# Blenheim as a torpedo bomber?



## tomo pauk (Jan 20, 2016)

How good or bad idea is to modify the Blemheim into a torpedo bomber? What engines - low level Mercury, or Perseus? crew, gun armament?


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## RCAFson (Jan 20, 2016)

IIRC, the Bleinheim bomb load was 1000lb so using it with a 1600lb torpedo might be problematic.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 20, 2016)

The Swordfish could carry a Mark XII torpedo, so why not? 

The Mark XII weighed 1,545 pounds and the max. load of the Blenheim was 1,200 pounds.

As it turns out, the Beaufort Torpedo bomber was based on the Blenheim, so it was certainly considered.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 20, 2016)

You might have a problem with undercarriage clearance, which would necessitate lengthening it, increasing the size of nacelles, then comes weight increases etc... It was almost done, actually; a torpedo carrier variant based on the basic Bristol 142 was drawn up.

The Beaufort (and Botha) was built to Spec 10/36, which was actually a combination of two specs reworked, the first being for a land based torpedo bomber M.15/35 and a general purpose land based recon machine, G.24/35. To the former, Bristol submitted the 150, which was in effect a torpedo carrying Bristol 142, which became the Blenheim, but with mods for the different spec. These included a longer cabin and bomb bay to enable the torpedo to be carried internally, as well as local strengthening etc. It was to be powered by the 890 hp Perseus. To the latter the firm submitted the 149, basically a 142 that could carry larger and heavier loads.

The Blenheim and proposed variants were designed by Frank Barnwell, and between the Blenheim and Beaufort there was little commonality, particularly after Leslie Frise at Bristol realised that both specs could be met by one design, and so forth the Beaufort was born. Initially however, it was intended that there was commonality - as was the case between the Beaufort and Beaufighter, but the Beaufort was altogether larger and could carry heavier loads than the Blenheim, so by necessity was a completely new aeroplane.

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## Juha (Jan 21, 2016)

RCAFson said:


> IIRC, the Bleinheim bomb load was 1000lb so using it with a 1600lb torpedo might be problematic.



Not necessarily, the Finnish AF Blenheims could carry max 850 kg (1,874 lb) to 972 kg (2,143 lb) depending on the version.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 21, 2016)

Blenheinm I carried 1000 lbs of bombs, along with 2000 lbs (278 imp gals) of fuel. The Mk.IV upped the fuel to 3355 lbs ( 466 gals), while still retaining the high-altitude Mercury VIII engine (840 HP at 14000 ft).
Mk.V ('Bisley') received the low-altitude Mercury XV (955 HP at 8500 ft), carrying same bomb load and fuel as the Mk.IV; some sources give also that engine, but with 905 HP (on 87 oct fuel?) for the Mk.IV .

Max take off weight went from 12500 lbs for the Mk.I, to 15800 for Mk.IV, and finally 17040 for Mk.V. Tare weight (ie. no fuel, bombs, ammo) went from 8077 lbs -> 9790 -> 10775 for the Mk.V.

So my idea is to trade the increase of fuel (and respective fuel tanks) and nose turret for torpedo load, obviously installing the low-level rated engine for better take of performance.

edit: Hmmm, the Mercury XV was geared same as the VIII, the result of using greater boost via 100 oct fuel was increase of power down low.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 21, 2016)

The idea seems good to me, considering that the RAF had a total of 30 torpedo bombers in all of the British Isles in Sept 1939 (others were in the Colonies) and those were Vickers Vildebeests 







Most anything would be an improvement. 

Considering that some Blenehims were fitted with two external bomb racks for four 40lb bombs each behind the regular bomb bay




Ground clearance may not be much of an issue, or fit longer tail wheel strut. Since the tail wheel doesn't retract this shouldn't be an insurmountable problem.
There were medium supercharged Mercury engines, giving 830hp for take off and 890 hp at 6000ft on 87 octane fuel. Running the fully supercharged engines on 100 octane boosted take-off/low altitude performance without sacrificing _higher altitude_ performance (in this case higher altitude being around 9000ft and up.

The Converted Blenheim would _NOT _be as good as as the Beaufort being slower and shorter ranged. Defensive armament may not be as good either but it _could_ be available in 1939-40 when the Beaufort was not. It might have also been shipped out to the colonies, ie Singapore to replace the Vildebeests there in Dec of 1941. 

Doctrine or RAF rules/regulations that might have prevented it include the pre-war prohibition of more than 38lb tyre pressure to prevent rutting of the grass fields while taxiing. This prevented designers from simply fitting the same size tire with more plys and using higher pressure to handle the load and instead forced the fitting of larger diameter/wider tires and wheels. 
Although fitting a slightly larger tire doesn't seem to have been a huge problem.






The Blenheim gear being of the semi-retracting variety. 






Landing the plane while loaded might a problem however. The tube under each wing outboard of the engines are for the rapid dumping of fuel in the outer tanks. The Blenheim could take-off at higher weights than it was rated to land at and might require the dropping of the torpedo in an engine out emergency landing scenario, something the Blenheim was not very good at anyway. 

Blenheim was a bit of victim of it's own early success (fastest bomber in world in 1937?) and the same obsession with numbers that lead to 2000 Battles. It was _good enough _to serve/stay in production *as is *while better planes are designed and built (some of which failed) and the obsession with numbers and shortage of design staff (working on those better planes) meant whatever improvements the Blenheim saw were small and late. The MK V finally getting clamshell landing gear doors that not only fully enclosed the wheels but didn't add sq ft of extra drag when the landing gear was down like the "apron" style doors did, see engine out scenario.


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## stona (Jan 21, 2016)

Which Service are you proposing this for? I always tend to lack at the practical issues 
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 21, 2016)

Same costumer as for the Beaufor and ill-fated Botha - RAF.



Shortround6 said:


> ...
> *The MK V finally getting clamshell landing gear doors* that not only fully enclosed the wheels but didn't add sq ft of extra drag when the landing gear was down like the "apron" style doors did, see engine out scenario.



Thanks for pointing out that tidbit.



Shortround6 said:


> There were medium supercharged Mercury engines, giving 830hp for take off and 890 hp at 6000ft on 87 octane fuel. Running the fully supercharged engines on 100 octane boosted take-off/low altitude performance without sacrificing _higher altitude_ performance (in this case higher altitude being around 9000ft and up.



Indeed, the 'medium superhcraged' being the Mk.XX for example. Looking at the power chart of it, the take off power on 100 oct fuel would amount to maybe 950 HP. The Mercury XII should do even better at 100 oct fuel, 1000+ HP for take off. Granted, availability of 100 oct fuel prior 1940 is not guaranteed, so better stick to 'conservative' boost.
There was also the range of Perseus engines with good low-leve performance needed for torpedo bombers, Marks XIc, XIIc, XIVc, offering up to 890 HP for take off.


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## Juha (Jan 21, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Blenheinm I carried 1000 lbs of bombs, along with 2000 lbs (278 imp gals) of fuel. The Mk.IV upped the fuel to 3355 lbs ( 466 gals), while still retaining the high-altitude Mercury VIII engine (840 HP at 14000 ft).
> Mk.V ('Bisley') received the low-altitude Mercury XV (955 HP at 8500 ft), carrying same bomb load and fuel as the Mk.IV; some sources give also that engine, but with 905 HP (on 87 oct fuel?) for the Mk.IV .
> 
> Max take off weight went from 12500 lbs for the Mk.I, to 15800 for Mk.IV, and finally 17040 for Mk.V. Tare weight (ie. no fuel, bombs, ammo) went from 8077 lbs -> 9790 -> 10775 for the Mk.V.
> ...



Hello Tomo, Blenheim Mk IV had Mercury XV engines.
Finnish Blenheims used same engines as the RAF planes, only 87 oct fuel, our airfields were small and had rather soft sirfaces. So the load carrying ability would not have been a problem, only the ground clearance. I think that the bombload differences between the FiAF and the RAF Blenheims was a result of different bomb dimensions


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## tomo pauk (Jan 21, 2016)

I'm interested in what kind of bomb load your Blenheims carried.

Indeed you're right that Mercury XV was installed on the Blenheim IV.


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## Juha (Jan 21, 2016)

Hello Tomo
I don't have just now time to look individual loads but one randomly picked up example. In the early morning of 15 July 1944 the Bomber Sqn 42 sent 16 Blenheims on a mission, their cumulated load was 8280 kg consisting of 48 x 100 kg, 60 x 50 kg and 240 x 2 kg bombs. The Bomber Sqn 48 sent 6 Blenheims, their cumulated load was 5060 kg consisting of 46 100 kg bombs, 2 50 kg bombs and 24 15 kg bombs.

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## parsifal (Jan 21, 2016)

wonder what the range would be if the Blenheim were asked to haul a torpedo around

Ive got this nagging suspicion that somewhere a torpedo carrying Blenheim was tested......


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## tomo pauk (Jan 21, 2016)

Blenheim I with 1000 lbs (all in bomb bay) and 278 gals - 975 miles (afer allowances are deduced in worth of 64 gals)
Mk.IV with 1000 lbs and 466 gals - 1460 miles (allowance of 60 gals)
For comparison - Beaufort I with 1000 lbs and 570 gals makes 1510 miles; 1390 miles with torpedo.

My guess is that, if we trade 720 lbs worth of fuel (100 imp gals) on the Mk.IV so torpedo can be carried, with fuel now of 366 gals, the range of 1000-1100 miles, depending on how good/bad the torpedo is faired in? 

But then there is the Hampden - a torpedo and 2 x 500 lbs of external bombs, for 1540 miles.

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## Juha (Jan 21, 2016)

And there was Wimpy, which could carry 2 torpedoes. But Wimpy and Hampden were bigger planes, so easier targets to AA gunners. Anyway Hampden was used as a long-range torpedo-bomber up to 1943 off Norway.

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## Juha (Jan 22, 2016)

BTW
there are two stories of the successes of British air gunners in my site, one rather famous Blemheim case and one not well known success of a Hampden TB I when attacked by two Bf 109Gs off Norway on 7 July 1943. The results of air combats were sometimes surprising.

See Air gunners

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## ChrisMcD (Jan 25, 2016)

Effectively the Beaufort was a Blenheim beefed up to carry a torpedo and a dedicated radio operator. The raised deck between the pilot and the rear gunner was to give the radio operator a decent place to work and the fuselage was lengthened to allow the torpedo to be carried as "semi-recessed". One of the main problems with the Blenheim was that it was very cramped.

Wilfred Freeman insisted that the Beaufort needed more power, so it was fitted with Bristol Taurus engines - which were not sufficiently developed. But at least were better than the Perseus's fitted to the truly awful Blackburn Botha

Most Beauforts would have had Twin Wasps - but the ship carrying the first load was torpedoed - so a lot had to soldier on with the Taurus 

Still the properly engined Mk II's did very well with the RAF in Malta and the RAAF in OZ


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## stona (Jan 29, 2016)

I’m going to make a post just to put the state of the RAF’s maritime capability in the pre-war years and at the outbreak of WW2 into perspective.
Here is not the time to go into the details of the development of naval aviation after WW1. I would suggest that the loss of expertise to the RAF which occurred in 1937 when the FAA was handed over to the Admiralty had a serious impact. The two land based torpedo squadrons left to the RAF had never exercised with the fleet and did not serve as repositories for everything that had been learnt in the preceding years. When the FAA was transferred to the Admiralty Coastal Area/Coastal Command almost lost its ‘raison d’etre’.
At the outbreak of war, almost twenty years after the Navy’s first torpedo trials, the aircrews of Coastal Command would have to start re-learning all the lessons already learnt by others at great cost to themselves.

The RAF’s maritime capability was largely ignored in the 1930s. In 1934 there was only one land based torpedo squadron, the only increase was in flying boat squadrons, but here it should be remembered that one of these ‘squadrons’ comprised just 4 aircraft.
By September 1939 the number of Maritime squadrons had risen from 5 to 18, but 16 of these were in the General Reconnaissance and Trade Defence categories. 12 of these 16 squadrons were employing aircraft that could double as bombers. Just 2 were strike squadrons. An Air Staff memorandum of June 1936 was explicit.
_
“Such shore based air forces should be available equally for the air war proper and for employment in support of naval operations in accordance with the requirements of the situation at any given time.”_

It’s why General Reconnaissance aircraft like the Anson and later Hudson were equipped to carry bombs.


Then there was the constant agitating by the Deputy Director of the Plans Division in the Air Ministry to reduce the number of aircraft devoted solely to maritime work. This man, a certain Group Captain Arthur Harris, started his campaign as early as 1936 and famously carried it on later as C-in-C Bomber Command.
At the outbreak of the war the RAF’s maritime strike capability was nominally 2 squadrons of torpedo bombers. In fact a total of just 12 Vildebeest biplanes were operational. Even this was a light bomber converted to drop torpedoes and in 1939 was already obsolete.
Next post, when I have time, will cover what happened next and will pertain more directly to the thread title 

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Jan 29, 2016)

There was a need for a better torpedo bomber but efforts to create one were hampered by the results of the Air Staff’s decision to go for the Blackburn Botha, over which a discrete veil should be drawn. Trials in 1939 only confirmed what a terrible aircraft it was. It was never used as a torpedo bomber.

Just as important were the financial and doctrinal constraints imposed by Air Ministry thinking. Take a look at the RAF’s bombing force in 1939 and though it is usually criticised with hindsight for being largely obsolete in fact none of its aircraft had been designed earlier than 1932 and more than half later than 1935. The late expansion plans were aimed at creating a bombing force of modern aircraft by 1941, with a large proportion of four engine types, like the Stirling. To do this the Air Ministry considered it essential to do away with specialisation in its force. This did not bode well for a specialist aircraft like a torpedo bomber. An Air Staff memorandum of February 1936 explains.

_“It is essential that the major proportion of our air forces should be ‘ubiquitous’ if we are to achieve and adequate measure of defence against air attack as well as to meet our many other commitments in Imperial Defence. Ubiquity requires not only the avoidance of specialisation in training and equipment, but also unification of organisation and control.”_

Offensive maritime operations had no place the Air Staff’s concept of a future conflict, even if it had the torpedo bomber would now be an aircraft contrary to the idea of ubiquity. Air Vice Marshall Ludlow-Hewitt, another future bomber leader, made this clear whilst still Director of Operations and Intelligence when he wrote.

_“It appears that the torpedo bomber will in future be so highly specialised a type we will not be able to combine it with any other.”_

Funding for the RAF was tight in the 1930s and torpedoes were expensive (about £2,000 at 1930’s prices) and required regular maintenance in storage, unlike bombs. The RAF also reckoned that training to drop torpedoes would add 16 weeks to a pilots training. The Air Ministry essentially handed the whole matter of torpedo aircraft over to the FAA, whilst refusing to relinquish control of the 4 land based torpedo units (2 in UK and 2 in Far East) to the Navy.

