# SBD Dauntless Discussion Group



## jernst (Sep 9, 2005)

I'm wondering if there might be any interest among members to participate in a YAHOO discussion group about the SBD Dauntless and it's variants?

Thanks.


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## evangilder (Sep 9, 2005)

There may be, but you could also start a thread for it here.


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## R Leonard (Sep 9, 2005)

I agree that you might be better off here. Most SBD action was in the Pacific and there are, in my experience, precious few who specialize in the Naval Aviation end of the Pacific War. To my all my friends here, that's not a slam on the somewhat Eurocentric bent of the conversations here, it is simply an observation that there is more interest in European operations than Pacific. I suspect were you to try to start up a Yahoo discussion group you would quickly find that there wouldn't be a whole lot of takers. If you look at some of the Yahoo groups you often find discussion groups with just two or three messages, one announcing the formation of the group and then a couple wondering where everybody went. Here you have an established group of aviation enthusiasts who are willing to discuss many topics, and even with the the greater interest in Europe, they have a, frankly as an almost exclusive Pacific War Naval Aviation interest type, myself, a refreshing and abundant knowledge on that theater that you really don't find in other forums. 

Rich


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## evangilder (Sep 9, 2005)

You are right, Rich. There is more about the European theater here, but I have been learning more about the Pacific lately and find it a fascinating piece as well. I am always open to learning new things about the Pacific.


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## jernst (Sep 9, 2005)

Thanks for your help and input guys. You're probably correct...there might be little interest in the SBD once the 'group' gets up and running.

john ernst


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## plan_D (Sep 9, 2005)

In my defence, I love learning about the CBI.


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## Wildcat (Sep 9, 2005)

The PTO has always interested me more as well.


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## jernst (Sep 9, 2005)

Hmm......should the group be a "PTO" discussion group......or "dive bomber' discussion group.....?

john ernst


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## syscom3 (Sep 9, 2005)

Start the thread and I will provide some pics I've taken of the SBD when its up in the air at the Chino airshows.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 9, 2005)

Ditto on all counts, I love the SBD! I WOULD OF LOVED TO BEEN A GUNNER!


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Sep 9, 2005)

i'd rather be the radio operator/gunner in an avenger, atleast you have a proper turret.........


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## jernst (Sep 9, 2005)

> Ditto on all counts, I love the SBD! I WOULD OF LOVED TO BEEN A GUNNER!



I'd love to think a SBD group could be viable. As suggested above, I'm not sure if SBD 'only' discussion can sustain a group for very long.

I'm thinking a 'Aircraft of the PTO" might have a better shot at making it.

Thoughts?

john ernst


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## syscom3 (Sep 9, 2005)

make it "aircraft and all things concerning the PTO".

Got me thinking of topics we could discuss.


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## R Leonard (Sep 9, 2005)

Yeah, but then I'd be forced to go to only one message group instead of the fun of cruising around looking at all. So many topics, so little time.

Rich


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## syscom3 (Sep 9, 2005)

Perhaps "carrier aircraft of the PTO". I know the brits had a carrier in the pacific for a few months. We could get to hear from them too.


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## Glider (Sep 9, 2005)

A carrier!!!, for a few months!!!. Try a number of carriers, in fact all we could spare from about July 1944 on including nearly all our Fleet Carriers. The RN formed a seperate task force under USN overall command but I cannot remember the Number we were given. I used to have a book on it but gave it up a number of years ago.

Maybe its not just us Europeans who can learn some new facts about the Pacific War


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 9, 2005)

Apparently not.

*British carriers of the PTO:* (that I can recall)

Fleet carriers:
- HMS Illustrious
- HMS Victorious
- HMS Formidable
- HMS Idomitable
- HMS Implacable
- HMS Indefatigable

Light carriers:
- HMS Colossus
- HMS Vengeance
- HMS Venerable
- HMS Glory

And a whole mess of CVE's as well. The real action for the Royal Navy in the Pacific didn't start until late 1944, November I believe, but they arrived in force.


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## evangilder (Sep 9, 2005)

I was thinking just one for a short time didn't seem correct, but I didn't know off the top of my head. Sounds like something for some serious study.


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## Glider (Sep 9, 2005)

Sounds about right. 
Being serious for a second I would welcome a thread on the the Pacific. It had so many firsts, I wouldn't know where to start and the scale of it just beggers the imagination, simply huge.


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## syscom3 (Sep 9, 2005)

I was reffering to early 1943 when the USN was down to 1 carrier in the SW pacific, and needed help from the RN untill the new Essex class carriers could be deployed. 

Of course we can also talk about the RN carrier groups at the later stage of the pacific war


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## R Leonard (Sep 9, 2005)

As you can no doubt guess, all of that works for me!

Rich


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 9, 2005)

Really? Who would've thought?


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## plan_D (Sep 9, 2005)

When the USN needed the RN? I see. You mean when the IJN diverted five of it's fleet carriers to the Indian Ocean to attack the Royal Navy there, giving the USN vital breathing space to lick it's wounds after Pearl Harbour. 

Is that enough?


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## syscom3 (Sep 9, 2005)

No. In early 1943, just after the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal, the USN had only one aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise. 

Roosevelt asked Churchill to release an aircraft carrier for a few months and put under direct command of Adm. Nimitz, to hold the line till the Saratoga and Essex became available.

That was really the only time the RN was in the SW Pacific untill late 1944.


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## plan_D (Sep 9, 2005)

It does not matter where it happened though. The Royal Navy may not have been in the South-West Pacific in force until 1944 but they still held up the Japanese. Or at least provided time wasting targets for the IJN. 

1943 was quite a vital year for the Atlantic. I wouldn't have given up one carrier!


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## NAVAIR (Sep 9, 2005)

The Dixie Wing of the CAF is currently flying this gorgeous SBD-5.






From the Dixie Wing webpage, copyright rules apply.

If you visit their website at http://www.dixiewing.org/aircraft/sbd/ you can download several videos of flight ops.

My regards,

NAVAIR
[/url]


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 9, 2005)

plan_D said:


> 1943 was quite a vital year for the Atlantic. I wouldn't have given up one carrier!


Actually, the Victorious operated in the Pacific for a time in mid 1943. She was sent to support USS Saratoga. I forget the exact details of the operation, but it lasted for a couple of months. Between May and June?

Oh R Leonard, where are you? 

Nice pic NAVAIR.


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## syscom3 (Sep 9, 2005)

I know the pics suck, but it was the best I could do. The folks at Chino couldn't control the early morning haze.

I will check my old photo albums to see if there are better ones that I can scan for you.


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## plan_D (Sep 9, 2005)

I was saying that I wouldn't have given up a single carrier, NS. And yes, RL, needs to be here to sort all of this out.


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## R Leonard (Sep 10, 2005)

okay . . .

HMS Victorious operations in the Solomons, 1943: After refitting at Norfolk Navy Yard (Portsmouth, VA) in the winter 1942-43, HMS Victorious (Capt. L.D. MacIntosh, RN) arrived at Pearl Harbor on 4 March 1943 in response to a December 1942 USN request for the loan of a carrier until the Essex class carriers started to be ready for combat duty. After re-equipping with US airplanes and a work-up period in Hawaiian waters, Victorious operated with USS Saratoga in the Solomons area from 17 May through 31 July, 1943. These carriers operated as TF-36 under RAdm DeWitt Ramsey, USN. There were no major sea engagements during this period. Most of the action was in the central Solomons with USN and USMC aircraft operating out of Cactus and Knucklehead. Saratoga and Victorious primarily served as a backstop against any possible sortie by Japanese carrier forces, though they did provide cover for the invasion of Munda. Many sources, books, and especially the internet, will throw out that Victorious was re-named USS Robin as a security precaution. My source, who was flying fighters in the vicinity in the same period reported that “Robin” was the radio call sign for Victorious. This later became a joke as the ship was referred to as USS Robin, but there was never anything official. (Which makes a little more sense, I can’t see the RN going along with re-naming one of their RN commanded and manned ships as USS anything) Others will report that this joint operation goes unmentioned in US histories, however, I’d point out that it is covered in the more thorough naval histories of the period. A quick random survey in my library of US type histories, grabbing just four off the shelf, the info appears in all four. Descriptions of the operations shows up as early as 1946 in volume 2 of Capt. Walter Karig's five volume "Battle Report' series, "Pacific War- Middle Phase". Also shows up in the German source, Rohwer Hummelchen's "Chronik des Seekriegs 1939-45" (Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945). 

and

OOB TF-37 during operations off the coast of Japan, July-August 1945 (all named are RN unless otherwise noted)

Commander Carrier Task Force 37 - VAdm Sir Bernard Rawlings, KCB, KBE

Implacable - Capt CC Hughes-Hallett, CBE
-38th Naval Fighter Wing - Lt Cdr RM Crosley, DSC (w/Bar)
--880 Squadron (Seafire) - Lt Cdr Crosley
--801 Squadron (Seafire) - Lt Cdr S Jewers, RNVR
--828 Squadron (TBM) - Lt Cdr FA Swanton, DSC
--1771 Squadron (Firefly) - Lt Cdr WRJ MacWhirter, DSC

Indefatigable Capt QD Graham, CBE, DSO
-24th Naval Fighter Wing - Lt Cdr NG Hallett, DSC (w/Bar)
--887 Squadron (Seafire) - Lt Cdr AJ Thomson, DSC, RNVR
--894 Squadron (Seafire) - Lt Cdr J Crossman, DSO, RNVR
--820 Squadron (TBM) - Lt FL Jones, DSC (w/Bar), RNVR
--1770 Squadron (Firefly) - Maj VBG Chessman, DSO, MBE, DSC, RM

Victorious Capt MM Denny, CB, CBE
-47th Naval Fighter Wing - Lt Col RC Hay, DSO (w/Bar), DSC, RM
--1834 Squadron (F4U) - Lt Cdr PN Charlton, DFC
--1836 Squadron (F4U) - Lt Cdr JB Edmundson, DSC
--849 Squadron (TBM) - Lt Cdr AJ Griffiths, RN

Formidable Capt P Ruck-Keene
-6th Naval Fighter Wing - Lt Cdr RL Bigg-Wither, DSC (w/Bar), RNVR
--1841 Squadron (F4U) - Lt Cdr Bigg-Wither
--1842 Squadron (F4U) - Lt Cdr DG Parker, DSC, RNVR
--848 Squadron (TBM) - Lt Cdr TGV Percy

King George V (FltFlg) Capt BB Schofield, CBE
ComCruSquad4 - RAdm EJP Brind, CB CBE
Newfoundland (FlgCruSqd4) Capt RW Ravenhill, CBE, DSC
-Black Prince Capt GV Gladstone
-Euryalas Capt RS Warne, CBE
-Achilles (RNZN) Capt FJ Butler, MBE
-Uganda (RCN) Capt ER Mainguy, RCN
-Gambia (RNZN) Capt RAB Edwards, CBE
Grenville (4thDesFlot) Capt RG Onslow, DSO
-Udine Cdr TC Robinson, DSC
-Urania Lt Cdr DHP Gardiner, DSC
-Urchin Lt Cdr AF Harkness, OBE, DSC, RD, RNVR
-Ulysses Lt Cdr BGB Bordes, DSC
-Undaunted Lt Cdr CER Sharp
-Quiberon (RAN) Cdr GS Stuart, RAN
-Quickwatch (RAN) Lt Cdr OH Becher, DSC, RAN
-Quality Cdr Viscount Jocelyn
-Quadrant Lt Cdr PC Hopkins
Troubridge (2DesFlot) Capt GF Burghard
-Tenacious Lt Cdr GC Crowley, DSC
-Termagent Lt Cdr DC Beatty, DSC
-Terpsichore Cdr RT White, DSC
-Teazer Lt Cdr TF Taylor, DSC

I could probably conjure up an OOB for TF-57 during the Okinawa campaign, but I don’t have one handy. It would be similar to the above.

Rich


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## R Leonard (Sep 10, 2005)

And also found

TF-37 Activity July and August 1945

Format is Date -- Strike Sorties -- CAP Sorties -- Tons of Bombs Delivered

18 Jul -- 51 -- 40 -- 10
24 Jul -- 284 -- 131 -- 93
25 Jul -- 175 -- 138 -- 46
28 Jul -- 237 -- 132 -- 85
30 Jul -- 192 -- 130 -- 66
9 Aug. -- 258 -- 137 -- 105
10 Aug. -- 227 -- 132 -- 90
13 Aug. -- 21 -- 42 -- 8
15 Aug. -- 17 -- 47 -- 1
TOTAL -- 1462 -- 929 -- 504

Rich


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## plan_D (Sep 10, 2005)

Oh, he works miracles. Excellent, Rich. B-E-A-utiful.


