# This Day in the Battle of Britain



## Njaco (Jul 4, 2010)

In recognition of the 70th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain, I'm starting a thread about the daily actions. I'll be starting this on the most accepted date of 10 July which is in a few days but before that I wanted to set the scene, so to speak by giving my sources, the combantants strengths, what machines were used and who were the heros of the battle. I understand that with a fluid battle its sometimes difficult to pinpoint a start or end to something but in this case it will be the 10th. There were numerous phases of which I will be going with the accepted 4 but when they started and ended is up to debate. I will be using the following:

10 July - 7 August - Channel convoy Attacks
8 August - 6 September - Attack of RAF Airfields
7 September - 30 September - London Bombed and Other cities
1 October - 31 October - Beginning of the Blitz

For this post I'm listing all my sources: books I have and several websites that I also gathered info. Below is the list along with authors and the ISBN number if anyone wants to look these books up.

"The Epic of Flight: The Luftwaffe" Time/Life Books 1982 ISBN 0-8094-3339-7
"The Epic of Flight: The RAF At War" Time/Life Books 1982 ISBN 0-8094-3293-5
"World War II: The Battle of Britain" by Leonard Mosley, Time/Life Books 1977 ISBN 76-45540
"The Narrow Margin" by Derek Wood Derek Dempster, Hutchinson and Company 1961 ISBN 0-85052-915-8
"The Battle of Britain" by Marcel Jullian, Grossman Publishers 1967 ISBN 67-12933
"Jagdwaffe: The Battle of Britain" by David Wadman Eddie J. Creek, Classic Publications 2001 ISBN 1-903223-05-9
"Defenders of the Reich: JG 1 1939-1942" by Eric Mombeek, Classic Publications 2001 ISBN 1-903223-01-6
"Bf 109 D/E Aces 1939-41" by John Weal, Osprey Press 1996 ISBN 1-855324-87-3
"The JG 26 War Diary: 1939-1942" by Donald Caldwell, Grub Street 1996 ISBN 1-898697-52-3
"JG 53: 'Pik As'" by John Weal Osprey Press 2007 ISBN 13-978-1-84603-204-2
"Luftwaffe Fighter Units: Europe 1939-41" by Jerry Scutts Osprey Press 1977 ISBN 0-89402-019-6
"German Bombers Over England" by Bryan Philpott, Patrick Stephens Limited 1978 ISBN 0-85059-339-5
"Hurricanes of the 40 Days" by Harold Calin, Belmont Productions 1968
"Duel of Eagles" by Peter Townsend, Simon Schuster 1971 ISBN 79-116510
"Eagle Day" by Richard Collier, Avon Books 1966 ISBN 66-19248
"Strike From the Sky" by Alexander McKee, Lancer Books 1960
"The Sky Suspended" by Drew Middleton, Pyramid Books 1960
"The Luftwaffe War Diaries" by Cajus Bekker, Ballantine Books 1964 ISBN 0-345-28799-1
"A History of the Luftwaffe" by John Killen, Berkley Medallion Books 1967 ISBN 425-01760-5
"Hitler's Luftwaffe" by Tony Wood and Bill Gunston, Crescent Books ISBN 0-517-22477-1
"Hitler's Stuka Squadrons" by John Ward, MBI Publishing 2004 ISBN 0-7603-1991-X
"The Hardest Day" by Dr. Alfred Price, Rigel Publications 1979 ISBN 1-898-80012-X
"The Luftwaffe Data Book" by Dr. Alfred Price, Greenhill Books 1977 ISBN 1-85367-293-9
"Finest Hour" by Tim Clayton and Phil Craig, Simon and Schuster 1999 ISBN 0-684-86930-6
"Spitfire vs Bf 109: Battle of Britain" by Tony Holmes, Osprey Press 2007 ISBN 978-1-84603-190-8

Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain aircraft losses
Bristol Past : Fishponds Local History Society
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN HISTORICAL SOCIETY
The Battle of Britain - Home Page
Hkans Flygsida - The Falco and Regia Aeronautica in the Battle of Britain
Luftwaffe Aces of the Battle of Britain
The timeline of the battle
World War 2 - No. 32 RAF Squadron, May/June 1940
www.wwiidaybyday.com
10 July 1940
Statistics of the Battle of Britain
Battle Losses
 BoB: A German Perspective
Polish Air Force Operational Records
Daily Diary

I am also going to include pics that were either taken on the day in question or depict an event that happened on that day. There will also be maps to guide you through the battle as best as I can.

Above all I'm going to try to do my best to represent exactly what happened that day and hope no controversy erupts from this. 

*ADDITION*
As a companion thread to this one, I would like to suggest that everyone check out Airframes "Bits and Pices" thread. Additional info can be gained from his work into the campaign.

Battle of Britain 'Bits Box'.

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## B-17engineer (Jul 4, 2010)

Godspeed Chris, Godspeed. 

Lookin forward to it!


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 5, 2010)

Njaco said:


> and hope no controversy erupts from this.



I wish you the best of luck on that one

I am looking forward to this thread and hope to learn some new things about the period. I know a lot of historians now consider it to be only a minor battle in the grand scheme of things but I am still interested in how Britain kept on fighting when most sensible opinion was that defeat was inevitable.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 5, 2010)

Very very cool. Looking forward to this as usual.


----------



## Glider (Jul 5, 2010)

Bring it on and I thank you in advance


----------



## Lucky13 (Jul 5, 2010)

Looking forward to it Chris!


----------



## BikerBabe (Jul 5, 2010)

I join the chorus of "looking forward to this".


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jul 5, 2010)

Brilliant, Njaco. Thank you.

MM


----------



## Crimea_River (Jul 5, 2010)

From me too. Looking forward to this.


----------



## rochie (Jul 5, 2010)

good luck Chris, great first picture


----------



## Grummanf6f (Jul 5, 2010)

Great idea looking forward to following it 8)


----------



## Njaco (Jul 5, 2010)

The planes and pilots of the RAF.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 5, 2010)

Pilots and planes of the Luftwaffe.


----------



## Crimea_River (Jul 5, 2010)

Nice Chris but I doubt the 110 is of BoB vintage. It looks like a C-7 (bomb racks on the wings) with the large Wespe on the nose, common to the the Russian campaign.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 5, 2010)

Cool concept Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 6, 2010)

Crimea_River said:


> Nice Chris but I doubt the 110 is of BoB vintage. It looks like a C-7 (bomb racks on the wings) with the large Wespe on the nose, common to the the Russian campaign.



You're right! I couldn't find a decent profile of the 110 so I used one as close to the battle as I could. Good catch!

Tried to make a map showing most of the fighter bases.


----------



## Lucky13 (Jul 6, 2010)

Awesome stuff Chris!


----------



## T Bolt (Jul 6, 2010)

Excellent thread Chris!


----------



## Airframes (Jul 8, 2010)

Great start Chris, and I've been looking forward to this ever since you first told me about it. It'll more than compliment the bits and pieces I'll be posting in the BoB thread in the Modelling Section - which I'm_ still _trying to get together in a presentable fashion, without being too 'bulky' !
I should have some Bf110 profiles from the BoB, and other aircraft, if you need anything. I'll be posting the odd one or two of my own profiles in the other thread, so I'll liase with you, as already briefly discussed.
BTW, you've missed the top off the map, showing the more northern 13 Group airfields! Usworth and Catterick, although involved, were perhaps not so 'busy' as Acklington and Leuchars.


----------



## B-17engineer (Jul 8, 2010)

Fantastic Chris! Appreciate this!


----------



## syscom3 (Jul 8, 2010)

This will be neat!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 8, 2010)

Airframes said:


> Great start Chris, and I've been looking forward to this ever since you first told me about it. It'll more than compliment the bits and pieces I'll be posting in the BoB thread in the Modelling Section - which I'm_ still _trying to get together in a presentable fashion, without being too 'bulky' !
> I should have some Bf110 profiles from the BoB, and other aircraft, if you need anything. I'll be posting the odd one or two of my own profiles in the other thread, so I'll liase with you, as already briefly discussed.
> BTW, you've missed the top off the map, showing the more northern 13 Group airfields! Usworth and Catterick, although involved, were perhaps not so 'busy' as Acklington and Leuchars.



Terry, I want you to add whatever you feel is worth it. This is by no means an end-all to everything (i.e. Stukas removed, etc.). I'll try my best but I know how perceptions can be. I'll try to post facts and everyone else can make up their mind. The map was difficult as there weren't many that I could find with the proper bases and the question is really at what period were these maps showing? 

Heres another map showing radar ranges....


----------



## Airframes (Jul 8, 2010)

No problem Chris. As for the maps, I'm currently working on my own maps, and also hope to produce a satellite image 'map' showing the locations. The RAF airfields were generally the same throughout the Battle, but of course the Squadrons occupying them changed as they rotated. If I don't get the 'satellite map' completed, I'll post a map showing the locations etc, one each for RAF and Luftwaffe.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 8, 2010)

Can't wait to see that!

Some profiles showing basic aircraft formations during the battle.


----------



## FalkeEins (Jul 9, 2010)

..the official 70th anniversary commemoration takes place this Sunday (11 July) at the Battle of Britian memorial at Capel-le Ferne, Kent, in the presence of HRH Prince Michael of Kent.

Battle of Britain Memorial


----------



## Crimea_River (Jul 9, 2010)

Great stuff Chris.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 9, 2010)

If my calculations are right, its 10 July in England right now, so lets begin......


----------



## Njaco (Jul 9, 2010)

*10 JULY 1940 Wednesday*
*THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN: PHASE ONE*
*UNITED KINGDOM*: First light on the 10th July 1940 revealed a typical dirty English Summers day with intermittent driving rain from the North West: ‘Harry clampers’ to the fighter pilots of 11 Group, many of whom drunk their early morning cup of tea or turned over in bed for a lie in. The first phase of what was soon to be known as the Battle of Britain commenced with the Luftwaffe conducting major attacks on Channel convoys. The bulk of the attacks were in the south where the Luftwaffe went on probing attacks on British shipping in the English Channel and in the outer Thames Estuary. Smaller raids, and a number of German reconnaissance aircraft were spotted along the east coast while other nuisance raids took place in the north. At first light, almost every day, the Germans had been sending out weather and recognisance flights to photograph the previous days targets, possible future targets and to report on the weather. Do 17s, Do 215s or Ju 88s were usually used for this task, which included attacks on convoys if conditions allowed. They took advantage of cloud cover wherever possible and were often difficult to pick out on the radar sets. During this phase, London remained unscathed. Most of these attacks in the Channel were on the merchant convoys bringing much needed coal, raw materials, machinery and foodstuffs to Britain. By sinking these merchant ships Germany would deny the British people of the various commodities required just for their sheer existence.

But at the same time, by attacking these channel convoys, it was hoped that the Luftwaffe would draw out the British fighters from their bases. This way the Luftwaffe could analyze the strength of the RAF and determine the speed and the efficiency that the RAF could deploy its squadrons. To achieve this the Luftwaffe assigned General Lörzer’s II Fliegerkorps and General von Richthofen’s VIII Fliegerkorps the task of securing air superiority over the English Channel and its convoys. A battlegroup consisting of KG 2, II./StG 1, IV(Stuka)./LG 1 and other units were concentrated into a shipping strike force under the Geschwaderkommodore of KG 2, Oberst Johannes Fink, who was given the title Kanalkampfführer or Leader of the Channel Battle. But the battlegroup wasn't up to strength to commence operations so only Channel convoys were targeted until sufficient planes and ammunition were gathered.

For the next two or three weeks, the Luftwaffe was quite content on attacking the convoys in the English Channel, some of the conflicts included just a couple of Ju 87s dive bombing individual or small convoys, others included using U-boats while some of the larger convoys were attacked by numbers of Do 17s backed up by German Artillery from the French coast. The skies over the Channel were a criss cross pattern of vapor trails, then suddenly a Ju 87 would come hurtling in a near vertical dive sometimes hotly pursued by a Spitfire or Hurricane. Depending where one was watching from, depended on the sky show to be seen, but the two areas that seemed to attract the most action was an area between the Isle of Wight and Weymouth, and the other was the in the vicinity of the Dover Straights which had now been given the name of "Hellfire Corner".

At 0815 hours a lone Dornier 17z of KG 3 on a recon mission at about 10,000 feet was intercepted by Spitfires from RAF No. 66 Sqd. P/O Charles Cooke led the section and as the Spitfires peeled off one by one, engines roaring, the crew of the Dornier spotted them and soon it was weaving and sliding in a desperate effort to evade the gunfire from the Spitfires. Oblt. Bott, who had taken off from Antwerp on the recce flight at dawn fought hard to survive, manoeuvring the aircraft to give his three gunners repeated opportunities to knock out the two attacking Spitfires, but the eight guns of the second aircraft soon overwhelmed the Dornier, killing Bott and his second in command, Lt. Schroeder. The gunners in the Dornier tried in vain in warding off the Spits but to no avail. The Spitfires continued to harass the bomber and in the melee P/O Cooke's windscreen was hit and a hole developed in the canopy letting in extremely cold air. Then one of the Spitfires came up from underneath, firing at the Dornier with all eight Browning's and went in close and the Dornier went into a banking glide bellowing smoke until it hit the sea between Yarmouth and Harwich.

At approximately 1100 hours the convoy "Bread" was sighted off Manston by one Dornier 17 escorted by ten Bf 109s. Immediately the German radio operator dispatched a message to Kanalfront HQ giving the location of the convoy, size and its present course. The Spitfires of RAF No. 74 Sqd were scrambled and located the Dornier and the Bf 109s - heading for the slower Dornier first, but not before the highly maneuverable 109s turned and got the Spitfires in their sights. Two of the Spitfires were hit, but not bad enough to put them out of action They kept their course and as they approached firing range of the Dornier, they opened fire. Immediately the front cockpit of the bomber exploded in smoke and flame. The Dornier went down low and the Spitfires weaved and turned and engaged in a dogfight with the Messerschmitt escort. The two Spitfires that were hit were forced to return to Hornchurch while the other four remained for a while. Only one Bf 109 was hit and received minor damage. The Germans were reinforced by another group of about twelve aircraft just as the Spitfires of RAF No. 610 Sqd arrived and the remaining four Spitfires of RAF No. 74 Sqd returned back to base. RAF No. 610 Sqd scored no 'kills' but managed to stop the 109s and they headed back towards the French coast. In this combat, RAF No. 74 Sqd had two of its Spitfires damaged over the Channel while one Spitfire of RAF No. 610 Sqd had to make a forced landing at Hawkinge after being hit during the same combat.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 9, 2010)

_(10 July 1940 continued.....) _
The transmission that the Dornier made at 1030 hours was received loud and clear back in France. At 1350 hours British radar picked up a strong signal that a German formation was coming across the French coast just west of Calais and heading in the general direction of Folkestone. This was the largest number of German bombers ever seen coming across the Channel at that time. The main force was twenty-six Do 17s of III./KG 2 spread in three groups, thirty Bf 110s of I./ZG 26 and twenty Bf 109s of III./JG 51. The 'scramble' order went out to Manston, Biggin Hill, Croydon, Hornchurch and Kenley from which the following squadrons were scrambled: RAF No. 56 Sqd, RAF No. 32 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No. 111 Sqd (Hurricanes), the Spitfires of RAF No.74 Sqd while Kenley sent out six Spitfires of RAF No.64 Sqd towards the closing stages of the battle. As a feint for the attack, a single Ju 88 of II./LG 1 was sent to Bristol but soon aborted the mission.

The Dorniers turned and headed for the convoy just as the British fighters arrived on the scene. The Spitfires of RAF No.74 Sqd and the Hurricanes of RAF No. 56 Sqd and RAF No. 32 Sqd engaged the Bf 109s and the Bf 110s while the Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Sqd went straight in and attacked the Dorniers. The Bf 110s immediately formed a defensive circle and it was left up to the fighters of III./JG 51 to protect the bombers. Soon the throng of warplanes were joined by more fighters from II./JG 51, bringing a total of thirty British fighters engaged with seventy German aircraft. The skies off the coast at Folkestone became a maze of vapor trails snaking in all directions. It was a tough dogfight with neither side gaining the upper hand. Hptm. Hannes Trautloft of III./JG 51, remembered;


> “_Suddenly the sky was full of British fighters. Today we were going to be in for a rough time_.”


Or as Lt. Bechtle, piloting a Dornier 17, witnessed,


> "_It was a magnificent dogfight! From a distance, the aircraft looked like bunches of grapes . . . !" _



As the dogfight continued, the Dornier formations started to break up as many of the British fighters began to harass them like dogs snapping at their tails. F/O Tom Higgs of RAF No. 111 Sqd took on a lone Dornier firing off numerous rounds towards the weaving bomber that was desperately trying to evade the pursuing Hurricane. But Higgs went in closer than his firing range, and with his thumb on the firing button clipped the Dornier with his wing before spinning seawards out of control with one wing missing. The Dornier also spun out of control. Both aircraft crashed into the Channel and a rescue launch that was soon on the scene picked up the pilot of the Dornier and another member of the crew, but there was no sign of the rest of the bomber's crew or of F/O Higgs.

One Bf 109 belly-landed outside Calais, damaged after the battle. Another Bf 109, that of Ofw. Arthur Dau of 7./JG 51 was lost in another collision, this time with a Hurricane of RAF No. 56 Squadron. A Bf 110 of III./ZG 26 was shot down and another damaged. Werner Kreipe of III./KG 2 described the attack on the convoy.


> “_The convoy had been sighted between Dover and Dungeness. Our briefing took only a few minutes, and within a half hour of being airborne we had sighted the coast of Kent. The Channel was bathed in brilliant sunshine . . . A light haze hung over the English coast, and there, far below us, was the convoy, like so many toy ships with wispy wakes fanning out behind. As soon as we were observed, the ships of the convoy dispersed, the merchantmen maneuvering violently and the escorting warships moving out at full speed. Anti-aircraft shells peppered the sky. Our fighters now appeared. We made our first bomb run, and fountains leapt up around the ships _. . . _By now the fighter squadrons of the Royal Air Force had joined in, and the sky was a twisting, turning melee of fighters . . . My wing was in the air for three hours in all. We reported one heavy cruiser and four merchant ships sunk, one merchant ship damaged and eleven British fighters shot down or damaged. We had lost two bombers, two twin-engined fighters and three single-engined fighters during the course of this engagement_.”


But despite JG 51’s and Werner Kreipe of KG 2’s claims, only one 700 ton ship was sunk from the convoy "Bread" with three Hurricanes damaged as well as four Spitfires, three Do 17s destroyed with one damaged on crash landing, three Bf 110s shot down and three Bf 109s shot down or damaged on crash landing. The rest of the ships in the convoy were not even attacked and continued their journey.

At 1530 hours sixty Ju 88 bombers from Luftflotte 3 were dispatched to attack the targets of Swansea in Wales and Falmouth in Devon. British 10 Group in the west at this stage had not been formed, so there really was no fighter protection in this part of England. But RAF No. 92 Sqd from Pembury were scrambled but were too late to avoid the bombing by the German bombers. An ammunitions factory was badly damaged at Swansea and Falmouth also suffered considerable damage. Shipping was also hit hard as was destruction to a power station. Thirty people were killed.

At 0515 hours, five HE [High Explosive] bombs fell on Martlesham Aerodrome. No damage was reported. At 0517 hours, two HE bombs (either 100 or 250lbs) fell on Honington Aerodrome one of which fell within 600 yards of the hangar and the other within 400 yards of the same hangar. The Dornier aircraft concerned was reported shot down by RAF No. 66 Sqd. At 0544 hours, seventeen bombs estimated between 50 and 100 lbs each, were dropped on West Raynham Aerodrome, causing minor damage to the plant and setting a hangar on fire. Three Ansons and one Gladiator were burnt out in the hangar. Three Battles and one Tutor were superficially damaged. At 0557 hours, about fourteen bombs fell in a cornfield 300 yards north-east of the Marham Aerodrome. Wires on the road nearby were cut. No damage was reported to the station.

Another dogfight over the Channel later at 1400 hours brought the total for the day to nine British fighters destroyed with three British fighters credited to Oblt. Walter Oesau, the Staffelkapitän of 7./JG 51. Also given credit for destroying Spitfires and Hurricanes for the day were Lt. Erich Hohagen and Lt. Heinz Tornow of 4./JG 51, Uffz. Otto Tange of 4./JG 51, Hptm. Horst Tietzen and Lt. Hans-Otto Lessing of 5./JG 51. Another Spitfire was also credited to Oblt. Josef Priller of 6./JG 51.

By the end of the day, in a view of things to come, the German’s claim of seven aircraft lost along with those just mentioned, seemed heavy as compared to the relatively light losses of the RAF. But even with an actual total of fifteen aircraft lost, the Luftwaffe still believed it had begun to achieve its aim of bringing Fighter Command up to battle and destruction.

The Bf 110 crews of Hptm. Rubensdörffer’s Epr.Gr 210 moved from Köln-Ostheim to the airbase at Denain with the airfield at Calais-Marck to be used as a forward airbase.


----------



## B-17engineer (Jul 9, 2010)

Chris that was just Brilliant!!! I really appreciate the time it took to put together. 

Thanks again!


----------



## Airframes (Jul 9, 2010)

Nice work Chris. I'll chip in now and then, when I've got a few other things sorted.


----------



## Crimea_River (Jul 10, 2010)

Interesting read. First of many, I'm sure!


----------



## Wildcat (Jul 10, 2010)

Good stuff Chris!


----------



## Wayne Little (Jul 10, 2010)

Ditto...Good stuff Chris......the Battle of Britain movie was on the box today too!


----------



## Gnomey (Jul 10, 2010)

Nice work Chris, will be following this one closely.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 10, 2010)

*11 JULY 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*:The morning of the 11th, was typical of what one could expect on an English summers day. Southern England was covered in exceptionally low cloud, and thick fog in many areas would have made flying impossible. In contrast to the events of the previous day, the next few days were very much similar to those of the days leading up to the 10th, that was, spasmodic attacks on coastal shipping in the Channel, recon flights along the English coast, and only a few occasions where the fighters went up and generally engaged air combat on a one-to-one basis. The weather was generally clearer in the west during the morning, and this is where the Germans had to decided to strike.

During the morning from 0600 hours to 0900 hours the Luftwaffe sent several single aircraft on raids to areas between Yarmouth and inland from Flamborough Head. The raids dropped bombs on numerous places including the Royal Engineer Headquarters at Melbourne in Derbyshire. A Do 17 was intercepted during these raids and shot down off Cromer along with a Hurricane from RAF No. 145 Squadron. The pilot, S/L Peter Townsend was picked up by merchant boat after bailing out. During the dawn period, British radar picked up a signal off the east coast near Walton-on-Naze. RAF No.66 Squadron sent out a flight to intercept and found it to be lone recon Do 17. Suffering from damage by the Spitfires, the German bomber lost height as it made its way out over the North Sea, but not before its gunfire hit one of the Spitfires off the coast south of Great Yarmouth.

Near 0800 hours, ten Stukas from IV (Stuka)./LG 1 escorted by twenty Bf 109s were sent to intercept a convoy steaming across Lyme Bay. Six Spitfires of RAF No.609 Sqd were vectored into the area where radar had picked out a blip in the region of Portland. What they found was the formation of Ju 87s. They were just ready to make the engagement when they were pounced on by three Staffeln of Bf 109s. RAF No.609 Sqd lost its Flight Commander, and another Spitfire was shot down. As the German formation crossed the Channel, it was met with six attacking Hurricanes from RAF No. 604 Sqd. with the result that one British fighter was immediately shot down. Reaching the convoy, the Stukas were bounced by another flight of Spitfires, three British fighters positioning themselves to intercept the Stukas while three covered their rear. The escorting Messerschmitts succeeded in breaking through the rear Spitfires and shot down two of the British fighters but no ships were sunk from the attack. One Stuka was lost and another badly damaged.

Between 0900 hours and 1100 hours four raids of single Luftwaffe aircraft flew to England, searching for shipping targets. One Do 17 was caught off Selsey Bill by fighters from RAF No. 601 Squadron and shot down. Another raid bombed Swansea and carried out a shipping reconnaissance of Milford Haven. A Do17 was intercepted by fighters and shot down off Cromer by S/L Douglas Bader of RAF No. 242 Sqn. One Hurricane was shot down during the combat but the pilot was reported safe.

But the first big raid of the day began shortly after 1100 hours when a flight of six Ju 87s from III./StG 2 joined with about thirty Bf 110s from 9./ZG 76 and came over the Cherbourg peninsula and set a course for Portland. The formation surprised a flight of six Hurricanes from RAF No. 601 Squadron near Poole (who were vectored to search for a single aircraft) who promptly turned and dove on the Stukas. Two Ju 87s were shot down before the escorting Bf 110s were able to intervene. Bf 110s also suffered the same fate when several more British squadrons were vectored into the battle. One was piloted by Oberlt Hans-Joachim Goering (nephew of Reichsmarschall Goering), the other by Lt Friedrich-Wolfgang Graf zu Castell. One Bf 110C crashed on Portland Verne, the other went into the sea off Portland. Neither crew survived. Another Bf 110 from 7./ZG 26 was also lost.The British claimed a total of eight Bf 110s shot down along with one He 111 and one Ju 88 destroyed by defending anti-aircraft fire. Five RAF pilots put in a claim for the demise of Staffelkapitean Oblt. Gerhard Kadow of 9./ZG 26 when he survived a crash landing near Wareham in Dorset. One Hurricane, with red and blue checked markings, was lost. The Stuka attack on Portland incurred slight damage, but with the arrival of the Hurricanes, the Stukas had to abort.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 10, 2010)

*11 July 1940 continued....*

The running dogfight exposed the inferiority of the escorting twin-engined fighters. Four Messerschmitts were shot down by pilots of RAF Nos. 238, 87 and the ever-present 601 Squadron throughout the day. The difficulties of the Zerstörer concept were explained by a pilot with V(Z)./LG 1;


> "_I would not say that the British fighters were superior to the Bf 110. Each possessed certain advantages and disadvantages. Under equal conditions much depended on the pilots. But I would like to make one thing clear: the nature of our missions places us at a grave disadvantage compared to the British. The fighter pilot's motto always has been: see and attack at once! But on our missions this applied only to the British. They could initiate their attacks from a safe altitude, where and when they wanted. On the other hand we as direct escorts were tied to our slower-flying bombers. We had to wait until the British attacked, usually in superior numbers. In order for us to have at least some measure of mutual protection in this disadvantageous situation we formed one or two vertically staggered defensive circles." _


The rest of the afternoon the Luftwaffe tried several attacks on convoys off Suffolk but RAF fighter patrols forced the bombers to scatter their bomb loads in the water and little damage was done.

The next major raid for the Luftwaffe was no surprise to the British as radar gave enough of a warning to scramble fighters. Twelve He 111s escorted by twelve Bf 110s crossed over the Isle of Wight and headed for Portland, again. Intercepted by Hurricanes from RAF No 601 Squadron again, the formation was turned back. Guided by accurate AA fire, two RAF squadrons intercepted the Germans and in the ensuing combat, No 601 Sqn shot down 4 He111s of KG 55 and 1 Bf 110's of ZG 76 for certain and 4 He111s probable. As a result of this engagement, a Bf 110 landed near Weymouth practically undamaged and the occupants arrested before they could destroy the aircraft.

At 1744 hours a flight of about fifty He 111s from 2./KG 55 raided Portsmouth Harbour. Fighters from RAF No. 145 Squadron attacked the bombers. The bombers were able to shoot down one RAF fighter but lost three Heinkels; one crashing in Sussex, one in the sea off of Sussex and another that crashed returning to the airfield at Villacoublay. RAF No. 145 Squadron lost a Hurricane during the combat but claimed one Bf 110 and three He 111s shot down. The AA at Portland shot down three enemy aircraft, one He111, 1 Ju88 confirmed and one unidentified enemy aircraft unconfirmed. Bombs fell on Portsmouth setting fire to the gas works and causing some casualties. British pilots reported that during this engagement, German bombers threw out various objects which appeared to be metal turnings, plates and wire, in great quantity.

In the afternoon a flight of British fighters came across a German He 59 seaplane with Red Cross markings escorted by twelve Bf 109s. Diving to the attack, a fierce battle raged between the British and German fighters. One Spitfire, flown by A. C. Deere of RAF No. 564 Squadron collided with a Bf 109 and his plane was damaged but he was unhurt. He was finally able to crash land about five miles outside of Manston. Two Spitfires were destroyed during the battle along with two Bf 109s as P/O J. L. Allen of RAF No. 54 Squadron finally forced the He 59 floatplane down on the Goodwin Sands.

After 2100 hours several raids penetrated into the West Country and bombs were dropped in South Wales, Somerset, Bristol, Portland, Dorchester and Plymouth areas. A few German raids also crossed the East coast and bombs were dropped in the Hull, Ipswich, Harrogate, Doncaster, Colchester and Harwich areas. No serious damage was reported. At 0100 hours, nine Ju 88s of I./KG 51 attacked oil tanks, searchlights and anti-aircraft gun placements at Bristol, Avonmouth and the Portishead docks. On the return flight, a Junkers crashed into the sea and another was lost crashing in France. Several bombs were reported to have exploded in mid-air before reaching the ground and their targets.

Losses: Luftwaffe - 11, Fighter Command - 4

*WESTERN FRONT:* The pilots and crews of II./JG 54 received a new Gruppenkommandeur when Hptm. Winterer was posted as commander of the Gruppe in place of Obstlt Richard Kraut.

The Bf 110s of the Zerstörergruppe V(Z)./LG 1 led by Hptm. Horst Liensberger moved from Alencon to three airfields around Caen, France.


----------



## B-17engineer (Jul 10, 2010)

Great read Chris, thanks !


----------



## Crimea_River (Jul 10, 2010)




----------



## Njaco (Jul 11, 2010)

*12 JULY 1940 Friday*
*UNITED KINGDOM*: Although the weather for the day was cloudy with morning fog over the Channel, coastal shipping continued to provide worthwhile targets for the Luftwaffe. Raids for the day were sporadic and understrength. Most of the action took place off the Essex and Suffolk coastline. He 111 and Do 17 bombers were targeting some of the merchant shipping along one of Britain's busy trade routes. The first action of the day consisted of a flight of twelve German aircraft attacking two convoys - "Agent" off North Foreland and "Booty" twelve miles off Orfordness - in the morning. A second formation of six aircraft followed the first flight. Six RAF fighter sections composed of RAF No. 85 Sqd, RAF No.151 Sqd, RAF No. 242 Sqd, RAF No. 264 Sqd and RAF No. 17 Sqd intercepted the formations and a battle ensued in the cloud and fog. The Hurricanes of RAF No. 85 Sqn (Martlesham Heath) were up early after enemy aircraft had been spotted off the coast near Harwich attacking the convoy codenamed "Booty". P/O John Bickerdyke a New Zealander shot down a bomber whilst protecting the convoy off Orford Ness. Combat just off the East Anglia coast lasted until almost midday with the Hurricanes having accounted for two He 111s. A Hurricane was shot down and another crash landed while the Luftwaffe lost six bombers.

Shortly after 0900 hours a He 111 formation was detected over the North Sea just off the coast near Aberdeen in Scotland where bombers dropped a number of bombs on a shipyard killing twenty-nine people and injuring 100. The German formation was intercepted by fighters from RAF No. 603 Sqd and lost a He 111 from 2./KG 26. Another RAF Hurricane was lost over the sea. RAF N. 151 Sqn F/O J.H.L.Allen a New Zealander was K.I.A. (killed in action) when he flew convoy patrol in Hurricane P3275. He ditched into the sea after combat with a Dornier Do 17 of II./KG 2 at 09:45hrs off Orford Ness. Aberdeen was raided again later by a single aircraft which dropped high explosive bombs. This raid caused twenty-six deaths and seventy-nine casualties and considerable damage to property, including the Hall Russell Co. Iron Works. Many IBs were dropped in region of Bridgehill near Consett. A cow was killed and a house was slightly damaged by fire.

Intermittent raids by the Luftwaffe continued all afternoon. At 1515 hours a Do 17 over Portland was attacked by Hurricanes from RAF No. 501 Sqd. The German bomber evaded destruction but sent a Hurricane crashing into the sea. RAF No. 501 Sqn PO Duncan A.Hewitt in Hurricane P3084, a Canadian, was shot down and killed while attacking a Dornier Do 17 off Portland at 15:45hrs.

A second raid on shipping took place off the Isle of Wight in the early afternoon. At 1555 hours the German bombers dropped their loads between the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth. One bomber, an He 111 from Stab./ KG 55, was attacked by six Hurricanes of RAF No. 43 Sqd as it retreated and crashed into the ‘Horse and Jockey’ pub in Hipley, northwest of Portsmouth Hampshire. The plane still carried a full load of bombs.

Five formations of Luftwaffe Ju 88 bombers raided Cornwall, Devon, Weymouth, Falmouth and St. Eval at about 1640 hours. Intercepted by RAF No. 243 Sqd over the St Eval airfield, one Ju 88 was attacked and seen to have black smoke bellow from its port engine. At nearly the same time several German aircraft reconnoitered the Thames Estuary and the Norfolk coast. At 1642 hours, a trawler off the Essex coast sent out a SOS as it was being attacked by a He111 of 4./KG 53 flown by Uffz Rudolf Franke. The aircraft was shot down and was a shared claim of F/Lt A. G “Sailor”. Malan, P/O P. C. Fasken and Sgt E. A. Mould of RAF No. 74 Sqn.

During the night starting at 2240 hours and lasting until 0117 hours, several raids were carried out over the Portland area and the Scottish coast. Bombs were dropped on Billingham, Thornby, Cupar, Dunfermline and Helensburgh with very little damage caused.

Losses: Luftwaffe - 8, Fighter Command - 6

A Ju87 operating against shipping the in English Channel was seen to have an extra fuel tank under each wing. These tanks could increase the range of the Ju87 to 900 miles with corresponding reduction in its bomb load.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The crews of III./JG 3 led by Hptm. Walter Kienitz transferred from the airfield at Poix and Utrecht to new bases at Guines. Following the “Udet” Geschwader was Hptm. Hans-Heinrich Brustellin’s I./JG 51 who left the airfields at Leeuwarden and also transferred to Guines.

Oberst Josef Kammhuber, formerly of KG 51, was released from his job as Officer with Special Duties of the RLM and C-in-C Luftwaffe and was posted as Geschwaderkommodore of the He 111 flying KG 1, replacing Oblt. Ernst Exss. The ‘Hindenburg’ Kampfgeschwader was based at Rosieres-en-Santerre at this time.


----------



## Wayne Little (Jul 12, 2010)

Keep it coming Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 12, 2010)

*13 JULY 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The day started out very much like the day before with morning fog over southern England. There was very little activity, even by the Luftwaffe. As the conditions seemed to improve during the morning, a couple of attacks were made on the port of Dover. As in the days previous, targets for the Luftwaffe were shipping and convoys. RAF No. 43 Sqn Tangmere (Hurricanes) responded and engaged a force of He111' over the Channel. At 1114 hours a Heinkel He 111 was shot down over Spithead by Hurricanes from RAF No. 43 Squadron. Early afternoon saw a couple of feint attacks on a convoy off the Essex coast near Harwich. Two raids headed for the Isle of Wight. Engaged by Hurricanes of RAF No. 501 Sqd, the formations lost only one Do 17 that crashed west of Southampton.

Later in the afternoon, enemy aircraft were detected again in the Channel area and again attacked the convoy "Bread" off the Dorset coast near Lyme Bay - RAF No. 56 Sqn North Weald (Hurricanes), RAF No. 64 Sqn Kenley (Spitfires) and RAF No. 238 Sqn (Hurricanes) were scrambled to intercept. One Do17 was shot down during the afternoon by RAF No. 238 Sqn while another five were destroyed about 15 miles off Calais at 1800 hours

The Bf 110s of V./LG 1 flew their first major mission of the war, entrusted to attack a convoy along with a formation of twenty Ju 87 Stuka bombers of II./StG 1 off Portland at 1420 hours. Failing to find the target, the forty twin-engined fighters formed a defensive circle, or '_Abwehrkreis_', when Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Sqd and Spitfires of RAF No. 609 Sqd bounced the formation. One Bf 110 was shot down and three others were badly damaged as the defensive maneuver worked. Two Ju 87s were so badly damaged that they crash landed returning to France - one at Cap Gris-Nez and another at Noorfontes. The British lost two Hurricanes from RAF No. 56 Sqd while RAF No. 238 Sqd lost one fighter.

Dover Harbour and a convoy south of the city were the target for a mixed flight of Ju 87 dive-bombers and Bf 109 fighters shortly after 1730 hours. Bounced by Spitfires of RAF No. 64 Sqd, the Jagdflieger suffered several Messerschmitts damaged along with a Ju 87 shot down by anti-aircraft fire. The defending anti-aircraft fire also claimed a Spitfire but the plane managed to land safely.

Reaching the convoy just off the Straits of Dover at 1800 hours the twelve Ju 87’s from StG 1 along with twelve fighters from II./JG 51 attacked. Eleven Hurricanes from RAF No. 56 Squadron attacked the Stukas. The escorting Messerschmitts dove to break up the Hurricanes. Oblt. Josef Fözö, a Staffelkapitän with the II Gruppe of JG 51, described the action;


> "_Unfortunately for them (the Hurricanes), they slid into position directly between the Stukas and our close-support Messerschmitts. We opened fire, and at once three Hurricanes separated from the formation, two dropping and one gliding down to the water smoking heavily. At that instant I saw a Stuka diving in an attempt to reach the French coast. It was chased by a single Hurricane. Behind the Hurricane was a 109, and behind that a second Hurricane, all of the fighters firing at the aircraft in front. I saw the deadly dangerous situation and rushed down. There were five aircraft diving in line towards the water. The Stuka was badly hit and both crewmen wounded; it crashed on the beach near Wissant. The leading Messerschmitt, flown by Fw. John, shot down the first Hurricane into the water, its right wing appeared above the waters like the dorsal fin of a shark before it sank. My Hurricane dropped like a stone close to the one that John had shot down." _


The British lost two Hurricanes in the battle along with two more damaged for a cost to Oblt. Fözö's Gruppe of one Bf 109 from 9./JG 51 destroyed. The British fighters also claimed three Stukas shot down. The Kommodore of JG 51, Oberst Theo Osterkamp was credited with the destruction of one of the Hurricanes for his sixth and last aerial victory of the war. Sgt J.R.Cowsill of RAF No. 56 Sqn in Hurricane (N2432) was shot down and killed over Calais by a Bf 109 of JG 51 at 16:45hrs. Sgt J.J.Whitfield of RAF No. 56 Sqn was hit by gunfire from another Bf109 of JG51 over the Channel and crashed into sea at 1900hrs. Spitfire R6688 was destroyed.

Although two Hurricanes were actually lost, eight JG 51 pilots were given credit for kills including two for Oblt. Josef Fözö and one for Hptm. Horst Tietzen and Oblt. Arnold Lignitz. P/O Michael Robert Mudie from RAF No. 615 Sqn. on convoy patrol off Dover in Hurricane L1584G, was shot down by a Bf 109 of JG51 at 1530 hours. He died the next day.

A second attack on the convoy near Dover brought down a Fw 200 four-engined bomber from I./KG 40, for a total of seven German aircraft lost for the day. Several bombs were dropped on the convoy but the attack was unsuccessful.

For once during the battle, the evening finds very little activity over England as few raids were conducted by the Luftwaffe. Between 0038-0138 hrs in Co Durham a large number of IBs dropped on railway lines leading to Seaton Snooks, others on west side of Brenda Road, West Hartlepool. No damage. IBs also fell near Graythorp Village. Co Durham.. Shotley Bridge district.. Many IBs dropped in region of Bridgehill near Consett. A cow was killed, a house was slightly damaged by fire. Bombs were dropped in the following areas: - Dundee, Warmwell, 4 miles NE Lulworth Cove. Fighters were despatched to intercept a few enemy raids but no interceptions were effected.


----------



## Airframes (Jul 13, 2010)

Good work Chris.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 13, 2010)

*14 JULY 1940 Sunday
"THERE'S ONE GOING DOWN IN FLAMES!" 
UNITED KINGDOM*: The dawn brings clear weather for the day but the Luftwaffe failed to take advantage of the situation, instead conducting small and scattered raids on shipping and convoys. All through the morning the Luftwaffe tried to either engage in shipping attacks or at least to locate convoys. In almost all cases patrolling RAF fighters chased away the German bombers and fighters. Few, if any, targets experienced bombs dropping on them and it seems as if the Luftwaffe let an opportunity escape them.

At approximately 1100 hours a convoy was attacked off Manston by 1 Dornier escorted by 10 Bf109s but in consequence of timely action by two RAF fighter squadrons, the German aircraft were driven off. They suffered losses of 1 Bf109 confirmed and 4 Bf109s probable.

The only large scale raid of the day was made at about 1500 hours when a formation of about forty Ju 87s of II./LG 1, escorted by a number of Bf 109s from III./JG 3 and JG 51 headed towards Dover and the Channel looking for shipping convoys. As the convoy "Bread" continued its journey in the Channel, it again became the target for the Luftwaffe. More than 20 Do17s from KG 2 with a heavy fighter escort of Bf 109s from JG 51 and Bf 110s of ZG 26 were engaged by Spitfires and Hurricane's from Biggin Hill, Croydon and Manston. Over 100 aircraft were engaged. Most of the bombs missed the merchant ships although the bombers succeeded in damaging two of the merchant vessels and a naval unit. The SS Island Queen' (779t) cargo ship in convoy 'CW 5" was sunk by German aircraft off Dover. The Norwegian vessel 'Balder' and the British ship SS 'Mons' were damaged in the same convoy. Three RAF fighter squadrons converged on the formation and a great dogfight ensued. Three Ju 87s and three Bf 109s including one from 8./JG 3, were shot down. Another Bf 109 from 8./JG 3 was severely damaged during the fight. The British lost one Hurricane from RAF No. 615 Sqd to Hptm. Horst Tietzen of 5./JG 51 for his ninth victory. P/O Michael. Robert Mudie of RAF No. 615 Sqn flying a Hurricane (L1584) was shot down at 15:30hrs. He baled out badly injured and was rescued by Navy, but died the next day.

Towards the evening, owing probably to worsening weather, activity then decreased. 1 Ju88 was shot down by AA fire. In the east, casual shipping was attacked and a few localities bombed including Raynham Aerodrome. During the course of these attacks 1 Do17 and 1 He111 were shot down and 1 Do17 and 1 He111 were probable casualties. RAF No. 242 Sqn took part and accounted for one certain and one unconfirmed (included in the above). A few sporadic raids took place over the Scottish coast, none of these were intercepted.

Shortly before midnight, He 111s of I./KG 55 attacked the oil tanks at Avonmouth and searchlight placements at Bristol along with raids on the Isle of Wight, Kent and Suffolk. The attack on Avonmouth wrecked the railway line and dock's line along with a signals box. The National Smelting Works suffered a bomb dropped on them during a second raid.

Losses for the day were 2 machines for the Luftwaffe while the RAF lost 4 aircraft.

In reviewing the episode which brought down the He 59 floatplane on 11 July, the British took notice of how German search and rescue aircraft tended to circle above British convoys for no apparent reason. Believing that these planes were either shadowing convoys or guiding bomber formations to the ships, the RAF issued the following communiqué;


> “_Enemy aircraft bearing civil markings and marked with the Red Cross have recently flown over British ships at sea and in the vicinity of the British coast, and they are being employed for purposes which His Majesty’s Government cannot regard as being consistent with the privileges generally accorded to the Red Cross. His Majesty’s Government desire to accord ambulance aircraft reasonable facilities for the transportation of the sick and wounded, in accordance with the Red Cross Convention, and aircraft engaged in the direct evacuation of the sick and wounded will be respected, provided that they comply with the relevant provisions of the Convention. His Majesty’s Government are unable, however, to grant immunity to such aircraft flying over areas in which operations are in progress on land or at sea, or approaching British or Allied territory, or territory in British occupation, or British or Allied ships. Ambulance aircraft which do not comply with the above requirements will do so at their own risk and peril.”_


*GERMANY*: Another Bf 109E from JG 2 was damaged, this time from the III Gruppe while trying to land at Rhein-Main airfield.

 BBC Broadcast: 14 July 1940

_Part of text of Charles Gardner's BBC Broadcast. Dover - July 14th 1940_


> "_The Germans are dive-bombing a convoy out at sea; there are one, two, three, four, five, six, seven German dive-bombers, Junkers 87s. There’s one going down on its target now — Bomb! No! he missed the ships, it hasn’t hit a single ship — there are about ten ships in the convoy, but he hasn’t hit a single one and — There, you can hear our anti-aircraft going at them now. There are one, two, three, four, five, six — there are about ten German machines dive-bombing the British convoy, which is just out to sea in the Channel. I can’t see anything. No! We thought he had got a German one at the top then, but now the British fighters are coming up. Here they come. The Germans are coming in an absolute steep dive, and you can see their bombs actually leave the machines and come into the water. You can hear our guns going like anything now. I am looking round now. I can hear machine gunfire, but I can’t see our Spitfires. They must be somewhere there.....There’s one going down in flames! Somebody’s hit a German and he’s coming down with a long streak - coming down completely out of control - a long streak of smoke."_


----------



## Lucky13 (Jul 14, 2010)

Most excellent stuff Chris!


----------



## Gnomey (Jul 14, 2010)

Keep it coming!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 14, 2010)

*15 JULY 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Increasingly bad weather restricted air operations over the Channel and England as cloud cover was very low. Not the most ideal weather conditions for flying, and neither side saw, or undertook much activity. The Luftwaffe made a few reconnaissance missions over the North Sea and the English Channel. Very few raids were conducted with some occurring in the Cardiff, Swansea, Portsmouth and Southampton areas. Convoys on the south and east coast were also targets for the Luftwaffe bombers. The convoy "Pilot" was making its way through the Thames Estuary when spotted by a German reconnaissance aircraft and its position and course were radioed back to German HQ. By late-morning the weather had broken up enough for fifteen Do17 bombers of KG 2 to take off for an intended attack on the convoy. However, the attack was turned back by a force of Hurricanes, but which did not manage to score.

Further to the west a small force of Luftflotte 3 aircraft attacked. At 1130 hours a number of He 111 bombers were attacking industrial and dock areas along the Scottish coast. LG 1 bombed the Westland Aircraft works and the runway at Yeovil. St Athan R.A.F. Station was attacked and the airfield cratered. The railway lines near Avonmouth were also damaged. This raid dropped four unexploded bombs on St Athan. RAF No. 603 Sqd intercepted and avoided any major damage. A He 111 of 2./KG 26 was shot down at 1212 hours which crashed into the sea. The first raid on Brighton came on 15th July when Kemp Town was bombed, and was followed by several others that month, mainly over Whitehawk and Kemp Town.

In the afternoon at 1355 hours, a number of German bombers made an attack on the Naval Air Station at Yeovil in Somerset in the west of England. One of the runways received slight damage, as did one of the hangars and a number of craters appeared, but damage was kept to a minimum. RAF No. 213 Sqd (Hurricanes) intercepted and one Hurricane was shot down although the pilot baled out. Interception was also made by RAF No.92 Sqd (Spitfires) in which the Luftwaffe lost one Ju 88 from II./LG 1 and another damaged.

Through broken cloud and rain squalls the Dornier formation from KG 2 arrived over the convoy "Pilot" at 1413 hours but Fighter Command had 'seen' them coming and scrambled RAF No. 56 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 151 Sqd (Hurricanes) to meet them before the Dorniers had time to attack the convoy. Although some German bombers attempted an attack, they were turned around without causing any damage. Once the attack was aborted, the Hurricanes returned to base. One Dornier was shot down.

Very slight activity was encountered during the night, the weather still being very bad. Despite the weather, the Luftwaffe conducted several small raids and minelaying operations over Liverpool Bay along with a few attacks in the Avonmouth area.

The scoreboard by the end of the day was four fighters lost by the RAF while the Luftwaffe lost three aircraft.

The SS _'Heworth' _(2,855t) a steamer bound from London to Sunderland, was sunk by German aircraft near Aldeburgh Lightvessel.

*GERMANY*: The Stab and I Gruppe of JG 26 begin moving from Germany to France for the campaign against England. Not to be left out, the II Gruppe of JG 2 now contributed to aircraft damaged by the Geschwader when a Bf 109E from 4./JG 2 was damaged while landing at Husum.


----------



## Vic Balshaw (Jul 15, 2010)

Brilliant thread Chris, well worth reading. Good one mate.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 15, 2010)

*16 JULY 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: A quiet day little activity due to bad weather. Continuing Luftwaffe operations were according to the weather pattern, but a few were conducted. Throughout the morning small formations of German bombers were sent to the Bristol area. The responding RAF fighters failed to make contact and the bombers failed to find many of their targets. Again the east coast of Scotland came under attack and bombing occurred at Fraserburgh and Peterhead between the hours of 1300 and 1600. RAF No. 603 Sqd (Spitfires) intercepted and shot down a He 111 from III./KG 26 near Kinnaird’s Head. Two survivors were seen to take to a rubber raft.

Late in the afternoon when clearing conditions prevailed, RAF No. 601 Sqd (Spitfires) intercepted a German formation at 1700 hours and a Ju 88 was shot down over the Isle of Wight. Only one crew member survived the crash into the Solent and was seen taking to a dingy.

Activity during the night remained very quiet. Dundee, Middlesborough, Hull and Grimsby were given red warnings. One raid was plotted over Duncansby Head and two in the Aberdeen area. There were no reports of any bombs having been dropped. Five or six raids were plotted between Newcastle and the Humber, some of which were minelaying, and a few crossed the coast. One of these, after cruising around for over an hour off the Humber, was first given as being friendly owing to its having fired the correct signal, but was later stated to be hostile, as it disappeared towards Germany.

The loss totals for the day were two fighters lost by the RAF while the Germans counted five aircraft as being lost. Thus ended the first week of the Battle. The RAF had performed reasonably well in combat against their adversary.

In addition to the weather problems and without any support from other fighting units on the coast, Hptm. Trautloft’s III./JG 51 was down to fifteen serviceable aircraft, 40 % below establishment and seriously hampering his Geschwader’s operations over the Channel. But relief was on the way as several Geschwaders were done with their rest period and were soon ordered to the Channel coast.

Whilst returning to Scapa Flow in thick fog, Destroyer HMS _'Imogen' _collides with the cruiser HMS _'Glasgow' _off Duncansby Head at 58 34N 02 54W. _'Imogen' _catches fire and is abandoned.

RAF No. No 232 Hurricane Squadron was formed on this day.

*GERMANY*: A study prepared by Oberst "Beppo" Schmid, chief of intelligence of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, determined that the RAF could reach strengths equal to those of the Luftwaffe by 1940. Therefore, the priorities established for the forced submission of England were the...


> _"(1) defeat of the Royal Air Force, (2) incapacitation of the British air armament industry, and (3) elimination of the British Navy." _


Subsequent actions could then be directed against port, shipping, and other industries, but strong air forces would still be required to accomplish this. Schmid stated after the war that he briefed the commanders that because of the...


> "_...high morale of the British people and the improvising skill of British leaders, Great Britain could not be forced to capitulate through air attack alone, but only through actual occupation of the island_."


The study of the air and industrial armaments capability of England and the RAF, “Studie Blau” (Case Blue), was completed and submitted to Hitler. The report advised Hitler to destroy England’s ocean supply lines and her harbours but it neglected to take into account the British radar units. Obst. Schmid stated in the report;


> “._ . . The Luftwaffe is in a position to go over to decisive daylight operations owing to the inadequate air defenses of the island.”_


 Hptm. Adolf Galland commented on the strength of the British defenses lightly covered in Oberst Schmid’s report;


> _“From the very beginning the British had an extraordinary advantage which we could never overcome throughout the entire war; radar and fighter control. For us and our command this was a surprise and a very bitter one.”_


After several considerations, including those offered in Oberst Schmid’s report, Hitler signed Directive No. 16:


> _Since England, in spite of her apparently hopeless military situation, still shows no signs of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out. The aim of this operation is to eliminate the British homeland as a base for the further prosecution of the war against Germany, and, if necessary, to occupy it completely. I therefore order as follows:
> The landing will be in a form of a surprise crossing on a wide front from an area in the vicinity of Ramsgate to the area to the west of the Isle of Wight. Units of the Air Force will act as artillery, and units of the navy as engineers. The possible advantages of limited operations before the general crossing (e.g. the occupation of the Isle of Wight or the county of Cornwall) are to be considered from the points of view of each branch of the Armed Forces and the results reported to me. I reserve the decision to myself.
> In order to establish the necessary conditions for the final conquest of England Preparations for the entire operation must be completed by the middle of August . . . The preparations must also create such conditions as will make a landing in England possible, the English Air Force must be reduced morally and physically that it is unable to deliver any significant attack on the German crossing. . . . primarily against flying units, their ground installations and their supply organizations, also against their aircraft industry, including that manufacturing anti-aircraft equipment . . . in view of our forthcoming operations . . . I reserve to myself, the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal. The intensification of the air war may begin on or after 5 August. The exact time is to be decided by the air force after the completion of preparations and in the light of the weather. The invasion will bear the code name " SEELOEWE". Adolf Hitler, July 16th 1940._



The casual approach to the war with Britain was certainly a reflection of the overconfidence resulting from the highly successful campaigns recently concluded in Poland, Norway and especially in France. All, however, were campaigns where the bomber forces functioned almost exclusively as extensions of the tactical air arm. But the near exclusive use of the bomber arm for tactical support of the Army inevitably led "to confusion and misconceptions as to the employment of the bomber which lasted throughout the war." And, in addition to the task of defeating the RAF, the German Combined Staffs issued a directive in July from Field Marshal Keitel stipulating...


> "_...the German lack of command of the sea could be substituted by supremacy in the air."_


Hitler's Directive identified the role of the Air Force in the invasion (code-named Seelowe or "Sea Lion") as prevention of "interference by hostile air forces." In addition, the Luftwaffe was to mount attacks against British strong points, especially those in the landing areas, against troop concentrations and reinforcements, as well as naval units operating in the area of operations. In essence then, the Luftwaffe would provide an "air umbrella" beneath which the invasion could take place. The Air Force Operations Staff (OKL) translated Hitler's guidance into two main aims, and these were subsequently issued to the Luftflotten. First, eliminate the RAF as a fighting force, including its ground organization. Second, cut external supplies by attacking ports and shipping.


----------



## Berta59 (Jul 16, 2010)

Perfect!!


----------



## Berta59 (Jul 16, 2010)

Perfect!!!!


----------



## T Bolt (Jul 16, 2010)

Great work Chris! Keep em' coming


----------



## Njaco (Jul 16, 2010)

*17 JULY 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The bad weather continued along with rain. The few raids that did occur were against shipping and convoys. Scotland's industrial east was bombed, as was the city of Bristol. Four Luftwaffe raids were plotted off the Scottish Coast and Orkneys. One crossed from Peterhead to the west Coast and dropped bombs at Ardeer ICI factory doing little damage. Of the remainder two carried out a reconnaissance of the Orkneys at 0721 hours and were intercepted by RAF fighters but without successful results.

At 1136 hours a Do 17 flew as far as Kenley but was then intercepted by fighters and chased out to sea, slightly damaged. Three German bombers raided Ashford and Lydd at 1515 hours and another three He 111s dropped their loads on the Mere Oil Fuel Depot at Portland around 1540 hours. Intercepted by British fighters, one He 111 was shot down along with a RAF fighter, a Spitfire. The Spitfire was shot down by Lt. Helmut Wick of 3./JG 2 for his fourteenth victory. At the same time a British ship was attacked thirteen miles from Dartmouth. Off the Isle of Wight a single Ju 88 came across two Hurricanes who then attacked the bomber. The twin-engined bomber escaped and the Hurricanes returned to base, damaged.

The blockade of Britain was now tightened, and following the closure of much of the East Coast to British shipping, aerial minelaying operations were extended to cover the important shipping lanes and harbour entrances on the western side of the country. In order to maintain the pressure on the defenses, and to interrupt vital war production, these missions were usually flown on nights when no harassing attacks were taking place, thereby extending the amount of time an area remained under Red Alert, and on occasions, as with the reconnaissance aircraft, small bombs were carried, these often being aimed at searchlights or anti-aircraft gun sites.

Losses; Luftwaffe 2 - Fighter Command 1

At 2232 hours nine raids, which first of all proceeded towards Cherbourg, having come over the coasts of Northern France, Belgium and Holland, turned northwards heading towards south-west England. Some of the raids crossed the coast covering the Bristol Channel area. At 0026 hours a further number of raids approached South West England, some again crossing to the Bristol Channel area. Bombs were dropped at Port Talbot, and near Swansea and near Radstock. Mine laying was in the Bristol Channel and off the Plymouth coast. Between 2200 and 0235 hours some nineteen raids were operating off the east coast, of which seven were minelaying including He 111s of I./KG 4, based in Holland, minelaying the Bristol Channel and Severn Estuary. None went further north than the Wash. A few crossed the coast and bombs were dropped at Queenborough near Rochester, Felixstowe, Harwich, Chatham, near Barking and at Gillingham. Not more than forty aircraft in all operated during the night.


----------



## Crimea_River (Jul 16, 2010)

Thanks for doing this Chris. Great work.


----------



## magnu (Jul 17, 2010)

A really good read. Thanks Chris.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 17, 2010)

A fantastic effort Chris, and in my opinion very balanced and accurate

Well done so far


----------



## Njaco (Jul 17, 2010)

Thanks guys! I was worried that it might seem too Luftwaffe slanted as it started out some 10 years ago as a daily diary of the Luftwaffe during WWII. Trying to make it objective.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 17, 2010)

*18 JULY 1940 Thursday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Although heavy rain continued to fall, with improved flying conditions, a number of channel ports came under attack and things started to 'heat up' off the coast near Dover. Between 0740 and 0830 hours, 4 raids crossed the coast between Portland Bill and Bournemouth, penetrating inland to railway junctions at Castle Cary and Bruton (Somerset), Netheravon, Upavon, Abingdon and Upper Heyford. Two of these raids returned via Ventnor and Shoreham. No bombs were dropped.

At 0930 hours a formation of thirty Bf 109s of JG 51 assembled and headed out into the Channel to attack shipping near Deal. What could be described as a major dog-fight off the coast at Beachy Head, occurred when fifteen Spitfires of RAF No. 152 Sqd and RAF No. 610 Sqd made contact with the Bf 109s over the channel. The RAF lost 3 aircraft but failed to shoot down any of the Jagdflieger. RAF No. 152 Sqd had two aircraft damaged, but RAF No. 610 Sqd lost one Spitfire over Calais, shot down in the heavy clouds by Hptm. Tietzen of 5./JG 51 for his tenth kill. P/O P.Litchfield of RAF No. 610 Sqn in Spitfire P9452 was killed.

Early that afternoon the coastguard station at St Margaret’s Bay was bombed and the Goodwin Lightship was sunk. 4 houses were destroyed during an afternoon attack on Gillingham. Twelve Hurricane's of RAF No 43 Sqn intercepted twenty-eight Ju 87's forming up to attack the radar station at Poling.

At 0942 hours a Heinkel 111 bombed Montrose Aerodrome, diving as low as 500 feet. Some aircraft received slight splinter damage and five casualties, two fatal, were suffered by RAF personnel. A single Ju 88 bombed Cardiff and Penarth at 1145 hours but was bounced by RAF fighters. Although slightly damaged, the medium bomber managed to escape over the southern coast.

At 1300 hours the Luftwaffe sent two formations of bombers off the Isle of Wight and Selsey Bill. The Selsey Bill formation lost a He 111 to fighters from RAF No. 145 Sqd while the Isle of Wight formation shot down two Spitfires from RAF No. 609 Sqd, one being credited to Oblt. Karl-Heinz Greisert of 2./JG 2. Another Spitfire from RAF No. 152 Sqd was also lost in combat. F/Lt Frank J Howell of RAF No. 609 Sqn in Spitfire R6634 was on patrol in near Poole in Dorset when at 15:15hrs he was in combat with a Ju 88, he baled out and was picked up by the Navy.

RAF No. 111 Squadron probably brought down one Henschel 126 over the Channel at about 1520 hours. Shipping reconnaissance took place off the East Coast and fifteen Luftwaffe aircraft were reported east of Bawdsey at about 1500 hours. There were unconfirmed reports of dive-bombing on trawlers.

In the course of the day, two Ju 88s , one Do 17, one He 111 and a Bf 109 were lost to the Germans while the British lost three fighters.

German activity at night began at about 2350 hours and was directed mainly North of a line Humber to Liverpool. Ten to twelve raids at least were in this area. Several crossed the coast proceeding westward and fading off the West coast. Minelaying was off Cumberland, Westmoreland and Lancashire as far south as Liverpool. Several of the raids were picked up by the British returning eastwards. Some raids did not cross the coast and minelaying was off the Yorkshire coast and Southwards.

RAF No. 266 Squadron Operational Record Book, 18 July:


> Average temperature, visibility very good. Flying 17 hours 25 minutes. B Flight at readiness. Ac Flight available. Practices included interception and attacks, target and cine gun practice. Spitfire aircraft N.3170 collided with tractor on aerodrome whilst taxiing and badly damaged. Pilot PO D.G. Ashton uninjured. Spitfire aircraft N.3244 force landed in a cornfield at Heckington, Lincs., owing to engine trouble. Pilot PO R.J.B. Roach uninjured.



*WESTERN FRONT*: At 1230 hours three Blenheims were shot down over the French coast north of Le Havre by fighters from JG 2 and JG 54. RAF No.235 Sqd and RAF No. 236 Sqd lost six aircrew between them when attacked by the Luftwaffe fighters. Getting credit for the kills were Hptm. Wolfgang Schellmann of Stab II./JG 2, Uffz. Willi Melchert of 5./JG 2 and Fw. Georg Kiening of 6./JG 54. The fighters of II / JG 2 lost a Bf 109 during the sortie. Later twenty-four British fighters escorted eighteen Blenheims on a raid on Boulogne between 1900 and 1912 hours. No Luftwaffe fighters intercepted the formation. C.R.D.Thomas and H.D.B.Esldon of RAF No. 236 Sqn in Blenheim L6779 were shot down and killed over Le Harve at 12:15hrs.

At the JG 26 airbase in France Hptm. Adolf Galland of III./JG 26 was promoted to Major.

*GERMANY*: The fighters of I./JG 52 led by Hptm. Siegfried von Eschwege flew their Bf 109Es from Zerbst to Neuruppin leaving Hptm. Von Houwald’s III./JG 52 at the Zerbst airfield.

"Radio Caledonia" starts broadcasting to Britain, urging Scottish separatism.


----------



## T Bolt (Jul 17, 2010)

Great stuff Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 18, 2010)

*19 JULY 1940 Friday
*
*DAY OF THE FIELD MARSHALL*
*GERMANY*: In Berlin, Adolf Hitler made his “Last Appeal to Reason” speech, which, in part, stated;


> " _In this hour, I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not a vanquished foe begging favors, but the victor, speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war need go on. I am grieved to think of the sacrifices it must claim_."


 He remarked that...


> "_Fighting alone all these weeks on the Channel front, Jagdgeschwader 51 has already shot down 150 of the enemy's aircraft, quite enough to weaken him seriously. Think now of all the bombers we can parade in the English sky. The few R.A.F. fighters will not be able to cope" _


Later he gave promotions to several important Luftwaffe figures, most importantly Hermann Göring was promoted to Reichsmarschall of the Luftwaffe. General der Flieger Hugo Sperrle of Luftflotte 3, the General-Inspector of the Luftwaffe Erhard Milch, and Albert Kesselring of Luftflotte 2 were promoted to Generalfeldmarschall while Generalinspekteur der Jagdflieger General der Flieger Ernst Udet, General der Flieger Hans-Jurgen Stumpf of Luftflotte 5 and General der Flieger Alfred Keller of Fliegerkorps IV were promoted to Generaloberst. Generalleutnant Robert Ritter von Greim of Fliegerkorps V, Chief Of The General Staff Generalmajor Hans Jeschonnek, Generalleutnant Bruno Loerzer of Fliegerkorps II, Generalleutnant Hans Geisler of Fliegerkorps X and Generalmajor Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen of Fliegerkorps VIII were promoted to General der Flieger. Chief Of The General Staff of Luftflotte 3 Oberst Gunther Korten and Chief of the Luftwaffe-Operations General-Staff Oberst Otto Hoffmann von Waldau were promoted to Generalmajor. Among the Jagdgeschwaders, Hptm. Werner Mölders, Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 53 was promoted to Major and Hptm. Rolf Pingel was made acting Gruppenkommandeur of the unit. The Geschwaderkommodore of JG 51, Oberst Theo Osterkamp was promoted to Generalmajor.

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The 19th was a disastrous day for the RAF. The weather over the British Isles improved slightly and the Luftwaffe took advantage of this with an increase of raids. The airfield at Norwich was bombed at 0603 hours with a hangar destroyed. At 0730 hours a Do 17 that was conducting a reconnaissance over Croydon was shot down by a RAF Hurricane off Shoreham. The city of Glasgow in Scotland was the target of two Do 17s at 1030 hours in the morning. 42 people were injured. A raid attacked some naval units 40 miles off Clacton and several reconnaissances were reported. 

The first major action of the day occurred off Dover. A formation of thirty Luftwaffe aircraft headed out from Cap Griz Nez and made for Dover. One squadron of Hurricanes (RAF No.111) and a second of Spitfires took off to intercept the flight. RAF No.141 Squadron (Defiants) - twelve of which had just recently arrived within 11 Group from Turnhouse and on this day had flown from West Malling to operate out of Hawkinge - took off on a routine flight at 1232 hours and were ordered to patrol a line just south of Folkestone at 5,000 feet. Three of the aircraft eventually aborted the patrol because of engine malfunctions. At 1300 hours, as the nine Defiants were patrolling in the middle of the English Channel, they were unaware of sixteen Bf 109s from III./JG 51 led by Hptm. Hannes Trautloft and II./JG 2 led by Hptm Wolfgang Schnellmann, flying "up sun" and were unexpectedly jumped on by the Bf 109s. Recognizing the rear turret fighters for what they were - Defiants had no forward armament, the Bf 109s attacked from below and astern. One by one the twin engined RAF fighters fell from the sky into the channel, being no match for the far superior Bf 109. Six Defiants were shot down in rapid succession, including four in less than a minute, before JG 51 was broken up by the Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Squadron. Three Defiants just managed to make it back to Hawkinge, thanks to the intervention of RAF No. 111 Squadron while one Bf 109 was severely damaged and crashed on landing back at its base. Three Defiants were credited to Lt. Pichon-Kalau vom Hofe of the Stab flight of III./JG 51 for his first three kills. The fourth Defiant was given to Oblt. Walter Oesau of the 7th Staffel and another went to Hptm. Hannes Trautloft of the Stab flight of III./JG 51. Two other Bf 109s were shot down and anti-aircraft fire destroyed a Do 215. The Spitfire Squadron failed to make contact with the Germans.

A second engagement occurred at 1600 hours when thirty-six Luftwaffe bombers and fighters again headed for Dover. Two Squadrons of RAF Spitfires and one of RAF Hurricanes (RAF Nos. 64, 32 and 74 Sqdrns) were dispatched to intercept the formation. Clashing over Folkestone six Messerschmitts and one Ju 87 were shot down and three Messerschmitts of 9./JG 51 and III./JG 27 were badly damaged with two of the pilots seriously wounded. Two Spitfires of RAF No. 64 Squadron were shot down by Lt. Hans Kolbow of III./JG 51 and Oblt. Arnold Lignitz of 3./JG 51. Oblt. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 claimed his second victim of the day – a Hurricane – while another Hurricane of RAF No. 32 Squadron fell to Uffz. Leander Mayer of III./JG 51. F/Sgt G.Turner of RAF No. 32 Sqn in Hurricane P3144 was in combat with a Bf 109 over Dover at 16:25hrs. He baled out but was badly burned. The aircraft crashed at Hougham.

Earlier at 1431 hours, twelve Bf 109s engaged RAF Hurricanes off Selsey Bill and shot down one Hurricane for a loss of one Bf 109. Another RAF Hurricane was shot down in flames at 1735 hours over West Grinstead. F/Lt J.W.C.Simpson from RAF No. 43 Sqn in Hurricane P3140 was on patrol when was shot down by a Bf 109 of JG 27. He baled out near Selsey at 17:15hrs slightly wounded. J.A.Buck from RAF No. 43 Sqn in Hurricane P3531 was shot down by a Bf 109 he baled out wounded, but drowned near Selsey .At 1803 hours a lone Heinkel He 111 was destroyed off Shoreham. In addition one section of Spitfires shot down 2 Luftwaffe seaplanes (unconfirmed) near Calais. One Hurricane crashed (pilot safe). D.O.M.Browne from RAF No. 1 Sqn in Hurricane P3471 was on patrol when his aircraft was set on fire in an attack on a He 111. He crash landed at 18:15hrs but was unhurt.

The increase in operations continued into the night. Bombers from KG 55 raided Southampton. One He 111 from 7 Staffel was shot down by fighters of RAF No. 145 Squadron and crashed into the sea off Sussex. Minelaying was conducted between 2330 and 0230 hours over the Thames Estuary, the Hull area, Firth of Forth and the Firth of Clyde. The RAF airfield at Manston was also attacked. Shortly after midnight a RAF Blenheim on patrol encountered a Luftwaffe seaplane and shot it down in flames near Harwich.

Losses: Luftwaffe 16 - Fighter Command 10

The first prototype cavity magnetron is delivered to TRE -- the British radar research centre -- near Swanage, on the south-west coast.


*WESTERN FRONT*: The Ju 88 crews of III./LG 1 received a new Gruppenkommandeur when Hptm. Karl-Friedrich Knust was appointed in place of Major Dr. Ernst Bormann. The Gruppe was based at Lille.


----------



## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Jul 18, 2010)

Excellent work Chris! Thank you for the work. This ties in well with the book I'm now reading entitled With Wings Like Eagles written by Michael Kordan.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 18, 2010)

Thanks! I think you can appreciate the totality of the battle when reading it day by day as opposed to a book. You can grasp the situation. Can't wait till August.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 18, 2010)

I have to agree with you, and thanks for doing this!


----------



## timmo (Jul 19, 2010)

Tried to commemmorate yesterday here but you were off-line, so put it elsewhere.

Maybe worth a repeat?

= Tim

No1 Son says that it doesn't indicate that it was my first day on a Squadron.

PPS How DO I delete that enter a link??


----------



## Njaco (Jul 20, 2010)

Thanks for adding that timmo! I'm gonna re-size it so that it fits better.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 20, 2010)

*20 JULY 1940 Saturday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The weather over the Channel continued to improve and more Luftwaffe operations were flown. Fighter engagements with the Luftwaffe were on a smaller scale due to a reduction of German activity near British coasts. What activity there was, however, was almost entirely directed towards attacks on shipping. They were hoping that their efforts would draw RAF Fighter Command into combat over the open waters, but this was not to happen. Many convoys came under attack, and many dogfights took place over the channel and as close as possible to the English coast. From 0600 to 0900 hours very little activity occurred. Most Luftwaffe operations in the morning were reconnaissance for larger raids in the afternoon resulting in the loss of a Ju 88 off the Norfolk coast. The first of several raids on the convoys occurred at 0900 hours when four flights of three Luftwaffe aircraft each headed for the Kent coast. The responding RAF fighters failed to intercept the airplanes when the radar tracks confused the radar operators. Shortly after 1100 hours two raids approached Swanage and a naval unit reported having been bombed. No reports were received regarding any damage. The first major raid was an early afternoon attack on Dover Harbour resulting in two Bf 109s from 3./JG 27 being lost including the Messerschmitt of Lt. Ulrich Scherer. The RAF lost three fighters during the combat. Sgt C.Parkinson of RAF No. 238 Sqn (Middle Wallop) baled out after being shot down by a Bf109 off Swanage in Hurricane P3766, at 1315 hrs. He died of his injuries on the next day.

During a late afternoon attack, again on Dover, I./JG 27 lost its Gruppenkommandeur, Major Helmut Riegel, in action over the Island of Sark, Dover with Hurricanes of RAF No. 501 Squadron. Major Riegel had designed the Geschwader’s distinctive badge of a Negro and tiger’s head superimposed on an outline of Africa. Major Eduard Neumann was appointed Gruppenkommandeur in his place.

Just after 1500 hours a formation of German dive-bombers and fighters returned to the Dover harbour. In consequence, 3 fighter squadrons proceeded to investigate and intercepted an German force of 40 Ju87s, escorted by a number of Bf109s over Dover and the Channel. The British claimed destroying a “Jaguar-ME” which was reported to be camouflaged in pale and dark blue and silver. Later in the afternoon two German raids of over twenty aircraft each, approached Dover again but aborted the raids after RAF fighters were dispatched. One formation decided instead to attack the convoy “Bosom” in the Channel. At 1740 hours, the Stukas of II./StG 1 escorted by Bf 110s and Bf 109s dropped onto the convoy. Destroyer HMS 'Acheron' was bombed and damaged by near misses, 10 miles off the Isle of Wight. Patrolling British fighters tried to engage the Ju 87s but were intercepted by the Messerschmitts. A lively dogfight ensued. The battle was described in the War Diary of RAF No. 32 Squadron;


> "_Convoy escort, 10 miles east of Dover. At 1758 hours, with 610 Squadron, intercepted a raid on the convoy by about 50 Ju 87s and Messerschmitt Bf 110s, escorted by Messerschmitt Bf 109s. Led by S/L Worrall, the squadron shot down six of the enemy (three Me 110s, two Me 109s and one Ju 87) and damaged four others (all Me 109s). One Hurricane was lost but the pilot, F/Lt Bulmer, is reported to have baled out near North Foreland. Sergeant Higgins was slightly wounded in the face by splinters from bullets striking his protecting armour." _


In reality only two Bf 109s of II./JG 51 were shot down during the attack and no Ju 87s or Bf 110s were lost although four Stukas were very badly damaged; two crash-landing in France. The British lost three fighters. RAF No. 32 Squadron lost Hurricanes to Hptm. Horst Tietzen and Oblt. Josef Priller (who shot down the aforementioned F/Lt Bulmer, a Royal Navy sub lieutenant attached to the RAF whose body was never recovered) while a Spitfire from RAF No. 610 Squadron [P/O G Keighley had to carry out his second bale out (first on 31st May 1940)] was destroyed by Ofw. Karl Schmid of 1./JG 51. Ofw. Oskar Sicking became the 1 Staffel’s first loss when he crash landed on the beach near Audinghem, France following the battle. Channel convoy CW7 was attacked by a large force of German bombers off Dover. German aircraft sank the transport SS 'Pulborough' (trawler Lady Philomena takes off 17 survivors) and damaged the destroyer HMS 'Brazen'. The Norwegian shps 'Kollskegg' and 'Nina Borthen' were also damaged. 'Brazen' was taken in tow, but later sank. 'Brazen’s anti-aircraft guns claimed 3 German aircraft shot down. At 1840 hours forty-eight Messerschmitts tangled with forty Hurricanes and Spitfires for no loss to either side.

Minelaying operations were increased during the night for the loss of one bomber off Margate. Severa. l raids were conducted over Hartlepool, Silloth, Rochford, Eastchurch, Swansea and Chatham. Further reports of damage by bombs which fell on Stirling at 0220 hours, state that damage was done to three sheds and some vehicles at the Royal Ordnance Factory, Forthside. A Focke-Wulf FW200C of 1./KG40 (F8+EH) was brought down by AA fire during a minelaying sortie and crashed into the North Sea between Hartlepool and Sunderland.

Losses: Luftwaffe 9 - Fighter Command 3

Now that the so-called "phoney war" was over, women all over Britain were expecting to be asked to play a larger part in the war effort - whether they wanted to or not. The reluctance felt by many women about taking jobs outside the home were reinforced by their men-folk’s disapproval. There were public outcries over every new opening, however small, for women that the war has created. The Land Girls were seen as a threat to agricultural training programmes and moral standards, the women pilots of the Air Transport Auxiliary accused of taking the jobs not...


> "for the sake of doing something for the country but for the sake of publicity."



*GERMANY*: One of Reichsmarschall Göring’s first orders was to reinforce his decision of 26 June 1940 and instructed Oberst Josef Kammhuber of KG 1 to organize and command a night-fighter force. By the end of the month, Oberst Kammhuber had expanded I./NJG 1, led by Oberst Wolfgang Falck, by combining I./ZG 1 and IV./JG 2 flying Bf 110Cs out of Venlo airfield in the Netherlands. The Gruppe later received two squadrons of aircraft - Do 17s from a bomber wing - to form Falck’s new Intruder Group for night-fighter operations.

Göring also ordered Oberst Kammhuber to command the night air defenses of the Reich, the Nachtverteidigung (night protection of the skies). He created a night defensive line, from the Isle of Sylt to Scheldemündung, consisting of a double defensive line of searchlights and Flak artillery. Searchlights were used to illuminate bombers as night-fighters closed in for the kill. Known as the ‘Kammhuber Line’, this extensive network of searchlights, radar and night-fighters was based in occupied France, Belgium and Holland, covering the approaches that British bombers took to reach their targets. Oberst Kammhuber’s position as Kommodore of KG 1 was taken by Generalmajor Karl Angerstein. Kammhuber gained special powers to overrule the RLM’s T.A. for the choice of series production aeroplanes. This was one of Hitler's system for solving emergency situations.

As a celebration of sorts, on this night Oblt. Werner Streib of I./NJG 1 flying a night-fighter test prototype Do 17Z – the only such aircraft built - attacked a formation of RAF bombers sent to bomb the industrial center near the Ruhr. He closed in on a shadowy outline of another plane and identified it as a RAF Whitley bomber. He backed off and approached the bomber from behind. When the night-fighter was within 250 yards, the British tail gunner opened fire on Oblt. Streib but the Oberleutnant returned fire with two short bursts. Two men were seen to parachute out as the bomber turned and tried to get away. With smoke poring from the starboard engine, Oblt. Streib fired at the port wing and set it ablaze. The warplane crashed and Oblt. Streib scored the first kill by a night-fighter over Germany. Oblt. Streib would soon become known as “The Father of Night Fighting”.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Hptm Kienitz’s III./JG 3 moved yet again, this time transferring their Bf 109Es from Guines to Dortmund and Bönninghardt. In Germany, 3./JG 77 arrived at the Berlin-Tempelhof airfield for operations.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 20, 2010)

*21 JULY 1940 Sunday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Most of the Luftwaffe operations for the day were centered in the Channel and the Straits of Dover with convoys being the targets. A few isolated raids penetrated inland. In the morning, the Luftwaffe carried out shipping reconnaissance in the Channel and afterwards made two unsuccessful attacks on convoy "Peewit". Shortly after 0900 hours south of the Needles, bombers of KG 3 attacked the convoy “Peewit” with fighter escort provided by JG 27. The attack did little damage. One Spitfire was reported lost whilst on convoy patrol at about 0930 hours.

At 1458 hours another raid was conducted on the “Peewit” convoy but the Ju 87 bombers aborted when three RAF fighter squadrons were dispatched to intercept the force. A Bf 109 was claimed shot down. At 1520 hours nine Bf 110s of V./LG 1 made their first sortie in the fighter-bomber role, participating in another dive attack on the “Peewit” convoy, still passing south of the Needles. A flight of RAF Hurricanes were sent to Portland to intercept the raiders and chased the fighter-bombers to the French coast. One Messerschmitt was damaged by a Hurricane and crash-landed at Theville, killing one of the crew. A Bf 109 from 7./JG 27 and a Hurricane from RAF No. 43 Squadron (P/O R.A.DeMancha in Hurricane P3973) were destroyed in a collision near the battle. Both aircarft crashed in sea 5m South of the Needles.

Besides the convoy attacks, a few raids were made inland by the Luftwaffe. A flight of Bf 110s was bounced by Hurricanes and lost a Messerschmitt over Goodwood. The British also lost a Hawker Hector bi-plane to Bf 109 fighter-bombers near Old Sarum. The victorious Messerschmitt was then shot down by a fighter from RAF No. 238 Squadron. A Do 17 was shot down near Blandford by RAF Hurricanes. Again, Do 17s attacked shipping off the Scottish coast with one from 1/606 destroyed.

Raids during the night were centered on the West Country area between the hours of 2330 and 0300 hours. Two raids went as far as Barrow-in-Furness and returned via Liverpool and over Yorkshire. Other isolated raids went over Leeds, Church Fenton, Tyneside, over Norfolk and Wiltshire. Bombs were reported to have been dropped in Tyneside, near Derby, Driffield and Hornsea, but no serious damage was reported. It was reported at 0520 hours that an unsuccessful attempt was made on a convoy off the Lincolnshire coast.

Losses: Luftwaffe 7, Fighter Command 6

Among the squadrons of Fighter Command, No. 152 Squadron (Spitfire) moved from Warmwell to Middle Wallop and No. 253 Squadron (Hurricane) moved to Turnhouse. No. 263 Squadron (Hurricane) reported 4 aircraft only operational and No. 605 Squadron (Hurricane) had only 3 aircraft operational. 

*WESTERN FRONT*: The II and III Gruppen of JG 26 joined the rest of the Geschwader near Calais, France on former World War I British air bases. This improved the strength of Luftflotte 2. Hptm. Siegfried von Eschwege’s I./JG 52 were moved again from Neuruppin to an airfield at Bayreuth.

*GERMANY*: Göring conferred with the chiefs of staff of the three Luftflotten concerning the conduct of air operations prior to the intensified air war with England. Göring specified small-scale attacks; except against convoys, and expressly ordered;


> "_that installations needed by the German armed forces in later operations were not to be attacked"_.


As an example he quoted the dock installations in south coast ports. Göring also called for the stockpiling of supplies and munitions, air defense measures and the setup of signal communications. Timing and the selection of targets Göring intended to "closely integrate" with the Luftflotten involved.


----------



## Lucky13 (Jul 21, 2010)

Excellent work Chris!


----------



## timmo (Jul 21, 2010)

Thanks, Njaco - couldn't seee how to delete the existing one.

= Tim


----------



## Njaco (Jul 21, 2010)

*22 JULY 1940 Monday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: A quiet day except for a few south coast shipping attacks and some coastal reconnaissance. In contrast to the previous day’s activity, the Luftwaffe conducted few raids over England outside of convoys attacks and a few inland raids. Most of the raids were aborted when the RAF sent up squadrons of fighters to intercept the raiders. One flight of bombers flew over the Sussex coast at a high altitude, preventing any RAF fighters from reaching them. No contact was made. Two Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Squadron attacked a lone Do 17 off Selsey Bill and it crashed into the Channel after accurate firing from F/L Boyd and P/O Weir.

Six German prisoners were killed, and eighteen injured, by high explosive bombs which fell on Duff House, Banff, at 0922 hours. The house was severely damaged.

During the night, however, the number of raids significantly increased with mines being dropped on British ports along the south and east coasts and the Thames Estuary. Bombs fell in Banffshire, where casualties resulted, in the neighborhood of Edinburgh, and in the coastal areas of Kent, Suffolk, Essex and Monmouthshire. The Stab and I./KG 51 sent its Ju 88s to bomb the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton at 2230 hours. Margate had eight high explosive bombs at 2235 hours, one house being demolished. The electricity supply failed and gas mains were fractured. About 15-20 high explosive bombs fell near Manston aerodrome at 2230 hours. Bombs which fell on a farm at Skipsea (East Yorkshire) at 0145 hours, causing damage to electricity supply, were described as a. . .


> "_. . .supposed new type containing petrol, paraffin and other oils." _


During the night on an attack against Plymouth, Lt. Hajo Herrmann, flying a Ju 88 with III./KG 30, attempted to avoid several barrage balloons over the target. His evasive maneuver caused the bomber to lose airspeed and drop down onto one of the balloons. With both objects now falling together, Lt. Herrmann regained airspeed and managed to take-off from the balloon and continued his mission, dropping two mines in the area.

At 1735hrs. P/O J.L.Bickerdike of RAF No. 85 Sqn (Martlesham Heath) in Hurricane P3895 was killed as he crashed on approach to Castle Camps satellite airfield.

Destroyer HMS 'Beagle' reported destroying a German Junkers Ju 87 by pom-pom fire.

Losses: Luftwaffe 1, Fighter Command 1

At Wick, Sea Gladiators of RAF No. 804 Squadron, Fleet Air Arm flew their first Battle of Britain sortie under the control of 13 Group.

RAF No 301 (Polish) Squadron was formed at Bramcote, near Nuneaton, Warwickshire, under authority of Air Ministry signal 0977 – 17.7.40. The flying equipment of the Unit were sixteen aircraft. The manning principle was to complete the establishment with Polish personnel but to support them with a limited number of British officers and airmen to work in a supervisory capacity.The aim was ultimately to release all British personnel from the Squadron.

Oblt. Streib flying with I./NJG 1 destroyed another RAF bomber for his second night time kill. RAF Fighter Command also recorded its first night victory. A Blenheim Mark 1F night fighter, equipped with airborne radar gained the first 'kill' when a Do 17-Z was shot down off Brighton by a Blenheim of the Fighter Interception Unit at Tangmere.

*GERMANY*: Göring issued a directive to seal off by mines, and attack, the ports of Dover, Plymouth, Portland and Portsmouth.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 22, 2010)

*23 JULY 1940 Tuesday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Again, despite the weather, few raids were conducted by the Luftwaffe. Mostly shipping off the East coast was targeted. Tactics changed on the 23rd, as the Channel was almost free of all shipping movements. Dowding had earlier suggested that convoys use the east coast route, go around the top of Scotland and head out into the Atlantic from there. The reason was that convoys were becoming to easy a target for the Luftwaffe conveniently positioned all along the French coast. The other advantage of this, was that any attacking bombers would not have the luxury of fighter escort as the distance would be too great from any of their bases. Although a number of convoys did enter the Atlantic via the Shetlands, convoys still navigated the Channel.

While patrolling a convoy off Yarmouth in the early morning, Hurricanes reportedly shot down a Ju 86. A 'help' message from a convoy some distance off Lowestoft was received at about 0809 hours but only one bomb was reported to have been dropped from a great height.

An inland raid by the Luftwaffe went as far as Kenley before approaching RAF fighters forced the formation to return to base. At 1120 hours six Luftwaffe aircraft bombed trawlers off North Foreland. Two RAF squadrons were dispatched but failed to find the bombers. In the afternoon at 1530 hours nine German bombers attacked a British naval ship near Harwich. No RAF fighters appeared. Ten minutes later RAF Spitfires shot down a Do 215 during a raid near Kinnaird’s Head. At 1640 hours a formation of Luftwaffe bombers dropped their loads on Pulham Market and evaded the intercepting RAF fighters by using the heavy cloud cover. Another raid over North Scotland was turned back when RAF fighters were sent to engage at 1800 hours.

Luftwaffe activity at night was again at somewhat on a lesser scale and almost exclusively confined to coastal flights, presumably minelaying. The chief activity was along the east coast from Dover to the Tyne and Forth Estuary, with one or two raids as far north as Kinnaird's Head and considerably less concentration in the Thames Estuary and the South Coast. It was reported that one He111 was shot down for certain at 0040 hours by a Spitfire near Dunbar. Montrose aerodrome reported one HE bomb which fell in the landing ground at 0043 hours without causing damage or casualties.

Losses: Luftwaffe 6, Fighter Command 0 - _(the first day of the Battle proper when no British planes or pilots were lost.)_

RAF No. 43 Squadron (Hurricanes) moved from Tangmere to Northolt while RAF No. 1 Squadron (Hurricanes) moved from Northolt to Tangmere. No. 264 Squadron (Defiants) moved from Duxford to Kirton in Lindsey. No. 141 Squadron (Defiants) arrived at Prestwick and were non-operational.

RAF No. 301 Squadron recieved 4 Battle aircraft allotted to the Squadron from Maintenance Units and delivered by ferrying pilots from RAF Station, Shawbury.

*WESTERN FRONT*: A Stab was added to Kampfgruppe z.b.V. 108.

Submarine minelayer 'Narwha'l (instructed to proceed on the surface) was attacked and sunk by a Dornier flying boat in the Norwegian Sea at 55 30N 01 10E. All crew of 59 were lost.


----------



## T Bolt (Jul 23, 2010)

Great work Chris!


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 23, 2010)

I agree, outstanding!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 23, 2010)

*24 JULY 1940 Wednesday*

*BATTLE OF THE THAMES ESTUARY
UNITED KINGDOM*: German bombing attacks took place at a number of British towns on the 24th. Houses were damaged in the usually quiet suburb of Walton-on-Thames, the aircraft factories at Weybridge were attacked as was Brooklands airfield by a Ju 88 pretending to come into land. The Ju 88 circled the airfield for seven minutes, finally lowering its undercarriage while following several British planes coming in to land. As the Junkers crossed over the airfield buildings, it dropped twelve bombs and flew off. Slight damage was caused.

An early morning raid on shipping in the Bristol Channel by Ju88s resulted with a few ships damaged. Soon after Welsh-based RAF No. 92 Sqn. Spitfires (K9998, N3167, N3297)intercepted and engaged a Ju88 of KG51 over Porthcawl. The Junkers was later shot down by RAF No. 87 Sqn. P/O R.P. Beamont near Lynton, Devon.

But the day will be remembered as the day that the seaside town of Margate had a grandstand view of the Battle of Britain. At 0755 hours, a German formation had been detected coming in from the German coast and heading towards a convoy in the Thames Estuary. Fighter Command scrambled RAF No. 54 Squadron (Spitfires) at 0815 hours to make an interception. RAF No. 64 Squadron (Spitfires) also intercepted. Six Spitfires of RAF No. 54 Squadron attacked a number of the Dorniers who were attacking the convoy in the Straits of Dover but the squadron had to break up to send a couple of flights to the Thames Estuary where another convoy was under attack, but they could claim no victories except to spoil the aim of the bombardiers on the Dorniers. No German aircraft were shot down, but RAF No. 54 Squadron had three Spitfires shot down by accurate gunfire from the Dorniers.

At about 1100 hours, another Luftwaffe formation was detected heading for the Thames Estuary. 18 Do17s escorted by JG 52 along with JG 26 attemptted to bomb a convoy. Again, RAF No. 54 Squadron was dispatched. Thus ensued what RAF No. 54 Sqn called ‘*The Battle of the Thames Estuary’*. The British fighters were understrength as they split their force to attack the two German formations. A ship was forced to run for shallow water and RAF No. 54 Sqn had their ‘_biggest fight since Dunkirk_.’ So furious and confused was the fight over Margate that RAF No. 54 claimed 16 ‘109s. This day was the last day for 54 Sqn at Rochford - they had been there for a month and were to be posted back to Hornchurch. The Operational Record Book of 54 Sqn shows "B" Flight intercepted a formation of Do215s off Dover and Green Section under P/O Dorian Gribble managed to break up the formation forcing them to jettison their bombs and turn back across the Channel.

Extract from the operational record book of 54 Sqn:


> 125 hrs: The whole squadron took part in what they termed as "The Battle of the Thames Estuary" when a whole convoy was attacked by 18 Do215s, two squadrons of Bf109s and unknown number of He113s. The squadron accounts for 2 destroyed (confirmed) by P/O Colin Gray and Sgt George Collet, and four destroyed (unconfirmed) by F/Lt Alan Deere, F/O Desmond McMullen, P/O Edward Coleman and P/O Douglas Turley-George. Eight enemy aircraft were claimed as probably destroyed by F/O Desmond McMullen (2), P/O Dorian Gribble (2), P/O Colin Gray, F/Sgt Phillip Tew and P/O Douglas Turley-George. Two were damaged by P/O Edward Coleman and P/O Henry Matthews. Sadly, P/O John Allen DFC was lost in this encounter when he was attacked by a Bf109 off the coast near Margate and was seen coming down with the engine of his aircraft stopped, although it appeared that he seemed to be in full control. Suddenly his engine came to life and he appeared to be making for a landing at Manston, but the engine cut again and he appeared to turn the aircraft in the direction of Foulness. The aircraft stalled over the coast and the Spitfire went into an uncontrollable spin. P/O Allen did not bale out, and the aircraft crashed in flames near the Olde Charles Inn at Cliftonville near Margate.



On reaching the formation, F/L A.L. Deere leading one of the sections reported back to his sector controller that the formation consisted of about eighteen Do 17s and forty plus Bf 109s and requested immediate assistance. RAF No. 64 Squadron (Spitfires) was scrambled to assist as was RAF No.610 Squadron (Spitfires) that was based at Gravesend. A hectic battle followed, the Bf109s trying desperately to cover the Dorniers, but over the Thames Estuary, the Bf109s had to keep an eye on their fuel. The ensuing battle in the skies took place almost over the town of Margate. Dorniers diving low and pulling out at almost sea level attempting to avoid the Spitfires, almost touching the rooftops of seaside hotels, Spitfires being chased by Bf 109s weaved about in all directions in the sky above. The Messerschmitts were from JG 26 flying from their new bases in France. Their first mission would end disastrously.

III./JG 26, under strength with only ten Bf 109s, was to sweep ahead of the bombers while III./JG 26 would be the close escorting flight. II./JG 26 aborted the mission when the nine Spitfires of RAF No. 610 Squadron appeared. The Bf 109s from III Gruppe followed and engaged RAF No. 54 Squadron and RAF No. 65 Squadron. A Bf 109 of 8./JG 26 was shot down by one of the Spitfires and its pilot, Lt. Josef Schauff baled out but his parachute failed to open and his pilotless aircraft smashed into a quiet avenue in residential Margate. Another Bf 109 of III./JG 26 was hit and had to make a forced landing just outside the town. The pilot, Oblt. Werner Bartels, the popular Third Gruppe Technical Officer was seriously injured and taken prisoner. His Bf 109E-1 was salvaged by the British and used by the Red Cross in England for fund raising the next several years. A Spitfire of RAF No. 54 Squadron was hit by gunfire from a Bf 109 and nearly crashed into the town centre of Margate, but the pilot managed to regain a little height and clear the township, but crashed in a ball of flame at nearby Cliftonville. Two other Spitfires, both from RAF No. 54 Squadron crashed after being hit by gunfire from German fighters. Pilot Officer Allen (R6812) engaged a 109 near Margate, then his engine stopped. When it came to life again he attemptted to reach RAF Manston, but instead his aircraft spun in and crashed on an electricity sub-station in Omer Road, Cliftonville. Sergeant G.R. Collett (N3192) chased a Bf109 for a considerable distance, only to run out of fuel and crash at Sizewell, Suffolk.

JG 26 lost three pilots. Lt. Josef Schauff, Oblt. Werner Bartels and Hptm. Erich Noack, Gruppenkommandeur of II Gruppe. Karl Ebbinghausen was promoted to Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 26 in place of Oblt. Noack, who crashed while attempting to land back at Marquise. Three Dorniers were shot down over the Estuary. III./JG 52 lost four aircraft, including that of the Gruppenkommandeur, Hptm. Wolf-Heinrich von Houwald, who was killed attempting to land at Marquis-East. The total German losses for this action were three fighters from JG 26, one from III./JG 27 and four from III./JG 52. Another Messerschmitt from 5./JG 51 was written off after returning to St. Inglevert damaged. It was a disastrous period for the Luftwaffe. Four days earlier, Major Riegel Gruppe Kommandeur of I/JG 27 was killed, as was Staffelkapitaen Oblt Keidel of 8/JG 52, then Major Werner Molders was shot down, and severely wounded and was hospitalized for over a month.

This was a rough combat for Hptm. Adolf Galland of III./JG 26, who claimed a Spitfire and he later commented;


> “_We were no longer in doubt that the RAF would prove a formidable opponent_.”


Off Dover at 1727 hours three German bombers attacked ships in the Channel. Fighters from RAF No. 74 Squadron shot down one Do 215 off Manston. The British lost two Spitfires and two trawlers were sunk.

Poor weather at night curtails most activity. Searchlight crews illuminated one He 111 which fired back upon their sites at New Brighton. That, or another He-111 was then illuminated again and held for three minutes. Coastguards at Hoylake and Formby Point independently claimed that it crashed into the sea as a result of dazzle.

A low-flying single He-111 dropped HE and incendiaries onto Glasgow’s Hillington Industrial Estate, damaging a printing works, a sugar and oil cake factory and injuring 18 people.

Losses: Luftwaffe 13: Fighter Command 3.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Hptm. Siegfried von Eschwege moved his crew and the Bf 109s of I./JG 52 from Bayreuth back to the airfield at Zerbst which they left on the 18 July 1940.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 24, 2010)

*25 JULY 1940 Thursday*

*RAF NO. 54 SQUADRON BLACK THURSDAY
UNITED KINGDOM*: Luftwaffe activity by day was again concentrated with attacks on shipping and convoys in the Channel as the Germans now had some radar on the French coast. The weather had improved enough during the early morning for German Stuka and E-boat attacks on a convoy working its way through the Dover Straits. Newly installed radar and wireless intercept stations at Wissant allowed Oberst Fink to track and hit the convoys at their most vulnerable. By early morning he had ordered his planes aloft.

The first attack was a formation of sixty Ju 87s of II./StG 1 and IV(Stuka)./LG 1 in three waves vectored on the Channel convoy CW8 "Peewit" followed by flights of forty or more aircraft. Defence rested with AA gunners, Dover Site D1 claiming a JU87 before frantic calls brought along Spitfires of 54 Sqn and 65 Sqn upon which a hoard of Bf109s pounced. But the Luftwaffe changed its tactics when it sent strong fighter formations forward to sweep the target of British fighters before the bombers arrived. Each wave of Stukas was escorted forward by one Gruppe of fighters from JG 26. The escorting Bf 109's came in at sea level to meet the Spitfires and Hurricanes while the Ju 87 Stukas came out of the sky the dive bomb the convoy.

Starting at 1127 hours the convoy was off Dover harbour and the target of the attacking Luftwaffe aircraft. RAF No. 54 Sqd with five Spitfires was on patrol over Dover when the first German formation appeared over the convoy. RAF No. 54 Sqn. called this ‘Black Thursday’. Diving to attack the Stukas, the Spitfires were immediately set upon by Messerschmitts from Major Adolf Galland's III Gruppe. Like the previous day, RAF No.54 Squadron was to suffer badly, but with one Spitfire to every five Bf 109's, they were lucky not to lose more than three aircraft. The small British flight was overwhelmed and one Spitfire was shot down by Major Galland. Waiting for the Stukas to come out of their dives were Spitfires from RAF No. 64 Squadron. The Spitfires managed to engage the Stuka formation as they came out of their dives and shot down two Ju 87s of II./StG 1 before the Bf 109s of 7./JG 26 intercepted. The RAF lost a total of five Spitfires at no loss to JG 26. RAF No. 54 Sqn’s ‘B’ Flight Commander, Flt. Lt. BH Way, was killed. Oblt. Georg Beyer's 7./JG 26 claimed four Spitfires without loss. RAF No.32 Squadron (Hurricanes) and RAF No.615 Squadron (Hurricanes) came in to assist the sea level dogfight against the fifty Bf 109's but with no luck. Plt. Off. V.G.Draw of 32 Sqn mixed with six Bf 109s received leg wounds and force landed a badly damaged P3677.

The fighter sweeps succeeded as the Stukas arrived over the convoy mostly unmolested. It was a disaster for the convoy as they were pounded by heavy guns from the French mainland as well. Eleven merchant coal ships out of twenty-one were sunk and another seven were damaged in the Straits as well as two Royal Navy destroyers, HMS 'Boreas' and HMS 'Brilliant'. The two destroyers, along with two motor torpedo boats, had left Dover to attack E-boats leaving Boulogne. Ju87s dive-bombed the destroyers which were also the targets of shore-based artillery from the French coast. HMS 'Boreas' was hit and called for smoke and tugs. Both damaged destroyers headed back for Dover, whose No.4 LAA gunsite claimed a Stuka. More Spitfires of 54 and 64 Sqns tried to protect the warships, along with Hurricanes of RAF No. 56 Sqn even though they were challenged by over 100 enemy aircraft. Just as the destroyers came under further attack RAF No. 610 Sqns Spitfires arrived to bag two Bf 109s and damage several more without loss.

As reported by Pilot Officer D.R.Turley-George of RAF No.54 Sqn:


> The 109s coming at us from above as we still struggled for height F/L B.H.(Wonky) Way being hit and falling away out of sight [he was dead]. I remember the 109 attacking me from the port side, my trying to turn in towards him, the loud bangs of his cannon-shells striking my Spitfire as he hit me from an almost full deflection angle; and even through the pounding fear that I felt, admiring his marksmanship. A few seconds later, with my aeroplane miraculously still answering apparently normally to the controls, finding myself behind two Me 109s, aligning my sight on one, pressing the gun button — and the guns failing to fire; then diving out of the fight to return to base.



_(P/O D.R.Turley-George had joined No 54 Squadron on the 15th of July 1940. He was shot down twice by Bf 109's during the Battle, the first time was on the 25th of July 1940 when he crash landed his Spitfire P9387 near Dover after combat with Bf 109s at 15:00hrs.)_

At 1430 hours, with the convoy only just past Folkestone, the Luftwaffe sent another forty Ju 88s with an escort of over fifty Bf 109s to make a final attack on the convoy. Only eight Spitfires of RAF No.64 Squadron were scrambled to meet the ninety German fighters and bombers, along with twelve Spitfires of RAF No.54 Squadron and a flight of Hurricanes from RAF No.111 Squadron. The Hurricanes and Spitfires were vastly outnumbered by five to one, almost impossible odds, but the RAF pilots were equal to the task. When the eight Spitfires of 64 Sqn arrived they faced 30 Ju 88s of III./KG 4 accompanied by more than 50 Bf 109s. Three more 64 Sqn Spitfires arrived along with 12 Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Sqn. Despite engaging the bombers they could not prevent the sinking of two more ships. One Spitfire was lost. Flt. Sgt. Franklin, manoeuvring extremely low in N3164 caused a Bf109 to plunge into the sea.

The tactic here was to meet the bombers head on at full throttle then as they dispersed they pulled upwards to meet the oncoming Bf 109's. The tactic worked, and both fighters and bombers withdrew. With RAF No.64 Squadron and RAF No.111 Squadron returning to refuel, the German formation, strengthened by another staffel circled and returned to the convoy. Here they sank a further five merchantmen and seriously damaged four others. Only two out of twenty-one ships of convoy 'CW 8' were to reach their destination of Portland. Fw. Bernhard Eberz of 9./JG 26 was shot down, the only loss of the day for the Geschwader. Other Geschwader were not so lucky. In the convoy battle off Folkestone, the Jagdwaffe lost six warplanes, one from III./JG 27 and four from III./JG 52, who lost its newly appointed Staffelkapitän of the day before, Wilhelm Keidel who had a total of five victories. The sixth fighter was a Bf 109E-4 from 5./JG 51 which was so badly damaged returning to St. Inglevert that it was written off.

After this days fighting, RAF No. 54 Squadron Hornchurch headed north for a brief rest. They had been constantly in action for the past three weeks, had flown in excess of 800 flying hours, had 506 operational sorties to their credit, had lost five experienced pilots and had twelve of their aircraft destroyed.

The last of the raids began at 1930 hours when several flights of twelve to thirty aircraft flying at 15 minute intervals attacked another convoy off Dover. The British lost four Spitfires to the Messerschmitts of JG 51 during the activity over the Dover straits with the British claiming fourteen Luftwaffe aircraft shot down. The four Spitfire kills were credited to Uffz. Paul Obst, Hptm. Walter Oesau, Hptm. Horst Tietzen and Lt. Hans-Otto Lessing of the II Gruppe of JG 51.

Earlier two Luftwaffe flights of thirty and twelve aircraft approached Portsmouth then turned toward Portland. At 10:40 Ju87s of III./StG1 tried to attack Portland but were intercepted by three squadrons of RAF fighters, six German bombers were shot down along with a RAF Spitfire. A Stuka from III./StG 1 was shot down off Cherbourg after being chased across the Channel. Another Stuka was badly damaged in the same encounter. Two raids of single German aircraft resulted in a RAF Hurricane being shot down by a Ju 88 which in turn was itself destroyed by other British fighters. The aircraft in the other solitary flight was destroyed by anti-aircraft fire. RAF No.32 Sqn Hurricanes joined RAF No. 615 Sqn in another battle.

RAF No.152 Sqn destroyed a Do 17M west of Eastfleet and a Ju 87.

By night, several raids started from the Cherbourg district and crossed the coast of Dorset en-route for the Bristol Channel and South Wales but no bombing has been reported from this area. AA claim an German aircraft shot down in flames near Milford Haven. There was considerable minelaying activity in the Firth of Forth (where some 28 were also dropped into the sea) and the Newcastle area. Harwich and Lowestoft were also visited by raiders, bombs being dropped at Bungay (Norfolk) and near Harlestown. Minelaying was also being carried out in the Thames Estuary and the Downs by approximately ten aircraft.

Lt. Günther Rall was given command of 8./JG 52.

Losses: Luftwaffe 16: Fighter Command 8.


----------



## Glider (Jul 25, 2010)

I must say that these postings go beyond the normal, giving not just the detail but a sense of the desperate fighting that went on and the tactics that were used.

Best thread for some considerable time. Many thanks


----------



## Njaco (Jul 25, 2010)

*26 JULY 1940 Friday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The weather was disastrous. Low dark cloud and heavy rain all over Britain made any flying almost an impossibility, but still the Luftwaffe persisted with spasmodic bombing attacks by Fliegerkorps VIII. But of the raids that were conducted, most were aborted when RAF fighters were sent to intercept. Their targets were Channel shipping south of the Isle of Wight. At 0603 hours a single German plane succeeded in evading any RAF fighters and bombed Mayfield and Hastings. A number of bombs were dropped and casualties were recorded. At 0900 hours, three raids of more than twenty-one aircraft each approached Swanage. At 0945 hours a formation of Bf 109s flying off the Isle of Wight were bounced by Hurricanes of RAF No. 601 Squadron and although several Messerschmitts were damaged, they managed to destroy one of the British fighters, a Hurricane flown by P/O P.Challoner-Lindsey, the only casualty for the RAF. Another flown by F/O J.H. Riddle was damaged by gunfire but managed to return to base. RAF No. 601 Squadron managed to shoot down two German bombers.

Around noon a flight of some twenty Luftwaffe aircraft approached Portland but as in the other actions, the bombers turned and retreated when RAF fighters were dispatched. RAF No. 238 Sqn. tangled with JG 27 off Portland. A Bf 109 from 2./JG 27 was caught and shot down south of Portland by a Hurricane of Flt. Lt. S.C. The German pilot, Fw. Günther Böer, went missing in action. Plt. Off. Goodman in a Hurricane downed a Bf 109 of III./JG 27.

Even though the morning raids produced negative results, the Luftwaffe tried one more time for the day with a large raid. At 1530 hours several formations of about fifty aircraft headed to the Isle of Wight. Three RAF fighter patrols flying at between 10,000 and 20,000 feet went for the formations. The German flight split and returned to friendly airspace. One flight did manage to continue to the coast at Dungeness where fighters from RAF No. 65 Squadron shot down a Bf 109 off Dover.

Another Luftwaffe raid attempted at 1848 hours with a flight of more than twenty-four aircraft made it nearly to Portland before breaking up and returning to Cherbourg. Three steamers were sunk in the Channel and the motor-lifeboats 'Rosa Woodd' and 'Phyllis Lunn' went out after survivors. RAF No 92 Squadron whilst on patrol off the Pembroke coast at 1700 hours, claimed to have shot down one Ju 88 (unconfirmed).

Despite the day’s failures, the night brought new opportunities. Numerous raids by either single aircraft or a few bombers were conducted all over the English countryside. At 2100 hours He 111s of II./KG 55 managed to defy the weather and attacked the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton again along with a raid on Bristol itself. Again shipping in the Channel was recorded to have been hit as well as some land based areas. At 2128 hours a single bomber dropped its load on Kent and Essex before crashing into the sea of Brightlingsea. Several minelaying operations were conducted in the Thames Estuary between Deal and Harwich. Bombs fell for the first time on Brentwood, Essex.

RAF No. 1 Squadron replaced 43 Sqn. at Tangmere.

The first R.C.A.F. Squadron arrived in Britain equipped with Canadian built Hurricane's.

The Admiralty issued an order prohibiting the passage off Dover by ships during daylight hours. Air Intelligence reported that the RAF's night bombing of Germany was most effective and was worrying the German High Command. It was also reported from another source that the RAF raids were causing serious damage. The Germans were stated to be considerably worried by these raids and RAF delayed action bombs were particularly unpopular. Although not really achieving the desired effect - destruction of prime targets - Bomber Command's early venture into bombing Germany would have a completely different and welcome result in the near future.


Losses: Luftwaffe 2: Fighter Command 1.


----------



## Lucky13 (Jul 26, 2010)

Super work Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 27, 2010)

*27 JULY 1940 Saturday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The summer of 1940 was as unpredictable as ever, as again the weather partially cleared although the cloud base remained over the English Channel. Fliegerkorps VIII again made attacks along the southern coast against shipping and naval units in the Straits and Dover harbour along with continued attacks on the convoy “Bacon”. Beginning at 0945 hours, elements of Richthofen's Fliegerkorps VIII attacked the convoy off Swanage while two convoys near the Estuary were raided. The destroyers HMS 'Montrose' and HMS "Wren " of the 18th Destroyer Flotilla were escorting six minesweeper trawlers off Aldeburgh when they were attacked by He 111 aircraft from KG 53. The "Wren " was sunk about 20 nautical miles east of Aldeburgh and 'Montrose' was damaged. RAF No.609 Squadron was ordered to the Portland area to cover the convoy off the coast. One Bf 109 and one Ju 87 was shot down by Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 145 and 238 Squadrons respectively and another Ju 87 limped away to the south trailing smoke. RAF No.609 Squadron lost one aircraft in the combat off the coast at Weymouth, the Spitfire being credited to Oblt. Gerhart Framm of 2./JG 27. Spitfires of RAF No 234 Squadron shot down one Ju 88 (unconfirmed) off Land's End.

Dover was attacked by two separate raids with four bombs falling in the harbour and five dropping on the barracks buildings. During this second attack, the destroyer HMS "Codrington" was sunk and destroyer "Walpole" alongside the depot ship "Sandhurst" in Dover Harbour was badly damaged. With the navy losing three destroyers this day, the Admiralty decided to withdraw all naval ships from Dover and cease using the harbour as an advanced base. Although Fighter Command was now released from the burden of protecting the destroyers, based there for anti-invasion operations, it was to place a further burden on the RAF as they would have to provide additional protection of the Channel convoys though the Straits, something that Dowding and Park did not want to do. But with convoys having no destroyer protection the task was handed to the RAF. Dover itself was being hit so badly that the Air Ministry issued instructions that Fighter Command was to engage any German formations approaching the port with superior forces whenever possible. To manage this, fighter squadrons in the south-east were ordered to increase to 28 and Fighter Command was to make more use of Hawkinge and Manston.

One of the Dover attacks during the day was carried out by six Bf 109s carrying bombs on centre-section racks. This was the first report of Bf 109s being used in the Jabo role. They crossed the Straits and dropped bombs which caused damage to dock equipment. RAF Fighters chased the German aircraft towards France but did not make contact.

As the afternoon progressed the weather deteriorated and the British fighters patrolling over the convoy "Agent" were recalled. One of the last raids of the day was an attack on the city of Belfast. Five raids of one aircraft each were reported off the east coast of Scotland and the Orkneys.

At 1602 hours, one raid of 6+ Luftwaffe aircraft flew towards Dungeness, turned west and bombed a steamer (which was damaged) off Sandgate. At 1730 hours, three RAF Squadrons were sent up to patrol the Dover area and RAF No 41 Squadron shot down one He 113 (?) (confirmed) and RAF No 615 Squadron shot down one He 59. RAF No 501 Squadron lost one Hurricane.

Late at night on the 27th of July and early in the morning of the 28th July, bombs were dropped at Swansea Docks, Upton-upon-Severn and Kidwelly (Carmarthen). No damage was reported except at Swansea where a railway line was displaced. During the night there was minelaying along the east coast and around Portland.

Generalmajor Theo Osterkamp was appointed Jagdfliegerführer (Jäfu) 1 or fighter-leader of Luftflotte 2, responsible for tactical coordination of JG 3, JG 26, JG 52, JG 54 and ZG 26 and left his duties as Kommodore of JG 51. Major Werner Mölders, Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 53, took over as Kommodore of JG 51. Major Mölders' place as Gruppenkommandeur was taken by Hptm. Harro Harder.


----------



## tango35 (Jul 27, 2010)

Hello Chris, you didan excellent job so far. It " forces " me(LOL) to come here to read this thread.

greets from over the Channel 
Thomas


----------



## Njaco (Jul 27, 2010)

Thanks tango!!!


----------



## timmo (Jul 27, 2010)

How much of your excellent spiel is 'freehand', Njaco - how much out of (which) reference?

= Tim


----------



## Njaco (Jul 27, 2010)

about 1/4 is mine and the rest copied or reference.


----------



## timmo (Jul 27, 2010)

How much of your excellent spiel is 'freehand', Njaco - how much out of which references?

= Tim


----------



## Njaco (Jul 27, 2010)

all the references listed at the beginning of the thread.


----------



## Airframes (Jul 27, 2010)

Good stuff again Chris. I've been playing around with the satellite image maps, and it's looking promising. I just need to sort out scales, in order to show the areas clearly enough. I think I'm going to have to make four separate images; one showing the south coast of England up to London, in relation to the north coast of France, one of the English south coast, and two of the French coast. The latter due to the spread of the Luftwaffe units. Do you want me to do one of the whole of the UK, showing airfields and radar etc ?


----------



## timmo (Jul 27, 2010)

Sorry, Njaco - didn't mean to repeat.

References - ah, yes! Should have remembered that they were all there.

= Tim


----------



## Njaco (Jul 27, 2010)

Go for it Terry or as they say here in the colonies, "Get 'er Done"!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 27, 2010)

*28 JULY 1940 Sunday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The weather was a carbon copy of the previous day, and Fighter Command expected stronger attacks by the Luftwaffe. Additional Fighter Command Squadrons were moved to forward bases as Dowding placed eight squadrons on forward airfields in readiness. But the morning proved too quiet. It turned out to be a disastrous day for the Luftwaffe. Their losses started at 0500 hours when a Ju 88 of 3./KG 51 on a mission to bomb Crewe in Lancashire lost its bearings and became hopelessly lost, then ran out of fuel and made a forced landing at Bexhill Sussex. The crew was not wounded and was made prisoners. Then at 0525 hours, 10 Group released a flight from RAF No.234 Squadron (Spitfires) to intercept Ju 88's approaching the Devon coast south of Plymouth. F/L Hughes, and P/O Horton all contributed in shooting down one Ju 88 east of Plymouth.

At 0630 hours, hostile aircraft appeared over Glasgow and bombed the Hillingdon district where a printing works was seriously damaged. Some windows of the Rolls Royce factory were broken and a few minor casualties were reported. At 0730 hours, a Ju 88 which approached Portcawl and bombed shipping was shot down by RAF No 92 Squadron. Several raids approached Bournemouth and Portland but faded without any attack being made.

The Luftwaffe fighters used a new tactic this morning that surprised the British defenders. Just past noon a large formation was detected to the west of Calais, and moments later another formation was picked up on the other side. But for some unknown reason the amalgamating formations seemed to hold their pattern, then when part way across the Channel turned back.

By 1330 hours another large formation built up in the vicinity of Calais and headed towards Dover. Slowly the German formation made its way towards the English coastline escorted by fighter elements from I and II./JG 51 and III./JG 26. As the German bombers with their escort approached the Kent coast, the British Observer Corps reported about sixty Heinkel's and forty Messerschmitts. Fighter Command released RAF No.41 Squadron (Spitfires), RAF No.74 Squadron (Spitfires), RAF No.111 Squadron (Hurricanes) and RAF No.257 Squadron (Hurricanes) to intercept.

The formation was just about over the coast when RAF No.74 Squadron was first on the scene, the other squadrons arriving moments later. As was usual practice, the Hurricanes attacked the bombers while the Spitfires engaged combat with the Bf 109 escort. A dozen Spitfires of 74 Sqn led by the famous South African ‘Sailor’ Malan (thus known from his merchant navy days) waded in among 36 Bf 109s of I./JG 51 over Dover, while Hawkinge’s Hurricane squadrons set about the bombers. But here, where the new tactic during the morning failed, it was applied during this afternoon raid with tepid results. The German formations split up before reaching their objective and headed back to French bases, leaving the British fighters to engage only the escorting German fighters. The fighting was intense as JG 51 engaged first followed by Bf 109s of JG 26, up sun of RAF No 74 Sqd, who bounced on the unsuspecting Spitfires. The RAF lost five Spitfires against five fighter losses for the Luftwaffe. RAF No 74 Sqd had two fighters destroyed and two damaged while RAF No.41 Squadron lost one damaged. A Spitfire damaged from RAF No. 41 Squadron was done in by Gefr. Martin Gebhardt of 2./JG 51 but Gefr. Gebhardt was shot down and killed shortly after the battle over Dover. He was given no credit for the kill. Spitfire claims went to Ofw. Karl Schmid of 1./JG 51, Richard Leppla of 3./JG 51, and Fw. Arthur Haase of 6./JG 51. Four Hurricanes were credited as being shot down by 7./JG 26 including one by Oblt. Muncheberg.

During his first flight with his new unit Major Werner Mölders, the new Kommodore of JG 51, managed to shoot down a Spitfire, his twenty-sixth victory, but was wounded in the legs. Although in pain, he was able to land safely back in France, out of action for a month. Major Mölders reported on this battle over the Channel;


> "_North of Dover we met some low-flying Spitfires. I shot down a Spitfire in flames. But now I found myself in the middle of a clump of Englishmen and they were very angry with me. They all rushed at me and that was my good luck. As they all tried to earn cheap laurels at the expense of one German, they got in each other's way. Well, I managed to manoeuvre among them and made them even more confused. Nevertheless, I couldn't avoid being hit. Bullets bespattered my aircraft. The radiator and fuel tank were shot up badly and I had to make a getaway as quickly as possible. Luckily my engine held out to the French coast, then it began to misfire. When I wanted to land, the undercarriage wouldn't work. There was nothing to do but land without it. I made a smooth belly-landing_."


Oblt. Richard Leppla of 1./ JG 51 claimed that the Spitfire he shot down, flown by F/L J. T. Webster, was the one that injured Mölders, but some controversy exists as Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan of RAF No. 74 Squadron also claimed to have shot down Mölders even though Malan returned safely to his airbase - contrary to Leppla’s report. Major Mölders’ victim, F/O A.D.J. Lovell, managed to land his damaged aircraft at Hornchurch.

He 59 seaplanes arrived to rescue German survivors only to find RAF No.111 Squadron (Hurricanes). Because a number of German rescue and Red Cross planes had been detected on observation, photographic and possibly other missions as well as carrying out their primary roll as search and rescue aircraft, the Air Ministry on 14 July 1940 gave instructions for them to be shot down if they were seen near to allied shipping or close to the English coast. One of these Heinkel 59 rescue planes was spotted by No.111 Squadron and shot down about 10 miles to the east of Boulogne off the French coast. As the crew of the He 59 scrambled in the water another He 59 made a landing close by to rescue them and a Hurricane of RAF No.111 Squadron flown by F/O Ferris strafed the second He 59 causing damage, but it managed to take off and make for safety. Another He 59 was also shot down by RAF No.111 Squadron whilst on a search and rescue mission at approx 1530 hours.

In all, a total of eighteen German aircraft had been shot down during the day, and the shooting down of He 59 search and rescue planes caused Hitler to proclaim that the RAF in attacking unarmed aircraft with defenseless and injured personnel on board nothing but cold blooded murderers.

There was considerable German activity in most areas during the night. The main feature was the intense activity of minelaying from the Thames Estuary to the Humber, extending later as far north as Aberdeen. Inland raiding over the south and east coasts was very pronounced and nearly all areas of England, Scotland and Wales were involved. By 0130 hours, raids were mostly withdrawing and at 0145 hours the country was clear north and east of a line from Chester to London. By 0245, all inland raids had withdrawn to the coast.

At 2330 hours, He 111s of III./KG 55 attacked Rolls Royce Crewe. Kent and Sussex were bombed late at night. Near Edenbridge, houses and gas and water mains were slightly damaged. Sealand Aerodrome was bombed at 0230 hours and South Wales was also bombed and the railway track near Neath was damaged, and a road blocked at Pontaliw near Swansea.

*GERMANY*: The planes and crews of III./JG 2 moved from their base at Frankfurt-Rebstock and traveled to the airfield at Evreux-West. The Gruppe was led by Major Dr. Erich Mix. The 3rd Staffel of JG 77 left their airfield at Berlin-Tempelhof and transferred to Wyk-Föhr.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 28, 2010)

Nice! (I love the last pic)


----------



## B-17engineer (Jul 28, 2010)

Last picture some books said is propaganda. Nice work Chris.


----------



## B-17engineer (Jul 28, 2010)

Chris also when I'm home later today I'll post some nice color pictures from BoB in the He-111.....if you'd like.


----------



## B-17engineer (Jul 28, 2010)

Here Chris


----------



## Njaco (Jul 28, 2010)

I don't think they're from BoB - I believe thats Norway. I have those around here somewhere!!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 28, 2010)

*29 JULY 1940 Monday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The weather was fine and it was expected that more attacks would be made by the Luftwaffe as flying conditions were as perfect as one could get. Slow to make their presence felt, it was not until 0700 hours that the first German formations were detected coming in across the Channel towards Dover. The observer Corps reported that the formation consisted of forty Ju 87 Stukas of II./LG 1 and II./StG 1, in two waves of 20 aircraft each and fifty Bf 109s of JG 51 and III./JG 26. Fighter Command sent up more squadrons than usual including RAF No.41 Squadron (Spitfires), RAF No.56 Squadron (Hurricanes), and RAF No.64 Squadron (Spitfires). RAF No. 41 Sqn began the proceedings with a 07:25 scramble to engage the enemy on his northern flank, leaving ten Hurricanes of RAF No. 501 Sqn. to race in from the sunward side. As they met the Luftwaffe they realised they were facing one of the largest formations yet of Bf 109s escorting two waves of Stukas.

The massed formations of Spitfires and Hurricanes arrived over the town of Dover just as the Ju 87s were making their first attacks at 0730 hours and the skies above the town became a swirling mass of weaving aircraft and vapor trails as an estimated number of 200 aircraft engaged in combat. 41 Sqn. went in after the Stukas but Bf 109s bore down upon the Spitfires. The squadron, forced to split, engaged both, and lost one aircraft in combat and four more in crash landings. 64 and 56 Sqns. were vectored to help. 501 Sqn. penetrated to the Stukas, shooting down two into the sea.

The concussion of bursting bombs shook buildings and broke windows all along the seafront, while waterspouts dropped tons of water onto ships in the harbour. Two Ju 87s from II./LG 1 and one Ju 87 from II./StG 1 were shot down into the sea while Fighter Command received a number of damaged aircraft including five Spitfires from RAF No.41 Squadron. Two RAF fighters were lost. Two other Stukas from II./StG 1 were damaged. Dover's AA guns added to the confusion and claimed RAF No. 501's Ju 87s.

Dover received slight damage as one merchant vessel (already damaged) and one small yacht were sunk and one naval unit was damaged. The Stuka's attack sank the steamer 'Gronland', which had been damaged on the 25th, and started a fire aboard a submarine depot ship. A naval auxiliary was sunk, and the oil pipeline broken, fuel gushed, then blazed upon the water. Buildings were damaged by splinters and blast. Patrol yacht 'Gulzar' (197grt) was sunk by German bombing in the submarine basin in Dover Harbour. The entire crew was rescued.

Several Experten made claims against the British aircraft. Hptm. Horst Tietzen of 5./JG 51 claimed his thirteenth kill while credit was given to Ofw. Fritz Beeck for his second and Fw. Eduard Hemmerling for his third. Both pilots were from 6./JG 51. Ofw. Karl Schmid of 1./JG 51 was credited with his ninth victory, a Spitfire over Dover. But JG 51 lost two pilots. Fw. Emmerling of 1./JG 51 was killed when he crash landed in the Channel off Calais as was Hptm. Erwin Aichele of 6./JG 51 when he crash-landed in France after the battle over the Channel.

Soon after midday attention switched to Channel convoys. Off Dungeness one was subjected to a low-level onslaught by Ju 88s of KG 76, whose lead aircraft hit a ships balloon cable.

Destroyer HMS "Delight" (Cdr M. Fogg-Elliot DSO) of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla departed Portsmouth at 1500 for the Clyde, but was sunk by German bombing off Portland. She was sailing in daylight, in contravention of local orders and placing herself at significant risk. After she had left the harbour, she was detected by German radar at Cherbourg, which directed German aircraft to attack the destroyer, by now some 20 miles (32 km) off Portland Bill. She attempted to fight them off, but was hit by a bomb on her fo'c'sle, which caused a major fire and a subsequent explosion. She finally sank in Portland harbour early the next morning, having lost six of her company in the attack.

At 1700 hours twenty He 111 and Do 17s attacked Harwich while Bf 110s of Epr.Gr 210 were sent from St. Omer to attack the port of Dover again. Convoy 'Agent' off Essex also came under attack by a mixture of 36 fighter and fighter-bomber Bf 110s. They were intercepted by RAF No.66 Squadron (Spitfires), RAF No.17 Squadron (Hurricanes) and RAF No.85 Squadron (Hurricanes) off the Essex coast near Harwich and two He 111's were shot down while RAF No.151 Squadron (Hurricanes) attacked the formation of Bf 110s off the coast at Orfordness. One He 111H-2 with 2./KG 53 was shot down by the RAF fighters of RAF No 17 Squadron, into the North Sea off Lowestoft. Six German planes in total were shot down while the British lost three fighters, Hurricanes were credited to pilots from 8./ZG 26. The Gruppenkommandeur of III./KG 26, Obstlt Adolf Genth was killed when his Do 17 was rammed by a Spitfire. Ofw Edmund Riebl and his crew were also killed when their Do 17 crashed at Paddock Wood. Two Hurricanes were damaged by accurate gunfire from the Bf 110s and both made forced landings at Martlesham and Rochford respectively. The day's activities resulted in four Luftwaffe fighters being severely damaged from anti-aircraft fire. In addition to the Bf 109s from JG 51 already mentioned, two other Messerschmitts lost, one each from II./JG 27 and 4./JG 51, crash-landed without injuries. Dover was left untouched.

