# The use of 100 Octane Fuel in the RAF pt 2



## Glider (Aug 8, 2009)

All
The previous thread was closed in unfortunate circumstances but I was just finishing the additional research that I promised to undertake. I feel that what I have goes some way towards addressing the outstanding questions and for completion is worth putting it on the forum.

For ease of reference, I will start by reposting the basic timeline that I posted at the start of the last thread which remains basically unchanged. This will be followed by the outstanding questions as posted in the last thread and then the new papers that I have found in the National Archives.

*16th March 1939 Meeting *
Held to consider the question when 100 Octane Fuel should be brought into use in the RAF and the number and type of squadrons involved.

There are three main parts to this.
i) It is true that at this meeting authorisation was given for 16 fighter squadrons and two twin engined bomber squadrons be converted to be use 100 Octane fuel by September 1940. The change over to start at the end of 1939 and the ACAS would select the squadrons.
ii) It was anticipated that these units would use 10,000 tons of fuel over a twelve month period and this would slow down the aim of achieving an 800,000 ton reserve.
iii) The AMPD asked that he should be kept informed as to the progress of the production of the 100 Octane fuel in order that the change over of squadrons could be kept under review in the light of any acceleration or diminution in Supplies.

_General Points_
A number of differences are apparent. 
- Clearly this is a peace time plan, the war hadn’t started, 18 squadrons would use a lot more than 10,000 tons over twelve months when at war. It is certain that when war started there would be changes.
- It covers both fighters and bombers
- They were not defined as being Blenheim just twin engined bombers of which the RAF had a number of types.
- The 18 squadrons wasn’t a fixed number, it was open to change. 

*14th November 1939 letter * 
The tests of 100 Octane in the Hurricane and Merlin
In this letter it mentions:-
i) That the tests were successful
ii) The policy of immediately going over to the use of 12 lbs boost is being strongly urged by Fighter Command
iii) The decision is dependent on the availability of sufficient stocks of 100 Octane but that it is understood that there are adequate reserves for this eventuality

*7th December 1939 Letter from FC Admin to HQ*
This letter starts going into the nuts and bolts of how the change from 87 to 100 Octane would need to be handled. It’s the sort of information any change of this magnitude will need.
The most interesting part is that it lists the 21 operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance.

*12th December 1939 Letter from Director Of Equipment re Issue of 100 Octane Fuel *
Letter confirms that 100 Octane Fuel is approved for use in Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant aircraft. Issue to be made as soon as the fuel is available at the distribution depots servicing the fighter stations concerned. Some bomber units may be given priority.
The date of use is dependent on when the fuel can be put down in bulk at the distribution sites and the relevant stations. Re the latter as a station empties a tank of 87 Octane it will be replaced with 100 Octane. 

_Observations_
Clearly this is a change to the March notes. Certain aircraft are included and other aircraft in Fighter Command are excluded, no Blenheim fighter units are included or are any Gladiator units.
There is no limit set to the number of squadrons or area such as 11 Group, or any reference to specific squadrons. The RAF decided to use the 100 Octane and instead of limiting it to a number of squadrons, have decided to limit it by type of aircraft.

In my opinion, the statement of relevant stations can only mean those with Hurricanes, Spitfires or Defiants as defined as needing the fuel in the first instance.

*18th May 1940 Summary of Conclusions of the meeting of the Oil Co ordination Committee*
The key points here are:-
i) The Committee took note that the position of the use of this fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft had been made clear to Fighter Command.
ii) Satisfaction was expressed that the units concerned had been stocked with the 100 Octane Fuel
iii) The Minutes were to reflect the appreciation of the work of the Petroleum Board and that the Air Ministry had been impressed with the manner in which the work had been executed.

*1st August 1940 Memo from Downing re the Handling of the Merlin Engine *
This note is advising the pilots that there is an increase in engine failures in the overuse of the emergency 12lb boost.
The interesting thing is that this memo was sent to *ALL *fighter groups. Had we been talking about the 16 squadrons or less this would not have been the case. It would have been sent to the squadrons involved.

*7th August 1940 Note confirming that the Use of 100 Octane had been authorised for all Commands.*This speaks for itself.

*Consumption Information*
The following information are the consumption details of fuel during the BOB period. This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report that is available from the National Archives.

Consumption of Aviation Spirit
The following figures are for the Air Minstry and are the Average Monthly Consumption

September – November 1939 16,000 tons 
Dec 1939 – February 1940 14,000 tons 
March 1940 – May 1940 23,000 tons 
June 1940 – August 1940 10,000 tons (100 Oct) 26,000 tons (87 Oct)
Sept 1940 – November 1940 15,000 tons (100 Oct) 18,000 tons (87 Oct) 

_Point of Interest_
The total Usage of fuel for June – August 1940 period and Sept – Nov 1940 period is essentially unchanged allowing for the reduction in daylight fighting and the reduction of the raids on the Barges by night. However there is a clear increase in the use of 100 Octane that can only come from the release of the fuel for other commands. 

*Reserves Information*
The following information are the reserve stocks of 100 Octane fuel during the BOB period
This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report (a) that is available from the National Archives, as well as Gavin Baileys paper(b) and Wood and Dempster(c).

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

Point of interest. From the start of the war until the end of the BOB the reserves never dropped and continued to increase. There was never any danger of the supply of the oil running out.

In this summary I have not touched on the other papers, sources links that exist and support the view that Fighter Command was effectively fully converted to 100 Octane by May 1940. They were posted on the Me110 Hurricane Thread and we know they exist.


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## Glider (Aug 8, 2009)

Outstanding Questions

I believe that there are two outstanding questions

1) Some people believe that the RAF fought the BOB with 18 squadrons of fighters using 100 Octane and that nothing put forward before changes this view.

2) That this is supported by the statement in the meeting of the 7th Meeting of the Oil Policy Committee where it states that the use of 100 Octane Fuel had been made clear to Fighter Command

*Item 1*
In the 5th Meeting of the Oil Policy Committee held on the 24th February 1940, there is the attached page which is included as item 9 of the Summary of Conclusions.
It clearly states that Fighter and Blenhiem Squadrons should start to use 100 Octane fuel.


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## Glider (Aug 8, 2009)

The follow on from this covers Item 2 the clarification of the use of 100 Octane to Fighter Command

*6th Meeting of the Oil Committee 6th April 1940*

_Initial Papers Actions Arising from the 5th Meeting_.
As you might expect these papers relate to the previous actions and are linked to item 9 of the Summary
What I wasn't expecting was the confusion in Fighter Command about the changes needed to the Fighter Engines before the 100 Octane could be used.

Fighter Command are asking for clarification on the changes needed


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## Glider (Aug 8, 2009)

*6th Meeting Continued*

Clearly the people in the Meeting are confused by Fighter Commands Statement and in the Meeting Mr Tweedle explained the situation.


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## Glider (Aug 8, 2009)

*6th Meeting Summary of Conclusions*

These papers show that the distribution of 100 Octane should continue based on what the meeting had been told and that Mr Tweedle should clarify matters with Fighter Command.


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## Glider (Aug 8, 2009)

*7th Meeting of the Oil Committee 18th May 1940*

This you will have seen before but I add it for completion. The use of the Fuel has been made clear to Fighter Command and the distribution of the fuel has gone well.

What is interesting is what isn't in the file and its a big file. At no stage is any concern expressed about any shortage of 100 Octane Fuel the level of stocks or any lack of supply. There was never any mention of capping distribution or shipping stocks from one station to another or sector.

There was concern that the USA might embargo the shipping of 100 Octane Fuel but other sources of fuel had been identified and as a back up 35,000 tons of 100 Octane was to be produced in the UK to see if we could supply it from our own resources. This was done but the plant (Billingham) went back to the processing of 87 Octane when the test was completed. Cost was the reason, it was more expensive to produce 100 Octane in the UK.

Cost was a theme in all discussions even to the point where the committee was deciding if a team of workers at one refinery should be paid a weeks overtime. I wish our current leaders were as keen to save money.


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## Civettone (Aug 8, 2009)

Good job man !! 


Kris


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## Kurfürst (Aug 10, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And that's supposed to mean?



It means what it means. Bring on the facts, everything else is irrelevant: if you want to claim that every Station was supplied with 100 octane fuel, you better be prepeared to show the evidence for it.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 10, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> It means what it means. Bring on the facts, everything else is irrelevant: if you want to claim that every Station was supplied with 100 octane fuel, you better be prepeared to show the evidence for it.


I'm going to let Glider to continue to support this argument. So far I've seen nothing that Glider posted to convince me that all of fighter command was not operating with 100 octane fuel at all fighter groups and for the most part I've just been reading and watching what goes on here as a bystander.

Until you could come up with documented evidence to show the opposite, I believe that Glider has done his job. With that said I will not put up with hidden underlying insults that discredits someone hard work and actually taking to time to post historical documents on this site. I'm only going to say this once.


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## Glider (Aug 10, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Senseless partisanship and hollow rhetorics won't challenge that he is unable to support evidence for his claims, and as long as he makes he claims, the burden of evidence is upon him.



An interesting statement from you Kurfurst, the man who has supplied nothing, absolutely nothing, to support his side of the arguement.
Even if you do (and thats a big ' if') supply this paper from Australia you keep quoting, the whole basis of his arguement ie that this limitation was caused by a shortage of fuel is clearly wrong.


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## Milosh (Aug 10, 2009)

*Magnificen*t article Glider.  Do you mind if I post and link to your post on other boards?

That is 'hands and feet above and beyond' any proof Kurfurst has ever shown with regard to the 4 Gruppen of 109K-4s that were suppose to have been using 1.98ata boost. Kurfurst has yet to show proof that any of the bases where these fighters were stationed even had C3 fuel.

All anyone sees from him is ie, ' I. / JG 27 Bf 109 K-4 no change, boost increase to 1.98 ata'.

The best he can do with regard to C3 fuel is:

_"On April 22 1945 Luftwaffenkommando West reported the following fuel stocks on airfields in Bavaria (note that this is the immidiately available stocks on bases, not the main stores) Apparently the availability of B-4 and C-3 was similar.

B-4 = 350,000 liters
C-3 = 284,000 liters
J-2 = 1,897,000 liters"_ 



> Absence of such evidence that such decision was taken, and carried out, such statement is unsupportable. Speculations about what should have happened are useless at this point.



 Priceless Kurfurst.


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## Glider (Aug 10, 2009)

Milosh said:


> *Magnificen*t article Glider.  Do you mind if I post and link to your post on other boards?
> 
> That is 'hands and feet above and beyond' any proof Kurfurst has ever shown with regard to the 4 Gruppen of 109K-4s that were suppose to have been using 1.98ata boost. Kurfurst has yet to show proof that any of the bases where these fighters were stationed even had C3 fuel.
> 
> ...



No problem, feel free to use this information and that goes for anyone. A number of people helped me with the first posting and its the least I can do.
I have tried to ensure that all the postings tie up and you will see that where it relates to to say item 9 of a summary of conclusions, then item 9 has been posted. I could see one line which I knew Kurfurst would almost certainly leap on and could have left it out, but that would have broken the train so I kept it in.

The item that I wasn't expacting was the production of 100 Octane in the UK . I only copied the one paper that is attached but what impressed me was that considering the average consumption of 100 Octane was 10,000 tons a month at the hight of the BOB this trial produced 33,000 tons in four months. The paper may be of interest as it gives some clues at to what was needed and other material required.
This trial was completed and as mentioned before the refinery switched back to normal production.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 10, 2009)

10,000 tons = 20,000,000 pounds = 120,000,000 gallons (anyone please check my math) *in a months' time. *

BTW - Kurfurst will be allowed back in 30 days. If he could put his money were his mouth is without discrediting some one else's research and doumented evidence, he'll remain as a participating member. Additionally it is also evident that using profanities against any mod on this site is a loosing battle.

With that said, please press on with this interesting thread.


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## Glider (Aug 10, 2009)

The numbers are in British measurements so 10,000 tons is 22,400,000 pounds. The 10,000 tons being the average monthly consumption during June to August 1940 of 100 Octane.

What that relates to in gallons I don't know. However the thrust of Kurfursts case is that there was a shortage of 100 Octane in May 1940. However on 31st May the British stockpile was 294,000 tons of the stuff and it was increasing, so there wasn't a shortage, unless of course you consider a 2 1/2 year stockpile, a shortage.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 10, 2009)

Very interesting information and documents Glider. Thanks for posting.

Just a word of advice to everyone. This thread is a great thread and it and other threads can remain great places for debate. Whether one side is wrong or not, in the end good information and reading comes out of it, and everyone learns from it.

But when people start insulting others because they don't agree with their research, that is bullshit! It ruins threads and will not be tolerated.


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## Vincenzo (Aug 10, 2009)

Glider said:


> No problem, feel free to use this information and that goes for anyone. A number of people helped me with the first posting and its the least I can do.
> I have tried to ensure that all the postings tie up and you will see that where it relates to to say item 9 of a summary of conclusions, then item 9 has been posted. I could see one line which I knew Kurfurst would almost certainly leap on and could have left it out, but that would have broken the train so I kept it in.
> 
> The item that I wasn't expacting was the production of 100 Octane in the UK . I only copied the one paper that is attached but what impressed me was that considering the average consumption of 100 Octane was 10,000 tons a month at the hight of the BOB this trial produced 33,000 tons in four months. The paper may be of interest as it gives some clues at to what was needed and other material required.
> This trial was completed and as mentioned before the refinery switched back to normal production.




for true "will be about 33,000 tons" this a preventive report we don't know the actual production, almost not from this doc


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## Vincenzo (Aug 10, 2009)

I read the docs in none it's write that 100 octane was in use in all the stations/squadrons (for hurri and spits), the docs clear that all spist and hurri can use the 100 octane fuel also with the engienes were not modified (but with no benefit). if i miss some show me.

Adler you write this
"But when people start insulting others because they don't agree with their research, that is bullshit! It ruins threads and will not be tolerated." 
i want notes that kurfurst not insulted the glider research or person but him referee at a not gentle comment of lesofprimus
"And look who the fu*k is asking for the evidence now, the guy who couldnt prove his own allegations with evidence.... I love how uve twisted everything around Kurfurst to make everyone run for u, its hilarious...."


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## fass (Aug 10, 2009)

If I may join the fray: I've picked up (most of) Glider's story quickly but this is evidently first-class historical research. Of course your location is advantageous, Glider! 
However, I think it would be a good thing to keep emotions - and associated language - in check on a forum characterized by scholarship rather than acrimony.

Consider the following question:
Suppose 100 octane were exclusively distributed to certain stations, other stations being restricted to 87 octane. Normally, a squadron is stationed on a certain station (that's why it's "stationed"...) as its home base. But any senior commander will be aware that in wartime squadrons are rotated, can be suddenly posted to a different station and that aircraft unfortunately do not always land at their home base for a variety of reasons (battle damage or just getting lost...). So in no time you'd be having umpteen fighters with engines tuned for 100 octane being stranded on 87 octane stations, and vice versa. A logistics nightmare and one supposes the RAF might have thought of that?


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 10, 2009)

fass said:


> Consider the following question:
> Suppose 100 octane were exclusively distributed to certain stations, other stations being restricted to 87 octane. Normally, a squadron is stationed on a certain station (that's why it's "stationed"...) as its home base. But any senior commander will be aware that in wartime squadrons are rotated, can be suddenly posted to a different station and that aircraft unfortunately do not always land at their home base for a variety of reasons (battle damage or just getting lost...). So in no time you'd be having umpteen fighters with engines tuned for 100 octane being stranded on 87 octane stations, and vice versa. A logistics nightmare and one supposes the RAF might have thought of that?


Speaking in general terms, the use of a lower octane fuel isn't necessarily going to ground an aircraft in an emergency situation and the same holds true for using a higher octane rated fuel on an aircraft fated for the lower fuel if it’s just a matter of re-positioning aircraft. One would have to be careful with CHT temps, mixtures and detonation.


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## Glider (Aug 10, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> for true "will be about 33,000 tons" this a preventive report we don't know the actual production, almost not from this doc



You are correct when you say this is a preparitory document. There were other papers that covered the end of the production and the switch back to normal production.

It was an experiment and as such it worked but wasn't repeated as it wasn't needed. Shoud I go back to the National Archives I am more than happy to look into this in more detail.


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## Glider (Aug 10, 2009)

fass said:


> If I may join the fray: I've picked up (most of) Glider's story quickly but this is evidently first-class historical research. Of course your location is advantageous, Glider!
> However, I think it would be a good thing to keep emotions - and associated language - in check on a forum characterized by scholarship rather than acrimony.
> 
> Consider the following question:
> Suppose 100 octane were exclusively distributed to certain stations, other stations being restricted to 87 octane. Normally, a squadron is stationed on a certain station (that's why it's "stationed"...) as its home base. But any senior commander will be aware that in wartime squadrons are rotated, can be suddenly posted to a different station and that aircraft unfortunately do not always land at their home base for a variety of reasons (battle damage or just getting lost...). So in no time you'd be having umpteen fighters with engines tuned for 100 octane being stranded on 87 octane stations, and vice versa. A logistics nightmare and one supposes the RAF might have thought of that?



Fass
Thanks for the comment and I agree about the words used. 
Looking at the scenario outlined you are correct but the problems of having mixed fuel on different squadrons in wartime are numerous.

1. Squadrons are based at stations in peacetime but no in war. In the BOB squadrons were rotated between no 11 Group and No 13 Group for time to recover and retrain. So you would have to take the fuel with you. The option of leaving the aircraft behind doesn't really work as they need to have work done on them. You don't want a fleet of worn out aircraft in the front line.
The logistics of moving the fuel around would be huge 

2. Squadrons are merged for instance into the big wings. One of the problems of the big wing was that they merged types such as Hurricanes and Spitfires which made them difficult to handle as they had a different performance. Throw different fuel into the mix and you have four differing performances, Hurricanes with and without 100 Octane plus Spitfires with and without 100 Octane

3. What are new aircraft built to, with or without the 100 Octane

There are other problems but with all the many of hundreds of books about the BOB you would think that something would have been mentioned if these problems existed.


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## Milosh (Aug 10, 2009)

Maybe I missed it Glider but do you have a list of the order in which the stations received the 100 fuel? I would imagine it would start with the stations in south-east England (11 Group) and gradually radiate out to stations in northern Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

fass, you wouldn't have aircraft stranded at bases for they could be fueled with whatever fuel was available to get them back to their home base. The 100 fuel was because the Merlin got an increase in allowable boost pressure. The Merlin would run on the lower grade of fuel just fine as long as the boost was kept below the boost pressure of the lower rated engine.


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## Glider (Aug 10, 2009)

Milosh said:


> Maybe I missed it Glider but do you have a list of the order in which the stations received the 100 fuel? I would imagine it would start with the stations in south-east England (11 Group) and gradually radiate out to stations in northern Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.



I am afraid that I don't have a full list as to which field was issued with the fuel at what date. We do have a list of the first 21 stations that were to be issued with the fuel. These were

ACKLINGTON 13 Group
BIGGIN HILL 11 Group
CATTERICK 13 Group
DEBDEN 11 Group
DIGBY 12 Group
DREM 13 Group
DUXFORD 12 Group
HORNCHURCH 11 Group
LECONFIELD 12 Group
MANSTON 11 Group
MARTLESHAM HEATH 11 Group
NORTHHOLT 11 Group
NORTH WEALD 11 Group
TANGMERE 11 Group
TURNHOUSE 13 Group
CROYDON 11 Group
ST. ATHAN
WITTERING 12 Group
CHRUCH FENTON 12 Group
GRANGEMOUTH 13 Group
FILTON 10 Group

These are of course stations not squadrons. All these would have had more than one squadron and you can imagine the confusion if one squadron on a station was supposed to have a different fuel from a different squadron.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 11, 2009)

As I understand it the modifications to enable an aircraft to use 100 octane fuel was a simple recalibration or ajustment of the boost limit device and the addition of a control device in the cockpit to over ride the normal limit and allow the extra boost.

take standard engine made to run on 87 octane fuel at 6lb of boost. The supercharger will supply this amount of boost all the way to 16,250ft. Engines were first reset to allow 9lbs of boost which the supercharger would NOT supply all the way up to 16,250ft but only to a lower altitude. Engines were later reset/manufactured to allow 12lb of boost but again the supercharger could only supply this bost to a still power altitude above which the performance dropped back to the lower settings. above 16,250-17,000ft there was no difference in performance between an engine running on 87 octane and one running on 100 octane.

If plane was forced to land at a field that had no 100 octane fuel the answer was simple, put in enough 87 octane to get back to the home feild and fly normally, just don't hit the boost over ride button on the way home. 

100 octane might cause lead fouling of the spark plugs in certain types of engines which is why all engines types that might use it had to be tested first before operational permission could be granted.


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## Njaco (Aug 11, 2009)

Glider, do you have a time frame for those first 21 stations?


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## Glider (Aug 11, 2009)

Njaco said:


> Glider, do you have a time frame for those first 21 stations?



I am afraid that I don't. We do know the following
1) that the transfer was being planned as early as the 7th December 1939 when the letter was written by FC admin to HQ.
2)	That the issue of the fuel to the squadrons should be made as soon as the depots for the stations had been filled with the 100 Octane Fuel
3)	Some squadrons started using the Fuel pretty quickly
North Weald started using it on the 16th February 1940 as mentioned in 151 squadron Opps ready book. Hurricane Squadrons in France were also using the fuel in May, No 1 Sqd starting on the 18th May at Berry-Au-Bac.
Digby Squadrons started operating with the fuel on 21st March
Hornchurch on 16th March
Drem on 16th February

Clearly this was a fluid situation as the French Stations didn't show on the initial list of stations to be so equipped. I wish that I did have this information but do not.

Hope this helps


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## bigZ (Aug 12, 2009)

In "I kept no diary" by Air Commodore F.R Banks. He mentions that he gave a paper in Jan of 37 in which he pleaded for the development of British military enginess to take 100 octane fuel. Which despite citical opinion from oil company representaives the Director of Technical Development of the British Air Ministry agrred with his paper.

"So by 1940 the Merlin's power was increased by this fuel from a combat rating of 1,000(plus) bhp to over 1,300 bhp, and 100 octane became available to Fighter Command ready for the BOB..."

"In June 1930, only 3 months before the start of WWII, a company tanker, the Beaconhill, set sail across the Alantic for the UK. with a full cargo of 100 octane fuel. We began stockpiling the this fuel though the decision to use 100 octane for Fighter Command was not made until March 1940 and that for its use by Bomber Command came in 1941."

The author also suggests for more detailed information:-

Milestones in Aviation Fuels by W.G.Dukek, D.P Winans and A.R.Ogston. Paper given at A.I.A.A. Designers and Operators meeting, July 1969, Los Angeles.

Sorry I couldn't scan the extract as I am still unpacking after my relocation to NZ.


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## Mike Williams (Aug 12, 2009)

Below please find documentation related to 100 octane use by the RAF leading up to and during the Battle of Britain:







Emergency +12 lbs./sq. in. Boost Operation: Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.





Handling of Merlin in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant Aircraft, H.C.T. Dowding, C-in-C Fighter Command, 1 August 1940:





611 Squadron Operations Record Book





74 Squadron Operations Record Book





602 Squadron Operations Record Book





151 Squadron Operations Record Book





David Ross, The Greatest Squadron of Them All, The Definitive History of 603 Squadron, RAauxAF, (Grub Street, London, 2003), p. 125.





Alec Harvey-Bailey, The Merlin in Perspective, (Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1983), p. 85.





Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story, (Arms and Armour Press Ltd., London, 1986), p. 74.





Flight, No. 1631 Vol. XXXVII, The Outlook, March 28, 1940.