The body at the Air Ministry that oversaw air launched weapons was the Bombing Committee and it had a subsidiary Torpedo Sub-Committee which, in the words of the Director of Staff Duties responsible for these bodies _“never functioned.”_
This gives an idea of the low priority accorded torpedo attack. If more proof was needed an Air Staff letter makes it clear.
_
“…on occasions, shore-based torpedo-carrying aircraft may be required to attack warships reported to be in range. The Air Staff have, however, always regarded this method of attacking warships as unsuitable employment of aircraft.”_

Just as the junior service resisted any form of close air support, believing the job of destroying enemy forces in the field was that of the Army, it also believed that sinking the enemy’s warships was the job of the Navy.
It is important to understand the historical context in which decisions were made. They were not made in a vacuum, and they were not made with hindsight. Sometimes they were made by people lacking in foresight too.

We will get to the aircraft…..honest.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Jan 29, 2016)

Thank you for the historical perspective. I might add that it didn't really need "hindsight" in many cases. Unfortunately in too many cases large blinders were used to ignore the lessons of WW I or willful disregard of those lessons was employed to justify the decisions made in the planning/procurement of aircraft and their deployment.
Inadequate testing/development of weapons (and all to often depending on hope/wishful thinking rather than tests and training) hampered the RAF even in it's "dream mission" (strategic bombing) let alone planes/units devoted to periphery tasks like maritime reconnaissance/coastal patrol. 

There had been a fair number of coastal patrol/anti-sub aircraft operating around Britain and the North Sea in WW I. They were actually fairly successful in keeping U-Boats out of the coastal areas or at least reducing their effectiveness. Unfortunately too often a quick analysis resorted to a "scoreboard" mentality. AS in how many U-Boats were sunk vs how many convoys came though the patrolled areas without being attacked. ( the true goal of anti-sub operations). 
The Anson was a lousy anti-sub plane however good a trainer it may have been. It carried a lower bomb-load than many WW I flying boats that less powerful engines. It had short range-endurance for a reconnaissance plane over water. 
All too often the RAF high command had a rather distorted notion of what constituted "twin engine" safety when flying over water. Twin engines seemingly was considered "enough" with no thought given to both engines having generators or hydraulic pumps. Cross over fuel systems so dead engine's fuel tank/s can feed the live engine. Feathering propellers were a luxury the RAF couldn't afford (many Ansons (especially the early ones) had fixed pitch props) so many planes struggled to make landfall flying on one engine. "Cheap" purchase price was often paid for by lost aircraft and aircrew on operations that better equipped planes would have brought home to be repaired and to fly again.
Wishful thinking and/or blinders also comes in on the whole Botha Debacle. 
With the Blenheim as a baseline (the only all metal, retracting landing gear monoplane bomber the British even had flying at the time) the idea that you could go from a 3 man crew to 4 man and bigger fuselage and add even more "stuff" ( empty weight of a Botha MK I was 3,700lbs more than a MK I Blenheim (46%)) and keep the same _size _engines and still wind up with even a useful airplane relied more on divine intervention (the sleeve valve gods??) than good planing.


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## stona (Jan 29, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> I might add that it didn't really need "hindsight" in many cases. Unfortunately in too many cases large blinders were used to ignore the lessons of WW I or willful disregard of those lessons was employed to justify the decisions made in the planning/procurement of aircraft and their deployment.
> Inadequate testing/development of weapons (and all to often depending on hope/wishful thinking rather than tests and training) hampered the RAF even in it's "dream mission" (strategic bombing) let alone planes/units devoted to periphery tasks like maritime reconnaissance/coastal patrol.



I couldn't agree more.

Why was the Air Staff so dismissive of torpedo attacks against shipping?
The FAA and the ballistics sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had both come to different conclusions of which the Air Staff were well aware. During 1936 and 1937 FAA aircraft had undertaken a number of exercises using torpedoes against manouevering targets in various conditions and managed a corrected score of 34% hits. The correction was for casualties to AA etc. The uncorrected figure was 50%. Furthermore the ballistics sub-committee reckoned that one torpedo hit was sufficient to severely damage a large vessel, two or more hits would invariably result in a sinking.
The answer lies, once again, in inter Service rivalries. The Air Ministry was determined to resist Admiralty efforts, which were robust, to wrest control of shore based maritime squadrons and assets. In RAF memorandums this is described as the Navy's efforts to _'get a foot ashore'_ or even _'establish a bridgehead'._ Indeed it was this that lead to the call in the mid '30s to the call for a medium bomber/torpedo carrier resulting in the Botha and Beaufort. If the Air Ministry could demonstrate that the RAF had a maritime strike capability, even if a dozen old biplanes, then Admiralty claims that the RAF was unable to perform naval support and trade protection roles could be countered and the Air Ministry's role as sole arbiter on aviation matters could be retained.

The RAF really believed that the only weapons aircraft should be deploying against shipping were bombs. Despite the results of various bombing trials in the 1930s the RAF also managed to discount the most accurate method of bombing shipping, dive bombing. Instead the RAF decided that _'pattern bombing' _was the way to go.
How the bombers were supposed to navigate over the sea to find their targets was another question solved by wishful thinking, rather like the bomber v battleship question being decided in favour of the ship. In October 1938 the Deputy Director of Staff Duties, Group Captain F H Maynard wrote with breathtaking insouciance that long range navigation over sea and interception of naval targets amounted to _"a comparatively simple exercise"_
Later a plan to use Coastal Command aircraft to guide the bombers to their targets was mooted. The bomber crews couldn't 'Bradshaw', a reference to a famous Victorian railway guide book much used on cross country training flights, over the sea.

Cheers

Steve

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## fastmongrel (Jan 29, 2016)

Surprisingly the RAF didnt test or even train much with its bombs and bomb sights never mind testing and training with Torpedos, this resulted in a lot of deaths in the first 2 years to essentially dump scrap iron near (sometimes not even near) the targets . I sometimes think the RAF and the Air Ministry in the 30s thought that carrying guns and bombs was not the done thing and that all that mattered was flying in perfect formation at the Hendon airshow.


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## stona (Jan 30, 2016)

fastmongrel said:


> Surprisingly the RAF didnt test or even train much with its bombs and bomb sights never mind testing and training with Torpedos,



Bombing trials were intermittent and unscientific. I can't be exhaustive here, but as a rough guide the following trials against shipping were undertaken.

1931, trials against _Centurion _using the 'Fourth Vector' bomb sight, introduced in 1929. These were quite extensive, different heights were used and aircrews tried different bombing angles and scales of attack from single aircraft to large formations. A 32% uncorrected hit rate was claimed.

1932. No trials

1933. A series of trials for different techniques. High altitude 'precision' bombing by three aircraft from 9,000ft, high altitude 'pattern bombing' up to 16,000ft by a whole squadron, dive bombing with release at 1,500ft and bombing ahead of the ship with a buoyant ('B') bomb were all tried. Dive bombing was most accurate with a 38% hit rate.

1934. Similar trials at which despite the repeated success of dive bombing the RAF chose 'pattern bombing' by a whole squadron as the standard method for attacking shipping.

1935/1936 No trials

The results of the 1933 and 1934 trials led to disagreement between the Air Ministry and Admiralty who came to different conclusions from the same data. Whilst the Air Ministry was happy with the conclusions it had drawn the Admiralty felt more work was needed, particularly into the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire. The Admiralty also deemed the trials unscientific as they were always carried out in near perfect conditions and both pilots and bomb aimers were familiar with the target areas.This advice, and to be fair similar opinions from within the Air Ministry expressed by Director of Staff Duties Sholto-Douglas for one, were ignored.
So it was that the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield,suggested that the Imperial Committee for Defence should conduct an investigation into bombing and anti-aircraft defences and any other areas where there were sources of contention. The British, as anyone who has been reading this thread will have realised, love a committee.
The Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Edward Ellington, agreed to the proposal but said that he did not want _"too much of a scientific analysis", _which neatly sums up the RAF's attitude to the coming trials.

1937. A Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was set up in February to oversee the trials. It was preponderantly scientific in make up, men like Henry Tizard, Sir Frank Smith and R H Fowler were all scientists. Initially they analysed the data from all the previous trials and concluded that it was insufficient for the drawing of _'reliable conclusions'._ Furthermore _'the bomb v battleship controversy had indeed been carried out on the basis of aspirations rather than actuals.'_ That's committee speak for wishful thinking.

Again I have to skim the detail which would fill a book, but the part of the extensive trials in 1937 and 1938 into anti-aircraft gunnery showed serious weaknesses in the Admiralty's original conclusions, even against 80 mph 'Queen Bees'. It is often claimed that the inability of ships to defend themselves against a skilful and determined aerial attack came as a huge surprise to the Admiralty once the war started but in 1938 the Sub-Committees report came down in favour of the bomber. Both Service staffs broadly agreed with the conclusions. This led the Admiralty to investigate more closely the subject of torpedo and dive bombing attacks whilst the Air Ministry concluded that the bomber would indeed always get through and felt vindicated.
The widespread belief in the Navy that it could defend its ships with anti-aircraft fire shows that the Air Ministry did not have a monopoly on wishful thinking, though the report did lead to the acknowledgement that some form of fleet defence aircraft would be required, leading to the interim Sea Gladiator and then Fulmar.

The bombing part of the investigation took place in late 1937 and early 1938. The venerable _Centurion_ was again made available. The results of dive bombing and level bombing were found to be similar. Bombing accuracy fell off with height. A low release height was more accurate but an altitude of 10,000ft was recommended to ensure penetration of armoured decks, a contradiction which could not be resolved. The effects of a vessels avoiding action were considered minimal.

1939 these trials continued. Both Services now tried for more scientific rigour. The establishment of yet another committee, the Service Marking Committee, to oversee the plotting of bomb trajectories and resting sites was a reflection of this. It may be that the looming war concentrated minds, inter-Service cooperation certainly did improve. There were problems. Most bombing was done by Overstrands, only in mid 1939 did the RAF provide more modern types (Wellingtons, Whitleys and Blenheims were used) and on only a few days was the weather less than good.

There was still inertia. The problems of navigation, particularly over sea, were ignored, even after Bomber Command was handed the responsibility of attacking the German High Seas Fleet in October 1937.

There was testing and trials in the 1930s, but until the establishment of Tizard's Sub-Committee they were almost useless, the vague results were interpreted by the different Services to reinforce their own prejudices. From 1937 through to the outbreak of war more scientific testing was done, but not enough and not varied enough. Most bomber crews did not get involved in any of this testing and it is quite true that when the war started many navigators had never undertaken a long over sea flight.
It wasn't until early 1938 that Bomber Command aircraft were authorised to make flights _"to any great distance from the coast"_ in Ludlow-Hewitt's words. It was not until around a year before hostilities that Bomber Command aircraft received aeronautical charts as opposed to the topographical survey maps then in use, neither did they have the most basic gear for survival at sea.

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Jan 30, 2016)

I've been looking at the specific case of the Blenheim for use by Coastal Command. The British aircraft industry had an unfortunate practice of 'fading out' obsolete types and gradually switching production to newer types, in an effort to keep up the total number of aircraft available. This led to 'stop gap' orders, which swelled the relative proportion of superseded aircraft and delayed the supply of more advanced aircraft. I'm sure a list of such aircraft is not required on this forum, but the Blenheim falls into this category. The term 'stop gap' was applied to the Blenheim as early as March 1938 when it was mentioned as the only aircraft that could fill certain General Reconnaissance squadrons.
In early 1939 the Blenheim was considered_ 'beyond effective operational value'_ but the Air Ministry still ordered 62 aircraft as a 'stop gap' until the Beaufort came into production.
It seems unlikely, given the status of the Blenheim at this time, relative to the Beaufort, that it would even be considered as a torpedo bomber. We know that the Beaufort would have a difficult introduction into service, but the men at the Ministry in 1938/9 did not.
There was no phoney war for Coastal Command and the Command struggled to fulfill its mission requirements with its Hudsons and Ansons, the latter of which could not even patrol closer than 60 miles from the Norwegian coast due to its limited range. Germany's major naval units could, and did on occasion, sail undetected through the Baltic to the North Atlantic. During the first month of the war 9 reconnaissance aircraft were lost on North Sea Patrols, some shot down by Luftwaffe float planes. This prompted the AOC-in-C of Coastal Command, Air Chief Marshall Sir Frederick Bowhill, to raise with the Air Ministry either raising the performance of reconnaissance types to something comparable with the enemy fighters or providing fighter escort. Neither was possible in 1939. At the end of 1939 the only aircraft available which fulfilled some of the requirements for a maritime reconnaissance fighter was the Blenheim IV. The Air Ministry was asked on 29th September 1939 for three Blenheims to be used for trial purposes with Coastal Command.Though the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshall Sholto-Douglas agreed that _"...it will be necessary in the future to provide reconnaissance aircraft with increased range, manoeuvrability and defensive power"_ he also made it clear that these would be the Botha and Beaufort. 20 Bothas would be delivered to Coastal Command by the end of December and Beauforts were expected to start operational service from mid November, following trials with No. 22 Squadron.The Blenheims were not forthcoming.
If Coastal Command was unable to obtain an effectively unmodified version of an aircraft already described by the Air Ministry itself as a 'stop gap', what chance was there of the Air Ministry sanctioning the potentially fruitless and certainly expensive conversion to a torpedo bomber, for which role two other types were already authorised? The answer, I'm afraid, is zero.

The only positive to emerge from Bowhill's request in 1939 was that it sowed the seeds for future success in the later anti-shipping campaign. Those seeds would germinate about two years later with the introduction in late 1941 of the Beaufighter.

Cheers

Steve
Edit. I should say that Coastal Command would later get Blenheims. They equipped three squadrons in early 1940 at a time when the two Beaufort squadrons were grounded. They were only ever reconnaissance aircraft and nobody else wanted them.
The situation prompted Bowhill to write.

_"I have no Striking Force whatever. It is one continual promise from the production side which never materialises, and to think that this Command started this war (and is still in the same position) with Vildebeests as a Striking Force is extraordinary."_

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## tomo pauk (Jan 31, 2016)

Thank you for posting the wievs and realities among the different branches of UK's military 

Granted, once Bothat and Beaufort are in the pipeline, the torpedo-carrying Blenheim is nothing but a further duplication of effort. In the same time, it is too bad the Hampden was not tested with torpedo earlier, as a back-up against either Botha or/and Beaufort being flops, and then cancel Botha and order 400-500 of those from Blackburn.
Similar scenario can be drawn for the torpedo-carrying Blenheim.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

At this period aircraft production, even of the obsolete/stop gap types, was being dangerously accelerated. The problems with the Botha and Beaufort were not discovered until far too late. The Botha was a hopeless case and the Beaufort was grounded and had severe limitations imposed on its use, after it arrived at operational squadrons. They were both very nearly flops.
I agree that it would have been nice to have other options, poor Bowhill had no viable torpedo aircraft at all early in the war. He would carry the can for his Command's poor start to the war, but it was never his fault, he simply didn't have the equipment to allow him to fulfill the unrealistic mission demanded of him.

