigant army.europe-asia-africa....not really big problem for this "achse".
also the usa was for sure nervous about the menpower and technology of this achse.
thanks god the history take another way and i was borned in the middle of 60tis in nice-rich and free west germany.our poor friends in east germany would have more 45 years dictatur+terrorism by the communists before they can feel the freedom there.
and if hitler get a little time more for building rockets and the a-bomb......good night to the world.
so in the end germany was the big looser of this ww2....but.....today 2009 i will say good that we loose.
this loosing war bring us the chance to build a new free germany........and we take this chance well!!!!
cheers to my friends oversea
andre

ps: sorry to me,but to say the true i am a little bit proud what biiiig history our small country bring to the world..........i am natioanalist...not nazi!!!!!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 18, 2009)

Interesting points. 

Where in Germany are you from?


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## BombTaxi (Jul 18, 2009)

In some respects, Malta was a win/lose point in the war. Take Malta, you take the RN out of the Eastern Med, and supply lines to Axis forces in NA are saved, while Allied lines are cut. The Allie are ejected from NA, and the idea of the Japanese and Germans meeting up in Iran becomes slightly more feasible - at any rate, it gives Germany the chance to seize much needed oil reserves while denying the same to the Allies. That would have seriously altered the course of the war - can you imagine how the Battle of the Bulge could have gone had the Germans actually had the fuel available to mount a proper Blitzkreig?


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## Freebird (Jul 18, 2009)

jag.rosso said:


> *biggest blunders???*
> -let 200K-300K british soldiers getting home in calais yes
> 
> 
> ...




Good points!


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## plan_D (Jul 19, 2009)

I could never pinpoint the greatest blunder of the war; a war is made up of mistakes - the side with the fewest wins. 

For Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attack can't really be considered a blunder in military terms. The strike was excellent, surprising and, to a degree, crippling. Of course the U.S recovery was short, given our hindsight, but 6 months is a long time in war - and it's all credit for the U.S industry. Just remember the Taranto attack by the Royal Navy which in terms of destruction was no greater than Pearl Harbour but so much more effective due to Italy being much less capablet to cope. Of course, the IJN could have wreaked more havoc with concentrated attacks on fuel depots and communication targets (and hunting the carriers) but as port strikes go - it's the best in history. 
Maybe you could see the U.S side of Pearl Harbour as a blunder because they allowed themselves to be in that position. Looking back we can say that the Japanese should have never been allowed to be in a such an advantageous position on the day; given the events after Pearl Harbor though, the day becomes irrelevant in military terms. 

As for German blunders; they're in their hundreds. Allowing the BEF to escape has never been a blunder in my eyes; the German logistical situation was stretched at best - pushing that far, that fast was excellent going (especially against the largest military in Western Europe). Imagine, though, the logistical nightmare dealing with all the troops that would be captured. At the time, allowing the troops to leave instead of risking lives at the end of their supply was a good choice. The politics of it are a front, in my opinion. The fact that those men went on to fight later in the conflict would have been irrelvant if the Germans had not tripped up in Russia. Just a quick nit-pick also, the BEF escaped through Dunkirk - not Calais, which fell the day before the Dunkirk evacuations started. 

The German aid in the Balkans was a mistake of the Italians, who were a hinderance to the German war effort by attempting to extend their empire. Greece was a required element to remove the British from the continent, but Yugoslavia was really the time waster. By postponing the invasion of the Soviet Union by 6 weeks it really slowed the German advance during the later stages of 1941; however, even with that delay it was mistakes during the invasion period that cost them that winter - diverting forces away from Moscow and not allowing Guderian to pull back from Tula to prepared defences in Smolensk were the two great blunders of that year - if the Wehrmacht had concentrated their forces in the summer and then pulled back in winter; Moscow would have been under the Swastika by Spring '42; instead they were pushed away in the winter ice and snow, and couldn't recover.


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## jag.rosso (Jul 19, 2009)

yes malta was for sure the end of NA operation.second point is that we must take too much material from there to help our wehrmacht in east front.
but all this is the result of not attack england.
they not have war on their teritory (ok,some bombs+rockets)and was able to build such a strong army and send them far away from their country to fight against german.
if we really direct after getting france attack england....you will meet no british soldier in NA and rommel would be able to make a fast blitzkrieg there.
and the usa would have no place in europe to help+bring goods there.
oil of course also a big problem.....but minimum the same problem to transport oil to our troops far away in russia...no streets...no train...partisans...and extremly weather.....not good for blitzkrieg strategy.

i am living in city bochum...ruhrgebiet...german´s biggest industrie area....completly bombed in war.(70 kilometer away from cologne)


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## Hop (Jul 20, 2009)

> In some respects, Malta was a win/lose point in the war. Take Malta, you take the RN out of the Eastern Med, and supply lines to Axis forces in NA are saved, while Allied lines are cut. The Allie are ejected from NA, and the idea of the Japanese and Germans meeting up in Iran becomes slightly more feasible - at any rate, it gives Germany the chance to seize much needed oil reserves while denying the same to the Allies.



Taking Malta wouldn't have made that much difference to the Med. Whilst the Germans would lose less supplies en route to NA, the British would be spared the burden of supplying Malta. There would be very little effect on the RN in the eastern Med, apart from removing one of their most dangerous duties.

Supplies for the allies in Egypt went around Egypt and up through Suez, so very little effect from losing Malta.

And even if the Germans had taken Egypt, going from there to the oil fields was beyond them. It's 700 miles from the shores of the Med to the oil fields. It would be like NA all over again, the Germans at the end of a long, tenuous road link and the British close to bases well supplied by sea.

