# The P-38J and L in the European theater.



## DSR T-888 (Sep 22, 2014)

When the problems were finally fixed for the P-38, it was too late since the Mustang was already proving dominance. So my question is; how did/would the P-38J-25 and P-38L-5-LO preform against German fighters in the European theater if some of the USAAF still used the P-38 up until the end of the war. 

Thanks
DSR_T-888

http://www.456fis.org/THE P-38/P-38speedchart.JPG
http://www.456fis.org/THE P-38/P-38climb.JPG
http://www.456fis.org/THE P-38/P-38rollchart.JPG

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/p-38/p-38-tactical-chart.jpg


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## GregP (Sep 22, 2014)

My thoughts are that the P-38 suffered from 4 basic faults ... until they were fixed.

1. The pilots had VERY little to no training. The P-38 required a lot of actions to get from cruise to combat ready condition. The early guys were probably shot down while trying to accomplish this task.
2. The early Allison had an issue with the intake manifold that took some months to sorts out; the solution was simple and easy, but they had to FIND it ... and did.
3. The issue with European fuel versus American fuel wasn't understood until we GOT some European fuel. After that, the "fix" was a simple jetting change.
4. The "fix" for the poor cockpit heater was also simple; use an electric heater.

The late model P-38's HAD the fixes are were dangerous opponets to any air force, Japanese or German. The cirtical mach number didn't change but WAY too much has been made of that. Had they been used as escort fighters that mach number thing would be of little import. The idea is to get the enemy fighters away from the bombers and if they dive away at high mach, the task is automatically accomplished. The enemy HAS to stay and fight at the bomber's altitude to be effective since that's where the bombers are. If they don't ... defacto mission accomplished.

The armament was always good since it didn't have to be aimed to converge. I think thay would have done just fine with pilot training and the bugs fixed. After the P-38J-20, they also had hydraulic aileron boost to materially increase the roll rate. That HAD to help.

Obviously this is a "what if," but it's a good one that hasn't been largely explored. I posulate that the late model P-38's would have been effective. As effective as the P-51's? Hard to say. They set a high mark. I think it would depend on who was using them and how they were employed. Had the same people flying the P-51's been flying the P-38's in manner to exploit the P-38's strengths, perhaps the results would have been similar. Had they been flown wrongly, perhaps not as good. The job would have gotten done.

Thing is, P-38 fan though I am, I am ALSO a big P-51 fan. So I wouldn't want to deprive the world of the immortal P-51 to achieve better P-38 success. Tough "what if" to actually wish for.

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## wuzak (Sep 22, 2014)

2 3 are one and the same. The fix for the "fuel issues" was a revision to the intake manifold. A fix which was underway before the P-38 experienced the fuel problems in Europe.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 22, 2014)

GregP said:


> 1. The pilots had VERY little to no training. *The P-38 required a lot of actions to get from cruise to combat ready condition*. The early guys were probably shot down while trying to accomplish this task.



No more than single engine fighters, you just had to do the same thing twice (and at the same time) and this would be typical for any twin engine fighter.


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## DSR T-888 (Sep 22, 2014)

Comparing the P-51D to the Early J models of the P-38. Performance wise I'd think they are pretty equal. 

Speed, P-51
Climb, P-38
Turn rate, P-38
Roll rate, P-38
visibility, P-51
range, P-51
dive, P-51
pay load, P-38
Survivability, P-38(twin engines) 







http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/p-38/p-38-tactical-chart.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/Performance_Data_on_Fighter_Aircraft.pdf

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## drgondog (Sep 22, 2014)

Respectfully, the compressibility issue crippled the P-38's ability to chase and close on the FW 190 and Bf 109s. The LW was aware of the weakness and a split Ess, if actuated immediately was an 'out' move. The J-25 'fix' with dive flaps didn't achieve anything but the ability to control the dive and get out of compressibility hell sooner.

The 479th FG was last 8th AF FG to use the P-38. I have found no record of anything newer than the J-15 and don't know when the Dive Flap mod was applied in the field, but the J-25 didn't arrive into 9th AF units until September, 1944.

From a success evaluation perspective, July marked initiation of notable air to air positive results - particularly with the 55th FG. The 479th also scored well, with very few losses in Late August through late September, 1944, keeping in mind that not only the quality of LW was down, but the mix of the powerful but less agile Sturm FW's had increased as a major victim of the improved 38J.

The P-38J-25 and L arrived into the MTO in late Summer 1944 but the combined three fighter groups (1st, 14th and 82nd) scored far less post June 1944 than the prior 18 months.. curiously the 332nd FG scored more in the last 10 months than any of the individual MTO Lightning FG's in that period.

*Short answer - IMO No*. The peak Performance level was increased with the late J but opportunity continued to elude them because a.) it was still easy to see before they could see the LW, and b.) the 109 and 190 could still out dive it to evade it.

Additional observation - opinion based on available 8th AF combat record vs the LW.

The P-38 was credited with 266 air/161 ground for 101 losses air to air/109 losses strafing. The Ratio of aircraft destroyed to the 390 lost due to all other operational causes other than air combat was 2.6:1 air to air ratio, and 1.1:1 for combined aircraft destroyed to P-38s lost. Period October 1943 through September, 1944.

By contrast the Mustang was 3329 to 324 air to air, 3192 to 569 losses strafing. 1354 Mustangs were lost to all other causes. The air to air ratio was 10.3:1 air to air ratio, and 6521 to 1923 for 3.4:1 ratio - combined aircraft destroyed to losses due to all causes.

Last but not least - it was 2X to purchase and operate..

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## drgondog (Sep 22, 2014)

GregP said:


> My thoughts are that the P-38 suffered from 4 basic faults ... until they were fixed.
> 
> 1. The pilots had VERY little to no training. The P-38 required a lot of actions to get from cruise to combat ready condition. The early guys were probably shot down while trying to accomplish this task.
> 
> ...



It has always been an interesting What If regarding the late start up of the P-38 into production and thorough test program in 1939... as much as having AAF 'see the light' in late 1940 and then accelerated the introduction of the Merlin 61 into the Mustang airframe several months earlier - even via reverse Lend Lease from RR to US as Packard was tooling up.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 22, 2014)

From Rau's letter;

"As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot *fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-fivehours in a P-38*, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavyload). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced",what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure."

I think in hindsight we could blast many holes in this!

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## tomo pauk (Sep 22, 2014)

GregP said:


> My thoughts are that the P-38 suffered from 4 basic faults ... until they were fixed.
> 
> 1. The pilots had VERY little to no training. The P-38 required a lot of actions to get from cruise to combat ready condition. The early guys were probably shot down while trying to accomplish this task.
> 2. The early Allison had an issue with the intake manifold that took some months to sorts out; the solution was simple and easy, but they had to FIND it ... and did.
> ...



Re #1: By late 1943, the W. Allies were using the same fuel - 100/130 grade? The different fuels were thing of 1938-41 era?

Re #4: The fix was to equip the pilots with electricaly-heated suit, that was helped out with having both engines outfitted with generators? Only one generator per P-38 was in earlier versions. The socket rheostat were provided for the suit. The basic, hot air heating system, was also improved?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 22, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Re #1: By late 1943, the W. Allies were using the same fuel - 100/130 grade? The different fuels were thing of 1938-41 era?



There were several changes to the "100/130 grade" fuel as the years went on with different amounts of allowable lead content (not OVER 3.0cc to 4.0cc to 4.6 cc) AND different allowable percentages of certain compounds, These changes allowed much higher production of 100/130 fuel from the same tonnage of base stock oils. _HOWEVER_ the changes were agreed to and applicable to ALL allied 100/130 fuel. There was *NO* British spec or American spec 100/130 fuel at this time. The Problem comes in that each refinery "could" use the amount of lead and compounds like aromatics that it needed to in order to get the *current* batch of fuel to meet the specification up to allowable limits. So not all batches of fuel were exactly the same. 
Allison and the other engine makers were aware of the change in the specification in the Spring of 1943 and working on solutions during the Summer/Fall which ended with the 'Madam Queen' intake manifold being fitted to ALL new Allisons (turboed or not) at the end of Nov/beginning of Dec 1943 and 'some' manifolds being sent overseas for refitting of engines in the field (or at overhaul?)


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## DSR T-888 (Sep 22, 2014)

Very interesting FLYBOYJ, thanks for the share.

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## varsity07840 (Sep 22, 2014)

my understanding regarding the German split s evasive tactic is that the P-38's initial roll rate was pathetic, allowing the 109 or 190 to be down and away well ahead of the P-38, which could not catch up due to compressibility issues.

Duane

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## GregP (Sep 22, 2014)

Hi Wuzak, 

I like Drgondog's salutation, so I'll use it here. With respect, #2 and #3 are not the same. The intake manifold issue was cured with a turbulator installed inside the manifold. The manifolds that Joe has which do not HAVE the turbulator are not used for airplane engines today. The different fuels were definitely NOT the same issue ... the Allisons had to be jetted for European fuels to run right on it. Once they discovered that, the cure was a matter of finding the correct jets ... a matter of a few engine runs with different jets.

I don't think we were running the same fuels in late 1942 to early 1943. We were running the same fuels some time AFTER we found the issue out. It isn't interesting enough for me to dig out "Vee's for Victory," but it wasn't until well into 1943, perhaps the fall, as you stated. That gave the P-51 time eough to gain a foothold in the ETO and, by the time all the fixes were in for the P-38, the P-51 was firmly entrenched. So, they reassigned the P-38 to the MTO and PTO.

Hi Bill, With respect back at you, the P-38 does NOT continue to dive after starting one. I've seen WAY too many P-38 8,000 foot dives to believe that one. Ask Steve Hinton who flies one. The answer is simple to me, don't dive away with the Germans until problems set in ... stay around and fight. We probably will never see this one from the same perspective, Bill, but since it's a "what if," there is no real-world data to corroborate either theory; late model P-38's didn't mix it up in the ETO much. The P-38 needed to get pretty fast to hit critical Mach, so the P-38 pilots, like the Luftwaffe, KNEW when they were approaching the limit or SHOULD have. Your theory (diving with the Luftwaffe fighters) is no doubt correct for the guys who were flying P-51's, and they did quite well at it. Had they been flying P-38's I doubt the same tactics would have been employed. It's OK and not worth much discussion since it's a "what if" anyway. I don't feel like even starting a mild disagreement over the point ... I just feel that, if the situation had occurred, they would have found a way to stay around and fight just as the P-47 guys used different tactics from the P-51 guys. As long as the Germans were diving away from bomber attack, the escort job was done anyway.

Since it IS a "what if," I'd like to have seen a P-38 with 2 - 3% thinner wing and 2-stage Merlins in it, coupled with a serious program to shed weight. But, it never happened, so is a pipe dream. I can draw one, but that won't make it magically appear ...

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## BiffF15 (Sep 22, 2014)

The P-38K would have been an interesting variant...

Cheers,
Biff

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 22, 2014)

Greg - If you put a P-38 in a terminal dive from 20 or 30K, it's going to go like a bat out of hell until it self destructs (or pop the dive brakes). With that said I know that Steve would never press the museum's bird in such a manner. I worked with guys during the 1980s who flew the P-38, they all had the same comments about it's diving tendencies and many green AND experienced pilots were killed diving the P-38. Ken Sparks, one of the premiere P-38 drivers in the PTO early in the war killed himself off the California Coast diving a P-38, this after he had a tour and 11 kills under his belt.

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## GrauGeist (Sep 22, 2014)

GregP said:


> ...*The answer is simple to me, don't dive away with the Germans until problems set in ... stay around and fight*...


That would be the fastest way to get yourself killed...

P-38s relied on their speed and firepower to score against opponents. They were not agile in the sense of engaging in a turning fight against Axis fighters.


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## GregP (Sep 23, 2014)

Let's say we disagree without any sarcasm intended. 

The P-38 was not a consumate dogfighter one on one but, in the hands of a decent pilot with a flight of three other P-38's around him, it beat the crap out of Zeros that could fly rings around it on paper on an individual basis. The take-away is that proper tactics favoring a plane's strengths overcome maneuverability. Either that or the Zero really wasn't all that maneuverable ... naaaahhh ... it WAS and it didn't help at all. The P-38 was the mount of our top two aces. Put them in the ETO and they'd STILL be aces, unless you think the Japanese pilots who got the better of PTO Spitfires on a regular basis, were less skilled than the Germans by a mile.

I don't think so. The Japanese got the best from their aircraft and were overmatched against the P-38, as a whole, when the P-38's were flown by the people who were flying them in the PTO. If pilots unfamilair with the P-38 were flying them in the PTO, the situation might well have been different. It wasn't. They WERE familiar with their mounts.

That says to me that the plane was solid when flown by solid pilots with experience in type. The same can be said for ANY decent warplane. The Bf 109 was a tough opponent when flown by a Bf 109 expert, whenever and wherever encountered, until the end of the war ... unless he was desperately short of fuel. Even Erich Hartmann got shot down in a Bf 109 when he ran out of fuel ... it says nothing about the plane or pilot as fighters other than lack of an engine makes it a glider despite any pilot skill.

I'd take an experienced P-38 squadron any day for a mission inside the range of the aircraft, just as I'd take ANY plane flown by people experienced in type and inside the attack range.

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## GrauGeist (Sep 23, 2014)

The P-38 was not a turning fighter, simple as that...even the Me262 shot them down.


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## timmy (Sep 23, 2014)

The question that we never really got answered

Can a Good TWIN ENGINE fighter match a Good SINGLE ENGINE fighter ??????

The closest we got was the P-38L. Sadly we never got to see it against quality opposition
No doubt it was devastating when it had a clear performance advantage against its opposition (A6M)
But how would it go against a Dora with the same performance numbers? With the boosted ailerons
could the P38 now dogfight? Or is it a case with physics that something so large and has such a large
target area is always going to be more venerable against single engine fighters?

Just another point. I'm sure I read somewhere that the late model P38 had a range as far as 2500 miles
Is this true? If so why didn't they use it to escort the long range B29's

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## Conslaw (Sep 23, 2014)

The late-model P-38s, with combat flaps were quite maneuverable, especially when the pilot used differential thrust on the two engines. The P-38 was at a disadvantage when trying to follow a single engine plane turning with the torque of its engine, but by using differential power, this disadvantage was largely countered, and turning in opposite direction of the single-engined plane's torque, the Lightning had the advantage. The -J and -L had boosted ailerons, and this was more important the faster the speed of the fight. The P-38 offered the top pilots plenty of tools to work with. Unfortunately the workload was too heavy for low-hour pilots to fully master.

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## Conslaw (Sep 23, 2014)

I'm guessing the P-38s didn't escort the B-29s for a couple of reasons. First the P-38 did not excel in the escort role in Europe. Secondly, you could fit more P-51s on Iwo Jima than you could P-38s. Each P-51 only used up half the gas and half the maintenance hours as the P-38. That's very important at the end of a long supply line.

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## GregP (Sep 23, 2014)

Hi Graugeist,

ANYTHING can be shot down from ambush, even the best fighter built by anyone ever. Let's not forget that 140 Me 262's were shot down by USAAF piston fighters at a time when almost no P-38's were in the theater. The Me-262's were shot down by P-51's and P-47's ... since they were THERE.

About 200 Me 262's were operational at any one time, maximum. They shot down from 300 to 450 enemy planes, depending on who you believe (probably in the middle). There is no record of sorties flown as far as I know. 

The P-38 shot down 3,668 enemy planes in real life during wartime.

Which one was the more effective fighter during the war?


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## GrauGeist (Sep 23, 2014)

Well, I am sure glad that the Luftwaffe didn't comprise of only Me262s!

However, there were nearly 40,000 Bf109s produced. Do you suppose that a P-38 may have encountered one of those at some point, over Europe? Then there were roughly 20,000 Fw190's...which may have encountered a P-38 at some point...

The P-38 was good for turning hard to the right, because of the torque and "P-factor", not so well to the left. They also had a tendancy to buffet hard at the stall thresh hold and in the hands of an experienced pilot, had a chance at making it through a turning fight. But a turning fight was not the P-38's forte. It was it's ability to hit fast and hard.

Not sure where you're going with the "real life during wartime" thing...was there an event in an alternate universe that I'm not aware of?


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## Denniss (Sep 23, 2014)

Smells like the BoB problem of the Bf 110, just at a higher performace level.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 23, 2014)

Denniss said:


> Smells like the BoB problem of the Bf 110, just at a higher performace level.



Not quite. 

The P-38 did have a few things going for it, Especially at the higher altitudes. It usually had the best acceleration and climb of the American fighters. Since ALL fighters loose speed during maneuvers and the higher the G load the maneuver the more speed lost the P-38 lost less speed during the maneuver and gained it back quicker once level flight (or something close) was returned to. 
Depending on month/year and exact models of aircraft compared the P-38 could hold it's own in speed vs the majority of enemy fighters it came up against and _depending on altitude_ could often out climb them. I believe the Bf 110 could NOT out climb the Hurricane during the BoB?


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The P-38 was good for turning hard to the right, because of the torque and "P-factor", not so well to the left.



From Wiki;

_"The Lockheed design incorporated tricycle undercarriage and a bubble canopy, and featured two 1,000-hp (746 kW) turbo-supercharged 12-cylinder Allison V-1710 engines fitted with counter-rotating propellers to eliminate the effect of engine torque, with the superchargers positioned behind the engines, with the exhaust side of the units exposed along the dorsal surfaces of the booms. Counter-rotation was achieved by the use of "handed" engines, which meant that the crankshaft of each engine turned in the opposite direction of its counterpart.

The YPs were substantially redesigned and differed greatly in detail from the hand-built XP-38. They were lighter and included changes in engine fit, and the propeller rotation was reversed, with the blades spinning outward (away) from the cockpit at the top of their arc rather than inward as before. This improved the aircraft's stability as a gunnery platform."_

AFAIK The P-38 had no P factor when both props were turning and no critical engine during engine out situations (or both engines were critical depending the way you look at it).

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## Bad-Karma (Sep 23, 2014)

timmy said:


> The question that we never really got answered
> 
> Can a Good TWIN ENGINE fighter match a Good SINGLE ENGINE fighter ??????
> 
> ...



Id be curious to know how a F7F would fare vs a single engine fighter.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 23, 2014)

Joe, I was para-quoting Lt. G. "Pat" Brown, 15th AF USAAF, from his memoirs. He entered the MTO (and later ETO) with the P-38 from '43 onward and saw quite a bit of action.

I thought that, instead of entering my own opinion on the subject, I would use the opinion of someone who did. I know that my Uncle flew the P-38 in the PTO for the duration, but he did not talk much about the battles.

Anyway, here is Mr. Brown's opinion in his own words:


> Just a short statement concerning the “hows and whys” we flew as we did on combat missions: First of all we flew in flights of four airplanes. Secondly’ two flights would weave back and forth with each other all the way to the target and back home. A pilot’s blind spot is directly behind him. Therefore we weaved back and forth. By doing this each flight was watching the other flight’s tail.
> 
> When attacked from the rear, which is the typical attack method because the attacker hopes he is not detected. The entire flight does a 180 degree turn toward the attacker in order to get into firing position. If the attacker climbs back up or proceeds on down, the flight makes another 180 degree turn back on course to escort the bombers or whatever else they were doing. If the attacker does not leave by one of the methods described, the fight starts and who knows what will go on from there.
> 
> ...



Lt. Brown seen here in his P-38:

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## Shortround6 (Sep 23, 2014)

timmy said:


> The question that we never really got answered
> 
> Can a Good TWIN ENGINE fighter match a Good SINGLE ENGINE fighter ??????
> 
> ...



we are back to categorizing fighters as single engine and twin engine again  

P-38 had 327 sq ft of wing while a P-47 had 300sq ft, an F4U had 314 and an F6F had 334 sq ft. The engine nacelles and center pod on the P-38 are actually pretty skinny compared to the P-47 and F6F fuselages, so the 'target' area isn't that far off. Besides, if you are worried about big a target your plane is you are already in deeeep doo-doo. 
The twins big disadvantage _should_ be roll response with the engines being a number of feet out from the center of the fuselage, _BUT_ individual planes all had different roll responses depending aileron type, size/shape/placement, deflection and 'gearing in the system'. Speed and altitude could change roll response too. P-38 with power boosted ailerons could out roll many single engine fighters. Without the power boost, nowhere near as many. 



> Just another point. I'm sure I read somewhere that the late model P38 had a range as far as 2500 miles
> Is this true? If so why didn't they use it to escort the long range B29's



AN escort *should* be able to return from a mission and not be a _suicide_ escort. That is not just fly with the bombers and then have the pilot bailout/crash land because he can't make it back. 

That 2500mile figure is for ferrying the aircraft from base to base using a pair of 300 gallon drop tanks. They often left the ammo boxes empty when ferrying aircraft to lighten the load. With 600 gallons outside and only 410 gallons inside (and the inside tanks were used for warm-up, taxi and take-off because the fuel feed was more reliable than the drop tank fuel feed) it was quite possible to get the P-38 (and some other planes with big drop tanks) further into enemy territory than they could get out once the tanks were dropped. Ferry speeds and altitudes were often much different than escort speeds and altitudes. 
For combat use the P-38 often used 165 gallon drop tanks.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Joe, I was para-quoting Lt. G. "Pat" Brown, 15th AF USAAF, from his memoirs. He entered the MTO (and later ETO) with the P-38 from '43 onward and saw quite a bit of action.
> 
> I thought that, instead of entering my own opinion on the subject, I would use the opinion of someone who did. I know that my Uncle flew the P-38 in the PTO for the duration, but he did not talk much about the battles.
> 
> Anyway, here is Mr. Brown's opinion in his own words:



_"A single engine airplane will normally attempt to escape with a left turn. Because of torque and P-factor, it can make a sharper turn to the left than to the right. *In a P-38 if we were trying to escape an enemy single engine fighter, we would normally make a turn to the right, with counter rotating props we could turn equally well in both directions, but remember the enemy single engine fighter didn’t turn quite as well to the right as to the left. That is why we would turn right".*_

I think he was speaking relative to single engine fighters

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## GregP (Sep 23, 2014)

Hi Graugeist,

Where I was going with the real wartime thing is that the early P-38's were flown into combat with 4 major faults including no pilot training. Unsurprisingly, they didn't fare too well. By the time the P-51's got there, almost everyone HAD some combat experience and the faults in the P-38 were worked out or rapidly getting that way.

My point is that had the same inexperienced pilots been thrown into the fray in P-51's, they'd have had some training issues and some teething problems, too. When the P-38 faults were worked out, it was an outstanding fighter with a very good record in the MTO and PTO once the guys knew how to fly and fight it and once they had combat experience, and it was good enough to be the mount of our two top aces. 

In fact, if you LOOK at the top 10 aces from the U.S.A., Number 1, 2, and 8 flew P-38's. Number 3 flew a Hellcat. Numbers 4, 6, and 7 flew a P-47. Numbers 5 and 10 flew a Corsair and number 9 flew a Wildcat. Note that there were two planes with 3 aces each in the top 10; the P-38 and P-47. The P-51 doesn't show up in this list. It is no reflection on the P-51, which got to the fray rather late.

My entire point is simple. The P-38 was a good fighter that had a less than wonderful start at WWII combat due to several factors combined. Later in it's service life, it was effective and there were experienced people flying it, so it would have been effective anywhere under those circumstances.

I never said it was the best fighter out there; but I say it was a good one. If you don't think so, that's OK. We don't have to agree for things to be OK but you might keep in mind that it was the mount of the two top US aces, so it ain't all bad. There are plenty of P-38 fans out there, and I'm one of them. As it happens the only true dud we had in MY mind is the Buffalo ... and there are plenty of Buffalo fans out there. No doubt they love the Finns, but the US experience with more than 9 times the number of Buffalos was abysmal. One record of astounding success with 10% of the Buffalos and another record of abysmal failure with 90% of them. Go figure. Maybe we should have shipped the entuire build to the Finns! They might have won the war with the Buffalo ...

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## Koopernic (Sep 24, 2014)

timmy said:


> The question that we never really got answered
> 
> Can a Good TWIN ENGINE fighter match a Good SINGLE ENGINE fighter ??????



Definitely yes.

Turning circle is primarily a matter of: 1 wing loading, 2 power to weight ratio.

If a twin matches a single in these parameters it can turn with it, climb with it, accelerate with. Its likely the twin can exceed them due to its arrangement advantages but the tendency to cram in equipment can destroy that.

Two provisos though:

The engine power must be good at altitude and on the P-38 it was not only good but better, if you bank in to a turn and start pulling g the increase in drag from induced drag from the extra wing lift will slow the aircraft down and height will be lost.

One must also consider the coefficient of lift. Most wings are about the same but full span leading edge slats like on the Me 109 or 262 add about 40% extra lift so we should be talking of lift loading (wing loading x coefficient of lift max ie CLmax). Note however that slated wings have poor lift to drag ratios when the slats are out.

And of course the less drag then the more power available for turning, climbing, acceleration and speed. That's why the Mustang was so good because its laminar profile wings had so little drag at high speed.


Adolf Galland said of the P-38 something like "they could out turn us but by the time they'd banked we were long gone"

And here is the problem. Because the P-38 pilot is only a man he could not deflect the big ailerons enough to get maximum roll rate. There were likely other factors such as the inertia of the outlying engines and the so called windmill effect (for the same tip speed you get a faster roll with a smaller span)

However when power assisted ailerons were added the roll rate of the P-38L was one of the highest of any aircraft in the war. I believe the P-80 ended up with the system.

Lockheed had also thickened the inboard wing sections to carry sufficient fuel: this lead to a severe mach tuck problem. Solved in several steps and finally dive recovery flaps were added to pitch the wing up and little while slowing it down. Mustang hardly needed them.

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## tomo pauk (Sep 24, 2014)

The inboard wing section of the P-38 was not that overly thick - 16% thickness to chord ratio. The problem was that nacelles and central pod created sort of a venturi tube, that increased speed of the air moving above and under then inboard wing section. More from the flight manual of the P-38: link.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 24, 2014)

Ok, can we dispense with the slat nonsense for good now?






These are full span slats






These are NOT










another chart





partial span slats are only going to affect the proportion of wing they cover. If they cover 1/2 the span then they are only going to affect the "lift"over that part of the span. 

*However that is actually not correct.* What the slats do is _keep_ that area of wing from *stalling* at high angles of attack and the wing generates the lift at the high angle of attack. SO what you can have is the outer portions of the wing generating lift with the slats out while the inner portion of the wing is stalled and generating *NO* lift. 

This may be be better than the whole wing stalling but it certainly doesn't mean that the Bf 109 was generating 40% more lift just above stall. 

What it *did* do was maintain air flow over the ailerons so lateral control was maintained, many aircraft loosing aileron control and lateral control at speeds a bit above stalling speed. It also worked as sort of a warning system allowing an experienced pilot to operate on the edge of the stall for maximum lift. Some other aircraft had warning signals (like buffeting) and some did not, the ones without could go into a stall and spin with little or no warning so 'green' pilots often flew wider turns/maneuvers than the plane was capable of to avoid the stall. 

Also please notice the rise in drag as the angle of attack increases, this is one reason dog fights quickly descended in altitude. Pulling any "extra" turning ability the slats may offer for very long increases the drag sharply which will decrease the airspeed of the aircraft quickly.

edit, sorry forgot drag chart.






Granted these are generic charts and individual airfoils/wings will vary some.

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## drgondog (Sep 24, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> Definitely yes.
> 
> Turning circle is primarily a matter of: 1 wing loading, 2 power to weight ratio.
> 
> ...



I don't recall any change of main airfoil from the NACA23016 or tip airfoil section. The change that did occur was to design and install a wing filet which did reduce buffeting.

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## drgondog (Sep 24, 2014)

GregP said:


> Hi Graugeist,
> 
> Where I was going with the real wartime thing is that the early P-38's were flown into combat with 4 major faults including no pilot training. Unsurprisingly, they didn't fare too well. By the time the P-51's got there, almost everyone HAD some combat experience and the faults in the P-38 were worked out or rapidly getting that way.
> 
> ...



The P-38 was a formidable adversary when flown by a good fighter pilot against any conventional fighter. The good ones knew their limitations (just as all aircraft possess them).

Having said that, the drive to replace the P-38s with P-47s and P-51s began as 1944 drew to a close, with exception of recon, and by July 1945 had virtually disappeared from most of the famous combat units it started with. Some remained in CBI and some remained in the Philippines but the assault on Japan was a mirror image of ETO - with the Mustang doing most of the long range escort.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 24, 2014)

GregP said:


> ...In fact, if you LOOK at the top 10 aces from the U.S.A., Number 1, 2, and 8 flew P-38's. Number 3 flew a Hellcat. Numbers 4, 6, and 7 flew a P-47. Numbers 5 and 10 flew a Corsair and number 9 flew a Wildcat. Note that there were two planes with 3 aces each in the top 10; the P-38 and P-47. The P-51 doesn't show up in this list. It is no reflection on the P-51, which got to the fray rather late...



Good point, *let's have a look* at the top American aces:

Maj. Richard I. Bong, USAAF (40) P-38 - *PTO*
Maj. Thomas B. McGuire, USAAF (38) P-38 - *PTO*
Capt. David McCampbell, USN (34) F6F - PTO
Maj. Francis S. Gabreski, USAAF (28) P-47 - ETO
Maj. Robert S. Johnson, USAAF (27) P-47 - ETO
Col. Charles H. MacDonald, USAAF (27) P-38 - *PTO*
Maj. George E. Preddy, USAAF (26) P-40/P-51 - PTO/ETO
Maj. Joseph J. Foss, USMC (26) F4F/F4U - PTO
1st Lt. Robert M. Hanson, USMC (25) F4U - PTO
W/Cmdr. Lance C. Wade, RAF (25) Hurricane/Spitfire - ETO
Maj. Gregory Boyington, (24) P-40/F4U - PTO
Lt. Col. John C. Meyer, (24) P-47/P-51 - ETO
Lt. Cecil E. Harris, (23) F4F/F6F - PTO
Lt. Eugene A. Valencia, (23) F6F - PTO
Col. David C. Schilling, USAAF (22) P-47 - ETO
Col. Gerald R. Johnson, USAAF (22) P-39/P-40/P-38 - *PTO*
Col. Neel E. Kearby, USAAF (22) P-47 - PTO
Maj. Jay T. Robbins, USAAF (22) P-39/P-38 - *PTO*
Capt. Dominic S. Gentile, USAAF (22) Spitfire/P-47/P-51 - ETO
Capt. Fred J. Christensen, USAAF (21) P-47 - ETO
Maj. Raymond S. Wetmore, USAAF (21) P-51 - ETO
Capt. Kenneth Walsh, USMC (21) F4U - PTO
Capt. John J. Voll, USAAF (21) P-51 - MTO
Lt. Col. Walker M. Mahurin, USAAF (20) P-47/P-51 - ETO
Capt. Donald N. Aldrich, USMC (20) F4U - PTO
Col. Thomas J. Lynch, USAAF (20) P-39/P-38 - *PTO*
Lt. Col. Robert Westbrook, USAAF (20) P-40/P-38 - *PTO*

Now after having a look at this list, we see that the P-38 was among the top scoring aircraft. However, do you notice that NOT a single P-38 is listed in the top ETO rankings? (As a matter of fact, not even the P-51 is the top ETO winner...that distinction goes to the P-47)

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## DSR T-888 (Sep 24, 2014)

Interesting discussion...


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## drgondog (Sep 24, 2014)

Top score for an ETO P-38 driver was 20FG James Morris with 7.33, for MTO 82FG Sloan and 14FG Brezas w/12 each .. which might put PTO scores in perspective?


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## tomo pauk (Sep 24, 2014)

GregP said:


> ...
> 4. The "fix" for the poor cockpit heater was also simple; use an electric heater.
> ...



Back to this tidbit - the USAF memo, dated March 11th 1944 (that deals with perspective P-38K), says that cockpit heating is 'satisfactory' with newly produced P-38Js. The electric gun heater is introduced with P-38J-15, so the hot air formerly used to heat the guns is now directed in the cockpit. Also the 'intensifier tube inlet' is now of increased size; those two changes more than doubled the amount of heat entering in the cockpit. Lockheed is also trying to seal any gaps where leakage can occur. Here, last page talks about cockpit heating.


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## gjs238 (Sep 24, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Back to this tidbit - the USAF memo, dated March 11th 1944 (that deals with perspective P-38K), says that cockpit heating is 'satisfactory' with newly produced P-38Js. The electric gun heater is introduced with P-38J-15, so the hot air formerly used to heat the guns is now directed in the cockpit. Also the 'intensifier tube inlet' is now of increased size; those two changes more than doubled the amount of heat entering in the cockpit. Lockheed is also trying to seal any gaps where leakage can occur. Here, last page talks about cockpit heating.



I don't understand how issues like cockpit heating and windshield defrosting don't get addressed during development prior to wartime service.
Weren't aircraft flown at high altitudes during development?


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 24, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> I don't understand how issues like cockpit heating and windshield defrosting don't get addressed during development prior to wartime service.
> *Weren't aircraft flown at high altitudes during development*?



Over Southern California!

Remember - when the P-38 was being developed no one ever thought more than a dozen or so would ever be built. All the YP-38s were built by hand and things like cockpit heating and windshield defrosting were just being developed. When the P-38 first flew we were still operating open cockpit biplane fighters.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 24, 2014)

We may have been "operating" open cockpit biplane fighters but they were hardly in first line operation or units. Speaking of the AAC here although the navy had been using enclosed cockpits since the early 30s, although they often flew with the canopy open. 

Besides, you think they _might_ have learned just a little bit from






The PB-2A initially served with the 27th Pursuit Squadron, 1st Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field, Michigan.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 24, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> We may have been "operating" open cockpit biplane fighters but they were hardly in first line operation or units.



But they were there...

_"The first unit to receive the P-12 in the Panama Canal Zone was the 24th Pursuit Squadron (6th Composite Group) in 1930. This squadron then joined the 16th Pursuit Group, where it joined the 29th and 78th Pursuit Squadrons, both equipped with the P-12. The 78th lost its P-12s in 1936, but the other two squadrons kept them to *1939.* 

On Hawaii the P-12 was used by the 5th Composite Group. It was one of many types used by the 4th Observation (then Reconnaissance) Squadron in c.1929-1937 and then the 58th Observation Squadron (c.1936-38 ). The P-12 was also used by the 6th and 19th Pursuit Squadrons, both of the 18th Pursuit Group, from 1931-*1938*."_

I think the XP-38 first flew in January 1939.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 24, 2014)

Don't forget the P-26!

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## GregP (Sep 24, 2014)

Where did I get the list?

Since it apparently isn’t obvious, the list I have is:

1. Richard I. Bong, P-38 pilot, 40 kills
2. Thomas McGuire, P-38 pilot, 38 kills
3. David McCampbell, F6F pilot, 34 kills
4. George Preddy, P-47 pilot, 29 kills
5/6. Gregory Boyington, F4U pilot. 28 kills 
6/5. Francis Gabreski, P-47 pilot, 28 kills
7/8. Robert Johnson, P-47 pilot, 27 kills
8/7. Charles McDonald, P-38 pilot, 27 kills
9. Joe Foss, F4F pilot, 26 kills
10/11. Robert Hanson, F4U pilot, 25 kills
11/10. John Meyer, P-47 and P-51 pilot. 25 kills.

Above I simply stopped with Robert Hanson. This is the list that was “official” a bit after WWII and includes USAAF, USN, and USMC all together. I am not a subscriber to all the revisionist filtering that went on over the years. It was mostly done by people trying to advance the careers of certain aces, and they seem to have convinced some people of same. I’m not in that group.

Three P-38 aces, three P-47 aces, two Corsair aces, and one Wildcat ace.

This is U.S. list, not an “Allied list,” though I have that as well along with list for all countries except the smallest five (and I'm working on them as I get the time and desire). The P-38 was a U.S. fighter in origin and most of the production run, so I stuck with US pilots.

I’d be happy to participate in an “Allied Ace” discussion, it has merit and there are a lot of good pilots out there from all sides, but the merits of the P-38 were almost a U.S. - only concern. The only P-38 that was of real concern to the British was the awful units they ordered with non-contra-rotating props and non-turbo, too (lots of torque issues along with critical engine issues and generally unfriendly performance). None of the rest of the P-38’s were so afflicted.

And Bill, US citizens flying the RAF are not counted as U.S.A. by me. They are counted as RAF since that's the service they were flying for when the victories were achieved. If you disagree, then do so in good health. I'll maintain my point of view either way.

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## GrauGeist (Sep 24, 2014)

Greg, 
Every single pilot I listed was an American, *there are no allied pilots on my list*. W/C Wade was an American who chose to remain with the RAF after the U.S. entered the war.

My list, goes to illustrate that the top P-38 aces achieved those victories *in the Pacific Theater*. Even the aces you listed with the P-38 *were Pacific Theater*.

I didn't post the list to debate scores, or half scores or little itty bitty peices of scores, I posted the list to illustrate that the P-38 was not the ultra German killing machine that some make it out to be. Yes it held it's own, yes it performed wonderfully, and yes it was a terror to ground targets, but in Europe, it took a back seat to the other types.

The big question here, would be "why"? In the Pacific, it was a top scoring platform against agile, well flown adversaries. This is quite a contrast between the ETO (and MTO) and the Pacific.

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## GregP (Sep 24, 2014)

Graugeist,

I never mentioned the theater and don't care at all. The list of the top 10 is the list. There are three P-38's in the top 10 U.S.A. list. It's a stand-alone fact. Where the heck are you coming from?

The P-38J and L are a "What IF" in the ETO. No more than a very few ever GOT there! I am not aware that there are rules about "what ifs."

Don't beat around the bush, say what you are trying to say.

I am not trying to disagree, I am trying to find out what you are talking about.


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## wuzak (Sep 24, 2014)

This is the list of the top 50 American Aces according to List of World War II flying aces - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


PilotCountryServiceWWII Aerial VictoriesRichard I. BongUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces40Thomas B. McGuireUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces38David McCampbellUnited StatesU.S. Navy34Francis "Gabby" GabreskiUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces28Gregory "Pappy" BoyingtonUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps28Robert S. JohnsonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces27Charles H. MacDonaldUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces27George E. Preddy, Jr.United StatesU.S. Army Air Forces26.83Joseph J. FossUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps26Robert M. HansonUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps25John C. MeyerUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces24Cecil E. HarrisUnited StatesU.S. Navy24Raymond H. LittgeUnited StatesU.S. Air Force23.5Eugene A. ValenciaUnited StatesU.S. Navy23Lance C. WadeUnited StatesRoyal Air Force23David C. SchillingUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces22.5Gerald R. JohnsonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces22Neel E. KearbyUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces22Jay T. RobbinsUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces22Dominic S. GentileUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces21.83Fred J. ChristensenUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces21.5Raymond S. WetmoreUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces21.25John J. VollUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces21Kenneth A. WalshUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps21Walker 'Bud' Melville MahurinUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces20.75Donald N. AldrichUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps20Thomas J. LynchUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces20WestbrookUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces20Glenn E. DuncanUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces19Patrick D. FlemingUnited StatesU.S. Navy19Cornelius N. NooyUnited StatesU.S. Navy19John Lucian SmithUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps19Alexander VraciuUnited StatesU.S. Navy19Arthur J. BenkoUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18.5Marion E. CarlUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps18.5Leonard K. CarsonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18.5Glenn T. EaglesonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18.5Wilbur J. ThomasUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps18.5Walter C. BeckhamUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18Herschel H. GreenUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18John C. "Pappy" HerbstUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18Charles H. OlderUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18Hubert ZemkeUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.75John B. EnglandUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.5Duane W. BeesonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.33John F. ThornellUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.25Henry W. BrownUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.2Gerald W. JohnsonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17James S. Varnell, Jr.United StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17John T. GodfreyUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces16.33


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## GrauGeist (Sep 24, 2014)

This thread was referring to the European Theater...so let's find a thread about the P-40's performance in North Africa and flood it with PTO stats, then...

The conversation that launched my list was to point out (factually) that the P-38 wasn't as freakin' awesome in Europe as you insist.

You're arguing just for the sake of arguing. sometimes I think you do this just to get attention, so don't encorage me to say what's on my mind, you won't appreciate it.

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## wuzak (Sep 24, 2014)

And doesn't big victory credit numbers suggest opportunity as much as it does aircraft or pilot ability?

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## GregP (Sep 24, 2014)

Go back and read the FIRST post, Graugeist, and THEN say that. 

It is a postulation question, which I was attempting to follow until you interrupted it. Instead of trying to take over this thread, maybe start one with YOUR question as the lead post? Maybe I could follow it then ... your venom eludes me ... sorry, you just aren't making sense in light of the author's first post.

And I don't need attention. Maybe you do. Go drink a beer and calm down. Then come back. You wouldn't appreciate the reciprocal from me either and, more important, it would serve no purpose ... and there's NO reason for it other than some desire to argue and try to CONVINCE me that I'm wrong. I'm 63 years old and I have my opinions because of the facts I've learned about for 50+ of those years. You ain't gonna' change them.

This isn't an argument forum, it is a discussion forum. I don't have to have the same opinon as you do and largely don't. Get over it and play nice in the sandbox. I have not insulted you personally in any way, as far as I know (if I have, apologies ...), and will try very hard not to do so. Stop trying to do it to me and stop right now before it gets out of hand.

Please?


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## GrauGeist (Sep 25, 2014)

Greg, 
I won't further this discussion either here or in PM...you're on your own, there...

The bottom line, as I posted earlier, is that the P-38 scored an impressive amount of victories against Axis adversaries, however, there is a huge difference between what it acheived in Europe (and the MTO) and the Pacific theater.


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## GregP (Sep 25, 2014)

Agree Graugeist. Once the P-38 faults were fixed it did well. I feel it would have done the same if it were still in the ETO, and it largely wasn't except as a recon platform. 

Obviously you don't agree. I guess we can leave it there. 

Been on my own for a lot of years. Still am.


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## drgondog (Sep 25, 2014)

wuzak said:


> This is the list of the top 50 American Aces according to List of World War II flying aces - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> 
> PilotCountryServiceWWII Aerial VictoriesRichard I. BongUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces40Thomas B. McGuireUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces38David McCampbellUnited StatesU.S. Navy34Francis "Gabby" GabreskiUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces28Gregory "Pappy" BoyingtonUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps28 *24*Robert S. JohnsonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces27Charles H. MacDonaldUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces27George E. Preddy, Jr.United StatesU.S. Army Air Forces26.83Joseph J. FossUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps26Robert M. HansonUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps25John C. MeyerUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces24Cecil E. HarrisUnited StatesU.S. Navy24Raymond H. LittgeUnited StatesU.S. Air Force23.5 *10.5*Eugene A. ValenciaUnited StatesU.S. Navy23Lance C. WadeUnited StatesRoyal Air Force23David C. SchillingUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces22.5Gerald R. JohnsonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces22Neel E. KearbyUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces22Jay T. RobbinsUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces22Dominic S. GentileUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces21.83Fred J. ChristensenUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces21.5Raymond S. WetmoreUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces21.25John J. VollUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces21Kenneth A. WalshUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps21Walker 'Bud' Melville MahurinUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces20.75Donald N. AldrichUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps20Thomas J. LynchUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces20WestbrookUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces20Glenn E. DuncanUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces19Patrick D. FlemingUnited StatesU.S. Navy19Cornelius N. NooyUnited StatesU.S. Navy19John Lucian SmithUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps19Alexander VraciuUnited StatesU.S. Navy19Arthur J. BenkoUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18.5Marion E. CarlUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps18.5Leonard K. CarsonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18.5Glenn T. EaglesonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18.5Wilbur J. ThomasUnited StatesU.S. Marine Corps18.5Walter C. BeckhamUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18Herschel H. GreenUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18John C. "Pappy" HerbstUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18Charles H. OlderUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces18Hubert ZemkeUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.75John B. EnglandUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.5Duane W. BeesonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.33John F. ThornellUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.25Henry W. BrownUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17.2 *14.2*Gerald W. JohnsonUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17James S. Varnell, Jr.United StatesU.S. Army Air Forces17John T. GodfreyUnited StatesU.S. Army Air Forces16.33



The corrections apply to the official American Fighter Aces totals.. the various lists pre USAF Study 85including the Eight Air Force Victory Credits Board June 1945 had numerous double credits that were copied without thought, and Study 85 removed them. 

The American Fighter Aces Association recognizes for example Wade and RAF Eagle Squadron ace Dunn, as American Fighter Aces as well as officially recognized scores for Tex Hill while flying for Nationalist Chinese AVG before joining the 23FG. Bob Neale had 13 with AVG, recognized as an American Fighter Ace - was born in British Columbia. Alex Baumler, another AVG/CBI Ace, recognized by AFA received 4.5 of his 9.5 credits flying I-15 and I-16 for the Soviets in Spanish Civil War in 1937, one with the AVG and 4 with 23rd FG.

Dunn, Wade, and Baumler's non US (including AVG, Eagle Squadron) vc's are not accounted for in USAF 85, nor are USMC and USN or RAF, etc.

Wayne - in addition the list is top WW II scores. Gabreski got 6.5 more in Korea (officially number 3), Whisner raised his to 21, Eagleston to 20.5, Mahurin to 24.25, Meyer to 26,


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## Mike Williams (Sep 25, 2014)

DSR T-888 said:


> When the problems were finally fixed for the P-38, it was too late since the Mustang was already proving dominance. So my question is; how did/would the P-38J-25 and P-38L-5-LO preform against German fighters in the European theater if some of the USAAF still used the P-38 up until the end of the war.
> 
> Thanks
> DSR_T-888



You might consider checking out the operations of the 9th Air Force P-38 groups, i.e. 367th, 370th and 474th Fighter Groups. The 367th and 370th operated the P-38 into early 1945 and the 474th stayed with the P-38 through to war's end. These units did see action against German fighters.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 25, 2014)

P-38s _MIGHT_ have racked up a higher _European_ score had they not been sucked off to North Africa to cover the invasion and Tunisia campaign followed by Sicily/Italy.

First P-38 fighter groups go operational in England in Aug/Sept of 1942 but are redeployed to North Africa in Oct/Nov of 1942. P-38 fighters (recon planes did operate from England) will NOT operate from England in any numbers (squadron or above) until Oct 1943 at which point there are already 7 fighter groups in England operational with P-47s. 

So in some cases score in a particular theater is influenced by numbers available, time in service and enemy opposition (you can't shoot down what isn't there for instance).


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## gjs238 (Sep 25, 2014)

GregP said:


> 9. Joe Foss, F4F pilot, 26 kills



F4F ace!
The ace of aces!


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## gjs238 (Sep 25, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> P-38s _MIGHT_ have racked up a higher _European_ score had they not been sucked off to North Africa to cover the invasion and Tunisia campaign followed by Sicily/Italy.
> 
> First P-38 fighter groups go operational in England in Aug/Sept of 1942 but are redeployed to North Africa in Oct/Nov of 1942. P-38 fighters (recon planes did operate from England) will NOT operate from England in any numbers (squadron or above) until Oct 1943 at which point there are already 7 fighter groups in England operational with P-47s.
> 
> So in some cases score in a particular theater is influenced by numbers available, time in service and enemy opposition (you can't shoot down what isn't there for instance).



What was the motivation for redeploying P-38's to North Africa instead of using P-40's in that theatre?
Range?


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## drgondog (Sep 25, 2014)

Mike Williams said:


> You might consider checking out the operations of the 9th Air Force P-38 groups, i.e. 367th, 370th and 474th Fighter Groups. The 367th and 370th operated the P-38 into early 1945 and the 474th stayed with the P-38 through to war's end. These units did see action against German fighters.



Yes, Mike

Each was equipped with P-38J-15 with leading edge fuel tanks when they started combat ops in April and early May, 1944. I haven't yet found out whether P-38L's were delivered but all the J's received the filed modifications for both the boosted ailerons and the Dive flaps by late June when all the ETO P-38s were upgraded to the P-38J-25.
Gp -VC's
367 89.0
370 42.0
474 96.0

By contrast the 354th FG, flying P-51s in 9th AF, same mission profiles - scored as follows from 1 May 1944

354 378.5 

- These do not include the 14 VC's in the brief P-47 operation Dec 1944 through mid Feb 1945, or the 'missing' 37 VC's in the lost IX AF April 45 Victory Credit Board.

Simply stated, the 354th FG Mustangs outscored all three 9th AF P-38 FG's equipped with P-38J-15 and newer Lightnings from May 1, 1944 through VE Day.

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## Koopernic (Sep 25, 2014)

drgondog said:


> I don't recall any change of main airfoil from the NACA23016 or tip airfoil section. The change that did occur was to design and install a wing filet which did reduce buffeting.



You have to admit that a 16% thick aerofoil is a thick aerofoil. Ledicner gives:

Lockheed 22 P-38 Lightning NACA 23016 (root) NACA 4412 (tip)
Sadly no washout information. Even the tips are thick. It's no surprise that compressibility became an issue.


Below is an Me 262 replica displaying its full span 'slats out' during a manoeuvre at an air show.






The Me 262 had no washout angle (geometric twist) yet it had good stall characteristics both in landing configuration and under "G" with plenty of pre stall buffet.
Ledicner gives:

Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe NACA 00011-0.825-35 (root) NACA 00009-1.1-40 (tip)

In English: the roots is 11% thick with point of maximum thickness at 35%, tip is 9% thick with 40% (this actually increases the sweep angle)

The stall characteristics of the Me 109 with partial span slats was investigate in publications TB 9443 and UM7801 and LuFo 

1 Stall angle of Messerschmitt's NACA 2R1 is 18 degrees at CLmax 1.46 degrees (somewhat more than the primitive Clark Y used in Shortround6's example)
2 With slats airflow remained attached till 30 degrees CLmax of 1.8

Its true that partial span slats do not significantly effect the inner portion of the wing however:
1 In tapered planforms such as Me 109 and P-51 tips will stall first unless either twist is added or slats so the positive effect of slats is more than just to avoid the 1 or 2 degrees of 'necessary evil' wing twist might suggest.
2 I believe due to propeller stream the airflow angle of attack over the inner un-slatted portion of the wing was less than the angle of attack over the slated portion.

Also note Messerscmitt experiment with wing fences on the Me 109B and found that they worked at stopping span wise flow and improving stall which effected even the small taper of the me 109 though not as good as slats.

Taking into account the *whole wing *the Me 109 had a CLMax of 1.46. This is apparently a higher CLmax over the total wing than the Spitfire V = 1.12 and P-51 = 1.28 Taking into account this lift loading and the much lower wing loadings of the Spit and P-51 we find that Me 109 is only a little worse than the Spit (4%) and slightly better than the P-51B. Early days yet, I'm gathering primary data before I stick my neck out. Manoeuvrability may get more down to power loading, lift to drag ratios and aerodynamic refinements than wing loading.

I realise I have hijacked the thread a little: but I was only arguing that *the P-38 or any hypothetical twin could in theory be just as manoeuvrable as a single given equal technology, engine power* and approximately equal lift loading or at least wing area. The P-38 should have worked very well.

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## Shortround6 (Sep 25, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> What was the motivation for redeploying P-38's to North Africa instead of using P-40's in that theatre?
> Range?



Well, range and the _fact_ that they KNEW the P-40 couldn't compete with the 109s on even terms. Even using P-40Fs. They did use hundred of P-40s in that theater along with P-39s. The P-38s flew top cover for the tactical bombers (B-25/B-26s) and the lower altitude fighters. 

The P-40s could hold their own _but only at the lower altitudes,_ which is no way to win a campaign. It only works *IF* your enemy co-operates and flies were your aircraft are the strongest.


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## GregP (Sep 25, 2014)

Hey gjs,

I like the Wildcat, too. We have a frequent visitor at the museum in the form of Tom Camp and his FM-2. I love the whine of the supercharger as he flies a fast pass. Evey pilot who has had the fortune to fly it likes it, too.


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## drgondog (Sep 25, 2014)

GregP said:


> Graugeist,
> 
> The P-38J and L are a "What IF" in the ETO. No more than a very few ever GOT there! I am not aware that there are rules about "what ifs."



Greg - For Certain, the P-38J started combat operations for both the 20th and the 55th in December, 1943. For certain, the 364th began combat ops with J-10 in late February 1944 as it lost one on the 29th. For certain the -15's were operational in May/June 1944 for the 20/55/364 and 479 so the inference is also for the 367/370 and 474 as they received ships from each of the 8th AF units in addition to their own inventory.

The combined air victory credits for three experienced P-38 Groups performing escort (20/55 and 364) were 104 plus 479 with 4 for those three months of operations with P-38J-10 and J-15's. 

In the unhappy comparison with the 9th AF 354th FG which flew escort in all of May, mostly ground support and medium bomber escort for June/July - It destroyed 129 - again more than all the four 8th AF P-38s combined. 

So to your point about Very few P-38J's being in the ETO, based on the TO&E for each FG of 26/squadron and 4 HQ for 100%, that would mean 82 but simplify math with 80

October through November 80 55thFG
December through February 160 55th and 20thFG
March through April 320 55th and 20th and 364th FG and 367th FG
May through July 560 55th, 20th, 364th, 479th, 367th, 370th, 374thFG's
August through September 479th plus 367 plus 370 plus 474


Approximate monthly sortie capability with perfect weather
October -November 80x30x2 = 4800 P-51= 0 354FG 9th AF arrives for Ops December1
December-February 160x2x30= 9600 P-51=80x2x30 (plus 357 80x15)=4800+1200= 6000
March- 240x30 = 7200 P-51=400x30 (4th and 355th and 363rd added)= 12000

In the period October 1943 through March 31, 1944 the P-38s in the 8th AF had an operational sortie capacity of 21600 sorties. The P-51B in 8th and 9th AF had a sortie capacity of 18000 sorties. That is a ratio of 21600/18000 or 20% more capacity in same flying weather.

But in that timeframe the P-38 destroyed 115 German aircraft, the Mustang 398 German aircraft

For Q2-1944

April 320x30 (367FG+) = 7200 P-51=480x30 (352nd added) =14400 
May 560x30 (370/474/479+) =16800 P-51=640x30 (339/361/359+,363 removed)=19200
June 560x30 =16800 P-51=640x30 = 19200

Now the P-38 sortie capacity through Q2 is 40,800 while P-51 is 52,800
The P-38 destroys 90 German aircraft while the P-51 (with 30% more sortie capacity) destroys 972 in the same period.

*In that period the P-38H destroyed 27 aircraft and the P-38J destroyed 178
In that period the P-51B (mostly) destroyed 1370 aircraft in the air.

The Total available sortie days from October, 1943 through June, 1944 were 62,400 for the P-38 and 60,000 for the P-51*



Can you now make a case that the P-38J would have done very well?

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## drgondog (Sep 25, 2014)

GregP said:


> Where did I get the list?
> 
> Since it apparently isn’t obvious, the list I have is:
> 
> ...



No problem - the AFA recognizes them and they are the central repository of Ace validation, depending on USAF, USN and USMC but also include validated confirmation for credits received by RAF, AVG records, etc.

So, if you drop to 24 for your cut off - then P-38 (3), F4U and P-51 (two each), P-47 (two) F4F (one) F6F (two)


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## gjs238 (Sep 25, 2014)

drgondog said:


> and that leaves 3 P-38, 2 P-47, 2 F6F, 2 P-51, 2 F4U, 1 F4F aces



Interesting.

My earlier exclamation for the F4F driver is for the deeds he accomplished in an R-1830 powered aircraft. 
Wonder what he would have accomplished in a F6F or F4U.

It's also interesting that there weren't more F6F and P51 aces.
Both were responsible for the destruction of so many axis aircraft.
I'm wondering if there were more US pilots, flying more aircraft, diluting the number of kills per pilot.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 25, 2014)

Quite possible.

It is one thing to be flying from Henderson Field and having the Japanese supply numbers of targets to your location on a somewhat regular basis (  ) against a small group of defenders, and having hundreds of American planes (just on carriers) looking for targets in 1944/45. Campaigns (and battles) were often shorter and further apart. 
On _average_ the American pilots of 1944/45 were better trained too, so wingmen on others in the squadron were more likely to pick up one or two victories. 

No disrespect intended for the early pilots ( and ground crew), ill fed, sick and living (and servicing aircraft ) in truly appalling conditions it was anything *but* a shooting gallery. However what some people may view as being outnumbered and surrounded (not literally in the case of Guadalcanal) other people view as a target rich environment.

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## drgondog (Sep 25, 2014)

In Fire in the Sky by Bergerud, he claims that the IJN had zero notion of finger four type formations for improved defense, and this claim seems to be backed by many Japanese pilot and air leaders.

He cites other factors for the Allies gaining the upper hand in 1942 despite the continued maneuverability advantage and residual supply of top notch fighter pilots out of the pre-war training program. 

First, the Japanese radar lagged behind ours and was not in sufficient number to scatter and place in various strategic spots to get consistent early warning - and by the time they did our Strafers created havoc. Second, the Japanese construction battalions had good key core personnel but their labor supply was dominantly untrained indigenous labor in contrast to our CeeBee's and the equipment assets far behind ours. That resulted in airfields without good prepared surfaces from revetments to taxiways to the main air strip - meaning that it took a long time between alert and getting aircraft off the ground. Last, the combination of spare parts chain of supply and lack of sufficient mechanics resulted in a lot of the inventory un flyable from one mission to another.

Another major factor affecting both sides was disease - but we won with better supply of meds and docs and rotation to medical facilities whereas the Japanese suffered much worse attrition from daily flight rosters.

Even though the Germans never suffered as described above in the Battle over Germany, they also suffered skilled fighter pilot attrition as the war progressed into from 1942 into 1944. But, unlike the Japanese they almost always were able to get a battle force with an initial altitude advantage to begin the fight.

One last important factor. The LW fighter pilots were told to avoid US escorts and attack where no escorts existed. It was EASY to spot a P-38 and in combination with the 'avoid the escorts', the Germans found it far easier than against the P-51 which very much looked like a 109 until it was too late.

IMO, this resulted in the ability of the P-38 to do well in the PTO, and conversely why they had much more difficulty in the ETO.


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## drgondog (Sep 25, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Interesting.
> 
> My earlier exclamation for the F4F driver is for the deeds he accomplished in an R-1830 powered aircraft.
> Wonder what he would have accomplished in a F6F or F4U.
> ...



Probably didn't dilute the ratio of kills per pilot, but more US pilots survived because we eventually attained numerical superiority. Very few US aces were lost in air to air combat as a percentage of aces...

Joe Foss returned to PTO as CO of VMF 115 flying F4U-1A and FG-1A for about 7 months at Espiritu, Bougainville and Emirau and finally Leyte. Never engaged again. It is all about opportunity, skill, and luck.

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## drgondog (Sep 25, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> The stall characteristics of the Me 109 with partial span slats was investigate in publications TB 9443 and UM7801 and LuFo
> 
> 1 Stall angle of Messerschmitt's NACA 2R1 is 18 degrees at CLmax 1.46 degrees (somewhat more than the primitive Clark Y used in Shortround6's example)
> 2 With slats airflow remained attached till 30 degrees CLmax of 1.8
> ...



Simplictically, maybe. One of the knocks against the P-38 was the initial sluggish response to lateral stick force because of the relative rolling inertia to be overcome before steady state rolling rate was achieved. Even with boosted ailerons, the description was akin to tapping feet awaiting a slow then fast response. That is not a happy circumstance if somebody is on your tail or you are chasing someone with excellent roll and response rate that Reverses on you.

I just blathered a lot of 'stuff' from memory so I will have to actually look now. Enjoy the chat.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 25, 2014)

Mach limit anyone? in the 30,000+ft range a late model P-38's max level speed was perilously close to its mach limit (290 IAS at 30,000ft). Hence instructions like "max angle for extended dives is 15 degrees".

At lower altitudes, as per the Med and the Pacific it did pretty well. But for high altitude combat in mid-late '44...no fun at all.

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## eagledad (Sep 25, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Yes, Mike
> 
> Each was equipped with P-38J-15 with leading edge fuel tanks when they started combat ops in April and early May, 1944. I haven't yet found out whether P-38L's were delivered but all the J's received the filed modifications for both the boosted ailerons and the Dive flaps by late June when all the ETO P-38s were upgraded to the P-38J-25.
> 
> ...



*The P-38 groups that went operational in the spring of 1944 were not exclusively equipped with J-15 and newer Lightnings. The 394th squadron of the 367th Fighter Group in April 1944 started with one J-5, 9 J-10's and 10 J-15's. (Dynamite Gang, page 26). The 370th Fighter Group lost a J-10 (42-68021)on 5/19/44 (The 370th Fighter Group in World War II, page 411). I do not have any information on the 474th as to its original equipment but suspect it also had a mixture of 5, 10, and 15's. As an aside,the 479th had at least one J-5 (42-67261)that was lost on a training mission on May 25, the same day that the Group went operational (The 479th Fighter Group in World War II, page 468).*

IMHO, a P-38J-25/L flown by a well trained and experienced pilot would hold its own or more against most Luftwaffe piston-engined fighters. If those models had been available in late 43, early 44, they may have earned the P-38 a great reputation in the ETO. I do believe however, that by 1945, the Lightning had reached the end of its development potential, unlike the P-51D which morphed into the H, or the P-47D which could be developed into the M/N.

Eagledad


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## gjs238 (Sep 25, 2014)

eagledad said:


> I do believe however, that by 1945, the Lightning had reached the end of its development potential, unlike the P-51D which morphed into the H, or the P-47D which could be developed into the M/N.
> 
> Eagledad



Hmmm, Griffon powered P-38?


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## eagledad (Sep 25, 2014)

Hello gjs238!

With the Lightning's relatively low critical mach number wouldn't one need to do some redesign of the airframe to get the most out of the power increases of a more powerful engine? Perhaps, if one wanted to use the Lightning in an exclusive low level role, a Griffon would work. However, I don't believe a Griffon powered P-38 would be able to successfully tangle with a high flying Ta-152, P-51H, P-47N, or Spifire XIX.

Eagledad


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## BiffF15 (Sep 25, 2014)

GregP said:


> Where did I get the list?
> 
> Since it apparently isn’t obvious, the list I have is:
> 
> ...



GregP,
Didn't George Preddy get all his kills in a Mustang?
V/R,
Biff


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## wuzak (Sep 25, 2014)

BiffF15 said:


> GregP,
> Didn't George Preddy get all his kills in a Mustang?
> V/R,
> Biff





> Preddy initially served in the Southwest Pacific Theater, flying P-40s with the 9th Pursuit Squadron, 49th Pursuit Group, which provided air defense against Japanese aircraft attacking Darwin, Australia. Preddy claimed two Japanese aircraft damaged over Darwin. He was hospitalized after a collision with another P-40. After his recovery, Preddy was reassigned to the 352nd Fighter Group in the European Theater, flying P-51s. The group flew out of RAF Bodney, England and Asch Airfield, Belgium. On August 6, 1944, Preddy claimed six German Luftwaffe fighters in a single sortie.



George Preddy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Shortround6 (Sep 25, 2014)

Griffon wouldn't really do much of anything for the P-38L at high altitudes anyway. With RAM it was good for 1425hp at 29,000ft Military power for 15 minutes. Without Ram it was 26,600ft. WEP was 1600hp at 28,700ft with RAM and 25,800ft without. That is at 3000rpm. 