I think in the case of the Hampden the problem would have been prising it from the hands of Bomber Command. It was used as a torpedo bomber, but only after they were withdrawn from service with Bomber Command. You would have a very slim chance convincing men like Ludlow-Hewitt or Portal, a slightly better chance with Peirse and zero chance with Harris (I've ignored that interim chap, between Peirse and Harris, whose name I can never remember  ) that they should give up a single bomber to another Command.
It says a lot for the emphasis placed on the bombing campaign and the political leverage that Bomber Command had, that the names that have cropped up in senior and influential roles on the Air Staff/Air Ministry in this story went on to command Bomber Command.
I haven't looked at the operational history of the Hampden as a torpedo bomber, so I've no idea how good it was. It seems to have been a fairly simple conversion. It's a type which drops off my radar once it leaves Bomber Command.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 31, 2016)

I'd try not to steal any historical Hampden's from the Bomber Command, but have more of them produced as torpedo bombers.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

I don't have the figures but what you are suggesting is to offset some production intended as bombers for Bomber Command to supply torpedo bombers to Coastal Command. This is rather similar to the Admiralty doing the same to Hurricane production for its Sea Hurricanes, something it was unable to do in 1941 and hardly in 1942, even after Fighter Command was relegating the type from front line service in Europe. You'd have a better chance of obtaining second hand aircraft for conversion but given the prevailing attitude of the Air Staff, the influence of Bomber Command and as the low priority accorded Coastal Command I don't think it could have been done historically. I've not noticed any early request from Coastal Command for the type either.

Harris, as Deputy Chief of Air Staff partially backed an idea of Beaverbrook's to transfer Coastal Command to the Navy. Harris wanted to transfer the responsibility for maritime air operations to the Navy whilst keeping the resources then existing in Coastal Command, a sort of back door expansion of Bomber Command. He argued once again that equipping Coastal Command was a serious drain on aircraft and personnel and prevented the expansion of Bomber Command and, as he put it, the _"air war proper"_ would suffer. He also quoted Churchill's opinion of Inskip, that his was _ "the strangest appointment since Caligula appointed his horse a Consul of the Roman Empire."_
This did not go down well with Chief of Air Staff Portal or Vice-Chief of Air Staff Freeman who commented.
_
"The paper makes me despair and want to go back to MAP...The need for your_ [Harris] _having a trained staff officer is urgent. The paper is hypothetical and egotistical."_

But Harris had support in even higher places. Churchill wrote.
_
"Fighters are streaking ahead, and it is a great comfort we have so good a position in them. We must, however, increase our bomb deliveries on Germany and it appears that some of the types and patterns most adapted to this are not coming forward as we had hoped."_

It wasn't until 15th April 1941 that Coastal Command was afforded some protection by a new inter-Service agreement, one provision of which was that no squadrons could be transferred from Coastal Command without Admiralty agreement.

Now, whilst I don't believe it was a historical option it would be an interesting exercise to imagine what might have happened had Coastal Command had a couple of squadrons of Hampdens. Coastal Command didn't mount any torpedo operations early in the war because it couldn't. What if it could have?

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 31, 2016)

stona said:


> I don't have the figures but what you are suggesting is to *offset some production intended as bombers for Bomber Command to supply torpedo bombers to Coastal Command. *This is rather similar to the Admiralty doing the same to Hurricane production for its Sea Hurricanes, something it was unable to do in 1941 and hardly in 1942, even after Fighter Command was relegating the type from front line service in Europe. You'd have a better chance of obtaining second hand aircraft for conversion but given the prevailing attitude of the Air Staff, the influence of Bomber Command and as the low priority accorded Coastal Command I don't think it could have been done historically. I've not noticed any early request from Coastal Command for the type either.
> ...



(my emphasis)
Nope - Blackburn produces 400-500 Hampdens under license, instead of Botha, starting in 1939
Same goes with Sea Hurricane - not steal what is earmarked for RAF, but produce extra aircraft for the RN.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

Bowhill first suggested the Hampden as a solution to the Beaufort's limited range, it couldn't reach the Kiel Canal or some of the important enemy anchorages and shipping lanes in the Kattegat. This was in a letter of 12th June 1941. This is shortly before Bowhill was replaced by Air Chief Marshall Sir Philip Joubert at Coastal Command. Joubert was more interested in competing with Bomber Command for long range aircraft to cover the 'Atlantic Gap' and anti-submarine operations in general. He was not supportive of his Command's anti-shipping role. He did not consider that attacking shipping was the primary role of Coastal Command's Strike Force and wrote to Portal saying so on 4th July 1941. It wasn't until 15th December that Joubert wrote to Freemen regarding the Hampden. It is worth quoting at length as it shows what was thought of the Hampden and also how he claims it as his idea!

_"As you know we are in a mess about the Beauforts, and it has occurred to me that as the Hampden is becoming obsolescent from Bomber Command's point of view, it might be handed over to Coastal Command. It can carry two torpedoes or two mines and can travel far. It would be excellent for torpedo work and mining in the Bay of Biscay and on the Norwegian coast, and for the bombing of submarine bases and enemy shipping. Indeed it would make an excellent a/s_ [anti-submarine] _craft as well."_

Freeman's response was cautious arguing that far from being obsolescent the Hampden was still extremely useful to Bomber Command _"with its flexibility between bombing by day or night and sea mining..." _Freeman was however a supporter of Coastal Command, he had threatened to resign earlier if the maritime squadrons were handed over to the Admiralty, and he threw his weight and considerable influence behind what Joubert described as a _"tremendous effort of organisation and drive" _in securing an immediate allocation of 24 Hampdens which were to equip a new Coastal Command squadron, No. 415 (Canadian).
In January 1942 the order was modified so that 40 aircraft were to be delivered immediately and that 12 aircraft a month were to be modified to carry torpedoes thereafter. No. 415 Squadron did get its Hampdens by the end of January and commenced operations in April 1942. Additional aircraft did not start arriving until April and the other three Hampden squadrons (Nos. 144, 455, 489) did not become operational until mid to late 1942.

So, historically, the Hampden became operational with Coastal Command from early 1942, which begs the question, what would have been done with them a year or two earlier?

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> (my emphasis)
> Nope - Blackburn produces 400-500 Hampdens under license, instead of Botha, starting in 1939
> Same goes with Sea Hurricane - not steal what is earmarked for RAF, but produce extra aircraft for the RN.



That's going beyond 'what iffery' into the realms of fantasy 

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 31, 2016)

Why?


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## fastmongrel (Jan 31, 2016)

Could the Lockheed Hudson carry a torpedo. I know it had a fairly small bomb bay but put a reserve fuel tank in the bomb bay and carry a fish externally. Thats if it wouldnt snap in half.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

Coastal Command could have benefited from Hampdens. Coastal Command was part of the RAF, the RAF fought hard in the 1930s (and after the war incidentally) to keep it. Any extra production would have gone to Bomber Command, just as new built Hurricanes went to Fighter or other RAF Commands before the Navy. If the Admiralty, the Senior Service who had the Prime Minister as First Lord of the Admiralty couldn't prise a type out of the hands of the RAF at the Air Ministry, what chance did the least regarded of all RAF Commands have? 
Coastal Command was very much the poor man of RAF Commands at this time. This was reflected in a woeful supply of men and materiel.Whilst the RAF, even at periods of high pressure, maintained an operational ready rate of 70%-80% in Coastal Command this was closer to 40%. For every hour a General Reconnaissance aircraft (like an Anson) flew it needed 20 hours of maintenance, for the flying boats this figure was 91/2 hours. The Command, unlike others within the RAF, didn't have the means to manage this. The Air Staff in the late 1930s funded Coastal Command just enough to sustain its existence and prevent it being snatched by the Admiralty. The result was that it couldn't even begin to fulfill its operational requirements until 1942. Any early expansion of the type you are suggesting was historically impossible. Some things might have changed, Bowhill tried very hard to no avail and was not sparing in his criticism of the Air Ministry, but the idea that a substantial number of front line bombers could have been diverted is fantastic.
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 31, 2016)

If Coastal Command had gone to the Navy at the same time as the FAA where would the Admiralty have got the funds and aircraft. They could barely squeeze the aircraft they had out of government as it was.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

fastmongrel said:


> If Coastal Command had gone to the Navy at the same time as the FAA where would the Admiralty have got the funds and aircraft. They could barely squeeze the aircraft they had out of government as it was.


Exactly. I doubt they'd have had much more luck than Coastal Command had in attaining aircraft, they certainly wouldn't have got aircraft destined for Bomber Command. I think that had that transfer to Admiralty control occurred the strike capacity of the land based maritime units may well have disappeared altogether, at least for a few years. The Air Staff only maintained it (with Vildebeest for heaven's sake) as a means to blocking that transfer.
The Admiralty would have concentrated on the reconnaissance and anti-submarine roles (as Joubert initially did, his comment above about anti-shipping/mining operations in the Bay of Biscay was in support of his plan to attack the ships operating out of that area to support and re-supply the U-Boats operating in the Atlantic). The Navy would have used its own FAA strike aircraft as it historically did. I think an impetus pushing the Admiralty for land based maritime strike aircraft may have come later with the need for operations against the Italians in the Mediterranean, which is a lot smaller than the Atlantic, but all this is speculation.
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 31, 2016)

I think there is a great What If to be written about the RFC and RNAS staying seperate and equal services.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 31, 2016)

Now that we're discussing the British bombers, would some kind soul please rectify the tid-bit on the Wikipedia entry about the Whitley - it is stated that Mk. II was "Powered by 920 hp (690 kW) *two-stage* supercharged Tiger VIII engines: 46 built"
It was two-speed supercharged, not two-stage.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 31, 2016)

.duplicate post


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## fastmongrel (Jan 31, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Now that we're discussing the British bombers, would some kind soul please rectify the tid-bit on the Wikipedia entry about the Whitley - it is stated that Mk. II was "Powered by 920 hp (690 kW) *two-stage* supercharged Tiger VIII engines: 46 built"
> It was two-speed supercharged, not two-stage.



Done

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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

fastmongrel said:


> I think there is a great What If to be written about the RFC and RNAS staying seperate and equal services.



But then then one would be part of the RN and one part of the Army and there would be no independent air Service at all !

It was only by amalgamating both that the RAF was created, the FAA being part of the RAF until it was removed from the RAF and handed to the Admiralty shortly before the war. This when their Lordships first tried to get control of Coastal Command and its shore based assets.
There was never an independent naval air service, it was always under either the Air Ministry or Admiralty. I don't see how it could ever have existed independently.
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 31, 2016)

stona said:


> But then then one would be part of the RN and one part of the Army and there would be no independent air Service at all !
> 
> 
> Cheers
> Steve




Thats exactly what I find so intruiging, how would things have developed with an RFC and an RNAS. Maybe things would have developed on similar lines to the US air services or the RFC becomes like the Luftwaffe a service designed to support the Army and protect the Home country while the RNAS takes over responsibility for Heavy bombers and Empire defence. The possibilities are endless and I wish I had the time, the knowledge and the writing skill to explore some what ifs.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

You could write a book on it!
Who would control a strategic bombing force? The Army or the Navy? The first such force came into existence in the RAF, but IIRC the RNAS had a go at it (in a 1917/18 context) first.
Cheers
Steve


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## nuuumannn (Jan 31, 2016)

fastmongrel said:


> I think there is a great What If to be written about the RFC and RNAS staying seperate and equal services.



Yep, although its arguable that with thinking in the 20s and 30s the way it was, would the thought processes of the Admiralty staff been made with any more foresight that they were.

Back to a Blenheim with carrying a torpedo for a moment, I suspect the actual path taken of designing a whole new aeroplane to do so was the right one; The Blenheim would have required too much structural modification to allow it to happen. Firstly, the Beaufort wasn't Just a modified Blenheim; they had virtually no structure in common; the control yoke was the same, but little else - the same spectacle control yoke was also used in the Beaufighter. Also, just lengthening the tail wheel strut doesn't make a torpedo bomber. Where on the Blenheim's structure are you going to mount the attachment brackets? Forward or aft of the bomb bay doors? Either way the aircraft's C of G is going to be seriously compromised without altering the bomb bay design. This is where the Hampden was ideal; little structural change was required to carry a torpedo internally (I'll get back to that).

Also, while the Blenheim might have been capable of carrying the equivalent weight of a torpedo, it wasn't carrying it as a single mass. How would that affect the aerodynamics? Would it actually be able to fly with a torpedo and what would its handling be like on release? it'd probably porpoise like, well, a porpoise. Those puny little Mercurys weren't going to be able to do much. Bigger engines were required.

As for the Hampden, it proved useful but slow; modifying it required little change to its existing structure; the lower rear gun cupola was made smaller, which gave the impression of an alteration to the depth of the bomb bay doors, but these remained the same as on bomber variants. Issues arose with the decision to carry torpedoes with detachable fins; the torpedo could no longer be carried internally and therefore the bomb bay doors remained open in flight. The fins extended aft of the torpedo's prop and in the Hampden sat over the revised gun cupola. There were handling difficulties with the Hampden as a torpedo bomber however, which did cause the loss of examples carrying out torpedo training; the Canadians lost at least one during training in Patricia Bay. I can't elaborate further on its service as a TB, as I'm away from home.

A better aeroplane was required. Thank Bristol for the Beaufighter.



> the RNAS had a go at it (in a 1917/18 context) first.



They more than had a go at it; the first strategic air strikes of the Great War were made by RNAS aircraft, as early as 1914. Also, the big Handley page bomber, the HP O/100 was built to a requirement stipulated by Cdre Murray Sueter, Director of the Air Department of the Admiralty a year later.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

The Hampden required a little more modification to fit the torpedo, at least one of the frames was altered and the reinforced hard point to mount the torpedo installed, but essentially I agree.
Cheers
Steve


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## nuuumannn (Jan 31, 2016)

yep, Steve, I'm aware of that, but the Blenheim would have required a lot more than reinforcing hardpoints in the bomb bay and altering a frame or two. I remember reading that the Hampden's bomb bay floor level was altered as a result of the doors no longer sitting flush with the rear cupola; but I cannot believe that extensive modification was carried out.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2016)

Yeah, that old chestnut still does the rounds! The bomb bay was not itself modified, only the frame at the rear of the bomb bay was reduced in height and had either a 12" cut out or a concave bottom, depending who you believe, to accommodate the back of the torpedo. The rear cupola was reduced in height by 12" to clear the 'Monoplane Air Tail' (MAT). It didn't move fore or aft. The glazing seems to have changed to accommodate this too. A heavy duty carrier to mount the torpedo was fitted to the roof of the bomb bay.
You will know, but for those that don't, the main body of the torpedo was carried , partially exposed, within the length of the bomb bay. The breakaway MAT sat behind the bomb bay area and cleared the reduced gondola by 3" (on a good day).
All in all, as you first said, it was a relatively simple conversion. Had the bomb bay itself had to be substantially modified, or even the gunners cupola moved, it would not have been and I wonder if it would ever have been done.
Cheers
Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 1, 2016)

Yep, thought it was a stretch, Steve. Would like to see the RAF Museum example when its done.

The RAF Museum's Beaufort and torpedo with fins.


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## stona (Feb 1, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> Yep, thought it was a stretch, Steve. Would like to see the RAF Museum example when its done.



Still being 'resurrected' at Cosford but I will certainly be in the queue to see it too 

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 1, 2016)

It might not have been a that great trick to hang a torpedo _underneath_ a Blenheim, as in bolt the bomb bay doors shut after cutting appropriate holes in them to clear struts/mounts for the torpedo. This does affect both range and speed compared to putting the torpedo _inside _the airplane and with the limited power British engines of the late 30s needing all the help they could get to get an aircraft up to a decent speed. However most any monoplane would have had a huge advantage on speed/range over the Vildebeest.

