# Battle of Britain RAF and LW order of battle



## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

The thread about Bf109 landing gear drifted off topic onto the relative strengths of the RAF and LW during the BOB. I thought it would be best to start a new thread so the subject could be continued here.

If you take the BOB starting with Churchills speech the figures I have for 1 July 1940are .


Single engine fighters LW 1,107 RAF 754
Two engine fighters LW 357 RAF149
Bombers LW 1,380
dive bombers LW 428

serviceability on both sides was approx 72-75%

On 13 August LW
Single engine fighters 908 
Two engine fighters 263 
Bombers 988
dive bombers 311

15 September .......................LW........... RAF
Single engine fighters ............500+ ........ 630
Two engine fighters ........... 120
Bombers ...............................500

For 15 sept they are the forces available to kesselring in LW and 10/11/12 group for Park. Does anyone have better/different figures?


These figures gleaned from "the most dangerous enemy"


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## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

LW OoB and the airfields the units were based at, Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle

13 Aug 40

Strength Summary
Number	Type	Strength	Svcble
42 1/3	Kampfgruppen	1482	1008
9	Stukagruppen	365	286
1	Schlachtgruppe	39	31
26 Jagdgruppen	976	853
9	Zerstrergruppen	244	189
3	Nachtjagdgruppen	91	59
14	Seefliegerstaffeln	240	125 

7 Sept 1940

Strength Summary
Number	Type	Strength	Svcble
43	Kampfgruppen	1291	798
4	Stukagruppen	174	133
2	Schlachtgruppe	59	44
27	Jagdgruppen	831	658
8	Zerstörergruppen	206	112
18	Fernaufklärungsstaffeln	191	123
6	Seefliegerstaffeln	52	33

In addition this link, German Order of Battle - Statistics as of Quarter Years, 1938-45


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## Njaco (Jul 14, 2011)

Great idea Mustang!

Here is what John Ellis in "The WWII Data Book" lists.....


S/E aircraft

6 July....................RAF - 644 LW - 750
20 July..................RAF - 658 LW - 656
10 August..............RAF - 749 LW - 805
7 September..........RAF - 746 LW - 623
28 September........RAF - 732 LW - 276

T/E aircraft (fighters)
6 July....................LW - 220
20 July..................LW - 168
10 August..............LW - 224
7 September..........LW - 129
28 September........LW - 230

Dive bombers aircraft 
6 July....................LW - 280
20 July..................LW - 248
10 August..............LW - 261
7 September..........LW - 180
28 September........LW - 343

bombers
6 July....................LW - 1200
20 July..................LW - 769
10 August..............LW - 998
7 September..........LW - 772
28 September........LW - 750



will check other sources I have including several from Dr. Price.


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## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

Thanks milosh and Najco. I realise its not easy, not all of the LW was used in the BoB and serviceabilty availability will always be a point of disagreement but there is a trend downwards for the LW and upwards for the RAF.


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## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> would it also be necessary to exclude the Blenheims, Defiants and Glads if we were to exclude the Bf 110s. I would prefer to put all fighters into the mix, because thats the way the chips fall, but then again, fighters based in Germany or Scotland are not really in the battle.


The blenheim was never more than a backup in N England the gladiator was a reserve I dont think any were ever scrambled by Park though i think a few did take off. The defiant was very quickly withdrawn. The Bf110 was used throught the BoB because the LW took an age to realise how badly it was suited as an escort. In terms of effectiveness in the battle it was just the Bf109 Hurricane and Spitfire that really played a part.


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## davebender (Jul 14, 2011)

> Single engine fighters LW 1,107 RAF 754
> Two engine fighters LW 357 RAF149
> Bombers LW 1,380
> dive bombers LW 428


I suspect these numbers include Me-110 and Ju-88 recon aircraft. Probably also includes Me-109s and Me-110s assigned to night fighter units.

Where are the aircraft of RAF Bomber Command which operated continuously against Germany from September 1939 to May 1945? They didn't cause much bomb damage during 1940 but they did tie down a substantial amount of Luftwaffe resources which would otherwise have been employed in the BoB.

One more question. 
The RAF could maintain a higher fighter aircraft sortie rate as they were operating over friendly airfields. Shouldn't we be counting aircraft sorties rather then individual aircraft?


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## P-40K-5 (Jul 14, 2011)

all excellent points.


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## Mustang nut (Jul 14, 2011)

davebender said:


> I suspect these numbers include Me-110 and Ju-88 recon aircraft. Probably also includes Me-109s and Me-110s assigned to night fighter units.
> Where are the aircraft of RAF Bomber Command which operated continuously against Germany from September 1939 to May 1945? They didn't cause much bomb damage during 1940 but they did tie down a substantial amount of Luftwaffe resources which would otherwise have been employed in the BoB.
> One more question.
> The RAF could maintain a higher fighter aircraft sortie rate as they were operating over friendly airfields. Shouldn't we be counting aircraft sorties rather then individual aircraft?


I agree with P-40 excellent points, i was just trying to kick off the discussion which was off topic on the other thread.
I didnt include bomber or coastal command maybe I should have. I was addressing the numbers in the Battle of Britain which was the topic of discussion. 
Of course bomber command and also coastal command played a part and the LW had to respond. The figures I gave at the end were for those available to Kesselring on on side and Park on the other to attack defend the S.E. og England. Both sides had other areas of concern to defend and attack. Basically on what is called Battle of Britain day the RAF did have a slight superiority in SE fighters but only because of what had gone before starting with the invasion of Belgium.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

Here is a page from Deightons hard cover version of "Battle of Britain" / LW figures are for the two main air fleets committed plus LF 5 as a separate total. Date is 1 July 1940


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## davebender (Jul 14, 2011)

I think you mean "Fighter. The true story of the Battle of Britain.", a copy of which is on my bookshelf.

Unfortunately Len Deighton makes no distinction between bombers and recon aircraft. Nor does he discuss RAF Bomber Command, whose influence caused most Me-110 units to convert to the night fighter mission by the fall of 1940.


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## Glider (Jul 14, 2011)

I don't think that bomber command would influence the numbers as they mainly flew at night so the Me109's and Me 110's attacking the UK were useless against them. It was almost two battles going on at the same time. Had BC tried a mass raid against the German forces in France by day then it would have impacted the numbers.


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## davebender (Jul 14, 2011)

I disagree. 

Without a need for night fighters the Luftwaffe is likely to have three times as many Me-110 long range day fighters plus an additional Jagdgeschwader equipped with Me-109s. Perhaps more Ju-88s also as the recon mission can be performed by Do-215s which were historically assigned to the night fighter force.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

davebender said:


> I think you mean "Fighter. The true story of the Battle of Britain.", a copy of which is on my bookshelf.
> 
> Unfortunately Len Deighton makes no distinction between bombers and recon aircraft. Nor does he discuss RAF Bomber Command, whose influence caused most Me-110 units to convert to the night fighter mission by the fall of 1940.