P-38L can make just about the same amount of power as a 60 series Griffon running 18lbs boost but 10,000ft higher. At low level the Griffon has it allover the Allison (at least by the book numbers) but the turbo (if working properly) is mighty tough to beat at 25,000ft and above. 
Of course the Turbo or the Griffon do nothing to solve the mach tuck problem.

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## GregP (Sep 25, 2014)

Hi Bill,
That’s a lot of data that I’d LOVE to have access to. I have a pdf of Report 85, but it is a scanned document and not computer readable. I decline to retype it into readable format. So while I like the report, it has very little actual use to me. Your data on the P-38 in the ETO wouldn’t happen to include the type missions they were assigned, would it?

As I’ve often stated in here, the scrutiny applied to a select few, like Boyington, has not been applied to everyone. Until it is, I’ll take the victories awarded in the war and not the revisionist numbers. Anyone else is free to do as they please, just like I am. I will not argue about it; I simply use different numbers. Use whatever you like.

The numbers I have for the P-38 do not include aircraft attached to individual units and I’d love to have those data. From Francis Dean’s “America’s Hundred Thousand,” I do have the numbers for USAAF aircraft in the ETO. Those numbers show the P-38 flying 60.7% of the sorties the P-51 flew while suffering 69.7% of the P-41’s combat losses and dropping 355% of the bombs the P-51 did. That’s 355% of the bombs with 60% of the sorties the P-51 flew. That figure alone makes me wonder VERY hard about the missions assigned to the P-38 versus the P-51, and it points me to the supposition that the P-51 was selected for the missions that afforded higher opportunities for air combat, while bomb-laden P-38’s were assigned what can only be support bombing duties with MUCH less chance of encountering a defender in the air that is searching for high-altitude strategic bombers.

Those 60.7% of the P-51 sorties in P-38’s resulted in 35.8% of the air victories and 18.1% of the ground victories. I think my supposition here is confirmed that the P-38’s were supporting Army units. They would never replace strategic bombers and that leaves only ground support as the major mission.

So my opinion is they got what they assigned the two planes to do and both did OK. We don’t KNOW how they would have dome if the missions were switched … they weren’t switched, at least in the ETO.

Bottom line is the P-51 did a very credible job at escort and destroying enemy planes. The P-38 seems to have dome pretty well at what it was assigned and I see no evidence that would suggest to me that if the missions were swapped, we would have failed and lost the war. To come to that conclusion, I’d want to see statistics for similar missions flown against similar defenders. Obviously I have no data supporting my argument, but I KNOW the P-51 was afforded missions with much higher probability of seeing enemy aircraft. Bombers draw enemy fighters and escorts will engage them. P-51’s were primary escorts. Pretty easy there. Perhaps the planners did that on purpose because they though as you do. Could be.

I think an experienced P-38 group would have done just fine on escort missions that were within their range. Then again, I think a Hellcat group would have dome the same, but that’s another “what if.” In the event, they all did what they were assigned. The P-51 won it’s laurels fairly and is what it is in history. The P-38 showed what it could do in the PTO and MTO and, if employed correctly, would have done just fine in my opinion in the ETO. It’s not intended to try to convince you, Graugeist, or anyone else, it’s MY opinion. The only data I have that shows late model P-38 employed in escort mission was in the PTO and MTO, so that’s what I use for comparison.

But, by all means, if you have the data in the ETO about mission types, please post it. I have never seen it and would like to. I don’t disbelieve you, but would like to have the sources!

I’ll end with this. The USAAF flew the A-36, P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47, P-51, P-61, some Spitfires, and some Beaufighters in the ETO. That’s 9 types used by the USAAF. The P-38 in the ETO came in third in the ETO against all other USAAF types and that says it wasn’t too bad. You guys can hate it and disrespect it all you want. It wasn’t that bad in the final tally.

And I’m not trying to convince you of anything (you opinions are no doubt based on your own reading) and I don’t doubt your data. I might embrace it if had the sources. Cheers.

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## tomo pauk (Sep 26, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Griffon wouldn't really do much of anything for the P-38L at high altitudes anyway. With RAM it was good for 1425hp at 29,000ft Military power for 15 minutes. Without Ram it was 26,600ft. WEP was 1600hp at 28,700ft with RAM and 25,800ft without. That is at 3000rpm.
> 
> P-38L can make just about the same amount of power as a 60 series Griffon running 18lbs boost but 10,000ft higher. At low level the Griffon has it allover the Allison (at least by the book numbers) but the turbo (if working properly) is mighty tough to beat at 25,000ft and above.
> Of course the Turbo or the Griffon do nothing to solve the mach tuck problem.



The latest sentence is dead on.
For the Griffo, we need also to add a substantial amount of exhaust thrust at such high altitudes, maybe equivalent of 20% of engine power? That woul make it about 1700 hp for military power at 27-30 kft?


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## drgondog (Sep 26, 2014)

BiffF15 said:


> GregP,
> Didn't George Preddy get all his kills in a Mustang?
> V/R,
> Biff


No. The 352nd and 355th FG both began ops in September 1943. Both in P-47s. Both Preddy and Meyer got their first victory credits in P-47s. Both scored 3-0-0 and 3-1-0 respectively in the P-47 from September 1943 through March, 1944.

The 352nd converted to P-51s in mid April, 1944 and all the rest of their respective scores were in P-51s.


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## drgondog (Sep 26, 2014)

eagledad said:


> The P-38 groups that went operational in the spring of 1944 were not exclusively equipped with J-15 and newer Lightnings.
> 
> *Didn't say that they were Exclusively operational. I cited the presences and the loss date to prove the existence of the P-38J and successive evolution in arrival into 8th and 9th AF fighter groups*
> 
> ...



As to the other question.. this is what I stated
_
Each was equipped with P-38J-15 with leading edge fuel tanks when they started combat ops in April and early May, 1944. I haven't yet found out whether P-38L's were delivered but all the J's received the filed modifications for both the boosted ailerons and the Dive flaps by late June when all the ETO P-38s were upgraded to the P-38J-25_

What I meant, and should have clarified, is that *all the P-38J's* were scheduled to be upgraded with Field kits to install the dive flaps and boosted ailerons and bring them to the J-25 capability.Retrofit capability to redesign the intercooler and install the leading edge fuel cells would have been impossible at Service centers in England. However, AFAIK it would not have been impossible to retrofit the earlier J-5 or -10 because I'm not as familiar with the internal design features of the P-38J blocks.

As to the sources - multiple conversations with both John Landers and Robin Olds, curiously on this subject of "what if". Landers was certain that he had both dive flaps and boosted ailerons on his June 25, 1944 fight with 109s and 190s near Paris. He was equally certain that he was flying the -15. The last of those conversations were in the mid 80's. In the only conversation with Olds on this subject, Zemke (and Loisel and Landers) were also in it... either 1984 0r 1986 AFA Reunion in Tuscon. Zemke, Olds and Loisel recall flying the 'modified' J-15 also in the summer of 1944. Neither Olds nor Zemke recall a P-38L-1 at 479th but the first P-38L-1's were rolling into USAAF inventories in June, 1944. 

As an aside to frame the P-38L-1 combat arrival discussion - PTO aces Bong, McGuire and McDonald all scored in L-1s in October/November 1944. Two aces of the 474FG in ETO scored with J-25s in August (Kirkland - two 109s 8/25) and Milliken - 2-0-3 FW 190s on 9/12/44)

EDIT - 9/27 I haven't found the source(s) yet that cite Lockheed producing several hundred dive flap kits in late 1943 to March 1944 and dispatch them to ETO/PTO and MTO. A friendly fire incident took down a AAF transport carrying 200 en route to England in early March, 1944. It is in one of Ethell's and one of Bodie's books but I'm looking for a Ben Kelsey memo dated April 1943 citing his satisfaction with the dive flap mod on one of the very early -5's


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## Shortround6 (Sep 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The latest sentence is dead on.
> For the Griffo, we need also to add a substantial amount of exhaust thrust at such high altitudes, maybe equivalent of 20% of engine power? That woul make it about 1700 hp for military power at 27-30 kft?



I am not sure about the that much exhaust thrust. for 10,000ft difference in altitude you loose about 20% in air density (roughly) so you have 20% less exhaust mass. That gets balanced somewhat by the higher exhaust velocity because of the lower air pressure at the exhaust nozzles. 
For the Merlin XX exhaust thrust (power) never exceeded 11.5% of brake hp. A two stage engine will show a higher percentage because you have the weight of the exhaust used to drive the supercharger but that is not a constant either, the Merlin XX needed 225hp to drive the supercharger at 20,000ft to give 12lb of boost. At 30,000ft the supercharger could only deliver a bit over 2lbs of boost . Charge flow(weight of air+fuel) had dropped from 144lb/min to 107.2lb/min and supercharger power requirement had dropped to 167hp. 

I do have to apologize though, apparently I was looking at the wrong page in my book (and failed to check a second source) and a two stage Griffon *will* pretty much match at Late Turbo Allison at altitude (27-28,000ft).


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## drgondog (Sep 26, 2014)

GregP said:


> i Bill,
> That’s a lot of data that I’d LOVE to have access to. Your data on the P-38 in the ETO wouldn’t happen to include the type missions they were assigned, would it?
> 
> *I have the data but not in spreadsheet. The P-38 in 8th AF was tasked first to long range escort through its entire 8th AF career.*
> ...



I still believe the critical factor in the ETO, and to a degree in the MTO, for strategic incursions into Germany on bomber escort was simply that the LW fighter pilots were ordered to not engage escort - and the big freaking P-38 was easy to spot and avoid... and they did. But they had no such defense against the P-51.

The net - the P-38 escorted well and nobody came to the party. When they did engage, the 109 and 190 could both outdive and maintain control in the dive to easily escape many combat situations with the P-38. Until the dive flap and boosted ailerons, the P-38H and J were also at a maneuvering disadvantage except for a steep climbing turn to the right.. it was nowhere near as ideal as P-38 vs A6M, Ki 61, etc combat.

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## drgondog (Sep 26, 2014)

eagledad said:


> [
> 
> IMHO, a P-38J-25/L flown by a well trained and experienced pilot would hold its own or more against most Luftwaffe piston-engined fighters. If those models had been available in late 43, early 44, they may have earned the P-38 a great reputation in the ETO. I do believe however, that by 1945, the Lightning had reached the end of its development potential, unlike the P-51D which morphed into the H, or the P-47D which could be developed into the M/N
> 
> Eagledad



From my perspective this statement represents the 'average' concensus for the advocates of "The P-38 coulda done better in the ETO, if only.. - fill in the blanks -"

Here's the thing. For the Pre P-38J-15 which first started arriving in February 1944 to fill (maybe late January) operational squadrons in the ETO, there were two sets of issues, one group Objective, the other Intangible that hindered achievement of the Lightning versus the Bf 109 and FW 190. Thos two represented the primary adversaries with relatively equal performance at the altitudes in which the 8th AF bombers were escorted..

Mechanical/Aerodynamic - tangible and objective
* Intercooler issues resulting in mechanical engine failures 
* Immediate entry into compressibility and uncontrollable dive when diving from high speed cruise.
* Lack of roll and turn maneuverability in comparison.

Intangibles
* Cockpit comfort due to frigid cockpit/lack of adequate heating resulting in increased fatigue
* Huge size and distinctive plan form making it uniquely identifiable from great distances
* Significant areas of rear and down aft visibility diminished by tail boom geometry
* Combination of twin engine operation and complicated control processes to move from cruise to combat state in short time.

In addition One Major Intangible representing External factors beyond Engineering solution
****** Luftwaffe High Command instructions to avoid bomber escort

So, on paper the entry of the 55th FG in October with the improved P-38H that still had all the above Tangible issues resulted in:
Operational issues reducing effective mission strength below that of comparable 8th AF P-47s (P-51s subject to this also as bugs were being fixed in first several months of operations).
* combat performance versus mainstream LW fighters well below P-47 when engaged.
* loss rate to mechanical problems and initially higher accident rate due to complexity and training required to operate twin engines versus single engine fighter.
* Twice as expensive to operate versus single engine fighters

Positive Factors - but intangible to the analyst wondering why the P-38 wasn't doing as well against the LW.
* The escort missions seemed successful because fewer attacks SEEMED to occur when P-38s were escorting specific bomber groups.. This is somewhat anecdotal but my own research of individual 8th AF Fighter Group Histories points to more Mission Summary Reports, Para H. Claims for A/c destroyed" cite the phrase 'NIL" far more than the P-51 and P-47 groups - even if in same general area and time as the other groups.

My conclusion is and has been for some time, that the avoidance of combat order by Goering was very easy to obey because the P-38 was mostly visible to the LW before the LW was visible to the P-38s. Secondly, until the dive flap was installed, avoidance of a P-38 even when engaged was relatively easy by simply pushing the 109 and 190 into a sharp roll and split S. If the P-38 even tried to follow, it would spend a long period of frustration until it reached sufficiently dense air to recover from the dive - due to the tuck issue following onset compressibility shock wave moving the CMac.

In the PTO, the Japanese fighters did not have either the speed or diving ability to escape from a P-38 and the combats were far more in middle altitudes where the .68M speeds were not often encountered even in a dive for some time or very steep dive angle. Nor were the Japanese inclined to avoid combat. Those are three factors for me which I think illustrates the relative effectiveness of the PTO P-38 versus the ETO/MTO long range escort utilization of the P-38 for attacks against Germany, Austria and Balkans.

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 26, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Combination of twin engine operation and complicated control processes to move from cruise to combat state in short time.



Excellent assessment Bill but I have issues with this one. I think it's obvious that a twin is more complicated to operate than a single engine fighter - two of everything. If you look at the placement of some of the controls on the P-38 and compare them to other twins of the day (and those developed after the P-38 ) some are in the same location and worked the same way. I think with training, a competent pilot could handle the work load and configure his aircraft to be combat ready in a required amount of time to defend himself, but this will go back to the complexity argument of operating a twin (let alone the time and cost to train pilots to handle the complexity of a twin). I never read much about PTO P-38 drivers complaining about the time it took to go from cruise to combat state. I think Rau's letter addressing this situation was a bit exaggerated, but funny that he talks about a new pilot with only 25 hours in the P-38, where AFAIK PTO P-38 drivers had a hell of a lot more time in type before they were cut loose to fly combat.

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## drgondog (Sep 26, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Excellent assessment Bill but I have issues with this one. I think it's obvious that a twin is more complicated to operate than a single engine fighter - two of everything. If you look at the placement of some of the controls on the P-38 and compare them to other twins of the day (and those developed after the P-38 ) some are in the same location and worked the same way. I think with training, a competent pilot could handle the work load and configure his aircraft to be combat ready in a required amount of time to defend himself, but this will go back to the complexity argument of operating a twin (let alone the time and cost to train pilots to handle the complexity of a twin). I never read much about PTO P-38 drivers complaining about the time it took to go from cruise to combat state. I think Rau's letter addressing this situation was a bit exaggerated, but funny that he talks about a new pilot with only 25 hours in the P-38, where AFAIK PTO P-38 drivers had a hell of a lot more time in type before they were cut loose to fly combat.



Hi Joe. I honestly do not know how much time the average replacement P-38 pilot had when a.) they got to England, and b.) how much time they got in the 496th FTG at Goxhill before moving into 8th and 9th AF P-38 groups. IMO the extra training and flight time translated to fewer mistakes making the multiple moves required to drop the tanks, run the RPM and throttle up, and go do sumtin' fast, but not significantly reduce the time. 

But - it was definitely more steps than a 51 or a 47 with the attendant possibility of a mistake along the way.

At the Fighter Conference at Patuxent River in October 1944, the P-38L was ranked as the 'worst cockpit and control layout' and only 2 of the 28 ranked maneuverability as good, 10 'fair' and 16 'poor' when compared to the other fighters flown at the Conference. Note that this was the latest P-38, it was after the last one flew combat for the 8th AF and just then reaching combat units in the PTO.

At the end of the day your points make sense Joe - but begs the question "If I have to invest more time in training, more time to train maintenance procedures, more average time to maintain it on a daily basis, spend more money on fuel, drain the fuel storage 2x faster, fight with an opponent that is still more maneuverable, can still out dive me - when I have a single engine fighter (the Mustang B/D) that doesn't have those problems.. would I want the first one to fight with?"

I think Doolittle answered the question in January 1944 and would have answered it the same way even if he had more experience with the J before making the decision. Remember he came from 12th AF and 15th AF where the P-38 combat in the Africa and Med campaigns didn't expose the P-38F and H as much as European high altitude escort conditions..

At any rate, it is an interesting discussion.

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## GrauGeist (Sep 26, 2014)

Here's a good overview of the P-38 from a pilot who flew them: Capt. Robert DeHaven, 7th FS, 49th FG (14 victories: 10 w/P-40 - 4 w/P-38):


> After training I requested duty in the Pacific and I requested being posted to a P-40 squadron and both wishes were granted. This was early in 1943 and most pilots already desired more advanced types and some thought my decision a mistake. Yet I had been inspired by the deeds of the Flying Tigers. We had also heard accounts that the P-38 was difficult to bail out of because of its twin-boom tail and that it was difficult when flying with one engine. I also knew that P-38s were still rare in the theater and I wanted to get into the war as soon as possible. That wish, too, was granted. I never regretted the choice.
> 
> If you flew wisely, the P-40 was a very capable aircraft. In many conditions, it could outturn a P-38, a fact that some pilots didn't realize when they made the transition between the two aircraft. The P-40 kept me alive and allowed me to accomplish my mission. The real problem with it was lack of range. As we pushed the Japanese back, P-40 pilots were slowly left out of the war. So when I moved to P-38s, an excellent aircraft, I did so not because I believed that the P-40 was an inferior fighter, but because I knew the P-38 would allow us to reach the enemy. I was a fighter pilot and that was what I was supposed to do.
> 
> ...

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## tomo pauk (Sep 26, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> I am not sure about the that much exhaust thrust. for 10,000ft difference in altitude you loose about 20% in air density (roughly) so you have 20% less exhaust mass. That gets balanced somewhat by the higher exhaust velocity because of the lower air pressure at the exhaust nozzles.
> 
> For the Merlin XX exhaust thrust (power) never exceeded 11.5% of brake hp. *A two stage engine will show a higher percentage because you have the weight of the exhaust used to drive the supercharger but that is not a constant either,* the Merlin XX needed 225hp to drive the supercharger at 20,000ft to give 12lb of boost. At 30,000ft the supercharger could only deliver a bit over 2lbs of boost . Charge flow(weight of air+fuel) had dropped from 144lb/min to 107.2lb/min and supercharger power requirement had dropped to 167hp.



Yep, 20% of extra power should be a bit too much, somewhere around 15% should be available at 30000 ft?
Could you please elaborate a bit about the bolded part?
If I'm reading this chart right (for Jumo 213E), whenever the boost and RPM are at certain level, and the engine/plane is at ever higher altitude, the exhaust thrust is also increasing. That is despite the ever increasing power needed to drive a S/C. 
Highest line is for the 'Sondernotleistung' (ie. use of MW-50; only available for lower 2 S/C gears), next one is for 'Notleistung', the bolded one is for 'Kampfleistung'. 







The chart for the BMW-810D - despite greater need for the S/C, the exhaust thrust is cosiderably greater in second S/C gear, than in 1st:


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## drgondog (Sep 26, 2014)

Nothing about an engine change dramatically re-sets to table for the P-38 save reducing mechanical issues from the combination Intercooler/Turbosupercharger/engine issues. A Merlin 60 series IMO would do just fine as The alternate future 'what if' universe of possibilities, but

1. Doesn't change the 'whoops I shouldn't have pushed the nose down" issue
2. Doesn't make me roll (or transition into the Roll) appreciably faster - so the 190 and 109 cand still flick away as before.
3. Doesn't make my big fat planform shrink from a size 14 to a size 3
4. It Does reduces the range a bit as the Allizon was better on fuel conservation but yanking the intercooler and turbo out provides for more internal fuel or reduces weight for better climb and range.
5. Cockpit control procedures are the same
6. It is still 2x to fly and maintain but less so w/o Turbo to worry about
7. Reduced performance beyond 30,000 feet w/o turbo

But below 30K, say at 20-24K to FTH it is a wee bit faster - but also pushes it closer to the .68M limit for compressibility..

Now - change the wing to a 12% or less and a LOT of problems go away.

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## wuzak (Sep 26, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Now - change the wing to a 12% or less and a LOT of problems go away.



Or use a laminar flow profile.

Now that we are changing the wings, would there be an advantage to trimming the wing span?

The P-38's wingspan was

3' less than the XP-67 (which was heavier, with 6 x 37mm cannon!)
2' 2" less than the Mosquito's (a bomber)
2' greater than the Fw 187 (which was lighter at max take-off than the P-38 was empty!)
7' greater than the Whirlwind (which was lighter at max take-off than the P-38 was empty!)
7' greater than the Hornet (which was had a similar max take-off weight to the P-38)
10' greater than the XF5F/XP-50 (which were much lighter)
10' 5" greater than the Tairov Ta-3 series prototypes, which used two big fat radials and was still lighter at max take-off than the P-38 was empty
12' greater than the proposed Supermarine Type 327 (which also would have been much lighter)

The XP-49 tidied up some of the details of the P-38 but used the same wing and dud engines (the IV-1430).


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## GregP (Sep 27, 2014)

Pretty good response, Bill, and I bow to your research on the data. I have never had access to it and still don't. Good stuff.

What I CAN say is the P-38 has little trouble staying with the stock P-51 when flown as they are today. The guys I know who fly it are all amazed by the P-38. None have ever been attacked by anybody while doing it. No doubt they aren't using full power or, especially, WER. These are privately-owned aircraft, even ours (owned by the museum).

All the people who give talks on it praise the P-38's ability to spit ammunition out the front that ins't converging. All say it rolled very well if you were a strong armed guy, and our own P-38 has NO trouble rolling with our Mustangs and P-40 ... it just takes some muscle.

So, modern operational data collides with your war information. Plus, it WAS the mount of the two highest-scoring aces for the U.S.A. 

I hope to GET some of your sources (Thanks for the thread on sources) but feel that verbal recollections from real WWII pilots trump modern revisionist books EVEY time. The pedestrian P-40 "woke up" when flown at 75" of MAP according to guys who DID it and that set of operations was responsible for a significant portion of the P-40's success. And that difference made the P-40 formidable when flown at WER power. I'm sure the P-38 guys had a similar experience as they have described it almost the same way on numerous occasions in live talks at the museum. Overboosting was common under certain circmstances, such as when you are about to die if you don't overboost.

Meanwhile, my opinions are in flux with your data shown ... and I can't verify them all at once ... so I'll refrain at this time.

I'm still a huge P-38 fan, but understand the data you posted. It speaks to me of ETO tactics versus PTO/MTO tactics. The latter were VERY effective. The former much less so, at least with the P-38. My jury is still deliberating ... but your data, if true, is somewhat telling.

Maybe you can tell me how the 60% of P-38's versus P-51's dropped 355% of the bomb tonnage if they were not on gound support missions?


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## wuzak (Sep 27, 2014)

Greg, how warbirds are flown today bears no resemblence to how they were in the heat of the battle 70 years ago.

I assume if teh same extra muscle required to make the P-38 roll quick was used in the P-51 or P-40 they would roll quicker too.

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## OldSkeptic (Sep 27, 2014)

Note sure why people are even continuing this.

Griffons in a P-38, when the std engines in a late model meant max level speed was about 20mph off of the critical mach limit...
So it was aerodynamically limited. 

Even if you could, then give it the gun ...and fall out of the air into an uncontrollable dive. That is what mach limits are..you lose total control of the aircraft....
You go into a dive you cant pull out off..lawn dart time.

Be in level flight...hit the limit and the nose goes down..and down. Your only hope is that, if it holds together that as you hit thicker air then the high mach limit mean you can start to regain control.

The only answer was to, which they did in the end, keep it to operations under 20,000ft, preferably 15,000ft, where the gap between the mach limit and the planes speed was much larger.

Totally flawed plane and you can't excuse Lockheed over this. Using the same data, at roughly the same time, Messerschmitt created the 109 with a 0.75-0.8 mach limit, Supermarine created the Spitfire with a 0.85 mach limit.

Lockheed were like Hawker, with the Hurricane having a 0.7'ish mach limit (and the Typhoon similar). Took them until the Tempest to get into the 0.8 region.

So, sadly Kelly Johnston (and Camm) cannot excuse their design mistakes, because others didn't.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 27, 2014)

A little harsh considering that the "boffins" at the RAE and the scientists/researchers Langley (NACA) didn't *know* there was problem with those airfoils in 1938-39-40. Neither company, in fact neither country had wind tunnels working at those speeds. 

Building 400mph at sea level seaplanes may tell you that the thick airfoils may have more drag than the 'Boffins' are saying but it doesn't tell you about mach tuck either. 

The P-38 had about all the engine power in 1944 that it could stand. 

as for "Using the* same data*, at roughly the same time, Messerschmitt created the 109 with a 0.75-0.8 mach limit, Supermarine created the Spitfire with a 0.85 mach limit."

There was NO *data*, just guesses and some were better than others.

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## drgondog (Sep 27, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Or use a laminar flow profile.
> 
> Now that we are changing the wings, would there be an advantage to trimming the wing span?



A laminar flow airfoil should cut down the drag and move the Mcr from .68M to a higher value even at 16% T/C. Should also diminish the Mach Tuck issue by pushing the shock wave formation region farther aft of the aerodynamic center.

Reducing wing span would increase the Induced Drag but reduce Zero Lift Drag and reduce the available lift. Should increase top speed, reduce range potential, reduce climb performance - but those are gross generalizations as the introduction of the laminar flow airfoil should reduce zero lift drag even more than reducing wingspan which should tend to improve L/D and restore range potential..


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## tomo pauk (Sep 27, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> ...
> 
> Totally flawed plane and you can't excuse Lockheed over this. Using the same data, at roughly the same time, Messerschmitt created the 109 with a 0.75-0.8 mach limit, Supermarine created the Spitfire with a 0.85 mach limit.
> 
> ...



What aircraft did you designed, so you have the credentials to throw mud on people that really designed aircraft?

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## drgondog (Sep 27, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Totally flawed plane and you can't excuse Lockheed over this. Using the same data, at roughly the same time, Messerschmitt created the 109 with a 0.75-0.8 mach limit, Supermarine created the Spitfire with a 0.85 mach limit.
> 
> *What data are you referring to? Although the Existence of Shock wave phenomena were known, first discovered by Ernst Mach, the application of low speed wind tunnel data to theoretical analysis did not extend to high speed compressibility predictions - and there was no way to model the airfoil at the subsonic/supercritical region analytically at that time.
> 
> ...



Respectfully Kelly needs zero excuses and to label the 23016 airfoil a 'design mistake' is silly given the state of the aerodynamics 'art' of 1937-1938.

Once Kelly figured out the problem in 1942 he proposed the solution, but the War Production Board said 'no'.

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## drgondog (Sep 27, 2014)

GregP said:


> Pretty good response, Bill, and I bow to your research on the data. I have never had access to it and still don't. Good stuff.
> 
> What I CAN say is the P-38 has little trouble staying with the stock P-51 when flown as they are today. The guys I know who fly it are all amazed by the P-38. None have ever been attacked by anybody while doing it. No doubt they aren't using full power or, especially, WER. These are privately-owned aircraft, even ours (owned by the museum).
> 
> ...



*The P38 in the MTO flew a lot of fighter bomber missions from the very beginning of the African campaign to the end of the war. The P-38/P-47 and P-51 flew some fighter bomber mission, about the same number, in the 8th AF but the prime mission was Escort. The 9th AF flew fighter bomber missions almost exclusively but following D-Day had one Mustang fighter Group (354) and one Recon Group (363) plus several recon P-38 and P-51 and Mosquito squadrons.

Pretty simple math when you contrast the 8th and 9th AF mission side by side, the look at the daily mission profile for 9th AF P-38s vs 8th AF P-51s*


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## drgondog (Sep 27, 2014)

Excerpts concerning introduction of the Dive Flaps, the kits, and last a pice about Col CY Wilson killing a 109 from a dive with a recently modified P-51J-15 on JUNE 25, 1944.

Der Gabelschwanz Teufel - Assessing the Lockheed P-38 Lightning
_The complaints were relayed to the Lockheed factory, and design changes were incorporated in the P-38L. Prior to the arrival of the "L's" at Wormingford, many modification kits were shipped to Langford Lodge, North Ireland, for field modifications of the "J" model Lightning then arriving in the theater. Unfortunately, an early shipment aboard a DC-4 was lost at sea when the Brits shot the cargo plane from the sky. It took several months to replace the lost modification kits. Early P-38J-5-LO's were modified at Langford Lodge by the addition of the replacement kits. The kits added dive recovery flaps under the wings, outboard of the engines, and a 3000psi hydraulically boosted aileron system. The P-38L's were now coming down the production line with the aileron boost and "speed boards" installed.

The P-38J resolved the intercooler efficiency problems of the earlier subtypes via the use of a core type intercooler in the forward nacelle chin. While prototypes were being tested in early 1943, P-38H production continued. The new nacelle chin provided increased oil cooling capacity, and automatic control of the intercooler vent, resulting in the full availability of the 1,600 HP War Emergency rating of the F-17 powerplant. Other design changes were introduced, including enlarged glycol radiators in the tail booms, in later build aircraft additional outboard leading edge tanks, and two major control system changes. These were hydraulically boosted ailerons which decreased control forces by a factor of six, and electrically actuated dive flaps under the wings which cured the dive compressibility problems. The latter were fitted standard from the P-38J-25-LO, sadly almost all retrofit kits intended for earlier P-38J subtypes were lost in a friendly fire incident in early 1944, thereby delaying the introduction of this important modification to theatre units by several months. Curiously, the modification entered production as a kit in late 1943, yet was not incorporated into production aircraft for another six months, until the P-38J-25-LO, although some P-38J-10/15-LO aircraft were retrofitted in the field._

P-38 Lightning Aces of the ETO/MTO - John Stanaway - Google Books this references a victory on June 25 by Col Cy Wilson with an upgraded P-38J-15 after installation of the Dive flaps Mod kit.

I'll have to dig up the references from the library - but the summary is that the second batch of kits arrived in late April and the installation process on the J-15's started in June, and proceeded all the way through September until the 479th converted 100% to Mustangs and the 479th P-38s went to 9th AF as replacements to 367, 370 and 474FG's. The J-25s arrived in September and the L's in October at various 9th AF Lightning Groups. Only the 474th finished ops with the P-38L's


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## Shortround6 (Sep 27, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Once Kelly figured out the problem in 1942 he proposed the solution, but the War Production Board said 'no'.



And something to consider here before too many people cast bricks/stones at the War Production Board. 

They built almost 3 times the number of P-38s in 1942 than they did P-47s.
The P-47Bs were rather quickly relegated to use as trainers. 
P-47C production didn't exceed P-38 production on a monthly basis until the spring of 1943 with any regularity. 
Total number of P-47s produced doesn't pass total number of P-38s until about Oct/Nov of 1943. About the time P-51Bs first start showing up in Europe. 
For a good part of 1942-43 is was P-38s or P-39/P-40s with _very_ little else. Delays in P-38 production would have had serious consequences.

By Winter of 1943/44 The Mustang was passing BOTH the P-38 and P-47 by. Perhaps at this time the P-38 could have been "fixed" but then we come up against the cost factor. While a P-38 might NOT have been _that much more expensive_ than a P-47, it certainly was much more expensive than a P-51. 

Please remember not only factory lead times but transport times for US aircraft to war zones. It took weeks if not several months to get a fighter plane form the factory door to a combat theater so needs/wants had to be planned for several months in advance and hope there were no big surprises.

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## drgondog (Sep 27, 2014)

Great summary Shortround


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 28, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> A little harsh considering that the "boffins" at the RAE and the scientists/researchers Langley (NACA) didn't *know* there was problem with those airfoils in 1938-39-40. Neither company, in fact neither country had wind tunnels working at those speeds.
> 
> Building 400mph at sea level seaplanes may tell you that the thick airfoils may have more drag than the 'Boffins' are saying but it doesn't tell you about mach tuck either.
> 
> ...





Shortround6 said:


> A little harsh considering that the "boffins" at the RAE and the scientists/researchers Langley (NACA) didn't *know* there was problem with those airfoils in 1938-39-40. Neither company, in fact neither country had wind tunnels working at those speeds.
> 
> Building 400mph at sea level seaplanes may tell you that the thick airfoils may have more drag than the 'Boffins' are saying but it doesn't tell you about mach tuck either.
> 
> ...



Mitchell totally disagreed with the British and US 'boffins', hence he went for the thinnest wing he could get away with. So he was a lot smarter than they were. He was right, they were wrong. He also had a superb aerodynamicist (Shenstone) who who had spent a lot of time Germany examining their work. Mitchell being a great team leader amd manager listened to him.

One interesting part of the design is the small tailplane compared to other designs (inc the Mustang). This was because the air from the wings and underbelly is directed towards the tailplane by careful shaping. This, of course, helped lower total drag.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 28, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Respectfully Kelly needs zero excuses and to label the 23016 airfoil a 'design mistake' is silly given the state of the aerodynamics 'art' of 1937-1938.
> 
> Once Kelly figured out the problem in 1942 he proposed the solution, but the War Production Board said 'no'.





drgondog said:


> Respectfully Kelly needs zero excuses and to label the 23016 airfoil a 'design mistake' is silly given the state of the aerodynamics 'art' of 1937-1938.
> 
> Once Kelly figured out the problem in 1942 he proposed the solution, but the War Production Board said 'no'.




Well Willy and R.J didn't make that mistake....and they started earlier...so..it was a mistake. It had the worst mach limit of any significant fighter in WW2. Even the P-47 was better. I think even the Hurricane was better (I'd have to check, this is from memory) and that was just a converted Fury biplane.
And the only way to fix it would have been by a Typhoon to Tempest like conversion with a whole a new wing.

So P-38 lovers, it just wasn't a very good plane. Complex and expensive to build, hard to maintain, complex and hard to fly. Over and above the miserable mach limit it was as buggy as all heck. I'm amazed the design got accepted by the US.

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## drgondog (Sep 28, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Well Willy and R.J didn't make that mistake....and they started earlier...so..it was a mistake. It had the worst mach limit of any significant fighter in WW2. Even the P-47 was better. I think even the Hurricane was better (I'd have to check, this is from memory) and that was just a converted Fury biplane.
> And the only way to fix it would have been by a Typhoon to Tempest like conversion with a whole a new wing.
> 
> So P-38 lovers, it just wasn't a very good plane. Complex and expensive to build, hard to maintain, complex and hard to fly. Over and above the miserable mach limit it was as buggy as all heck. I'm amazed the design got accepted by the US.



Then your powers of perception, had you been placed in the decision making process in 1938 would have been flawed. When the P-38 prototype first flew its performance and potential were beyond any other aircraft the US military had seen to date and far exceeded expectations. The aerodynamic and performance analysis were completed in April 1937.

For your assertions that Kelly didn't get it right in contrast to "Willy and RJ" with respect to selecting a thinner wing because of foreknowledge of compressibility effect on aerodynamic center movement and associated CMac change to force Mach Tuck you would of course have eveidence that they knew about the phenomena well in advance of the rest of the Aero community... and that their prototypes achieved even near the performance demonstrated by the XP-38?

If the prototype had not been crashed by Kelsey in feb 1939, delaying any formal flight testing until Feb 1941 with the YP-38.. the issue would have been discovered and solved presumably tow years earlier and the fix(es) would have been applied by December 1941 instead of December 1943.

What RJ and Willy succeeded in designing were two of the best dual purpose fighters of the war. What Kelly Johnson designed became the best one of very few 'all purpose' fighters of the war, one that had a strategic footprint an order of magnitude over the Spitfire and Bf 109. The Mosquito, the F4U and perhaps the Mustang come to mind for different reasons.

I have reminded the passionate supporters of P-38J/L that it didn't succeed to its potential in the ETO because of a combination of factors, including political, that worked against achieving greater success in the Battle of Germany. 

The 'fat' airfoil contributed to the problems with compressibility but the CDo of the P-38 was a little more than the Spit and greatly below the 109 pointing to Excellent aerodynamics for such a very large fighter, with very great range and very high speed, very high climb rate and very high ceiling.

Go back and compare the performance of the prototypes, then compare the design changes and engine upgrades required to match the prototype P-38 performance. Kelly Johnson broke a lot of new ground to make an unknown company a future giant in the Industry.

I worked as a co-op for him for a short time on an SR-71 computer modeling project and got to know him. I suspect without proof that neither "RJ or Willy" could have acquired, trained and managed a successful project as the SR-71 in which virtually ALL the design issues were 'Unknown' and breaking new ground, ranging from strength/weight requirements of titanium because of the temps and strengths required (as well as driving innovation in titanium machining), wing airfoils that changed in flight due to differential temperatures between top and bottom surfaces at Mach 3, variable geometry inlets to accommodate a 2000 mph range of shock wave geometry, etc, etc.

So yes, I suppose I do take deep offense at such an offhand derogatory remark against one of the Giants of the airframe design business. 

Oldskeptic, you would have to be one helluva aerodynamicist with a track record of solving unknown issues beforehand to make a Valid comment regarding 'he shouldda known'.

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 28, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> So P-38 lovers, it just wasn't a very good plane. Complex and expensive to build, hard to maintain, *complex and hard to fly*. Over and above the miserable mach limit it was as buggy as all heck. I'm amazed the design got accepted by the US.


 And I guess that's your own arm chair opinion? Have you ever flown a twin engine aircraft and analyzed the P-38's cockpit to really make a viable and intelligent assessment of this? 

I know quite a few folks who flew both the Mustang and P-38 and loved both aircraft equally and at least one who preferred the P-38 over the P-51. I suppose the pilots of the 1,800 downed Japanese aircraft that fell under the P-38's might also agree with you.

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## gjs238 (Sep 28, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Respectfully Kelly needs zero excuses and to label the 23016 airfoil a 'design mistake' is silly given the state of the aerodynamics 'art' of 1937-1938.
> 
> Once Kelly figured out the problem in 1942 he proposed the solution, but the War Production Board said 'no'.



When solution did Kelly Johnson propose?


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 28, 2014)

_"Lockheed could not have anticipated this problem. In fact, Kelly Johnson probably knew as much about compressibility as anyone in the world at that time.* Unfortunately, in 1937 no one could predict with any degree of certainty the effect of compressibility on aircraft control*." _

The P-38 Lightning

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## gjs238 (Sep 28, 2014)

When did folks become aware of the problem?
From Wikipedia:

_During a test flight in *May 1941*, USAAC Major Signa Gilkey managed to stay with a YP-38 in a compressibility lockup, riding it out until he recovered gradually using elevator trim.[19] Lockheed engineers were very concerned at this limitation but first had to concentrate on filling the current order of aircraft._


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## gjs238 (Sep 28, 2014)

And regarding the loss of the prototype on 11 February 1939:
Again from Wikipedia:

_Lockheed's Chief test pilot Tony LeVier angrily characterized the accident as an unnecessary publicity stunt,[27] but according to Kelsey the loss of the prototype, instead of hampering the program, sped the process by *cutting short the initial test series*.[28] The success of the aircraft design contributed to Kelsey's promotion to captain in May 1939._


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## tomo pauk (Sep 28, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Well Willy and R.J didn't make that mistake....and they started earlier...so..it was a mistake. It had the worst mach limit of any significant fighter in WW2. *Even the P-47 was better.* I think even the Hurricane was better (I'd have to check, this is from memory) and that was just a converted Fury biplane.
> And the only way to fix it would have been by a Typhoon to Tempest like conversion with a whole a new wing.
> 
> So P-38 lovers, it just wasn't a very good plane. Complex and expensive to build, hard to maintain, complex and hard to fly. Over and above the miserable mach limit it was as buggy as all heck. I'm amazed the design got accepted by the US.



About the statement that Hurricane was a converted Fury biplane - joke, right? 

Silly Americans thought that a 400 mph aircraft, with decent climb and armament, and great range was an useful fighter. Instead to stick with P-40s; really silly.

Let's see how thick an airfoil, but for a twin-engined fighter, did Willy thought it would be okay. For the Bf-110, the thickness to chord ratio was 18.5% (root) and 11% at tip. Please note the 'Flugel' part in the attached table, where the wing profile was '2 R1 18.5' as at the root, and '2 R1 11' at tip. The Bf-109 was using the '2 R1 14.2' profile at the root, for example - ie. 14.2% thickness to chord ratio. Perhaps the Bf-110 would've been more competitive had Willy decided to go with 16% thick wing?







Supermarine design team thought that such a thick wing would be okay for the proposed 460 mph twin-engined fighter, Type 327 (picture kindly posted by wuzak in a related thread):






It is in the 18-20% TtC (root) range? 

As for the damning with a faint praise ("Even the P-47 was better."), here is the dive limit table for the P-47N, that used same wing profile as the earlier P-47s:

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## drgondog (Sep 28, 2014)

What Kelsey can state that is true is the migration from Prototype to limited production ore for YP-13 WAS accelerated because of the crash a.) because Lockheed was not well off financially, b.) the initial performance results blew every other design away, and c.) getting Lockheed started on building more P-38s to progress with evaluation was to give them a contract.

What he didn't state is that Arnold saw the potential, saw what was happening in Europe, looked around at the existing airframes for comparison, and would have been an idiot to not proceed even if the prototype was not lost. 

Losing the prototype cost the AAF two years of evaluation and performance enhancement recommendations. 

The biggest problem was that Lockheed 'hand built' the p-38 and there was no money to invest in tooling and fixtures until an order was received.. so Lockheed started from scratch in 1939 to building a producable airframe.

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## gjs238 (Sep 28, 2014)

GregP said:


> Plus, it WAS the mount of the two highest-scoring aces for the U.S.A.



Greg, you are in good company - it seems that many in the US had difficulty understanding this during the war.
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_P-38_Lightning#European_theater:

_Fleet Air Arm Captain and test pilot Eric Brown recalled: "We had found out that the Bf 109 and the Fw 190 could fight up to a Mach of 0.75, three-quarters the speed of sound. We checked the Lightning and it couldn't fly in combat faster than 0.68. So it was useless. We told Doolittle that all it was good for was photo-reconnaissance and had to be withdrawn from escort duties. And the funny thing is that the Americans had great difficulty understanding this because the Lightning had the two top aces in the Far East."_

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## drgondog (Sep 28, 2014)

Not to take anything from either Bong or McGuire or any ace that flew F4U, F6F, P-38 or P-47 but those aircraft ALL were faster and performed better in airspeed higher than 300 mph against all the Japanese fighters likely be seen until 1944-1945. McGuire was killed because he was overconfident and apparently broke the golden rule of don't pick a fight low and slow - and had his external tanks on - to compound the problem.

The Lightning in Europe had no such clear advantages, were forced to fly at bomber altitudes where the pre-dive flap, pre-intercooler fix, P-38s were at a tactical disadvantage against adversaries that could nearly escape at will but had performance so excellent that once it had the advantage of a six O'clock position on the P-38, IT couldn't escape.. 

The PTO was Entirely Different. In the MTO the conditions were somewhat similar in that the bombers bomber lower and many escort missions were for medium bombers as well - so the mechanical problems were never as severe for MTO P-38s and at medium altitudes it matched up very well against the 190 and 109s.

It (ETO vs PTO) was further compounded by the fact that the Japanese were NEVER ordered to evade and it wasn't in their make up to flee when they could fight. I have not yet seen the same orders from Goering to MTO squadrons stipulating that the LW fighters avoid escorts like Defense of the Reich.

So, the Germans with at least as good a maneuver fighter, that could out dive to escape or shoot down the P-38 had more encounters with the P-38 in the MTO... and it was always so easy to see..

Do you understand that while the PTO conditions were perfect for the P-38 as an escort and air superiority fighter, it labored in high altitude, cold ETO conditions - until the J model?

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## GregP (Sep 29, 2014)

Hi Joe,

I agree. What I said above was to not let the speed get to the problem area. That limits the dive to non-dangerous territory and gives the P-38 a good zoom climb back to the bomber's altitude at the same time. I didn't to dive or not dive with the enemy, I said not to dive with them until the problem occourred. That means breaking it off before cirtical mach numberarrives, which also and coincidentally keeps the P-38 near the bombers. Their job was not to kill German fighters, if they were acting as escorts, their job was to protect the bombers.

So I DO agree that the P-38 should not be dived to critical mach, but don;t agree it was inconsistent with protecting the bombers at teh same time. If you can believe all the hype, the Tuskeegee Airmen employed those SAME tactics quite successfully ... stick with the bombers. It worked for them. Why not for the P-38's?

Hi gjs,

I have NO difficulty comprehending the issue. I don;t think it is all that big a limit unless youa re hell-bent on chasing the enemy aircraft down. If youARE< then yes, it is a major stumbling block. If you are there to protect the bombers instead of merely increasing your personal score, it isn't. Sorry, I don;t buy it at all ... unless the need is really to chase the enemy down and kill him. It wasn't the main mission.

You could argue it backwards. If top speed was paramount, why is the Hellcat the most successful aircraft at air-to-air combat uin the US arsenal of WWII? It shot down more than the P-51 in the air but comes in a number two if you add in ground kills. Rather unusual if speed was the main factor, don't you think?

I don;t feel maximum speed was all that important, and neither was a slower dive speed ... unless you were in a fight for a kill. If thaht was the case, you were probably ignoring your primary mission in the first place.


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## drgondog (Sep 30, 2014)

GregP said:


> Hi Joe,
> 
> I agree. What I said above was to not let the speed get to the problem area. That limits the dive to non-dangerous territory and gives the P-38 a good zoom climb back to the bomber's altitude at the same time. I didn't to dive or not dive with the enemy, I said not to dive with them until the problem occourred. That means breaking it off before cirtical mach numberarrives, which also and coincidentally keeps the P-38 near the bombers. Their job was not to kill German fighters, if they were acting as escorts, their job was to protect the bombers.
> 
> ...



Please research Doolittle's biography "I could never be so lucky again", Eaker's biography "Air Force Spoken Here", Arnold's "Global mission" plus the collaboration of Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker and Andrews resulting in Copp's two volume set "Forged in Fire" and "A Few Great Captains".

I'm not nitpicking. If you want the background behind the situation in 1943, particularly the discussions at Casablanca - which Churchill described in Grand Alliance - all the way through to November 1943 when Eaker was promoted to run Med AF and Spaatz brought in to replace him plus pick up the 9th AF, then you need to understand all the deliberations and the command decisions.

By the folks that made them.

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## OldSkeptic (Sep 30, 2014)

GregP said:


> Hi Joe,
> 
> I agree. What I said above was to not let the speed get to the problem area. That limits the dive to non-dangerous territory and gives the P-38 a good zoom climb back to the bomber's altitude at the same time. I didn't to dive or not dive with the enemy, I said not to dive with them until the problem occourred. That means breaking it off before cirtical mach numberarrives, which also and coincidentally keeps the P-38 near the bombers. Their job was not to kill German fighters, if they were acting as escorts, their job was to protect the bombers....



Their job was to kill the Luftwaffe, the bombers were really just bait to bring them up. That was the great innovation by the great (and always underestimated) Doolittle.
He realised that just chasing them away was pointless, the Luftwaffe pilots lived to fight another day and that would let it steadily build up strength, eventually to level that could overwhelm any escorts.

They had to be killed, chased and killed, setting in train the attrition on pilots and machines that finally killed the organisation.

Take a 'thought experiment'. Say the Luftwaffe had managed to build up to (say) 2,000 fighters over Germany...that would have ended the USAAF's daylight campaign, real fast.
At that sort of numbers they could have (a) intercepted the escorts as they headed towards rendezvousing with the bombers, forcing them to drop tanks and taking them out of the game, (b) staged multi pronged attacks, with enough to draw off the escorts and still enough left to hammer the bombers.

The USAAF then would have had to have built up far greater numbers of escort fighters to counter that (with escorts escorting other escorts at various points).

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## gjs238 (Sep 30, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Their job was to kill the Luftwaffe, the bombers were really just bait to bring them up. That was the great innovation by the great (and always underestimated) Doolittle.
> He realised that just chasing them away was pointless, the Luftwaffe pilots lived to fight another day and that would let it steadily build up strength, eventually to level that could overwhelm any escorts.
> 
> They had to be killed, chased and killed, setting in train the attrition on pilots and machines that finally killed the organisation.
> ...



Mac knows best...
or not

From Wikipedia:
_In July 1942, as a Brigadier General – he had been promoted by two grades on the day after the Tokyo attack, by-passing the rank of full colonel – Doolittle was assigned to the nascent Eighth Air Force. This followed the rejection of his name by General Douglas MacArthur as commander of the Southwest Pacific Area in place of General George Brett. Major General Frank Andrews first turned down the position, and, offered a choice between George Kenney and Doolittle, MacArthur chose Kenney.[5]_


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## drgondog (Sep 30, 2014)

George Kenney, Frank Andrews and Jimmy Doolittle were all superb leaders.


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## gjs238 (Oct 1, 2014)

GregP said:


> <SNIP> I'm still a huge P-38 fan... <SNIP>



Greg,

If you're still hot heavy about the P-38, there's a thread about P-38 erection you might like:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ot...ech-/38-erection-maintenance-pages-20445.html


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## OldSkeptic (Oct 1, 2014)

In all this the 8th and BC were aided by the poor tactics of the Luftwaffe defending Germany. I shake my head at times how just badly they did. Both of them were very lucky that the Luftwaffe didn't have a Keith Park. 

Though the sheer resources that the US could bring would have meant air superiority being achieved in the end (by day), the Luftwaffe could have extracted a far higher price and dragged it out much longer than they did. The key was to 'strip off' (Park's term) the escorts. Given the long distances, the escorts (when they moved to the phased tactics) were terribly vulnerable to being bounced as they headed for their rendezvous with the bombers. Slow (most economical cruise), full of fuel and drop tanks. Ideal for bounces from high level 109s to disrupt them and make them drop their tanks. A squadron or two at the right places, with the proper ground control could have caused havoc amongst them.

The same applied even if they stayed with the bombers (wasting fuel doing so and reducing their range) right from the beginning (the pre-phased approach). Just a few squadrons, in the right place with the right tactics would have stripped them off the bombers.

Look at what Park achieved in doing that, with little warning, with the 109s right with the bombers and with, at times, escort/bomber ratios of 3:1 (even 5:1). Stripping them off and getting other planes right into the bombers.

Fortunately the culture of the Luftwaffe was against that sort of careful tactical control. Galland being a classic example of being an idiot in this, repeating Badar's mistakes in wanting to swan all over the sky with minimal ground control and creating large, unwieldy and easily disrupted 'big wings', which was amazing because he had so much fun shooting down such clumsy things over France. Just shows a great fighter ace often does not make a good tactician.

In the case of BC, I really think that with better tactics the Luftwaffe could have killed them by early '44 at the latest. They very nearly did as it was.
The key issue was getting large numbers of nightfighters into the bomber stream, when they did BC's losses were horrendous and unsustainable. BC's job was to avoid/misdirect/etc them.

There were two places where the Luftwaffe knew exactly where the bomber streams were. When they took off and formed up and when they landed. A more aggressive campaign, catching them as they formed up over England and heading out and then staying with them, including getting them when they returned would have taken BC out of the game pretty quickly. And there wouldn't have been much the British could have done about it unless they totally changed their 'counterforce' doctrine and totally unleashed their own (and better) nightfighters as intruders in massive numbers, pre-raids to clear the way (even then it would have been difficult). BC being BC I have great confidence that they would have already lost and given up before they managed to work that one out.


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## pbehn (Oct 1, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Their job was to kill the Luftwaffe, the bombers were really just bait to bring them up. That was the great innovation by the great (and always underestimated) Doolittle.
> He realised that just chasing them away was pointless, the Luftwaffe pilots lived to fight another day and that would let it steadily build up strength, eventually to level that could overwhelm any escorts.
> 
> They had to be killed, chased and killed, setting in train the attrition on pilots and machines that finally killed the organisation.
> ...


I think your thought experiment is 2000 fighters meeting an air born threat anywhere in Germany. 2000 fighters alone could not protect Germany. From the UK the USAF could attack from the North Sea and across France from Italy and North Africa they could attack all of South Germany France and Eastern Europe. To protect Germany from all possible avenues of attack would require more than 10,000 aircraft. To take a break to build up such a force would mean Germany did not have any industry or cities in place. I base this on the difficulty the UK had in repelling the luftwaffe in 1940.


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## OldSkeptic (Oct 1, 2014)

pbehn said:


> I think your thought experiment is 2000 fighters meeting an air born threat anywhere in Germany. 2000 fighters alone could not protect Germany. From the UK the USAF could attack from the North Sea and across France from Italy and North Africa they could attack all of South Germany France and Eastern Europe. To protect Germany from all possible avenues of attack would require more than 10,000 aircraft. To take a break to build up such a force would mean Germany did not have any industry or cities in place. I base this on the difficulty the UK had in repelling the luftwaffe in 1940.



Thanks to their extensive radar (and radio listening) network, which stretched into France and Holland, they had hours of warning of USAAF raids from whatever direction. In 1940 Park had 30-40 mins warning and had to react to that, which he did masterfully. They didn't need 10,000 fighters, 2,000 with well trained pilots, with good tactics, would have made the 8th's job a heck of a lot harder.


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## drgondog (Oct 1, 2014)

pbehn said:


> I think your thought experiment is 2000 fighters meeting an air born threat anywhere in Germany. 2000 fighters alone could not protect Germany. From the UK the USAF could attack from the North Sea and across France from Italy and North Africa they could attack all of South Germany France and Eastern Europe. To protect Germany from all possible avenues of attack would require more than 10,000 aircraft. To take a break to build up such a force would mean Germany did not have any industry or cities in place. I base this on the difficulty the UK had in repelling the luftwaffe in 1940.



In practice Old Skeptic is right - all te LW had to defend against was the long range escorts (P-38 and P-51). The number of US long range Groups went from three (December 1944) (20, 55 and 354FG's) to 10 by the end of May - which meant 3 long range escort groups per 11 Bomb Groups (30 mile string) in each of three divisions. 2000 LW fighters attacking where THEY chose to engage limits the numbers of long range escort groups to defend - one to two Maximum.


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## pbehn (Oct 2, 2014)

drgondog said:


> In practice Old Skeptic is right - all te LW had to defend against was the long range escorts (P-38 and P-51). The number of US long range Groups went from three (December 1944) (20, 55 and 354FG's) to 10 by the end of May - which meant 3 long range escort groups per 11 Bomb Groups (30 mile string) in each of three divisions. 2000 LW fighters attacking where THEY chose to engage limits the numbers of long range escort groups to defend - one to two Maximum.



There are sometimes I find forums contradictory, some time ago I suggested that the Luftwaffe would have had more success if they engaged the escorts earlier forcing them to drop their tanks. I was told that post war both sides admitted that this would merely result in the LW being wiped out in a different place, I cant look back over my previous posts to find it though.. The P47 also had considerable range with its larger drop tank. 2000 aircraft may be able to defend a particular place in central Germany but not the whole of Germany. The combat radius of a SE is quite small, after climbing to 25,000ft and fighting for 20 mins it needs to find some where to refuel. With only 2000 aircraft you must surrender all the extremities like the northern ports the Ruhr and the southern industrial areas. To outnumber the escorts all over Germany by sufficient AC to enable heavy enough losses to be inflicted requires many more than 2000 aircraft. The bombers themselves were not unarmed and did inflict losses on the LW even on completely unescorted raids. Where would you place 2000 planes to repel raids on Hamburg Berlin Peenemunde and Stuttgart?

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## pbehn (Oct 2, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Thanks to their extensive radar (and radio listening) network, which stretched into France and Holland, they had hours of warning of USAAF raids from whatever direction. In 1940 Park had 30-40 mins warning and had to react to that, which he did masterfully. They didn't need 10,000 fighters, 2,000 with well trained pilots, with good tactics, would have made the 8th's job a heck of a lot harder.


Park only had to deal with raids across the channel, after the LW tried a raid from Norway and got hammered all raids from there stopped, I say "only" but this was a considerable task. Park had more than 30-40 minutes warning that a raid was building up but knowing a raid was building didn't tell you where it was coming from. The 8th could attack across any German coast+ France and Holland. Other forces could attack across the Alps. All the Americans would have to do is modify their tactics. Instead of a deep penetration raid just raid the periphery of Germany with more escorts until Germany concedes the territory. The problem isn't solved until the escorts are massively outnumbered wherever they are and that cannot be done all over Germany with 2000 AC. This is of course hypothetical and ignores the fact that Germany had to defend the French coast, transport links to France the eastern oilfields as well as defending the eastern front with Russia


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## drgondog (Oct 2, 2014)

pbehn said:


> There are sometimes I find forums contradictory, some time ago I suggested that the Luftwaffe would have had more success if they engaged the escorts earlier forcing them to drop their tanks. I was told that post war both sides admitted that this would merely result in the LW being wiped out in a different place, I cant look back over my previous posts to find it though..
> 
> *I either did, or would have agreed with you. I still believe the LW gave the 8th FC too much leash by virtue of "Avoid the fighters" order from Goering as well as not sending separate flights of 109s to attack the fighter escorts in one pass and evade beginning in mid 1943.. It was one thing for Hunter to order the fighter groups to not drop their tanks unless extremely necessary - and another for the group CO's to tell their guys 'do what you think best'*
> 
> ...



Exactly as placed for the Defense of the Rich as far as sectors go - just reinforce the fighter strength 4X.

Another factor. The US was producing crews, fighter pilots and the respective aircraft at peak production. Impossible to reinforce the 8th and 9th AF FC much because there really weren't enough airfields to expand beyond April, 1944 and shifting resources from MTO (When reinforcements are required to support 15th AF) isn't feasible. Ditto the PTO/CBI which was still suffering lack of front line fighter strength for its own projects. 

In summary - the notion that the LW could actually stick 1500 more fighter pilots into LF Reich in spring 1944 is ludicrous - But since the question is What If, I agree OldSkeptic's POV.

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## nuuumannn (Oct 2, 2014)

> Thanks to their extensive radar (and radio listening) network, which stretched into France and Holland, they had hours of warning of USAAF raids from whatever direction.



I agree, and the Allies were well aware of it. To combat this, the British did employ electronic countermeasures as one way of temporarily blinding German coastal Freya radars in the form of Mandrel, before some US 8th AF raids, and also employed Moonshine and other countermeasures to further deceive the Germans as to where the forthcoming raid was approaching from.


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## pbehn (Oct 3, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Exactly as placed for the Defense of the Rich as far as sectors go - just reinforce the fighter strength 4X.
> 
> Another factor. The US was producing crews, fighter pilots and the respective aircraft at peak production. Impossible to reinforce the 8th and 9th AF FC much because there really weren't enough airfields to expand beyond April, 1944 and shifting resources from MTO (When reinforcements are required to support 15th AF) isn't feasible. Ditto the PTO/CBI which was still suffering lack of front line fighter strength for its own projects.
> 
> In summary - the notion that the LW could actually stick 1500 more fighter pilots into LF Reich in spring 1944 is ludicrous - But since the question is What If, I agree OldSkeptic's POV.



The P47 was replaced by the P51 but could surely still be used with 150gal tank for penetration or withdrawal. I said 10000 to defend Germany, the scenario you are describing isn't defending Germany but a few places furthest from the UK. I disagree with your numbers a little, if you have 2000 fighters can 850 be available to defend Augsberg without leaving huge areas with no cover at all. If the LW did magic up 1500 extra fighters then the USA must keep them pinned down somehow or they will go to Normandy in which case what is politically acceptable changes.


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## drgondog (Oct 3, 2014)

pbehn said:


> The P47 was replaced by the P51 but could surely still be used with 150gal tank for penetration or withdrawal.
> 
> *Yes - the 150 centerline tank for the pre-P47D-20 with wing pylon was in fact the dominant Penetration and withdrawal escort - up to Stuttgart or Hannover. In April 1944 there were about 13 active operational P-47 Fighter groups in both 8th and 9th AF performing escort duties under 8th AF operational control. At the same time there were five Mustang groups with the 352nd making the sixth in Mid April plus three P-38 FG's performing long range and target escort.
> 
> ...



By the time the bombers cross the coastline the relative options for the bomber course narrows down considerably, but the primary tactics of assembling the bomber stream in a somewhat contiguous series of bombers groups was followed with rare exception. When multiple targets were selected during the ramp up phase in February through May to replace P-47 groups with Mustangs, even separate target branches were delayed until well into Germany.

If I could give you a mission that represents a typical day in the life of the 8th, select 24 April. Three Task Forces with 1st BD leading as 1st TF, 2nd TF/2nd BD next and finally 3rd BD next as 3rd TF in trail. 

All the bombers crossed the coastline NW of Paris, proceeded to Stuttgart then set a course for Munich, Gablingen and Freidrichshafen. At Stuttgart, the target escorts P-38s and P-51s arrive. The 4th FG (mustangs) are sweeping in front with intent of STAYING with the 1st TF as Penetration escort to Augsburg - but make contact north of Stuttgart with JG 11. The next relay for target support for 1st TF isn't due until Augsburg.

Looking at the map, the bombers stay 'connected' all the way through Stuttgart and part way to Ulm, then the 3rd TF, escorted by the shorter range P-38s (all three FG's) turn se toward Friedrichshafen.. then a little later the now tail end 2nd TF B-24s turn for Gablingen as the 1st TF continues toward Augsburg to Erding (Ne of Munich) thence south and then back to the west under Munich and begins bomb run on Landsberg and Oberphaffenhofen. The 352nd and 354th FG and 363rd FG cover Gablingen strike leaving the 1st TF completely uncovered (by plan) for 15 minutes between Ulm and Augsburg - and are attacked by the first elements of nearly 250 s/e day fighters. The 355th and 357th arrive on-time north of Augburg and immediately engage. 

After all targets are bombed the reciprocal track for all bomb groups is northwest toward Frankfurt where as many of the Mustangs and Lightnings with fuel reserves continue escort until R/V with P-47s of the Withdrawal escorts.

My scenario is in place for a realistic appraisal of what would have been possible - as follows:

The 56th FG swept in front of 1st TF prior to R/V with 4th FG at Stuttgart. 56th Alone, with several P-47 groups in trail in close escort but running low on fuel as they approach Stuttgart. The 4th FG is inbound as is the 20th/55th and 364th P-38 FG's. The 352nd, 363rd, 354th also inbound but further away, and last are 355th and 357th. All the Target escort fighters are on a more direct course (not parallel to the bombers).

Assuming that 2000 day fighters implies 4X locally placed to augment the actual defense, then:

If LW controllers could draw on eight Gruppes instead of two and hit the 56th and 4th at Stuttgart there are perhaps 20 minutes in which they have the US fighter escort at a severe disadvantage. Don't even go after the bombers yet, just engage the US escorts with significant air superiority at the point of attack. The 1st TF is now completely stripped and subject to persistent attacks from those fighters emerging or not involved with the 4/56 FG engagement. 100 s/e fighters beginning attacks from Stuttgart past Ulm.

The second attack occurs against the 355th and 357th 100 miles northwest of Augsburg with perhaps two Gruppes. This fight would be more even but the outcome is certain. The ability of the two mustang groups to achieve R/V and perform escort is out the window because of low fuel. Additionally this attack could be sourced from Kassel to Mulhausen - presumably from another 4x reinforced defense sector, leaving the Munich sector able to put up 500+ fighters to attack from Ulm all the way to and around Munich... against bombers that were unescorted.