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## Civettone (Jul 21, 2009)

plan_D said:


> I could never pinpoint the greatest blunder of the war; a war is made up of mistakes - the side with the fewest wins.
> 
> For Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attack can't really be considered a blunder in military terms. The strike was excellent, surprising and, to a degree, crippling. Of course the U.S recovery was short, given our hindsight, but 6 months is a long time in war - and it's all credit for the U.S industry. Just remember the Taranto attack by the Royal Navy which in terms of destruction was no greater than Pearl Harbour but so much more effective due to Italy being much less capablet to cope. Of course, the IJN could have wreaked more havoc with concentrated attacks on fuel depots and communication targets (and hunting the carriers) but as port strikes go - it's the best in history.
> Maybe you could see the U.S side of Pearl Harbour as a blunder because they allowed themselves to be in that position. Looking back we can say that the Japanese should have never been allowed to be in a such an advantageous position on the day; given the events after Pearl Harbor though, the day becomes irrelevant in military terms.
> ...


I agree on Italy and Japan. But I disagree what you say about Calais. There are contemporary reports which said that they still had oil and 'gusto' to go on. The units were surprised that suddenly they were ordered to halt the offensive even though the enemy was in disarray. In any sense, it's simply impossible that the whole army around those British/French forces would suddenly all have run out of juice. What's more, what about the infantry units that were mainly horse drawn. Oh wait, that's most of them... 
Also, it's quite unlike the German High Command to order troops to stop because of fuel shortages. Or to stop for any reasons. They expected the impossible from their units. They expected the impossible from the Luftwaffe. And that's where it went wrong.

One can say that the Germans made hundreds of blunders. But few of them were military. Almost all of them were political and racially or ideologically inspired. And THAT's why the Germans lost the war. 

Kris


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## carbonlifeform (Jul 22, 2009)

Geeez, the biggest blunder? There are sooooo many to choose from but for me, it's gotta be the invasion of Russia. The invasion itself wasn't dumb as a good number of Russian soldiers happily surrendered in the beginning. They didn't wanna fight for Stalin. The blunder was the other war the SS was carrying on behind the lines. Burning villages and murdering the inhabitants. This greatly strengthened the Russian soldiers resolve. They were no longer fighting for Stalin and communism, they were fighting for their homes and families and friends.

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## Clay_Allison (Jul 22, 2009)

Attacking all three of Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus Mountains was the mistake that cost Germany the war. Cutting off Russian fuel and taking it for themselves on top of taking the strategic high ground overlooking North Africa would have been a war-winning victory that would have forced the Allies to the negotiating table.


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## carbonlifeform (Jul 22, 2009)

plan_D said:


> I could never pinpoint the greatest blunder of the war; a war is made up of mistakes - the side with the fewest wins.
> 
> For Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attack can't really be considered a blunder in military terms. The strike was excellent, surprising and, to a degree, crippling. Of course the U.S recovery was short, given our hindsight, but 6 months is a long time in war - and it's all credit for the U.S industry. Just remember the Taranto attack by the Royal Navy which in terms of destruction was no greater than Pearl Harbour but so much more effective due to Italy being much less capablet to cope. Of course, the IJN could have wreaked more havoc with concentrated attacks on fuel depots and communication targets (and hunting the carriers) but as port strikes go - it's the best in history.
> Maybe you could see the U.S side of Pearl Harbour as a blunder because they allowed themselves to be in that position. Looking back we can say that the Japanese should have never been allowed to be in a such an advantageous position on the day; given the events after Pearl Harbor though, the day becomes irrelevant in military terms.
> ...



Pearl Harbour wasn't a US blunder. Roosevelt knew the attack was coming. British decrypters had broken the Japanese Naval codes and Churchill had given Roosevelt 7 weeks warning.I contend that Pearl Harbour was intentionally sacrificed to get a very unwilling American population involved in the war. Kinda curious that the entire Pacific Fleet was moored there EXCEPT, the carriers. The one ship type most needed to defeat Japan.

I gotta agree with you about the German blunders tho. That's what happens when you have a syphilis affected megalomaniac at the helm of one's military. Hitler's drastic decisions could read like a comedy of errors, if war wasn't so horrible.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 22, 2009)

carbonlifeform said:


> Pearl Harbour wasn't a US blunder. Roosevelt knew the attack was coming. British decrypters had broken the Japanese Naval codes and Churchill had given Roosevelt 7 weeks warning.I contend that Pearl Harbour was intentionally sacrificed to get a very unwilling American population involved in the war. Kinda curious that the entire Pacific Fleet was moored there EXCEPT, the carriers. The one ship type most needed to defeat Japan.


Hogwash.

My wife's grandfather was a Cryptographer on MacArthur's staff and was stationed in the PI prior to the start of WW2 and had access to the most sensitive intelligence information prior to the start of the war. He witnessed first hand communications between Washington, Pearl Harbor and the Philippines prior, during and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The only Japanese codes broken by anyone on the allied side prior to hostilities were diplomatic codes. In his book "Surviving the Day" he documents this on several occasions. The allies knew for the longest time that something was coming but where and when was the real question. Despite wanting a way to get into the war, Roosevelt was not going to "sacrifice" anything in the manner described as there would have been too many witnesses to the intelligence traffic that would have sounded the alarm before and after the attack.

Conspiracy theories are easy ways out to explain the seemingly preventable. Bottom line, the US was plain and outright skunked by the Japanese and we initially got our butts kicked.

