# RAF BoB Fighters OTL ATL v Me-109



## merlin (Feb 10, 2014)

In OTL in the BoB the RAF had three single-engine fighters, the Hurricane, the Spitfire Defiant - the less said about the latter as possible.
Where possible the tactics were for the Spits to take on the 109s, but in practice it didn't always happen that way.
Any German 109 pilot that was shot down always insisted it was by a Spit - such was the low regard they held the Hurricane!

So, given that the Spit v 109 was a close call, they both had their advantages, and the Hurricane v 109 whilst the 109 was superior it didn't 'win' all the encounters! How would ATL aircraft cope?

Gloster f.5/34 - could depend on the engine fitted, but has the best cockpit canopy for all round vision, is said to be easy to fly, slower yes than the 109 but similar to the Hurricane; its problem maybe altitude performance!?

Boulton-Paul P.94 - plausible to get some in service, said to be almost as fast as the Spit., but would the length impair combat performance!?

Curtis P-36 - said to have done quite well in France, personally I'm not convinced - BoB combat was at higher altitude than in France.

Grumman Martlet - again plausible to get some in service, but dubious that this early (export) version could cope e.g. rate of climb!?

Boulton-Paul P.88a - could've been available, again depends what hp the Hercules engine it has goes up to. A big machine, robust, IMO likely to be a little faster than the Hurricane - and with those cannon once you get hit your down out!!?

Gloster F.9/37 - again could've been available with earlier PODs, granted it's a 'twin' but Blenheim 1Fs were in 109 range, the Gloster twin was much faster and said to handle well?

Westland Whirlwind - problems with manufacture and the engine, long take-off, nevertheless maybe some could've been available earlier, it was best at low to medium altitude!?

Others ?

I have posted this elsewhere, curious what everyone here thinks.


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## Greyman (Feb 10, 2014)

If available for the Battle of Britain, I think the Whirlwind would have been great. Better than the Hurricane I in speed and climb at all altitudes, and faster than the Spitfire I below 18,000 feet without either using emergency boost (the Spit had it beat when both pulled the tit, however). Above 18,000 the performance wasn't far behind the Spitfire. The armament and fighting view of the Whirlwind would have also been a decisive advantage.

The Martlet and Mohawk generally didn't have the speed or altitude performance for the Battle of Britain.


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## Timppa (Feb 10, 2014)

IMO the OTL planes did better than any of the ATL ones could have done in BoB, especially in their POD versions. Using those would have only caused big LOL from LW and serious PTSD to the RAF pilots. That is my PoV.

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## yulzari (Feb 10, 2014)

You would make more of a change with making more pilots available and improving their training and sub squadron level tactics. Fighter production was not the bottleneck. Trained pilots were. Especially as enough had to be held back to assault any landings.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 10, 2014)

merlin said:


> In OTL in the BoB the RAF had three single-engine fighters, the Hurricane, the Spitfire Defiant ---------- cope?





> Gloster f.5/34 - could depend on the engine fitted, but has the best cockpit canopy for all round vision, is said to be easy to fly, slower yes than the 109 but similar to the Hurricane; its problem maybe altitude performance!?



As built? Slow, no self sealing tanks or armor, Mercury engine has FTL several thousand feet below Melrin III. Without an major engine change a service version will be 20-30mph slower than a Hurricane.









> Boulton-Paul P.94 - plausible to get some in service, said to be almost as fast as the Spit., but would the length impair combat performance!?



Length has nothing to do with it. Speed was "estimated" not proven and most sources say the "estimated" Speed was with a Merlin XX engine which was available only in small numbers near the end of the BoB. 



> Curtis P-36 - said to have done quite well in France, personally I'm not convinced - BoB combat was at higher altitude than in France.



French versions were lacking in armor and self sealing tanks, without major engine up grade ( just putting 100 octane in the tanks won't do it) a British Hawk will be slower and poorer climbing, they was a reason they didn't use the ones they had. 




> Boulton-Paul P.88a - could've been available, again depends what hp the Hercules engine it has goes up to. A big machine, robust, IMO likely to be a little faster than the Hurricane - and with those cannon once you get hit your down out!!?



Without figuring out the problems with sleeve valve _mass production_ months earlier this is a non starter. Deliveries of the Hercules engines in the summer of 1940 was a trickle. Also the 1940 versions (or summer of 1940) are the1325-1400hp take-off versions and teh 2 speed versions offer only about 100-120hp more shaft power at altitude than the Merlin for the same or more weight and more drag (and the loss of the exhaust thrust) 



> Gloster F.9/37 - again could've been available with earlier PODs, granted it's a 'twin' but Blenheim 1Fs were in 109 range, the Gloster twin was much faster and said to handle well?



Again, engines are a major sticking point. The engines it made it's speed with gave problems and were taken out. Later Taurus engines gave problems even a t less power and lower altitudes and you still have the sleeve valve production problem. 



> Westland Whirlwind - problems with manufacture and the engine, long take-off, nevertheless maybe some could've been available earlier, it was best at low to medium altitude!?



Probably the best of the bunch but required a major change of emphasis in programs in the summer/fall of 1939.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 10, 2014)

Changing the training program would have helped, giving more gunnery training would have helped. Changing the pattern the guns were harmonized for may have helped. Making more incendiary ammunition would have helped.


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## stona (Feb 10, 2014)

yulzari said:


> Fighter production was not the bottleneck. Trained pilots were. Especially as enough had to be held back to assault any landings.



True, but holding back pilots to assault an invasion had nothing to do with it. By August 1940 all the Fighter Command squadrons outside 11 and 12 Groups were undermanned and many were barely operational. They certainly weren't being held back against an invasion. That wasn't the RAF's principal job anyway, it was the Royal Navy's. ADGB and then Fighter Command had a defined job to do, protecting Britain's industrial and military infrastructure (not you will note the civilian population) and that's why squadrons were held back in the Midlands and the North.

As units in 11 Group suffered losses experienced men were stripped from squadrons elsewhere to reinforce them. This system, which obviously weakened the squadrons not bearing the brunt of the battle, was introduced as a temporary expedient by Dowding and was unpopular with, even resented by, the squadrons who tended to lose their most experienced and best men. 



Shortround6 said:


> Changing the training program would have helped, giving more gunnery training would have helped. Changing the pattern the guns were harmonized for may have helped. Making more incendiary ammunition would have helped.



Yes again, the problem was that the shortening of the training program forced on the RAF by its losses didn't allow for much alteration. Pilots went to operational squadrons to finish their training on the job far less trained than was the intention of the original system. Dowding was adamant in 1940 that he didn't want to establish any more OTU's as they would impose an even heavier burden on his already limited resources. He was right to do so. 
What he might have done was convert more trained pilots from other types within Fighter Command to fly the two principle fighters. He might also have attempted to secure other trained pilots from Bomber Command, though how successful this would have been given the personalities and politics involved we'll never know. He did neither and this was, in hindsight, a mistake.
The only consolation is that however unsatisfactory British pilot training was at this crucial time, the German system was worse.

Gunnery was poor and a lack of gunnery training and facilities to carry it out was identified in 1940. Another report more than a year later is almost a carbon copy. Nothing was done. I know that you are well aware why the RAF's eight gun fighter weapons were synchronised in the way that they were. It was the result of exhaustive research carried out largely at Martlesham Heath/Orfordness and considered the best option, _given the admitted low quality of the average fighter pilot's gunnery skills_. Changing the harmonisation could and did help those pilots who could actually hit something. It made no difference to the majority who couldn't hit a cow's arse with a banjo and therefore probably should have been changed sooner.

I don't know how much incendiary ammunition was available. The .303 'ball' round supposed to be used by the RAF was not the standard rifle round used by the Army and of which millions were available. The bullet was developed (at Orfordness again) specifically for air to air combat.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Feb 10, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> As built? Slow, no self sealing tanks or armor, Mercury engine has FTL several thousand feet below Melrin III. Without an major engine change a service version will be 20-30mph slower than a Hurricane.



But Gloster F.5/34 rolled better than Spit and Hurri, especially at higher speeds and was easier to fly than even Hurri.




Shortround6 said:


> French versions were lacking in armor and self sealing tanks, without major engine up grade ( just putting 100 octane in the tanks won't do it) a British Hawk will be slower and poorer climbing, they was a reason they didn't use the ones they had.



According to a Curtiss procure there was an option for 1/4" back armour on Hawk 75A, it seems that at least many of the Hawk 75As which Finns got had that back armour installed and some even had self-sealing wing tanks.

Juha


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## Shortround6 (Feb 10, 2014)

I am not saying it wasn't possible but when you stick that stuff in the performance (especially climb and altitude) will go down. British were sending the Hawks to India and other places away from Western Europe in the summer/fall of 1940. 

You also have 3-4 different engines being used in the Hawks along with different armament layouts so getting really good performance figures is a bit hard. You also have the P&W engines rated at 2550 rpm on a P-36 (American) for "flight" but allowed to run at 2700 rpm for take-off so we are not sure what rpm was used to hit which performance numbers. ( It seems at 2550rpm the P-36A could NOT break 300mph?)


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## Lefa (Feb 10, 2014)

Finnish Forces - Finnish Curtiss P-36 Hawk

Finland used 87 octane fuel, so the factory performance levels were not achieved.

The plane had slower and climbed worse than the Brewster.

Against old Russian planes it perform well, but I do not think that it possible against Bf 109 E model.


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## Juha (Feb 10, 2014)

Lefa said:


> ...Finland used 87 octane fuel, so the factory performance levels were not achieved.
> 
> The plane had slower and climbed worse than the Brewster.
> 
> Against old Russian planes it perform well, but I do not think that it possible against Bf 109 E model.



As JoeB wrote earlier: “In the Battle of France period, as given case by case in "Battle of France Then and Now" by Cornwell:
Spitfires downed 24 Bf109E's for 32 Spitfires shot down by Bf109E's, .75:1
Hurricane: 74:151, .49:1
Hawk 75: 23:38, .61:1
D.520: 14:30, .47:1.”

see:http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/dewoitone-d-520-vs-spitfire-bf-109-a-24052-2.html 

So during the BoF Hawk-75As did better than Hurris against 109Es but worse than Spits. The BoB was different than the BoF, a pure air war versus a massive ground attack with powerful air support but Hawk wasn't helpless against 109Es.

Juha


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## Juha (Feb 10, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> I am not saying it wasn't possible but when you stick that stuff in the performance (especially climb and altitude) will go down. British were sending the Hawks to India and other places away from Western Europe in the summer/fall of 1940.
> 
> You also have 3-4 different engines being used in the Hawks along with different armament layouts so getting really good performance figures is a bit hard. You also have the P&W engines rated at 2550 rpm on a P-36 (American) for "flight" but allowed to run at 2700 rpm for take-off so we are not sure what rpm was used to hit which performance numbers. ( It seems at 2550rpm the P-36A could NOT break 300mph?)



According to British tests Cyclone-engine Mohawk IV (H-75A-4) was capable to 486km/h at 4 300m and had the service ceiling of 10 300m, max roc at 2 870kg was 13.2m/s. Probably the most common subtype in GB because it was the subtype in production for France when France surrendered, the orders of earlier versions were all already fulfilled.

Juha


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## Jabberwocky (Feb 10, 2014)

Juha said:


> As JoeB wrote earlier: ï¿½In the Battle of France period, as given case by case in "Battle of France Then and Now" by Cornwell:
> Spitfires downed 24 Bf109E's for 32 Spitfires shot down by Bf109E's, .75:1
> Hurricane: 74:151, .49:1
> Hawk 75: 23:38, .61:1
> ...



A really important factor that is not brought in here is pilot training.

Pre-war, French fighter pilots had an average of 500 to 600 hours of training and upwards of 750 hours flight time.
British pilots had an average of under 300 hours training, with new pilots receiving less than 200 hours, including just 20 to 40 hours on operational types. 
German pilots on average had around 210 to 300 training and about an average 450 hours flight time, most of which would have been on operational types.

As pilot training waxes and wanes, so does comparative battle performance.


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## GregP (Feb 10, 2014)

What the heck is OTL and ATL?

Doesn't compute.


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## Juha (Feb 10, 2014)

Hello Jabberwocky
still Hawk-75As did better than D-520s against 109Es and clearly better than Blochs and MS 406s, to which the rate was appr. .3:1.

Juha


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## merlin (Feb 10, 2014)

GregP said:


> What the heck is OTL and ATL?
> 
> Doesn't compute.



OTL is the abbreviation for 'original time line' ATL therefore stands for alternative (or alternate -as those from the US tend to use) time line.


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## The Basket (Feb 10, 2014)

How's about a Bf109 made under licence by...say Vickers. ..with a Merlin? 

How delicious! 

First 109 was Rolls Royce!


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## nuuumannn (Feb 10, 2014)

Without getting into strategy and tactics, which, in effect defined the outcome on both sides, a few things about Merlin's aircraft choices. I think the British had what it needed in place to affect defeat of the Luftwaffe. Both the Spitfire and Hurricane were excellent aircraft and were able to match the German fighters. Choosing any of these types over either the Spit or Hurri would have been foolhardy.

The Gloster was a non starter performance and armament wise; Gloster received a large order to build Hurricanes prior to the outbreak of the war; if they concentrated on their own fighter, there would have been less Hurricanes.

The BP P.94 was a paper project only and was designed as a stop gap for if Spit or Hurri production didn't meet expectations. Its big advantage was that it had commonality with the Defiant, which meant the jigs were already in place to build it. Its performance, whilst not being up to Spitfire/Bf 109 standard would most likely have been better than the Hurricane, bearing in mind the structural strength of the airframe required to mount the turret would have been absent. Since neither Spit nor Hurri production was threatened, it wasn't necessary.

There was no way the P-36 was going to be ready in time for the BoB. The first French examples arrived in the UK in August 1940, but it took many months before they were made serviceable for RAF/SAAF squadron service, not until the very end of the year.

The Martlett order for the FAA was also too late; as the Martlett I its performance and armament was not up to the same standard as the Spitfire or Bf 109.

The BP P.88 was cancelled in 1937. Had it been continued with it was not going to be ready by 1940 in numbers because of its powerplant, either Hercules or Vulture variant. Possible Merlin engined variant, then which aircraft would miss out on Merlins?

The Gloster twin - what could it bring to the table? Better performance than the Blenheim that was already in production in numbers, most probably, but again, what is Gloster not producing if it puts this into production - Hurricanes? The Reaper, which was based on the Gloster twin was a more advanced and more capable aircraft, but there was no way it would have been ready in time for the BoB.

The Whirlwind; just not ready in time. The Air Ministry were also, perhaps unfairly regarding it as obsolescent in late 1940, but in reality, the RAF needed single-seat fighters.

Let's also not forget the RAF's _fourth_ single engined fighter, the Gladiator! 

Merlin, based on your comment on the Defiant, I suspect you have little to say about it. The fact was that it was not being used in the role for which it was designed. Its failure was also down to tactics. It could have played a different part in the BoB had it been employed in the role for which it was designed - as a bomber destroyer and it was based in 13 Group in the north and Scotland, where LW bombers did not have single-seat fighter escort. This would also make RAF single-seat fighters based in the north available down south. The other problem with the Defiant was not just its low speed, but also its numbers, there weren't that many of them; only two squadrons, of which only one was active in more than one day's combat. As a nightfighter the Defiant performed admirably and became the RAF's night fighter of choice until the Beaufighters and Mossies entered service in suitable numbers in 1942.

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## stona (Feb 11, 2014)

The Whirlwind was an attempt at a cannon armed fighter, something that the RAF realised that it needed well before the BoB. It's development was fraught with difficulties and Dowding seems to have disliked it personally. It would have been, as above, too late for the BoB even had the original production schedule been achieved.
The problems of developing a cannon armed fighter (not bolting cannons on to Spitfires and Hurricanes) are illustrated by the introduction of the first successful aircraft designed as such, the Hawker Typhoon, in mid 1941.
Cheers
Steve


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## Greyman (Feb 11, 2014)

I think the Beaufighter has that distinction


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## Shortround6 (Feb 11, 2014)

The Beaufighter was the first British cannon armed fighter to go into service and it rather illustrates the problems of the time and "_estimates_" of performance. 

It went into production in July of 1940 and a few over 100 were completed by the end of December. Production would follow normal lines, a handful of planes per month with general increase each month. Granted it is a twin but you need planes by the hundreds for the BoB, not dozens per month or handfuls. 
The Beaufighter was also slower than expected. Good as it was at some jobs it's performance was a disappointment and the _expected_ performance is part of the reason some of the other planes (like the Gloster) were canceled. 

It is also a bit of a stretch to claim that the 1941 Hawker Typhoon was "successful". It took until the end of 1942 for the Typhoon to become reliable. 

One has to wonder what a 1942 Whirlwind would have been like?


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## davparlr (Feb 11, 2014)

GregP said:


> What the heck is OTL and ATL?
> 
> Doesn't compute.



Thanks for asking, Greg.


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## pbehn (Feb 11, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Merlin, based on your comment on the Defiant, I suspect you have little to say about it. The fact was that it was not being used in the role for which it was designed. Its failure was also down to tactics. It could have played a different part in the BoB had it been employed in the role for which it was designed - as a bomber destroyer and it was based in 13 Group in the north and Scotland, where LW bombers did not have single-seat fighter escort. This would also make RAF single-seat fighters based in the north available down south. The other problem with the Defiant was not just its low speed, but also its numbers, there weren't that many of them; only two squadrons, of which only one was active in more than one day's combat. As a nightfighter the Defiant performed admirably and became the RAF's night fighter of choice until the Beaufighters and Mossies entered service in suitable numbers in 1942.



It had always puzzled me why the defiant wasn't put up in the north. But it puzzles me how it got into service, I presume no one thought of France falling.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 11, 2014)

pbehn said:


> But it puzzles me how it got into service, I presume no one thought of France falling.



Probably not. By the thinking of the day (1937-39) France was one of the most powerful Nations on Earth, at least in the size of it's army. It took WW II (and after) to bring out the fact that simple counts of bayonets, tanks or artillery tubes weren't the best way of rating a countries power but only a start.


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## Juha (Feb 11, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> ...There was no way the P-36 was going to be ready in time for the BoB. The first French examples arrived in the UK in August 1940, but it took many months before they were made serviceable for RAF/SAAF squadron service, not until the very end of the year...



There was a simple way to get Hawk 75As used by France, Holland, Iran and Norway, simply order them from Curtiss. Would that have been a wise thing to do is another question.

Juha


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## RCAFson (Feb 11, 2014)

merlin said:


> In OTL in the BoB the RAF had three single-engine fighters, the Hurricane, the Spitfire Defiant - the less said about the latter as possible.
> Where possible the tactics were for the Spits to take on the 109s, but in practice it didn't always happen that way.
> Any German 109 pilot that was shot down always insisted it was by a Spit - such was the low regard they held the Hurricane!
> 
> ...


Other alternatives, if UK aero industry was freed to work on them:

The MB-2: Martin-Baker MB 2 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Hawker Tornado: Hawker Tornado - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (maybe with earlier Griffon?)

Hawker Typhoon: Hawker Typhoon - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (maybe with earlier Griffon?)

Gloster Gladiator: Gloster Gladiator - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (maybe with uprated engine, CS prop and 6 x .303 MGs?)

Fairey Fulmar: Fairey Fulmar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (maybe with Merlin X or XII engine or better still, the RR Griffon?)

Fairey Fantome: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairey_Fantôme

Gregor FDB-1: Canadian Car and Foundry FDB-1 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (with uprated engines?)

last, but not least, the Vickers Venom: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickers_Venom 

(by no means an exhaustive list - I'm sure there were many other potential alternatives)


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## Shortround6 (Feb 11, 2014)

The main problem here is what was the production capacity of Curtiss and how fast could it be expanded? The US had ordered over 500 P-40s in April of 1939. Since an early P-40 is a Hawk 75 from the firewall back they are made using a _LOT_ of the Hawk 75 (P-36) production tooling, floor space and workers. There was some swapping around of US deliveries (delayed) to accommodate French and British orders but Curtiss was working pretty much flat out to deliver what was already ordered. To the extent of working on planes outdoors in Buffalo, New York. Not much different than Toronto Canada.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 11, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Other alternatives, if UK aero industry was freed to work on them:
> 
> The MB-2: Martin-Baker MB 2 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Needs a new engine and landing gear.



> Hawker Tornado: Hawker Tornado - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (maybe with earlier Griffon?)
> 
> Hawker Typhoon: Hawker Typhoon - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (maybe with earlier Griffon?)



For an early Griffon you need R-R to keep developing the Buzzard/ "R" engine during the 30s which might have slowed down the Melrin. And sticking a 1400-1500hp engine (87-100 octane fuel not 100/130)in air-frame meant for a 2000hp engine may not get the results you want. 



> Gloster Gladiator: Gloster Gladiator - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (maybe with uprated engine, CS prop and 6 x .303 MGs?)



Pick one direction or the other, higher performance or more fire power. Even with 100 octane (which will NOT change power at altitude) and a CS prop you won't really get both. Keep 4 guns and go for a bit of extra performance or add two more guns, ammo and equipment and use up a fair amount of the the performance. 



> Fairey Fulmar: Fairey Fulmar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (maybe with Merlin X or XII engine or better still, the RR Griffon?)



The Merlin XII allowed the Spitfire II to hang on to Early Spitfire performance despite weight gains due to increased operational equipment. Don't expect much sticking it in a two seat aircraft. Merlin X will improve things at low altitude ( already pretty much covered by the 12lbs of boost) but only raises combat altitude over a Merlin III by around 1,000ft. 



> Fairey Fantome: Fairey Fantôme - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> Gregor FDB-1: Canadian Car and Foundry FDB-1 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (with uprated engines?)



The Biplanes won't stop either the 109 or the 110. Lacking in speed and firepower. P&W was stopping production of the R-1535 and the R-1830 weighed several hundred pounds more, needed a bigger prop and still won't be fast enough.


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## RCAFson (Feb 11, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> For an early Griffon you need R-R to keep developing the Buzzard/ "R" engine during the 30s which might have slowed down the Melrin. And sticking a 1400-1500hp engine (87-100 octane fuel not 100/130)in air-frame meant for a 2000hp engine may not get the results you want.



Given that there's a lot less demand for the Merlin (sans Hurricane and Spitfire), I think RR would have more time for the Griffon. The Griffon IIB produced 1730/1490hp with 100 octane fuel, which should get the Tornado/Typhoon to Spit MK 1 levels of performance.





> Pick one direction or the other, higher performance or more fire power. Even with 100 octane (which will NOT change power at altitude) and a CS prop you won't really get both. Keep 4 guns and go for a bit of extra performance or add two more guns, ammo and equipment and use up a fair amount of the the performance.


 In Malta, the Gladiator was field modded with ex-Blenheim engines and props for an increase in performance showing that there was still unused potential in the design.




> The Merlin XII allowed the Spitfire II to hang on to Early Spitfire performance despite weight gains due to increased operational equipment. Don't expect much sticking it in a two seat aircraft. Merlin X will improve things at low altitude ( already pretty much covered by the 12lbs of boost) but only raises combat altitude over a Merlin III by around 1,000ft.


 The Fulmar was handicapped as an interceptor by the low altitude rated engines; a high altitude rated engine (even the Merlin III) will considerably boost high altitude performance allowing the Fulmar to act as a bomber killer, especially in areas out of reach by the 109 and a non-naval Fulmar will be somewhat lighter because there's no need for folding wings.





> The Biplanes won't stop either the 109 or the 110. Lacking in speed and firepower. P&W was stopping production of the R-1535 and the R-1830 weighed several hundred pounds more, needed a bigger prop and still won't be fast enough.



Biplanes are much lighter (and cheaper) than monoplanes, meaning there can be more off them. They just have to hold the fort until the next generation of high speed monoplanes can be put into production. The Gladiator actually had a pretty good record against the 109 and 110, and an improved Gladiator or other biplane should do even better.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 11, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Given that there's a lot less demand for the Merlin (sans Hurricane and Spitfire), I think RR would have more time for the Griffon. The Griffon IIB produced 1730/1490hp with 100 octane fuel, which should get the Tornado/Typhoon to Spit MK 1 levels of performance.



Those numbers are with 100/130 fuel which was not available in 1940. The Fuel available in 1940 was 100/115-120 or so depending on batch. In 1940 they had no scale or standardized test to measure rich mixture response. Initial testing of the engines up until 1939 would have been done with 87 octane fuel which is why R-R built the Vulture and Napier went for the Sabre engine ( and Bristol was working on the Centaurus). (P&W R-2800 was originally _supposed_ to be a 1650 hp engine on 87 octane fuel). 





> In Malta, the Gladiator was field modded with ex-Blenheim engines and props for an increase in performance showing that there was still unused potential in the design.



Picking a margin of performance against Fiat CR 42s or even MC 200s whose engines were very similar in power to the Mercury is rather different than trying to fight against Bf 109Es. 




> The Fulmar was handicapped as an interceptor by the low altitude rated engines; a high altitude rated engine (even the Merlin III) will considerably boost high altitude performance allowing the Fulmar to act as a bomber killer, especially in areas out of reach by the 109 and a non-naval Fulmar will be somewhat lighter because there's no need for folding wings.



Using a single speed Merlin would trade high altitude performance for low altitude performance. Please note that the Fulmar is a large/ heavy single engine aircraft for the time. Empty (no guns or radio) it weighs more than a Hurricane or Spitfire loaded with ammo fuel and pilot. Leaving out the wing hinges is NOT going to correct that. Engine availability or allowable boost limits in Aug/Sept of 1940 are not what they would be in the Spring of 1941. 




> Biplanes are much lighter (and cheaper) than monoplanes, meaning there can be more off them. They just have to hold the fort until the next generation of high speed monoplanes can be put into production. The Gladiator actually had a pretty good record against the 109 and 110, and an improved Gladiator or other biplane should do even better.



They may be lighter but a large part of that is the lighter/less powerful engine, the lighter armament, less fuel for the less powerful engine. Also few 1930s biplanes carried armor or self sealing tanks. 

If your real problem is a shortage of trained pilots, putting the pilots you do have into combat in second (or third) rate fighters just means you loose your pilots even faster no matter how many of these second rate fighters you can build.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 11, 2014)

Martin Baker MB.2 - designed to F.5/34; obsolescent even before the war began. The other problem is getting it into production and service; much modification would have needed to be done to make it a viable service machine, but a big hindrance to continuing with it was that MB did not have the resources for mass production.

