# Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?



## Ascent (Mar 17, 2014)

I'm trying to help my daughter with her homework which has asked her for crucial turning points during the Battle of Britain.

Now I have a fair idea of how the battle flowed but I'm not really sure that I can locate the crucial points when the British won and the Axis lost.

What would you say are the standout points in the battle?

Would you say the poor assesment of British losses could be one? It meant the Germans believed they were causing much more damage then they were?


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## GrauGeist (Mar 17, 2014)

One of the key events to look at, is the change of policy by the Luftwaffe when they went from bombing military targets to civilian targets.

The British were feeling the pressure of the Luftwaffe's attacks on military targets such as airfields, munitions/fuel depots and factories in spite of the Luftwaffe's lack of total air superiority.

Once the Luftwaffe switched to attacking cities, such as London (the Blitz), it bought the RAF a little time and lost what little initiative the Luftwaffe had over the RAF.


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## stona (Mar 17, 2014)

There is really only one turning point. The Luftwaffe failed to break Fighter Command throughout June and August 1940 in support of a _threatened_ invasion. This gave the rest of the Wermacht, and particularly the Kriegsmarine, a perfect get out from mounting an actual invasion which they were ill prepared and unequipped to do.
In pursuance of the real objective of the battle, which was to force some kind of negotiated settlement on the British, the Germans switched the weight of their attacks to London, the so called Blitz. 
About 5 pm on 7th September 1940 was the turning point. At precisely this time Dowding was discussing, at Bentley Priory, with Evill, Park and Douglas, how to manage his diminishing resources. 11 Group was on the point of collapse. Six of its seven sector stations had been badly damaged and Fighter Command as a whole was running out of_ operational _pilots. The Luftwaffe launched a huge attack on London. During the next hour and a half 348 bombers, escorted by 617 fighters, set fire to docks, warehouses and oil tanks along both banks of the Thames to the east of the city. They also blasted numerous densely populated streets. It was by far the most powerful attack ever launched by any air force against any target to date, but it was a new target. It was not Fighter Command and its infrastructure.
Battle of Britain day is of course 15th September, a day on which the Luftwaffe suffered substantial losses. Hitler's cancellation of Operation Sealion followed on the 17th, but the man fighting the tactical battle, Keith Park, always regarded the 7th, when the Luftwaffe switched its attacks from sector airfields to London, as the turning point. Who are we to disagree?
Cheers
Steve

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## Greyman (Mar 17, 2014)

Chruchill said:
- changing target to London
- failure of germans to attack command and control networks
- changing from concentrated to dispersed attacks
- fighting over England and the channel favoured the RAF
- Beaverbrook's aircraft production/Bevin's labour laws
- Dowding's management
- poor german intelligence
- comparable fighter performance (Hurr/Spit vs. 109)

Dowding said:
- poor target selection by germans
- radar
- recalling Hurricanes from France/Beaverbrook and shadow factories/improvised fighter repair system
- fighting over England and the channel favoured the RAF
- flexibility of AA command and effect of AA guns

Milch said:
- late 1939 Luftwaffe was still developing and not ready for large scale operations
- Luftwaffe incorrectly organized at top level
- cancellation of four-engine bomber programs
- inadequate range for escort fighters/poor drop tank design

Galland said:
- poor leadership, changing orders, constant criticism
- British radar and fighter control
- inadequate range for escort fighters
- inadequate bombers for the mission
- poor target selection
- fighting over England and the channel favoured the RAF

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## davebender (Mar 17, 2014)

What turning points? RAF daytime air superiority was never seriously in doubt at any time during WWII.


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## vinnye (Mar 17, 2014)

From what I have seen, read etc it would seem that poor intelligence was a factor for both forced.
The RAF thought that the LW was under the impression that the RAF was weaker than it was, and the RAF thought the LW was stronger than it was - both based on their own squadron make up!
Also important was the LW did not properly understand the significance of the radar stations - if they had, they would have bombed them to dust!
Good leadership by Dowding and Park also helped - eg not always sending fighters to engage raids over the Channel - especially if it was judged to be a lure to engage RAF fighters by greater LW escorts.
Not adopting the Big Wing - as others were pushing for.
Poor leadership by LW - especially when their fighters were tasked with close escort rather than being able to gain height and dive on RAF squadrons from an advantageous position an break them up before they could engage the bombers.
Other things that may have affected the fight - change of Vic to Finger Four formation, closer harmonization of RAF machine guns for greater hitting power. Addition of armour plate to RAF fighters.


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## davebender (Mar 17, 2014)

> LW did not properly understand the significance of the radar stations - if they had, they would have bombed them to dust!



Easier said then done. RAF and USAAC had far more assets then Luftwaffe yet failed to bomb German radar stations and fighter control centers to dust.


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## pbehn (Mar 17, 2014)

I have read that a cruical point was the accidental bombing of London (or dropping of bombs to lighten load) led to a retaliatory raid on Berlin which provoked Adolf to order the bombing of London. This took the load off fighter commands hard pressed squadrons in the South East. However I also read that the Luftwaffe was equally hard pressed.

Intelligence was important estimates of original strength and capacity to replace losses as well as the losses themselves led Germany to underestimate its opponent and Britain and commonwealth to overestimate. While Goering was convinced the RAF was down to its last 50 fighters the RAF was able to deploy 50 fighters in a "big wing" as a single unit. The big wing was a bad fighter tactic in my opinion but the psychological effect on the Luftwaffe was profound, the pilots involved knew they were no nearer winning in August than at the start in May June


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## davebender (Mar 17, 2014)

Late 1940 Germany attempted to interdict British seaports via bombing. As previously discussed, WWII era Port of London was essentially in the center of town. So bombing the seaport with 1940s technology means some bombs will hit the city accidently. However London per se wasn't the target.


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 17, 2014)

I agree with Dave, the biggest was the switch from military to civilian targets. This allowed the RAF to rebuild.


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## Aozora (Mar 17, 2014)

davebender said:


> Easier said then done. RAF and USAAC had far more assets then Luftwaffe yet failed to bomb German radar stations and fighter control centers to dust.



Not forgetting the bombing and rocketing of German radar stations into dust for pre D-Day preparations, while deliberately excluding enough of them to fool the Germans into believing the invasion was taking place elsewhere.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 17, 2014)

> However London per se wasn't the target.



Actually, it was. Even if the LW had done so much damage to RAF airfields, part of the pretext to invading the UK would have been bombing London. The LW was going to do it anyway and this highlights one of the failures of the LW from the start of the battle; a lack of understanding of what damage the bombers were actually doing. There was no intelligence reporting back how effective the bombing of RAF airfields was, nothing to quantify results. Photo recon aircraft were being frequently shot down. This was a major failure of the Germans since they had no idea of where they were up to. Even once the wholesale bombing of London began, the Germans were still none the wiser as to how much damage they were doing to the capital.

Here is a quote from the excellent assessment of the battle called "The Battle of Britain" by Richard Hough and Denis Richards;

"Even after the news spread among Fighter Command squadrons of the fearful bombing of London on the night after the first great day battles over the capital, most pilots registered in their minds only an intensification of the battle as a preliminary to invasion. At a higher level of command the switch in German tactics was seen as the possible salvation of 11 Group. It also caused a certain amount of bewilderment. There had been plenty of evidence over the past weeks that enemy intelligence was weak and ill-informed, so the failure to recognise how close to breakdown the command and communications structures of 11 Group had become might account for the folly of not giving it the coup-de-grace.

"Clearly the invasion threat remained real. But why bomb London as a preliminary? There was little military advantage in setting fire to a lot of warehouses and killing a few thousand civilians. On the other hand, the invasion of Poland and of Holland had been accompanied by intimidating attacks on Warsaw and Rotterdam, presumably to cow the population. Did Goering really believe that a few thousand tons of bombs on the capital would lead the British to succumb to the threat of invasion? Yet early morning recce flights on 8 September showed no sign of an invasion fleet. it was all very puzzling."


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## Milosh (Mar 17, 2014)

Yet the USAAF did target cities and in doing so decimated the Luftwaffe.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 17, 2014)

> Yet the USAAF did target cities and in doing so decimated the Luftwaffe.



Pretty simplistic view, though, Milosh, considering the USAAF was targeting specific targets within the cities, not just the cities themselves - they didn't just swan over and attack Cologne for the hell of it to achieve victory - also, the USAAF had better recon, far greater resources and better management of the campaign on their side, things that the Germans lacked in 1940.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 17, 2014)

Another thing that the Luftwaffe lacked that the USAAF (and RAF) had to their advantage, was heavy bombers.

Something that Wever had envisioned for the Luftwaffe but his plans were derailed by his premature death in 1936.


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## parsifal (Mar 17, 2014)

Some very intersting and inciteful comments. Id say the turning point came about 1938 or so. Germany's decision to focus on tactical support made the LW unsuited to sustained air operations, in which direct support of the armies was not the focus. The things the LW did well were related to support of the army, whether that be CAS, air superiority over the battlefield or tacair ops just behind the front. Later in the war they were able to adaprt enough to make a decent showing of air defence issues, but on the offensive, they were simply out of their depth as far as taking and holding air superiority over a wide and deep area like SE England.

Germany's production priorities and pre-war preparations also failed to anticipate what they might do if faced with England not prepred to surrender. this should have been a battle problem well thought out and prepred for well before going to war. It wasnt.

Conversely, for the British, they never lost sight of their primary mission. tjough untested, a major part of the RAFs resources were devoted to air defence over England. throughout the phoney war and even during the BOF, Dowding never lost sight of what the main game was going to be, though the politicians put enormous pressure on him to bend and "compromise". Thankfully he had the drive and conviction to resist, ands was able to achieve that.

So, in the end, it gets down to the degree of focus each side had. the Germans in their prewar and pre-battle prearations showed a distinct lack of focus on the defeat of Britain, the RAF dedicated huge proportions of their resources to denying the LW controlover England, and were working on that very problem for a long time. everything just came together, the engine development, airframe design, radar, commuications, command structures, production finally tactics and training. It was far from an effortless or mistake free process, but it was far better than anything the germans did. individual elements of the german effort were comparable to the British, but it just all lacked the cohesion that the British put into their effort. And that, in my opinion, made the difference ultimately. Focus, versus lack of focus


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## Milosh (Mar 17, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Pretty simplistic view, though, Milosh, considering the USAAF was targeting specific targets within the cities, not just the cities themselves - they didn't just swan over and attack Cologne for the hell of it to achieve victory - also, the USAAF had better recon, far greater resources and better management of the campaign on their side, things that the Germans lacked in 1940.



The target might have been a specific industrial complex but the weather in Europe was not exactly great to 'pickle barrel' targeting. RAF BC at night had a better CEP than the 8th AF during the day.

The strategic bomber objective defined in the Pointblank directive 'Quebec conference' and applied in the CBO plans in 1944 for the Argument, were absolutely clear about the main goal of the bombardment > destroy the Luftwaffe.


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## nuuumannn (Mar 17, 2014)

Yep, and like I said, the USAAF had better resources and management to do so. The Luftwaffe was not in the same position to enact victory against the RAF by bombing London. Certainly not by bombing the civilian population.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 18, 2014)

IF anything, the switch to bombing London pulled the British out of a mood of doubt and concern to a mood of steeled resolve.

The Blitz worked the exact opposite of what Berlin was counting on...


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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> IF anything, the switch to bombing London pulled the British out of a mood of doubt and concern to a mood of steeled resolve.
> 
> The Blitz worked the exact opposite of what Berlin was counting on...



The government's agents, eavesdropping on the civil populations conversations in pubs and other public places reported in November 1940 that the thing that Londoners were complaining most about was the weather. In this case things really don't change 
Cheers
Steve

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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Some very intersting and inciteful comments. Id say the turning point came about 1938 or so. Germany's decision to focus on tactical support made the LW unsuited to sustained air operations, in which direct support of the armies was not the focus. The things the LW did well were related to support of the army, whether that be CAS, air superiority over the battlefield or tacair ops just behind the front. Later in the war they were able to adaprt enough to make a decent showing of air defence issues, but on the offensive, they were simply out of their depth as far as taking and holding air superiority over a wide and deep area like SE England.



This can't be a turning point in the BoB because at this period (largely before 1938 ) the Germans were developing an air force to carry out precisely the things which you correctly say it did well. In the numerous surviving specifications and other 'doctrinal' documents this intention is made clear. There was never any plan to take on Britain. When such a need arose the German planning isn't just inept, it is sometimes laughable.
The Wermacht as a whole seems to have viewed crossing the English Channel as it would a rather wide river which the Channel certainly is not. The Duke of Medina Sidonia found this out in 1588 as he and his ships were swept past the Isle of Wight and the entry to the Solent!
Cheers
Steve


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 18, 2014)

Well, it was raining bombs.


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## pbehn (Mar 18, 2014)

davebender said:


> Late 1940 Germany attempted to interdict British seaports via bombing. As previously discussed, WWII era Port of London was essentially in the center of town. So bombing the seaport with 1940s technology means some bombs will hit the city accidently. However London per se wasn't the target.




There was a German raider shed its bombs on London . Churchill ordered a raid on Berlin in reprisal. Adolph insisted that no bombs be dropped on London without his permission, so he gave permission. Maybe he provoked himself by issuing cast iron guarantees that Berlin would never be bombed. 


The turning point for me is when the invasion was called off, the LW maybe could have done better as others have described but never came remotely close to defeating the RAF. They needed to destroy the RAF completely but were losing a war of attrition.


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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

pbehn said:


> The turning point for me is when the invasion was called off, the LW maybe could have done better as others have described but never came remotely close to defeating the RAF. They needed to destroy the RAF completely but were losing a war of attrition.



They did come close to defeating Fighter Command and particularly 11 Group. This despite their inept waging of the campaign. 

It wasn't the RAF but ultimately the RN that had to be defeated to enable an invasion. The invasion, despite some expensive and time consuming planning, was never a viable operation. The Wermacht lacked the means and more importantly, particularly in the case of the Kriegsmarine, the will to launch it. 

Vice Admiral Assman of the German Naval Staff summed up the attitude to 'Sealion'.

_"Not one of the responsible persons was inclined to take a clear cut stand against the operation.........yet all felt relieved when, failing to gain air supremacy, they had a valid reason which justified calling off the operation." _

He also wrote later.

_"Naval Staff also appreciated clearly that air supremacy alone could not provide permanent security against vastly superior naval forces in the crossing area."_

As early as 21st May, before the French capitulation, following a Fuhrer Conference, Raeder went to great lengths to emphasise the _'impossible tasks' _involved in an invasion of Britain. He warned that some _'irresponsible persons' _might use the invasion of Norway as a precedent. He was at pains to emphasise that a dash across the docile Baltic Sea in fast passenger liners, through the Denmark Gate, evading the British Fleet to seize and land in lightly defended harbours was not the same as a large scale, opposed, crossing of the English Channel.
Later on 19th July 1940, in a memorandum sent via the Naval Staff, Raeder reiterated these arguments and others against the invasion forcefully to Hitler.
By 10th September 1940, as evidenced by an entry in the Naval Staff war diary, days before the official cancellation, it is clear that the Kriegsmarine is relieved that 'Sealion' is no longer even an option.

_"It would be more in the sense of the planned preparation for operation 'Sea Lion' if the Luftwaffe would now concentrate less on London and more on Portsmouth and Dover, and on naval forces in or near the operation.
The Naval War Staff, however, does not consider it suitable to approach the Fuhrer now with such demands because the Fuhrer looks upon a large scale attack on London as possibly being decisive. Bombardment of London might produce an attitude in the enemy which will make the 'Sea Lion' operation completely unnecessary."_

For the Germans the Battle of Britain WAS Operation Sea Lion, the battle that was never fought. In the years prior to 1939 there had never been a need to plan for it and no advantage that the Luftwaffe might gain over the RAF could make up for a lack of long term naval preparation. The RN was still the primary obstacle to invasion and, as Assman wrote, _"everyone concerned with the operation knew this."_

If you extend a turning point retrospectively, as Parsifal did for the Luftwaffe, I would suggest that the lack of long term naval planning, to enable the Kriegsmarine to confront the RN was a more crucial historical point. Nothing the Luftwaffe could ever have done could have facilitated the invasion.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Mar 18, 2014)

stona said:


> They did come close to defeating Fighter Command and particularly 11 Group. This despite their inept waging of the campaign.
> 
> ."[/I]
> 
> ...




It depends on the meaning of defeat. The RAF and especially 11 group were very hard pressed but so was the LW. To mount an invasion or force a surrender by bombing the LW needed to sweep the RAF from the skies while having most of its air force intact, this they were never even remotely close to achieving, by the end of September the RAF was as strong as ever and the LW wasnt. I agree with almost all other points made. The LW wasn't formed to mount a cross channel invasion, with better planning intelligence and execution they could have done better, even pushed the RAF away from Kent but they would still be a long way from where they needed to be to either mount an invasion or force a surrender.

Re Radar, it would seem obvious that radar stations overlap, if the LW had pressed home many attacks on 3 adjacent stations they could have punched a hole in the Chain Home defence. I am a Brit who has read about the BoB and Radars involvement since I was a kid, it seems obvious now but at the time it wasnt to the German high command, though I am sure German pilots didn't believe they were intercepted by chance. They did take out some stations but the ggap wasnt big enough or there long enough for the advantage to be noticed and taken advantage of.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 18, 2014)

I grew up believing that the switch to bombing London was the key turning point but I'm not so sure.

The prime reason the LW lost the BoB in my opinion is that they simply weren't equipped to with neither the tactics nor machinery nor manpower to do so.
Equally important is that they seriously underestimated the British political will to fight on - and I would also add the combined effect of the then British Empire Commonwealth to add to British capability.
Each side was guilty of poor estimates of the strength of the other, the LW grossly underestimated the RAF's abilities and the RAF overestimated that of the LW (which, in the end, was good for the RAF disastrous for the LW).

(when I say BoB I mean the air war, an actual successful invasion is a very different thing something I do not believe Germany could have 'won' even with periodic or day air-superiority over the south coast of England, they simply didn't have the ability to effectively deal with the British Royal Navy, nevermind that they lacked credible equipment to actually carry out the necessary operation and support the required logistical effort) 

German output of both planes pilots was much lower than Britain's (this has always surprised me) the comment that they were fighting a war of attrition they would ultimately lose is correct, I think.

The radar issue too is surprising, Germany were leaders in radar in the late 30's early 40's, that they failed to fully appreciate the 'force multiplier' effect of a properly integrated defence system also surprises.
The poor recon also added to German woes in addition to the British 'XX' successes, they were being led up a blind alley (although XX would be more important later).

Stephen Bungey's 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' shows the RAF never came close to the often claimed collapse (yes 11 Group came close to disaster but it was hardly 'the RAF') that it was the LW that was suffering unsustainable losses (losses which, along with the previous attrition would have serious effects in the Russian campaign in '41).
I tend to side with this view these days.
I have never seen it proven but I am inclined to think the BoB was something of a bluff that got out of hand thanks to the typical hubris of the then German leadership, they expected Britain to fall into line when shown enough of the threat of force started something that was hard to get out of.
I also have a sneaking suspicion some of this was to mislead Stalin too.

Bungay makes an interesting claim about how use of the Me110 as a fast strike plane could have yielded much better results for the LW than dive-bombers the mass bombing by He 111's (from the results of 'Test Group 210' (Erprobungsgruppe 210), but thankfully we will never know.

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## parsifal (Mar 18, 2014)

yep, i have to agree gixxerman, and with the greatest respect Steve, I think you are overplaying or overstating the real crisis that beset FC by the end of August. 11 gp was indeed almost on its knees, but 11 gp is not the whole of FC. it was a big chunk of FC, and its problems were very real, but even a few days of respite would allow it to recover, and that simply wasnt enough time for the Germans to win total air superiority, knock out all the airfields, destroy the radar net, suppress the ports and coastal defences and get a sizable force lodged in South East England. They were months away from getting anywhere near that


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## pbehn (Mar 18, 2014)

The Chain Home RADAR installations were primitive by the standards of 1940 so primitive the Germans doubted its usefulness. However it could detect and locate raiders position and approximate height and numbers. Its strength was in the fact that it covered the whole of the British coastline facing the LW and was integrated into what is now called a command and control system which of course the LW couldn't see.


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## redcoat (Mar 18, 2014)

Milosh said:


> Yet the USAAF did target cities and in doing so decimated the Luftwaffe.


By shooting down the Luftwaffe fighters attacking the bombers, and this is exactly why Kesselring and his senior staff were urging a switch from attacking the airfields to London. 
Their reasoning was that London was a target the RAF would have to defend, so the switch would bring the remaining RAF fighters into a battle where the escorting Luftwaffe fighters could shoot them down.
Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, the 'remaining' RAF fighters were far greater in number than they had expected.


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## redcoat (Mar 18, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Some very intersting and inciteful comments. Id say the turning point came about 1938 or so.


According to the author Stephen Bungay, the turning point was in 1915, with the first German air attacks on the UK. After that date the defence of Britain air space was always a major priority for the RAF.


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## Hop (Mar 18, 2014)

> There was a German raider shed its bombs on London . Churchill ordered a raid on Berlin in reprisal. Adolph insisted that no bombs be dropped on London without his permission, so he gave permission.



This is a bit of a myth. The first significant attack on London came on the 15th August when the Luftwaffe mounted a planned attack on an airfield in Croydon (they hit Croydon airport rather than Kenley, but both were in Croydon). 60 civilians were killed when bombs hit civilian buildings outside the airfield.

The next day the Luftwaffe attacked more targets in London, killing 15 civilians in Wimbledon.

A few days after that the Luftwaffe started bombing London at night. As Richard Overy puts it:



> The raids on Berlin were in reality retaliation for the persistent bombing of British conurbations and the high level of British casualties that resulted. In July 258 civilians had been killed, in August 1075; the figures included 136 children and 392 women. During the last half of August, as German bombers moved progressively farther inland, bombs began to fall on the outskirts of London. On the night of the 18/19, bombs fell on Wimbledon, Croydon and the Maldens. On the night of the 22/23 the first bombs fell on central London in attacks described by observers as "extensive" and for which no warning was given; on the night of 24/25 August bombs fell in Slough, Richmond and Dulwich. On the night the RAF first raided Berlin, bombs fell on Banstead, Croydon, Lewisham, Uxbridge, Harrow and Hayes. On the night of the next raid on Berlin, on 28/29 August, German aircraft bombed the following London areas: Finchley, St Pancaras, Wembley, Wood Green, Southgate, Crayford, Old Kent Road, Mill Hill, Illford, Hendon, Chigwell. London was under red warning for 7 hours 5 minutes. The bombing of London began almost 2 weeks before Hitler's speech on 4 September, and well before the first raid on Berlin





> I agree with Dave, the biggest was the switch from military to civilian targets. This allowed the RAF to rebuild.



Operational strength on 13 August, the day the Luftwaffe launched their offensive:


Jagdwaffe (Bf 109) - 853
ZG (Bf 110) - 189
Stukas (JU 87) - 286
KG (level bombers) - 1,008

RAF
Spitfires and Hurricanes - 579

BF 109 pilots fit for duty - 869 (1st August)
Fighter Command pilots and aircrew - 1,396 (10 August)

On 7 September, the day the Luftwaffe began all out attacks on London:

Jagdwaffe (Bf 109) - 658
ZG (Bf 110) - 112
Stukas (JU 87) - 133
KG (level bombers) - 798

RAF
Spitfires and Hurricanes - 621

BF 109 pilots fit for duty - 735 (1 September)
Fighter Command pilots and aircrew - 1,381

It wasn't the RAF that needed rebuilding. Fighter Command had pretty much maintained strength throughout the worst period of the battle. It was the Luftwaffe that desperately needed a change of tactics.



> Pretty simplistic view, though, Milosh, considering the USAAF was targeting specific targets within the cities, not just the cities themselves - they didn't just swan over and attack Cologne for the hell of it to achieve victory



Sometimes they did. The USAAF began area bombing of German cities in the summer of 1943. Sometimes an area attack was the plan before takeoff, more often an area attack was the secondary target if the primary target was covered with cloud. Richard G Davis, the official historian of the USAF, says the 8th AF carried out more than 1 area attack a week throughout 1944 and 1945.



> Id say the turning point came about 1938 or so. Germany's decision to focus on tactical support made the LW unsuited to sustained air operations, in which direct support of the armies was not the focus. The things the LW did well were related to support of the army, whether that be CAS, air superiority over the battlefield or tacair ops just behind the front.



The most numerous bomber in the Luftwaffe at the start of the war was the He111. The He111 had a range of around 1,400 miles. That's not a tactical bomber. The Luftwaffe had 780 of them in service at the start of the war. That's a strategic bombing force that dwarfed any other in the world at the time.

At the start of the war Bomber Command had 8 squadrons of Wellingtons, 6 of Whitleys, 8 of Hampdens, with about 12 aircraft per squadron, that's about 260 bombers roughly comparable to the He111.



> They did come close to defeating Fighter Command and particularly 11 Group. This despite their inept waging of the campaign.



I've seen nothing to suggest either FC or 11 Group were "close to defeat". At the meeting on 7th September, hours before the Luftwaffe switched to London, Dowding talked of "preparing to go down hill". He also talked of his changes to squadron organisation creating enough pilots to "meet wastage greater than any incurred so far". Just before that meeting Park, commander of 11 Group, told his chief controller: 

_"I've been looking at these casualty figures and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we hang on as we are going, we shall win in the end"_

These are not the views of commanders facing defeat. And that's despite the fact they greatly overestimated German strength. 

There's no doubt the Luftwaffe was beginning to hurt Fighter Command, but that's not the same as bringing them close to defeat. At all times the Luftwaffe was much closer to defeat, although the RAF did not know it at the time.



> I'm trying to help my daughter with her homework which has asked her for crucial turning points during the Battle of Britain.
> 
> Now I have a fair idea of how the battle flowed but I'm not really sure that I can locate the crucial points when the British won and the Axis lost.



Probably the only decisive "point" of the BoB came on 15 May, long before the battle began. Dowding opposed sending any more fighter squadrons to France, and the war cabinet agreed. If that decision had gone the other way Britain may have had too few aircraft and pilots left to defeat the Luftwaffe in August and September.

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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

parsifal said:


> yep, i have to agree gixxerman, and with the greatest respect Steve, I think you are overplaying or overstating the real crisis that beset FC by the end of August.



I'm only going by what Park and Dowding said to Evill et alter in that Bentley Priory meeting on 7th September. The critical shortage was in operational pilots. I've posted the figures many times in other discussions.

It was most certainly not the case that "by the end of September the RAF was as strong as ever". 
This stems from a contention in the BOB pamphlet published during the war and from which many historians (who should know better) have quoted uncritically. Even Dowding himself felt moved to correct this particular assertion. He pointed out that Fighter Command was receiving four-fifths of Service Flying Training Schools (SFTS) output, overloading the OTUs with 80-90 pupils who they had to turn out at the end of a fortnight _"as best they could."_
Consequently about 120 pilots per week had to be brought up to standard in mainly 'C' class squadrons, each having 16 non-operational pilots each. Twenty such 'C' class squadrons were effectively non-operational. Dowding doubted that they would be capable of intercepting unescorted bomber formations.

At the end of October an 11 Group squadron had on average 19 pilots (establishment was 26) with plans to increase this to 24. There were few non-operational pilots still training in 11 Group (unlike the wonderful BoB film). 11 Group was still no stronger than in the critical late August-early September period when Dowding was forced to introduce the much despised stabilisation system, in his own words _"a desperate expedient forced upon me by the heavy losses"._
It would stay in place long after the British considered the battle over, into November 1940.

Fighter Command had enough pilots overall, a point the BoB pamphlet took at face value, but not enough fit to engage the enemy. In October 1940 roughly one third (440) of all Fighter Command pilots were non-operational.
Of the 231 pilots killed or seriously wounded between 24th August and 7th September about 50 were from 11 Groups pool of experienced flight leaders. Such men can not be replaced from OTUs and there were just not that many of them to begin with.

The Luftwaffe could have defeated the RAF with a different campaign, or at least forced it North of the Thames. As it was the campaign against Fighter Command enjoyed some success. Park wrote in a memorandum on 12th September that the Luftwaffe had _"on several occasions barged through our first and second screen of fighters and reached their objectives by sheer weight of numbers." _
It wouldn't have made the slightest difference to the outcome of the war at the end of 1940. Had it emboldened the Germans to attempt an invasion it might well have ended in catastrophe for them. I don't believe they would have made the attempt, other excuses not to would have been found, particularly by the Kriegsmarine, many of whose senior officers regarded the enterprise as pure folly.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Mar 18, 2014)

stona said:


> I'm only going by what Park and Dowding said to Evill et alter in that Bentley Priory meeting on 7th September. The critical shortage was in operational pilots. I've posted the figures many times in other discussions.
> 
> It was most certainly not the case that "by the end of September the RAF was as strong as ever".
> This stems from a contention in the BOB pamphlet published during the war and from which many historians (who should know better) have quoted uncritically. Even Dowding himself felt moved to correct this particular assertion. He pointed out that Fighter Command was receiving four-fifths of Service Flying Training Schools (SFTS) output, overloading the OTUs with 80-90 pupils who they had to turn out at the end of a fortnight _"as best they could."_
> ...



Depends how you define strength. I am certainly not going to disagree with Dowding and Park (or even you steve) by the time in question the Stuka had been taken out of the game the Bf110 almost the same. All raids from across the North sea had stopped. Dowding and Parks point of view like the Germans was based on faulty intellegence. However as I and others have said The British overestimated the size of the LW at the start and its capacity to provide new planes and pilots. The LW front line strength was diminished and while you are correct in what you say about pilot quality in the RAF it was facing a much diminished threat from the LW who had similar problems. Dowding and Park didn't realize, or fully realize it at the time but that was why they were good, considering that the worst case scenario may actually happen.

To mount an invasion they needed to have air superiority over England while they actually didnt even have it over their own territory they were unable to fully protect the assembled bares in Antwerp for example. I agree with you and others though. Even if the capacity of the RAF was reduced to token defence an invasion still wouldnt have gone ahead, just one RN. Battleship among a fleet of flat bottomed barges would have been disaster.


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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

Raw numbers need careful analysis. Many historians just don't do this. From July to October 1940 the Luftwaffe lost 2,662 airmen, many times more than the British. They also lost 1,887 aircraft, substantially more than the RAF.

It is interesting to make a comparison of fighter losses (Bf 109 and Bf 110 for the Luftwaffe)

The RAF lost 1,023 aircraft, almost all Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe lost 873 Bf 109s and Bf 110s.

When we compare fighter crew losses the story is also different. The RAF lost 537, the Luftwaffe 551. Obviously some RAF fighters were shot down by bombers but the rather similar figures, bearing in mind that the Luftwaffe was operating over enemy territory and that the Bf 110 had two crewmen, tell an interesting story.

I'm just saying that raw data can be misleading and often needs careful interpretation. It's what good historians do.

My figures are from 'The Battle of Britain Then and Now'. The exact numbers vary very slightly from source to source but these are about as good as it gets 

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Mar 18, 2014)

stona said:


> Raw numbers need careful analysis. Many historians just don't do this. From July to October 1940 the Luftwaffe lost 2,662 airmen, many times more than the British. They also lost 1,887 aircraft, substantially more than the RAF.
> 
> It is interesting to make a comparison of fighter losses (Bf 109 and Bf 110 for the Luftwaffe)
> 
> ...



Cheers steve thats as I remember the figures (I dont have any books here) in terms of a fighter against fighter conflict the LW won on points but the RAF was there to engage bombers which shows the LW lost heavily. However Bomber command also had quite substantial losses also which arnt normally counted in the BoB so on balance a stalemate of sorts which was all the RAF needed.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 18, 2014)

Hop said:


> It wasn't the RAF that needed rebuilding. Fighter Command had pretty much maintained strength throughout the worst period of the battle. It was the Luftwaffe that desperately needed a change of tactics.


The constant bombing of airfields and support infrastructure was most certainly taking it's toll on RAF operations, when the Luftwaffe shifted it's concentration away from these targets, it allowed the RAF to rebuild and reinforce it's assets.


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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

pbehn said:


> so on balance a stalemate of sorts which was all the RAF needed.



Absolutely, that's exactly what it was. Dowding said that he had only to _avoid defeat _until the weather turned in November. That's exactly what he did with his 'stalemate' and in so doing he denied the Germans their stated objectives which was in itself a victory of sorts (and not a Pyrrhic one, the cost was sustainable.....just).

I don't believe that the outcome prevented and invasion, and nor did Churchill who in his first reference to the Battle of Britain, on 18th June 1940, in the House of Commons referred to the resistance of the entire nation adding a cutting reference to _"some people"_ forgetting that we have a Navy. 
It is a part of the well know 'finest hour' speech.

_"Here is where we come to the Navy. After all, we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that. We must remind them. For the last 30 years I have been concerned in discussions about the possibilities of oversea invasion, and I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at the beginning of the last war, of allowing all Regular troops to be sent out of the country, although our Territorials had only just been called up and were quite untrained. Therefore, this island was for several months practically denuded of fighting troops. The Admiralty had confidence at that time in their ability to prevent a mass invasion, even though at that time the Germans had a magnificent battle fleet in the proportion of 10 to 16, even though they were capable of fighting a general engagement every day and any day, whereas now they have only a couple of heavy ships worth speaking of."_

None of this diminishes the efforts of the RAF in delivering an important rebuff to Nazi ambition and the heroism of those who fought it, on both sides, should not be forgotten.

Cheers

Steve


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## Hop (Mar 18, 2014)

> The constant bombing of airfields and support infrastructure was most certainly taking it's toll on RAF operations, when the Luftwaffe shifted it's concentration away from these targets, it allowed the RAF to rebuild and reinforce it's assets.



How badly was it affecting RAF ground operations? 

In the past I've tried to quantify it. The hard data I've been able to find covers RAF aircraft destroyed on the ground and RAF personnel killed on the ground. 

Fighter Command aircraft destroyed on the ground:

25 August - 20
28 August - 5
4 September - 4
25 September - 1

Not only are those figures low, they do not suggest any sort of escalation in the ability of the Luftwaffe to destroy FC aircraft on the ground. In fact they suggest the opposite. 

RAF personnel killed on the ground (21 August - 5 September only):

21 August - 2
26 August - 4
31 August - 40 (according to Dowding all 40 were killed when a bomb exploded in a trench they were taking cover in)
1 September - 3

If the Luftwaffe were having a significant impact on RAF operations I'd have expected to see them inflicting _increasing_ damage on RAF bases, as the RAF became unable to defend them properly. The statistics don't show that. 

The other area I'd expect to see an effect is in serviceability rates. If the airfields were being heavily damaged, it should have made it harder to repair planes after combat, and decrease the serviceability rate. Air Commodore Peter Dye, from the RAF Historical Branch, gave 3 figures for Fighter Command serviceability rates:

An RAF study in 1945
July - 92%
August - 89%
September - 90%
October - 88%

The official history of the RAF:
Nov 1939 - 80%
Jul 1940 - 76%
September 1940 - 80% ("where it stayed for the remainder of the year")

A Fighter Command Research Branch study from 1949:

"the average number of serviceable aircraft per squadron across
11 and 13 Groups was in excess of 15 for the period July to October 1940."

Certainly the Luftwaffe did some damage to the RAF. But the statistics do not suggest it was particularly significant.


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## pbehn (Mar 18, 2014)

Hop said:


> How badly was it affecting RAF ground operations?
> 
> In the past I've tried to quantify it. The hard data I've been able to find covers RAF aircraft destroyed on the ground and RAF personnel killed on the ground.
> 
> ...



Good figures and if you compare to the losses both in absolute terms (men killed aircraft lost) and general terms (men injured and aircraft damaged) the situation is a bit different. As I have read it the LW was getting smaller and so massed raids on the London were the last resort. In terms of men and machines (a body count) it was close , in terms of mounting an invasion it wasnt close at all.


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 18, 2014)

from US Air Force Magazine How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle of Britain

"The attacks continued relentlessly. On average, the Luftwaffe sent 1,000 airplanes a day, and seldom fewer than 600. On Aug. 30 to 31, more than 1,600 came. The worst day for Fighter Command was Aug. 31 when it lost 39 aircraft and 14 pilots. Most days the Luftwaffe’s losses were even heavier than the RAF’s, but the production of Hurricanes and Spitfires was no longer keeping up with losses, and there were not enough replacements for the experienced pilots who had been killed."

"An enraged Hitler on Sept. 5 ordered a change in basic strategy, shifting the Luftwaffe’s focus of attack from British airfields to the city of London. That took the pressure off Fighter Command at a critical time. RAF fighter losses fell below the output of replacements. In diverting the offensive from the RAF, the Germans had lost sight of the valid assumption with which they had begun: The key objective was destruction of the RAF. Otherwise, the Sea Lion invasion would not be possible."


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## Njaco (Mar 18, 2014)

> This is a bit of a myth. The first significant attack on London came on the 15th August when the Luftwaffe mounted a planned attack on an airfield in Croydon (they hit Croydon airport rather than Kenley, but both were in Croydon). 60 civilians were killed when bombs hit civilian buildings outside the airfield.
> 
> The next day the Luftwaffe attacked more targets in London, killing 15 civilians in Wimbledon.



Going by memory, these areas weren't London proper AT THAT TIME as they might be now. I'm not very good on locales in and around London. But there were some areas hit that are now a part of London.

Several years ago I did this thread which has the best numbers that I could produce. All sources are listed at the front....

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/day-battle-britain-25360.html

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## vikingBerserker (Mar 18, 2014)

Excellent info Chris!


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## stona (Mar 19, 2014)

Hop said:


> If the Luftwaffe were having a significant impact on RAF operations I'd have expected to see them inflicting _increasing_ damage on RAF bases, as the RAF became unable to defend them properly. The statistics don't show that.
> 
> The other area I'd expect to see an effect is in serviceability rates. If the airfields were being heavily damaged, it should have made it harder to repair planes after combat, and decrease the serviceability rate. Air Commodore Peter Dye, from the RAF Historical Branch, gave 3 figures for Fighter Command serviceability rates:
> 
> ...



Aircraft availability/serviceability was never a problem. Operational pilots was a crucial shortage at the beginning of September. Operational aircraft per squadron might have been 13-15 on average (still below establishment) but operational pilots even in 11 Group fell as low as 15 (establishment 26). 20 squadrons were 'C' class with 16 of their pilots, the vast majority, non-operational.

Damage to sector airfields on occasion left Park, in his own words, flying little more than his desk.

Airfields can be and were quickly repaired, only a few were rendered non-operational for any significant period of time.

On 7th September, just before the stabilisation system was introduced, Dowding told Evill that Fighter Command was 'going downhill' due to the losses being inflicted upon it. Aeroplanes, telephone lines, hangars etc could all be replaced and surprisingly quickly. Grass fields can be filled, rolled and be operational again in hours. One of the things Dowding demanded was more repair crews. 
Pilots on the other hand, and particularly combat ready leaders, could not be so easily replaced. This was the crucial shortage in September 1940 for the RAF just as it would be for the Luftwaffe a few years later. It was this shortage that had both Park and Dowding so worried at the beginning of September, though Park was also concerned about the serious damage caused to 11 Groups infrastructure. It would not be correct to say that they were on the verge of defeat but they were seriously considering how best to manage their diminishing resources and trying to impress the gravity of the situation on their superiors..
By coincidence it was at this very point (almost to the hour) that the Luftwaffe shifted the weight of its attacks away from Fighter Command and onto London. This was therefore, for Park, the man controlling the day to day battle in the South of England, both a turning point and a relief of the pressure exerted on his resources. He said it, not me.

Cheers

Steve


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## redcoat (Mar 19, 2014)

stona said:


> On 7th September, just before the stabilisation system was introduced, Dowding told Evill that Fighter Command was 'going downhill' due to the losses being inflicted upon it.


Indeed, but Evill told him at the same conference that even if the casualty rate remained at the level of the last few weeks Fighter Command would still have 725 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes ready to take to the sky's in the third week of September, the last week judged suitable for any German invasion


> Pilots on the other hand, and particularly combat ready leaders, could not be so easily replaced. This was the crucial shortage in September 1940 for the RAF just as it would be for the Luftwaffe a few years later.


It was already a problem at the beginning of September 1940, the establishment of a Gruppe was supposed to be around 35-40 but the average had fallen to 20 in bomber units and 18 in Bf 109 units.

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## pbehn (Mar 19, 2014)

redcoat said:


> Indeed, but Evill told him at the same conference that even if the casualty rate remained at the level of the last few weeks Fighter Command would still have 725 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes ready to take to the sky's in the third week of September, the last week judged suitable for any German invasionIt was already a problem at the beginning of September 1940, the establishment of a Gruppe was supposed to be around 35-40 but the average had fallen to 20 in bomber units and 18 in Bf 109 units.



That was the point I was trying to make. Yes the RAF were under pressure and 11 group under severe pressure but the Luftwaffe were in a worse position relative to the start. I was never in the military but always morale is considered important, the accounts I have read from the BoB generally state that the RAF didnt consider they were near to defeat and the LW progressively didnt feel they could win.

In terms of the air war Spitfires and Hurricanes were vitally important, in terms of an invasion the RAF had lots of aircraft that could straffe and bomb beaches and landing craft . For an invasion the LW needed to have eliminated all single engined fighters from the south coast, if they didnt then how could they support a landing?


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 19, 2014)

stona said:


> Aircraft availability/serviceability was never a problem.



I am not so sure of that, I remember reading about Churchill visiting an airbase during an attack and he inquired about the reserve aircraft and being told there were none.


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## pbehn (Mar 19, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I am not so sure of that, I remember reading about Churchill visiting an airbase during an attack and he inquired about the reserve aircraft and being told there were none.




That wasn't an Airbase I believe it was the centre of the control for the BOB, at the height of the battle he could see all squadrons were airborne and enquired about reserves, Park was there and maybe Dowding. There were no reserves. But thet is for the operational situation in 11 group I believe. The situation was difficult for 11 group at thet time but because of the Command and control sytem Dowding and others had constructed the British political leader could see in real time what was happening, Hermann and Adolph just got second hand news. I think it was the bunker at RAF UXBridge but I am sure others can correct that.

for Brit readers I dont read the daily mail it just came up in the search ha ha
RAF bunker that helped Battle of Britain: Operation rooms prevented Nazi invasion | Mail Online


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 19, 2014)

I believe you are correct on that.


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## pbehn (Mar 19, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I believe you are correct on that.



I have read that it was that visit that inspired the "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few" speech, in any case the situation was dire, but at least the British (my) political leader could see it first hand. Maybe the first time in modern history that a leader in politics was there looking at a battle of international importance in real time.


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 19, 2014)

I will admit, that was the finest military speech I have ever heard.


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## pbehn (Mar 19, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I will admit, that was the finest military speech I have ever heard.



I must admit I liked Patton at the start of "lust for Glory" No bastard ever won a war my dying for his country he won it by making some other poor dumb bastard die for their country" 

From Churchill his "never in the field" speech was iconic but as a nephew of a veteran of Bomber Command this is my favourite.

We ask no favours of the enemy. We seek from them no compunction. On the contrary, if tonight our people were asked to cast their vote whether a convention should be entered into to stop the bombing of cities, the overwhelming majority would cry, "No, we will mete out to them the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us." The people with one voice would say: "You have committed every crime under the sun. Where you have been the least resisted there you have been the most brutal. It was you who began the indiscriminate bombing. We will have no truce or parley with you, or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst - and we will do our best." Perhaps it may be our turn soon; perhaps it may be our turn now.

For my uncle it was about meting out to them the measure and more than the measure" little to do with stragegy and tackticks just cold blooded revenge, but later in the speech it is clear not against the German people but against the Regime that controlled them, considering the emotion at the time his words were remarkably measured and with a view to the future when Europe and Germany were free from Naziism 

We live in a terrible epoch of the human story, but we believe there is a broad and sure justice running through its theme. It is time that the enemy should be made to suffer in their own homelands something of the torment they have let loose upon their neighbours and upon the world. We believe it to be in our power to keep this process going, on a steadily rising tide, month after month, year after year, until they are either extirpated by us or, better still, torn to pieces by their own people.


sorry off topic


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2014)

this one


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y0t-RqjMH-A_

But i like this one as well


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZzZZyJEiUgw_


or his blood sweat and toil speech


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TlkN-dcDCk_

Churchill was a brilliant orator and able o reach out to people in a way no one has been able to match, except perhaps herr Hitler, albeit in a different way

its interesting to compare with Stalins November "appeal to mother Russia" speech


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8IGbjPqFFvA_


This one of Hitlers speeches by comparison.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EV9kyocogKo_

As to which was the most inspiring, well thats a matter of opinion. I know which reaches out and touches my soul the most.

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## redcoat (Mar 20, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I am not so sure of that, I remember reading about Churchill visiting an airbase during an attack and he inquired about the reserve aircraft and being told there were none.


Churchill was asking about operational units being held in reserve, not aircraft held in reserve, and when Park said "none" he was only referring to units within 11 Group, not the whole of Fighter Command. In other groups a number of Squadrons saw no action at all on this day.


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## redcoat (Mar 20, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I will admit, that was the finest military speech I have ever heard.


During the war radio broadcasters were not allowed to record within the House Of Commons. 
Churchill's speech's "Blood, Sweat and Tears" and "The Few", or any of Churchill speeches from the House Of Commons were never heard during the war, snippets were read out by BBC staff on the radio, and reported in the press, but the recordings we hear were made post war.


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## pbehn (Mar 20, 2014)

redcoat said:


> During the war radio broadcasters were not allowed to record within the House Of Commons.
> Churchill's speech's "Blood, Sweat and Tears" and "The Few", or any of Churchill speeches from the House Of Commons were never heard during the war, snippets were read out by BBC staff on the radio, and reported in the press, but the recordings we hear were made post war.



A surprising number of people claim to have heard them at the time even though it was impossible. The memory can play tricks.


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## Hop (Mar 20, 2014)

Churchill did visit the BBC to record some of his speeches during the war. For example, on the 18 June he gave the "finest hour" speech to the House of Commons. That evening he went to the BBC to record it for broadcast. The government information minister at the time wrote in his diary how he had to "bully" Churchill to do it.


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## stona (Mar 20, 2014)

redcoat said:


> Churchill was asking about operational units being held in reserve, not aircraft held in reserve, and when Park said "none" he was only referring to units within 11 Group, not the whole of Fighter Command. In other groups a number of Squadrons saw no action at all on this day.




This was at the underground bunker at RAF Uxbridge on 15th September 1940. Park was present for this (and other VIP visits) as the visitors were officially his guests. Dowding was not there, Park was the AOC 11 Group, Dowding commanded Fighter Command.

You are quite correct to say that during this visit 11 Group committed all of its squadrons to the fray and had no reserves. This was not the only time this happened but was the only time Churchill saw it happen for himself.
Knowing when and where to make a maximum commitment of your forces is something that only the best commanders get correct. In this case, and others, Park got it absolutely right.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Mar 20, 2014)

stona said:


> This was at the underground bunker at RAF Uxbridge on 15th September 1940. Park was present for this (and other VIP visits) as the visitors were officially his guests. Dowding was not there, Park was the AOC 11 Group, Dowding commanded Fighter Command.
> 
> You are quite correct to say that during this visit 11 Group committed all of its squadrons to the fray and had no reserves. This was not the only time this happened but was the only time Churchill saw it happen for himself.
> Knowing when and where to make a maximum commitment of your forces is something that only the best commanders get correct. In this case, and others, Park got it absolutely right.
> ...



This was not the first time Churchill had enquired about "reserves" on a visit to France during the battle of France he equired about the masse de manouveur" and was told there wasnt any.

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## Njaco (Mar 20, 2014)

pbehn said:


> I have read that it was that visit that inspired the "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few" speech, in any case the situation was dire, but at least the British (my) political leader could see it first hand. Maybe the first time in modern history that a leader in politics was there looking at a battle of international importance in real time.



I believe that the "Never So Few" speech occurred on Aug 20 while the aircraft in reserve comment was made on Sept 15 or thereabouts.


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## pbehn (Mar 21, 2014)

Njaco said:


> I believe that the "Never So Few" speech occurred on Aug 20 while the aircraft in reserve comment was made on Sept 15 or thereabouts.



True ....from wiki

Never was so much owed by so many to so few was a wartime speech made by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 20 August 1940. The name stems from the specific line in the speech, Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few, referring to the ongoing efforts of the Royal Air Force pilots who were at the time fighting the Battle of Britain, the pivotal air battle with the German Luftwaffe with Britain expecting a German invasion. The speech also refers to the aerial bombing campaign by RAF Bomber Command, although the speech is usually taken to only refer to Fighter Command. With the Battle of Britain won a few months later and German plans postponed, the Allied airmen of the battle ultimately became known as "The Few".