BTW my wife's grandfather? He stated if he knew of any type of plan to "allow" the Japanese to attack or invade anywhere in the Pacific, we would have taken himself and his wife out of the PI. Instead they were both captured on Bataan and spent over 3 years as a POW.


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## jag.rosso (Jul 22, 2009)

carbonlifeform said:


> Geeez, the biggest blunder? There are sooooo many to choose from but for me, it's gotta be the invasion of Russia. The invasion itself wasn't dumb as a good number of Russian soldiers happily surrendered in the beginning. They didn't wanna fight for Stalin. The blunder was the other war the SS was carrying on behind the lines. Burning villages and murdering the inhabitants. This greatly strengthened the Russian soldiers resolve. They were no longer fighting for Stalin and communism, they were fighting for their homes and families and friends.




excellent point......
in the beginning the wehrmacht get flowers and food from the people in russia ukraine etc.they was happy that somebody kick away stalin facists.many russians wanted to fight with the wehrmacht against stalin...but hitler said no!!but than ss arrive and show them another face of german army.so a big partisan problem start.

two differnet armys ( wehrmacht--ss ) who fight two differnt wars for the same regime and not really work together was a big big blunder in my eyes.

andre


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## Clay_Allison (Jul 22, 2009)

Invading Russia was not a blunder, attacking Moscow and Stalingrad was the blunder. If they had focused their entire strength on the Caucasus Mountains they could have destroyed Russian Industry in its infancy, denying them fuel and taking the oil for themselves. In addition they'd have flanked North Africa and been in position to drive the British from Egypt.


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## carbonlifeform (Jul 22, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Hogwash.
> 
> My wife's grandfather was a Cryptographer on MacArthur's staff and was stationed in the PI prior to the start of WW2 and had access to the most sensitive intelligence information prior to the start of the war. He witnessed first hand communications between Washington, Pearl Harbor and the Philippines prior, during and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The only Japanese codes broken by anyone on the allied side prior to hostilities were diplomatic codes. In his book "Surviving the Day" he documents this on several occasions. The allies knew for the longest time that something was coming but where and when was the real question. Despite wanting a way to get into the war, Roosevelt was not going to "sacrifice" anything in the manner described as there would have been too many witnesses to the intelligence traffic that would have sounded the alarm before and after the attack.
> 
> ...



Perhaps your wife's grandfather wasn't privy to communications between London and Washington since he was stationed in the Phillipines??? 
Look, sometimes leaders make those kind of sacrifices for the greater good. Churchill did something similar during the Blitz. British codebreakers had discovered the city of Coventry was the next target. Churchill chose NOT to warn the populace so he wouldn't give away the fact they had broken the Luftwaffe's codes.
That knowledge was more important to the war effort than warning civilians of an impending raid. The entire British cryptology community wasn't told at the time either. It was kept VERY hush hush.
The British knew what was going to happen in the Pacific as well, and when. Why do you think they spent the weeks leading up to the December attacks, trying desperately to reinforce their holdings?
I'm not condemning Roosevelt or trying to demonize him. I just think he did what he thought was necessary to get the US population riled up enough to really wanna get involved cuz before Dec.7th, the average American couldn't care less.
I don't believe in conspiracy theories and I don't believe everything I hear. I believe in probability. I reached my own conclusions based on numerous factors gleaned from studying the whole event for over 20 years and the fact that too many coincidences adds up to no coincidence. 
I'm not trying to diminish the terrible losses at Pearl either. I've even been to the USS Arizona Memorial to pay my respects even tho I'm not American. No matter which side of the coin you look at it from, it was a very dark day for the US Pacific Fleet and it's sailors.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 22, 2009)

carbonlifeform said:


> Perhaps your wife's grandfather wasn't privy to communications between London and Washington since he was stationed in the Phillipines???


 Yes he was - he had one of the highest IF NOT THE HIGHEST security clearances in the South Pacific and would report directly to MacArthur and saw communication not only from the SWP, but from other channels, communications with Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Remember these places along with the Philippines were attacked right after Pearl Harbor, so you're going to tell me that these places were sacrificed too? Again there was heavy intelligence communication through out the SWP in the days leading up to Pearl Harbor but there was no inkling on where and when the attack was going to happen. There were at least two other men who he worked with who were privy to the same information and held similar clearances and I believe at least one of them perished on the Bataan Death March.



carbonlifeform said:


> Look, sometimes leaders make those kind of sacrifices for the greater good. Churchill did something similar during the Blitz. British codebreakers had discovered the city of Coventry was the next target. Churchill chose NOT to warn the populace so he wouldn't give away the fact they had broken the Luftwaffe's codes.
> That knowledge was more important to the war effort than warning civilians of an impending raid. The entire British cryptology community wasn't told at the time either. It was kept VERY hush hush.


You're talking a raid vs. the demolition of an entire Navy and if that was the case Roosevelt would have had no control of the carrier fleet being removed from Pearl


carbonlifeform said:


> The British knew what was going to happen in the Pacific as well, and when. Why do you think they spent the weeks leading up to the December attacks, trying desperately to reinforce their holdings?


The only thing the British knew, like the Americans, that something was going to happen. This is well documented in the book "Bloody Shambles" as well as in my wife's grandfather's book as well.



carbonlifeform said:


> I'm not condemning Roosevelt or trying to demonize him. I just think he did what he thought was necessary to get the US population riled up enough to really wanna get involved cuz before Dec.7th, the average American couldn't care less.