The real result against LW around Munich was shooting down or forcing to Sweden of 27 B-17s for the loss of 50 s/e and t/e day fighters of which 42 were awarded to the P-51s of the 355th and 357th for the loss of six over Munich plus two more strafing around Stuttgart.

IMO in this scenario the German fighter losses would be as great as the destruction of US fighters but more importantly it would be possible to shoot down 100 B-17s and B-24s on a given day... and the 8th AF could not survive that kind of repeated losses politically.

IMO this is a reasonable scenario that would be catastrophic to D-Day air superiority plans if a.) LF Reich could actually achieve 200o experienced pilots in January 1944 and b.) could replenish at least 70% of the attrition


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## Koopernic (Oct 4, 2014)

In terms of the effect of the P-38 one thing that I think is worth noting is what the Luftwaffe hoped to use to destroy bombers; The *"Zerstoerer"* a word meaning *"Destroyer"* was meant to be used to destroy enemy bombers. (Me 110 and latter Me 210C/Me 410A). Zerstoerers were meant to be fighter bombers that strafed up and bombed enemy runways and ground born aircraft to supress enemy fighters, they were also to use their fire power (which got to 4 x 20mm and 2 x 30mm canon on the Me 110G) to dispatch enemy bombers. Furthermore the idea was to use outsize long range weapons such as 30mm, 37mm even 50mm canon and 20cm rockets to snipe of bombers with stereoscopic range finder equipped gyro sights at ranges the 0.50 inch Browning was considerably less effective. (German gyro sights seem to have started with this in mind). The Me 110 and Me 410 apart from greater fire power than the single engine fighters also possessed greater range but were only about 7.5% to 5% slower.

Whatever the P-38's limitations against the Luftwaffes single engined fighters it may have had a greater effect on its twin engine fighters.


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## Just Schmidt (Oct 4, 2014)

Not being a pilot, or an engineer, I am rather an historian with a taste for the big picture but a weak spot for aviation during ww2. As such this site supplies me with a lot of usefull input, though it is sometimes difficult to decide who is right when 'specialists' get entrenched.

I always liked the twin fighters, their relative weakneses apart. If we assume that a bigger aircraft will (other things being equal) usually be less manouvarable than smaller (and yes, the P 47 approaches several contemporary twins), then the P 38 should encounter problems in ETO at day, and probably at night because of the limited space for rader and extra crew. As stated before in this thread, the relative success of P 38's against the japanese is largely explicable from the fact that it enjoyed a margin of speed that it didn't in ETO. This aggrevated by the light construction/lack of passive defense in most japanese fighters. To be fair, they often had to make do with far less power than their allied counterparts. Die Luftwaffe, with tougher mounts and higher speeds, could not be taken on as successfully with the same tactics. And of course japanese rader was even more inferior to the allied (at least UK and USA) than the German.

I take it that magicking 1500 more fighters into german airspace in 44 includes pilots and fuel. Actually they might have gotten close to supplying the extra airframes, but this underlines the axis basic problem, far inferior ressources than the allies. And even if more efficient use had been made of the awailable ressorses, parity could never have been met, exept through way of greater attrition for allied forces, which WERE approached in the early years of the war. But then again, untill 41, especially december, the balance was more even.

As it were, the remarkable fact is that die Luftwaffe did well at night at the same time they were decimated at day. The nightfighting strategy worked to an extent where they did win the 'battle of Berlin'. Bomber command lost so grieviously on the deep penetrations (not only at Berlin) that Harris had predicted would win the war for the allies. That points to the tactics and strategy used not being entirely misconcieved, at least on the German side.

One point I would like to comment on is the easily recognizable layout of the P 38. At the attitudes that the bombers and their escorts flew, contrails often gave away that SOMETHING was there. How easy it was to distinguish 1, 2 and 4 engined planes from each other in that way, I don't know.

This might not be so controversial, but here's one: reminicent of the debate on the lightning is the old story of the Bf 110. I just read a quite provokative article in a Norwegian periodical on warfare setting out to rahabilitate that mashine as an air superiority fighter. I believe it hasn'y been translated into english. Apart from entirely glossing over the many well known occasions where single engined fighters gave them a sound beating, it seem to have something going for it when it examines the 110's record as an escorting fighter, or the Zerstörer role outlined by Koopernic. That is, when it was not tied to the bombers in close escort, the kill to loss ratios during the battle of britain seem to compare favourably with the Bf 190E. In other words, when somewhat counterintuitively NOT used for protecting single bombers on single missions, but seeking to bounce hunting fighters where they are likely to be found - near freindly bombers - the bigger twins might have been effective.

That just might make sense if we remember that, during BoB, the hurricane by far outnumbered the spitfire, and the 110 indeed in 1940 enjoyed a margin of speed over pretty much every operational fighter except the spitfire. I must admit that I'm somewhat in doubt here. But who knows, even considering that the 110 might have had more going for it in fighter versus fighter than is usually conceded, might bring the whole forum heavily down on my head. Then again, it really isn't given much cred...

Anyway, not to highjack the thread, a twin engined fighter (P 38's late models) probably need to be faster (also in climb and dive) than its single engined opponents, besides the obvious fact that it should be employed in the right way under the right surcumstances, assuming those circumstances are present.

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## drgondog (Oct 4, 2014)

Thoughtful essay Schmidt.

Imbedded in your piece is that the twin for all combatants was a common thread of "easy to see First". At night, we can strip this fault away and deal solely with the effectiveness of the night fighter to a.) find its prey quickly, b.) have enough speed advantage to close on its prey and c.)enough firepower to take it down. The Me 110 and Ju 88 fulfilled these requirements as well as the He 219.

For daylight the given of being 'spottable' yields the initiative to the 'spotter' if performance equality was also given. While relative maneuverability was important the tactical advantage always fall to the one that sees the other first - which is why you, and I, and others have associated with less success for the P-38 against the Bf 109 and 190 than against the Zero, for example.

The second most contributory factor altering the P-38 success was the well known and lingering issue of dive performance in which a split ess to chase, or evade, led to a forced high speed and uncontrollable dive for many thousands of feet due to compressibility limit - not suffered by its ETO adversaries.

The introduction of the dive flap resolved the issue from Uncontrollable dive but did not alter the limit dive speed issue - which remained well below the Bf 109, FW 190, P-47 and P-51. This limit meant that the P-38 maneuverability equality was solely in positive vertical and forward speed until the boosted flaps some delayed parity in turn and roll (greater than 109, less than 190).

Historically, the all altitude performance of the Mustang and steadily increasing range capability of the P-47 drove the tactical planners of the Air Force to allocate more and more Close Air Support roles to the P-38 in Europe at the point in time of its development that it was reaching its air to air potential - but history passed it by in the ETO as the Mustang was not only cheaper to buy, train in, operate and maintain but available in quantities to perform all of the long range mission requirement.


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## drgondog (Oct 4, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> In terms of the effect of the P-38 one thing that I think is worth noting is what the Luftwaffe hoped to use to destroy bombers; The *"Zerstoerer"* a word meaning *"Destroyer"* was meant to be used to destroy enemy bombers. (Me 110 and latter Me 210C/Me 410A). Zerstoerers were meant to be fighter bombers that strafed up and bombed enemy runways and ground born aircraft to supress enemy fighters, they were also to use their fire power (which got to 4 x 20mm and 2 x 30mm canon on the Me 110G) to dispatch enemy bombers. Furthermore the idea was to use outsize long range weapons such as 30mm, 37mm even 50mm canon and 20cm rockets to snipe of bombers with stereoscopic range finder equipped gyro sights at ranges the 0.50 inch Browning was considerably less effective. (German gyro sights seem to have started with this in mind). The Me 110 and Me 410 apart from greater fire power than the single engine fighters also possessed greater range but were only about 7.5% to 5% slower.
> 
> Whatever the P-38's limitations against the Luftwaffe single engined fighters it may have had a greater effect on its twin engine fighters.



I agree. Must point out that the Bf 110 and Ju 88 and Me 410 were easy to spot by the P-38 before, or at the same time, and the German T/E was inferior in performance to either seek a tactical advantage (safely) or evade, once engaged by P-38. Having said that, all the German twins were even more vulnerable to the higher performance single engine fighters and the range of the P-51 made it necessary for the LW to pull all the twin engine day fighter bases back to the 'Berlin Line' as the LW reduced the sorties against US bomber forces during the spring and finally altogether in July/August 1944 when they transitioned to FW 190A8's 

The daylight success of the LW twin engine day fighter ceased when it was continuously molested by US day fighters at long, then longer, range. The P-47D forced the daytime ZG units into western Germany, then central Germany as the 150 gallon belly tanks were added, and finally out of operations altogether by the P-51


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## OldSkeptic (Oct 4, 2014)

drgondog said:


> By the time the bombers cross the coastline the relative options for the bomber course narrows down considerably, but the primary tactics of assembling the bomber stream in a somewhat contiguous series of bombers groups was followed with rare exception. When multiple targets were selected during the ramp up phase in February through May to replace P-47 groups with Mustangs, even separate target branches were delayed until well into Germany.
> 
> .....



I agree entirely (good scenario) and there is an additional factor. The great successes the Luftwaffe achieved in late '43 was also because they could use their heavily armed twins. As the US escorts got more range they were obliterated, putting more pressure on the SE fighters. 

In your scenario (I call it the 'Park/drgondog' scenario), provided they can strip away the escorts earlier this still leaves the Luftwaffe their twins to cause havoc.

Analogous to Park using the Spits against the 109s thus creating the space for the Hurricanes to get through to the bombers, we have the SE Luftwaffe fighters stripping away the US escorts to let the big twins get through to the bombers.

Airfighting is three dimensional, time after time we see a well placed squadron (or less) causing huge destruction of a much larger group of fighters. Park's tactics were not about getting Spits into dogfights with the 109s (anything but, he didn't want them to do that it was hit and run he wanted), it was about disrupting them with good bounces. Causing them to lose formation, move away from the bombers, lose altitude, burn fuel, etc (and if they had drop tanks then...drop them) and fighter pilots being fighter pilots to get into pointless chases after being bounced. That was what he meant by 'stripping the escorts away'.

So it wasn't, if done well, necessary for the Luftwaffe to use huge numbers of their SE fighters against the US escorts to strip them away. It was the tactics that mattered more.

Remember what Park faced. Little warning time, towards the end of the BoB ridiculous escort/bomber ratios (3:1, even 5:1 at times), yet he, with good tactics, still managed to inflict crippling losses on the bombers all the time.

Numbers, of course, are important, but good tactics can multiply the effectiveness of what you have got. The Luftwaffe had the technical capability (and greater fighter numbers would have been very useful, natch) but not the tactical capability to use what they had as effectively as they could have done.

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## pbehn (Oct 7, 2014)

drgondog said:


> By the time the bombers cross the coastline the relative options for the bomber course narrows down considerably, but the primary tactics of assembling the bomber stream in a somewhat contiguous series of bombers groups was followed with rare exception. When multiple targets were selected during the ramp up phase in February through May to replace P-47 groups with Mustangs, even separate target branches were delayed until well into Germany.
> 
> If I could give you a mission that represents a typical day in the life of the 8th, select 24 April. Three Task Forces with 1st BD leading as 1st TF, 2nd TF/2nd BD next and finally 3rd BD next as 3rd TF in trail.
> 
> ...


This is a mission profile to ensure defeat. The original proposition is that the LW could defend Germany with 2000 fighters. This shifted to the LW defending against only the 8th AF on deep penetration raids. Now we have the 8th committing suicide repeating serious mistakes over and over until they are told to stop.

If the LW has 2000 s/e fighters then the allies must use all their strength and use it wisely. All aircraft useful to the allies from all groups must be used. First raids to attack their outlying airfields using P47 (the range of a P47 is greater than the range that they can escort) mosquitos. First raids targetted only on airfields with a small number of bombers and large escorts on a fixed flight plan no splitting of the bomb group.Flying through the LW lines in large numbers is doing bwhat the LW wants, constantly pounding at its limits is what it doesnt. The USAF and British had a large number of trained pilots, it is relatively easy to convert from a typhoon to a P47 and from a Spitfire to a Mustang. Once into early summer planes can be doubled up flying 2 missions a day (Mosquitos bombed Berlin 2 times a night after all. Spitfires can be used for withdrawal over France (they were at times). Multiplying the LW by a factor of 4 would put serious issues in front of the allies but unless they had a massively increased capacity to replace pilots they would eventually lose even if they could find the planes and the fuel to fly them.

Alternatively the allies could sit on the ground and within a month 1500 of these fighters would be sent to the eastern front or make the tactical decision to drive the LW away from Normandy in the build up to D day.


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## pbehn (Oct 7, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> I agree entirely (good scenario) and there is an additional factor. The great successes the Luftwaffe achieved in late '43 was also because they could use their heavily armed twins. As the US escorts got more range they were obliterated, putting more pressure on the SE fighters.
> 
> In your scenario (I call it the 'Park/drgondog' scenario), provided they can strip away the escorts earlier this still leaves the Luftwaffe their twins to cause havoc.
> 
> ...



Brilliant as Dowding and Park were they nearly lost when the LW concentrated on raids against Radar and Airfields. PArk was able to strip away the escorts when the objective, London, was clear. The Me109 had fuel to fight over London for, 5 minutes Park only had to make the escorts use burn 5 minutes of fuel and he would eventualy have the bombers alone regardless of the ratio. During the BoB Germany came no where near replacing their material losses while the RAF was replacing losses of aircraft although pilots were another matter. In 1944 Germany was struggling to provide pilots planes and fuel, even starting with 2000 planes and pilots they would lose because the allies had more and could more easily replace them.


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## OldSkeptic (Oct 8, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Brilliant as Dowding and Park were they nearly lost when the LW concentrated on raids against Radar and Airfields. PArk was able to strip away the escorts when the objective, London, was clear. The Me109 had fuel to fight over London for, 5 minutes Park only had to make the escorts use burn 5 minutes of fuel and he would eventualy have the bombers alone regardless of the ratio. During the BoB Germany came no where near replacing their material losses while the RAF was replacing losses of aircraft although pilots were another matter. In 1944 Germany was struggling to provide pilots planes and fuel, even starting with 2000 planes and pilots they would lose because the allies had more and could more easily replace them.



I think Bungey (His book "Most Dangerous Enemy") pretty much has debunked that common mythology. Only one airfield (Manston) was ever put out of operation. Virtually no planes were caught on the ground. The radars were hard to take out, only a Stuka might do it and they were easy prey, and the RAF had redundancy and mobile radars and quick repairs. The Luftwaffe tried that for weeks and got nowhere, except large losses.

The Germans attacking London was a last resort because nothing else had worked, the RAF just kept inflicting unacceptable losses. The Germans had worse problems getting new pilots and they didn't have the production of the British to replace machine losses.

Only if they had hit Sector stations and took out the controllers could they have done it...and they didn't know they existed, their importance or where they were.

They needed a quick victory (to enable an invasion), so they depended on the RAF being stupid. That is put up all their fighters in the air so that the Luftwaffe experten could shoot them down at a 5:1 ratio (as if) or get their planes caught on the ground. Neither of these things happened, Park tactically managed his forces beautifully.

Oh yes the RAF was under pressure all right, but so was the Luftwaffe. Neither side really knew how the other one was suffering. The Luftwaffe fell prey to over confidence, the RAF, correctly, remained very conservative. Even at the worst point, when Dowding broke up squadrons (allocated as A, B C categories) Fighter Command actually had more pilots than at the beginning of the Battle (don't forget the huge losses they suffered in France which had to made good). They were under _establishment _(ie theoretical) strength, but they still had plenty...plus reserves, which the Luftwaffe didn't.

And the Luftwaffe newbies were just as bad as the RAF ones, ie cannon fodder.

So the BoB would still have turned out the way it did, even if the Luftwaffe had kept on at the airfields (etc) and never touched London. 

The Luftwaffe were not stupid they also tried very hard to take out aircraft production...and like Bomber Command and the USAAF did later, failed, despite the fact that (at that time) the Supermarine and Hawker production were well within 109 escort range (closer than London).

So we are back to inaccurate bombing again, which had little effect, so the bombers were just the reason to get the RAF up so they could be shot down. Trouble was, FC (after France) had a hard core of experienced pilots ..and, which they could never understand (and didn't understand later in '43 and '44) the concept of a 'General' maintaining effective tactical control over his forces.

You have to remember the Heer (Army part of the Wehrmacht) training, leadership, doctrine, etc (such as Mission Command) was all worked out before the Nazis took over. It was a master of 3rd Generation warfare. Hence why it was so good.. and took the combined forces of the USSR, UK and US to beat them.

The Luftwaffe was created by the Nazis. Hence it's doctrine and ethos were very different. Full of the 'warrior hero' nonsense. Technology, logistics, tactics, were secondary to 'will power' and all that piffle. Hence things like Galland not wanting radios in fighters in the BoB, pilots never getting breaks (while their soldier brothers were far better looked after). Marseille feted, who slaughtered huge numbers of Hurricanes and P-40s...and shot down only 4 bombers in his entire career (leaving his soldier brothers to get hammered by the DAF while he got the headlines...dickhead). 

Galland, even at the end, still couldn't except tight effective tactical ground control. To him the pilots in the air were the 'kings'...and then repeated the mistakes of Leigh Mallory in France in '41...the same which mistakes he benefited from in getting his 'score' (and medals).

So it was a weird and very disfunctional organisation, the most effective leader of it all was Kesselring, a very (prior and later) good ground general..who got thumped twice by Park.

Park was like Monty, a really good General who knew his stuff inside out. He knew what he wanted to achieve, he learned, he taught, he changed things. He out thought the enemy at all points...he denied them of what they wanted. He never risked too much at any point in time, hence his opposition to (along with many other reasons) the 'big wing stuff. He understood that air warfare was 3 dimensional and that timing, position and surprise were more important than just raw numbers. 4 planes at the right time and place with the advantage of position and surprise can create more damage than 200 at a tactical disadvantage.

And he cared about his pilots. When the Luftwaffe was hitting the RAF's airfields (many not Fighter Command) his jumped up and down, not because the airfield's were out of operation ..they weren't (Spits and Hurris all took of in grass) but because the pilots didn't have a bed and food and so on. Unlike Leigh Mallory, Park got in his Hurricane and went all round his airfields and talked to his people regularly. 

A true leader.

The Luftwaffe, unlike the Heer who produced many of them, was incapable of producing and using people like Park...hence they lost.

Though the RAF (overall) wasn't much better in may ways since it fired Park and Dowding real fast after the BoB.....took until the DAF to get it back being useful again.... 70% losses in Bomber Command (50% killed)? Which was the same the Luftwaffe overall suffered, as did the U-Boats.... Ideology (idiotology?) achieves nothing just gets people killed for nothing.

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## pbehn (Oct 8, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> I think Bungey (His book "Most Dangerous Enemy") pretty much has debunked that common mythology. Only one airfield (Manston) was ever put out of operation.



I wrote my post with this book in mind, please read the sections on the early raids, they did take down a radar but didnt realise it and they did wreak havoc with low level raids using Me110 as a fighter bomber but only had one squadron.



The original discussion was that the LW could defend Germany with 2000 aircraft, this was changed to 2000 AC against the 8th AF, later to 2000 against the 8th AF where mission profiles lead to the bombers being left unescorted. However since you say this *The Luftwaffe, unlike the Heer who produced many of them, was incapable of producing and using people like Park...hence they lost.* I now think the LW would struggle to defend Magdeburg alone with 10,000 AC.

The LW night fighters showed that the LW could use the best technology to produce a formidable defence, the question was always numbers. Multiplying the LW by 4 to defend Germany would create problems for the allies but eventually they would prevail. They may not have eliminated the LW before D Day was planned and the Russian Army may have been at the edges of Berlin but they would have won eventually in my opinion.

I think you are contradicting and moving the goal posts for your amusement and so will duck out for a while.......cheers


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## DSR T-888 (Oct 12, 2014)

Mike Williams said:


> You might consider checking out the operations of the 9th Air Force P-38 groups, i.e. 367th, 370th and 474th Fighter Groups. The 367th and 370th operated the P-38 into early 1945 and the 474th stayed with the P-38 through to war's end. These units did see action against German fighters.



Thanks


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## drgondog (Oct 12, 2014)

*Quote Originally Posted by Mike Williams View Post 

You might consider checking out the operations of the 9th Air Force P-38 groups, i.e. 367th, 370th and 474th Fighter Groups. The 367th and 370th operated the P-38 into early 1945 and the 474th stayed with the P-38 through to war's end. These units did see action against German fighters.*

The total VC's for the three P-38 Groups (including P-47 (367FG) and P-51(370FG) after transition for 367 and 370FGs) was 89-9-43 for 367FG, 42-13-39 for 370FG and 96-54-24 for the 474th FG. By contrast the all Mustang op 339th FG which was operational for same period May 1 forward, destroyed 237 in the air and 431 on the ground.

I'm too lazy to parse out the P-47 scores for 367 and 370 but there weren't many


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## GregP (Oct 23, 2017)

Graugeist, ALL combat planes got shot down. That says nothing about either plane. It should not come as a surprise that B-17s shot down Bf 109s. That doesn't mean the B-17 was a fighter or better. Even Coronados shot down fighters.

Any P-38, even the prototype P-3.8, should be able to outroll and out-turn an Me-262. The Me 262 was faster and, if one of his cannon shells hit, you were in real trouble. And the P-38, while not the most agile plane on the planet, wasn't bad at a turning fight. A LOT of Japanese pilots found that out.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 23, 2017)

GregP said:


> Graugeist, ALL combat planes got shot down. That says nothing about either plane. It should not come as a surprise that B-17s shout down Bf 109s. That doesn't mean the B-17 was a fighter or better. Even Coronados shot down fighters.
> 
> Any P-38, even the prototype P-3.8, should be able to outroll and out-turn an Me-262. The Me 262 was faster and, if one of his cannon shells hit, you were in real trouble. ANd the P-38, while not the most agile plane on the planet, wasn't bad at a turning fight. A LOT of Japanese pilots found that out.



Which post are you responding to?


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## swampyankee (Oct 24, 2017)

Germany had finite resources. What’s being given up to get more fighters or to have them cover a smaller area? Do you pull them from air combat on the Eastern Front? Reduce production of night fighters?


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## GregP (Oct 24, 2017)

Sorry, I started reading the post again and responded to post #18. Old news. Please disregard as the reply was overtaken by pages of later posts. 

I'm one of the people who thinks the P-38 is very unjustly maligned for a mount that spawned our two top aces. They showed clearly, at least to me, that if you are a decent pilot, know your aircraft and the weakness of your enemy, success is not only possible, but likely.

These tactics are better suited to the PTO where smaller groups of planes fought each other than to the large melees of the ETO on escort missions. But I do not think Bong and McGuire would be meat on the table for anyone had they been flying in the ETO.


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## Conslaw (Nov 3, 2017)

timmy said:


> The question that we never really got answered
> 
> Can a Good TWIN ENGINE fighter match a Good SINGLE ENGINE fighter ??????
> 
> ...


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## drgondog (May 14, 2018)

GregP said:


> Hi Bill, With respect back at you, the P-38 does NOT continue to dive after starting one. I've seen WAY too many P-38 8,000 foot dives to believe that one. Ask Steve Hinton who flies one. The answer is simple to me, don't dive away with the Germans until problems set in ... stay around and fight. We probably will never see this one from the same perspective, Bill, but since it's a "what if," there is no real-world data to corroborate either theory; late model P-38's didn't mix it up in the ETO much. The P-38 needed to get pretty fast to hit critical Mach, so the P-38 pilots, like the Luftwaffe, KNEW when they were approaching the limit or SHOULD have. Your theory (diving with the Luftwaffe fighters) is no doubt correct for the guys who were flying P-51's, and they did quite well at it. Had they been flying P-38's I doubt the same tactics would have been employed. It's OK and not worth much discussion since it's a "what if" anyway. I don't feel like even starting a mild disagreement over the point ... I just feel that, if the situation had occurred, they would have found a way to stay around and fight just as the P-47 guys used different tactics from the P-51 guys. As long as the Germans were diving away from bomber attack, the escort job was done anyway.
> 
> Since it IS a "what if," I'd like to have seen a P-38 with 2 - 3% thinner wing and 2-stage Merlins in it, coupled with a serious program to shed weight. But, it never happened, so is a pipe dream. I can draw one, but that won't make it magically appear ...



Hi Greg - Don't know if I responded to this before. The P-38G/H/early J had the major dive control compressibility issue when initiating dive at high speed above 20K. Immediate onset drag rise/compressibility and shock wave creating pitch down moment - not recoverable until well into denser air. Intitiating a dive at 15K did not cause that issue.

The dive flap, while not called a dive brake, changed the CP immediately and much delayed onset compressibility as the P-38 moved into denser air. Ergo - and increased drag to delay the speed increase, smaller pitch down moment was still created - but controllable.

BTW, the P-47 experienced similar issues of pitch down but always more controllable from high to medium altitudes. The Mustang CP was well aft of 25% chord (major advantage of low drag wing) and thus did not have that issue. NAA did design a dive flap similar to P-38 and P-47 but dive tests were not sufficiently favorable to introduce into the production wing for any version of the 51.


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## drgondog (May 14, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Re #1: By late 1943, the W. Allies were using the same fuel - 100/130 grade? The different fuels were thing of 1938-41 era?
> 
> Re #4: The fix was to equip the pilots with electricaly-heated suit, that was helped out with having both engines outfitted with generators? Only one generator per P-38 was in earlier versions. The socket rheostat were provided for the suit. The basic, hot air heating system, was also improved?



Tomo - do you know details regarding the introduction (model, timing of field mods, timing of 1st production release) for the socket rheostat?


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## tomo pauk (May 14, 2018)

drgondog said:


> Tomo - do you know details regarding the introduction (model, timing of field mods, timing of 1st production release) for the socket rheostat?



No, unfortunately I don't have the details.


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## EverKing (Jun 12, 2018)

drgondog said:


> Tomo - do you know details regarding the introduction (model, timing of field mods, timing of 1st production release) for the socket rheostat?


The pilot's manual simply says "Late airplanes" or "later J Models." As best I can find, this corresponds with the J-15 (which added the second generator on the RH engine as well as other improvements) beginning with #42-103979 and would have reached combat operations in Early '44 (January or February). Bong and Lynch were both flying J-15s of this production block in Feb./March '44 (Lynch was lost in #42-103987 on March 8 and Bong's most famous "Marge" was #42-103993 and was lost in the hands of another pilot shortly thereafter). When the second generator was added they added the plug for the heated flying suit (or perhaps shortly thereafter?) as well as electric gun heaters which allowed them to re-route the LH blast heat from the armament compartment to the cockpit, essentially doubling the available heat (the RH blast heat always went to the cockpit).

And, yes, Tomo, it's me...the same Lightning obsessed EverKing from that other forum. I'm doing research for the next few chapters of the story and stumbled on this thread. Still reading through it, there is a lot of discussion to catch up on.

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## tomo pauk (Jun 12, 2018)

EverKing said:


> ...
> 
> And, yes, Tomo, it's me...the same Lightning obsessed EverKing from that other forum. I'm doing research for the next few chapters of the story and stumbled on this thread. Still reading through it, there is a lot of discussion to catch up on.



Wow! Welcome to the home, man

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## redcoat (Jun 12, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> No more than single engine fighters, you just had to do the same thing twice (and at the same time) and this would be typical for any twin engine fighter.


When you are being bounced by enemy fighters having to do things twice is a luxury you don't really have time for.



> 20th Fighter Group Headquarters APO 637 U.S. Army(E-2)3 June 1944Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat. To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.1. The following observations are being put in writing by the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC. They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended in anyway to "low rate" our present equipment.2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the word 'average’, taking full consideration just how little combat training our pilots have before going on as operational status.3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure.4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. The logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get organized that they were shot down before they could get going.5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead.6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that incombat.7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective combat airplane.8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane .HAROLD J. RAUColonel, Air Corps,

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## drgondog (Jun 13, 2018)

EverKing said:


> The pilot's manual simply says "Late airplanes" or "later J Models." As best I can find, this corresponds with the J-15 (which added the second generator on the RH engine as well as other improvements) beginning with #42-103979 and would have reached combat operations in Early '44 (January or February). Bong and Lynch were both flying J-15s of this production block in Feb./March '44 (Lynch was lost in #42-103987 on March 8 and Bong's most famous "Marge" was #42-103993 and was lost in the hands of another pilot shortly thereafter). When the second generator was added they added the plug for the heated flying suit (or perhaps shortly thereafter?) as well as electric gun heaters which allowed them to re-route the LH blast heat from the armament compartment to the cockpit, essentially doubling the available heat (the RH blast heat always went to the cockpit).
> 
> And, yes, Tomo, it's me...the same Lightning obsessed EverKing from that other forum. I'm doing research for the next few chapters of the story and stumbled on this thread. Still reading through it, there is a lot of discussion to catch up on.



Thanks for the reply. During your research have you managed to uncover either the first Depot mod timing (either US or UK) for the 55 Gallon LE Kits, and 2.) the number of 55 gallon LE kits sent to UK and 3.) the serial number or block to have the 55 gallon tanks installed on Burbank line?

Regards,

Bill


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## EverKing (Jun 13, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Wow! Welcome to the home, man


Thanks, I think I will enjoy being here. It is right up my alley. 


redcoat said:


> When you are being bounced by enemy fighters having to do things twice is a luxury you don't really have time for.


Yup, Rau's letter is a bit of the "gold standard" for P-38 researchers trying to understand the contemporary experiences at that time, c. March 1944.

The most interesting bit from that letter was the mention of the "Unit Control" system for the engine. It wasn't unheard of at the time for Fighter aircraft to have these systems. Republic built a simple one for the P-47 which used a simple push-rod interlink to tie the throttle and RPM levers together (which also controlled the turbo-supercharger through the automatic turbo-regulator). Of course, the best system in the early '40's was the one in the FW-190 which had what amounted a to a mechanical computer to tie all the engine controls together into a single lever. From what I have read, the FW system was so reliable, in fact, that they did not even include individual controls for each system. Allison eventually added a similar system to the V-1710-G series engines on the F-82 but that was too late to help the P-38.



drgondog said:


> Thanks for the reply. During your research have you managed to uncover either the first Depot mod timing (either US or UK) for the 55 Gallon LE Kits, and 2.) the number of 55 gallon LE kits sent to UK and 3.) the serial number or block to have the 55 gallon tanks installed on Burbank line?
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Bill


I do not have the specific dates and details for the Outer Wing tank installation but it appears that some of the J-5s received field modification kits and some of the J-10s had them installed at the modification center--in both cases, specific numbers are hard if not impossible to come by. They became standard factory installations with the J-15. It seems around this time is also when they changed the fuel management/tank-switching system to incorporate the OW tanks into the main tank selector valves by installing five position switches with the OW position completing an electrical circuit to activate the tanks; prior to this accessing the fuel in the tanks was handled through an added on switch box to the pilot's left, near the external store (bomb/tank) switch box.

Regarding the central question of the thread: the P-38 was in a strange juxtaposition in Western Europe at the time. It held its greatest advantage over German A/C above 20,000 feet, and was unmatched by LW fighters above about 25,000 (until high-altitude planes like the Ta-152); but, and here's the rub, that is also where the P-38 experienced the most trouble (engine, cockpit, etc.). At high speed and altitude it could turn inside the FW-190 (but prior to the boosted ailerons could still not out-roll it which sometimes made it impossible to "catch up" in a turn even with the smaller radius) but in order to keep that advantage it needed to maintain both speed and altitude. The problem here is that at these high altitudes it was capable of getting close to its .68 Mach critical speed even in level flight. So, it couldn't really go faster but neither could it slow down and hold its advantage. Now, that changed a little with the J-25 and L but the issues of approaching Crit.Mach remained. What the boosted ailerons and Dive Recover Flaps allowed, however, was some ability to follow the E/A down when they tried to Split-S away and escape. Combine that with increased pilot experience and better indoctrination (assuming the 8AF would have done so had they kept the P-38 in wider use) and I see no reason the late model Lightnings wouldn't have been able to own the vertical in Europe the same as they did in the PTO.

It is hard to say how much impact this would have had, other than giving the Lightning a chance to redeem itself slightly and start to dig out of its poor Kill Ratio pit in Western Europe. Of course, even without the improvements, simply sticking around to take on the increasingly fewer and less skilled LW would have helped improve the Kill Ratio. There is a big difference between even December '43, when the 20th FG and 55 FG would often face a highly experienced enemy out numbered as much as 5:1, and June of '44 when the VIII FC groups could out number the enemy in their own airspace, and January '45 when the LW could barely sortie any full groups and they mostly filled by green pilots.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 13, 2018)

redcoat said:


> When you are being bounced by enemy fighters having to do things twice is a luxury you don't really have time for.


And with training you compensate for that very easily. That memo (the infamous Col. Rau memo) you posted has been flung around this forum for years, I'd invite you to see older comments. It was evident the leadership of that command did not like or want the P-38. With that said I'm sure 9th AF P-38s were "bounced" many times in combat and managed quite well. I don't know if you ever flown an airplane but its obvious a twin is more difficult than a single engine aircraft, but again, if you train and understand the limitations as well as the advantages of your aircraft, those extra controls will be seamless.

I'd invite you to read this article. http://www.historynet.com/p-38-flunked-europe.htm

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## eagledad (Jun 13, 2018)

Drgondog and EverKing,

From Warbird Tech Series Lockheed P-38 Lightning , Vol 2, by Frederick Johnson, pg31, "The inclusion of the leading edge tanks was scheduled to begin on the assembly line with the Lightning bearing Lockheed number 422-3513 (AAF 43-28498). The reference for the previous line is from "Field Service Facts" Lockheed-Vega Customer Service Division, Nov 19, 1943.

From the Mighty Eighth War Manual by Roger Freeman pg 185
42 leading edge tanks were fitted to(P-38) in the last week of the year (1943)and during the next two months 120 P-38Js were processed,

FYI

Eagledad

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## Tieleader (Jun 13, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And with training you compensate for that very easily. That memo (the infamous Col. Rau memo) you posted has been flung around this forum for years, I'd invite you to see older comments. It was evident the leadership of that command did not like or want the P-38. With that said I'm sure 9th AF P-38s were "bounced" many times in combat and managed quite well. I don't know if you ever flown an airplane but its obvious a twin is more difficult than a single engine aircraft, but again, if you train and understand the limitations as well as the advantages of your aircraft, those extra controls will be seamless.
> 
> I'd invite you to read this article. http://www.historynet.com/p-38-flunked-europe.htm


Really informative article.Thanks!

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## GregP (Jun 14, 2018)

A lot of the guys who actually flew it in combat don't seem to agree with that article, but some do. The article was written by someone with an agenda. I surmise the P-38 had some issues and whether or not it did bad things while you were flying it had a lot to do with your opinion of it.

I know people who can break a wheelbarrow and ruin hot water soup as well as people who can actually make a bad engine run just right. One might hate the P-38 and the other might like it a lot. I have no dog in the hunt because I have never flown one, but they fly just fine today, with very few engine issues. These are the same engines used in WWII, flown with knowledge of how they like to be operated.

The horror stories can be made to come true or avoided for exceptionally long periods of time ... longer than most Merlins before overhaul, in fact. Depends on how you treat the engines. You can kill 'em or make 'em love you, and can also be "average" and get average engine life.

In the war, Merlins proved themselves tens of thousands of times, with fewer cases of engines coming apart. But the Allison is not a bad engine, by any means. And the P-38 was, in real life, the plane our two top aces flew, so it can't be all bad, and wasn't all good, either. Neither were most other service fighters. Too bad there aren't more surviving and flying today ... only 11 or so committing aviation on a regular basis.

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## GrauGeist (Jun 14, 2018)

redcoat said:


> When you are being bounced by enemy fighters having to do things twice is a luxury you don't really have time for.


That didn't seem to be a problem with the Mossie's crews...

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## drgondog (Jun 14, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> That didn't seem to be a problem with the Mossie's crews...



Dave, in fairness to the comparisons, one of the primary issues was the relatively low P-38H and J cruise speeds and that was combined with extremely cold operating environment. Until the J-10 and above the throttle and RPM had to be advanced in a more leisurely time span or risk blowing up the engine. I don't recall the block model J that more or less solved the intercooler and turbo spool up issues

The Mossie, Spit, Mustang operated much closer to combat speeds at 25000 feet in ETO and was able to move from 30+"MP to 61" and 3000 RPM much faster

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## redcoat (Jun 14, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> That didn't seem to be a problem with the Mossie's crews...


Actually it was. If a Mossie got bounced by an enemy single seat fighter in daylight, it had great difficulty in escaping it.
The trick with the Mossie was keeping the speed high and lots of changes in course to prevent interception

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## Shortround6 (Jun 14, 2018)

I would note that the article makes several mistakes that we have mentioned before.

1.
" Arrival of the newer P-38J to fill in behind the P-38H was supposed to help, but did not help enough. The J model’s enlarged radiators were trouble-prone. Improperly blended British fuel exacerbated the problems: Anti-knock lead compounds literally seethed out and became separated in the Allison’s induction system at extreme low temperatures. This could cause detonation and rapid engine failure, especially at the high power settings demanded for combat."

I have no idea if some of the fuel causing problems was blended in Britain or In British controlled refineries but at this point the US and the British were using a common fuel specification/s and had been for some sometime. This specification (for 100/130 fuel) had been changed 3 times (at least) and the changes were known to the parties (using air air forces and engine makers, in addition to the oil companies) involved. Allowable lead for instance had gone from 3.0cc per US gallon to 4.0cc per US gallon to 4.6 cc Per US gallon. This allowed for much higher production of 100/130 from base stocks without building additional refining capacity. The Problem the P-38s were having was NOT with the lead coming out of the fuel. Other changes in the fuel specification allowed for a higher use of aromatic compounds which do raise the knock limit, these are heavier than straight run gas and have different vapor points and freezing points. The effect of using these compounds (which are NOT lead) was suspected or known months before the P-38J showed up in Europe and Allison had been working on a new intake manifold to help combat the problems since the spring of 1943. It took until near the end of 1943 to get the Manifold in to service (and manifolds were shipped overseas for refitting to existing engines). I believe that Allison began fitting the new manifold to ALL Allison engines, not just P-38 engines shortly after. 

2. 
"In an article on ausairpower.net, Carlo Kopp noted that in their early days in the European theater, “Many of the P-38s assigned to escort missions were forced to abort and return to base. Most of the aborts were related to engines coming apart in flight….[due to] intercoolers that chilled the fuel/air mixture too much. Radiators that lowered engine temps below normal operating minimums. Oil coolers that could congeal the oil to sludge. These problems could have been fixed at the squadron level._ Yet, they were not._”

A partial fix was ready to hand, simply operate the P-38 according to Allison and Lockheed instructions. Instead the Army thought they knew better. They operated at a high cruise RPM and low boost. This kept the intake air cool or cold and really didn't work the engine very hard (part throttle at high rpm). Allison and Lockheed were recommending low rpm and high boost (greater use of the turbo when cruising) which would have heated the air more before it went through the intercooler and would have meant hotter air going though the engine supercharger and into the manifolds helping stop the the fuel separation and fuel puddling in the manifolds. Hotter air going in raises the temperature of the gases all the way through the engine, hotter combustion chamber temperature and hotter exhaust temperature. This may not have fixed the oil temp problem but it sure couldn't hurt. The Army gave in and began operating the P-38 the way Allison and Lockheed wanted but not until the late spring/summer of 1944. This was in conjunction with a visit by Tony Levier (Lockheed test pilot) to P-38 units in England. 
Operating an aircraft against both the airframe and engine makers recommendations and then blaming the aircraft doesn't seem quite fair. The low RPM and high boost technique was hardly new or novel. The British had been doing it with non-turbo planes for several years before the P-38 showed up in late 1943. 
It also helps with the turbo spool up problem as the turbo is operating at a higher speed when cruising than the high engine rpm/low boost method of cruising. 
Yes you need for the engine and props to accelerate up to speed but the props should automatically adjust pitch to the _power going to them. _Trying to go from high cruise engine rpm to combat power with the turbo trying to go from just off idle to full boost is going to leave you with turbo lag (engine starving for air) while an engine at lower rpm but with full (or nearly full) boost from the turbo will actually make more power at the lower rpm and then build.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 14, 2018)

redcoat said:


> "great difficulty in escaping it."


 Please elaborate



redcoat said:


> The trick with the Mossie was keeping the speed high and lots of changes in course to prevent interception


Training, tactics, training, tactics, as with the P-38. BTW a common tactic by most if not ALL fighter pilots (except those very green) was to fly a zig-zag course, never fly straight and level and always keep your head on a swivel. The number of engines the fighter had made no difference.


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## swampyankee (Jun 14, 2018)

The high rpm, low boost cruise may have increased the oil temperature, as the mechanical losses would have been greater and the fuel economy worse than with low rpm, high boost.


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## BiffF15 (Jun 14, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> The high rpm, low boost cruise may have increased the oil temperature, as the mechanical losses would have been greater and the fuel economy worse than with low rpm, high boost.



Swampyankee,

I agree and thought the same thing. The upside is reliability and safety at the expense of maybe some range. However IIRC Lindbergh flying with the Lightning guys in SWP actually extended their range by quite a bit.

Cheers,
Biff


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## eagledad (Jun 14, 2018)

Gentlemen

Tony LeVier (Lockheed P-38 test pilot) in a report written in May of 1944 after returning from visiting P-38 units in England recommended that for maximum engine efficiency/fuel economy pilots use 2300 rpm and 36" manifold pressure (MP) as the maximum for auto lean and cruise conditions. In reducing power (from 2300rpm and 36 MP), reduce MP from 1/2" to 1" for each decrease of 100 rpm. For increased power (from 2300rpm and 36"MP) , go to auto rich and increase MP 2" for each 100 rpm increase. He also stated that when he came to England, P-38 pilots were cruising between 2000 and 3000 rpm. One combination that he came across was 2800 rpm and 24 " MP.

The above is from Lockheed P-38 Lightning by Steve Pace, pages 74 and 76

Eagledad

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## redcoat (Jun 14, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Please elaborate


The Mosquito didn't have a speed advantage over the Fw 190 or the Bf 109G, so if these fighters did manage a successful bounce the Mosquito had great difficulty in getting away.
This is why when the Mosquito bombers were first introduced in 1942 and used on long range penetration flights into Germany the loss rate was 16%, better tactics and modifications to increase it's speed reduced the loss after a while to around 8% before these long range daylight raids into Germany ended in mid 43 and they transitioned to night attacks.

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## Barrett (Jun 14, 2018)

Boy, I think most of us have seen books with less info than this thread!

Just want to share an illuminating document that turned up when researching _Forgotten Fifteenth_:
Col. Obie Taylor rebuilt the 14th FG after the N Africa doledrums. He said that he never stopped learning about the 38, and that a newbie needed about 50% more transition time in a 38 than a s/e fighter, "but after that he could be nearly unbeatable."

The 15th's three P-38 groups did little escort after the Ploesti campaign (c. Aug 44) and most flew bombing-strafing missions til VE. Two of them (1st and 14th?) scored only about 4 kills in that time.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 15, 2018)

Barrett said:


> Boy, I think most of us have seen books with less info than this thread!
> 
> Just want to share an illuminating document that turned up when researching _Forgotten Fifteenth_:
> Col. Obie Taylor rebuilt the 14th FG after the N Africa doledrums. He said that he never stopped learning about the 38, and that a newbie needed about 50% more transition time in a 38 than a s/e fighter, "but after that he could be nearly unbeatable."
> ...



I've been told by several veterans who flew P-38s and P-51s and they said the same. Usually 200 hours in a twin (B-25s and A-20s) made very proficient P-38 pilots


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 15, 2018)

redcoat said:


> The Mosquito didn't have a speed advantage over the Fw 190 or the Bf 109G, so if these fighters did manage a successful bounce the Mosquito had great difficulty in getting away.
> This is why when the Mosquito bombers were first introduced in 1942 and used on long range penetration flights into Germany the loss rate was 16%, better tactics and modifications to increase it's speed reduced the loss after a while to around 8% before these long range daylight raids into Germany ended in mid 43 and they transitioned to night attacks.


And again, this shows that tactics and training was the key with regards to flying twin engine fighters - see above


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 15, 2018)

Just a few words about the P-38:
1. More successful in PTO because it had a theoretical 70mph speed advantage and CLIMB ADVANTAGE at all altitudes over Zero and Oscar. In ETO P-38 had no speed advantage, no (or little) climb advantage and couldn't dive or turn as well as LW. Late J and L models addressed these issues, but the heavy lifting was done by the time they were operational.
2. One prime factor for 8th AF switching to P-51 was maintenance. Over twice the maintenance for each P-38 as there was for a Mustang.
3. P-38 was effective in the 8th AF escort role primarily because THEY WERE THERE. Presence of ANY escort fighter severely disrupted the LW's plan of attack. ANY escort fighter would have forced the withdrawal of twin engined interceptors and upgunned/rocket tube armed 109s and 190s. And the 109 and 190 had only enough fuel for about one pass at the bombers before they had to retire for more fuel. 
4. P-38 was limited by not being able to use automatic boost control (until later models). Since the P-38's critical altitude was up to 30000' the engines could be over boosted at any altitude under that, which was basically the whole combat envelope. Virtually all the Allisons had auto boost except the P-38. Something about it fighting with the turbo regulator. Not much of a problem if critical altitude is 12000', hard to over boost above that. But with all the pilot workload on the twin engined P-38 the threat of over boosting at any altitude was an added headache.
5. Twice as expensive to produce, twice the maintenance, inferior dive/turn and a handful for ANY pilot much less a newby. 
Probably not the best use of the AAF's limited resources IMO.

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## tomo pauk (Jun 15, 2018)

Good post, but this:


P-39 Expert said:


> ...
> Probably not the best use of the AAF's limited resources IMO.



AAF's resources were more than suitable to sustain production, use and maintenance of the P-38s.

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## GrauGeist (Jun 15, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Good post...


I agree with Tomo, however, in point 3, I need to address this portion:


P-39 Expert said:


> ...ANY escort fighter would have forced the withdrawal of twin engined interceptors and upgunned/rocket tube armed 109s and 190s. And the 109 and 190 had only enough fuel for about one pass at the bombers before they had to retire for more fuel.


The Wfr.Gr.21 and R4M were not used as extensively as was the 30mm cannon.
It was much more typical to have the Bf109 flying top cover while the heavier armed types (Bf110, Me410, Fw190A-8, etc.) attacked the bombers. And the presence of Allied fighter escort didn't deter the Luftwaffe's attacks.
In regards to limited fuel, only the Me163 and Me262 had short fuel windows for engagement - particularly the Me163, which had roughly 7 minutes of fuel. The Me262 had roughly 80 minutes cruise or 30 minutes of combat.
The piston-engined types had a much better fuel window and often times, they were flying from very local fields that lay in the bomber's paths.

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 15, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> I agree with Tomo, however, in point 3, I need to address this portion:
> 
> The Wfr.Gr.21 and R4M were not used as extensively as was the 30mm cannon.
> It was much more typical to have the Bf109 flying top cover while the heavier armed types (Bf110, Me410, Fw190A-8, etc.) attacked the bombers. And the presence of Allied fighter escort didn't deter the Luftwaffe's attacks.
> ...


All I'm saying is, those twins and rocket firing single engined planes were doing major damage.
ANY escort fighter will force their withdrawal since their performance is degraded.
Then the LW has to fight "fair", and intercept with interceptors not destroyers.
P-38s were valuable in the ETO, I'm just saying they were not twice as good since they were twice the price and suffered delayed combat introduction.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 15, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> All I'm saying is, those twins and rocket firing single engined planes were doing major damage.
> ANY escort fighter will force their withdrawal since their performance is degraded.
> Then the LW has to fight "fair", and intercept with interceptors not destroyers.
> P-38s were valuable in the ETO, I'm just saying they were not twice as good since they were twice the price and suffered delayed combat introduction.



They suffered delayed combat introduction in Europe because all available P-38s were going to the Med, Indo-China and Pacific. The 55th fighter group was the first fighter group to perform escort missions in NW Europe and that started in October of 1943, roughly 8 weeks before P-51s start flying escort missions. The actual planes are P-38H's. 
I don't think anybody is saying they were twice as good.
In late 1943 the plane to compare to is the P-47 which equipped 7 fighter groups at the time the 55th became operational. P-47s had no paddle blade props and no water injection at this time (and wings were not plumbed for drop tanks). Things changed a lot in the next 4 months.

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 15, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> They suffered delayed combat introduction in Europe because all available P-38s were going to the Med, Indo-China and Pacific. The 55th fighter group was the first fighter group to perform escort missions in NW Europe and that started in October of 1943, roughly 8 weeks before P-51s start flying escort missions. The actual planes are P-38H's.
> I don't think anybody is saying they were twice as good.
> In late 1943 the plane to compare to is the P-47 which equipped 7 fighter groups at the time the 55th became operational. P-47s had no paddle blade props and no water injection at this time (and wings were not plumbed for drop tanks). Things changed a lot in the next 4 months.


My point about delayed combat introduction is that they didn't get into combat AT ALL until the end of '42.


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## drgondog (Jun 15, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> My point about delayed combat introduction is that they didn't get into combat AT ALL until the end of '42.


Not strictly true, even in context with fact that the AAF was just getting started in late 1942 in ETO and MTO. The 1st, 14th started combat ops in ETO August 1942 (1st) and October (14th) and 78th FG was on the way. Africa stripped the P-38 FG's from 8th AF and from that point until Blitz Week through Schweinfurt that 8th AF realized it was in deep trouble for un-escorted deep penetrations and Arnold approved emergency re-deployment of 55th FG and re-routed 20th and 364th to join the 55th.

P-38s were operational in May 1942 in the Aleutians and as Recon in Australia.


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## swampyankee (Jun 15, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Good post, but this:
> 
> 
> AAF's resources were more than suitable to sustain production, use and maintenance of the P-38s.




They were still finite. Removing the P-38 from production _may_ permit increased production of equally effective, less expensive aircraft. It's not guaranteed, as Lockheed, for one, may not be able to produce Mustangs or Thunderbolts.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 15, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> All I'm saying is, those twins and rocket firing single engined planes were doing major damage.
> ANY escort fighter will force their withdrawal since their performance is degraded.
> Then the LW has to fight "fair", and intercept with interceptors not destroyers.
> P-38s were valuable in the ETO, I'm just saying they were not twice as good since they were twice the price and suffered delayed combat introduction.


Warfare is not "fair" - each side will always escelate with new threat upgrades. The side that overpowers their enemy is the winner.
And like I mentioned earlier, the Wfr.Gr.21 was not used in large numbers, entered service from about mid-43 onward. The R4M entered service in '44 both with the goal of inflicting broader damage in a single salvo and to reduce the drag penalty from either gunpods or Grenate launch tubes. The R4M didn't see widespread service, either.

What was the primary destroyer of bombers, was the MG151/20 and both the Mk103 and Mk108. These were used aboard the dedicated interceptors, who had fighter protection of their own. The deadliest combination would be the late model Bf109s flying cover for the heavily armed and armored Fw190 Sturmbocks. The 109's drew off the fighter escort and the Sturmbocks moved in and tore the bombers apart with their 30mm minengeschoss rounds.

I cannot honestly think of any time that the Luftwaffe approached a bomber formation, saw Allied escorts and turned away. I CAN recall many instances when Luftwaffe elements engaged the escorted bombers without the benefit of top cover - the Me262 was one such type that would commit slashing attacks on the bombers while dodging the escorts and then used their speed to either climb up and away to prepare for another attack or leave the area, which was very frustrating to the Allied fighters.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 15, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> They were still finite. Removing the P-38 from production _may_ permit increased production of equally effective, less expensive aircraft. It's not guaranteed, as Lockheed, for one, may not be able to produce Mustangs or Thunderbolts.



Lockheed could probably build anything you wanted them to.
The Problem being that the P-38 was earlier in timing than the P-47 and the Merlin Mustang.

In March, April and May of 1942 Lockheed built 100 P-38s in each month. Republic built 1, 1 and 10 aircraft in each month and NA was building 52-86 Mustangs a month for the British with Allison engines.
At what point do you tell Lockheed to stop making P-38s and spend months swapping over the production lines?
In Dec of 1942 Lockheed built 160 P-38s, Republic built 142 P-47s and NA was building A-36s.
In 1943 Lockheed built 2497 P-38s, Republic built 4428 P-47s (660 in Dec) and NA had built 1710 P-51s (A-36s built in 1943 not counted).

Trying to get Lockheed to build P-51s in 1943 leads to the question of where do the engines come from?

From the Middle of 1942 to some point in 1944 every US Air Force Commander in Every Theater was screaming or begging for more P-38s.
When do you tell them to make do with P-39s and P-40s for months while Lockheed tools up for the P-47 and P-51?

Yes ,it was big and expensive but the US simply didn't have anything to replace it until the Spring of 1944 and in 1944 Lockheed built 4186 P-38s. (average 348 a month), perhaps Lockheed could have worked up to 4-500 P-51s per month, I don't know, but changing over in 1944 could have cost 600-1000 planes lost during the change over.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 15, 2018)

Folks, do we forget that Lockheed never expected to build more than 100 P-38s or that the AAF never intended to buy more than 75?

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## taly01 (Jun 16, 2018)

From what I've read after developing the early P-38 and proving its concept (without much promise of purchases from USAAF in 1941) the best of the Lockheed team were moved to making revenue for the company by getting ready the Ventura and Hudson for British purchases! (remember this is pre-USA entry to WW2 and lend-lease).

So P-38 development remained in limbo until Pearl harbour and then they hurriedly tried to get it ready and found it was not really combat ready yet.


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## redcoat (Jun 16, 2018)

One of the reasons often put forward in threads on the P-38 and why it was replaced in the 8th Air Force by the P-51 is economic, it was cheaper to operate a single engined fighter like the P-51 than a twin engined fighter like the P-38.
Is there any historical evidence for this claim or is it merely an assumption by the posters ?


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## drgondog (Jun 16, 2018)

redcoat said:


> One of the reasons often put forward in threads on the P-38 and why it was replaced in the 8th Air Force by the P-51 is economic, it was cheaper to operate a single engined fighter like the P-51 than a twin engined fighter like the P-38.
> Is there any historical evidence for this claim or is it merely an assumption by the posters ?


I have researched this question thoroughly. There is no written/sourced statement in Arnold, Spaatz, Doolittle, Eaker, Anderson, Lockheed, NAA histories or correspondence files in public or USAFHRC that I have covered that mentions economics as a factor.

What is true and verified is that Kenney would have taken every P-38 made if he could have had access and the P-38 was doing very well in multi role missions all over the globe. What is also true is that when Dallas P-51C started deliveries in September, 1943, the P-51B/C production quickly outpaced the P-38 at Burbank. What is also true is that the 85 gallon fuselage tank kits to extend range of P-51B/C beyond Berlin were being installed in October, 1943 and those kits were delivered 3:1 to UK over the 55 gallon LE kits for the P-38J-10.

Nobody in 8th AF lost sight that only 2 P-51 equipped groups nearly outscored all the 8th and 9th AF P-47D groups combined (IIRC ~ 10) performing escort for Big Week campaign - and far outscored the combined five P-38 FGs from both 8th and 15th AF. Destruction of the Luftwaffe was the Prime mission of 8th AF from January through May, 1944.

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 16, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> I agree with Tomo, however, in point 3, I need to address this portion:
> 
> The Wfr.Gr.21 and R4M were not used as extensively as was the 30mm cannon.
> It was much more typical to have the Bf109 flying top cover while the heavier armed types (Bf110, Me410, Fw190A-8, etc.) attacked the bombers. And the presence of Allied fighter escort didn't deter the Luftwaffe's attacks.
> ...


The LW 109s and 190s had very little fuel to work with. The 190 held 140 gallons internal. It burned about 160gph at climb/combat setting giving it a theoretical 52 minutes of operation. Deduct 20 minutes to climb to 26000' and deduct 20 minutes reserve for landing and there are 12 minutes of fuel left for combat. Maybe one pass at the bombers, maybe two if there was no interference from escort fighters. The 109 was even more challenged with only 88 gallons internal.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 16, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> They were still finite. Removing the P-38 from production _may_ permit increased production of equally effective, less expensive aircraft. It's not guaranteed, as Lockheed, for one, may not be able to produce Mustangs or Thunderbolts.



What would be the "equally effective, less expensive aircraft", and when to do the re-tooling? The P-40 and P-39 were less effective, but certainly not equally effective when it is about air combat 400-500-700 miles away from the base, at 20000-30000 ft. The P-47 is equaly effective, but it is not less expensive (10% cheaper?). That leaves us with P-51, that AAF didn't think much of before late 1942.
The main shortcoming of the P-38 was that it was not produced in double the numbers, so all theaters can have it already by mid-1942, while easing the introduction of needed modifications.



FLYBOYJ said:


> Folks, do we forget that Lockheed never expected to build more than 100 P-38s or that the AAF never intended to buy more than 75?



AAF ordered 13 YP-38s in late April of 1939, then 60 of P-38s, then UK and France orderd hundreds by May of 1940, then in Aug 1940 AAF ordered 608 examples. For example, Lockheed dragged their feet for 10 precoius months - time between the contract for YP-38s until start of manufacturing of those. All together, they squandered the timing advanatge held vs. P-47 and P-51.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 16, 2018)

taly01 said:


> From what I've read after developing the early P-38 and proving its concept (without much promise of purchases from USAAF in 1941) the best of the Lockheed team were moved to making revenue for the company by getting ready the Ventura and Hudson for British purchases! (remember this is pre-USA entry to WW2 and lend-lease).
> 
> So P-38 development remained in limbo until Pearl harbour and then they hurriedly tried to get it ready and found it was not really combat ready yet.



As above - Lockheed have had on orders more than 1100 P-38s before Autumn of 1940, and plenty of time was squandered between April of 1939 and late 1941.



P-39 Expert said:


> The LW 109s and 190s had very little fuel to work with. The 190 held 140 gallons internal. It burned about 160gph at climb/combat setting giving it a theoretical 52 minutes of operation. Deduct 20 minutes to climb to 26000' and deduct 20 minutes reserve for landing and there are 12 minutes of fuel left for combat. Maybe one pass at the bombers, maybe two if there was no interference from escort fighters. The 109 was even more challenged with only 88 gallons internal.



Have you accunted for drop tanks fuel? Why would the German fighters always employ the Climb/Combat setting?


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 16, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> As above - Lockheed have had on orders more than 1100 P-38s before Autumn of 1940, and plenty of time was squandered between April of 1939 and late 1941.
> 
> 
> 
> Have you accunted for drop tanks fuel? Why would the German fighters always employ the Climb/Combat setting?


Most LW fighters didn't use drop tanks for interception missions.
Regarding the climb/combat setting, they were taking off and climbing or in combat the whole mission on an intercept. Probably in climb/combat setting while returning to base in case any allied fighters were around for ground attack duty. That estimate does not include any time at TO/Emergency power or any interruption by escort fighters.
They just didn't carry much fuel. A 190's engine was in the same displacement class as the Corsair and Hellcat and they carried around 250gal and the Thunderbolt carried over 300. A 190 carried 140gal.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 16, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Most LW fighters didn't use drop tanks for interception missions.



Any proof?



> Regarding the climb/combat setting, they were taking off and climbing or in combat the whole mission on an intercept. Probably in climb/combat setting while returning to base in case any allied fighters were around for ground attack duty. That estimate does not include any time at TO/Emergency power or any interruption by escort fighters.
> They just didn't carry much fuel. A 190's engine was in the same displacement class as the Corsair and Hellcat and they carried around 250gal and the Thunderbolt carried over 300. A 190 carried 140gal.



The Climb/Combat setting was limited to 30 minutes for the BMW 801 and DB 605.
P-47 was capable for 450-600 miles radius with wing drop tanks, LW fighters didn't needed such kind of radius in 1943-45; t's R-2800 burned from 210 gph (max continuous power) to 315 gph (war emergency power) - the BMW 801 was making less power and was consuming less. 10% less displacement.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 16, 2018)

A Bf-109 G (DB605A) used approximately 105 US gallons per hour at the climb/30 minute rating. With the fuel injection it didn't use as much fuel per HP hour as many of the allied engines. 

US radials ran really rich ( really rich) at military power as an aid to cooling, both as an anti detonation measure and as a way to cool the engine itself.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 16, 2018)

There seems to be a misconception about Luftwaffe types and their range/tactics.

The Luftwaffe interceptors most certainly did use drop tanks to increase their range & loiter time and home defense increasingly became their priority from 1944 onward.

There is plenty of proof to the interceptors using droptanks, but for this conversation, I'll use a quick example.

Seen attached, is a Bf109G-6/U2 of 3./JG301 (White 16) flown by Lt. Prenzel. He was on a "Wild Sau" night mission against RAF bombers the evening of 21 July 1944 and ended up landing at RAF Manston in error. 
JG301 operated as Reichsverteidigung (Defense of the Reich), who's mission was to intercept and engage Allied bombers and fighters.

In the photo, taken when Lt. Prenzel and his Bf109 were taken into custody, the droptank can be seen still in place.


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## swampyankee (Jun 16, 2018)

redcoat said:


> One of the reasons often put forward in threads on the P-38 and why it was replaced in the 8th Air Force by the P-51 is economic, it was cheaper to operate a single engined fighter like the P-51 than a twin engined fighter like the P-38.
> Is there any historical evidence for this claim or is it merely an assumption by the posters ?


Well, two engines of comparable complexity, so about double engine maintenance effort, a unit cost of $97,000 for the P-38, vs $52,000 for the P-51 (Price of WW2 Aircraft), so close to 80% greater unit price, about twice the fuel consumption and oil consumption, and greater training requirements, so I think the economic argument is very strong. So is the argument based on the P-38's fitness for service, which was, by many reports, poor in the ETO for the earlier versions.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 16, 2018)

It may be hard to separate _economic_ _cost_ from _logistic footprint. _The P-38 and P-47 both having a much larger _logistic footprint _even after the initial plane was paid for. 
With everything the aircraft needed fighting for priority in shipping space (even the ground crews food) to get across the Atlantic the logistic footprint was probably more important that contract cost.


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## redcoat (Jun 16, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> Well, two engines of comparable complexity, so about double engine maintenance effort, a unit cost of $97,000 for the P-38, vs $52,000 for the P-51 (Price of WW2 Aircraft), so close to 80% greater unit price, about twice the fuel consumption and oil consumption, and greater training requirements, so I think the economic argument is very strong. So is the argument based on the P-38's fitness for service, which was, by many reports, poor in the ETO for the earlier versions.


I've never thought the economic argument was a good one because the leadership of the Eighth were not accountants, all they were concerned about was protecting their bombers, the financial cost was irrelevant to them.

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## MIflyer (Jun 16, 2018)

The P-38 cost twice what a P-51 did and required more maintenance as well. That will make the decision right there.

And my friend Ward Duncan. maintenance chief for the 9th PRS in India during most of WWII, used to go on at length about pilot errors that brought down P-38's or at least caused them to limp home on one engine.


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## pbehn (Jun 16, 2018)

redcoat said:


> I've never thought the economic argument was a good one because the leadership of the Eighth were not accountants, all they were concerned about was protecting their bombers, the financial cost was irrelevant to them.