Hawker Tornado and Typhoon, both designed to F.18/37, a Spitfire and Hurricane replacement. Time is not on these two aircraft's side for the BoB, even with Griffons. The other problem was that neither were very good interceptors, but they were modern and if they were all the British could have fielded, then they would have had to do. Probably the most suitable, but not within the time frame.

Fairey Fulmar, even if you put a big block V-8 in a camper van, it's still a camper van. You might as well redesign it from scratch. Too big, too heavy, too slow - even without folding wings and anchors and Admiral's cabin and all the extra amenities required for naval service.

Vickers Venom, a smart little machine with good performance and armament for a pre-war monoplane, but like the opening paragraph in Wikipedia states, its engine lacked the power and potential for development; it was too small and with measures required for service its performance would have been reduced.

As for biplanes, yes, the Gladiator did well for itself, but was there because the BoB was about numbers and Dowding, Park et al realised that, so decisions were made to enforce the number of worthy fighters in front line service by using sub par fighters like the Gladiator, Defiant and Blenheim. If these guys had a choice, I'm pretty certain biplanes would not have made their list of aircraft likely to enter front line service, let alone combat. An anachronistic option that would not have been contemplated, realistically speaking.

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## parsifal (Feb 11, 2014)

It is a misconception to believe the hawk 75 was a single monlithic type, devoid of armour and tuned only to run on 87 octane rated fuel ("standard" in British vernacular). in fact there were at least 6 subtypes , not including the weird and wonderful such as the Hawak 75N and M. im talking the mainstream Hawk 75A series . in 1938 first deliveries were of the A-1 subtype. these were indeed unarmoured and of lower performance, but the later A-4s were much better protected and much more powerful

The largest foreign operator of the Hawk was the Armee de l'Air, the French Air Force. Next to the Morane-Saulnier M.S.406, the Curtiss Hawk was numerically the most important fighter in French service during the German onslaught into Western Europe in May of 1940. 

In February 1938, two months before the first P-36A had rolled off the Buffalo assembly lines for the USAAC, the French government entered into negotiations with the Curtiss company for the supply of 300 fighters of the Hawk 75A type which Curtiss had offered to the Armee de l'Air. The Hawk 75A was an export version of the P-36A, and was being offered for sale with either the Pratt Whitney Twin Wasp or the Wright Cyclone engine. 

However, the unit price asked by Curtiss was considered exorbitant by the French--almost twice as high as that of the Morane-Saulnier M.S.406. In addition, the proposed delivery schedule commencing in March of 1939 with 20 planes and continuing at a rate of 30 planes per month was considered totally unacceptable. Furthermore, the USAAC was itself unhappy with the Curtiss company's inability to meet delivery schedules for its P-36As, and felt that the French sale would only slow things up still more. Consequently, the USAAC opposed the French sale. 

Nevertheless, the rapidity of German rearmament made the modernization of the Armee de l'Air's equipment a matter of the utmost urgency, so the French persisted with the negotiations. As a result of the direct intervention of President Roosevelt, a leading French test pilot, Michel Detroyat was permitted to fly a Y1P-36 service test prototype at Wright Field in March of 1938. He submitted a thoroughly enthusiastic report. In addition, Curtiss suggested that more acceptable delivery schedules could be offered if the French government would finance the construction and equipping of supplementary assembly facilities. 

The French still felt that the unit price was too high, and on April 28, 1938 they decided to delay their decision until the completion of the test trials of the Bloch MB-150, the quoted price of which was scarcely half that of the Curtiss fighter. However, the MB-150 was suffering an extensive series of teething troubles (the first prototype couldn't even fly!) and had been subjected to a succession of modifications for nearly two years. By mid-1938, it was felt that the Bloch fighter's main problems had been overcome. However, it was soon realized that in order to adapt the design for mass production, a complete structural redesign would have to take place. 

The rework of the Bloch MB-150 would obviously be a costly and time- consuming process, and time was something the Armee de l'Air did not have. Consequently, on May 17, 1938 the Minister for Air announced that the French would acquire the Curtiss Hawk, and that a French purchasing commission was instructed to order 100 Hawk airframes and 173 Pratt Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp engines. The contract stipulated that the first Hawk should be flown at Buffalo by November 25, 1938 and that the 100-th plane should be delivered by April 10, 1939. 

The initial production version of the Hawk was designated Hawk 75A-1 by Curtiss, of which 100 had been ordered by France. According to the original plan, the majority of the Hawk 75A-1s were to be shipped by Curtiss in disassembled form to France, with assembly being completed in France by the Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques du Centre (SNCAC) at Bourges. The first Hawk 75A-1 was flown at Buffalo early in December 1938, only a few days after the committed date. The first Hawk 75A-1s (actually the fourth and fifth examples off the line) were delivered by ship to France on December 14, 1938. Fourteen more Hawk 75A-1s were delivered in fully-assembled form for Armee de l'Air trials, but the rest were delivered in disassembled form. The first assembly was commenced by SNCAC in February 1939. 

During March and April of 1939, the 4e and 5e Escadres de Chasse had initiated conversion from the Dewoitine 500 and 501, and by July 1, 1939 the 4e Escadre had 54 Curtiss fighters on strength and the 5e Escadre had 41. The conversion had not been without problems, one Hawk 75A-1 having crash- landed when an over-speeding propeller had caused the engine to overheat, and another one had been destroyed in a fatal crash as a result of a flat spin that developed during aerobatic trials with full fuel tanks. Throughout the entire service history of the Hawk 75A, there were problems with maneuverability and handling when all the fuel tanks were completely full. 

The Hawk 75A-1 was powered by the Pratt Whitney R-1830-SC-G engine, with an international rating of 900 hp at 12,000 feet and 950 hp for takeoff. Armament comprised four 7.5 mm machine guns, two mounted in the upper decking of the fuselage nose and two in the wings. Apart from the altitude indicator, all instruments were metric calibrated. A modified seat was fitted to accommodate the French Lemercier back parachute. The throttle operated in the "French fashion", i.e. in the reverse direction to the throttles of British or US aircraft. 

Following the placing of the initial French order for the Hawk 75A in May of 1938, an option had been taken for 100 more machines. This option was converted into a firm order on March 8, 1939. These aircraft differed from the A-1 in having an additional 7.5 mm machine gun in each wing, some structural reinforcement of the rear fuselage, and the minor modifications necessary to permit interchangeability between the R-1830-SC-G and the more powerful R-1830-SC2-G, the latter affording 1050 hp for takeoff. 

The new model was designated Hawk 75A-2 by Curtiss. The four wing guns and the new engine made the Hawk 75A-2 more or less equivalent to the US Army's XP-36D. The first A-2 was delivered to France at the end of May, 1939. The first 40 of these were basically similar to the A-1 in both powerplant and armament. The first A-2 to have both the uprated engine and the increased armament was actually the 48th off the Buffalo line. French Air Force numbering continued from the Hawk 75A-1, the first Hawk 75A-2 being numbered 101. 

One hundred and thirty-five of the Hawk 75A-3 version were ordered by France on October 9, 1939, with improved 1200 hp R-1830-S1C3G engines and armament similar to that of the A-2 (six 7.5-mm machine guns). Maximum speed was 311 mph at 10,000 feet. Initial climb rate was 2350 feet per minute, service ceiling was 33,700 feet, and range was 820 miles. Wingspan was 37 feet 3 1/2 inches, length was 28 feet 7 inches, and wing area was 236 square feet. Weights were 4483 lbs empty, 5692 lbs gross. About sixty Hawk 75A-3s reached France before the surrender, with the rest being diverted to Britain. 

The last French order before the Armistice was for 395 Hawk 75A-4 aircraft. These were armed like the A-3s but were fitted with 1200 hp Wright R-1820-G205A Cyclone engines. Cyclone-powered 75s could be distinguished from Twin Wasp models by their short-chord cowlings of slightly greater diameter and by the absence of engine cowling flaps and bulbous nose gun port covers. Maximum speed was 323 mph at 15,100 feet. Initial climb rate was 2820 feet per minute, service ceiling was 32,700 feet, and range was 670 miles. Weights were 4541 lbs empty, 5750 lbs gross. Wingspan was 27 feet 3 1/2 inches and length was 28 feet 10 inches. Only two hundred and eighty-four of these A-4s were actually built, and of these, only six A-4s actually reached France before the surrender. these aircracraft were fitted with back armour and were rated for 100 Octane fuel. If the RAF had taken up its option to buy the Hawk, it would have been these aircraft that stepped up.

There was nothig wrong with the Curtiss as a fighter. against the LW, under FAF colours it had outperformed all other Armee d' la Air fighters. partly because Unlike most french suppliers, Curtiss was a relaiable supplier, but the aircraft itself was capable of quite a bit. Its biggest problem was its cost and this may have affected numbers, and numbers in the BoB was THE critical issue

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## Greyman (Feb 11, 2014)

Those figures seem a bit optimistic, at least compared to what the A&AEE tested. Quick and dirty graph here:







The red is Mohawk AR645 - 
Cyclone GR1820 G205A
6,330 pounds
110cm low gear, 115 cm high gear
2500 rpm

Other two curves are a Spitfire and Hurricane using +12 boost.

A&AEE climb figures for the Curtiss fighter are slightly worse than the Hurricane I.

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## The Basket (Feb 12, 2014)

Single seat Battle?
Techinically meets timeframes and available. Fulmar is basically a Battle


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## Juha (Feb 12, 2014)

The Basket said:


> Single seat Battle?
> Techinically meets timeframes and available. Fulmar is basically a Battle



Fulmar was based on Fairey's P.4/34 not on Battle.

Juha


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## Juha (Feb 12, 2014)

IIRC 1200 hp R-1830-S1C3G engine and probably also R-1830-SC2-G needed 100oct fuel to deliver 1200/1050hp. Finns tried to hoard a small amount of 100oct/C3 fuel for some of its Hawks to give them a slightly better chances to catch VVS Pe-2s. Admittedly Hawk was a slowish fighter, they were almost useless as escorts to FiAF Blenheim IV PR planes because high up Blemheim was as fast if not a bit faster than Twin Wasp Hawk using 87oct fuel, Finns as others had problems with Cyclones and they converted all their Hawks to PW engine already in 1941, we got our first Hawks in June 1941. Cyclones after some mods were used as spare engines for Brewster 239s.

Juha


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## The Basket (Feb 12, 2014)

Juha said:


> Fulmar was based on Fairey's P.4/34 not on Battle.
> 
> Juha



P4/34 was based on the Battle.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 12, 2014)

"Based on" can mean a slightly modified air-frame or it can mean taking what was learned form one air-frame and applying to a new air-frame by scaling up or down but keeping NO parts the same and this is pretty much the story with the Battle and the P4/34/Fulmar. 

The P4/34 had 6ft 7 1/2 in less wig span and was 2ft 4 1/2 shorter in the fuselage than the Battle. The fuselage was also thinner with no provision for a prone position for a bomb aimer _under_ the pilot. 

The Fulmar cut about 1 ft from the wing of the P4/34 and actually the 2nd P4/34 was used as the prototype of the Fulmar. Fulmar had a 342sq ft wing compared to the Battles 422sq ft wing. The P4/34 got rid of the bomb cells in the wing of the Battle and carried it's bombs under wing and also used inward retracting landing gear that fit flush instead of the Battle's rearward retracting semi-exposed landing gear.


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## yulzari (Feb 12, 2014)

stona said:


> True, but holding back pilots to assault an invasion had nothing to do with it. By August 1940 all the Fighter Command squadrons outside 11 and 12 Groups were undermanned and many were barely operational. They certainly weren't being held back against an invasion. .



My take on this has been formed by conversations with an ex BoB period RAF pilot. He was flying targets for anti aircraft guns. He, and all his (experienced) colleagues, applied to move to Fighter Command during the BoB but were told they were being held back to fly sorties against German ground forces were there to be an invasion.

Now, this could be internal politics in the RAF, but he felt sure it was exactly what was meant to happen. At the same time his unit was receiving the bomb racks back from central stores together with a stock of bombs ready for use in an invasion.

On another tack; the fighter air training model to use for comparison was the Finnish one. To compensate for low numbers of expensive fighters they instituted rigorous and thorough air to air combat training and ruthlessly weeded out the competent but mediocre to ensure their few fighters would be used to their best. Firing accuracy and close engagement before firing had the same purpose.


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## stona (Feb 12, 2014)

yulzari said:


> My take on this has been formed by conversations with an ex BoB period RAF pilot. He was flying targets for anti aircraft guns. He, and all his (experienced) colleagues, applied to move to Fighter Command during the BoB but were told they were being held back to fly sorties against German ground forces were there to be an invasion.
> 
> Now, this could be internal politics in the RAF, but he felt sure it was exactly what was meant to happen. At the same time his unit was receiving the bomb racks back from central stores together with a stock of bombs ready for use in an invasion.



Now you are referring to pilots in Bomber Command. Bomber Command may well have held units and pilots back against a supposed invasion, I don't know. It was actually quite busy on cross Channel operations against the gathering invasion barges amongst other things in any case. 

Fighter Command did not hold pilots in reserve for anti invasion operations because it couldn't. It didn't have enough _combat ready _ pilots to allow it such a luxury.

Cheers

Steve


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## The Basket (Feb 12, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> "Based on" can mean a slightly modified air-frame or it can mean taking what was learned form one air-frame and applying to a new air-frame by scaling up or down but keeping NO parts the same and this is pretty much the story with the Battle and the P4/34/Fulmar.
> 
> The P4/34 had 6ft 7 1/2 in less wig span and was 2ft 4 1/2 shorter in the fuselage than the Battle. The fuselage was also thinner with no provision for a prone position for a bomb aimer _under_ the pilot.
> 
> The Fulmar cut about 1 ft from the wing of the P4/34 and actually the 2nd P4/34 was used as the prototype of the Fulmar. Fulmar had a 342sq ft wing compared to the Battles 422sq ft wing. The P4/34 got rid of the bomb cells in the wing of the Battle and carried it's bombs under wing and also used inward retracting landing gear that fit flush instead of the Battle's rearward retracting semi-exposed landing gear.



Thank you for your reply.
I am fully aware of the aircraft of my country which I consider my birthright. 
I wont lecture you on budweiser and coca cola so do me the honour of not lecturing me.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 12, 2014)

Your post # 34

"Single seat Battle?
Techinically meets timeframes and available. Fulmar is basically a Battle."

Unless that is understated British humor or sarcasm? A bit like saying a F8F Bearcat is basically a F6F Hellcat. 

Both monoplanes, both use P&W R-2800 engines. Both single seaters from the same company.


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## parsifal (Feb 12, 2014)

and built in the same war i guess. Thats an exampe of british understated humour incidentally


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## The Basket (Feb 12, 2014)

parsifal said:


> and built in the same war i guess. Thats an exampe of british humour incidentally



P4/34 is a two seat based on the Battle. Or lessons learnt from the Battle.
however you want to twist it. The same design team in the same time period come up with similair aircraft. Funny that.

I have to advise you that the Hellcat and Bearcat are different generation fighters. I am surprised you didnt know that.


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## parsifal (Feb 12, 2014)

I did know that. Wasnt trying to be sarcastic at all, sorry if it came across that way, more trying to be funny. guess I failed there as well.

There were technical similarities bertween the two designs, yet they were also quite different
Battle
wingspan 16.46 meters 54 feet
wing area 39.2 sq_meters 422 sq_feet 
length 12.9 meters 42 feet 4 inches
height 4.72 meters 15 feet 6 inches

empty weight 3,015 kilograms 6,650 pounds
MTO weight 4,895 kilograms 10,790 pounds

max speed at altitude 415 KPH 255 MPH / 225 KT
service ceiling 7,620 meters 25,000 feet
range 1,600 KM 1,000 MI / 870 NMI
Fulmar

wingspan 14.15 meters 46 feet 5 inches
wing area 31.77 sq_meters 342 sq_feet 
length 12.24 meters 40 feet 1 inch
height 4.27 meters 14 feet

empty weight 3,955 kilograms 8,720 pounds
MTO weight 4,855 kilograms 10,700 pounds

max speed at altitude 400 KPH 250 MPH / 215 KT
service ceiling 6,255 meters 21,500 feet
endurance 4 hours
As can be seen the Fulmar was considerably smaller, and was much heavier in empty condition, a product of its strengthened airframe, armamaent and armour mostly. Pilots were indifferent to the Battles handling capabilities, but found the Fulmar to be very manouverable....enough to take on single seat fighters with some chance of survival. not so the Battle. 

The Battle had greater range, and carried bombs, whereas, in the early marks of the Fulmar, bomb handling was not provided. in the later marks the Fulmar could carry about half the load of a battle, but were also rated to divebomb, which the battle could not do

So, even though they were similarin general outline, there were significant differences in the design of the two airframes


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## parsifal (Feb 13, 2014)

One suggestion leading on from that, is the possibility of a twin engined Fulmar. How would it have performed with either two twin wasps or two Merlin engines fitted. the RN did really well with the fulmar, despite its obvious performance limitations. training, armament, manouverability (yes, the Fulmar was moderately manouverable, the later Firefly was exceptionally so) how would it have fared with twice the power. I think it would have shifted from a fighter able to nearly survive in a hostile air environment, to being able to dominate it.


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## Old Wizard (Feb 13, 2014)

The biggest problem the RAF had was abandoning their peace time fighter tactics. They learned that the hard way.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 13, 2014)

I am not sure what the intent of the original post was.

A fighter or fighters to _supplement_ the Hurricane and Spitfire?

A fighter to _replace_ the Hurricane and/or Spitfire?

To replace the Hurricane means you need to build 2000 of them by Aug of 1940. 

Most anything can supplement to some some extent but obviously most (all) of the choices would be lucky to reach the Hurricanes performance (Whirlwind excepted) without major tweaking or unhistorical engines.


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## Juha (Feb 13, 2014)

Hello SR6
I took it as to supplement, otherwise UK would have been in dire straits. There would not have been enough Hawks to replace Hurricanes and Spitfires were clearly better. But with a good and reliable engine Venom might have potential, if it would have been possible to self-seal its fuel tanks and to give protection to pilot without too much performance loss, probably a big IF to so low-powered and small plane. And if only FC would have been so clever as to sent some fighter pilots to Finland to study proper fighter tactics in 1938/39.

Juha


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## nuuumannn (Feb 13, 2014)

The Hawk 75 and possibly the Wildcat are probably the best pre-war options and possibly available in numbers, but who doesn't get their Hawks if Britain gets them? The Venom, I'm afraid is a non starter because of the lack of potential for development; adding bits to make it combat worthy would seriously degrade its performance; its maximum speed was only 312 mph; it really needed another engine. It's advantage was that it was small and light; once its weight goes up it loses its rate of climb and speed. I guess if it was all there was it would have had to do.

Like I said with the Fulmar earlier, Parsifal; not even worth contemplating. Yes, the Fulmar did well in the FAA's hands in the Med, but how would a couple of squadrons of them fare over Britain in the summer of 1940 up against 40 to 60 Bf 109s at a time? To put it into perspective, that other much maligned two seater, the Defiant I had a higher maximum speed by nearly 20 miles an hour, greater rate of climb and better ceiling than the Fulmar, it was also smaller and lighter and _it_ was considered slow and sluggish. I don't rate the Fulmar's chances at all and based on the RAF's experiences with the Defiant by day, I suspect the Fulmar would not be much different.


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## parsifal (Feb 13, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> The Hawk 75 and possibly the Wildcat are probably the best pre-war options and possibly available in numbers, but who doesn't get their Hawks if Britain gets them? The Venom, I'm afraid is a non starter because of the lack of potential for development; adding bits to make it combat worthy would seriously degrade its performance; its maximum speed was only 312 mph; it really needed another engine. It's advantage was that it was small and light; once its weight goes up it loses its rate of climb and speed. I guess if it was all there was it would have had to do.
> 
> Like I said with the Fulmar earlier, Parsifal; not even worth contemplating. Yes, the Fulmar did well in the FAA's hands in the Med, but how would a couple of squadrons of them fare over Britain in the summer of 1940 up against 40 to 60 Bf 109s at a time? To put it into perspective, that other much maligned two seater, the Defiant I had a higher maximum speed by nearly 20 miles an hour, greater rate of climb and better ceiling than the Fulmar, it was also smaller and lighter and _it_ was considered slow and sluggish. I don't rate the Fulmar's chances at all and based on the RAF's experiences with the Defiant by day, I suspect the Fulmar would not be much different.




The Hawk 75 was not one single type, it was a series of subtypes. The performance figures quoted are for the earlier marks, the A-4 subtype had about 10mph extra speed, armour and better armament and the later ones still (subtypes 5 and 6 ) quite possibly even higher. The later marks of Hawk were very competitive to the hurricane. Biggest problem was the unit price....the Americans were charging a bomb for them, and wanted the french to fund a new factory for them. I can see scenarios where Hawks were built inAustralia (but Britain actively sought to stifle the emerging Australian aero industry because they wanted a cornered market basically), so if Hawk production was decentralised to the dominions, there might have been some augmentation of the main types. Two thigs were needed, however. money, and a willingness or approval by the foreign office to allow US penetration of Commonwealth nations. 

With regard to the Fulmar, it would not have been possible to replace either the hurricane or the Spit, but the Fulmar was a very effective bomber destroyer, and was capable of survivibg in a hostile air environment, as its experiences over Malta and the desert clearly show. surviving and winning are two very different things. Rather like the gladiator, or the CR42 over malta, these aircraft could survive, but they could not win air superiority, whatever the numbers. what was needed with the fulmar was better performance, so we do basically agree. Was the Fulmar capable of that. maybe, but the obvious need was for a two engine configuration 

Defiant is a much maligned aircraft, but I do think its basic concept as a turretted fighter was the problem more than its mediocre performance. Getting the gunner and the pilot to work together was difficult. It was harder than a bomber with turrets. in a bomber the aircraft is flying straight and level, with the main defences derived from flying in formation (except at night when this defensive technique was not possible). For Definats they were expected to aerobat, and use turret tactics at the same time. 

So, I disagree that the defiant was on a par with the Fulmar. Not even close despite the similarity in performance. In the first six months of its service, the Fulmar shot down something like 120 enemy...more than had entered service up to that time. air victories included vicotories over fighters including Me 109s. I dont know the score of the Definat, but its deployment was more extensive, and earlier yet I doubt it enjoyed anywhere near the same success as the Fulmar

Wildcat in 1940 was a non-starter. it was basically an unserviceable aircraft. it is not a contemporary of the Fulmar , it was 1941 before it really could be considered an operational type. Maybe fixable before it actually was, but then its performance and armament was less. The early martlets were found to be most unsatisfactory, at least from an FAA perspective. There were reasons why they were generally not used operationally in fleet defence in the Med until 1941. Martlet basically sucked until the technical issues had been solved


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## nuuumannn (Feb 13, 2014)

> So, I disagree that the defiant was on a par with the Fulmar. Not even close despite the similarity in performance. In the first six months of its service, the Fulmar shot down something like 120 enemy...more than had entered service up to that time. air victories included vicotories over fighters including Me 109s. I dont know the score of the Definat, but its deployment was more extensive, and earlier yet I doubt it enjoyed anywhere near the same success as the Fulmar.



Well, good to see that we can agree on some points, but disagree on others. Yes, Parsifal, you are right regarding the Wildcat; like I said in my earlier post, it was not available in numbers, but in terms of what was available, it was probably more suitable than other suggestions here, including the Fulmar. The Fulmar is where we are going to have to agree to disagree. Firstly, it was not a first rate fighter regardless of its performance in the Med. The Royal Navy has a habit of getting the very best out of the meagre equipment it has, but that doesn't make the Fulmar an excellent fighter. It was a well designed and built aeroplane that was pleasant to handle and fly according to its pilots, but it would not have survived in the skies over Britain in 1940. The RAF needed first rate fighters against a well trained and well equipped Luftwaffe in the numbers the Germans were appearing in. It would have been slaughtered.

As for its performance compared to the Defiant, the Fulmar was 20 mph slower, that's a big margin in 1940 terms. Remember that the Spitfire prototype's speed of 340 mph was considered less than what was expected of it in 1936 and four years later the production Fulmar was only capable of 280 mph - the Lancaster had a higher maximum speed! Not good enough and there's no way that Dowding would find the Fulmar's sluggish performance acceptable. Even at just over 300 mph, there was doubts about the Defiant's speed and survivability by the end of 1939 when it entered service. How would a 280 mph fighter fare?

The fate of the Defiant was not determined by its turret doctrine; you're mistaken in that assumption. The failing was in its use as a fighter against fighters; against bombers, the Defiant's unique armament proved itself adequate to the task and its successful use as a night fighter for two years on the front line confirms this. 264 Sqn's commanding officer trained his men in the best way to exploit his aircraft's advantages. In almost every combat the Defiant entered into it was supremely outnumbered by German single-seaters; when 151 Squadron lost 6 of its number in one action, the 9 aircraft were pounced on by 30 Bf 109s. This is a big factor in the losses suffered by the Defiant squadrons and I doubt the Fulmar would do any better. 

Also, the Defiant as a day fighter did not have a more extensive deployment than the Fulmar. In total, the number of available Defiants on the front line at the start of August 1940 was 35. Only two squadrons operated as day fighter units and of those, the largest number of Defiants in one single action was 12. The highest number lost in one day's combat was 6. Not high figures, but clearly as a percentage of losses, this is unsustainable. Counter that with as many as 80 to 100 German fighters escorting bombers during one raid alone and the Defiant and its losses compared to the number operating in theatre gets put into perspective; I'm pretty certain that a big two-seat 280 mph fighter would fare _no_ better, forward firing guns or not.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 13, 2014)

The Fulmar would be too little, too late. First Fulmar (not converted P4/34) flies in Jan 1940 and makes 230mph with a slightly up rated Merlin III engine in a rather "untidy" installation. Merlin VIII and a better installation gets the speed up to *255mph* at 9000ft. It is not until the Merlin 30 engine shows up in the MK II that the Fulmar hits 270mph although with a bit more drag and equipment than the MK I. 