On a night mission to attack the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton, an He 111 from 8./JG 55 was detected by searchlights and came under fire from AA gun batteries which managed to hit and damage the bomber. A fire started to engulf one of the engines believed to be the port engine, and soon the other engine began to lose power and the crew decided to abandon the aircraft. All baled out and were eventually captured. Two of the crew were at large for some 48 hours, but one crew member, Fw. J. Markl, managed to evade capture for nine days, believed to be the longest period of time that a German airman was "at large" before being captured. The oil tanks at Avonmouth were also attacked by the Heinkels.

A Hurricane from RAF No. 302 Squadron based at Leconfield airfield near Beverley, Yorkshire, was landing at base in a crosswind on a first familiarisation flight and damaged the aircraft. PO K. Lukaszewicz was unhurt, the aircraft was repairable.

Losses: Luftwaffe 13: Fighter Command 5.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The crew and Bf 109Es of Hptm. Siegfried von Eschwege’s I./JG 52 were transferred again, this time from Zerbst to the airbase at Bönninghardt.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 29, 2010)

*30 JULY 1940 Tuesday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The poor weather once again kept raids by the Luftwaffe to a minimum. Low cloud and light rain hampered the missions over the Channel. Attacks were on convoys off Orfordness, Clacton and Harwich. There were, however, a few engagements for Fighter Command with the first involving Spitfires of RAF No. 603 Squadron attacking a small raid of He 111's off Montrose with success just after midday. At about 0900 hours, three raids consisting of 21+ aircraft in all approached Swanage. In each case as the fighters were sent to intercept, the raiders turned away not less than 10 miles from the coast. At about 0945 hrs, RAF No. 601 Sqn when on patrol off the Isle of Wight, intercepted a formation and a Bf 109 was a probable casualty. One Hurricane is thought to fall into the sea and the pilot lost (this is difficult to substantiate and records conflict on this event, no pilots are named that I can see). Between 1100 and 1300 hrs, twenty enemy aircraft approached Portland but turned back when some distance from the coast on the approach of RAF fighters. RAF No. 238 Sqn shot down one Bf109 (confirmed). A He 111 that crashed north-east of Montrose was shot down by the defending Spitfires at 1212 hours. At 1100 hours Ju 88s attacked a convoy in the Channel without sinking a single ship. RAF No. 85 Squadron intercepted Bf 110's off the Suffolk coast and shot down one Bf 110, 10 miles east of Southwold at 1532 hours.

At 1530 hours, eight raids consisting of fifty aircraft assembled in the Bay of Seine and flew towards the Isle of Wight. Three fighter squadrons ordered to patrol at heights between 10,000 - 20,000 feet turned the enemy force which split and flew to within 30 miles of the Isle of Wight whence it returned to its rendezvous area. One raid crossed the coast north of Dungeness and No 65 Sqn shot down one Bf109 (confirmed) off Dover. A force of 24+ aircraft (and probably considerably more) appeared in the Cherbourg area at 1848 hours. The formation was plotted on a 10-mile front, flying in layers at an average height of 16,000 feet. It turned west towards Portland and then broke into separate raids and returned direct to Cherbourg. Squadrons off Portland failed to sight the enemy.

A small raid appeared over Surrey during the early evening with bombs being dropped on several areas near Esher, Chessington and Tolworth. The same raiders also attacked a balloon barrage. Bombs were dropped at Heysham (five miles south of Lancaster) from a raid coming in from the west. Other reports of bombs were received from Barry Docks and near Cwm Bargoed, where a railway track was damaged. The night-time activities also proved very quiet with raids plotted over Plymouth, Dorset, Devon, The Midlands and South Wales. During one of these raids, near Bristol, anti-aircraft fire claimed a He 111 bomber. The bombers of KG 55 continued with their attacks on the Bristol area. Beginning at 2300 hours until ending shortly after midnight, He 111s of I./KG 55 raided the Bristol Aeroplane Company and the oil tanks at Avonmouth.

Losses: Luftwaffe - 5, Fighter Command - 0

*GERMANY*: On 30 July, after a number of possible invasion dates that had come under heated debate and discussion, Hitler now had made it quite clear that no invasion could take place before 15 September, although it is believed that he personally did not want an invasion until at least early 1941. All his Generals did not favor this, the waiting period was too long, and it would also give Britain time to be better prepared and although at this stage the United States showed no signs of becoming involved with the war in Europe, that was always a consideration. But the question always remained, could Winston Churchill persuade Roosevelt to supply air and land forces to assist the British. If this happened, then Germany's chance at a successful invasion would be seriously hampered. Adolph Hitler had decided that before any such invasion take place, the British Royal Air Force must be eliminated both in the air and on the ground, and sent a message to Göring stating that he must have his forces in readiness to commence the great battle of the Luftwaffe against England within twelve hours notice. But arguments continued within the Wehrmacht regarding an invasion of Britain and how best it could be implemented. The Luftwaffe were deciding on the best method of action and the targets that would best hit hard on the Royal Air Force. The German Army and the Navy shared great differences as to where the invasion landings should take place. The Navy stating that to tranship hundreds of barges, invasion craft and transport carrying craft the narrow area of the Dover Straits would be best suited for this purpose. But the Army disagreed wanting the wider fronts of a number of landing beaches between Dover in the east through to Lyme Regis and Portland in the west.

It had been announced on German radio by Dr Joseph Goebbels who denounced the statement by the German Secretary of War that Britain would be overpowered in a short time and that British military forces would come under German control. He said;


> "_Britain was already weakening, it cannot muster the number of planes required to conquer our glorious Luftwaffe, they are losing a battle that they are intent on prolonging_."


He went on to say that even the United States now had no intention on attempting to save Britain, and that soon, an invasion of Britain will be successful. Of course, Goebbels, Minister for Propaganda, was doing just that, trying to impress the German people that Germany was well under way in winning the war and that the German government would be taking up residence in Whitehall maybe by Christmas.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 31, 2010)

*31 JULY 1940 Wednesday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The day dawned as a typical summer's day with clear skies and higher temperatures and even a number of people braved the consequences and a number of seaside resorts reported bathers on many of their beaches. The first combat operation of the day was at Plymouth at 0855 hours when it was not Fighter Command that were involved, but a Short Sunderland flying boat of the 10 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force based at Mount Batten. It was flying escort to the merchant cruiser 'Mooltan' that was departing Plymouth after a refit. Three and a half hours out of Plymouth the Sunderland sighted a Ju 88 and intercepted, providing the necessary cover for the 'Mooltan'. The German bomber broke off the engagement and departed the scene. The only other morning combat was over the Channel at 1100 hours, when Ju 87's attacked small convoys, the Luftwaffe continuing with its mission of destroying Channel traffic. Bombs were reported to have been dropped near four ships off Lowestoft and near a naval unit in Yarmouth Roads. Three RAF sections dispatched at various times failed to make contact. After 1200 hours the Luftwaffe contents itself with reconnaissance flight and a few single raids over the North Sea. No aircraft on either side were shot down.

In the afternoon at about 1600 hours two Staffeln of Bf 109s from JG 2 shot at barrage balloons over Dover. As the Bf 109s concentrated on the balloons, Spitfires from RAF No. 74 Squadron attacked the Messerschmitts. Soon, more Messerschmitts from II./JG 51 joined in the battle and a dogfight ensued over the Dover area. Four Bf 109's were damaged in the combat with one Bf 109E damaged and crash-landing at Fecamp with a seized engine with the pilot unhurt. The British lost three Spitfires from RAF No. 74 Squadron with one badly damaged and crashed on landing. Credit for kills were given to Oblt. Josef Fözö and Lt. Erich Hohagen of the 4th Staffel and Hptm. Horst Tietzen of 5./JG 51 for his fourteenth kill.

Losses: Luftwaffe - 5, Fighter Command - 3

Not until during the night did raids increase, with bombs dropped on areas near Swansea and South Wales, the Hornchurch, Gravesend and Shoeburyness areas of Kent; Southend and Brentwood areas of Essex; Ipswich, Wattisham, and Martlesham areas of Suffolk and Croydon.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Upset that the Geschwaderkommodore of JG 53, Obstlt Hans-Jürgen von Cramon-Taubadel had entered into a marriage whose family was not 100% Aryan, Reichsmarschall Göring this day ordered that all the unit's aircraft were to have its emblem, the "Ace of Spades", painted over and replaced with a simple red band, allegedly as an intelligence subterfuge. Most of the Geschwader's aircraft carried the red band across the front cowling while others had it placed underneath. Pilots within JG 53 responded in different ways to this slight - painting a huge 'question' mark on the red band where the unit badge was painted over, some painting over the whole cowling in the accepted recognition marking of all yellow. But III./JG 53, commanded by Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke, painted out the swastikas on their tailfins and used the empty space to record aerial victories. Obstlt. von Cramon was never awarded the Ritterkreuz and was eventually sent to Scandinavia to serve as chief-of-staff to several local commands for the remainder of the war.

The Bf 109Es of I./JG 3 left their airbase at Grandvilliers and transferred to Colembert.

Hptm Erwin Röder became Gruppenkommandeur of IV.(Stuka)/LG 1 in place of Hptm Bernd von Brauchitsch. The unit was based at Hesdin.


CASUALTIES FOR JULY

R.A.F. Fighter Command
Hurricane: 33 destroyed, 17 damaged
Pilots: 23 killed, 0 missing, 11 wounded

Spitfire: 34 destroyed, 24 damaged
Pilots: 25 killed, 0 missing, 9 wounded

Blenheim: 4 destroyed, 1 damaged
Crew: 9 killed, 0 missing, 1 wounded

Defiant: 6 destroyed, 1 damaged
Crew: 10 killed, 0 missing, 2 wounded

TOTAL AIRCRAFT: 77 destroyed, 43 damaged
TOTAL PERSONNEL: 67 killed, 0 missing, 23 wounded

The Luftwaffe
Dornier Do 17: 39 destroyed, 13 damaged
Personnel: 30 killed, 74 missing, 19 wounded

Heinkel He 111: 32 destroyed, 3 damaged
Personnel: 52 killed, 85 missing, 6 wounded

Junkers Ju 88: 39 destroyed, 11 damaged
Personnel: 52 killed, 67 missing, 11 wounded

Junkers Ju 87: 13 destroyed, 11 damaged
Personnel: 10 killed, 12 missing, 3 wounded

Messerschmitt Bf 109: 48 destroyed, 14 damaged
Personnel: 17 killed, 14 missing, 13 wounded

Messerschmitt Bf 110: 18 destroyed, 4 damaged
Personnel: 13 killed, 17 missing, 2 wounded

Other: 27 destroyed, 1 damaged
Personnel: 19 killed, 33 missing, 15 wounded

TOTAL AIRCRAFT: 216 destroyed, 57 damaged
TOTAL PERSONNEL: 193 killed, 302 missing, 69 wounded
_Peter G. Cooksley The Battle of Britain Ian Allan 1990 _


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 31, 2010)

Njaco said:


> TOTAL PERSONNEL: 193 killed, 302 missing, 69 wounded



Something we all forget in arguments on the merits of different aircraft. Virtually every battle resulted in deaths of fine young men. Doesnt matter where they were born or what uniform they wore, they were the brightest and best of there generation.


----------



## Glider (Jul 31, 2010)

Seconded


----------



## syscom3 (Jul 31, 2010)

NJACO:

Luftwafee Numbers:
TOTAL PERSONNEL: 193 killed, *302 missing*, 69 wounded ..... the 302 [missing] figures should show up in British figures for POW's. It should be a combination of POW's and true MIA (body not recovered)

Do you have anything to reconcile those numbers?


----------



## Njaco (Jul 31, 2010)

Not sure what you mean. The numbers came from....

Peter G. Cooksley The Battle of Britain Ian Allan 1990 

But thats 302 _Luftwaffe _missng.


----------



## syscom3 (Jul 31, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Not sure what you mean. The numbers came from....
> 
> Peter G. Cooksley The Battle of Britain Ian Allan 1990
> 
> But thats 302 _Luftwaffe _missng.



The British should have figures for how many of the 302 were POW's. The balance would be MIA - Body Not recovered.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 31, 2010)

Ok, I thought you may have misread that as total of both sides.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 31, 2010)

*1 August 1940 Thursday*

*GERMANY*: Hitler’s Directive No. 17 for the Conduct of Air and Sea Warfare Against England was signed and issued. The planned invasion of England was given the codename ‘SEELOWE’ (Sea Lion);



> _“In order to establish the necessary conditions for the final conquest of England I intend to intensify air and sea warfare against the English homeland. I therefore order as follows:
> 1. The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest time possible. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations and their supply organizations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing anti-aircraft equipment._
> 
> _2. After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country. Attacks on the south coast ports will be made on the smallest scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations._
> ...


HyperWar: The Battle of Britain--A German Perspective [Addendum/Appendices]

During the first few days of August 1940 the pilots of both the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe were taking each day as it came, and one day was not that different as the day previous. Up until now it appeared that Germany had no real plan of action. Göring, Räder, Kesselring and Hitler all had their own ideas regarding the preparation of an invasion of England and likewise the time that it should take place. Not being stretched to any sort of limits the pilots had periods when they had time to themselves, the Luftwaffe content on attacking the British convoys that were constantly plying the Channel route. Bomber Gruppen were quite content on mine laying duties along the eastern and southern coastline of Britain, while usually during the hours of darkness, the odd Heinkel or Junker's penetrated inland to bomb a factory or industrial target.

The outline of the air attack against England was given by Göring as early as 21 July, when Hitler had placed all his confidence in the Reichsmarschall in the destruction of the RAF prior to the invasion at a date yet to be fixed. Admiral Räder, the commander of all German Naval operations had little to do in actual operations during the Battle of Britain, but played an important part in German naval aggression in the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel. The three Luftflotten commanders, Albert Kesselring (Luftflotten 2), Hugo von Sperrle (Luftflotten 3) and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (Luftflotten 5) were responsible for their own Air Fleets and areas, and had to take all orders from their superior, the Reichsmarschall Herman Göring. The only person who could make any decision regarding the actual date of the invasion was Adolf Hitler himself.

The day previous, Hitler had informed Göring to have all his Air Fleets ready at twelve hours notice for air attacks on England. This was a sign that plans were now under way for the impending invasion and that Hitler had made a decision. Göring called an urgent meeting with his Luftflotte commanders at The Hague. It is believed that Göring stated at the meeting, that in the recent attacks on Channel convoys the Luftwaffe had failed to draw the British fighters into the air. The RAF was prepared only to send small waves of fighters and replenish them with new waves when the others returned to refuel and re-arm. He went on to say that his intelligence sources had informed him that Britain had only 500 fighters available to defend their island in the south, and that the air offensive against England would be nothing but a simple operation. It was true that AVM Park was only sending in small numbers of aircraft to defend the convoys, but in stating that Fighter Command only had 500 fighters to defend themselves with was rather an under estimation. They had not taken into account that Dowding could call on nearly twice that many in total from his other groups.

The German Navy was not satisfied with the mission assigned to the Luftwaffe by Directive No. 17 and the Naval Operations Staff war diary reflected that. . .


> "_. . . in view of the counteraction to be expected with certainty from the British Navy during the amphibious operation, the Naval Operations Staff holds the opinion that operations against naval ships should be required as part of the intensified air offensive _. . ."


but, also recognized that. . .


> "_. . .it will be necessary to wait until the first phase of the air operation is over." _


Certain naval records also indicate that Hitler had agreed, during a July conference, that if the Luftwaffe had failed to seriously damage the Royal Air Force within the first eight days that the operation would be postponed until May 1941.

At the conference with his pilots and Luftwaffe officials, Reichsmarschall Göring was told by a pilot about how well built and maneuverable the British Spitfires were. The Reichsmarschall, responding to the complaints and in front of Generalluftzügmeister Ernst Udet, commented;


> “_If that is so I would have to send my Luftzügmeister before the firing squad!” _


Udet did not respond to the slight. Göring continued;


> “_The Führer has ordered me to crush Britain with my Luftwaffe. By delivering a series of heavy blows I plan to have this enemy, whose morale is already at its lowest, down on its knees in the near future so that our troops can land on the island without any risk_.”


The lead up to the planned invasion began.

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The morning period was exceptionally quiet, but thick overnight mist in low lying regions aborted most of the minelaying that the Luftwaffe usually carried out during the hours of darkness. But a Spitfire from one of the Photographic Reconnaissance Units, on patrol over the north of France noticed heavy aircraft concentration at Cherbourg. He circled round, capturing the airfield on film and headed back to base. Fighter Command was notified at once of the build up, and they decided that the German held airfield should be bombed before they were committed in any offence against Britain.

After the low cloud and mists of the morning disappeared, the Luftwaffe sent out bombers to attack the British convoys “Agent” and “Arena” in the Channel just off of the Yorkshire coast. RAF No. 607 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 616 Sqd (Spitfires) were scrambled to intercept the bombers. Both squadrons took a little time in locating the German bombers but eventually sighted a Ju 88 and a Dornier Do 17 out to sea just below the cloud base. The RAF fighters were observed and the German bombers gained height and disappeared into the protection of the cloud after a short exchange of gunfire from both sides. One Spitfire of RAF No. 616 Sqd was damaged by gunfire from the Ju 88 but landed safely at base. About this time a Ju 88 of 9./KG 4 crashed into the North Sea while on operational duties, but it was unclear if it was a result of the action between the two RAF squadrons.

At 1430 hours several raids of three plus aircraft flew towards Dungeness. The Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Sqd were scrambled to intercept and about eight miles off the coast from Hastings the Hurricanes engaged a Henschel Hs 126 shooting it down into the sea. Other Hurricanes engaged a Ju 88, and one of the Hurricanes that attacked the Hs 126 was seen to crash into the Channel, Sub/Lt I.H.Kestin being listed as missing. The Junkers tried to make good his escape, but became damaged in doing so. It managed to land at its base, but Feldwebel Kohl on board was seriously injured and was to die two weeks later of his injuries.

By 1530 hours a number of combat actions were taking place up and down the Essex coast. Thirty He 111 bombers approached the Norfolk coast and for some reason no RAF fighters were sent to intercept them. They continued on towards the city of Norwich where they attacked the Norwich Railway Station inflicting minor damage, but doing far greater damage at the Boulton-Paul Aircraft Works on the outskirts of the city. A railway pedestal crane was destroyed and steel erectors belonging to Messrs Dawney and Co. were damaged. Also receiving direct bomb hits were a timber yard, and a factory. A total of six people were killed and nearly sixty injured in this bombing raid. Two Dorniers were intercepted off the east coast near Harwich. One was shot down while the other headed home trailing thick smoke. Two Spitfires got entangled in a small skirmish over the Channel just off the Sussex coast near Worthing.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 31, 2010)

_(1 August 1940 continued....)_

It was about this time that British Bomber Command were ready with a response to the photos taken that morning. The task to bomb the airfield near Cherbourg was given to RAF No. 56 Sqd (Coastal Command) based at Thorney Island using Blenheim IV bombers, and these would be escorted by RAF No. 236 Sqd (Long range Blenheim fighters). Ground crews loaded up the thirteen Blenheim bombers with the required bomb loads while ten Blenheim fighters were prepared and placed at readiness. The Blenheims of RAF No.236 Sqd were now taking off. The Blenheim bombers of RAF No.56 Sqd had taken off a little earlier and the Blenheim fighters were to rendezvous with them just prior to the French coast and strafe the Cherbourg aerodrome after the bombs were dropped by the bombers. The forecast given to the crews was that conditions would be fine with good visibility. The Blenheim fighter escort was to take off in three waves, with five minutes separating each wave and the last wave of four was to stay clear of the target area and stay off the French coast covering the withdrawal of the others. But all was not to go according to plan. The forecasters had got it all wrong as heavy low cloud covered the entire French coast around Cherbourg. The leading three Blenheims led by F/Lt R.M. Power missed the Cherbourg Peninsular completely and overtook the Blenheims of RAF No.56 Sqd and flew deeper into German-held territory before deciding to return to base.

A break in the cloud appeared just as the Blenheims of RAF No.56 Sqd neared the coast. They were on course and the aerodrome on the peninsula could be seen and they commenced their bombing run. Not far behind were the second wave of three Blenheim fighters led by S/L P.E. Drew. RAF No. 56 Sqd managed to drop their bombs successfully causing considerable damage amidst heavy flak and machine gun fire from aerodrome gun emplacements. S/L Drew led with Australian P/O B.M. McDonough and Sgt R.C. Smith at about 50-70 feet strafing the airfield and gun batteries. Many of the batteries were hit, fires started to follow explosions as hangars and buildings were hit, aircraft in the open were either destroyed or damaged. For the RAF the mission seemed to be a success. But it was short lived.

Some of the Blenheim bombers of RAF No. 56 Sqd were hit as they pulled out of their bombing run. Sgt Smith's aircraft received a number of hits as his low level strafing run sustained further damage to the aerodrome. He pulled out on completion, turned and headed back across the Channel losing contact with the others. One of the Blenheims of RAF No. 56 Sqd failed to return. It was piloted by the squadron commanding officer Wing Commander Weld-Smith. Two Blenheims of RAF No.236 Sqd also failed to return. A number of Bf 109's of III./JG 27 and JG 54 got into the air and several claims were made. Confirmed Blenheim kills were awarded to Ofw. Michael Hauer of 4./JG 54, Oblt. Franz Eckerle of 6./JG 54, Oblt. Walter Adolph of 8./JG 27, Ofw. Hans Richter of 8./JG 27 and the first victory of the war for Oblt. Erwin Düllberg of 8./JG 27.

S/Lt I.H.Kestin of RAF No 145 Sqn was shot down and killed at 15:00hrs. He was on patrol in his Hurricane P3155 South of Hastings and was hit by return fire from a Heinkel Hs 126.

By night, mine laying continued in north east Scotland and near Scapa Flow and also in the Thames Estuary. The first of an unusual tactic by the Luftwaffe was carried out when four He 111s of II./KG 55 targeted the Bristol and Southampton areas for dropping of fourteen packets of leaflets carrying Hitler’s “Last Appeal to Reason” speech from 19 July. Bad navigation and poor visibility caused the bombers instead to drop the leaflets over South Wales and Somerset falling in open pasturelands amongst grazing cattle and sheep. Two He 111s of II./KG 55 targeted the Parnall Aircraft Plant at Yale for leaflet dropping but could not locate their target. Instead the two twin-engined Heinkels dropped bombs on searchlights near Bristol.

At 0015 hours, RAF No 29 Squadron night-fighters claimed an enemy bomber. But the shot-down aircraft proved to be a Fairey Battle of No 1 Group, highlighting the difficulties of IFF at night. 

The Luftwaffe lost five aircraft over England while the RAF lost one Hurricane and two Blenheims with the crews killed.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Along the Channel coast Fahnenjunker Gerhard Barkhorn was transferred from 3./JG 2 to 6./JG 52 and was promoted to Lieutenant and Lt. Günther Rall, Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 52, was promoted to Oberleutnant. 6./JG 52 at that time was stationed at the channel. Major Alexander von Winterfeldt was promoted to Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 52 in place of Hptm. Von Houwald who was killed a week earlier. Major von Winterfeldt was a pilot during the First World War. His place as Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 2 was taken by Oblt. Karl-Heinz Metz. Major Adolf Galland was awarded the Ritterkreuz, the first of many awards. Hptm Erwin Röder replaced Hptm Bernd von Brauchitsch as Gruppenkommandeur of IV.(Stuka)/LG 1.

Movements included ObLt. Karl Vieck's,Stab./JG 3 moving from Le Mans to Colembert joining Hptm Günther Lützow's I./JG 3 who moved from Grandvilliers. 

The RAF bombed the airfield at Leeuwarden, Holland at night and damaged three aircraft from II./JG 27.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 1, 2010)

*2 August 1940 Friday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: A generally quiet day, mostly because of very low cloud and drizzle over much of the southern part of the country but there were a few shipping convoys in the Channel and along the east coast that were attacked. The Luftwaffe made scattered bombing attacks, but no serious damage was recorded. One attack was made on an area near to the Forth Bridge in Scotland. while Halton and Christchurch in Hampshire suffered small bombing raids. Mine laying and reconnaissance along the east coast continued and a number of German bombers failed to return from their missions, while most of the RAF casualties were non combat related. A Spitfire was destroyed as the pilot crashed on take off at Hornchurch, a Hurricane of RAF No. 504 squadron Castletown came in too fast and it flipped over on landing. Then a Blenheim from RAF No. 219 Squadron based at Catterick airfield, Yorkshire, overshot the runway at Leeming during practice landings without flaps at 15.15. The undercarriage was deliberately raised to avoid running into the Great North Road. PO W.G.M. Lambie and Sgt R. Bell were unhurt, the aircraft was damaged but repairable. Another Spitfire crashed on take off on night patrol from Rochford Airfield and exploded in flames, killing S/L H.C.Sawyer.

Late morning brought a small raid of He 111s over the Thames Estuary and Essex which was attacked by Spitfires of RAF No. 19 Squadron, scrambled from Duxford. Off Haisborough the section of Spitfires armed with cannon attacked, but lost the German aircraft in cloud. This raid ineffectually bombed shipping off Yarmouth. RAF No. 19 Squadron began using the cannon-armed Spitfire Mk 1b, but the restricted space for the cannon mounts made them extremely unreliable in the first versions. Only 30 were produced, intended as a solution to the increasing amount of armour plate fitted to Luftwaffe aircraft.

The most interesting and unusual event of the day was when a formation of German bombers attacked the steamship SS 'Highlander', six miles south of Stonehaven. In trying to defend herself, the 'Highlander' managed to hit one of the Heinkel's and it crashed into the sea. Earlier bombs had missed the ship and by all accounts the bombers started to come in low and began to strafe the ship. One of them, a Heinkel He 115 came in, just above the waterline and with a banking turn one of the wings almost touched the white capped waves of the sea. The gunners on the 'Highlander' tried desperately to fire at the sweeping aircraft, when it tried to pull up and one of its wings hit one of the lifeboat davits in the deck. It was unclear as to whether the 'Highlander' had hit the bomber with gunfire, but as it hit the davits, it swung round crashing onto the deck of the ship. According to German records, two He 115 bombers failed to return to their base, and all crew were reported as missing. English records do not state whether the crew were killed or were taken prisoner. The 'Highlander', obviously only suffering minor damage sailed into the harbour at Leith Scotland delivering the wrecked Heinkel to the authorities.

By night activity was not heavy, although attacks were widespread. The usual visits were paid to South Wales, coming in over the Weymouth area, and some of these raids penetrated up as far as Sealand, Liverpool and Lancashire. One continued across to Hartlepool, turned back and flew home via Liverpool, Wales and the south coast to Cherbourg. Several raids crossed in over East Anglia, (a searchlight post north of Bury St Edmunds was reportedly machine-gunned) and penetrated to the Midlands. Bombs were reported at Ternhill but the nearest fell four miles away from the aerodrome.

A raid which crossed in near Beachy Head came north to North Weald and circled the London Artillery Zone. This was later joined by a further raid which came in near North Foreland, up the Estuary and also circled in the London Artillery Zone. Swansea was bombed at 2330 hours when house property and motor vehicles sustained considerable damage. There were five casualties. Ju 88s of II./KG 51 dropped bombs on the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton and on searchlights near the city of Bristol. An East coast convoy was attacked by German aircraft and a trawler was sunk.

Minelaying was in the Thames Estuary, off East Anglia, Tees to St Abb's Head, Aberdeen and North East coasts.

The only claims for the Luftwaffe during the day were a Blenheim shot down near Le Havre by Oblt. Paul Temme of Stab I./JG 2 at 1100 hours and two Blenheims destroyed by Uffz. Hans Schätzel of 4./JG 54 and Fw. Fritz Oeltjen of 7./JG 54 over the Zuidersee, Holland about an hour later.

On this day the now famous Polish No. 303 Squadron, was formed at Northolt. Two of its most outstanding pilots were the Flight Commander, a Canadian named John Kent and a Czech pilot, Sgt. Josef Frantisek who achieved the highest score during the Battle of Britain. Sir Hugh Dowding strongly opposed forming Polish fighter squadrons - for which the Polish government in exile pressed very hard - but in view of the rapidly deteriorating military situation during the Battle of France, with Britain's very survival depending on the few fighter pilots it could muster, an agreement was finally reached. John Kent later remarked,


> "All I knew about the Polish Air Force was that it had resisted the Luftwaffe for about three days."


While it wasn't exactly the truth, it was generally thought that after two lost campaigns (Polish and French) the pilots' morale must have been low, and their skills remained largely an unknown. But the ever increasing casualties and insufficient supply of new pilots finally forced the RAF to accept into service foreigners, of whose Poles were the largest group.

Squadron Leader Henry Cecil 'Sam' Sawyer of RAF No. 65 Sqn was killed on taking off just before midnight for night patrol from Hornchurch, He was not very experienced at night flying and was probably blinded by the glare from the exhaust and climbed too steeply. He stalled and crashed his Spitfire R6799, which was burned out. He was only 25 and had been with the squadron for just a matter of weeks


R.A.F. Losses: 4 aircraft damaged or destroyed (through accidents) and 2 pilots killed.

Luftwaffe Losses: 14 aircraft damaged or destroyed with 19 pilots aircrew killed or missing.


----------



## Lucky13 (Aug 2, 2010)

Awesome work Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Aug 2, 2010)

*3 August 1940 Saturday*

*UNITED KINGDOM:* The Luftwaffe General Staff issued the plan for the destruction of the RAF, starting the campaign for the Battle of Britain. The plan for Adlerangrif or 'Eagle Attack' consisted of three phases:

Phase One: First 5 days: Attacks made in a semicircle starting in the west and proceeding south and then east, within a 90- to 60-mile radius of London.

Phase Two: Next 3 days: Radius from London reduced to between 60 and 30 miles.

Phase Three: Final 5 days: Attacks concentrated within a 30-mile radius centered on London.

The major Luftwaffe forces committed to Adlerangrif were Luftflotte 2, under Kesselring; Luftflotte 3, under Sperrle; and Luftflotte 5 (in Norway), under Stumpff. The spearhead would be Luftflotten 2 and 3, operating from locations in France, Belgium and Holland, supported by Luftflotte 5, operating from locations in Norway. The Luftwaffe simply drew a line through the center of England dividing the majority of the airspace between Luftflotten 2 and 3

There was widespread fog over most of Southern and Eastern England and in the Midlands during the morning. Once this cleared it gave way to heavy low cloud which would be down to 3,500 ft in places with restricted visibility. German activity was again confined to reconnaissances of shipping off the south and south east coast, and only a few raids approached near coasts; of these only two crossed inland. All recorded incidents took place in the north of England and in Scotland. Four raids approached the coast between Swanage and Land's End in the morning and one of these crossed the coast at St Alban's Head. It flew to Bristol and Cardiff by the usual route and returned on the same track. This aircraft was reported to have bombed a trawler which claimed to have shot it down off St Alban's Head. Bradford, Liverpool. The Firth of Forth near Edinburgh and Crewe were bombed and suffered slight damage. Because of the weather only a few enemy aircraft were detected and these were mostly over the Channel. A few raids took place over Falmouth and Swansea but generally because of the weather it was a quiet day for both sides. RAF Interceptions were attempted but none were successful. One nuisance sortie included a Ju 88 which flew so low by Wembury Cliff searchlight site that gunners fired down upon it. Low cloud and poor visibility was prevalent up to midday.

RAF fighters made two successful interceptions, shooting down a He111 off Montrose and a Bf110 off Southwold. Attacks were reported on convoys off Orfordness, Clacton and Harwich. RAF No. 85 Sqn shot down one Bf110, 10 miles east of Southwold at 1532 hrs. Five raids were plotted during the course of the day between Flamborough Head and the Orkneys, one of which was reported to be a meteorological flight. Another of these raids was identified as a He111 and was shot down by RAF No. 603 Sqn off Montrose at 1212 hrs.

Although German raids were again widespread at night there was not an exceptional number of Luftwaffe aircraft involved. At 2135 hours a raid came in via Southend to North Weald, and a split off this raid turned towards Chelmsford. More bombs fell on the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton when two He 111s of I./ KG 55 raided the factory at 2216 hours. At 2245 hours the usual activity developed along the East Anglian coast and some raids crossed inland. Similarly the usual raids crossed in over Weymouth area and proceeded to South Wales. As on the previous night some of theses passed on to Crewe, Liverpool, Manchester and Bradford areas. At about 0100 hours a further raid was on the same course to Crewe and Liverpool. It then turned east to Leeds and flew over Digby, North Weald and out over Beachy Head. Heavy fog was reported between the Thames and Duxford, which made interception by the RAF difficult. Further dropping of leaflets of Hitler's recent speech were reported from Epping, Tonbridge and Waltham Cross (Essex).

Fighter Command strength was 708 aircraft serviceable with 1,434 pilots. British defenses also included some 1,200 heavy and 650 light anti-aircraft pieces. And, although the Germans considered these insufficient for the defensive task, anti-aircraft fire would account for about 12 percent of the German losses in the coming battles.

Losses: Luftwaffe 4 : Fighter Command 0.


*WESTERN FRONT:* The personnel of I./JG 52 moved from Bönninghardt led by Hptm. Siegfried von Eschwege to new fields at Cocquelles. ObLt Karl Vieck's Stab./JG 3 transferred to Colembert, joining I./JG 3 who arrived the day before.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 3, 2010)

*4 August 1940 Sunday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Even though the weather was fine early and the cloud was higher with sunny breaks, there were no recorded incidents. It was a very quiet day for both sides.

A number of German reconnaissances were made over the sea, mainly along the south coast and in the Bristol Channel area. Several raids approached the Isle of Wight during the day, of which four flew towards the convoy at anchor at the entrance to Spithead. These turned back when RAF fighter patrols were dispatched. Two raids crossed the coast; one near Poole passed over Southampton and out to sea again over Portsmouth; the other near Bournemouth, passing Middle Wallop and Upavon, re-crossed the coast near Poole, fading in the Baie de la Seine. One raid was plotted 50 miles east of Kinnaird's Head, approached to within 15 miles of the of the coast, and then turned back. Several of the raids approaching the south coast were probably concerned with a convoy which was anchored in St Helen's Roads, Isle of Wight, owing to fog.

At approximately 1100 hrs a convoy was attacked off Manston by 1 Dornier escorted by 10 Bf109s but in consequence of timely action by two RAF fighter squadrons, the German aircraft were driven off. They suffered losses of 1 Bf109 confirmed and 4 Bf109s probable. At 1325 hrs a large force of about 120 enemy aircraft collected behind Calais and approached a convoy between Dover and Dungeness. Fighter interception by 5 squadrons resulted in 6 Bf110s, 1 Bf109, 1 Do17 and 1 Do215 being confirmed as having been shot down, and 2 Bf110s, 5 Bf109s and 4 Do215s as probable casualties.

At night widespread fog was covering most of southern England. At about 2300 hours two raids crossed the coast near Immingham; Hull and Grimsby. At the same time two raids crossed over Harwich, which went up through the Midlands as far as Derby, returned near London, and passed out over the Kent coast. At 0014 hours the military camp at Kennett (Cambridgeshire) was bombed which resulted in one soldier being killed and twelve being injured. Further leaflets of Hitler's speech were dropped during the early morning at Langstone, Raglan, Glais (near Swansea), Helmsley, Wass (Yorkshire), Elan Valley (South Wales), Clydach (Glamorgan), Rogerstone and Christchurch (near Newport, Monmouthshire). A He 111 from 7 / KG 55 went missing on a night mission to Manchester. It was believed the bomber crashed into the Channel.

Further leaflets of Hitler's speech were dropped during the early morning of the 4th August at Langstone, Raglan, Glais (near Swansea), Helmsley, Wass (Yorkshire), Elan Valley (South Wales), Clydach (Glamorgan), Rogerstone and Christchurch (near Newport, Monmouthshire).

Middle Wallop Sector came under the control of No 10 group at 1300 hours. RAF No 604 Squadron (Blenheims), No 238 Squadron (Hurricanes), No 609 squadron (Spitfires) and No 152 Squadron (Spitfires) were therefore now operating under No 10 Group control.

Sgt J.P.Walsh of RAF No. 616 Squadron was killed as he spun in his Spitfire N3271 in to the ground from 5,000ft in a practice dogfight near Kirton in Lindsey. The exact cause of the crash is unknown, Walsh was 20 years old and is buried in Harrow Cemetery, Middlesex. The aircraft was a write-off.

Losses: Luftwaffe 10: Fighter Command 1.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 5, 2010)

*5 August 1940 Monday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: With a return to better flying weather so does the Luftwaffe increase its flights to England.

Trawlers south of Selsey Bill were attacked early in the morning and small formations approached Beachy Head and the Isle of Wight, but turned away on the sighting of RAF fighters. At 0800 hours the Luftwaffe sent a formation of Ju 88's after a convoy during its passage between Hastings and the North Foreland. Four RAF squadrons were sent to intercept. One section from RAF No. 65 Sqn (Hornchurch) were four miles from Calais when they came across five Bf 109s from I./JG 54 returning from the convoy raid. Diving into the schwarm, two Bf 109s returned to France, damaged while Oblt. Reinhard Seiler of 1./JG 54 claimed a Spitfire from RAF No. 65 Sqd.

Off the East Coast four enemy reconnaissances for shipping were reported during the morning and three calls for help were received from convoys. Unfavorable weather prevented interceptions. Over the Kent coastline, six Spitfires from RAF No 64 Squadron battled more Messerschmitts from JG 54, resulting in one Spitfire from RAF No. 64 Squadron being destroyed. Sgt. L.R.Isaac of 64 Sqn was shot down and killed in his Spitfire L1029 by a Bf 109 off Folkstone at 08:50hrs. One Bf 109 was shot down and another made it back to France damaged.

German reconnaissances in the Channel extended to North-West of Cornwall in the afternoon. Around 1400 hours RAF No. 41 Sqdrn (Spitfires) and RAF No. 151 Sqdrn (Hurricanes) went after 30 ro 40 Luftwaffe aircraft seeking Channel shipping - Ju 88s escorted by Bf 109s from JG 51. Despite a partial interception because of the weather, RAF No. 151 Sqdrn. claimed another 109. This second battle over Dover with Bf 109s from JG 51 and RAF fighters increased several Experten victories. Those pilots given credit for British kills were Gefr. Paul Limpert who destroyed a Spitfire for his first victory, Lt. Hermann Staiger downed a Spitfire for his fifth kill and Hptm. Walter Oesau whose victory total increased to thirteen. All three pilots were from 7./JG 51. But the Geschwader lost a pilot when Karl Schmid was killed in action. He had ten victories in the air over the Allies.

Several raids of three plus aircraft flew towards Dungeness; one of these raids was intercepted at 1450 hrs by RAF No. 145 Sqn and one Hs126 and one Ju88 (both unconfirmed) were shot down, the RAF lost one Hurricane.

In the afternoon following several reconnaissances, a convoy was attacked off Yarmouth and RAF fighters contacted the Luftwaffe successfully. RAF No 242 Sqn shot down one Ju88 (confirmed) and one He111 (unconfirmed). RAF No 72 Squadron (Spitfires) intercepted one He 111 off Blyth (Northumberland) and chased it out to sea.

At 1512 hrs bombs were dropped on Norwich by one aircraft. Some damage was done in a railway goods yard and two timber yards were set on fire. The usual tracks were plotted off the coast between Cherbourg and Boulogne. Other bombs are reported at or near Brighton, Leighton Buzzard, Milford haven, Isle of Grain and Middlesborough. At 0010hrs in Northumberland. Eleven IBs exploded at Fisher Lane Road End (just off the old A.1 near the turn off to Cramlington). One house on fire, extinguished by a fire brigade unit from Gosforth UDC. Several HEs in a field at Seven Mile House Farm (One UXB).

Losses: Luftwaffe, 6; RAF 2.

*WESTERN FRONT*: At the airfield in Pihen, France, Hptm. Douglas Pitcairn, Staffelkapitän of 1./JG 51 collides with his wingman, Ofw. Erwin Fleig during takeoff. Hptm. Pitcairn is seriously injured and his wartime flying days done. Oblt. Hermann-Friedrich Jöppien takes his place as Staffelkapitän.

During the past few months Bomber Command had initiated a campaign of bombing various targets in occupied France with little return. But a Portuguese writes from Lisbon:


> "_From accounts of people returned from Germany things are in a very bad way indeed. The R.A.F. raids are causing terrible damage. The Huns need more of this kind of thing to show them who are the masters of the air. They must be blown off the face of the earth." _


----------



## Njaco (Aug 5, 2010)

*6 August 1940 Tuesday*

*GERMANY*: At Karinhall, outside Berlin, Reichsmarschall Göring called a meeting with his Luftflotte commanders to discuss how to implement Hitler's Directive 17. In attendance was the Inspector General, Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch, the commander of Luftflotte 5, Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, Luftflotte 2's Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring and Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle of Luftflotte 3. Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle suggested that since England was supplied by sea then the Luftwaffe should target the ports of the British Isles. Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring pressed his contention that one large raid on a central target, such as London was the way to bring England to the peace table. But Göring insisted that the airfields and personnel of the Royal Air Force should be destroyed before all other considerations. But, as Theo Osterkamp (a Fliegerkorps chief of staff during the battle and later a fighter commander) points out,


> "Göring, however, would have none of this, believing, as did many in the Reich Air Ministry, that not only had the RAF Fighter Command already been substantially weakened, but that the Luftwaffe was quite capable of defeating it in daylight operations."


As a prelude to the German invasion, the vital elimination of the RAF and its associated aircraft industry was scheduled to begin early in August, and the day for it's launching was given the code name of Adler Tag , or Eagle Day. The plan required that the fighter defenses be beaten down, while the total destruction of RAF Fighter Command should be achieved within four weeks, after which the invasion itself could begin. Meanwhile, as part of the same plan, a day and night bombing offensive was to be directed against the British aircraft industry and to assist in this the He 111's engaged in minelaying were temporarily switched to conventional bombing.

The major Luftwaffe forces committed to Alderangriff were Luftflotte 2, under Kesselring; Luftflotte 3, under Sperrle; and Luftflotte 5 (in Norway), under Stumpff. The spearhead would be Luftflotten 2 and 3, operating from locations in France, Belgium and Holland, supported by Luftflotte 5, operating from locations in Norway. 484 aircraft were available to the bomber formations of Luftflotte 3, comprising the Ju 88's of KG 51, KG 54, LG 1 and KGr 806 in addition to the He 111's of KG 27, KG 55 and KGr 100. This force was further bolstered by the arrival of the thirty-three Dornier Do 17's of KGr 606.

This having been decided on (or rather, ordered by Göring), the meeting ended and the commanders went to prepare their air fleets. Thus, over the objections of his field commanders, Göring was slowly beginning to take more and more direct control of the operations. Since no date had been set for beginning Alderangriff, the Luftwaffe simply continued with the Kanalkampf operations already in progress.

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Still reasonably quiet. This day was almost a repeat performance of the previous day. With the weather generally cloudy with fairly strong winds, there was little activity from the Luftwaffe. A number of individual raids were plotted along the South and East Coasts. Misty weather and cloud conditions made interceptions difficult. One enemy aircraft crossed the South Coast near Portland and flew to South Wales where it bombed the RAF station at Llandow. There was a ground fog in places and some haze; conditions which accounted for the failure to intercept. Damage caused to the station was slight and there were no casualties.

There were some attacks against shipping but until 1630 hours only three tracks were plotted, of which one approached to within 5 miles of Dover. At 1630 hours two raids amalgamated and flew towards Clacton and over a convoy which was well out of its area 10 miles north of Herne Bay. The convoy was bombed but seems not to have been damaged. A fighter squadron did not intercept. Between 1827 and 1853 hours, seven raids concentrated in the Calais - Boulogne area and flew various courses in the Straits of Dover. Four squadrons were detailed but did not make contact. In the Humber, a convoy was reported on by enemy aircraft, but no attack developed. Two sections of RAF fighters failed to contact. In a raid off Haisborough a section of Spitfires armed with cannon attacked, but lost the enemy aircraft in cloud. This raid ineffectually bombed shipping off Yarmouth.

Off East Anglia three RAF No.85 Sqn. Hurricanes led by Sgt. Geoffrey Allard shot down a Do 17 of III./KG 3. The Dornier was spotting a convoy east of Lowestoft. RAF No 72 Squadron (Spitfires) intercepted one He 111 off Blyth (Northumberland) and chased it out to sea.

The Dornier was the only casualty of the day for both sides.

P/O P.W.Horton a New Zealander of RAF No. 234 Sqn crashed on landing after a night patrol at St Eval flying Spitfire P9366. He survived the crash. A Spitfire from RAF No. 72 Sqn based at Acklington airfield in Northumberland, crash-landed following an uneventful patrol at 1240hrs. The pilot, Sgt R.C.J. Staples was unhurt but the aircraft was a write-off.

A Blenheim from RAF No. 219 Sqn based at Catterick airfield in Yorkshire, collided with HT cables and crashed into a river during a searchlight co-operation flight, Pilot Officer J.C. Carriere and Sgt C. Beveridge, both superficially injured, the aircraft was a write-off.

The following three Spitfires from RAF No 616 Sqn based, at Leconfield airfield near Beverley in Yorkshire, returned to base, damaged by return fire from the same Junkers Ju 88, engaged twenty miles NE of Flamborough Head at 1700 hrs. One was piloted by S/ L M. Robinson, the second by Sgt M. Ridley and the third by F/O R.O. Hellyer. The pilots were unhurt and the aircraft were repairable.

The first contingent of airmen from Southern Rhodesia arrived in Britain today to add its strength to the increasingly international air force which is waging war on Germany. The men join not only British and Polish pilots but also airmen from Canada, Australia and New Zealand - not to mention volunteers from Ireland and the USA. Throughout the Empire, towns, islands, colonies and even tribes are donating money for individual planes to the mother country. Soon more airmen will arrive from the colonies to pilot the planes that their fellow countrymen have donated. Already Canada is training hundreds of fighter pilots.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The Kanalfront Geschwaders were moved and transferred to numerous forward airfields in France. The I and II Gruppen of JG 52 moved after refitting from Nordholz in Germany to Peupelinge airfield on the Pas de Calais. The personnel of Hptm. Hubertus von Bonin’s I./JG 54 transferred their Bf 109s from Eindhoven to a new airbase at Guines-en-Calaisis. A small detachment of the Gruppe moved to an airfield at Amsterdam. Hptm. Winterer’s II./JG 54 moved their Bf 109Es from the field at Harlinghem to Campagne-les-Guines. Hptm. Fritz Ultsch’s III./JG 54 joined the II Gruppe at Campagne-les-Guines, flying their Messerschmitts from Soesterberg in Holland. When they arrive at the airfield outside Calais they find that the sheep pasture being used as an airfield is so rutted and grooved that take-offs and landings were sometimes more dangerous than the missions they fly.

Returning from an operational mission, a fighter from JG 3 was damaged upon landing.

Hptm. Heinz Cramer was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of II./LG 1, taking the place of Major Kurt Dobratz. The unit used twin-engined Ju 88 bombers flying from the airfield at Orleans-Bricy. The Stuka unit of LG 1, IV(Stuka)./LG 1 received a new Gruppenkommandeur when Hptm. Erwin Röder took the place of Hptm. Bernd von Brauchitsch. Hptm. Röder’s unit uses the Ju 87 Stuka for operations, flying from the Tramecourt airfield.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 6, 2010)

*7 August 1940 Wednesday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: There was very little Luftwaffe activity during the day. A few raids reconnoitered convoys and one convoy was bombed. One raid approached to within 30 miles of Aberdeen but fighters were unable to intercept. At 0635 hours, Hurricanes of RAF No 46 Squadron saw bombs bursting around a convoy off Cromer but interception by fighters from Coltishall was frustrated by thick cloud from 5,000 to 10,000 feet. In the evening, a raid of 9+ aircraft approached the Isle of Wight but turned south before a squadron from Tangmere and a flight from Middle Wallop which were waiting to intercept, could make contact.

Attacks on Dover harbour, and the sinking of two destroyers based there, had forced the Navy to rebase their remaining ships from Dover to Portsmouth before the end of July, and to temporarily halt convoy traffic. However, the Admiralty decided the convoys of colliers must continue - to stop them would be admitting they had lost control of the Channel. A group of merchant captains gathered for a briefing on 7 August were told this bluntly. German radio was claiming the Luftwaffe had closed the Channel to British shipping, and the Admiralty intended to prove this false.


> "We don't give a damn for your coal, we'd send you through empty if we had to. . . It's a matter of prestige"


. . . the merchantmen were told.

And so, on the evening of 7 August, a convoy of twenty merchant ships and nine escorts, code-named 'CW9' by the Navy but known as "Peewit" to the RAF, left the Thames. It was planned that this convoy would pass through the Dover Straits in darkness, and at first light it would pick up its fighter escort off the south coast. Unfortunately, the British were as ignorant of German radar as the Germans were of the British. The Freya radar set at Wissant, which unlike its British counter-parts was used for detecting shipping rather than aircraft, picked up the convoy in plenty of time. “Peewit” edged past Dover, hugging the shore, slowly heading westwards as daylight faded. Under the watchful eyes of the Germans, the large convoy had been seen from Cap Gris Nez and warning messages flashed to the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. In the pre-dawn darkness, a flotilla of E-boats attacked like a pack of wolves into a flock of sheep. The German boats scattered the convoy and mayhem ensued until the E-Boats called off the attack in the gathering light. In the confusion two other ships collided, sinking one, and as dawn broke the convoy was no longer an orderly group but was scattered over several miles. The rest would be left to the Luftwaffe.

There were widespread raids from the Thames to Aberdeen, from Poole to Cornwall and the North to Liverpool. There was a marked increase in night raids, with scattered nuisance missions up entire East Coast, and in the South West and over Merseyside.

The order to attack British airfields was given by Generalfeldmarchall Albert Kesselring on this day.

P/O R.A.D.Smith of RAF No 616 Squadron was killed while night flying at Leconfield in his Spitfire I.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 6. RAF 1.

*WESTERN FRONT*: At St. Omer airfield, the Staffelkapitän of 3./Epr.Gr 210 and a proponent of fighter-bomber tactics, Hptm. Valesi, crashed in his Bf 109E and was killed.

Major Werner ‘Vati’ Mölders, Kommodore of JG 51, returned from the injuries he suffered on 28 July, 1940. A pilot from JG 51 came to Major Mölders and asked the commander for leave so the pilot could marry. Major Mölders responded,


> “_Why marry now when there is only England left? Marry later to celebrate the victory_.”


The leave was denied.

At their airbase outside Normandy, II./JG 27 Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Werner Andres was given the word that his unit was to stand down for twenty-four hours. This came as welcome news for Hptm. Andres and his pilots who did not necessarily care for the cramped accommodations at the airfield.

Bomber Command attacked the Haamstede base of JG 54, destroying 2 Bf 109s and damaging 5 others on the ground.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 7, 2010)

*8 August 1940 Thursday*

*THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN: PHASE TWO*
*UNITED KINGDOM*: During the opening phase of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe conducted what they called Kanalkampf - attacks on shipping in the English Channel. The forces committed by the Germans were nowhere near their full potential, as they were still building up to full strength after the wear, tear and attrition of the Battle of France. Only when their bases were fully prepared and their units back up to strength would the assault on England itself begin. With the focus now on the destruction of the RAF, the Luftwaffe tried to lure the RAF up to battle with its fighters. For their part, Fighter Command refused to be drawn into what would have been a battle of attrition over the Channel, and likewise husbanded their available forces for the inevitable onslaught that was to come. The Admiralty were made fully aware that their convoys could not expect anything but token protection from Fighter Command, but still they continued to demand more and more cover from the RAF.

The 25 ships of the convoy CW9 (code-named 'Peewit'), was finally observed by the Germans. However, the convoy's scattering worked in its favor, as it made it difficult for the Luftwaffe to locate them all in order to plan their attacks. Another factor that prevented a complete disaster was the German command structure. They were confused as to whether the ships were in Luftflotte 2 or Luftflotte 3's area of responsibility, and so both Luftlotten initially did nothing, giving the ships several hours grace to collect themselves into some sort of order. German shore radar detected the convoy during the early morning hours and E-boats attacked, sinking two coasters ('Holme Force' and 'Fife Coast') and damaging others.

Finally Generalmajor von Richthofen of Fliegerkorps VIII, part of Luftflotte 3, ordered all his dive-bombers along with the fighters of I. and III./JG 27 for escort to attack the convoy.


> "_This convoy must be wiped out_!"


he stated.

They launched their first attack at 09.00 hours, with two raids escorted by the Bf 109s. The cloudbase that morning was only 2,000 feet, and the convoy was especially equipped with barrage balloons in an attempt to discourage attempts at dive-bombing. British radar detected them and five 11 Group squadrons and one from 10 Group were sent up to tackle the raiders. Between 08:49 and 09:43 two assaults each of 100-plus raiders attacked the convoy (15 miles west of the Isle of Wight), which lost SS 'Conquerdale' and SS 'Empire Crusader'.

Meanwhile, fighter sweeps over south-eastern England by elements from JGs 3, 26, 51, 53 and 54 had drawn some attention, being met by Spitfires from RAF Nos.41, 64, 64 and 610 Squadrons. Shortly after 1100 hours the Bf 109s of JG 51 engaged Spitfires from RAF No. 64 and 610 Squadron. Five Luftwaffe pilots claimed victories including Hptm. Hannes Trautloft of Stab III./JG 51 and Oblt. Josef Fözö of 4./JG 51. Four Spitfires were lost (with three of their pilots killed), one force-landed and two others badly damaged. Luftwaffe losses were one shot down, four crash-landed in France, and one badly damaged.

At about 12:48 the second assault on CW9 developed, just east of the Isle of Wight with a force of fifty-seven Ju 87 Stukas from StG 2, StG 3 and StG 77, again escorted by about thirty Bf 109s from JG 27, and a further twenty Bf 110s of LG 1. After disposing of the balloon cover the Stukas dive-bombed and scattered the ships. But Hurricanes of Nos. 43, 145, 238 and 257 Squadrons and Spitfires of 609 Squadron - over 50 fighters - arrived. The Stukas still managed to get through, sinking four ships and damaging seven others. Sqn. Ldr J.A. Peel of No. 145 Squadron fired the first shots of this, for some the first official day of the Battle of Britain. Three Stukas were shot down and four damaged along with an escorting Bf110 of V./LG 1 and three Bf109s, three more '110s and a '109 were damaged.

Determined to sink the entire convoy, Fleigerkorps VIII returned in force at about 15.00 hours, mustering eighty-two Ju 87s in another attack to the south of the Isle of Wight, escorted by sixty-eight Bf 109s of II./JG 27, whose twenty-four hour stand down from the pervious day was rescinded, and Bf 110s. 10 and 11 Groups responded with seven squadrons. Amongst these was RAF No. 145 Squadron, returning for its third battle over the convoy for the day. Between them, RAF No. 145 and RAF No.43 Squadrons accounted for most German losses on the day. Unfortunately, even their effort was not enough. Six damaged ships limped into the nearest port; only four of the original convoy arrived at their intended destination of Swanage, Dorset.

By the end of the day’s fighting,the Luftwaffe had lost 31 aircraft. Nine German fighters were lost and another eight damaged with II./JG 27 suffering most, having four aircraft lost and two damaged, including the Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 27, Hptm. Werner Andres, who became a prisoner. Hptm. Andres described his bad luck,


> “_I was hit in the instrument panel and in the engine, thick white steam and plumes of black oil rushed past the canopy of my aircraft and much of it managed to enter the cockpit, maybe my controls had been shattered also as I had no control over the now fast descending aircraft. The waters of the Channel were fast coming towards me, I knew that the situation was hopeless. I managed to throw back the cockpit hood and took all the necessary precautions for a crash-landing in the water. It was my good fortune that I was approaching the water at an angle so as to make a belly landing – had I been diving straight down, it would not have been possible to survive. I prepared myself for the impact, then suddenly I was pushed forwards and my arms cushioned the impact as a wall of white water engulfed my Bf 109 and the icy waters seemed to cut me in half. I jumped from the aircraft almost before it had come to a standstill, and within one minute the tail of the aircraft rose dramatically and the Bf 109 slid head first to the bottom_.”


 Hptm. Ernst Dullberg was appointed as acting Gruppenkommandeur of II Gruppe in Hptm. Andres place.

The British lost nineteen aircraft including a Blenheim from RAF No. 600 Squadron shot down into the sea off Ramsgate, and sixteen of their valuable and irreplaceable experienced pilots killed or missing, plus still others wounded. Two Spitfires were lost from RAF No. 65 Squadron over or near Ramsgate. One British pilot, S/L Harold Fenton, looking for two lost pilots over the Channel, was attacked and shot down by a German observation plane. Most of these losses (13 Hurricanes and a Spitfire) were protecting a strategically worthless convoy.

The Stuka losses were a cause for concern. The accuracy they achieved by dive-bombing naval targets was a lesson not lost on their Japanese allies-to-be, but in terms of Germany's current war against Britain, the loss of a few colliers and a score of fighters, most of which were regarded as an inferior type by the Luftwaffe, was not a balance against their own losses either. The heavy Stuka losses this day, added to those to be inflicted in the days to come, would ultimately lead to the type's withdrawal, but even this day's "victory" by the RAF did not alter the course of the Battle. While it was a fine close-support aircraft, and would have had a major part to play if "Sealion" had been launched, the Stuka was not suited to the strategic bombing role now being thrust upon the Luftwaffe, and its withdrawal was almost inevitable for this reason. Low-flying Dornier sneak-raiders proved to be just as effective against airfields without the same vulnerability.

To compound the Luftwaffe's problems, although they - the Luftwaffe and Fighter Command - were unaware they were doing so, they both over-estimated their own air-to-air successes, and under-estimated the overall size of Fighter Command, both by a factor of two. Before the 8th, they had developed an impression that the RAF was short of planes due to the small numbers of fighters committed previously, and thought the combats on this day represented a "maximum effort" by the RAF. They also thought that the RAF had lost such a large portion of their force on the day that they would no longer have enough planes to defend the Channel, and that it would only take a few days more of clear weather to destroy the remainder of Fighter Command. The order to launch this major assault - Adlerangriff, the Attack of the Eagles, as soon as weather permitted - was issued as a result of the events on the 8th. In fact, Fighter Command had around a thousand Hurricanes and Spitfires available at units and in storage, and more coming off the assembly lines every day, and at no stage during the Battle was availability of planes a factor.

Adding to the Luftwaffe's sense of victory this day was the fact no more convoys sailed after 8 August. But this was not due to their efforts. The Admiralty "discovered" the vital coal being transported by sea could be moved by rail, and suddenly there was no longer any need to waste the lives of so many brave collier crews or fighter pilots on "prestige". Fighter Command was finally freed to do what it was meant to do - defend Britain.

A little after 2030 hours, He 111s from I./KG 55 bombed the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton. Later at 0230 hours Heinkels of II./KG 27 attacked areas near Bristol. He 111s of II./KG 27 returned over England at 0215 hours, attacking the Bristol searchlights.

Losses: Luftwaffe 31 : Fighter Command 20.

*WESTERN FRONT*: As the crew of Hptm. Kienitz's III./JG 3 arrived at their new airbase at Desvres, they found that instead of a prepared airfield they must operate from a local football field.

Oberleutnant Gustav “Micky” Sprick was appointed Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 26.


----------



## Glider (Aug 8, 2010)

I find a lot of the information contained in these postings to be fascinating. The accuracy of the bombing in this case and the use of E boats.

Many thanks


----------



## Lucky13 (Aug 8, 2010)

Most excellent work Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Aug 9, 2010)

*9 August 1940 Friday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Heavy rain and squalls prevented most air operations over the Channel and England although I./JG 53 lost a Bf 109 when it hit a Flak emplacement while making an emergency landing on the Island of Guernsey. In the afternoon, several raids concentrated in mid-Channel but turned when British fighters were sighted.

At 1140 hours, one He 111H of KG 26 crossed the coast near Sunderland, but after being active over Sunderland was shot down by RAF No 79 Squadron (Hurricanes) at 1145 hours. There is a report that 1 boat was dropped by this aircraft. The crew were picked by a RN patrol boat, two of the crew were injured and two were unhurt. Four people were killed and seventy-eight injured, when a shipyard (Laing's), a railway bridge, some residential property (in Bonners Field) and Monkwearmouth Station Hotel was hit when bombing took place over Sunderland at by the Heinkel, dropping 14 bombs over shipbuilding and railway facilities. A Heinkel He 111H was shot down by AA gunfire during operations near Flamborough Head. The aircraft and the crew, listed as missing. By dawn in total 190 HE’s had fallen in 24 hours, killing 7 and injuring 100

At 1650 hours, two Messerschmitts machine-gunned Dover Harbour. Fighters intercepted and fired at the enemy aircraft but without results.

But the weather didn't prevent night operations. KG 26 attacked Wearmouth, Northumberland, dropping 14 bombs over shipbuilding and railway facilities and injuring 73 people. Twelve He 111s of II./KG 27 dropped bombs and leaflets on the airfield at Filton at 2400 hours.

Sgt.R.D.Ritchie of RAF No 605 Squadron in his Hurricane I (L2103) died when he crashed into the sea 1 mile off Dunbar at 16:45hrs. He was picked up by a boat but his neck was found to be broken.

F/L S.P.le Rougetel flew with RAF No 600 Squadron. At night his Blenheim suffered engine failure and was attacked. To compound his problems, he came under fire from British A.A. fire. He and his radar operator/gunner (Sgt E.C.Smith) baled out of the Blenheim 1f BQ-O (L8679) over the Channel. They were both safe but Smith had to swim ashore at Westgate. Oblt. Karl-Heinz Metz from 8./JG 2 was credited with the kill.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 5; RAF 4.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 9, 2010)

*10 August 1940 Saturday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The original date for ‘Alderangriff’, Reichsmarschall Göring’s ‘Attack of the Eagles’ passes, as the Luftwaffe was not ready to carry out the objectives and weather was too poor over Britain for operations. Thundery conditions with line squalls; some bright intervals was the order of the day. The new date was set for August 13.

In the early morning, a raid reported a convoy at Swanage; the raid then turned and faded south of Shoreham. There were reports of machine-gunning off trawlers near Beachy Head and a little later, two further raids appeared in this area. Later, it was reported that an enemy aircraft had been active over a ship 40 miles south west of Pembroke. At about 0630 hrs, RAF No. 85 Sqn intercepted and claimed one Do17 (confirmed). This enemy aircraft had reported the position of a convoy east of Lowestoft. RAF No. 72 Sqn intercepted one He111 off Blyth (Northumberland) and chased it out to sea.

At 0730 hours, one raid crossed the coast at Pevensey and attacked the aerodrome at West Malling where AA guns went into action. Some HE bombs were dropped on or near Malling Aerodrome, Kent. Considerable damage was reported to old laundry block of the Institution and surrounding buildings. There were about ten civilian casualties. It is said that two sticks of bombs, 12 in all, were dropped, one stick in one direction and the other across it. A lone undetected Do 17 put 11 HEs close to RAF West Malling despite RAF No. 501 Squadron's attempts to stop it.

During the afternoon, several shipping reconnaissances were made off Yarmouth and Cromer and a Dornier was active over South Norwich. This raider was intercepted by a Spitfire which fired all its ammunition into it but the enemy aircraft turned out to sea and escaped.

Bf 110 pilots of Erpro 210 attempted a surprise evening strike on Norwich.

The bombers of II./KG 27 targeted the South Wales ports and the Bristol docks with bombs and leaflets a little past 2330 hours. During the night serious damage was done to the Llandore GWR (Great Western Railway) viaduct near Swansea where a direct hit on a shelter killed four.

RAF Coastal Command 608 Sqn. carries out its first operation with its new Blackburn Botha general reconnaissance aircraft.

No aircraft were lost from either side during the day.

Fighting alone, with their backs against the wall, the people of Britain decided that the most useful thing to do, the most practical and patriotic thing to do, would be to buy Spitfires to replace those that had fallen. And so in the summer of 1940 communities large and small, businesses, organisations, societies, clubs, trade unions and individuals started up “Spitfire Funds”. As the poster showing a cheery RAF pilot suggested, their slogan was - *“I’ll fly it if you’ll buy it!”* In February 1940 a brand new Spitfire cost £8897.6s.6d. Airplane enthusiasts and those sad types who just like long columns of pre-decimal figures might enjoy the following price list…


> Engine £2000
> Tailwheel £10
> Fuselage £2500
> Compass £5
> ...


Although it doesn’t sound very much £8897.6s.6d was equivalent to about £255,608 today. Recognizing that it would be difficult for cash strapped organisations to raise such large sums Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Production, decided to make the public an offer that it couldn’t refuse. He dropped the nominal price of a Spitfire to just £5000, equivalent to £143,600 today. If your community or organisation could raise £5000 Lord Beaverbrook would build a Spitfire, stick your name on it and give it to the RAF. In reality the next Spitfire off the production line was simply accredited to the donating group.

*WESTERN FRONT*: A new recruit was posted to combat status. Hans-Joachim Marseille joined I(Jabo)./LG 2 and began operations against the British over the Channel front.

In Vichy France, Laval offers Germany 200 pilots to help fight the Battle of Britain.


----------



## Glider (Aug 10, 2010)

There is one thing that I hadn't expected and that was the number of raids by one or two German bombers. Also the potential loan of 200 pilots to help with the attack on Britain was new to me. I have to wonder how many would have defected given the chance


----------



## Njaco (Aug 10, 2010)

I agree. Wasn't aware of that also. Starting tommorrow, things heat up!


----------



## Njaco (Aug 10, 2010)

*11 August 1940 Sunday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft that were daily flying on meteorological flights out into the Atlantic Ocean, reported that the barometric pressure was building up in the mid-Atlantic south-west off the Spanish coast and with the wind speed and direction were very confident that fine weather would prevail over the next few days in the Channel area, and in particular over the designated target areas. Göring lamented that provided the weather was in their favor, that the Luftwaffe would destroy the RAF within fourteen days. He had nearly 2,000 serviceable aircraft at his disposal, which consisted of some 800 medium range bombers, 700 Bf 109s, 250 Ju 87 dive bombers, and 160 Bf 110 twin engine fighters plus a number of reconnaissance aircraft. His pilots were well trained with even the newer pilots going through a strenuous training program, but the events of the previous month during Kanalkampf - the battle over the Channel - had taken its toll.

After France, the Luftwaffe thought that the RAF with its morale at an all time low and aircraft which many thought were antiquated, had pilots that flew them lacking the knowledge needed for fighting in combat. But they were caught by surprise at the skill of the RAF fighter pilots and the performance of the machines that they flew. In contrast, many of the Luftwaffe pilots were not only tired, but many of them were near to exhaustion.

In comparison, the RAF had just 650 fighter aircraft, and approximately 1,250 pilots and many of these lacked the proper training, in fact many of them had to complete their training on an operational airfield due to the fact that the RAF drastically needed....more pilots. But the pilots, it did not matter whether they were experienced or not, displayed great courage and determination in the July dogfights over the Channel. In the proposed next phase of the Battle of Britain this determination would be very much put to the test.

The 11th of August was a Sunday, and for the port of Dover in south-east Kent was just like any other Sunday morning. It was early, but many people were either getting ready to go to church or for those non-believers, were having their usual sleep in while the rest looked forwards to the usual good Sunday breakfast. That is until they heard the drone of bombers coming from the direction of the Channel. Many thought it unusual, others who had been making a study of the war so far stood in wonderment as up until now, all of Germany's attacks had been over the sea lanes; why now were they heading towards Dover and the coast of England? It was not long before they found out. Most thought that the enemy planes were on their way to the industrial centers along the Thames or even London itself. They were quite surprised when explosions started to erupt in the harbour, tall fountains of water spouted into the air as bombs landed, and many surrounding houses fell victim to the bombing. People ran screaming and shouting and running in all directions, even though the siren had sounded when the aircraft were first heard, many ignored the fact that this could well be an air raid because so far the Luftwaffe had not yet resorted to attacking land bases in Britain.

Fighter Command had been warned of the small build up that was moving in towards the coast at Dover at 0830 hours, radar had supplied the position and direction of the German formation, and the Observer Corps reported the type and strength. Park was informed that the formation consisted of about thirty Bf 110 and an equal number of Bf 109s. So the Bf 110s from Epr.Gr 210 and a couple of Bf 109 fighters had Dover all to themselves. Well, for a while anyway. A number of Luftwaffe Squadrons came over in quick succession and it looked as though something big could be building. AVM Park had no alternative but to allow some of his fighters from Hawkinge and Manston to "scramble". RAF No. 74 Sqd (Spitfires) operating out of Manston and RAF No. 64 Sqd (Spitfires) were the squadrons released to cover Dover. Official records state that only a few skirmishes took place and that Dover Harbour was the prime target of the German attack. Fires were caused at Dover as a result of the attacks on the British balloons, some which were shot down. Some slight damage was caused to houses and it was reported a gas holder was punctured by Messerschmitt shrapnel. But the Luftwaffe plan was to attract as many of the British fighters into the air as possible at Dover while the main strike of the day was to be concentrated much further west near Portland, this operation being laid on in place of the mass 'Adler Tag' assault which had been postponed.

Soon after the attack at Dover had ceased, Ventnor radar detected an excessive build up across the Channel just outside of Cherbourg. Park immediately put all of his squadrons in stand-by mode. As time went on, the build-up was getting bigger and bigger and it now looked as if it was the biggest armada of air power yet sent across the Channel. But fortunately the only build-up was coming in from the direction of Cherbourg. This now, was not an assortment of Ju 87s or Bf 110s, but fifty-six Ju 88 heavy bombers from I and III./KG 54, twenty Heinkel He 111s of KG 27, sixty-seven Bf 110s from II and III./ZG 2 and about thirty Bf 109s of III./JG 2. In total, about 170 German aircraft. Fighter Command relayed the information to the Operations Room at 10 Group and RAF No.145 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No. 152 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.213 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.238 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.601 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires) were scrambled to intercept.

Off the coast, and out over the Channel, the dogfights were fierce and numerous. Spitfires in high speed chases weaving over or under other dogfights that were in progress, were either chasing Bf 109's or being chased by them, sometimes a British pilot would abort an intended attack because once within identification range he found it to be a British fighter.

The attack by the formation that was heading towards the Portland Naval base and Weymouth was the biggest of the day, with destruction of a number of factories, the gasworks and oil storage tanks, all others being fairly minor and were really of nuisance value more than anything else, although the days losses were high. ASW Trawler HMS 'Hertfordshire' was in Admiralty floating dock (AFD19) which was holed and strained. The 'Hertfordshire' suffered some splinter damage. The Luftwaffe lost a total of 38 aircraft made up of two Heinkel He 59s, two Ju 87s, (one each from IV./LG 1 and II./StG 1), six Ju 88s, three Dornier 17Zs, ten Bf 110s from ZG 2 and fifteen Bf 109s. Further to that some fifteen aircraft either made forced landings or managed to make it back to their bases with considerable sustained damage. Hptm. Hans-Peter Kulbel was recently made acting Gruppenkommandeur of I./ZG 2 in place of Major Ernst Ott. But his promotion lasted only one day when he was lost in the day’s action over Portland. Hptm. Christians was appointed acting Gruppenkommandeur the next day.

The personnel of JG 2 suffered the most Luftwaffe losses for the day with close to seven fighters lost including the Gruppe Adjutant of III./JG 2, Oblt. Adolf Steidle, along with the Staffelkapitän of 6./JG 2, Oblt. Edgar Rempel and Oblt. Heinz-Ewart Fricke of 9./JG 2. JG 27 lost Uffz. Siegfried Lackner and Uffz. Rudiger Menz.

Luftwaffe victors included Oblt. Hans-Karl Röders and Lt. Werner Kluge of 9./JG 2, each claiming a Hurricane and Rudolf Rothenfelder, the designer of the emblem for 9./JG 2, claiming a Spitfire. Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 claimed a 'Tomahawk' over Portland for his eleventh victory. Oblt. Helmut Wick of 3./JG 2 described his action of the day;


> “_Three Englishmen with radial engines appear, in very tight formation, and I pull the stick into my stomache and zoom up behind these. A quick glance left and right. All clear. I dive and get the leader in my Revi gunsight. I press the button and he goes down, his companions covering him as he disappears. I climb again, searching the sky. To the right there is nothing, but I cannot believe my eyes when I look the other way. The sky is full of Spitfires, and just a few Bf 109s. I go straight into the dogfight, but at once get a Spitfire on my back. At full speed I try to lose him. Now I have one Spitfire in front and another behind me. Damn it! I dive vertically away to lose him, then climb again. Suddenly I see white trails shooting past. I look back. Yet another is behind me, sending his tracers past my ears like the “fingers of the dead”. I will thank God if my mother’s son can get out of this dogfight! I manage to outclimb the Spitfires, and try again to help my outnumbered comrades, but each time the Tommies come down behind me. Suddenly a Bf 109 comes past very fast with a Spitfire behind it. This is my chance. Get behind the Spitfire and centre it in my Revi. After a few shots it goes down . . . I watch it crash into the sea with a huge splash.”_


----------



## Njaco (Aug 10, 2010)

_( 11 August 1940 continued...)_

The RAF fared no better than the Luftwaffe with six Spitfires and twenty-one Hurricanes shot down, one Spitfire and five Hurricanes making forced landings and one Spitfire and nine Hurricanes damaged. Four Hurricanes from RAF No. 111 Squadron were shot down off of North Foreland and all four British pilots were killed. F/Lt R.Voase-Jeff of RAF No 87 Squadron was lost in combat in his Hurricane I (V7231) over Portland Bill at 10:45hrs. He was awarded the D.F.C. and later the Bar to the D.F.C. P/O John R.**** flew with RAF No 87 Squadron and was the first Australian to shoot down an enemy aircraft in WW II. He baled out of his Hurricane I (V7233) safely after being shot down off Portland Bill at 10:50hrs by Oblt. Helmut Wick of 3./JG 2 (Wick claimed 3 kills for the day). He swam ashore slightly injured. His Hurricane I (V7233) LV-K was recovered in 1983 and was on display at Tangmere Aviation Museum. F/O A.Ostowicz from Poland joined RAF No 145 Squadron on the 16th of July 1940. He was in combat with enemy fighters when he was shot down off Swanage and killed in his Hurricane I (V7294). He was awarded the K.W. and Bar on the 1st of February 1941. The RAF ace F/Lt Roland Derek G.Wight of RAF No 213 Squadron was shot down and killed off Portland in his Hurricane I (P3789) at 11:00hrs whilst leading 3 Hurricane's against 60 Bf 110's. He held the D.F.C. and is buried at Cayeux sur Mer France. His Score stood at 10½ confirmed kills.

For the RAF squadrons, it had been a hard day. No sooner had they landed to refuel and rearm, they were up again repeating the performance all over again. To illustrate how busy the day was, the Squadron log of RAF No. 74 squadron (Manston and Hornchurch: Spitfire I and II) commanded by South Africa's "Sailor" Malan - read:-


> "_take off at 0749 hrs., second patrol: take off 0950, third patrol: take off 1145, fourth patrol: take off 1356."_


 Operations Rooms had been stretched to the limit, as the casualties mounted and fresh squadrons were brought to readiness. They didn't know it then, but with 'Adler Tag' yet two days away, this was only the beginning.

During the early afternoon the Dorniers of 9./KG 2 were sent to attack a merchant convoy off Harwich on the Essex coast and again escorted by twenty-four Bf 110s from Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer's Epr.Gr 210. Another battle ensued as fighters from RAF No.17 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.74 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No.85 Sqd (Hurricanes) fought in heavy combat. The convoy - code named "Booty" - suffered two freighters set on fire but the RAF lost three aircraft just off of the East Coast while two Bf 110s were damaged but all returned to base.

Meanwhile, another build up of enemy aircraft was forming in the Thames Estuary, this was picked up by radar, and again the Luftwaffe was heading towards another convoy. This time a medium convoy that had just left the docks in London. The formation consisted of forty-five Dorniers of II and III./KG 2, ten Ju 87 Stukas, and about fifteen Bf 109s. RAF No.74 Sqd (Spitfires) were redirected south to make an interception along with RAF No.54 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No.111 Sqd (Hurricanes). But by all accounts, the weather started to deteriorate rapidly and the mission was aborted. 

But the British tried to put pressure on the German landing operations on the French coast. At 1130 hours, fighters from JG 51 intercepted a formation of Spitfires from RAF No. 610 Sqd covering a formation of Blenheims from RAF No. 604 Sqd over Calais. Another 2 Blenheims of 604 Squadron escorted by 3 Spitfires of 152 Squadron attempted to set fire to waterborne He 59s off France. Two Spitfires were shot down in the ensuing combat including the first victory of the war for Uffz. Alfred Rauch of 5./JG 51. Hptm. Ernst Wiggers of 2./JG 51 destroyed a Blenheim from the bomber formation.

Night time missions also began to increase as Göring prepared for 'Alder Tag'. Several He 111s of III./KG 55 took-off from Villacoublay airfield at 2015 hours to bomb the aircraft factory at Filton and the oil tanks at Avonmouth. One bomber crashed returning to France after the mission. At 2335 hours, seven He 111s of II./KG 27 attacked the Bristol Aeroplane Factory and the Avonmouth docks and lost one Heinkel when it crashed in Dorset.

At night a Bristol searchlight team held a He-111H in their beam long enough for a Hurricane of 10 Group to bring about the Groups first night success.

The heaviest day in losses so far found 38 Luftwaffe and 32 RAF planes downed in air battles


----------



## Airframes (Aug 11, 2010)

Good account Chris. Be aware that the photo, often captioned as pilots scrambling during the BoB, is pre-war, taken at Duxford, and is of 19 Squadron's Spitfires. Note the early 'flat' canopy, lack of armoured wind shield, 'straight' radio mast, and two-bladed prop. Also the half black underside colour.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 11, 2010)

Yes, I was aware it was early but didn't know it was 19 sqdrn. Thanks! August heats up now!


----------



## Njaco (Aug 11, 2010)

*12 August 1940 Monday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Göring ordered Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 to be ready for 'Alderangriff’' to commence the next morning at 0700 hours with the code words 'Alder Tag'.

Hans-Joachim Jabs of 2./JG 27 remembered;


> “_For some reason, all of us had a gut feeling that something was now about to break. During the previous month we had all been engaged in heavy combat, but by the end of the month all operational missions became few and far between, many squadrons were only going out on spasmodic attacks. We enjoyed the comfort and relaxation of that first week of August, we almost behaved as if there was no war on, although many were asking the question . . . why? Word had got around that the Fuhrer had endorsed a plan of invasion of England and we all believed that this to be somewhere on or about the 10th or 12th of August and I think that this period of quiet that we were experiencing was to get all our aircraft in 100% operational condition. Many trucks were seen arriving at the base and we could only assume that they were bringing in fresh supplies of fuel and ammunition, everyone seemed to know that the planned invasion of England was near. When we were given orders to stand down for 24 hours, we then knew that it must be the next day that the invasion was to start.”_


The day before the official Adler Tag was due to commence, British radar detected German aircraft at 07:20 hours approaching from the direction of Calais. It was not unusual for German bomber formations to fly directly overhead en route to their target area. But this time it was different, this was a highly skilled Bf 110 operation. As a prelude to Adler Tag, the Luftwaffe decided to target the British coastal radar chain in a series of attacks that moved up and down the coast in stages. Each of the Bf 110s carried a single 500kg bomb, and this elite squadron, Epr.Gr 210, was commanded by Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer who split his Gruppe into four groups of four Bf 110s each shortly after 09:25 hours. At first, he led the section on a westerly course, flying low in an effort to avoid detection, then just south-east of Beachy Head, they swung northwards and headed towards Eastbourne and the white cliffs of Dover. At a pre-determined point, the raiders started to gain height so as to effectively dive bomb their targets. The British radar suddenly picked up the German formation but became bewildered as to how they had suddenly appeared. The twenty-one Bf 109s and Bf 110s were flying directly for Dover, then, as soon as they flew over the coast they suddenly turned and immediately attacked the tall towers of the radar installations. Oblt. Wilhelm Rössiger and his Messerschmitts headed for the radar station at Rye, Oblt. Martin Lutz and his Bf 110s headed for Pevensey, Oblt. Otto Hinze and his flight flew to the radar masts at Dover while Hptm. Rubensdörffer's Zerstörers attacked the station at Dunkirk, near Canterbury.

Hptm. Rubensdörffer reported that the mission was seventy-five percent successful, and Kesselring, to make sure that the RAF radar network was in chaos, sent out Ju 87 Stukas to attack several small convoys in the Thames Estuary. Although Fighter Command's communications were stretched to the limit, Foreland CHL for some reason escaped the early morning attack by Hptm. Rubensdörffer and reported back to HQ that fifty German aircraft had been picked up, with another force of twelve that although separate from the main force were possibly intending to link up and attack the convoys of "Agent" and "Arena" that were cruising in the Estuary. These were the Stukas of IV./LG 1 commanded by Hptm. Erwin Röder who had taken over from Bernd von Brauchitsch on 6 August. Hornchurch dispatched their RAF No.65 Spitfire Sqd and Biggin Hill sent out the Hurricanes of RAF No.501 Sqd to intercept. It was not a good day for Fighter Command. Convoy "Agent" was attacked by the Ju 87s, and the Hurricanes that were trying to stave them off paid a high price. Four of them were shot down and two RAF pilots were killed. Convoy " Arena" lost several vessels sunk or damaged. All the Stukas returned to base.

The convoys “Snail” and “Cable” were subjected to similar raids all day. Fifteen Hurricanes from RAF No. 501 and RAF No. 151 Sqds attacked the Stukas who were in turn bounced by the escorting Bf 109s of III./JG 26. Five RAF fighters were destroyed by the pilots of JG 26 without loss to the Gruppe. Luftwaffe fighter losses to other fighter units amounted to nine Bf 109s destroyed and five returning damaged to France with one from I./JG 2 being written off. After shooting down two British fighters, the Gruppenkommandeur of Werner Mölder's old unit, III./JG 53, Hptm. Harro Harder, was lost over the convoys - shot down by a Spitfire from RAF No. 609 Squadron. He had eleven victories including five Spitfires shot down in a forty-eight hour period. Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilke was named Gruppenkommandeur of III Gruppe.

At 1151 hours, Poling radar detected a large force of raiders over the Channel south of Brighton. This turned out to be a bomber force of fifteen Ju 88s of KG 51 and KG 54, escorted by Bf 110s of ZG 2 and ZG 76. Cover for the formation was provided by twenty-four Bf 109s of JG 53. In all, a total of 200+ aircraft. They kept to their westerly course following the coastline of Sussex until they were south of the triangular shape of the Isle of Wight, then the Kommodore of KG 51 Oberst Dr Fisser led his formation on a heading for Portland giving the RAF the impression that he was going to repeat the bombing of the Dorset town as he had done the previous day. But as the balloon defenses of Portsmouth came into view on his starboard side, he turned his formation northwards.

There were still other radar stations operating, notably the important one at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight, and this was to become the next target for the Luftwaffe, and at the same time, because of the major towns of Portsmouth and Southampton were nearby, attacks could be made on these. The action continued as Oberst Dr Fisser led his Geschwader west, some fifteen miles off the flat west Sussex coast with the triangular configuration of the Isle of Wight dead ahead. Then he ordered his armada sharply to starboard in order to enter Portsmouth harbour through a gap in the balloons. Portsmouth readied for the attack but Fisser and fourteen of his crack crews had other plans, though, and as he circled he watched his bombers going in like a huge serpent in line-astern.

The anti-aircraft fire, from every ship in the harbour, firing for once from a steady gun platform, and from the Army's guns ashore, was in its intensity like nothing Fisser, or any of his crews, had seen before - 4.5 inch, 3 inch, 2 pound pom-poms, Bofors and even 20mm filled the sky with black puffs and criss-crossing tracer. Now Fisser himself turned south-west, losing height and gaining speed rapidly as he raced at 300 mph and at 5,000 feet over Foreland, the eastern tip of the Isle of Wight, heading for the little seaside resort of Ventnor. There, on a strip of high-level ground close to the town, were sited the tall towers of the CH station which covered the whole mid-Channel area, and whose screens were now scarred with the blips from Fisser's main force and, more ominously, the detachment coming directly for the Station. Fisser wasted no time. Like Rubensdörffer, he wanted to get in and out as fast as possible, and he aimed the nose of his Ju 88 at the towers and the buildings, all connected by a criss-cross pattern of white concrete paths. Like most Ju 88 commanders, he favored the shallow dive approach which gave his bomb-aimer the best visibility and more time to make last split-second adjustments than in the 45 degree or steeper approach. Fisser saw no anti-aircraft fire, and it was almost impossible to miss with the four 250 kg, delayed-action, high-explosives they all carried.

Dropping his bombs and lighter by a ton, he pulled up steeply above the scattered boarding- houses and small hotels of the seaside resort, over the chalk cliffs and the breakers on the shore, and watched the bombs explode. Fisser was a veteran of the Polish and French campaigns, had dropped bombs across half of Europe, but he could never have seen such concentrated devastation. The whole target was engulfed by white-and-black clouds, with more exuding from the inferno as he turned away and ordered his planes to close in, climbing at full throttle, to escape the avenging wrath of the British. But already the first reports were coming in from behind that still distant Hurricanes were diving towards them. And, belatedly, the Bofors anti-aircraft fire had burst into action. It was accurate firing, too, and as Fisser continued his turn overland north of Ventnor, he suddenly realized that his whole detached force was in a dangerous position, with a height disadvantage and only a scattering of Bf 110s to give them any support before they could clear the area. RAF No. 145 Sqd Hurricanes were first on the Ventnor scene, but RAF No. 152 Squadron's Spitfires came in seconds later, and a whirling fight ensued before Fisser could get his Ju 88s away.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 11, 2010)

_(12 August 1940 continued....)_

One Hurricane of P/O McGregor got on the tail of a Bf 110, ignoring the rear-gunner's fire, and dispatched it with a single burst. Then two more of his squadron began harassing Fisser's Junkers and were joined by two more of RAF No.152's Spitfires. The Kommodore was killed at the controls. The Junkers, trailing flames, dived towards the ground, was pulled up violently, presumably by one of the crew, and headed towards Godshill Park, yawing and only partly under control. It struck the ground heavily, sending up a cloud of pale earth, and slid to a halt, its back broken but the fire self-extinguished. Leutnant Schad and Oberleutnant Luederitz, both wounded, staggered from the wreckage, and their captors succeeded in extricating the fourth crewman, badly burned, a few minutes later. Most of Fisser's Geschwader were still attacking Portsmouth at 12.25 hours as he lay dead in this pleasant park on the Isle of Wight a few miles away. The anti-aircraft fire remained intense and accurate throughout the Portsmouth attack. Ten more Ju 88s fell to RAF fighters' guns from RAF No. 152 Sqd and RAF No. 213 Sqd., or the ground gunners. By a curious freak of the tides in these uncertain waters, the body of Fritz Budig- McGregor's Bf 110 victim - was washed ashore near Gosport, while his pilot's body was found on the beach near Boulogne five weeks later. Five escorting Bf 110s and a Bf 109 were also destroyed.

P/O W.S.Williams a New Zealander, shot down a Ju 88 but was himself forced to belly-land his damaged aircraft at Bembridge. He barely got clear of the blazing Spitfire I (N3175) when it exploded.

Portsmouth was hit hard in this battle, shops, buildings and factories were destroyed, fires broke out in many parts of the city and falling walls and masonry became a hazard. This was the first major attack on an English populated area, and to the British, it was a sign of things to come. 100 civilians died, but as far as the air war was concerned, the British were still losing less than the Luftwaffe. The sudden German attacks caught the British off-guard and put the radar stations at Dover, Pevensey and Rye temporarily out of action. At Pevensey, eight of the 500 lb bombs hit the station with one bomb cutting the main electrical cable. Over Rye, most of the bombs hit empty barracks but still caused enough destruction to halt operations for a few hours. The Dover station was hit hard but the crucial masts were still standing after the attack. The hardest hit was the station at Ventnor, which was out of action for three weeks, leaving a gap in the radar defenses. But other stations were able to mask the outage by transmitting on the same wavelength as Ventnor and the Luftwaffe did not exploit this. Although considerable damage was done, and the attack played havoc with the communications, again, the Luftwaffe onslaught did not attain the success that it had anticipated. Dunkirk continued to transmit as did Pevensey and Dover, after only a brief interruption to communications. By noon all the radar stations were back operational except Ventnor. But Kesselring and Sperrle were convinced that now the radar station attacks had achieved their purpose and that the RAF was now 'without it's eyes'. The Luftwaffe would now impose the next phase of the battle, and that was the destruction of the RAF airfields in southern England. The first three on the list were, Lympne, Hawkinge and Manston.

After returning to base, the warplanes of Epr.Gr 210 were re-armed and refueled and took-off for another mission over England. This time the target was the RAF airfield at Manston. Manston, or 'Charlie 3' as this airfield was known, was the real prime target, it was the most easterly of all the airfields in the south, and another of the all grass airfields which allowed entire squadrons to take off together thus they were in the air and reaching the enemy quicker than if they had to take off in single file on any of the concrete runways. Shortly after 1300 hours, the Bf 110s and bomb-laden Bf 109s dove on the airfield. RAF No 56 Squadron, already airborne and approaching the airfield, tried to intercept the raiders but with so many German planes swirling over the base, a concentrated effort was lost as pilots dove to singly attack different bomber formations.

RAF No 54 Sqd (Spitfires) witnessed the whole of the attack from the air. The Squadron had managed to get off safely before the Epr.Gr 210 Bf110s and Bf 109's arrived and began an interception of the German formation, but RAF No 65 Sqd had a hair raising experience taking off as bombs exploded around them. Only P/O K.G.Hart was injured and his aircraft damaged in the attack. No sooner had RAF No 54 and RAF No 65 Squadrons pushed the Bf 110s and Bf 109's back over the Channel, a formation of thirty Dornier Do 215s of KG 2 led by Oberst Fink escorted by forty Bf 109s came in over the Straits of Dover and headed for Manston again. 

This was the first major attack on a British airfield. For two solid hours Manston had been under constant bombardment. The airfield was now a shambles. It is estimated that 150 high explosive bombs fell, destroying hangars, workshops and damaging two Blenheims and the airfield finished up with more holes in the ground than an eighteen hole golf course. After the bombing of Manston, the Luftwaffe diverted their attacks on to the airfields of Lympne and Hawkinge where they were bombed by Ju 88s of II./KG 76. Hawkinge suffered a similar fate as Manston with hangars and huts destroyed and twenty five large, and numerous small craters appearing all over the airfield, enough to put Hawkinge out of action for three days. Lympne also suffered in the attack. Hptm. Kurt Fischer's I./JG 26 provided close escort for the Lympne bombers from KG 3 and beat off an interception by RAF No. 601 Sqd. Spitfires. Two Spitfires were shot down but the Gruppe lost Oblt. Friedrich Butterweck when his Bf 109 exploded over Ashford.

A fighter sweep over Dover by III./JG 26 failed to enticed any British fighters to battle but part of the Gruppe managed to become entangled in the combat over Manston. Three Spitfires were shot down, one by Lt. Heinz Ebeling of 8./JG 26 for his third of the day, and one each for Fw. Gerhard Gryzmalla of 8./JG 26 and Lt. Johannes Naumann of 9./JG 26. P/O A.Geoffrey Page of No 56 Squadron was shot down in flames while attacking some Do 17's, baling out of his Hurricane I (P2970) "Little Willie" over the Channel and was rescued, badly burned.

The Bf 109s of II./JG 52 flew their first mission over the Channel coast from Pas de Calais and lost three aircraft and pilots. Uffz Leo Zaunbrecher of 2./JG 52, flying Bf 109E ‘Red 14’, was damaged in combat with P/O J. McLintock of RAF No. 615 Squadron and crash landed in a cornfield near Selmeston, Sussex.

Lt. Max-Hellmut Ostermann of 7./JG 54 described his Geschwader’s actions;


> “_In comparison with my combats in France, I was very calm. I didn’t fire, but tried again and again to get into a good position. But every time I got there the Tommy would break away . . . Finally my chance came. Below, I saw a Bf 109, and 200 metres behind him, a Spitfire. I peeled off and dived, turning in behind him. Now it was I who sat 200 metres behind the Tommy. Be calm; don’t fire yet! I applied full power and slowly closed the gap, as the Tommy did with his own target. Now, at 100 metres, the wing-span filled the Revi gunsight. Suddenly the Tommy opened fire, and the Messerschmitt in front broke away. I had pressed the gun button at the same instant, aiming dispassionately as we went into a slight left-hand turn. My first shots hit. The Spit streamed a long grey smoke trail and dived steeply into the sea, just off the coast. A great column of water marked the impact. At once I called my victory over the radio, and had enough witnesses to confirm my crash. My first Tommy was down.”_


It now seemed that the stage had been set. The Luftwaffe knew of the importance of the British radar, but they knew little about the basic fundamentals of how it was working for Fighter Command. They knew that the radar was the 'eyes' of the RAF, and that before making any attempt at engineering raids on RAF installations and facilities this radar had to be knocked out. They had tried, but only to find out that within hours, the radar stations were back in operational status once more. Even Ventnor, which they thought had been totally destroyed, was much to their surprise back in operation within four weeks.

Thirty-one German aircraft on this day were shot down, but it was not a day that favored the RAF as twenty-two fighter planes were destroyed and eleven pilots were killed.

During a return flight from a night mission to attack Bristol, a He 111 from 9./KG 55 crashed at Rambervillers, France, killing two crew members. The night bombers begin to switch targets from docks and shipping to RAF airfields. Soon after midnight He 111s of II./KG 27 attacked the RAF airfield at Sealand, Cheshire.

The pilots and personnel of JG 3 met a newcomer. When Obstlt. Hassel von Wedel, an old World War I friend of Göring and newly appointed as the official historian of the Luftwaffe, demanded to be placed at a front-line fighter group, Göring posted him to JG 3 to record the upcoming battle. He arrived this day to the airfield at Samer.

The first Bristol Beaufighters were delivered to the Fighter Interception Unit at Tangmere, equipped with A.I. MkIV (airborne interception) radar. An experimental British radar, using the cavity magnetron which was developed only six months earlier, tracks an aircraft for the first time.


----------



## timmo (Aug 12, 2010)

Naco - how can I best print out your whole story without other comment?

That photo - it makes me squirm to see idiots doing the 'egg spoon race' carrying their 'chutes risking a trip by various leads/connections.

I would have been airborne before they reached their aircraft!!

= Tim


----------



## Glider (Aug 12, 2010)

Personally I am cutting and pasting each days onto a word document.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2010)

Sorry, each post is limited to 1000 words so some days get 2 posts. Sorry guys.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2010)

I will be away for the next few days so I am putting the reports for the next 3 days on now.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2010)

*13 August 1940 Tuesday*

* “ADLERTAG”
UNITED KINGDOM:* The second phase of the “Battle of Britain” began in earnest as the Luftwaffe switched from destroying convoys to targeting RAF airfields and radar stations in an effort to finally destroy the RAF before the invasion.

With the beautiful weather of the past two days and the promise of more of the same, Reichsmarschall Göring had ordered that the planned attack against the RAF would begin at 0700 hours on the 13th. But with the morning came fog, cloud and moisture, forcing Göring to again postpone the day's mission. But as the recall order was issued, several formations of bombers and fighters were already airbourne and failing to get the recall order, continued on to their objectives. Instead of the mass attack that was planned, the day's activities turned into a smattering of confused raids and attacks.

As early as 05:30 radar stations identified two forces, about 60 aircraft, assembling over France, so 11 Group ordered two squadrons, Nos. 64 and 111, to protect damaged Hawkinge and Manston, assuming the enemy would, logically, hit them again. Hurricanes from North Weald took station over a Thames convoy, while others watched over Tangmere. A Do17P was shot down at 06:20 off Kent by Sq. Ldr. A.G. Malan partnered by Flg. Off. J.C. Mungo Park (74 Sqn.) 

Fifty-five Dornier Do 17s of KG 2 mounted the day’s first raids against the naval base at Sheerness and the airfield at Eastchurch. The thick cloud served to hide them until they split, one group to Eastchurch Coastal Command airfield, a smaller group to Sheerness dockyard. Already in the air at 0730 hours when the recall order came through, Kanalkampfführer Oberst Johannes Fink, the Kommodore of KG 2, led his Kampfgeschwader to the rendezvous point of the fighter escort only to find a few Bf 110s, trying to turn the bombers back by flying up and down and around the bombers. Ignoring the twin-engined fighters, Oberst Fink along with Oblt. Weitkus' II./KG 2 and Major Fuchs' III./KG 2, set course for the Thames. Dropping down to 1500 feet, the bombers encountered no defending British fighters on their way to the target. There were none, since the British radar operators had designated the formation as "only a few aircraft', no fighter squadrons were dispatched. The bombers arrived at Eastchurch with none of the escorting of Bf 110s in sight, and, with surprise, totally destroyed the airfield including five Blenheim bombers. Only on the return flight was the formation intercepted by RAF Nos.74 and 151 Squadron and lost five bombers to the fighters. Hurricane L1750, the first cannon-armed Hurricane, flown by Flt. Lt. R. Smith scored a certain success and RAF No. 111 Sqn then joined in. After continuing to search the skies for his escorting fighters to get the Spitfires off his back, Oberst Fink finally guided the bomber formations to cloud cover in an attempt to evade the British fighters and soon the Spitfire attacks broke off. Returning to base, Oberst Fink discovered that "Alder Tag" and the day's operations had been cancelled and his Kampfgeschwader lost several crews for nothing. 100 bombs were dropped on Eastchurch killing 16 men, injuring 48 and destroying one Spitfire of 266 Sqn. The station was fully operational by evening. Five Do 17s were shot down. 

Despite the weather turning even worse in the afternoon, Göring decided to begin "Alder Tag" precisely at 1400 hours and more raids were scheduled. The first mission was complex, using a flight of Bf 110s to draw away British fighters while a second flight of German bombers attacked airfield targets. Chosen as the lead diversion were twenty-three Bf 110s of Hptm. Liensberger's V(Z)./LG 1 who were ordered only to make the English coast and then freiejagd over the countryside. Believing that the British radar stations were down from the previous day's missions, they crossed the coast around the appointed time of 1400 hours and several RAF squadrons bit at the bait and took off to intercept. This happened even though Air Marshall Dowding had forbidden his fighters from having direct contact with Luftwaffe fighters. The misunderstanding was because as the radar reports indicated a formation approaching, it didn't give the type of aircraft, so instead of German bombers, the British fighters came upon Hptm. Liensberger's Bf 110s. As the Messerschmitts crossed the coast, fifty British Spitfires engaged the twin-engined Zerstörers from the rear. Before Hptm. Liensberger could get his flight into a defensive circle, two Bf 110s were shot down by the British. The Spitfires then flew directly into the circle, firing upon every German fighter that they could. But this presented an easy target for some of the Zerstörer rear gunners who sent some of the British fighters back to bases, spouting black smoke. Finally the German flight broke from the combat and headed for home. Upon reaching the Caen airfield, Hptm. Liensberger found that five of his Bf 110s were shot down and several others badly damaged.

But the effort was a waste of time. On the German side, the plan was to engage and tie up the British fighters so the bombers could get through unharmed. But as with many things, timing was everything. Instead of the bombers arriving twenty to thirty minutes after the fighter battle to find the British fighters refueling, weather caused the bombers to arrive three hours later, when the Spitfires and Hurricanes, landed and refueled and re-armed, were waiting.

At 1700 hours, the German bomber formations crossed the coast again, this time fifty-two Ju 87s of Major Graf Schönborn's StG 77 escorted by Bf 109s of Oblt. Max Ibel's JG 27, to their west were 30 Ju 87s of II./StG 2, on course for Southampton and Middle Wallop. Forward support was provided by Bf 109s of JG 53 which swept between the Isle of Wight and Lyme Bay until they ran low on fuel. Increasing heavy cloud cover and weather over the entire area caused the Stukas to miss their targets. Near the airfields, the Ju 87s were intercepted by seventy British fighters who became entangled with the Messerschmitt escorts. But while the battle was joined among the English and Germans, one squadron of fifteen Spitfires from RAF No. 609 was able to dive past the Bf 109s and attacked the Stukas II./StG 2. Five German dive-bombers were shot down, the day being noted as the 'glorious 13th' in the Squadron's records.

A second wave of Ju 88 bombers from Oberst Bülowius' LG 1 also failed to find their targets in the bad weather and set off for targets of opportunity. Hptm. Kern and his I./LG 1 attacked the installations at Southampton while six other Ju 88s bombed the fighter base at Middle Wallop. Another attack on Middle Wallop strayed and attacked Andover instead. Twelve German bombers badly damaged the airfield at Andover but the base was not part of the vital RAF fighter command chain of bases.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2010)

_13 August 1940 continued......._

As Andover was attacked, a third flight of dive-bombers from StG 2 attacked two targets on the Thames Estuary. Escorted by fighters from JG 26 who cleared intercepting British fighters out of the way, eighty-six Ju 87s Ju87s of LG 1 reached the airfield at Detling unscathed. At 1815 hours, the Stukas destroyed the airfield, killing 67 and destroying 22 aircraft on the ground but the landing strip was, again, not a vital fighter sector station. It was a Coastal Command airfield performing sea patrol and reconnaissance. The station was functional the next day. The second target - Rochford on the north bank of the Estuary - was left alone when the Stukas couldn't find the airfield because of the thick cloud cover. They returned to base still carrying their bombs. KG 54 attacked the aerodromes at Odiham and RAE Farnborough, but the formations were broken up by RAF fighters.

Despite claiming victory and success, "Alder Tag" was a miserable failure when instead of destroying important RAF fighter airfields the Luftwaffe for the most part succeeded only in attacking insignificant air bases. The Luftwaffe mounted some 1,485 sorties while Fighter Command opposed with 727 defensive sorties. In combat the Germans lost twenty bombers with fourteen badly damaged; fifteen Bf 110s with six damaged; and nine Bf 109s destroyed. Fighter Command lost fourteen fighters and six damaged and no significant damage to airfields or command and control.

Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 destroyed a RAF Hurricane over Brighton in the morning. But his Geschwader lost two Messerschmitts from combat damage including the plane of Oblt. Paul Temme of the Stab I./JG 2 who was shot down and made a prisoner of war by the British. Oblt. Temme had six victories. _(see pic below of Temme's Bf 109 crash)_

The Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 51, Hptm. Hans-Heinrich Brustellin destroyed a British aircraft to increase his victory total.

In the evening two Heinkel He 111s dropped bombs over the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton around midnight. Other bombers dropped equipment such as parachutes, radios and maps over the Midlands of England and the lowlands of Scotland in an effort to make the British believe that a parachute landing had been made. He-111s of Kgr 100 equipped with the X-Gerat navigational system attacked the Spitfire factory at Castle Bromwich, Birmingham.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2010)

*14 August 1940 Wednesday*

*UNITED KINGDOM:* The weather continued to worsen and prevented the Luftwaffe from following up the raids of the 13th with a large attack, even one at Gruppe strength. Instead several missions were planned but without an all-out effort, not much was achieved.

At 1200 hours, sixteen Bf 110s of Epr.Gr 210 were able to again elude discovery and attack RAF Manston airfield, losing several Zerstörers to the defending anti-aircraft fire. The Messerschmitt of Lt. Brinkmann was hit by the airfield defenses and collided with the Bf 110 of Uffz. Steding, causing both planes to crash to the ground. Everyone on board was killed except for Gefr. Schank, who was captured by the British with severe wounds. Only four bombs hit the airfield destroying a Puss Moth, damaging three Blenheims of No 600 Squadron and four hangars were left blazing at the airfield. Three and a half squadrons of 11 Group (forty-two fighters of RAF Nos. 32, 65, 610 and 615 Sqdrns) were in the area but mainly above cloud dealing with Bf 110s and Bf 109s from JG 26. Fighter Command lost 9 fighters while JG 26 lost one Bf 109.

At 12:00 hours, five raids totaling some 300 aircraft approached the Kentish Coast between North Foreland and Dover. At 12:20 the main Stuka force attacked Hawkinge and Dover, with a detachment sinking the Gate Light Vessel killing two crew. This was the attack that the Bf 109s of JG 26 were escorting when they became entangled with the fighters from 11 Group. The successful intervention of JG 26 allowed only one Ju 87 to be lost from the raid. A mid-afternoon raid by Do 17s on Pevensey was thwarted and the attackers forced to jettison their load, but a later raid on Pevensey put four bombs in the radar station.

Middle Wallop Aerodrome was attacked four times between 17:07 and 19:35 hours. About 20 HE were dropped and two hangars were reported to have been seriously damaged. Three airmen and one civilian were killed. During the same period, Andover Aerodrome was also attacked, 15 HE bombs being dropped which destroyed a transmitting set in the centre of a group of W/T masts, and killed a civilian operator. About 20 HE were dropped in the St Denys area of Southampton at 17:05 hours causing damage to the main railway tracks and to rolling stock. The main line was blocked with debris.

Fighters of II./JG 52 lost three more aircraft and pilots over the Channel. In the afternoon the Ju 88s of I./LG 1 bombed the railway station at Westons Mare and the Whitchurch airport. For alittle over two hours beginning at 15:51 hours, He 111s of III./KG 27 raided the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton again and a factory north of Bristol. The bombers were intercepted over the Severn Estuary by Spitfires from RAF No. 92 Squadron. Three He 111s were shot down, two of the bombers crashing in Somerset and the third lost in the Bristol Channel.

Although no operational training units were involved in the battle, No. 7 OTU at Hawarden, Flintshire, formed a battle flight to deal with emergencies. On the 14th, after hearing explosions and gun-fire in the area, Wing Commander Hallings-Pott accompanied by S/L J. S. McLean and P/O P. V. Ayerst, took off in Spitfires and intercepted a He 111, shooting it down near Chester.

In a battle over Dover, Bf 109s of JG 51 engaged British warplanes. Experten of JG 51 adding to their scores were Ofw. Arthur Dau of 7./JG 51 shot down his sixth Allied aircraft – a Hurricane, Hptm. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 brought his score to fourteen with a destroyed Hurricane and Oblt. Josef Priller of 6./JG 51 added to his victory total by defeating a British Spitfire.

There was very slight Luftwaffe activity at night, but a He 111, which appeared in North Wales, was subsequently shot down near Sealand by anti-aircraft fire. Oberst Alois Stöckl, Gruppenkommandeur of KG 55, was killed in the He 111 near Wallop and was replaced with Oblt. Hans Körte the next day. There were a few raids in Aberdeenshire and over convoys off Kinnaird's Head.

Losses: Luftwaffe 21 : Fighter Command 6

*GERMANY:* The personnel of 6./KG 55 lost a He 111 due to engine failure near Giessen, Germany.

Tonight an air raid alert was sounded in Berlin at 01:35 and ended at 02:22. This was the third alert in the German capital since the outbreak of war. No explosions could be heard from the vantage point on the United Press offices, nor were any searchlights seen operating. The German Ministry of Propaganda released no details.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2010)

*15 August 1940 Thursday*

*GERMANY*: In Germany, Reichsmarschall Göring conducted a morning meeting at Karinhall with his Luftflotten commanders, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring of Luftflotte 2 and Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle of Luftflotte 3. After discussing the outcome of "Alder Tag" on the 13 August and the reports of the bomber and fighter crews, the Reichsmarschall issued the following orders:


> *1.* The fighter escort defenses of our Stuka formations must be readjusted, as the enemy is concentrating his fighters against our Stuka operations. It appears necessary to allocate three fighter Gruppen to each Stuka Gruppe, one of these fighter Gruppen remains with the Stukas, and dives with them to the attack; the second flies ahead over the target at medium altitude and engages the fighter defenses; the third protects the whole attack from above. It will also be necessary to escort Stukas returning from the attack over the Channel.
> 
> *2.* Night attacks on shipping targets are only fruitful when the night is so clear that careful aim can be taken.
> 
> ...


Regarding the targeting of radar installations or Funkmess as the Germans called it, Reichsmarschall Göring ordered,


> _“From now on we shall waste no more time on the British radar installations.” _


This decision will have grave consequences in the days to come and for the battle.

*UNITED KINGDOM: "BLACK THURSDAY"*
The day begins with Luftwaffe reconnaissance sorties during which a Do 17 of 3(F)/31 is shot down south of Ventnor by Spitfires.

Over the French airfields the day dawned with cold, grey clouds and any morning operations were cancelled. But the clouds suddenly disappeared in the early afternoon and the air fleets of Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 began preparations to continue with the battle. And for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, bombers from Luftflotte 5 were to participate. But from Germany came the order that due to the weather, no attacks were to be mounted. Again, this recall comes too late as several flights were already on their way to England.

The first to take-off for England were forty-five Ju 87 Stukas of Hptm. Keil's II./StG 1 and Hptm. von Brauchitsch's IV (St)./LG 1 who crossed the Channel with their two Gruppen of Bf 109 escorts from JG 26. At 11:25 hours, the Stukas with escort reached the coast on their way to bomb Lympne and Hawkinge. 24 of the Stukas turned towards Folkestone and they were intercepted by British fighters who shot down the lead aircraft. The two airfields in the Kent countryside were hit hard with Lympne so damaged that the base was out of action for the next two days. As the Stukas dove on Hawkinge, they were met with Hurricanes from RAF No. 501 Squadron who immediately shot down two of the dive-bombers. The Hurricanes were then pounced on by the escorts from JG 26 and lost two of their fighters to the Bf 109s. Over Lympne, RAF No. 54 Squadron tried to reach the German bombers, but the Messerschmitts of III./JG 26 succeeded in keeping the Spitfires off the bombers and shot down two of the fighters from RAF No. 54 Squadron, with one victory going to Major Adolf Galland. When the Stukas were safely on their way to France, Major Galland gathered together his flight from JG 26 and over the Channel took on the remaining Spitfires from RAF No. 54 Squadron. He shot down one British fighter and just missed getting a second. Lympne was put out of action for two days.

The next attack was left to Luftflotte 5 out of Norway. Shortly after 1330 hours, sixty-five He 111s from I. and III./ KG 26 took off from Stavanger airfield and headed out over the North Sea to attack the airfields at Dishforth, Usworth and Linton-upon-Ouse. Believing that most of Fighter Command's Hurricanes and Spitfires would be tied up down in the south, the only escort for the bombers were twenty-one Bf 110s belonging to I./ZG 76, equipped with extra fuel tanks - called 'Dachshunds' by the Germans - for the 1,100 mile flight. No Bf 109 Fighter Gruppen were assigned the escort duty - with Fighter Command busy with its few remaing fighters, there would be no need for escorts. In an effort to counter-act the British radar defenses, the Germans outfitted the Gruppenkommandeur's Bf 110 - Hptm. Werner Restemeyer's aircraft named "Dora" - with several radio listening devices. Handling the radio duties was Hptm. Hartwich from X Fliegerkorps' radio intercept company. It was hoped that by listening in on Fighter Command's radio transmissions, Hptm. Restemeyer could then direct the bomber formation away from British fighters.

As a diversion for the attack, a flight of twenty seaplanes was sent to the Firth of Forth, seventy-five miles north of the airfield targets of KG 26, hoping to attract any remaining British fighters away. But navigational errors brought KG 26's bombers over the exact same course as the seaplanes, seventy-five miles off course. The seaplanes did their job, bringing several squadrons of British fighters up to intercept them. Instead of seaplanes, what the Spitfires and Hurricanes found were the Heinkels of KG 26.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2010)

_(15 August 1940 continued....)_

The German formation was slaughtered. For nearly fifteen minutes, the bombers were attacked by Spitfires from RAF No. 72 and 79 Squadrons, breaking from formation and dropping their bomb loads into the sea and countryside. One of the first Spitfires to attack hit Hptm. Restemeyer's Bf 110 "Dora" and exploded the extra fuel tank. The Gruppenkommandeur was last seen plunging into the sea in flames. The rearguard of the Bf 110 formation, Uffz. Karl Richter, was hit in the head and lost consciousness. His radio-operator, Uffz. Hans Geishecker, thinking his pilot was dead, baled from the Messerschmitt and into the sea. But Uffz. Richter woke up in time to bring his Zerstörer out of the fall and took his crippled machine back for a crash landing at Esbjerg. Uffz. Geishecker was never heard from again. Richter was taken to the St. Josef hospital in Esbjerg where he was treated for the shot in the head.

Meanwhile the rest of the Bf 110s did their best to protect the bombers. Oblt. Uellenbeck ordered the remaining five aircraft of 2./ZG 76 to attack the British fighters and led the squadron into the battle, hitting one of the Spitfires and causing it to trail smoke. Outnumbered, the Bf 110s formed a defensive circle and tried their best to get back to base. Oblt. Gordon Gollob's 3./ZG 76 managed to stay with KG 26's bombers but after a few minutes combat with the British, the squadron was down to only four aircraft. One of those missing was Fw. Linke who managed to re-cross the North Sea on one engine and land at Jever. He was finally credited with the destruction of two Spitfires.

What was left of the bomber formation, tried to fly south in search of their targets but after more attacks by additional Hurricanes and Spitfires arriving on the scene, most of the Heinkels crews dropped their loads and headed for home. The final score for this first attack in the Battle of Britain of Luftflotte 5 was six Bf 110s and eight bombers shot down into the North Sea. During the attack 8./KG 26 lost five aircraft. The raiders claimed eleven British fighters shot down. The effort from Luftflotte 5 wasn't over.

While KG 26 was getting mauled, fifty Ju 88s from I., II. and III./KG 30, again unescorted, were sent to attack the RAF bomber airfield at Driffield. Met at the coastline by Hurricanes, the bombers broke through the British fighters from 12 Group and successfully bombed the airfield, losing six Ju 88s for the effort. Leaving the airfield and hangars a flame - including an ammunition dump which suffered a direct hit and twelve Whitley bombers totally destroyed - the remaining bombers of KG 30 turned and made for their airbases in Denmark. The contribution from Luftflotte 5 was done for the day.

While the German bombers from Norway and Denmark were turning for home, the next major Luftwaffe raid commenced. Beginning at 14:50 hours, all three Gruppen of Do 17s from KG 3 totaling eighty-eight bombers, took off from bases in Belgium and head for RAF targets south of the Thames. Along for the raid was the Kommodore of KG 3, Generalmajor von Chamier-Glisczinski flying at the head of Hptm. Pilger's II./KG 3 formation which contained thirty Dorniers. The Gruppe's target was Rochester. The bombers under Hptm. Rathmann's III./KG 3 were to again bomb the Coastal Command airfield at Eastchurch. Escorting the Dorniers were one hundred and thirty Bf 109s from Major Handrick's JG 26, Major Mölder's JG 51, Major Trübenbach's JG 52 and Major Mettig's JG 54. The heavy escort prevented the British fighters from successfully attacking the bombers and as such only two Dorniers were lost along with four Bf 109s. The airfields were badly damaged including the Short aircraft works which was developing the Stirling four-engined bomber. I. and II./KG 3 attacked the Short and Pubjoy factories at Rochester and managed to drop eight bombs near the target.

Major Adolf Galland was up for the second time of the day when his III./JG 26 were ordered to fly a fighter sweep over the south-east of England in support of the bombers. Because of the large number of escorting fighters engaged with the RAF, several Luftwaffe pilots added to their scores. The most successful were Hptm. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 and Hptm. Horst Tietzen of 5./JG 51. Hptm. Tietzen destroyed three British Hurricanes to bring his total to eighteen kills. Hptm. Oesau downed two Spitfires over Folkestone for sixteen kills then destroyed a barrage balloon over Dover. Other pilots successful in English skies were Ofw. Fritz Beeck of 6./JG 51 for his third kill, Oblt. Josef Fözö and Lt. Heinz Tornow of 4./JG 51, Otto Tange of 5./JG 51, Oblt. Josef Priller of 6./JG 51 and Oblt. Hermann Staiger of 7./JG 51 who also destroyed a barrage balloon over Dover. The RCAF gets its first kill when Ernest McNab shoots down a Dornier bomber. 

Just before the Dorniers of KG 3 reached their targets, twelve Bf 110s and Bf 109s of Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer's Epr.Gr 210 snuck through the radar defenses and bombed the airfield at Martlesham Heath. Late in the afternoon, 12 Ju 88s from I./LG 1 bombed Middle Wallop, and 15 aircraft from II./LG 1 attacked Worthy Down. I./LG 1 destroyed several Spitfires on the ground; but II./LG 1 was less successful, only three aircraft reached their target; and no less than 5 aircraft from 4./LG 1 were shot down. Only the Staffelkapitan and one other crew survived.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2010)

_(15 Augut 1940 continued....)_

10 Group scrambled its largest number of fighters when 80 bombers headed towards Swanage and Southampton shortly after 17:00. Three squadrons made for Swanage to engage about 40 Ju 87s protected by Bf 109s and Bf 110s, all heading for Portland. RAF Nos. 87 and 213 Squadrons tackled the bombers and the '110s, leaving 14 Spitfires of RAF No. 234 Squadron to engage first the Bf 110s and then the Bf 109s, which in overwhelming their interceptors shot down four. Nevertheless, the Stukas had been forced to jettison their loads. 

Because of the severe losses, Luftflotte 5 was withdrawn from any more operations over England. Hptm. Graf von Stillfried was made Gruppenkommandeur of I./ZG 76 in Hptm. Restemeyer’s place. Hptm. Rolf Kaldrack was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of III./ZG 76 in place of Hptm. Friedrich-Karl Dickore.

Returning from a mission raid on Plymouth, Devon, an He 111 from 2./KG 55 force landed near Granville, France with several members wounded and one killed.

In the early evening KG 27 conducted several missions to Bristol. III./KG 27 sent its He 111s to raid the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton at 08:00 hours but the mission was aborted. Later II./KG 27 sent He 111s over the airplane factory at Filton and the Avonmouth docks a little before 0100 hours.

The Luftwaffe made 1,266 fighter sorties and 520 bomber runs, losing seventy-five aircraft over England including twenty-six Bf 110 Zerstörers. Major Adolf Galland of III./JG 26 commented on the problems facing the Jagdwaffe pilots,


> “_Two or three sorties daily was the rule, and the briefing read: ‘Freie Jagd over south-east England.’ The physical as well as the mental strain on the pilots was considerable. The ground personnel and the planes themselves were taxed to the limit . . . Failure to achieve any noticeable success, constantly changing orders betraying lack of purpose and obvious misjudgment of the situation by the Command, and unjustified accusations had a most demoralizing effect on us fighter pilots . . . We complained of the leadership, the bombers, the Stukas and were dissatisfied with ourselves. We saw one comrade after the other, old and tested brothers in combat, vanish from our ranks. Not a day passed without a place remaining empty at the mess table. The reproaches from higher quarters became unbearable. We had the impression that whatever we did we were bound to be in the wrong . . . In those days all the loudspeakers of the ‘Greater German Reich’ from Aachen to Tilsit, from Flensburg to Innsbruck, and from the army stations of most of the occupied countries, blared out the song ‘Bomben auf En-ge-land’. We pilots could not stand this song from the very start.”_


Luftwaffe losses, 75 aircraft, RAF losses, 35.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Aug 12, 2010)

Excellent, THANKS!!!!


----------



## T Bolt (Aug 12, 2010)

Wonderful!! Your doing a brilliant job Chris


----------



## Njaco (Aug 15, 2010)

*16 August 1940 Friday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Though the weather was good for operations, the German attacks started in the late morning. The day was marked by three great assaults. At midday the Germans operated over Kent and the Thames Estuary; a little later they attacked objectives in Sussex and Hampshire; and in the early evening they crossed the coast almost simultaneously at four points between Harwich and the Isle of Wight. Main stream attacks were at Biggin Hill, Kenley, Croydon and the Northolt airfields. Other forces attacked Manston, West Malling, Tangmere, Gosport, Lee-on-Solent, Farnborough and Harwell. The London suburbs of Esher, Malden and Wimbledon were bombed, and other raids on Harrow and Wealdstone, Gravesend and Tilbury. Ventnor radar, although still out of action was bombed again. It was typical, however, of the weaknesses of the German plan, or German intelligence, that only three of the eight airfields attacked were used by Fighter Command.

At 1200 hours a formation of 100 Do 17s and Bf 109s headed to the Thames Estuary. This force was one of three sent to targets in the British Isles. One squadron of Spitfires and two squadrons of Hurricanes were sent to engage the bombers. At 1215 hours a larger formation of bombers crossed the coast at Kent and was intercepted by three squadrons of RAF fighters. All three fighter squadrons decided to attack together at the middle of the bomber formation in an attempt to separate the flight. Soon numerous planes were weaving about the sky as bombers and fighters mixed together. The Hurricane of RAF F/L Henry Ferris, caught up in the confusion, collided with a Dornier bomber and both aircraft crashed to the ground. The Spitfire of S/L Rodney Wilkinson of RAF No. 266 Squadron collided with the Bf 109 of Uffz. E. Buder, who baled out and was captured. S/L Wilkinson was then bounced by two Bf 109s and shot down in flames and killed. Ten Luftwaffe aircraft were lost in the combat against six fighters lost by the RAF. Hptm. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 shot down two Spitfires off Cap Gris Nez for his seventeenth and eighteenth victories.

KG 2 's attack coming in over Dover and the North Foreland resulted in 80 bombs falling on West Malling airfield, 66 of them exploding in surrounding farmland. Two Ju 88s attacked the aerodrome at Brize Norton and destroyed 46 training aircraft.

At 1300 hours a third large build-up of enemy aircraft was picked up by the Chain Home RDF stations setting course towards the English coast from Cherbourg. This formation of about 150 aircraft comprised a large formation of fifty-four Ju 87 (Stuka) of StG 2, Ju 88s of KG 54 and escorting Bf109E fighters of II./JG 2 and Bf 110s of III./ZG 76. When the Stukas reached the Nab Tower, east of the Isle of Wight, the leading aircraft fired off signal flares and the force split into three groups; a small group peeled off to attack the Ventnor Chain Home station, a second group set course towards Portsmouth, where later they attacked Gosport, and the largest group headed for RAF Tangmere. Challenged by Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 1, 43 and 601 Squadrons along with 602 Sqn. Spitfires tackling the escort, 17 Stukas were claimed by the RAF, the Luftwaffe admitting to losing 9. Despite being intercepted by the Hurricanes, several Stukas dropped their loads over the airfield, destroying seven Hurricane fighters, six radar-equipped Blenheim fighters of the Fighter Interception Unit and a Magister trainer on the ground. Two hangers were destroyed and three others were badly damaged as well as the workshop, fire hydrants and pumphouse, all of which received direct hits; stores, sick quarters, the officers mess and the command post were partially hit causing severe structural damage A squadron of Hurricanes got past the escort and managed to destroy eight Stukas and damaged six more before the dive-bombers headed for home with several more smoking on the return flight. 43 Squadron lost four Hurricanes on the ground, and another flown by P/O C. A. Woods-Scawen crashed on the Isle of Wight although the aircraft was destroyed, the pilot was unhurt. The Ju 87s claimed two Hurricanes shot down including one from RAF No. 601 Squadron - P/O W. Fiske. William M. Fiske, III - the first American to join the RAF was killed when he force-landed Hurricane P3358, which was then strafed and burnt. He will become the only American buried at St. Paul's Cathedral in London. The inscription reads: "An American citizen who died that England might live."

Ten minutes later, Tangmere airfield was again attacked, this time by Ju 88s from Luftflotte 3. This attack was far more accurate than the earlier one with every building or hanger being hit. Aircraft in the open and in hangers were damaged, totaling fourteen RAF planes destroyed on the ground. P/O Frank Carey, later Group Captain, CBE, DFC and two bars, AFC, DFM, U. S. Silver Star, summed up his part in the action:


> “_This was the first time that Tangmere itself was attacked – with considerable success too. We met the raid head-on over Selsey Bill. Due to our positioning, we were only able to fire on about the second wave, leaving the leaders more or less undisturbed in their bombing. However, we were very lucky that our head-on attack so demoralized the Ju 87s that they, and the successive waves behind them, broke up. Some dropped their bombs into the sea in an effort to get away_.”


 The German attack was not only fought in the air. Second Lieutenant E. P. Griffin of the Royal Engineers Construction Company based at RAF Tangmere, on hearing the air raid warning, went to his battle position and with his Lewis machine gun shot down a Messerschmitt Bf110. The aircraft crashed three-quarters of a mile from the aerodrome, killing the three members of its crew. A few days later his colleagues presented him with a cartoon entitled, “The Glorious 16th of August 1940”.

The Ventnor radar station, out of operation since the attack of 12 August, was attacked by five Ju 87s. After five minutes of bombing the station it was again put out of action though with considerably more damage than before. It would take until 23 September, before the station was back on-line.

More Luftwaffe action was seen over the Naval establishments of Gosport and Lee on Solent. Both these bases, although not belonging to Fighter Command, were targets for the Luftwaffe and they came under constant bombing attacks. This raid caused serious bomb damage to HMS Daedalus, three hangers and forty two aircraft were destroyed, 14 people were killed and 5 wounded. Just some of the aircraft damaged in the air raid included the DH 86 AX841 (ex G-ACZO) W9374 Percival Q.6 W9374 (ex G-AFFE) and DH 94 G-AFNY The Grange RAF Station base of Gosport suffered heavily as several buildings were damaged and a number of people killed. RAF No. 213 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) and 249 Squadron Boscombe Down (Hurricanes) were involved in combat over Southampton and Portland with both squadrons losing aircraft.

The determination of the British pilots was shown when at 1345 hours a flight of three Ju 88s was bounced by Spitfires over the Solent. Trying to join in the attack with his Hurricane was F/L James Nicholson of RAF No. 249 Squadron. As he turned to join the combat, his plane was hit by cannon fire from a Bf 110. A second cannon burst from the Messerschmitt hit the Hurricane’s fuel tank and engulfed the plane in flames. A third shot of gunfire cut through the length of the aircraft. Wounded in the head and leg, blinded from blood seeping into his eyes and his Hurricane burning fiercely, F/L Nicholson tried to turn away from the twin-engined fighter. As he did so, the Bf 110 overshot the Hurricane and into the gunsights of F/L Nicholson. Using his severely injured hand to fire his guns, he sent a burst into the Bf 110 which burst into flames and spiraled down into the sea. Once the Messerschmitt crashed, F/L Nicholson baled out of his burning aircraft and ended up at hospital. James Nicholson was awarded the Victoria Cross, England’s highest award and the only fighter pilot so honored by the British. After recovering from his severe burns and other injuries (other injuries included being shot in the buttock's by a trigger happy Local Defense Volunteer as he descended in his parachute), Nicholson returned to flying in April 1941 as a Squadron Leader.

On a raid on Heathrow airfield, Middlesex, bombers of KG 55 lost six He 111s, three shot down over Sussex and three more returning to France with battle damage.