There is no real technical reason that some sort of half-a**ed torpedo bomber could not have made using the Blenheim as a base.
The MK IV was supposed to have an all up weight of 14,400lbs. They were using MK Vs at up to 17,000lbs all up. I don't what was modified to allow the MK V to operate at that weight but I would guess the modifications were minor.

Such a torpedo bomber would neither the speed or range of the Beaufort (or perhaps even the Botha 

A much better Blenheim than the MK IV could have been built using existing parts ( in the sense that nothing needed to be "invented" rather than finding production capacity) even in 1939.

The real _what if _comes in the already mentioned political struggles (read inter-service and intra-service rivalry/s).

Prying *any "*remotely usable" bomber away from bomber command _in 1938-39-40-41 _was difficult if not impossible depending on the year. 
*"*Remotely usable" being anything that could fly from Britain to the German border, drop several 500lb bombs and return to Britain _if not attacked _by the Germans. Being a bit facetious here to get the point across. 

Had _extra _production been available to build 400-600 more twin engine aircraft then Bomber Command would have been foaming at the mouth like a rabid dog trying to get them too. 

In hindsight we *know* that bomber command accomplished almost exactly squat (nothing) in 1939-40 and parts of 1941 so any diversion of assets stood a good chance of improving _something---anything _over what was done. 
What is hard to understand is the refusal to consider these diversions (splitting) of assets (aircraft/crews/ground crews) _at the time_ given both the experiences of WW I and the lack of proof of results at the time. How long did it take before photo recon missions were started to assess bomb damage (or lack of it) by bomber command? 
Or the fact that next to nobody was willing to point out that the emperor had no clothes? 
The British had *ONE *_night bomber squadron_ in 1937-38 (please correct this) flying bi-planes and this squadron rarely flew (let alone practice bomb) at night in order to reduce accidents. 
It is one thing to plane your doctrine/strategy on an unproven concept. It is another thing to base it on a doctrine/strategy that hasn't even been really trained for, practiced or trialed in exercises.

One of the few things bomber command did get right was the rapid shift from daylight bombing to night bombing *after *Wellingtons and Hampdens were shown to be incapable of penetrating German "air space" without unacceptable losses in the fall of 1939.


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## stona (Feb 1, 2016)

The Mk XII Torpedo weighed 1,548 lbs. The carrier, accessories etc later fitted to the Beaufort was about 150lbs so this Blenheim is going to need to lift about 1,700lbs. I believe this is more than the maximum bomb load allowed for a Blenheim IV.
The Mk XII was also 16'3" long without a MAT. Not sure where that goes on a Blenheim either. There's no point in ditching a load of fuel to allow the extra lift, even if it is possible. Any land based torpedo bomber is going to need all the range it can get.
Coastal Command's request for three Blenheim IVs for trials, which was anyway declined, was for trials as General Reconnaissance aircraft, not a torpedo bomber.






The post above makes some good points. Bomber Command embarked on a steep learning curve during the war, but unlike Coastal Command it didn't really start that in 1939.
All the 'Western Air Plans' which the RAF was supposed to implement on the outbreak of war were based on erroneous assumptions. Plans 1,4 and 5 included detailed planning of Bomber Command's role. None of them included any means of helping Poland whose nearest point was 700 miles from Bomber Command's UK air fields.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 1, 2016)

I am not sure the weight of the torpedo is all that big a problem. 
The MK I Blenheim went from 8100lbs tare and 12,500lbs all-up to the MK IV, 9790lbs tare and 13,500 (or 14,400lbs depending on source) to the MK V (type 160) at 11,000lbs tare and 17,000lbs all up. 
Trading fuel in the outer wing tanks (94 imp gallons each) for the weight of torpedo might very well even things out too. 
Plenty of carrier based torpedo bombers traded fuel for torpedo weight when switching from recon missions to torpedo strike missions. 
Just filling the outer tanks 1/2 full saves 700lbs. 
The Blenheim suffered from being under-powered for most of it's career. When first introduced it was certainly as good (or better) than some contemporaries (foreign) but as time went on the contemporaries got better engines and props. The Blenheim got 100 octane fuel but was stuck with pretty much the same power plant to the end of it's days. Put that together with being shuffled off to the tropics (North Africa and the Far East) where the hot temperatures sapped engine power, prop bite and wing lift (and tropical filters did what ?) and it is little wonder that the bomb load of the Blenheim was never officially increased. Also please note that a fair proportion of the weight increases in the later models went to increase protection (both armor and protected tanks) and increase defensive guns/heavier gun mounts/turrets and other operational equipment.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 1, 2016)

We might also recall that fuselage/nose was modified when going to Mk IV, and then again for the Mk V. These modifications added the weight.
The Mercury engines wer not the latest thing, still the Blenheim have had better power to weight ratio than Beaufort with Tauruses, along with more favorable wing loading.


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## stona (Feb 1, 2016)

The Finns managed to lift 800kg according to some sources, but in what condition they were flying (fuel, armament etc) I don't know.

The British loading plans I've seen show either 4 x 250lb or 2 x 500lb bombs. The 1,000lbs maybe what would fit internally, not a maximum load.

One thing is certain, a torpedo could not have been carried internally and the effect on the Blenheim's less than stellar performance of hanging one externally can only be guessed at.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 1, 2016)

For the best description of the Blenheim bomb load arrangements (and guns) I have seen so far (Better ones may be available) see:

Blenheim armament

I don't believe anyone here has suggested putting the torpedo inside the plane and while inside torpedoes were quite the rage in the late 30s carrying torpedoes on the outside seems to have worked for the He 111, the Italian SP-79, the Japanese GM3 and some other aircraft.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 1, 2016)

Ju 88 also carried torpedoes externally, so did in Soviet service the A-20 and Il-4.

The speed figures I have, thanks to Neil Stirling:
Mk.I - 285 mph @ 15000 ft
Mk.IV (bomber, 3 forward firing guns, 2 guns in upper turret) - 266 @ 11800
Mk.IV (fighter, tray with 4 .303s, 2 guns in turret) - 260 @ 12000 ft
Mk.V ('Bisley') - 263 @ 13000 ft; 244 @ 6000

Beaufort I (Taurus engine) - 247 @ 5000, 236 @ 5000
Hampden (1 torpedo, mean weight) - 220-233 mph

We can expect at least 240 mph for a Blenheim + torpedo?


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## Juha (Feb 1, 2016)

Hello Stona
thanks for the Blenheim armament link!

On FiAF Blenheims, see my messages #5, #10 and #12. From the info in the last one can calculate that most of the six Blenheims of the Bomber Sqn 48 participating that mission carried 860 kg (1896 lb) bombs. Only differences to the RAF Blenheims were that FiAF Blenheims had 2 wing mgs and IIRC always only one turret mg and again IIRC our short noses had extra tankage when compared to the RAF Mk. Is. And of course different bomb carriers.

Juha


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## nuuumannn (Feb 1, 2016)

> There is no real technical reason that some sort of half-a**ed torpedo bomber could not have made using the Blenheim as a base.



Sure, then again, anything could be done to make the Blenheim better or more varied in its roles, question is, why bother? In 1939 the Beaufort flew for the first time and was clearly the RAF's preference - it was bigger, more powerful and could carry a heavier load than the Blenheim - it was purpose built for the role. Any time after 1939, when the storm clouds gathered, the Blenheim was found wanting in performance and load lifting ability. Modifying it would be a waste of time and effort when the best option would be to concentrate on the development of the Beaufort and Beaufighter. The Beaufighter, which, admittedly was not available in large numbers in 1939 - '40 was altogether more suited to the role as it became the RAF's premier torpedo bomber in Coastal Command strike squadrons by the end of the war. The Mosquito made a poor torpedo bomber.


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## stona (Feb 2, 2016)

It would have been nice to concentrate on better types, but in 1941, when the first real anti-shipping campaign got underway, Coastal Command was operating 13 Squadrons of which 7 were equipped with Blenheims (2 on loan from Bomber Command), 4 with Hudsons and only 2 with Beauforts. These came under No 18 Group operating from the east coast.
In March '41 when German successes against British shipping in the North West Approaches caused a redistribution of Coastal Command's anti-shipping assets and 4 squadrons were transferred to the North West, the gap created was filled by even more Blenheims from Bomber Command's 2 Group.
This led to yet another spat between the two Commands.In May 1941 it became apparent that the two Commands were not coordinating their operations so that some areas had overlapping patrols whilst others had none. The two AOCs-in-C were asked to establish a division of responsibility to avoid this but the ensuing disagreement became a major row over the proper function of the two Commands.
Peirse claimed on Bomber Command's behalf that ALL bombing, whether against ships or on land should be under Bomber Command control. He wrote.
_
"Experience has shown abundantly that two separate forces cannot run an offensive against shipping in the same area. The anti-shipping technique is complicated and must be directed by one hand. It is moreover a bombing technique."_

His crews might have substituted 'suicidal' for 'successful' for the low level technique, but no one asked them.
In return Joubert argued that the fact No. 2 Group's Blenheims had adapted themselves so well to attacking moving targets at sea using an aircraft already deemed redundant for the purposes of the main bomber offensive was a good reason to hand them over to Coastal Command. With an eye for the influential bomber advocates on the Air Staff, he concluded.

_"It is agreed that the attack on shipping can be one of the roles of Bomber Command but it should be a very minor one and subject to the diversion of aircraft to the* main role*, which is the attack on military and industrial objectives within Germany."_

The referee for this match was once again the Chief of Air Staff, Portal. He refused to get embroiled in the arguments and simply divided responsibilities on geographical grounds. Bomber Command got the area from Cherbourg to the Dutch Frisian island of Texel, Coastal Command the rest.

Why is this important? The answer comes in one word, range. I have read that the Finnish Blenheims only carried the heavy loads for 300Kms, a 600Km round trip plus a reserve. If you dig out your old Atlases and look at where Coastal Command's Blenheims (the bulk of its force) were to operate in 1941 you will see that this might be a problem.
For example, to fly from a North Eastern base across the North Sea to the Norwegian coast is at least 400 miles. Once there the aircraft had to fly a patrol line before returning. From a South Western base to the Bay of Biscay is a similar distance.
If a fully equipped Blenheim can lift 700-800kg with a sufficient fuel load then it might be viable for such operations, otherwise it is, as it historically was, a non starter as a torpedo bomber.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Feb 2, 2016)

stona said:


> ...1933. A series of trials for different techniques. High altitude 'precision' bombing by three aircraft from 9,000ft, high altitude 'pattern bombing' up to 16,000ft by a whole squadron, dive bombing with release at 1,500ft and bombing ahead of the ship with a buoyant ('B') bomb were all tried. Dive bombing was most accurate with a 38% hit rate.
> 
> 1934. Similar trials at which despite the repeated success of dive bombing the RAF chose 'pattern bombing' by a whole squadron as the standard method for attacking shipping....



Not very surprising, also IJNAF made the same conclusion for their land based medium bombers and used it in 1941-42.


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## Juha (Feb 2, 2016)

stona said:


> ...Why is this important? The answer comes in one word, range. I have read that the Finnish Blenheims only carried the heavy loads for 300Kms, a 600Km round trip plus a reserve...



I cannot answer that from top of my head. Should look the sqn histories and combat reports before being able to verify.



stona said:


> For example, to fly from a North Eastern base across the North Sea to the Norwegian coast is at least 400 miles. Once there the aircraft had to fly a patrol line before returning. From a South Western base to the Bay of Biscay is a similar distance.
> If a fully equipped Blenheim can lift 700-800kg with a sufficient fuel load then it might be viable for such operations, otherwise it is, as it historically was, a non starter as a torpedo bomber.
> 
> Cheers
> ...



Many CC torpedo attacks were made inthe Channel and off Belgian and Netherland coast, at least later on. Those targets would have been in the reach of the Torp Blemheims. On the other hand, Hampden TB Is were used because most of the Norwegian coast and Bay Of Biscay were too distant even for Beaufort.


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## stona (Feb 2, 2016)

Juha said:


> Many CC torpedo attacks were made inthe Channel and off Belgian and Netherland coast, at least later on. Those targets would have been in the reach of the Torp Blemheims.



As this area fell under Bomber Command control in 1941 it would have to be later. After the argument between Pierse and Joubert Coastal Command could not operate in an anti-shipping capacity in this area except in exceptional circumstances.
Bomber Command, unsurprisingly, bombed!

As I am playing the voice of the real history I think that we should also consider when Coastal Command historically even considered developing torpedo attacks. In late 1941 and early 1942 Coastal Command's Operational Research Section and its Development Unit started to investigate the best means of attacking various classes of shipping with the weapons available. I can't possibly reproduce these reports at length but most of the conclusions related to the method of attack, bombs still being the principal weapons. The first use of the new Beaufighters was to be as escorts and flak suppression aircraft.
It was only in May 1942 that Joubert asked his ORS to investigate torpedo attack. The importance of developing torpedo attack was emphasised, but so was the reservation of torpedo carrying Beaufighters for 'Major attacks'. The reason for this is simple, a chronic shortage of torpedoes. The production of torpedoes was the responsibility of the Admiralty, catering for the needs of the FAA and RAF as well as the surface and submarine fleets. In December 1941 it was agreed that half of torpedo production would be devoted to aircraft variants, stocks of torpedoes for use by surface vessels were allowed to drop to enable this. However, in January 1942, of the 100 aerial torpedoes produced, the RAF got just *25.* When the Air Ministry protested that this level of supply would jeopardise aircraft attacks on major German naval targets and rule out attacks on merchant vessels for the foreseeable future the supply was increased to *33 *(from 110) in February. The RAF estimated its monthly requirement at *167*. In March and April 1942 production stuck at an average of 102 per month and the RAF got none, *ZERO*. During the four months from March to June 1942 the RAF received 88 torpedoes, but only 33 were for operational use.
We can see what's happening here.It would be very difficult to argue for more torpedo bombers when there were no torpedoes to drop. Coastal Command dropped just 13 torpedoes against merchant shipping in the first 6 months of 1942.
This problem was only alleviated after a 1943 expansion in production and a decrease in demand for the MTO following 'Torch'. Indeed the success of torpedo attacks in the MTO did much to bolster Coastal Command's hand in respect of this method, but far too late for the Blenheim.

Cheers

Steve




the supply of torpedoes which were expensive and required maintenance even in storage. Here Coastal Command had to compete with the Fleet Air Arm.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 2, 2016)

In some of these "what if" threads we are actually looking at 4 or more things.

1. Would the "what if" actually perform as proposed. 
2. Could the hardware have built given the knowledge of the time?
No Mustang style wings in 1937,etc. 
3. Could the hardware have been built given the production abilities of the time. 
No magic factories. 
4. Could/would the "intended user" have been able to make use of the "what if".

