# Use of 100 Octane Fuel in the RAF during BOB



## Glider (Jan 7, 2009)

All
I promised to do some digging and come up with a summary of what I found on this topic which is the following. First of all I must thank a number of you for helping me track down the relevant documentation, there are too many to name but you know who you are and the assistance is much appreciated.

I will do this in two stages:-
a) First of all a ‘dry’ account based on the original documentation with a comparison of this compared to the view as laid out by Kurfurst
b) Various other sources that support the position as put forward in the original documentation.

In addition I will try to keep the timeline clear.

*16th March 1939 Meeting held to consider the question when 100 Octane Fuel should be brought into use in the RAF and the number and type of squadrons involved.*

There are three main parts to this.
i) It is true that at this meeting authorisation was given for 16 fighter squadrons and two twin engined bomber squadrons be converted to be use 100 Octane fuel by September 1940. The change over to start at the end of 1939 and the ACAS would select the squadrons.
ii) It was anticipated that these units would use 10,000 tons of fuel over a twelve month period and this would slow down the aim of achieving an 800,000 ton reserve.
iii) The AMPD asked that he should be kept informed as to the progress of the production of the 100 Octane fuel in order that the change over of squadrons could be kept under review in the light of any acceleration or diminution in Supplies.

Compared to the position held by Kurfurst
A number of differences are apparent. 
- Clearly this is a peace time plan, the war hadn’t started, 18 squadrons would use a lot more than 10,000 tons over twelve months when at war. It is certain that when war started there would be changes.
- It covers both fighters and bombers
- They were not defined as being Blenheim just twin engined bombers of which the RAF had a number of types.
- The 18 squadrons wasn’t a fixed number, it was open to change. 
- To the best of my knowledge the 18 squadrons in question were never identified. This is not a surprise, as you would only nominate the units when you start preparing to use the fuel, to allow for training and other preparatory work.

*14th November 1939 letter re the tests of 100 Octane in the Hurricane and Merlin*
In this letter it mentions:-
i)	That the tests were successful
ii)	The policy of immediately going over to the use of 12 lbs boost is being strongly urged by Fighter Command
iii)	The decision is dependent on the availability of sufficient stocks of 100 Octane but that it is understood that there are adequate reserves for this eventuality

*7th December 1939 Letter from FC Admin to HQ*
This letter starts going into the nuts and bolts of how the change from 87 to 100 Octane would need to be handled. It’s the sort of information any change of this magnitude will need.
The most interesting part is that it lists the operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance.

Difference to Kurfurst Position
- Kurfurst still believes that the reference to relevant stations means only those that were hosts to the 18 squadrons mentioned in March but never identified, when the list contains 21 stations all of which are likely to have more than one squadron.

*12th December 1939 Letter from Director Of Equipment re Issue of 100 Octane Fuel*Letter confirms that 100 Octane Fuel is approved for use in Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant aircraft. Issue to be made as soon as the fuel is available at the distribution depots servicing the fighter stations concerned. Some bomber units may be given priority.
The date of use is dependent on when the fuel can be put down in bulk at the distribution sites and the relevant stations. Re the latter as a station empties a tank of 87 Octane it will be replaced with 100 Octane. 
Observations
Clearly this is a change to the March notes. Certain aircraft are included and other aircraft in Fighter Command are excluded, no Blenheim fighter units are included or are any Gladiator units.
There is no limit set to the number of squadrons or area such as 11 Group, or any reference to specific squadrons. The RAF decided to use the 100 Octane and instead of limiting it to a number of squadrons, have decided to limit it by type of aircraft.
In my opinion, the statement of relevant stations can only mean those with Hurricanes, Spitfires or Defiants as defined as needing the fuel in the first instance.
It’s fair to mention that Gavin Bailey says that the authorisation came in February 1940. I suspect he may have been in error as the source is the original letter confirming a decision that had been made. It could be that original authorisation referred to in this letter might have had some conditions applied referring to February, I simply don’t know.

Difference to Kurfurst Position
- Kurfurst believes that the reference to relevant stations means only those that were hosts to the 18 squadrons mentioned in March but never identified.


----------



## Glider (Jan 7, 2009)

*18th May 1940 Summary of Conclusions of the meeting of the Oil Co ordination Committee*
The key points here are:-
i)	The Committee took note that the position of the use of this fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft had been made clear to Fighter Command.
ii)	Satisfaction was expressed that the units concerned had been stocked with the 100 Octane Fuel
iii)	The Minutes were to reflect the appreciation of the work of the Petroleum Board and that the Air Ministry had been impressed with the manner in which the work had been executed.

Difference to Kurfurst Position
- Kurfurst believes that the reference to relevant stations means only those that were hosts to the 18 squadrons mentioned in March but never identified.

Reference to Gavin Bailey
Whatever the possible cause of confusion re the timing of the Authorisation (see 12 December), there is agreement that use of the fuel began in fighter command from the 18th May. after the stations selected had received their stocks of the 100 Octane fuel. 

*1st August 1940 Memo from Downing re the Handling of the Merlin Engine*This note is advising the pilots that there is an increase in engine failures in the overuse of the emergency 12lb boost.
The interesting thing is that this memo was sent to ALL fighter groups. Had we been talking about the 16 squadrons or less this would not have been the case. It would have been sent to the squadrons involved.

*7th August 1940 Note confirming that the Use of 100 Octane had been authorised for all Commands*.
This speaks for itself.

*Consumption Information*The following information are the consumption details of fuel during the BOB period. This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report that is available from the National Archives.

Consumption of Aviation Spirit
The following figures are for the whole of the RAF and are the Average Monthly Consumption

September – November 1939 16,000 tons 
Dec 1939 – February 1940 14,000 tons 
March 1940 – May 1940 23,000 tons 
June 1940 – August 1940 10,000 tons (100 Oct) 26,000 tons (87 Oct)
Sept 1940 – November 1940 15,000 tons (100 Oct) 18,000 tons (87 Oct) 

Point of Interest
The total Usage of the RAF fuel for June – August 1940 period and Sept – Nov 1940 period is essentially unchanged allowing for the reduction in daylight fighting and the reduction of the raids on the Barges by night. However there is a clear increase in the use of 100 Octane that can only come from the release of the fuel for other commands. 

*Reserves Information*
The following information are the reserve stocks of 100 Octane fuel during the BOB period
This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report (a) that is available from the National Archives, as well as Gavin Baileys paper(b) and Wood and Dempster(c).

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

Point of interest. From the start of the war until the end of the BOB the reserves never dropped and continued to increase. There was never any danger of the supply of the oil running out.

In this summary I have not touched on the other papers, sources links that exist and support the view that Fighter Command was effectively fully converted to 100 Octane by May 1940. They were posted on the Me110 Hurricane Thread and we know they exist.


----------



## pbfoot (Jan 7, 2009)

an article by Bill Gunston
"One vital factor often overlooked in accounts of the BoB was the power increase RAF aircraft obtained from using 100 octane fuel. To get an octane rating of 100 required a very complicated process which done on a commercial scale required a large and exspensive refinery plant. Though Dr. SF Birch of Anglo -Iranian's laboratory at Sunbury on Thames was the pioneer of this alkylation process it was the US Army Air Corp that pioneered 100 octane aviation fuel . Probably nothing would have happened in Britain had it not been for a great engine man Air Commodore Rod Banks who Jan 1937 urged that RAF engines should be able to use 100 octane " even if the supply of such fuel were limited, because the use of high -duty equipment might prove decisive in the air in the early stages of a war"
Accordingly , two British emgines one of them the Merlin ,were tested and developed to run on 100 octane which was available only from abroad . Eventually an outstanding fuel called BAM 100 ( British Air Ministry 100) was developed , and the first cargo was shipped to Britain from the ESSO refinery in Aruba in June 1939. The Air Ministry stockpile the valuable fuel which was dyed a distinctive green the fact remained unknown to german intelligence. This stockpiling went on throughout the war , but in may 1940 when the chips were down and everything counted the RAF began to use the special fuel in the Merlins of Fighter Command"


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 7, 2009)

Good info Glider.


----------



## Glider (Jan 8, 2009)

Thank you Syscom. 
Kurfurst has gone very quiet, wonder why?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 9, 2009)

I guess the 64k question is, did the RAF enjoy an advantage in its fuel over that of the germans in 1940. I used to think that it did, then the German supporters of this forum pointed out that the Germans developed fuels of similar octane rating, but later still I came to believe that this higher rated German fuel did not begin to be delivered until 1942, or thereabouts.....


----------



## Glider (Jan 9, 2009)

I don't think that there is any doubt that the RAF enjoyed a significant improvement in the performance of its aircraft by using the 100 Octane Fuel. Germany did have 100 Octane but it seems to be very limited in its availability. Its worth remembering that the DB605 was designed for lower rated fuel. I have little doubt that Germany would have given its eye teeth for the sort of reserves that the UK were able to build up. 

The Merlin went from around 1000hp to 1300hp with the new fuel and the increase in boost. Add that to the introduction of the CS Propeller at the same time and you have a serious improvement.