At 1730 hours a formation of He 111 bombers escorted by Bf 110 twin-engined fighters attacked the Sussex area. Met by Spitfires of RAF No. 610 Squadron and Hurricanes of RAF No. 1 and 615 Squadron, the flight lost four Heinkels and two Messerschmitts with another Bf 110 crashing upon returning to France. Two Spitfires from RAF No 610 Squadron were shot down with credit going to Hptm. Horst Tietzen for his nineteenth kill and Lt. Hans-Otto Lessing for his fourth Allied aircraft. Both pilots were from 5./JG 51. Five minutes after the battle a lone He 111 was rammed by an unarmed Anson trainer causing both to crash to the ground.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 15, 2010)

_(16 August 1940 continued...)_

The last of the day’s raids by the Luftwaffe was made at 1750 hours when seventy He 111s with fifty Bf 110s attacked targets in Essex. Flying back to Duxford from Coltishall, RAF No. 19 Squadron Duxford (Spitfires) were given mid-air instructions to proceed to a vectored position just off the east coast at Clacton-on-Sea Essex. At first there was no sign of the raiders, but it was not long before a flight made contact with the He111 and Bf110s just south of Harwich. Joined by another flight, a strong and intense battle emerged with weaving planes and long glowing lines of tracer above the coastline. One He111 was brought down over the sea, but a number of Bf110s crashed into the Essex countryside. 

The Fighter Gruppen lost a few pilots during the day’s actions including a promising leader. Oblt. Karl Ebbighausen, Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 26 with nine victories during the war, was killed in action. Hptm. Erich Bode was promoted to Gruppenkommandeur of the Gruppe in his place. Also lost to the Luftwaffe was the Staffelkapitän of 4./JG 2, Oblt. Walter Möckel who failed to return from a sortie over Portsmouth and was listed as missing until it was confirmed he was a prisoner of war. The ‘Richthofen’ Geschwader also lost two Bf 109s from combat with one pilot killed. Fw. Christian Hansen of 2./JG 53 ‘Pik As’ crash landed at Goshill on the Isle of Wight after battle.

Night-time brought bombers over the Filton airfield and the Avonmouth docks. For about four hours - starting at 2330 hours - Heinkels of II./KG 27 raided the two targets along with an attack on the searchlights of Bristol.

On 16 August 1940, Winston Churchill was again watching the outcome of the enemy air raids, this time with Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park at No. 11 Group Headquarters at RAF Uxbridge. On leaving that evening, he was heard to say, “_Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few_” – the words he used in the famous speech he made on the Battle of Britain in the House of Commons four days later.

Losses: Luftwaffe 44 : Fighter Command 28 (Including 6 on the ground). 

Changes continued at ZG 2 when Hptm. Eberhard Heinlein was removed and made acting Gruppenkommandeur of II./ZG 2 in place of Hptm. Harry Carl. At Epr.Gr 210, Hptm. Hans von Boltenstern was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of the fighter-bomber unit in place of Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer. The Gruppe was stationed at Denain flying Bf 110s and Bf 109Es. 

*GERMANY*: The German News Bureau reported:


> "_An authoritative source has informed us that in the course of this afternoon's aerial hostilities, one German aerial formation took off on a special mission. This combat group was deployed against all military and war-related targets immediately surrounding the British capital. The German Luftwaffe will offer proof that no power in the world can prevent it from dropping its bombs anywhere in England that it chooses - even, if it should be necessary over the City of London_."


----------



## Gnomey (Aug 16, 2010)

Great stuff Chris! Keep it coming.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 16, 2010)

*17 August 1940 Saturday*

*UNITED KINGDOM*: A strange day in the middle of a vital battle for existence. The weather dawned bright and clear – perfect for air operations. RAF aircrews were tired from the last few days desperate battles and it was a perfect opportunity for the Luftwaffe to keep up the pressure on the RAF. But again, the Luftwaffe failed to take advantage of the situation. Needing rest and repair for their aircraft, the pilots and crews of the German air force were not given any missions for the day except for occasional reconnaissance flights which the RAF ignored.

The last few days had been hectic and tiring for all those that had taken part. Commented Ofw. Manfred Langer of 4./KG 3;


> “_Day after day we were flying operational duties. The constant run of failures to achieve our goals of destroying our targets due to being constantly intercepted by British fighters was beginning to take its toll. Time and time again we tell our commanding officers that we must destroy the radar systems because we are always being met over the Channel by Spitfires and Hurricanes. The British pilots are very clever, they seem to be able to turn us around and we are forced to return to our bases, not only with bullet holes all over our aircraft, but with dead or injured crewmen that have to be attended to on the return flight. We became tired and exhausted, each new day brought new missions and then came the night operations. Man can only take so much, he is not a machine, although I think that our commanders thought differently. When the weather is too bad for flying, it is like a dream come true.”_


Even though the 17th dawned an exceptional summers day, little wind and cloudless skies, there was not a German aircraft in sight, the skies around the south coast were empty. Radar operators at many of the stations began to suspect that their masts or receivers were faulty, not a blip could be seen on any of them. Or as Commanding Officer 32 Squadron Biggin Hill Mike Crossley commented;


> "_Not a single sausage, scare, flap or diversion of any description today. Amazing, heavenly day too."_


 While Fighter Command were asking the question "_Why? Why don't they come_?" Station Commanders took the opportunity to clean up their airfields. Biggin Hill, Manston, Brize Norton, Tangmere, Kenley and Hornchurch all had work to do in clearing up the mess caused by the bombing of the previous day. Although ground crews managed to repair buildings, fill in holes and craters and repair damaged aircraft, it was with pilots that replacements could not keep up with losses. Over the last five days Fighter Command had lost sixty-eight valuable pilots killed or posted as missing. As well as this some seventy had been injured or wounded and would not return to action for many weeks, some not at all.

On the brighter side, 310 Squadron made up of Czechoslovakian pilots became operational. They were posted to Duxford. RAF No 1 (Canadian) Squadron was now operational. RAF No 145 Squadron moved to Drem and RAF No 602 Squadron moved to Westhampnett near Tangmere. 

While Fighter Command kept regular patrols without enemy contact, a Royal Navy vessel successfully shot down one raider in the Channel. One raid was plotted well out to sea in Cardigan Bay, and a ship was reported to have been sunk near Strumble Head. A raid was plotted in mid-Wales moving east and returning. It was reported that leaflets were dropped in the Welshpool area. A Junkers Ju 88 from NJG 1, briefed to intrude over the Wash, strayed and was shot down into the sea off Spurn Head at 03.00 hours by a Blenheim night fighter, crewed by P/O Rhodes and Sgt. Gregory from RAF No 29 Squadron. The Ju 88 was listed as lost together with its crew.

Despite the lack of any major operation, a few Experten still managed to claim British warplanes to add to their victory totals especially from JG 51. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 claimed a Hurricane for his fourth kill while Hptm. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 destroyed his nineteenth Allied warplane – a Hurricane off Cap Gris Nez. Another pilot from the 7th Staffel, Ofw. Arthur Dau claimed his seventh victim – a Hurricane – down over Canterbury. Not to be outdone, the rising Experte of the 5th Staffel, Hptm. Horst Tietzen, shot down a British airplane to reach the magic score of twenty kills. At 1740 hours, Hptm. Josef Fözö of 4./JG 51 downed a Hurricane from RAF No. 601 Squadron.

German bombing was negligible during the daylight hours, but about midnight 17th/18th August, the attack was renewed when Luftwaffe aircraft dropped bombs in East Suffolk, Warwickshire, Staffordshire and Derbyshire, notably in the Coventry and Birmingham districts. Not much damage was done in these areas but one raid reached Liverpool where damage was done in the docks area.

The Bristol Aeroplane Company and the docks at Avonmouth were again the targets for night missions by fourteen He 111s of II./KG 27 with the bombers leaving the area at 0205 hours. Damaged in the attacks were a warehouse, dry-dock and a rail yard in Liverpool. Other bombers from KG 27 dropped bombs over the city of Coventry with slight damage. Many bombs fell on open ground. At about the same time, fourteen He 111s from KGr 100 dropped bombs on Castle Bromwich near Birmingham. Despite using X-Gerat to guide them to the target, most of the bombs fell on open ground. One of the bombers suffered a mechanical failure and crashed at Dinard returning from the mission. All the crew survived.


----------



## Lucky13 (Aug 17, 2010)

Outstanding work Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Aug 17, 2010)

*18 August 1940 Sunday
"THE HARDEST DAY"
UNITED KINGDOM*: Despite the devastation of 15 August, the Luftwaffe would face its toughest test this day over England when careful plans and tactics were dismantled and English ingenuity and desperation were successful. It would be remembered as one of the harshest days the Luftwaffe had ever had to face over the British Isles, as three major attacks were planned against airfields and radar units along the coast. But despite ingenuous plans and execution from the German Air Forces by the end of the day, only one British sector station would be out of action and the RAF airfields damaged for only a few hours while the Luftwaffe realized the folly of using Stukas against British fighters and the difficulties of coordinating large formations.

First Luftwaffe intruders of the day were six reconnaissance aircraft including a Bf 110 of LG 2 which was shot down at 31,000 feet over Manston. The first loss of an aircrew for the Luftwaffe occurred during the early morning hours when a Ju 88 from NJG 1 on an intruder mission, was attacked by a RAF Blenheim. Hit numerous times, the Junkers crashed and killed the entire three man crew.

The plans called for Dornier Do 17s, Junkers Ju 88s, and Heinkel He 111s to attack the airfields at Kenley and Biggin Hill for the first major assault. While the majority of the bombers were to attack in a conventional bombing run; at about 12,000 feet, one Staffel of Dorniers was to fly tree-top level to each target and attack a few minutes after the main forces. The second attack was to be made by Stukas on the airfields at Ford, Gosport and Thorney Island along with the radar site at Poling. The last major assault of the day was for more bombers to attack the airfields at Hornchurch and North Weald. All of the attacks were to be escorted with almost all the Fighter Geschwader of Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3.

The RAF airfield at Kenley was the first targeted for attack by the bombers of KG 76, one of the most experienced Kampfgeschwader in the Luftwaffe. The attack was to be in three phases. First, twelve Ju 88s of II./KG 76 escorted by twenty Bf 109s from JG 51 were to dive-bomb the airfield, attacking the hangers and installations. Five minutes later, twenty-seven Do 17s from I./KG 76 and III./KG 76 escorted by twenty-five Bf 110s from ZG 26 would bomb from 12,000 feet in an attempt to destroy the runway and airfield defenses. Five minutes after this action, nine Do 17s from 9./KG 76 were to run in, unescorted, at low altitude and finish off the attack. The first two attacks were to come in from the south-east while the last tree-hopping attack was to come from the south. At Biggin Hill, the assault was to be made by sixty He 111s of KG 1 at the same time as the Kenley raid with escort provided by forty Bf 109s from JG 54. The whole attack would be preceded by a freie jagd of sixty Bf 109s from JG 3 and III./JG 26. The fighters from JG 26 were led by Oblt Gerhard Schopfel while Major Adolf Galland was at Karinhall on a visit to Göring.

Shortly before noon, the first two attacking formations began to take off and reach altitude. With cloud building up, the bomber formations were given the all clear to take off, some three hours behind the planned commencement of operations. Bombers of KG 1 got away as scheduled and over the French coast met up with their escorts. But heavy cloud cover forced a delay in the rendezvous as several bombers circled the airfields waiting for formations to emerge from the clouds. The Do 17s and Ju 88s of KG 76 had problems with the cloud and found it difficult meeting up with their escorts. Several minutes later the bombers of 9./KG 76, led by Staffelkapitaen Hptm. Joachim Roth took off and flew almost a direct route to the target, first at an altitude of 500 feet but dropping to 60 feet as they approached the Sussex coast, avoiding the British radar. Relatively free of any defensive fire from the British, the Dornier formation approached the airfield at about 1320 hours only to find, not pillars of smoke from the preceding attacks, but clear skies. The problem was that the delay that had occurred with the Ju 88s and Do 17s in negotiating the cloud base on take off, coupled with the fact that flying time was slower than expected, they were running up to ten minutes behind schedule while the nine low flying Do 17s crossing near Beachy Head were on time. Instead of being the third to arrive the nine bombers of 9./KG 76 were the first to arrive at the airfield and were alone.

As the German bombers spread out and selected targets, the British defenses woke up and attacked. RAF No. 111 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes) were "scrambled" and instructed to vector Kenley, and to 111 commander Squadron Leader John Thompson's surprise, he was told to maintain only 100 feet over the airfield. Quipped Thompson;


> "_Your bloody mad_" _"......I could prune trees at that height_."


Came the voice over the R/T;


> "_I repeat, yes repeat.......vector Kenley.....patrol at 100 feet........30 plus low level bandits approaching_"


The twelve Hurricanes curved in to attack the formation from above as British anti-aircraft guns opened fire. The first plane to go down was not German but British when one of the attacking Hurricanes spun and dove into the ground. The remaining British fighters pulled up and away from the flak bursts and made for the opposite side of the airfield where the German bombers would exit after attacking the airfield. Despite the murderous fire from below, the Dorniers pressed home their attacks. Soon three hangars were ablaze as bombs scored direct hits. But many of the bombers were severely damaged from the ground fire. Reaching the end of the airfield the German bombers faced another British defense, parachute-and-cable launchers. These were cables shot into the sky and held aloft by small parachutes and weighted with a drag parachute. Launched in rows of nine or more directly in the flight path of a low flying enemy airplane, the cable would create drag on the plane and play havoc with its control, finally forcing it to crash. Upon reaching the edge of the airfield, the Do 17s were greeted with the first salvo of these innovative British defenses. Most of the bombers made it through the cables but one bomber, damaged and on fire from the anti-aircraft guns, was unable to clear the wires. The cables snagged the bomber, the plane stalled and finally crashed to the ground just outside the airfield, killing all on board.

The rest of the bomber formation cleared the cables and airfield only to be bounced by the waiting Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Sqd. Immediately, two Hurricanes set one bomber on fire and it soon crashed. The rest of the formation scattered and tried to individually make it back to France. Continuing with their attacks as the Dorniers hedge hopped across the English countryside, the Hurricanes were able to seriously damage more of the Dorniers but lost three more fighters to the bomber's defensive fire. Crossing the coast the remaining seven bombers headed to French soil, many smoking, on fire and running on only one engine. Two Dorniers crashed into the Channel on the return flight and two more crashed onto the French coast. One of the bombers that crashed on the coastline was counted to have more than two hundred holes from .303in rounds in its fuselage. Two more landed, wheels down and seriously damaged, at other airfields in France - one piloted by the navigator after the pilot had been killed in his seat. Only one bomber made it back to its airfield at Cormeilles-en-Vexin without serious damage and no injured crewmen.

While the attack by 9./KG 76 was happening, the twenty-seven Dorniers of I./KG 76 and III./KG 76 were having troubles of their own. The first RAF fighters to engage the high flying Dorniers were Hurricanes from RAF No. 615 Sqd. who became entangled with the escorting Messerschmitts of JG 3. The Bf 109s, coming out of the sun, seriously damaged three Hurricanes, killing one of the British pilots. Despite this success, the action allowed the twelve Hurricanes of RAF No. 32 Sqd. to dive and attack the bomber formations of I./KG 76, III./KG 76 and the Zerstörers of ZG 26 unmolested from the Bf 109s. The sudden attacks by the Hurricanes knocked down one Dornier and seriously damaged several others while forcing some of the bombers to miss Kenley and instead drop their loads on rail lines near the airfield and on Croydon airfield. Several Bf 110s were damaged when eight Spitfires of RAF No. 64 Sqd. joined the battle. One of the Zerstörers attacked was that of Rüdiger Proske, who, with his rear gunner wounded and his engines damaged, pretended to 'play dead' in the face of an attack by a Spitfire. Allowing the twin-engined plane to plunge 6,000 feet out of control, Proske regained control and found nobody had followed him down during his death spin. He headed for France.

Instead of being the first to arrive, the twelve Ju 88s of II./KG 76 arrived last to find the target covered in smoke and instead switched to their secondary target, the airfield at West Malling. As the formation passed Biggin Hill, the anti aircraft defense of the airfield damaged a Ju 88 and it was immediately pounced on by RAF fighters. The bomber crashed eight miles south-east of Biggin Hill.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 17, 2010)

(_18 August 1940 continued....)_

Four Ju 88s and six Do 17s were lost during the attacks on Kenley, with one Ju 88 forcing Flt. Lt. Stanford Tuck, by return fire to bale out of his RAF No. 92 Squadron Spitfire. Despite the heavy attack by KG 76, Kenley was operational again within twenty-four hours. A total of 100 bombs had fallen on the airfield with the result that ten hangers were damaged and fourteen aircraft on the ground destroyed. For the first time the operations room at Kenley was put out of action with the communications cut and nine people killed. Within three days after moving to a new location, operations were back in action. 

Before the bombers arrived at Kenley, Oblt Schöpfel's fighter formation was flying twenty-five miles ahead of the Dorniers, clearing the way. As Major Schöpfel recounted;


> "_We were on a freie jagd. The Gruppe flew over Dover, gaining quite a bit of altitude. Suddenly I saw a squadron of English fighters climbing far beneath us. We had probably been reported and the British were looking for us. The British flew over the water in a broad arc, and then over land, in the direction of Canterbury. I led the Gruppe after them immediately. We were in a favorable position as we approached. Eight aircraft, Hurricanes, flew in front in flights of vees. Behind them was a cover flight. Its fourth aircraft was weaving - flying first left, then right. The English still had not seen us. They now had the more favorable position, since they were higher, but we attacked. I flew toward the weaving aircraft. At 100 meters I had it in front of me, and pressed the button. The fire of my cannon and machine guns literally blew the Hurricane apart. Pieces fell away, smoking and burning. The second aircraft in the cover flight was now in my sights. I repeated the same manoeuvre. I opened fire, and the Hurricane burst into flames. Undisturbed, the others continued spiraling upward. They had no inkling that there were Messerschmitts on their tails. Now I was behind the third aircraft. A short burst, and this one likewise fell apart. Number Three! The Englishmen flew onward; still they had noticed nothing. So I took on the fourth aircraft. This time, however, I approached too closely. When I pressed the button, the Englishman exploded, so near me that pieces hit my crate. It sprayed oil so thickly on the front and right side of my canopy that I could see nothing, and had to break off the battle, which had lasted two minutes._"


 The Hurricanes that Major Schöpfel had come across were fighters from RAF No. 501 Sqd. who, while returning from a patrol, had been ordered to station over Canterbury. Seeing that he had an advantage, Major Schöpfel ordered his Gruppe to hold course and dived on the British fighters alone. In the space of six minutes, Major Schöpfel had added four aircraft to his score. His Gruppe continued with their mission and intercepted RAF No. 17 Sqd. as they prepared to attack the returning bombers. One Hurricane was destroyed and two others crash landed with damage.

The airfield at Biggin Hill was approached by the sixty bombers of KG 1 at about 13:27 hours. Because four of the five RAF fighter squadrons available were attacking the formations over Kenley, only one British fighter squadron, RAF No. 615 Sqd with fifteen Spitfires, attempted to thwart the German bombers. The forty Bf 109s of JG 54 intercepted the Spitfires and allowed the bombers to proceed unmolested to the airfield. At the target, the anti aircraft defenses were told to hold their fire because British fighters were in the area. The Heinkels dropped their loads without any interference from the British. As the bombs dropped on Biggin Hill, the Ju 88s of II./KG 76 began dive-bombing the airfield at West Malling.

After their bombing runs, the aircraft of KG 76 and KG 1 along with their escorting fighters broke away for the return flights to France. More British fighter squadrons were called onto the retreating bombers and by 13:45 hours numerous battles were being fought over the English countryside. Hundreds of aircraft were caught up in separate battles with at one point a Bf 110 being chased by a Hurricane who was also being chased by another Bf 110 with another Hurricane on its tail. Both Messerschmitts were claimed as destroyed by the attacking Hurricane pilots.

In the largest attack by Stukas, one hundred and nine Ju 87s from StG 3 and StG 77 accompanied by 24 Ju 88s of KG 54 and escorted by 150 Bf 109s, mounted an attack on the RAF airfields at Gosport, Ford and Thorney Island along with the radar station at Poling shortly after 14:00 hours. Crossing the coast the escort fighters split into two groups . . . one to stay above with the dive-bombers on their bombing run and the second diving below to assist when they pulled out of their dives. Poling CH radar station lost two pylons, disabling the station for a week, Ford naval air station was raided losing two hangars destroyed, a third of the quarters and killing 14, Gosport and finally Thorney Island where a hangar was bombed and started a fire. It was at this moment when the RAF struck at the German formations. Eighteen Hurricanes of RAF Nos 43 and 601 Squadrons burst into the formations of dive-bombers from I./StG 77 just as the Stukas were about to dive onto Thorney Island. Several bombers were shot down as the British fighters tagged onto the Ju 87s and followed them through their dives, showering the Junkers with gunfire. More British fighters from RAF Nos. 152 and 602 Squadrons with 234 Squadron taking on the top cover, joined the battle until approximately 300 aircraft were fighting above the English coastline. When the fighting finally subsided, numerous Stukas and crew were destroyed or damaged, a total of thirty dive bombers, nearly 21% of the total force committed in the day's actions. Ten Stukas were destroyed and five seriously damaged out of twenty-eight aircraft from I./StG 77 alone, including the dive-bomber of the GruppenKommanduer Hptm. Herbert Meisel, who was killed. Six bombers were shot down and two seriously damaged from the other three Gruppen involved. The RAF lost four Spitfires and two Hurricanes. 

As the German bombers and fighters head out over the Channel, sixteen Bf 109s from I./JG 52 were sent near the Straits of Dover as cover for the returning formations. Led by Oblt. Wolfgang Ewald, the Messerschmitts failed to engage any British fighters. Having plenty of fuel left, Oblt Ewald guided his fighters to the airfield at Manston and strafed the RAF airbase at 15:30. After two passes, two Spitfires were left burning and six others damaged. A Hurricane that was refueling was also destroyed. Two hours later 8 raids crossed over the Essex coast via the Blackwater and Thames estuaries. RAF Nos. 54 and 151 Squadrons came into action to hinder the bombing of North Weald and Hornchurch.

Fourteen victory Experte Lt. Walter Blume of 7./JG 26, was shot down and captured, becoming a prisoner of war as was Oblt. Helmut Teidmann of 2./JG 3, ending the war as a prisoner after having achieved seven victories against the Allies. The 7./JG 26 also lost Lt. Gerhard Müller-Dühe when he was killed in action The most grievous loss for the Luftwaffe this day was the loss of the Staffelkapitän of 5./JG 51, Hptm. Horst Tietzen, when he was reported missing over the Thames Estuary. It is believed that Hptm. Tietzen was shot down by S/L Peter Townsend of RAF No. 82 Squadron. Hptm. Tietzen became the first recipient of the Ritterkreuz to be awarded posthumously.

In air battles over Portsmouth, JG 2 lost three fighters including the Messerschmitt of Oblt. Rudolf Möllerfriedrich of 6./JG 2 who was listed as missing after failing to return from the mission. Two more Bf 109s crashed at Cherbourg returning from combat with both pilots wounded. A Heinkel He 111 from KGr 100, a pathfinder unit working during daylight for the first time, was also destroyed. 

In the heaviest day of fighting so far, the Luftwaffe lost 69 planes to the RAF's 33; another 29 RAF machines were wrecked on airfields. 

Due to heavy losses, the fighters of II./JG 52 led by Hptm. Hans-Günther von Kornatzki was pulled out of action from Peupelinge and transferred to Jever on the German Bight and start flying defensive missions.

During the night He 111s from KG 27 fly missions to airfields and harbours in the Bristol area.


----------



## T Bolt (Aug 17, 2010)

This thread is a grand achievement Chris! I have been copying and pasting it to a word document so I can file it for future reference and as of todays post it's 94 pages and 45,421 words. Incredible!


----------



## Njaco (Aug 17, 2010)

cool!


----------



## Crimea_River (Aug 17, 2010)

Well done Chris.

Anyone wanting to read a good book on this day in the BoB, check out "The Hardest Day" by Alfred Price.


----------



## Glider (Aug 18, 2010)

And anyone wanting a good history of the BOB, read this


----------



## Grunherz (Aug 18, 2010)

I am absolutely in awe of this thread! Great read, great research and a great effort. Well done!


----------



## rochie (Aug 18, 2010)

great work Chris, thought todays post might be a big one !


----------



## Njaco (Aug 18, 2010)

*19 August 1940 Monday
WESTERN FRONT*: Across the Channel, Reichsmarschall Göring, realizing that at the moment his Luftwaffe was not gaining the upper hand against the RAF, was holding an important conference with his commanders at Karinhall. It was from this meeting, that a number of important changes to strategy would be made. Berating his fighter pilots for failing to achieve the air superiority needed for Operation ‘SEELOEWE’ , he decided to re-issue orders outlining specifically what was needed to achieve the Operation’s objectives.

First, he confirmed that the Ju 87 and the StG Staffeln would cease front line operations against British targets and that only two Staffeln would be maintained. This would be for reasons that some operations may require the services of the Ju 87 for pin-point bombing accuracy that only the Stuka could deliver. For though the Stukas had bombed some of the coastal airfields with great accuracy, they had suffered the heaviest losses of all; so heavy that they were condemned to wait on airfields behind Calais until the great day of invasion, when in absence of the defeated Royal Air Force they could demonstrate their powers against the Royal Navy. VIII Fliegerkorps, with some 220 Ju 87s, were withdrawn to the Pas de Calais area thus taking them out of the battle.

Another order to come out of this meeting angered many Bf 109 commanders. Göring had instructed that on Bf 110 missions, they must be escorted by Bf 109 fighters. This was almost a laughable situation having fighter aircraft escort fighter aircraft. In addition he ordered that the Bf 109s would fly in close escort, closer than previously. He refused to accept that the High Command was responsible for the failure of the fighter pilots and still believed in the Bf 110 Zerstörer theory. Several fighter pilots became frustrated with this change and resorted to placing on their aircraft the badge of the German Railway service with the legend ‘_In the aerial service of the State Railways’_, a bitter jest on the close bomber escort work – or ‘driving trains’ – instead of using their full combat potential in free-chase fighter combat.

Another decision made by Göring, was that fighter crews be given the chance to 'get to know' the bomber crews that they were to escort. They should meet, build up friendships, and work together like brothers. This was further highlighted when Göring stated that all bomber crews should always have the same escorts, a view that was not received with the same enthusiasm by fighter and bomber crews alike. If anyone wanted to do something that would bind the two crews together, they said, then we should be given radio communication with each other, our radios should also be on the same frequencies making for easier and less confusing understanding of radio messages.

Göring also decided to reshuffle the command structure of the Jägdflieger by removing several Kommodore and replacing them with younger more aggressive men. According to him, the older commanders were not as aggressive as the younger fighter pilots and with new blood in command of his pilots, the fortunes of the Luftwaffe would change for the better.

Major Hanns Trübenbach was appointed Kommodore of JG 52 in place of Major Merhart von Bernegg.

Luftflotte 3's Bf 109 fighters were moved to various airfields in the region of Pas-de-Calais, bringing them under the command of Kesselring, but this would then provide them with greater limits and allow them to stay over England for a longer period of time.

*UNITED KINGDOM*: After a very quiet morning, a formation of approximately 100 Bf 109s, in two waves, sixty plus being detected just off the coast of Dungeness while forty plus were sighted to the north of Dover and flew along the south coast of England on a 'free chase' mission but the RAF were not to fall for such a tactic and ignored them allowing them to return to their bases. Spasmodic attacks by Bf 109 fighters from Calais airfields during the course of the afternoon made strafing attacks on many of the British coastal airfields. These included Manston, Lympne, Hawkinge and a number of airfields in the south-west. Manston received the most damage once again, but was not recorded as being serious. At 1430 hours RAF No. 602 Sqd (Spitfires) were dispatched to intercept a formation of Ju 88s detected off the Sussex coast. One Ju 88 was shot down off the coast near Bognor with all four crewmen killed. One of the Spitfires was also shot down about 15 minutes later by return gunfire from a Ju 88. The pilot managed to bale out although sustaining burns to both hands and landed near Arundel. All the Ju 88s aborted the mission and returned to their bases in Northern France.

At 1515 hours, two Ju 88 bombers of KG 51 managed to cross the south-west counties of England without interception by British fighters and traversed the River Severn and headed for the oil storage tanks at Llanreath close to the Pembroke Docks in South Wales. Two tanks received direct hits and eight tanks exploded and burst into a flaming inferno, a fire which burned for a week and destroyed ten out of the fifteen oil tanks. Another Ju 88 of III./KG 51 struck at Bibury grass airfield, a satellite aerodrome of Pembury, killing an airman and damaging two Spitfires of 92 Squadron. F/L T.S. Wade and P/O J.A. Paterson gave chase and disposed of the raider in the Solent. Wade had to crash-land his Spitfire though. 

Worthy Down Aerodrome suffered a dive bombing attack at 1424 hours by a single He 111. Three 500lb bombs dropped, one damaging a hangar, one on the apron and one near another hangar causing considerable damage to buildings, cables and telephone wires and minor damage to four or five aircraft outside hangars. There were six minor casualties to personnel. Bombs were dropped at Shrivenham (Watchfield) Aerodrome. They fell outside the boundary and no damage resulted. At 1420 hours, a Ju 88 attacked Harwell Aerodrome in a steep dive releasing three heavy bombs and setting fire to three Wellingtons, which were totally destroyed. Coltishall Aerodrome was bombed at 1456 hours and an unfinished hangar was hit and slightly damaged. Honington Aerodrome was subject to two attacks, the first at 1615 hours by a single aircraft using HE and incendiaries. Slight material damage was done with four dead and many injured were reported. The second attack was delivered by one Do 17 at 1825 hours and resulted in heavy damage to one barrack, two Wellingtons and one Magister. Small raids also bombed many districts in Norfolk, Suffolk, Kent, Sussex, Hampshire and Isle of Wight, but little material damage was done.

Three cannon armed Spitfires of RAF No. 19 Squadron destroyed a 7./KG 2 Do 17z off Essex. At 1809 hours, one Bf 110 was intercepted and destroyed off Great Yarmouth.

P/O C.N.Birch of RAF No 1 Squadron crashed when he strayed into a balloon area near Finsbury Park in his Hurricane I (P3684). He baled out safely and his aircraft crashed off Oxfordness.

The orders given by Göring in his Luftwaffe Command Orders Staff 1A were in part put into action during the night. In this document Göring mentioned that the weather conditions expected in the next few days was cloud over much of Britain, and that the Luftwaffe must take full advantage of the situation;


> "_The cloudy conditions likely to prevail over England in the next few days must be exploited for [aircraft factories] attacks. We must succeed in seriously disrupting the material supplies of the enemy Air Force by the destruction of the relatively small number of aircraft engine and aluminum plants. These attacks on the enemy aircraft industry are of particular importance, and should also be carried out by night. . . . It would appear desirable for the purpose of night operations to allocate to units particular areas which they will come to know better during each successive raid. Within this area a list of target priorities should be drawn up, so that each sortie will produce some valuable result. . . . There can no longer be any restriction on the choice of targets. To myself I reserve only the right to order attacks on London and Liverpool_."


But these amounted to only small raids, between twelve and fifteen He 111 bombers attacked Liverpool and the Merseyside Docks and some dropped more bombs in the Midlands on the way back. Damage was only minimal and one He 111 was shot down on the return journey over County Durham. These were some of the first bombs to be dropped on the City of Liverpool.

Over the Bristol area during the night, weather conditions improved enough to allow KGr 100, the only unit in the Luftwaffe to be equipped with the sophisticated X-Verfahren electronic navigation and bombing aid, to carry out their first precision attack under Luftflotte 3, the target being the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton. X-Verfahren was a complex system employing a main and three cross beams which gave the pilot aural indications 50 km, 20 km and 5 km out from the target. It's chief disadvantage, however, was that it was only able to operate in conjunction with specially-equipped aircraft manned by crews trained in its use.

The operation against Filton involved twenty-three He 111's which were dispatched from their newly established base at Vannes in Brittany flying along an approach beam radiated from the X-Beam transmitter at Cherbourg. Over Bristol it was a clear moonlit night up to 02.00 hours after which some cloud developed at 3000 metres. During the attack, which took place between 23.19 and 02.50 hours, the 16.65 tonnes of high explosive bombs and 576 incendiary bombs caused considerable damage to the works, in particular at No.4 Factory and No.11 Test Bed, and resulted in four people being injured. All the German aircraft, however, returned safely to base.

Losses: Luftwaffe 10: Fighter Command 5


----------



## Njaco (Aug 19, 2010)

*20 August 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Activity was reduced due to deteriorating weather conditions with several reconnaissance raids made during the morning.

At about 1100 hours, Erpro 210 interfered with a convoy off Aldeburgh {East Coast} before striking sharply at Southwold's defences. Spitfires of RAF No 66 Sqd intercepted the Bf 110s as they attacked the airfield at Martlesham Heath.

At 1345 hours a formation of Do 17s was intercepted by Hurricanes from RAF No. 242 Sqd over the North Sea. One of the Hurricanes piloted by Midshipman P.J.Patterson was hit by returning gunfire from Do 17s and he went into a vertical dive and crashed into the sea some miles out of Winterton on the east coast.

The first large raid, of Do 17s and Bf 109s, arrived at 1430 hours over the Thames Estuary. The bombers were engaged by Hurricanes of RAF No 615 Sqd as they approached their target at Eastchurch airfield while Spitfires of RAF No. 65 Sqd fought off the Bf 109 escorts. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 destroyed a British Spitfire, bringing his kill total to five Allied warplanes.

At 1530 hours another raid was made on the airfield at Manston. Bombs were dropped and the airfield strafed by Bf 109's but these were driven back by the local ground defenses and Blenheims of RAF No. 600 Sqd. Damage was only minimal although a hangar was damaged, a couple of buildings hit by debris and a Blenheim aircraft of RAF No. 600 Sqd was damaged, but there were no casualties during the incident. RAF No. 65 Sqd (Spitfires) went in to intercept, but were attacked by the Bf 109 escorts in which one Spitfire was damaged by cannon fire and made a forced landing on Foulness Island. The Spitfire I (R6818 ) was badly damaged and written off but P/O K.G.Hart of RAF No. 65 Squadron escaped injury.

The oil tanks at Llanreath at Pembroke Docks which were still burning from the previous days bombing were again attacked. Defense was by anti-aircraft gunfire that failed to hit any of the German bombers, but they did manage to hit a Blenheim of RAF No. 236 Sqd, that although damaged, managed to return to base.

Later in the afternoon Hurricanes of RAF No. 302 Sqd (Polish), in action for the first time, attacked a Ju 88 off the Yorkshire coast on its way to bomb the airfield at Thornaby. Green Section “B” Flight, sighted the Junkers at 1910 hours, flying at 3,000 ft East between Hull and Spurn Point. The Section attacked and the Ju 88 crashed into the sea 6 miles S.W. of Withernsea. 4 prisoners were taken.

A Do 17 was shot down off Suffolk by Hurricanes of RAF No. 257 Sqd.

During the night very few raids were plotted around the country due to heavy cloud and poor visibility.

A Luftwaffe Focke Wulf FW 200C-1 Condor, coded "F8+KH" and assigned to I./KG 40, crashed at 1410 hours local on the lower slopes of Mount Brandon on the Dingle Penninsula in County Kerry, Ireland and became the first German crew interned in that country. This was the second Luftwaffe aircraft to crash in the country during World War II. The Condor had departed Abbeville, France, on a reconnaissance mission over northwestern Ireland and had been damaged by AA fire from a ship. All of the crew survived. A plaque commemorating this event is on the wall of O'Connor's Bar and Guest House in Cloghane, Co. Kerry. Some interesting relics of that and other aircraft can be seen in the bar of these premises. Exactly 48 years later, the pilot and a crewman returned to the spot and met an Irish woman who had helped them on this day.

The Luftwaffe lost fourteen aircraft damaged or destroyed, seventeen pilots and aircrew killed or missing and three wounded. The RAF lost three aircraft damaged or destroyed and one pilot killed. No 242 Squadron Hurricane P2976 Midshipman P.J.Patterson crashed into the sea off Winterton Norfolk at 13:45hrs. Patterson was reported missing, cause unknown.

While the action was taking place during the afternoon, Churchill was in Parliament and it was on this day that he delivered his speech that ended with. . .


> "...._The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the world war by their prowess and by their devotion.* Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few*_."


 Even today, no one would disagree that no truer words have been spoken, and the speech was one of those that would go down as being one of Winston Churchill's famous speeches. But there was always the humorous side, as P/O Michael Constable-Maxwell chuckled;


> "_He must be thinking of our liquor bills._"



*GERMANY*: The former Staffelkapitän of 5./JG 51, Hptm. Horst Tietzen, who was killed on 18 August, 1940, was posthumously awarded the Ritterkreuz.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 20, 2010)

*21 August 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The weather, which was slowly getting worse from the previous day, was expected to continue. Fighter Command knew that large scale operations would be out, but they were not stupid enough to acknowledge the fact that the Luftwaffe would not attempt the occasional mission to possibly airfields and/or industrial targets, this form of raid becoming known as 'tip-and-run'. This was borne out just after midday when the days events started to unfold.

British radar picked up a small to medium formation out over the North Sea off Norfolk at 12:15 hours. The formation was tracked for a while before Fighter Command dispatched any aircraft. This was due to the possibility that the formation may have been on a reconnaissance mission and not causing any particular threat. The formation broke into two groups. One came inland and flew on a south-westerly course, the other continued north past the Wash and the Humberside region. Newly formed RAF No. 302 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 242 Sqd (Hurricanes) were instructed to intercept. The Dorniers were from KG 2 and headed towards Norwich crossing the coast near Great Yarmouth. The other formation also consisted of Do 17s and were from KG 3, continuing their flight path along the east coast towards Hull.

RAF No. 242 Sqd made first contact and threw the Dornier formation into disarray. As the bombers twisted and turned, Blue Section led by Fl/Lt G.F. Powell-Sheddon, tore into the front part of the formation and with two of his section hit one of the Dorniers. A Do 17 of KG 2 went down and crashed in flames in Norfolk. Many of the formation sought cover in the low cloud and aborted the mission. RAF No. 302 Sqd, a new Polish squadron, returned to base.

As the other portion of the formation, flying north-west, passed Hull, they were closer to the coast and Fighter Command released RAF No. 611 Sqd using new Spitfire IIs and interception was made just off the coast at Skegness. P/O J.W. Lund claimed first blood when he shot down a Do 17 of KG 3 that crashed into the sea killing all on board. P/O Lund then took a hit from gunfire from a Dornier and decided to return to base only to crash on landing with the pilot escaping any injury. The next casualty was one of the Spitfires of RAF No. 611 Sqd, when P/O M.P. Brown bore in to attack a Dornier, but as he pulled away his Spitfire was hit by gunfire from the Do 17 which damaged the tailplane and one of the ailerons on his starboard wing and he was forced to return to base with a very unresponsive Spitfire. More Spitfires got into the attack. F/O D.H. Watkins lined up a Dornier in his gunsight and gave it a five second burst. Smoke trailed from the stricken bomber and it went down crashing into the sea off Scott's Head killing all the crew. Within five minutes, his Spitfire was hit, but damage was only minor so he decided to return to base.

The combat action continued and moved off the coast at Skegness, the Dorniers having been foiled in their attempt in attacking a coastal convoy coming down the coast. Convoy 'CE9' ran the Dover Straits under shell-fire and high-level bombing. Low-level raiders were driven off by intense AA fire and the difficulty of flying through the convoys' kite-barrage. Many of the bombers tried to gain height and take cover in the cloud. Another Spitfire took a hit in the glycol system and also sustained damage to the hydraulic system, and returned to base. With RAF No. 611 Sqd losing half of its aircraft the rest attempted to block access to the cloud cover forcing many of the Dorniers to take evasive action.

In a desperate attempt to seek the safety of the clouds, one Do 17 collided with another receiving damage that forced the bomber to make a forced landing between Skegness and Maplethorpe. The crew were captured. The other Do 17 was immediately attacked by RAF No. 611 Sqd Spitfires and crashed in the vicinity of Maplethorpe.

In the south west, German bombers made several attacks targeting 10 Group airfields and oil installations. In Cornwall, a raid of Ju 88s was bombing the airfield at St. Eval, destroying six Blenheims of RAF No. 236 Sqd, as Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Sqd scrambled in pursuit. Two hangars at St Eval Aerodrome were set on fire and at Binbrook and Stormy Down aerodromes there was a certain amount of damage to buildings. At RAF Watton in Lincolnshire a Do 17Z completed half a circuit before dropping 20 bombs causing neither casualties nor damage. The line of craters was soon filled and the raider was shot down by fighters. 

An attack was made on Brize Norton airfield and also at Middle Wallop. RAF No. 17 Squadron (Hurricanes) intercepted a formation of Ju 88s making the attacks. Intercepted off the Sussex coast and the Isle of Wight by the Hurricanes one Ju 88 was shot down, the Junkers crash landed at Earnley and the crew captured. RAF No. 17 Squadron sustained no casualties. One Blenheim bomber was damaged at Middle Wallop during the raid. At about 13:30 hours, Spitfires of RAF No. 234 Sqd engaged more Ju 88s off the Cornish coast. A Spitfire intercepted and attacked a Ju 88 and shot down by P/O R.F.T.Doe. The bomber crashed and burst into flames killing all on board. Between 17:30 hours and 18:30 hours two raids were made against the coastline. The first, by Ju 88s, was intercepted by Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Sqd off Cornwall whilst the second, saw Hurricanes of RAF No. 56 Sqd attack Do 17s near Ipswich. F/O R.E.P.Brooker of No 56 Squadron destroyed a Do 17 when he was himself shot down by return fire from the rear gunner in a Do 17 over East Anglia, at 18:15 hrs. He was slightly injured during his force-landing in his Hurricane I (P3153).

During the night activity was low with only a few small raids plotted. Further German raids, mostly of single aircraft, were off Harwich, Aberdeen, the Humber, Firth of Forth and near Drem. Small-scale minelaying was from Kinnaird's Head to St Abb's Head, Humber to Yarmouth and Dungeness to Selsey Bill.

Losses: Luftwaffe 18: Fighter Command 13

*WESTERN FRONT*: Reichsmarschall Göring began the command changes among his pilots. Oblt. Gunther Lützow was appointed Kommodore of JG 3 in place of Oblt. Karl Vieck. Oblt. Lützow’s place as Gruppenkommandeur of I Gruppe was taken by Oblt. Lothar Keller.


----------



## B-17engineer (Aug 20, 2010)

Chris, its great to read that knowing the bomber for my BoB GB could've been one of the bomber in the formation that day , KG 3 its from  Thanks for this! Its great!


----------



## Glider (Aug 21, 2010)

Counple of things that I noticed about today. a) its the first combat of the Spit II and b) how effective the single MG's are in the German Bombers. I always thought that they were more effective than a lot of people thought, but I had not expected them to be this good.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 21, 2010)

*22 August 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The weather again was to be a deciding factor in the course of the day's events. Rain and strong winds that developed overnight would continue into the day. Heavy seas were to be expected in the Channel with winds reaching gale force at times. Most Luftwaffe units had been grounded for the day, although the RAF reported over 500 sorties. By day, the action was very light for the obvious reasons, but the Luftwaffe stepped up night bombing operations to a number of areas. But the first action of the day was during the morning.

A convoy code named "Totem" was battling heavy seas through the Straits of Dover when they reported that they were under attack. As it turned out, the convoy was under attack by German gun batteries based at Cape Griz Nez. German batteries shelled Dover during a cross-Channel duel which had lasted all day. Their first target was the convoy of ships edging up the English side of the Channel under Royal Navy escort. Then the guns turned on Dover. The Germans had installed 14-inch batteries with a 20-mile range along the coast from Boulogne to Calais as part of the plan to invade England. Those guns were used for the first time when shells sent water spouts 100 feet above the convoy. RN escorts laid smoke to conceal the convoy.The convoy later reported that most of the shells were wide and no damage was done to the ships. The convoy continued on after the eighty minute bombardment without any further enemy attack. But their position had been reported and with the weather postponing any air attacks on the English mainland, it presented a target for the Luftwaffe. With dusk, the guns turned on civilian targets in Dover. During a 45-minute barrage a shell burst through the stained glass window of a church and exploded near the altar. By nightfall the convoy, with its 50,000 tons of food and war material, was snug at anchor.

BBC - Archive - WWII: The Battle of Britain - News Report | Convoy Shelled in Straits of Dover

At 1230 hours British radar picked up a formation of thirty German aircraft coming across the Channel. The plot showed that it was heading towards convoy "Totem". 11 Group released RAF No. 54 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No. 610 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No. 615 Sqd (Hurricanes). Both RAF No. 54 Sqd and RAF No. 610 Sqd arrived over the convoy in time to see the raiders approaching. They went into action immediately, and just as they approached the Ju 88s, they were attacked by Bf 109s. They managed to turn the bombers back, but not before one of the RAF No. 54 Squadron Spitfires was shot down and crashed into the Channel off the coast of Deal. Sgt G.R.Collett was killed in his Spitfire I (R6708 ). One Ju 88 was damaged and crash landed in France. One of the RAF No. 615 Sqd Hurricanes was accidentally shot down by one of the Hurricanes of the same squadron but the pilot escaped without injury after making a forced landing near Deal.

With the afternoon over, the raids continued. At 1830 hours, a raid of thirty German aircraft crossed the coast near Deal. On a number of occasions, the Luftwaffe sent over waves of Bf 109 fighters, usually to strafe aerodromes and landing strips. This raid, seemed to be one of those. Once it was observed that the formation did not consist of any bombers, Fighter Command released only one squadron of Spitfires to intercept the Bf 109s crossing the coast near Deal and heading towards Manston. But in addition to a freie jagd by fighters, there was also a formation of Bf 110s of EprGr 210 escorted by Bf 109s from JG 26 heading for Manston airfield. RAF No. 616 Sqd drew the short straw on this occasion, and as usual with fighter to fighter combat, just a series of dogfights ensued, but not without casualties. Sgt M.Keymer of No 65 Squadron was shot down and killed in his Spitfire I (K9909) off Dover at 1935 hours. He was attacked by a Bf 109 of JG 26. F/O Hugh Spencer Lisle 'Cocky' Dundas was wounded in the arm and leg when he baled out of his Spitfire I (R6926) after combat with a Bf 109 at 1930 hours. EprGr 210 dropped approximately thirty bombs during the raid on Manston resulting in the destruction of two hangars and two Blenheim aircraft. Some buildings were damaged and the aerodrome was made unserviceable.

RAF No. 302 Sqdrn (Polish) conducted its second engagement. The squadron claimed 2 Ju 88s - one at sea and the other four miles from the coast at 12,000 ft. but both were unconfirmed.

An attack on Bristol at 2300 hours was conducted by Heinkels of KGr 100, the only unit in the Luftwaffe to be equipped with the sophisticated X-Verfahren electronic navigation and bombing aid. The heaviest attack came during the night when Ju 88s dropped more than sixteen tons of high explosive on the aircraft works at Filton seriously disrupting production. The operation against the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton involved twenty-three He 111s flying from Vannes, Brittany and all the aircraft returned safely. Two factory buildings were damaged and four people injured.

Possibly the most notable, and in a way controversial were the bombs that were dropped on the township of Harrow and the adjoining Wealdstone. Records have always shown that at 0330hrs on the morning of August 22nd 1940, the first bombs to be dropped on London were at Harrow. Geographically, in 1940 Harrow was in the county of Middlesex, the Greater London area did not extend as far as either Harrow or Wealdstone. But as far as the Civil Defense was concerned, Harrow was included and was within the boundaries of Civil Defense Area No.5 which was classed as the London area. To take the matter further, Harrow and Wealdstone also come under the jurisdiction of the London Metropolitan Police. Yet look in any gazetteer, and you will most certainly see Harrow and Wealdstone listed as being in Middlesex.

Losses: Luftwaffe 4: Fighter Command 5

SS 'Thorold' (1,689 GRT)a Canadian merchant ship, was bombed and sunk by Do-17 bombers, in the Irish Sea in position 51.46N, 005.38W. From her crew of 23, ten crewmembers were lost.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Another day of awards given to several Luftwaffe personnel. Major Adolf Galland was promoted to Kommodore of JG 26 in place of Major Gotthardt Handrick. Galland's place as Gruppenkommandeur of III Gruppe was taken by Hptm. Gerhard Schöpfel. Hptm. Rolf Pingel was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 26 in place of Hptm. Kurt Fischer. Generalmajor Theo Osterkamp, formerly of JG 51 and now belonging to Jagdfliegerführer 1 was awarded the Ritterkreuz for his leadership as was Major Max Ibel, Kommodore of JG 27. Obstlt. Harry von Bülow-Bothkamp, Kommodore of JG 2 and a former Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 77 with a total of six enemy aircraft destroyed during World War I, was awarded the Ritterkreuz in recognition of his leadership during the early campaigns in Norway and France despite his not scoring a single victory in World War II.

Goring also took avantage of the brief respite caused by the weather to make some changes with his fighter forces. The three jagdgeschwader of Luftflotte 3 - JG 27, JG 2 and JG 53 were reassigned to Luftflotte 2 and began moving from Cherbourg to Calais.

In a British raid over Daedereide, Holland, S/Lt (A) R. L. G. Davies and Lt N. M. Hearle in a Swordfish of RAF No. 812 Squadron were shot down and made prisoners of war.

*GERMANY*: German propaganda radio station NBBS prophesises the destruction of London by,


> _'aerial torpedoes carrying many tons of high explosive and guided by radio.'_


----------



## Njaco (Aug 22, 2010)

*23 August 1940 Firday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The typical English summer was behaving in its usual unpredictable way which again meant that any major assault was out of the question. Reconnaissance only at first, with small raids developing as the day went on, raiders were attacking any convenient airfield or factory. Many of them tried to probe the London defences, jettisoning bombs indiscriminately if attacked. An occasional German patrol aircraft was detected off the coast, but Fighter Command was not going to waste time on these, and those enemy aircraft that did cross the coast and penetrate inland managed to avoid interception in the low cloud cover.

The afternoon was still clear of any enemy activity due to the inclement weather. A few single aircraft managed to cross the coast, but they stayed very close to the cloud base and they did little or no damage. Sgt H.J.Merchant of No 1 Squadron force landed a Hurricane I (P2980) at Withyham, Kent after running out of fuel. He hit some trees but was unhurt. Manston received 30 more bombs at 01:25 and three Ju 88s attacked Thorney Island. One He 111 was destroyed by fighters near Sumburgh. In the afternoon, nine raids of single aircraft, one of which was reported to be a meteorological flight, approached the coast between Selsey Bill and Lyme but turned away. Later, eleven individual aircraft penetrated inland and attacked scattered targets in Devon and Hampshire.

German activity was widespread during the night although not on the scale of the previous night. The largest of the raids were in the Bristol and South Wales area, with Cardiff receiving several visits. Raids were reported over East Anglia and northwards along the coast to Middlesborough, Harrogate and York. Kent was also visited. The Luftwaffe also dropped bombs on Aberdeen in Scotland. Adrian Hope Boyd of RAF No 145 Squadron (Hurricane) destroyed a He 111 over the Firth, 10 miles from Edinburgh.

In their Hurricanes, the pilots of RCAF No 1 Squadron had their first encounter with the Luftwaffe. The RCAF’s No 1 (Fighter) Squadron was the only Canadian squadron that took part in the Battle of Britain.

Overnight, the Luftwaffe targeted Filton again and up to sixteen tons of high explosive fell on the airfield causing some damage, but although hangars and machine shops were hit it was not enough to put them out of action.

The 3 Staffel of KG 55 lost a He 111 to flak when it crashed at LeHarve, France returning from a mission raid on Southampton. The 2 Staffel also had a He 111 crash at LeHarve after being damaged by RAF fighters on a mission to attack aircraft factories at Yeovil. All three Gruppen of KG 27 engaged in missions against targets in the Bristol area. Just before 2300 hours twelve He 111s of the III Gruppe dropped their loads on the Bristol docks. At 2300 hours eleven He 111s of the I Gruppe raided the docks at Avonmouth. Twenty minutes after midnight eight He 111s of the II Gruppe bombed the Bristol docks for the second time.

Convoy OA 203 in the Moray Firth, was attacked and the streamers 'Llanishen' (5,035 grt) and the 'Makalla' (6,680 grt - pictured) were sunk by Luftwaffe He 115s based in Stavanger, Norway. Unlike previous attacks, they dropped torpedoes, sinking two fairly substantial ships.

Churchill had the name of the volunteer force changed to The Home Guard, a title with more purpose and dignity, reflecting the fact that these men would be the first line of defence in case of invasion. With the army re-equipped the Home Guard now received uniforms, weapons and ammunition.

P/O Petrus Hendrik Hugo, of RAF No. 615 Squadron was awarded the DFC, the citation reading,


> "_Pilot Officer Hugo has displayed great keenness to engage the enemy on every possible occasion. During June and July, 1940, he destroyed five enemy aircraft." _


RAF No. 307 Sqdrn (Polish) was formed as a night-fighter squadron.

RAF No. 304 "Land of Silesia" Sqdrn (Polish) was formed at RAF Bramcote, from 185 men, including 31 Officers, most of whom saw action in Poland and France with 2nd Air Regiment (Kracow) and 6th Air Regiment (Lwow) and with the French Army. This became 304 Silesian Squadron, commanded by Wing Commander Bialy with Wing Commander WM Graham as its British adviser. It was attached to No 1 Bomber Group and was given 16 Fairey Battles for training purposes.

Hptm Hannes Trautloft took over as Geschwaderkommodore of JG 54 and Walter Oesau replaced him as Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 51. Leutnant Wolfgang Kosse was appointed Staffelkapitän of 5./JG 26.

Losses: Luftwaffe 5: Fighter Command 1

53 Grumman G-36a Martlet Is, and 6 Grumman G-36a Martlet IIIs were diverted from a French order which had not been delivered before the Fall of France in 1940 and delivered to the British Purchasing Commission on 23 August 1940 and transferred to the first FAA unit 804 squadron at Hatston, 778 squadron at Arbroath, 759 squadron at Yeovilton and 802 squadron at Donisbristle from September through to November 1940.

*GERMANY*: The propaganda minister, Josef Goebbels, worried by recent British successes, orders that ridicule of the English way of life must stop and the enemy's fighting spirit be stressed instead.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 23, 2010)

*24 August 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM:* Since August 18th, things generally were relatively quiet, the lull of the last five days had allowed both sides to regroup and re-establish themselves. So far, all the Luftwaffe had been doing was to cause inconvenience to Fighter Command. The radar stations had been damaged, but in nearly all cases they were back in operation within 24 hours. Some airfields had been damaged, but again, the damage was not enough to make them non-operational. Both sides were losing both pilots and aircraft, and with the Battle of Britain now over two months old, the Luftwaffe had not yet achieved the advantage that it had hoped for, and Göring 's plan that the Royal Air Force would be wiped out in two weeks were hopelessly dashed.

Another directive was issued by Göring:


> _".......To continue the fight against the enemy air force until further notice, with the aim if weakening the British fighter forces. The enemy is to be forced to use his fighters by means of ceaseless attacks. In addition the aircraft industry and the ground organization of the air force are to be attacked by means of individual aircraft by night and day, if weather conditions do not permit the use of complete formations." Göring went on to add that concentrated attacks were to be made on Royal Air Force airfields. The tactic of trying to lure the fighters of Fighter Command into the air would continue, as "...these fighters must be destroyed if we are to succeed."_


The bombers were to fly with a strong fighter escort, very close, in an attempt to lure the RAF fighters up to battle and hopeful destruction. German fighter pilots were still opposed to the fact that they were not being given 'free hunt' instructions and that they could fly above the bombers that they were escorting. The instruction to stay close to the bombers thus giving them full protection continued.

Because of the increasing bomber losses during those German attacks without any fighter escort, the fighters of Luftflotte 3 were redeployed to operate over South East England. But this change left a surplus of bombers in other areas who, without fighter escort, could not conduct daylight raids and decided to carry out night operations. The Luftwaffe also began to shift to the targeting of aircraft production plants and the inland fighter fields instead of coastal airfields although the clear weather of the next few days brought a concentration of bombers on the RAF Group 11 fighter bases, especially those surrounding London.

As Oberst ‘Pips’ Priller of 6./JG 51, who claimed a two Spitfires during the day, later commented;


> “_In such confused fighting, the claims for aircraft shot down and the loss ratios on both sides are misleading. It was no easy task over England in August 1940. Sometimes the youngsters were the victims of their inexperience and over-enthusiasm. There were times when we heard a plea from someone who was confused and disoriented, and nothing could be done about it. I remember one occasion when a lad who hadn’t, as we used to say, tasted much English air, lost sight of our formation after some frenzied twisting and turning about the sky. But we could see him, he had dived steeply and was over the outskirts of London. He should have stayed with the Staffel instead of chasing off on his own. When he grasped the situation he called for help, “Come quickly! I’m on my own over London”._


It seemed now, that it was going to be a battle of tactics. Previously, the bombing had become far more widespread. In the early stages bombing was only concentrated on the radar stations and some of the production factories in the Southampton and Portsmouth areas with an occasional attack on the midlands, but now destruction by bombing was getting far more intense. Most of the airfields had received some sort of damage, bombing was getting closer to London and in some cases the suburbs had been hit, inland towns and cities in the industrial midlands were now sustaining bomb damage. The Air Ministry and the War cabinet were very concerned at the close proximity the bombing was on the capital itself. Göring had issued instructions that London was not to be bombed except only upon his orders which was a directive that had been passed down from Adolph Hitler.

London was ringed by the Sector Stations that were there to protect it. These were Kenley to the south in the county of Surrey, Biggin Hill also in the south in the county of Kent both just a short drive away from London. Hornchurch to the east, which was a vital airfield because it protected the London Docks, the Thames and the Thames Estuary as well as the large factories at Dagenham and Tilbury. North Weald to the north-east protected much of the Home Counties as well as providing back up for the busy Hornchurch. Northolt in the west of London completed whatever protection London needed.

It was with a tired and exhausted German Air Fleet, that Göring unleashed a savage all out bombing attack on Britain. August 24th was to be the start of a campaign of sustained bombing, sending over the Channel more aircraft that the RAF could cope with. A major difference in tactics was the introduction of 'stepped' raids, with successive formations of aircraft at different altitudes from low level fighter-bomber groups to high-level bombers at 24,000 ft. As one formation sets off so another builds up behind Calais, and the raiders split off into feint attacks as they proceeded, making interception most difficult at all levels and positions.

At 0830 hours a formation of Luftwaffe aircraft developed off the coast of Calais. The formation consisted of over forty Do 17s and Ju 88s with about sixty or more Bf 109s as escort. 12 fighter squadrons went up to intercept and RAF No. 610 Sqd (Spitfires) made contact. The Spitfires had position and height, and dived into the middle of the formation making the bombers scatter and the Bf 109 escort initially had problems with acceleration because of the new orders in keeping with close contact with the bombers. There was no account of bomb damage in the area at the time and the formation was turned back on another unsuccessful mission. But the raid was a feint, and the real attack was timed to catch the British fighters on the ground as they refuelled.

Dover and Folkestone were shelled at approximately 1000 hours. Four shells fell near Hawkinge Aerodrome (Folkestone), but little damage reported otherwise. The interval between the shells fired was about 8 minutes.

At 1130 hours another German formation came across the Channel from Cape Griz Nez which consisted of Ju 88s and an escort of Bf 109s. RAF No. 264 Sqd (Defiants) had been deployed as was RAF No. 151 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 501 Sqd (Hurricanes). Deploying the Defiant squadron was a devastating move, especially as RAF No. 141 Sqd (Defiants) had almost been decimated about a month previous. At the time, RAF No. 264 Sqd was at Manston and after so many attacks now was being used mainly as a refueling station rather than a base. RAF No. 610 Sqd (Spitfires) had been vectored to Dover, where they saw nothing for the first 40 minutes.

The Defiants made contact with the bombers who made their first attack on Manston airfield. Although they managed to claim one Ju 88 shot down and another damaged, they suffered in the usual way, even in combat with the Ju 88s. Three Defiants were destroyed while two others sustained damage. RAF No. 610 Sqd managed to intercept a flight of six Bf 109s, but they turned away and headed back towards France having a head start on the pursuing Spitfires. RAF No. 610 Sqd broke off the engagement, except for Sgt R.F. Hamlyn, who chased one Bf 109 back to France, despite orders not to chase enemy aircraft across the Channel. Another Spitfire from RAF No. 610 Squadron was shot down over Ramsgate by Hptm. Josef Fözö of 4./JG 51. Fw. Josef Oglodeck of 1./JG 51 was killed in action shortly after getting his second Spitfire at 1412 hours. Oblt. Josef Priller of 6./JG 51 destroyed two Hurricanes off Margate.

Although Manston had many tunnels and underground shelters, it was now rapidly becoming useless, the result of regular and constant bomb attacks. In three days, RAF No. 264 Sqd had lost some twelve Defiants, fourteen pilots and gunners including the Commanding Officer were killed with most of the others being wounded. Just as the Ju 87 was withdrawn from the Luftwaffe, Fighter Command decided that the end had now come for the Defiant as a front line fighter, and what was left of RAF No. 264 Sqd was transferred back to Kirton-on -Lindsay.

During the afternoon, more waves of bombers were detected heading towards London. But then a change in course, and the bombers took on a course that placed them in a straight line for the Sector Stations of Hornchurch and North Weald.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 23, 2010)

_(24 August 1940 continued....)_

During the afternoon, more waves of bombers were detected heading towards London. But then a change in course, and the bombers took on a course that placed them in a straight line for the Sector Stations of Hornchurch and North Weald. 

With many other squadrons attending skirmishes around the south eastern coastline and with the possibility of more to come, 11 Group was stretched to the limit. RAF No. 32 Sqd (Hurricanes) had been scrambled, as was RAF No. 54 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.65 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No. 151 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No. 264 Sqd (Defiants), RAF No.501 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No. 610 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No. 615 Sqd (Hurricanes). Park sent out a request for assistance from Leigh-Mallory's 12 Group and 12 Group sent in RAF No. 19 Sqd with their cannon armed Spitfires, while three squadrons at Duxford attempted to form a 'big wing', but by the time that they had reached the target area the German bombers were already on their way home leaving a trail of blazing fires around the Thames Estuary, some caused by hastily jettisoned bombs giving an indication as to the ferocity of the combat. Meeting this mass of British fighters were fighter schwarms from I(J)./LG 2, III./JG 3, I and III./JG 26, JG 51, II./JG 2 and I./JG 53.

Thirty Bf 109s bounced Spitfires of RAF No. 616 Sqd and shot down seven of the British fighters in less than 30 seconds. The Defiants of RAF No. 264 Sqd managed to draw away the escorting Bf 109s off of a Dornier bomber formation allowing more Hurricanes to attack the German bombers. During the battle the British lost four Defiants shot down with three British planes falling into the sea off Thanet killing all aboard. Other British fighters were lost when Sgt G.Hill from No 65 Squadron escaped injury when his Spitfire I was shot down off Margate at 15:35 hours. Sgt G.T.Clarke of RAF No 151 Squadron was shot down and wounded by Bf 109's over Ramsgate at 15:55 hours and crash-landed his Hurricane I (P3273). Two Bf 109s from II./JG 2 were destroyed with one pilot killed and the second pilot wounded upon crashing near Le Havre.

P/O W.J.Glowacki from Poland flew with the RAF's No. 501 "County of Gloucester" Squadron flying Hurricanes, became an "Ace in One Day". Flying Hurricane 1 V7234 Glowacki and the rest of his section pounced on a formation of enemy bombers which had just carried out a devastating attack on Manston. Glowacki tore into the Ju 88s and shot down two in quick succession plus one of the escorting Bf 109s. A few hours later he notched up his fifth kill of the day when he downed a Ju 88 near Greystone. 

The combat action continued over the Thames Estuary and the north coast towns of Kent. Manston had taken the brunt of the attack, but a number of German bombers managed to get through to their targets of North Weald and Hornchurch where, although considerable damage was done, operations were not affected. But with this attack, and the other raids around south-eastern England, the toll once again began to mount. The RAF was to lose twenty aircraft and eighteen of those damaged were repairable, to the thirty-nine destroyed of the Luftwaffe. Friendly fire also claimed victims. P/O D.N.Woodger of No 235 Squadron and his gunner D.L.Wright were shot down and killed in error by a Hurricane of RCAF No 1 Squadron at 16:45hrs. Their Blenheim IV (T1804) crashed at Bracklesham Bay.

The day was not over yet. Most of the action during the morning was in the Dover, Ramsgate, Thames Estuary and East London area, but by mid afternoon although Ventnor Radar was not in operation, a formation of about fifty heavy bombers were detected east of Cherbourg. Another formation was also detected coming from the south-east. Several squadrons were scrambled, but only RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires) made contact with the Germans in most unpleasant circumstances. They spotted the bomber formation 5,000 feet above them, just as the AA coast guns started to fire at the bombers. It was like being caught between 'the devil and the deep blue sea' except in this case it was the thick cloud of a bomber formation and the chilly waters of a cold and bleak English Channel.

Numerous Luftwaffe fighter units were involved in the combat actions after 1500 hours and many Experten increased their scoreboards. Fw. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 shot down a British Hurricane for his sixth victory of the war. Oblt. Herbert Ihlefeld of 2(J)./LG 2, Oblt. Erwin Neuerburg of 7./JG 3 and Oblt. Arnold Lignitz of 9./JG 51each shot down two British fighters. But JG 51 lost several pilots. Uffz. Hans Busch and Uffz. Walter Harheim of 2./JG 51 were killed when their Bf 109s collided over Ramsgate. Lt. Franz Achleitner of 9./JG 3 with five victories, was shot down and captured, becoming a prisoner of war.

The Spitfire of American, P/O Andy Mamedoff was hit and, fighting with broken controls, just managed to land the plane in a field. With only a single squadron against seventy plus bombers, it was too much to ask that RAF No. 609 Sqd force the bombers into retreat, and the formations continued on to the City of Portsmouth where they let loose over 200 250 kg bombs. This raid resulted in the largest amount of casualties so far in a single raid during the Battle of Britain. Over 100 people in the city were killed on that afternoon, and 300 sustained serious injuries. Houses, shops, factories, the Naval barracks and the dockyards were all seriously damaged, and for the first time, the newspapers had to print the grim reality of truth in their headlines. For months previously Britons were reading newspaper headlines, "144 down out of 1,000", "25 Spitfires stop 70 Bombers" and "115 Raiders out of 600 Destroyed" figures were very much exaggerated. Now the headlines were to read "Portsmouth Suffers Heavy Bombing", simply that, in an effort to maintain morale the amount of dead and injured was only placed in small print. The destroyer HMS 'Acheron' was damaged by German aircraft during the air raid on Portsmouth.

But the bad news was not to stop with the day raids. No sooner had the bombers began their return journey, another large formation was building up off the Cherbourg Peninsular. This was joined by another formation from the south east and radar tracked them across the Channel. But by this time darkness had fallen and it was an impossibility for any British squadron to be 'scrambled'. With the small amount of night fighters that Fighter Command possessed it would be a disaster to allow them to go up and fly the flag for the RAF. Instead, Britain's only defense for the oncoming bombers would be the searchlights and AA groundfire. This time, the target was London itself. A target that was not to be attacked unless ordered to do so by Göring himself from instruction direct from Adolph Hitler.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 23, 2010)

_(24 August 1940 continued....)_

So far for the period of the war, Londoners although often hearing local gunfire, seeing vapor trails of dogfights in the sky and hearing about the war in newspapers and on the radio, the only experience of bombing was when Croydon was mistakenly identified as Kenley and just a couple of bombs dropped on nearby Croydon and Purley, the target here was naturally the aerodrome at Croydon. The other instance was earlier in the morning when bombs were dropped on the docks and outskirts of East London. But that was in daylight. This was to be a new experience, a frightful experience, for this was the first time that London would be bombed at night. London had never been bombed since the Gotha bombing raids of 1918, and this was to be far more frightening, and spectacular than anything Londoners had seen before. A formation of 170 He 111s were sent to attack an aircraft factory at Rochester and oil storage tanks at Thameshaven. Navigational errors caused the bombers to become lost and they inadvertently dropped their loads too far west. Bombs fell at Aldgate in the city, at Bloomsbury, Bethnal Green, Finsbury, Hackney, Stepney, Shoreditch and West Ham. Fires covered the whole of London's East End, the night sky glowed blood red, fountains of flame bellowed out of factory windows, and wall structures came crashing down. While most of the bombs landed in the dockland area of East and West Ham and others fell in North London and as far west as Esher and Staines, one of the Heinkels left his release of bombs far too late, and it was these that landed in Central London that was to have immediate consequences in the days following.

Although hardly anything was accomplished by the raid, British Prime Minister Churchill demanded a reprisal raid upon Berlin. Within twenty four hours Bomber Command was to launch its first attack on the city of Berlin. Whether this was a good move or not, the bombing of Berlin only provoked the Luftwaffe into a series of regular night raids on the British capital. This was to be the warning that the Blitzkrieg on London had now begun.

But the night wasn't over.

Unable to carry out daylight attacks, night operations were the obvious answer and accordingly Luftflotte 3's bombers were ordered to attack the next most important targets in Britain, the vital West Coast ports of Liverpool and Bristol. The first of the new night targets attacked was a raid on the harbour installations at Bristol. He 111s from I, II and III./KG 27 and Ju 88s from I and III./LG 1 totaling forty-four warplanes subsequently were over the City dropped 27.2 tonnes of high explosive bombs, 13 tonnes of Oil Bombs and 5364 incendiary bombs in a raid which lasted from 21.40 to 05.09 hours. The attack, however, was not a success and although the weather over the Bristol area was fine, low cloud impeded visibility, with the result that the majority of the bombs fell fairly harmlessly in North Somerset.

2nd Lt Ellis Edward Arthur Chetwynd Talbot (1920-41), Royal Engineers, carried a new and unpredictable type of German bomb to a safe spot on his shoulders. (Empire Gallantry Medal)

*WESTERN FRONT:* The III Gruppe of JG 51 received a new Gruppenkommandeur when Hptm. Walter Oesau was posted to replace Hptm. Hannes Trautloft.

The 3 Staffel of JG 77 was reformed as 12 Staffel of JG 51.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 24, 2010)

*25 August 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM*: After early morning mists, especially in the north, the morning was expected to be fine and clear with cloud developing during the afternoon. The north expected scattered cloud during the afternoon and evening. Surprisingly, although the weather could only be termed as cloudy but fair, it was in fact warm to hot with ideal flying conditions. But for a day of any serious activity, it was not to be, not for the morning period anyway. Dowding and Park were discussing the possibility that the Luftwaffe were turning their attention to the bombing of London and the cities after the previous night encounter, unaware at this stage that the bombing may have been accidental.

During the mid-afternoon, Ventnor CH had detected a formation coming in across the Channel again heading towards the cities of Portsmouth and Southampton. Up until now, it had almost looked like being a perfect day off for the pilots of 10 and 11 Groups. Many just lazed around most of the day in the warm sunshine hoping that the Luftwaffe pilots were too, lapping it up and could not be bothered with fighting a wretched war. 

But now the non-events of the day changed. No large raids appearred until 16:00, when some 100 plus aircraft had been detected coming in over the Channel from Cherbourg heading for Weymouth. Further to that, another three waves of enemy aircraft were coming in from the Channel Islands that totaled some 100 plus aircraft. Headquarters FC immediately notified 10 Group in which they dispatched RAF No.609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires) and RAF No.152 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires) under the command of Squadron Leader Horace Darley and RAF No. 616 Squadron Kenley. 11 Group dispatched RAF No.17 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) while RAF No.87 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) and RAF No.213 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) were under the command of Wing Commander John Dewar and made up the three squadrons vectored to attack the incoming German formations. All squadrons met at the vectored position just to the south of Weymouth and Portland where the British fighters found a heavy contingent of Bf 110s from 1./ZG 2 and ZG 76 and Bf 109s from JG 26, JG 53, JG 2 and JG 54. RAF Nos.87 and 609 Squadrons defended Portland and RAF No. 17 Sqn. protected Warmwell. The Ju 88s of II./KG 51 and II./KG 54 protected by Bf 110s split into three groups to attack Weymouth, Portland and Warmwell. 87 Sqn. took on the Portland Ju 88s leaving the 110s to 609 Sqn. But the 110s were in turn escorted by Bf 109s of JG 53 and JG 26. 17 Sqn. found the bombers impossible to reach through the dense fighter screen. As with nearly all occasions of combat, they were outnumbered and once again indulged in some serious dog fighting and a number of bombers managed to get through and attack the airfield at Warmwell causing damage only to a couple of hangars and cutting the communications. Flying very high, with massed fighter protection, the raid (200-plus aircraft) bombed several western areas from Weymouth to Scilly Isles and across to Bristol and Pembroke.

Squadron Leader Cedric Williams of 17 Squadron was shot down and killed when gunfire from one of the Bf 110s hit his Hurricane, while another pilot was seen to bale out of his crippled Hurricane to safety. But if there has to be a hero of the day, it has to be Czech pilot Count Manfred Czernin of 17 Squadron who by accurate head on and rear attacks shot down three Bf 110s in just one minute. As the number of Bf 110s lost became greater, more Bf 109s came in from above who shot down more British fighters. But the damage had been done, the force of Bf 110s had diminished considerably, and the Bf 109s had to return to their bases because they were low on fuel. Oblt. Kurt Ruppert of 3./JG 26 chased a Spitfire across the Channel to Calais where he shot it down. The Spitfire pilot, Sgt. P.T.Wareing of RAF No. 616 Squadron Kenley, was taken prisoner where he escaped in 1942 and returned to duty. In this combat, Fighter Command lost sixteen fighters from the three squadrons while the Luftwaffe lost a total of twenty aircraft.

At the same time, there was a small skirmish over Dover where a Staffel of Bf 110s again bombed the harbour and docks, but fighters from Gravesend and Biggin Hill chased them back out over the Channel. During the battle over the Isle of Wight, III./JG 2 lost three Bf 109s destroyed by British fighters. All three pilots survived though they were severely wounded. But JG 2 succeeded in claiming its 250th victory of the war while Oblt. Helmut Wick got his nineteenth and twentieth victories.

The only other sizeable raid of the day developed over Kent around 18:00. Six 11 Group squadrons were in action, RAF No.32 Sqn operating from Hawkinge, and engaging a dozen Do 17s until Bf 109s drove them off and destroyed a Hurricane - P/O K.R.Gillman being listed as missing. But the new Luftwaffe tactics were working, and to a point were working well. They were pleased at the decision that the Bf 109 bases had been moved to the area of Calais which had now allowed them to spend more time over enemy territory. Also, the new tighter Luftwaffe formations were allowing the bombers now to at least get through to their target areas. A point recognized by Fighter Command who stated that all they have to do now is to learn that even from the air, dockland areas do not look like oil refineries and storage areas and that with the new formations they have taught the navigators how to read a map.

P/O M.M.Shand, a New Zealander joined RAF No 54 Squadron on the 24th of August 1940 with some 20 hours flying on Spitfires and no training at all in combat. He flew as No 2 to Al Deere on his first outing. He was injured on the 25th of August 1940 at 19:20hrs when his Spitfire I (R6969) was attacked by a Bf 109 over Dover.

Losses: Luftwaffe 20; RAF 16.

The bombers of KG 55 attack Bristol during the night, losing a He 111 from 9./KG 55 shot down into the sea off Sussex by fighters from RAF No. 615 Squadron. At 2300 hours He 111s of III./KG 27 bomb the city of Birmingham with one Heinkel dropping bombs on the harbour at Avonmouth.

*GERMANY*: The first RAF Bomber Command raid on Berlin occurred during the night of 25/26 August. Winston Churchill dispatched an order to Bomber Command that an attack of retaliation be made on Berlin. The participants were: 9 Vickers Wellington Mk Is of No. 99 Squadron based at Newmarket, Suffolk, and 8 Vickers Wellington Mk Is of No. 149 Squadron based at Mildenhall, Suffolk, and 12Handley Page Hampdens Mk Is of No. 61 and No. 144 Squadrons, both based at Hemswell, Lincolnshire, and 9 Armstrong Whitworth Whitley Mk Vs of No. 51 Squadron (4 Group) and 5 Whitley Mk Vs of No 78 Squadron (4 Group), both based at Dishforth, Yorkshire. Whitley and Wellington crews were told that their main target "_is the Siemens and Halske factory at Siemenstadt, producing 85% of the electrical power used by the German forces." _Hampden crews were told to demolish Berlin's Klingenberg power station. Other objectives were the Henschel Aircraft Factory, the Bucker training aircraft factory at Rangsdorf, Tempelhof aerodrome and Tegel's gasworks. The head of the Air Staff of the RAF, Sir Charles Portal, justified these raids by saying that to...


> "_get four million people out of bed and into the shelters_"


...was worth the losses involved.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 25, 2010)

*26 August 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: From first light, German aircraft on reconnaissance patrols had been picked up by radar throughout the Kent and Sussex areas. 11 Group kept a watchful eye but they came to the conclusion that these aircraft were only on photographic missions and posed no threat. The day was marked by three major Luftwaffe operations. The first comprising of five distinct raids over Kent, started at 1137 hours with intrusions by around 50 bombers and 80 fighters, some of which strafed east Kent targets. Fighter Command was a little hesitant at first when a build-up of enemy aircraft was detected coming from the direction of Lille. This was joined by further aircraft from Luftflotte 2 and the force was estimated at 150 plus. Fighter Command had no option but to take defensive action. Some 40 Hurricanes and 30 Spitfires of 11 Group rose to defend their bases. RAF No.616 Squadron was one of the first squadrons of the day that was "scrambled" and according to reports, far too late - a flight of Bf 109s were almost on top of them as they desperately tried to gain height. They tangled desperately, but the 109s had the upper hand. There was little the Yorkshire squadron could do. Seven of the squadron's Spitfires were shot down, all of them destroyed, while two pilots were killed and the other five either baled out or crash landed their aircraft. Kommodore Mölders of the Stab./JG 51 downed a Spitfire, his twenty-seventh victory. At 1215 hours Major Mölders comrade at JG 51, Hptm. Josef Fözö of 4./JG 51 destroyed two Spitfires from RAF No. 616 Squadron over Dover.

Although six squadrons were involved, it was only RAF No.264 Squadron Hornchurch (Defiants) that suffered further casualties. Warned of an intended attack on its base, Hornchurch, RAF No. 264 Squadron hastened away to engage KG 3's Do 17s over Herne Bay. Although the Defiants assembled in their specified battle formation for a bomber interception they were no match for the escorting Bf 109s which claimed three of the Defiants. In return the Defiants shot down six Do 17s and a fighter. The struggle did reduce the Bf 109s fuel forcing them to leave. The Do 17s decided it was unwise to continue unprotected and jettisoned their loads. All the Defiant's were shot down while over the Herne Bay-Margate area soon after 1230hrs. The Dorniers managed to bomb Dover and Folkestone as well as the seaside resorts of Margate and Broadstairs. Some of the Do 17s went on to drop bombs on the airfields of Biggin Hill and Kenley again. But opposition from Fighter Command was strong, and all the bombers and the escorts were flying back over the Channel by 1250hrs.

The second major operation started shortly after 13:00 when eight raids developed. Radar again detected enemy activity off the Belgian coast. 78 Do 17s of II./KG 2 and III./KG 3 escorted by 120 Bf 110s of ZG 26 and ZG 76 and Bf 109s of JG 3 assembled over Lille. The Observer Corps made a visual sighting off the coast at Deal, made a far more accurate assessment regarding strength and height of the enemy. One formation took a wide berth around the Thames Estuary, the bombers and their escorts turning east and approaching the Essex coast just south of Harwich. The other formation came in through the Estuary and took the usual course along the River Thames. Fighter Command put 10 squadrons into action. Among them were RCAF No. 1 Sqdrn Northolt (Hurricanes), RAF No. 85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes), RAF No. 111 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), RAF No. 310 Squadron Duxford (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 615 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes). The flight path of the enemy bombers could give them a possibility of three targets. The aerodromes of Hornchurch and North Weald, or another attack on London. Debden could also be a possibility but was located just a little to the north of the flight path. AVM Keith Park's tactics now, was to release half of his required squadrons leaving the other half on standby at their respective bases. Looking at the overall situation, he could possibly pinpoint the obvious targets of the Luftwaffe. Once the airborne squadron flight leaders reported the enemy strength, height and position, Park would vector the squadrons that had been on standby to allocated positions to cut the enemy off. 

First interception was made by the Czech's of RAF No. 310 Squadron Duxford (Hurricanes). Being the first squadron on the scene, they found it difficult to get at the bombers because of the Bf109 escorts, so they matched their Hurricanes against the Messerschmitt fighters. Weaving in and out of enemy aircraft, and in many cases....themselves, No. 310 squadron went in full of exuberance and enthusiasm. It was not until the arrival of 56 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes) and 111 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) that the first enemy aircraft were shot down. RAF No. 56 Squadron claimed the first Bf 109 over the beaches of Clacton, then No. 111 Squadron and No. 310 Squadron claimed Bf 110's in the same area. But No. 310 Squadron was to lose two Hurricanes although both pilots baled out and sustained only minor injuries, and two others were damaged and managed to return to base. No. 111 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) also had two of their aircraft damaged with no loss of life. The German bomber formation and their escorts were over the area between Clacton and Colchester when they were intercepted by RCAF No. 1 Sqdrn Northolt (Hurricanes). At this stage, some of the Bf 109s had turned back, but Fighter Command still had to contend with the Bf 110s as well as the Do 17s. Soon, the German formation turned nor' west and it became apparent that the target was Debden. With Nos. 56 and 111 Squadrons still involved, the three squadrons managed to steer many of the Dorniers off their intended bombing run. One of the Do 17s fell to the guns of a Hurricane of RCAF No. 1 Squadron, then another Bf 110 went down in flames crashing at Great Bentley, believed shot down by P/O P.J.Simpson of No. 111 Squadron. RCAF No. 1 Sqdrn was making its first combat fighting with 11 Group. Unfortunately the first Canadian fighter pilot serving with a Canadian fighter squadron during WW2 was killed in action over SE England. Flying Officer R.L.Edwards of No.1 Sqn. (later No.401 Sqn RCAF) of Coburg, Ontario was shot down at approximately 1530hrs by a Dornier Do 17 of KG 2 following the attack on Debden, his Hurricane crashing near Thaxted, Essex. F/O Edwards was buried in Brookwood Military Cemetery. The RCAF No. 1 Sqdrn commander S/L E.McNab was hit by return gunfire from a Do 17 and returned to base, severly wounded. Although all three Fighter Command squadrons managed to disperse the bombers, six Do 17s managed to get through to Debden and released about 100 bombs doing considerable damage to the landing area, one hangar, the sergeants mess, the transport and equipment depots and the NAAFI. Water mains and the electricity were hit and were out of action for a short period and it is reported that six people at the airfield were killed. Although Hornchurch and North Weald may have been targets, they were spared on this day.

At the same time as combat operations were taking place inland from Harwich, RAF No. 85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 615 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) intercepted the formation that was approaching up the Thames. Interception was made just off the coast near Margate. A number of Bf 109s were shot down over North Kent, and the Do 17s fared no better. One of them being shot down by newly promoted P/O G.Allard of No. 85 Squadron. The Dornier, with both engines stopped, decided he could make a wheels up landing at nearby Rochford aerodrome, a satellite of Hornchurch. P/O Allard followed him all the way down. The Dornier slid on its belly almost the whole length of the grass covered airfield before coming to rest. "_Now that's one way to give yourself up_" was one remark from the ground staff at Rochford, "_door to door service, things must be bad over the other side_." as they waved at P/O Allard's Hurricane who flew overhead, then went back to join in the rest of the action.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 25, 2010)

_(26 August 1940 continued....)_

The third operation, directed against Portsmouth and Southampton started in the late afternoon and was the last large-scale day raid mounted by Luftlotte 3. About 50 He-111s of I. and II./KG 55 were escorted by 100 plus Bf 109s and Bf 110s from V(Z)./LG 1, JG 27, JG 2 and JG 53. The main force skirts the Isle of Wight and makes for Portsmouth at about 15,000, evading British fighters which have been wrongly positioned by their controllers. 11 Group released RAF No. 43 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 602 Squadron Westhampnett (Spitfires), while 10 Group released RAF No. 234 Squadron Middle Wallop (Spitfires), RAF No.152 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires) and RAF No.213 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes). The weather was by now closing in with low cloud covering much of southern England, and a number of squadrons failed to make contact with the enemy. Those that did, managed to cause havoc amongst the Heinkel's dispersing them in different directions. Coupled with the fact that the weather situation was getting worse, the bombers turned back towards home with most of them jettisoning their bomb loads over the Channel. Three He 111s were shot down, and two, crippled by accurate gunfire from British fighters limped home in damaged condition. Four Bf109s were claimed for the loss of four fighters and three pilots wounded. Some bombs dropped on Portsmouth damaging Langstone Harbour, destroying Fort Cumberland and causing a fire at Hilsea gas works. 

Then the bombers target the dockyard, which suffered badly. The destroyer 'Acheron' has her stern blown off. Two ratings were killed and three crew were wounded. The destroyer 'Bulldog', moored alongside, was damaged by splinters. Her commanding officer, Cdr J P Wisden, was mortally wounded and dies on the 29th. The French torpedo boat 'Flore's' bridge was damaged by falling masonry. HMS Vernon, the Navy's mine and torpedo centre, was also badly damaged 

Near Portsmouth Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 gained his thirteenth victory when he destroyed a RAF Spitfire in the afternoon. But the ‘Richthofen’ Geschwader lost the Bf 109 of Lt. Walter Hoffmann of 7./JG 2 who failed to return from a sortie and was listed as missing in action. II./JG 53 fared no better. II./JG 53 was unable to score a single kill while the Gruppe lost 2 pilots over the Channel and a third was fished out of the sea north of Cherbourg. I./JG 53 was credited with 4 kills including 2 Spitfires for Hptm. Hans-Karl Mayer at the expense of one pilot killed when his Bf 109E crashed near Portsmouth.

Later, an escorted rescue He 59 was shot down south of the Isle of Wight. 

Losses: Luftwaffe, 41; RAF, 31. It had been a bad day for both sides - a day when fierce combat was the order of the day, although Fighter Command fared better than the Luftwaffe. German fighter pilots blamed the new order of flying close to the bombers as the main reason that some forty-one German aircraft had been shot down. They claimed that they lost the element of surprise, and were spotted by British fighters as soon as the bomber formation was seen. The German High Command had for some time had reservations of these daylight bombing raids on British airfields and naval bases even though the new strategy was working, and this latest mission failure from Hugo Sperles Luftflotte 3 was now to prove a point and subsequently major daylight raids were suspended indefinitely. This suspension was to last about four weeks.

Ireland's neutrality, assiduously preserved by the premier, Eamon de Valera, had not won immunity from German air raids. Luftwaffe bombs hit four places in County Wexford today, 130 miles from the border. Two of the three young women killed while working at a creamery were sisters. The third, a blast victim, was found sitting at a dining table, knife and fork in hand. The motive for the attack was not clear, for Ireland, like neutral Spain and Turkey, was an intelligence goldmine for the Germans. Dublin's representative in Berlin protested.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 26, 2010)

*27 August 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Most of Britain awoke to a very damp and gloomy morning. There was rain in central and eastern England with some cloud in the Channel and haze over Dover Straits. Weather conditions restricted air activity for most of the day. Several reconnaissance raids were made during the morning along the south coast areas and Fighter Command intercepted a few without loss. Many of the pilots, as they did so often on seeing wet and waterlogged airfields, breathed a sigh of relief as they knew that once again they could possibly take things easy, even if was for four or five hours.

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park took advantage of the wet and miserable morning to make contact with his controllers, a meeting that also had Air Vice Marshal Sholto Douglas present. The main subject was his disagreement with Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory regarding the sending up of a possible three squadrons of fighters flying as a wing, to intercept large numbers of enemy formations. Leigh-Mallory's persistence in the 'Big Wings' was that at least Fighter Command could meet the enemy with an equal or near equal number of fighters instead of the tactics used by Keith Park and supported by Dowding in sending up a minimum number of fighters where at all times there were outnumbered by anything up to three to one. Park told the meeting that not only was it not feasible to put up large formations of fighters, but greater time would have to be taken in the initial stages of forming them up. He gave the instance of the previous day, when he asked Leigh-Mallory for assistance in intercepting a Dornier formation coming in from the east, and to intercept before they got to the 11 Group airfields east of London. Park continued, that by the time that Leigh-Mallory had got the 12 Group squadrons airborne, the raiders had got through to Debden, caused damage by bombing and were on the way home by the time that the Duxford squadrons had arrived. 12 Groups reaction to Parks comments was that they were informed far too late, and by the time that the Duxford squadrons had arrived at the vectored position, they could not find the enemy. Keith Park questioned this, stating that four squadrons were already managing to hold the enemy between Clacton and Harwich, but as a precautionary measure, called for 12 Group assistance in giving protection to the airfields east of London should the event happen that some of the bombers may get through. Park went on to say that the enemy had twice the distance to travel than the 12 Group fighters, were slower than the 12 Group fighters, yet could not give Debden the protection needed. He compared this with 310 Squadron, a single squadron dispatched from Duxford that managed to intercept the enemy before it had reached the Essex coast.

The weather started to clear by midday, and the Luftwaffe moved more Bf 109 units to the coast at Calais with the intention here of providing the bombers of Luftflotte 2 with even greater numbers as escorts than ever before. But still only restricted daylight activity.

A lone Do 17 was detected over the Channel south of Plymouth and RAF No. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop (Hurricanes) sent a flight to intercept. The Dornier was spotted and one of the Hurricanes managed to shoot it down and it crashed at Tavistock in Devon. The aircraft was on a photo-reconnaissence flight. Spitfires of RAF No.222 Squadron made contact with another Do 17 on reconnaissance.

Around 1200hrs, Radar picked up a German formation coming across the Channel from the direction of Cherbourg. 10 Group released two squadrons to intercept just as they reached the coast. Spitfires of RAF No. 152 Squadron were scrambled from Warmwell and engaged a Ju 88 off Portland. Maj. Wolfgang Schellmann from Stab./JG 2 subsequently shot one of the Spitfires down to reach double digits with 10 kills while two other Ju 88s were damaged, one of them crashing on landing back at its base.

By nightfall, Do 17s made a bombing run on the west and the south-west of England, again, 10 Group sent up three squadrons who managed to destroy three of the bombers, the others scattered and returned home. The only casualties in this combat were the three Dorniers. Shortly after 2300 hours the Luftwaffe raided the Bristol area with two formations of bombers. Near midnight eleven Do 17s of KGr 606 bombed military targets while Heinkels of III./KG 27 dropped bomb loads on Bristol. Three small HEs were dropped in Hull, the Lodge and Maternity Home in Hedon Road were destroyed and Seward Street goods station damaged. Ofw. Merbach of Stab I./NJG 2 claimed a Hurricane over Grimsby at 21:30.

At Port Clarence in County Durham, there were several HE dropped in this area. A year later a girl drowned in one of the craters. Several reports of parachute troops descending in West Hartlepool and Stockton districts were received but no trace was found. Church bells were rung at Norton on the instruction of the Home Guard. An air raid stopped play at Lord's cricket ground.

A Blenheim from RAF No.219 Squadron based at Catterick, Yorkshire undershot the runway in a sudden rainstorm at 01.45. Sergeants H.F. Grubb and S. Austin were both unhurt and the aircraft was found to be repairable. A Spitfire from No 72 Squadron based at Acklington airfield in Northumberland, was severely damaged in a landing accident, the pilot was unhurt but the aircraft was a write-off.

Fighter Command continued to move squadrons around. RAF No. 603 Squadron moved from Turnhouse to Hornchurch and were replaced at Turnhouse by RAF No. 65 Squadron who moved from Southend. RAF No. 32 Squadron moved from Biggin Hill to Acklington as RAF No. 79 Squadron moved from Acklington to Biggin Hill.

*GERMANY*: NBBS extols the British public to horsewhip Churchill and his underlings and to burn their property. They then deny that the station (NBBS) is German. _'The fact that we are British must be clear from every word we broadcast.'_

*WESTERN FRONT*: Hptm. Hans “Gockel” von Hahn of JG 53 is appointed Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 3.

Oblt. Helmut Wick of JG 2 was awarded the Ritterkreuz after having achieved twenty victories against the Allies.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 27, 2010)

*28 August 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The Luftwaffe concentrates on destroying RAF No. 11 Group airfields in southeast England. Two heavily escorted bomber formations crossed the Kent coast just after 09:00 hours after the Eastchurch, Rochford and Kent area. He-111s of II and III./KG 53 and Do 17s of I./KG 3 escorted by Bf109s of I and III./JG 51 proceeded north near Sandwich. Fighter Command again "scrambled" 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes), 85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes), 615 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) and poor 264 Squadron Hornchurch (Defiants) who were using the satellite station of Manston and were preparing to disband and withdraw the squadron up north to Kirton on Lyndsay. They were unable to prevent the Dorniers from reaching Eastchurch and Heinkels from raiding Rochford. Eastchurch was seriously damaged with two Battles destroyed and two damaged. Eight RAF fighters and six pilots were lost for five enemy aircraft brought down. Made a prisoner of war was Arthur Dau of JG 51, who, with seven victories, ended his career on English soil. JG 51’s Kommodore, Major Mölders downs two more Allied warplanes, a Spitfire and a Curtiss, bringing his score to twenty-nine. RAF No. 264's Defiants which were involved in combat over the area proved no match for the Luftwaffe fighters and three of the twelve that were originally scrambled were shot down. 

A second raid some two hours later by Do17s from 1./KG 2 attacked the southern Essex airfield at Rochford for the second time that day but did little damage and the airfield remained operational. Rochford had some buildings damaged but the bombers failed to catch 264 Squadron on the ground. Spitfires of 54 Squadron positioned at 30,000 feet dived upon the escort, Flt. Lt. Deere claiming a Bf109, Flt. Lt. George Gribble another at the end of an 11-aircraft line, and Sqn. Ldr Leathart a Dornier. In a quite astonishing chase of a Bf109 Gribble and Norwell ended the fight so low that Gribble's shooting killed a cow. After landing he discovered pieces of a tree lodged in his Spitfire, Deere was less fortunate and had to bail out. As the raiders were approaching Rochford, Hurricanes on No.1 Squadron downed a Do17 of 6./KG 3 on Rochford aerodrome, its crew becoming PoWs.

The third raid was a fighter sweep over South East corner of Kent and into the Thames Estuary at 25,000 ft and above. Seven Gruppen of Bf 109s from JG 2, JG 3, JG 26, JG 27, JG 51, JG 54 and Epr.Gr 210 were used in the attacks. The battle resulted in a wasteful fighter-versus-fighter encounter with 16 aircraft lost on both sides. Park told his Squadron Controllers in no uncertain terms that unless these enemy formations were proving a threat, they must not allow valuable fighter squadrons to be drawn into fighter to fighter combat.

Some of the losses for the Luftwaffe included Oblt. Hans-Theodore Griesebach of 2./JG 2, who failed to return from the mission and was listed as missing. A Ju 88A-1 from I./KG 54 crashed near Dieppe, France on the return flight from England. Eight victory Experte Georg Beyer of JG 26 was shot down and captured, ending his career as a prisoner of the Allies. From JG 3, Hans-Herbert Landry was shot down and severely injured. The five victory Experte was made a prisoner of war.

Liverpool was now selected for the first really heavy raid of the war. 160 Luftwaffe bombers including Heinkels of KG 27, Ju 88s of LG 1 and Ju 88s of KGr 806 were sent to raid the harbour at Liverpool along with twenty-three Do 17s from KGr 606 that attack the Bristol area during the night. The attack was not successful as few bombs fell on the cities. At Avonmouth (Bristol) the Shell Mex installations and the National Smelting Co. works were hit, Coventry shops and houses were damaged and in Altrincham (Cheshire) a 50,000 gallon oil tank at the Anglo-American oil depot caught fire. Other raiders from Luftflotten 2 and 3 attacked other major Midland cities.

Losses: Luftwaffe 31: Fighter Command 17.

During the afternoon, Winston Churchill was visiting Dover and was staying at Dover Castle. It was while he was there, the air raid siren sounded and Churchill and his entourage watched as fighters clashed with German bombers over the town. A spokesman for the War Office stated later:


> "_It was while we were at Dover, that we saw the approaching German bombers and just a short distance away they were met by British fighters. Mr Churchill seemed mesmerized as the air battle took place almost overhead. We saw maybe two German bombers crash into the sea and some fighters with smoke trailing from them as they spiraled away from the main dogfight. Later that afternoon, we had to drive to Ramsgate and on the way we saw a smoldering aircraft in a field, and Churchill asked the driver to pull off the road and get as close to the wreckage as he could. There was firemen, soldiers and ARP men standing around and I walked with the Prime Minister towards the aircraft. Even though I warned Mr Churchill about the dangers of being out in the open during an air raid, he said that he must have a look, and when he saw the tangled mess he said 'Dear God, I hope it isn't a British plane.' He was reassured that it was not." _


Another gift from the Luftwaffe falls into British hands. A Gotha Go 145 communications aircraft lifted off from its base in Cherbourg for a flight to Strasbourg. Navigation problems caused the pilot to fly over the Channel and eventually land the plane on a racecourse in southern England. Captured by the British the plane was soon part of the inventory of RAF No. 1426 Captured Enemy Aircraft Flight, also known as the 'Rafwaffe', and used for evaluation.

*GERMANY*: The second night attack of the war by the British against Berlin succeeds in causing the first causalities in the German capital. Ten civilians were killed and twenty-nine injured in the city that Reichsmarschall Göring assured would never be bombed by enemy aircraft.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 29, 2010)

*29 August 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The day was quiet in the morning, with airfield attacks in the south and south-east later in the day. Some 700 Luftwaffe fighters made provocative sweeps to which RAF did not respond. Luftflotte 2 mounted a massive fighter sweep over Kent with 560-plus Bf 109's and 150-plus Bf 110`s from Jagdfliegerftuhrer 1 and 2, but defending fighters failed to make contact. The Chief of Kesselring's fighter organisation then claimed unlimited fighter superiority had been achieved.

During the morning, hostile aircraft reconnoitred the Guildford area and Weymouth Bay and a small raid attacked Warmwell Aerodrome.

At 15:10 hours, nine Luftwaffe aircraft flew over Dover towards Tangmere; this raid was immediately followed by about 170 aircraft which appeared to head for Biggin Hill. These raids were intercepted and driven off, four aircraft being destroyed by our fighters and one anti-aircraft. Strong hostile patrols were maintained off Calais until 1725 hours.

At 16:00 hours, a small raid attacked a RAF establishment in the Scilly Isles causing little damage. Sgt J.H.Mortimer 'Cocke-Sparrow' Ellis from RAF No 85 Squadron was on patrol at 16:00hrs when he was shot down by a Bf 109. He baled out of his Hurricane (L1915) unhurt. His aircraft crashed at Ashburnham, Kent. Sgt F.R.Walker-Smith of RAF No 85 Squadron was wounded in the foot at 16:30hrs. His Hurricane I (V7350) was shot at by a Bf 109 over the Sussex coast and he baled out.

At 1725 hours, a raid of twenty plus aircraft passed over North Foreland and flew towards Rochester. It was intercepted and four Luftwaffe aircraft were destroyed.

F/Lt Harry Raymond Hamilton, a Canadian of RAF No 85 Squadron was shot down and killed at 18:15 hours. His Hurricane I (V6623) shot down by a Bf 109 near Rye.

P/O Richard H.Hillary from RAF No 603 Squadron was shot down by a Bf 109 at 19:00hrs. He crash landed his Spitfire I (L1021) at Lympne but he was unhurt. Hillary recovered from his wounds and returned to combat but sadly died later flying at night. He wrote a book, 'The Last Enemy' which was one of the best to come from the Second World War.

At 1945 hours Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 downed a Hurricane to bring his score to seven kills. P/O A.G.Wainwright flying with RAF No 151 Squadron baled out of his Hurricane I (P3882) during a routine patrol at 19:40 hours near Basildon, Essex. He broke several ribs on landing.

Dusk raids penetrated East Anglia, main objectives apparently being Debden and Duxford, but from 2300 hours onwards, there was singularly little activity east of a line Brighton to Flamborough Head until 0230 hours when fresh raids appeared along the East Coast, apparently minelaying, but a few crossing inland.

He 111 bombers of I./KG 55, Ju 88s of III./LG 1 and Heinkels of I./KG 27 attacked Liverpool, when some houses were demolished and damage caused to electricity and water mains. Fires were started but soon brought under control. The Heinkels of KG 55 lose two bombers but not from battle. One crashes on take-off from Villacoublay airfield and another at Sens, France when it runs out of fuel returning from the mission. The only other aircraft lost is a He 111 from I./KG 27 when it crashes at Fordingbridge.

RAF No. 305 (Polish) Squadron was formed at Bramcote, Nuneaton, Warwickshire, under establishments BC119 for Polish personnel, with an ancillary establishment of British personnel under Air Ministry establishment BC119.

H.Q. No.12 Group advised that RAF No. 307 Squadron was to be equipped with Defiant Aircraft and not Hurricane Aircraft as previously advised. The establishment of aircraft was 16 I E. Battle aircraft. The majority of Polish personnel of this Squadron were “French" Poles. i. e. those who have served with the French Forces prior to the capitulation of that country. In order to assist with training by English methods, a number of “British” Poles. i. e. those trained at Hucknall, were included in the strength.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 17; RAF, 9.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The Bf 110s of Hptm. Horst Liensberger’s V(Z)./LG 1 leave their airbases around Caen and transfer to several airfields at Liegescourt and Crecy-en-Ponthieu.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 29, 2010)

*30 August 1940 Friday
"THE BAD WEEKEND"
UNITED KINGDOM:* This day, Germany launched a total of 1,310 sorties against Britain. It appeared that Kesselring was intent on attacking with everything that he had. Many times over the last few days, fighter sweeps by Bf109s failed to attract Fighter Command into the air as Park was not going to be drawn into unnecessary fighter combat. So Kesselring sent over numbers of bombers, working in conjunction with the Bf109s. He was adamant that somehow he would get the RAF fighters into the air.

Despite the fine weather of the morning period, the only raids were on shipping in the Thames Estuary. These shipping strikes had been left alone for the last couple of weeks and Fighter Command regarded them as once again being lures to attract RAF fighters into the air. 100+ German aircraft arrived in the Deal-Dungeness area at 07:36 hours, Do 17s escorted by Bf110s of ZG 76 and heading for a convoy sailing from the Thames at Methil. Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Squadron and Spitfires of RAF No. 54 Squadron engaged the Do 17s and bf 110s over the Thames Estuary.

The Bf 109s of JG 26 made a freie jagd over the English countryside in the morning that failed to provoke a response. The first sign of major activity occurred at 10:30 hours when a formation was picked up off the coast near Cape Griz Nez. Three separate groups were detected which turned out to be separate formations of He 111s which in all totaled about 120 aircraft. The Luftwaffe were now, for the first time using a smaller number of Bf109s as close escort, and with a larger number flying at about 25,000 feet.

In an effort to slow the loss rate, the RAF had restricted its fighters from engaging the escorting Messerschmitts of bomber formations, waiting until the escorts were low on fuel and turned to leave the area before attacking. AVM Park also instituted the famed cry "Tally Ho" to help the British fighters know where attacking bombers and fighters were and at what strength instead of spreading his forces too thin. It took awhile before this actually worked with some fighter pilots shouting out the cry but without giving strength, altitude and course. Because of this, no less than nineteen Gruppen of bombers were able to attack RAF airfields around Kent and the Thames Estuary for two hours unmolested, causing serious destruction. One direct hit on the power supply line took out the radar stations at Dover, Rye, Pevensey, Foreness, Beachy Head and Whitstable and they they were off the air for a critical three hours. Biggin Hill was attacked twice by 109s and Ju88s within a few hours and major damage was done with the result that some 40 people were killed. Kenley, Shoreham, Tangmere and Rochford were also targeted where the story was much the same. Hangars, buildings and the airfields themselves receiving devastating damage.

Fighter Command was finally forced to get some of its fighters into the air. RAF No.43 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes), 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes), 85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes), 111 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 603 Squadron Hornchurch Spitfires), 610 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) and 616 Squadron Kenley (Spitfires) were released by Fighter Command cope with the incoming formations. Park dispatched his squadrons in two waves, as the German bombers were coming across the Channel in three separate formations. RAF Nos. 43, 79, 253, and 603 Squadrons went in first to intercept the first wave of bombers just prior to them reaching the English coast between Deal and Folkestone. 85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes) met up with the leading Heinkels and decided on a head on attack.

The skies over the south coast became a pattern of vapour trails as some of the RAF fighters got tangled up with 109s. Most of the fighters tried in vain to straffe the bombers, but it all became a melee of all sorts. The casualties started to fall from the sky, Spitfires, Bf 109s, Hurricanes, Heinkels and Dorniers. Many were badly shot up, others just collided into each other.


> "_I saw his contortions, then I saw him straighten and fly straight into the German aircraft; both crashed and Percy was killed. I was close enough to see his letters, as other pilots must have been and who also confirmed this incident, which in itself caused me to realize my young life and its future, if any, had jumped into another dimension_."


Sgt. G.Pallister RAF Nos. 249 43 Squadrons on P/O P.Burton ramming a German aircraft.

South African pilot, P/O E.J.Morris went into a head on attack with a Heinkel for the first time in his career. RAF No. 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes) engaged a formation of Heinkel 111s and while some peeled off to exhert their attack from above, many decided to make a head on attack. Morris was one of them. He pressed the firing button, banked sharply only for the Heinkel to ram the underbelly of his Hurricane. His aircraft was cut to pieces, but Morris, still strapped in his seat managed to pull the ripcord and parachuted to safety. His injuries were just a broken leg...and a bit of confidence. He said afterwards;


> "_I thought they were supposed to break formation if we pressed home a frontal attack_".


He was told that;


> '_...not if the pilot is dead, you are supposed to make allowances for that'_.


Morris replied;


> "_Then how the hell are you supposed to know if he is dead or not?"_


The way you did, he was politely told.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 29, 2010)

_(30 August 1940 continued....)_

At 11:15 hours the Observer Corps further reported that 40 plus Heinkel He111s and 30 Do17s escorted by 100 plus Bf109s and Bf110s were approaching the coast. By now, the first wave of bombers had pushed on over Ashford still in combat with the British fighters. With the first wave of He111s and Do17s crossing the Kent coast, what radar was working was picking up sightings that stretched right back to the French coast. AVM Park at Fighter Command Group HQ decided to place nearly sixteen squadrons at readiness with two squadrons from 12 Group sent in to give cover to Biggin Hill and Kenley. But by the time that they managed to take off and gain height, the German bomber formation was well over Kent and heading towards London. The He111s and the Do17s broke into two formations, and once again Park was quick to realize that his Sector Stations were under attack once more. One eyewitness said of this day, that no matter where you looked over Kent, Surrey or South London, you could see nothing but bombers and fighter planes fighting it out.

During this period of combat, one pilot stood out for his courageous actions. Squadron Leader Tom Gleave, flying a Hurricane of RAF No. 253 Squadron, scrambled from Kenley with two other pilots, F/L George Brown and P/O Douglas Francis. As they gained height above Maidstone, Gleave caught sight of a massive formation of Bf109s. The Hurricanes dived and attacked directly at the Bf109s without loss to themselves. It was during the resulting dogfights, that Sqn. Ldr. Gleave successfully shot down 5 Bf109s. 

With squadrons engaging the first wave of bombers, and also the second wave, reports were still coming in to Fighter Command that more formations were over the Channel and heading for the Kent coast. Park had no option but to put all his squadrons into the air. Two squadrons that had been covering Biggin Hill were moved forward into the attack, and Park called on 12 Group to send squadrons down covering Biggin Hill and Kenley. Once again, Biggin Hill was hit, the two squadrons from 12 Group failing to sight the Ju88s coming in from the south. Many of the bombs fell wide and the town of Biggin Hill suffered as did the village of Keston. Kenley suffered much the same fate with many buildings hit and many stationery wounded aircraft on the ground receiving further damage. RAF No.79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes) along with 74 Squadron Hornchurch (Spifires) were pulled back to guard the aerodromes of Biggin and Kenley because once again, the 12 Group squadrons had failed to show. Two sections of Hurricanes tried to keep the Bf109s occupied, while two sections engaged the bombers. As well as Biggin Hill and Kenley suffering badly in the raid, the airfields of Croydon and Detling were also hit. 

Again Keith Park was on the phone to 12 Group asking;


> '_...where in the hell were your fighters that were supposed to have protected my airfields?"_


The answer was that the 12 Group fighters could not find the enemy, to which Park 'politely' told them that they were not supposed to be going looking for the enemy, they were supposed to be at the South London airfields waiting for the enemy to come to them. 

By 13:15 hours many of the original He111s, Do17s and Bf109s were heading for home, that is, if they hadn't been shot down. The pressure was building and before the squadrons completed their turn-rounds Kesselring dispatched small groups of bombers protected by many fighters and crossing the Kent coast from 13:00 at around 15,000 feet at 20-minute intervals, and largely unplotted because power supplies to radar stations had been cut during the morning raids. This time, their strength was much smaller. Coming in in three waves, they all veered into different direction once over the Kent coastline headed for their own particular target. These attacked the forward airfields of Hawkinge and Manston.

For over two hours the Luftwaffe roamed over south-east England. Five fighter squadrons responded, among them RAF No. 222 Squadron, which was to operate three times during the day and have eight of its Spitfires put out of use, lose five, have a pilot killed and two injured. Twelve of 222 Squadron's Spitfires on patrol at 16,000 feet over Lympne sighted 15 escorted He-111s near Canterbury and as they attacked were set upon by the Messerschmitts. They claimed a Bf 110 damaged but P/O Asheton was forced to land on the obstructed Bekesbourne airfield, Sergeant Baxter had to put down at Eastchurch and P/O Carpenter baled out of P9378 near Rochford. RAF No. 43 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) engaged the bombers. Although the airfield received minor damage, all the bombers made just the single run before turning back over the Channel.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 29, 2010)

_(30 August 1940 continued....)_

At around 1600 hours, more waves of heavy German bombers came across the Kent countryside and from the direction of the Thames Estuary. 13 squadrons were scrambled to deal with them. RAF Nos.56 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes), 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 501 Squadron Gravesend (Hurricanes) and 603 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) were among the squadrons dispatched to intercept. Many of these squadrons had been in combat practically non stop since 10:30 hours. 19 Gruppen in total headed for Hawker's at Slough, the Hurricane and Spitfire repair centres at Oxford, for Luton and three vital airfields - North Weald, Kenley and Biggin Hill. One small formation, intercepted by only one squadron, managed to put Detling out of use for 15 hours. Now for the first time, AVM Park - for the second time this day having every one of his squadrons airborne - called in 12 Group and this time requested them to engage in combat and not just protect 11 Group airfields. One of the squadrons to be sent down in the combat area was RAF No. 242 Squadron Duxford (Hurricanes) led by S/L Douglas Bader who had just brought his squadron down from Coltishall that morning. Bader, had been longing for action for months, but up until now had not seen any, with the exception of intercepting a lone aircraft while on patrol. But according to Bader;


> "...._that is not action, my twelve Hurricanes against fifteen or so of theirs, that's what I call action!"_


So if Bader was calling fifteen enemy aircraft 'action', then he was now going to be thrown right into it, because, being vectored close to North Weald there were seventy enemy aircraft to be met. Led by Bader (P3061) they tackled raid X33, a diamond formation of KG 1s He 111s which had already braved 54 rounds of heavy AA fire, which shot down two.

Around 16:10 hours, 20 He-111s of II./KG 1 escorted by Bf110s flew across Southend and then North Weald bound for Luton's industrial area. Although some of the German raiders dropped their loads outside the city of Luton, despite the efforts from the Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 1, 56, 242 and 501 Squadrons - Nos. 1 and 56 each destroying a Heinkel - , many more continued on and dropped bombs on Vauxhall, believing it to be a plane parts factory. The major factories in Luton made women's hats and truck parts. The Vauxhall Motor Works at Luton was hit resulting in over fifty-three people killed and one hundred and forty injured. No public warning had sounded and horrific scenes followed the destruction of the factory's main internal stairway. 

For the second time that day, Biggin Hill was bombed and almost put out of action. Detling airfield was the first to get hit by at least fifty HE bombs. Oil tanks were hit and set ablaze, the main electricity cable was hit and cut the power to all buildings and with hangars and roadways cratered it was anticipated that the airfield would be out of action for at least two days. Nine Ju88 bombers managed to get though the British defences and took everybody by surprise and struck Biggin Hill with a low level bombing attack dropping 1000 lb bombs causing mayhem. The transport yard was destroyed, storerooms, the armoury and both officers and sergeants messes were severely damaged, two hangars were wrecked earlier in the day and now another hanger was almost flattened, and the telephone and communication lines were severed, gas and water mains were ruptured. Casualties amounted to thirty-nine personnel killed and thirty five injured. 

It had been a busy day for Fighter Command, over 22 squadrons had been in action for most of the day, many of them doing up to four sorties. But as night fell, there was to be no let up. 

Liverpool was again raided by 130 plus bombers of the Luftwaffe. He 111s of II. and III./KG 27, Ju 88s of I. and III./LG 1 and Ju 88s of II./KG 51 attacked the city with ten of the bombers dropping their loads on Bristol at night. Do17s and He111s made raids on London and Portsmouth, Manchester was bombed as was Worcester. The bombers of 8 Staffel of KG 55 lost a He 111 to anti-aircraft fire on another night mission to Liverpool. It crashed returning to base at Sens, France. But the Kampfgeschwader lost several aircrews to mishaps rather than battle. Two He 111s from 5 and 6 Staffeln collided during a formation flight near Paris and crashed killing all the crews. Another pair of He 111s, this time from 8 Staffel and the Erganzungsstaffel of KG 55 collided near Versailles killing most of their crews.

At 0200 hours 100 incendiary bombs were dropped on Hawarden Aerodrome, slightly damaging one aircraft.

It had been one of the worst days for the RAF, 39 aircraft were destroyed, eight of these were Spitfires from 222 Squadron Hornchurch. Over 50 RAF personnel had been killed (39 of these at Biggin Hill) with nearly 30 seriously injured. Some 200 civilians had been killed in the air raids and along with the radar stations of Pevensey, Beachy head and Foreness sustaining damage, Biggin Hill was made virtually unoperational, and the control of its sector was transferred over to Hornchurch. On the German side, a total of 41 fighters and bombers had been destroyed. But they too, during the hours of darkness felt the brunt of an Bomber Command offensive as well. More that 80 Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys attack cities in Holland and Belgium. Berlin is attacked by 149 Squadron Bomber Command. 50 Squadron attacked oil refineries near Rotterdam. Of these, only four RAF bombers are lost. 

RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn entered the battle for the first time. In the course of a training interception with six Blenheims in the afternoon, ‘B’ Flight contacted with some 60 German bombers, 60 fighters and British fighters having a running battle near Hatfield. F/O Paszkiewicz brought down one Do. 17. (Destroyed) while the rest of the fighters escorted the Blenheims safely back to Northolt.

In the morning battles Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 brought his score to fourteen with the destruction of an RAF Hurricane near London. Later at 1800 hours he destroyed a Hurricane and a Spitfire over Gouldhurst to bring his score to sixteen victories. But his Geschwader lost several Messerschmitts during the day including those of Ofw. Harbauer of II./JG 2 and Uffz. Rieh of III./JG 2. Another pilot from II./JG 2 was shot down and captured, becoming a prisoner of war.

In a H.Q. Fighter Command letter dated 29th August, 1940 addressed to H.Q. No.12 Group advised that RAF No. 307 (Polish) Squadron was to be equipped with Defiant Aircraft and not Hurricane Aircraft as previously advised.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The personnel of Hptm. Ensslen’s II./JG 52 moved their Bf 109s from Jever to Husum.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 30, 2010)

*31 August 1940 Saturday
"THE BAD WEEKEND"
UNITED KINGDOM*: The 'Bad Weekend' continued. It was now felt that the Luftwaffe really meant business. The forward airfields of Hawkinge, Lympne and Manston had received considerable damage the day before, but they were regarded as still being operational. The main airfields of Gravesend, Croydon, Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch and Duxford also had received serious damage. Biggin Hill had the day before, made a statement that they were temporarily out of action. But with an all out effort by the ground crews (and some pilots) overnight and in the early hours of the morning, they declared themselves operational.

At 07:55 hours radar picked up one raid over the Thames Estuary, another plot was picked up over the Channel and heading towards the Dover and Dungeness area and within a few minutes it was confirmed that three formations were approaching from the Thames Estuary while the fourth was approaching over Dover. The objectives were the North Weald, Debden, Duxford and East Kent areas. AVM Park, realizing that he had dispatched his fighters far too late the previous day, was taking no chances this time. Two squadrons were "scrambled" and vectored to the Margate and Thames Estuary area. This first wave of enemy aircraft was identified as Bf109s and flying at some 25,000 feet where their performance was better than that of the Spitfire. Park sent out the order for them to return to their bases as he was not wanting to involve fighter to fighter combat. RAF No.253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) received the message and headed for home. But the other squadron, RCAF No.1 Squadron did not receive the message and got caught up with the Bf109s and three of their aircraft were destroyed. F/O G.C.Hyde baled out of his aircraft but sustained severe burns, F/Lt V.B.Corbett suffered the same fate. Realizing that Fighter Command was not to be tempted, the Bf109s decided to attack the barrage balloons around the Dover area. The Bf109s shot down all (23) of the Dover Balloon Barrage.

Three more waves of enemy aircraft had been detected by radar approaching the Thames Estuary again shortly after 08:00 hours. The Observer Corps reported them to be a formation of 200+ enemy bombers, which consisted of a mixture of He111s and Do17s escorted by 60 Bf110s. Keith Park made the decision to "scramble" 13 squadrons from 11 Group in the London area, leaving only two or three squadrons to guard the city. But reaching the mouth of the Thames, the German aircraft broke and split into several formations, each heading for a separate target. North Weald was hit and sustained considerable damage, Hornchurch also received a few hits, although the RAF fighters here were doing a swell job at keeping most of the bombers away from the airfield.

A formation of 40 Do17s headed towards Duxford with the escorting Bf110s as protection. 12 Group was taken by surprise and the Group Controller there sent out an urgent appeal to 11 Group for assistance. AVM Park responded immediately and diverted RAF No.111 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes) to make an interception. RAF No. 111 Squadron flew due north-east in an effort to cut off the formation, then turning south met the Dornier Do17s head on. They managed to scatter the formation but could only destroy only one bomber.

With most of the RAF fighters holding the bombers at bay around the London area, and RAF No.111 Squadron already dispersing the other formation from attacking Duxford, it left a third formation completely unopposed at attacking Debden airfield which suffered badly where over 100 bombs fell causing serious damage to three barracks, storerooms and pot-holing the airfield badly. 18 personnel were injured in this attack as well as a number of aircraft parked on the base. The returning Dorniers and Heinkels ran into RAF No.19 Squadron Fowlmere (Spitfires) where two enemy bombers were shot down at the expense of two of the Spitfires. One pilot, F/O J.B.Coward had his aircraft shot up by a Bf109 and had his leg torn off just below the knee, but he managed to bale out and was safely taken to a base hospital.

At 09:00 hours the Luftwaffe launched another attack, this time two waves approached from the Thames Estuary again. One Dornier formation diverted to Eastchurch where the airfield received minor damage, as did Detling airfield which was attacked by Bf110s. By this time, Fighter Command was feeling the strain of many days of hard combat. Fighters were being lost in greater numbers than they were being replaced, but what was more important was the fact that the pilots were becoming tired. Many were going up on four sorties a day and at the moment with 11 Group under constant attack they were not in a position to be given the rest that was so badly needed.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 30, 2010)

_(31 August 1940 continued......)_

At mid-day 100 bombers with a heavy escort was detected coming across the coast at Dungeness. Breaking into two separate formations, both seemed to be taking different routes towards London. Confirmation came that one of the formations consisted of Dornier Do17s while the other was made up of He111s which also split into two more formations. In this attack, Biggin Hill was again attacked just after RAF No.79 Squadron (Hurricanes) was "scrambled". Hornchurch "scrambled" RAF No.603 Squadron (Spitfires) which had just recently come down from Scotland. 

The attack on Biggin Hill began with Oblt.Hans von Hahn's JG 3 destroying barrage balloons over the airfield. RAF No.79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) had been ordered to patrol over Biggin Hill and to expect a raid by Heinkels on the airfield again. This time they couldn't get to the bombers because of the strong cover by the fighter escort. Three Bf109s were shot down, during the fierce combat but the bombers made it through and again Biggin Hill suffered considerably. Further extensive damage was done to hangars and buildings, the married quarters and the officers' mess were bombed and the operations block received a direct hit, extinguishing the lights and filling the rooms with acrid fumes, dust and smoke from the fires which broke out. The airfield was cratered so badly that squadrons that had previously taken off, had to be diverted to Kenley and Croydon. Now, all the telephone lines at Biggin Hill had been put out of action. 

As Biggin Hill was being attacked, another formation of sixty Dorniers from Oberst Fink's KG 2 attacked the sector station at Hornchurch. RAF No. 603 Squadron was scrambled to protect the airfield. The squadron was still using sections of three planes with Red Section leading and Blue and Green Sections to right and left. The last three machines formed a rearguard section above and behind. The squadron managed to take off before the approaching Dorniers dropped their first bombs. Then the Spitfires of RAF No.54 Squadron were scrambled and they just managed to get airborne and start to gain height before the first of the bombers became visible. It was still quiet when three more Spitfires began to gain speed across the airfield and one by one they cleared the ground almost at the same time as the Dorniers, who were now above, had let their bombs go. As the third flight of three Spitfires left the ground, a bomb exploded just in front of the leading Spitfire being piloted by F/L Alan Deere - who was at a height of about twenty feet and retracting his wheels - throwing the three Spitfires to the ground, destroyed. They all got caught up in the blast of this bomb, all of them being blown in different directions. All three pilots survived but the planes were a total loss. Four Do17s were shot down.

During the afternoon, waves of Bf110s from Epr.Gr 210 came over the coast from Cape Griz Nez and attacked the radar stations once again. Foreness CHL also came under attack, but although damage was caused, it was not enough to put any of them out of action and by nightfall, all radar stations were working as normal. The Observer Corps reported that some 150 plus enemy aircraft crossed the coast between Dover and the Thames Estuary. Fighter Command were to release RAF Nos.85 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes), 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 310 Squadron Duxford (Hurricanes), 501 Squadron Gravesend (Hurricanes) and 601 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes). LG 1 lost five Bf 110s and two Ju 88s in the day's combat.

S/L Tom Gleave of 253 Squadron Kenley, who had the previous day shot down four enemy aircraft in as many minutes was now a casualty himself. When the squadron was scrambled, Tom Gleave led what was left of his squadron, just seven serviceable Hurricanes and attacked a formation of Ju88 bombers. He was just about to return to Kenley, when a Bf109 dived down behind him, then pulled up firing at the Hurricane. Gleaves machine was hit underneath the fuselage and in the tail section. At the same time, the reserve fuel tank burst into flames and some twenty-eight gallons of high octane fuel splashed all over his body. With his clothing alight, and flames licking every part of the cockpit of the Hurricane, he rolled the aircraft over on its back and managed to unbuckle his harness and fall out of the open canopy which luckily was in the locked open position as he had been in the process of preparing to land. With his clothes on fire, he chose not to open his parachute in case the chute caught fire, and fell for at least 2,000 feet before deciding to pull the ripcord. His body had been badly burned, so too his face. His eyelids had practically been melted together and he was falling blind as he heard the closing sound of a Messerschmitt, then the sound of the Merlin engine of a Spitfire followed by the rat-a tat of Browning machine guns, and he knew he was safe as the Bf109 pulled away. He landed in a wood, and with his eyelids now peeled open and his trousers burnt away he saw that his legs had terrible burns with the skin coming away like sheets of wafer thin pieces of paper. His gloves too had been burnt off revealing a pair of skinless hands and bloodstained flesh. 

All available aircraft at Biggin Hill and Hornchurch were scrambled at 15:15 hours as another large formation made its way in from the Thames Estuary. Interceptions were made by Hurricanes of RCAF No. 1 and by RAF Nos. 17, 85, 87 and 151 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 54, 72, 222 and 602 Squadrons over a period of nearly two hours. Hornchurch received only slight damage and one of the personnel was reported killed. But as it had been in the past, heavier attacks seemed more prevalent at Biggin Hill where again the damage was more serious. Eight low flying Dorniers, carrying 1,000 bombs, managed to fly past the Observer Corps undetected, up the Thames towards London, then turned sharply towards Biggin Hill. The operations room was hit and once again the telephone system was out of action. The concrete roof of the ops room caved in and the plotting table was smashed to pieces. Two hangars, the officers mess and a number of workshops were destroyed, as well as concrete runways and roads that had received direct hits. As Dornier bombers swept over Croydon, demolishing hangars and technical buildings, S/L Peter Townsend of RAF No.85 Squadron (Hurricanes) led his squadron off through the smoke and dust against the attackers. Twenty minutes later, after a sharp cut and thrust combat with a swarm of escorting Messerschmitts, his Hurricane was hit. He baled out with injuries.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 30, 2010)

_(31 August 1940 continued......)_

Among the successful German pilots was Kommodore Mölders of JG 51 who downed three British Hurricanes to bring his score to thirty-two. Lt. Erich Meyer of 2./JG 51 was given credit for destroying a British warplane, his first. Lt. Mietusch of 7./JG 26 destroyed a Spitfire over Chelmsford and Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 claimed a Hurricane. His score was now at seventeen kills. A Bf 109 from II./JG 2 was shot down into the sea. The pilot, unhurt from the combat, was finally rescued by the Seenottdienst. 

At night He 111s of I./KG 27 and Ju 88s of KGr 806 returned for a third night mission over Liverpool. Some of the bombers raided the alternative target at Bristol. A shelter was destroyed causing the death of 20 people and there were many other casualties. Bombs fell in the Nelson and also the Clarence Dock, a trawler being hit while in the latter. A raid on Bradford commenced at 2235 hours on 31st August, and concluded at 0300 hours on 1st September. Extensive damage to property and water and gas mains occurred in the centre of the city. Considerable damage was caused to shop property and also a cinema and two large mills, along with the corporation gas works at Birkshaw Lane; other property damaged included dwelling houses and the railway siding signal box. There were many casualties.

The landing ground at Tholthorpe was twice attacked, firstly at 2245 hours on 31st August, and the second at 0230 hours on 1st September. The station was still operational although there was a crater 25 feet deep on the airfield.