To me the torpedo Blenheim certainly seems at least plausible for item 1. (we don't have hard numbers proposed but they may not be necessary, better than a Vildebeest and not as good as a Beaufort seems to be the range/target.)
A torpedo Blenheim could certainly past test 2. 
3 & 4 tend to merge. Without a magic factory no _extra_ production is available due to the willful stupidity of certain people in the RAF/Air Ministry. However 4-9 squadrons of Blenheims (torpedo/bomber/fighter mix)could have been diverted to Coastal Command in 1939 without making a dent in what Bomber Command _accomplished _with them (using hindsight). Using "foresight" on the other hand, it seems incredible that the main CC aircraft (the Anson) had fewer machine guns and 1/2 the bomb load of many of the flying boats/floatplanes used for coastal patrol in WW I. It was faster but endurance wasn't much better than some of them either. 
However it also seems to a case of Coastal Command also not being able to do much with Blenheims _unless _some people in charge got their heads out of their butts and both investigated better ways of attacking ships (both weapons and *tactics*) in 1938-39 so the squadrons would have time to train with the weapons and tactics. Otherwise you are back to the all to common situation of the British servicemen in the early part of WW II. "Take this piece of kit (which is quite probably rubbish and/or they have not been trained to use) , keep a stiff upper lip and muddle your way through."
This "practice" resulted in a LOT of VCs but didn't produce a lot in the way of lasting effects. 

BTW it is about 350 miles from Aberdeen to Bergen and about 305-310 miles from Scapa Flow to Bergen. Put a few air fields in the Shetland Islands (225 miles from Lerwick to Bergen).

Another BTW, the first helicopter crash in Britain was at Twatt airfield on Orkeny (about 12-15 miles from Scapa Flow) and involved a 
Sikorsky R-4 and a parked Blenheim. date was Feb 1945.


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## stona (Feb 2, 2016)

As far as 'what iffery' goes,the Torpedo Attack Committee was not established until June 1942 and with other bodies went on to define what would later become the familiar Wing Strike Tactics.
On 30th July 1942 this committee reported that equipment* essentia*l for a successful torpedo attack were an ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) radar and a means of sighting. *Desirable *was a radar altimeter. All the aircraft of the Strike Wing should be composed of the same type of aircraft and they should be fast enough for Fighter Command's single engine fighters to provide effective cover. The Hampden was singled out as completely unsuitable.
At the same meeting it was also revealed that there were no target ships being used for torpedo practice.
This is in the middle of 1942. I'm afraid that any notion that a viable torpedo strike force could have been established in 1939/40/41, using the Blenheim or any other available type, is difficult to support, even if the torpedoes could be found.

Atlases at the ready again !!!!!!!!!!!!!

In 1940 (the time we are considering in the original posters premise) patrols weren't flown from Aberdeen to Bergen. Patrol lines were flown at 35 mile intervals. The northern line ran from the Shetlands to the Norwegian coast just above Stadlandet (about 250 miles) and the southern line ran parallel (in a sort of North Easterly direction) from Newcastle on Tyne out into the North Sea towards Denmark. This system was soon abandoned and a system of 'cross over, line and box' patrols started. The only aircraft that Coastal Command had capable of making what we might call armed reconnaissance along Norway's south western coast line was the Hudson.
Later as the Germans used more northerly ports patrols were extended north and south from Trondheim to the Heligoland Bight. Even from the Shetlands to Trondheim, on a straight line, is over 400 miles, add another 150 or so from Wick. From, say, Wattisham to the Heligoland Bight is more than 300 miles. Once an aircraft arrived it then had to look for and identify any shipping.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 2, 2016)

It didn't take a rocket scientist to figure out where the Germans would have to travel to get submarines and surface raiders into the North Atlantic.

In 1938-39 they had four choices.
1. the English channel
2 the gap between John o'Groats and South Ronaldsay (basically an entrance to Scapa Flow)
3 the gap between the Orkney and Shetland islands
4 the gap between the Shetlands and Norway.

It shouldn't have taken much more than a paper airplane scientist to figure out the first two were rather unlikely or poor choices.
It shouldn't have take much more than a rubber band powered model airplane scientist to figure out that the Shetlands-Norway gap was the most likely (especially for surface ships). It also shouldn't have required any especially brilliant thinking to figure out you couldn't depend on Norwegian coast watchers notifying the Admiralty of ship movements in a timely fashion. With the experience of hundreds of years of smuggling going on in European waters depending on surface ships alone wasn't the right answer either no matter how much it pleased the RAF to foist off the maritime patrol/shipping watch mission on the Navy's surface fleet assets.
Leaving Coastal Command with few air craft capable of patrolling the most likely route (even unarmed reconnaissance) seems like a real failure in planning. Again referencing even WW I experience. 
As to the training, it points out how in "what ifs" so much is training and tactics vs actual performance of hardware.
Mixed Groups of Blenheims consisting of bomber versions, trained in low level attacks, fighter versions for strafing/flak suppression and torpedo carrying versions _had they been trained for it and trained to operate together _could have been a formidable strike force in 1939 and the Norwegian campaign. 1939 German ship AA being much lighter than German ship AA in 1942/43.
On the other hand even with a time machine, handing 1939/40 squadrons 1943 Beaufighters and Beauforts and having them use 1939 tactics/methods of attack wouldn't have changed historical outcomes much. Uncoordinated attacks by penny packets of aircraft operating without decent intelligence (forget Ultra, just timely reports from radar equipped shadow aircraft) wasn't going to accomplish much except by pure luck.


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## stona (Feb 2, 2016)

They weren't looking just for the surface raiders and submarines, that would have been fairly easy.
Rather like with bombing policy there was a progressive slip in what shipping could and could not be attacked from the air. By February 1940 was only a step away from a blockade of Germany. The Chiefs of Staff had just re-iterated that _"The wearing down of Germany by ever increasing force of economic pressure should be the foundation of our strategy."_
The matter of limiting Scandinavian ore supplies to Germany by force (trade negotiations had limited Sweden's to 9.9 million tons per annum) was seriously discussed as early as November 1939.

The MEW estimated that 18% of Germany's supply of iron pyrite and 6% of copper ore (the actual figure was much higher) came from Norway as well as timber, 32% of Germany's fish requirement and any number of other vital supplies. This is the shipping that Coastal Command was supposed to find. Further south it was all the commercial shipping passing through ports like Rotterdam, Emden, Hamburg etc and then on down into the French ports from Cherbourg, through the Bay of Biscay to Spain.

It was a huge area to cover. In fact the only way convoys could be found and interdicted was with a combination of human intelligence from agents in ports from Norway to Spain, photographic reconnaissance of ports and signals intelligence. It wasn't until May 1940 that efforts were made to intercept signals traffic of the German merchant fleet whose simple cyphers were open. The ships tended to travel in small groups and there wasn't much traffic to intercept, but by mid 1940 larger convoys were being used for protection. Early in 1941 the cypher used in German controlled dockyards was broken giving valuable information on convoy movements. By July the Admiralty was able to draw up a complete plan of convoy activity between the Elbe and Rotterdam for example. Luftwaffe signals indicated important convoys that would receive air cover (the code word 'Citrone' was used for this for many months, not a good idea) and might therefore contain valuable targets. The escort vessels were usually naval minesweepers who used Enigma. From August 1941 this was broken and proved most important in ascertaining Coastal Command's efficacy against convoys, particularly outside the Bay of Biscay. The escorts not only gave details of their charges but always reported accounts of enemy action and any damage incurred, very useful for British Intelligence.
A signal like this one, intercepted on 5th August 1941 is invaluable:
_"V.2012 proceeded to Hook_ [of Holland] _with convoy after SS Viborg had been severely damaged by air attack."_
Coastal Command's responsibilities and operations were much, much more complicated, and its area of operations much vaster than your post would have us believe. It takes a far too simplistic view of challenges facing the British and Coastal Command in the early stages of the war. If only it had been so easy!!

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Feb 3, 2016)

Re Enigma and Coastal Command.
It seems that Enigma intercepts were rarely useful in the day to day operations of the Command. They rarely provided timely information to enable the organisation of a strike on a valuable target.
There were a few notable exceptions and these were in the Command's campaign against blockade runners sailing between the French Biscay ports and the Far East.
It was interception of signals from one of the_ Elsa Essberger's _accompanying U-boats that led to her location about 50 miles north west of the Spanish coast. She was attacked and severely damaged on 11 Jan '42 and forced to unload her precious cargo of natural rubber and vegetable oil at the Spanish port of Ferrol.
Later it was signals intercepted showing that 5 destroyers were leaving Gironde at about the time that the blockade runner _Alsterufer_ was expected that led to the location of this ship which was attacked and sunk on 27 December '43, before she had even reached the outer limits of the Bay.
Note the dates, none of this was possible in 1939/40 or even 41.
Cheers
Steve

Thought for the day.
In November 1942 a Bomber Command crew (heavy or medium) had a 44% chance of surviving a first tour of 30 missions and an overall 19.5% chance of surviving a second.
Coastal Command crews had to complete 200 hours operational flying for a tour, surprisingly close to the 30 missions of Bomber Command. A torpedo bomber crew had a 17.5% chance of surviving a first tour and if recalled for a second (a common occurrence) this fell to just 3%.
Another survey conducted in early 1943 revised the figures for a Coastal Command torpedo bomber crew to just 2% for a first tour and 0% for a second.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 3, 2016)

Thank you for the Historical notes, I have learned a few (or more than a few) things.
They re-enforce my contention that you could not expect 1943 results in 1939-40 simply by changing aircraft. 

However the "selection" of aircraft for "Coastal Command" was simple in 1936-39. And the Anson was *not *the answer. 

Before France fell in 1940 we can eliminate the Bay of Biscay from consideration. 
Germany's outlets to the Atlantic were as outlined above. Coastal Command did have the responsibility of watching most/all of the north sea and the English Channel just in case the Germans did try something. CC was also responsible for covering the Western Approaches. 

What was needed was an airplane that could cover the Western Approaches AND at least part of the Norwegian coast as those were the greater distances at the time (mid Atlantic gap can be worried about later). Now perhaps given budget constraints a hi/low mix of air craft could be considered but in Sept 1939 CC had 18 squadrons, 10 equipped with Ansons and 2 with Vildebeests and 3 with Saro London Bi-plane flying boats 
(and one of these squadrons was based at Gibraltar) 
and 2 with Sunderlands and 1 Supermarine Stranaer 
Flying boat squadrons rarely, if ever, had a complement of 12 aircraft so a simple squadron count skews things a bit. 
It looks like the bean counters in the treasury had skewed things (with the air ministry) toward the low end of the mix. 
Ansons not having the range required and having, as it turned out, an almost useless bomb load. 
Not only was it below (often well below) the planes used in WW I but the 100lb anti-sub bomb was useless. Another example of "wishful" thinking. 

From Wiki:

" 
The primary weapon against the U-boats in a future conflict was to be the 100 lb (45 kg) anti-submarine bomb (ASB). It was developed in 1926 following a 1925 Admiralty request. Trials were undertaken in 1927. Inexplicably, although the weapon was introduced and ready for testing in 1931, not a single test was carried out against any submarines or to determine the bomb's behaviour under water. The Air Ministry preferred 250 lb (110 kg) and 500 lb (230 kg) bombs, which were unacceptable to the Admiralty, due to corrosion issues in salt water, possible due to the ammonium nitrate fillings. Nevertheless, a trial order of 50 was placed in May 1939. The 100 lb (45 kg) A/S bomb proved useless. The aircraft available could only carry two, and even if they scored direct hits, little damage was done"

Even if they had worked 2 bombs is hardly an "effective" armament as 4 bombs makes a longer string and greatly increases the chances of a "HIT". Hit being a bomb exploding close enough to cause damage. Later operational research revealed that the 250lb depth charge had a lethal radius of 19 feet. 

Against surface ships (unarmed) the Anson with 100lb normal bombs might have been a bit more effective but it gave a pretty poor return for crew and fuel used even if cheap to purchase. 

In real History 4 squadrons of Blenheim fighters joined CC in Feb 1940 from fighter command, Bomber command graciously (sarcasm) _loaned _2 squadrons of Blenheim bombers in May of 1940 and in August gave up a squadron of Fairey Battles (which was shipped off to Iceland). 

Now we do have the historic Air Ministry issued Specification G.24/35 which covered a _replacement _for the Anson and to which Bristol responded with designs that wound up as the Bolinbroke/Blenheim IV. 

The intent was there, the design was there, the Canadians set up a production line for them to satisfy Canadian requirements (although events over took production.)

What seems to be lacking in Britain was sense of urgency in regards to Coastal Command equipment vs Bomber Command equipment. This lack of urgency (or Bomber Commands hogging of resources) lead to CC getting cast-off aircraft for several years after the war started. (old Wellingtons and Whitleys as Bomber Command got newer planes).


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## stona (Feb 3, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> .
> What seems to be lacking in Britain was sense of urgency in regards to Coastal Command equipment vs Bomber Command equipment. This lack of urgency (or Bomber Commands hogging of resources) lead to CC getting cast-off aircraft for several years after the war started. (old Wellingtons and Whitleys as Bomber Command got newer planes).



This never changed. Even after the North Coates Wing had demonstrated success with it's Wing attack tactics, many lessons had been learned or re-learned by early 1943, there was a concerted move to disband it! This time the demand came from within Coastal Command and from its new AOC-in C, Slessor.

If we have a look at the aircraft involved in the first of the North Coates Wing's successful operations we have another demonstration of why such operations would have been impossible much earlier.
The torpedo component of the Wing was No. 254 Squadron with a full complement of 31 'Torbeaus'. The anti-flak component was made up of Nos. 236 and 143 Squadrons with a total of 38 Beaufighters.
On 18th April a convoy was spotted of The Hague by Mustangs on reconnaissance operations. Their report was relayed to No. 16 Group H.Q. where the decision to launch a strike against an important convoy, comprising eight merchant vessels and eight escorts including four minesweepers (which now carried additional anti-aircraft armament) was taken. 
*21 Beaufighters* were dispatched accompanied by *21 Spitfires *of Nos. 167 and 118 Squadrons and *8 Typhoons* of No. 56 Squadron as cover. Close escort was provided by *8 Mustangs *of No. 613 Squadron. *Total aircraft dispatched, 58.*
They sank the Norwegian_ Hoegh Carrier_ (4,906 tons) and damaged some other vessels.This was the sort of force that was needed to conduct successful strikes against protected convoys, and continued to be so later in the war with better types.
It was low level bombing and torpedo attacks by individual or few aircraft that had caused the appalling losses behind the statistics I quoted above. It wouldn't matter what aircraft were employed, what was needed was plenty of them in a coordinated action with developed tactics to minimise losses. Throughout 1941/2 Coastal Command was trading at least 6 aircraft and their crews for each vessel sunk.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Feb 3, 2016)

Interesting that Wikipedia says that the Canadians flew Ansons with 2 x 250lb bombs on patrols over the Gulf of St Lawrence. These might have been a later mark with the 450hp P&W Wasp junior.