Flight, January 6th 1944, p. 22.





W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans, excerpt from AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, (Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.) p. 319.






A. R. Ogston, excerpt from History of Aircraft Lubricants (Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. Warrendale, PA USA), p. 12.





V. A. Kalichevsky, The Amazing Petroleum Industry, (Rheinhold Publishing Corporation, New York, 1943), p. 7.





RAF Website
The Royal Air Force - History Section 

“All benefited from the replacement of 87 octane petrol with 100 octane, which allowed the engines to run at higher boost, and increased the Spitfire's speed by 25 mph (40 km/h) at sea level and by 34 mph (55 km/h) at 10,000 feet.”

Al Deere, Combat Report - 26 May 1940 , 54 Squadron





F/Lt Brian Lane, Combat Report - 26 May 1940, 19 Squadron





P/O John Bushell. Combat Report, 18 May 1940, 151 Squadron





F/LT. John Webster, Combat Report - 28 July 1940, 41 Squadron





F/Lt George Gribble, Combat Report - 15 August 1940, 54 Squadron





P/O R.D. Elliott, Combat Report - 9 September 1940, 72 Squadron





56 Squadron Combat Report, 9 May 1940





F/Lt I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940





602 Squadron Spitfire I in pre Battle of Britain camoflage and marked for 100 octane fuel





609 Squadron Spitfire I in pre Battle of Britain camoflage and marked for 100 octane fuel





610 Squadron Spitfire Mk I at Hawkinge in early July 1940. Note the petrol bowser marked for 100 octane fuel.





Spitfire Mk II P7420 with 19 Squadron, September 1940, Note the petrol bowser marked for 100 octane fuel.






For further reading and additional documentation please see:
Hurricane Mk I Performance
Spitfire I vrs Me 109


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2009)

Great post Mike, thanks!!!!!!!


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## parsifal (Aug 12, 2009)

To me thats a slam dunk. FC was using 100 Octane for the entir4e command during the course of the battle. Great post.


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## Krabat42 (Aug 12, 2009)

Excellent work, Mike! The Operations Record Books are the best sources, primary sources. Magazine articles and books have to be taken with a grain of salt. We have to be careful with magazine articles, especially during the war. Deception and Propaganda are not only german inventions. And after the war many writers just took for granted what was written then. And journalists in general... 

But if these Operations Record Books still exist, there is an easy way to prove it: Someone has to check the books of ALL squadrons involved for a note like "100 octane fuel now in all aircraft". Did I say easy? Of course it's not. But as long as nobody does that, there will be discord on this topic.

And Juha, I'm totally d'accord with you. I said it is likely but if this thread is to be a discussion, we have to let the people discuss. I was definitely expecting Kurfürst bringing his own proof. That's all. 

And let's hope that this topic brings even more interesting scans. 

Krabat


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## Glider (Aug 12, 2009)

bigZ said:


> "In June 1930, only 3 months before the start of WWII, a company tanker, the Beaconhill, set sail across the Alantic for the UK. with a full cargo of 100 octane fuel. We began stockpiling the this fuel though the decision to use 100 octane for Fighter Command was not made until March 1940 and that for its use by Bomber Command came in 1941."



This statement is without doubt incorrect. In May 1940 the UK had a stockpile of 240,000 tons of 100 Octane and the figures are supported by original documents as supplied to the Oil Committee copies of which were posted on earlier threads. I am afriad that I am away from my home PC which has my copies. 

The summary given at the start of this thread shows how stocks increased during the BOB, there was never a shortage. Had there been its safe t say that the experimental production of 33,000 tons would have continued and probably extended. 



> The author also suggests for more detailed information:-
> 
> Milestones in Aviation Fuels by W.G.Dukek, D.P Winans and A.R.Ogston. Paper given at A.I.A.A. Designers and Operators meeting, July 1969, Los Angeles.
> 
> Sorry I couldn't scan the extract as I am still unpacking after my relocation to NZ.



I hope this helps


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## Glider (Aug 12, 2009)

Krabat42 said:


> Hi Glider,
> 
> good research but I'm not convinced of the "ALL SQUADRONS" either. Maybe there were more documents which are more convincing - though I found every one you scanned interesting - but from what I've read I wouldn't come to a definite conclusion. It may be likely, yes, but as a historian I have to say "likely" is no proof, no offence meant. Again, kudos for your research, and believe me, since I'm working in an archive I know what I'm talking about.


I think Mike Williams posting covers this but its fair to say that Kaufursts argument was that only 18 fighter Squadrons and 2 Blenhim squadrons had the 100 Octane Fuel. This was was obviously incorrect.



> One word to people getting banned: I followde this thread (and others) and as an ex-forum-moderator I have to say that there is "potential for improvement" here. Kurfürst may not have been very polite, but the better way would have been to give him time to check the sources and bring his own arguments. Yes, he left only short comments but one of his first was asking for some time. Historical research needs time and nobody can follow Glider's work in just minutes, especially since he probably checked more sources than the ones he scanned. And when Adler joined the fray it looked somewhat like ganging up on Kurfürst - mind you, it just looked that way. This is an absolute no-go in this early state of a discussion. It's just winding up people. If one moderator is not enough to calm someone, you can still "gang up", that's just an unsolicited advice.


I am not a moderator and had nothing to do with his banning, also I made no complaint about his comments to anyone despite what most people would consider to be agressive statements.
The Moderators on this forum may not be perfect but they are pretty dammed good and I wouldn't fancy their role. They don't tend to react in this manner on a whim and you can be sure there are good reasons for any action they take.
I will now finish blatently sucking up to them and go back to my holiday in the Wet (make that very wet) Midlands.

For those who may not have seen the earlier threads every statement, figure, observation and stastic has been supported by original documentation not books or articles. 
If there are any doubts please PM me and in a weeks time I will be able to send you copies or links to them. I cannot be fiarer than that.

What everyone has been waiting for


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## Vincenzo (Aug 12, 2009)

Glider said:


> I think Mike Williams posting covers this but its fair to say that Kaufursts argument was that only 18 fighter Squadrons and 2 Blenhim squadrons had the 100 Octane Fuel. This was was obviously incorrect.



for true the Willams post don't prove that Kurfurst fail on the 18 squadrons, there are only ~15 squadrons in Williams post


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## Juha (Aug 12, 2009)

Hello Vincenzo
I noticed that also but there are more in the links Mike provided, especially on the Hurricane Mk I page.

Juha


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 12, 2009)

Krabat42 said:


> And when Adler joined the fray it looked somewhat like ganging up on Kurfürst - mind you, it just looked that way. This is an absolute no-go in this early state of a discussion. It's just winding up people. If one moderator is not enough to calm someone, you can still "gang up", that's just an unsolicited advice.
> 
> Krabat



1. I took no sides in the argument. I was making a general statement about discussions.

2. This was not an early state of discussion. This was part 2 (a second thread opened) for the same discussion. The first one was closed because both parties were flaming and being rude to one another. This thread was opened and both parties were told not to let it get out of hand.



FLYBOYJ said:


> Krabat, let me make something perfectly clear. No one ganged up on Kurfurst. He dug his own grave and his banning was the results of countless warnings and complaints by other members. We mods just don't go off looking to ban people for the hell of it. We read and watch and discuss the actions of our members and when we see someone becoming increasingly belligerent, they are removed.
> 
> Now with that said I do not want to discuss how this site is run and I could care less if you or anyone else moderated forums in different fashions. This is the way this site is run an we are not forcing membership to participate. *In other words if someone doesn't like the way things are run here, leave.*
> 
> Now this is my unsolicited advice to you and any one else who has a problem with this. Now if the complaining continues over this I will once again shut down this thread which would really piss me off becuase there is some great info being dispursed here, so please carry on and stay on topic. This thread is abot 100 octane fuel, not the banning of Kurfurst.



Sorry Joe, did not read your post before I responded with mine.


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## Mike Williams (Aug 12, 2009)

Thanks FLYBOYJ, parsifal and krabat!

Hi Juha:

I agree that there are sufficient primary sources and credible literature citations available in the various threads on this board and elsewhere such that there is really little mystery left regarding the conversion of Fighter Command to 100 octane fuel. I can’t see the point of putting much more research time in to the subject as I wouldn’t expect to increase my understanding of events to any significant degree. 

Perhaps the following will further flesh out the story. 

Air Ministry document AP1590B/J.2-W dated 20.3.40 clearing +12 boost states:
1. The emergency use of higher boost pressures up to +12 lb/sq.in. is now permitted for short periods by operation of the modified boost control cut-out. 

The Spitfire I Pilot’s Notes states:
“When using 100 octane fuel, +12 lb./sq.in. boost, obtained by operating the boost control cut-out, may be used for short periods.”


Air Chief Marshall Dowding’s memo dated 1 August 1940 states:
“The use of the automatic boost cut out control enables the pilot to get an emergency boost of + 12 lbs. per sq.in. from the engine for 5 minutes when circumstances demand it. Some pilots "pull the plug" with little excuse on every occasion.”

Understanding that 100 octane fuel is required to safely operate the boost cutout, pull the plug/tit or obtain +12 lbs emergency boost on Merlin II and III engines equipping Spitfire Mk I and Hurricane Mk I, we can see that following pilots comments demonstrate use of 100 octane fuel. These are obviously highly condensed; please see the links or citations for the full accounts.

Pilot accounts from Hurricane Squadrons: 

56 Squadron Combat Report noting +12 boost for Hurricanes, 9 May 1940:
S/L J.O.W. Oliver, 85 Squadron, 10 May 1940: "... I pulled the plug."
F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940: "...boost-override pulled." 
F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940: "...pulling his boost cut out..."
P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940: " I now pulled out the emergency boost-plug for the first time ever..."
P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940: "I pulled the tit'* for over-boost... *Emergency boost over-ride on the Merlin engine."
S/L E. M. Donaldon, 151 Sqdn., Combat Report, 18 May 1940: "I pulled the plug and climbed at 10 lbs boost…"
P/O John Bushell, 151 Sqdn., Combat Report, 18 May 1940: "I used full 12 lb boost (pulled the plug) and overtook EA rapidly."
P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940: Vitry, France: "...I had to pull the tit... Emergency boost control giving extra power"
F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 18 May 1940: "...pulled emergency boost control..."
F/Lt I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940: "At about 100 feet I straighten up, pull the tit *; a jerk as my supercharger goes up to twelve boosts."
F/Lt I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940: "Here goes with the tit. A jerk - the boost's shot up to twelve pounds; speed's increased by 30 m.p.h."
F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 19 May 1940: "...pulled emergency boost..."
Sgt. L.H.B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940: "Pulled tit..."
Sgt. J. C. Harrison, 229 Squadron, 28 May 1940: "I pulled the emergency boost and followed him down still firing."
P/O C. M. Simpson, 229 Squadron, 29 May 1940: "...I followed it down with boost out and pulled."
Sgt. P. Ottewill, 43 Squadron, 1 June 1940: "...automatic boost cut-out pulled."
F/Lt. R. G. Dutton, 145 Squadron, 1 July 1940:...pulled the plug..."
P/O G. E. Goodman, 1 Squadron, 18 August 1940: "...I pulled the plug..."
P/O Wicks, 56 Squadron, 30 August 1940: "With full throttle emergency boost..."
P/O J. R. B. Meaker, 249 Squadron, 6 September 1940: "...so I pull the plug..."
F/Lt J. A. Kent, 303 Squadron, 9 September 1940: "...I pulled the boost override plug..."
P/O T. F. Neil, 249 Squadron, 18 September 1940: "Plug pulled..."
P/O R. G. A. Barclay, 249 Squadron, 27 September 1940: "I had to use automatic boost cutout to catch up the 109."
S/L A. A. McKellar, 605 Squadron, 7 October 1940: "I followed one, pulled my boost control, and speedily made up on him."

Pilot comments from Spitfire Squadrons:

F/O D. H. Watkins, 611 Sqdn, 2 June 1940: “…emergency boost”
P/O John Freeborn , 74 Sqdn, 24 May 40: “boost cut out”
P/O Colin Gray, 54 Sqdn, 25 May 40: “…emergency boost tit”
P/O Al Deere, 54 Sqdn, 26 May 40: “12 boost”
F/Lt Lane, 19 Sqdn, 26 May 40: “12 lb. boost”
P/O M. P. Brown, 611 Sqdn, 2 June 40: “boost cut out”
F/Lt John Webster, 41 Sqdn, 19 June 40: “12 lbs boost”
F/Lt D. P. Kelly, 74 Sqdn, 28 July 40: “boost cutout”
F/Lt John Webster, 41 Sqdn, 28 July 40: 12 boost”
F/Lt John Webster, 41 Sqdn, 29 July 40: “twelve boost”
P/O George Bennions, 41 Sqdn, 28 July 40: emergency boost”
P/O Art Donahue, 64 Sqdn, 5 August 1940: “…emergency throttle”
F/Lt John Webster, 41 Sqdn, 8 August 40: “12 boost”
F/O R. W. Wallens, 41 Sqdn, 11 August 40: “12 lbs boost”
F/Lt George Gribble, 54 Sqdn, 15 August 40: “12 boost”
F/O Hugh Dundas, 616 Sqdn, 15 August 40: “through the gate”
F/Lt Robert F. Boyd, 602 Sqdn, 18 August 40: “10 lbs boost”
P/O James Morton, 603 Sqdn, 28 August 40: “pressed the tit”
P/O Ronald Berry, 603 Sqdn, 31 August 40: “emergency boost”
Sgt Jack Stokoe, 603 Sqdn, 1 September 40: “boost override”
P/O Roger Hall, 152 Sqdn, 4 September 40: “energy boost”
F/O Robert Oxspring, 66 Sqdn, 6 September 40: “through the gate for emergency power”
P/O R. D. Elliot, 72 Sqdn, 9 September 40: “MAX Boost (12 lbs)”
F/O Brian Macnamara, 603 Sqdn, 27 September 40: “full throttle and with the red lever pressed”
P/O Bob Doe, 234 Sqdn: “pull the plug”
Geoffrey Wellum, 92 Sqdn” “emergency boost override”
P/O David Crook, 609 Sqdn, 30 September 40: “'pulled the plug', i.e. pushed the small handle on the throttle quadrant that cuts out the automatic boost control thus allowing one to use emergency power.”
F/O D. McMullen, 222 Sqdn, 15 October 40: “12 boost”

The squadrons noted above are as follows: Spitfire – 19, 41, 54, 64, 66, 72, 74, 92, 152, 222, 234, 602, 603, 609, 611 616. 610 squadron Spitfires are shown being refueled with 100 octane above. Hurricane – 1, 17, 43, 56, 73, 79, 85, 87, 145, 151, 229, 249, 303 605. I’m quite sure more accounts and documentation will be found demonstrating 100 octane use by other squadrons during the Battle of France, during the Dunkirk evacuation and during the Battle of Britain.


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## claidemore (Aug 13, 2009)

I'm no math wizard, but that looks like 31 different squadrons to me. 

I've yet to read a combat report or anecdote from an RAF pilot stating that they 'only had 87 Octane fuel' for a particular mission or while with a particular squadron.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2009)

QUESTION:
When 100 octane was used, what was done to the aircraft besides placing a 100 octane sticker by the fuel nozzle?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 13, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> QUESTION:
> When 100 octane was used, what was done to the aircraft besides placing a 100 octane sticker by the fuel nozzle?



I believe that was covered in Mike Williams post #48


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> I believe that was covered in Mike Williams post #48


I missed it - thanks!


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## Colin1 (Aug 13, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> QUESTION:
> When 100 octane was used, what was done to the aircraft besides placing a 100 octane sticker by the fuel nozzle?


As it's a piston-engined aircraft
I would imagine manual advance of the ignition timing to take advantage of the higher octane number
I can't think of a reason why it would be different to pre-engine management automobiles
I've no idea if strobes etc existed in those days


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## Mike Williams (Aug 13, 2009)

FLYBOYJ said:


> QUESTION:
> When 100 octane was used, what was done to the aircraft besides placing a 100 octane sticker by the fuel nozzle?





Colin1 said:


> As it's a piston-engined aircraft
> I would imagine manual advance of the ignition timing to take advantage of the higher octane number
> I can't think of a reason why it would be different to pre-engine management automobiles
> I've no idea if strobes etc existed in those days



Hello FLYBOYJ and Colin: Please refer to these documents for details of the modifications necessary to convert from 87 to 100 octane.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 13, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> As it's a piston-engined aircraft
> I would imagine manual advance of the ignition timing to take advantage of the higher octane number
> I can't think of a reason why it would be different to pre-engine management automobiles
> I've no idea if strobes etc existed in those days



Many WW II aircraft engines used FIXED ignition timing. While it may be possiable to adjust the igniton timing once it was set it didn't move with the engine runnig unlike most automobiles. 
Some engines did use an ingition retarder for starting but once the engine was running the ignition timing stayed in the same place regardless of throttle setting or rpm.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> As it's a piston-engined aircraft
> I would imagine manual advance of the ignition timing to take advantage of the higher octane number
> I can't think of a reason why it would be different to pre-engine management automobiles
> I've no idea if strobes etc existed in those days


Read below....


Shortround6 said:


> Many WW II aircraft engines used FIXED ignition timing. While it may be possiable to adjust the igniton timing once it was set it didn't move with the engine runnig unlike most automobiles.
> Some engines did use an ingition retarder for starting but once the engine was running the ignition timing stayed in the same place regardless of throttle setting or rpm.



Shortround6 hit it on the head. In today's world an impulse coupling in the magneto would retard the spark for starting and then advance as engine RPM increased.

Somthing to think about - The document that Mike posted mentioned Mod 136 to Merlins that would have the described field mods (64, 77) embodied. It seems mod 64, 77 154 were the documents used to field modify the noted aircraft for 100 octaine. It would be interesting to find out when Merlins were rolling out of the factory with Mod 136 embodied. It would seem that all engines installed on Merlin powered aircraft would have to have mod 154 completed during installation. This would include engines at the factory as well as new or overhauled engines in the field. I know in today's world that when an engine is overhauled all mods are done to that engine prior to return to service and I would assume this would be the same case for the RAF in 1940.


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## claidemore (Aug 13, 2009)

March 1940 they started the field modifications on the Merlin II and III. Pilots notes from April 1940 state "the automatic boost control has been modified". 

Variable speed props were installed in the field by Dehavilland techs, and all subsequent planes left the factory with them. I believe the same would have been done with the mods for 100 octane. Wouldn't make sense to keep manufacturing and installing engines set up for 87 octane, and having them continually converted in the field after issue to squadron. I don't think it's a stretch to assume that every 'new' plane issued during the Battle would have been 100 octane ready.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2009)

claidemore said:


> March 1940 they started the field modifications on the Merlin II and III. Pilots notes from April 1940 state "the automatic boost control has been modified".
> 
> Variable speed props were installed in the field by Dehavilland techs, and all subsequent planes left the factory with them. I believe the same would have been done with the mods for 100 octane. Wouldn't make sense to keep manufacturing and installing engines set up for 87 octane, and having them continually converted in the field after issue to squadron. I don't think it's a stretch to assume that every 'new' plane issued during the Battle would have been 100 octane ready.



All good points Claid although somtimes deliverey schedule may dictate where and when a mod was to be completed, but again I believe that these mods were more than likely done prior to delivery.


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## Mike Williams (Aug 26, 2009)

claidemore said:


> ...that looks like 31 different squadrons to me.



Hi claidemore:

Here are three more:

Jeffrey Quill, 65 Squadron, 12 August 1940: “I pressed my boost cut-out and felt the surge of power as the boost went suddenly up and black smoke poured from my exhausts.”
Jeffrey Quill, Spitfire, _A Test Pilot’s Story_, (Crecy Publishing Limited, Manchester, 1998), pg. 185.

P/O K B McGlashan, 245 Squadron, 28 May 1940: “We’d boost an extra four pounds, from eight to twelve…”
S/L Kenneth Butterworth McGlashan with Owen Zupp, _Down to Earth_, (Grubb Street, London, 2007), pg 29.

P/O T D Welsh, 264 Squadron (Defiant), 29 May 1940: “I pulled the boost cut out and my motor picked up.”


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## merlin (Aug 26, 2009)

And another (though it may have already have been quote) - from Tim Vigors autobiography - 'Life's too short to cry': - p.137

Driving through London we saw little traffic. Petrol rationing had, by this time, really started to bite. It had not affected us pilots too badly as, quite illegally, we used to top up the tanks of our cars from the petrol bowsers used for refuelling aircraft. As long as this was done reasonably discreetly the authorities kindly turned a blind eye. What effect 100 octane fuel was having on the pistons and cylinders of my Ford 8 remained to be seen. so far EGO (part of the car's no plate) was still going like a bomb. in fact the diet seemed to suit her.

And there's the gladiator squadron in Norway - and that was before the Battle of France let alone the Battle of Britain - that was sent 100 fuel but they couldn't use it, they wanted 87 octane!!


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## Mike Williams (Sep 13, 2009)

The use of 100 octane fuel was approved for Spitfire Squadrons by 24 September 1938. No. 19 Squadron had received the first Spitfire into service on 4 August 1938 and was equipped with a full complement of sixteen Spitfires by December 1938.






In December 1938 Fighter Command noted that Duxford, Debden, Northholt and Digby had received 100 octane fuel. Nos. 19 66 Squadrons were at Duxford in Spitfires. These were the only units equipped with Spitfires in December 1938. Nos. 85 87 Squadrons were based at Debden and were equipped with Hurricanes. No. 29 squadron, equipped with Demons Blenheims, was also based at Debden at this time. No. 111 Squadron was based at Northholt with Hurricanes. Nos. 46 and 73 Squadrons were at Digby; 46 with Gauntlet IIs and 73 with Hurricanes. 






Thanks to Gavin Bailey and Neil Stirling for their assistance.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2009)

Mike Williams said:


> The use of 100 octane fuel was approved for Spitfire Squadrons by 24 September 1938. No. 19 Squadron had received the first Spitfire into service on 4 August 1938 and was equipped with a full complement of sixteen Spitfires by December 1938.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Also of interest is the page from the same set of documents, which sheds some context of these two papers detailing the shipments to stations involved in these early trials.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2009)

More


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2009)

*Proposals for securing adequate supplies of 100 octane fuel to meet war requirements

Annex I. *
December 1938.


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## Colin1 (Sep 16, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> *Proposals for securing adequate supplies of 100 octane fuel to meet war requirements
> 
> Annex I. *
> December 1938.


Pulled the comment


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2009)

*Proposals for securing adequate supplies of 100 octane fuel to meet war requirements

Annex II. *
December 1938.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2009)

*Proposals for securing adequate supplies of 100 octane fuel to meet war requirements

Appendix I. *
December 1938.


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## fibus (Sep 17, 2009)

I would be proud of such research.


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## Glider (Sep 19, 2009)

Its certainly interesting that in 1938 the UK was making preparations to equip 2,500 aircraft with 100 Octane Fuel.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 19, 2009)

Pardon for a newbie butting in but I have been reading this discussion, and others on the same subject with some interest. From what I can gather from the primary documentary evidence contributed by Glider, Mike Williams and others 100 Octane fuel was being used by RAF fighters from at least 1940, correct? It seems to me from the evidence supplied that the argument is conclusive; the RAF used this fuel as a matter of course throughout the battles of France and Britain.

So what is Kurfürst's big deal? In support of his argument that RAF fighters were not using the fuel in large quantities in 1940 he supplies documentary evidence from 1938, well before the war started, when the British could not guarentee supplies from the USA, and 1942, which simply confirms that the RAF consumed 400,000 gallons of the fuel in 1941. I don't see 1940 being mentioned anywhere in the document on Beaverbrook's memo .