The casualties this day were the highest of the Battle of Britain for RAF Fighter Command with thirty-nine aircraft destroyed in combat and fourteen pilots killed. For the Luftwaffe, a total of forty-one aircraft were lost during the day and night. 

In all, it had been a terrible day for the RAF. Since first light, the airfields of 11 Group had been under relentless attack. But the already tired pilots were hanging out, and as one pilot had said;


> ".....this is about as bad as it can get, because after today, it just cannot get any worse."


 By evening, the sun went down closing another month and Fighter Command was taking a rather grim view of the situation. The last couple of days had taken a toll on pilots, including many experienced commanders and now many squadrons were being led by junior officers and even in some cases by non-commisioned officer pilots. Sgt J.H (Ginger) Lacey of RAF No.501 Squadron was one of them. S/L P.W.Townsend of 85 Squadron was another experienced pilot that was a casualty, his place being taken by P/O G.Allard. Sgt A.(Archie) McDowell had his moment of glory when he took command of 602 Squadron. RAF No.151 Squadron had lost six pilots in three days and was now down to twelve pilots to fly ten serviceable aircraft and was eventually withdrawn from 11 Group duties. RAF No.43 Squadron lost two of its commanders and by early September a third, S/L C.B.Hull, a South African was killed. From now on, it seemed that the Royal Air Force was to rely heavily on the young and inexperienced pilots of Fighter Command. 

The German pilots like the British were becoming tired, and by now disillusionment was setting in. They had been promised by German High Command that the attacks on the British Fighter Command would be a swift action, and that to knock them out in the air as well as on the ground would be nothing but a formality. But the Luftwaffe had found that this was not to be so, they felt that on many occasions they were being misinformed by their own intelligence service because they were constantly underestimating the strength both in pilots and aircraft of Fighter Command. They also felt that the RAFs strength as the war progressed was in the skill of the fighter pilot, the young British pilots were learning tactics fast. But, the number of losses in the Luftwaffe was now causing great concern, not only to the German High Command, but to the pilots themselves. Many German fighter pilots had by now grown to "hate' the Channel, and started to call it the 'sewer' because any more than ten minutes spent in combat, then a forced landing in the Channel was inevitable. 

September would decide if an invasion of England would at all be possible. 

Movements within Fighter Command were 610 Squadron (Spitfires) who had been operation out of Biggin Hill were transferred north to Acklington where it was hoped they would indulge in a well earned rest. 72 Squadron (Spitfires) under the command of S/Ldr A.R.Collins moved down from Acklington to Biggin Hill.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Aug 30, 2010)

Well done Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Aug 31, 2010)

*1 September 1940 Sunday
"THE BAD WEEKEND"
UNITED KINGDOM:* The "Bad Weekend" continued as the Luftwaffe resumed its assault on RAF airfields with the bases at Biggin Hill, Detling, Tilbury and Eastchurch heavily attacked. The day held the same usual pattern as did many of the preceding days, quiet early, but at mid morning a build up of German aircraft was detected by the radar stations at Dover, Foreness and Pevensey. The Luftwaffe kept to their standard pattern of sending in a small formation of Bf 109s first as a diversionary, but as usual they were ignored by Fighter Command. These were followed by sixty bombers that consisted of formations of Dornier Do17s and Bf 110s with a fighter escort of Bf 109s at higher altitude.

At 1050 hours the German aircraft crossed the coast near Dover and other raids followed. Just prior to reaching the Kent coast, they broke up into a number of smaller formations, each designated to a different target. Again it was the airfields of Fighter Command that bore the brunt of the Luftwaffe attacks, Eastchurch, Rochford, Detling and once again Biggin Hill. A total of ten British fighter squadrons were given the order to readiness, and once again, it seemed as though 11 Group would be stretched to the limit as the German bombers were heading for four different areas at the same time. By 1100 hours about one hundred and twenty warplanes from Luftflotte 2 were over Kent and the Thames Estuary. Some penetrated to Biggin Hill, Kenley, Gravesend, Hornchurch and North Weald.

Fourteen British fighter squadrons were scrambled and vectored to intercept the German formations as they crossed the coast from Dungeness to Margate, and as others entered the Thames Estuary and headed due west along the River Thames towards London. Fierce dogfights occurred over the eastern half of Kent. Most of these were in separate pockets scattered in different areas. RAF No. 54 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No. 72 Sqd (Spitfires) were vectored towards the Maidstone area. Here, they engaged a formation of Dorniers after they had crossed the coast near Beachy Head. As RAF No. 54 Sqd. intercepted the Dornier formation, they were joined by RAF No.1 Sqd (Hurricanes) while RAF No. 72 Sqd. made their approach on the bombers from the west. As they lined up their attack, they were jumped on by Bf 109s who tore into the squadron with deadly accuracy. A Spitfire from RAF No. 72 Sqd. and a Hurricane from RAF No.1 Sqd. were shot down by fighters from JG 52. Both British pilots were killed.

The sector station at Biggin Hill was again so badly damaged that equipment was moved out into the open so that operations could continue. Returning British fighter squadrons were ordered away from the cratered airfield to Croydon and others. Biggin Hill was again temporarily out of business. Just as the Spitfires and Hurricanes landed and refueled at Croydon, a formation of one hundred and fifty German aircraft headed inland to attack Hawkinge, Lympne, Detling and Biggin Hill again. Hit for the second time in a day, Biggin Hill was completely demolished. Hornchurch was bombed with incendiary bombs at 1140 hours but no damage or casualties occurred.

The dock areas of London now came under attack by the German bombers that had managed to get through the British fighters. The attack on Tilbury demonstrated the ludicrousness of Göring's order of 24 August when three Geschwader of fighters from JG 52, JG 53 and JG 54 were forced to escort only eighteen He 111 bombers of II./KG 1 against the docks and airfield. Considerable damage was done. The railway station was hit and both up and down lines blocked; gas and water mains were broken; the premises of Harland Wolff received a direct hit; dockside buildings and workshops were also affected; a number of private houses were demolished and ten shops damaged. Casualties reported were five dead and 28 injured. During the air battle, Alfred Grislawski of JG 52 and Fw. Werner Stumpf of 7./JG 53 each gained their first kills of the war. One of the German pilots lost was Oblt. Anton Stangl of 5./JG 54 who crashed over England and was taken prisoner. He had five victories with JG 54. Killed was Oblt. Oskar Bauer from III./JG 53.

Another raid at 1105 hours over Gravesend resulted in three houses demolished and fifty damaged. Gas and water mains were fractured and there was slight damage to the gas and electricity works but the production was not affected. Ofw. Erich Rudorffer of 2./JG 2 claimed his thirteenth British aircraft over Dover during this raid.

At 1340 hours some seventy German aircraft crossed the Coast between Dover and Dungeness in the second major raid of the day. A second wave of about eighty aircraft followed. The British fighters of the morning raids had hardly returned to their bases, rearmed and refueled when they were once again placed at readiness as the large formations had been detected coming in over Dover. It was all a carbon copy of the earlier raid and the German bombers again broke into smaller groups with some approaching London over Dover and Ashford while another headed north and came in following the Thames. The first interceptions were made between Folkestone and Hastings but they could do nothing to slow down the advance of the Luftwaffe bombers which were 150 plus strong and consisted of Do17s, Bf 110s and Bf 109s.

Biggin Hill and Kenley were the objectives again. This was now the sixth raid on Biggin Hill in three days. During the day, they had been trying to hold a funeral service at a cemetery just outside the airfield for the fifty or so personnel that were killed in the earlier raids on the station. All the coffins were lined up next to the graves, some were draped with flags, but many were not as there were not enough of them to go round. The service was in progress as the air raid siren sounded. Inside the airfield, everything seemed to be in disaster mode. Hangars were hit, as were mess halls, workshops and the telecommunications system. Bf 110s came in low and bombed with accuracy, Do17s at a higher altitude dropped high explosive bombs. Damage was extensive.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 31, 2010)

_(1 September 1940 continued......)_

The attack continued on to Kenley where Do17s of KG 76 came in low. One of them was shot down by the Hurricanes of RAF No. 84 Sqd. It tried to return towards the coast hoping that it could get back to base, but with both engines in flames the bomber crashed near Dungeness. Three of the crew managed to bale out and were captured, but a fourth was killed when the aircraft crashed. A Bf 110, after completing its bombing run on Biggin Hill, was shot down by P/O P.F. Mayhew of RAF No. 79 Sqd and it exploded as it hit the ground at Brasted, killing both crew on board. Another Bf 110 was attacked by the Hurricanes of RAF No. 85 Sqd. over Biggin Hill. Damaged by machine gun fire, it managed to keep flying. It was finally shot down by P/O C.E. English of RAF No. 85 Sqd. hitting the 110 in its only remaining engine. It made a forced landing at Ham Street where both of the crew were captured.

But the glory experienced by RAF No. 85 Sqd. was to be short lived. Over the Kenley area, as the British tore into the Zerstörers, they were jumped on by a number of Bf 109s from JG 26, cutting the squadron to pieces. Four Hurricanes of RAF No. 85 Sqd. were shot down with all four pilots killed including one who was so severely injured that he died in hospital in February of 1941. Two other RAF squadrons involved, RAF No. 79 and RAF No. 72, lost seven fighters destroyed or badly damaged. Major Adolf Galland of Stab./JG 26 got his twenty-seventh kill. Oblt. Eberhard Henrici of 1./JG 26 claimed two Hurricanes destroyed during the dogfight.

During the air-battles over Kenley, the pilots of JG 26 lost an experienced comrade. Oblt. Josef ‘Jupp’ Bürschgens explained how he ended his flying war career;


> “_I led the 7th Staffel, as I had done frequently over the past several weeks. At 1300 hours we took off from Caffiers. Our mission was to escort a bomber formation in an attack on Kenley, an airfield near London. Flying at about 19,500 feet altitude, we reached the target without being attacked, and were only then engaged by British fighters, which were primarily interested in the bombers and Bf 110s. I was still right beside the bombers when a Spitfire immediately beneath me attacked a circling Bf 110 from behind. It was simple for me to get behind the attacker by a short maneuver. We then had a Bf 110, a Spitfire and a Bf 109 (myself), flying in a row. While the rear gunner fired at the Spitfire and the Spitfire in turn attempted to silence the rear gunner, I found it easy to put a long burst into the Spitfire, which immediately smoked and broke away in a split-S. I had approached very near the 110, whose gunner was firing continuously, and turned away to keep from ramming it. At this moment I felt a blow beside my left foot in the cockpit, and my engine quickly came to a stop. Good Lord! – the Bf 110 gunner, seeing me pointed at him (like the Spitfire), had taken me to be another enemy, and had hit my aircraft_!"


Oblt. Bürschgens crashed near Rye and spent the rest of the war as a prisoner in Canada with ten victories to his war-time credit.

At 1530 hours five raids totaling seventy Luftwaffe aircraft again crossed the Coast between Dover and Dungeness. Their course was the same as the two earlier raids. One of these formations, containing about twenty aircraft, circled on the Coast line but others penetrated towards Maidstone and the Thames Estuary. This time they started to bomb targets along the way. At 1540 hours one formation of Bf 109s dropped bombs on Hawkinge and Lympne airfields while another formation made their attack on Detling and Chatham. No buildings at Hawkinge were damaged and the aerodrome was still serviceable. Bf 110s also decided to strafe the Dover balloon barrage along the way. Two balloons of the Barrage were shot down.

A formation of Do17 bombers headed towards South London and it was at 1730 hours that Biggin Hill realized that they were again to be the target. A direct hit on the operations rooms put them completely out of action. All telephone lines were cut and the Teleprinter Network was destroyed by a single 500lb bomb. One of the workshops was on fire and four Spitfires were destroyed on the ground and the station armory was ablaze. Biggin again was declared unoperational temporarily. Six squadrons of RAF fighters could not stop this final attack, although RAF No. 603 Sqd managed to claim one Bf 109 that crashed at Chilham.

The heavy airbattles in the afternoon saw many scores of the Jagdflieger rise. Oblt. Wilhelm Herget and Oblt. Hans-Joachim Jabs made claims of three British fighters each, flying Bf 110s for 6./ZG 76. Getting a double kill was Oblt. Gustav Rödel of 4./JG 27 to bring his score to eight victories. Other prominent Experten were Hptm. Gerhard Schöpfel of Stab III./JG 26 (14 kills total), Oblt. Hans Philipp of 4./JG 54 (10 kills), Hptm. Günther von Maltzahn of Stab II./JG 53 (5 kills) and Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke of Stab III./JG 53 (4 kills).

German activity at night was much reduced compared with that of the previous nights and the areas attacked were quite different. Only a small number of isolated raids went to the Industrial Midlands. Main raids were confined to three areas only: Kent, Bristol Channel and South Wales and Tyne/Tees. Many early raids were plotted over Kent and into the Thames Estuary. Attacks were on Detling Aerodrome, Dunkirk and Rye. Two attacks were made on Detling Aerodrome at 1630 hours and 2300 hours, with the result that the wireless mast was damaged, Officers' Mess demolished, and the aerodrome became unserviceable.

Four Ju 88s of I./KG 51, six Ju 88s of II./KG 51 and two Ju 88s of III./KG 51 along with nine He 111s of I./KG 55 and ten He 111s of III./KG 55 raided Liverpool and Bristol between the hours of 2100 and 0300 causing little damage as the bombs were scattered from Avonmouth, across Stoke Bishop and the City Centre to Redfield killing nine and injuring fourteen civilians. One of the Heinkels carrying a former Lufthansa employee from Croydon, England was hit as it withdrew across the English coast and crashed in France.

The Naval oil depot at Llandarcy was hit and was reported to be burning so furiously that no action to stop the fire could be taken until daylight. High explosive bombs were dropped at Newton Downs, Porthcawl Aerodrome at 2240 hours. There was damage.

During these and in other operations twenty-five German aircraft were destroyed (plus 24 damaged). British casualties were fifteen aircraft totally destroyed and six pilots killed or missing. The RAF was beginning to feel the loss of its fighters and was on the verge of collapse. The British were suffering badly; they were losing more aircraft than were being produced, which meant that if things continued like this, the resources of Fighter Command would soon be depleted. Pilots, too, were becoming an even more serious issue. Since the Battle of Britain had begun, Dowding had lost some 75% of his squadron commanders and nearly 400 pilots had either been killed or seriously wounded. RAF No 111 Squadron at Croydon and RAF No 151 Squadron at Stapleford were down to just seven pilots each, available for operations while the two Hurricane squadrons at North Weald could count on only two Hurricanes as serviceable. By the evening of 1 September, RAF No 54 Squadron was removed from operations.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The Luftwaffe Staff Operations IA issued an order that listed thirty British factories that were to be destroyed. Each one of these made many vital parts for the manufacture of aircraft. RAF airfields, it stated, were to be continually attacked. But the German plans were still going astray. The Luftwaffe had failed to destroy the Royal Air Force in the two weeks as originally planed. They had also failed to wipe the Royal Air Force from the skies in preparation for the invasion of Britain. The Battle of Britain was now in its 55th day, and it now appeared more than ever that plans were now to be made for an attack on London itself. But some were not convinced that Britain was winning. Luftwaffe pilots were reporting that the British fighter defense was not as intense as it had been previously. Pilots attached to 11./KG 1 on reporting after a mission over the dockland areas of East London officially placed in their report that;


> _'Only slight enemy fighter resistance easily countered by own escort'._


One of the new pilots to enter combat this day was Georg-Peter Eder who reported to duty with his first combat assignment, flying with the 1st Staffel of JG 51. Heinz-Günther Amelung was appointed Staffelkapitän of 5./StG 77.


----------



## T Bolt (Aug 31, 2010)

Excellent job Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Sep 2, 2010)

*2 September 1940 Monday
"A HELL OF A DAY"
UNITED KINGDOM*: RAF Group 11 airfields were again the targets of German bombs. The Luftwaffe's effort consisted mainly of five attacks in the East Kent - Thames Estuary area. Debden, Eastchurch, Rochford, North Weald and Biggin Hill were heavily bombed throughout the day.

At 0750 and 0752 hours the Coast was crossed at Dover and Lympne by forty and thirty Do 17s of KG 3 respectively at 20,000 feet while a small formation of aircraft came in at Deal at 8,000 feet. Fighter cover was provided by fifty Bf 110s from ZG 76 in close escort and Bf 109s from JG 51 and JG 53 at a higher altitude. The raids split inland and proceeded to Eastchurch (KG 3 with escort from ZG 76), North Weald, Rochford and Biggin Hill. Seven British squadrons were detailed for this attack and some inflicted casualties on the German raiders. Although Park scrambled the squadrons few contacted the enemy, for close protection of Sector Stations was now prescribed.

RAF No. 72 Sqd (Spitfires) was immediately put into action over the northern coast of Kent and followed the Dornier bombers towards Biggin Hill. RAF No. 92 Sqd (Spitfires) were also sent to assist RAF No. 72 Sqd. but failed in protecting Biggin Hill from yet another attack. As No. 72 Squadron was busy dealing with the Do17s and Bf110s at around 13,000 feet, another nine Do17s, contour hugging, again struck Biggin Hill. But this time the British fighters had done enough to put the Do17s off their bombing run and little further damage was done to the airfield.

A further raid of thirty aircraft flying at 10,000 feet was intercepted by British fighters near Hawkinge and turned back. RAF Nos. 222 and 603 Squadrons (Spitfires) and RAF No. 249 Sqd (Hurricanes) engaged the Dornier formation that headed north-west inland from the Thames Estuary. No. 603 Squadron (City of Edinburgh ), patrolling over Hornchurch was vectored to the withdrawing Bf109s and bagged one which fell to P/O Richard Hillary (X4277) later to become famous as the author of the book 'The Last Enemy'. Two of the Hurricanes were damaged by gunfire from the Bf 110s and one was shot down in flames from gunfire from another Bf 110 but one of the Do17s was shot down and another peeled away belching smoke, but again, North Weald sustained only slight damage. One of the Spitfires of RAF No. 603 Sqd. engaged a Bf 110 over Hawkinge and had difficulty in lining up the 110 enough to get a clear aim. The British aircraft was hit by defensive gunfire from the German fighter that smashed the Perspex hood and the upper fuselage, but the RAF pilot managed to return to base.

Of the two raids, only two targets sustained damage. Enough bombers managed to escape the marauding British fighters to make a strike on the Short Brothers aircraft factory at Rochester where a number of buildings were destroyed and a number of civilians were killed. Another formation managed to attack the old motor racing circuit of Brooklands near Weybridge where Vickers Wellington bombers were being produced. Gravesend Aerodrome was attacked at 0805 hours, when eleven high explosive bombs were dropped causing damage to gas, electricity and telephone services.

Mid day came. With many aircraft at Fighter Command's airfields still rearming and refueling after the morning raid, another large formation was detected on the radar. The first detection was made while the Luftwaffe was still over the French coast, but as they approached the Channel more smaller formations joined in and soon a contingent of over 225 bombers were approaching the Kent coast. At 1220 hours two waves of about twelve and thirty aircraft each crossed the Coast at Folkestone and North Foreland and flew into the Estuary. Several RAF squadrons were sent to intercept the Luftwaffe bombers. RAF No. 72 Sqd was back in the air and one of the first to make contact. Intercepting a formation of Do17s and Bf 110s over the Isle of Thanet, a fierce combat took place over the towns of Margate and Herne Bay. For nearly twenty minutes, the twisting and spiraling shapes of aircraft weaving this way and that filled the skies. It was nothing new to the residents below. They were now used to the dogfights that were occurring almost daily above their towns. One of the Spitfires was damaged by gunfire from one of the Dorniers. The action now moved over Herne Bay. Another of RAF No. 72 Squadron's Spitfires was attacked by a Bf 110 and shot down, but this time it crashed into the ground and burst into flames. The dogfighting grew in intensity as more than eighty Bf 109s swooped down and into the combat over Herne Bay and Margate.

RAF No.603 Sqd also found no rest as they too were scrambled and they made contact with the German formations just east of Sheerness. They were surprised when they got caught up in a dogfight with over seventy Messerschmitt Bf 109s.

By now, most of the action was between the fighters, the bombers managing to carry on, leaving the fighters to break up into their own small groups and a series of individual dogfights emerged. About two hundred aircraft were involved and the German fighters managed to hold the fighters of the RAF back even though the casualty rate on the German side was the greater. Several Luftwaffe aircraft were shot down. One of the Bf 109s, piloted by Oblt. Ekkehard Schelcher in combat with RAF No. 603 Sqd. over the Isle of Sheppy, was shot down possibly by P/O J.S. Morton and crashed near Chilham. His body lay in the wreckage of his aircraft for 37 years which was classified by the German authorities as a recognized war grave before the body was interred at the German war cemetery at Cannock Chase. Several claims were made by pilots of JG 54 and JG 2 including Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 who downed two RAF Spitfires over New Romney.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 2, 2010)

_(2 September 1940 continued.....)_

Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Croydon, North Weald, Debden, Detling, Eastchurch and Hawkinge were all damaged, and although still operational they were not at full capacity or working with the efficiency that was hoped, only Tangmere and Kenley had escaped much of the constant bombing. Debden airfield was the only aerodrome hit with severe damage. The British had to set up an emergency operations room outside the airfield at Debden - this time in a chalk pit outside Saffron Walden. Other raids penetrated to Maidstone, causing considerable damage to house property and twenty-five families had to be evacuated. Strong German formations continued to cruise in the Straits for about an hour.

At 1612 hours two hundred and fifty German aircraft crossed the Coast at points North of Dungeness and Deal and then spread fanwise across Kent. One raid flew towards Biggin Hill and the remainder to the Thames Estuary and Essex flying over Hornchurch, North Weald and Colchester to Harwich. A formation of Do17s bombed Hornchurch Aerodrome at 1640 hours. British fighters were so successful in breaking up the raid that only six bombs fell on the landing ground causing no damage to buildings or personnel. But there was some damage suffered by the AA Brigade Headquarters nearby. At Detling a hanger was hit and damage was caused at Eastchurch. Some thirty German aircraft concentrated 10 miles south-east of Central London where they were turned back by RAF fighters. Four British Fighter squadrons were in the air and successful interceptions were made. Strong interceptions by fighters from JG 2 and ZG 76 increased several scores including another Spitfire for Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2. He ended the day with a score of twenty British aircraft shot down up to this date. Oblt. Herbert Ihlefeld of 2.(J)/LG 2 and Oblt. Otto Bertram of 1./JG 2 each claimed a Spitfire during the 1230 hours raids and the 1600 hours raids.

Immediately after the above attackers had returned to France, at 1720 hours, a number of German formations started building up across the Channel near Calais. As was usual with Luftwaffe raids, the bombers accumulated into one large formation that crossed over Sheppey, Thames Estuary and East Kent then broke away into smaller formations again with each going to its own designated target. A large dogfight started to develop over the Thames Estuary, but not before some of the bombers managed to get through the defenses and made their attack on the aerodromes of Detling and Eastchurch. Damage at Detling was considerable with an estimated 100 bombs being dropped on the airfield causing many craters and wrecking one of the main hangars. Thirty German bombers wrecked 'C' Flight hanger. Detling was non-operational for the next three hours. Eastchurch then received two attacks, the first by eighteen aircraft which exploded a dump of three hundred and fifty 250lb bombs, had administration buildings damaged, the NAAFI destroyed, five aircraft destroyed and water and sewage pipes ruptured. In the second raid another hanger was hit. Suffering severe damage, Eastchurch was later declared unoperational and while most of the station was moved to Wymswold Warden, the base hospital and sick bay was transferred into the village. Major Walther Grabmann, Kommodore of ZG 76 reported to General Osterkamp after the Eastchurch raid;


> _"There's not much doing over there anymore!"_



At 1725 hours some fifty bombers with an escort of about forty Bf 109s managed to get through to Hornchurch. RAF No. 603 Sqd. were pulled back to protect the airfield. Under the harassment by RAF No. 603 Sqd., many of the bombs dropped wide of their target and damage to the aerodrome was only minimal. RAF No. 72 Sqd, already having been involved in the combat landed, refueled and rearmed and was back again in the action calling it;


> "_. . . a hell of a day_".


Many of the German aircraft decided to turn back and RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqd. met them on their return. 12 Hurricanes of the squadron had left Northolt and were sent to intercept the Raid and then to patrol Ashford. Bf109s dived out of sun and on to the Squadron near Dover at 19,000 ft. They managed to damage a couple of Bf 109s and a Do17 but one their own received damage and had to make a forced landing in open ground outside Dover. Red Section were compelled to evade the Messerschmitts and lost them but Sgt. Rogowski pursued one Bf109 which crashed in the sea 10 miles from the French coast. Sgt. Frantiszek also pursued one Bf109 over the French coast. F/O. Henneberg pursued another Bf109 also over the French coast firing six bursts into its engine from 150 to 25 yards. The aircraft lost height and speed, trailing thick black smoke and with the engine on fire. F/O Henneberg and Sgt. Frantiszek were compelled due to A.A. fire to break off at 3000 ft.

At 1800 hours other raids totaling eighty German aircraft approached the Coast between North Foreland and Dungeness. They did not penetrate inland and after patrolling the Coast returned to France at 1830 hours. Strong patrols were maintained on the French side of the Channel.

Other notable Experten increasing scores this day were Fw. Rudolf Täschner of 1./JG 2 (six kills total), Ofw. Erich Rudorffer of 2./JG 2 (14 kills), Fw. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 (8 kills), Hptm. Wolfgang Lippert of 3./JG 53 (11 kills), Fw. Erwin Leykauf of 7./JG 54 (5 kills) and Oblt. Wilhelm Herget of 7./ZG 76. Fw. Werner Stumpf of 7./JG 53 got his second kill in as many days. Ofw. Erich Kuhlmann of 3./JG 53 destroyed a Hurricane for his fourth victory but was shot down himself shortly after.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 2, 2010)

_(2 September 1940 continued.....)_

German night activity was extensive and was not so confined to specific areas as on recent nights. The early evening brought a little relief, but just after midnight the bombers came over in small formations. A new feature was the early termination (0130 hours) of all the main attacks. By dusk the Luftwaffe was operating along the East Coast, Wash to Tyne (mostly mine-laying), over Derby, in the Liverpool and the Barrow-in-Furness areas. From 2200 to 0030 hours a steady stream of raids crossed the Coast between Beachy Head and Swanage and flew to the industrial Midlands as far as Liverpool, Manchester and Sheffield. Many German aircraft passed to and from these areas over London Central. Others flew in over the Wash. The number of raids towards South Wales was rather less than recently. Off North East Scotland there was increased activity and a number of raids were between Rattray Head and as far north as Scapa. Between the hours of 2030 and 2100, several He 111s of II./KG 27 and II./KG 55 returned to the cities of Liverpool and Bristol causing minor damage. Swanage was attacked, bombs fell at Leighton Buzzard, and in the north Merseyside was attacked and in the Midlands the areas of Birmingham and Wolverhampton failed to escape bomb damage.

A convoy off Kinnairds Head called for help at 2240 hours. The German raid left two steamers off Aberdeenshire damaged, one of which was burned out.

The total of thirty-one fighters lost by Fighter Command this day along with eight pilots killed, was double from the day before. The Germans lost thirty-five bombers and fighters. Once again, Epr.Gr 210 had suffered, with eight Bf 110s destroyed. On one bomber shot down was found a supply of hand grenades to be thrown at pursuing fighters.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Reichsmarschall Göring visited with Major Adolf Galland of JG 26, Major Werner Mölders of JG 51 and other fighter commanders at their airfield. After bellowing at his commanders about how the fighters were not saving the bombers, he calmed down and asked Mölders what he needed. Werner Mölders replied;


> "_I would like the Bf 109 to be fitted with more powerful engines._"


 Turning to Galland, Göring asked;


> "_And you_?"


 to which Galland responded;


> "_Ich bitte um die Ausrüstung meines Geschwaders mit Spitfire_." ("I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my squadron.")


Göring stormed away. Some time later Spitfires from RAF No. 603 (City of Edinburgh ) were heavily engaged over the channel by Bf109’s from JG 26. During the combat, Sgt. Pilot Alfie Summers, flying a new Mk.IIa Supermarine Spitfire P7351 XT-A, became disorientated and landed right next to a German Army unit in France. The Spitfire was recovered by the Luftwaffe and shipped to an evaluation unit to assess its performance. The Reichsmarschall, on hearing of the capture of an air worthy Spitfire thought he would exact revenge on Galland. He ordered the spitfire sent to Galland’s JG 26, with the order that it would be Galland’s personal machine;


> “_He wanted Spitfires – HAH! Here is his first, let us see what Galland will do with it!_”


 When Göring’s aides mentioned that it would surely be too dangerous to fly a captured aircraft against the RAF as it would be at risk of being attacked by both sides, Göring replied;


> “_If Galland is as good as he says, and the Spitfire as superior as he thinks, then he should not be in any danger from the combined forces of the Luftwaffe and RAF_!”


The Spitfire was duly sent to JG 26. When it arrived and on hearing Göring’s comments, Galland laughed and ordered the spitfire painted in his colours. He sent a message to the Reichsmarschall, thanking him for his first Spitfire and said he was looking forward to receiving others! 

Hptm. Joachim Seegert was made acting Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 2 while the Kommodore of JG 2, Oberst Harry von Bulow-Bothkamp decided to retire from active duty.


----------



## syscom3 (Sep 2, 2010)

"On one bomber shot down was found a supply of hand grenades to be thrown at pursuing fighters."

Were the German bomber crews that desperate?


----------



## Glider (Sep 2, 2010)

I like the idea of Galland being given his own Spitfire but adit I find that hard to believe


----------



## michaelmaltby (Sep 2, 2010)

I did a quick Google on "Galland's Spitfire" and there wasn't a crumb on it. Just the quote about "wanting some".

On the other hand,  Bader almost talked the Jerry pilots at the "club" in France into letting him take up a 109 - missing one artificial leg .

MM


----------



## Njaco (Sep 2, 2010)

I did have 2 sources for that - one I believe was Galland's book. Its been years since I wrote that, Might have to remove.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 2, 2010)

*3 September 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The targets for almost 300 German planes this day were Eastchurch, North Weald and Lympne airfields with North Weald being the heaviest hit. At about 0830 hours one German aircraft at 22,000 feet made a reconnaissance to North Foreland, along the Kentish Coast to Eastchurch, and out by Dungeness. At 0915 hours, 40 minutes after assembly south and east of Calais, over twenty aircraft at 20,000 feet approached Deal but were intercepted by one British squadron off North Foreland. A further formation of about eighty aircraft flew up the North side of the Estuary at 25,000 feet.

These were followed by another raid composed of forty Do 17s of KG 2 and sixty Bf 110s with a fighter escort of forty Bf 109s from JG 26 at a higher altitude flying up the Thames River whose objective was North Weald. Again, the Bf 109 fighters would advance ahead of the Dornier and Messerschmitt bombers. Again Fighter Command would refuse to engage the leading fighters, instead timing their take offs to engage the main bomber force at the latest possible moment. This way, the leading Bf 109s would have used up valuable fuel and it would not be long before they would need to return back towards their bases. But the British pilots were unable to gain height in sufficient time to attack the Germans. Eleven RAF fighter squadrons were ordered up and 12 Group sent the Czech No. 310 Squadron (Hurricanes) to provide assistance cover at North Weald.

North Weald was hit hard. It was estimated that over 150 bombs fell on the aerodrome, many of them delayed-action which caused substantial damage. Two hangars, several MT lorries, two Hurricanes and one Blenheim were damaged by fire and the main stores and living quarters received a certain amount of damage. The hangars belonged to RAF Nos. 25 and 151 Squadrons and were severely damaged by the fire that broke out afterwards. A part of the old Operations Room was demolished, but there was no damage when a direct hit was registered on the new Operations Room. One of the British squadrons at the airfield had just landed there from a previous patrol and was refueling when the Luftwaffe bombers appeared.

12 Hurricanes of RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn left Northolt at 10:28 hours and made contact with two Bf109s near Dungeness. Sgt. Wojtowicz was attacked and his engine damaged, last seen going in to land near Dungerness. F/O. Henneberg’s aircraft hit in the tail but he was not wounded, and flew the machine to Northolt and landed normally. Rest of the Squadron had no contact with the enemy.

RAF No. 19 Sqd. and No. 310 Czech Sqd. managed to intercept about fifty Do17s with about 100 Bf 109s returning after their raids on East London. Three of the British fighters that swooped down on the German formation suffered with jammed guns. 'Green' section fared better and managed to down two Bf 110s and another was seen trying to escape by flying at about fifty feet above the waters of the Thames Estuary towards Whitstable. The formation of Bf 110s No. 310 Czech Sqd. encountered were from 1./ZG 2 and they surprised the German pilots with outrageous maneuvers and daredevil antics. They screamed in for the kill with throttles wide open, calling and shouting excitedly in their own language. As the fighter bombers weaved, intent on completing their attack on the airfield, the Czech squadron managed to claim four Bf 110s. In total, five Bf 110s of ZG 2 were destroyed. The first was when a Bf 110 (3M+EK) collided with another Bf 110 (3M+HL) and crashed and exploded in flames at Harlow north of North Weald. The Bf 110 (3M+HL) was at the time being pursued by Hurricanes of No. 310 Czech Sqd. and trying to take evasive action when it collided with 3M+EK. It crashed at Epping south of North Weald. Also prior to attacking North Weald, a Bf 110 (3M+BK) was attacked by Spitfires of RAF No. 222 Sqd. and shot down at Reculver. Both crew baled out and were captured by a motor boat crew off Herne Bay. At 1100 hours, P/O J.M.V. Carpenter of RAF No. 222 Sqd., Sgt. B. Furst of No. 310 Czech Sqd. and Sgt. G.C. Unwin of RAF No. 19 Sqd. all laid claims for the destruction of Bf 110 (3M+CB) which crashed at Stowmaries. Finally, at 1118 hours, a Bf 110 (3M+EL) was shot down possibly by F/O Count M.B. Czernin of RAF No. 17 Sqd. (Hurricanes) and crashed at Canewden, Essex. Lost was Ofw. Kurt Müller of 3./ZG 2 who was made a Prisoner of War.

In addition to those mentioned above, Bf 110s of ZG 26 also on escort duty for Do17 bombers, came under attack over the southern coast of Essex. One of them was damaged by British fighters over Southend where it had to make a crash landing. F/O Count Czernin of RAF No. 17 Sqd. claimed another Zerstörer when he shot down a Bf 110 over Wickford at 1030 hours. Then Spitfires of RAF No. 54 Sqd. attacked another Bf 110 over the Thames Estuary at 1038 hours and partially disabled it. It was finally shot down by F/O B. van Menz of RAF No. 222 Sqd. over Southend where it crashed at North Shoebury House. Oblt. Hans-Joachim Jabs of 6./ZG 76 tried to get his heavily damaged Bf 110 to French soil but the plane was too broken to make it and he ditched in the Channel. He was later rescued and returned to base. Three British fighters were shot down during the aerial battle. Oblt. Sophus Baagoe of 8./ZG 26, Obfhr. Friedrich Lugger of 9./ZG 26 and Lt. Kurt Sidow also of 9./ZG 26 claimed double kills.

In another incident. Two Blenheims, returning to North Weald were accidently mistaken for Bf110s by a couple of Hurricane pilots. They opened fire on the helpless fighter bombers only to shoot down and destroy two of their own aircraft.

Splits from this raid flew towards Debden, Hornchurch and Thames Haven. Hornchurch and Debden received considerable damage, but all stations remained operational. RAF No. 603 Sqd. were warned by the Hornchurch controller that they had about fifty plus bandits above them. Eight Spitfires from RAF No. 603 Sqd. decided to go in line astern at the Dorniers over Margate and at the same time the Bf 109s from II./JG 26 dived toward the Spitfires. The British fighters had no time to gain height, and the climb was aborted so as to gain speed. But already in their dive, the Bf 109s had the momentum and their speed was far greater than that of the Spitfires. Three aircraft fell in flames. Oblt. Eckhardt Roth, the Gruppe adjutant was killed and two severely burned British pilots baled out into the Thames Estuary. Both Spitfires were claimed by Hptm. Erich Bode of Stab II./JG 26, his first kills of the war. P/O Richard Hillary of RAF No. 603 Squadron was shot down;


> "_I was peering anxiously ahead, for the controller had given us warning of at least fifty enemy fighters approaching very high. When we did first sight them, nobody shouted, as I think we all saw them at the same moment. They must have been 500 to 1000 feet above us and coming straight on like a swarm of locusts. The next moment we were in among them and it was each man for himself. As soon as they saw us they spread out and dived, and the next ten minutes was a blur of twisting machines and tracer bullets. One Messerschmitt went down in a sheet of flame on my right, and a Spitfire hurtled past in a half-roll; I was leaving and turning in a desperate attempt to gain height, with the machine practically hanging on the airscrew. Then, just below me and to my left, I saw what I had been praying for - a Messerschmitt climbing and away from the sun. I closed in to 200 yards, and from slightly to one side gave him a two-second burst: fabric ripped off the wing and black smoke poured from the engine, but he did not go down. Like a fool, I did not break away, but put in another three-second burst. Red flames shot upwards and he spiralled out of sight. At that moment, I felt a terrific explosion which knocked the control stick from my hand, and the whole machine quivered like a stricken animal. In a second, the cockpit was a mass of flames: instinctively, I reached up to open the hood. It would not move. I tore off my straps and managed to force it back; but this took time, and when I dropped back into the seat and reached for the stick in an effort to turn the plane on its back, the heat was so intense that I could feel myself going. I remember a second of sharp agony, remember thinking "So this is it!" and putting both hands to my eyes. Then I passed out._"


Hillary was saved by the Margate Lifeboat and was immediately taken to the Queen's Victoria Burns Unit in East Grinstead.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 2, 2010)

_(3 September 1940 continued....)_

With the damage done, and North Weald in a shambles, Hornchurch damaged but only regarded as minor and parts of Tilbury and the London Docks also damaged by high explosive and incendiary bombs, the raiders began their retreat back eastwards. At 1115 hours when the North Weald attacking forces were heading back to France, two other raids, consisting of thirty aircraft in all, went inland at Deal and North Foreland. They penetrated only a short distance before returning. One small raid made its way towards Maidstone and one of fifteen aircraft headed towards Biggin Hill but no definite objective was singled out. Manston was bombed at 1140 hours by three German aircraft which dropped five bombs but did no damage. There was one unexploded bomb in the middle of the aerodrome.

Most of the day's intense fighting occurred during this time with elements of JG 26, JG 27 and JG 51 engaged with fighters of the RAF. Notable pilots achieving kills were Major Adolf Galland of Stab/JG 26 reaching his twenty-eighth kill. Others victors included Lt. Gustav Sprick of 8./JG 26 (15 kills total), Oblt. Gustav Rödel of 4./JG 27 (10 kills) and Oblt. Gerhard Homuth of 2./JG 27 (13 kills). Getting their first victories of the war were Uffz. Arnold Küpper of 8./JG 26, Lt. Johannes Naumann of 9./JG 26 and Oblt. Otto Meyer of 8./JG 26.

At 1400 hours six Luftwaffe raids were active off the Kent Coast and one of these entered the Estuary. After the success of the morning's attack, the Luftwaffe followed the same course and pattern as they had done just five hours previously. However, this was a lighthearted affair in comparison with the morning raids. Fighter Command put up the usual strong opposition once the attackers had crossed the coast. More squadrons, and a request for 12 Group to give protection to North Weald again, were put up and this time AVM Park was prepared. But most of the raids were aborted and many of the RAF fighter squadrons began chasing the Germans back towards their own coastline. No damage was recorded.

At night, German activity was on a similar scale to that of recent nights but confined almost entirely to the Liverpool, South Wales and Kentish areas. Very little attention was paid to the Industrial Midlands. From 2100 hours a steady stream of raids from the Brest and Cherbourg areas was plotted to South Wales and Bristol. Ninety aircraft flew on to Liverpool and a few as far as Barrow-in-Furness. Successive waves followed to Liverpool and whilst the rest of the country was almost clear by 0100 hours raids were still passing towards Liverpool at 0230 hours.

Beginning at 2100 hours and lasting until 0130 hours twenty-one He 111s from Stab, I and III./KG 55 raided the docks at Avonmouth. Although it was a clear night with no moon, giving perfect visibility over Bristol, only minor damage was caused at Avonmouth, the raid having in fact spread itself along the North Somerset coast with four people killed and five injured at Portishead. Two high explosive bombs were dropped on the LMS Leamington - Rugby railway line near Dunchurch station causing damage to the track and a goods train was derailed.

Aircraft losses for both sides were even at sixteen apiece for the day. The Luftwaffe achieved parity for only the second time during the battle.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 16; RAF, 16.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Hermann Göring had arranged a meeting with his Air Fleet Commanders and it was at the Hague that they all met, with the usual introductions of wine, delicacies and light hearted humour before getting down to the serious business of discussing the current situation as it stood at the moment. In attendance were Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring, commander of Luftflotte 2, Feldmarschall Hugo Sperrle, commander of Luftflotte 3, Oberst Werner Junck, General Bruno Lörzer and other Fliegerkorps commanders. Göring began the meeting by asking if British Fighter Command was defeated or were they still able to attack the bombers. Kesselring announced that the RAF was finished and that the attack of numerous targets should cease and a concentrated raid on one objective, namely London, should be enough to bring England down. Sperrle disagreed to the point that he wagered a good meal that the RAF was far from finished. He stated that he could not agree that the RAF was down to its last reserves, and that his sources stated that the British Royal Air Force still had in excess of 600 aircraft based on operations in the southern portion of England and that a further reinforcement of 400 aircraft could be called upon from areas in the north and west bringing a total of 1000 fighters. A heated discussion ensued. Commenting on the ability of the RAF after so many losses, Oberst Junck remarked;


> "_This is a Verdun of the air_!"


Infuriated, Kesselring turned to German Intelligence Chief Oberst Josef ‘Beppo’ Schmid for the exact number of aircraft the British had left. Caught between the two commanders, Oberst Schmid announced that British Fighter Command had perhaps only 100 fighters left or even as much as 350. This information convinced Göring that British defenses would soon be exhausted and the invasion could commence. After some discussion, a 'Zielwechsel' or change of objective was decided. The attacks on RAF airfields would cease. Göring and Kesselring were convinced that the British Air Force was all but finished, and the recommendation was put to Hitler that the time had come that London, the inland cities and the dockland areas be attacked and bombed as a prelude to the invasion. Convinced by Göring that the British were close to defeat, Hitler informed the meeting that the earliest date for the sailing of the invasion fleet would be on 20 September, the actual landings (S-Day) to take place on 21 September and the launching of the attack on the English Isles through Kent would be on 11 September. Hitler also asked for an increase in the output of 2,200lb bombs, designed for use against built up areas.

As for the attack on London, Hitler proclaimed,


> " _Will not the British ever learn. Their bombers come and kill innocent German people, and I have given them fair warning. We have told you before, that the nights when the British bombers do not attack our capital, our glorious Luftwaffe has forcibly stopped the British bombers in their tracks and they have had to turn for home. But now, the time is right, the British air force is down to its last reserves, they cry for pity, and I will give them pity for I will wipe London from the face of the earth. I want fire everywhere, thousands of them and then they will unite in one gigantic area of conflagration."_


 Unknown to the Luftwaffe High Command, this decision changed the whole course of the battle, giving Fighter Command a breather and a chance to rebuild.

Despite much opposition to the bombing of London, things were busy in the preparation of the pending invasion. Thousands of landing craft were ready for mobilization in many of the harbours along the coast of northern France. Trucks carrying amphibious craft were photographed in a nose to tail convoy along the French coastal roads by the RAF. The 'Sea Lion' plan now provided for elements of 11 divisions to make the assault. Two airborne divisions were to be sent in at once, but the other nine would start 6700 strong and only reach full strength after several days. About 250 tanks were to accompany the assault. Four divisions of the 16th Army with airborne support were to land near Folkestone, two of the 9th Army near Eastbourne and three more of the 9th Army, also with airborne support, at Brighton. These beachheads will not be mutually supporting in the early stages. At this time the defending British forces had only made a partial recovery from the equipment losses at Dunkirk. There were perhaps four divisions fully equipped and about eight more in a reasonable state. In addition, there were various mobile brigade groups. There were about 350 cruiser and heavy tanks in the country and about 500 antitank guns.

In France, Hptm. Karl-Heinz Greisert was made Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 2.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 3, 2010)

*4 September 1940 Wednesday
"BE CALM, HE'S COMING!"
UNITED KINGDOM*: The Luftwaffe's main effort consisted of two attacks in East Kent and the Thames Estuary areas. There was also a considerable amount of high flying reconnaissances of convoys, especially round the North and East Coasts and Wales. Most of the action commenced from 0900 hours onwards as the British fighters engaged a mixture of Bf 110s and Bf 109s. And for the first time, the Luftwaffe began to target during the day, the aircraft factories of Britain in obedience of the order from 1 September.

Between 0700 and 0800 hours four Luftwaffe raids were in the Channel off the Isle of Wight, Portland and Beachy Head. At 1615 hours two German aircraft flew over the Isle of Wight. A British section sent up did not make an interception.

At 0915 hours activity developed into an attack by about 150 German aircraft. One group of eighty aircraft flew into the Estuary and on towards Eastchurch, Hornchurch, North Weald and Debden, and the other of seventy aircraft crossed near Lympne and flew towards Biggin Hill. Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Squadron scrambled from Croydon and RAF No. 253 Squadron, scrambled from Kenley. RAF No. 66 Squadron Kenley (Spitfires) were vectored to the Thames Estuary as was RAF No. 72 Squadron Croydon (Spitfires). The Bf 109s of the Eastchurch force stuck to their task well, keeping the Hurricanes and Spitfires at bay and allowing a number of the Bf 110s to get to Eastchurch where again the airfield was attacked. A number of bombs made deep craters in the runway and some stores were damaged. Most of the German aircraft soon turned and by 0945 hours were re-crossing the coast.

At 0934 hours, the second German formation, headed to Biggin Hill. Fighter Command released a number of fighter squadrons towards the Dover area but some excellent defensive action by the British fighters stopped most of the Bf 110s from getting through. The remaining bombers made it to the Aerodrome at Lympne, which was attacked but did not suffer any damage of importance, although the harbour and the barrage balloons came under fire. Most of the damage at the airfield were a number of bombs hit buildings and again the aerodrome was cratered.

During their withdrawal a force of thirty Luftwaffe aircraft patrolled off North Foreland in addition to the usual hostile patrols in the Straits. The balloons at Dover continued to be shot up. RAF No. 111 Squadron, even though they forced the Bf 109s to retreat did lose two of their pilots, both over the Channel off Folkestone. Oblt. Werner Machold and Oblt. Otto Bertram of 1./JG 2 claimed both kills.

Fighter units engaged in these actions were from JG 2, JG 3, JG 51 and JG 54. Several notable pilots claiming kills were Fw. Erich Rudorffer and Uffz. Kurt Bühligen of 2./JG 2, Oblt. Richard Leppla of 3./JG 51, Oblt. Hans-Ekkehard Bob of 9./JG 54 and Uffz. Hans Hahn of 4./JG 2. Hptm. Wilhelm Balthasar of Stab III./JG 3 destroyed his twenty-fourth Allied aircraft southeast of London before being severely wounded. He made it back to England but was out of war operations until February 1941. Oblt. Karl Müller of 6./JG 2 failed to return from a sortie and was listed as missing in action.

At 1235 hours five German bombers were over Dover and at 1258 hours an attack developed. Radar at Dover and Rye detected a wide formation coming across the Channel for the midday attack. By 1305 hours some 300 aircraft crossed the English coast on a wide front between Dover and Littlehampton at 20,000 feet. This consisted of about fifty Heinkel He 111s, thirty Dornier Do 17s and 200 Bf 109s. Again they split into small groups and headed towards five different targets. The bulk flew over Kent and Sussex but had begun to disperse by 1400 hours. Some however flew over the Thames Estuary and near Gravesend but drew off at 1340 hours. A third section of about fifty aircraft flew along the Coast to west of Shoreham as if making for Kenley but quickly turned back.

RAF No.43 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) were ordered up giving protection along the Sussex coast. RAF No.46 Squadron Stapleford (Hurricanes) were to patrol the Thames Estuary, 66 Squadron Kenley (Spitfires) who had already been up once that morning, 72 Squadron Croydon (Spitfires) also up for a second time, 79 Squadron Biggin Hill (Hurricanes), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 249 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes), 234 Squadron Middle Wallop (Spitfires), 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 601 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes), 602 Squadron Westhampnet (Spitfires) and 603 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) were all scrambled for this biggest build up of the day. The British Squadrons were divided as two separate formations came in from two different parts of the English coast. Heavy dogfighting action took place over northern Kent and as usual, in the Thames Estuary with the skies over Kent and Sussex chaos. Vapor trails now hung like heavy white clouds as two thirds of RAF No. 11 Group battled it out at 20,000 feet. But 11 Group were further reinforced by RAF No.73 Squadron (Hurricanes) who had been transferred from Church Fenton to Debden, 41 Squadron (Spitfires) came down from Catterick and found their new home at Hornchurch.

What radar did not pick up was a low flying formation of Bf 110s that were following the railway line from Hindhead to Guildford until it was too late. This small formation of fourteen Bf 110s managed to get through the British defenses and was not intercepted until just north of the town of Guildford which is to the south-west of London. They were met by RAF No. 253 Squadron (Hurricanes) who had reasonable success, even though a couple of Bf 110s did get through. Although the target was the Hawker factory at Brooklands, they mistakenly hit the Vickers Armstrong Works aircraft factory at Brooklands, Weybridge where Wellington bombers were made. Following the rail line into Brooklands, the bombers burst onto the aircraft factory. As the bombers approached, the anti-aircraft defenses were made ready and immediately shot down two of the Zerstörers, throwing the rest of the formation into confusion. Through the AA fire, six bombers managed to drop their loads on the factory, killing eighty-eight people, injuring 600 and completely stopping production of Wellington bombers for four days. Considerable damage was done to the erecting shop and plant. Heavy calibre bombs were dropped outside the hangars causing some damage but it was believed that the casualties would have been greater but for the fact that the attack was made during the lunch hour. The Hawker factory nearby escaped unscathed. A total of six of the Bf 110s were destroyed prior to the bombing of the Vickers factory, while another nine were destroyed as they turned for home. Another raid reached Rochester where the Short Bros factory producing the new four-engined Stirling bombers was damaged.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 3, 2010)

_(4 September 1940 continued......)_

At 1320 hours AVM Park instructed that a squadron patrol the sector station to the south of London, and also a squadron was to patrol the sector station of North Weald who were still trying to repair the damage of the previous raids. German aircraft had crossed all along the south coast, and now Tangmere was brought into the action. While all this was going on, a small force of 14 Bf 110 fighter-bombers of Epr.Gr 210 with close escort provided by V.(Z)/LG 1 and III./ZG 76 crossed the coast almost unnoticed and attacked the radar station at Poling. II./ZG 76 flew a free-lance sweep east of the main formation to cover their withdrawal back over Beachy Head. The in-coming raid was first met by RAF No.234 Squadron, soon reinforced by RAF Nos.43 and 601 Squadrons with top cover from No.602 Squadron, while No.253 Squadron joined the fray east of Guildford. Twelve Spitfires of RAF No. 234 Squadron bounced the Luftwaffe formation along with the Hurricanes from RAF No. 601 Squadron. Seven Bf 110s were shot down over Worthing in sixty-five minutes. The Zerstörers suffered badly and RAF No. 234 Squadron alone claimed a record fourteen Bf 110s and one Do 17 destroyed for the day for only one damaged Spitfire in return. RCAF No.1 and RAF No.79 Squadrons also hit II./ZG 76 over East Grinstead. 

Of the Bf 110s lost was that of the Gruppe adjutant of Stab.(Z)/LG 1, Oblt. Wilhelm Schäfer, who was shot down and captured. Oblt. Schäfer remembered later;


> "_I was not down to fly this mission, as my machine had been shot down in the Channel on 11th August. On the morning of the 4th September as the aircraft of I. Gruppe were started up and II. Gruppe were moving to their take-off position, the Geschwaderkommodore (Obstlt. Friedrich Vollbracht) suddenly gave me the "green light" to take part in the mission in his machine, in his place. With my Bordfunker, Uffz. Heinz Bendjus, I arrived at the airfield ten minutes later and found that the Kommodore's machine had one wing uncovered. As both Gruppen had already take-off , there was no time to warm-up the engines. Already, on take-off, there were problems as the tail unit was malfunctioning and the cold engine was not functioning properly. I was not successful in my hope of catching up the rest of my unit before reaching the English coast, and so my flight was a solo effort to England. From afar, I could see that the Bf110s were caught up in a heavy dogfight. Although my left engine was still not functioning fully. I hoped in the meantime to link up with my Geschwader on the return flight. As a result of my stuttering engine I was neither high enough nor fast enough to catch up with my returning Geschwader and shortly afterwards was attacked by several Spitfires. As my chances in the forthcoming combat were slim, I took my first chance to dive towards the coast. That was a mistake. As I flew over the coast, coming towards me from the Channel were two fighters that immediately engaged me in a low-level combat. Fired at from both sides, but without success, I was hoping that they would soon have to break off combat due to low fuel, when a third fighter appeared above me, in a firing position, and turning, the full side of my Messerschmitt presented a good target. In spite of several hits, I was still able to control the aircraft, until the left engine failed and I could no longer do so. In order not to crash in flames, I shut off both engines, and carried out a belly landing in a meadow. The place of the force-landing was Mill Hill , Shoreham Downs; the time was 13:50 hours on 4th September 1940. With that, the active war service for my Bordfunker and myself ended. I myself was not wounded, Uffz. Bendjus was slightly wounded. Our aim to set the aircraft on fire was not to be. We were soon greeted by Home Guard, and transported into captivity to a nearby village. On the way we were greeted by a British officer, who claimed to have shot us down. He apologised for not being able to take us for a drink at the officer's mess with him_."


 Sixteen Bf110s were lost in the Weybridge attack with RAF Nos.43 and 234 Squadrons in particular inflicting considerable damage.

But numerous Zerstörer pilots did claim kills during these actions despite an official loss by Fighter Command of four pilots killed. Making claims were Hptm. Erich Groth of Stab II./ZG 76 who claimed four Spitfires destroyed, Oblt. Walter Borchers of 4./ZG 76 who took credit for three Spitfires downed and Oblt. Hans-Joachim Jabs of 6./ZG 76 and Oblt. Wilhelm Hobein of 5./ZG 76 who each claimed two Spitfires shot down during the battles.

By nightfall, the Luftwaffe changed from the bombing of Fighter Commands airfields and aircraft producing factories, to the bombing of large towns and cities. Night bombing raids were made on Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea, Liverpool, Newcastle and Tilbury Docks. In South Wales, large oil storage tanks received direct hits and the red glow lit up the dark night sky so much that it was a wonder that they couldn't see it from London.

Several bomber Gruppen were involved in the mission to raid Bristol and Avonmouth. Aircraft involved were one He 111 of I./KG 27, one Ju 88 of II./LG 1, six Ju 88s of I./KG 51, five Ju 88s of II./KG 51, eleven Ju 88s of III./KG 51, eleven He 111s of I./KG 55, thirteen He 111s of II./KG 55 and one Ju 88 of I./LG 1. Despite clear weather, the raid caused little damage besides creating a fire at the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton. Total casualties for the British amount to four killed and six injured.

In all, for the day, the Luftwaffe lost 35 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 27 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 5 wounded. Anti-aircraft fire accounted for an additional five German planes. Fighter Command lost fifteen valuable aircraft, nine Spitfires and six Hurricanes. Six RAF pilots were killed.

Off Cromer, E Boats attacked a south-bound convoy, sinking the 'SS New Lambton' (2,709t) steamer, from Hartlepool. 'SS Joseph Swan' (1,571t) steamer, from Blyth. 'SS Fulham V' (1,562t) steamer, from South Shields and the 'SS Corbrook' (1,792t) steamer, from Seaham. All were carrying coal to London.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 3, 2010)

_(4 September 1940 continued.....)_

*WESTERN FRONT*: Back in France, Hptm. Wolfgang Lippert was made Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 27 in place of the acting Gruppenkommandeur Ernst Dullberg. Oblt. Martin Lutz was made acting-Gruppenkommandeur of Epr.Gr. 210 in place of Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer. Oblt. Werner Weymann was appointed Staffelkapitän of 1./Erpr.Gr. 210 in Oblt. Lutz's place.

*GERMANY*: Adolf Hitler spoke to a crowd at the Sportpalast in Berlin about the war against Britain, In his usual sarcastic manner, he informed them of the astounding success that the Luftwaffe was having on the Royal Air Force, he fed them largely inflated figures that indicated that the Luftwaffe had actually shot down more RAF aircraft than the RAF actually possessed. They wanted to know when England would be invaded, to which he told them,


> “_In England they’re filled with curiosity and keep asking, ‘Why doesn’t he come? Be calm. Be calm. He’s coming!’ . . . It is a wonderful thing to see our nation at war, in its fully disciplined state. This is exactly what we are now experiencing at this time, as Mr. Churchill is demonstrating to us the aerial night attacks which he has concocted. He is not doing this because these air raids might be particularly effective, but because his Air Force cannot fly over German territory in daylight. Whereas German aviators and German planes fly over English soil daily, there is hardly a single Englishman who comes across the North Sea in daytime. . . They therefore come during the night and as you know, release their bombs indiscriminately and without any plan on to residential areas, farmhouses and villages. Wherever they see a sign of light, a bomb is dropped on it. For three months past, I have not ordered any answer to be given, thinking that they would stop this nonsensical behavior. Mr. Churchill has taken this to be a sign of our weakness. You will understand that we shall now give a reply, night for night, and with increasing force! . . . And if the British Air Force drops two, three or four thousand kilos of bombs, then we will now drop 150,000, 180,000, 230,000, 300,000 or 400,000 kilos, or more, in one night. If they declare that they will attack our cities on a large scale, we will erase theirs! We will put a stop to the game of these night-pirates, as God is our witness. The hour will come when one or the other of us will crumble, and that one will not be National Socialist Germany. Never! Never! I have already carried through such a struggle once in my life, up to the final consequences, and this then led to the collapse of the enemy who is now still sitting there in England on Europe's last island_.”


The Battle of Britain was now in its 55th day, and it now appeared more than ever that plans were now to be made to make an attack on London itself. So the RAF got another reprieve just when they were almost destroyed. The war of purely military targets was over and total war, or war between peoples, was now a reality.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 4, 2010)

*5 September 1940 Thursday
"THE ONE THAT GOT AWAY"
UNITED KINGDOM*: The day proved to be a beautiful day for combat, the weather was clear with only a slight breeze. Conditions for flying were ideal, although Fighter Command was praying for rain and inclement weather. Although the directive had gone out that the Luftwaffe were to bomb the British cities, it was no doubt that this day, arrangements were already being made for the annihilation of London and the industrial centers of the Midlands. But in the meantime, the Luftwaffe were resting many of their heavy bombers and quite a number had been moved from airfields further south to more strategic airfields closer to the French coast. For the time being, the Luftwaffe would continue its attacks of RAF airfields and aircraft factories in an effort to wear down Fighter Command.

One such mission was an attack again on the sector station at Biggin Hill around 1030 hours by KG 2. But to confuse the British this time, a diversionary raid on Croydon was launched. German bombers approached at two points, one wave crossed the coast between Dover and Folkestone while the other came in from the Thames Estuary. Five RAF squadrons were dispatched to intercept. Biggin Hill was attacked, as was Croydon, Eastchurch, Lympne and North Weald. More damage was sustained, but only Biggin Hill again gave cause for concern. Biggin Hill was again a shambles and Group Captain Grice stated that he now had only one hangar left standing, and even that was nothing but a burnt out shell and the commander issued orders to place explosive charges in it and destroy it at the next raid. RAF No.79 Sqd (Hurricanes) is the only squadron operating from Biggin, RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires) was told to remain at Croydon for the time being.

After the bombers dropped their loads, they were intercepted by six Spitfires. Thirty Bf 109s of II./JG 3 flying escort for the bombers, dove to the attack. Other RAF squadrons soon joined in. The Manston based RAF No. 41 Sqd immediately made their presence felt. F/L J.T. Webster came hard down on a Bf 109 who was about to engage one of the Hurricanes. A couple of short bursts missed and the Bf 109 took evasive action but F/L Webster weaved and swayed keeping the 109 in his gunsight. Another short burst and smoke trailed from the Messerschmitt and it glided down finally making a forced landing just outside the village of Adlington Kent. F/L Webster was also thought to have shot down another Bf 109 while over the South London area. The Bf 109 withdrew and losing height, finally made a forced landing near Faversham in Kent. The Bf 109 of Oblt. Franz von Werra, Gruppe Adjutant of Stab II./JG 3 was shot down over Marden in Kent by P/O B.G. Stapleton of RAF No.603 Sqd, although it was believed that the Bf 109 sustained original damage after being hit by gunfire from the Spitfire of P/O G.H. Bennions of RAF No. 41 Sqd.

And so began one of the most adventurous chapters of Luftwaffe history. Oblt. Franz von Werra was captured and taken to the authorities and finally transferred to a prisoner of war camp in Canada where he made good his escape by making his way to the USA and finally by boat to Europe where he rejoined his unit and flew again against Fighter Command. The British pilot who shot at Oblt. von Werra, F/L Webster, was later killed the same afternoon. Also lost was Lt. Heinz Schnabel of 1./JG 3 when he, too, was shot down and taken prisoner by the British. Lt. Schnabel had six victories against the British.

Concerning the combat which resulted in von Werra's fall into British hands, there is confusion. That he crash landed on 5th September at Winchet Hill is not disputed but other circumstances surrounding the incident are open to question. F/L Webster of RAF No. 41 Sqd. is often given credit for downing von Werra as is P/O Stapleton of RAF No.603 Sqd. Also getting credit is P/O Bennions of RAF No. 41 Sqd. and F/O Pat Hughes of RAF No. 234 Sqd, an Australian ace.

At 1050 hours twelve Bf 109s attacked the Dover Balloons. The Dover guns opened fire destroying one German aircraft and damaging another. Shortly after a formation of Do17s and Bf 109 escorts came in from the Thames Estuary and headed in the direction of South London. Too far to the south to be targeting London, for some reason the target was again that of.....Biggin Hill. RAF No.79 Sqd was scrambled and with some miraculous flying broke up the Dorniers and they dropped their bombs well off target.

Pilots from the escorting fighters from JG 3, JG 54, JG 52 and LG 2 that made claims during the morning battles were two Spitfires for Oblt. Herbert Ihlefeld of 2.(J)/LG 2, single claims for Oblt. Willy Stange of 8./JG 3, Lt. Franz Beyer of 8./JG 3, Lt. Hans Berthel of Stab I./JG 52, Oblt. Karl-Heinz Leesmann of 2./JG 52, Hptm. Fritz Ultsch of Stab III./JG 54, Lt. Max-Hellmuth Ostermann of 7./JG 54, Fw. Paul Pausinger of 8./JG 54 and Uffz. Karl-Heinz Kempf of 9./JG 54.

The second raid of the day was detected by the British at 1230 hours when another huge formation was again coming in from the Thames Estuary. The assemblies were at a high altitude, some above 20,000 feet, and quite a number of formations were so high that they were undetected by both the British radar and the Observer Corps. One of the formations was intercepted by RAF No. 72 Sqd (Spitfires) and consisted of about fifty Ju 88s and Heinkel He111s escorted by about 100 Bf 109s as escorts. The main target was the oil storage tanks at Thameshaven and the attack caused serious damage. Giant palls of thick arid black smoke could be seen for miles. RAF No. 72 Sqd were joined by RAF No. 73 Sqd (Hurricanes), and both squadrons were attacked by a recently arrived formation of Bf 109s. Some of the Hurricanes were bounced by surprise and four of them were shot down with one of the pilots killed.

Thereafter up to 1630 hours strong German formations (up to 70+) patrolled the Straits of Dover and a seaplane was reported to have rescued a German crew off Ramsgate. Nos 10 and 12 Groups assisted No 11 Group during this attack by providing patrols over Tangmere and North Weald.

Many of the bomber formations managed to get through Fighter Command's defenses although a number of Bf 109s were casualties of the afternoon battle. Many of the airfields and towns along the Thames were still cleaning up after the morning's raids when now, almost mid-afternoon they were witnessing German bombers making their way to their targets and the tell tale spirals of fighter dogfighting high above. By 1500 hours the afternoon raid was almost a couple of hours old and still damage was being recorded and aircraft were being shot down, but this last hour of the battle was the most active of the afternoon. At 1530 hours another raid of fifty German aircraft was intercepted when attempting to cross the coast near Dungeness. Most British squadrons were either only recently arrived replacing those that had returned to their bases to refuel and rearm or had been recalled back into the skirmish. RAF No.41 Sqd (Spitfires) were now back into the affray, as was RAF No. 66 Sqd (Spitfires) that had been called in to relieve squadrons returning to base. One of the squadrons that had been in the thick of the action since just after midday was RAF No. 72 Sqd and RAF No. 73 Sqd and they were just about to return to base to refuel and rearm, when they were dispatched to the Essex coast after a formation of Ju 88s that had been detected.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 4, 2010)

_(5 September 1940 continued.....)_

As the German bombers made their way home, Staffels of Bf 109s from JG 2, JG 3, JG 53 and JG 54 came out across the Channel to provide escort on a day that although it may have seemed impressive, was not all that it claimed to be by the Luftwaffe. During the engagement Flt. Lt. A. Rabagliati of RAF No. 46 Sqn. took a four-cannon Hurricane, V7360, into action for the first time. Operating alongside RAF No.249 Squadron, No. 46 encountered Bf109s over the Thames Estuary, one being blown apart by cannon fire. All told the RAF claimed 18 Bf109s destroyed, plus four probables, and another one damaged. Detling aerodrome was bombed and five oil tanks at Thameshaven set on fire, which came to serve as a useful beacon despite the efforts of RAF Nos.43 and 303 Squadrons to prevent the bombing. Thameshaven was the only target which they claimed was a success, and just about the last nail had been hammered home in Biggin Hill's coffin, but other than that any damage done was not to have any effect on Fighter Command. The Hawker factory at Brooklands was hit, but damage was only slight and the casualties were few. Maidstone was hit and demolished a part of one street and the attacks on Detling and Eastchurch were by no means going to affect Fighter Command.

In the meantime, S/L Zdzislaw Krasnodebski's RAF No. 303 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) was in action over the south coast even though the squadrons actions was deemed 'questionable' even by AVM Keith Park since they had commenced an impressive record from August 30th when the squadron had made their first claim. 9 Hurricanes had left Northolt at 14.53 hrs. After various vectors, S/Ld. Kellett, 'Red 1', at 22,000 ft, near Gillingham, saw A.A. fire across the Estuary and led his Squadron to attack. Red Section attacked Bf109s that were circling around 35 Ju. 88s. As 'Red' section went in, about a dozen German fighters came in to attack from above. 'Yellow' section, apparently mistook the enemy’s direction because of the circling fighters, and after taking avoiding action lost the enemy. 'Blue' section went in under 'Red' and attacked the Bombers. The Squadron became scattered and returned independently with claims of six Bf 109s and three Ju 88s.

For those that were keeping score, it was twenty-three German planes down for twenty RAF fighters, a fairly even scoresheet in reality. Claims by the Jagdflieger for the afternoon battles were much more than the actual loss by Fighter Command of twenty machines. But credit was given. Of those increasing their scoreboards were three Spitfires for Oblt. Helmut Reumschüssel of 2./JG 3, double kills were awarded to Hptm. Otto Bertram of 1./JG 2 (his third double in four days) and Hptm. Hubertus von Bonin of Stab I./JG 54. Notable pilots with claims included Oblt. Rudolf Pflanz of 3./JG 2, Hptm. Hans von Hahn of Stab I./JG 3, Ofw. Robert Olejnik of 2./JG 3, Oblt. Willy Stange of 8./JG 3, Hptm. Günther von Maltzahn of Stab II./JG 53, Hptm. Heinz Bretnütz of 6./JG 53, Lt. Friedrich-Karl Müller of 8./JG 53 and Oblt. Hans Philipp of 4./JG 54. The most important of the day's successful pilots was Oblt. Helmut Wick of 6./JG 2 who claimed a Spitfire for his twenty-third kill. He was slowly gaining on Mölders and Galland.

Losses were heavy for JG 54 over England. Lost were Fw. Dettmer of 9./JG 54 and Uffz. Behze of II./JG 54 who were killed in the dogfights over Kent. Uffz. Fritz Hotzelmann of I./JG 54 was shot down over Maidstone and captured becoming a prisoner of war. The most serious loss for the Geschwader was the Gruppenkommandeur of Stab III./JG 54, Hptm. Fritz Ultsch, who was shot down and killed shortly after getting his fourth kill.

As the darkness of night closed in on the evening of September 5th, British radar tracked a large formation of German bombers heading towards the city of London. German activity commenced soon after 2030 hours. The night fighters of the RAF were not up to the task of attacking the bombers - the British were not experienced in night fighting. Hundreds of searchlights lit up the night sky and the bombers were lit up like small white specks. Anti-aircraft fire followed but the bombers maintained their courses. Other formations attacked Manchester and Liverpool causing damage, but all the cities received only the one air raid which by now, most of the residents were getting used to the hit and run tactics of the night attacks. Heinkel He 111 bombers of II and III./KG 27 again targeted the city of Liverpool. Damage was caused at Walton where one high explosive bomb fell on Dunlop Works. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board suffered some damage of a fairly widespread nature but not very serious. In London many houses were damaged and water, gas, electricity mains and sewers also damaged. The County Hospital at Dartford was hit, two wards being damaged, three houses destroyed and casualties exceeded fifty. Numerous other towns were placed under a Red Alert and scattered attacks were made by German bomber formations. By 0230 hours activity had decreased and less than a dozen raids were still inland.

At 0300 hours during the early morning darkness, a German aircraft dropped a parachutist in Nottinghamshire. No one heard or saw the aircraft or noticed the parachute silently gliding earthwards.

Because of the attacks being made on the aircraft factories and assembly lines, Keith Park was to take the necessary steps to provide cover for these establishments. Following a recommendation from AVM Hugh Dowding, Park was to give maximum protection possible to the Hawker factories at Kingston and Brooklands, and to the Supermarine works at Southampton. 12 Group was informed, that if 11 Group was to provide additional cover for Weybridge and Brooklands, he would need the support of 12 Group and that they would be called upon at short notice. The same was passed on to 10 Group, that they provide patrols from Brooklands to Croydon whenever there was heavy enemy activity in the area, although Park new that 12 Group was fairly heavily committed by having to cover the Essex and Norfolk coasts where a number of enemy formations had recently been keeping 12 Group busy. Knowing that 12 Group would hastily respond to his request, AVM Quintin-Brand made available four extra squadrons that could cover the Southampton-Portsmouth area as soon as heavy raids had been detected. Park also brought down 504 Squadron who had been resting at Catterick and posted them to Hendon. 

*
WESTERN FRONT*: Several units from Luftflotte 5 in Norway including KG 26 and KG 30 transferred to the Channel coast while several fighter Gruppen in France were moved to forward airbases in order to reduce the flight time across the Channel.

Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 was awarded the Ritterkreuz for achieving twenty-one victories.


----------



## Airframes (Sep 5, 2010)

Great stuff Chris. Coincidentally, Ltn Heinz Schnabel, shot down and force-landed at the same time as von Werra, was the one who _nearly_ got away! Together with Oblt. Harry Wappler, he made an audacious escape attempt which almost succeeded, on the day after von Werra, having escaped and returned to active duty, went missing, presumed dead.
The story is in my thread on Schnabel's aircraft, in the Modelling Section Group Builds.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 5, 2010)

Thanks Terry. Don't know how I missed that!


----------



## Juha (Sep 5, 2010)

Hello Njaco
thanks a lot for Your effort. Great job.
The info on LW meeting on 3 Sept is especially interesting; when I came across info on that meeting years ago it was the first time when I understood that Sperrle really had also other attributes than his fierce look and large appétit for his position. I cannot recall from earlier texts the exact numbers of his estimate on FC strength, so it was nice to see the figure which was very accurate, it would be nice to know what was his source, but clearly Sperrle’s opinion was much more realistic than that of Smiling Albert, who had the habit of being overly optimistic, the weak spot of that very capable officer.

Juha


----------



## Njaco (Sep 5, 2010)

Thanks Juha, I'm trying to make it as accurate as possible.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 5, 2010)

*6 September 1940 Friday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The fine weather of the previous days was expected to continue with the cloud in the north dispersing overnight and bringing fine weather to all areas. The success of Bomber Command's raid on Berlin on the previous night would no doubt raise anger in the German halls of officialdom. Hugh Dowding and Keith Park knew by instinct that the overnight raids on Berlin especially, would bring about instant retaliation.

At 0800 hours British radar and observation detected a number of single Bf 109s over factories and industrial areas. Park requested that Air Vice Marshal Brand of 10 Group cover the factories at Weybridge and the upper reaches of the River Thames with a squadron of fighters. Brand gave this task to RAF No. 609 Sqd (Spitfires). RAF No. 609 Sqd patrolled the area, without incident but when they returned to refuel, a formation of Bf 110s got through and managed an attack on the Hawker factory at Brooklands, where half the total output of Hurricanes was produced. This time their aim was accurate and the Hawker factory was hit but only minor damage was caused.

Between 0840-0950 hours, a large raid of Ju88s, He111s, Do17s and Bf109s, totaling some 300 German aircraft crossed the Coast between Dover and Dungeness and spread out fanwise, headed for Biggin Hill, Thames Estuary area and North Weald. Scrambled into action were Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 1, 73, 111, 249, 253, 303 (Polish), 501 and 601 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41 and 609 Squadrons. RAF No.1 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes)and RAF No. 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) were busy over the north Kent coast and the Thames Estuary. RAF No.111 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes), RAF No.303 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) and RAF No.501 Squadron Gravesend (Hurricanes) were kept busy in engagements over the aerodromes of Kenley and Biggin Hill, while RAF No.249 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes) and RAF No.601 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) were kept busy over Maidstone, Tunbridge Wells and Rochester. Thameshaven, still ablaze from the previous days bombing was again the target for another attack, but although RAF No.73 Sqd (Hurricanes) intercepted, they were engaged by the escorting Bf 109s. P/O H.W. Eliot was hit by gunfire from one of the Bf 109s and he was forced to bale out leaving some of the bombers to add fuel to an already burning Thameshaven.

The Polish pilots of RAF No. 303 Squadron, who had so far shown great courage and inflicted heavy losses on the Luftwaffe, suffered the loss of 7 Hurricanes as a Gruppe of Bf109s attacked from above whilst they were attacking. While being vectored towards a bomber formation, they were bounced by fighters of III./JG 27. S/Ldr Kellet, Maj. Krasnodebski and Sgt. Karubin, were all wounded (Krasnodebski seriously) and baled out, while Sgt. Rogowski made a forced landing. F/Lt. Forbes shot down one Bf109 and damaged another. He was forced down by petrol pouring into the cockpit. He tried to land but overshot the field and was slightly wounded by splinters. Other pilots claimed seven confirmed (5 Bf 109, 1 Do 17, 1 He 111) and one probable victories. (The Bf 109 awarded as a 'probable' to Feric crashed while attempting to land in France). Witold Urbanowicz's victim was Hptm. Joachim Schlichting, the Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 27. A veteran of Legion Condor and the son-in-law of Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch, Hptm. Schlichting had bailed from his burning Bf 109 over the Thames Estuary. Because both the British and the Polish commander were wounded in this fight, AVM Park appointed Witold Urbanowicz as the new squadron commander.

Vapor trails and dogfights filled the skies between the coast and London. Heavily involved were the Messerschmitts of JG 27 who suffered greatly. Crashing and becoming prisoners of the British were Uffz. Ernst Nittmann of 7./JG 27 and Oblt. Werner Schüller of 3./JG 27. Other deeply involved Geschwaders also lost fliers. Lt. Karl-Heinz Metz of 8./JG 2 collided with Fw. Kurt Goltzsch over Kent and was taken prisoner by the British. Recorded as missing in action from the 'Richthofen' Geschwader were Lt. Max Himmelheber of Stab I./JG 2 and Oblt. Adolf-Friedrich von Götz from1./JG 2.

A number of bombs were dropped during the raid. The Southern Railway lines to Caterham and Oxted were temporarily blocked and very slight damage was done to the Hawker-Hurricane Aircraft Factory at Weybridge and to Pobjoy's Factory at Rochester. For the rest, the bombs were remarkably ineffective and there were very few casualties.

The second attack occurred between 1255-1400 hours, totaling some 200 German aircraft crossed the coast again between Dover and Dungeness, followed by further raids. The majority of the raids did not penetrate beyond Kent and Sussex, but some went as far as Debden and Hornchurch. Biggin Hill was again a target but the bombs overshot the airfield and landed on the Westerham road where the much repaired main trunk cable was once more severed. The raiders were intercepted by Spitfires of RAF Nos. 72, 234, 602 and 603 Squadrons along with Hurricanes of RAF No. 303 (Polish) Squadron and prevented from reaching their targets.

Major Galland's entire JG 26 was engaged in escort duties to England. While III./JG 26 led the raid with a freie jagd, Galland and I./JG 26 were close escort for the bombers, the rest of the Geschwader taking high escort duties. A number of RAF squadrons had now been dispatched into the combat areas. As the German formation reached the target, they were bounced by Spitfires and Hurricanes. First to engage was the II Gruppe's Stabschwarm which quickly shot down two Spitfires from RAF No. 234 Sqd who were vectored to fifteen Bf 110s escorted by twenty-five Bf 109s heading for Dover. Claims for the two Spits were made by Hptm. Erich Bode and Oblt. Kurt Ebersberger. The next to get hit was Oblt. Müncheberg's III./JG 26 which was still operating a freie jagd ahead of the raid. Oblt. Müncheberg's own 7 Staffel was hit by Spitfires from the same RAF No. 234 Sqd and quickly lost three Bf 109s. Oblt. Hans Christinecke was hit, crashed and taken prisoner. Gefr. Karl Biecker and Gefr. Peter Holzapfel were killed.

Sgt M.C. Boddington RAF No. 234 Sqd came in astern of a Bf 109 and gave chase, and it was not until over Ashford that the Bf 109 was brought down. F/L Pat Hughes tagged onto a weaving Bf 109 that had been escorting a damaged Bf 110 and fired a short burst. The Messerschmitt banked and weaved, trying to escape from the Australian but Hughes stuck to him like glue. Smoke emitted from the German fighter over Beachy Head as Hughes' next burst found its target, but Hughes was forced to disengage as he himself came under fire from other Bf 109s. P/O J. Zurakowski took over and it was uncertain if he managed to hit the Messerschmitt but it crashed in flames near Old Romney. British troops were quick to get to the burning Bf 109 finding the pilot still in the blazing cockpit. The heat was so intense that there was no way that they could get at the German pilot and pull him clear. Instead, they pulled their rifles and shot the pilot as an act of humanity so as to stop any undue suffering. There is a grave at the New Folkestone Cemetery marked "Unknown German Airman" This is probably the remains of that pilot who was shot by British troops. Research has discovered that the burnt remains were taken to the New Folkestone Cemetery, but the German authorities claim that only the two pilots of 7./JG 26 did not return that day who were on operations in that area. Although German records state that Gefr. Peter Holzapel's death occurred on January 7th 1941. So it is still not certain as to who lies in the grave dedicated to an "Unknown German Airman" at Folkestone. Gefr Peter Holzapel's aircraft was also possibly hit by Hurricanes from RAF No. 303 Polish Sqd which reached the German formation near the coast and claimed two German bombers and five fighters for the loss of three Hurricanes. The fighters of II./JG 26 claimed two Spitfires and two Hurricanes destroyed without losing a single pilot.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 5, 2010)

_(6 September 1940 contiued....)_

The third attack at 1745 hours, of two raids with some fifty German aircraft each, crossed the coast between Maidstone towards the Thames Estuary. The main target was Hornchurch but the formations turned back through Maidstone. The raid had split up and headed south as Spitfires of RAF No. 222 Squadron, scrambled from Hornchurch engaged the Bf109s and Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Squadron, scrambled from Croydon, chased down the bombers. Little damage was done. One of the more unusual events was a Bf 109 which landed at Hawkinge when it ran out of fuel. This could possibly be Uffz. Hans-Georg Schulte of 7./JG 53, an eight victory Experte who claimed a Spitfire at 1910 hours and then crash landed, becoming a Prisoner of war.

But the most unusual was an incident that happened about this time. At 1720 hours, a German soldier dressed in civilian clothes, was captured at Denton, (Northants). He was in possession of a loaded automatic, receiving and transmitting wireless set, Swedish passport and British identity card. He reported that on landing with a parachute at 0300 hours he was injured by crashing on his wireless set. He was discovered in a ditch by a farmer. As part of his duties upon landing he was to report on damage to British airfields and aerodromes. Gosta Catroli, a Swedish national trained by the German Secret Service "Abwerh", had parachuted from a Dornier Bomber and landed near Yardley, Hastings.

Numerous Jägdflieger made kills against the RAF during the day especially during the first attack of the day. The most notable being Major Werner Mölders, Kommodore of Stab./JG 51 who downed a Spitfire over Folkestone during a fighter sweep over the English coast for his thirty-third kill along with Major Adolf Galland, Kommodore of Stab./JG 26 who destroyed a Hurricane near Tonbridge for his twenty-ninth score. Close behind the two Kommodoren was Oblt. Helmut Wick of 6./JG 2 who got his twenty-fourth victory. Confirmed double kills were awarded to Oblt. Herbert Ihlefeld of 2.(J)/LG 2, Oblt. Hans Hahn of 4./JG 2, Oblt. Walter Schneider of 6./JG 26 and Lt. Julius Meimberg of 4./JG 2. Famous pilots adding to their score were Hptm. Otto Bertram of 1./JG 2, Lt. Horst Ulenberg of 2./JG 26, Lt. Karl Borris of 5./JG 26, Oblt. Kurt Ebersberger of Stab II./JG 26, Lt. Gustav Sprick of 8./JG 26, Oblt. Joachim Müncheberg of 7./JG 26, Oblt. Gustav Rödel of 4./JG 27, Oblt. Max Dobislav of 9./JG 27, Oblt. Hermann-Friedrich Joppien of 1./JG 51, Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 and Hptm. Heinz Bretnütz of 6./JG 53.

By the end of the first week in September, Fighter Command was in a desperate situation. By now, the British commanders were at their lowest ebb, with exhausted pilots and squadrons. Spitfires and Hurricanes were still being lost at a far greater rate than they were being replaced. In the last week of August, for example, only 91 Spitfire and Hurricanes were produced while losses reached 137 destroyed and 11 seriously damaged. In just two weeks Fighter Command had lost 295 planes with 171 badly damaged. 103 pilots had been killed while 128 had been wounded. Squadrons were now weakened by only having 16 pilots attached instead of the normal 26. Experienced pilots numbered no more than 500 – less than one-half of Fighter Command’s strength. One squadron, RAF No. 85, based at Croydon, had fourteen of its eighteen pilots shot down in two weeks, two of them twice.

On the ground the persistence of the German attacks was beginning to take effect. Air superiority over Kent and Essex, at least for a week or two, was in the Luftwaffe’s grasp. As far as the airfields were concerned, Lympne and Manston were out of action while Biggin Hill which had suffered immensely could only operate one squadron at a time. Six of the seven sector airfields were extensively damaged, the telecommunication links to and from the operations blocks proving especially vulnerable. Radar stations were being patched up the best that they can, and communications was only at 75% efficiency. The RAF was faced with the real possibility of withdrawing 11 Group to bases north of London. The aim of Adlerangrif was near to being realized.



> "_We have squadrons that have been involved in combat from first light right through until dusk, they have operated like this for days on end and that includes many of our experienced squadrons. These men are not immortal, they are human beings, day after day of prolonged combat has made them tired and they are exhausted.__We cannot win if we have pilots who cannot even stand up_."


 . . . said Dowding at a meeting that day. He explained that he must now categorise all squadrons. "A" will consist of all those squadrons in the front line of defence which would include all squadrons in 11 Group plus those in 10 and 12 Groups that would most likely find themselves also in the front line. "B" would be those squadrons that were not in the front line but were prepared and ready to be transferred to a front line airfield, and "C" would be all those squadrons that have reached exhaustion or have not yet reached the level required for operations in the front line. 

That night, from the office of the War Ministry, the Home Forces HQ issued its preliminary Alert No.3, "Invasion probable within three days". 

Luftwaffe Losses: 53 aircraft damaged or destroyed including 8 He111s from KG 26, 54 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 9 wounded. RAF Losses: 29 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 6 pilots killed or missing and 11 wounded.

Luftwaffe activity during the night was on a very reduced scale. From 2015 hours, a few raids flew towards London via the Thames Estuary and Kent. Bombs fell on West Ham damaging houses, railway lines and the Victoria Docks causing 55 casualties. More bombing involved Woolwich, Southwark and London's south-east suburbs, where over 70 casualties were reported. There were no raids after 0030 hours. During another raid on Liverpool, a He 111 from 6./KG 55 crashed at Caen, France, possibly from friendly anti-aircraft fire.

The King and Queen visited RAF Fighter Command headquarters at Bentley Priory, Stanmore (Middlesex).

'SS St Glen' (4,647t) cargo ship, Rosario and Buenos Aries to Hull, was sunk by German aircraft off the east coast of Scotland.

*WESTERN FRONT*: At a railroad siding between Calais and Boulogne, in his special train, code-named 'Asia' Reichsmarschall Göring gave a banquet for his air fleet commanders. He offered them the choicest of French wines and they ate the finest of French table food. He told his guests, that from this day, he would be taking personal command of the battle and his air fleets for the first time since the opening of hostilities against England and began making plans to direct them in their attacks. He would settle for nothing less than victory. During an evening radio broadcast in Germany, Reichsmarschall Göring commented on his new position,


> “_This moment is a historic one. As a result of the provocative British attacks on Berlin on recent nights, the Führer has decided to order a mighty blow to be struck in revenge against the capital of the British Empire. I personally have assumed the leadership of this attack and today I have heard above me the roaring of the victorious German squadrons_.”


Oblt. Günther Scholz was made acting Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 54 in place of Hptm. Fritz Ultsch who was killed the day before.


----------



## Airframes (Sep 6, 2010)

Thanks Chris. Although I have most of the information already, it's good to see it all laid out in an easy to read, day by day account. You're doing a great job here mate, keep it up !


----------



## Njaco (Sep 6, 2010)

Thanks!


----------



## Njaco (Sep 6, 2010)

*7 September 1940 Saturday
"THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN: PHASE THREE - LONDON AND THE NIGHT BLITZ"
UNITED KINGDOM*: In a final effort to destroy the RAF, day-light attacks on London commenced with the code-name "Loge". Believing that England was down to her 'last fifty Spitfires', Hitler and Göring were confident that one heavy attack on the British capital would bring England to her knees. And they were not far from the truth. The Luftwaffe had pounded and pounded at the RAF, and now it appeared that victory was within their grasp. Six out of seven sector airfields were heavily damaged. Another five advanced airfields were also destroyed. Telephone and communication lines were disrupted or totally destroyed and the general destruction was confusing the handling of squadrons in the air. The fighter losses from the day before again exceeded aircraft production. And Fighter Command could call upon only about 700 pilots.

But the Luftwaffe also had its problems. Air crews were becoming fatigued and the Bf 110 and the Ju 87 had proven to be useless against the Hurricanes and Spitfires of the British. The third phase of the battle – 24 August to 7 September - had cost the Luftwaffe 378 aircraft destroyed and 115 aircraft damaged while RAF losses amount to 262 aircraft lost. It had taken the German war machine much longer than they had anticipated, mainly due to their own mistakes, but slowly they were grinding away at Fighter Command, and slowly Fighter Command was weakening. Adolph Hitler was now firm in his beliefs that by concentrating on an all out bombing campaign on the British capital, Britain would collapse, and that the bombing should continue until Britain submitted under the strain. In between missions to England by day and by night during September 5th and the 6th, the Luftwaffe was busy in its preparations of strengthening all bomber units and moving Bf 110 and Bf 109 units to specific locations close to the French coast. An all out bombing campaign on London was to commence.

The Saturday started with a strange deadly quiet, experienced by all the radar stations along the south coast. The CRTs were all blank, not a sign of the enemy. Some took advantage of the mild balmy early morning to stroll outside, something that had not been done for weeks. But it was at Wittering that the first contact was made with the Germans. A single blip had been detected and RAF No. 266 Squadron was sent to intercept. Three Spitfires took off and made for their vectored position at twenty-eight thousand. All three aircraft were at full boost trying to catch the enemy aircraft, and one of them had to turn back because the engine started to become erratic. The German aircraft was a Dornier 215 and it was not until they were well out over the North Sea close to the Dutch border that they managed to make their first attack. Their shots went wide and they came under some accurate gunfire from the German aircraft. A second attack was more successful with the Dornier exploding in a ball of flame.

Across the Channel at 10:30 hours, Göring, Albert Kesselring and the commander of II Fliegerkorps, Bruno Loerzer drove through the French countryside towards the township of St Omer. Göring, who had now pronounced himself as the leader of the Luftwaffe operations wanted to see for himself the beginning of the final stage of the battle, and had invited Loerzer and Kesselring along. They were to position themselves at the closest point of the French mainland to the English coast, as it would be from here that they could witness what they thought would be the greatest onslaught that Britain would ever endure.

Along the way they found time to have breakfast, and called in to some of the Luftwaffe fighter stations, one of them being the Lehrgeschwader of Bf 109s based at Calais-Marck, where a midday banquet was held. Here, Göring in his open heavy leather coat that displayed all his war medals talked and chatted with the many pilots. He spoke of his days as a fighter pilot when air combat was fought with open cockpit biplanes. He was in a sort of jovial, yet somewhat cocky mood. After lunch, the procession of three Mercedes escorted by motorcycle police made their way to the high picnic grounds at Cape Blanc Nez, where a team of noncommissioned officers with almost a precision like mentality set out tables and white table linen, and hastily set out the sandwiches, biscuits and champagne. There was a war on, the British were lazily sitting around almost bored with themselves, the German pilots were preparing to deploy themselves on the greatest attack yet, and Göring was going to have a picnic.

At 11:55 hours the radar at Dover and Pevensey picked up the first significant blips of the day, a small formation just off the coast. They appeared to be content on staying just within striking distance of the English coastline but made sure that they did not cross the coast. RAF No. 66 Squadron (Spitfires) who were on a routine patrol were sent to intercept. It was a small formation of about fifty Bf 109s with twelve of the Messerschmitts carrying bombs in the 'Jabo' role, possibly trying to draw the British fighters out, just as they had done during the early Channel attacks in July. Being as the Germans were content in staying out there, Fighter Command decided that as long as they kept their distance from the coast, no other squadrons would be sent to intercept.

The raid was plotted approaching Dover, which subsequently split and bombed Hawkinge airfield and Dover causing light damage. RAF No.66 Sqd engaged combat, but after two of its aircraft had to return to base, they decided to break off the action. One of the Spitfires did not make it back to Kenley, instead the pilot P/O Bodie decided to crash land the aircraft close to Hawkinge when losing height rapidly. The other Spitfire made it back to Kenley and also made a crash landing.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 6, 2010)

_(7 September 1940 continued....)_

On the other side of the Channel, it was a different story. German ground personnel were busy putting the finishing touches to new airfields that were positioned very near to the French coast. Many new gun emplacements were being constructed, and word broke through to British intelligence that heavy bombers were being moved into readiness. More amphibious landing craft were still arriving at the Channel ports. A meeting that was called by the British Chiefs of Staff and was to commence that day at 17:30 hours to discuss whether or not the "Alert No.1" should be issued. At this stage, Dowding and Park had no idea as to the change in tactics that the Luftwaffe was to implement later this day.

Across the Channel, Göring and his party of invited guests started to take their positions on the cliff edge. Everyone was relaxed, talking and smiling with a sort of waiting in anticipation. It looked like a picnic day for the rich. Suddenly, in the distance the dull drone of engines could be heard, coming from the south. Shortly, the same sounds could be heard to the north, an eerie sort of sound yet you could not see anything. After about ten minutes, one of the Major's called and pointed to the south. The first of the huge formations could just barely be seen coming over the high ground behind them. All eyes were at straining point, some members of the party were on tip toes stretching their necks to get the first glimpses of the great armada of bombers that were soon to fill the sky.

The first major raid by the Luftwaffe on London was also one of the largest when the bombers escorted by fighters began forming over Calais. As the hundreds of bombers formed a sheet of black cross like figures in the sky above, the smile on Göring's face went from cheek to cheek. He excitedly placed his hands on a Major's shoulder and shook it, pointing towards the mass of aircraft high above. The noise was deafening. From his special train, 'Asia' at Cap Griz Nez, Göring stood up from his collapsible seat, settling his binoculars on the first spearhead of the Heinkels and Dorniers which were now circling some ten miles away before forming up with the twin-engined fighter screen on each flank and, almost invisible above, the Bf 109s. As the bombers and their escort groaned deafeningly overhead, gaining altitude, to these senior officers it was as if the frustrating weeks of struggle in the air, with its distressing casualties, and the Phoenix-like reappearance of the Hurricanes and Spitfires when none should have survived, had been wiped clean.

Other formations, again Heinkels, Dorniers and intermixed with Bf 110s came in from the east, and as the main formation passed over the French coastline high above Göring's head, more formations could be seen way back over the mainland to the west. The total blanket of bombers and fighters now covered an area that was at least 800 square miles, and still the excitable Göring could hardly control himself as the huge formation of droning bombers headed towards the English coast. German bombers and their Bf 109 escorts began forming over inland France from 15:00 hours onwards. Slowly, as other groups took off, they joined forces with more formations, with each formation flying at a different altitude, and flying some minutes either above or below the formation in front.

By 15:40 hours the coastal radar stations, that had been extra quiet all day, suddenly could not believe their eyes. At first, it was just a few blips off the French coast that slowly appeared to join and increase in size like a formidable cancer. The radar station at Foreness was the first to detect the appearance of the Germans on the CRT screen. Within moments, Dover had also picked up the giant formation as did Rye. Those that had been relaxing outside in the late afternoon sun were called in, cigarettes were stubbed in the already full ashtrays as everybody's attention was turned to the armada that was crossing the Channel and coming towards them. It was realized that the biggest raid yet of the conflict was heading towards the Kent coast. The plots on the large map showed that the build up of German aircraft was increasing and covering a wider area. The information was passed on to Group HQ. The usual procedure of the Luftwaffe attacks was after the Channel crossing, the formations would split up upon reaching the English coast, and it was presumed that this would be no different.

The huge armada of German aircraft were now over the coast and within the range of the Observer Corps posts. They reported in to the Maidstone HQ that "_Enemy sighted, 100 plus, 20,000_," but within moments, they would lift the telephone again, "_Further to my last report.....make that 200 plus_," and so it continued. In reality, a total of some 1,100 aircraft were crossing the English coastline consisting of 372 medium-heavy bombers, 200 Bf 110s with bomb loads and 642 Bf 109s flying as escorts, with one main target in mind, London.

The target for this first London raid was the large dock and residential area on the banks of the Thames east of the city. The majority of aircraft for the raid were from Luftflotte 2 along with KG 26 and KG 30 from Luftflotte 5 who had transferred to the area in the last two days. Once over the Kent coast, the huge armada of German bombers and their escorts broke into separate groups with each one seemingly heading for a different target.

Fighter Command became bewildered as the change in direction saw many of the bombers heading away from the sector airfields and away from patrolling RAF fighters. Adding to the confusion for the plotters was the disappearing and re-emergence of formations as they made their way towards England. As soon as one formation was plotted another appeared and headed over the Channel. The Luftwaffe did its best to confuse the British and keep the main objective, London, hidden from the observers. Seeing the size of the approaching formation, Keith Park ordered every squadron covering London into the air. The dispersal's at Northolt, Kenley, Croydon, Hendon, North Weald and Hornchurch all became an immediate hub of activity. By 16:20 hours, RAF No.1 Squadron (Hurricanes) completed its scramble, as did RAF No.303 Squadron (Hurricanes), RAF No. 504 Squadron (Hurricanes), and RAF No. 501 Squadron (Hurricanes). Expecting the assault to be directed at the sector airfields, all squadrons were ordered into positions that would provide protection for the important sector stations and such installations as the oil refinery at Thameshaven. The station controllers were still undecided as to which were really the targets, but the general feeling was that the fighter station surrounding London would be one of the first targets. It was of no surprise when the first squadrons scrambled were directed to give cover to the all important airfields. Within thirty minutes, Fighter Command had twenty three squadrons in the air. Most had been vectored to cover the aerodromes around London while others had been vectored towards the Thames Estuary to meet the phalanx of aircraft, one and a half miles high and covering nearly 800 square miles sky.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 6, 2010)

_(7 September 1940 continued....)_

It took Duxford's "Big Wing" twenty minutes to gain formation. This had been the first time that the "Big Wing" had officially been involved in large scale operational combat with 11 Group. It was Bader's plan, that his wing of thirty-six fighter planes should be scrambled early and meet the Germans in advance of the Maidstone area, with the purpose of disrupting the German bombers. Once the bombers had been forced to scatter, it would then make it easier for the fighters of 11 Group to attack. The length of time that it took the "Big Wing" to gain formation, was again by far too long. They had to climb to a height of 20,000 feet to put them in an advantageous position. The outcome was that they were attacked by Bf 109s while still climbing, and because of this, they could not make contact with the German bombers at their vectored position near Maidstone. They did however manage to make contact with a German formation over the Thames Estuary and again their results were more than favorable.

From the French coast, the huge armada of German bombers flew in a direct line across the Channel towards the Kent coast, just as they had done on previous occasions. The flight pattern used was also the same as had been done previously, and it was this that had Fighter Command fooled as they were to believe that the airfields were again to be attacked. But on reaching the English coastline, many formations broke into smaller groups, and at their varying altitudes changed direction, criss crossing the flight paths of the formations below them. One group, flew almost north-west, then once over the Guildford area turned north flying over Windsor and Maidenhead, then making a circle around the city of London, headed towards their target of the dock area and industrial borough of West Ham. One large formation started to head towards the west of London, while another turned to the north-east as if to go up the east coast of Essex and Suffolk. The first formation consisting of eighty bombers in three flights with heavy fighter escort, made its way up the Thames River towards London at 1700 hours. Two other groups, once over the coast near Beachy Head turned north as if to make towards the coast of Essex, but once over the Thames close to the Isle of Sheppy, turned west following the River Thames until they reached the London docks and West Ham. Another group took the direct line and from the coast of Kent flew directly towards the east end of London. For the Luftwaffe, it was a well thought out plan. They succeeded in confusing Fighter Command who had no idea that the Luftwaffe target was London's dockland area and the industrial and heavily populated east end.

RAF No.501 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.249 Sqd (Hurricanes) made some inroads to the north of Rochester, but the first load of bombs had already been unleashed on the oil storage tanks at Thameshaven which was still burning from the raid the previous day. There was little chance that they could get near to the bombers as they were outnumbered by ten to one by the Bf 109 escorts. The Hurricanes of RAF No.249 Sqd suffered badly at the hands of the Bf 109s over Maidstone and lost six aircraft. Park wanted to know where the Duxford wing had got to and remarked that they should have intercepted the German bombers in the vicinity of Rochford and Maidstone, where the addition of thirty-six fighters could have assisted RAF No.501 Sqd and RAF No.249 Sqd and made more of an impact on splitting up the bomber formation. The Heinkels and Dorniers with their escort of Bf 109s and Bf 110s continued the path along the Thames although many of the escorts had to turn back because of their fuel situation, and some of the bombers had turned back after unleashing their bombs on Thameshaven. But as many as 230 continued on towards London with no British fighters there to infiltrate or stop their progress.

With the Spitfires and Hurricanes kept busy on the fringes of their flight path, the German bombers flew at a much higher altitude than normal escaping the bursting shells from the anti aircraft fire down below. The bombers flew towards London as if in a great procession, with different formations flying at different levels. While this huge formation continued its course along the Thames, the other large formation that was approaching from the south was intercepted by RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires) over Dartford in Kent and slightly to the south-east of London. The mixture of Dorniers and Heinkels was again protected by their Bf 109 escorts. The RAF No.609 Sqd squadron leader positioned his squadron to attack when suddenly the bombers changed direction, ready for their attack on the dockland area of London. The coordinated attack by RAF No.609 Sqd was now off guard. It appeared that Fighter Command was not going to gain the upper hand. There were just far too many bombers and escorts. RAF No.609 Sqd managed to destroy two Dorniers, two Bf 110s and a Bf 109 and surprisingly without loss to themselves.

The vast mixture of Dornier Do17s, Heinkel He 111s and Junkers Ju 88s first dropped their bombs with great accuracy on Woolwich Arsenal on the south side of the River Thames and the entrance to London's dockland. Helmut Staal, in the leading flight of bombers of II./KG 76, reported,


> "_It had been an easy flight up from the Thames Estuary and along the Thames. There was no opposition and we felt that we had the whole sky to ourselves, we were at 5.000 feet. The docks at Woolwich stood out almost as if beckoning for us to release our bombload. Through the glass canopy I could see tall cranes and the long square shape of the three main docks, I lined them up carefully, and as I pressed the release button I looked elsewhere at the huge mass of buildings and warehouses below then just caught a glimpse of the sticks of bombs as they kinked from side to side as they fell towards earth." _


The huge factory of Harland and Woolfe suffered almost total destruction, and the munitions factory at Woolwich was also hit. Here the shells for the Army were manufactured, and with just one hit the gunpowder storage bins erupted causing great sheets of flame to rise hundreds of feet into the air. Another wave of bombers rained their bomb loads down on the Royal docks at North Woolwich. Queen Victoria dock, King George V dock, Royal Albert dock and many backwaters blazed from end to end. Large ships that had brought in supplies were hit and themselves were on fire. Other important docks at Millwall, Wapping right up to St Katherine's dock near Tower Bridge were ablaze. Some forty miles of warehouses along the Thames had been hit and were a blazing fury. Many people had to be evacuated by boat. "_Send all the pumps you've got_," pleaded one fire officer, "_the whole bloody world's on fire_." One of the problems facing the fire-fighters was that the level of the Thames had fallen in the dry summer and they had difficulty in getting their pumps to work.

But it was not just the docks themselves that suffered this unforeseen onslaught. The heavily populated area of London's east end was regarded as the poorer side of the city. These were the battling workers, the slums, a different class of people that resided to the south and to the west of London. West Ham, Silvertown, Canning Town, East Ham, Poplar, Stratford, Wapping and Whitechapel all became enveloped in a blazing fury. Factories and terraced houses were destroyed. The fire brigades in all the suburbs were fighting a losing battle that was to continue on for another four hours as wave after wave of German bombers came over and dropped, instantaneous, incendiaries.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 6, 2010)

_(7 September 1940 continued......)_

Finally realizing that London was the target, RAF Fighter Command scrambled a few fighter squadrons and intercepted the bombers as they returned to France, mauling the withdrawing attackers especially the escorting Bf 110s who were at their maximum range and were forced to withdraw from the combat as quickly as possible. If it was to be any advantage to Fighter Command, while the bombers were over the east end of London, their Bf 109 escorts had long since made the return trip back to their bases because of the fuel situation. This was to be one of the longest and busiest days so far for the pilots. Time and time again they had to return back to base for refueling and rearming. Two, three, four even maybe five sorties in one day. But as the bombers turned back and headed for home, the Spitfires and Hurricanes tore into the defenseless and unescorted bombers.

RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn had left Northolt with 11 Hurricanes, heading towards Essex. They were to rendezvous with RAF No. 1 Squadron which took off first. F/Lt. Forbes took the Squadron to 24,000 ft. and got into position above and partially up sun, waiting for a formation of about 40 Do 17s with Bf 109s. RAF No. 1 attacked first and then F/Lt. Forbes led the Squadron in an attack on the Bomber's quarter head on out of the sun. RAF No. 303 claimed 10 Do17s and 3 Bf109s destroyed and 2 Do17s and 2 Bf109s probable while losing P/O. Daszewski wounded and taken to Waldershire Hospital Selstead,.

But while seven RAF Squadrons fired on the first wave of bombers leaving London, more German bombers approached the city and dropped their loads. Between 1745 hours and 1810 hours, wave after wave of German aircraft attacked the city. Although, Spitfires and Hurricanes were dispatched as each flight was detected and intercepted, enough bombers reached their targets and dropped their loads that by evening, the East End docks were in flames. Bombs had fallen on the areas of Poplar, Woolwich, Limehouse, Tottenham, Barking and Croydon, causing heavy destruction and numerous fires.

Leigh-Mallory's "Big Wing" that had missed the interception of the incoming bombers, managed to attack the first wave after they had dropped their bombload and headed for home. All squadrons were still airborne even as light started to fade and eventually Fighter Command had to be content in letting the bombers return unmolested in the dark.

But all was not finished. At 20:22 hours, as many of the attacking bombers were returning home, another wave was crossing the Kent coast at Beachy Head. They could hardly be seen against the night sky, and what a target they would have been if Fighter Command had an effective night fighter squadron available, as this formation did not have the protection of a Bf 109 escort. The flames from the dock areas burned through the night, lighting the way for Hugo Sperle's Luftflotte 3 bomber formations onto the city in the first of a coordinated Luftwaffe day and night attack. Because of a possibility of collision during the night, Luftflotte 3 sent those units that were not engaged during the day, in continuous single aircraft flights, all following the same route over London. The fires allowed the bombers to achieve an almost 90% accuracy when 333 tons of explosive and 13,000 incendiaries were dropped on the city throughout the evening. The bombing continued well into the night, in fact, the total bombing lasted for seven hours. The last bomber dropped its load at 0430 hours.

On hearing about the destruction, Göring, so pleased with himself, immediately telegraphed his wife Emmy and told her that _"....the English have had enough". _He also broadcast on German radio to the German people, that this being the first blow while he had been in charge of the battle, over half of London now lay in ruins and that he had struck a serious blow...straight at the enemy's heart. “_London is in flames!” _he bellowed. The Berlin press and propaganda machine stated that the attack on London was a reprisal attack for the British bombing of Berlin. They stated that the air raids on London of the 7th/8th September was a great success and that the British people would now be frightened into submission now that the glorious Luftwaffe not only caused a great firestorm from the city to the edge of the Thames Estuary, but during the afternoon an already depleted British Air Force was overcome by the might of the Luftwaffe.

So began the Night Blitz. Every night, except for one single night, for the next seventy-six nights, London experienced raids of from sixty to 260 German bombers each evening, causing more destruction and damage.

Losses: Luftwaffe 41: Fighter Command 26. 

By the end of the combined attack, the Luftwaffe had lost forty-one aircraft including sixteen Bf 109s with eleven of the pilots becoming Prisoners of War, including Oblt. Hans Krug of 4./JG 26 with nine victories and Ofw. Gotthard Goltzsche of 1./JG 77. Several were missing in action like Ofw. Fritz Ströhlein of 2./JG 51 with five victories and Uffz. Willi Melchert from 5./JG 2. But the RAF also lost pilots when twenty-eight fighters were shot down during the battle with thirteen pilots killed or missing. Several Experten added to their scores including Kommodore Major Mölders, when he downed a Spitfire over London. Oblt. Helmut Wick of 6./JG 2 reached twenty-five kills with the destruction of a Spitfire and Major Hannes Trautloft of Stab./JG 54 reached seven kills with a Hurricane shot down over Maidstone. Double kill claims were awarded to Ofw. Georg Schott of 2.(J)/LG 2, Uffz. Günther Seeger of 3./JG 2, Ofw. Max Buchholz of 1./JG 3, Lt. Helmut Meckel of 1./JG 3, Lt. Heinz Ebeling of 9./JG 26, Oblt. Hermann Staiger of 7./JG 51 and Oblt. Wilhelm Hobein of 5./ZG 76. Ofw. Erich Rudorffer of 2./JG 2 was awarded the destruction of three Spitfires over the Thames Estuary. After 147 combat missions over England, Ofw. Heinrich Hoffmann of 3./JG 51 claimed his first victory, when he shot down a RAF Spitfire fighter.

The British were surprised and disheartened by the day's activities. The Luftwaffe had succeeded in heavily attacking London with little interference from Fighter Command. Part of this was because of a new tactic ordered by Reichsmarschall Göring that the Jagdwaffe would now stay with the bombers as protection. With almost double and sometimes triple the number of fighters over bombers, the RAF had a hard time getting to the bombers. But this tactic also reduced the effectiveness of the German fighter and many pilots hated this order. As the Staffelkapitän of 2./JG 26, Fritz Losigkeit, stated;


> " _When we escorted the first sorties against London, it rained Spitfires and Hurricanes. Because the bombers flew quite slowly, we constantly had to dance backwards and forwards in order to stay with them. If they made a sharp left or right turn, we broke away and had to get back to the bombers because the English fighters immediately went for the gaps."_


But the tactic worked for now as London burned. It had proved to be, the largest bombing raid ever made against a British city and claimed the lives of 448 civilians and a further 1,337 were seriously injured as rows of houses, buildings and warehouses collapsed into the inferno. Mr Albert Ernest Dolphin (b. 1896), a porter, died when he flung himself under a falling wall, saving the life of a nurse trapped after a bomb hit the South-Eastern Hospital, New Cross. (George Cross)

*GERMANY*: One of the largest flying boats ever built, the Blohm and Voss BV 222 ‘Wiking’ prototype was first flown. Piloted by Flugkapitaen Helmut Rodig, the six engined aircraft was also destined to be one of the largest flying boats to become operational during the war. Soon after the test flights, the flying boat was fitted with enlarged doors for transport duties with the Luftwaffe.

*WESTERN FRONT*: After undergoing night-fighter training and spending a short spell at the Erprobungsstelle Rechlin, Oblt. Gordon Gollob, ex-Staffelkapitän of 3./ZG 76, was transferred to II./JG 3 based on the Channel front.

Hptm. Max Dobislav was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 27 in place of Hptm. Joachim Schlichting. Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 was transferred to the 9 Staffel of JG 2.

Oblt. Helmut Lent was appointed Staffelkapitän of 6./NJG 1, based at Deelen in Holland. Initially he could not come to terms with the different techniques required for night fighting.


----------



## Airframes (Sep 7, 2010)

Good stuff again Chris. That's an impressive bomb plot map BTW. I notice the road an aunt of mine lived on was hit, in Plumstead.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 7, 2010)

*8 September 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The last of the German bombers left London and headed for home hoping to cross the Channel before the first light of day emerged. With the exception of the hour just before 2000 hours, London had been subjected to nearly twelve hours of continuous bombing.

As the first light of 8 September started to break through, the picture of the experiences of the late afternoon bombing and the continued onslaught throughout the night began to emerge. The East End probably suffered the worst, but serious damage was done to areas south of the River Thames as well as the outer city areas between Aldgate and Ludgate Hill. Fires were still raging in bond stores and the dock areas around North Woolwich. Nothing escaped the tons of bombs and incendiaries that were dropped. The Royal Albert Dock, Queen Victoria Dock and King George V Dock were burning infernos, ships were damaged and the industrial areas of Custom House, Silvertown and Canning Town were still burning fiercely as raw materials added fuel to the timbers and structure of the many buildings. On the other side of the road, homes were demolished and others so badly damaged that they became uninhabitable. The damage went as far inland as Barking, East Ham, West Ham and Bethnal Green, areas that were highly populated and classed as residential. South of the Thames, the situation was almost as bad, and what made this worse, was the fact that most of the south side was residential until reaching Deptford. Again, as north of the Thames, houses were demolished, others became unrecognizable as walls and roofs lay in shambles in back gardens and in roadways.

The huge pall of smoke bellowing from the warehouses and docks could be seen for miles. Fires raged right up to London's Tower Bridge where the St. Katherine's Dock which lies almost adjacent was engulfed in flame. The area of Wapping where hundreds of bond stores and shipwright stores were built on top of each other separated only by a network of narrow streets, was ablaze. Firemen and ambulance men had a terrible time in this area as many of the streets had been blocked by fallen brick walls and burst water mains. Whole streets had been destroyed and many other houses demolished. But the people of East London gathered their possessions together and piled them into perambulators and carried on with their usual amazing spirit. To many Londoners' this had been the first time that they had really experienced the effects of saturation bombing. After almost twelve hours of non-stop continuous bombing, the people emerged from shelters, basements and underground stations, wherever they thought that may have been safe. Many had heard on the radio overnight that "_German Military forces have been reported to have landed on the south coast of England....."_ and many were afraid to emerge. But on the early morning news broadcasts it was confirmed that no enemy paratroop sightings had been made, nor had any German ships or barges crossed the Channel during the night and that it was perfectly safe with no need to confine oneself into an air raid shelter. But for those at Fighter Command, and at the sector and satellite stations, today was to be just 'another day at the office'.

Much of the morning was quiet with several Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights off Start Point, Portland, East Anglia and the Estuary, the Isle of Wight and Beachy Head. The only action of any significance was a Spitfire claimed shot down at 09:40 hours. The claim was denied to the fighter pilot, one Fhr. Hans-Joachim Marseille of 1.(J)/LG 2.

The main Luftwaffe raid of the day was a formation of about 100 aircraft sent to attack the airfields around Kent and Essex. At around 11:30 hours, the formation of about twenty Do17 bombers with thirty Bf 109s of JG 2 and JG 53 as escort crossed the coast near Deal as it headed on a north-westerly course. RAF No.41 Sqd. (Spitfires), already on routine patrol, were vectored towards the Dover area, while RAF No.46 Sqd. (Hurricanes), RAF No.222 Sqd. (Spitfires) and RAF No.605 Sqd. (Hurricanes) were scrambled to intercept. RAF No.41 Sqd. was first on the scene as the formation began crossing the coast at Deal. The Spitfires dived in to attack the bombers but the Bf 109s were soon onto them and they were forced to engage combat with the Bf 109s while the bomber formation continued across Kent. One of the Bf 109s took a hit but did not crash. One Spitfire was seen to leave a trail of smoke, and disappeared from the scene.

RAF No.41 Sqd. were hopelessly outnumbered fighting the Bf 109s on their own, but were relieved when RAF No.46 Sqd. arrived followed soon after by RAF No.605 Sqd. One of the Hurricanes of RAF No.46 Sqd. was damaged by a Bf 109 and was forced to break off and return to base. Within minutes while over the Isle of Sheppy another Hurricane of RAF No.46 Sqd. was shot down, the pilot managed to bale out but was dead when found by wardens, his aircraft having crashed at Bearsted. One of the Hurricanes of RAF No.605 Sqd. became involved with a Bf 109 over Tunbridge and took heavy cannon fire. The British pilot managed to bale out and the aircraft crashed and exploded in flames at Trottiscliffe. The Bf 109s swept in again, and in quick succession claimed two more Hurricanes of RAF No.46 Sqd.

Although badly mauled, RAF No. 46 Sqd. kept up the attack, and together with RAF No. 222 Sqd. and RAF No. 605 Sqd. chased one of the Bf 109s and shot it down near Sevenoaks while two Hurricanes moved in and finally brought down one of the Do17s over Maidstone. Forcing the scattered Dorniers inland, many came under attack by AA gunfire in which two more of the bombers were brought down, both near Maidstone. The bomber formations failed to reach their target which was to be London, and were turned back. Some bombs were dropped in Kent, particularly in rural areas near Dartford where a fire broke out at a station. At West Malling a large number of bombs were apparently directed at the Aerodrome at 1234 hours. In the neighborhood telephones, water and gas services, 50 houses and the Southern Railway line were damaged and road A20 was blocked. Detling was bombed at 1300 hours. Otherwise little serious damage was caused and casualties were small.

Lost in the dogfights was Oblt. Hans Kunert of 8./JG 53 who was killed in the action. He had nine victories against the Allies. But several pilots claimed kills against the RAF including three Hurricanes by Oblt. Helmut Wick of 6./JG 2 whose score now stood at twenty-eight victories. Oblt. Hans Hahn of 4./JG 2 reached fifteen kills with a Hurricane destroyed and Oblt. Ignaz Prestele of 2./JG 53, Oblt. Franz Götz of 7./JG 53 and Lt. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 each added a Hurricane to their scoreboard.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 7, 2010)

_(8 september 1940 continued......)_

The second attack was on a smaller scale, and commencing at 1930 hours, was directed to the London area. It appeared to be the prelude to the night operations. The air raid sirens sounded again in London as bombers from Luftflotte 3 including Do17s, He 111s and Ju 88s crossed the Coast between Beachy Head and Shoreham. It was now almost dark, too late for Fighter Command to do anything about it. Again, as it was on the previous night all the bombers were loaded with high explosive bombs, delayed action bombs and incendiaries. Londoners were subjected to the steady, dull drone of the engines of some 250 bombers overhead, then, the drone was broken by the sudden shrill whistling sound as sticks of bombs came down, the whistle getting louder as the bombs got to a few hundred feet above them.

Luftwaffe raids continued to penetrate the London area from dusk onwards in a steady stream, originating from Cherbourg. As nighttime arrived, a large formation of bombers, He 111's, Ju 88's and Do17's, approached the Thames area at altitude, giving away their target of London and once more bombs rained down on the docklands and surrounding areas throughout the night claiming the lives of hundreds of people. There were continuously about five raids in the area. There was a lull about 0100 hours, but by 0200 hours activity had increased, with about twenty raids in the South Eastern counties, including the London area. Many of the warehouses along the Thames again became targets, and buildings that were still burning were re-stoked. The inferno was to light up once again, with hundreds of fires, many joining together to become one. The damage was to be more widespread on this night as bombers targeted more inland residential areas, while others again went for railway stations and city buildings. Major fires were reported in several districts including - Commercial Road East, Twickenham (a timber yard), Borough High Street (next to a Gunpowder Factory), Surrey Commercial Docks, Greenwich, Wandsworth (Vacuum Oil Co) and at Wimbledon Station (train fired). Also hit were County Hall, London Hospital, St Thomas' Hospital, the London Fire Brigade Station (Whitechapel), LMS Junction at East Ham and a public shelter at Islington. Every Metropolitan borough and 60 local authority areas reported bomb damage, large fires overtaking Berger Paints in Homerton, Madame Tussauds and Baker Street. Three hospitals were hit, Fulham Power Station was set on fire and many bombs dropped indiscriminately fell close to the Thames. Major incidents occurred at Acton, Leyton, Poplar and at Broad Street Station. the Embankment was flooded at Chelsea. 

The casualty rate on this night totaled 412 people dead with 747 injured. Compared to the previous night, that was more people killed, but the injured list was much lighter. At Victoria Station a train was hit and the driver killed. All the tracks were blocked between London Bridge and New Cross. No trains were run between Waterloo and Clapham Junction, all due to the presence of unexploded bombs.

Losses: Luftwaffe 25 : Fighter Command 6. 

The Luftwaffe lost twenty-five aircraft damaged or destroyed, including one He 111 from KG 55 that crashed on the return flight at Villacoublay airfield, France due to damage from anti-aircraft fire, thirty pilots and aircrew killed or missing and seven wounded. 5./KG 27 were assigned to a night nuisance raid on Liverpool. Taking off from Brest shortly before 23.00 hours, a He 111P-2 failed to lift off the runway, struck obstacles at the end of its run, crashed and burned. Fw. Heinz Klempien (FF) and Gefr. Kurt Bengeser (BO) were killed and Gefr. Willi Hey (BS) was injured.

For Fighter Command the afternoon period was quiet, with no activity at all. Personnel at all of the aerodromes were now working in far more pleasant circumstances to repair damaged airfields. It had been two whole days, and not one of Fighter Commands aerodromes had suffered any enemy attack. It was just what Air Vice Marshal Keith Park (Commander of 11 Group) wanted. Airfield damage had been repaired, damaged buildings were being made habitable and aircraft were either being repaired or undergoing minor servicing thus building up squadron strength which in Park's view would be . . .


> " _Göring's greatest mistake, and one that would cost him the Battle of Britain_."


The Luftwaffe was losing the initiative.


----------



## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Sep 7, 2010)

Excellent work Chris! Thank you sir!


----------



## syscom3 (Sep 7, 2010)

What was the Spitfire and Hurricane production for these couple of weeks of the BOB?


----------



## Hop (Sep 8, 2010)

According to Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin:

August 25 - 31 
Hurricanes - 54 (+9 imported from Canada)
Spitfires - 37
Total - 100

September 1 - 7
Hurricanes - 54
Spitfires - 36
Total - 90

16 Hurricanes were sent abroad between 25 Aug and 7 Sept.

Edit: corrected the numbers, had the wrong weeks down first time.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 8, 2010)

Thanks Hop. Anybody know if any of these were used for the shipping to Malta? Operation Hurry and Operation Coat? Might have reduced the number.

duh. I guess thats the ones sent abroad.


----------



## syscom3 (Sep 8, 2010)

Thanks Hop.

Looks like the Spit production was 5 per day. The RAF would have at sit out a couple of weeks just to bring its Spifire totals up to an acceptable level.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 8, 2010)

*9 September 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Besides an early morning attack on a trawler, 25 miles east of Lowestoft, the Luftwaffe was inactive for the first part of the day. It was now obvious to Dowding and Park that the Luftwaffe was going to leave the 11 Group aerodromes alone. Already damaged airfields were just about back to a reasonable sort of order, the personnel that had been toiling both night and day busily rebuilding to make all airfields fully operational again could ease off a little. Aircraft and supplies had been replenished and although Fighter Command was nowhere yet back to full strength, they were a lot stronger than they were just seven days ago. Again, no German formations were detected during the morning or the early and mid afternoon sessions.

Luftwaffe tactics when targeting the aerodromes, commenced generally with a morning attack - with the last few days, when the aerodromes had been left alone, there had been no early morning attacks. It seemed that bombing raids on London were forming a pattern of commencing a few hours after midday. Park issued the order that Hornchurch, Biggin Hill and Kenley push some of their squadrons forward to their satelite stations.

Apart from patrols in Calais/Boulogne area, there was little German activity until 1605 hours when the formations began to mass in the Calais/Boulogne area. From 1655 hours on, an attack of some 300 aircraft on the South East crossed the Coast between North Foreland and Cover. A number of Bf 109s this time were slightly ahead of the main bomber force, obviously hoping that they would draw British fighters into the air. Air Vice Marshal Keith Park instructed that the advance party of Bf 109s were to be left alone. With the German bombers following a similar course as they did just two days previous, it seemed obvious that the target was again London. Park exclaimed to his controllers;


> "_When will they ever learn.....same time, same course and the same target I would say_."


Twenty-four Squadrons of British fighters were detailed to this attack, inflicting heavy casualties.

RAF No. 66 Sqd.(Spitfires) and RAF No. 92 Squadron (Spitfires) were ordered to patrol over South London keeping both aerodromes within sight. RAF No.222 Sqd. (Spitfires), RAF No. 253 Sqd. (Hurricanes) and RAF No.605 Sqd. (Hurricanes) were to cover the northern section of Kent, while later RAF No. 303 Sqd. (Hurricanes) were ordered to patrol from Tonbridge to Folkestone. From Tangmere, RAF No.607 Sqd. (Hurricanes) were ordered towards Guildford to cover the area over Surrey as far as Biggin Hill.

Finally from 12 Group Duxford released RAF No.19 Sqdn (Spitfires), RAF No.242 Sqdn (Hurricanes) and RAF No.310 (Czech) Sqdn (Hurricanes) and they were vectored to a point between Hornchurch and North Weald and at 20,000 feet provided close protection in the absence of the 11 Group fighters. Again Bader was to ignore orders. the late afternoon sun would be setting in the west by the time they would be near London, and he wanted to make any attack with the sun behind him so he ordered the squadrons to the west of London and climb to 22,000 feet.

RAF No.607 Sqdn Tangmere (Hurricanes) were one of the first British squadrons to make contact. A leading formation of He 111s and Do17s with a Bf 109 escort from JG 3 and JG 26 were just to the east of Guildford heading towards Weybridge and Brooklands. The Hurricanes lined up the formation and went in before the escorts could get down at them. Coming in just in time was RAF No.605 Sqdn who also commenced an attack on the bombers. One Do17 was brought down by RAF No.607 Sqdn, but one of the Hurricanes of RAF No.605 Sqdn collided with a He 111, shearing off a portion of the wing while taking evasive action in trying to avoid gunfire from both the RAF No.607 Sqdn Hurricanes, the bombers and Bf 109s. The Heinkel crashed at Alton in Hampshire. Sadly No. 607 squadron had suffered six aircraft lost on their first day in action. Another Hurricane of RAF No.605 was hit by crossfire and the pilot baled out safely.

Twelve Hurricanes of RAF No.303 (Polish) Sqdrn were scrambled and led by F/Lt. Kent. Victories over Bf 109s were claimed by Zumbach and Frantisek, while a Bf 110 was shot down by F/Lt. Kent. Sgt. Frantisek also claimed a kill over a He 111, but it was awarded as a 'probable' (the Heinkel actually made it back to base, with two crew members killed and one wounded). Sgt. Wunsche was shot down and he baled out, while Sgt. Frantisek crash-landed, uninjured - his Hurricane totally destroyed.

Up to 1730 hours the main trend was towards the Estuary and South London, though one raid of about thirty-five aircraft penetrated to Central London. This bomber formation was approaching London from the east when they were intercepted by RAF No.222 Sqdn and RAF No.242 Sqdn. The German formation consisted of Do17s and Bf 110s with Bf 109 escorts from JG 27, JG 53 and JG 54. RAF No.222 Sqdn made their attack and claimed a damaged Do 17 but P/O Tim Vigors was attacked by Bf 109s, found his engine shattered by cannon fire and was forced to crash land his aircraft. Although RAF No.19 Sqd. had been scattered, by now they had reformed and were joined by RAF No.310 (Czech) Sqdn and the 'Big Wing' was now in place and about to show how thirty-three fighter aircraft could cause havoc amongst the Germans. Sqn. Ldr. Bader led the 'Duxford Wing' in the battles over Kent and Surrey with Spitfires of RAF No. 19 Squadron and Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 242 and 310 (Czech) Squadrons where they engaged the Do17s and Bf110s. Between them, they were to claim twenty-one German aircraft destroyed with many others damaged and a few claimed as probables. If Bader had adhered to orders, they would have been flying helplessly around North Weald and Hornchurch which neither was attacked. AVM Park would have lodged an official complaint for the Duxford Wing disobeying orders, but in light of its success, no complaint was ever lodged.