No my copy does not include "Fighter" in the title, and i am reasonably certain it has significant differnces to the publication you mention Dave. For example, you say Deightons soft cover book does not mention the numbers of recon machines. The table I have does....there were 67 LR and 28 SR machines included in that sheet i posted, and these are additional to the bombers. Deightons list does not include KM aircraft or SAR aircraft

I am uncertain about your claim relating to 110s, but I have a book at home by Gunston that goes into some depth about German TE NF conversions. Wasnt the first conversion a Ju88C conversion in June 1940. There were only very limited numbers converted for the rest of 1940, i do know that, perhaps no mor than 30 machines, and i am pretty sure none of them were Me110s. But I will check tonite and give a bit more information.


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## Milosh (Jul 14, 2011)

davebender said:


> I disagree.
> 
> Without a need for night fighters the Luftwaffe is likely to have three times as many Me-110 long range day fighters plus an additional Jagdgeschwader equipped with Me-109s. Perhaps more Ju-88s also as the recon mission can be performed by Do-215s which were historically assigned to the night fighter force.



Do you ever look at the numbers?

13 Aug 40

3	Nachtjagdgruppen	91	59 (on hand - serviceable)
9	Zerstrergruppen	244	189 

Of those 91 a/c, 50 were Bf110s, 10 were Do17s, 11 were Ju88s and 20 were Bf109s.

My math does not come up with ~750 Zerstrer.


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## davebender (Jul 14, 2011)

Neither does mine.

Luftflotte 2 had about 90 operational Me-110 day fighters as of September 7th, 1941. Luftflotte 3 had 28 more for a total of 118. Multiply that by three and the Luftwaffe would have about 350 long range Me-110 day fighters available for bomber escort over England.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 14, 2011)

Unfortunately Len Deighton also makes a few technical errors in one of his Battle of Britain books (Fighter, even in hard cover) that tends to cast doubt on his credibility. Maybe they were typos but he was trying to draw conclusions from them and/or punch up the "story" a little.


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## parsifal (Jul 14, 2011)

He's certainly not the best source, but I still think he is useful as a reference....certainly for the purpose of establishing numbers.

And as i said, the version I have is greatly different (even in the title) to the the soft cover version you guys are referring to. Text, layout, appendices are all completely different


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## Milosh (Jul 15, 2011)

davebender said:


> Luftflotte 2 had about 90 operational Me-110 day fighters as of September 7th, 1941. Luftflotte 3 had 28 more for a total of 118. Multiply that by three and the Luftwaffe would have about 350 long range Me-110 day fighters available for bomber escort over England.


 
The BoB was well over by Sept 7 *1941*.

On Sept 7 *1940*

*Luftflotte 2*
Stab/ZG 2	Toussous-le-Noble 1
I/ZG 2	Amiens, Caen	20
II/ZG 2	Guyancourt/Caudran	28
Stab/ZG 26	?	3	3
I/ZG 26	Abbeville, St. Omer	33
II/ZG 26	Crècy	25	
III/ZG 26	Barly, Arques	25
V (Z.)/LG 1	Ligescourt, Alencon	23

*Luftflotte 3*
Stab/ZG 76	? 2
II/ZG 76	Le Mans, Abbeville	27
III/ZG 76	Laval	19

That is 206 Bf110s.


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## davebender (Jul 15, 2011)

Operational aircraft are the only aircraft that count. 

Much of the Luftwaffe was committed to fighting in Norway and France during April to June 1940. That's doubly true for the Me-110 as it was the only German fighter aircraft with range adequate for operations over Norway. Consequently a large portion of Luftwaffe aircraft were damaged or in need of overhaul by July 1940. 

Most RAF fighter aircraft did not experience combat prior to the BoB so Britain should have had a much higher rate of servicable aircraft.

Unternehmen Seelöwe, 07.09.1940
3. Stab/ZG 26.
14. I/ZG 26. (33 is the on hand figure.)
17. II/ZG 26. (25 is the on hand number.)
17. III/ZG 26. (25 is the on hand number.)

I suspect most Luftwaffe bombing raids during July to September 1940 had fewer then 100 Me-110 long range escort fighters. Once the short range Me-109s turned for home German escort fighters would have been seriously outnumbered by Hurricanes and Spitfires.


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## parsifal (Jul 15, 2011)

davebender said:


> Operational aircraft are the only aircraft that count.
> 
> Much of the Luftwaffe was committed to fighting in Norway and France during April to June 1940. That's doubly true for the Me-110 as it was the only German fighter aircraft with range adequate for operations over Norway. Consequently a large portion of Luftwaffe aircraft were damaged or in need of overhaul by July 1940.
> 
> ...




The Luftwaffe took several weeks to recover and redeploy from the french campaign. Another issue they needed to address was the shortage of airfields in northern France. But all these issues were well under control by about 15 July

With regard to your second comment, most of the british aircraft were new, so to an extent you have a point, however, the gap in operations between June and the middle of July had been used to bring the LW back to a state of readiness. LW did not go into battle unready.

They started the battle in August with over 200 Me 110s. On those days when maximum effort was demanded, why would they have less than full effort from the 110 formations.


You also overlook that during the period of operations, the maximum effort by the Brits would be during the flighht in. By the time the germans were leaving, there would be many Brit formations in need of fuel, or ammunition, or both. I dont think there is any evidence of the Brits witholding effort so they could gang up on the 110s


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## Milosh (Jul 15, 2011)

On Aug 13 1940 had 189 serviceable Bf110s out of 244 on hand. Luft5 had 34 Bf110s on hand with 32 serviceable.

Luft 2 and 3 had 206 Bf110s on hand with 112 serviceable on Sept 7 1940.

There was no Bf110s in Luft 5 on Sept 7 1940.

For the invasion of Norway, the LW had 64 Bf110s on hand. When the battle of France began the LW had 372 a/c in the Zerstörergruppen with 247 serviceable. Of this number, 53 were still in Norway.

Sept 7 1940

Twin-Engined Fighters (Night-Fighters Excluded)
Stab/ZG 2	Toussous-le-Noble	1	-
I/ZG 2	Amiens, Caen	20	10
II/ZG 2	Guyancourt/Caudran	28	10
Stab/ZG 26	?	3	3
I/ZG 26	Abbeville, St. Omer	33	14
II/ZG 26	Crècy	25	17
III/ZG 26	Barly, Arques	25	17
V (Z.)/LG 1	Ligescourt, Alencon	23	19 
Stab/ZG 76	?	Bf 110	2	2
II/ZG 76	Le Mans, Abbeville	27	12
III/ZG 76	Laval	19	8


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## davebender (Jul 15, 2011)

Ludwig von Eimannsberger wrote a history of V/LGI that includes the complete operational record for April to October 1940. Perhaps this will provide insight as to just how busy Me-110 Gruppe were before and during the Battle of Britain.

*May 1940 Combat Missions.* 
Does not include transfers and training missions.
5.
10.
10. Two missions in one day. Both to Verdun.
11. Another mission to Verdun. 1 Me-110 lost.
12. 
12. Two more missions to Verdun in one day. 3 Me-110s lost.
13.
13.
13. Three missions to Verdun in one day.
14.
14.
14. Three missions to Verdun in one day.
15.
15. Two missions to Sedan in one day.
16.
16.
16. Three missions to Reims in one day. 3 personnel casualties but no aircraft lost.
17. Mission to Reims. 3 Me-110s lost.
18. Mission to Reims.
18. Mission to Compiegne.
19.
20.
21. Amiens. 1 Me-110 lost.
23.
24.
25.
25.
25. Three missions in one day.
26.
26. Two missions in one day.
27.
27. Two missions over Dunkirk in one day.
28.
29.