_The Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Navy operated the aircraft until 1952. Although the Canadian Ansons were used throughout the training schools of the British Commonwealth Air Training plan for training aircrew some were pressed into operational service with the RCAF's Eastern Air Command. A good example of the training schools involvement in combat operations with the EAC during the emergency of the battle is illustrated in an article dated the 1st of March, 2006 of the Royal Canadian Legion magazine entitled Eastern Air Command: Air Force, Part 14 the author Hugh A. Haliday wrote: "The need for Atlantic patrols was undiminished, yet the Battle of the St. Lawrence stretched EAC resources. Based at Charlottetown, 31 General Reconnaissance School was mobilized to fly patrols using Avro Ansons, each carrying two, 250-pound bombs. At the very outset of the war the Anson and its ordnance had failed in RAF anti-submarine work. Now in Canada it was remobilized as an aerial scarecrow. German views varied as to Canadian countermeasures. The captain of U-517 found his operations increasingly restricted by strengthened air patrols. In October 1942, U-69 reported “strong sea patrol and constant patrol by aircraft with radar.”_


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## stona (Feb 3, 2016)

As far as I know Coastal Command used Anson's with a couple of the next to useless 100lb bombs or 20lb bombs (not sure how many) on external racks. I haven't really checked, but don't remember noticing the use of 250lb bombs. I'll happily be corrected 

What is certain is that the Hudson was Coastal Command's primary bomber along with the Blenheim in the early war years.
Cheers
Steve


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## ChrisMcD (Feb 3, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> The Mercury engines wer not the latest thing, still the Blenheim have had better power to weight ratio than Beaufort with Tauruses, along with more favorable wing loading.



I think that is a major point. All these aircraft are underpowered.

If Bristol had managed to get the Hercules into volume production in time for a Hercules/Beaufort the problem of a decent, long range, fast torpedo bomber would have been solved in plenty of time and the RAF might have had some of the successes the IJNAF had with the G3M and G4M. 

AFAIK the Taurus was a double Aquila, in the same way that the Hercules was a double Perseus and yet is started design later - so if Fedden had sorted out Hercules mass production in time; all this hanging on with old model Mercuries, Pegasuses etc. would have been unnecessary.

After all the Beaufighter is essentially a "sports model" Beaufort. Without the extra gunners/bomb aimers and with a huge payload. 

I find it interesting that only the IJNAF and the RAF actually planed land based torpedo bombers (I stand to be corrected, but I think all the rest were adaptations).


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## Shortround6 (Feb 3, 2016)

ChrisMcD said:


> AFAIK the Taurus was a double Aquila, in the same way that the Hercules was a double Perseus and yet is started design later - so if Fedden had sorted out Hercules mass production in time; all this hanging on with old model Mercuries, Pegasuses etc. would have been unnecessary.



Aquila was 9 cylinder single row engine with a 5in bore and a 5 3/8in stoke (950cu in/15.6L) The Taurus was a 14 cylinder two row engine with 5 in bore and 5 5/8in stroke (1550cu in/25.4L)
The Perseus was a 9 single cylinder with 5 3/4in bores and 6 1/2 in stroke(1520cu in/24.9L) The Hercules was a two cylinder 14 cylinder engine with 5 3/4in bores and 6 1/2 in stroke(2360cu in/38.7L)

The Mercury was a 9 cylinder single row engine with..........wait for it............5 3/4in bores and 6 1/2in stroke (same 1520 cu in/24.9L as the Perseus)
The Pegasus was a 9 cylinder single row radial with 5 3/4in bores and a 7 1.2 in stroke. (1753cu in/28.7L).

Please notice that the Aquila was simple too small to be seriously considered as a combat engine (anybody want to use the R-1340 out of a T-6 trainer in a combat plane?) and the Hercules was in a whole new class/category.

The British were engaging in wishful thinking (self deception?) in thinking that swapping/substituting any of the others around was going to make any great difference in aircraft performance. P & W canned the R-1535 (14 cylinder twin row) from further development in the late 30s as not worth the time/effort of future development compared to the R-1830 and R-2800. 

The Taurus was almost 300lbs heavier than a Mercury and around 165lbs heavier than a Pegasus so what ever it gained in power and streamlining had to be balanced against the weight gain. Every 3 Perseus made was 2 Hercules NOT made in cylinders.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 3, 2016)

> However the "selection" of aircraft for "Coastal Command" was simple in 1936-39. And the Anson was *not *the answer.



Oooh, pre-WW2 looks soooo backward in hindsight.

In 1936 the Anson was frontline - it was a patrol bomber; there was no requirement to spend long hours over the mid Atlantic or the very northern reaches of the North Sea - that was the job of the new Supermarine Stranraer flying boat that also entered service that year; the Anson was just to operate around Britain's immediate coastal waters. In 1936 the RAF was equipped with the Gloster Gauntlet and Bristol Bulldog as its fighters and the Handley Page Heyford as its heavy bomber. Even the Harrow, which was a monoplane of similar construction to the Anson didn't enter service until a year later. In order to establish what was front line at the time, take a look at what air forces around the world had_ in service_ in 1936, not under development, but squadron use. In 1936 Britain was in a peaceful state and the economy was geared toward such things - there was definitely weapons development but of greater immediate priority was stabilizing the economy for peacetime growth.

This didn't mean there was no foresight; there was a spec for a torpedo bomber on the cards and Bristol even saw that the basic 142 from which the Blenheim was developed would be inadequate unless it underwent considerable modification and was fitted with new engines. Also that year, P.13/36, the spec that produced the Manchester had a requirement for a torpedo to be carried internally, although this was later dropped.

let's say that Peace-In-Our-Time did actually happen and there was no WW2; aircraft like the Anson, Blenheim and Battle would have remained in service a lot longer than they did - there would have been no Hudson for the RAF, no Mustang, probably no Lancaster nor Mosquito.

yes, the Anson's warload was inadequate, but show me examples of modern land based (not flying boats) maritime patrol aircraft in service in 1936 for comparison.

Steve, the Anson's puny warload was carried internally - see here:

Omaka Open Day 31 January 2016


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## nuuumannn (Feb 3, 2016)

> After all the Beaufighter is essentially a "sports model" Beaufort. Without the extra gunners/bomb aimers and with a huge payload.



In theory it was supposed to be, as the Beaufort Fighter, but in practice the two had nothing in common. There was no structural commonality between them.


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## fastmongrel (Feb 3, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> In theory it was supposed to be, as the Beaufort Fighter, but in practice the two had nothing in common. There was no structural commonality between them.



I have always understood the Beaufighter shared the tail section aft of the observers position, wings outboard of the engines, ailerons and landing gear with the Beaufort.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 3, 2016)

I'm away from home, so I can't verify it, but I remember reading something about the Beaufighter being fitted with Frise ailerons and the Beaufort not, but I could be mistaken. As for the undercarriage, could be, I can't recall, but the rear fuse on both aircraft have different dimensions and the elevators are a different shape. As for the outer wings, the Beaufighter's were different owing to hard points and I think the ailerons were different lengths. If only I worked at the museum still and I could nip down during my lunch break and check them both out! Certainly Wikipedia supports that view, and maybe in the prototype, but in production aircraft there were considerable differences in these areas.

From Wiki: "In general — apart from powerplants — the differences between the Beaufort and Beaufighter were minor. The wings, control surfaces, retractable landing gear and aft section of the fuselage were identical to those of the Beaufort, while the wing centre section was similar apart from certain fittings."

More on this in a bit...


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## Shortround6 (Feb 3, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> Oooh, pre-WW2 looks soooo backward in hindsight.
> 
> In 1936 the Anson was frontline - it was a patrol bomber; there was no requirement to spend long hours over the mid Atlantic or the very northern reaches of the North Sea - that was the job of the new Supermarine Stranraer flying boat that also entered service that year; the Anson was just to operate around Britain's immediate coastal waters. In 1936 the RAF was equipped with the Gloster Gauntlet and Bristol Bulldog as its fighters and the Handley Page Heyford as its heavy bomber. Even the Harrow, which was a monoplane of similar construction to the Anson didn't enter service until a year later. In order to establish what was front line at the time, take a look at what air forces around the world had_ in service_ in 1936, not under development, but squadron use. In 1936 Britain was in a peaceful state and the economy was geared toward such things - there was definitely weapons development but of greater immediate priority was stabilizing the economy for peacetime growth.



Let's see, the British were flying the Blackburn Kangaroo





In 1918 on anti-sub missions. Max bomb load was 900-1000lbs depending on source but usual bomb load was a pair of 230lb Anti-sub bombs or a single 520lb LC Anit-sub bomb was also carried at times and one Kangaroo used the 520lb bomb to severely damage the UC 70 which was finished off by Destroyers. 
The British used hydro-static fuses on the 230lb AS bombs (two types) and the 520lb AS bomb in WW I. 
Using a pair of 270hp RR Falcons the Kangaroo could carry a pair of 230lbs for eight hours over a distance of 560 miles. 
Handley Page O/100 bombers were also used for anti-sub patrol on occasion, at least 3 being fitted with the 6pdr Davis recoilless gun for anti-sub work (not very successful) 

There were at least 3 different single engine float plane patrol bombers, mostly operated from shore bases, Being able to land on water in an emergency (engine failure?) being seen as a safety measure. These planes carried four to six 100-116lb bombs depending on type of aircraft on patrols of 3-1/2 to 4 1/2 hours. 
Then we have a variety of flying boats used for anti-sub patrol, also carrying multiple 100-116lb bombs (or pairs of 230lb bombs).

Sorry, it doesn't take hindsight to criticize a bomb load of a _pair _of 100lb bombs over 15 years later while using higher powered engines. Or the fact that the WW I planes had 2 machineguns as a minimum and sometimes up to 4 machine guns. Of course in 1935 the idea of using 335hp engines in a "Patrol Bomber" was pretty laughable, unless you were _trying to build the cheapest patrol bomber you could. _
The Cheetah engine was a 7 cylinder engine of 835cu in displacement (13.7L) which hardly a first class engine in the early or mid 30s.
Wright had a 7 cylinder 760cu in engine and a 9 cylinder 975 cu in engine (using the same cylinders) at the time in addition to the 1820 cu in Cyclone.
P & W had a 985 cu in 9 cylinder engine called the Wasp Junior because it was smaller than the older 1340 cu in 9 cylinder Wasp.
P & W was also offering a 9 cylinder 1690 cu in engine (the Hornet) and 1535 cu in and 1830 cu in 14 cylinder engines. 

BTW the chances of a Supermarine Stranrear flying patrol over the mid Atlantic was about nil, normal range is usually given as 1000 miles or 400 miles less than a Blenheim which _nobody _has suggested was a plane capable of patrolling the mid Atlantic. 

the Harrow was a victim of the protracted design/procurement time frame all to common to British aircraft projects of the time. 

American examples of what _could _be done include things like the P-26 for fighters (6 squadrons in service in 1936) and the Martin B-10 bomber. 103 B-10Bs delivered by Aug of 1936, first flight of a much different prototype was back in Feb of 1932. 
BTW the first PBY prototype (granted it had a different tail among other things) flew just 8 months after the first Stranrear. 
Lets also remember that the Douglas rolled the 100th production DC-2 airliner out the door in July of 1935. Not a "patrol bomber" although it was the basis of the B-18 bomber. 

Sorry, better aircraft both possible and available had they been willing to pay the price. 
The idea of going to war 1939 with anti-sub bombs that had been designed and minimally tested (but not against even a scrapped WW I Sub) over ten years before before a production batch was even ordered also boggles the mind. 
Too many brave British airmen lost their lives trying to fight with grossly inadequate aircraft and weapons (untested bombs, WW I machineguns, etc)


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## Shortround6 (Feb 3, 2016)

fastmongrel said:


> I have always understood the Beaufighter shared the tail section aft of the observers position, wings outboard of the engines, ailerons and landing gear with the Beaufort.




It may have started that way and it was certainly the plan, It is somewhat borne out by the Beaufighter having one of the shortest development cycles (start of project to prototype to 1st production version) of any British project of the time. 
How much the tail and wings, etc changed from first production version to later versions and diverged from the Beaufort I don't know. 
We know the dihedral on the tailplanes changed. we know that wing guns were added after the first few hundred Beaufighters were built, and then fuel tanks were made to fit in the gun bays. 
I have no idea how much changed from the MK I Beaufighter to the MK X. The MK X may be quite different than a late production Beaufort. The MK Beaufighter may be much closer to a 1940 Beaufort.


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## Juha (Feb 4, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> ...the Anson's puny warload was carried internally - see here:
> 
> Omaka Open Day 31 January 2016



Hello Nuuumannn, really excellent shots of the Faithful Annie!

Juha


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## Juha (Feb 4, 2016)

One more point up to May 1940 British Gov loathed to damage private owned property and that incl. shipping. So only warships and state owned merchant ships were legitime targets. Gov contracted merchant ships were so so... And how could an aircrew to check the ownership of an merchant ship they saw? That was the problem. So no incentive to improve methods to attack merchant ships. KM warships were of course legitime targets.

Juha


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## stona (Feb 4, 2016)

It appears from Coastal Command sources (August 1939) that their Ansons could carry two 100lb bombs 'internally' and up to eight 20lb bombs in 'wing cavities' (???). An alternative of two 250lb bombs 'externally' is mentioned but seems not to have been the norm. The Hudson's 1,400lb internal load is used for comparison and both are described as 'useful'.
The Anson's range is given as 600 miles whereas the Vildebeest's is given as 'between 150 and 185 miles' which is,frankly, laughable for a land based maritime aircraft. Even Fighter Command's Hurricane interceptor had a 'radius of action restriction' of 120 miles.

There was some crazy thinking behind all this. Some unlikely people recognised it. On 7th December 1936 in a memorandum to the Air Staff on Combined Air Requirements none other than the ultimate bomber man, a certain Group Captain A.T. Harris wrote.
_"Our mistake has been to make a bomber and then add a torpedo or vice versa."_
The same memorandum them went on to give a requirement for a torpedo bomber that could double as a medium bomber!