I will grant that these figures are for "normal" ratings and not using higher boost levels but it looks like the Fulmar would be 30-35mph slower than a Hurricane at 9-10,000ft. using similar ( but not identical power the Fulmar I would have more) power.

The Fulmar MK II had 1360hp available at 6000ft ( or higher with ram?) at 12lbs. But Hurricanes using 12lbs of boost could do 320mph or more at 9,000ft. 

Trials with the MK 30 don't start until the Spring of 1941 but even using MK III (or MK XII) with 12lbs of boost is going to leave the Fulmar way to slow and too low an altitude.


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## parsifal (Feb 14, 2014)

as i said, not competitive but survivable. theres a difference. we can talk all day about the technical deficiancies of the type, but these are the basic, irefutable facts. Over the most heavily bombed target in the world to date, they survived. they didnt win, they couldnt win with those performce values. the best they could hope for was to hope or find a straggler bomber and pick him off. They certainly could catch a He111 when fully loaded, but had difficulty catching a faster ju88. Ju87 was not in the hunt against a Fulmar being competently flown. Against an Me 109, they were hard pressed, but they proved again and again during their careers that they could survive. 

These are the facts. not conjecture or summation, or extrapolation. the facts.


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## Greyman (Feb 14, 2014)

I don't think the Fulmar in any way belongs in the air at 15 to 20,000 feet attacking German formations.






In order of speed: Spitfire, Hurricane, Defiant, Fulmar. Climb performance is even more sobering. Not a good interceptor at all for the Battle of Britain. Even the Blenheim fighters were a better choice.

First three are running full +12 boost and the Fulmar is running full +9½ boost.

A&AEE figures.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 14, 2014)

> Against an Me 109, they were hard pressed, but they proved again and again during their careers that they could survive.



Against the numbers of German fighters ranging over Britain in the Summer of 1940? Again, I don't agree. You are ignoring the simple fact that the RAF needed good first rate fighters, _not_ aircraft that could just survive. It had those already in the Defiant, Gladiator and Blenheim. If there were no Hurricanes, the Fulmar would be yet another failed fighter. It's unlikely that the Fulmar would even _survive_ against the kinds of numbers of fighters the Germans were fielding; losses would be as proportionally heavy as Defiants were, if not worse and it too, would have been removed from active day fighter duties. It had too poor ceiling, poor rate of climb and poor turn of speed for a front line modern fighter in 1940 - that's a fact you haven't countered into your argument, Parsifal.


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## RCAFson (Feb 14, 2014)

Greyman said:


> I don't think the Fulmar in any way belongs in the air at 15 to 20,000 feet attacking German formations.
> 
> View attachment 254047
> 
> ...



But we're not talking about a Fulmar I. We're talking about a P.4/34 developed into a single seat (why twin?) RAF heavy fighter and such a fighter would be ~1000 lbs lighter than a Fulmar I. The P.4/34 made 284 mph at ~16000ft with a Merlin II engine. (at 2850rpm and 4lb boost according to David Brown ). Pop a Merlin XII into it and it should be quite a bit faster than the P.4/34 and with 8 x mgs and 750rpg it has a lot more firepower than the Hurricane, for example.

In any event, if the RAF didn't order the Hurricane or Spitfire, they would pretty much have had to order something else in volume, such as an Gladiator with uprated engines and a CS prop, but if not that then what?


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## parsifal (Feb 14, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Against the numbers of German fighters ranging over Britain in the Summer of 1940? Again, I don't agree. You are ignoring the simple fact that the RAF needed good first rate fighters, _not_ aircraft that could just survive. It had those already in the Defiant, Gladiator and Blenheim. If there were no Hurricanes, the Fulmar would be yet another failed fighter. It's unlikely that the Fulmar would even _survive_ against the kinds of numbers of fighters the Germans were fielding; losses would be as proportionally heavy as Defiants were, if not worse and it too, would have been removed from active day fighter duties. It had too poor ceiling, poor rate of climb and poor turn of speed for a front line modern fighter in 1940 - that's a fact you haven't countered into your argument, Parsifal.



This simply is not supported by the experiences over Malta, where both hurricanes and Fulmars fought side by side in a situation heavily dominated by the enemy. Fulmar here was at least as challenged as it would have been had it been used over SE England, and whilst I freely agree it had no chance of affecting the air state, claiming it would be shot out of the sky over SE England because of the superior performance of the 109 is just a fallacy not in any way supported by its experiences over Malta. And it is also a fallacy to claim that LW densities would in some way be greater over SE England than was confronted over Malta. Over Malta the initial force structure for the LW was about 40 109s, but this rapidly ramped up in a short space of time.  if anything, one could probably argue that the density of fighters over Malta was greater than anywhere else at that time

What is irrefutable, is that the Fulmar was simply not capable of wresting air superiority from the 109, given the numbers available. But then, neither was the hurricane able to achieve that.

The air war began in Malta with token strength of six antiquated Gladiator fighters. A force of Hurricane’s was flown in and this constituted No.412 Flight. In late-1940 RAF Wellingtons (five squadrons) were based on the island and were the only offensive capability Malta possessed. In January 1941, however, all these were destroyed on the ground in a series of intense air attacks. Meantime, Hurricane fighters were constantly ferried to the island to replace losses and to increase the number fighters on Malta. In all, 361 Hurricanes were ferried towards Malta since August 1940 of which 303 reached the island, and of which 150 went on to North Africa. May 1941 brought the total force of Hurricanes to 50 aircraft.

LW strength varied greatly, but at the beginning was about 230 a/c, of which 40 were 109s, and about 50 were 110s. The Germans were supported by about 190 Italians. German committment to the siege waxed and waned through 1941, but at its peak was about 850 a/c (including the italians). British defences never exceeded 50 a/c at any time, though losses were quite heavy. 

Another source I have gives the following strength figures for FKX as at the end of March

Fleigerkorps X
Lt-General Hans Geissler in Sicily
(22 March 1941)
7./Jagdgeschwader 26
Me109E7
14
I/Jagdgeschwader 27
Me109E-7
39
I/Nachtjagdgeschwader 3
Me110E-3
III/Zestörergeschwader 26
Me110D-3; 33
9./Zestörergeschwader 26
Me110D-3 15
Lehrgeschwader 1
Ju88A-4
II/LG1
26
III/LG1
40
He111H-3
12
II/Kampfgeschwader 26
He111H-3
36
III/Kampfgeschwader 30
Ju88A-4
27
Stukageschwader 1
Ju87B-2
I/StG1
30
II/StG1
42
III/StG1
37
I/Stukageschwader 2
Ju87B-2
38
Stab/Stukageschwader 3
Ju87B-2
5
+ The strength of Fliegerkorps X on 22 March 1941 was: normal strength of 520 of which an average of around 350 were serviceable at any given time. . Not shown are other non-combat units, which accounted for 77 Ju52/3m transports and two reconnaissance units having a total of 29 Ju88D-1s.

From June 1940 to the beginning of 1942, the defending fighters had claimed 199 confirmed enemy aircraft kills and 78 probables, while the AA guns accounted for another 50 aircraft. All this had been achieved for the loss of 20 Hurricanes, and just 3 Fulmars, as well as 1 Gladiator plus another 10 Hurricanes 2 Fulmars were lost in accidents; these figures exclude losses on the ground.

I dont have a lot of detail on the italian contribution. it was generally smaller than the Germans but amounted to several hundred aircraft

Fighter Squadrons:
261 Squadron: Hurricane Mk I – August 1940 to May 1941
806 Royal Navy Squadron (Detachment): Fulmar Mk I – January 1941 to March 1942
185 Squadron: Hurricane Mk I, IIA, B, C – May 1941 to February 1942
249 Squadron: Hurricane Mk I, IIA, B – May 1941 to February 1942
46 Squadron (renamed to 126 Squadron): Hurricane Mk IIB, C – June 1941 to February 1942
1435 Flight: Hurricane Mk IIB, C – December 1941 to February 1942 

In any estimation, the fulmars were not "hacked out of the sky" as is so often claimed. and in fact there is good evidence they made good stable gun platforms for shooting down axis bombers. as a percentage of the force structure, their losses were higher than the hurricanes, but not greatly so. It is just another of those urban myths that the quality of the aircraft automatically dictates its loss rate. its what it does in the air that changes that. how high, and how hard a target. Speed is basically irrelevant to survivability. Speed leads to whether you can gain the upper hand, it counts for virtually nothing when you are fighting slow moving bombers. it was because their speed advantage, along with their numbers and the skill of their pilots that the 109s dominated the sky over Malta for so long as they did. 

Over Malta, the Fulmar was being asked to do a lot. But it did it, in the face of the most frightful odds and the most terrible of conditions. So too did the hurricane, with little evidence of any measurable diffierence in their respective loss rates


Saying or claiming that the war over Malta was in some easier or safer than SE England in some way is just patently untrue. it was THE most dangerous place on earth for an Allied pilot to fly at that time. And the fulmar managed to survive in that situation, and even do some good. Replacement or alteranative for the hurriacan (much less the spit), it certainly was not. im not responding to that. im responding to the claim that somehow Malta (and battles leading to it) was in some way safer than over England. that is just not the case. And that the Fulmar could not survive ina hostile and hot enemy environment. its experiences over Malta clearly, and conclusively disprove that that, and no amount of jiving can alter that basic truth 

Over Malta itself, the lions share of fighting was done by Hurricanes, but they were supported by about a squadron or so of fulmars. In the various supply runs to the beleagured island, there were no other types used until september 1941, other than


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## nuuumannn (Feb 14, 2014)

Parsifal, that information, whilst interesting and painting a good overview of ops over the Mediterranean does not do anything to support your point. You are steadfastly ignoring the fact that Bf 109s did not appear in _anywhere near _the numbers in the Med that they did over Britain in 1940 

If you examine Fulmar kills and losses you will see that Fulmars largely shot down bombers, Ju 87s, Ju 88s, He 111s, Italian S.79s, Cant Z.501s (the Fulmar's first kill on 2 September 1940) and Z.1007s, with a few Fiat CR-42s for good measure. The number of combats with Bf 109s were few and far between and even then when Fulmars did encounter them it was in small numbers, nothing like those that the Germans hurled at the RAF in 1940. Lt Robert Henley claimed that in mid January 1941 whilst on CAP he saw "...an aircraft identified as a Messerschmitt Me 109 attempted to join the formation but did not attack. When it broke away the Fulmars proved too slow to pursue it." During the raid against Kirkenes, two (also reported as 3 Fulmars) were lost for the loss of 1 Bf 109 and two Bf 110s (and a Ju 87). One source I've read claims four Bf 109s were lost, but this has been refuted. 

The only time Fulmars encountered enemy fighters and bombers in anything like the numbers that the RAF was meeting in 1940 was over Ceylon when on 5 April 1942 125 Japanese carrier aircraft attacked Colombo, which included Zeroes. Two Fulmars were quickly shot down for one Zero to Lt Mike Hordern of 806 Sqn. 

I entirely agree that the FAA pilots that fought in paltry few numbers against a numerically superior enemy were courageous and clever in their employment of the Fulmar, but that does not change the fact that Fulmars _did not_ encounter Bf 109s in the same numbers as the RAF in 1940 - how many times do I have to state this? You are saying that there were between 40 Bf 109s and 50 Bf 110s in the Med? The RAF was frequently meeting these numbers of these fighters on a daily basis in every air raid almost every day. The scale was completely different and you know it. Any suggestion that the Fulmar would do as well as it did in the Med against the creme of the Luftwaffe in the Summer of 1940 _is_ a fallacy, Parsifal; the Fulmar just could not perform and its losses would have been heavy by comparison to the numbers involved, just like the Defiant.


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## Greyman (Feb 14, 2014)

parsifal if you can get your hands on it, I highly recommend 'Hurricanes Over Malta' by Brian Cull and Frederick Galea. It is packed to the brim with information and anecdotes on the struggle over Malta from June 1940 to April 1942. It doesn't paint a very rosy picture of the Fulmar's capabilities, numerous examples of bravery and determination notwithstanding.

A choice quote from a quick skimming to sum up the situation:

'_Despite the rapidly deteriorating availability of the Hurricanes, the few remaining Fulmars were considered too vulnerable to fighter attack and unsuitable as interceptors, and the policy was for them to remain around the fringes of a raid and pick off stragglers_.'


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## Aozora (Feb 14, 2014)

parsifal said:


> This simply is not supported by the experiences over Malta, where both hurricanes and Fulmars fought side by side in a situation heavily dominated by the enemy. Fulmar here was at least as challenged as it would have been had it been used over SE England, and whilst I freely agree it had no chance of affecting the air state, claiming it would be shot out of the sky over SE England because of the superior performance of the 109 is just a fallacy.... Speed is basically irrelevant to survivability. Speed leads to whether you can gain the upper hand, it counts for virtually nothing when you are fighting slow moving bombers. it was because their speed advantage, along with their numbers and the skill of their pilots that the 109s dominated the sky over Malta for so long as they did.



You're contradicting yourself; in one sentence you say speed was not essential, yet you also state the reason the 109s dominated over Malta was _because_ of their speed advantage and their numbers and pilot skill? 

These are exactly the advantages the far larger numbers of 109s the Fulmars would have encountered over SE England would have enjoyed. 265 mph (Fulmar Mk I) v 354 mph? That isn't just a "speed advantage" - the 109 could _cruise_ faster than a Fulmar's top speed! Apart from that, the Fulmars in the Mediterranean, or over and around Malta, rarely, if ever encountered Bf 109s, nor can I find references to Fulmars shooting down 109s - but, I'll keep looking.

Not to mention the Fulmar's very slow rate of climb cf Spitfires and Hurricanes. The British fighters were at their most vulnerable when they were climbing for altitude where they could be - and often were - bounced by 109s which were already flying at higher altitudes. Fulmars trying to climb to altitude after a scramble would have been far more vulnerable. The slow ROC also meant that Fulmar units would have needed to be scrambled far earlier than the Spitfire and Hurricane units, or Fighter Command would have been forced to fly standing patrols in the hope that they could intercept Luftwaffe formations. 

Unfortunately, had Fulmars been employed in large numbers during the B of B, they would have been shot down in large numbers before they could close with the Luftwaffe bombers.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 14, 2014)

Greyman said:


> I don't think the Fulmar in any way belongs in the air at 15 to 20,000 feet attacking German formations.
> 
> In order of speed: Spitfire, Hurricane, Defiant, Fulmar. Climb performance is even more sobering. Not a good interceptor at all for the Battle of Britain. Even the Blenheim fighters were a better choice.



Some sources say the Fulmar I could do 255mph at 9000ft, not 4500-5,000. I don't have the A&AEE figures so you may very well be correct but even giving the Fulmar the benefit of the doubt only increases it's speed about 10mph at the higher ? (17,000ft ?) altitudes. Changing the engine to a MK XII (which rather assumes a scenario of NO Spitfires instead of the Fulmars being a supplement) isn't going to change things a whole lot. 

Assuming that the Merlin VIII gave 1060hp at 7500ft as in Lumsden and _assuming_ it was down to 900-915hp at 15,000ft for the Fulmar to do 240mph at that altitude the cube law says you need 1382hp just to do 276mph (a 15% increase) and 1382hp at 15,000 ft is beyond the capability of the MK XII, the MK XX and 45. 

Adjust as needed for differences but 260 or 285mph at 15,000 leaves the plane way to slow. Bristol Blenheim could do 260mph _without_ over boosting engines.


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## Greyman (Feb 14, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Some sources say the Fulmar I could do 255mph at 9000ft ...



Looking at the graph it isn't unreasonable that a fast Fulmar - perhaps lighter than the one tested - could be 8ish mph faster at 9,000 feet (full throttle height of the Merlin VIII without emergency boost)


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## Shortround6 (Feb 14, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> But we're not talking about a Fulmar I. We're talking about a P.4/34 developed into a single seat (why twin?) RAF heavy fighter and such a fighter would be ~1000 lbs lighter than a Fulmar I. The P.4/34 made 284 mph at ~16000ft with a Merlin II engine. (at 2850rpm and 4lb boost according to David Brown ). Pop a Merlin XII into it and it should be quite a bit faster than the P.4/34 and with 8 x mgs and 750rpg it has a lot more firepower than the Hurricane, for example.
> 
> In any event, if the RAF didn't order the Hurricane or Spitfire, they would pretty much have had to order something else in volume, such as an Gladiator with uprated engines and a CS prop, but if not that then what?




If you are going to build a single seater just build a new airplane. Leaving out the rear seat and fairing over the cockpit doesn't gain much. To _save_ 1000lbs you are going to need to do more than just leave the rear seater home and rip out the radio gear. Not to mention that most of the weight you want to remove is behind the center of gravity. Having twice the ammo doesn't really give you twice the firepower, it allows to shoot with the SAME firepower twice as long which is not quite the same thing. BTW 400rpg for 8 guns is 192lbs not including the weight of the ammo boxes. Or about the weight of a second crew man. 

Gladiator with "uprated" engine and CS speed prop should see a lot better climb at low altitude but improvement at higher altitudes would be minimal, as would speed increases. That is unless you uprate the Mercury _waaaay_ beyond what was done historically.

The did run them on occasion at 9lbs of boost with 100 octane fuel but just like the Merlin III, this _only_ affected power below the FTH of 13-14,000ft. To "uprate" more than that you need more/thinner/longer cooling fins which may or may not require different manufacturing techniques. You may need a new (bigger) supercharger and drive. Just changing the gear ratio isn't going to get you much. Getting 840hp at 13-14,000ft from a 25 liter air cooled engine was doing pretty good as it was. The Wright R-1820GR205A that gave 1200hp for take-off on 91 octane was only good for 1000hp at 14,000ft from it's 30 liters and it weighed 300lb more than Mercury.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 14, 2014)

Greyman said:


> Looking at the graph it isn't unreasonable that a fast Fulmar - perhaps lighter than the one tested - could be 8ish mph faster at 9,000 feet (full throttle height of the Merlin VIII without emergency boost)


Could be 

Sometimes in the "what ifs" I like to give best case for the proposal so we can eliminate minor quibbles. If you are 50mph too slow then an extra 10mph doesn't really make much difference.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 14, 2014)

I agree with SR, might as well start with a clean sheet; even then at the rate the British got prototypes ready for production, there'd be no way that there would have been any in squadron service in time for the Battle of Britain. 

Lobelle actually draughted a single-seat fighter to the naval spec N.9/39, but it bore little resemblance to the P.4/34 or the Fulmar. It bore a superficial resemblance to the Firefly and was to be powered by a Griffon. To my knowledge he never concocted a single-seat fighter from either the P.4/34 or Fulmar, certainly not officially anyway. A lightened Firefly with four cannon was proposed to a twin engined cannon armed fighter spec - odd that it was single engined and to a Defiant replacement Lobelle also proposed a Hercules engined fighter.


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## parsifal (Feb 14, 2014)

Aozora said:


> You're contradicting yourself; in one sentence you say speed was not essential, yet you also state the reason the 109s dominated over Malta was _because_ of their speed advantage and their numbers and pilot skill?
> 
> These are exactly the advantages the far larger numbers of 109s the Fulmars would have encountered over SE England would have enjoyed. 265 mph (Fulmar Mk I) v 354 mph? That isn't just a "speed advantage" - the 109 could _cruise_ faster than a Fulmar's top speed! Apart from that, the Fulmars in the Mediterranean, or over and around Malta, rarely, if ever encountered Bf 109s, nor can I find references to Fulmars shooting down 109s - but, I'll keep looking.
> 
> ...



Without speed, you cannot really win air superiority, but also without sppeed, you can survive. there is a world of difference between the two issues, and ther is no contradiction. i dont know how many times Ive had this sort of discussion, basically because most people dont understand the difference between air superiority, air supremacy and being able to challenge the air state.

Without speed Fulmars, or any other fighter cannot control the air state. the best they hope to do is sneak up and pick off an odd bomber or two.. thats exactly what the air garrison managed to do over Malta, with just 3 losses in air combat in over a year of fighting (ther were other losses, but not to fightres). And because Malta was a point target, and SE England is not, the concentration of 109s over Malta was always going to be larger than the tendency of small scale raids that charaterised the battles over England in 1940, despite the greater numbers of enemy fighters. That is the nature of point defence. 

We can talk about the theoretical disadavatages of the Fulmar, or the Gladiator, or the CR42 all day, but that just conveniently ignores the basic facts......these types of aircraft did not suffer an especially high rate of attrition (except when other factors were also in the mix....and that could happen....anybody who fields inferior fighters is usually cockeyed in other areas as well), either when fighting with or against better types, or fighting on their own. What they could not do, was prevent superior types from dictating, or controlling the air state surrounding their own operations. Obsolete fighters are essentially an attritional weapon, they really cannot prevent an enemy from dominating the sky and being able to fly operations as required. however, if the cost of those opperations becomes too high, it becomes uneconomic to continue operations, and the side flying the dumbass fighters, in a blunt instrument kind of way can sometimes deny air air superiority to an opponent.

I tell you what, show me the evidence that Fulmars suffered an especially high rate of attrition, and I will look at the scenario differently, re-examine the factors affecting loss rates, and get back to you. but I can tell you one thing, top rated fighters dont reduce your own losses, at least not by much. What they can do is increase enemy losses,and permit your strike elements to hit with decreased vulnerability.

As to numbers, well, we will never know, so that much of your argument is sheer opinion and conjecture based on preconceived ideas and biases. what we do know is that the Fulmar, even when outnumbered 4 or 5:1 it didnt seem to bother them in the least. It just prevented them from doing their job (destroy enemy bombers) effectively, because they were too busy trying to just not get shot down. Ther is no evidence 9infront of us) for you to claim they would be shot out of the sky. There is evidence that they could survive in a hostile environment, just that it doesnt fit your conception of how air warfare is supposed to work. its a common misunderstanding


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## parsifal (Feb 14, 2014)

Greyman said:


> parsifal if you can get your hands on it, I highly recommend 'Hurricanes Over Malta' by Brian Cull and Frederick Galea. It is packed to the brim with information and anecdotes on the struggle over Malta from June 1940 to April 1942. It doesn't paint a very rosy picture of the Fulmar's capabilities, numerous examples of bravery and determination notwithstanding.
> 
> A choice quote from a quick skimming to sum up the situation:
> 
> '_Despite the rapidly deteriorating availability of the Hurricanes, the few remaining Fulmars were considered too vulnerable to fighter attack and unsuitable as interceptors, and the policy was for them to remain around the fringes of a raid and pick off stragglers_.'



Ive read the book, though i seem to have lost my copy of late....Im not claiming they were acting or capable as interceptors. They needed more speed, alot of it, to do that and their performance at altiude was failry poor. but they could (and did) undertake the role of bomber destroyer very effectively in their time. They were an aircraft designed to operate below 15000 feet, high altitude was another thing they were not really built for.

just so we are clear. i am not claiming the Fulmar was a possible alternative or replacement for either the hurricane or the spitfire. it might work as a supplement at best. What i am going nuts over are these unsubstantiated claims that it would be shot out of the sky. There is no evidence that i am aware of of that ever happening. Provided the pilot was competent of course. Neither am i claiming the Fulmar was anything really special. It was just an aircraft, that happened to be too slow to be suited to the role of air superiority fighter, but it did possess certain qualities that made it good at what it was built for...... heavy armament, good loiter time, stability and reasoable manouverability made it ideal as a bomber killer, and thats reflected in its kill scores. 

Why do i know this...well in part because ive seen other aircraft from another age do exactly the same thing in excercise.....our usage of A4s were modelled on exactly the fulmar experience, I know the theory, and i know that it works...it worked then, and it worked in the 70s. Maybe things have changed now....who knows


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## RCAFson (Feb 14, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> If you are going to build a single seater just build a new airplane. Leaving out the rear seat and fairing over the cockpit doesn't gain much. To _save_ 1000lbs you are going to need to do more than just leave the rear seater home and rip out the radio gear. Not to mention that most of the weight you want to remove is behind the center of gravity. Having twice the ammo doesn't really give you twice the firepower, it allows to shoot with the SAME firepower twice as long which is not quite the same thing. BTW 400rpg for 8 guns is 192lbs not including the weight of the ammo boxes. Or about the weight of a second crew man.
> 
> Gladiator with "uprated" engine and CS speed prop should see a lot better climb at low altitude but improvement at higher altitudes would be minimal, as would speed increases. That is unless you uprate the Mercury _waaaay_ beyond what was done historically.
> 
> The did run them on occasion at 9lbs of boost with 100 octane fuel but just like the Merlin III, this _only_ affected power below the FTH of 13-14,000ft. To "uprate" more than that you need more/thinner/longer cooling fins which may or may not require different manufacturing techniques. You may need a new (bigger) supercharger and drive. Just changing the gear ratio isn't going to get you much. Getting 840hp at 13-14,000ft from a 25 liter air cooled engine was doing pretty good as it was. The Wright R-1820GR205A that gave 1200hp for take-off on 91 octane was only good for 1000hp at 14,000ft from it's 30 liters and it weighed 300lb more than Mercury.



The Fulmar I included folding wings, arrestor gear, catapult points, observer, 2 full oxygen systems, full naval radio and radio homing equipment, none of which is needed for an RAF heavy fighter. Again, look at the P.4/34 performance specs and then uprate them with a more powerful engine. I don't know why people are fixating on the Fulmar I with a Merlin VIII engine as being even remotely similar to what an RAF heavy fighter would perform like.

My understanding was that the malta field mod consisted of fitting a Mercury XV engine and CS prop to the Gladiator. 

BTW, another alternate candidate for RAF FC was the Gloster F.9/37:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_F.9/37


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## Shortround6 (Feb 14, 2014)

The P4/34 had an extra 80-100 sq ft of wing area, an extra 7-8ft of fuselage length compared to a single seat fighter Weighed as much empty as a Hurricane did loaded, and that is without guns, armor or self sealing tanks. There is no way, given the same engine, that it could perform anywhere close to even a Hurricane. 
Just how much operational equipment was in the P4/34 when it was tested? 

And the cube rule says that if the Hurricane did 313mph with 1030hp and the P4/34 did 283mph with same 1030hp it needs 1393 hp to get the same 313mph. Merlins with 1393hp at 16,000ft were a bit scarce in 1940. They were a bit scarce for most of 1941. 