Contents

1 Background
2 Legacy
3 Excerpts
4 References
5 Source
6 External links

Background

Churchill apparently first used his famous words upon his exit from the Battle of Britain Bunker at RAF Uxbridge on 16 August when visiting the No. 11 Group RAF Operations Room during a day of battle. Afterwards, Churchill told Major General Hastings Ismay ‘Don’t speak to me, I have never been so moved’.[1] After several minutes of silence he said ‘Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few.’ The sentence would form the basis of his speech to the House of Commons on 20 August.[2]

However, in 1954 "Pug" Ismay related an anecdote to publisher Rupert Hart-Davis; when Churchill and Ismay were:

travelling together in a car, in which Winston rehearsed the speech he was to give in the House of Commons on 20 August 1940 after the Battle of Britain. When he came to the famous sentence, ‘Never in the history of mankind have so many owed so much to so few’, Ismay said ‘What about Jesus and his disciples?’ ‘Good old Pug,’ said Winston, who immediately changed the wording to ‘Never in the field of human conflict ....‘.[3]

The speech was given as the United Kingdom prepared for the expected German invasion. In it, Churchill tried to inspire his countrymen by pointing out that although the last several months had been a series of monumental defeats for the Allies, their situation was now much better. Churchill's argument was in fact correct; shortly thereafter the British won the battle – the first significant defeat for the hitherto unstoppable Wehrmacht.

This speech was a great inspiration to the embattled United Kingdom during what was probably the most dangerous phase (for Britain) of the entire war. Together with the three famous speeches that he gave during the period of the Battle of France (the "Blood, toil, tears, and sweat" speech of 13 May, the "We shall fight on the beaches" speech of 4 June, and the "This was their finest hour" speech of 18 June) they form his most stirring rhetoric.

At the end of the speech, he introduced the first phase of the growing strategic alliance with the United States, and referred to the coming agreement for establishing US bases on various British territories.

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## pbehn (Mar 22, 2014)

redcoat said:


> Churchill was asking about operational units being held in reserve, not aircraft held in reserve, and when Park said "none" he was only referring to units within 11 Group, not the whole of Fighter Command. In other groups a number of Squadrons saw no action at all on this day.



Thinking about this, again my books are at home so is from memory. The operational situation of 11 group was at the front line of the defence. It was part of the strategy that when 11 group was committed then adjacent groups would share the load as I remember 10 group did their job but 12 group was somewhat "remis" with Leigh Mallory's politiking. For 11 group to be completely committed with no reserves would be expected when the whole of the Luftwaffe was going between the Pas de Calais and London. Also as I remember Uxbridge was a short detour from Churchills normal trip from Chartwell to London, I believe he was there on many occasions although how much he knew of the minutae of Dowding and Parks strategy I dont know


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## parsifal (Mar 22, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Thinking about this, again my books are at home so is from memory. The operational situation of 11 group was at the front line of the defence. It was part of the strategy that when 11 group was committed then adjacent groups would share the load as I remember 10 group did their job but 12 group was somewhat "remis" with Leigh Mallory's politiking. For 11 group to be completely committed with no reserves would be expected when the whole of the Luftwaffe was going between the Pas de Calais and London. Also as I remember Uxbridge was a short detour from Churchills normal trip from Chartwell to London, I believe he was there on many occasions although how much he knew of the minutae of Dowding and Parks strategy I dont know




lee mallory's group to the North was supposed to provide cover over 11 Gps airfields, whilst 11 gp was to step forward aggressively and engage the LW in its approaches. The idea was to break up the attacking formations before they started pasting RAF assets. It didnt work. Operating forward meant Parks squadrons were more exposed to the attentions of the 109s, which lavished lots of attention on the relatively green fighter units of 11 Gp. Moreover, and more importantly Lee Mallory failed to position his fighters in a timely fashion, being preoccupied with the so called "big wing". It took too long to form the big wings, by which time the LW was on its way home, its fighters had had time to regroup to cover the returns by the bombers. all around, this phase of the battle was least satisfactory for the RAF, and the stage where it came very close to losing.

Park may have been able to not push forward a quite as much, but there is a lot of debate about that as to whether he could or not. but Lee Mallory should have been relieved of his command for his failures at this time IMO.

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## pbehn (Mar 22, 2014)

parsifal said:


> lee mallory's group to the North was supposed to provide cover over 11 Gps airfields, whilst 11 gp was to step forward aggressively and engage the LW in its approaches. The idea was to break up the attacking formations before they started pasting RAF assets. It didnt work. Operating forward meant Parks squadrons were more exposed to the attentions of the 109s, which lavished lots of attention on the relatively green fighter units of 11 Gp. Moreover, and more importantly Lee Mallory failed to position his fighters in a timely fashion, being preoccupied with the so called "big wing". It took too long to form the big wings, by which time the LW was on its way home, its fighters had had time to regroup to cover the returns by the bombers. all around, this phase of the battle was least satisfactory for the RAF, and the stage where it came very close to losing.
> 
> Park may have been able to not push forward a quite as much, but there is a lot of debate about that as to whether he could or not. but Lee Mallory should have been relieved of his command for his failures at this time IMO.



That is exactly what was contained in my comment about Politiking..if a commander with the talent of Park was in charge of 12 group the battle would have run very differently, to me Park should have a statue in Trafalgar square on a column equal in height with Nelsons

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## pbehn (Mar 22, 2014)

parsifal said:


> lee mallory's group to the North was supposed to provide cover over 11 Gps airfields, whilst 11 gp was to step forward aggressively and engage the LW in its approaches. The idea was to break up the attacking formations before they started pasting RAF assets. It didnt work. Operating forward meant Parks squadrons were more exposed to the attentions of the 109s, which lavished lots of attention on the relatively green fighter units of 11 Gp. Moreover, and more importantly Lee Mallory failed to position his fighters in a timely fashion, being preoccupied with the so called "big wing". It took too long to form the big wings, by which time the LW was on its way home, its fighters had had time to regroup to cover the returns by the bombers. all around, this phase of the battle was least satisfactory for the RAF, and the stage where it came very close to losing.
> 
> Park may have been able to not push forward a quite as much, but there is a lot of debate about that as to whether he could or not. but Lee Mallory should have been relieved of his command for his failures at this time IMO.



That is exactly what was contained in my comment about Politiking..if a commander with the talent of Park was in charge of 12 group the battle would have run very differently, to me Park should have a statue in Trafalgar square on a column equal in height with Nelsons


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## CobberKane (Mar 22, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Pretty simplistic view, though, Milosh, considering the USAAF was targeting specific targets within the cities, not just the cities themselves - they didn't just swan over and attack Cologne for the hell of it to achieve victory.



That old chestnut? I'm sure the residents of Dresden where comforted to know the USAAF were precision bombing them, not area bombing. The Axis bombed the allied civilians, the Allies bombed the Axis civilians. To say anything else is semantics. C'este la Guerre.


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## pbehn (Mar 22, 2014)

CobberKane said:


> That old chestnut? I'm sure the residents of Dresden where comforted to know the USAAF were precision bombing them, not area bombing. The Axis bombed the allied civilians, the Allies bombed the Axis civilians. To say anything else is semantics. C'este la Guerre.



You cannot make a precision raid with 1000+ bombers flying in defensive boxes, sure you may make a factory the target but in fact it is the factory you may hit and the homes of its workers you will hit....pure statistics


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## GrauGeist (Mar 23, 2014)

CobberKane said:


> That old chestnut? I'm sure the residents of Dresden where comforted to know the USAAF were precision bombing them, not area bombing. The Axis bombed the allied civilians, the Allies bombed the Axis civilians. To say anything else is semantics. C'este la Guerre.


Sure, bomber command said "hey, how many civilians can we screw today?"

And the general consensus was that while targeting civilians, perhaps a military target or two might get knocked out in the conflagration...hey, bonus, right?


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## mhuxt (Mar 23, 2014)

Needs new thread.


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## CobberKane (Mar 23, 2014)

mhuxt said:


> Needs new thread.



Yeah, I know it. I don't mean to hijack the thread, I just hate to see the myth propagated that the Allies did not target German civilians, just as I hate to read the BS about Eisenhower deliberately starving to death thousands of German POWs and, in a repulsive league of it's own, the pseudo-academic holocaust denial of David Irving and his like. Those who forget history, or revise it, are doomed to repeat it. I'll go away now...


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## GrauGeist (Mar 23, 2014)

I suppose it might be a moot point to mention that the first two raids on Dresden were done by the RAF...


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## mhuxt (Mar 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> I suppose it might be a moot point to mention that the first two raids on Dresden were done by the RAF...



It would be moot, since the first three raids on Dresden were all USAAF affairs. But, as noted, that's another thread.


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## stona (Mar 23, 2014)

The only difference between the RAF and USAAF approach was that the British, realising the limitations of bombing accuracy much earlier than their colleagues, acknowledged that civilians were targets as in the 'dehousing' of workers. The USAAF was never quite so upfront about it.

I think you would have a hard job describing the fire bombing of Tokyo as any more of a precision raid than the fire bombing of Hamburg.

The reality was that by 1944, as far as heavy bombers went, the RAF's night bombing was more accurate, that is more concentrated around the aiming point, than the USAAF's daylight effort, special missions excepted.

It was war. Who are we to judge? Get over it!

Cheers

Steve


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## GrauGeist (Mar 23, 2014)

mhuxt said:


> It would be moot, since the first three raids on Dresden were all USAAF affairs. But, as noted, that's another thread.


Then hopefully that thread will show you that out of three raids between 14 and 15 February that started the disasterous fires, the first two waves that struck (772 aircraft total) were RAF bomber command, the following two were 8th AF (527 aircraft total). Three raids followed later between 2 March and 17 April.

Whether it was right or wrong, the fact remains that the bombing was a joint effort.


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## Milosh (Mar 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Then hopefully that thread will show you that out of three raids between 14 and 15 February that started the disasterous fires, the first two waves that struck (772 aircraft total) were RAF bomber command, the following two were 8th AF (527 aircraft total). Three raids followed later between 2 March and 17 April.
> 
> Whether it was right or wrong, the fact remains that the bombing was a joint effort.



The Dresden attack was to have begun with a USAAF Eighth Air Force bombing raid on 13 February 1945. The Eighth Air Force had already bombed the railway yards near the centre of the city twice in daytime raids: once on 7 October 1944 with 70 tons of high-explosive bombs killing more than 400,[37] then again with 133 bombers on 16 January 1945, dropping 279 tons of high-explosives and 41 tons of incendiaries.[5]

On 13 February 1945, bad weather over Europe prevented any USAAF operations, and it was left to RAF Bomber Command to carry out the first raid. It had been decided that the raid would be a double strike, in which a second wave of bombers would attack three hours after the first, just as the rescue teams were trying to put out the fires.

On the morning of 14 February 431 bombers of the 1st Bombardment Division of the United States VIII Bomber Command were scheduled to bomb Dresden at around midday, and the 3rd Bombardment Division were to follow the 1st and bomb Chemnitz, while the 2nd Bombardment Division would bomb a synthetic oil plant in Magdeburg. The bomber groups would be protected by the 784 P-51 Mustangs of VIII Fighter Command which meant that there would be almost 2,100 aircraft of the United States Eighth Air Force over Saxony during 14 February.[56]

There is some confusion in the primary sources over what was the target in Dresden, whether it was the marshalling yards near the centre or centre of the built up area. The report by the 1st Bombardment Division's commander to his commander states that the targeting sequence was to be the centre of the built up area in Dresden if the weather was clear. If clouds obscured Dresden and if it was clear over Chemnitz, then Chemnitz was to be the target. If both were obscured then the centre of Dresden would be bombed using H2X radar.[57] The mix of bombs to be used on the Dresden raid was about 40% incendiaries, much closer to the RAF city busting mix than that usually used by the USAAF in precision bombardments.[58] This was quite a common mix when the USAAF anticipated cloudy conditions over the target.

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## redcoat (Mar 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> I suppose it might be a moot point to mention that the first two raids on Dresden were done by the RAF...


As Milosh has already posted the USAAF first bombed Dresden on the 7 October 1944 and then on the 16 January 1945.


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## pbehn (Mar 23, 2014)

redcoat said:


> Why are you repeating something that has already been shown to be wrong ???????
> 
> As Milosh has already posted the USAAF first bombed Dresden on the 7 October 1944 and then on the 16 January 1945.



I cant understand why Dresden has such special status. Both the USA and British fire bombed cities, you would think the bombing of Dresden took place after the surrender when some refer to it. I did meet a guy who claimed that one evening, but it was an Irish pub in Hamm and he was drunk lol


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## GrauGeist (Mar 23, 2014)

redcoat said:


> As Milosh has already posted the USAAF first bombed Dresden on the 7 October 1944 and then on the 16 January 1945.


Because the *Firestorms *were initiated between 13 February and 15 February, that's why.

The two previous bombing missions hit the marshalling yards with HE, not incindiary munitions.


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## parsifal (Mar 23, 2014)

guys, wtf. how is Dresden relate to the BoB


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## bobbysocks (Mar 23, 2014)

agreed....all this will do is start something that will get this thread locked. start a dresden thread if you want to debate it


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## CobberKane (Mar 23, 2014)

Fair enough. Here's something a bit closer to the topic: given the RAFs response to the accidental bombing of London during the BoB was almost instant, do you think Churchill's go-ahead to bomb Berlin was a considered effort to move the Luftwaffe's focus from the beleaguered airfields to the British civilian population?


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## pbehn (Mar 23, 2014)

CobberKane said:


> Fair enough. Here's something a bit closer to the topic: given the RAFs response to the accidental bombing of London during the BoB was almost instant, do you think Churchill's go-ahead to bomb Berlin was a considered effort to move the Luftwaffe's focus from the beleaguered airfields to the British civilian population?



That was the effect but I dont think it was the plan, I think the plan was to give Hitler and Goering political problems at home, and to show people in UK that the war wasnt a one way street. There is another side to this, at the time Germany was receiving substantial supplies from Russia it was important to show both Russia and the USA that the UK could strike back.

http://ww2today.com/12th-november-1940nazi-soviet-talks-molotov-in-berlin


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## bobbysocks (Mar 23, 2014)

CobberKane said:


> Fair enough. Here's something a bit closer to the topic: given the RAFs response to the accidental bombing of London during the BoB was almost instant, do you think Churchill's go-ahead to bomb Berlin was a considered effort to move the Luftwaffe's focus from the beleaguered airfields to the British civilian population?



only one that can answer that with any certainty is Mr. Churchill himself.....we know how it play out and may speculate...but may never know the true motives or strategy


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## pbehn (Mar 23, 2014)

bobbysocks said:


> only one that can answer that with any certainty is Mr. Churchill himself.....we know how it play out and may speculate...but may never know the true motives or strategy



Churchills speeches made his intentions very clear, whether he deliberately wanted a slug fest of bombing cities I dont know. At the time German cities were considerably further away from RAF airfields than British cities were from the LW.


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## redcoat (Mar 23, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Churchills speeches made his intentions very clear, whether he deliberately wanted a slug fest of bombing cities I dont know. At the time German cities were considerably further away from RAF airfields than British cities were from the LW.


both the RAF and Luftwaffe were bombing each others cities from the first days of the battle. The RAF had been attacking targets in the Ruhr by night since May, and the luftwaffe had been launching night attacks on British towns and cities from the start of the battle, with the single exception of London.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 23, 2014)

the bigger question for me is are you willing to risk the loss ( death or capture ) of trained pilots over germany or western europe with bombing raids? evidently they did. one of the strategies of the BoB was to fight over their own soil so if the pilots bailed out they possibly could continue flying and fighting if they suffered no serious wounds. if pilots were becoming in short supply it is more expedient to transition the pilot and co-pilot from multi-engine ac like a lanc than train a raw recruit from the ground up....or accelerate a current cadet with minimal hours. the bomber pilots probably already have several hundred hours of flight time....although not in a SE fighter. i seriously think the berlin raid was more of a psy-op than anything else....to show hitler and the nazis that no matter what everyone believed about the might of the 3rd reich they werent invulnerable to attack, even in berlin. like you said the lw was way closer to the uk than the other way.


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 23, 2014)

If I had to guess the Berlin raid was similar to the Doolittle raid, mainly a morale builder.


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## pbehn (Mar 23, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> If I had to guess the Berlin raid was similar to the Doolittle raid, mainly a morale builder.



I was just about to post the same comment.....
why cant I give bacon?


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## pbehn (Mar 23, 2014)

redcoat said:


> both the RAF and Luftwaffe were bombing each others cities from the first days of the battle. The RAF had been attacking targets in the Ruhr by night since May, and the luftwaffe had been launching night attacks on British towns and cities from the start of the battle, with the single exception of London.



True if you talk about the battle of Britain but the "rules of engagement" in the early days of the war were very strange for nations at war, a lot of leaflet dropping and specifically forbidden to bomb civilian targets, predicatably all sides were dragged into open unrestricted warfare.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 23, 2014)

pbehn said:


> why cant I give bacon?


Horse has the system set up to give bacon once every 24 hours


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## pbehn (Mar 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Horse has the system set up to give bacon once every 24 hours



Its like Saudi Arabia here....can I get a coke?


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## CobberKane (Mar 24, 2014)

Personally, I would bet that Churchill not only had a fair idea of what would happen if he bombed Berlin, but intended that it should happen. By that stage of the BoB Fighter Command was barely hanging in. The accidental bombing of London could hardly be mistaken for a major change in Luftwaffe policy, but it provided Churchill with the excuse to do in retaliation what they had been accusing the Germans of - bombing civilian targets. But why do it? As has been previously mentioned, the Luftwaffe was in a far better position to bomb London than the RAF was to bomb Berlin; a move to civilian targets was bound to visit more vastly more destruction on British cities than German. The only explanation I can see for taking an action highly likely to precipitate this (maximum retaliation for a single German attack that was entirely at odds with their previous behaviour, and later turned out to be accidental) was to take the pressure off fighter command. Churchill was no fool, and he proved by his subsequent actions that he had no problem with the concept of total war.


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## Milosh (Mar 24, 2014)

RAF FC wasn't barely hanging on it was 11 Group. 11 group had ~2/3 of the RAF fighters.


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## stona (Mar 24, 2014)

And the bombing of London wasn't a retaliatory action, though that is how German propaganda portrayed it, a bit like returning fire on the Poles in September 1939.

The realisations that 'Sea Lion' was and always had been pie in the sky and that the RAF was not going to be defeated before the winter weather arrived in any case (bad German intelligence meant that the Wermacht actually had no idea how weakened Fighter Command was) meant that the change in targets amounted to a change in policy. If the threat of invasion wouldn't force Britain to the negotiating table to accept a settlement on German terms then maybe bombing London would.

This incidentally went against Nazi air doctrine. The decision to avoid 'morale bombing' grew out of the fact that, starting with Moltke the Elder, the Prussian-GermanArmy had developed a strong reliance on combined arms warfare. The objective was to defeat the enemy's army, if possible by large scale "operational" movements culminating in a battle of annihilation. The implication was that enemy cities could be taken _after the battle _, not as Trenchard had suggested, before it and not, as Douhet suggested, as a substitute for it.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Mar 24, 2014)

Milosh said:


> RAF FC wasn't barely hanging on it was 11 Group. 11 group had ~2/3 of the RAF fighters.


In fact 11 Group had 39% of the FC's serviceable fighters on 1 Sept 40 at 09.00hrs


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## Juha (Mar 24, 2014)

And one must remember, that the attacks on London worked as Kesselring and co had thought, FC lost more planes in Sept than in Aug but pilot losses(KIA/MIA/POW) were slightly less. LW's losses in planes and aircrews were less in Sept, so in fact exchange rate got better for the LW. But still the fighter pilot situation, which was the dominant factor because in daylight LW bombers needed fighter escort and the number of escort available was the critical factor to the LW daylight effort, was worse in the LW than in the FC inSept and Oct 40.


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## redcoat (Mar 24, 2014)

pbehn said:


> True if you talk about the battle of Britain but the "rules of engagement" in the early days of the war were very strange for nations at war, a lot of leaflet dropping and specifically forbidden to bomb civilian targets, predicatably all sides were dragged into open unrestricted warfare.


The Luftwaffe attacked targets in civilian areas during its invasions of Poland, Norway, Holland, Belguim, and France, while Britain only relaxed it's ban on attacking targets in civilian areas after the Luftwaffe attack on Rotterdam.


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## Hop (Mar 24, 2014)

Njaco said:


> Going by memory, these areas weren't London proper AT THAT TIME as they might be now. I'm not very good on locales in and around London. But there were some areas hit that are now a part of London.



London has an odd history of local government thanks to its importance since Roman times. Even today "The City of London" has its own local government and police force, covering an area of just over 1 square mile in the centre of London, with a population of around 7,000. As a result of the powers of the old city, and the size of London relative to the rest of the UK, London local government didn't cover the whole of the city until the 1960s.

But Croydon was certainly part of London. It was part of the Metropolitan police area since 1840. It was covered by London transport, part of the London civil defence area. Croydon was the main London airport. The newspapers of the time talked of London being bombed.

And don't forget, a day or two later they were back bombing targets in Wimbledon, also in London.


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## Hop (Mar 24, 2014)

CobberKane said:


> Fair enough. Here's something a bit closer to the topic: given the RAFs response to the accidental bombing of London during the BoB was almost instant, do you think Churchill's go-ahead to bomb Berlin was a considered effort to move the Luftwaffe's focus from the beleaguered airfields to the British civilian population?



No, for two reasons.

First, as Overy points out, it was not a response to one supposedly accidental raid on London:



> The raids on Berlin were in reality retaliation for the
> persistent bombing of British conurbations and the high level of British civilian casualties that resulted. In July 258 civilians had been killed, in August 1,075; the figures included 136 children and 392 women. During the last half of August, as German bombers moved progressively further inland, bombs began to fall on the outskirts of London. On the night of 18/19 August bombs fell on Croydon, Wimbledon and the Maldens. On the night of 22/23 August the first bombs fell on central London in attacks described by observers as 'extensive' and for which no warning was given; on the night of 24/25 August bombs fell in Slough, Richmond Park and Dulwich. On the night the RAF first raided Berlin, bombs fell on Banstead, Croydon, Lewisham, Uxbridge, Harrow and Hayes. On the night of the next raid on Berlin, on 28/29 August, German aircraft bombed the following London areas: Finchley, St Pancras, Wembley, Wood Green, Southgate, Crayford, Old Kent Road, Mill Hill, Ilford, Hendon, Chigwell. London was under 'red' warning for seven hours and five minutes. The bombing of London began almost two weeks before Hitler's speech on 4 September, and well before the first raid on Berlin.



To put the those civilian deaths in context, in October, November and December 1940, which included the RAF's first area bombing attack, less than 400 German civilians were killed by bombing. 

Secondly, the first raid on Berlin was ordered on the 25 August. Serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes in the preceding days:

18 Aug - 624
19 Aug - 607
20 Aug - 636
21 Aug - 639
22 Aug - 631
23 Aug - 646
24 Aug - 646
25 Aug - 649

The War Cabinet received a weekly summary of the fighting. From the summary for the week 15 - 22 Aug:



> During daylight hours on the 15th, 16th and 18th the German Air
> Force attacked this country on a heavy scale, the enemy operating in waves
> consisting in some cases of as many as 150 aircraft. On the 15th August it is
> estimated that 1,200
> ...





> On the three days on which the principal attacks were made a large
> number of enemy fighters escorted their bombers; the primary object of these
> attacks was to gain air superiority by destroying our fighter defences, both in
> the air and on the ground. Throughout the week the main weight of attack was
> ...



And from the next week's summary:



> Enemy tactics have undergone a considerable change. No short-range
> dive-bombers were seen, while last week 83 were destroyed; even the Ju. 88 has
> not been used for dive-bombing. The long-range bomber force is being
> increasingly employed and night attacks have been intensified. The raids were
> ...



I can't see any reason for Churchill to want a change. The RAF's airfields certainly weren't "beleaguered" according to the reports. In fact, things seemed to be going very well, with very high reported Luftwaffe casualties, low casualties for the RAF, little serious damage to airfields, and a strengthening RAF fighter force.


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## stona (Mar 24, 2014)

redcoat said:


> The Luftwaffe attacked targets in civilian areas during its invasions of Poland, Norway, Holland, Belguim, and France, while Britain only relaxed it's ban on attacking targets in civilian areas after the Luftwaffe attack on Rotterdam.



The line had become blurred. Where bombs fell and where they were intended to fall are two different things. The Germans did not see even the attacks in and around Rotterdam as attacks on the civilian populations but rather as attacks on legitimate military targets, in line with their 'combined arms 'doctrine.
In fact the attack(s) on Rotterdam were in effect unintended 'morale' bombing attacks. French and British and French propaganda made a point of playing up the collateral damage whilst ignoring the intent.

The Luftwaffe specifically rejected the doctrine of Douhet and his successors (like Trenchard) most notably in 1935 with the adoption of Wever/Wilberg's ' Luftkriegfuhrung (The Conduct of the Air War)', L.Dv.16, which makes the aims of the Luftwaffe quite clear. It is encapsulated in the concept of 'Operativer Luftkrieg'. It is a development of an earlier 1931 Reichswehr technical manual, 'Die Truppenfuhrung', specifically for the Luftwaffe.

Page 14 para. 10 gives us those aims.

_'To combat the enemy's air force, thereby weakening the enemy's armed forces and at the same time protecting our people and homeland

To directly support army and naval forces by taking part in operations and combat at sea and on land.

To attack the sources of power of the enemy's armed forces [strategic centres of gravity] and interrupt the flow of supplies to the front [interdiction]'_

No priorities are assigned or given, but the doctrine for the use of the Luftwaffe is summed up in three sentences.

Earlier, particularly in Poland, faulty intelligence had led to attacks on what the Germans imagined to be concentrations of Polish forces which were not present. This happens to this day. A precision guided weapon on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, or one on a civil air raid shelter in Baghdad are modern examples. When you start dropping high explosives, no matter how well or badly aimed there will be collateral damage.
In 1940 both the targeting and aiming was far less precise than we imagine it to be today, but things did and still do go wrong.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Mar 24, 2014)

Milosh said:


> RAF FC wasn't barely hanging on it was 11 Group. 11 group had ~2/3 of the RAF fighters.



Serviceability rates and reserves are a good indication of the efficiency of any air force and the sort of campaign for which it has set itself up.

At around the time of the BoB the RAF had a higher percentage of serviceable 'first line' aircraft than the Luftwaffe. Not by much but small margins win battles.

The Luftwaffe, designed for short, sharp campaigns maintained a small reserve, about 20% of front line aircraft. In June 1940 the RAF had more aircraft in reserve than at the 'front' and was far better position to fight a long campaign of attrition through the summer and autumn of 1940. It's why having enough aircraft was not a problem for the RAF in 1940.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Mar 24, 2014)

stona said:


> Serviceability rates and reserves are a good indication of the efficiency of any air force and the sort of campaign for which it has set itself up.
> 
> At around the time of the BoB the RAF had a higher percentage of serviceable 'first line' aircraft than the Luftwaffe. Not by much but small margins win battles.
> 
> ...



The RAF also developed a very good system for cannibalising damaged aircraft and getting some of them back in service not really possible for the LW


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## stona (Mar 24, 2014)

pbehn said:


> The RAF also developed a very good system for cannibalising damaged aircraft and getting some of them back in service not really possible for the LW



Yes, the RAF repair system was efficient. There were initial problems with the Spitfire, facilities for which only existed at certain airfields, but these were overcome. The more traditionally constructed Hurricane could often be patched up even at satellite stations.

Due to the speed of the German advance and movement of the Luftwaffe to airfields a long way from home (it deserves much credit for the almost 'frictionless' way it managed this) a situation where aircraft with any significant damage had to leave the Luftwaffe and be sent back to Germany, typically by rail, to enter the industrial repair system developed. Once repaired they would be re-accepted into the Luftwaffe. You may notice some Luftwaffe aircraft during this period with the letter 'F' after the werknummer. This is for 'Flugklar' and indicates an aircraft which has returned to service and is cleared for flight again. The CEAR on Werner Bartels E-1 notes the werknummer as 6296F. This marking seems to have been abandoned by 1941.
As you say it can hardly have helped serviceability rates, particularly combined with a small reserve and relatively low levels of new/replacement aircraft production.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Mar 24, 2014)

As I can't find any info, can someone tell what is a Provisional Storage Unit.

"The RAF service level facility was the Provisional Storage Units. Aircraft repairs that were beyond the Civilian Repair Organization were handled at the PSU."


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## Njaco (Mar 24, 2014)

Hop said:


> No, for two reasons.
> 
> First, as Overy points out, it was not a response to one supposedly accidental raid on London:
> 
> ...



and yet the very next weekend is remembered as "The Bad Weekend" when Kesselring and the Luftwaffe concentrated on those very same airfields and almost - ALMOST - collapsed FC. I don't know about "...things seemed to be going very well,". Biggin Hill was almost totally destroyed as were numerous other stations. You must remember that it wasn't a case of throwing peas at a wall - it was picking the right and proper wall. Luftwaffe attacks very often concentrated on the wrong airfields but when they did get it right, it was disastrous.

.


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## pbehn (Mar 24, 2014)

The diagram seems to show to me that in this war of attrition where the LW had to sweep the RAF out of the skies as a prelude to invasion. Not only were the RAF not on their knees the LW was relatively worse of compared to the start. The diagram is interesting but the real problem for both sides was pilots and aircrew which were much harder to replace.


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## Hop (Mar 24, 2014)

> and yet the very next weekend is remembered as "The Bad Weekend" when Kesselring and the Luftwaffe concentrated on those very same airfields and almost - ALMOST - collapsed FC. I don't know about "...things seemed to be going very well,". Biggin Hill was almost totally destroyed as were numerous other stations.



What happened on the 31 August cannot have influenced the decision to bomb Berlin on the 25. The fighting up to the 25th, when the decision to bomb Berlin was taken, was favourable for the RAF, as the figures and reports above show.

As to FC "almost collapsing" the following week, from the next war cabinet summary, 29 August - 5 September:



> The scale of enemy attack on this country by day during the week
> under review was considerably greater than it was in the previous week, but by
> night it was slightly smaller. Attacks were chiefly against aerodromes by day
> and industry by night, though some damage was inflicted on aircraft and other
> ...





> About twice as many aircraft were employed by the enemy in daylight
> attacks as in the previous week. The raids were generally of a mass character
> by large formations and were repeated two or three times daily. These daylight
> operations have been mainly directed against aerodromes, especially those in the
> ...



On the 2 September Churchill reported to the war cabinet on his visit to FC on 31 August:



> The Prime Minister said that on the 31st August he had
> visited the Fighter Command during one of the big German air
> attacks. He had found it very instructive to watch the Officers
> of the Fighter Command deploying their forces and building up
> ...

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## redcoat (Mar 24, 2014)

On the 5 September Air Vice-Marshal Park commander of 11 Group spoke to his Chief Controller Lord Willoughby de Brooke " I know you and the other controllers must be getting worried about our losses" Park said "Well I've been looking at these casualty figures, and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we can hang on as we're going, I'm sure we shall win in the end"


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## stona (Mar 24, 2014)

Milosh said:


> As I can't find any info, can someone tell what is a Provisional Storage Unit.
> 
> "The RAF service level facility was the Provisional Storage Units. Aircraft repairs that were beyond the Civilian Repair Organization were handled at the PSU."



I'm not particularly familiar with The RAF organisation but I wonder whether there is a confusion between PSU and Aircraft Storage Unit (ASU) most of which became known simply as Maintenance Units (MUs)

I would expect the sort of repairs described to be carried out by an MU.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Mar 24, 2014)

redcoat said:


> On the 5 September Air Vice-Marshal Park commander of 11 Group spoke to his Chief Controller Lord Willoughby de Brooke " I know you and the other controllers must be getting worried about our losses" Park said "Well I've been looking at these casualty figures, and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we can hang on as we're going, I'm sure we shall win in the end"



And once again Park was not referring to aircraft losses but losses (he said 'casualties') of trained personnel. Aircraft were never a problem. On 4th June 1940 Fighter Command had 331 operational Hurricanes and Spitfires, on 11th August it had 620 operational Hurricanes and Spitfires. What Dowding and Park didn't have was the combat ready pilots to fly them.

Cheers

Steve


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## redcoat (Mar 24, 2014)

stona said:


> In fact the attack(s) on Rotterdam were in effect unintended 'morale' bombing attacks. French and British and French propaganda made a point of playing up the collateral damage whilst ignoring the intent.


The attack on Rotterdam was indeed a 'morale' bombing attack, the attack was intended to demoralise the troops defending the city. the German's planned a similar attack on London on the first day of Operation Sealion, in order to disrupt the British response to the landing.


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## beitou (Mar 24, 2014)

At any time did the Germans start to worry about pilot losses?


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## bobbysocks (Mar 24, 2014)

Milosh said:


> As I can't find any info, can someone tell what is a Provisional Storage Unit.
> 
> "The RAF service level facility was the Provisional Storage Units. Aircraft repairs that were beyond the Civilian Repair Organization were handled at the PSU."



i am going to guess the PSU is the "heavy repair shop". on a lot of bases light work was done out in the revetments and heavier work went to different hangars. even those had limitations and if the damage or problem was significant i imagine they would ship it to another location where they had the facilities to deal with it.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 24, 2014)

redcoat said:


> The attack on Rotterdam was indeed a 'morale'  bombing attack, the attack was intended to demoralise the troops defending the city. the German's planned a similar attack on London on the first day of Operation Sealion, in order to disrupt the British response to the landing.



wasnt rotterdam bombed after the neitherlands already surrendered or was close to doing so....or am i thinking of another place?


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## redcoat (Mar 24, 2014)

bobbysocks said:


> wasnt rotterdam bombed after the neitherlands already surrendered or was close to doing so....or am i thinking of another place?


The city was bombed after the city's defenders had agreed to surrender, the German ground forces were unable to recall the bombers in time.


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## Juha (Mar 24, 2014)

beitou said:


> At any time did the Germans start to worry about pilot losses?



Don't know but at the end of Sept 40 they had more serviceable 109s than combat-ready pilots to fly them.

Juha


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## Milosh (Mar 24, 2014)

I can't find it now, but an experienced Luftwaffe pilot stated that pilot replacements were not ready for combat.


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## parsifal (Mar 24, 2014)

beitou said:


> At any time did the Germans start to worry about pilot losses?



Short answer...absolutely. Average strengths of the the fighter groups going into the battle was 35 aircraft, 6-8 weeks later they were down to about 20 a/c per group. Serviceability rates also plummetted . at the start the germans were able to field about 600 109s on a daily basis, by the beginning of october this figure had slumped to under 300.

I dont agree that the LW came close to defeating the RAF. The RAF came close to breeaking, but in order for the LW to claim outright victory, they needed air supremacy, and that meant they had to emerge from the battler with significant strength still available. That meant not only that they had to remove the RAF from the equation, they also had to remain standing themselves as a potent and dominating force. Whilst the RAF was taking a bit of a beating, the LW was doing it tough as well. And that was enough for the RAF to claim victory, even in the difficult parts of the battle. The RAF merely had to reatin southern England as disputed airspace to achieve victory, the LW needed air supremacy. They never came close to that, whilst the RAF never relinquished their dispute of the skies being fought for. 

Moreover, the RAF insisted on fighting well forward, which i dont accept and donet understand. Fighting well forward does have its reasons, but it also gives back certain advantages to the LW, which i think were more important in that opening stage of the battle.

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## pbehn (Mar 24, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Short answer...absolutely. Average strengths of the the fighter groups going into the battle was 35 aircraft, 6-8 weeks later they were down to about 20 a/c per group. Serviceability rates also plummetted . at the start the germans were able to field about 600 109s on a daily basis, by the beginning of october this figure had slumped to under 300.
> 
> I dont agree that the LW came close to defeating the RAF. The RAF came close to breeaking, but in order for the LW to claim outright victory, they needed air supremacy, and that meant they had to emerge from the battler with significant strength still available. That meant not only that they had to remove the RAF from the equation, they also had to remain standing themselves as a potent and dominating force. Whilst the RAF was taking a bit of a beating, the LW was doing it tough as well. And that was enough for the RAF to claim victory, even in the difficult parts of the battle. The RAF merely had to reatin southern England as disputed airspace to achieve victory, the LW needed air supremacy. They never came close to that, whilst the RAF never relinquished their dispute of the skies being fought for.
> 
> Moreover, the RAF insisted on fighting well forward, which i dont accept and donet understand. Fighting well forward does have its reasons, but it also gives back certain advantages to the LW, which i think were more important in that opening stage of the battle.



Even before the BoB started Goering was shocked at how much it had lost in strength "Is that all that is left of my Luftwaffe" he said. As others have said it was a tool for short campaigns and after Poland Holland Belgium France and Norway it was depleted in numbers


Fighting forward had its tactical advantages, using up fuel of escorting fighters being one of the main ones.


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## parsifal (Mar 24, 2014)

German command structures
Part I of II
On the basis of map exercises conducted by Felmy's staff at Luftflotte Two-the only such exercises (against Britain) held prior to the war-General Felmy concluded "neither the strength nor the training or equipment of Second Air Fleet forces were adequate to insure a quick victory over Britain in 1939."

The "target date" established for these map exercises had been set at 1942. Based on these staff estimates, it would appear that both Goering and his chief of staff were fully cognizant of the dangers in entering into a war against England before the Luftwaffe was adequately prepared. After an official visit to England in 1938, Milch warned Hitler against Ribbentropp (the German ambassador in London) whom he believed "was damaging relations between the two countries." 

Milch also conveyed an additional warning; England was prepared to go to war over the Danzig and Polish corridor question. Goering would express his foreboding when, upon receiving final confirmation of the attack upon Poland, he called Herr Ribbentropp (then the foreign secretary) and shouted at him, "Now you have your war. You alone are to blame." Two days later (3 September 1939), when England declared war on Germany, he is quoted as saying, "May Heaven have mercy on us if we should lose this war."

A study prepared by Oberst (Colonel) "Beppo" Schmid, chief of intelligence of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, further determined that the RAF could reach strengths equal to those of the Luftwaffe by 1940. Therefore, the priorities established for the forced submission of England were the " firstly defeat of the Royal Air Force, secondly incapacitation of the British air armament industry, and thirdly elimination of the British Navy."

Subsequent actions could then be directed against port, shipping, and other industries, but strong air forces would still be required to accomplish this. no mention in these professional staff studies was ever made of the impportance of the CH network, even at this stage German appreciation of its importance was limited. Schmid stated after the war that he briefed the commanders that because of the "high morale of the British people and the improvising skill of British leaders, Great Britain could not be forced to capitulate through air attack alone, but only through actual occupation of the island." At other time he testified that the LW did not appreciate the importance of the CH network, or the infrastructure that was using it. 

These studies were thoroughly professional and sound in judgement, but as always, there was significant political inteference from the highest levels. Hitler's opinion, was that Britain could be defeated through a combination of air and sea blockades. Hitler insisted that, "the moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate." If this could be achieved, there would be no need for invasion. Hitler then outlined his strategy in Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of War. The directive called for the invasion of Poland and a strategic defensive in the west against England and France. This was the basis of Hitlers terror bombing campaigns. it wasnt there yet, but the war experiences put the finishing touches on terror bombing as an instrument of war. The British were still some way behind, but catching. in 1939, their air staffs were still very muchbesotted by the notion of precision bombing...taking out specific targets by point attacks. 

According to Directive No. 1, the Luftwaffe was to "take measures to dislocate English imports, the armaments industry, and the transport of troops to France." While planning for the contingency was allowed, no attacks were to be made on the mainland of Britain itself. Hitler would, however, issue a memorandum on 10 October detailing his intentions in the West if Britain failed to come to an agreement for peace. Specifically, Hitler identified "Germany's unfavorable geographic location for air warfare, which forced aircraft to fly long distances to reach their targets." In recognition of this limitation, War Directive No. 6 (dated 9 October 1939), mandated the occupation of "as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium and northern France as a basis for conducting a promising air and sea war against England." Not all of hitlers interferences were retrograde....this was a positive step in the right direction...obvious to us now, but not so obvious at the time. Subsequently, Directive No. 9, issued on the 29th of November 1939, identified Britain as "the driving force behind the Western Powers' will to make war. The defeat of Britain . . . was the prime condition for final victory, and the most effective means to bring about this defeat was to paralyze the British economy." Again, i tend to agree with hitlers summation. The air staffs recommendation was based on the false premise of being able to gain air supremacy, and being able to carry out a cross channel attack. Neither of these presumptions by OKL were at all realistic. 

The precedence established for target selection was 1) ports (either by mining approaches or bombing installations), 2) attacks on merchant shipping and associated naval escorts, 3) storage depots followed by transport conveying British troops to the continent, and 4) vital military industries including aircraft and munitions factories. Interestingly, after the main assault of 1940, this was precisely the template the LW reverted to in late 1940 and early 1941. and whilst it would gain outright victory, it was a more modest set of objectives that hurt Britain a lot. 

The intention of these 1939 studies was not total war against England, or an invasion, or even an all out air war. What the Germans did desire was an economic strangulation of the British Isles to the point that a negotiated peace could be had. Political attitudes against continued German aggression had stiffened and the peace proposals Hitler presented in the Reichstag on 6 October were soundly rejected by the British.

The fact remains that neither the Luftwaffe nor the German Navy was in a position to blockade England to the extent required by Hitler's memorandums and directives. A factor that Hitler had not yet grasped but also a factor the British seemed to have been quite willing to exploit to their best advantage. Therefore, the German command had to devise new plans to conquer Great Britain. 


Much of the German air planning for the Battle of Britain was based on the considerable successes of earlier campaigns in 1939 and early 1940. But, "no uniformly accepted concept existed concerning the operational conduct of air warfare against England." The prerequisite for successful land operations was recognized as security, through control of the air. The task for the Luftwaffe, however, was viewed in simplistic terms and approached rather casually; the only difference between the coming battle and others previously fought was "that the R.A.F., being the most powerful single air force yet encountered, would necessarily require for its destruction some time longer than the 12 to 48 hours previously allotted to other air forces." This was quickly exposed as the faulty assessment it was, but is indicative of the completely inadequate approach the air staff had to this most difficult of problems.


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## parsifal (Mar 24, 2014)

Geran Command structure Part II of II

As an example of the extreme and fatal complacency that existied in the LW, Erhard Milch, in his capacity as the inspector general, reported (in June 1940) that as a result of his visits to the various captured airfields and the field headquarters, "no preparations at all were being made for air war with Britain." This is somewhat amazing considering the tremendous logistical problems associated with sustained operations from those airfields. Runways had to be improved, and depots established. Munitions, fuel, and supplies had to be transported hundreds of miles from their sources within Germany. The Germans continued to view the English Channel as little more than a large river. The air force was to support the land forces in another "river-crossing" exercise-an operation not unlike those previously conducted on the Meuse, Maas and Vistulla rivers--without regard to the strategic consequences. 

The casual approach to the war with Britain was certainly a reflection of the overconfidence resulting from the highly successful campaigns recently concluded in Poland, Norway and especially in France. All, however, were campaigns where the bomber forces functioned almost exclusively as extensions of the tactical air arm. But the near exclusive use of the bomber arm for tactical support of the Army inevitably led "to confusion and misconceptions as to the employment of the bomber which lasted throughout the war." And, in addition to the task of defeating the RAF, the German Combined Staffs issued a directive in July from Field Marshal Keitel stipulating "the German lack of command of the sea could be substituted by supremacy in the air." Further burdens on an already overtaxed force structure. 

Some of the Luftwaffe's airmen were more skeptical (and realistic), and Werner Baumbach, a future General of Bombers wrote, "we know that England is the hardest nut to be cracked in this war. Our experience at the front has shown us that final victory against England can only be attained by the systematic cooperation of all arms of the service and ruthless application of the elementary principle of concentrating all one's strength and effort at the vital strategic point. Even if the air arm is the most important weapon in total war, it cannot by itself ensure the decisive, final and total victory." Evidently, nobody important was listening when he stated this most obvious of onservations. 

Hitler's Directive No. 16, dated 6 July 1940, identified the role of the Air Force in the invasion (code-named Seelowe or "Sea Lion") as prevention of "interference by hostile air forces." In addition, the Luftwaffe was to mount attacks against British strong points, especially those in the landing areas, against troop concentrations and reinforcements, as well as naval units operating in the area of operations. The LW never gained the necessary advantages to make any serious inroads into these directive missions. In essence then, the Luftwaffe would provide an "air umbrella" and also the necessary "force multipliers" beneath which the invasion could take place and be assisted. To that, it was also responsible for keeping the attentions of the RN at bay, something it was never entirely successful at in other TOs . There was little difference in this directive from those used to form the operational basis for the campaigns in Poland, Norway and France. But, there was one significant flaw, and that flaw was a total failure to provide a special joint command staff to control all three branches of the Wehrmacht-such as the Joint Command organized as Group XXI for the operations in Norway-to assume responsibility for the planning, preparation, and execution of Operation Sea Lion. This included an over arching control and directoion of air assets to ensure campaign, as oppsed to air force, objectives were followed and effecitiely met. 5 Instead, the responsibility for operational planning rested with the three high commands of the Wehrmacht (OKH), the Air Force Operations Staff (OKL) and the navuy (OKM, all operating more or less separate to each opther 


Much of the planning for the "intensified" air operations was apparently conducted by the Air Fleets and then submitted for approval by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff and ultimately by Goering. What is unclear, however, is how this planning was coordinated. This disjoited command structure and competing objectives goes a long way to expaining the ragged and inneffective application of LW power during the campaign. Klee writes that "by 25 July 1940 the air fleets formulated their initial intentions for the conduct of air warfare against Britain, basing their work on appropriate studies submitted by their air corps. On 29 July the Luftwaffe Operations Staff provided comments on the plans submitted. On 1 August the air fleet submitted their revised plans. Again Goering disapproved certain specific points." Finally, on 2 August 1940, the Preparations and Directives for Operation Adler was released.


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## pbehn (Mar 24, 2014)

Good posts parsival, I have read similar before as I see it the LW were accustomed to fighting Bi Planes in the main while against the UK they had an opposing force equal in quality and numbers to their own(or almost) when they attacked an airfield there wasn't a mechanised division rumbling over the horizon. Having crossed the channel a good few times I cant get my head around someone mistaking it for a river, especially a senior military commander. There have been times when the weather has been so bad IN THE HARBOUR that boarding a car on a ferry in the port wasnt possible and at other times I was stuck in the channel for 4 hours with fog, all around Calais.


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## parsifal (Mar 24, 2014)

Iwouldnt describe the LWs opposition before the BoB as "mainly Biplanes" or inneffective. During the Polish campaign, the LW did enjoy a clear technical and numerical advantage, but still managed to lose more than 500 aircraft during the campaign. I would put that down to the exceptionally well trained Polish aircrew. Even during the phoney war, LW losses were running almost at the replacement rate.....

The battles in norway were pretty small scale, but losses to the Dutch, Belgian and french Air Arms were actually very heavy. Its a common misunderstanding that the Germans won these air campaigns cheaply and easily. In fact its far more accurate to describe these campaigns as the Germans winning them, despite having sustained heavy losses, not that they won cheap and easy victories. Losses over France, for example, in 6 weeks were approaching 1500 a/c to all causes. Thats a savage loss rate by any standard. French pilots were again well trained and effective, and had fought well, but the FAF was heavily outnumbered, and (like the whole French Army really) quite unable to cope with the fast changing front lines and fluid nature of the campaign. French command structures were poor, dividing air strength up in penny packets along the front such that there was no decisive point at which they could bring decisive strength to bear (the Russians made the same mistake a year later). This was probably the stand out for the British effort over Britain. Radar, and a centralised and highly organised command structure allowed them to distribute their fighters as they thought most appropriate. the British chose to string out their fighters in penny packets, much as the french had, why, because they wanted every bomber strike parried. i think that had its reasons....good ones, but it also meant British losses were heavier than they needed to be as every fight for FC was a fight they were fighting at long odds. they might have been better to concentrate on a few of the strikes and let a few through that were less damaging. Maybe.


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## stona (Mar 25, 2014)

Milosh said:


> I can't find it now, but an experienced Luftwaffe pilot stated that pilot replacements were not ready for combat.



Exactly the same problem the RAF had.

Steve

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## bobbysocks (Mar 25, 2014)

if you are attacked and at the end of the battle have kept the status quo ( the way things were prior to the battle )....it is a victory.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 25, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Iwouldnt describe the LWs opposition before the BoB as "mainly Biplanes" or inneffective. During the Polish campaign, the LW did enjoy a clear technical and numerical advantage, but still managed to lose more than 500 aircraft during the campaign. I would put that down to the exceptionally well trained Polish aircrew. Even during the phoney war, LW losses were running almost at the replacement rate.....
> 
> The battles in norway were pretty small scale, but losses to the Dutch, Belgian and french Air Arms were actually very heavy. Its a common misunderstanding that the Germans won these air campaigns cheaply and easily. In fact its far more accurate to describe these campaigns as the Germans winning them, despite having sustained heavy losses, not that they won cheap and easy victories. Losses over France, for example, in 6 weeks were approaching 1500 a/c to all causes. Thats a savage loss rate by any standard. French pilots were again well trained and effective, and had fought well, *but the FAF was heavily outnumbered*, and (like the whole French Army really) quite unable to cope with the fast changing front lines and fluid nature of the campaign. French command structures were poor, dividing air strength up in penny packets along the front such that there was no decisive point at which they could bring decisive strength to bear (the Russians made the same mistake a year later). This was probably the stand out for the British effort over Britain. Radar, and a centralised and highly organised command structure allowed them to distribute their fighters as they thought most appropriate. the British chose to string out their fighters in penny packets, much as the french had, why, because they wanted every bomber strike parried. i think that had its reasons....good ones, but it also meant British losses were heavier than they needed to be as every fight for FC was a fight they were fighting at long odds. they might have been better to concentrate on a few of the strikes and let a few through that were less damaging. Maybe.