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## evangilder (Sep 10, 2005)

Once again, Rich, great info. Thanks


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 10, 2005)

He's a fountain on this stuff. Excellent.


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## syscom3 (Sep 10, 2005)

We could make another thread...."American carriers vs RN carriers, who was better"

That would bring out some opinions, heheheheheh


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 10, 2005)

That was discussed here not so long ago. Now that we have a lot of fresh faces around here, it might be interesting to see some more opinions.


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## trackend (Sep 10, 2005)

Well I just re-read War in a Stringbag by commander Charlie Lamb 
and he said the Eagles flight deck was so thin that if you jumped up and down it set off a sympathetic vibration on the other hand the Illustrious had three inches of amoured flight deck but when the Stukas reaked revenge for Taranto using amour peircing bombs it contained the fires and made them a real arsehole to tackle. but against convetional bombs and Kamikazi the amoured flight decks where very usefull in damage limitation.


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## syscom3 (Sep 10, 2005)

Didnt the USN think the unarmoured flight decks had one advantage in that they could be repaired very quickly? 

Question for you..... Did that 3" armoured flightdeck affect its sea handling in rough sea's? All that weight so high above the water, must have given the ship a high center of gravity.


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## Glider (Sep 10, 2005)

I don't know why the USA went fo the wooden deck and it may well have made it easier to repair in dock where you have the cranes and equipment to handle the timber. Unfortunately it didn't do anything to cntain the damage when the ship was hit. Hence they were able to take such damage.
The weight of the deck and the armoured sides to hanger (up to 4 inches) did have an effect and this was countered by only having one hanger deck not two as in other Fleet carriers which is why the nominal no of aircraft carried by the RN carriers was so much less than the USN carriers.
Our later carriers had a better balance retaining the Armoured deck but reducing the armour on the sides of the hanger to 1.5 inches which enabled us to go back to two hanger decks, helping to redress the balance to some degree.


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 10, 2005)

The Colossus class light carriers were essentially slightly smaller Illustrious class fleet carriers minus the added armour.


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## Glider (Sep 10, 2005)

The Colossus and Majestic classes were really good examples of someone sitting down with a problem and coming up with a pragmatic solution. Its an interesting story which I have outlined below.
The RN needed carriers and they needed them quickly. We didn't have the Naval shipyards to build sufficient numbers of large carriers. The CVEs which as we know were basically converted merchant ships were coming on stream, were serving well but were of course too small and slow.
So the design for the Colossus was finalised. 
The ships were built to Merchant Navy standards enableing them to be built in non naval shipyards. 
The non armour protection, compartmentation, damage control, sprinklers, fireproof curtains, ventilation etc was as good as the best but the armour was missing. 
The engines were standard destroyer engines and machinery for ease of supply
AA defense was very good but only short range. The carriers main AA defence was its aircraft, secondly its escort then its AA. They didn't carry any 20mm just 40mm and 2pdr. 20 mm lack the range to hit and destroy an attacking plane before it drops its weapons, hence the emphasise on the 40mm guns. 
As a result you had a small ship that could carry a good number of aircraft at speed to keep up with our capital ships of the time. It was also cheap and easy to produce.
Its a formula that worked as after the war a number were purchased by other countries.
France, Netherlands, Australia, Argentina, India, Brasil all bought examples.


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 10, 2005)

Canada too. We were loaned the Warrior for a time, of the Colossus class, and the Magnificent which was a Majestic class. We later bought one of the Majestics (the planned HMS Powerful) which was updated and commissioned as HMCS Bonaventure. Six Majestic class carriers were planned, but none were ever commissioned into the Royal Navy. The war ended and they were considered surplus to requirements.


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## syscom3 (Sep 10, 2005)

The more I read up on the Dauntless and the Helldiver, the more I appreciate the SBD.

Too bad the USN just didnt put in larger engines as an upgrade, and not waste time with the "2C"


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 10, 2005)

The SBD was also very maneuvable and scored Zero Kills, now here I go lighting the "fire," I read that an SBD empty, with a good pilot could trun INSIDE a Zero using it's dive brakes in the turn....

COMMENTS?!?


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## evangilder (Sep 10, 2005)

But what good would an empty plane do in a dogfight? Seriously, I suppose it is possible, but I would think it would be a bit foolhardy to mix it up with a Zero while flying an SBD.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 10, 2005)

evangilder said:


> But what good would an empty plane do in a dogfight? Seriously, I suppose it is possible, but I would think it would be a bit foolhardy to mix it up with a Zero while flying an SBD.



Sorry Eric, I should of said clean (no bombs). As far as mixing it up with a Zero, there were times I think SBDs didn't have a choice!


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## lesofprimus (Sep 10, 2005)

On the second day of the Battle of the Coral Sea, Lt. "Swede" Vejtasa was leading 4 of the 8 Douglas SBDs assigned anti-torpedo patrol duty. He suddenly found himself alone and under attack by 8 Mitsubishi Zeros. A wild dogfight ensued, with no quarter given by either side. Remembering lessons his skipper had emphasized, "Swede" defended himself. Turning into every attack, he was able to increase the angle of deflection for the enemy fighters and maneuver into position to use his own forward-firing .30 caliber guns. He downed three Zeros that day; but when the dogfight was over, only half of the SBDs returned to the USS Yorktown.


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## syscom3 (Sep 10, 2005)

I think one of the escape choices for the SBD if it had altitude, was to deploy the dive brakes and go vertical. The zero couldnt follow the plane down.


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## evangilder (Sep 11, 2005)

Wow, guys, amazing stories. I would have figured that an SBD would just try and beat feet outta there if attacked by Zeros. I guess there are times when you have to fight your way out.


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## syscom3 (Sep 11, 2005)

lesofprimus said:


> .....A wild dogfight ensued, with no quarter given by either side. Remembering lessons his skipper had emphasized, "Swede" defended himself........He downed three Zeros that day.......



No doubt he turned into the Zero's..... but I seriously doubt he got into a dogfight with them. Maybe he put some holes into the zero's when he had the chance, but to shoot down three? 

Think about it, a dive bomber dogfighting the most maneauverable fighter of that stage of the war?


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## syscom3 (Sep 11, 2005)

I found this unique pix I took at Chino this spring (2005).

TBM, Wildcat and SBD warming up for the mornings's fly by.


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## R Leonard (Sep 11, 2005)

> now here I go lighting the "fire," I read that an SBD empty, with a good pilot could trun INSIDE a Zero using it's dive brakes in the turn....




Oh, aren’t you an evil man  

I wouldn't touch that line with a 10 foot pole.

But, let’s talk about the SBD a little bit. The SBD first flew on August 1935 and entered service with VB-5 (Bombing Squadron 5) on April 11, 1938. The last SBD in US naval service was in the Pacific Fleet Pool and was stricken from service on September 30, 1945. The last of some 5,321 SBDs was delivered to the Navy in August 1944. SBDs were in combat from December 1941 into late July 1945. Pilots executing attacks from SBDs were solely responsible for sinking five aircraft carriers and were partially responsible for another carrier, a battleship, a cruiser and other smaller warships and numerous merchant vessels. 

Over the course of the war SBDs flew some 52,687 combat sorties. Of those, 6,048 were in Navy squadrons off aircraft carriers, 5,283 were in Navy squadrons based ashore, 40,872 were in Marine Corps squadrons, also based ashore, and another 484 sorties were from land based SBDs for which, for whatever reason, the post war Navy statisticians could not identify as definitively Navy or Marine Corps. Roughly 22,942 tons of bombs were dropped on targets in these sorties; 2,524 from carrier-based aircraft, 2,185 from USN land-based aircraft, 18,147 from USMC land-based, and the balance, 86 tons, from the unknown service group. 

In US service, SBD losses for the entire war in combat theaters were 654. These losses can be broken down several ways. USN carrier-based SBD losses in combat sorties were 40 to enemy AA fire and 43 to enemy aircraft for a total of 83 losses directly attributed to combat action. Also in the course of combat operations there were an additional 48 SBDs lost in operational accidents, giving us a total of 131 combat related losses, or 38.42% of all combat related losses with a loss per hundred combat sorties rate of 2.17. An additional 65 carrier-based SBDs were lost in non-combat flights. Another 35 were lost aboard ship, mostly in the losses of USS Lexington, USS Yorktown, USS Wasp, and USS Hornet.

USN land-based SBD losses in combat sorties were 17 to enemy AA fire and 12 to enemy aircraft for a total of 29 losses directly attributed to combat action. Also in the course of combat operations there were an additional 4 SBDs lost in operational accidents, giving us a total of 33 combat related losses, or 9.68% of all combat related losses with a loss per hundred combat sorties rate of 0.62. An additional 55 land-based SBDs were lost in non-combat flights. Another 19 were lost on the ground, most to Japanese naval and land gunfire and air raids on Guadalcanal and others to routine ground accidents.

USMC land-based SBD losses in combat sorties were 96 to enemy AA fire and 24 to enemy aircraft for a total of 120 losses directly attributed to combat action. Also in the course of combat operations there were an additional 56 SBDs lost in operational accidents, giving us a total of 176 combat related losses, or 51.61% of all combat related losses with a loss per hundred combat sorties rate of 0.43. An additional 104 land-based SBDs were lost in non-combat flights. Another 36 were lost on the ground, somewhat more than half of these to Japanese naval and land gunfire and air raids in the course of the Guadalcanal campaign and the balance to routine ground accidents.

Of the unknown service group, there was only one combat related operational loss, accounting for 0.29% of all combat related losses. This group had a loss per 100 combat sorties rate of 0.21.

In total, US naval service SBD losses in combat sorties were 153 to enemy AA fire and 79 to enemy aircraft for a total of 232 losses directly attributed to combat action. There were an additional 109 SBDs lost in combat related operational accidents, making a total of 340 combat related losses, or 52.06% of all SBD losses from all causes in combat theaters. Overall, the SBD had a loss per 100 combat sorties rate of 0.65. This rate was the second lowest for the major USN/USMC type aircraft, behind only the PBJ (0.36). Comparatively, though, 6.28 times more combat sorties than the PBJ.

As far as air to air results are concerned, we already know that some 79 SBDs were lost to enemy aircraft. The post war USN statistics report that aircraft carrier based, USN SBDs were credited with 106 enemy aircraft shot down, dividing these into 31 bombers and 75 fighters; this for 43 carrier-based air-to-air SBD losses. For USN land-based SBDs, credits were totaled at 10, all fighters versus 12 losses. I’ll come back to these numbers later. Land-based USMC SBDs were credited with 22, all fighters, in trade for 24 SBD losses. In sum, for the 79 SBDs lost in aerial combat, the Navy credited 138 enemy aircraft shot down in return, 107 fighters and 31 bombers. 

Of the 52,687 action sorties flown by SBDs only 464 actually involved engaging enemy aircraft in combat. Best estimates are that SBDs engaged a total of 78 bombers and 708 fighters. In those engagements we know that losses were 79, or 17% of those SBDs engaging in aerial combat. SBDs damaged, but not lost, in these encounters were 92 or 19.8%. These results can also be shown for USN carrier-based SBDs and in combination for land-based USN and USMC SBDs. 

Of the 6,048 action sorties flown by SBDs from carriers, 301 including engaging enemy aircraft in combat. SBDs were estimated to have engaged a total of 76 bombers and 357 fighters. In those engagements we know that losses were 43, or 14.3% of those carrier SBDs engaging in aerial combat. Carrier SBDs damaged, but not lost, in these encounters were 66 or 21.9%. 

Of the 46,639 action sorties flown by SBDs from land bases, 163 including engaging enemy aircraft in combat. Land-based SBDs were estimated to have engaged a total of 2 bombers and 351 fighters. In those engagements we know that losses were 36, or 22.1% of those land-based SBDs engaging in aerial combat. Land-based SBDs damaged, but not lost, in these encounters were 26 or 16.0%. 