Much more intriguing is the document marked "Consumption of 100 Octane Fuel in No.s 90, 98 201 Squadrons" which shows that the RAF was experimenting with the fuel in 1937. According to The Royal Air Force - History Section 90 Sqn was equipped with Blenheims, which means that the Bristol Mercury was capable of using 100 octane fuel, The Royal Air Force - History Section 98 Sqn with Battles, meaning the Merlin I could use 100 octane in 1937, and RAF - 201 Squadron 201 Sqn used Supermarine Southamptons, using the Napier Lion. Three different types of aircraft and three different types of engine all able to use 100 octane fuel in 1937. This proves that the Air Ministry was well up with the new development in aviation fuel. Note too that the long range Wellesleys which broke distance records in 1937 used 100 octane fuel - Bristol Pegasus.

In the balance of the information submitted by Kurfürst there is no evidence whatsoever that the RAF lacked supplies of 100 octane fuel in 1940. The word "Proposals" indicates these are planning documents which are based on a "worst case" contingency ie;as of 1938 Britain could expect no help from other countries in the event of war, therefore the projected supplies of aviation fuel were based on this assumption. The document confirms that Britain recognised how essential 100 octane fuel would be and was planning to refine the fuel in the West Indies - there is nothing startling or new about the Air Ministry making such plans in 1938. Nor did the Air Ministry have a crystal ball which told them that the USA would continue to supply 100 octane fuel in 1940. Primary documents from 1940 beat primary documents from 1938 or 1942. Or am I just being obtuse? 8)


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## Kurfürst (Sep 19, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> So what is Kurfürst's big deal? In support of his argument that RAF fighters were not using the fuel in large quantities in 1940...



Problem is nobody made such an arguement. Glider etc. state that each and every RAF Figther Station was was supplied with 100 octane fuel, and each and every RAF fighter Squadron was running on 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain. As others have noted, there is no conclusive evidence for this (yet) in the documentation so far found. As opposed to this, reasearch and some of the documentation (including research in the Australian archieves, papers the 18 May Meeting, and fuel consumption data) points to that 100 octane fuel was issued to some stations, while others relied on 87 octane fuel. It is yet to be determined what was the ratio between these stations. Whether the RAF used 100 octane fuel or whether the engines were capable of using it was never a question, and nobody questioned this here AFAIK.

Generally using higher octane fuel in an engine originally for lower octane fuel, say 87 which was the standard in the 1930s, was no particular problem as it would appear. For example, the Germans were using their own 96/115 octane fuel 'C-3' during the Battle of Britain even with Ju 88 bomber units, even those the Jumo 211 engines of these bombers were probably not gaining any extra output with it.

Glider's post and documents he posted cover the period up to May 1940, and it makes clear that some specific bomber Stations were issued with this fuel, as well as Mike's collection of Pilot combat reports show that several RAF Squadrons were using the fuel in France and later over Britain in the summer of 1940. The question is of course complicated by the fact that the Squadrons were rotated amongst fifty-odd stations during the Battle. I will address this later.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 19, 2009)

Some more evidence:


This is from a researcher (Pips over Allaboutwarafe discussion boards, who posted this some time ago), researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. 

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report. 

_"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude. 

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.
*
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place.* Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but *all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). *The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel. 

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. *Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.*_


The second description is from Gavin Bailey's work, "The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain", originally published online on April 15, 2008:

_Significantly, at the same time as the British were preparing to take these preliminary steps required to utilise 100-octane fuel, a committee was formed consisting of representatives from the leading oil companies, Imperial Chemical Industries and Air Ministry officers. Chaired by Sir Harold Hartley, the chairman of the Fuel Research Board, the objective of the committee was to recommend measures to ensure that adequate supplies of 100-octane fuel could be supplied in wartime. The immediate impetus behind this development was the possibility that the main existing source of supply"”hydrogenation plants run by Standard Oil and Shell within the United States"”might become inaccessible owing to the embargo requirements of the US Neutrality Acts on the outbreak of war. A further consideration was the fact that 100-octane supplies were purchased in dollars in the case of Shell and Standard Oil production in the United States and in Dutch guilders for Shell production from Curacao in the Netherlands West Indies and later on from the Netherlands East Indies. This presented a potential problem for British balance of payments and foreign currency exchange which was only resolved in the short- and medium-term future by the adoption of supply under the terms of lend–lease in 1941.

The Hartley Committee eventually determined in December 1938 that three new hydrogenation plants should be funded partially at government expense in Trinidad and in Britain to expand British-controlled annual 100-octane fuel production capacity to 720,000 tons above the level already in prospect from existing supplies. At this point Shell and ICI had co-operated to build the first hydrogenation plant in Britain at Billingham on Teeside and further plants were being planned at Stanlow in Cheshire by Shell and Heysham and Thornton in Lancashire by the Air Ministry. In January 1939, when the Hartley Committee report was adopted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Treasury was able to cancel one of the planned plants in Trinidad on the grounds of cost, in return for an expansion of the authorised war reserve from 410,000 tons to 800,000 tons, 700,000 tons of which were to consist of 100-octane. This represented an entire years worth of estimated consumption on the basis of the major expansion and production schemes then in force and required an enormous investment in building the required protected underground storage infrastructure.

*RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939.*34

By the time war broke out, the available stocks of aviation fuel had risen to 153,000 tons of 100-octane and 323,000 tons of other grades (mostly 87-octane).35 The actual authorisation to change over to 100-octane came at the end of February 1940 and was made on the basis of the existing reserve and the estimated continuing rate of importation in the rest of the year The available stock of 100-octane fuel at this point was about 220,000 tons. *Actual use of the fuel began after 18 May 1940, when the fighter stations selected for the changeover had completed their deliveries of 100-octane and had consumed their existing stocks of 87-octane. *While this was immediately before the intensive air combat associated with the Dunkirk evacuation, where Fighter Command units first directly engaged the Luftwaffe, this can only be regarded as a fortunate coincidence which was contingent upon much earlier decisions to establish, store and distribute sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel._


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## Glider (Sep 20, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.


This the paper that the AWM cannot find and have not heard of but for now I will go what we have in front of us. 
Point A Where have McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and Churchill quoted from this paper? If you cannot supply the paper then the quotes would be of interest. 


> _"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude. _


_
This statement is inaccurate as permission had been given to use 100 Octane Fuel in February Post 2 has the details and copy of the original paper. This is supported by operation books reporting the change over in some squadrons as early as February post 48 has examples of original documents. 




By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use.

Click to expand...

 This is a false claim with no evidence to support it. Any evidence would be welcomed and appreciated. In my opinion its unlikely as all the squadrons in France were using 100 Octane in May so why we wouldn't use 100 octane for defending the UK is something that would need evidence to support.



The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Click to expand...

This is totally wrong. The consumption of 100 Octane fuel in July and August on average was 10,000 tons a month. 
On 31st May the Stockpile was 294,000 tons a two and a half year stockpile
On 31st August it was 404,000 tons a three and a half year stockpile
Post 1 has the details
This was supported by the use of Billingham refinery to produce 33,000 tons of 100 octane in the four months up to November 1940. If there had been a shortage this production would have continued. 
Post 26 has the details of the preparitory paper. I didn't take a copy of the completion paper but assure you that it did take place.




.
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place.[/B] Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but *all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). *The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel. 
The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. *Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.*

Click to expand...

_This is without doubt wrong. I say this as I went through the entire records minutes, actions and reports contained in the Oil Co ordination Committee and nowhere was there any mention of a shorage of 100 octane, of a slowdown or stoppage of the distribution of fuel. Neither was there any mention of the recommencement of the distribution at any time let alone September. This is supported by the decision on 7th August to allow 100 Octane fuel to be released to all operation commands namely Coastal and the rest of Bomber Command. Post 1 has the details. 
I should add that the Oil Coordination Committee was responsible for the purchasing, import, storage and distribution of all fuel for the United Kingdon at home and overseas. It would have been impossible for such actions to have been implemented without their knowledge or involvement. 
Also the minutes of the War Cabinet are available on line and anyone can check these. You will see that the War Cabinet didn't make any decisions on 100 octane in May 1940, In fact they never mentioned 100 octane at all. 



> The second description is from Gavin Bailey's work, "The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain", originally published online on April 15, 2008:]


[/QUOTE]

Gavin Bailey formally objected to the use of his material to support the idea that the RAF was limited in the use of 100 Octane Fuel. If people wish to go into this then the following link will suffice.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-during-bob-16305-5.html


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## Glider (Sep 20, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Problem is nobody made such an arguement. Glider etc. state that each and every RAF Figther Station was was supplied with 100 octane fuel, and each and every RAF fighter Squadron was running on 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain.



I think one thing has to be made clear. Can I give a 100% Cast Iron, Gold Plated guarantee that every station in fighter command had 100 Octane fuel. No I cannot, as that would involve checking vast amounts of data and I have a life to lead, so in short there could be one station in the back end of nowhere which didn't get the fuel. As Kurfurst rightly pointed out I used the phrase , *"sources links that exist and support the view that Fighter Command was effectively fully converted to 100 Octane by May 1940*. Note the word *effectively*.
That said I do believe and there is no evidence in my mind to contridict the view that all stations did have the 100 Octane Fuel. 



> As others have noted, there is no conclusive evidence for this (yet) in the documentation so far found. As opposed to this, reasearch and some of the documentation (including research in the Australian archieves, papers the 18 May Meeting, and fuel consumption data) points to that 100 octane fuel was issued to some stations, while others relied on 87 octane fuel. It is yet to be determined what was the ratio between these stations. Whether the RAF used 100 octane fuel or whether the engines were capable of using it was never a question, and nobody questioned this here AFAIK.


*The Australian Archives again*. There are two questions here
a) Does the paper exist 
b) If it does is it accurate
Responses are
a) The Australian Archives that couldn't find the paper when I asked for it, couldn't find it when the editors at Wikipedia asked for it. Kurfurst was going to look for it but don't know how far he got with the request. I haven't seen it and am assuming he failed but could be wrong on that.
b) Without (a) we cannot know (b) but the omens are not good I will go into that later.

*18th May Meeting*
I don't know what Kurfurst is referring to as this is totally covered in my postings 3, 4, 5 and 6 and has nothing to do with shortages, named squadrons or named stations. 

*Fuel Consumption figures *
These support my contention that the increase in September was due to the fuel being released to Bomber and Coastal Command in August. The details are in Posting 1. 
Kurfursts comments are vague but I am happy to debate them if he can be specific.



> Glider's post and documents he posted cover the period up to May 1940, and it makes clear that some specific bomber Stations were issued with this fuel, as well as Mike's collection of Pilot combat reports show that several RAF Squadrons were using the fuel in France and later over Britain in the summer of 1940. The question is of course complicated by the fact that the Squadrons were rotated amongst fifty-odd stations during the Battle. I will address this later.


I admit this confused me in two areas. 
a) Posting 1 goes well beyond May and goes to August 1940.
b) The total number of squadrons in Mikes combat reports and postings is 34 squadrons Posts 57 and 68 have the details. Considering the contention from Kurfurst is that we had only 18 squadrons its difficult to understand the argument. 
I have no doubt that if we were to look into the other squadron records we would find similar postings.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 20, 2009)

I'm sorry, but Kurfürst has not answered my main points; none of the documents he has presented relate _directly_ to 1940. The document from 1937 shows that the RAF was already using 100 octane. The documents from 1938 show that the Air Ministry and the RAF were fully aware that supplies of 100 octane fuel were vital and plans were underway to overcome any potential shortfall in the event that the US would stop supplying the fuel. The document from late 1941 or 1942 merely discusses Beaverbrook's projections about how much 100 octane fuel would be used in 1942 cf 1941. Where is Kurfürst's evidence from 1940 which will show that some RAF fighter squadrons were forced to use 87 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain while others continued to use 100?



> Generally using higher octane fuel in an engine originally for lower octane fuel, say 87 which was the standard in the 1930s, was no particular problem as it would appear. For example, the Germans were using their own 96/115 octane fuel 'C-3' during the Battle of Britain even with Ju 88 bomber units, even those the Jumo 211 engines of these bombers were probably not gaining any extra output with it.



What on earth does this mean? In fighter v fighter combat, especially between aircraft as evenly matched as the Spitfire I and Bf 109E, small advantages could mean the difference between being killed or killing the opponent.
The combat reports make it clear that several RAF pilots evaded 109s by using the "overboost", similarly 109s were shot down after being caught by pilots using +12 lbs. How does Kurfürst know that Ju 88s using the German equivalent fuel, which was supplied in very small quantities BTW, didn't evade Hurricanes or Spitfires because thay were able to call on some extra boost?


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## Milosh (Sep 20, 2009)

> By the time war broke out, the available stocks of aviation fuel had risen to *153,000 tons* of 100-octane



To give people an idea how much fuel that is, it is enough for ~910,000-920,000 Spitfire sorties.

1 ton = 14.5 barrels
1 barrel = 35 Imp gal.


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## Glider (Sep 20, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> I'm sorry, but Kurfürst has not answered my main points; none of the documents he has presented relate _directly_ to 1940. The document from 1937 shows that the RAF was already using 100 octane. The documents from 1938 show that the Air Ministry and the RAF were fully aware that supplies of 100 octane fuel were vital and plans were underway to overcome any potential shortfall in the event that the US would stop supplying the fuel. The document from late 1941 or 1942 merely discusses Beaverbrook's projections about how much 100 octane fuel would be used in 1942 cf 1941. Where is Kurfürst's evidence from 1940 which will show that some RAF fighter squadrons were forced to use 87 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain while others continued to use 100?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



You will find this quote from a previous thread of interest. It shows that the British investigated the fuel carried in 29 crashed German aircraft, of the 29 only one had 100 octane fuel and that was from captured british stocks.

I direct you to Document file number 043697, in the BP Archive at Warwick University, and specifically to 'Petroleum Board Enemy Oils Fuels Committee. A Survey of the Results Obtained to Date in the Examination of Enemy Fuel Samples', by D. A. Howes, dated 4 November 1940. This used fuel samples taken from 29 crashed Luftwaffe aircraft between November 1939 and September 1940, and, exclusive of one sample of captured British 100-octane, revealed octane ratings which varied between 87.5 and 92.2 octane. The results were summarised by H. E. Snow to Sir William Fraser on 13 November 1940 as follows (and I quote from the original document):

'No general indication [of] iso-octane or other synthetics. The only 100 octane fuel identified was definitely captured British.'

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-during-bob-16305-5.html


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 21, 2009)

It would seem that a brief summary of this discussion would read something like:

We have Glider and others providing documantary evidence, running through from 1938 to late 1940, which gives a clear picture of how extensive the use of 100 octane fuel in RAF fighter squadrons was during the battles of France and Britain. Glider admits that he does not know some things, but this does not weaken the evidence he has presented. I read over 20 primary source documents in these threads alone which provide strong evidence that there were sufficient supplies of 100 octane fuel to sustain the needs of RAF fighter units during the critical months of 1940. Not only that but there was enough to allow some bomber units to use the fuel as well. 

The only objection comes from Kurfürst, who has not presented any 1940 vintage documentary evidence that RAF fighter units were having to use 87 octane fuel (the only alternative) during operational sorties, because of supply shortages. The only basis for his argument (from the first thread) that only "25% of fighter squadrons" were using 100 octane fuel is based on a _1938_ planning document, which was written with the contingency that supplies of the fuel would be withheld by the USA in the event of a war. He has also presented a written transcript which purports to come from Beaverbrook, but the source document, it seems, cannot be found. So far no evidencehas been produced that shows that any fighter squadrons were "relegated" to using 87 octane fuel during operational sorties. Until Kurfurst (or someone else) can provide documentation that this did happen, all he is working with is conjecture and assumption based on some provisional planning data from 1938 and/or 1941-42, and what seems to be a mystery memo from Beaverbrook to the Australians. 

The matter about whether ALL RAF fighter stations were supplied with 100 octane is a red herring. What would have mattered in 1940 is whether the stations in 11, 10 and 12 Groups were able to supply the fighter squadrons with the fuel, particularly during the B of B. I have no problem with Glider admitting that he has no idea whether all stations were supplied, because none of the participants in this discussion know for sure. The _weight of evidence_ is that there was no supply problem... unless some sensational NEW documentary evidence is produced which counters this...


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

More to ponder on, 100 octane fuel development and operational use via 

Spitfire: The History by Eric B. Morgan , Edward Shacklady
Spitfire: The History: Amazon.co.uk: Eric B. Morgan, Edward Shacklady: Books


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> It would seem that a brief summary of this discussion would read something like:



Thank you for your summary. Others have already summerized the contents of the thread, please read below if you missed it.



Krabat42 said:


> Hi Glider,
> 
> good research but I'm not convinced of the "ALL SQUADRONS" either. Maybe there were more documents which are more convincing - though I found every one you scanned interesting - but from what I've read I wouldn't come to a definite conclusion. It may be likely, yes, but as a historian I have to say "likely" is no proof, no offence meant. Again, kudos for your research, and believe me, since I'm working in an archive I know what I'm talking about.Krabat



Personally, I find myself in agreement with Krabat 42. Let it be a court, or a historical question, the burden of evidence is upoon the one making the claim. It is Glider, and Mike, making the claim that each and every RAF fighter squadrons were supplied with, and was using, 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain. As others, including Krabat42, Vincenco and myself have noted, the evidence for this claim is so far absent from this thread, and is directly contradicted by some of the other evidence posted. At present, the evidence is sufficient to prove that 100 octane fuel was used a number of Squadrons during the Battle, the the exact percentage and amount is impossible to determine. Until such evidence is posted, I am afraid most of us who are sceptical on this claim will have trouble accepting this claim based on how 'likely' it should be.

Of course all of us can look it at different the evidence posted at angles, but a very definietive claim like this should be backed up by very definietive sources speaking in no uncertain terms. Certainly if 100 octane fuel was used in such an uniform manner as some posters claim, there should be evidence easily found for this.



> The only objection comes from Kurfürst, who has not presented any 1940 vintage documentary evidence that RAF fighter units were having to use 87 octane fuel (the only alternative) during operational sorties, because of supply shortages. The only basis for his argument (from the first thread) that only "25% of fighter squadrons" were using 100 octane fuel is based on a _1938_ planning document, which was written with the contingency that supplies of the fuel would be withheld by the USA in the event of a war.



As opposed to:

_This is from a researcher (Pips over Allaboutwarafe discussion boards, who posted this some time ago), researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at* the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. *It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. _


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

Glider said:


> You will find this quote from a previous thread of interest. It shows that the British investigated the fuel carried in 29 crashed German aircraft, of the 29 only one had 100 octane fuel and that was from captured british stocks.
> 
> I direct you to Document file number 043697, in the BP Archive at Warwick University, and specifically to 'Petroleum Board Enemy Oils Fuels Committee. A Survey of the Results Obtained to Date in the Examination of Enemy Fuel Samples', by D. A. Howes, dated 4 November 1940. This used fuel samples taken from 29 crashed Luftwaffe aircraft between November 1939 and September 1940, and, exclusive of one sample of captured British 100-octane, revealed octane ratings which varied between 87.5 and 92.2 octane. The results were summarised by H. E. Snow to Sir William Fraser on 13 November 1940 as follows (and I quote from the original document):
> 
> ...



This opinion was posted already in the other discussion, but unfortunately it was not possible due to refute it because the premature closing of that thread due to the behaviour of the poster.

However, the notion and implication that the only 100 octane fuel used by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain originates to British stocks of 100 octane fuel, captured from British airfields in France after the premature leave by the British Army in June 1940 is a dangerous myth, which needs to be promptly refuted, before any credence is attributed to it. Even if I did not want to engage in continuing that discussion here, given that the title discusses the RAF use of such fuel in 1940, the above repetence of it warrants a proper refutation of the claim by poster 'gbailey'.

Some of the documents already posted from the Australian archieves already show that already in 1938 the British were concerned of German 100 octane fuel developments and the capacity to produce this fuel on an industrial scale. Please refer back to these before proceeding further.

Please also refer to the German datasheet of the DB 601N. This type of engine was developed for German 100 octane 'C-3' fuel use, and went into mass production in late 1939 (October 1939 via Manfred Griehl to be exact)






It extremely puzzling, to say the least, why would the Germans decide to mass produce an engine, specifically made for 100 octane fuel use, without having any own stock of 100 octane fuel. And then equip whole wings of fighters, bombers, and zestoerers with the said engine. 

As the statements by 'gbailey' are said to be based on 'Document file number 043697, in the BP Archive at Warwick University, and specifically to 'Petroleum Board Enemy Oils Fuels Committee. A Survey of the Results Obtained to Date in the Examination of Enemy Fuel Samples', please find below the original scans of the document below to these claims made. 

The full document, of 76 pages, is not reproduced here due to size restriction,_ but it is available in its full at my website_ at Kurfurst - Your resource on Messerschmitt Bf 109 performance.

It should be noted, however, that during the war, there were different octane ratings used for aviation gasoline. Allied states generally preferred to give octane rating at its rich mixture, while the Germans preferred the CFR method, which gave the octane rating at weak mixture.

The bottomline of the story, the green 'C-3' type fuel that the Germans were calling 96 octane fuel by the CFR method, was the equaivalent of 96/110 octane fuel as the Allies would call it. In other words, actually a bit better at rich mixture and for knock resistance than ordinary 100 octane fuel. 

Also it is evident from these documents that the British were aware of the existance and use of German 100 octane - for simplicity's sake lets ignore for a moment it superior qualities and call it the same since the summer of 1940. 

Examples of such fuel were found and analysed in crashed Ju 88 and Me 110 aircraft. The use in the former type is especially interesting as the types capable of taking advantage of higher octane fuel were DB 601N-powered Bf 109Es and Bf 110Cs. These latter were already in service by July 1940. By the automn, 1200 DB 601N engines were delivered, divided amongst Bf 110, Bf 109 units, Bf 109F production and reserve engines. Priority was given to Bf 110 units until the automn for these engines. The use of 100 octane C-3 thus may appear to be superflous in German bomber aircraft, nevertheless is was an existing practice.

The British report do not seem to mention 100 octane fuel found in Bf 109s, but this may be due to the limited scope of the report. See the image of Bf 109E-4/N, W.Nr. 1190, 'White 4', is being unloaded by Curtiss workers. The Emil belonged to 4. Staffel Staffel of JG 4, and was flown by Uffz. Horst Perez on, when it was shot down on the 30th September 1940 over East Dean during the Battle of Britain. Note the fuel triangle with the '100' label, pointo to 100 octane fuel and the DB 601N. 






Given the contradiction between gbailey's statements - ' exclusive of one sample of captured British 100-octane, revealed octane ratings which varied between 87.5 and 92.2 octane' - and the original scan of the document below, it would be very much desirable that gbailey would comment on how he arrived at the opposite conclusions in comparisons what these vintange British reports of the same series say.


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2009)

Hello Kurfürst
as I have wrote earlier, the burden of delivering proof is on your side, because current BoB literature says that FC had converted to 100 oct before the beginning of BoB. Numerous books claiming this have been mentioned in the treads where we have discussed on this subject. Mike and other have showed evidence that over 30 sqns definitely used 100 oct, you still have not shown any evidence, that even one sqn of those serving under 10, 11 or 12 Group, those were the groups that really mattered, used 87 oct during the BoB. So try to find some positive proof to back up your stand. As I have wrote, history doesn’t progress if we argue on “established” facts again and again without positive proof that “established” facts were wrong but it progresses if we can proof that “established” facts are wrong or even partly wrong and so success to generate new understanding of our past.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

Dear Juha,

I am afraid this whole thread is all about what the so-called 'established' historical facts are. 