While the combat action by the 'Big Wing' over South London was still in progress, most of the British squadrons were still in the air scattering the German bomber formations from Thames Haven to West London. By now the sky was once again full of contrails as the aerial battles raged for around 90 minutes and had involved nearly 300 German aircraft along with Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 1, 242, 253, 303, 310, 605 and 607 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 19, 41, 66, 92, 222, 602 and 611 Squadrons. RAF No. 92 Sqdrn lost three Spitfires in a battle over its Biggin Hill base. But the great significance of the day was that very few bombers got through to their targets.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 8, 2010)

_(9 September 1940 continued....)_

Now that the Luftwaffe had decided to abort any serious attacks on Fighter Command airfields and turned its attention on inland targets as well as London, Air Vice Marshal Keith Park had more time to assess the situation and give the British greater time to intercept the Germans. AVM Park had also sent out the instruction that squadrons should as far as possible work in pairs. Kesselring's views on this move by Fighter Command were that he agreed that Park's order was actually working. Not only that, Fighter Command was a much stronger organization than the tattered remnants of a defeated defense as German sources had earlier imagined. Because of this, formation leaders had now been given instruction, that should they meet up with what they would consider stiff opposition, they may order the formation to disengage. This order was given by the German High Command.

Adhering to the instruction from Gruppe Headquarters to "_Break off task if fighter opposition is too strong_" the German raid was aborted. Many bombers instead dropped their loads over the countryside, causing little damage. Some bombs were dropped in the London suburbs south of the River. Bombs were also dropped in Kent, notably at Canterbury. Casualties were few. The remnant of the German formations made the most of their retreat back across the Channel and although Fighter Command did sustain a number of losses, it could only be claimed as being not only a tactical victory for the RAF but a morale boosting one as well.

The Luftwaffe lost twenty-eight aircraft for the day while the RAF had lost nineteen fighters. JG 27 was among the hardest hit with Uffz. Karl Born of 7./JG 27 killed in action and the Gruppe-Adjutant Oblt. Günther Bode of Stab I./JG 27 and Oblt. Erwin Daig, the Staffelkapitän of 5./JG 27, both forced down and taken prisoner. Oblt. Bode's Bf 109 was hit in the radiator on the first pass by Spitfires near London. He turned for home but the engine overheated and he made a forced landing near Mayfield. Oblt. Daig was attacked by Spitfires at 20,000 feet and hit in his fuel and engine cooling system. He made a forced landing at Charity Farm near Parham. Both Messerschmitts were used as displays by the British for several months. Uffz. Heinrich Höhnisch of 1./JG 53 was also shot down and made a prisoner of war.

But the victors of the battle were many for the German side. Though there was much overclaiming on both sides, the Luftwaffe gave credit to several notable Jagdflieger. Kommodore Major Werner Mölders of Stab./JG 51 got his thirty-fifth victory over the RAF when he downed another Spitfire over London. The Kommodore's brother, Oblt. Viktor Mölders of 2./JG 51 got a Spitfire for his eighth victory. Oblt. Gerhard Schöpfel of 9./JG 26 shot down three Spitfires from RAF No 92 Squadron over the Thames Estuary. Double victories were credited to Lt. Eberhard Bock of 3./JG 3, Oblt. Erich Woitke of 6./JG 3, Oblt. Jakob Stoll of 9./JG 53, Lt. Hans Götz of 1./JG 54 and Oblt. Hermann-Friedrich Joppien of 1./JG 51. Also getting credit for kills were Major Dr. Erich Mix of Stab III./JG 2, Hptm. Günther Lützow of Stab./JG 3, Oblt. Willy Stange of 8./JG 3, Oblt. Wolfgang Redlich of 1./JG 27, Oblt. Erbo Graf von Kageneck of 8./JG 27, Lt. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 and Oblt. Hans-Ekkehard Bob of 9./JG 54.

The after dark attacks continued. What Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 had failed to do during the day, Sperle's Luftflotte 3 succeeded at night. The usual stream of raids started to come out of Cherbourg and the Somme about 2000 hours, crossing the coast between Isle of Wight and Dungeness, all proceeding to the London area, where again four to five raids of 250 bombers were maintained for most of the period. Fires were burning around St Paul's and buildings on both sides of Ludgate Hill were ablaze. Major fires were reported in Barbican, Cheapside to Cannon Street (where a building collapsed), Bow, Blackwall and Southwark. The area around the Guildhall and the Bank of England suffered considerably, while a women's hospital suffered many casualties when it was hit. In the East End bombs again fell on the dockland area and a number of nearby residential houses were destroyed including a school which was being used as a temporary shelter to homeless families. Altogether, over 400 people were killed on this night's attacks and 1,400 people were injured. The toll was steadily mounting.

From about 0230 hours the method of approach changed and Luftwaffe activity increased. Raids had by this time practically ceased to come out of the French Coast and were replaced by a larger series of raids from the Dutch Islands via the Thames Estuary into the London area, homing over Dungeness. Soon after 0430 hours the last raids were leaving the London area and by 0455 hours the country was clear of German raids.

German aircraft visited the areas of Birmingham, Liverpool, Derby and Nottingham about midnight. Bombers of I./KG 27 took off from Tours, France and raided the city of Liverpool but no major damage was reported. The Lancashire Steel Corporation's Works were hit and a Blast Furnace damaged.

It was not known at the time, but this was to be the commencement of a fifty-seven day long onslaught by the German bombers on London. They were determined to crush the city and its people.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The OKL issued a report for 9 September:


> "_The maintaining of the attack against London is intended to take place by day through Luftflotte 2 with strong fighter and destroyer units; by night Luftflotte 3 will carry out attacks with the object of destroying harbor areas, the supply and power sources of the city. The city is divided into two target areas, the eastern part of London is target A with its widely stretched out harbor installations. Target area B is the west of London, which contains the power supplies and the provision installations of the city. Along with this major attack on London the destruction raids will be carried on as much as possible against many sectors of the armament industry and harbor areas in England in their previous scope."_


Oblt. Helmut Wick was promoted to Hauptmann and appointed Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 2. Hptm Franz-Heinz Lange took over as Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 77 when Hptm Karl Hentschel transferred out.

*GERMANY*: Press sources report that all Berlin householders have received printed instructions urging them to stay at home and retire early to enable them to sleep for several hours before midnight. They are asked to set their alarm clocks for midnight and to remain dressed.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 9, 2010)

*10 September 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Low cloud and periods of heavy rain over Northern Europe stopped any form of Luftwaffe air activity and any operations planned against England had to be canceled. For Fighter Command the day was nothing but a rest day and pilots and command leaders were trying to work out as to why Germany had decided to turn its attacks against London. If an invasion was Germany's highest priority, why the decision to bomb London? For an invasion to be successful, Germany would have to knock out as many military establishments as possible. As ACM Keith Park stated after the war,


> "_The decision to bomb London was Germany's greatest mistake, in those first few days of September our airfields were a shambles, pilot and aircraft strength was still at an all time low. By switching tactics and concentrating on London he will give us the time we need to strengthen our forces_."


Of the attacks of the previous nights, some newspapers made comparisons to the blitzkrieg attacks on a number of towns and cities in northern Europe, and many of the Londoner's abbreviated the name and called the attacks on their city as "The Blitz" and from then on, the name stuck.

For most of the morning there were occasional reconnaissance raids along the South and East Anglian coasts. Small scale attacks were on Portsmouth, Tangmere, Poling and West Malling. At 1230 hours one Dornier crossed the coast near Hastings, penetrated to Central London, and flew out East near Clacton. Two raids, of which one was a Ju 88 flying along Norfolk Coast, flew from Yarmouth to Harwich, and a further raid attacked Yarmouth. Fighter Command decided to leave them alone.

Bomber Command sent RAF No.248 Squadron (Blenheims) on a mission to Norway but this had to be aborted because of deteriorating weather conditions over the North Sea. A flight from RAF No.236 Squadron St Eval (Blenheims) was placed on escort duty for the steamship 'Scillonian' and the mission was successfully completed.

With cloud cover persisting during the late afternoon, British radar picked up various single aircraft coming across the Channel from 1700 hours onwards. With Fighter Command again not responding, a number of attacks were made by the Luftwaffe. A couple of lone bombers ventured into 10 Group territory and made some nuisance drops.

At 1605 hours Tangmere reported that it had come under machine-gun strafing along the tarmac from a Bf 110 or Do17. Another lone raider attacked West Malling again but caused no serious damage. Bombs were dropped on the Aerodrome at 1732 hours; a slight fire resulted and there was one casualty to personnel. Nearby Portsmouth was attacked by single Do17s. Bombs were dropped at a few places, mostly on the coast, in the South East of England. Damage was done to the Southern Railway's Electricity sub-station at Newhaven. The Bf 110s of Epr.Gr 210 along with the long-range fighters of ZG 26 attacked the Supermarine aircraft plant at Woolston.

RAF No.72 Squadron (Spitfires) was one of the few squadrons scrambled and attacked one of the roaming Do 215s and one was brought down, although one of the Spitfires was hit by return gunfire from the bomber and had to make a forced landing at Etchingham (Kent). Just after 1800 hours, a small German formation crossed the coast near Dungeness and targeted Biggin Hill aerodrome, but were intercepted by British fighters and one of the Dorniers of 9./KG 76 was shot down and the mission aborted. Another Spitfire Squadron, RAF No. 602, based at Westhampnett suffered the loss of 3 aircraft trying to land at Tangmere after the raid had dispersed at about 2000 hours. This was due to inexperienced pilots trying to land in fading light at dusk.

By nightfall, the Luftwaffe was again targeting London and this time they were making full use of the cloud cover. Also taking advantage of the weather, attacks were made on industrial areas of South Wales and on the Lancashire area of Merseyside. London was though, the main target where over 150 bombers pounded the city once again. The major damage in the London area caused by bombs during the night, were St Katherine's Dock where a raging fire was out of control, at Islington, in the City (Golden Lane and Aldgate Avenue) at Shadwell where East End Maternity Hospital was set on fire, a major fire on Cable Street, at London Docks (2 large warehouses on fire), at Milwall (Hydraulic Mains burst), in the Mile End Road, a major fire at Durrell's Timber Yard, at Paddington, St Marylebone and Bayswater Road. At Brentwood over 1,000 incendiary bombs were dropped and serious fires were started at a Convent and a Woolworth's Store. At 2220 hours three He 111s of II./KG 27 raided the city of Bristol again.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Reichsmarschall Göring ordered that if the weather situation prevented large-scale operations against London, then surprise daylight attacks by individual bomber aircraft were also to be made on targets associated with the British aircraft industry. These were to be undertaken by crews specially selected for their skill and experience, and were only to be flown in low cloud and often appalling conditions in an attempt to prevent interception by RAF fighters. The missions became known to the Luftwaffe crews as 'Pirateneinsatze' or Pirate Attacks. Epr.Gr 210 and ZG 26, with about ninety aircraft, were temporarily transferred to Luftflotte 3 to carry on these raids.

But RAF Bomber Command also took advantage of the weather conditions. Seventeen Whitleys attacked the Pottsdamer railway station at Berlin causing considerable damage, then went on to attack the Bremen dock area while a Blenheim squadron attacked the important bomber aerodrome at Eindhoven. Eight Heinkel He111 bombers were destroyed, two were badly damaged and another was damaged when it crashed into craters upon landing later.

GrossAdmiral Erich Raeder commented in a report;


> "_There is no sign of the defeat of the enemy's Air Force over southern England or the Channel areas_."


The N.B.B.S., the radio station in pay of the Germans issued an appeal:


> "_We ask our compatriots to join us in a last effort to secure peace_."



Hptm. Heinz Fischer was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of III./KG 1 in place of Major Willibald Fanelsa who was lost on 27 August 1940.

During the late stage of the battle the Regia Aeronautica was instructed to establish a force in Belgium to assist in operations against the British. Formed by the transfer of existing units, Corpo Aereo Italiano (CAI) came into being, under the aegis of 1a Squadra Aerea di Milano. Generale sa (Air Marshal) Rino Corso-Fougier was made Air Officer Commanding. He was reputed to be a brilliant officer and pilot, but his only recent war experience was the short lived campaign when Italy invaded the south of France. There where three Stormi (roughly a RAF Wing). Two of these were bombers and were the striking force, self-protection being provided by the fighter Stormo. With the transport element (twelve Caproni 133Ts, one Savoia-Marchetti S.75, with nine Ca164s for communications) a force of some two hundred aircraft. After the arrival of the force in Belgium Field Marshal Kesselring presented Generale Corso-Fougier with a Fiesler Storch for his personal use. Apart from the military aircraft a Ju52/3m I-BIZI was loaned by the Ala Littorio as courier between Force headquarters and the Stato Maggiore in Rome. Zone of operations allocated to the Italians was bounded by the parallels 53oN and 01oE. The worthwhile targets were along the coast between the Thames and Harwich including the estuaries of the Orwell and Stour. The Regia Aeronautica’s aircraft had been most advanced in the period 1937/1938, but there had been insufficient development from that time. As an example only three G.50bis were fitted with radios and all G.50bis lacked adequate instruments for instrumental navigation. The absolute lack of instrumental flying training for the crews limited the fighters to only daylight patrols and bomber escort missions.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 10, 2010)

*11 September 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: This was the day that Hitler had planned to invade Britain. But in reality, Germany was no where nearer ready for an invasion than they were three or four weeks previous. Britain's coastal defenses still stood firm along the southern and eastern coastlines, naval ports and other small seaports that were being used by the Royal Navy along the southern coast of England were still intact and most of Britain's Civil Defense forces were just waiting for the word that would put them into action. On top of this, RAF Bomber Command had been continually bombing ports from Calais to Boulogne and along the Dutch coast destroying many of the barges that were to be used in "Unternehmen Seelöwe".

RAF Fighter Command was now on standby. The sector controllers had received notification that the Germans had changed tactics from two or three separate attacks during the course of the day, to mass raids of 300 to 400 aircraft that were coming across the Channel in two waves in quick succession. They were not to place too many squadrons to intercept the first wave, and that enough aircraft had to be held back to intercept the second wave which so far had proven to be larger in number than the first. Spitfires were to concentrate on the German fighters that were at higher altitude while the Hurricanes were to attack the bombers and close fighter escort. With the two German waves, generally only fifteen minutes apart, AVM Keith Park ordered that those British squadrons brought to 'readiness' first were to attack the first wave and their escorts. The squadrons available and at "Readiness fifteen minutes" were to attack the second wave.

The morning period was just as quiet as previous mornings of the last four days, and it appeared that things were to take the usual practice of large formations of bombers coming over at about 1700 hours. It was a fine morning, not as warm as many other mornings but pleasant, and many British pilots just lazed around outside their dispersal's doing what they had usually done. Some read old newspapers or magazines, many tried to write letters home while the rest fell asleep taking full advantage of the lull in activities. But after lunch, their afternoon 'siesta' was interrupted by radar detection of a large build-up from Calais to Ostend. The Luftwaffe was to come early today.

At 1445 hours most of the British radar stations along the Kent coast detected and followed the course patterns of a number of German formations that were building up from Calais along to Ostend. The largest of these crossed the coast near Ramsgate. Two large formations of one hundred and fifty bombers each making a total of three hundred in total, escorted by Bf 109s and Bf 110s headed towards the Thames Estuary and the River Thames. One formation crossed between Ramsgate and Deal while the other was further out over the sea. Again, British squadrons from 11 Group and 12 Group 'Duxford Wing' were scrambled. New to the coming battle were squadrons from 10 Group who would deal with the impending operations over Southampton and Portsmouth.

RCAF No.1 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) along with RAF No.222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) and 238 Squadron Middle Wallop (Hurricanes) were in action over central Kent, 17 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 46 Squadron Stapleford (Hurricanes), Spitfires of 72 Squadron Croydon, 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 249 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes) and 266 Squadron Wittering (Spitfires) were involved in heavy combat action spread over the Thames Estuary. 19 Squadron Duxford (Spitfires), 74 Squadron Coltishall (Spitfires) and 266 Squadron had been brought down as usual from 12 Group to protect Hornchurch and North Weald and all of them became involved in action over southern and eastern areas of London. RAF No. 41 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) covered a large area between the Thames Estuary and the Channel while 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) gave cover to the Channel areas over Dover and Folkestone. Other squadrons airborne were 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 303 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) and 605 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes).

Over 300 German aircraft were in the two separate formations and both covered by their Bf 109 escorts flying at higher altitude had crossed the coast between Deal and Foreness then turned 45 degrees over the Thames Estuary and followed the usual pattern of using the River Thames as their flight path. Of these, thirty Luftwaffe aircraft penetrated to Central London but a split, however, turned and flew towards Brooklands. These thirty planes were intercepted by four British Squadrons. Over the Estuary between Herne Bay, Shoeburyness, Gravesend and Tilbury a huge melee of high altitude dogfights developed creating long twisting spirals of vapor trails. Many of the bombers continued on towards London escorted mainly by Bf 110s, the Bf 109s being contained by British fighters. But time was on the side of the RAF fighters, as the 109s were now at the critical stage of their fuel supply. Several of the escorting fighters from JG 2, JG 51, JG 53, JG 54 and LG 2 started to return early and left much of the bombers of KG 1 and KG 26 without an escort.

The leading German bombers had now been spotted by the British fighters from 12 Group. At 23,000 feet, the Spitfires and Hurricanes could now attack with the required height advantage. Leigh-Mallory's 'Big Wing' now contained RAF No. 19 Sqd, RAF No.74 Sqd, RAF No.266 Sqd and RAF No.611 Sqd. Between London and Gravesend the Germans were flying in waves of tight formations of Dorniers, Heinkels (KG 1 and KG 26) and Junkers 88s, with some protecting fighters. Bf 110s were behind the bombers and a formidable force of Bf 109s behind them at about 24,000 feet. It had been arranged that the two Spitfire squadrons in the lead (composite RAF Nos.19 and 266 and RAF No. 611 Sqd) were to attack the fighter escort, while RAF No. 74 Sqd went at the bombers. As RAF No.74 Sqd. went for the force of Junkers 88s, they met German fighters diving on them, but the British fighters continued on to the Junkers. Leigh-Mallory's 'Big Wing' would deal with the Messerschmitts. Eight aircraft of RAF No. 19 Sqd. and six of RAF No.266 Sqd. were leading the Wing. They dived in line astern for a head-on attack on the leading Heinkel 111s and their screening Messerschmitt 110s and Bf 109s. After this first insurgence, 'Red 1', Sqn Ldr B.E. Lane, broke off to port and saw the enemy turning south-east over Sittingbourne in Kent. He went for the nearer of two 110s, blowing bits off its starboard engine and then setting it alight. The other Me 110 opened its throttle and left. RAF No. 19 'Red 1' tried for the Heinkels and saw some flames emerging jaggedly from one, but nothing more. Several bombers were shot down in the attack. A Spitfire from the defending forces was also hit and force landed in Kent. Hptm. Ernst Wiggers of 2./JG 51 was shot down and killed.

In the same melee, the British RAF No. 19 'Green Section' did not have the best of luck. F/O L.A. Haines flying 'Green 1' climbed to attack some forty Bf 110s at a higher altitude than the Heinkels. As usual they went into a defensive circle, but F/O Lane decided to go straight into one of them. As he did so, a Bf 109 came down on him and the Spitfire was hit in both mainplanes and was forced to crash land his aircraft. 'Green 2' was F/O F. Dolezal and he took aim at one of the Bf 109s, and as it went into a slow dive belching black smoke Dolezal followed it down but was hit by a descending Bf 109 and its gunfire ripped open the side of the Spitfire and the pilot sustained injuries in the knee and leg. He managed to get the aircraft back to base and land safely.

12 Hurricanes of RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn had left Northolt and intercepted the enemy raid along with No. 229 Squadron over the Horsham area. The Squadron was at the same level as the bombers and wheeled in to attack the rear as they were a little late. The Polish pilots tried with some success to penetrate the fighter defence and the following enemy casualties were inflicted. F/Lt. Forbes, leading the Squadron claimed 2 Do 215 destroyed and F/O. Henneberg claimed 1 He 111 and 1 Bf109, destroyed. P/O. Zumbach had 1 Bf109 destroyed, F/O. Lokuciewski added 1 Do 215 and 1 Bf109 destroyed and F/Lt Paszkiewicz claimed 1 Bf110 destroyed, Sgt. Szaposznikow shor down 2 Bf110s, Sgt. Brzozowski, 2 He 111s destroyed and Sgt. Wojtowicz claimed 2 Bf109s destroyed. Some of the pilots chased the raiders right over the coast and the formation was broken up.

Port Victoria on the Isle of Grain was attacked and only 36 bombers proceeded to bomb the capital. The bombers that eluded the British fighters dropped their loads onto the dock areas of London again. Warehouses and sheds were set on fire and heavy damage done at the Surrey Commercial Docks as a result of the attack with high explosive and Incendiary bombs. A public shelter was hit in Lewisham High Street where 100 casualties resulted, and 50 people were buried by rubble when Deptford Central Hall was hit.The Woolwich Arsenal was hit as well as much of the dockland areas again. Finsbury, Holborn, Bermondsey and Central London were hit. But this attack on London was a disaster for the Luftwaffe. A formation of He 111s from KG 26 were bombing the northern areas of London, notably Paddington, Finsbury and Islington when they were intercepted by Hurricanes and Spitfires from RAF No.249 Sqd. (Hurricanes), RAF No.609 Sqd. (Spitfires) and RAF No.41 Sqd. (Spitfires). The fighters broke up the formations who tried desperately to evade the deadly Spitfires while the Hurricanes kept the Bf 110 escort at bay and who were fighting desperately for their own survival. Eight Heinkels were shot down in this battle, while twelve more limped back towards home nursing burning aircraft, smoking engines and air conditioned cockpits.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 10, 2010)

_(11 September 1940 continued.......)_
In the meantime, two heavily escorted Luftflotte 3 formations from Cherbourg and Seine Bay were heading towards Southampton and Portsmouth and 10 Group released squadrons from Tangmere, Westhampnett and a flight from Middle Wallop. Most of the British fighters intercepted the Germans off the coast at Selsey Bill and an intense combat ensued. The Bf 109s of JG 27 and the Bf 110s of ZG 76 managed to destroy some of the defending Hurricane and Spitfire fighters. Some of the bombers managed to get through the fighter defense and both the towns of Portsmouth and Southampton received bomb damage. Eight Bf110s dive-bombed the Cunliffe-Owen Aircraft works at Eastleigh, Southampton killing 28 and injuring 70 when a shelter was hit. The bombers also made a dive-bombing attack on Eastleigh Naval Air Station at about 1613 hours without causing any damage. But most of the formations and their escorts were scattered and were forced to turn back.

Geoffrey Wellum was just over 18 years old when he went into combat with No. 92 Squadron for the first time on 11th September: 


> I glance round at the ten brave little Spitfires and a strengthened resolve flows into me. Well, there’s not many of us but we’ll knock **** out of some of you, at least for as long as we can.....It’s absolutely breathtaking. Not long to go now. Brian’s voice is in my earphones. ‘Gannic from leader. OK boys, in we go. A good first burst and away. Watch for 109s.’ Voices over the R/T. Urgency. ’109s above the first lot coming round to six o’clock, 3,000 feet above.’ ‘Six more at four o’clock high.’ ‘I see them, they’re starting to come down, here they come, watch ‘em, Blue Section. Break into them, Blue, break starboard, break, break for Christ’s sake.’....My target, concentrate, the target. Looking at him through the sight, getting larger much too quickly, concentrate, hold him steady, that’s it, hold it … be still my heart, be still. Sight on, still on, steady . . . fire NOW! I press the gun button and all hell is let loose; my guns make a noise like tearing calico.



One hour after these battles several small raids appeared over Kent. The Dover balloons were attacked and single aircraft headed to Colerne, Kenley, Detling and Eastchurch but in no case was the damage severe or the casualties heavy. One formation dive-bombed the convoy "Peewit" between Margate and Dover with an escort from JG 26. In the melee over the convoy several fighters, particularly from III./JG 26 found themselves over Kent and engaged with RAF fighters. Oblt. Joachim Müncheberg of 7./JG 26 downed his nineteenth aircraft when he destroyed a Spitfire east of Ashford at 1925 hours. Five minutes later Lt. Gustav Sprick of 8./JG 26 claimed a Hurricane near Canterbury for his seventeenth kill. Three other pilots from 8./JG 26 also claimed kills. The convoy escort 'Atherstone' was disabled in the attack. 

As the 'Schlageter' pilots headed for home they encountered a British Coastal Command formation of Blenheims returning from a raid on Calais. In an effort by the British to disrupt the German invasion plans, the RAF tried to destroy the invasion preparations on the coast of France. Twelve Fleet Air Arm Albacore torpedo bombers with an escort of Blenheim fighters from Coastal Command No. 235 Squadron were sent to bomb invasion shipping in the Calais harbor. Intercepted by the fighters from III./JG 26, one of the Blenheims was shot down by Hptm. Gerhard Schöpfel, Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 26, for his twentieth victory. When he returned to base, he was awarded the Ritterkreuz. Fighters from III./JG 53 and 1./JG 52 also intercepted the Blenheims and shot down several planes. Oblt. Günther Büsgen of 1./JG 52 destroyed two of the British planes for a score of four victories as did Oblt. Walter Fiel of 8./JG 53 who also reached a score of four kills.

Again London was pounded by night bombing from 2100 hours until 0430 hours the following morning, and still the RAF had no answer to these night attacks. Hundreds of searchlights picked out the invading bombers but it all seemed in a lost cause because of the high altitudes that they were flying at. London's dockland was again hit as well as parts of Central London and Buckingham Palace sustained damage and gave reason for the Queen (now the Queen Mother) to state . . .


> "_....now the palace has been bombed, I feel now that I can look at the people of the East End straight in the eye_".


The Stab of KG 55 lost a He 111 after it crash landed at Villacoublay returning from the raid on London.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 25; RAF, 29.

In all, it had not been the best of days to either side. RAF Fighter Command would have to be commended for the effort that they put in defense, but it came at a price. For the first time, Fighter Command casualties exceeded that of the Luftwaffe. Many of the bombers managed to get through with London again suffering considerable damage. Luftwaffe combat losses for the day totaled twenty-one, and another six force landed. KG 26 was the worst hit, with eight He111s shot down. Of these losses, only four were Bf 109s, although a fifth crashed as a result of a midair collision over France. Collisions were not that unusual; four Ju 87s were lost to this cause on a training mission. Six Spitfires and nineteen Hurricanes were lost and a further six fighters crash landed. Twelve pilots were killed and four severely injured. This was an exchange rate that Fighter Command could not afford.

Many Jagdflieger added to their scoreboards in the battles up the Thames and over Kent. The two most notable being Major Werner Mölders of Stab./JG 51 who downed a Spitfire south-east of London and Major Adolf Galland of Stab./JG 26 who claimed a Hurricane north-west of Dungeness. Double kills were awarded to Oblt. Herbert Ihlefeld of 2.(J)/LG 2 (21 kills total), Ofw. Siegfried Schnell of 4./JG 2 (12 kills) and Oblt. Hermann-Friedrich Joppien of 1./JG 51 (19 kills). Credits for destroying British aircraft were given to Oblt. Hans Hahn of 4./JG 2 (16 kills), Uffz. Kurt Bühligen of 6./JG 2 (2 kills), Hptm. Eduard Neumann of Stab I./JG 27 (3 kills), Oblt. Gerhard Homuth of 3./JG 27 (14 kills), Oblt. Gustav Rödel of 4./JG 27 (12 kills), Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 (24 kills), Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke of Stab III./JG 53 (6 kills), Oblt. Kurt Brändle of 4./JG 53 (4 kills), Oblt. Hubertus von Bonin of Stab I./JG 54 (9 kills), Oblt. Wilhelm Herget of 6./ZG 76 and Oblt. Hans-Joachim Jabs of 6./ZG 76.

*WESTERN FRONT*: II/NJG 1 was redesignated I/NJG 2.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 11, 2010)

*12 September 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The air war of the last week or so had developed into a rather dull sort of plan. It did not matter what the weather conditions were, the days were relatively quiet and to many of the once exhausted British fighter pilots, they found time to relax and enjoy time amongst themselves as longer gaps between sorties developed. Each afternoon, as if trying to keep to a weekly timetable, formations of German aircraft would show up on the CRT screen at the coastal radar stations generally around 1400 or 1500 hours and it was time to repeat the performance of the previous day. The next three days were to prove no different. The weather was not the best for combat, conditions being as unpredictable as ever, but at this time of the year it was only to be expected that unsettled conditions would prevail as the summer had just about passed and the often wet and dull days of autumn would be coming in.

The threat of invasion was still a high priority with the British War Office but as on many other occasions, the Luftwaffe had failed to follow up after the main attack. Why, they thought, throw everything at us as they did on 7 September and fail to continue. The leaders in all the various departments knew that Britain was still managing to hold out, with the Luftwaffe turning its attention to London itself gave Fighter Command the breathing space it so badly needed. By 12 September most of the airfields were back to at least 85% fully operational with the exception of maybe Biggin Hill.

The morning period was virtually a non-event as far as combat action was concerned. British Radar reported that a number of lone aircraft were well offshore both over the Channel and the North Sea. Fighter Command decided to leave these aircraft alone as they were reconnaissance patrols and not doing any harm. Warmwell dispatched just one section of Spitfires to intercept a lone Ju 88 out from Swanage, but it made full use of the low cloud and disappeared. Another German patrol was sighted and Hurricanes of RAF No. 151 Squadron were scrambled from Digby with one Ju 88 destroyed and another damaged off the Humber Estuary. About midday three small raids dropped bombs on the radar station at Fairlight - although without doing any real damage. Chased as far as Cap Gris Nez one Do 215 was destroyed by RAF No 605 Sqd. and RAF No 603 Sqd. damaged one Do17 over Beachy Head. At 1251 hours three high explosive bombs were dropped on Harrogate and near the Majestic Hotel. Mains were damaged, a house nearby was demolished, and fifteen casualties resulted. At 1440 hours, six high explosive bombs and some Incendiary bombs were dropped on Hastings and wrecked two houses and badly damaged three others. The German aircraft was reported to have machine-gunned those who were engaged in the rescue work. Later in the afternoon Ju88's made another small raid over Hampshire and Wiltshire before being intercepted by Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Squadron St Eval (Hurricanes) scrambled from Middle Wallop. It can be seen that the Luftwaffe at this time was keeping well clear of London and all these isolated incidents took place either in the west country or up north in Scotland.

One unfortunate incident that happened was with Wing Commander J.S.Dewar of RAF No. 213 Squadron who was commander of the airfield at Exeter. Taking advantage of the lull in combat activity, he was to fly over to Tangmere to visit friends there. He never arrived and it seems that his Hurricane V7306 had been shot down after he had encountered some enemy aircraft and he decided to bale out. On the way down he was straffed by German plane or planes and shot to pieces as he dangled helplessly underneath his descending parachute.

The bombers of III./KG 51 and I./KG 54 did not attack London until late in the evening, and even then it was on a far reduced scale than on previous occasions. The night bombers before often numbered between two and three hundred, but this time barely fifty made the dismal trek across the Channel in rather murky conditions including only three He 111s of III./KG 27 who dropped bombs on Liverpool. No serious damage was done, although bombs fell in the commercial area of Aldgate, Mansion House and Holborn, but the most serious threat was a high explosive delayed action bomb which fell just to the north of St Paul's Cathedral. Two officers who defused the bomb, Lt. R.Davies and Sapper J. Wylie of the Royal Engineers became the first military personel to receive the George Cross for their actions. One high explosive bomb fell near Wavertree Station during the night, and two houses were wrecked. Many other bombs were dropped in the Liverpool area but little damage was done. The greater number of raids left the French Coast between 2100 and 2200 hours, after which there was a gradual decrease in activity until about 0330 hours. All raids had finally withdrawn by 0415 hours.

One German aircraft was reported shot down by AA guns in North London, another Luftwaffe casualty was claimed by the Balloon Barrage at Newport (Monmouthshire) and a third German aircraft was reported to have been badly damaged by AA guns in the West Country and was last seen flying very low over the sea. The night attacks appeared to have been quite ineffective, and apart from some damage to road and rail communications, no target of major importance was hit.

Luftwaffe losses: 13 RAF Losses: 2


----------



## Njaco (Sep 12, 2010)

*13 September 1940 Friday
"I SHALL NOT LEAVE!"
UNITED KINGDOM*: No sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods in all areas. Many of the German commanders were pushing for an exact date for "Unternehmen Seelöwe" to commence. Already the weather seemed to be closing in and with these deteriorating conditions it appeared that any chance of a successful invasion might be out of the question if Hitler could not make up his mind. Already, the date previously set for 11 September had been postponed, and Hitler had said that he favored 24 September as the most likely date, but if conditions continued as they are, it would be an impossibility for the barges to cross the Channel should the expected winds that were prevalent at this time of the year accompany the heavy cloud and rain squalls.

Throughout the day Luftwaffe bombing activity was concentrated on the London area, and on the counties of Essex, Surrey, Kent and Sussex where damage was spread over a wide area, without being in any case severe. From 0730 hours, a number of raids, mostly by single aircraft, crossed the Coast between Hastings and Beachy Head and penetrated to the Thames Estuary and London area. Again, as on the day previous, air activities were hampered by bad weather, and the Luftwaffe took advantage of this by sending the aircraft deeper into Britain than they had done during other daylight attacks on the British. The Air Ministry buildings at Harrowgate were attacked, so was an aluminum factory at Banbury in Oxfordshire. The large railway junction just outside Reading had been bombed the previous day causing disruptions on the Great Western line, and the first raids on Northern Ireland had occurred.

At 0650 hours, a Focke-Wolfe 200 of I./KG 40 was detected over Northern Ireland, the first time that the Germans had penetrated this area and proof that Ireland was not free of the war situation. The aircraft managed to drop bombs on the steamship S.S. 'Longfort' just off Copeland Light at Belfast and also submitted a motor vessel to gunfire but there were no reports of damage.

Small raids did occur during the morning period until about 1130 hours when a raid of He111s crossed the Kent coast and split towards their targets around Kent and Sussex. One of the bombers was intercepted and shot down by a Hurricane of RAF No. 501 Squadron, scrambled from Kenley and piloted by Sgt. James "Ginger" Lacey, before he too was shot down. Sgt. Lacey managed to bale out and landed safely on a farm in Kent.

It had not been a good day for the Luftwaffe. Although only a small number of aircraft were destroyed, there was no real reason that, under the circumstances they need not have made any missions at all. The first aircraft lost was at 1330 hours while on a raid to South Wales when a He111 hit the cables of a barrage balloon and crashed in the town of Newport. A number of British fighter squadrons had been scrambled after reports came through that radar had picked up German aircraft, and that the general direction was London. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 238, 501 and 607 Squadrons, were scrambled from Middle Wallop, Kenley and Tangmere, and intercepted a raid by Ju88s, about 1530 hours over Wiltshire, before the bombers could turn back to France. Using the cloud to their advantage, it did appear that the targets were either Biggin Hill, Kenley or Croydon. One of the squadrons scrambled intercepted a small force of He 111 bombers over Maidstone and attacked. Most of the bombers decided to abort but not before one of the Heinkels was shot down. A He 111 of 2./KG 1 was badly damaged during another mission over England and it crashed on landing back at its home airfield. One He 111 of KG 55 crashed on German soil after a bombing mission, due to serious damage cause by AA gunfire and an attack made by a British fighter.

At the same time, another small raid of Ju 88s from Luftflotte 3 was centered on Tangmere. One enemy bomber was shot down by RAF No.609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires). Another Ju 88 was badly damaged and crashed into the ground on landing at its home base. Again, the raid was aborted and no damage was sustained on the Tangmere aerodrome. As well as these aircraft destroyed and two others that crashed on English soil, twenty German aircrew were killed.

Two German bombers flying single missions towards London and coming from different directions penetrated the defenses and dropped a small number of bombs which fell on Whitehall and a part of Downing Street while the other aircraft dropped bombs on the Chelsea Hospital and another fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace, the third time the Royal Palace had been attacked. At 11:10 hours the building was straddled by a stick of six bombs dropped by the low-flying aircraft. It would go down in history as the day the Luftwaffe came closest to claiming the ultimate trophy – the life of George VI. The Queen Mother was "battling" to remove an errant eyelash from the King's eye, when they heard the "unmistakable whirr-whirr of a German plane" and then the "scream of a bomb". The blast showered them with broken glass.


> "_It all happened so quickly that we had only time to look foolishly at each other when the scream hurtled past us and exploded with a tremendous crash in the quadrangle_,"


she wrote later. Some of the servants were injured as one bomb crashed through a glass roof and another pulverised the palace chapel. Hours later, after lunching in their air-raid shelter, she and the King were visiting West Ham in London's East End. She wrote:


> "_I felt as if I was walking in a dead city... all the houses evacuated, and yet through the broken windows one saw all the poor little possessions, photographs, beds, just as they were left_."


The bombing, along with the royal family's refusal to flee Britain against Foreign Office advice, was to win the King and Queen affection and fellow-feeling across the country. The Queen declared:


> "_The children will not leave unless I do. I shall not leave unless their father does, and the king will not leave the country in any circumstances, whatever._"


At West Ham the Ravenshill School where homeless were being accommodated was hit mid-morning and 50 casualties resulted.

During the night, bombs again fell on the London area, Westminster, Battersea, Mitcham, Clapham Junction, Wembley and Hammersmith being chiefly affected. Bombs also fell during the night in districts of Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Essex and Cambridgeshire, where little damage was done and in Cardiff, where a cold storage plant was gutted by fire, and other industrial damage caused. At 2140 hours high explosive bombs fell near the Town Hall at Mitcham, a result of which the London Road was closed to traffic. Victoria Street at Westminster was blocked by debris caused by an high explosive bomb at 2200 hours. By 0130 hours, activity had practically ceased, but at 0200 hours a second wave originating from the Dutch Islands approached London from the North-east, having crossed the Coast between Clacton and Harwich. At 0030 hours, the Cardiff Pure Ice and Cold Storage Plant was hit by high explosive bombs and gutted by the fire that resulted. Curran's Works were also hit but only slightly damaged and bombs also fell in the Docks area partially demolishing the Albion Box Works.

Luftwaffe activity continued over London and North of the Thames Estuary until 0525 hours when all the raids finally withdrew with a total of 105 bombers having flown the Channel in the bad weather during the night. Although only five night fighter sorties were flown, Flg Off M.J. Herrick in ZK-A of RAF No. 25 Squadron managed to bring down a He-111H 5J+BL of 3./KG 4 near North Weald. Another was shot down by AA gunfire near Hendon.

RAF Losses: 3 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 1 pilot and 1 aircrew of a Blenheim were killed. Luftwaffe Losses: 10 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 13 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 5 wounded.

Oblt. Hermann Crone was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of I./KG 1 in place of Major Ludwog Maier who was lost on 5 September 1940.

*GERMANY*: A meeting had been called in Berlin to commence at lunchtime, and as was usual a banquet was organized prior to the serious meeting between Hitler, Göring, Milch, Kesselring and Jodl being the most notable commanders in attendance. The Führer outlined the present situation. He made mention of the fact that the Luftwaffe still had not yet attained air superiority over the Royal Air Force, which was a rather hypocritical statement being as he had ordered Göring to concentrate his attacks on London earlier in September at the expense of continuing the raids on RAF airfields. He also made mention that more and more barges were being unloaded along the Dutch and Belgian coasts in readiness. He said;


> "_Soon_,_we will be moving our armies to these northern ports, armies of specially trained men, all will be ready." "But_,_our bombers have justly tore the heart out of the British populace. London is a city burning night after night and the British air force is still terribly weak and we can continue to hit the British where it so terribly hurts.......at their beloved capital_."


The Führer spoke at length on the bombing of London, and only outlined the preparations of any forthcoming invasion. The commanders started to think that Adolph Hitler was now more concerned with the total destruction of London and that their leader was having second thoughts about any invasion of England. By the time that the meeting was over, all that the commanders had learnt were the thoughts that were coming out of the mind of the Führer. There were no fresh orders and he failed to ask for any reports on the current situation.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 13, 2010)

*14 September 1940 Saturday
GERMANY*: In Berlin, Hitler called a rush conference ordering all his naval, air force and army commanders-in-chiefs to attend. This time, he made little mention on the bombing of London of the last seven days. Instead, he presented to them his plans for the all-out invasion of Britain. At last, "Unternehmen Seelöwe" looked as though it was all systems go. The Führer was excited and full of eagerness, but nothing was said that was not already known.....except the exact date of any planned invasion.

Hitler pointed out that the naval preparations for "Unternehmen Seelöwe" were now almost complete. By mid-September the Germans had assembled about 1,000 assorted invasion craft in the Channel ports, with some 600 more in the Scheldt.


> "_All our barges are now in place, and we have more held in reserve along river banks_,"


he said which was borne out by one of the British Observer Groups which had the day previous seen up to ten large German transport ships tow a number of barges from Calais to Cape Griz Nez. Spitfires of the PRU had also flown over the Belgian and Dutch coasts and had also reported and photographed the collection of barges. RAF bombing crippled about 12 per cent of this armada though what remained was still sufficient for the first stage of invasion as planned. But there again, based on the PRU intelligence, Bomber Command had bombed many of the barge installations at an average of every second night, so what was Hitler trying to pull when he said that "_All our barges are in place_." Maybe he forgot to add that at least one third of them were submerged at their moorings. The French coast was now so well lit up by burning barges that it had become known as "Blackpool Front" to the RAF bomber pilots.



> "_If we plan now.....the invasion date can be set for one week from now, given that we need five days of good weather to achieve the desired results_."


Hitler then went on to state that in the preparation we must make sure that the Luftwaffe has complete air superiority over the Channel and over southern England. But again, a remark that had been heard before, when issuing the order to Göring prior to 'Alder Tag', "_Before any invasion can be mounted against England, we must first destroy the RAF both in the air and on the ground_." This was the whole concept of the task given to Göring to eliminate the British Royal Air Force.

It was finally deferred until the 24th, which meant that a final decision should have been made on 14 September (ten days notice was the German Navy's very reasonable stipulation). Finally, the on again, off again "Unternehmen Seelöwe" was at last given as 17 September, which should have been 19 September if Hitler estimated that it would take five days of preparation. Orders were given for a full scale attack to be made prior to the lead up of the invasion, and again this was placed in the hands of Reichsmarschall Göring. An alternative date, as was mentioned earlier by the Führer could be given as 27 September. He had been misled again by Göring, himself in turn misled by the Luftwaffe's faulty Intelligence.

It was not so much the evidence that was at fault but rather the ability to interpret it correctly. The 9th had shown that Fighter Command was still very much a force to be reckoned with; the 11th and 14th, however, spoke with equivocal voices. On each of these days Fighter Command and Luftwaffe losses were equal, though this was not appreciated by the Air Ministry at the time. On the 14th, particularly, to the Luftwaffe the opposition appeared scrappy and uncoordinated, and they felt that during the last few days Fighter Command had begun to collapse. This news was, of course, conveyed to the Reichsmarschall, and via the situation reports to Hitler. Both felt that the hour of destiny was approaching.

*UNITED KINGDOM*: Again no sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods and a chance of thunderstorms in all areas. Over the Channel, the heavy cloud and rain would give way to lighter higher cloud during the day, but the chance of showers would persist.

The Germans did what they could in an attempt to jam the British radar with electronic interference. A few aircraft managed to cross the Channel on weather reconnaissance missions. At 1000 hours, a He 111 flew over North-east Kent and towards South London and was eventually shot down. Some of the coastal resorts in the vicinity of Eastbourne and Brighton were bombed by one or two raiders. At Brighton twenty-one high explosive bombs and some incendiaries fell in the Old Borough, and some of these hit a cinema causing 35 deaths and many injuries. A small formation was detected over Selsey Bill and one German aircraft was reported to have been shot down. Others probed the areas of South London and bombs fell on residential areas of Croydon and Mitcham killing over fifty people.

Between 1520 and 1545 hours, the Coast was crossed between Deal and Dungeness by German aircraft in three formations. In the first, 150 Luftwaffe aircraft operated, some of which penetrated the Inner Artillery Zone and attacked London via the Estuary. In the second attack, about 100 aircraft were involved and the Inner Artillery Zone was again penetrated from the South-east through Kent. Bf 109s from JG 26, JG 77, JG 51 and JG 54 escorted Do17s, He 111s and Ju 88s bombers and a mini aerial combat session developed within 30 minutes. Some twenty-two RAF fighters squadrons from 11 Group and five from 12 Group were scrambled to intercept the raids. Vectored to the Thames Estuary were RAF No. 41 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.66 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.73 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.222 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.504 Sqd (Hurricanes) and 1 RCAF Sqd (Hurricanes). Vectored to the Kent coast near Deal were RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.92 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.229 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.253 Sqd (Hurricanes). Gladiators of RAF No. 247 Sqd, scrambled from Roborough managed to intercept the raiders off the Sussex coast.

Again, as was becoming a common occurrence, people along the coastal stretches from Folkestone, round 'Hell Corner' to Margate saw the twisting and snaking black dots against the grey overcast with many cheering if they recognized a German plane spiral down into the sea. Most of the action took place over the Estuary or over north Kent near Maidstone by the time that the British fighters made contact with the German bombers. Even though the raids were small by previous standards, there were more Bf 109s than usual indicating that the Luftwaffe was trying to draw as many fighters in the air as possible. A number of Do17s were shot down but also quite a few Bf 109s also suffered. I./KGr.606 was to suffer most when two Dorniers were classed as write offs, while two others were damaged. Stab./KG 55 lost another He 111 shot down in the sea off Sussex by a fighter from RAF No. 72 Sqd. One crewmember, Fw. Josef Geiger was able to crawl into a dingy and spent the next three days in the water before being picked up by the Seeotdienst. JG 26 claimed five fighters for the loss of the Gruppe-Adjutant of I./JG 26, Oblt. Kurt Dähne, when his Messerschmitt collided with a Hurricane from No.253 Sqd. A pilot from 9./JG 26 force landed his plane at St Inglevert after the battle, his plane written off. Fw. Heinz Ettler of 1./JG 77 was shot down over Detling and taken prisoner. Uffz. Valentin Blazejewski of 6 (S)./LG 2 fired on a Spitfire on his way home from escorting the bombers and was immediately attacked and hit from behind by another Spitfire. Bailing out over Ashford he spent the rest of the war as a prisoner.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 13, 2010)

_(14 September 1940 continued.....)_

For Fighter Command, RAF No.73 Sqd was to suffer the most after losing three aircraft and with four others damaged but repairable. Only one pilot was killed. There were casualties amongst other RAF squadrons. Two Hurricanes of No.253 Sqd. and No.601 Sqd. were shot down but no details are known except the pilot of the Hurricane of No.601 Sqd. was listed as missing. The Hurricane of No.253 Sqd. was shot down near Faversham, Kent. A Spitfire from RAF No.222 Sqd, badly damaged in combat with the escorting Luftwaffe fighters, crashed attempting to land and killed the pilot.

Twenty-five claims were made by the fighters of Luftflotte 2 and 3, even though the true losses to Fighter Command were twelve destroyed and nine damaged. Over South-west London the Kommodore of JG 51, Major Werner Mölders, downed a Spitfire, his thirty-seventh victory. Major Adolf Galland, the Kommodore of JG 26 also destroyed a Hurricane near London for his thirty-first victory. Other claims were made by Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51, who downed two Spitfires to reach twenty-six victories, Uffz. Rudolf Meixner of 3./JG 77 who claimed two Hurricanes to three kills and Hptm. Dietrich Hrabak of Stab II./JG 54 who destroyed a Hurricane south-east of London for his ninth victory.

Damage to London was minimal where bombs were dropped in Camberwell, Lambeth and in Battersea, where a gasometer was hit and slight damage was done to the Power Station. In Lambeth, Camberwell New Road was blocked by flooding from a burst water main, and the LCC Main Sewer was damaged, as a result of high explosive bombs. The Southern Railway Bridge between Victoria and Clapham Junction was penetrated by an high explosive bomb; a hit was also registered on the Battersea Power Station but only minor damage was caused.

A second attack commenced at 1810 hours, and seven formations of between twelve and thirty aircraft successively crossed the coast at Dover and Lympne until 1835 hours. The objectives were Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Northolt and London. In the last case the attack was made from the South-west. All aircraft were detected at between 17,000 and 20,000 feet. Many of Fighter Command's squadrons had only been back a short while after the afternoon raids when they were scrambled again. The German formations were intercepted just as they crossed the southern coastline and a running battle took place as far as London, but many of the raiders had turned back before their destination was reached. As the last raid had dispersed, Bf109s of JG 26 swept low across Kent and were intercepted by Hurricanes of RAF No. 46 Squadron, scrambled from Stapleford and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41 and 92 Squadrons, from Hornchurch and Biggin Hill, over the Maidstone area. Oblt. Joachim Müncheberg of 7./JG 26 and Hptm. Rolf Pingel, the Gruppenkommandeur of Stab I./JG 26, both added a Hurricane to their scoreboard - the twentieth for Oblt. Müncheberg and the fifteenth for Hptm. Pingel. Upon reaching their bases both Jagdflieger were awarded the Ritterkreuz even though Hptm. Pingel hadn't reached the required twenty kills.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 14; RAF, 14. The final score of aircraft lost was fourteen each, but six RAF pilots were saved to fly again while several Jagdflieger were captured and made POWs.

At night Luftwaffe activity was slight in spite of favorable weather conditions. Between 2000 and 2200 hours, several small raids flew erratic courses over Sussex and Kent and penetrated to London and North of the Thames Estuary. One raid of six aircraft approached from the North Sea to Cromer and flew North-west. This raid split and sections penetrated to the North Midlands. Between 2200 and 0100 hours, raids of single aircraft were plotted in the Thames Estuary, some approached London and others penetrating into Essex. About three raids crossed the coast between the Wash and the Humber. Bombs were dropped in many districts in the Southern half of England, but the night raids were on a small scale and no serious damage or casualties was reported. Four high explosive bombs were dropped on the Sports Field near the Officers' Mess at Cottesmore. By 0400 hours London was clear.

A Hurricane from RAF No.43 Squadron based at Usworth airfield in Durham got caught in his leader's slipstream and made a heavy landing at base. Pilot Officer C.K. Gray was unable to correct fully owing to arm injuries sustained on 26th August 1940. The aircraft was damaged but repairable.

RAF No. 302 'City of Poznan' (Hurricane) Squadron based at Leconfield were moved to Duxford as part of the 'Big Wing', led by the indomitable Douglas Bader.


----------



## Airframes (Sep 14, 2010)

Good stuff again Chris. I notice, however, that the Hurricanes lost are shown as being from 610 Squadron. This squadron flew Spitfires at the time, with the well-publicised codes of DW.
Perhaps it should read 601 (County of London) Squadron, Aux.A.F. , who _did_ fly Hurricanes at the time ?


----------



## Njaco (Sep 14, 2010)

Let me check. You could be right and I apologize as I'm not that familiar with the RAF.

You are righ! I must have transposed the numbers! It was from 601 that lost a Hurricane that day!


----------



## Njaco (Sep 14, 2010)

*15 September 1940 Sunday
"BATTLE OF BRITAIN DAY"
UNITED KINGDOM*: Sunday September 15th 1940, was not only the turning point of the Battle of Britain, it was the turning point of the whole war. For Adolf Hitler and the German commanders, time was now running out. If an invasion was to take place on 17 September as planned, the lead-up would have to commence no later than today. The weather had shown, just how quickly it could turn at this time of year, and with winter not too far away, the German forces would have to take advantage of the better conditions that now seemed to prevail. Göring had sent out the instructions the day previous to all bomber and fighter bases that preparations for an all out assault on England was to be made on this day. Bomber units were given times and flight paths of their attack. Over the last few weeks, the Luftwaffe had experimented with different flying formations. Needless to say, none had really been successful, losses had still been high, but they had discovered that on the occasions that they had kept at high altitudes, they had on a number of occasions surprised Fighter Command.

This was mainly due to the fact that the British radar was ineffective above 20,000 feet, and by flying at a height above this level they could cross the Channel undetected, but, the Germans did not know this. All that they were aware of, was the fact that those formations that flew at higher altitudes were not intercepted until they were usually well over the English coast. The most logical reason for this, thought the Germans, was due to the fact that it took the British fighters much longer to gain the required height to intercept. The sending of advance Ju 87 and Bf 110 units to bomb the radar stations along the southern coastline was, in the opinion of the Luftwaffe, a waste of time. As fast as they seemed to be destroyed, they were back in operational use again, and mobile units too were brought in to replace any radar station damaged. Over the last few days, the Germans had practiced at electronic jamming. This they believed was successful and plans were made to intensify the jamming procedure in an effort to further reduce detection.

The spirit of the German aircrews was still far from high. Time and time again, they had been told that the 'Glorious Luftwaffe' was ready to strike the final blow. But they had been told that in July, and again in August when 'Alderangriff' had been announced, and it was to be repeated yet again. Early in the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe aircrews were told that the Royal Air Force would be wiped out in two or three weeks. Now, whenever they flew over the British countryside they were still met with masses of British fighters in the hands of pilots that were gaining in skill and techniques. Many firmly believed that they were no nearer victory than they were two months previous. Commented Adolph Galland;


> "_Failure to achieve any notable success, constantly changing orders betraying lack of purpose and obvious misjudgment of the situation by the Command, and unjustified accusation had a most demoralizing effect on us fighter pilots, who were already overtaxed by physical and mental strain_."



In Britain, things were slightly different. Most of the pilots were relatively fresh unlike their German counterparts. Combat action had been very infrequent, with only one really heavy day. Fighter Command was now stronger than it had been for weeks, aerodromes repaired, planes and personnel had replaced many that had been shot down and the radar stations were all functioning at 100%.

Heavy cloud and rain overnight was expected to clear and the forecast for the day was fine in most areas with patchy cloud. No rain was forecast but some areas could expect an odd shower to develop. The cloud was expected to clear during the afternoon giving way to a fine and clear evening. It was not long after breakfast that AVM Keith Park knew that today was to be different from all the others. For the first time in a week, he had been notified that there was a build up of German formations along the enemy coast.


> "_This, I think is what we have been waiting for. I think that it is about to happen_."


Unaware of what was about to unfold within Fighter Command, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his wife decided that he would call upon AVM Park at 11 Group Headquarters at Uxbridge.

AVM Park took his visitors to the operations room, and as he began to explain some of the complexities of the operations, a radar report had come through that a number of German aircraft had been detected building up in the vicinity of Dieppe and another smaller formation had been detected over the Channel off the coast near Dover. Park told the Prime Minister that he was lucky because it looked like that he could witness the activities of operations because a couple of German formations had been spotted. Winston Churchill replied that he would let the C-in-C carry on with his job and that he would just sit and watch.

By 0930 hours the two formations had spread themselves out and were detected near the coasts off Dover, Harwich and in the Thames Estuary. RAF Squadrons were dispatched from Hornchurch, Gravesend and Croydon. But most of the German formations were ordered to turn back. The Fighter Command squadrons were recalled. The only other activity was just off the Devon coast where a lone reconnaissance aircraft was detected and a flight from RAF No.87 Squadron (Hurricanes) was scrambled. It turned out to be a He111 on weather reconnaissance and was shot down by P/O D.T. Jay.

By late morning the weather cleared and an all out attack was ordered by Göring. New formations were detected at 10:30 hours positioned between the towns of Calais and Boulogne. It appeared that the German formations were in no great hurry and were forming up very slowly. This worked to the advantage of Keith Park as it gave him the chance to organize his defense forces.


> "_This, Mr. Prime Minister looks like the big one_."


said Park.

At 1100 hours the first wave of German bombers - hundreds of Ju 88s and Do 17s - flew across the Channel and up the Thames towards London. Just as the first Fighter Command squadrons approached the southern coast of Kent, the leaders of the German formation still had a few miles to go before they crossed the tall cliffs of the British coastline. The German bombers consisted of practically the whole of I./KG 76 flying Dornier Do 17s. These had met up with the Do 17s of III./KG 76 and KG 3 behind Calais and now the combined force, escorted by Bf 109 formed a vast armada almost two miles wide crossing the coast. All the Luftwaffe aircraft departed from bases in the Brussels and Antwerp areas. The heights of the German formations were between 15,000 and 26,000 feet and the Observer Corps reported that they were crossing the coast just north of Dungeness, to the south of Dover and at Ramsgate.

Thirty minutes later the first wave of bombers consisting of twenty-five Do 17s from KG 2 and KG 76 with the He-111s of KG 26 and KG 53 and twenty-one Bf 109 Jabos from II.(Schlacht)./LG 2 escorted by 150 fighters, crossed the Kent coast. The bombers came across the coastline in a number of vic formations. Some of these consisted of three aircraft, some in five while others were in vics of seven, but as they crossed the tall cliffs they looked something like a giant herringbone. The bombers, which consisted of Dorniers, Heinkels and Junkers were escorted by Bf 110 aircraft flying in close support while the Bf 109s flew top cover high above the bombers. Hundreds streamed across the Channel, many of them decorated with insignia as colorful as any air force had ever boasted . . . the green dragon signifying Hptm. Hans von Hahn's I./JG 3, Major Adolf Galland's Mickey Mouse, armed with gun and hatchet, puffing a cigar strangely like Galland's own, the eagle's head of Werner Mölders, Major von Cramon-Taubadel's jet-black ace of spades, the green heart of Major Trautloft's JG 54, the white and red lightning flashes of KG 3, the poised black sledgehammer that marked Oberst Johannes Fink's Dorniers and the bared shark's teeth of II./ZG 76.

Almost every RAF squadron from 11 Group was committed and soon more from 12 Group, known as the 'Duxford Wing', were scrambled. The German formation was making slow progress and RAF No.72 Squadron (Spitfires) and RAF No.92 Squadron (Spitfires) were vectored to intercept the bombers between Maidstone and Ashford. Some of the other squadrons that had been vectored further south were now re-vectored. These included the Hurricanes of RAF No.253 Squadron and RAF No.501 Squadron, with the Spitfires of RAF No.66 Squadron, RAF No.603 Squadron and RAF No.609 Squadron and within minutes were reinforced with RAF No.72 and RAF No.92 Squadrons. Soon after the initial interception, RAF No.229 Squadron (Hurricanes) and RAF No.303 Squadron (Hurricanes) met the raiders between Rochester and South London while RAF No.17 Squadron and RAF No.73 Squadron (Hurricanes) met the bombers over Maidstone. The heavy bomber formation was still stepped between 15,000 and 25,000 feet with a massive Bf 109 fighter escort above and slightly to the rear of the main formation.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 14, 2010)

_(15 September 1940 continued....)_

Great air battles ensued when the British fighters and German bombers and fighters clashed over the English countryside. The combat action was exceptionally heavy, and most of the defending British fighters managed to keep the Messerschmitt escorts from providing the cover for the bombers. The Spitfires harassed the Bf 109s, criss-crossing them at every opportunity, and one by one they were sent spiraling towards earth trailing plumes of smoke. The Bf 109s tried to continue to escort the bombers who now were being attacked by the Hurricane squadrons. The British fighter pilots were slowly breaking up the formation with a steady application of force causing the bombers to straggle out of formation. Luftwaffe Do 17 Front Gunner Hans Zonderlind reported,


> "_From the time that we had been over Maidstone until reaching the outskirts of London, we had been under extreme pressure. The British fighters had been with us since we had first crossed the English coast and had gathered in intensity all the time. Our escort had been doing a grand job with the Spitfires at keeping them away from us, and we thought that should things remain like this, then this bombing run would be made easy. We saw the Hurricanes coming towards us and it seemed that the whole of the RAF was there, we had never seen so many British fighters coming at us at once. I saw a couple of our comrades go down, and we got hit once but it did no great damage. All around us were dogfights as the fighters went after each other, then as we were getting ready for our approach to the target, we saw what must have been a hundred RAF fighters coming at us. We thought that this must have been all the RAF planes were up at once, but where were they coming from, as we had been told that the RAF fighters were very close to extinction. We could not keep our present course, we turned to starboard and done all that we could to avoid the fighters and after a while I am sure we had lost our bearings, so we just dropped our bombs and made our retreat._"


 Numerous aircraft from both sides were shot down out of the skies.

One particular pilot engaged several Do17s over London during the action, which was to be immortalised in the movie "The Battle of Britain". Over central London, a Do 17 of 1./KG 76 piloted by Oblt. Robert Zehbe was hit by gunfire from several fighters and caught fire. As Sgt. Ray Holmes of RAF No.504 Sqd vectored in for a last shot, the two planes collided. Sgt. Holmes managed to free himself and jumped, the parachute breaking his fall just twenty feet or so above the rooftops of some houses in fashionable Chelsea. His backside hit the sloping roof of one of the houses, and he began to slide down the roof, fall off over the guttering and straight down into the garden below, into a garbage bin. The Dornier came down about a mile away crashing into the forecourt of Victoria Station, practically demolishing a small tobacconist's shop.

The hundreds of Bf 109s covered a wide area and they too were having their successes. Two Hurricanes of RAF No.229 Sqd were shot down over the Sevenoaks area, with P/O Doutrepont's aircraft being shot up badly and he was killed as the Hurricane went down and crashed on Staplehurst Railway Station. Another member of the squadron, P/O R. Smith managed to bale out of his bullet riddled aircraft also over Sevenoaks and he suffered severe leg injuries. Over Tunbridge Wells, F/O A.D. Nesbitt of 1 (RCAF) Squadron was swooped on by Bf 109s and he baled out as his aircraft spiraled to earth. F/O R. Smither was not so lucky, as he went down with his aircraft also over Tunbridge Wells. The combat now covered a wide area, and as the minutes ticked by, the intensity of the battle increased as more fighters of Fighter Command arrived on the scene. RAF No.501 Sqd (Hurricanes) was one of them. They intercepted the Germans over northern Kent and mixed it with both bombers and fighter escort.

The Bf 109s were being held over the northern area of Kent with only a few managing to escape the onslaught by the Spitfires. The bombers were being harassed by the Hurricanes, and one by one they began to turn away smoke trailing from engines and desperately trying to evade any further attack by the British fighters. Others dropped their bombs at random. Some of the more courageous tried in vain to make it to their target, riddled with bullets, crewmen either dead or injured at their posts. But more was in store for them as they approached London. Keith Park's timing of requesting the 'Duxford Wing' to cover the airfields of Hornchurch and North Weald was to perfection, as was everything else that was taking place. It seemed that Fighter Command could do no wrong.

As the German bomber formation, with about only one third of its Bf 109 escorts, approached the outskirts of London, the Luftwaffe was in disarray. The Bf 109s peeled away one by one. Some had sustained damage but most were now low on fuel. With the city now in their sights, they were confronted by the awesome sight of the four squadrons of the 'Big Wing'. Where everything was running in favor of 11 Group, as for once, Douglas Bader's 'Big Wing' also ran to perfection and in unison. The squadrons were able to take off as ordered, and the formation had collected perfectly over Duxford and fifty-six fighter aircraft made the steady climb towards their vectored area, and had time to position themselves at the correct height and head towards Gravesend. As they approached the Thames, the Hurricanes were stepped between 25,000 and 26,000 feet. As the 'Big Wing' closed in, they were joined by RAF No.41 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.46 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.504 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires). The Bombers were confronted by British fighters on all sides, and one of the biggest combat actions ever seen over London developed.

Perfectly positioned, with the bombers 3,000 feet below them they were about to make their attack, when a formation of Bf 109s came out of the sun. Bader immediately ordered the Spitfires of RAF No.19 and RAF No.611 Sqds to take on the German fighters, which they did, scattering them by a surprise attack so effectively that they left the bomber formation and flew off to the south-east. While the 'Big Wing' were holding, the Hurricanes of RAF No.257 Sqd and RAF No.504 Sqd (Hurricanes) attacked the German bombers. Bader waited for them to complete their sweep, then instructed his three Hurricane squadrons to fall into line astern and attack. Bader selected the most westerly of the three German formations, while RAF No.302 Sqd took on the middle formation while the remaining formation was left to RAF No.310 Sqd.

Hurricanes came in to deal with the bombers in an unusual way, head-on in a shallow climb, claiming three of the bombers. Others joined in, and in such numbers and with such aggression that it was like gulls mobbing an albatross. Seven more Dorniers were claimed as destroyed before the 'Big Wing', in all its multiple glory, hurled itself into the whirling melee. The raid had now entirely broke up over south London, and any idea the bomb-aimers had of identifying let alone attacking their assigned target had disappeared, like so many of their own kind.

There was not much for the bombers to do, the pressure on them was that intense. They would be attacked by a couple of squadrons of RAF fighters, then as soon as they broke off the engagement, another couple of squadrons were ready to pounce at an already decimated bomber force. The bombers began to drop their bomb loads at random, hoping that this would lighten their load and they could make as hasty retreat as possible without any further damage to their aircraft. South London was the worst affected, with Lewisham, Lambeth, Camberwell and a couple of the bridges across the River Thames all recording bomb damage. One high explosive bomb fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace causing slight structural damage to the building but a bigger hole was made in the lawns at the rear as the bomb failed to explode. A power station in Beckenham was also hit.

The German formations headed out towards the west, turning south near Weybridge. RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires) chased them as they headed for the coast and took on fifteen Dornier Do17s. A formation of Bf 109s saw the desperate situation that their bombers were in and joined in as did a few Bf 110s. Over Ewhurst in Surrey, RAF No.605 Sqd (Hurricanes) came in to assist and as the fierce action continued over the town of Billingshurst just west of Horsham they were joined by RCAF No.1 Sqd (Hurricanes) who took on the troublesome Bf 109s. In the other direction, some eighty German bombers were trying to make good their escape towards the Thames Estuary. Fighter Command attacked in large numbers with squadrons attacking any of the escorts while others took on the merciless bombers.

Horst Zander, a radio operator in a Do 17 of 6./KG 3, reported,


> _"Our Gruppe had become split up. Every crew sought its own safety in a powered gliding race down over the sea and for home_."


Suddenly his Dornier was struck hard.


> "_The cabin was full of blood. Our pilot was hit. In the inter-com I heard him say feebly; Heinz Laube, you have to fly us home. Meanwhile we had reached the North Sea and so had peace in which to change over. The flight mechanic put a first-aid dressing on the badly wounded pilot, and after we had disobeyed orders by requesting a bearing from Antwerp-Deurne, our observer, with his B-2 pilot's license, took over the shot-up machine. Twenty minutes later, the aircraft bucking like a horse, he managed to land us safely."_


The raid was deflected and KG 3 did not make its objective.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 14, 2010)

_(15 September 1940 continued......)_

The first morning battle had been a disaster for the Luftwaffe, as many aircraft crashed, and others blew up in mid-air, while the remainder struggled for the safety of the French coast. For the Germans, after about ten minutes over London, there was now no such thing as a formation. German bombers were at all levels of altitude and most were scattered over an area fifteen miles wide. To give an example of the intensity of this morning battle, the combat area was approximately eighty miles long by thirty-eight miles wide, and up to six miles high. Because of the intensity and aggression shown by the pilots of Fighter Command, the bombers dropped most of their bombs randomly over a wide area. Damage was done, but not as much as was intended by the Luftwaffe commanders. For the Luftwaffe, the raid was doomed to failure the moment that the first formations had crossed the Channel. This time, everything had gone right for Fighter Command and 11 Group. Timing, position and height was all on the side of the RAF. AVM Park and his pilots had won the first round of the day.

As the clocks in Britain showed 1230 hours, the first battle of the day had finished. Most of the German bombers who had intentions of again dropping hundreds of tons of bombs on the city had been fought off by Fighter Command. In scattered areas of Kent and Sussex the odd skirmish still took place as patrolling squadrons observed a few Dorniers and Heinkels desperately trying to make their way back to their bases in northern France and Belgium. The pilots of the Hurricanes and Spitfires showed no mercy. It made no difference whether the bombers were crippled or not. Some, which it was obvious that they would never make it back, were shot down, the broken hulks of German aircraft could be seen from the outskirts of London to the Channel coast. 

By 1300 hours the radar stations along the Kent coast picked up new movements across the Channel. It was the commencement of German bombers busily forming up for yet another raid on the British capital. Fighter Command was notified, but as there was no indication yet that the bombers were heading across the coast, it was just a 'wait and see' game. All RAF squadrons that had been involved with the mornings action, were again placed at readiness and this included the 'Duxford Wing' and the two squadrons from 10 Group. As time progressed, radar had reported that the formation had broke up into three distinct groups, and that it was possible that each group was following a short distance behind another. The first of the bomber formations crossed the Kent coast between Dungeness and Dover at 14:15 hours, with the other formations behind and flying at 15 minute intervals. The German formations were made up of three distinct formations. All consisted of Dornier Do 17s, Heinkel He 111s and Do 215s from KG 2, KG 53 and KG 76. Smaller Gruppen came from KG 1, KG 4 and KG 26 which made up a total bomber force of 170 aircraft. These were supported by Bf 110 and Bf 109s from JG 26 and JG 54 among others as escorts and their number was in excess of 300. Most of the bomber formations had come from airfields in the Beauvais and Antwerp areas. In total, there was a combined force of 600 plus aircraft heading north towards London on a front some thirty miles wide.

Even though all the RAF squadrons had been brought to readiness, some squadrons, especially those some distance from London were still being re-armed and refueled, and quite a few pilots were not with their squadrons. These had been shot down or baled out of their stricken aircraft and had made their way to other airfields and had telephoned in to their home bases, while some were being ferried back but had not yet arrived. Those that had got back, found the time to have a bit of lunch while their aircraft were in the hands of the ground crews. This was one of the reasons that the Luftwaffe had made this second raid so soon after midday, as they knew that it would take Fighter Command to take at least two hours to get all their squadrons back to full strength. The hoped that by the time that they crossed the coast that most of the RAF fighters would still be on the ground. 

AVM Park scrambled squadrons in almost the same order as he had done so only three hours earlier, but because the German formation had taken less time in forming up the 11 Group commander had less time to get his fighters into the air, coupled with the fact that some squadrons were still re-arming and refueling, the efficiency was not as good as it had been during the morning period. 12 Group were called up by 11 Group who again requested maximum assistance just as they had done during the morning. The same applied to 10 Group. The only change that Park made that differed from the morning attack, was that he held more of his fighters back, giving orders that they patrol areas to the east, south and west of London. The squadrons that were vectored to the forward areas were mainly instructed to attack the German escort fighters. This was due to the fact that by forcing the German escorts into combat early, they would use up far more fuel, and the morning raid had showed him that the bombers were far more vulnerable when they reached the outskirts of London, and the net result was that Fighter Command inflicted far more damage to aircraft over London than over the Kent coast.

The first engagements took place over Kent. Squadrons from Hornchurch intercepted a large formation of Dorniers south of Canterbury. Diving down in line astern they managed to destroy two of the bombers and another couple as they were wheeling away leaving behind a trail of thick black smoke. But they were jumped upon by Bf 109s and intense combat took place between the fighters of both sides allowing the Do 17s to continue their journey. The Bf 109s, of JG 26 led by Adolf Galland and of JG 54 led by Hannes Trautloft, engaged the RAF fighters before they had to return low on fuel. Two aircraft of the Hornchurch squadrons were damaged.

Another formation consisting of Dornier Do 17s and Heinkel He 111s was detected south of Maidstone, and without any Bf 109 protection, they became the targets for RAF No.73 Sqd (Hurricanes) who managed to destroy three of the bombers without loss to themselves. West of this attack near Dartford, RAF No.66 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires) intercepted another column of German aircraft where again the combat action was intense. The Spitfires weaved in and out of the bombers managing to avoid collision in the huge traffic jam that was forming. Bombers started to take evasive action by banking either left or right. Just as another bomber formation was approaching from the south, the melee was joined by RAF No.249 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.504 Sqd (Hurricanes) and the large colossus of Luftwaffe bombers went into a frantic flight pattern. RAF No.73 Sqd who had engaged the formation from the outset, had now been entwined into the huge dogfight as well as RAF No.253 Sqd (Hurricanes).

The western flank saw Do 17s, He 111s and Ju 88s which numbered about eighty curve right from Kent, across the outskirts of Surrey and head towards the western side of London. A terrific battle ensued as fighters from RAF No.213 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.607 Sqd (Hurricanes) which had been vectored to cover Biggin Hill intercepted the large formation. Again, Bf 109s were seen to the south of London, but decided not to come to the aid of the bomber formation which managed to get mauled by the Hurricane squadrons. This was one of the most intense battles of the day. The British fighters tore into the Germans like hungry cats to a flock of wounded birds.

Even though most of the attacking bombers had been thrown off their planned flight path, many of them managed to get through to the southern areas of London. If they thought that most of Fighter Commands fighters were behind them and still engaged in combat over Kent and Surrey, they were in for a big surprise. Wing Commander Woodall at Duxford, had scrambled his 'Duxford Wing' which comprised RAF No.19 Sqd (Spitfires), 242 Sqd (Hurricanes), 302 Sqd (Hurricanes), 310 Sqd (Hurricanes) and 611 Sqd (Spitfires). Now, as in the morning session, the Luftwaffe were met by forty-nine fighters of Bader's "Big Wing". Combined with a number of other squadrons that had followed the leading bombers and two other squadrons that had just joined the action, a total of some 150 more fighters awaited them. Again, Bader ordered the Spitfires to attack the Bf 109s, who for some strange reason had not left their bombers early as on previous occasions, while the Hurricanes attacked the bombers. They were at a disadvantage as they were still climbing and had not had the time to get into position. The "Duxford Wing" leader complained later that it was the case again of being called on far too late, but the real reason this time was that the Germans had formed up much quicker this time and that almost caught even Keith Park off guard. The 'Wing' was scrambled again to patrol North Weald, and Bader led them through a gap in the clouds. At 16,000 feet, flak burst ahead, and in moments he saw the bombers; about forty of them, some 4,000 feet above the Hurricanes. But Bf 109s were diving on them and he yelled as he steep-turned, "Break up!" Around him the sky was full of wheeling Hurricanes and Bf109s. A yellow spinner was sitting behind his tail, and as he yanked hard back on the stick an aeroplane shot by, feet away. Bader hit its slipstream and the Hurricane shuddered, stalled and spun off the turn. He let it spin a few turns to shake off the 109 and came out of it at 5,000 feet. When Bader had first spun out, he almost collided with P/O Denis Crowley-Milling, and it was while in Crowley-Milling's slipstream that he went into the spin and did not pull out until 5,000 feet. He was unable to reach the bombers.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 14, 2010)

_(15 September 1940 continued....)_

The combat action over the southern and south western areas of London was extreme. The formation that had been intercepted as far away as Maidstone somehow managed to straggle through, many of the Bf 109s managed to stay as long as they could, but with fuel tanks getting into the danger zone, they had to break off and leave many of the bombers at the mercy of the British fighters. The German bombers, who had intended to drop their bomb loads on London itself, had jettisoned them in scattered areas in London's eastern and southern suburbs that suffered most. The most severe damage was done in West Ham, East Ham, Stratford, Stepney, Hackney, Erith, Dartford and Penge. Fighter Command now had everything that they possessed in the air.

Squadron leader John Sample RAF No.501 Squadron Kenley;



> _"I started to chase one Dornier which was flying through the tops of the clouds. Did you ever see that film "Hells Angels?" You'll remember how the Zeppelin came so slowly out of the cloud. Well, this Dornier reminded me of that. I attacked him four times altogether. When he first appeared through the cloud - you know how clouds go up and down like foam on water - I fired at him from the left, swung over to the right, turned in towards another hollow in the cloud, where I expected him to reappear, and fired at him again. After my fourth attack he dived down headlong into a clump of trees in front of a house, and I saw one or two cars parked in the gravel drive in front. I wondered whether there was anyone in the doorway watching the bomber crash. Then I climbed up again to look for some more trouble and found it in the shape of a Heinkel III which was being attacked by three Hurricanes and a couple of Spitfires. I had a few cracks at the thing before it made a perfect landing on an RAF aerodrome. The Heinkels undercarriage collapsed and the pilot pulled up, after skidding 50 yards in a cloud of dust. I saw a tall man get out of the right-hand side of the aircraft, and when I turned back he was helping a small man across the aerodrome towards a hangar_."


RAF No.303 Sqd had been ordered up at Northolt at 1420 hours and were vectored to cover the north Kent coast along the Thames. The squadron consisted of nine Hurricanes and was led by S/L R. Kellett when they sighted a large formation coming towards them. Interception was made over Gravesend. RAF No.303 Sqd was in the air just one hour and ten minutes before they returned back to Northolt. In this time, they had destroyed three Dornier Do 215's, two Messerschmitt Bf 110's and one Bf 109. One Do 215 was seen to break away from the combat action trailing smoke and losing altitude, but its fate was not known and the squadron was also credited with a probable. But only seven of the nine Hurricanes returned, with one pilot missing and another Hurricane crashing near Dartford with the pilot managing to bale out of his aircraft.

One of the Luftwaffe pilots who had to make a rather ungracious landing was the veteran Obstlt Dr. Hasso von Wedel. Like most of the Bf 109 pilots, he stayed with the Dorniers as long as possible, but the fuel situation forced him to leave early, leaving the bombers in a very vulnerable position. On the return journey, his flight of Bf 109s were attacked by RAF No. 605 Sqd, RCAF No.1 Sqd and RAF No.229 Sqd all flying Hurricanes. It is believed that one of the Hurricanes of RCAF No.1 Sqd followed von Wedel down, the veteran not being able to out maneuver the Hurricane. He was hit and his Bf 109 lost its controls. He tried in vain to make a landing on Romney Marsh, but the controls did not respond, and he made a heavy wheels up landing at a farmhouse, destroying a shed in which a mother and daughter were sitting in a car awaiting the father who was about to take them out on a Sunday drive. Both mother and daughter were killed instantly. A local policeman arrived on the scene to find a battered and bruised von Wedel wandering around in an almost tearful state, and as he apologized to the policeman for what he had done, the constable simply asked " _would you like a cup of tea sir_?".

The bulk of the fighting took place over London and its outskirts from Dartford westward, where five pairs of squadrons from 11 Group and the wing from 12 Group were all in action between ten minutes to three and a quarter past, mainly with the third formation but probably also with survivors of the other two. Again retiring by two distinct routes, the attackers were engaged on the way out by another four squadrons, including two from 10 Group. Guns of the inner artillery zone and the Thames and Medway defences were also in action and claimed a number of successes. Flight Lieutenant W.G.Clouston of RAF No.19 Sqd Duxford (Spitfires) took the two sections of his squadron to attack a formation of Do17s over Shoeburyness. Making their attack in line astern they made their attacks before any Bf109s arrived. F/L Couston lined up one, and gave a series of short bursts, one of the engines of the Dornier exploded in flame and smoke. Before he lost sight of it, ten feet of the bombers wing broke away and fell earthwards causing the bomber to roll over and spiral down to a watery grave below.

For the German bomber crews, it was now a no win situation. They were outnumbered over their target area, so much so that accurate bombing was virtually impossible. More and more fighter squadrons were moving into areas to cut off any retreat so that when they did decide to abort, trying to get into the protection of the cloud cover would be their only hope of survival.

As the last of the bombers were being chased back across the Channel, and many of the squadrons who had fought one of the heaviest air combats of the Battle of Britain retired to their respective aerodromes, another small raid had been detected and was approaching the Dorset town of Portland. It was just a small force of about ten He 111s from II./KG 55 and 10 Group scrambled RAF No.152 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.607 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires). The German target was the Woolston Spitfire factory which was hit. The bombing was not accurate and severe damage was kept to a minimum. RAF No.602 and RAF No.609 Squadrons both intercepted after the bombers attacked their target, and both claimed that they had destroyed two aircraft each. One bomber crashed in the Channel and another on its return to Villacoublay. 

A small formation of Bf 110s from Epr.Gr 210, once the crack dive bombing Gruppe of the Luftwaffe, made an attack again on the Woolston factory complex at 1800 hours. Most of the British fighters that had been up on constant sorties during the afternoon had returned to their bases and by this time were busy being rearmed, refueled and many were undergoing their usual repairs from damage sustained during the hectic afternoon. Therefore the Bf 110s were free from any attack or interception by Hurricanes or Spitfires. The task of defense was by the AA gun batteries who put up a tremendous fight in defense with accurate gunfire, which although they did not shoot down any German aircraft, the barrage that they put up was so aggressive that not a single bomb was dropped onto the Spitfire factory.

As the afternoon attack came slowly to an end, one by one the often tired and exhausted pilots from both sides returned to their bases. By evening, ninety-nine bombers and fighters were counted as shot down from the German formations including Lt. Julius Haase, the Staffelkapitän of 3./JG 53 with five victories, who was shot down and killed. Numerous German pilots were shot down and taken prisoner by the British. Six victory Experte Lt Hans Berthel, the Gruppe-Adjutant of I./JG 52 baled out of his crippled Bf 109 following combat and was taken prisoner. Uffz. August Klick of 3.(J)/LG 2 and Uffz. Andreas Walburger of 2./JG 27 were both shot down and made POWs. This attrition rate of bombers and fighters forced Hitler to consider postponing "Unternehmen Seelöwe" and halting anymore daylight raids on London. It was clear to all Luftwaffe aircrews on this day that RAF Fighter Command was far from being a spent force and without air superiority the invasion could not proceed.

Fighter Command lost thirty-six aircraft damaged or destroyed, ten pilots killed or missing and thirteen wounded. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, watching the battle with Air Marshal Park at the command room at Uxbridge, declared that the “_fifteenth of September 1940 was the day of our Victory_!” This day was to belong to the Royal Air Force Fighter Command, and in future years was to become known as "Battle of Britain Day".

During the night the main German raids were centered on London with others on Liverpool, the Midlands, South Wales and Bristol. London continued to bear the brunt of the attack. The first hostile raids were plotted leaving the French Coast at Le Havre at about 2000 hours. They crossed the Coast at Shoreham and penetrated to the London area which was to be the main objective throughout the night. At about 2230 hours raids to London started to come from the Dieppe area crossing the coast between Selsey Bill and Dover. Another raid on London was conducted by He 111s of II./KG 27 around 2330 hours. Between 0100 and 0300 hours raids were coming in via the Thames Estuary and Essex. About fifteen raids were plotted out of the Cherbourg area to South Wales and the Bristol Channel, some of which penetrated to the Midlands and others to Liverpool. By 0130 hours these raids had withdrawn but the activity over London and the South-east continued until about 05:00 hours.

Over Belgium Sgt John Hannah (1921-47), a wireless operator and air gunner in Hampden P 1355 of No. 83 Squadron, was terribly burnt putting out a fire aboard his flak-ridden bomber, which returned to base safely after attacking Antwerp. (Victoria Cross)

Reactions: Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Glider (Sep 15, 2010)

Cleary this was a major effort on your part NJ, many thanks


----------



## Njaco (Sep 15, 2010)

_(15 September 1940 continued.......)_

Just after 1000 hours, nineteen Dornier 17s of III./KG 76 took off from their airfield at Cormeilles-En-Vexin, near Paris. Once the Dorniers had formed up, they headed northwest towards London, to take part in what would be the fifth daylight bombing raid on the capital. The aiming point for the bombers was to be the maze of railway lines between the Thames and Clapham Common. Amongst the III Gruppe Dorniers was Werk Nr 2555, F1+FS, of the 8th Staffel, flown by Fw. R Heitsch. With him were Fw. S Schmid, Fw. H Pfeiffer, and Fw. M Sauter. Also on board was a new ‘secret weapon’. An infantry flamethrower had been fitted in the Dornier’s fuselage, facing rearwards. Any RAF fighter attacking from close behind was going to be assured of a warm reception, or so it was intended. Controlled by the radio operator, Fw Schmid, the new weapon would see action for the first time. If it didn’t set the attackers on fire, it might at least deter them from getting too close. Should it prove successful, the weapon would be introduced on other bombers.

The Dorniers reached the outskirts of London without loss. The escorting fighters, and the advance guard of fighters ‘free hunting’ ahead, had done their job well. In the rear of the formation was Werk Nr 2555, it’s secret weapon as yet unused. Soon Fw. Schmid reported a British fighter closing in from behind. Sgt Ray Holmes, in his RAF No 504 Sqdn Hurricane, closed in to four hundred yards before opening fire. As he did so, his windscreen was suddenly coated in black oil, which completely blocked his view. The flamethrower, obviously intended for use on the ground, was not working properly at 16,000 feet, giving a jet of flame only some 100 yards long. A lot of the oil had not caught fire, and it was this that had found it’s way onto the Hurricane. Knowing that the airflow would clear the oil away, Ray Holmes waited for his view to be restored. As his windscreen cleared Ray realised that he was dangerously close to the Dornier, and ramming the stick forward, passed beneath the bomber.

If Ray Holmes had escaped the clutches of the secret weapon without damage, the same could not be said of the Dornier. The starboard engine had been hit by machine gun fire, forcing Rolf Heitsch to feather the propeller and leaving him to struggle with the controls. With one engine out, Rolf was forced to drop out of the bomber formation. Below was a bank of cloud, and he headed the Dornier towards it, knowing that it would shield him from enemy fighters. Before they could reach the enveloping cloud, they came under attack from several RAF fighters. Each time one approached, the flamethrower was triggered, but perversely it seemed to have the wrong effect! To the RAF pilots, the jet of flame and smoke made the Dornier look as if it was on fire, and sensing an easy victory they went in to attack! Several pilots reported attacking the Dornier. Sgt Robinson, of RAF No 257 Sqdn reported that the Dornier ‘caught fire in the rear’, P/O Campbell, of RAF No 242 Sqdn, stated that;


> ‘When I opened fire, smoke was observed issuing from the lower part of the fuselage of the enemy aircraft’, whilst Sgt Suidak, of No 302 Sqdn noted ‘Black smoke pouring from the cockpit’.


 He also reported that as another pilot attacked, the Dornier caught fire BEFORE the pilot fired on it. 

Eventually, the flamethrower’s operator, Fw Schmid was hit by machine gun fire, and severely wounded, which put an end to its use. It was obvious that all hope of reaching France had gone. With the radio operator badly wounded, there was no question of bailing out, and leaving him behind, a forced landing was the only option. The Dornier came to rest, undercarriage up, on the brow of a field above Castle Farm, on the outskirts of Shoreham Village, Kent, narrowly missing the high-tension cables that ran over the field. Having released the escape hatch, the crew of the Dornier carefully brought the unconscious Stefan Schmid out of the cockpit, and laid him on the grass. The radio operator was badly wounded in the chest, and Rolf Heitsch, who had trained as a doctor before the war, could see that there was nothing that could be done to save him. Fw Martin Sauter, and the observer, Fw Pfeiffer had also been wounded, but less seriously. Schmid was taken to Sevenoaks Hospital, but was found to be dead on arrival. The Castle Farm Dornier turned up at Lowestoft in late October 1940, when it was exhibited on the Crown Meadow in aid of the local Spitfire fund.

Reactions: Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## michaelmaltby (Sep 15, 2010)

Thank you so much for your efforts on this, Njaco.

What a day - September 15, 1940.

MM
Proud Canadian


----------



## Njaco (Sep 15, 2010)

*16 September 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: At meetings held this morning, on both sides of the Channel, two completely different attitudes were emerging over the analysis of the previous days combat actions. Keith Park, the C-in-C of 11 Group, even though the success of the previous days events had exhilarated him, he still felt that improvements could be made. He was not going to rest on his laurels as there was always the chance that Göring would send his Luftwaffe over again if not with a stronger force. He was concerned that individual squadrons were failing to rendezvous at the right times at given vectored positions. That paired squadrons were meeting up with each other far too early and too low for that matter. And he also showed concern that paired squadrons were not committing themselves to the task that paired squadrons were supposed to do.

In Germany, if Göring was disappointed, Hitler was furious. London was supposed to have been decimated, the capital was supposed to have been flattened and in flames and the people were supposed to have been bombed almost into submission. The fighters of the Royal Air Force were to have been knocked out of the sky, after all, the Luftwaffe had send more than enough aircraft to put an end to Fighter Command once and for all. In actual fact, London did not receive the full scale bombing that was intended, but, compared with the number of German aircraft that had orders to bomb London, damage was only slight. The German fighters had no chance of destroying Fighter Command because they were met with far more fighters than they anticipated, and pilots that, after the lull of the previous week fought with renewed vigor and enthusiasm. Couple this with the attack on the night of the 15th and 16th by Bomber Command who repeated their raids of the previous night and sent 155 bombers to attack all the Channel ports along the French, Belgian and Dutch coasts including a large attack on the docks at Antwerp where the hundreds of barges were docked in preparation for the planned invasion of England.

Göring called a meeting of his Luftflotten commanders on this day;


> "_The British air force is far from finished, their fighters proved that yesterday. Their bombers are continually attacking our barge installations and although we must admit they have achieved some form of success, but I will only say and repeat what I have said before, and that is our orders to attempt full scale attacks on London, instead of the destruction of their air force will not achieve the success we need, it will only act as our demise_."


A thought that was indeed shared by one of Germany's best fighter pilots. Commented Major Adolf Galland of III./JG 26, referring to the battle;


> "Our greatest mistake was not keeping the pressure up on the airfields of southern England. Göring thought that he was master when he said that he was now in charge of the battle. He thought he was losing too many aircraft in attacking the RAF airfields, they were always there, not in great numbers, but they were always there. He thought that by trying to bomb London by night, he knew that Britain had no night fighter squadrons, he could devastate London and the people of Britain would be crying for mercy. This was his greatest mistake. He himself gave the RAF room to breathe, time to reorganize, time to rebuild. The result was, we were losing the Battle of Britain."


But it was always the fact that 'someone else was at fault'. Adolf Hitler placed the blame on Göring for the way that the attacks had been implemented. Göring in turn gave criticism to his fighter pilots because they did not give adequate protection to the bomber force, and in turn both fighter and bomber forces of the Luftwaffe initiated bitter arguments between each other. The bomber forces argued that much of the time forming up over the French coast was because the fighter escort failed to rendezvous at the correct time, while the fighter units claimed that it was the time that the bomber units took to form up over the airfields and that they had wasted precious time and most importantly precious fuel which shortened the amount of time that they could spend over England.

Göring decided that further daylight attacks on the British capital and other British cities and towns were right out of the question. His conversation with the Führer that morning was one that Hitler displayed his disappointment of the events of the previous day, there was no mention of future plans. His decision now, was to continue where he had left off prior to Hitler's intervention with his directive No.16, only his task was now made even harder because Fighter Command was now stronger than ever before, and the success of September 15th had given the leaders and the pilots of 11 Group renewed confidence. He would continue with daylight bombing of RAF fighter aerodromes and fighter production factories. This way, as before he could hope to destroy Fighter Command on the ground as well as in the air, just as he had planned in early July. To keep Hitler happy, he would mount a campaign of night attacks on London for as long as possible, knowing full well that the British fighters had no answer to night fighting.

The thought of any major raid on Britain was obviously out of the question. Conditions were in fact disastrous and only a few small feints were intercepted with the odd reconnaissance aircraft. The largest was an impending raid towards North Kent targets, but nothing really developed.

Although the weather was poor, an early raid was detected over the Channel at about 0730hours. British radar picked up a medium plot of nearly 350 aircraft heading directly towards London in several waves and spread out along the Kent coastline. By 0832 hours all the aircraft had re-crossed the Coast. No interception was made. 21 Fighter Squadrons were in the air, and it may have been on this account that the enemy turned away so soon.

One raid crossed the Estuary into Essex and towards London but soon turned back. This was confirmed as 100 plus, but turned out to be Bf 109s, probably looking for targets of opportunity rather than any pre-planned raid. Hurricanes of RAF No.605 Sqd were scrambled to intercept, but most of the German fighters had turned back and the squadron engaged in combat with the last remaining Bf 109s of JG 51. RAF No.605 Sqd appeared to damage two of the German fighters, but Major Werner Mölders attacked the Hurricane of P/O E.J. Watson and caused enough damage for it to make an emergency landing at Detling. It was the Kommodore's thirty-eighth victory.

A few German aircraft had been detected off the Suffolk coast, but made no attempt to cross. One of these was a reconnaissance Ju88 plotted off the east coast of Norfolk and Lincolnshire. Hurricanes of RAF No. 257 Sqd were scrambled from Martlesham Heath along with Spitfires of RAF No. 616 Sqd from Kirton-in-Lindsey. The Ju 88 was chased by a Spitfire of RAF No.616 Sqd, who after damaging the German bomber by gunfire, aborted the chase because of a critical fuel situation. The Spitfire ran out of fuel about 20 miles north of Cromer and Sgt T.C. Iveson was forced to abandon the aircraft. While the Spitfire sank in the North Sea, the pilot was picked up by a Navy motor torpedo boat and brought ashore at Great Yarmouth.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 15, 2010)

_(16 september 1940 continued....)_

The few Luftwaffe planes on sorties that day also experienced the fuel shortage problem. During a protection flight in the morning, Hptm. Erich von Selle's II./JG 3 lost the bomber formation they were escorting in heavy cloud, despite weather reports to the contrary. Trying to return to France, the eighteen planes of von Selle's Gruppe found themselves running out of fuel. When they finally landed, eight of the planes had no measurable fuel left in their tanks. Two hours later, the Gruppe were ordered up for another escort mission. Hptm. von Selle refused, stating he was twenty-two planes understrength and could not afford to lose the rest. Told that it was an order, von Selle replied that he will take his flight up. If the cloud cover was too thick to see at 1,000 feet, he would take the planes to 3500 feet and order every man to bail out. The Gruppe received no more orders for the day.

Throughout the remainder of the day there were no large-scale raids made by the Luftwaffe, but only reconnaissance and fighter sweeps across southern England. Patrolling RAF squadrons made interceptions with a few of these raids. RAF No.73 Sqd Debden (Hurricanes), 257 Sqd Debden (Hurricanes) and 504 Sqd Hendon (Hurricanes) were ordered to patrol the north Kent coast in the vicinity of Gravesend. They returned after about one hour and the official record book of 257 Sqd stated that there was no contact made with the enemy. 

It was hard to ascertain as to who shot down who on this day. Besides a few squadrons on training flights, only two RAF squadrons were reported to have flown on operational duty. Yet statistics indicate that nine German aircraft were shot down. Ten German aircraft, in fact did crash while on operational sorties, but who takes the credit for their destruction? The Luftwaffe lost one He 111, two He 115s and seven Ju 88s. Only three claims were awarded to the Jagdflieger. In addition to Major Werner Mölders kill, Uffz. August Dilling of 6./JG 3 and Oblt. Georg Claus of Stab./JG 51 were awarded with two Spitfires destroyed.

RAF Losses: 5 aircraft damaged or destroyed and 1 pilot wounded. Luftwaffe Losses: 18 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 17 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 5 wounded.

As soon as darkness fell, the Blitz on London was renewed with a number of night bombing raids starting a little earlier than normal. Wave after wave approached the city of London with very little respite. Many heavy high explosive bombs were dropped in the West End and the City, starting serious fires, most of which however, came under control after a time. Minor bombing was reported from most districts in Greater London, and communications were interrupted. In all, 170 German aircraft dropped over 200 tons of high explosive. The targets followed a pattern very similar to that of the early bombing raids, and that was the London dock area, the residential districts of West Ham, East Ham, Hackney, Bethnal Green and Shoreditch. Bombing over the rest of the country during the night was rather more widespread. Others dropped their loads on the southern boroughs of Southwark, Bermondsey and Brixton, and in the west at Finchley, Willesden and Stanmore. More formations of German bombers made their way to Liverpool and Manchester, while others targeted Coventry, Birmingham and Bristol. The people of Britain were now to take the night bombing in their stride, from now on, the evening movement down to the shelter was to become a part of the daily ritual, for it was in these often cold and damp places, often cramped that people were to spend as much time down in their 'Anderson' as they did in their home. In London itself, the deep underground stations of the 'tube' became the nightime mecca for thousands. Beds and bunks lined the station platforms, and this too became so much a ritual for thousands, many of the voluntary services brought down pots of tea and plates of food, and as time went on entertainers and bands joined in and many an enjoyable concert was held deep down below the surface of London. In other towns and cities, the story was very much the same. The lifestyles of the people was now beginning to change, but the thing was now, for how long could the people last.

HEs fell in the grounds of Heaton Secondary Girls School for a second time, this time destroying an empty house adjoining the School. Eleven IBs were dropped on the Golf Links at Hebburn in the vicinity of Hebburn Lakes. No injury or damage. 

The first of the 'Pirateneinsatze' or Pirate Attacks was carried out by a lone He 111 of I./KG 55 on the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton. But the raider soon aborted his mission and returned to its airbase at Dreux. Another raid on London by He 111s of I./KG 27 did succeed with bombs failing on the city shortly after 2100 hours. Another He 111 from the same Gruppe dropped its load on the ancient city of Bath.

A Heinkel 115C Seaplane from Seenotflugkdo 3/506 was severely damaged by AA gunfire during a torpedo attack on a convoy and force-landed on the sea 7 miles off Alnwick at 1500 hours. The crew took to their dinghy and tried to sink the plane by shooting at the floats, but were only partially successful. The crew of four were rescued and the plane was taken in tow by a fishing boat and towed, upside down, to Eyemouth Harbour and beached. The fishing boat crew possibly expecting a reward, got nothing, except the petrol in the tanks and some parachute silk for their wives.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 16, 2010)

*17 September 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: During the morning, just as the Luftflotten commanders were giving instruction of the impending days raids, and the crews were being briefed, a communiqué came through stating that "Unternehmen Seelöwe" had yet again been postponed. It was due to the present circumstances, and the message was obviously under the direction of Hitler, he being the only one who could announce such a decision. Later, the German General Staff sent a message by radio to the commanding officer handling the loading and supply of troop-carrying aircraft in Holland. It gave the commanding officer the authorization to dismantle all of the air-loading equipment at all the Dutch airfields. Without this vital equipment, there could be no such invasion, and by the withdrawal of the air-loading equipment and possibly the barges at Antwerp, it appeared that this postponement was more like an abandonment.

In the deciphering rooms at Bletchley Park, the message was intercepted by Ultra loud and clear. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Newhall stated to his ministry that with this great news of the air-loading equipment being ordered to disband, and with the unreliable weather conditions that could be expected for the remainder of the year, any planned invasion would now not take place, not in 1940 anyway. In Germany, Hitler's new directive stated that "Unternehmen Seelöwe" could still be expected, even as late as October, but only if the air and weather conditions permitted, otherwise such an invasion could not now take place until 1941.

There was very little activity during the morning period. Radar had picked up several small blips over the Channel, but these being either German aircraft flying singularly or in pairs were ignored by Fighter Command as they were probably just weather or photo-reconnaissance aircraft and caused no threat. One German bomber came very close over the town of Dover and the air raid warning sounded but the bomber flew along the coastline for a while before turning back out over the Channel towards its base.

The weather was unsuitable for mass raids on London and in accordance with Goring's directive of the 16th September, Luftflotte 2 sent waves of fighters across, with a few bombers as bait, in the hope of luring 11 Group into an unprofitable battle.

In the afternoon a formation of Ju 88s was detected heading in a northerly direction over Bristol. Their target was believed to be the factory areas of north of Bristol. RAF No.152 Sqd (Spitfires) was scrambled to intercept. One of the Ju 88s was hit and it was further harassed by the Spitfires until it crashed near Warminster south-east of Bath. The pilot was killed while three others were captured, one of them being a Gruppenkommandeur. With the brightening of the weather allowing better visibility, another large formation was detected crossing the Channel from Calais. As they crossed the coastline between Dover and Dungeness, the Observer Corps had trouble identifying them. The German formation was only flying at 15,000 feet, but they were a large contingent of Bf 109s consisting of units from JG 26, JG 27 and JG 53, heading across the Kent coast.

11 Group dispatched at varying times a number of squadrons, most of them Hurricanes while No 12 Group had 5 Squadrons patrolling at 15,000 to 20,000 feet north of the Estuary. RAF No.17 Sqd, 73 Sqd, and 253 Sqd and the all Hurricane squadrons from Debden were vectored to the Hendon and Northolt area. The formation of Bf 109s, accompanied by a small number of Ju 88 bombers were heading in the general direction of Sheerness and Tilbury, and over the Kent countryside, quite a number of bombs were dropped indiscriminately indicating that a number of the Bf 109s had taken to the new role of carrying bombs. But over various areas of mid Kent, furious dogfights broke out involving Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 17, 303, 501, 504 and 607 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 19, 41 and 611 Squadrons.

One of the combat areas was in the Dover area. Heavily involved was RAF No.41 Sqd who took on a large formation of Bf 109s. Two of the Messerschmitts became sandwiched between RAF No.41 Sqd Spitfires and trailing smoke, dived down to low levels in a bid to make good their escape. Both of these managed to return to Wissant without any further attack being made on them. But three other Bf 109s were not so lucky. Two were shot down and crashed into the Channel, another was destroyed when it crashed near Deal, but not after RAF No.41 Sqd sustained some bruising from the German fighters. At 1535 hours, F/O J.G. Boyle's Spitfire was hit by gunfire from a Bf 109 over Manston, and had to return to Hornchurch. At 1540 hours, P/O J.N. Mackenzie's Spitfire was severely damaged and while the pilot was unhurt, his aircraft was beyond repair after it crash landed. P/O H.H. Chalder was another who had to return to base while P/O H.C. Baker of RAF No.41 Sqd had to make a forced landing at Stelling Minnis after he took a hit while in combat over Manston.

Over "Hells Corner" another Bf 109 broke away and attempted to return to its base after receiving damage, but the damage was too severe and it had to make a forced landing. This may have been the Bf 109E-1 of Uffz. Heinz Bock of 7./JG 26 who force-landed his machine with engine damage near Rye.

RAF No.501 Sqd took on some Bf 109s over Ashford but were not as lucky as RAF No.41 Sqd. 501 Squadron was to lose two Hurricanes in this engagement while claiming one victory. One of them was Sgt J.H. Lacey who managed to bale out of his stricken aircraft, while the other was Sgt E.J. Egan who went down with his Hurricane that had burst into flames. One of the Luftwaffe victors was Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke of Stab III./JG 53 who claimed a Hurricane over Ashford. Hptm. Eduard Neumann of Stab I./JG 27 claimed two Hurricanes over Gatwick. P/O Bennions of RAF No.501 Sqd described their only success of the day:


> "_After the commencement of the engagement, I found myself about 2,000 feet below a section of 5 Me109s. Two of the Me109s dived down onto me and I evaded by turning sharply right; then one dived away and as I turned to follow three more came down on me. After turning and twisting violently, I spun out and, on pulling out I found that one only had followed me down. I turned to engage and he disappeared into the clouds. I climbed back to 15,000 feet and sighted a loose formation of four Me109s circling. I attacked the rear one from the inside of a left hand turn and, after a short burst, I saw pieces fly off the aircraft, which then rolled over and spun inverted for about 8,000 feet and then dive straight into the ground midway between Canterbury and Herne Bay, near a very large wood." _


RAF No.19 Sqd also got into the action and over north Kent was credited with two destroyed Messerschmitts. As it turned out, both were shot down by Sub Lt "Tony" Blake, who as it happens turned out to be the Navy's highest scoring fighter pilot. Oblt. Jakob Stoll of 9./JG 53 went missing in action and with fourteen victories, was presumed dead. The engine of 7./JG 26's Uffz. Karl-Heinz Bock's Messerschmitt seized and he force landed at Rye to become a prisoner of war.

Later at 1800 hours Hurricanes of RAF No. 151 Squadron scrambled from Digby, intercepted a He111.

The usual night raids began to commence at about 2000 hours. London was bombed again along with raids on Liverpool, South Wales, East Anglia, Middlesborough and Glasgow. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary and off the coasts of Kent and Suffolk. The first raids were on London where continuous waves of bombers pounded the city. Several He 111s of III./KG 27 returned over London with a midnight raid. Later in the evening, Junkers Ju 88s went on a bombing spree over Merseyside. The Dornier Do 17s of KGr 606 flying out of Brest targeted Liverpool. Again, the bombing was either not accurate or the Germans just dropped their bombs anywhere as long as they were over the city. There were plenty of industrial and dock areas that could be bombed, but the residential areas were also taking a beating and again, many lives were lost. The cities of Newcastle and Durham were also hit, but many houses were damaged and destroyed. Reports of bombs landing in open country were again reported well away from towns and cities. One HE was dropped in a field south of Southbrook Farm and West of Catcote Farm, West Hartlepool. Cattle were grazing in the field with the result that one was seriously injured and another slightly injured. Windows at Southbrook Farm and in adjacent residential property were damaged.

Night raiders use the 1000-kg blast bombs for the first time. Adapted from sea mines these cylindrical objects are about eight feet long and two feet in diameter. Each descends suspended from a 27-foot diameter silk parachute. Thin case and large charge combine to produce a colossal hollow bang, tremendous shock waves and extensive blast damage over a quarter mile radius.

Fireman Harry Errington (b. 1910) rescued two trapped colleagues after a direct hit on a building which was being used as a shelter by auxiliary firemen. (George Cross)

Losses: Luftwaffe 8: Fighter Command 8.

Victory came at 2345 hours to one of the Defiants of RAF No.141 Sqd converted to night fighter operations and based at Biggin Hill. A number of Junkers Ju 88s were detected crossing the coast near Dover and 11 Group dispatched a flight from RAF No.141 Sqd. Interception was made north of Ashford and Sgt Lawrence and Sgt Chard began their attack on 'B3+OL'. The badly damaged bomber finally crashed in a residential street in Maidstone killing all the aircrew.


----------



## T Bolt (Sep 17, 2010)

Keep it comming Chris!


----------



## Njaco (Sep 17, 2010)

*18 September 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: It now appeared that the Royal Air Force were starting to gain the upper hand, but even though London suffered serious damage and hundreds of casualties from 7 September onwards, the battle was far from being over. Adolf Hitler may have postponed the invasion once again, but the intensity of day and especially night raids were about to increase. Göring was under instructions to continue bombing attacks on the British capital although personally, he would have like to revert back to destroying the fighters, the airfields and ground support installations of the RAF. Daytime attacks would still continue, and by increasing Bf 109 and Bf 110 escort duties to the bombers, he could hopefully destroy at least some of the RAF by forcing them to send fighters into the air. But with instructions to concentrate on bombing London, it was going to be a big task if the targets were not the fighter aerodromes themselves. Night time bombing would continue, and this was to become more widespread with greater intensity and with more high HEs followed by thousands of incendiary bombs.

Conditions were expected to be a continuation of the previous day except that the low to medium cloud that brought the rain periods would disappear. The day was expected to be bright and clear although the squally winds would continue. At 0900 hours 150 German aircraft were plotted concentrating in the Calais area. At 0927 hours about fifty aircraft crossed the coast near Hythe followed by another fifty. The Observer Corps reported tiny specks at high altitude which indicated that it was a formation of fighters flying at heights in the region of 20,000 feet between Folkestone and North Foreland. But they weren't only fighters. II(Schlacht)./LG 2 committed 21 Bf 109s in a bombing attack against the Tilbury docks where several bombs were dropped hitting the rail triangle and houses west of the docksat 0953 hours.

The other German fighters including those of JG 26 reached Maidstone and decided to break up into two separate formations. One headed towards Sheerness while the other veered north towards the open waters of the Thames Estuary. At varying intervals, a total of fifteen squadrons of Fighter Command were scrambled to intercept. Only six of the fifteen Fighter Command squadrons made contact between Maidstone and Chatham. These were RAF No.17 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.46 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.73 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.257 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.501 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.603 Sqd (Spitfires). Most of these squadrons, once they observed that the enemy were all Bf 109 fighters, made their presence felt but broke off any form of attack in accordance with Park's instructions not to be drawn into combat with German fighters unless they were escorting their bombers.

A couple of flights from both RAF No.501 Sqd and RAF No.603 Sqd did become involved in combat after being jumped by the Bf 109s. One pilot baled out of his Hurricane over Staplehurst while a Spitfire pilot of RAF No.603 Sqd was killed after his aircraft was shot up and crashed near Ashford. Oblt. Roloff von Aspern of 4./JG 54 and Fw. Hermann Neuhoff of 7./JG 53 were each credited with a Spitfire destroyed over Ashford.

No sooner had a number of the squadrons landed that others were scrambled and vectored to intercept German formations detected over Dover and over the Thames Estuary. Some of the squadrons that were scrambled earlier were vectored to new locations while more squadrons were released. A number of the squadrons engaged the Germans over the Estuary and a number of individual combat actions take place at various locations at the mouth of the River Thames. RCAF No.1 Sqd (Hurricanes) became involved and had one of its fighters shot down, but P/O E.W.B. Beardmore baled out and received slight injuries. Hptm. Dietrich Hrabak from Stab II./JG 54 was credited with a Spitfire at this time. RAF No.66 Sqd (Spitfires) engaged Bf 109s over North Kent and one of the Spitfires was hit and the pilot, Sgt D.F. Corfe sustained injuries after he managed to crash land the aircraft at Perham. RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires) managed to turn a formation of Bf 109s around while over Sheerness and continued the chase as the German fighters headed towards Dover and the Channel. Three Spitfires were damaged with two of their pilots receiving injuries while the third was unhurt.

By 1200 hours the first German bombing raid of the day was detected coming in north of Dover. It consisted of a small formation of Ju 88s escorted by 100 Bf 109 fighters from JG 3, JG 26, JG 51 and JG 27. Further raids crossed the coast at Deal and also proceeded to Maidstone. These three movements constituted the first wave. At 1245 hours the second wave consisting of three raids of 54 aircraft crossed the coast near Dover leaving 12+ aircraft circling in the Straits. At 1300 hours, the two raids were already in the London area with another 120 aircraft distributed from Rye to the Mouth of the Thames. The Stabschwarm of JG 26 tore into the Hurricanes of RAF No. 46 Sqd who were scrambled to intercept. Major Adolf Galland from Stab./JG 26 shot down three Hurricanes in twenty minutes to bring his score to thirty-five kills and Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 shot down his twenty-eighth victim over Ashford. But there were losses. Oblt. Rudolf Krafftschick of 1./JG 27 went missing in action over England while Uffz. Ernst Schulz of 3./JG 1 and Gefr. Walter Glockner of 9./JG 27 were both shot down and captured, Uffz. Schulz, wounded so severely that he died of his wounds three months later. At 1300 hours aircraft started to return home and by 1345 hours, the majority had left.

Shortly after 1530 hours contacts of the third raid of the day were made by the south coast radar stations. Again the German bombers were forming up in position over Calais, where two separate formations were detected. Early sightings indicated that there were between one hundred and one hundred and fifty aircraft heading towards the English coast and the Observer Corps reported that they were crossing the coastline between Dungeness and Folkestone and towards Ashford and Chatham. This time, it was reported that there were no sign of fighter escorts, and that the formation was made up of mainly Do 17 and Ju 88 bombers of III./KG 77. What fighters there were conducted a sweep up the Thames but turned back before they could be intercepted. Fighter Command put up at least ten squadrons where most of the action was taking place over Maidstone and Chatham.

II(Schlact)./LG 2 were back over Britain with an escort of 100 fighters and went after the Port Victoria oil depot at 1615 hours. Fighter Command dispatched another twelve squadrons who engaged, but not before many bombs fell on the dockyards and surrounding areas of Chatham. The Medway Oil Company, Port Victoria, was attacked and although no damage was done to the Oil Company's premises, an Admiralty Tank was set on fire and soon under control.

By now, a number of squadrons had engaged the Luftwaffe over the north Kent coast with many squadrons that had left aerodromes in the protective area around London. Park again called on 12 Group and in response Woodhall scrambled the 'Duxford Wing' to patrol the area from London to Gravesend. Flying up the Thames, two groups of between twenty and thirty bombers were heading for London. The wing found the two formations south of the river below Gravesend and Northfleet and ordered the squadrons to attack. Leaving RAF No. 611 Sqd on patrol and RAF No. 19 Sqd to look after any escorts, Bader led his three Hurricane squadrons in an almost vertical diving attack on the first formation. Immediately they broke up the formations with Bader's RAF No.242 Sqd diving into the centre with all guns blazing. Against the white of the cloud base the German bombers stood out almost beckoning to be picked off one by one. The sky was a kaleidoscope of frantically weaving bombers and marauding fighters leaving trails in the air of criss-crossing vapor trails. One by one the bombers went down in flames and by 1730 hours the action was still continuing to the south of London. The 'Big Wing' continued its success in the combat claiming thirty bombers destroyed while losing none although in actually only nineteen bombers were lost. Many of the bombers scattered going in all different directions, but it was estimated that sixty managed to get though and head towards London. Most bombs fell on the central area of the city, but within forty minutes most of the bombers were heading back towards the coast.

By 1930 hours, the first of the night-time bombers came over and the night raids began. Approximately 200 aircraft were plotted approaching Dungeness, the first time that formations of aircraft were plotted at night. From 2100 hours onwards steady flows of German aircraft were mainly concentrated on the London area. London was again hit bad and many buildings which had just their fires extinguished where hit again and it started all over. Just before midnight, heavy bombing occurred along the Thames and as the night wore on this was extended closer to the city centre. As one formation arrived, dropped its bombload, another formation was approaching lining up in the queue to add further destruction as the other formation left. Other targets were Liverpool and Manchester where the Merseyside docks received some heavy attacks. Although other bombs were dropped in various areas of Kent, Surrey, Herefordshire and Middlesex, it was believed that they were bombs from aircraft dropped at random to lighten the load for the return journey.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Hptm. Günther "Fränzl" Lützow of Stab./JG 3 was awarded the Ritterkreuz.


_(Thanks to Juha for corrections!)_


----------



## Njaco (Sep 19, 2010)

*19 September 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Heavy cloud was expected to continue throughout the day and rain periods, heavy at times was expected over most of Britain. The Channel areas could expect a very low cloud base with early morning fog and mist patches in coastal districts. Ironically, it was not on the south coast that the first attacks of the day occurred. A small formation made a surprise attack on Liverpool. No serious damage was done as most of the German aircraft were flying in singly or in pairs. Later in the morning, a number of Ju 88s were heading towards London. These were met by RAF No.249 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.302 Sqd (Hurricanes) over north Kent. The Ju 88s scattered and were turned back with one of the bombers being shot down by F/O J. Kowalski of RAF No.302 Sqd at 1130 hours and it crashed near Bury St Edmunds. Another was to sustain engine damage and crash landed near Cambridge.

During the rest of the day, the Luftwaffe made a number of reconnaissance flights over the Channel and off the English east coast over the North Sea. One of the aircraft, a Ju 88 was spotted crossing the coast near Harwich at 1045 hours and was soon intercepted by British fighters and it crashed on the coast near Orfordness. Everything was rather quiet up until 1600 hours when radar picked up small blips off the coast near Swanage.

RAF No.152 Sqd consisting of two Spitfires, was scrambled from Warmwell. Not long afterwards a bomber was sighted over the Channel. The German plane, a Ju 88, disappeared into the murk but moments later it reappeared about two miles in front. The squadron closed in, making alternate quarter attacks from left and right, aiming first at the gunners positions and then at each engine. The Ju 88 was badly battered and it dived into the sea. This downed Ju 88 was probably one from 1./KG 51 that was recorded as being shot down by British fighters off Britain's south coast, although the cause of crash was stated to be "Cause Unknown". Those killed were Obfw. Luckard and Uffz. Henker while Fw. Walter and Gefr. Roeder were listed as missing.

Across the Channel, the Germans were busy during the day cleaning up the Channel ports from Calais to Antwerp after Wellingtons, Hampdens and Whitleys unleashed another successful night attack on the barges during the night of the 18th/19th September. It was the biggest operation yet by Bomber Command on the barge installations when 194 bombers were involved. Of these, 187 crews reported that their mission was successful. The German invasion fleet started to pull out of the Channel ports to avoid further damage from Bomber Command.

Inclement weather conditions in the evening, curtailed many German operations although scattered attacks did occur. Mine laying continued along the coastline, Northumberland and County Durham were bombed although no serious damage was reported. Liverpool prepared for night raids and many sirens sounded, but it appears that German aircraft kept well out into the Irish Sea as no attack was made on the city. A formation of German bombers was detected off the Welsh coast at 1950 hours and appeared to be heading for the port of Liverpool, but they were lost and there was no record of them reaching Liverpool. The London area came under warning signals at 1955 hours and a number of separate raids on the capital commenced at 2100 hours, and damage was done at Heston aerodrome in Middlesex when bombs destroyed a hangar and a number of buildings. Thirteen aircraft were damaged, some seriously. These included Spitfires of the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit, a Wellington bomber that was 'just visiting' and the famous Lockheed 12A that was used by the famous war photographer Sidney Cotton. In London, a bomb exploded at the entrance to a large air raid shelter in the borough of Tottenham and estimates put the casualty count at about seventy. Bombs fell at Edmonton, Golders Green and Willesden, but damage was not serious. By 2100 hours, much of the heavy cloud cover either thinned out or cleared, especially in the North Wales and north west coast of England and a number of German aircraft were spotted. Most came under AA gunfire, but there were no reports of any of the bombers being brought down.

The weather seriously hampered Bomber Commands operations. Only a handful of Blenheims left for a raid on Dunkirk Harbour bombing German shipping and buildings.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 9; RAF, 0.

In general, it was a day of spasmodic and scattered raids, quite often only consisting of a single German bomber. It was just the second time during the battle that Fighter Command did not suffer any casualties with the exception that one aircraft of RAF No.257 Sqd suffered engine failure while on convoy patrol but landed safely. But the Luftwaffe did sustain a number of casualties. Excluding about six Luftwaffe bombers that crashed on landing on internal flights or crashed on take off, there were a number of them that crashed after being involved in operations against the RAF. One Ju 88 of 4(F)/121 had to make a forced landing at Oakington aerodrome due to engine failure while on a photo-reconnaissance flight and was involved with British fighters and its crew captured. Another Ju 88 of 5(F)/122 was involved in a British fighter attack and had to return to base carrying one dead and one seriously injured crewmember. A Do17 of 7./KG 2 was attacked by Spitfires over southern England and although it managed to return to France it crashed. Another Do17 of 2./KG 3 was believed to have suffered damage from AA gunfire and crashed on landing causing minor damage to the aircraft. 3./KG 55 also lost a He 111 to anti-aircraft fire during the raid on London and it crashed in Essex. A Ju 88 was shot down by fighters over London with all the crew either killed or missing. A He 111 of 4./KG 4 was pursued by Hurricanes over the Thames Estuary and was last seen heading out towards the North Sea and was presumed to have crashed into the sea. The crew of a He111 were captured after their aircraft was brought down by AA gunfire near Bishops Stortford in Herefordshire.

RAF No. 71 was formed at RAF Church Fenton with Brewster Buffalos. These were unsuitable for European conditions and Hawker Hurricanes replaced them from November. The RAF picked an Englishman, W. M. Churchill, to be Squadron Leader. The squadron became operational at RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey on 5 February 1941 but moved in April to RAF Martlesham Heath. The squadron's first confirmed victory came on 21 July 1941 during a bomber escort mission when Pilot Officer Dunn destroyed a Bf 109F over Lille.

*GERMANY*: Hitler formally announced that "under the present circumstances it is not possible to contemplate any invasion plans against England" and ordered the assembly of the invasion fleet to be stopped, and the shipping in the Channel ports to be dispersed "so that the loss of shipping space caused by enemy air attacks may be reduced to a minimum". The invasion was now postponed indefinitely and there would be no further discussion on the matter until the spring when the weather conditions would more suited to any implementation of an invasion. Plans were put into place where the majority of German troops, that had been placed in readiness for an invasion of Britain, were now given fresh orders and were posted to alternative fronts. Most of them were to go to the east in preparation for "Operation Barbarossa" that was to take place the following year, some had been sent to Crete while the remaining troops dismantled all the barges at the various ports along the Channel coast.

Of course this news did not reach Britain, as they remained unaware of the situation. But what was making news in Germany, was the headlines in most of the German newspapers. They accused RAF Bomber Command of murdering twenty-one deficient children at Bethel and stated that this bloody act was cause for revenge. Yet these same newspapers drowned in their own glee in reporting that German bombers had attacked London with devastating results killing thousands of civilians which included hundreds of children. Another newspaper, The Diplo stated that Germany was waging war with clean weapons and in a chivalrous manner.

But although all plans now had been postponed, that was not say that hostilities against Britain were to cease. Air attacks were to continue, especially at night. The regular daylight sortie was still to occur which kept Fighter Command busy, but the continuous bombing of British cities and towns was to achieve nothing, except that Hitler hoped that it would demoralize the people. But in actual effect it had the opposite. The more the Luftwaffe bombed Britain, the stronger the people became.


----------



## Glider (Sep 19, 2010)

Never knew about Buffalo's going into action in the ETO, let alone claiming an Me109F


----------



## Njaco (Sep 19, 2010)

*20 September 1940 Friday
"ENTER THE JABO"
UNITED KINGDOM*: It was another of those mornings where there was an abundance of blue sky and scattered cloud, but the radar screens at the south coast radar stations were totally clear. The quiet of the early morning was broken at 1030 hours when radar picked up a German formation that was coming across the Channel from the direction of Calais and by 1100 hours a formation of about twenty-two Bf 109s of II./LG 2 at 15,000 feet crossed the coast at Dungeness, with other formations of fifty plus Bf 109s crossing the coast in the region of Dover. The LG 2 Messerschmitts were flying the first 'Jabo' raid, bombing from a medioum height and supported by several Jagdgruppen flying a freie jagd. Several Gruppen from JG 26 led by their Kommodore were escort for the Jabos. The radar at Foreness picked up another formation that had stayed out to sea and came in through the Thames Estuary. It consisted of several waves of Bf 109s and Ju88s that headed straight through into Kent. This was another change of tactic by the Luftwaffe, although it was not the first time that they had sent in Bf 109s en masse on daytime attacking raids.

Fighter Command released fifteen squadrons including RAF No.41 Sqd, RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.92 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.222 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.253 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.605 Sqd (Hurricanes). Once it was determined that the main formations were made up of fighters, 11 Group issued a recall for the squadrons already heading for interceptions. They soon countermanded the order when it became clear that these were bomb-carrying fighters.

The Luftwaffe had the upper hand by sheer weight of numbers. It was a possibility that both waves of German fighters were targeting London, but over the Kentish countryside, what the RAF fighter pilots lacked in numbers they made up for in skill even if they did sustain many casualties. The German aircraft converged on East London and the attack reached Biggin Hill, Kenley, the Inner Thames Estuary and Hornchurch. The main combat action was over the fields of Kent and at the mouth of the Thames near Southend and Sheppy with neither formation making much progress towards their objective. LG 2 managed to cross the coast at 25,000 feet, drop to 12,000 feet and drop their bombs over London unchallenged by the defenders. HEs were dropped near the viaduct on the Lewes Road in Brighton. Eleven persons were killed and several injured. Water supply was affected for a short time. there was major damage reported and fires from Dock Head to London Bridge, including Kitchen's Wharf, Shad Thames. All the Jabos returned to France safely, the only loss being a Bf 109 from 9./JG 27. When finally released from escort duties, the staffel leaders of JG 26 went into the attack.

One of the first aircraft of Fighter Command to go down was the Spitfire of P/O H.L. Whitbread of RAF No.222 Sqd at 1115 hours. A Bf 109 came from above and took him by surprise and the Spitfire crashed at Higham near Rochester killing the pilot. The victorious Luftwaffe pilot was Major Galland, the Kommodore of JG 26 and the Spitfire was his thirty-sixth victory. RAF No.222 Sqd 'B' Flight reformed after this attack but was bounced yet again, this time possibly by II./JG 2 and lost two more Spitfires over the Thames Estuary.

At about 1130 hours, RAF No.253 Sqd had three Hurricanes shot down between Ashford and Maidstone. Two of the crashed Hurricanes were credited to Hptm. Johannes Seifert of 3./JG 26. All three pilots, P/O A.R.H. Barton, Sgt A.R. Innes and an unnamed pilot all escaped serious injury. P/O W.J. Glowacki was unhurt as his Hurricane of RAF No.605 Sqd was hit by gunfire from a Bf 109 but was one of the lucky ones in being able to return to base. By 1135 hours, RAF No.92 Sqd lost two pilots when they became seriously involved in combat in the Dover/Dungeness area. One Spitfire crashed at West Hougham and another crashed in the Channel, both the victims of JG 51’s Kommodore, Major Mölders. Bringing his tally to forty, he was awarded the Eichenlaub on returning back to base, the first pilot so honored. Jafu 2 claimed fifteen fighters for the loss of two Bf 109s but Fighter Command's true losses were 8 fighters lost and 4 damaged.

The sheer weight of numbers were causing all sorts of headaches for both Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons. The techniques involved when fighter was against fighter were quite different to those when the Bf 109s were involved with providing escort. Günther Rall of 8./JG 52 commented;


> " _We in JG 52 were very inexperienced. In two months our strength fell from thirty-six pilots to just four. We really wasted our fighters. We didn't have enough to begin with, and we used them in the wrong way, for direct close escort. We were tied to the bombers, flying slowly - sometimes with flaps down - over England. We couldn't use our altitude advantage nor our superiority in a dive. Of course, the Spitfire had a marvelous rate of turn, and when we were tied to the bombers and had to dogfight them, that turn was very important_."


Losses: Luftwaffe 8: Fighter Command 8

The morning's attack was the only main combat of the day. But it had been a terrible blow to Fighter Command. Eight aircraft were lost with five pilots killed or missing while the Luftwaffe lost four aircraft. Of the five RAF pilots killed in the attack, four of them at least were experienced seasoned pilots, pilots that were still badly needed. The Bf 109 pilots, whether experienced or not had this day gained a slight advantage by downing more British fighters than they had lost themselves.

The Jabo raid was pronounced an unqualified success and Goring immediately ordered that all eight of the Jagdgeschwadern operating against Britain were to convert fully one third of their aircraft to fighter-bombers. Specially formed teams of mechanics quickly carried out the conversions and between 20 September and 1 October, the aircraft of one staffel in each Gruppe or one Gruppe within each Geschwader, were fitted with bomb racks, creating a Jabo force of some 200 - 250 fighter bombers. Major Galland was frustrated with this, commenting that operating the Bf 109 in this role was behaving like a fool whose sword has become blunt in battle and, rather than sharpen the blade, turns it around and tries to use the hilt. General Osterkamp, leader of the fighters under Luftflotte 2, complained to the Luftwaffe Chief-of-Staff and was told:


> "_We have very reliable information that the English are completely demoralized. The next bomb might be the one that will make them crack._"


*WESTERN FRONT*: A Ju 88D-1 belonging to 1./ Küstenfliegergruppe 106 took off from Fliegerhorst Barth near Stralsund on a navigation training flight. When it was over Hærup, 15 kilometres southwest of Hobro the weather had become foggy and the Ju 88 was heard circling the area, becoming lower with each pass. At 1730 hours it was too low and one wing touched a field belonging to Farmer Niels Jensen. The aircraft cart wheeled across the field and “became smaller and smaller” while breaking up. One flyer was thrown out of the wreck while the rest remained inside the wreckage. The Ju 88 was a total loss and the crew of four died. Navigator Oblt. z. See Hans Helmut Thiele, pilot Uffz. Otto Harbich, wireless operator Ogfr. Hans-Joachim Freund and Student Pilot Gefr. Heinz Schlegel were all laid to rest in Friedrichshaven cemetery.