Some have touched on an important point above. The British aircraft industry of the 1920s was not that of the 1940s or '50s and '60s. The start of the expansion period coincided with quantum leaps in aircraft and engine design. All metal monoplanes were replacing the earlier wood and fabric aircraft, retractable undercarriages, variable pitch propellers and numerous other advances were being made. Engine power also increased by a factor of as much as five in roughly ten years. A lack of investment in the 1920s meant that insufficient resources were channeled into research and development, making it difficult for firms to match the technical standards being achieved on the Continent and in the US as rearmament began.
This was compounded by an overall lack of production capacity. When the Air Ministry radically cut its orders in the 1920s many smaller companies simply went out of business. Some were not so small, perhaps the most notable casualty was the Sopwith company.
One of the first effects of increasing pressure on production was the withdrawal from design departments of facilities available in leaner times.
It wasn't until 1938 that the Air Ministry adopted a policy of fostering experimental work shops.
As late as 1942, an investigation into design and development work revealed that some aircraft firms still didn't have experimental work shops and that in most the introduction of new aircraft was slowed down by insufficient allocation of floor space and plant for developmental work.
The most advanced aircraft that the British had at the outbreak of war was the Spitfire. It was essentially the result of a small team of flying boat designers drawing on the companies racing heritage to design a fighter with the most advanced features of the time. It was not the result of a concerted and well financed government effort to produce a cutting edge aircraft. We had it as much by luck as by judgement. A comparison of the investment and facilities at BFW/Messerschmitt AG and the Supermarine sheds at Eastleigh makes for a salutary lesson.
Compare the investment and facilities at BFW/Messerschmitt AG with the Supermarine sheds at Eastleigh.
The contemporary Hurricane was a more conservative design, a throwback to earlier times, and is far more representative of the state of the British aircraft industry in the 1930s. All the Luftwaffe's front line combat aircraft at the outbreak of the war, including bombers and dive bombers, were all metal monoplanes.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Feb 4, 2016)

Juha said:


> One more point up to May 1940 British Gov loathed to damage private owned property and that incl. shipping. So only warships and state owned merchant ships were legitime targets. Gov contracted merchant ships were so so... And how could an aircrew to check the ownership of an merchant ship they saw? That was the problem. So no incentive to improve methods to attack merchant ships. KM warships were of course legitime targets.
> Juha



This was a real problem in the first months of the war. As I said above, there was a slow slip in what could and could not be attacked.
It wasn't until 4th May 1940 that the Air Ministry issued a signal to Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands stating that any shipping underway, merchant or otherwise and irrespective of the flag under which it was sailing, was liable to attack if found within 10 miles of the Norwegian coast south of latitude 61 degrees North, and anywhere east of longitude 6 degrees East as far south as latitude 54 degrees North (the base of the danish peninsula). Ships at anchor could be attacked if definitely identified as enemy on all parts of the Norwegian coast except Oslo and Trondheim fjords, this because allied troops were still concentrated here in the closing stages of the Norwegian campaign.
As early as December 1939 Joubert had said.
_"I think it is possible that the attacks already carried out by German aircraft on inoffensive British shipping would enable us to get away with an attack on German shipping from the point of view of neutral nations."_
There were all sorts of ridiculous orders about identifying signals, warning shots and attacks on 'non vital' parts of vessels. It wasn't until February 1940 that merchantmen and trawlers converted as flak vessels were allowed to be attacked.
Britain was in a difficult situation in Scandinavia. The Russo Finnish peace agreement in March 1940 finally ended any hope of a foothold in northern Scandinavia and Britain was wary of attacking Norwegian shipping (2/3 of Germany's non-Baltic routed iron ore was delivered in Norwegian ships) for fear of precipitating a German-Norwegian alliance and it was feared any attacks on Swedish shipping would lead that nation to go back on agreements limiting Germany's ore supplies. It wasn't until the German invasion of Norway in April, that the British felt that they could attack these merchant fleets, hence the May Directive. The Germans had managed to solve Britain's conundrum for her.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 4, 2016)

stona said:


> It appears from Coastal Command sources (August 1939) that their Ansons could carry two 100lb bombs 'internally' and up to eight 20lb bombs in 'wing cavities' (???). An alternative of two 250lb bombs 'externally' is mentioned but seems not to have been the norm. The Hudson's 1,400lb internal load is used for comparison and both are described as 'useful'.



The eight 20lb bombs in the wings (?) could also be replaced by smoke floats or flares. Coastal Command was hardly going to say that the Anson's bomb load was "useless" 



> The Anson's range is given as 600 miles whereas the Vildebeest's is given as 'between 150 and 185 miles' which is,frankly, laughable for a land based maritime aircraft. Even Fighter Command's Hurricane interceptor had a 'radius of action restriction' of 120 miles.



The land bomber version of the Vildebeest (the Vincent) could (and did) carry a 100 gal tank under the fuselage in place of the torpedo and was credited with around 1250miles range. The Vildebeest is sometimes listed as having a range of 1000 miles or more but that _may _be with a similar (same?)external tank. Point is well made however. What was acceptable range/performance in 1928 (First flight of a Vildebeest prototype) was hardly up to world standards by 1934 when the contract for the MK III was issued let alone in 1939-41. 

[quoteThere was some crazy thinking behind all this. Some unlikely people recognised it. On 7th December 1936 in a memorandum to the Air Staff on Combined Air Requirements none other than the ultimate bomber man, a certain Group Captain A.T. Harris wrote.
_"Our mistake has been to make a bomber and then add a torpedo or vice versa."_
The same memorandum them went on to give a requirement for a torpedo bomber that could double as a medium bomber!
[/QUOTE]

Once again, making sure that as many planes as possible could be borrowed/commandered for the RAF's *true mission *(bombing the enemy into submission and gaining the RAF equal status with the Navy and Army) 



> Some have touched on an important point above. The British aircraft industry of the 1920s was not that of the 1940s or '50s and '60s. The start of the expansion period coincided with quantum leaps in aircraft and engine design. All metal monoplanes were replacing the earlier wood and fabric aircraft, retractable undercarriages, variable pitch propellers and numerous other advances were being made. Engine power also increased by a factor of as much as five in roughly ten years. A lack of investment in the 1920s meant that insufficient resources were channeled into research and development, making it difficult for firms to match the technical standards being achieved on the Continent and in the US as rearmament began.[QUOTE/]
> 
> I was perhaps rather critical of the Cheetah engine, it was actual a pretty good engine for it's size/class but the problem was in selecting such a limited aircraft in general for widespread use as a Coastal Patrol plane. It may very well have been more comfortable for the crew than using Hawker Harts/Hinds and the two engines did give better margin of safety than a single engine plane. While plenty of subs had been scared into diving by not very effective attacks during WW I that method (or dependence) of attack is hardly a sign of good planning. A few Squadrons to ease the crews into monoplanes with retracting gear as an interim plane is one thing, having over 1/2 of your patrol planes being such a limited machine 5 years later is another.
> 
> ...


[/QUOTE]


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## stona (Feb 4, 2016)

It does appear that the Anson really wasn't a bad option for Coastal Command, at least as a reconnaissance aircraft. It's range did leave it a little short and as far as I can tell nobody ever thought to extend this by the simple expedient of adding additional fuel capacity in place of the internal bomb load.

I've no idea why the Vildebeest couldn't manage a 400 mile round trip with a torpedo, that was a limitation imposed by Coastal Command. I suppose it was the same as Fighter Command's 'radius of action restriction' like the 120 miles for a 'standard' Hurricane (as of August 1941) which I quoted.

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 4, 2016)

Thanks Juha - it's always neat to see that aircraft being flown. We are very fortunate that its here in our corner of the world.



> Sorry, it doesn't take hindsight to criticize a bomb load of a _pair _of 100lb bombs over 15 years later while using higher powered engines.



Let's look at the role of maritime patrol between 1918 and 1939. There was little change in technology in either the hunters or the hunted and while the aircraft might have changed, the means of detecting them and destroying them hadn't; the most effective piece of equipment aboard a sub hunter was the good ole Mark One Eyeball. Typically, submarine hunting sorties were carried out in conjunction with surface forces, patrol boats and destroyers, with which the aircraft were in radio contact. The electronics fit aboard was HF radio and DF equipment and that was pretty much it. The spotting of the submarine was done by eye until the appearance of ASV (Air-to-Surface Vessel) radar during the war. The standard bomb sight in use in Ansons, as it was in the RAF's heavy bombers was the Mk.IX Course Correcting Bomb Sight, which was, to all intents and purposes, useless at attacking moving objects.

Maritime patrol was carried out low and slow. During the Great War one of the most effective maritime patrol assets was the non-rigid airship; the RNAS operated around 200 by the end of 1918, although not all at once. Compared to the Anson of 1936, the North Sea Class of 1917, which was probably the best and most capable non-rigid of the war had a greater radius of action and endurance, a larger crew and a heavier war load, but with airships come the added chore of operations and maintenance - airships are cumbersome by comparison to aeroplanes. Surprisingly there were very few incidents involving hydrogen mishandling - the British maintained a high standard of discipline and workmanship within its airship community, which reduced incidents and unnecessary losses. By comparison the Anson was faster and had the benefit of ease of operation, faster turnaround time and greater manoeuvrability; airships had a huge turning circle. As for defensive armament - and that's what it was for, almost all the fighter aircraft in service in 1936 had armament of two small calibre machine guns; the same as the Anson. The Luftwaffe's principal fighter in 1936 was the Heinkel He 51 although the biggest threat to British maritime patrol aircraft at the outbreak of war was German aircraft carrying out the same role. The Anson I flying in New Zealand is in the markings of an aircraft flown by a New Zealander in the RAF whose aircraft was shot down by a Heinkel He 115; he was the first RAF officer to become a POW of the war.

In terms of weaponry and tactics, the maritime patrol aircraft of 1936 operated similarly to those of 1918; when a contact was made, surface vessels were radioed and marker flares were laid. If the aircraft was in a position to make an attack, bombs were dropped, although this was not always possible. The bomb load was small and in actual practice during the Great War, the bombs were found to be in use for disabling the submarine to prevent it from escaping before surface vessels that could carry greater and more potent loads arrived on the scene. More often than not, aircraft did not drop their bombs on submarines, merely recording and marking their position. There are accounts of successful sinkings of submarines using small ordnance during the Great War; an exploding 100 lb bomb under the water close to a sub hull is going to create a considerable shock wave depending on how close the bomb is to the submarine.

Sub hunting was, in 1918, as it was in 1936 and even into 1942 a very hit-and-miss activity; the detection of a damaged or destroyed submarine was determined by visual cues only; oil slick, debris rising to the surface and this might not actually signify a destroyed submarine, and the sub could still be able to make its way back to a safe port, yet give the impression it was destroyed from visual cues, hence the presence of surface vessels, which were nominally equipped with Asdic, which was introduced in 1918. At the end of the Great War, it was proudly announced that no convoy under escort by airship was successfully attacked by submarine, not strictly true, but it underlines the real value of maritime patrol aircraft; that of deterrence.

Let's look at the submarines. In 1918 as in 1936, submarine technology hadn't changed much. They weren't true submarines, but submersibles, not being able to spend much time under water as it was uncomfortable for the crew and of course having to rely on battery power alone. This restricted their submerged speed to around four to six knots. Most submarines submerged to hide themselves, preferring to operate on the surface, where their small silhouette could conceal their presence. Their forward speed on the surface was around 10 to 12 knots; your average pleasure cruiser in 1936 could do faster than that. This status quo didn't really change until the introduction of the Schnorkel, XXI U-boats and closed cycle engines in the latter half of the war.

So, bearing all this in mind, was the Anson inadequate? What type of vessel would it expect to encounter in waters around Britain in 1936 and how well would it deal with it? There's no reason at all to suspect the Anson of not being able to carry out these tasks as described above in 1936. Lets face it though, the replacement spec for the Anson stipulated greater performance, load carrying capability etc and first flew in 1939, merely three years after the Anson entered service, the Beaufort torpedo bomber reconnaissance aircraft.


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## stona (Feb 5, 2016)

This has been a most interesting if meandering thread!
To return to the original premise, there was no impetus to convert anything into a torpedo bomber for Coastal Command for a variety of reasons, not least a lack of torpedoes.

Despite some successes with torpedoes it wasn't until late 1942, when there was a prospect of more torpedoes becoming available, that the aptly named Aircraft Torpedo Attack Committee asked Coastal Command's ORS to investigate the comparative effectiveness of bombs and torpedoes against shipping. The conclusion was that bombing was more effective than torpedo attack and that might be even more so with the adoption of the Mk XIV bomb sight.

In an amazing volte-face by the Air Staff, which had always favoured bombing as the best way to attack just about anything, the Command was told that it was too early to form such an opinion and that in the period in question the torpedo had been inexpertly employed, training was poor, most squadrons did not have proper sighting equipment etc. It was also sceptical of the Mk XIV bomb sight demanding more practical operational experience with the new sight before conclusions could be drawn. This never happened.

The 25lb solid rocket head proved the most efficient sinker of shipping. 5 of the 9 vessels sunk by Nos. 16 and 18 Groups between June and December 1943 were claimed for this weapon.

The adoption of Strike Wing tactics ended the large scale use of the bomb as an anti-shipping weapon, largely in favour of cannon and rockets but also, by late 1943, with the now available and improved Mk XV torpedo. The aircraft were also the improving with more powerful Beaufighters (Mks XIC and X) as was the equipment. The ASV Mk II radar was being fitted, even to the old Hampdens that would be withdrawn a few months later, such was the availability. In July 1943 Coastal Command started using 'Gee' as a navigational aid. By early 1944 this was standard equipment on the Command's Beaufighters. Transmissions in No. 18 Groups area were reported effective up to 460 miles, all the way to Trondheim.
Slessor argued hard for Mosquitoes for Coastal Command and the first squadron (No. 248) received some in December 1944, becoming operational with the type in February 1945. The Mosquito was one of the best aircraft of the entire war on all sides and the late war exploits of the rocket firing anti-shipping version will need no introduction here.

Whatever the outcome of all this, the efficacy of air dropped torpedoes was still being hotly debated in early 1943.
All the technological developments that made torpedo bombing viable came far too late for a Blenheim torpedo bomber. It never had a role in Coastal Command as a torpedo aircraft. Despite the best efforts of the men who served in the squadrons through out 1939/40/41, the Command only became effective in 1942 and from these beginnings developed by 1943/44 into something quite different to the sorry organisation it had been. Having a Blenheim torpedo bomber in the early years would have made no difference at all.
It would have been one more target for enemy fighters or flak (if it actually found a convoy to attack) and would rarely have had torpedoes available for operations in any case.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 5, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> .................. As for defensive armament - and that's what it was for, almost all the fighter aircraft in service in 1936 had armament of two small calibre machine guns; the same as the Anson. The Luftwaffe's principal fighter in 1936 was the Heinkel He 51 although the biggest threat to British maritime patrol aircraft at the outbreak of war was German aircraft carrying out the same role.
> 
> In terms of weaponry and tactics, the maritime patrol aircraft of 1936 operated similarly to those of 1918;............
> 
> ...



Nice summation of ASW although a bit biased towards the Anson. The main thing the Anson had going for it was that it was cheap. 
Granted no other aircraft had any better detection system and more than a few had worse vision and comfort for the crews (hard to be an effective lookout if you are half frozen although the RN didn't believe that. 
_IF _you don't expect or specify a better war load that WW I float plane with a single 250-300hp engine then you aren't going to get it.
The 100lb anti-sub bomb turned out to be a bad joke. It needed "almost" a direct hit in order to be effective. The 250lb aerial depth charge carried 170lb of torpex and was figured (several years after going into use) as having a lethal radius of 19ft. The MK I 100lb AS bomb held about 52lbs of TNT and the MK II held 62lbs. lethal radius is not in the books I have but is obviously much less than the 250lb DC. Given the roughly 16ft beam of the Pressure hull of a type VII U boat the ideal spacing for using the 250lb DC with two charges would have been about 45 ft giving a lethal pattern of 80-85ft to cover aiming/drop error. Going to four charges would give a pattern length of about 175 ft. This is using hindsight as the British _never _tested their anti-sub bombs against hulked subs or even mock-up sections of hull structure to see what effect they had between the wars. 
They were using, as noted in a previous post large numbers of 230lb light case anti-sub bombs in WW I and even a few 520lb light case anti-sub bombs. 
The "idea" that the 100lb anti-sub bomb was adequate was based more on hope and faith than any objective reasoning. 

So was the defensive armament. Specifying the SAME defensive armament as a DH-4 in 1933-34 was based more on budget than reality of what the plane would face in 1936-39 in service. British were specifying (or at least seriously talking about) 8 gun fighters. The French introduced at least some fighters armed with 20mm cannon in 1935. Many countries, even if keeping 2 machine guns were shifting to faster firing guns that so that two modern guns would equal 3-4 WW I era guns. 