In terms of anti-aircraft fire, 4,316 action sorties flown by carrier-based SBDs faced enemy AA fire or about 71.36% of all action sorties. We already know that this cost 40 aircraft or 0.93% of those carrier SBDs encountering AA fire. Another 257 carrier SBD’s were damaged, or 5.95%. On the average, about 13.47% of carrier SBDs hit by AA fire were lost. Land-based SBD action sorties facing enemy AA fire numbered 23,760 or about 51.48% of all sorties. We already know that this cost 113 aircraft or 0.48% of those land-based SBDs encountering AA fire. Another 918 land-based SBD’s were damaged, or 3.86%. On the average, about 10.96% of land-based SBDs hit by AA fire were lost. 

In total, 28,076 action sorties flown by SBDs encountered AA fire or about 53.29% of all action sorties. Enemy AA fire cost 153 SBDs or 0.54% of all SBDs encountering AA fire. A total of 1,175 SBD’s were damaged, or 4.19%. On the average, then, about 11.52% of SBDs hit by AA fire were lost. 

I can’t particularly comment on USMC SBD aerial victory claims as I have no other ready data the USN statistical studies. I have, though, looked at USN SBD aerial victory claims and can add to our body of knowledge on the subject. First of all, a review of the action reports (in USN/USMC parlance the ACA Report) shows that there is a slight discrepancy between the USN post war analysis and what we can count today. I believe the differences can be attributed to several causes, probably in combination: incomplete data in the original compilation, keying errors (the original 1946 analysis was done on some of the early punch card systems), and either a quality control miscue or a philosophical difference in what constitutes a credit. 

In any event, as we know from the post war statistical analysis, Navy SBDs, carrier-based and land-based, combined, were credited with 116 enemy aircraft shot down, 31 bombers and 85 fighters. Well, maybe not. Consider that if you count up the claims, this putting a squadron, name, date, time, enemy aircraft identification, and general location, you get a somewhat different answer. First of all, we need to divide the combat results in to three categories: actual credits, probable credits, and damaged; that is, shot down for sure, probably shot down, but can’t say for sure, and put some holes in it, but it got away or was lost from sight. 

When we make this analysis, we end up with something like 96 credits, 16 probables, and 17 damaged. If you were to add the 96 credits to the 16 probables you get 112, a difference of 4, or 3.45%, between the USN post war statistics and a modern look at the numbers. This is well within the average variance I’ve found of about 4.5%. This leads me to believe that in the post war statistics, at least for SBDs, probables were given credit as actuals. On the other hand, if you take all the shared credits (the .5 or .25 or .20 and so on where more that on aircraft was involved in a particular shoot down) and credit each as a full credit, lo and behold actual credits are suddenly up to 115 without considering the probables. In either case I suspect a lack of firm guidance in the original 1946 statistical compilation that allowed for either probables recorded as actuals or shared credits as whole, full credits.

Be that as it may, we can determine some interesting data in the combat results if we break them down further, for example, how many enemy aircraft were shot down by SBD pilots as opposed to radioman/rear gunners? Or exactly what were the enemy plane types shot down? 

SBD credit breakdown:

Shooter -- Actual Credits -- Probables -- Damaged 
Carrier Based Pilots: 41.0 -- 12.0 -- 16.0
Carrier Based Gunners: 52.0 -- 3.0 -- 1.0
Total Carrier Based: 93.0 -- 15.0 -- 17.0

Land Based Pilots: 0.0 -- 1.0 -- 0.0
Land Based Gunners: 3.0 -- 0.0 -- 0.0
Total Land Based: 3.0 -- 1.0 -- 0.0

All Pilots: 41.0 -- 13.0 -- 16.0
All Gunners: 55.0 -- 3.0 -- 1.0
Total: 96.0 -- 16.0 -- 17.0

This shows us that about 57.3% of actual credits for SBD shoot downs were given to the guys in the back seat.

Enemy types noted as shot down were:

Type -- Actual Credits -- Probables -- Damaged 
Mitsubishi Type 00 VF, A6M (Zeke): 55 -- 5 -- 14
Aichi Type 99 VB, D3A (Val): 8 -- 5 -- 3
Nakajima Type 97 VTB, B5N (Kate): 8 -- 0 -- 0
Mitsubishi Type 96 VF, A5M (Claude): 5 -- 2 -- 0
Mitsubishi Type 01 VB/VR, G4M (Betty): 5 -- 1 -- 0
Aichi Type 00 Float VSO, E13A (Jake): 3 -- 0 -- 0
Kawanishi Type 94 Float VSO, E7K (Alf): 3 -- 0 -- 0
Kawanishi Type 97 VP, H6K (Mavis): 2 -- 0 -- 0
Kawanishi Type 2 VP, H8K (Emily): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Mitsubishi Type 0 Float VSO, F1M (Pete): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Mitsubishi Type 99 VB(M), Ki-51 (Sonia): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Nakajima Type 2 Float VF, A6M2-N (Rufe): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Nakajima Type 95 Float VSO, E8N (Dave): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Unidentified Japanese Transport Aircraft: 1 -- 0 -- 0
Martin Type VB(M) DB.7 (Vichy French): 1 -- 0 -- 0
Kawasaki Type 03 VF, Ki-61 (Tony): 0 -- 2 -- 0
Nakajima Type 2 VF, Ki-44 (Tojo): 0 -- 1 -- 0

So, if we look at this list, that breaks down as:

Fighters: 61 -- 10 -- 14
Bombers: 23 -- 6 -- 3
Float Scout/Observers: 8 -- 0 -- 0
Flying Boats: 3 -- 0 -- 0
Unidentified: 1 -- 0 -- 0

Kind of a funny oddity in the post war statistics is that they tend to include float planes in the fighter category and flying boats in the bomber category. So, if we roll those numbers into the fighter and bomber categories we get:

Fighters: 69 -- 10 -- 14
Bombers: 26 -- 3 -- 6
Unidentified: 1 -- 0 -- 0

And if we add credits and probables together, that leaves us with 79 fighters and 29 bombers as shot down which is not all that far off from what was reported in the post war statistics, short 6 fighters and 2 bombers. And if we go the other way and record shared credits as full credits we end up with 77 fighters and 37 bombers and the single unidentified.

Anyway, fun with numbers.

By USN squadrons, SBD aerial scores looked like:

Squadron -- Credits -- Probable -- Damaged
VB-16 -- 19 -- 2 -- 13
VS-10 -- 13 -- 0 -- 0
VS-2 -- 10.5 -- 1 -- 0
VB-2 -- 6 -- 3 -- 0
VS-5 -- 6 -- 0 -- 1
VS-71 -- 6 -- 0 -- 0
VB-8 -- 5 -- 0 -- 0
VS-6 -- 5 -- 0 -- 0
VS-3 -- 3 -- 3 -- 1
VB-12 -- 3 -- 1 -- 2
VB-11 -- 3 -- 1 -- 0
VB-10 -- 3 -- 0 -- 0
VB-9 -- 3 -- 0 -- 0
VB-3 -- 2 -- 2 -- 0
VB-5 -- 2 -- 0 -- 0
VB-6 -- 2 -- 0 -- 0
VS-72 -- 2 -- 0 -- 0
VGS-29 -- 1 -- 0 -- 0
VS-8 -- 1 -- 0 -- 0
VB-13 -- 0.5 -- 3 – 0

My eyes are getting crossed. I’ll do some real work tomorrow to take my mind off all this and then maybe tomorrow night see if I can conjure up anything else interesting.

Regards,

Rich


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## syscom3 (Sep 11, 2005)

Do you know if Japanese records or eyewitness's correlate those claims of aircraft shotdown?


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## jernst (Sep 12, 2005)

> I’ll do some real work tomorrow to take my mind off all this and then maybe tomorrow night see if I can conjure up anything else interesting



Very interesting. Thank you Rich.


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## plan_D (Sep 12, 2005)

That was an excellent read, Rich. Thanks for taking the time.


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 12, 2005)

Yes indeed. Great post Rich.


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## evangilder (Sep 12, 2005)

Once again, Rich, great info!


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## R Leonard (Sep 12, 2005)

> Do you know if Japanese records or eyewitness's correlate those claims of aircraft shotdown?



Two parts . . . 

1. Do I know “. . . if Japanese records . . . correlate those claims of aircraft shot down?”

2.	Do I know “. . . if . . . eyewitnesses correlate those claims of aircraft shot down?”

For the first, no I have no such records at hand, nor do I read Japanese. In return, I’d ask if you have any such records that would disprove the credited claims? And, if you don’t have them either, what, exactly, would be your point? Certainly nothing you could prove, then, eh? And if you do have corresponding Japanese loss reports, please enlighten me, but, remember, facts, reports, and reasoned analysis, not just opinion.

Seriously, if you really want to go there, wouldn’t an equally obvious question be: Are there any US records that would corroborate any of the claims for such Japanese stalwarts as, say, their top 5 naval aces, Nishizawa Hiroyoshi (87), Fukumoto Shigeo (72), Sugita Sho-ichi (70), Iwamoto Tetsuzo (66), or Sakai Saburo (62) or their top 5 Army aces, Nakada Yoshihiko (45), Kamito Sumi (40), Anabuki Satoshi (39), Kamae Morichiki (32), or Sasaki Isamu (32), against US, or anyone else for that matter, adversaries? Do you really want to know the answer to that question?

Second part. It helps to have a working knowledge of USN scouting and bombing doctrine as it relates to such aircraft as the SBD. Since there’s not a great many SBD pilots left from whom you could gather this information in person, though I know not just a few of those still left, I suggest you try to get a copy of the USF-74 manual for a complete discussion of doctrine and tactics. Briefly, generally, and to avoid going into some sort of PhD dissertation, scouting doctrine called for two-plane sections to go out on a particular bearing for A number of miles, make a turn to the left or right (usually right), go for B number of miles, and return to base or point option on some other bearing, normally about 20 degrees off the outgoing leg. Two planes, two pilots, two gunners, eight eyes, plenty of witnesses.

For bombing missions VB and VS squadrons, say, in 1942 and 1943, usually made up of 18 aircraft, were generally divided into three six-plane divisions of two three-plane sections each. This organization was designed to provide maximum protection and support in the event of an attack. So, in any given section there are three pilots and three gunners, twelve eyes. Again, plenty of witnesses, especially in view of the USN’s almost fanatical preoccupation with section integrity.

Further, I’d point out the analysis of SBD sorties engaging enemy aircraft and the results thereof. Of all SBD sorties, some 52,687 in all, but 464 actually engaged enemy aircraft, or only 0.88% of all SBDs in combat, less than 1%. These 464 SBDs engaged an estimated (remembering of course the estimates of enemy aircraft engaged is not the same as enemy aircraft shot down and, often, a little difficult for the individual aviator to discern as he is usually a little busy at the time) 786 enemy planes. Of the estimated enemy planes engaged, a total of 138 were claimed, or 17.5%. Compared to other USN aircrafts’ percentage of engaged to claimed, F4F (37.8%), FM (59.4%), F6F (55.4%), F4U (40.4%), SB2C (15.4%), and TBF/TBM (16.1%), I don’t see the SBDs 17.5% as particularly unusual, especially considering the operating environment, and especially in the 1942-1943 time period. Indeed, I might describe it as fairly typical. And oddly enough, the 17.5% engaged claims rate is quite close to the 17% engaged loss rate of the SBD. Tends to firm up my thinking on the subject.

So, yeah, I’m fairly comfortable with the USN reports. Just as the Japanese reported what they thought they saw, so then did the US aviators. I prefer to leave it at that. See, I told you, no PhD dissertation.

If you have some alternative, then, please, be my guest. Pursue it to your heart’s content, both sides, though, and bring back your results. I would be most interested in seeing them and grateful, indeed, gratified, for your efforts.

Regards,

Rich


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## R Leonard (Sep 12, 2005)

More SBD esoterica . . .

With regard to action sorties flown by SBDs in the course of the war, most of such can be broken down by type of target attacked. 