Agreed very much with the post, but the bolded part. 
How exactly were the numbers stacked? In the time LW heavily engaged FAF, they were in the same time against part of the RAF FC, and what ever the Belgians and Dutch managed to get airborne. IIRC, the thing was that LW was managing about three sorties per plane per day, while for the French it was less then one sortie. RAF managed a bit better.


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## pbehn (Mar 25, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Agreed very much with the post, but the bolded part.
> How exactly were the numbers stacked? In the time LW heavily engaged FAF, they were in the same time against part of the RAF FC, and what ever the Belgians and Dutch managed to get airborne. IIRC, the thing was that LW was managing about three sorties per plane per day, while for the French it was less then one sortie. RAF managed a bit better.



I read a document on here I think it was an American evaluation of the conflict. Basically the French Air Force was in the most part posted well away from the areas of conflict further more in the later days of the Battle of France the French were effectively forbidden to engage the LW. I think that was in "The most dangerous enemy" it certainly pissed off the RAF pilots stationed on the same fields.

Parsival, how many SE monoplanes did the LW encounter prior to the BoB that wernt RAF hurricanes?


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## Hop (Mar 25, 2014)

Milosh said:


> I can't find it now, but an experienced Luftwaffe pilot stated that pilot replacements were not ready for combat.



Ulrich Steinhilper. 



> High also on the list of losses as the battle wore on were the replacement pilots. They simply didn't have the experience that we pre-war regulars had acquired. In our Gruppe at the beginning of the French Campaign we had thirty-six experienced pilots, none of whom had less than three years flying experience. Now we were getting replacements for the experienced pilots we had lost straight from Jagdfliegerschule (fighter school]. At that time we still tried our best to take care of these fledglings until they could accrue some experience.
> 
> Typical of these youngsters was a young Gefreiter who arrived in late September. His flying time was minimal - he had only fired a few shots at a ground target, had never flown on oxygen and still had no idea how to use his radio. We tried to increase their experience before they actually came along on combat missions by taking them up on patrols between missions. Then we would talk on the radio, climb to altitudes in excess of 8,000 metres (25,000 ft) and make them use oxygen. Of special importance was teaching them how to change the pitch of their propeller to get maxmum pull from the engine at high altitude. A flat pitch would allow the engine to rev up to its maximum so that the super-charger would deliver the maximum volume of air to the cylinders and produce optimum power; changing to a coarser pitch would have that engine power converted into more pull and consequently speed our rate of climb. It was vital they mastered this technique if they were to keep up in a battle-climb or at high altitude.
> 
> ...



Milch also noted in August that pilots were being sent as replacements to the units in France with 10 landings on Bf109s, and who had never fired a cannon in training.


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## redcoat (Mar 25, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Radar, and a centralised and highly organised command structure allowed them to distribute their fighters as they thought most appropriate. the British chose to string out their fighters in penny packets, much as the french had, why, because they wanted every bomber strike parried. i think that had its reasons....good ones, but it also meant British losses were heavier than they needed to be as every fight for FC was a fight they were fighting at long odds. they might have been better to concentrate on a few of the strikes and let a few through that were less damaging. Maybe.


There was research done on this to work out the effectiveness between the "Big Wing" and squadron size attacks, and it was found that the smaller size attacks were more effective in both terms of enemy losses caused and casualties suffered.


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## pbehn (Mar 25, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Agreed very much with the post, but the bolded part.
> How exactly were the numbers stacked? In the time LW heavily engaged FAF, they were in the same time against part of the RAF FC, and what ever the Belgians and Dutch managed to get airborne. IIRC, the thing was that LW was managing about three sorties per plane per day, while for the French it was less then one sortie. RAF managed a bit better.



I read a document on here I think it was an American evaluation of the conflict. Basically the French Air Force was in the most part posted well away from the areas of conflict further more in the later days of the Battle of France the French were effectively forbidden to engage the LW. I think that was in "The most dangerous enemy" it certainly pissed off the RAF pilots stationed on the same fields.

Parsival, how many SE monoplanes did the LW encounter prior to the BoB that wernt RAF hurricanes?


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## Juha (Mar 25, 2014)

Of LW's opponents in 39-40 only Norwegians and Belgians had biplane fighters, all others, incl. Poland, had only SE fighters

PAF had appr. 161 SE fighters (P.11 and P.7)
RNeAF 28 Fokker D.XXI plus 23 TE Fokker G.IA
FrAF had 631 SE and 58 TE fighters in first-line units on 10 May 40


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## pbehn (Mar 25, 2014)

Juha said:


> Of LW's opponents in 39-40 only Norwegians and Belgians had biplane fighters, all others, incl. Poland, had only SE fighters
> 
> PAF had appr. 161 SE fighters (P.11 and P.7)
> RNeAF 28 Fokker D.XXI plus 23 TE Fokker G.IA
> FrAF had 631 SE and 58 TE fighters on 10 May 40



Thanks....getting confused between Bi plane and non retractable undercarriage


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## Juha (Mar 25, 2014)

All French and all Dutch TE had retractable u/c, all Polish and all Dutch SE had fixed u/c


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## pbehn (Mar 25, 2014)

Juha said:


> All French and all Dutch TE had retractable u/c, all Polish and all Dutch SE had fixed u/c



Why were the French so completely out classed, I thought their only competetive fighter was the Dewotine 530?


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## parsifal (Mar 25, 2014)

> Agreed very much with the post, but the bolded part.
> How exactly were the numbers stacked? In the time LW heavily engaged FAF, they were in the same time against part of the RAF FC, and what ever the Belgians and Dutch managed to get airborne. IIRC, the thing was that LW was managing about three sorties per plane per day, while for the French it was less then one sortie. RAF managed a bit better.



The FAF was outnumbered pretty badly. At the start of the campaign, the available forces to each side were as follows

Belgian AF: 

1st Regiment (army co-operation): based at bierset, Deurne and Gossoncourt, with 40 Fairey Fox and 10 Renard 31
2nd Regiment (fighters): based at Schafen and Nijvel with 30 Fairey Fox and 25 CR 42, 15 Gloster Gladiator and 11 Hurricane I
3rd Regiment (recon and bomber): based at Evers with 27 Fairey Fox and 13 Fairey Battle

Total Belgian Strength at beginning
151 a/c

Dutch AF

In 1940, the Dutch AF had 29 Fokker DXXis and 41 GIs (which they commandeered). The Fokker CX bombers were destroyed in the opening day of the assault. most of the medium bombers; Fokker T4, T5 and T8W were in the NEI, but there were 12T5s and at least 8 T8W seaplanes used,

Total Dutch strength at beginning 
90 a/c (not including the CX)

French Air Force
In May 1940, before the battle the FAF could deploy 
26 Groupes De Chase (19 with MS406) and a total strength of 700 fighter. In the vital North west sector however, there were less than 300 fighters, and in the whole of metropolitan France no more than 550 fighters were deployed 

21 Groupes De Bombardment (mostly obsolete aircraft) total air strength 320 planes

5 Groupes de bomadment d'Assault: 80 planes

11 Groupes de Reconnaisance 170 planes

38 Groupes Aerians d'Observation ; 420 planes

Total strength was 1690, of which about 1100 were in the metropolitan area, and of these about 700 in the Northwest department. 190 French aircraft were destroyed on the ground on the opening day of the4 assault, and similar proportions of losses were suffered by both the Belgians and Dutch. During the campaign, the French did not redeploy any of their overseas air assets to France, and preferred for the fight to come to their intererior departments rather than move them forward to join the fight at the front. 

The Royal Air Force In France

There were a number of bomber formations engaged almost from the beginning, and based in England, and during the Dunkirk operations there were about 10 squadrons or equivalent used to cover the evacuation. but these were not available at the beginning of the campaign

British Air Forces in France (or BAFF) was an RAF Command set up on 15 January 1940 under the command of Air Marshal Arthur Barratt to provide unified control of all RAF units based in France. It had two immediately subordinate formations, with differing tasks.
the "Air Component" (Royal Air Force Component of the British Expeditionary Force) underAir Vice-Marshal C H B Blount to provide reconnaissance and fighter cover for the BEF.

the AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) under Air Vice-Marshal P H L Playfair. The AASF consisted of RAF light bomber squadrons based within France (around Rheims) to allow them to bomb Germany should the political decision to do so be taken. No such decision had been taken before the German offensive in the West began on 10 May 1940, and thereafter the AASF bomber force was used against the advancing German Army and its lines of communications.

As well as the forces under its command, BAFF could also request RAF Bomber Command to provide support from UK-based medium bombers. The headquarters of BAFF were at Chauny alongside those of the French air commander, to maximise co-operation between the BAFF and the Armée de l'Air 

There were about 600 aircraft in total, of which 4 squadrons amounting to 36 aircraft were Hurricanes and 135 were bombers. It had been agreed that this rather meagre force structure would be reinforced immediately by 4 squadrons of Hurricanes, but in fact this was expanded to 6 squadrons. the RAF also during the campaign used up about 600 of its reserve aircraft and of courcse committed a big part of FC when the evacuation started. but at the start of the campaign the British deployed about 600 aircraft

Total allied committment at the start of the battle was 1570 aircraft

German comittment to the battle was in excess of 2500 aircraft

starting advantages were ther3efore about 5:3, however the Germans were able to gain some advantage from having the initiative. As outlined above, about 190 French aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and about 40-50% of the Belgian and Dutch Air forces similalry destroyed. I have no information on the RAFs losses to these pre-emptive strikes, but assuming it was at lerast 100 aircraft, that places the immediate match up of forces at 2500+ LW aircraft to about 1000 allied machines. This proportions never really changed much during the campaign, despite the British efforts to reinforce the front. Put simply Allied loss rates were too high for a sustainable ramping up of strength to ever be claimed. By Day 5 of the campaign the minor allies were basically gone, and both the RAF and FAF left reeeling in the face of repeated hammer blows by the LW, plus unsustainable losses as the bombers tried to stem the flooding advances of the Germans ground forces.


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## parsifal (Mar 25, 2014)

Another source i found gives the following strength figures for the BOF, westerrtn front 10 May 1940

Type
French; [British/Belgian/Dutch] [Allied Combined] German
Fighters 583 197 780 1264 
Bombers 84 192 276 1504 
Recon/Obs'n 458 96 554 502 
Totals 1125 485 1610 3270 

This does not alter the fact that the allies were pretty badly outnumbered

FAF fighter units did pretty well however. The best formations were the Curiss Hawk escadrilles, that really did write a glorious chapter for the FAF. 

The American-made Curtiss 75A fighter joined French squadrons beginning in March 1939 and being delivered across four subtypes, each progressively improving on the last . It was the most effective type in its class in combat over France (on both sides), for the French, until the Dewoitine D520 became operational in mid-May 1940. Eight squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A shot down 220 German aircraft (confirmed kills), losing only thirty-three pilots. In the seven major aerial battles in which the Curtiss fighters were engaged with Messerschmitts, the total score was twenty-seven Bf 109Es and six Bf 110Cs destroyed for three of the French flown Curtiss aircraft.

The Morane-Saulnier MS 406 equipped eighteen squadrons in France on 10 May 1940. The kill-loss ratio for units flying the MS 406 was 191 to 89, however, many Morane units were lost on the ground. The shortcomings of the Morane fighter compared to the Bf 109E have been the topic of many memoirs, but in the reported battles in which Messerschmitts faced Moranes alone, the French posted a record of thirty-one kills and five losses. During the Battle of France, the air staff converted twelve squadrons equipped with Moranes to other types as rapidly as training facilities permitted. This policy marginally increased the efficiency of the individual units, but it acted to decrease the effectiveness of the fighter force as a whole by taking combat-experienced squadrons out of the line at a critical time. Further, it failed to capitalize on new production to increase the size of the fighter force. 

Another fighter designed to meet the same specification as the MS 406 was the Bloch MB 152. Though it lost out in the procurement competition to the Morane, the Bloch firm developed the basic design around a more powerful engine. The resulting Bloch MB 152 was faster and more powerfully armed than the MS 406. Twelve squadrons had Bloch fighters on 10 May 1940, and six more became operational with them during the battle, but they were not deployed forward like the Moranes. Units while equipped with Blochs shot down 156 German planes and lost 59 pilots. 

The first two squadrons equipped with the fast and agile Dewoitine 520 entered the battle on 13 May; eight others completed conversion training and became operational before the armistice. Between them, they shot down 175 enemy aircraft for a loss of 44 aviators. Polish pilots manned two squadrons of Caudron C 714 fighters. The ultralight Caudron (3086 pounds, empty) was capable of 302 mph with a 450-horsepower engine. Becoming operational on 2 June, the Poles shot down seventeen German aircraft and lost five pilots before their unit was disbanded on 17 June.

the fighter force accounted for between 800 and 1000 of the 1439 German aircraft destroyed during the battle.

On 10 May 1940, the operational units of the French Air Force committed to the Western Front were heavily outnumbered. The FAF did not enage in a particulalry high rate of operations, and this effectively increased German superiority to about 4:1, when the sortie rate is used inplace of raw numbers. but the french were still fairly effective in the air denial role they chose to employ, such that by mid-June, the Luftwaffe was exhausted. It had lost 40 percent of its aircraft. 

On the 17 June the french Air Staff ordered that the FAF begin evacuation to French North Africa. An examination of which units were ordered to North Africa and which were left behind reveals much about the motivation behind the evacuation. The units flown to North Africa were those regular air force squadrons with the most modern and effective aircraft all of the squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A (10), Dewoitine 520 (10), Amiot 354 (, Bloch 174 (1, Farman 222 (4), Douglas DB-7 (, and Martin 167 (10), plus most of those with the Lioré et Olivier 451 (12 of 1. Those left behind included all of the air force reserve units-47 observation squadrons and 12 fighter squadrons-and all of the units closely connected with the army (the observation squadrons, the 10 assault bomber squadrons, and 7 night fighter squadrons converted to the ground assault role). 

The behavior of the leaders of the French Air Force before and during the Battle of France suggests that their primary purposes were to protect the regular air force against its domestic adversaries and to ensure its survival after the battle and the expected defeat. Refusing to expand the regular air force, spinning off the dangerous and unglamorous observation mission to the reserves, maintaining a low operational rate, and selecting only regular air force units and those unconnected with direct support of the army to send to North Africa constitute a coherent pattern. The senior aviators kept their service small, protected the cadres from severe danger, and kept most of the regular air force together out of the Germans' reach. Such decisions suggest a misordering of priorities in a nation at war but do make psychological and institutional sense when one reflects on both the frustration the aviators had suffered in their struggle to achieve operational independence from the army and the cavalier and callous way in which parliamentary officials had played with their lives, careers, and values.


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## parsifal (Mar 25, 2014)

duplicate post


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## tomo pauk (Mar 25, 2014)

Many thanks for the effort to dig out and type the data. The data from the last post seem to be emanating from Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, USA (Ret). Kirkland says also:

_The French faced the German invasion with 4360 modern combat aircraft and with 790 new machines arriving from French and American factories each month. However, the air force was not organized for battle. The regular air force had only half again as many units as during its peacetime nadir in 1932. As the battle opened, 119 of 210 squadrons were ready for action on the decisive northeastern front. The others were reequipping or stationed in the colonies. The 119 squadrons could bring into action only one-fourth of the aircraft available. These circumstances put the Allied air forces in a position of severe numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe._

The French seem to have considerably more A/C than Germans. Question is how good they were deploying them (= bad), using (low sortie number = bad) and whether there was enough plots to fly them properly (maybe, with Poles and Chezcs arriving in 1939/40)?
The Germans will be here any minute now, and French are ready to blow mud huts in Chad?


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## Juha (Mar 25, 2014)

In fact FrAF had appr. 8300a/c in France and appr 1500 in colonies, those in colonoes were mostly unsuitable for European war. And those in other parts of France could be transferred to the NE France if needed. Some were protecting central France , some were guarding the Italian front etc. and many were in depots. Much of the claim on FrAF are really BS, how much of RAF were in 11 Group area during the summer 40? Probably even less than FrAF had in NE France on 10 May 40. SU had deployed much of its AFs near its western frontiers in June 41 and was that a clever move?


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## parsifal (Mar 25, 2014)

It was Kirkland, but his claims about the french outnumbering the germans are bogus, hence i didnt use that bit. An aircraft half built on a factory floor, or an aircraft sitting in a faxctory awaiting delivery is not a number that should be added to the total availability, particulalry when the german numbers dont include those p[erpheral numbers. The limiting factor for the French was the number of pilots, and small size of the starting forces. 

There were no missing thousdands of aircraft in the FAF, as the Germans discovered after the armistice. There were quite a few, but not a couple of thousands that were ever discovered, and the FAF did not have a giant bonfire on surrender either


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## Njaco (Mar 25, 2014)

So I guess the question is were the British just having afternoon tea with the Luftwaffe and swatting them down like flies with barely a sweat or was the RAF really on the verge of breaking? I keep getting the impression that not many believe that the RAF had a hard time during the BoB.



> ....But our own
> Air Force was stronger than ever and there was every reason to be
> optimistic about the 1940 Air Battle of Britain.



I have to disagree with this comment, Hop. From my BoB thread with many sources....

30 August 1940 - It had been one of the worst days for the RAF, 39 aircraft were destroyed, eight of these were Spitfires from 222 Squadron Hornchurch. Over 50 RAF personnel had been killed (39 of these at Biggin Hill) with nearly 30 seriously injured. Some 200 civilians had been killed in the air raids and along with the radar stations of Pevensey, Beachy head and Foreness sustaining damage, Biggin Hill was made virtually unoperational, and the control of its sector was transferred over to Hornchurch.

31 August 1940 - The casualties this day were the highest of the Battle of Britain for RAF Fighter Command with thirty-nine aircraft destroyed in combat and fourteen pilots killed. *RAF No.151 Squadron had lost six pilots in three days and was now down to twelve pilots to fly ten serviceable aircraft* and was eventually withdrawn from 11 Group duties. RAF No.43 Squadron lost two of its commanders and by early September a third, S/L C.B.Hull, a South African was killed. *The last couple of days had taken a toll on pilots, including many experienced commanders and now many squadrons were being led by junior officers and even in some cases by non-commisioned officer pilots.* Sgt J.H (Ginger) Lacey of RAF No.501 Squadron was one of them. S/L P.W.Townsend of 85 Squadron was another experienced pilot that was a casualty, his place being taken by P/O G.Allard.

1 September 1940 - British casualties were fifteen aircraft totally destroyed and six pilots killed or missing. Since the Battle of Britain had begun, Dowding had lost some 75% of his squadron commanders and nearly 400 pilots had either been killed or seriously wounded. *RAF No 111 Squadron at Croydon and RAF No 151 Squadron at Stapleford were down to just seven pilots each, available for operations while the two Hurricane squadrons at North Weald could count on only two Hurricanes as serviceable.* By the evening of 1 September, RAF No 54 Squadron was removed from operations.

2 September 1940 - The total of thirty-one fighters lost by Fighter Command this day along with eight pilots killed, was double from the day before. The Germans lost thirty-five bombers and fighters. Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Croydon, North Weald, Debden, Detling, Eastchurch and Hawkinge were all damaged, *and although still operational they were not at full capacity or working with the efficiency that was hoped*, only Tangmere and Kenley had escaped much of the constant bombing. Debden airfield was the only aerodrome hit with severe damage. The British had to set up an emergency operations room outside the airfield at Debden - this time in a chalk pit outside Saffron Walden.


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## Juha (Mar 26, 2014)

Hello Njaco
there is something odd in your info. 111 Sqn was based at Debden on 1 Sept 40 with 11 combat ready and 5 u/s Hurricanes and 19 pilots at 09.00 hrs. (sources Mason and Bungay and Robinson’s RAF Fighter Squadrons confirmed the base and more or less the strength saying they were operating with 9 Hurries instead of the normal 12. 151 had at the same time 9 combat ready and 4 u/s Hurricanes and 17 pilots was withdrawn to Digby later on that day.
North Weald’s other Hurri sqn, 151 was the other, the 56th had 9 combat ready and 5 u/s Hurricanes and 18 pilots and moved to Boscombe Down later on that day. In the evening NW’s Hurri sqns were 46 and 249, both had 15 combat ready Hurricanes and 20 and 18 pilots.


It had been a hard fight but LW had also taken hard beating and in its all important Jagdwaffe was wearing down maybe even more alarming rate than the FC


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## stona (Mar 26, 2014)

The establishment of pilots for a Fighter Command squadron in 1940 was 26 _operational_ pilots. 19 isn't bad (if they were all operational) as some 11 Group squadrons' pilot numbers, which had preference to keep the numbers up, fell to single figures. The whole point of the stabilisation system was to strip operational pilots from squadrons in other Groups and feed them into 11 Group's squadrons due to the overall shortage of operational pilots. This in turn meant that many squadrons outside 11 Group had almost no operational pilots at all, leading to the creation of 'C' class squadrons.
Some of the 'C' class squadrons had as many as 16 of their pilots as non-operational, which obviously renders these squadrons useless in any combat sense. The problem is that people uncritically look at_ total pilot numbers and total aircraft strength_ and assume that Fighter Command was as strong or stronger in October 1940 than it was in July when this is not the case. I get bored repeating it, but by the beginning of October, just one month after the introduction of the stabilisation system, about one in three Fighter Command pilots was non-operational, in terms of fighting the Luftwaffe they might as well not have existed.

The Luftwaffe had a similar problem because neither side had planned for or anticipated the losses that they would sustain through the Battles of France and Britain. At he end of the day Britain and Germany (particularly Britain in 1940) could produce aeroplanes MUCH faster than they could produce fully trained pilots to fly them.

Small margins make a difference. An RAF pilot who escaped uninjured from being shot down over southern England could quickly return to his unit (no counselling and recuperation in those days and PTSS hadn't been invented). His Luftwaffe counterpart could not.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Mar 26, 2014)

Hello Stona
I agree with most but IMHO the idea of “C” class sqns was that they were somewhat like OTUs with an active Flight or two which could protect convoys, attack LW intruders and recon planes if needed using the band of sqn’s combat ready pilots but were mainly used to train pilots straight from the flying schools or from OTUs crash courses. Of course not all pilots straight from the battle were good teachers but i.g Johnnie Johnson got good training at 616 Sqn in Sept 40 and it began immediately after his and his 2 comrades’ arrival.
But yes, pure numbers can be misleading, 56th was in practice leaderless after the loss of F/Lt Weaver on 31 Aug 40 so it had to be transferred to a more peaceful station on 1.9.40.

While most of the green pilots were liabilities not all were, in FiAF i.g. Lampi shot down 2½ bombers (those were real kills) during his first combat sortie on 25.6.1941 during VVS massive opening attacks even if he had not yet done his air-to-air gunnery training. In fact his flight CO had on previous day noticed that he still lacked that exercise for qualified combat pilot and had asked a target towing for Lampi on 25 June butt VVS bombers arrived first. After the combat the senior NCO persuaded the flight CO to cancel the target towing and accept Lampi’s kills as accepted results for the air-to-air gunnery exercise. L/Cpl Kirjonen was another example of a very green pilot achieving excellent results in FiAF, he was promoted to sergeant after 2 months of combat after 5 confirmed kills (of which at least 3 fighters and 2 x ½ bombers were real).


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## stona (Mar 26, 2014)

'C' class squadrons were not like OTUs at all. It was RAF practice to post pilots to operational squadrons after they left an OTU to finish their training 'on the job'. Before the war nearly every squadron therefore had a handful of pilots being trained in its establishment.
The problem was that during the battle of Britain squadrons in 11 Group simply could not continue this practice. They barely had enough pilots as it was, despite their operational man power being a Fighter Command priority. They could not afford to carry non-operational pilots to make up the numbers. Their replacements were, after the establishment of the stabilisation system, fully trained and operational pilots from squadrons in other Groups. This, combined with the shortening of the various training courses, including those at OTUs, led to the squadrons who had unwillingly given up their best pilots being manned by a preponderance of barely trained young men. Many could hardly fly the Spitfire and Hurricane, let alone fight them. Some had only fired their guns on a handful of occasions. Whatever the intended use of a 'C' class squadron Dowding didn't think that they were capable of attacking even 'unescorted bombers'.
Of the 440 non-operational pilots in Fighter Command's squadrons at the beginning of October 1940 there were bound to be some naturally talented young men who could perform well. It would be stranger if there weren't some. They do not however represent the vast majority. Most were more like the young Luftwaffe pilot described in a post above.

Incidentally the transfer of No.56 Sqn. predates the stabilisation system by exactly one week. A week later it would have been more likely that an experienced officer (and other replacements) would have been brought in, the squadron remaining at 11 Group. This was precisely the practice that reduced the operational efficiency of the 'donor' squadrons.

Cheers

Steve


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## Hop (Mar 26, 2014)

> Whatever the intended use of a 'C' class squadron Dowding didn't think that they were capable of attacking even 'unescorted bombers'.



C squadrons were supposed to have 5 or 6 experienced pilots. In Dowding's own words:



> The remaining squadrons of the Command, which would be stripped of their operational pilots, for the benefit of the A squadrons, down to a level of 5 or 6. These C squadrons could devote their main energies to the training of new pilots, and, although they would not be fit to meet German Fighters, they would be quite capable of defending their Sectors against unescorted Bombers, which would be all that they would be likely to encounter.


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## stona (Mar 26, 2014)

And later he said that they were incapable of intercepting even unescorted bombers. This in a rebuttal of the contention in the BoB pamphlet that Fighter Command was stronger in October than July. I can't remember if he made the comment during the war, whilst in the US, or post war and I'm not at home to check.

If a 'C' class squadron had 16 non operational pilots and 6 experienced hands it would have an establishment of 21 which was well above the average for any squadrons in Fighter Command at this time.

Most 'C' class squadrons were simply not operational in any meaningful way.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Mar 26, 2014)

I accept that, but what did they need to become operational. Basic facts are, the RAF began offensive sweeps over France from the beginning of March 1941, in a concerted way I mean. LW was still encamped in strength in North western France until the middle of May. What emboldened the british to switch from defensive posture to offensive posture in that 4 month interlude. Obviously a decrease in the tempo of operations and the loss rates, but this applied equally to the LW as well. The arrival of mass production pilots from about November possibly also. The early offensive moves were more successful exchange rates than the later ones, from July onward, when RAF losses became very one sided against them. Not many losses to the german fighters (suggesting that the surviving German fighter pilots were the best of the best) but losses forr "other" types did mount in these early sweeps. Not until an effective flak defence was put into place were the RAF losses really starting to rampo up, although losses to fighters (even though in July there were a lot less of them) were not insubstantial.

All this suggests to me that both sides fought themselves more or less to the point of exhaustion, but the RAF seems to have possessed better powers of recovery. Daylight operations over Britain tapered right away, though they still did happen. night time operations continued until early May, after which operations against Britain were almost exclusively mining and anti shipping ops by the two remaining KGs, with some rather furtive and fitful recon operations undertaken occasionally by fighters mostly. In comparison, the RAF, whilst suffering one sided losses felt strong enough to mount a sustained offensive over France, before June 1941, this was mostly to make that part of the world unpleasant for the LW and KM, thereby making invasion harder mostly. after July there was a political imperative added...do whatever was possible to assist the Russian (tghis was unsuccessful, niot a single formation was recalled from Russia to Northwest France, and the RAF paid a heavy price in these operations).

So, clearly the RAF picked itself up from the canvas quicker than the LW. Judging simply by the tempo of operations, FC was able to commence offensive operations before the LW fighter groups felt they had recovedered enough to firstl;y recommence offensive operations, and secondly, to mount a strong air denial campaign to the British incursions over their airspace in daylight. So, it seems to me that these "C" squadrons whilst not combat worthy in October, had to have recovered and acquired combat readiness by aboiut January. What happened to change this status.


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## Capt. Vick (Mar 27, 2014)

The beginning...the middle...the end.


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## OldSkeptic (Mar 28, 2014)

Ascent said:


> I'm trying to help my daughter with her homework which has asked her for crucial turning points during the Battle of Britain.
> 
> Now I have a fair idea of how the battle flowed but I'm not really sure that I can locate the crucial points when the British won and the Axis lost.
> 
> ...



Simply read Stephen Bungay's book' Most dangerous Enemy'. It explains everything. The why, the who, the how. ... And debunks quote a few myths, like the nonsense about " if they hadn't started to attack London they would have won".

Basically the most powerful offensive air force in the World at the time came up against the most powerful air defence system in the World.

Noting that the 'Dowding System' is the gold standard air defence system that everyone in the World has copied since then.


But, saying that the British could have lost it all in one day. All systems require good people to run and operate it. Dowding created the system, but give an idiot the best system in the World and they will stuff it up. 

In that Keith Park was brilliant, how he handled his forces day after day, week after week, month after month was magnificent (and the BoB has been wargamed by just about every airforce in the World to all heck for decades and no one, ever, has ever done better than Park did).

His political enemy Leigh Mallory did a Bob exercise in 42 .. and lost in a day, for example .. yes he was an idiot ... and played political games during the Bob, like sending his worst squadrons to 11 group as Dowding rotated them through. He was trusted to be a military professional ... and acted like a political animal. Dowding, after he was fired, was horrified when he found out what Mallory did.
Another one of those "I'd rather win my internal political games than actually win the war" people that the World is full of.

So get the book.


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## beitou (Mar 28, 2014)

What justification was there for firing Dowding after the BoB, beyond mear political games, was there a real military reason?


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## OldSkeptic (Mar 28, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Iwouldnt describe the LWs opposition before the BoB as "mainly Biplanes" or inneffective. During the Polish campaign, the LW did enjoy a clear technical and numerical advantage, but still managed to lose more than 500 aircraft during the campaign. I would put that down to the exceptionally well trained Polish aircrew. Even during the phoney war, LW losses were running almost at the replacement rate.....
> 
> The battles in norway were pretty small scale, but losses to the Dutch, Belgian and french Air Arms were actually very heavy. Its a common misunderstanding that the Germans won these air campaigns cheaply and easily. In fact its far more accurate to describe these campaigns as the Germans winning them, despite having sustained heavy losses, not that they won cheap and easy victories. Losses over France, for example, in 6 weeks were approaching 1500 a/c to all causes. Thats a savage loss rate by any standard. French pilots were again well trained and effective, and had fought well, but the FAF was heavily outnumbered, and (like the whole French Army really) quite unable to cope with the fast changing front lines and fluid nature of the campaign. French command structures were poor, dividing air strength up in penny packets along the front such that there was no decisive point at which they could bring decisive strength to bear (the Russians made the same mistake a year later). This was probably the stand out for the British effort over Britain. Radar, and a centralised and highly organised command structure allowed them to distribute their fighters as they thought most appropriate. the British chose to string out their fighters in penny packets, much as the french had, why, because they wanted every bomber strike parried. i think that had its reasons....good ones, but it also meant British losses were heavier than they needed to be as every fight for FC was a fight they were fighting at long odds. they might have been better to concentrate on a few of the strikes and let a few through that were less damaging. Maybe.



Negative. Park never used 'penny packets'. You have been watching too much Bader stuff and reading nonsense.

Park's tactics were clear: stop the bombers bombing (duh), cause continual attrition on them before and after.

Strip away fighter escorts (sometimes the Luftwaffe did 5 escorts to 1 bomber), then hammer the bombers. 
Never risk all your fighters at one time.

As such he never did (which Mallory wanted and Galland*, stupidly, forgetting all his exprerience did later) waste time with forming up large numbers of clumsy, easy to see, easy to attack fighter formations.

Park sent up squadrons, sometimes as pairs, to attack, then other.. then others, then others. So there was never a moment the Luftwaffe was not under attack.
He carefully stripped away their escorts (something the Germans never did against the escorted US bombers, though it would have been easy to do, except they were ... stupid, an air force full of 'Leigh Mallory's).

Though it was frightening for the pilots, say 12 planes against hundreds of bombers and their escorts. But they were small, hard to see, fast and could (and did) get in, kill and get out again.
What each of them didn't see, was that was happening all the time, with repeated attacks by different, small groups, from all different directions.... all the time.

And Park, always pushed, long before the Germans ever thought about it, frontal attacks. To break the bomber formations up.


*Galland, serious prat... 'major throat ache' ... and with the strategic and tactical skills of a wet hamster. Should have been left at Squadron Leader level (like Bader).
When the US escorts saw the big 'gaggles' forming up to attack they had a field day.... as did Galland himself against Bader's 'big wings' on both the Bob and the later, disasterous RAF attacks in France...hmm not the brightest boy on the block.Then again if he had been smart he would never have been promoted (he hated radios in the BoB by the way, despite his later 'recant' in his book).


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## Milosh (Mar 28, 2014)

Has anyone come across a weekly RAF fighter status report for the BoB?

I have only seen parts of of the report (scanned and posted).

Supposedly it is 11" x 17" in size.

It is titled:

Statement Showing Establishment and .......
Aircraft Issued to Squadrons plus Air....... C.R.O (Repair)


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## Milosh (Mar 28, 2014)

I don't know what your definition of 'penny packet' is Old Skeptic but my says what you describe is 'penny packet'.


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## OldSkeptic (Mar 28, 2014)

Milosh said:


> I don't know what your definition of 'penny packet' is Old Skeptic but my says what you describe is 'penny packet'.




Nope it is called coordinated multi-dimensional constant attack... unless you think air war is like a bunch of calvary boofheads fronting up to each other showing each their pretty flowered hats....???? 

Do you think stealth attacks are a modern invention? Air to air war is like creeping up to someone and shoving a stillotoe onto their liver. Or coming in so fast that they hit you and are gone.

When, under Galland no less, the Germans tried to emulate the 'boofhead lets all spend an hour forming up' nonsense the Mustangs had a field day....

The US was lucky they faced idiots like Galland rather than a Park .. who I suspect would have stopped the US bombing campaign real quick, and the UK night one if he had been in charge.

In fact, despite their incompetence, the Germans won both of the late 43 US and late 43/early 44 UK bombing campaigns. The 8th and Bomber Command went back to lick their, incredible, wounds...And, then saved, were ordered to help out on the build to what really mattered ... invasion.


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## mhuxt (Mar 28, 2014)

beitou said:


> What justification was there for firing Dowding after the BoB, beyond mear political games, was there a real military reason?



He'd been due to retire for a number of years prior to the Battle of Britain in any case. Portal, Chief of Air Staff from October 1940, was no less than 11 years younger.

The lack of night defence also didn't work in his favour.


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## Hop (Mar 28, 2014)

The historian John Ray argues that the failures with night fighting were "crucial" in the decision to replace Dowding. He points out that in September, with the Luftwaffe flying over 6,000 night bomber sorties, and over 6,000 civilians killed by bombing, the RAF managed to shoot down only 4 German bombers at night.

Sir John Salmond (former head of the RAF) was appointed to head an inquiry into night fighting. Dowding objected to most of the recommendations in his report. Salmond wrote to Churchill that he believed it was "imperative" Dowding was replaced, and that most (if not all) of the Air Council agreed with him.

There's no doubt Dowding's opponents used the failures in night fighting as a stick to beat him with, but there's no doubt either that there was a general feeling Dowding was incapable of dealing with the night offensive.


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## gjs238 (Mar 28, 2014)

In another thread there was mention of the statistics of flak vs. fighter losses of US UK bombers over Europe.
In that context, the flak over the UK during the BOB seems weak.


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## stona (Mar 28, 2014)

Hop said:


> The historian John Ray argues that the failures with night fighting were "crucial" in the decision to replace Dowding.



I would agree.

I'm not at home and can't access the material (substantial) which I have on Dowding and I'm not going to enter a full scale discussion without it, however the failure to counter act the Luftwaffe night offensive was used as the hammer to nail the lid on Dowding's coffin. 
In fact nobody could have done any better than Dowding as the technical means to achieve any successful night time interceptions did not exist. This was no more Dowding's fault than any one else's at the Air Ministry or in the RAF.

It must be pointed out that though crucial this represented the culmination of a campaign to remove Dowding which predated the BoB. It was round three or four of the campaign 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Mar 28, 2014)

> Negative. Park never used 'penny packets'. You have been watching too much Bader stuff and reading nonsense.



Sorry, but I dont watch "Bader stuff", and I dont read nonsense. Oh, and i do try and be a bit respectful of other members if i can help it, just a friendly piece of advice.

Park did use penny packets but later in the fight he increased the strength of his interceptions to one and two squadron sized interceptions.

As his biography states"Although he considered the Big Wing approach impracticable in the circumstances confronting his group, Park did employ two-squadron formations where possible later in the battle. His superior, Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, agreed with Park’s approach, later noting that ‘If the policy of big formations had been attempted at this time in No. 11 Group, many more German bombers would have reached their objective without opposition.’ With benefit of experience in later commands, Park was convinced that ‘we would have lost the Battle of Britain if I had adopted the “withholding” tactics of No. 12 Group’.. So, implicit in Dowdings comments is that early on park DID use small sized formations to interecept every strike, primarily to prevent any German strike from passing through unparried. Precisely what my statement was, in other words....it wasnt some grandiose scheme to destroy the German fighter groups, and statistically it impossible for all German strikes to be intercepted and all German strikes to outnumber the bombers by 5 to 1. There were simply too many bombers airborne for that to ever happen except in isolated occasions. 

im not suggesting a mallory style big wing, but I am interested to explore whether swinging to a squadron to two squadron sized interception might not have better from an earlier point, rather than a later one 



> Park's tactics were clear: stop the bombers bombing (duh), cause continual attrition on them before and after.
> 
> Strip away fighter escorts (sometimes the Luftwaffe did 5 escorts to 1 bomber), then hammer the bombers.
> Never risk all your fighters at one time.
> ...



But according to his own biography he did exactly that. Not in the hundred, but he did adopt larger formations as soon as he could. 




> Park sent up squadrons, sometimes as pairs, to attack, then other.. then others, then others. So there was never a moment the Luftwaffe was not under attack.
> He carefully stripped away their escorts (something the Germans never did against the escorted US bombers, though it would have been easy to do, except they were ... stupid, an air force full of 'Leigh Mallory's).



Boy, do you have an attitude problem, or what. The Germans in 1944 were NOT stupid. Leigh Mallory in 1940 was wrong, but he was NOT stupid. The only stupid person, is the post war strategist who thinks the enemy is stupid. Im not much of a German fan, but I would never call them stupid or incompetent. If they were stupid, what does that make us, who lost to them many times

Leigh Mallory wanted to use interception forces that were too big and cumbersome, but even park wanted to increase the size of his CAP before it was over. 

And even Parks defence, great as it was, is not above criticism. There is NO evidence that Parks tactics were any more cost effective than hanging back and delivering a more concentrated attack a few minutes later. Attacking continuously does have benefits, but it also means the attackers are outcumbered, and are exposed and closer to the 109s than was perhaps wise . I think Park eventually got that, and changed his approach somewhat as a result. Precisely what im suggesting incidentally, only a little earlier 



> Though it was frightening for the pilots, say 12 planes against hundreds of bombers and their escorts. But they were small, hard to see, fast and could (and did) get in, kill and get out again.
> What each of them didn't see, was that was happening all the time, with repeated attacks by different, small groups, from all different directions.... all the time.
> 
> And Park, always pushed, long before the Germans ever thought about it, frontal attacks. To break the bomber formations up.
> ...



im speechless. You do realize that people might actually take you seriously if you were a little more respectful of these men. Each of these men, Galland, Bader I respect them both. oh, and by the way, the RAFs greatest losses when they commenced operations over France wasnt so much the big wing circuses as the isolated small scale affairs. the Germans tended to avoid the really big circuses because they were outnumbered too badly, but when they could catch 20 or 30 isolated fighters, they would pounce, in "big wings" and slaughter the RAF. My source for that, incidentally is Foreman, oh but then I read rubbish, dont I....


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> ...
> He carefully stripped away their escorts (something the Germans never did against the escorted US bombers, though it would have been easy to do, except they were ... stupid, an air force full of 'Leigh Mallory's).
> ...



Parsifal covered the rest.
I have a question re. quoted excerpt: just when the Germans are to start stripping the 8th AF bombers from escorts? They cannot do that west of the Continent (RAF will not allow that). They cannot do that between N. Sea and Ruhr (in 1944, the often-downplayed P-47 is a threat above 25000 ft). Once above Germany proper, it is too late. In case the LW throws all of its resources above Belgium/Netherlands/Saar, they will be outnumbered and outperformed = destroyed, and the P-51s will have even a better field day killing trainers and strafing at will.

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## pbehn (Mar 28, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Parsifal covered the rest.
> I have a question re. quoted excerpt: just when the Germans are to start stripping the 8th AF bombers from escorts? They cannot do that west of the Continent (RAF will not allow that). They cannot do that between N. Sea and Ruhr (in 1944, the often-downplayed P-47 is a threat above 25000 ft). Once above Germany proper, it is too late. In case the LW throws all of its resources above Belgium/Netherlands/Saar, they will be outnumbered and outperformed = destroyed, and the P-51s will have even a better field day killing trainers and strafing at will.



The only Idea I have is to engage the escorts for the withdrawal and make them drop their tanks, other experts here will surely tell me why they couldnt because the deutschers aint stupid.


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## stona (Mar 28, 2014)

Park's basic tactical unit remained the squadron. More than one squadron might well be tasked to a raid, simultaneously from the same airfield or (more often) from different fields. That allowed him far more flexibility than Leigh - Mallory (and others') preferred tactic, whereby several squadrons would need to be assembled to form a 'Big Wing' prior to even setting off to make the interception. 

Cheers

Steve


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## GrauGeist (Mar 28, 2014)

I'm trying to understand how Galland can be considered an "idiot"...he constantly fought over several different policies handed down by the big, true "idiot" (Goering), even risking his own position in the Luftwaffe.

During the Battle of Britain, Galland warned about needing escorts for the Bf110, he warned about the bomber formations flying too slow and at the perfect altitude for British interception (without success).

Galland pointed out early on the need to strengthen the Jagdwaffe and argued with Goering over the presence of American fighters, to which Goering refused to believe (1943).

Galland was a proponent of the Me262 as a fighter and not a bomber. He pushed for the Sturmbock conversion, and was relieved of command due to his protest of Operation Bodenplatt, which he insisted was a useless waste of men and machines.

He instituted several policies that allowed the Luftwaffe some margain of success against overwhelming odds...

Hardly an idiot.

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## pbehn (Mar 28, 2014)

As for penny packets! In "the most dangerous enemy" this was discussed at some length. For the RAF pilots there is a limit to how far you can see. A squadron attacking a formation could not see another squadron that had engaged only a few minutes earlier. In all pilots accounts I have read there is the phenomena of being on your own suddenly. One moment the sky is full of aircraft the next it is empty. Travelling at 350MPH with a sky 25,000 ft deep its easy to understand.


I have no doubt Park could have done better, I have no doubt Park would have done better given a re run of the BoB, Park has said in certain situations maybe he could have done better. But I doubt any airforce leader faced with his problems on the practical and political front actually could have done better. The actions in the BoB are one of the first and few where his every descision could be analysed. Leigh Mallory took part in a re enactment using his big wing tactics (I read somewhere here) he got trounced.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2014)

Quirk is that the USAF escorts were, well, escorted by shorter range fighters. In case one does not have an equal number of fighters as his opponent, he basically has no options. Attack the escorts early - shorter ranged fighters will get you. Attack escorts when those are deep in your territory - the chance for 'stripping the escorts' is lost; at best, you still have enemy bombers roaming free. 
Toss there that LW fighters were significantly outperformed above 20-25000 ft (where it mattered in the ETO) from mid/late 1943 on, there was hardly any chance the LW would gain the upper hand against the USAF and RAF. 
People at the head of LW were not stupid - while they did make mistakes (everybody else did, too), their main problem was that they were outproduced and outnumbered by other 3 major powers, and even the slightest mistakes were augmented by that.


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## stona (Mar 29, 2014)

If the Luftwaffe used its fighters to intercept USAAF escorts further out, forcing them, maybe, to drop tanks, then they would have been playing in to the hands of the Americans. They would not be able to attack the bombers and the escorts would be doing their job in a different way. They would still be shooting down Luftwaffe fighters, just nowhere near the bombers. 
The 8th AF history makes it clear that both sides understood this.
Just as for the RAF during the BoB the bombers were the targets for the fighters, a point made time and again by both Park and Dowding.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Apr 2, 2014)

pbehn said:


> True if you talk about the battle of Britain but the "rules of engagement" in the early days of the war were very strange for nations at war, a lot of leaflet dropping and specifically forbidden to bomb civilian targets, predicatably all sides were dragged into open unrestricted warfare.



After Rotterdam the gloves started to come off. It was a convenient excuse. 

The idea that the German switch to bombing London in September was in retaliation for the bombing of Berlin is absolute nonsense. It is part of the myth of the BoB, not the history. Halder wrote in his diary on the 22nd JUNE 1940, nearly three months earlier, shortly before France surrendered.

'The raids of the British Air Force at home are becoming bothersome. _Now they are extending their attacks to Berlin _and ObdL therefore wants us to transfer Army AA units. Lengthy discussion of subject over the telephone.'

My italics.

Incidentally, though some find it hard to believe that the Wermacht could be amateurish enough to view crossing the Channel rather like crossing a wide river it was Halder, following an invasion conference on 22nd July who summed up, under the heading 'Method', how it would be done.

'Similar to large scale river crossing on line Ostend-Le Havre'.

Remember that this man was chief of the OKH General Staff 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Apr 2, 2014)

stona said:


> After Rotterdam the gloves started to come off. It was a convenient excuse.
> 
> The idea that the German switch to bombing London in September was in retaliation for the bombing of Berlin is absolute nonsense. It is part of the myth of the BoB, not the history. Halder wrote in his diary on the 22nd JUNE 1940, nearly three months earlier, shortly before France surrendered.
> 
> ...



no, it is not nonsense. hitler directive 17 issued 1 august 1940, was very explicit and is unequivocal in what it was to do:

In this order Hitler explicitly prohibited attacks on London and against civilians. Any airmen who, deliberately or unintentionally, violated this order were to be punished. Its unequivocal what german intent was at that stage, and that continued for some time. NO ATTACKS ON LONDON WERE AUTHORISED. Hitler's No. 17 Directive, issued 1 August 1940, established the conduct of war against Britain and specifically did not authorise any terror attacks or attacks aimed directly at the civilian population. . The Führer declared that terror attacks could only be a means of reprisal, as ordered by him alone. 
Fuhrer Directive 17

Hitler's instructions were echoed in Hermann Göring's general order, issued on 30 June 1940 (before fuhrer directive 17, which reinforces the point that terror attacks against London was a co-rdinated thought out policy move by the Germans)

"The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... The most thorough study of the target concerned, that is vital points of the target, is a pre-requisite for success. It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary loss of life amongst the civilian population".

All this changed after September. completely. 

On 24 August, fate took a turn, and several off-course German bombers accidentally bombed residential areas of London. The next day, the RAF bombed Berlin for the first time, targeting Tempelhof airfield and the Siemens factories in Siemenstadt. It was not seen so much as a reprisal raid by the British, more as an attempt to try and ease the pressure on FC by forcing the LW to divert some resources to home Defence. this was nothing new, the RAF had attempted the same thing to try and ease the pressure on the French as early as 15 May 1940, when the first bombings of German cities were authorised. However, the attacks on the german capital by the RAF were seen by Hitler as indiscriminate due to their inaccuracy. Flying into one of almost uncontrolled rage, he ordered that the 'night piracy of the British' (as he referred to it) be countered by a concentrated night offensive against the island, and especially London. This is simply an historical fact, beyond any interpretation or historic revisionism. Its exactly how the blitz began and im staggered that we would even be sitting here arguing about how it transpired 

The proof that the bombing of berlin caused the change in German strategy is simply irrefutable, simply by the speech hitler gave on 4 September. no other piece of evidence that might be scrounged out of the dark corners of historical revisionism can match what he said. 

In a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940, Hitler ranted and raged , announcing that:

"The other night the English had bombed Berlin. So be it. But this is a game at which two can play. When the British Air Force drops 2000 or 3000 or 4000 kg of bombs, then we will drop 150 000, 180 000, 230 000, 300 000, 400 000 kg on a single night. When they declare they will attack our cities in great measure, we will eradicate their cities. The hour will come when one of us will break – and it will not be National Socialist Germany"

How can you say that the bombing of Berlin did not cause that change of heart. its there, plain as day, for all to see. What is not so clear, is whether the british deliberately bombed Berlin as a direct reprisal to the bombing of London on the 24 August.