June and July 1940 were just as busy as May 1940. Two more Me-110s were lost during July 1940 over the Isle of Wight.

The Gruppe lost 9 Me-110s over England during August 1940.

The Gruppe lost 13 Me-110s over England during September 1940.

During October 1940 the Gruppe was reconstituted as 1/NJG3.


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## Freebird (Mar 3, 2013)

Milosh said:


> In addition this link, German Order of Battle - Statistics as of Quarter Years, 1938-45



Excellent link, thanks!
Is there a similar tabulation for RAF numbers?



Njaco said:


> Great idea Mustang!
> 
> Here is what John Ellis in "The WWII Data Book" lists.....
> 
> ...



Njaco, is the 276 a typo? Maybe 672? or 726?

And are the RAF numbers the total S/E aircraft or only those operational?


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## Poor Old Spike (Mar 4, 2013)

As a matter of interest these are the loss figures as given at the end of the 1969 film "The Battle of Britain"








Galland's verdict in an interview- _"The Battle of Britain...that was a tough fight"_
Interview with World War II Luftwaffe General and Ace Pilot Adolf Galland



1940: Grim-faced Me109 pilot Gustav "Micky" Sprick lands in France and describes his combat with RAF fighters in the Battle of Britain-


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## stona (Mar 4, 2013)

Sprick,another one killed when the wing(s) came of his Bf 109 F....... or.....

Sprick_ may_ have been a victim of P/O Wladislaw Drecki who claimed two Bf 109s he shot at crashed to the ground from low level,though he gives his position in his report as having been slightly out to sea. Typically confusing as you'd expect them to have crashed into the sea. Sgt Belc (like Drecki of 303 squadron) also made a claim at the right time and place for a Bf 109 which was pursuing Drecki.

Malan also made a claim in the right place and time.

It just goes to show how difficult it is to establish who shot down what.Several RAF pilots either shot at or witnessed Sprick's crash and it is possible several claimed him.

Caldwell concludes,with others,that Sprick was the victim of a wing failiure as he pulled out of a split S evasive manoeuvre.

You can have this fun with many,many claims. Try and establish who shot down Franz von Werra if you have an afternoon to waste 


Cheers
SteveS


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## Njaco (Mar 13, 2013)

freebird said:


> Excellent link, thanks!
> Is there a similar tabulation for RAF numbers?
> 
> 
> ...



All numbers are serviceable S/E a/c available for both sides. On the part of the LW, these numbers are for Luftflotte 2 and 3 only. And that number is correct. For the RAF it does not include those a/c in storage.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 13, 2013)

Njaco i don't think 276 is correct, the 28th september situation is available also on ww2.dk (the Milosh link).


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## Njaco (Mar 14, 2013)

I don't know what to say. Page 232 "The WWII Data Book" by John Ellis.

.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 14, 2013)

Yes i think the missprint is in the book


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## GregP (Mar 14, 2013)

Right, the book is wrong because we don't like the numbers? 

This sounds like research without reference, there COULD be a misprint. It will take some digging to be sure.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 15, 2013)

GregP you don't followed all the discussion i've give the reference lw orbat for 28 september in ww.dk, you can did the sum of unit in the western for find a number that is not 276


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## Freebird (Mar 22, 2013)

GregP said:


> Right, the book is wrong because we don't like the numbers?
> 
> This sounds like research without reference, there COULD be a misprint. It will take some digging to be sure.



Or could it be perhaps that a large number of S/E aircraft were withdrawn near the end of September as it became clear that the BoB landings would not occur?


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## Milosh (Mar 22, 2013)

freebird said:


> Or could it be perhaps that a large number of S/E aircraft were withdrawn near the end of September as it became clear that the BoB landings would not occur?



If that is so then why did the number of dive bombers almost double?


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## Milosh (Mar 22, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> GregP you don't followed all the discussion i've give the reference lw orbat for 28 september in ww.dk, you can did the sum of unit in the western for find a number that is not 276



Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

gives a total of 920 s/e fighters


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## Freebird (Mar 24, 2013)

Milosh said:


> Single engine fighters - 28.09.40
> 
> gives a total of 920 s/e fighters



But only 712 available...


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## Glider (Mar 24, 2013)

freebird said:


> But only 712 available...


 and only 676 pilots. It doesn't matter how many aircraft you have, if you only have X no of pilots then in reality you only have X no of combat aircraft to use


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## stona (Mar 24, 2013)

Glider said:


> and only 676 pilots. It doesn't matter how many aircraft you have, if you only have X no of pilots then in reality you only have X no of combat aircraft to use



Exactly,and on September 14th 1940 the Luftwaffe's Bf 109 Staffeln possessed only 67% operational ready crews against authorised aircraft.

The losses following Adlertag the previous month were never made good.The Luftwaffe lost 18.5% of all combat aircraft available at the beginning of August in that month (774 to all causes) with a corresponding loss of crews. 
That's why it was in a sorry state by September,that's why the RAF won the Battle of Britain(whatever spin some revisionists might try to apply) and that's why the Luftwaffe started bombing London,by night.

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Mar 24, 2013)

Its an interesting point that the RAF shortage of trained aircrews is well known and often discussed but the Luftwaffe were in no better and in some ways a much worse situation.

On the 29 June 1940 they had 906 Me109 pilots ready for action and on 28 September they had 676, a serious shortfall of about 25%.


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## GregP (Mar 24, 2013)

I dare say, Vincenzo, that many diferent numbers can be supported by simply using different references. Unless you do the research yourself and come up with a number that agrees with someone else's research independently, then you have just another number and another opinion supported by someone else's book or research. Everybody has an opinion. 

What we haven't established in the real numbers. But it has been interesting.

Disagreeing with a book should mean you have independent research that says different, with attendant sources that you can somehow find more believable than the numbers you disagree with, and can explain why you believe that, on some legitimate basis not based on simple disagreement. Otherwise it's just another opinion, as valid or invalid as anyone else's.

I think we all know the outcome. What we disagree on are the numbers and some small amount of the reasons for a few losses. Maybe the real reports are just lost and we'll never know, but the outcome is pretty well set since it really happened and is long over. The numbers, plus or minus a few percent are also pretty well known, give or take a bit.


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## Tante Ju (Mar 24, 2013)

Glider said:


> and only 676 pilots. It doesn't matter how many aircraft you have, if you only have X no of pilots then in reality you only have X no of combat aircraft to use



Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

It says 917 pilots for 920 aircraft. Yeah, they were like, 3 pilots short.


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## GregP (Mar 24, 2013)

Everybody has different numbers. Interesting.


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## Freebird (Mar 24, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Single engine fighters - 28.09.40
> 
> It says 917 pilots for 920 aircraft. Yeah, they were like, 3 pilots short.



It actually says 917 pilots "pres" (present?) and 676 "ready" so it would seem that there are 241 pilots wounded, sick or otherwise not "ready" to fly


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## Juha (Mar 24, 2013)

IMHO most of those not ready were green pilots who still needed the final touches of their combat training to be regarded as fully combat capable.