As I see, your stance is, briefly, that it is I who have to disprove your claims, and unless I do so, they are to be accepted as true. 

This is hardly how it works, please refer to Russell's teapot - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia for a better understanding of the pitfalls of 'burden of proof'.

To quote Russel:

_'If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is an intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.'_

Regarding the number of RAF FC Squadrons, using 100 octane fuel during the Battle, I think the deployment and constant changing of Stations by the Squadrons during the Battle has to be taken into account. It was Stations, and not squadrons, which were supplied with this fuel. As noted by Vincenzo in an earlier thread, there were about 50+ Stations used as a base during the BoB, and the analysis of fighter Squadron movement indicates that Squadron report show a pattern of reporting 100 octane fuel use in combat are clearly connected to being deployed at certain stations, 10 to 15 out of the fifty or so. To give a simple example, Squadron X may report use of 100 octane when deployed at Y Station, then when redeployed to another Station, there no such reports. However, Squadron Z deployed to Y Station in its place starts to report using 100 octane fuel afterwards. The mechanism in this is not difficult to be realized. 

As I noted earlier, I will share my analysis of this later. For today, I feel the subject has been sufficiently discussed.


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2009)

Dear Kurfürst
have you notice that huge majority of aircombat happened in the areas of 10 and 11 Group. It is not surprising that for ex sqns stationed at Castletown, Isle of Man didn't produce combat reports.

On established facts, name a book on Bob which support your stand. As I wrote, numerous books are named that claims that FC had gone over to 100 oct before the BoB began.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2009)

Hello Kurfürst
Quote:” As I see, your stance is, briefly, that it is I who have to disprove your claims, and unless I do so, they are to be accepted as true.”

Now IIRC my only claim have been, that in the literature on BoB many famous experts claim that FC changed to 100 oct before the BoB began and when you asked in what books I gave titles of some and others produced scans on relevant pages from some of the books which proved my point. So I have backed up my claim but I’m still waiting some positive proof from you to back up your claim. All I have seen is that Glider et al have demolished your original claim that only 16+2 sqns used 100 oct during the BoB but now you seem to have changed you a position a bit and demanded new proofs that your claim is wrong instead of producing positive backing to your claim.

Juha


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## pbfoot (Sep 21, 2009)

I think Kurfurst is missing something of note when he talks about Squadrons moving or being posted to "non 100 octane" stations I believe it was standard practice that the aircraft remained on station and the the personel transferred without their aircraft , leaving their aircraft for the incoming personel or squadron


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 21, 2009)

I note Kurfürst has left out a great deal of my statement


NZTyphoon said:


> It would seem that a brief summary of this discussion would read something like:
> The only objection comes from Kurfürst, who has not presented any 1940 vintage documentary evidence that RAF fighter units were having to use 87 octane fuel (the only alternative) during operational sorties, because of supply shortages. The only basis for his argument (from the first thread) that only "25% of fighter squadrons" were using 100 octane fuel is based on a _1938_ planning document, which was written with the contingency that supplies of the fuel would be withheld by the USA in the event of a war. He has also presented a written transcript which purports to come from Beaverbrook, but the source document, it seems, cannot be found. So far no evidence has been produced that shows that any fighter squadrons were "relegated" to using 87 octane fuel during operational sorties. Until Kurfurst (or someone else) can provide documentation that this did happen, all he is working with is conjecture and assumption based on some provisional planning data from 1938 and/or 1941-42, and what seems to be a mystery memo from Beaverbrook to the Australians.



As opposed to what? A transcribed, third hand account of a memo which nobody, apart from Pip, has seen?
Why did Kurfürst omit my mentioning this? He has yet to explain why he continues to use such documents as a basis for his argument when others are doing all the hard work and supplying documents from 1940.



> More to ponder on, 100 octane fuel development and operational use via
> 
> Spitfire: The History by Eric B. Morgan , Edward Shacklady
> Spitfire: The History: Amazon.co.uk: Eric B. Morgan, Edward Shacklady: Books



I'm familiar with the book but I don't have a copy. However, in this excerpt Morgan and Shacklady used a document from November 1937 which only describes fuel supplies from British sources. Nothing about the USA and hardly convincing evidence about the events of 1940. Then comes a document from March 1939 to prove that 100 octane fuel was to be used in sixteen fighter squadrons and two bomber by September 1939. So what? As I have explained before. the RAF's pre-war planning was based on an assumption that in the event of war being declared the USA would withold supplies of 100 octane.

Only later do thay say that supplies were shipped from the USA and then go on to say that large numbers of tankers were sunk. Strangely enough 1940 documents, none of which are mentioned by M S, show that stocks of 100 octane fuel were increasing throughout 1940, in spite of the use of the fuel by the RAF. Where was it coming from if the tanker losses were so bad?



> I think the deployment and constant changing of Stations by the Squadrons during the Battle has to be taken into account. It was Stations, and not squadrons, which were supplied with this fuel. As noted by Vincenzo in an earlier thread, there were about 50+ Stations used as a base during the BoB, and the analysis of fighter Squadron movement indicates that Squadron report show a pattern of reporting 100 octane fuel use in combat are clearly connected to being deployed at certain stations, 10 to 15 out of the fifty or so.



First of all what does this mean?


> the analysis of fighter Squadron movement indicates that Squadron report show a pattern of reporting 100 octane fuel use in combat are clearly connected to being deployed at certain stations, 10 to 15 out of the fifty or so.



What pattern? Can Kurfürst present some evidence that there is such a detectable " pattern" ? If by this he means that combat reports show the airfield at which the pilot was based then he is mistaken. Take a look at the combat reports presented by Mike Williams - none of them show where the pilot or unit was based.

There were not 50+ Fighter _stations _during the Battle of Britain! This is something which needs to be cleared up: the vital airfields were the 19 *Sector Stations*. In addition there were 26 _ Satellite airfields_, many of which only had basic facilities. A list of the Stations and airfields: 
Seven in 11 Group:
Tangmere  : Satellite airfields :Westhampnett, Ford
Kenley :Croydon 
Biggin Hill  :West Malling
Hornchurch  : Hawkinge , Gravesend, Manston. Rochford
North Weald  :Martlesham Heath , Stapleford Tawney
Debden  :Martlesham Heath 
Northolt  : Hendon

Two in 10 Group:
Filton  embry, Exeter, St Eval, Bibury, RNAS Roborough
Middle Wallop :Warmwell, Boscombe Down

Five in 12 Group:
Duxford  :Fowlmere
Wittering  : Coltishall
Digby  :Ternhill
Kirton-in-Lindsey : no satellite
Church Fenton  : Leconfield 

Five in 13 Group:
Usworth :Catterick 
Acklington  : no satellite
Turnhouse  : Grangemouth, Drem 
Dyce :Grangemouth
Wick :Kirkwell, Sumburgh

The Sector stations and airfields with with a  were definitely supplied with 100 octane fuel, according to Glider's list: NOTE: Elsewhere there is a photo of 610 Sqn Spitfires being refueled at Hawkinge - the fuel tanker is marked with a 100 octane label. 


> We do have a list of the first 21 stations that were to be issued with the fuel. These were
> 
> ACKLINGTON 13 Group
> BIGGIN HILL 11 Group
> ...



Eleven out of 14 Sector Stations in 11, 10 and 12 Groups had been supplied with 100 octane fuel (Kenley's satellite Croydon was also supplied with the fuel). These are the most important Groups and the most important Sector Stations NOTE:Sector stations were the focal points for supplying fuel to their satellites.

In total thirteen out of 19 Sector Stations plus several airfields were supplied with 100 octane fuel. This is going by Glider's list. Considering each Sector Station was responsible for operating two or more fighter squadrons, and was responsible for supplying its satellite airfields, the situation is quite different from the bare statistics of 10-15 out of 50+.


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## Vincenzo (Sep 21, 2009)

my old topic on that
Tab for only spit and hurry squadrons (54):
Stations/Squadrons When used Days (max 114)
RAF Acklington. Ever 114
RAF Dyce. 31/8-11/10 42
RAF Turnhouse. Ever but 27/8 and 20/7 112
RAF Usworth. Ever but 1/9-7/9 107
RAF Wick. Until 1/9 53
RAF Catterick. Ever but 26 and 27/7 112
RAF Drem. Ever 114
RAF Grangemouth. Until 1/9 54
RAF Sumburgh. 17/7-17/9 63
RAF Church Fenton. Until 22/10 105
RAF Digby. Ever 114
RAF Duxford. Ever 114
RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey. Ever 114
RAF Wittering. Ever 114
RAF Coltishall. Ever 114
RAF Leconfield. Ever 114
RAF Filton. From 26/9 36
RAF Middle Wallop. Ever 114
RAF Boscombe Down. From 14/8 79
RAF Exeter. Ever 114
RAF Pembrey. Ever 114
RAF St Eval. Ever but 13/8 and 10/9 112
RAF Warmwell. From 12/7 112
RAF Biggin Hill. Ever 114
RAF Debden. Until 7/10 90
RAF Hornchurch. Ever 114
RAF Kenley. Ever 114
RAF Northolt. Ever 114
RAF North Weald. Ever 114
RAF Tangmere. Ever 114
RAF Croydon. Ever but 19/8-31/8 101
RAF Eastchurch Never but 12 and 13/8 2
RAF Gravesend. 25/7- 29/10 but 10/9 96
RAF Hawkinge Never but 10/7 1
RAF Hendon. 5/9-25/9 21
RAF Martlesham. From 5/9 57
RAF Rochford. Until 23/7 14
RAF Stapleford. From 29/8 64
RAF Westhampnett. From 31/7 93
RAF West Malling. From 30/10 2
Castletown Ever but 1/9 and 14-17/9 109
Fowlmere 24/7-29/10 98
Matlask From 30/10 2
Castle Camps From 3/9 59
Sealand Never but 11 and 12/7 2
Prestwick From 23/8 but 10/10 68
Skitten 13/10-23/10 11
Chibolton From 30/9 32
Aldergrove From 20/7 104
Speke From 26/9 36

total 50 fields, 36 with almost a squadron for almost 57 days


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## Milosh (Sep 21, 2009)

One must take what comes out of Australia with a grain of salt. The Australians were always whining, and in some cases with good cause, but they were at the end of a *very* long supply line. In the case of 100 octane fuel for Australia, why was it needed at that time? The Japanese menace was well over a year away and the fuel was most certainly required _at home_ with the Germans on the British doorstep. The British most certainly would be making all kinds of excuses why they could not supply 100 octane fuel to Australia.

Also, why could not Australia produce it own 100 octane fuel? Were there no refineries in Australia?


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2009)

Hello pbfoot
I’m not BoB specialist but the few sqns I know took their plane south with them when they moved to 11 Group and the sqns they were relieving took their remaining planes with them up to north. And those could not have been the only cases because IIRC there was a standing order, given after an unfortunate incidence when one sqn was surprised with empty guns during a transfer flight (they had put their personal belongings into ammo trays) that during transfer flight at least half of the guns must be loaded (so half of the ammo trays could still be used as baggage storage).

Spitfire: The History by Eric B. Morgan and Edward Shacklady shows the movements of the a/c from one unit to another, so if one is very interested in this that might be a place from where to begin to study this.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2009)

Hello
I made a short check using Bowyer’s Aircraft for the Few, checking 2nd and 12th Hurricane and Spit sqns listed (3 Sqn, 87 Sqn, 41 and 234Sqn). None seemed to change their whole a/c establishment in one go but in 41 Sqn 4 planes were dropped out from their books on 20.9.40 and 7 on 24.10.40 without any explanation by Bowyer.But there were no corresponding influx for 24.10. but sqn got 4 planes on 19.9., on 28.9. sqn got 2 planes and 3 on 29.9. but it got planes on many other days also. In No. 3 Sqn 4 planes were dropped from their books without explanation by Bowyer on 21.7.40 and it got 8 planes on 23.7.40. In the other 2 sqns there were not any noticeable clusters of outgoing planes. I also noticed that Bowyer has noted on 56 Sqn that ”considerable interchange of aircraft with 249 Sqn in Sept 40” on the other hand he has noted on 249 Sqn “some jointly used with 56 Squadron in 9.40”

That’s all in this time

Juha


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## Hop (Sep 21, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> A list of the Stations and airfields:
> Seven in 11 Group:
> Tangmere  : Satellite airfields :Westhampnett, Ford
> Kenley :Croydon
> ...



Looking at the combat reports on Mike Williams site, as well as the stations you've identified, 609 squadron used 100 octane fuel when based at Middle Wallop on 30 September, 602 used it when based at Westhampnett, 610 at Gravesend and 74 at Rochford.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

via http://www.raf.mod.uk/Bob1940/stations.html

11 Group

Group Headquarters

11 Group Headquarters was based at RAF Uxbridge, the administratve centre. Also within the physical area of 11 Group and close to Uxbridge is RAF Bentley Priory, the Headquarters of Fighter Command during the Battle.

Sector Airfields

*RAF Biggin Hill.*

RAF Biggin Hill was home to the Biggin Hill Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 32 Squadron from 4 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 5 June 1940
No 610 Squadron from 2 July 1940
No 79 Squadron from 27 August 1940
No 72 Squadron from 31 August 1940
No 92 Squadron from 8 September 1940
No 141 Squadron from 13 September to 18 September 1940
No 72 Squadron from 14 September 1940
No 74 Squadron from 15 October 1940

*RAF Debden.*

RAF Debden was home to the Debden Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 85 Squadron from 22 May 1940
No 17 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 15 August 1940
No 601 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 111 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 17 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 25 Squadron from 8 October 1940

*RAF Hornchurch.*

RAF Hornchurch was home to the Hornchurch Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 65 Squadron from 5 June 1940
No 74 Squadron from 25 June 1940
No 54 Squadron from 24 July 1940
No 41 Squadron from 26 July 1940
No 54 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 266 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 600 Squadron from 22 August 1940
No 264 Squadron from 22 August 1940
No 603 Squadron from 27 August 1940
No 41 Squadron from 3 September 1940

*RAF Kenley.*

RAF Kenley was home to the Kenley Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 615 Squadron from 20 May 1940
No 616 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 253 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 66 Squadron from 3 September 1940
No 501 Squadron from 10 September 1940
No 253 Squadron from 16 September 1940

*RAF Northolt.*

RAF Northolt was home to the Northolt Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 609 Squadron from 19 May 1940
No 257 Squadron from 4 July 1940
No 303 Squadron from 22 July 1940
No 43 Squadron from 23 July 1940 to 1 August 1940
No 1 Squadron from 1 August 1940
No 401 Squadron RCAF from Mid-August 1940
No 615 Squadron from 10 October 1940
No 302 Squadron from 11 October 1940

*RAF North Weald.*

RAF North Weald was home to the North Weald Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 151 Squadron from 20 May 1940
No 56 Squadron from 4 June 1940
No 25 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 249 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 257 Squadron from 8 October 1940

*RAF Tangmere.*

RAF Tangmere was home to the Tangmere Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 145 Squadron from 10 May 1940
No 43 Squadron from 31 May 1940
No 601 Squadron from 17 June 1940
No 1 Squadron from 23 June 1940
No 266 Squadron from 9 August 1940
No 17 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 607 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 601 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 213 Squadron from 7 September 1940
No 145 Squadron from 9 October 1940


Fighter Airfields

*RAF Croydon.*

RAF Croydon was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 111 Squadron from 4 June 1940
No 501 Squadron from 21 June 1940
No 401 Squadron RCAF from July 1940
No 85 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 72 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 111 Squadron from 3 September 1940
No 605 Squadron from 7 September 1940

*RAF Detling.*

Detling was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening.

*RAF Eastchurch.*

RAF Eastchurch was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 266 Squadron from 12 August 1940

*RAF Ford.*

RAF Ford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 23 Squadron from 12 September 1940

*RAF Gosport*.

Gosport was, along with Lee-on-Solent, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

*RAF Gravesend.*

RAF Gravesend was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 610 Squadron from 26 May 1940
No 604 Squadron from 3 July 1940
No 501 Squadron from 25 July 1940
No 66 Squadron from 11 September 1940

*RAF Hawkinge.*

RAF Hawkinge was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 79 Squadron from 2 July 1940

*RAF Hendon.*

RAF Hendon was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 257 Squadron from 17 May 1940
No 504 Squadron from 5 September 1940

*RAF Lee on Solent.*

Lee on Solent was, along with Gosport, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

*RAF Lympne.
*
Lympne was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening. Due to the extreme forward position of this site it was under constant threat of attack and was not permanently manned during the Battle by any one Squadron.

*RAF Manston.*

RAF Manston was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 604 Squadron from 15 May 1940
No 600 Squadron from 20 June 1940

*RAF Martlesham.*

RAF Martlesham was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 25 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 5 September 1940
No 17 Squadron from 8 October 1940

*RAF Rochford.*

RAF Rochford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 54 Squadron from 25 June 1940
No 264 Squadron from 27 August 1940
No 264 Squadron from 29 October 1940

*RAF Stapleford.*

RAF Stapleford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 151 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 46 Squadron from 1 September 1940

*RAF Thorney Island.*

RAF Thorney Island was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 236 Squadron from 4 July 1940

*RAF Westhampnett.*

RAF Westhampnett was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 145 Squadron from 31 July 1940
No 602 Squadron from 13 August 1940

*RAF West Malling.*

RAF West Malling was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 141 Squadron from 12 July 1940
No 66 Squadron from 30 October 1940



10 Group

Group Headquarters

10 Group Headquarters was based at RAF Box, the administratve centre.

Sector Airfields

*RAF Filton.*

RAF Filton was home to the Filton Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 504 Squadron from 26 September 1940

*RAF Middle Wallop.*

RAF Middle Wallop was home to the Middle Wallop Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 236 Squadron from 14 June 1940
No 238 Squadron from 20 June 1940
No 401 Squadron RCAF from 21 June 1940
No 501 Squadron from 4 July 1940
No 609 Squadron from 5 July 1940
No 604 Squadron from 26 July 1940
No 222 Squadron from 13 August 1940
No 238 Squadron from 10 September 1940
No 23 Squadron from 12 September to 25 September 1940


Fighter Airfields

*RAF Boscombe Down*.

RAF Boscombe Down was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 249 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 56 Squadron from 1 September 1940

*RAF Colerne.*

RAF Colerne was used as a satellite and relief airfield for Middle Wallop during the Battle, units rotated in and out of the station on a daily basis.

*RAF Exeter.*

RAF Exeter was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 213 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 87 Squadron from 5 July 1940
No 601 Squadron from 7 September 1940

*RAF Pembrey.*

RAF Pembrey was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 92 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 8 September 1940

*RAF Roborough.*

RAF Roborough was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 247 Squadron from 1 August 1940

*RAF St Eval.*

RAF St Eval was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 222 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 236 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 238 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 222 Squadron from 11 September 1940

*RAF Warmwell.*

RAF Warmwell was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 152 Squadron from 12 July 1940


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

12 Group 

Group Headquarters

12 Group Headquarters was based at RAF Watnall, the administratve centre.

Sector Airfields

*RAF Church Fenton.*

RAF Church Fenton was home to the Church Fenton Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 87 Squadron from 26 May 1940
No 73 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 249 Squadron from 8 July 1940
No 85 Squadron from 5 September 1940

*RAF Digby.*

RAF Digby was home to the Digby Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 46 Squadron from 13 June 1940
No 29 Squadron from 27 June 1940
No 46 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 151 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 611 Squadron from 10 October 1939

*RAF Duxford.*

RAF Duxford was home to the Duxford Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 264 Squadron from 10 May 1940
No 19 Squadron from 3 July 1940
No 310 Squadron from 10 July 1940
No 46 Squadron from 18 August 1940
No 312 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 242 Squadron from 26 October 1940
No 19 Squadron from 30 October 1940

*RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey.*

RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey was home to the Kirton-in-Lindsey Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 222 Squadron from 4 June 1939
No 253 Squadron from 24 May 1940
No 264 Squadron from 23 July 1940
No 74 Squadron from 21 August 1940
No 264 Squadron from 28 August 1940
No 616 Squadron from 9 September 1940
No 85 Squadron from 23 October 1940

*RAF Wittering.*

RAF Wittering was home to the Wittering Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 266 Squadron from 14 May 1940
No 74 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 266 Squadron from 21 August 1940
No 1 Squadron from 9 September 1940


Fighter Airfields

*RAF Coltishall.*

RAF Coltishall was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 66 Squadron from 29 May 1940
No 242 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 616 Squadron from 3 September 1940
No 74 Squadron from 9 September 1940
No 72 Squadron from 13 October 1940

*RAF Leconfield.*

RAF Leconfield was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 249 Squadron from 18 May 1940
No 616 Squadron from 6 June 1940
No 302 Squadron from 13 July 1940
No 303 Squadron from 11 October 1940

*RAF Tern Hill.*

Tern Hill was one of the 12 Group airfields used for resting units, and as a training airfield and maintneance depot. It was used as a relief landing ground and as a temporary base for night fighters operating against raids on Liverpool and cities in the north midlands.

13 Group

Group Headquarters

13 Group Headquarters was based at RAF Newcastle, the administratve centre.

Sector Airfields

*RAF Acklington.*

RAF Acklington was home to the Acklington Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 72 Squadron from 6 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 13 July 1940
No 32 Squadron from 28 August 1940
No 610 Squadron from 31 August 1940

*RAF Dyce.*

RAF Dyce was home to the Dyce Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 248 Squadron from 22 May 1940
No 141 Squadron from 22 August 1940
No 145 Squadron from 31 August 1940
No 1 Squadron from 9 October 1940

*RAF Turnhouse.*

RAF Turnhouse was home to the Turnhouse Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 603 Squadron from 5 May 1940
No 141 Squadron from 28 June 1940
No 253 Squadron from 21 July 1940
No 65 Squadron from 28 August 1940
No 141 Squadron from 30 August 1940
No 1 Squadron from 14 September 1940
No 607 Squadron from 10 October 1940

*RAF Usworth.*

RAF Usworth was home to the Usworth Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 607 Squadron from 5 June 1940
No 43 Squadron from 8 September 1940

*RAF Wick.*

RAF Wick was home to the Wick Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 1 Squadron from 23 May 1940


Fighter Airfields

*RAF Catterick.*

RAF Catterick was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 219 Squadron from 4 October 1939
No 41 Squadron from 8 June 1940
No 54 Squadron from 28 July 1940
No 41 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 504 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 54 Squadron from 3 September 1940
No 600 Squadron from 12 October 1940

*RAF Drem.
*
RAF Drem was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 145 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 263 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 111 Squadron from 8 September 1940
No 141 Squadron from 15 October 1940

*RAF Grangemouth.*

RAF Grangemouth was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 263 Squadron from 28 June 1940

*RAF Kirkwall.*

RAF Kirkwall was used as a satellite and relief airfield for fighter and coastal operations over the Scottish Islands and naval bases there.

*RAF Sumburgh.*

RAF Sumburgh was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 248 Squadron from 20 July 1940
No 248 Squadron from 31 July 1940


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

Which of the above Stations and Fighter Airfields were supplied with 100 octane fuel?


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2009)

Hello Kurfürst 
a question
Quote:” By the automn, 1200 DB 601N engines were delivered”

Source, please? Because according to Mankau’s Petrick’s Bf 110/Me 210/Me 410 book at Generalluftzeugmeister’s meeting on 31.5.40 they anticipated 1000 DB 601N engines by 1.1.41, of which appr. 350 are to be put in reserve. And in the meeting on 22.1.41 they heard that 500 DB 601N engines, if I counted right, were in planes serving in frontline units.