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## Hop (Apr 2, 2014)

Hitler always intended to attack London. Also from directive 17:



> 2. After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.



London was the largest port in the world, and had the largest food stores. 

Hitler issued similar orders as early as November 1939, about his plans if the Germans succeeded in conquering part of the channel coast opposite the UK.



> How can you say that the bombing of Berlin did not cause that change of heart. its there, plain as day, for all to see.



The Germans always had an eye on public opinion. When they attacked Poland, they first staged a fake Polish attack to claim they were simply defending themselves. When Jodl set out his plan for attacking Britain in June 1940, he called for "terror attacks, announced as reprisals". 

As early as 19th August Goering ordered a "great" attack on Liverpool, calling for more than 100 bombers to hit the city in one night. It wasn't actually launched until a week later, and was an utter failure, but it was part of the Luftwaffe progression from attacking the RAF to attacking British port cities that Hitler had been calling for.

And the talk of one "accidental" bombing of London is simply wrong. The Luftwaffe hit London in daylight a couple of times in mid August. From about the 20th they bomber London almost every night. Notes on captured Luftwaffe pilots told them that if they couldn't find their targets at night, they could jettison bombs over London because "something of value" was likely to be destroyed.


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## stona (Apr 2, 2014)

I did not say that it was nonsense that initially the Luftwaffe was very constrained in what it could or could not attack. I said it was nonsense that the switch of targets from the RAF to London was a retaliation for an air raid on Berlin. These had already been going on for three months. Read my post properly.

The RAF did not first bomb Berlin in August following an error by some German aircraft which bombed London. THAT is part of the myth. As Halder made clear the RAF extended its raids to Berlin (or at least the area of Berlin) in June 1940 which was why the Luftwaffe wanted Army AA units moved to that area. The RAF was probably aiming at a specific target when they too 'erroneously' bombed the city. Incidentally Halder had no objections to the request.
I don't notice Hitler or anyone else raging about these attacks in June, July or August 1940 when plan A, defeat the RAF, was still in place.

What caused the change of targets was a change of strategy. In early September the Germans realised that they were not going to gain any kind of air superiority over the Channel and Southern England. To them, largely due to bad intelligence, the RAF seemed stronger than ever. In any case it was not defeated. Even the bluff of an invasion was untenable and some other way to 'persuade' the British into some kind of negotiations was needed. This was at the root of the intentional change from attacking the RAF to attacking London.

It is important to remember that in the planning for 'Sealion' number one on the list of 'things to do' is almost invariably to gain air superiority over the Channel and invasion area. This applies to documents, diaries and orders from all three services.

This was all part of an increasing escalation.
Martin Van Creveld has written.

"The day before Nazi Germany started WW2 on ist September 1939, Hermann Goering, as Hitler's deputy and commander of the Luftwaffe, ordered his pilots to observe the laws of war and make sure they only attacked military targets, broadly defined as anything that is important for the enemy's conduct of the war. Less than six years later, an American aircraft dropped the most powerful bomb in history until then on Hiroshima, a city devoid of any major military significance, killing an estimated 75,000 civilians and bringing the greatest war of all to an abrupt end. What had happened to air power in the meantime, and how did it make the transition from the one to the other?"

A very good question, maybe for another time.

Cheers

Steve


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## Hop (Apr 2, 2014)

> I said it was nonsense that the switch of targets from the RAF to London was a retaliation for an air raid on Berlin. These had already been going on for three months. Read my post properly.



Halder is completely wrong on this. The first RAF attack on Berlin was on the 25th August. The majority of the aircraft involved didn't bomb because of poor visibility in the Berlin area. The next attack a few nights later was described in the war diary of the Wehrmacht high command as "the first attack on Berlin".


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## pbehn (Apr 2, 2014)

stona said:


> What caused the change of targets was a change of strategy. In early September the Germans realised that they were not going to gain any kind of air superiority over the Channel and Southern England. To them, largely due to bad intelligence, the RAF seemed stronger than ever. In any case it was not defeated. Even the bluff of an invasion was untenable and some other way to 'persuade' the British into some kind of negotiations was needed. This was at the root of the intentional change from attacking the RAF to attacking London.



Steve Im confused here, I thought the change was because the LW believed the RAF was down to its last 50 fighters, to deliver a knock out blow.


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## stona (Apr 2, 2014)

Hop said:


> Halder is completely wrong on this. The first RAF attack on Berlin was on the 25th August. The majority of the aircraft involved didn't bomb because of poor visibility in the Berlin area. The next attack a few nights later was described in the war diary of the Wehrmacht high command as "the first attack on Berlin".



If Halder is wrong then the OKH and ObdL are wrong. It seems to me that the men running the war for Germany,including the Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the Luftwaffe, would know where bombs were falling. Whether the bombers took off with the intention of bombing Berlin I very much doubt but bombs did fall on Berlin.
This is what led to a telephone conference and was a serious enough situation to get a mention in Halder's war diary. It was an unwelcome distraction at a time when he was more concerned with sorting out the mess in France and the Low Countries in the days immediately prior to the French surrender.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Apr 2, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Steve Im confused here, I thought the change was because the LW believed the RAF was down to its last 50 fighters, to deliver a knock out blow.



I think the Luftwaffe had found out the hard way in late August and early September that their intelligence analysis, which did indeed suggest that the RAF was seriously depleted, were not quite correct. I've said time and time again that pilots were becoming a problem (for the Luftwaffe too) but there were still enough to give the Luftwaffe a bloody nose. In a way the Luftwaffe blinked first.

The Kriegsmarine war diary makes it clear that the change in target let them of the hook. It meant that they would never have to attempt 'Sealion', an operation that almost no naval officers believed was possible in any case. It was also understood to be a change in tactic with the express intention of forcing Britain out of the war by forced negotiation.

Cheers

Steve


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## Hop (Apr 2, 2014)

> If Halder is wrong then the OKH and ObdL are wrong.



I suspect Halder misunderstood. RAF aircraft were no doubt flying night recce and leaflet operations over Berlin. They didn't drop bombs, though.

From Karl Klee's translation of the war diary of the Wehrmacht High Command:



> On 28 August and during the night 28/29 August the Luftwaffe committed a total strength of 400 bomber and 576 fighter aircraft against England. Among other raids, 722 demolition and 6,840 incendiary bombs were dropped on Liverpool and Birkenhead during the night. The score of hits could, however, not be exactly observed owing to bad visibility.* The losses of the friendly forces amounted to 12 those of the enemy to about 43 aircraft. *During the night of 28/29 August, British bomber aircraft raided Greater Berlin for the first time. 8 demolition and a great number of incendiary bombs were dropped. The major part of these bombs was dropped on residential areas near the Goerlitz railroad states. 8 civilians were killed, 21 were heavily and 7 were slightly wounded.*
> 
> As a result of the air raid on Greater Berlin, the Fuehrer decides to return to Berlin immediately.



*British records show bombing over the Midlands with no one aware the Luftwaffe was actually trying to hit Liverpool. From the RAF campaign diary "Main objective of the night was industrial Midlands up to Liverpool and as far as Bradford and Leeds"

William Shirer was living in Berlin. From Rise and Fall:



> It didn't amount to much. There was a dense cloud cover over Berlin that night and only about half of the eighty-one R.A.F. bombers dispatched found the target. Material damage was negligible. But the effect on German morale was tremendous. For this was the first time that bombs had ever fallen on Berlin.
> 
> The Berliners are stunned [I wrote in my diary the next day, August 26]. They did not think it could ever happen. When this war began, Goering assured them it couldn't ... They believed him. Their disillusionment today therefore is all the greater. You have to see their faces to measure it.
> 
> ...



The Air War by Janusz Piekalkiewicz uses newspaper stories and press releases to document WW2. From that:



> Monday 26 August
> The Wehrmacht High Command announced:
> 
> On the night of 25th-26th August, a large number of aircraft bombed airplane and munitions factories in Birmingham, Kingston and Coventry...That same night, for the first time since the war began, several enemy aircraft flew over Berlin and released a number of incendiary bombs along the city limits. In the rest of Germany, random bombs were released at various points over nonmilitary targerts. No damage was inflicted either there or in Berlin. One of the aircraft that flew over Berlin was shot down by flak on its return journey.


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## stona (Apr 2, 2014)

Hop said:


> I suspect Halder misunderstood.



What, he misunderstood a request from the OKL for anti aircraft units to be transferred from the Army to the Luftwaffe and moved to protect Berlin? This request came as a result of British bombs falling on Berlin on 22nd June IIRC.
Halder's war diary is not a retrospective account. It is a contemporary account of events more or less as they happened.
It is entirely possible that these bombs were not intended for Berlin. I would suggest that the forces on the ground had a firmer grasp of where ordnance was landing than those dropping it in mid 1940, particularly at night. The raids later _targeted _Berlin. Targeting Berlin and bombing Berlin are two different things.

I know that the raids on London were couched in terms of retaliation for British raids on Germany. It's called propaganda, something the Nazi state, with its iron control of its media was particularly good at. If we are to believe everything coming out of Berlin then we should believe this.

'This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our territory. Since 5.45 A.M. we have been returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met by bombs. Whoever fight with poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever departs from the rules of humane warfare can only expect that we shall do the same. I will continue this struggle, no matter against whom, until the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured.'

Today I am in Chemnitz (Karl Marx Stadt). If you want to see the effects of British bombing, combined with an attempt to build a socialist city you should come here. It's not pretty 

Cheers

Steve


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## Njaco (Apr 2, 2014)

Hitler intended to attack London.
The Luftwaffe intended to attack London.

What they needed was an excuse. Up to that time London was not "officially" a target but bombs were dropped here and there - nothing on the scale that happened when the Luftwaffe put its full weight into it (like 7 September).

But these pin-prick attacks are what Hitler needed as an excuse to fully commit to London.


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## redcoat (Apr 2, 2014)

parsifal said:


> no, it is not nonsense. hitler directive 17 issued 1 august 1940, was very explicit and is unequivocal in what it was to do:
> 
> In this order Hitler explicitly prohibited attacks on London and against civilians. Any airmen who, deliberately or unintentionally, violated this order were to be punished. Its unequivocal what german intent was at that stage, and that continued for some time. NO ATTACKS ON LONDON WERE AUTHORISED. .


This would be fine and dandy if London was the only town or city in the UK, it isn't.
The Luftwaffe was attacking military related targets within civilian areas in the UK from the start of the battle, as was the RAF on Germany.


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## redcoat (Apr 2, 2014)

stona said:


> The RAF did not first bomb Berlin in August following an error by some German aircraft which bombed London. THAT is part of the myth. As Halder made clear the RAF extended its raids to Berlin (or at least the area of Berlin) in June 1940 which was why the Luftwaffe wanted Army AA units moved to that area. The RAF was probably aiming at a specific target when they too 'erroneously' bombed the city. Incidentally Halder had no objections to the request.Steve


 The raid on Berlin in June which spooked the Luftwaffe was probably the raid of 7th June 1940 when a single French Farman F220 bombed the city in retalilation for a Luftwaffe attack on Paris, there were certainly no RAF raids that far into eastern Germany during June and July.


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## parsifal (Apr 2, 2014)

The Germans had been thinking about how to defeat the Britsh in air warfare since before the war, and Hitler did favour direct attacks on the british population in the various discussions that transpired. The germans had succesfully employed terror bombing as a technique since Guernica, and had employed it as a technique to soften enemy resolve at least a dozen times since the outbreak of the war. It was a technique that had yielded some pretty good results for them. In 1939 the use of such techniques had been discussed and developed in a general sense for use against the british. 

I get all that, and accept it, but from the beginning of June to the end of August there was a fundamental change in German policy initiated by none other than the fickle Adolf Hitler. After the fall of France (actually before that), Hitler believed that the British would be amenable to making peace with germany. he had no real desire to destroy Britain, as he thought the break up of the British empire would not be in Germany's interests. His strategy changed as a result of that, and terror bombing was removed from the list of possible attacks on the british. Hitler deduced that terror attacks on attacks on british might not be conducive to convincing the British of the need to make terms. So, he forbade them, except on his express orders. He was prepared to try targetted attacks in an effort to induce them to the peace table. He never gave up or permanently removed terror attacks as a technique, and in the lead up to war had preferred it over more conventional means of attack. But for that critical perior June to August, it was off the table....for the moment.

We dont actually know the thought processes that were in Hitlers head from late August through to early September, but what we do know is that by the 4th september, he was angry, really angry. I dont believe that anger was staged, or fake. But the reason that we need to consider is why he was angry. In his speech he states that it was a retalitory motive that led him to unleash terror attacks. Maybe, but I dont buy that. he had always thought direct attacks on civilian poulation was an effective means of attack, it was a form of warfare that he had successfully used earlier, and in the lead up to war he had advocated its use aginst the british. he had deviated from that path after June, allowing conventional attacks a chance to deliver the result he was looking for. It didnt deliver (though some now believe it was close to achieving some sort of result. Hitler wasnt interested in tactical victories over FC however, neither did he really believe in the viability of a cross channel attack, what he wanted, was a negotiated peace with Britain), I believe that when confronted with an attack by the british on his capital, he realized the British were not being brow beaten to the peace table by conventional attacks on their air force, and decided to move to the next level of his strategy....a reversion to his previous thinking of direct attacks on the British population. this is entirely consistent with his previous and subsequent form. Ever the gambler, when faced with a reverse, Hitler tended to become stubborn and obstinate, casting aside all rationality (something in short supply in Hilters mind at the best of times) and cling to things he believed to be known winners, at least in his mind. his "no retreat" decision in front of Moscow was based on that innate conservatism, and his subsequent adherence to that concept 1942-5 clearly his nature when struck with adverity. so what did he do when faced with a reverse against the British? He reverted to what he believed was a known winning strategy. terror attacks.....

All this is true, so from the longer viewpoint, the germans did plan to carry out direct attacks on the british population. but in that period June to September, for reasons not related to the rules of warfare or any sense of right and wrong, but for reasons of achieving a certain strategic outcome, Hitler forbade direct attacks on the British except with his express orders. These are all clearly on the record. When confronted with that failure, hitler firstly got angry, and then unleashed what he believed would be the second stage of his attack, and a more effective strategy against the British. he upped the ante, to put even more pressure on the british 9or so he thought...actually he lost the battle because of that decision) I dont believe that was a calculated decision, as such, I believe it was a decision borne from the expedients that confronted him, and that, is a world of difference from what you guys are claiming


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## parsifal (Apr 2, 2014)

redcoat said:


> The raid on Berlin in June which spooked the Luftwaffe was probably the raid of 7th June 1940 when a single French Farman F220 bombed the city in retalilation for a Luftwaffe attack on Paris, there were certainly no RAF raids that far into eastern Germany during June and July.



Correct. Raids on Berlin were not athorised until late August. Churchill had given limted freedom of attack to attack other cities in germany, specifically port cities and cities in western germany, mostly the ruhr, on the 15 May, and as far as I know, that order had not been expoanded until later in August. The britsh did have concerns about terror attacks, despite the bravado, and attacking berlin was sure to put pressure on hitler to unleash revenge attacks.


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## redcoat (Apr 3, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Churchill had given limted freedom of attack to attack other cities in germany, specifically port cities and cities in western germany, mostly the ruhr, on the 15 May, and as far as I know, that order had not been expoanded until later in August. The britsh did have concerns about terror attacks, despite the bravado, and attacking berlin was sure to put pressure on hitler to unleash revenge attacks.


It should be noted that all the intended targets of RAF raids in this period including the attacks on Berlin, were either military or military related, and if they were unable to find any targets of this nature they were to return to the UK with their bombs.


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## Hop (Apr 3, 2014)

> What, he misunderstood a request from the OKL for anti aircraft units to be transferred from the Army to the Luftwaffe and moved to protect Berlin? This request came as a result of British bombs falling on Berlin on 22nd June IIRC.



No, I think he understood the request but misunderstood "bombs falling on Berlin". Without knowing the exact wording of what he was told it's impossible to say, of course, but "as far as Berlin" could mean targets north, south or east of the city, or "the RAF are flying over Berlin" could mean recce and propaganda sorties.

22 June was also the end of the battle of France, so it's natural the Germans were discussing redeploying anti aircraft guns.



> It is entirely possible that these bombs were not intended for Berlin. I would suggest that the forces on the ground had a firmer grasp of where ordnance was landing than those dropping it in mid 1940, particularly at night.



William Shirer was in Berlin. His diary was contemporaneous, too. Berliners seemed unaware of any previous attacks on the city. The German press announcements were contemporaneous, they seemed unaware of any earlier attacks. 

It's not just that the RAF didn't order any earlier attacks, it's that no one else in Berlin seemed to have noticed any earlier attacks either.


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## abaddon1 (Apr 11, 2014)

One critical fact, often overlooked, is that, during the Battle of France, although the RAF had already lost almost one thousand aircraft... (almost half of which were fighters)... by June 1940; Churchill, at the request of the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, demanded more aircraft be sent even though it was clear the battle for France was lost and Britain would be left standing alone against Germany. 
Despite immense political pressure; at the insistence of Sir Hugh Dowding commanding Fighter Command, the RAF refused to release any further squadrons; Dowding's argument being that the service possessed insufficient fighters to defend against the coming assault on Britain; and that if he obeyed Churchill's edict, and the current rate of losses continued, there would be no fighters left within two weeks to defend the UK.
Air Vice Marshall Keith Park agreed with Dowding; forcing Churchill to back down.

Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

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## pbehn (Apr 11, 2014)

abaddon1 said:


> Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.


I dont know about that, when Churchill visited France his impression was that the French had given up long before they surrendered, they were burning documents in the courtyards while demanding more aircraft. I was under the impression that it was Leigh Mallory that poisoned his mind to Dowding and Park. I may be wrong though.

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## parsifal (Apr 12, 2014)

abaddon1 said:


> One critical fact, often overlooked, is that, during the Battle of France, although the RAF had already lost almost one thousand aircraft... (almost half of which were fighters)... by June 1940; Churchill, at the request of the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, demanded more aircraft be sent even though it was clear the battle for France was lost and Britain would be left standing alone against Germany.
> Despite immense political pressure; at the insistence of Sir Hugh Dowding commanding Fighter Command, the RAF refused to release any further squadrons; Dowding's argument being that the service possessed insufficient fighters to defend against the coming assault on Britain; and that if he obeyed Churchill's edict, and the current rate of losses continued, there would be no fighters left within two weeks to defend the UK.
> Air Vice Marshall Keith Park agreed with Dowding; forcing Churchill to back down.
> 
> Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.



Reynauds request is all the more galling when one remebers that already the FAF was evacuating key units out of metrolpitan france at the time the request was being made.


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## eWildcat (Apr 12, 2014)

Only if we suppose that the Armée de l'Air didn't resist some orders and didn't play any political game itself. Things were pretty messy at the time.


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## stona (Apr 12, 2014)

abaddon1 said:


> Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.



Much more complicated than that. Churchill still backed Dowding long after the BoF, during what I think of as the second round in the fight by some at the A.M. and in the RAF to remove him.

In January 1942 Park went to Egypt as Air Officer Commanding, not some training command, and thence to Malta where he pulled the rabbit out of the hat for a second time. In 1944 (can't remember when) he was made AOC-in-C, Middle East Command.

Park was probably one of the best tactical commanders that Britain and its Commonwealth has ever produced. Dowding always credited him for the way he handled 11 Group and effectively managed the BoB from hour to hour and day to day.

I'd have renamed Auckland as Parksville 

Cheers

Steve.


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## redcoat (Apr 13, 2014)

abaddon1 said:


> Churchill never forgave either of them; and when the Operation Seelöwe crisis had passed, Park was posted immediately to Training Command, whilst Dowding was arbitrarily retired and sent on special duty to the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production.


It was internal RAF office politics which saw Dowding retired and Park transferred, not Churchill.


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## stona (Apr 14, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Reynauds request is all the more galling when one remebers that already the FAF was evacuating key units out of metrolpitan france at the time the request was being made.



Six Hurricane squadrons were in France on day one of the invasion. On May 10th Dowding expressed the view that the efforts of_ 'every modern fighter in the service' _would not effect the outcome in France and the Low Countries and that their absence from their home bases might seriously effect the issue there. Nonetheless Dowding lost another six squadrons to France with a further four making cross channel sorties on a daily basis.
Dowding described the pressure for more assistance as_ 'relentless and inexorable'_

On 15th May Dowding attended a cabinet meeting at which Newall spoke up resisting sending more fighters to France. Dowding did NOT confront Churchill on his own as some have since written. Newall made the case for retaining the fighters at home but Churchill explained that the BEF was still in position, near Brussels, and that it was preparing to attack German lines of communication and could not be denied support.

The next day, with the Germans clearly winning the battle, Dowding set out his case against sending more aircraft to France in a letter to the Air Ministry. This is probably the most famous letter written at any time, by any airman, to any recipient. It now hangs framed at the RAF college at Cranwell and I don't feel I need to reproduce it here.

On this day (16th) the Air Ministry ordered Dowding to prepare to send a further eight half-squadrons across the Channel. Dowding now only had thirty six squadrons of the fifty two he believed he needed for home defence. Incidentally, Churchill claimed in his memoirs that Dowding told him he only required twenty five (not fifty two) but in this he was mistaken.
Churchill then flew to France and telegraphed London asking for an _additional _six squadrons for France.
At 11pm on 16th May the cabinet agreed to this request. On 17th Churchill returned and said, with typical hyperbole, that the decision to send fighters to France had been _'the gravest decision that a British cabinet had ever had to take'._

Now Newall, not Dowding, stepped in again saying that there were not enough French airfields for these six squadrons so they stayed in Kent and undertook cross Channel operations. Dowding, in a letter to Park, described this as_ 'a notable victory on the "Home Front"._

Dowding now sent Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton to France to assess the situation. He spent three days (17-19 May) in France before reporting that the Germans were winning and any fighters sent to help the Allied Armies would be lost for no good reason.

On 19th May Churchill ruled that no more fighter squadrons were to be sent to France, confirmed by the cabinet the next day. On 19th and 20th May all but three of the fighter squadrons returned to the UK. On 24th May Dowding wrote that this had_ 'converted a desperate situation to a serious one.'_

Harold Lander, in charge of the Bawdsey research group which became the 'Stanmore Research Section' at the outbreak of the war, produced the graphs and figures which convinced Churchill that Dowding had been correct in the first week of June (not 15th May as some historians seem to think). Much later Lander wrote.
_'There seems little doubt that, had Dowding not won his little battle with Churchill in May [actually June], he would have lost the Battle of Britain in September.'_
Well, maybe.

It was a dramatic scene. 
Dowding, armed with Lander's data, attended a cabinet meeting on 3rd June. Dowding did not feel he was convincing Churchill. 
He later wrote that Beaverbrook, who was also at the meeting, had since told him that, _'He saw me throw my pencil down on the table and said to himself "he's going to resign". Luckily, I had realised that one can often convince a person through his eyes when it is not possible to do so through his ears, and I had armed myself with a graph showing the balance of Hurricane wastage against replacements. I got up from my seat and walked around the table to the PM's chair. I laid the graph on the table before him and said, "If the present rate of wastage continues for another fortnight, we shall not have a single Hurricane left in France or in this country." That did the trick.' _

He retained Churchill's confidence and respect.

When the Battle of Britain pamphlet was published in March 1941 it failed even to mention Dowding or Park. It was written 'anonymously' by a certain Hilary St. George Saunders who later acted as Leigh-Mallory's diarist and co-wrote a slightly skewed (in my opinion) three volume history of the RAF.
Churchill wrote to Sinclair on Dowding's behalf asking for an explanation.

_'The jealousies and cliquism which have led to the committing of this offence are a discredit to the Air Ministry and I do not think any other service department would have been guilty of such a piece of work. What would have been said if the War Office had produced the story of the Battle of Libya and had managed to exclude General Wavell's name, or if the Admiralty had told the tale of Trafalgar and left Lord Nelson out of it! It grieves me very much that you should associate yourself with such behaviour.'_

Despite this, it was not until August 1943 that an illustrated version of the pamphlet was published which not only named and credited Park and Dowding but also carried photographs of the two men.

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Apr 14, 2014)

In August 1942 Dowding had written an article for (I think but can't find my source) the Evening Standard which the censor had rejected. It pertained to the current day fighter situation. Dowding did not then detail his grievances to the Air Ministry but rather wrote directly to Churchill, explaining that.

_'My opinions are known, but they are not accepted [at the AM] and my despatch on the Battle of Britain has been withheld even from the Commanders in Chief and service members of the Air Council. The clear lead in performance and hitting power of our day fighters has been allowed by slovenly thinking and lack of development work to degenerate into a state of inferiority in both respects."_

Churchill initially asked Tedder to respond to Dowding's article but Tedder suggested that Dowding address his concerns to Portal. Eventually Churchill replied himself. After suggesting that publishing such an article which might give useful information to the enemy would have been a _'reckless step'_ he assured Dowding that _'You knew well from our relations that you had only to write to me to ensure that immediate attention would be given to what you say.' _

As we study the relationships between the various 'players' in these dramas we discover that nothing is black and white. Everyone, including Dowding, was playing the political game, some better than others.

Politics?

In May 1945 Sinclair wrote a letter to Dowding commending his _'inspired leadership' _which had helped preserve _'our island citadel'._. It was however impossible to recognise this by promoting him Air Marshall. That rank retains a half salary until death and was really the least that should have been done. In January 1946 both Sholto-Douglas and Harris did receive this promotion.

Three weeks later Sinclair wrote more honestly to Sholto-Douglas._ 'I felt as though I had won a battle when I got Fighter Command into your hands, and, looking back, how right I was.'_
The many pilots killed in mostly pointless operations over France in 1941 might not have agreed.

When Douglas sent Dowding a copy of the second volume of his memoirs (Years of Command......good luck if you want to read it, seriously boring) Dowding wrote to _'My dear Sholto'_ to thank him for the book and _'for the kindly things which you have said about me.'_

Dowding never publicly expressed any ill feeling about his treatment, he played the game. Park was a different matter. He wrote in 1968. _'To my dying day I shall feel bitter at the base intrigue which was used to remove Dowding and myself as soon as we had won the battle.'_ Leigh-Mallory had been least generous. According to Park _'He did not even bother to attend the usual formality of taking over from me, so I handed over to my senior staff officer.'_

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2014)

> The many pilots killed in mostly pointless operations over France in 1941 might not have agreed


.

These operations could better be described as just costly, not pointless. there were very real and valid points to their operation. The way they were executed was pretty poor, but again, thats different to "pointless". Foreman brings this out failry well. 

The "point(s)" were, control of the channel, pushing back the bombers that were left in the west after June, both sucessful. The RAF wanted to force the LW up for a full showdown, and this never happened. Most importantly the RAF wanted to lessen the pressure on the Russians and regain the initiative. Like anything, some elements were successful, some were not. What is unarguable was the very heavy cost, and this does make the whole idea dubious, but not pointless.


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## Koopernic (Apr 15, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Correct. Raids on Berlin were not athorised until late August. Churchill had given limited freedom of attack to attack other cities in germany, specifically port cities and cities in western germany, mostly the ruhr, on the 15 May, and as far as I know, that order had not been expoanded until later in August. The britsh did have concerns about terror attacks, despite the bravado, and attacking berlin was sure to put pressure on hitler to unleash revenge attacks.



The first RAF raids on Berlin were in August. The targets were Berlin Tempelhof Airport and Siemensstadt which was an industrial suburb known for the Siemens electrical engineering firm, in other words both "civil targets". I expect there was militarily related manufacturing operations there. Hitlers subsequent decision to switch from Luftwaffe attack on RAF bases to industrial, power and dockland targets in and around London (and other cities) was influenced by this RAF bombing of Berlin and perhaps it was seen as a reprisal . Other factors seem to have been that the campaign against the RAF did not seem to be working and the attacks on the docks, their where-houses, nearby offices and the adjoining suburb (where break bulk cargo had to be laboriously sorted) fitted in with the u-boat campaign. 

There were no Luftwaffe "terror raids" until the so called Baedecker raids, which were themselves Reprisals for RAF raids on Lubeck and Rostock which were both picturesque Medieval coastal towns though certainly with some industry. These two cities were the first use of the RAF's "area bombardment" with the medieval town center itself targeted by the RAF rather than saturation bombing of specific targets or the area around them. Bath, one of the targets, had then and does now have impressive industry.

The initial excuse for RAF attacking Military targets in Germany was given as a reprisal for the Luftwaffe bombardment of Rotterdam during the German Army Siege of Rotterdam, when ultimatums were pronounced, however the RAF decision to bomb German targets had in fact already been taken and propaganda exploited opportunity.

There seem to have been a few attacks on each others naval bases preceding this.

It's fairly obvious that both sides attempted to restrain themselves, some from genuine ethical concerns, some from attempts to prevent escalation, but also for the sake of not appearing to be the first to "bomb civilians" for the sake of moral or propaganda lever edge. To this extent any inevitable navigation error could be used as an excuse. The Butt report lets us know how ridiculously easy it was for crews to bomb way off targets they thought they had positively identified. Only seemed to work on coastal targets on moon lit nights. For the Germans, as as soon as a city was under direct siege by their Army and in the way of Army objectives the Luftwaffe would be called in, even then at Rotterdam they did negotiate.

The French Air force raid on Berlin seems to have been a reprisal for Operation Pauli, the Luftwaffe operation to destroy the remaining French air-force by attacks on air bases around Paris.

Hence the decision to Bomber Tempelhoff Airport and Siemensstadt in Berlin may have saved Britain to the extent that the Germans may have reacted by switching their attacks to targets in London.

Personally I find the destruction of so much cultural heritage revolting however I am also not happy to use the word "terror". The formal, non emotive and more accurate term to use is "demoralization".


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## stona (Apr 15, 2014)

parsifal said:


> .
> 
> These operations could better be described as just costly, not pointless. there were very real and valid points to their operation. The way they were executed was pretty poor, but again, thats different to "pointless". Foreman brings this out failry well.
> 
> The "point(s)" were, control of the channel, pushing back the bombers  that were left in the west after June, both sucessful. The RAF wanted to force the LW up for a full showdown, and this never happened. Most importantly the RAF wanted to lessen the pressure on the Russians and regain the initiative. Like anything, some elements were successful, some were not. What is unarguable was the very heavy cost, and this does make the whole idea dubious, but not pointless.




They were ill advised at the very least, particularly after the experiences of the Luftwaffe over Britain. You can learn from your enemy as well as your own experience. By late 1941 the Luftwaffe also had a fighter in the Fw 190 which was markedly superior to the current Mark of Spitfire in almost all respects and a second in the Bf 109 F which was at least its equal. These two latter points were what worried Dowding so much, though Fighter Command was no longer his responsibility he retained his empathy for the pilots who flew for it.

It is no accident that the Air Staff stepped in on 13th November 1941 with a directive limiting all but essential RAF operations over Northern Europe. As early as March 1941 Evill had contended that 'Circus' operations were ineffective and should be curtailed. It was Douglas who, whilst conceding that more training was needed, argued that the offensive gave Fighter Command the opportunity to _'lean forward into France'_. 
He was lucky that plans for combined operations, culminating in the Dieppe raid supported the need for offensive operations. Douglas was more or less ordered to maintain these in a directive of 13th March 1942. He was also ordered to _ “press forward as rapidly as possible with training and preparation for combined operations.” _.

There are very often considerations above those of any individual service or command that influence how it operates.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Apr 15, 2014)

Steve you need to read about Robert E lees seven days campaigns to understand why it was absolutely imperative for the RAF to continue its forays into France, regardless of the costs.

I hope I am not insulting you by explaining, but on the assumption you may not get the point im trying to make, I will give my explanation

When Mclelland made his move on Richmond in 1862, he held all the aces, and the confederate capital was his for the taking. but he was cautious. Lee arrived, and fought seven battles in seven days, each one was technically a defeat, but stretegically it made Mclelland think he was being outflanked and in imminent danger of being surrounded and outgunned. He became ever more cautious and eventually pulled back away from Richmond. Tactically he had won every battle yet strategically he had lost.

In the case of the germans, the RAF campaigns of 1941 and 1942 gave them no rest, and this affected loss rates. as foreman shows, whilst losses in combat were quite low, mostly because of the vast experience of the german aircrews, but also because of the superior types committed (it was mostly Hurricanes being flown over france incidentally, at least in 1941), but most of all, because the germns chose only to rise for those fights where they were not too badly outnumbered, in terms of overall losses, the Germans were losing more aircraft as a proportion of their force structure in comparison to the RAF losses. German losses are a sad story of "failed to return" or "crashed on landing" , and other similar non-combat losses. When you consider these losses, there was a steady attrition on the LW.

The offensives over france were necessary to gain control of skies, and gain the initiative over the LW, as well as giving it no rest. It took time to do this, and it has to be said, the operations themselves were very poorly thought out and not very inspiring in terms of delivery. It was a cost that had to be paid, and it was paid, but I am of the view, that in a strategic sense at least, it was worth it. by the latter part of 1942, not thanks to the USAAC which was still miniscule in Europe, the LW was firmly on the defensive and firmly losing the fights for the French coastal areas. There were very sound reasons why the LW abandoned the coastal area in the finish, though it took a while to achieve that outcome. FC lacked aircraft with much range, and this prevented it from extending that control of the air even deeper into German held territory. without absoloute control of the skies over Britain, and its littoral waterways, the bomber offensive was really unable to get into full swing. Without that total control the LW could provide too much information as to what the british were up to. Challenging for air superiority over the continent was one of those thankless and unsung tasks carried out by the RAF and something for which it receives scant praise even today.


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## gjs238 (Apr 15, 2014)

parsifal said:


> <SNIP> it was mostly Hurricanes being flown over france incidentally, at least in 1941
> <SNIP> FC lacked aircraft with much range, and this prevented it from extending that control of the air even deeper into German held territory



Sounds like a job for P-40's and later, Mustangs


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## stona (Apr 15, 2014)

The RAF tried to push too far, too soon. It should have confined it's operations closer to the French coast, particularly after it was noticed (very early) that the Luftwaffe only reacted to RAF raids (whether bombers were present (Circus) or not) on its terms. More imaginative means and tactics needed to be used.

In April 1942 Fighter Command losses were such that Leigh Mallory was once again reigned in. He was ordered:

_(a) To pick targets right on the coast, and not try to penetrate.

(b) To carry out a proportion of…operations without bombers at all, since the Hun [was] apparently ready to react even though no bombers [were] present.

(c) To employ large numbers of squadrons with a view to out-numbering the Hun. _

From March 1942 the need to maintain air superiority over the Channel and French coast was an explicit requirement for the combined operations. But even this was conditional. Douglas was ordered to resume Circus operations and supplement these with fighter sweeps in order to attrite Luftwaffe strength, though he was to conserve strength where possible until the introduction of more effective aircraft. Somewhat contradictory orders to be polite.

Until 'Dynamo', which can be seen as a combined operation in reverse, as noted by Air Vice-Marshal James Robb, deputy chief of combined operations, and then 'Archery' (Vaasgo, Norway) any sort of combined operation involving air power was entirely theoretical. Air Vice-Marshal Richard Peirse, deputy chief of the air staff, noted that _“If the enemy has a powerful air force, we must prevent him somehow or other from interfering with our landing and our lines of communications.”_

From early 1942 this was the real reason why the RAF was allowed to operate further into NW Europe. DCAS informed Douglas on 1 May that his priorities were:

_(a) The intensification of the day fighter offensive which calls for reinforcement of 11 Group with Spitfire squadrons.

(b) Maintenance of a proper state of readiness of squadrons ear-marked for operation “Region”

(c) The training of fighter squadrons in rotation in Combined Operation_.

Despite this in June 1942, after just three months, operations inland were once again strictly limited by the Air Staff.

Fighter Command was simply not up to the job its commanders were asking it to do.

The origins of all this lay in Anglo-American discussions in early 1942 to increase the scale and frequency of raids. On 18 April, the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved a memorandum that stated that raids were “_to be undertaken in the summer of 1942 on the largest scale that the available equipment will permit.”_ These discussions fell under what proved to be premature and optimistic decisions concerning Operation Sledgehammer/Roundup and the debate over the invasion of Europe in 1942. 

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Apr 15, 2014)

As far as operations to fight a war of attrition over France I would say it was theoretically impossible. There was nothing in France worth throwing the LW away on or for as far as Germany was concerned. Without a beach head the Germans would conserve their forces.


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## stona (Apr 15, 2014)

pbehn said:


> As far as operations to fight a war of attrition over France I would say it was theoretically impossible. There was nothing in France worth throwing the LW away on or for as far as Germany was concerned. Without a beach head the Germans would conserve their forces.



The Luftwaffe certainly seems to have agreed with you. They didn't rise to the 'bait', usually a few bombers, on Circus operations. It came up and fought as and when it decided to, regardless of the RAF formation. The RAF was undertaking offensive operations into NW Europe (when the Air Staff wasn't limiting these, something it did whenever it got cold feet over the losses) but it certainly didn't have the initiative.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Apr 15, 2014)

> The RAF was undertaking offensive operations into NW Europe (when the Air Staff wasn't limiting these, something it did whenever it got cold feet over the losses) but it certainly didn't have the initiative


.

The RAF certainly DID have the initiative. you need to read Foreman. The RAF was bombing KM ships in harbours, preventing free movement in the channel and use of the French ports. they successfully curtailed mining operations almost to a standstill, sank nearly 250000 tons of axis shipping in 1941 alone in the channel. Eventually they forced the withdrawal of KM Heavy ships, no mean feat, and then drpped the ball by failing to sink those ships. but they never again posed much threat to Britain as they did in the opening months of 1941. RAF attentions on the Uboat bases forced the expenditure of millions of Reichmarks on the construction of securee berthing facilities, and diverted huge respources away from the construction of anti invasion defences. moreover, losses , overall losses , were only about 1.5 to 2:1 against the RAF, which were acceptable, given the range limitations faced by the RAF and the nature of the RAF operations. the LW had no such freedom of action, even over the skies nominally under their control. they picked and sniped where they could, sometimes effectively, but this is not holding the initiative, and it is not controlling the skies. its opportunistic air denial. Effective, but no strategy for holding the initiative, and does not lead to any effective usage of the skies. And in the end, quite costly for the germans to maintain....too costly as it turned out 

The operations of the RAF curtailed the construction of the Atlantic wall, and made possible the destruction of french indusry, something the Germans had at least considered as incorporating into their own industrial infrastructure. It wasnt death from the sky, but it was significant, and it made a difference, in that it made possible the more substantial gains that came later on.

During this period, the RAF was accounting for about 73% of total LW losses. The Eastern front was taking another hit on the German bomber forces, particulalry due to the heavy wear and tear attrition this front caused, but the really big LW losses did not occur in the fair weather months of 1941 or 42. Without the activities of the RAF, the LW would have had opportunity to rest and recover. The RAF offensive was not successful in diverting a single fighter unit west, but neither were the germans given much opportuinity to replace losses they were sustaining on that front, and constatnt maintence demands in both the west and south kept the supply of spares to the east constantly on a slow drip feed. It was anything but a waste of time. it was a critical part of preventing defeat actually. as it was, they (the LW) went through enough aircraft to re-equip their entire air force twice over in that two year period. 

Sometimes, holding the initiative is not about fancy tactics, slick fighters and poster boy pilots. sometimes it gets down to the dirty numbers, dogged determination and courage. the RAF showed all these things in spades, and it paid dividends for them in the finish. In the finish the LW lacked the reserves to really give the Russians what for, and further lacked the reserves to sustain their air defences in the west. that came from the combined efforts of all the allies, but a big part of the load was shouldered by the RAF in 41-2, and a big part of that effort were these blunt and unimaginative operations over France. not pretty, not clever, but determined, and certainly, in the end, effective. 

Finally, Galland himself concedes that in the months of 1941, it became apparent to the Jagdwaffe that they no longer held the initiative, and this sapped at their very resolve. he says as much in his book. Or are we going to start dismissing Galland now as well.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

A question: how much aircraft and crewmen were lost in the ETO between January of 1941 and January 1943, on daylight operations, by RAF and LW?


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## stona (Apr 15, 2014)

I was taught that the side instigating combat in a particular contact/confrontation holds the initiative. As the Luftwaffe was deciding when and whether to come up and engage any particular RAF raid it held the initiative in that sense.

I'd like to know were the figure of 73% of Luftwaffe losses in the west comes from. Between June and November 1941 the Luftwaffe lost an average of 240 single engine fighters per month in the east to all causes, damaged and destroyed. I don't believe there were equivalent losses in the west of this type.
Even total losses don't equate to that either. The only months between June and December 1942 on which Luftwaffe aircraft losses were greater on all other fronts combined than in the east were October and November, that was due to Operation Torch, not operations in NW Europe.
February 1943 was when Luftwaffe losses in the west (including the MTO) exceeded those in the east consistently and for the rest of the war. 

Tomo, I will have many more figures in my various files which I will endeavour to find. I know that March-June 1942 the RAF lost 335 fighters almost all Spitfire Vs.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Apr 15, 2014)

In 1941-42he crucial battle in which the air war played a Major part was the Battle of the Atlantic, as has been said Germanys plans for surface raiders, u boat Blockade were eventually thwarted, If the LW had air supremacy over French ports and free reign over the Atlantic we would have lost it.


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## parsifal (Apr 15, 2014)

Murray has done a lot of work i this regard, and luftwaffe atrition rates were always pretty poor. But in the context of what we are talking about, its rather harder. Ive got the data, but its spread across the pages of three fairly hefty book.

but to pick what might be termed two or three "typical days", ill t4ry and give some idea of the losses being suffered by either side.

First date 9th June 1941, ther were wild claims by either side, but according to Foreman, the RAF casualties were 

7 sqn Stirling from 7 Squadron damaged, crew safe
9 sqn Wellington R1758, DNR crew lost
9 sqn wellington DNR crew lost
18 sqn Blen V 6428 DNR crew lost
18 sqn Blen V 6427 DNR crew lost

74 sqn spit W3186 DNR pilot lost
79 sqn hurri abandoned, pilot safe
222 sqn spit P7929 crash landed pilot safe 
254 squadron Blen crashed at londonderry crew safe, not really related to combat ops
1 PRU Spit X 4496 DNR Pilot lost

RAF sent 9 sqn Wellingtons to the Dutch coast on an anti-shipping mission by daylight (the first time since April 1940), unescorted. BC sent 18 aircraft (Blenheims mostly) also to holland and and lost two aircraft. two Stirlings of 7 squadron were sent on gardening operations off holland and one failed to return 

Over the channel and french coastal areas there were a series of short and sharp engagements, in which the RAF appears to have gained the upper hand

Luftwaffe losses on this day in the west and over germany were as follows

III/JG3 Bf109 F2 #8152 crashed aftrer combat landed, pilot killed
III/JG2 Bf109 E7 #5983 "White 15" DNR pilot lost
III/JG26 Bf109F2 #6716 Crash landed, Pilot safe, 60% damage (a write off)
Stab/JG26 Bf 109F2 12680 crash landed, 45% damage, pilot injured
I/jG 77 Bf109 E7 2669 crash landed on take off Stavanger 255 damage, no report on pilot condition (not really a combat related loss) 
IV/KG53 He111H2 2787 shot down whilst on antishipping operations (cause not stated) crew killed
E/ZG76 Bf110C1 Crashed in friedland (after engaging RAF bombers) aircraft destroyed, crew killed
3.(F)/31 Bf110 C5 2291 crashed on take off in Holland (again aagainst RAF incursions aircraft written off, crew unhurt

On the 9th february there was a major operation....the famous channel dash. In this operation, according to Foreman the RAF was outnumbered 72 fighters to 90 LW defenders, nearly all Bf 109s and FW 190s. most of the RAF fighters were Spitsd although one quadron of Whirlwinds, number 137, blundered over the German ships and lost 4 of their number. The RAF lost this engagement, in every sense, but LW losses were far from one sided.

Raf claims/ admitted losses were 

41 sqn: 3 destroyed, 1 Damaged/ 1DNR
65 sqn: 1 destroyed, 2 Damaged/zip
72 sqn: 3 destroyed, 4 Damaged 1 probable/zip losses
111 sqn 1 destroyed, 1 Damaged, 1 probable/zip losses 
118 sqn 0 destroyed, 0 Damaged/ 1 DNR
124 sqn 0 destroyed, 0 MIA 1 Damaged/ 1 cat E (pilot injured) 1 DNR 
129 sqn 0 destroyed, 1 Damaged/ zip losses
222 sqn 0 destroyed, 1 Damaged/ 2 DNR
234 sqn 2 destroyed, 0 Damaged/ 2 DNR
401 sqn 2 destroyed, 2 Damaged/ 1 Cat E
403 sqn 1 destroyed, 1 Damaged/ 1 DNR
485 sqn 5 destroyed, 1 Damaged/zip losses
Hch Wg 0 destroyed, 0 Damaged, 1 probable/zip losses

137 sqn 0 destroyed, 0 Damaged/ 4 DNR

Other ops
19sqn 0 destroyed, 0 Damaged/ 1 MIA

Admitted German losses were 

BF109 E 1 destroyed 4 damaged,
Bf 109F 5 destroyed 7 damaged
FW190A: 0 destroyed, 2 damaged

Thats a total of 6 destroyed, 13 damaged. RAF claims were 18 destroyed, 14 damaged, 3 probable
Not sure what LW claims were.


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## parsifal (Apr 15, 2014)

> I was taught that the side instigating combat in a particular contact/confrontation holds the initiative. As the Luftwaffe was deciding when and whether to come up and engage any particular RAF raid it held the initiative in that sense.



Your theory was correct, your application totally incrrect. the LW was not deciding when and where engagements were occurring. they were reactibg to RAF initiatives. In that situation the RAF could, and did, break off the campaign at any time




> I'd like to know were the figure of 73% of Luftwaffe losses in the west comes from. Between June and November 1941 the Luftwaffe lost an average of 240 single engine fighters per month in the east to all causes, damaged and destroyed. I don't believe there were equivalent losses in the west of this type.




It looks as if, either deliberately or inadvertently you are mixing serviceability rates up with losses. the two are different numbers and differnt concepts, though they usually point to the same general malaise of overwork, and poor logistic support, which the LW in the East certainly suffered from. Main source for my figures is Caldwell, which in turn is based on Grohler's analysis. I didnt know losses were quite that heavy in the east. According to Caldwell, LW strength was down from 2700 to just over 1000 by the beginning of December. East Front was receiving roughly 120 replacements per month, give or take. . Problem is that by the following March, LW strength was back up to 2200, and by the following June strengths were at just over 3000 with Richthofens air fleet reporting serviceability of just over 70% (this was the highest serviceability rate of any major EF formation after 1941. by November it had plummetted again to about 45%). In temporary sense, LW losses on the East front were running at about 400 per month in the east, but in a permanent sense, losses were about 1400 per year. LW is reported to have lost 5500 as complete losses June 41 to June 42. not sure of losses on the southern fron or training accidents, but significant losses were occurring over western europe 




> Even total losses don't equate to that either. The only months between June and December 1942 on which Luftwaffe aircraft losses were greater on all other fronts combined than in the east were October and November, that was due to Operation Torch, not operations in NW Europe.



Foreman costello Caldwell do not agree with your figures at all. 



> February 1943 was when Luftwaffe losses in the west (including the MTO) exceeded those in the east consistently and for the rest of the war.



Its more a case that the LW had not much more to lose in the east than losses rose above EF losses 



> Tomo, I will have many more figures in my various files which I will endeavour to find. I know that March-June 1942 the RAF lost 335 fighters almost all Spitfire Vs.



Does not equate to Foremans figures at all


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## stona (Apr 15, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Murray has done a lot of work i this regard,



Condensed into helpful tables like this 







Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Apr 15, 2014)

Murray is available on line, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945

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## bobbysocks (Apr 15, 2014)

thanks for that link milosh...


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2014)

the following attachment is something I found. it is taken from the 1946 RAF post action report. this table are the LW losses and U/S aircraft lists for 1941 on the Eastern Front. Figures are based on the LW quartermaster generals returns


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 20, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Pretty simplistic view, though, Milosh, considering the USAAF was targeting specific targets within the cities, not just the cities themselves - they didn't just swan over and attack Cologne for the hell of it to achieve victory - also, the USAAF had better recon, far greater resources and better management of the campaign on their side, things that the Germans lacked in 1940.



Nope.


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 20, 2014)

parsifal said:


> .
> 
> Finally, Galland himself concedes that in the months of 1941, it became apparent to the Jagdwaffe that they no longer held the initiative, and this sapped at their very resolve. he says as much in his book. Or are we going to start dismissing Galland now as well.



Yes you can dismiss him, he wrote and said a lot of self serving crap and blamed everyone except himself. He was promoted far above his level and, if you want to pick one operational Luftwaffe leader responsible for the destruction of it, ... it would be him.