Kurfurst did point out that some of the 110's in the BOB had 100 Octane but I don't know what sort of improvement it gave performance wise. Some 109's also had it but it seems to have been a very small minority.


----------



## gavinb (Jan 31, 2009)

As the author of the EHR article in question, I would like to clarify two points.

1. The March 1939 decision over the use of 100-octane fuel was a pre-war plan which simply indicates that the RAF had begun stockpiling and planning the use of 100-octane fuel before the crisis of 1940 and that the received wisdom of Standard Oil BAM-100 shipments from Aruba arriving 'just in time' (as demonstrated by the Gunston quote reproduced in the thread), is not historically correct.

2. That March 1939 decision was over-ridden by a series of subsequent planning decisions, including critical ones made between February and May 1940 (which are cited in the original article) to begin and expand the immediate operational use of the fuel. 

Both of these points should be clear to anybody reading the original note in EHR; and nothing in my work either can or should be used by people attempting to argue that 100-octane fuel was not in widespread use in Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain. That position is contradicted by a mass of original evidence cited in my work (and elsewhere). The next time anyody attempts to produce carefully-selected references from my work to contradict the historical use of 100-octane fuel by the RAF in the Battle of Britain, please refer them back to my original article which if nothing else should provide them with sufficient primary source evidence to disabuse them of that notion.


----------



## Kurfürst (Jan 31, 2009)

Mr. Bailey,

First, thank you for posting in this discussion. Do you have perhaps any information as to how 'widespread' the use of 100 octane fuel was in Fighter Command from May 1940, how many Squadrons were using it etc? 

Certainly there are some extremist opinions that which suggest that each and every Spitfire and Hurricane was running on that fuel, at all time. So far however, no evidence at all was produced that would support that point of view and without the evidence, the statement would appear to me as mere wishful thinking. 

In particular, it seems that there is evidence in May 1940 decision was made to stop existing conversion on the basis of the uncertainity of the supplies, and that around 1/4 of the Squadrons were supplied with this kind of fuel during most of the Battle.


----------



## ppopsie (Jan 31, 2009)

Aviation fan like I am can be easily digging up the mere figures but learning about the fuels and aircraft performances on this thread is quite enjoyable. In the case of Japanese aviation right before WW2 was that we were certain about how the 100 octane avgas meant. Moral Embargo inhibited us to build refinery plants for it but on an experiment a Mitsubishi Kinsei engine originally rated at 1000hp on 91 octane had performed 1400hp on special high octane AVGAS imported from the US. The IJN produced and used 91 octane gasoline for the fighters and the bombers during the war. In this the Nakajima Homare or Ha-45 engine which aimed at performing on 2000hp class was designed with an assumption of using the 100 octane aviation gasoline. But it was not in the case as it is well known.


----------



## Glider (Jan 31, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Mr. Bailey,
> 
> First, thank you for posting in this discussion. Do you have perhaps any information as to how 'widespread' the use of 100 octane fuel was in Fighter Command from May 1940, how many Squadrons were using it etc?
> 
> ...



Kurfurst
When *if ever *are you going to supply any evidence to support your statements!! 
All the statements in my summary are supported by original documentation including the statements on the level of supplies. This you have seen on the thread of 110 vs Hurricane. If original documentation is not good enough for you can I ask what is good enough.
I should point out that your only 'evidence' is a paper that you cannot produce, cannot supply a link to and one that the supposed holders of such The Australian War Records Office have not been able to find or even have heard about.
This stacked against a raft of original documents showing a natural progression in such a decision process doesn't amount to a tin of beans. But despite this obvious blinding anomaly, the original documentation isn't good enough for you but your mystery paper is. 

However back to facts, the papers showed a monthly usage of 10,000 tons of 100 Octane a month, against a stockpile of 294,000 tons as at the 31st May, almost a two and a half year stockpile. Where exactly is the shortage you keep going on about? 
After all it is this shortage, which forms that basis for your evidence of a decision to stop the roll out of 100 Octane. So all we are asking you to do is to provide some evidence to support your theory.


----------



## gavinb (Jan 31, 2009)

For a start you need to research the decisions made on the 7th, 8th and 9th Meetings of the Air Ministry's Oil Co-ordinating Policy Committee on 18th May, 29th June and 10th August 1940, respectively. These can be found in AVIA 10/282 at the Public Records Office, Kew. I believe this source is cited in my original article, which you should not selectively quote to support a thesis which it explictly contradicts.

Now in return I'd like to know what evidence you have which demonstrates that operational squadrons in Fighter Command (and particularly 11 Group) after May 1940 were* not * using 100 octane fuel routinely. I am particularly interested in learning the source of your statement that -

_... it seems that there is evidence in May 1940 decision was made to stop existing conversion on the basis of the uncertainity of the supplies, and that around 1/4 of the Squadrons were supplied with this kind of fuel during most of the Battle._

- as this is appears to be contradicted by the decisions in the sources I have just cited.


----------



## gavinb (Jan 31, 2009)

Glider, interesting posts.

Re: December 1939 decisions. 

I'd have to revisit the PRO to be definite about this, however:

My notes indicate that the position in December was that the 'roll-out' of 100-octane remained at ACAS' discretion, and this was issued in February subject to expenditure of 87-octane and replacement with 100-octane. The notes I have of the AoC-in-C of Fighter Command's memo on the issue of 12 December 1939 indicate that use of 100-octane was approved for the Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant but I don't believe this amounted to execising the decision to begin using the fuel operationally, which seems to have remained at ACAS' discretion as I understand it. That authority seems to have been given in February and confirmed in May. 

Let me know if I've misapprehended this.

In any case, the relevant file for that letter (PRO AIR 2/2434) should contain the rather interesting observation for some readers, made on 25 August 1938, that the RAF planned to supply 100 octane to * all * Spitfire and Hurricane bases.


----------



## Glider (Jan 31, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Dont lose it boys, this is an intersting discussion



Your right, my wife who you will not be surprised to know is a teacher suggested I did some lines.

I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing 
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
I must remember that everyone must produce everything and Kurfurst nothing
 I feel better for that, now back to business as usual


----------



## Glider (Jan 31, 2009)

gavinb said:


> Glider, interesting posts.
> 
> Re: December 1939 decisions.
> 
> ...



I don't disagree with this. Clearly the use of the fuel was dependent on the availability of stocks being distributed. The authority was given in December for it to be used in Hurricanes, Spitfires and Defiants but that authority for General use was confirmed in May as the fuel had been distributed.
The letter of the 12th December 100 Octane Fuel Memo confirms that authority has been given to use the fuel, but general use is dependent on stocks having been put in place

I wasn't aware of the Feb documents and in my summary of the situation made a guess that there might have been some conditions attached but that I didn't know. From what you have said it looks like a confirmation was made of the December decision.


----------



## Colin1 (Jan 31, 2009)

Glider,
here's what I have on the build-up to the use of 100 octane fuel

1935 - RAF now involved in 100 octane fuel, 29Jul35 it was decided that 95 or 100 octane fuel would be in general aviation use in 2 or 3 years time. The decision was the result of the visit to the US by one D R Pye of the Air Ministry who sent a long and detailed report of his findings to Vickers-Armstrong.

1936 - Samples of 95 and 100 octane fuel received from the US and the Asiatic Petroleum Company also offered their own 95 octane blend at the rate of 15 million gallons per annum. ShellMex and Anglo American offered the same quantities the following month.

1937 - By November, 3 RAF squadrons were using 100 octane fuel in their aircraft and a minute from the Air Ministry stated 'Deliveries under existing commitments will be, say, 5.3 million gallons per annum from March 1938 and 22.4 million gallons a year from March 1939 from all sources'.

1939 - Meeting held to discuss the issue of general release of 100 octane fuel for all RAF aircraft and what squadrons, number and type were to be supplied. The decision was taken to supply to 16 fighter squadrons and 2 twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940; the change-over to 100 octane was expected to result in the consumption of 3.1 million gallons per annum. *The meeting also directed that a reserve of 250 million gallons was to be accumulated*.

1939 - Secony-Vacuum (now Mobil) producing it at their Jersey plant. It was extremely expensive but the USAAC were using it in their aircraft in late 1939.

1939 - First trials of the fuel in a Spitfire took place at Rolls-Royce in Hucknall on 24Sep39 when K9788 fitted with a Merlin XII modified to burn the new fuel made its first flight. Take-off run reduced by 30yds. The cost of running a 100-octane Spitfire was £53 5s 0d dearer than running an 87-octane Spitfire per full tank expended (for those of you who are pre-decimal).

Initially, all 100 octane had to be shipped from the US and ran the gauntlet of the Atlantic U-boats, where a large number of supply ships were sunk but once refinement began at Abadan in Persia, the supply situation eased significantly.

There was a Supermarine report dated 16Feb38 concerning the Spitfire Mk I Production Bi-fuel installation, devised by Rolls-Royce to increase the power of combat engines.