If they were accountants the cost of fighters would still be immaterial. How much does a fully crewed bomber cost in men materials and training hours?

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## BiffF15 (Jun 16, 2018)

pbehn said:


> If they were accountants the cost of fighters would still be immaterial. How much does a fully crewed bomber cost in men materials and training hours?



Also something to consider is the decision makers wouldn’t stop 38 production to introduce the K model and it offered a perf boost. While more expensive than a Mustang it would appear costs weren’t a major consideration until post war.

Cheers,
Biff

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## swampyankee (Jun 16, 2018)

redcoat said:


> I've never thought the economic argument was a good one because the leadership of the Eighth were not accountants, all they were concerned about was protecting their bombers, the financial cost was irrelevant to them.



They did — one hopes — know how to count. They’d notice the lower number of aircraft — ones which cost nearly double and were not more capable — and the greater number of support staff.


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## pbehn (Jun 16, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> Also something to consider is the decision makers wouldn’t stop 38 production to introduce the K model and it offered a perf boost. While more expensive than a Mustang it would appear costs weren’t a major consideration until post war.
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff


While all this was going on the B-29 and other bomber projects plus the A Bombs themselves were being financed, I suspect in the scheme of things fighter costs were "small beer".

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## redcoat (Jun 16, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> They did — one hopes — know how to count. They’d notice the lower number of aircraft — ones which cost nearly double and were not more capable — and the greater number of support staff.


The only counting the leadership of the Eighth was concerned with was the difference between the number of bombers setting out and the number which returned.

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 16, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> What would be the "equally effective, less expensive aircraft", and when to do the re-tooling? The P-40 and P-39 were less effective, but certainly not equally effective when it is about air combat 400-500-700 miles away from the base, at 20000-30000 ft. The P-47 is equaly effective, but it is not less expensive (10% cheaper?). That leaves us with P-51, that AAF didn't think much of before late 1942.
> The main shortcoming of the P-38 was that it was not produced in double the numbers, so all theaters can have it already by mid-1942, while easing the introduction of needed modifications.
> 
> 
> ...


Hindsight is 20/20, but why didn't the initial British order for P-51s specify the Merlin XX. It did wonders for the P-40F, imagine what it would have done for the early P-51 pending the introduction of a two stage engine. At half the cost of a P-38.


drgondog said:


> I have researched this question thoroughly. There is no written/sourced statement in Arnold, Spaatz, Doolittle, Eaker, Anderson, Lockheed, NAA histories or correspondence files in public or USAFHRC that I have covered that mentions economics as a factor.
> 
> What is true and verified is that Kenney would have taken every P-38 made if he could have had access and the P-38 was doing very well in multi role missions all over the globe. What is also true is that when Dallas P-51C started deliveries in September, 1943, the P-51B/C production quickly outpaced the P-38 at Burbank. What is also true is that the 85 gallon fuselage tank kits to extend range of P-51B/C beyond Berlin were being installed in October, 1943 and those kits were delivered 3:1 to UK over the 55 gallon LE kits for the P-38J-10.
> 
> Nobody in 8th AF lost sight that only 2 P-51 equipped groups nearly outscored all the 8th and 9th AF P-47D groups combined (IIRC ~ 10) performing escort for Big Week campaign - and far outscored the combined five P-38 FGs from both 8th and 15th AF. Destruction of the Luftwaffe was the Prime mission of 8th AF from January through May, 1944.



Page 144 "Vees for Victory" Gen. Jimmy Doolittle is said to have decided to rely on the P-51 as primary long range escort fighter because the P-38's Allisons were blowing up and the fixes were taking months. That should qualify as excessive maintenance.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 16, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Hindsight is 20/20, but why didn't the* initial British order for P-51s specify the Merlin XX*. It did wonders for the P-40F, imagine what it would have done for the early P-51 pending the introduction of a two stage engine. At half the cost of a P-38.



Just maybe, the British didn't order the initial Mustangs with Merlin XX engines because they ordered them on May 29th 1940 and Packard didn't sign the deal to make Merlins until Sept of 1940?????

And just maybe they were right because NA managed to build 138 Mustangs in 1941 while Packard only built 45 Merlins in 1941 and the British were already getting 2/3rds of them for other aircraft??????????

You not only need hindsight, you need a time machine shuttling back and forth between mid 1942 and late 1941 to deliver the engines.

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## pbehn (Jun 16, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Hindsight is 20/20, but why didn't the initial British order for P-51s specify the Merlin XX. It did wonders for the P-40F, imagine what it would have done for the early P-51 pending the introduction of a two stage engine. At half the cost of a P-38.
> .


That would give you a slightly better but possibly later P51 but it would just replace Hurricanes with P51s.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 16, 2018)

I would note that while you would get better Mustangs, they would arrive late ( they only had 4 squadrons of Allison Mustangs in Service at Dieppe In Aug 1942) and you would be short hundreds of other aircraft, whether they were Hurricanes, P-40Fs, 4 engine bombers or whatever the British were shoving Packard built Merlins into.

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## pbehn (Jun 16, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> I would note that while you would get better Mustangs, they would arrive late ( they only had 4 squadrons of Allison Mustangs in Service at Dieppe In Aug 1942) and you would be short hundreds of other aircraft, whether they were Hurricanes, P-40Fs, 4 engine bombers or whatever the British were shoving Packard built Merlins into.


You also wouldn't get P51B/C mustangs any earlier, the engines had just started to become in service. I just suggested less hurricanes as the lowest down the tech "food chain".

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## swampyankee (Jun 16, 2018)

redcoat said:


> The only counting the leadership of the Eighth was concerned with was the difference between the number of bombers setting out and the number which returned.



They'd probably be counting the escorts that were unable to complete a mission due to engine failurs and the number of pilots who became casualties because of poor cockpit heating. The P-38 was not succeeding in Europe. It was better than nothing, but not as good as the single-engined aircraft that replaced it.

And cost lest to operate and procure.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 16, 2018)

pbehn said:


> You also wouldn't get P51B/C mustangs any earlier, the engines had just started to become in service. I just suggested less hurricanes as the lowest down the tech "food chain".


 to borrow from another thread how about the Merlin XX used in the Defiant II 

In reality it would take weeks of engineering (drawing. fabrication and testing) to change from the Allison to the Merlin XX and then it would take pretty much all the engineering time it took historically to change to the two stage Merlin from the single stage Merlin (heavier engine, bigger heavier propeller, larger radiator and oil cooler plus intercooler, needed larger duct) and so on.

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## redcoat (Jun 17, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> They'd probably be counting the escorts that were unable to complete a mission due to engine failurs and the number of pilots who became casualties because of poor cockpit heating. The P-38 was not succeeding in Europe. It was better than nothing, but not as good as the single-engined aircraft that replaced it.
> 
> And cost lest to operate and procure.


But there is no historical evidence that what you stated in your last comment played any role in the replacement of the P-38, you are merely making an assumption.

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## pinehilljoe (Jun 17, 2018)

I good reference is Warren Bodie's book on the P-38. Mr Bodie wrote a 13 or 14 part article in Wings/Airpower in the 80s on the P-38 and the book is largely a collection of the articles.
)
IMHO it wasn't performance, it was other factors. The P-38 had demonstrated the range to escort to Berlin, and pilots like Robin Olds (8 claimed, 5 confirmed kills) showed the 38 could perform with the best of the Luftwaffe.

The 5th AF demand for the Lightning IMHO was the factor. In 42 and 43 the 38 was the only fighter that could fly the long range missions routinely in South Pacific.


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 17, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Just maybe, the British didn't order the initial Mustangs with Merlin XX engines because they ordered them on May 29th 1940 and Packard didn't sign the deal to make Merlins until Sept of 1940?????
> 
> And just maybe they were right because NA managed to build 138 Mustangs in 1941 while Packard only built 45 Merlins in 1941 and the British were already getting 2/3rds of them for other aircraft??????????
> 
> You not only need hindsight, you need a time machine shuttling back and forth between mid 1942 and late 1941 to deliver the engines.




So the P-51 (Allison) was in production in 1941 and the MerlinXX was in production in 1941, both in the USA, but there is no way they could have been used together? To get a fighter in production before the P-38 got into combat in very late 1942?


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## drgondog (Jun 17, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> So the P-51 (Allison) was in production in 1941 and the MerlinXX was in production in 1941, both in the USA, but there is no way they could have been used together? To get a fighter in production before the P-38 got into combat in very late 1942?


Simple answer - No. First, the AAF was not interested in the Mustang until very late 1941, and the interest expressed first was for the A-36 with combination of Mustang IA - both with Allisons.

Second, the re-tooling for Mustang XX/28/1650-1 was significant because it imposed a re-design of the radiator/cooling design, engine mount changes, etc and did not solve the high altitude requirement for escort which was just starting to surface as 8th AF started bombing ops over Germany.

Third, the contract for the 1650-3 was just beginning, along with the engineering changes for the two speed/two stage supercharger at the end of 1941.

Fourth, NAA did not at that time have a high enough priority at War Production Board to warrant diversions from either Packard delivery obligations to British or the P-40F. AAF Mat'l command did not allocate any more than two of Packard's early production 1650-3 until July 1942 while both the RAF Mustang X and XP-51B were well into design change stage. And that required Arnold to approve and push the allocation. Barney Echols resisted but was overcome by Muir and others in mid 1942 when the CAS arm of AAF held sway. In fact, the Merlin 1650-3 Mustangs were originally DEDICATED to 9th AF to replace P-39 for ETO. That is why the 354th, 357th and 363rd FG were all slated to receive the P-51B first.

Fourth - it took Packard until July, 1943 to keep pace with NAA delivery of complete airframes of P-51B-1=NA

On your other comments about "Lack of external fuel tanks for Day Fighter Arm", the first approval for C/L 80 gallon tanks began with introduction of Bf 109G-4 in September 1942. Note - that date is 3 months prior to first 8th AF raid on Germany on January 27, 1943.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 17, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> So the P-51 (Allison) was in production in 1941 and the MerlinXX was in production in 1941, both in the USA, but there is no way they could have been used together? To get a fighter in production before the P-38 got into combat in very late 1942?



Ah.........no.

Please note that as of Jan 1 1942 there had been 207 P-38s built for the US forces and 138 Mustangs built for the British. Also note that Lockheed was building , at a minimum 100 P-38s a month for most of 1942 (August was an exception) Lockheed built way more P-38s in 1942 than NA built Mustangs (in part because the Mustang had not been ordered in the numbers that that P-38 had been) 

Changing the goalposts and comparing apples to oranges doesn't help discussions. 

You asked about the initial British order for Mustangs. It was placed 2 1/2 months before the deal with Packard was signed although Packard had been working for several weeks prior to the actual signing. The British ordered an additional 300 Mustangs in Sept of 1940, during the BoB. At this point it seemed that the Hurricane needed the Merlin XX to stay competitive as a front line fighter. This idea went out the window When the 109F showed up. However that is 4-6 months further along. Allison engines are already ordered for the Mustangs, playing switcharoo with the engines at this point is difficult. Sticking Allisons in Hurricanes would be a disaster from a performance point of view. 

Now you want to change things to some air force (US?) getting Merlin XX powered planes in _production and/or initial service_ BEFORE the P-38 _sees combat_. 
These are two different things. And the contention that the P-38 didn't see "combat" until late 1942 is also somewhat mistaken. 

April 16th 1942 sees F-4 photo Lightnings flying recon missions over Eastern New Guinea and new Britain (they used 75 gallon drop tanks to get to Australia ) 

May 29th 1942 sees P-38Es start their deployment to Alaska. 

The 1st Fighter Group is playing ping-pong flying back and forth across the Country, initially deployed from their base in Michigan (Selfridge field) to the west coast after Pearl Harbor they headed east in April to get ready for deployment to England, They got their older P-38s replaced by P-38Fs. June sees them heading West again because of Midway. They are turned around before they get there and go back to Maine (jumping off point for the transatlantic flight). Over the Summer two P-38 fighter groups (six squadrons ?) cross the Atlantic by air. Early Sept sees a number of sorties over France as the groups work up but with no contacts (combat?) Oct 15th sees the first B-17 escort mission. Oct 31st sees all P-38s in England withdrawn from operations for use in Operation Torch. 

In the Pacific the 67th fighter squadron with a mix of P-38s and P-39s arrives at Henderson field On Aug 22nd. Oct 31st sees the 339th squadron with P-38s arrive at Henderson field. Perhaps you define that as _very late 1942?
_
Now _perhaps _our mythical Merlin XX Mustang could have been built by the hundreds in spring/summer of 1942 (and the P-40Fs built as additional P-40Es?) 
But they would not have been able to fly the Atlantic. Would they have been able to fly from England to North Africa once the ground troops took a few airfields like the P-38s did? 

The British Mustangs flew their first operational mission on May 10th 1942, shooting up a German Airfield just across the Channel. As stated before the British have 4 operational squadrons in the middle of Aug 1942 at which point both NA and RR are working on building prototypes of Mustangs with two stage engines. 

There is often a 4 to 6 month delay between a fighter going into production and it seeing squadron use (in it's first squadron let alone large numbers) with combat often taking several months more. 

There is alo the need to allocate resources (like engines) so they get the highest number of _effective_ aircraft rather than a lesser number of great fighters. 
This was the whole Spitfire vs Hurricane II debate. The Hurricane II got the better engine because they felt that without it the Hurricane ( being built in larger numbers than the Spitfire) would be obsolete without it and the Spitfire (in the MK II version) was good enough in the interim. 


Would a few hundred Merlin XX Mustangs (or even 500) made up for not having the P-40F? Would the Merlin XX Mustangs have been sent to NA to provide top cover/support for the P-40E/Ks and not used to escort B-17s in any case?

Yes a Merlin XX Mustang would have been better than the P-40F but you can't have them in unlimited quantities and something has to take the place of the P-40Fs and Ls or the Allison P-40s despite how well they might have done at low altitude are going to get pounced on from above more often.

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 17, 2018)

drgondog said:


> Simple answer - No. First, the AAF was not interested in the Mustang until very late 1941, and the interest expressed first was for the A-36 with combination of Mustang IA - both with Allisons.
> 
> Second, the re-tooling for Mustang XX/28/1650-1 was significant because it imposed a re-design of the radiator/cooling design, engine mount changes, etc and did not solve the high altitude requirement for escort which was just starting to surface as 8th AF started bombing ops over Germany.
> 
> ...



Whole point of my initial P-51XX post was to substitute that production for P-38 production.
Yes, the AAF would need to get more interested in P-51 production, again to replace P-38 production. They sure got interested in the P-51 production with the Merlin 61.
No retooling for the P-51XX since it would have been ordered that way from the beginning. Probably less retooling for the Merlin 61 (P-51B/C) since the P-51 would have already been designed for a Merlin.
Doesn't replace the P-51B/C, just gets a Merlin P-51 (with slightly lower performance) in production sooner, at the expense of P-38 production and P-40F (MerlinXX) production.
If nothing else, just put the XX into the P-51 instead of the P-40F.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 17, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Whole point of my initial P-51XX post was to substitute that production for P-38 production.
> Yes, the AAF would need to get more interested in P-51 production, again to replace P-38 production. They sure got interested in the P-51 production with the Merlin 61.
> No retooling for the P-51XX since it would have been ordered that way from the beginning. *Probably less retooling* for the Merlin 61 (P-51B/C) since the P-51 would have already been designed for a Merlin.



Cutting US total fighter production by several hundred aircraft in late 1941/early 1942 would have done what? 
You don't stop making P-38s on saturday and start making P-51s on Monday. 

What part of the two stage Merlin was longer and heavier than the single stage engine and needed bigger radiators/oil coolers and an additional inter-cooler radiator aren't you getting? 

Engine mount designed for a 1510lb 1300hp engine (and suitable prop) may NOT be the engine mount you design for a 1700lb 1600hp engine with a prop around 100lbs heavier. 
Engine mount has to keep the engine/prop attached to the plane during a 8 G turn/pull out with a safety margin. 
Just because a few bolt holes will line up doesn't mean it is suitable.


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 17, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Ah.........no.
> 
> 
> Please note that as of Jan 1 1942 there had been 207 P-38s built for the US forces and 138 Mustangs built for the British. Also note that Lockheed was building , at a minimum 100 P-38s a month for most of 1942 (August was an exception) Lockheed built way more P-38s in 1942 than NA built Mustangs (in part because the Mustang had not been ordered in the numbers that that P-38 had been)
> ...



*Yes a MustangXX would have been better than the P-40F. Just put the P-40F engines in the Mustang.*


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## billrunnels (Jun 17, 2018)

I think the P-38 could have provided bomber stream support. However, I am partial to the P-51 simply because I witnessed their performance first hand. It was outstanding.

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## pinehilljoe (Jun 17, 2018)

drgondog said:


> Simple answer - No. First, the AAF was not interested in the Mustang until very late 1941, and the interest expressed first was for the A-36 with combination of Mustang IA - both with Allisons.
> 
> 1943.



I believe Ben Kelsey and the AAF was interested in the Mustang from the start of the NA 73 program and knew its performance was superior. The A-36 was out of necessity. Fiscal Year '42 dollars for fighters were committed to other types, but there were FY dollars left for ground attack bombers, and the A-36 was built to at least get some Mustang into the war as soon as possible.

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## tomo pauk (Jun 17, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Hindsight is 20/20, but why didn't the initial British order for P-51s specify the Merlin XX. It did wonders for the P-40F, imagine what it would have done for the early P-51 pending the introduction of a two stage engine. At half the cost of a P-38.
> ...



Let's not blame the British for what was the American mistake - AAF lost too much time neglecting the whole Mustang/XP-51 program for more than a year. 
But yes, the 'Mustang XX' would've give a 420+ mph fighter for 1942-43, above 20000 ft, with capability for long range, no vices (rate of roll, compressibility, heating, training...) , no problems with size and shape the P-38 had - if the AAF made that decision in early 1941.




P-39 Expert said:


> So the P-51 (Allison) was in production in 1941 and the MerlinXX was in production in 1941, both in the USA, but there is no way they could have been used together? To get a fighter in production before the P-38 got into combat in very late 1942?



As above - yes, technically it was feasible, but decision need to be made much earlier than US entering the war as it historically did.

BTW - all of the above has no bearing on the P-38.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 17, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> *Yes a MustangXX would have been better than the P-40F. Just put the P-40F engines in the Mustang.*




Nobody is arguing that a MustangXX wouldn't be better than the P-40F.

However that is not the question.
There were about 1550 P-40F/ Kittihawk IIs built and it took from Jan of 1942 till Dec/42-Jan/43 to build them.

The question is whether the allies would have been better off replacing a large number of those P-40Fs with MustangXXs and building additional P-40E/Ks instead?
Curtiss built about 2300 Allison powered P-40s during the same time frame. The vast majority of P-40Fs went to North Africa/Med. It was well known that the P-40E could not stand up to the 109 by itself (or with support of the P-39) and needed Support/top cover from P-38s, P-40Fs and Spitfires.
Improving the P-40 was a priority for the US as it was the fighter being built in the largest quantity in the US in 1942 and followed by the P-39. They built more P-40s in 1942 than P-38s and P-39s put together and you could even throw in about 1/2 the production of either the P-47 or Mustang.

You are also not going to get 1500 MustangXX's in 1942 without seriously screwing up some other production line as they only built around 900-950 mustang airframe in 1942 (including A-36s).

Replacing P-38s with MustangXX Production means serious changes in events, like no Yamamoto shoot down? No flying fighters across the atlantic in 1942. No flying fighters from England to North Africa for operation Torch. Supporting the invasion of Sicily from bases in North Africa? 

people seem to think that the MustangXX is some sort of P-51B _lite. _At just over 23,000ft the Merlin XX engine is down to around 940-950hp with no RAM compared to the 1330hp of the Merlin V-1650-3. Having about 72% of the power at that altitude really makes the plane a bit _lite _as while it will be lighter than the P-51B it sure won't be only 72% of the weight of the P-51B.

you can pretty much forget stuffing fuel tanks in the rear fuselage of the MustangXX as with a power plant weight over 300lbs lighter the cg problems of putting fuel in the rear fuselage are going to be that much worse.


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## drgondog (Jun 17, 2018)

pinehilljoe said:


> I believe Ben Kelsey and the AAF was interested in the Mustang from the start of the NA 73 program and knew its performance was superior. The A-36 was out of necessity. Fiscal Year '42 dollars for fighters were committed to other types, but there were FY dollars left for ground attack bombers, and the A-36 was built to at least get some Mustang into the war as soon as possible.



That belief would Not be correct. 

The AAF test pilot that first flew the Mustang I/XP-51 wrote a hatchet job, five liner on behalf of Material Command evaluation that stated 'crappy airplane" at Echols orders. Echols tried to force NAA to disengage from Mustang production, scrap tooling and convert Inglewood production to B-25. Echols despised NAA for disobeying his wishes to shut up and build P-40s

Kelsey was an unabashed supporter of Lockheed and the P-38 and NEVER got behind the Mustang. It was only after the CAS side of AAF got the Mustang evaluation away from Material Command/Wright Field to Eglin Field for evaluation, that AAF recognized what a good airplane the Mustang was in comparison with P-40, P-39, P-38 and P-47

Echols and Kelsey tried to re-write history post WWII, but nobody at NAA bought in. Col. Ben Bradley was a key facilitator in mid 1943 for AAF Mat'l Command and he had to be very careful to point out (when necessary) to his boss MG Echols that even the XP-75 which Echols championed - was a dangerous Turkey.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 17, 2018)

duplicate


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## tomo pauk (Jun 17, 2018)

drgondog said:


> That belief would Not be correct.
> 
> The AAF test pilot that first flew the Mustang I/XP-51 wrote a hatchet job, five liner on behalf of Material Command evaluation that stated 'crappy airplane" at Echols orders. Echols tried to force NAA to disengage from Mustang production, scrap tooling and convert Inglewood production to B-25. Echols despised NAA for disobeying his wishes to shut up and build P-40s
> 
> ...



Bill - I must nudge you to have that book ready for print...

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## Shortround6 (Jun 17, 2018)

I Believe (but Bill can certainly correct me) that the A-36 order was placed for a number of reasons, in part to get some sort of Mustangs in operation in the US forces, in part to help NA finance plant expansion for later models of the Mustang, in part to keep the existing production line open and not be converted to something else (like the B-25 mentioned above) and in part to keep the workers who were trained/practiced at Mustang assembly from being dispersed to other plants/jobs making it that much harder to restart production. 
There may be other reasons (like the existing Army dive bombers didn't suit the Armies needs? A-25 in 1942 anyone?) and how much weight is given to any one reason is certainly open to question/debate. I am just listing possible reasons, I have no idea how much actual weight any of them had, if any.

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## tomo pauk (Jun 17, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> 
> Replacing P-38s with MustangXX Production means serious changes in events, like no Yamamoto shoot down? No flying fighters across the atlantic in 1942. No flying fighters from England to North Africa for operation Torch. Supporting the invasion of Sicily from bases in North Africa?
> 
> people seem to think that the MustangXX is some sort of P-51B _lite. _At just over 23,000ft the Merlin XX engine is down to around 940-950hp with no RAM compared to the 1330hp of the Merlin V-1650-3. Having about 72% of the power at that altitude really makes the plane a bit _lite _as while it will be lighter than the P-51B it sure won't be only 72% of the weight of the P-51B.



I myself think of the 'Mustang XX' as of the 'better P-51A', and earlier.
About the production of P-38 - more need to be produced, not less, and again earlier. Preferably by another source? 
Kill the Vengeance, A-24, even B-26 need-be.

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## pinehilljoe (Jun 17, 2018)

drgondog said:


> That belief would Not be correct.
> 
> The AAF test pilot that first flew the Mustang I/XP-51 wrote a hatchet job, five liner on behalf of Material Command evaluation that stated 'crappy airplane" at Echols orders. Echols tried to force NAA to disengage from Mustang production, scrap tooling and convert Inglewood production to B-25. Echols despised NAA for disobeying his wishes to shut up and build P-40s
> 
> ...



The fiscal year constraint came from the article Wings/Airpower did on the A-36. 

An online sources states the same
North American A-36 Apache
The Gathering of P-51 Mustangs and Legends, Sept 27-30, 2007, Columbus, Ohio, Rickenbacker Field


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## wuzak (Jun 18, 2018)

redcoat said:


> The Mosquito didn't have a speed advantage over the Fw 190 or the Bf 109G, so if these fighters did manage a successful bounce the Mosquito had great difficulty in getting away.



Equally, the Bf 109 and Fw 190 didn't have a great speed advantage over the Mosquito, which made their task of catching up difficult.

At certain height bands the Mosquito did, in fact, boast a slight speed advantage, or was equal. One of those was at or near sea level.




redcoat said:


> This is why when the Mosquito bombers were first introduced in 1942 and used on long range penetration flights into Germany the loss rate was 16%, better tactics and modifications to increase it's speed reduced the loss after a while to around 8% before these long range daylight raids into Germany ended in mid 43 and they transitioned to night attacks.



If you have 6 aircraft and 1 is lost, that is a loss rate of 16%. And that was the usual situation in 1942. 

If you send 12 you'd probably still only lose 1. That is a loss rate of 8.5%.

I use the comparison of the 8th AF to illustrate this. In the middle of 1943 the Luftwaffe would shoot down around 60 B-17s from a 300 aircraft raid. That is a 20% loss rate.
In early 1944, despite the presence of escort fighters, the Luftwaffe could still shoot down around 60 B-17s. The difference was that the raids had over 1,000 aircraft by then, giving loss rates of ~6%. 
The escort fighters did take a toll on the Luftwaffe, such that in the following months the capacity of the Luftwaffe to shoot down B-17s was much reduced.


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## wuzak (Jun 18, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> 4. P-38 was limited by not being able to use automatic boost control (until later models). Since the P-38's critical altitude was up to 30000' the engines could be over boosted at any altitude under that, which was basically the whole combat envelope. Virtually all the Allisons had auto boost except the P-38. Something about it fighting with the turbo regulator. Not much of a problem if critical altitude is 12000', hard to over boost above that. But with all the pilot workload on the twin engined P-38 the threat of over boosting at any altitude was an added headache.



The turbo provided the function of automatic boost control for the P-38.

It basically compensated for altitude, the engine feeling like it was at sea level.

The engine superchargers on P-38s ran at lower rpm (gear ratio) than on P-39s and P-40s, which meant they had a lower pressure ratio. So less scope for overboosting the engine.

While a P-39 or P-40's engine had a critical altitude of maybe 12,000ft, the P-38's engines, ignoring the turbos, had a critical altitude of a couple of thousand feet, or less. 

The turbo regulator worked to deliver air to the engine at sea level pressure. It did not provide overboosting capacity (though if the regulator failed it could, but that would likely lead to turbo failure before engine failure).


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## wuzak (Jun 18, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> The LW 109s and 190s had very little fuel to work with. The 190 held 140 gallons internal. It burned about 160gph at climb/combat setting giving it a theoretical 52 minutes of operation. Deduct 20 minutes to climb to 26000' and deduct 20 minutes reserve for landing and there are 12 minutes of fuel left for combat. Maybe one pass at the bombers, maybe two if there was no interference from escort fighters. The 109 was even more challenged with only 88 gallons internal.



Before the longer range escorts, the bombers would have to endure hours of attacks from the Luftwaffe on ingress and egress. Pausing around the time they got to target, which was also usually where they met intense flak.

The speed of massed B-17 formation attacks was such that the Luftwaffe fighters would have time to attack on the bombers' ingress, refuel and rearm and have another go as the bombers made their way out.

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## drgondog (Jun 18, 2018)

pinehilljoe said:


> The fiscal year constraint came from the article Wings/Airpower did on the A-36.
> 
> An online sources states the same
> North American A-36 Apache
> The Gathering of P-51 Mustangs and Legends, Sept 27-30, 2007, Columbus, Ohio, Rickenbacker Field


The requirement to keep NAA Mustang production line was solved when the CAS 'mafia' made their case that the Army needed a low-mid level fighter, not a slow attack bomber/dive bomber and drove the procurement that enabled NAA to bid on the 'dive bomber program funding'. It was ONLY this drive within the US Army Aviation cadre which removed Procurement of the Mustang from Material Command authority - and Oliver Echols.

There were no 1942 funds at that time for another Fighter, so the Director of Military Requirements, MG Muir Fairchild directed the procurement of the dive/attack bomber version of A-36 to be acquired under CTI-538. Mat'l Command was bypassed vis Chief of Air Staff General Milford Harmon in April 1942 and NA-97 was executed 4-16-1942.

Paul Ludwig did an excellent job of documenting the politics between AAF Mat'l Cmd, Army War Plans, NAA and Arnold.


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## drgondog (Jun 18, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> I Believe (but Bill can certainly correct me) that the A-36 order was placed for a number of reasons, in part to get some sort of Mustangs in operation in the US forces, in part to help NA finance plant expansion for later models of the Mustang, in part to keep the existing production line open and not be converted to something else (like the B-25 mentioned above) and in part to keep the workers who were trained/practiced at Mustang assembly from being dispersed to other plants/jobs making it that much harder to restart production.
> There may be other reasons (like the existing Army dive bombers didn't suit the Armies needs? A-25 in 1942 anyone?) and how much weight is given to any one reason is certainly open to question/debate. I am just listing possible reasons, I have no idea how much actual weight any of them had, if any.


Steve - all of the above, but IMO, the last one was critical. The experiences of the RAF in Africa were becoming visible to War Plans and it was acutely conservative that airfield supremacy or at least equality was a requirement for CAS. The Mustang was embroiled in perhaps the nastiest political turmoil in USAAF during WWII.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 18, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Lockheed dragged their feet for 10 precoius months - time between the contract for YP-38s until start of manufacturing of those. All together, they squandered the timing advanatge held vs. P-47 and P-51.


Actually that's inaccurate - nothing wasn't done for 10 months for a number of reasons - Lockheed was being contracted to mass produce aircraft that were originally built by hand and the AAF knew this. At the same time Lockheed was expanding their plant to support other government contract which at the time had priority. Adding to the situation was the compressibility issue which up to that time was an unknown factor. All this happening at a time where the US was trying to remain neutral and stay out of the European war.

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## tomo pauk (Jun 18, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Actually that's inaccurate - nothing wasn't done for 10 months for a number of reasons - Lockheed was being contracted to mass produce aircraft that were originally built by hand and the AAF knew this. At the same time Lockheed was expanding their plant to support other government contract which at the time had priority. Adding to the situation was the compressibility issue which up to that time was an unknown factor. All this happening at a time where the US was trying to remain neutral and stay out of the European war.



Joe - USA trying to stay away from the Europen war have had any bearing to the time lost on the (Y)P-38s, US companies were more than happy to sell aircraft to anyone US goverment allowed, and was with money. Compressibility issue emerged after the YP-38 was flight tested, not in the design phase.
Granted, Lockheed was contracted to make other A/C, but design shop was more or less a separate entity within the company, doing it's specific job? It took Republic, a small company compared with Lockheed, less time to roll out the XP-47B after the contract, despite there nothing was the same on the XP-47B what was on the V-1710-powered mock-up of the XP-47A. The YP-38 used plenty of major items from XP-38 (wings, booms, pod, engine layout was the same).


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 18, 2018)

wuzak said:


> The turbo provided the function of automatic boost control for the P-38.
> 
> It basically compensated for altitude, the engine feeling like it was at sea level.
> 
> ...



So the turbo kept the engine from overboosting at altitude?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 18, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Joe - USA trying to stay away from the Europen war have had any bearing to the time lost on the (Y)P-38s, US companies were more than happy to sell aircraft to anyone US goverment allowed, and was with money. Compressibility issue emerged after the YP-38 was flight tested, not in the design phase.
> Granted, Lockheed was contracted to make other A/C, *but design shop was more or less a separate entity within the company, doing it's specific job?*


 The fact that the US was trying to stay out of the war had a great bearing on all this - the DoD was not quickly releasing contracts or more importantly MONEY to support these programs. US defense spending was increased but the purse strings were still being watched. Answering your bolded question - NO, at that time the R&D engineering department was part of the production group and need funding both internally and externally to keep operating. Lockheed was only going to put out so much of its own capital for R&D work and wasn't going to work "at risk" unless they were guaranteed something in return, basically the way most if not all manufacturers work today. When the XP-80 came along, the R&D section of Lockheed was split from the rest of the company, given its own VP and set up it's own infrastructure. That eventually because the Skunk Works.


tomo pauk said:


> It took Republic, a small company compared with Lockheed, less time to roll out the XP-47B after the contract, despite there nothing was the same on the XP-47B what was on the V-1710-powered mock-up of the XP-47A. The YP-38 used plenty of major items from XP-38 (wings, booms, pod, engine layout was the same).


Republic (formally Seversky) was NOT a small company and had the resources and infrastructure in place to build and develop combat aircraft. Even though the P-47 was a monster of an aircraft it was still easier to build than a P-38. 

I worked aircraft production for over 20 years - no manufacturer ever "drags it's feet" when they receive funding unless there are continual design changes or other production or funding issues. Back then and even more true today, aircraft manufacturers are hit with fines and penalties when schedules aren't met and stock holders don't like that.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 18, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The fact that the US was trying to stay out of the war had a great bearing on all this - the DoD was not quickly releasing contracts or more importantly MONEY to support these programs. US defense spending was increased but the purse strings were still being watched. Answering your bolded question - NO, at that time the R&D engineering department was part of the production group and need funding both internally and externally to keep operating. Lockheed was only going to put out so much of its own capital for R&D work and wasn't going to work "at risk" unless they were guaranteed something in return, basically the way most if not all manufacturers work today.
> ...



The money was allocated for 13 YP-38s - 2180725 US$, contract signed at February 11th 1939. At August 10th, 66 production A/C were ordered by the Government/AAF. Lockheed starts making the 1st YP-38 at February of 1940, a full year after they got the contract.
the 1st YP-38 gets airborne for the 1st time at September 16th 1940. That is 19 moths after the contract was signed and money allocated.
It took Republic 8 months to make a 1st flight of the XP-47B after they got the contract. 
For what it's worth.


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## wuzak (Jun 18, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> So the turbo kept the engine from overboosting at altitude?



If the regulator was working correctly, the MAP in the engine, at a given rpm and throttle setting, would not change with altitude up to critical altitude. 

Beyond critical altitude the turbo was not capable of maintaining air pressure to the engine, as at critical altitude it was at its design limit. Going beyond that limit risked turbo failure. Overboosting above critical altitude was, therefore, impossible, and MAP fell away quickly. 

Obviously there was some scope for overboosting, because WEP was added during the evolution of the P-38. But not nearly to the same extent as with automatic boost controlled altitude rated engines. These used much higher pressure ratios, which required throttling below rated altitude to maintain MAP in the safe range.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 18, 2018)

wuzak said:


> The turbo provided the function of automatic boost control for the P-38.
> 
> It basically compensated for altitude, the engine feeling like it was at sea level.
> 
> ...



The P-38 engines had the most changes of planes powered by Allisons. The P-38s up to and including the E used 6.44 supercharger gears (and B-2 turbos) the F used 7.48 gears and the B-2 turbo, the G used 7.48 gears and the B-13 turbo, the H,J and L used 8.10 gears and the B-33 turbo.
Now throw in the turbo regulator changes and the intercoolers and blanket statements about the P-38 power plants are very difficult to make.

Wuzak is correct that the turbo regulator acted like a an automatic boost control. Later ones were better than early ones. On Late Js and Ls it was completely automatic. The regulator would hold whatever pressure the _throttle setting_ called for. This is different than the actual throttle plate position in the carburetor. The regulator control also controlled the throttle plate in addition to the turbo wastegate to keep everything working together .

Some early aircraft had automatic boost control according to the pilots notes but they don't say which ones. They do say that when performing the mag check to quickly note the RPM drop before the automatic boost control kicks in and tries to compensate for the drop in RPM.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 19, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> The money was allocated for 13 YP-38s - 2180725 US$, contract signed at February 11th 1939. At August 10th, 66 production A/C were ordered by the Government/AAF. Lockheed starts making the 1st YP-38 at February of 1940, a full year after they got the contract.
> the 1st YP-38 gets airborne for the 1st time at September 16th 1940. That is 19 moths after the contract was signed and money allocated.
> It took Republic 8 months to make a 1st flight of the XP-47B after they got the contract.
> For what it's worth.


And each contractor didn't get all that money at once, it was stretched out in progress payments. Additionally you have to look at the schedule that was agreed upon when the aircraft was signed. Lastly one has to consider the Government Furnished Equipment (engines, turbocharges, radios, etc.) and when they were scheduled for delivery. Bottom line, there was no intensional foot dragging by Lockheed in the development of the P-38, the prototype schedule was a product of the state of affairs at the time.

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## GregP (Jun 19, 2018)

Well said, FlyboyJ. 

There were a LOT of decisions made in WWII that were the result of the state of affairs at the time, including almost every aspect of the decision processes for weapons systems, all along the way. It crept into the decision process for almost everything, and still does today.


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 21, 2018)

wuzak said:


> If the regulator was working correctly, the MAP in the engine, at a given rpm and throttle setting, would not change with altitude up to critical altitude.
> 
> Beyond critical altitude the turbo was not capable of maintaining air pressure to the engine, as at critical altitude it was at its design limit. Going beyond that limit risked turbo failure. Overboosting above critical altitude was, therefore, impossible, and MAP fell away quickly.
> 
> Obviously there was some scope for overboosting, because WEP was added during the evolution of the P-38. But not nearly to the same extent as with automatic boost controlled altitude rated engines. These used much higher pressure ratios, which required throttling below rated altitude to maintain MAP in the safe range.


So, if that P-38 was below critical altitude, it could not be overboosted because of the turbo regulation? Just asking.


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## jmcalli2 (Jun 21, 2018)

DSR T-888 said:


> When the problems were finally fixed for the P-38, it was too late since the Mustang was already proving dominance. So my question is; how did/would the P-38J-25 and P-38L-5-LO preform against German fighters in the European theater if some of the USAAF still used the P-38 up until the end of the war.
> 
> Thanks
> DSR_T-888
> ...



This may give some idea; http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/Performance_Data_on_Fighter_Aircraft.pdf
Seems the P-38 could our roll, out turn, and our climb the P-51 and P-47.


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## Peter Gunn (Jun 21, 2018)

I'm not really seeing that, according to the page posted in post #240, the Mustang out rolls the P-38 _significantly, _78 degrees per second v 39. (See the second to last sentence in paragraph 2)
For the Lightning using boosted ailerons, they only give an _estimated value_, no actual test numbers are given.

Climb is almost a wash but goes to the P-51 by a small margin, 40 fpm.

Turning is reasonably close as well, 838 v 883 @ 400 MPH for a slight advantage to the P-38.

Diving speed, no contest - Mustang.


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## wuzak (Jun 22, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> So, if that P-38 was below critical altitude, it could not be overboosted because of the turbo regulation? Just asking.



No, it should not be able to. Or, at least, not very much.

SR explained the different gear ratios used by the V-1710s in the P-38.

It went from 6.44 to 7.48 and finally 8.10:1. As the V-1710 developed and could take more boost, the supercharger gear ratios were increased to give the extra boost.

The altitude versions used 8.8 or 9.6 gears.

There is a couple of ways that the P-38 could have been overboosted.

One was to over-speed the engine, and the other was if the turbo put in more boost than nominally required (through faulty regulator).


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## drgondog (Jun 22, 2018)

jmcalli2 said:


> This may give some idea; http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/Performance_Data_on_Fighter_Aircraft.pdf
> Seems the P-38 could our roll, out turn, and our climb the P-51 and P-47.



You need to look deeper into the report - the roll rates were at 40lb stick force for P-51B/P-47D but 80 pounds for P-38J (With Boosted ailerons); 

The tests were at 10,000 feet instead of say 25,000 feet where both the P-47 and P-51 have increasing Power Available over Power Required due to high drag of P-38 (in comparison) and the turns are CALCULATED for 4G with no comment regarding whether the altitude is maintained in the 4G turn (it can't) using max CL (unrealistic for sustained turn in high AoA Drag condition with extensive cooling drag.

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## BiffF15 (Jun 22, 2018)

drgondog said:


> You need to look deeper into the report - the roll rates were at 40lb stick force for P-51B/P-47D but 80 pounds for P-38J (With Boosted ailerons);
> 
> The tests were at 10,000 feet instead of say 25,000 feet where both the P-47 and P-51 have increasing Power Available over Power Required due to high drag of P-38 (in comparison) and the turns are CALCULATED for 4G with no comment regarding whether the altitude is maintained in the 4G turn (it can't) using max CL (unrealistic for sustained turn in high AoA Drag condition with extensive cooling drag.



Bill,

Curiosity forces the ask, but why would they test the P38 at 80lbs and the rest at 40lbs? 

Cheers,
Biff


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## Greyman (Jun 22, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> Bill,
> 
> Curiosity forces the ask, but why would they test the P38 at 80lbs and the rest at 40lbs?



My guess is that they figured 40 pounds was a reasonable upper limit for manoeuvring for the stick fighters while 80 pounds could be generated with about the same effort using the Lightning's wheel.


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## drgondog (Jun 22, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> Bill,
> 
> Curiosity forces the ask, but why would they test the P38 at 80lbs and the rest at 40lbs?
> 
> ...


Biff - I suspect the 80 pounds was to get the dismal roll rate w/o boosted ailerons. Recall that the 120+ was Calculated

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## Reluctant Poster (Jun 24, 2018)

Control forces were studied in NACA Report No 755 Requirements For Satisfactory Flying Qualities of Airplanes. See attached file.

The target for maximum aileron control force at below 80% of maximum speed was:
a. Wheel-type controls: +/- 80 pounds applied at the rim of the wheel.
b. Stick-type controls: +/- 30 pounds applied at the grip of the stick.
This was determined by the limitations of pilots in applying forces to the lateral controls.

This explains why the P-38 had a wheel.

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## BiffF15 (Jun 24, 2018)

Reluctant Poster said:


> Control forces were studied in NACA Report No 755 Requirements For Satisfactory Flying Qualities of Airplanes. See attached file.
> 
> The target for maximum aileron control force at below 80% of maximum speed was:
> a. Wheel-type controls: +/- 80 pounds applied at the rim of the wheel.
> ...




RP,

So if I understand correctly the wheel force at 80 was of similar exertion to a stick at 30lbs. That must mean a pilot put roughly 40 of down with one arm and 40 up with the other to initiate the roll?... And that was similar to a one arm stick throw of 30?

cheers,
Biff


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## Smokey Stover (Jun 24, 2018)

It would have been a disaster. Think Bf 110 except a little bit faster, but still meat on the table for luftwaffe pilots in single seat fighters. There's no place for romance and sentimentality in warfare. That's like saying how would the Mosquito have done as a fighter escort. In a word, terribly!


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## Shortround6 (Jun 24, 2018)

A few _minor_ differences between the P-38 and the Mosquito. For one the P-38 was stressed to do fighter type maneuvers. It might not have done them as well as some single engine planes but there was less chance of breaking the P-38 in a high G turn or pull out. 
The P-38 did have few things going for it. 
It had the best power to weight ratio of any American Fighter (and the best acceleration) when figured at military power and it had a very good rate of climb. Slightly better climb than a P-51 in the low/mid 20,000ft range. and better than a P-47.

It couldn't do some of things the single engine planes could do but it could do a few things better than they could do. 

There is a lot of room between "not as good as a P-51" and a "disaster."

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## BiffF15 (Jun 24, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> A few _minor_ differences between the P-38 and the Mosquito. For one the P-38 was stressed to do fighter type maneuvers. It might not have done them as well as some single engine planes but there was less chance of breaking the P-38 in a high G turn or pull out.
> The P-38 did have few things going for it.
> It had the best power to weight ratio of any American Fighter (and the best acceleration) when figured at military power and it had a very good rate of climb. Slightly better climb than a P-51 in the low/mid 20,000ft range. and better than a P-47.
> 
> ...




SR6,

This thread branch leads me to the question of upgrades for the P38. It did receive improvements, but not on the magnitude of the P47 & P51. The Mustang went from the Allison to the Merlin, 3 blade to 4, and eventually the H. Was it "allowed" upgrades due to two production lines? Same for the P47, much bigger more engineered upgrades at multiple production locations. Yet the "brass" decided not to go with the P38K variant which would have been fairly large step for the Lightning.

The P40Q is another. Most likely the production loss was not deemed enough to warrant the production line interruption.

I ask rhetorically as the answers are lost to time.

Cheers,
Biff


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## Shortround6 (Jun 24, 2018)

My own opinion for the P-40Q is that it came too late. First test flying in the Fall of 1943 when Mustangs are being shipped to England by the hundreds (even if not fly flying operationally.) The Spring of 1944 (April) test figures are with the -121 engine compared to the Fall '43 test being done with the -101 engine. Spring of 1944 having one or two prototypes is way too late compared to P-51Ds showing up in Europe in June of 1944 in quantity. Earliest P-51Ds showed up in March. 
The other problem is that the US was planning on adding substantially to the armament, going from four .50s to either six .50s or four 20mm cannon. Plane was already 20mph slower than the P-51. 

Major change to the P-38 that _seems_ not to have been done is changing the propellers/reduction gear. Late models seem to have gotten broader blades than the early P-38s but not to the extent that P-47s got or the change to four blade props the Mustangs got. Perhaps not as big a deal was made of it? P-38 J props were about 72-73lbs heavier than a YP-38 prop (each) while power had gone from 1100hp to 1600hp. 
Props are rather hard to figure out. Larger/heavier may cut into payload or change the CG?


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## Shortround6 (Jun 24, 2018)

from a thread on the P-38 and props.

*P-38 Lightning-why no 4-blade paddle prop?*

We have another thread going about long range fighters. 
A large prop with many blades or broad cord blades _may _be the best for climb or high altitude work. 
However while cruising (even high speed cruise) it may be transmitting 50-70% of the "peak" power of the engine and the larger surface area prop will have more drag and lower efficiency in cruise. 
DO you want that last few percent in climb/rate or top speed at 25,000ft and _give up _a few dozen miles in operational radius? or go for the range/radius and give up a bit on peak performance. 

Think of propellers a bit like tires on a car. What works best on pavement (low altitude air) doesn't work so good on sand/mud (high altitude air) and vise versa.

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## Reluctant Poster (Jun 24, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> RP,
> 
> So if I understand correctly the wheel force at 80 was of similar exertion to a stick at 30lbs. That must mean a pilot put roughly 40 of down with one arm and 40 up with the other to initiate the roll?... And that was similar to a one arm stick throw of 30?
> 
> ...


That was my first thought but I also think you are using different groups of muscles

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## GregP (Jun 24, 2018)

Hi Bill,

I saw you noted the 40 lbs for the P-51 with a stick and 80 lbs for the P-38 with a wheel.

I would say that the 40 lbs is the stick side force with one arm, which is probably the way most people fly. You might be able to get a bit more with two hands, but you are pulling or pushing with with much weaker muscles than the biceps and triceps. The wheel allows you to use BOTH hands and stronger muscles to affect a roll. P-38 pilots toady state that the P-38 can be muscled around much quicker than contemporary flight reports indicate, and that they can apply much more force with two hands lifting and pushing down than they can with one arm pushing or pulling sideways.

I'd not make too big a thing of the difference in force since the P-38 pilots were almost surely using two arms versus one for the P-51 ... MOST of the time.

Not a big argument from me, just saying I can do more with two arms going up or down than with one sideways. Why shouldn't they?

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 28, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> SR6,
> 
> This thread branch leads me to the question of upgrades for the P38. It did receive improvements, but not on the magnitude of the P47 & P51. The Mustang went from the Allison to the Merlin, 3 blade to 4, and eventually the H. Was it "allowed" upgrades due to two production lines? Same for the P47, much bigger more engineered upgrades at multiple production locations. Yet the "brass" decided not to go with the P38K variant which would have been fairly large step for the Lightning.
> 
> ...


Regarding the P-40Q, I firmly believe that was a lost opportunity. That engine (actually just the auxiliary stage supercharger, the actual engine was the same as any contemporary two stage Allison with 8.1 internal supercharger gears) was in series production as the -93 from March 1943 for the P-63. The P-40Q engine had a few refinements not in the -93 like putting the carb on the engine stage supercharger instead of the auxiliary stage (why this wasn't done sooner is a mystery to me). This engine (either the E or F variant) could have been installed in the contemporary P-39, P-40 and P-51 giving those planes the high altitude performance of a two stage engine. The two stage Allison was in development since 1940 so the airframe manufacturers would have had a head start on modifications necessary to retrofit the new auxiliary stage. 
By the way, the first P-63s began trickling out of the factory in October, six months after it's engine (-93) was in series production. Six wasted months in mid '43, right when two stage fighters were sorely needed.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 28, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Regarding the P-40Q, I firmly believe that was a lost opportunity. That engine (actually just the auxiliary stage supercharger, the actual engine was the same as any contemporary two stage Allison with 8.1 internal supercharger gears) was in series production as the -93 from March 1943 for the P-63. The P-40Q engine had a few refinements not in the -93 like putting the carb on the engine stage supercharger instead of the auxiliary stage (why this wasn't done sooner is a mystery to me). This engine (either the E or F variant) could have been installed in the contemporary P-39, P-40 and P-51 giving those planes the high altitude performance of a two stage engine. The two stage Allison was in development since 1940 so the airframe manufacturers would have had a head start on modifications necessary to retrofit the new auxiliary stage.



I will be among the 1st to support installation of the 2-stage V-1710 on P-51, and wherever it can give it's service. With that said, the P-40Q is/was not an answer to what 8th AF needs, or any other American AF - a proper LR escort fighter - hence no oportunity was lost with not manufacturing it.



> By the way, the first P-63s began trickling out of the factory in October, six months after it's engine (-93) was in series production. Six wasted months in mid '43, right when two stage fighters were sorely needed.



As before - how many 2-stage V-1710s were produced in 1943?
At any rate, P-63 does not solve the problem the USAAF had at ETO, same as the P-40Q. From operational view of the USAAF commanders, P-63 or P-40Q is equal to a Spitfire VIII, while being later for a year or more.

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## Piper106 (Jun 28, 2018)

Per posts 256 and 257, I thought the issue was that the Allison two stage engines (as historically packaged) did not fit into the 'original' Mustang fuselage. I was under the impression it required a redesign (ala the P-51J) to install the two stage Allison, where as the Merlin 60 series (and the Packard V-1650-3, -7, -9, etc.) fit into the Mustang I / P-51A with minimal changes.


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## Policy Peddler (Jun 29, 2018)

way back to the first post; 2. The early Allison had an issue with the intake manifold that took some months to sorts out; the solution was simple and easy, but they had to FIND it ... and did.
What was the issue with the intake manifold and what did they do to correct it?
thank you


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## drgondog (Jun 29, 2018)

Piper106 said:


> Per posts 256 and 257, I thought the issue was that the Allison two stage engines (as historically packaged) did not fit into the 'original' Mustang fuselage. I was under the impression it required a redesign (ala the P-51J) to install the two stage Allison, where as the Merlin 60 series (and the Packard V-1650-3, -7, -9, etc.) fit into the Mustang I / P-51A with minimal changes.



The Allison coupled two stage/2 speed engine was not considered by NAA for the XP-51B. From a design standpoint, the airframe forward of the firewall could have been modified. That said, NAA was thoroughly pissed off at Allison and only stuffed the Allison in the XP-51J because AAF asked them to do so - probably because they wanted different options to paying RR/Packard for Merlin license. AAF did declare victory with XP-82, permitting only 20 to have the Merlin.

As to 'minimal' changes to stuff 1650-3 into the P-51-1 airframe?
Drop wing 3", re-build lower cowl for carb intake and integrate with new wing position, major re-design of cooling system and lower cowl with design iterations to cure the rumbling problem at high speed. IIRC more than 30,000 hours between Feb 1942 and 'ready for flight' in October 1942.

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 29, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> I will be among the 1st to support installation of the 2-stage V-1710 on P-51, and wherever it can give it's service. With that said, the P-40Q is/was not an answer to what 8th AF needs, or any other American AF - a proper LR escort fighter - hence no oportunity was lost with not manufacturing it.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


I don't know '43 production. Allison shipped over 5000 with the auxiliary stage for the P-63. Assuming the P-63 cancellation in August '45 that would mean about 28 months of production or an average of 180/mo.
That big P-63 wing could have held a LOT more fuel than 132 gallons, but.....


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 29, 2018)

drgondog said:


> The Allison coupled two stage/2 speed engine was not considered by NAA for the XP-51B. From a design standpoint, the airframe forward of the firewall could have been modified. That said, NAA was thoroughly pissed off at Allison and only stuffed the Allison in the XP-51J because AAF asked them to do so - probably because they wanted different options to paying RR/Packard for Merlin license. AAF did declare victory with XP-82, permitting only 20 to have the Merlin.
> 
> As to 'minimal' changes to stuff 1650-3 into the P-51-1 airframe?
> Drop wing 3", re-build lower cowl for carb intake and integrate with new wing position, major re-design of cooling system and lower cowl with design iterations to cure the rumbling problem at high speed. IIRC more than 30,000 hours between Feb 1942 and 'ready for flight' in October 1942.



Supposedly NAA took more time designing for the Merlin conversion than they spend on the whole P-51 airframe originally.[/QUOTE]


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## David Fred (Jun 29, 2018)

GregP said:


> My thoughts are that the P-38 suffered from 4 basic faults ... until they were fixed.
> 
> 1. The pilots had VERY little to no training. The P-38 required a lot of actions to get from cruise to combat ready condition. The early guys were probably shot down while trying to accomplish this task.
> 2. The early Allison had an issue with the intake manifold that took some months to sorts out; the solution was simple and easy, but they had to FIND it ... and did.
> ...



I’m a P-38 fan as well, my Dad was a combat Marine, 4th Marine Division, Roi-Namur, Saipan, Tinian, Iwo Jima. And he swore by the 38, and his dearly beloved Corsair. (Although that may have had as much to do with Marine pilots supporting Marines in ground attack). And with the “L” version, they did indeed add 12:1 aileron hydraulic boost. My book, like a kids baseball cards, has a page on each plane, and version, and at the bottom are three or four anecdotal remarks from pilots of the time. Up until the “L”, they all shared the same comment “very poor roll rate”. The “L” says “ much improved roll rate”. Still, I doubt that on that front it could never have competed with the P-51, with its clipped wings, and the advantage of engine torque to aid in rolls opposite prop rotation.


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## drgondog (Jun 29, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Supposedly NAA took more time designing for the Merlin conversion than they spend on the whole P-51 airframe originally.


[/QUOTE]
Not remotely close.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 29, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> I don't know '43 production. Allison shipped over 5000 with the auxiliary stage for the P-63. Assuming the P-63 cancellation in August '45 that would mean about 28 months of production or an average of 180/mo.
> That big P-63 wing could have held a LOT more fuel than 132 gallons, but.....



AHT says that 3303 P-63s were produced; ~110/mo.
Granted, it was a shame that P-63 didn't held at least 200-230 gals (1st deleting the possed guns and their ammo, so the ribs are designed to allow for another fuel tank on each side).


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## drgondog (Jun 29, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> I don't know '43 production. Allison shipped over 5000 with the auxiliary stage for the P-63. Assuming the P-63 cancellation in August '45 that would mean about 28 months of production or an average of 180/mo.
> That big P-63 wing could have held a LOT more fuel than 132 gallons, but.....


Well, if you kill WI you could replace water tank with another 50 gallons of fuel. But, emasculate the engine performance in the process. It was always a desirable fighter for VVS because they didn't care about range, and the P-63/39 was always undersized relative to range.

Tomo is correct that a LE tank could have been installed. That said, For comparison purposes, NAA told Material Command that sticking 16 gallon tanks in LE of P-51B would take a year to redesign the wing and insert into production release ----------------> begin delivery of 'modified P-51B/C with that design into D-Day. Unlike the Fuse tank, the LE tanks would not have been available as a kit - because the entire wing would have been altered with respect to airframe structural analysis.

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## David Fred (Jun 29, 2018)

Not remotely close.[/QUOTE]

Yes, seems HIGHLY unlikely


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## GrauGeist (Jun 29, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> That big P-63 wing could have held a LOT more fuel than 132 gallons, but.....


How and where?

The wing was already packed full of MGs, Ammunition wells, Maingear, Maingear well, Maingear articulation assembly, control surface actuators and corresposnding motors/linkages, not forgetting spars, formers and such. They even packed fuel cells inside of the inner wings at the attachment point.

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 29, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> How and where?
> 
> The wing was already packed full of MGs, Ammunition wells, Maingear, Maingear well, Maingear articulation assembly, control surface actuators and corresposnding motors/linkages, not forgetting spars, formers and such. They even packed fuel cells inside of the inner wings at the attachment point.
> 
> View attachment 500001


The attachment is for a P-39. We're talking about a P-63 wing.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 29, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> The attachment is for a P-39. We're talking about a P-63 wing.


Right, because they were completely different aircraft...

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## BiffF15 (Jun 29, 2018)

drgondog said:


> The Allison coupled two stage/2 speed engine was not considered by NAA for the XP-51B. From a design standpoint, the airframe forward of the firewall could have been modified. That said, NAA was thoroughly pissed off at Allison and only stuffed the Allison in the XP-51J because AAF asked them to do so - probably because they wanted different options to paying RR/Packard for Merlin license. AAF did declare victory with XP-82, permitting only 20 to have the Merlin.
> 
> As to 'minimal' changes to stuff 1650-3 into the P-51-1 airframe?
> Drop wing 3", re-build lower cowl for carb intake and integrate with new wing position, major re-design of cooling system and lower cowl with design iterations to cure the rumbling problem at high speed. IIRC more than 30,000 hours between Feb 1942 and 'ready for flight' in October 1942.




Bill,

If you have a moment to expand on the cause / nature of the NAA / Allison relationship that resulted in the above comments it would be appreciated. If it's in your book I can wait!

Cheers,
Biff


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## Navalwarrior (Jun 29, 2018)

GregP said:


> My thoughts are that the P-38 suffered from 4 basic faults ... until they were fixed.
> 
> 1. The pilots had VERY little to no training. The P-38 required a lot of actions to get from cruise to combat ready condition. The early guys were probably shot down while trying to accomplish this task.
> 2. The early Allison had an issue with the intake manifold that took some months to sorts out; the solution was simple and easy, but they had to FIND it ... and did.
> ...


Resp:
There has been little published about these last P-38 variants, so many people aren't aware that Lockheed did get it fixed. I know of at least one FG that deployed (late '43?) to England that received no training on two engine planes, much less fighters. Their first indication was when the pilots walked out to the Tarmac and saw the parked P-38s. I did read where a Luftwaffe pilot witnessed some manuvers by P-38s late in the war, where he exclaimed: "They aren't supposed to be able to do that!" I think it pertinent to remember the part they did play in the ETO, as they held the line, until the Mustang arrived and the P-47's 'range' was maximized. They did continue to play a part in 'shuttle' escorts near the end of combat.


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## Peter Gunn (Jun 29, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> *SNIP*
> I think it pertinent to remember the part they did play in the ETO,
> *SNIP*



I doubt any of us here will disagree with that statement.


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## BiffF15 (Jun 29, 2018)

Gents,

Just found out my retired USMC bud down the streets Father In Law flew P38's and B26's. Will let you know what he has to pass along when I get to speak with him.

Cheers,
Biff

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## drgondog (Jun 29, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> Bill,
> 
> If you have a moment to expand on the cause / nature of the NAA / Allison relationship that resulted in the above comments it would be appreciated. If it's in your book I can wait!
> 
> ...


Biff - the dominant issue is a.) they were always late on deliveries, causing the NA-73X/Mustang I deliveries to RAF to slide, and b.) they made significant changes without alerting NAA, also causing re-work at NAA and see a.) above.

In fairness, Material Command were in Allison's shorts and caused many of the aforementioned changes

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 30, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> Right, because they were completely different aircraft...
> 
> View attachment 500017


Plenty of room in that wing for a lot more fuel, especially without the wing guns.

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## P-39 Expert (Jun 30, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> There has been little published about these last P-38 variants, so many people aren't aware that Lockheed did get it fixed. I know of at least one FG that deployed (late '43?) to England that received no training on two engine planes, much less fighters. Their first indication was when the pilots walked out to the Tarmac and saw the parked P-38s. I did read where a Luftwaffe pilot witnessed some manuvers by P-38s late in the war, where he exclaimed: "They aren't supposed to be able to do that!" I think it pertinent to remember the part they did play in the ETO, as they held the line, until the Mustang arrived and the P-47's 'range' was maximized. They did continue to play a part in 'shuttle' escorts near the end of combat.


Lockheed did get it fixed, those L models would have handled about any escort role including 8thAF. But the models before the J-25 just had too many problems and the L didn't start production until after D-Day and by then the LW was done.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 30, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Plenty of room in that wing for a lot more fuel, especially without the wing guns.


Again, where?
There's already fuel cells installed in areas that won't affect the aircraft's performance (i.e.: roll rate, etc.) or compromise the wing's structural strength. There's really no room left. You can't just arbitrarily stuff a tank here and there without some sort of trade-off. Additional tanks means additional weight with the tank, interior baffles and self sealing compound. Then add the weight of the fuel itself and then pumps, plumbing and such.

And removing the guns? Then what does the pilot do, use the centerline cannon as it's sole armament?

Bell's engineers were pretty clever people, we can pretty much assume that they placed as much fuel capacity in the wings as was practical.

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## GregP (Jun 30, 2018)

I think the P-40Q WAS an answer to MANY U.S. needs during WWII. It would have been a very welcome addition / replacement everywhere the P-40 was flying in wartime service, and we flew them from before the war started until after the war ended. Had it been possible to extend the range, it could have been useful in places other than where the P-40 was the mainstay.

I am not saying it would have replaced something and become a war winner. I am saying it was head and shoulders better than ANY standard P-40, and we flew those in every theater of war right up to and past the end of the war. So, Yes, the P-40Q would have very useful and welcome by any P-40 command.

Regarding Post #275, good synopsis. Had Allison been instructed to work on a 2-stage integral supercharger, then they would have done so or at least tried.

I have been part of Motorola in the past, we we were asked to so so many things in electronics by the government that caused issues with other things that it isn't even funny. It would not surprise me in the least to find out things were the same in WWII.


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## BiffF15 (Jun 30, 2018)

GregP said:


> I think the P-40Q WAS an answer to MANY U.S. needs during WWII. It would have been a very welcome addition / replacement everywhere the P-40 was flying in wartime service, and we flew them from before the war started until after the war ended. Had it been possible to extend the range, it could have been useful in places other than where the P-40 was the mainstay.
> 
> I am not saying it would have replaced something and become a war winner. I am saying it was head and shoulder better than ANY standard P-40, and we flew those in every theater of war right up to and past the end of the war. So, Yes, the P-40Q would have very useful and welcome by any P-40 command.
> 
> ...




Greg,

The question is why didn't the Army go with the Q. Was it costs to manufacture, or not enough return on investment once done (lives saved for increased performance)? IMHO once the Merlin powered Mustang started flying in ETO then in Asia it would be tough to justify spending any additional money on an airplane that couldn't literally compete with one you already had in production (P38K comes to mind although not exactly in the same category). I really like the looks of the Q and would love to see them flying today, and it was an improvement in performance back in the day.