He would not have sacrificed a portion of his navy, almost his entire battleship force and gamble with his carriers to do so, sorry..



carbonlifeform said:


> I don't believe in conspiracy theories and I don't believe everything I hear. I believe in probability. I reached my own conclusions based on numerous factors gleaned from studying the whole event for over 20 years and the fact that too many coincidences adds up to no coincidence.


Coincidences or facts - you show me facts - other cryptographers, messengers, diplomats who could support your cvlaims an I'll believe it. Something like that would not and could not have been hushed up for long and it would have been a matter of time before someone who had access to that information would have leaked it to Roosevelt's political adversaries. Sorry, but it seems your research does not include an understanding of the people in the US intelligence corps, how they worked and how many of them would of had access to this type of information if it had existed.



carbonlifeform said:


> I'm not trying to diminish the terrible losses at Pearl either. I've even been to the USS Arizona Memorial to pay my respects even tho I'm not American. No matter which side of the coin you look at it from, it was a very dark day for the US Pacific Fleet and it's sailors.


We'll I've been there - several times, as a civilian and as a member of the US Navy and I could tell you you're entitled to your opinions about this. Until you could produce proof and show evidence in the form of communication or even eye witnesses (someone who was actually there, like my wife's grandfather) this is nothing more than a conspiracy theory.


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## Hop (Jul 22, 2009)

> Look, sometimes leaders make those kind of sacrifices for the greater good. Churchill did something similar during the Blitz. British codebreakers had discovered the city of Coventry was the next target. Churchill chose NOT to warn the populace so he wouldn't give away the fact they had broken the Luftwaffe's codes.
> That knowledge was more important to the war effort than warning civilians of an impending raid. The entire British cryptology community wasn't told at the time either. It was kept VERY hush hush.



That's a myth as well. RV Jones was involved in countering the German guidance beams. They knew an attack was coming, they knew it was aimed at one of 3 targets, "Umbrella" (Birmingham), "All One Price" (Wolverhampton) or "Korn". They had no idea which of the 3 targets was to be selected, or what the codename "Korn" referred to. On the night of the Coventry raid the consensus among those in the know was that none of the 3 targets was going to be attacked and it would be another raid on London.

After the raids on Birmingham and Coventry they worked out the next raid was to be on Wolverhampton and Jones spoke to the head of Anti-Aircraft Command, who moved extra flak batteries to defend Wolverhampton. The raid never happened. After the war Jones interrogated senior Luftwaffe officers who said they had cancelled the big attack on Wolverhampton because they had spotted the big concentration of flak guns in the area and realised the British had found out about the attack.

So not only do those involved say they did not know of the Coventry raid in advance, when they did know about Wolverhampton action was taken. Why Wolverhampton if not Coventry?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 22, 2009)

Civettone said:


> One can say that the Germans made hundreds of blunders. But few of them were military. Almost all of them were political and racially or ideologically inspired. And THAT's why the Germans lost the war.
> 
> Kris



I think that sums it up very well. The Germans had the military power to win the war up until Barbarossa. Political blunders (many of them ideological and racially inspired) blew it for them.

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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2009)

The idea that the Pacific Fleet was served up as a sacrificial lamb is not supported by any serious analysis that I know of. Costello in his book "Pacific War" goes into some detail about this. Though it was written at a time that some of the decypts were still classified, he takes the view that the Americans knew something was coming, and surmised that the main attack was likely to fall in the far east. The attack on Pearl came as a complete surpise. 

Another problem was the US command system. The information gleaned from the US decrypts was not properly circulated, so even though the the information was there, it was not having much effect on command decisions.

I agree with Joe, conspiracy theories are a convenient cop out for what was really a much bigger systemic failure in the US military. They just did not know how to use and take advantage of their intelligence advantages before the war. The same criticisms can be levelled at the Russians because of their failure to heed the numerous warning they had received about the impending German attack in 1941.

Perhaps the greatest failure for the US before Pearl was a gross underestimation of the Japanese. They believed that the Japanese possessed inferior aviators, that their equipment and training was inferior to the west, that they lacked the iniitiative, organization skills and military prowess to undertake a successful attack on the US. They under-estimated the audacity of the Japanese and their minute attention to detail. They seriously expected to halt the Japanese at the beaches of the PI, and that the B-17s based in the Far East would deal a crushing blow to the Japanese navy and the home islands factories if the Japanese were foolish enough to attack. They believed that they could outfight the Japanese fleet at night, that cruisers were there to protect destroyers, that radar would solve all battle problems at sea, that convoys were not needed, and that the US Pacific Fleet would have a relatively easy time fighting its way across the pacific in a matter of days. None of these assumptions were correct.....it was a classic case of under-estimating ones enemy, and over estimating ones own abilities.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 22, 2009)

parsifal said:


> The idea that the Pacific Fleet was served up as a sacrificial lamb is not supported by any serious analysis that I know of. Costello in his book "Pacific War" goes into some detail about this. Though it was written at a time that some of the decypts were still classified, he takes the view that the Americans knew something was coming, and surmised that the main attack was likely to fall in the far east. The attack on Pearl came as a complete surpise.
> 
> Another problem was the US command system. The information gleaned from the US decrypts was not properly circulated, so even though the the information was there, it was not having much effect on command decisions.
> 
> ...



Parsifal, you hit the nail on the head and many of your points were mentioned by my wife's grandfather. He worked with excellent code breakers and at the start of the war immediately started cracking Japanese codes and setting up code systems that the Japanese couldn't touch. After that the Intel sometimes languished in a sea of protocol and red tape and he stated his frustration the whole time the PI was being overrun.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2009)

The blunder was there alright, but it was not a deliberate "mistake" if you get my drift. What is amazing is the speed that the US learnt how to win. Another furphy (ie mistake) is to assume that the US won by superior industrial might alone. This was certainly a part of it, but they also won by learning the trade so to speak. 