His strategy and tactics were outmoded, he didn't understand (especially in the BoB) things like logistics and communication (even later he was not really sure of it) . He, bizarrely, became a fan of the 'big wing concept in defending Germany, though he happily shot down high numbers of RAF fighters in 'big wings' because they were such easy targets.... need I go on. A Keith Park he was not.

His endless mantra, post war was 'Goering, Goering, Goering'. If Goering hadn't existed he would have had to invent someone else to blame. A very good squadron leader a good/fair wing leader, disastrous above that level.


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## stona (Apr 20, 2014)

I might not go quite that far, but there is more than an element of truth in that 
Cheers
Steve


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 20, 2014)

Ascent said:


> I'm trying to help my daughter with her homework which has asked her for crucial turning points during the Battle of Britain.
> 
> Now I have a fair idea of how the battle flowed but I'm not really sure that I can locate the crucial points when the British won and the Axis lost.
> 
> ...



Read Stephen Bungey's Book, Most Dangerous Enemy and it will answer all your questions. Definitely the finest book on the BoB (though as he admits built on the works of people like Price and so on).

The Luftwaffe had no chance of winning unless:
(1) Keith Park made a mistake (as did later Leigh Mallory) .
(2) They mastered and employed tools and tactics that no one had really worked out (ie fast fighter bombers on low level accurate attacks on critical areas).

Plus they had to win quickly, their logistics were far poorer. Their aircraft production was less than the UK's, their pilot training was less than the UK's.

Though we always get the 'RAF running out of pilots thing', The Luftwaffe was running out too ... and they couldn't replace them as fast as the UK could. And they couldn't replace their aircraft either (which the UK could) .

It started out with the Luftwaffe fighters (roughly the same size as the RAF) having to shoot down Spitfires and Hurricanes at a 4:1 or even a 5:1 ratio to win....Not going to happen .. and didn't.

The RAF was set up for a war of attrition, the Luftwaffe wasn't, it could have gone on for another month or so (before the weather closed on) and the same result would have happened. 
It didn't matter that the Luftwaffe attacked London (though it made the RAF's job easier, Keith Park was overjoyed at their strategic mistake), they could have just kept on doing what they did prior to that and the same result would have happened.

At no point was the RAF close to defeat, though they had taken losses, people forget the terrible losses the Luftwaffe had.. and the RAF could replace them while the Luftwaffe couldn't.

But and I say but, without Keith Park's incredible tactical leadership day to day, week after week, month after month then the RAF could have lost. One thing they did count on was the 'big mistake' by the RAF, like getting all its planes caught on the ground so the Luftwaffe could do to it what they did to the Polish (and later the USSR). Park never got caught that way.


And, by the way, the Germans, defending Germany were jokes. Tactical idiots. I can say this, because by the end of the BoB the Luftwaffe were sending over 5 fighters for every bomber a ratio the US fighters that did the final killing of the Luftwaffe never even came close to. 

Park carefully 'peeled off' the fighter escorts, before sending in the bomber killers. And killed the bombers (and the fighters). Something, with better leadership than Goering and Galland could have done even more easily to the US, even after the P-15 came into play. They had hours to work things out, Park had minutes....


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## parsifal (Apr 20, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Yes you can dismiss him, he wrote and said a lot of self serving crap and blamed everyone except himself. He was promoted far above his level and, if you want to pick one operational Luftwaffe leader responsible for the destruction of it, ... it would be him.
> 
> His strategy and tactics were outmoded, he didn't understand (especially in the BoB) things like logistics and communication (even later he was not really sure of it) . He, bizarrely, became a fan of the 'big wing concept in defending Germany, though he happily shot down high numbers of RAF fighters in 'big wings' because they were such easy targets.... need I go on. A Keith Park he was not.
> 
> His endless mantra, post war was 'Goering, Goering, Goering'. If Goering hadn't existed he would have had to invent someone else to blame. A very good squadron leader a good/fair wing leader, disastrous above that level.




None of this is relevant to whether Galland could accurately assess the LW state of mind or make comment about the mood and morale of his pilots If he was a "mediocre" squadron leader as you say elsewhere, but a poor logistician and tactician, that only leaves man management in his leaderships bag of tricks. As a failure in the other two areas of management, he has to, by definition need to be a great leader of men, and to do this, he needs to understand the mood of his men. This means then that his appraisal of the LWs reaction to the British offensive is correct, and accurate.

FWIW I pretty much disagree with everything contained in your assessment of him. I think he epitomised the best of the LW....tactical, professionally excellent skills, poor strategic sense, no real concept of combined arms or theatre needs. There were advantages,m and disadvantages to the german method, just as there were advantages and disadvantages to the way the RAF things, including the big, little wing, Park tactics, Mallory tactics.


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## Njaco (Apr 20, 2014)

See, this is why I love this forum - you learn something new every day. So it wasn't Goering fault for the failure of the LW - it was Galland!!! Cool.

OMG. I just LOVE revisionist history.

All Galland's fault.
RAF never ran out of pilots or planes.
The LW couldn't fight it way out of a wet paper bag.
Midway never happened.
June 6 was never important.
on and on and on.........................



> At no point was the RAF close to defeat, though they had taken losses, people forget the terrible losses the Luftwaffe had.. and the RAF could replace them while the Luftwaffe couldn't.



Exactly what source do you have for this comment? Everything I have ever read - some which includes stats - shows that during the first week of September, the RAF was on the ropes. I want to read the same sources you have that say this wasn't so and that in fact there never was a crisis. You make it sound like the RAF or England never needed any help from the US or anywhere else. They had plenty. "The RAF could replace them"?????? That goes against EVERYTHING I've read. What source for this do you have?


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## Juha (Apr 20, 2014)

28 Sept 1940 Jagdwaffe establishment was 1132 Bf 109s and pilots but it had 920 109s and 917 pilots of which 712 109s were serviceable and 676 pilots were combat ready, so clearly Jagdwaffe had replacement problems.

Also Kesselring the CG of the most powerful LFl wanted in early Sept to shift attacks from a/fs to London in order to force FC to fight, so it wasn’t that Hitler/Göring forced the shift over the military commanders heads but some militaru commanders agree with the shift. 

Juha


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## Milosh (Apr 20, 2014)

Especially Juha when compared to,
Single engine fighters - 29.06.40

Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

also give pilot statistics


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## mhuxt (Apr 20, 2014)

Njaco said:


> Exactly what source do you have for this comment? Everything I have ever read - some which includes stats - shows that during the first week of September, the RAF was on the ropes. I want to read the same sources you have that say this wasn't so and that in fact there never was a crisis. You make it sound like the RAF or England never needed any help from the US or anywhere else. They had plenty. "The RAF could replace them"?????? That goes against EVERYTHING I've read. What source for this do you have?



Well, you could start with Bungay, "The Most Dangerous Enemy".


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## stona (Apr 20, 2014)

mhuxt said:


> Well, you could start with Bungay, "The Most Dangerous Enemy".



For what? The RAF could replace the aircraft but, just like the Luftwaffe, not the pilots. I've covered this elsewhere with facts and figures. There are plenty of other authoritative sources which don't necessarily share Bungay's opinions. Bungay always pretty much supports the traditional 'myth' of the BoB.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Apr 20, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Read Stephen Bungey's Book, Most Dangerous Enemy and it will answer all your questions. Definitely the finest book on the BoB (though as he admits built on the works of people like Price and so on).
> 
> The Luftwaffe had no chance of winning unless:
> (1) Keith Park made a mistake (as did later Leigh Mallory) .
> ...



I don't know where to start with that......so I won't bother 

Steve

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## mhuxt (Apr 20, 2014)

stona said:


> For what? The RAF could replace the aircraft but, just like the Luftwaffe, not the pilots. I've covered this elsewhere with facts and figures. There are plenty of other authoritative sources which don't necessarily share Bungay's opinions. Bungay always pretty much supports the traditional 'myth' of the BoB.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



I was responding to Njaco's query re: Skeptic's statement that the RAF was at no point close to defeat, specifically the query about which source was Skeptic referring to.

I thought the traditional 'myth' of the BoB was that it was a close-run thing?


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## Njaco (Apr 21, 2014)

My question is if the RAF wasn't close to defeat, if most things associated with the BoB are myths, then why is it celebrated at all? If it was just another day in the war, why all the fuss? Then 1940 after June was no different than 1941 or 1942 over Western Europe.

If its all a myth, what was the crisis?


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## mhuxt (Apr 21, 2014)

Njaco said:


> My question is if the RAF wasn't close to defeat, if most things associated with the BoB are myths, then why is it celebrated at all? If it was just another day in the war, why all the fuss? Then 1940 after June was no different than 1941 or 1942 over Western Europe.
> 
> If its all a myth, what was the crisis?



I suppose it's the difference between how things are objectively, and how they're experienced on the ground. 

"The strutting Nazi bully-boys swept all before them, and expected us to roll over and give in, but we took all they could give and won through in the end.

There'll always be an England."

<shrug>

Anyway, Bungay's thesis is that it was in no way a close-run thing. I don't have Overy's book to hand, will make a quick trip to the local library and pick it up, see what he says.


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## stona (Apr 22, 2014)

Njaco said:


> If its all a myth, what was the crisis?



The primary premise of the myth is that 'the few', that is Fighter Command or specifically 11 Group, saved Britain from an invasion in 1940. This was propagated by the media on both sides of the Atlantic not least in an effort to cultivate US public opinion for a more active role in the war prior to Pearl Harbour. You'll find this myth on the MOD/RAF site today.

According to various polls by Gallup in October 1939 only 5% of Americans were in favour of entering the war. On 6th June 1940 this was 19% 'following Italy's entrance' In July 1940 this FELL to 14% 'following the collapse of France'. In October it rose to 17% following the 'aerial blitzkrieg on Britain'. According to Gallup if the 50 million Americans who voted in the November 1940 presidential elections were asked to take a vote on whether or not to enter the war, then only 6 million would have voted 'Yes' in December. Incidentally 87% favoured taking over British possessions in the Caribbean should the Germans be victorious in 1940, the excuse being to safeguard the Panama canal !

There was a lot of work to be done in forming American public opinion.

This was done in many ways. The 'Why we Fight' series of films are obvious. Many articles appeared in the US press explaining the importance of the RN in the Atlantic to US interests. It is no coincidence that the 'Destroyers for Bases' deal was announced in September. 'Free Trade' was often mentioned. The prospect of maintaining a large standing army in 'peacetime' was raised. It may seem strange today but this was anathema to most Americans in 1940. Conscription was mentioned. Most Americans would remember the clash between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court over his effort to force a quarter of a million young men into the 'Civilian Conservation Corps' in the 1930s.
For my own reasons I have many press cuttings from the US press at this time. To say that British propaganda was uncritically reproduced would be the kindest way of summing them up . For example on 7th September Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who also happened to be the publisher of the Chicago Daily News, confidently assured his readers that 'Britain has a better than even chance now of withstanding the blitzkrieg' attributing his confidence to 'Britain's superior navy.' Today we would call that 'on message'.
Another front page article trumpets.
'Pilots Have What It Takes. RAF Oblivious to Odds, Small Force Takes on 200 Nazis'. A captured German pilot is quoted, rather dubiously, in the article saying 'These Spitfires are really terrible. They're much to good for us'. I'm sure you get the picture. 

11 Group was on the ropes, but so was the Luftwaffe. The RAF was not on the verge of defeat any more than the Luftwaffe was. The two air forces fought each other to a stalemate. This stalemate has been portrayed as a victory in Britain since 1940. It was in the sense that the Luftwaffe was denied its stated objectives, but it could still bomb London and other cities by night, at will. 
The Germans did not even acknowledge that there had been a Battle of Britain. Their BoB was never fought, it would have taken place on English beaches or, more likely, in the middle of the Channel as they were massacred by the Home Fleet. For them the aerial campaign of July to September against mostly S.E. England was just part of a longer campaign stretching into 1941.

Unlike some (including IIRC Bungay) I do not believe that the Germans could have launched a successful invasion in the summer/autumn of 1940, even had Fighter Command been forced to withdraw north of London. I have given plenty of evidence for the Wermacht's own lack of confidence in such an operation, but here's one more, from General Gunther von Blumentritt.
'We knew far too little of England. We knew literally nothing of amphibious operations. At the time we were preparing 'Sealion' plans, accounts of the campaigns of Caesar, Britanicus and William the Conqueror were being read.'

None of this detracts from the determination and heroism of those 3,000 or so men who flew for the RAF in the battle, or the many thousands more who supported them, nor that of their adversaries. That is not part of any myth.

Cheers

Steve

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## Hop (Apr 22, 2014)

> My question is if the RAF wasn't close to defeat, if most things associated with the BoB are myths, then why is it celebrated at all? If it was just another day in the war, why all the fuss? Then 1940 after June was no different than 1941 or 1942 over Western Europe.
> 
> If its all a myth, what was the crisis?



In less than a year the Germans had conquered Poland, then Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. They had defeated the British army on the continent and driven them back across the sea. Having defeated the rest of Europe, they were launching their campaign against Britain. It's hardly surprising it was viewed as a crisis in Britain. The Germans themselves thought they had all but won.

The Luftwaffe committed everything to a short offensive. The RAF husbanded their resources to fight a long campaign. The result was not a foregone conclusion at the start.

The myth isn't that Britain was in no danger. If the RAF had made as many mistakes as the Luftwaffe, the result could have gone differently. The myth is that the Germans were close to winning in early September. They weren't. The result was a foregone conclusion by early September. The Luftwaffe had squandered their advantage in July and August. By early September the RAF was beginning to suffer. By early September the Luftwaffe was at its last gasp. The RAF was short of pilots. The Luftwaffe had less fighter pilots. They were more exhausted. They were short of aircraft. They were short of spare parts. The Luftwaffe could not continue on the same scale as they had before.

To the men on the ground fighting the battle it appeared a lot closer than it did to the men at the top who could take a longer view. To the post war historian, with accurate figures for the Luftwaffe, it wasn't close at all.


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## stona (Apr 22, 2014)

At the time there was no appreciation of something called the Battle of Britain, note the capitalisation. Overy mentions that Park referred to the Battle of London. The night time blitz heralded what the C-in-C Sothern Command considered the Battle of England. 
One of the few things almost all narratives do agree on is that there was no clear idea in September/October 1940 that a battle had been won. The Germans never came to see it that way. 
In Churchill's June 1940 speech in which the phrase 'battle of Britain' was used it was not capitalised, unlike the 'Battle of France', which was over. The myth of the Battle of Britain was really cemented in March 1941 with the publication by HMSO of the infamous pamphlet, the one that didn't even mention Dowding or Park. A more realistic story was told in Dowding's August 1941 account 'Battle of Britain Despatch' but this was not published.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Apr 22, 2014)

Hop said:


> To the men on the ground fighting the battle it appeared a lot closer than it did to the men at the top who could take a longer view. To the post war historian, with accurate figures for the Luftwaffe, it wasn't close at all.



There are many quotes posted here from Dowding Park and others from both sides. I cannot question a man like Park but his opinion at the time was based on what he knew or assumed. He didnt know the size of the LW prior to the BoF, he didnt know their losses in France, he didnt know how many A/C they produced. If he had this info he would have been much more comfortable with the situation.

On the British side it was a war of attrition on the German side it had to be a complete white wash leaving the LW fully able to support an invasion with no opposition. The RAF had hundreds probably into thousands of aircraft capable of strafing a beach, without sweeping all RAF SE fighters out of existence a landing couldnt be considered, which is one of many reasons it was called off.


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## stona (Apr 22, 2014)

pbehn said:


> There are many quotes posted here from Dowding Park and others from both sides. I cannot question a man like Park but his opinion at the time was based on what he knew or assumed. He didnt know the size of the LW prior to the BoF, he didnt know their losses in France, he didnt know how many A/C they produced. If he had this info he would have been much more comfortable with the situation..



Of course there were intelligence failures on both sides but I don't think that is relevant to Dowding, Park or anybody else's assessments of Fighter Command's position. Quotes are almost invariably lacking context to some extent, particularly within the constraints of a forum posting, but these men were expressing concern at the situation of their own forces and not in relation to the strength of the enemy. In everything Dowding wrote and said, and what I know of Park's writing, neither man ever made any assumptions about Luftwaffe strength, rather they concentrated on what they saw coming across the Channel, day by day.
I do not believe that the critical lack of operational pilots expressed by Dowding in early September would have been made any less serious to him by the knowledge that the Luftwaffe was also struggling. Park was very worried about attacks on Sector airfields, later confiding in Jonnie Johnson that although there were many other airfields in Southern England they were not equipped to communicate with his headquarters and that 'Without signals the only thing I commanded was my desk at Uxbridge'. This concern has nothing to do with the relative strength of the enemy.
On the afternoon of 7th September, around the time these concerns were being expressed, the Luftwaffe made an attack on London with 348 bombers escorted by 617 fighters. Those are the numbers that Fighter Command had to deal with, along with a force of 200 bombers that came along, unescorted, after dark, to wreak more havoc that night.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Apr 22, 2014)

stona said:


> On the afternoon of 7th September, around the time these concerns were being expressed, the Luftwaffe made an attack on London with 348 bombers escorted by 617 fighters. Those are the numbers that Fighter Command had to deal with, along with a force of 200 bombers that came along, unescorted, after dark, to wreak more havoc that night.
> Cheers
> Steve



Those figures tie up with the figures of available fighters. To some extent commanders are always a bit in the dark, however Dowding /Park were not aware that that was all LW fighters available while the LW were concentrating forces to deliver the final knock out blow.

There were some very dark days and 11 group was severely tested but as far as being wiped out I dont think that was ever a possibility. If they had continued and lost more planes they would posibly be in the position of not being able to defend themselves against attack.


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## stona (Apr 22, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Those figures tie up with the figures of available fighters. To some extent commanders are always a bit in the dark, however Dowding /Park were not aware that that was all LW fighters available while the LW were concentrating forces to deliver the final knock out blow.
> 
> There were some very dark days and 11 group was severely tested but as far as being wiped out I dont think that was ever a possibility. If they had continued and lost more planes they would posibly be in the position of not being able to defend themselves against attack.



I actually agree with you about the intelligence short fall. It was probably worse for the Germans than for the British during the battle, but most British appraisals of Luftwaffe strength were way off the mark.

I don't think that 11 Group was ever going to be 'wiped out' but I think, even with the Luftwaffe's woeful tactics, it might have been forced North of London despite Dowding's insistence that he would only do this IF an invasion was actually launched.

Dowding was very keen on the concept of 'forward interception'. It was a system which had roots in the earliest radar experiments, the so called Biggin Hill experiments, of 1937. Dowding was keen to intercept many rather than annihilate a few as he rightly felt that the disruption of the bomber formations would lead to at worst inaccurate bombing and at best a failure of the bombers to bomb at all. He was directly asked to clarify this by Leslie Gossage, Park's predecessor at 11 Group on its formation in 1936, later Inspector General of the RAF.
Dowding wished to match machine with machine but cautioned that if too many fighters were sent up they could be caught on the ground re-fuelling and re-arming by a second wave of bombers, too few risked defeat.
He did not wish to lose this advantage, afforded him by the technology (something else Luftwaffe intelligence never grasped).

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Apr 22, 2014)

stona said:


> I actually agree with you about the intelligence short fall. It was probably worse for the Germans than for the British during the battle, but most British appraisals of Luftwaffe strength were way off the mark.
> 
> I don't think that 11 Group was ever going to be 'wiped out' but I think, even with the Luftwaffe's woeful tactics, it might have been forced North of London despite Dowding's insistence that he would only do this IF an invasion was actually launched.
> 
> ...



Steve I dont think it has yet been declared a crime to agree, much hinges on the definition of victory I think, you are obviously better informed than me and I dont have any books with me.


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## stona (Apr 22, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Steve I dont think it has yet been declared a crime to agree, much hinges on the definition of victory I think,



I hope that it hasn't 

I think the problem with the definition of a victory was more that one side didn't think that the battle (or campaign more realistically) was over and the other didn't appreciate that they had won !

I do think that the outcome of the battle of Britain was a victory for Fighter Command. I don't think that the numbers game is useful, better to look at what the two sides were trying to achieve. 

Dowding set out with the express intent of not being defeated before the weather turned irrevocably in November. He achieved this, not easily but with time to spare. 

The initial German objective was officially to defeat the RAF and obtain air superiority over a potential invasion area. The Luftwaffe never came close to this. 

A more realistic German objective was to force Britain into a 'negotiated', read 'imposed', settlement. I contend that the switch in targets away from Fighter Command and the Royal Navy was part of this plan. Again the Luftwaffe never came close to achieving this.

Everyone knows that Hitler famously postponed 'Sealion' "until further notice" on 17th December, but Raeder, using the failure of the Luftwaffe as an excuse, had already reported on the 13th

_1. The present situation in the air battle is not conducive to implementing Operation Sealion, as the risks are too great.

2. Failure of the operation would result in a prestigious victory for the British, which would diminish the effects of the air raids.

3. It is vital that Luftwaffe strikes on Britain, particularly on London, continue unabated. These raids should be intensified given good weather and without regard to Sealion. These attacks could be decisive in achieving a final victory.

4. Operation Sealion must not be cancelled. The British must be kept insecure. Cancellation of the landing would take a great deal of pressure off England._

Despite the last point everyone in the Wermacht seems to have understood that Hitler's postponement 'until further notice' actually meant 'for ever' as most knew, particularly in the Kriegsmarine, that no matter what the Luftwaffe did, a cross Channel amphibious operation was beyond the Wermacht's ability. Raeder really wanted the threat of an invasion maintained, but it wasn't to be.

Within a week of Dowding reporting that Fighter Command was 'going downhill fast' the Germans had effectively conceded what they saw as round one. 

To me that adds up to a significant victory for the RAF, but not the victory of the myth propagated in 1940/41 and prevalent ever since.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Apr 22, 2014)

Steve...agreed as long as it isnt against forum rules

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## stona (Apr 23, 2014)

There are many things that could be written about Dowding and the outcome of the Battle of Britain. The inscription on his statue outside the Church of the Royal Air Force, St.Clement Danes, does a pretty good summing up.

_"Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding was Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command, Royal Air Force, from its formation in 1936 until November 1940, he was thus responsible for the preparation for and the conduct of the Battle of Britain. 
With remarkable foresight, he ensured the equipment of his command with monoplane fighters, the Hurricane and the Spitfire, he was among the first to appreciate the vital importance of R.D.F. (radar) and of an effective command and control system for his squadrons. They were ready when war came. 
In the preliminary stages of that war, he thoroughly trained his minimal forces and conserved them against strong political pressures to disperse and misuse them. His wise and prudent judgement and leadership helped to ensure victory against overwhelming odds and thus prevented the loss of the Battle of Britain and probably the whole war. 
To him the people of Britain and of the free world owe largely the way of life and the liberties they enjoy today."_

It is strangely appropriate that the church, designed by Wren and completed in 1682, was gutted during the blitz and restored in 1958 to become the RAF church.

Steve

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## stona (Apr 23, 2014)

I'd just add that thousands of highly trained and dedicated young men and women manned Fighter Command and made it ready to fight the Battle. Dowding was one of only two men, Park being the other, who could have lost it.

Writing after the release of the Battle of Britain film Al Deere (now Air Commodore) also summed up Dowding's plan and the nature of the victory.

_"His plan was simple. To use an analogy, it was based on the premise that as the light weight in the contest he could not expect to knock out his heavier opponent. He could only hope to win either by a technical knock out or on a points decision. To knock out the Luftwaffe was indeed never possible, it had too much in its armoury. A technical knock out was possible but not probable in the expected time available. A points decision seemed, therefore, the most likely solution and this meant staying the distance. In effect this is what Fighter Command achieved." _

The details were worked out by Deere's fellow Kiwi, Park. During the filming of the afore mentioned film, in 1968, at Hawkinge, Dowding sat with the actor Trevor Howard (who portrayed Park) and watched closely as two Spitfires made their landings. He then turned to Howard, saying. _"If it hadn't been for Keith Park's conduct in the battle, and his loyalty to me as his Commander in Chief, we should not be here today."_

One for the album. Lord Dowding and Trevor Howard, Hawkinge 1968.







Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Apr 23, 2014)

stona said:


> I'd just add that thousands of highly trained and dedicated young men and women manned Fighter Command and made it ready to fight the Battle.



Entirely agree...and recognize that the Battle of Britain wasn't just a British victory. It was a victory for all free-thinking people, as evidenced by the highly cosmopolitan make-up of Fighter Commend. Yes, British personnel made up the majority but more than 20% of Fighter Command's pilots came from other nations. Airmen came from the following countries:

Great Britain - 2,342
Australia - 32
Barbados - 1
Belgium - 28
Canada - 112
Czechoslovakia - 88
France - 13
Ireland - 10 
Jamaica - 1
Newfoundland - 1
New Zealand - 127
Poland - 145
Rhodesia - 3
South Africa - 25
United States - 9

I find the number from New Zealand to be particularly significant - the second largest non-Brit contributors (after Poland) and yet such a small country so far away from Europe.


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## gjs238 (Apr 23, 2014)

Only 9 Yanks?


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## stona (Apr 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Only 9 Yanks?



To be fair the US wasn't committed as part of the Commonwealth/Empire and neither had it been invaded and occupied by the Germans.
The Americans had to circumvent their countries neutrality in order to join up. At least one (Fiske, KIA 16th August '40) pretended to be Canadian, a ruse that the British must have seen through, but to which they turned a blind eye in true Nelsonian fashion.
Theoretically at least these Americans risked their citizenship and prosecution, should they return to the USA.
Cheers
Steve


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## buffnut453 (Apr 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Only 9 Yanks?



Yeah but Ben Affleck was one of them and he won the Battle single-handed, so we really didn't need any more!






I'll get me coat!

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## bobbysocks (Apr 23, 2014)

pretty much all of the other countries look like CW or were terrritories of countries that had been invaded. the number of americans may be a little a little off....the 9 could be the americans that went to england to join the raf like gentile and may not take into account the ones who went to canada and flew in the rcaf like claude weaver. but even then i would venture to say the number was very small maybe another half a dozen or so.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 23, 2014)

Weaver isn't listed at all, either under Canada or the US. The listing on the Battle of Britain Monument is, I believe, pretty comprehensive.


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## bobbysocks (Apr 23, 2014)

hmm let me look. my mistake....he enlisted in 41 well after the BoB. i was thinking he jumped in earlier. but he went to canada ( at 17 ) because it was easier to fly with the rcaf than it was in the usaac..it wasnt until late 43 that the us loosened up the requirments for pilots.


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## stona (Apr 23, 2014)

bobbysocks said:


> ..it wasnt until late 43 that the us loosened up the requirments for pilots.



Officially, but by July 1941 the RAF had formed three 'Eagle' squadrons from US volunteers, Nos. 71, 121, and 133. The State Department had quietly dropped the threat of prosecution for US citizens crossing the Atlantic to volunteer.

The first operational Eagle squadron was No. 71, made operational in February 1941, after the Battle of Britain.

Personally I'm bloody glad they came. We needed all the help we could get and these young men took a considerable personal risk just getting here and many gave their lives in a cause that, officially at least, was not yet theirs. They of course didn't see it that way.

Cheers

Steve

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## bobbysocks (Apr 23, 2014)

bobbysocks said:


> ..it wasnt until late 43 that the us loosened up the requirments for pilots.



what i meant by this was up to late 43 you had to have a couple years of college to be eligible to become a cadet. it was a longer more drawn out process. you couldnt jump right from high school into the program. in 43 the us started testing and at that point younger cadets entered into flight training.

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## stona (Apr 23, 2014)

Not specifically the BoB but an interesting response given by General Douglas MacArthur to a request from the chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies on September 16th 1940.

_"You have asked my military opinion as to whether the time has come for America to give continued and further aid to England in the fight for civilization. The history of failure in war can almost be summed up in two words; too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends. Victory in war results from no mysterious alchemy or wizardry but entirely upon the concentration of superior force at the critical points of combat. To face an adversary in detail has been the prayer of every conqueror in history. It is the secret of the past successes of the Axis powers in this war. It is their main hope for continued and ultimate victory. The greatest strategical mistake in history will be made if America fails to recognise the vital moment, if she permits again the writing of that fatal epitaph; too late. Such coordinated help as may be regarded as proper by our leaders should be synchronized with the British effort so that the English speaking peoples of the world will not be broken in detail. The vulnerability of singleness will disappear before unity of effort. Not too late, not tomorrow, but today."_ 

I rarely find myself sympathetic to MacArthur, but there's not much to argue about there.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Apr 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Only 9 Yanks?



The USA was Neutral, it takes a special person to volunteer to fight for a cause which has nothing to do with your own motherland, respect to all of them. The big surprise to me is the French, any French pilot could have escaped via Cherbourg as many Poles Czechs and indeed RAF pilots did.


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## stona (Apr 23, 2014)

pbehn said:


> The big surprise to me is the French,



Someone had to fly for General Jean Romatet and the Armée de l'air de Vichy 

Steve


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## pbehn (Apr 23, 2014)

stona said:


> Someone had to fly for General Jean Romatet and the Armée de l'air de Vichy
> 
> Steve


Joking aside the French air force was huge and some pilots had experience of monoplane fighters, they could have made a huge difference. However I think if your home land surrenders you are in the position of a spy when captured, not that it affected the Poles and Czechs.


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## gjs238 (Apr 23, 2014)

stona said:


> To be fair the US wasn't committed as part of the Commonwealth/Empire and neither had it been invaded and occupied by the Germans.
> The Americans had to circumvent their countries neutrality in order to join up. At least one (Fiske, KIA 16th August '40) pretended to be Canadian, a ruse that the British must have seen through, but to which they turned a blind eye in true Nelsonian fashion.
> Theoretically at least these Americans risked their citizenship and prosecution, should they return to the USA.
> Cheers
> Steve



How was this handled in China with the AVG?


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## gjs238 (Apr 23, 2014)

stona said:


> Officially, but by July 1941 the RAF had formed three 'Eagle' squadrons from US volunteers, Nos. 71, 121, and 133. The State Department had quietly dropped the threat of prosecution for US citizens crossing the Atlantic to volunteer.
> 
> The first operational Eagle squadron was No. 71, made operational in February 1941, after the Battle of Britain.
> 
> ...


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## stona (Apr 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> How was this handled in China with the AVG?



Let Chennault explain.

_"Planes were a tough problem. China had been a long-time, profitable customer for Curtiss-Wright, so my old friend, Burdette Wright, Curtiss Vice-President, came up with a proposition. They had six assembly lines turning out P-40's for the British, who had taken over a French order after the fall of France. If the British would waive their priority on 100 P-40B's then rolling off one line, Curtiss would add a seventh assembly line and make 100 later-model P-40's for the British. The British were glad to exchange the P-40B for a model more suitable for combat.

"The P-40B was not equipped with a gun sight, bomb rack or provisions for attaching auxiliary fuel tanks to the wing or belly. Much of our effort during training and combat was devoted to makeshift attempts to remedy these deficiencies. The combat record of the First American Volunteer Group in China is even more remarkable because its pilots were aiming their guns through a crude, homemade, ring-and-post gun sight instead of the more accurate optical sights used by the Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

"Personnel proved a tougher nut to crack. The military were violently opposed to the whole idea of American volunteers in China. Lauchlin Currie and I went to see General Arnold in April of 1941. He was 100% opposed to the project.

"In the Navy, Rear Admiral Jack Towers, then Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and later Commander of the Navy's Pacific Air Forces also viewed the A.V.G. as a threat to his expansion program. . .

". . . It took direct personal intervention from President Roosevelt to pry the pilots and ground crews from the Army and Navy. On April 15, 1941, an unpublished executive order went out under his signature, authorizing reserve officer and enlisted men to resign from the Army Air Corps, Naval and Marine air services for the purpose of joining the American Volunteer Group in China.

"Orders went out to all military air fields, signed by Secretary Knox and General Arnold, authorizing bearers of certain letters freedom of the post, including permission to talk with all personnel . . .

SALARIES OUTLINED

" . . . Their offer was a one-year contract with CAMCO (Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company) to 'manufacture, repair and operate aircraft at salaries ranging from $250 to $750 a month. Traveling expenses, 30 days leave with pay, quarters, and $30 additional for rations were specified. They would be subject to summary dismissal by written notice for insubordination, habitual use of drugs or alcohol, illness not incurred in line of duty, malingering, and revealing confidential information. Before the end of the A.V.G., I had to dismiss at least one man for every cause except revealing confidential information. A system of fines was initiated for minor offences.

"There was not mention in the contract of a $500-bonus for every Japanese plane destroyed. Volunteers were told simply that there was a rumor that the Chinese government would pay $500 for each confirmed Jap plane. They could take the rumor for what it was worth. It turned out to be worth exactly $500 per plane. Although initially the five-hundred-dollar-bonus was paid for confirmed planes destroyed in air combat only, the bonus was soon applied to planes destroyed on the ground - if they could be confirmed."_

The first contingent of pilots of the American Volunteer Group left San Francisco on July 10, 1941, aboard the Dutch ship Jaegersfontaine. Just before leaving, Chennault received confirmation of Presidential approval for the second American Volunteer Group of bombers with a schedule of 100 pilots and 181 gunners and radio men to arrive in China by November, 1941, and an equal number to follow in January, 1942.

Steve


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## stona (Apr 23, 2014)

Double post ):


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## bobbysocks (Apr 23, 2014)

stona said:


> Not specifically the BoB but an interesting response given by General Douglas MacArthur to a request from the chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies on September 16th 1940.
> 
> _"You have asked my military opinion as to whether the time has come for America to give continued and further aid to England in the fight for civilization. The history of failure in war can almost be summed up in two words; too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends. Victory in war results from no mysterious alchemy or wizardry but entirely upon the concentration of superior force at the critical points of combat. To face an adversary in detail has been the prayer of every conqueror in history. It is the secret of the past successes of the Axis powers in this war. It is their main hope for continued and ultimate victory. The greatest strategical mistake in history will be made if America fails to recognise the vital moment, if she permits again the writing of that fatal epitaph; too late. Such coordinated help as may be regarded as proper by our leaders should be synchronized with the British effort so that the English speaking peoples of the world will not be broken in detail. The vulnerability of singleness will disappear before unity of effort. Not too late, not tomorrow, but today."_
> 
> ...



i am not a huge mac fan either but i do like that quote....i think as true today as it was then. thanks for the posting it. its one i will keep...


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## pbehn (Apr 23, 2014)

bobbysocks said:


> i am not a huge mac fan either but i do like that quote....i think as true today as it was then. thanks for the posting it. its one i will keep...



The timing of that quote is proof positive of the significance of the BoB, he would never have said that the day after Dunkerque.


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## parsifal (Apr 23, 2014)

I dont know about that. Mac had a grasp of history that few in the US military have ever displayed. He knew, from a very early point, what was at stake, and what was needed to be done. Mac, after all was a driving force in the introduction of the Garand, and this says volumes about his grasp of military necessities.


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## GrauGeist (Apr 23, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Entirely agree...and recognize that the Battle of Britain wasn't just a British victory. It was a victory for all free-thinking people, as evidenced by the highly cosmopolitan make-up of Fighter Commend. Yes, British personnel made up the majority but more than 20% of Fighter Command's pilots came from other nations. Airmen came from the following countries:
> 
> Great Britain - 2,342
> Australia - 32
> ...



Curious as to why there aren't Dutch pilots listed there. There were several that escaped after Germany overran the Netherlands.


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## Koopernic (Apr 23, 2014)

The biggest "mistake" the Luftwaffe made was not building a Luftwaffe designed to attack and defeat Britain. The Luftwaffe was built for entirely different purposes, more important to German survival in event of simultaneous conflict with France and or Poland, something it did very well. The RAF on the other hand was built, almost specifically, to defeat an air attack against Britain from its very inception. So its a little misleading to speak of German strategy and tactics being flawed because the underlying hardware and organization just wasn't there. German strategy was improvised after the defeat of France and a matter of weeks. RAF strategy goes back years, at least to when Dowding had built the worlds first radar equipped integrated air defense system and probably to WW1. Luftwaffe was preoccupied and certainly not getting directives to prepare for war with Britain.

For instance if the Luftwaffe had of prepared for war with Britain it surely would have ensured its entire force of Me 109E had drop tanks. Such tanks were familiar to the Luftwaffe when they were used on the Heinkel He 51B over Spain during the intervention in the civil war. This 50 gallon fuel tank was jetisonable and some were fused to create a sort of napalm bomb.

As it was the first drop tank capable Me 109 was the Me 109E-7/N which entered service at the end of the BoB and a tiny handfull of numbers. Earlier 109's seemed to be only capable of carrying a non jetisonable ferry tank.

With drop tanks the Me 109 can escort German bombers over a much greater portion of the British Isles, moreover they can spend an additional 60 minutes at full military power over Britain. Me 109E fuel storage is slightly over 400L, the 66 gallon drop tank is 300L and fuel consumption of a DB601A at full power (1100 metric hp) is 300L/hour. Cruise consumption at 240mph is about 125L/hour.

However even this is inadequate since Britain can simply utilize ports and factories out of the range of the Luftwaffe fighters.

You will note that the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) didn't have an specialized amphibious landing craft delivered till end of 1941. 
Landing Crafts so it was even less ready.

The scenario of the Luftwaffe attriting the RAF into numerical collapse and then defeating the massive Royal Navy seems remote.

To me it's surprising that the Luftwaffe had any chance at all in the period that is called the "Battle of Britain". It didn't have the right kit.


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## parsifal (Apr 24, 2014)

> The biggest "mistake" the Luftwaffe made was not building a Luftwaffe designed to attack and defeat Britain. The Luftwaffe was built for entirely different purposes, more important to German survival in event of simultaneous conflict with France and or Poland, something it did very well. The RAF on the other hand was built, almost specifically, to defeat an air attack against Britain from its very inception. So its a little misleading to speak of German strategy and tactics being flawed because the underlying hardware and organization just wasn't there. German strategy was improvised after the defeat of France and a matter of weeks. RAF strategy goes back years, at least to when Dowding had built the worlds first radar equipped integrated air defense system and probably to WW1. Luftwaffe was preoccupied and certainly not getting directives to prepare for war with Britain.



I agree that the Luftwaffe was built for a different purpose and that its TO and E, as well as the general doctrine and tactics that it used were not at all suited to a prolonged strategic campaign. The LW was a tactical weapon, designed primarily to gain and hold air superiority over a battlefield, provide direct support to its armies, and dislocate communitcations and transport networks that supported that enemey battleline. 


I do not agree that the LW was designed at any stage to be a defensive weapon, in response to perceived or real threats from either the Poles or the French. It was designed from an early point tp be an offensive, attacking weapon. The Germans did view Poland and france with some trepidation, but from a very early point the idea of the LW wasto destroy the war making potential of these frontier enemies by offensive action.

It is not misleading to speak of german strategty and tactics. What is valid, is that it was not very good strategy, and the germans changed their stratgy several times. And, they were at a loss as to how or what tactics they needed in order to achieve victory. this was most apparent in their muddled and sometimes contradictory targetting choices. Facts are, the germans permeated their strategy against the British several times during the camapign. At the begining, the basic strategy was to gain air superiority over South eastern England. This very nearly worked, but then there was a change in strategy, still consistent with earlier existing strategies applied by the LW at various times, but not in the case of England at the beginning, because it was felt to be counterproductive. 



> For instance if the Luftwaffe had of prepared for war with Britain it surely would have ensured its entire force of Me 109E had drop tanks. Such tanks were familiar to the Luftwaffe when they were used on the Heinkel He 51B over Spain during the intervention in the civil war. This 50 gallon fuel tank was jetisonable and some were fused to create a sort of napalm bomb.
> 
> As it was the first drop tank capable Me 109 was the Me 109E-7/N which entered service at the end of the BoB and a tiny handfull of numbers. Earlier 109's seemed to be only capable of carrying a non jetisonable ferry tank.
> 
> ...



There were problems for the germans in their development of Drop tanks, moreover, as far as im aware, nobody possessed proper drop tanks in 1940. but i agree, that the germans did not undertake a detailed assessment of needs for an attack on Britain. they did, however uindertake a number of sandtable excercises to ascertain how best to defeat the RAF. these were undertaken in 1939, as I recall. it seems pretty cleqar that the RAFs radar detection methods and C&C capabilities were not understood very well, but that is not to say they didnt think about the issue, it says more that they failed to appraise the issue properly. 



> The scenario of the Luftwaffe attriting the RAF into numerical collapse and then defeating the massive Royal Navy seems remote. To me it's surprising that the Luftwaffe had any chance at all in the period that is called the "Battle of Britain". It didn't have the right kit



Thats a very big call, and there are a LOT of people who will not agree with you. The second part about the RN is entirely true, but Ive chosen to read the first bit. It was entirely possible for the LW, with only minor changes here and there, to win some kind of tactical victory. The LW was thwarted in this respect by a number of own goals, and also some very capable leadership decision made by the British. not only Park or Dowding.....things like the appointment of Beaverbrook, Churchills refusal to divert fighters to France and the like should also be taken into account. it turned out to be a British victory, but only by the slimmest of margins


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## stona (Apr 24, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Curious as to why there aren't Dutch pilots listed there. There were several that escaped after Germany overran the Netherlands.



It's probably a matter of timing, or where they were posted. Many Dutch airmen served with distinction and several Dutch squadrons were eventually established.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Apr 24, 2014)

The first Bf 109 found by the British, equipped with a drop tank was 'White 11', W.Nr. 4900, the Bf 109E-1 flown by Fw.H.Schmidt of 6./JG 53 which force landed at Wheelstead Farm, Old Romney on 30th November 1940.

Reference to this can be found in CEAR Serial No.33 of 2nd December 1940 which states: 

_'One bomb rack for 250kg bomb and usual release gear fitted. This aircraft is fitted with additional petrol tankage and also an extra 9 litre oil tank. There is a notice in the cockpit to this effect and instructions to pump over petrol after one and a half hours flying. This inscription is hanging on an oil **** and may refer to oil. The situation and capacity of the extra fuel tank is not clear and the aircraft will be further examined after lifting.' _

A subsequent report on this aircraft appears in CEAR Serial No.33 No.3/179 of 20 December 1940 which states: 

_'Crashed on 30.11.40 at Old Romney. This aircraft was fitted with extra oil tank of two gallons capacity and pipe lines for extra fuel tankage. The aircraft has now been examined but no extra fuel tank was found. The fuel line however, runs down to the bottom of the fuselage near the external bomb rack and it is assumed that a jettisonable auxiliary tank had been carried. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that a metal, streamlined petrol tank was found in the country which could be slung to the bomb rack of a Me 109. The capacity of this tank is approximately 90 gallons (the tank is damaged and the capacity cannot be definitely ascertained). This would give an extra range to the aircraft of about 450 miles at normal cruising speed, or rather more than double the usual range. A further report will be issued if and when a tank is found in situ.' _

It seems that the first operational drop tanks were being fitted in the period just after the official BoB. Dave Wadman, from whom the above reports came, also has a report, possibly describing similar installation, dating from the end of October.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Apr 24, 2014)

Double post....again ):


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## Shortround6 (Apr 24, 2014)

A couple of points here as we seem to looking at the Luftwaffe capabilities with the aid of our infamous "retrospectroscope".

1. In 1939/40 what nation/s had long range escort fighters in service/production or even prototype form _aside_ from twin engine machines? 
2. What Nation had *more* _long range_ bombers *in service* than Germany in 1939/40?
Long range being relative, what was long range in 1939 was NOT long range in 1942/42. He 111s could hit a good part of England from bases in Germany and could hit Northern Ireland once bases in the low countries and France were obtained. How much more range was _needed_ for strategic purposes in 1939/40? 1941 starts to change things. 
3. What nation *didn't* believe that the bomber "_would always get through"_ *without escorts*in 1939?

To fault German thinking or planning in 1938-39-40 (first 1/2) when just about _every_ other nation thought the same way seems to be using the "retrospectroscope".

Exceptions can be found, like American bombers, but then the Americans were faced, in peace time, with buying a few really long range bombers or lots and lots of shorter range bombers to cover the same area. It is 2565 miles from San Francisco to New York (or almost 1200 miles from Miami to Panama) and only 1737 miles from Dublin to Moscow. American requirements for simply deploying aircraft were far different than European nations.

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## gjs238 (Apr 24, 2014)

.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 24, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> we seem to looking at the Luftwaffe capabilities with the aid of our infamous "retrospectroscope"



I'm pretty sure a doctor once used one of those retrospectroscopes on me...and jolly uncomfortable it was too!


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## GrauGeist (Apr 24, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> 1. In 1939/40 what nation/s had long range escort fighters in service/production or even prototype form aside from twin engine machines? *Japan*
> 2. What Nation had more long range bombers in service than Germany in 1939/40? *Japan*


Sorry, I had to...


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## stona (Apr 24, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> A couple of points here as we seem to looking at the Luftwaffe capabilities with the aid of our infamous "retrospectroscope".
> 
> 1. In 1939/40 what nation/s had long range escort fighters in service/production or even prototype form _aside_ from twin engine machines?



A fair point, but the failure of the British to develop one can be laid firmly at Portal's door and is one of the gravest strategic shortcomings chargeable to him and the Air Staff. 

It led in 1941 with Fighter Command being squandered in France when, with a suitable fighter it should have been escorting Bomber Command, in force, to make meaningful attacks on German airfields in France and Belgium from where the Luftwaffe was launching the night time blitz. It was the only realistic way the night time bombing could have been countered, given the state of AI radar and night fighters, and it should have been the number one priority of Fighter Command. AI technology needed time to develop, a long range fighter was demonstrably possible.

It led to an inability of the RAF to support the Americans as late as 'Pointblank' and led to a fairly acrimonious dispute between Arnold and Portal. Arnold "found the spectacle of a fighter force which Portal stated to consist of 1,461 with crews remaining inactive whilst his bombers were shot out of the sky both incomprehensible and unacceptable."

Whilst all these fighters and support sat idly in Britain or were being misused on operations making pin pricks in NW France and Belgium there was no air defence worth talking about in India and the Far East. In the Middle East and North Africa Bf 109 Fs were being confronted by Hurricanes (at best).

The offensive fighter proved in the hands of the Americans to be one of the major strategic weapons of the war. It determined the outcome of not just purely aerial battles. No one at the Air Ministry understood this, certainly not the baleful trio of Portal, Douglas and Leigh Mallory.

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Apr 24, 2014)

This is true to some extent but in the technical climate of 1937-39 in England the escort fighter was a technical impossibility. What those men failed to realize was the impossibility faded in 1940 and then trailed away/vanished with almost every month. 

A Spitfire or Hurricane saddled with a fixed pitch propeller and operating from 1938/39 airfields/aerodromes had little capacity for external fuel tanks. The fitting of the two pitch propeller shortened the take-off run from 420 yds to 320 yds on the Spitfire and the constant speed prop helped even more despite the gains in weight. Hurricanes showed similar improvement. The British were behind the Americans and Germans in the adoption of two pitch and constant speed propellers and in 1939 the bombers got first "pick". 

For the Spitfire take-off power went from 880hp with a Merlin III ( and even a fair portion of that could not be used with the fixed pitch prop) to 1175hp on a Merlin XII with a constant speed prop but only a small attempt was made to increase the fuel capacity. 
The Hurricane II with the Merlin XX went to 1280hp but again, little effort was spent on drop tanks until well after the planes went into service. In under 3 years the take-off power due to slightly better engines, better props and and better fuel had improved by 33-50% for the Merlin engine with little increase in engine weight. 
Improved (larger?) airfields and the throwing out of the 35lb per sq in tire inflation rule opened up the possibility of much increased take-off weights which as you say, were not taken advantage of, either with new airplanes or with extensive modifications of the old ones.


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## stona (Apr 24, 2014)

I agree that it was an impossibility in 1939-7 but it wasn't an impossibility in 1940-1. Cotton had got an admittedly highly modified PR Spitfire up to 2,000 mile range in February 1941. I'm not suggesting that this was a viable fighter but the principle was established. I believe the Americans had also built a long range version of the Spitfire but my memory is not clear of when or how. Interesting that Portal was a prime mover in Cotton's 'removal'.

None of the three I mentioned had any grasp of fighter tactics or fighter potential, they were all essentially pre-war 'bomber boys'. Leigh Mallory demonstrated consistently through out the BoB that he did not understand how Fighter Command's system worked at all. After the BoB they had a fighter arm that kept growing but had no clear idea what to do with it. They lamely continued the useless and wasteful operations over France simply because they did not have the imagination or leadership to envision any other use for their fighters.