Fighter Command would no doubt have recognised the fighting qualities of the Bf109-E by now and although what I have doesn't go as far as to actually say so, I would suggest that the threat posed by the Bf109-E coupled with the magnitude of the 100 octane fuel reserve would indicate that all participating (fighter) squadrons would be supplied with 100 octane fuel.

Just one point, three RAF squadrons were using 100 octane in 1937, what aircraft types would be likely to be using it that early? 

That's to gavinb too, if you're still here.


----------



## KrazyKraut (Jan 31, 2009)

What modifications to the engine were required btw?


----------



## Colin1 (Jan 31, 2009)

KrazyKraut said:


> What modifications to the engine were required btw?


Doesn't provide the details unfortunately, I'll rake around and see if I can find anything


----------



## Mike Williams (Jan 31, 2009)

Hello Gavin: Thank you for publishing your article _The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain._ I found the article interesting and informative. Your research and work is appreciated.



KrazyKraut said:


> What modifications to the engine were required btw?



Basically a modified boost control cut-out and new spark plugs.







This work was done on station at the time units were converting in March 1940.


----------



## KrazyKraut (Jan 31, 2009)

Thank you. I assume this is maintenance level 3 stuff? Sounds like it anyways. Were they modified at the airfields or returned to repair center/assembling factories for these mods?


----------



## Mike Williams (Jan 31, 2009)

KrazyKraut said:


> Thank you. I assume this is maintenance level 3 stuff? Sounds like it anyways. Were they modified at the airfields or returned to repair center/assembling factories for these mods?



I think you can safely assume there wasn’t much effort required, i.e. pulling the control valve, drilling two holes, then replacing the valve – not a big deal. Mods were done on station at time of conversion in March 1940, see ORB excerpts above.


----------



## Colin1 (Jan 31, 2009)

Mike Williams said:


> Basically a modified boost control cut-out and new spark plugs.
> 
> This work was done on station at the time units were converting in March 1940


Mike
wasn't this the work more in line with Rolls-Royce's work on water injection than the implementation of 100 octane fuel? The two ventures were roughly concurrent in the pursuit of combat engine performance.


----------



## Mike Williams (Jan 31, 2009)

David Ross suggests that the various mods such as 100 octane conversion, constant speed airscrews, two step rudder, pedals, and IFF were done by the ground crew. I think he's got it about right. 







Somewhat off topic but adding to Ross's list, the ground crew also installed pilot armour before the Battle of Britain, see : http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no609-armour.jpg


----------



## Mike Williams (Jan 31, 2009)

Hi Colin: I see you have Spitfire the History 

The only instance, that presently comes to mind, when water injection was used on Merlin engines, outside of testing, was with the P-51H equipped with V-1650-9 where 90" Hg was obtained using 115/145 with water injection. Maybe there are others but my memory fails me.

The ORBs shown above simply state that the aircraft were converted to 100 octane. A.P.1590B/J.2-W  dated 20 March 1940 states quite explicitly that the boost control cut-out must be modified to operate at + 12 lb/sq.in and that 100 octane fuel must be used. 



Colin1 said:


> Mike
> wasn't this the work more in line with Rolls-Royce's work on water injection than the implementation of 100 octane fuel? The two ventures were roughly concurrent in the pursuit of combat engine performance.


----------



## Colin1 (Jan 31, 2009)

Mike Williams said:


> Hi Colin: I see you have Spitfire the History
> 
> The only instance, that presently comes to mind, when water injection was used on Merlin engines, outside of testing


It's a first-class reference although I know for a fact that my copy is out of date; the Mk IX in the Belgian Air Museum is no longer extant, it burned (along with the rest of the museum, if I recall).

You're right, it didn't get out of testing, Rolls-Royce intended to fit a Merlin II into a Hurricane along with a de Havilland High Speed propeller but the programme was discontinued, although it doesn't make a big point of telling us why.


----------



## Mike Williams (Jan 31, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> Just one point, three RAF squadrons were using 100 octane in 1937, what aircraft types would be likely to be using it that early?



Hi Colin:
It looks to me to me that these three squadrons were using 100 octane fuel in 1937: 90 Squadron flying Blenheims, 98 Squadron flying Hawker Hinds, and 201 squadron flying Saro Londons.






Of interest to your story line; Duxford, Debden, Northholt and Digby received 100 octane in 1938:

Duxford: No. 19 in Spitfire I, No. 66 in Gloster Gauntlet II
Debden: No. 85 No. 87 in Hawker Hurricane
Northholt: No. 111 in Hawker Hurricane
North Weald: No. 56 151 in Hurricane
Digby: No. 46 in Gaunlet II No. 73 in Hurricane 






Regarding 100 octane stocks see:
















Regarding 100 octane consumption during the Battle of Britain see the following:

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Jan 31, 2009)

Pardon my ignorance in this, but isnt the difference between 87 and 100 Octane the difference between "standard" and "super" grade petrol. If so, it would simply be amatter of adjusting the ignition timing and possibly the intake and fuel mixture for the engines. Backyard mechanics were doing that to Morris, Zephyr, VW and all manner of car engines throughout the '50s and '60s


----------



## Colin1 (Feb 1, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Pardon my ignorance in this, but isnt the difference between 87 and 100 Octane the difference between "standard" and "super" grade petrol. If so, it would simply be a matter of adjusting the ignition timing and possibly the intake and fuel mixture for the engines. Backyard mechanics were doing that to Morris, Zephyr, VW and all manner of car engines throughout the '50s and '60s


I don't think your view is borne out of ignorance
my own views as an auto-engine building hobbyist is that you take advantage of higher-RON fuel by advancing the ignition timing, I refrained from comment in case it's not that simple for the aero-engine. 
Merlins didn't have distributors to advance the timing with, they had magnetos which, if I recall, is a cross between a distributor and an HT coil; absolutely no idea if you can alter the advance using that.

That new lad from Salisbury might know, he actually re-builds WWII aero engines.


----------



## Kurfürst (Feb 1, 2009)

Now unfortunately my originally intented reply was taken by this board's engine, and I don't intend to re-type the whole thing again, so please pardon me for being brief.



gavinb said:


> For a start you need to research the decisions made on the 7th, 8th and 9th Meetings of the Air Ministry's Oil Co-ordinating Policy Committee on 18th May, 29th June and 10th August 1940, respectively. These can be found in AVIA 10/282 at the Public Records Office, Kew. I believe this source is cited in my original article, which you should not selectively quote to support a thesis which it explictly contradicts.



First, thank you for giving us your references. About a month ago, Glider made an offer that he, being more closely situated to Kew than the rest of us, would try to find that paper, but I haven't heard of him about it ever since, and not sure if he attempted or succeeded in it.

Now, as for your thesis, it seems to be refuting the notion that the use of 100 octane fuel was made available by US. 

And I believe I have quoted the part of your work which notes that as of 1939, 16 fighter and 2 Blenheim Squadrons were intended to be supplied with 100 octane fuel. You should also not rely on Glider's 'summaries' of my arguements, as they are not my arguements, but Glider's own arguements presenting my position as strawman arguements.

As for the 18th May meeting, it does seem to have two salient points.

a, The position of the Oil Committee was 'made clear' to Fighter Command, which does sound like, given the circumstantial evidence (see later), that Fighter Command's wishes for 100 octane fuel were not completely fulfilled.

b, It also notes that 100 octane fuel was supplied to 'Squadrons concerned', ie. _selected_ Squadrons, and not all.

As for the 10th August meeting, it does note that they intended to use 100 octane fuel for all operational aircraft of all Commands; from the actual rate of fuel consumption by type of fuel, it is also clear that this remained a plan and did not materialize.

Ie. In June - August, a monthly avarage of 10 000 tons of 100 octane is used against 26 000 tons of other grades; in September 1940, 14 000 tons of 100 octane is used against 23 000 tons of other grades. In October, its 17 000 tons vs 18 000 tons. In November, its still 15 000 vs 13 000 tons.

Quite clearly, the majority of operational RAF aircraft were using 87 octane during the period, despite the plans made on 10th August.

I don't think we are in disagreement about that RAF fighters which were deployed to Stations that were supplied with 100 octane were taking advantage of the fuel. The dilemma and uncertainty that surrounds the issue is that to what extent 100 octane fuel was used during the Battle by RAF fighters, and not wheter it was used at all or not.

However, if your thesis is that 100 octane was the only kind of fuel used by Fighter Command during the Battle, I must note that at this point, this thesis would lack the sufficient evidence, and is contradicted by contemporary RAF fighter manuals which note both 87 and 100 octane fuel use, German reports that indicate that captured Spitfires and Hurricans were found fuelled with 87 octane fuel, and the generic lack of positive evidence to the positive claim, and also documentary evidence, that will be listed below. 



gavinb said:


> In any case, the relevant file for that letter (PRO AIR 2/2434) should contain the rather interesting observation for some readers, made on 25 August 1938, that the RAF planned to supply 100 octane to all Spitfire and Hurricane bases.



As you noted, the August 1938 was a pre-war plan that was over-ridden by a series of subsequent planning decisions, first the March 1939 decision which revised and limited the number of Squadrons effected to 16 + 2 effective in September 1940, and as you noted, this was brought forward to early 1940. I do not see how its nature was any different than the March 1939 plan that replaced it.