The Americans started the war as rather poor jungle fighters. But they listened and learned and watched very carefully, and by wars end were as good or better than any of the other players. Thats just one example. There are dozens to pick


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## Messy1 (Jul 22, 2009)

Agree with your post 391 100% Parsifal! Under estimating the Japanese I feel was the main contributor to Pearl Harbor. Warnings that something was coming, and those that thought that PH might be the target, went unheeded.


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## dennis420b (Jun 27, 2010)

I had to go with Stalingrad, because you don't use armor to go through a city, you encircle it. And I didn't pick the invasion of the USSR, as that front was bound to open up, better to do it on your terms. But I believe delaying Kursk was the biggest blunder. I have to believe that Manstein could have crushed the salient and at least then those units spearheading the counterattack would be pressed to stop another breakout, if he could have acted on schedule . Perhaps 43 ends up a draw and maybe Stalin seeks a cease fire. eh, who knows.


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 7, 2018)

Thorlifter said:


> I'll have to go with Operation Market Garden. I wanted to go with Pearl Harbor because that is what got the U.S. mobilized and lit the fires in the production plants. But if the carriers were at Pearl, it's would have been trouble. Sure you can point out the oil fields were mostly ignored, but other than that, Pearl was a pretty successful attack.
> 
> Operation Market Garden was a cluster F from the word go.


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 7, 2018)

Thorlifter said:


> Which one do you guys thing was the worst blunder of WWII?


Operation Market Garden. Ike was caught between a rock and a hard place about Montgomery: What he did against Rommel in Africa did not mean he could lead a multi-national Allied force, combining Airborne, Group and Armored Divisions into a conquest of Holland and thus into Germany, preserving the vital bridges. If Ike hadn't held a grudge against his best Field Commander, George Patton, and had studied the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, where Patton outflanked and outmaneuvered Montgomery's troops-hands down, as seen with Messina-- Marshall and FDR picked Ike, a junior officer to Patton until the US entered the war in Europe, because he was more "flexible" in his dealings with the British Command, Patton's biggest deficit in a multi-national alliance was his lack of tact and diplomacy--

When the SHTF in Dec. 1944 in Europe- Montgomery, the "genius" behind Market Garden, told Ike he could get to Bastogne in several weeks- Patton was already in motion-the rest is history.

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## pbehn (Jan 7, 2018)

The failure of Market garden to be completely successful only didn't shorten the end of the war in Europe.


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 14, 2018)

pbehn said:


> The failure of Market garden to be completely successful only didn't shorten the end of the war in Europe.


True-- I can only wonder what Hitler and the OKW remaining Officer Corps he retained after the July 1944 ill=fated bombing at the Wolf's Lair thought about that Fubared Op., and if so, how did it influence the German "Autumn Mist" attack in the Ardennes that started on 16 Dec. 1944, and caught the Allied Forces by surprise, General George S. Patton being the exception here.


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## parsifal (Jan 17, 2018)

Ive fought Market Garden on the sand table at staff college. I was the lucky SOB given command of the irish guards, tasked with flying down hells highway to relieve the paratroopers. our paratroop force had elected to drop in the DZ adjacent the town, rather than the DZ some miles from the target. it helped, but the incessant attacks along that highway made the job of my relief force almost impossible, much as it was historically.

monty was the ideal general for the british army of 1944. by that time the british were out of men. there were no replacements left. Every loss to the new BEF was a permanent loss. Consequently, every yard gained every little piece of resistance erncountered had to be utterly crushed before allowing the ground to be occupied. this was the only game the british army could play by 1944. monty understood it perfectly. these rules of engagement applied as much to the market garden operation as any. trouble was, these basic, unalterable rules of enagement also made the objectives of the operation impossible to meet.

monty's plan would have been great if it had worked, and would have materially shortened the war if it had. but it never had the slightest chance of success really, which makes all the more tragic really.

The worst defeat? no, not a chance. Dunkirk and Burma '42 were both worse. probably the greatest defeat for the british in WWII came at Singapore

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## Elmas (Jan 17, 2018)

Entry of Italy into the war. Mussolini believed the war, after the defeat of France, was over: not at all, the war was just starting...

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 17, 2018)

parsifal said:


> Ive fought Market Garden on the sand table at staff college. I was the lucky SOB given command of the irish guards, tasked with flying down hells highway to relieve the paratroopers. our paratroop force had elected to drop in the DZ adjacent the town, rather than the DZ some miles from the target. it helped, but the incessant attacks along that highway made the job of my relief force almost impossible, much as it was historically.
> 
> monty was the ideal general for the british army of 1944. by that time the british were out of men. there were no replacements left. Every loss to the new BEF was a permanent loss. Consequently, every yard gained every little piece of resistance erncountered had to be utterly crushed before allowing the ground to be occupied. this was the only game the british army could play by 1944. monty understood it perfectly. these rules of engagement applied as much to the market garden operation as any. trouble was, these basic, unalterable rules of enagement also made the objectives of the operation impossible to meet.
> 
> ...