I'm not sure whether Dowding (a personal hero) would have done much better, but he couldn't have done worse. The men and women who disposed of him (Sholto Douglas, Trenchard, Portal, Sinclair, Freeman, Salmond and Irene Ward MP (who had no idea what she was involved in) along with certain other serving officers, Bader, MacDonald, Kingston-McCloughry and of course Leigh Mallory made sure we'll never know.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Apr 24, 2014)

stona said:


> I agree that it was an impossibility in 1939-7 but it wasn't an impossibility in 1940-1. Cotton had got an admittedly highly modified PR Spitfire up to 2,000 mile range in February 1941. I'm not suggesting that this was a viable fighter but the principle was established. I believe the Americans had also built a long range version of the Spitfire but my memory is not clear of when or how. Interesting that Portal was a prime mover in Cotton's 'removal'.
> 
> None of the three I mentioned had any grasp of fighter tactics or fighter potential, they were all essentially pre-war 'bomber boys'. Leigh Mallory demonstrated consistently through out the BoB that he did not understand how Fighter Command's system worked at all. After the BoB they had a fighter arm that kept growing but had no clear idea what to do with it. They lamely continued the useless and wasteful operations over France simply because they did not have the imagination or leadership to envision any other use for their fighters.
> 
> ...



The problem with discussing a British escort fighter is it leads to a discussion of which bombers it world escort, much as I like the Lancaster as an aeroplane as an escorted daylight bomber it would be mince.


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## parsifal (Apr 24, 2014)

> It led in 1941 with Fighter Command being squandered in France when, with a suitable fighter it should have been escorting Bomber Command, in force, to make meaningful attacks on German airfields in France and Belgium from where the Luftwaffe was launching the night time blitz



Again, you make the same unsubstantiated claims as just a short while ago, and again, i am compelled to correct your error. 

Up to May 1941, when the blitz ended, LW losses were considerably higher than those suffered by the RAF. Thats within the period from January to May 1941. before that, i make no comment. My source for that is Foremans daily loss reports for both sides. 

After May, the LW pulled out of western Europe except for two fighter groups, and one bomber group (and not including the roughly 160-250 fighters left in Ersatz formations in Germany itself) . Western Europe was later reinforced by a further fighter and one LR Anti shipping unit to augment the VLR Gruppen already deployed.

In the period July to November, losses in air combat were heavily in favour of the Germans, however overall airframe losses were actually fairly similar. The numbers of aircraft damaged and then written off in these groups is astounding.

Moreover, whilst FC losses were undeniably heavy, and many of the operations ill advised and an over-extension of RAF capabilities (for exactly the reasons you suggest....a lack of long range fighter aircraft), these operations were absolutely essential, and absolutely successful....eventually. The British, in order to move to a truly offensive stance, had first to lay some essential ground work over Britain, its waterways, and coastal regions, and also establish dominance over the French and Belgian coastlines and in the channel itself. It took a while, not fully achieved in 1941, but it was eventually successful, and critically accounted for the lions share of LW losses at that time, and gave them no real rest at a time that it needed that above anything. Throughout 1941, the LR group continued to attempt mining operations mostly off the western coastline of england, with a steadily declining level of success. I did some really detailed research into this about 3 years ago, looking at the day by day records from various sources. in 1940 through to the first half of 1941, about 1 million tons of shipping were lost to mines in the coastal waters around the British isles. In the latter half of 1941, through to the middle of 1942, this tonnage , despite a much increased temp of operations by the LW in this field (it was intended this would be the LWs main offensive weapon against Britain after the redeployment East) losses plummeted in that period to under 250000 tons. Thanks to the efforts of the KMs S-Bootes, this collapse was partially offset by a further loss of about 250000 to these small craft, but that was not FCs issue, and eventually these small boats were also mastered and pushed back. 

youve made much about alleged losses on the east Front at this time. Yes, but they were recoverable losses. Unserviceable aircraft awaiting repair is not the same as an aircraft either shot down outright, or recovered, damaged, and then written off. Whilst i dont have monthly figures on the LW (East) recovery rate, we do know that this TO was down to less than a 1000 aircraft in December, but by June'42 had staged a fairly remarkable recovery as their logistics recovered. Hayward and Hardesty give a pretty good overview of this recovery. In the West, most losses were permanent, and therein lies the difference, and why the RAF was accounting for well over 50% (some sources claim 70%) of overall German losses. 

Be prepared to back up your claims on this issue. I for one dont agree with your position on this issue.


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## stona (Apr 25, 2014)

Losses in the East were always higher than in the East. The idea that many of these were somehow recoverable shows a lack of understanding of the Luftwaffe system. The operational side of the Luftwaffe (all units subsidiary to a Fliegerkorps) simply raped lightly damaged aircraft for parts. They did not have the spare parts that they should have had, but more seriously nor did the administrative arm ( a 'Werft' was subsidiary to a Luftgau) whose job it was to repair anything but the light damage, including replacing functional parts, engine changes etc. In fact this infra structure barely existed in a working sense in the East. Aircraft more severely damaged had to leave the Luftwaffe and return to 'industry', that is the manufacturers or specialised repair and salvage companies. This usually meant a return to Germany by train and seems rarely to have been possible from the Eastern Front.

The idea that the RAF, operating to about as far as Lille, was seriously attriting the Luftwaffe in 1941 I'm afraid I don't buy.

I have an account of one of Mallory's conferences, held at Northolt, attended by both fighter and bomber leaders. Johnnie Kent (commanding officer of No. 303 (Polish) squadron, who surely needs no introduction) said that using bombers in such small numbers had no effect on enemy industry and wondered what the objective was. He continued.

"_If the bombers are merely there as bait to bring up the fighters so that they could be destroyed then we should restrict our radius of activity to that which would permit us to fight without the nagging fear of running out of fuel. This mental obstacle seriously interferes with the pilots' fighting spirit and it is my opinion that we have already lost far too many first class men because these factors are not receiving sufficient attention."_

Mallory looked taken aback at this criticism (according to Kent) and turned to his Group Operations Officer to reply. This was Group Captain Victor Beamish, an accomplished and experienced fighter leader in his own right. To Mallory's bewilderment Beamish agreed with Kent. Mallory turned to another staff officer, one without operational experience, who gave the reply he wanted. Mallory's eventual reply was "_My answer to Kent is - we've done it!"_

There ensued a bit of a row after which Kent remembers that 

_"The AOC preferred the second opinion and we continued to go to Lille and lose good men, all to little purpose. *Worse even than the fact that these operations were virtually useless from a military point of view was the fact that they dominated all thinking about fighters." *_

My emphasis. A very perceptive comment by Kent, illustrating precisely my point about the lack of vision and imagination displayed by Mallory (et alter) in the leading of Fighter Command.

In 1944 Jonnie Johnson wrote an appreciation of Leigh-Mallory following his death in a flying accident.

_"Leigh-Mallory was very much a fatherly figure and at his best when he led conferences with his young wing leaders, because *he did not pretend to know about fighter tactics *and relied on us to keep him up to date."_

This of a man who had been in Fighter Command since 1937. Johnson may have intended a compliment but it beggars belief.

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2014)

> In 1944 Jonnie Johnson wrote an appreciation of Leigh-Mallory following his death in a flying accident.



Good information, Steve. Mallory's pigheadedness got him and his family killed when he insisted that his pilot take off in the Avro York taking him to India, and make its way over the Alps in bad weather, despite the pilot raising his objections to the conditions. Mallory's brother George's body still lies on the side of Mt Everest. Interesting that both were killed high up the sides of mountains.


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## stona (Apr 25, 2014)

stona said:


> The idea that the RAF, operating to about as far as Lille, was seriously attriting the Luftwaffe in 1941 I'm afraid I don't buy.



Or 1942 for that matter. In August 1942, after nearly two years of such operations by the RAF and with all the other commitments that the Luftwaffe had in other theatres, there were still three full strength fighter Geschwaders covering the Channel and North Sea coasts. They were thinly spread not because the RAF had reduced them in any way, they comprised 442 fighters, mostly Fw 190s, but precisely because the Luftwaffe had so many other commitments and, for reasons discussed elsewhere, the total fighter establishment in late 1942 was similar to that in 1940.

When the Americans started their tentative raids on the European mainland in August 1942 they discovered just how little effect the RAF had had on Luftwaffe capabilities over the previous two years and were quite happy to say so.
The 9th October raid on Lille was the first time the 8th AF sortied more than 100 bombers. No less than 36 squadrons of allied fighters undertook various feints and sweeps. None of this prevented III./JG 26 intercepting the bombers and claiming six. Priller would later say that he never saw an allied fighter that day! Lt. Otto Stammberger's (III./JG 26) combat report at least mentions con trails from allied fighters, but they did not intervene in his attacks and he shot down a B-17 (Capt. Olson, 306th B.G.)

In 1941 there were only two regular Groups assigned, by Luftflotte 3, to the daylight defence of the area which the RAF could reach, I./JG 3 and I./JG 3. How exactly the RAF was going to grind down the entire Jagdwaffe when opposed by these two Gruppen I don't know. Put this in perspective. There were, by December 1941, six regular night fighter Gruppen in the same area under Luftflotte 3. 

The RAF became increasingly desperate. The 12th August raid on two power stations near Cologne by 54 Blenheims was a vain attempt to persuade the Luftwaffe to recall fighter units from the hard pressed Eastern Front. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Koopernic (Apr 25, 2014)

stona said:


> The first Bf 109 found by the British, equipped with a drop tank was 'White 11', W.Nr. 4900, the Bf 109E-1 flown by Fw.H.Schmidt of 6./JG 53 which force landed at Wheelstead Farm, Old Romney on 30th November 1940.
> 
> Reference to this can be found in CEAR Serial No.33 of 2nd December 1940 which states:
> 
> ...



The Bf 109 variant that was entering service at the start of the Battle of Britain was the Bf 109E4. The E1,E2,E3 were already supersceded, they had inferior 20mm guns and often lacked a full fit-out of pilot armour. The first version of the Me 109 that had the ability to carry a jetisonable fuel tank was the Me 109E7 more specifically the Me 109E7/N which started coming of the production lines in August 1940 about one month before the Battle of Britain was over. However a certain number of Me 109E1 had been produced as Me 109E1/B to carry up to 250kg bomb however these aircraft were not plumbed for external fuel tanks nor did they have the enlarged oil capacity that would be needed to exploit the extra range from carrying extra fuel. Standard Me 109E1 nor any subsequent variant of the Me 109E2,E3 or E4 could carry bombs or fuel tanks. If the RAF recovered a Me 109E1 plumbed for a jetisonable fuel tank then it is almost certainly an Me 109E1/B which likely had been damaged and during rework in the factory was upgraded to near as possible Me 109E7 standard since it already had the strengthening needed to carry a bomb rack.


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## stona (Apr 25, 2014)

It is possible that the aircraft recovered had been upgraded, many E-7s were upgrades from earlier versions. The British CEAR would have taken the designation from one of the aircraft's data plates (standard procedure) and these were not always altered to reflect an upgrade and the upgraded aircraft retained their original werknummern.

There is no IF about the recovery of the aircraft and separate fuel tank and the identity of the aircraft is clear.

You are correct that the first version of the Bf 109 factory equipped with the plumbing to carry an auxiliary fuel tank was the E-7, but that doesn't mean that other options were not trialled before the system went into production. The relevant plumbing was part of the E-7 standard. An E-7/N had a DB 601 N engine fitted and the N designation has nothing to do with the rest of the aircraft's production standard.

The E-7 standard included the drop tank plumbing and bomb release mechanism wiring as standard in order to enable easy field conversion from fighter bomber to extended range fighter and vice-versa.

You are not quite correct about the fitting of bomb racks. A Bf 109 E-1,3 or 4/B could be fitted with either the ETC 500/IXb or ETC 50/VIIId rack. The relevant wiring etc was not, however, standard. 

Cheers

Steve

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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2014)

The attrition suffered by Germany on all fronts prevented the LW from 1940 on from ever being able to recover, or expand at anything like the rate of her opponents. Germany entered the war in 1939, with 2916 front line combat aircraft. By December 1940, despite having added 3350 into the LW, the LW a/c strength stood at 2885. Between January and June 1941, the LW grew to 3451 front line a/c, having received an additional 1800 a/c in that period (approximately....overall acceptances in 1941 was 3746). From July to December 1941, the LW shrank to 2961, despite having received another 1800 aircraft. from January to June 1942, the LW recovered, and expanded back to 3573 aircraft, having accepted 2500 a/c. From July to December 1942, the LW shrank slightly to 3440 a/c after receiving over 3000 a/c in that period 

From 1939 through to the end of 1940 the RAF had received 4283 aircraft, with the RAF growing from a front line strength of 1660 a/c to 2900. In the period January to June 1941, the RAF grew to 3106 a/c, and in that same period received about 3500 a/c.From July to December 1941, the RAF received 3564 ac, and the force grew to 4287 a/c. From January 1942 to June 1942, the RAF grew to 5500 a/c, having received some 4200 a/c. From July 1942 through to December, the RAF grew to 6430 front line aircraft, having received a further 3900 a/c 

One method of determining losses is to add starting total plus aircraft received, and then subtract the final aircraft on strength. For the LW this reveals the following losses in the specified periods

For germany, losses in those periods were as follows:

1939 to end of 1940: 3381
Jan to June 1941 1234
July to Dec 1941 2290
Jan to June 1942 1888
July to Dec 1942 3133


For Britain the overall losses suffered in those same periods were about

1939 to end of 1940: 3043, of which 689 were BC losses
Jan to June 1941 3294, of which 555 were BC losses
July to Dec 1941 2383, of which 828 were BC losses
Jan to June 1942 2988, of which 960 were BC losses 
July to Dec 1942 2970, of which 842 were BC losses 

Losses in the period July to December 1941 for the LW were just over 1400 outside the EF, dropped slightly in the first half of 1942. I havent done the detailed breakdaown for the last half of 1942, but it seems to trend about the same, except at the very end of the year. 

Seems very clear to me. Without the sacrifices made by the RAF made January 1941 through to December 1942, the LW would have been in a far better position than it was to prosecute its war against the Russians,and further, would have enjoyed a substantial period of growth. LW losses were replaced, but LW expansion was curtailed by RAF operations. Mor3eover, the break even point, excluding the wastage that was occurring within BC appears to have been achieved from about June 1942. in that month in western Europe, the RAF lost 68 aircraft (not including BC) and a further 148 damaged, compared to 89 LW aircraft (including all types) and 105 damaged. I dont see much changing or trending away from that after that month.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 25, 2014)

Despite (because?) some disagreements between the knowledgeable people, this thread is well worth reading.


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## stona (Apr 25, 2014)

Luftwaffe expansion wasn't curtailed by RAF operations, it was curtailed by bad planning. Yes, there were of course Luftwaffe losses in NW Europe, but these were not the critical losses, not least because so few fighters (and we are talking fighter losses) were actually based there. 

You have 3,381 aircraft lost in 1939/40. I can tell you that between May 1940 and December 1940 the Luftwaffe lost 1,528 bombers, roughly half the total and about 1,000 single engine fighters (I have two numbers either side of that figure).

In 1941 (excluding November for which the records are lost) in all theatres, the Luftwaffe lost 5,002 aircraft of which only 1,327 were single engine fighters.

The Jagdwaffe had roughly three times as many aircraft in the East than the West and was suffering a monthly loss rate of 36.3% for single engine fighters in the East. This is where it began to be dismantled prior to the American intervention which came later, not by losses incurred by two (or three) Gruppen based in NW Europe.

The Luftwaffe was still continuing other operations against the UK. The first blitz is usually dated by the British from September 1940 to December 1941 followed by the two series of 'Baedecker' raids from April to June 1942. By 1943 the few under strength Kamfgruppen left on the Western Front had become less relevant, though still capable of mounting some strategic raids. This had nothing to do with the RAF and everything to do with commitments elsewhere.

The RAF operations of this period had no effect whatsoever on the German ability to continue its night time blitz. They had virtually no effect on Germany's industrial capability and had minimal effect on the Jagdwaffe's ability to oppose the day time USAAF raids as the gathered pace into 1943.

So worried were the Germans by this series of pin pricks inflicted by Fighter Command under Leigh-Mallory, that they based a mere two fighter Gruppen between the French Channel coast and Denmark!

The limit of Fighter Command's range was roughly Lille and even there we know that the pilots were fretting about running out of fuel. Anyone not familiar with the geography of NW Europe should look at a map to see for what a large number of RAF fighter pilots were sacrificed. Mallory's 'leaning forward' barely crossed the Channel.







Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Apr 25, 2014)

stona said:


> ...In 1941 there were only two regular Groups assigned, by Luftflotte 3, to the daylight defence of the area which the RAF could reach, I./JG 3 and I./JG 3. How exactly the RAF was going to grind down the entire Jagdwaffe when opposed by these two Gruppen I don't know. Put this in perspective. There were, by December 1941, six regular night fighter Gruppen in the same area under Luftflotte 3. ...



Hello Steve, difficult to say what you mean, I./JG 3 participated the Op. Barbarossa and then spent the autumn at Magdeburg and arrived to West (in Holland) only on 13 Dec 41, but Stab, II. and III./JG 2 and the whole JG 26, i.e. 5 Gruppen were stationed in the areas that could be reached by FC single engine fighters and one of the Gruppe of JG 2 was stationed at Brest to cover Western Bretagne from possible daytime raids by the BC and the CC.

And generally, don't forget MTO, it was at times important drain of LW resources.

Juha


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## pbehn (Apr 25, 2014)

stona said:


> The limit of Fighter Command's range was roughly Lille and even there we know that the pilots were fretting about running out of fuel. Anyone not familiar with the geography of NW Europe should look at a map to see for what a large number of RAF fighter pilots were sacrificed. Mallory's 'leaning forward' barely crossed the Channel.
> 
> 
> Cheers
> ...



Lille is the first place I ever went to in France almost exactly the same distance from Calais as London is from Dover. The RAF learned very little from the BoB about offense.


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## wiking85 (Apr 25, 2014)

Out of curiosity, had the LW not conducted the Battle of Britain, would the RAF had started these cross Channel raids in 1940? I know historically they did some bombing at night and by day, especially the costly Blenheim raids in 1940, but these were relatively minor; had they not been on the defensive, was the plan to take the fight to German targets by day within fighter range?


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2014)

> Luftwaffe expansion wasn't curtailed by RAF operations, it was curtailed by bad planning. Yes, there were of course Luftwaffe losses in NW Europe, but these were not the critical losses, not least because so few fighters (and we are talking fighter losses) were actually based there.




Bad planning, yes, but if the losses werent being suffered, it wouldnt really have mattered how many or how few their losses were. Overwhelmingly LW losses artose from two causes, a low replacement rate, brought about by poor planning, and over use, which elevated loss rates to levels that, whilst not exactly unsustainable, did mean the LW got no resy, and could not expand when they absolutely needed to 



> You have 3,381 aircraft lost in 1939/40. I can tell you that between May 1940 and December 1940 the Luftwaffe lost 1,528 bombers, roughly half the total and about 1,000 single engine fighters (I have two numbers either side of that figure).



so long as we have basic agreement on numbers, im happy 




> In 1941 (excluding November for which the records are lost) in all theatres, the Luftwaffe lost 5,002 aircraft of which only 1,327 were single engine fighters.



This may be a number appearing in the Quartermasters returns, but its a number that cannot be correct, and i highly suspect, as Ive said several times now, that it includes aircraft decommissioned (and listed as a lost) rebuilt and r4eturned. in my book, that is not a loss. If the LW had lost 5000 aircraft in 1941, and none returned, it would not have had any aircraft available or on strength for 1942. It kind of did get to that point, but not as outright losses. In th3e east this is evidenced by its rather rapid recovery after the winter losses in the east.

This suggests that in the east, the attition rate was very heavy (and from that standpoint your claim that most losses came from the eastern front is very valid, however, these losses were recoverable, as hayward clearly outlines. In terms of outright losses , losses were relatively modest on the Eastern Front at this time, as Groehler also clearly shows. 



> The Jagdwaffe had roughly three times as many aircraft in the East than the West and was suffering a monthly loss rate of 36.3% for single engine fighters in the East. This is where it began to be dismantled prior to the American intervention which came later, not by losses incurred by two (or three) Gruppen based in NW Europe.



i would argue that the Fighter arm was not dismantled by anyone, least of all by the Russians, until after 1942. However, its strength returns were kept in check by those losses. On the eastern front most of those 36% losses were being recycled back to the units after repair, as Hayward shows, but over thye winter too slowly. AQn exactly similar problem was occurring in the panzer arm and the infantry. Units (if you want to call an infantry formation a unit) were being damaged or wounded, removed from the effectives list, repaired and then returnmed. in the first year of the war in the east, the logistic system was bad, and this affected return rates very badly, including for the LW. But the tank arm provides the most vivid example. By December, the quartermaster was reporting a 5% effectives rate, that doesnt mean that heer had lost permanently 95% of its tanks. By the following June it was back to about 75% effectives, with a frontline tank strength of over 3000 (from memory). Tank production from new in that period was insufficient to make good those losses, they were repairing the thousands of broken down tanks already in the tank park.

The same thing happened in the LW, but not in the west, where losses tended to be almost always, complete, and permanent. Caldwell shows this very clearly as well, and its why, total permanent losses for the LW were only 28% of total losses came from thje Eastern Front(permanent loses....see caldwell).




> The Luftwaffe was still continuing other operations against the UK. The first blitz is usually dated by the British from September 1940 to December 1941 followed by the two series of 'Baedecker' raids from April to June 1942. By 1943 the few under strength Kamfgruppen left on the Western Front had become less relevant, though still capable of mounting some strategic raids. This had nothing to do with the RAF and everything to do with commitments elsewhere.



More than half the sorties made by the German bomber groups in the West were either anti shipping strikes or minelaying strikes, but these were increasingly expensive for them (everything to do with the RAF, actually, as the Germans generally didnt know how these losses were occurring, so this is one instance where RAF claims are more reliable than LW strength reports) 




> The RAF operations of this period had no effect whatsoever on the German ability to continue its night time blitz.


 Understanable, since the vast majority of bomber operations werent directed to bombing British cities, they were mostly losing aircraft over the ocean or in the harbours and estuaries around england. 



> They had virtually no effect on Germany's industrial capability and had minimal effect on the Jagdwaffe's ability to oppose the day time USAAF raids as the gathered pace into 1943.



The starategic campaigns of both the UK and Germany against cities were inneffective, with losses for BC considerably greater than the losses suffered by the German bombers attacking England. The difference was that the loss rates being suffered by the germans (across the board, including their fighters) were more serious than those suffered by the RAF. Between 1939 and 1942, the RAF had grown from a force of 1660 aircraft, to a force of over 6000 a/c. In that period, LW strengths had fluctuated, but overall, had barely moved. they could hgardly keep up with losses, and thjat included the period they faced off only against the RAF. They may not have been worried, but that does not escape the fact that their ongoing usage of their air force was bleeding it white. Without that ongoing attrition on all fronts, the LW would have recovered and then defeated its foes in detail. The LW would have been in a far better position to resist the US daytime onslaught, than it found itself in. There was a definte point and purpose in the attrition that was occurring, albeit in a Somme kind of way. 



> So worried were the Germans by this series of pin pricks inflicted by Fighter Command under Leigh-Mallory, that they based a mere two fighter Gruppen between the French Channel coast and Denmark!




Versus, on average, about 18 squadrons of the RAF in the NW until 1942. Thats roughly the equivalent of 3 gruppen to 2. Classic military theory says that an advantage of 3:1 is required for an attack, this seldom presented itself for the RAF.

You are also forgetting the commitments in the South 



> The limit of Fighter Command's range was roughly Lille and even there we know that the pilots were fretting about running out of fuel. Anyone not familiar with the geography of NW Europe should look at a map to see for what a large number of RAF fighter pilots were sacrificed. Mallory's 'leaning forward' barely crossed the Channel.



I dont see how you can make that claim. At the beginning it was less than that, at the end, it was a lot more than that. A Spit IX with drop tanks has greater range than a Spit I or Hurri I without drop tanks. its a nonsense argument, meaningless and pointless. I think you know that.


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## Koopernic (Apr 26, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> A couple of points here as we seem to looking at the Luftwaffe capabilities with the aid of our infamous "retrospectroscope".
> 
> 1. In 1939/40 what nation/s had long range escort fighters in service/production or even prototype form _aside_ from twin engine machines?
> 2. What Nation had *more* _long range_ bombers *in service* than Germany in 1939/40?
> ...



The predecessor of the Luftwaffe had conducted bombing raids using Gotha bombers against British targets during WW1 and were well aware that bombers could not avoid serious losses without escorts. 
See here:
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a280686.pdf


Indeed that is why the Luftwaffe actually sent escorts. Furthermore without escorts an attrition strategy against British aircraft is not possible either. Yet the Luftwaffe was in no ways prepared for this.

Germany spent 7 years preparing for a land war with France and to a lessor extent Poland, Britain spent 7 years preparing for air with Germany. Britain was able to put far more time and effort in to a more focused objective.


In 1933, when Hitler was elected to the Chancellery, German armed forces were so weak that either Poland or France alone could have defeated Germany in a matter of days. Poland had a dictatorship under Beck, some bodies within Poland wanted to take German territory to Berlin as they regarded it as theirs, Germans within Poland had their land repossessed and redistributed to Poles and there were about 4000 murders of ethnic Germans during the interbellum and many simply had to leave. I don't want to exaggerate this as there were many reasonable people of Goodwill in Poland but the Germans did have legitimate defense needs and fears. In todays Eastern Europe, in Putins Russia there is a fear of reanexing Finland, Estonia, Lativia, Lithuania and the Ukraine now? There was a similar situation within the German region of Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia meanwhile France could at a whim invade and demand further payments under the Versailles treaty or even to annex territory as she had tried to do in the years after WW1. This sense of economic, ethnic, military, territorial vulnerability played upon Germans fears. Not Hitlers fears, not Nazi fears but German fears.

The strategic situation of Germany is that it is surrounded and its sea and trade access is easy to cut of. I would say it is obvious that in any conflict that involved a simultaneous east west attack, a highly likely scenario, German forces must be able to handle this. Moreover the defenses must be in Breadth not Depth to avoid any significant penetration of German territory, since the country is small. Since any conflict that goes on for any extended period becomes a war of attrition and blockade and favors the enemy. The solution to that is to have enough flexibility and speed of reaction to knock out at least one opponent before the advantages of attrition inevitably cause a German collapse.

This is the 'paradigm' German military planners intrinsically prepared for irrespective of Hitler. They did not plan on world conquest, they did not plan on invading Britain. They didn't have even a single amphibious landing craft in service, they didn't have any long range aircraft to support a maritime war against Britain. They didn't have long range fighter escorts. They abandoned the Junkers Ju 89, which would be madness if a war against Britain was contemplated considering the ease with which it was developed into the Ju 90 airliner and then the Ju 290 transport and by a roundabout path back to bomber.

This is the situation for the German Military, now its time to bring up Hitler. What did he tell the High Command to prepare for?

Nothing specific as far as I can tell. Mein Kampf includes clear references to expansion in the East. Stalin had Mein Kampf translated, the first translation in fact and was not alarmed. Hitler must be dumb to reveal his plans, right? However as ex Soviet Intelligence analyst Viktor Suvorov points out Hitler was speaking in terms of a process that would take hundreds of years. Hitlers first exposition of his aims were in what is now known as the November Speech (November 1937) just after Mussolini's visit. He left Goering surprised and dumbfounded, ie the leader of the Luftwaffe had no idea of what was coming. Hitler said that he saw himself as the savior of the German people, he saw them under threat, and to, in view of the fact that the French, British and Russians people had occupied much of the planet, would need to be able to defeat France, neutralize Britain and Occupy Western Russia. But these were not specific plans, with a specific timetable and sequence they were general objectives.

When war broke out in September 1939 the German armed forces were still in a state of building this fundamentally defensive strategy against its neighbors: what Hitler had said would make no difference because the precarious German resource situation meant diverting resources for such things as a long range air force was a folly.

By 1938 Britain was well on the way to replacing its out of date multi-engine biplane bombers with multi-engine monoplane bombers. Britain was armed to the teeth with a well layed out plan for expansion that had been put in place by Chamberlain.

Why did a Heinkel He 111P have enough range to reach Britain? Simple, because the He 111 was essentially an airliner. It was a Douglass DC2 with gun ports and liquid cooled engines and aircraft of that type have that kind of performance. It lacked a rear turret.

At the outset of the WW2 (September 1929) RAF strength was
1 266 Hadley Page Hampton.
2 6 squadrons of Wellingtons, which in my estimate would be 120 Wellingtons given RAF squadron sizes and aircraft held in reserve.
3 Slightly more Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys of which 205 had been delivered by July 1939. This was an aircraft specifically designed to be a night bomber, a role it was very effective in.
I would assume at least 150 would be in front line service.

So that's about 500 front line twin engine medium bombers.

The Hampton was not inferior to the Dornier Do 17, the 230mph Whitworth Whitley was not inferior to the contemporaneous 250mph Heinkel He 111P and had a better armament layout. The Ju 88A1 barely saw service and was still riddled with teething problems till the Ju 88A5 (the A5 preceded the A4). The Vickers Wellington was the finest bomber in the world at the time and unlike the German bombers had a tail turret with superior armament.

The Fairy Battle (over 1000 in service) was faster than a Ju 87 Stuka, could fly further, could also dive bomb, though not vertically and could unlike the Ju 87 level bomb with a string of 4 x 250lb bombs. During the Battle of France Battles took out Bridges over the Sein by level bombing from low altitude. The Battle was no more vulnerable than the Stuka. Over 1000 were in service at the outset of WW2 and like the Vickers Wellesley it had a range of around 1200 miles. Enough to strike Germany from Britain, the reverse can't be said for the Ju 87.

There were 16 squadrons of Bristol Blenheim's Mk I by 1938 though by 1939 they had been replaced with 9 squadrons of Mk IV of which 6 were bomber squadrons.

It's worth also noting the precarious economic situation of Germany in 1939 which limited any expansion of the Luftwaffe. In practical terms the Me 109E was not suitable for mass production. It had been designed around the concept of jobbing of sub assemblies to jobbing shops and various subcontractors. This while clever to a degree it also severely interfered with implementation of truly efficient mass production. That wasn't achieved till the redesigned Me 109F series. The spitfire wing was notoriously difficult to produce but once large scale presses were introduced it was as efficient as anything could be.


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## stona (Apr 26, 2014)

The Mk IX Spitfire wasn't in production until mid 1942, let alone with a slipper tank. Until then the British were struggling against the Fw 190 (see Dowding's concerns about the inferiority of RAF fighters at this time).
My comment about Lille is based on the period from the end of the BoB, throughout 1941 and well into 1942 an approximately eighteen month period when the Fighter Command losses under discussion occurred. It is not nonsense, meaningless or pointless. It is essentially the limit of RAF fighter operations for this period as evidenced by the comments of numerous _operational_ pilots and commanders. I cited a couple earlier. By late 1942/early 1943 the Americans were becoming involved and it was their turn to express exasperation at the limited range of RAF Fighter Command (see Arnold's comments).
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Apr 26, 2014)

Welcome back, Sigfried?


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## Koopernic (Apr 26, 2014)

stona said:


> The Mk IX Spitfire wasn't in production until mid 1942, let alone with a slipper tank. Until then the British were struggling against the Fw 190 (see Dowding's concerns about the inferiority of RAF fighters at this time).
> My comment about Lille is based on the period from the end of the BoB, throughout 1941 and well into 1942 an approximately eighteen month period when the Fighter Command losses under discussion occurred. It is not nonsense, meaningless or pointless. It is essentially the limit of RAF fighter operations for this period as evidenced by the comments of numerous _operational_ pilots and commanders. I cited a couple earlier. By late 1942/early 1943 the Americans were becoming involved and it was their turn to express exasperation at the limited range of RAF Fighter Command (see Arnold's comments).
> Cheers
> Steve



If I understand the evolution of the spitfire wing correctly it is that the idea of the structure, which evolved before the Spitfire, was that main spar D section design would allow carriage of quite large amounts of fuel in the leading edge. This was certainly proposed for Supermarine long range bombers. PRU spitfires used this while some gun armed variants (from the Mk VII/VIII onwards) had tanks here. I don't know if this was Mitchell intention at the time. It added quite a bit of range, about 35%.


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 26, 2014)

stona said:


> A fair point, but the failure of the British to develop one can be laid firmly at Portal's door and is one of the gravest strategic shortcomings chargeable to him and the Air Staff.
> 
> It led in 1941 with Fighter Command being squandered in France when, with a suitable fighter it should have been escorting Bomber Command, in force, to make meaningful attacks on German airfields in France and Belgium from where the Luftwaffe was launching the night time blitz. It was the only realistic way the night time bombing could have been countered, given the state of AI radar and night fighters, and it should have been the number one priority of Fighter Command. AI technology needed time to develop, a long range fighter was demonstrably possible.
> 
> ...



Perfectly correct. Most people don't realise just how disasterous that trio were (Portal, Douglas and LM). Portal (and some of the actual letters are available in some books) fought against the 'long range fighter' right to the very bitter end. Even in late '43 he was writing to Arnold and telling him it was impossible ...just as the P-51B was coming into service. What can you say?

There were, after they got a handle on the CoG issue in the Mk V, no technical reasons why a medium range Spit Mk V (combat radius of 250-300 miles) could not have been built. With a LR Mk IX /VIII (450-500 mile C.R.) coming in later. Both the British and the Americans built and tested LR Spit prototypes (Quill mentions a test in his book for example).

Douglas's and LM's 'leaning towards the enemy' approach wasn't just tactically deficient it was strategically disasterous because, as you said, it stole away planes from Malta, North Africa and the Far East, where they were critically needed. The both (with Portals' support) fought against any Spits going anywhere else. . For example the Desert Air Force suffered appallingly in their obsolete P-40s and Hurricanes against 109Fs (and later Gs). The DAF was just lucky that the 109s concentrated against their fighters rather than their bombers, otherwise it would not be too hard to imagine a scenario where the DAF is effectively gutted as an attacking force in 42.

Park showed the way when he took over in Malta. Within weeks (using far better tactics) he gutted the attacking Luftwaffe, then he went on the offensive. His tactics were straightforward, mixes of spit fighters and fighter bombers (he was the first to add bombs to Spits). Then attacked their airfields. If the Luftwaffe didn't come up they got hammered in their airfields. They had the choice of having to fight (and they were poorly placed for a battle of attrition) or move their airfields further away and reducing their effectiveness. In either case it was a strategic win. 
If he had remained at 11 Group (or even better been put in charge of Fighter Command) he would have applied the same tactics in France/Holland/etc (and killing those big clumsy, easy to shoot down bog wings tactics). And, I am very sure, would have had far longer ranged Spits very quickly too. He also would have made sure that the primary areas of combat in '41 '42 (Malta, NE, FE) were well supplied very early on.

The reasons for the second point are also obvious, the Luftwaffe wouldn't have reinforced France/etc (they would have pulled back more basically taking them out of the game there) because there were no strategic reasons to. But they did reinforce the ME and the Med to a great extent because they were primary strategic combat areas. With greater losses in the ME/Med they would have been forced to choose between putting more forces there that would have had to be pulled from the Russian front, or lose their airpower there (in either case the Allies win strategically).

So the "trio's" combination of sabotaging LR fighters, denying the primary combat areas of the time effective fighter airpower, forcing useless tactics (big wings) on pilots, attacking an easily defended (and strategically at the time unimportant) area with resulting appalling losses. So when you add it all up, how many thousands of fighter pilots and bomber crews were they responsible for killing for little or no result?


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 26, 2014)

pbehn said:


> The problem with discussing a British escort fighter is it leads to a discussion of which bombers it world escort, much as I like the Lancaster as an aeroplane as an escorted daylight bomber it would be mince.



Depends on the tactics used. The RAF at that time had the numbers to easily crush any France based Luftwaffe. Again noting that good tactics had to be applied.

But there were major strategic targets in France that was essential for British to take out in '41 and the Luftwaffe would have HAD to defend them. That was the U-boat bases, before they were hardened.

The fact that the RAF ignored them until they had built all their bomb proof bunkers was a strategic mistake of the *first order*. Again their obsession with hammering cities got in the way of them being able to a make major strategic contribution to the war.

It wouldn't have been easy, there would have been heavy losses and a 300 mile CR Spit was essential because it would have had to be done in daylight. BUT, the British could have afforded it (they threw away far more on useless things) and saved millions of tons of shipping that were later sunk by the France based U-boats. The complete disinterest (and their continual disinterest of Coastal Command) by the RAF higher levels in a campaign like that always astonishes me.

So much so that at times I think that (excepting the BoB, the DAF ,the TAF and Coastal Command) the RAF was more of a strategic liability to the British than an asset.


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 26, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> If I understand the evolution of the spitfire wing correctly it is that the idea of the structure, which evolved before the Spitfire, was that main spar D section design would allow carriage of quite large amounts of fuel in the leading edge. This was certainly proposed for Supermarine long range bombers. PRU spitfires used this while some gun armed variants (from the Mk VII/VIII onwards) had tanks here. I don't know if this was Mitchell intention at the time. It added quite a bit of range, about 35%.



Yes, Cotton showed the way. tanks in the leading edge of the wings, tank under the pilot seat, tank behind the pilot. They squeezed in fuel everywhere.

You could get, with all armament 13 UK gals in the leading edge of each wing (26 UK gals in total). There was the option, if you ditched the 2x0.303" in each wing to add another 7-8.
With a bob weight on the elevator cable (and the elevator aerodynamic fixes)you could run to 66 (or even 70) UK gals behind the pilot for a MK IX/VII. The plane (just like the Mustang) was unstable until you got down to half that. It steadily improved until at 20gals it was the same as being empty.

This didn't matter since it was just climb and economical cruise to the bomber rendezvous point. So normal practice would be to take off and use the rear tank first (down to say 20 gals), then switch to 90gal drop tank for the rest of the rendezvous trip and the initial escort phase until combat, then dropping the tank, combat, perhaps depending on fuel and ammo still available a further escort phase before returning, using the remaining rear and main/wing tanks.

Based on that then a 500 mile escort radius is quite possible with a reasonable reserve for a MK VIII fuel configuration (the conversion of a Mk IX to have the wing tanks and the larger front main tanks, 96 vs 87 gals should have presented no real problems). You needed about 87 gals left after getting there, escorting and combat to get back from a 500 mile escort trip, with a 100 miles in reserve.

The Spit V was the worst one re CoG issues, so even with the elevator fixes and bob weight then you are probably limited to (say) a 30 gal rear tank (or even 10 under the pilot, with 20 rear?). But, with the leading edge tanks (easy to fit) and a 45gal drop tank then a 300-350 (maybe 400 miles with careful planning and a 90 gal drop tank) escort radius is quite possible. Without the 26 gals leading edge tank then on a Mk V you are limited to 300 miles, just.


The Mustang was so good because it had more internal fuel (221 vs 188 max UK gals) and could carry larger drop tanks (125 vs 90 UK gals). It used a little less in cruise and had a bit higher cruise speed, but that was partially traded off by higher usage in the climb and combat phases. It's CoG was a bit better than the Spits so you could retain a higher amount of rear tank fuel and still be combat capable, thus having more for the return (you then use more of the drop tanks).


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## Shortround6 (Apr 26, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> The predecessor of the Luftwaffe had conducted bombing raids using Gotha bombers against British targets during WW1 and were well aware that bombers could not avoid serious losses without escorts.
> See here:
> http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a280686.pdf
> 
> Indeed that is why the Luftwaffe actually sent escorts. Furthermore without escorts an attrition strategy against British aircraft is not possible either. Yet the Luftwaffe was in no ways prepared for this.



For believing that escort fighters were needed the Luftwaffe sure spent an awful lot of time and money on the Schnellbomber concept. 
A concept that was reinforced during the Spanish civil war even though it was wrong. The Japanese were actually leaning the correct lesson in China but nobody was paying much attention there. 




> By 1938 Britain was well on the way to replacing its out of date multi-engine biplane bombers with multi-engine monoplane bombers. Britain was armed to the teeth with a well layed out plan for expansion that had been put in place by Chamberlain.



I guess it depends on what you mean by "well on the way" and "armed to the teeth" in 1938. Britain did have prototypes built and plans for expansion and production. However by Sept of 1938 (Munich Crisis) there were about 16 squadrons of Blenehim Is, 4-5 squadrons of Wellesleys (although they were going to the mid-east in 1938) Number of Battles in service in 1938? The first batch of 155 ordered had considerable trouble with their Melrin I engines and the switch to the Melrin II caused considerable trouble with the production of the Hurricane being held up while engines were sent to Fairey, March 1938 saw R-R producing about 50 Melrins a month although this soon tripled. Second batch of Battles starts production in late spring of 1938? The Whitley was in production but the first 34 used the rather terrible Tiger IX engine. In fact by Sept 1939 there were 7 squadrons flying Whitleys and two of them were not fully equipped. The two not fulley equiped and only one other one had the Merlin powered Whiteys, the other 4 squadrons had planes with Tiger VIII engines. ALL Whitley MK Is and IIs having been pulled from operational units. First Wellington doesn't reach an operational squadron until Oct 1938. Three squadrons were operating Hampdens by Dec of 1938. 



> Why did a Heinkel He 111P have enough range to reach Britain? Simple, because the He 111 was essentially an airliner. It was a Douglass DC2 with gun ports and liquid cooled engines and aircraft of that type have that kind of performance. It lacked a rear turret.



Please, not this old hack again. A number of planes were designed to be dual purpose in the early/mid 30s. the question is how far one way or the other they tipped. The He 111 was a lousy airliner, with accommodations as bad or worse than the Boeing 247 which flew 2 years earlier, worse than the Ju 52 and much worse than the DC-2 which flew about one year earlier. I would also note that airliners only have to fly one way, they are allowed to refuel before making the return trip. An airliner flying London to Berlin only needs a range of around 600 miles plus reserves. 




> So that's about 500 front line twin engine medium bombers


.

And the Germans had about 700 He 111s in serviceable condition at the start of the war, granted some may have been in training units, now lets add the Do-17s and the Ju-86s. 



> The Vickers Wellington was the finest bomber in the world at the time and unlike the German bombers had a tail turret with superior armament.


A bit debatable. The Wellington I ( there was a lot difference by the time you get to the IC) using Vickers "turrets" and not Frazer-Nash turrets. The MK I also used a ventral "dustbin" which cut 16mph form the planes speed (not unlike the dustbins used by German bombers in Spanish civil war. Aside from the difference in guns the MK I had a lower gross weight than a MK IA or C (Handled by their larger tires which were no longer fully enclosed). 



> The Fairy Battle (over 1000 in service) was faster than a Ju 87 Stuka, could fly further, could also dive bomb, though not vertically and could unlike the Ju 87 level bomb with a string of 4 x 250lb bombs. During the Battle of France Battles took out Bridges over the Sein by level bombing from low altitude. The Battle was no more vulnerable than the Stuka. Over 1000 were in service at the outset of WW2 and like the Vickers Wellesley it had a range of around 1200 miles. Enough to strike Germany from Britain, the reverse can't be said for the Ju 87.



The Fairey Battle had no dive bombing sight. The Crews were not really trained for dive bombing or even army co-operation. True tactical support was supposed to handled by the Lysander ( a pair of 250lb bombs). 

In Sept 1939 the Germans had a much more formidable bombing force than the British had (although the British were catching up fast.) The BF 110 was also _supposed_ to clear the way for the bombers and while not an escort fighter as the term was latter known it was _supposed_ hit enemy interceptors on the ground or in the initial stages of climb and keep them from attacking the bombers that way and do it at ranges beyond that of the 109. Didn't work against radar. 

Some of the luftwaffe concepts/tatical ideas didn't work but lets not pretend they weren't thinking of or working on ways to project air power beyond the immediate land battle field.


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## GrauGeist (Apr 26, 2014)

The "Schnellbomber" concept was something that other airforces were always looking at, too.

The basic idea, is to have a bomber fast enough, that it eliminates the need for escorts. In theory, this will free up fighter groups for other duties as well as eliminate the need for defensive armament and related crew.

The Mosquito was in essence, an ideal "Schnellbomber" and perhaps, the pinnacle of the theory in practice, was the Ar234.


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## Aozora (Apr 27, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Yes, Cotton showed the way. tanks in the leading edge of the wings, tank under the pilot seat, tank behind the pilot. They squeezed in fuel everywhere.
> 
> You could get, with all armament 13 UK gals in the leading edge of each wing (26 UK gals in total). There was the option, if you ditched the 2x0.303" in each wing to add another 7-8.
> With a bob weight on the elevator cable (and the elevator aerodynamic fixes)you could run to 66 (or even 70) UK gals behind the pilot for a MK IX/VII. The plane (just like the Mustang) was unstable until you got down to half that. It steadily improved until at 20gals it was the same as being empty.
> ...



From Spitfire IX/XI/XVI Pilot's Notes:

Handling:










Economical flying and fuel consumption:


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## buffnut453 (Apr 27, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Perfectly correct. Most people don't realise just how disasterous that trio were (Portal, Douglas and LM). Portal (and some of the actual letters are available in some books) fought against the 'long range fighter' right to the very bitter end. Even in late '43 he was writing to Arnold and telling him it was impossible ...just as the P-51B was coming into service. What can you say?
> 
> There were, after they got a handle on the CoG issue in the Mk V, no technical reasons why a medium range Spit Mk V (combat radius of 250-300 miles) could not have been built. With a LR Mk IX /VIII (450-500 mile C.R.) coming in later. Both the British and the Americans built and tested LR Spit prototypes (Quill mentions a test in his book for example).
> 
> Douglas's and LM's 'leaning towards the enemy' approach wasn't just tactically deficient it was strategically disasterous because, as you said, it stole away planes from Malta, North Africa and the Far East, where they were critically needed. The both (with Portals' support) fought against any Spits going anywhere else. . For example the Desert Air Force suffered appallingly in their obsolete P-40s and Hurricanes against 109Fs (and later Gs). The DAF was just lucky that the 109s concentrated against their fighters rather than their bombers, otherwise it would not be too hard to imagine a scenario where the DAF is effectively gutted as an attacking force in 42.



Methinks you're sitting on both sides of the fence. Surely availability of longer-range fighters would _increase _the impetus for taking offensive action in Europe and hence made it even less likely that high-performance fighters would be available for other theatres. If L-M had employed Park's tactics that you're praising, would fighter-bomber Spitfires escorted by yet more Spitfires be any less of a drain on resources than a Big Wing?


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## stona (Apr 27, 2014)

Koopernic said:


> If I understand the evolution of the spitfire wing correctly it is that the idea of the structure, which evolved before the Spitfire, was that main spar D section design would allow carriage of quite large amounts of fuel in the leading edge.



Not in the case of the Spitfire. It was originally designed to be part of the cooling system with condensers in the wing. The wing fuel cell size was limited because the wing ribs get in the way. To fit the 12.5 gallon cells in the leading edge required the removal of the front of at least one rib IIRC. (Edit I see the larger 66 gallon leading edge tanks covered below).
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Apr 27, 2014)

Good call on the purpose of the D box, Steve.
For the LE tanks to be installed, two ribs were removed*, and the skin was doubled at that wing section, in order to reinforce it now that ribs are not there.

*added: total of 4 per A/C; just the part of the ribs in front of the spar


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## parsifal (Apr 27, 2014)

for June 1942, the operations over France, Belgium, the North Sea, the channel, the British isles, the western approaches and the Irish Sea cost the germans 89 aircraft lost and 105 damaged, of which nearly 60 were written off. In that same time, the RAF lost 68 shot down and 48 Cat E losses. These numbers exlude non combat related losses. There were a few additional RAF aircraft not classified as cat E but scrapped anyway. June was the month that LW losses first exceeded RAF losses in this TO, though RAF non combat losses pushed the figures back over the top.

Not so bad in my opinion, though a long range fighter would have been an enormous help, unquestionably.


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## stona (Apr 27, 2014)

parsifal said:


> for June 1942, the operations over France, Belgium, the North Sea, the channel, the British isles, the western approaches and the Irish Sea cost the germans 89 aircraft lost and 105 damaged, of which nearly 60 were written off.



And in June 1942 the Germans lost 350 aircraft on the Eastern Front. This is before the summer offensives began, when losses rose sharply, but does include losses around Sevastopol.

Steve

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## Juha (Apr 27, 2014)

stona said:


> And in June 1942 the Germans lost 350 aircraft on the Eastern Front. This is before the summer offensives began, when losses rose sharply, but does include losses around Sevastopol.
> 
> Steve



And 299 on the other Fronts, again, MTO was important but often forgotten drain of the LW resources. In oct 42 LW lost more planes on the other fronts than on the Eastern Front 324 vs 200 and in Nov massively so 595 vs 224, in Dec it it was again other way around 366 vs 408.