Cheers,
Biff


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 30, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> Again, where?
> There's already fuel cells installed in areas that won't affect the aircraft's performance (i.e.: roll rate, etc.) or compromise the wing's structural strength. There's really no room left. You can't just arbitrarily stuff a tank here and there without some sort of trade-off. Additional tanks means additional weight with the tank, interior baffles and self sealing compound. Then add the weight of the fuel itself and then pumps, plumbing and such.
> 
> And removing the guns? Then what does the pilot do, use the centerline cannon as it's sole armament?
> ...





GrauGeist said:


> Again, where?
> There's already fuel cells installed in areas that won't affect the aircraft's performance (i.e.: roll rate, etc.) or compromise the wing's structural strength. There's really no room left. You can't just arbitrarily stuff a tank here and there without some sort of trade-off. Additional tanks means additional weight with the tank, interior baffles and self sealing compound. Then add the weight of the fuel itself and then pumps, plumbing and such.
> 
> And removing the guns? Then what does the pilot do, use the centerline cannon as it's sole armament?
> ...


Room for more fuel outboard of the present tanks, and forward of the main spar the entire span except where the landing gear strut goes through the spar. Lots of room there. Yes that would call for the removal of the water injection tank and the .50MG. Remaining armament of one 37mm cannon and two .50MGs is plenty for shooting down LW interceptors. 
There would be no water injection for WEP but, honestly WEP added 3mph to the top speed of the P-51D and 8mph to the P-38L. Less than 10mph for the chance to blow up your engine (over enemy territory) and piss off your crew chief for the extra work. 
The weight saved by deleting the WEP water (200#) and .50MGs (350#) alone is the equivalent of 91 additional gallons for a total of 223 gallons internal for NO EXTRA WEIGHT. Probably room for more fuel than that. Plus three drop tanks.
And Bell engineers were clever but the configuration, fuel, armament etc was specified by the AAF. Bell had very little say in the matter.


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 30, 2018)

drgondog said:


> Biff - the dominant issue is a.) they were always late on deliveries, causing the NA-73X/Mustang I deliveries to RAF to slide, and b.) they made significant changes without alerting NAA, also causing re-work at NAA and see a.) above.
> 
> In fairness, Material Command were in Allison's shorts and caused many of the aforementioned changes


Could the late deliveries possibly be blamed on AAF allocating engines for domestic planes instead of a plane ordered by the British? Just a thought.
And the government was definitely in Allison's shorts. Took the AAF forever to delete the worthless backfire screens (mid '42) after Allison had told them that the backfire problems were behind them with adjusting valve clearance and moving to an aluminum intake manifold from the (flammable) magnesium manifold among other things.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 30, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Room for more fuel outboard of the present tanks, and forward of the main spar the entire span except where the landing gear strut goes through the spar. Lots of room there. Yes that would call for the removal of the water injection tank and the .50MG. Remaining armament of one 37mm cannon and two .50MGs is plenty for shooting down LW interceptors.
> There would be no water injection for WEP but, honestly WEP added 3mph to the top speed of the P-51D and 8mph to the P-38L. Less than 10mph for the chance to blow up your engine (over enemy territory) and piss off your crew chief for the extra work.
> The weight saved by deleting the WEP water (200#) and .50MGs (350#) alone is the equivalent of 91 additional gallons for a total of 223 gallons internal for NO EXTRA WEIGHT. Probably room for more fuel than that. Plus three drop tanks.
> And Bell engineers were clever but the configuration, fuel, armament etc was specified by the AAF. Bell had very little say in the matter.


So, forward of the main spar...ok, and what, remove the formers? Install dozens of tiny little tanks?

Removing the MGs from the wing leaves the syncro'd MGs in the cowl, which had a lower rate of fire. In a time when air forces were increasing armament, going back to a 1930's philosophy of two MGs is not providing much of an advantage, even if they increased it's range from 450 miles to a thousand.

And it was most certainly Bell's engineers that ran the show. The USAAF provides a specification and the engineers work to meet that spec. The Air Force didn't hand blueprints to Bell and asked them to make it.


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 30, 2018)

GregP said:


> I think the P-40Q WAS an answer to MANY U.S. needs during WWII. It would have been a very welcome addition / replacement everywhere the P-40 was flying in wartime service, and we flew them from before the war started until after the war ended. Had it been possible to extend the range, it could have been useful in places other than where the P-40 was the mainstay.
> 
> I am not saying it would have replaced something and become a war winner. I am saying it was head and shoulder better than ANY standard P-40, and we flew those in every theater of war right up to and past the end of the war. So, Yes, the P-40Q would have very useful and welcome by any P-40 command.
> 
> ...


Agree completely. The two stage Allison would have totally transformed the performance of the P-40, P-39 and P-51.


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## P-39 Expert (Jun 30, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> So, forward of the main spar...ok, and what, remove the formers? Install dozens of tiny little tanks?
> 
> Removing the MGs from the wing leaves the syncro'd MGs in the cowl, which had a lower rate of fire. In a time when air forces were increasing armament, going back to a 1930's philosophy of two MGs is not providing much of an advantage, even if they increased it's range from 450 miles to a thousand.
> 
> And it was most certainly Bell's engineers that ran the show. The USAAF provides a specification and the engineers work to meet that spec. The Air Force didn't hand blueprints to Bell and asked them to make it.


Bell came up with ideas and put them on paper, but the AAF completely controlled (specified) everything about any plane that they purchased. They are the buyer, they got exactly what they wanted at the time.

Yes you would need new formers for the new tanks just like the tanks presently there. Should have been specified by the AFF long before production began.

Armament was adequate and a worthy tradeoff for the extra endurance. The P-51B/C only had 4 .50MGs.


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## eagledad (Jun 30, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Room for more fuel outboard of the present tanks, and forward of the main spar the entire span except where the landing gear strut goes through the spar. Lots of room there. Yes that would call for the removal of the water injection tank and the .50MG. Remaining armament of one 37mm cannon and two .50MGs is plenty for shooting down LW interceptors.
> There would be no water injection for WEP but, honestly WEP added 3mph to the top speed of the P-51D and 8mph to the P-38L. Less than 10mph for the chance to blow up your engine (over enemy territory) and piss off your crew chief for the extra work.
> The weight saved by deleting the WEP water (200#) and .50MGs (350#) alone is the equivalent of 91 additional gallons for a total of 223 gallons internal for NO EXTRA WEIGHT. Probably room for more fuel than that. Plus three drop tanks.
> And Bell engineers were clever but the configuration, fuel, armament etc was specified by the AAF. Bell had very little say in the matter.



P-39 Expert,

Am I mis-reading your statement, or are you implying that the 51D and 38L had water injection? I don't believe that either pilot manual mention that these aircraft had water injection. I know the 51H had the provisions, but the 38L and 51D?

Just curious.

Eagledad


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## wuzak (Jun 30, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> There would be no water injection for WEP but, honestly WEP added 3mph to the top speed of the P-51D and 8mph to the P-38L. Less than 10mph for the chance to blow up your engine (over enemy territory) and piss off your crew chief for the extra work.



The WEP top speed was at a lower altitude than the Military power top speed.

So while it was 3 or 4mph faster overall, it was achieved at a lower altitude.

In this report the P-51D had a top speed of 442mph @ 26,000ft WEP (3,000rpm, 67inHg MAP/+18psi boost), 438 @ 28,000ft Military Power (3,000rpm, 61inHg MAP/+15psi boost) and 420 mph @ 29,400ft Normal Rated Power (2,700rpm, 46inHg MAP/+8psi boost). These speeds were all at the critical altitude in high gear.*

But comparing speeds below critical altitude, the gain from Military to WEP was 12mph @ sea level, 16mph @ 10,000ft (low gear critical altitude), 11mph @ 20,000ft and 10mph @ 25,000ft.

Unfortunately that report only has WEP climb data, but I think you'll find that climb was improved significantly below critical altitude of WEP. But this report does.

Climb rates (ft/min):


```
Altitude      WEP       MP
Sea Level  3,410     3,030
7,500ft    3,510
9,700ft              3,170
21,200ft   2,680
23,200ft             2,300
```

Note that the climb rate and speed when using WEP will fall after critical altitude until they reach the same values as Military Power at the critical altitude of Military power. In WEP the change from Lo to Hi gears will also occur at a lower altitude. 

* Altitudes seem high for a V-1650-7


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## wuzak (Jun 30, 2018)

The gains in WEP for the P-63 are both more dramatic and underwhelming!

At 5,000ft WEP gives ~20mph gain over Military power. About 12mph @ 10,000ft, up to 18mph @ 15,000ft and about 4mph at 20,000ft. After which WEP is no advantage (actually, same rating as MP from then on).

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-63/42-78015.pdf

No climb data in that report.


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## swampyankee (Jun 30, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Room for more fuel outboard of the present tanks, and forward of the main spar the entire span except where the landing gear strut goes through the spar. Lots of room there. Yes that would call for the removal of the water injection tank and the .50MG. Remaining armament of one 37mm cannon and two .50MGs is plenty for shooting down LW interceptors.
> There would be no water injection for WEP but, honestly WEP added 3mph to the top speed of the P-51D and 8mph to the P-38L. Less than 10mph for the chance to blow up your engine (over enemy territory) and piss off your crew chief for the extra work.
> The weight saved by deleting the WEP water (200#) and .50MGs (350#) alone is the equivalent of 91 additional gallons for a total of 223 gallons internal for NO EXTRA WEIGHT. Probably room for more fuel than that. Plus three drop tanks.
> And Bell engineers were clever but the configuration, fuel, armament etc was specified by the AAF. Bell had very little say in the matter.




Water injection wasn't so much for speed as to increase rate of climb and improve energy retention.


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## GregP (Jun 30, 2018)

Could also be that the end of P-40 production in Nov 44 was known at the time, and the decision was not so much to not go with the P-40Q in the P-40 production run as much as it was to terminate production of P-40s entirely. Now THAT is understandable. I am somewhat leaning toward the situation where the P-40Q, while interesting and a very good performer, was simply too late in the line of P-40s to be considered for production unless they rescinded the decision to terminate P-40 production. It is likely that the money to be spent for potential P-40s was already tied up in production contracts for other aircraft, negating any chances for the P-40Q.

That seems much more logical to me than the USAAF not recognizing the quantum leap in performance the P-40Q would have offered over the standard P-40 series.

Either way, though I am fond of the prototypes, they didn't make it, like so many other planes with good potential at first or any glance from many countries. C'est la vie.

Oh, and the P-40Q could compete quite well with the P-51D. It was slower by some 15 mph, which is nothing in combat, but could out-roll the P-51 easily, was likely more maneuverable, had very good climb, and most likely more forgiving handling in general. It DID fall short in range as an escort, but the P-40 was never an escort fighter to begin with. Notwithstanding, it wasn't selected and I would not say the reasons were wrong until I could actually see the real reasons enumerated, which isn't likely if we haven't seen it to date.

So, no argument for it other than it could definitely have been useful in almost any role the P-40 was actually used for.


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## wuzak (Jul 1, 2018)

GregP said:


> I am somewhat leaning toward the situation where the P-40Q, while interesting and a very good performer, was simply too late in the line of P-40s to be considered for production unless they rescinded the decision to terminate P-40 production. It is likely that the money to be spent for potential P-40s was already tied up in production contracts for other aircraft, negating any chances for the P-40Q.



The P-40Q was just too late, full stop.

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## Dan Fahey (Jul 1, 2018)

wuzak said:


> The P-40Q was just too late, full stop.


P40Q was available and sorted out in early 1943.
CW do not want to stop Production to retool for the Q.

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## P-39 Expert (Jul 1, 2018)

eagledad said:


> P-39 Expert,
> 
> Am I mis-reading your statement, or are you implying that the 51D and 38L had water injection? I don't believe that either pilot manual mention that these aircraft had water injection. I know the 51H had the provisions, but the 38L and 51D?
> 
> ...


Didn't mean to confuse you, I was talking about deleting the water injection from the P-63 and replacing it with additional fuel and then saying how little WEP (War Emergency Power) added to the speed of the P-51D and P-38L at altitude. They didn't have water injection because they had an intercooler for WEP.


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## P-39 Expert (Jul 1, 2018)

wuzak said:


> The WEP top speed was at a lower altitude than the Military power top speed.
> 
> So while it was 3 or 4mph faster overall, it was achieved at a lower altitude.
> 
> ...


Right, WEP only helps performance below critical altitude. Purpose of the second stage was to increase critical altitude.


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## drgondog (Jul 1, 2018)

Dan Fahey said:


> P40Q was available and sorted out in early 1943.
> CW do not want to stop Production to retool for the Q.


CW didn't have a contract to produce P-40Q. Had a contract been forthcoming from Material Command, CW would been delighted to invest in tooling.

AAF finally saw the light on the Merlin Mustang potential mid 1942, and orders for Hybrid NA-99 to NA-102/103 kicked in at end of Q3. The deliveries of the P-51B-1 started at approximately the timeframe that P-40Q was being tested and modified. At the end of 1942, substantiation from Mustang X and Spit IX high altitude promise, combined with unfiltered reports by pilots that flew the XP-51 and P-51-1 outside the Material Command domain made it pretty clear that the P-51B had far more potential than P-40Q.

Greg's comments about maneuverability advantage the P-40Q promised were sound, but range and speed at altitude were already fully confirmed with first flight tests of the P-51B-1-NA by Chilton in May 1943. At the take off Gross weight of 8600 pounds (closer to interceptor/fighter role with only 105 gallons of fuel) the speed attained was 450+ at 29K, with climb rate of 3800+ fpm at 12K at MP of 61. This was without racks, specially prepared wing with sanded finish and taped gun ports. The follow on test at WP on the 18th May states 'equipped as production fighter' but unclear re: Racks had 442 and 3600 fpm from SL to 13K (3520fpm) in Low Blower.

Notable is that the actual flight test performance achieved by Chilton and Army flight tests were Very close to the original Performance Estimates Report NA-5534 dated 10-19-1942, BEFORE the first flight of XP-51B #1. 

When the P-40Q started testing, the P-51B-1 was already in serial production on a brand new line funded by A-36/P-51A contracts, the Dallas P-51 line was receiving plans and tooling to begin NA-103 P-51C.

Curtiss had a very spotty 'estimate to actual' record including P-36, P-40, XP-46 and XP-60 and speculatively had a much higher performance estimate for the P-40Q than revealed in flight tests?

As a War Plans and Requirements Division of Air Staff, why would you allocate Tooling and supply priorities to a fighter with less potential?

Summary, the P-40Q offered zero advantage over the P-51B-1 (save roll rate), and due to increasing delta in advantage of P-51B-1 at escort altitudes and above, combined with far greater range - why would Army buy the P-40Q?

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 1, 2018)

Dan Fahey said:


> P40Q was available and sorted out in early 1943.
> CW do not want to stop Production to retool for the Q.


That wasn't a CW decision - had CW been given a production contract they would have retooled in a New York minute!



drgondog said:


> CW didn't have a contract to produce P-40Q. Had a contract been forthcoming from Material Command, CW would been delighted to invest in tooling.



BINGO!

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## P-39 Expert (Jul 1, 2018)

drgondog said:


> CW didn't have a contract to produce P-40Q. Had a contract been forthcoming from Material Command, CW would been delighted to invest in tooling.
> 
> AAF finally saw the light on the Merlin Mustang potential mid 1942, and orders for Hybrid NA-99 to NA-102/103 kicked in at end of Q3. The deliveries of the P-51B-1 started at approximately the timeframe that P-40Q was being tested and modified. At the end of 1942, substantiation from Mustang X and Spit IX high altitude promise, combined with unfiltered reports by pilots that flew the XP-51 and P-51-1 outside the Material Command domain made it pretty clear that the P-51B had far more potential than P-40Q.
> 
> ...



The whole P-40Q question is based on serial production of the two stage Allison beginning in March 1943. Curtiss, Bell and NAA all knew that the two stage Allison was coming, being tested and would be in production in early '43. They all could (should) have started modifications necessary to adapt their planes (P-40, P-39 and P-51) to this engine to coincide with it's serial production. All three would have had excellent high altitude capability shortly thereafter in mid '43. 

The P-40Q first flew in April '44, much too late to put into production. Air superiority had already been secured in Europe so there was no need. But the engine was available in production much sooner a little over a year earlier. 

Really no reason to continue P-40 production unless it had a two stage engine. An Allison P-40 reached combat ceiling (1000fpm climb) at UNDER 20000' in clean condition (no drop tanks). With an external tank it was even lower. Every engagement with any Axis fighter normally resulted in the P-40 being attacked first from above. Not good. Either give it a two stage engine or quit wasting resources producing it.

Same with the P-38. It wasn't really a good plane until the ultimate J-25 and L got into production in June of '44. Air superiority had already been won. Much better to have high altitude single engined fighters at half the cost to build, maintain and operate.


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## drgondog (Jul 1, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> The whole P-40Q question is based on serial production of the two stage Allison beginning in March 1943. Curtiss, Bell and NAA all knew that the two stage Allison was coming, being tested and would be in production in early '43. They all could (should) have started modifications necessary to adapt their planes (P-40, P-39 and P-51) to this engine to coincide with it's serial production. All three would have had excellent high altitude capability shortly thereafter in mid '43.
> 
> *Nope. More comments below. The V-1710-119 and -121 which appeared in the P-40Q, then XP-51J - did not operated to specs.*
> 
> ...



The P-40Q first flew in June 1943. The limitations including very low oxygen supply (2 3/4 hrs at 20K), no external wing rack capable of carrying either drop tanks or bombs of same weight, no internal space to add extra fuel tank, limited capability to pressurize tanks without modification, 20-30mph slower than Production P-51B with much better performance using an engine that was in full production (1650-3) rather than development stage (V-1710-119) and -121).

The same engine was installed on the XP-51J and first flown April, 1945 - with a pot load of engine issues that were never solved by Allison for boost above 61-63" MP. The experience was so bad that NAA abandoned testing with less than 10 hours and sent it to Wright Patterson.

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## michael rauls (Jul 1, 2018)

This whole " why didn't the p38 do well in Europe" narrative is so frustrating with even the defenders of the p38 accepting the premise. First off by way of comparison wich p38,p47,or p51 and in what time frame are we talking about? Say 42 to 43 or 44,45? If we're talking42,43, yes the p38 had shortcomings but it was the only one of the 3 major fighter types that could even get to the fight much of the time. The 47 didn't have the range and the alison engine 51s were usless abouve20,000 feet. And in spite of there shortcomings bomber losses plunged when p38s began escort. If were talking 44,45 then its a much closer comparison but p38s were therein limited numbers(the 474th used them till the end) and they achieved just shy of a 5 to 1 kill ratio durring this time. Now i would subbmit that a 5 to 1 kill ratio achieved while flying low and slow ladden with ordinance(the38s ussual mission profile during this time) vs the p51s 7 or 8to 1 kill ratio(depending whos numbers you use) while flying unladden at high altitude out ahead of the bombers where the could often have a tactical advantage is at least compatible if not better when the comparative mission profiles are taken into account. So in my mind and I would think the mind of anyone who looks at it objectively the p38 has NOTHING to apologize for its performance in the European theater. All that being said if I were marking the decisions I would have gone largely with the p51 also just because half the cost,just as effective.


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## P-39 Expert (Jul 1, 2018)

drgondog said:


> The P-40Q first flew in June 1943. The limitations including very low oxygen supply (2 3/4 hrs at 20K), no external wing rack capable of carrying either drop tanks or bombs of same weight, no internal space to add extra fuel tank, limited capability to pressurize tanks without modification, 20-30mph slower than Production P-51B with much better performance using an engine that was in full production (1650-3) rather than development stage (V-1710-119) and -121).
> 
> The same engine was installed on the XP-51J and first flown April, 1945 - with a pot load of engine issues that were never solved by Allison for boost above 61-63" MP. The experience was so bad that NAA abandoned testing with less than 10 hours and sent it to Wright Patterson.





drgondog said:


> The P-40Q first flew in June 1943. The limitations including very low oxygen supply (2 3/4 hrs at 20K), no external wing rack capable of carrying either drop tanks or bombs of same weight, no internal space to add extra fuel tank, limited capability to pressurize tanks without modification, 20-30mph slower than Production P-51B with much better performance using an engine that was in full production (1650-3) rather than development stage (V-1710-119) and -121).
> 
> The same engine was installed on the XP-51J and first flown April, 1945 - with a pot load of engine issues that were never solved by Allison for boost above 61-63" MP. The experience was so bad that NAA abandoned testing with less than 10 hours and sent it to Wright Patterson.


I'm talking about the -93 that went into the P-63. It was in series production from March '43 with over 2500 built. You are talking about the -101 that began TESTING in July 1943 and first flew in the P-40Q in November '43. Neither it nor the follow on -121 saw production.


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## P-39 Expert (Jul 1, 2018)

drgondog said:


> The P-40Q first flew in June 1943. The limitations including very low oxygen supply (2 3/4 hrs at 20K), no external wing rack capable of carrying either drop tanks or bombs of same weight, no internal space to add extra fuel tank, limited capability to pressurize tanks without modification, 20-30mph slower than Production P-51B with much better performance using an engine that was in full production (1650-3) rather than development stage (V-1710-119) and -121).
> 
> The same engine was installed on the XP-51J and first flown April, 1945 - with a pot load of engine issues that were never solved by Allison for boost above 61-63" MP. The experience was so bad that NAA abandoned testing with less than 10 hours and sent it to Wright Patterson.


The P-40N you mentioned was the "ultralight" version with reduced armament, fuel and the new aluminum radiators. Only 400 built before reverting back to the full load in the N-5. Performance fell back to 350mph and 31000' ceiling. Not very competitive.


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## GregP (Jul 1, 2018)

I have long wondered how a P-40Q with a 2-Stage Merlin would have performed, but have not invested any time in thinking about the details because they never built one even when the engine was available for experimentation. It would probably have been VERY competitive with the P-51B, which was already in serial production ... and, again, would likely not have been selected for production due to existing production of the P-51B.

The only way I can see the P-40Q with a 2-stage Merlin maybe being produced is if the plane were to be available at almost the same time as the XP-51B was. And, while it MIGHT have been possible, it never happened in real life, even when the 2-stage Merlin were available. Had it been available to Curtiss significantly sooner, and had they acted upon it, Curtiss might have gotten an order for some P-40Qs.

It's an interesting "what-if" that didn't happen and would not happen unless the timeline were to be significantly altered to favor Curtiss, and if they were smart enough to pursue it.

That we were "saddled" with the P-51 instead might be one of the best instances of serendipity ever to occur along with the private venture Spitfire working out so well for the British. We didn't "want" the P-51, but were forced to both acknowledge and accept its performance when we tested it. It certainly wasn't exactly perfect. But if it wasn't, it was as close as we ever got, aside from maybe the F-86 somewhat later.


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## Dan Fahey (Jul 1, 2018)

drgondog said:


> CW didn't have a contract to produce P-40Q. Had a contract been forthcoming from Material Command, CW would been delighted to invest in tooling.
> 
> AAF finally saw the light on the Merlin Mustang potential mid 1942, and orders for Hybrid NA-99 to NA-102/103 kicked in at end of Q3. The deliveries of the P-51B-1 started at approximately the timeframe that P-40Q was being tested and modified. At the end of 1942, substantiation from Mustang X and Spit IX high altitude promise, combined with unfiltered reports by pilots that flew the XP-51 and P-51-1 outside the Material Command domain made it pretty clear that the P-51B had far more potential than P-40Q.
> 
> ...



CW chose not to ask USAAF to manufacture the Q. They could have replaced the N version with the Q. The engine was available for the P63 and P51j. Q had better flight performance over all coupled with higher altitude performance CW imho became a Greedy manufacture. It would have saved lives. Example, The F87 was the last straw with the now DOD. After that CW was asset stripped by greedy investors. Second most profitable Defense contractor during WW2. Today CW is a speciality DOD contacting company.

The US failed to introduce the P63 to USAAF which would have been a far better Ground attack and fighter plane than any of the current fighters. For the same reason the P51 almost got ingnored. The NIH issue came up. Like the P40 and whole new design P51 because the calaboration of two engineering groups the P63 suffered the same fate.


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## BiffF15 (Jul 1, 2018)

Gents,

Those of you with a God's eye view of timelines answer me this. Was there some overt point at which the USAAF started picking winners and losers for upgrades and then actually stopped major upgrades? Example is the P72, P38K, P40Q? The P51 was getting the H, the P47 was getting the N and jets were on the horizon. I understand the P38K "might" have been not warranted for the threat (or lack thereof) faced in Asia and losses of new production aircraft during the transition (single production line drawback).

Cheers,
Biff


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## Shortround6 (Jul 1, 2018)

There seems to be a bit of confusion as to when the P-40Q was actually "ready." 
They had 3 airframes and some of the airframes went through several different models of engines, 

One report is dated from Nov of 1943 and that test is of the first XP-40Q serial number AC-9987. This plane started out as a P-40K . 
The engine used was the V-1710-101 (F-27). No performance figures are given in the report. The performance figures most people seem to be quoting are from an
April 1944 report/test which had a different airframe and a different engine. 
I would also note that P-40 production for 1944, even in the first part of 1944 (production stopped in Nov) was roughly 1/2 the number per month that it had been in 1943. Granted it probably could have been sped back up if really needed but the P-40 was seen as no longer needed or desirable before Jan of 1944. 

In the Summer of 1943 this is what you had for a XP-40Q










From :Curtiss XP-40Q Fighter

For a good timeline/description of evolution. 
The P-40Q was simply too late in timing.

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## Navalwarrior (Jul 2, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> The whole P-40Q question is based on serial production of the two stage Allison beginning in March 1943. Curtiss, Bell and NAA all knew that the two stage Allison was coming, being tested and would be in production in early '43. They all could (should) have started modifications necessary to adapt their planes (P-40, P-39 and P-51) to this engine to coincide with it's serial production. All three would have had excellent high altitude capability shortly thereafter in mid '43.
> 
> The P-40Q first flew in April '44, much too late to put into production. Air superiority had already been secured in Europe so there was no need. But the engine was available in production much sooner a little over a year earlier.
> 
> ...


Resp:
The only theater where the P-38 performed poorly, if I can say that, was the ETO. If you were in the AAF in any other theater before Jan 1944, what was better than the P-38? The P-47N didn't make it until 1945. So there was the P-39, P-40 and P-38 (few P-47s in PTO/CBI). All of the fighters evolved, with most getting better. As for the Allison contract, think about how many fighters were already needing engines ( don't forget replacements in the field)? Not sure they could supply the Allisons need for another fighter. Just think out loud.


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## GregP (Jul 2, 2018)

I think we've all agreed about the "too late."

Once the performance of the P-51B was known, the only real reason to produce the P-40Q would have been if the P-51B failed. And ... the P-40Q could have addressed most missions of the P-51B, but not long range escort, so ... the P-51B seems like the only game in town for that particular mission at the time.

They would have invested a lot of bucks in P-51B to make it work before trying out the P-40Q. As it happened, they didn't need to do that since it basically worked right off the drawing board. In retrospect, it does seem like North American had a very good set of shoulders upon which to rest their fortune and Curtiss had great difficulty producing a plane that performed better than the standard P-40.

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## P-39 Expert (Jul 2, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> The only theater where the P-38 performed poorly, if I can say that, was the ETO. If you were in the AAF in any other theater before Jan 1944, what was better than the P-38? The P-47N didn't make it until 1945. So there was the P-39, P-40 and P-38 (few P-47s in PTO/CBI). All of the fighters evolved, with most getting better. As for the Allison contract, think about how many fighters were already needing engines ( don't forget replacements in the field)? Not sure they could supply the Allisons need for another fighter. Just think out loud.


The competition was a lot better in Europe. In the PTO the Lightning had the speed and climb advantage. In the ETO their speed and climb was just barely able to keep up but the low Mach number and less maneuverability hurt them. And of course the cost to maintain a twin.

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## swampyankee (Jul 2, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> The competition was a lot better in Europe. In the PTO the Lightning had the speed and climb advantage. In the ETO their speed and climb was just barely able to keep up but the low Mach number and less maneuverability hurt them. And of course the cost to maintain a twin.



I’m not sure “the competition was a lot better in Europe”; although the competion was a lot higher. There were several aircraft that did much better in Europe than against Japan. 

The design defects in the early variants of the P-38, in its induction system, ergonomics, and nimbleness, mostly roll acceleration, and defects in pilot training were all contributory. By the time those were sorted, better aircraft were coming on line.

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## drgondog (Jul 2, 2018)

Dan Fahey said:


> CW chose not to ask USAAF to manufacture the Q. They could have replaced the N version with the Q. The engine was available for the P63 and P51j. Q had better flight performance over all coupled with higher altitude performance CW imho became a Greedy manufacture. It would have saved lives. Example, The F87 was the last straw with the now DOD. After that CW was asset stripped by greedy investors. Second most profitable Defense contractor during WW2. Today CW is a speciality DOD contacting company.
> 
> The US failed to introduce the P63 to USAAF which would have been a far better Ground attack and fighter plane than any of the current fighters. For the same reason the P51 almost got ingnored. The NIH issue came up. Like the P40 and whole new design P51 because the calaboration of two engineering groups the P63 suffered the same fate.


CW hardly chose 'not to ask' for a contract to manufacture the Q. They were already looking at the end of the P-40N line with no follow on. They had failed to bring the XP-46 and XP-60 to successful achievement of promised performance, leaving their strong supporters (Echols) holding the bag as airframe after airframe specified by Material Command failed. They were staring into the abyss.

The biggest blunder of Material Command, namely the XP-75 - was already being deemed dangerous to fly by Ben Bradley, the then current Fighter Projects Director. Material Command at that time had lost a lot of stroke with AAF in context of selecting 'winners' and they were tagged by that time with a.) being advocates of failed CW proposals, and b.) open obstructors to NAA at the expense of war fighting capability.

The XP-51F with Performance estimates of Far superior capability to even the P-51B was well along on the engineering side as USAAF Next Gen along with P-47M with all Republic manufacturing capability poised to produce them. It would have taken pretty dumb AAF decision makers to select P-40Q for any mission other than replace P-40s for Commonwealth/Allies.

The P-63 was deemed superior to the P-39 and P-40 but not superior to P-51B and only the Russians were interested in it. It was not remotely close to P-47D/P-38H/J or P-51B contemporaries in combined CAS and escort flexibility.

Same basic issue as P-40Q - no well defined mission (AAF) urgent enough to ramp up Logistics supply chain to introduce yet another new airframe and engine into the mix. By that time the Planners were well acquainted with requirement for range to maximize tactical footprint over the battlefield. .

The fighters in serial production were better than the P-40Q. The Military Requirements Division had zero critical mission (CAS, Interceptor, Escort) for which the P-40Q was superior to the P-47D/P-51B, the P-38H/J or P-51B, the P-38H/J and P-51B respectively. 

The P-40Q had less range than the P-51A on pure internal fuel and had no provision for external stores, especially combat tanks. It could outclimb the P-51A and out roll it - but so what if it was being compared to the P-51B? 

Last point, really a question? How do you assign corporate Greed to the failure to select P-40Q, when the P-40 was basically dead for AAF future plans?

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## Peter Gunn (Jul 2, 2018)

I will say this, the P-40AQ in SR6's post #305 is one sleek looking ship. I like it better than the bubble top version, but only for aesthetic purposes, I am partial to all the razor backs.


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## GregP (Jul 2, 2018)

Well said, Bill. The fact that I really like the P-40Q with the bubble canopy does nothing to change your succinct summary. Had they installed a 2-stage Merlin, it might have been better at some things than a P-51, but range alone would preclude it from ever replacing the P-51, even IF P-40Q performance with a Merlin proved to be better then the P-51 and, without analysis, that is highly doubtful to start with.

I had not brought up the rather pedestrian XP-46 and XP-60 series (I do like the XP-60E alone in the series), but when you did, it more or less drives the nail in the coffin.

Maybe we can put this one to bed.

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## Bad-Karma (Jul 2, 2018)

Peter Gunn said:


> I will say this, the P-40AQ in SR6's post #305 is one sleek looking ship. I like it better than the bubble top version, but only for aesthetic purposes, I am partial to all the razor backs.



Finally a post I'm qualified to weigh in on 

To heck with the performance numbers they should have stopped at N based on looks alone! Possibly even E !


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 2, 2018)

Curtiss XP-40Q Fighter

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## Schweik (Jul 2, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Well, range and the _fact_ that they KNEW the P-40 couldn't compete with the 109s on even terms. Even using P-40Fs. They did use hundred of P-40s in that theater along with P-39s. The P-38s flew top cover for the tactical bombers (B-25/B-26s) and the lower altitude fighters.
> 
> The P-40s could hold their own _but only at the lower altitudes,_ which is no way to win a campaign. It only works *IF* your enemy co-operates and flies were your aircraft are the strongest.



Actually not true. The P-38s rarely flew top cover for P-40s - they used P-40Fs for that because of their higher performance ceiling (about ~20k feet) and Spit Vs (both RAF and American) when the range allowed.

The five USAAF P-40 fighter groups (almost all flying P-40F or L) all had good records against the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica. Most had 3-1 or better on claims, which translated to slightly better than 1-1 in actual combat when you look at the German records. The best (57th FG and 325FG) did a little better than that, apparently - though the numbers aren't all published yet. There were 18 USAAF Aces flying P-40s in the Med.

There are a few reasons for this not necessarily attributable to the aircraft type - unlike the RAF the USAAF squadrons were using 'finger four' formations with wingmen, they had better radios, they were attacking the German bases and thus often facing German fighters forced to come up from below at least some of the time, they did not use 'defensive circles', and so on. And the P-40F / L could still fight well up to 20,000 feet vs. 12-15,000 feet for the Allison engined models that the RAF / Commonwealth were (mostly) using).

P-38s didn't do all that well in North Africa and after a few bad days operating and medium to low altitude, they specialized in escorting the heavy bombers, mainly B-24s of which there were a lot in Theater, sometimes B-17s, at high altitude. If you look at Shores Mediterranean Air War Vol III, you'll see that most of the P-38 missions were of this type, often in long range strikes. Sometimes they were also used in Maritime patrol.

P-38 squadrons had a lot of bad days in the Med including one squadron flying in on a ferry mission (with only 50 rounds of .5 ammo loaded and no 20mm) being shot down by some Ju 88s.

S


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## Schweik (Jul 2, 2018)

OldSkeptic said:


> I think Bungey (His book "Most Dangerous Enemy") pretty much has debunked that common mythology. Only one airfield (Manston) was ever put out of operation. Virtually no planes were caught on the ground. The radars were hard to take out, only a Stuka might do it and they were easy prey, and the RAF had redundancy and mobile radars and quick repairs. The Luftwaffe tried that for weeks and got nowhere, except large losses.
> 
> The Germans attacking London was a last resort because nothing else had worked, the RAF just kept inflicting unacceptable losses. The Germans had worse problems getting new pilots and they didn't have the production of the British to replace machine losses.
> 
> ...



I think this is a pretty good analysis. The LW pilots interview excerpts in Shores MAW emphasize the frustration with the 'cult of personality' of the Experten and the kind of 'uber' mentality which, as a Strategy, promoted the kill scores of the experten, with the other pilots in the Stafflen reduced to protecting the star. 

More seriously though was, as you mentioned, the emphasis on attacking fighters, or seeking out fights which would benefit the kill scores as opposed to preventing their troops from being bombed, let alone providing effective CAS for the Afrika Korps. This caused serious tension between the ground commanders including Rommel, and the Luftwaffe leadership. There was also apparently significant tension between the Italian and German fighter units.

The LW units, especially JG 27, went out of their way to find easy targets - especially low flying fighter bombers, and would concentrate their activities in those areas where they found 'easy pickings', rather than wherever the DAF was doing the most damage. The DAF, in turn, basically ignored the LW attacks for far too long, concentrating on their main mission of providing effective CAS and protecting their own ground forces from Stukas. 

DAF were thus providing pretty effective CAS but were quite late in adapting to LW tactics - leading to serious morale problems among other issues. And I think it was really the arrival of the Americans, despite their inexperience, which tipped the balance back in the Allied favor decisively, though of course Spitfires helped a lot too. The USAAF were using better tactics and took the fight to the LW by attacking their airfields, as a conscious shift in strategy by the US FG commanders like Bill Momyer. This put a lot more pressure on JG 27 which 'broke' and had to be sent away for a while for R&R. JG 77 didn't do as well and was suffering casualties literally from the day they arrived (when they lost one of their squadron leaders).

S


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## wuzak (Jul 2, 2018)

Schweik said:


> unlike the RAF the USAAF squadrons were using 'finger four' formations with wingmen, they had better radios



Really? The RAF were still using Vic formations in 1942/43?

And the USAAF had better radios than the RAF?


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## Schweik (Jul 2, 2018)

wuzak said:


> Really? The RAF were still using Vic formations in 1942/43?
> 
> And the USAAF had better radios than the RAF?



yes and yes. RAF was just starting to use finger four / two pairs in late 1942. Up until then they were using Vics and 'weavers', 'fluid pairs' and various other formations all of which proved easy pickings for the Germans. Numerous Luftwaffe pilots quoted in MAW commented on this and how easy it made it for them. The RAF also habitually formed 'defensive circles' when attacked from above by Axis planes. Tactics started to change about the time the Americans showed up, a couple of the _Experten_ interviewed said they didn't see proper formations until they faced the Americans - but I think this just means the 'finger four'. The tactic also changed into turning into the enemy attacks and making a head on pass.

Roughly the same situation with the radios. Per Bobby Gibbes and some others, the original radios were HF (UHF?) and required constant fiddling with the knobs to stay in tune. According to Gibbes, many died while trying to tune in their radios, oblivious to the frantic warnings being called out by their squad-mates. US planes came with "VF" (VHF?) radios which, per Gibbes and some others, stayed in tune much longer and changed channel via a button.

Everything started to change for the better for the Allies around the fall of 1942

S


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## Schweik (Jul 2, 2018)

drgondog said:


> The P-40Q first flew in June 1943. The limitations including very low oxygen supply (2 3/4 hrs at 20K), no external wing rack capable of carrying either drop tanks or bombs of same weight, no internal space to add extra fuel tank, limited capability to pressurize tanks without modification, 20-30mph slower than Production P-51B with much better performance using an engine that was in full production (1650-3) rather than development stage (V-1710-119) and -121).
> 
> The same engine was installed on the XP-51J and first flown April, 1945 - with a pot load of engine issues that were never solved by Allison for boost above 61-63" MP. The experience was so bad that NAA abandoned testing with less than 10 hours and sent it to Wright Patterson.




The P-40Q didn't get the green light for three reasons:

1) Multiple prototype accidents. Never a good sign.
2) P-51 was already looking good and production ready to take off
3) War Dept, Air Force and the government in general were sick of Curtiss Aircraft.

I think 3 is actually the most important reason. Curtiss was just screwing up right and left, they hadn't improved the P-40 nearly enough, the other P-40 replacements (P-46 and P-60 etc.) were failures (and looked like crap!) and numerous other aircraft they had produced turned out to be very expensive debacles. The Helldiver and the Seamew were epic fails. Experiments like the C-76 and the XP-55 failed. Their best designers had left after 1942, and even the P-40 run was having some production quality problems. The only planes they made even partly successful after the mid-war were the C-46 and the Seahawk and neither was critical to the war effort.

Curtiss as a company was just corrupt and bloated and incapable of delivering what was needed.

The P-40Q did look promising and may have been better in some respects than a P-51 but it would have meant taking a gamble on a once great company that had let them down time and time again. North American by contrast had a much better record both in terms of design and production.

S


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## Schweik (Jul 2, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> The P-40N you mentioned was the "ultralight" version with reduced armament, fuel and the new aluminum radiators. Only 400 built before reverting back to the full load in the N-5. Performance fell back to 350mph and 31000' ceiling. Not very competitive.



Actually they went back and forth, they had other N "interceptor" subvariants with the 4 gun armament and higher-rated engines (the short run N-10-CU for example - made for the Russians, and the final N-40 variant which had metal ailerons and a V-1710-115), couple of other variants that were even slower intended purely for training or FB work (most of the N-20 and N-30).

Some things were usually put back in to even the first 'stripped' N like the starter and battery but they kept a lot of the other weight savings (obviously the lighter radiator and wheels). The N types used by the RAF in Italy and 23rd, 51st and 80th FG in CBI could be configured various ways by taking out or adding gear. For fighting over 'The Hump' (Himalayas) they typically kept a lot of the weight savings including often removing two guns. They did the same with P-40K and M.

When fighting at lower alt over battling land armies further East they put the extra gun back in.

S


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## Peter Gunn (Jul 3, 2018)

drgondog said:


> The P-40Q first flew in June 1943. The limitations including very low oxygen supply (2 3/4 hrs at 20K), no external wing rack capable of carrying either drop tanks or bombs of same weight, no internal space to add extra fuel tank, limited capability to pressurize tanks without modification, 20-30mph slower than Production P-51B with much better performance using an engine that was in full production (1650-3) rather than development stage (V-1710-119) and -121).
> 
> *SNIP*



Just a few of the reasons that to me, make the Mustang, if not the very definition of a world beater, then very close to it.

I am still amazed at what a masterpiece Edgar Schmued et. al. achieved using slide rules and the old brain box.


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## swampyankee (Jul 3, 2018)

Dan Fahey said:


> CW chose not to ask USAAF to manufacture the Q. They could have replaced the N version with the Q. The engine was available for the P63 and P51j. Q had better flight performance over all coupled with higher altitude performance CW imho became a Greedy manufacture. It would have saved lives. Example, The F87 was the last straw with the now DOD. After that CW was asset stripped by greedy investors. Second most profitable Defense contractor during WW2. Today CW is a speciality DOD contacting company.
> 
> The US failed to introduce the P63 to USAAF which would have been a far better Ground attack and fighter plane than any of the current fighters. For the same reason the P51 almost got ingnored. The NIH issue came up. Like the P40 and whole new design P51 because the calaboration of two engineering groups the P63 suffered the same fate.



CW’s airframe side was having problems before WWII; they had problems getting and keeping engineering talent. It got worse post-war. CW still exists, but it’s very much small potatoes


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## drgondog (Jul 3, 2018)

Schweik said:


> The P-40Q didn't get the green light for three reasons:
> 
> 1) Multiple prototype accidents. Never a good sign.
> 2) P-51 was already looking good and production ready to take off
> ...


What you say about Curtiss reputation in 1943 is factual - but the primary reasons that the P-40Q never made the cut were 1.) as tested, it had an unproven engine for high altitude operation, 2.) as tested, it was lighter than it would have been in combat operations which would diminish projected performance and 3.) MOST IMPORTANTLY - there was no key mission for which the P-40Q was required for, in which it was better at, than P-51B, P-38H/J and P-47C/D.

The same logic applied to the XP-51G which arguably had the highest (Actual) conventional s/e performance in US R&D Inventory in early 1944. It had more performance than P-51B/D, P-47M, etc - But - the Merlin 100/14 SM engine was still in development/test, the internal fuel was inadequate for projected maximum range escort, so its only true projected role would have been very fast mid range escort/air superiority and/or long range Interceptor. The P-40Q was puny in any comparison one could make except roll and turn in mid speed range.

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## Schweik (Jul 3, 2018)

drgondog said:


> What you say about Curtiss reputation in 1943 is factual - but the primary reasons that the P-40Q never made the cut were 1.) as tested, it had an unproven engine for high altitude operation, 2.) as tested, it was lighter than it would have been in combat operations which would diminish projected performance and 3.) MOST IMPORTANTLY - there was no key mission for which the P-40Q was required for, in which it was better at, than P-51B, P-38H/J and P-47C/D.
> 
> The same logic applied to the XP-51G which arguably had the highest (Actual) conventional s/e performance in US R&D Inventory in early 1944. It had more performance than P-51B/D, P-47M, etc - But - the Merlin 100/14 SM engine was still in development/test, the internal fuel was inadequate for projected maximum range escort, so its only true projected role would have been very fast mid range escort/air superiority and/or long range Interceptor. The P-40Q was puny in any comparison one could make except roll and turn in mid speed range.



I'm not sure it's that cut and dry. There was no such thing as a perfect fighter, and to a large extent the others were doing missions they weren't fully suited for either - P-47 was a high altitude fighter but they were using it for CAS. P-38 too as well to some extent. Spitfire was an interceptor but they were using it for escort some times. P-51 was a long range fighter but was being used as an interceptor.

I think if the War Dept thought they were going to get a good fighter out of a P-40Q I think they probably would have gone for it. Lack of sufficient oxygen tanks or external tank fittings are not exactly insurmountable design flaws. I think the P-63 was just too short ranged to be of much of any use (except to the Russians). If they trusted Curtiss (and if the prototypes hadn't crashed) I think they may have produced it. But given the track record at Curtiss (including making bad engines) I think it may have been a bad bet. And so did they!

S

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## Schweik (Jul 3, 2018)

My take on the P-38 is this.

It was a brilliant design, certainly the best twin engined day fighter design of the War. Probably the only twin-engined fighter actually viable in day time air-to-air combat after the first year or two.

But it was also a flawed design. It had a lot of design flaws which probably could have been fixed in time but which Lockheed was a little too slow to correct. These were _eventually _fixed but by that time, it was past the tipping point of the war and in fact we had entered the Jet Age. WW II piston-engined fighters were in a race to be useful before their entire design basis was obsolete. It's arguable when that cutoff point was, but probably some time toward the end of 1944. You might say until the end of the war but I would argue that wasn't quite the case. Certainly by the next significant War (Korea) Jets were dominant and even the best piston engined fighters were playing tertiary roles.

The P-38 was able to be useful even in it's early flawed (E,F) variants because it had a speed (and high speed climb) advantage over the enemies in the Pacific Theater and some of the pilots were able to adapt. It didn't have this advantage in Europe. The last 'L' variant was probably good enough to hold it's own in a fight, arguably - which is unusual for twin engined fighters as I said. But it still had some pretty serious flaws (not being able to dive away was a really big flaw) and by then it didn't really have a role that wasn't already done a little better by the P-51 or the Spitfire. 

Any more money put into that design or it's production was no longer worth the investment since the next fighter was going to be a Jet.

S

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## pbehn (Jul 3, 2018)

Schweik said:


> I'm not sure it's that cut and dry. There was no such thing as a perfect fighter, and to a large extent the others were doing missions they weren't fully suited for either - P-47 was a high altitude fighter but they were using it for CAS. P-38 too as well to some extent. Spitfire was an interceptor but they were using it for escort some times. P-51 was a long range fighter but was being used as an interceptor.


You are taking the end, or best use of these aircraft to be their original design use. The Spitfires design brief was certainly as an interceptor, the P51 certainly wasn't designed as a long range escort, it wasn't even designed for US forces. 

edit The P-38 and P-47 were ordered to other specs, I believe they were also primarily interceptors with high altitude performance in their origins.

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## Schweik (Jul 3, 2018)

pbehn said:


> You are taking the end, or best use of these aircraft to be their original design use. The Spitfires design brief was certainly as an interceptor, the P51 certainly wasn't designed as a long range escort, it wasn't even designed for US forces.
> 
> edit The P-38 and P-47 were ordered to other specs, I believe they were also primarily interceptors with high altitude performance in their origins.



I'm talking about the role they were _developed_ for, not necessarily just the original design specs or prototype. There is a subtle but very real distinction, and sometime the two things were in sync, sometimes they weren't.

The P-51 became a "real" fighter in the eyes of the USAAF when the Merlin 60 allowed it to fly (fight) at high altitude. They already knew about it's range but that was also enhanced. The combination of these traits were obvious and led to it's development as a long range escort.

I think the P-38 was also developed as an escort fighter from an early date in it's production cycle. As was the Thunderbolt. The P-47 was certainly optimized for fighting at high altitude and not as maneuverable or fast down low. But the radial engine and heavy armament made it suitable in certain respects for CAS, which ultimately became it's most important role.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> I think the P-38 was also developed as an escort fighter from an early date in it's production cycle.



100% Incorrect!!! The P-38 design was based on an Army Air Corps Circular Proposal "X-608" released in 1937. This spec was written by Lts, Ben Kelsey and Gordon Saville and called for a twin-engine high-altitude "interceptor" having "the tactical mission of interception and attack of hostile aircraft at high altitude."

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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> 100% Incorrect!!! The P-38 design was based on an Army Air Corps Circular Proposal "X-608" released in 1937. This spec was written by Lts, Ben Kelsey and Gordon Saville and called for a twin-engine high-altitude "interceptor" having "the tactical mission of interception and attack of hostile aircraft at high altitude."



Ok well, maybe this is a matter of emphasis. Did you read this part in the post you quoted?

"I'm talking about the role they were _developed_ for, *not necessarily just the original design specs or prototype.*"

I think once the early P-38 models started being produced, there was an immediate push to use them in the escort role, though interception was also a useful role particularly in the Pacific and particularly at longer range (such as the dramatic shoot-down Yamomoto)

Aircraft don't appear as a prototype or an initial version and just remain the same. They start getting pushed in one direction or another. Right?

S


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## Ascent (Jul 4, 2018)

The Americans were wed to the idea of the unescorted bomber formation long past the point that other countries had realised the folly of it, why would they develop an aircraft as an escort when they didn't forsee a role for it?

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## GrauGeist (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> I think...


Don't.

The P-38 was born of the long-range interceptor ideology, much like Germany's Bf110 heavy fighter/interceptor (Zerstorer) or Bell's XMF-1 Airacuda.

It was designed in a time when the philosophy of the "heavy bombers will get through", the P-38 was intended to counter that.

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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> I'm talking about the role they were _developed_ for, not necessarily just the original design specs or prototype. There is a subtle but very real distinction, and sometime the two things were in sync, sometimes they weren't.
> 
> The P-51 became a "real" fighter in the eyes of the USAAF when the Merlin 60 allowed it to fly (fight) at high altitude. They already knew about it's range but that was also enhanced. The combination of these traits were obvious and led to it's development as a long range escort.
> 
> I think the P-38 was also developed as an escort fighter from an early date in it's production cycle. As was the Thunderbolt. The P-47 was certainly optimized for fighting at high altitude and not as maneuverable or fast down low. But the radial engine and heavy armament made it suitable in certain respects for CAS, which ultimately became it's most important role.


When it became clear that escorts were required the US and UK used whatever they could lay their hands on and worked on increasing the range of everything.

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## P-39 Expert (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> My take on the P-38 is this.
> 
> It was a brilliant design, certainly the best twin engined day fighter design of the War. Probably the only twin-engined fighter actually viable in day time air-to-air combat after the first year or two.
> 
> ...


IMO you are correct. Almost all fighters got better as they progressed through their incremental models. The P-38 was very advanced and by the time they got it working properly (L) the LW had been beaten by (mostly) other planes.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Ok well, maybe this is a matter of emphasis. Did you read this part in the post you quoted?
> 
> "I'm talking about the role they were _developed_ for, *not necessarily just the original design specs or prototype.*"
> 
> ...



Don't back peddle!!!! I read your quote -

*"I think the P-38 was also developed as an escort fighter from an early date in it's production cycle."
*
Early in the P-38 production cycle they were being built by hand!!!!!

The use of the P-38 as an escort came as an OPERATIONAL requirement by Lockheed's major customer, the USAAF. A paragraph from Wiki documents how this came about quite nicely:

_*"The strategic bombing proponents within the USAAF, called the Bomber Mafia by their ideological opponents, had established in the early 1930s a policy against research to create long-range fighters, which they thought would not be practical; this kind of research was not to compete for bomber resources. Aircraft manufacturers understood that they would not be rewarded if they installed subsystems on their fighters to enable them to carry drop tanks to provide more fuel for extended range. Lieutenant Kelsey, acting against this policy, risked his career in late 1941 when he convinced Lockheed to incorporate such subsystems in the P-38E model, without putting his request in writing."*_



Schweik said:


> Aircraft don't appear as a prototype or an initial version and just remain the same. They start getting pushed in one direction or another. Right?


 Not all the time!!!


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## drgondog (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> I'm not sure it's that cut and dry. There was no such thing as a perfect fighter, and to a large extent the others were doing missions they weren't fully suited for either - P-47 was a high altitude fighter but they were using it for CAS. P-38 too as well to some extent. Spitfire was an interceptor but they were using it for escort some times. P-51 was a long range fighter but was being used as an interceptor.
> 
> I think if the War Dept thought they were going to get a good fighter out of a P-40Q I think they probably would have gone for it. Lack of sufficient oxygen tanks or external tank fittings are not exactly insurmountable design flaws. I think the P-63 was just too short ranged to be of much of any use (except to the Russians). If they trusted Curtiss (and if the prototypes hadn't crashed) I think they may have produced it. But given the track record at Curtiss (including making bad engines) I think it may have been a bad bet. And so did they!
> 
> S


Schweik - I find my self arguing when I agree much of what you post, That said, as you said, the AAF was sending out CP's from 1937 through 1940 for a War Plan Requirement that contemplated Defense of the United States - not strategic warfare fought outside US and Territories. The AAF got its nose under the tent with the B-17 based on Coastal Defense capability which was a lot more agile than aircraft carriers to maneuver in position of a foreign power (i.e. Japan) known to the WPD to be capable or potentially capable of projecting power to attack the US (Japan, UK) without regard to friendly/not friendly.

The CP's for Interceptors included the 'heavy' (P-38) and 'Lite' (P-39) - bot to be equipped with turbos to support the in-line engine technology of the time And carry 37mm cannon as primary anti bomber armament.

It was well known by several chief AAC architects (notably Spaatz) that a S/E fighter could not be developed as a long range fighter (escort or otherwise) capable of supporting WP Objectives. It wasn't until Spring 1939 that multi place fighter CP-618 (leading to P-61) which focused on t/e long range fighter aircraft and single place fighter CP-616 (NAA not invited) which led to XP-46, XP-47 and DS-312A - but still pointing toward Interceptors, not general purpose fighters for all altitudes.

When Arnold appointed a Special Board (Kilner Board) to examine R&D priorities in May, the Board came back several months later with a. Better Liquid Cooled Engines, 2.) Improved fire control systems for bomber defense, and 3.) Fighter to rank with Best in the World. Arnold also appointed the Emmons Board to perform further review on Fighter requirements. Emmons Board came back with "development of an escort fighter capable of 1500 mile range" as Number 4 - Arnold moved it to number 1.) as Spaatz and Eaker submitted reports recounting RAF difficulties in prosecuting Daylight bombing against both the Bf 110 and Bf 109, Arnold REMAINED the visionary - and the first to ask "what if the bomber can not survive, unescorted, over enemy held targets".

Note: Mustang contract for NA-73 in secret discussion with BPC in direct conflict with orders from AAC Material Command that same month.

The point of the 'blah, blah, blah' above - is that over the next several months, a.) the P-39 was believed to be inferior to the existing Bf 109 and Spitfire and the shock of the A6M had not occurred, b.) the P-38 was ordered by Brits w/o turbos and in testing which led to cancellation due to poor performance and c.) the P-40 arrived in Britain and France with questionable performance comparisons to Bf 109 and Spitfire.

As you stated, Curtiss and Bell greatly overstated performance and the follow-on development fighters were also disappointing. The Close Air Support acolytes still wedded to the notion that Army Aviation should continue to increase battlefield effectiveness were feeling greatly under-appreciated by Material Command and began to place great pressure on suitable high speed/high capability (plus bomb load/maneuverability and range (for Recon)

Both the P-39 and P-40 were small airframes, no easy growth potential for internal fuel or external loads, deemed ok as interim solutions, but neither the P-63 nor P-40Q offered anything near a complete check list of CAS requirements. All this pressure, combined with knowledge of anticipated Merlin 61 capability unfolding in fall/winter 1941 growing awareness outside Material Command of Mustang capability, desire by Arnold to find a role for the Mustang in early 1942 - killed the future of P-63 and P-40Q - before they could get traction. The interceptor role of the P-63 and possibly the P-40Q was a possibility IMO) but by that time RANGE was deemed priority 1 as an outcome of Arnold Conference in February 1942. 

Note that Arnold was Not aware that the P-38E had been modified to carry external ferry tanks of 165 and 330 gallons. At the time of the Fighter conference, however, he did know that the Mustang I had greater range and cruise speed with internal fuel than the P-38E with only internal fuel. It also had 1500 mi range capability with the auxiliary tank kits replacing wing guns/ammo belts.

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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

I think we are talking about two different things here, and this is kind of a big deal in aircraft development. 


Phase one is initial design and planning. Requirements issued by the government, companies come up with designs they think will match them.
Phase two is the actual building and testing of the first few prototypes
Phase three is the introduction to the field and first contact with the enemy. Many aircraft never got past this stage.

Phase four is initial series production, teething, subsequent redesigns and improvements - this is when a given aircraft either becomes viable or gets cancelled. The aircraft is in production and gets used but may not yet be ideally suited for any job.

Phase five is when - if the design is very successful - they start large-scale production and it gets into the field in significant numbers, and becomes one of the mainstays of the war.

I'm talking about phases three and four. You guys are talking about phases one and two.

The design theories are often way,_ way_ off, and have to be radically rethought after they contact the enemy.

For the P-38 phase four lasted a long time. Two years arguably. For the mustang it also lasted about a year (however long the Allison Engined ones were in use). Others had a shorter 

S


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## Milosh (Jul 4, 2018)

Some examples of Phase Three please.


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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

I have seen this many times on this forum, I believe it stems first from a picture of a P-51D and an evaluation of its range, speed and altitude performance and all round handling qualities. It seems rational to conclude that it was designed to do that from the outset, but the fact is it wasn't.

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## drgondog (Jul 4, 2018)

["Schweik,]I think we are talking about two different things here, and this is kind of a big deal in aircraft development.


Phase one is initial design and planning. Requirements issued by the government, companies come up with designs they think will match them.
Phase two is the actual building and testing of the first few prototypes
*Phase 2.1 is evaluation and recommendation to the manufacturer for mandatory and desirable improvements*
*Phase 2.5 is acknowledgment, discussion and Agreement to specific improvements*
*Phase 2.7 is release of Y version meeting agreement (not always followed - NA-73 and P-47 are specific examples where production was authorized before testing improvements.*
*Phase 2.8 is release of early production series to customer (ie BPC/RAF) to perform Operational Suitability Testing, which if accepted as is, leads to deployment to Training and operational units for training prior to combat *

Phase three is the introduction to the field and first contact with the enemy. Many aircraft never got past this stage.
*Phase 3.0 is recommendation for new mods, and/or decision that aircraft does not have a strong capability to accomplish projected role, but has value elsewhere (P-39, P-40 later models as P-38 and P-47 and P-51 are produced in numbers to gradually replace the operational aircraft and return the obsolete aircraft to lower threat environment (P-40K/N assigned to Air Training Command, P-39 also assigned to train units in States, P-63 deployed to ATC and Russia)*

Phase four is initial series production, teething, subsequent redesigns and improvements - this is when a given aircraft either becomes viable or gets cancelled. The aircraft is in production and gets used but may not yet be ideally suited for any job.
*Phase four as you presented is actually Phase 2.8 above*

Phase five is when - if the design is very successful - they start large-scale production and it gets into the field in significant numbers, and becomes one of the mainstays of the war.
*During WWII in US, your Phase five was eliminated before order placed for high quantity production - examples given include P-47B, P-51B which were contracted for production before first actual prototype flight. *
*In the above scenario, the P-40Q was not solicited by AAF - it was an investment, originally based on upgrading wing to low drag and introducing new Allison two stage supercharger to improve high altitude cability - but use an airframe for which tooling and processes (P-40K) existed and easily placed into production following acceptance testing and Agreement for serial production -*

I'm talking about phases three and four. You guys are talking about phases one and two.

*I'm talking about all except end of life cycle.*

The design theories are often way,_ way_ off, and have to be radically rethought after they contact the enemy.

*In many examples, the Specifiers were way off and the designers did a credible job of design/fab to spec. Where many designers failed in 1937-1942 was lack of awareness of drag rise at speeds above .5M and/or low drag airfoils which reduced high speed performance estimates to crap (specifically CW and Bell and even Douglas)*

For the P-38 phase four lasted a long time. Two years arguably. For the mustang it also lasted about a year (however long the Allison Engined ones were in use). Others had a shorter

*From Contract to 1st Operational combat sortie:
P-38 6-23-37 to 4-42
P-39 10-7-37 to 10-9-41
P-40 4-26-38 to 9-1940 (Russia)
P-47 9-6-1940 to 4-8-1943 (8th AF)
P-51 4-12-1940 to 5-10-1942 (RAF)
P-51B 8-25-1942 to 12-1-1943 (9th AF)*

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> I think we are talking about two different things here, and this is kind of a big deal in aircraft development.
> 
> 
> Phase one is initial design and planning. Requirements issued by the government, companies come up with designs they think will match them.
> ...



The P-38, because of many circumstances went from your phase 2 to phases 4&5 simultaneously!

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## drgondog (Jul 4, 2018)

pbehn said:


> I have seen this many times on this forum, I believe it stems first from a picture of a P-51D and an evaluation of its range, speed and altitude performance and all round handling qualities. It seems rational to conclude that it was designed to do that from the outset, but the fact is it wasn't.



The P-51B/D was the bastard stepchild of the P-51 Mustang airframe and the Packard Merlin 1650-3.

With the Allison it was a superb replacement to P-39 and P-40 in the low to middle altitude CAS, medium bomber escort role. With the Merlin it was all of those things from SL past 35,000 feet plus long range air superiority fighter.

Had the XP-51G entered serial production in Fall of 1944 it would have rivalled any piston engine interceptor and medium to long range escort fighter ever built. It would still have more range than P-38L/P-47D-25 on internal fuel alone but its combat radius would narrowly cover Berlin/Munich but not Iwo Jima/Tokyo.

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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

drgondog said:


> The P-51B/D was the bastard stepchild of the P-51 Mustang airframe and the Packard Merlin 1650-3.
> 
> With the Allison it was a superb replacement to P-39 and P-40 in the low to middle altitude CAS, medium bomber escort role. With the Merlin it was all of those things from SL past 35,000 feet plus long range air superiority fighter.
> 
> Had the XP-51G entered serial production in Fall of 1944 it would have rivalled any piston engine interceptor and medium to long range escort fighter ever built. It would still have more range than P-38L/P-47D-25 on internal fuel alone but its combat radius would narrowly cover Berlin/Munich but not Iwo Jima/Tokyo.


All very well dg but you must be wrong, I mean look at it, no way is that an accident of birth






Just joking, it is hard to believe though.

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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

Milosh said:


> Some examples of Phase Three please.



how about the first combat of the Bouton Paul Defiant

first combats of the F2A Buffalo in the Far East / CBI

first combats of the Bf 110 in Poland and France (successful!) and in the BoB (not successful and clearly needing redesign and / or a new role)

first combats of the P-38 

first combats of the Ki 43

One of the things that happened a lot in phase 3 was they realized they needed to add a raft of things like more and better armor and fuel system protection, better high altitude capability (if they could figure that out) plumbing for external fuel tanks, more and better guns, more and better ammunition, better or improved radios, and etc. Sometimes they decided that the plane in question needed better turning or rolling capability and so added features like combat flaps. Sometimes they had problems which took a long time to figure out like the compressability / dive problems of the P-38.

Sometimes they figured out (often the hard way) that they needed to strengthen wings or fuselage


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## drgondog (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> I
> ["Schweik,]I think we are talking about two different things here, and this is kind of a big deal in aircraft development.
> 
> 
> ...


So, Schweik - you disagreed with my insertions and/or comments above to this postulation of your five phases of Design through serial production? What did you disagree with?