However it remains unclear wheter there were more Squadrons effected than the original 16 + 2. Do you have perhaps information regarding the number of Stations / Squadrons that were actually supplied with 100 octane fuel?



gavinb said:


> Now in return I'd like to know what evidence you have which demonstrates that operational squadrons in Fighter Command (and particularly 11 Group) after May 1940 were* not * using 100 octane fuel routinely. I am particularly interested in learning the source of your statement that -
> 
> _... it seems that there is evidence in May 1940 decision was made to stop existing conversion on the basis of the uncertainity of the supplies, and that around 1/4 of the Squadrons were supplied with this kind of fuel during most of the Battle._
> 
> - as this is appears to be contradicted by the decisions in the sources I have just cited.



Certainly. A couple of years ago an Australian researcher shared his findings about the matter with some of us during a related discussion.

He came across a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance, when he was researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. He noted that the reason why it was included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report. 

He summarized the contents of the addendum as the follows (salient points highlighted by me):

_
"Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude. 

*By* the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in *May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use.* The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war *the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.*

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly *87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane* (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel. 

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply* RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.*"_

It certainly does seem to be connected to your papers in Kew, in particular the position of the Oil Committee that was 'made clear' to Fighter Command in the SIXTH meeting, in May 1940.


----------



## Kurfürst (Feb 1, 2009)

Mike Williams said:


> Regarding 100 octane consumption during the Battle of Britain see the following:



This paper seems to be at odds regarding the amount of 100 octane fuel issued between July and 10th October, noted as being 22 000 tons by Wood and Dempster, which is also referenced on your site.


----------



## Glider (Feb 1, 2009)

GavinB
You should be aware that this is the paper _Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War_ that Kurfurst has been asked to supply a number of times which he has failed to do so. You should also be aware that the Australain War Archives when asked for a copy of this paper could not find it, and neither had they heard of it. The following is the reply from the AWA
_Thank you for your inquiry. Yes this appears to be a mysterious item! The reference should have included a series and item number if the report came from our official records. I cannot find any publication in our books database with this title. Wikipedia should be contacted to request the writer provide a more precise reference_ At the time Kurfurst was asking Wikipedia to change their entry to reflect his belief in the lack of 100 Octane fuel to the RAF in the BOB. As Kurfurst was the one pressing Wikipedia to change he is the one referred to as the original writer. It should be noted that this he failed to do, despite his claim to have a link to the document that worked. 

In Kurfursts defence he has given me the links which he insists work for him, but didn't work for me but when I asked him to send me a copy he went silent.

Re my summaries of Kurfursts position they are dead accurate. A good example being his insistance that the March 1939 plan only allowed for the 18 squadrons which he maintains. The March 1939 paper did mention 18 squadrons but also allowed for the number to be varied depending on the availability of the fuel.

It will also be noticed that according to Kurfurst it was a lack of supply *the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time* his emphasis. However as we know there was no lack of supply.


----------



## Glider (Feb 1, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> This paper seems to be at odds regarding the amount of 100 octane fuel issued between July and 10th October, noted as being 22 000 tons by Wood and Dempster, which is also referenced on your site.



Just a thought Kurfurst that you mentioned first in a previous exchange. Issued at 22,000 tons is not the same as consumed. We know that stocks had to be in place before the squadrons were able to use the fuel. 
This statement seems to be based on the premise that issued to the distribution stations is the same as consumed by the squadrons, which is not the case.


----------



## Kurfürst (Feb 1, 2009)

Glider said:


> GavinB
> You should be aware that this is the paper _Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War_ that Kurfurst has been asked to supply a number of times which he has failed to do so.



Glider has been given the exact source and a link to the discussion where this was discussed. Besides it was made clear that it was not me who did the research but by an Australian fellow. He claims the link was 'broken', and repeats the same story about having been 'asked' to 'provide' the material that was clear to him that was researched by _somebody else_.

The link however works for me and appearantly, for everyone else... odd, isn't it?  



Glider said:


> You should also be aware that the Australain War Archives when asked for a copy of this paper could not find it, and neither had they heard of it.



I would like to see the email and the name of the contact person you have contacted, and the full contents of the this _alleged_ email correspondence... Your story simply stinks and it is quite simply made up IMHO. I doubt you have even attempted to contact the Australian archieves. 
I am thinking you are making up a story to dismiss the evidence that disproves your wishful claims, that you have so far failed to support with any evidence.



Glider said:


> In Kurfursts defence he has given me the links which he insists work for him, but didn't work for me but when I asked him to send me a copy he went silent.



Well you have been told _SEVERAL_ times it was an Australian fellow who researched the document. So why are you asking _me_ for copies? 
You have been told_ SEVERAL_ times how to contact _him_. So why are you still keep telling the story about _me_ going silent etc?

About a month ago you have told us that you will research the relevant documentation in the National Archieves in Kew. Ever since we haven't heard from you. It appears that either you were not even attempting it, or you have found it, and the reason you are silent about is because it disproves your own position. 



Glider said:


> Re my summaries of Kurfursts position they are dead accurate.



No, you were misrepresenting it in a set of strawmen arguments, also somehow you 'forgot' to include several of the evidence I have pointed out.



> A good example being his insistance that the March 1939 plan only allowed for the 18 squadrons which he maintains. The March 1939 paper did mention 18 squadrons but also allowed for the number to be varied depending on the availability of the fuel.



I would like to see the document, to see whether it supports your position or not. Besides earlier you have been _denying that the document even exists_, you were denying _that it effected Blenheim Squadrons_, so I do wonder, _why are your position changing so often_?



> It will also be noticed that according to Kurfurst it was a lack of supply *the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time* his emphasis. However as we know there was no lack of supply.



No, not 'according to Kurfurst', as you were told dozens of times. 
According to Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War from February 1941.

Well 'we' know that the RAF supply of 100 octane fuel was only 220 000 tons as of the spring 1940 and that the fuel had to be imported from overseas, and the shipments were uncertain. 'We' also know that the target for reserves was set at 800 000 tons, which means in effect they had but 1/4 the reserves they required.


----------



## claidemore (Feb 1, 2009)

Why doesn't someone who does have this mysterious missing paper post it?

Or repost the link?

In the interests of edification, science and blissfull harmony.


----------



## Kurfürst (Feb 1, 2009)

The thread in question:

Board Message

(Requires registration)


----------



## Glider (Feb 2, 2009)

Kurfurst
As you are well aware the previous response from the AWA 
_Thank you for your inquiry. Yes this appears to be a mysterious item! The reference should have included a series and item number if the report came from our official records. I cannot find any publication in our books database with this title. Wikipedia should be contacted to request the writer provide a more precise reference _was from an editor at Wikipedia as at the time you were trying to get them to amend the entry for the BOB aircraft entry. 

However I had asked myself and this morning had a reply which is copied below. 
*PS* I accept your apology for accusing me of making it up, telling a story that stinks, probably not contacting the AWA and making up a story to dismiss the evidence that disproves my wishful claims.

_Australian War Memorial Research Centre
ReQuest 

Response to your question with Question #: RCIS20344 


Your question is: 
I am trying to find a copy of the following Document which I have been told is held in your archives. 

Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And Its Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War

The first question is of course do you have a copy of this document and secondly if you do what is the process to try and obtain a copy.


Our response is:
Dear David,

Thank you for your enquiry to the Research Centre of the Australian War Memorial.

I have searched our books database (which includes journals), RecordSearch (which is the National Archives of Australia's search engine for our Official Records) and our general search field in the hope that your text may be picked up as a reference in an online article without success. 

Do you have any more information about the record? Is it a journal article or a monograph? If you can think of any other identifying markers, please email our Publishing and Digitised team at pub&[email protected] A curator will search again for you. 

I'm sorry I couldn't help you. 

Kind regards,_

I am sure you agree that it is incumbant on the person making the claim to support that claim. 
So until you support your statement with something substantial the matter is closed. Clearly this paper is a dead end at this stage and without it, you have no case.


----------



## Kurfürst (Feb 2, 2009)

> Clearly this paper is a dead end at this stage and without it, you have no case.



Clearly somebody already found it and made notes of it. There is no doubt about the credibility of the person either, neither does he have an unhealthy interest in proving it either way.

That you have not given exact reference to the paper and they cannot find it is no particular wonder. You need to have the exact reference to the paper in order to find it, or do the research yourself.

I also note that you are particularly quiet about your earlier claim:
_
'The March 1939 paper did mention 18 squadrons but also allowed for the number to be varied depending on the availability of the fuel.'_

So I must ask: did you made that up?



Glider said:


> I am sure you agree that it is incumbant on the person making the claim to support that claim.



Certainly. You have made a claim in your first posts:



Glider said:


> ... Fighter Command was effectively fully converted to 100 Octane by May 1940.



So please produce the documents which show that FC 'fully' converted. 
So far you have produced nothing that would positively support this thesis.