For carrier-based SBDs action sorties actually attacking targets, by target type were:
Airfields - - 1,765
Land transportation targets - - 20
Harbor areas - - 37
Other military land targets - - 2,338
Other or unknown land targets - - 86
Armored warships - - 639
Unarmored warships - - 157
Merchant vessels over 500 tons - - 726
Merchant vessels under 500 tons - - 77
Unidentified ship type - - 57

For land-based SBDs action sorties actually attacking targets, by target type were:
Airfields - - 5,368
Land transportation targets - - 1,345
Harbor areas - - 484
Other military land targets - - 34,075
Other or unknown land targets - - 689
Armored warships - - 155
Unarmored warships - - 471
Merchant vessels over 500 tons - - 483
Merchant vessels under 500 tons - - 759
Unidentified ship type - - 41

For all SBDs action sorties actually attacking targets, by target type were:
Airfields - - 7,133
Land transportation targets - - 1,385
Harbor areas - - 521
Other military land targets - - 36,413
Other or unknown land targets - - 775
Armored warships - - 794
Unarmored warships - - 628
Merchant vessels over 500 tons - - 1,209
Merchant vessels under 500 tons - - 836
Unidentified ship type - - 98

Bearing in mind that the USN/USMC did not reliably record ammunition expenditures prior to August 1943 and, therefore, numbers for ammunition expended are for August 1943 though August 1945, carrier-based SBDs expended 1,888 tons of bombs on land targets and 410,000 rounds of ammunition. Against warships and merchant targets, carrier SBDs expended 636 tons of bombs and 93,000 rounds of ammunition. For the land-based SBDs, land targets were visited with 19,733 tons of bombs, 6,581,000 rounds of ammunition and 144 rockets; warships and shipping targets received 685 tons of bombs, 123,000 rounds of ammunition, and 88 rockets.

Rich


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 12, 2005)

Rich you're amazing!


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## syscom3 (Sep 12, 2005)

R Leonard said:


> > .......
> > For the first, no I have no such records at hand, nor do I read Japanese. In return, I’d ask if you have any such records that would disprove the credited claims? And, if you don’t have them either, what, exactly, would be your point? Certainly nothing you could prove, then, eh?
> 
> 
> ...


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## R Leonard (Sep 13, 2005)

Well, the theory that some SBD gunner credits must be discarded because the USAAF had a gunner over claiming problem had the effect of forcing me to go back and double check some the data. In the course of that, I, with apologies to all, (mea culpa) discovered that I’d been done in by the spread sheet sort while my eyes were crossed. Please note the following revised numbers for pilots versus rear gunner credits.

Despite the USN statistical study showing 116 credits for USN SBDs, carrier-based and land-based combined, I can still, as my previous post reported, find no more than 96 actual shoot down credits. And as in my earlier post, from testing out the various permutations, I believe that the difference (20) lies in either counting probables as actual credits or shared credits as whole credits or some combination of the two.

Double-checking the numbers gives a revised break down of the results, thusly:

Carrier-based pilots: 60.5 / 8.0 / 4.0
Carrier-based gunners: 32.5 / 7.0 /13.0
Land-based pilots: 0.0 / 1.0 / 0.0
Land-based gunners: 3.0 /0.0 / 0.0
Total pilots: 60.5 / 9.0 / 4.0
Total gunners: 35.5 / 7.0 / 13.0
Total USN SBD: 96.0 / 16.0 / 17.0

Rather than the previously reported 57.3% of SBD credits going to rear gunners, the correct percentage is 37.0%. My apologies to all and my regrets for any confusion that may have caused.



> My point is the AAF bombers of all theaters had widely exaggerated claims of fighters being shot down. The SBD crews would have been no different.



So, you seem to want to discount some indeterminate number of gunners' claims based, I presume, on the issue of over claiming by AAF bomber gunners, and I also presume you are focusing primarily on the ETO where the problem was apparently endemic. I’d point out that the revelations on AAF gunner over claiming were nothing new, were obvious at the time to those keeping the counts, and was really only merely verified with the examination of actual Luftwaffe loss returns. 

Further I’d suggest to you that when there’s a box of 16 to 20 bombers lumbering along, surrounded by 10 other boxes of similar numbers, and some brave soul goes blasting down through three or four of these boxes and some 35 to 40 gunners start blazing away in turn, you are going to get a lot of claims. You apparently have little appreciation for the differences in action between the ETO and PTO. Formations, especially naval were small. See my previous on scouting and bombing doctrine (which, I fear you either did not read or simply ignored as it doesn’t fit your mindset). The air war in the PTO, from a naval aviation standpoint was totally different than that of the ETO and to attempt to draw conclusions on one based on the other is IMO a waste of time. Perhaps you may wish to look somewhat deeper into the subject.

But, if you are so sure that credits to Navy SBD gunners are so inflated (all 35.5 of them from 7 Dec 1941 through 20 June 1944), tell me, exactly which ones do you propose we discard?

7-Dec-41; 0825; ARM1/c Miller; VS-6; 1 A6M; Barbers Point, TH
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; Sea1/c Snowden; VS-6; 1 A5M; Roi
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; AMM3/c Clark; VS-6; 1 A5M; Roi
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; ARM1/c Georgiou; VB-6; 1 A5M; Taroa
20-Feb-42; btwn 1640 1715; ARM1/c Rountree; VS-2; 0.5 G4M; 2S,157E 300 mi NE of Rabaul
7-May-42; 0745; Cdr Schindler (TF-16 staff); VS-5; 1 A5M; Shoho strike, Coral Sea
7-May-42; btwn 1110 1120; ARM3/c Liska; VS-2; 2 A6M; Shoho strike, Coral Sea
8-May-42; btwn 1114 1140; ARM3/c Liska; VS-2; 1 A6M; Coral Sea, TF17-Anti VT patrol
4-Jun-42; 1020; AMM3/c Chochalousek; VS-6; 1 A6M; Midway, near Japanese carriers
4-Jun-42; 1020; AMM2/c Adkins; VS-6; 0.5 A6M; Midway, near Japanese carriers
4-Jun-42; 1658; AOM2/c Bassett; VB-3; 1 A6M; 31-40N, 179-10W Midway area
7-Aug-42; 1320; AMM2/c Caruthers; VS-5; 1 A6M; About 5 mi SW of Tulagi
20-Aug-42; 1315; ARM1/c Yanick; VS-71; 0.5 H6K; 10S, 163E; 60 mi NE of Guadalcanal
24-Aug-42; 1620; ARM2/c Dobson; VS-3; 0.5 A6M; 06S, 161E, 100 mi NE of Santa Isabel
24-Aug-42; 1620; ARM3/c Godfrey; VB-3; 1 D3A; Ryujo Strike
3-Oct-42; 1535; ARM2/c Farrell; VS-3; 1 A6M; 08S, 157E; 70 mi W of Pohnpei
3-Oct-42; 1725; ARM3/c Gunter; VS-3; 1 E8N; 08S, 157E; 70 mi W of Pohnpei
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c Berthold; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c Lineawever; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM1/c Martz; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM1/c Martz; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c McLean; VB-8; 0.5 B5N; Santa Cruz at Hornet
14-Nov-42; btwn 0845 1115; ARM3/c Moore; VS-10; 1 A6M2-N; NE of Russel 
14-Nov-42; 1615; ARM2/c Colley; VS-10; 1 A6M; NW of Russel 
14-Nov-42; 1615; ARM2/c Colley; VS-10; 1 A6M; NW of Russel
14-Nov-42; 1700; ACRM Gardner; VB-10; 1 A6M; near Guadalcanal
14-Nov-42; 1700; AMM1/c Schindele; VB-10; 1 A6M; near Guadalcanal
17-Jul-43; 0932; ARM1/c Brunetti; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area
17-Jul-43; 0932; ARM2/c Seneker; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area
17-Jul-43; 0940; AOM3/c Steed; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area
5-Nov-43; 1030; ARM2/c Day; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul
5-Nov-43; 1030; ARM1/c Wells; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul
5-Nov-43; 1030; ACRM Wilson; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul
11-Nov-43; 0917; AMM2/c Wilson; VB-9; 1 A6M; St George's Channel
11-Nov-43; 0917; ARM3/c Shaffer; VB-9; 1 A6M; St George's Channel
4-Dec-43; 0805; ACRM Stafford; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi 
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM2/c Lynch; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi 
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM1/c Baxter; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi 
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM3/c Landaker, Jr; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi 
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c Hisler; VB-16; 1 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c Maggio; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM1/c McElhiney; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c LeMay; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet

You pick. You decide which ones to discard and then provide the factual basis to make that determination.

Personally, I’m not particularly in the business of debunking anyone’s claims. Where that sort of conversation usually leads is to claims of one side being garbage and the other as pure as the driven snow. Usually goes something like:

“My guy, Ottohad Stehdenbed, shot down 153 Klingons without a doubt. But your guy, Sammy Snowflake? There is absolutely no way he ever shot down 95 Romulins, ever, end of story, period. Maybe 15 if he was lucky; anymore is just wishful thinking.”

“Oh yeah? Stehdenbed got 153? Bull! If he shot at it he claimed it, and everyone knows it. And Snowflake? Everyone knows he gave claims to other members of his squadron, so he actually shot down more than 95 Romulins.”

“Oh sure, and where’s your proof?”

. . . volume starts to go up . . .

“Proof, I don’t need no stinkin’ proof. I just know this and so does everyone else. Where’s your proof?”

. . . volume still increasing . . .

“Don’t have or need any, but Snowflake simply couldn’t have done what he claimed and everyone knows that all of Stehdenbed’s claims were observed by someone, so they’re real!

At this point the conversation degenerates into name calling and finger pointing. Ever wonder just who “everyone” is?

Well, I don’t go there and I don’t entertain such discussions. The bad news is, that for the most part, there are no Japanese records, at least none available in English, that I’ve been able to find that would tend to disprove any of these SBD claims (and it’s not as though I haven’t looked and I know most of folks who have worked hard on this very subject). In fact you might note that the famous shoot down of Sakai by a mixed group of VS-6 and VB-6 rear gunners does not appear on this list . . . and they were sure that he was well and truly shot down (though they had no clue as to his identity). And, though unequivocally unwilling to discuss further the subject of who’s claims are valid and who’s are not, from what I have read, I suspect you might be rather disappointed with the results of comparing Japanese claims to US actual losses. You could start by just looking at the actual SBD losses reported here and comparing that to whatever Japanese claims you can find. 

USN and USMC combat losses are reported in “US Naval Aviation Combat Statistics – World War II,” published by OpNav in 1946. You also might want to look at the “USAAF Statistical Digest for World War Two,” though the information there is not as clearly laid out as the USN study, it’s all there if you know how to ferret it out. A fairly thorough background in statistics and in the subject at hand are also extremely helpful. Though my undergrad degree is in history, my master’s is in business; statistics, of a government nature, is what I do for a living. I grew up in the brown shoe navy (when airplanes were still blue and naval leadership was not an oxymoron). I don’t study the European theater; I don’t care, it may have well have been on the other side of the universe for all I care. My sole historical interest is WWII naval aviation, has been since I was an undergrad, lo, those 35 years ago. So, at the risk of being accused of tooting my own horn, there is, perhaps, a grasp the data, the operational realties, and the story they tell that you may not possess. And confining ones reading to the popular histories, slick magazines and the Internet won’t do it for you. Frankly, comparing the air operations in the ETO to the PTO is comparing night to day. There is no comparison. I deal in numbers. If you can’t show me a number, or at least an analytical approach to deriving a number, then all your short shrift of the ‘could haves’, ‘couldn’t haves’, ‘should haves’, and ‘shouldn’t haves’ doesn’t count. 

Regards,

Rich


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## lesofprimus (Sep 13, 2005)

> lesofprimus wrote:
> .....A wild dogfight ensued, with no quarter given by either side. Remembering lessons his skipper had emphasized, "Swede" defended himself........He downed three Zeros that day.......





> No doubt he turned into the Zero's..... but I seriously doubt he got into a dogfight with them. Maybe he put some holes into the zero's when he had the chance, but to shoot down three?
> 
> Think about it, a dive bomber dogfighting the most maneauverable fighter of that stage of the war?



I suppose he and his gunner lied about the engagement...... Im sure theres many MANY pilots who won the Navy Cross who lied about thier victories...... Lying sure makes an average pilot look better doesnt it??? He should have claimed 5 destroyed aircraft, that way he coulda lied about becoming an Ace as well.... 

U know he sure as hell didnt splash 7 Japanese aircraft in defense of the Enterprise during the Battle of Santa Cruz in his piece of crap Wildcat.... No one could do that in a Wildcat, let alone 3 with a Dauntless........

Funny thing is, my Grandfather, my Father, and myself have met him and conversed with him before, and I'll tell ya, he sure talked and acted like a liar.... I actually saw his nose grow 2 inches during one fanciful tale about his Wildcat days... Typical of the Captain of the Constellation, lying about his credentials to get a cushy CO job on a carrier...