----------



## Crimea_River (Sep 20, 2010)

Tsk, tsk Chris. Pic of a 109F in the BoB thread?


----------



## Njaco (Sep 21, 2010)

I was waiting for someone to catch that. Only pic I found of a jabo.

_(slaps self on arm and tweaks his own nipples)_


----------



## Njaco (Sep 21, 2010)

*21 September 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Early morning dawned with cloudless skies with no sign of the Luftwaffe and it was to remain that way for most of the day. Radar picked up an occasional aircraft, but these were believed to be on reconnaissance flights as they kept clear of the English coast. This was to be one of the quietest days of the battle, with more action being seen behind the scenes than in the air. But just as the Battle of Britain in the air seemed to be slowing down, so was the possibility of any German invasion for at least this year. Now, almost into the month of October, the days would be becoming shorter, the weather would soon deteriorate with the waters of the Channel becoming rougher and the signs from the German held Channel ports indicated that Bomber Command had all but destroyed any hope of the German infantry using the ports as a dispersal point for the Channel crossing.

In general, this was an exceptionally quiet day. Small nuisance raids by small formations of German aircraft had attacked both Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes but these were thwarted by fighters from Kenley, Biggin Hill and Croydon. The Hawker Aircraft Factory was bombed and machine-gunned at 0833 hours by a Ju 88 of LG 1. The boiler house was hit and unexploded bombs were in the dope shop and main shop. The effect on production was small and only slight casualties were reported. Small raids were made against targets at Weybridge, Ramsgate and Rye and many more reconnaissance flights across southern England. The only large raid during daylight materialized at about 1800 hours when over 200 aircraft crossed the coast in several waves and made for the airfields south of London. All five squadrons of the 'Duxford Wing' were scrambled along with Spitfires of RAF No. 41, 72, 92 and 603 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF No. 253 and 501 Squadrons to intercept the raid.

RAF No.238 Sqd accounted for one aircraft destroyed, a Ju 88 near Tangmere just before 1500 hours, while the Spitfires of RAF No.602 and RAF No.611 Squadrons accounted for one each destroyed. One of the Do17s damaged by RAF No.802 Sqd managed to get back to the French coast, but was to crash land at Landerneau, killing all on board. Major Galland, the Kommodore of JG 26, gained the Luftwaffe's only success, a Spitfire west of Ashford from RAF No. 92 Sqd which force-landed near Hildenborough. It was his thirty-seventh victory.

The usual night raids continued on London and Liverpool which was now becoming a regular occurrence. Bombing was again chiefly directed against the East End and the Dock areas where very serious fires resulted. Although the East End of London still came under constant bombardment, other targets in and around London were now being hit. Grand Union Canal was bombed at 1030 hours and the explosion cracked the wall of Limehouse Cut and also damaged part of a warehouse. Liverpool and adjoining areas were also the scenes of bombing resulting in several fires. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary, off the Yorkshire coast, in the Tyne area and off the East coast of Scotland. The raids dropped a mine on Hornchurch's landing ground which failed to explode, seriously damaged Bethnal Green medical works and started a fire in Howard's Timber Yard, Poplar, attended by 80 pumps.

A parachute mine that delivered itself into central Ipswich could not be defused and had to be blown in-situ. The controlled explosion produced a crater 50 feet wide and 25 feet deep, demolished 70 houses, damaged 750 and broke windows 650 yards away.

Lt. John MacMillan Stevenson Patton (b. 1915), Royal Canadian Engineers, towed a bomb from an aircraft factory to a bomb crater, where it went off harmlessly. (George Cross). Lt-Cdr Richard John Hammersley Ryan (b. 1903) and his assistant, CPO Reginald Vincent Ellingworth (b. 1898), who had shared many dangerous assignments, were killed when a sensitive magnetic mine, which was dangling from a parachute in a warehouse, went off as they tackled it. (George Cross for both). Mr. Leonard John Miles, ARP, saved several lives when he left his air-raid shelter to warn others nearby of an unexploded bomb. He was fatally wounded when it went off. (George Cross).

Losses: Luftwaffe 11: Fighter Command 0.

To Churchill's suggestion that one Pole is worth three Frenchmen, General Lord Gort replied that it is nearer ten.

Official permission was given to use the London Underground as an air raid shelter.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 22, 2010)

*22 September 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Again, just like the day previous turned out to be a relatively quiet day and was far from the usual 'business as normal' that had been experienced during the latter part of August into early September. In general things had quieted down considerably and one would possibly have feelings that the worst was over. Gone were the waves upon waves of bombers and fighter escorts that had previously crossed the Channel with monotonous regularity. The daytime activities had now slowed down to just the occasional bomber formation being detected and over the last few days the Luftwaffe had tried out the new tactic of massed Bf 109s. But these hardly created any impression or panic and combat losses on both sides were fairly even, and considerably low. This day would have the smallest number of Fighter Command sorties since the start of the battle.

The day opened to many fog covered areas and a mist layer remained for most of the morning period. The first air activity of the day was during the late morning when a formation of Bf 109s managed to get through and fly high over London. Two RAF squadrons were dispatched to intercept, but there appears not to be any record of action and the Luftwaffe database does not show if any of the fighters were shot down in the area.

A lone Ju 88 on a photo or weather reconnaissance mission was detected over the Channel south of the Isle of Wight and RAF No.234 Squadron from Middle Wallop sent one flight to intercept. The Junkers was shot down and made a belly landing in the sea. All the crew managed to get out of the sinking aircraft and were captured by British authorities. Another small number of German aircraft got through and according to the station records book at Fowlmere, they came under attack at 1530 hours. One Spitfire on the ground was destroyed and a number were damaged. There was no damage to any buildings or to the airfield. There is a possibility that the attack on Fowlmere, was by the Bf 109s that were detected earlier over London.

The afternoon was again peaceful, much to the delight of the aircrews, although one station commander stated to one of his squadron leaders _"....that if things remain this quiet, you sure you won't get bored_!!" There was a report that 4 HEs fell at Queens Crescent at 1715 hours without damage. But during the evening, as usual, things started to change. The usual night activity started at an early hour, the first raids having been plotted arriving during the hours of daylight. Wave upon wave of Heinkels, Junkers and Dorniers threw everything at London. The city had many heavy nights of bombing, but this was by far the heaviest. By 2030 hours there was very considerable activity concentrated almost exclusively on the London area. By midnight, it looked as if there was a sunset over London, the night sky was that red. South of the River several fires were started but in most cases these were quickly extinguished. There were very large fires raging at Dagenham and Woolwich. The fire in the Royal Arsenal Timber Field was the result of bombing, but at 0328 hours on the 23rd this increased to two major conflagrations, involving the Arsenal. 100 houses were demolished and 100 damaged and direct hits were registered on two Air Raid Shelters killing between thirty and fifty people in addition to numerous others injured. The British Museums King Edward buildings were damaged and Mile End 'tubestation was closed by a direct hit.

Fighter Command sent up a number of Defiant and Blenheim night fighters, but with Britain night fighting ability still in its infancy, and about a dozen 'nighties' up against an estimated 125 bombers, their task was almost an impossibility. After forty five minutes they returned to their bases. But the first known victim of German night intruder patrols was shot down near Thornaby in Yorkshire, - a Whitley bomber of RAF No.58 Squadron.

The weather conditions in the north were considerably different to those in the south. This is shown by three Hurricanes of 85 Squadron who were at Church Fenton who crashed in bad weather conditions. All three were on a routine patrol off the coast when bad visibility caused them trouble in locating base. All three had extinguished their fuel and had to make forced landings well short of Church Fenton aerodrome. F/L G.Allard made his forced landing at Clitheroe, P/O J.E.Marshall forced landed at Burnley while P/O J.A.Hemingway made his force landing outside the town of Burnley.

Losses: Luftwaffe 17: Fighter Command 1

*GERMANY*: Flight testing begins on the unpowered airframe of the Heinkel He 280 V1 twin turbojet fighter. The He 280 was towed aloft by a Heinkel He 111B bomber and cast off for gliding flight.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 22, 2010)

*23 September 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The rather peaceful periods that the aircrews had experienced over the last few days was about to end, much like the cloud and rain periods as the bright ball of the sun could be seen above the low lying mist and fog layers. Some aircrews may have been thrown into a false sense of security as the month's combat actions had melted down to almost nothing. But by 0840 hours radar stations from Foreness to Rye detected four separate formations, close together, coming in from the Channel towards Dover. As they approached the Kent coastline they appeared to fan out with the outer formations coming in from Ramsgate and Brighton while the centre ones came in over Deal and Folkestone. The remainder spread out from Dover towards Maidstone and over the Estuary into Essex. Again, as in the previous few days, they were Geschwaders of Bf 109s and the Observer Corps estimated their numbers as two hundred plus. Fighter Command released fourteen squadrons. Again the British had the problem of fighters not being able to get to the desired height and position because of the time taken to gain height in a Bf 109 attack as they approached at a much faster rate than the bombers.

The formations of Bf 109s crossed the coast at about 0915 hours. Over fourteen Fighter Command squadrons scrambled to meet the raid, but only a few succeeded in engaging the raiders. Eight of 11 Group's squadrons managed to make an interception of the Germans when they were over North Kent. RAF No.257 Squadron (Hurricanes) and RAF No.92 Squadron (Spitfires) were among the first to intercept and a fierce dogfight took place off the coast near Herne Bay and Margate. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 73, 229 and 303 Squadrons along with Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 72 and 603 Squadrons were engaged in dogfights over Kent, Sussex and the Channel for nearly one hour.

An area from Dartford to Margate became a mass of twisting, whirling white vapor trails as the fighters from both sides weaved and spiraled against the backdrop of a now bright blue sky. A Spitfire of RAF No.92 Squadron piloted by P/O A.J.S. Patterson, engaged in aerial combat over Gravesend was hit, forcing the pilot to break away from the action. He tried to make for the aerodrome at West Malling, but in an attempted forced landing the Spitfire crashed into the ground wounding himself in the upper leg. Lt. Gustav Sprick, Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 26, was given credit for the kill.

Sgt D.J. Aslin of RAF No. 257 Squadron suffered burns when his Hurricane sustained a hit from one of the Bf 109s and caught fire over the Thames Estuary. He managed to bale out with his aircraft crashing near Eastchurch. Sgt Aslin was the thirty-eighth victim of Major Galland, the Kommodore of JG 26 who shot down his thirty-ninth less than a minute later. The action continued as other British pilots came to grief. Four Hurricane's from RAF No.73 Squadron, scrambled from Debden and engaged in combat over the Thames between Sheppy and Southend, were jumped on by Bf 109s of II./JG 26 and were shot down in flames over the Isle of Sheppy and the Thames Estuary. A Spitfire of RAF No.72 Squadron crashed at Sittingbourne, a Spitfire II of RAF No.74 Squadron was shot down while in single combat with a Bf 109 and a Spitfire flown by P/O W. Beaumont of RAF No.152 Squadron was last seen over the Channel but it is not known if he was engaged in combat over north Kent.

Hptm. Wilhelm Balthasar from Stab III./JG 3 reported,


> "_Over London my Schwarm met a formation of Englishmen, around sixty fighters .......... I made a head-on attack on a Spitfire. The enemy tracer flew past my canopy, but the Englishman went spinning down in flames. Perhaps he had lost his nerve. Now a wild dogfight began. It was best to break away. Now I had four Spitfires on my tail. I was 18000 metres, and I pushed the stick forward and dived away at full speed, pulling out at ground level with my wings fluttering. No British fighter could have followed my wild dive. I looked behind me. Damn! There were two Spits on my tail again. There was no time to draw breath. My only chance of escape lay in my flying ability at low level, hedgehopping to the Channel over houses and around trees. It was no use, one of them was always there and I couldn't shake him off. He hung a hundred metres behind me. Then we were over Dover. I thought: He can't keep this up as I fled out over the wavetops but the Spitfire stayed behind. I jinked to right and left as the pilot opened fire and the bullets splashed into the water in front of me. I blinked the sweat out of my eyes. The French coast was now in sight. My fuel was getting low. I kept squinting behind so as not to miss the moment when he broke away. Wait, my friend, I thought. You must return soon, and then I will be the hunter. Cap Gris Nez loomed up in front, and I skimmed over it one metre above. Suddenly the Tommy climbed steeply and slowed down. . . . At once I turned my Me 109 and zoomed up in a tight bank, engine howling, straight at him. I fired one burst from close range I nearly rammed him and the Spitfire went straight into the sea. He flew fantastically_."


Hptm. Balthasar would be rewarded with the claim of two Spitfires destroyed. Five pilots of LG 2 were credited with kills as were seven from JG 26 including Oblt. Walter Schneider of 6./JG 26 who was awarded two Hurricanes ten minutes apart. In total, eleven Hurricanes and Spitfires were lost due to combat action. Four pilots managed to bale out of their damaged aircraft, while four crash landed. Of the eight, six pilots received burns or severe wounds.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 22, 2010)

_(23 September 1940 continued....)_

But it wasn't just the fighters of Fighter Command that were having a bad day. The Luftwaffe suffered just as bad. F/Lt Brian Kingcombe of RAF No.92 Squadron managed to score a direct hit on a Bf 109 near Maidstone. Fw. Gerhard Gryzmalla of 8./JG 26 baled out and was captured. Another of the RAF No.92 Sqd Spitfires being flown by P/O J.F. Drummond damaged the cooling system of a Bf 109 north of Maidstone and it was forced down finally finishing up in a pond where Fw. Arnold Küpper of 8./JG 26 also was taken prisoner. RAF No.72 Sqd also claimed credit for destroying a Bf 109 that was seen to dive into the Channel off Folkestone. The Poles of RAF No.303 Sqd also increased their tally when they claimed two Bf 109s over the Thames Estuary while RAF No.257 Sqd and RAF No.605 Sqd destroyed one each. In all, ten Bf 109s either crashed on English soil, or crashed on landing due to battle damage and were all destroyed while four managed to return back to their French bases with sustained battle damage. Uffz. Friedrich Dilthey of 4./JG 2 was made a prisoner of war when his Bf 109 crashed on English soil after combat. The Messerschmitts soon retreated back across the Channel.

I.(J)/LG 2 claimed three aerial victories for the loss of four Bf 109s including one important pilot. As Hans-Joachim Marseille was returning from a bomber-escort mission, his engine failed after combat damage sustained over Dover; he tried to radio his position but was forced to bail out over the sea. He paddled around in the water for three hours before being rescued by a Heinkel He 59 float plane based at Schellingwoude. Severely worn out and suffering from exposure, he was sent to a field hospital.

A lone Ju 88 on a photo or weather reconnaissance mission was detected over the Channel south of the Isle of Wight and RAF No.234 Squadron (Spitfires) from Middle Wallop sent one flight to intercept. The Junkers was shot down and made a belly landing in the sea. All the crew managed to get out of the sinking aircraft and were captured by British authorities. Then about 1100 hours, of 234 Squadron scrambled from St. Eval and intercepted a small raid of Bf109s off the coast of Cornwall.

Just after 1300 hours Spitfires of RAF No. 41 Sqd were scrambled from Hornchurch to escort an Anson reconnaissance plane spotting for big guns firing from Dover. They were attacked by nine Bf 109s, subsequently forcing the Anson to land before the Spitfires chased them back towards Calais.

At 1730 hours 40 German aircraft flew to the North Foreland, turned into the Estuary, crossed inland at Sheppey and flew South to Rye. At about the same time 55 aircraft crossed the coast between Folkestone and Dover. The attack lasted for only a short time and was confined to the area East of a line Sheppey - Rye. Twelve Fighter Squadrons in four wings were detailed to the attack from Uxbridge, but no casualties on either side were reported.

The afternoon was again peaceful after a busy morning, much to the delight of the aircrews but during the evening, as usual, things started to change. During the night more raids were made on London by 261 aircraft with bombs also dropped on Newmarket, near Duxford, Digby, Liverpool, Preston, the Midlands, South Wales and the Bristol area. At 1945 hours the usual stream of German aircraft started from East of Baie De la Seine area, crossing the coast at Beachy Head. At the same time bombers also appeared from the direction of Antwerp, crossing the coast at Harwich and spreading out inland towards Bury St Edmunds where they turned South West towards the London area.

London was under Red Alert from 19:56 to 05:27 and fire engulfed Clarnico's, trapping over 100 in the factory's basement shelter. By midnight 24 serious fires were burning in West Ham. A fire completely gutted the ARP Transport Store and Garage, at Lowhall Farm, but all the vehicles were saved. At 2107 hours the Stevenage Wharf was hit and petrol was leaking into the river from tanks of the National Benzol Co. Hastings, Bexhill and Seaford were also attacked, but casualties were few and damage confined to property. A He-111H-3 of KG 26 was reported down near Chobham during the night and the crew baled out. A Vickers Twin Mk 8 firing from Waltham Cross exploded a descending mine. By 0345 hours only one raid remained in the London area, and a few between London and the South Coast.

During the daylight attacks, Oblt. Hans ‘Assi’ Hahn, the Staffelkapitän of 4./JG 2, shot down a Spitfire over London for his twentieth victory and upon returning back to his airfield was awarded the Ritterkreuz. In England, JG 3's Lt. Hans-Herbert Landry, who was shot down on 28 August, 1940 and severely injured, died of his wounds in a British POW camp.

Losses: Luftwaffe 17: Fighter Command 11.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 24, 2010)

*24 September 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Most of the fighter stations in the south of England woke up to a rather foggy morning. Reports had come through from the coastal radar stations indicated that most of the Channel coast was also under the influence of reduced visibility. However, by 0630 hours, the visibility increased as the fog began to lift. At 0810 hours radar stations at Foreness, Dover and Rye picked up a large formation coming across the Channel from Calais. It turned out to be a formation of about 200 plus that consisted of Ju 88 bombers with Bf 109 fighter escort. The formation was broken up into a number of smaller formations that were to cross the Kent coast on a wide front.

Keith Park decided that he would send up eleven squadrons. RAF No. 72 Sqd (Spitfires) were scrambled early to meet an advance formation of Bf 109s. The bomber formation continued its route in a northerly direction heading towards the Thames Estuary and it was in this area that they were met by RAF No.17 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.92 Sqd (Spitfires). The area over the Thames Estuary was misty with fog areas over the resort towns, but above this, the two fighter squadrons engaged in combat with the bombers. Both the Spitfire squadrons lost aircraft without inflicting any losses to the raiders whilst all other RAF squadrons scrambled had been recalled as the bombers turned back without executing their attack. According to German records, a number of the bombers did sustain damage in this action, and although they managed to return to their bases many of them crashed upon landing due to combat damage.

The first casualty of the morning was from RAF No. 72 Sqd that engaged the advance party of Bf 109s. At 0820 hours a Spitfire flown by Sgt J. Steere sustained damage while in combat over Dartford, but not enough for him to abandon his aircraft and he managed to return to base. In return, RAF No. 72 Sqd managed to shoot down one Bf 109 before the German fighters gained height and redirected themselves east to meet up with the main bomber formation. Over the Thames Estuary, RAF No. 72 was to claim another two possibly damaged, and one definitely damaged. RAF No.92 Sqd (Spitfires) claimed six German aircraft damaged, with two of them possibles. One of them, a He 111 was seen returning back out towards the North Sea badly smoking from both engines. One of the RAF No.92 Sqd Spitfires was hit by gunfire from one of the Bf 109s and was seen to crash near North Weald and bursting into flames on impact. The pilot did not bale out and went down with the aircraft.

Just after 1100 hours two waves of attacks crossed the Kent coast. The first, a primary wave of about one hundred aircraft, crossed near Dover and the second of eighty aircraft came in over the east near Ramsgate to attack coastal towns. Although eighteen Squadrons were scrambled, most failed to intercept due to poor weather and cloud cover but Hurricanes of RAF No. 17 Squadron, scrambled from Debden, were attacked by Bf109s of JG 26 led by Major Adolf Galland. RAF No.17 Sqd (Hurricanes) claimed one aircraft damaged and another possibly damaged, but unfortunately lost one Hurricane after it crashed into the sea off Chatham after being hit by gunfire from a Bf 109. The pilot P/O H.A.C. Bird-Wilson managed to bale out of his burning aircraft with burns to his hands and body, but was rescued from the sea by a boat. 

The morning had been a busy one for Fighter Command although they weren't pushed anywhere near the limit. Several Luftwaffe pilots were successful during the morning attack including Oblt. Anton Mader and Gefr. Kaspar Amhausend, both of 1./JG 2, Hptm. Günther von Maltzahn of Stab II./JG 53, Uffz. Fritz Schweser of 7./JG 54 and Uffz. Hugo Dahmer of 6./JG 26. Another victor of the morning battles was Major Adolf Galland, Kommodore of JG 26, who shot down a Hurricane over Rochester for his fortieth victory. Returning back to base from an unsuccessful freie jagd in the afternoon he was immediately summoned to Berlin.

Almost as if on cue, everything seemed to be quiet while everybody went home.

By 1330 hours, RAF No. 41 Sqd (Spitfires) was on patrol over the Channel near 'Hell Corner' when they were bounced on by a flight of Bf 109s. The squadron was forced to take defensive action and failed to turn the action into one of attack. Two aircraft were lost, one crashed into the sea and the pilot rescued, while the other sustained serious damage and once over the Kent coast was forced to crash land somewhere outside Dover. The pilot was unhurt.

Twenty minutes later a formation of fifty Bf 110 aircraft from I./Epr.Gr 210, 4./ZG 76 and III./ZG 76 made a surprise attack on the docks and naval ports of Southampton and Portsmouth. The Bf 110s managed to fly past the Isle of Wight and up the Solent with not one Hurricane or Spitfire in sight and headed towards the Spitfire factory at Woolston where a number of direct hits caused considerable damage to a number of buildings and an air raid shelter where it was estimated that 100 factory workers were killed. The main factory and assembly plant was not hit and production was unaffected. The only defense that could be offered by the British defenses was by the anti-aircraft units who excelled with accurate gunfire with one Bf 110 crashing into the sea, two Bf 110s of III./ZG 76 also sustaining hits and crashing into the Channel while a Bf 110 of 4./ZG 76 sustained damage and managed to get back to base.

After the raid on Southampton, the attackers then turned on Portsmouth where they dropped their bombloads on mostly residential and commercial areas of the city with the naval dockyard and factories remaining undamaged. Shortly after 1600 hours another raid, consisting of Do17s, He111s and Bf 109s, was plotted approaching the Isle of Wight and Southampton. As they crossed the coast and turned inland, Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 56, 238, 605 and 607 Squadrons along with Spitfires of RAF Nos. 66, 152 and 609 Squadrons had been scrambled to intercept. The Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Squadron engaged the Do17s and some fleeing He 111s were attacked by Spitfires of RAF No.66 Squadron over Kent. Four German aircraft were destroyed plus two damaged. Lt. Karl Roos of 5./JG 53 claimed a Spitfire, his first victory, south of the Isle of Wight.

Losses: Luftwaffe 10: Fighter Command 6.

Six Hurricanes and Spitfires were destroyed, three pilots baled out, four damaged aircraft crashed on landing while eight other aircraft, although damaged by German gunfire were repairable. The Luftwaffe lost twenty aircraft damaged or destroyed, sixteen pilots and aircrew killed or missing and six wounded.

Soon after darkness fell, the usual formations of bomb-laden Heinkels, Dorniers and Junkers arrived over the coastline of Kent, Sussex and Hampshire for the continuation of the night bombing raids that had been so prevalent over the last couple of weeks. At 1930 hours, raids started coming out of Le Havre making for Shoreham and London. These were followed by a sequence of other raids on the same course which were not, however, as numerous as usual. At about the same time, raids from the direction of Holland crossed the North Norfolk coast and for the most part remained in East Anglia except for two which penetrated more deeply Westwards. None of these raids appeared to proceed to the London area. The bombing was very widespread with heavy forces again targeting London, Portsmouth and Plymouth. Other areas targeted by the Luftwaffe bomber formations were Hull and Humberside, Newcastle and Middlesborough and Manchester and a number of areas in the west and in South Wales. At 2100 hours IBs fell on the Sunbeam-Talbot Motor Works, the offices of which were damaged by fire. Warwick Road was blocked and Earls Court Railway Station closed. Bombs were reported near the West End Central Police Station with fires at Boyle Street and Saville Row. Hungerford Bridge and Signal Box was on fire, together with St Margaret's, Westminster. Bombs were dropped on the SR track at Broughton Street, Battersea and the line from Battersea to Clapham Junction was blocked.

At midnight II./KG 27 sent several He 111s on a raid on the city of Liverpool. It was by far one of the most widespread of bombing attacks so far and it continued until about 0600 hours the next morning. There was also some activity in the Dundee area, the Midlands and South Midlands.

Several HEs were dropped at 0314 hours on Feltwell and slight damage was done to walls and windows of one hangar. One Wellington aircraft was burnt out and another was damaged.

*GERMANY*: The Geschwaderkommodore of JG 26, Adolf Galland received the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross; Hitler agrees with his admiration for the RAF.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 24, 2010)

*25 September 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: As a result of Hitler's indefinite postponement of the invasion instructions were issued to increase the attacks against the British aircraft industry, both by night and day, by reducing the size of the formations engaged in raids on London. Accordingly the bomber force of Luftflotte 3 was once again assigned the most important targets on the western side of Britain, and as part of a new strategy September 25th saw the start of a planned series of large scale daylight attacks, in Geschwader strength with long range fighter cover, on the aircraft industry in the West Country.

The day started relatively quietly with only a few reconnaissance raids until about 1148 hours when a large raid crossed the coast near Weymouth. The target that morning was the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton, and the weather was perfect for bombing, with banks of thick cloud broken by patches of clear blue sky. Gruppenkommandeur Major Friedrich Kless led five He 111s of the Stab./KG 55, twenty-one He 111s of I./KG 55, twenty-four He 111s of II./KG 55, eighteen He 111s of III./KG 55 escorted by fifty-two Bf 110s of all three Gruppen of ZG 26 flying in almost perfect formation arrived over the city and made straight for the works, and found them completely at their mercy. In 45 terror-filled seconds they let loose 168 bombs, causing a high death-roll and much havoc. Seven Ju 88s broke away from the main body flying to Filton, and made an unsuccessful dive bombing attack down to 500 feet on the oil tanks at Portland. The raiders were not intercepted by RAF fighters until they had left the target area, but the local anti-aircraft gunners scored their first success, an He 111 of II./KG 55 which was brought down at Failand during its run in to the target. Hurricanes of RAF No. 229 and RAF No.238 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF No.152 and RAF No.234 Squadrons were scrambled but were originally vectored to Yeovil where the Westland aircraft works seemed the likely target. Once the true target was determined, three Squadrons swung into pursuit. The He 111s of KG 53 and KG 55 suffered heavy losses to the Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Squadron with P/O John Urwin-Mann (a Canadian pilot) shooting down two of the bombers. A total of eight bombers and fighters failed to return including three shot down over Dorset and two that crashed on the return to France. One of the Bf 110s lost from ZG 26 was Walter Scherer with ten victories, who was shot down and taken prisoner.

Serious damage had indeed been caused at the Rodney Works, while here and at the Flight Shed and East Engine Works, the workers shelters were hit by a stick of bombs, causing many casualties. Damage to house property, gas and water mains was experienced over a wide area including Filton village, Westbury-on-Trim, South Mead and Chipping Sodbury. The attack also destroyed eight newly built aircraft, including two precious Beaufighter prototypes, and production was temporarily halted. Over Filton and surrounding districts 81.5 tonnes of HEs and 6 tonnes of Oil Bombs had been dropped, which tragically resulted in the death of 132 people, of which 91 were Company employees, while a further 315 were injured. The crew reports, and photographs taken by KG 55 during the attack, together with a reconnaissance mission flown over Filton later that day by a lone Bf 110 of 4(F)/14 proved to the Germans that the raid had been a great success. Accordingly the Luftwaffe's own magazine, 'Der Adler', soon after proudly proclaimed "this factory will not produce many more aircraft", while Major Friedrich Kless, the attack leader and Gruppenkommandeur of II/KG 55, was awarded the Ritterkruz on October 14th.

Although Filton was acting as a temporary sector station, RAF Nos. 87 and 213 Sqdrns were operating from Exeter and Bibury. To guard against further attack Dowding immediately ordered RAF No. 504 (County of Nottingham) Squadron to move to Filton from Hendon.

It was not until later in the day, at about 1600 hours, that a second raid was made, this time on the Plymouth and Isle of Wight areas. Approximately twenty-four German bombers with an escort of twelve Bf 110s crossed the coast at Start Point and attacked the Plymouth area at 1647 hours. Several sections of RAF fighters - Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 238 and 607 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF No. 609 Squadron, intercepted and dispersed this formation. One German bomber was destroyed (plus two aircraft probably destroyed and one damaged) without loss to the defending RAF fighters. A large amount of damage was caused to house property, water mains, electric supply and telephone wires.

Shortly after 1930 hours, raids began coming out of Le Havre towards Portsmouth and made for London. These were followed by others from Cherbourg which entered along the coast Westward from Beachy Head. Other raids from Holland came in over the Norfolk Coast and the Wash. Some of the latter made a wide sweep and approached London from the North West. Other raids were made on Derby, South Wales, Liverpool, the Midlands and East Anglia. The railway property in and around London was one of the Luftwaffe's main objectives during this period with damage and traffic interference being caused. The railway bridge over Thames Road, Chiswick, was hit by HEs and HE bombs were dropped on the GW and LMS (London Joint) Railway at Kensington at 0500 hours, the lines being completely blocked by debris. Major fires were started at Wandsworth, Edmonton, Tottenham, Old Kent Road and Hammersmith. During these fires damage was caused to British Oxygen Co's plant at Edmonton, and the GWR sheds at Hammersmith. 

KGr 606 again undertook a raid on Liverpool with its Do 17s with one of the bombers dropping its load on the city of Bristol. By 0530 hours, the last raids from the London area had re-crossed the South Coast.

Anti-aircraft in the Rochford area claimed to have destroyed on Ju 88 at 1940 hours which was reported to have fallen into the sea.

On the night of the 25th, the highest number of people sheltering in the tube stations was recorded.

A Hurricane from RAF No.43 Squadron based at Usworth airfield in Durham, landed wheels up at Hetton le Hole following engine failure due to the mishandling of a fuel ****. P/O C.E. Langdon was unhurt, the aircraft was damaged but repairable.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The crews of II./JG 52 completed its refitting and returned to its airfields at Peupelinge, France.

36 CR42 Fighters and 36 G50 Fighters from Italy were being transferred as complete units (2 Gruppos) to Melsbrouck on the Western Front. 72 BR20 Bombers and 5 Cant1007 Bombers were also being transferred and a number of transport aircraft accompanied them.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 25, 2010)

*26 September 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Throughout the morning and early afternoon small, single aircraft, reconnaissance and bombing raids were made on coastal towns from Yorkshire down to Kent and along the South coast. Although many squadrons were scrambled during this period, very few interceptions were made. Luftflotte 3, in contrast to their recent night-time operations, undertook a daylight mission against the aircraft factories of Britain.

About 0900 hours, some 180 German aircraft (100 fighters and 80 bombers) crossed the Coast between Folkestone and Dover in six formations at heights varying from 15,00 to 20,000 feet. No 11 Group sent up 13 Squadrons to meet this attack and 11 of these Squadrons intercepted. No 12 Group provided 4 Squadrons to patrol North Weald and Hornchurch. The attack was halted in the Maidstone - Tonbridge area but some enemy aircraft penetrated to Central and West London. By 0943 hours, raids were dispersing over the Coast from Shoreham to Dungeness.

Between 1147 and 1215 hours, six formations totalling 300 enemy aircraft crossed the coast between Dover and Lympne at heights varying from 12,000 to 29,000 feet, and headed towards the Chatham area. Twenty Squadrons were sent up and the main engagements took place over Kent and East Sussex.

At 1120 hours two formations consisting of about 25 bombers escorted by 45 Bf110s and some Bf109s, crossed the coast near Swanage and flew to Filton. At Frome, the Bf109s turned back. Eight Squadrons were despatched to meet the attack, one of which intercepted and dispersed the enemy formations before they reached the Bristol Aeroplane Co's Works, but Filton RAF Station was attacked from 11,000 feet. 2 bombs fell near the Operations Room, one on the perimeter of dispersal tack and 5 in fields near the North corner of the landing ground. Serviceability was not affected and the only damage was to one hangar, water pipe to hydrant and the field telephone. There was no damage to service aircraft.

In the afternoon, Northolt was visited by King George VI, who talked with the pilots of RAF No. 1 (Canadian) and No. 303 Squadrons. As the visit was drawing to a close, 303 Squadron was scrambled in full strength, and directed towards a large enemy raid.

At about 1630 hours, the raid approached the Isle of Wight and Southampton areas and was followed by a second wave of bombers and fighters amounting to about sixty aircraft of He 111s, Ju 88s and Bf 109s. KG 55 tried to repeat its success of the day before. Their objective was the Southampton Supermarine Works. At 16:28 hours 27 Bf110s attacked the Itchen and Woolston Vickers-Supermarine works, six dive-bombing, the remainder attacking from 14,000 feet. A quarter of an hour later, after tracking in over the New Forest, came 35 Heinkels escorted by 50 fighters to destroy the factory. Once again, the He 111s of KG 55 were escorted by Bf 110s and bombed the factory. I./KG 55 devastated the factory where three Spitfires on the production line were destroyed. Some of the 70 tons of bombs used strayed onto Dawks gas works killing 11 and injuring 16, and another 11 were killed at the docks. Casualties at Supermarine's were serious, nearly 100 more dying in and around the works factory. Five Hurricane Squadrons and four Spitfire Squadrons were scrambled to intercept the raid including RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn which had left Northolt in the middle of an inspection by the King. Twelve squadrons of fighters ordered to intercept mostly flew too high. It was left to Solent guns to challenge the raiders before four squadrons went into action - after the bombing - shooting down a He-111 and two ZG 26 Bf110s on the Isle of Wight. Hurricanes from RAF No.229 Squadron intercepted the flight and shot down a Heinkel into the sea near the Isle of Wight. Two more Heinkels made it to Dreux airfield with battle damage and crash-landed.

RAF No. 303 led No. 229 Squadron into the fray. S/Ld. Kellett led 'Red Section' against the German fighters but as fighter opposition did not develop the Squadron instead attacked the bomber sections in echelon from astern. Escorting Bf 109s attacked after the first sweep and the Squadron broke up into mostly dog fighting and some pursuing the bombers back to France. Sgt. Balc forced landed at Biggin Hill and P/O. Januszewicz at Wyton Farm near Fureham with both unhurt. The Squadron saw nothing of No. 229 Squadron which was below and behind them, and unable to make a concerted attack. In the resulting fight, Polish pilots claimed thirteen victories (7 He 111, 2 Do 17, 4 Bf 109). Three Hurricanes were damaged. On the King's request, the results of the fight were relayed to Buckingham Palace.

Up until nearly 1800 hours chases and dogfights spread across the southern areas of England and over the Channel. Hptm. Helmut Wick of Stab I./JG 2 destroyed his thirtieth Allied aircraft and Major Wolfgang Schellmann of Stab/JG 2 destroyed a Spitfire over the Isle of Wight. Claims for double kills were made by Uffz. Karl Hannes of 5./JG 2 and Fw. Wilhelm Hermes of 2./JG 2. Five pilots of ZG 26 claimed downing three Spitfires and two Hurricanes including Obstlt. Johann Schalk of Stab III./ZG 26.

Fortunately for the future of the Spitfire, many of the production jigs and machine tools had already been relocated before 20 September and steps were being taken to disperse production to small facilities throughout the Southampton area.

As darkness was falling, a raid of twenty-five German aircraft, originating from the Bay of Biscay was made on Crewe just before 2000 hours without interception. High explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped causing damage to property and Coppenhall Junction. At the latter, all four lines were reported out of action. After leaving Crewe, the raids split up and returned via Bristol and Poole Bay.

During the night German activity was at first widespread over the whole country south of a line Liverpool to Humber. Heavy raids were made across the country to London, Liverpool, Hull, the Midlands, Cambridge, Newmarket and the airfields at Mildenhall and Duxford. Raids did not approach London until 2030 hours and then continued until 0300 hours. A lull until 0500 hours followed when twelve further raids visited London. The damage in the London area was not so severe as on the previous night, but railway communications were affected at Carlton Hill and part of the track between Park Avenue and Palace Gate Stations was damaged. Castlehaven Road Railway Bridge was badly damaged and there was also a large fire on the Southern Railway Crystal Palace line. In the Westminster district, one bomb fell outside the Houses of Parliament and another in front of the steps leading from King Charles Street to St James Park. The underground Cabinet War Room suffered a hit when a bomb exploded on the Clive Steps.

At 2336 hours, a large number of incendiary bombs were dropped on the Royal Small Arms Factory causing several fires. The tunnel between Birkenhead Park Station and Hamilton Square Station was damaged by a bomb. Liverpool. At 2100 hours, high explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped causing very considerable damage to property and starting severe fires in the Dock areas where ships and warehouses were burning.

Although Fighter Command claimed 131 aircraft shot down, reality was much different. Losses: Luftwaffe, 9; RAF, 9.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Hptm. Otto Bertram was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 2 in place of Hptm. Dr. Erich Mix.

77 Blenheims, Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys attacked Channel ports during the Battle of Britain. 1 Blenheim and 1 Hampden were lost, the latter from 61 Sqdn based at Hemswell. The crew were P/O R.P. Earl, P/O W.D. Hermon and Sgt D. Sinclair, lost whilst attacking the 'Scharnhorst'.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 26, 2010)

*27 September 1940 Friday
"THE BATTLE OF GRAVENEY MARSH"
UNITED KINGDOM*: The weather during the morning was fair, with patches of cloud, and for the citizens of Bristol this offered the unique opportunity to witness a classic 'dog-fight' over the City. The first raid of the day by the Luftwaffe over England was a formation of Bf 110s with a front escort of Bf 109s from JG 51, JG 54 and some units from JG 77 some 180 German aircraft (100 fighters and 80 bombers). The formation consisted of ten Bf 110s of Epr.Gr 210 and forty-two long range twin-engined Messerschmitts of all three Gruppen of ZG 26 conducting a daylight pin-point raid on the Parnall Aircraft works at Yale. At about 0900 hours, the formation crossed the Coast between Folkestone and Dover in six formations at heights varying from 15,00 to 20,000 feet. No 11 Group sent up 13 Squadrons and the attack was halted in the Maidstone - Tonbridge area but some bombers penetrated to Central and West London. Attacked by British fighters from Dungeness to London, the Zerstörers dropped their loads over the countryside and dove away from the British to head home. Hurricanes of RAF No. 504 Sqdrn chased and shot down two Bf 110s of the escorting I./ZG 26 while the remaining fighter-bombers lost a third of its force to additional RAF fighters. One of the Messerschmitts disintegrated over the Stapleton Institution at Fishponds, and was the only enemy aircraft to crash within the Bristol boundary during the Second World War, while the other came down at Haydon, near Radstock. A number of senior officers of Epr.Gr 210 were lost including the Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Martin Lutz and the Staffelkapitän of 2 Staffel, Oblt. Wilhelm Rossiger, both of whom were posthumously awarded the Ritterkreuz. Also lost was Oblt. Adolf Johann Buhl of I(J)./LG 2 who was listed missing in action after combat. He had seven victories with the Lehrgeschwader. Oblt. Werner Weymann was made acting-Gruppenkommandeur of Epr.Gr. 210 in place of Oblt. Lutz. Oblt. Wolfgang Schenck was appointed Staffelkapitän of 1./Erpr.Gr. 210 in Oblt. Weymann's place.

On this day, two days after the devastating attacks on the Aeroplane Works at Bristol, the Germans again came over with the same intentions. At about 1130 hours a force of about nine bombers, accompanied by fighters, came over the city, but a squadron of Hurricanes was waiting for them. A.A. guns were in action as well, and the formation was dispersed before it could reach its target. Regardless of the danger, crowds of people came out in the streets to watch the 'dog fights' taking place in the sky.

At 11:45 hours a Bf 110 from 3./ZG 26 was engaged head-on and the petrol tank was set on fire during an escort sortie for the Erpr.Gr 210 raid on Yale. Probably attacked by Sgt H. D. B. Jones of No. 504 Sqdrn but also possibly that claimed by F/O T. H. T. Forshaw of No. 609 Sqdrn. The abandoned aircraft crashed and burned out. Lt Koepsell baled out and was captured unhurt, landing at Terry Hill, near Mells. Uffz Schmidt fell dead near Kilmersdon Colliery railway with unopened Parachute.

As the first major attack subsided, another approached the Kent and Sussex coast at 1130 hours and consisted only of Do 17 and Ju 88 bombers. Between 1147 and 1215 hours, six formations totaling 300 German aircraft crossed the coast between Dover and Lympne at heights varying from 12,000 to 29,000 feet, and headed towards the Chatham area. Twenty RAF Squadrons were sent up and the main engagements took place over Kent and East Sussex. RAF Squadrons were ripping into the helpless bombers as the Bf 109 and Bf 110 fighter escorts arrived. For nearly two hours aerial battles consumed the skies over southern England.

A Ju 88 crashed and burned out at Folly Farm, South Holmwood on Friday at 9.30 hours. Possibly that claimed by P/O M. Ferric of No.303 Squadron. Walter Schmidt from Ravensburg was flying in another 2 Staffel Ju 88 as gunner and recounts the day;


> "_I was a gunner on a Ju 88 of the 2 Staffel of KG 77 which took part in the raid. It was one of the most memorable acts of enemy action that I took part in, of my 200 sorties from 1940-45. If I remember correctly, the target was a gas works in London. We were flying with eighteen machines of the first group in formation of two squadrons. The approach height was about 5,300 m and the bomb release 5,100 m. At this height the warning came through the intercom of "fighters below right". As I glanced below and slightly to the left, I could see fighters myself. I Believe they had a big red circle on their wings without white. The green camouflage paint was very dark, by that we recognised the British fighters at once. They were flying about 200 m below us, against our flight direction. Then commenced the most hectic aerial combat I had experienced. We were attacked by fighters without a break. Often I saw several aircraft at once being shot down in flames, with black or white smoke trailing, or like red torches. The '3Z + HK' broke in the middle at the point of the cross insignia. One couldn't possibly observe everything. Our own fighters were more than likely too far behind and above. At this time, we were still under strong fighter attack. After a quick look round I saw several parachutes descending. Between the fighter attacks, I noticed to my horror that the release on my parachute harness, on which I was lying most of the time, had opened. It opens itself on a 90 degree turn and with light pressure and was now lying loose with the parachute on my back. Between single fighter actions, I managed to get my parachute operational again. Should it have been necessary to use my parachute in that condition, I would have had the same fate as comrade Menningmann, who fell out of his harness. In the meantime, both our squadrons were scattered all over the place and we returned home alone. After our return to base, we observed only nine aircraft returned from this action." _



As the raid over the southeast was developing, another approached Dorset and attacked Filton at about 1130 hours. This raid was principally composed of fighters, made up of forty-five Bf 109s and Bf 110s and was engaged by Spitfires of RAF No.152 and RAF No.609 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF No.56 and RAF No.504 Squadrons. At Frome, the Bf 109s turned back. The escorting Bf 109s had orders to remain in the London area to protect the follow-up bomber formations of Do 17s and Ju 88s but they failed to rendezvous with the bombers. Instead they were heavily bounced by the British fighters who forced the German fighters to break away from combat and dive for home. Without the needed escort, the Do 17s and Ju 88s were intercepted at the coast and forced to retreat, dropping their loads harmlessly.

P/O Alfred Keith Ogilvie of RAF No. 609 Sqdrn succeeded in downing an Bf110 off Portland as he described in this combat report.


> "_I was flying Yellow 3. At 24,000 feet we engaged a circle of Me110s. Following Yellow 1 we made a beam attack on the circle, each taking a separate aircraft. The circle broke up and I saw an Me110 turn into Yellow 1. There was a head on collision, both aircraft disintegrated in terrific explosion. I made an attack on one from almost head on, climbed up and came down vertically on him (10 secs). He went straight down, both engines on fire. This was seen by other pilots. I also saw at least three other 110s going down in flames, one hit the sea, another on the land near Portland_."



With no fighter escort to effectively clear the skies, the Luftwaffe decided to split the next raid into two formations, one group of eighty aircraft headed to Bristol while another group of 300 bombers were sent to London. Unbeknown to the Zerstörer pilots of LG 1, the twin-engined fighters were to be used as a feint to draw off the Spitfires and Hurricanes from the two bomber formations. Of the last remaining eleven Bf 110s of V(Z)./LG 1 available, one was damaged during take-off and aborted, leaving ten planes to take on the British. The ruse worked as the small formation drew the attention of Fighter Command and was decimated by British fighters. Of the ten Zerstörers from V(Z)./LG 1 that took-off from the airfield near Caen, only three planes made it back to base. The others were lost in the day's battles over England. One pilot remembered, . . .


> _ . .after 27 September there were only two crews left who had been with the Gruppe prior to the start of the French campaign in May 1940: Fw. Jecke (still in hospital) and radio operator Uffz. Schmergal of 14./LG 1 and Oblt. Zobel with Uffz. Pellnat. The others had been killed, wounded or captured and as well several had been transferred. . . The personnel who had come from the Zerstörer Replacement Training Gruppe had suffered equally heavily. Of twelve crews assigned to the unit before the end of operations over England, nine failed to return from combat sorties. . _."


 The most serious of the losses was the Gruppenkommandeur, Hptm. Horst Liensberger, who was killed in battle. Despite this, several pilots from V(Z)./LG 1 put in claims for four Spitfires shot down but were denied.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 26, 2010)

_(27 September 1940 continued....)_

There were still too many British fighters. Drawing Spitfires and Hurricanes from No. 10 Group, the two bombers formations were intercepted and badly mauled over the West Country, breaking formation and dropping their loads on the suburbs. Twenty bombers managed to slip through the defenders and reached the center of London but caused little damage. The rest retreated back over the Channel, harassed the entire way by British fighters.

The day's losses for the Luftwaffe totaled fifty-five aircraft missing including twenty-one bombers making this day one of the most devastating days of the battle for the Germans. Ten aircraft were destroyed during the 1130 hours raid, losses that forced the Luftwaffe to halt the fighter-bomber attacks on West Country targets. Twenty-eight fighters were lost by Fighter Command but most of these crash landed on English soil with their pilots returning to action shortly after. Among the victors of the day was Hptm. Helmut Wick of Stab I./JG 2 who brought his score to thirty-one kills, close on the heels of Mölders. Scoring multiple victories were Oblt. Hans Philipp of 4./JG 54 who downed four British fighters to reach fifteen kills, two Spitfires and a Hurricane to Oblt. Roloff von Aspern of 5./JG 54, a pair of Spitfires was credited to Oblt. Herbert Ihlefeld of 1.(J)/LG 2 to bring his scoreboard to twenty-five, a pair of Hurricanes to Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 who ended the day with thirty victories, Oblt. Arnold Lignitz of 9./JG 51 destroyed two Hurricanes for his 17th and 18th kills and Oblt. Gustav Rödel of 4./JG 27 who gained his 13th and 14th victories over two Hurricanes. Double kills were also credited to Lt. Willi Kothmann of 2./JG 27, Uffz. Xaver Ray of 8./JG 53, Ofw. Josef Pöhs of 5./JG 54 and Lt. Otto Grote of 4./JG 54.

Before returning to base, Kommodore Mölders of JG 51, downed another Spitfire from RAF No. 222 Sqdrn, the same British fighter who had just shot down a Messerschmitt Bf 109 near Maidstone. It was his forty-first victory. His brother, Oblt. Viktor Mölders of 2./JG 51 recorded his ninth kill of the war, a Hurricane. II./JG 52’s return to the front started disastrously when five pilots, including Oblt. Karl Trieber, and seven planes were lost. Fw. Franz Bogasch of 4./JG 52 was shot down and captured. 

Billeted at a pub on the Kent coast, they had been ordered to capture any German aircrew shot down in the countryside. But the men of the 1st Battalion London Irish Rifles were to carve themselves a little-known place in military history: they fought the last ever battle to take place on the British mainland. An isolated Junker 88 piloted by Uffz. Fritz Ruhlandt fell prey to British planes in the area of North Kent near Faversham. British Spitfire and Hurricane fighters from RAF No. 66 and No. 92 Squadron had attacked what they recognized as a new variant of the Junkers Ju 88 over Faversham. An order had been issued to them to capture one such aircraft intact if possible. The German bomber's first engine had already been damaged by anti-aircraft fire during a raid on London and the Spitfires were able to destroy its second engine, forcing the pilot to make a crash landing on Graveney Marsh. The injured plane was skilfully landed on the Graveney Marshes close to the Sportsman Inn near the sea wall. The 1st London Irish were quickly on the scene to face the crew of the Junker 88 expecting an instant surrender. To the horror of the London Irish the German crew opened fire with two machine guns and submachine gun fire. The Captain of the London Irish positioned his men along the dykes of the Marshland ready to return the fire. As they crawled nearer they saw a single white flag implying a surrender of the German crew. As the London Irish advanced closer to apprehend the enemy crew a skirmish broke out injuring two of the Germans. After a short battle the Germans surrendered – and their captors then took them for a pint at their local pub. The aircraft was taken to Farnborough Airfield where it was said to have "_provided highly valuable information_". Captain Cantopher was subsequently awarded the George Medal for his action. The extraordinary skirmish, has been nicknamed the 'Battle of Graveney Marsh'. It was the last battle fought on English soil. The battle also inspired the writer Kevin Wells to immortalize the fight in his poem "The Battle of Graveney Marsh". (_printed at the end of this post_.)

There were no further raids until during the night when the all too familiar pattern of bombing raids on London continued. Edinburgh was visited just after dusk and there were scattered raids in the Liverpool District, Birmingham and Nottingham, mostly up to midnight. German activity was chiefly directed towards London from the French Coast and lasted from 1940 hours to 0600 hours, with a brief lull from 0215 to 0315 hours. At 0315 hours, there was renewed activity from the Abbeville area to London crossing the coast between Bexhill and Hastings. This stream continued until about 0600 hours when the last raids were re-crossing the coast.

It appeared that damage was of a less serious nature than on the previous night although communications were again affected and several fires started. A fire was started at The Thames Ammunitions Works but the damage was negligible. Liverpool was again the night-time target for the Dorniers of KGr 606. One of the bombers broke away from the formation and again dropped its load on the city of Bristol.

With the end this day, one of the most active and disappointing for the Luftwaffe, Adolf Galland told Göring;


> "_in spite of the heavy losses we are inflicting on the enemy fighters, no decisive decrease in their number or fighting efficiency was noticeable. . . ."_


*
WESTERN FRONT*: The bomber element of the Corpo Aereo Italiano left the airfields of San Damanio di Piacenza and Cameri di Novara on the morning of the 27 September, flying in formation through the autumn weather, over the plains of Lombardy and Piedmont. On the northeast course, they approached the Alps under 7/10ths cloud, steadily increasing altitude before levelling for the crossing. Over the mountains, the weather deteriorated further with 8/10ths strato-cumulus being at its worst in the region of Innsbruck. Six bombers landed safely in various German airports (four at Nürnberg, one at München and one at Ergoding (Ergelding?)). Three bombers safely landed at Anversa, they too had used too much lubricant. 

*THE BATTLE OF GRAVENEY MARSH*
Spitfires, tearing through the sky, 
turning like pipistrelles 
squaring up to vie 
with the Luftwaffe’s’ finest. 
During those final throes of the Battle of Britain, 
on September 27th,1940...
divesting Germany in a mid-air sortie 
of technology much needed 
for an island that stood alone

A Junkers 88, barely two weeks old 
with the latest navigation aids 
and bomb-sights aboard, 
wounded, 
falling like a dead leaf onto British soil…

At Graveney Marsh, near Whitstable, Kent 
the 1st battalion London Irish were sent to
apprehend the luckless crew 
who fought for their secret before being subdued 
to Lancaster and Halifax went this new technology
to avenge London, Portsmouth, 
Southampton and Coventry
This last fought battle on English turf 
deserves far more than the obscure footnote 
by which history has measured its worth

_by Kevin Wells _


----------



## Glider (Sep 27, 2010)

Its interesting how high the losses were in replacement German Pilots. It supports the view that the Luftwaffe had as many problems with replacement crews as did the RAF

Loved the bit about buying the Germans a pint, seems like something only the British would do.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Sep 28, 2010)

Yea, that is pretty cool.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 28, 2010)

*28 September 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Luftwaffe activity consisted of a few isolated raids and three main attacks, of which two were delivered over Kent towards London and one was directed against the Portsmouth area. Forced by the huge losses suffered by large formations, a change in Luftwaffe tactics found smaller formations of bombers - about thirty or so of the fast Ju 88 bombers - escorted by between 200 and 300 fighters. The first use of this method was around 0955 hours, when raids totaling about 120 aircraft approached the Kent Coast, of which seventy penetrated inland in two waves. One wave of thirty German bombers were escorted by several large fighter formations from JG 26 and JG 54 near Deal, heading towards London. This first wave of aircraft flew to Biggin Hill and about six of these reached Central London. Bombs were dropped in Poplar, Deptford and Woolwich. The second wave did not penetrate further West than Maidstone. Intercepted by the RAF, the formations were driven off but not without difficulty as the high altitude of the German fighters placed the British fighters at a disadvantage. Several skirmishes were fought but with light losses. Hptm. Gerhard Schöpfel of Stab III./JG 26 downed his nineteenth enemy plane just north of Dungeness during this raid.

The second raid of the day occurred around 1430 hours when fifty Bf 110s escorted by fighter elements of JG 2, JG 3, JG 26, JG 51 and JG 52 crossed the coast heading for Portland. The raid spread out over Kent but didn't penetrate further West than a line Beachy Head - Maidstone - Isle of Sheppey. The raid aroused a 25-Squadron response to deal with a section of 40 bombers and 120 fighters, all flying high. Intercepted by fighters from RAF No. 10 Group along with five squadrons from No 11 Group, the German invaders were driven off before reaching their targets. But not before serious clashes with the escorting fighters. Other fighters engaged about the Bf110s off Portsmouth. Several Experten added to their scores as the bombers fled back to France. Top of the list was again Major Werner Mölders of Stab/JG 51 for his forty-second kill ( a Spitfire over Littlestone) , followed by Hptm. Helmut Wick of Stab I./JG 2 for his thirty-second, Ofw. Werner Machold of 9./JG 2 for his twenty-third, Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 for his thirty-first, Lt. Gustav Sprick of 8./JG 26 for his twentieth and Hptm. Rolf Pingel of Stab I./JG 26 for his sixteenth.

About five minutes after the second raid crossed the coast heading for France the third wave of bombers and fighters appeared. While the attack in Kent was reaching its peak, this raid crossed the Channel towards Portsmouth with a small formation breaking off to Tangmere. Some sixty German aircraft flew from Cherbourg towards Portsmouth. The raids were met by five Squadrons of RAF No 11 Group which were diverted from the Kent attack, and by four Squadrons of RAF No 10 Group. Faced with this strong defense, the bombers turned and headed back, dropping their bomb loads into the Channel. Three other efforts of little consequence were made during the afternoon over Hastings, Ramsgate, Folkestone, Eastbourne, Portsmouth and Southampton, and no bombs were reported as having been dropped.

There were two attacks on convoys during the day. At 1515 hours, there was an attack on a convoy off Spurn Head. At 1730 hours, more Luftwaffe aircraft attacked a convoy near the Thames Estuary.

During the night London was bombed along with the airfield at Digby, the Midlands, Liverpool, Derby, Nottingham, Peterborough and the Bristol Channel area. German night activity commenced at about 2000 hours when the first raids crossed the Sussex Coast and approached London. At the same time, raids which appeared to originate from the Dutch Islands crossed the Coast in the Wash area and penetrated over Lincolnshire and Norfolk to Digby, Peterborough and Nottingham. Raids were also plotted into the Liverpool area, returning over Wales. At 2100 hours, a concentration of raids on London was plotted, crossing the Coast near Portsmouth and also between Beachy Head and Shoreham. The 121 raiders approached London, with 65 crossing its heart between 18:46 and 07:12 hours and causing the defending guns to fire for nine hours. Major incidents occurred at Lambeth and Nine Elms goods yards, the Albert Embankment, and Southwark, where three HEs destroyed St. Peter's Crypt Shelter, killing 18 outright and trapping many.

After midnight, activity spread westwards to include an area Selsey Bill - St Albans Head and North to Middle Wallop, but the main objective of most raids was still London and its Western suburbs. Two isolated raids were plotted in Oxfordshire, and two in the Bristol Channel. By 0230 hours, raids were less in number but were still approaching London from the Coast of Sussex. Several hospitals were hit including West Middlesex Heston, Staines Emergency, St Bernards (Uxbridge) and Barnes Isolation. Two raids were plotted in the Derby area. At 0345 hours, a fresh stream of raids came from Dieppe towards London and activity over this area continued until 0550 hours.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 16; RAF, 16.

*NORWAY*: Uffz. Otto Niemeyer of 4./JG 77 received his fourth victory in the late afternoon when he shot down a British Hudson bomber north west of Bergen.


----------



## Airframes (Sep 28, 2010)

Great stuff once again Chris. All the times I've seen that pic of the '109 on the beach, and i never knew it was flown by Marseilles ! Is that the one now flying in Canada?!!


----------



## Njaco (Sep 28, 2010)

I'm not sure but the one site I had had that caption. I researched a little but couldn't find anything against it. Very interesting!


----------



## Bernhart (Sep 28, 2010)

never realized so much happened late September


----------



## Gnomey (Sep 28, 2010)

Great stuff! Thanks for keeping this going.


----------



## pbfoot (Sep 28, 2010)

Airframes said:


> Great stuff once again Chris. All the times I've seen that pic of the '109 on the beach, and i never knew it was flown by Marseilles ! Is that the one now flying in Canada?!!



nope his was recovered out of Russia and it wknr 3579


----------



## Njaco (Sep 28, 2010)

Thanks Neil!

and sometimes things aren't what they seem. Just caught this and can't believe I wasn't sharper in catching it.

anybody notice something with these 2 pics I posted earlier?


----------



## tail end charlie (Sep 28, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Thanks Neil!
> 
> and sometimes things aren't what they seem. Just caught this and can't believe I wasn't sharper in catching it.
> 
> anybody notice something with these 2 pics I posted earlier?



Quite obviously the first photo was on the 14th of August, just look at the weather reports


there seems to be a bit of photo shop work there.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 28, 2010)

*29 September 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Apart from a sweep by German fighters through Kent westwards, and as far as Reading by one element, the day's activities consisted of reconnaissances, attacks on shipping and some inland flights. In the morning extensive reconnaissances took place off-shore in the East Kent and Thames Estuary areas. One Do 215 flew inland at Ramsgate to Maidstone and Northolt and was shot down at Taplow.

At 0910 hours one aircraft crossed the Coast at Lyme Bay and flew through Somerset to Wiltshire. At 1120 hours eighteen high explosive bombs were dropped near the naval base of Lowestoft. A land mine was detonated and some ammunition exploded causing damage to property, water mains and telegraph wires. There were several casualties. At about 1127 hours one convoy was attacked in the Portsmouth area, and at 1135 hours a "Help" message was received from another convoy off the North Wales Coast. British fighters failed to intercept the attacking Luftwaffe aircraft.

Several Luftwaffe aircraft endeavored to reach London during the afternoon but only a few were able to do this, and there were no major occurrences, but in the evening Sittingbourne was subjected to heavy bombing. At 1610 hours three formations of fifty, twenty and twenty German aircraft crossed the Coast West of Dungeness at 10 minute intervals, while a further twelve aircraft went inland at Dover. The first raid flew westwards of the London area before wheeling south. A split however, flew towards Central London. The remainder penetrated only some 25 miles inland. All the German aircraft were fighters flying at a great height most probably from JG 3 and JG 53. Bf 109s of JG 53 and JG 3 claimed Hurricanes between 1720-1738 hours south of London.

Between 1800 and 1900 hours three small raids of nine, three and three aircraft were plotted by the British radar in St George's Channel, and intercepted with the result of one German aircraft being destroyed.

Night operations commenced at about 2000 hours and London was again the main objective, but considerable activity took place over South and South East England, South Wales, the Midlands and as far North as Liverpool, East Anglia, Aberdeen and the Firth of Forth area. At 1930 hours the first German raids were plotted approaching the Coast at Shoreham from the direction of Dieppe. From 2000 hours onwards, a steady stream of raids crossed the Coast between Portsmouth and Beachy Head, the majority having London as their objective. A few, however, coming in over Portsmouth, flew North-west to the Middle Wallop area.

Between 2100 and 0200 hours, raids of one or one or more aircraft crossed the Coast between Poole and Start Point and flew to the South Wales area, some continuing North to Liverpool. At 2230 hours Heinkel He 111s of III./KG 27 raided Liverpool which resulted in fires being started at Duke's Dock and Salthouse Dock. Four warehouses, including one containing grain, caught on fire.

A number of raids crossed the Coast at points between Clacton and the Wash. A few of these approached London from the North-east, whilst the others were active over East Anglia and the Midlands. Bombing caused several fires, the most serious being in Upper Thames Street. An unexploded bomb is also reported to have been dropped in the South East corner of St Paul's Churchyard. Cheapside and Queen Victoria Street were closed. Horse Shoe Wharf, Cannon Street and Carter Lane were also affected. An He 111 from 9./KG 55 failed to return from one attack on aircraft factories near Gloucester while another He 111 from the Staffel made it to Caen before crashing. The plane from 9 staffel may have been the Heinkel He111P from KG 55 that was shot down by a Hurricane of the RAF off the coast of Ireland. The entire crew were killed and buried in Glencree.

After 0200 hours Luftwaffe activity was almost entirely confined to the South Eastern Counties and the London area. At 0230 hours, raids were approaching London both from the South and from the East. Activity continued until 0305 hours when the last raids were plotted leaving England.

Although the British allowed for five aircraft missing with three pilots killed or missing, numerous Jagdflieger made claims during the day, mostly from JG 3, JG 51 and JG 53. Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 destroyed two Spitfires to bring his score to thirty-three. Oblt. Ignaz Prestele of 2./JG 53 claimed a pair of Hurricanes near London to boost his score to eight. Altogether fourteen German pilots were given credit for kills over England.

Two of the British fighters were lost to friendly fire. P/O. C. Graves of RAF No. 253 Sqdrn in Hurricane Mk I V6621 was mistakenly attacked and shot down by a Hurricane during action against Bf109s over Weybridge, Surrey at 1830 hours. Graves baled out, burned, near Chailey, Sussex, and admitted to Brockley Park Hospital, Haywards Heath. Before being shot down, Graves claimed a Bf109 flown by Oblt Walter Layerer of 2./JG 77, who was killed. Flight Lieutenant R. M. B. D. Duke-Woolley, also of RAF No. 253 Sqdrn in Hurricane Mk I P3609 was also mistakenly attacked by a Hurricane and damaged in the fuel tank and rudder controls during action against Bf109s over Weybridge, Surrey and returned to base, unhurt.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 5; RAF, 5.


----------



## fastmongrel (Sep 29, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Thanks Neil!
> 
> and sometimes things aren't what they seem. Just caught this and can't believe I wasn't sharper in catching it.
> 
> anybody notice something with these 2 pics I posted earlier?



The RAF only had 2 aircraft they just flew them round in circles so it looked like they had lots.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 29, 2010)

What kills me is that the top pic is from a book while the bottom is from this site...

14th September 1940: Hurricane fighter planes taking off from Gravesend, aft...

I hope they didn't pay Getty for that image!


----------



## T Bolt (Sep 29, 2010)

I'd say the second photo is the real one. You can see the shadows of the hurricanes on the ground wile in the first pic there are no shadows and something doesn't look quite right where the Hurricane on the left is in front of the buildings..


----------



## vikingBerserker (Sep 29, 2010)

I think the top pic is the real one, you can see more detail on the planes. The light in the 2nd looks a bit off, eso around the tire on the plan on the left.

Or they both could be fake.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 29, 2010)

*30 September 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The Luftwaffe reintroduced old tactics with close escorts to their bombers and paid a heavy price in bombers and fighters for negligible damage. Four attacks of considerable weight were made over East Kent, one of which spread westwards, and two others took place in the Portland area. The second of these synchronized with the fourth attack which spread westwards in Kent. Other activity consisted of reconnaissance flights along the Coasts, and attacks on shipping. The result of all this activity was the loss of several fighter Experten for minimal gain.

A Ju 88 which made a reconnaissance of Chesterfield at 0630 hours re-crossed the Coast at the Humber and was shot down. From 0635 hours single German aircraft were active from the Estuary to Beachy Head and inland in two cases to Farnborough and Worthing.

At 0900 hours formations of thirty German aircraft including twelve bombers and fifty fighters, crossed the Coast East and West of Dungeness respectively. They were preceded by a single aircraft which flew in over Rye. The attack penetrated to Biggin Hill and Kenley. Meanwhile another raid of twelve aircraft patrolled Dungeness eastwards of the attack, just inland, and fifty additional aircraft remained off-shore at Dover.

At 1010 hours seventy-five Luftwaffe aircraft composed of bombers with fighter escort from II./JG 26 crossed at Dungeness and again flew to the Biggin Hill - Kenley area where the formations were broken up by fierce British resistance. Twenty-five German aircraft patrolled the Straits. By 1030 hours the raids had turned South and headed for France. Five Hurricanes are claimed by the II./JG 26 during this mission including the first for Uffz. Karl Schieffer of 5./JG 26.

At 1055 hours 100 German aircraft made up of bomb carrying Bf 110s with an escort of Bf 109s from JG 2, JG 27 and JG 51 crossed the Coast at St Albans Head of which fifty came from Cherbourg and fifty from the Seine. A split of twenty-five planes flew across Dorset and Devon to the Somerset border, but the remainder penetrated inland only some 15 miles before intercepted by Hurricanes and Spitfires. No 10 Group detailed one squadron to patrol Bristol, while the other British squadrons were detailed to counter the attack. Heavily involved in the battle, Hptm. Helmut Wick of Stab I./JG 2 downed a Hurricane and a Spitfire to bring his score to thirty-four. Also claiming kills were Oblt. Rudolf Pflanz of Stab I./JG 2 and Uffz. Kurt Bühligen of 6./JG 2. The raid was over by 1200 hours without the bombers reaching their target.

At 1310 hours some 100 Luftwaffe aircraft with eighteen others in advance, flew inland at Lympne. A second wave brought up the total to about 180 aircraft in all, with forty more patrolling at Dover. The formation of eighteen, followed by the main body, spread inland on a general course for London. It was principally held up 20 miles from Central London, but nine aircraft consisting of Ju 88s and Bf 109s of JG 27 penetrated while others approached the South-Western suburbs. The aircraft were re-crossing the Coast at 1345 hours. Duxford scrambled the 'Big Wing' to intercept the raiders. 12 Hurricanes if RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn left Northolt and was third in the Wing behind RAF No. 1 (Canadian) Squadron and No. 229 Squadron and were vectored towards Dungerness. At 14,000 ft they came upon about 30 Do215s in close formations of nines escorted by Bf109s. Unable attack, the Squadron broke away upwards and pursued the bombers over the Channel. Several pilots made inconclusive attacks on the Bf109s and 303 'Red Section' was checked by rearguard escorts, but one, F/O Urbanowicz destroyed two Bf109s near the French coast, and one Do215 over France. Sgt. Karubin destroyed one Bf109 off Beachy Head and P/O. Radomski destroyed one Do215, but crashed landed at Lydd unhurt. “B” Flight were too late for any effective contact. The fighters of JG 27 lost their Gruppe-Adjutant when Hans Bertram of 1./JG 27 was shot down over Sussex and killed during the mission.

At 1608 hours four raids totaling about 200 German aircraft flew from Dungeness to Biggin Hill and scattered over East Kent from Kenley to Hornchurch. Some flew West and approached Weybridge from the South. These again turned West down the Thames Valley as far as Reading. More aircraft were over Middle Wallop, North of Tangmere and near Winchester. At 1635 hours, while the East Kent raid was in progress, fifty Heinkels flew over Portland with a further fifty following the Coast to Lyme Bay. These joined the first formation and flew inland some 20 miles. Weymouth was bombed and damage also reported in the Yeovil area. By 1700 hours the aircraft were returning to France.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 29, 2010)

_(30 September 1940 continued....)_

It was during both of these raids that the German formations were badly mauled by the British. RAF 303 (Polish) Sqdrn was back in the air and ordered to patrol its base and then join with RAF No. 1 (Canadian) Sqdrn and 229 Sqdrn who had taken off fifteen minutes earlier, to again form the 'Big Wing'. Climbing at full boost, the squadrons became separated and neither could join the wing. “A” Flight was broken up by Bf109s of which F/O. Urbanowicz destroyed one. They were soon involved with 150 to 200 Bf109s and Bf110s and the odds were too great. Cloud cover alone saved the squadron from heavy casualties. RAF No.303 “B” Flight made its way towards the bombers going southeast near Croydon. Sgt. Belc broke away to protect a Hurricane being attacked, and never rejoined the Flight. The remaining 4 British fighters were dived upon by Bf109s when they were closing in on the bombers. Sgt. Franciszek broke off upwards in order to cover the flight from the surprise attack. He caught one Bf 109 in a turn and destroyed it and in a subsequent fight with six more Bf 109s probably destroyed another. He finally escaped into cloud.

With four British squadrons attacking the Luftwaffe bombers and fighters on the way in and another four fighter squadrons intercepting them on the way out, losses by the German aircrews were high. Bombers from I./KG 55 lost four Heinkels shot down into the Channel by fighters from RAF Nos. 238, 504 and 609 Squadrons on the mission to Yeovil. One crew was rescued by the Seeotdienst including Major Ernst Kuhl, who was injured. JG 52 lost three pilots who became prisoners of war as did two pilots from JG 53. Two pilots from JG 2 were killed, Fw. Wilhelm Hermes of 2./JG 2 and Uffz. Peter Neumann-Merkel of 9 / JG 2. Oblt. Werner Machold of 9./JG 2 brought his score to twenty-four with the destruction of an RAF aircraft near Portland. He later destroyed two more RAF aircraft and ended the day with his victory total at twenty-six kills.

P/O Alfred Keith Ogilvie of RAF No. 609 Sqdrn described in his diary:


> "_We tangled with a 109 circus and I found myself a playmate. He had too much staff for Junior, and though he got in a deflection shot which floated across in front of me, I never got a shot at him. . I was pleased that the Spitfire was able to turn inside of the 109, but he suddenly flipped over and disappeared before I had fired a shot - a moral victory only_!"



At 1730 hours a reconnaissance of Southampton was made by a single aircraft.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 48; RAF, 20.

Wing-Cdr Laurence Frank Sinclair (b. 1908 ) dragged an airman from a crashed, burning plane. Unfortunately, the airman later died. (George Cross)

Civilian casualties of the Blitz this month are 6,954 killed and 10,615 hurt.

Two German agents, Karl Drucke - who had a loaded 6.35 Mauser automatic and a flickknife that was found in his suitcase and was taken from Drucke by Inspector John Simpson after a struggle - and Vera Eriksen, were arrested at Buckie, on the Moray Firth, having first been spotted in Port Gordon. A third member of the same group, Werner Walti (real name Robert Petter), was arrested in Edinburgh, where he had deposited a wireless set in a suitcase at the Waverley Street luggage office. After extensive MI5 interrogation in London the two men were sentenced to death at the Old Bailey and hanged in Wandsworth Prison on 6 August 1941. The woman, who had been a prewar part-time informant for MI5, escaped the same penalty.

A Spitfire from RAF No.610 Squadron based at Acklington airfield in Northumberland crashed on the beach at Alnmouth due to a flying accident. The aircraft was a write-off, the 21-year-old pilot, Flying Officer C.H. Bacon was killed and was buried in St Mary's Cemetery in Windermere, Westmoreland.

A Spitfire from RAF No.64 Squadron based at Leconfield airfield near Beverley in Yorkshire, crashed 4 miles N of base during a routine sortie at 10.30 hours, no cause stated. The pilot, P/O Adrian Francis Laws, was killed and is buried in Wells-Next-The-Sea Cemetery, Norfolk. 

A Hurricane of RAF No.302 Squadron based at Leconfield near Beverley in Yorkshire, piloted by Sergeant J.S. Zaluski, taxied into a stationary Hurricane at base. There were no casualties, both aircraft were damaged but repairable.

A Blenheim from RAF No.219 Squadron based at Catterick airfield in Yorkshire, disintegrated and crashed a mile SW of Accrington shortly after take-off, to begin a routine night patrol, at 21.40, the exact cause of the crash unknown. Sergeants C. Goodwin and G.E. Shepperd, together with AC2 J.P. McCaul were killed and the aircraft a write-off. The pilot, Sgt Goodwin aged 21 was buried at his home town of Kingston upon Hull, Sgt Shepperd, the air gunner, aged 23 is buried in Catterick Cemetery and AC2 McCaul, who was 28 years old, is buried in Leigh Cemetery in Lancashire.


----------



## Airframes (Sep 30, 2010)

Good stuff yet again Chris.
The pics of the 501 Squadron Hurricanes - this is one of the most famous pics taken during the battle, and has always been attributed as being taken at *Gravesend*, which is correct. (I'd need to check the dates, but I believe it was August14th).
The hangars in the background show damage from a previous raid (first pic), and the second pic has definitely been either masked, 'dodged' or airbrushed if on an original print, or 'photoshopped' or similar if an electronic image.
The Squadron were not stationed at Hawkinge until 1942, and, although they might have positioned at Hawkinge as a FOB, the background is not that of the station.
The Bf109 'White 4', although it appears to be the 'E3' model, is in fact an E4, verified by the data plate, the engine and the plate on the port(?) undercarriage leg, and now resides in the Imperial War Museum, Duxford, displayed more or less as it was when force-landed, with the starboard wing unrestored. This airframe toured the USA and Canada, before returning to Bournemouth, UK, bearing hundreds of signatures, where it was in store for many years before being restored for display.
Here's a couple of pics I took last year.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 30, 2010)

Thats what I thought. That second pic looks doctored to me. As for the Bf 109 I will have to check my source which I believe was Eric Mombeek's Jagdwaffe series. But its cool that the plane still survives!


----------



## Njaco (Sep 30, 2010)

*UNITED KINGDOM*: The sad saga continued for the Luftwaffe. German losses were mounting, but still Göring did not understand that he could ill afford to lose aircraft at the rate that he was. Although his aircraft establishments were producing more aircraft, Britain too was producing just as many. In fact newer models of the Hurricane and Spitfire were being produced that were to prove far more deadly than the earlier versions. And so the Germans switched tactics.

Göring had now realized that sending in an advance squadron of fighters and fighter bombers was not luring the RAF fighters into the air, and that the strongest reaction by the British was concentrated bombing attacks. For this reason, Bf 109s were laden with a small bomb load, and that after the release of the bombs they could then revert to being fighters. Although this move only proved marginally effective, the Bf 109s, because of the extra weight, used up more fuel and their stay over enemy territory was made even shorter.

With the introduction of the Bf 109E-7 Jabos, it was to set new tactics for the Luftwaffe and a new headache for Fighter Command. The German High Command issued orders that at least one Gruppe in every Jagdgeschwader was to be equipped for Jabo operations. The problem that Keith Park was now faced with was that these Jabos would fly at extremely high altitudes and come in at great speeds. The Hurricane was a great aircraft at lower altitudes and did not perform well at 25,000 feet. So the job of taking on the Jabos was left to the Spitfire squadrons which was a good performer at high altitudes.

The Luftwaffe would now use their main bomber force almost entirely under cover of darkness. In daylight they sent over only small numbers of fast Ju88s together with Messerschmitt fighters at high altitude carrying bombs, protected by further fighters above. This activity occurred every day during October and proved extremely difficult to deal with, but strategically was of little benefit to the Germans.

During October London continued to be the principle target for the long range bombers, being raided every night. However with the planned invasion of Britain now shelved the Luftwaffe High Command ordered more bombing effort to be put into night harassing attacks on the harbour installations at Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow, with the industrial centres of Birmingham and Coventry as alternative targets, while still maintaining the pressure on the Capital. As a result I Fliegerkorps was transferred to Luftflotte 3 adding to its inventory the He 111's of KG 1 and KG 26 as well as the Ju 88's of KG 76 and KG 77, although, a number of these units were to remain non-operational for some time. 

The Luftwaffe opened the new month of October with an attack made by two aircraft at 0655 hours on Carew-Cheriton and one hangar was wrecked, two slightly damaged, one hut completely demolished, one defence post demolished and two Anson aircraft burnt out but the aerodrome was serviceable. The casualties amounted to 1 airman killed and ten injured. 

Eighty Bf 109s of JG 2 and JG 53 and the remaining thirty-two BF 110s of ZG 26 made a sweep over Portsmouth and Southampton at about 1030 hours in two waves. Three Squadrons from No 10 Group engaged the formations over Swanage and the Isle of Wight and forced the Messerschmitts to turn back. Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Squadron, scrambled from Middle Wallop and RAF No. 607 Squadron, scrambled from Tangmere, intercepted the raid over Poole with each squadron losing 2 aircraft. The German raiders lost four aircraft during this engagement although Obstlt. Johann Schalk from Stab III./ZG 26 made a claim for a Hurricane destroyed at 11:45 hours. Bob Doe led down the six Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Sqdrn in a bounce from 5000 feet above the German aircraft, and got the Messerschmitts from below as he pulled up from the dive. One of the problems with the bomb-carrying Bf 109s was that with a 250kg bomb hanging under its belly, the single-engined warplane was not as versatile in the role of a fighter, so the bombs had to be jettisoned early allowing the Messerschmitt to revert back to its role of a fighter. 

At the same time the second wave of 50 German aircraft approached the Needles and were met over the sea by 5 Squadrons from No 11 Group. The enemy aircraft did not cross the coast and withdrew. In a reversal of the day before, the action resulted in victory for the German force and several Luftwaffe pilots made claims. Hptm. Helmut Wick of Stab I./JG 2 claimed two Spitfires to bring his tally to 36 while Ofw. Rudolf Taschner of 1./JG 2, Lt. Franz Fiby of Stab I./JG 2, Uffz. Josef Keil from 8./JG 3 and Hptm. Karl-Heinz Greisert of Stab II./JG 2 all made claims for RAF fighters destroyed.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 30, 2010)

_(1 October 1940 continued.....)_

Shortly after 1300 hours, the Luftwaffe sent three waves of bombers on an attack on London. The first two waves contained about 50 Bf 109s and Bf 110s while the third consisted of He 111s. Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 72, 92 and 603 Squadrons along with Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 253, 303, 501 and 605 Squadrons were scrambled to meet the raiders with successful interceptions made by Spitfires of RAF No. 41 Squadron, from Hornchurch and Hurricanes of RAF No.303 (Polish) Squadron, from Northolt. The RAF lost four aircraft. Major Galland led JG 26 as they escorted the Jabos to London. Over Brighton, II./JG 26 was attacked from above by a lone Hurricane from RAF No.303 (Polish) Sqdrn. Uffz. Hans Bluder of 4./JG 26 was hit and failed to exit his aircraft as it plunged straight into the ground. 

By 1403 hours a second attack developed with 50 German aircraft flying North West towards Biggin Hill. A second formation of the same strength followed but withdrew soon after. The first formation returned to France shortly after but single aircraft maintained patrols in North Kent and North Surrey until 1520 hours. 13 Squadrons were detailed to the attack and again the raiders turned away from the British fighters with a few dropping bombs in the New Romney area. 

At 1610 hours 70 Luftwaffe aircraft - mostly Bf 109s and Bf 110s - in three successive waves flew towards Kenley at 20,000 feet. 40 of these approached the South East edge of the Inner Artillery Zone but immediately turned South East. The remainder comprising 38 Bf 109s from II(Schlacht)./LG 2 escorted by JG 26 and JG 51 made for central London. Although intercepted by RAF fighters and dispersed, several managed to drop bombs on the city's southern outskirts before heading back for France. Only one escort was lost, Uffz. Garnith from 1./JG 51 was shot down and made a POW. The remaining daylight hours saw only occasional reconnaissance raids along the coast and over southern England.

During the night raids were made against London, Bristol, the Midlands, East Anglia, Liverpool, Manchester and Preston areas. The first night bombers came out of Le Havre and Cherbourg area and crossed the Isle of Wight at 1940 hours. Raids from Dieppe and the Somme crossed the coast between Beachy Head and Dungeness with London as their objective. A number of raids originating from Cherbourg crossed at Portland and flew to Bristol Channel whence they spread to South Wales, West Midlands and up to Chester, Liverpool, Manchester and Preston areas. A few raids were plotted over East Anglia and inland as far as Leicester. Mines were dropped off the east coast and in the Thames Estuary. At 2145 hours there was a marked lull in the number of fresh raids entering the country. Central London was clear for a time, but at 2340 hours fresh raids approached from the East and a number were plotted in and out of the Thames Estuary. Several formations of Luftwaffe Heinkels and Dorniers raided London again. A formation of He 111s of KGr 100 raided the city of Manchester with a single bomber dropping ordinance on the city of Bristol.

Losses: Luftwaffe 6 : Fighter Command 4 

The names of the first recipients of the newly-instituted George Cross and George Medals were announced today. The following details are taken from the official accounts in the London Gazette of the deeds for which the awards were made:

1) *Thomas Hopper Alderson*, part time rescue party worker, detachment leader, Bridlington. George Cross. A pair of semi-detached houses at Bridlington was totally demolished in a recent air raid (presumably one of the raids that took place in the middle of August). One woman was trapped alive. Mr Alderson tunnelled under the wreckage and rescued her. Some days later two five-storey buildings were demolished and the debris collapsed on to the cellars in which eleven people were trapped, six people in one cellar were buried under the debris. Mr Alderson tunneled about 14 ft. under the main heap of wreckage, working unceasingly for 3½ hours, succeeded in releasing all of the people trapped. On the third occasion, some four-story buildings were totally demolished, five people were trapped in a cellar and Mr Alderson led the rescue party in excavating a tunnel to the cellar. He also personally tunnelled many feet under the wreckage to rescue alive two people (one of whom later died) trapped under a massive refrigerator. Mr Alderson worked almost continuously under the wreckage for 5 hours, during further air raid warnings and with enemy aircraft overhead.
2)*Patrick King*, Air Raid Warden, of Seaton Delaval: During an air raid Mr King was in his shelter when he heard a bomb explode. He ran towards the place where it had fallen and found two semi-detached houses had almost collapsed. One was empty, but in the other was a blind lady, a Miss Hannah Wilson, who sheltered under the stairs. He ascertained by shouting that she was alive but buried under the stairs. Mr King using axe and saw made a tunnel using sawn off roof timbers as supports for it, after a considerable time and much difficulty he managed to reach her, clear the debris off her body and bring her to safety. All the while the house was in imminent danger of collapse.

No 80 Signals Wing of the RAF was finally able to counteract ‘Knickebein’, the radio beam navigation used by the Luftwaffe on its night raids on London. This forced the bombers to use bright moonlight for bombing. At about the same time the FuMG 65, also known as the Würzburg-Gerät radar system, entered service. It was a very powerful system with a range of 35 Kms.

The British kept inventing new ways in which to deal with the Luftwaffe bombers and the latest was an airbourne parachute bomb. Known as "Mutton', the parachute with a bomb dangling from 2,000 feet of piano wire was an adaptation of the rocket fired parachute mines that were used on 18 August. The idea was to launch these in the path of an approaching bomber formation and denotate when an aircraft was nearby. RAF No. 420 Flight was formed to use the equipment and on 1 October, F/L Burke collected the first Harrow bomber equipped to use it from the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough.

*WESTERN FRONT*: The Kommodore of KG 2, Oberst Johannes Fink, was promoted to Generalmajor. Oberleutnant Gustav “Micky” Sprick, Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 26, was awarded the Ritterkreuz after gaining his 20th victory on 28 September.

The RAF sent bombers and fighters in 105 separate raids on Germany through Holland during the night. Bombs fell on many German military installations but only slight damage was done. Three waves of British bombers flew over Berlin but caused very slight damage but did manage to drop leaflets over Aschersleben with the headline “Terror war Hitlers Waffe”. Luftwaffe night-fighters shot down four of the British bombers over Bersenbruck. Flak destroyed two Blenheims and a Hampden over the harbors at Boulogne and Le Touquet.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 3, 2010)

*2 October 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Massed fighter-bomber formations began very early and, climbing above 30,000 ft, they attacked south-east London and Biggin Hill for most of the morning. Some smaller waves in the afternoon again penetrated as far as central London. Bf109s operated at a high altitude over south-east England with a mixture of fighter and fighter-bomber variants bombing London before the RAF could react. The raiders also relied upon cloud and rain cover to mask their approach to London.

A Ju88 landed intact at 0630 hours at Brightlingsea (Essex Coast). It had left Amsterdam at 0300 hours on a Meteorological and reconnaissance flight and got lost.

An attack was made at 0715 hours on RAF Station Penhros and considerable damage was done to the carpenters shop, armoury workshops, drug store, fabric workshop, Clerk of Works office and stores and transport sheds. An attack was made by a single plane at 0843 hours on Portland, and 1 HE bomb which failed to explode fell between four Admiralty tanks but no damage was caused.

At 0830 hours, the Luftwaffe commenced with the first of five daylight raids against London with high flying Bf 109s, Bf 110s, bomb-carrying Bf 109E-7s and medium bombers. Just after 0900 hours and during the following hour, two raids from Luftflotte 2 crossed over Kent towards the southern areas of London. Ju88s, Do17s and Bf109s made up the raids and were intercepted by Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 17, 253, 501 and 605 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66, 602 and 603 Squadrons. At 0955 hours about 50 Luftwaffe aircraft crossed the Coast at Dungeness, the leading formation of twenty aircraft coming into the Inner Artillery Zone. The remainder approached no further than Kenley. Meanwhile ten German aircraft flew inland at Brighton northwards to Biggin Hill, joining the other formations flying South at 1015 hours. LG 2 and the entire Geschwader strength of JG 51 flew in at a great height over the southern counties. Although the high altitude of the German formations prevented many RAF fighters from engaging the bombers, the RAF claimed nine aircraft shot down for the loss of one Spitfire from RAF No. 603 Squadron. P/O P.G.Dexter of RAF No. 603 Sqdrn was wounded whilst flying a Spitfire I (P9553) by a Bf 109 of JG 53 over Croydon at 10:30 hours. Two pilots of JG 53 - Lt. Eric Schmidt and Uffz. Robert Wolfgarten, both from 9./JG 53 - claimed 4 Spitfires during this period. Oblt. Walter Fiel of 8./JG 53 was shot down and made a POW. One Do17 was shot down by the Hurricanes of RAF No.17 Squadron near RAF Pulham. 30 aircraft crossed the coast at Dungeness and flew towards Central London, twelve of them penetrating to the Inner Artillery Zone but all quickly made for home. During the raid thirty aircraft were patrolling round Dover and joined up with the inland formation when they recrossed the Coast at 0920 hours. During the raid strong patrols were maintained in the Straits. Bombs were dropped at Woolwich and Hastings.

At about 1130 hours 12+ German aircraft approached the Maidstone area and Margate, where bombs were dropped. Margate and Lympne were reported to have been bombed. These were followed by fifty aircraft flying towards Biggin Hill. Some of the latter approached the Inner Artillery Zone in the Crystal Palace area. At 1126 hours, several HE and Oil Incendiary bombs were dropped on the aerodrome at Lympne. One shelter was hit and an Army lorry was set on fire. Eight fighter squadrons were sent up to intercept. Due to the high altitude of the bombers, the Fighter Command squadrons scrambled to intercept could not reach the raiders before they had turned back to France. By 1220 hours all the aircraft were flying South of Maidstone returning to France.

During the early part of the afternoon several small raids crossed over Dungeness but turned away before reaching their targets. At 1320 hours, two raids totalling thirty Luftwaffe aircraft flew towards Kenley - Biggin Hill from Dover and Dungeness, while a further fifteen aircraft approached Sheppey. Twenty aircraft reached the East of London. By 1335 hours all the aircraft were returning to France, although until 1400 hours considerable activity continued in the Straits with small raids penetrating into East Kent. Bombs were dropped at various suburban places including Camberwell, and at Rochester.

At 1455 hours thirty German aircraft flew inland from Dungeness to Biggin Hill - Kenley but only one aircraft penetrated further towards Central London. By 1518 hours the aircraft had turned away. During the attack five aircraft flew round North Foreland to Sheppey returning by the same route at 1520 hours. Camberwell was reported to have been bombed again.

Just before 1630 hours another raid of He111s and Bf109s - about seventy-five aircraft - was plotted over Kent following the same route as previous raids to Biggin Hill where they split, one formation of eight aircraft flying over South East London. The bulk remained in the Biggin Hill area but by 1650 hours had turned South. The Spitfires of RAF No. 41 Squadron, scrambled from Hornchurch intercepted some of the raiders. Meanwhile, off the Lincolnshire coast at Skegness, He111s were engaged by the Hurricanes of RAF No. 151 Squadron scrambled from Digby.

Shortly before 1930 hours, a convoy was attacked off Peterhead and the He115 responsible was intercepted and shot down by Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Squadron. A further He115 was badly damaged.

During the night the regular bombing of London continued with further raids on the areas of Newcastle, the Midlands and Manchester by 180 aircraft throughout the night. The bombing saturated a central strip of London from Hornchurch/Romford to Northolt/Uxbridge; other raiders struck Manchester and North-West Scotland. At about 1915 hours the first night raids left bases between Cherbourg and Dieppe to cross the coast between Selsey Bill and Dungeness to approach the London area. Between 2100 and 2200 hours London and the South East counties were clear of raids, but a steady stream originating from Cherbourg crossed the coast between the Isle of Wight and Bournemouth flying North to the Midlands and up to the Manchester area and in one case as far North as Newcastle. These raids continued until about 0100 hours and returned in most cases over Wales and the Bristol Channel. Four HEs and one oil IB fell near Medomsley, one of the HEs falling on the railway embankment between Shotley Bridge and Blackhill Station causing very slight damage to property. An elderly lady was reported to have died from shock at Blackhill. There was no interference with railway workings although six telephone lines were broken. Thirty-three RAF night-fighters were scrambled but failed to intercept the raiders. Mines were also dropped in the Humber and Thames Estuary.

Losses: Luftwaffe 17 : Fighter Command 1.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 3, 2010)

*3 October 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Although poor weather brought a halt to most large scale German air operations over England, the Luftwaffe did send single aircraft especially after mid-day, in a fairly continuous succession of raids that crossed the coast and in some cases dropped bombs in various parts of the country. Small attacks were carried out by low flying Ju88s on designated targets with several of the raiders falling to anti-aircraft batteries or crashing in bad weather. Many of the places had no military importance. London and the Midlands appearred to have been the main objectives during the day but a number of aerodromes were also attacked. The lull in the battle today gave exhausted ground crew of both sides a chance to catch up on much needed work on their aircraft.

From 0630 to 1230 hours some nine reconnaissances by single aircraft were made between the Yorkshire Coast and Harwich. In two cases aircraft penetrated far inland, one flying to Worcester, where bombs were dropped, to Birmingham and Wellingborough which was also bombed. The second crossed the coast at Bawdsey, flying to North Weald and Debden. The town of North Weald experienced a raid on the airfield in the morning but this attack caused little damage. At about 0700 hours Luftwaffe aircraft attacked St Eval from a low height with two Spitfires and one Anson completely destroyed and two hangars also hit but mostly there was minor damage.

At 0940 hours ten HE bombs fell near the premises of Shell Mex BP Ltd in the Isle of Gray. The premises were intact but slight damage was done to the railway. Eighteen bombs were dropped at Rushden at 1018 hours. A school, boot factory and Electricity Sub-Station were damaged. The railway also suffered and traffic was temporarily suspended.

A single Ju 88 from KG 77 hit the de Havilland factory at Hatfield at 1126 hours from a height of 50 feet, bouncing 4 bombs that demolished the Technical School and assembly shop where much of the work for the early Mosquitoes was promptly destroyed. 21 people were killed and 70 injured as the Ju 88 machine-gunned the workers running for the protection of trenches. A Sheet Metal shop was destroyed before the bomber was brought down by 40mm Bofurs shells, .303 machine gun bullets from an RAF detachment and even rounds from a Hotchkiss manned by the Home Guard. The burning aircraft crashed at Hertingfordbury.

The Mining and Engineering Co of Worcester was attacked at 1232 hours. The damage was not extensive and full production resumed in about seven days. Upwood Aerodrome was attacked at 1333 hours but the bombers failed to hit their objective. The Gas Light and Coke Company was bombed at Banbury at 1440 hours and production was suspended for four days.

From 1500 hours raids crossed the Coast between Beachy Head and Selsey Bill flying inland and in one case to the Bedford area. This aircraft on its return flight located a convoy near Selsey which it bombed. A further track was plotted near Fishguard flying North East to Speke thence via Wales and the Bristol Channel to Dorset. The objectives for these afternoon raids appeared to be the airfields of the RAF and, again, London. Six bombs were dropped at 1505 hours on Woodley, three of which were of delayed action. No damage was reported. Cosford was attacked at 1517 hours and Wyton attacked at 1520 hours but no damage was reported at either location. At 1530 hours a bomb was dropped at Tatsfield and slight damage was done to the BBC Station. The training station at Skegness was attacked at 1613 hours and six HE bombs were dropped on the landing ground at Stanton Harcourt but caused no damage. White Waltham was bombed at 1654 hours and St Merryn was attacked at 1750 hours and three aircraft were slightly damaged.

During the night the size of raids was reduced due to the continuing poor weather. London was visited and also the South East of England, but there was no report of the Midlands or the North having been bombed. Up to 2100 hours only eleven raids of single aircraft had entered the country, nine from Dieppe to the London area, and two from Calais to North of London and on to Bedford. An IB was dropped near to the Aerodrome at Gravesend during the night but no damage was reported. The aerodrome at Ford was attacked at 1940 hours and one Government building was damaged.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 9; RAF, 1. The only casualty for Fighter Command during 173 sorties was a Blenheim of RAF No. 600 Squadron, from Hornchurch, which crashed after a patrol sortie.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Seven RAF bombers made daylight raids on Rotterdam, Dunkirk and Cherbourg. Last night 81 bombed targets in Germany, Eindhoven airfield and the Channel ports.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 3, 2010)

*4 October 1940 Friday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Luftwaffe operations over the Channel were again hampered by the increasingly bad weather and the first major raid was not flown until after 13:00 hours by bomb-carrying Bf 109E-7s and Bf 110s. Although the weather conditions were poor, the Luftwaffe did launch several small raids during the day. At first there were shipping attacks, they were then followed by succession of single raids against London and the South East of Kent. The Penrhos Aerodrome was attacked at 0645 hours. The office was demolished and nearby farm buildings were damaged. At about 08:30 hours an Air Ministry Establishment at Fairlight was attacked. The first of the small raids was by Ju88s just after 10:00 hours during which one of the raiders was shot down by Hurricanes of RAF No.257 Squadron off the Suffolk coast.

Another Ju88 bomber was intercepted, at 11:00 hours, by Hurricanes of RAF No. 229 Squadron over the Channel. At about midday a raid of He111s was intercepted off the Sussex coast by Hurricanes of RAF No. 501 Squadron, scrambled from Kenley and RAF No. 607 Squadron, scrambled from Tangmere. As this raid subsided, more Ju88s crossed the coast near Beachy Head at about 1300 hours and were engaged by Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Squadron, scrambled from Croydon.

F/Lt K.McL Gillies from RAF No. 66 squadron was KIA at 16:00 hours while on patrol in his Spitfire I (X4320). He failed to return from an interception of a He 111 off the East Coast. His aircraft crashed off Covenhithe, Suffolk. This may have been the Spitfire claimed by Lt. Ludwig Theopold of Stab I.(J)/LG 2 over Ramsgate, the only Spitfire claimed by the Luftwaffe all day. A Hurricane was claimed by Oblt. Richard Leppla of 3./JG 51 over Dover for his 12th victory.

It was not until about 1700 hours that another raid of Do17s and Ju88s crossed the Kent coast before turning back as the Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Squadron gave chase.

The weather improved sufficiently by nightfall for Luftflotte 2 to resume heavy bombing. Large raids were made on London and a few on the Liverpool and Bristol areas. At about 1905 hours a stream of raids commenced from the Abbeville region on the most intense scale yet observed after dark. The German aircraft were shown as crossing the Channel in lines ahead spaced at 3 to 5 mile internals. A few raids also came from Baie de Seine over Shoreham. The stream from Abbeville was maintained and it is estimated that over 100 raids passed over the route in the two hours to 2100 hours, while at the same time the stream from Baie de Seine narrowed and became more active, with 20 or more raids passing during the hour 2000 to 2100. The target of all the above raids was London. 34 raids were plotted in between Beachy Head and Dungeness to London, but only eight pierced the central zone, the remainder spreading to South West and North West London and up to North Weald and Debden. The New Cross Telephone Exchange was hit and there was a certain amount of damage done to the railways. An HE bomb caused a fire at Hawkers Aircraft Factory at Kingston. The shelter and stores were hit but only minor damage was reported. Major damage occurred at Enfield at 2015 hours on the LNER track near Crews Hill Station. Both lines were damaged and traffic was stopped. Mines were dropped off the Norfolk and Suffolk coasts.

AVM Park issued new observations and instructions to sector controllers and to squadron commanders, whose pilots were becoming fretful at the frequency with which they were still at an unfavourable height when they met the enemy. Park assured them:


> "_I wish the squadron commanders and sector controllers to know everything humanly possible is being done by group to increase the warning received of incoming raids. ... With the prevailing cloudy skies and inaccurate heights given by the RDF the group controllers' most difficult problem is to know the height of the incoming raids_."


Park then detailed what steps were to be taken to correct this situation, including the formation of a special reconnaissance flight at Gravesend. 


> "_Whatever time permits I wish you to get the readiness squadrons in company over sector aerodromes. Spitfires 25,000 feet, Hurricanes 20,000 feet, and wait until they report they are in good position before sending them to patrol lines or to intercept raids having a good track in fairly clear weather_."


Hptm. Walter Adolph, with a total of nine victories in the war so far, was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 26.

Sir Charles F.A. Portal, KCB, DSO, MC was chosen to be Chief of the Air Staff, with effect from 24 October, to replace Sir Cyril Newall, who was appointed Governor of New Zealand. Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse was named Portal's successor as C-in-C Bomber Command.

S/Ldr. M. Lister Robinson, DSO, DFC was made commanding officer of RAF No. 609 Squadron.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 12; RAF, 3.

*WESTERN FRONT*: "The War is won," Hitler told Mussolini today when the two met for three-hours in an armoured train - a gift from the Fuhrer to the Duce. The British people were under an "inhuman strain" and, Hitler claimed, it was only a matter of time before they cracked. In Berlin, foreign office spokesmen told neutral journalists that the principal subject discussed by the two leaders and their foreign ministers was an appeal to the British to call off the war. However, the Italians were quick to note that Hitler no longer talks about invading Britain. Count Ciano, notes in his diary, that this obvious setback for their Axis partner put Mussolini in an exceptionally good mood. "_Rarely have I seen the Duce in such good humour_." In Rome, Il Popolo di Roma (newspaper) commenting on the talks, speaks of a long war in prospect, with Germany unable to invade Britain this year.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 4, 2010)

*5 October 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Six attacks were made by the Luftwaffe in formations of varying size, of which four were in the South East of England, (three of them developing towards London), and two in the Portsmouth-Southampton area. Most of their activity was again concentrated on Kent and Sussex and some of the coastal towns that suffered on the 4th October were again bombed on the 5th. Owing to indiscriminate bombing, most of the damage was mainly confined to house property, although the railways at Gillingham and Lewes received slight damage.

Just before 0900 hours, a reconnaissance Ju88 was attacked by Hurricanes of RAF No. 253 Squadron, off Beachy Head. At 0930 hours a large raid by thirty Bf109s attacked Dover at low level and most had returned before the scrambled Spitfires of RAF No. 72 Squadron from Biggin Hill arrived.

At 1045 hours 150 German aircraft including JG 51, JG 53, EprGr 210 and LG 2 crossed the coast at or near Lympne and spread fanwise through Kent to attack Detling and Folkestone. A formation of 100 German fighters flew towards London, but only fifty aircraft penetrated the Inner Artillery Zone, with twenty getting no further than South London. A second formation of fifty bombers remained near the Coast. The raids were intercepted by Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66, 72, 92 and 603 Squadrons. With most of the German formations consisting of fighter-bombers, the RAF was free to tangle with these aircraft who dropped their ungainly loads the minute they were engaged. The escorts took on the British aggressively. Bitter dogfights took place over the people of London with great swirls and streaks of vapor trailing across the pale blue autumn sky. Numerous scores were claimed by pilots of JG 53 including a Hurricane over Maidstone by Hptm. Heinz Bretnütz of 6./JG 53 for his 17th victory. Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 reached 35 kills by claiming a Spitfire over London. But lost were Uffz. Wilhelm "Willi" Ghesla and Lt. Alfred Zeis both from 1./JG 53 who were made POWs. Also captured was Fw. Erhardt Pankratz from 6.(Sch)/LG 2.

As the fighter sweeps were withdrawing, Bf110s crossed over Kent towards Maidstone and were met head-on by the Polish Hurricane Squadron, RAF No. 303, scrambled from Northolt. These were the Bf 110s of EprGr 210 who had re-entered the battle by raiding the new RAF airfield at West Malling. RAF No. 303 Squadron was scrambled at around 11:00 hours, and intercepted the formation of about a dozen Bf 110s and 50 Bf 109s over Kent. After a determined attack on the Bf 110s, the Bf 109s intervened and a fierce dogfight developed. The Polish pilots claimed nine victories (5 Bf 110 and 4 Bf 109), of which six (4 Bf 110, 2 Bf 109) have been verified after the war. Oblt. Werner Weymann, Gruppenkommandeur of Stab./ErprGr 210 was also killed. He was the fourth Gruppenkommandeur lost in action by the unit since 15 August and Wolfgang Schenck took over leadership of the unit in the air. 303 squadron sustained one casualty - Lt. Januszewicz was killed in the dogfight. F/O Januszewicz probably fought with the Bf109s of JG 53 and he crashed in flames at Stowting, near Lyminge in his Hurricane I (P3892).

Shortly before 1400 hours a large raid of thirty Ju88s of KG 77 and fifty Bf109s approached the Dorset coast and proceeded to attack Southampton. The aircraft approached the Needles and flew to Southampton and inland for about 25 miles. At the same time fifty German aircraft crossed the coast at Swanage and flew mostly over Poole and Weymouth but some elements penetrated some 30 miles before they retired. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 238 and 607 Squadrons scrambled to intercept but made little impact on the bombers due to the Bf109 escorts. Numerous pilots from JG 2 made several claims including 3 Hurricanes for Hptm. Helmut Wick of Stab I./JG 2 who reached 39 kills. Ofw. Rudolf Täschner of 1./JG 2 claimed three Hurricanes over S. Bournemouth. RAF No. 607 Squadron from Tangmere was bounced by 109s over Swanage and four Spitfires were shot down, all pilots surviving unhurt. 

As this raid was in progress, another Bf109 sweep across Kent by a mixed force of fifty bombers and fighters from Luftflotte 3 was made with interceptions by Spitfires of RAF No. 41 Squadron, scrambled from Hornchurch. The Spitfires split them up and drove them off.

At 1715 hours two formations of thirty aircraft each, mainly Bf 110s crossed the Isle of Wight and flew inland covering Portsmouth - Southampton - Tangmere. They were soon turned away. It was during this time period that Hptm. Helmut Wick of Stab I./JG 2 claimed his two Spitfires for a five-in-one day. When Hptm. Wick returned to France, he was awarded the Eichenlaub for achieving forty-one victories.

During the night London was repeatedly bombed with further raids on Liverpool, Leicester, Northampton, the Midlands and East Anglia. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary. A formation of over 200 Luftwaffe bombers attacked Kenley, Biggin Hill, Debden and Martlesham airfields. Forty German aircraft crossed the coasts during this period, twenty-six from Abbeville, twelve from Le Havre and two from Cherbourg areas. Practically all concentrated on London. Little damage was caused by the raiders. A large fire was started at the West India Dock. Numerous bombs were dropped on the Borax Works at Erith which caused a fire. A thirty pump fire occurred at C E Morton's Factory at Millwall and a fire broke out at the premises of Amos Smith King George Dock, Hull. Major damage was done to the LMS yard at Cricklewood. The carriage sheds and goods siding suffered most. Portland Naval Dockyard was bombed at 2035 hours,and the telephone communications between Portland and Weymouth were cut. 

Fighter Command flew 1,175 sorties - a record.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 13; RAF, 8.

Oblt. Rudolf Resch replaced Oblt. Werner Lederer as Staffelkapitän of 6./JG 52.

The tired pilots of V(Z)./LG 1, now designated I./NJG 3 a new night-fighter Geschwader, began staging back to Germany with their twin-engined fighters.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 5, 2010)

*6 October 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The German High Command began to realize that the Battle of Britain was lost and started to decrease the amount of daylight raids and instead focused on night-time attacks on London. The original purpose for the Battle of Britain had vanished. The air superiority needed for the Invasion of England could not be gained and Hitler began to instead focus elsewhere, namely Russia.

Heavy rain prevented many air operations over the Channel, including a large Luftwaffe formation that tried to gather off Calais but had to soon abandon the mission and returned to base. Despite this, small formations of single German aircraft raided England continuously all day, causing little damage. Raids by single aircraft were carried out over South and South-East England, London and the Thames Estuary. During the morning these raids were particularly directed against the Dover/Deal area, whereas, in the afternoon, they were concentrated more particularly on the Inner Artillery Zone. Some penetrated as far as Reading, Bedford, Bicester, Duxford, Bury St Edmunds, Attleborough and Brighton. Quite a new feature of the day was the number of attacks which were made on small towns with machine-gun fire - Wickham Market, Felixstowe and Shirley (a suburb of Southampton) suffered chiefly, but very little damage was done. A reconnaissance of Kenley and Biggin Hill was carried out during the morning and a convoy off Southwold was shadowed.

Middle Wallop was attacked at 1130 hours and several bombs were dropped at Biggin Hill at 1245 hours. There was nothing to report beyond the possibility of damage to one Spitfire. 3 HE bombs were dropped near the Gas works, Northbourne Road, Eastbourne with damage to gas and water services.

At 1330 hours two raids were over a convoy. Two sections of RAF fighters were dispatched to intercept and at 1430 hours a raid of 12+ Luftwafffe aircraft flew over the same convoy and crossed in and out over the coast near Aldeburgh. No interceptions were reported. A Spitfire from RAF No. 64 Squadron based at Leconfield near Beverley in Yorkshire, crashed into the sea during a routine section patrol at 1420 hours. The 24-year-old pilot, Sergeant Frederick Fenton Vinyard was listed as missing, and his name is commemorated at Runnymede. The aircraft was lost.

At 1619 hours a single He 111 of II./KG 55 took of from Chartres, France to bomb Parnall Yate but soon aborted the mission and returned to base. At 1635 hours a Ju88 machine-gunned the Southern perimeter of the Camp at Farnborough and the Aerodrome and adjacent houses at White Waltham were machine-gunned at 1700 hours, but no damage occurred. The Hawker Aircraft Factory at Slough was attacked at 1650 hours. There was slight damage to one of the shops. A strafing attack at Northolt succeeded in destroying a Hurricane I (P3120) from RAF No.303 Squadron on the ground and killing the pilot, Sgt. Antoni Siudak. The attacking Ju88 was later shot down by a Hurricane of RAF No.229 Squadron and crashed in Leatherhead, Surrey. Tragically a lookout on one of the hangars was also killed during the attack, A/C 2. Henry Stennett from R.A.F.V.R. Slight damage was caused at the RAF airfield at Croydon as well as Biggin Hill airfield during these annoying pin-prick attacks. At some point during these attacks a Ju88 collided with a barrage balloon but the bomber was able to escape when it broke the cable of the balloon and flew off.

Geschwaderkommodore Werner Mölders of JG 51 flew the new Bf 109 F-1 WNr. 5628 'SG+GW' against the RAF for the first time. JG 51 was the only unit on the English Channel to received 3 of the first Bf 109F-1s in October 1940. Mölders' flight resulted in no combat claims.

There were almost no night attacks. At 2000 hours only one enemy aircraft was over England. It flew from Dieppe, over Shoreham, towards Kenley and Northolt, and then out East. At 2100 hours another flew in to near Reading, on to the Birmingham area, Bury St Edmunds, Duxford and North Weald, across the Inner Artillery Zone, and out over Romney at 2320 hours. One further raid flew in at Beachy Head at 2120 hours over London to Waltham Abbey and Hatfield and then South and out at Romney at 2230 hours.

Losses: Luftwaffe 9: Fighter Command 2.

An RAF No. 106 Squadron Hampden 'L4100' was on a cross country flight when it was attacked by two Hurricanes from RAF No. 17 Squadron flown by P/O Jack Ross (P3894) and Sgt George Steward (P3027) just after midday. Sgt K.S Powers, who was the navigator of the Hampden, was killed but none of the other crew members were injured nor was the Hampden badly damaged and it was able to land normally on Stradishall. The Commanding Officer of RAF No. 106 Squadron was very upset about what happened, and went to the fighter squadron with several large pictures of Hampdens, and gave them a "roasting".

*WESTERN FRONT*: Oblt. Werner Streib, Gruppenkommanduer of I./NJG 1 was awarded the Ritterkruez.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 6, 2010)

*7 October 1940 Monday
"....a tenacity unknown so far!"
UNITED KINGDOM*: Slightly better weather allowed the Luftwaffe to conduct daylight raids over England throughout most of the day. Five main attacks developed during the day, four towards the London area and one over Dorset. The first began at about 1030 hours when Bf 109s and Bf 110s, totalling about 127 aircraft, flew in over South East England, some of them penetrating as far as Gravesend and East London. Successful interceptions were made by Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 303 (Polish), 501 and 605 Squadrons. The Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41 and 66 Squadrons, although scrambled to intercept, were unable to make any decisive attacks and lost aircraft during the combat. Fw. Willy Roth of 4./JG 26 claimed a Spitfire from RAF No. 603 Sqdrn and Oblt. Josef Priller from 6./JG 51 also claimed a Spitfire north of Canterbury. Interception by five squadrons of RAF fighters disrupted the bomber formations and they returned to base. One raid by Do17s, at about 1100 hours, was intercepted by Spitfires of RAF No. 41 Sqdrn off the coast at Folkestone before breaking away back across the Channel.

The most serious of the day's losses affected the Luftwaffe's most successful fighter pilot. Shot down over England and taken prisoner was Viktor Mölders, brother of Werner Mölders and Staffelkapitaen of 2./JG 51, the Jabo Staffel of JG 51. The unit was making a fighter-bomber attack with 250 kg bombs against the docks in London when it was attacked by RAF Hurricanes. Oblt. Mölders' Bf109 E-4/B Werk Nr 4103 "Black 1" was hit from below by two long bursts fired by Sgt. Eric Wright of RAF No.605 Sqn. With smoke and glycol pouring from his aircraft, Mölders flew at rooftop height back towards the Channel but his engine overheated and he made a forced landing at Lidham Marshes, Doleham Farm, Guestling, East Sussex at around 1115 hrs. The aircraft was as described, fairly intact and was subsequently salvaged. The younger Mölders had nine aerial victories. Also lost was Lt. Erich Meyer from 2./JG 51 who was attacked on the return journey by Hurricanes from RAF No. 501 Sqdrn. Lt. Meyer ditched into the Channel, made it to a dingy and was picked up by a British motorboat. Almost 35 years later in the summer of 1974, a fishing trawler had its net tangled in an object and when divers investigated found the submerged Bf 109. In July 1976, the remains of Meyer's fighter were recovered and brought ashore for restoration and display. ('The Reluctant Messerschmitt' by Don Everson, Portcullis Press Ltd.)

A larger force of over 100 Bf 110 and Ju 88 bombers attacked targets near Dover at 1225 hours. They penetrated to Biggin Hill and South and South East London and 11 Group ordered 13 Squadrons to oppose with fighters from 12 Group on Stand By. The German formations were intercepted by eight separate RAF fighter squadrons who managed to disrupt the bombers and most failed to reach their target, dropping their bombs early and without causing serious damage. Nine Bf 109s from I(Jagd)./LG 2 were sent out to attack Dulwich railway station escorted by JG 3. Near Dover, the formation was attacked by Spitfires and three of the jabos were forced to jettison their bombs, but the remainder pressed on and attacked their target. Fifteen minutes after LG 2's attack, a small force of eight aircraft from I./JG 51 - which had set out to attack West London - was also attacked by Spitfires and three aircraft were lost. Ofw. Werner Hübner from 4./JG 51 claimed a Spitfire over Dover and Lt. Erich Schmidt of 9./JG 53 also claimed a Spitfire. So far as London was concerned Dockland received the most attention, and a fire was started at Rotherhithe, and there was also a certain amount of bombing done at Tidal Basin.

At 1400 hours, another large German force of Bf 110s, Ju 88s and Bf 109s, escorted by about fifty Bf 109s from JG 27, JG 26 and JG 53 crossed the Channel near Folkestone and headed towards several London airfields. Again, the RAF took off in strength and managed to interrupt the bombing runs. At one point RAF P/O K. W. MacKenzie of RAF No. 501 Sqdrn lined up behind a Bf 109 and fired. After a few short bursts, the Bf 109 began to smolder and he eventually ran out of ammunition. With the Messerschmitt blowing smoke and damaged, MacKenzie closed in on the German fighter and using his propeller, sliced into the tailplane of the ‘Emil’ and caused the Bf 109 to crash into the Channel. Twenty Bf 109s from II(Schlacht)./LG 2 with an escort from 5./JG 27 being led by their Staffellkapitaen, Oblt. Ernst Düllberg, attacked West London but were unable to reach their target due to the strong fighter defense. Before reaching the objective, flying at 2,200 feet, JG 27 were surprised by RAF No. 605 Squadron Hurricanes attacking from above and behind. Uffz Paul Lederer from 5./JG 27 dived and banked sharply to the left chased by three Hurricanes, one above, one on his tail, and one below. Eventually he was shot down at Bedgebury Wood, SW of Cranbrook, Kent and was captured. But his Staffelkapitaen, Oblt. Ernst Düllberg of 5./JG 27 shot down a Hurricane over London at 1445 hours. Uffz. Georg Mörschel and Uffz. Hans Bley, both from 4.(Sch)/LG 2 were shot down and made prisoners. Uffz. Mörschel's aircraft was hit in the cooling system and his engine caught fire, making a forced landing at Tunbridge Wells, Uffz. Mörschel just managed to crawl clear of his burning fighter when he was captured. Uffz. Bley had his fuel tank holed and he jettisoned his bomb and made for home but his fuel ran out and he came down in the sea. He made it to his dingy and was picked up to spend the rest of the war as a POW.

RAF No. 303 Sqdrn was ordered to patrol Kenley – Brooklands at 20,000 ft with RAF No. 1 (Canadian) Sqdrn. This would be RAF No. 1 Sqdrn's last flight in the Battle of Britain as the unit was headed north to Prestwick Scotland for a rest and re-grouping. Over London the squadrons found about 50 Bf109s flying at 25,000 to 30,000 ft. The Messerschmitts dived down in groups of five, and two groups attacked RAF No. 1 Sqdrn and others followed them, then dived away Southwards. RAF No. 303 Sqdrn tried to overtake them unsucessfully. The Squadron then shadowed another formation of Bf109s flying Westwards, and these came down to attack and were chased South over the Channel. The Hurricanes had difficulty catching the Bf109s in level flight but F/O. Pisarek destroyed one Bf109 over the Channel and Sgt. Belc destroyed one Bf109 N.W. of Redhill. Sgt. Szaposznikow destroyed one Bf109 in the Sea off Brighton and probably another. P/O. Mierzwa landed at a decoy aerodrome and crashed taking off. He proceeded to Detling and was unhurt.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 6, 2010)

_( 7 October 1940 continued......)_

Just after 1600 hours two raids were made against southern England. The first was a large attack against the Westland factory at Yeovil by 25 Ju 88s from Luftflotte 3 escorted by 52 Bf 109s from JG 2, seven from JG 53 and thirty-nine Bf 110s from ZG 26. Hurricanes of RAF Nos.56, 238, 601 and 607 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 152, 602 and 609 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept the raiders over Portland. Nine aircraft were shot down, 2 Ju88s and seven Bf 110s, which were proving no match for the RAF's single engined Hurricanes and Spitfires. Lt. Botho Sommer of 9./ZG 26 was made a prisoner when he was shot down and captured. The Bf 110 pilot had five victories with the Zerstörer Gruppe. Ofw. Fritz Stahl, a six kill Experte with 4./ZG 26, went missing during the day's action and was presumed dead. 

From the No. 609 Sqdrn Combat Report by S/Ldr Michael Robinson on 7 October 1940:


> "_At 15.24 hours No. 609 Squadron was ordered to patrol base at 20,000 feet. The Squadron was airborne at 16.30 hours with myself leading. Five minutes later we were told to proceed to Portland to intercept E/A flying from South. We headed for Portland, climbing on 238 Squadrons right flank. At about 19,000 feet, bandits were sighted about 15 miles south of us. 238 Squadron suddenly appeared to break up and turn towards the East, and at the same time I saw Me 109's above us and in the sun. It was extremely bright, and as we were heading into the sun it was very difficult to pick out enemy aircraft which for now were ahead of us, also we were rather embarrassed by the Me 109's still above us. I ordered the Squadron into sections line astern and turned underneath the 109's in the direction of the enemy aircraft and then saw a circle of Me 110's directly ahead of us and proceeded to attack. I broke away downwards without seeing the result of the attack and climbed up and engaged a seperated Me 110 astern. A Hurricane carried out a deflection attack between myself and the Me 110 but I went on firing when the former had broken away, and the Me 110 dived vertically down with his port motor smoking. I then climbed up and asked Bandy control for the position of any E/A. He told me E/A plotted at 15,000 feet over Lyme Regis. I proceeded to the latter place and found a cirle of Me 110's about 10 miles NW of Portland. I attacked from dead astern and it dived vertically onto the ground about 5 miles N of the Coast (Little Breedy)." _


JG 2 was heavily involved in the air battles over Portland and claims were made by numerous Luftwaffe pilots. Hptm. Karl-Heinz Greisert, Lt. Egon Mayer and Uffz. Kurt Bühligen from JG 2 all made claims for Hurricanes over the Dorset coastal town. Many of the Ju 88s got through to the target at Yeovil and dropped their loads. The factory was damaged and an air raid shelter was hit, killing 100 people. There were two large fires at Portsmouth - one at a furniture depository, and the other at Government House. 

As the furious air battles were developing over Dorset and the surrounding areas, a second raid was made over Kent and Sussex by Bf109s from JG 51, JG 27 and JG 26 and fighter-bombers from II./JG 3 and I(Jagd)./LG 2 with successful interceptions made by the Spitfires of RAF Nos. 222 and 603 Squadrons along with Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Sqdrn. The attack was directed against the docks on the bow of the Thames River and fires were started in the city. It was during this time that Oblt. Josef Priller of 6./JG 51 got his second Spitfire of the day. Josef Gärtner of 8./JG 26 claimed a Hurricane. The Acting RAF No. 605 Sqdrn Ldr 'Archie' McKellar claimed five Bf109Es during this day. Bombs dropped on Hatfield damaged three Lysanders belonging to RAF No. 239 Sqdrn. 

During the night London was bombed continuously with smaller raids on South Wales, the Midlands, Liverpool, East Anglia, Montrose, Sunderland and Newcastle. While considerable forces concentrated on London, raiders were much more widely dispersed than for some time past, and large sections of the country were attacked. No less than 80 enemy aircraft were plotted in during the early period, coming from various French districts, the Dutch Coast and Denmark. The raids from Denmark flew to Scotland, four being plotted in the Firth of Forth district and three around Arbroath. From 2100 Hours to 2300 Hours a further 40 raiders were employed, 15 of which operated over South East England and London. The remainder was widely scattered over South Wales and the Bristol Channel areas, the Midlands and Lancashire, East Anglia, Sunderland and Firth of Forth districts.

RAF Station Hendon was bombed at 2120 hours, and No 24 Squadron Hangar received a direct hit, and some ammunition exploded. Speke Aerodrome was attacked at 2350 hours, and an Audax aircraft was completely wrecked and a Douglas DF7 was damaged. Some windows in the hangars were broken, but the aerodrome was serviceable. Major damage was done to the LNER line at Mill Hill East, which caused the line to be blocked. Ten HEs and twenty-four IBs fell in the vicinity of Sedgefield Railway Station. One incendiary bomb fell through the roof of a house in a timber yard at the station causing slight damage. The remainder of the IBs fell in open space and caused no damage. Nine of the HEs fell in open fields.

At 19.00 hours a Polish pilot in a British plane R1922 made a forced landing at Old Trimdon having lost his way. He was uninjured and there was no damage to the plane.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 21; RAF, 17. Luftflotte 3 reported that,


> _"...enemy fighter defences showed a tenacity unknown so far."_



*WESTERN FRONT*: Major Gotthard Handrick of JG 26 was made Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 52 in place of Hptm. Wolf-Heinrich von Houwald.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 7, 2010)

*8 October 1940 Tuesday
"Day of the Dingy"
UNITED KINGDOM*: The first combat of the day saw Blenheim IVs of RAF No. 235 Squadron, scrambled from Manston, intercept and shoot down two He59s over the Channel during a patrol mission. Pilot Officer Henri Gonay, a Belgian flying with the unit, was awarded one of the kills.

Throughout the morning many small raids were made over southern England, mainly by Bf109s and small numbers of He111s, which penetrated as far as Biggin Hill, Hornchurch and Kenley areas. Luftwaffe attacks started early with London again being the main target for four jabo attacks which began crossing the coast regularly between 0830 and 1300 hours. At 0833 hours 50+ aircraft crossed the coast near Dungeness and, flying in close formation, attacked London at 0850 hours. They then split into small sections and flew out, being met by a raid of 100+ which reached the South London - Biggin Hill - Kenley area by 0915 hours. One such raid was met with force, at about 1030 hours, by the Spitfire squadrons of Biggin Hill (RAF Nos. 72 and 92 Squadrons) and Hornchurch (RAF Nos. 41 and 222 Squadrons) along with Spitfires of RAF No. 66 Squadron from Gravesend. 

Two attacks were flown at a high altitude and with the RAF unable to intercept, flew unmolested to drop bombs on BBC House, the RAF’s Adastral House, the War Office and Charing Cross Station, along with residential areas in Bermondsey, Lewisham and West Ham. Tower Bridge was attacked at approximately 0900 hours and the hydraulic mains were damaged, and the bridge was out of action.

Just after 1100 hours another small raid of Do17s and Bf109s crossed the Kent coast at Lympne. Spitfires of RAF No. 41 Squadron intercepted the raid over Folkstone as the Do17s turned back to France.

At about 1300 hours, Ju88s and Bf109s made a raid along the Sussex coast at Hastings, Eastbourne and Bexhill. Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Squadron were scrambled from Tangmere to intercept.

RAF West Hampnet was attacked by low flying aircraft which machine-gunned the aerodrome but did not drop any bombs. Ford Aerodrome was attacked with bombs and also machine-gunned. One Boston aircraft of RAF No.23 Squadron was written off. In addition one Blenheim was damaged, and the Aerodrome was rendered unserviceable. Shoreham was attacked by three German aircraft with bombs and machine-gun fire and rendered unserviceable. West Malling was also attacked with 2 HE and hundreds of incendiary bombs. He 111s of II./KG 55 conducted a raid on the Thorney Island airfield, Sussex and lost two bombers, one from ground fire and another on returning to Villacoublay airbase.

Sadly on this day Sergeant Josef Frantisek, flying a Hurricane I (R4175) of RAF No. 303 (Polish) Squadron, crashed and was killed whilst on a lone patrol over Surrey. One day after his 27th birthday, Frantisek touched down too fast and crashed at the end of the airfield in Cuddington Way at Ewell. The Czech pilot had successfully shot down 17 Luftwaffe aircraft during September and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Medal for his bravery. He remained Fighter Commands highest scoring pilot during the Battle of Britain. It has been said that Frantisek had absolutely no concept of discipline or teamwork. He would fly in formation with the squadron until the enemy was sighted, then would go his own way. His exasperated British Squadron Leader finally decided enough was enough; for all his results, such behaviour couldn't be tolerated. He offered to arrange for Frantisek to transfer to a Czech squadron, but Frantisek preferred to stay and fight alongside his Polish friends. He was too good to be grounded, and all pilots were valuable, so a compromise was made. Frantisek was replaced in the Squadron formation, but allotted a "spare" aircraft so he could fly as a "guest" of the Squadron as and when - and how - he saw fit. Thus freed to fight his own private war, he would still accompany the squadron on intercepts sometimes, but at other times he would take off after them to fly a lone patrol over Kent, in the area through which he knew the German aircraft being intercepted would fly on their way back to base.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 7, 2010)

_( 8 October 1940 continued.....)_

As small reconnaissance and bombing raids continued during the afternoon in the southeast and along the coastline to Dorset, a raid by a Ju88 on the Merseyside area was intercepted by the Hurricanes of RAF No 312 (Czech) Squadron, scrambled from Speke, at about 1630 hours. Junkers Ju88 WkN. 4068 coded M7+DK, of KG 2/806 took of from its base at Caen-Carpignet in France to bomb the Rootes aircraft factory at Speke and photograph the results. The aircraft was loaded with four 250 kg bombs. The route that was taken took them from Caen to Southampton to Droitwich to Ellesmere Port and finally to Speke arriving in the target area around 16:00 hours. One member of the crew was a "Bildberichter" (Photographic War Correspondent). Before reaching the objective, whilst flying at 13,000 feet the aircraft was attacked by three Hurricanes of "Yellow" section RAF No 312 (Czech) squadron based at Speke. The starboard engine was hit and damaged and the pilot made a forced landing with the undercarriage retracted at Bromborough Dock at 16:15 hours, with two bombs still in their racks. Sergeant Josef Stehlik in L1807 got in the first burst and P/O Alois Vasatko in L1926 continued firing from below and above in quarter tactics. Meanwhile F/L Denys Gillam in P2575 kept up stern attacks and soon the Ju88 was seen to be gliding downwards with both of its engines on fire, landing in a field on the opposite side of the Mersey. This was 312 (Czech) Squadron's first combat since formation on 29/8/1940. The aircraft was removed by the RAF within a few days and it was announced on the 9th October 1940 by the Commander of the Merseyside Garrison that the aircraft was to be put on public view in connection with "War weapons Week" in Liverpool the following week. In the meantime the JU88 was moved to the Oval Recreation Ground were it was placed on display to the public. More than £70 was collected for the Mayor of Bebington’s “Spitfire Fund”. On the 18th October 1940 the Ju88 was paraded through the streets of Liverpool in procession with University students, the aircraft was later displayed at St George's Plateau alongside a Messerschmitt Bf 109. The Ju88 was later taken to RAF Sealand and disposed of.