So until you support your statement with something substantial the matter is closed.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 2, 2009)

I thought that there was areasonable body of evidence already presented.

Does anyone know what these references to "other threads" is about. There is obviously a deeper argument going on here......


----------



## Glider (Feb 2, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Clearly somebody already found it and made notes of it. There is no doubt about the credibility of the person either, neither does he have an unhealthy interest in proving it either way.


I would say that there is every reason to doubt the person as the mystery Australian was asked to supply a copy of the paper in the original thread and guess what he didn't.



> That you have not given exact reference to the paper and they cannot find it is no particular wonder. You need to have the exact reference to the paper in order to find it, or do the research yourself.


Your the one who claims to have a working link, if you will not give the paper then give me the reference.
By the way you have little regard if they can only trace papers with a thread



> I also note that you are particularly quiet about your earlier claim:
> _
> 'The March 1939 paper did mention 18 squadrons but also allowed for the number to be varied depending on the availability of the fuel.'_
> 
> So I must ask: did you made that up?


As you can see, no I didn't, 





> So until you support your statement with something substantial the matter is closed.



Priceless


----------



## Kurfürst (Feb 2, 2009)

So, it was 16 Fighter Squadrons and 2 twin engined bomber Squadrons that were scheduled for conversion to 100 octane fuel. They aimed for 800 000 tons of reserve of 100 octane fuel... they had what - 220 000 tons in reserve by spring 1940?

Its at odds with your claim that _all_ of Fighter Command's Squadrons converted, isn't it?
Do you have_ any evidence_ if this decision was later revised by a later decision and more Squadrons were to be involved? 
Given that they had but 1/4 of the fuel reserves they aimed at, it appears to be unlikely.

It agrees well with the contents of the Australian paper though. Sixteen Squadrons would be about 1/4 of Fighter Command. Also the lack of what they considered sufficient reserves (800k tons) is also evidenced.


----------



## Glider (Feb 2, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I thought that there was areasonable body of evidence already presented.
> 
> Does anyone know what these references to "other threads" is about. There is obviously a deeper argument going on here......



If you wish I could repost the summary with links to all the papers that supported it. 
Then we can wait for the papers that support the other side of the argument?

A bit of background. Originally this Australian made the claims on another forum in July 2004. He quoted the Australian paper which was dated February 1941 that basically said that due to a lack of supplies the change over from 87 Octane to 100 Octane was stopped after approx 125 Spitfires and Hurricanes had been converted.
A meeting of the 9th May was quoted when this was confirmed by the Government. This was very different from the other sources of information and he was asked to supply a copy of the paper. Interestingly Kurfurst also asked him where a copy could be obtained.
As far as I can see, no one on thread did get a copy, a link was given which went to the Australian Archives but this does not work. As you can see I tried to get a copy from the AWA myself but failed.

A number of the facts quoted from this paper are well out of kilter with the facts around the stocks and reserves. The quotes from this thread that the UK only recieved its first bulk shipments from the Middle East on 12th August whilst accurate, are extrapolated to imply that the fate of the use of 100 Octane in the BOB depended on these shipments is wrong. We had hundreds of thousands of tons of reserves in stock from a variety of refineries around the world. To think that a tanker of about 10,000 tons (I don't know the exact size but this was a good size for the 30's.) made a huge difference is clearly in error.

Moving on the July 2008, Kurfurst tried to get some changes made to the Wikipedia entry on a couple of areas that I have found. Namely these were on his view of the Structural weaknesses of the Spitfire and the lack of use of 100 Octane by the RAF in the BOB based on the Australian paper. This is to do with the 100 octane, the Wikipedia editor asked Kurfurst for a copy with no success and also approached the AWA directly for a copy with the same result as myself. 

What I find interesting is that I am beginning to doubt that Kurfurst has access to this paper. I say this as the only quotes that makes on the paper are the same word for word that the Australian made back in 2004, no differences at all.


----------



## Glider (Feb 2, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> So, it was 16 Fighter Squadrons and 2 twin engined bomber Squadrons that were scheduled for conversion to 100 octane fuel. They aimed for 800 000 tons of reserve of 100 octane fuel... they had what - 220 000 tons in reserve by spring 1940?
> 
> Its at odds with your claim that _all_ of Fighter Command's Squadrons converted, isn't it?
> Do you have_ any evidence_ if this decision was later revised by a later decision and more Squadrons were to be involved?
> ...



What no apology for accusing me of making it all up, shame on you. 

By the way the 800,000 tons reserve wasn't just for fighter command and was never met but I think that even would agree that it didn't stop us using it.

Now for the Australian Paper reference please


----------



## parsifal (Feb 2, 2009)

Thanks Glider

guys, I know that there is some emotion here, but if i may, you have an interesting discussion. Dont spoil it by getting abusive. I respect you both, because you both have a good knowledge to call upon (if admittedly they are coming from opposite directions) and look forward to an interesting discussion, not a stupid fur ball


----------



## Mike Williams (Feb 2, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Pardon my ignorance in this, but isnt the difference between 87 and 100 Octane the difference between "standard" and "super" grade petrol. If so, it would simply be amatter of adjusting the ignition timing and possibly the intake and fuel mixture for the engines. Backyard mechanics were doing that to Morris, Zephyr, VW and all manner of car engines throughout the '50s and '60s



Hi Parsifal:

As mentioned before, A.P. 1590B/J.2-W details the work to be carried out when converting from 87 to 100 octane. I’ve never seen any mention of changes to the ignition being necessary. I do have a document, however, noting that a slight retarding of the ignition would eliminate backfires when Merlin engines were converted from 100 to 150 octane. 

Summary of Use of 150 Grade Fuel


----------



## Mike Williams (Feb 2, 2009)

Hi Glider:

Yes, as you note, fuel consumption and fuel issued are not directly comparable. Wood and Dempster wrote in their book 
_The Narrow Margin_, page 87: 

_As it turned out, aviation spirit was to prove no worry for the R.A.F. By July 11th, 1940, the day after the Battle of Britain opened, stocks of 100 octane petrol used in the Merlin engine stood at 343,000 tons. On October 10th, twenty-one days before the battle closed, and after 22,000 tons had been issued, stocks had risen to 424,000 tons. With other grades of aviation spirit total stock available on October 10th, 1940, was 666,000 tons. Oil reserves were 34,000 tons. _

Their figures seem to agree quite well with documents obtained from the National Archives where we have comparable data:

100 Octane Fuel Stocks in U.K. at 31 March 1940 was 220,000 tons







100 Octane Fuel Stocks in U.K. at the end of May 1940 was 294,000 tons






100 Octane Fuel Stocks in U.K. at 29.10.40 was 423,400 tons






Consumption of 100 Octane fuel during the Battle of Britain was 51,000 tons.






I expect Wood Dempster would have used the consumption figures had they been available to them.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Feb 2, 2009)

Okay, another dumb question, what were the stocks of 87 Octane at the same time, and what was the comparative consumption in that same time period. If it is markedly greater than the 100 Octane consumption, wouldnt that indicate a continued dominance of the use of that fuel grade in the squadrons????


----------



## Juha (Feb 2, 2009)

hello Parsifal
You must remember that Fighter Command was only one part of RAF, there were also Bomber, Coastal and Training Commands plus maybe also Maintenance Command used some aviation fuel. And IMHO probably at least the Blenheims of 2 Group/BC probably used 100 oct because after converting from Mk Is to Mk IVs in 1939/early 40 only with it they could take full benefit out of the Mercury XV, ie the use of +9 lb boost, and Blenheims desperately needed all extra mphs they could get and many of the 2 Group missions were flown at low level.

Juha


----------



## Kurfürst (Feb 2, 2009)

I believe the consumption of 'other grades' coloumn is practically equiavalent of 87 octane consumption, as it is doubtful that lower octane aviation fuel was used. According to the table, that would be, for example, 14 000 tons of 100 octane avgas against 23 000 tons of 87 octane avgas consumed in September 1940, ie. the majority of consumption, about 2/3s, was 87 octane. According to the table, the sitauation was the same in the month before, with 87 octane being the major fuel type consumed.

However, the tables produced by Williams doesn't seem to match the figures given by Wood and Dampster (I suspect that they are working from the very same AIR document, ie. take note that the July 11 - 11 October 10 1940 period is equivalent of the Q3 1940 and other similiarities, however the part of the document which deals with the actual Q3 consumption is not revealed to public to unknown reasons) as 22 000 ton being issued against about 34 000 tons claimed to have consumed. 

I would say to say that units could in some mysterious way, consume more fuel than they were issued, is very interesting notion, but not a likely possibilty in our physical reality. 

Another oddity about the tables produced by Williams is the disparity between the *'Table II - Consumption'* and the first document *'Annexure A'*. 

While the former shows that no 100 octane fuel was consumed at all until June 1940, and all consumption constituted of 'other grades' (~87 octane), the 'Annexure A' document show the 'actual consumption in the second quarter' of 1940 (ie. April-June) as 18,100 tons. Curiously enough, there is no reference given for this former table of consumption. Allegedly it is found in the National Archieves, but with the reference withheld, it is ensured it cannot be checked. Given the inconsistencies and the circumstances, there is something fishy here.