On C-3. Yes, Germans have counted much on it but there seems to be problems in production, because in the meeting on 22.1.41 the senior engineer had sent a message on C 3 fuel situation in which he proposed to reinstall DB 601 A engines (which ran wit 87 oct B 4 fuel) in Bf 110 again. And on 6.2.41 meeting “Aircraft manufacturers have begun converting Bf 110s from N to A engines”

And Bf 109 production switched from 601 N engined planes, which needed C 3, to 601 E and then 605A engined versions which run with B 4 fuel.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2009)

Hello Kurfürst
A counter question: Which of the above Stations and Fighter Airfields were supplied only with 87 octane fuel? As I have wrote many times, BoB literature states that FC had converted to 100 octane fuel before the beginning of the BoB, so if you think that those writers had got it wrong, produce your evidence.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> There were not 50+ Fighter _stations _during the Battle of Britain! This is something which needs to be cleared up: the vital airfields were the 19 *Sector Stations*. In addition there were 26 _ Satellite airfields_, many of which only had basic facilities.



As others have demonstrated already, your list is incomplete. A complete list of RAF fighter stations and airfields has been added from the British Ministry of Defence website.




NZTyphoon said:


> A list of the Stations and airfields:
> Seven in 11 Group:
> Tangmere  : Satellite airfields :Westhampnett, Ford
> Kenley :Croydon
> ...



Unfortunately no. What Glider and you calls a list that was shown in the earlier thread(s) of what stations were 'definietely supplied with 100 octane fuel' was in fact a mere letter from FC Admin to HQ on 7th December 1939.

The documents posted by Glider on the first page of this thread show that _this was only a proposition_, not a decision - a simple RAF administrator hardly had the authority to decide such matter - and decision was not yet taken on the matter nor in February on the 5th meeting, nor even in April 1940, and there isn't the slightest clue how many, if any of the listed 21 stations would be choosen for 100 octane fuel shipments, and wheter they were supplied or not. 

See:


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## Mike Williams (Sep 21, 2009)

These documents from December 1939 list the stations requiring 100 octane fuel since they have or were expected to have in the near future Merlin engined aircraft. Non operational stations in Fighter command were also required to hold certain quantities of 100 octane.



















The Squadrons equipped with Hurricanes during December 1939 are as follows: 3, 17, 32, 43, 46, 56, 79, 111, 151, 213, 501, 504, 605.

During December 1939 these Hurricane Squadrons were stationed as follows.
3 – Croydon, 
17 – Debden
32 – Biggin Hill
43 – Acklington
46 – Digby
56 – Martlesham Heath
79 – Manston
111 – Drem
151 – North Weald
213 – Wittering
501 – Tangmere
504 – Debden
605 – Tangmere

All these Stations were listed as requiring 100 octane fuel.

The Squadrons equipped with Spitfires in December 1939 are as follows: 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 152, 602, 603, 609, 610, 611, 616.

During December 1939 these Spitfire Squadrons were stationed as follows:
19 - Duxford
41 - Catterick
54 - Hornchurch
65 - Northholt
66 - Duxford
72 - Drem
74 - Rochford
152 - Acklington
602 - Grangemouth
603 - Turnhouse
609 - Drem
610 - Wittering
611 - Digby
616 – Leconfield

Rochford is the only base not listed, however, 74 Operations Record Book indicates that they had 100 octane at while at Rochford in March 1940.

Units converting to Hurricane or Spitfire after December 1939 and the station where they converted are as follows:

64 – Church Fenton
92 – Croyden
145 – Croyden
222 – Duxford
229 – Digby
232 – Sumburgh
234 – Leconfield
242 – Church Fenton
245 – Leconfield
253 – Manston
257 – Hendon
263 – Drem
266 – Sutton Bridge
302 – Leconfield
310 – Duxford
312 – Duxford
601 – Tangmere

Sumburgh is the only base not listed to receive 100 octane fuel. 232 formed there in July 1940.

Those units base in France during December 1939 were 1, 73, 85, 87 605 in Hurricane and 615 in Gladiator. We know from pilot accounts that 1, 73, 85, and 87 were using 100 octane by May 1940.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 21, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> As others have demonstrated already, your list is incomplete. A complete list of RAF fighter stations and airfields has been added from the British Ministry of Defence website.
> 
> 
> The documents posted by Glider on the first page of this thread show that _this was only a proposition_, not a decision - a simple RAF administrator hardly had the authority to decide such matter - and decision was not yet taken on the matter nor in February on the 5th meeting, nor even in April 1940, and there isn't the slightest clue how many, if any of the listed 21 stations would be choosen for 100 octane fuel shipments, and wheter they were supplied or not.
> ...



Wow! I stand corrected on a few airfields.

I note that while Kurfürst is quite happy to use planning documents from 1938 and 1939 as evidence that he is right about the events of 1940, other people using similar documents are wrong. He wants to have things both ways while he provides no documentary evidence of his own. Glider did not state anywhere that his list of Sector Stations and airfields definitely supplied with 100 octane is based on that single document from 7 December 1939.

Meantime Kurfürst, where is the actual Beaverbrook memo you keep quoting, it is about time this was produced as a document.

Kurfürst 


> the analysis of fighter Squadron movement indicates that Squadron report show a pattern of reporting 100 octane fuel use in combat are clearly connected to being deployed at certain stations, 10 to 15 out of the fifty or so.



What evidence can you supply to support this statement?

Kurfürst, where are your documents from 1940 that show that fighter units were forced to use 87 octane fuel on operational sorties?

As it is Kurfürst has continually ignored requests to provide some evidence of his own that a mere 25% of RAF fighters used 100 octane fuel - instead he hides behind Bertrand Russells "Teapot Theory" while rejecting or criticising documentary evidence provided by others. This is the sort of no-win argument which will continue to go in silly little circles. I don't see that there is much point in trying to prove anything to Kurfürst because he has proved that he will not accept any evidence that his own pet theory is wrong. Why spend hours trying to convince someone who always thinks he is right?


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Kurfürst
> a question
> Quote:” By the automn, 1200 DB 601N engines were delivered”
> 
> Source, please? Because according to Mankau’s Petrick’s Bf 110/Me 210/Me 410 book at Generalluftzeugmeister’s meeting on 31.5.40 they anticipated 1000 DB 601N engines by 1.1.41, of which appr. 350 are to be put in reserve.



Juha, I wonder why are you quoted the projection on DB 601 N production by Mankau and Petrick from May 1940, when Mankau and Petrick make it clear how many were actually delivered (1100-1200 quoting the Generalluftzeugmeister’s meeting on 26.10.40:






You have the same book... you see, you are saying they anticipated 1000 engines by January 1941, but the book later says that they actually delivered 1100-1200 by the end of October 1940 - ie. some 200 more engines three months earlier than _anticipated_.

You see, I have the book too. I like books!



> And in the meeting on 22.1.41 they heard that 500 DB 601N engines, if I counted right, were in planes serving in frontline units.



Yes Juha, a couple of months earlier in the end of October they reported 4 Gruppen of 110s, 1 Gruppe of 109s with DB 601N. Even if I calculate with max establishment per Gruppe (about 35 aircraft), I get around 300-350 engines (not counting the other types like bombers of course.

So, in the end of October they had about 300 engines in use, by the end of December, about 500. Mankau and Petrick also makes it clear where to others went (reserved for circulation and 109F programmes).



> On C-3. Yes, Germans have counted much on it but there seems to be problems in production, because in the meeting on 22.1.41 the senior engineer had sent a message on C 3 fuel situation in which he proposed to reinstall DB 601 A engines (which ran wit 87 oct B 4 fuel) in Bf 110 again.



Now again it is a problem that Mankau and Petrick does not say that.

You say that there was problem production of C-3. Mankau and Petrick summary the said meeting on 22.1.41 that by 1 April 1941 the following units were to be equipped with DB 601N:

6 Gruppen of 110s = 480 DB 601N engines
5 Gruppen of 109E-7N = 200 601N engines
12 Gruppen of 109 F = 480 601 N engines
Rowehl (I am not sure what this expression means) = 70 DB 601N engines

In total 1230 engines in service by 1 April 1940. Mankau and Petrick also notes (direct quote):

_"This means that by 1 April 1941 apprx. 850 DB 601N engines shall be in active operation, for which the fuel will be available"_

I really, really have to have think hard how could you come to the conclusion, that if in mid-January 1941 they had about 500 engines in active operation, and they wanted to increase that to 850-1200 engines within three months, that there was a some kind of _shortage_ of C-3 fuel.

The decision to equip 110s with DB 601N was already made on *6 November 1940*, and cause was to free up two months of DB 601N production to be installed in Bf 109Es (up to that date, 110s had priority). It should be noted that the Bf 109F production was also gearing up at the time, and engines had to be secured for that several weeks before; the 110 was also planned to be soon phased out in favour of the Me 210 anyway.



> And on 6.2.41 meeting “Aircraft manufacturers have begun converting Bf 110s from N to A engines”



Yes, and perhaps this has to do with the fact that during a very short period of the first half of 194, Messerschmitt, Arado etc. factories produced some 1380 Bf 109F-2s, all with DB 601Ns;



> And Bf 109 production switched from 601 N engined planes, which needed C 3, to 601 E and then 605A engined versions which run with B 4 fuel.



Bearing no relevance to the subject, given that the DB 601E was a more reliable and more powerful engine than the DB 601 N, not the mention that in the meantime the BMW 801 powered FW 190A appeared, which used C-3 fuel (even the earliest ones with the BMW 801C, even though the 801C was supposed to operate on B-4).


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## Glider (Sep 21, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Unfortunately no. What Glider and you calls a list that was shown in the earlier thread(s) of what stations were 'definietely supplied with 100 octane fuel' was in fact a mere letter from FC Admin to HQ on 7th December 1939.



Be careful with your quotes Kurfurst. Nowhere will you find that I have said that these were definately supplied with 100 Octane. These were identified as the stations to be fuelled with 100 Octane in the first instance. It should be noted that for obvious reasons French stations were not on the list nor where supples that were sent to Norway which we know happened.



> The documents posted by Glider on the first page of this thread show that _this was only a proposition_, not a decision - a simple RAF administrator hardly had the authority to decide such matter - and decision was not yet taken on the matter nor in February on the 5th meeting, nor even in April 1940, and there isn't the slightest clue how many, if any of the listed 21 stations would be choosen for 100 octane fuel shipments, and wheter they were supplied or not.


You are correct when you say that a Group Captain Administrator does not decide such matters, but a Group Captaiin is an implementer who makes things happen.

However the paper you posted is a different matter and has nothing to do with the choice of the stations. The paper you posted was in my post 2 and is the instruction from the Chief of the Air Staff that fighters and Blenhiem Bombers should start to use 100 Octane fuel.
When the Chief of the Air Staff requests something he is not asking for something. ACAS stands for Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and we can be sure that he wouldn't do this without his.

Please take care with your quotes and postings, mistakes like this can cause confusion.

By the way did you get anywhere with the hunt for the Australian Paper it would solve a lot of questions.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2009)

Glider said:


> Be careful with your quotes Kurfurst. Nowhere will you find that I have said that these were definately supplied with 100 Octane.



Glad to hear that. I was going by NZTyphoon's description of your list - relying on one guy's conclusion of another guy's conclusions of a paper can lead to such mistakes. 



Glider said:


> These were identified as the stations to be fuelled with 100 Octane in the first instance.



To me the correspondance is less clear in its terms, it seems that Mr. Air Vice Marshall is writing a letter to Mr. 
Director of equipment saying we'd like to have 100 octane and this and that stations, and the other replies that he has no idea which station will receive it, when, but two thing is sure it will take some time, and that Bomber Command Station (all the four or so as seen from the later papers) are to have priority.



> It should be noted that for obvious reasons French stations were not on the list nor where supples that were sent to Norway which we know happened.



Yes, indeed, though I do not think it is very important either, given that it would only shed light on the much neglected story behind 'the longest naval hit on 100 octane avgas' and 'how things that were poured into a Hurricane yesterday are poured into a Heinkel today'.  



> You are correct when you say that a Group Captain Administrator does not decide such matters, but a Group Captaiin is an implementer who makes things happen.



Yes but do we know eventually what decision was made with regards the requirements of these stations?



> However the paper you posted is a different matter and has nothing to do with the choice of the stations. The paper you posted was in my post 2 and is the instruction from the Chief of the Air Staff that fighters and Blenhiem Bombers should start to use 100 Octane fuel.
> When the Chief of the Air Staff requests something he is not asking for something. ACAS stands for Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and we can be sure that he wouldn't do this without his.
> 
> Please take care with your quotes and postings, mistakes like this can cause confusion.



I see, thanks for the clarification. It seem to me though the Oil Committee (with which you paper deals with) was a political body of civillian experts and decision makers, and they were making the decision over a proposition ACAS was making. 

From your papers it seems to me there was considerable confusion in Fighter Command about possible difficulties that may erupt from converting aircraft to 100 octane fuel, possibly due to communication error (or the complete lack of it), even as late as spring 1940. 

Which is quite a bit shocking, considering the same concerns were raised in 1938, see the documents I have posted from the Australian archives.



> By the way did you get anywhere with the hunt for the Australian Paper it would solve a lot of questions.



I do not live in Australia to research personally (nor would I have the time around now with plenty of work to do after the summer lull), nor do I have any reason to doubt or to discredit the research done by Pips. Unfortunately the documentation you provided seem to have a gap from May 1940, a gap which Pips research fortunately covers.

Perhaps you should ask Pips. He is still active on some forums. It would also give him an opportunity to directly face and have to opportunity to certain... allegations regarding his research that were so far only spoken out behind his back.


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## Milosh (Sep 21, 2009)

Posted by Oliver Lefebvre on his board:

_Wastel are you sure about the E-7/N for 41 ? AFAIR my delivery data show a much lower amount of E-7 with the DB601N. While the E-7 was planned for use with the DB601N, *the installation of this engien was quite troublesome on the Emil and few were actually fitted with it*.
I'll try to come up with my numbers if the documents have not already been packed away..._ 

Board Message

There is also a reference to 30 E-4/Ns built. Considering the above saying there was problems operating the DB601N engine, one has to ask how many E-4/Ns actually had the engine installed.


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## Juha (Sep 22, 2009)

Hello Kurfürst
Thanks for the answer
I seem to have missed the info given at the GL meeting on 26.10.40.

Quote:” "This means that by 1 April 1941 apprx. 850 DB 601N engines shall be in active operation, for which the fuel will be available"”

I cannot sat which is the correct expression but in my book, the English edition, the sentence is translated as " Meaning that on 1 April 1941 there are apprx. 850 DB 601N engines in active operation that WILL NEED fuel allocated.” Emphasis mine.

Quote:” Bearing no relevance to the subject, given that the DB 601E was a more reliable and more powerful engine than the DB 601 N, not the mention that in the meantime the BMW 801 powered FW 190A appeared, which used C-3 fuel (even the earliest ones with the BMW 801C, even though the 801C was supposed to operate on B-4).”

Yes, I know but clearly Germans didn’t produce enough C 3 to allow the whole Jagdwaffe to convert to use it, so vast majority of 109 units returned for time being to B 4 users and C 3 was allocated to 190 units.

IMHO it is not so difficult to began suspect that there was some kind of production delays in C 3 production, as I wrote in my earlier message 
“because in the meeting on 22.1.41 *the senior engineer had sent a message on C 3 fuel situation in which he proposed to reinstall DB 601 A engines in Bf 110 again*"

Juha

PS Rowehl was the commander of the clandestine recon unit so the planes of his unit got those engines


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## Glider (Sep 22, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> To me the correspondance is less clear in its terms, it seems that Mr. Air Vice Marshall is writing a letter to Mr.
> Director of equipment saying we'd like to have 100 octane and this and that stations, and the other replies that he has no idea which station will receive it, when, but two thing is sure it will take some time, and that Bomber Command Station (all the four or so as seen from the later papers) are to have priority.


Your mixing the two papers up. The list of stations was prepared in 1939 and on the 7th December the Admin people were looking into the nuts and bolts of how this was to be done. Its preparitory work the sort of thing done every day at work in many different fields. Part of that plan is to draw up who gets the first deliveries of the fuel. Post 110 has the letter.
The reference to a 'request' from the Chief of the Air Staff was at a meeting of the 24th February 1940 and the timeline is in those first two posts


> I see, thanks for the clarification. It seem to me though the Oil Committee (with which you paper deals with) was a political body of civillian experts and decision makers, and they were making the decision over a proposition ACAS was making.


The attached shows the make up of the committee. Its a mixture of people.


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## Glider (Sep 22, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> From your papers it seems to me there was considerable confusion in Fighter Command about possible difficulties that may erupt from converting aircraft to 100 octane fuel, possibly due to communication error (or the complete lack of it), even as late as spring 1940.
> 
> Which is quite a bit shocking, considering the same concerns were raised in 1938, see the documents I have posted from the Australian archives.


As I said in my first postings it was the last thing I expected to find and the people on the Committee were also confused but it was sorted out.



> I do not live in Australia to research personally (nor would I have the time around now with plenty of work to do after the summer lull), nor do I have any reason to doubt or to discredit the research done by Pips. Unfortunately the documentation you provided seem to have a gap from May 1940, a gap which Pips research fortunately covers.
> 
> Perhaps you should ask Pips. He is still active on some forums. It would also give him an opportunity to directly face and have to opportunity to certain... allegations regarding his research that were so far only spoken out behind his back.



I think that I and others have done sufficient research and posted a significant amount of original documentation. Plus, as this the one thing that you are relying on its up to you to supply this. 
I should point out that I don't live in Australia and it didn't stop me trying to get a copy. Everyone I am sure would love this 'Pips' to explain how he put together his case so I suggest you ask him as you are live on forums where he is active. Clearly he isn't active on this one. 

Even if the paper does exist and thats a big 'if', I am not that concerned, interested yes but not concerned, as the basic belief on which its apparently based, ie that the RAF during the Battle Of Britain were limited in the use of 100 Octane by a shortage of the fuel is totally wrong, unless of course you believe that a three year stockpile, is a shortage.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 22, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> NZTyphoon,
> 
> As a new member, I kindly suggest you to read the post #82 by DerAdlerIstGelandet.



I am new to all this so if I have unintentionally caused offence my apologies. All I am asking is that you present some evidence for statements you have made - I do not believe that there is anything wrong with asking for evidence during what should be a civilised debate.

You have made this statement:


> Let it be a court, or a historical question, the burden of evidence is upoon the one making the claim



and this



> a very definietive claim like this should be backed up by very definietive sources speaking in no uncertain terms



Given that you want others to provide cast-iron definitive proof of their claims what is the harm in asking you to do likewise?


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## Mike Williams (Sep 22, 2009)

Mike Williams said:


> These documents from December 1939 list the stations requiring 100 octane fuel since they have or were expected to have in the near future Merlin engined aircraft. Non operational stations in Fighter command were also required to hold certain quantities of 100 octane.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



It should be noted that stocks of 100 octane stood at 202,000 tons as of December 1939.





I should also add that the documentation in hand of units converting to 100 octane shows the aircraft modified and 100 octane fuel being used by February 1940. 16 February 1940 is the earliest documented date so far known of use of 100 octane in operational fighter units after the December 1939 Fighter Command Instructions.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 22, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> Given that you want others to provide cast-iron definitive proof of their claims what is the harm in asking you to do likewise?



Sounds reasonable to me...


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 22, 2009)

While investigating this matter further I came across some interesting information which may help our understanding: I found this in "Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith (Peyton Smith page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"): 


Imperial gallons per ton (2,240 lbs)
Aviation Spirit - 100-octane: 315 (Comment: 2,240 divided by 315 = 7.1 lbs)
-other grades: 300


1 ton of 100 octane = 315 imp gallons: take 1 Spitfire I, fuel load = 85 imp gallons = 315 divided by 85 = 3.7 Spitfire fuel loads; for every ton of 100 octane a Spitfire could fly 3.7 sorties.

On Page 2 http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-during-bob-16305-2.html in the previous thread Mike Williams presented a paper entitled "Table II Consumption" detailing the monthly average consumption of 100 and 86 octane fuels

Jun-Aug = 10,000 tons = 37,000 Spitfire fuel loads 
Sept = 14,000 tons = 51,800 Sfl
Oct = 17,000 tons = 62,900 Sfl

Total = 41,000 tons = 151,700 divided by 22 weeks = 6895 Sfl per week = 985 Sfl per day

Just a rough guide - there is no indication as to how much 100 octane fuel was consumed over France or Norway in June: this is just the fuel load of a Spitfire; the Hurricane took 90 gall, and I forget how much fuel a Defiant used. My question is how many fighter sorties were flown on a daily average during the B of B? How does this compare with Kurfurst's theory that 25% of RAF fighters used 100 octane (going by his statement that only 10-15 bases were supplied)?

Using this method there is no longer a need to worry about how many Fighter Command airfields were being stocked with 100 octane fuel. All we need know is how many combat sorties were flown on average during the 22 weeks. 

Variables:
Not all aircraft landed with empty fuel tanks; a Spitfire landing with, say 30 gallons left need only be topped up with 55 gallons - standard Fighter Command policy was to fill all fuel tanks of all operational aircraft in readiness for the next day's operations; this prevented evaporation, condensation and potential vapour locks.

All aircraft shot down and destroyed = full fuel load.

Of course there were quiet periods when far fewer combat sorties were flown by Fighter Command; August 16 17 between two days of intensive combat August 15 18. 

87 Octane: Mike William's table also shows that consumption of 87 octane was far higher than 100. This is easily accounted for because there were aircraft and second-line operations still using 87 octane fuel: heavy bombers, Coastal Command aircraft, Army Co-operation Command, aircraft deliveries, training etc.

There is still some refinement required...


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 23, 2009)

More information: The Battle of Britain by T.C.G. James shows 51,364 sorties, day night from July 10 through Sept 30; some of the most intensive combat took place between these dates.

51,364 divided by 13 weeks = 4,280 sorties = 611 sorties daily average: well within my rough calculations. How good does 25% of Fighter Command aircraft using 100 octane fuel look now?


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## Juha (Sep 23, 2009)

In principle the answer should be in already published books. I’d not be surprised if there are some official or semi-official histories on RAF supply and maintenance organizations and on British fuel policies during WWII. One possible source for the answer is that mentioned in Gavin Bailey’s already mentioned article in note 13, namely D.J. Payton-Smith,_ Oil. Study of War-Time Policy and Administration _(London 1971).

But as NZTyphoon’s rough calculations shows all FC combat sorties flown during the BoB could have easily covered with 100oct used during that time and still a great deal left for training at fighter sqns, transfer flights, test flights and engine testing.

After 30. Sept things seems to have cool down a bit, From Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29 4,825 defensive sorties, it had flew more per week only twice after 1st July, but Sep 30 – Oct 6 it made only 1,782 defensive sorties.

Juha


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 23, 2009)

Continuing; because the fuel capacities of the three main Fighter Command fighters varied it would be worth revising the mathmatics:
B P Defiant =: 97 gallons
Hurricane = : 90
Spitfire = : 85
Total = 272 divide by 3 = 90.7 gallons 

315 gallons per ton of 100 octane divided by 90.7 = 3.47 
10,000 tons = 34,700 Combined Fighter fuel loads
14,000 tons = 48,450 CFl
17,000 tons = 58,990 CFl

41,000 tons =142,140 sorties divide by 22 weeks = 6,461 divide by 7 days = 923 CFl per day

Other variables: Some Blenheim Bomber units also used 100 octane.
Presuming Spitfire PR unit also used 100 octane.



> One possible source for the answer is that mentioned in Gavin Bailey’s already mentioned article in note 13, namely D.J. Payton-Smith, Oil. Study of War-Time Policy and Administration (London 1971).