In fact, I think all Navy Pilots were liars..... The Marianas Turkey Shoot??? Just a goddamn bunch of liars........ I dont think Ive ever heard of a truthful Navy pilot, except maybe the dead ones that cant lie about thier actions....

Liars, all of em.....

And I suppose Commander Flatley was fooled by "Swede" as well, cause he picked outstanding bomber pilots like "Swede" Vejtasa and John Leppla to form his new fighter group, which would be named the "Grim Reapers....


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## evangilder (Sep 13, 2005)

Well said Rich. Thanks for the correction too.


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## R Leonard (Sep 13, 2005)

I knew I liked you, Les.

Rich


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## evangilder (Sep 14, 2005)

I missed your response earlier, Les. Good points there. Must have been fun to watch that nose grow.


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

Look at this, Rich is a well of information and there's even some humour in there too. Excellent post, I enjoyed reading it. And it was extremely informative. 

And les, well he's just les, and he does it well.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

I took a quick look at them and came to a figure of 21 kills. I would whole heartedly accept that figure. I added some comments to it.


7-Dec-41; 0825; ARM1/c Miller; VS-6; 1 A6M; Barbers Point, TH Believable
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; Sea1/c Snowden; VS-6; 1 A5M; Roi Imprecise time, probably shared
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; AMM3/c Clark; VS-6; 1 A5M; Roi	Imprecise time, probably shared
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; ARM1/c Georgiou; VB-6; 1 A5M; Taroa Imprecise time, not believable
20-Feb-42; btwn 1640 1715; ARM1/c Rountree; VS-2; 0.5 G4M; 2S,157E 300 mi NE of Rabaul Imprecise time, not believable
7-May-42; 0745; Cdr Schindler (TF-16 staff); VS-5; 1 A5M; Shoho strike, Coral Sea Believable
7-May-42; btwn 1110 1120; ARM3/c Liska; VS-2; 2 A6M; Shoho strike, Coral Sea Imprecise time, not believable
8-May-42; btwn 1114 1140; ARM3/c Liska; VS-2; 1 A6M; Coral Sea, TF17-Anti VT patrol Imprecise time, not believable
4-Jun-42; 1020; AMM3/c Chochalousek; VS-6; 1 A6M; Midway, near Japanese carriers Believable
4-Jun-42; 1020; AMM2/c Adkins; VS-6; 0.5 A6M; Midway, near Japanese carriers	Believable, shared
4-Jun-42; 1658; AOM2/c Bassett; VB-3; 1 A6M; 31-40N, 179-10W Midway area Believable
7-Aug-42; 1320; AMM2/c Caruthers; VS-5; 1 A6M; About 5 mi SW of Tulagi Believable
20-Aug-42; 1315; ARM1/c Yanick; VS-71; 0.5 H6K; 10S, 163E; 60 mi NE of Guadalcanal Believable, shared
24-Aug-42; 1620; ARM2/c Dobson; VS-3; 0.5 A6M; 06S, 161E, 100 mi NE of Santa Isabel Believable, shared
24-Aug-42; 1620; ARM3/c Godfrey; VB-3; 1 D3A; Ryujo Strike	Believable
3-Oct-42; 1535; ARM2/c Farrell; VS-3; 1 A6M; 08S, 157E; 70 mi W of Pohnpei	Believable
3-Oct-42; 1725; ARM3/c Gunter; VS-3; 1 E8N; 08S, 157E; 70 mi W of Pohnpei	Believable
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c Berthold; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet	Believable, shared
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c Lineawever; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet	Believable, shared
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM1/c Martz; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet	Believable, shared
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM1/c Martz; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet	Believable, shared
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c McLean; VB-8; 0.5 B5N; Santa Cruz at Hornet	Believable, shared
14-Nov-42; btwn 0845 1115; ARM3/c Moore; VS-10; 1 A6M2-N; NE of Russel	Imprecise time, not believable
14-Nov-42; 1615; ARM2/c Colley; VS-10; 1 A6M; NW of Russel	Not believable cause of two claims at same time
14-Nov-42; 1615; ARM2/c Colley; VS-10; 1 A6M; NW of Russel	Not believable cause of two claims at same time
14-Nov-42; 1700; ACRM Gardner; VB-10; 1 A6M; near Guadalcanal Not believable cause of two claims at same time
14-Nov-42; 1700; AMM1/c Schindele; VB-10; 1 A6M; near Guadalcanal	Not believable cause of two claims at same time
17-Jul-43; 0932; ARM1/c Brunetti; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area	believable
17-Jul-43; 0932; ARM2/c Seneker; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area	Not believable cause of two claims at same time
17-Jul-43; 0940; AOM3/c Steed; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area	believable
5-Nov-43; 1030; ARM2/c Day; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul	these three were shared, believable
5-Nov-43; 1030; ARM1/c Wells; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul
5-Nov-43; 1030; ACRM Wilson; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul
11-Nov-43; 0917; AMM2/c Wilson; VB-9; 1 A6M; St George's Channel	believable
11-Nov-43; 0917; ARM3/c Shaffer; VB-9; 1 A6M; St George's Channel	Not believable cause of two claims at same time
4-Dec-43; 0805; ACRM Stafford; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi believable
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM2/c Lynch; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi Not believable cause of four claims at same time
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM1/c Baxter; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi Not believable cause of four claims at same time
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM3/c Landaker, Jr; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi	Not believable cause of four claims at same time
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c Hisler; VB-16; 1 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet	Imprecise time, but believable
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c Maggio; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet these three were shared, belivable
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM1/c McElhiney; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c LeMay; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet


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## R Leonard (Sep 14, 2005)

And If I had left out the times what happens to your argument? 
And in the course of an action where there's enemy planes about, do you always expect someone to look down at his watch and take out a pencil and note the time? 
And the fact that some of these only gives a range of time in which an action occurs makes them "unbelievable"? 
And the fact that several of the credits occurred in the same area makes the unbelievable? And how do you draw that conclusion? Do you know with what other aircraft these were operating? Do you know who may have witnessed the events? Are you aware of the circumstances of the action? Please describe the action so that we may share your insight.
What makes you think a credit is shared when it is not so noted, were you there? 

And when were you certified as an ACIO?

Facts, not opinion. Show me some evidence. 

Oh, you have none?

Oh, that's right, I forgot, you don't need no stinkin' evidence do you?

Your considered opinion means nothing without something to back it up. Lawd, lawd, I've seen folks grasp at straws before, but this is prime.

Rich


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## lesofprimus (Sep 14, 2005)

I dont have any evidence, but if some enlisted dude can shoot out Sakais' eyeball.........

Well, he was a better pilot than 9/10ths of all pilots in the PTO...


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> lesofprimus said:
> 
> 
> > .....A wild dogfight ensued, with no quarter given by either side. Remembering lessons his skipper had emphasized, "Swede" defended himself........He downed three Zeros that day.......
> ...



Who said anything about a dogfight?!? The man fought his was out of a situation, in doing so he downed 3 aircraft. If you want to assume his methodology involved what would be called a dogfight, so be it.

The SBD had a nickname you may be aware of "SLOW BUT DEADLY." I wonder where that came from? Additionally, let's assume he did "dogfight" the Zeros - we could throw in the assumption that he was just a better pilot than his opponents, used his dive brakes to turn and fought like hell - the man did go on to be a double ace, (seven in one day) so he must of done something right that day and continued to so something right for the rmainder of the war....


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

And If I had left out the times what happens to your argument?
- If you left out the times, I would have asked you if you had more evidence. 

And in the course of an action where there's enemy planes about, do you always expect someone to look down at his watch and take out a pencil and note the time? 
- Actaually yes. All pilots were asked to give the best estimate of time of events as it happened. The pilots actually had clocks in the cockpit for them to look at from time to time. If the AAF could do it, the surface ships do it (when they were shooting at enemy planes and ships) then I think it would be resonable for the naval Air Arm to request the same things from their pilots.

And the fact that some of these only gives a range of time in which an action occurs makes them "unbelievable"?
- Yes. to say "i shot down a plane sometime between the following 30 minutes in the air. I cant remember it though." would be a flag for anyone to question the validity of the claim.

And the fact that several of the credits occurred in the same area makes the unbelievable?
- The fact several gunners made claims at the same time at the same location is most probably the result of them all shooting at the same plane

And how do you draw that conclusion?
- Logical conclusion as proven many times in tallying up the results at the end of the war. The gunners of the planes in formation did not all talk amongst themselves on who was going to shoot at which plane.

Do you know with what other aircraft these were operating?
- Irrelevent to this discussion

Do you know who may have witnessed the events?
- the ones that had precise times of their kill, or of shared kills I counted as valid. That is good evidence there were multiple witness's

Are you aware of the circumstances of the action?
- Irrelevent to this discussion

Please describe the action so that we may share your insight.
- Irrelevent to this discussion

What makes you think a credit is shared when it is not so noted, were you there? 
- When the times matched at the same location, that was a shared kill, with all gunners shooting at the same plane. By the way, were you there too?

And when were you certified as an ACIO?
- Did you get yours over the internet? I have a CCNA and a white chevy. Do you?

Facts, not opinion. Show me some evidence.
- Im questioning the evidence in that the kills claimed were exagerated. It's perfectly valid to interject personal opinion into an argument, as long as you dont declare it fact. You seem to be attacking me for asking questions. Are you hiding something?

Oh, you have none?
- Your evidence sounds mighty slim. Attack the questioneer, not discuss the facts as you see them.

Oh, that's right, I forgot, you don't need no stinkin' evidence do you?
- Im asking the questions. I dont need evidence. Im just pointing out some area's of the claims that need further clarification and study. 

Your considered opinion means nothing without something to back it up. 
- I dont think youre helping your argument by continuing to attack me, and not expanding on your evidence. Ive already stated that some of those claims didnt sound "kosher". Others did make sense.

Lawd, lawd, I've seen folks grasp at straws before, but this is prime.
- Ive seen some of the Luftwaffe experts in the other threads do a professionally good job backing up their claims. I dont think youre doing a good job at all. Its like youre not sure of the evidence.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

lesofprimus said:


> I dont have any evidence, but if some enlisted dude can shoot out Sakais' eyeball.........



If I remember the story right, this was the first time he came against Avengers and he didnt correctly identify them untill too late. From afar, he thought they were Wildcats that had foolishly bunched up for some reason.


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

Rich is doing just a good, if not better, of a job than the Luftwaffe experts on this site. It seems to me that you just agree with those talking about the Luftwaffe and not with Rich. 

I have say if I was in combat I wouldn't waste my time lookin' at the clock if I had to keep my out for roaming Zeros after blasting my ass to pieces.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Who said anything about a dogfight?!? The man fought his was out of a situation, in doing so he downed 3 aircraft. If you want to assume his methodology involved what would be called a dogfight, so be it.
> 
> The SBD had a nickname you may be aware of "SLOW BUT DEADLY." I wonder where that came from? Additionally, let's assume he did "dogfight" the Zeros - we could throw in the assumption that he was just a better pilot than his opponents, used his dive brakes to turn and fought like hell - the man did go on to be a double ace, (seven in one day) so he must of done something right that day and continued to so something right for the rmainder of the war....



The Dauntless got its SBD nickname from its ship killing capabilities, not dogfighting capabilities.

He could have used the dive flaps to slow down to good effect but the end result would him being at a slow speed and low energy state. Not a good position to be in. The SDB was never known to be a good accelerator.
Like I say, he fought his way out of the situation, took some shots at the Zero's. Did he shoot them down? I dont think so.

If a Stuka pilot claimed he turned into attacking Spitfires and using two MG, managed to shoot down 3 planes, would it make you wonder if it could have happened?


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## lesofprimus (Sep 14, 2005)

> Did he shoot them down? I dont think so.


So once again ur calling him a liar.... I suppose his gunner was lying as well.... I also suppose u discount everyones claims, even if they were verified....

You know what I think??? <edited by administrator>



> If a Stuka pilot claimed he turned into attacking Spitfires and using two MG, managed to shoot down 3 planes, would it make you wonder if it could have happened?


If the Stuka pilots gunner verified the account, and the Stuka pilot was a very respectable individual, no I would not wonder about it... I would shake the mans hand and thank him for his service to his country...