Juha


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## GregP (Mar 24, 2013)

On what do you base that opinion? I assume you have some training graduation statistics to make you think that?

Not nitpicking ... just asking.


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## stona (Mar 25, 2013)

Ready means combat ready. There's no mystery here. If a crew wasn't ready it wasn't going to fly on operations. There are any number of reasons why aircrew might be present but not ready,there is no point in conjecture,they couldn't fly operationally.

This table is based on the Luftwaffe's own figures in the quartermaster returns (in BA/MA RL 2 III/708 and 709 for any archivists reading)







Operational ready rates fell throughout the period. Despite a sudden drop following "adlertag" Bf 109 pilot readiness rates did start to recover in September before tailing off again.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Mar 25, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Single engine fighters - 28.09.40
> 
> It says 917 pilots for 920 aircraft. Yeah, they were like, 3 pilots short.



It says:

*Aircraft*
Establishment - 1132 
On Strength - 920 
Serviceable - 712 

*Pilots*
Establishment - 1132 
On Strength - 917
Ready - 676

There was a shortage of 36 pilots for the 712 a/c that were capable of flying operations.


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## fastmongrel (Mar 25, 2013)

Were the aircraft serviceability rates similar for the RAF and LW allowing for different methods of accounting. I have always imagined it would be harder for the LW to keep serviceability up than the RAF for the simple reason of distance to the LWs main bases and factories. Was the infrastructure in place for major repairs/servicing to be done in France or did aircraft have to go to Germany.


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## stona (Mar 25, 2013)

Luftwaffe service,salvage and repair organisation was more convoluted than the British equivalent. Only fairly minor repairs were done at the front,in this case France. There was no equivalent of the British civilian repair organisation and badly damaged Luftwaffe aircraft effectively left the Luftwaffe to go back to "industry" for repair. This was not necessarily the manufacturer but other authorised contractors. In 1940 this often meant back to Germany,by rail. 
After repair the aircraft would rejoin the Luftwaffe. In the early years some major repairs would have the letter F for "flugklar" added after the werknummer. It was an indication that they were cleared for flight again. 
It made for some interesting accounting regarding new parts and upgrades too. Ultimately it was the RLM who had to pay the bill,but then they already owned the damaged aircraft and all its parts. No danger of any disagreements there then 
I have somewhere a diagram/flow chart illustrating the German system. If I can find it I'll post it.
Cheers
Steve


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## Milosh (Mar 25, 2013)

Greg, using the link provided, the following units were not based in France and the Low Countries

II./JG51 Bf 109E 39 *35 28* 39 34 25
I./JG52 Bf 109E 39 *28 21* 39 24 17 -
II./JG52 Bf 109E 39 *25 24* 39 29 17 -
III./JG52 Bf 109E 39 *28 28* 39 38 38 -
I./JG54 Bf 109E 39 *24 15* 39 32 23 -
Stab/JG77 Bf 109E 4 *4 4* 4 4 4 -
II./JG77 Bf 109E 39 *42 33* 39 35 35 -
III./JG77 Bf 109E 39 *26 17* 39 38 34 -
Stab/JG1 Bf 109E 4 *4 4* 4 4 3 -

On Strength - 216
Ready - 174

So On strength vs GB > 920 - 216 = 704
So Ready vs GB > 712 - 174 = 538

As the above numbers were obtained from German documentation, I would take these numbers (704/538 ) over the number (276) in the graphic in Post #28.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 25, 2013)

stona said:


> Exactly,and on September 14th 1940 the Luftwaffe's Bf 109 Staffeln possessed only 67% operational ready crews against authorised aircraft.
> 
> The losses following Adlertag the previous month were never made good.The Luftwaffe lost 18.5% of all combat aircraft available at the beginning of August in that month (774 to all causes) with a corresponding loss of crews.
> 
> Steve



you would think this would have been a wake up call or the writing on the wall for them to take notice. but this problem plagued them from the onset and it doesnt appear they did anything to remedy it. i can understand late in the war when fuel conservation was critical....but at this juncture they should have had the training schools going full bore and had pilots standing around looking for something to fly. they can always fulfill a less critical second duty with minimal training...but when you need experienced replacement pilots you would have them.


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## GregP (Mar 25, 2013)

Hi Milosh,

Maybe you could explain what your numbers are. The Battle of Britain was basically fought from some day in July through September 1940, and you give a lot of numbers in your post. Are they numbers by month? If so, of what? Strength? Were they ready, on strength? Or what? What do the I., II., III. Stab, etc. stand for? I believe the BOB was fought by Luftflotte 2, 3, and 5 commanded by Kesselring, Sperrie, and Stumpff respectively. Are you saying these were comprised of the JG's in your post above?

From the post, "on Strength" and "Ready" are not apparent, especiallty since you appear to be subtracting the on strength number from some 920 number than comes from somewhere. The data listed even in Wiki comes from German sources, too. Specifically from documents taken from Otto Bechtle attached to KG 2 in 1944. 

In fact, all the sources I looked at say their numbers for the Germans come from German data and there are citations to that effect. Nowhere I looked claimed to get the German data from British sources ... unless it was data about British assets.

So, maybe you could explain your post above. If not or if you just don't care to, I understand and am not really arguing, just trying to understand what you posted so I can go from there. I know your post seems apparent to you, but I ask for a slightly better explanation if you will. I'm sure it makes sense when explained.


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## Milosh (Mar 25, 2013)

Tante Ju posted a link, which can be found in my Post #46.



> What does the I., II., III. Stab, stand for?



You don't understand the Luftwaffe unit designations Greg?

The Gruppen number was indicated by the Roman figure, whilst that of the Staffel was the Arabic figure: thus III./JG27 was the third Gruppe, and 3./JG27 was the third Staffel of JG27. The complete organisation of JG27 in early 1943 was:

Stab/JG27
I./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 1. - 3. staffeln)
II./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 4. - 6. staffeln)
III./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 7. - 9. staffeln)


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## GregP (Mar 25, 2013)

Thanks Milosh. I am interested, but I basically love the aircraft themselves, and have not looked long and hard into Luftwaffe groups and units. I am assuming you posted what was in place in the summer of 1940 above.

So, I know a bit about their aircraft (and have worked on some of them including the Bf 109 and the He 111), but not necessarily the Nazi military organization. So, you have 6 numbers with some in bold and some not bold. From the post I can't tell what the numbers represent and assume it means aircraft on hand at some point in time ... probably the start or end of a month. But I don't know if they were "on strength", "ready" or what. You also don't say where you got the numbers except they are from German sources.

To me, the Germann units would have some authorized number of planes, some actual number of planes, and some aithorized and actual number of crews including pilots, mechanics, etc. A unit might be authorized for, say, 40 planes, but might have only 35, with maybe 27 serviceable and ready for a mission. They might have 20 - 40 crews for those 27 serviceable planes.

The references I looked at all say the Luftwaffe got the worst of it except for some posts that, if you believe them, would seem to indicate the Germans won. They didn't and Operation Sealion never happened.