During the night bombing raids continued on London with further raids made on Portsmouth, Southampton, Liverpool, the Midlands and East Anglia. Mines were dropped off the Northeast coast, the Humber and Thames Estuary. The raids were continuous and a number of fires were started, the worst of which were at Bermondsey and the LEP premises at Chiswick. At 21.40 hours a High Explosive Bomb fell near the RAF Experimental Station at Cresswell near Newbiggin in Northumberland, blocking a road and causing one slight military casualty. Two HEs fell in a potato field east of the Water Works at Cleadon Hill and another a little further east in a stubble field. Three fires occurred at Trafford Park, the most serious being at the Rubber Regenerating Works, but this was soon under control. An HE bomb exploded on the private railway line of the Royal Ordnance Factory at Euston. Some buildings were damaged and the rail track also suffered, but there was no interference with production. 

Two convoys were reconnoitred in the Thames Estuary at about 1640 hours and one off Dover at 0650 hours. The latter was fired at from Cap Gris Nez between 0800 and 0900 hours and there was also considerable air activity in the Straits at this time.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 14; RAF, 4.

During this period of the battle, Luftwaffe fighter pilots were issued with a new type of dingy. The previous type, a two-man dingy, was found to be too bulky and altogether unsatisfactory, particularily for use in the already small cockpit of the Bf 109. The new dingy was more compact and was worn on the pilot's back over the inflatable life jacket. On 8 October Lt. Heinz Escherhaus of 1./JG 77, took off in his "Yellow 10" on a freie Jagd patrol and was flying at 25,000 feet when he was suddenly attacked in the rear by his own rubber dingy. Contrary to instructions, Lt. Escherhaus' batman had connected the gas flask to the dingy and it had accidently inflated. The pilot was pushed forward onto the control column and, in an effort to get things right within the rapidly diminishing confines of his cockpit, he lost control and went into a very steep spiral dive. Now, owing to his uncomfortable position, Escherhaus was unable to alter the propellor setting and the aircraft over-revved. The boost blow-out valve went off and then, when the pilot was eventually able to regain control, he found that the engine would not respond to the throttle. Finally on pulling out, the engine stalled and he had to make a forced landing, coming down at Eastry in Kent. RAF intelligence was greatly amused by Lt. Escherhaus' aerial combat with his dingy and his misfortune was recorded in three seperate interrogation reports.

At the height of the Battle of Britain, 24 Indian pilots were sent to the UK to under go conversion training and participate in Ops. Even though they could take part only after the Battle of Britain, many of them distinguished themselves flying operations with the various commands. The 24 Officers arrived by ship in England on 8th October 1940. On arrival, they were given a welcome message addressed individually to them by the Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair. The 24 were initially sent for basic flying training and later on to SFTS followed by OTUs. They subsequently spread out among the Squadrons in Fighter, Coastal and bomber Command. Eight of them were killed in training and operations.

RAF No. 71 (Eagle) Squadron was declared operational and assigned the squadron code XR. The RAF picked an Englishman, W. M. Churchill, to be Squadron Leader.

The Air Ministry soon approved formation of another Polish Air Force unit: RAF No. 309 (Polish) Squadron. Its organization started on 8 October 1940 at RAF Renfrew near Glasgow. The command of the squadron was given to S/Ldr Pistl, an experienced officer, who was advised by W/Cdr Mason. The squadron received used Westland Lysanders Mk III, a two-seater designed specifically for army cooperation and tactical reconnaissance. The aircraft was armed with four machine guns and light bomb racks.

Wing Commander John Harvey Hutchinson died when his Miles Magister, Serial P6347, hit the cable of a tethered barrage balloon at Langley, near Slough. He was buried at Pembrey.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Oct 7, 2010)

WOW, that is a cool pic!


----------



## Airframes (Oct 9, 2010)

Nice stuff again Chris, and interesting about Meyer's Bf109 being recovered in 1974. Didn't know about this (I don't think so, anyway). Any idea where it is now?


----------



## Njaco (Oct 10, 2010)

*9 October 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: 11 Group Airfields in the south-east formed today's main targets along with the usual attacks on London by fighter-bombers. Poor weather prevented any major air operations from being conducted until late morning. During the morning reconnaissance raids were made by single Ju88s, one of which was intercepted and shot down by Hurricanes of RAF No. 1 Sqn, scrambled from Wittering, over the Wash just before 1130 hours. A bomb fell on St. Paul's Cathedral in the early morning, exploding inside the roof and severely damaging the High Altar. At 1010 hours bombs fell near Vickers Armstrong Works at Weybridge, but only one house was slightly damaged.

From 1100 hours raids of 20 to 30 aircraft crossed the Kent coast at high altitude and reached southern areas of London. These raids were made throughout the day by bomb carrying Bf109s and proved difficult to intercept by fighter Command. Spitfires of RAF No. 92 Sqn had been scrambled from Biggin Hill to patrol at high altitudes in order to meet such raids and succeeded at about 1230 hours when they engaged Bf109s of JG 51 over Kent. Sgt E.T.G.Frith from RAF No. 92 Sqn was badly burned when he baled out of his Spitfire I (X4597) following combat with Bf 109s near Ashford, Kent at 1250 hours. He died from his injuries on the 17 October 1940. The East Ham Memorial Hospital was hit, involving some casualties, and some damage was done to communications and dock-side property.

At 1133 hours 30+ aircraft came in at Rye and flew to Gravesend, Hornchurch and Canewdon, and left by the Thames Estuary. At the same time, a raid of 12+ entering at Folkestone passed over Maidstone and went South. Two other raids, one of 12+ and one of 20+ flew inland from Lympne and another raid of 12+ passed over Dungeness on a North Easterly course to Dover. A raid of 30+ enemy aircraft entered the country at Eastbourne and turned south at Cranbrook. Maidstone was attacked by fighter-bombers with 87 buildings being damaged, and using cloud cover a single raider managed to damage English Electric's Stafford factory. Only slight damage was done, and there were twenty minor casualties.

During early afternoon, at about 1300 hours, Hurricanes of RAF No. 601 Sqn, scrambled from Exeter, intercepted a small raid of He111s near Dartmouth and successfully claimed two of the raiders before they could reach a convoy off Lands End.

At 1430 hours a larger raid of over 160 to 180 aircraft crossed the Channel in two waves of high flying Bf 109s and low level Ju 88s and succeeded in bombing targets in east London. No 11 Group despatched 9 Squadrons and No 12 Group 3 Squadrons to meet this attack. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 73, 249, 253, 303 (Polish) and 605 Squadrons along with the Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66, 72, 74, 92, 222 and 602 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept. Over the following hour fierce dogfights ensued over Kent, the Thames Estuary and Channel areas. Most of the German formations became scattered and as such, were not able to attack in a concentrated pattern, causing little damage. Hastings was attacked again after being attacked at 1045 hours and 1205 hours. In the second attack five houses were wrecked and many damaged. Oblt. Hans-Ekkehard Bob from 7./JG 54 claimed a Spitfire and then two hours later claimed another Spitfire near Chatham.

At 1853 hours a low-level bombing and machine-gunning attack was made at Lee on Solent Naval Air Station, six bombs being dropped. No damage to buildings or casualties were caused. At 1930 hours about 12 bombs were dropped on Yeovilton Naval Air Station, including two on the main runway. None of these exploded when dropped. About 20 bombs were dropped around the Penrhos Station at 1810 hours, but only very slight damage was done to the roofs of buildings. Two low level attacks at 1900 hours and 2015 hours were made on St Merryn Naval Air Station with HE and incendiary bombs. One hangar and the Sick Bay were damaged, and one Proctor aircraft destroyed. One Swordfish was also damaged, and the aerodrome was unserviceable owing to unexploded bombs.

The Luftflotten were ordered it increase the night bombing effort on England and the Kampfgeschwaders responded this night with another mission to London. Night activity commenced at about 1850 hours, raids crossing the coast towards two main objectives. The first was the Liverpool/Manchester area, the enemy crossing near Swanage from the Cherbourg area. About 6 aircraft were involved in this attack and they returned on reciprocal tracks. About 90 aircraft crossed the coast from Baie De La Seine, Dieppe and Holland, between Selsey and Cromer toward the main objective of London. London was heavily bombed along with Manchester, Liverpool and Derby. Some 386 tons of High Explosive and 70,000 one kg bombs were dropped on London during the course of 487 bomber sorties. Mines were dropped off the coast from the Thames Estuary up to Scotland.

A RAF No.235 Sqn Blenheim IVf 'N3530' with J.C.Kirkpatrick, R.C.Thomas and G.E.Keel was shot down over the Channel and killed at 1730 hours. They were flying aerodrome protection duty South of Thorney Island. Hptm. Otto Bertram from Stab III./JG 2 claimed two Blenheims about the same time.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 9; RAF, 3.

RAF No 145 Squadron (Hurricanes) moved to RAF Tangmere and No 1 Squadron moved to RAF Dyce.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Hptm. Heinz Bretnutz was made Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 53 in place of Major Freiherr von Maltzahn. Oblt. Gordon Gollob was appointed Staffelkapitän of 4./JG 3.

At the Beaumont-le-Roger airfield of I./JG 2, a Bf 109E ran out of fuel and crash landed at the airfield, seriously damaging the airplane.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 10, 2010)

*10 October 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Heavy rains prevent the Luftwaffe from mounting a massive raid and instead sent frequent flights of high-flying Bf 109s to attack targets in England throughout the day. Reconnaissance raids were being plotted as early as 0600 hours and by 0700 hours a small group of He111s attacked and bombed Dover before returning to France without being intercepted. Within the hour a larger raid of 20+ Do17s and Bf109s were approaching the Sussex coastline and were met by the Spitfires of RAF No. 92 Squadron, scrambled from Biggin Hill to patrol the area, near Brighton. Three Spitfires were lost during the engagement.

At 1000 hours two raids of about 30 Bf109s crossed over Kent, of which one was intercepted by Spitfires of RAF No. 603 Squadron scrambled from Hornchurch. Maj. Adolf Galland of Stab/JG 26 claimed a Spitfire near Eastchurch for his 42nd victory. Hastings was attacked twice, at 0644 hours when 14 HE bombs fell in the residential area demolishing four houses, and at 1215 hours when further civil damage was done. Brighton, Eastbourne and Bexhill were also attacked, but only superficial damage resulted.

Just after 1200 hours a raid was plotted approaching the Dorset coast. 100+ German aircraft including Bf 109s from JG 53 penetrated slightly inland at Lulworth. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 52, 56, 145, 213, 238 and 607 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF No. 152 and 609 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept. During the battles Hurricanes of RAF No. 56 and 238 Squadrons suffered losses to the Bf109s over Wareham and Corfe areas. Spitfires were claimed by Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke of Stab III./JG 53, Lt. Erich Schmidt of 9./JG 53 and Oblt. Gerhard Michalski of Stab II./JG 53.

The last main attack of the day consisting of 65+ aircraft, crossed the Kent coast just after 1500 hours and headed for London. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 73, 229, 249, 253, 257, 303 and 615 Squadrons along with Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66, 72, 92 and 602 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept the raid. Although both Hurricanes and Spitfires were dispatched, only the Spitfires were able to reach the altitude of the Messerschmitts and even then were are at a disadvantage with the German fighters still above them. One formation of German bombers split into two sections with one heading to London and the other to the South-west. The second wave of over 80 came inland over Deal and Dover at 1525 hours. Few contacts were made, targets were not found and slight damage was reported. No 12 Group despatched three Squadrons to assist in meeting this attack.

Sgt. Otto Hanzlicek, of RAF No 312 (Czech) Sqdrn, took off from the RAF station at Speke airport, Liverpool in Hurricane I 'L1547' along with P/O Dvorak on practice against enemy aircraft attacks in the Liverpool area. At 1415 hours the engine of his aircraft caught fire and he was forced to abandon his aircraft near Oglett. Unfortunately the wind blew him out over the River Mersey, and he bailed out too low and he fell down into the River Mersey, some 300 - 400 yards from the edge of the river and drowned. He was seen to fall into the water on the North side of the river by a farmer near Oglett, but when the farmer arrived at the river bank 10 minutes later there was nothing to be seen. Sgt. Hanzlicek's aircraft came down into the River off the end of runway 08 and had been seen to be emitting smoke over the river just opposite to the airfield by personnel at the station. 

During the night the bombing continued on London with further raids on Liverpool, South Wales, the Midlands, East Anglia, Gloucester area and to the airfields of Debden and Duxford. At 0345 hours a single He 111 of III./KG 55 took off from Villacoublay airfield to attack the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton but soon aborted the mission and returned to base. Four people were killed in a bombing incident centred around the Potter Lane area, Yorkshire. Four HEs fell in the market garden, Preston Road, two HEs landed in the river area near the harbour entrance and four delayed HE were dropped at High Flatworth Farm. Apart from slight activity in Northern England, raids had practically ceased by 0400 hours. London and its approaches were clear by 0452 hours and at 0530 hours, apart from an isolated raid over Bristol, there were no enemy aircraft over the country. Few districts in Greater London escaped bombing, but the reports indicated that little real damage was done, beyond some further dislocation of railway communications and utility services. Mullards Radio Valve Co Suffered damage to the machine shop at Mitcham Works. At Wembley a large trunk water main was damaged near the GEC factory. HE bombs were dropped on the GWR Line - Greenford Loop, and both lines were reported destroyed.

Carew Cheriton was attacked at 1958 hours by a low-flying enemy aircraft, which dropped 6 HE bombs. A petrol pump was set on fire, but this was quickly extinguished, and other damage was negligible. An attack was made on General Aircraft Ltd, Hanworth, at 1940 hours, and the main hangar was set on fire by incendiary bombs. The fire was under control by 2340 hours.

2 HEs fell and exploded in the river 50' astern of the block-ship 'Melba' lying at the Groyne Quay, South Shields. There were no casualties. Mines were dropped in the Bristol Channel, Thames Estuary, off Harwich and the Northeast coast.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 4; RAF, 4.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 12, 2010)

*11 October 1940 Friday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Many of the raids made on this Friday consisted of bomb carrying Bf109s, which saw the first combat of the day involving Spitfires of RAF No: 72 Squadron, scrambled from Biggin Hill to protect a convoy, at about 0800 hours off Deal. Six bomb carrying Bf 109s crossed the Channel and caused little damage. Fighters and fighter-bombers continued to use stream tactics, generally at 30,000 to 35,000 ft where they were difficult to counter. Hptm. Heinz Bretnütz and Oblt. Gerhard Michalski from Stab II./JG 53 each claimed a Spitfire at 0855 hours.

Over the next few hours many reconnaissance raids were made over southern England until about 1030 hours when four separate waves of Bf109 bombers and fighters crossed the Kent coast for nearly 1 hour and made for targets around Kent and London. Many unsuccessful attempts were made to penetrate to the London areas, but only succeeded in dropping a few bombs on the Southern outskirts of the Capital. Bombs were dropped on Ashford, Canterbury, Maidstone, Folkestone, Whitstable and the Thames Estuary areas. Many Fighter Command squadrons were scrambled to intercept, but only the Spitfires of RAF Nos. 66 and 72 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 73 and 253 Squadrons managed to engage the raiders. P/O J.H.T.Pickering of RAF No. 66 Sqdrn was injured when his Spitfire I (X4052) was shot down by Oberst W. Mölders of JG 51 in a Bf 109 over Canterbury at 1115 hours.

The pattern continued into the afternoon from 1400 hours as waves of Bf109s crossed the coast at Hastings and Dungeness where they split for targets near Portland, London and Hornchurch. Another raid crossed the Essex coast and made for North Weald and then Biggin Hill areas. No 11 Group detailed 13 Squadrons to meet this attack and No 12 Group patrolled from Eastchurch to Canterbury with 3 Squadrons. The dogfights involving Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 73, 249 and 253 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF No. 41 Squadron lasted until nearly 1700 hours. The Spitfires of RAF No. 41 Squadron from Hornchurch and RAF No. 66 Squadron from Gravesend had suffered during the combat with Bf109s, each losing three aircraft. F/O D.H.O'Niell of RAF No 41 Squadron died when his parachute failed to open after bailing out of his Spitfire I (X4052) when he collided with Sgt L.R.Carter in another Spitfire I (X4554) whilst climbing to engage some Bf 109s at 1625 hours. O'Niel's aircraft crashed near West Kingsdown, Kent.

JG 26 provided escort for the jabos throughout the day. Late in the afternoon, Maj. Adolf Galland from Stab/JG 26 claimed a Spitfire and a Hurricane to reach 44 victories while Hptm. Walter Adolph of Stab II./JG 26 brought his score to eleven with a pair of Spitfires. C.A.H.Ayling was KIA while flying with No 421 flight, shot down in his Spitfire Mk II (P7303) at 1600 hours over Newchurch, Kent.

As the evening arrived a raid by Do17s was made on targets in the Midlands and Merseyside between 1800 hours and 1930 hours. The Hurricanes of RAF No. 312 (Czech) Squadron were scrambled from Speke to intercept, as did the Spitfires of RAF No. 611 Squadron, from Ternhill. Three of the Do17s were successfully shot down with the loss of one aircraft to each squadron. Little or slight damage was caused by the raiders but one Dornier Do17Z-3 from 2./Kflgp 606 was shot down by the RAF off the Irish coast at Meath. Only two bodies were recovered and buried in Glencree.

Night raids commenced at 1835 hours, and between that time and 2100 hours approximately 55 raids from Cherbourg, Le Havre, Dieppe and Belgian and Dutch Coasts crossed the Coast towards London, which was again the main objective. Wimbledon was bombed when a ‘stick’ of five 500-pound bombs straddled the club grounds. The first bomb demolished the club tool house. The second bomb of the ‘stick’ fell on the roof of Centre Court. The third bomb fell in Church Road at the club N.E. entrance and the last two produced two bunkers in the Wimbledon Park Golf Club. The damage to the Centre Court meant a loss of 1,200 seats. The Lever factory at Port Sunlight was also hit. HE bombs fell at the City of London Electric Light Co, Bankside Power Station, causing some damage to feeders. The SR service at Heston was interrupted owing to an unexploded bomb on the line between Syon Lane and Isleworth Station.

Other raids appeared over Liverpool during the period and attacks on this area were maintained. Enemy aircraft were also plotted over Aberdeen and the Firth of Forth. There was continued operation towards Liverpool up to 2330 hours, after which time the Country was clear except in the London area and its approaches from the South-west. Other districts visited during the night included Southampton, Portsmouth, towns in Dorset, Berkshire, Surrey, Kent and Norfolk, and parts of Scotland, but damage was all of a minor category. Mines were dropped off the east coast of Scotland and the Thames Estuary.

Losses: Luftwaffe 7: Fighter Command 8

The first Beaufighter night fighter Squadrons became operational. 

The first production Handley Page Halifax I (L 9485) makes its maiden flight.

*GERMANY*: Daily Keynote from the Reich Press Chief:


> "_The Minister has once again specified the wishes of the Luftwaffe staff leaders that we issue formal denials in all cases where the English claim to have hit military targets, unless the English have hit the corresponding mock installations. ... the Luftwaffe has repeatedly raised objections to the use of expressions like "air pirates" or "night pirates," but on the other hand the Reich Chancellery desires that these expressions be used: Therefore the Wehrmacht High Command [the OKW] should take up the matter with the Fuhrer."_


*WESTERN FRONT*: A force consisting of H.M.S. Revenge, cruisers, destroyers and motor torpedo boats, working in conjunction with heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force, bombarded the port of Cherbourg on the night of the l0th-llth October. The co-ordination of the attack was excellent, the lighting of fires in the target area and the illumination of Cape de la Hague by flares for fixing purposes occurring at exactly the right moment. One hundred and twenty rounds of 15 inch and 800 rounds of 4.7 inch shell were fired and very heavy fires were started. It would appear that the shore defences at first mistook the bombardment for part of the air attack as the only response to shells falling was a marked intensification of anti-aircraft fire, including flaming onions and multi-coloured tracers of all descriptions. After the bombardment had ceased a battery of heavy guns (estimated up to 13-15inch) to the east of the town opened fire. Salvoes fell close to the ships for a period of 30 minutes and up to a range of about 36,000 yards. The fire was so accurate that it was thought that some form of R.D.F. was used for ranging. No casualties or damage were sustained by H.M. Ships.

Overnight, in the English Channel off the Isle of Wight, German torpedo boats Falke, Greif, Kondor, Seeadler Wolf sink British anti-submarine trawler HMT Warwick Deeping (no lives lost), French submarine chasers CH.6 (9 killed, 12 taken prisoner) and CH.7 (12 killed, 8 taken prisoner) and French armed trawler Listrac (12 killed, 25 wounded).


----------



## Njaco (Oct 12, 2010)

*12 October 1940 Saturday
"The Best Laid Schemes...."
UNITED KINGDOM*: As with previous days the majority of the raids were carried out by high altitude, bomb carrying, Bf109s and waves of these started crossing the coast from 0900 hours. One of these raids managed to reach and bomb London during the morning while others reached the areas of Biggin Hill and Hornchurch. Much easier to intercept than large, ungainly bomber formations, this caused an increase in losses for the Jagdgeschwaders from RAF fighters.

At about 1000 hours a large raid was intercepted over north Kent by Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 249 and 257 Squadrons, both scrambled from North Weald. The Biggin Hill Spitfires of RAF Nos. 72 and 92 Squadrons were also in action over Kent with the Bf109s of LG 2, JG 77 and JG 54. F/L Georges Perrin a Free Frenchman of RAF No 249 Sqdrn was wounded when he baled out of his Hurricane I (V7313) near Ewhurst Sussex after combat with a Bf 109 at 0950 hours. JG 54 would lose two Bf 109s including that of Lt. Bernhard Malischewski of Stab II./JG 54 who was shot down and captured.

While aerial battles were being fought over Kent and London, Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Squadron, scrambled from Tangmere, engaged more Bf109s of LG 2 over Hastings and southern areas of Kent and Sussex. At this time Major Werner Mölders, Kommodore of JG 51, destroyed three Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Sqdrn, bringing his score to 45 kills. Squadron Leader Paul Watling Rabone of RAF No. 145 Sqdrn, one of Mölders victims shot down a Bf 109 and was uninjured when he force landed his Hurricane I (V7521) due to battle damage. Hptm. Walter Oesau from Stab III./JG 51 also claimed a Hurrincane to reach 36 victories.

Successive raids continued into the afternoon and reached areas of Hertfordshire, Surrey, Essex, Kent, and Sussex. One raid of Bf109s was met by Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Sqdrn, scrambled from Croydon, at about 1300 hours over Maidstone. Sgt. P.R.C.McIntosh was on patrol with RAF No 605 Sqdrn in the Romney Marsh area when they engaged a large number of Bf 109s at 1230 hours. He was shot down and killed, aged 20. His Hurricane I (P3022) was found near Littlestone Golf Course. He is buried at St Johns, Shirly, Croydon.

Slightly later at about 1530 hours and for nearly 1 hour raids of Ju88s and Bf109s including fighters from JG 53 and JG 54 approached the Kent and Sussex coastline. Spitfires of RAF No. 602 Sqdrn, from Westhampnett, engaged the bombers off the coast near Beachy Head whilst the Bf109s were intercepted by Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 257 and 615 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41 and 92 Squadrons. Oblt. Roloff von Aspern from 5./JG 54 shot down a Hurricane for his 15th victory and Fw. Wolfgang Patho from 4./JG 53 claimed a Spitfire for his first.

By 1700 hours the raids had subsided and only reconnaissance aircraft were being detected by radar. One such aircraft, an Arado Ar196, was intercepted and shot down over the Channel by Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Sqdrn. The crews of JG 52 lost Oblt. Günther Büsgen of 1./JG 52, when he was shot down over England. With six victories in the war, Büsgens was made a POW.

During the night heavy bombing continued on London and the Midlands with other raids reported over East Anglia and the Northeast. The raids on London were increased with bombers flying over the city all night until the first rays of light of the coming day. A HE bomb fell at 2045 hours near King Charles' Statue and penetrated to the Hall at the bottom of the escalator at Trafalgar Square Station, where it exploded, killing seven people, whilst injuring 30. Three Heinkel bombers of II./KG 55 dropped bombs on Parnall Yate shortly after 2030 hours. A heavy attack on the Coventry area developed between 2037 hours and 2150 hours, and several serious fires were started; many other scattered localities, mostly in Southern England were bombed during the night, but the scale of the attack was light and no material damage was caused in these districts. A Gas Works, the factories of Sterling Metal Co and Cornercroft were hit, and the telephone system was interrupted.

The National Gallery was hit by a bomb, but Myra Hess carried on her Gallery concerts as she had been doing for the past year. Against the bare walls of the central galleries (the pictures were safe in a Welsh slate quarry), lunch-time chamber-music concerts were given to 1,500 people, who paid a shilling a head to hear pianists like Solomon and Denis Mathews as well as Myra Hess's Bach and Beethoven. Much of the music - like the bomb damage was German.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 11; RAF, 10.

12 new Pilots were posted to RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn from No. 307 Sqdrn, with Defiants for conversion and training on Hurricanes.

*GERMANY*: General Keitel, on orders from Hitler, issued a Directive from the OKL;


> “_The Führer has decided that until next spring the preparations for ‘SEELOEWE” are to be continued with the sole intention of maintaining political and military pressure on England . . Should the projected landing be resumed in spring or early summer, orders will be given for new preparations. In the meantime, it is necessary to shape conditions in the military sphere to suit a final invasion_.”


Hitler had postponed Operation 'Sealion' until the spring of 1941. The operation will never receive the go-ahead.

Even though the current operations for the Invasion of England were halted, the aircraft companies of Messerschmitt and Junkers were given a new directive - code named ‘Warschau-Sud’ - to build gliders that could carry assault troops and tanks. Messerschmitt is to build one in steel tube and fabric while Junkers is to build one in wood components. Fourteen days are given to the project and the ambitious requirement was to be able to carry either an 88mm gun and its half-track tractor, or a PzKpfw IV medium tank. After countless months Junkers comes up with the enormous Ju 322 ‘Mammut’. Uncontrollability and frequent crashes, including one when a tank crashes through the floor of the transport, finally dooms the project and in April of 1941 the remaining examples and prototypes are broken up for fuel. The Messerschmitt was originally designated the Me 261w, was then changed to Me 263, and eventually became the Me 321. Although the Me 321 saw considerable service in Russia, it was never used for a British invasion, or for any other such aerial assaults.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Oct 12, 2010)

One thing this chronology has made me appreciate, Njaco, is the rather large role bomb-carrying Me-109's played in the B of B. Until now, I was under the impression that the Fw-190 "tip and run" missions against the south coast that began later were the major source of fighter-bomber missions against the UK. Obviously not the case.

Thanks again for this splendid series 

MM


----------



## Njaco (Oct 12, 2010)

*13 October 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Though the Invasion of England is officially postponed, the Luftwaffe continued with missions in an effort to harass the RAF. With fog covering most of the country and Channel areas throughout the morning air activity was restricted to occasional reconnaissance raids. One developed off the east coast where a convoy was attacked.

As conditions improved by early afternoon, the Luftwaffe launched the now familiar pattern of high altitude raids over Kent and London. The first was plotted after 1300 hours when some 50 to 60 Bf 109s which included the whole of III./JG 3 as escort, flew up the Thames and dropped their loads on Woolwich and the railway at Dalston and Hackney causing destruction. Most of the interceptions were made by Spitfires of RAF Nos. 46, 66 and 92 Squadrons. The German formation was flying at about 27,000 ft when it was attacked by Spitfires from RAF No. 92 Sqdrn. A Bf109E-4 "White 7", flown by Gefr. Hubert Rungen of 7./JG 3 became slightly separated and went to attack two Spitfires. Meanwhile, a third Spitfire climbed from underneath and shot through Rungen's radiator. Chased by this third Spitfire, Rungen made for the coast but made a forced landing at Cukold Coombe near Ashford. Gefr. Rungen was captured.

Just after 1400 hours a large wave of raids, mainly Bf109s with Ju88s, was crossing the Kent coast and heading for London, causing slight damage to the city. This raid split, one part towards Hornchurch and the other via Dartford to Central London. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 73, 229, 249, 253, 257, 303 (Polish), 605 and 615 Squadrons along with Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 46, 66, 72, 92 and 602 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept and tangled with the Bf109s of JG 54 and JG 27. Oblt. Hans Philipp from 4./JG 54 claimed 3 Hurricanes and Ofw. Karl Hier and Gefr. Leo Masterer, also from 4./JG 54, claimed two Hurricanes apiece. Oblt. Hans-Ekkehard Bob of 7./JG 54 commented;


> "_During all of our operations the radio communications traffic of the British fighter pilots were being intercepted. On one occasion an interesting conversation took place between ground control and a British fighter formation when ground control said: 'Attack the German bomber formations!' The English formation leader shouted back: 'There are no bomber formations here!' Ground control: 'But bombs have been dropped!' Formation leader: 'I see only Me 109s but they can't drop bombs!' Word quickly got around, though, that the bombs were being dropped by the Me 109 units with the result that air combat was resumed._"


As the main battles over Kent were dying off, another raid of 25 Bf109s crossed over Dover at about 1530 hours and was met by the Spitfires of RAF No. 66 Squadron, still weary from the last engagements. The Bf 109s got to the center of London in spite of the spirited opposition.

One of the tragedies of aerial warfare was realized, at 1800 hours, by two Blenheim crews of RAF No. 29 Squadron, from Ternhill. At 1735 hours, two Blenheims, L7135 (P/O Humphreys and Sgt Bell) and L6637 (Sgt Stevens, Sgt Sly and AC Jackson) took off to patrol Point of Air. At about 1820 hours, in a position about 10 miles North Weald of Liverpool, Blenheim L7135 was attacked from above by a Hurricane. The pilot at once fired two Very lights and warned Blenheim L6637. L7135, although hit by the Hurricane fire, received no serious damage and the crew escaped uninjured, but L6637 was shot down into the sea. They were mistaken for Luftwaffe bombers by Hurricanes of RAF No. 312 (Czech) Squadron. One of the crews was killed.

Combat report RAF No. 29 Squadron:


> "_At 1950 hours a Blenheim (crew Sgt Roberts and Sgt Mallett) ordered on searchlight co-operation by vectors. Bombs observed in Grantham area. At 2030 hours and enemy aircraft was sighted at 13,000 feet. Pilot followed him down to 3,000 feet and engaged him at about 500 yards range. Blenheim experienced inaccurate return fire. After firing 2.368 rounds, the enemy aircraft's starboard engine appeared to pack up and he disappeared in cloud layer. There was considerable AA activity and searchlight co-operation but it was of no assistance. The weather was extremely good. Unfortunately the enemy aircraft has not been confirmed and must therefore rank as damaged."_


Not to be outdone by No. 312 Squadron, P/O J.K.Ross of RAF No. 17 Squadron was shot down and wounded by British A.A. fire over the Chatham area. He baled out of his stricken Hurricane I (P3536) at 1350 hours.

During the night London was bombed along with Liverpool, the Midlands and East Anglia. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary, the Humber, the Irish Sea, off Harwich and Flamburgh Head. In the evening Stanmore Underground Station is bombed, very close to RAF Fighter Command. 154 people were killed in a shelter in Stoke Newington in a night bombing raid. Wembley Park station was hit by two High Explosive (HE) bombs at 1947 hours, damaging telephone wires and signals. At 2115 hours a bomb from a lone enemy aircraft demolished two houses directly above the east end of the westbound platform tunnel of Bounds Green Piccadilly line station. Approximately 6-to-8 segments of tunnel collapsed on the scores of people on the platform sheltering from the air raid.

There was a considerable amount of air activity over Newcastle and Middlesbrough. A 250kg bomb demolished a communal air raid shelter and a fish-shop. Altogether twenty-one people were killed, and fatalities occurred in Marsh Road (shelter), Argyle Street, Farrer Street (shelter), Hardman Street, Benjamin Street and Hatherley Street (shelter). Four small HEs were dropped in the Stoneferry and Kathleen Roads, Maxwell and Woodhall Street areas. Domestic and industrial buildings were slightly damaged. Two people were killed and eight seriously injured.

Losses: Luftwaffe 4: Fighter Command 3

*WESTERN FRONT*: Bomber pilot Lt. Hajo Herrmann of KG 30 was awarded the Ritterkreuz.

In response to Rumanian President Antonescu plea for help, Hitler orders the Luftwaffe's night intruder forces to move to the Mediterranean.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 17, 2010)

*14 October 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: In comparison to the past week, the scale of raids on this Monday was limited due to poor weather conditions. Although many Fighter Command squadrons were scrambled throughout the day, very few engagements were encountered and accidents or Anti-Aircraft guns caused most of the Luftwaffe casualties. In the early morning, at 0345 hours, a lone Dornier Do 17 from 4(F)./ 14 on a weather reporting mission jettisoned four bombs on the Bristol area.

Major Luftwaffe operations over England didn't commence until 1030 hours when Bf 109s and Bf 110s flew in from the south bombing targets from high altitude, out of the reach of Fighter Command. But the formation was turned away by RAF fighters and poor visibility. Scattered raids were made by He111s and Ju88s on targets in the southeast including the airfield at North Weald. The aerodrome was by now showing the effects of nearly 400 accurately aimed bombs. Hardly a building had escaped so that dispersal and improvisation were necessary to keep the four squadrons going. During one of these raids the He111s found themselves being attacked by patrolling Hurricanes of RAF No 605 Squadron, scrambled from Croydon.

Several raids were made during the afternoon by Do17s and Bf109s on Portsmouth, London and areas of East Anglia. Hurricanes of RAF No. 17 Squadron, scrambled from Debden, intercepted one of the Do17s over Suffolk. RAF Hawkinge and Duxford airfields were hit along with targets in South London. In Middlesex a direct hit on an air raid shelter killed twenty people. F/O Czernin and P/O Pittman from RAF No. 17 Squadron took off from Martlesham at 1440 hours and intercepted a Do17 with British markings on the tail-fin, upper wing surfaces and fuselage. As the aircraft turned away, black crosses were seen on the underside of the wings and F/O Czernin attacked leaving the port engine on fire. The aircraft fired 2 rockets, which were however incorrect colours. Later P/O Pittman attacked, but the Do17 escaped by flying through Harwich balloon barrage. The 2 Hurricanes landed at 1600 hours and claimed a Do17 damaged.

But the serious damage comes at night when the skies are clear and a full moon lights up the English countryside. The scale of bombing was reduced with the main targets being London, Birmingham and Coventry with smaller raids on East Anglia, Liverpool and Preston. 565 people were killed and another 2125 civilians were seriously injured in the attacks. At the historic city of Coventry, intense fires were caused when oil bombs were first dropped followed by high explosive bombs. The wooden structures of the ancient city and the intense fire power turned out to be a lethal combination. A direct hit on the Carlton Club, London, spared the members, none of whom were seriously hurt. ‘_The devil looks after his own’ _was the verdict of a labour MP. Unhappily, there were no less than 500 casualties inflicted that day and night on the civilian population. Worse was to come. Two Dorniers of KGr 606 dropped several bombs on Bristol and the Avonmouth area at 2100 hours.

While the Luftwaffe lost only four aircraft for the day, the RAF fared better, losing a single Hurricane from RAF No. 605 Squadron.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Obstlt. Werner Streib, Gruppenkommandeur of I./NJG 1 scored his tenth night-fighter victory during the evening.

*GERMANY*: Daily Keynote from the Reich Press Chief: "_The British raids on Berlin (or other German territory) should not be presented in such an exaggerated form that the reader is bound to get the impression that half of Berlin has been destroyed. But by the same token, the destruction in London should not be depicted so as to suggest that London has already been razed to the ground: in each case the possibility of intensified attacks must be preserved."_


----------



## Njaco (Oct 17, 2010)

*15 October 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The day opened with new instructions from the AOC of 11 Group. It was in response to the new tactics being employed by the Luftwaffe in which twin-engined bombers had been more or less eliminated from their battle order. They were being replaced by strong forces of Me109s and 110s. Secondly they were flying at much higher altitude than before. Sometimes as high as 30,000 feet. All this meant that German aircraft were arriving over London between 17 and 20 minutes after the radar stations had given the first warning. As they might be flying as high as 30,000 feet, RAF fighters were often unable to intercept, as it took them at least 15 minutes to achieve the requisite altitude. The answer was to have squadrons patrolling at 20,000 feet or thereabouts, enabling them to intercept the enemy. The result was that, throughout October, the number of enemy aircraft shot down by the RAF fell in relation to the losses suffered by Fighter Command. It had become a battle of fighter versus fighter.

The daylight German nuisance raids by bomb-carrying Messerschmitt fighters and single bombers continued. The Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton was targeted by a single He 111 of III./KG 55 at 0610 hours. At 0700 hours twenty Do 17s attacked the city of Birmingham and destroyed the airfield at Ternhill. Several RAF aircraft were destroyed on the ground including two Blenheim bombers.

Jafu 2 maintained pressure on Fighter Command and fighter-bombers from JG 2, JG 3, JG 26, JG 51, JG 52 and JG 54, as well as II(Schlacht)./LG 2 again carried out missions with fighter escort to London. All units flew a total of two missions during the day and made several well-executed attacks on London which resulted in a serious disruption of the capital's rail service.

At 0800 hours, bomb-carrying Bf 109s crossed the Channel in a raid on the south of England. British fighter squadrons from Biggin Hill and Hornchurch were scrambled to intercept them, but not before the damage had been done. Although most of the Messerschmitts were turned away by the RAF, the initial flight of Bf 109s got through to London and about twenty fighter-bombers managed to damage the King George V Dock in West Ham, Waterloo Station and suburbs in South London. More than sixty Bf 109s crossed the Channel at 0945 hours but were turned away by RAF fighters who were able to scramble early and gained the advantage of attacking out of the sun. RAF No. 149 Sqd, who had recently come down from Dyce, got caught up in combat over the Channel and one of their Hurricanes managed to get a Bf 109. But several pilots of JG 51 claimed victories including Maj. Werner Mölders of Stab/JG 51 who reached a score of 47 with a Hurricane downed over London and Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 who also destroyed a Hurricane to reach 37 kills.

About noon, close to sixty Bf 109s - including those of JG 27 - and Bf 110s crossed the coast near Folkestone and headed to London. Six RAF fighter squadrons engaged the Bf 109s and caused them to drop their bombs early in order to take on the British Hurricanes and Spitfires. The Luftwaffe Zerstörers climbed for the clouds and disappeared while a formation of Bf 109s came down on the Spitfires. RAF No. 609 Sqd also made for the safety of cloud cover and a hasty retreat back to Warmwell. Slight damage was caused to the districts of Ashford, Maidstone and Gravesend by the German fighter-bombers. Oblt. Erbo Graf von Kageneck of 9./JG 27 claimed a Spitfire over Maidstone for his 12th victory. 

At about the same time, a flight of fifty bombers were bounced by Spitfires of RAF No. 145 Sqd over the Isle of Wight. For once, RAF fighters bounced the high-flying Bf 109s out of the sun, shooting down 4. As more Spitfires from RAF No. 609 Sqd climbed to join in the battle, they were bounced by more Bf 109s creating two separate dogfights over the island and the Solent. Having a much larger force of fighters engaged than the RAF allowed several Bf 109s to break off and continue to the target at Southampton but they caused little damage. Josef Priller from 6./JG 51 claimed two Hurricanes about this time over Dover. The last daylight raid by the Luftwaffe was conducted at 1550 hours over Ashford and Maidstone.

During the afternoon, I./JG 26 and II./JG 26 encountered a number of Hurricanes east of London and downed four without loss. Maj. Adolf Galland of Stab/JG 26 got a Spitfire near Rochester for his 45th victory while Uffz. Erhardt Scheidt of 1./JG 26 claimed a Spitfire and a Hurricane.

The daytime Pirate attacks also resumed on the 15th, when Oblt. Speck von Sternburg of III./KG 55 made an abortive attempt against Filton, to be followed by three more unsuccessful efforts later in the month by the same crew. The RAF launched 41 fighters but only shot down one Heinkel bomber.

The fighters of JG 2 lost several more pilots and planes including Fw. Horst Hellriegel of I./JG 2, who was listed as Missing in Action when he failed to return from the mission. Gefr. Alois Pollach of II./JG 2 also failed to return from a sortie and he, too, went missing in action. Another Messerschmitt from II./JG 2 crashed at Beaumont-le-Roger when the pilot tried to land his damaged Bf 109 after combat with the British fighters. The pilot was unhurt but the plane was written off as 75 % damaged. But Hptm. Helmut Wick from Stab I./JG 2 downed a Spitfire over Portsmouth to reach 42 victories. Ofw. Siegfried Schnell from 4./JG 2 claimed two Spitfires over Southampton.

By nightfall, yet another raid was made on London. At 2100 hours local, 30 aircraft head for Hornchurch and central London and hit Waterloo Station and block all but 2 of the rail lines. Clear skies and brilliant moonlight allowed the Luftwaffe to return to London in force. Five main railway stations were damaged and the air raid shelter at Balham Underground Station suffered a direct hit, killing over 100 people. The Royal Docks were also hit and numerous wharves along the Thames erupted into flames. Beckton Gasworks, Battersea Power Station and the Handley Page aircraft factory suffered serious damage to their buildings. Several bombers from KG 55 attacked Yeovil and lost one He 111 that crashed near Cherbourg, France on the return flight.

The BBC lost 7 people killed when a bomb hit BBC Broadcasting House during the BBC's 2100 hours local news program whilst Bruce Belfrage read the 9 o’clock news. Despite being covered in plaster and debris, Belfrage continued with his broadcast. In London, train service was stopped at the 5 main stations and traffic for other stations were cut by more than two-thirds. The Underground (subway) was severed at 5 places and roads were blocked throughout the city and a reservoir, 3 gasworks, 2 power stations and 3 important docks were hit. There were 900 fires in London during the night and there were over 1,200 casualties including 400 killed including 64 people sheltering in Balham Underground station. Bombs destroyed the main artery of London's water supply, the 46 million Imperial gallon-a-day (55.2 million U.S. gallons or 209.1 million liters) pipeline at Enfield.

Birmingham and Bristol were attacked, as London suffered its heaviest assault of the war so far: 400 bombers and a continuous raid that lasted six hours. At 2145 hours eight Do 17s of KGr 606 along with a single He 111 of III./KG 55 dropped bombs in the Bristol area. Another 50 aircraft attacked London and at 2320 hours, attacks began in Kent and the Thames Estuary.

Still the RAF had no answer to the night raids of the Luftwaffe. They had a few Blenheims and Beaufighters that were equipped for night duties, but these were only good for attacking an odd recon plane or observation aircraft, they were not strong enough to take on a whole formation of heavy bombers. Losses for the day’s actions included fourteen aircraft lost by the Luftwaffe and fifteen lost by the RAF. Among the Kanalfront Jagdgeschwader's losses for the day was Lt. Ludwig Lenz of I.(J)/LG 2, who failed to return from a sortie in his Bf 109 and was listed as missing in action.

Section Cdr George Walter Inwood (b. 1906), Home Guard, saved two men unconscious from gas in the cellar of a bombed house; he died from gas on a third rescue. (George Cross)

Lieutenant (Acting Captain) Eric Charles Twelves Wilson of the East Surrey Regiment, reported killed and awarded a VC posthumously last Saturday, was alive and a prisoner of war. The War Office informed his parents, the Reverend Cyril and Mrs Wilson of Hunsdon Rectory near Ware, Hertfordshire. Wilson was awarded his VC, the 12th of the war, for outstanding bravery while attached to the Somaliland Camel Corps. Between 11 and 15 August he kept a machine-gun post on Observation Hill in action despite being wounded and suffering from malaria. His mother said tonight that she had never given up hope.

*GERMANY*: A new recruit joined the Luftwaffe Military Training Regiment 10 at Neukuhurn near Koenigsberg in East Prussia. Erich Hartmann, soon to be known as the “Blond Knight of Germany” and “The Black Devil of the South”, will begin his flight training as a fighter pilot.

*WESTERN FRONT*: General Alexander Holle was made Kommodore of KG 26 in place of Generalmajor Robert Fuchs.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 17, 2010)

*16 October 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Heavy fog covering the coastlines prevented many German air operations over England and those that were flown were turned back by RAF fighters. Shortly after 0800 hours the first of two waves of bomb-carrying Bf109s swept across Kent towards the Biggin Hill, Kenley and south London areas. As this raid was turning back the second crossed over the coast at Dungeness and made for east London. Several Fighter Command squadrons were scrambled to intercept with successful engagements involving the Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41 and 92 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 229, 253, 302 (Polish), 501 and 605 Squadrons.

RAF No. 302 (Polish) Squadron had a rough day against the Luftwaffe. Sgt. Wedzik was flying in "Blue" section at 20.000 ft, when he was attacked and shot down in flames by a Bf109. The aircraft crashed near Chatham but Wedzik escaped by parachute. Squadron Leader Satchell returning from enemy action, forced landed in a field in the Slough Building Estate, because of a holed petrol tank and his gauges being shot trough. Satchell was uninjured and his Hurricane (P3812) undamaged and after refuelling, flew back to Northolt. P/O Malinski forced landed in a very rough field with his under- carriage up, after suffering engine failure at 22.000 ft. The pilot was uninjured. Sgt. Kosarz was returning from a patrol when he struck a balloon cable, owing to very bad visibility, cloud and mist. The aircraft started to spin but Kosarz was able to right it and landed perfectly at Heston aerodrome.

At 1130 hours another wave of raids crossed the Kent coast and headed for the areas of Hornchurch, Gravesend and the Thames Estuary. The Bf109s were met by Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 46, 253, 257 and 501 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 66 and 92 Squadrons. RAF Ternhill was bombed, destroying a hangar and damaging others.

Whilst battles raged over Kent, a raid was made by He111s, Bf110s and Bf109s attacked the area of Southampton and the Isle of Wight. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 145 and 213 Squadrons, both scrambled from Tangmere, intercepted the raiders over Christchurch and Swanage areas.

Further down the coast off Falmouth, Spitfires of RAF No. 234 Squadron, scrambled from St. Eval and Hurricanes of RAF No. 601 Squadron from Exeter, intercepted a small raid of Ju88s as they approached.

Just before 1600 hours, two raids of He111s and Bf109s crossed over Kent and made for areas of east London. Bombs were also dropped, by this raid, on the main rail lines in Ashford. Spitfires of RAF Nos. 92 and 222 Squadrons managed to intercept some of the raiders before they turned back for home.

The weather was not that much better during the evening but at least 200 bombers chanced the mist and drizzle to raid the British Isles. The night raids started early, at about 1830 hours, with bombs dropped on London, Birmingham, Stoke-on-Trent, Wolverhampton, Glasgow and Aberdeen. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary, the Bristol Channel and off East Anglia. Only one bomber, a Do 17 of KGr 606, flew a mission over Bristol while the rest of the bomber Gruppe raided Liverpool a few minutes after 2100 hours. 2 German bombers crashed of unknown causes around 1930 hours, 1 near Bishops Stortford and another near Denbigh.

The Luftwaffe lost five aircraft while the RAF have none lost to combat missions throughout the day.

Siegfried Bethke of the Luftwaffe was ruminating in his diary about the general situation. He now realised that destroying the RAF in a few days, as Göring was still claiming, was a fool’s dream. “_The English seems to be putting up with things quite well_,” he jotted then added, “_Important things did not happen_.” Ulrich Steinhilper, on the other hand, was shot down over England at the end of October, by which time he was mentally and physically completely exhausted.“_There is no doubt in my mind_,” he said, “_that the RAF broke the back and the spirit of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain.”_

Sqdn Ldr Townsend accompanied by Fg Off T.J. Molony, motored to Speke to sit on court of enquiry.

Despite official denials, rumours persist that the Germans attempted an invasion in the late summer and perished disastrously. Large numbers of dead Germans are believed to have been washed ashore on the south coast between the Isle of Wight (where the "invasion" was aimed) and Cornwall. One story is that the corpses were charred, because the sea was set on fire. A further theory is that the Germans held an ill-fated rehearsal of the invasion and that the barges were sunk in storms. No-one has seen the bodies, but that is explained by the authorities concealing them. In fact, any bodies washed up are of German airmen shot down.

*GERMANY*: Reichsmarschall Göring promoted Oberst Josef Kammhuber to Generaloberst and nameed him to the new position of General der Nachtjägd. Generaloberst Kammhuber’s headquarters was based in Utrecht, Holland as he began to organize the night-fighter force into mainly two different branches: the defense of the Reich’s territory and the long range night attacks on RAF bases.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 17, 2010)

*17 October 1940 Thursday
"Retirement"
UNITED KINGDOM*: Perhaps for no one did the Battle of Britain have a more unexpected end than for Dowding himself. As the battle continued throughout the rest of September, and the German aircraft ranged farther north over London, instead of concentrating their attacks against No. 11 Group’s airfields south of the capital, Leigh-Mallory’s No. 12 Group was drawn increasingly into the fighting, rather than being used merely when Park called for fighter protection over his Sector airfields. A consequence of this change in the balance of British forces was that Douglas Bader’s “Big Wing” began to play a larger role in the battle, despite Park’s doubts about its wisdom and his preferences for “squadron strength” attacks, which had in any case hitherto been accepted dogma for fighter operations. Bader did not hide his anger at Park’s reluctance to use his big wing as he saw fit, and one of his pilots, who happened to be a member of Parliament, passed this growing dispute about Fighter Command tactics on to the Undersecretary of State for Air and, more disturbingly, to the prime minister. The fat was now in the fire, and with a politician’s natural sense of self-preservation when faced with a sharp difference of opinion between senior officers of any service in wartime, Churchill urged the Chief of the Air Staff to arrange for a meeting of the interested parties and discuss “Major Day Tactics in the Fighter Force.” Since Churchill was more than capable of intervening directly in service matters when he wanted to, he was clearly throwing a hot potato back to the air force. That there was no urgency to the matter in his mind is proved by the fact that it did not take place until October 17, more than a month after the greatest and most successful day of the battle. It may be that Dowding was simply too tired by October 1940 to perceive that he was walking into a trap, or that he put too much reliance on Churchill’s promises of support (though given his long experience with politicians that seems unlikely); or perhaps he had simply had enough of repeatedly being given new dates for his retirement. Certainly, he can have had no illusions about the meeting; nor can Park — it was a grim, hanging jury of his peers that he was facing, barely disguised as an impartial inquiry into the facts. His old rival Newall, the Chief of the Air Staff, was too ill to attend, and this ought to have been a warning, since he was replaced at the meeting by Sholto Douglas, now the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, with whom Dowding had clashed many times before. Douglas was younger than Dowding, sleeker, an altogether jollier and more outgoing personality, at least on the surface, a decorated war hero, happily married, and a good mixer, and he had set his eyes long since on Dowding’s job. The presence of Leigh-Mallory cannot have surprised Dowding—the whole purpose of the meeting was ostensibly to thrash out the differences between Park and Leigh-Mallory—but it must have come as a shock to realize that Leigh-Mallory had brought Bader along to represent the views of the fighter pilots. That Sholto Douglas had allowed Leigh-Mallory to introduce into the meeting a mere squadron leader (the equivalent of a major), however highly decorated and celebrated, to dispute the views of the Air Officer Commanding-in- Chief, Fighter Command, and of Air Vice-Marshal Park, who commanded No. 11 Group, would have been enough to tell Dowding that his neck was on the block. Nothing of this is reflected in the minutes of the meeting — it took place in England, after all. Everybody gave his point of view politely, making full allowance for the other fellow’s point of view. Park conceded that there was something to be said for the big wing, Leigh- Mallory admitted that there were occasions when an attack by one or two squadrons might be called for, and even Bader was restrained in front of his superiors. Sholto Douglas gave an impartial summing up, and Dowding promised to increase cooperation between the two groups, though he did not suggest how he hoped to achieve this. It was all very polite and English, but there is no question that his failure to get his two principal subordinate commanders to cooperate with each other was being criticized, with some reason. The upshot was that Dowding was retired. Park was removed from his post and sent to command a Group in Training Command. The Air Ministry produced a slim pamphlet giving an account of the Battle which failed to mention Dowding or, indeed, Park. Churchill remarked that it was like an account of Trafalgar without any mention of Nelson. Air Vice Marshal Sholto Douglas then took over the command of Fighter Command. Trafford Leigh Mallory took over from Park at 11 Group. Bader was to get further promotion to Wing Commander and took over command of a wing at Tangmere.

On the battle-front bomb-carrying Bf109s made renewed raids on London and targets in the southeast. The first crossed the coast at about 0830 hours and was followed by a larger raid just after 0900 hours, which also included Do17s crossing over East Anglia. 90 Bf 109s and Bf 110s attacked Margate, Broadstairs and Stanmore. Many squadrons were scrambled to intercept these raids but poor visibility made this task difficult. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 46, 242 and 302 (Polish) Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF No. 266 Squadron succeeded in finding and engaging the enemy.

Just after 1300 hours another raid was plotted approaching Gravesend with a second wave of four raids just before 1500 hours. The largest raid of about 80 aircraft was met over East London, Kenley and Biggin Hill by 14 RAF squadrons, which shoot down 4 Bf109s. Over the next two to three hours' dogfights raged high over Kent and southeast England involving Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 46, 229, 242, 249, 253, 302 (Polish), 303 (Polish), 501 and 605 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66, 72, 92, 222 and 603 Squadrons. Bombs were dropped on central London and the airfield at Kenley.

At 1700 hours a raid of Bf109s swept across Kent and Sussex. Interceptions were made by the Tangmere Hurricanes of RAF No. 213 Squadron and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 603 and 609 Squadrons.

During the night raids were made on London, Liverpool, Birmingham, the Midlands and East Anglia. Mines were dropped off the Suffolk coast and the Thames Estuary. German bombing has killed 1,567 people in the week up to today, much of the air raid damage due to new German land mines. In London, a bomb destroyed automatic signalling equipment at Waterloo Station however, people using flags kept the trains rolling.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 15; RAF, 3.

Sub-Lt Jack Maynard Cholmondeley Easton (b. 1906), RNVR, and AB Bennett Southwall (b. 1913), RN, tackled a mine dangling six inches from the floor of a house. It slipped and both men ran for cover, but the huge blast killed AB Southwell and badly injured Sub-Lt Easton. (George Crosses)

2nd Lt Alexander Fraser Campbell (b. 1898 ), 9 Bomb Disposal Coy Royal Engineers, lay alongside a bomb in case it began ticking as it was taken from a factory. He defused it but died the next day along with six men of the Royal Engineers when another bomb exploded while he was trying to defuse it. (George Cross).

*WESTERN FRONT*: 4 German destroyers and 6 torpedo boats left Brest, France, to attack shipping in the Bristol Channel but they were spotted by British reconnaissance aircraft at 0719 hours. British cruisers HMS 'Newcastle' and 'Emerald' and 5 destroyers left Plymouth at 1100 hours and sighted the German ships at 1600 hours. After an exchange of shellfire at a distance of 11 miles lasting until 1800 hours, both sides retired with no damage reported.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Oct 17, 2010)

Wow, the bomb defusers never get the credit they deserved, thanks for posting.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 19, 2010)

*18 October 1940 Friday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The weather and visibility was poor and prevented any large scale Luftwaffe missions during the day and night. Most Luftwaffe flights were reconnaissance and those that did try to conduct raids were turned away by RAF fighters. One successful interception for Fighter Command was by the Hurricanes of RAF No. 229 Squadron, scrambled from Northolt, who intercepted some Ju88s over Kent as they approached London. Between lunch and tea, thirty-five raids were counted flying high over East Anglia. Forty-five RAF fighter patrols were flown. Some intercepted and shot down 4 Luftwaffe machines.

The poor weather conditions created many accidents for both sides as pilots and crews became disorientated in the fog. One tragic incident involved the Polish pilots of RAF No. 302 Squadron. Whilst on patrol they became lost over Surrey and ran out of fuel forcing emergency landings, subsequently losing four Hurricanes and pilots. The most serious of the day’s losses for the Luftwaffe was visited upon JG 2 when two pilots were killed. Fhr. Hans-Eduard Siebold of I./JG 2 was killed when he crash landed his Bf 109E at St. Brieuc. 8./JG 2 lost its Staffelkapitän when Oblt. Walter Palting was killed, crashing his Messerschmitt at Grandcamp for unknown reasons.

During the night raids were made on London, Bristol, Birmingham, Liverpool, Southampton and East Anglia. All 160 bombers participating had returned to their airfields by 0145 hours local. Mine laying was carried out around the Thames Estuary areas. In the early evening a formation of Heinkels of II./KG 27 attacked Birkenhead with one of the bombers raiding Bristol at 2015 hours.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 15; RAF, 4.

Göring praised his fighter pilots for inflicting such terrible losses on Fighter Command, and his bomber pilots for having;


> "_reduced the British plutocracy to fear and terror_."


Sgt Michael Gibson (b. 1906), Royal Engineers, and 2nd Lt Campbell (see yesterday's entry), after a night of very dangerous work, were both killed by a bomb they were trying to defuse. (George Cross).

A second evacuation of the half a million children in the London area is under way. They are leaving at the rate of 2,000 a day in small parties under a "trickle" evacuation scheme. Over 20,000 left in September. A further 89,000 mothers and young children are being assisted to leave this month. When the heavy bombing began on 7 September, thousands of East Enders fled from the devastation. Some 5,000 trekked to Epping Forest and camped there. Others took lorries to the Kent hopfields where they bedded down on straw in the hop-pickers' huts. About 10,000 Londoners and local people are now living in the Chislehurst caves in Kent. They are equipped with electric light and a canteen and sick bay. Families have taken over individual caves and installed bed and furniture. Some 25,000 went to Paddington and took trains to places such as Reading, Basingstoke and Oxford, which alone billeted 15,000 refugees. Most of these "trekkers" have now returned. East Enders clearly hate leaving their familiar neighbourhoods or being placed in West End billets - even when they are bombed out.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Night-fighting Do 17Z-10s of 4./NJG 1 score the Nachtgeschwader’s first kill by shooting a RAF Wellington into the Zuider Zee.

Hptm. Radusch’s place as Gruppenkommandeur of I./NJG 1 was taken by Major Werner Streib.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 19, 2010)

*19 October 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Cloudy weather in the Channel and swirling mists in northern France gave the Germans an easy morning. The morning was relatively quiet with scattered reconnaissance raids being plotted over the Channel and coastal areas. One bomber sent out in the morning was shot down over Kent. Around noon a single bomb was dropped on Coventry, destroying a few houses but not much else. An attack on the Bristol Aeroplane Company in the afternoon by a single He 111 of III./KG 55 was aborted soon after take-off in France. One bomber sent out was brought down over Kent.

Around 1400 hours fourteen Bf109s had assembled over the Pas de Calais for a sweep on England. They steered for London unopposed but dropped no bombs. Only one main raid totalling abut 60 aircraft materialised just after 1500 hours, by Ju88s, Do17s and Bf109s crossing the Kent coast at Dungeness and made for London. Spitfires of RAF Nos. 66, 92 and 222 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 253 and 605 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept. A dog-fight over Beachy Head developed and two British fighters were shot down.

During the night heavy raids were made on London, Liverpool, Manchester, Coventry, Birmingham, Bristol and South Wales. Do 17s of KGr 606 and He 111s of I./KG 27 raided Liverpool shortly after 1930 hours. Bombs fell at Ludworth, Wheatley Hill, Middleton in Teesdale, Tudhoe, Winterton, Satley and Spennymoor all in Co Durham. Thirteen IBs fell in the vicinity of Ludworth and Wheatley Hill. All dropped in open country. A particularly vicious attack was launched against London and surrounding suburbs. Railway communications appeared to be the main objective and considerable damage was done. The Dockyards were attacked but damage was not as great as at first thought, owing to a large number of bombs falling either on empty sheds or on warehouses already destroyed. There were numerous fires But all were brought under control. At 2325hrs, the Gas Works in Eastbourne was attacked; thankfully there were no deaths or casualties, although the gasometer was punctured.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 2; RAF, 5.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Oblt. Josef ‘Pips’ Priller of 6./JG 51 was awarded the Ritterkreuz for achieving twenty victories.

An RAF Wellington was shot down over the Zuider Zee by a Luftwaffe Do 17 Z-10 'Kauz II' intruder, with the Infra-Red system called 'Spanner'.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 19, 2010)

*20 October 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Rain and cloud again restrict missions over England but some flights did occur. In total, raids were made by four waves of about thirty aircraft throughout the day. Only a few medium bomber raids were carried out but most raids consisted of fighter-bombers. During the morning bomb-carrying Bf109s made persistent attacks on targets in the southeast and on London. Bombs were again dropped in the London area but only a few casualties occurred, and property, mostly private, was little damaged. Between 0930 hours and 1130 hours Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 249, 253, 302 (Polish) and 605 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66, 74 and 92 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept these raids. Around 1100 hours, JG 54 engaged the RAF and Hptm. Dietrich Hrabak from Stab II./JG 54 claimed a Hurricane over Ashford. Oblt. Hans Philipp of 4./JG 54 claimed 2 Hurricanes to reach a score of 20 victories.

Just after 1300 hours another raid of about 50 aircraft was plotted over Dover and heading for targets in London, Hornchurch and Thames areas. RAF fighters were scrambled to intercept the raiders with successful engagements made by Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66, 74 and 603 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Squadron. JG 54 was up again along with Bf109s from JG 52 and JG 53. Oblt. Hans-Ekkehard Bob from 7./JG 54 claimed a Spitfire as did Fw. Albert Griener from 5./JG 52. JG 52 lost Fw. Ludwig Bielmaier of 5./JG 52 when he was shot down and captured. P/O B.V.Draper of RAF No 74 Squadron force landed his Spitfire II (P7355) after combat with a Bf 109 at 1300 hours. He escaped injury.

At about 1430 hours Spitfires of RAF No. 74 Squadron, scrambled from Biggin Hill, intercepted another raid of Bf109s over Maidstone. Sgt T.B.Kirk of RAF No 74 Squadron baled out of his Spitfire II (P7370) badly wounded after combat with some Bf 109's over Maidstone, Kent at 1455 hours. Sgt C.G.Hilken of RAF No 74 Squadron was wounded when he baled out of his Spitfire II (P7426) after combat with a Bf 109 over South London at 1500 hours.

The remainder of the afternoon saw small raids being made over Kent without little incident. Hptm. Heinz Bretnütz of II./JG 53 reached 20 kills with a Hurricane claimed at 1625 hours. Dover was again shelled by German heavy artillery in Calais but only 15 out of 50 exploded.

During the night the main raids of nearly 300 bombers were on London and Birmingham with further bombs dropped in the Midlands, East Anglia, Derby and Manchester. Activity was heavy, and steadily maintained until about 0100 hours, when the numbers engaged against London began to diminish rapidly. Birmingham and Coventry were the principle targets of Do 17s of KGr 606. In Coventry the Armstrong-Siddeley and Singer Motor Works were hit. An infants' school containing a Warden's Post was badly damaged and over the whole area casualties were reported as 20 dead, 78 injured with at least 15 trapped. Mines were dropped around much of the southern, eastern and northern coastlines. A raid was plotted over Catterick between 0100 and 0300 hours and minelaying was reported from the Humber to the Tees. Erdington Institution, Birmingham where children evacuated from London were installed, was hit and of the 20 casualties it was reported that no children were injured.

In London The British Museum Newspaper Repository building was destroyed by bombing, along with an estimated 6,000 volumes of English provincial and Irish newspapers, mainly from the late 19th century. Two temporary buildings were erected at the end of the War to provide replacement storage space, and these are still in use today. At 2040 hours there was a heavy explosion at Euston, with water reported to be percolating through to one of the southbound Northern line platforms. A Delayed Action (DA) bomb was reported 30 ft (9 metres) from the King William Street entrance to Bank station at 2117 hours. The station was closed, but exit allowed via Monument station. At 0003 hours, an HE bomb fell in Spur Road, Waterloo, and penetrated to the Waterloo City line depot.

Eleven RAF night-fighter sorties were flown but they were not successful. Dowding reported that the Beaufighter squadrons were having trouble with their airbourne interception radar equipment and aircraft. On 19 October Dowding had reported that RAF No. 219 Sqdrn had 4 Beaufighters ready for operations but by dusk all 4 were unserviceable.

Losses: Luftwaffe 14: Fighter Command 5.

_For a small understanding of how the British people faced the war during the battle, please see this link: _
BBC - WW2 People's War - That Fatefull Day 20th October 1940

Churchill stated the British were stronger in their will to resist due to the bombings.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Oblt. Helmut Wick of I./JG 2 was promoted to Major and appointed Geschwaderkommodore of the “Richthofen” Geschwader replacing Major Wolfgang Schellmann. Wick commented, “_As long as I can shoot down the enemy, adding to the honor of the ‘Richthofen’ Geschwader and the success of the Fatherland, I will be a happy man. I want to fight and die fighting, taking with me as many of the enemy as possible.”_

P/O G.H.Baird was with RAF No 248 Squadron during the Battle of Britain and was on a recce sortie off the Norwegian coast flying in Blenheim IVf (P6952) when he was shot down and made a POW. Also in the crew were D.L.Burton, R.Copcutt and S.V.Wood. P/O S.R.Gane of RAF No 248 Squadron during the Battle of Britain flying in Blenheims and was on a recce sortie off the Norwegian coast flying in Blenheim IVf (L9453) when he was shot down and killed. The other members of the crew were M.D.Green N.J.Stocks. Although these were the only losses by RAF No 248 Squadron, five pilots from II./JG 77 were credited with Blenheim victories.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 24, 2010)

*21 October 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Due to poor weather this Monday was quiet of combat apart from a few interceptions of reconnaissance and small bombing raids. Taking advantage of the overcast, single aircraft and small formations of bombers dispatched by Luftflotte 2 and 3 reached widely separated targets in England.

At 0615hrs, an Armstrong Whitworth Whitley of 58 Sqn (GE-O) which had taken off at 1900hrs the previous night, crashed into a steep hillside on return from a bombing mission on the Skoda Works, Pilsen after being shot by Hptmn Karl Hülshoff of 1./NJG2. The aircraft crashed into a hillside at Botton Head on Ingleby Greenhow Moor, North Yorkshire.

A small raid made it to Liverpool during the morning along with several on London, Northampton, Cambridge and Duxford areas. Just after 1300 hours Hurricanes of RAF No. 253 Squadron, scrambled from Kenley, met a raid of Ju88s and Do17s over Kent.

W.S. Williams of RAF No. 266 Sqn in Spitfire X4265 was killed when he took part in an interception and after the action landed at Stradishall to refuel. As he took off at 1250 hrs he flew low across the airfield and then seemed to stall. His engine cut and unable to pull out, he crashed and was killed.

Later in the afternoon, Spitfires of RAF No. 609 Squadron, scrambled from Warmwell, intercepted and shot down a Ju88 over Dorset. The Ju 88 was posing as a Blenheim and machine gunning the airfield at Old Sarum, Hampshire from a height of about 50 feet. From the RAF No. 609 Sqdrn record book:


> "_F/L F.J. Howell dived to decide what it was and even after making sure that it was a Ju 88 with a big cross, was surprised to see the rear gunner signaling with smoke cartridges. Both pilots (F/L Howell and P/O S.J. Hill) attacked in turn and after an unusual chase above and below the tree-tops the enemy aircraft hit the ground and blew up near Lymington_."


During the night large raids appeared over London, Liverpool and the Midlands with further raids on Sheffield, South Wales and Lancashire. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary and off Swansea. PMs were dropped in the Sutton and Silverdale Roads, Maybury Road, Bellfield Avenue areas. One of the mines fell at the end of Strathmore Avenue, Beverley High Road, near the River Hull, bringing extensive damage to hundreds of houses and many casualties, two of which proved fatal. The effects of blast can be strange - a man who was getting dressed in his upstairs bedroom, found himself being lifted up to the ceiling and then thrown on to the bed which was by now in the front room downstairs. The blast had stripped him of his garments.

Liverpool suffers its 200th air raid and again saw the Dorniers of KGr 606 along with the Heinkels of III./KG 27 raid the city at 2245 hours.

In Coventry the attack commenced at 1945 hrs. Dicken Leather Works, GEC Stores, Morris Bodies, and Cheylesmore Schools were all gutted. There were other fires at Courtaulds, Riley's and shops in the centre of the town. The Staff Canteen at Alfred Herberts was completely wrecked, and hits were registered on the Gaumont Cinema, King's Head Hotel, and the London Road institution, causing 41 casualties with 23 trapped. The BTH Company wias completely out of action for three days, owing to unexploded bomb and failure of gas and electric supply. Damage to Armstrong Siddeley was extensive and production delayed considerably. The Aero Finished Stores, tool stores, office and canteen were gutted; the water tower was down and the main fractured. There were 22 minor roads blocked in the district and many houses were demolished, rendering up to 500 people homeless.At Weymouth bombs were dropped near the railway station at 1215 hours on the 21st. South National Bus Depot was partially demolished and a number of buses damaged. Four HE were also dropped in Portland Harbour. In Southwark a bomb hit the edge of an underground shelter in the New Kent Road, where 26 people were sheltering, 3 were killed. At St Pancras, a heavy HE made a crater 40 feet in diameter, it fell at the junction of Eversholt Street and Phoenix Road. A large water main was fractured allowing the water to enter the Northern Line railway tube 50 feet below.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 6; RAF, 0.

The first high-altitude flight by the Vickers Wellington V reaches 20,000 feet.

*WESTERN FRONT*: Generalmajor Johannes Fink gave up his duties as Kommodore of KG 2 to become Inspector of Bomber and Ground Attack Flyers and General Of Bomber-Flyers with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. Oberst Herbert Rieckhoff from KG 30 was appointed Kommodore of KG 2 in place of Generalmajor Fink. Oblt. Erich Blödorn was made Kommodore of KG 30 in Oberst Rieckhoff’s place.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 24, 2010)

*22 October 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Throughout the morning very little air activity was reported due to poor weather conditions. Two convoys off Dover and one in Thames Estuary were unsuccessfully attacked. Between 0750 and 0904 hours Dover was again shelled. Two shells fell on the land and one in the sea. Thirty houses were slightly damaged and four persons slightly injured. Road A259 to Folkestone was partially blocked but was available for single line traffic. Up to 1230 hours some 30 tracks were plotted round North Foreland to Beachy Head. In one case a Dornier flew low inland and over Manston. Interceptions were much hampered owing to fog and low cloud. One HE and 10 anti-personnel bombs were dropped on Eastbourne at 1025 hours, causing 18 casualties of which 2 were fatal. Five houses were demolished and other extensive damage to property was caused.

In the foggy weather, five German crashes led to the loss of several senior officers. As the fog cleared during the early part of the afternoon a raid of about 30 Bf109s crossed the Kent coast at 1400 hours and was intercepted by Spitfires of RAF No. 74 Squadron, scrambled from Biggin Hill and Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Squadron, scrambled from Croydon. P/O J.A.Milne a Canadian of RAF No 605 Squadron was wounded after combat with some Bf 109s. He crash landed his Hurricane I (V6783) near Dorking at 1430 hours. He had a broken hip. Bombs were dropped at RAF Brockworth. One oil bomb fell on the roof of a tool shed and 3 HE fell on the airfield doing no damage. Casualties reported were 2 killed and 32 injured.

Shortly after this raid three smaller raids approached North Foreland and Hornchurch areas at about 1530 hours, one of which was met by Hurricanes of RAF No. 249 Squadron, scrambled from North Weald. The convoy "Fruit" off Dover called for help and Uxbridge diverted two squadrons to cover it.

At 1600 hours reports were received of several raids of Ju88s and Bf109s approaching different areas of the Kent coast. One raid of 18 aircraft again made landfall at Dungeness while 4 other raids amounting to 60+ aircraft remained in mid-Channel. Those crossing the coast pursued a course for Hornchurch finally turning South to Biggin Hill. JG 51 led by Major Werner Mölders were up as was JG 26 led by Major Adolf Galland. Hurricanes of RAF Nos, 46, 257, 501 and 605 Squadrons along with Spitfires of RAF Nos, 66, 74, 92 and 222 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept. F/O Peter Cape Beauchamp St John of No 74 Squadron was killed when his Spitfire II (P7431) was shot down by a Bf 109 over South Nuttfield, Surrey at 1530 hours. The Geschwaderkommodore of JG 51, Major Mölders, destroyed three Hurricanes from RAF Nos. 46 and 257 Squadrons off the English coast during the dogfights. P/O N.B.Heywood of RAF No 257 Sqdrn was killed as his Hurricane I (R4195) was hit by A.A. fire during a combat with Bf 109s over Folkestone at 1645 hours. The aircraft crashed South of Lidd in Kent. Sgt R.H.B.Fraser of RAF No 257 Sqdrn was shot down by a Bf 109 and killed in his Hurricane I (V6851) over Folkstone at 1650 hours. Sgt J.P.Morrison from RAF No 46 Sqdrn was killed when he was shot down in his Hurricane I (R4074) over Dungeness at 1650 hours. Major Mölders was credited with the victories and his score now stood at 50. But it wasn't all Hurricanes that went down. RAF No. 257 Sqdrn picked off Fw. Heinrich Arp from 2./JG 26. Arp's aircraft broke up in the air and scattered pieces along the coast southwest of Dungeness.

During the night the bombing raids were reduced in scale on London, Liverpool, the Midlands, Bristol and South Wales. The first aircraft crossed the coast at 1830 hours, and 40 raiders were tracked in up to 1900 hours, coming from France and Holland; thereafter activity slackened. The majority concentrated on London, and the Birmingham-Coventry area; a few raids penetrated to the Liverpool, Bristol and South Wales areas. One attacked a convoy in the Thames Estuary. By the end of the period there were very few new tracks entering the country. At Stapleford one 750lb bomb was dropped at 2030 hours. It fell inside the perimeter 100yds from Southern boundary, causing no damage to aircraft or personnel.

At Coventry raids commenced at 1958 hours and ceased at 2155 hours causing widespread fires and considerable damage. Fires were reported at Cornercroft Ltd, Armstrong Siddeley, Morris Bodies, Smith Molesworth, Coventry Brace Co, Rotherham's Ltd, GEC, LMS Goods Yard, shops and residential property. St Mary's Hall, the Queen's Hotel, and a Public Shelter were hit by HE and a number of people trapped, but all were extricated alive. The spare parts department of the Daimler Works was hit. A further unexploded bomb was removed from Riley's and full production resumed.

Liverpool was again the target for the Do 17 bombers of KGr 606, dropping their loads on the city at 2035 hours.

Two Focke-Wulf Fw 200C-1s were lost near Ireland. One 'Condor' from 1/KG.40 was lost in the Atlantic and the bodies of the crew were found near Clifden. The second Fw 200 was reported as having been brought down by its own attack on Irish merchant vessels near Cape Clear.

At 1500 hours an officer was attempting to remove the fuse from an unexploded bomb which fell on Seal about three weeks ago, when it exploded, and no trace of him was found.

Losses: Luftwaffe 10: Fighter Command 6.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 24, 2010)

*23 October 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM*: No large raids were made on this Wednesday with only reconnaissance and occasional Bf109 sweeps crossing the coast throughout the day. A Blenheim from RAF No. 600 Squadron based at Catterick in Yorkshire, crashed into a hillside at Kirkby Malzeard, Yorkshire during practice flights through cloud at 1055 hours. P/O P.R.S. Hurst was killed and buried in Catterick Cemetery.

At 1240 hours an aircraft from Calais flew from Dover to Dungeness and Hastings, where it turned North and crossed the Inner Artillery Zone. This aircraft attacked the Stanmore before returning across the IAZ and going across Kent.

At 1323 hours a raid from Holland came into the Estuary over a convoy off Clacton, circled Harwich for ten minutes and returned to the Scheldt; this was followed at 1331 hours by another from Holland into the Estuary, over two convoys North West of Herne Bay and then to South East London and back to the Scheldt.

Hurricanes of RAF No.145 Squadron, scrambled from Tangmere during the afternoon, intercepted one raid of Bf109s over Sussex and lost two Hurricanes during the combat.

During the night the bombing of London continued with other raids dropping mines off the Yorkshire and Lincolnshire coasts. A PM was dropped on the bowling green in Tynemouth Park and another in a field at Kennersdene Farm, Tynemouth near the LNER electric railway which caused craters measuring 35' x 15'. Damage to Park Cafe, Bowling Club Pavilion, Beaconsfield House AFS Station, the Grand Parade First Aid Post and many other buildings including 280 houses. There was damage also to the Princes Theatre, Russell Street, North Shields. Twelve German aircraft penetrated the Yorkshire coast from the east. These were tracked to the western seaboard and a short distance out to sea off the Lancashire coast and minelaying was suspected. An attack was made at St Pancras at 1847 hours causing considerable damage, including a large crater on the London main line, 2 holes through a bridge; also property and rolling stock suffered severely.

A He 111H of I./KG 27 was destroyed when it crashed at Tours airfield after a combat sortie. The aircraft struck a barrack block, killing all four crew (Lt. Wolfgang Wilhelm, Uffz. Ernst Bautz, Uffz. Wilhelm Forster, Uffz. Alfons Jenau) and thirteen occupants of the building, and injuring eleven others (all groundcrew of KG 27).

Losses: Luftwaffe 3: Fighter Command 2.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 24, 2010)

*24 October 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Luftwaffe activity was again reduced to mostly reconnaissance raids over East Anglia and southern England.

At about 1100 hours, one aircraft flew West over Southwold and penetrated to within 20 miles of Coventry before turning back. This aircraft, a Dornier Do 215, was intercepted and shot down over St. Neots by Hurricanes of RAF No. 1 and 17 Squadrons. "Red" Section of RAF No. 1 were ordered to intercept and F/L M.H. Brown, P/O A.V. Clowes, DFM, and P/O A. Kershaw sighted the Dornier 3,000 ft above cloud. As a result the Dornier was brought down at St. Neots. All 3 pilots expressed the opinion that the aircraft did not make very good use of cloud cover before the attack and the only evasive action taken was diving into the clouds.

At 1430 hours Hurricanes of RAF No. 229 Squadron, scrambled from Northolt, intercepted a small raid of Do17s over Middlesex. Bombs were dropped at Hayes and a serious fire was started at the works of the Fairey Aviation Co, where the main store was damaged.

Also during the afternoon a reconnaissance aircraft was plotted near Weston-Super-Mare and Taunton. Tragically, two Hurricanes of RAF No. 87 Squadron, scrambled from Exeter to intercept, collided in cloud and P/O D.T. Jay (Hurricane P3404) was killed. P/O Jay baled out but was believed to have hit the tailplane as he did not pull his ripcord. The other pilot, Johnny Co ck got down OK, landing at Exeter with a chewed up tail. The raider escaped.

During the night the main targets were London and Birmingham with further raids on Liverpool. German aircraft began to appear from the Dutch Islands, from the Somme area and from Cherbourg at about 1900 hours, the majority flying towards London and the remainder - about six tracks - towards St Alban's Head. At Birmingham an attack commenced during which many HE and incendiary bombs were dropped causing 90 fires, some of which were serious. New Street Station suffered considerable damage, fires breaking out on five platforms. Damage included a passenger train, 3 signal boxes, loaded parcel vans, and the roof of the station was badly affected. In London, communications and public utility services appeared to be the main targets though, as before, many bombs fell some distance from any apparent objective.

Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary, off the Essex coast and along the coastline between the Wash and the Firth-of-Forth.

Italian aircraft based in Belgium, made their first attack with a raid on Harwich in a joint mission with Lufthlotte 2. The Italian pilots had slowly transferred to Belgium through the end of September and early October, finally being declared ready by 22 October. The Generale sa Corso Fougier installed his HQ in Petite Espinette of Rhode-St-Genesis (between Brussels and Waterloo) and the technical services were established on the aerodrome of Evere. Once established in their new bases the units had less than a month to become accustomed to strange airfields and language, northern weather conditions and integration into the Luftwaffe structure. II Fliegerkorps was to be the controlling formation and to facilitate control and communications. The worthwhile targets were along the coast between the Thames and Harwich including the estuaries of the Orwell and Stour. A few days after arrival the Italian’s funny cork-stripped life-vests (nicknamed “sausages”) were replaced with German-supplied inflatable rubber vests fitted with a fluorescing bag to facilitate being located on the sea. A number of modifications were made to the equipment and a special grey-blue uniform was created for the troop, eliminating knickerbockers and puttees of World War 1 vintage. The airfields in Belgium received codenames. Known names are “Dedalo” (Melsbroeck) and “Icaro” (Chièvres). The arrival of the Italian task force in Belgium resulted in that the exiled Belgian government in London declared war on Italy. Operations commenced on 24 October with a night bombing raid on Felixstowe and Harwich, twelve BR.20Ms of 13o Stormo and six from 43o Stormo taking part. The first aircraft, flown by Capitano Bassi of 43o Gruppo, took-off at 2035 hours and was quickly followed by the ones flown by Capitano Gastaldi and Tenente Albertini. At 2050 hours MM21928 (5-8 ) of 5a Squadriglia flown by Capitano Carlo Pagani took-off. A few minutes later this aircraft crashed close to the church at Houtem, killing Pagani together with his crew. Ten of the aircraft from 13o Stormo managed to locate Harwich and dropped their bombs from an altitude of 5000 to 5500 meters. When returning MM21895 (Capitano F. Bassi) of 3a Squadriglia and MM22624 (Tenente M. Pesso) became lost. Bassi’s crew baled out near Cambrai and Pesso’s between Namur and Charleroi, while his aircraft (MM22624) crashed in Lustin. The evacuation of the two aircraft went well and only the radio operator 1o Avieri Armando Paolini was wounded in a foot. During the return a third bomber flown by Capitano U. Machieraldo had to force-land at Lille-Epinoy and the aircraft was damaged. The remaining eight aircraft from 13o Stormo landed at Melsbroeck between 2350 and 0035 hours. For the 22% loss of aircraft or seriously damaged, the bombing results were poor. Contrary to wartime propaganda by the Italian news media the bombing carried out by the CAI was comparatively ineffectual and expensive in crews and aircraft.

Sgt D.R. Stoodley of RAF No. 43 squadron (Usworth) was killed in Hurricane V7303, in a dusk-flying accident at base. He had made six attempts to land cross-wind, and finally stalled at 250 ft.

P/O J Bury-Burzymski of RAF No. 303 squadron (Leconfield) was killed in Hurricane V6807, which crashed during dog-fight practice, at 17.20 hrs.

This quieter day enabled Dowding to try and straighten out the difficult relations between Keith Park at 11 Group and Leigh Mallory at 12 Group. He told the former to make allowances for the latter’s difficulties when trying to send reinforcements. However, subsequent events showed it was really too late to mend these fences. Things had gone too far.

RAF No. No 71 (Eagle) Squadron received 3 Brewster Buffaloes.

Losses: Losses: Luftwaffe, 8; RAF, 4.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 24, 2010)

*25 October 1940 Friday
UNITED KINGDOM*: Fighter-bomber raids developed high over Kent and London, bringing a return of dogfights and bombs released indiscriminately. All day Bf 109 formations of up to Gruppe strength from JG 27, JG 51, JG 53, JG 54, JG 26 and II(Schlacht)./LG 2 each flew three missions against the overall city area of London and were escorted by usually twice as many fighters. In one of their now rare appearances in daylight, twin-engined medium bombers attacked a total of 16 RAF stations, being joined by Bf 109s which bombed Martlesham and Hawkinge. Just after 0900 hours several waves of Bf109 raids, mainly from JG 26 and JG 51, were crossing the Kent and Sussex coasts and heading for targets around southern London, Kenley and Biggin Hill. While this attack was in progress two other formations flew inland - one of 12 aircraft at Dungeness and the other of 40 aircraft at Hastings. At 0920 hours, the raids, increasing to 65 aircraft concentrated towards Biggin Hill but a split of some 20 aircraft flew to Central London. Of the several Fighter Command squadrons scrambled to intercept, heavy engagements were made by the Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41 and 66 Squadrons. JG 54 was one of the escort Geschwaders flying at 26,000 ft and JG 26 was escorting the Bf 109s of II./LG 2. Near Biggin Hill, the JG 54 formation was attacked by ten Spitfires from RAF No. 41 Sqdrn. On the first pass, Oblt. Joachim Schypek of 6./JG 54 was hit by P/O Peter Brown and forced to crash land at Broom Hill near Lydd. Maj. Werner Mölders from Stab/JG 51 claimed a Spitfire near Dover while Lt. Heinrich Tornow of 4./JG 51 was credited with a Hurricane over London.

Returning from the morining mission, II./JG 26 and III./JG 26 were attacked by RAF No. 603 Sqdrn Spitfires over Maidstone and shot down three. Hptm. Walter Adolph of Stab II./JG 26, Lt. Karl Borris of 4./JG 26 and Oblt. Hans-Jürgen Westphal from 7./JG 26 were given credit for the kills. F/O Robert Wardlow 'OXO' Oxspring was on patrol leading a flight from No 66 Squadron when they were bounced by 6 Bf 109s. Oxspring bailed safely out of his blazing Spitfire I (X4170) over Tonbridge after the combat at 0900 hours. Oblt. Kurt Eichstadt of 5./JG 26 was hit from above by a Spitfire, possibly from RAF No. 66 Sqdrn. Eichstadt's Bf 109 broke up in the air and he was thrown clear but his chute failed to open.

At 1200 hours more raids were crossing over Kent towards Maidstone, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch areas. German aircraft numbering 100 crossed the coast near Dover at 20,000 feet and flew on a Westerly course past Maidstone. The formation split into many small sections and covered the South East from Hornchurch to South of Biggin Hill. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 249, 257, 302 (Polish) and 310 (Czech) Squadrons were directed to the area along with Spitfires of RAF Nos. 19, 222 and 603 Squadrons. Three Squadrons from 12 Group which were in the air at Duxford were sent to the Maidstone patrol line. 3./JG 77 were on a mission to London escorting Bf 109s from 1./JG 77 and 2./JG 77. Approaching the target area, a great number of Spitfires and Hurricanes were waiting the German formation. However the bombs were dropped and the whole formation was on the return journey when the British fighters attacked. Gefr. Karl Raisinger of 3./JG 77 was hit and crash landed at Harvey's Cross near Brighton. Sgt J.M.Beard of No 249 Squadron was wounded when he baled out of his stricken Hurricane I (P3615) after combat with a Bf 109 over Linton, Kent. P/O P.Olver of RAF No. 603 Squadron was injured when he baled out of his Spitfire I (P7365) after combat with Bf 109s near Chartham, Kent at 1015 hours.

P/O W.B. Pattullo of RAF No. 46 squadron, (Stapleford) was killed in Hurricane V6804, when he crashed into a house in Woodstock Avenue, Romford, at 1207 hours, following a routine patrol. P/O Pattullo was taken from the wreckage, and admitted to Oldchurch Hospital, but died the next day.

A third main wave of Bf109 raids approached Dungeness just after 1300 hours and interceptions were made by Spitfires of RAF Nos. 92 and 222 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF No. 46 Squadron over Kent. 50 aircraft flew inland at Dungeness followed by 20 others. A split remained near Dover while the main body flew to Central London at 1330 hours splitting into small formations en route. The Air Provost Marshal's department at Westminister was hit by an HE bomb at 1330 hours, killing four RAF personnel and injuring eight. A huge bomb landed on the Blackfriars Road destroying some trams which were trying to temporarily shelter from the onslaught. On the other side of the road, on the corner with Union Street, a building, known originally as the Surrey Chapel but subsequently as the Blackfriar’s Ring, was also very badly damaged. Returning from this mission, III./JG 26 were set upon by nearly two dozen Spitfires from RAF No. 92 and 603 Squadrons. Lt. Hermann Ripke of 8./JG 26 fell victim to P/O Tom Sherrington of RAF No.92 Squadron high above Sevenoaks, Kent. Lt.Ripke's Bf 109E crashed at Riverhill House, Sevenoaks. His wingman Fw. Joseph Gartner was shot down by RAF No.92 Squadron's F/O "Pancho" Villa. Gartner's aircraft crashed at Congelow Farm, Yalding. Oblt. Joachim Müncheberg of 7./JG 26 forced one of the Spitfires to crash land. Hptm. Wolfgang Lippert of Stab II./JG 27 made a claim for two Hurricanes at this time near London.

During these aerial conflicts over Kent, Spitfires of RAF No. 72 Squadron intercepted and shot down a patrolling Bf110 off the Great Yarmouth coast.

F/Lt F.Jastrzebski of RAF No 302 Squadron was KIA when he failed to return after a patrol over the Channel in his Hurricane I (V7593). He was seen to leave the formation and glide towards France.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 24, 2010)

_(25 October 1940 continued....)_

Shortly after 1500 hours another large wave of sweeping raids crossed the Kent coast and split into formations heading for London, Kenley and areas of Sussex. Several RAF squadrons were scrambled to intercept but only the Hurricanes of RAF No. 501 Squadron, from Kenley, succeeded in engaging the Bf109s. The Hurricanes suffered heavily at the hands of JG 51 and subsequently lost 4 aircraft and 1 pilot. P/O V.Goth was killed when his Hurricane I (P2903) collided with P/O K.W.Mackenzie's Hurricane (V6806) during combat with Bf 109s over Tenterden, Kent. MacKenzie baled out of his Hurricane safely while P/O V.Goth crashed in Bridgehurst Wood, Marden. P/O Vivian R. Snell shot down a Bf109E and was then shot down himself while flying Hurricane P2903. He baled out and watched his Hurricane crash into a field at Brenchley near Tonbridge in Kent. 

Whilst RAF No. 501 Squadron were experiencing heavy combat over Kent, a patrolling Hurricane of RAF No. 79 Squadron, scrambled from Pembrey, was thought to have been shot down by a reconnaissance aircraft plotted in the area. P/O S. Piatkowski was killed when he crashed his Hurricane, N2728, near Carew Cheriton after a routine patrol over Linney Head. Pilots of RAF No.79 Squadron were involved mostly in patrolling the coast and their base at Pembrey with the chance for a kill rarely presenting itself. The fruitless patrols and the boredom of waiting were sometimes interrupted by well remembered events. Donald Stones relates a story about Sgt. Wlodzimierz Mudry in his book 'Poles in Defence of Britain';


> "_We had two artists in the squadron now. John Parker, who was already established as the keeper and illustrator of our unofficial Squadron diary, and Sergeant Mudry, one of three newly acquired Polish pilots... Parker and Mudry decorated the walls of our mess with exciting drawings in coloured chalk of near-nude chorus girls and caricatures of aerial battles in which 79 Squadron always came off badly. Of the girls, one magnificent specimen with much leg and what we call an air-cooled chest, wore only a short pair of black French knickers, attached by drawing pins to the wall. A visiting VIP of high rank fell into the trap and through unendurable curiosity, casually lifted the knickers, to be confronted with a card bearing the message: 'You have a dirty mind. Put 2s 6d in the beer kitty_.' "


The Luftwaffe attacked the airfield at Montrose (Scotland) in the late afternoon by four He111s of the KG 26 based in Norway. During the low-level attack, machine gun bullets bounced off the High Street and bombs rained down on the air station. Five men were killed and 21 wounded and extensive damage was done to buildings and aircraft. Defences were caught off guard by the low-level attack and the Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Squadron were destroyed on the ground. Other towns in Angus and Fife were also hit, with bombs dropped on Cellardyke and Arbroath.

At 1740 hours some 20 enemy aircraft in two formations were in the vicinity of a convoy off North Foreland and at 1744 hours the convoy was attacked. In response to a 'help' message, four Squadrons were despatched but no interception were made. This may have been the thirteen Bf 109s of JG 27 who were on their fourth mission of the day when they attacked a convoy of 35 ships near Ramsgate and claimed one merchant vessel sunk with a direct hit.

P/O Robert Duncan Yule of RAF No. 145 Sqdrn was shot down by Bf 109s in a combat over Kent and was admitted to hospital with leg wounds after making a forced landing which completely wrote off his Hurricane I (P3926). (_While rehearsing for the Battle of Britain fly past over London on the 11th of September 1953, Yule collided with another jet aircraft. Faced with a densely-populated area, Yule steered his aircraft towards Woolwich Arsenal and crash-landed between rows of buildings. Some workers were injured and Yule was killed. His selfless action undoubtedly saved many lives_.)

P/O S.F.Soden from RAF No. 606 Squadron was shot down in a Spitfire I (P7635) by a Bf 109 baling out near Chartham, Kent and badly injuring a leg on landing.

During the night raids were made on London, the Midlands, South Wales, Liverpool and the airfields of Wittering Middle Wallop. Mines were dropped off Aberdeen, Liverpool, East Anglia and the northeast coastline. The attack on London commenced at about 1830 hours from the mouth of the Scheldt and from Dieppe in moderate strength. Raids also appeared from Cherbourg flying Northwards. Meanwhile, 45 raids approached London from the East and South and the attack was sustained, although in gradually diminishing strength, throughout the period. Many gas and water mains were damaged, and at Bordesley the Great Western Railway and the lines were flooded. House property and the Municipal Bank suffered damage. A formation of Ju 88s of I./LG 1 raided Birmingham at 2010 hours. Later at 2235 hours He 111s of III./KG 27 attacked Liverpool and Bristol.

RAF No.601 squadron, (Exeter) lost two Hurricanes during a training flight. Sgt L.D. May in Hurricane V6917 and Sgt F Mills-Smith in Hurricane P3709 both died in a mid-air collision and crashed in the sea off Exmouth, at 1500 hours.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 20; RAF, 10.

A British Air Ministry announcement demonstrated the diversity and numerical strength of the flying personnel available to it. Airmen from Poland, France, Belgium, Holland and Czechoslovakia were being deployed and still more were in training. The Eagle Squadron of American volunteers was also growing.


----------



## Airframes (Oct 25, 2010)

Good work yet again Chris. Is it me, or does the 602 Sqn Spitfire in post# 295 seem to have the nose, windscreen, and part of the canopy of a Hurricane, and part of the wing root too ?!
I wonder if that's some sort of composite photo?


----------



## Njaco (Oct 26, 2010)

Not being an expert of the RAF but having a common knowledge of the Spitfre, I too thought something was off.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 26, 2010)

*26 October 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The day started with occasional reconnaissance raids over most of southern England and East Anglia. By 1030 hours a small sweeping raid by Bf109s of JG 53 was met with force by the Biggin Hill Spitfires of RAF No. 92 Squadron. The first claim for the day was made by Fw. Stefan Litjens of 4./JG 53 who downed a Spitfire near Tonbridge

During this period, Spitfires of RAF No. 234 Squadron, scrambled from St. Eval, intercepted a Ju88 off Cornwall and lost one of their aircraft before the raider was shot down.

At 1100 hours a large raid had been plotted by radar leaving the Boulogne area and crossing the Channel. Patrolling Hurricanes of RAF No. 229 Squadron, scrambled from Northolt, were vectored to intercept the raid over the Channel and suffered the loss of 2 aircraft during a dogfight with Bf109s. P/O D.B.H.McHardy of RAF No 229 Squadron became a POW when his Hurricane I (V6704) was shot down off the French coast by a Bf 109 after attacking a He 59 at 1130 hours. F/O G.M.Simson, a New Zealander with No 229 Squadron was KIA as his Hurricane I (W6669) was shot down off the French coast by a Bf 109 after he attacked a He 59 at 1130 hours.

Between 1200 hours and 1300 hours several squadrons were scrambled to intercept Bf109 raids over Sussex and Kent. The ensuing engagements involved Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 302 (Polish) and 605 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF No. 602 Squadron. Lt. Friedrich Geißhardt of 1.(J)/LG 2, Fw. Otto Junge from 6./JG 52 and Oblt. Egon Troha of 9./JG 3 all made claims during this period. JG 52 lost Ofw. Oskar Strack of 1./JG 52 when he was listed as missing in action. F/O C.W.Passy of RAF No 605 Squadron escaped injury when he force landed his Hurricane I (P3737) near Marks Cross, Sussex at 1235 hours. The Hurricane had developed engine problems whilst chasing a Bf 109.

Throughout late afternoon from 1600 hours until dusk, small raids crossed inland with very few interceptions made. Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Squadron, from Croydon and Spitfires of RAF No. 222 Squadron, from Hornchurch, were both involved in combat with Bf109s over Kent. Maj. Adolf Galland from Stab./JG 26 claimed a Hurricane south of London for his 46th victory. F/O James C.F.Hayter of RAF No 605 Squadron was attacked at 25000 feet and his Hurricane I set on fire. Slightly wounded, Hayter baled out of his Hurricane I (P2916) after combat with a Bf 109 at 1545 hours. He landed in the grounds of a house where a cocktail party was taking place. He was invited to join it and was later picked up by his fiancée, who lived not far away.

At 1800 hours 5 HE bombs were dropped at RAF Wick, 2 falling on the Aerodrome and 3 nearby demolishing several houses and causing 15 civilian casualties, 3 of which were killed. The attack was made by two He111s flying very low and flashing correct recognition signals. One hangar was hit and a Hudson aircraft burnt out, two others being damaged, and another hangar was also damaged.

The Lossiemouth Aerodrome was attacked at 1830 hours by two enemy aircraft approaching from the sea at 100 feet and a third from the West of the Aerodrome. Bombs were dropped on the edge of the landing ground and one Blenheim was burnt out, two others being damaged. One He111 crashed, and it is believed that this was due to the explosion of its own bombs. The casualties reported were 2 dead and 12 wounded.

As the night raids were underway, RAF No: 151 Squadron, based at Digby, lost 2 (night fighter) Hurricanes as they scrambled to intercept bombers at about 2000 hours. Both pilots were killed.

During the night London was again bombed along with Liverpool, Manchester, the Midlands and Bristol. He 111s from II./KG 55 attacked London during the night and lost three bombers on the return flight to France. II./KG 27 lost no bombers during a raid on Liverpool with He 111s at 2210 hours. Bombing was mainly directed against the centre of Birmingham, where large blocks of offices and commercial buildings were hit. In addition the Midland Homeopathic Hospital had to be evacuated. The factories of Stratton Co Ltd and Bulpitt and Son were gutted. The New Street (LMS) Station was closed to all traffic owing to an HE on No 1 platform. In London, The Royal Hospital suffered a direct hit but there were no casualties. A major fire was started at Saffron Hill, Clerkenwell, necessitating the employment of 50 pumps.

Mines were dropped along the east of England from the Thames Estuary up to the Firth-of-Forth.

Transport has taken a hammering as the Luftwaffe kept up its nightly attacks on the capital. Railways in particular were hard hit, not just at the docks but with main-line stations regularly bombed. This week it was the turn of St Pancras station, but the forecourt of Victoria station was also badly damaged. For travellers train services, especially on the Southern Railway, often terminate in the suburbs, and commuters face new puzzles every day in finding "passable" routes to the office. Unexploded bombs closing many streets add to the frustration by diverting bus routes. So many buses and tramcars have been bombed that Londoners see the unfamiliar colours of buses borrowed from as far away as Aberdeen and Exeter on their streets. The Underground has also been interrupted by bombs. Four stations have been hit, the worst being Ballam, where 600 people sheltering were deluged with a river of sludge when the road and water mains above caved in, suffocating 64 of them.

Oblt. Bernhard Jope of I./KG 40, flying one of the few four-engined 200C-1 “Condors” available, attacked the 348 ton ocean liner “Empress of Britain” southwest of Donegal, Ireland. The liner was crippled from the attack and finally sunk by a torpedo from a German U-Boat.

Losses: Luftwaffe 10: Fighter Command 6.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 26, 2010)

*27 October 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The Luftwaffe renewed its persistent raids of bomb-carrying Bf109s on London and selected targets in the southeast throughout the day. There seemed to be no absolute pattern to the German attacks. Raids were conducted only by small groups of planes that were usually turned back by the intercepting British fighters. A number of the airfields came under attack again. Hawkinge, still a forward airfield and of only minor importance, Martlesham, Kirton-on-Lindsay, Driffield and Honnington were also attacked, but serious damage was kept to a minimum.

Just after 0730 hours and for nearly two hours wave after wave of Bf109 raids swept across Kent heading for Biggin Hill, Kenley and London. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 46, 249, 253, 257, 501, 605 and 615 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 66, 74, 92, 222, 602 and 603 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept the raiders. Only the Spitfires of RAF Nos. 66 and 74 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF No. 605 Squadron, from Croydon, managed to engage the Bf109s of JG 53, JG 27 and JG 54. Oblt. Erbo Graf von Kageneck of 9./JG 27 claimed a Spitfire over Ashford. III./JG 54 were returning from a sweep over London when they came across Hurricanes from RAF No. 605 Squadron and dived to attack. Uffz. Arno Zimmermann of 7./JG 54 was climbing from the attack when a Hurricane believed to be flown by Sgt. Eric Wright fired a burst which hit Zimmermann and his Bf 109. Zimmermann finally crash landed on the beach near Lydd. Sgt. J.A.Scott of RAF No 74 Squadron was shot down and killed in his Spitfire II (P7526) by a Bf 109 over Maidstone at 0900 hours. F/O A.Ingle of RAF No 605 Squadron was wounded with slight cuts to the face when his Hurricane I (V7599) sustained some battle damage and suffered a forced landing at Barcombe, Sussex at 0940 hours.

Oblt. Ulrich Steinhilper of I./JG 52 and his wingman were shot down by Sgt Bill Skinner and A/Flt Lt Mungo Park in Spitfire Mk IIs of RAF 74 Squadron. Steinhilper's 109 was hit from behind after he saw what he called;


> _"....a staircase to the sun, a staircase of Spitfires queuing for the attack, the first one already with red flames dancing along the leading edge of his wings as his guns fired. I landed beside the embankment of a canal. I looked around at the countryside to see if anyone was approaching. Nothing. Only the grey wet drizzle, blown by the wind. I couldn't believe that moments before I had been flying in the bright sunshine. Above the clouds I could hear the throb of engines as my comrades made their way back to base. How far away I was from them now. I felt so alone, so hopeless, my throat tightened and I thought that I was about to cry." _


Oblt. Steinhilper became a POW first in England and then in Canada. He was one of only 12 pilots remaining from the 36 who had started the Battle of Britain with JG 52. The rest were gone - killed or captured. (_In 1980 the remains of Steinhilper's Messerschmitt were recovered from the marshes near Canterbury and preserved by the dedicated staff of the Kent Battle of Britain Museum at Hawkinge. Three years later Steinhilper was surprisingly asked to participate in a Yorkshire television programme entitled Churchill's few. For this project he came back across to England, where after 46 years he was reunited with his old friend ‘yellow 2’ which was then just a lump of wreckage.)_

A Hurricane from RAF No. 43 Squadron based at Usworth near Sunderland, crashed vertically during high altitude aerobatics, the cause unknown, but believed to be through oxygen failure. The aircraft crashed at Congburn Dean, Edmondsley at 1025 hours. The 21-year-old pilot, Sergeant L.V. Toogood was killed and is buried in Kingstone Cemetery, St Mary's Road, Portsmouth. (_A major recovery by the Northumberland Aeronautical Collection was made in October 1978. The parts recovered were: the tail wheel assembly, radiator, pilot's seat, radio, armour plate, main wheels and the shattered remains of the Roll-Royce Merlin engine. The pilot's parachute was recovered intact, in excellent condition and positive proof of identity was provided by the pilot's wallet, handed to the RAF.)_

At 1130 hours, another series of raids started crossing the east coast of Kent heading for Dartford and the docklands of London and although sighted by RAF fighters, the raiders were too high to intercept. But RAF No. 145 Squadron tried. F/O D.G.S.Honor from RAF No 145 Squadron force landed his Hurricane I (V7422) near St Leonards, Sussex at 1220 hours. He had run out of fuel after combat but he was unhurt. Also running out of fuel was Sgt D.B.Sykes of RAF No. 145 Squadron who force landed his Hurricane I (N2494) near St Leonards, Sussex at 1220 hours. P/O P.A.Baillon of RAF No 609 Squadron bailed out of his Spitfire I (P9503) safely after combat over Andover at 1150 hours.

By 1230 hours the second wave of Bf109s crossed the Kent and Sussex coasts. Interceptions were made by Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Squadron, scrambled from Tangmere, near Hastings and by Hurricanes of RAF No. 501 Squadron, scrambled from Kenley, over Kent.

At 1320 hours, one raid of 14 aircraft approached Faversham from Dungeness and then turned East; simultaneously another raid of 20 aircraft reached the Central London area and a secondary wave turned back over Ashford. As more Bf109s crossed the coast at Dungeness they were engaged by Spitfires of RAF No. 603 Squadron, scrambled from Hornchurch, over the Maidstone area. During this dogfight RAF No. 603 Squadron lost 3 Spitfires and 2 pilots. P/O C.W.Golsdsmith a South African had been shot down by a Bf 109 of JG 51 South of Maidstone, Kent at 1405 hours. He died of his wounds on the 28th of October 1940. P/O R.B.Dewey of No 603 Squadron was killed when his Spitfire II (P7365) was shot down by a Bf 109 of JG 51 south of Maidstone, Kent at 1405 hours.

Maj. Hannes Trautloft from Stab/JG 54 claimed a Spitfire over Ashford. P/O Eric F.Edsall from RAF No. 222 Squadron crashed in a Spitfire I (X4548 ), when he ran out of fuel after combat and he was injured when he crash landed near Hailsham at 1405 hours.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 26, 2010)

_(27 October 1940 continued......)_

At 1630 hours two large raids were approaching their respective targets with formations of Ju88, He111 and Do17 bombers with Bf109 fighter escorts. The first raid crossed North Foreland and over the Thames Estuary into East Anglia whereby the airfields at Martlesham Heath and Coltishall along with the docks in Harwich were attacked. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 17, 242, 249, 257 and 310(Czech) Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF No. 19 Squadron, from Duxford, were scrambled to intercept the raid. Nine Bf109s dive-bombed the aerodrome at Martlesham at 1642 hours. Between 9 and 12 - 50 Kilo bombs were dropped and three delayed action bombs were dropped on the East side of the aerodrome. The only damage was one workshop, and the aerodrome was serviceable during daylight on the West side. An attack was made by a Do17 on Coltishall at 5,000 feet and a further low-flying He111, which machine-gunned the aerodrome, causing very little damage and no casualties. A second attack took place at 1810 hours by high-flying aircraft, which dropped bombs but caused no damage, but No 3 Post was dive machine-gunned by a Bf109 from 100 feet.

The second raid of Ju88s and Bf109s was made against the Southampton and Portsmouth areas. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 56, 145, 213, 238 and 607 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 152, 602 and 609 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept. P/O Alexis Jottard a Belgian with RAF No 145 Squadron was shot down and killed in his Hurricane I (P3167) by a Bf 109 at 1715 hours off the Isle of Wight. At the time of his death Jottard was credited with one damaged enemy aircraft. This was claimed while flying biplanes. Oblt. Hermann Reifferscheidt from 1./JG 2 claimed his first victory, a Hurricane near the Isle of Wight. Sergeant J.K.Haire of RAF No 145 Squadron in his Hurricane I (V6888 ) ditched on the sands of Bembridge and escaped injury after a dogfight with a Bf 109 at 1715 hours. P/O Franck Weber was a Czech who served with RAF No 145 Squadron and baled out of his Hurricane I off the Isle of White safely after combat with a Bf 109 at 1715 hours and was picked up out of the Channel.

Before the main bombing raids of the night were launched, several small raids were made, at about 1830 hours, against the airfields of Leconfield, Feltwell, Driffield, Kirton-in-Lindsey and Martlesham. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 1, 17 and 85 Squadrons made interceptions on the Do17s and He111s over Norfolk and Lincolnshire. A Ju 88A from 7./KG 4 was hit by ground fire during a low level attack on Driffield aerodrome at 1800 hours. It belly landed on Richmond Farm, Duggleby, Yorkshire. Three enemy aircrew members were captured unhurt, the other one died of his wounds on November 15th. A machine gun (an MG15) from the German aircraft is now in the trophy case at Driffield. At Leconfield, Pilot Rossocachacki of RAF No. 303 (Polish) Squadron was injured by shrapnel when the Aerodrome was bombed by 2 He111s at 1808 hours. RAF Mildenhall was attacked for the first time.

At 1732 hours, a Heinkel 111 made a low-flying attack on Lindholme and dropped 6 HE light bombs scoring two direct hits, one on the sick quarters and the other on the Barrack Block, causing 8 casualties. At 1800 hours, an He111 approached the aerodrome at Kirton in Lindsey and came down to 2,500 feet and carried out a machine-gun attack before dropping two bombs which exploded on the roof of No 1 Hangar. A further three bombs were dropped on the South West building and four buildings under construction, one of which was a new explosive store. 

During the night raids were made on London, Liverpool and the Midlands. The attack on London was maintained at fair strength but later became sporadic, assuming the single 'relay' character. The attacks on Coventry and Liverpool increased in strength and over the former were still being plotted at 010 hours, although they had ceased over the latter about midnight. A marked feature was wide dispersal of raiders, practically all districts South of a line Barrow to Middlesborough being visited at some time during the period. The route Selsey - Oxford - Midlands, with fanning out both East and West, seemed particularly favoured. The main damage was the blockage of the LMS line at Tottenham and the Kingston Southern Railway Line at Malden due to flooding caused by a main bursting. 

Mines were dropped off Harwich, in the Thames Estuary and along the coast of eastern England up to the Firth-of-Forth.

Losses: Luftwaffe 12: Fighter Command 12.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 27, 2010)

*28 October 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM*: The shipping and convoy attacks off Dover and in the Thames Estuary started early. Reconnaissance raids were the main source of Luftwaffe activity during the morning with bombs dropped on a convoy near Dover and on the outskirts of the airfield at Hawkinge. Successive waves attacked London in the afternoon.

The first main attack of the day materialized at 1300 hours when about 30 Bf109s swept over Dungeness and into Kent. The formation split up and eventually turned back before British fighters could intercept. This was followed by a similar raid at about 1430 hours, 18+ enemy aircraft flew in from Dover to Maidstone and the Biggin Hill area. As in the previous sweep, penetration was not made further North West. Hurricanes of RAF No: 257 Squadron, scrambled from North Weald, intercepted the Bf109's of JG 27 near Gravesend. Ofw. Otto Schulz of 4./JG 27 and Oblt. Ernst Düllberg from 5./JG 27 each claimed a Spitfire.

By 1600 hours several raids of nearly 50 aircraft each were plotted over the Channel. The first headed for the Isle of Wight and at 1630 hours Portsmouth was attacked before Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 145 and 213 Squadrons, both from Tangmere, could intercept. One of the Do17s was eventually attacked as it headed back toward France.

Meanwhile, the other raids, of mainly Bf109s, were crossing the coast at Dover, Dungeness and Beachy Head. Fresh formations of 50, 30+ and 50 aircraft came inland between Beachy Head and Dungeness, one raid going to Hornchurch and the others to Biggin Hill. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 229, 249, 253, 257, 501 and 605 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 74, 92 and 603 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept. For once the Bf109s of JG 51 and JG 53 suffered losses without inflicting any on Fighter Command. Ofw. Hans Dieter John from 4./JG 51 was shot down and killed. He had eight victories against Allied aircraft at the time of his death. Oblt. Gerhard Michalski of Stab II./JG 53 claimed a Hurricane near London.

During the night the number of raids over England was reduced. Early raids were widespread over most of the Country and the main objectives were London and its suburbs, and the Midlands where Birmingham received most attention with small raids on Reading, Coventry, Sunderland, East Anglia and the airfields at Biggin Hill, Digby, Linton-on-Ouse, Driffield, Binbrook, and Massingham. In London a 50 pump fire broke out at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich but was under control by about 0200 hours on the morning of the 29th October. The only other serious incident reported was major damage at Southwark which occurred at 0140 hours when a Public Shelter was hit containing 400 people, the casualties being 100.

Incendiary leaves were dropped close to the aerodrome at Digby at 2050 hours. They appeared to fall from a container, spreading over a fairly large area and were alight in the air but extinguished before reaching the ground. At 1947 hours, approximately 300 incendiary bombs fell on Biggin Hill. All fires were extinguished and there were no casualties.

Birmingham again received a fierce attack and there were altogether 230 incidents reported about 32 of which involved damage by high explosive bombs, the remainder being fires caused by incendiary bombs including several oil bombs. The most serious fire was New Street Station where a fire started on No 3 platform and spread to platforms No 4 5, Midlands Parcel Office, Refreshment Room and offices and other building on the Station. The Cathedral, Woolworth's and the Army and Navy Stores were amongst the many other buildings which were affected by fire. A feint to the Bristol area was conducted by a lone He 111 of KG 27 at 2145 hours. 

Losses: Luftwaffe 12: Fighter Command 0


----------



## Njaco (Oct 31, 2010)

*29 October 1940 Tuesday
"The Last Gasp"
UNITED KINGDOM*: The Tuesday was to be a testing day for Fighter Command with an increase in daylight raids on southern England. The Luftwaffe launched what was possibly their last and final raid of any importance on London during the Battle of Britain. Park again asked that 12 Groups fighters to intercept the bombers, but it took over twenty minutes before the Duxford Wing was formed and was again too late to attack the bombers.

From 0800 hours reconnaissance raids were made at regular intervals until just after 1030 hours when radar detected a formation of Bf109s crossing the Channel toward the Kent coast at Deal. Whilst the Spitfires of RAF Nos. 66, 74 and 92 Squadrons were occupied with the raiders, a small section of bomb-carrying Bf109s broke away and successfully bombed targets in central London including Charing Cross bridge. P/O R.R.Hutley flew with RAF No. 213 Squadron. He baled out of his Hurricane I (P2720) off Selsey at 1145 hours. He was picked up but he died later.

A convoy off Dover was visited by enemy aircraft at 0945 and 1025 hours.

Just after midday the Hurricanes of RAF No. 1 Squadron were scrambled from Wittering to intercept a small raid of Do17s.

At about 1300 hours, a large raid of over 100 Bf109s crossed the Kent coast in several waves and headed for the areas of Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Maidstone, west and central London. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 249, 253, 501 and 615 Squadrons along with Spitfires of RAF Nos. 66, 74, 92, 222 and 602 Squadrons had already been scrambled to intercept. The Bf109s of JG 51 got caught and suffered heavy losses to the Spitfires, especially those of RAF No. 602 Squadron from Westhampnett who gained an advantage by working in pairs. The Hurricanes and Spitfires had a height advantage and dove onto the approaching 109s. Eight of the Messerschmitts were shot down in less than ten minutes, and the others dropped their bombs at random and turned back in retreat. The attack developed as RAF No. 222 Sqdrn climbed to deliver an attack on the Bf 109s from the rear. RAF No. 602 Sqdrn attacked simultaneously from above, just as RAF Nos. 615 and 229 Sqdrns were climbing for height. Outmaneuvered, the Messerschmitts turned for home whereupon RAF No. 602 gave chase. Lt. Ernst Terry of the Stab I./JG 51 was shot down and captured. Fw. Heinrich Tornow of 4./JG 51 with twelve victories to his credit, was killed in action over England. Maj. Werner Mölders from Stab/JG 51 claimed a Hurricane over Dungeness. P/O N.D.Edmond, a Canadian with RAF No 615 Squadron was wounded at 1245 hours. His Hurricane I (V6785) was badly damaged in combat.

As the dogfights over Kent and Sussex were subsiding another raid of twelve Ju 88s from LG 1 and Bf109s was plotted approaching Portsmouth at 1430 hours. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 145 and 213 Squadrons both scrambled from Tangmere and were joined by the Spitfires of RAF No. 609 Squadron from Warmwell. Maj. Helmut Wick of Stab/JG 2 claimed two Hurricanes over Portsmouth to bring his score to 44. P/O Winter of RAF No. 247 Squadron intercepted one Ju88. The attack on Portsmouth caused 39 casualties, including 3 killed. Four shops were demolished and 50 houses badly damaged, also one high explosive bomb fell on the railway, demolishing ten wagons. Two new wings of the works of Messrs Evans Sons were seriously damaged.

While Portsmouth was being raided, the Italians reappeared briefly by day with 15 BR20 bombers escorted by 39 CR42 and 34 G.50bis fighters attacking Ramsgate. The CR42 biplanes causing more puzzlement than anxiety. (_The RAF shot down the first Italian aircraft in November when three CR42 biplane fighters and three BR20 bombers were shot down. One of the BR20s had a crew of six, all wearing helmets and carrying bayonets. Due to poor support from the fighters, the Italian bombers switched from daylight to sporadic night bombing attacks. After about three months of operations from Belgium, the entire force was recalled to Italy in January 1941 to support the Italian invasion of Greece. In the end, it is almost surprising the C.A.I. managed to operate and the few missions effected appear as the maximum effort that those simple but bold men could hope to do._) The Royal Marines Barracks in Deal was attacked from the air. At 1640 hours, three HE bombs were dropped in the barracks, the casualties being 1 Officer and 7 other ranks killed, 6 Officers and 6 other ranks wounded. Historian David Collyer claims that the bombers were actually not from the Luftwaffe;


> "_The bombs fell in Cornwall Road, Cemetery Road, and near the railway bridge in Telegraph Road. My uncle Leslie can remember seeing an Italian aircraft flying by after dropping a bomb in front of the Officers' Mess at the RM depot_."


This would indicate that the attackers were from the Italian Air Corps on their attack against Ramsgate, some eleven miles from Deal.

Late afternoon was to witness several successful attacks by fighter-bomber Bf109s on airfields across East Anglia, Lincolnshire and South Yorkshire. This was Luftflotte 2's operation launched under the code-word "Opernhall" (Opera Hall). Seventy-one Ju 88s escorted by 31 Bf109s and 52 bomb-carrying Bf 109s with an escort of 99 Bf 109s and Bf 110 aircraft carried out attacks on a number of airfields. Bombs were dropped at Leeming and Linton on Ouse. The first materialized at 1645 hours when North Weald was bombed by Bf 109s from II(Schlacht)./LG 2 and JG 26 during the scramble of both Hurricane Squadrons, RAF Nos. 249 and 257. One Hurricane from RAF No. 249 Sqdrn was damaged and one from RAF No. 257 Sqdrn (Sgt A.G.Girdwood in his Hurricane I (P3708 ) was completely destroyed when it was hit by a bomb and caught fire. Another from RAF No. 257 Sqdrn was so badly damaged by bombs while it was taking off that its pilot (P/O F.Surma from Poland) climbed to 3,000 feet and baled out. Hptm. Gerhard Schöpfel of Stab III./JG 26 claimed one of the Hurricanes lost. II(Schlacht)./LG 2 lost three aircraft shot down during this mission including the Staffelkapitain of 5(Schlacht)./LG 2, Oblt. Benno von Schenk whose Bf 109E-4 plunged into the sea off the Blackwater Estuary and Ofw. Joseph Hammeling of 4./LG 2 who was attacked at 3,000 feet by two Hurricanes believed to have been from RAF No. 249 Sqdrn but also possibly by Polish Pilot, Michal Maciejowski, of RAF No. 111 Squadron. Ofw. Hammeling was obliged to make a force landing at Wick in Essex in his Bf 109E-7 WkNr 5593 "White N". The following is a translation of a letter by Josef Hammeling describing his ordeal:


> "_Here is an account of my sortie on 29th October 1940, on which date I became a prisoner of war in England. It was late in the afternoon, about 1700 hours (local time) when about 40 Messerschmitts Bf 109's of my Gruppe took off from Calais/Marck airfield. We headed on a course for London and reached the English coast at about 6,000 metres. Our Gruppe's objective was an airfield to the north-east of London (North Weald). This was a diversionary feint attack about 20 kilometres from the primary target and we took the opportunity to descend to about 4-500 metres for the attack. It was at this altitude that we struck at the target with bombs and our fixed armament and it was during this low-level attack that I received a hit in the radiator system, presumably from the ground defences. The result was that the coolant temperature rose quickly and the motor commenced losing revs. with alarming speed. However, I sought to gain height, in case I had to get out in an emergency. Soon after this two British fighters, a Spitfire and a Hurricane attacked me and I was unfortunately wounded in the head and right arm whilst at an altitude of about 80 metres. Eye witnesses later reported that my machine burned where it came to rest in a rural area near Colchester. After my (pancake) landing I summoned my strength to jump out of my aircraft and attempt to destroy it but some British soldiers intervened. By now I had recovered and took the opportunity to thank those who helped me. They were, to me, safety- although enemies, those who first gave me aid. The Doctor who removed a fragment of metal from my person also treated me in an exemplary manner..." _


Apparently he was captured by the local gamekeeper, Jum (short for Jumbo) Brown, who was a private in the Essex Home Guard. Jum was awarded a Certificate by the Home Guard in recognition of his bravery in single handed sorting out the capture of plane and pilot. Obfw. Konrad Jäckel from 8./JG 26 was also shot down and captured during this time.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 31, 2010)

_(29 October 1940 continued......)_

Over the next hour targets were attacked at Wattisham, Honington, Leeming, Newmarket, West Raynham and Linton-on-Ouse. Involved in engagements with the raiders were the Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 1, 17, 46, 219, 249, 253, 257, 302 (Polish), 310 (Czech) and 501 Squadrons along with Spitfires of RAF Nos. 19, 41 and 222 Squadrons. Hptm. Wilhelm Balthasar of Stab III./JG 3 claimed two Spitfires. At 1750 hours RAF North Coates received a machine-gunning attack by three low flying enemy aircraft, and at Norwich the Maintenance Unit was bombed at 1755 hours and one hangar was partly destroyed, the Stores also being damaged.

Sub/Lt A.G.Blake of RAF No. 19 Squadron was killed when his Spitfire II (P7423) crashed near Chelmsford, Essex after an encounter with a Bf 109 at 1715 hours. It was believed he was 'picked-off' by a Bf109 whilst acting as 'weaver' during squadron patrol over south London, crashed and burned out at 'Oakhurst', 216 London Rd, Chelmsford.

F/Lt James Anderson Thomson of RAF No. 302 (Polish) Squadron was injured when he baled out after colliding with a Hurricane over Brooklands. He was slightly injured. P/O E.Fetchner, a Czech of RAF No. 310 Squadron was killed in his Hurricane I (P3889) when he collided with another Hurricane near Duxford at 1510 hours.

Epr210 were ordered to carry out a diversionary attack on the dock areas of London. At briefing no exact target was given but the general impression was that if they could not hit the docks then they could release bombs anywhere. All went well until on the return flight they were attacked by Spitfires. One latched onto the tail of the Staffelkaptian of 3./Epr210, Oblt. Otto Hintze. Trailing a plume of white smoke, Hintze dove away which was noticed by Sgt. J.H.B. Burgess of RAF No. 222 Sqdrn. As the first Spitfire broke away, Sgt. Burgess roared in and gave another burst, watching as Oblt. Hintze bailed from the cockpit, hitting the tailplane and injuring his shoulder. Landing safely in Ashford, Oblt. Hintze was captured.

III./JG 2 flew missions from its new base at Bernay and lost several planes and pilots during the day. The first to be lost was Uffz. Walter Bader of I./JG 2 who was hit by German anti-aircraft or ‘friendly’ fire and crashed at Cherbourg, severely wounding Uffz. Bader. Later the Adjutant of III./JG 2, Oblt. Erich Wolf, failed to return from a sortie and was officially listed as missing in action. But JG 2 was not alone in its losses. Killed in a flying accident this day was Ofw. Horst Götz of 5./JG 3, who had five victories. Also lost from JG 3 was Oblt. Egon Troha, the Staffelkapitain of 9./JG 3, who with five victories to his credit, was shot down and captured, ending the war as a prisoner. 

Twelve HEs of light calibre were dropped at 1830 hours in the petrol compound at Billingham Reach and immediate vicinity. Four petrol tanks and one foamite tank were perforated by splinters. There were no casualties but a quantity of the petrol escaped from the tanks before they were plugged. There was no fire. An engine house and steam, water and oil pipes were damaged, also a reaper which was standing in a field.

Lt. Gerhard Barkhorn of 6./JG 52 on his thirty-eighth sortie was shot down into the Channel but was picked up by a German rescue boat after floating for two hours in his lifeboat. Sgt W.T.Page of RAF No. 1 Squadron force landed his Hurricane I (P3318 ) near Peterborough after combat with a Dornier Do 17 at 1730 hours.

During the night the main targets were London, Birmingham and Coventry with scattered raids made on Liverpool, Oxford and Reading areas. London received less raids than usual but activity was widespread over the Home Counties. A severe fire was caused at the works of Messrs Wrays Optical Works Ltd by incendiary bombs which were dropped at 1940 hours. The centre part of the factory was completely gutted, the whole of the factory heating system is damaged, the boilers probably being destroyed, and the store containing all raw materials for glass work was burnt out. Production will be seriously curtailed. Another large raid on Birmingham at night and another feint by a single Dornier of KGr 606 over Bristol at 2155 hours. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary and off Hartlepool. 

Hptm. Hans ‘Assi’ Hahn was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 2 on the Channel Coast in place of Hptm. Otto Bertram. 

A new type of German mine, set off by the noise of a ship was discovered near Porthcawl. Two Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve officers, Lieutenant Baker and Sub-Lieutenant Cummins, succeeded in recovering safely a German acoustic mine from the River Ogmore near Porthcawl, allowing its mechanism to be studied at HMS Vernon and counter-measures developed. 

Losses: Luftwaffe 27: Fighter Command 11.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 31, 2010)

*30 October 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM:* In comparison to the past few days, German activity was reduced to reconnaissance and two main raids. Luftflotte 3 joined the action sending a force of over 100 aircraft consisting of fighters and fighter bombers which reached London and bombed a number of targets.

The first raid appeared on radar at about 1130 hours when several waves of Ju88s and Bf109s crossed the Channel towards the Kent coastline. At 1200 hours, 80 Luftwaffe aircraft flew into the Thames Estuary and at 1215 hours, 2 waves of 50 and 60 aircraft entered British airspace at Dymchurch. Six of the 10 RAF fighter squadrons on patrol sighted the German and attacked. For nearly two hours dogfights raged in the skies over Kent and Sussex involving Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 17, 32, 249 and 253 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66 and 222 Squadrons. Some of the Ju88's had penetrated into East Anglia and were intercepted by Hurricanes of No: 1 Squadron, scrambled from Wittering. P/O A.E. Davies of RAF No 222 Squadron was killed when he was shot down by a Bf 109 over Sussex at 1210 hours. His aircraft a Spitfire I (N3119) was repaired later and re-used. P/O H.P.M. Edridge of RAF No 222 Squadron was also killed when he crash landed his Spitfire I (K9939) after combat with a Bf 109 over Ewhurst.