As far as the Mercury goes, They managed to get a Blenheim up to about 290 something mph by fairing the nose, clipping the wings, taking out the turret, polishing the paint and sanding rivets, AND running 100 octane gas, over reving the engine and running 9lb boost. The Mercury XV engine had the SAME ratings as the MK VIII used in the Gladiator. Differences were it was capable of taking the controllable pitch prop (Different shaft? and oil pump for the pitch mechanism.) 

All the Gloster F.9/37 needed was an engine that actually worked more than occasionally. The 2nd prototype when powered with a different model Taurus engine saw the speed drop to 330mph and most production Taurus engines were rated for an altitude of 3500ft and had cooling and reliability troubles at that altitude. Throw that in with Bristol NOT solving the sleeve valve production problem _until_ the summer of 1940 ( they could make limited numbers of decent sleeve valves but not large numbers) and you would have production _starting_ in Aug/Sept. a little late.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 14, 2014)

FWIW, the chart with Merlins (1st half of war, VIII included), plus table for VIII and Mk.30. Seems like Merlin III and XII have circa 300 HP more at 10000 ft than the Mk.VIII.

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## fastmongrel (Feb 14, 2014)

Only use I can see for a Fulmar in the BoB is as a patrol plane. If the LW had managed to knock holes in the Chain Home system the Fulmars endurance could have been handy for flying above the Channel to provide early warning of raids and possibly shadow the raid providing tracking info as long as they kept well out of the way of the 109s.


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## Aozora (Feb 14, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Without speed, you cannot really win air superiority, but also without sppeed, you can survive. there is a world of difference between the two issues, and ther is no contradiction. i dont know how many times Ive had this sort of discussion, basically because most people dont understand the difference between air superiority, air supremacy and being able to challenge the air state.



Thanks for being condescending, that really helps your argument.



parsifal said:


> Without speed Fulmars, or any other fighter cannot control the air state. the best they hope to do is sneak up and pick off an odd bomber or two.. thats exactly what the air garrison managed to do over Malta, with just 3 losses in air combat in over a year of fighting (ther were other losses, but not to fightres). And because Malta was a point target, and SE England is not, the concentration of 109s over Malta was always going to be larger than the tendency of small scale raids that charaterised the battles over England in 1940, despite the greater numbers of enemy fighters. That is the nature of point defence.



I cannot find one single instance where Fulmars were even likely to encounter Bf 109s over Malta, so, from that perspective, you have no basis for your claims that they could survive for long enough to pick off one or two bombers when faced with modern, high speed fighters flown by competent pilots.




parsifal said:


> I tell you what, show me the evidence that Fulmars suffered an especially high rate of attrition, and I will look at the scenario differently, re-examine the factors affecting loss rates, and get back to you. but I can tell you one thing, top rated fighters dont reduce your own losses, at least not by much. What they can do is increase enemy losses,and permit your strike elements to hit with decreased vulnerability.



You know ful-mar well that Fulmars did not encounter modern, high speed fighters such as the Bf 109 so there are no such attrition statistics to point to. 



parsifal said:


> As to numbers, well, we will never know, so that much of your argument is sheer opinion and conjecture based on preconceived ideas and biases. what we do know is that the Fulmar, even when outnumbered 4 or 5:1 it didnt seem to bother them in the least. It just prevented them from doing their job (destroy enemy bombers) effectively, because they were too busy trying to just not get shot down. Ther is no evidence 9infront of us) for you to claim they would be shot out of the sky. There is evidence that they could survive in a hostile environment, just that it doesnt fit your conception of how air warfare is supposed to work. its a common misunderstanding



Nor is your hypothesis proven and, once again, thanks for your condescending remarks about my inferior understanding of how air combat works.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 14, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> FWIW, the chart with Merlins (1st half of war, VIII included), plus table for VIII and Mk.30. Seems like Merlin III and XII have circa 300 HP more at 10000 ft than the Mk.VIII.



The problem isn't 300 more hp at 10,000ft. it's the 3-400 hp needed at 16,000ft and up to drag the larger, heavier airframe around to equal even the Hurricane. We are not talking about the Spitfire, if you want a _viable_ alternative fighter for the BOB it had better equal the Hurricane on _average_ and planes with more weight and drag won't do it and planes with the Mercury radial won't do it. The Taurus and Hercules by historical standards weren't built in enough numbers in the summer/early fall of 1940 to be viable power-plants. 
As an example even the British were going to power early Beauforts with P&W R-1830s but the ship carrying the first 200 or so engines was torpedoed (also points out a problem with depending on US engines) so production went forward with the Taurus engines.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 14, 2014)

I'm not championing the Fulmar as a suitable replacement for the Spit Hurri. Even with Merlin 30, it was managing only 245 mph at 15000 ft (259 mph at 9000 ft). The Merlin III XII were making between 50 and 100 HP more than Mk.30, so we might just top 250 mph at 15000 ft with either Mk.III or Mk.XII. A loosing proposal vs. 100 mph faster LW opposition. Even with Merlin XX onboard, achieving 280 mph at 18-20000 ft might be Fulmar's best shot. Again, not enough. Further, it wouldn't have any climb advantage at any altitudes vs. LW fighters. Then we have another thing: the UK was't awash with Merlin XXs in 1940. 
One might wonder an 250-280 mph fighter will be of any use as a bomber destroyer, since it will be ill able to catch something faster than a Stuka.

For a plane that would really do as good as BoB RAF duo (or better), UK need to produce a small fighter with Merlin, not something bigger than even Spitfire or Huricane.


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## merlin (Feb 14, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> I am not sure what the intent of the original post was.
> 
> A fighter or fighters to _supplement_ the Hurricane and Spitfire?
> 
> ...



Yes to supplement. Moreover, if we're going to play WI with aircraft then some of the 'engine problems' can be solved earlier rather than late!!

I tried to make my little list 'reasonably plausible' options, though I'm surprised at some of the aircraft mentioned ..... !!

Whilst a single-seat 'Defiant' could've happened earlier e.g. as a result of the encounter over Holland, a moot point about it's speed without a Merlin XX to power it.

And yes, the use of the Defiant in the BoB seems strange, e.g. should've been used against the Newcastle raid, meanwhile down South, rather than scrabble to meet raids, might have been better to have them go for departing raids - coup de grace to the damaged and stragglers.

The Gloster F.5/34 - it would need to fly earlier, Gloster build it because Hurricane production is handled by the Austin Shadow factory (better option then Battles - IMHO). It's also possible that it could have got export orders - other countries that I believe licence produce the Mercury - Sweden, Finland Poland!

The Boulton-Paul P.88A B - given that OTL the Vulture was pulled, but the Hercules came good, I included the 'A' - again feasible that it was built flew and ordered - granted it needed the expected 1500 hp !

Interesting the comments on the Martlet, again the FAA could've had a Squadron or two in time, though they would've needed to have ordered it rather than taken over the French order.


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## parsifal (Feb 14, 2014)

> hanks for being condescending, that really helps your argument.




im not being condescending, sorry if you took it that way. Rather than me getting into a distasteful argument about what i think and what you think about your knowledge of air control, why dont you just tell me what you think and then we can take it from there. The generally accepted theories on air control is about the measure of freedom of manouvre a force can exercise in a given theatre or battle. air supremacy generally means a force can act with virtual impunity. perhaps only attritional losses due to unavoidable non combat losses. No real restriction on operational freedom. Air superiority means that there are some losses, but operations can be undertaken with a fair amount of freedom and and choice, losses tolerable, and operations able to be undertaken on a sustained basis. Air parity means restricted air operations, limited freedom of manouvre, some operations ok, but some with heavy losses, air activity intermittent. There is one other term, not really relating to air control, but simply what a defender can sometimes achieve....air denial, which means that every now and then they can intervene and inflict attrition on an opponent, so as to increase the costs and losses and reduce accuracy for the bombers. Obsolete fighter, no matter the numbers, cannot effectively claim either of the first two air states under any circumstances (except if ther are no opposing forces at all, or perhaps only with sustained attrition over a fairly long period), but they can do quite a bit towards the last two. Which is precisely where the fulmar slots in in 1940-41. 

Over SE englands the Germans, despite massive efforts, never achieved air superiority, much less supremacy. they were aiming for the latter. Because of that, clashes between opposing fighters were numerous, because the RAF simply would not concede air superiority to the germans. However, they did not achieve their victory because they necesarily possessed a superior fighter. We still argue incessantly about whether the 109 or the spit was superior, but forget that the lions share of the fighting for the british was done by an aircraft decidely inferior to the 109....the Hurricane. The Germans lost 250 fighters, give or take, during the main phase of the BoB , whilst the Brits lost , what, say 700 fighters. To those 250 German fighters, you can add at least 1200 other german aircraft, and thats where their defeat lies. Losses were so heavy, that the germans were unable to sustain operations, but the Brits did not win that victory by superior types, or a clear technological advantage (in the air i mean). They used attrition to wear the germans down, concentrating on the destruction of the bombers, because, you guessed it, their main fighter was outclassed by the Germans.

over Malta, despite the relatively modest 109 numbers committed, the Germans did achieve air superiority, tending to air supremacy. They could operate with virtual impunity over Malta in the finish, and could underttake whatever air operation they cared for. because Malta was a point defence target, they could achieve fighter concentrations way above what the modest numbers would otherwise suggest. the losses they suffered were attritional, inflicted in the main by Hurricanes, but also by the half squadron of Fulmars also based there. In the face of overwhelming German superiority, RAF and FAA tactics were not to engage head on, but pick off stragglers and wounded aircraft.....an effective response but one that took time to achieve any measurable or significant effect. If forced to do so, they could have also used that tactic over SE England for Fulmar operations. 




> I cannot find one single instance where Fulmars were even likely to encounter Bf 109s over Malta, so, from that perspective, you have no basis for your claims that they could survive for long enough to pick off one or two bombers when faced with modern, high speed fighters flown by competent pilots.




Where and how thoroughly did you look. Encounters between 109s and fulmars, or Hurricaners for that matter, during the worst parts oif the air battle over Malta were indeed rare, though not non-existent. It was an appropriate and effective response to an enemy conceded as having total air superiority over the island. I disagree that they were non-existent however. I suggest you look again, particulalry just after January 10 1941, and goes to the heart of what im arguing. But in the main fighter to fighter encounters were rare, which to that extent is consistent with your claim. They were actively avoided by the defenders, thats why, and really, when you think about it, is the main point Im making. fighting 109s in an aircraft like the Fulmar is not something really good for your long term health, but it does not follow that because the 109 outclassed the Fulmar, that the Fulmar was going to be shot down as a matter of course or that the fulmar was unable of achieving some effective results. over malta, the Fulmar managed both...to survive and shoot down enemy aircraft,whilst avoiding clashes with an enemy that could clearly fly rings around it if it had caught the fulmar. Or that it (the Fulmar) could not operate with some effect on the battle. It proved itself very suvivable over Malta, and had quite a bit of effect. Remember, i conceded that obsolete fighters cannot win air superiority in the face of a better quality opponent, except by attritional means, but they can survive, and they can use "air guerilla tactics" to pick off the vulnerable strike aircraft here and there, gradually wearing down an opponent until the problem was more manageable. this is precisely what the defenders over Malta were forced to do, but it was effective in the end. far from disproving that the fulmar was a survivable asset in such an enbvironment, or that there were no 109s over Malta, it 9ther was no combat with 109s) proves that Fulmars could survive in a hostile environment, with minimal losses, and some effect (albeit a supplementary one, which is all I ever claimed). 

Thats why having the biggest, meanest fighter on the block will get you air auperiority, but not necessarily victory, and why having a force of Fulmars (if they had been available at all in any meanigful numbers in August 1940) over England in 1940, was not necessarily a liability. They were never available, and in any event the RAF had oodles of spare Hurricanes and Spits to use instead. they were short of pilots. But if they had had oodles of pilots, but were short of airframes, but a relative large supply of Fulmars, i would not have hesitated to use them to try and get at stragglers and damaged bombers where the opportunity arose....and it arose often, because the germans had insufficient numbers of fighters to be everywhere in strength when needed. 



> You know ful-mar well that Fulmars did not encounter modern, high speed fighters such as the Bf 109 so there are no such attrition statistics to point to.



This is incorrect, but it is true that they were uncommon. Thats the very point Im making. they could operate in skies dominated by superior fighters (even a 110 was a handful for a fulmar), both in numbers and quality, and yet, still get effective and important work done 




> Nor is your hypothesis proven and, once again, thanks for your condescending remarks about my inferior understanding of how air combat works.



Its not my theory, its theories that Ive learnt, taught and applied for a living stretching over a period of years. Not being condescending, have a great deal of respect for your knowledge actually, but on the the application of air power, the achievement of air state, why having the most modern fighter wont necessarily win a campaign, you dont understand the theory. There is no other way of putting it. I have to ask, do you have any practical experience in air operations or air defence problem solving. i will hazard a gues and expect that you have none, but have read extensively on the technical aspects of flying. Doesnt mean you are wrong in the wider sense, but its obvious to me, someone who is trained in this field professionally, that you dont understand these concepts at all. I genuinely dont want to offend you in that regard, but it is what it is

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## RCAFson (Feb 14, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The P4/34 had an extra 80-100 sq ft of wing area, an extra 7-8ft of fuselage length compared to a single seat fighter Weighed as much empty as a Hurricane did loaded, and that is without guns, armor or self sealing tanks. There is no way, given the same engine, that it could perform anywhere close to even a Hurricane.
> Just how much operational equipment was in the P4/34 when it was tested?
> 
> And the cube rule says that if the Hurricane did 313mph with 1030hp and the P4/34 did 283mph with same 1030hp it needs 1393 hp to get the same 313mph. Merlins with 1393hp at 16,000ft were a bit scarce in 1940. They were a bit scarce for most of 1941.
> ...



and the proto-Fulmar had ~40 sqft less wing area than the P.4/34. The P.4/34 was flight tested at full operational weight regardless of the equipment on-board.


Mercury XV 100 octane:



> Powerplant: (100 Octane Fuel) Two Bristol Mercury XV 9-cylinder poppet-valve air-cooled radial engines developing 905 hp (675 kW) at take-off, a maximum output of 995 hp (742 kW) for level flight (5 minute usage) and a maximum ecomical cruising power output of 590 hp (440 kW) at 16,000 ft (4877 m) at 2400 rpm. (87 Octane Fuel) Two Bristol Mercury XV 9-cylinder poppet-valve air-cooled radial engines developing 725 hp (541 kW) at take-off, a maximum output of 840 hp (627 kW) for level flight (5 minute usage) and a maximum ecomical cruising power output of 590 hp (440 kW) at 16,000 ft (4877 m) at 2400 rpm.
> Bristol Blenheim


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## Shortround6 (Feb 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> and the proto-Fulmar had ~40 sqft less wing area than the P.4/34. The P.4/34 was flight tested at full operational weight regardless of the equipment on-board.



Hmmmm, the full operational weight of the P.4/34 in 1937 included armor, self sealing tanks, 1940 radio gear? it included eight .303 guns in the wings (with cartridge slots) instead of one? 




> Mercury XV 100 octane



Very nice an true _as far as it goes_, but it doesn't go quite far enough. It does NOT give the altitudes at which the maximum power for level flight (5min usage) were obtained does it? 
on 87 octane it is 840hp at 14,000ft and with 100 octane it is 995hp at 9,250ft. At 14,000ft it will be back to 840hp because the supercharger will simply not supply any more air. 

Also the "normal" climb was 825hp at 2650 rpm at 13,000ft with both fuels, just as the max economical cruising power was identical. 

I Believe I have stated that the use of 100 octane fuel would improve the performance of a Mercury powered fighter at _LOW_ altitudes but would do nothing for performance without _major_ changes at higher altitudes. Much like the Merlin, 100 octane did _nothing_ above 16-17,000ft. and the Mercury starts 200hp less than the Merlin 2,250 ft lower. Mercury will be at 800hp or below at the Merlins FTH.


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## fastmongrel (Feb 15, 2014)

All the Mercury needed was another 5 to 10 liters of capacity, completely new cooling fins with more area and a decent supercharger. Apart from that it was a decent engine just no fighter engine in 1940.


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## Glider (Feb 15, 2014)

The idea that the Fulmar could have been effective in any shape or form in the BOB I find difficult to understand. It was barely faster than the Blenheim and while in theory I can see the case for picking off the stragglers or damaged aircraft there are some problems:-

a) It wasn't fast enough to catch the stragglers. Max speed approx. 270 mph. He111 approx. 270mph, Ju88 315mph, Do17 255mph (I give you that one). 
b) What are the German fighters doing while you wait for the Stragglers and damaged aircraft?
c) The Hurricane was heavily outclassed by the Me109 we all accept that, but the Fulmar was worse than the Hurricane by some margin, speed acceleration, agility, climb you name it. The losses would have been huge
d) Its poor climb would have made it very difficult to intercept the bombers in the first place. 

The only area where I can see the Fulmar of being of assistance in defending the North of England against attacks from Norway. It would be fast enough to catch an incoming bomber at cruising speed. There are no 109's to worry about and the Fulmars good range and ammunition supply would have been of considerable assistance


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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> All the Mercury needed was another 5 to 10 liters of capacity, completely new cooling fins with more area and a decent supercharger. Apart from that it was a decent engine just no fighter engine in 1940.



We're talking about an uprated engine for a Gladiator, although it could power the Gloster F.9/37 as well.


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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Hmmmm, the full operational weight of the P.4/34 in 1937 included armor, self sealing tanks, 1940 radio gear? it included eight .303 guns in the wings (with cartridge slots) instead of one?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



It included the full bomb load, bomb racks, 2nd seat and related equipment, so this will more than balance off the conversion to a single seat heavy fighter.

The supercharger gear ratios could have been adjusted to boost power at high altitude, but in any event a Gladiator with a Mercury XV and CS prop would have been a handful for any axis fighter, while the improved climb and ceiling from the CS prop would increase success in interceptions.


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## stona (Feb 15, 2014)

The reality was that as of April/May 1935 the Air Ministry was developing several single seat fighters.

When the Supermarine F37/34 and Hawker F36/34 were bought into line with the F10/35 specification (officially on 28th May 1935) everything but the Gloster F7/30 was out of the running. That included Gloster and Bristol fighters to F5/34 and what Verney described as 'three private ventures' which must have included Martin-Baker projects amongst others.

The Gloster F7/30 was henceforth the official back up in case either of what were to become the Hurricane and Spitfire should fail. Everything else became irrelevant. Quite rightly the Air Ministry did not see a need for more than two eight gun fighters. 

I think that history has proved that the Ministry men got it just about right, particularly with the Spitfire.

Cheers

Steve

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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2014)

Glider said:


> The idea that the Fulmar could have been effective in any shape or form in the BOB I find difficult to understand. It was barely faster than the Blenheim and while in theory I can see the case for picking off the stragglers or damaged aircraft there are some problems:-
> 
> a) It wasn't fast enough to catch the stragglers. Max speed approx. 270 mph. He111 approx. 270mph, Ju88 315mph, Do17 255mph (I give you that one).
> b) What are the German fighters doing while you wait for the Stragglers and damaged aircraft?
> ...



Right, so that's why the 1000lb heavier, navalized Fulmar, with low altitude rated engines never shot down ANY axis bombers...  A handful of Carrier borne Fulmars, were, in actuality, shooting down axis bombers at a terrific rate compared to the Spitfire/Hurricane even while the BoB was still on.

Remember that a non-navalized Fulmar is much lighter, faster aircraft with a higher ceiling.

As you state a non-Naval Fulmar with a higher altitude rated engine could have been used as a long range patrol fighter, and it could have replaced and/or supplemented the Hurricane/Spitfire in areas beyond the reach of the 109. Probably a very useful for Patroling the Bay of Biscay to deter the FW-200 and in the eastern Med where it could have provided some air cover all the way to Crete, while flying from Egypt.


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## parsifal (Feb 15, 2014)

lets not either kid ourselves, neither short change these second string fighters. with regard to the Fulmar, it had no chance whatsoever of acting in the air superiority role. F-15 it was not. But I agree to an extent with RCAFson....it had runs on the board as far as destroying bombers, AND, it demonstrated that it could operate and survive in a moderately hostile environment. You wouldnt trade your Hurricane or Spitfire for a Fulmar, but if you were coming up short of those two, but still had the pilots, the Fulmar could take some of the load.

A better option, which Ive suggested a couple of times now is a twin engined version of the Fulmar. Id love some of you technical types to have a go at estimating its performance with two merlins fitted......


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## stona (Feb 15, 2014)

parsifal said:


> lets not either kid ourselves, neither short change these second string fighters. with regard to the Fulmar, it had no chance whatsoever of acting in the air superiority role. F-15 it was not. But I agree to an extent with RCAFson....it had runs on the board as far as destroying bombers, AND, it demonstrated that it could operate and survive in a moderately hostile environment. You wouldnt trade your Hurricane or Spitfire for a Fulmar, but if you were coming up short of those two, but still had the pilots, the Fulmar could take some of the load.
> 
> A better option, which Ive suggested a couple of times now is a twin engined version of the Fulmar. Id love some of you technical types to have a go at estimating its performance with two merlins fitted......




The Fulmar would have been withdrawn from the BoB in days. It had no chance of surviving in that environment. The primary objective of Fighter Command, as re-iterated on several occasions by both Park and Dowding, was to shoot down the Luftwaffe's bombers. The Fulmar would have been unable to climb to reach them, then have struggled to catch them, and finally been cannon fodder for the escorting Bf 109s. 
This fate was only narrowly avoided by the Hurricane and to a lesser extent the Spitfire, both of which largely out perform the Fulmar.

A twin engine Fulmar derivative might be an interesting 'what if' but in 1939/40 such a suggestion would have been met with a 'why?' The Air Ministry had effectively just axed the Whirlwind.

Cheers

Steve


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## cherry blossom (Feb 15, 2014)

One aircraft which I have not seen discussed is the Reggiane Re.2000. According to Wikipedia Reggiane Re.2000 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia :

“In December 1939 a British commission, led by Lord Hardwick and Air Ministry representatives, came to Italy to purchase (along with marine engines, armaments and light reconnaissance bombers) 300 Re 2000s. The Director of Aircraft Contracts confirmed the British order in January 1940.”

Realistically, I don't think that the aircraft would be delivered in time even assuming different Italian political choices. There were fairly severe problems associated with leaking fuel tanks and unreliable engines. The only possible combat application that seems plausible to me is the use of the long range Re.2000GA version, which was not actually available in the time frame, to protect shipping against Fw 200 Condors (sort of competes with the Fulmer for that role).

The first Reggiane Re.2001 prototype seems to have flown in May 1940 but I don't know when the second prototype with the redesigned wing first flew. Assuming that the British encouraged rapid development, is it possible to imagine either a Merlin engined Re.2001 analogue or a R-1830 powered Re.2002 analogue being ready for the BoB? The R-1830 seems to be shorter, narrower, lighter and more powerful than the Piaggio P.XI RC 40. There would still be a problem in fitting a decent armament


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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2014)

stona said:


> The Fulmar would have been withdrawn from the BoB in days. It had no chance of surviving in that environment. The primary objective of Fighter Command, as re-iterated on several occasions by both Park and Dowding, was to shoot down the Luftwaffe's bombers. The Fulmar would have been unable to climb to reach them, then have struggled to catch them, and finally been cannon fodder for the escorting Bf 109s.
> This fate was only narrowly avoided by the Hurricane and to a lesser extent the Spitfire, both of which largely out perform the Fulmar.
> 
> A twin engine Fulmar derivative might be an interesting 'what if' but in 1939/40 such a suggestion would have been met with a 'why?' The Air Ministry had effectively just axed the Whirlwind.
> ...



The RAF were limited by the Hurricane/Spitfire's range in terms of where they could base the fighters and still allow them to make a successful interception. A long range, long endurance, fighter like a denavalized Fulmar could be based well away from the coast, be scrambled when Luftwaffe aircraft are first detected and then be vectored to an interception over a much longer distance than the Spitfire/Hurricane, and finally return to inland bases, well away from the damaged bases that 11 Group was forced to use.

Speed - yes slower than a Hurricane but at ~300 mph at 20,000 ft (with a Merlin XII) still more than sufficient to catch a loaded bomber crusing in formation.
Climb - given it's larger wing area (and thus more lift) it's climb rate (at ~8700lb) with a Merlin XIII should be similar to a Hurricane I with a Merlin III.


You are really being too hard on the Hurricane - it was never cannon fodder for the 109 during the BoB and mainly suffered higher losses than the Spitfire because 11 Group was based so near to the 109's bases forcing it to fight while climbing and from a constant altitude disadvantage and the constant theat of being bounced by the escort. 11 Group was mainly composed of Hurricane squadrons but Spitfires (or even the vaunted 109) would have suffered much same loss rates under the same circumstances.

Fighter combat is mainly about altitude advantage and using that to win the combat. If this wasn't the case then the F4F-4, which was a real dog compared to the Zero would have been blown from the sky but it didn't happen that way, did it? The Defiant was withdrawn, not because of it's performance but because it couldn't be used successfully as a daylight fighter because it had no forward firing guns.

The BofB came down to how many firing passes the RAF fighters could make, per luftwaffe raid, and the kill rate per firing pass versus losses suffered by the interceptors. It might actually be that high climb rate, uprated Gladiators operating from 11 Group bases might have done better than the historical fighters ( I suppose this could be determined mathematically) in making interceptions and thus firing passes, even though the kill rate per firing pass might have been lower.


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## stona (Feb 15, 2014)

I have consistently argued here and elsewhere _for_ the Hurricane. I do not believe it was outclassed by the Bf 109 E, but the Messerschmitt was a better fighter. Nonetheless on 1/9/40 11 Group comprised 14 Hurricane squadrons and only 6 Spitfire squadrons. Contrary to the myth it was the Hurricane that bore the brunt of the battle.

Raids were detected as they formed up over the French coast. Interceptors were vectored to the raids as their course (and altitude) were established from 11 Groups airfields. I can't make sense of the suggestion that formations of Fulmars could have been vectored onto raids from bases further back. The detection ranges and timings don't support your proposition. Aircraft had to be vectored to within visual range of a raid, about a maximum of three miles. The course of the raid had to be accurately plotted to enable this. It only took a raid about ten to fifteen minutes to cross the Channel. Attempts by the so called Duxford Wing to make interceptions from 12 group almost invariably failed.