I am given to believe that the Luftwaffe aircraft losses were not easily or quickly replaced and pilots losses were also not easily replaced, particularly since any new pilots were "green" by definition. If they got a light stream of green pilots who could be assigned as wingmen to veterans, then they migyht have done well. But losses of enough veterans that would have to be replaced by green pilots were higher than expected, so general pilot quality declined.

So, my understanding is that while the losses were not that lopsided either way, the Luftwaffe lost aircraft on hand strength, veteran pilots, and was generally much worse off after the BOB than was the RAF Fightter Command who had lower veteran pilots losses and produced enough aircraft to just about replace their losses along the way, if not slightlty increase their strength. It helped that the BOB was actually mostly over Great Britain so any bail outs or forced landings were necessarily over much friendlier soil, contributing to the lower loss rate of veteran pilots.

It appears that you are arguing that the generally accepted numbers of aircraft on hand are wrong, and that the Luftwaffe had more aircraft and pilots on hand than is gemerally thought by most people. If that were true, why wouldn't the Luftwaffe continue the Battle of Britain since they thought Fighter Command was ready to be beaten? 

Just trying to understand where you are going with your contention. Not saying you are right or wrong. Looks like you are saying the order of battle at the end of the BOB generally accepted by most people is wrong and that the Lufftwaffe was stronger than usually thought ay the end of September 1940. If true, then somewhere along the line they made awfully poor use of their resources.


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## parsifal (Mar 25, 2013)

On the discrepancy in pilot numbers, as Steve says, any number of reasons could explain this. I would think that some would relate to pilots still completing training, pilots that are wounded, I would even think it would include pilots missing, but not yet confirmed dead or captured. It might also include pilots on furlough....these were, after all, just men, who needed to be rested like any other person. 


The IJN went to war with about 1300 aircraft availbale, and over 5000 trained pilots. It still suffered chronic shortages of pilots almost from the very beginning. The US air services at the beginning of the war had 4500 front line aircraft, hardly any fit for front line service. At the beginning the US scrounged for aircraft.

This should demonstrate just how easy it is to mislead people with dodgy interpretations of the basic data...lies, damn lies and statistics.


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## GregP (Mar 25, 2013)

OK, I went back and looked at the link. 

What makes Single engine fighters - 28.09.40 a believable reference? We don't know where the data came from, only that comments be addressed to Michael Holm. Is he more believable than other authors? He says the numbers come from, "HRA 137.306-14 has been extracted from a series of 35 files of documents entitled "Einsatzbereitschaft der Fliegenden Verbände" which were originated by sections of the 6. Abteilung of the Luftwaffe General quartiermeister's Staff." Unless we look that up and confirm it, it's just another internet set of numbers.

So I looked up the Luftwaffe makeup and know what the designations are now. But some things are elusive. For instance, I/JG2 and II/JG2 were both part of Luftlotte 3 while III/JG2 came under the command of Luftlotte 2. Might make sense in the future, but is somehwat confusing right now. Of course, I don't have to know the reasoning behind the organization to be aware of the command path.

I do find it quite interesting that so many references give numbers at odds with one another, yet all claim to be from good sources. Sorting it out WOULD be a good thing for this thread to accomplish and I applaud the thougt Mustang Nut. Let's continue.


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## Milosh (Mar 25, 2013)

> It appears that you are arguing that the generally accepted numbers of aircraft on hand are wrong, and that the Luftwaffe had more aircraft and pilots on hand than is gemerally thought by most people. If that were true, why wouldn't the Luftwaffe continue the Battle of Britain since they thought Fighter Command was ready to be beaten?



No, what I have posted is in reply to your Post #30 and that the numbers, at least for the fighters, is wrong in the book whose numbers are quite at odds with other sources for Sept 28 1940. Who are these 'most people'?

The Luftwaffe did continue the BoB till the spring of 1941 but they switched to mainly night attacks where s/e fighters were not required.

Holm got his info at the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg. Can't get a much better source than that.


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## GregP (Mar 25, 2013)

If you don't know who "mostb people" are then you're in the same boat I was in with internal Luftwaffe unit makeup. The other sources also claim to be using German data, as I said earlier. 

However, the 276 for LW fighters avaiable seems low to me, too, given the losses by month up until that time. I'd dig into it like you did if I were so inclined. I wonder how many of the 917 or so pilots available in Holm's numbers were new, green pilots? He doesn't say and I'd bet that a fair number were new guys, with that number getting worse steadily after that point time. However, I don't have the information to go prove that assertion numerically, so I'll just let it ride. 

We know the Luftwaffe didn't train enough pilots to cover attrition as the war went along, to the point where average pilot quality dropped for the LW as the war wore on while it climbed for the Allies to the point where they had the better pilot corps late in the war, coupled with vast numbers of good fighters available. Still, the BOB seems to have been as close to a draw as possible without a decisive victory for either side at the time. The real victory came as the LW were unable to replace the BOB losses in a timely enough manner to stay well matched as losses mounted after the BOB while simultaneously attacking the Soviet Union and North Africa / the Med.

Still, if the Nazis had not invaded the Soviet Union, they might have done a great job in Europe, even with the high attrition of aircraft and pilots. Good thing Hitler was fixated on the Soviet Union, huh? If not for that, things might have been ... interesting.


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## Jenisch (Mar 25, 2013)

GregP said:


> Still, if the Nazi had not invaded the Soviet Union, they might have done a great job in Europe, even with the high attrition of aircraft and pilots. Good thing Hitler was fixated on the Soviet Union, huh? If not for that, things might have been ... interesting.



This again no...


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## GregP (Mar 25, 2013)

Yah, but that's my opinion. I know you think differently. That's OK. 

No real argument since it didn't happen and we both might be right or wrong in the "what if" scenario.


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## Njaco (Mar 25, 2013)

Greg, I have some of the same questions but I know what some of what Milosh posted means. I would like to know what date those numbers come from.

Quick LW Unit Designations:

A whole geschwader (or group) was called something like JG 26 and had 4 squadrons within the group that were designated by roman numerals - so II./JG 26 was the second squadron in the 26 Group. To confuse even more, each squadron had 4 units called Staffeln that were numbered by conventional Arabic numbers. So 3./JG 26 would mean the third staffel of JG 26.

As for Milosh's numbers, I think they can be read from left to right as: total a/c, a/c on operations, a/c servicable but there are far too many numbers. I would like to know when and where.

oh and the BoB ran from July 10 to October 31 for most historians.


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## GregP (Mar 26, 2013)

When I went to the link, the numbers seem to mean:

The first three numbers are "Established (approved number to have on hand)), on strength, and serviceable for aircraft. 

The last three numbers appear to be established (approved number to have on hand), present, and ready for pilots, and they all appear to be for 28 Sep 1940. 

Since these are numbers for only one point in time, it doesn't seem to prove anything except on 28 Sep 1940 for only the Luftwaffe, but the link will let you navigate to numbers at other times. To know anything, we'll have to get to a comparative set of numbers for the same dates, I think, for LW and Fighter Command. Then we have something worth discussing.