Juha


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## stona (Apr 27, 2014)

Juha said:


> And 299 on the other Fronts, again, MTO was important but often forgotten drain of the LW resources. In oct 42 LW lost more planes on the other fronts than on the Eastern Front 324 vs 200 and in Nov massively so 595 vs 224, in Dec it it was again other way around 366 vs 408.
> 
> Juha



Think of the weather on the Eastern Front in October and November and its impact on operations. It may well have limited operations in NW Europe too. Also consider that the leap in losses elsewhere, particularly the MTO coincides with 'Torch'.
Stalingrad must be a contributor to losses in the East in December when you'd expect operations to be curtailed.
Cheers
Steve


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## Milosh (Apr 27, 2014)




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## parsifal (Apr 27, 2014)

stona said:


> And in June 1942 the Germans lost 350 aircraft on the Eastern Front. This is before the summer offensives began, when losses rose sharply, but does include losses around Sevastopol.
> 
> Steve



And again, thjs figure are not the outright losses. The majority are recoverable losses, airframes returned to depots for rebuilds. Outright losses, were about 1/4 of that total


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## pbehn (Apr 27, 2014)

Great discussion, I hope Ascents daughter is taking it all in.


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## parsifal (Apr 27, 2014)

If , as being claimed here, the LW was losing 350 aircraft on the eastern front and 299 on other fronts, that brings the total loss rates to 700 for the month. If you add the other totals for other months June to December you get a figure of 4711 aircraft lost. Murray is not being genuine here, however, as these figures include recoverable losses. From June to December the front line strength of the LW barely moved, from 3572 to 3440. In that same period there were about 6000 acceptances for new aircraft. Training and non-operational accidents accounted for 35% of total losses. 

At those rates, unless some of those losses are recoverable, the LW would cease to have exist by about September. Clearly it did not. For a slightly later period Caldwell shows that recovery rates on the eastern Front were roughly twice that what they were in the West. The reason was that relatively few aircraft on the eastern front relatively speaking were being shot down...for the latter part of the war, air combat casualties accounted for about 14% of casualties, whereas total losses were just touching 50%. Outright losses on the western front, were always four or five times greater as a proportion of the totals of listed losses. Why, because unlike the eastern front, a much larger proportion of losses were occurring in the air. In the east large numbers were being damaged for various reasons, like landing and take off damage, and the logistic network was being stretched to the limit, such that the regular front line reapir and maintence facilities could not cope. large numbers of aircraft were being damaged and not repaired at the front, despite the official LW "policy". they were being returned to the factories and rear depots.....there was a massive facility at Lvov for example, for repair (I think). These aircraft were being listed as losses, but were being repaired and returned for service, exactly the same as their tanks were being recycled in this way.

After my stepfather was wounded at Stalingrad, and had recovered, he was sent to Holland, where he was employed in a similar depot to repair MG42s for the Army. MGs would suffer damage, be detached from the TOE of the unit, sent to the depot repaired and then re-issued. If we were to look at losses for MGs, these items would be listed as a loss. But they arent a real loss. they are temporarily taken out of service for a while, whilst being repaired, and then returned. Thats, not a loss, thats a measure of the heavy fighting the heer was going through at that time. And for the Eastern Front, the poor logistics of that front. Same basic deal for the LW


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 27, 2014)

Aozora said:


> From Spitfire IX/XI/XVI Pilot's Notes:



That's largely (plus other pilots notes) what I based my analysis on. But if you got serious about a LR Spit then you had the option to add a bob weight to the elevator controls (as Quill mentioned in his LR test) which helped during that period of 'worst stability', still unstable of course but helped markedly for that first 1/2 to an hour when it was at it's worst (depending on the flight profile of course).

The history of bob weights are interesting. First introduced as a crash measure in the Spit V because of serious CoG issues, then when the elevator horn fix came through they were removed on the V and not used on most other subsequent fighter models. The Spit VII always had a bob weight due to the effects of friction on the elevator cables because of the pressurised cockpit. Don't know for sure but I'd expect the later pressurised PR versions probably did the same.

So it was doable. People forget the Mustang fully fueled up was pretty horrible too and they managed it. Read some pilots accounts where some of the more experienced ones kept a larger amount of fuel in the rear tank than normally recommended, because they had learned to deal with it and it gave them that extra margin for return fuel (always a nice thing), not a good idea for a newbie naturally.

On a Spit VIII/IX loaded to that level it used 26-30 UK gals just on the initial climb to 20,000ft, by which stage things are starting to settle down, so the flight profile would just be an initial dead straight climb and again a bob weight would help somewhat during that period.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 27, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The "Schnellbomber" concept was something that other airforces were always looking at, too.
> 
> The basic idea, is to have a bomber fast enough, that it eliminates the need for escorts. In theory, this will free up fighter groups for other duties as well as eliminate the need for defensive armament and related crew.
> 
> The Mosquito was in essence, an ideal "Schnellbomber" and perhaps, the pinnacle of the theory in practice, was the Ar234.



The Problem with the _Schnellbomber_ concept is that it only works for short period of time. Given equivalent engines and aerodynamic knowledge the intercepting fighter can always be faster than the bomber (at least up until around Mach 2 and then it is a materials problem) and it takes less time to design a fighter than a bomber. 
Germans drew the wrong lesson from Spain and believed that speed and three 7.9mm MGs on rather restricted mounts were _enough_ of a defense which left them playing catch-up for too much of the war.


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## parsifal (Apr 27, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Great discussion, I hope Ascents daughter is taking it all in.



nah, we are squabbling like 10yos again, buts a good discussion just the same.

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## GrauGeist (Apr 28, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The Problem with the _Schnellbomber_ concept is that it only works for short period of time. Given equivalent engines and aerodynamic knowledge the intercepting fighter can always be faster than the bomber (at least up until around Mach 2 and then it is a materials problem) and it takes less time to design a fighter than a bomber.


That was (and still is) the problem with technology. As soon as a breakthrough enters the arena, everyone scrambles for a new threat upgrade. The moment you introduce a new platform, you had better be ready to improve what you already have...the moment you rest on your laurels, you've lost.



Shortround6 said:


> Germans drew the wrong lesson from Spain and believed that speed and three 7.9mm MGs on rather restricted mounts were _enough_ of a defense which left them playing catch-up for too much of the war.


The Spanish Civil War was a terrible expiriment. Antiquated technology was sharing the battlefield with new technology and produced distorted results. The problem here, was the general staff wasn't taking into consideration all the factors of the battlefield. They just looked at the successes and patted each other on the back instead of asking why they were acheiving such high results.
The Luftwaffe did have several airframes early on, that would have met the _Schnellbomber_ criteria, but waffled and whizzed away the opportunity (as always) until the Ar234 came along.

Even still, a Schnellbomber can only produce so much, in the way of results, as a high-speed bomber can only carry a limited amount of ordnance in order to retain it's high-speed. Devoting a large amount of production for high-speed bomber production isn't practical, as the strike value of a high-speed bomber returns little in the way of dividends. They certainly have their value in the way of surgical strikes, priority targeting and even propeganda, but not much else beyond that.


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## merlin (Apr 28, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Great discussion, I hope Ascents daughter is taking it all in.



Yes, but only problem is that Battle of Britain 'discussion' has been left a long way behind!


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## pbehn (Apr 28, 2014)

I think even before the BoB the Spitfire (and Hurricane) could have done with more range, not only at Dunkerque but in the BoB itself. They had enough time between 1939 and 1945 to apply themselves to it.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 28, 2014)

We can recall that Re.2001, Ki-61 and P-40 were capable to lug around much more internal fuel than the BoB trio, on about same engine power (1050-1150 HP) and without any 'trick' aerodynamics. Those 3 of the 'other' fighters weren't cannon fodder for the BoB trio.


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## nuuumannn (Apr 28, 2014)

> The Problem with the Schnellbomber concept is that it only works for short period of time. Given equivalent engines and aerodynamic knowledge the intercepting fighter can always be faster than the bomber (at least up until around Mach 2 and then it is a materials problem) and it takes less time to design a fighter than a bomber.



Agree with Dave regarding technology, but this is no reason not to do something though, if it was, you'd never put anything into service for fears it'd be overtaken by the time you did. The concept worked very well in the Mosquito, and even once the Germans introduced jet fighters to intercept it, the Mossie was an effective aircraft in the jobs that it carried out. The Ar 234 was unstoppable over the UK because of its speed and altitude and was a formidable weapon, just because the Allies might have produced something to counter it eventually would be a silly reason for the Germans not to attempt to put it into service. The short period of time might be enough to force a change in long term strategy - obviously depending on a given situation, but if you are not going to try, why bother playing?


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## Koopernic (Apr 29, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Agree with Dave regarding technology, but this is no reason not to do something though, if it was, you'd never put anything into service for fears it'd be overtaken by the time you did. The concept worked very well in the Mosquito, and even once the Germans introduced jet fighters to intercept it, the Mossie was an effective aircraft in the jobs that it carried out. The Ar 234 was unstoppable over the UK because of its speed and altitude and was a formidable weapon, just because the Allies might have produced something to counter it eventually would be a silly reason for the Germans not to attempt to put it into service. The short period of time might be enough to force a change in long term strategy - obviously depending on a given situation, but if you are not going to try, why bother playing?



Interestingly the Arado 234C might have given the Germans 2 years of impunity over Britain. 

The Arado 234A reconnaissance aircraft flew at 480 mph, the Arado 234B was wider and slower (461mph) because the jettison-able takeoff trolley/landing skid system had been replaced with a conventional undercarriage which lead to a widening of the fuselage to restore the fuel volume lost in stowing the wheels. These version were propelled by 2 x Jumo 004 engine of 900kg thrust each. (total 1800kg)

The next progression was the Arado Ar 234C which was powered by 4 x BMW 003A engines of 800kg thrust each. (total 3200kg i.e. 77% more than the Ar 234B).

The Ar 234C was actually over powered and Mach limited and not thrust limited. The Mach Limit was just over Mach 0.8. Four of these aircraft were actually delivered to the Luftwaffe. The BMW 003 engine actually had a higher cruise thrust than the Jumo 004 and was in anycase mach limited so could have carried out its mission, with bombs at Mach 0.8 all the way. Granted it is a small bomb load.

We now have a situation that the only two aircraft that might intercept it: the P80A (which was slower anyway, the P-80C was some time away) and the Meteor III were also Mach limited at around the same Mach. When a modified speed Meteor III which was essentially a prototype Meteor IV with entirely new Derwent V engines broke 600mph in late 1945 it did so at sea level where the Mach was 0.8. One almost killed Eric Brown due to Mach Tuck. Likewise with later P-80 which broke 600mph at lower altitudes.

There might have been tweeks such as sharpened leading edges and an uprated engine for the P-80 to get a few extra 0.05 mach.

The next stage of development for the Arado 234 was a swept crescent wing like the Handley Page Victor. The wing had a high sweep in its inner portion with a reduced sweep but finer profile on the outer portion to break the Mach 0.8 limit while retaining good handling. This double sweep arrangement also meant the C of G didn't change much which meant the fuselage and its attachment points did not need to be redesigned, which was very attractive from a manufacturing point of view. One wing was built and ready to be mated to a fuselage when British troops over ran the Arado 234 testing centre and Unwittingly wrecked it. 

Basically the RAF needs the Miles M.52 to stop it which is ready when?

There was an Arado 234D which used the uprated Jumo 004D engine and was expected to fly 494 mph, perhaps enough to match a Meteor III and or P-80A but it was expected to use this version mainly in maritime roles where the worst it might run into was a navalised spitefull.


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## eWildcat (Apr 29, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> We can recall that Re.2001, Ki-61 and P-40 were capable to lug around much more internal fuel than the BoB trio, on about same engine power (1050-1150 HP) and without any 'trick' aerodynamics. Those 3 of the 'other' fighters weren't cannon fodder for the BoB trio.



Well, it's true, but the Re.2001 and Ki-61 entered service well after the Spitfire I, and the P-40 was actually "cannon fodder" if it flew higher than 15/20 000 ft.


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 29, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Agree with Dave regarding technology, but this is no reason not to do something though, if it was, you'd never put anything into service for fears it'd be overtaken by the time you did. The concept worked very well in the Mosquito, and even once the Germans introduced jet fighters to intercept it, the Mossie was an effective aircraft in the jobs that it carried out. The Ar 234 was unstoppable over the UK because of its speed and altitude and was a formidable weapon, just because the Allies might have produced something to counter it eventually would be a silly reason for the Germans not to attempt to put it into service. The short period of time might be enough to force a change in long term strategy - obviously depending on a given situation, but if you are not going to try, why bother playing?



Nah, the 234 real use was for photo-recon. Sure it was fast, but it all comes back to bombing accuracy and the correct targets. Say, in some wonderful wishland they had 1,000 of them in say late 43 (totally impossible of course, but this is a thought experiment) What could they do? There has been no photo recon for 3 years over the UK, so they don't know what to hit any better than they knew in the BoB. Light bomb load therefore they have to get down low to achieve bombing accuracy where they are as vulnerable as anything else to flak. They would have just lost lots, while the allies had the option of hammering their airfields at will (either through tactical or strategic bombers) further hampering them.

Funnily enough their V1 campaign was more rational (the V2 was a joke). The V1 was cheap to develop and build so they could throw thousands at the UK, Antwerp, etc. It cost the allies far more in resources to defend against them that it cost the Germans to use them, so it was a sort of strategic win for them. Unfortunately the V1 was so inaccurate and thanks to great counter intelligence (read R.V Jones book) they were mislead so that it became even more inaccurate. Their lack of photo recon meant they had no idea what was being hit by any objective measures.

The dominance of Allied photo recon is always underestimated by most commentators. Both at the tactical and strategic levels. High altitude PR Spits and Mossies along with low level Spits and Mustangs (the 'Dicers') dominated the battlefields and airspace throughout the Continent for years. The Germans usually had no idea what was happening, they knew nothing about the D-Day build up for example, while their counterparts (well those who used it properly) had very clear ideas of what they were facing.

Again the Germans had nothing with the performance of the high alt PR Spits and Mossies, they went everywhere with impunity. The low level boys had a rougher time of course because of flak, but the low level PR Spits and Mustangs were still way above the performance levels of their opposition.

Trouble was the prop airframes the Germans had could be matched quite easily. Yes the 109 could (and were) used for high alt PR, but they didn't have the performance advantage that stopped them from being shot down. The 190 had the same issue, yes it was good at low altitude but not good enough to survive against the defences the UK had. And none had any real range.

Again back to RV Jones as an example, he had mapped all the German Channel radar network, so before and during D-Day it was easily destroyed and spoofed.

So the only useful contribution the 234 could have made was as a PR plane, no matter how many they had. Good contribution no less though. With that sort of info in June 44 Rommel might have been able to persuade Hitler to give him the forces to kill the invasion in Normandy... maybe (he only had about 3-7 days to do it, after that it was only a matter of time). Poor old Rommel, wonder boy until Monty thumped him .. again and again and again.....


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## tomo pauk (Apr 29, 2014)

eWildcat said:


> Well, it's true, but the Re.2001 and Ki-61 entered service well after the Spitfire I, and the P-40 was actually "cannon fodder" if it flew higher than 15/20 000 ft.



I was pointing out to the thing that there was no much (any?) technological gap between those 3 fighters and the BoB trio. The Re.2001 and P-40 (no letter), P-40-B and -C were just a bit more than re-engined pre-war fighters. 
The P-40 was not cannon fodder for the Spit I/II/Hurricane I/II/Bf-109E, ie. BoB fighters.


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## stona (Apr 29, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Some very intersting and inciteful comments. Id say the turning point came about 1938 or so. Germany's decision to focus on tactical support made the LW unsuited to sustained air operations, in which direct support of the armies was not the focus. .............Conversely, for the British, they never lost sight of their primary mission. tjough untested, a major part of the RAFs resources were devoted to air defence over England.



I found Parsifal's post on a re-reading of this thread. I substantially agree with the gist of the argument but not the timing. For the British 1938 should read 1925. Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) was formed in January that year and had moved to its Uxbridge headquarters by May. 
The two senior officers were Air Marshal Sir John Salmond who featured heavily at the Air Ministry throughout the BoB period, and Air Commodore F V Holt, his chief of staff. Wing Commander J S T Bradley was in charge of training. Major General E B Ashmore was in charge of ground defences. ADGB controlled fighters and bombers but Air Commodore Brooke-Popham, who in 1922 had been put in command of the world's first staff college for air force officers at Andover, was given command of fighters under the newly formed 'Fighting Area'.

There was another very important officer who initially took charge of 'Operations, Intelligence, Mobilisation and Combined Training.' This followed a chance meeting with Holt at the RAF club in Picadilly. This officer was a certain Keith Park, recently returned from Egypt.

The ideas about air defence developed in 1926/7 had not changed in principle twelve years later at the outbreak of the war. Park always credited Holt and Ashmore for much of this work. He also credited Brooke-Popham with laying the foundations of Fighter Command and with being one of the first to appreciate the value of scientists to the air force. Fighter Command was not created between 1936 and 1939. Not even Dowding's driving force could have achieved that. It was built on a decade of effort by officers including Park, many of whom are largely forgotten.

Cheers

Steve

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## GrauGeist (Apr 29, 2014)

An interesting and little known fact (among the general population) about the Battle of Britain, was Italy's limited participation.

Their performance was less than spectacular, however.


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## Airframes (Apr 29, 2014)

Dave, it's arguable whether Italian forces actually took part in the Battle, as their main participation was after what is now considered the 'official' end of the Battle. That said, you are correct in including them, as, when they did participate, it wasn't known that the Battle had ended 'officially'.


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## GrauGeist (Apr 29, 2014)

Sad to say, their participation/performance was such, that it makes for an obscure footnote in history.


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## Airframes (Apr 29, 2014)

But a nice photo of a crashed aircraft in Rendelsham Forest, and stories of bottles of Chianti, cheese and other stuff on board, and a Fiat on it's nose on the beach !


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## pbehn (Apr 29, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Sad to say, their participation/performance was such, that it mahttp://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=1121445kes for an obscure footnote in history.


Especially when you consider that while they were attacking (or looking towards) England at Mussolinis insistence Taranto was attacked and the Italian fleet severely mauled.


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## gjs238 (Apr 29, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Funnily enough their V1 campaign was more rational (the V2 was a joke). The V1 was cheap to develop and build so they could throw thousands at the UK, Antwerp, etc. It cost the allies far more in resources to defend against them that it cost the Germans to use them, so it was a sort of strategic win for them.



Has anyone done an economic analysis of this?

I know this group has had some quite detailed discussions of the Strategic Bombing Campaign, with Parsifal being a big contributer, but don't remember seeing this done for the V-1's.


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## stona (Apr 30, 2014)

Post war US estimates put the estimated development costs of the V-1 and V-2 weapons at three billion dollars. 1 US dollar was equivalent to 2.5 RM during the war years, give or take a few cents. The V-1 program comprised a mere two hundred million dollars of this.

About 30,000 V-1s were built at a cost of 5,000 RM each. A V-2 cost 121,000RM and 6,600 were built. This is a lot of money, but also a lot of bang. Many missiles (estimates go as high as a quarter) launched never made it across the Channel. A loss the Germans could ill afford. It has been estimated that the production of both missiles used up materiel equivalent to 24,000 single engine fighters. Could the Germans afford this?
36,000 tons of explosives were used in these weapons which might have been better used elsewhere. To defend the V-1 launch sites in France the Germans employed as many flak units as they used to defend the entire city of Hamburg.
It is important to be aware of indirect costs, not just the 5,000RM price tag for a V-1

Against this the weapons did cost the allies vast sums to defend against them. There was a huge redeployment of anti aircraft artillery to SE England. As many as ten fighter squadrons were largely tied up in anti 'Diver' operations. 2,000 barrage balloons and associated infra structure were deployed to little effect. Even the most optimistic estimates credit balloons with 300 V-1s.
Between August 1943 and August 1944 Operation Crossbow sorties against the launch sites comprised 14% of all bomber sorties flown and 16% of tonnage dropped. This is a significant cost and it never stopped the launches. The diversion of bombers from other targets is what historians call an 'opportunity cost' (like the cost to the Germans of defending the launch sites) and they are significant.

For all the money spent by both sides what did the V-1 (or V-2) really achieve. The answer is not a fat lot. They were the result of a lack of strategic vision, something that the Germans in particular displayed throughout the war. The weapons might have been cheap, particularly the V-1, but they were also unreliable and very inaccurate. They were never able to threaten specific military targets, but only area targets like London or later Antwerp. They couldn't for example threaten the invasion fleet assembling in ports along the south coast of England, they were too small a target. The V-1 could 'repetitively strike' (usually this means at least 50% of missiles but it is unclear in my reference) within a circle with a diameter of 12 miles, for the V-2 this was 9 miles. They did deliver a tonnage on vague targets like this much more cheaply than for example a strategic bombing force could have, if those billions had been spent there instead, but the effect on the outcome of the war was negligible.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Apr 30, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Has anyone done an economic analysis of this?
> 
> I know this group has had some quite detailed discussions of the Strategic Bombing Campaign, with Parsifal being a big contributer, but don't remember seeing this done for the V-1's.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb#Assessment


> Unlike the V-2, the V-1 was a cost-effective weapon for the Germans as it forced the Allies to spend heavily on defensive measures and divert bombers from other targets. More than 25% of Combined Bomber Offensive's bombs in July and August 1944 were used against V-weapon sites, often ineffectively.[12] In early December 1944, American General Clayton Bissell wrote a paper which argued strongly in favour of the V-1 compared to conventional bombers.[34]
> 
> Blitz (12 months) vs V-1 flying bombs (2¾ months)
> Blitz	V-1
> ...


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## stona (Apr 30, 2014)

What's the last bit about? The vast majority of V-1s were not air launched. About 1,450 sorties were flown to air launch V-1s. Against this should be balanced a report on KG 53 of October 1944 when training for air launching the V-1 at Karlshagen. There was a 23.94% failure rate from 71 attempted launches, as near a dammit 1 in 4. Of those launched many failed to perform correctly. Of the 71 attempted launches only 40 V-1s were adjudged to have performed 'satisfactorily'. Satisfactorily was that they attained ranges between 75 Km and 85 Km, the only fly in the ointment being that they were all supposedly programmed for a flight of 60 Km !

Beware of Wikipedia! Articles often have a high content of B.S.
Total losses of aircraft on air launched V-1 missions (KG 3 and KG 53) was 65. An unsubstantiated PoW account claimed that 12 aircraft were lost to a premature explosion of their payloads. This number is not included in the 65 official losses above and may explain the odd total of 77 in that article. Most were destroyed on the ground or lost to 'other causes'. Few (best estimate is a total of 17) were destroyed by night fighters.

Cost effectiveness is a very difficult thing to assess. The V-1s certainly tied down resources in England and the campaign against the launch sites, production facilities etc did use significant resources of the allied air forces. The problem for the Germans is that the allies could afford this. The opportunistic gain for the Germans is that these resources were not doing more damage elsewhere.

The V-1s also absorbed significant resources in Germany for their production, transport and launch, all of which had to be protected. This is separate from development costs. Germany was far shorter of such resources than the allies and this begs the question whether these increasingly scarce resources might have been better used elsewhere.

Simply being 'cost effective' at dumping a tonnage of explosives inaccurately across SE England, London and Antwerp does not necessarily mean that a system is worth the investment in it. 

The Air Ministry compiled statistics on the accuracy od air launched V-1s. It would make for depressing reading for the Germans.







Of course 6-10 miles either way will still hit a target the size of a city (as London and Antwerp in particular found out) but how militarily valuable is this? The allies were dropping vastly more and more concentrated explosives on German cities, totally devastating many, something V-1s never came close to doing, and people still argue about how useful that was in interfering with Germany's productivity and will to fight on!

Obliterating a greenhouse in Kent (my family were market gardeners and this is from a first hand account) might not be as good value for money as a toolmaker in Croydon.

This lot were 'aimed' at London.






Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Apr 30, 2014)

The US built Republic-Ford JB-2 and the navalized version, KGW-1, were planned to be used for the invasion of Japan.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JB-2_Loon
So I assume there was value seen.


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## stona (Apr 30, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> The US built Republic-Ford JB-2 and the navalized version, KGW-1, were planned to be used for the invasion of Japan.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JB-2_Loon
> So I assume there was value seen.



The US could easily afford such a weapon, even if it didn't work very well. Value for money is always relative to how much you can afford to spend. The US was also churning out B-29s and even the odd atomic bomb. Such things were beyond the resources available to Germany. The V-1 and V-2 was a last and useless throw of the dice. 

The US could afford to transport no less than 492 German rocket scientists and technicians to the US after the war for its own programmes. Some of these men had 'dubious' backgrounds to say the least. Prominent among them was Werner von Braun and 126 men who had worked at Peenemunde.

Cheers

Steve


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## GrauGeist (Apr 30, 2014)

There was also the huge expense of building fortified V-1 storage and launch facilities like Siracourt and V-2 facilities like Watten. 

Even without constant damage and reconstruction from Allied bombing, they consumed a tremendous amount of materials, logistics and manpower.


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## pbehn (Apr 30, 2014)

I believe the V2 cost more lives on the German side than the allies use of slave labour poor conditions and extremely dangerous propellants.

The innaccuracy of the V1 was in part a victory for the spy network. Sensors (radio I believe) were attached to some to indicate how far they travelled, As i remember the sensors said they were long but spies told them they were short so they increased the parameters even more.


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## stona (Apr 30, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> There was also the huge expense of building fortified V-1 storage and launch facilities like Siracourt and V-2 facilities like Watten.
> 
> Even without constant damage and reconstruction from Allied bombing, they consumed a tremendous amount of materials, logistics and manpower.



Precisely so. And all this was also protected with substantial flak resources which might have been used elsewhere. Transporting the V-1s also used up scarce resources. These were all 'opportunity costs' to the Germans.

As I said before, just taking into account the price tag for each V-1, even if you include the cost of development, is an over simplified view of the overall cost, which also includes numerous factors like those in GrauGeist's post above. 

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Apr 30, 2014)

A brief return to the BoB. Some way back I said that I was unaware that Park had specifically favoured head on attacks, though certainly not denying the possibility. He did indeed favour them as seen in a document entitled 'Head-on Attacks', AIR 16/901.
Park considered that Luftwaffe bomber formations were vulnerable from the front, poorly armoured, lightly armed, in tight formation (without room to manoeuvre) and led by the best pilots. If attacked from the front he wrote that the formations _'would break up in confusion'_. This fitted with his avowed aim of ruining the aim of the many, rather than shooting down a few.
Dowding refused to authorise this as a standard tactic because it allowed the least time for accurate shooting, the risk of collision was high and the fighters were exposed to the coordinated fire of rear gunners as they over shot.

There is a first hand account from Myles Duke-Woolley, who did favour the tactic.

_"I will say the old Hun tried hard, but they did not like that head-on business. One could see the leader carrying on straight, but the followers wavering, drawing out sideways to the flanks, and in some cases just plain leaving the formation."_

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Apr 30, 2014)

stona said:


> There is a first hand account from Myles Duke-Woolley, who did favour the tactic.
> 
> _"I will say the old Hun tried hard, but they did not like that head-on business. One could see the leader carrying on straight, but the followers wavering, drawing out sideways to the flanks, and in some cases just plain leaving the formation."_



What goes around comes around...


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## parsifal (Apr 30, 2014)

Im not sure that head on attacks made all that much sense when attacking LW bomber formations. A B-17 defensive box was a formidable formation, and the weakest part of the aircraft was from front on. LW bombers were far weaker defensivand ive heard their weakest point, in terms of defensive fire was from behind


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## stona (May 1, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Im not sure that head on attacks made all that much sense when attacking LW bomber formations. A B-17 defensive box was a formidable formation, and the weakest part of the aircraft was from front on. LW bombers were far weaker defensivand ive heard their weakest point, in terms of defensive fire was from behind



I think it made sense to Park because of his oft' repeated priorities. The bombers were the targets, he kept repeating this over and over again like a mantra. He also believed that disrupting the formations not only made the bombers more vulnerable (which it did) but that it would spoil their ability to bomb accurately. He also repeatedly said that disrupting the many was more important than downing a few. Unlike a certain Leigh - Mallory, who said the exact opposite, Park (and Dowding) believed it was important to intercept the bombers before they reached their targets whenever possible. The intention was to prevent them bombing (not likely, though it did happen) or at the very least force them to bomb inaccurately.

We all discuss today rates of attrition, who could last longer, and talk about fighting to a stalemate. Park had been involved in the development of Britain's air defences since the mid 1920s and defending Britain's air space, all of it, was all he was trying to do. He had a thorough understanding of the system and tools which he had to do the job, which was just as well for us.

Things might have been very different. In May 1938 the Air Ministry wished to send Park to Palestine. Arthur Harris was to go to Fighter Command as Senior Air Staff Officer, Dowding's number two. Harris wrote that he had a long standing agreement with Cyril Newall, Chief of the Air Staff, that he should go to Palestine. Harris later claimed that he persuaded Newall by telling him that he was recently married and that his wife's trousseau was "entirely tropical". In fact Park had in April been in hospital with acute streptococcal pharyngitis and his being declared 'unfit for service abroad' and sent on a month's sick leave suffering from 'general debility' probably had more to do with the change in appointments than Mrs Harris' wardrobe. Harris went to Palestine and Park became Dowding's right hand man in July 1938.

Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!

Cheers

Steve


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## OldSkeptic (May 1, 2014)

stona said:


> Post war US estimates put the estimated development costs of the V-1 and V-2 weapons at three billion dollars. 1 US dollar was equivalent to 2.5 RM during the war years, give or take a few cents. The V-1 program comprised a mere two hundred million dollars of this.
> 
> About 30,000 V-1s were built at a cost of 5,000 RM each. A V-2 cost 121,000RM and 6,600 were built. This is a lot of money, but also a lot of bang. Many missiles (estimates go as high as a quarter) launched never made it across the Channel. A loss the Germans could ill afford. It has been estimated that the production of both missiles used up materiel equivalent to 24,000 single engine fighters. Could the Germans afford this?
> 36,000 tons of explosives were used in these weapons which might have been better used elsewhere. To defend the V-1 launch sites in France the Germans employed as many flak units as they used to defend the entire city of Hamburg.
> ...



Didn't say it was successful, just a more rational use of their resources. The Allies threw a lot at it, I get a total of 33 squadrons (inc 13 night fighters) involved for all or a part of the V1 defence period (June-Sep '44). 15 served through the entire campaign (3 were night fighters). Then there was the bombing, tactical aircraft, medium bombers and the strategic ones. 

Add in everything else and the Allies definitely spent more resources than the Germans did, but they could afford it at that point. The political resources spent by the British were also immense, standing weekly PM committee, etc, etc. It was of major importance to them, there were evacuations again, etc, etc. So directly and indirectly it tied up a lot of their resources.

There were ways the Germans could have used them more effectively if they had managed to get them into full production say even 6 months before and if they had the intelligence/PR/etc resources and info (very big 'ifs' of course). Aim all at a port for a week and launch a few thousand, repeat at other places. The actual impact would be small in terms of hits, but the disruption would have been hideous and almost certainly harmed the D-Day build up. But they were too late, by the time they had the numbers any strategic gain they could possibly have got was really gone, intertesting to speculate that if they hadn't wasted all that time on the V2 then they might have been able to get the V1 up and running sooner(?).


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## OldSkeptic (May 1, 2014)

stona said:


> Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!
> Steve





stona said:


> I think it made sense to Park because of his oft' repeated priorities. The bombers were the targets, he kept repeating this over and over again like a mantra. He also believed that disrupting the formations not only made the bombers more vulnerable (which it did) but that it would spoil their ability to bomb accurately. He also repeatedly said that disrupting the many was more important than downing a few. Unlike a certain Leigh - Mallory, who said the exact opposite, Park (and Dowding) believed it was important to intercept the bombers before they reached their targets whenever possible. The intention was to prevent them bombing (not likely, though it did happen) or at the very least force them to bomb inaccurately.
> 
> We all discuss today rates of attrition, who could last longer, and talk about fighting to a stalemate. Park had been involved in the development of Britain's air defences since the mid 1920s and defending Britain's air space, all of it, was all he was trying to do. He had a thorough understanding of the system and tools which he had to do the job, which was just as well for us.
> 
> ...



We were lucky to have Park. People underestimate the pressure he was under. The Luftwaffe, to their credit, tried about every trick in the book. At times they were sending over bombers with 5:1 fighter/bomber ratios. hence Park's brilliant tactics of 'stripping off the escort' first.


This is where people who didn't understand air tactics then (and quite a few even now) get all mixed up. The 'big wings' seem like a good idea, until to realise that airfare is 3 dimensional and where seeing the enemy first and surprising them is of greater importance than numbers. Park used lots of squadrons, just in separate coordinated attacks, from all directions. There never was a moment where the Luftwaffe were not being attacked, going there and coming back. Single squadrons were small, hard to spot, could form up, climb and attack very quickly, and had a target rich environment. So they could get in and out and inflict damage, which the next squadron did the same from somewhere else and so on. At no point did he risk too many forces, even if a a whole squadron was lost they could be easily replaced.

The 'big wings' were the opposite and perfect for the Luftwaffe fighter tactics, who could dive in and kill some, then repeat. Post war analysis showed that, at best they managed 1:1 kill/loss, maybe less. Over Dieppe and the French campaign they lost at about 4:1.

Trying to form up a 'big wing' in 11 Group invited a slaughter of a couple or several squadrons at one hit, which was a Luftwaffe hope. This is what the US escorts later did to the German 'big wings', the Mustangs got into them as they were forming up and murdered them. Big, clumsy, easy to see, wasted huge amounts of time and fuel just forming up, everyone looking over their shoulder to avoid running into someone else and not noticing 4, half a dozen or 12 enemy fighters in their midst wrecking havok.


So we were lucky, Leigh Mallory would have lost the BoB in a couple of weeks ...max, Harris, (shudder), probably in a couple of days. Only Park, week after week handled his forces with a skill that has never been beaten (in all the innumerable wargames since then by just about every airforce in the world). Fortunately the Luftwaffe never had a a Park, otherwise the UK/US bombing effensive would have suffered a heck of a lot more than they did.

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## beitou (May 1, 2014)

By the time the B of B started had the Germans managed to set up any of their own radar stations on the Frech coast? Did the Luftwaffe manage to get any warning of Park's intercepting squadrons beyond visual?


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## stona (May 1, 2014)

beitou said:


> By the time the B of B started had the Germans managed to set up any of their own radar stations on the Frech coast? Did the Luftwaffe manage to get any warning of Park's intercepting squadrons beyond visual?



Interceptions of raids during the BoB rarely took place out to sea, unlike he much smaller scale Channel battles that preceded the assault on Fighter Command.
This is largely due to the way the command and control system worked. Raids could be detected forming up over the French coast but this was not the time to launch interceptors. Course, height and direction of the raids were all established in order to get the right squadron or squadrons to the right place at the right time to make the interception. 
From the moment that orders were given by group controllers (for 11 Group these came from Uxbridge, scene of Churchill's dramatic visit) to sector controllers they were to be executed by squadrons taking off from airfields in that sector. Once airborne they were controlled from the ground and guided to the raid by their senior sector controller. It is often not understood that when squadrons from different sectors operated together they remained under the control of their own sector controller. As soon as raiders were sighted squadron commanders took charge and no further attempts were made to contact the engaged squadrons from the ground until they reported that the action was over.
It was the group controllers who were at the centre of the action. They had to interpret the filtered information coming in from Bentley Priory. They had to distinguish between major raids and feints and still keep as many aircraft as possible ready for action. Aircraft were not to waste fuel on pointless patrol, nor were they to be caught on or close to the ground. Several balances had to be struck between likely alternatives almost every day. It was a guessing game in which the penalties for guessing wrongly could be (and were) severe.


The Germans certainly had operational radar (Freya) at the beginning of the war but it was not part of a sophisticated command and control system until later. It did not give comprehensive coverage either. I believe the Germans did have some success seeing British raids coming early in the war, but I'd have to look that up to be sure. Someone else may know better 
The Luftwaffe's fighters and bombers operated free from ground control (and couldn't communicate with one another) so even had the RAF fighters been detected there is little that could have been done about it.

Cheers

Steve


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## Airframes (May 1, 2014)

I'd need to check specific details, but from memory, the German 'Freya' radar installations along the Channel coast were initially dedicated to shipping. It wasn't until heavier allied bomber raids commenced (I think after 1941) that serious thought was given to properly integrating these units into air defence.


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## stona (May 1, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Over Dieppe and the French campaign they lost at about 4:1.



I don't want to open a 'Big Wing' debate but over Dieppe Leigh-Mallory was finally convinced by some of his operational commanders that sending wings did not work and that squadrons should be sent in twos and threes, but once there operate under control of their individual commanders. Park would surely have approved 
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (May 1, 2014)

> Over Dieppe and the French campaign they lost at about 4:1.



Im not defending Mallory's or anybody's tactics, but its this kind pf one eyed selective editing of the real situations in order to run an agenda that really gets my hackles going. Overall, the campaigns in France were badly managed, and really brought out the RAFs failure to develop longer ranges for its aircraft, of which Dieppe was a prime example. However, there were other times, when the same tactics were employed, and LW losses were much closer to 1:1. Not just as a result of air combat....it wasnt tactics that delivered the RAF what meagre success it did achieve, but the overall loss rates from all causes that attrited the LW. its not that the RAF fought an exemplary campaign....it didnt, but force an opponent to get airborne, force an opponent to get entangled with you, and your opponent will suffer losses, even if you are losing in the actual air combats. There is no such thing as a free lunch in airborne warfare. Moreover these campaigns were critical as a precusor to other developments in the war, often overlooked and conveniently forgotten. People will often trot out the devastation meted out on the LW from January 1944 on, without ever giving a second thought as top why they had become vulnerable by early 1944. It was the attrition, on all fronts (east west, south, even north) that gave the LW no rest, put it on a drip feed as far as replacing losses, that forced it into the situation it was in 1944. Give it even the slightest rest, and the LW will be exponentially stronger than it was by the time of the critical showdown. This is all linked back to the type of war the LW fought, fromeven before BoB. The losses over France were a part of that process. 

Instead of trotting out the old chestnuts like Dieppe, we could talk about the RAF success, like June '42, where in Combat LW losses amounted to 89 aircraft and 105 damaged, versus 68 and 48 for the RAF. Sounds great, and challenges this notion about Mallory, or so it seems. But thats playing the same tricks with smoke and mirrors as we are attempting to do with Dieppe. Overall loss rates for the RAF, taking account other ops in the TO and non operational losses again pushed the proportion of losses in favour of the LW.

It had little to do with the tactics. It had everything to do with stretching the RAF beyond what it could reasonably undertake with the gear that it had. It had more to do with the fact that on those few occasions that the RAF got properly organised and looked like winning in the air, the LW refused to engage. It did have something to do with Mallory's stupidity, but this was a relatively minor issue compared to the other challenges being tackled at the time. And lastly , misreporting total LW loses is just one of my real bugbearts, and something I have spent a bit of time researching.


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## OldSkeptic (May 1, 2014)

stona said:


> Interceptions of raids during the BoB rarely took place out to sea, unlike he much smaller scale Channel battles that preceded the assault on Fighter Command.
> This is largely due to the way the command and control system worked. Raids could be detected forming up over the French coast but this was not the time to launch interceptors. Course, height and direction of the raids were all established in order to get the right squadron or squadrons to the right place at the right time to make the interception.
> From the moment that orders were given by group controllers (for 11 Group these came from Uxbridge, scene of Churchill's dramatic visit) to sector controllers they were to be executed by squadrons taking off from airfields in that sector. Once airborne they were controlled from the ground and guided to the raid by their senior sector controller. It is often not understood that when squadrons from different sectors operated together they remained under the control of their own sector controller. As soon as raiders were sighted squadron commanders took charge and no further attempts were made to contact the engaged squadrons from the ground until they reported that the action was over.
> It was the group controllers who were at the centre of the action. They had to interpret the filtered information coming in from Bentley Priory. They had to distinguish between major raids and feints and still keep as many aircraft as possible ready for action. Aircraft were not to waste fuel on pointless patrol, nor were they to be caught on or close to the ground. Several balances had to be struck between likely alternatives almost every day. It was a guessing game in which the penalties for guessing wrongly could be (and were) severe.
> ...



Several things. Park and Dowding wanted the end of channel shipping because of pilot losses. During the BoB (post the channel fight stage) pilots were instructed NOT to go over the Channel. Basically if you ditched or parachuted into it .. you died.

Yes the Germans did have radar, technically better radar than the UK had, but correct about the lack of a whole C&C system at that time. But it was good enough to pick up RAF bombers often, which suffered 50%+ losses in many missions. Purely local control sort of thing, but still good enough to intercept many BC raids in those early days. The comms was poor, but that was largely because of resistance with the Luftwaffe itself. Eric Stilpepper (book Spitfire on my Tail) was the comms officer for his Group, and they had good equipment, but Galland and the rest of the 'Spanish' crew were dead set against it (despite his claims in his own book much later). In fact Galland couldn't see the need for fighters to have radios at all.....

Galland was of the school, like Badar, that the fighters should just do what they want, where they want and the commander in the air should be the person that controls everything. The whole C&C system that the RAF had was an anathma to him (and Bader), probably a factor in why the Germans never managed the RAF's level of performance with their later (and in some ways technically better) system, they clung to obsolete and poor tactics. You could make a strong argument that Galland was promoted way above his level.

I mean, large gaggles (their big wings) in late 43/44 forming up were perfect for the US escorts, once they had the range, to see and hammer. And they never, to my knowledge managed to perfect the 'stripping off the escorts' tactics like Park did, even though they were technically capable of doing it (and it would have been hard for the USAAF to respond to). This was despite that at no time did the Luftwaffe face the sort of fighter/bomber escort ratios that the British often did. So you can't help but think that the Luftwaffe underperformed in the Air Battle of Germany compared to their technical resources.

You take a pretty obvious and straightforward tactic. In '43 the Luftwaffe had perfected the hammering of the bombers with heavy weapons in their twins. Then after they were broken up the formations the singles got in. This was fine until, even with P-38s, the USAAF had escorts who could murder the low performance twins the Germans had.

Now a logical move would have been for single squadrons, across Holland, France and Germany to be vectored into to boom and zoom the escorts to make them drop their drop tanks as early as possible, hence crippling their range and keep their twins well back waiting for the now unescorted bombers.. This would have worked either if the USAAF used the earlier tactic of escorting the bombers all the way or the later (more fuel efficient) layered defence where groups of fighters rendezvoused for different escort phases. In the second case they were very vulnerable (full of fuel and heavy) to that sort of tactic. Take a brave pilot not to drop their tanks when a bunch of high flying 109s come hammering in....at the very least it would disrupt the fighters and break them up, reducing the numbers that met the bombers. if you were really smart you would hit those fighters just over the coast when they were at their most vulnerable (didn't matter what they were in, a P-51 would have been just as easy a target as a P-47 fully loaded like that).

In the end, of course, the sheer numbers when the US built up enough fighters could have overcome that, with fighters escorting fighters for different phases, but it could have bought the Germans months of time.

But Galland (and the ilk) copied the 'big wing' approach, the same ones they had happily shot down in droves when they met them and had no 'Plan B' for when the US escorts started clearing the skies of their twins......definitely not a tactical genius.


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## beitou (May 1, 2014)

to clarify for myself; Park attacked with multiple squadrons from pretty much as soon as the Germans crossed the UK coast. These attacks were from various directions and continuous. At no time after crossing the UK coast were the Luftwaffe left unattacked, or that was the idea. These attacks were not penny packet attacks, if you are up go and attack, instead they were coordinated from multiple directions using ground control. The Luftwaffe never had such close ground control. Thease attacks pulled the escorting fighters away from the bombers and left the bombers vulnerable to fighter attack. Spitfires and Hurricanses attacked bothe bombers and fighters. Micheal Caine was busy killing Zulus.

To me the idea of big wings seems common sense, get more aircraft up and therefore shoot more down, however the opposite seems to have happened, more up means more targets for the Germans. Zulu spears did not manage to shoot down any Spitfires.


The Germans lost as many pilots as the British and could not replace them any easier than the British.


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## parsifal (May 1, 2014)

> Yes the Germans did have radar, technically better radar than the UK had, but correct about the lack of a whole C&C system at that time. But it was good enough to pick up RAF bombers often, which suffered 50%+ losses in many missions.




German radar early in the war had virtually nothing to do with these loss rates, moreover, it again skews the overall picture of RAF bomber losses way out of proportion to quote figures like that. RAF losses 39-40 for BC were under 600 aircraft for the 15 month period, equating to 14% of the force structure. The RAF suffered a number of disastrous losses early on, moving through to as late as March, as they learned the bitter lessons that the bomber does not always get through. The attacks on Kiel amd Wilhelmshaven were disasters, not because of radar...the bombers were just hacked out of the sky by conventional means.

Over france, the Battles and Blenheims of the AASF suffered exceptionally heavy losses trying to knock out the bridges at Sedan, but this was mostly due to the flak wall that the RAF, in its failure to react immediately, allowed the Germans to put into place in the three days allowed to them. Radar had nothing to do with these losses. Gallands free range tactics in these battles worked a treat in these situations incidentally...its what they were developed for...more or less instantaneous and autonomous reactions by the guys on the spot over the battlefield, defending the Heers vital needs on an availability basis. Parks, or indeed the RAFs rather cumbersome (in comparison) centralised control methods would not have, and didnt, work very well in these super tactical situations, where the focus was on tactical support. It took the RAF about four years to learn these lerssons that the germans already knew. 

For the germans, their methodologies and tactical concepts were about maximising flexibility, hence Gallands advocation of the free range tactics. The German air force was different to the Allies during the BOF because it was a flexible force, abale to switch from tactical bombing of infrastructure, to CAS, to air defence over the battlefield, and everything in between. Allied systems were not nearly as flexible in this regard, and this is what lost them the air war over france in May. not everything that Galland, or the LW did or thought, was silly. They were years ahead in some respects. Its just that in pure air defence, or sustained air operations, they had not planned, or prepared for such work to anythiing like what the RAF had done.

From the RAF own website, the following comments relate to how the RAF organised its CAS efforts in Normandy.

"Fighter bombers began a new direct support role, operating with the assistance of radio-equipped Forward Air Controllers (FACs). The fighter bombers were on call from "Cab Ranks", orbiting points close to the forward edge of the battle area. From these Cab Ranks, the FACs could very quickly call on air support for any targets of opportunity or threats to the troops in their area. The FACs were both RAF and Army personnel, specially trained to identify targets to the pilots and direct thier fire".

Often these FACs were airborne as well, and often the squadron commanders were empoered to act on their own initiative


Almost word for word, you could apply those descriptions to the germans methods of 1940. this is not a weakness, its a strength, and one of the reasons the LW survived for as long as it did.

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## Koopernic (May 1, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Yes the Germans did have radar, technically better radar than the UK had, but correct about the lack of a whole C&C system at that time.
> 
> .



It was the German Navy that invented radar; the idea for it literally was that of the chief physicist of their signals branch, von Kunhold and was inspired by their active sonar work. Sonar was proving inadequate for gunnery aiming (yes they were looking at that). If you look at the dates (first detection of target first detection of an aircraft they arguably beat Watson Watt). The radar that evolved from this was known generally as "Seetakt" or roughly "Sea Tactical" and it pretty soon had blind fire capability added. Blind fire ability to 0.1 degree had been demonstrated in 1936 using lobe switching but the German navy waited till a more advanced system that only switched the receiving lobe (thus not loosing range, also harder to jam and also able to distinguish between closely spaced targets) was available so Bismark didn't have blind fire (neither did the Royal Navy at the time)

Seetakt opperated on "G" wave (Initially 60cm then latter 80cm) which was a frequency 10-20 times higher than CH or the early type 279 RAN radars, this was needed for accurate naval blind fire. In order to extend the range for purposes of air warning the company that built them "GEMA" increased power output by reducing frequency. The new frequency was the "F" band, around 2.4m and so it was called F for "Freya". Freya, unlike CH, worked well over land which was a German necessity given geography.

A handful of these "Freya" radars were in service by the time war broke out and they were simply integrated into the air warning and reporting service that was already in existence, so its not quite correct to say they just had no clue, they did have a system but it wasn't as well evolved given latter deployment.

The German Navy had approached a company called Telefunken to help with development but Telefunkens chief engineer/physicist a certain Dr Runge scoffed at von Kunhold's idea and declined. Runge however though about it and changed his mind and Telefunken privately developed what was initially called "Darmstadt" (his university) and latter "Wurzburg" when the wavelength went from 60cm to 54 and power was upped from 1kW to 8kW. (all Telefunken FLAK radars were named after university towns). It's said that the initial insult by Runge effected transfer of know how.

Wurzburg-A was in service a few months after war broke out. It used a 3m dish and was designed as an early warning set, however unlike Freya it had height finding ability though only about 35 nautical miles range , about 1/3rd of Freya's. Three operators were required: one nodded the antenna vertically to find elevation, one nodded horizontally to track bearing while the other read of the range. Accuracy was about 2 degree, about 4 degrees if target was close to ground. It was this out of date radar British Commandos captured at Bruneval.

Wurzburg-B never existed but was meant to use infrared optics to track bearing. Within a Year of deployment of Wurzburg-A the new Wurzburg-C came out in early 1941 and introduced conical scan, for which Runge had patents. It was now possible for a single operator to track the target to within 0.3 degree in both elevation and bearing and the crew was reduced to two. Accuracy dropped to about 0.5 degrees if the aircraft was low.