Add to that, as was referenced in the 7th meeting in May, the_ 'Oil Committe made its position clear'_ to Fighter Command in the Sixth meeting, which sound very much like the material in the Australian Archieves about the suspension of 100 octane conversions due to inadequate reserves in May. I find it noteworthy, that neither Glider nor Williams is willing to reveal the contents of this meeting and the preceding meetings.

In any case, none of the documents so far show any reference to the number of Squadrons that used 100 octane fuel in 1940, expect for the March 1939 which reveals that 16 + 2 were intended, conversion starting in the end of 1939. The 7th meeting also speaks of '_Squadrons concerned_', indicating the new fuel was allocated _to select Squadrons only_.

This March 1939 decision _may_ have been overridden later. However, if this would be the case and the number of Squadrons were to be increased in a later decision, doubtlessly it would be waved around all over the place. 

But there's no such waving of evidence, in fact, whenever the question arises what position was made clear by the Oil Committee before the 7th meeting in May 1940, the silence is deafening.

BTW the question of German avgas situation was raised earlier in this thread by Glider, perhaps the following paper is of value to that discussion. Appearantly, German reserve stocks of avgas were between 600-680 000 tons, the actual consumption being 80-100 000 tons per month.


----------



## Kurfürst (Feb 2, 2009)

Glider said:


> By the way the 800,000 tons reserve wasn't just for fighter command and was never met but I think that even would agree that it didn't stop us using it.



Certainly.

But, at the present state of evidence, it seems that 16 Fighter Squadrons and 2 twin (Blenheim) engined bomber Squadrons were the only ones eligible to receive the new fuel type.

What position was made clear by the Oil Committee to Fighter Command in May, Glider?

Would it be an accurate summary that :_...actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply)._


----------



## Glider (Feb 2, 2009)

Read my first two posts Kurfurst. The timeline and meanings are laid out and defined. Everything in those posts is supported by official documents and your statements are no more than a conspiracy theory. 

I don't know what the actual words or minutes of the meeting of 7 May are, just the paper that you have seen.

The difference is I am saying that I don't know, but I also believe that you don't know either, but you are working on an assumption that you do know. If you did have the paper and it supported your theory, then you would have posted it.

Your whole argument is based on an assumption of what was said in that meeting and of course the Australian paper and I am becoming more convinced that you don't have access to the Australian Paper either and probably never have had a copy.

We agree that it is the responsibility of the person making the statement to support that statement with evidence. So supply that evidence.


----------



## Juha (Feb 2, 2009)

Kurfürst
Quote:” While the former shows that no 100 octane fuel was consumed at all until June 1940, and all consumption constituted of 'other grades' (~87 octane), the 'Annexure A' document show the 'actual consumption in the second quarter' of 1940 (ie. April-June) as 18,100 tons.”

Are You desperate or incapable to read even a simple table? The Consumption table clearly shows that before June 40 Aviation fuel consumption is given as total, without dividing it between 100 oct and other grades, that’s why the first 3 consumption figures are given in middle, between the columns “100 Octane” and “Other Grades”.
Now can you give a source, book or document which says that only ¼ of FC fighters used 100 oct fuel during the BoB, I mean other than “I think” or “an Australian”. In Hurricane vs Bf 110 thread others gave at least some 6 books/articles that says that FC converted to 100 oct before the BoB, can you give even a couple that say that ¾ of FC fighters used 87oct fuel during the BoB? “The generally accepted fact” is that FC fighters used 100 oct during the BoB, if you think otherwise, please produce some generally acceptable proof to back up your position.

Juha


----------



## pbfoot (Feb 2, 2009)

pbfoot said:


> an article by Bill Gunston
> "One vital factor often overlooked in accounts of the BoB was the power increase RAF aircraft obtained from using 100 octane fuel. To get an octane rating of 100 required a very complicated process which done on a commercial scale required a large and exspensive refinery plant. Though Dr. SF Birch of Anglo -Iranian's laboratory at Sunbury on Thames was the pioneer of this alkylation process it was the US Army Air Corp that pioneered 100 octane aviation fuel . Probably nothing would have happened in Britain had it not been for a great engine man Air Commodore Rod Banks who Jan 1937 urged that RAF engines should be able to use 100 octane " even if the supply of such fuel were limited, because the use of high -duty equipment might prove decisive in the air in the early stages of a war"
> Accordingly , two British emgines one of them the Merlin ,were tested and developed to run on 100 octane which was available only from abroad . Eventually an outstanding fuel called BAM 100 ( British Air Ministry 100) was developed , and the first cargo was shipped to Britain from the ESSO refinery in Aruba in June 1939. The Air Ministry stockpile the valuable fuel which was dyed a distinctive green the fact remained unknown to german intelligence. This stockpiling went on throughout the war , but in may 1940 when the chips were down and everything counted the RAF began to use the special fuel in the Merlins of Fighter Command"


this piece that I typed word for word answers the date for start of use IMHO


----------



## Vincenzo (Feb 4, 2009)

i noted before of BoB they estimed consume of 100 octane for julliet/december in ~94K tons of 100 octane spirit, the actually consume for june/december it's only ~72K tons, it's logic that consume up the estime with BoB but not, maybe there are some change in the units planned of use it, late in october they estimated a consume of 31K fot november/december and actually consume was 31K


----------



## gavinb (Feb 7, 2009)

Kurfurst,

I'm afraid a lengthy response on the responsible handling of historical evidence appears to be required. Quoting, at second-hand, a secondary source as a reference which cannot be traced or supported by any primary source evidence is not sufficient to overcome the wealth of primary source evidence that I have cited in my article, or that Mike Williams and Glider have posted in this forum. If you want that reference to be taken seriously, then please cite an available primary source reference to the alleged War Cabinet decision that the roll-out of 100-octane needed to be stopped due to supply shortages in May 1940. Absent such evidence, the Australian paper quoted is clearly in error, You may prefer to believe it for your own reasons, but it is not a historically-credible source.

Re: the references I posted: they were cited accurately to enable you (and any other reader) to view them for yourselves; this is standard practice in any historical thesis or article subject to publication. If you are unable to accept my handling of the references concerned, and are unwilling to wait for Glider or Mike Williams to go to Kew, take digital photos and post them on this forum, then I suggest you use the facility available on the PRO website to order photocopies of the relevant documents yourself. 

My thesis, if this requires further clarification after my original posting on this forum, is that 100-octane fuel was supplied from a diversity of sources within and outside the US (in contrast to the received wisdom), but also was in widespread use during the Battle of Britain, as a mass of incontravertable primary source evidence demonstrates (in conformity with the received wisdom). Yes, you have quoted one decision mentioned in my article about the planned use of 100-octane fuel in selected squadrons in 1939. However you then ignore the text and references which then indicate that this decision was overtaken by others. Highlighting that first decision without exploring the subsequent changes to it is either mistaken or dishonest. If you cite my work again, I would ask you to make it clear that I have explictly and publically disagreed with your revisionist appreciaton of the use of 100-octane in Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain. 

>As for the 10th August meeting, it does note that they intended to use 100 octane fuel for all operational aircraft of all Commands; from the actual rate of fuel consumption by type of fuel, it is also clear that this remained a plan and did not materialize.

I suggest you substantiate this assertion with some convincing original source material. Then you can start instructing me on the requirements for evaluating historical evidence to support a hypothesis. Now for the conclusions from this Australian paper which you reproduce:

_The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time._

And yet the decisions for Fighter Command and then all operational units to use the fuel are recorded in May and August 1940, as are the levels of reserve involved, and the levels of anticipated importation which made it clear that the war reserve figure would be reached in 1941 despite beginning the operational use of the fuel. Please don't bother to quote this text again without some original source material to support the assertions in it, as it is clearly and convincingly contradicted by the original sources from the relevant bodies in the Air Ministry and Committe of Imperial Defence which have already been cited.

What concerns me is the selective use of evidence in this thread. To echo Glider's comments to another participant, this is not a debate or discussion, merely a futile exercise in which some posters go to substantive efforts to produce primary source material to refute a belief held by another poster which remains impervious to such evidence. On the basis of the evidence posted so far, there is no illusiary 'middle ground' here between two competing but legitimate opininions. Your view is mistaken. If you disagree with that, then start dealing with the evidence that contradicts your opinion and start assembling some credible evidence which supports that opinion.


----------



## gavinb (Feb 7, 2009)

Mike, thank you for the kind words, but even more for the evidence on the operational use of the fuel you have posted here (thanks also to Glider in that respect). I must admit, my intentions in my article were simply to challenge the perceived impact of 100-octane in the BoB and also the attribution of national origin to the fuel used, rather than demonstrate that it was used at all, which still appears to a rather exceptional interpretation. I did check some station ORB's in 11 Group for evidence of 100-octane supplies, which was patchy, e.g. Hornchurch clearly had it, as indicated from other sources (including rail deliveries of SO (NY) contracts in 1937-9, but it wasn't mentioned in the April-May 1940 ORB (note for Kurfurst before he jumps on it - other stations _did_ record it). The 611 Sqn ORB is particularly useful in that respect, so thanks for that.