Yep, this is my source for the fuel weight; the book is full of excellent details on 100 octane aviation fuel.



> After 30. Sept things seems to have cool down a bit, From Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29 4,825 defensive sorties, it had flew more per week only twice after 1st July, but Sep 30 – Oct 6 it made only 1,782 defensive sorties.



So, 4,825 divide by 7 = 689 sorties per day
1,782 divide by 7 = 255 (rounded up)


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## Mike Williams (Sep 23, 2009)

Hi Juha:

The Royal Air Force – History Section on-line is rather straightforward about the whole business.


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## Juha (Sep 23, 2009)

Hello Mike
Yes, You, I and others have already given many books and authorative net sources which mentioned as a fact that FC had converted to 100 oct before the BoB began, but that have not satisfied all participants of these discussions, so I only gave some hits from where the doubters may look more detailed info.

And thanks a lot for those numerous documents you have published here and on your own sites.

Very much appreciated!

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Sep 23, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> Continuing; because the fuel capacities of the three main Fighter Command fighters varied it would be worth revising the mathmatics:
> B P Defiant =: 97 gallons
> Hurricane = : 90
> Spitfire = : 85
> ...



Interesting calculation, but it does not address non-operational flights (training, excercises, transfers etc.) by combat units.

To give some idea of the extent of non-operational flying, the German Luftwaffe in the four months of the Daylight phase of BoB (July-October) wrote off 404 aircraft on operations, but without enemy interference, and further 280 aircraft outside operations (training, familiarisation, transfer etc.); 349 aircraft were damaged on operations, but not due to Enemy Action, while 301 aircraft were damaged during non-operational sorties.


In other words, some 40% of the write offs and some 46% of the varying degree of damage occured during flights which were not directly related to the battle. 

Assuming aircraft were wrecked by pilots in a similiar rate during operations and outside the scope of operations during training and practice, it would also point to that operational flying time, ie. combat sorties accounted for only about 50-60% of the total flying time. 

The calculations by NZTyphoon only take account the actual combat sorties, but ignore the training flights during which the more seasoned pilots initiated fresh replacements into combat flying, and integrated them into the unit. Given that according to the documentation presented so far, stations either had 87 octane fuel or 100 octane fuel, but not both, this kind of non-operational flying has to be factored into consumption. 

Bombers, like the Blenheim would of course consume far greater amount of fuel than single engined fighters. The tankage for the Bristol Blenheim, one type we know to have been marked for 100 octane fuel use, had an internal tankage of 278 gallons, a bit more than 3 1/4 times that of a single engined fighter.

Further of interest is the Spitfire I pilot notes - it seems to specify to seperate boost limits, one when the aircraft is using 87 octane fuel, and a seperate one when the aircraft is fueled with 100 octane fuel.


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## Glider (Sep 23, 2009)

If you are going down this route Kurfurst the first thing we need to know is how many is 25%. How many aircraft do you think managed to burn through 10,000 tons of fuel a month. 

Before I address the question of the Pilots Notes can you tell me when they were prepared?

But before then, can we ask when you are going to reply to some of the questions being asked of yourself.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 23, 2009)

Glider said:


> If you are going down this route Kurfurst the first thing we need to know is how many is 25%.



One in four, twenty five in hundred, about 125 in 500.



> How many aircraft do you think managed to burn through 10,000 tons of fuel a month.



Well, that is a more practical question. In late 1944, the Allied High Command noted that the monthly requirement of 150 grade fuel for 25 Sqnds of Sptifire IX, 5 Sqns of Spitfire XVI and 5 Sqns of Spitfire XIVs was 15,000 tons - presumably this included the requirements for non-operational flying.

The rest is a simple. If 35 Spitfire Squadrons are said to require 15 000 tons, then 2/3s of this, 10 000 tons, should be sufficient for 24 Squadrons. 

But to show what interesting results can be arrived at with a bit of calculation, lets examine the same calculation method for the Luftwaffe.

In August, 1940, the Luftwaffe aviation gasoline consumption, was appx. 100 000 (one hundred thousend) tons.

Each Bf 109E took on 400 liters of fuel, or 296 kg (make it 300 kg, or 0.3 tons). 

Thus, in August 1940, the Luftwaffe had sufficient fuel for _over 330 000_ Bf 109E sorties. Very impressive, but of course this ignores the requirements of bomber units, training flights, transfer flights, requirements of the engine industry for testing engines, test flights, non-operational flights, fuel lost in accidents and fuel lost due to enemy bombing (Manston anyone..?) et cetera. 



> Before I address the question of the Pilots Notes can you tell me when they were prepared?



Please see the Spitfire II pilots notes from July 1940, showing similiar limitations when 87 octane fuel is used (a PDF version can be found at Zeno's Warbirds website).



> But before then, can we ask when you are going to reply to some of the questions being asked of yourself.



I can only answer specific questions.Unfortunately, I will be absent for the rest of week due to a trip to Steyrmark.

I believe you are already aware what the Australian papers say.


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## Hop (Sep 23, 2009)

> In late 1944, the Allied High Command noted that the monthly requirement of 150 grade fuel for 25 Sqnds of Sptifire IX, 5 Sqns of Spitfire XVI and 5 Sqns of Spitfire XIVs was 15,000 tons - presumably this included the requirements for non-operational flying.



No, they didn't. The requirements for 2nd TAF AF were 15,000 tons. That included not just the Spitfire squadrons you mention, but also 20+ (iirc) Typhoon squadrons, along with Mosquito and Tempest squadrons.



> The rest is a simple. If 35 Spitfire Squadrons are said to require 15 000 tons, then 2/3s of this, 10 000 tons, should be sufficient for 24 Squadrons.



Apart from the fact 15,000 tons was also for the Typhoon, Tempest, Mosquito etc squadrons, your figures are flawed in that drop tanks were commonly used in 1944, and not available in 1940. Maximum fuel for a 1940 Spitfire was 85 gallons, in 1944 it was 175 (or more) gallons for the Spitfire IX and over200 for the Spitfire XIV.


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## Juha (Sep 23, 2009)

And on Kurfürst August 40 calculations
and RAF also burned much 87 oct, BC, CC and TC were still using 87 oct, and how big were fuel loads of Sunderland, Hudson and Whitley for ex? So Kurfürst is simply comparing apples and oranges.
BTW, have you info on how much Bf 109 units used fuel in August 40? that would be more relevant on FC comsumption.
Juha


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## Juha (Sep 23, 2009)

Just to show how futile it is to compare consumption of a whole airforce to consumption of a fighter component of an air force. Normal fuel load of FW 200C-3 Condor, it is the earliest subtype on which I have info, was 8060litre, that is more than 20 times of the normal fuel load of Bf 109E. Also how the sorties divide between fighters and other types are usually different in attacking force than in defending force, for ex LW flew many night bombing missions during the BoB, and they were purely bomber missions.

Juha


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## Glider (Sep 23, 2009)

Sticking to the 1940 BOB the sums seem to be 

10,000 tons equals 34,700 flights assuming that all the flights use up all the fuel.

Kurfurst believes that the RAF only had 150 fighters using the fuel.

So each fighter flew of average 231 flights a month, around 8 flights a day. So each fighter flew for 16 hours a day, simple really. All you have to do is ignore any maintanence, night time, combat repairs, bad weather. Don't know why I didn't think of it mysef.

*Now for some specific questions*
1) Have you any book that supports your version
2) Have you any official reports that support your version
3) Have you the Australian Paper that neither you or I have ever seen (selected quotes are not close)
4) Have you any action reports that support your story

Re the Pilots Notes we have an interesting situation. I also have a copy of the Spit II Pilots notes dated July 1940 and they only mention 100 Octane. Its odd as I would expect the Pilots notes for around May 1941 to mention both fuels as by that time they were being passed to training units that didn't have 100 Octane.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 23, 2009)

Kurfurst says


> The calculations by NZTyphoon only take account the actual combat sorties, but ignore the training flights during which the more seasoned pilots initiated fresh replacements into combat flying, and integrated them into the unit. Given that according to the documentation presented so far, stations either had 87 octane fuel or 100 octane fuel, but not both, this kind of non-operational flying has to be factored into consumption.



Kurfurst knows full well I said:


> 87 Octane: Mike William's table also shows that consumption of 87 octane was far higher than 100. This is easily accounted for because there were aircraft and second-line operations still using 87 octane fuel: heavy bombers, Coastal Command aircraft, Army Co-operation Command, aircraft deliveries, training etc.



If Kurfurst is right and only 25% of stations were supplied with 100 octane then the consumption rate would read more like:

June-Aug = 2,500 tons
Sept = 3,500 tons
Oct = 4,250

So where was the rest of the fuel consumed? Carrier pigeons, perhaps? 



> Further of interest is the Spitfire I pilot notes - it seems to specify to seperate boost limits, one when the aircraft is using 87 octane fuel, and a seperate one when the aircraft is fueled with 100 octane fuel.



A clear indication that aircraft engaged in secondary duties (including training) were still able to use 87 octane fuel, which is yet another reason for 87 octane consumption being greater. This would include factory test flights etc.

So far Kurfurst has not explained why 75% of Fighter Command aircraft were still using 87 octane fuel when the consumption rate of 100 octane still more than covers the average sortie rate, ie:



> 41,000 tons =142,140 sorties divide by 22 weeks = 6,461 divide by 7 days = 923 CFl per day



when we know that James shows 51, 364 defensive sorties day and night between 10 July and 30 September;



> 51,364 divided by 13 weeks = 4,280 sorties = 611 sorties daily average: well within my rough calculations.



Hooton:


> Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29 4,825 defensive sorties, it had flew more per week only twice after 1st July, but Sep 30 – Oct 6 it made only 1,782 defensive sorties.
> So, 4,825 divide by 7 = 689 sorties per day
> 1,782 divide by 7 = 255 (rounded up)



More than enough to allow for training flights with squadrons.




> Bombers, like the Blenheim would of course consume far greater amount of fuel than single engined fighters. The tankage for the Bristol Blenheim, one type we know to have been marked for 100 octane fuel use, had an internal tankage of 278 gallons, a bit more than 3 1/4 times that of a single engined fighter.


According to Warner The Bristol Blenheim: A Complete History: Amazon.co.uk: Graham Warner: Books
Blenheim units were using 87 octane fuel in their inner fuel tanks and 100 octane in their outer fuel tanks during this time, leading to some potentially nasty complications for the pilot. Pages 98 to 101



> Well, that is a more practical question. In late 1944, the Allied High Command noted that the monthly requirement of 150 grade fuel for 25 Sqnds of Sptifire IX, 5 Sqns of Spitfire XVI and 5 Sqns of Spitfire XIVs was 15,000 tons - presumably this included the requirements for non-operational flying.



More powerful engines? Larger fuel capacity? Use of Drop tanks? Perhaps these have something to do with a need for more fuel than in 1940...


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## Glider (Sep 23, 2009)

Can I suggest that people come up with specific questions for Kurfurst as he has said that he will awnser them? Keep them as short as possible to give him a chance.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 23, 2009)

It is quite possiable that training flights, if conducted from airfields out of the general combat zone, could have been done with 87 octane fuel. After all each use of the extra boost (higher than 6lb) that the 100 octane fuel allowed was supposed to be noted in the aircraft log book and maintence schedules modified accordingly. 

I would also note that the fule consumption of the BoB Spitfire might be just a bit less than the fuel consumption of a late war Spitfire. After all, just how much fuel is needed for about 1000hp if the pilot doesn't use the extra boost vrs the fuel consumption of the later 2 stage engines? According to the Manuals for the MK II and the MK ( t the Zeno's sight the later model Spit might use anywhere from just a few gallons an hour more to over 30 gallons and hour mor depending on throttle setting. 
This is for missions of the same duration, as has been notted in other posts the fact that many late war missions used drop ranks seriously alters the comparison.


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## Glider (Sep 23, 2009)

Glider said:


> Re the Pilots Notes we have an interesting situation. I also have a copy of the Spit II Pilots notes dated July 1940 and they only mention 100 Octane. Its odd as I would expect the Pilots notes for around May 1941 to mention both fuels as by that time they were being passed to training units that didn't have 100 Octane.



I have been looking at the two different copies of the Pilots Notes and the one on Zenos warbirds site as quoted by Kurfurst cannot be for June 1940. I say this as in section 35 page 9 on the firing controls it gives a description of the controls for the IIA which had 8 x LMG and the IIB with 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG. In June 1940 the IIB wasn't even a glimmer on the horizon.
The original one only mentions the LMG and doesn't refer to it as a IIA only a II which again is correct.

Its only fair to add that Zeno's is dated June 1940 so no blame can be given to Kurfurst for his confusion.


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## Milosh (Sep 23, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> In August, 1940, the Luftwaffe aviation gasoline consumption, was appx. 100 000 (one hundred thousend) tons.



Where is the primary source proof for this 100,000 tons of consumption?


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## Glider (Sep 24, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> One in four, twenty five in hundred, about 125 in 500.



*Specific Question*
Are you saying that the RAF had 18 squadrons of fighters on 100 Octane or about 125 fighters which equates to about 6 squadrons.
Or of course the 34 squadrons for which we have combat reports for could have shared them out, four each!!!


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 24, 2009)

Glider said:


> I have been looking at the two different copies of the Pilots Notes and the one on Zenos warbirds site as quoted by Kurfurst cannot be for June 1940. I say this as in section 35 page 9 on the firing controls it gives a description of the controls for the IIA which had 8 x LMG and the IIB with 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG. In June 1940 the IIB wasn't even a glimmer on the horizon.
> The original one only mentions the LMG and doesn't refer to it as a IIA only a II which again is correct.
> 
> Its only fair to add that Zeno's is dated June 1940 so no blame can be given to Kurfurst for his confusion.



Some pilot's notes I have were updated using Amendment Lists which were "...issued as necessary and will be gummed for affixing to the inside back cover of these notes." These were like postit notes and covered amendments which were to be made to the pilot's notes - the pilot pasted them into the book where needed. For example I have a copy of the PN for the Corsair I - IV: on one page (17 PART II HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS)
which has A.L.4 Part II pasted just below the main heading. A.L.4 reads "Note. - On aircraft KD868 and subsequent, oxygen should be used at all times during flight."

I don't know whether these were in use in 1941 but it is possible that the notes used by Zenos had not had any amendment lists added. It is also possible that earlier issues of the Spitfire II notes were not amended or updated until the notes were reprinted.


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## Glider (Sep 24, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> Some pilot's notes I have were updated using Amendment Lists which were "...issued as necessary and will be gummed for affixing to the inside back cover of these notes." These were like postit notes and covered amendments which were to be made to the pilot's notes - the pilot pasted them into the book where needed. For example I have a copy of the PN for the Corsair I - IV: on one page (17 PART II HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS)
> which has A.L.4 Part II pasted just below the main heading. A.L.4 reads "Note. - On aircraft KD868 and subsequent, oxygen should be used at all times during flight."
> 
> I don't know whether these were in use in 1941 but it is possible that the notes used by Zenos had not had any amendment lists added. It is also possible that earlier issues of the Spitfire II notes were not amended or updated until the notes were reprinted.



That is also the case for my Hunters notes which have gummed in updates with the changes logged at the start but that isn't the case for these examples. The layout and in some cases level of detail are totally different.


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## NeilStirling (Sep 24, 2009)

I think its worth posting this, it may have been posted before

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/100oct-consumption-bob.jpg


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## Juha (Sep 24, 2009)

OK Kurfürst
A simple question, let’s assume that you are right and only ¼ of FC fighters used 100oct, and to make the case a little bit less obvious lets assume, that they were more active than those sqns using 87 oct fuel and used 1/3 of the fuel consumption of FC, so June –Aug FC would have used 10.000tons 100oct and 20.000tons 87 oct, in Sept 14.000 tons 100oct and 28.000 tons 87 oct. and so on. Ups, the real other than 100 oct fuel consumption was clearly less than that presumed FC’s 87 oct consumption. So, what you think all those trainers, bombers, Hudsons and 4-engined Sunderlands used? Plus of course those fighters to which there was not enough 87oct?

Juha


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 24, 2009)

> The calculations by NZTyphoon only take account the actual combat sorties, but ignore the training flights during which the more seasoned pilots initiated fresh replacements into combat flying, and integrated them into the unit.



This was one of Fighter Command's biggest weaknesses through into 1941; there was little "on the job training" utilised by squadrons, particularly during times of intensive operations. As a consequence many pilots arriving fresh from training were flung straight into combat with little initiation. In brief - there was little Squadron level training and OTUs were not properly organised until 1941. Johhnie Johnson, for example, described how he arrived on an operational squadron in late September 1940 only to find that as a tyro he was ignored by the experienced pilots. He did not receive additional training until he was transferred to 616 Sqn in October.


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## Mike Williams (Sep 24, 2009)

Hi Merlin:



merlin said:


> And another (though it may have already have been quote) - from Tim Vigors autobiography - 'Life's too short to cry': - p.137
> 
> Driving through London we saw little traffic. Petrol rationing had, by this time, really started to bite. It had not affected us pilots too badly as, quite illegally, we used to top up the tanks of our cars from the petrol bowsers used for refuelling aircraft. As long as this was done reasonably discreetly the authorities kindly turned a blind eye. What effect 100 octane fuel was having on the pistons and cylinders of my Ford 8 remained to be seen. so far EGO (part of the car's no plate) was still going like a bomb. in fact the diet seemed to suit her.



I’ve read similar stories along those lines. Here’s one from Tony Bartley of 92 Squadron followed by a scan of the Vigors reference you mentioned:

Tony Bartley DFC, _Smoke Trails in the Sky_, (Crecy Publishing Limited, Wilmslow, Cheshire, 1997), p. 35.





Tim Vigors DFC, _Life’s Too Short to Cry_, (Grub Street, London, 2006), p. 137. 





I’m fairly certain I’ve a few more around like these; I just have to dig them out.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 25, 2009)

Strolling through the Flight Global archives I came across this article from June 1945; the last paragraph of page 612 and the first sentence of 613 are interesting:



> The Air Ministry had the foresight to realise the critical importance of high-duty fuels, and this led to the issue of a specification for 100 octane in March, 1937—sufficiently before the war to enable our fighters to use it from the very start, although it did not come into general use throughout the whole of the R.A.F. until August, 1940.



This accords with the August 7 paper presented elsewhere http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100oct-7aug40-allcommands.jpg; now, assuming that this took some time to come into full force it is noticable that consumption of "Other Grades", (87 octane) of fuel drops off cf 100 octane starting in September:
Sep - 100 octane = 14,000 tons; 87 = 23,000 tons
Oct - 100 octane = 17,000 tons; 87 = 18,000 tons
Nov - 100 octane = 15,000 tons;87 = 13,000 tons
Dec - 100 octane = 16,000 tons;87 = 11,000 tons

By the winter of 1940 the amount of air activity declined - the changes in fuel consumption fits the pattern that more RAF aircraft were starting to use 100 octane while use of 87 declined. By April 41 both 100 octane 87 show 22,000 tons each, coinciding with the time that fighters such as the Beaufighter and Whirlwind and heavy bombers such as the Stirling, Halifax and Manchester were coming into service - training was also being reorganised (I'm not sure when OTUs came into being) . Just another peice in the jigsaw of proper historical research.


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## parsifal (Sep 25, 2009)

One way to control a debate that a person does not agree with is to act so obnoxiously as to get that thread closed. At least then the conclusions being drawn in that thread wont continue to be analysed and the things upsetting to a member are no longer in his face so to speak.

This is really sad, because for most of us the debate is engaging, the information being brought forward detailed and interesting. I would suggest that when someone is deliberately acting to get a thread closed, the best thing that the rest of us can do is simply to pay no attention to the trouble maker. This is not a luxury open to the mods, my comments are for the members, including those causing the trouble and those reacting to it


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 25, 2009)

There are some points worth raising about how the availability of 100 octane fuel affected the performance of RAF fighters: According to Alfred Price:


> The higher octane fuel allowed an increase in supercharger boost from +6 lbs to +12 lbs, without risk of detonation that would damage the engine. A pilot could select the additional boost for five minutes by advancing the throttle 'through the gate' to the fully forward position. The emergency power setting increased the maximum speed by 25 mph at sea level and 34 mph at 10,000 feet. It also improved the fighter's climbing performance between sea level and full-throttle altitude. (Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939-41 page 19)



According to Alex Harvey-Bailey _The Merlin in Perspective - the combat years_ the Merlin III generated 1,310 hp at 9,000 feet using +12 lbs compared with its normal rating of 1,030 hp using +6 lbs at 16,250 feet. There do not seem to be any + 12 lb figures for the Merlin XII of the Spitfire II or the Merlin XX of the Hurricane II.

Points worth noting:
1: So far I have not seen an analysis of how often +12 lbs boost was used during the battle - ie: how often did pilots resort to going through the gate and in what circumstances? 

2: Con: The critical altitudes at which the +12 lbs boost had the most effect were well below the Merlin III's usual full-throttle height of about 16,000 feet - much of the combat during the battle took place at higher altitudes. 

Pro: Even so the provision of 100 octane gave pilots an option during attack or evasion - the combat reports show that Luftwaffe aircraft were caught and shot down at lower altitudes after RAF pilots went through the gate; of course it would be impossible to know how many Luftwaffe aircraft were shot down or damaged because RAF fighters were able to use the extra boost, without going through every single combat report from both sides. Similarly it would be interesting to know how many RAF pilots lived to fight another day because they were able to use the extra boost.

3: Con: Pilots were limited to +12 lbs for a maximum of five minutes: if the extra boost was used pilots had to note this in the engine log book because it was considered to be an extra load on the engine. The engine mechanics had to check the engine and replace the wire to the throttle gate.


> Below please find documentation related to 100 octane use by the RAF leading up to and during the Battle of Britain:
> Emergency +12 lbs./sq. in. Boost Operation: Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.


 Mike Williams # 48. Apparently Morgan and Shacklady say that the life of a Merlin engine dropped from c. 100 hours to 10-20 hours - no documentary evidence provided, however.

Pro: Five minutes may not seem a long time, but in air to air combat where encounters usually lasted less than 1 minute it was more than enough.

Overall I would suggest that at times the effect of 100 octane fuel on the Battle of Britain in particular has been overstated. In some publications it has been cited as being _ critical_ to the outcome. However, because the performance increases conferred on RAF fighters was below the heights at which most combat took place it would have only been effective in a limited number of situations. Because it provided RAF pilots with options they would have otherwise lacked, the provision of 100 octane fuel was a valuable added tool, but not absolutely critical.


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## Glider (Sep 25, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> There are some points worth raising about how the availability of 100 octane fuel affected the performance of RAF fighters: According to Alfred Price:
> 
> 
> According to Alex Harvey-Bailey _The Merlin in Perspective - the combat years_ the Merlin III generated 1,310 hp at 9,000 feet using +12 lbs compared with its normal rating of 1,030 hp using +6 lbs at 16,250 feet. There do not seem to be any + 12 lb figures for the Merlin XII of the Spitfire II or the Merlin XX of the Hurricane II.
> ...


All we do know is that Downing sent a note to all units reminding them that they should not overuse the extra boost.
As for the circumstances the following link gies some examples. Spitfire Mk I versus Me 109 E



> 3: Con: Pilots were limited to +12 lbs for a maximum of five minutes: if the extra boost was used pilots had to note this in the engine log book because it was considered to be an extra load on the engine. The engine mechanics had to check the engine and replace the wire to the throttle gate. Mike Williams # 48. Apparently Morgan and Shacklady say that the life of a Merlin engine dropped from c. 100 hours to 10-20 hours - no documentary evidence provided, however.