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 15, 2014)

I'm sorry, Parsifal, but you have not addressed the big difference between Malta and UK; the sheer numbers of Bf 109s operating at any one time. Aozora's right, there are few instances of Fulmars in combat with Bf 109s and those that there are were not nearly in anything like the numbers over the UK in 1940. How can you expect the Fulmar to do any better than the Defiant in the same circumstances as the turret fighter found itself in? The Fulmar was slower by a considerable margin, had a lower rate of climb and ceiling.


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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2014)

stona said:


> I have consistently argued here and elsewhere _for_ the Hurricane. I do not believe it was outclassed by the Bf 109 E, but the Messerschmitt was a better fighter. Nonetheless on 1/9/40 11 Group comprised 14 Hurricane squadrons and only 6 Spitfire squadrons. Contrary to the myth it was the Hurricane that bore the brunt of the battle.
> 
> Raids were detected as they formed up over the French coast. Interceptors were vectored to the raids as their course (and altitude) were established from 11 Groups airfields. I can't make sense of the suggestion that formations of Fulmars could have been vectored onto raids from bases further back. The detection ranges and timings don't support your proposition. Aircraft had to be vectored to within visual range of a raid, about a maximum of three miles. The course of the raid had to be accurately plotted to enable this. It only took a raid about ten to fifteen minutes to cross the Channel. Attempts by the so called Duxford Wing to make interceptions from 12 group almost invariably failed.
> 
> ...



Yes, 11 Group was the only group where the Hurricane squadrons substantially outnumbered Spitfire squadrons; in all the others there was a rough parity. So yes, the Hurricane bore the brunt of the battle from 11 Group's forward bases.

12 Group's big wing tactics were a hindrance but a short range fighter will have more problems with interceptions as there is much less ability to recover from controller mistakes caused by initial errors in forecasting enemy movements.


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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> I'm sorry, Parsifal, but you have not addressed the big difference between Malta and UK; the sheer numbers of Bf 109s operating at any one time. Aozora's right, there are few instances of Fulmars in combat with Bf 109s and those that there are were not nearly in anything like the numbers over the UK in 1940. How can you expect the Fulmar to do any better than the Defiant in the same circumstances as the turret fighter found itself in? The Fulmar was slower by a considerable margin, had a lower rate of climb and ceiling.



If a Fulmar finds a 109 below and in front, it will soon be a dead 109. The Defiant cannot attack in the same tactical circumstance - the Defiant is simply unable to utilize the most successful of all fighter tactics (an 8 gun Defiant - 4 in the wings and 4 in the turret might have worked); diving from above, leading to it's demise.


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## Glider (Feb 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Right, so that's why the 1000lb heavier, navalized Fulmar, with low altitude rated engines never shot down ANY axis bombers...  A handful of Carrier borne Fulmars, were, in actuality, shooting down axis bombers at a terrific rate compared to the Spitfire/Hurricane even while the BoB was still on.
> 
> Remember that a non-navalized Fulmar is much lighter, faster aircraft with a higher ceiling.
> 
> As you state a non-Naval Fulmar with a higher altitude rated engine could have been used as a long range patrol fighter, and it could have replaced and/or supplemented the Hurricane/Spitfire in areas beyond the reach of the 109. Probably a very useful for Patroling the Bay of Biscay to deter the FW-200 and in the eastern Med where it could have provided some air cover all the way to Crete, while flying from Egypt.



However the bombers shot down by the Carrier Fulmars were almost always 
a) unescorted
b) at a lower altitude
c) incoming in a loaded condition, not running away presumably after dropping their bombs at full lick, being alone with a fighter after them.

There are a number of cases where Hurricanes found it difficult to catch a Ju88 going for home. A Fulmar wouldn't stand a chance of catching it.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 15, 2014)

During 1940, Hurricanes were hard pressed to beat the LW hardware, and were happy recipients of the new Merlin (XX) that reduced much of performance advantage held by Bf-109E. After that said, Hurricanes pretty much did their job back then.
Assuming that warmed-up biplanes and/or over-sized fighters with same Merlins would've emulated what Hurricane did during BoB is wishful thinking.

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## parsifal (Feb 15, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> I'm sorry, Parsifal, but you have not addressed the big difference between Malta and UK; the sheer numbers of Bf 109s operating at any one time. Aozora's right, there are few instances of Fulmars in combat with Bf 109s and those that there are were not nearly in anything like the numbers over the UK in 1940. How can you expect the Fulmar to do any better than the Defiant in the same circumstances as the turret fighter found itself in? The Fulmar was slower by a considerable margin, had a lower rate of climb and ceiling.



The concentration of 109s over a point target (malta) was arguably greater than that likely to occur over any of the numerous battles occurring in SE England, despite the greater numbers of 109s present in the theatre over england, because Malta was a point target, England was an area target. that was one of the weaknesses of the German assault in 1940, its failure to concentrate. They didnt make that mistake over Malta. 

The initial deployment of FKX consisted of 40 109s and 36 110s. by April ther were a further 46 109s and 36 110s. There were few losses for the fighters up to that time. That means Malta was being hit by up to 80 109s and say 70 110s. after that, some elements of the LW were redeployed to other parts of the TO, but until April, Malta was subjected to the full force that FKX could throw at them.

In comparison, for the entire area of SE England, there were about 600 me 109s and about 200 Me 110s. You can basically divide the area into three, based roughly on the range capabilities of the 109, and looking from say somewhere north of England around to say the Welsh border....very roughly, but good enough. That means on average, if the air fronts were receiving equal distributions of resources (which they werent, thats not the purpose of this exercise), a large formation of Fulmars in England might expect to face a maximum of roughly 150 Me 109s, however because the German raids were never concentrated, there may be, at any time in any sector, 3 or four raids happening at any time. so, typically, over England your defenders might be confronted with a german fighter force of 30-40 Me109s, however, because of the range limitations of the 109, and the slow speeds of the attacking bombers, as the german you would be forced to either shuttle your fighters back and forth, or, as the the historical case was the norm, leave some of your bomber formations unprotected. 

There is no difference in the tactical concentration of fighters over Malta, and typically what you might find over England. What would have to happen for this not to occur is for the Germans to concentrate their forces, but if they do this, as the defender in a hypothetical where there are insufficient first line fighters, you simply can counter that by also concentrating your limited resources. In that situation your second line forces dont need to get involved....its only when forces are too weak and too strung out to cover the entire front that you are forced to use them. 

Its simply not true that there were few instances of combat between 109s and Fulmars. it happens on a nearly daily basis over Malta. I am choosing my words VERY carefully here. Combat does not mean, necessarily, direct dogfighting between 109s and Fulmars, that hardly ever happened, not because of a lack of trying by the LW, or because there were not plenty of German fighters about (to say nothing of the italians, which ought not be discounted in this, its just that they are not as important as the Germans), its simply that direct combat between Fulmars and 109s was avoided, by the defenders, and later by the Germans themselves, as they switched their fighers to Jabo operations over Malta. The Fulmars either stayed on the deck, but more usually (based on the claims made for them and the Hurricanes), were airborne but stayed away from the 109s, and went after the bombers. (I know of one instance of a fulmar chasing a Ju87 into the flak zone, and continuing his pursuit in this dangerous area, because he knew the enemy fighters would not follow him into that area. He was shot down by friendly fire.....thats still combat with a 109...before he entered the flak area, 109s were hot on his tail..., but the cause of the loss was due to friendly fire) They used their range/endurance advantages to great effect. The 109s would run out of puff, start to head home, and then the Fulmars would go to work. thats still combat, its just not "my d*ck is bigger than yours" type combat that says a fighter must engage another fighter, or else its not in combat. Fighter versus fighter enagagements were rather pointless, except when air supeiority is being fought over. accept that the enemy has air control, and fighter engagements are not worth doing, and the brits found out a year later over france. 

all the things you say about the Fulmars performance are correct. it was slower, had a llower operating altitude.Counts for nought in the scenario i would use them. You might also add that they were heavily armed and stable as a gun platform, surprisingly agile and effective as a bomber destroyer with a considerable advantage in range and endurance over any of the se fighters used in 1940. Use or create situations that work to those strengths, and you have something to work with. not so the defiant. Why, mostly because it was based on a faulty concept


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## vikingBerserker (Feb 15, 2014)

IIRC Fulmars from carriers also engaged Bf 109s 110s during a couple of convoy escort missions to Russia.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> It included the full bomb load, bomb racks, 2nd seat and related equipment, so this will more than balance off the conversion to a single seat heavy fighter.



Really? It did 284 mph with a pair of 250lb bombs hanging off the bottom of the plane? The Hawker Henley, a slightly smaller, lighter aircraft built to the same specification only managed 294mph with the bombs in the bomb bay. The Hurricane II lost 20mph when carrying a pair of 250lbs bombs. If that held true ( or close to it) then the P.4/34 would have been just about as fast (within 10-12mph?) as a MK I Hurricane if the Hurricane I had been equipped with bomb racks and a pair of 250lb bombs. Something doesn't sound right. 



> The supercharger gear ratios could have been adjusted to boost power at high altitude, but in any event a Gladiator with a Mercury XV and CS prop would have been a handful for any axis fighter, while the improved climb and ceiling from the CS prop would increase success in interceptions.



The Mercury XV was already the high altitude Mercury engine, _adjusting_ the supercharger gear ratios for even more altitude performance would have cut into the low altitude performance. Mercury's only came with single speed superchargers. 
The "high" altitude (fully super charged) engines were "rated" at 725hp with 87 octane fuel, the low altitude ( moderately supercharged engines) were rated at 82 hp for take-off on 87 octane fuel and 870hp at 4500ft instead of 840hp at 14,000ft. 
The two speed Pegasus even with 100/130 fuel (better than the fuel used in the BoB ) was rated at 1065hp at 1250ft in low gear and 965hp at 13,000ft in high gear from 28.7 liters (longer stroke did limit RPM). 
Juggling supercharger gears isn't going to gain much over 13-14,000ft. Bristol was already pushing the basic supercharger about as far as it would go.


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## parsifal (Feb 15, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> IIRC Fulmars from carriers also engaged Bf 109s 110s during a couple of convoy escort missions to Russia.



yes, but they didnt do particualalry well. The raid over Kirkenes is perhaps the best example, from memory, 9 Fulmars escorting 20or so albacores, intercepted by about 12 109s and a similar number of 110s, at least that number available, not all achieved an interception(there were two raids, one on Kirkenes and one on petsamo), 3 fulmars lost than the albacores decimatred, for 1 110 claimed and 1 probable 109)


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## vikingBerserker (Feb 15, 2014)

Yes, I believe that's what I was talking about.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 16, 2014)

Whilst what you are saying make sense, Parsifal, it simply doesn't add up. You cannot compare the two environments because of the concentration of German fighters in one area of sky. Like the example I gave earlier, 141 Sqn (I put 151 in a previous post, it was actually the former) lost 6 Defiants in a matter of minutes to thirty (that's 30) Bf 109s. The Fulmar could not have expected to have fared any better. 

You give me actual examples where up to 30 Bf 109s engaged the FAA's Fulmars over Malta all at once and provide evidence that the Fulmars did well and we'll call it even. In fact, you can provide examples of Fulmars tangling with Bf 109s over Malta and I'll be happy - that's dates, numbers of Fulmars and '109s etc, but that doesn't change the fact that the concentration of German fighters over England was greater - you said so yourself in the figures you offered. Yes, there are examples of Fulmars battling with '109s - they even tangled with Mitsubishi Zeroes over Ceylon as I provided in my earlier post; during the FAA attack on Kirkenes, Fulmars tangled with Bf 109s, but combat between the two was few and far between, so your claims of Fulmars faring well against Bf 109s can't really be substantiated and since they never encountered them on anywhere near the scale as the RAF over England means that you can't really make an even comparison.

RCAFson, comparing the Defiant against a Bf 109 is not an even fight, we know that, but if you read my earlier posts, the Defiant wasn't designed to take on fighters - it was a bomber destroyer, so wasn't really designed to mix it with single-seaters - sigh - how often do I have to repeat myself before people actually read what's being written? Let's look at this hypothetical scenario. A Fulmar sees a Bf 109 below it and in front of it. The Bf 109 applies power and speeds away before the Fulmar gets a chance to fire on it; its speed of 350+ mph would leave the Fulmar with its speed of 260+ in its wake, particularly since the Bf 109's rate of accelleration was greater. Again, take a look back at one of my earlier posts about a quote by an FAA Fulmar pilot who spotted a '109 that joined his formation.


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## Aozora (Feb 16, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Its not my theory, its theories that Ive learnt, taught and applied for a living stretching over a period of years. Not being condescending, have a great deal of respect for your knowledge actually, but on the the application of air power, the achievement of air state, why having the most modern fighter wont necessarily win a campaign, you dont understand the theory.



Actually you're quite wrong, but I can't be bothered arguing about such things. Fer instance, I can cite example of "second-string" fighters proving extremely useful eg; the Finns using Buffaloes or the Russians using I-15s, 152s and 153s or I-16s. During the B of B Fulmars could have proved useful during, for example, the August 15 raid by Luftflotte 5 where they would not have encountered 109s; on August 18 Blenheims of 235 Coastal Command squadron managed to attack Ju 87s of Stg 77 while they were attacking Thorney Island - the escorting 109s were tangled up with Hurricanes and Spitfires and the Blenheims were left free to attack the Ju 87s. 

So Fulmars could have been used to good effect, but I still wouldn't give much for their chances if they were caught in sustained combat against 109s


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## Juha (Feb 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> ...The supercharger gear ratios could have been adjusted to boost power at high altitude, but in any event a Gladiator with a Mercury XV and CS prop would have been a handful for any axis fighter...



I doubt that, have you some real numbers? Definitely better I-153 (faster, clearly better climber, better acceleration, lighter controls but a slightly worse turner) wasn't a match to 109E or 110C/E using right tactics.


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## stona (Feb 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> 12 Group's big wing tactics were a hindrance but a short range fighter will have more problems with interceptions as there is much less ability to recover from controller mistakes caused by initial errors in forecasting enemy movements.



Why is that any different for a long range fighter? By the time the Fulmars had set course from their inland bases the Luftwaffe raid would be turning and heading for home. If Spitfires and Hurricanes couldn't catch it then a Fulmar had a snowball's chance in hell of doing so. A faster aeroplane can compensate for errors in vectoring _better_ than a slower one.

It is difficult to know how many interceptions (by 11 Group) failed but evidence from pilots' log books (too small a sample to draw definite conclusions) would imply about one in three failed. H.R 'Dizzy' Allen, a man who expressed views with which I strongly disagree about the handling of the battle, but whose views deserve respect, went further.

"on only 50% of occasions did my squadron achieve an interception after the order was given."

Allen also gives a distance of only two miles at the maximum at which the average pilot could visually locate the enemy. It was, according to him, a particular problem when operating at high altitude because the pilots lacked a frame of reference. Altitude of raids given was often quite inaccurate, best estimates came from the Observer Corps in clear conditions. 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 16, 2014)

> Whilst what you are saying make sense, Parsifal, it simply doesn't add up. You cannot compare the two environments because of the concentration of German fighters in one area of sky. Like the example I gave earlier, 141 Sqn (I put 151 in a previous post, it was actually the former) lost 6 Defiants in a matter of minutes to thirty (that's 30) Bf 109s. The Fulmar could not have expected to have fared any better.



Defiants were always going to be a failure, not so much because of their mediocre performance as their dumb tactical concept. they were never going to work. Fulmars on the other hand had lower performance, as you rightly point out, and in a one on one, against first line fighters like the 109, were not going to do well. As a supplement to the Hurricane and Spitfire, they showed (with the hurricane) that they were a very good supplemnent to them, in environments "hot" with enemy fighters. Malta is the best example of that, but there were other instances of that sort of co-operation. 

What were th relative strengths of the Fulmar. Certainly not their speed, or their climb. Manouverability was adequate, no more. protection, okay, but nothing special. But it still had some strengths that could prove useful i think. It had the same gun arm,ament as a hurricane, but carried more than twice the ammunition supply. It had about 50% greater endurance, and a higher cruise speed over distance compared to a Hurricane (Not sure about the spit). Designed as two seat scout aircraft with a secoondary role as a fighter, this actually proved quite an advantage. The observer maintained communication with the carrier and other squadron members far better than a single pilot could, and allowed mutual defence to be better, and for attacks to be set up more carefully, whilst the pilot could concentrate on his main task of flying andf fighting. It wasnt enough to compensate for the weight penalty of a second crewman, but it was a help. A second pair of eyes was also found to be a big help for the pilot. Because the division of labour in a Defiant was cockeyed, in that th4 second crewman was the main werapons man whilst the pilot was the manouvre expert, I seriously doubt that similar advantages could be attributed to a Defiant crew. but that is admittedly debateable. 




> You give me actual examples where up to 30 Bf 109s engaged the FAA's Fulmars over Malta all at once and provide evidence that the Fulmars did well and we'll call it even. In fact, you can provide examples of Fulmars tangling with Bf 109s over Malta and I'll be happy - that's dates, numbers of Fulmars and '109s etc, but that doesn't change the fact that the concentration of German fighters over England was greater - you said so yourself in the figures you offered. Yes, there are examples of Fulmars battling with '109s - they even tangled with Mitsubishi Zeroes over Ceylon as I provided in my earlier post; during the FAA attack on Kirkenes, Fulmars tangled with Bf 109s, but combat between the two was few and far between, so your claims of Fulmars faring well against Bf 109s can't really be substantiated and since they never encountered them on anywhere near the scale as the RAF over England means that you can't really make an even comparison.




Nearly every day from mid February to mid April 1941. The basis of what you are looking for, has virtually nothing to do with the suggestion im arguing. I can only say it again. im not arguing that in a 1 on 1 fight with a 109 was advisable, but acting in a supplementary role, in an environment dominated by enemy se fighters, it could operate and survive, and do some good work. What it could not do was wing air superiorty single handedly. I dont know how many times I need to say that before the message has a chance to sink in.

These are the things I am not saying

direct combat between a 109 and a Fulmar was advisable
fulmars against 109s could win air superiority through superior performance. 
fulmars could operate on their own.

This is what I am saying

Fulmars have the runs on the board as to survivability
Fulmars were in combat against the 109, but that does not mean they went head to head with them 
Fulmars had certain strengths that might be useful if operating in a supplementary role to the Spits and hurricanes
Superior performance of your fighter forces makes you a contender for winning air superiority, but not necessarily on a sustained basis. numbers count for far more than quality in that respect. 

(my emphasis in the following )......"In spite of being employed in a manner quite contrary to the original procurement spec, the Fulmar proved to be extremely effective. In RN service they were credited with over 120 confirmed kills in European waters, several more in the Indian Ocean, for less than 20 lost in air to air combat(*a). This impressive record was achieved in the face of horrendous odds and often alongside single engined types attaining far less lustrous results. The intuitive response to this success is to presume that it was an accomplished bomber killer, but still wouldn’t stand a chance against enemy fighters. The numbers available don’t seem to bear that assumption out. Only three Fulmars were lost to enemy fighters in European skies, the remainder of their losses were taken to defensive fires from the bewildering variety of enemy bombers they engaged. The opposite side of the ledger is surprising. Five enemy fighters were confirmed by the end of ’41, including a Me 109. Although the numbers aren’t statistically viable, it seems the Fulmar was at least the equal of the fighters it faced! 

So what gives? How on earth can a machine that experts like Capt Brown note was barely capable of catching enemy bombers knock them down by the score, while managing to defend themselves against the enemies fighters? 

I think the answer lies in the way it played to its strengths. The considerable endurance built into the frame made useful CAP missions achievable. Prior to the Fulmar entering service, ‘planes were launched to intercept inbound raids. This was a deeply unsatisfactory state of affairs, but the happy combination of improved radio telephones, better co-ordination between fleet units and effective radar allowed for the art of fighter control to mature. The observer facilitated excellent command and control, separating the pilot from his flying duties and the need to maintain a rapport with his shipboard controller. The observer took on navigation duties, operated the crafts avionics, could provide local control to several accompanying aircraft and offered another pair of eyes. The combination of a well worked up crews’ efforts will always exceed the value of their individual contribution. This is what made the Skua so deadly, in spite of its’ lacklustre performance. The Fulmar added a significant performance boost, much greater agility and the devastating punch of eight Brownings, with an unusually large ammunition supply. As the War progressed the number and quality of enemy aircraft faced by the Fairey increased, but advances in radar, radio telecoms and improved fighter control compensated enough to keep pace".


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## Shortround6 (Feb 16, 2014)

In trying to _estimate_ the performance of prototype aircraft in the BoB it might do well to revue the History of the Hurricane and Spitfire. 

Hurricane monoplane F.36/34 Merlin "C" engine, ballasted to represent service equipment (guns/etc) and 107 gallons fuel (?) 5672lbs. 
Hurricane MK I No L1547 with Merlin III and wooden prop and 77.5 gallons fuel 6040lbs.
Hurricane MK I No L1547 with Merlin III and 2 pitch metal prop and 77.5 gallons fuel 6363lbs (includes 58lbs ballast/counterweight)
Hurricane MK I No L2026 with Merlin III with ROTOL constant speed prop and 78.5 gallons fuel 6316lbs
Hurricane MK I No L2026 with Merlin III with ROTOL constant speed prop and 78.5 gallons fuel 6750lbs in overload condition tested May/June of 1940. Overload does NOT include bombs or drop tanks.

weights from RAF data sheet. Tare weight (not guns, radios, etc) 5234lb. Light weight (No fuel, ammo, pilot, etc) 5820lbs, mean weight 6550lbs max weight 6793lbs (97 gallons?) 

The Hurricane I gained around 1000lbs (give or take) from prototype to Service use in the BoB. granted it gained new props and metal skinned wings but it also gained armor, bullet proof windscreen, selfsealing tanks and more radio equipment. 

The Spitfire prototype went 5332lbs.
An early MK I with wooden prop went 5819lbs.
A Spitfire MK II went 6172lbs. 

Granted the MK II picked up an extra 24lbs worth of ammo. 

Some of the Prototypes would not gain as much weight as the Hurricane but ANY service aircraft in the summer of 1940 would have gained 4-500lbs minimum from prototype condition (assuming they _started _with 2 pitch/controllable pitch prop). This may be only a 3-10mph loss in speed (depends on drag of additions, IFF aerials,etc) but the loss of climb and ceiling would be much more important. It may affect turning ability a bit and will certainly affect sustained turning ability. 

I would note that the P-40 gained 400lbs from the "plain" P-40 to the P-40C not including the change in guns/ammo. Just armor and self sealing tanks.


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## parsifal (Feb 16, 2014)

These are some notes i made of the early fighting January to early March taken from the book "Air War Malta" by authors Canwell and Sutherland. ive summarised, so its not a quote as such, but its more a condensing down of the text, not my own words as such...

18 Jan the Germans hit Luqa and Hal with more than 80 aircraft. Germans were clearly after the fighters, which they missed, both on the ground and in the air. CAP consisted of 9 Hurricanes and 2 Fulmars, which claimed 17 shoot downs, Axis admitted to the loss of 10 german and 4 Italian aircraft. Axis escort consisted of 10Cr42s, 12 or so MC 200s and about 12 Me 110s. A second raid followed almost identical on the 19th, same targets. Serviceable aircraft by close of business on the 19th was 6 hurris and 1 Fulmar. That morning the Fulmar was used to intercept and destroy a Z506 operating some distance from Malta. 

In the first three weeks of January there had been 950 sorties flown against malta

109 operations really began from 8 February. At first a single squadron was used, but was followed by a second squadron a few weks later. German commander had requested 109s to achieve air superiority over the island. This was largely achieved by late Febrauary, though RAF formations continued to fly, avoiding combat with the much superior 109s wherever possible.

At the beginning of March either 2 or 3 Fulmars were detailed to fly night intruder missions over sicily, using their loiter capabilities to catch early morning or late evening bombers takling off or landing. Not sure of how many victories, if any. 

Throughout February there were over 100 109 sortes flown directly over Malta. During February, raids concentrated almost exclusively on fighter airfields and the docks. The Germans were attempting to eliminate the fighters from the equation, but failed to completely eliminate them, despite the pounding these airfields took. Maltas defences, including fighters were weak, but remained viable and operational. Malta defenders were not challenging for air superiority directly 


There were four big raids in the middle of the month and the composition and strength of the defenders remained remarkably static. 5 replacement hurris arived early Feb by mid Feb reported available fighters were...9 Hurris and 2 Fulmars (my comment...despite their most strenuous efforts, the air garrison was still in the ring, because they were not challenging the air superiority established by the 109s directly). By the time of these mid month raids, a second squadron of 109s had deployed, and the 110s were being reinforced as well. Typical raid was on the 17 feb, which saw an escort of German fighters engage the 11 defenders....or rather attempt to engage. Defenders refused to engage the fighters head on, and still managed to claim 2Ju88s, 2 Ju87, 1 Do217 and 2 Me 110s. AA broughht down a further 5 aircraft. 1 hurri was lost to defensive fire from a Ju87. no losses from the fighters, but by the end of these raids 5 further Hurricanes were grounded, as probable write offs. 5 replacements did not arrive until 6 March.


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## stona (Feb 16, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Throughout February there were over 100 109 sorites flown directly over Malta.



This needs to be put into perspective. At the height of the Battle of Britain more than that number of sorties _a day_ were flown by Bf 109s over Southern England. A very much more hostile environment for the Fulmar.

There was never more than a few Bf 109s operating against Malta, in fact at the end of January 1941 there was a total (all types) of 141 Luftwaffe aircraft based in Sicily. This figure peaked at 243 in May. There really is no comparison with the Battle of Britain.

Between 11/10/40 and 10/2/41, largely before the Bf 109s arrived (7./JG 26 arrived at Gela on 9/2/41) A.H.Q. Malta _claimed_ to have destroyed 2 x S.79s, 6 x CR 42s, 13 Ju 87s, 6 x MC200s, 12 x Ju 88s, 2 x Z.506Bs. This is a total of 41 aircraft in roughly a month, including two floatplanes (Z.506) six biplanes (CR 42) and a couple of torpedo bombers, even if a pretty good one (S.79). There is a distinct lack of high performance single engine fighters with the exception of the 6 (that's SIX) MC200 with which the Hurricane could more than compete.
Again any comparison with the sort of environment to which the Fulmar would be exposed in the BoB is spurious.