Wurzburg-D came out only a few months latter with some deliveries and some 80 on the production line around June 1941. Wurzburg-D reduced range accuracy to less than 24 meters and added selsysn's so that the FLAK predictor "Kommandogerat 40" could directly accept inputs from the Radar. Wurzburg also had an analog computer to convert spherical co-ordinates to Cartesian which included speed and altitude.

The same time as Wurzburg-D was coming into service in 1941 a variant called Wurzburg-Riesse (Riesse = giant) which added a 7m power driven dish to replace the 3m dish of Wurzburg-D was introduced. This more than doubled range and increased accuracy to under 0.2 degrees. It was designed as a FLAK radar but because of its high accuracy and range two of them could be used to guide a German night fighter to within 100m or so of a Bomber.

Both Wurzbug-D and Wurzburg-Riesse were the worlds finest blind fire AAA radars till mid 1943 when the US built SCR-584 started deploying. The US SCR-268 was inferior in accuracy, the Germans easily jammed them during the Anzio landing and the British Army didn't really have anything at all because their priorities lay elsewhere. (Hence the need to borrow US SCR-584 radar during the V1 offensive)

Wurzburg Riesse could often cut through Allied Jamming even if Wurzburg-D wasn't effective due to its much tighter beam.

When British commando's captured a Wurzburg-A the Germans implemented a anti jamming program, within 2 weeks there was a way to adjust frequecies over 3MHs via a field instruction, then 6MHz, then 3 islands of 6MHz and then automatic retuning systems. "Windows" was overcome with "Wurzlaus" which was a Doppler system initially developed to detect low flying aircraft and Nurnburg which allowed the operator to hear propeller modulations to help reacquire a target in heavy jamming. Refinements such as ability to compensate for high altitude winds and other forms of anti jamming. Wurzbug Riesse with a moving target indication called k-laus could get through jamming. There was also a Wurzburg-Riesse Gigant with 20 times the power.

About 4000 Wurzburg were produced with another 500 Wurzburg Riesse. 

1943 saw a new radar on a 3m sized Wurzburg dish called Mannheim which added auto track, doubled power. Manheim-K was to switch to 27cm wavelength but became a project called Manheim-KK when the 9cm British magnetron was discovered. This was deployed as Rotterheim, one of about 100 microwave radars the Germans got into service between the Luftwaffe and German Navy.

These are just the main Luftwaffe radars, the Germans were trying to replace them or upgrade them.

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## OldSkeptic (May 2, 2014)

beitou said:


> to clarify for myself; Park attacked with multiple squadrons from pretty much as soon as the Germans crossed the UK coast. These attacks were from various directions and continuous. At no time after crossing the UK coast were the Luftwaffe left unattacked, or that was the idea. These attacks were not penny packet attacks, if you are up go and attack, instead they were coordinated from multiple directions using ground control. The Luftwaffe never had such close ground control. Thease attacks pulled the escorting fighters away from the bombers and left the bombers vulnerable to fighter attack. Spitfires and Hurricanses attacked bothe bombers and fighters. Micheal Caine was busy killing Zulus.
> 
> To me the idea of big wings seems common sense, get more aircraft up and therefore shoot more down, however the opposite seems to have happened, more up means more targets for the Germans. Zulu spears did not manage to shoot down any Spitfires.
> 
> The Germans lost as many pilots as the British and could not replace them any easier than the British.



Correct. The idea always was to shoot down bombers, but you have to neutralise the escorts too. it wasn't so much about shooting down the escorts (though that was always a bonus) but disrupting them, causing them use up fuel and altitude and position (hence the term 'stripping away'), letting other fighters in to hammer the bombers. And the Luftwaffe couldn't handle that attrition, it's fighter manufacturing was inferior to the British (plus they were unable to make up bomber losses too) and their training wasn't able to produce the numbers needed for the losses. Newbie Luftwaffe pilots were just as useless as the RAF ones and just as easily shot down. So the Luftwaffe steadily suffered attrition in both aircraft, pilots/crews numbers *and* quality.

By the end of the BoB Fighter Command was actually stronger that it was at the beginning, while the Luftwaffe had declined significantly. It wasn't even close to a draw. 
Some have argued (which I agree with) that the Luftwaffe never really recovered after that and never achieved that peak combination of numbers and quality ever again.


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## OldSkeptic (May 2, 2014)

parsifal said:


> For the Germans, their methodologies and tactical concepts were about maximising flexibility, hence Gallands advocation of the free range tactics. The German air force was different to the Allies during the BOF because it was a flexible force, abale to switch from tactical bombing of infrastructure, to CAS, to air defence over the battlefield, and everything in between. Allied systems were not nearly as flexible in this regard, and this is what lost them the air war over france in May. not everything that Galland, or the LW did or thought, was silly. They were years ahead in some respects. Its just that in pure air defence, or sustained air operations, they had not planned, or prepared for such work to anythiing like what the RAF had done.



Yes and no. If you look at the history of the Luftwaffe from it's inception it was designed to be a part of 'combined arms', reflecting the lessons the Wehrmacht (which was the name for the entire German forces, the Army actually was the Heer) had experienced in 1918 against Monash.

The role of the fighters under that doctrine was to gain local air superiority so things like their Stukas could get in and be a 'long artillery' of the Heer, while their medium bombers were an 'interdiction' force. They laid great importance in catching the enemy air force on the ground. 
But at the same time, within the fighter community there was a thread of 'Red Baron' type followers, or a more scathing person would say 'score chasers'.

From 1939 to 1942, except in the North African Desert, that combined arms doctrine served them well. But the rot was setting in and their effectiveness was declining.
A lot of that came from the BoB, When Goering over promoted his 'young Turks' (people like Galland) who had great scores and were the ideal of the the 'warrior heroes' that the Nazis ideologically admired.

But these people (remember Galland's dislike of radios?) had no idea of proper air tactics. So the Luftwaffe air arm became a sort of inverted idea of what a real fighter air force should do.

So you see in the North African campaign people like Marsaille happily shooting down heaps of P-40's and Hurricanes while they never shot down bombers, great scores and headines and medals and money for them, sod the poor soldier on the ground being bombed. And this 'warrior/hero' thing had by then became so perverted that a Luftwaffe squadron was really a life support mechanism for a single high scoring pilot, rather than a combined fighting unit achieving a tactical and strategic aim.

This fighter pilot mentality was not unique by any means. When Harry Broadhurst took over the DAF and put bombs on Spitfires there was a lot of pilot opposition, but he (with Monty's backing) made sure it happened and the DAF's effectiveness went up a lot (noting the Park had already done that months before in Malta).

This meant, overall, that the Luftwaffe, which was the world leader in 39-42 was by then falling behind, the allies were catching up and overtaking them and the internal rot was getting worse. By early 43 the DAF had developed far better CAS (and interdiction) than the Luftwaffe ever had. This became the western allies doctrine and though the US, until very late 44/early 45 never got quite as good as the DAF and the later 2nd Tactical air Force, they became good enough to become a contributing war winning tool.

By that time the Luftwaffe had long gone into total self destruct. Galland's 'big blow', as an example, was a strategic and tactical nonsense. His own book , very self serving, showed his own weaknesses, he was for several years the 'Inspector General of the Luftwaffe', basically second only to Goering. Hitler, for all his many military faults was by that time totally skeptical of the Luftwaffe .. and basically he was right to be that, because by that time it was useless. Galland, forgetting his own slaughtering of big wings.... pushed big wings. Like the rest was enamoured by 'new gadgets' when what they needed was a better 109 that could be mass produced, a higher altitude 190 and a fast twin, close ground control and good tactics ... and forgetting totally 'big scores' by individual pilots.

They needed, for the air defence of German a C&C system like the British had, with someone in charge that could do things like 'strip off the escorts'... that person was not Goering or Galland, who's tactical ideas by that time was 'super weapons' or 'mass attacks' (and for Galland, the idea that someone on the ground could tell a fighter pilot what to do was a total anethma).

In his own book he never understood how Park beat the Luftwaffe (and lied about it and blamed Goering for all the faults) and hence never learned the lessons, and then when he was in an over promoted level never made the right things happen.

There is a parallel, most German generals never admitted they were ever beaten, except by Hitler's useless orders. Right. Galland, in his own mind was never beaten (even in the BoB) .. except for Goering...total amateur...


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## stona (May 2, 2014)

beitou said:


> To me the idea of big wings seems common sense, get more aircraft up and therefore shoot more down, however the opposite seems to have happened, more up means more targets for the Germans.



During the BoB the problems with Big Wings were many and obvious.

They took too long to assemble and set of for an interception. Leigh-Mallory was happy not to intercept the bombers before they bombed and said so on at least two occasions I can think of. This was anathema to men like Park and Dowding who considered the air defence of Great Britain to entail an effort to prevent the bombing or at the very least disrupt it.
Bader complained that his wing should have been sent off earlier but in this he reveals a complete lack of understanding of how the coordinated system worked and also ignorance of the technical limitations of the system, particularly Chain Home.

A wing cannot climb as fast as a squadron, particularly when made up of the RAF's two principle fighters and much crucial time was lost in take off and the climb and assembly. As Park commented in October 1940. 

_"Bitter experience has proved time and time again that it is better to intercept the enemy with one squadron above him than by a whole wing crawling up below, probably after the enemy has dropped his bombs." _

When Malan briefly operated with 12 Group he managed to join the wing whilst refusing to be part of it. According to Flt.Lt. HM Stephen who was present at Malan's initial meeting with Leigh-Mallory, Malan insisted that he and his squadron should be on top in the air, above everyone else. He and his men would be Park's 'one squadron'.

Jonnie Johnson came to the conclusion that two squadrons was the optimum wing formation for air fighting.

_ "My own later experience on both offensive and defensive operations confirmed that two squadrons of fighters was the ideal number to lead in the air". _

Squadron Leader H. Broadhurst told Johnson.

_"Sometimes in 1940 our control and reporting system was unreliable so that plotting enemy raids on the ops tables at Fighter Command and 11 Group was not always accurate. I remember at least one occasion when 
there were no hostile plots on the table and yet some of our chaps were shot down. It was, therefore, very important for a flight leader to obey the controller's instructions so that, down in the hole, he would know exactly where the leader was. If like Douglas [Bader] you went darting about all over the place, it upset the whole plotting table. So, when I lead the Wittering wing I obeyed instructions and did what I was told to do." _

These men understood how the system worked something Bader demonstrably did not. Bader believed that 

_"the Battle should have been controlled from Fighter Command HQ, where they had the map of the whole country, and knew the state of each squadron."_ 

Such breath taking ignorance of how the system worked is surprising even from a man like Bader. Group Captain Townsend had this to say about Bader's opinion.

_"Douglas Bader wanted control by Fighter Command, by Dowding himself in the last resort. But as Commander in Chief Dowding was far to preoccupied with strategic decisions to follow the Battle blow by blow. He left that to his Group Commanders. 'Bader's suggestion beats the band,' was Park's subsequent comment. 'It would have been impossible for one controller to handle fifty squadrons.'_

Bader was only able to get away with all this because of his close relationship with Leigh-Mallory and because the man sitting at a desk under whose control he was supposed to be, Wing Commander AB Woodhall, the Duxford controller, failed to control him. Bader brazenly disobeyed orders 'darting about all over the place' even when he was supposed to be covering 11 Group's airfields.

What experience did Bader base his assumption that WW1 'Flying Circus' type tactics were appropriate to the BoB? He was a recently appointed squadron commander (June 1940) who imagined that he better knew how to fight the Battle than the two men most responsible for creating Fighter Command , themselves masters of strategic and tactical matters. He had little experience of aerial combat either. A close look at 'Big Wing' operations is a salutary lesson.
From 7th September to 29th October the 'Big Wing' undertook 37 operations. It made 7 interceptions, none at all in October when most raids came in at higher altitudes. This was the sum total of Bader aerial combat experience. Even Fighter Command's harshest critics admit an interception rate better than the Wing's 19%. Even 'Dizzy' Allen, who had a decidedly unique but nonetheless valid view of how the battle was fought, admits to a 50% interception rate and his claim is the lowest I've seen.

I will not discuss how many aircraft the Wing shot down as that sort of thing invariably generates more heat than light. Not even Leigh-Mallory's most ardent supporters would believe that it was anything like the 105 that Leigh-Mallory claimed in the summary to his September 1940 report. The number doesn't even tally with the narrative of each patrol in the report which it summarises! Dowding didn't beat about the bush in his response to Leigh-Mallory's creative arithmetic.

_"I read a great many combat reports and I think I am beginning to pick out those which can be relied on and those which throw in claims at the end for good measure." _

That is just about as close as one senior officer can come to accusing another of cooking the books.

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (May 2, 2014)

I'll leave Bader alone for a bit.......I've plenty more

Let's get back to Leigh-Mallory and his support of the so called 'Big Wings'. On 29th January 1941 Leigh-Mallory conducted a paper exercise (familiar to any college trained officer) based on an actual attack on Kenley, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch on 6th September 1940. His intention was to demonstrate that large formations would have been more effective, both in defending the airfields and inflicting losses on the Germans. Unfortunately he completely mismanaged the defence. The raid was not intercepted at all on the way in and, worse, Kenley and Biggin Hill were both bombed whilst the RAF was still on the ground. It's a good job this was a 'theoretical' raid. Several of his mistakes were pointed out to him by Wing Commander Thomas Lang, one of 11 Group's senior controllers. Leigh-Mallory's response was that next time he would do better. There was no next time and a next time wasn't a luxury that Park could have afforded.

Cheers

Steve

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## merlin (May 2, 2014)

So, judging by all the unfavourable comments about - Leigh-Mallory, where would a more likely place for him to be, instead of AoC 12 Group e.g. Army Co-op in France 1940, or still in the Middle-East, or ..... ??


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## Aozora (May 2, 2014)

merlin said:


> So, judging by all the unfavourable comments about - Leigh-Mallory, where would a more likely place for him to be, instead of AoC 12 Group e.g. Army Co-op in France 1940, or still in the Middle-East, or ..... ??



Walmington-on-Sea? Town Trail Walmington-on-Line

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## Shortround6 (May 2, 2014)

What have you got against the Home Guard ????

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## OldSkeptic (May 2, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> What have you got against the Home Guard ????



Good one....


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## stona (May 3, 2014)

Leigh-Mallory should have been anywhere but Fighter Command, an organisation which he didn't properly understand at any level. He should also have been kept away from the Americans later. They did not have confidence in him, unlike Tedder.
Cheers
Steve


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## OldSkeptic (May 3, 2014)

stona said:


> Leigh-Mallory should have been anywhere but Fighter Command, an organisation which he didn't properly understand at any level. He should also have been kept away from the Americans later. They did not have confidence in him, unlike Tedder.
> Cheers
> Steve



He pissed off Monty too on several occasions because of his timidity at times. I think he had gotten his fingers burnt too much during that 41/42 period and later on became very loss sensitive.


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## stona (May 3, 2014)

An illustration of how Park handled his squadrons is required to show how the command and control system worked and also why Dowding was so keen to keep Fighter Command so far south.

13th August 1940. Park receives good information from radar that a large raid has formed up and is approaching.

1. Left flank. A small formation is put up over two airfields in Suffolk.
2. Left flank. Two full Hurricane squadrons and one Spitfire squadron are ordered up. They are positioned over a convoy in the Thames estuary and the forward airfields at Manston and Hawkinge.
3. Right Flank. A squadron of Tangmere's Hurricanes are sent up. One section patrols its base the rest patrol a line from Petworth to Arundel (West Sussex).
4. Centre. A squadron of Northolt's Hurricanes are sent to a position over Canterbury from where they can be sent either east or west as required.
5. Finally the left is reinforced by two sections of a Spitfire squadron from Kenley and the right with another of Tangmere's squadrons.

These dispositions left Park with about half of his Hurricanes and one third of his Spitfires uncommitted.

The result?
The raid split into two, one part was intercepted by the Canterbury Hurricanes near Bognor, the other by one of the Tangmere squadrons near Worthing. All the Brits will notice that these are two famous _seaside_ towns. Neither reached or bombed its targets. This is a perfect demonstration of the concept of 'forward interception'. One of Park's cardinal principles was in his words _"to intercept the enemy before he reached his coastal objective". _ and this is exactly what he achieved on that day.

Another consequence of the effective resistance put up over SE England on that day was the erroneous conclusion reached by the Luftwaffe that fighters must have been moved south from the North and the Midlands by Fighter Command. This in turn led to the August 15th raids, launched from Norway and Denmark, against targets in those areas. This was another debacle for the Luftwaffe. It's a good job that it was because had any encouragement been offered to the Luftwaffe in those operations they would surely have been repeated, stretching Fighter Command's resources even further.

On 19th August Park summed up the lessons of the recent fighting in one of his numerous instructions to his controllers. He was confident that the Luftwaffe could be thwarted so long as sector aerodromes remained in service and the temptation to swop fighter for fighter was avoided.

It is obvious who drew the most confidence from the operations of the previous week and who thought that, if they hadn't won the exchanges, they had at least achieved the stated objective of avoiding defeat.

Cheers

Steve

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## OldSkeptic (May 3, 2014)

stona said:


> An illustration of how Park handled his squadrons is required to show how the command and control system worked and also why Dowding was so keen to keep Fighter Command so far south.
> 
> 13th August 1940. Park receives good information from radar that a large raid has formed up and is approaching.
> 
> ...



Great stuff Steve, keep it up. Sadly an awful lot of people don't know just how good Park was. And he kept it up week after week and basically never put a foot wrong. Amazing performance, one of the greatest pieces of generalship in all history.

As I have mentioned before the BoB is probably one of the most wargamed battles around. And no one has even beaten Park's performance. Incredible to think how he had mastered the tactics of aerial warfare to such an extent....far too many people struggle with it now.


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## Marcel (May 3, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Dutch AF
> 
> In 1940, the Dutch AF had 29 Fokker DXXis and 41 GIs (which they commandeered). The Fokker CX bombers were destroyed in the opening day of the assault. most of the medium bombers; Fokker T4, T5 and T8W were in the NEI, but there were 12T5s and at least 8 T8W seaplanes used,
> 
> ...


Sorry for bringing up an old post and being not on topic, but just read this and these numbers are all wrong. We had 29 D.XXI's, 23 G.1's, which were not all operational on May 10th. 3 of the "spanish" G.1's were actually made partly operational on the last day and flew one mission. Th C.X was far from wiped out, as the matter of fact they flew right up until the last hours of the fight, and didn't suffer that much. The T.V was the main bomber in the Nl, but there were about eight. The last of that one was shot down doing an attack on the moerdijk bridge on May 13th. The T8W was a navy float plane, they flew around and a couple of them fled to the UK flying right until september, forming 320 squadron. I don't believe the T.4 saw any action. 

The T5,T8W were never in the NEI


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## Marcel (May 3, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Curious as to why there aren't Dutch pilots listed there. There were several that escaped after Germany overran the Netherlands.



There were no dutch fighter pilots in england at the time. There were naval pilots (see the T8W's that fled to England) and the 320 squadron, but I don't believe any Dutch fighter pilot made it to the UK before August. They were pretty locked up in there.


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## GrauGeist (May 4, 2014)

I recall reading where several did make it to Britain after the Netherlands fell to Germany in May.

In addition to those pilots joining the RAF in time for the BoB, there were Dutch Navy Fokkers and crew that made it over to Britain, which became the core of 320 and 321 Squadron.

Eventually, the RAF formed 322 Squadron, an all Dutch fighter unit, but that was in 1943.


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## Marcel (May 4, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> I recall reading where several did make it to Britain after the Netherlands fell to Germany in May.
> 
> In addition to those pilots joining the RAF in time for the BoB, there were Dutch Navy Fokkers and crew that made it over to Britain, which became the core of 320 and 321 Squadron.
> 
> Eventually, the RAF formed 322 Squadron, an all Dutch fighter unit, but that was in 1943.


Well, afaik apart from the MLD personel, only the pupils from Haamstede were able to immediately leave to the UK. These were by no means active pilots, but trainees. They were not ready in time to fight in the bob. According to my info, no operational pilot could escape immediately, stuck as they were in Holland (Haamstede is in Zeeland) without aircraft. Some of them got there eventually, but too late to participate. They certainly did not have the chance to withdraw with the allieds like some Belgians could.


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## GrauGeist (May 4, 2014)

It's been a while since I read about that, it means I'll have to dig around and find the book.

When I do, I'll see about posting the info

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## bbear (May 4, 2014)

Stona: 
"Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!"

Personal leadership as a factor: how important was it? 

Park visited his units frequently. He saw the picture through his own eyes: the machines, crew (ground and air), command, facilities, replacements - the whole picture. Is it the case that when Park committed a squadron to an action he not only knew what he was sendng but who? Could he, did he, form some impression of the consequences in materiel, in men and women, and in morale. Did he ever considerr matters in terms of people who he knew personally? In human terms - how close is too close, how distant is too distant? 

Reports in person or in writing would give Group commanders one story - the eagle eye of senior airman wuld sometimes tell a different one?

Take it either way - 
aid to technical decision makng, or
morale, confidence, trust and positive regard 
or personal leadership.

What did the human element count for in the BoB? Park specificaly or in general? Crucial points in the battle if any? How would one assess this historically, objectively? If the factor is important and subjective - what does numerical analysis (kill/loss ratios, for example) count for?

If you please? That is -if the question is interesting.


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## stona (May 4, 2014)

I think personal leadership was a very important factor. Park wasn't leading armies of men and women he was leading 11 Group. He certainly did know some of the leaders at squadron level personally but one shouldn't make too much of this. 
He was an experienced airman and accomplished combat pilot himself. In November 1918 he was credited in an official report with nine enemy aircraft destroyed and eleven 'sent down out of control'. Earlier, whilst still an artillery officer at Gallipoli he had been much impressed with the leadership style of Sir William Birdwood. Park later commented that he showed how a leader could relax without cheapening his authority, though he did not adopt 'the soul of ANZAC's' habit of taking naked swims 

Park was acutely aware of the strain the Battle was placing not just on his pilots but all the others who kept the operation running. In November 1940 he was fighting for more facilities, equipment and transport for his men. He wanted pilots released for 'exercise and recreation' whenever bad weather ruled out flying. He wanted regular hot meals and more comfortable accommodation at dispersal points. He asked that pilots in the London area be billeted off aerodrome in order to get undisturbed sleep. 'Guest' nights should be reintroduced and the provision of 'string bands, in order to remove some of the drabness of the present war' would be worth the effort.

His leadership style is nicely summed up by an apparent contradiction in two orders/signals he gave on 19th and 20th August 1940. In instructions to his controllers he pointed out that too many pilots were being lost over the sea whilst setting off in hot pursuit of retreating German aircraft. Retreating Germans were beaten Germans, at least for that day, and it mattered little to Park that their lives and machines were spared. These losses grieved him more than any others. He did not want his pilots setting off across the Channel in pursuit of retreating German aircraft.
The very next day (20th) he signalled Hornchurch to commend 'the fine offensive spirit of the single pilot of No. 54 squadron who chased nine He 113s [actually Bf 109s] across to France this afternoon.' He went on to ask all at Hornchurch and other stations to be aware of the German practice of putting up strong patrols over the Straits of Dover to protect aircraft returning from raids. 
He didn't want his pilots chasing retreating aircraft but when they did so he praised their courage whilst drawing their attention to the danger of doing so and, crucially, avoiding a heavy rebuke. He understood and had learnt, probably way back at Gallipoli, that the young men who fought for him had to be led rather than driven.

His leadership of 11 Group in 1940 was crucial to the fighting of the campaign. There may have been other officers who could have waged a successful campaign too, some of the other senior group commanders certainly understood how the system worked and could have replaced him.

Long after Park was removed from 11 Group the second version of the BoB pamphlet, which included Park and Dowding was released. Wing Commander Lang, the officer who had sent Park the results of Leigh-Mallory's disastrous paper exercise earlier, summed up his congratulatory message thus. 'I think you will always be referred to as A.O.C. 11 Group.' He was indeed.

Cheers

Steve

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## OldSkeptic (May 4, 2014)

bbear said:


> Stona:
> "Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!"
> 
> Personal leadership as a factor: how important was it?
> ...



In warfare, as in all human endeavours, morale is a critical element. Both Park (and later Monty) put tremendous effort into that personal touch, to create a bond of trust.
Plus it is an important check on an all to human failure of just ordering 'pieces on the board' around. When you meet and see the people you are sending out to kill and die it is a good way of making sure you don't think about them as purely machines and never waste them.

That bond is that the people on the 'pointy end' know that they are not being sent out for no reason, that their superiors wont risk them for something meaningless and that they will try and give them everything possible to win with the minimum loss of life. This is nothing to do with 'softness' as both of them were two of toughest 'hard asses' (using the US term) around.

Note that both Park and Monty served in WW1 and saw the terrible and so often useless waste of people and learned from that. Park served in Gallipoli and the Somme. Monty through the entire Ww1 (except for convalescence). Both were injured severely, interesting to speculate how that affected them both personally. Park, after recovering became a fighter/recon pilot and was shot down twice with 5 kills and 14 (using the later term) probables.
Both had fought and nearly died at the 'pointy end' and both were thinkers and leaders.

There is a great strategic theoretician, John Boyd, who said that there are 3 elements to warfare, moral, mental and physical, and of those the moral one is the most important, mental is the second and the physical the lowest.

Time after time we have seen people with greater motivation and skills outperform those with vastly better resources, but that lack those other elements.
Even more so in warfare, which is an extreme human behaviour. We've seen that in so many wars, such as Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan (against all comers) and Lebanon. Vastly inferior (in terms of resources), but superior in terms of skills and motivation, forces beating those with the huge resources but who were inferior in the other areas.


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## stona (May 4, 2014)

Two phrases with which Park would have agreed.

“The moral is to the physical as three to one” 

“The secret of war lies in the communications”

Both attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte.

As for the numbers game. It only becomes important for what we now call the BoB in retrospect. Even the ever cautious Park consistently estimated that the RAF was destroying 3 or 4 Luftwaffe aircraft (at various times) for every one it lost. It wasn't the point, at the time. The RAF didn't have to shoot down vast or even superior numbers of German aircraft and pilots, it had to avoid losing too many itself.

Cheers

Steve


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## OldSkeptic (May 4, 2014)

stona said:


> Two phrases with which Park would have agreed.
> 
> “The moral is to the physical as three to one”
> 
> ...



First rule (so often forgotten especially these days by Americans) rule of strategy .. never do what your enemy wants you to do.

Dead true. The Luftwaffe 'strategy' (if you can call it that) was to get the RAF up and their 'superior' planes and pilots would kill them, or they would kill them on the ground. And for a while there was bit of truth in that, at that time the Luftwaffe was at its peak of power and, overall its pilots, bomber crews, doctrine and tactics were greatly superior.

Park's job was to avoid the 'big loss' as much as 'killing the enemy'. Dowding, correctly left the tactical battle to Park while he managed the logistic and sadly political battle, I mean Douglas was so out of touch that Dowding, in a sense had to ambush him to get what was a logical operational decision, which Douglas never ever forgave him for. Leigh Mallory, which Park finally picked up on (and documented) sabotaged Dowding's replenishment system (he sent his crap in while keeping his 'best' in 12 group).

Hard not not come to the conclusion that LM was worth at least 10 squadrons to the the Germans.

The key logistics were pilots, not planes for the RAF. Correctly the RAF over estimated the Luftwaffe in planes, crews and production (always the sensible thing to do, then your surprises are always good ones).


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## stona (May 4, 2014)

Douglas never accepted or understood the difference between simple flying experience and vital combat experience. He didn't perceive a difference between operational and non operational fighter pilots. Some on this forum suffer the same problem 
For example on 31st October 1940 Douglas wrote that the pilot position had undergone a "kaleidoscopic change" and that in the case of Fighter Command "we are actually faced with a surplus." Evill made a more realistic assessment. At the end of July there had been sixty two squadrons and 1,046 operational pilots. At the end of October there were sixty six and a half squadrons and 1,042 operational pilots. Total wastage in those three months was 1,151 pilots, twenty five every two days. Fighter Command, Evill concluded, was "at about the lowest ebb in operational pilots" at which it could function.

This is after the 'stabilisation' system was introduced on 8th September.
All 11 Group squadrons were 'Class A' with a minimum strength of 16 operational pilots. Some 10 and 12 Group squadrons were also designated Class A, but there minimum strength of 16 pilots need not all be operational (a distinction lost on both Douglas and Leigh Mallory). This was because Dowding insisted to Park that they must retain some operational squadrons outside 11 Group to exchange for the most exhausted squadrons in that Group.
Class B squadrons were to retain 6 operational pilots in their quota of 16.
Class C squadrons were to retain only 3 operational pilots and these squadrons themselves were not really operational squadrons.

Fighter Command Head Quarters would inform 10, 12 and 13 Groups daily of the number of pilots required from them for allotment to 11 Group. These men were supposed to be fully trained. Men from OTUs were sent to squadrons outside 11 Group to finish their operational training as 11 Groups commitments left its own squadrons unable to do this.

Richard Saul of 13 Group had previously always sent experienced units south to 11 Group and now he sent his best trained men as part of the stabilisation system. Leigh-Mallory had always retained his better squadrons in 12 Group and now he did the same with individual pilots. 

In July and August 1940 squadrons sent to 11 Group from 13 Group were credited with 43 aircraft destroyed for the loss of two pilots. Those from 12 Group with seventeen aircraft destroyed for the loss of thirteen pilots. Even allowing for the inaccuracy of the credits this is hard evidence that Leigh-Mallory was sending less capable and experienced squadrons down to 11 Group and that this practice was being paid for in the lives of young pilots. That is about the most damning indictment of Leigh-Mallory that can be made.

Cheers

Steve


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## OldSkeptic (May 4, 2014)

stona said:


> Douglas never accepted or understood the difference between simple flying experience and vital combat experience. He didn't perceive a difference between operational and non operational fighter pilots. Some on this forum suffer the same problem
> For example on 31st October 1940 Douglas wrote that the pilot position had undergone a "kaleidoscopic change" and that in the case of Fighter Command "we are actually faced with a surplus." Evill made a more realistic assessment. At the end of July there had been sixty two squadrons and 1,046 operational pilots. At the end of October there were sixty six and a half squadrons and 1,042 operational pilots. Total wastage in those three months was 1,151 pilots, twenty five every two days. Fighter Command, Evill concluded, was "at about the lowest ebb in operational pilots" at which it could function.
> 
> This is after the 'stabilisation' system was introduced on 8th September.
> ...



Thanks Steve, I think we are 'double teaming' this to educate people here, totally correct. Oh yes, for political reasons LM sent in his 'crap'. To be fair I blame Dowding for this to an extent, he should have ordered LM to send Bader' squadron into 11 Group where Bader would have learned .. or died (probably died, he really wasn't that good a fighter pilot). But again to be fair Dowding was acting as the 'Chairman of the Board' and he was not, as Bader, LM and Douglas were ... politicians, who were much more interested in winning their internal political battles than actually wining the war.


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## stona (May 4, 2014)

Bader to his credit asked to go down to 11 Group on several occasions. There are many things I will criticise Bader for, but a lack of courage is certainly not one of them. How he could have fitted in with 11 Group's tightly controlled operations will forever remain a moot point because Leigh-Mallory refused to release him.

I do enjoy a story to illustrate a point.

Late in September 1940 the fantastically named Squadron Leader Raymond Myles Beecham Duke-Woolley was leading his Hurricane squadron, having taken off from Kenley, in a patrol over Canterbury. He had got up to 31,000ft when, looking north he saw a black mass coming from the direction of London. Despite Leigh-Mallory's contention that having a base at Duxford would give his wings adequate time to gain height before entering 11 Group's area this black mass, which was indeed 12 Group's 'Big Wing', was much lower than Duke-Woolley and his Hurricanes.
Duke-Woolley reckoned that the wing 'looked determined' and therefore decided to turn in behind it as voluntary top cover. His squadron was using a loose German style formation in accordance with Park's instructions, and as they were also flying somewhat higher than Hurricanes were supposed to they may have looked a lot like the Luftwaffe. This is certainly what the Duxford Wing thought, failing to identify the friendly Hurricanes it thought it was about to be attacked and started to orbit. Duke-Woolley, thinking that it was preparing to intercept a raid followed suit. For some minutes there was a ridiculous stalemate until the 'Big Wing' started to run short of fuel, having taken so long to assemble, and retired, in good order to the north.
A couple of weeks later Duke-Woolley learned that his patrol report had got around, been leaked in modern parlance, and had been received with 'huge delight' by ground crews and pilots throughout 11 Group.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (May 4, 2014)

> Thanks Steve, I think we are 'double teaming' this to educate people here, totally correct.



I wouldnt be too sure about that. more like watching a first class comedy act in full swing.


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## bbear (May 5, 2014)

Thanks to OldSkeptic and stona, thanks all.

You have gven me answers about the human element some of which I asked for - and a generous surplus. 

As I understand it: The human element is important and was crucial in the BoB. Crucial if not in outcome then in the speed and comparative cost of the strategic outcome. Records showing combat developed skill in, intimate operational knowledge of and high prioity oerational attention to that factor are objective measures of leadershp in that sense. 

I notice that my question set off a quantity of subjective assessment of leaders and decisons. So maybe the human element is important but possibly best acknowledged then avoided in explanations of events? 

As a a result I am slightly more minded to regard neat 'numbers analysis' with suspicion. Thank you.


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## OldSkeptic (May 5, 2014)

Bbear, numbers are useful in that they can help you work out where you are, but you have to be aware of the 'fuzz factor'.. and the 'map' is not the 'terrain'.

For internal management good numbers are essential in knowing your resources so you can make the right decisions in allocating/increasing/etc them.

The 'fog of war' means you can never be sure about the other side, hence the need for good intelligence and analysis, but at best you will only have a limited picture of where they are at.

Hence the role of human talent in being able to work out, with limited and often 'noisy' data what the other side thinks, wants to do and is planning to do. So you can counteract it. A classic example of that was R. V. Jones the great master of scientific intelligence (get his book, a must read) with a tiny staff out performed most of the other 'intelligence' organisations by light years. Even Kim Philby admired him.

Fighter command was full of scientists and used them (unlike bomber command) to the full in all areas, not just the technical things but in things like operations research. 

Dowding and Park largely discounted the 'claims' numbers of their own people, though even they at that time didn't know just how inaccurate they were. They, correctly, overestimated the Luftwaffe's capability and resources, since it is always best to plan for the worst so all your surprises are nice ones. 
They also strived to avoid the 'big mistake', that high risk/maybe high payoff so enamoured by the 'romantic' commentators of war and fiction writers (and the incompetent), that occasionally comes off, though you never hear about the many, many times it doesn't.

That 'big mistake' was what the Luftwaffe was really counting on.

At the same time, both Dowding and Park endlessly tried to make things better for their pilots under such incredible danger and stress. 
Park wrote endless memos about thing like getting better accommodation for the pilots so they could get rest. Dowding ensured, as best he could with the resources, rotations of pilots and units to give them rest and time to regroup.

Both of them, though rather standoffish people in a personal sense, showed deep understanding and caring about their people ... again that morale element, that 'bargain' that is so important between the leaders and the led.

Park later showed that he was as good on the offense as he was on the defence in Malta, because he had thought about it and worked how to do it properly. Rather than the LM 'leaning towards the enemy' nonsense that got more pilots killed than in the BoB.

The Luftwaffe was another thing entirely, though tactically, technically and in quality at the peak of its powers at that time and led by some very competent people (especially Kesselring who never gets the credit he is due for being both an excellent air and ground general .. I'd put him way above Rommel for example). But, as opposed to the Heer (the German Army) and as it is was a purely Nazi created organisation it was wedded to that 'warrior/hero' mythos (which I will argue was the real reason it finally collapsed). 

Pilots got no rest, they were expected to fight endlessly for years until death or injury, totally inhumane. There is no surprise that the highest scoring pilots of the war were German, they were simply an example of the 'tail' of what so called a 'survival curve'. Statistically some will will survive long enough to build up immense scores (just like some lightbulbs will last for 20 years, but the average is a fraction of that).
Plus, tactically and strategically it became totally distorted. The ultimate example of that was Marseille in North Africa, where his squadron was a life support system for him while he shot down endless, obsolete P-40s and Hurricanes, while never shooting down any bombers....the same ones that were hammering the German troops all the time.

Funny how the 'standoffish', not 'jolly' and (using the British term at that time) 'not clubable' had far more care for their people than the other, apparently 'more human and nice', ones did (and I include the 'nice' Eisenhower in that observation). That observation fits a long standing theory of mine, but that, as they say, is another thing entirely.


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## Hop (May 5, 2014)

> Douglas never accepted or understood the difference between simple flying experience and vital combat experience. He didn't perceive a difference between operational and non operational fighter pilots. Some on this forum suffer the same problem
> For example on 31st October 1940 Douglas wrote that the pilot position had undergone a "kaleidoscopic change" and that in the case of Fighter Command "we are actually faced with a surplus." Evill made a more realistic assessment. At the end of July there had been sixty two squadrons and 1,046 operational pilots. At the end of October there were sixty six and a half squadrons and 1,042 operational pilots. Total wastage in those three months was 1,151 pilots, twenty five every two days. Fighter Command, Evill concluded, was "at about the lowest ebb in operational pilots" at which it could function.



Jagdwaffe pilots fit for duty:

29 June - 906
1 August - 869
1 September - 735
28 September - 676
1 November - 673

To those figures you have to add the number of Bf 110 pilots, around 100 - 150, and night fighter pilots (around 50 - 100)

Just to illustrate the difference in thinking between Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe, at the end of July Fighter Command had 675 serviceable aircraft for their 1,046 operational pilots. On 31 October they had 684 serviceable aircraft, 1042 operational pilots.

The Luftwaffe operated with much smaller margins. On 29 June the Jagdwaffe had 856 serviceable aircraft, 906 pilots. On 28 September they had 712 serviceable fighters, only 676 pilots fit for duty. Again you have to add the Bf 110s and night fighters to get the total German fighter force, so the numbers of pilots and aircraft are higher, but the difference with Fighter Command is clear. FC wanted spare pilots to reduce the load. The Luftwaffe simply threw everything into the battle at once.


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## Xjrtaz (May 5, 2014)

Well now, I must say there are some great comments and use of factual information to get across the strategic situation in 1940 up to and including the BoB. Great stuff well done all.
I would like to add a few short comments, firstly well done 'Parsifal' for pointing out the losses sustained by the Luftwaffe during their campaign in a Poland sept 39. Here is an extract from my website dedicated to my father, a Polish fighter pilot:
Here are the statistics on the comparative numbers and losses in the campaign.
Polish Air Strength:
Total Aircraft: 435
First Line Combat Aircraft: 313
Total Losses: 327 (75%)
Combat Losses: 187
Air-to-air combat: 70
Enemy ground fire: 30
Friendly Ground Fire: 33
Destroyed on ground: 54
Damaged and written off: 140
Evacuated to Romania: 98 (mostly fighters) Unaccounted for: 10
German Air Strength:
Total Aircraft: 2085
First Line Combat Aircraft: 1323
Total Losses: 564 (27%)
Combat Losses: 285 (from German records) (Polish claimed kills: 220) (Polish claimed air-to-air kills: 133) (Polish claimed ground-to-air kills: 87) Damaged and written off: 279
As you can see, the German losses were higher – 172% - of the Polish losses for this period, hardly a walkover!!

I know I am biased but one thing my father and some of his flying compatriots were always ed with was the fact that it took so long and such heavy losses to be sustained by the RAF before Dowding actually 'took his thumb out of his backside' to utilise the foreign fighter pilots he had available to him who were being wasted by sitting around doing nothing but learning outdated and tactically useless methods of flying currently practised by the RAF at the time. To have these highly skilled, combat trained pilots sitting around was a major mistake made by Dowding. The Poles were masters at close flying, combat against the ME109, very high gunnery skills as the records show between RAF and Polish sq during gunnery competitions when the top places were always held by the Polish pilots and the records of kills by 303,303,308,315 and 317 sq speak for themselves.
The poles would not use the vic formation or line abreast or line astern as they were classed by the more experienced poles as dangerous formations, hence finger 4 being adopted by the RAF later from these foreign sq use.
My father was always critical of the .303 'pop gun' as he called it and the poles cut down the convergence range of their guns down to 75 - 100 yes to ensure damage was done ( one of the reasons, the other was a hatred of Germans for several reasons!).
As I said, I am slightly biased as I was, and still am influenced by the views of a WW2 Polish fighter pilot, but don't forget the Czechs and Free French pilots also available to Dowding.
There was a few comments about Churchill and his famous saying which I won't repeat again! My father who was often stationed at Northolt which was primarily a Polish fighter station with several Polish sq's rotating in and out, said that Churchill often came to spend time with the poles as he liked their fighting spirit and attitude and would chat to the poles and always left inspired. His personal plane was at Northolt.
Personally I don't think you can pin it down to a 'specific' day that the conflict over England actually turned against the LW, there are too many factors involved all playing their part. There have been many valid comments above, including the English radar, bombing of London and German civilian targets etc etc.
Lately I have been reading the German histories including JG26, JG2 and others and it has been interesting to note the losses the Germans ACTUALLY suffered, not the losses claimed by the RAF which was later said to have been kept both false and high to 'keep up morale'. There is a lot of factual information out there if you look.

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## bbear (May 5, 2014)

OldSkeptic. Thank you.. I have read you on such topics before with interest. But here you have put the point quite powerfully and precisely.

My puzzle with any theory or hypothesis of that kind is - how could we test it? Does any historian count, classify and grade the memos Park sent? or Kesselring? Is there a weighing of personnel files or another quantitative effort that as ever beenn proposed? Or even a text analysis of auto-biographies? Can one calibrate callousness or measure a mythos?

Anecdote and character analysis and comparison of 'leadership styles' I've read some of. And they are great for illustrating a point, it seems to me. But to prove or disprove a notion of our kind we would ned objective evidence. Otherwise as people have their own pre-existing lists of heroes and villains.. discussion might turn into one of those endless and unending irresolvabes. Your reading or any theory realated to it would be condemned to a fate worse than disproof.. That is to be put in the large bucket of issues where 'it is strongly suspected but unprovable'. 

Except that there might just be agreement that 'the human element' is large - and largely imponderable - as a factor in explanation of events? Maybe? 

Thanks again for the blast of fresh air.


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## merlin (May 5, 2014)

Further to T Leigh-Mallory

1914 The King's Liverpool Regiment, 1915 The South Lancashire regiment, Jan 1916 No 1 School of Aeronautics, July 1916 No 5 No 7 Sqn (BE2 c &d ), Nov '16 Flight Commander 7 Sqn., May '17 Office Commanding 15 (Reserve) Sqn.,
Nov '17 OC No 8 (Army Op) Sqn., 
Significant dates: Feb '21 OC 2 Sqn School of Army Co-operation. April '26 Air Staff HQ 22 Group. April '27 Commandant, School of Army Co-operation. Jan '30 Instructor - Army Staff College. Dec '31 Supernumerary No 1 Air defence Group.
Jan '32 Air Staff, Directorate of Operations Intelligence, Jan '34 attended Imperial Defence College. OC No 2 Flying Training School Rigby. Nov '35 SASO RAF Iraq - to- 14 Dec 1937 AOC No 12 (Fighter) Group!

Source: extracted from -

```
http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Leigh-mallory.htm
```

NB - no Fighter experience in WW1, and only a month of 'Air Defence' experience!! Just how did he get the job !!?? Seems more fitting to stay in the Middle-East a bit longer perhaps via another posting then to France in 1939/40 .


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## pbehn (May 5, 2014)

merlin said:


> Further to T Leigh-Mallory
> 
> 1914 The King's Liverpool Regiment, 1915 The South Lancashire regiment, Jan 1916 No 1 School of Aeronautics, July 1916 No 5 No 7 Sqn (BE2 c &d ), Nov '16 Flight Commander 7 Sqn., May '17 Office Commanding 15 (Reserve) Sqn.,
> Nov '17 OC No 8 (Army Op) Sqn.,
> ...


How did he get the job? I would advance the theory that with a fore name of Trafford and a Double barreled family name that he was "just the right sort of chap" and "just the sort of fellow we are looking for"


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## merlin (May 5, 2014)

So if not L-M who ??

So far undecided between two:

- AVM G B A Baker b. 1894, WW1 - 1916 Flight Commander 19 Sqn RFC - Spad SVll, Jan '35 Attended Imperial Defence College, Dec '35 Air Staff HQ Fighting Area, May '36 Air Staff, HQ 11 Fighter Group.

Well maybe better is:

- AM Sir John Baldwin WW1 - 1914 U?T Pilot, 19 Feb '15 F/O RFC, 7 Dec '15 Flight Commander RFC, 12 June '16 Sqn Commander RFC, 28 Dec '17 OC 41st Wing RFC/RAF, 1928 Attended Imperial Defence College, Jan '32 SASO HQ Fighting Area
6 Feb '33 AOC Fighting Area (Temp.), Feb '34 AOC No 1 (Air Defence) Group, 22 Aug '35 Director of Personal Services.


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## stona (May 5, 2014)

Park only got his job under Mountbatten because Leigh-Mallory was killed on his way to take up the post 
Another what if?
Steve


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## Milosh (May 5, 2014)

In August 1944, with the Battle of Normandy almost over, Leigh-Mallory was appointed Air Commander-in-Chief of South East Asia Command (SEAC). But before he could take up his post he and his wife were killed en route to Burma when Avro York MW126, in which they were flying, crashed in the French Alps, killing all on board. A court of inquiry found that the accident was a consequence of bad weather and might have been avoided if Leigh-Mallory had not insisted that the flight proceed in such poor conditions against the advice of his aircrew.


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## Xjrtaz (May 5, 2014)

It does make you wonder! When I read Peter Delabiliers book he mentioned in there that he had to submit his cv for the post and he was up against an Air Marshal and a rear admiral.....all for a position commanding ground troops. How the frak do they work that one into the equation!


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## beitou (May 5, 2014)

Xjrtaz said:


> It does make you wonder! When I read Peter Delabiliers book he mentioned in there that he had to submit his cv for the post and he was up against an Air Marshal and a rear admiral.....all for a position commanding ground troops. How the frak do they work that one into the equation!



Because they were all the right sort of chaps, one of us, decent blokes, went to the right school and all that. Commanded troops on the ground, a mere detail.


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## parsifal (May 5, 2014)

Kesselring was a LW comander, placed in command of a ground army in Italy. Did okay.

Mountbatten was an Admiral, placed as the overall commander of SEAC, a combined operations post, and one in which he excelled. He had such lumiaries as Stilwell and Chiang Kai Shek to deal with. No easy feat. 

Mac ran a fiefdom in the SWPAC, in command of air, naval and ground assets. He was a US Army general, in charge of mostly foreign troops and assets. Whatever his criticisms, he was effective.

Area commanders were not a new concept. What was astounding and different, from the allied POV, was the Joiont Chiefs, which took Joint Operations to a whole new level. SHAEF was a product of that combined operations approach. it cut across national and service divisions very effectively. Not perfect....as the legendary rivalry between monty and Patton clearly shows, but it was a structure that worked, and enabled the best to be extracted out of people like Mallory


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## nuuumannn (May 5, 2014)

> How did he get the job? I would advance the theory that with a fore name of Trafford and a Double barreled family name that he was "just the right sort of chap" and "just the sort of fellow we are looking for"



Actually, Mallory, to use his correct name, dd not have a double barrelled sir name. His family name was Mallory. There was no hyphen between the Leigh, which was his middle name - his father's middle name also, and his family name. Pretentious sod. Shades of "von" Ribbentrop the wine salesman.

This is Mallory's older brother:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Mallory

You'll notice that wiki has even hyphenated his name. As I mentioned before, interesting how both died on the side of a mountain.


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## stona (May 7, 2014)

The hyphenation may have been an affectation but Leigh-Mallory's father did it and at least one son (Trafford our future Air Chief Marshal) was happy to carry it on. Why his elder brother chose not to, I know not. The name is invariably written this way in contemporary documents and sometimes abbreviated as L-M in minutes, capitalised and hyphenated.
Cheers
Steve


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## buffnut453 (May 7, 2014)

Xjrtaz said:


> It does make you wonder! When I read Peter Delabiliers book he mentioned in there that he had to submit his cv for the post and he was up against an Air Marshal and a rear admiral.....all for a position commanding ground troops. How the frak do they work that one into the equation!



Because he was Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in the Persian Gulf not just the Army forces. This was a Joint position and hence open to all 3 services.


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## pbehn (May 7, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Because he was Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in the Persian Gulf not just the Army forces. This was a Joint position and hence open to all 3 services.


His father was a captain in the Navy I believe. In some places his name is given as coeur de la Billiere, thats a name to conjour with, at the time of his appointment I read his ancestors came over with William Ist and have been in the military ever since.


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## buffnut453 (May 7, 2014)

I was on a year-long course with Peter de la Billiere's nephew - didn't cash in on his famous surname and was a top bloke!


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