And for the record, he shot down all 3 in head on passes... If anyone can remember, it aint too hard to knock a Zero outta the sky.....


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

I imagine it would have been simple for the man once he had the foolish Zero pilots turning towards him and going head on. After all the American pilots were told to go head on into Japanese attacks because their planes could not take much damage, if any at all. 

That would be vastly different for a Spitfire vs. Stuka. The Stuka could turn into the Spitfire but the Spitfire could take it's punishment (Unless it was a Ju-87G and a 37mm splattered the Spitfire). The Spitfire would mostly likely get on the tail of the Stuka before the pilot even thought of turning into him. The SBD was more agile than the Stuka...a lot more.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

I remember reading about the USN Submarine war in WW2, and many captains wrote in their reports that they heard the torpedo explode, they saw the ship on fire and they saw it sink. After the war they were shown proof that the ship didnt sink and it was still afloat. If you want to know the name of the book, send me a PM and when i get home, i will let you know.

Did that make them liars? Nope. It just proved that in the stress of battle, they thought they saw it happen and were simply mistaken.

Once again, you attack me for asking questions.


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

If the SBD pilot saw the Zero go down in flames then he hasn't made a mistake. Since we're talking the Zero, the odds are the aircraft fell apart or burst into flames when hit. I think that's a pretty safe bet that it's gone to hell.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

If you read what I have been saying, I am not denying the SBD gunners shot down planes, Im just saying that its not as many as was claimed. If three gunners shoot at the same plane and see it explode and crash, from their point of view, three planes were shot down.

The Germans seemed to have the strictest rules for awarding claims, and the US wasnt nearly so strict.

Unfortunatly for the navy, claims made in the middle of the ocean when theres no gun film, can be hard to prove/dissprove. Unless those claims can be correlated with Japanese records, then some of the claims should be looked at under a critical eye.

Should I believe at face value that all the German fighters claimed by the B17's and -24's be true? Or do you use some analysis to it and figure out a more reasonable tally?


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## plan_D (Sep 14, 2005)

He wasn't the gunner though, he was the pilot and he was on his own.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> He could have used the dive flaps to slow down to good effect but the end result would him being at a slow speed and low energy state.



Forget a low energy state, have you ever turned in an aircraft with full flaps?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 14, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> And in the course of an action where there's enemy planes about, do you always expect someone to look down at his watch and take out a pencil and note the time?
> - Actaually yes. All pilots were asked to give the best estimate of time of events as it happened. The pilots actually had clocks in the cockpit for them to look at from time to time. If the AAF could do it, the surface ships do it (when they were shooting at enemy planes and ships) then I think it would be resonable for the naval Air Arm to request the same things from their pilots.



If everytime my aircraft had missle fired at it in Iraq me or the rest of the crew had checked out watches or looked at the 2 clocks on the instrument panels to see what time we were engaged I would not be typing right now. Trust me in the middle of a deadly situation or combat the last thing you think about is the time.


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## evangilder (Sep 14, 2005)

Yep, That is the truth there. Can you imagine someone yelling "timeout" so that they could put down their weapon, pull out their trusty notebook and pencil to mark then time? Then call "okay, resume killing"? Not going to happen. The last thing on your mind when you are in the middle of bad guys is what time it is.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 14, 2005)

Trust me I know that feeling. A typical engagement went by so quick that you did not even have time to shit in your flight suit. Thankgod I did not have to experience that many times.


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## evangilder (Sep 14, 2005)

Yep, and the concept of time is completely skewed when under fire. Minutes turn to hours quickly in that situation. I know that happened to me a few times. It seemed like hours, but with the amount of firing going on, we would have needed a mountain of ammo to go on for hours. So at that point its pretty much a guess.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 14, 2005)

Yeap 1 minute seems like an hour. An 8 hour mission over Iraq felt like 1 hour to me.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

Theres a vast difference between saying you had an event happening approx. around a specific time and then saying you had a 30 minute window when it happened.

Those planes only had endurance really measured in minutes and the pilots were looking at the clock from time to time.

Plus part of their navigation was decided upon specific times (minutes from ship, minutes from rally point, etc.)

If you look at the list he provided, there were exact times specified on some of the claims. So that proves it was done.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 14, 2005)

Yeah it was looked at, after the fact so you did not know the exact time. Trust me I have been in the situation. Not dogfighting ofcourse but under fire while flying and the clock was the last thing on my mind.


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## evangilder (Sep 14, 2005)

Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. There may have been guys that put their best estimate on the time, while others gave a range. It doesn't prove or disprove anything. Unless you personally know the person making the claim and the way that he did his time marks, there is no way to know for sure.


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## trackend (Sep 14, 2005)

I find this info really interesting guys If you go back in history from ancient times to the current state of affairs ask any guy who has been in a scrap and although the technology changes the feelings and emotions that the participants have remain almost unchanged including how long an action or event took.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

FLYBOYJ said:


> syscom3 said:
> 
> 
> > He could have used the dive flaps to slow down to good effect but the end result would him being at a slow speed and low energy state.
> ...



Actually I have. And fact is when the flaps go down, you slow down. Slow speed means a low energy level. Then the SBD had better speed up quite quick or its doomed. Only way to do that is to dive downward which means its not heading into the fighters.


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

plan_D said:


> He wasn't the gunner though, he was the pilot and he was on his own.



There we go, hes all alone and claims three zero's! I wonder if he was telling tall tales at the officers club and someone took him at his word....
"and there I was....."

8)


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## lesofprimus (Sep 14, 2005)

No his gunner was with him... Ur confusing 2 seperate incidents...


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> FLYBOYJ said:
> 
> 
> > syscom3 said:
> ...



It also means you're increasing wing area and you turn tighter - look at those dive flaps on the SBD. I'd bet dollars to donuts that with flaps deployed the SBD could easily turn inside a Zero. As the flaps were perforated(also used as dive brakes), I would also guess there were no limitations on speed deployed.....


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## lesofprimus (Sep 14, 2005)

ACtually what Swede did was he used a zoom climb, flaps out and pulled a bunch of G's, came around and dove slightly, full throttle, and on each successive pass, peppered each of the 3 Zeros with a bunch of rounds... Each one burst into flames, the 3rd Zero also had his wing ripped off.....

U see, Swede was a hell of a gunner and taught gunnery to new pilots... He sustained no damage to his craft in this engagement, although his windscreen was covered with oil from the 2nd Zero...


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

Did anyone witness this?

And does anyone have turn data for the SBD with flaps down? 

Also, wasnt it fowler flaps that increased wing area? I thought the SBD flaps were the more traditional types that changed the shape of the wing, not wing area.


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## lesofprimus (Sep 14, 2005)

His gunner witnessed all 3, his wingman saw 2 and confirmed another large splash for the 3rd...


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

lesofprimus said:


> ACtually what Swede did was he used a zoom climb, flaps out and pulled a bunch of G's, came around and dove slightly, full throttle, and on each successive pass, peppered each of the 3 Zeros with a bunch of rounds... Each one burst into flames, the 3rd Zero also had his wing ripped off.....
> 
> U see, Swede was a hell of a gunner and taught gunnery to new pilots... He sustained no damage to his craft in this engagement, although his windscreen was covered with oil from the 2nd Zero...



Maybe mentioned earlier, I think his gunner would of confirmed the kills as well. I do know that majority of SDB gunners were ARMs (Aviation Radioman). It would seem that once the battle was over and the crew gained their composure, Swede's gunner would of been on the radio immediately, either on frequency to the carrier or attempting to communicate with the other aircraft in his flight. I'm sure flaming 3 Zeros might of been a topic of discussion......


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> Also, wasnt it fowler flaps that increased wing area?.



All flaps increase wing area when deployed - fowler, split, zap, or slat.....


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## KraziKanuK (Sep 14, 2005)

FLYBOYJ said:


> syscom3 said:
> 
> 
> > Also, wasnt it fowler flaps that increased wing area?.
> ...



Only the Fowlers, since they extend backwards when extended. Split flaps are hinged and only drop down. They change the camber of the lower wing airfoil.

Slats are not really flaps, in my book.

What is a zap?


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## lesofprimus (Sep 14, 2005)

The opposite of a zip???


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

"zip flaps"..... hehehehe

They were named after Northrop engineer Edward Zap, who invented them.

I think they were retractable flaps that extended the whole span.

Im probably wrong on this, so someone correct me.


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## R Leonard (Sep 14, 2005)

> And If I had left out the times what happens to your argument?
> -	If you left out the times, I would have asked you if you had more evidence.


-- Presuming, of course, that you knew I had the times.



> And in the course of an action where there's enemy planes about, do you always expect someone to look down at his watch and take out a pencil and note the time?
> -	Actaually yes. All pilots were asked to give the best estimate of time of events as it happened. The pilots actually had clocks in the cockpit for them to look at from time to time. If the AAF could do it, the surface ships do it (when they were shooting at enemy planes and ships) then I think it would be resonable for the naval Air Arm to request the same things from their pilots.



-- Oh gee, I didn’t know instrument panels had clocks! Who would have thought; what a clever idea. In you own words “best estimate of time of events as it happened” and maybe that’s the best they could have done under some circumstances. Also we’re not discussing pilots.



> And the fact that some of these only gives a range of time in which an action occurs makes them "unbelievable"?
> -	Yes. to say "i shot down a plane sometime between the following 30 minutes in the air. I cant remember it though." would be a flag for anyone to question the validity of the claim.



-- Evidently the debriefers don’t share your august opinion; especially since they rated 7 other gunners claims as only probables and another 13 as only damaged.



> And the fact that several of the credits occurred in the same area makes the unbelievable?
> -	The fact several gunners made claims at the same time at the same location is most probably the result of them all shooting at the same plane



-- And you can make this determination without any knowledge of the engagement itself? 



> And how do you draw that conclusion?
> -	Logical conclusion as proven many times in tallying up the results at the end of the war. The gunners of the planes in formation did not all talk amongst themselves on who was going to shoot at which plane.



-- Ahh, I see, logic, but not based on any actual knowledge of the circumstances.



> Do you know with what other aircraft these were operating?
> -	Irrelevent to this discussion



-- Ummm, well, I suppose I can see how the number of aircraft involved on both sides of an engagement would be irrelevant to how many were shot down; especially since it is equally obvious that it is apparently, in your world, impossible for than one plane to be shot down in any one engagement. Give me a break.



> Do you know who may have witnessed the events?
> -	the ones that had precise times of their kill, or of shared kills I counted as valid. That is good evidence there were multiple witness's



-- And so anyone else who witnessed an action is dismissed out of hand, right?



> Are you aware of the circumstances of the action?
> -	Irrelevent to this discussion ‘



-- The circumstances of an action would seem to drive the results. Certainly more relevant than your opinion.



> Please describe the action so that we may share your insight.
> -	Irrelevent to this discussion



-- You don’t mean you have no idea what occurred? And you presume to pass judgment?



> What makes you think a credit is shared when it is not so noted, were you there?
> -	When the times matched at the same location, that was a shared kill, with all gunners shooting at the same plane. By the way, were you there too?



-- See above regarding circumstances surrounding the action. Here you sit in front of your PC 60 years later with apparently no knowledge of the events and pontificate and pass judgment on what has been recorded. Must be nice to be omniscient.



> And when were you certified as an ACIO?
> -	Did you get yours over the internet? I have a CCNA and a white chevy. Do you?



-- Apparently you have no idea what is an ACIO, which probably explains a lot. Wouldn’t drive a chevy if you paid me. 



> Facts, not opinion. Show me some evidence.
> -	Im questioning the evidence in that the kills claimed were exagerated. It's perfectly valid to interject personal opinion into an argument, as long as you dont declare it fact. You seem to be attacking me for asking questions. Are you hiding something?



-- Hardly can be hiding if I can provide you with information you obviously do not have yourself in the first place. Glad to see that you aren’t declaring anything as fact, merely your opinion to which you certainly entitled, regardless how uninformed.



> Oh, you have none?
> -	Your evidence sounds mighty slim. Attack the questioneer, not discuss the facts as you see them.



-- If I can cite the instances of the claims and you cannot, that seems that I have evidence of the claims and you have naught but your self esteemed opinion.



> Oh, that's right, I forgot, you don't need no stinkin' evidence do you?
> -	Im asking the questions. I dont need evidence. Im just pointing out some area's of the claims that need further clarification and study.