Cheers

Steve

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## Glider (Feb 16, 2014)

I was looking up the details of the fighting over Malta on the 18th Jan and the German losses were all Ju87's and were split between the fighters 7 and the guns 3. 

However that wasn't the point of the posting and I recognise that this is a diversion. On the 19th Jan the first Spitfire arrived on Malta. It was a PR aircraft that had taken off from the UK, photographed Turin and due to unexpected winds didn't have the fuel to return to the UK so diverted to Malta. What a flight!! No one on the Island expected it and they couldn't believe their luck.

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## parsifal (Feb 16, 2014)

stona said:


> This needs to be put into perspective. At the height of the Battle of Britain more than that number of sorties _a day_ were flown by Bf 109s over Southern England. A very much more hostile environment for the Fulmar.
> 
> There was never more than a few Bf 109s operating against Malta, in fact at the end of January 1941 there was a total (all types) of 141 Luftwaffe aircraft based in Sicily. This figure peaked at 243 in May. There really is no comparison with the Battle of Britain.
> 
> ...


 

the key being "over southern England. South eastern England is a BIG area, Maltas airfields a point target. There is no comparison in the concentration of effort, you are rigtht, but its 100% the reverse of what you are claiming. Sure numbers overall are not comparable, but against a specific target, the pendulum swings all the way back to malta being the more dangerous place. By far. 

Do you have a representative sortie rate by the luftwaffe against a single airfield or port, and the numbers of defenders that typpically were sent to oppose them. then we can put the issue into real persective. the difference between malta and SE england is threefold. Firstly numbers as you say. the defence of Malta was entrusted in January to less than 20 fighters, against which there were over 200 axis aircraft. thats odds of about 10:1. Where in england was FC ever asked to fights with odds that long.

Secondly, where in England did the defence concede air superiority to the Germans. and this makes a huge difference to any analysis of likley Fulmar operations in England. Put the Fulmar into a situation where it is vying against the 109 for air superiority, and it will lose, unquestionably. Use it in the manner it was used over malta....avoid contact with the fighter, use the strengths of the aircraft to your advantage, and you have an effective attritional weapon that could well augment the efforts of the Hurricane and Spitfires. put the Fulmar in the wrong place and wrong battle, and it will lose, but as Malta clearly shows, it was possible to avoid being snookered like that more or less routinely. 

Air Superiority was conceded over malta from the first week of february . It seems just like a phrase to us, but it means something. minimse combat with the enemy fighters,, specifically the 109s, even though they are there in numbers. As far as High performance fighters, the Germans had, at that stage about 32 Me 110s available in FKX, and the unkown numbers of CR42s and MC200s and G-50s (but a good estimate would be aroun 100+). All of these aircraft were on a par with the Fulmar...in the case of the saettas and Me110s, I would say they were superior.

Thirdly because Malta was a point target, it was the subject of ALL the axis air activity, and that makes it a far more dangerous place than any SINGLE target or strike in SE England. If two fulmers are expected to take on three full German air fleets at the same time, your argument makes sense. If they are operating over a specific target at one point in time, they will only ever be asked to do battle with a fraction of those numbers. If you put 10 fulmars into the battle , statistically speaking based on the numbers of aircraft each side had available, they would most likely have 30 luftwaffe aircraft to fight, of which about 8 would be Me 109s. If there were say 6 Hurricanes working with them, and 4 Fulmars, to what extent can the 6 hurricanes hold off or keep busy the 109s, and to what extent can the 109s afford to loiter on deep penetration raids or thin themselves out to protect stragglers and lost aircraft. The Fulmar can simply out wait the 109 if they need to.... 


What is the basis of your last claim. Malta was the most attacked, most heavily bombed target on earth to that point of history. The Axis went after the fighter defences specifically. They had plenty of material to do it, and had a real go of it. In the finish they brought up their heavy ace....the 109 formations. Against that, with odds of around 10 to 20:1 (overall numbers of aircraft. for fighters, they had about 30-40 Me109s at its peak, about 30 or so Me 110s and about 100 Italian fighters, against roughly 11 defending fighters, or odds of about 16:1, or against the 109s alone, about 3:1). against odds of that order, Fulmar losses were 3 aircraft shot down by fighters for the entire year, and 17 other (for the whole ETO, not just Malta) again for the entire year. Yet people feel it safe to claim SE england was a far more dangerous environment and the Fulmar had no hope to survive. I just dont see the evidence to support that ..

And once again, I am not saying the Fulmar can successfully engage directly a 109. Thats not the basis of sound strategy against an opponent that holds air superiority. You look for chinks, and in the summer of 1940, the LW had plenty


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## parsifal (Feb 16, 2014)

Glider said:


> I was looking up the details of the fighting over Malta on the 18th Jan and the German losses were all Ju87's and were split between the fighters 7 and the guns 3.
> 
> However that wasn't the point of the posting and I recognise that this is a diversion. On the 19th Jan the first Spitfire arrived on Malta. It was a PR aircraft that had taken off from the UK, photographed Turin and due to unexpected winds didn't have the fuel to return to the UK so diverted to Malta. What a flight!! No one on the Island expected it and they couldn't believe their luck.



Now that I did not know. Great information


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## Greyman (Feb 16, 2014)

You got me curious ...

18 January 1941
50+ x Ju87s, ? x Ju88s, ? x MC200 attack Hal Far and Luqa
5 x Hurricanes and 4 x Fulmars scrambled
7 x Ju87s claimed shot down (only one actually lost, additionally 1 x Ju88 and 1 x MC200 lost)
2 x Fulmars lost (one to a Ju87, one probably to an MC200)

Lieutenant(A) Robert Henley (who was shot down by the Ju87) specifically stated in this action; '_The poor old Fulmar had problems gaining height and in gaining speed against the Ju88s_.'

EDIT: from the aforementioned 'Hurricanes Over Malta'


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## stona (Feb 16, 2014)

Greyman said:


> Lieutenant(A) Robert Henley (who was shot down by the Ju87) specifically stated in this action; '_The poor old Fulmar had problems gaining height and in gaining speed against the Ju88s_.'



This is the same Lt. Henley who reported the incident (mentioned above by someone else) in which an aircraft which he identified as a Bf 109 attempted to join his formation. It broke away, presumably realising its mistake, and simply flew away from the Fulmars who failed to get a shot at it. Later, during the same sortie (10th Jan 1941), Henley claimed an S.79 destroyed (jointly with Sub Lt. Sewell) and two others damaged before landing at Hal Far after an eventful 3 hour 40 minute flight 'with virtually no gas'.

On the same day two S.79s attacked H.M.S. Illustrious and the Fulmars flying what we now call CAP, flown by Sub Lts. Orr and Hogg, were ordered to give chase. _It took the Fulmars fifty miles to catch and attack the S.79s. _ One was claimed destroyed but in fact both got back to Trapani where Ten. Angelo Caponetti crashed his damaged aircraft attempting to land.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Feb 16, 2014)

Glider said:


> On the 19th Jan the first Spitfire arrived on Malta. It was a PR aircraft that had taken off from the UK,



This was a Spitfire PR Mk ID, P9551, flown by Flt.Lt. P. Corbishley, DFC. It was recorded at the time as the 'only one of its type and range in existence' which wasn't quite true. The given range was 1,750 miles. Permission was obtained from the Air Ministry for the aircraft to be retained on Malta until wind conditions were suitable for its return to England. AHQ Malta decided to make good use of this wind fall (literally) and Corbishley made his first sortie over Sicily on 21st January. Corbishley and his Spitfire were shot down by flak on a mission to Genoa on 2nd February 1941.

Cheers

Steve


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## RCAFson (Feb 16, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> In trying to _estimate_ the performance of prototype aircraft in the BoB it might do well to revue the History of the Hurricane and Spitfire.
> 
> Hurricane monoplane F.36/34 Merlin "C" engine, ballasted to represent service equipment (guns/etc) and 107 gallons fuel (?) 5672lbs.
> Hurricane MK I No L1547 with Merlin III and wooden prop and 77.5 gallons fuel 6040lbs.
> ...



The normal loaded weight of the Fulmar I was 9672 lbs (Wings of the Navy).
- folding wings, arrestor gear, catapult points, naval radios and homing gear = ~500lb
- 2nd crew plus seat, related equipment and life support = ~500lbs
= ~8700lb = loaded, fueled and armed NN Fulmar (NN = non naval). For comparison, a fully loaded F4F-4 = 7995lb while the Martlet II and IV weighed ~7750lb.

With a Merlin II the NN Fulmar should perform close to the P.4/34, but should be ~10mph faster with a Merlin XII at altitude. Overall performance would be similar but superior overall to the Martlet IV (for example), because of the NN Fulmars low wing loading, which is about the same as a Hurricane 1. Overall climb rate will be similar to a Hurricane as well, while ceiling with a Merlin XII would be ~30,000ft.

Would the RAF have benefited from a heavy fighter with a range of ~1000 miles? I think the answer is yes, even during the BofB.


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## RCAFson (Feb 16, 2014)

To quote myself from an earlier thread:

The Fulmar's finest hour?
On May 08 1941 Fulmars from Ark Royal and Formidable engaged both the Luftwaffe and Reggia Aeronautica and soundly thrashed them both:

RA losses:

4 x SM79
2 x CR42 

Luftwaffe losses:
1 x Ju-88
4 x He-111
2 x Me-110 (crash landed due to battle damage)
1 x Me110 damaged
1 x Ju-87 (confirmed by Fulmar gun camera but not noted in Luftwaffe records)
1 x Ju87 damaged

FAA:

2 x Fulmar (one from bomber defensive fire)
2 X Fulmar crash landed on CVs
1X Fulmar crashed due to weather (not combat related)
6 x Fulmars damaged

Data from Shores, Mediterranean Air War, 1940-1945: Volume One: North Africa, June 1940-January 1942, p182-185


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## Greyman (Feb 16, 2014)

Great books. Can't wait for volume two.


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## stona (Feb 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> To quote myself from an earlier thread:
> 
> The Fulmar's finest hour?
> On May 08 1941 Fulmars from Ark Royal and Formidable engaged both the Luftwaffe and Reggia Aeronautica and soundly thrashed them both:



And not a Bf 109 to be found 

This is all very well but hardly supports the contention that the Fulmar would have been useful, or even capable of surviving, in the cauldron of the Battle of Britain.

Cheers

Steve


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## merlin (Feb 16, 2014)

Quite frankly I'm amazed, in any ATL of BoB, I would not have considered the Fulmar - at the outside just as a possible emergency night-fighter, but then it would probably take too long to climb to have any chance of achieving an interception.

Whilst, an ATL BoB helps to do away with the Defiant Blenheim, when every I do an alternative FAA - the Fulmar doesn't get a look in!


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## stona (Feb 16, 2014)

Greyman said:


> Great books. Can't wait for volume two.



Indeed, mine's already been ordered though not expected until May.

Cheers

Steve


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## RCAFson (Feb 16, 2014)

merlin said:


> Quite frankly I'm amazed, in any ATL of BoB, I would not have considered the Fulmar - at the outside just as a possible emergency night-fighter, but then it would probably take too long to climb to have any chance of achieving an interception.
> 
> Whilst, an ATL BoB helps to do away with the Defiant Blenheim, when every I do an alternative FAA - the Fulmar doesn't get a look in!



The climb rate of a NN Fulmar would be similar to the Hurricane, it's turn radius would be similar to a Hurricane, and while it's top speed would be lower, it's speed in a dive would probably be higher. 

Question: Could the RAF have employed the Martlet II/IV profitably during the BofB? If the answer is yes, then the same could be said for the NN Fulmar.


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## RCAFson (Feb 16, 2014)

stona said:


> And not a Bf 109 to be found
> 
> This is all very well but hardly supports the contention that the Fulmar would have been useful, or even capable of surviving, in the cauldron of the Battle of Britain.
> 
> ...



The 109 wasn't everywhere, all at once, during the BofB when we all know that much of the UK was well beyond the range of the 109. 

Again, the key factors during the battle were interception rates and kill rates per firing pass. The Fulmar certainly proved that it could achieve very high kill rates per firing pass. When the Fulmar met single seat fighters, it generally fought well although overall probably on a losing exchange rate, just as the Spitfire and Hurricane did against the 109 during the BofB, and for much the same reason; if the RAF fighters or the Fulmar were bounced, then they generally lost, but generally won when the situation was reversed, and generally fought the 109 to a draw during encounters when neither side had the advantage of surprise.


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## Aozora (Feb 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Again, the key factors during the battle were interception rates and kill rates per firing pass. The Fulmar certainly proved that it could achieve very high kill rates per firing pass.



Could you please explain how you came to this conclusion? I take it this means that you have thoroughly researched every combat in which Fulmars participated, worked out how many firing passes each Fulmar made and calculated how many aircraft were shot down?

Question: why on earth would the RAF spend so much time and effort de-navalising the Fulmar when aircraft like the Miles M 20 were available?


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## nuuumannn (Feb 16, 2014)

> Again any comparison with the sort of environment to which the Fulmar would be exposed in the BoB is spurious.



Yep, Steve, but Parsifal is steadfastly ignoring it. 

Nothing you've written confirms anything you've said about how the Fulmar would do in combat with up 30 Bf 109s at once, Parsifal. Still waiting on evidence of Fulmar combats with lots of '109s over Malta...



> The 109 wasn't everywhere, all at once, during the BofB when we all know that much of the UK was well beyond the range of the 109.



This is rather a pointless statement because where there _were_ lots of Bf 109s was the biggest concentration of RAF fighters.

As for the Defiant, yeah, we know it didn't do well in the BoB as a day fighter, but like I said, it wasn't it's turret at fault but its tactical use. Proof of this was that in December 1940 the Air Ministry altered a previously released night fighter specification - can't remember which one off the top of my head - to a turret equipped replacement for the Defiant! Bristol fitted a BP Type A turret (as fitted to the Defiant) to a Beaufighter and GdeH toyed with the idea of fitting a turret to a Mossie, although he protested strongly to the idea). A number of manufacturers issued designs to the tender, so the turret fighter still had life in it after the Daffy's day fighter debut.

In all accounts of the Fulmar I've come across it is regarded as a good aircraft but lacking that essential fighter quality; speed. I can provide several different quotes stating exactly the same thing, so what is so difficult about accepting that it would suffer high losses against large numbers of Bf 109s at once? In the words of Daryl Kerrigan from 'The Castle'; "Tell 'im 'ee's dreamin..."

Fulmar I rate of climb: 1,200 ft/min, Hurricane I RoC: 2,520 ft/min, Bf 109E RoC 3,300 ft/min...


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## RCAFson (Feb 16, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Could you please explain how you came to this conclusion? I take it this means that you have thoroughly researched every combat in which Fulmars participated, worked out how many firing passes each Fulmar made and calculated how many aircraft were shot down?
> 
> Question: why on earth would the RAF spend so much time and effort de-navalising the Fulmar when aircraft like the Miles M 20 were available?




So you're now claiming that the Fulmar was so fast that it could make repeated passes at Axis bombers? I thought the argument was that the Fulmar was too slow:


nuuumannn said:


> "...In all accounts of the Fulmar I've come across it is regarded as a good aircraft but lacking that essential fighter quality; speed..."
> 
> Fulmar I rate of climb: 1,200 ft/min, Hurricane I RoC: 2,520 ft/min, Bf 109E RoC 3,300 ft/min...



You can't really have it both ways...

The greatest effort was to navalize it. A parallel development of a non-naval Fulmar would have been trivial in comparison. 

Yes, the M20 would have been another alternative.


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## parsifal (Feb 16, 2014)

> Yep, Steve, but Parsifal is steadfastly ignoring it.
> 
> Nothing you've written confirms anything you've said about how the Fulmar would do in combat with up 30 Bf 109s at once, Parsifal. Still waiting on evidence of Fulmar combats with lots of '109s over Malta...



Ive not ignored it at all. ive given several detailed responses outlining my reasons my friend, which you choose to ignore. not the other way around. Fine, i understand, you dont agree, but please dont say im ignoring what you say, when that is patently untrue. i happen to not agree with you, that is not ignooring you, its disagreeing with you. You should have the nouse to know the difference.

Ive given you a response as to why it was possible for the fulmar to survive in skies dominated by the 109. The Fulmar, for whatever reason, could act in those sorts of situations, survive, and do some good things to boot. It could not on its own challenge for air superiority. Please take the time to read those words more carefully than you have. You do know what thet means dont you. it means, a Fulmar cannot dogfight with a 109. But it doesnt follow that a Fulmar cannot fly in skies filled with enemy fighters. it could, it did. thats a fact. what is conjecture are these claims that it would be shot out of the sky over england, because on a front measuring several hundred miles there were many more 109s than over a point target like Malta. Ask yourself a basic mathermatics question....how many points are ther in a line. if we equate SE england as a line, and Malta as a point, then as a line, it is immeasurably bigger than the point target. that means that despite the much larger numbers of fighters, they also had a much ;larger frontage to cover. Of course malta is not a mathematical point, and England is not a mathematical line,, but how many battlefields the size of malta can be fitted into the battlefield the size of SE england...50, 1000??? probably closer to the latter i would suspect. 

The hypothesis that needs to be proven is whether the fullmar would be shot down over england, not that , not that it would be unable to survive with any 109s about. Its already proven that in skies filled with 109s, with the specific mission of killing it, those 109s could not do it. Your argument has been thats because there were so few 109s, but mine is that density wise there is no difference between malta and England. As to whether a fulmar could survive in 109 dominated skies or not, the proff is already there, it could, it did, its a fact, at least when in the company of some help (9 hurricanes) . its up to you guys to give examples or provide evidence that it could not or that would be shot out of the sky if it got airborne over England during the battle.

I suspect you guys are extrapolating the experioences of the hurris and Spits over England, and concluding that if these aircraft were hard pressed to compete with the 109, then how on earth would an aircraft like the Fulmar survive. I would say this, if the Fulmar attempted to mix it with a 109 in the way the hurricane of the spit did, then it would most certainly wind up dead. that is not the starting supposition to my claim. I am not claiming the Fulmar could dispute air superiority over a 109, I am merely claiming it could survive....hang back, fly around them, wait for the Hurricanes and Spits to do their thing then move iin, whatever it did over malta to survive and then take out more than a few of the bombers 

For the record, ther were two squadrons of fulmars present in the British Isles, and suffered 0 losses. They didnt fire a shot, to be fair, but they were there, I guess...


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## Aozora (Feb 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> So you're now claiming that the Fulmar was so fast that it could make repeated passes at Axis bombers? I thought the argument was that the Fulmar was too slow:
> 
> You can't really have it both ways...



Wrong, please don't try misrepresenting my post - You're making these claims about the Fulmar:



RCAFson said:


> Again, the key factors during the battle were interception rates and kill rates per firing pass. The Fulmar certainly proved that it could achieve very high kill rates per firing pass.



I'm asking you how you reached that conclusion; please explain.


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## stona (Feb 17, 2014)

But Parsifal, if the Fulmar is going to operate over England during the BoB in an area where there are some of your 'softer' targets for it, that is Luftwaffe bombers, it will have to operate in an area also laden with Bf 109s and Bf 110s. Over Malta it could operate around the fringes, relatively safe from the Bf 109s since the total number of Bf 109s flying on any particular mission was barely into double figures (often it wasn't, serviceability in Sicily wasn't great). Malta might be a point target but a dozen Bf 109s can't cover it and its environs.
The Luftwaffe did not attack 'Southern England'. It attacked specific targets with large concentrations of escorted bombers. There would be extremely limited opportunities for the Fulmar to engage bombers around the fringes without itself falling victim to escort fighters which were much more numerous _and concentrated _ than over Malta.
The Defiant faced exactly the same problem. It was designed to engage unescorted bomber formations, and would have been good at it too. The appearance of Bf 109s with the bombers rendered it redundant overnight and the same would have happened to the Fulmar.
Your 'air superiority' argument seems to be that the Spitfires and Hurricanes could have somehow handed off the Luftwaffe's fighters allowing the Fulmars (and why not Defiants?) to wreak havoc on the bombers. Unfortunately the RAF did not exert this kind of air superiority over Southern England. The air space was being bitterly contested, both sides felt that they had the advantage at various stages of the battle.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Feb 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The 109 wasn't everywhere, all at once, during the BofB when we all know that much of the UK was well beyond the range of the 109.
> 
> Again, the key factors during the battle were interception rates and kill rates per firing pass. The Fulmar certainly proved that it could achieve very high kill rates per firing pass. When the Fulmar met single seat fighters, it generally fought well although overall probably on a losing exchange rate, just as the Spitfire and Hurricane did against the 109 during the BofB, and for much the same reason; if the RAF fighters or the Fulmar were bounced, then they generally lost, but generally won when the situation was reversed, and generally fought the 109 to a draw during encounters when neither side had the advantage of surprise.



The Bf 109 was present where the RAF's targets, the Luftwaffe's bombers, where. The BoB (with few exceptions) was fought over SE England and the Channel.

What evidence do you have to support the contention that the Fulmar could achieve 'very high kill rates per firing pass'. I have first hand accounts from Fulmar pilots who were surprised at the amount of punishment some Italian types could sustain and keep flying. It had the same forward firing armament as the much superior single seat eight gun fighters. Maybe flying much slower and engaging slower targets, having more time to fire, might bias the figures if there are any.

RAF air to air gunnery during the BoB was woeful. I doubt that the FAA's was any better. The vast majority of pilots never hit, let alone shot down, an enemy aeroplane. Kill rates per firing pass sounds like something from a computer game manual. The number of strikes needed to shoot down various types using various ammunitions was carefully calculated and updated throughout the war by the 'boffins' at Orfordness, but it was irrelevant if the average pilot couldn't hit the target, and he couldn't.

If a Fulmar 'bounced' a Bf 109 there was nothing to stop the Bf 109 simply turning and accelerating away. The reverse is not true and could easily end badly for the Fulmar. The Bf 109 out performs the Fulmar in just about every criteria known to quantify aircraft performance. One Hurricane pilot said that the most disconcerting thing about flying the Hurricane against the Bf 109 was that it wasn't fast enough 'to run away'. Refreshing honesty from someone who was there. In a Fulmar the situation would be much, much worse. 

Even Parsifal isn't suggesting that the Fulmar could have competed with the Bf 109. Pitting a two seat navalised fighter based on a light bomber against one of the two best single seat fighters in the world is always going to be a no contest. 

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 17, 2014)

> But it doesnt follow that a Fulmar cannot fly in skies filled with enemy fighters. it could, it did.



Prove it, then? Provide me/us with examples of the Fulmar tackling large numbers of Bf 109s - not Italian bombers, not CR-42s, not Bf 110s and Stukas, but Bf 109s. The thing is, Parsifal, you can't because you and I both know, such combat did not happen. Like we've been stating from way back, the Bf 109 did not enter the fray over Malta in anywhere near the numbers it did over Britain, therefore comparisons of combat over Malta are pointless; there is little common frame of reference. You can go on all day about the strategic situation and what the FAA was up against, but no amount of interceptions against the numbers and types of aircraft present over Malta is proof that it could survive during the BoB.

How can you believe that the Fulmar, with worse performance than the Defiant could survive where the Defiant couldn't? And don't mention the turret as a reason why it is different, because it was the Defiant's low speed that was its biggest hindrance, not its armament. How can you not agree that with worse speed than 300 mph the Fulmar could survive against large numbers of the best German fighter pilots flying one of the best fighters in the world at the time? Steve's right; I can provide plenty of examples of Defiants being shot down even when in the presense of single seaters - Defiants were too slow at 300 mph; the Fulmar was a German target waiting to be shot down at less than that speed over Britain. 



> The Fulmar certainly proved that it could achieve very high kill rates per firing pass.



Got any figures to back that up with? I can provide you with the fact that no FAA pilot became an ace on the Fulmar alone. Yes, aces did fly Fulmars, but none of them shot down five or more aircraft flying the Fulmar. Sub Lt Graeme Hogg was the highest scoring FAA fighter pilot to fly the Fulmar with 4 claims plus 8 shared in the Fulmar of his total of 12. During an attack by S.79 torpedo bombers against the Illustrious, Hogg and two of his 806 squadron mates claimed a bomber each, but used up all their ammunition shooting down their bomber.

It's common knowledge that Fulmar pilots had to make the first pass count because they would not get another chance because of, you guessed it, its low speed and acceleration. Robert Henley of 806 Sqn stated after being shot down during attacks on Illustrious that; "I recall a fairly massive raid raid of Ju 87s and Ju 88s, with all available fighters scrambled - some four Fulmars - and we just flew around uncontrolled, shooting at anything that came within range. The poor old Fulmar had problems gaining height and speed against the Ju 88s. My aircraft was hit, I think to my embarrassment, by a Ju 87, which stopped my engine some miles east-south-east of Hal Far."


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## Shortround6 (Feb 17, 2014)

The Fulmar was very _unlikely _ to anymore successful than a Hurricane _per firing pass_ since they used the same guns in essentially the same layout and both were noted as steady gun platforms. The Fumlars advantages were that it could make _MORE_ firing passes (assuming it could catch the targets), and due to it's low rate of closure it's firing pass _would last longer._ 

Differences in performance of the guns between 1941 and 1940 _might_ be due to a different ammo load out and perhaps to a different harmonization pattern. Standard loadout for eight guns in the BoB ( and yes, it could vary) was 3 guns with ball, 2 with AP, 2 with MK IV tracer and *1* gun with MK VI Incendiary (De Wilde). as time went on the percentage of MK VI Incendiary increased and the ball disappeared. Mosquito's and Spitfires with four .303 guns tasked with air to air later on were loaded with two guns of AP and two guns with MK VI Incendiary. For ground strafing is was 3 guns to 1 AP/incendiary. 

These changes in ammo and perhaps changes in harmonization patterns make it difficult to compare combat effectiveness based on 'type' of aircraft unless the comparison is done for the _same_ time period. 


The South East England and Malta comparison needs a bit of looking at to. Granted over Malta the Germans could put a high ratio of fighters but the routes to and from Malta were pretty limited and the limit on the _total_ number of aircraft the Germans were using meant that the while the raid was concentrated in area so was the strike formation. Over England there were often multiple strikes per day on targets a number of miles apart by formations that based a number of miles apart. Pin point density may be lower but British single fighters or small formations of fighters (3-4) that engage in 30-40 mile pursuits of stragglers can find themselves engaged by a German fighter group (3-12 aircraft) that was assigned to a different raid than they one they are pursuing. 