They were limited to five minutes but this was often exceeded. Also it didn't have to be one five minute burst per flight. If they allowed a cooling off period this could be repeated. I will need to find the quote but I am sure that to pass the RAF tests this flight cycle was repeated by Rolls Royce and the engine lasted about 1.5 hours at 12 lb boost before failing. I should emphasise that this is from memory only and it was over a considerable number of flights.



> Overall I would suggest that at times the effect of 100 octane fuel on the Battle of Britain in particular has been overstated. In some publications it has been cited as being _ critical_ to the outcome. However, because the performance increases conferred on RAF fighters was below the heights at which most combat took place it would have only been effective in a limited number of situations. Because it provided RAF pilots with options they would have otherwise lacked, the provision of 100 octane fuel was a valuable added tool, but not absolutely critical.



I don't know about Crtical but I would cetainly say very important not just for the reasons you stated but simply because of the better climb performance. Intercepting is about speed but as important is climb, if you cannot get up to the attacking bombers you don't intercept them and you are a sitting duck for the escort.
A thirty percent increase in power plus the extra efficiency of the Constant Speed Prop is something any fighter pilot would give their right arm for. Imagine the impact on the car you drive let alone a fighter plane.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 25, 2009)

> I don't know about Crtical but I would cetainly say very important not just for the reasons you stated but simply because of the better climb performance. Intercepting is about speed but as important is climb, if you cannot get up to the attacking bombers you don't intercept them and you are a sitting duck for the escort.
> A thirty percent increase in power plus the extra efficiency of the Constant Speed Prop is something any fighter pilot would give their right arm for. Imagine the impact on the car you drive let alone a fighter plane.



Yup, improved climb and improved take-off performance were both important.



> They were limited to five minutes but this was often exceeded. Also it didn't have to be one five minute burst per flight. If they allowed a cooling off period this could be repeated.



Good point; also note that the pilot didn't have to use up the five minutes in one go; he could (for example) use 5 'squirts' of 1 minute each.



> I will need to find the quote but I am sure that to pass the RAF tests this flight cycle was repeated by Rolls Royce and the engine lasted about 1.5 hours at 12 lb boost before failing. I should emphasise that this is from memory only and it was over a considerable number of flights.



I have seen this information as well - couldn't say where. 

Please note I am not trying to understate the importance of 100 octane and +12 lbs boost - one intangible worth thinking about is the effect on the morale of RAF pilots knowing (for example) that they could call on the extra power when being chased at low level by angry 109s. However, there were limitations to its use that are worth considering, as well as the benefits.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 25, 2009)

Combat may have started well above the altitude at which 100 octane provide an advantage but the combats often decended to altitudes were it did, indeed some combats id wind up down at sea level.

The 100 octane advantage could be simply that a British pilot and plane escaped to fight another day or that a German pilot and plane didn't get back across the Channel. Enough of these little differences added up over time could mean quite a difference in the odds after a month and half.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 26, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> Combat may have started well above the altitude at which 100 octane provide an advantage but the combats often decended to altitudes were it did, indeed some combats id wind up down at sea level.
> 
> The 100 octane advantage could be simply that a British pilot and plane escaped to fight another day or that a German pilot and plane didn't get back across the Channel. Enough of these little differences added up over time could mean quite a difference in the odds after a month and half.



One pilot who benefitted was Al Deere: On 12 August he shot down a 110 over the channel only to be attacked by a 109; Deere escaped using +12 boost. Three days later Deere unwittingly chased a 109 across the English Channel only to find himself near Calais/Marck airfield and in the sights of two 109s who decided to chase him. Deere escaped across the channel only to be forced to bale out. Although he doesn't mention using +12 in his book, I presume he did? I will endevour to find out...


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## Mike Williams (Sep 26, 2009)

Hi bigZ:



bigZ said:


> In "I kept no diary" by Air Commodore F.R Banks. He mentions that he gave a paper in Jan of 37 in which he pleaded for the development of British military engines to take 100 octane fuel. Which despite critical opinion from oil company representatives the Director of Technical Development of the British Air Ministry agreed with his paper.
> 
> "So by 1940 the Merlin's power was increased by this fuel from a combat rating of 1,000(plus) bhp to over 1,300 bhp, and 100 octane became available to Fighter Command ready for the BOB..."
> 
> ...



Thanks for sharing that information. Here are the scans confirming your post. Other members might find the information of interest. 
















Air Commodore F. R. Banks, _I Kept No Diary _, Airlife Publications, Shrewsburg, 1978, Appendix II Fuel pp 234-236

Here also is the relevant portion from the Dukek paper that Banks referred to:


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## 109ROAMING (Sep 26, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> Although he doesn't mention using +12 in his book, I presume he did? I will endevour to find out...



Let me know how you go with that , I assume your referring to his autobiography?

I have his biography so let me know if your unsuccessful there and Il take a look and see what I can dig up

If you've got both books then sweet!


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## mhuxt (Sep 26, 2009)

Thanks for posting that Mike. Is the blend for Mosquito Merlins referred to above distinct from 150-octane?


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## Njaco (Sep 26, 2009)

Can I ask a rather stupid, dumb question? What exactly is the importance of 100 octane fuel as compared to others? It seems to me at least, that an increase in power, however small or large, doesn't really warrant this much controversy. Can someone explain this to me?


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## Mike Williams (Sep 26, 2009)

Hi NZTyphoon Glider:



NZTyphoon said:


> Overall I would suggest that at times the effect of 100 octane fuel on the Battle of Britain in particular has been overstated. In some publications it has been cited as being _ critical_ to the outcome. However, because the performance increases conferred on RAF fighters was below the heights at which most combat took place it would have only been effective in a limited number of situations. Because it provided RAF pilots with options they would have otherwise lacked, the provision of 100 octane fuel was a valuable added tool, but not absolutely critical.





Glider said:


> I don't know about Critical but I would certainly say very important not just for the reasons you stated but simply because of the better climb performance. Intercepting is about speed but as important is climb, if you cannot get up to the attacking bombers you don't intercept them and you are a sitting duck for the escort.



I would characterize the use of 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain as conferring a significant performance increase relative to performance while using 87 octane. I think one could argue that, when taken together, 100 octane fuel, constant speed props and pilot armour incorporated just before the Battle of Britain were indeed critical to the success of the RAF. Take- off, climb, level speed, acceleration and turn would all have improved with the increased boost made possible by 100 octane fuel. Let’s just look at level speeds for the moment. 

Comparing A.&A.E.E. data of a Spitfire I operating at 6.25 lbs/sq.in.  against R.A.E. data of a Spitfire I operating at 12 lbs./sq.in.  shows an increase of speed of 31 mph at sea level and 18 mph at 15,000 feet obtained through the use of 100 octane fuel and 12 lbs. boost.






Comparing A. A.E.E. / R.A.E. data of a Hurricane I operating at 6.25 lbs.sq.in. against Hawker data of a Hurricane I operating at 12 lbs./sq.in. shows an increase of speed of 22 mph at 5,000 feet and 26 mph at 10,000 feet which extrapolates to an increase of approx. 20 mph at sea level and 9-10 mph at 15,000 feet obtained through the use of 100 octane fuel and 12 lbs. boost. RAE tests showed a gain of 31 mph at 5,000 feet 29 mph at 10,000 feet with 12 lbs boost. 
.


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## Mike Williams (Sep 26, 2009)

mhuxt said:


> Thanks for posting that Mike. Is the blend for Mosquito Merlins referred to above distinct from 150-octane?



Hi Mark:

That piqued my curiosity as well. I don’t know the answer to your question but it certainly deserves looking into. The Ministry of Aircraft Production Grade 100/150 specification states that 100/150 grade fuel contained mono-methyl-aniline not exceeding 2½ per cent by volume. Banks notes the Mosquitoes used fuel containing 8 percent mono-methyl-aniline. Gracious…


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2009)

Njaco said:


> Can I ask a rather stupid, dumb question? What exactly is the importance of 100 octane fuel as compared to others? It seems to me at least, that an increase in power, however small or large, doesn't really warrant this much controversy. Can someone explain this to me?



Hi NJ

It has a lot to do with revisionist history. The "pro-allied" camp in this debate are saying that 100 Octane was in widespread use in the RAF from an early stage, and that this made a huge difference to the performance arcs of the spits and hurricanes that used it. It is pretty well known that the Luftwaffe only used higher rated fuels on a very limited scale, and that this only chnged relatively slowly as the wasr progressed. The allies on the other hand embraced the widespread use of high octane fuel from an early stage. Whilst german fuels were comparable in their octane ratings, they were never fully adopted on a widespread scale, or at least on not a wide a scale as the allies did.

By arguing that 100 octane rated fuel was not widespread, the pro-german revisionists can argue with even greater conviction the superiority of german technology over the allied tech development, and that the allies only won because of brute strength. A variation to the "we were stabbed in the back" argument that gained so much favour in weimar germany after wwi, and assisted the Nazis in their rise to power.

At least thats how i sees it.....


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## claidemore (Sep 26, 2009)

well said parsifal.


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## Njaco (Sep 26, 2009)

Thanks Parsifal. I was just curious why such a small thing as fuel type would create such a furor.


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## Glider (Sep 26, 2009)

The one question that often knocks them off balance is, if C3 was so popular, effective and plentiful why was the DB605 designed for lower octane fuel.


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## mhuxt (Sep 26, 2009)

Mike Williams said:


> Gracious…



Heheheheh, yes, I have this image of Jeremy Clarkson saying "Powahhhhhhhhh!"


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 26, 2009)

> Overall I would suggest that at times the effect of 100 octane fuel on the Battle of Britain in particular has been overstated. In some publications it has been cited as being critical to the outcome.





> I think one could argue that, when taken together, 100 octane fuel, constant speed props and pilot armour incorporated just before the Battle of Britain were indeed critical to the success of the RAF.



I should have emphasised that some publications have cited 100 octane as being critical _without mentioning the use of constant speed props_. 

The story of the props is interesting because, as most of us know, the original de Haviiland unit fitted to Hurricanes, Spitfires and Defiants was a two speed unit. In June 1940 de Havilland manufactured conversion kits which turned the two speed propeller into a constant speed unit; these kits were fitted to all frontline de H props by de H specialists in a "crash" conversion programme which lasted about a month (McKinstry Spitfire: Portrait of a Legend 2007 page 172.) Some Hurricanes were already fitted with Rotol CS propellers and there were two squadrons (19 and 54 Sqns) of Spitfires using these units in May. The Rotol units were also fitted to Spitfire IIs and the small number of Hurricane II's which started operations in September.


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## merlin (Sep 27, 2009)

Mike Williams said:


> Hi Merlin:
> 
> I’ve read similar stories along those lines. Here’s one from Tony Bartley of 92 Squadron followed by a scan of the Vigors reference you mentioned:
> 
> ...



Thanks for sharing the full scans (mine was from a library book), yes no doubt there're similar tales out there - I remember my Father telling me he had 100 octane in his cigarette lighter - and he was based in Gosport.
Going back to Tim Vigors - I loved the piece about sanity towels and the Brewster Buffalo - did I laugh at that!!


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## merlin (Sep 27, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> I should have emphasised that some publications have cited 100 octane as being critical _without mentioning the use of constant speed props_.
> 
> The story of the props is interesting because, as most of us know, the original de Haviiland unit fitted to Hurricanes, Spitfires and Defiants was a two speed unit. In June 1940 de Havilland manufactured conversion kits which turned the two speed propeller into a constant speed unit; these kits were fitted to all frontline de H props by de H specialists in a "crash" conversion programme which lasted about a month (McKinstry Spitfire: Portrait of a Legend 2007 page 172.) Some Hurricanes were already fitted with Rotol CS propellers and there were two squadrons (19 and 54 Sqns) of Spitfires using these units in May. The Rotol units were also fitted to Spitfire IIs and the small number of Hurricane II's which started operations in September.



The addition of these technical factors to the aircraft can make a nonsense of informaiton from any reference book regarding max speed of the Spitfire Hurricane - becasuse it depends, when and with what added! So you need:
A, 1939 Spitfire Hurricane - max speed?
B, 1940 ........ ditto ....... ... ditto ... - with CS prop,
C, 1940 ......... ditto ..... ..... ditto ... .... ditto .. 100 Oct ?


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 27, 2009)

merlin said:


> The addition of these technical factors to the aircraft can make a nonsense of informaiton from any reference book regarding max speed of the Spitfire Hurricane - becasuse it depends, when and with what added! So you need:
> A, 1939 Spitfire Hurricane - max speed?
> B, 1940 ........ ditto ....... ... ditto ... - with CS prop,
> C, 1940 ......... ditto ..... ..... ditto ... .... ditto .. 100 Oct ?



Mike Williams has provided two graphs comparing the performances of Spitfires and Hurricanes using +6.25 lbs and +12 lbs boost #171.

Alfred Price The Spitfire Story shows the following:

Spitfire I K9793 (de H two speed propeller, no armour, no IFF)

Service ceiling: 34,400 feet
Take-off run (0 wind): 320 yards: clear 50 feet: 490 yards

Height/Max Speed/Climb

18,600: 367 mph: 1,700 ft/min
20,000: 366 mph: 1,305 ft/min

Spitfire I N3171 (Rotol C/S propeller, no armour, no IFF)

Service ceiling: 34,700 ft
Take-off run: 225 yards: clear 50 feet: 370 yards

Height/Max Speed/Climb

10,000 feet: 320 mph: 2,895 ft/min
15,000 feet: 339 mph: 2,430 ft/min
20,000 feet: 353 mph: 1,840 ft/min

The major improvements in T/O distance and climb rates can be seen; the de H C/S speed conversion kit would likely have given similar figures: It would be interesting to know how much heavier the C/S de H prop unit was after conversion. More details Spitfire Mk I N.3171 Trials Report


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## Juha (Sep 27, 2009)

On Spitfire props
The original fixed pitch 2-bladed wooden, installed at factory to first 77 production Spits. 83lb/38kg.
de Havilland two speed propeller 350lb/159kg
Rotol C/S propeller 500lb/227kg.

Source:Alfred Price Spitfire MarkI/II Aces

One main impact of CSU was that it made fighting clearly easier, Pilot didn’t need to worry on pitch when moved from horizontal flight to climb/dive and back to horizontal etc. And especially CSU didn’t have time or height limits as the higher boost allowed by 100oct fuel. 

And German fighters also had CSU, IIRC from 39 onwards at latest. British fighters got them by crash operation during Summer 1940. Before that Blenheims had had priority for CSUs

Juha


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## Shortround6 (Sep 27, 2009)

merlin said:


> The addition of these technical factors to the aircraft can make a nonsense of informaiton from any reference book regarding max speed of the Spitfire Hurricane - becasuse it depends, when and with what added! So you need:
> A, 1939 Spitfire Hurricane - max speed?
> B, 1940 ........ ditto ....... ... ditto ... - with CS prop,
> C, 1940 ......... ditto ..... ..... ditto ... .... ditto .. 100 Oct ?



Actually the max speeds at rated altitude were very similar. 

See the tests refered to in the above posts.

It was the take of and climb that showed tremendous advantages. 

Think of the propellor as the gearing in a car. The fixed pitch prop would be locked in high gear. A two position prop would be a 2 speed car and the VP or constant speed propeller would be a car with many speeds in it's transmission but with the same top gear ratio. 

Fighters had a good enough power to weight ratio to get by starting in "top" gear which is why the available V-P propellors went into bombers in 1939. Try starting a loaded truck in high gear


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## Mike Williams (Sep 27, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> I should have emphasised that some publications have cited 100 octane as being critical _without mentioning the use of constant speed props_.



Hi NZTyphoon

I take your point that 100 octane fuel by itself may not have made the critical difference, however, in as much as my interest in this instance is in the performance of the aircraft that fought in the Battle of Britain, its doesn’t make much sense to me to separate out the various modifications/improvements such as fuel and propellers since the performance obtained was a function of both in this case.

As the following 1944 excerpt from Flight demonstrates, folks have been arguing this point before the war was even over.


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## Mike Williams (Sep 27, 2009)

Hi Juha:



Juha said:


> One main impact of CSU was that it made fighting clearly easier, Pilot didn’t need to worry on pitch when moved from horizontal flight to climb/dive and back to horizontal etc. And especially CSU didn’t have time or height limits as the higher boost allowed by 100oct fuel.
> 
> British fighters got them by crash operation during Summer 1940.
> Juha



I concur with your assessment as to the merits of the CSU. Regarding the crash program, you may find the following of interest:

F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 15 May 1940, France:
Paul Richey DFC, _Fighter Pilot _(Redwood Press, Wiltshire 1990) p 93.





F/Lt I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940, France:
W/C Ian Gleed D.F.C., _Arise to Conquer_, (Random House, New York 1942) pp. 62-63.

























242 Squadron, June 1940
Hugh Halliday, _No. 242 Squadron, The Canadian Years_, (Canada's Wings, Ontario, 1981). p.78.





242 Squadron Hurricane in France with Rotol constant speed propeller.





32 Squadron Hurricane with Rotol constant speed propeller at Hawkinge, 29 July 1940. 





501 Squadron Hurricane with Rotol constant speed propeller at Anglure, France during May 1940.





Conversion of Hurricane Two Pitch Airscrews to Constant Speed


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## Juha (Sep 27, 2009)

Hello Mike
and thanks again for those ORB pages!
Very much appreciated.

Yes, it would have been more accurate to write that also the older fighters in front-line units also got their CS props during the Summer 40, installed by teams sent by manufactures.

Juha


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## Glider (Sep 27, 2009)

IIRC the teams went to each airfield and there was a four stage process. 
1) The team would show the ground staff how to convert the first aircraft
2) Get the ground crew to help with the second aircraft
3) Watch the ground crew do the third aircraft.
4) Then comment on the ground crews performance and leave them to do the rest while they moved on to the next airfield.

In this manner all the aircraft were quickly converted as each team only spent one day at each airfield.


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## Juha (Sep 27, 2009)

Hello Glider
Yes, when I checked the system from Morgan's and Shacklady's Spitfire bible, according to them it went like that, and all teams were from de Havilland.

Juha


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 27, 2009)

Interesting information Mike: the letter alone confirms that the British knew that 100 octane fuel was in general use in RAF fighters in 1940. I'll see if I can find that "Pitch Panic" article.
Here 'tis: 
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1943/1943 - 2888.html

I note the variety of MUs mentioned as holding the Rotol Spitfires for 54 Sqn; 6 MU, 9 MU and 24 MU with the majority coming from 6 MU. 611 Sqn experimented with a Spitfire fitted with a "Cottonised" PR canopy with perspex blisters and mirrors. All sorts of interesting details.


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## pbfoot (Sep 27, 2009)

I don't think the name 100 octane was in very common use amongst the troops initially
I believe it was just refered to by colour which was green


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## Glider (Sep 28, 2009)

Very good piece NZ, it shows what can be dne when people knuckle down and get on with things.


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## Juha (Sep 28, 2009)

Hello NZTyphoon
very interesting article, and that clearly have been the source of Morgan and Shacklady, wording is so similar. But in the article there are mistakes, for ex Mike’s photos on ORBs clearly show that already on 1st Nov 39 19 Sqn got a Spit with CS propeller for testing and some sqns got Hurricanes with CS propellers while in France.

Juha


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 28, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello NZTyphoon
> very interesting article, and that clearly have been the source of Morgan and Shacklady, wording is so similar. But in the article there are mistakes, for ex Mike’s photos on ORBs clearly show that already on 1st Nov 39 19 Sqn got a Spit with CS propeller for testing and some sqns got Hurricanes with CS propellers while in France.
> 
> Juha



Hi Juha,
Yes, the article doesn't mention the Rotol props for some reason, yet Flight was describing Rotol C/S units in 1937:
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1937/1937 - 1732.html
and 1939
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1939/1939 - 0834.html

Mind you, we are getting off topic. In this article there is mention of Merlin engines using 100 octane fuel and de H _constant speed_ propellers in December 1938.

walter sagitta | de havilland | 1938 | 3453 | Flight Archive


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 28, 2009)

Glider said:


> Very good piece NZ, it shows what can be dne when people knuckle down and get on with things.


Hi Glider,
I started exploring the Flight archives a few months ago; there is some really good information available that, in some cases, I have not seen in print elsewhere.


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## Mike Williams (Sep 28, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello NZTyphoon
> very interesting article, and that clearly have been the source of Morgan and Shacklady, wording is so similar. But in the article there are mistakes, for ex Mike’s photos on ORBs clearly show that already on 1st Nov 39 19 Sqn got a Spit with CS propeller for testing and some sqns got Hurricanes with CS propellers while in France.
> 
> Juha



*Exactly!* Thanks Juha! Thanks for posting that article NZTyphoon. Just as Juha noted, that seems to be the source for other recounting of that story, including Morgan Shacklady. Clearly the article was written from the De Haviland point of view. A huge omission in the article is the contributions of Rotol. 65 Squadron, which S/L Cooke led, was based at Hornchurch along with 54 and 74 Squadrons (quite a few other squadrons having rotated through during the Dunkirk evacuation). All 54 Squadron Spitfires had been equipped with the Rotol constant speed propeller since December 1939 so Cooke must have known all about its advantages. Documentation in post 186 clearly shows new Hurricanes were equipped with Rotol constant speed units and delivered to Squadrons by at least by April 1940. This is not meant to diminish de Haviland's retrofit program but there is another side of the story not often told.


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## Mike Williams (Sep 28, 2009)

NZTyphoon said:


> Hi Juha,
> Yes, the article doesn't mention the Rotol props for some reason, yet Flight was describing Rotol C/S units in 1937:
> http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1937/1937 - 1732.html
> and 1939
> ...



Nice!


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 29, 2009)

Another facet of the 100 octane story which has not been touched on is the matter of transporting the fuel across the Atlantic to Britain. Essentially convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Arnold Hague Convoy Database

The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships and tankers, many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. As we have seen elsewhere these supplied 100 octane fuel. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that


> _...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines_...(#90)


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## Milosh (Sep 30, 2009)

I would say that without a shadow of doubt that 100 octane fuel was in wide spread use during the Battle of Britain from all the proof that this thread, and the other thread, contains. These two threads will be an excellent reference source if the subject ever brought up again.

I would like to thank all who did the research and contributed to the threads.


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## Nikademus (Oct 1, 2009)

interesting uh...."discussion" 

Is late 1941 part of the debate for 100 octane and the RAF?


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## Glider (Oct 1, 2009)

The original idea was to look into the 'new theories' about the use of 100 0ctane during the BOB but if you have a question or observation about 1941 feel free to throw it in.


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## Nikademus (Oct 1, 2009)

ok, just wanted to be sure before dipping a toe in.... 

The thread made me recall a paragraph i read out of Black Cross/Red Star. It concerned lend lease Hurricanes sent to Russia. An comment made was that the planes engines were quickly worn out over time due to the fact that their engines were designed for 100 octane fuel while the Russians could only pump in 87 octane. This resulted in degraded preformance.


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## Glider (Oct 2, 2009)

I don't know about the life of the engine but using 87 octane would definately hinder performance. I remember reading that the RAF pilots who flew Hurricane when they were forst sent over being very impressed with the Pe 2 as they had a lot of trouble keeping up with them.


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## pbfoot (Oct 3, 2009)

parsifal said:


> And who cares whether it was true or not they were using it, in 41 and 42 the Spitfires were slaughtered by the Luftwaffe, this Mister here, Williams, should include as part of his webpages the incidents where RAF fighters were shot down like flies during 41, 42 and early 43, 100 octane fuel or not[/I]
> 
> Would that be similar to the German aircraft, including 109s that were shot down in their untold numbers in that very same period????



The RAF/RCAF fighters were not shot down in droves however they lost more then the Germans by a reasonable margin however this being said the Germans had the advantage because they could opt wh.en and where to fight .