My question is, "are the numbers (in the link) reliable?" Milosh thinks so and I simply don't know since I have no prior knowledge of whoever Mr. Holm is other than a number set on the internet from some supposed good source. He isn't on my list of respected experts, so his numbers are suspect. I have no reason to suspect him, but also no reason to believe him. Ergo, he is an unknown and I don't have any access to German libraries and don't read German anyway.

I looked up the Luftwaffe unit breakdowns, but thanks for the post above, Njaco! Now if I only knew what units reported to upper units, I'd have something. Again, I don't speak or read German, but it appears that "Gruppe" is plural and "Gruppen" is singular ... unless I have it backwards. Same for the other unit designators ... I think.

I don't know what units were assigned to Luftlotte 2, 3, or 5, or if all units are accounted for, but the numbers seem to indicate 281 approved fighters, 216 on hand, and 174 serviceable; 281 pilots approved, 238 present, and 206 available for missions.

If that's true, and if all are accounted for, then the 276 isn't far off for approved strength, but the real available was 174 with enough pilots to fly them all.

We'll get there.


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## Milosh (Mar 26, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Greg, I have some of the same questions but I know what some of what Milosh posted means. I would like to know what date those numbers come from.
> 
> Quick LW Unit Designations:
> 
> A whole geschwader (or group) was called something like JG 26 and had 4 squadrons within the group that were designated by roman numerals - so II./JG 26 was the second squadron in the 26 Group. To confuse even more, each squadron had 4 units called Staffeln that were numbered by conventional Arabic numbers. So 3./JG 26 would mean the third staffel of JG 26.



The date is at the top of the list Njaco > 28.09.40
Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

For other dates > German Order of Battle - Statistics as of Quarter Years, 1938-45

For Jagdgeschwader > The Luftwaffe, 1933-45

Your not quite right Njaco.

staffel = squadron
gruppe = wing
geschwader = group


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## Milosh (Mar 26, 2013)

Greg, you have it backwards > gruppen is plural

So the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg is not a good source? That is like saying the USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama is a questionable source.

I could say the same about John Ellis.

A bit of cross referencing and internet searching on your part will tell you which Luftflotte a unit is in.
To help you along, Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle



> I don't know what units were assigned to Luftlotte 2, 3, or 5, or if all units are accounted for, but the numbers seem to indicate 281 approved fighters, 216 on hand, and 174 serviceable; 281 pilots approved, 238 present, and 206 available for missions.



Where did these numbers come from?


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## Njaco (Mar 26, 2013)

Alright, I throw my hands up! I was being lazy and just trying to give an impression of terminology. It was late for me and I was tired. And I didn't check the link. And I wasn't sure those numbers were coming from the link. and.......



I'll take my penance now..


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## stona (Mar 26, 2013)

Milosh said:


> Your not quite right Njaco.
> 
> staffel = squadron
> gruppe = wing
> geschwader = group



That's not correct either. The translation to the structure of other airforces is always approximate but we can at least get them in the right hierarchical order.

Geschwader = Wing
Gruppe = Group
Staffel = Squadron

In 1940 a typical Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing) comprised a Geschwader Stab and then three Gruppen (groups) which as Njaco correctly said were designated by Roman numerals (I,II,III). Each Gruppe comprised a Gruppe Stab and three Staffeln (squadrons). These were identified by arabic numerals (1,2,3,4 and so on) and further distinguished by a colour code.

The various Stab can be translated as Staff Flights and these aircraft were flown by officers identified by the various bars and chevrons you will see on aircraft from this period. 

Everyone else had an identifying number or Kennziffer in the relevant colour for his Staffel usually infront of the fuselage Balkenkreuz and then a device (a vertical or horizontal bar,wavy line,circle (nothing for I Gruppe)) to identify which Gruppe he was from,usually behing the fuselage Balkenkreuz.

Many fighter (and other) units applied unit emblems to their aircraft,usually,but not always,on the engine cowling, and many pilots also applied personal emblems,usually below the cockpit.

This only applies to Jagdgeschwader and it varied throughout the war,particularly with the addition of a fourth Gruppe and a fourth Staffel to each Gruppe late in the war.Other types of units used different systems of marking and identification. That used by the Jagdgeschwader is probably the easiest to decipher!

Cheers

Steve


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## Njaco (Mar 26, 2013)

Hey guys, I knew I was using the wrong and proper terminology. I was just trying to convey something similar for Greg and was lazy about it. Don't need to start a war.


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## stona (Mar 26, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Hey guys, I knew I was using the wrong and proper terminology. I was just trying to convey something similar for Greg and was lazy about it. Don't need to start a war.



Not at all,I just wanted to clarify the approximations,which is all they are.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Mar 26, 2013)

Actually stona, what I posted is correct if the RAF is used for comparison purposes.

ie. squadron > wing (composed of multiple squadrons) > group (composed of multiple wings)


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## stona (Mar 26, 2013)

Milosh said:


> Actually stona, what I posted is correct if the RAF is used for comparison purposes.
> 
> ie. squadron > wing (composed of multiple squadrons) > group (composed of multiple wings)



Yep, fair point,they are only approximations.

Steve


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## GregP (Mar 26, 2013)

Hi Milosh,

The numbers came from your post #49.

If I copy the ALL the numbers from the link: Single engine fighters - 28.09.40, then when I add them up I get different total than the table in the link. If you actually add the columns, you get:

1,132 aircraft approved on strength, 917 on hand, 712 serviceable; and 1,132 pilots approved on strength, 917 on hand, and 674 ready for missions.

So, on the face of it, if the body of the table is correct, the units covered by this table could field up to 674 single engine fighters assuming no aborts for any reason, even though they technically had 712 fighters avaialble. Can't fly them without pilots. 

All this was apparently true on 28 Sep 1940. Seems like they were short 38 pilots on that particular day with regard to aircraft serviceable. The telling figure in my mind is that there were 917 pilots on hand with only 674 ready to fly. That means for some reason or another there were 243 pilots not available for mission that were on hand. Either they were out of crew rest or a large number were wounded and recovering ... or something. It is also possible that many pilots were still listed as being "available" when they were, in fact, missing but not yet declared missing or KIA or POW.

I don't know except that they were "not available" and none were listed as being on limited duty.

From the table's data, I'd say the strength on 28 Sep 1940 was 674 single engine fighters available since that's all the fighter pilots they had available. They were having some issues with the supply line since they had 205 fighters on hand that were unserviceable for some reason. With 205 unserviceable, they might easily have canabalized some to get others running, but there was no point since they only had 674 pilots to fly them and had more serviceable fighters than pilots.

Do you get different numbers? Or interpret it differently? Anybody?


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## Juha (Mar 26, 2013)

GregP said:


> On what do you base that opinion? I assume you have some training graduation statistics to make you think that?
> 
> Not nitpicking ... just asking.



On memoirs, e.g. Rall got his final part of training in first-line unit.

Juha


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## GregP (Mar 26, 2013)

Hi all,

I looked at Milosh’s link (thanks Milosh!) and got the data for all reported points in time in 1940 for the Luftwaffe. The title of the page is “German Order of Battle - Statistics as of Quarter Years, 1938-45,” implying the Order of Battle is for the entire Luftwaffe, not that committed to the Battle of Britain alone. They don’t have every month, they have only March, June, September, and December in specific days near the end of the month (28 – 30 ).