Weather conditions may also play a part. Was the weather over Malta "clearer" on average than over England, less clouds? Were the extra crewmen able to give better warning of a possible bounce? Would cloudier conditions favor the Fulmar over England or hurt them?


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## Greyman (Feb 17, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> How can you believe that the Fulmar, with worse performance than the Defiant could survive where the Defiant couldn't?



Forget the Defiant, the _Blenheim_ had better level speed and climb performance than the Fulmar.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 17, 2014)

Only advantage/s the Fulmar had over the Blenheim was more guns and perhaps turn. 

Had the British really wanted to, the Blenheim could have been modified for slightly better performance. Ditch the turret, clip the wings, a few sheet metal fairings around the nose, fit _constant speed props_ *NOT* _controllable pitch props_ and run on 100 octane fuel. Cotton at the Photo Recon unit had one modified like that with a few other tweaks and got it to do over over 290mph with no belly gun pack. But it does _nothing_ to help or make up numbers at 15,000ft and above.


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## pbehn (Feb 17, 2014)

Surely the best thing would be to increase production of Spitfires and Hurricanes, but in any case the shortage wasn't planes it was pilots.


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## stona (Feb 17, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> due to it's low rate of closure it's firing pass _would last longer._



And consequently it's exposure to return fire from the target would also be longer. Many Spitfires and Hurricanes were shot down by return fire from the bombers making their usually shorter passes.

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Feb 17, 2014)

Interestingly, on the subject of firing passes, the Admiralty didn't like the point harmonisation recommended by the RAF and stuck with their own, more spread out pattern. They found that point harmonisation was of no added benefit in destroying enemy aircraft, and that casualties to their own fighters were much higher (five times higher by their figures).

Their reasoning was exactly what you just described - longer exposure to enemy defensive fire as the Fulmar tried to get within 250 yards.


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## stona (Feb 17, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Surely the best thing would be to increase production of Spitfires and Hurricanes, but in any case the shortage wasn't planes it was pilots.



I'd qualify that as 'combat ready' pilots. The shortage was of well trained and experienced pilots and it was chronic. The total number of pilots in Fighter Command actually increased between July 1940 (1,377) and November 1940 (1,796). 

The need for properly trained pilots in 11 Group seems to have evaded Douglas at a meeting at Bentley Priory on 7/9/40. The net loss in pilots in the four weeks leading up to 4/9/40 was only 68 (348 lost against 280 from the OTUs) but the OTU course had been reduced to two weeks and pilots emerging had as little as ten hours on front line fighters. 11 Group was losing almost 100 pilots per week and had resorted to fielding composite squadrons on some occasions. In Dowding's own words, addressed to Douglas. "You must realise that we are going downhill."

Coming back to the Fulmar, Dowding gave a series of lectures in the U.S. between November 1940 and May 1941._ On the practicalities of air fighting he emphasised the need for fighters to be 'at least 30 mph faster than any bombers they opposed'. He also emphasised the need for a fast rate of climb and speed in level flight and the advantages of easy manoevrability at all heights and speeds._ Pilots needed protective armour, good radios, cockpits offering good all round visibility, anti-icing devices and bullet proof windscreens. He discussed the relative performance of cannon and machine guns and emphasised the need for pilots to be trained at and become proficient in deflection shooting.

It is not difficult to see, given the criteria he gave, why he would not have been a fan of the Fulmar when fighting the pivotal defensive air battle in British history, but maybe others know better 

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Feb 17, 2014)

Of course the pilots needed to be combat trained. I can never understand why pilots with 10 hrs experience were thrown into the fray while other pilots with much more experience were up in Scotland and N England.



The Spitfire and Hurricane had different rates of climb and I believe climbed at different forward speeds which made it a bit difficult for them to operate together. Putting another Marque in the mix would make even more headaches.


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## stona (Feb 17, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Of course the pilots needed to be combat trained. I can never understand why pilots with 10 hrs experience were thrown into the fray while other pilots with much more experience were up in Scotland and N England.



Squadrons in other Groups were relieved of their experienced pilots and men which they had trained, who were transferred to squadrons in 11 Group. 11 Group squadrons were also maintained with a higher number of pilots, on average about 19 as opposed to as few as 10 in other Groups. By mid September 1940 even 11 Group's squadrons had on average only 16 pilots. The official establishment for a squadron in Fighter Command was 26.

This was Dowding's so called 'stabilisation system' introduced on 8/9/40 a day after the conference I cited above. Entire squadrons would no longer be rotated in and out of 11 Group, trained men would be. This system was very unpopular, particularly with the squadrons who lost their most experienced men along with newly operational pilots whom they had just trained. Introduced as an 'expedient', read desperate measure, it continued until the end of November 1940. 

Dowding himself wrote. _'The stabilisation of squadrons in the line and the creation of Class 'C' squadrons was a desperate expedient forced on me by the heavy losses.' _

Many squadrons in other Groups were either not fully operational or, as Dowding himself said, capable only of taking on unescorted bomber formations. On 23rd October 1940 440 of Fighter Command's pilots, roughly one third, were non-operational. This is why the raw figures for pilot numbers are somewhat misleading.

There was no large reserve of experienced pilots upon which Fighter Command could draw. 

12 and 13 Groups both had jobs to do even with their limited resources, protecting the industrial infrastructure of the Midlands and the North. 13 Group did this very well as Luftflotte 5 discovered on 15th August.
We know, but Dowding could not, that such an attack would not be repeated.

Cheers

Steve


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## RCAFson (Feb 17, 2014)

stona said:


> The Bf 109 was present where the RAF's targets, the Luftwaffe's bombers, where. The BoB (with few exceptions) was fought over SE England and the Channel.
> 
> What evidence do you have to support the contention that the Fulmar could achieve 'very high kill rates per firing pass'. I have first hand accounts from Fulmar pilots who were surprised at the amount of punishment some Italian types could sustain and keep flying. It had the same forward firing armament as the much superior single seat eight gun fighters. Maybe flying much slower and engaging slower targets, having more time to fire, might bias the figures if there are any.
> 
> ...



The RAF developed the 8 gun fighter because they foresaw the need to maximize kill rates per firing pass. The RAF/Air ministry placed maximum firepower as a requisite precisely because the average pilot was not a good shot, nor was he likely to make (or get the opportunity to make) repeated firing passes at a target. The latter part of the previous sentence was especially true for the Fulmar but because he could open fire sooner and fire longer he could maximize his chances of a kill per pass. However, another factor which has not been mentioned is that the Fulmar's long endurance would enable it to remain on station, and with sufficient remaining firepower to be combat effective.



> If a Fulmar 'bounced' a Bf 109 there was nothing to stop the Bf 109 simply turning and accelerating away. The reverse is not true and could easily end badly for the Fulmar. The Bf 109 out performs the Fulmar in just about every criteria known to quantify aircraft performance. One Hurricane pilot said that the most disconcerting thing about flying the Hurricane against the Bf 109 was that it wasn't fast enough 'to run away'. Refreshing honesty from someone who was there. In a Fulmar the situation would be much, much worse.



A Fulmar diving from above has been gaining energy and speed in its dive, so it will have a momentary advantage over the 109, and it doesn't take long at all for the Fulmar's armament to tear apart a 109 airframe. However even the "bogeyman" 109 pilots don't have eyes in the back of their heads:



> ... It has been estimated that throughout the history of air combat 80 to 90 percent of downed fighter pilots were unaware of their danger until the moment of the attack. Surprise, then, and conversely, the avoidance of surprise, must be considered the most vital element in air combat.
> Shaw, Fighter Combat: tactics and Maneuvering, p.195.


 Of course the corollary of this statement is that only a small portion of aircombat, where neither side had the advantage of surprise, resulted in kills.

For the historical two seat Fulmar, having a rearward facing observer was a huge advantage (and given the above statement by Shaw we can see why):



> The original pair of Fulmars—those flown by Lt. 'Buster' Hallett and Lt. Frank Pennington (a New Zealander)—had meantime also been engaged by half a dozen MC202s and CR42s, two of the latter damaging Pennington's aircraft. His TAG, Pty.Off.(A) Len Barrick, was gravely wounded; despite the severity of his wounds, Barrick continued to give warning of the approach of the Fiats until he fainted. Hallett's aircraft was also forced down from 12,000 feet to sea level. Both aircraft managed to escape however, landing-on at 1230 and 1240 respectively.
> 
> Malta, the Spitfire Years, p.485



It's been mentioned previously that 9 Fulmars met a superior number of 109s and 110s over Kirkenes, with the result that 2 Fulmars and 1 110 were shot down - according to you this outcome should not have been possible, yet it is predicted by Shaw, above. It also explains why the Wildcat/Martlet could tackle the Zero.


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## RCAFson (Feb 17, 2014)

Greyman said:


> Interestingly, on the subject of firing passes, the Admiralty didn't like the point harmonisation recommended by the RAF and stuck with their own, more spread out pattern. They found that point harmonisation was of no added benefit in destroying enemy aircraft, and that casualties to their own fighters were much higher (five times higher by their figures).
> 
> Their reasoning was exactly what you just described - longer exposure to enemy defensive fire as the Fulmar tried to get within 250 yards.



Yes, and having lots of ammo allowed the Fulmar to open fire at long range (to suppress return fire) and still continue firing as he closed the range.


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## parsifal (Feb 17, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Surely the best thing would be to increase production of Spitfires and Hurricanes, but in any case the shortage wasn't planes it was pilots.



Ah yes, but one of the parameters of the hypothetical was that the hurricane and/or Spitfire are either not there at all, or are in short supply. What options are available in that circumstance. 

The situation would have to be considered dire, some have suggested the RAF might develop a new type, or develop existing prototypes further than they did. Perhaps. Of they could try and extract more out of the assets that they did posses, or might posess with some production or expenditure.

One obvious solution might be to balance up the supply and quality of RAF pilots.another might be to try and secure US equipment. another might be to establish additional industrial support in the dominions. Another might be to use other resources as best as possible. hence the suggestion to use fulmars.

The problem for britain was not the 109 (at least directly). it was a fighter, and a fighter on its own doesnt do much, if your opponent does not want to play ball (neither does a bomber, unless there is a plan that the force is working to. in 1940, the germans only had the very vaguest of plans, which in any case changed several times) . The impotence of pure fighter operations was something the RAF learned the hard way in 1941. But having fighters control the skies over an opposing territory usually allows your own strike aircraft to go out there and do stuff at tolerable cost. So, in the absence of having enough air superiority fighters to take on the enemy fighters, apart from the obvious of having a very big problem, what can you do. Well, you can try and reduce that advantage of fighter control, by making the cost to his bombers a little more expensive he had expected. one thing is to scrounge around and find aircraft that, whilst unable to challenge for air superiority, can cause a bit of mischief amongst the enemy's bombers, by working to the strengths that opposing aircraft, or aircraft fleets might not possess. The best second line candidate for that is the Fulmar, or possibly the American Hawk, each for different reasons. The 109 and the force to which it was attached had some glaring weaknesses, despite being arguably the best fighter in the world at that time. It was short ranged, it was in relatively limited numbers, and this might be considered worse if the Spits and Hurricanes were also in short supply. The obvious reason for a shortage of RAF top line fighters would have to be over committment over france, but if that had happened, then it also follows that there would be less 109s available. Not a 1 for 1 exchange, France was a bottomless, non-cost effective snake pit for the RAF in 1940, but some reduction 

What Im suggesting is nothing new, it was used by the germans themselves in 1943-5 when faced with a heavy assault against their own territory, even in the face of escorted raids against them. With wide variations of success and failure. Certainly not ideal for them, but they made the best of it. They were not above using bombers, and twin engined obsolete aircraft, night fighters (during the day), anything they could lay their hands on to try and get at the bomber forces and reduce its effectiveness. The Germans knew about the concept of improvising, making do, adapting. Evidently our British related colleagues, after more than 70 years, still have not grasped that concept. Its not a first line fighter, so it cant be used in their air fight. I bet if they had a 3.7 inch AA gun available and were being attacked by tanks, would argue they had no weapons to attack that tank "because an AA gun is for shooting at aircraft, not tanks!!!"....weve heard those sorts or arguments before havent we. i thought we'd learnt that lesson, but evidently not. 


other than those, ther isnt a lot around to choose from that could realistically be acquired by the RAF in time. I certainly discount the defiant because it was a manifest failure, and i doubt also that the gladiator had much stretch left in it. Other types are too far in the pipieline to arrive in time, except perhaps the Whirlwind. A twin engined fulmar might help a bit as well


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## Juha (Feb 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> ...It's been mentioned previously that 9 Fulmars met a superior number of 109s and 110s over Kirkenes, with the result that 2 Fulmars and 1 110 were shot down - according to you this outcome should not have been possible, yet it is predicted by Shaw, above. It also explains why the Wildcat/Martlet could tackle the Zero.




According to the report of the captain of HMS Victorious the crews of the Fulmars saw at least three M.E. 109s and six ME110s approaching. Because the 1.(Z)/JG 77 and 14./JG 77 were the only LW Zerstörer and fighter units participating and most of them clearly concentrated on torpedo-bombers, I doubt that Fulmars fought against significantly superior numbers. And as I have written before the Bf 110 pilot, Karl-Fritz Schlossstein, and his gunner, both survived, maintained that they were shot down by an Albacore gunner whose plane they were hitting hard not by a Fulmar. 

Juha


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## nuuumannn (Feb 17, 2014)

> Forget the Defiant, the Blenheim had better level speed and climb performance than the Fulmar.



Doesn't paint a rosy picture for the Fulmar in an environment heavy with first class single-seaters!



> one thing is to scrounge around and find aircraft that, whilst unable to challenge for air superiority, can cause a bit of mischief amongst the enemy's bombers, by working to the strengths that opposing aircraft, or aircraft fleets might not possess.



Parsifal, I generally respect your point of view and on the whole agree with your synopsies of situations because you generally make sense. But I think in this case I have to disagree with you, for the simple fact that what the RAF _needed_ was first rate fighters - forget for the moment pilot shortage etc - aircraft that were up to the quality of the Spitfire and Hurricane - nothing less. Dowding had to accept the Defiant, Gladiator and Blenheim and all their inadequacies; he had little choice. Although I'm guessing here, I suspect that if he had a choice, Dowding would have gone for a single-seater with good performance, _not_ another two-seater and certainly not something with performance worse than that of the second fiddle fighters he already had. Adding another poor performer like the Fulmar would not serve any real benefit at all and, like we've stated all along, in an environment where high performance single-seaters were operating in large numbers, the last thing you want is to throw away the lives of your pilots and waste equipment. The removal of the Defiant from day fighter duties at the end of August 1940 was for that very reason.

In the event of production of either Spitfire or Hurricane not living up to expectations, the Air Ministry made plans for stop-gap fighters to be built that it was hoped could have some effect against the Germans, but they were stop-gaps only. Even then, with performance better by a country mile than the Fulmar, they were only expected to do their jobs until there were sufficient high performance single-seaters available. Adding another second string fighter is a waste. Whilst I agree that a Hawk 75 would be a possible option, I _have_ to disagree with the Fulmar because of its inadequate performance alone - not that they were in any numbers to have been available by the summer of 1940 at any rate.

Ask yourself this question; what would you choose (if you could) if you were in Dowding's position - a single-seater with as good or close performance to the Spitfire or Hurricane or the Fulmar? You'd be mad to choose the Fulmar.


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## RCAFson (Feb 17, 2014)

Juha said:


> According to the report of the captain of HMS Victorious the crews of the Fulmars saw at least three M.E. 109s and six ME110s approaching. Because the 1.(Z)/JG 77 and 14./JG 77 were the only LW Zerstörer and fighter units participating and most of them clearly concentrated on torpedo-bombers, I doubt that Fulmars fought against significantly superior numbers. And as I have written before the Bf 110 pilot, Karl-Fritz Schlossstein, and his gunner, both survived, maintained that they were shot down by an Albacore gunner whose plane they were hitting hard not by a Fulmar.
> 
> Juha




They wouldn't be the first aircrew to be wrong about how they were shot down...clearly they didn't see the attacking Fulmar, as their attention was elsewhere:



> ... It has been estimated that throughout the history of air combat 80 to 90 percent of downed fighter pilots were unaware of their danger until the moment of the attack. Surprise, then, and conversely, the avoidance of surprise, must be considered the most vital element in air combat.
> Shaw, Fighter Combat: tactics and Maneuvering, p.195.



Fulmar's claimed 2 x 110s while Albacores claimed none, AFAIK.

In any event, even if the numbers were roughly equal; 3 (or more) 109s and 6 110s, why weren't the Fulmars wiped out? Even the 110 has a huge advantage, on paper, over the Fulmar.


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## RCAFson (Feb 17, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Doesn't paint a rosy picture for the Fulmar in an environment heavy with first class single-seaters!
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I have to say that it is almost pointless to discuss historical alternatives on this board, because there is such a huge resistance to actually discussing the topic at hand - alternative fighters in this case. The naval Fulmar gives us a guide to how a much lighter, uprated engined Fulmar might have performed, but it is not an exact guide because the speed and climb rate of the NN Fulmar would be clearly superior. There is continuing reference to the naval fulmar, rather than to the NN Fulmar, which is what the RAF would have been using, if developed as an alternate, heavy LR patrol/escort fighter.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 17, 2014)

> There is continuing reference to the naval fulmar, rather than to the NN Fulmar, which is what the RAF would have been using, if developed as an alternate, heavy LR patrol/escort fighter.



Because the naval Fulmar actually existed and therefore was being considered among the very first choices laid down by posters on this thread. All the aircraft suggested in the first few posts by Merlin et al existed or were paper projects submitted as alternative to existing specifications. No one said anything about inventing something that did not exist or was not considered and as I stated in an earlier post, Marcel Lobelle (Fairey's chief designer) never considered a single-seat P.4/34 or Fulmar for that matter. All of his immediate pre-war official paper projects were new designs with features based on the Firefly rather than the Fulmar. 

All the merits and inadedquacies of the types discussed here were real, not imaginary, like your single-seat Fulmar. You are living in fantasyland. I could turn to you and state, "well, if you are going to build a fighter based on the Fulmar, in my 'what if' scenario, Heinkel had developed jet fighters and jet bombers and had them in service in the summer of 1940 - and lots of them".

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## Juha (Feb 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> They wouldn't be the first aircrew to be wrong about how they were shot down...clearly they didn't see the attacking Fulmar, as their attention was elsewhere:



That's true but they anyway were probably in the best position to know what happened to their plane, after all both the pilot and the WOp/AG survived, alongside the crew of the artillery training ship Bremse, who picked them up. They clearly didn't see an attacking Fulmar, probably there was none. A pilot/AG combination was clearly more difficult to attack unnoticed than a single-seater, especially at low level.





RCAFson said:


> Fulmar's claimed 2 x 110s while Albacores claimed none, AFAIK.



½ of the Albacores were lost, there is a good chance that an Albacore hit hard by the 110, according to the German pilot, didn't make it back, so no claim.



RCAFson said:


> In any event, even if the numbers were roughly equal; 3 (or more) 109s and 6 110s, why weren't the Fulmars wiped out? Even the 110 has a huge advantage, on paper, over the Fulmar.



Because they did what they should, shot down (with Flak) ½ of the attacking torpedobombers, Fulmars clearly failed to protect effectively their charges.


Juha


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## Shortround6 (Feb 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> I have to say that it is almost pointless to discuss historical alternatives on this board, because there is such a huge resistance to actually discussing the topic at hand - alternative fighters in this case .



Pot calling kettle.....................

If your "historical alternatives" include not only alternative fighters but engines that never were (and never could be) and alternative physics then yes, you are going to wind up with huge resistance. 

The Bristol Mercury was a very nice 25 liter 9 cylinder radial but it had 92.6% of the displacement of the Merlin, it ran at 91.66% the RPM of the Merlin and even with 100 octane fuel and even boosting to 9lbs it operated at 88.8% of the manifold pressure of the Merlin. Put it all together and it was going to give you 75-80% of the power of the Merlin, granted it was lighter but it had _more_ drag. Powering ANY alternative fighter with the Mercury is going to result in distinctly second rate fighter. 
The ONLY other British radial _in production in *numbers*_ during the BoB is the Bristol Pegasus, which is not only in demand for the Hampden and Wellington bombers but a number of other aircraft as well. It also has higher drag than the Mercury to somewhat off set it's higher power but even at it's best it only gave 965hp at 13,000ft with a 2 speed supercharger and 100/130 octane fuel. 

No matter how much _stuff_ you rip out out of the P4/34 there is no way on _THIS_ earth that a plane of it's size is going to perform as well as a Hurricane using the same engine and prop. The question is how much worse it will perform. The Defiant was both smaller and lighter than the P4/34 and the prototype Defiant _without_ turret was slower than Hurricane. Maybe it was the radiator? 
You also want to stuff in more armament weight than the Hurricane carried. An extra 170lbs of ammo over and above the 420lbs of guns and ammo the Hurricane carried not including the weight of larger ammo boxes/trays/hatches, and not including the weight of the gun mounts, local strengthening, gun heating, charging and firing equipment. (gun installations could go 20-50% more than the weight of the guns and ammo alone).

Taking weight _out_ of a carrier plane is a lot harder than it seems without a lot of redesign and new components. You don't want the wing to fold? fine, take out the hinges (and control linkage hinges) and any power assist the wing may use and bolt it in place but you are stuck with the beefed up ribs at the joint and any local stiffening/structure unless you build new tooling and run a stress analysis on the new structure. Same with taking out the arresting gear, some of the weight is the the gear and some is beefed up structure. Same with catapult points. Converting land planes to naval use was often easier. They could just beef up local areas or add doubling plates to existing structure. 

The P4/34 was designed as a _dive bomber_ and as such had a pretty sturdy airframe, made a good staring point for a Carrier aircraft, perhaps not so good for a land fighter, you weren't likely to break it in a hard turn but you may have a bit more weight distributed through the spar/s frames and structure than you really need for a land fighter. Taking it "out" requires new drawings, new stress analysis and new testing of the new structure. 

Can it be modified? yes but it may not be as easy and quick as you think, a reason that they often designed new airframes for new jobs rather than modifying an old airframe for too long. 

When looking the prototypes that were passed over in 1935-39 try asking _why_ instead of assuming politics or stupidity on the part of the air staff. There may have been but it requires _proof_, they may have had good reasons for passing over many of those planes. 

My own personnel favorite was the Whirlwind, especially with 20/20 hindsight but the decision to ditch working on a 21 liter engine in favor of working on a 36 liter engine was the right one for R-R. Dowding's quote about not wanting a plane with _two_ engines when you could have a plane with the same armament with one engine actually doesn't stand up quite so well when it is two 12 cylinder engines vs one 24 cylinder engine. 
As an "alternative" it is one of the few that had decent performance, an engine that needed little, if any, modification to be "useful" in the Bob and both aircraft and engine had actual production facilities (small though they may be) in existence in time for the BoB. 
A little more 'belief" at the time and a firm _order_ *NOT* to concentrate of Lysander production might have seen more use of the Whirlwind.


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## stona (Feb 18, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> My own personnel favorite was the Whirlwind, especially with 20/20 hindsight but the decision to ditch working on a 21 liter engine in favor of working on a 36 liter engine was the right one for R-R. Dowding's quote about not wanting a plane with _two_ engines when you could have a plane with the same armament with one engine actually doesn't stand up quite so well when it is two 12 cylinder engines vs one 24 cylinder engine.
> As an "alternative" it is one of the few that had decent performance, an engine that needed little, if any, modification to be "useful" in the Bob and both aircraft and engine had actual production facilities (small though they may be) in existence in time for the BoB.
> A little more 'belief" at the time and a firm _order_ *NOT* to concentrate of Lysander production might have seen more use of the Whirlwind.



Me too. It did have some serious problems but had both the Spitfire and Hurricane failed, leaving only the Gloster fighter as a back up, some serious time and effort could have been invested in the Whirlwind and its engines. The RAF _might_ have had, with the removal of the uncertainty which surrounded the project, potentially, a competitive cannon armed fighter in 1940.

It makes a lot more sense than mucking about with a hopelessly outclassed navalised light bomber as a front line fighter.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Feb 18, 2014)

stona said:


> Squadrons in other Groups were relieved of their experienced pilots and men which they had trained, who were transferred to squadrons in 11 Group. 11 Group squadrons were also maintained with a higher number of pilots, on average about 19 as opposed to as few as 10 in other Groups. By mid September 1940 even 11 Group's squadrons had on average only 16 pilots. The official establishment for a squadron in Fighter Command was 26.
> 
> This was Dowding's so called 'stabilisation system' introduced on 8/9/40 a day after the conference I cited above. Entire squadrons would no longer be rotated in and out of 11 Group, trained men would be. This system was very unpopular, particularly with the squadrons who lost their most experienced men along with newly operational pilots whom they had just trained. Introduced as an 'expedient', read desperate measure, it continued until the end of November 1940.
> 
> ...



Thanks Steve, I did read in one book that Leigh Mallory was suspected of keeping his best pilots to further his big wing theory.


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## stona (Feb 18, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Thanks Steve, I did read in one book that Leigh Mallory was suspected of keeping his best pilots to further his big wing theory.



It wouldn't surprise me if he did that. 

12 Group was the second line of defence and the next strongest Group.It did field some very good squadrons though they were more undermanned than those in 11 Group. It was tasked with protecting the Midlands and 11 Groups air fields. It failed to do the latter, much to Park's dismay. 

Why Leigh Mallory was not forced by Dowding to toe the line would be the subject of another thread 

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Feb 18, 2014)

The spitfire hurricane defiant and fulmar all had merlin engines. I cannot see a scenariowhere the British ordered a twin seat fighter but no single seaters. If the whirlwind was originally designed for Merlins and was available for the BoB it could have been devastating, even 8 rifle calibre guns couldnt guarantee a kill. IIRC a heinkle was eventually brought down after being attacked but 7 spitfires-hurricanes it had literally hundreds of holes, it waas known at the time cannon were needed but how to mount them?