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## GrauGeist (Jul 4, 2018)

There is also plenty of examples of aircraft that were designed and funded in house by an aircraft manufacturer with the hopes of landing a contract. Some were accepted outright, some were adapted/modified to meet a proposal and some fell short.

A few examples:
Lockheed's XP-58
Heinkel's He100
Curtiss' P-36 (Hawk 75)
Hawker's Typhoon
Seversky's SEV-3/P-35 (predecessor to the P-47)
Heinkel's He280
Focke-Wulf's Fw187

And so on...


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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

drgondog said:


> *Phase 2.7 is release of Y version meeting agreement (not always followed - NA-73 and P-47 are specific examples where production was authorized before testing improvements.*
> *Phase 2.8 is release of early production series to customer (ie BPC/RAF) to perform Operational Suitability Testing, which if accepted as is, leads to deployment to Training and operational units for training prior to combat *



This is a confused muddle of specific US and RAF processes all of which fall under 'phase two'



> *(P-40K/N assigned to Air Training Command, P-39 also assigned to train units in States, P-63 deployed to ATC and Russia) *


P-40K was one of the most successful P-40 variants and in wide / heavy combat use with the RAF, RAAF, Soviets, US 57th FG in the MTO, and 23rd, 51st, and 80th FG in the CBI. There were more aces flying the P-40K than P-38E or F for example.

P-63 was designed for the Russians with direct Russian involvement. It was changed after early combat experiences per their request.



> *Phase four as you presented is actually Phase 2.8 above *



Actually no, you completely missed the point - very often aircraft made it through all the testing and acceptance phases, got into combat and were found to be extremely unsuitable for the intended mission when faced with actual enemy aircraft. Example I cited above such as the Defiant, the F2A and Me 110 were either quickly phased out or given a new mission (Me 110 converted to night fighter) or like the Ki-43, they were 'sent back to the drawing board' with fairly significant changes made.
*



During WWII in US, your Phase five was eliminated before order placed for high quantity production - examples given include P-47B, P-51B which were contracted for production before first actual prototype flight.

Click to expand...

*
Yes and quite often production orders were immediately cancelled or drastically reduced as soon as the aircraft got into combat. For example the USAAF ordered 80 P-43s, but as soon as early models did poorly in Europe they cancelled the order and Seversky went back to the drawing board, ultimately leading to the P-47.

Perhaps a more salient example, the Luftwaffe put in an order for 1,000 Me 210 before they were even flown. But all the numerous problems led to a drastic reduction in that order and only 90 were made. Ultimately they kept modifying them until they came up with the Me 410 (a bit too late)
*



In many examples, the Specifiers were way off and the designers did a credible job of design/fab to spec. Where many designers

Click to expand...

*
Ultimately it was kind of irrelevant if the problems were with the specs or the actual design or both (usually it was both). Corporate and military bureaucracy rarely predicted or implemented the design for the the actual needs well, let alone perfectly.



> *P-40 4-26-38 to 9-1940 (Russia)
> P-47 9-6-1940 to 4-8-1943 (8th AF)
> P-51 4-12-1940 to 5-10-1942 (RAF)
> P-51B 8-25-1942 to 12-1-1943 (9th AF)*



P-40 flew in combat in 1940? That's news to me. I think it would be a neat trick considering the first ones arrived in Russia in August and September 1941 (from English and US sources respectively) according to this article

Allison P-51 continued to be 'modded' long after may 1942

P-47 had a particularly long teething as mentioned re: the P-43 above.

S


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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

drgondog said:


> So, Schweik - you disagreed with my insertions and/or comments above to this postulation of your five phases of Design through serial production? What did you disagree with?



I think you are talking much more about the official design and acceptance process, where I'm talking more about what happens after the design encounters reality and the scramble to change it sufficiently to survive combat (often requiring they find some other role for it).

Fairy Fulmar made it through design and acceptance trials and then faced combat, where they quickly realized it was more suitable for recon than actual fighting. I think it was basically the same for the P-51A (also used as a dive bomber).

Also, to me it makes no difference to me if it was a private venture by the company, a side deal for some foreign government, or part of a formal proposal by their own government. Thats all part of the design and acceptance phase to me.


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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

Regardless of the design the engine had to gain an average of 200BHP per year from 1940 to 45 ending at 2000+. Similar improvements had to be made in drag reduction, armament protection drag reduction etc. Some base designs could be modified some couldnt


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## Milosh (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> For example the USAAF ordered 80 P-43s, but as soon as early models did poorly in Europe they cancelled the order



The P-43 was sent to Europe?

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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

pbehn said:


> Regardless of the design the engine had to gain an average of 200BHP per year from 1940 to 45 ending at 2000+. Similar improvements had to be made in drag reduction, armament protection drag reduction etc. Some base designs could be modified some couldnt



Sure but if it was as simple as putting more horsepower in the Fairey Firefly and the Helldiver would have been great planes, and the Fairey Spearfish and the Douglas Skypirate would have been legends...

S


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## P-39 Expert (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Sure but if it was as simple as putting more horsepower in the Fairey Firefly and the Helldiver would have been great planes, and the Fairey Spearfish and the Douglas Skypirate would have been legends...
> 
> S


Enough horsepower and you will definitely become a legend.


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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

Milosh said:


> The P-43 was sent to Europe?



Sorry typo - should have said CBI


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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

Speaking of legendary amounts of horsepower, can somebody explain why they didn't use the F7F in WW2? 4200 hp is pretty sweet. nice looking design too unlike a lot of others late-war one-offs.











They had them in 1944 right? Climb rate is phenomenal. Celing 40,000 ft. Even wing loading is pretty good for a twin engined fighter.


Grumman F7F Tigercat - Wikipedia


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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Sure but if it was as simple as putting more horsepower in the Fairey Firefly and the Helldiver would have been great planes, and the Fairey Spearfish and the Douglas Skypirate would have been legends...
> 
> S


They wouldn't because the war was over when the Spearfish first flew, they certainly would if they were in service in 1941.


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## Schweik (Jul 4, 2018)

pbehn said:


> They wouldn't because the war was over when the Spearfish first flew, they certainly would if they were in service in 1941.



Ok I got to admit, I'm a little disappointed you didn't follow that. Well let me put it this way. Which aircraft do you think got more victories against Axis aircraft:

Fairey Firefly (1,730 hp)
Hawker Typhoon (2,180 hp)
Yak 3 (1,300 hp)

Also Spearfish first flight July 1945 end of war Sept 1945. I know that isn't long enough to get into combat but your literal statement was wrong breh.


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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Ok I got to admit, I'm a little disappointed you didn't follow that. Well let me put it this way. Which aircraft do you think got more victories against Axis aircraft:
> 
> Fairey Firefly (1,730 hp)
> Hawker Typhoon (2,180 hp)
> ...


Which had the most victories in 1939/40 Hurricane or P-51?


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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Speaking of legendary amounts of horsepower, can somebody explain why they didn't use the F7F in WW2? 4200 hp is pretty sweet. nice looking design too unlike a lot of others late-war one-offs.
> 
> View attachment 500544
> 
> ...


Read the link you provided.


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## GrauGeist (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Yes and quite often production orders were immediately cancelled or drastically reduced as soon as the aircraft got into combat. For example the USAAF ordered 80 P-43s, but as soon as early models did poorly in Europe they cancelled the order and Seversky went back to the drawing board, ultimately leading to the P-47.


It only performed poorly in the hands of Chinese pilots.
Pilots of the AVG wanted to retain their P-43s after newer types were becoming available.
The USAAC liked the performance of the P-43, but felt it was overall obsolete BUT ended up placing an order for the P-43 to keep Republic's assembly line going until the P-47 became available (which was under development and nearing acceptance). The aircraft purchased were intended to be trainers from the start.

Also, the P-43 was one of the few Allied types that could climb fast enough and high enough to intercept and dow the KI-46.

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## fubar57 (Jul 4, 2018)

The F7F design contained several flaws (including heavy weight and high landing speed) that prevented the Navy from accepting the plane for carrier use. I guess being a Navy aircraft they wanted to work out the bugs first. It went to Marine units instead but the war ended before it's use

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## Milosh (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Sorry typo - should have said CBI



That is a brain fart. A typo would be "P-40 4-26-38 to 9-194*0* (Russia)" where 1940 should be 1941.

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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> The F7F design contained several flaws (including heavy weight and high landing speed) that prevented the Navy from accepting the plane for carrier use. I guess being a Navy aircraft they wanted to work out the bugs first. It went to Marine units instead but the war ended before it's use


Didn't it need bigger carriers? Like the Midway class?


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## fubar57 (Jul 4, 2018)

Yessir


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## GrauGeist (Jul 4, 2018)

pbehn said:


> Didn't it need bigger carriers? Like the Midway class?


The F7F was trialled aboard the USS Shangri-La (CV-38), which was an Essex Class carrier.

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## fubar57 (Jul 4, 2018)

This was the entire quote..."Originally conceived as a carrier-based fighter for the new Midway class of aircraft carriers, the design contained several flaws (including heavy weight and high landing speed) that prevented the Navy from accepting the plane for carrier use. Instead, the plane was delivered to USMC units, but the F7F materialized too late to see any action in WWII".....

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## drgondog (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Speaking of legendary amounts of horsepower, can somebody explain why they didn't use the F7F in WW2? 4200 hp is pretty sweet. nice looking design too unlike a lot of others late-war one-offs.
> 
> View attachment 500544
> 
> ...


It did see service with USMC as a night fighter squadron - either Guam or Okinawa, I had a friend who flew them as well as F4U in night fighter role - Korea. He also commanded the first A4 nuc equipped squadron post Korea, Col Don Barrel Fenton RIP. Great friend and hunting buddy.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 4, 2018)

Schweik said:


> how about the first combat of the Bouton Paul Defiant
> 
> first combats of the F2A Buffalo in the Far East / CBI
> 
> ...


Nice theory.

Falls apart with a closer look at the aircraft listed.

The First combat of the Boulton Paul Defiant _came after _they had decided that armor and fuel system protection was needed by ANY first line combat aircraft( not just fighters), The Defiant _never_ got more and/or better guns or more/better ammo. It got a better engine but the Merlin XX wasn't even a gleam in Rolls-Royce's eye when the Defiant was designed and ordered into mass production. 

The F2A is a real howler, you do realize that out of 509 Buffaloes built only about 30 were built after Pearl Harbor and 20 of them were for the Netherlands East Indies? Basicly production during Dec 41-April 42 was cleaning out the factory spaces/completing contracts. 
Next to no changes were ever made to the Buffalo as a result of combat experience with early models. One Reason the Finns got the Buffaloes they did was that the US Navy decided they didn't want the F2A-1 after getting the first 11 or so and allowed Finland to take the rest of the Production run while the Navy replaced them with F2A-2s later in the production queue. The Navy also sent most of the original 11 F2A-1s back to the factory to converted to F2A-2s. This was well before any Finnish B-239 fired any guns in anger. 

The whole "later models were redesigned/modified as a result of combat experience" for the P-38 needs a rethink. You are not taking into account the lag time between when orders were placed and planes were delivered let alone saw combat. As of Oct 31st 1941 there were 1000 P-38s on order (including British?) while only 80 had been completed. 
The P-38G was first delivered in June of 1942 which is 4 months or less from the first operational use of the F-4 recon plane/s from Australia, the combat flap wa was being installed back in Feb of 1942. Please note that the *first combat claim *of the P-38 was for two Japanese flying boats on Aug 9th 1942. 6 months after combat flaps start being fitted to all new P-38s (the F model) . The First P-38Hs were built in March of 1943. They don't get into action for several more months

Many other aircraft show similar stories. A continual race to provide _improved_ models _before _ combat experiences could really be integrated into the designs. 
For the US especially waiting to react to enemy developments could mean months of combat against against a superior enemy. They were aiming for performance in excess of _what they thought the enemy could come up with in the future_.

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## pbehn (Jul 4, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> For the US especially waiting to react to enemy developments could mean months of combat against against a superior enemy. They were aiming for performance in excess of _what they thought the enemy could come up with in the future_.


Exactly what happened on the British side. The well known Spitfire numbers MkV and Mk IX were stop gap models rushed into production to meet an urgent need the planned development to meet anticipated enemy development actually had lower marque numbers for more advanced designs.


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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Nice theory.
> 
> Falls apart with a closer look at the aircraft listed.
> 
> The First combat of the Boulton Paul Defiant _came after _they had decided that armor and fuel system protection was needed by ANY first line combat aircraft( not just fighters), The Defiant _never_ got more and/or better guns or more/better ammo. It got a better engine but the Merlin XX wasn't even a



You completely missed my point. The Defiant was a bad design (or a bad spec or both). It got canceled as the result of miserable combat performance which highlighted the major flaws of the design (or the spec).



> The F2A is a real howler, you do realize that out of 509 Buffaloes built only about 30 were built after Pearl Harbor and 20 of them were for the



Again, missed the point, but your factual information is off as well. Most of the Buffaloes were used (unsuccessfully) by the British in the CBI. In your little summary you also seem to have forgotten about the USMC F2As used at Midway among other places.

But that is again, beside the point. What I was referring to (I thought it was obvious) was that combat experienced demonstrated that the F2A was unsuitable - whether in Rangoon, Singapore or Midway. But mainly RAF combat experience. I didn't mean literally every case meant the plane got more guns or etc.. That tended to be reserved for the most successful designs.

This is what I was saying earlier:
_
"very often aircraft made it through all the testing and acceptance phases, got into combat and were found to be extremely unsuitable for the intended mission when faced with actual enemy aircraft. Example I cited above such as *the Defiant, the F2A *and Me 110 were *either quickly phased out or given a new mission* (Me 110 converted to night fighter) or like the Ki-43, they were 'sent back to the drawing board' with fairly significant changes made."_



> Many other aircraft show similar stories. A continual race to provide _improved_ models _before _ combat experiences could really be integrated into the designs.
> For the US especially waiting to react to enemy developments could mean months of combat against against a superior enemy. They were aiming for performance in excess of _what they thought the enemy could come up with in the future_.



I don't agree with you. Not all changes were done in the factory for one thing.

More generally, the P-38s most serious teething problems (dive compressability, cockpit heating etc.) were continuously being complained about in the field - Lockheed tended to deny the problems and even sent Charles Lindburgh among others to smooth things over with pilots and teach them better combat techniques. But the fixes came later.

S


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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

drgondog said:


> It did see service with USMC as a night fighter squadron - either Guam or Okinawa, I had a friend who flew them as well as F4U in night fighter role - Korea. He also commanded the first A4 nuc equipped squadron post Korea, Col Don Barrel Fenton RIP. Great friend and hunting buddy.



Sounds like an interesting guy.

Seems like the F7F would have been better in the ETO than the P-38.

S

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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> It only performed poorly in the hands of Chinese pilots.
> Pilots of the AVG wanted to retain their P-43s after newer types were becoming available.
> The USAAC liked the performance of the P-43, but felt it was overall obsolete BUT ended up placing an order for the P-43 to keep Republic's assembly line going until the P-47 became available (which was under development and nearing acceptance). The aircraft purchased were intended to be trainers from the start.
> 
> Also, the P-43 was one of the few Allied types that could climb fast enough and high enough to intercept and dow the KI-46.



I have read a ton of AVG stuff and I don't think they actually liked it - from what I gather it didn't have self sealing tanks or armor for one thing.

S


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## GrauGeist (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> I have read a ton of AVG stuff and I don't think they actually liked it - from what I gather it didn't have self sealing tanks or armor for one thing.
> 
> S


Read more accounts from the AVG then, they most certainly did like it.
It was fast, it had a remarkable rate of climb and had one one of the highest operating ceilings of any Allied type at the time.
And after it was replaced by newer types, it remained in service as a high-speed photo recon ship.
Also of note: Col. Scott took a famous photo of Mount Everest from a P-43.

In regards to self-sealing tanks and armor, few pre-war American fighters possesed those features.


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## pbehn (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> You completely missed my point. The Defiant was a bad design (or a bad spec or both). It got canceled as the result of miserable combat performance which highlighted the major flaws of the design (or the spec).
> 
> 
> 
> ...


The Defiant and the Me110 were not used for the purpose they were designed for. The Defiant was supposed to intercept unescorted bombers, used in the presence of S/E fighters its performance is debatable one squadron did badly, one did quite well. The 110 was not intended to attack an integrated defence system, even at the end of the BoB the Germans were still unsure of what they were attacking. Without RADR the 110 would have been attacking the RAF on the ground or taking off as they had previously. Both sides were also presented with a new need, that of a dedicated night fighter.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> You completely missed my point. The Defiant was a bad design (or a bad spec or both). It got canceled as the result of miserable combat performance which highlighted the major flaws of the design (or the spec).



How about really reading about some of these aircraft. The Defiant was NOT canceled (unfortunately) after initial combat results. Production continued into 1942 although the roles had been changed. 





> Again, missed the point, but your factual information is off as well. Most of the Buffaloes were used (unsuccessfully) by the British in the CBI. In your little summary you also seem to have forgotten about the USMC F2As used at Midway among other places.
> 
> But that is again, beside the point. What I was referring to (I thought it was obvious) was *that combat experienced demonstrated that the F2A was unsuitable - whether in Rangoon, Singapore or Midway. But mainly RAF combat experience.* I didn't mean literally every case meant the plane got more guns or etc.. That tended to be reserved for the most successful designs.



How about rereading what I wrote? I was talking about production and modifications as per _your 5 step plan_. Production of the Buffalo, in whatever form, had essentially ended *before *any of that combat experience (by anybody) was gained. The existing planes were used, but nobody had any plans to build any more even before it saw action. Why did the Marines have the F2A? Because the Navy was dumping them as fast as possible. They didn't need combat experience to tell them the Buffalo was *not* up to the job.






> I don't agree with you. Not all changes were done in the factory for one thing.



If not done in the factory you have two basic avenues. Refit or repair centers (using factory supplied parts in most cases) or true field modifications which pretty much consist of ripping things out. You don't change engines or wing shapes or other major parts in the Field.



> More generally, the P-38s most serious teething problems (dive compressability, cockpit heating etc.) were continuously being complained about in the field - Lockheed tended to deny the problems and even sent Charles Lindburgh among others to smooth things over with pilots and teach them better combat techniques. But the fixes came later.



Do you have any proof that Lockheed was denying the problems?
BTW long range flying techniques might be a bit different than actual "combat" techniques.
Lockheed could only do so much. For instance it did take way to long to get a second generator in the P-38 ( many twin engine planes in a number of air forces only got one generator for far too long). However Lockheed could NOT buy and install the 2nd the generator on their own unless the USAAF not only approved but authorised the change. The generators had to come from somewhere (allocated for generator production) The engines were supplied to Lockheed by the government, as were the props, the guns and some of the other equipement. Lockheed had to build what the contract/s called for. They could not introduce changes on their own, contracts could be changed (and were) but it took both sides to agree.
BTW, it is well known that the USAAF was ignoring both Lockheed and Allison recommendations when it came to cruising the P-38. Somehow that tends to get glossed over. Blaming Lockheed for the USAAF ignoring their recommendations is twisting things.

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## Milosh (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Sure but if it was as simple as putting more horsepower in the Fairey Firefly and the Helldiver would have been great planes, and the Fairey Spearfish and the Douglas Skypirate would have been legends...
> 
> S



The Helldiver after some bugs were worked out served until the 1950s by the Americans. And yes fitting a more powerful engine was one of the bugs worked out. The last service use was by the Italians in 1959, not bad for a so called dud airplane.

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## fubar57 (Jul 5, 2018)

Lindberg was sent to teach long distance fuel conservation, trying to stretch out the mileage, not combat.


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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> Lindberg was sent to teach long distance fuel conservation, trying to stretch out the mileage, not combat.



Well he flew 50 sorties and shot down a Ki 51 bomber so presumably he was getting into more than fuel efficiency


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## pbehn (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Well he flew 50 sorties and shot down a Ki 51 bomber so presumably he was getting into more than fuel efficiency


As I saw it on TV he had to fly the aircraft on a lot of sorties because what he was proposing was considered to be dangerous extreme lean mixtures on cruise.


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## fubar57 (Jul 5, 2018)

....and losing his wingman and squadron during the shootdown. From his war journal


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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

pbehn said:


> The Defiant and the Me110 were not used for the purpose they were designed for. The Defiant was supposed to intercept unescorted bombers, used in the presence of S/E fighters its performance is debatable one squadron did badly, one did quite well. The 110 was not intended to attack an integrated defence system, even at the end of the BoB the Germans were still unsure of what they were attacking. Without RADR the 110 would have been attacking the RAF on the ground or taking off as they had previously. Both sides were also presented with a new need, that of a dedicated night fighter.


 
From the Wiki:

Boulton Paul Defiant - Wikipedia

_The squadron lost a further five aircraft (to JG 26) on 28 August _[1940]_, with nine crew killed, and effectively ended operations, withdrawing to RAF Duxford the following day.[27] With these losses, the Defiant—which had been intended from the start as a day and night fighter—was transferred to night operations instead. The type had proven unsuited to the demands of the day fighter when set against the likes of the Bf 109E, and was less capable than other RAF aircraft such as the Hurricane and the Spitfire.[27] By 31 August, over half the delivered Defiants had been shot down by Luftwaffe aircraft, a rate that was deemed to be unacceptable.[27]_

Defiants had some luck initially especially when Bf 109 pilots still thought they were Hurricanes and came up slowly from behind, but once the Luftwaffe realized Defiants couldn't defend themselves from a frontal attack it became a lot easier to get them.

After that production did continue yes, for a little while as a night fighter and then... as a target tug. I gather it performed 'sterling service' as a target tug but that was a derailment of the original plan. Which was my point:

"Stage 3" was the point at which an aircraft was typically deemed either acceptable or unsuitable for the job it was intended for (as a day fighter- whether the enemy would escort their bombers was up to the enemy). Saying that the Defiant or any other aircraft lived up to it's spec-expectation is a bit off to me, because part of what a fighter had to be was versatile. The Defiant had a major flaw in that the turret couldn't fire forward - secondary to the more fundamental design fail of building a plane around a (admittedly very nice) powered gun turret. Pre-war planners couldn't predict how fast planes would need to fly - with the drag and weight of the turret and second crewman, it would never be able to catch front line fighters (or even many bombers - I think a Defiant would be challenged catching a 'clean' Ju 88). But that was often the case, and it's part of my point: pre-war planning or even mid-war, pre-deployment planning simply could not predict everything beforehand. Combat trials were crucial. If it was a really good (and / or lucky) design, only minor changes would be required (typically more -or less- guns, more armor or self sealing tanks, more fuel / hardpoints and so on). But in many cases the plane effectively got derailed by it's combat debut and was either cancelled or shunted into some other role.

Similarly to the Defiant, Bf 110 were intended as a Zerstorer or heavy fighter, but for the most part had to be used as a night fighter and later as a specialized heavy-bomber destroyer or weapons platform, that required it's own escort to survive. They did make improvements to the plane, aside from adding radar and more guns for night fighter versions they also put more powerful engines in it, but it wasn't enough to ever really make it viable as a day fighter. Of course this does also vary by Theater - Bf 110 lasted a bit longer in the 'heavy fighter' role in Russia where the opponent was more in disarray and seldom had even local air superiority until early 1943.

Ki-43 was initially deemed insufficiently maneuverable by IJA pilots, leading to the addition of combat flaps. Combat experience showed a tendancy to shed wings in a steep dive which was also addressed by structural strengthening. More powerful engine Some armor and self-sealing tanks were added later (a bit too much later)

As for the F2A, the US Navy cancelled their contract in 1941, shifting over to the F4F, but the British liked it and ordered another 170 of them, which they were still producing through the fall of 1941 - if they had done well in Singapore, Malaya and Burma, the British Purchasing Commisision would probably have ordered more. Seems like the main issue was really some kind of failure with the engine to perform properly at high altitude (overheating and oxygen starvation) which was never addressed, Brewster in fact "repurposing" some old DC 3 engines because they couldn't get enough ought of Wright.

Engine production was often the Achilles heel of new aircraft designs and it was extremely common for an engine which was anticipated in the design stage of the cycle to either not be available or to be flawed / underperforming when it came time to build a prototype or early production run, requiring a last minute switch to another engine (if that was even possible). This was quite often the reason for an aircraft to fail in what I called Stage 2 or 3.

S


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## fubar57 (Jul 5, 2018)

The Defiant was planned to fire forward, the pilotsu control column had a firing button. The guns had to be fired above, I believe, 15 degrees above the center of the aircraft to avoid destroying the propeller as they weren't synchronized. Why it wasn't incorporated I can't remember

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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> The Defiant was planned to fire forward, the pilotsu control column had a firing button. The guns had to be fired above, I believe, 15 degrees above the center of the aircraft to avoid destroying the propeller as they weren't synchronized. Why it wasn't incorporated I can't remember



Seems like it would be tricky to synchronize guns that could move around. Even locked forward before shooting, you would have to link sychronization equipment to a turret that moved 360 degrees. Significant engineering challenge there I would think.

Some of the battles I read about were interesting, in which Defiants in a defensive circle were able to concentrate fire from multiple planes on attacking Bf 109s- something conventional fighters certainly could not do. And they seem to have been good at attacking bombers by flying alongside and outgunning relatively weak side facing defensive guns.

The turret fighter was an interesting and "tempting" idea I would say, but in practice one with perhaps too many insurmountable technical challenges.


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## GregP (Jul 5, 2018)

One solution would have been easy ... fixed forward armament. Put two wing MG and reduce to two rear cannons of larger bore. However, a better solution would have been to stop making it or change it into a single seat fighter. It would have resembled a metal Hurricane, but likely would have been faster (what wasn't?).


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## GrauGeist (Jul 5, 2018)

GregP said:


> One solution would have been easy ... fixed forward armament. Put two wing MG and reduce to two rear cannons of larger bore. However, a better solution would have been to stop making it or change it into a single seat fighter. It would have resembled a metal Hurricane, but likely would have been faster (what wasn't?).


They tested a turretless Defiant and it was no better in performance than the Hurricane, so it wasn't developed past the testing stage.


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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

GregP said:


> One solution would have been easy ... fixed forward armament. Put two wing MG and reduce to two rear cannons of larger bore. However, a better solution would have been to stop making it or change it into a single seat fighter. It would have resembled a metal Hurricane, but likely would have been faster (what wasn't?).



According to the wiki they did try that - and it was faster - I think it said 360 mph. But not so maneuverable (in what way they didn't specify)

Presumably not better than a Spit though so they didn't bother.

I do kind of like the idea of the turret fighter for the extra capabilities it lends. You see something a bit like it with the remote control turrets on late war planes like me 410 and various bombers.







More efficient setup and much less draggy, though still extra weight with gunner on board.


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## GregP (Jul 5, 2018)

Since the better solution wasn't better, the best solution was to stop making it. I knew they did the non-turret version, but I never saw the report of the conclusions as to why it was not proceeded with. I assumed the Hurricane was already in production and that was the main reason.


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## Milosh (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> As for the F2A, the US Navy cancelled their contract in 1941, shifting over to the F4F, but the British liked it and ordered another 170 of them



The Brits were hard up for any a/c and went for any a/c they could get their hands on.

At the time of the Defiant's design, fighters didn't escort bomber as they didn't have the range. With the fall of France that changed and the Defiant had to be used in a way it wasn't designed for.

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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

Milosh said:


> The Brits were hard up for any a/c and went for any a/c they could get their hands on.



Well, they didn't want P-39s. Or P-38s as I recall...



> At the time of the Defiant's design, fighters didn't escort bomber as they didn't have the range. With the fall of France that changed and the Defiant had to be used in a way it wasn't designed for.



Even for it's intended job, I don't think the Defiant would have cut the mustard, as a lot of Axis bombers were too fast and / or high flying.

As for the 'bombers always get through' etc.... the divergence between what planners and designers _thought_ the war environment would be like and what it actually _was_ is what 'phase 3' was about. The best designs often proved to be the most adaptable. A fighter with a turret that can't shoot forward is very specialized.


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## Milosh (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Well, they didn't want P-39s. Or P-38s as I recall...



Because they weren't up to doing the job in Europe!

As for the bombers, stop reading specs for bombless bombers. Besides to keep formation bombers travel at a lower than max speed and range decreased with speed.


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## Milosh (Jul 5, 2018)

The Germans did quite well with upward and forward weapons.


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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

Milosh said:


> Because they weren't up to doing the job in Europe!



Neither was the F2A, at least not on the Allied side.



> As for the bombers, stop reading specs for bombless bombers. Besides to keep formation bombers travel at a lower than max speed and range decreased with speed.



I read mostly pilot reports and squadron records, and in the Med Hurricane pilots for example reported having trouble catching Ju 88s on numerous occasions due to their speed. Italian pilots flying MC 200 and G.50 sometimes had similar problems with A-20s.

S


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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

Milosh said:


> The Germans did quite well with upward and forward weapons.



_Schräge_ _Musik _was typically fixed not turret


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## Milosh (Jul 5, 2018)

And the Defiant's turret could be locked forward.

The German NFs had to be under the e/a to hit their target while the Defiant could stand off to the side.

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## Milosh (Jul 5, 2018)

The Brewster Mark I produced four Commonwealth aces: Geoff Fisken, Maurice Holder, A. W. B. (Alf) Clare and R. D. (Doug) Vanderfield


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## Dan Fahey (Jul 5, 2018)

*Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline. 
By Louis R. Eltscher and Edward M. Young. New York: Simon and Schuster, Twayne Publishers, 1998. Pp. xiii+213; 
illustrations, figures, appendices, notes/references, index. $33.*

Formed in 1929, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation was a leading American manufacturer of aircraft, engines, and propellers on the eve of World War II. The corporation’s contribution to the war effort was unparalleled in terms of quantity production. Despite that success, Curtiss-Wright was effectively out of the aerospace business by the 1960 and remains today a small-scale subcontractor to various industrial concerns. Louis R. Eltscher and Edward M. Young document this transition through an analysis of its corporate management in _Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline_. The authors assert that Curtiss-Wright’s failure to maintain a balance between manufacturing, marketing, and management (a paradigm introduced by business historian Alfred D. Chandler) was at the root of the corporation’s *[End Page 147]* troubles. As part of Twayne’s Evolution of Modern Business Series, _Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline_ focuses on the interrelationship between technology and business within the tumultuous American aviation industry and tells the story of the path that one corporation took.

The Curtiss-Wright Corporation resulted from the merger of companies originally founded by the greatest names in early American aviation: Glenn Curtiss and Wilbur and Orville Wright. The Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation, the largest American airplane manufacturer during World War I, produced highly innovative military and racing aircraft during the 1920s. The Wright Aeronautical Corporation led in the development of one of the new aeronautical technologies of the 1920s: the radial, air-cooled engine. According to Eltscher and Young, the merger of the two corporations in August 1929 resulted from the “larger vision” of Clement M. Keys, the new president of Curtiss-Wright (p. 51). Keys wanted to build the infrastructure of American aviation—aircraft, engines, transportation networks, airports, and flight schools—and control it through the large aviation holding company. He emphasized research and technological innovation, military contracts, and exports to sustain a competitive advantage within an industry plagued by economic downturns, sparse government support, and fluctuating markets. Unfortunately, the harsh effects of the Great Depression countered most of Keys and Curtiss-Wright’s efforts during the 1930s.

The authors contend that World War II was the turning point in the history of Curtiss-Wright. The only American manufacturer capable of immediately meeting the demands of the Allied aviation programs of 1938–43, the corporation concentrated on the quantity production of aircraft that were soon obsolete in light of the rapid pace of technological change. Instead of cross-licensing designs and subcontracting other producers for component parts, the corporation overextended its managerial and engineering resources to expand its own production facilities. Consequently, when Curtiss-Wright attempted to introduce new designs, such as the C-46 transport or the R-3350 radial engine, there were significant developmental problems. Curtiss-Wright’s promise of untested technologies in large quantities and the failure to deliver them resulted in a considerable loss of prestige and the scrutiny of congressional investigators.

Curtiss-Wright emerged from World War II in a sound economic state, but its leaders were unsure of the direction the corporation should take. The new jet-engine technology was quickly supplanting the internal combustion reciprocating engines Curtiss-Wright had been producing during the war. An internal battle erupted between weak and indecisive managers who favored the use of profits to expand engine research and development versus aggressive stockholders who wanted a dividend. The victory of the stockholders effectively put Curtiss-Wright on the path to decline. Eltscher and Young posit that a cultural transition took place within the corporate *[End Page 148]* management of Curtiss-Wright. Those who had a distinct “obsession with profits” and no background or apparent interest in aviation replaced those who had matured with the corporation and the aviation industry (p. 146). Failing to find a suitable product for the aerospace market after 1960, Curtiss-Wright became a subcontractor of aircraft subassemblies and component parts for its former competitors.

Despite its brevity, historians of technology will find _Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline..._

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## GrauGeist (Jul 5, 2018)

Milosh said:


> And the Defiant's turret could be locked forward.
> 
> The German NFs had to be under the e/a to hit their target while the Defiant could stand off to the side.


Both the IJA and IJN had successful interceptors set up with Schrage Musik, too.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 5, 2018)

Dan Fahey said:


> Those who had a distinct “obsession with profits” and no background or apparent interest in aviation replaced those who had matured with the corporation and the aviation industry_._



I saw that at Lockheed during my last years there, sad but true!

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## pbehn (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Well, they didn't want P-39s. Or P-38s as I recall...
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Neither P-38 or 39 performed as advertised, they were not ready for service. The F4F although initially not with folding wings did have reasonable performance. With the fall of France the design use of the Defiant disappeared and in any case a nightfighter was needed, the Defiant wasn't a particularly good night fighter, just better than anything else at the time. The concept of overweight slow turret fighter wasn't abandoned, the P-61 took it to another level.

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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

pbehn said:


> Neither P-38 or 39 performed as advertised, they were not ready for service. The F4F although initially not with folding wings did have reasonable performance.



Yeah but... we were talking about the (essentially failed) F2A not the (successful) F4F. And the F2A actually had most of the same problems that the P-38 and P-39 did.



> With the fall of France the design use of the Defiant disappeared and in any case a nightfighter was needed, the Defiant wasn't a particularly good night fighter, just better than anything else at the time. The concept of overweight slow turret fighter wasn't abandoned, the P-61 took it to another level.



I don't think it's realistic or even plausible to put the P-61 in the same category as the Defiant. P-61 was faster than almost all enemy bombers (other than jets), had far greater range, had on-board radar, and had it's own forward firing guns. It was more of a 'limited success' as distinct from the 'dismal failure' of the Defiant.

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## pbehn (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Yeah but... we were talking about the (essentially failed) F2A not the (successful) F4F. And the F2A actually had most of the same problems that the P-38 and P-39 did.
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think it's realistic or even plausible to put the P-61 in the same category as the Defiant. P-61 was faster than almost all enemy bombers (other than jets), had far greater range, had on-board radar, and had it's own forward firing guns. It was more of a 'limited success' as distinct from the 'dismal failure' of the Defiant.


We were talking about what planes the British would take and what they wouldn't. Limited success and dismal failure are questions of semantics.


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## Milosh (Jul 5, 2018)

On 24 August, nine Defiants of 264 scrambled from Manston to engage an incoming German force; in the ensuing engagement, three Ju 88s and a single Bf 109E were shot down for the loss of two Defiants. Later that same day, another cluster of bombers appeared and were engaged by seven Defiants that had been in the process of refuelling; three Ju 88s and two Bf 109Es were downed.

On 26 August 264 Squadron engaged a formation of 12 Dornier Do 17 bombers over north-eastern Kent but was attacked by a large formation of Bf 109s.[29] Three aircraft were lost (two to ace Hpt. Gunther Lutzow of JG 3) but six Do 17s and a Bf 109 were shot down.

Not bad for such a dud a/c.

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## Milosh (Jul 5, 2018)

The Defiant got radar and was also used for electronic countermeasures.


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## GregP (Jul 5, 2018)

The British didn't GET P-39s. They got P-400s. It was not what they expected, but WAS what they ordered. Bell made a prototype P-400 that had 30 coats of primer with extensive sanding between them, more rigid gear door linkages, putty-filled junctions with the canopy, and a host of other changes other than the British-specified armament. When it was done, the P-400 prototype made 391 mp at 14,400 feet. The British ordered it. None of these changes were made to production P-400s, and they had a top speed of some 359 mph when tested. Bell should have been severely slapped for not supplying production airplanes that matched the performance of the P-400 prototype. I'd say they engaged in a bit of profiteering.

The British didn't GET P-38s. They got the Model 322B, which was basically a P-38E without turbochargers and with both engines being right-handed for commonality with the P-40 engines. That stepchild was not very good, and wound up as US fighter-trainers after being converted back to left and right-handed engines (still without turbochargers). If they wanted US fighter planes, it baffles me why they didn't just order them instead of ordering them with unproven changes. 

Bell was at fault for the P-400s, but the British were at fault for the model 322B P-38s. Methinks things could have been a bit more above-board between allies than was the case in real life. When Lockheed tested the Model 322B, they should have raised the flag to the British. Maybe they did.


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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

Milosh said:


> The Defiant got radar and was also used for electronic countermeasures.



And Target Towing! It was a grrrreat Target Tug!

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## Schweik (Jul 5, 2018)

Milosh said:


> On 24 August, nine Defiants of 264 scrambled from Manston to engage an incoming German force; in the ensuing engagement, three Ju 88s and a single Bf 109E were shot down for the loss of two Defiants. Later that same day, another cluster of bombers appeared and were engaged by seven Defiants that had been in the process of refuelling; three Ju 88s and two Bf 109Es were downed.
> 
> On 26 August 264 Squadron engaged a formation of 12 Dornier Do 17 bombers over north-eastern Kent but was attacked by a large formation of Bf 109s.[29] Three aircraft were lost (two to ace Hpt. Gunther Lutzow of JG 3) but six Do 17s and a Bf 109 were shot down.
> 
> Not bad for such a dud a/c.



I could be wrong but:

1) I think those are claims, not actual victories (usually about 1/3 of claims are real, on average though it varied widely)
2) Defiants got some victories early on when LW pilots confused them for Hurricanes, but once they recognized the type and figured out how to safely attack from the front or below, loss rates took off and quickly reached 50%, as noted in the excerpt I posted from the same wiki you are posting from. The best strategy Defiant pilots came up with after that was a descending defensive circle that moved down to Sea Level. Not really conducive to intercepting & shooting down enemy bombers, or protecting friendly ones.

My criteria for "dismal failure" for a fighter incidentally would be it couldn't survive in the combat environment without help, let alone catch and destroy enemy aircraft.

S


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2018)

Schweik said:


> As for the F2A, the US Navy cancelled their contract in 1941, shifting over to the F4F, but the British liked it and ordered another 170 of them, which they were still producing through the fall of 1941 - if they had done well in Singapore, Malaya and Burma, the British Purchasing Commisision would probably have ordered more. Seems like the main issue was really some kind of failure with the engine to perform properly at high altitude (overheating and oxygen starvation) which was never addressed, Brewster in fact "repurposing" some old DC 3 engines because they couldn't get enough ought of Wright.
> 
> Engine production was often the Achilles heel of new aircraft designs and it was extremely common for an engine which was anticipated in the design stage of the cycle to either not be available or to be flawed / underperforming when it came time to build a prototype or early production run, requiring a last minute switch to another engine (if that was even possible). This was quite often the reason for an aircraft to fail in what I called Stage 2 or 3.
> 
> S




You have a rather warped timeline on the Buffalo. The British ordered 120 Buffaloes in Jan 1940(initial talks had started in AUg 1939) , later increased to 170, not 2nd order for 170 planes. 
Britain winds up with few more because of the Belgian order for 40 aircraft which had been placed in Dec. 1939 Only one had reached Belgium by the time Belgium fell so France took over the rest of the order. With the fall of France England took over the remainder. (some got sidetracked to French possessions) 

Please note that the British did not order the P-39/P-400 until April of 1940. Because the Buffalo was actually in production (even if small quantities) Britain was actually take delivery (in England) of some of their Buffaloes in July of 1940. The First Aircobra Is don't show up in England for another year ( July 1941).

Brewster's production capability is small and the British order was interrupted in order for Brewster to build 43 F2A-2s for the US Navy, this takes from Sept 1940 through Dec 1940 (one finished in Jan) whereupon Brewster goes back to building the rest of the British order. (and Dutch East Indies) 
Jan 1941 sees the US order 108 F2A-3s as Grumman is not building F4Fs fast enough. It will take until July for the first one to be delivered. 
The last British 339Es is completed in May of 1941.
The Dutch got 72 Buffaloes on the initial order and an additional 40 in the 2nd order 

The British would have needed divine intervention to order more Buffaloes in late winter/early spring of 1942 as the lines were being closed down. Nov 1 1941 had seen Brewster designated as an associated contractor for the F4U Corsair. Granted they made a hash of it but the idea that the British could have ordered (and received) Buffaloes in preference to the US getting (or thinking they were getting) Corsairs requires more than rose tinted glasses. 

The British (and Dutch?) got ex DC-3 engines in part due to lack of capacity at Wright to build new engines and in part because The US had not cleared the latest R-1820 for export. The British and Dutch aircraft got the R-1820-100 series engines and the F2A-2 and -3 got R-1820-200 series engines. The -200 had roughly 100 more HP at most altitudes (or more) due to a number of modifications (including a new Crankcase and larger bearings) which allowed it to turn an extra 200rpm. 

Things were changing pretty quick in 1940/41 and plane seen as useful in the Spring of 1940 would be regarded as a deathtrap in the Fall/Winter of 1940 let alone 1941. Unfortunately the British tended to shuffle off many these aircraft to the Middle or Far East assuming (mistakenly) that the potential enemies didn't have anything better. 

For the British (and French) P-38s, they were originally specified with the same engines as the long nosed P-40/Tomahawks so they could all use the same spare engines/parts, despite Lockheed's warnings/predictions of reduced performance. Later British orders were to use turbos and handed engines. 

The P-36 may be an example of your stage 2-3. The P & W R-1830 being the 4th engine to be tried in the airframe followed by the Turbo Allison in the P-37 series (XP-37 was actually the original Hawk 75 airframe) . The non-turbo Allison in the XP-40 (10th P-36 off the production line). The XP-42 was a P-36 with an extension shaft and long cowling on the modified R-1830 and P & W used a P-40 as a test hack for a two stage R-1830 so the basic P-36/40 airframe went through at least eight engines (or more depending on how you count R-1820s ) _before_ the P-40Q.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 6, 2018)

The F2A was an early 30's design that went into production in the mid 30's with a mission profile that was outdated.

And the F2A-3 was heavier because of self-sealing tanks and armor installed (about 500 pounds all told), causing a performance penalty opposed to the F2A-2.

AND, the F2A in Allied hands in the PTO were piloted by inexperienced pilots against veteran IJA/IJN pilots.

The F2A in the hands of the determined Finns, fighting against the Soviets at low to medium altitudes (which was the prime operating conditions for the F2A) shows exactly what the F2A was capable of.


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## Kevin J (Jul 6, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Yeah but... we were talking about the (essentially failed) F2A not the (successful) F4F. And the F2A actually had most of the same problems that the P-38 and P-39 did.
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think it's realistic or even plausible to put the P-61 in the same category as the Defiant. P-61 was faster than almost all enemy bombers (other than jets), had far greater range, had on-board radar, and had it's own forward firing guns. It was more of a 'limited success' as distinct from the 'dismal failure' of the Defiant.


The Defiant was the RAF's most successful night fighter during the Blitz of 1940/41, the Hurricane was the most numerous night fighter and the Beaufighter, available only in small numbers, clearly the best. The Defiant II of 1941 was armed with radar and the Defiant I retro fitted with it. As a night fighter, the Defiant, with guns that could be fired upwards, was a success and led to proposals (tests?) with turret armed Beaufighters, so I think it would be fair to say that the Defiant pioneered the concept of the turret armed night fighter.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 6, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> The F2A was an early 30's design that went into production in the mid 30's with a mission profile that was outdated.
> 
> And the F2A-3 was heavier because of self-sealing tanks and armor installed (about 500 pounds all told), causing a performance penalty opposed to the F2A-2.
> 
> ...



Lets remember that the US Navy was not stupid. The F2A-2 and F2A-3 had engines that were 20% more powerful for take-off than the F2A-1 and B239 and up to 33% more powerful at altitude (British and Dutch Buffaloes were somewhere in between). They were also geared engines with larger props which, in theory, should have meant better propulsive efficiency. 

The F2A-3 was about 300-350lbs heavier than the F2A-2 if both were carrying equivalent loads. (same amount of fuel and ammo).

However in the summer of 1941 when the F2A-3 went into production Curtiss was winding down the long Nosed P-40 and starting production of the P-40D/E. P-39 production went over 100 planes per month in Aug 1941 and Lockheed was doing double digits (barely) of the P-38. It didn't take a crystal ball to see that the F2A series was a dead end as a land based fighter and not a good carrier fighter for future use.

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## pbehn (Jul 6, 2018)

Schweik said:


> My criteria for "dismal failure" for a fighter incidentally would be it couldn't survive in the combat environment without help, let alone catch and destroy enemy aircraft.
> 
> S


But the Defiant wasn't a fighter, it was an interceptor, designed to intercept unescorted bombers. My idea of dismal failure would be an aircraft that took four years to develop, cost more than the planes it struggled to shoot down and which was requested by Spaatz to be replaced by a piece of wood made in another country.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 6, 2018)

A true example of a "dismal failure", would be the Curtiss SO3C "Seamew".
It was intended to replace the Curtiss SOC "Seagull" but it was so bad, that it was withdrawn from service after a short time and the SOC was brought back into service to replace it's replacement.

The definition of dismal failure couldn't be any clearer than this.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 7, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> The Defiant was the RAF's most successful night fighter during the Blitz of 1940/41, the Hurricane was the most numerous night fighter and the Beaufighter, available only in small numbers, clearly the best. The Defiant II of 1941 was armed with radar and the Defiant I retro fitted with it. As a night fighter, the Defiant, with guns that could be fired upwards, was a success and led to proposals (tests?) with turret armed Beaufighters, so I think it would be fair to say that the Defiant pioneered the concept of the turret armed night fighter.



We have to be very, very, very careful with numbers/statistics from the night Blitz of 1940/41. Up until Feb of 1941 the numbers of German planes shot down was so small (sometimes over a month went by without a claim by the "night fighters" that changing the numbers by one or two can significantly swing things and changing the end date can really skew things. The Defiant never got radar before the bulk of the German bombers flew off to attack Russia so they were doing visual intercepts only as were the Hurricanes. Only the Blenheim and Beaufighters had radar up until that time (April/May of 1941). 
I am not saying the bombing stopped, just that the number of German bombers was much reduced and that the British night fighters were claiming many more victories in the spring of 1941 than they did in the fall and winter of 1940/41. 
Defiants may have only claimed 3-4 victories from Sept to the beginning of Feb for example. Which was more than the other types but obviously more an example of luck than combat prowess or capability. 

Actual shoot downs could be different. British night fighter claims went up dramatically in April/May of 1941 which is still before radar went into Defiants. 
Shorter nights or radar in the twin engine planes was finally beginning to work? 96 claims made in the first two weeks of May, mostly by Beaufighters. 

It would be very interesting to see the actual number of claims for the Defiants (and other night fighters) on a month by month basis rather than statements like it was the most successful.
One book claims that the British night fighters (all types) shot down 8 German bombers in the first 2 months of the night Blitz out of 12,000 German sorties. The next 3 months were even worse.

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## P-39 Expert (Jul 7, 2018)

GregP said:


> The British didn't GET P-39s. They got P-400s. It was not what they expected, but WAS what they ordered. Bell made a prototype P-400 that had 30 coats of primer with extensive sanding between them, more rigid gear door linkages, putty-filled junctions with the canopy, and a host of other changes other than the British-specified armament. When it was done, the P-400 prototype made 391 mp at 14,400 feet. The British ordered it. None of these changes were made to production P-400s, and they had a top speed of some 359 mph when tested. Bell should have been severely slapped for not supplying production airplanes that matched the performance of the P-400 prototype. I'd say they engaged in a bit of profiteering.
> 
> The British didn't GET P-38s. They got the Model 322B, which was basically a P-38E without turbochargers and with both engines being right-handed for commonality with the P-40 engines. That stepchild was not very good, and wound up as US fighter-trainers after being converted back to left and right-handed engines (still without turbochargers). If they wanted US fighter planes, it baffles me why they didn't just order them instead of ordering them with unproven changes.
> 
> Bell was at fault for the P-400s, but the British were at fault for the model 322B P-38s. Methinks things could have been a bit more above-board between allies than was the case in real life. When Lockheed tested the Model 322B, they should have raised the flag to the British. Maybe they did.


I really don't believe that Bell tried to decieve the British with the P-400. 

The contract was signed in April '40 at a weight of 6000#. There were five subsequent weight increases (to 7850#) under a couple of contract revisions, the last of which was in June '41 which increased the number of planes to 675.

This final revision in June was after the P-400 tests in April that showed 371mph at 14,090' for a normally equipped production plane. 
Bell did produce the one 391mph modified P-400 #AH571 that had the minor modifications and highly polished surface but that one plane was clearly identified as not a production model. Tested in April the modifications were not put into the final contract revision in June.

In my opinion Bell built exactly what the British specified in the contract. A 7850# plane when contemporary SpitfireV weighed 6600#.

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## fubar57 (Jul 7, 2018)

I've been learning so much about the *P-38 *in the last few pages

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## pbehn (Jul 7, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> In my opinion Bell built exactly what the British specified in the contract. A 7850# plane when contemporary SpitfireV weighed 6600#.


That would be a great topic for a thread.


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## GregP (Jul 7, 2018)

The quality of the P-400s was VERY poor, with MANY things not functioning or poorly installed. That from multiple British sources and from some U.S. pilots who were not flying them but were there when they were delivered and being put to use.

I think Bell tried their best to screw the British, and I seriously doubt it was Larry Bell. It was likely upper management other than Larry Bell, who was not a bad sort when it came to quality in his products.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 7, 2018)

GregP said:


> The quality of the P-400s was VERY poor, with MANY things not functioning or poorly installed. That from multiple British sources and from some U.S. pilots who were not flying them but were there when they were delivered and being put to use.
> 
> I think Bell tried their best to screw the British, and I seriously doubt it was Larry Bell. It was likely upper management other than Larry Bell, who was not a bad sort when it came to quality in his products.


This is interesting and if you have any additional information, please post. I believe the basic structural airframes came down the same production lines as US models (our P-39 Expert could probably confirm that). Of course there was different equipment installed so was it the equipment that didn't work or the "different equipment" was poorly installed? If the factory installed equipment that didn't function as "designed" this is not a quality function. 

Lastly I think some of the foreign customer equipment was installed at mod centers, but again I could be wrong.


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## GregP (Jul 7, 2018)

Joe, we have many visitors at the museum. Not a small percent are British. Of the ones I get into conversations with that are either pilots or aviation enthusiasts, almost 70% mention the early experience with the Bell P-400s and the early P-38s when they talk about US planes at all (not their favorite subject). Almost to a person, they mention the poor quality of the P-400s and the lack of performance in the P-38s.

Most of my books that mention the P-400 at all also mention poor performance and some mention poor quality.

I am firmly in the corner which thinks the P-38 (P-322B) experience was entirely the fault of the British, who requested same-turning, non-turbo engines without a test of the configuration. I have seen first hand the quality of the typical US fighter aircraft, as have you, I know. While it isn't exactly pristine perfect, U.S. planes are not badly built in general, certainly not badly-built enough to generate such venom from the British. That goes for every manufacturer I have seen, from Seversky to Republic, Curtiss, Bell, North American, etc. Pretty decent airplanes. I am left thinking there MUST be something behind the talk, but have never seen a real, live, unrestored P-400 so I can look it over and make a first-hand evaluation. We DO have a P-39 that has a corrosion problem, but the workmanship is typical U.S. as far as I can tell. But it is a P-39, not a P-400.

Lacking a real P-400, the books and people who have spoken with me about it have convinced me that there is some basis for their almost universal insistence on poor quality. It cannot be performance alone. I also recall that this was early in the war, when everyone was ignoring the factory suggestions for proper running of the Allison engine, and engine problems could contribute to the perception of poor quality, even if it were not really true. I cannot say for sure, myself.

So, I'll just say that the P-400 failed miserably to live up to British expectations according to most reference books I have seen and backpedal from there. I believe there is a basis for the quality assertion, but cannot prove same.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 7, 2018)

GregP said:


> Joe, we have many visitors at the museum. Not a small percent are British. Of the ones I get into conversations with that are either pilots or aviation enthusiasts, almost 70% mention the early experience with the Bell P-400s and the early P-38s when they talk about US planes at all (not their favorite subject). Almost to a person, they mention the poor quality of the P-400s and the lack of performance in the P-38s.
> 
> Most of my books that mention the P-400 at all also mention poor performance and some mention poor quality.
> 
> ...



Good info Greg, but still perplexed - "poor quality." Was the plane built poorly? Did it perform poorly (as you mentioned the engine issue)? Were components not installed properly or were not installed per engineering drawings? I know you (and many of us) will never have the full answers on that.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 7, 2018)

Apparently the British screwed up the clever Bell design by insisting that it carry some items that hurt performances. Like guns, ammo, radios, instruments and the like.
The basic story is that Bell never told the British that the performance numbers that sold the plane to the British (and that Bell signed the contract for and guaranteed the numbers for) were _estimates _based off an unarmed prototype. It takes two sides to amend a contract. Bell should have known that some of the changes the British wanted (like self-sealing tanks and armor) would affect performance and should have amended the numbers accordingly. They didn't. They came up with the specially prepared plane to try to hit the guaranteed numbers which rather shows they knew a standard production example wouldn't come close.


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## pbehn (Jul 7, 2018)

From what I read there were issues like the cabin filling with smoke when the guns were fired, compass stopping working when guns fired, things like IFF equipment bolted behind the pilot obscuring rear view, issues with undercarriage damage but this may have been pilot training issue.


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## Schweik (Jul 7, 2018)

Some of the things the British complained about were clearly production related - from the wiki:

_"The gun access doors on the wing had been seen to bulge in flight, so they were replaced with thicker aluminum sheet. Similarly, the landing gear doors deflected open by as much as two inches at maximum speed, so a stronger linkage was installed to hold them flush."_

That sounds like production issues. Along with all the faring over and sanding down and filling in of holes and so on, according to the wiki _"Despite the success of these modifications, none were applied to other production P-39s."_

If that is indeed true it sounds like a somewhat unfinished aircraft was being foisted on them which was indeed a problem with some American planes throughout the war. The problems we have already discussed with the P-38 are part of this, but also as seen with many other American types. The Helldiver as previously mentioned was a good example, the F2A as well. Many times, with many aircraft, the design was fairly close to the tipping point in terms of engine capacity and airframe lift vs. weight.

There was almost always a small raft of things that needed to be added which pushed things over the edge from a nice performing airplane into one that was struggling. American corporate culture didn't seem to have the impetus to do the whole series of fine tuning modifications (like faring over rough spots and fixing the landing gear doors and gun access panels so they didn't bulge out at high speeds) that could tip it back into the positive category again.. let alone sort out tricky and hard to nail down problems like compressibility.

This is the sort of thing that foreign buyers and more autonomous units would often do in the field. The AVG for example did a lot of that same exact kind of sanding, repainting, faring over and waxing to their P-40s to get every iota of performance increase that they could out of them (and increased speed by about 10-15 mph). The Russians did much the same and often removed some or all the wing guns from both early P-40s, Hurricanes and P-39s.

Eventually after being used in combat though many of these things did get corrected even by regular units. Sometimes it took a while, really too long - B-25s took a long time to get proper tail guns for example, even though the need was obvious enough that they put fake ones in the Doolittle raid planes. But the relationship between the UK and the US was often tainted with suspicion. The P-38 required a lot of faith and hard work to get into truly effective working condition (and it cost some lives in the process) but I don't think there is any doubt that it would have been a more effective fighter - at least in the Pacific and CBI - for the British than the Buffalo, the Hurricane or probably even the Spit V, had they been able to collaborate more effectively with the US military bureaucracy and Lockheed.

The British often made somewhat strange choices in their purchasing (both in terms of those accepted and those declined) and they were frequently at odds with the Americans, who they kind of felt should just listen to them more. The Americans were arrogant too and thought they knew better even when they clearly didn't. The Mustang is one of the few success stories perhaps in part because each side was able to claim responsibility for it's eventual triumph.

S

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 7, 2018)

pbehn said:


> From what I read there were issues like the cabin filling with smoke when the guns were fired, compass stopping working when guns fired, things like IFF equipment bolted behind the pilot obscuring rear view, issues with undercarriage damage but this may have been pilot training issue.


To me those are "design" or "operational" issues


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 7, 2018)

Schweik said:


> Some of the things the British complained about were clearly production related - from the wiki:
> 
> _"The gun access doors on the wing had been seen to bulge in flight, so they were r*eplaced with thicker aluminum sheet.* Similarly, the landing gear doors deflected open by as much as two inches at maximum speed, so a *stronger linkage was installed* to hold them flush."_
> 
> That sounds like production issues. Along with all the* faring over and sanding down and filling in of holes and so on*, according to the wiki _"Despite the success of these modifications, none were applied to other production P-39s."_



Production = ENGINEERING. The assembler at the factory will build to the item requirements indicated on a drawing or some other specification reference. They will not change material, sand or modify lap joints unless indicated on a spec or drawing. The floor inspector will inspect to those requirements.

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## P-39 Expert (Jul 7, 2018)

The P-400 was one of the first production models in the P-39 series and undoubtedly production quality could not have been as good as the later models. They were introducing a brand new airplane. By that time the British no longer needed them and certainly didn't want to pay for them. They went to good use with the AAF who really needed them.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 7, 2018)

Bell aircraft had very limited experience in both design and manufacture when working on the initial P-39s. This was their 2nd design to fly (be constructed). The XP-39 was 500lbs over weight (10%) when first delivered. The Airacuda had been overweight and the XP-39 and initial YP-39 overlapped the YFM-1 production.
Companies like Grumman and Vought and Curtiss had built more different designs and many more production aircraft and had much more experience with turning drawings into flying aircraft at the desired weights, and they didn't always get it right. 

Sturdier parts are almost always heavier so substituting heavier gauge metal in doors or linkages means more weight. A constant battle in aircraft. Please note even Grumman had trouble with the landing gear doors on the XF5F and that the F4F and earlier didn't use landing gear doors.


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## GregP (Jul 7, 2018)

I think we all know in here that the 391 mph that the XP-39 supposedly hit was, probably, a calculated number with a few incorrect assumptions made. I think we all know the production P-39s were not 390 mph airplanes at their best altitude.

But that does not explain the British assertion of poor quality. Unfortunately, as stated above, I don't know what DOES explain it.

Perhaps some of our British members will ring in in about Bell quality, not performance, which we all know was some 30 - 40 mph short of the 391 mph they thought they were buying.

Cheers.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 7, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> The P-400 was one of the first production models in *the P-39 series and undoubtedly production quality could not have been as good as the later models.* They were introducing a brand new airplane. By that time the British no longer needed them and certainly didn't want to pay for them. They went to good use with the AAF who really needed them.


That's questionable.

Although there is a learning curve during the production of any new aircraft, the majority of the production P-39 airframe wasn't hand built (as you probably know). Although many smaller components might have been hand built, I'd bet dollars to donuts that most of the aircraft was built with small production tools (sub assemblies) and large production jigs for the the larger components. Having worked on several production lines I've found that some early units were actually built better than latter ones, this for a few reasons - those assembling the unit, operating under a learning curve were a little more careful and contentious during the initial production run. The second factor, the one that everyone forgets about is the production tooling was brand new. Jigs and fixtures wear out when you start running a few hundred units through it. I've seen structural components running down a production line for 20 years, never an issue but then suddenly don't fit the next higher assembly. 9 times out of 10 we found worn tooling.







At the end of the day one would have to have access to factory quality records that would show production line non-conformances during a given period.

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## P-39 Expert (Jul 8, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> This is interesting and if you have any additional information, please post. I believe the basic structural airframes came down the same production lines as US models (our P-39 Expert could probably confirm that). Of course there was different equipment installed so was it the equipment that didn't work or the "different equipment" was poorly installed? If the factory installed equipment that didn't function as "designed" this is not a quality function.
> 
> Lastly I think some of the foreign customer equipment was installed at mod centers, but again I could be wrong.


Probably only one production line for both the P-400 and P-39 since they were produced at Buffalo. The Niagra Falls plant opened in the fall of '41 and shows only P-39 production. 
Different Bell models, model 14 for the P-400, 14A for the P-39D-1 and 14A-1 for the D-2, and model 15 for the P-39D and 15B for the F (new hydromatic prop). All the same plane with relatively minor differences (cannon, propeller, oxygen, cabin heater, wing guns, guages, throttle etc). Model 14 was for export, 15 for AAF. 
Then Model 26 for the long run of P-39K through Q.

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## =FB=VikS (Aug 10, 2018)

Hi All!

Is there any information about K-14 installation on P-38`s? As it seems like it was only a test installations and it didnt get operational due to lack of space in cockpit.
Also, some books states that some of P-38J`s had "christmas tree" rockets installations field-fitted - as it was P-38L-5 standart equipment, any details or maybe photos available?
And the same question about AN/APS-13 tail warning radar - did it get into J models?


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## MIflyer (Aug 10, 2018)

In the case of the P-38, the E models, made before the war, had higher quality fit and finish than did the later models made under wartime urgency. I think you'll find that the same thing was true of the P-39.


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## Schweik (Aug 10, 2018)

I think it is true that production quality may go down as mass production ramps up - (and jigs wear out, less skilled workers are brought in, production spills out into the parking lot as production schedules tighten, new subcontractors or new factories coming online that aren't ready for Prime Time etc.) but this is also offset by improvements in _design_, including better factory floor layout, better jigs, better or improved materials, subassemblies, component design and so on.

I know from reading the histories of many planes that numerous small but problematic design flaws in early models of various fighters were swiftly 'cleaned up' as they went into larger scale production. Things like gun or fuel fumes getting into the cockpit, parts that oxidise or corrode, fuel systems or self-sealing tanks leaking, or compasses or other instruments not working properly, guns jamming or radios not being grounded right, ailerons or rudder trim tabs needing to be strengthened and so on.

And I _suspect_, things like wheel doors not being made thick enough on a P-39 though I don't know for sure if that was ever corrected.

So I think you have two competing trends taking place simultaneously, and maybe it's a measure of how good the manufacturing company or agency was run, whether they tended to overall improve the aircraft or contribute to it's decline. Curtiss aicraft for example seemed to generally trend toward decline from 1943 whereas North American aviation went the opposite way toward greater effiicency and quality overall.

Not sure about Bell or Lockheed though the P-38 did seem to improve a lot across 1944.

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## MIflyer (Aug 10, 2018)

Here's another shot, showing P-39's and Aircobara I's at the Bell plant, Dec, 1941.

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## MIflyer (Aug 10, 2018)

As for the Christmas Tree rocket launchers, the pilot's training manual says it was for the later versions.


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## DarrenW (Aug 10, 2018)

=FB=VikS said:


> Is there any information about K-14 installation on P-38`s?



This topic was brought up here before but it could definitely use some more research:

P38-L (Late) Gyro gunsight ?

It's believed that the K-14 gun sight wasn't used operationally on the P-38 as there's no mention of it in the pilot manuals of the time.