The speeds you gave for submarines were their normal cruising speeds. Granted most subs attacked from air were caught by surprise at cruising speeds but even a British WW I H class sub (1916) could make 13kts on the surface and 8-9kts under water (briefly). The L class (1917) could make 17knots on the surface. They were good for 10.5 kts underwater when new. 
Any anti sub tactics needed to take these burst speeds into account. A surface ship that takes 15 minutes to get to the smokefloat/marker now has to search for a submarine that could be anywhere in a 4 mile diameter area.


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## ChrisMcD (Feb 5, 2016)

Has anyone pointed out that the Anson was cutting edge in it's time?

The first monoplane with a retractable undercarriage to enter squadron service with the RAF!


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## fastmongrel (Feb 5, 2016)

ChrisMcD said:


> Has anyone pointed out that the Anson was cutting edge in it's time?
> 
> The first monoplane with a retractable undercarriage to enter squadron service with the RAF!



The RAF was run by incompetent buffoons who lived on a diet of Avgas and Dope. All its planes were complete rubbish built by the Wright Bros that carried only enough fuel to fly from London to Brighton before crashing. All other countries had vast fleets of Anti Sub aircraft that could fly to the Moon and back, they carried so many Depth Charges they sank the entire German U Boat fleet in one pass and could drop Laser equipped Sharks to finish off the survivors. 

The Anson was a General Purpose aircraft used as a Transport, a Coastal patrol aircraft but mostly as the RAFs main multi engine trainer. The RAF knew it wasnt up to much and was desperate to get better patrol aircraft but circumstances meant it was still in use in 1939 when it was pretty much obsolete. If the Anson kept U Boats off the surface they were doing a vital job.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 5, 2016)

fastmongrel said:


> The RAF was run by incompetent buffoons who lived on a diet of Avgas and Dope. All its planes were complete rubbish built by the Wright Bros that carried only enough fuel to fly from London to Brighton before crashing. All other countries had vast fleets of Anti Sub aircraft that could fly to the Moon and back, they carried so many Depth Charges they sank the entire German U Boat fleet in one pass and could drop Laser equipped Sharks to finish off the survivors.



Gee whiz, _somebody *finally* got it *right* _

A little more seriously, what would you call the men or organization responsible for designing a AS bomb in 1926/27, doing only the most rudimentary of testing (but never a live shot (real explosives against a real or even simulated target) , sealing the design and then issuing a production contract for the first 50 bombs in October 1938. Delivered in 1939? No 250lb or 500lb AS bombs until then either. 
The Anson had NOTHING *to* drop in 1936-37 and most if not all of 1938 except 20lb bombs or perhaps 40lb bombs, both being fragmentation bombs. 
This means no training with "real" bombs during those years, no checking to see if bombsights will put the unmade bombs where pilot/bombardier think and so on. 

The Anson was a *great *trainer and light transport. It might have been a decent_ short range_ maritime recon plane. As an anti-sub aircraft it left an awful lot to be desired. And if the RAF needed a plane to patrol the Norwegian coast or the Shetland/Norway gap the Anson wasn't it.
And being cutting edge in the RAF in 1935-36 was hardly cutting edge in world in of aviation. 

Now as an equal opportunity "basher" don't get me started on some of the obvious mistakes the Americans made like the hyper engine fiasco, The Wright Tornado engine, several Curtiss designs and..................oops, got started


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## stona (Feb 6, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> And being cutting edge in the RAF in 1935-36 was hardly cutting edge in world in of aviation.



Exactly, I touched on this above. Why do people get so irate about facing a self evident fact? I think the Anson was a decent aircraft but yet again it harks back to an earlier era in its construction techniques. It was an old fashioned aircraft and this is only glossed over by having a retractable undercarriage and a few other 'modern' features. The most glaring problem with aircraft like this, which are effectively the end of one generation of aircraft, is the lack of development potential (think Hurricane and any number of early bombers as well). The more or less contemporary Bf 110 was so far ahead in this respect that it was still being built in numbers as a front line night fighter at the end of the war!

You will often see people write or say that 'we were lucky to have the Spitfire'. They usually don't know how true that is.

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 6, 2016)

> Nice summation of ASW although a bit biased towards the Anson. The main thing the Anson had going for it was that it was cheap.



It was, and to a degree I agree with you, my point was to illustrate what the status quo was and yep, the Anson was definitely yesterday's technology; it was based on the Avro Ten (which was a licence built Fokker F-VIIb) with its one piece wooden wing mounted at the bottom of the fuselage, but again, my point was to illustrate that there wasn't much alternative to the Anson at the time - the de Havilland entry to the requirement that produced the Anson was a military version of the D.H.89a Dragon Rapide!

As for speeds of submarines, adding a couple of knots isn't going to change much really and the speeds I quoted were pretty much for the subs in service with Britain's potential enemies. Yes, there were faster subs and more advanced aircraft than the Anson, but they weren't in service in Britain in the North Sea and by highlighting the expense, you've hit the nail on the head, Shorty; Britain wasn't at war when the Anson entered service; as I pointed out in a previous thread; Britain was at peace and budgets were oriented toward other things. The Anson was adequate for what it was at the time, and I think your perspective and expectations are biased toward what you think should have been the status quo based on individual examples, rather than what actually was, based on trends at the time.

Steve, I like to think of it as pragmatism, rather than romanticism. One questionable decision regarding your point is, why was the Blenheim kept in production for as long as it was, with wartime experience with it? Decisions made about such aircraft like the Battle and Blenheim are harder to justify when they entered service before the war, but during the war things changed considerably and cold hard experience highlighted inadequacies for what they were, but before the shooting started, who knew? Let's face it though, the British realised the Anson was inadequate before the war, when the British Purchasing Commission went to the US and ordered the Hudson off the drawing board as an Anson replacement in 1938 (of course, this leads directly back to the questionable proposition behind turning the Blenheim into a torpedo bomber...).


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## stona (Feb 6, 2016)

Numerous aircraft were kept in production after their sell by dates because of the parlous state of the aircraft industry. The practice of phasing out one type whilst introducing another was a double edged sword. Old types lingered and new types were delayed. It was all in an effort to produce quantity rather than quality and the Air Ministry felt that some role would be found for just about anything with wings.

I mentioned in another thread that British aircraft production, with the exception of a few months in 1940 NEVER matched the numbers planned.

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 6, 2016)

Another shift away from the thread, regarding the Beaufighter being different to the Beaufort. Having consulted my various sources (I'm home temporarily before I bugger off again) the production examples shared nothing in common structurally. The Beaufighter's undercarriage was changed from Vickers units as installed in the Beaufort and Beaufighter prototype to Lockheed units in anticipation of weight increases. The Beaufighter's fin and rudder areas increased on production examples and wings changed in structure owing to weapons fit (as highlighted earlier). On the prototype, the Beaufighter's oil coolers were placed under the engine nacelles, whereas the Beaufort's were in the wing leading edge, the Beaufighter's were moved back to the leading edge in production examples. Control surfaces changed as trim tabs on the Beaufighter increased in size over those fitted to the Beaufort. So, the reality, despite the intent was that the two were so different that they shared no common structure at all! There was no interchangeability between them.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 6, 2016)

stona said:


> Numerous aircraft were kept in production after their sell by dates because of the parlous state of the aircraft industry. The practice of phasing out one type whilst introducing another was a double edged sword. Old types lingered and new types were delayed. It was all in an effort to produce quantity rather than quality and the Air Ministry felt that some role would be found for just about anything with wings.



Yes, understandable to a point, but questionable in the face of combat experience. It's always easy to second guess 70 or more years after the fact, isn't it!


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## Shortround6 (Feb 6, 2016)

Often what is wanted/desired for 2nd string aircraft like a crew trainer is not what is wanted or desired in a front line combat aircraft. The crew trainer can use an older form of construction, it needs to be 'modern' enough to crew "realistic" training.
Like pilot having to use (or at least have) retracting landing gear and flaps if that is what the operational types are going to have. The ability to drop some sort of bombs that will act/behave in flight/drop like operational bombs. Gunner/s need a gun station at least resembling what they will see in service. It would help in the gun/s were the same as operational guns. Inter-crew communication, teamwork are being formed too. 
A good crew trainer needs to be rugged and easy to fix. The pilots are still learning and minor crack-ups and hard landings are going to be all too common. The Anson was a good fit for many of these requirements. If anything it may have been too easy to land 
It was also roomy enough to handle other roles and the roominess allowed for instructors to be carried in addition to the crew or for certain types of instruction several students at the same time. Multiple navigators or radio operators for instance. 
There is no doubt that the Anson performed many valuable services for the RAF for many years. And for many of those jobs having the latest, most up to date aircraft would not only have provided little or no benefit but increased the overall cost of the training program or missions. 
That doesn't mean it was a good anti-sub aircraft even in 1937-38 even if the AS bombs had been available. 
Most if not all of the Ansons used by Coastal Command came from the first 5 production batches. Batch one was 174 aircraft delivered from March 1936 to April 1937, batch two was 143 aircraft delivered from April to Sept of 1937, batch three was 28 aircraft delivered from Oct to Dec of 1937, batch four was 98 aircraft delivered between March 1938 and Sept 1938 and finally the 5 batch, 850 aircraft delivered from October 1938 to Sept 1939. some planes from these batches were delivered to Australia and at least 3 foreign countries. 
Using the Anson in place of biplanes in 1936-38 CC is one thing, having it form the backbone of CC in Sept 1939 (10 out of 18 squadrons?) is another thing. 

It is easy to criticize 70 years after the fact in many cases. In many instances we don't know what the production capabilities or even engineering capabilities of the various companies or facilities was. We don't know how far in advance things had to be ordered. For instance while the initial order for the Blenheim not "only" covered 150 aircraft it also covered "long lead items" for further 450 aircraft. This contract was placed 9 months before the contract for 600 Hurricanes was placed. Once a program was up and running not only were the _powers that be _loath to cancel them but cancellations in the middle of contracts/production runs could result in both lost money (unusable parts/material) and lost man hours.

However there were also many boneheaded decisions made by many air forces/armies/navies that were either contrary to good engineering practice or flew in the face of experience gained in WW I. 
2nd guessing decisions made in the 30s in light of what was known (or should have been known) is more difficult but certainly possible. For instance, The RAF had tested variable pitch propellers in the early or mid 20s as I recall (could be wrong, maybe late 20s) and came to the conclusion that whatever advantage in performance they provided was offset by their cost, increased weight (lower payload?)and increased maintenance. Once this report was made it seemed to become gospel in the RAF or Air Ministry and further consideration of variable pitch propellers was not entertained. Bringing it up was a waste of time. 
Now the initial report could very well have been correct. Fitting variable pitch propellers to a wire braced, fabric covered biplane with fixed landing gear is unlikely to offer a large change in performance. However by the early/mid 30s 2 pitch if not variable pitch props were becoming much more common even in commercial (airline) aviation on all metal monoplanes with retracting landing gear. Rotol was formed by Rolls Royce and Bristol almost in the face of opposition from the air ministry because both companies could see the need of higher powered engines and faster aircraft to have such propellers. The Air Ministry was caught several years behind the trend in world wide aviation. 
Variable pitch props were certainly not secret and had been being used since 1932/33 with further refinements coming until constant speed fully feathering props were in use by over a dozen airlines in 1938. Granted they were more expensive than fixed pitch or 2 pitch props. 
I would really like to see the thinking behind the 100lb AS bomb. seeing as how a 230lb light case bomb was almost standard in WW I for the planes that could lift it (in pairs or multiples) how a bomb 43% of that size came to be seen as the new "standard" almost boggles the mind. The improvement in explosives (torpex and cyclonite blends) was way in the future and not implemented until after the 1st year or two of WW II and for quite some time certain size and types of weapon had priority over others until production could meet demand. 
Ineffective weapons are only cheap if they don't have to be used in earnest. Once they have to be used in actual conflict they become very expensive indeed.


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## Juha (Feb 8, 2016)

A few points to the very interesting thread
Anson was a fairly good navigator trainer but not very good for pilot training being too nice to fly. Airspeed Oxford was clearly better being much more demanding.
IMHO besides the many lean years which had undermined British aviation industry and many not too flexible minds in top positions in the RAF and the Air Ministry one main problem hindering the development of the british bomber a/c was Fedden's fixation to the sleeve valve. That delayed the production of the reliable 1500 - 2000 hp radials a few/several critical years. Without adeque power it is almost impossible to design a good bomber.


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## stona (Feb 8, 2016)

Juha said:


> Without adeque power it is almost impossible to design a good bomber.



Amen to that. They tried and got the Stirling.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 8, 2016)

To be fair and without using the retropectoscope (hindsight) too much the Perseus was in production in small numbers from 1933/34 on. This lead to the erroneous conclusion that they had the sleeve valve production problem figured out. They could build sleeve valve engines in small numbers without getting reject sleeves in out of ordinary numbers. It was large scale production that resulted in crippling scrap rates of sleeves. Or sleeves that would not _stay _round after short periods of service.
What one doesn't need the retrospectroscope for is wondering why they thought switching to sleeve valves on the same size (displacement) engine (Mercury to Perseus) would result in a _big enough _power increase to allow that much bigger/heavier aircraft. 
The Taurus was a blind alley that sucked up too much time and effort during this time. Need for the retrospectroscope is mixed. We _know _it didn't turn out well but trying to see the attraction in a 14 cylinder engine that was only about 2% bigger in displacement than the 9 cylinder Perseus takes a bit more faith. It offered higher rpm and less frontal area than the 9 cylinder engines but future increases in power were going to be limited. It was about 94% the displacement of a Merlin and conventional wisdom of the time was that air cooled engines could not equal liquid cooled engines in terms of power for displacement as a general rule of thumb. It was also about 85% the displacement of the P & W R-1830. It, again, was trying to make up for the lack of displacement with RPM.
The Hercules was about 91% of the displacement of the Wright R-2600. The R-2800 wasn't generally known about until several years later and comparisons to that engine definitely need the retrospectroscope. The Hercules was eventually turned into a reliable high powered engine but it took time and a lot of redesigning. (or course the R-2600 was redesigned twice after the initial 1500-1600hp versions)

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## Juha (Feb 8, 2016)

Hello SR6
again an informative and balanced message as usual.

Juha


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## Shortround6 (Feb 9, 2016)

stona said:


> Amen to that. They tried and got the Stirling.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


 Actually the Stirling suffered from a few other problems. Wacking big fuselage and a small wing called for _more _power than a Halifax or Lancaster. 
But the point is well made by the Warwick and Manchester. The loss of drag of two engine nacelles was _not_ balanced by the loss of hundreds of horsepower. Two engines of under 2000hp (in early versions) vs 4 engines of over 1000hp (or even over 1100hp) for early versions.


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## stona (Feb 9, 2016)

The Stirling did have many issues, but fundamentally trying to design a bomber with four engines, weighing 45,000 lbs + within the constraints of the Air Ministry specifications was not ever going to end well with the power ranges of the available engines at the time.
Cheers
Steve


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## JAG88 (Apr 16, 2019)

On a related matter, when did the UK develop its Monoplane Air Tail for their torpedoes?

I apologize for the necro.


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