At 1530 hours the second main raid of 130 Bf109s was crossing the coast near Dover and made for the areas of Maidstone and East London. This attack was divided into two phases. In the first about 80 Luftwaffe aircraft approached Maidstone of which 40 continued North West to South East London, where a few bombs were dropped; these latter aircraft were then intercepted and split up by two RAF Squadrons. In the second phase five small formations totaling about 50 aircraft crossed the Coast between Dover and Beachy Head, and one formation of 12 reached Harwich. Several of these formations were intercepted and quickly retired. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 17, 249, 253, 501 and 615 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41, 66, 92, 222 and 602 Squadrons were scrambled to intercept. Sgt L.A.Garvey of No 41 Squadron was killed when he was shot down in his Spitfire II (P7375) by a Bf 109 over Ashford, Kent at 1610 hours. Sgt W.B.Smith a Canadian from RAF No 602 Squadron was wounded when he force landed his Spitfire I (X4542) near Lydd at 1620 hours after being attacked by a Bf 109.

RAF No.1 Squadron Operational Record Book:


> "_Blue Section (B Flight) took part in an Army co-operation movement. This section was ordered to scramble base. Personnel: POs G.E. Goodman, R.G. Lewis and Sgt V. Jicha. E/a sighted. Goodman mistook it for a Blenheim. Lewis and Jicha recognized it as a Junkers 88 and shot it down. Sgt J. Dygryn crashed when landing, plane written off."_


During the night a major attack was mounted on London and the surrounding counties with smaller raids on the Midlands, Nottingham, Sheffield and the airfields of Duxford and Debden. The first night raiders crossed the coast soon after dark but the weather was bad and all were gone by 2400 hours. Feltwell (Norfolk) Aerodrome was subject to attacks by the Luftwaffe in three waves, at 1801, 1812 and 1818 hours. One hangar of RAF No 75 Squadron was hit and one aircraft set on fire, but this was quickly extinguished. Some damage was done to the structure and several craters were created. Mines were dropped off Harwich and the Thames Estuary.

Lt Robert Selby Armitage (1910-82), RNVR, did very dangerous work in September and October, once tackling a mine in a tree with no chance of escape if the fuse was activated. (George Cross)

Maj. Herbert John Leslie Barefoot (1887-1958 ), Royal Engineers, showed great courage as a bomb-disposal pioneer during September and October. (George Cross)

Flt-Lt Wilson Hodgson Charlton (1907-53) dealt with over 200 unexploded bombs while on bomb disposal duty during September and October. (George Cross)

Sub-Lt William Horace Taylor (b. 1908 ), RNVR, showed great gallantry in mine disposal throughout September and October, in particular regarding an operation at RAF Uxbridge in Middlesex. (George Cross)

Losses: Luftwaffe 8: Fighter Command 6.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 31, 2010)

*31 October 1940 Thursday
"FINI"
UNITED KINGDOM*: October 31st 1940 now goes down as the official date as the end of the Battle of Britain, even though Germany added the additional phases that included the bombing of London. For the last several months, the great air battle that had raged over south-east England was to go down in history as one of the most important battles that Britain had to overcome. The Luftwaffe, as the attacking force had a combined strength of bombers, fighters and fighter-bombers. There were huge numbers of aircrew both trained and straight out of flying school, and they had the advantage of flying by both day and by night. Fighter Command on the other hand, as the defending force had only front line fighters that combined did not equal the number of their enemy. They were also at a disadvantage as far as aircrew were concerned, often not enough to man the operational squadrons, who were also losing valuable aircraft daily. The biggest advantages that Britain had over Germany was the fact that they had the English Channel as a natural form of defense and the advantage of flying most of the time over home territory. From courage to casualties, Fighter Command defended with everything that they had even though the odds were far against them. The combined efforts of Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, Air Vice Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the Air Ministry, the 2,935 pilots that took part as well as the thousands of personnel that manned the radar stations, filter rooms and the operation rooms. The refuellers and armourers and fitters that kept the fighter aircraft in the air. All the combined efforts of these people proved that by working as a team, they could attain victory over an enemy that was fighting for all the wrong reasons. The Battle of Britain was epic that had no planned script, yet it had a cast of thousands, and each person that took part must be given credit for its success. The Battle of Britain marked the first defeat of Hitler's military forces, with air superiority seen as the key to victory.

The fact that the RAF had emerged apparently intact from nearly 4 months of day to day battle against a concerted attack by three Luftflotten of the Luftwaffe was of enormous significance. Against every expectation, to have won this victory meant that the rest of the world saw that Britain was a serious contender in the war against Hitler. For Britain itself, the victory meant that the Germans would not, after all, be marching down Whitehall in a repetition of their victory parade down the Champs Elysees. It meant also, that Britain would not have to experience the nightmare of invasion with the Gestapo making lists of thousands of English people whom they wanted to eliminate. From Churchill’s point of view it meant above all that he could show America that Britain was worth supporting.

At the time, Thursday 31st October 1940 was not known as the "official" end to the Battle of Britain, especially by the pilots still fighting, but ironically it proved to be one of the quietest days in four months. Only minor attacks were made which were nothing more that nuisance raids interrupting the dinner of many of the RAF pilots.

Throughout the day from 0730 hours until dusk, reconnaissance and scattered bombing raids were made over East Anglia, Kent, Sussex, South Wales, Hampshire and Lancashire. Bombs were dropped on the airfields of Bassingbourn, Martlesham and Poling with further targets in the Monmouth and Newport areas also being attacked. The Aerodrome at Lawford Heath, which was under construction, was attacked at 1345 hours and five HE were dropped and 16 wooden huts were badly damaged. The Royal Ordnance Factory at Glascoed was attacked by a single enemy aircraft at 1250 hours. The attacking aircraft dropped 12 bombs, three of which were unexploded and then proceeded to machine-gun the factory from a height not greater than 200 feet. The roof of the building was damaged. At 1325 hours, an HE fell on the Works of the British Portland Cement Co and damaged the electricians' shop. At 1444 hours, five enemy aircraft machine-gunned many houses in the vicinity of Castle Bromwich and some damage was done to roofs and glass from AA guns and blast. The Repairable Equipment Ltd Factory was the chief sufferer.

'SS Hillfern' (1,535t) a cargo ship, sailing from Sunderland to Cork with a cargo of coal, was sunk by German aircraft, NE of Kinnaird Head. At about 1100 hours a ship off Rattray Head and the Bell Rock Lighthouse was machine-gunned. While this ship was being salvaged in the afternoon it was again attacked.

One He 111 of III./KG 55 took off at 1045 hours on a mission to the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton but soon aborted the flight upon leaving the Villacoublay airfield.

Although several Fighter Command squadrons were scrambled to intercept or patrol during the day, there was no direct combat between the Luftwaffe and the RAF. The losses on both sides were due to accidents. A Hurricane from RAF No.43 Squadron based at Usworth near Sunderland, force-landed at Chirnside, Berwick, due to engine failure at 1030 hours. The pilot, Sergeant B. Malinowski was unhurt, the aircraft damaged but repairable.

During the night London and the Midlands were the targets with mines dropped off Spurn Head and the Thames Estuary. Luftwaffe activity was divided into two phases, one in the early evening and the other in the early morning. Adverse weather conditions accounting for intervening absence of any enemy operations. At 1825 hours the first night raiders (approximately 30) were leaving Dieppe on the usual North Westerly route. Strong westerly gales blew them off course so that landfalls were made in the Hastings/Dungeness area. These raids were joined by two from Calais and all proceeded towards West and Central London, though only a few achieved their objective. At 0245 hours two attacks developed with London and the Midlands as their respective objectives. The Midland raids of approximately six aircraft made landfall in the Weymouth area, the majority proceeding to Birmingham and in one or two cases further North. Approximately 25/30 raids from Dieppe/Le Havre Coast were concerned in the London attack. At 0500 hours the attack on London began to slacken and the last raids on the Midland area were leaving the country.

Losses: Luftwaffe 2: Fighter Command 1

Although the Battle of Britain between the RAF and the Luftwaffe was over, during the Blitz (September 1940 to May 1941) German aircraft delivered more than 35,000 tons of bombs to targets in Great Britain, with the loss of 650 aircraft. London was attacked 19 times during that period, with 18,800 tons of bombs. In London 60,000 houses were uninhabitable, 130,000 less badly damaged, and 16,000 totally destroyed. Three-quarters of the houses in the East End are of Stepney were estimated to be wrecked.

The Allied losses were 544 aircrew killed, 422 wounded and 1547 aircraft destroyed, while the Luftwaffe lost 2698 aircrew killed, and lost 1887 aircraft. During the first four months, (1 July - 31 October 1940), one Luftwaffe bomber unit, KG 51 lost 13 Ju 88s and 21 damaged.

2936 fighter pilots took part in the battle on the British side, including 595 non-British pilots. These included 145 pilots from Poland, 127 from New Zealand, 112 from Canada, 88 from Czechoslovakia, 28 from Belgium, 32 from Australia, 25 from South Africa, 13 from France, 10 from Ireland, 7 from America, and 1 from each of Jamaica, Palestine and Rhodesia.


----------



## Glider (Oct 31, 2010)

An excellent set of postings, Many thanks

The last photo sums it up better than anything I can say

They went with songs to the battle, they were young. 
Straight of limb, true of eyes, steady and aglow. 
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted, 
They fell with their faces to the foe. 

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old: 
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn. 
At the going down of the sun and in the morning, 
We will remember them.

That last picture says it al


----------



## Airframes (Oct 31, 2010)

Chris, you've provided a fantastic concise, accurate and easy to read day to day account of the most famous, and biggest, air battle in history, posted 70 years to the day, for each account. Very well done my friend, and thanks.


----------



## fastmongrel (Oct 31, 2010)

Many thanks for all your hard work Njaco I learnt an awful lot from your daily posts.


----------



## syscom3 (Oct 31, 2010)

Thanks NJACO.

No one who read this for the past several months cannot say they learned something new!


----------



## Njaco (Oct 31, 2010)

Thanks guys, I LOVED doing it!


----------



## vikingBerserker (Oct 31, 2010)

It was a pleasure to read.


----------



## John Vasco (Nov 1, 2010)

Otto Hintze was NOT acting-Gruppenkommandeur of Erprobungsgruppe 210 when he was shot down on 29th October 1940. His 3. Staffel had been attached to II./LG 2 since early October in order to fly fighter-bomber missions alongside that Gruppe. 3./Erpr. Gr. 210 were attached to Erprobungsgruppe 210 in name only from then on.

Following the loss of acting-Gruppenkommandeur Oblt. Werner Weymann on 5th October, the Bf 110s of Erpr. Gr. 210 were nominally led by Wolfgang Schenck until Major Lessmann was posted in on 1st November 1940.

Unfortunately it is a common misconception that Otto Hintze led Erpr. Gr. 210 in October 1940.

Source: the man himself.


----------



## Glider (Nov 1, 2010)

Well Njaco, scores of postings, many hundreds of pages in length should anyone want to print it of very fine detail, in which I agree that everyone found something new, and what do we find at the end. That your not perfect, missing one persons posting for one month in the entire war. Shame on you

John, the information is of interest, but the tone needs working on.


----------



## Bernhart (Nov 1, 2010)

"P/O A.E.Davies of RAF No 222 Squadron was killed when he was shot down by a Bf 109 over Sussex at 1210 hours. His aircraft a Spitfire I (N3119) was repaired later and re-used,"

how is this possible? was plane on the ground or landing? hard to imagine a plane being shot down and being repaired.


----------



## Njaco (Nov 2, 2010)

Glider, no worries!  I expected some mistakes including one nobody has caught yet.

John, thanks for that. I believe I got that from a book by Eric Mombeek which is usually accurate. But I defer to you, kind sir!

and Bern, check this......

N3119 Ia 389 EA MIII FF 28-10-39 6MU 3-11-39 HQ Hornchurch 4-1-40 602S 14-3-40 AST 22-8-40 222S 12-9-40 shot down by Bf109 12-05hrs P/O Davies killed 30-10-40 AST SOC 5-11-40 cancel 16-2-41 53OTU 5-6-42 

production page 002


----------



## Bernhart (Nov 2, 2010)

would love to see details of this!


----------



## Crimea_River (Nov 2, 2010)

It's not unusual for damgaed aircraft to be patched up and re-used. I don't know the details of this particualr case, but it's possible the pilot, badly wounded, managed to belly land the plane but then later died. The plane could have been repaired relatively easily.


----------



## Njaco (Nov 3, 2010)

Anyone who wants to see what some of the places during the BoB are like today, please check GeeDee's thread about his two day tour.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/wa...st-october-2010-70th-anniversary-26827-2.html


----------



## Njaco (Nov 9, 2010)

another interesting tidbit source unknown...


----------



## Geedee (Nov 9, 2010)

What a bl**dy fantastic thread !. I will admit its on a part of the forum I dont normally look at....I can see now that I've been missing out somewhat !.

Been busy trying to figure out how many mornings I have to get to work extra early, to enable me to print this epic off on the works printer (but dont tell anyone !) current estimate is all of next month ....gulp. Once printed, this will definately accompany me next year when Tony and I...and any-one who can join us !!... do another Battle of Britain pilgrimage

Chris, you should have a go at making a 'front cover' picture for this thread. That would be the icing on the cake !!

Top marks


----------



## Njaco (Nov 9, 2010)

Thanks Gary. I'm sure I've made a few mistakes and there are some spelling problems along the way but I had fun doing this. Thanks everyone!


----------



## Geedee (Nov 9, 2010)

Njaco said:


> there are some spelling problems along the way



LOL. I can rarely reply to a topic without getting my spelling rs about face, you have nothing to worry about !


----------



## Njaco (Nov 9, 2010)

How is this for a cover? Or I could try something in black white?


----------



## T Bolt (Nov 9, 2010)

It has been a wonderful thread Chris, and we all appreciate the hard work that you put into it. Like Gary I too I'm looking for the opportunity to print it out at on the sly. I've been saving it to word, and it turned out to be an amazing 318 pages and 163,477 words. I even made up a cover for it.
WELL DONE CHRIS!


----------



## Njaco (Nov 9, 2010)

> ....an amazing 318 pages and 163,477 words.



[email protected]! that much!!!!

thats a great cover!


----------



## Njaco (Nov 10, 2010)

also did a B/W for those without color printers


----------



## Geedee (Nov 10, 2010)

B*ll*x ....! Gonna have to print three copies now !!!


----------



## John Vasco (Apr 10, 2011)

Glider said:


> Well Njaco, scores of postings, many hundreds of pages in length should anyone want to print it of very fine detail, in which I agree that everyone found something new, and what do we find at the end. That your not perfect, missing one persons posting for one month in the entire war. Shame on you
> 
> John, the information is of interest, but the tone needs working on.


 
I don't need you to tell me how to word a post, when it is providing factually correct information from an actual participant. I corrected wrong information which I have seen on several websites over a long period of time.

I post on here to provide people with information from the decades of research I have done. I don't need sarcasm from people like you. Or perhaps you've done more and know more than I do...?

I would suggest the tone of your whole reply needs working on.


----------



## Glider (Apr 11, 2011)

John Vasco said:


> I don't need you to tell me how to word a post, when it is providing factually correct information from an actual participant. I corrected wrong information which I have seen on several websites over a long period of time.
> 
> I post on here to provide people with information from the decades of research I have done. I don't need sarcasm from people like you. Or perhaps you've done more and know more than I do...?
> 
> I would suggest the tone of your whole reply needs working on.


 
As to the tone of my reply, that is something that we will have to disagree on, it was in my opinion deserved and deliberate. There were two points that got my goat as they say.

1) The emphasis of the word NOT, it wasn't needed, added nothing and put an aggressive tone that was out of place.
2) I cannot find anywhere any acknowledgement or thanks from you for the huge effort put into this thread, which surpasses anything that I have seen on any thread on any forum.

The fact that you have done decades of research doesn't excuse you from acknowledging the work that went into it. Neither does it mean that you have the right to be aggresive. As I said I found what you said interesting, it was the how it was said.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 11, 2011)

congratulations Nj, well done. from that graph you posted i can see why the battle was basically lost from the 2nd week of september.....

I may print this whole thread off as well and put it in my library. Its an excellent account my friend


----------



## Njaco (Apr 11, 2011)

John and Glider - please no fisticuffs. I know you both from the forum and would not take any comment from either as an insult. Its all good. I was not offended and actually amazed that Mombeek got that little bit wrong.

Can't we all jus get along?!


----------



## Njaco (Apr 11, 2011)

Thanks Parsifal. I enjoyed doing it!


----------



## Glider (Apr 11, 2011)

Njaco said:


> John and Glider - please no fisticuffs. I know you both from the forum and would not take any comment from either as an insult. Its all good. I was not offended and actually amazed that Mombeek got that little bit wrong.
> 
> Can't we all jus get along?!


 
Happily, I will now go back to being a quiet old man with my slippers and Scotch by the fire.

Thanks again


----------



## John Vasco (Apr 11, 2011)

Glider said:


> As to the tone of my reply, that is something that we will have to disagree on, it was in my opinion deserved and deliberate. There were two points that got my goat as they say.
> 
> 1) The emphasis of the word NOT, it wasn't needed, added nothing and put an aggressive tone that was out of place.
> 2) I cannot find anywhere any acknowledgement or thanks from you for the huge effort put into this thread, which surpasses anything that I have seen on any thread on any forum.
> ...


 
Your post was deliberate, but in my opinion, not deserved. It was sarcastic and taking the piss.

1. Your use of the word 'emphasis' sums up exactly what I was doing in putting the word 'not' in capitals. If you thought it was agressive, that's your problem.
2. There is no obligation upon anyone, on any forum, to state anything about threads or posts. You imply that I should post an acknowledgement or thanks for the thread. Why? I am not beholden to it, or its author. I really don't follow the logic or criticism in your second point.

I have not claimed the right to anything. You are the one putting that on me. Also, I don't see the connection between 'decades of research' and 'acknowledging the work', as you put it. The two do not inter-connect. What's your point exactly?

To reiterate: I posted the correct information regarding Otto Hintze. What had been posted was incorrect information, which has been perpetrated in print, and since its advent, the internet. The simple fact is, the correct information has been out there since 1990.

You are a stright talker, and I have no problem with that. But there is no excuse for the sarcasm and jibe that you displayed in quoting/replying to my post regarding Otto Hintze.

And in case there are any doubters out there, here's a pic of me with Otto Hintze taken at his home in Munich. He's on the left of the photo. On the right is Eberhard von Treutschler d'Elsa, Staffelkapitän of 5./ZG 26 during the Western Campaign in the Spring of 1940.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 11, 2011)

Alright enough! Njaco already asked everyone to calm down. He said he took no offense to your post and he explained that to Glider. Glider said no problems. 

Lets get this back on topic and leave the bickering to private messages, okay...


----------



## parsifal (Apr 18, 2011)

So, NJ, having gone to all this effort, i invite you to summarise your opinions on the battle....was there a winner, what mistake did each side make, and could the battle have gone differently??????


----------



## Njaco (Apr 19, 2011)

I'll have to think a bit on that. My first impression is that Park and Douglas shepherded their forces too much. I'm leaning towards the opinion that if the RAF used everything available in the first few weeks to put a hurtin' on the Luftwaffe, it might not have gone on so long - who knows. And it might have gone differently for the RAF if dumb pride on the Luftwaffe's part hadn't blinded them. Reading the book "Miracle of Dunkirk" by Walter Lord and I can only surmise that Goering was eager to show his buddy his planes could do the job after being embarassed at Dunkirk.


----------



## Njaco (Jun 21, 2011)

Hate to do this guys but I've found some more info and pics and I'm updating parts of the thread. If it helps, the post should state update by njaco at the bottom. But its some great stuff.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 22, 2011)

Still want to apply gentle pressure on you about a summary NJ. I see it as an important end point to reach


----------



## Njaco (Jun 22, 2011)

Ok will do.

While I believe there was no clear winner, the UK comes out on top as winner for the fact that it destroyed the plans of Hitler and created the first true opponent for Germany. Add in the fact that it woke up Wash DC that the Brits weren't going to go down quietly and were a worthwhile endeavour for the US.

For me, it appears as the proving ground for many tranis of thought between the wars as to how to implement this new war machine - the airplane - into battle plans. Both sides lived and learned from mistakes ( the Brits with 'Vic' formations and the Germans with restricted close fighter support of bombers among others). The one thing I get out of this is how so different the two sides were in the armed forces. While a pilot in the RAF could go against convention, such as Malan with the finger four, The LW pilot really had no outlet and looked upon the daily orders as tiring and sometimes useless which destroyed moral and cohesion. While I think the LW airman was better trained, the RAF pilot had a cause.

But I will tell you, there are so many factors that come up when looking at this period, I sometimes find it hard to pinpoint one particular 'Ah-hah' moment.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 22, 2011)

"tranis of thought" I didnt know we had thoughtful cross dressing pilots in WWII.......

Seriously I think I agree with you on all points. Bravo Zulu NJ


----------



## syscom3 (Jun 22, 2011)

NJACO .....

Britain comes out a clear winner simply because it accomplished its strategic and tactical goals.

For tactical goals, keep control of the air and preventing the destruction of the RAF.
For strategic goals, preventing an invasion of the homeland.


----------



## Njaco (Jun 22, 2011)

I agree. Its just that I don't think the RAF had very much of a goal after Dunkirk except to prepare whereas the LW was on the offensive and couldn't achive its goals because of the RAF. That seems -to me - more important. But I agree with what you posted. 

'tranis'[email protected], missed that one!!


----------



## psteel (Jun 25, 2011)

> The Allied losses were 544 aircrew killed, 422 wounded and 1547 aircraft destroyed, while the Luftwaffe lost 2698 aircrew killed, and lost 1887 aircraft. During the first four months, (1 July - 31 October 1940), one Luftwaffe bomber unit, KG 51 lost 13 Ju 88s and 21 damaged.



Doesnt sound like much of a victory. When we were kids, we were told the RAF shot down the LW at a rate of 4:1 explaining why it was such a victory. I remember my mom saying that was rubbish, and during the blitz they always cut all the BBC claims in half when they heard them. More resently the claim was revised down to 1150 RAF planes lost Vs 1750 LW planes. Still a victory but much more of a mariginal one. Now we are claiming 1547 RAF destroyed Vs 1887 LW aircraft. Maybe if we wait long enough the Germans will shoot down more British planes than they lose?


----------



## Njaco (Jun 27, 2011)

The objective of Goering and Hitler wasn't achieved because of the RAF. Sounds like a victory to me.


----------



## psteel (Jun 28, 2011)

Njaco said:


> The objective of Goering and Hitler wasn't achieved because of the RAF. Sounds like a victory to me.


 
Close but not quite. The objectives of Hitler and Goering wasn't achieved because they were unreachable in the context of the situation they created. A secret LW wargame in 1937 predicted, that even if their bombers were entirely Ju-88 and they operated from the French, Beligian and Dutch coasts, they could still not defeat the RAF, without a multi engined long-range strategic bomber.


----------



## Mustang nut (Jun 28, 2011)

psteel said:


> Close but not quite. The objectives of Hitler and Goering wasn't achieved because they were unreachable in the context of the situation they created. A secret LW wargame in 1937 predicted, that even if their bombers were entirely Ju-88 and they operated from the French, Beligian and Dutch coasts, they could still not defeat the RAF, without a multi engined long-range strategic bomber.


 
I agree, the BoB was supposed to be the start of an invasion. To mount an invasion Germany needed to clear the RAF from the sky and still have an airforce themselves. During the battle fighter production increased markedly in the UK but hardly at all in Germany. If you call the end of the Battle October then the RAF was stronger than when it started and the LW was weaker.

IMO the victory was purely psychological, in 1939 the LW was considered by many to be unbeatable and a war winning service on its own by the end of 1940 it wasnt.


----------



## psteel (Jun 28, 2011)

Looking through some internet sites [Uboat Net and Navypedia] plus books [O’Hara’s German fleet at war 1939-1945 and Smith "Hold the Narrow Sea"], I have some more info on the channel naval engagements.

Royal Navy (United Kingdom)
http://www.uboat.net/allies/warships/types.html?navy=HMS&type=Destroyer

July 4th Stuka attacked the channel convoy OA178, sinking 4 merchants and damaging 6 more. Then they hit Portland Harbor and sunk a tug plus a flak ship and damaged 3 more merchant ships.

July 4th German SBoot attacked the channel convoy, sinking 3 merchants. 
July 7-9th LW attacks damaged one Steamers and a minesweeper and slightly damaged a couple of more vessels

July 10th Stuka attacks damaged two Steamers and sunk two more while damaging a couple of auxiliary warships. 
July 13th More Stuka attacks damaged two Steamers and sunk another as well as crippling the destroyer’s _ HMS Vanessa _ and under repair for 4 months

July 19th More Stuka attacks damaging the destroyer’s _ HMS Beagle _ which had to be taken under tow.
July 20th LW attacks damaged two armed trawlers while 3 Steamers were sunk along with the destroyer _ HMS Brazen _ 

July 24th three armed trawlers were sunk by LW attacks
July 25th Convoy CW8 was hammered by 90 LW aircraft including Stuka attacks and sunk 5 merchant vessels plus damaged another 5 vessels. Later two RN DD each took couple of bomb hits in further LW attacks.

July 26th 3 German Sboot attacked a convoy sinking three small merchant vessels
July 27th In the port of Dover _ HMS Sandhurst _ _ HMS Codrington _ were sunk after several surprise by 2 dozen Me-109 Jubo /110 attacks , while _ HMS Walpole_ was crippled, the day after it arrived as a replacement. In addition 40-escorted Stuka heavily bombed Dover and two more auxiliary warships were crippled, for the loss of 6 Stuka.

July 27th _ HMS Wren _ sunk after attack by He111 bombers
July 29th _ HMS Delight _ sunk after attack by 15 LW bombers
July 30th _ HMS Whitshed _ is mined and crippled off the Thames 
Aug 2nd a Merchant ship was sunk in an attack

Aug 8th 4 German SBoot attacked a channel convoy sinking 4 merchants and damaging a couple more. This was followed by several massed Stuka attacks that suffered 32 lost DB in exchange for the loss of 20 RAF fighters. These strikes sunk 3 more merchant vessels as well as damaging another 7 more.

Aug 24th _ HMS Acheron _ Attacked by 40 Ju-88 suffered a direct hit and 3 near misses, that put the ship in repairs for 4 months. 

Aug 31st


> HMS Express struck a mine and was badly damaged, HMS Esk went to her assistance and hit mine and sank immediately, HMS Ivanhoe also went to her assistance and hit a mine and was badly damaged, so much so she she had to be sunk by HMS Kelvin.


 Allied Warships of WWII - Destroyer HMS Esk - uboat.net

Sept 8th _ HMS Galatea _ was damaged knocked out for a month ,by newly laid mines.
Sept 10/11th three British Destroyers swept the Channel at night and sank two barges a trawler and a tugboat.

Sept 11th _ HMS Atherstone_ was crippled by 3 direct hits and 5 near misses from a Ju-88 squadron attack.
October 7 ; _ HMS Hambeldon_ was crippled by mines laid by the KM near South Forland.

October 12th the 5 German TB expended the bulk of their ammo [~ 300 shells per TB], to sink the four anti invasion Trawlers. A RN destroyer squadron then set upon the Germans at night. Despite out gunning the Germans 3:1 [probably 10:1 in main gun ammo] ; being 3-4 knots faster and opening fire at ~ 5000 yards, the Germans escaped using smoke, maneuvers and clever deception involving depth charges to simulate minefield.

Dusk on the 17th October, A British Cruiser - Destroyer squadron of 7 warships engaged a flotilla of 4 German Destroyers also out gunning them 3:1. While the British opened fire at long range [25,000 yards], the German destroyers were only able to make 29knots in the moderate seas. The British seemed to close the range to 17,000 yards but several LW attacks on the British combined with torpedoes launched from the German destroyers allowed them to open range again and make good an escape. The British Cruiser expended 1200 shells getting a couple of near misses on one German Destroyer and hitting another destroyer twice with little apparent damage. In both of these encounters it took the British warships 8 hours to react to the German flotillas. As the British squadron returned to base they were attacked several times by RAF Blenheim’s .All though both sides fired, no hits were recorded.

On the 19th October the _ HMS Venetia_ was lost to mines laid by the KM in the Channel.

Oct 28th the _ HMS Walpole and Windsor_ was crippled to mines laid by the KM in the south coast and out of repairs for months.



Over a three-month period in the Channel area [July-Oct], the LW/KM sank 8 destroyers and crippled 13 more [each out for months]. A further 37 Steamers and auxiliary vessels were also sunk, while another 33 were damaged.


----------



## Njaco (Jun 28, 2011)

I appriciate your opinion psteel. Regardless as to whether it was unreachable or not, it was still attempted and thwarted by the RAF. Are there any historical examples of an unreachable objective finally being overcome?


----------



## psteel (Jun 28, 2011)

Hi Njaco. I have no answers only more questions. I suppose anything can be said to be impossible until it is attempted.

As an aside I was looking at the data and note that in July the Germans mounted 13 attacks on these convoys/Harbors and many more mining missions in between, while the activity in Aug-Sep-Oct, looks like no more than 3-5 incidents per month and most of those were mining incidents. Also I note that the bulk of the incidents in July were air attacks. I also note that 9 RN destroyers were either crippled or sunk during July. Given the length of time they were in repair, they would not have been able to participate in any anti invasion mission. 

The Germans also sunk or crippled another 48 merchant/Auxiliary warships. Given that the majority of the anti invasion fleet were small slow auxiliary vessels with minimum armament, they would best resemble these merchant vessels as targets. It also looks like the LW attacks involved only 1/4 of their Stuka fleet, at most.

From the German perspective, they should have kept up the pressure of July, through Aug-Sept-Oct. Infact they should have expanded these attacks on coastal targets/naval targets. It seems these LW attacks were costly to the RN and difficult to counter for the RAF, since they were at the limits of intercept range.


----------



## Njaco (Jun 28, 2011)

I think until they had sufficent resources to properly attack the RAF, the LW contented itself with going after the shipping in July. Later, the attacks were more to bring the RAF up to battle and destroy, as this was the true objective on the part of LW. After a few encounters the RAF caught on and backed off.

I agree that shipping attacks should have had greater weight within the LW or Kriegsmarine but outside the scope of the BoB. I've always thought that more LW a/c committed to shipping strikes coupled with the wolf packs might have crippled the shipping for a bit.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 30, 2011)

My two cents worth

RAF can only claim a partial victory in thwarting invasion. The failure of the Germans to implement an invasion in fact was the product of a number of converging failures, including

1) a lack of prewar preprations. The consequent makeshift prepration in the channel were viewed with outright skepticism by the people on the ground. The preparations were never a serious attempt at a channel crossing in my opinion, or if they were, were a prime example of amateur hour. I say that because of point (2) (see below).

2) Reading the actual Fuhrer directive for Sealion, I am struck by its lack of committmnt. I forget the precise wording of the document, it basically says...."preparations are to be made for a cross channel assualt, and if neccessary are to be carried out. This suggst hitler himself was never committed to the assault. He actually did not want Britainor her empire to be defeated, because he thought this would only benefit other enemies of germany. He clung to the view that britain would cave in to the threat of invasion

3) expanding on Point (1), the invasion fleet had an expected fleet speed of just 2 knots, but thats with a favourable current. Remember the Germans were atttempting to utilize river barges in an open water body, towed by tugs. Problems would arise for this arrangement, however, if ther was any sort of current. A post war study by the RN, estimated that the real rate of advance would be more like 1 knot in the prevailing current, and the distance to the landing point more like 80 miles, after the embarkation and debarkation points are considered, as well as the currents. That means that the all up time for the cross channel voyage was something i the order of 120 hours....more than enough time for the RN to tear it to pieces. thats with or without the Germans holding air superiority over southern England. Having control of the air is just a bonus, not a prequisite for crossong the channel, but the abject preparations would gurantee failure. 

4) That is not to say that control of the air was not a critical battle, its just not critical to a crossing of the channel. The importance of the battle is simply about who controlled the airspace over southern England and the survival of the RAF. Saying that the British objectives were simplistic is generally true, but achieving that objective was incredibly difficult. Dowdings defensive plans could not have been achieved by any other force in 1940, including the LW. his handling of the battle was as close to perfect as one can be. He always avoided th pitfall of over-comitting the RAF, this cost more aircraft overall, but minimised the risk of exhausting the RAF at any particular point. By contrast the LW, particularly its fighter arm was exhausted by October. Its seviceability rates were down to below 50%, its formations worn thin, its resolve shaken. Like it or not, they had been defeated, and they knew it. 

5) Mention needs to be made about how th world viewed Britain and the battle. Most nations prior to the battle did not give britain much chance of survival. This included the US and Spain. As the battle progressed, this view was generally reversed, and by battles end Britain had pretty much guranteed US support and deterred Spanish entry into the war. Most of the neutrals or exiled governments had pledged their supports (and their extensive merchant fleets) to the allied cause. This was a crucial and tremendous victory in itself

6) A cautionary note on losses. I assume that these figures only include full write offs, and dont include aircraft damaged. This probably makes the respective totals not comparable. What the RAF might classify as a write off might not be a write off in LW terms. Im not as sure as the RAF, but the LW had a procedure of giving a percentage figure for damage. They classified anything above 70% as a write off. However this is a totally unrealistic benchmark. Truth is, anything much above 30% damage was never going to fly again. I am willing to bet the RAF was more realistic in its damage assessments than the LW...reason.....Hitler and Goring were obsessed with totals, not with airworthy craft...

7) In any event, loss of machines is not so important. Its the loss of aircrew thats the important number. NJ mentioned 544 pilots lost from the RAF. I agree with that number. Missing though are the numbers of german aircrew. Because they were employing Bombers, there losses are going to exceed 1800, probably more like 4000. Given the Germans were losing highly experienced air crew, in exchange for only moderately expereineced or even inexperienced RAF aircrew, and that the RAF re-supply of aircrew was alrady overtaking the LW re-supply, the extent of the material victory is brought into sharp focus.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jun 30, 2011)

Excellent points. I would add to this the LW switching from military targets to civilian ones. IMO The RAF was on the ropes but the LW switch gave them enough time to regroup.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 3, 2011)

The lack of targetting priorities and a clear strategy by the LW was always a problem. Deighton argues that any one of the strategies explored by the LW during the battle, if they stuck to it, was likley to succeed, but they lacked the sense of purpose and direction that the RAF had. For the RAF there were just two matters to consider....continued dispute of the airspace, and continued existence of the RAF as a credible challenge to the LW over SE England. The RAF achieved their objectives, whilst the LW was still making up its mind as to what strategy it should be following....


----------



## Njaco (Jul 3, 2011)

I wanted to add a fantastic website that did just what I have done here but is far more extensive. Really a great site!!!!

The Battle Of Britain Weather Diary - Netweather Community Forums


----------



## stona (Jul 3, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> I agree, the BoB was supposed to be the start of an invasion.



No it wasn't. The means to mount a seaborne landing were not available to the Germans in 1940. Tanks landed from Rhine barges with concrete and railway line in their bottoms?Assault troops paddling ashore in inflatables?
It was an effort to force Britain to a negotiated peace favourable to Germany and allowing her to enact her agenda in Eastern Europe.
I notice that Parsifal has gone into some detailed reasoning in a later post so I won't.
Steve


----------



## Njaco (Jul 3, 2011)

Stona, I'm not sure how to answer you but while Germany hoped that Britain would sue for peace, Hitler went ahead with an invasion plan as outlined in Fuhrer Directive # 16...

Fuhrer Directive 16

"_Since England, in spite of her hopeless military situation, shows no signs of being ready to come to an understanding, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England and, if necessary, to carry it out.

The aim of this operation will be to eliminate the English homeland as a base for the prosecution of the war against Germany and, if necessary, to occupy it completely_."

Now look at this from the document..
"_2. These preparations must also create such conditions as will make a landing in England possible, viz:

(a) The English Air Force must be so reduced morally and physically that it is unable to deliver any significant attack against the German crossing."_

The Battle of Britain - the RAF against the Luftwaffe - was the preparation for the start of an invasion against England. What other reason was there for attacking England as such with the LW, stock-piling barges in French ports, etc?


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 3, 2011)

Excellent info.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 4, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Stona, I'm not sure how to answer you but while Germany hoped that Britain would sue for peace, Hitler went ahead with an invasion plan as outlined in Fuhrer Directive # 16...
> 
> Fuhrer Directive 16
> 
> ...



I can agree that without the aerial victory the germans were never gooing to implement Sealion. However, the question is, if they had won air superiority, would they have carried through, and secondly, if they had, would it have been successful?

As I pointed out in my original post, I think the circumspection in the fuhrer directive is important....."and if necessary we will carry it out" why did he need to say "and if necessary" was there doubt or hesitation in his mind???? I think there must be, because his other directives do not use such circumspect language. Compare it it Directive Number 21 for example, and you wil be struck by the different tone in the rhetoric.

I have serious doubts that Hitler ever intended to undertake Sealion as a serious venture. I think he hoped to win air superiority as a bargaining chip....to conbvince the british government of the hopelessness of their situation. secondarily i think he wanted to isolate the British politically, by making them appear as a defeated nation. How better to do that, short of amphibious invasion, than to have flets of Luftwaffe bombers roaming unopposed over england. He never achieved that.....

And if he was fair din*kum, then his planning for thactual invasion was attrocious. Crappy transport, no escort, vulnerable to surcface subsurface, and airborne attack, it would have been a massacre. And after September, even if they had gotten ashore, they would have been met by a re-invigorated and equipped British Army fighting on its home soil for its very existence. Thats got to be a recipe built in hell IMO


----------



## Hop (Jul 4, 2011)

> As I pointed out in my original post, I think the circumspection in the fuhrer directive is important....."and if necessary we will carry it out" why did he need to say "and if necessary" was there doubt or hesitation in his mind????



Because he thought bombing alone would force Britain to sue for peace.



> I have serious doubts that Hitler ever intended to undertake Sealion as a serious venture. I think he hoped to win air superiority as a bargaining chip....to conbvince the british government of the hopelessness of their situation. secondarily i think he wanted to isolate the British politically, by making them appear as a defeated nation. How better to do that, short of amphibious invasion, than to have flets of Luftwaffe bombers roaming unopposed over england.



I think, above all, he wanted Britain out of the way so that he would be free to invade Russia. He didn't want a 2 front war.

I think the difference in tone between directive 16 and 21 is because Hitler wanted Russia. He just wanted Britain to go away.

But that doesn't mean the invasion wasn't serious. It was planned and organised to the best of Germany's ability. Granted with hindsight it would have been a disaster, but the Germans overestimated their own ability and underestimated Britain's, so it was far less clear at the time.

It's worth noting that when Hitler did eventually call off the invasion, he ordered some small scale preparations to carry on as a bluff. The original orders were "prepare for invasion", after the cancellation it became "cancel most of the preparations, keep some going to fool the British". If the invasion had never been serious in the first place, the orders (at the most senior levels) would have reflected that.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jul 4, 2011)

"... by battles end Britain had pretty much guaranteed US support and deterred *Spanish* entry into the war ...."

The part about _Spain _is most significant, Parsifal. Franco was a shrewd man and he wasn't going to back a loser. He made_ that_ call by October, 1940, I guessing. 

In the end - it doesn't matter whether Hitler intended to invade or not. What matters is how Britain responded - having lost an army on the continent but having heroically _recovered_ the men off the beaches. To the British public the Germans were coming. It's an _island_, remember, with a long history of people _arriving_, and not leaving .

I'm glad this thread has gone active again. Last year I followed the dailies eagerly. Thanks, Njaco. 

MM


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 4, 2011)

At the time of writing the directive it was expected by many that the RAF would be swept away in weeks by September that obviously wasnt the case.


----------



## stona (Jul 6, 2011)

I'm with Parsifal,the invasion was a bluff. Hitler made plenty of orders and directives throughout the war which were at best fanciful. I don't believe that the high command of the Wermacht believed that a seaborne invasion was a practical proposition. I've read the directives and seen the plans as I'm sure many of us have. I've seen the same things for Moscow,Stalingrad,Leningrad,much later Antwerp and many more but that don't make it so. We'll never know what was in the mind of the Fuerher but I doubt he believed it either. The Army didn't have a single landing craft! Rhetoric like "The English air force must be reduced etc" is one thing they thought they could do. Had they succeeded who knows what may have happened politically in Britain and diplomatically in a settlement. One thing that wouldn't have happened,militarily, was a seaborne invasion.
I have a ludicrous image in my mind of soldiers paddling ashore in inflatables whilst flat bottomed river barges,the ones that didn't founder on the way,attempt to land tanks in the swell. All armies in 1940,the germans included,struggled to cross a river. Just compare the german capability in 1940 with the allied resources used in Overlord.......ridiculous.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Njaco (Jul 6, 2011)

ahhh but Hitler was invincble. Didn't he tell his genrals France could be taken and it was against what the OKH thought? Hindsight is one thing. You have to gauge the atmosphere in Germany at the time. Victory was assured!


----------



## parsifal (Jul 6, 2011)

Njaco said:


> ahhh but Hitler was invincble. Didn't he tell his genrals France could be taken and it was against what the OKH thought? Hindsight is one thing. You have to gauge the atmosphere in Germany at the time. Victory was assured!



That wqs the image he wanted to project. his self image was a lot more modest.

Hitler, in fact was an opportunist, a gambler. He would follow the pathway of least resistance, seeking the cheap and easy victories. You mentioned his intervention on Plan Yellow (invasion of France)....true enough....what is missing from your summation, however, is that he got abad case of jitters half way through, that allowed the BEF and half the french army in the pocket to escape. He had the same crisi of nerves at Narvik, and again after Crete. KM ops were riddled with his timid interventions. later, as the fortunes of war forced him on the defensive he favoured a static defence over mobile operations, because it was a concept he could understand. His whole war strategy was based on the premise of cheap and easy victories. If things got hard, he tended to lose his nerve and bravado and look for alternatives. 

Perhaps the best analogy of how he would have reacted if the LW had won air superiority in 1940 over SE England would be to look at the other great (planned) opposed airborne/amphibious operation.....the invasion of Malta. Shaken by the experiences of his airborne forces over Crete and having to rely on italian transport for the amphibious component, he opted for something he could understand, an alternative.....in this case, the prospective conquest of Egypt. This was in spite of the fact that over malta, the germans had won air superiority at the time of the prospective invasion. He lost his nerve, at the prospect of an opposed landing, one with much better propsects than Sea Lion. Though we are dealing with extrapolations here, why would we expect him to act much differently in the Channel in 1940, to the way he acted two years later over Malta???? Added toi this his stated admiration of the british empire, and his reluctance to dismember it, and i think we have a pretty strong case to question the true intent of the invasion preparations


----------



## stona (Jul 7, 2011)

We (the British) have contributed to the perception of Hitler's invasion plans with our reaction at the time. Whether or not the British government really believed that an invasion was possible it was deemed judicious to infect the British public with "invasion fever". This is done at critical times in our history. The British are an island race and particularly susceptible to this virulent disease whose main symptoms are hysteria and patriotic speeches.
Elizabeth I alleged speech at the time of the Armada contains the sort of rhetoric heard at a time when Napoleon was supposedly poised to invade and in the famous "fight them on the beaches" speech from Churchill.

"I know I have but the body of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart of a king, and of a king of England, too; and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realms: to which, rather than any dishonor should grow by me, I myself will take up arms." 

Her Majesty at least was facing a genuine invasion attempt. My Grandmother,who lived in Canterbury (Kent,South East England), was not but was expecting to be confronted by German parachutists every time she nipped out to the shops! Statistically she was more likely to be shot by the Local Defence Volunteers.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 7, 2011)

stona said:


> Her Majesty at least was facing a genuine invasion attempt. My Grandmother,who lived in Canterbury (Kent,South East England), was not but was expecting to be confronted by German parachutists every time she nipped out to the shops! Statistically she was more likely to be shot by the Local Defence Volunteers.
> Cheers
> Steve


 
Very good point steve and parsival, as parsival said Hitler was a gambler. The opposite of invasion fever is complacency. If Britain hadnt taken an invasion attempt seriously I think that would increase the chances of Hitler taking a gamble.


----------



## Hop (Jul 7, 2011)

Churchill didn't really believe the Germans would attempt an invasion either, until he started getting Enigma decrypts showing the extent of the preparations.

Whether Hitler would have gone through with the invasion or not we will never know. We know, from the German records, that the invasion was prepared as a genuine operation at the highest levels. 

Hitler hoped for an easy victory. That doesn't mean he would have backed away from an invasion if bombing alone didn't seem to be doing the job.



> Perhaps the best analogy of how he would have reacted if the LW had won air superiority in 1940 over SE England would be to look at the other great (planned) opposed airborne/amphibious operation.....the invasion of Malta. Shaken by the experiences of his airborne forces over Crete and having to rely on italian transport for the amphibious component, he opted for something he could understand, an alternative



But in 1940 he didn't have the experience of Crete. He was fresh from the battles of Norway and France. If the Luftwaffe had indeed driven the RAF from the SE of England, then he'd have had an unbroken string of successes. I think, given that background, he'd have tried an invasion if he had air superiority.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Jul 7, 2011)

"..... The British are an island race and particularly susceptible to this virulent disease whose main symptoms are hysteria and patriotic speeches."

REALLY Stona .... . This certainly has been Britain's undoing then ..... hysteria and patriotic speeches?

MM


----------



## Mustang nut (Jul 7, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> "..... The British are an island race and particularly susceptible to this virulent disease whose main symptoms are hysteria and patriotic speeches."
> 
> REALLY Stona .... . This certainly has been Britain's undoing then ..... hysteria and patriotic speeches?
> 
> MM


 I cant think of many wars without hysteria and patriotic speeches. Churchill was good at them but so were Roosevelt,De Gaulle, Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin I believe.


----------



## stona (Jul 7, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> "..... The British are an island race and particularly susceptible to this virulent disease whose main symptoms are hysteria and patriotic speeches."
> 
> REALLY Stona .... . This certainly has been Britain's undoing then ..... hysteria and patriotic speeches?
> 
> MM



I was making a serious point in a humorous way. 
Invasion fever served a purpose,it got the majority of the population onside. It got the Local Defence Volunteers out every night although if they'd lived up to their nick name (Look,Duck,Vanish) they might not have been terribly effective. They were good at taking pot shots at local people who ignored their road blocks,sadly some were killed. It got my Nan looking for paratroopers over Canterbury. Well to do families sought out lethal pills to kill themselves with. There are endless accounts of people living along the South coast reacting to the slightest unusual sight or sound by deciding that "it's the invasion" and evacuating their homes at three o'clock in the morning. This qualifies as a sort of hysteria and as for the speeches,we all know them.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2011)

Hop said:


> But in 1940 he didn't have the experience of Crete. He was fresh from the battles of Norway and France. If the Luftwaffe had indeed driven the RAF from the SE of England, then he'd have had an unbroken string of successes. I think, given that background, he'd have tried an invasion if he had air superiority.



Crete only reinforced his sense of caution whern faced with a difficult operation. He had already displayed a marked lack of resolve at Narvik and during Fall Gelb. His airborne forces had shown their vulnerability in Holland, where the airtbaorne assault had almost been defeated, and over 125 of the transports had been shot down. There is absolutely no reason not to believe that he would react any differntly to the way that he did with Herkules.

Hitler had no real stomach for high risk operations like amphibious or airborne assaults. If he could achieve a quick smash and grab, like Weserbung, then yes, but any sign of opposition, he usually folded and left the table in a real hurry. His attempted invasion of the Aland Islands in 1944, his reaction to the invasion at Kos, his excessive garrison on Jersey, anythiing remotely associated with seasborne communication, and Hitler always lost his nerve. I see absolutely no reason to think his reaction to Sealion would be any different, particulalry when he woulod come to realize the extrem vuklnerabilkity of the invasion fleet. I am confident, he would never have risked it


----------



## michaelmaltby (Sep 3, 2011)

"Hitler had no real stomach for high risk operations like amphibious or airborne assaults. If he could achieve a quick smash and grab, like Weserbung, then yes, but any sign of opposition, he usually folded and left the table in a real hurry. His attempted invasion of the Aland Islands in 1944, his reaction to the invasion at Kos, his excessive garrison on Jersey, anythiing remotely associated with seasborne communication, and Hitler always lost his nerve. I see absolutely no reason to think his reaction to Sealion would be any different, particulalry when he woulod come to realize the extrem vuklnerabilkity of the invasion fleet. I am confident, he would never have risked it".

Exactly 

MM


----------



## psteel (Sep 3, 2011)

parsifal said:


> My two cents worth
> 
> 
> 3) expanding on Point (1), the invasion fleet had an expected fleet speed of just 2 knots, but thats with a favourable current. Remember the Germans were atttempting to utilize river barges in an open water body, towed by tugs. Problems would arise for this arrangement, however, if ther was any sort of current. A post war study by the RN, estimated that the real rate of advance would be more like 1 knot in the prevailing current, and the distance to the landing point more like 80 miles, after the embarkation and debarkation points are considered, as well as the currents. That means that the all up time for the cross channel voyage was something i the order of 120 hours....more than enough time for the RN to tear it to pieces. thats with or without the Germans holding air superiority over southern England. Having control of the air is just a bonus, not a prequisite for crossong the channel, but the abject preparations would gurantee failure.
> ...



I agree with the second point which is why any invasion attempt had to occur along side any battle in the air, not in sequence after the BoB,.... just like it was done in Norway or the invasion of Russia. You throw so much at the enemy he can't read and adjust to the changing situation fast enough to counter it. Fog of war will do the rest.

BTW Hitler’s faith faltered halfway through the Norway invasion, but he was convinced by the Generals to continue.

The first point I don't agree with however . The British didn't know the German plan, which timed the ride to the currents either way, so the average fleet speed would have been more like 4 knots, not 1 knot. The Extreme distance mentioned is the exception as most units had 40-60 mile journeys. A two-day turnaround was planned for each part of each wave with two parts to each wave. However the towed barges only crossed on the first wave. After this they would operated from either side to speed up embarking and departure from the beaches, while motorized barges would operate in successive waves.

It was really difficult to sink a vessel at this point in history. Through out the war the British averaged 150 sorties for every vessel sunk, ranging from trawlers on up and this doesn't include anything about the infamous "Butt Report". In naval battles it took hundreds of shells to sink even a small vessel with small guns. Since the Germans would be armed themselves that means it would be a race to see who sank the most. In studies of naval battles through this period, the Germans had a knack for beating off allied and British naval attacks despite being out gunned and out numbered and often inflicted twice as much as they lost 

Adding to the British woes would be the mine fields/barriers. If the Germans could establish and maintain the mine barriers either side of the Dover Straits, any invading fleet would likely suffer 1/3 losses crossing such a barrier, just like at Kallinengrad.

You guys need to acknowledge that the reason any invasion of UK didn't happen, was firstly because Hitler didn't want to invade the UK . He really believed the British would stand aside and let him get on with his racial strategy. All through the 1930s he adjusted the German rearmament drive to avoid conflict with the UK because he saw them as potential racial allies. Deep down Hitler believed the English were part of his Aryan race. Hitler tolerated the BoB as part of what has been referred to as 'Fright wars' to scare the British into neutrality.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Sep 3, 2011)

".... You guys need to acknowledge that the reason any invasion of UK didn't happen, was firstly because Hitler didn't want to invade the UK . He really believed the British would stand aside and let him get on with his racial strategy. All through the 1930s he adjusted the German rearmament drive to avoid conflict with the UK because he saw them as potential racial allies. Deep down Hitler believed the English were part of his Aryan race. Hitler tolerated the BoB as part of what has been referred to as 'Fright wars' to scare the British into neutrality."

This is very true, psteel.

MM


----------



## Njaco (Sep 4, 2011)

> BTW Hitler’s faith faltered halfway through the Norway invasion, but he was convinced by the Generals to continue.



psteel, just read about that and it surprised me. He really didn't have confidence in his armies despite his boasting.


----------



## Glider (Sep 4, 2011)

Some observations if I may


psteel said:


> The first point I don't agree with however . The British didn't know the German plan, which timed the ride to the currents either way, so the average fleet speed would have been more like 4 knots, not 1 knot. The Extreme distance mentioned is the exception as most units had 40-60 mile journeys. A two-day turnaround was planned for each part of each wave with two parts to each wave. However the towed barges only crossed on the first wave. After this they would operated from either side to speed up embarking and departure from the beaches, while motorized barges would operate in successive waves.


I don't disagree with the distances you mention but its worth remembering that the Germans did a test of the planned towing of the barges and it was a total failure. Its quite possible that the germans would have had barges all over the place. Also to have two days between waves sound as if they were asking for trouble. 



> It was really difficult to sink a vessel at this point in history. Through out the war the British averaged 150 sorties for every vessel sunk, ranging from trawlers on up and this doesn't include anything about the infamous "Butt Report". In naval battles it took hundreds of shells to sink even a small vessel with small guns. Since the Germans would be armed themselves that means it would be a race to see who sank the most. In studies of naval battles through this period, the Germans had a knack for beating off allied and British naval attacks despite being out gunned and out numbered and often inflicted twice as much as they lost


I am not aware of the Germans having the beating off allied naval and air attacks at any time let alone when outnumbere or outgunned. The point you make about the number of sorties/shells taken to an enemy vessel is a good one but I wonder how much different the German forces would have been. The RN had a good number of warships ready and able to attack any invasion beachead and to stop them the German airforces would have had to achieve an almost unbelievable hit rate. I say Airforce as the German navy simply didn't have any warsips in any numbers. 

At this time the German Navy had about 10 destroyers available and that is assuming that :
a) they were all available for service 
b) none had been damaged in the build up prior to the invasion 
c) none had been damaged in the first stages of the invasion

All of which I believe to be very dubious assumptions



> Adding to the British woes would be the mine fields/barriers. If the Germans could establish and maintain the mine barriers either side of the Dover Straits, any invading fleet would likely suffer 1/3 losses crossing such a barrier, just like at Kallinengrad.


Germany didn't have the ships to lay the minefields and they certainly didn't have the ships to escort the minelayers if they did. The RN weren't total idiots, they also had considerable naval forces to counter any minelaying, and lay their own mines once the landings had started.


> You guys need to acknowledge that the reason any invasion of UK didn't happen, was firstly because Hitler didn't want to invade the UK . He really believed the British would stand aside and let him get on with his racial strategy. All through the 1930s he adjusted the German rearmament drive to avoid conflict with the UK because he saw them as potential racial allies. Deep down Hitler believed the English were part of his Aryan race. Hitler tolerated the BoB as part of what has been referred to as 'Fright wars' to scare the British into neutrality.


This I totally agree with.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 4, 2011)

I was less to do with a sense of innate racial ties, as a a belief that other nations would benefit more from a defeat of Britain over germany/ If Britain existed as a client, subservient kingdom to the german Reich, the German Reich would derive many of the benefits of the british Empire for nothing. Crackpot theory, but thats how he (Hitler) thought. 

As far as Hitler not building a force structure to dfeat Britain, that had nothing to do with "being nice to the British because he liked them". It had much to do with concentrating on domination of Europe, and assuming that once that was achieved, and there were no more allies on the continent that Britain woiuold see logic and sue for peace. When that didnt happen, all of Hitlers assumptions came crashing down his ears. 

The last factor influencing hitler, was his total lack of faith in the KM, which despite the heroic and effective battles fought by the KM in Norway, was only reinforced by the results. And whilst the wehrmacht showed some stomach when taking losses, the KM was far less willing to do so. They never were strong supporters of the plan. They were even less enthusastic after the pasting they received in Norway.

Now, there was absolutely no way that the barges plan was ever going to average 4 knots. Not least for the fact that at 50 miles (which is only the nearest port, because it inoved so many troops th average didtance is moree like 80 miles), ther would be at least two changes of tide. Moroever, because the RAF was keeping a close watch over the ports of embarkation, and it takes days to embark troops in a tactically efficient way (tactical loading) they are going to take at least a week to load onto the transport. Look at Dunkirk, the allies managed 338000 evacuations, no equipment, no tactical loading, in 8 days, an average of 40000 men loaded per day. If they were being tactically loaded, you might load 10000 men per day, given the equipment available to the Germans. There were basically 4 ports avaialable in that 80 mile radius...Dunkirk, Ostend, Boulogne and Calais. Calais was the biggest, my guesstimate for these four points of embarkation would be about 25000 men per day. That means to get a 100000 man army across the ditch the germans will need about 4 days to embark. Plenty of time for the RN and the RAF to prepare a welcome.

There was no way the Germans were going to "sneak" 100000 men across the channel.


----------



## buffnut453 (Sep 4, 2011)

I don't think any serious historians believe that barge-based invasion of the UK was ever going to succeed. My view is that it was political pressure seeking to induce a change of course in London. Had Fighter Command lost air superiority over SE England, there was every chance that pro-German factions in London, aided and abetted by those who wanted peace at any price, would have succeeded in fomenting yet another change of Government leadership, replacing Churchill with someone more focussed on suing for peace (Halifax, for example). 

Whilst the threat of invasion wasn't real or even plausible, the threat of becoming subservient to Herr Hitler's will most certainly was. Look at what happened in Vichy France which, although supposedly neutral, was never anything of the sort. There was no way that Hitler would allow Britain to toe an entirely neutral line because political and commercial links would very rapidly blur the situation. The key issue here is the concept of "neutrality" as brought up by psteel. When confronted with a force, both political and military, as that of Nazi Germany, there is no such thing as true neutrality. Hitler didn't want a neutral Britain, he wanted a Britain that was pro-Nazi (ie willing to let Hitler do what he wanted wherever he wanted). It irked him greatly that Britain, to a large extent driven by the force of personality that was Winston Spencer Churchill, refused to follow the script.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 4, 2011)

What would have happened politically if Britain had lost the air battle is an open question, and therefore I cant say that the removal of Churchil was impossible or unlikely even. In my opinion its too hard to tell really. But my opinion is that firtsly the chances of Churchill being removed were slim indeed. I cant stress enough thats an opinion, not a fact. But the British Government at that time was a unity government, and the main parties had resolved to resist no matter what. The opinion of the dominiions was fight on no matter what, and surely that was a factor.

It may have been a different story if the Germans had actually occupied the british Isles, though I doubt even that would have swayed the British to surrender, they had already made plans to continue to fight from Canada in that situation. They had looked aghast at how the french had prostituted themselves and were unlikley to ever go down that path IMO.

So if physical occupation of the home country was not going to lead to raproachment with the nazis, how much less would the loss of air superiority. The depth of anti-nazi feeling was very strong, and no amount of loss was going to change that. 

And air air superiority would, at best be a temporary and partial loss in the south and southeast of the country. A pull back for a week, or 10 days at the most and push the RAF back into the fray for yet more slaughter. That is not going to dislodge or undermine the British resolve in any way IMO and would not place Churchill at any risk of removal


----------



## syscom3 (Sep 4, 2011)

The invasion of Britain has been discussed at length. I think this summarizes why the Germans would fail.

The Germans would be executing the largest amphib invasion in history, with no experience in doing such a thing. They would be doing it without strategic or tactical doctrine, without the specialized naval and army assets officers and troops, and without the specialized amphib vessels needed to pull it off. 

They could land a few divisions, but would have little capability to reinforce or supply. 

End of story.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Sep 5, 2011)

".... End of story."

Agreed. If Germany had tried _and failed_ it would have been a major set-back for Barbarossa. Would Stalin strike preemptively? {aka Icebreaker}. 

MM


----------



## buffnut453 (Sep 5, 2011)

Parsifal,
I agree that we are "what-iffing" to a large extent but it's simply not true that the British Government was unified. If you haven't read it, I strongly recommend "Five Days in London" by John Lukacs which paints a far more variable picture than the traditional "we all stood shoulder-to-shoulder" view of British resistance to German aggression in 1940. Churchill easily survived a no-confidence vote following Tobruk but would the same have been true had Fighter Command had to pull back from Southeast England? Halifax was poised in the wings to take over, and in many respects was the preferred choice over Churchill because he was less...well, emotional. Appeasement didn't stop with the removal of Chamberlain; there were many in the halls of power who thought it better to make a deal with Hitler than to risk everything on yet another lengthy conflict.

Syscom,
I'm not suggesting that Operation Sealion was a viable _military_ operation, rather that it was a piece of political theatre aimed at inducing the British Government to change direction and sue for peace. With a pliant government in London, Germany didn't need to invade, at least not in 1940, but there is every likelihood that Britain would have seen increasing German influence from that point forwards, perhaps not unlike Vichy France.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Sep 5, 2011)

".... political theatre".

Bluff and blitzkrieg ....

MM


----------



## Mustang nut (Sep 5, 2011)

syscom3 said:


> They could land a few divisions, but would have little capability to reinforce or supply.
> 
> End of story.



From the cross channel swimming association

Why is the English Channel the top open water swim and such a hard swim?
A.There are a lot of factors that combine to make the swim hard.
The English Channel is approximately -19 nautical miles (38000 yards) or 35 kilometres (35000 mtrs) - wide at its narrowest point (actually 18.2 nm from Shakespeare Beach, Dover to Cap Gris Nez, France). Most swims are a little longer to the landing on either side.
The Tides are strong and change direction approximately every 6 hours. (See News - training - general Nav. pages)
They flow to the North East from about 1.5 hours before high water to about 4.5 hours after high water (Flood tide) - 
then turn and flow South West from 4.5 hours after high water to 1.5 hours before high water (Ebb tide). 
These tides can flow at up to 4 nautical miles per hour. The tide gets later every day by about 1 hour and change in height and flow speed every day. 
The lowest flow/ height range is known as the NEAP TIDES and is the time most swimmers try to swim. 
The highest flow/height range is the SPRING TIDES and require calm weather and good piloting for swims to be successful. (Good spring tide swims are usually a little faster the neap swims but require a lot more planning an skill from the pilot). See the channel chart on the navigation page.
The wind and the weather are an unknown quantity and the forecasts are only approximate. The Dover Straits are prone to local weather conditions that can vary considerably from that which is forecast and the weather can change very quickly (15/20 mins). 
When you combined wind and tide you can have some very sudden changes in sea conditions. 
Wind and tide together give a flatter sea that is "long" and more settled than wind against tide. 
Wind against tide creates a "short" confused sea. The stronger the wind and tide the rougher the sea gets, (remember that the tide changes direction every 6 hours)


Germany may have landed a few divisions but the chances of them being in anything like one place are about zero.
The chances of being able to get back and re supply them with a towed barge under fire are a bit less


----------



## Hop (Sep 6, 2011)

The problem with the Sealion as "bluff" theory is that the evidence shows it wasn't a bluff. It didn't become so until late September when Hitler called off the invasion, but said some preparations should continue as a bluff. Prior to that all orders were for actual preparations.

When looking at Hitler's state of mind, it's worth remembering in the preceding few months he had conquered Norway with an amphibious invasion, then defeated and occupied France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and driven the British off the continent. He was riding high.



> You guys need to acknowledge that the reason any invasion of UK didn't happen, was firstly because Hitler didn't want to invade the UK . He really believed the British would stand aside and let him get on with his racial strategy. All through the 1930s he adjusted the German rearmament drive to avoid conflict with the UK because he saw them as potential racial allies. Deep down Hitler believed the English were part of his Aryan race. Hitler tolerated the BoB as part of what has been referred to as 'Fright wars' to scare the British into neutrality.



Hitler saw the Dutch, Danes and Norwegians as racial allies, too. He didn't "want" to invade them, but did so anyway.

The British didn't "want" to invade Normandy, then fight their way in to Germany. They did it because it was necessary to end the war.

Hitler might not have harboured any hatred for the British, but he definitely wanted Britain out of the war, and if an air campaign didn't do it, then an invasion was the only practical way of doing so.

Hitler certainly hoped an invasion wouldn't be necessary. The idea was for the Luftwaffe to defeat the RAF and bomb Britain in to submission. Of course the Luftwaffe couldn't defeat the RAF, which made both the invasion and bombing Britain in to submission impossible.

But the invasion was certainly a "real" plan. The preparations were carried out in earnest. It wasn't until the Luftwaffe abandoned the attempt to defeat the RAF that Hitler abandoned the invasion and ordered false preparations to be made for psychological reasons (and those false preparations were on a much, much smaller scale).


----------



## buffnut453 (Sep 6, 2011)

Hop,

The air campaign that became the Battle of Britain was not to bomb Britain into submission. It was an attempt to achieve air superiority over southeast England so that the Luftwaffe could provide air cover over the invasion fleet. Without that air cover, the fleet was susceptible to interdiction by the RN because the inferior Kriegsmarine couldn't protect the barges adequately. Hitler needed the RAF out of the way to stand any chance of Britain collapsing. The key question is whether Sealion was intended as an opposed seaborne invasion or simply a means of concentrating force such that, if opportunity arose, Hitler could move forces into England. Given the challenges of an opposed landing, I strongly suspect the latter course of action. At the very least, it gave Hitlers divisions "something to do" whilst enjoying their French soujourn. 

As to your last point, if the large-scale "actual" invasion plan didn't overthrow the British Government, the chances of a smaller-scale deception campaign achieving that goal are slim at best. In order to be successful, a deception plan must make the enemy believe that the action could (or hopefully will) take place. I don't think that was ever the case from Sep 40 onwards. It may have been promulgated as such for propaganda purposes but the intelligence services, armed with ULTRA and photo recce, almost certainly weren't fooled.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 6, 2011)

Hop said:


> The problem with the Sealion as "bluff" theory is that the evidence shows it wasn't a bluff. It didn't become so until late September when Hitler called off the invasion, but said some preparations should continue as a bluff. Prior to that all orders were for actual preparations.
> 
> When looking at Hitler's state of mind, it's worth remembering in the preceding few months he had conquered Norway with an amphibious invasion, then defeated and occupied France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and driven the British off the continent. He was riding high.
> 
> ...




My opinion is that it was not intended as a bluff, but nevertheless it was an unworkable plan, principally arising from German inexperience in large scale amphibious operations, and secondly because of the equipment available to the germans. 

I think Hitler was deadly serious. I think also that the officers tasked with organizing it could barely contain their disdain for the plan, and how far reality was from the theory. 

This whole debate arose about whether the british victory in the air battle was responsible for saving Britain from invasion. Barring a total defeat of the RAF, which was very unlikely I am unconvinced that the cancellation of the seaborne component can be totally attributed to the luftwaffes defeat.

Lets say the Luftwaffe was able to win a local superiority for a few days.....which I think might be the most optimistic outcome that could be expected. Would such conditions alloow the plan to proceed. before answering that, understand what air superiority actually means. It does not mean the total dominance of the skies....there would still be a RAF presence, with the ability to undertake some operations like recon and night strikes, even some daytime strikes, There could be some aircover for the RN, and the RN would still have a very potent capability to hit the invasion fellet at night. It would have at least four nights in which to undertake barge hunting operations in the channel, much as they did in the invasion of Crete. My opinion is that the RN would destroy the invasion fleet almost in its entirety. The only variable is how many destroyers would be lost doing it, not whether it would be done. Depending on the degreee of German air superiority would determine how many destroyers were lost destroying the invasion fleet. The RN had certainly shownm that it could operate in waters where the Luftwaffe was preresent in great concentration, for an extended period, and at tolerable loss rates. One only has to look at Dunkirk to see that.


----------



## syscom3 (Sep 6, 2011)

Overlooked too are:

1) The RN would be "barge hunting" in the channel at night when the LW wouldnt be operating.

2) There was no way the Germans could keep the barges grouped together in a tactically sound way. Each hour in the channel means more of a probability of a navigation error or "time on beach" error. And the worse the weather and currents, the higher the errors.

3) How was the KM going to handle fire support missions? They assume that a warship sitting still in the water wont attract attention?

4) How were the Germans going to handle the inevitable times when there was bad weather in the channel? Cross their fingers and hope a 2 or 3 day delay wont impact the logistics?

5) The Germans were not going to seize an intact port in which to easily unload heavy eqmt. and tanks. Is this invasion going to be solely foot soldiers with no heavy artillery?


----------



## Glider (Sep 6, 2011)

Re item (4) I was on the coast at Southend today with the 50mph winds, the high tide, waves crashing onto the shore and a low tide that left a mile of thick wet sand to cross.


----------



## Hop (Sep 7, 2011)

> The air campaign that became the Battle of Britain was not to bomb Britain into submission.



That was always part of the plan. As early as Hitler Directive 9, November 1939:



> In our fight against the Western Powers England has shown herself to the animator of the fighting spirit of the enemy and the leading enemy power. The defeat of England is essential to final victory.
> 
> The most effective means of ensuring this is to cripple the English economy by attacking it at its decisive points.
> 
> ...



Then in August 1940, directive 17:



> In order to establish the necessary conditions for the final conquest of England I intend to intensify air and sea warfare against the English homeland. I therefore order as follows :
> 
> 1. The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organisations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.
> 
> ...



It was always the German intention to try to force Britain out of the war by bombing. 



> It was an attempt to achieve air superiority over southeast England so that the Luftwaffe could provide air cover over the invasion fleet.



That was the other objective. 

I think Hitler was in much the same position as Churchill later in the war. He hoped bombing would win the war, was apprehensive about an invasion, but wanted to win the war and knew an invasion was probably necessary.



> As to your last point, if the large-scale "actual" invasion plan didn't overthrow the British Government, the chances of a smaller-scale deception campaign achieving that goal are slim at best



The goal of the later deception operations was to keep British forces tied down defending the UK while the Germans turned their attention elsewhere.



> In order to be successful, a deception plan must make the enemy believe that the action could (or hopefully will) take place. I don't think that was ever the case from Sep 40 onwards. It may have been promulgated as such for propaganda purposes but the intelligence services, armed with ULTRA and photo recce, almost certainly weren't fooled.



I agree. British intelligence knew the invasion was off almost as soon as Hitler ordered preparations to halt. I don't think Hitler ever realised just how much success British intelligence was having reading his communications, though.



> My opinion is that it was not intended as a bluff, but nevertheless it was an unworkable plan, principally arising from German inexperience in large scale amphibious operations, and secondly because of the equipment available to the germans.



Again I agree. I don't think the invasion stood any chance of success, even if the Luftwaffe had managed to defeat the RAF. 

But I'm not convinced that the German high command realised that. They grossly overestimated their own capabilities and grossly underestimated British forces. To be fair, after the previous few months they had good reason to be over confident.


----------



## buffnut453 (Sep 7, 2011)

Hop,

The Aug 17 directive is not about "bombing Britain into submission", it's about neutralising the RAF and then disrupting Britain's seaborne shipping. The directive clearly states that these are precursors to invasion. Bombing was a vital component, as it still is in offensive air operations, but I don't think even Hitler, oft-deluded by the ever-optimistic Goering, believed his Luftwaffe was capable of maintaining the sort of strategic air campaign necessary to bring Britain to its knees. It would have taken sustained, coordinated all-arms action to stand any chance of success. The Channel prevented the land arm from participating while the RAF limited the effectiveness of both the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine.


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Oct 11, 2011)

RAF lost at least 4 aircraft. You have to ad Spitfire Mk.Ia P9335 from 7 OTU Hawarden, Flintshire, demaged cat. 2/FA


----------



## Njaco (Oct 11, 2011)

Welcome to the forum Ankita and thanks for the info!

UPDATE: In the year since I made this thread I've found more info and especially pics - so check out the thread again to find more tidbits that I've added. Sorry for everyone who printed this out but I want to make the most complete thread on the net about the battle. As an example, check out August 10.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 16, 2011)

These are some pics of the build-up of invasion barges that I was going to use throughout the thread but didn't get a chance. So here they are all together.


----------



## T Bolt (Oct 20, 2011)

Has it really been a year since you did this Chris. Wow, time flies. 
Those invasion barges look pretty primitive compared to what the Allies used on D-Day. Makes you wonder if Sealion had any chance at all even if air superiority had been achieved .


----------



## parsifal (Oct 21, 2011)

The river barges in particular would have benn dodgy as hell in the channel


----------



## fastmongrel (Oct 21, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The river barges in particular would have benn dodgy as hell in the channel



A good point which I have made several times on similar threads. Anyone unfamiliar with the sea who thinks crossing the Channel is easy because its only 20 miles or so across doesnt have a clue just how fearsome the currents and weather can be. A flat bottomed river barge with a max speed of 6 knots in the Channel is basically a way of killing lots of your own soldiers.


----------



## Njaco (Oct 22, 2011)

I alwys thought the same thing.


----------



## Airframes (Oct 22, 2011)

Good additions Chris, thanks.


----------



## parsifal (Oct 24, 2011)

fastmongrel said:


> A good point which I have made several times on similar threads. Anyone unfamiliar with the sea who thinks crossing the Channel is easy because its only 20 miles or so across doesnt have a clue just how fearsome the currents and weather can be. A flat bottomed river barge with a max speed of 6 knots in the Channel is basically a way of killing lots of your own soldiers.



The trouble is, its not a twenty mile trip, its more like an 80mile journey, because the points of embarkatrion are widely scattered. It would take several days to tactically load the 100000 or so troops in the assault waves, and sea speed would not be 6 knots....thats the speed these craft could do on a calm flat body of water. With currents and swell, its probably more like 2-3 knots. That means it takes about a week for some troops to get emabraked, make the journey and disembark.....no latrines, no means for hot food hounded by all that the RAF and the RN could throw at them, no real way to disembark. Its a recipe for disaster IMO


----------



## fastmongrel (Oct 28, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The trouble is, its not a twenty mile trip, its more like an 80mile journey, because the points of embarkatrion are widely scattered. It would take several days to tactically load the 100000 or so troops in the assault waves, and sea speed would not be 6 knots....thats the speed these craft could do on a calm flat body of water. With currents and swell, its probably more like 2-3 knots. That means it takes about a week for some troops to get emabraked, make tsailed from he journey and disembark.....no latrines, no means for hot food hounded by all that the RAF and the RN could throw at them, no real way to disembark. Its a recipe for disaster IMO



I know we once sailed from Vlissingen meaning to head for the River Crouch. After 2 days at sea in filthy unseasonal weather we ended up in Ijmuden even further from England than when we started. A big low in the Bay of Biscay and spring tides meant we spent our whole time going nowhere with 6 knots showing on the log.


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 16, 2011)

I remember reading a quote to the effect that if the Germans attempted anything resembling launching the invasion, Churchill, who had previously been First Lord of the Admiralty would have had the entire Home Fleet storming down the Channel, guns blazing! The reaction of the Royal Navy was one factor often overlooked in the debate about whether the German invasion would have succeeded.

I, too am of the opinion that the German seaborne invasion would have ended disastrously. I read once about a practise towing of unpowered barges (as many of them were) led by a single motorised barge out off the French coast. The motorised barge broke down and the towed barges got swamped in the swell, meanwhile a destroyer had to take the lot into tow back to port. The result was a farce for the German unit concerned. It was an enormous exercise and a vast amount of equipment was gathered for the invasion, but it would have failed miserably, I'm afraid.


----------



## psteel (Nov 17, 2011)

I read that Churchill forbade any capital ships from entering the Channel to counter any invasion unless the Germans had already deployed capital ships of their own. He thought it was just too risky otherwise.

The incident with the barges was conducted early in the mission to trail sea born invasion concepts examined in the 1920s and 1930s. More of the navy showing the army just how difficult it would be at that time. As I recall they lost a couple of barges out of the 50 that were used, one due to the troops all massing to one side capsizing the barge. Small wonder the Germans would go on to install about 100-150 tons of concrete ballast and steel girder strengthening to about 2150 barges by the end of September.

As such, the original exercise was political in nature as the navy was damned if he was going to throw away their limited fleet on Hitler’s bidding, when it was Hitler who had most blocked any fleet development in the first place. With more practice these landings became easier to do. The Germans had set up an amphibious assault battalion back in 1926 when the USMC counted only a brigade structure. By 1930 they had drawn up plans for converting merchant ships into troop ships and the plans for massed conversion of coastal/river barges into landing barges for troops/Vehicles and artillery. 

The idea of allied bombers and warships swamping and sinking masses of such barges is pure Atlantic nation fantasy, maybe by mid to late war it might have been possible but not at the start of the war. British strategy envisaged the need for a couple of years to mobilize their armed forces. In 1940 the British forces were just too weak. Neither the RN/RAF had enough to fire power to sink enough ships in the time period available, to prevent any invasion. The fact is once unleashed the Germans would have landed enough troops, supplies, artillery tanks, etc to smash the British defenses and drive on London, probably taking the capital after a bloody fight. 

The combined physical and psychological shock of such an attack could have been enough to topple the government and neutralize the UK in the short term, even if the RN was able to cut off any invasion from its line of supply after the fact. Its possible in such a crises Churchill would have been kicked out of power and some kind of deal struck with the nazi to shut down the second front to allow Hitler to get on with his massacre of the Slavs. In spite of the fact most posters would recoil at the above suggestions, the real life situation at that time was far too precarious to predict and could easily have gone either way.

But any invasion would have been very costly to both sides and no one could guarantee Hitler it would result in certain victory. Hitler was not going to risk his string of victories on anything short of a guaranteed victory… which is where Goering stepped in.


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 17, 2011)

psteel said:


> I read that Churchill forbade any capital ships from entering the Channel to counter any invasion unless the Germans had already deployed capital ships of their own. He thought it was just too risky otherwise.



I sincerely doubt that if the invasion was launched that Churchill would have continued this stance. I, too have read this, but I also read said quote mentioned before. (Churchill was a man of paradoxes). In an invasion scenario the heavy units of the KM would most certainly have been deployed, which, by necessity, the Royal Navy would have done so too. For the Germans to have launched a cross channel invasion without support from the KM's heavy units would have been suicide. 



> The fact is once unleashed the Germans would have landed enough troops, supplies, artillery tanks, etc to smash the British defenses and drive on London, probably taking the capital after a bloody fight. The combined physical and psychological shock of such an attack could have been enough to topple the government and neutralize the UK in the short term, even if the RN was able to cut off any invasion from its line of supply after the fact. Its possible in such a crises Churchill would have been kicked out of power and some kind of deal struck with the nazi to shut down the second front to allow Hitler to get on with his massacre of the Slavs. In spite of the fact most posters would recoil at the above suggestions, the real life situation at that time was far too precarious to predict and could easily have gone either way..



I certainly don't think it is too unpalatable, just highly unrealistic. I think you credit the Germans with more capability than they actually had. I think you also underestimate just how difficult it would have been for them to have crossed the Channel with their barges. Also, the depth of feeling in Britain regarding Churchill's stance in 1940, sure, he wasn't always popular, but I doubt he would have been kicked out. Chamberlain was dumped because he showed a lack of leadership; Churchill was instated as PM for the opposite reasons. Likewise, the British were not completely broken and had an invasion been launched, I'm sure the British armed forces would have demonstrated just how much fight they had in them.



> But any invasion would have been very costly to both sides and no one could guarantee Hitler it would result in certain victory. Hitler was not going to risk his string of victories on anything short of a guaranteed victory… which is where Goering stepped in.



This I agree on. The Germans 'lost' the Battle of Britain as much as the British 'won' it.


----------



## stona (Nov 17, 2011)

This old chestnut keeps bobbing to the surface.
The Germans were not capable of launching a seaborne invasion of the UK in 1940. No purpose built landing craft,no amphibious vehicles,no special armour,the list goes on.
Just compare the materiel available to the allies in 1944. They even laid their own fuel pipe lines under the channel and took harbours (Mulberry) with them. The Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe were to all intents and purposes absent and yet there were still some sticky moments. 
'Sealion' was a bluff with a political objective not a military one. If things had gone differently through the summer/autumn of 1940 it might just have worked. It certainly scared the sh*t out of the British people,particularly my Grandma who,living in Canterbury,was expecting paratroopers to kick in her door at any moment. In that sense it played into Churchill's hands.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## parsifal (Nov 17, 2011)

Another chestnut is the claim that the RAF lacked the strike capability to do much harm to the Germans assets at sea. Just as an indication, Coastal Command in early 1941, in the Coastal waters of Europe sank well over 50000 tons of Axis shipping, just on the Atlantic seaboard. by July of 1941, they were completely dominating the coastal water around Britain. These barges were going to be travelling at less than 1 knot, and with 2000 of them it would be like sinking fish in a barrel. A combination of mines, bombs even torpedoes would have decimated the germans.....provided the grermans didnt have air superiority.


----------



## pbfoot (Nov 17, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Another chestnut is the claim that the RAF lacked the strike capability to do much harm to the Germans assets at sea. Just as an indication, Coastal Command in early 1941, in the Coastal waters of Europe sank well over 50000 tons of Axis shipping, just on the Atlantic seaboard. by July of 1941, they were completely dominating the coastal water around Britain. These barges were going to be travelling at less than 1 knot, and with 2000 of them it would be like sinking fish in a barrel. A combination of mines, bombs even torpedoes would have decimated the germans.....provided the grermans didnt have air superiority.


In 1940 can you just picture the swarms of Ansons amd Straeners swoopimg in for the kill , the RAF was willing to sustain 50% losses on ferrying Hudsons over the ocean because they lacked a useful maritime aircraft. Fortunately the losses in Ferry Command were much much lower


----------



## syscom3 (Nov 17, 2011)

All it would take is one or two RN destroyers getting loose within the swarm of barges and the invasion fleet is history.


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 17, 2011)

syscom3 said:


> All it would take is one or two RN destroyers getting loose within the swarm of barges and the invasion fleet is history.



Yep, the Royal Navy had more destroyers in the Channel Fleet alone than the entire German surface fleet in 1940. Would have made a mess.


----------



## Juha (Nov 18, 2011)

Germany didn’t have any operational capital ships for Sealion, because of both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were badly damaged during Norway operations and were on docks to near the end of 1940. IMHO capital ships were not needed, cruisers and smaller ships would have been enough against German invasion fleet at sea. BBs might have been used to bombard invasion beeches and embankment ports, R-class BBs bombarded a couple times French ports during the BoB.

On lack of firepower by RN/RAF. Hardly, even DDs were in fact unnecessary powerful against barges, a couple 4.7” shells would have made a quite a mess inside a barge. And even if 8 .303mgs might have been too light armament to sink a barge, IMHO after a couple strafing runs there would not have been too many combat capable soldiers inside it.

Juha


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 19, 2011)

stona said:


> This old chestnut keeps bobbing to the surface.



It probably floats better than any german invasion barge.


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 20, 2011)

Juha said:


> Germany didn’t have any operational capital ships for Sealion, because of both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were badly damaged during Norway operations and were on docks to near the end of 1940. IMHO capital ships were not needed, cruisers and smaller ships would have been enough against German invasion fleet at sea.



They might not have been needed but if the Germans began their invasion I betcha they wouldn't have shied away from using them! We are talking about the threat of invasion here, not just some exercise. The Brits would have thrown everything at the Germans; capital ships or not, mines or U-boats in the Channel or not. They fitted light bombs to Tiger Moth trainers to attack beach landings, they placed stakes in almost every open field near the coast for fear of glider landings; parts of the UK are still scattered with tank traps. No one in Britain could have seriously predicted what we know today back in August 1940 about what ships the Germans were going to use or whether their invasion barges could cross the Channel or not. Sure, they would have known that German capital units were out of action, but that would not have stopped the Home Fleet from gearing up for the worst. Fear is a great motivator and the Brits were fearing for their existence. If _I _were Churchill, I would have sent every ship in the entire Royal Navy down the Channel if I knew the b*****ds were coming!


----------



## michaelmaltby (Nov 20, 2011)

"..... *No one in Britain could have seriously predicted what we know today *back in August 1940 about what ships the Germans were going to use or whether their invasion barges could cross the Channel or not. Sure, they would have known that German capital units were out of action, but that would not have stopped the Home Fleet from gearing up for the worst. *Fear is a great motivator* and ....." 

I like the way you think Nuuumannn . 

I am so sick of today's revisionist history. To understand the past you must FIRST put yourself in the moccasins of the person you would study ... without (after-the-fact) judgement ... or_ new _knowledge. Once you have thoroughly mastered the subject's situ ... and motivations ... and outcome ... you are then permitted to introduce "new" knowledge ... with which to re-cast the historical case. 67 years after WW2 there is not that much NEW knowledge ... there are plenty of artifacts (buried T-34, drowned P-39 etc. etc.) important to understanding the past - but mostly they put day-to-day *flesh *on the bare bones of statistics. The exception to the no "new" is in the fields like economics (Adam Tooze) where the learned are able to glean and assemble data into snapshots of the Nazi economy (like MRI's or tissue cross sections). *The fall of the Iron Current and implosion on the Soviets have also provided massive quantities of NEW material. *I do not object to history being re-written to include valuable new sources. I absolutely object to history being re-written (revised) by POLITICAL CORRECTNESS. Imposing contemporary values and motives on the long-since dead is unfair, disrespectful, bad history and political bull sh ... ite.

"No one in Britain could have seriously predicted what we _know today _...." and that is ... ????  ..... that many, many young Englishpersons (and others worldwide) today consider Britain's night bombers, *War Criminals* and the German population .. innocent victims. The _reversal _of social values (through neglect, abuse, overuse or conscious perversion) can lead to great injustices. Heros are suddenly cast in the role of piranhas ... in a heart beat.

"Those who cannot remember the pasta are condemned to reheat it..." (increasing the risk of dryness, burning, and reduction of taste and nutritional value). 

MM


----------



## Njaco (Nov 20, 2011)

Has anyone looked at the planned route of the invasion? I just saw in a book that the invasion route wasn't direct but skirted the Dover coast southwards until landing. Whether this is true or not, I don't know but it looks dangerous. This is a quick map I made based upon what was presented. I dunno.......


----------



## michaelmaltby (Nov 20, 2011)

"... it looks dangerous."

Sure does ... bloody Hell.

MM


----------



## parsifal (Nov 20, 2011)

Here is another version. This is the assault via narrow front option.

In 1974 a wargame was played at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. The wargame involved a number of senior military men from both sides including Adolf Galland the famous Luftwaffe fighter ace and Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris. It presumed that the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy and utilised previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.

Even without air supremacy the Germans were able to establish a beachhead in England using a minefield screen in the English Channel to protect the initial landings from the Royal Navy. However, after a few days, the Royal Navy was able to cut off supplies from the German beachhead, isolating them and forcing their surrender.

I forgot to say that this famous wargame was witnessed by a friend of mine, (who ended up being the RAN Fleet Commander before passing away from a brain tumour). He says it was a total crock. The Germans couldnt get ashore, so, because it was mostly a publicity stunt, they fudged it and made all of the RN start from Scapa, and not at a High readiness state. The RAF BC and CC were made to be grounded "for lack of Bombs" if my memnory serves me correctly


----------



## vikingBerserker (Nov 20, 2011)

Very interesting


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 22, 2011)

Yes, interesting, Parsifal; on the subject of the RAF not having any bombs, the Home Guard didn't have enough rifles to go around either... That's okay though, there weren't any German capital ships.



> "Those who cannot remember the pasta are condemned to reheat it..." (increasing the risk of dryness, burning, and reduction of taste and nutritional value)



Ha haaa! Very funny Mike!  

That quote is one of the most mis quoted quotes around. There are so many different variations, but the one I've used (thought up by someone far wittier than I) is based on the original wording of George Santayana; "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it..."


----------



## michaelmaltby (Nov 23, 2011)

I couldn't resist 

MM


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 28, 2011)

To pass the time whilst I'm off work at the moment, this afternoon I watched the movie Battle of Britain today. What a blast! Fantastic filming. The story behind its making is equally fascinating as the film itself. The following is copied from a series of articles that appeared in the excellent but now sadly defunct magazine Warbirds Worldwide:

"Many previous aviation films had resorted to using newsreel clips to make up for the lack of live action whilst others had attempted to use a small number of aircarft and clever camera angles to give the impression of large numbers. Both Fisz and Saltzman agreed early on that this film would be made properly, utilising a large fleet of aircraft, or it would not be made at all. The problem they faced was a big one. Where, in the 1960’s could enough airworthy World War II aircraft be found to recreate the Royal Air Force and Luftwaffe of the 1940s?

Enter Hamish Mahaddie. A highly decorated World War II bomber pilot and founder member of the famous Royal Air Force Pathfinder Force, Mahaddie had gained a reputation for being able to find suitable aircraft for films. In an interview conducted around 1988 he recalled how he became involved with the Battle of Britain. “I was technical adviser on the filming of 633 squadron because the producers of that movie wanted someone associated with Mosquitoes, and immediately after that I became involved with Ben Fisz and Harry Saltzman. We had a meeting and I was asked how many Spitfires were in airworthy condition and could be made available for the film. To the best of my knowledge at that time I knew of only one – the aircraft used to fly up the Mall in London every Battle of Britain day. Anyway they hired me, and within ten days I had an idea that there was over 100 Spitfires that may be available for the movie; they were not all airworthy but had possibilities. This was the start of a three year stint for me – it took 18 months to two years to gather all the aircraft for the film and then a year of production”.

Hamish Mahaddie set to work with the knowledge that unless he found enough aircraft to make the film credible it would not be made. He entered into talks with the Ministry of Defence in London. It was during this period that the film company had major problems. In September 1966 the Rank Organisation withdrew their support for the film and left Spitfire Productions without a financial backer. This obviously spelt disaster. Undaunted, Saltzman approached Paramount Studios only to find they had no interest in the Battle of Britain. Whilst this was going on Hamish had got the Ministry of Defence interested in the film and had come away with the loan of 19 Spitfires and three Hurricanes along with facilities at RAF Henlow for preparing the aircraft, including the services of a group of RAF Tradesman and Fitters. Some of the Spitfires required extensive work – for example the LF XVI Spitfires had to have their cannon removed, clipped wings returned to full elliptical planform, teardrop canopies removed and rear fuselage built up to the standard high back Spitfire shape with the usual canopy in place. Pointed rudders had to be replaced with the earlier rounded version and finally a coat of 1940 style camouflage and markings applied.

The aircraft loaned from the MoD came in various marks: V, IX, XVI, PR.19 and F.21, all of which were visually out of character with the early marks of the Battle period. However a compromise was made and it was decided to make all of the non-airworthy Spitfires resemble a cross between a Mk. V and Mk. IX. On the film set this mythical type was known as the “Mark Addie” and the result was remarkably uniform. Although Hurricanes outnumbered Spitfires during the actual battle they were much harder to locate for the film. However they were needed for the Battle of France segments of the film, for Spitfires were never sent to France in 1940. The RAF were only able to supply three Hurricanes, one of which was airworthy and with the Battle of Britain Flight. Hawker Siddeley Aviation then owned the last Hurricane built and this was loaned to the movie company. A surprise find came in the shape of Hurricane CF-SMI, which had just been restored by Bob Diemart in Canada. The aircraft was acquired by Mahaddie and air freighted to the U.K. Another Hurricane, albeit a static aircraft, came from the Shuttleworth Trust at Old Warden. 

During the assembly of the RAF contingent for the film Mahaddie learnt that the Spanish Air Force was in the process of disposing of a number of Hispano HA.1112 M1L Buchon aircraft. These machines were basically BF109 airframes built under licence in Spain and fitted with Rolls-Royce Merlin engines. Additionally the Spanish were still using CASA 2111s in the Transport and VIP flight role; basically Heinkel 111 bombers, again with Merlin engines. Contact was immediately made with the Air Attaché at the British Embassy in Madrid and after some enquiries Mahaddie confirmed the aircraft were at Tablada and Malaga airfields.

Mahaddie flew out to Spain to inspect the aircraft and on arrival found that only eight Buchons were in a flyable condition. However, on surveying a large number of dismantled airframes it was decided that approximately 20 airworthy ‘Bf 109’s’ could be constructed from the airframes available. After successfully bidding for the aircraft at auction, a contract was placed with the Spanish Air Force to rebuild the Buchons up to the standard required for the film. Eventually, of the 28 aircraft reconstructed, 18 were made airworthy, six were cleared to taxi and the remaining four were used for dressing the sets. Modifications had to be made to the fighters to make them resemble Messerschmitt Bf 109Es. 

Hamish takes up the story “…In order to give a clear definition on screen between the RAF and the Luftwaffe, we had the elliptical wing shape of the Spitfire and the cut off squared look of the Messerschmitt, but the Messerschmitt built by the Spanish had nearly a metre of rounded wing tip. In charge of flying the Messerschmitt’s was Commandante Pedro Santa Cruz and he was not at all happy about the removal of the wing tips. So I said I would personally test the de-tipped Buchon …. Now this is tantamount to an insult to a Spaniard, especially one of his ability, to do something that you are inferring he cannot do. He therefore became very annoyed and temperamental and said “certainly not El Hamish” as he called me “I will do ze testing”. So the wing tips were removed and the end of the wings faired over. True to his word, Santa Cruz did the test flights. Remarkably, he was ecstatic about the performance of the aircraft, asking why the rounded wing tips had been put on the aircraft in the first place!"


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 28, 2011)

Nice stuff nuuumann.

Been a while since I saw the movie so cant be sure but didnt they also use some Me 108s as 109s. Or was that a another film and I am getting them mixed up.


----------



## Njaco (Nov 28, 2011)

I believe our very own Airframes had a hand in the movie somewhere along with "A Bridge Too Far".


----------



## Airframes (Nov 28, 2011)

Not quite! I was around when the filming was taking place and, on a walking holiday in Norfolk, was lucky enough to see some of the aircraft formating for aerial shots. As for "A Bridge too Far", yes, I was one of many who took part in the jump for the cameras.
No, all the 'Bf109s' were Buchons, with one, two-seat version, used for air to air shots. This was the first movie to employ these aircraft, but since, they have been used in a few others, such as 'Memphis Belle' and that sh**e production, 'Pearl Harbour'.
Previous movies, such as 'The Longest Day', '633 Squadron' and 'Von Ryan's express' used Me 108s, suitably painted (ish!), to represent '109s - all they could get in those days.
In the BoB movie, there were also a lot of excellent full-size replicas, built as set dressing, and to be destroyed in the strafing and bombing scenes, and this included a full-size He111, used in the scene where one has belly-landed and the bomb-aimer is being cut free.
Note that in one or two scenes of the aftermath of the airfield bombing in the BoB movie, in the background, there is a Spitfire MkXVI on its nose on the airfield. This was due to Robert Shaw taxiing out rapidly, then applying the brakes, when 'out of shot', somewhat quickly! Due to time restraints, this real aircraft was left there, as set dressing !


----------



## parsifal (Nov 28, 2011)

fantastic, thanks airframes


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 28, 2011)

Airframes said:


> As for "A Bridge too Far", yes, I was one of many who took part in the jump for the cameras



Fame at last! What a great experience that must have been to have taken part in something like that!

More from Warbirds Worldwide on Battle of Britain:

Having sorted the fighters, Hamish then turned his attention to the bomber fleet. The CASA 2111s were still being used by the Spanish Air Force and therefore could not be purchased en bloc for the film company. Meetings were set up between Mahaddie, Ben Fisz and the Spanish Minister for Air; a request was made to loan the CASAs for use as Heinkel bombers in the film. After an official request in writing, the Spanish Government informed the British Air Attaché that they would be happy to loan the entire 32 bomber fleet to Spitfire Productions for the film sequences. All expense incurred during the filming of the aircraft, fuel, maintenance, pilots and ground crew would be waived, with the exception of painting the aircraft in Luftwaffe colours and the repainting at the end of filming. This saved Spitfire Productions a lot of money, money which they would not have had. For this happened during the period Rank withdrew their support and the organisation had saved on money provided by Saltzman; but this could not last indefinitely. Whilst Mahaddie had been busy rounding up the ‘RAF’ and ‘Luftwaffe’, Saltzman had been searching for a financial backer. He had persuaded United Artists to finance the making of the film. With sound financial backing the film was now back on the road after a gap of 12 months.

Mahaddie continued to amass the aircraft and was now turning his attention to privately owned aircraft. He had discovered that the Texas based Confederate Air Force had purchased a Spitfire Mk.IX in England and owned four of the Buchons. The CAF agreed to lease all the aircraft to Spitfire Productions on the proviso that they were flown during filming by CAF pilots. This was agreed and the film gained five more fighters. Four more Spitfires were placed under contract to Spitfire Productions. One of these was the Mk.XIV owned by Rolls Royce, the other three being Mk.IXs, two of which were dual control T.9 trainers. These T.9s would prove most useful for conversion training for the aircrew and, having full dual controls, camera equipment could be mounted in the front seat to give a superb pilots-eye view of the proceedings.

Now the budget would stretch to it, Mahaddie decided to have an additional three hitherto static Spitfires restored to fly, all three being early marks of the type Mahaddie was short of for the flying sequences. These three aircarft are noteworthy. A Mk.Ia, AR213, was reputed to have been purchased by Air Commodore Allen Wheeler in 1947 for the princely sum of £25, and was in store at RAF Abingdon and was transported to Henlow and rebuilt using parts from other Spitfires, Mk.IIa, P7350 which had been sat in the RAF Colerne Museum for many years, until surveyed by Spitfire Productions and found to be fit for flight, only needing a change of oil and a new set of spark plugs to get its engine ticking over, and a Mk.V Spitfire, AR501 which was owned by the Shuttleworth Collection. The latter had been stored in a dismantled condition and was refurbished to flying condition for the film. One thing is certain. There are a large number of Spitfires airworthy today and this may not have been the case had it not been for the film, which not only cleared out many static Spitfires, but rekindled interest in this type of aircraft. Indeed many agree it was this film that inspired much of the activity surrounding Warbirds today. By the end of 1967 Hamish Mahaddie had managed to collect 12 airworthy Spitfires, five taxiable Spitfires and nine aircraft suitable for dressing the sets. Additionally, three airworthy Hurricanes, plus three of the same type suitable for dressing sets. 28 Hispano Buchons had been acquired, and the loan of 32 CASA bombers secured.

Despite all the real aircraft that had been gathered together for the filming there were still insufficient airframes for director Guy Hamilton to re-stage the Battle of Britain as he wanted it for his Panavision cameras. A temporary aircraft factory was built at Pinewood Film Studios and full size wood and fibreglass Hurricanes, Spitfires and Bf 109s started to roll of the production line with the same urgency as the real thing did in wartime. These very convincing looking replicas were to be used for static dressing on the airfields and some were powered by motorcycle engines to enable them to taxi. Despite the majority of these replicas being destroyed during filming of the airfield attack sequences, several of each type survives in various aircraft museums in the U.K. The Pinewood aircraft factory excelled itself when it produced a one-off full sized replica of a Heinkel He 111. It weighed six tons and was complete down to the last minute detail. This particular replica was used in the film to simulate a crashed He 111. The production line was housed in three tents each measuring 80 feet by 120 feet.

To secure the spectacular aerial combat scenes for the film a special camera platform was needed. This came in the shape of North American B-25J Mitchell N6578D/44-31508 which was flown by the redoubtable Jeff Hawke. Heavily modified in Florida, by Hill Air and Flying W Products, the Mitchell was fitted with a hemispherical optical bubble which replaced the nose glazing enabling a Panavision camera to shoot through 210o without distortion. Clear vision panels replaced the waist gun positions, the tail turret was removed and a specially built clear vision camera position was installed with slipstream deflecting cowlings above and below the camera position. The only creature comforts afforded the cameraman was a full harness seat belt. In the Mitchell’s bomb bay there was a retractable double jointed arm with a remote controlled camera on the end which was capable of filming through 360 degrees.

In the mid-upper turret position was an enlarged astrodome under which the aerial unit director sat during filming, positioned around him was a bank of television monitor screens connected up to the cameras along with a video tape machine to enable instant playback of any particular camera shot. It took Hawke and co-pilot Duane Egli 22 hours to fly the Mitchell from Florida to England. On arrival the aircraft was given a distinctive paint scheme. The forward fuselage was natural metal, leading edges of the wings were white and the trailing edges of the wings were adorned with six black and white stripes. Rear port fuselage was dayglo red and the starboard rear fuselage was green. This garish colour scheme had a practical purpose, being used to position different formations of aircraft on a particular section of the Mitchell camera ship. Upon arrival in Spain one of the film crew, upon seeing the unique paint scheme, remarked, “It’s a damn great psychedelic monster”. That nickname was to remain with the aircraft for the duration of the filming.

By mid March 1968 the team of RAF personnel at RAF Henlow had all but finished work on the Spitfires and Hurricanes. The airworthy aircraft flew out to Duxford, the taxiable and static aircraft following by road transport. Flying the Spitfires and Hurricanes for the film was a select band of Royal Air Force pilots, all qualified flying instructors with many hours on fighter type aircraft. All of the pilots underwent conversion onto type in one of the Spitfire T.9 dual control aircraft. Leading the pilots was Wing Commander George Elliot, who personally tested each pilot on type. Undertaking the enormous task of maintaining the film fleet of Warbirds was Simpson’s Aero Services of Elstree. In charge was John “Tubby” Simpson. 

Hamish Mahaddie recalls, “John Simpson was a first class aero mechanic and an expert on the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine. With RAF airmen undertaking first line maintenance (refuelling and flight line tasks), John and his team of civilian engineers kept the aircraft serviceable during the shooting schedule of the film. If we had an aircraft go unserviceable during shooting with engine problems for example, John would remove the offending part and off he would go to Rolls-Royce at Filton or Derby, or in the case of radiators, up to Dellaney-Gallay, the radiator specialists. The repaired items would be back on the aircraft by the following morning. All this was made possible with the use of film money. Sadly, John Simpson was not a man to delegate work and all the rushing about all over the country probably contributed toward his untimely death shortly after the film was completed. I had maintained that I would lose one aircarft per week due to unserviceability during filming and after twelve weeks we would have no aircraft left to film. Due to the excellent work of Simpsons Aero Services we had no major serviceability problems whatsoever.”


----------



## parsifal (Nov 28, 2011)

bravo....amazing


----------



## Njaco (Nov 29, 2011)

Thanks for the addition Nuuummannnn!!!


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 29, 2011)

Going to have to watch the film again. Armed with all that info I will be checking all the aircraft


----------



## Airframes (Nov 29, 2011)

I've been collecting pics of the aircraft used, mostly photographed at the time. Let me know if I should post them here.
When the movie was in production, there was quite an effort put in to producing 'merchandise', ranging from colour postcards of the principle actors, dressed for their particular role, to maps, brochures and a book covering all aspects of production. i think I had all that was available at the time, but sadly, I only have the cinema programme from one of the UK regional premieres now.
I do remember that the cinema where I first saw the movie, had a full-size replica Spitfire on display in the foyer !!


----------



## Njaco (Nov 29, 2011)

Terry, go right ahead. I like how this thread is still alive.


----------



## Airframes (Nov 29, 2011)

OK Chris. I need to sort them, but here's a couple of pics for now.


----------



## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Nov 29, 2011)

Nice shots Terry!


----------



## Njaco (Nov 29, 2011)

Excellent!!!


----------



## Airframes (Nov 29, 2011)

Thanks Aaron and Chris. 
I must stress, these are _not_ my own pics, but those collected over the years from various publications, including some of the merchandise mentioned earlier. Most, if not all, were taken by Keith Hamshere, the stills photographer on the set, and many are from the Peter Arnold collection.
I'll post some more tomorrow, including the Stuka and 'Proctuka'.


----------



## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Nov 29, 2011)




----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 29, 2011)

Fantastic, Airframes, looking forward to seeing more.

During the time that Hamish Mahaddie was travelling the world looking for aeroplanes, Spitfire Productions were searching for suitable airfield locations in the U.K. Obviously modern day airfields with their vast expanses of concrete hard standings would not be suitable to represent the 1940’s grass aerodromes of the Royal Air Force’s Fighter Command. Harry Saltzman knew of RAF Duxford in Cambridgeshire which at that time was still owned by the Royal Air Force and was under a ‘Care and Maintenance Order’. Upon surveying Duxford Saltzman found it to be the ideal location for filming and the generous hangarage still available meant that Duxford could be used as a base of operations, there being ample living accommodation and engineering workshops just across the road. Negotiations between Spitfire Productions and the Ministry of Defence were entered into and in March 1968 the film company were given permission to use Duxford airfield and all of its facilities at a reported cost of £6000 per month excluding any repair, alteration or decoration work that the airfield needed to bring it up to 1940s standards. 

This extra rebuilding work at Duxford is thought to have cost the film company £38,000. Other locations during filming were RAF Debden, RAF Northolt, and ex RAF airfield at Hawkinge. RAF Debden was the home of the film's ‘flying unit’, whilst filming flying sequences for the film, the airworthy aircraft would operate out of Debden, leaving Duxford free to assume the mantle of the main airfield location. North Weald was the other main airfield location. During the 1960s the army were resident here, but for the summer of 1968 it seemed as if Fighter Command had regained control when the airfield was taken over by the film company and. Like Duxford, North Weald was dressed as a 1940s Fighter Command station.

Spain: March 1968. Director Guy Hamilton calls "ACTION!" for the cameras to start shooting the first scenes for Battle of Britain. The first sequences to be filmed were the re-creation of the British withdrawal from Dunkirk, which was actually filmed on a suitably dressed Heilva beach near the Spanish city of Seville. The German airfield scenes were filmed at Tablada and El Corporo airfields, and on March 18th the B-25 Mitchell camera ship arrived from the U.K., fully equipped and ready to start the aerial filming of the mass German bomber and fighter footage. On board the Mitchell were cameramen ‘Skeets’ Kelly and ‘Johnny’ Jordan two of the best aerial cameramen in the world. Sadly these two masters of their craft died soon after the making of the film, John Jordan disappeared from the bomb bay of a B-25 Mitchell during the filming of Catch 22, and Skeets Kelly was killed when the Stampe biplane in which he was a passenger collided with another Stampe during filming of the movie Zeppelin. 

From the day of the Mitchell’s arrival it was a time of high activity for the flying unit, for all the Spanish aerial shots had to be ‘in the can’ by the end of April 1968, in order for the film crews etc. to get back to England in time for the filming of the RAF sequences. It must have been quite a sight as formations of 30 plus Heinkels, in company with escorting fighters, were filmed in various numbers and angles for the camera. A solitary Spitfire Mk IX was fitted with long range fuel tanks and flown to Spain in order to film the RAF flying through the mass German formations.

The filming in Spain also utilised a Junkers Ju 52 trimotor – actually a CASA 352-L. Modifications to make the Spanish built CASA resemble the German Junkers were easy, recalls Hamish Mahaddie … “I only had to remove the chintz curtains favoured by the Spaniards and repaint the aircraft. It then became the personal transport of Fieldmarshal Milch, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe and as such it appeared on the screen at the start of the film title sequence, as Dietrich Frauboes, playing the part of Milch, inspects the rows of Luftwaffe Heinkels and Messerschmitt’s.’ At the end of the filming in Spain two Heinkels were purchased by Spitfire Productions, the remainder were returned to their previous Spanish Air Force markings and handed back to the Spaniards.

The two Heinkels, along with 17 Buchons, the Spitfire and B-25 camera ship then prepared to transit to the U.K. to take part in the aerial scenes with the Spitfires and Hurricanes that had been gathered there.
During April and May there had been an intensive programme of practice flights with the Spitfires and Hurricanes, in order to bring the formation flying up to standard and to get the pilots used to positioning the aircarft so the cameras could get the best possible shots. On the 11th May the Mitchell, a Heinkel (one Heinkel had gone unserviceable en route, arriving the following day) and the 17 Buchons arrived at RAF Manston in Kent. After clearing customs and undergoing an inspection by the air registration board the aircraft were issued with a restricted permit to fly in the U.K. This was to cover flights being made for the purpose of ‘air to air’ filming, practice flights, and transit flights to other locations in the U.K.

The Messerschmitts and Heinkels were then entered on the British Civil Aircraft Register and on May 14th the gaggle of Luftwaffe aircarft flew from Manston to Duxford. The English sequences could now begin in earnest. For the duration of filming in the U.K. the Luftwaffe aircraft would continue to be flown by Spanish Air Force Pilots, the job of maintaining the aircraft being the responsibility of the Spanish Air Force.
In order to film the complex aerial scenes a segment of official airspace was set aside for film company use. The space allocated to the production covered three areas of the East Midlands and East Anglia, each of which was approximately three miles long and 10 miles wide. NOTAMS (Notice to Airmen) were issued to all flying units, warning pilots to stay clear of the areas. However one Canberra jet is reputed to have broken cloud amidst a Staffel of 109’s his remarks are said to be unprintable!

The summer of 1968 was most unlike that of 1940, rain and low cloud bases hampering the flying and the filming day after day. The staff had to be paid despite the bad weather and is thought that at this stage the film was costing £55,000 a day to produce. The original film schedule had allocated 10-12 weeks to film aerial sequences in England. Due to poor weather conditions it actually took twenty weeks and involved some 5,000 flying hours to complete the aerial scenes. This was only possible due to the fact that in August, in sheer desperation to get some air to air filming ‘in the can’ the air unit flew nine Spitfires, three Buchons and the B-25 down to Montpelier in Southern France for three weeks. This drastic measure paid off, for the remainder of the dog fight scenes were captured on film over the Mediterranean.

Back in England meanwhile, Duxford had to have a large contingent of police to control the large crowds of sightseers that trampled the surrounding cornfields in order to get a view of the filming and the aircraft in action. The South-western end of Duxford doubled for France, with a mock-up of a French chateau and that corner was adorned with tents and other artefacts to resemble a B.E.F. airfield at the time of the British withdrawal from France in May 1940. Hurricanes, real and replica, were placed around the ‘French’ airfield and it was here that the spectacular low level strafing of the airfield by Bf 109s took place.

By clever positioning of cameras, Duxford played the part of two airfields in the film and it was also the location of one of the films most controversial talking points, the destruction of hangar 3.
The bombing raid on Duxford airfield was to be one of the most exciting parts of the finished film, but the film company had not been given specific permission to destroy the hangar during filming. Nevertheless, in a classic case of ‘blow now and ask questions later’, mid-June saw the hangar disappear in a sheet of flame and smoke when, during the filming of a bombing raid a ton of gelignite surrounded by three tankers of oil, was ignited in a tremendous climax to the airfield attack. The hangar disappeared in a sheet of flame and huge palls of thick black acrid smoke.

In late summer when the scheduled filming of the RAF ’big wing’ scenes took place it quickly became obvious that three airworthy Hurricanes all alone on the big screen would not be credible, so several Hispano Buchons were given a coat of washable paint and assumed RAF colours. These aircraft flew behind the three Hurricanes and with the use of special effects and superimposition etc., a credible ‘big wing’ formation emerged. The same system of superimposing images on top of each other was used with the Spitfire ‘big wing’ when 12 Spitfires became 24 and then 36, all part of the movie magic industry.


----------



## Airframes (Nov 30, 2011)

A few more pics from the movie sets.
*PIC 1.* The beginning of the 'hangar scene', where No3 hangar at Duxford is blown up. This didn't go quite according to plan, as part of the explosives chain failed to detonate, and the scene had to be re-taken. Apparently, no one thought to inform the local Fire Services, which resulted in fire tenders screaming across Cambridgeshire from all directions after the huge pall of smoke rose into the sky!
Today, only the concrete floor marks the spot where the hangar once stood.
*PIC 2.* Buchons at Duxford. Note the two-seat version, used for air to air shots of the 'Bf109' formations.
*PIC 3.* The Ju87 Stuka was loaned by the RAF, and there were rumours that it was to be restored to flying condition for the movie, possibly borne out by this shot, with the aircraft jacked up into flying attitude for lighting evaluation, and with some re-painted areas and markings. This aircraft is now in the RAF Museum, Hendon.
*PIC 4*. The producers wanted to avoid using models in flying sequences if at all possible and, after considering the Stuka too valuable to risk, went to great lengths to try to provide flying examples for the important scenes depicting the attacks on the RDF chain (radar stations). 
Percival Proctors were converted to resemble Ju87s, (three I believe) but were not used in the end. Apparently their flying characteristics were terrible too! 
They were soon dubbed 'Proctukas', and here's a pic of one of them.
In the end, a 'matte shot' was used to depict the approaching Stuka formation, and large-scale R/C models used for the actual dive bombing sequence, the only feasible alternative.


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 30, 2011)

Neat pics, Airframes!

"It had been realised at an early stage that dive bombing scenes with Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers would provide atmosphere and the right audience emotion for later on in the film when the Luftwaffe was being shot out of the sky. Only one genuine Stuka existed in the U.K., owned by the Royal Air Force and kept at RAF St Athan in Wales. Hamish Mahaddie’s idea was that this aircraft could be made airworthy and that formation scenes for the attacks on the radar stations etc. could be made up using suitably modified and disguised Percival Proctor aircraft.

Initially the RAF refused permission to restore the genuine Stuka to flying condition for the film. However, as the company demonstrated its expertise in getting other aircraft safely airworthy, the RAF gave permission to fly the Stuka. Inspection of the airframe revealed it would take a lot of time and money (both of which were very precious to Spitfire Productions) to make the Ju 87 fly and the plans were quickly dropped. 

The Proctor plan was then adopted, as Hamish Mahaddie recalls…”I bought three Proctors and were able to mock up a sort of one third scale Stuka. I was able to change the tail, degut the centre section and make a completely new centre section which had the correct gull wing configuration. The outer wing panels were then bolted back on and the cockpit canopy was changed for the long glass house type it is well known for. Sadly, I was unable to get a three bladed propeller and that is probably the main reason why my phoney Stuka was not used in the finished film, but the shots in the film when the Stukas are bombing the radar stations were filmed using large scale radio controlled models, and very effective they were too. You actually see the bombs drop from the aircraft, radio controlled models, no argument’.

For the filming, several of the Spitfires, Buchons and one of the Heinkel bombers were fitted with smoke pots. These were smoke canisters fitted to the cowlings of the aircraft which could be activated by the pilot to simulate for the film, an aircraft being hit and shot down. In fact Texan Wilson ‘Connie’ Edwards is reputed to have been shot down some 118 times during the aerial dogfight filming! One other interesting aspect of the film was the markings chosen for the aircraft. Producers Saltzman and Fisz were adamant that the aircraft that would appear in the film would be painted and marked as authentically as possible. 

This was left to the film's Technical advisors and a special film markings unit, who ensured that the Spitfires and Hurricanes were painted in the correct 1940 style camouflage of dark earth/dark green top surfaces and duck egg blue undersides. The Luftwaffe aircraft wore the correct two tone green splinter camouflage on the upper surfaces with light blue undersides. When it came to the question of squadron markings, the producers and technical advisors agreed it would be impossible to portray every RAF and Luftwaffe unit that took part in hostilities and it was decided to use fictitious code letters for the RAF machines, thereby apportioning no glory or blame to any particular RAF squadron. 

The markings unit devised a system of using fablon style code letters to be attached and removed from the aircraft at will – these could be, and were, changed after almost every filming sortie. Instead of using the correct colour grey for the codes, artistic licence prevailed and white was used so as to show up better on film, and thereby help the film audience to relate particular aircraft to the actors who were supposed to be flying them. During the filming the Hurricanes wore MI and KV squadron codes, with just the individual aircraft letters being used for the battle of France scenes. 

The Spitfires wore AI, BO, CD, DO and EI squadron codes, the BO codes being reserved for the replica aircraft that were to be destroyed in the bombing scenes and although some real aircarft wore EI codes, these were not seen in the finished film. The Luftwaffe aircraft wore a similar number of different fablon style code markings. The Heinkels carried A5, VI and 6J squadron codes with the Buchons having red, white or yellow propeller spinners with aircraft numbers to match. 

Some of the Bf 109s wore the Staffel leaders’ chevron markings instead of the codes and all the Luftwaffe aircraft carried fictitious unit badges. Like the Royal Air Force the Luftwaffe aircraft carried fictitious unit badges, and also had their markings changed after almost every sortie. Some aircraft even wore different marks on each side of the fuselage, thereby making it very difficult for the historian to pinpoint individual aircraft.

By the end of September 1968 filming of the aerial scenes had come to an end. Aircraft, ground crews and pilots had all been worked hard in order to secure the 40 minutes of aerial scenes. It was now up to the film Editors and special effects people – the backroom boys – to put the whole thing together back at Pinewood Studios. During the production of The Battle of Britain the film company had contracted several ex Battle of Britain pilots, both German and English, to act as technical and tactical advisers to the film, ensuring authenticity where possible. Amongst these were Wing Commander Robert Stanford Tuck, and Squadron Leader ‘Ginger’ Lacey for the RAF and General Adolf Galland with Oberst Hans Brustellin for the Luftwaffe. Spitfire Productions had received tremendous support from many aviation industries including Rolls-Royce, Dowty Rotol, Smiths Industries (Aviation Division), KLG Plugs, Dunlop, Shell, BP, Delany Galley and Lucas to name but a few. To compliment the fine cast of aircraft an international star cast of actors took part in the movie including: Michael Caine, Trevor Howard, Kenneth Moore, Laurence Olivier, Michael Redgrave, Robert Shaw, Susannah York, Kurt Jurgens, Manfred Reddemann and Hein Reiss.

With the Battle of Britain going on general release, aptly on September 15th (Battle of Britain Day) 1969, Spitfire Productions had sold off many of the aircraft, keeping a small number to participate in film promotion flying. Others were returned to their owners, civil and military. In total The Battle of Britain cost $13 million to make and it is a lasting tribute to the men and women of Fighter Command in 1940, and to the determination of Producers Ben Fisz and Harry Saltzman. On the whole the film received favourable reviews from the film critics and was an instant hit with aircraft enthusiasts the world over. The warbird movement in England had a tremendous shot in the arm and interest in Warbirds has escalated since. The film’s main location at Duxford was given a new lease of life with the Imperial War Museum and has finally established itself as the warbird capital of the U.K.


----------



## Airframes (Dec 1, 2011)

A few more pics from the movie sets.
*PIC 1.* Spitfires formate on the B-25 camera ship.
*PIC 2.* Buchons peeling off to attack.
*PIC 3.* Buchon in flying attitude at Tablada, Spain. Note the hangars in the background, painted in camouflage colours for the film.
*PIC 4 *Spitfire MkXVI and Mk19 at Duxford after filming. Note the remains of Number 3 hangar, top left.
*PIC 5.* Film crew preparing a 'scramble' scene, with Robert Shaw in the Spitfire cockpit.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 1, 2011)

Neat, Airframes!


----------



## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Dec 1, 2011)

Excellent material Terry! Thank you for sharing sir. I don't believe I have seen the movie but will find it and have a watch.


----------



## Airframes (Dec 2, 2011)

Heck Aaron, it's a must see! Probably the only movie to go to such lengths of seeking accuracy, actual air to air filming, and such a collection of real aircraft ! It can never happen again on such a scale.
Look around for the 2-disc set on DVD, which tells the story of the making of the movie, and has some interviews with BoB veterans too.


----------



## Njaco (Dec 2, 2011)

Aaron, if you want, I have an extra DVD of the movie (without the cover). If you want I can send it to you. PM me an address and I'll send a small letter.


----------



## Airframes (Dec 2, 2011)

Great stuff Chris! Aaron, you MUST see the movie !


----------



## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Dec 2, 2011)

Thank you Chris, and I will watch it Terry. Since reading one of the books on it and know a little about it, and by a little, I do mean just a little bit but it will make seeing the movie better. There was a lot in the book With Wings like Eagles that explained a lot behind the scenes if it was correct. Thank you again Chris and as soon as I finish here I will send my address and phone # for the buddy system to if that's ok.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 2, 2011)

A great book to read about the film is Leonard Mosley's Battle of Britain, Making of a film, the story of the film. Also try The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, this book was the basis of the screenplay for the film.

Enjoy the film, Aaron; the combat scenes will blow you away considering there's no cgi to be seen!


----------



## Airframes (Dec 3, 2011)

One other thing Aaron - I think you'll love the title music, 'The Luftwaffe March' - brilliant!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 4, 2012)

In 1968 when the "Battle of Britain" movie was being made, Lord Hugh Dowding met for the last time with his Fighter Boys of 1940.

From L to R: Alan Christopher "Al" DEERE, Thomas Percy GLEAVE, Robert Stanford "Tuckie" TUCK (seated), Boleslaw "Ghandi" DROBINSKI (Pole), Douglas "Dougie" BADER, Ludwik MARTEL (Pole), John Alexander "Kentowski" KENT (Canadian) , Peter TOWNSEND, Lord Hugh Tremenchard DOWDING (in wheelchair).


----------



## nuuumannn (Jul 5, 2012)

> I think you'll love the title music, 'The Luftwaffe March' - brilliant!



It's actually called Aces High, although it's often refered to as The Luftwaffe March:


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNVVoH9-QH0_

I've seen that image in colour njaco; there's another of interest; Galland and Stanford Tuck going on a hunting expedition.






Courtesy of Battle of Britain brochure; produced simultaneously to the film


----------



## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

If you post the opening credits, surely we should also have the closing music and final credits....


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KLDZkypBHnw_


----------



## nuuumannn (Jul 5, 2012)

"If I have to look at one more bomber I won't recommend you for promotion..."

One of the best scenes of the film:


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVKPS5aPvOc_


----------



## Njaco (Jul 5, 2012)

"Pigeon to shy hawk in one easy lesson...."


"taka-taka-taka-taka...."


----------



## parsifal (Jul 5, 2012)

I like the Polish pilots scene


----------



## nuuumannn (Jul 5, 2012)

"Spring chicken to shite-hawk in one easy lesson..."

Shite hawk - "slang name applied to various birds of prey that exhibit scavenging behaviour" or "A useless, going nowhere, idiot that talks crap"


----------



## Njaco (Jul 6, 2012)

Thats it!!!


----------



## parsifal (Jul 6, 2012)

its amazing just how tellingly accurate that statement is.....Ive read that 90% of the killing is done by 10% of the pilots, but these 90% are still needed to protect the real killers....safety in numbers and all that


----------



## Airframes (Jul 6, 2012)

Repeat please .....

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Jul 6, 2012)

My dad,a naval type,referred to sea gulls as "Shite Hawks". They dive on and eat the shite you chuck off a ship!

As for favourite scenes in the BoB movie,nothing to do with aeroplanes but Susannah York in her undies. Oooh Eeeer.

Steve


----------



## Njaco (Jul 6, 2012)

stona said:


> My dad,a naval type,referred to sea gulls as "Shite Hawks". They dive on and eat the shite you chuck off a ship!
> 
> As for favourite scenes in the BoB movie,nothing to do with aeroplanes but Susannah York in her undies. Oooh Eeeer.
> 
> Steve



If only I could hit the 'Like' button about 50 times for that post!!!


My favorite quote from the film...



> "We're not easily frightened. Also we know how hard it is for an army to cross the Channel. The last little Corporal who tried became a cropper. So don't threaten or dictate to us until you're marching up Whitehall... and even then we won't listen. "

Reactions: Useful Useful:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## nuuumannn (Jul 6, 2012)

"Corporal!"

"Sah!"

"Where are you taking those vultures?"

"Officers to the mess, NCOs to the guardroom, sah"

"Like hell you are, they're responsible for all that, get 'em to clear it up!"

"But what about the officers, sir?"

"Give them a bloody shovel!"



> My favorite quote from the film...



Beautifully delivered by Sir Ralph Richardson! The script writers really nailed it with that film; they really had their finger on the pulse of the time and each situation - cleverly witty.


----------



## Airframes (Jul 6, 2012)

"For the benefit of the un-educated among us, I shall translate.." (Flt/Lt.)
"Marchand can't believe Sedan has fallen - I can" (Flt/Sgt)
(Sideways glance from Officer)
Priceless!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 7, 2012)

You guys ought to go back through the thread. I've added a bunch of new pics that relate for each day including a few maps and extras.


----------



## Njaco (Sep 30, 2014)

Some new additions:

First some new pics.......
.




.






and then this:

Bomb Sight - Mapping the World War 2 London Blitz Bomb Census

*Was your street bombed during the Blitz?*
An interactive map has been created showing where German bombs landed on London during eight months of the Second World War Blitz. The year-long mapping project, devised by geographer Dr Kate Jones of the University of Portsmouth, uses red bomb symbols to illustrate where each bomb landed.

The map shows how the entire greater city, from Egham in the west to Dartford in the east, Potters Bar in the north and Caterham in the south, was affected.

Dr Jones chose to focus on the period of the Blitz which saw the most intensive bombing period by the Luftwaffe which killed thousands and destroyed more than a million homes.

The Bomb Sight project uses a slightly longer timeframe for mapping what bombs fell where because it uses maps of the London Second World War bomb census, taken between October 1940 and June 1941 which until now has only been available to view in the reading room at the National Archives.

The locations of the bombs have been combined with geo-located photographs from the Imperial War Museum and geo-located memories from the BBC's WW2 People's War Archive. Users can manipulate the map and zoom into specific streets or boroughs as well as find out what type of bomb was dropped where.

Funded by higher education charity Jisc, Dr Jones has created a website and mobile app to make the interactive map available to the general public, especially students, teachers and citizen researchers.
Paola Marchionni, Jisc programme manager, said: ''Bomb Sight is a fantastic resource and it shows the power of what is possible by mashing up content from that which resides in different places. The original Blitz maps have been scanned and geo-referenced thanks to the National Archive and testimonials from the BBC have been incorporated together with historical images from the Imperial War Museum to create an interactive teaching and learning resource that is similar to a map sat nav.

''There will be an augmented reality and mobile version available in December making the resource even more interactive.''

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Jul 12, 2015)

Posted on the wrong thread but hey this is a great thread and worth a read.....better than many books and for free.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Smokey Stover (Apr 26, 2018)

Njaco said:


> Some new additions:
> 
> First some new pics.......
> .
> ...



My family are from the west midlands area, Birmingham to be precise. One of my grandfathers was a fireman during the blitz. A big strong man with a no nonsense attitude. He was one of those working class citizens who made do and always tried to provide for his family, as well as helping his neighbours when in times of dire need. Friends and family described him as a hard working guy with a kind heart but no fool. Nothing ever phased him. At least until the night of 14th November 1940. His fire unit was ordered to quickly head for Coventry city centre. The devastation caused that night was nothing short of mass slaughter. The Luftwaffe dropped hundreds of tonnes of bombs on the city. So hot was the resulting firestorm that concrete walls and streets glowed red all night. The Germans even created a new name for this kind of devastation. The raid reached such a new and severe level of destruction that Joseph Goebbels later used the term _coventriert_ ("coventried") I.e. - To annihilate a whole city from the air. Much of the history is uncontested. In an horrific 12-hour period, many thousands of tonnes of bombs and incendiary devices were dropped on the city by more than 500 German planes. Homes, factories and Coventry's medieval centre, including its beloved cathedral, were destroyed. Hundreds lost their lives and for a while the morale of the city, and the whole country, looked as if it might have taken a mortal blow. n

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------