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## Navalwarrior (Aug 14, 2018)

drgondog said:


> I have researched this question thoroughly. There is no written/sourced statement in Arnold, Spaatz, Doolittle, Eaker, Anderson, Lockheed, NAA histories or correspondence files in public or USAFHRC that I have covered that mentions economics as a factor.
> 
> What is true and verified is that Kenney would have taken every P-38 made if he could have had access and the P-38 was doing very well in multi role missions all over the globe. What is also true is that when Dallas P-51C started deliveries in September, 1943, the P-51B/C production quickly outpaced the P-38 at Burbank. What is also true is that the 85 gallon fuselage tank kits to extend range of P-51B/C beyond Berlin were being installed in October, 1943 and those kits were delivered 3:1 to UK over the 55 gallon LE kits for the P-38J-10.
> 
> Nobody in 8th AF lost sight that only 2 P-51 equipped groups nearly outscored all the 8th and 9th AF P-47D groups combined (IIRC ~ 10) performing escort for Big Week campaign - and far outscored the combined five P-38 FGs from both 8th and 15th AF. Destruction of the Luftwaffe was the Prime mission of 8th AF from January through May, 1944.


Resp:
I think we are being overly critical of the P-38, simply due to its less than ideal ability in the ETO. I think the P-38 served well for the time period it was used. After all, it did well in the other theaters, particularly in the Pacific. It was the only (P-38F was coming off the production line at the time of PH attack) USAAF fighter at the beginning of WWII that was drop tank capable, which extended its already superior range. Keep in mind that the USAAF in the ETO had to make many adjustments to their Strategic War plan for it to succeed. 
To me, the extreme weather likely contributed to its lack of success in another way besides machinically. Since many switches had to be worked by the pilot prior to engagement, was the lack of visibility (enemy fighters too close before spotted) hinder the pilot's time frame to make his P-38 combat ready? Or put another way, did pilots in the PTO, for example . . . identify the threat of Japanese planes . . . at a greater distance, thereby, giving them ample time to make their fighter 'combat ready' (completing their required switching)? I would appreciate any comments. Thanks.

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## swampyankee (Aug 14, 2018)

I've read that modern _Luftwaffe_ pilots, who train in Texas, need considerable follow-on training to successfully operate in the relatively poor weather and crowded conditions of Central and Western Europe; it would not be surprising were a pilot trained in the plains of Texas to find the weather of Europe, especially in winter, to be daunting. Add the fact that the P-38 was probably the most complex aircraft flown by a single pilot in the US inventory, and there is likely to be a pretty steep learning curve before a pilot is really combat-adept.

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## Navalwarrior (Aug 14, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> I've read that modern _Luftwaffe_ pilots, who train in Texas, need considerable follow-on training to successfully operate in the relatively poor weather and crowded conditions of Central and Western Europe; it would not be surprising were a pilot trained in the plains of Texas to find the weather of Europe, especially in winter, to be daunting. Add the fact that the P-38 was probably the most complex aircraft flown by a single pilot in the US inventory, and there is likely to be a pretty steep learning curve before a pilot is really combat-adept.


Resp:
Agree fully. How many pilots who ended up flying the P-38 from Sept 1943 onwards, received adequate time in type . . . or any meaningful follow-on training in theater? Yes, they did receive some, but it was minimal. I believe that follow-on in theater training, from what I have read would have been barely adequate for a single engine fighter. The pressure for fighters, pilots, forced concessions to be made in training.


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## P-39 Expert (Aug 14, 2018)

I know I sound like a P-38 hater but I certainly am not.
It was successful in the PTO because it was up against 330mph planes (Zero and Oscar). 
It was not as successful in the ETO because it did not have a speed/climb advantage, it was not as maneuverable and couldn't dive due to it's low Mach number.
P-38J-25/L cured the dive problem. They were also faster with faster climb. But those came out after June '44 and by then air superiority had been won in the ETO.
Just too late. Coupled with being a twin and the resultant complexity resulted in it being a handful for new pilots.
Also I believe the P-39 and P-40 were both drop tank capable at the start of WWII.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> I know I sound like a P-38 hater but I certainly am not.
> It was successful in the PTO because it was up against 330mph planes (Zero and Oscar).
> It was not as successful in the ETO because it did not have a speed/climb advantage, it was not as maneuverable and couldn't dive due to it's low Mach number.
> P-38J-25/L cured the dive problem. They were also faster with faster climb. But those came out after June '44 and by then air superiority had been won in the ETO.
> ...



Environment, tactics and training. The speed of the aircraft encountered in the PTO had nothing to do with this. The Ki-61 was faster than 330 mph, as was the Ki-84. There was no adequate multi engine training for AAF pilots at the beginning of the war. many successful P-38 drivers had several hundred hours in twins before they transitioned into the -38

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## Shortround6 (Aug 14, 2018)

The P-38 was not in the ETO until the late fall of 1943. Oct 15th was the first mission. This is roughly 2 months before the P51s started and the P-38 equipped 1 fighter group (and a bit more) in the ETO from Oct to the end of Dec. This was the 55th, the 20th fighter group ws in England and did attach a squadron at a time to the 55th to gain operational experience. The 20th flew for the first time as a group on Dec 29th. 

For some reason that has yet to be explained P-38s in the MTO didn't seem to have much trouble (or at least anywhere near as much) keeping up with or diving from/after Bf 109s and Fw 190s in North Africa, Italy and southern Germany/Austria in 1943/44

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## P-39 Expert (Aug 14, 2018)

Tony was 360mph, still slower than the P-38F/G at 400mph and P-38 climbed better. How many Ki-84s did they see? 
I'll stick with the competition being a good deal better in the ETO. 
Agree fully with you on the training, could have been lots better for the P-38 since it was a turbocharged twin, but would have taken about twice as long.
Great plane, had all the measureables, but a real handful for the pilots.


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## wuzak (Aug 14, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> It was not as successful in the ETO because it did not have a speed/climb advantage, it was not as maneuverable and couldn't dive due to it's low Mach number.
> P-38J-25/L cured the dive problem.



The dive brakes fitted to late model P-38s did not fix the critical Mach number, nor could they. 

Simply helped with controlability issues and allowed slightly steeper dives.


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## DarrenW (Aug 14, 2018)

I personally think it was the altitude requirement in the ETO that gave the P-38 the most trouble during the war. In the MTO and the PTO combat occurred much lower down so there was less chance of compressibility occurring in a dive, and the warmer temperatures allowed the Lightning to operate more efficiently with less mechanical issues and pilot comfort was far better as well. The Lightning had a very good record in this type of environment. Afterall, it was the highest scoring USAAF fighter in those particular theaters with 3,131 victory credits between the two.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 14, 2018)

If may very well be this lack of feedback from the summer of 1942 to the fall of 1943 where there were fewer troubles with the P-38 (not none and mostly different) that lead to the P-38 having so much trouble in the ETO over the winter of 43/44. In Oct of 1943 there were 7 fighter groups in England using P-47s and the first one had gone operational 8 months before the P-38 went operational in the ETO. Initial operations (fighter sweeps over the channel) had not gone well, with crashes, dead stick landings, mid-air fires and landing gear collapses on the runway. There are at least 2 months of radio problems. edit> all this for P-47 but seemingly forgotten due to later service.<
Had one group of P-38s stayed in England over the winter of 42/43 some of the issues (like cockpit heat) might have been addressed.
The fuel issue was anticipated, perhaps not to the extent that it turned out to be, but it was feared that the change in allowable aromatics to stretch production would lead to some problems.

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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> Tony was 360mph, still slower than the P-38F/G at 400mph and P-38 climbed better. How many Ki-84s did they see?
> I'll stick with the competition being a good deal better in the ETO.
> Agree fully with you on the training, could have been lots better for the P-38 since it was a turbocharged twin, but would have taken about twice as long.
> Great plane, had all the measureables, but a real handful for the pilots.


There were many Japanese aircraft that easily exceeded 360 mph although I would agree that allied forces in Europe faced better enemy aircraft. Also consider that most of ETO combat took place over land, more times than none P-38s were flying and fighting over vast oceans bringing another dynamic into the combat scenario.

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## Navalwarrior (Aug 14, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> If may very well be this lack of feedback from the summer of 1942 to the fall of 1943 where there were fewer troubles with the P-38 (not none and mostly different) that lead to the P-38 having so much trouble in the ETO over the winter of 43/44. In Oct of 1943 there were 7 fighter groups in England using P-47s and the first one had gone operational 8 months before the P-38 went operational in the ETO. Initial operations (fighter sweeps over the channel) had not gone well, with crashes, dead stick landings, mid-air fires and landing gear collapses on the runway. There are at least 2 months of radio problems. edit> all this for P-47 but seemingly forgotten due to later service.<
> Had one group of P-38s stayed in England over the winter of 42/43 some of the issues (like cockpit heat) might have been addressed.
> The fuel issue was anticipated, perhaps not to the extent that it turned out to be, but it was feared that the change in allowable aromatics to stretch production would lead to some problems.


Resp:
I do recall reading about the problems P-47s had early in their use with the 8th AF. It also arrived in theater as non drop tank capable, having kits retro-fitted to carry one 'belly' tank in late Aug/Sept 1943. It would be several months into 1944 before it arrived fitted with wing pylons designed to carry two additional drop tanks (first wing pylon models could only carry bombs). I, like you, often wonder if the P-38 had remained in England . . . would improvements to it have run parallel with those of the P-47; thereby enabling the P-38 to become a primary escort fighter in the ETO. Perhaps not, but it is fun to contemplate.

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## michael rauls (Aug 14, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The P-38 was not in the ETO until the late fall of 1943. Oct 15th was the first mission. This is roughly 2 months before the P51s started and the P-38 equipped 1 fighter group (and a bit more) in the ETO from Oct to the end of Dec. This was the 55th, the 20th fighter group ws in England and did attach a squadron at a time to the 55th to gain operational experience. The 20th flew for the first time as a group on Dec 29th.
> 
> For some reason that has yet to be explained P-38s in the MTO didn't seem to have much trouble (or at least anywhere near as much) keeping up with or diving from/after Bf 109s and Fw 190s in North Africa, Italy and southern Germany/Austria in 1943/44


 I've often wondered also why p38s didn't seem to run into trouble with dives in other theaters that they did in Europe but something just occurred to me. Temperature affects the speed of sound. I knew it did but never made the connection before now. I couldn't remember how much so I looked it up it's 346 meters per sec at 72 degrees and 331 at 32 degrees. That's about a 5 % difference which would be about 28 mph at mach .68 at 25,000 feet if I've figured this right.
That seems like easily enough to explain why the early model p38s without the the dive flaps to keep them out of the domain of compresability seemed to have so much more trouble in colder climates but did fine in warmer ones.
I might be missing something but this would seem to explain it at least in part.

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## wuzak (Aug 14, 2018)

Pressure affects it too, and in the ETO the fights usually started at higher altitudes, which means lower pressure.


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## michael rauls (Aug 14, 2018)

wuzak said:


> Pressure affects it too, and in the ETO the fights usually started at higher altitudes, which means lower pressure.


10-4. On a hunch I checked and humidity affects it also. Only a fraction of a percent but add that on to our 28 mph and now you have maybe a 30 mph difference in what mach .68 will be on the extreme ends of the posible spectrum plus whatever pressure as you say would do. 
This does seem to explain alot.

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## DarrenW (Aug 14, 2018)

michael rauls said:


> I've often wondered also why p38s didn't seem to run into trouble with dives in other theaters that they did in Europe but something just occurred to me. Temperature affects the speed of sound. I knew it did but never made the connection before now. I couldn't remember how much so I looked it up it's 346 meters per sec at 72 degrees and 331 at 32 degrees. That's about a 5 % difference which would be about 28 mph at mach .68 at 25,000 feet if I've figured this right.
> That seems like easily enough to explain why the early model p38s without the the dive flaps to keep them out of the domain of compresability seemed to have so much more trouble in colder climates but did fine in warmer ones.
> I might be missing something but this would seem to explain it at least in part.



Temperature and air density must have played some role in it, but I also believe the higher altitudes flown in the ETO allowed for a much greater terminal speed to be reached when engaged in an extended power dive. Add in the fact that the Bf 109 and FW 190 could dive far better than a Zeke, and it's easy to see why the problems with compressibility were much more prevalent in the skies over Europe.

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## michael rauls (Aug 14, 2018)

DarrenW said:


> Temperature and air density must have played some role in it, but I also believe the higher altitudes flown in the ETO allowed for a much greater terminal speed to be reached when engaged in an extended power dive. Add in the fact that the Bf 109 and FW 190 could dive far better than a Zeke, and it's easy to see why the problems with compressibility were much more prevalent in the skies over Europe.


I'm sure you right. Probably a bit of both. I've read several accounts of p38s going after tonys from the low to mid 20,000s and not running into trouble and believe the ki 61 was a pretty decent diver so I'm thinking the temperatures affect on the speed of sound must have been a pretty substantial part of this even at higher altitudes but then again do temperatures verry that much that high up. Im not sure.

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## swampyankee (Aug 14, 2018)

wuzak said:


> Pressure affects it too, and in the ETO the fights usually started at higher altitudes, which means lower pressure.



Air is very close to a perfect gas; any effect by pressure is probably infinitesimal (see, for example Speed of Sound in Air)

On the other hand, until quite high altitudes, air temperature usually decreases with altitude, so the speed of sound will decrease.


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## michael rauls (Aug 14, 2018)

I looked it up and the troposphere extends 9 km at the poles but 15 km at the equator and since temps apparently drop quickly upon entering the stratosphere this would suggest that yes indeed even that high up there can be substantial variations in temperature between warmer and colder climates.


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## DarrenW (Aug 14, 2018)

[QUOTE="michael rauls, post: 1424325, member: 69991.... I've read several accounts of p38s going after tonys from the low to mid 20,000s and not running into trouble and believe the ki 61 was a pretty decent diver so I'm thinking the temperatures affect on the speed of sound must have been a pretty substantial part of this even at higher altitude....[/QUOTE]

Interesting...something to consider for sure!


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## KiwiBiggles (Aug 15, 2018)

wuzak said:


> Pressure affects it too, and in the ETO the fights usually started at higher altitudes, which means lower pressure.


No, pressure affects it only in that pressure and temperature are related. For an idealised gas, the speed of sound is proportional to the square root of the absolute temperature. YMMV for real gasses, but not to a huge extent.


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## eagledad (Aug 15, 2018)

Gentlemen,

Just a couple of items of interest,

The 1st FG flew 3 bomber escort missions with the 8th AF the last week of September and the first 2 weeks of October 1942, before transferring to North Africa. Perhaps this was too few missions to get a feel of the problems of the P-38?

However, based on experiences of the 7th Photo Recon Group with the F-5A (Photo recon version of the P-38G), HQ was aware of the cockpit and mechanical problems of the aircraft at high altitude by the middle of July, 1943. (See “Eyes of the Eighth” page 21).

So the question I have, was the time between the discoveries of the cockpit and mechanical problems in the ETO at high altitude (with the F-5A), and the fixes by Allison and Lockheed excessive? Or, was the P-38 so important at that time for the war effort, that disruptions in production could not be tolerated?

Just thinking in print.

Eagledad


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## Navalwarrior (Aug 15, 2018)

eagledad said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> Just a couple of items of interest,
> 
> ...


Resp:
Good question. Likely seen as an isolated incident, since few Lightnings were in use in the ETO. And with the allies in North Africa in full swing, where this problem likely didn't exist for the vast majority of P-38 usage, it was likely relegated to the back burner. Ditto for the PTO.


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## eagledad (Aug 15, 2018)

Navalwarrior,

Perhaps you are correct. However, 1 squadron of Spitfire Mk XI's was obtained and used by the 7th PRG and operated along F-5's starting in Nov 1943.
(First spread among the squadrons and then consolidated into the 14th PRS,) 
So, I take that to mean that the problem was considered relatively serious by the Photo Recon Group and HQ (I imagine that some one high up had to approve this reverse Lend-Lease).

Eagledad


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## Shortround6 (Aug 15, 2018)

There were some problems with P-38/F-5 recon planes in the Med. However some of them were different. One was that an oil vent tube was poorly shaped and would syphon engine oil out at certain speeds/altitudes causing engines to fail. 
Lockheed may have been working on a list of problems during 1943. And again, if the USAAF was operating the engines contrary to what Allison and Lockheed were recommending there may have been room for finger pointing.

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## Navalwarrior (Aug 15, 2018)

eagledad said:


> Navalwarrior,
> 
> Perhaps you are correct. However, 1 squadron of Spitfire Mk XI's was obtained and used by the 7th PRG and operated along F-5's starting in Nov 1943.
> (First spread among the squadrons and then consolidated into the 14th PRS,)
> ...


Resp:
I was not suggesting that the problem was not serious, only that they may have, as you stated . . . looked for an alternate solution. The Spitfire Mk XI became the solution, although likely believed it was only short term. In Africa, the RAF had no long range Recon fighter, which resulted in the USAAF in Theater furnishing an Allison engine Mustang (an A-36 of all things, as it could carry wing drop tanks) that they outfitted with cameras. Their Spitfires/Hurricane had short legs, so we're not suited for the task.

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## davparlr (Aug 15, 2018)

Every since I built my first P-38 it seemed to me that it was not as streamlined as it could have been. Four radiators could not have been as clean as the two wing mounted radiators in the Mosquito, and the complex horizontal tail had to have some needless interference drag as compared to the P-61 design. Add to that the various inlets and pipes and the exposed turbocharger and it just seems it could have been better.


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## fubar57 (Aug 15, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> I was not suggesting that the problem was not serious, only that they may have, as you stated . . . looked for an alternate solution. The Spitfire Mk XI became the solution, although likely believed it was only short term. In Africa, the RAF had no long range Recon fighter, which resulted in the USAAF in Theater furnishing an Allison engine Mustang (an A-36 of all things, as it could carry wing drop tanks) that they outfitted with cameras. Their Spitfires/Hurricane had short legs, so we're not suited for the task.



Ans:

The Mk.Xl had a range of over 1300 miles....short legs? A total of 471 Mark XIs were built between April 1943 and January 1946. Great Britain and its allies flew various photo-reconnaissance versions of the Spitfire with great success in all theaters during World War II. The U.S. Army Air Forces' 14th Photographic Squadron of the 8th Air Force operated Spitfire Mark XIs from November 1943 to April 1945


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## Shortround6 (Aug 15, 2018)

davparlr said:


> Every since I built my first P-38 it seemed to me that it was not as streamlined as it could have been. Four radiators could not have been as clean as the two wing mounted radiators in the Mosquito, and the complex horizontal tail had to have some needless interference drag as compared to the P-61 design. Add to that the various inlets and pipes and the exposed turbocharger and it just seems it could have been better.




what it was conceived as and what it went into service as are rather different, let alone what it wound up as. 

XP-38






The growth of the engines from around 1000hp during the planning staged to 1150hp as first flown was one thing, going to 1600hp required some major changes to intercoolers, radiators and oil coolers.

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## Navalwarrior (Aug 15, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> Ans:
> 
> The Mk.Xl had a range of over 1300 miles....short legs? A total of 471 Mark XIs were built between April 1943 and January 1946. Great Britain and its allies flew various photo-reconnaissance versions of the Spitfire with great success in all theaters during World War II. The U.S. Army Air Forces' 14th Photographic Squadron of the 8th Air Force operated Spitfire Mark XIs from November 1943 to April 1945


Resp:
Yes, but did they have them in North Africa in early to mid-1943?


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## fubar57 (Aug 15, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> Yes, but did they have them in North Africa in early to mid-1943?



Repl:

"The first PR.XIs entered service in the Mediterranean Feb./Mar '43" Source: Classic Warbirds - Merlin PR Spitfires. Looking for squadrons now......


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## Navalwarrior (Aug 15, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> Repl:
> 
> "The first PR.XIs entered service in the Mediterranean Feb./Mar '43" Source: Classic Warbirds - Merlin PR Spitfires. Looking for squadrons now......


Resp:
No need. Doesn't answer why the RAF asked for an Allison Mustang from the local USAAF. They kept it so long that they painted roundels on it.


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## fubar57 (Aug 15, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> No need. Doesn't answer why the RAF asked for an Allison Mustang from the local USAAF. They kept it so long that they painted roundels on it.



Rej:

Did address the "short legs" comment though


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## wuzak (Aug 15, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> I was not suggesting that the problem was not serious, only that they may have, as you stated . . . looked for an alternate solution. The Spitfire Mk XI became the solution, although likely believed it was only short term. In Africa, the RAF had no long range Recon fighter, which resulted in the USAAF in Theater furnishing an Allison engine Mustang (an A-36 of all things, as it could carry wing drop tanks) that they outfitted with cameras. Their Spitfires/Hurricane had short legs, so we're not suited for the task.



Q:

Do you have a reference for that?

And please define "recon fighter". Is it an armed reconnaissance aircraft, used for tactical reconnaissance, which would not necessarily require long range. If it was for tactical reconnaissance, it would also be used at low level, which would also explain the use of a P-51/A-36 aircraft.


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## Navalwarrior (Aug 15, 2018)

wuzak said:


> Q:
> 
> Do you have a reference for that?
> 
> And please define "recon fighter". Is it an armed reconnaissance aircraft, used for tactical reconnaissance, which would not necessarily require long range. If it was for tactical reconnaissance, it would also be used at low level, which would also explain the use of a P-51/A-36 aircraft.


Resp:
I cannot clarify, as it was taken from an article on Allison engined Mustangs. It stated merely that an RAF unit in North Africa asked, and received a Mustang from a local USAAF unit, which they outfitted with cameras. They kept it so long that they painted RAF roundels on it.


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## Navalwarrior (Aug 15, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> Rej:
> 
> Did address the "short legs" comment though


Follow up: Northwest Africa Tactical Air Force, July 1943 spreadsheet shows only one Recon Unit under Air Vice Marshall Broadhurst, flying Spitfires; No 40 Squ, SAAF.


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## fubar57 (Aug 15, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Follow up: Northwest Africa Tactical Air Force, July 1943 spreadsheet shows only one Recon Unit under Air Vice Marshall Broadhurst, flying Spitfires; No 40 Squ, SAAF.



Ret:

Same book..."In the summer of 1943 more than 20 PR.XIs were delivered to the Mediterranean. After the North African campaign, Sicily invasion and finally the invasion of Italy....". 682 and 683 squadrons had 10 each and "C" Flight of 680 Sqn was also equipt with PR.XIs


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## DarrenW (Aug 16, 2018)

P-39 Expert said:


> How many Ki-84s did they see?



Excellent question. Of the four most highly regarded late-war Japanese fighters, the _Hayate_ was by far the most numerous, with some 3,500 copies being produced (roughly a thousand more than that of the J2M, N1K, and Ki-100 combined). They entered combat with the IJAF in the Fall of 1944, the US Navy first encountering them during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Judging from the claims/loss ratio (144/16) Hellcat and Corsair pilots must have locked horns with them frequently enough. They were employed in many locations in and around the Philippines, Formosa, Okinawa, and the home islands. Unlike it's late-war counterparts that were primarily utilized as area-defense fighters, the _Frank_ was a versatile aircraft often being tasked with duties as a dive-bomber and ground-support aircraft.

Knowing of it's extensive use in areas where the Ki-84 operated, it's not a stretch to believe that US Army Lightnings of the 5th and 13th Air Forces made similar contact with the aircraft to that of the US Navy. However, I'm not in possession of Lightning claims data so maybe someone else here is and can shed some more light on the subject???


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## Navalwarrior (Aug 19, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> I cannot clarify, as it was taken from an article on Allison engined Mustangs. It stated merely that an RAF unit in North Africa asked, and received a Mustang from a local USAAF unit, which they outfitted with cameras. They kept it so long that they painted RAF roundels on it.


Update/Correction:
The 12th AF (USAAF) lent 6 A-36A to RAF No. 1437 Flight based in Matariya, Egypt. The A-36As were given RAF identification numbers, along with a single white letter immediately behind the British roundel (A thru F) on the fuselage. These numbers were HK944 'C' (42-84018), HK945 'B' (42-83898), HK946 'F' (42-84117), HK947 'A' (42-84107), HK955 'D' (42-83906) and HK956 'E' (42-83829). All planes retained their USAAF colors of upper Green and underside Gray. They began their missions from Luga, Malta on July 12, 1943. Two A-36A were shot down by flak on July 31, with Flight Sgt K.C.E. Stanley being rescued. On August 17, Flying Officers J.L. Griffith and W.H. Gilliland were on a reconnaissance mission when they were surprised by an attack by RAF 43 Squadron Spitfires, which confused them for ME-109s. In the fray, the two pilots of No. 1437 Flight did not recognize their attackers immediately, and started combat. Griffith takes after the top Spitfire, causing the pilot to ditch. The two A-36A pilots continue their mission, but Griffith bails out above the water after being hit by flak while flying over an enemy armored column, but is picked up by a Walrus of No. 284 Squadron.
The Flight was disbanded on Oct 17, 1943, with only A-36A HK944 (white letter C) surviving. HK944 was used by No. 112 Squadron as a pilot training aircraft as the Squadron began to receive the Merlin Mustang MkIII.
NOTE: I could find nothing stating they were actually fitted with cameras, but do believe they were so outfitted. I hope this info helps.

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## Navalwarrior (Sep 29, 2018)

Reluctant Poster said:


> Control forces were studied in NACA Report No 755 Requirements For Satisfactory Flying Qualities of Airplanes. See attached file.
> 
> The target for maximum aileron control force at below 80% of maximum speed was:
> a. Wheel-type controls: +/- 80 pounds applied at the rim of the wheel.
> ...


Resp:
I always wondered why it had a wheel vs a stick. I assumed it was carried over from Lockheed's other twin engined aircraft.


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## GregP (Sep 29, 2018)

Regarding post 445, Flyboyj said that the Allies in the ETO faced better enemy aircraft. Not too sure about that one.

They certainly faced enemy aircraft that had potentially higher top speed, but Japanese fighters were pretty darned good in their best-maneuvering range. Early on, they also had some seasoned combat veterans as leaders. By the time late-war was upon them, the aircraft were very good, even if not quite as fast as the German aircraft, but a large percentage of their seasoned combat veterans had been lost.

The Ki-84, Ki-44, Ki-100, J2M, and N1K series of aircraft were all excellent ... in the hands of a good pilot, with decent speed, if not exactly fast, and decent armament.

Not a strong disagreement here with Flyboyj because circumstances above consipred to make the late-war Japanese fighter force less effective overall than the Luftwaffe was when they were late-war, but the aircraft themselves were pretty good when properly employed.

It would be an interesting "what if" to have swapped some good aircraft between Germany and Japan to see what developed in the way of tactics and results but, of course, it never happened.

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## Navalwarrior (Sep 29, 2018)

GregP said:


> Regarding post 445, Flyboyj said that the Allies in the ETO faced better enemy aircraft. Not too sure about that one.
> 
> They certainly faced enemy aircraft that had potentially higher top speed, but Japanese fighters were pretty darned good in their best-maneuvering range. Early on, they also had some seasoned combat veterans as leaders. By the time late-war was upon them, the aircraft were very good, even if not quite as fast as the German aircraft, but a large percentage of their seasoned combat veterans had been lost.
> 
> ...


Resp:
I would think there would be a few pilots, Clive Caldwell, Maj Howard, etc. who flew air combat against the Japanese AND Germans, that could shed some light on threat/skill levels.

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 29, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> I always wondered why it had a wheel vs a stick. I assumed it was carried over from Lockheed's other twin engined aircraft.



During a Lockheed Management Club meeting I attended around 1982/ 83, Kelly Johnson was a guest speaker. I distinctly remember him saying that he wanted to put a stick in the P-38 as well as several other mods. You'll find that a lot of items installed on aircraft aren't always decided by the manufacturer.

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 29, 2018)

GregP said:


> Regarding post 445, Flyboyj said that the Allies in the ETO faced better enemy aircraft. Not too sure about that one.


The Japanese built great aircraft but operationally there were many challenges that go back to how they were built, interchangeability and field logistics was always an issue. IMO if you do a side-to-side comparison of Japanese vs German aircraft to include how they performed in the field, I think you'll find the German aircraft had the edge in overall performance.

I also believe the Luftwaffe operated way more efficiently than the both the JAAF and JNAF

Perhaps a subject for another thread.

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## Navalwarrior (Sep 29, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> During a Lockheed Management Club meeting I attended around 1982/ 83, Kelly Johnson was a guest speaker. I distinctly remember him saying that he wanted to put a stick in the P-38 as well as several other mods. You'll find that a lot of items installed on aircraft aren't always decided by the manufacturer.


Resp:
I guess I could have stated that better, as the manufacturer must satisfy the customer. Just thought that it originated with Lockheed.


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## Navalwarrior (Sep 29, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The Japanese built great aircraft but operationally there were many challenges that go back to how they were built, interchangeability and field logistics was always an issue. IMO if you do a side-to-side comparison of Japanese vs German aircraft to include how they performed in the field, I think you'll find the German aircraft had the edge in overall performance.
> 
> I also believe the Luftwaffe operated way more efficiently than the both the JAAF and JNAF
> 
> Perhaps a subject for another thread.


Resp:
Agree that German aircraft held an edge in overall performance over Japanese aircraft, but that an outstanding pilot often made a less than ideal fighter into a viable opponent.


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## michael rauls (Sep 29, 2018)

GregP said:


> Regarding post 445, Flyboyj said that the Allies in the ETO faced better enemy aircraft. Not too sure about that one.
> 
> They certainly faced enemy aircraft that had potentially higher top speed, but Japanese fighters were pretty darned good in their best-maneuvering range. Early on, they also had some seasoned combat veterans as leaders. By the time late-war was upon them, the aircraft were very good, even if not quite as fast as the German aircraft, but a large percentage of their seasoned combat veterans had been lost.
> 
> ...


I verry much agree. I think many(including myself here)often focus to much on early war Japanese types when thinking of what allied planes were up against against when it comes to Japanese aircraft in relation to German types.
I may get some disagreement on this but I think if you compare contemporary aircraft that is 1940 German and Japanese types or 1944 German and Japanese types they are pretty close in performance(with the exception of the Me262).
I would still give an edge to German types overall but don't think there's really that big a margin.


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## Clayton Magnet (Sep 29, 2018)

I think if a Ki-84 or N1K2 had proper fuel and maintenance, they would have matched anything in the sky.

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## pbehn (Sep 29, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> Agree that German aircraft held an edge in overall performance over Japanese aircraft, but that an outstanding pilot often made a less than ideal fighter into a viable opponent.


No they didn't, how many aircraft in the Luftwaffe inventory could take off and land from a carrier. How many single engine fighters had the range and performance of a Zero in the LW 1941/42? Is your opinion based on facts or eye shape?


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## Clayton Magnet (Sep 29, 2018)

well, to be fair, in 1941-42, nothing in the world matched the 109F and 190A. A Friedrich or Anton could not take off from a carrier, but a A6M2 and Ki-43 could not match them in performance.


pbehn said:


> Is your opinion based on facts or eye shape?


jeez, that seems unnecessary

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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2018)

Clayton Magnet said:


> I think if a Ki-84 or N1K2 had proper fuel and maintenance, they would have matched anything in the sky.




I think you are giving a bit to much credit to the Homare engine.

There are reasons the Wright R-1820 went from about 1200lbs when it made 930-1000hp on 91/96 octane fuel to weighing 1470lbs when it made 1525hp on 115/145 fuel. Part of it was the beefing up required to run at 2800rpm instead of 2200rpm and part of it was the beefing up required to go from BMEP of 184 to a BMEP of 237. The Homare was already running at high rpm and it weighed less than a Wright R-2600 that made 1900hp, Getting hundreds more HP out of the Homare without either cooking it (overheating) or breaking it doesn't seem likely.
Air-cooled engines were much more limited in their ability to be over boosted than liquid cooled engines. 
Better fuel may have helped the Ki-84 and N1K2 (especially over the front line fuel vs test fuel) but P-47Ns, P-51Hs and F4U-4s were becoming the order of the day in the Summer of 1945.


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## Navalwarrior (Sep 29, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> I think you are giving a bit to much credit to the Homare engine.
> 
> There are reasons the Wright R-1820 went from about 1200lbs when it made 930-1000hp on 91/96 octane fuel to weighing 1470lbs when it made 1525hp on 115/145 fuel. Part of it was the beefing up required to run at 2800rpm instead of 2200rpm and part of it was the beefing up required to go from BMEP of 184 to a BMEP of 237. The Homare was already running at high rpm and it weighed less than a Wright R-2600 that made 1900hp, Getting hundreds more HP out of the Homare without either cooking it (overheating) or breaking it doesn't seem likely.
> Air-cooled engines were much more limited in their ability to be over boosted than liquid cooled engines.
> Better fuel may have helped the Ki-84 and N1K2 (especially over the front line fuel vs test fuel) but P-47Ns, P-51Hs and F4U-4s were becoming the order of the day in the Summer of 1945.


Resp:
Not to mention, Japanese aircraft (there were a few, and I mean a few exceptions) could not make more than one pass at B-29s due to their altitude and speed. To make a single pass they had to be in the right place which gave them a narrow window to do so. German aircraft advanced at a greater rate (speed) as the war progressed. If the B-29 had served in the ETO many would have been lost due to jet interceptors.


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## Navalwarrior (Sep 29, 2018)

pbehn said:


> No they didn't, how many aircraft in the Luftwaffe inventory could take off and land from a carrier. How many single engine fighters had the range and performance of a Zero in the LW 1941/42? Is your opinion based on facts or eye shape?


Resp:
Germany didn't need any aircraft carriers to dominate Europe, so your statement is moot. Their Navy did just fine in choking off allied support from the US to England for many years. 
It is true that the A6 Zero had tremendous range for a single engine fighter. Chennault in 1940/early 1941 sent a full report to both the RAF in England and the USAAF in the US. I can't speak for the British but the USAAF higher ups never took Chennalt's report on the Zero seriously, so it was not shared/disseminated. Maybe allied manufacturers would have incorporated greater range sooner.


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## taly01 (Sep 30, 2018)

The Japanese shot down plenty of P-38 in the Pacific mostly due to some P-38 pilots been overconfident, in the Battle of the Bismark sea off New Guinea three "ace" P-38's were shot down when their flight leader decided to jump into the middle of a big dogfight at lowish level over a convoy. 

The Ki-84 was not that maneouverable, but damn fast <20,000ft, the Japanese tested a P-51C captured in China and the test pilot says manoeuverability is the same as Ki-84, interestingly he said the Fw190A out accelerates both ( the Japanese had a test Fw190A-5).


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## Navalwarrior (Sep 30, 2018)

taly01 said:


> The Japanese shot down plenty of P-38 in the Pacific mostly due to some P-38 pilots been overconfident, in the Battle of the Bismark sea off New Guinea three "ace" P-38's were shot down when their flight leader decided to jump into the middle of a big dogfight at lowish level over a convoy.
> 
> The Ki-84 was not that maneouverable, but damn fast <20,000ft, the Japanese tested a P-51C captured in China and the test pilot says manoeuverability is the same as Ki-84, interestingly he said the Fw190A out accelerates both ( the Japanese had a test Fw190A-5).


Resp:
I wonder what type of fuel was used in the Japanese test. I don't doubt that some of their aircraft was very advanced, just believe they couldn't produce them in numbers needed. History shows that the first few years of WWII the Japanese military was a serious threat. Just ask the USMC. In just less than 24 hrs, two USN Admirals were killed at Guadalcanal during a night surface engagement, so the threat was REAL.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 30, 2018)

taly01 said:


> The Japanese shot down plenty of P-38 in the Pacific mostly due to some P-38 pilots been overconfident, in the Battle of the Bismark sea off New Guinea three "ace" P-38's were shot down when their flight leader decided to jump into the middle of a big dogfight at lowish level over a convoy.



You reference basically one battle, you name no names, could you be talking about Tommy McGuire? Do you have numbers and documented evidence to support your statement? Look at the PTO claims ratio for P-38s and then let's talk

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## pbehn (Sep 30, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> Germany didn't need any aircraft carriers to dominate Europe, so your statement is moot. Their Navy did just fine in choking off allied support from the US to England for many years.
> It is true that the A6 Zero had tremendous range for a single engine fighter. Chennault in 1940/early 1941 sent a full report to both the RAF in England and the USAAF in the US. I can't speak for the British but the USAAF higher ups never took Chennalt's report on the Zero seriously, so it was not shared/disseminated. Maybe allied manufacturers would have incorporated greater range sooner.


Germany did need aircraft carriers it just didn't have the industrial capacity to build and man them. Their navy did quite well in the early years choking off the route from North America not the USA there is another country called Canada which you may have heard of, or maybe not, they would not have done so well if the US Navy had not been led by people who were anti British and did actually know what they were doing.


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## pbehn (Sep 30, 2018)

Clayton Magnet said:


> jeez, that seems unnecessary


Well someone should point out that this guys opinion is not based in any way on facts but on the USA being the top dog and every other nation below, he spent an inordinate amount of time trying to prove that the USA was responsible for the Spitfires performance, no real mention of the UKs role in the P-51s performance. The only protagonist in WW2 he respects is Germany apart from the USA of course, you draw your conclusions and I draw mine. I spent years working with the Japanese in Japan and elsewhere, I recognise the anti Japanese sentiment in the posts, as I do the USA flag waving.


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## Navalwarrior (Sep 30, 2018)

pbehn said:


> Well someone should point out that this guys opinion is not based in any way on facts but on the USA being the top dog and every other nation below, he spent an inordinate amount of time trying to prove that the USA was responsible for the Spitfires performance, no real mention of the UKs role in the P-51s performance. The only protagonist in WW2 he respects is Germany apart from the USA of course, you draw your conclusions and I draw mine. I spent years working with the Japanese in Japan and elsewhere, I recognise the anti Japanese sentiment in the posts, as I do the USA flag waving.


Resp:
Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, the President ordered all Japanese living in America to be 'relocated.' In the small town where I live (far away from California) the US Govt somehow found out that there was a single Japanese family living here. As a result, a US Army truck arrived one day to retrieve this Japanese family. However, since they did not have an address, the senior officer (likely a junior off) stopped into a restaurant on the city square to ask directions. No one would tell the soldier where the family lived. A local Judge approached the Army Officer, saying 'these people aren't a threat to anyone.' 'I will take full responsibility for them,' and drew up a letter stating such. The soldiers left w the letter, never to return. The entire family remained in our town through the entire war. My next door neighbor is Japanese. Again you are making assumptions that are incorrect.

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 30, 2018)

Gentlemen, keep this non-political


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## taly01 (Oct 1, 2018)

> You reference basically one battle, you name no names, .....



Thanks to indexes I found it in "Fire in the Sky", We were talking about books in another thread!
"Bob (Faurot) was shot down in the second day of the Battle of the Bismark Sea (March 1943). On the second day we lost 3 P-38's (39th FS), which was almost unheard of................he was much too low and the enemy present in large numbers..."

I don't deny the P-38's speed and dive made it very tough for Japanese planes....

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## Clayton Magnet (Oct 1, 2018)

taly01 said:


> I don't deny the P-38's speed and dive made it very tough for Japanese planes....


the P-38's dive made it very tough for the Americans as well


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 1, 2018)

taly01 said:


> I don't deny the P-38's speed and dive made it very tough for Japanese planes....



Good to hear!

Now with that said, if you're going to come on this forum and make a statement "The Japanese shot down plenty of P-38 in the Pacific mostly due to some P-38 pilots been overconfident," bring some evidence along to back up your claim.

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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 1, 2018)

Clayton Magnet said:


> the P-38's dive made it very tough for the Americans as well


Not for the 25 PTO aces who had 10 or more victories - 7 of them had 20 or more!!

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## GregP (Oct 1, 2018)

The P-38 was the mount of our (U.S.A.) top two Aces. It cannot have been all that bad. 

All fighters have weaknesses, and the P-38 had a couple. But the pilot who can exploit the strengths of his mount and the weaknesses of the enemy planes at the same time will always do well. At least, Bong and McGuire did.

Of course, the Japanese also had their Aces, and they did quite well. 

I had the privledge to hear Saburo Sakai speak once back in the 1980s in Arizona, at Falcon Field at the old Doug Chamlpin Fighter Museum. He admitted the Zero was long in the tooth during the last part of the war, but said that many U.S. pilots didn't seem to know that or ignored it and tried to fight him in the Zero's strongest flight envelope area. They mostly didn't fare too well. Between 180 and 280 mph, the A6M was the best fighter airplane in the world ever to take wing. 

If I am not mistaken, Eric Brown said nearly the same thing in his books, too.

Cheers.


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 1, 2018)

GregP said:


> The P-38 was the mount of our (U.S.A.) top two Aces. It cannot have been all that bad.
> 
> All fighters have weaknesses, and the P-38 had a couple. But the pilot who can exploit the strengths of his mount and the weaknesses of the enemy planes at the same time will always do well. At least, Bong and McGuire did.
> 
> ...


Resp:
At a 2015 Airshow, I witnessed Flying Legend's A6M2 perform low speed manuvers at @ 150 ft. I had read about the Zero's ability to manuver at slow speeds but seeing it made me a true believer. It was like watching a glider with an engine, just hanging in the air. I would think any allied fighter would lose at low speed. This was the reason Chennault taught his P-40 pilots to dive into them and keep going; hit and run tactics.

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## fubar57 (Oct 1, 2018)

I think that aircraft has an American engine installed

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## Clayton Magnet (Oct 1, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> This was the reason Chennault taught his P-40 pilots to dive into them and keep going; hit and run tactics.


Did the AVG ever encounter Zero's? I thought they were engaged with Ki-43's in Burma


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## fubar57 (Oct 1, 2018)

Ki-43-I or A6M2 as AVG opponent

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## Navalwarrior (Oct 1, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> I think that aircraft has an American engine installed


Resp:
Their website states it uses a DC-3 engine, and I believe that part of the landing gear has been changed.


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## fubar57 (Oct 1, 2018)

Please don't "Resp:" me any more: way too pretentious for this motley crew. I won't answer again if I see it

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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 2, 2018)

Clayton Magnet said:


> Did the AVG ever encounter Zero's? I thought they were engaged with Ki-43's in Burma



The AVG never fought against the Zero. The AVG misidentified Oscars as Zeros. The IJN moved all their Zeros out of southern China and Vietnam several months prior to Pearl Harbor.

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## Navalwarrior (Oct 3, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The AVG never fought against the Zero. The AVG misidentified Oscars as Zeros. The IJN moved all their Zeros out of southern China and Vietnam several months prior to Pearl Harbor.


Resp:
Roger. Thanks.


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 4, 2018)

taly01 said:


> The Japanese shot down plenty of P-38 in the Pacific mostly due to some P-38 pilots been overconfident, in the Battle of the Bismark sea off New Guinea three "ace" P-38's were shot down when their flight leader decided to jump into the middle of a big dogfight at lowish level over a convoy.
> 
> The Ki-84 was not that maneouverable, but damn fast <20,000ft, the Japanese tested a P-51C captured in China and the test pilot says manoeuverability is the same as Ki-84, interestingly he said the Fw190A out accelerates both ( the Japanese had a test Fw190A-5).


Resp:
Does anyone have any info on the type/capacity of the drop tanks used on the P-38 for the Yamamoto 'shoot down?' It was my understanding the they were quickly flown in from Australia. Thanks.


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## taly01 (Oct 6, 2018)

> Does anyone have any info on the type/capacity of the drop tanks used on the P-38 for the Yamamoto 'shoot down?



Very Interesting question! 5th Air Force got Ford Australia to make drop tanks locally but I suspect the P-38 ones in early 1943 were US made.

"....Operation Vengeance on April 18, 1943, involving the use of 18 Lightnings on a flight of over 1,000 miles on a mission to eliminate Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. This required the maximum possible underslung quantity of fuel, and each of the aircraft carried one 330 and one 165 gallon fuel tank (for a total of 1820 litres of fuel in external tanks)...."

http://www.avia-it.com/act/cera_una_volta/echi/CUV_Echi_2016/Seg_art_giu_16/Drop_Tanks_USAAF.pdf


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 6, 2018)

taly01 said:


> Very Interesting question! 5th Air Force got Ford Australia to make drop tanks locally but I suspect the P-38 ones in early 1943 were US made.
> 
> "....Operation Vengeance on April 18, 1943, involving the use of 18 Lightnings on a flight of over 1,000 miles on a mission to eliminate Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. This required the maximum possible underslung quantity of fuel, and each of the aircraft carried one 330 and one 165 gallon fuel tank (for a total of 1820 litres of fuel in external tanks)...."
> 
> http://www.avia-it.com/act/cera_una_volta/echi/CUV_Echi_2016/Seg_art_giu_16/Drop_Tanks_USAAF.pdf


Resp:
Thanks much!


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## IdahoRenegade (Oct 10, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> What would be the "equally effective, less expensive aircraft", and when to do the re-tooling? ...The P-47 is equaly effective, but it is not less expensive (10% cheaper?). That leaves us with P-51, that AAF didn't think much of before late 1942....
> 
> The main shortcoming of the P-38 was that it was not produced in double the numbers, so all theaters can have it already by mid-1942, while easing the introduction of needed modifications.



Thing is, the '47 was not "equally effective", at least until very late in the war. The whole reason that '38s were finally rushed to the 8th in late '43 was that the '47 didn't have the range to provide a long range escort (or any form of long-range combat). Republic was very late in sorting out drop tank issues and adding internal fuel. And as good as the '51-B proved to be, even it didn't see combat until December, and was an unknown quantity until then. Throughout '42 and until DE '43, the '38 as the only long range fighter we had with performance to even come close to matching the performance of German fighters. Thing is, they (and the 47 and 51) managed to do so in spite of the huge advantage that German fighters had-the fact that they didn't have to be built with significant fuel capacity and were operating in a defensive mode. That says a lot for all 3 aircraft-that they had both the range to take the fight to the enemy, and the performance to at worst, hold their own, when they got there.

The other factor to consider is that long range escort is only one of the roles these planes were utilized for. The '38 could carry 4000lbs of bombs/rockets, vs ~1000lbs for the Mustang. You'd need 4 planes, and 4 pilots to do the work of 1 (yes, this is dramatically simplifying things).

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## tomo pauk (Oct 10, 2018)

IdahoRenegade said:


> Thing is, the '47 was not "equally effective", at least until very late in the war. The whole reason that '38s were finally rushed to the 8th in late '43 was that the '47 didn't have the range to provide a long range escort (or any form of long-range combat). Republic was very late in sorting out drop tank issues and adding internal fuel. And as good as the '51-B proved to be, even it didn't see combat until December, and was an unknown quantity until then. Throughout '42 and until DE '43, the '38 as the only long range fighter we had with performance to even come close to matching the performance of German fighters. Thing is, they (and the 47 and 51) managed to do so in spite of the huge advantage that German fighters had-the fact that they didn't have to be built with significant fuel capacity and were operating in a defensive mode. That says a lot for all 3 aircraft-that they had both the range to take the fight to the enemy, and the performance to at worst, hold their own, when they got there.



Problem with P-38 is that it also became effective against Luftwaffe very late in war. Due to it's plethora of shortcomings, that some were adressed (faulty heating, low rate of roll, just one generator, lousy diving abilities) and some did not (size & shape, blind spots due to shape & layout) it didn't managed to attain more than 1:1 loss/win ratio vs Luftwaffe. We can check out P-38s achievements during one day of Big Week (from Wikipedia):
_"Escort for Mission 228 is provided by 69 P-38s, 542 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 68 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 0-1-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 19-3-14 Luftwaffe aircraft, two P-47s are lost, two are damaged beyond repair, three are damaged and two pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 14-1-4 Luftwaffe aircraft, three P-51s are lost and the pilots are MIA. German losses were 30 Bf 109s and Fw 190s, 24 pilots killed and seven wounded."_

The article is not clear on how many LW A/C fell due to defensive MGs.

As for the German A/C having huge advantage due to not being designed for great fuel loads - yes, LW fighters were lighter, but those US fighters were powered by engines with 2 stages of supercharging, while P-51 also brought the next-gen aerodynamics. Better engines meant that, at 25000 ft, it was US aircraft that enjoyed major advantage in engine power.



> The other factor to consider is that long range escort is only one of the roles these planes were utilized for. The '38 could carry 4000lbs of bombs/rockets, vs ~1000lbs for the Mustang. You'd need 4 planes, and 4 pilots to do the work of 1 (yes, this is dramatically simplifying things).



P-51D was rated for 2x1000 lb bombs, and has 100 miles greater radius while doing it (350 vs. 250). P-38 is also twice the target size (important when there is Flak expected), and twice as expensive.

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## IdahoRenegade (Oct 10, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Problem with P-38 is that it also became effective against Luftwaffe very late in war. Due to it's plethora of shortcomings, that some were adressed (faulty heating, low rate of roll, just one generator, lousy diving abilities) and some did not (size & shape, blind spots due to shape & layout) it didn't managed to attain more than 1:1 loss/win ratio vs Luftwaffe. We can check out P-38s achievements during one day of Big Week (from Wikipedia):
> _"Escort for Mission 228 is provided by 69 P-38s, 542 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 68 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 0-1-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 19-3-14 Luftwaffe aircraft, two P-47s are lost, two are damaged beyond repair, three are damaged and two pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 14-1-4 Luftwaffe aircraft, three P-51s are lost and the pilots are MIA. German losses were 30 Bf 109s and Fw 190s, 24 pilots killed and seven wounded."_
> 
> The article is not clear on how many LW A/C fell due to defensive MGs.
> ...



Thanks for the correction on the bomb load of the '51. I should KNOW better than to ever trust Wikipedia even for a quick reference.

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## fubar57 (Oct 10, 2018)

Nothing wrong with Wiki. I use it mostly to scroll down to the Notes, Citations, External Links etc. and go from there though occasionally I will quote Wiki but I make damn sure I include that the source was Wiki


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## Kevin J (Oct 10, 2018)

IdahoRenegade said:


> Thanks for the correction on the bomb load of the '51. I should KNOW better than to ever trust Wikipedia even for a quick reference.


I make that mistake too.


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 10, 2018)

IdahoRenegade said:


> Thing is, the '47 was not "equally effective", at least until very late in the war. The whole reason that '38s were finally rushed to the 8th in late '43 was that the '47 didn't have the range to provide a long range escort (or any form of long-range combat). Republic was very late in sorting out drop tank issues and adding internal fuel. And as good as the '51-B proved to be, even it didn't see combat until December, and was an unknown quantity until then. Throughout '42 and until DE '43, the '38 as the only long range fighter we had with performance to even come close to matching the performance of German fighters. Thing is, they (and the 47 and 51) managed to do so in spite of the huge advantage that German fighters had-the fact that they didn't have to be built with significant fuel capacity and were operating in a defensive mode. That says a lot for all 3 aircraft-that they had both the range to take the fight to the enemy, and the performance to at worst, hold their own, when they got there.
> 
> The other factor to consider is that long range escort is only one of the roles these planes were utilized for. The '38 could carry 4000lbs of bombs/rockets, vs ~1000lbs for the Mustang. You'd need 4 planes, and 4 pilots to do the work of 1 (yes, this is dramatically simplifying things).


Resp:
Agree. A couple of points:
The pre-WWII UAAAC/USAAF bomber strategy did not include fighter escort, so long range (the need for drop tanks for the P-47) was not really addressed many months into the war. 
German fighters often got to 'strikes' against long range bombers; ingress and egress, by landing, refueling and rearming for another attack. Much like the BoB the advantage was with the defenders in air engagements.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 10, 2018)

The P-47 "clean" had roughly double the range of a Spitfire or 109 (also clean), it just wasn't enough to escort long range bombers. 
But nobody had fighter that would escort a B-17 to it's max radius in 1942 or early 1943.


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 10, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The P-47 "clean" had roughly double the range of a Spitfire or 109 (also clean), it just wasn't enough to escort long range bombers.
> But nobody had fighter that would escort a B-17 to it's max radius in 1942 or early 1943.


Resp:
Correct. But there were many bomber missions of lesser distances that the P-38 could have flown.

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## fubar57 (Oct 10, 2018)

http://www.historynet.com/p-38-flunked-europe.htm


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## michael rauls (Oct 10, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Problem with P-38 is that it also became effective against Luftwaffe very late in war. Due to it's plethora of shortcomings, that some were adressed (faulty heating, low rate of roll, just one generator, lousy diving abilities) and some did not (size & shape, blind spots due to shape & layout) it didn't managed to attain more than 1:1 loss/win ratio vs Luftwaffe. We can check out P-38s achievements during one day of Big Week (from Wikipedia):
> _"Escort for Mission 228 is provided by 69 P-38s, 542 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 68 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 0-1-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 19-3-14 Luftwaffe aircraft, two P-47s are lost, two are damaged beyond repair, three are damaged and two pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 14-1-4 Luftwaffe aircraft, three P-51s are lost and the pilots are MIA. German losses were 30 Bf 109s and Fw 190s, 24 pilots killed and seven wounded."_
> 
> The article is not clear on how many LW A/C fell due to defensive MGs.
> ...


Don't know for sure if this is true but I have read several times that the p38s continued to be teathered to the bombers on many missions for some time after the p47s and 51s were freed up to fly ahead of the bomber streems to break up German formations.
If this is true it would seem to account for some of the shortage of kills by p38s on early 44 missions. The pre L model p38s certainly had there shortcomings when it came to high altitude combat but certainly tactics like these didn't help matters. 
It seems like of all the aircraft that needed to be able to range out ahead of the bomber streems to be effective it would be the p38 even more than other aircraft. That is to say being teathered to the bombers in an aircraft with dive limitations while German aircraft made firering passes then dive away is a non starter as far as effectiveness.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 10, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> http://www.historynet.com/p-38-flunked-europe.htm


 Unfortunately that story, while correct in some parts, perpetuates some of the anti-P-38 myths. 
The pilots might have still froze but if the planes were flown at lower rpm and higher boost there may have been less trouble with turbochargers and the oil and the coolant and the fuel puddling in the intake manifolds. (the lead never came out, other compounds did, they were anti-knock compounds but they were not lead) 
If, for example, you use more boost from the turbo, the intake temperature will be higher. If you raise the intake temperature 100 degrees the peak temperature in the cylinders goes up 100 degrees and the exhaust goes up 100 degrees. Now the higher boost used at cruise may not result in a full 100 degrees but you get the idea. 
The article gives a couple of gas mileage figures but doesn't say at what speed or altitude. A P-38L could get around 3.3 mpg at 210mph indicated (over 300mph true) at 25,000ft while burning about 98 gallons an hour. 210mph indicated at 25,000ft was the standard speed the USAAF used for figuring combat radius. A MUstang was good for over 5 miles to gallon in such conditions. 
Unfortunately the USSAF was operating it's P-38s against the wishes of both Allison and Lockheed and using high rpm and low boost. This burned more fuel than needed and helped keep the intake tract cold (there were other reasons). The Article mentions Lindberg in the Pacific but ignores Tony Levier going to Europe and telling the pilots there pretty much the same thing at about the same time (May/June?) of 1944. which helped but was a bit late. 

However the article fails to mention that the P-38Gs, Hs and early Js only had 300 gallons of internal fuel in the fall 43/winter44 and it took a while for the Js and Ls with 410 gallons internal to show up. That 110 gallons was worth 200-300 miles of radius depending on exit speed. 
The photo recon planes had a lot less trouble with engines, in part because they cruised faster (engines hotter) but the pilots may still have froze.

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## fubar57 (Oct 10, 2018)

I just posts' em(the links) and let you guys quibble about it. Thanks though.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 10, 2018)

Thanks for the link and your effort even if I do disagree with it

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## tomo pauk (Oct 11, 2018)

michael rauls said:


> Don't know for sure if this is true but I have read several times that the p38s continued to be teathered to the bombers on many missions for some time after the p47s and 51s were freed up to fly ahead of the bomber streems to break up German formations.
> If this is true it would seem to account for some of the shortage of kills by p38s on early 44 missions. The pre L model p38s certainly had there shortcomings when it came to high altitude combat but certainly tactics like these didn't help matters.
> It seems like of all the aircraft that needed to be able to range out ahead of the bomber streems to be effective it would be the p38 even more than other aircraft. That is to say being teathered to the bombers in an aircraft with dive limitations while German aircraft made firering passes then dive away is a non starter as far as effectiveness.



USAF didn't went immediately for the 'frei jagd', or loose escort.


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 11, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The P-47 "clean" had roughly double the range of a Spitfire or 109 (also clean), it just wasn't enough to escort long range bombers.
> But nobody had fighter that would escort a B-17 to it's max radius in 1942 or early 1943.

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## Navalwarrior (Oct 11, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> View attachment 512719


Con't:
I suspect the August 1943 range is for the P-47 with a single 75 US gal belly tank. I wish this chart included range updates for the larger tanks, as when the P-47D-15 RE became available.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 11, 2018)

Range and radius are not the same thing. Ranges usually do not include a combat allowance for one thing. I also doubt very highly that a Spitfire in May of 1943 was operating at a 175 mile radius without some sort of drop tank as the early Spitfires were operating at about a 120 mile radius when "clean".

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## michael rauls (Oct 11, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Con't:
> I suspect the August 1943 range is for the P-47 with a single 75 US gal belly tank. I wish this chart included range updates for the larger tanks, as when the P-47D-15 RE became available.


If my memory serves in the book " Americas hundred thousand" it lists that combat radius for the p47d 15 with 300 gallons external fuel as 570 miles so it would be just a few miles short of the p51s line on the map.

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## BiffF15 (Oct 11, 2018)

Yes would be nice to know the specifics, I.E. which drop tanks when and of how many gallons.

Cheers,
Biff


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## tomo pauk (Oct 11, 2018)

michael rauls said:


> If my memory serves in the book " Americas hundred thousand" it lists that combat radius for the p47d 15 with 300 gallons external fuel as 570 miles so it would be just a few miles short of the p51s line on the map.





BiffF15 said:


> Yes would be nice to know the specifics, I.E. which drop tanks when and of how many gallons.
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff



<draws the book>

With 370 gals of internal fuel, plus 2x150 gal drop tanks, the 'bubble top' P-47D is supposed to have 600 miles of radius. Flight at 25000 ft, at 210 mph indicated air speed (~310 mph true air speed at that altitude, depending on temperature). Includes allowance for warm-up, take off, climb to 25000 ft, 5 min combat on WEP, 15 min combat on military power, and 30 min reserve. 305 gals internal + 2x150 gals ('razoback' P-47D) = 425 miles radius.
P-5B to K: 700 miles, with fuselage tank installed and 2x75 gal tanks, under same conditions.

<puts the book away, goes for the younger daughter to kindergarten>

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## michael rauls (Oct 11, 2018)

I went and dragged out " Americas hundred thousand" and the graph/ text are a little unclear as to which sub model D it is referring to with which range. In the text it just references "early" and "late" p47 Ds. On a graph just above the range table the early p47s are grouped into p47c to p47d-22 and later p47s into p47d-23 to p47 d-40.
The range.table then lists two combat radius for the p47d. The first is on 370 gal internal fuel only and is 225 miles. The 2nd is with 370 gallons internal and 300 external and is actually listed as 670 miles.
I would note that the aproxamitly 80% increase in fuel is yielding about a 150% increase in combat radius (never noticed this discrepancy before)according to this table so something doesn't seem right here. Perhaps some of the members with more knowledge than I could shed some additional light on this.


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## michael rauls (Oct 11, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> <draws the book>
> 
> With 370 gals of internal fuel, plus 2x150 gal drop tanks, the 'bubble top' P-47D is supposed to have 600 miles of radius. Flight at 25000 ft, at 210 mph indicated air speed (~310 mph true air speed at that altitude, depending on temperature). Includes allowance for warm-up, take off, climb to 25000 ft, 5 min combat on WEP, 15 min combat on military power, and 30 min reserve. 305 gals internal + 2x150 gals ('razoback' P-47D) = 425 miles radius.
> P-5B to K: 700 miles, with fuselage tank installed and 2x75 gal tanks, under same conditions.
> ...


Thanks for posting that. Which book did you draw that info from?


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## Shortround6 (Oct 11, 2018)

michael rauls said:


> I went and dragged out " Americas hundred thousand" and the graph/ text are a little unclear as to which sub model D it is referring to with which range. In the text it just references "early" and "late" p47 Ds. On a graph just above the range table the early p47s are grouped into p47c to p47d-22 and later p47s into p47d-23 to p47 d-40.
> The range.table then lists two combat radius for the p47d. The first is on 370 gal internal fuel only and is 225 miles. The 2nd is with 370 gallons internal and 300 external and is actually listed as 670 miles.
> I would note that the aproxamitly 80% increase in fuel is yielding about a 150% increase in combat radius (never noticed this discrepancy before)according to this table so something doesn't seem right here. Perhaps some of the members with more knowledge than I could shed some additional light on this.




It has to do with the difference between "range" ( taking off and flying in a straight line and at perhaps a lower than operational height and then landing**) 
and "Radius" which involves not only taking off and climbing to (probably a higher) altitude but a combat allowance of 15-20 minutes at perhaps double the fuel per minute of cruising, then the flight back and 20 minutes to one hour of reserve depending on which air force (US NAVY wanted one hour to find and land on the carrier). The part Tomo left out was that the drop tanks would be let go at the start of combat so the return flight is made on the internal fuel only _*after *_you take out the the fuel used for take-off and the combat allowance and allow for finding and airfield after you get back to England (or where ever). 

** Some "ranges" are calculated by magically levitating the plane to 5,000 or 10,000ft and figuring how far it could fly on the available fuel, no allowance made for starting, warm up and take-off and climb to cruising height and no reserve at the end.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 11, 2018)

I would note that the addition of 65 gallons of internal fuel to the later P-47s made a for a significant jump in radius. They took off on internal fuel (the fuel supply was more secure) and switched to drop tanks at a "safe height", flaps and landing gear up and enough time to restart the engine if it quit when switching over to the drop tanks. Climb, forming up and cruise to target is done on the drop tanks. Main tank gets a trickle of fuel back from the overflow line form the carb/injector during flight but nobody relied on that but does help explain why they used 15-30 gallons out of the main before going to drop tanks. If main was full the any overflow fuel was vented overboard and wasted. SO combat starts with full (nearly) internal tanks and a P-47 could suck down 4-5 gallons a minute at military power. That extra 65 gallons was worth 20-25 minutes at "get out of Dodge City" speeds or over 100 miles.

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## michael rauls (Oct 11, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> It has to do with the difference between "range" ( taking off and flying in a straight line and at perhaps a lower than operational height and then landing**)
> and "Radius" which involves not only taking off and climbing to (probably a higher) altitude but a combat allowance of 15-20 minutes at perhaps double the fuel per minute of cruising, then the flight back and 20 minutes to one hour of reserve depending on which air force (US NAVY wanted one hour to find and land on the carrier). The part Tomo left out was that the drop tanks would be let go at the start of combat so the return flight is made on the internal fuel only _*after *_you take out the the fuel used for take-off and the combat allowance and allow for finding and airfield after you get back to England (or where ever).
> 
> ** Some "ranges" are calculated by magically levitating the plane to 5,000 or 10,000ft and figuring how far it could fly on the available fuel, no allowance made for starting, warm up and take-off and climb to cruising height and no reserve at the end.