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## Micdrow (Oct 4, 2009)

First off, I cleaned up this thread and all the crap in this thread. Mod threats and such are removed as well including my own except this one. This is the last time this thread get's side tracked. It ends. Udet is gone, Kurfurst your next if you step out of line. Ive had it, there is plenty of good info in here and the reason why Ive let this thread live. 

Continue on with the discussion please as there is nothing else to see


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## NZTyphoon (Oct 5, 2009)

Nikademus said:


> ok, just wanted to be sure before dipping a toe in....
> 
> The thread made me recall a paragraph i read out of Black Cross/Red Star. It concerned lend lease Hurricanes sent to Russia. An comment made was that the planes engines were quickly worn out over time due to the fact that their engines were designed for 100 octane fuel while the Russians could only pump in 87 octane. This resulted in degraded preformance.



I doubt whether the Merlins would have worn more quickly on 87 octane; I would suggest that there might have been other factors involved; possibly the fuel wasn't being filtered properly, and the fuel that was used was often contaminated Soviet Lend-Lease Fighter Aces of ... - Google Books Russian pilots were known for their propensity for running engines to the red line well before they were properly warmed.


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## Nikademus (Oct 5, 2009)

I did some review, and it appears I recalled in error. Apologies. Another fine example of the quirks of human memory. 

Here's the actual quotation of the memory this Thread triggered:

"Soviet fighter pilots found the British Hurricane to be outdated and cumbersome. Furthermore, the standard Soviet aviation fuel in 1941-42 was the B-70 formulation, with an octane rating between only 70 and 75. Since the Hurricane's Rolls-Royce Merlin engine was designed for a considerably higher octane rating the Soviet fuel wore them down rapidly, decreasing preformance and frequently causing flight accidents."

Source: Black Cross/Red Star Vol II. (p.32)


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## Milosh (Oct 6, 2009)

Yes Nikademus if the Soviets tried to operate the Merlins at their rated boost pressure using Soviet fuel, then they were abusing the engine, especial with what NZTyphoon posted. It would not take long to destroy an engine using 70-75 octane fuel at 12lb boost.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 6, 2009)

It wouldn't take long to to destroy a Merlin on 75 octane fuel at 6lbs of boost. 

Something about this story doesn't ring true.

While "B-70" may have been "a" standard Soviet fuel I doubt very highly that it was the fuel that the Soviets used in 1941-42 in their own fighters. 

Anymore than the US used standard "80" octane fuel in their fighters even though it was a standard fuel for primary training planes. 

To try to get some handle on the differences between fuels a "performance Number" scale was developed rather than octane because there is actually no such thing as a fuel with an octane rating higher than 100. Also the difference in actual performance is not linear. for instance the difference between 70 octane and 72 octane is actually 1 3/4 performance numbers while the 2 octane difference between 98 and 100 is almost 6 3/4 performance numbers. Adding more and more lead had diminishing returns also. 100 octane + 1ml of lead adds 26 performance numbers while the difference between 100 octane and 5ml of lead and 100 ocatne plus 6ml of lead is 4 performance numbers. 

To get back to the Merlins and the Soviet fuel. on the performance scale 100 octane is 100PN. 87 octane fuel is 68.29 PN. 75 octane fuel has a PN of 52.83. This means that the Merlin could operate at about 2lbs of boost at best with such a fuel if I have done the math right. This is assuming that everthing else stays the same which it probably didn't.

Performance numbers are from a chart from a soft cover book called "Aviation Fuels and their effects on Performance" prepared by the Ethyl corperation for the U.S. air forces on a purchase order from the Dept. of the Navy, Bureau of Aeronautics. copyright 1951.


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## Glider (Oct 7, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Some more evidence:
> 
> 
> By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.
> ...



Re the second part of the above I can confirm :-
a) - 87 Octane was *not *deemed to be the primary fuel source by the War Cabinet until further supplies could be delivered
b) - that the conversion of further aircraft to use 100 Octane was *not *halted by the War Cabinet and that the rest would have to continue with 87 octane.

Indeed the entire topic of 100 octane fuel and the use of it by the RAF was *not *discussed by the War Cabinet in May 1940. I have spent the day in the National Archives reviewing the War Cabinet minutes and summaries for May 1940 and 100 octane was never mentioned.
Please don't ask me for any copies of the minutes as the Cabinet were meeting almost daily and that is a heck of a lot of paper.

Their were some interesting nuggets such as the Cabinet being advised of the performance of the Defiant on the 18th May, the comment wasn't good. Aparently the French almost purchased 12 ex US destroyers but the deal fell through and the RN were asked to consider the taking over of the Swedish Navy, but the First Sea Lord turned this down.
As I said some interesting bits, some unexpected, but nothing on 100 Octane.


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## Milosh (Oct 7, 2009)

On pg 1 Glider you posted:

*Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)*

Kurfurst: _"The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel."_

How can he say what he said when the stockpile of 100 octane fuel actually increased? In fact, the consumption from June thro Aug (10,000t) was only a fraction of the actually stockpile (1/30th of May 31 and 1/40th of Aug 31).


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## Glider (Nov 4, 2009)

I am afraid that I don't know, only Kurfurst can awnser that question.


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## Altea (Nov 5, 2009)

Nikademus said:


> "Soviet fighter pilots found the British Hurricane to be outdated and cumbersome. Furthermore, the standard Soviet aviation fuel in 1941-42 was the B-70 formulation, with an octane rating between only 70 and 75. Since the Hurricane's Rolls-Royce Merlin engine was designed for a considerably higher octane rating the Soviet fuel wore them down rapidly, decreasing preformance and frequently causing flight accidents."
> 
> Source: Black Cross/Red Star Vol II. (p.32)



Frankly, if being rigorous as an historian i won't prise Christer Bergstorm for his technical level, rather low...
Soviet used natural refined fuels with B-59 to B-78 octanes marks, with some 1 to 4 cm cub TEL additives, that makes octane numbers quoted here:


TEL 1 2 3 4
Б-59 73 78 81 82
Б-70 80 85 87 88
Б-74 85 88 90 92 
Б-78 87 92 93 95


So 3B-70 makes 87 octane numbers, so for 1.5B-74 or 1B-78.

Your Pe-2's Klimovs 105 worked on 91-95 octanes fuel that ranges (the highest being the best for safe margin) from 3.5 - 4 B-74 to 1.5 - 3.5 B-78.

The mark 75 never existed in soviet standards. (X) B-59 was mainly used in cars or old planes as R-5, Po-2, R-Zet...

Of course, LL deliveries were also massively* used, and some local made B-95 that could gave 96-115 octane numbers at the war's end, using Houdry's cracking methods (Shell patent).

* some sources quote 2 620 thousand tons, aviation fuel and flavours!


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## Juha (Nov 5, 2009)

Hello Altea
Geust is a Diplomingenieur, I don't remember the English term, so he has technical background. But what has Geust to do with a quote from Christer Bergström's book? Christer doesn't have technical background.

Juha


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## Altea (Nov 5, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Altea
> Geust is a Diplomingenieur, I don't remember the English term, so he has technical background. But what has Geust to do with a quote from Christer Bergström's book? Christer doesn't have technical background.
> 
> Juha



 Sorry! I'm mistaken. I will correct my post.


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## Juha (Nov 5, 2009)

Hello Altea
BTW, thanks a lot for the info on Soviet fuels and engines.
Very much apreciated!
Juha


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## Milosh (Jun 30, 2011)

The following was posted on another board in a thread on the use of 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain.

_The following Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons are known to have used 100 octane fuel before or during the BoB:
1, 17, 19, 41, 43, 54, 56, 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 74, 79, 85, 87, 92, 141, 145, 151, 152, 222, 229, 234, 245, 249, 264, 303, 602, 603, 605, 609, 610, 611, 616

These squadrons were stationed at the following airfields (bold text) at sometime during the BoB.

*11 Group*

RAF *Biggin Hill*

- RAF *West Malling*

RAF *Debden*

- RAF *Martlesham Heath*

RAF *Hornchurch*

- RAF *Hawkinge*
- RAF *Gravesend*
- RAF *Manston*, night fighter base
- RAF *Rochford*

RAF *Kenley*

- RAF *Croydon*

RAF *Northolt*

RAF *North Weald*

- RAF *Martlesham*
- RAF *Stapleford*

RAF *Tangmere*

- RAF *West Malling*
- RAF Ford
- RAF Lee on Solent, RN airfield
- RAF Gosport, RN airfield
- RAF Thorney Island
- RAF *Westhampnett*

Not sure which Sector airfield these were assigned to but as all the sector airfields had 100 octane fuel, these to would need a stock of 100 octane fuel.

RAF Detling

RAF Eastchurch

RAF Hendon

RAF Lympne

In *10 Group*, 5 of the 6 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel.

In *12 Group*, 7 of the 8 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel.

In *13 Group*, 7 of the 10 airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel. Of the 3 that possible didn't have stocks of 100 octane fuel, one was based in the Shetland Is. and the other in the Orkney Is. _

Despite what the doubters say, I would say 100 octane fuel was in widespread use by Fighter Command if all those airfields had stocks of 100 octane fuel on hand during the battle.


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## merlin (Jul 21, 2011)

Glider said:


> I have spent the day in the National Archives reviewing the War Cabinet minutes and summaries for May 1940 ....
> Their were some interesting nuggets such as the Cabinet being advised of the performance of the Defiant on the 18th May, the comment wasn't good.



Interesting, can you tell us any more (though I realise this is an old post), especially as the date is before the disaster for the Defiant during the BoB?


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## Glider (Jul 22, 2011)

I had the wrong day, it was the 14th May and the comment as reported to the War Cabinet is as follows

Reference was made to the performance of Defiant aircraft,
which were 2-man fighters equipped with a power-operated turret.
They had had a successful day on the 12th May, but on the
13th May, out of a flight of 6 which had engaged enemy aircraft,
only one had returned to its base. One was known to have been
forced to land in Belgium, and probably a second. The other three
were missing

For those interested All the War Cabinet papers are available online from the National Archives. They are free and quick to download and the May 1940 file starts with CAB 65/7/1. 

You will find in the NA that the Defiant had a lot of attention and even Downing had some caution. Check out the wording of item 4 in his memo sent in 1939, which gives me the impression that he thought that any success would be a short lived affair.

PS For those interested, Kurfurst has been made aware of the availability of the War Cabinet Records on line, the link and the file numbers. He was invited to use these to check out his belief in the old Pips posting but as you might expect, he has gone silent.


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## Ratsel (Jul 22, 2011)

Glider said:


> The one question that often knocks them off balance is, if C3 was so popular, effective and plentiful why was the DB605 designed for lower octane fuel.


actually, the DB605 was designed to use both B4 C3. but B4 when combined with GM-1 or MW-50 was still one powerhouse of
and engine, let alone with C3. A flip of a switch on the Auto-Mags and the plane can run on the fuel that was on hand.


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## Glider (Jul 22, 2011)

I certainly could be wrong but its my understanding that the DB605 was originally designed for the B4 fuel and later developed for C3, GM1 and MW-50. 

I looked at the following amongst other sites
The Luftwaffe page , Daimler-Benz DB 605


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## Ratsel (Jul 22, 2011)

well yes there were different version of the DB605 (A-1, AM, AS, ASM, ASB , ASC, D, D-2, DB, DC) 7.5:1 / 8.5:1 engines etc., but
all were designed to run on different grade fuels. The nature of the beast especially in 1944/45. sorry, didn't mean to take away from
the discussion at hand.


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## Glider (Jul 22, 2011)

No problem, I have been wrong many times before and this could have been another example


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## Vincenzo (Sep 21, 2011)

Milosh said:


> The following was posted on another board in a thread on the use of 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain.
> 
> _The following Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons are known to have used 100 octane fuel before or during the BoB:
> 1, 17, 19, 41, 43, 54, 56, 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 74, 79, 85, 87, 92, 141, 145, 151, 152, 222, 229, 234, 245, 249, 264, 303, 602, 603, 605, 609, 610, 611, 616
> ...



sorry this not prove nothing, we need list alone the airports where the squadrons were stationary at time they used 100 octane fuel


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## Mustang nut (Sep 21, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> sorry this not prove nothing, we need list alone the airports where the squadrons were stationary at time they used 100 octane fuel



Every comparison Me109/hurricane I have read during the BoB quotes performance with 100 octane, pilots wouldnt have chased 109s back to France on 87 Octane. The LW got a bit of a surprise with the Hurricane in the BoB because in France the 109 was clearly faster during the BoB it was faster but not nearly by so much.

I think its fair to say 100 Octane was widely available.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 21, 2011)

Do we have any information on availability of 100 octane fuel in other parts of the British Empire or other theatres of the war? If we accept that 100 octane fuel was widely available in the UK in 1940, how long did it take to get 100 octane to North Africa, the Middle East and the Far East?


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## Glider (Sep 21, 2011)

I know that Malta and Gibraltar were using small quantities from the start of the war approx 700 tons a month at the end of 1940. Basically my understanding is that the fuel went with the front line aircraft.

By August 1941 stocks in Gibraltar and Malta were 6,000 tons 100 octane and 2,000 tons 87 octane unfortunately the figures for the rest of the Middle East I don't have. However the July 1941 figures for the Middle East were 27,000 tons of 100 Octane and 34,000 tons of 87 octane 

Hope this helps


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## Shortround6 (Sep 21, 2011)

Different time lines. With 100 octane widely available, for fighters at least, in the summer of 1940, the availability of 100 octane 18 months later in the Far East shouldn't have been a big problem. While 100 octane might have been a bit lacking in Egypt in the summer of 1940 the question is if was available in the Spring/Summer of 1941. P-40 Tomahawks went into action in the NA in May of 1941 and they required 100 octane fuel unless operated under rpm and boost restrictions. With stories of the these planes soon using higher than factory recommended boost settings for 100 octane fuel (american 100 octane) in service I doubt that they were pulling that trick on 87 octane fuel.


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## post76 (Sep 21, 2011)

> I think its fair to say 100 Octane was widely available.




Most engine charts note the use of 100 octane fuel. 
I think what may have fluctuated was the grade.

Octane is also a number derived from different attributes of the fuel quality.
Its possible to have two fuels that offer different performance and both be graded as 100 octane. 
If you read up on octane it goes more into this. I haven't looked at that it some time. 

We see the introduction of 130 grade and 150 grade but they're still referred to as 100 octane, no?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 21, 2011)

you are right in a sense and that is why it is important to know both date of the reference or chart/manual and the country. In 1939/40 US and British 100 octane was not the same stuff. Octane is actually just one attribute of fuel and was commonly measured, at the time, in a lean condition. Running rich changes the octane rating so it was important to know (and standardize tests) on HOW rich you were going to run/measure. Because of other attributes of the fuel/s US 100 octane could be a little better when run rich or even worse than 100 octane while British fuel varied from around 115-120 to 125 when run rich. Later the British specified 100 octane (or performance number) lean and 130 rich and the Americans soon standardized on the same specification. British fuel would dissolve american gaskets and tank linings in the early years which means it wasn't an easy thing just to switch over. Later ratings included 100/135, 100/140, 108/135, 100/150 and 115/145. The first number could affect cruise performance while the second number affected maximum power.


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## Ratsel (Sep 21, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> Do we have any information on availability of 100 octane fuel in other parts of the British Empire or other theatres of the war? If we accept that 100 octane fuel was widely available in the UK in 1940, how long did it take to get 100 octane to North Africa, the Middle East and the Far East?


Didn't the Americans supply Britan with 100 av-gas in 1939/40? At least I thought I read that. I could be wrong though.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 21, 2011)

Again the answer is sort of yes and no. The Fuel came from American refineries but it was contracted by, paid for, and blended to British specifications. It was not US government fuel (or US commercial fuel) in either ownership or characteristics.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 21, 2011)

The 100 octane didnt just come from US refineries a good proportion of it came from British owned or controlled Caribbean and Venezuelan refineries. 

Never understood why British blends of petrol dissolved US seals and tanks surely the US werent using unvulcanised rubber.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 21, 2011)

Going by memory US fuel at the time could contain NO MORE than 2% aromatic compounds, while British fuel could contain NO LESS than 20% aromatic compounds. This is what made the rich response different and affected the rubber parts. If they filled the tank, flew and burned and then refilled with the proper gas there wasn't much of a problem but a steady diet or parking the plane for days/weeks with the wrong fuel did cause problems.


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 21, 2011)

fastmongrel said:


> The 100 octane didnt just come from US refineries a good proportion of it came from British owned or controlled Caribbean and Venezuelan refineries.



About 45% of 100 Octane fuel supplied to the RAF came from US companies or US-owned companies. 

The rest is spread around from the Middle East (Iran), Caribbean (Venezuela-Aruba-Curacao), South Africa and Borneo.


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## Ratsel (Sep 21, 2011)

*The Trimpell Oil Refinery*


"Trimpell" was an amalgamation of Trinidad Leasing, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and Shell (American), and after making aviation fuel for the Air Ministry the refinery was to produce explosives, nitric acid and fertiliser. The main site at Heysham was funded by the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The Ministry of Supply funded a Nitric Acid and Ammonium Nitrate plant for explosive purposes which was also run by Trimpell. 

The site was set up in 1939 as the Heysham Aviation Fuel Works to produce aviation fuel for the RAF. Using coke brought in from the Durham coal field together with imported gas oil, ICI produced the base petrol and ammonia while Shell produced iso-octane to boost the base petrol from 87 octane to 100 octane standard. Shell had found that the use of tetraethyl lead and hydrogen as fuel additives made it possible to suppress engine knock and to boost aircraft engine performance. 


The plant at Heysham, together with those at Stanlow and Billingham produced iso-octane additives required to raise 87 octane fuel to 100 octane rating. Initially, the limited size of the 100 octane fuel stockpile required strict rationing until supplies could be increased to meet requirements and the 100 octane fuel was dyed green to distinguish it from the 87 octane fuel which was blue. 
Bulk supply contracts for higher octane fuel were placed by the Air Ministry and it was put into widespread use in the RAF in March 1940 when Spitfires' Rolls Royce Merlin engines were converted to use the 100 octane fuel. 

By May 1940, reconnaissance Spitfires had begun flying combat missions using the 100 octane fuel. By 31 July 1940, there were 384 Spitfires serving in 19 squadrons using the 100 octane fuel.



Shortround6 said:


> Going by memory US fuel at the time could contain NO MORE than 2% aromatic compounds, while British fuel could contain NO LESS than 20% aromatic compounds. This is what made the rich response different and affected the rubber parts. If they filled the tank, flew and burned and then refilled with the proper gas there wasn't much of a problem but a steady diet or parking the plane for days/weeks with the wrong fuel did cause problems.


The Luftwaffe used up to 35% aromatic compounds in C3! Geez louis!


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## bobbysocks (Sep 21, 2011)

fastmongrel said:


> The 100 octane didnt just come from US refineries a good proportion of it came from British owned or controlled Caribbean and Venezuelan refineries.
> 
> Never understood why British blends of petrol dissolved US seals and tanks surely the US werent using unvulcanised rubber.



if that is true about the dissolving of fuel system seals and tanks it would be the additives or combination of them. there were many different chemicals in fuel. the lead used to lubricate valves and upper end components also fouled plugs. i dont know how many hours they flew before they changed them out but i do know it was a dont very regularly. benzine and toululine are very strong solvents and are found in fuels today...i dont know what compounds where used back then. if could also be something as simple as alcohol used to displace water that would react to the seals.


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## Ratsel (Sep 21, 2011)

the aromatics naphtha (for producing high octane gasoline) would contain ethyl benzene (an acid-catalyzed chemical reaction), n-propyl (a common solvent), and n-butyl benzene (a catalyst as well as an absorbent for water).

*I should add that this was for aviation fuel of the 1940's.. no idea what they use today...


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## Shortround6 (Sep 21, 2011)

I believe it was blamed on the aromatics at the time. Benzene and toluene are both in the aromatic family. "gasoline" can be made up of over 400 different possible compounds (never all at once) or as few as a 1/2 dozen (lab samples of "pure" gasoline aside) depending on base stock and refining. With both Military and Civil specifications spelling out even the amount of allowable die (coloring) per gallon the chances of any real quantities of an unknown substance being in the fuel are pretty low.


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## Glider (Sep 22, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> *The Trimpell Oil Refinery*
> 
> 
> "Trimpell" was an amalgamation of Trinidad Leasing, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and Shell (American), and after making aviation fuel for the Air Ministry the refinery was to produce explosives, nitric acid and fertiliser. The main site at Heysham was funded by the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The Ministry of Supply funded a Nitric Acid and Ammonium Nitrate plant for explosive purposes which was also run by Trimpell.
> ...


I am confident that the Billingham plant only produced 100 octane fuel for a trial period of 4 months in 1940 after which production was stopped as it wasn't needed due to the surplus of supplies. They might have restarted production later in the war, but I have no evidence. 

Funding was authorised for the Heysham plant to produce 100 octane but I believe this was withdrawn, again due to the surplus of supplies. 
The RAF paid the price for this in 1944 when they ran critically short of 100 Octane. Such was the shortage in the build up to the invasion it impacted operations and emergency measures were taken to resolve the situation.

Re the number of squadrons using 100 octane in July I suspect its more than 19. I know of 15 squadrons that were using it in May 1940 and it could be more as I am unable to spend any more time at the NA due to work commitments.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 22, 2011)

I believe a number of Hurricane squadrons were also using 100 octane in the Summer of 1940.


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## stona (Sep 23, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> ethyl benzene (an acid-catalyzed chemical reaction)



Not a chemist are you! Ethylbenzene is produced commercially in 'an acid catalysed reaction'.
It is a chemical dear to my heart as its dehydrogenation gives hydrogen (obviously) and styrene which in turn is the monomer of polystyrene which goes into the kits that I very much enjoy sticking together in my spare time.
Aromatic hydrocarbons are simply carbon based molecules based on the 'benzene ring' of 6 carbon atoms ( we'll ignore the heteroarenes here). I trained at a time when you could still have a smell of benzene (the simplest of the group) and it does indeed have a sweet smell.
No idea what they did in 1940s fuels!
Cheers
Steve (who was indeed,once upon a time,a chemist!)


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## Ratsel (Sep 23, 2011)

I am not! for a definition of what those things were, I relied on wikipedia.. my bad LOL


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## stona (Sep 23, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> I am not! for a definition of what those things were, I relied on wikipedia.. my bad LOL



No worries chap,I don't know what the function of these various chemicals were in the fuels of the time even if I know what the chemicals were,or 'looked like' in a chemical sense!
Cheers
Steve


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## Ratsel (Sep 23, 2011)

haha seems I made another goof.. I was quoting C3 Luftwaffe fuel aromatic chemical make-up.. my bad again


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## stona (Sep 23, 2011)

Whoever wrote that report,knowing the constituents of the fuel, was trying to extrapolate backwards in an effort to define which processes the Germans were using to produce their fuels. I understand the terms and structure of the various chemicals mentioned but have no idea how their proportions in the final fuel affected its performance,neither am I familiar(in a practical way)with the processes mentioned.
The reason that the various methyl pentanes are under the heading 'octanes' is because the addition of methyl groups,the numbers indicate where on the molecule they are attached, brings the total number of carbon atoms in the molecules to eight. The writer tells us how he thinks these compounds were synthesised. Remember they were starting with coal!
We need a petrochemical engineer!
Amazingly I haven't 'done' chemistry for many years though organics was my field.
All good fun.
Cheers
Steve


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## Ratsel (Sep 23, 2011)

That is a declassified document, MR 22, Sept/72 by the Air Ministry. I have all 76 pages if you want them


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