From March to June 1940, aircraft allowed dropped 19%, aircraft on hand dropped 12%, but serviceable aircraft actually rose by 5%. Pilots stayed roughly equal with pilots available dropping by 5%. The end of June is right about when the BOB started.

From June to September 1940, aircraft allowed dropped 3%, aircraft on hand dropped 17%, and serviceable aircraft dropped 17%. Pilots allowed dropped 3%, pilots on hand dropped 19%, and pilots available for missions dropped 26%. This timeframe includes most of the BOB.

From September to December 1940, aircraft allowed rose 3%, aircraft on hand dropped 9%, and serviceable aircraft dropped 17%. Pilots allowed rose 3%, pilots on hand stayed about the same, and pilots available for missions rose 5%.

These data show a steady drop in aircraft on hand to the tune of 12%, 17%, and 9% for each respective quarter. The Luftwaffe was losing planes faster than they could replace them. For serviceable aircraft, we see they built up for the BOB by about 5%, and then dropped by 17% from June through September and another 17% drop through the end of the year. Clearly they had a lot of aircraft down for repair. Pilots on hand stayed about the same from March through June, dropped 19% during the BOB, and stayed about constant through the end of the year. Pilots available for missions dropped by 5% from March through June, dropped 26% through the BOB, and rose by 5% through the end of the year.

Clearly, the main months of the Battle of Britain were hard on German aircraft and pilots, particularly pilots. The slight 5% rise in pilots available from September through December is misleading since the main 26% drop consisted of a lot of veterans and the 5% rise was only a rise from the lowest level available in the entire year. They went from a high of 951 fighter pilots available for missions in March to a low of 674 in September and only rose to 711 by December. All of the difference were green pilots fresh out of training.

Fighter aircraft on hand went from a high of 1,258 in March to a low of 835 in December. Serviceable fighter aircraft went from a high of 856 in June after the buildup for the BOB to 712 in September after the main BOB and down to 588 in December. So despite any new fighter deliveries, the Luftwaffe was down to 588 serviceable fighters to be flown by 711 pilots available for missions, with a higher percentage of green pilots, as we might expect.

I emphasize that these data are for the whole Luftwaffe, not only the aircraft committed to fighting in the west. Naturally, if they assigned any fighters to points east, then these would necessarily detract from the numbers available to fight in the west. The Soviet Union wasn’t invaded until June 1941, but there were certainly some aircraft based near the Russian Front to preclude a surprise attack from Russia. The Germans were in North Africa and the general Mediterranean Sea in June 1940, so some of the serviceable aircraft and pilots were certainly there. So in September 1940, with 712 fighters serviceable and 674 fighter pilots, how many were based near Russia, how many were in North Africa, and how many in the general Med? I can easily see the number of pilots and planes available to fight the Battle of Britain at the close of September 1940 as being less than 500, but I have no concrete proof of a particular number based on these data. The numbers for Russia, North Africa, and the Med totally ignore any fighters based on the west coast of France to cover any sea actions near the coast and we KNOW there were some there as well as up in Scandinavia covering the action in that area. Fighter air cover was available to German ships along the coast of France throughout 1940.

The data certainly show that Germany was hurting for fighters about the time the battle of Britain was winding down, and they show the difficult time they were having reinforcing their aircraft and pilot availability. 

Maybe we can get some of the same information for RAF Fighter Command in 1940.

By the way, just a comment about the data in the links. Not all the totals in the tables are correct. If you copy them into Excel and add them up yourself, there are about 3 - 4 mistakes that don't amount to much, but they are off by 1 or 2 in some columns. I checked and the mistakes are not due to aplha characters for numbers, they are simple addition errors. Let's remember they weren't using too many computers immediately post-war ... particularly for things so mundane as adding up tables. Most were being used for hard scientific research.


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## GregP (Mar 26, 2013)

Thanks Juha, I always liked Rall. A very straightforward guy in his interviews, and forthcoming with frank discussion.


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## Njaco (Mar 26, 2013)

Map showing Luftflotten locations and Fliegerdivision locations.......

,


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## GregP (Mar 26, 2013)

By the way, Milosh, I never intended to say or imply the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg is not a good source. 

What I have found, on the internet, is that if you bother to check sources against data posted *on the internet*, then people who CLAIM to have gotten numbers from sources are correct about 60% of the time, and seem to be more interested in proving their point than in being honest the rest of the time. As I said, I have no reason to doubt Mr. Holm but also have no reason to trust him either, and I do not have access to the original German documents. So, his data are useful but I would not want to base conclusions in, say, a book on them until I checked at least a few tables for correctness. Generally, if someone posts correct numbers most of the time, they tend to be honest the rest of the time ... not always.

So, if the data are, indeed, correct from German documents, then we can see the result of fighting in the Battle of Britain in the declining numbers of both serviceable fighters and available fighter pilots in plain old black and white.

Again, thanks for the great source, Milosh. I'll do the rest of the war at my leisure and draw conclusions from there myself, based on the data I get. Hopefully it is historically accurate.


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## Glider (Mar 26, 2013)

The best I can find for the RAF are
Servicable Aircraft 
17th July 1940
■Blenheim - 67 
■Spitfire - 237 
■Hurricane - 331 
■Defiant - 20 
■Total - 659

28th September 1940
■Blenheim - 57 
■Spitfire - 214 
■Hurricane - 390 
■Defiant - 12 
■Gladiator - 8 
Total - 681

RAF - Battle of Britain 70th AnniversaryBattle of Britain 70th Anniversary


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## GregP (Mar 26, 2013)

Thanks Glider! I was running into a quagmire trying to find useful numbers. I can easily find squadron and wings, but it is harder to find number of serviceable aircraft!

I DID find losses as:
View attachment 229082


These from: www.SchoolHistory.co.uk

By the way, these are losses confirmed by the other side, not claims ... according to the text. Of course, I can also find other numbers that differ from these ... frustrating, to say the least!


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## Njaco (Mar 26, 2013)

Greg, thats a bad link - didn't come up for me. Did they give the dates for these numbers, like from July to Sept, etc.,?


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## GregP (Mar 26, 2013)

No they give dates at the end of March, end of June, end of September, and end of December.

As you know, I am a lousy typist .... it's SchoolHistory ... not Historu .... of you add the "y" it will work. I'll go fix the link. I clicked "online history lesson," did a search for "Battle of Britain," and went from there. It wasn't too hard to find the order of battle page. 

If you can't find it, I'll find it again and update the link. Let me know either way, no trouble.


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## Hop (Mar 27, 2013)

Greg, the RAF losses in those tables are for all causes on operations, including accidents. The Luftwaffe losses only cover losses to enemy action, and exclude accidents.

The Narrow Margin by Wood and Dempster gives the following figures for German single engined fighter losses, July - October:

On operations, due to enemy action: 502
On operations, not due to enemy action: 98
Not on operations: 63

I believe there's a tendency in German records to attribute unknown causes to accident rather than enemy action. Hooton in Eagle in Flames gives German bomber sorties and losses by day and night, from 1 July - 6 October:

Day
9,700 sorties, 507 lost to enemy action, 134 lost in accidents

Night
7,150 sorties, 36 lost to enemy action, 8 lost in accidents

As you can see, the Luftwaffe had a far, far lower rate of accidents flying at night than by day. That doesn't make sense unless "accidents" includes a large proportion of aircraft lost to enemy action.