 FWIF here- just googled a website devoted to WW2 History- They listed the "top ten" reasons why Hitler lost WW2- some of which are not relevant to aviation, but a few might pertain. Here are the ones I feel are relevant even yet today. (1) Have the Luftwaffe concentrate the bombing missions to the RAF bases, and to the chain of Radar towers- "The old expression: he who is forewarned is forearmed" applies here to the Radar advantage the RAF had, and which apparently Goering ignored.(2) Take the advice of his Generals and Field Marshalls-- as a Corporal in WW1- Hitler felt the enlisted soldier's distrust of the Prussian upper class who comprised 90% of the Officer Corps when he invaded Poland in 1939. (3) Accelerate the "Wunderwaffen" program, instead of waiting until late 1944, when the available supply of raw materials needed was almost "kaput"! (4) Waiting to invade Russia through Poland until the Japanese allies had agreed to also invade Russia- forcing Stalin to fight a 2-front war. Just a guess here, but think Japan would have to change their timetable for the attack on PH to make this 'jibe' with Hitler's June 22nd. 1941 op. Barbarossa--History can teach us many lessons, the cost of the tuition can be steep--Hansie

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## The Basket (Jan 21, 2018)

Odd to say Pearl Harbour was a disaster because from a military perspective it was successful with minimal losses.
The decision to go war with USA was political so the mistake was there. Although the politics in Japan was military so you know what I mean.
I don't think Midway was a military mistake either as the Japanese was simply caught out and unlucky. 
For s country as weak as Japan was to go to war with the USA was absolutely nonsense.

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 21, 2018)

The Basket said:


> Odd to say Pearl Harbour was a disaster because from a military perspective it was successful with minimal losses.
> The decision to go war with USA was political so the mistake was there. Although the politics in Japan was military so you know what I mean.
> I don't think Midway was a military mistake either as the Japanese was simply caught out and unlucky.
> For s country as weak as Japan was to go to war with the USA was absolutely nonsense.


Our ability to break the Purple Code the Japanese were using was a great advantage. And Adm. Nimitz's decision to have an uncoded message about the salt water treatment facilities being "kaput" from Midway, and the response over the Purple Code-- "AB" forewarned the USN. Darn shame the elevators were not functioning, as Adm. Spruance had to send the torpedo planes sans fighter escort- but the Japanese were indeed "caught with their pants down" when they were ordered to change from bombs (for the second strike on Midway) to torpedoes (for attacking potential American Naval vessels. History sometimes "turns on a dime"-- The USN was lucky at Midway, the Japanese were not.


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## pbehn (Jan 21, 2018)

The definition of blunder usually involves the word "stupid". Mussolini's insistence on joining Adolf in attacking the UK in 1940 must rank high up in the stupid territory. 20 aircraft lost and many more damaged dropping 54 tons of bombs on places like Harwich while at the same time RN Swordfish torpedo aircraft sank/damaged half of Benito's capital ships.

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## parsifal (Jan 21, 2018)

pbehn said:


> The definition of blunder usually involves the word "stupid". Mussolini's insistence on joining Adolf in attacking the UK in 1940 must rank high up in the stupid territory. 20 aircraft lost and many more damaged dropping 54 tons of bombs on places like Harwich while at the same time RN Swordfish torpedo aircraft sank/damaged half of Benito's capital ships.




With the benefit of hindsight, the entry of Italy into the war was a mistake, because of the very poor state of readiness of not just the armed forces, but indeed the whole country. Mussolini badly misread the mood of the nation, and badly over-estimated the capabilities of his own armed forces.

But Mussolini’s reading of the situation was not at fault, IF that decision is based solely on the cursory examination of the situation. Italy joined the war on the verge of the surrender of France, and Mussolini believed Hitler’s lies that Germany could meet the raw materials needs of Italy, and that Britain would capitulate after the fall of France. Neither of these pre-conditions were ever honoured or met. But then it gets even worse. At just about every juncture the germans patronised and lectured the Italians, goading Mussolini to make rash military decisions. This was the thinking behind the attack on Greece. The germans failed to consult properly over the invasion of Yugoslavia. The germans failed or did not bother to even advise the Italians about the invasion of the USSR.

Some of the bad tactical decisions were all of Mussolini’s making. Graziani’s advance into the western desert was the result of Mussolini’s incessant goading. The Italian army knew that it lacked the logistic support to undertake the invasion of Egypt properly. The deployment of the expeditionary force to assist in the attacks on England was another example of Mussolini’s folly, though it is a stretch and quite inaccurate to claim these aircraft might have made any difference to the outcome at Taranto. The Italians knew that the Med flt was at sea and was intending to attack the coastline. They had attacked the fleet several times from the air during its approach, with no effect. A few more bombers would not have altered that. Because the Swordfish attacked at night, the presence of a reinforced fighter group over the harbour would have made no difference. Italian fighters were ineffective at night. Nobody, least of all the Italians believed it possible for torpedoes to be launched into a harbour protected by anti-torpedo netting. The IJN watched that achievement by those 21 courageous Swordfish crews with keen interest. The Americans failed to heed the warning. So too the british, as a year later their battleship force in Alexandria was attacked and disabled by a handful of Italian frogmen.

The Italians did prove to be something of a paper tiger though one needs to be very careful not to accept many of the accounts completely at face value. They are often heavily biased…..the germans frequently try and shift as much blame as they can on their allies for mistakes that ultimately they themselves were responsible for. The British frequently was to paint a glorious chapter in their history books when in fact their performance was average at best. In both cases it served a useful purpose to paint the Italians in a worse light than they actually needed to.

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## swampyankee (Jan 21, 2018)

Elmas said:


> Entry of Italy into the war. Mussolini believed the war, after the defeat of France, was over: not at all, the war was just starting...