-- No actually, you do need the evidence. You are the one challenging the established record. In order for your challenge to stand you must offer something beyond your opinion which would effect a change to the record. You, since you are questioning their validity, must examine the claims “that need further clarification and study.” Anything else is just BS.



> Your considered opinion means nothing without something to back it up.
> -	I dont think youre helping your argument by continuing to attack me, and not expanding on your evidence. Ive already stated that some of those claims didnt sound "kosher". Others did make sense.



-- If challenging your opinion as having no basis in fact or research is attacking you, then so be it. I am questioning an obvious inability to offer any concrete refutation of the record beyond just your opinion. Opinions don’t count.



> Lawd, lawd, I've seen folks grasp at straws before, but this is prime.
> -	Ive seen some of the Luftwaffe experts in the other threads do a professionally good job backing up their claims. I dont think youre doing a good job at all. Its like youre not sure of the evidence.



-- If you are expecting me to do your research for your contention, you can guess again. If you’re nice, I might consider citing the reports where you could find the info, but don’t hold your breath and, somehow, I just don’t think you’d bother to follow up.

-- You are certainly entitled to your opinion, as I’ve said, but you should take care to couch it as such, rather than as some vaguely disguised fact. Always helps to start out with “I don’t know for certain because I wasn’t there and haven’t read the reports, but in my opinion . . .” That’s a little easier to digest and then all you’d hear from me is “my, that is certainly interesting . . . I think, on the basis of the record, you are perhaps mistaken, but it’s not my job to change your mind.”

Regards,

Rich


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## wmaxt (Sep 14, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> "zip flaps"..... hehehehe
> 
> They were named after Northrop engineer Edward Zap, who invented them.
> 
> ...



There spoilers on the surface of the wing usualy about 1/3 to 1/4 of the outer span. They "spoil" the lift on that wing and are very effective in terms of roll effectiveness. A great shot of how they work is on the F-14s in "Top Gun", note the elevators are also linked in modern aircraft which is only possible in computer assisted/controlled aircraft. 

By the way the ailerons were only used on the P-61 because the Spoliers were not accepted by conventional pilots.

wmaxt


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## wmaxt (Sep 14, 2005)

FLYBOYJ said:


> syscom3 said:
> 
> 
> > Also, wasnt it fowler flaps that increased wing area?.
> ...



? They normaly increase lift and drag. 

A fowler opens and extends creating more wing area. 

Plane flaps, like those on the P-51 and F4U just pivot down, extending the curve of the wing but not wing area. 

With split flaps, just the underside pivots down and uses the void created to draw the air down creating the airflow effect of both added area and extended curve for the wing. 

Slats do extend the area a little but mostly control and smoth the air flow. 

Spoilers (Zap) are mid chord (depending on purpose) and kill lift/change airflow, again depending on purpose but they open out of the skin without adding area.

Only Fowler flaps add phisical area, all other flaps just create the effect of added area but slats kill lift (except rare cases like the P-38 and P-47 where they impead supersonic airflow and restore lift).

wmaxt


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

wmaxt said:


> FLYBOYJ said:
> 
> 
> > syscom3 said:
> ...



Actually they do increase wing area - as you stated they extend the curve of the wing. Add in that "curve" and the wing area will increase. And you are correct, lift and drag are increased


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## KraziKanuK (Sep 14, 2005)

FB, if one measure the distance to the from the leading edge to the hinge line (a) and then the distance from the hinge line to the trailing edge of the flap (b), one arrives at the same total distance (c).

a + b = c, not c'


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## wmaxt (Sep 14, 2005)

KraziKanuK said:


> FB, if one measure the distance to the from the leading edge to the hinge line (a) and then the distance from the hinge line to the trailing edge of the flap (b), one arrives at the same total distance (c).
> 
> a + b = c, not c'



He's technicaly correct. The wing flap exposes a couple of inches as the hinge point rotates. In other words the point the flap starts in the up position and as it rotates it exposes some ammount of the inner curve of the flap changing the equasion to A+B+C=D and then you get A+B +B'+C =D'
B being the flap reveal line at the edge of the wing and flap in the up position, and B' being the new point at the wing edge, flap meeting point. 

It becomes obvious if you mark a door hinge (both the part on the frame and the door) and then close the door and the marks will now be in different places.

I hope I was clear.

wmaxt


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

KraziKanuK said:


> FB, if one measure the distance to the from the leading edge to the hinge line (a) and then the distance from the hinge line to the trailing edge of the flap (b), one arrives at the same total distance (c).
> 
> a + b = c, not c'



I know what you'rre trying to say and how it may seem but you're measuring the angle of flap with relationship to the flap bay. Measure the entire camber....

Maybe I should of said lifting area insted of wing area


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

Copied the drawing from a link I had in my "conehead" file, this explains the effects of a split flap and then moving it to the rear - should of looked at this to start with  

http://naca.larc.nasa.gov/reports/1932/naca-tn-422/index.cgi?page0001.gif


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## syscom3 (Sep 14, 2005)

OK Leonard, this is the end of the discussion.

I asked you origionaly if these claims had been compared to Japanese records, and the answer is clear. No they havent. So I guess we will have to put an asterisk around your datafile as saying it needs further analysis. I'd say about 1/5th to 1/4th of the claims could be suspect. 

Now since you seem to be a scholar of sorts, I challenge you to locate Japanese records and sources and compare it to each and every claim. It would make one heck of a good book when youre done. Maybe you could submit it to peer review and have it published. 

Now if youre wondering why I put such an emphisis on the time each kill occured...... its simple. Back then, navigation over the sea was dead reckoning. Plot board, compass heading and elapsed time. All naval pilots kept a close eye on the time, cause if they didnt, they would get lost real fast. 

End of discussion, over and out.


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## R Leonard (Sep 14, 2005)

I certainly don't need a lecture on navagation at or over sea. I suspect I probably know a little bit more about naval aviation doctrine and practices than you.

If you wish to pursue the Japaneses records, as I stated long ago, please be my guest.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 14, 2005)

Bottom line, I think there is overwhelming evidence that Swede Vejesta shot down 3 Zeros in an SBD, his gunner and other aircraft confirmed it, he probably out maneuvered his opponents by using flaps and high Gs - the man knew what he was doing because he went on the be a double ace. Enough Said?!?


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## plan_D (Sep 15, 2005)

And the ground crew would have seen the oil on his windscreen, engagemnt and hit would be a definate.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 16, 2005)

I dont see why he could not have shot down 3.


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## syscom3 (Sep 16, 2005)

Its possible, but in my humble opinion, improbable. I could accept one kill, but no way two and three.

My opinons only. 

I just dont see where the Dauntless would have the power to maneuver around like that with the Zero.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 16, 2005)

syscom3 said:


> Its possible, but in my humble opinion, improbable. I could accept one kill, but no way two and three.
> 
> My opinons only.
> 
> I just dont see where the Dauntless would have the power to maneuver around like that with the Zero.



If you manage your energy better than your opponent, power is irrelevant


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 17, 2005)

Yeap and the wierdest things happen in combat anyhow. The will to live can help you accomplish many things. I dont doubt his claim, I dont see a reason to.


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## lesofprimus (Sep 17, 2005)

Why dont we drop the fuck ing subject about Swede before I blow my fuck ing top.... I know the truth, and if some lame ass wants to deny to truth, fine.....

But I will not put up with syscom calling him a liar again......

Do u hear me???? Whether or not u think its true, I KNOW ITS TRUE.... He was called "Uncle Swede" in my house, and if u decide ur going to insult his memory, honesty and intergrity, we are going to have BIG problems syscom.... 

Ur opinion is irrelevant to the truth in this matter, as the truth is known and confirmed by others WAYYYY more enlightened than urself....

Understand???


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 17, 2005)

Yes lets drop this subject now.


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## syscom3 (Sep 17, 2005)

The US Army operated a version of the SBD for awhile in the SW Pacific. I think it was called the A-24. From what I can gather, it didnt perform well compared to the navy version.

Anyone have some information on how such an aircraft can see service in the same part of the world, but have performance like night and day? The only reason I can gather is the types of land targets it would attack were far and few between. Perhaps defended well enough to not make it worthwhile to use this plane.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 17, 2005)

Just saw one at Wright-Patterson, Here's a history....

Southwest Pacific Service in 1942 
In the days before Pearl Harbor, when war appeared imminent, the Army Air Forces transported the 27th Bombardment Group to the Philippines from Louisiana with its aircraft to follow later. The 27th flew the A-24, the Army Air Forces' first dive bomber. In light of the German Air Force dive bombing successes in Poland and France, the Army Air Corps acquired the US Navy's SBD-3 "Dauntless" dive bomber which was already in production. The A-24 was the SBD-3 without the tail hook and with either a solid or a pneumatic tail wheel. 
When war broke out the 52 aircraft being sent to the Philippines were diverted to Australia to be assembled there. Most of the 27th's pilots were flown back to Australia to assemble their airplanes and fly them to the Philippines. The enlisted men, however, remained in the Philippines and became members of the 1st Provisional Air Corps Regiment, fighting the Japanese ground troops. All of the survivors were subjected to the Bataan Death March 

The A-24s that arrived at Brisbane, Australia, in late December had been heavily used in Louisiana during maneuvers in September 1941 and still carried Louisiana mud on their wheels. In addition, they were missing trigger motors and solenoids, which prevented the firing of their forward guns, and the rear gun mounts broke easily. Many aircraft also had worn-out tires. The A-24s could not go into combat in the Philippines until these problems were corrected. 

The Australians either machined the necessary solenoids or they fixed firing handles for the guns. The rear gun mounts were strengthened and Australian truck tires were used in place of American aircraft tires. By this time, however, the battle for the Philippines was almost over. The 27th Bombardment Group was slowly rebuilt into three squadrons, the 16th, 17th, and 91st. The 91st, equipped with 15 repaired A-24s, was the only squadron capable of flying to Java. They flew first to Darwin, Australia, and then to Malang, Java, arriving there on 17 February 1942. Out of the 15 Aircraft that began the trip to Java, only 7 were available for combat. The others were lost in accidents or were in need of repairs. 

Over the next 10 days the 91st flew heroically against the best aircraft the Japanese possessed. The A-24s, however' had worn-out engines, no armor plate, no self sealing fuel tanks, and received no fighter protection. The pilots referred to them as "Blue Rock Clay Pigeons." The 91st squadron, nevertheless, attacked enemy ships in the harbor and the Japanese air base at Bali, as well as Japanese ships in the waters near Java, damaging and sinking numerous enemy ships. Two of the A-24s were shot down and three so badly holed they could no longer fly. In early March the order came to evacuate Java, ending a brief but valiant effort. 

In New Guinea in 1942 the A-24 was relegated to noncombat missions after five of seven airplanes were lost and one was badly damaged on a mission over Buna, New Guinea. The A-24s were regarded by many pilots as too slow, too short-ranged, and too poorly armed. 

Many of the remaining A-24s were used in the U.S. as training aircraft or to tow targets for aerial gunnery training. 

Suggested Reading: 
William H. Bartsch Doomed at the Start 
Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had 
George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports 

SPECIFICATIONS 
Span: 41 ft. 6 in. 
Length: 33 ft. 0 in. 
Height: 12 ft. 11 in. 
Weight: 10,200 lbs. maximum (with 1,200 lbs. of bombs) 
Armament: Two .50 caliber machine guns in the nose and twin .30 caliber flexible machine guns in rear cockpit; In Java, the A-24s carried Dutch 660 lb. bombs on the centerline and 110 lb. bombs on each wing. 
Engine: Wright R-1829-52 of 1,000 hp. 
Cost: $38,293 

PERFORMANCE 
Maximum speed: 250 mph/217 knots 
Cruising speed: 173 mph/150 knots 
Range: 950 miles with 1,200 lbs. of bombs 
Service Ceiling: 26,000 ft.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 17, 2005)

Most of them were regulated for training duties even though about 953 were built.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 17, 2005)

Well damn your post got in before mine. Good info FlyboyJ


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## Wildcat (Sep 17, 2005)

Very interesting info.


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## syscom3 (Sep 17, 2005)

Did the Army specify no self-sealing tanks? Or did the Navy version have the same thing?


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 17, 2005)

I would guess in they were ordered without combat equipment.


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## Nonskimmer (Sep 17, 2005)

In any event, that was a very informative post. Good stuff FJ.