----------



## merlin (Feb 7, 2009)

Interesting discussion everyone.
Can anyone supply the different max speeds for the Hurricane Spitfire.
1939/40 - standard propeller
1940 - new constant speed propeller
1940 - with also 100 octane fuel.

However, to add to the on going discussion, I'll add a couple of quotes:
From Wilfred Freeman's biography p.94/95 -
"The RAF had been using 87 octane for some years, but a change to the higher grade would permit safe use of higher supercharger pressures (boost), and extract the maximum value from the new engines and variable pitch propellers. the production capacity of German refineries was estimated to be roughly 970,000tpa of 100 octane by 1938, and it was clear that to remain competitive, the RAF would have to start using 100 octane fuel for operational aircraft as soon as possible.
Free world production of 100 octane fuel at this point was roughly 1,000,000 tpa, of which Britain contributed only 125,000, and Freeman urged the Government to establish capacity to meet potential deficiencies as a matter of the utmost importance, recommending the erection of three huge new hydrogenation plants one in britain fro 200,000 and two in Trinidad, one for 200,000 and one for 300,000 tpaat a total cost of £9m."
After Treasury amendments on 7 March 1939 authority was given to construct two new refineries with a capacity of 720,000 tpa, with another one being sanctioned after the outbreak of war.
And -The Battle of Britain by Richards Hough P.35
By March '40 Fighter Command was beginning to convert its Merlin-engined Hurricanes and Spitfires to accept 100 octane fuel. Hurricanes in France during the brief French campaign were still running on blue 87 octane, and it came as a considerable shock to Me 109 pilots in particular who witnessed the startling improvement in the performance of both the Hurricane and Spitfire from July 1940 onwards. Adolf Galland confessed that he was puzzled by the improvement of the enemy's performance until late in August when fuel from a crashed RAF fighter was analysed. The Luftwaffe operated thoughout of 87 octane fuel.


----------



## Glider (Feb 7, 2009)

The following gives some good details on the Hurricane
Hurricane Mk I Performance


----------



## gavinb (Feb 7, 2009)

Merlin, the sources quoted from the PRO AVIA 10 series come from Freeman's papers at the PRO, and date from his time as Air Member for Development and Production on the Air Council; this is one of the main sources for Anthony Furse's biography which you refer to.

I referred to the relevant performance improvements involved in using 100-octane fuel and the constant-speed variable-pitch propeller with the Spitfire IA and IIA in my article. These were taken from Alfred Price's _The Spitfire Story_ but also confirmed by checking the relevant A&AEE reports in the PRO AVIA 18/682. These are complicated by the marginal dissimilarity of the aircraft used for test purposes, but their specification, weight and finish were close enough for representative purposes.

Basically, a Spitfire I on 87-octane and a two-position, fixed pitch propeller could achieve 366 mph at 20,000 ft, and take 11 mins 24 seconds to climb to that height.

A similar aircraft on 87-octane and a constant-speed, variable-pitch propeller could achieve 353 mph at 20,000 ft, and take 7 mins 42 seconds to climb to that height.

A Spitfire IIA on 100-octane and CS/VP prop could do 351 mph at that height, and take 7 mins exactly to climb to that height.

I used these figures to indicate that the adoption of the CS/VP prop improved Spitfire performance by 33%, with the use of 100-octane fuel improving it by a further 7%.

At the risk of self-promotion, I'll refer you to my article for a fuller treatment of the various secondary sources concerning the use of 100-octane fuel in the BoB, including Hough Richards. To summarise, the original sources mentioned in this thread (and with digital photos kindly provided by other participants) trump those secondary sources.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 8, 2009)

It seems a pretty convincing argument to me that 100 octane was in widespread usage during the battle by the RAF. I ahve read that this conferred substantial performance improvements to the RAF fighters engaged.

However, the German supporters of this forum have been quick to point out that the Germans also developed and used higher Octane fuels (it should be noted that the german rating system is not directly comaparable to the allied octane rating system). My basic question is this.....did the Germans actually introduce higher octaned rating fuels, and if so, when did this begin to occur?


----------



## Juha (Feb 8, 2009)

Parcifal
late 40 LW got some DB 601N engines which used C3 fuel, 96 oct. But those engines were scare and they argued at highest levels of LW for ex how to divide 240 of them between 109s and 110s and how many to reserve. One can see which a/c got the engine by N sign, for ex Bf 109E-4/N. Early 109Fs had also DB 601N engines but G series was powered by DB 605A engine up to say mid/late 44 and it used again B4 fuel which was 87 oct. Those octane numbers are bit misleading IIRC late C3 was close to British 100/150 oct fuel in performance.

So LW got higher octane fuel in limited operational use in late 40 and it was the fuel used in 109F-1s and F-2s, (IIRC DB601E switched back to B4 fuel (engine of 109F-3s and -4s)) and all 109Es and 110s which had sign /N. But then LW mostly switched back to B4 but IIRC 190As used C3. And from say mid 44 onwards the use of C3 increased again. 

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Feb 9, 2009)

So is it fair to say that whereas the allies were using 100 Octane ona very widespread basis , from an early date, the Germans were later in their adoption of the fuel, and then only introduced it on a limited scale.....


----------



## Glider (Feb 9, 2009)

I did ask Kurfurst about the use of 100 Octane in the Luftwaffe and IIRC it was about 100 Me110's had this during the BOB, but I am not aware of what the improvement was in performance terms.


----------



## merlin (Feb 9, 2009)

Ref my post 57:-

Thanks 'glider' for the webpage - very interesting - curiously I'd thought the max speed for the Hurricane 1 was 324 mph (with rotol), what a 'drag' that thick wing must have been!

Thanks 'gavinb' for the Spitfire stats - though with the two - is there an extra 'mph' figure to be added via the five seconds boost!? Or am I misinterpreting?

And 'gavinb' I do know the difference between primary secondary information. Though, as often as I re-read it - I am still puzzled why you felt the need to go on about it! 
I thought my post gave a little interesting background information - e.g. that the RAF believed the Luftwaffe had access to 100 Octane. And likewise with the German reaction to the apparent improvement in RAF fighter performance. If you intepreted it differently - that's up to you. 

On a lighter note (pun intended) I asked my Father for his recollections, but at nearly ninety they may not be as good as there could be. nevertheless - he mentioned that apart from the 'blue' and 'green' there was also a 'clear' - 'just for gipsy moth type engines' though sometimes it did find its way into cars! Yet he also mentioned that his cigarette lighter ran on 100 octane!


----------



## gavinb (Feb 20, 2009)

Merlin,

Re: the Spitfire stats: 100-octane gave no benefit in performance above the full-throttle height of the engine, hence the maximum speed figures at 20,000 ft (about 1,000 - 2,000 ft above the FTH of the Merlin III engines used by Spitfire I and Hurricane I's in the BoB). It did provide a benefit to take-off and maximum continuous climbing power, which is reflected in the time to height figures.

I'm glad you know the difference between primary and secondary information; my point is that both my article and several posts here reference the primary sources of Freeman's own AMDP papers. I think the reason for emphasising this should become clear if you read Kurfurst's posts in this thread, and the sources he bases his opinion on. This distinction is relevant, as I can say that the primary sources involve indicate that 100-octane *was* supplied to the RAF in France before the BoB. I can also state from my own research in the BP archives that the only 100-octane the British recovered from the fuel tanks of downed German aircraft during the BoB came from captured British stocks. For more on the same subject, I've detailed how Hough Richard's account of the use of 100-octane can be challenged in my article. But I think that's enough from me on this issue for now.


----------



## Glider (Feb 20, 2009)

GavinB
I would like to thank you for your input in this thread, I have appreciated your comments and even at this late stage your information on the 100 octane recovered from German aircraft are very interesting.
Thanks Again


----------



## merlin (Feb 22, 2009)

I have another quote!! Though I'm sure gavinb win't mind me using as it bears out his thesis.

Anyway the source is 'Wings of War', Edited by Laddie Lucas, where 
"Airmen of all nations tell their stories 1939-1945" 
P.56 'Death strikes the Arctic' relating to 263 Squadron, led by Squadron Leader J. W. Donaldson - 'Baldy', and its Gladiators on the frozen waters of lake Lesjaskog in Central Norway. The story was set down by Group Captain Stuart Mills - then flight commander in the squadron.
P.57
"The crew of Glorious, which had been hurriedly recalled from a long spell in the Mediterranean, was in poor, even mutinous mood. They had had no shore leave with their families after a protracted absence abroad.
D'Oyly-Hughes, the ship's captain, wanted the squadron to take off on 24 April at a point about 300-350 miles off the Norwegian coast and fly in from there to Lake Lesjaskog. He knew we had no maps of the landing area.
We felt this to be quite unreasonable. Baldy therefore asked the captain if we could be put off much closer in - 150 mile off Norway. Because we had no maps, he also asked that two navy Skua aircraft be put up to lead us to the frozen lake.