One wonders how the war would have changed had Italy remained neutral. First, rather obviously, it would free up a lot of RN resources, as they'd not have any worries about Suez. Germany wouldn't have had its sideshow in Greece and the Balkans but, on the other hand, there were about 300,000 Italian troops on Eastern Front, and Italian submarines operating out of Bordeaux -- there was never more than about 30 -- sunk about 500,000 tons of shipping in the Atlantic (in terms of exchange rates, Italian submarines were about 15% less effective than German, and there were also far fewer of them). The Luftwaffe also used Italian torpedoes (List of Torpedoes of Italy - NavWeaps) as German air-launched torpedoes were significantly less effective (why else use imports?)

Personally, I think that Germany would have been significantly worse off, if for no other reason than the RN would not need to keep many units in the Med and would have free use of the Suez Canal. Italy would have been far better off. Overall, had Mussolini not actively supported Hitler, he'd probably have gotten to retire without being riddled with bullets and hanged from a lamppost.

Italy had a lot of internal problems, many of them due to regional differences. For example, Sicilian, an Italian "dialect" and Venetian, another one, are not mutually comprehensible. Indeed, they differ more than Danish does from Swedish or Norwegian. 

Sources:

Battle of the Atlantic
BETASOM - Wikipedia
Italian participation in the Eastern Front - Wikipedia

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 21, 2018)

Parsifal and Swamp Yankee have the correct "gen" on Italy's limited part of the Axis Forces in the ETO- thanks to, in part, the "mutual admiration society" comprised of Mussolini and Hitler. Neither had previous military command experience in WW1, As both you gentlemen have said it all, I'll close with a quote from FeldMarschall Gerd Von Rundstedt: "Mussolini-all he thinks about is his ulcer, and his whore!"


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## Elmas (Jan 22, 2018)

When the war was looming Italo Balbo, whose name I do not need to explain in this Forum, was desperate: _“The Duce has never seen the thickness of a N.Y. phone book…”_ he used to say. He knew that Americans would not stay idle if a punch-up in Europe was in view.

After three costly wars in Spain, Abissynia and the reconquest of Lybia, after the sanctions from Society of Nations and consequent autarchy, after “_Quota 90_” ( an artificial imposed parity of 90 Lire for 1 Pound Sterling, something like the Euro of nowadays) the Italian economy was stranded, and with no raw materials nor energetic supplies in any quantity to declare the war was recklessness.

Mussolini was so excited and convinced that U.K. would try, somehow, to get out of the war that, after May 1940, there was even no need of Hitler to convince him.

Probably (and almost surely) the King Vittorio Emanuele III had a sort of mental disease, and so was not able to react in the right way to avoid the war.

But above all, the war in Italy was not felt. Twenty years before the Italians had seven hundred thousand dead in a war against Germans, with enormous sacrifices, and no one in Italy wanted a war, except a few fanatics.

Mussolini, once a young socialist, in a political speech once boasted: _"If God exists_" he said _"I'll give him a minute to struck me with a lightning!"_ looking ostentatiously at the watch.

God spent thirty years instead of a minute, a very reasonable time considering the divine standards.

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## swampyankee (Jan 22, 2018)

Elmas said:


> When the war was looming Italo Balbo, whose name I do not need to explain in this Forum, was desperate: _“The Duce has never seen the thickness of a N.Y. phone book…”_ he used to say. He knew that Americans would not stay idle if a punch-up in Europe was in view.
> 
> After three costly wars in Spain, Abissynia and the reconquest of Lybia, after the sanctions from Society of Nations and consequent autarchy, after “_Quota 90_” ( an artificial imposed parity of 90 Lire for 1 Pound Sterling, something like the Euro of nowadays) the Italian economy was stranded, and with no raw materials nor energetic supplies in any quantity to declare the war was recklessness.
> 
> ...



Vittorio Emanuele III may have been mentally ill — clinical depression is quite common — but he may also have felt that Mussolini would bring glory and respect to Italy by military conquest and internal order by suppression of dissent, especially things like labor unions. Agreeing with Il Duce’s goals was probably very common for VEIII and the people in his social circle. 

Realistically, Italy was not a great power; it would be better off remaining neutral. Until Hitler invaded the Tyrol.

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## Elmas (Jan 22, 2018)

Probably the desire of glory and respect for Italy were common between VEIII an Mussolini, and surely VEIII appreciated conquest and internal order, but to say that Mussolini and VEIII did appreciate or approvate each other is a bit of a stretch. VEIII and most of all, the Court, considered Mussolini a_ parvenu_, while Mussolini considered the Court a viper nest.
Many times, in the Count Ciano Diary, Mussolini is reported to have said about the Monarchy: _" ... how many good things I could do if I did not have to pull all these braked carriages..."_


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 22, 2018)

Elmas said:


> Probably the desire of glory and respect for Italy were common between VEIII an Mussolini, and surely VEIII appreciated conquest and internal order, but to say that Mussolini and VEIII did appreciate or approvate each other is a bit of a stretch. VEIII and most of all, the Court, considered Mussolini a_ parvenu_, while Mussolini considered the Court a viper nest.
> Many times, in the Count Ciano Diary, Mussolini is reported to have said about the Monarchy: _" ... how many good things I could do if I did not have to pull all these braked carriages..."_


Another possible factor in the demise of Mussolini lay in his overt persecution of the Mafia, especially in Sicily. Don Vito Genovese became allied with the American armed forces effort to drive Mussolini and the German forces out of Sicily, and later, the Italian mainland. And on the "homefront", the Eastern seaboard docks were controlled by "Lucky" Luciano's mob, and that "protection" from sabotage and longshoremen striking in wartime moved Luciano from Ossining prison to a lower State (NY) "country-club" minimum security prison, until 1946, when he was freed, on the condition that he went to Sicily and never re-entered the US.