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## Gnomey (Sep 17, 2005)

Yes, nice info FBJ.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 17, 2005)

Thanks guys! I think the armor and self sealing tanks would of been considered GFE - Government Furnished Equipment, installed by the government at the contractor or at a later date.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 17, 2005)

That is how a lot of things are done on aircraft even today.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 17, 2005)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> That is how a lot of things are done on aircraft even today.



Yep - it's amazing how some things never changed. When I was building P-3s, the engines, Propellers, landing gear, most avionics and APU were all GFE. Sometimes we would be required to leave some of the avionics off so the Navy would itstall them at a later date.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 17, 2005)

We have contracters from all different companies come in and install stuff on our aircraft plus the Army has its own stuff that we put on that Sikorsky does not install.


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## syscom3 (Sep 17, 2005)

I know hindsight is 20/20 vision, but you would think that after 2 years of war, all planes in the AAF would have been retrofitted with the self sealing tanks!


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## quayhog (Sep 23, 2005)

I thought you all might learn something from this post copied from the Battle of Midway Roundtable web site. Its quoted in its entirety. address below. 

http://home.comcast.net/~r2russ/midway/fisher-sbd.htm


The SBD in Combat

by CDR Clayton Fisher, USN-Ret

©2005, The Battle of Midway Roundtable

(Editor’s note: Clay Fisher was an SBD pilot with VB-8, USS Hornet, at the Battle of Midway. On the morning of 4 June 1942 he flew as wingman to air group commander Stanhope Ring. The following text is taken from e-mail messages to the BOMRT in 2001 and 2005. In these messages, Clay describes his dive bombing and other combat experiences in the SBD.) 

* * * *

DIVING THE SBD
Check list before diving: 

1. Shift to Low Blower. 

2. Shift to low prop pitch. (We wanted full maximum power setting as we broke our dives. 

3. Hit full split flaps. (In early 1942 the SBD had to reduce speed to be able to split the flaps, which was tough when under attack. Douglas came out with an engineering change that allowed splitting the flaps at any speed. Also, we could dive at various split flap settings.) 

4. Open the cockpit hatch. I think this was to prevent the windshield from fogging up due to the changes in temperatures during the dive. (Our gunner's hatch was always open due to the twin gun mounts. In combat, the gunner was facing the tail during the dive. For training dives, he turned his seat to face forward. Those gunners were some of the bravest! 

If I remember correctly, at our standard 70-degree dive with full extension of the dive flaps, our maximum diving speed was only about 240 knots. You felt like you were hanging on a string. That slow speed let us release a bomb between 1500 and 1000 feet. We could do a "snap pullout." The blackout was more severe but of a shorter time period. I always tried to lower my head for the pullout, and it reduced the blackout. In our standard dive, the plane was vertical to the water or ground, but the track downward was 70 degrees. You felt no pressure on your butt or seat belt when you had it right. It was like you were floating. 

The SBD did not have shoulder straps. Sometime after the BOM, our mechanics made us a single chest strap that we could tighten for ditching, etc. I ditched at Santa Cruz without landing flaps, and I think that makeshift chest strap saved my life. &nbps I still banged my head on the instrument panel and was momentarily knocked out. I didn't remember anything after I chopped my throttle, until the cockpit filled up with water. 

Our standard squadron tactic was to try to position the formation so we could roll down in either a left of right 90 degree turn to pick up the target's course. We did not form the old pre-war "Hollywood" echelon for the individual breaks from the formation. We flew 3-plane sections and 3-section divisions. On the break, the #1 plane dropped down and immediately broke 90 degrees (either right or left). The following sections ditto. The longer we could stay in formation so our gunners could fire, the more protection we had against the fighters. We practiced to see how fast we could break into our dives. With sufficiently close intervals, we could have all 9 dive bombers in a column. 

The inside of the split flaps were painted red, and the last plane could see eight red bars. That prevented possible midair collisions if a pilot got out of position. If our flight leader rolled left into the dive, he turned left after his dive recovery and continued straight ahead. The other 8 planes would expedite a join-up on the inside of his turn. Getting back into formation for mutual protection was essential. We practiced this tactic, and were good at it, although in combat it was almost impossible to get all 9 planes back into formation. 

I think out dive bomber tactics were far superior to the Japanese. The long initial glide and then the final pushover that the Vals used had 2 weaknesses: (a) their initial long shallow dive made our fighters' job easier, and (b) it was difficult for them to get into the final dive position. I don't know if the Vals made 70-degree dives with only the fixed landing gear acting as dive brakes. 

The SBD had a glass window below the pilot's feet, which I guess was for sighting the target, and for a straight pushover dive. The glass was cleaned before takeoff, but engine oil always smeared up the glass. The SBD engine threw quite a lot of oil. You could always tell an SBD pilot by the oil on his flight helmet!

FORMATION FLYING

"Flying and fighting the SBD:

-did you commence a dive by the famous half-roll into a dive, pulling positive G, or by diving straight ahead, pulling negative G?


--where was the dive brake extension handle located?

--where was the bomb release located?

--the SBD apparently had a telescopic sight in front of the pilot. Was it used for bomb aiming or gun aiming or both?

--even in summertime, it should have been pretty cold flying at 15-19.000 ft altitude. Contemporary photos show pilots crewmen in thin clothing--no fur jackets. What did it feel like, actually?

--was there any trim change when extending the dive brakes?"


The old Hollywood movies of Navy dive bombers usually showed the formation flights "peeling off" from an echelon of aircraft "stacked up" flying a "step-up" formation" (each aircraft flying above the aircraft ahead). This was because the early dive bombers were biplanes and the upper wing would block out the plane you were flying formation on. The SBD was of course a monoplane and flew "step down" in all formations, which was a much better formation for combat. The attachment below describes the SBD flight formation. 

The trim tab and dive brake controls were located on the left side of the cockpit just below the throttle handle. When we were in position to open the split flap ("dive brakes"), we hit the flap handle and as we steepened our dives. As our speed increased, we had to keep adjusting our rudder tab to keep the aircraft from skidding. The pilot’s right hand and arm controlled the "joy stick." 

The SBD had a manual bomb release lever down low on the left side of the cockpit and an electrical switch on the top of the joy stick. 

In 1942 The SBDs had a telescope used as a bomb sight and also as a gun sight for the two forward .50 caliber machine guns that fired through the propeller. Later SBD models had a virtual image combination bomb and gun sight.

Most of the SBDs flew at about 12 to 14 thousand feet, and it did get pretty cold but the June weather during the BOM was tolerable. 

Estimating the correct "lead" on a fast moving ship and keeping the rudder trimmed were the secrets to obtaining a direct bomb hit. It took a lot of practice bombing on a moving target to become a proficient dive bomber pilot. Unfortunately, most of the younger dive bomber pilots that flew during BOOM never had the opportunity to practice very much dive bombing in the SBD. 

IN COMBAT SITUATIONS WE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO STAY IN OUR DEFENSE FORMATION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL OUR FLIGHT LEADER LED US INTO OUR 70 DEGREE DIVES. OUR FLIGHT LEADER WOULD ROLL INTO A 90 DEGREE SHARP NOSE DOWN TURN AND HIS INSIDE WINGMAN BROKE NEXT, FOLLOWED BY HIS OUTSIDE WINGMAN. THE SECTIONS BEHIND BROKE THE FORMATION THE SAME WAY. WE WANTED TO GET INTO OUR DIVES AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. ONCE IN OUR 70 DEGREE DIVES, THE ZERO FIGHTERS COULD NOT ATTACK BUT HAD TO SPIRAL DOWN AND ATTACK AFTER WE PULLED OUT. OUR FLIGHT LEADER WOULD ALWAYS TRY TO DO A 90 DEGREE TURN AFTER PULLING OUT OF HIS DIVE SO WE COULD JOIN UP ON THE INSIDE OF HIS TURN. THEN IT WAS A SIMPLE RELATIVE BEARING PROBLEM, JUST SIGHTING THROUGH THE BACK EDGE OF YOUR WINDSHIELD AT THE PLANE’S WINDSHIELD YOU WERE JOINING UP ON. ACQUIRING THAT POSITION QUICKLY PUT YOU BACK IN FORMATION. 

IN A 70 DEGREE DIVE WITH THOSE VERY EFFECTIVE DIVE BRAKES WE COULD RELEASE OUR BOMBS AS LOW AS 1200 TO 1500 FEET.

SO MANY ARTISTS CONCEPTS OF SBDs ATTACKING AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SHOW THE PLANES GLIDE BOMBING. I WILL DESCRIBE THE STANDARD SBD DIVE BOMBING RUN DURING 1942. IT WAS A 70 DEGREE DIVE--THE PLANE’S TRACK OR PATH IS 70 DEGREES, BUT THE PLANE IS IN A VERTICAL POSITION TO THE SURFACE OF THE WATER. YOU KNEW WHEN YOU WERE IN A GOOD 70 DEGREE DIVE WHEN YOUR BUTT WAS NOT PUSHED AGAINST THE SEAT NOR WERE YOU HANGING ON YOUR SAFETY BELT. YOU WERE SORT OF FLOATING BETWEEN THE SEAT AND YOUR SAFETY BELT. 

THE SPLIT FLAPS, OR WHAT THE PILOTS CALLED DIVE BRAKES, WERE PAINTED BRIGHT RED ON THE INSIDE OF THE FLAPS. THE HOLES HELPED CREATE MORE DRAG. WHEN WE BROKE OUR FORMATIONS STARTED OUR 70 DEGREE DIVES IN A LONG COLUMN, YOU COULD SEE THOSE RED FLAPS OF ALL THE PLANES DIVING AHEAD OF YOU. 

I THINK THE DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT DESIGNER WHO CONCEIVED THIS FLAP ARRANGEMENT WAS A GENIUS. EARLY IN 1942 DOUGLAS MADE A FLAP MODIFICATION THAT LET THE DIVE FLAPS OPEN AT HIGH APPROACH SPEEDS AS WE STARTED IN TO OUR DIVES. OUR MAXIMUM DIVE SPEEDS WERE ACTUALLY PRETTY SLOW, AROUND 240 KNOTS. YOU FELT LIKE YOU WERE JUST HANGING THERE AND GOING TOO SLOW WHEN THE AA STUFF WAS COMING AT YOU. 

ANOTHER GREAT FEATURE OF THE FLAP ARRANGEMENT WAS TO BE ABLE TO “COLLAPSE” THEM JUST AS YOU STARTED PULLING OUT OF THE DIVE. THIS GREATLY ACCELERATED THE PLANE’S SPEED AND GAVE THE JAPANESE GUNNERS PROBLEMS LEADING THE TARGET WITH THEIR GUNS. 

ALL NAVY SBD DIVE BOMBER SQUADRONS FLEW COMBAT MISSIONS FROM A STANDARD 9 PLANE DIVISION OF 3-PLANE SECTIONS, WITH THE SECTIONS AND THE WINGMEN FLYING IN STEPPED DOWN POSITION. THAT FORMATION PROVIDED MAXIMUM FIREPOWER FROM THE RAPID FIRING TWIN MOUNTED .30 CALIBER GUNS, BRINGING A POSSIBLE 18 GUNS TO BEAR ON ATTACKING ZERO FIGHTERS.

For more on Clay Fisher and the SBD, see his report of the Battle of Santa Cruz on the Pacific War Historical Society web site:

http://www.users.bigpond.com/battleforaustralia/Guadalcanal/ClaytonFisheratSantaCruz.html


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 23, 2005)

Good info thanks.


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## R Leonard (Sep 23, 2005)

There are, of course, some published histories that will tell you that Clay Fisher was killed in the Solomons, at the Battle Santa Cruz, I believe. Clay protests that the rumors of his demise are somewhat unfounded and a little premature.

Rich


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## Gnomey (Sep 23, 2005)

Nice info quayhog.


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## jernst (Sep 28, 2005)

Okay folks.....

This has been a very informative discussion, and quite honestly, I hadn't meant for it to be as contentious as it was.....sorry.

It's been a couple of weeks, and I'm still interested in the topic. Several people from other groups and forums have expressed an interest also.

So, I've begun an SBD discussion group on YAHOO. Here's the link to join...

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SBD-Dauntless/

I hope we're able to generate enough discussion about the plane, it's history, it's role as a dive bomber, and the various models and kits that are available.

I'd love to have you join us.

Thanks for all the information.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 2, 2005)

Good luck with your group!


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