The 670 mile combat radius with 370 gallons internal and 300 external is specified with mission profile of 5min fuel for warm up and take off, climb to 25,000 feet,cruise at 25,000 feet, drop external tanks, 5 min at combat power, cruise back at 25,000 feet, and fuel reserves 30 min at minimum cruise power.
The 225 mile figure given for internal fuel only has no specifics as to mission profile.
What you say makes sense but it seems the more rigorous specifics given for the combat radius with the external fuel example as opposed to no specifics at all for the internal fuel only example combat radius would result in a lesser percentage increase in combat radius per gallon aditional in the mission specified example not more. In other words the more things that are aloted for the mission profile, warm up, take off, climb out etc. the more one would expect to see a decrease in combat radius percentage increase in relationship to percentage increase in fuel compared to a figure with no specifics but we have the oposite dynamic here Thats why im kinda questioning the figures in this book on the p47s combat radius. Could be something im not getting here.(wouldn't be the first time) but doesn't seem right to me.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 11, 2018)

michael rauls said:


> I went and dragged out " Americas hundred thousand" and the graph/ text are a little unclear as to which sub model D it is referring to with which range. In the text it just references "early" and "late" p47 Ds. On a graph just above the range table the early p47s are grouped into p47c to p47d-22 and later p47s into p47d-23 to p47 d-40.
> The range.table then lists two combat radius for the p47d. The first is on 370 gal internal fuel only and is 225 miles. The 2nd is with 370 gallons internal and 300 external and is actually listed as 670 miles.
> I would note that the aproxamitly 80% increase in fuel is yielding about a 150% increase in combat radius (never noticed this discrepancy before)according to this table so something doesn't seem right here. Perhaps some of the members with more knowledge than I could shed some additional light on this.



The bigger main tank, 270 gals, was installed on the P-47D-25 and later A/C, including the -M and -N. Together with reserve tank, it meant 370 gals in the fuselage (= the only internal fuel on those -Ds and all -Ms). Earier -Ds, all -Cs and -Bs have had 205 gals in the main tank.
Major increase of range/radius due to small addition of fuel is to be expected - extra 65 gals will net a good flying distance in cruise setting. Eg. an extra ~40 min of flight at 25000 ft with P-47's engine still making healthy ~1150 HP.



michael rauls said:


> Thanks for posting that. Which book did you draw that info from?



From "America's hundred thousand".

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## Navalwarrior (Oct 11, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> The bigger main tank, 270 gals, was installed on the P-47D-25 and later A/C, including the -M and -N. Together with reserve tank, it meant 370 gals in the fuselage (= the only internal fuel on those -Ds and all -Ms). Earier -Ds, all -Cs and -Bs have had 205 gals in the main tank.
> Major increase of range/radius due to small addition of fuel is to be expected - extra 65 gals will net a good flying distance in cruise setting. Eg. an extra ~40 min of flight at 25000 ft with P-47's engine still making healthy ~1150 HP.
> 
> 
> ...


Resp:
Anyone have any dates when the first 'wet wing' P-47D-15s arrived in the ETO? Also, just a 'note' on range//combat radius; I know that around the 3rd quarter of 1943, either the 56th or 78th FG flew to bases closer to the west coast of England to refuel, just to get 10 min or so more flying time.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 11, 2018)

Drop tanks can get a bit weird because they only came in certain sizes. For the P-47 which seems to be the poster child for different drop tank set ups, you had that critical distance of how far you could get back out of "Dodge" (Germany) with the two two different internal tank setups. The question in 1943/early 1944 was hanging enough fuel under the plane to reach that distance that the 305 gallons internal allowed. Once you reached it it didn't matter how much more fuel you hung underneath, you were going to drop the excess fuel when you set up for combat (unless, _perhaps, _you had a small belly tank you kept when you dropped the wing tanks) Later in 1944 with the 370 gallons of internal fuel you could use some what bigger under wing tanks to reach the new max "return" distance. 
there seems to have been a jump from 108-110 gallon tanks to 165 gallon tanks. I am not sure that either tank was an exact match ot the amount of return fuel.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 11, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> Anyone have any dates when the first 'wet wing' P-47D-15s arrived in the ETO? Also, just a 'note' on range//combat radius; I know that around the 3rd quarter of 1943, either the 56th or 78th FG flew to bases closer to the west coast of England to refuel, just to get 10 min or so more flying time.



'Wet wing' usualy means that part(s) of the wing was/were sealed, in order to carry fuel internally in the wing itself.
The 1st P-47s with wing racks probably came to the UK in August 1943 by overflying Atlantic in stages. I don't know whether such P-47s (ie. with wing racks) were used inn the ETO in more than token numbers before 1944.


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## michael rauls (Oct 11, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> The bigger main tank, 270 gals, was installed on the P-47D-25 and later A/C, including the -M and -N. Together with reserve tank, it meant 370 gals in the fuselage (= the only internal fuel on those -Ds and all -Ms). Earier -Ds, all -Cs and -Bs have had 205 gals in the main tank.
> Major increase of range/radius due to small addition of fuel is to be expected - extra 65 gals will net a good flying distance in cruise setting. Eg. an extra ~40 min of flight at 25000 ft with P-47's engine still making healthy ~1150 HP.
> 
> 
> ...


Ok thanks. I see the numbers you cited in the fuel systems section. I was just looking at graph/ table 34 which lists the total internal fuel capacity as 370 gal in both the internal fuel only combat radius example (225 miles)and the with 300 external gal of fuel example(670 miles). However the resulting range increase in the with external tanks example seems to iclude what would be resulting from the extra 65 gal internal in the later models without that being listed on the graph.
Perhaps a typographical error that slipped by the editing process.


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## eagledad (Oct 11, 2018)

Gentlemen,

From the Mighty Eighth War Manual pages 220-221:

From page 221
The 8th AF used 6 sizes of drop tanks, some sizes produced with paper or steel.

P-47 with 1 75 gallon steel tank (actually held 84 gallons) had a radius of 280 miles.
P-47 with 1 108 gallon steel or paper tank (108 gallons) had a radius of 325 miles.
P-47 with 1 150 gallon steel tank (165 gallons) had a radius of 375 miles.
P-47 with 2 150 gallon steel tanks (2x165 gallons) had a radius of 550 miles.
P-47 with 1 200 gallon paper tank (205 gallons) had a radius of 275 miles. *
P-47 with 1 200 gallon steel tank (215 gallons) had a radius of 480 miles.
*This tank had a poor aerodynamic shape, would not take pressurization, and would leak if fuel were left in the tank for a few hours. It also would bounce along under the fuselage once released. This was the first drop tank tried by the 8th in the spring/summer of 1943.

P-51 with 2 75 gallon steel tanks (2x84 gallons) had a radius of 650 miles.
P-51 with 2 108 gallon paper tanks (2x108 gallons) had a radius of 750 miles.
P-51 with 2 110 gallon steel tanks (2x110 gallons) had a radius of 750 miles.

P-38 with 2 165 gallon steel tanks (2x165 gallons) had a radius of 600 miles.

Other notes:
In March 1944, all 75 gallon drop tanks held by P-47 units were transferred to P-51 units because of a shortage.
With the arrival of the 150 gallon tank in February 1944, it soon became the favored tank used by P-47 units. With the tank on the centerline, the wing shackles were available for other ordinance. Two 150 gallon tanks were carried (one under each wing) but the load made handling difficult.

During the time the P-38 was used by the 8th Air Force used the 150 gallon drop tank. No other special tanks were made. This tank was not pressurized and had to be released at 20,000 feet

The book does not state how the radius was/is computed, nor does it mention the total internal fuel each model carried. 
FYI
Eagledad

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## Navalwarrior (Oct 11, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> 'Wet wing' usualy means that part(s) of the wing was/were sealed, in order to carry fuel internally in the wing itself.
> The 1st P-47s with wing racks probably came to the UK in August 1943 by overflying Atlantic in stages. I don't know whether such P-47s (ie. with wing racks) were used inn the ETO in more than token numbers before 1944.


Resp:
Roger on the 'wing racks' def. I know the wing racks plumb for fuel (P-47D-15 were first w 'wet pylons') didn't arrive until 1944. I believe at least one was on hand @ March 1944. Just not sure when they were first flown as escort.


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## eagledad (Oct 11, 2018)

Navalwarrior,

A P-47D-15-RE, serial 42-75635 was shot down by FLAK on March 6, 1944. The Pilot, Major F Nelander was POW. The P-47 was from the 362nd FG
Just confirming what you wrote.

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## Greyman (Oct 11, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Range and radius are not the same thing. Ranges usually do not include a combat allowance for one thing. I also doubt very highly that a Spitfire in May of 1943 was operating at a 175 mile radius without some sort of drop tank as the early Spitfires were operating at about a 120 mile radius when "clean".



I think I got my numbers right ...

Spitfire IX (Merlin 66) has 85 gallons.

Standard allowance for take-off and climb to 20,000 feet is 22.5 gallons
Five minutes of combat is 11.75 gallons

So we have 50.75 gallons to play with ...
At most economical speed we get a range of 352.41 miles
At maximum weak mix we get a range of 194.88 miles

So yeah, for that 175 mile combat radius it looks like we're gunna need a drop tank.

EDIT: unless it's acceptable to do the entire mission at 220 mph (most econ speed)

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## Shortround6 (Oct 11, 2018)

Greyman said:


> I think I got my numbers right ...
> 
> Spitfire IX (Merlin 66) has 85 gallons.
> 
> ...




Thanks, finding much detail on ranges for British fighters is a challenge. My only quibble is that the US used 5 minutes at WEP and 15 minutes at military power for the combat allowance so longer than 5 minutes could really cut into the Spitfires radius.

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## Greyman (Oct 12, 2018)

I get 145.2 mile radius for the Spitfire IX (Merlin 66) with:

take-off and climb to 20,000
15 minutes of maximum weak mix
5 minutes of combat power
remainder at maximum economical


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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

Greyman said:


> I think I got my numbers right ...
> 
> Spitfire IX (Merlin 66) has 85 gallons.
> 
> ...


I think you'll find that the only safe drop tank they could use for missions over Europe was the 30 gallon slipper tank, which you could retain in combat, IIRC radius of action was about 125 miles. There was a 45 gallon slipper tank that could be used safely for patrol work. There were also 90 and 170 gallon slipper tanks for ferrying, the later with armament reduced to 2 m/c IIRC. Both these tanks restricted the Spitfires to level flight only, no combat manoeuvres. So if you tried the 90 gal on a patrol mission, even the Me 110 would make mincemeat of you. A 60 gal Kittyhawk drop tank slung underneath a Seafire III gave you a combat radius of about 180 miles IIRC.

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## Mike Williams (Oct 12, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> I think you'll find that the only safe drop tank they could use for missions over Europe was the 30 gallon slipper tank, which you could retain in combat, IIRC radius of action was about 125 miles. There was a 45 gallon slipper tank that could be used safely for patrol work. There were also 90 and 170 gallon slipper tanks for ferrying, the later with armament reduced to 2 m/c IIRC. Both these tanks restricted the Spitfires to level flight only, no combat manoeuvres. So if you tried the 90 gal on a patrol mission, even the Me 110 would make mincemeat of you. A 60 gal Kittyhawk drop tank slung underneath a Seafire III gave you a combat radius of about 180 miles IIRC.



Spitfires used 90 gallon tanks on operations:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/150grade/1-squadron-oprep-27aug44.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/111-kennedy-10sept43.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/610-ORB-1sept44.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/130_Oprep-12Sept44.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/41-OpRep-17Sept44.jpg

45 gallon tanks too:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/150grade/165_oprep_16sept44.jpg


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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

Mike Williams said:


> Spitfires used 90 gallon tanks on operations:
> 
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/150grade/1-squadron-oprep-27aug44.jpg
> 
> ...


With one exception all these uses occurred in 1944 by which time the Luftwaffe was a spent force. The 1943 operation occurred at Salerno where the only Luftwaffe opposition was from Fw 190A jabos. Try that two years earlier and you're mincemeat for Me 110s.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 12, 2018)

Why can you carry 200 gallons under a P-47 and not be mincemeat for Bf 110s and yet the Spitfire with a 108 Us gallon (90 imp) is? 
BTW 2 years before Salerno and you have Spitfire Vs. 
Test in 1942 of a fully tropicalised Spitfire VB with 90 gallon tank shows a change in climb to 20,000ft to 10 minutes form 8 minutes when clean. 
I believe the 30 gallon tank was self sealing, I don't know if any of the 45 gallon tanks were.


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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Why can you carry 200 gallons under a P-47 and not be mincemeat for Bf 110s and yet the Spitfire with a 108 Us gallon (90 imp) is?
> BTW 2 years before Salerno and you have Spitfire Vs.
> Test in 1942 of a fully tropicalised Spitfire VB with 90 gallon tank shows a change in climb to 20,000ft to 10 minutes form 8 minutes when clean.
> I believe the 30 gallon tank was self sealing, I don't know if any of the 45 gallon tanks were.[/QUOTE
> IIRC, Thunderbolts with belly tanks had a hard time. The 1941 Spitfire Vb was outclassed by both the Fw 190A and the Bf 109F-4. In 1941, the 90 gal slipper tank was for ferry only, when used for patrol, even the Me 110 could destroy it.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 12, 2018)

The whole idea of drop tanks was that you dropped them when you engaged in combat. Not carried them with you during the fight.

This was the whole idea of limiting the operational radius to the distance you could fly (at a reasonable exit speed, higher than most economical cruise) _after _dropping the tank and fighting at full throttle (or near it) for 10-20 minutes and allowing 20-30 minutes to find the home field or alternate and land. 
Some of the later Spitfires did carry the 30 gal tank (or perhaps the 45 gal) in combat but then they had a lot more power (and used more fuel in combat).


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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The whole idea of drop tanks was that you dropped them when you engaged in combat. Not carried them with you during the fight.
> 
> This was the whole idea of limiting the operational radius to the distance you could fly (at a reasonable exit speed, higher than most economical cruise) _after _dropping the tank and fighting at full throttle (or near it) for 10-20 minutes and allowing 20-30 minutes to find the home field or alternate and land.
> Some of the later Spitfires did carry the 30 gal tank (or perhaps the 45 gal) in combat but then they had a lot more power (and used more fuel in combat).


The 30 gal slipper could be retained in combat, the 45 gal dropped, which worked okay if the attachment hooks worked properly.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 12, 2018)

More than one US aircraft found it couldn't jettison it's drop tanks when desired. 
at any rate here is a Data sheet for the Spit MK IX HF
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-hfix-ads.jpg

Now when figuring ranges or radius please note that this sheet may be making no allowance for a reserve for landing. Figure 10-11 gallons for flying 20 minutes after getting over dry land to find either home base or alternate airfield and to land (possibly with several other aircraft in landing pattern ahead of you).

Operational planning also has to consider (add in a fudge factor) for the worst performing plane of the squadron/group.


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## Mike Williams (Oct 12, 2018)

At times Spitfires fought, for various reasons, even with 90 gallon drop tank still attached; for example:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/126-Rae-14aug44


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 12, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> The 30 gal slipper could be retained in combat, the 45 gal dropped, which worked okay if the attachment hooks worked properly.


Resp:
So are you stating that the 30 gallon tank was designed to be retained during air-to-air combat (assuming it is empty) in lieu of dropping them?


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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> So are you stating that the 30 gallon tank was designed to be retained during air-to-air combat (assuming it is empty) in lieu of dropping them?


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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

No I read it somewhere on the internet. Yes, it could be dropped, but when you get bounced, do you have the time. The 45 gal had to be dropped. Anything above that and operating restrictions applied to the Spitfire flying it.

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## fubar57 (Oct 12, 2018)

I'm guessing by that statement that P-51/-47 aircraft always had the drop-tanks released before they were "bounced"


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## Shortround6 (Oct 12, 2018)

Yep, Us Americans had better eyesight and never got bounced.


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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> I'm guessing by that statement that P-51/-47 aircraft always had the drop-tanks released before they were "bounced"


I think they dropped them as soon as they entered what they thought would be the 'hot' zone. Except of course, Thunderbolts lumbered with belly tanks, they were 'screwed' because they couldn't drop them. You should remember that the Thunderbolt was developed in haste, about 18 months between first flight and service entry, 2 years between first flight and combat entry. The USAAF got it into service pretty fast as it had excellent high altitude capability which was needed in Europe, they sorted out the range issue later. The Mustang had already had the drop tank issue sorted before it went into combat in Europe in Dec 43. The P-51A of early 43 was drop tank compatible and the Na 73 had first flown a year before the Thunderbolt.


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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Yep, Us Americans had better eyesight and never got bounced.


When you're flying much higher and faster than the intercepting Germans then that should be the case. Its only when you're flying a Spitfire V, or even worse a LaGG-3 that you're really screwed.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 12, 2018)

The NA-73 first flew 7 months before the XP-47B. It also took quite a while to sort out the drop tank situation on both aircraft. Proper drop tanks being in very short supply in Europe in the fall of 1943. 
The Initial P-51Bs arrived in England without either rear tanks or being drop tank capable (or drop tanks were not available) and their first few missions were without drop tanks. On their first missions with tanks they used 75 gallon ones, Lightings flying on the same missions are also using 75 gallon drop tanks. despite having used much larger tanks well before this. But there is a problem using some fuel tanks at high altitudes. 
A few P-47s had been ferried to England using a pair of P-38 165 gallon tanks at the end of Aug 1943 but it is only in Jan 1944 that a program is started to re-equipe/refit ALL P-47s to take under wing fuel tanks or bombs. 

Somewhere we may have the dates that various tanks went into service but it is a confused affair with some tanks being able to be used at low altitudes only and/or different pumps having to be fitted to the aircraft.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 12, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> When you're flying much higher and faster than the intercepting Germans then that should be the case. Its only when you're flying a Spitfire V, or even worse a LaGG-3 that you're really screwed.



The US did not always have the altitude advantage. Between radar and the bomber stream flying at 180-200mph the Germans often had 1-2 hours warning of incoming raids. If the 109 couldn't get to 30,000ft in an hour the Germans should have just surrendered in 1943.

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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The US did not always have the altitude advantage. Between radar and the bomber stream flying at 180-200mph the Germans often had 1-2 hours warning of incoming raids. If the 109 couldn't get to 30,000ft in an hour the Germans should have just surrendered in 1943.


The Germans were sneaky, they just waited until the Thunderbolts ran out of fuel and turned home in 1943. Then they attacked the bombers,


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 12, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> The Germans were sneaky, they just waited until the Thunderbolts ran out of fuel and turned home in 1943. Then they attacked the bombers,


Resp:
Very true. So much so that the 78th FG (and 56th) fitted their old 200 gal Ferry Tanks (which hindered their maneuverability and often would not jettison) to their P-47s (July? 1943) in order to gain a few extra miles. The 78th actually caught the Luftwaffe off guard and shot down several of their aircraft. The Germans thought they were untouchable. Surprise, surprise!

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## Navalwarrior (Oct 12, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The NA-73 first flew 7 months before the XP-47B. It also took quite a while to sort out the drop tank situation on both aircraft. Proper drop tanks being in very short supply in Europe in the fall of 1943.
> The Initial P-51Bs arrived in England without either rear tanks or being drop tank capable (or drop tanks were not available) and their first few missions were without drop tanks. On their first missions with tanks they used 75 gallon ones, Lightings flying on the same missions are also using 75 gallon drop tanks. despite having used much larger tanks well before this. But there is a problem using some fuel tanks at high altitudes.
> A few P-47s had been ferried to England using a pair of P-38 165 gallon tanks at the end of Aug 1943 but it is only in Jan 1944 that a program is started to re-equipe/refit ALL P-47s to take under wing fuel tanks or bombs.
> 
> Somewhere we may have the dates that various tanks went into service but it is a confused affair with some tanks being able to be used at low altitudes only and/or different pumps having to be fitted to the aircraft.


Yes to the 165 gal ferry tanks, but special plumbing was rigged to run fuel from these wing mounted tanks to the engine. The first wing pylon p-47s were for ordinance so we're not plumbed (crazy!). It would be months into 1944 before the plumbed wing pylons could carry drop tanks (P-47D-15s).

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## Navalwarrior (Oct 12, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> I think they dropped them as soon as they entered what they thought would be the 'hot' zone. Except of course, Thunderbolts lumbered with belly tanks, they were 'screwed' because they couldn't drop them. You should remember that the Thunderbolt was developed in haste, about 18 months between first flight and service entry, 2 years between first flight and combat entry. The USAAF got it into service pretty fast as it had excellent high altitude capability which was needed in Europe, they sorted out the range issue later. The Mustang had already had the drop tank issue sorted before it went into combat in Europe in Dec 43. The P-51A of early 43 was drop tank compatible and the Na 73 had first flown a year before the Thunderbolt.


Resp:
Actually, the A-36A was the first Mustang airframe to be drop tank capable. Since NAA incorporated wing pylons for ordnance, they went a step further and plumbed them (did not ask the USAAF). Since the P-51A soon joined the A-36A on the production line (built side-by-side) NAA only deleted the dive brakes (keep it simple, stupid!). The plumbing was retained.

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## Kevin J (Oct 12, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> Actually, the A-36A was the first Mustang airframe to be drop tank capable. Since NAA incorporated wing pylons for ordnance, they went a step further and plumbed them (did not ask the USAAF). Since the P-51A soon joined the A-36A on the production line (built side-by-side) NAA only deleted the dive brakes (keep it simple, stupid!). The plumbing was retained.


Yes, just found that. The drop tank requirement wasn't required by the USAAF for the A-36A, and it was North American's decision to incorporate the feature. I guess it simplified production?


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## pbehn (Oct 12, 2018)

Without enemy activity a P-51 B/D could fly from UK to Berlin return overland in UK and go back to Berlin then land in UK given perfect conditions. The radius lines drawn on a map are practical limits of how far they could escort a bomber group of the time in squadron strength allowing a time for them to actually fight. Operations always eat into any contingency so the contingencies built in were huge. Despite all the margins for form up escort combat and return pilots did land running on little more than fresh air, and an unknown number didn't make it back at all.


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## pbehn (Oct 12, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> No I read it somewhere on the internet. Yes, it could be dropped, but when you get bounced, do you have the time. The 45 gal had to be dropped. Anything above that and operating restrictions applied to the Spitfire flying it.


I believe it is a calculation, keeping a 45 gal slipper tank on throughout the mission increases the drag so much that its overall loss of range and top speed means it isn't a benefit.


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## Kevin J (Oct 13, 2018)

pbehn said:


> I believe it is a calculation, keeping a 45 gal slipper tank on throughout the mission increases the drag so much that its overall loss of range and top speed means it isn't a benefit.


Loss of top speed with a slipper tank on the Spitfire Vb TROP was 5 mph with a 30 gal one rising to 16.5 mph with a 90 gal one.


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## Greyman (Oct 13, 2018)

pbehn said:


> I believe it is a calculation, keeping a 45 gal slipper tank on throughout the mission increases the drag so much that its overall loss of range and top speed means it isn't a benefit.



At most economical speed, the Spitfire IX gained 287 miles in range if the 45-gallon tank was used and dropped halfway, and 251 miles if kept on throughout the mission.

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## Mike Williams (Oct 13, 2018)

Let us not forget the Spitfire VII which had somewhat better range and was operational by early 1943.

Spitfire VII aircraft data card







The 90 gallon drop tank was in widespread use in UK based Spitfires. Note again the use of 90 gallon drop tank in the following combat report. 






In this instance the mission was a sweep from Culmhead to Tours, a straight line distance of approximately 300 miles one way.

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## Kevin J (Oct 13, 2018)

Greyman said:


> At most economical speed, the Spitfire IX gained 287 miles in range if the 45-gallon tank was used and dropped halfway, and 251 miles if kept on throughout the mission.


Flying at most economical speed anywhere near or over the coast of Europe in 1941/42 was going to get you killed. The Spitfire V's acceleration was slow, pilots were advised to fly at max cruise IIRC. As for retaining the 45 gal slipper tank, again its going to get you killed, even by Me 110's, as happened in 1941 to a squadron of Spitfires flying cover for a downed pilots rescue attempt off the Hague..


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## Navalwarrior (Oct 13, 2018)

pbehn said:


> I believe it is a calculation, keeping a 45 gal slipper tank on throughout the mission increases the drag so much that its overall loss of range and top speed means it isn't a benefit.


Resp:
I would think the use of additional fuel (drop tank) puts the aircraft in an area it wouldn't have normally been. Looking at it from an economical or requiring a high rate of benefit would likely have prevented trials and testing from ever occurring. I know that in mid to late 1943 the USAAF 8th AF was willing to try anything (78th FG using 200 gal ferry tanks, etc) to get even a few more miles . . .to put them where they could engage the enemy. 
Bomber loses were excessive, and cries from Bomber Command for more fighter coverage was heard. Just my two cents.


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## pbehn (Oct 13, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> Flying at most economical speed anywhere near or over the coast of Europe in 1941/42 was going to get you killed. The Spitfire V's acceleration was slow, pilots were advised to fly at max cruise IIRC. As for retaining the 45 gal slipper tank, again its going to get you killed, even by Me 110's, as happened in 1941 to a squadron of Spitfires flying cover for a downed pilots rescue attempt off the Hague..


45 gallons is about twenty minutes to one hours fuel from most to least economical. If you maintain a high cruise speed from start to finish, the extra weight and drag could mean that no real improvement in range resulted.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 13, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> Flying at most economical speed anywhere near or over the coast of Europe in 1941/42 was going to get you killed. The Spitfire V's acceleration was slow, pilots were advised to fly at max cruise IIRC. As for retaining the 45 gal slipper tank, again its going to get you killed, even by Me 110's, as happened in 1941 to a squadron of Spitfires flying cover for a downed pilots rescue attempt off the Hague..



I believe they were instructed to fly at speeds that were a compromise between most economical and max cruise and to adjust the speed to the area they were in rather than a blanket one sentence "fits all" solution. Like flying under the German radar screens on the approach could be done at most economical, then increasing the cruise speeds.
A memo put out in Aug of 1942 has eight paragraphs and a further note/Memo called Safety Fast-Or Prune's guide for living is also about 8 paragraphs which repeats some of the same points. there was also an attached appendix of various speeds/altitudes and throttle settings for different fuel consumptions.
Several pf the paragraphs talk about mission planning and speeds to be flown in different areas that have different levels of threat.
For the fuel consumption at 10,000ft three different speeds are listed, each with 2 different throttle settings. There are a few misprints in the table.(or at least in the reproduction in one of Alfred Price's books). some of these throttle settings could show differences of 2-6 gallons per hour for the same speed (low rpm high boost gave best results, a fact well known before the summer of 1942.

Max cruise for a formation is also different than max cruise for a single airplane. In Aug 1942 the max cruise setting successfully used by a wing was 2650rpm and 5lbs of boost. Stringing your formation out with each plane running at a slightly different speed is also a recipe for disaster.

In the areas of the highest threat the highest possible cruise speed that the formation could use was the way to go. But blasting along at max cruise in areas of lower threat could well mean going for a swim or dinghy test.

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## Mike Williams (Oct 13, 2018)

This page from 91 Squadron's Diary is interesting as it shows their first fighter sweep to France (Reams area, 11th May 1944 ) with Spitfire XIVs , use of 90 gallon drop tanks and miles covered (460). West Malling (their base) to Reims (their destination) is 213 miles in a straight line, one way.

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## Kevin J (Oct 13, 2018)

Mike Williams said:


> This page from 91 Squadron's Diary is interesting as it shows their first fighter sweep to France (Reams area, 11th May 1944 ) with Spitfire XIVs , use of 90 gallon drop tanks and miles covered (460). West Malling (their base) to Reims (their destination) is 213 miles in a straight line, one way.
> 
> View attachment 512965


Spitfire XIV as opposed to Spitfire V which was the most numerous Fighter Command fighter until 1943. Less than 1000 Spitfire IX's were built between 1942 and 1943 and these had to be allocated between Britain, the Commonwealth, our European allies and the Americans being assigned to both the ETO and MTO. In my comments, I should have made it clearer that I was referring to the use of the slipper tanks by Spitfire V's, although I thought the restrictions on the larger tanks use continued.


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## pbehn (Oct 13, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> Spitfire XIV as opposed to Spitfire V which was the most numerous Fighter Command fighter until 1943. Less than 1000 Spitfire IX's were built between 1942 and 1943 and these had to be allocated between Britain, the Commonwealth, our European allies and the Americans being assigned to both the ETO and MTO. In my comments, I should have made it clearer that I was referring to the use of the slipper tanks by Spitfire V's, although I thought the restrictions on the larger tanks use continued.


True, but if you are doing anything that involves conflict with Germany's best you would always use squadrons which had the latest model. The RAFs front line strength of Spitfires was rarely more than 1000 in Europe. The wastage of fighter aircraft in WW2 is hard to believe in the modern era. A Merlin engine was in need of overhaul after 250 hours service, some were overhauled but many more were just replaced with the latest model.


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## Kevin J (Oct 13, 2018)

pbehn said:


> True, but if you are doing anything that involves conflict with Germany's best you would always use squadrons which had the latest model. The RAFs front line strength of Spitfires was rarely more than 1000 in Europe. The wastage of fighter aircraft in WW2 is hard to believe in the modern era. A Merlin engine was in need of overhaul after 250 hours service, some were overhauled but many more were just replaced with the latest model.


It was about 50 aircraft per squadron for every 6 month period in the front line. IIRC, there were 57 squadrons of Spitfires at the end of 1941, that means the RAF was going to lose 2850 (total) / 3 (proportion in the front line) * 2 (6 months period in year) or 1900 per year just in front line operations whether through accidents, write offs or destroyed in combat. No wonder the Luftwaffe claimed the Spitfire as the second on the list for enemy fighters destroyed. 
3300 Typhoons built in a three and a half year period, 18 in the 2nd TAF, 9 in ADGB, replacements at 950 pa, only 260 aerial victories, so (27 * 50 ) / 3 * 2 or 900 losses pa. 
Life expectancy of a new Thunderbolt pilot in a fighter bomber unit, 3 weeks, worst than an officer in the trenches in WW1 which was 6 weeks.


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## Mike Williams (Oct 14, 2018)

Further to the issue of Spitfire XIV range, prior to joining the 2nd TAF on the continent, Spitfire XIV squadrons based in the UK and equipped with 90 gallon drop tanks were escorting bombers to the Ruhr area in Germany, considered by the units to be “to the limit of endurance”.
For example:
11 Sept. 1944: 350 and 402 Squadrons - Hawkinge to Kamen/Ruhr, Germany – 282 mile radius.
610 and 130 Squadrons – Lympne to Gelsenkirchen, Germany – 264 mile radius.
12 Sept. 1944: 130, 350 and 610 Squadrons – Lympne to Wanne Eickel, Germany – 269 mile radius.
402 Squadron - Hawkinge to Wanne Eickel, Germany – 262 mile radius.
Also on 12 Sept. 1944 : 130 and 350 Squadrons – Lympne to Dortmund, Germany – 280 mile radius.
Refer back to:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/350-ORB-11Sept44.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/130_Oprep-12Sept44.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/402-Form541-12Sept44.jpg

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## pbehn (Oct 14, 2018)

Mike Williams said:


> Further to the issue of Spitfire XIV range, prior to joining the 2nd TAF on the continent, Spitfire XIV squadrons based in the UK and equipped with 90 gallon drop tanks were escorting bombers to the Ruhr area in Germany, considered by the units to be “to the limit of endurance”.


It would have to be the limit of endurance unless more internal fuel could be carried. More external fuel would result in a plane reaching a place it couldn't fly back from unless it went into combat with a 90+ gallon tank attached.

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## Mike Williams (Oct 14, 2018)

pbehn said:


> It would have to be the limit of endurance unless more internal fuel could be carried. More external fuel would result in a plane reaching a place it couldn't fly back from unless it went into combat with a 90+ gallon tank attached.



Considering the Spitfire XIV had a range of 350 miles with internal fuel, operating at max continuous and subtracting 55 miles to allow for 5 minutes combat, the Spitfire XIV squadrons' own assessment would seem to be in reasonable agreement with the range shown on the aircraft data card.

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## pbehn (Oct 14, 2018)

I agree, the problem comes when 5 minutes combat becomes 15 minutes or more.


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## BiffF15 (Oct 14, 2018)

pbehn said:


> I agree, the problem comes when 5 minutes combat becomes 15 minutes or more.



That’s a problem still in existence today. The fuel gauge has an adjustable bingo bug / setting and when reached says “bingo fuel” in your headset. Training almost removes this from today, as in we learn how much fuel is used for a 360 degree turn in full afterburner, along with always flying with an eye on the fuel gauge. Also you learn how to fly a min fuel recovery as well.

Success means you get the plane and pilot back.

Cheers,
Biff

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## pbehn (Oct 14, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> That’s a problem still in existence today. The fuel gauge has an adjustable bingo bug / setting and when reached says “bingo fuel” in your headset. Training almost removes this from today, as in we learn how much fuel is used for a 360 degree turn in full afterburner, along with always flying with an eye on the fuel gauge. Also you learn how to fly a min fuel recovery as well.
> 
> Success means you get the plane and pilot back.
> 
> ...


There are many things overlooked in the discussion, a 5 minute combat usually means descending and therefore climbing back up, which is the same as combat in terms of fuel consumption and just gets you back you where you were in terms of the formation but may have you even further from base. Also frequently forgotten when drawing a radius of range is that the formations rarely flew from base to target. Any allied raid from East Anglia straight to Dresden takes you nicely over the Dutch ports and the Ruhrgebiet which had massive flak defences. The calculation for range on a P-51 was not the actual range of the plane doing a peacetime test, it was practical calculation of what a squadron could do in war time while doing its job. An escort group having the choice of staying with the bombers or dropping in the North Sea is a disaster but was a real possibility.

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## pbehn (Oct 14, 2018)

Another thing over looked in term of range is that a single engine fighter can fly to berlin and back and its path would be a straight line. The turning radius of a bomb group is so huge it adds to the length of the trip, Fubar posted a map of an actual mission there is a huge loop over the target which adds miles to the mission, in general, everything you can think of, and lots of things you cant add to the missions actual range.

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## pbehn (Oct 14, 2018)

Tail winds would obviously be an advantage in terms of range, however winds over Europe are in streams, if they result in an escort group missing the bomb group at the RDV point they gain no advantage because they must stooge about waiting or race to catch up. so nothing is gained from the tail wind and it can be a headwind returning home. This is why the allies USA and UK had a massive joint investment in a basically joint operation to make sense of the weather.


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## Kevin J (Oct 15, 2018)

Mike Williams said:


> Further to the issue of Spitfire XIV range, prior to joining the 2nd TAF on the continent, Spitfire XIV squadrons based in the UK and equipped with 90 gallon drop tanks were escorting bombers to the Ruhr area in Germany, considered by the units to be “to the limit of endurance”.
> For example:
> 11 Sept. 1944: 350 and 402 Squadrons - Hawkinge to Kamen/Ruhr, Germany – 282 mile radius.
> 610 and 130 Squadrons – Lympne to Gelsenkirchen, Germany – 264 mile radius.
> ...


So the question here is: have Supermarine sorted out the 'no manoeuvres with 90 gal slipper tank' problem or is it the fact that the Luftwaffe has been cleansed from the skies over Western Europe which enables these tanks to be used as drop tanks?


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## wuzak (Oct 15, 2018)

COMBAT PERFORMANCE WITH 90 GALLON LONG-RANGE TANKS
50. As the Spitfire XIV has a very short range it has been assumed that when a long-range tank is to be carried, it is most likely to be the 90 gallon tank rather than the 30 gallon or 45 gallon. Pending further instructions, no drops or trials have been carried out with the 30 gallon or 45 gallon tanks. The aircraft's performance with either can be estimated from the results given below of trials with the 90 gallon long-range tank.
Drops
51. The aircraft was fitted with assistor springs as for the Spitfire IX. Two drops were made with empty tanks at 50 ft and 25,000 ft, A.S.I. 250 mph, with no trouble. Cine photographs were taken and show the tank dropping quite clear of the aircraft. Further trials would be necessary to check these results thoroughly.
Speeds
52. About 20 m.p.h. is knocked off the maximum speed and correspondingly off the speed at intermediate throttle settings. The aircraft is still faster than the FW.190 (BMW.801D) and the Me.109G above 20,000 ft.
Climb
53. Climb is most affected. With a half-full tank its maximum climb becomes identical with the Spitfire IX without the tank. Even with a full tank it can therefore climb as fast as the FW.190 or Me.109G. Its zoom climb is hardly affected.
Dive
54. So long as the tank is more than 1/3 full, the dive acceleration is similar.
Turning Circle
55. The Spitfire XIV now has a definitely wider turning circle than before, but is still within those of the FW.190 (BMW.801D) and Me.109G.
Rate of Roll
56. Similar.
Conclusions
57. Even with the 90 gallon tank, the Spitfire XIV can equal or outclass the FW.190 (BMW.801D) and the Me.109G in every respect. Its main advantages remain the tight turn and maximum climb.

Spitfire Mk XIV Tactical Trials

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## Mike Williams (Oct 15, 2018)

wuzak said:


> COMBAT PERFORMANCE WITH 90 GALLON LONG-RANGE TANKS
> 50. As the Spitfire XIV has a very short range it has been assumed that when a long-range tank is to be carried, it is most likely to be the 90 gallon tank rather than the 30 gallon or 45 gallon. Pending further instructions, no drops or trials have been carried out with the 30 gallon or 45 gallon tanks. The aircraft's performance with either can be estimated from the results given below of trials with the 90 gallon long-range tank.
> Drops
> 51. The aircraft was fitted with assistor springs as for the Spitfire IX. Two drops were made with empty tanks at 50 ft and 25,000 ft, A.S.I. 250 mph, with no trouble. Cine photographs were taken and show the tank dropping quite clear of the aircraft. Further trials would be necessary to check these results thoroughly.
> ...



Exactly, thanks wuzak!

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## wuzak (Oct 15, 2018)

Mike Williams said:


> Exactly, thanks wuzak!



You're welcome.

And thank you for digging up such reports and hosting them on your site.

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## Navalwarrior (Nov 2, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The NA-73 first flew 7 months before the XP-47B. It also took quite a while to sort out the drop tank situation on both aircraft. Proper drop tanks being in very short supply in Europe in the fall of 1943.
> The Initial P-51Bs arrived in England without either rear tanks or being drop tank capable (or drop tanks were not available) and their first few missions were without drop tanks. On their first missions with tanks they used 75 gallon ones, Lightings flying on the same missions are also using 75 gallon drop tanks. despite having used much larger tanks well before this. But there is a problem using some fuel tanks at high altitudes.
> A few P-47s had been ferried to England using a pair of P-38 165 gallon tanks at the end of Aug 1943 but it is only in Jan 1944 that a program is started to re-equipe/refit ALL P-47s to take under wing fuel tanks or bombs.
> 
> Somewhere we may have the dates that various tanks went into service but it is a confused affair with some tanks being able to be used at low altitudes only and/or different pumps having to be fitted to the aircraft.


Resp: All Mustangs from the A-36A/P-51A onward, including P-51Bs came drop tank capable from the NAA factory. Part of the drop tank problem in the ETO was due to a miscommunication (or an assumption) by Gen Eaker that the British would build drop tanks for the 8th AF. Eaker initially requested an order (sometime in 1943) for drop tanks from the US, but cancelled this request after meeting with British authorities. Eaker failed to follow-up on his request. Gen Hap Arnold was not happy. Just FYI.

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## Reluctant Poster (Nov 18, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> During a Lockheed Management Club meeting I attended around 1982/ 83, Kelly Johnson was a guest speaker. I distinctly remember him saying that he wanted to put a stick in the P-38 as well as several other mods. You'll find that a lot of items installed on aircraft aren't always decided by the manufacturer.


See my earlier post (247) uploading the NACA study of control forces. I assume the inertia of the twin engines required the greater force that could be exerted by a wheel. Perhaps the boosted controls would have allowed a stick to be substituted.
I find it interesting that bad features on aircraft are always forced on the designers. It reminds me that the referee is always the one to blame when your team loses.


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## BiffF15 (Nov 18, 2018)

Don't forget that the pilot is the ultimate chump in that food chain...


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## Greyman (Nov 18, 2018)

Reluctant Poster said:


> Perhaps the boosted controls would have allowed a stick to be substituted.



I would assume this was the case. Testing on the boosted aileron Lightning showed that aileron control forces were a non-issue.


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## Reluctant Poster (Nov 18, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Unfortunately that story, while correct in some parts, perpetuates some of the anti-P-38 myths.
> The pilots might have still froze but if the planes were flown at lower rpm and higher boost there may have been less trouble with turbochargers and the oil and the coolant and the fuel puddling in the intake manifolds. (the lead never came out, other compounds did, they were anti-knock compounds but they were not lead)
> If, for example, you use more boost from the turbo, the intake temperature will be higher. If you raise the intake temperature 100 degrees the peak temperature in the cylinders goes up 100 degrees and the exhaust goes up 100 degrees. Now the higher boost used at cruise may not result in a full 100 degrees but you get the idea.
> The article gives a couple of gas mileage figures but doesn't say at what speed or altitude. A P-38L could get around 3.3 mpg at 210mph indicated (over 300mph true) at 25,000ft while burning about 98 gallons an hour. 210mph indicated at 25,000ft was the standard speed the USAAF used for figuring combat radius. A MUstang was good for over 5 miles to gallon in such conditions.
> ...



Actually the F-5 suffered the same problems as the P-38
Dr Alfred Price from “Spitfire in Combat”
“Initially the 7th Photo Group flew the F-5, the reconnaissance version of the P-38 Lightning fighter. This aircraft was vulnerable to interception during deep penetrations into enemy territory, however, and it has serviceability problems. One squadron in the group was therefore equipped with Spitfire PR XIs, and operated the type for the rest of the conflict.”
Roger Freeman from “The Mighty Eighth War Manual” 
“Even before the first 8th Air force F-5As became operational, some disquiet was expressed in USAAF circles as to their suitability for the task.”
“Short comings of the F-5A and F-5B were principally insufficient ceiling and range for the type of operations conducted. Further, it could not accommodate cameras of 36-inch focal length which were desirable to obtain more detailed images.”
“On 14 December 1943 General Eaker informed the RAF that the current model P-38 used for photographic reconnaissance by 7th group was not to the standard required. As improved models would not be available for a few months, he inquired if it would be possible to obtain the use of 12 Spitfire XI’s to tide them over.”
“The Spitfires were used almost exclusively for the deepest penetrations of enemy airspace or to areas where the risk of interception was the greatest. Pilots with F-5 experience found the Spitfire cockpit cramped and noisy by comparison, plus a degree of vibration not evident with the smoother running Allisons. Performance was another matter for the Spitfire provided speed, range and altitude that could not be achieved with the Lightning models on hand in the winter of 1943-44. Few technical problems arose with the Spitfire in 7th Group service, although there was some trouble with the fuel system vapour lock during July/August 1944 caused by hot weather at ground level. The Group’s Spitfires had only a 5 per cent mechanical failure rate over their operational period. It was estimated that the Spitfire took but one third of the maintenance time required for the F-5 and had a 70 per cent availability, which 7th Group stated would have been even higher if the supply of spare parts had been simplified.”
“The F-5A suffered the same operating problems as contemporary P-38s operating at high altitudes, cutting out and pre-detonation, which sometimes prevented operation above 22,000 feet – although the minimum safe altitude for photo reconnaissance was advised as 24,000 feet. Little could be done about this problem.”
“Both versions (talking about the F-5B & C(my note)) were prone to the same engine troubles experienced with the fighter P-38Js. In March 1944 the position was critical with aircraft grounded through engine failures.”

Tom Ivie in “Aerial Reconnaissance – the 10th Photo Recon Group in World War II”
“The F-5s normally ranged 100-150miles from their bases, but at times they were as deep as 250-275 miles.”

Patricia Fussell Keen in “Eyes of the Eighth – A Story of the 7th Photographic Reconnaissance Group”
“About the time the 14th pilots arrived at Mount Farm the USAAF confirmed disturbing evidence of major flaws in its primary photo reconnaissance plane. The Eighth Air Force knew that its primary camera platform could not perform satisfactorily at high altitudes”
“By the middle of July 1943 it became apparent to headquarters that the limitations of the P-38G (F-5A) had probably cost lives. As well as altitude problems, the unarmed F-5A, which used speed to evade pursuit, had problems escaping enemy aircraft when carrying drop tanks on long flights. The high loss of pilots under these conditions prompted the USAAF to issue an order on 15 July 1943 restricting aircraft of Station 231 to a 300 mile radius on operational missions. As a result of this order, the newly formed 7th Group had to turn the jobs over to the RAF.”
“Spitfires allowed the 14th Squadron to fly longer missions and deeper missions into Germany. One major target remained primary in everyone’s mind, Berlin. When the big raid came, Headquarters would want damage assessment photos. Group Operations considered only 14th Squadron Spitfires capable of the range needed.” ((Captain Walter Weitner photographed the first USAAF raid on Berlin on March 6, 1944. Lt Charles Parker photographed the second raid on March 8. Both in Spitfire XIs) my note)
“In December, the Group began received 10 F-5Bs, a photographic version of the P-38J-5. Unfortunately this aircraft and the F-5C, a converted and modified version of the same P-38J, suffered the same engine problems endemic in the early aircraft.”

Professor John F. Guilmartin, Jr. in his 2001 lecture to the United States Air Force Academy “The Aircraft that Decided World War II: Aeronautical Engineering and Grand Strategy, 1933-1945, the American Dimension.”

“In addition, specially modified Spitfires were the most important Allied strategic photo-reconnaissance aircraft at the outbreak of hostilities in 1939—and the _only_ ones capable of deep penetrations of Axis territory—and so remained until the debut of reconnaissance versions of the Mosquito in the autumn of 1941." 
“The Griffon-powered Spitfire PR XIX (PR for photo-reconnaissance), which entered service in the spring of 1944, provides a final commentary on the Spitfire’s importance. The Griffon’s superior high altitude performance and a pressurized cockpit combined with the Spitfire’s refined aerodynamics to give the PR XIX a service ceiling of no less than 48,000 feet—the highest of any operational piston-engined aircraft—rendering it effectively immune from interception. At that point photo-reconnaissance versions of the P-38 were horribly vulnerable to interception by later versions of the Bf 109 and the PR XIX, though produced only in small numbers, satisfied a vital strategic requirement at a critical time. The aerial edge in battle early shifted between allied air forces and the _Luftwaffe_ as the Spitfire underwent growth in engine power, aeronautical performance and increased firepower.”
Here is the link to the complete paper:
http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/dfh/docs/Harmon44.doc

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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 18, 2018)

Reluctant Poster said:


> See my earlier post (247) uploading the NACA study of control forces. I assume the inertia of the twin engines required the greater force that could be exerted by a wheel. Perhaps the boosted controls would have allowed a stick to be substituted.
> I find it interesting that bad features on aircraft are always forced on the designers. It reminds me that the referee is always the one to blame when your team loses.


All true - it seems the only design creativity the manufacturer will have is when they are asked to produce a prototype or a private venture that will eventually meet a procurement spec


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## Navalwarrior (Nov 19, 2018)

Reluctant Poster said:


> Actually the F-5 suffered the same problems as the P-38
> Dr Alfred Price from “Spitfire in Combat”
> “Initially the 7th Photo Group flew the F-5, the reconnaissance version of the P-38 Lightning fighter. This aircraft was vulnerable to interception during deep penetrations into enemy territory, however, and it has serviceability problems. One squadron in the group was therefore equipped with Spitfire PR XIs, and operated the type for the rest of the conflict.”
> Roger Freeman from “The Mighty Eighth War Manual”
> ...


Reap:
The British are known for their superior intelligence ability. I suspect that this effort influenced their desire for dedicated designed photo recon aircraft for the role, rather than taking an existing aircraft, as the Americans often did.

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## wuzak (Nov 19, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Reap:
> The British are known for their superior intelligence ability. I suspect that this effort influenced their desire for dedicated designed photo recon aircraft for the role, rather than taking an existing aircraft, as the Americans often did.



Like the Spitfire and Mosquito?

Aircraft that were adapted from their original designed purpose to do PR work.


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## Navalwarrior (Nov 19, 2018)

wuzak said:


> Like the Spitfire and Mosquito?
> 
> Aircraft that were adapted from their original designed purpose to do PR work.


Resp:
Sure, but the British built them specific, often with significant changes. If we take the P-51 Mustang as an example, NAA simply took aircraft coming off the standard Production line, fitting them with cameras. If you look at the 'baby blue' high altitude Spitifre, the engine received a significant amount of specialization as did the wings.


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## wuzak (Nov 19, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> Sure, but the British built them specific, often with significant changes. If we take the P-51 Mustang as an example, NAA simply took aircraft coming off the standard Production line, fitting them with cameras. If you look at the 'baby blue' high altitude Spitifre, the engine received a significant amount of specialization as did the wings.



The early PR Spitfires also were modified from production aircraft.


> As a result of a meeting with Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding RAF Fighter Command, two Spitfires N3069 and N3071 were released by RAF Fighter Command and sent to the "Heston Flight", a highly secret reconnaissance unit under the command of Acting Wing Commander Cotton.
> 
> These two Spitfires were "Cottonised" by stripping out the armament and radio-transmitter, then, after filling the empty gun ports and all panel lines, the airframe was rubbed down to remove any imperfections. Coats of a special very pale blue-green called Camoutint were applied and polished. Two F24 cameras with five-inch (127 mm) focal length lenses, which could photograph a rectangular area below the aircraft, were installed in the wing space vacated by the inboard guns and their ammunition containers as a stop-gap measure. Heating equipment was installed on all PR Spitfires to stop the cameras from freezing and the lenses from frosting over at altitude. These Spitfires, which later officially became the Spitfire Mk I PR Type A, had a maximum speed of 390 mph. Several of the sub-types which followed were conversions of existing fighter airframes, carried out by the Heston Aircraft Company. The Type D, which was the first specialised ultra long-range version, was the first to require that the work be carried out by Supermarine.





> The Mk I PR Type D (also called the Extra Super Long Range Spitfire) was the first PR variant that was not a conversion of existing fighter airframes. The Type D carried so much fuel that it was nicknamed "the bowser." The D shaped wing leading edges, ahead of the main spar, proved to be an ideal location for an integral tank. Accordingly, in early 1940, work started on converting the leading edges, between rib four through to rib 21, by sealing off the spar, outer ribs and all skin joins allowing 57 gal (259 l) of fuel to be carried in each wing. Because the work was of low priority, and with the urgent need for fighters the first two, hand-built prototypes of the PR Type Ds were not available until October. In addition to the leading edge tanks these prototypes also had a 29 gal (132 l) tank in the rear fuselage. An additional 14 gal (63 l) oil tank was fitted in the port wing. The cameras, two vertically mounted F24s with 8 inch (20.3 cm) or 20 inch (50.8 cm) lens or two vertically mounted F8s with 20-inch (510 mm) lens, were located in the rear fuselage. With the full fuel load the center of gravity was so far back the aircraft was difficult to fly until the rear fuselage tank had been emptied. Despite these difficulties the type quickly proved its worth, photographing such long distance targets as Stettin, Marseilles, Trondheim and Toulon.



Supermarine Spitfire (early Merlin-powered variants) - Wikipedia


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## tomo pauk (Nov 19, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Resp:
> Sure, but the British built them specific, often with significant changes. If we take the P-51 Mustang as an example, NAA simply took aircraft coming off the standard Production line, fitting them with cameras. If you look at the 'baby blue' high altitude Spitifre, the engine received a significant amount of specialization as did the wings.



PR Spitfires used same engine that were on fighters' Spitfires. 
Wings got modifiations in order to hold more fuel, while loosing the armament.

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## GregP (Nov 19, 2018)

On the surface, the unsuitability of the F-5 sounds bogus. It could get up 39,000 - 40,000 feet and was generally as fast as a Spitfire when it got there.

The P-38J trued out at some 310 - 315 mph at 39,000 - 40,000 feet. That's 11.8 - 12.2 km. The P-38, in any variant, also cruised at high speed with regard to maximum speed. That is, it's speed was very good at reduced power. The same cannot be said for single-engine fighters ... most of the time.

The Fw 190, even an Fw 190D-9, couldn't get up there. About the highest it's charts go is 10 km, and it started to run out of steam before getting to 20 000 feet on the radial (190A or F) and a bit higher on the DB. None show 39,000 feet until the Ta 152 came along ... and it just barely made the war.

The Bf 109G with DB 605A shows on WWIIaircraftperformance that it could hit 350 mph at 10 km, but the graphs don't go up to 11.8 - 12.2 km. The only one I found for the DB 605 up that high shows the Bf 109G getting down to some 140 mph or so at 11 km ... close to the height where the stall speed was approaching the cruise speed. So, it wasn't very fighter-like at that height, IF it could get there. To be fair, neither was the P-38.

This makes me wonder why the F-5 was "not suitable" since it can clearly out run either of the main fighters used way up high by the Luftwaffe. I don't want to say the reports are wrong, but the performance charts certainly show the P-38 to be a great choice for photo-recon. I've heard guys speak who flew the early ones and they had nothing good to say about the Allison, and I understand that. But the later models ran great once they figured out the gremlins and were fast up high.

There has to be some explanation that isn't obvious.

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## wuzak (Nov 19, 2018)

GregP said:


> On the surface, the unsuitability of the F-5 sounds bogus. It could get up 39,000 - 40,000 feet and was generally as fast as a Spitfire when it got there.
> 
> The P-38J trued out at some 310 - 315 mph at 39,000 - 40,000 feet. That's 11.8 - 12.2 km. The P-38, in any variant, also cruised at high speed with regard to maximum speed. That is, it's speed was very good at reduced power. The same cannot be said for single-engine fighters ... most of the time.



Well, the Spitfire PR.XI top speed (2,950rpm) was 417mph @ 24,200ft. Maximum speed at 38,000ft was 387mph.

Maximum cruise (2,650rpm) speed was 397mph @ 31,000ft, which compares well to the all out maximum speed of 417mph @ 24,200ft.
Maximum cruise at 38,000ft was 378mph.
Maximum cruise at 24,000ft was 369mph.
At around 30,000ft the most economical cruise speed (2,350rpm) was just above 350mph.
Cruise speeds look to be a high proportion of maximum speed.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Spitfire_XI_MB789.pdf

Service ceiling was 43,000ft at maximum weight and 44,000ft at mean weight.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Spitfire_PRXI_aircraft-data-sheet.jpg

The PR.XI was unpressurised, so long periods at the higher altitudes was a problem. 

The PR.X was similar, but had the pressure cabin.

If the F-5 was difficult to intercept, the XI would have been nigh on impossible.

And in late 1944 the X and XI were being replaced by the XIX.




GregP said:


> There has to be some explanation that isn't obvious.


Turbos exploded.
Pilots froze.
It was costly to maintain.
Range was not what was required.
The Spitfire was a better performer.

These may have been some of the reasons why the USAAF desperately negotiated the acquisition of Spitfire PR.XIs for long range photo recon.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 20, 2018)

Things are relative and as always, timing can play a role. 
The first (of almost 500?) MK XI, which came before the MK X, wasn't built until Nov 1942. 
They simply weren't available (especially in numbers) when the F-5 started it's photo recon career. 
The F-4 Lightning (converted P-38E) was used mostly for training but did see some use in the South Pacific. 
The F5A was a converted P-38G and started to be produced in June 1942. 20 F5As were built ahead of the P-38G(181 built by March of 1943) 
The F5B used the same engines/airframe as the P-38J-5 (200 built) 

SO one has to be careful when comparing actual performance. The F5A was limited by the radiator and intercooler to less than desired performance. No WER at high altitudes and even military power may have been restricted. 

There may have been a considerable period of time when the Spit PR XI was a much better recon platform than the F5A with it's 300 US gallons of internal fuel for two engines. Performance limited by the drop tanks. 
By the time the F5B (410 US gallons internal) gets there the Griffon powered Spits are in the works.

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## wuzak (Nov 20, 2018)

Navalwarrior said:


> Reap:
> The British are known for their superior intelligence ability. I suspect that this effort influenced their desire for dedicated designed photo recon aircraft for the role, rather than taking an existing aircraft, as the Americans often did.



Just had another thought on this.

The USAAF initiated the design of two dedicated photo reconnaissance aircraft in WW2 - the Hughes F-11 and the Republic F-12, both of which flew after the war.

These were not designed to do any other roles.

On the other hand, I can't think of a British PR aircraft that was not an adapted airframe.


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## wuzak (Nov 20, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Things are relative and as always, timing can play a role.
> The first (of almost 500?) MK XI, which came before the MK X, wasn't built until Nov 1942.
> They simply weren't available (especially in numbers) when the F-5 started it's photo recon career.
> The F-4 Lightning (converted P-38E) was used mostly for training but did see some use in the South Pacific.
> ...



I was comparing PR.XI performance with the numbers Greg gave.


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## GregP (Nov 21, 2018)

Don't give me turbos explode and pilots froze. Those were very early faults (P-38F - G) that were corrected before the P-38J and later got there. The solution to frozen pilots was ... you guessed it ... an electric heater!

I believe the early issues with the early P-38s, but not from the J onward. They were fast, flew high, the engines ran great, and the turbos weren't falling out of the sky. Our guys ALSO had some training by then.

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## wuzak (Nov 21, 2018)

In 1943 in the ETO the USAAF were using F-5As, which were based on the P-38G. And those did have turbo problems, and the pilots freezing issue.

The P-38J started production in August 1943.

In October 1943 P-38Hs were just getting into service in the ETO. It would have been in late 1943 for the service entry of the P-38J.

The initial F-5Bs were converted from production P-38Js. Not really sure when the F-5B went into production or began service.

In any case, it appears that the USAAF were stuck with the F-5A to at least the end of 1943, and they very urgently requested Spitfire PR.XI replacements.

It also appears that the F-5B was not an improvement in performance compared the PR.XI (or pressurised PR.X, of which few were made).

The first PR.XIX was delivered in May 1944, without the pressure cabin.

Interestingly the initial contract for the PR.XIX had a cost of £7,500 each, which was later raised to £8,980 (from Morgan and Shacklady).

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## Denniss (Nov 21, 2018)

All F-5B were direct-production recon aircraft, all later versions were converted from new production P-38s
first batch of 90 F-5B was produced between J-5 and J-10, second batch of 110 between J-10 and J-15 (according to serial number list)

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## Milosh (Nov 21, 2018)

Serials for the F-5A/P-38G production run were as follows:

41-2157 Lockheed F-5A-2-LO Lightning 
*42-12667/12686 Lockheed F-5A-1-LO Lightning *
42-12687/12766 Lockheed P-38G-1-LO Lightning 
*42-12767/12786 Lockheed F-5A-3-LO Lightning *
42-12787/12798 Lockheed P-38G-3-LO Lightning 
42-12799/12866 Lockheed P-38G-5-LO Lightning 
42-12870/12966 Lockheed P-38G-10-LO Lightning 
*42-12967/12986 Lockheed F-5A-10-LO Lightning *
42-12987/13066 Lockheed P-38G-10-LO Lightning 
42-13067/13126 Lockheed F-5A-10-LO Lightning 
42-13127/13266 Lockheed P-38G-10-LO Lightning 
*42-13267/13326 Lockheed F-5A-10-LO Lightning *
42-13327/13557 Lockheed P-38G-10-LO Lightning 
43-2185/2358 Lockheed P-38G-13-LO Lightning 
43-2359/2558 Lockheed P-38G-15-LO Lightning 

Serials of the P-38J/F-5B were as follows:

42-12867/12869 Lockheed P-38J-1-LO Lightning 
42-13560/13566 Lockheed P-38J-1-LO Lightning 
42-67102/67311 Lockheed P-38J-5-LO Lightning 
*42-67312/67401 Lockheed F-5B-1-LO Lightning *
42-67402/68191 Lockheed P-38J-10-LO Lightning 
*42-68192/68301 Lockheed F-5B-1-LO Lightning *
42-103979/104428 Lockheed P-38J-15-LO Lightning 
43-28248/29047 Lockheed P-38J-15-LO Lightning 
44-23059/23208 Lockheed P-38J-15-LO Lightning 
44-23209/23558 Lockheed P-38J-20-LO Lightning 
44-23559/23768 Lockheed P-38J-25-LO Lightning

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## GregP (Nov 22, 2018)

The P-38G did have the early faults. The J and on didn't. The first P-38 joined the war on 4 Apr 1942. It was an F-4 / P-38E. The fighter versions started showing up in Aug 1942. The J started hitting combat in September 1944.

So, I suppose it was the case that the P-38 models before the J suffered from a few faults, all but one of which of which were fixable, some even field-fixable. Changing the intake manifolds could be done in the field, training would have helped with flying into a combat area at cruise power, and that could cure the turbo issue, too. But the pilot was going to be cold way up high until they fitted an electric heater (not sure if that was a field-fixable fault), but the critical mach number never changed. The dive flaps made recovery possible, but didn't cure it. Of course, we could cure it now ... it wasn't the wing or the tail, but that never happened during the war. After the war, I doubt anyone would waste the time to attempt a cure, but ti would have validated theories about localized supersonic flow and shock wave formation.

The only question would be exactly when the field fixes were available. I KNOW the lean cylinder-rich cylinders thing with the intake manifolds took about nine months ... until they sent home some British fuel and could duplicate the problem on the test stand. After that, it was a quick-fix. I've seen correspondence to that effect, dated late-May 1943. I have NO IDEA how long it would take to get new manifolds to Europe and installed ... it would depend entirely upon the logistics chain. Of course, the P-38J/L had all the fixes.

I'm sure early P-38J users (P-38L-20-LO and under) wished they had hydraulic ailerons! The P-38 at the Planes of Fame is a P-38J-20-LO ... without the assisted ailerons. The next block had them.

Cheers.

Typical typo for me: Aug - Sep 1943 for the P-38J. I think they started out in Aug and made combat in Sep or so.


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## wuzak (Nov 22, 2018)

If the J went into combat in September 1944, when did the F-5B and/or F-5C start operations?

One squadron's worth of Spitfire PR.XIs was procured by the USAAF in late 1943, and they were used until the war's end. 

And my understanding is that the Spitfires did the majority, if not all, the deep penetration reconnaissance for the USAAF.

Now I haven't seen performance numbers for the F-5B or C, but the P-38J's performance was, at best, a match for the PR.XI. Certainly it was not overwhelmingly superior.

And the F5B/C still remained more costly to operate and maintain than the smaller, lighter and single engine Spitfire XI.

Also, the unpressurised Spitfire XIX was starting to be delivered from May 1944. The pressurised version was testing around September 1944. The XIX was a step up in performance from the XI or (any version) the F-5.

But let's not forget that it wasn't anybody in here who declared the F-5 unsuitable for long range photo reconnaissance in the ETO, it was the USAAF in late 1943.


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## Kevin J (Nov 22, 2018)

wuzak said:


> If the J went into combat in September 1944, when did the F-5B and/or F-5C start operations?
> 
> One squadron's worth of Spitfire PR.XIs was procured by the USAAF in late 1943, and they were used until the war's end.
> 
> ...


You mean the J entered service in September 1943!!!


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## michael rauls (Nov 22, 2018)

Ya I've always read the J-25 with the dive flaps was beginning to trickle in in early 44 so it seems that the earlier Js would certainly have been there before September 44.


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## wuzak (Nov 22, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> You mean the J entered service in September 1943!!!



Just quoting Greg.

Also, first combat is not the same as entering service (which could have happened many months prior to first combat).

And reading Dean's _America's Hundred Thousand_ it looks like the P-38H was only just getting into service around that time.

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