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## Elmas (Jan 22, 2018)

Of course this is a personal point of view and I’m personally not a fan of “What if’s” but it could be that it was the sure knowledge that Italy would have entered the war that suggested to Churchill the famous speech of “Dunkerque” in front of the British Parliament, 4th June 1940.

With Italy into the war Suez, and with Suez Gibraltar, were in danger, and with Suez and Gibraltar the whole British Empire: so,if you have to lose all, then is worth to fight until the end.

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## Elmas (Jan 22, 2018)

Already said, but...

My Mother’s Dad was the Chief Engineer of the local narrow gauge railway and he used to say that, after some months of war, once exausted the coal stockpiles coming from Cardiff, they were compelled to use the local coal, with a percentage of 6% of Sulphur: and all this Sulphur in another couple of months completely destroyed the steam engines fire grids. And, as there was no iron to replace them, the steam engines had to be stopped. That in an Island with an invaluable strategic importance in the Med. A strange way to win a war.

My Father, as a youngster, was fascinated by Fascist propaganda but, as the war broke, he could not volunteer as he was just fourteen. But some of his older friends did, and when they returned from N.A., ill and wounded, the news they gave him were not all reassuring. _“We are overwhelmed”_ they said, _“we have no trucks, no food, we are infested by lice, while we see that British have <ogni ben di Dio>….”_ And that was well before 7th Dec, 1941. The italian logistics in the WWI were admirable, in comparison.

Many years ago I did go along with my Father in the Old Cemetery, and he stopped in front of some pictures in a wall. He indicated me one of those pictures: _“He was my best friend”_ he told me _“ we played soccer together. He voluntereed and embarked in a plane to go to N.A., but afterwards never was heard of him.”_

Far from being _Mare Nostrum_ Masters, isn’t it?

Certainly the war was far from being well conducted, but some blunders like the ARMIR in Russia (Italians in Russia? But what the hell we Italians were doing in Russia? Fighting a people who always demostrated to the Italians the greatest simpathy? Wassily Grossman in his _“Life and Fate”_ says _“Germans were very ill treated if they were caught by the populace. And Rumenians even worst. But Italians no, with Italians it was different…”_ I’ll have to write down a story about my sailing mate, Medaglia d’argento in the Russian campaign) were was sent, and lost, our best Artillery, were huge, but nothing in comparison to the main blunder, to enter the war.

Lucky Luciano? Could be, but the main reason is, strange it may sound to you, that Italians are quite realistic ( a little bit too much, sometimes…think to Niccolò Machiavelli...) and after losing Ethiopia and N.A., with food getting more and more scarce, with bombing of the cities every night more heavy, they completely realised, in the first months of 1943, that the war was over and there were no German tricks that could have changed things.

My Uncle, younger brother of my Grandad, was a Maggiore dei Carabinieri that worked with Prefetto Mori in Sicily in the ’30s against the Mafia. I still have some cousins in Palermo.

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## Freebird (Jan 22, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> Operation Market Garden. Ike was caught between a rock and a hard place about Montgomery: What he did against Rommel in Africa did not mean he could lead a multi-national Allied force,



You mean a multi national force, like the one Monty had in Africa or Italy? 




Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> combining Airborne, Group and Armored Divisions
> .



Like he did with Overlord?

.


> into a conquest of Holland and thus into Germany, preserving the vital bridges. If Ike hadn't held a grudge against his best Field Commander, George Patton, and had studied the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, where Patton outflanked and outmaneuvered Montgomery's troops-hands down, as seen with Messina
> .



Patton s army hooked around the Western side of the Allied advance, which wasn't as strongly defended, and beat Monty to Messina by what - an hour or So?
And you belive THIS is the criteria to be used for strategic considerations?

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 22, 2018)

freebird said:


> You mean a multi national force, like the one Monty had in Africa or Italy?
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 22, 2018)

freebird said:


> You mean a multi national force, like the one Monty had in Africa or Italy?
> 
> 
> 
> ...


 In Carlo D'Este's book about Patton, I believe he detailed that Sicilian campaign with both Monty's forces and Patton's. I deduced that Patton's strategy was not based on the same factors as was that of Monty, so perhaps it would be fair to say that Messina was a "touchstone" for Patton, a "milestone" for Monty. Ah, if only Patton hadn't slapped two soldiers in field hospitals, in front of witnesses, well who can say how the balance of the ETO campaign might have developed.??

Let me ad this quote about "Monty" by John C. McManus- in the 70th Anniv. D-Day issue of the WW11 magazine: "Britain's most successful and famous general in the ETO had a remarkable knack for angering and alienating others. A prickly personality, insufferable arrogance,and relentless self-promotion earned him a diverse array of enemies among professional peers of all nations. Eisenhower regarded him as his most contentious and difficult subordinate!"--

IMO, Monty, like many of his Sandhurst fellow high-ranking British Officers, were very "class conscious"--regarded Eisenhower as a Kansas farmboy, and Patton as a "cowboy" who chased Pancho Villa around Mexico on horseback- neither were "gentlemen"!! or "to the manor raised"-- Patton, like Monty and many high ranking German Generals, all were "prima donnas"- but Patton was a far better Field Commander, he lacked the political acumen that "Ike" developed in dealing with the British, and indirectly, with the Russians.


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## Guchi (Apr 25, 2022)

Starting WWII

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