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## stona (Mar 27, 2013)

According to Stephen Bungay (via Mason I think) Fighter Command had,on 1st July 1940,640_ serviceable _aircraft and 1103 aircrew available. Of these 338 were Hurricanes and 200 Spitfires. 
The rest,102 Defiants,Blenheims _and their crews _,remember the Blenheim had a crew of three and the Defiant two to be deducted from the overall total,are frankly irrelevant to the BoB. Why Dowding did not retrain these men in the face of pilot shortages for single engined/single seat fighters that developed in early September we will never know.

On 1st September 1940 the totals are 648 serviceable aircraft and 1142 aircrew. Of which 351 were Hurricanes (net gain of 13) and 207 Spitfires (net gain of 7). This reflects the fact that British aircraft production always kept pace with losses.

In the eighteen weeks between July and the beginning of November 1940 there were only three weeks when there was a net loss of Hurricanes and only four weeks when there was a net loss of Spitfires.

Another reason why we won.

Cheers

Steve


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## Njaco (Mar 27, 2013)

.


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## stona (Mar 27, 2013)

And if you boil that rather confusing chart down you'll find exactly what I posted above.There is just such a table in one of the well known BoB books which I will dig out. Fighter Command was never short of aircraft.
Cheers
Steve

Like this:






Category 1 losses,which could easily be repaired,often at the aerodrome,are not included. Category 2 is a badly damaged aircraft which might be repaired or broken for parts. Category 3 is a total loss,destroyed or missing.

Another often overlooked factor is the advantage of fighting over home territory.
In August 1940 the RAF lost 139 pilots/aircrew killed,110 wounded but only 7 missing. Contrast this with the Luftwaffe for the same month.463 killed,201 wounded but a huge 804 missing.
Nearly as many airmen(113) were killed flying one Luftwaffe type,He 111,as were killed in the RAF flying all types. Not surprising given that almost all RAF losses were in single seat fighters.


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## Juha (Mar 27, 2013)

A good source of info on the losses during the BoB, but there is a typo right on the first line, 10 July, in the table there stand for LW a/c losses 41, should be 14.
BBC News - Battle of Britain: The cost, you will see the table by downloading it

Juha


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## GregP (Mar 27, 2013)

Juha, thanks for the link. It's the data I've been looking for!

I appreciate it.


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## Milosh (Mar 29, 2013)

Greg do you realize the massive size of Herr Holm`s data. This took a massive amount of time and effort on his part and probably started before computers were around.

For just fighter units, there is over 90 units listed. The Jagdgeschwader Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen (ie. the comings and goings) for each Gruppe in a JG is listed on a monthly bases for approximately 30 months. That could be 100 files he had to find and pay for in the Bund Archives for each Gruppe.

This is not someone with a questionable agenda that you hinted about. This data, which all can view online (*thank you very much* Herr Holm), was done with passion and love and as accurate as he can make it.


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## GregP (Mar 29, 2013)

Hi Milosh,

I realize the size and do NOT accuse Herr Holm of anything at all except that I cannot validate his data. 

I am using it now since it is available, but am keeping an open mind since I have no idea if he is posting data as seen immediately after WWII or is what I call a "revisionist" who thinks that he is better qualified to cut the data than the people who fought the war. Without seeing the original data, I cannot say if his online data are valid or not, but I am willling to use them until proven one way or the other since I have been unable to locate the data otherwise.

I follow the scientific method. That is, state a hypothesis and attempt to prove it false. If you can't, the hypothesis might be right. It still might be wrong but, if you can't prove it, the so-called hypotyhesis might be valid unless and until proven wrong.

I'll say Herr Holm is right an will attempt to prove otherwise by wheatver means I can. If I can't, perhaps his data are correct, or as close as we'll get. If anyone out there reads German, maybe they could look at the original data and chime in here. Otherwise, I'll use it until and unless I can prove it wrong, which may never happen. Sorry, I've been burned enough times to be shy of accepting internet data at face value and thinking it is correct ... but I sure HOPE it is.

No insult to Herr Holm intened or implied ... just shy of internet "facts." At least his data aren't on Wiki! That is in his favor right away.


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## stona (Mar 30, 2013)

GregP said:


> I realize the size and do NOT accuse Herr Holm of anything at all except that I cannot validate his data.



You can validate his data,but you'll have to pay for the priveledge. He gives a list of sources on his website,mostly surviving contemoporary german documents held at the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv in Freiburg,but also material from USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

As Milosh says Holm has created a valuable source which we can all access free of charge.

Cheers

Steve


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## GregP (Apr 1, 2013)

Is Heer Holm's data WWI data or post-war revised data? That's my question.

If basically WWII data, I will accept. If revised, I'll decide when I see the diferences.


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## stona (Apr 1, 2013)

GregP said:


> Is Heer Holm's data WWI data or post-war revised data? That's my question.
> 
> If basically WWII data, I will accept. If revised, I'll decide when I see the diferences.



I should have clarified "contemporary". The German documents which form lists he published are surviving wartime documents. It's why there are periods,sometimes substantial,which are missing.

Sorry for any confusion.

Cheers

Steve


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## Snowygrouch (May 23, 2022)

Njaco said:


> I don't know what to say. Page 232 "The WWII Data Book" by John Ellis.
> 
> .
> View attachment 227930



The figure for SEF on 28th Sep 1940 is definetly totally wrong, German derived records I have state its not 276, but 1024 servicable S.E.F. of a unit strength on paper of 1580. (my figures are from 30th Sept 1940).


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## Vincenzo (May 23, 2022)

the 28th september is available on ww2.dk, this is available for gruppen, the total for SEF in the full luftwaffe are
aircraft establish: 1132 on strength 920, ready 712
pilots establish 1132, present 917, ready 676,
in the page of the gruppen someone can check what gruppen are in the BoB area

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## Snowygrouch (May 23, 2022)

Vincenzo said:


> the 28th september is available on ww2.dk, this is available for gruppen, the total for SEF in the full luftwaffe are
> aircraft establish: 1132 on strength 920, ready 712
> pilots establish 1132, present 917, ready 676,
> in the page of the gruppen someone can check what gruppen are in the BoB area



Yes those match my documents, I actually found the data from the 28th Sept as well.

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## Milosh (May 27, 2022)

Another source for numbers, Luftwaffe Orders of Battle 1945


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## Glider (May 27, 2022)

Snowygrouch said:


> Yes those match my documents, I actually found the data from the 28th Sept as well.
> 
> View attachment 670467


There are some very scary numbers in this paper.

Day fighters Establishment Aircrew 1132 + 12, operational aircrew 688 + 10, *61%*
T E Fighter Establishment Aircrew 272 + 148, Operational aircrew 126 + 73, *47%*
Bomber Establishment Crews 1638, Operational Crews 1074, 47% *65%*
Total establishment Aircraft and Crews 5261 
Losses Aircraft 3207 Written Off* 61% + *Damaged over 10%* 21%*
Losses Crews 2495 Lost *47.5%*


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