*Having got down on Lake Lesjaskog, the squadron found there were no refuelling tankers, only 4-gallon fuel cans and these were full of 100 instead of 87 octane spirit. This meant the engines would overheat and in due course seize up.*


----------



## Kurfürst (May 6, 2009)

gavinb said:


> My thesis, if this requires further clarification after my original posting on this forum, is that 100-octane fuel was supplied from a diversity of sources within and outside the US (in contrast to the received wisdom), but also was in widespread use during the Battle of Britain, as a mass of incontravertable primary source evidence demonstrates (in conformity with the received wisdom).



Dear 'gavinb' 
(if you wouldd kindly permit, I am having some doubts about your identity),

Would you kindly support us something a bit more substantial, than you repeated, but hollow referrals to 'a a diversity of sources' and 'a mass of incontravertable primary source evidence', to your thesis that 100 octane fuel was in 'widespread use during the Battle of Britain'. 

It would be also very kind of you if you'd define with more accuracy, what do you mean under the term 'widespread'. 

Would my understanding be correct in that when you use this term, you use it because you have no solid idea of the extent of use, and perhaps being a bit wishful? 



gavinb said:


> Yes, you have quoted one decision mentioned in my article about the planned use of 100-octane fuel in selected squadrons in 1939. However you then ignore the text and references which then indicate that this decision was overtaken by others.



I have re-read the article by Gavin Bailey (and here again I must stress my doubt your identity), and have found no such 'context'. 

Considering the article by Mr. Bailey has only limited availability, and that others cannot possible verify that this would claim that this decision was 'overtaken by others', would you kindly quote the part of the article that says so ?



gavinb said:


> Highlighting that first decision without exploring the subsequent changes to it is either mistaken or dishonest.



Again I must stress the doubts about your alleged identity, and that Mr. Bailey's article would contain any such reference to 'subsequent changes' in the nature you seem to find there.



gavinb said:


> If you cite my work again, I would ask you to make it clear that I have explictly and publically disagreed with your revisionist appreciaton of the use of 100-octane in Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain.



Dear Sir, for you to make such demands, we have to first make sure about your identity, and as I have noted, I have some severe doubts on this front, largely fuelled by the habit of some on this board to use alternate logins, the striking similarity of your style and arguments with them, which you display in the rest of your post - ie. willfully ignoring the fuel consumption documents already posted in this thread. 

I must also take note, in sake of historical accuracy, that your claims that the only 100 octane fuel found in German wrecks were of British origin, is decidedly false, or ill-informed. 
These are easily verifiable from British reports about the analysis of the captured fuel samples, which identified the German C-3 'green' fuel very early on. The use of 100 octane fuel by the Luftwaffe from July 1940 the latest is also well documented. Considering the fact 100-octane DB 601N engine was in production since late 1939, and that by mid-1940 over 1200 of these engines had been produced, coupled with the fact that the _pre-war_ British decision to invest into fuel facilities capable of producing 100 octane fuel were partially fuelled  by the knowledge that Germany _already had such capacity_, your implication that the Luftwaffe would have to rely of captured stocks from France for its 100 octane fighters seems to be somewhat reaching.


----------



## gavinb (Aug 3, 2009)

Dear 'Kurfurst'. In response to your claims that I am impersonating myself, I would like to point out that my contact details (including an email and postal address) have been publicly-available since the publication of the relevant article, e.g. on the EHR website, here -

The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain -- Bailey CXXIII (501): 394 -- The English Historical Review

I note that, to this point, I have received no communication from you or anybody claiming to be you in regard to confirming my identity, despite having received several emails and letters from others in regard to my EHR article. 

I also note that you post under a pseudonym without revealing your full identity.

It is clear that you disagree with the content and conclusions of my research, but I am afraid if you want to refute them, you will be required to engage with the sources which have been cited. Until you do so, and based on the evidence you have posted so far in this thread, your disagreement has no merit. 

You go on to state the following - 

_I must also take note, in sake of historical accuracy, that your claims that the only 100 octane fuel found in German wrecks were of British origin, is decidedly false, or ill-informed._

I direct you to Document file number 043697, in the BP Archive at Warwick University, and specifically to 'Petroleum Board Enemy Oils Fuels Committee. A Survey of the Results Obtained to Date in the Examination of Enemy Fuel Samples', by D. A. Howes, dated 4 November 1940. This used fuel samples taken from 29 crashed Luftwaffe aircraft between November 1939 and September 1940, and, exclusive of one sample of captured British 100-octane, revealed octane ratings which varied between 87.5 and 92.2 octane. The results were summarised by H. E. Snow to Sir William Fraser on 13 November 1940 as follows (and I quote from the original document):

'No general indication [of] iso-octane or other synthetics. The only 100 octane fuel identified was definitely captured British.'

I leave any remaining readers of this thread to draw their own conclusions about who has been posting 'false or ill-informed claims' at this point.


----------



## Micdrow (Aug 3, 2009)

Ok before this gets out of hand I suggest you both keep this civil and on topic!!!!


----------



## gavinb (Aug 4, 2009)

Micdrow,

In threads on the use of 100-octane fuel in the Battle of Britain hosted on this site, the poster known as Kurfurst has, aside from accusing me of making false claims;

1. Misrepresented and selectively distorted the results of my published work (in 'Hurricane vs.Bf-110' thread, on 1 January 2009 and repeated subsequently).

2. Ignored citations from original Air Ministry documents which disprove his belief (my post as 'gavinb' in 'Use of 100 Octane Fuel in the RAF during BOB' on 31 January 2009).

3. Been unwilling or unable to supply proof of his assertions when challenged (e.g. my post on 7 February 2009).

4. Accused me of lying about my identity without, apparently, having taken the most elementary steps to confirm it (his post of 5 June 2009). He has subsequently repeated this accusation elsewhere.

I suggest my responses have been entirely reasonable attempts to prevent somebody misrepresenting my work during which I have had to deal with accusations that I have impersonated myself. This would be comic if it wasn't for the issues of integrity which are involved. Having re-read my posts on this forum, I believe they have been a) entirely on-topic and b) remarkably civil in tone in the circumstances.


----------



## Micdrow (Aug 4, 2009)

gavinb said:


> Micdrow,
> 
> In threads on the use of 100-octane fuel in the Battle of Britain hosted on this site, the poster known as Kurfurst has, aside from accusing me of making false claims;
> 
> ...




Then if you felt insulted by it you should have reported it to a moderator through a pm or there is also a report link that goes to all moderators and we will look into it. Same goes for Kurfurst.

Bottom line is bickering distracts from the whole thread and then the whole subject gets lost. Bottom line is the insults will now stop on both sides or infractions will happen to whom ever fails to follow the rules.

Now lets get back on subject for this topic. If you want to talk more on this subject then you can PM me or one of the other moderators but for the most part I'm done with the subject and this will move on or the thread will be locked if the bickering continues.


----------



## Matt308 (Aug 4, 2009)

That's loud and clear from my end. Pay heed to Micdrow's words. Otherwise all parties may find themselves arguing somewhere else.


----------



## gavinb (Aug 5, 2009)

Micdrow,

Please re-read my posts, and particularly the last one. I am surprised and disappointed to see exactly when and where the prospect of censorship by moderators in this thread has actually appeared. 

This has nothing to do with 'insults' or ad-hominems, at least from my end; absent Kurfurst's public accusation of impersonation I would not have responded in this forum again. If your moderation policy is being engaged to deny an author the facility to challenge erroneous statements about their work posted on your forum, or to respond to erroneous challenges to their identity also posted on your forum, then I believe - to say the least - that policy requires examination. As for arguing somewhere else, I have already been compelled to respond to Kurfurst's allegations of impersonation elsewhere. As they appeared to originate on this forum, I believe a public response here was appropriate. 

I don't intend to waste any more of my time on this, but I do reserve the right to respond to further misrepresentations of my work or false allegations made about me in your forum or elsewhere, as I believe you or anybody else would.


----------



## Micdrow (Aug 5, 2009)

gavinb said:


> Micdrow,
> 
> Please re-read my posts, and particularly the last one. I am surprised and disappointed to see exactly when and where the prospect of censorship by moderators in this thread has actually appeared.
> 
> ...



I'm sorry to hear that Gavin but as you keep saying that this has happened in multiple locations on the forum and does not appear to be stopping any time soon including on another forum some where else. You said it your self moderation is not easy nor always popular and this one is one of those times. 

This topic has gone off in a none to civil tone and causing grief with both sides its seems. The easiest way to fix the problem which as an author and something that you don't like is censor ship. Both sides where warned wheither one is in the right or not. This should have been handled with PM's.

Well to keep the peace its some times necessary for the good of all to lock the thread. In this case if you are worried that some one will misinterpret your work then I can delete the whole thread so you dont have to worry about your work being misinterpeted or coming back. I will email Glider and ask him to start a new one for those that wish to talk about it and you wont have to worry about some one misinterpreting your work. 

Frankly I would rather have you stick around but from what Ive read you mind is probably made up.


----------