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## stona (Feb 18, 2014)

The fact that the Whirlwind was designed for Peregrine engines (originally the Kestrel K.26 for the pedants) was one of the factors that led to its and that engine's demise. It could have been developed into a decent fighter with those engines but it, like many war time designs, was never given a chance. As it was it was by no means a bad aeroplane. It was a very advanced aeroplane for its time and a 350+mph fighter which certainly puts it in a different class to something like a Fulmar.
Cheers
Steve


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## Aozora (Feb 18, 2014)

stona said:


> The fact that the Whirlwind was designed for Peregrine engines (originally the Kestrel K.26 for the pedants) was one of the factors that led to its and that engine's demise. It could have been developed into a decent fighter with those engines but it, like many war time designs, was never given a chance. As it was it was by no means a bad aeroplane. It was a very advanced aeroplane for its time and a 350+mph fighter which certainly puts it in a different class to something like a Fulmar.
> Cheers
> Steve



Part of the reason for the Whirlwind's demise was that the Hurricane and Spitfire were so successful, meaning that development and production of the Merlin had to take priority over developing the Peregrine. It is still extremely doubtful that the Whirlwind could have been built in sufficient numbers in 1940, and another fighter or fighters would still have been needed - perhaps even a single seat Defiant with eight forward firing Brownings?


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## merlin (Feb 19, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> If your "historical alternatives" include not only alternative fighters but engines that never were (and never could be) and alternative physics then yes, you are going to wind up with huge resistance.
> 
> The Bristol Mercury was a very nice 25 liter 9 cylinder radial but it had 92.6% of the displacement of the Merlin, it ran at 91.66% the RPM of the Merlin and even with 100 octane fuel and even boosting to 9lbs it operated at 88.8% of the manifold pressure of the Merlin. Put it all together and it was going to give you 75-80% of the power of the Merlin, granted it was lighter but it had _more_ drag. Powering ANY alternative fighter with the Mercury is going to result in distinctly second rate fighter.
> The ONLY other British radial _in production in *numbers*_ during the BoB is the Bristol Pegasus, which is not only in demand for the Hampden and Wellington bombers but a number of other aircraft as well. It also has higher drag than the Mercury to somewhat off set it's higher power but even at it's best it only gave 965hp at 13,000ft with a 2 speed supercharger and 100/130 octane fuel.
> ...



With my original list - I avoided aircraft such as the Bristol 153 153A, Supermarine 313, or Martin-Baker MB2:

The Boulton-Paul P.88 - one of the 'winners' of the competition, but the Treasury wouldn't finance so many prototypes - only Westland built, in addition, while in OTL the Vulture got terminated, the Hercules had 'problems' while not imagining the Hercules 100 could appear years earlier, still possible one in the 1500hp region could've been done in-time.

The Gloster single-engine - granted the Mercury engine was quite mature by then - not a lot more that could be squeezed out of it, yet the original spec was for a radial fighter for hot climates - so maybe the Air Staff still take that into account! Also I have seen mention of re-engining with the Taurus - though much of an advantage that gives is debatable! But it does need an earlier first flight to stand a chance, especially if that was when there were 'problems' with the Merlin.

The Gloster 'twin' - granted the main problem was the Taurus engine, yet even with the 900 hp IIIs 332 mph at 15,200 ft. is still pretty good. Again (as in the other thread) there's room for it to appear earlier.

The Marlet - the British Purchasing Commission could've been interested enough in it to order it before the French, so interesting to see the comments. But they were more interested in the Harvard, Hudson, Catalina later the Mustang, so no early Martlet and no P-36. 

Few can dislike the Whirlwind, obviously again problems with the engine, have read as well about maintenance issues - unrelated to the engine.


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## stona (Feb 19, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Part of the reason for the Whirlwind's demise was that the Hurricane and Spitfire were so successful, meaning that development and production of the Merlin had to take priority over developing the Peregrine.



Precisely. There were other problems with the Whirlwind, collapsing tail wheels and problems with the exhaust and radiator systems and even armament. Attempts to reduce the landing speed using leading edge slats were also less than successful. 
There was never any impetus to address these and other issues, particularly after the initial two stage cancellation and partial reprieve, because there was not any real need for the Whirlwind and the RAF was expecting the Hawker cannon armed fighter imminently. That of course didn't happen.
If the Air Ministry and RAF had been forced into pushing through the Whirlwind then things might have been different.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 19, 2014)

merlin said:


> With my original list - I avoided aircraft such as the Bristol 153 153A, Supermarine 313, or Martin-Baker MB2:



Some of these look attractive at first glance but a bit deeper look reveals the problems. For instance the Supermarine 313 was a larger plane than the Whirlwind, was supposed to use lower powered engines (The Goshawk?) and yet go faster? Something seems off.
The Martin-Baker MB2 shows a lot of ingenuity but the Dagger engine had more than it's share of problems, one that is hard to "fix" is that it gave it's peak power at around 8,000ft not 16,250 like the Merlin. Even if you "fix" the cooling problem you are only going to get around 830hp at 16,250 ft out of it which rather limits the altitude performance. Let's please remember that effective combat ceiling was thousands of feet lower than "service ceiling". 



> The Boulton-Paul P.88 - one of the 'winners' of the competition, but the Treasury wouldn't finance so many prototypes - only Westland built, in addition, while in OTL the Vulture got terminated, the Hercules had 'problems' while not imagining the Hercules 100 could appear years earlier, still possible one in the 1500hp region could've been done in-time.



The problem with the Hercules is what numbers of production and what power _at what altitude._ Bristol had little trouble making a few sleeve engines a month or even a few dozen per month, the trouble was trying to make thousands of sleeves per month in order to make hundreds of engines per month, they did solve it 1940, just not in time for the BoB. The adoption of 100 octane fuel did very little for the early Hercules engines. In some cases allowable boost went from 5lb to 6 3/4lbs (for a 1941 MK VI engine), There were changes in cylinder finning and cylinder head design as the Hercules went on. 

_The Gloster single-engine - granted the Mercury engine was quite mature by then - not a lot more that could be squeezed out of it, yet the original spec was for a radial fighter for hot climates - so maybe the Air Staff still take that into account! Also I have seen mention of re-engining with the Taurus - though much of an advantage that gives is debatable! But it does need an earlier first flight to stand a chance, especially if that was when there were 'problems' with the Merlin._ 
Perhaps more could have been squeezed out, but not without taking engineering time from the sleeve-valve engines, given the Taurus's saga perhaps they should have 
Debate on the Taurus is you get a smaller diameter but heavier engine that gives no more power at altitude (in production versions) but adds cooling problems. Lets look at it objectively shall we. Replace 24.9 liter 9 cylinder radial with 25.4 14 cylinder radial engine. You have to believe the sleeve valve is some sort of magic to think you are going to get a _major_ increase in power. Minor increase due to higher rpm, minor increase due to smaller cylinders, minor increase due to the sleeve valves, but a MAJOR increase? US 1200 hp radials were around 29.9 liters. 




> The Marlet - the British Purchasing Commission could've been interested enough in it to order it before the French, so interesting to see the comments. But they were more interested in the Harvard, Hudson, Catalina later the Mustang, so no early Martlet and no P-36.



And here you run into an engine problem too, which model P&W R-1830 or wright R-1820s will be _ordered_ in 1939 compared to what was becoming available in the fall of 1940 let alone what was used in 1941? A lot of the P W engines deleverid to the French and early British were single speed engines with around 1050 hp for take-off, later delivers shifted to 1200hp engines, Wright engines usually had two speed super chargers but had some problems as fighter engines. 



> Few can dislike the Whirlwind, obviously again problems with the engine, have read as well about maintenance issues - unrelated to the engine


.

Some of the maintenance issues were overblown. Some may not have been, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight we know that the Hawker Typhoon had more than it's share of maintenance issues too.


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## parsifal (Feb 19, 2014)

The nost likley scenario for the Spitfire and Hurricane not being in a position to rise to the Luftwaffes challenge in the late summer of 1940, is because of excessive attrition or inadequate production. Day , for example that the british had not ramped up production of Spitfires from early 1940, and found in June, after the fall of france, that FC was denuded of fighters....

One option, is simply not to rise to fight the luftwaffe, withraw out of the range of German fighters, and atack the bomber formations, as best as possible, from afar, until numbers situation had been restored. Britains SE might have been pasted, but the LW was of insufficient strength to carry out serrious damage, and her prearations for invasions non existent in a usable form until the early part of October, and even then of dubious reliability. So, what are the costs to Britain of foregoing serious deployment to the southeast of Britain until say early october. What could the Luftwaffe have done of long lasting importance in that time?


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## merlin (Feb 20, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The problem with the Hercules is what numbers of production and what power _at what altitude._ Bristol had little trouble making a few sleeve engines a month or even a few dozen per month, the trouble was trying to make thousands of sleeves per month in order to make hundreds of engines per month, they did solve it 1940, just not in time for the BoB. The adoption of 100 octane fuel did very little for the early Hercules engines. In some cases allowable boost went from 5lb to 6 3/4lbs (for a 1941 MK VI engine), There were changes in cylinder finning and cylinder head design as the Hercules went on.
> 
> *So, this begs the Question - what was the 'problem', why couldn't Bristol do it earlier? And how did they solve it? Therefore could that solution have arrived earlier!?* *I seem to remember that unlike Rolls-Royce Bristol didn't take on apprentices when re-armament started. * *And altitude - I think Fedden was fixated on the snail-volute rather than the turbine-volute for the supercharger.*
> 
> ...



So if the British did what the French did and ordered US engines, which ones would've been the most benefit with the timescale, e.g. the Wight Double-row Cyclone 2600 ??


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## Shortround6 (Feb 20, 2014)

Bristol had trouble making the sleeve valves come out 'round' within acceptable tolerances, or perhaps 'stay' round. Engines were often using unacceptable amounts of oil in under 20 hours of running. This could often result in oil fouled plugs so the answer was not just fit a larger oil tank and carry on. 

Solution, so the story goes, was found when a workman used some grinding wheels out of sequence by mistake in the finishing process( Bristol had used several hundred combinations of alloy, heat treatment and finishing processes already). 

Same problem beset the Napier Sabre before Bristol was _forced_ to help Napier ( they were not happy to 'solve' Napier's problem with Sabre while trying to sell their own 2000hp engine to the Government). Napier went through several hundred combinations themselves. 

The solution was _never_ apprentices when you are trying to make hundreds of engines a month, if not thousands. 

Hooker, when he went to Bristol after the war, is supposed to have said that the people at Bristol never understood airflow. 
You also have the cooling problem with air cooled engines, power is limited by the cooling system (fins and baffles) and in many cases the _ability_ to add as much fin area as was desired was limited by the foundry techniques (casting or forging) and machining ability. Wright went to machining groves instead of fins on the cylinder barrels and 'rolling' sheet metal fins into the groves on their later engines. The Hercules went through around 1/2 dozen different cylinder head designs with ever improving cooling ability. 

I would note however that in 1940 _nobody_ had a supercharger that offered a FTH of much over 17,000ft even in high gear of a two speed set up and that sometimes it took twice the power to drive the supercharger in high gear than in low gear. Picking the right supercharger gear was always a balance between altitude desired and the power needed to drive the supercharger ( and since 30% or more of the power just went heating the intake charge there comes a point of diminishing returns). 

AS far as the R-2600 goes. please remember that it is a 1900lb engine that is 55in in diameter, it is NOT a 'plug in' replacement for anything _but_ a Hercules and the 1940 1600hp for take-off version is only good for 1400hp at 11,500ft. (Merlin III at 12lbs was good for 1310hp at 9,000ft) and Wright only hit triple digit per month production in July of 1940. Production would double by Dec and double again by April/May 1941. First 1/2 of 1940 saw production numbers of around 70 per month most months.


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## stona (Feb 20, 2014)

parsifal said:


> So, what are the costs to Britain of foregoing serious deployment to the southeast of Britain until say early october. What could the Luftwaffe have done of long lasting importance in that time?



Losing RN and RAF facilities along the entire south coast and southern counties. Losing access to the channel for the RN and other shipping. It might not be a case of the Home Fleet not wanting to operate south of the Wash, but of actually fearing to do so.
Dive bombers operating unopposed could wreak havoc on, for example, port facilities. Ask any Maltese. That is rather different from being withdrawn from the fray.

This might have piqued some genuine interest in the Kriegsmarine for an invasion. It was easy for it to hide behind the Luftwaffe's inability to secure air superiority when in fact it had no appetite for 'Sea Lion'. I still doubt that an actual invasion was possible but who knows. The Germans with their tails up in August/September 1940 would be a very different proposition to the Germans fought to a stale mate, as they were historically.

Allowing a foreign air force to hammer your towns, cities and citizens, no matter how ineffectively, unopposed. This might not be militarily disastrous but it was (and is) politically unacceptable. A look at the reaction to WW1 raids by aeroplanes and air ships will illustrate the point.

Militarily a draw, to the British people the BoB was presented as a first victory. For the first time they had prevented the Germans achieving their rather ambiguous and confused objectives. The psychological and political effect of this are impossible to over estimate. It's why we live with the myth today and why the BBC still makes programmes about it, whilst authors (good bad and indifferent) still make money out of it.

Britain is a small island, I've just driven from Oxford to Carlisle in a few hours. Trading space for time, as per traditional doctrine is not an option as it was for some mainland European nations. There are no Urals to fall back to. _The RAF had to be seen to be doing something._

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Feb 20, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Hooker, when he went to Bristol after the war, is supposed to have said that the people at Bristol never understood airflow.
> You also have the cooling problem with air cooled engines, power is limited by the cooling system (fins and baffles) and in many cases the _ability_ to add as much fin area as was desired was limited by the foundry techniques (casting or forging) and machining ability. Wright went to machining groves instead of fins on the cylinder barrels and 'rolling' sheet metal fins into the groves on their later engines. The Hercules went through around 1/2 dozen different cylinder head designs with ever improving cooling ability.



There iss a cutaway rotating centaurus (I think)at the Yorkshire museum Elvington it is fascinating to watch. Easy to see the problems with the sleeves that not only had to rotate and oscillate but also conduct the heat away from the cylinders.


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## Greyman (Feb 20, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> I would note however that in 1940 _nobody_ had a supercharger that offered a FTH of much over 17,000ft even in high gear of a two speed set up and that sometimes it took twice the power to drive the supercharger in high gear than in low gear. Picking the right supercharger gear was always a balance between altitude desired and the power needed to drive the supercharger ( and since 30% or more of the power just went heating the intake charge there comes a point of diminishing returns).



MiG-1?


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## tomo pauk (Feb 20, 2014)

Merlin XX also fits the description (FTH above 17000 ft, in 1940, on +9 psi boost?). 

BTW, I've read in another forum that all of those, that were available for RAFs fighters, were earmarked for Hurricanes, so they would be able to haul bombs in NA! Hilarious.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 20, 2014)

The AM-35 was undergoing evolution during 1940 and the AM-35A engine didn't complete state testing until Sept 1940 and started production after that. Early in 1941 it got a strengthened impeller. It also weighed about 400lbs more than Merlin or DB 601 or Allison. 

The Mig-1 didn't enter use with regular service squadrons until Feb 1941.


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## pbehn (Feb 20, 2014)

stona said:


> Allowing a foreign air force to hammer your towns, cities and citizens, no matter how ineffectively, unopposed. This might not be militarily disastrous but it was (and is) politically unacceptable. A look at the reaction to WW1 raids by aeroplanes and air ships will illustrate the point.
> 
> Militarily a draw, to the British people the BoB was presented as a first victory. For the first time they had prevented the Germans achieving their rather ambiguous and confused objectives. The psychological and political effect of this are impossible to over estimate. It's why we live with the myth today and why the BBC still makes programmes about it, whilst authors (good bad and indifferent) still make money out of it.
> 
> ...



I think that for some of the forward airfields in Kent it was considered to abandon them, they were simply too far forward but politics dictated they remained operational, after Churchills "no surrender" speech he couldnt be seen to do just that. 

BTW for non UK residents Oxford is close to London and Carlisle is on the border. Having worked in Russia they have no concept of just how small the UK is. Flying home before turning to land on a clear day you can see the North sea on the right and the Irish sea on the left. London is only 70 odd miles from Dover


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## stona (Feb 20, 2014)

pbehn said:


> BTW for non UK residents Oxford is close to London and Carlisle is on the border.



Yep, a large part of the length of England (to the Scottish border) in about four and a half hours, a bit over 250 miles.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 20, 2014)

stona said:


> Losing RN and RAF facilities along the entire south coast and southern counties. Losing access to the channel for the RN and other shipping. It might not be a case of the Home Fleet not wanting to operate south of the Wash, but of actually fearing to do so.
> Dive bombers operating unopposed could wreak havoc on, for example, port facilities. Ask any Maltese. That is rather different from being withdrawn from the fray.
> 
> This might have piqued some genuine interest in the Kriegsmarine for an invasion. It was easy for it to hide behind the Luftwaffe's inability to secure air superiority when in fact it had no appetite for 'Sea Lion'. I still doubt that an actual invasion was possible but who knows. The Germans with their tails up in August/September 1940 would be a very different proposition to the Germans fought to a stale mate, as they were historically.
> ...



hi steve

These are certainly all possibilities, though I tend to discount the magnitude of the picture you paint. There are other examples of the LW having unfettered control of the air, over extended periods of time, yet I can think of no instances wherer they could flatten an entire regon in a matter of days or weeks. Possibilities might be the situation on the Eastern Front June 1941, where there was a lot of dislocation to the defence, but the collapse on that front was really a combination of pressure brought to bear to unhinge the Soviet defences. If the ground element is removed, the ability of the germans to flatten even a city, much less a region becomes very problematic. The three examples i can think of are Leningrad, Odessa and Malta. In leningrad, the naval facilities were repeatedly hit, but could not be knocked out, over Odessa, the port facitlites were again atacked but could not be neutralised, and once the air threat was removed, even naval construction, of sorts, could resume. as far as seaborne traffic is concerned, well, non-essential traffic would certainly stop, but for essential traffic, the LW was quite limited in its ability, and non-essential might choose to travel at night only and thereby reduce losses. General air force has a marked inability to hit ships. It takes specialist crews to do that, and for the germans in the Summer these were still recovering from their exertions over Norway. They possibly had the equivalent of two full wings to undertake those duties, and from October they were being progressivly transferred South. even with the undivided attentions of all available specialist resources, such as occurred over malta and the med, the LW was unable to curtail essential traffic entirely.

Not suggesting a full pullout, simply an abandonment of the forward positions. Pull back to some position behind London, leaving the SE exposed, but the rest is still covered. The LW would concentrate on the SE with escorted raids, realise this was not delivering what they needed and then extend their efforts further north, where escort for them was more difficult, exposure for the bombers more prolonged, and more time for a co-ordinated attack possible. Somewhat mallory i guess 

Powers of recovery for the RAF was quite resilient, maybe 300 to 400 frontline a/c per month, maybe more. So, in reality the LW might have a week or a month in which to capitalize. I doubt that they could achieve any lasting effect in that time frame. 

One final issue, that is bound to be a contentious statement. With or without the attentions of Fighter Command, the LW is going to suffer heavy losses. it was being called upon to undertake operations for which it was not designed...with fighter operating beyond their endurance limits, bombers overloaded and constantly under pressure. even during the salad days of Poland and the SitzKrieg, losses in the LW were not light...about 7% per month from memory. Unsustainable for them at the beginning of the war. It would not have been an operation under peacetime conditions


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## Shortround6 (Feb 20, 2014)

They didn't _need_ to flatten cities. They did, as things stood, disrupt British aircraft production to _some_ extent. Depending on AA guns alone (and barrage balloons) to defend the factories when even a few weeks production was important might have been a mistake. 
How many Spitfires were lost with the bombing of the Supermarine South Hampton Factory and the dispersal? The Short's factory in Rochester was taken out for months if not a year, granted production was shifted to other sites. Later in the year the BSA factory (Birmingham) was knocked out for about 3 months (making rifles). 
If allowed to bomb 'uncontested' how much more damage might the Germans have done? British factories had to make up for the losses in France for the army in addition to building up the air force. The Ship yards had to try to make up for the losses in shipping to the u-boats and build escorts. 
The Germans may not have been able to enough damage but it would have been a narrower margin.


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## parsifal (Feb 20, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> They didn't _need_ to flatten cities. They did, as things stood, disrupt British aircraft production to _some_ extent. Depending on AA guns alone (and barrage balloons) to defend the factories when even a few weeks production was important might have been a mistake.
> How many Spitfires were lost with the bombing of the Supermarine South Hampton Factory and the dispersal? The Short's factory in Rochester was taken out for months if not a year, granted production was shifted to other sites. Later in the year the BSA factory (Birmingham) was knocked out for about 3 months (making rifles).
> If allowed to bomb 'uncontested' how much more damage might the Germans have done? British factories had to make up for the losses in France for the army in addition to building up the air force. The Ship yards had to try to make up for the losses in shipping to the u-boats and build escorts.
> The Germans may not have been able to enough damage but it would have been a narrower margin.



It would not be uncontested. There would be fighters 40-60 miles further north than they were, that can still protect most of England, including London and the Supermarine fatories near there. Shorts is a different matter, but as the Germans demonstrated time and again, bomb damage was something fairly easily repaired given the right incentive. Shorts dont make fighters as i recall, and BSA, being located in Birmingham is outside 109 range anyway. Dare I say it, even a fulmar would have a field day attacking a massed concentration of unescorted german Bombers in daylight heading for the midlands....

All of a sudden the parameters of the scenario are changing I see, as inevitably they do. no longer are we simply faced with the british having few or no Spits and hurris, to where the germans are miraculously and meticulously targetting the British aircraft industry as a priority, with precision, perfectly co-ordinated and targetted strikes. History shows that none of that was the case. in the initial part of the battle, the LW went after the channel shipping, which was only partly responded to by FC....the sort of response I am now envisaging, but further inland. After a month of the Kanalkampf, they started a systematic attack on the airfields in the southeast and the radar installations. There were other attacks against a multiude of other tartgets, but none of them posessed the necessary strength or power to do much, and that was independant of the FC response. it was all the fault of the German command, they really had no clue what they needed to do, so tried a bit of everything instead. Same can be assumed in this scenario. They spent about a month doing that (attacking the airfields and radar installations), and very nearly succeeded, although their reconnaisance and target priorisation left a lot to be desired. in fact a hallmark of the german assault was its lack of focus, even when the assault is broken down or looked at in terms of the individual phases. So, attacks on the British aero industry did occur, but they were not a particular focus or concentrated assault, and we should assume a similar response in this case. In the absence of a determined, front line resistance by FC, the Germans would be left wondering what the devil the British were up to, not overconfidence. and neither were they focussed at destroying key elements in the same way as a schweinfurt or the plan to destroy German oil installations was. 

Anything happening outside the range of the 109 is going to be subjected to the same (or greater) sorts of responses and attrition as was historically the case. more actually, because in the scenario, the RAF is not in the front line trenches duking it out with the jagdfliegers at the Coast. there would actually be more fighters to counter deep penetration raids (including those over London). And this notion that might embolden the Navy to actually do something and attempt a crossing would have ended up a total disaster, which was shown in numerous post war simulations and studies. with or without British fighters protecting the beaches

Historically the Spitfire production program came in for sustained attacks from the LW. According to wiki....

_During the Battle of Britain, concerted efforts were made by the Luftwaffe to destroy the main manufacturing plants at Woolston and Itchen, near Southampton. The first bombing raid, which missed the factories, came on 23 August 1940. Over the next month, other raids were mounted until, on 26 September 1940, both factories were completely wrecked, with 92 people being killed and a large number injured; most of the casualties were experienced aircraft production workers.

Fortunately for the future of the Spitfire, many of the production jigs and machine tools had already been relocated by 20 September, and steps were being taken to disperse production to small facilities throughout the Southampton area. To this end, the British government requisitioned the likes of Vincent's Garage in Station Square Reading, which later specialised in manufacturing Spitfire fuselages, and Anna Valley Motors, Salisbury, which was to become the sole producer of the wing leading-edge fuel tanks for photo-reconnaissance Spitfires, as well as producing other components. A purpose-built works, specialising in manufacturing fuselages and installing engines, was built at Star Road, Caversham in Reading. The drawing office in which all Spitfire designs were drafted was relocated to another purpose-built site at Hursley Park, near Southampton. This site also had an aircraft assembly hangar where many prototype and experimental Spitfires were assembled, but since it had no associated aerodrome no Spitfires ever flew from Hursley.

Four towns and their satellite airfields were chosen to be the focal points for these workshops:
Southampton and Eastleigh Airport
Salisbury with High Post and Chattis Hill aerodromes
Trowbridge with Keevil aerodrome
Reading with Henley and Aldermaston aerodromes.
An experimental factory at Newbury was the subject of a Luftwaffe daylight raid but all missed their target and bombed a nearby school_.

One possible reason for the dislocation of Spitfire production in this hypothetical, might be that decentralization of production was undertaken earlier than historical, and this would give short term pain for long term gain. Foregoing production on a short term basis to secure the supply chanin by decentralization might actually be a good thing for the later parts fof the campaign. but destroying the Spitfire factory was something the germans did anyway with or without FC intervention....


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## Shortround6 (Feb 20, 2014)

Not so much of " to where the germans are miraculously and meticulously targetting the British aircraft industry as a priority, with precision, perfectly co-ordinated and targetted strikes" as teh examples I used were actually done. Granted the Birmingham strike was a night strike and part of the bombing of the city and may not have been a specific target. 
There is also short term and long term. The Bombing of the BSA Factory did not destroy the Factory or stop production for years, bu the loss of 3 months of rifle production in 1940 may or may not have been important. Hitler turned East in 1941 and the loss of several months of rifle production to the British Army diminished in importance. _IF_ the Germans had stayed in France and planned a Spring of 1941 invasion ( probably still doomed) then having lost several months of production may have been much more significant. BSA was the ONLY factory making rifles in 1940 in England. BTW a bomb raid in Aug 1940 burned out one building and the loss of 750 machine tools. 

The Supermarine factory was in Southampton, not really near London, and while the dispersal scheme did wonders there was still a loss of machinery and weeks worth of production until things go going again. Not a big loss in a 5 1/2 year war but for numbers in late 1940?

The point of Shorts is not just fighters but that the Germans were able to hit and cause damage to a number of war industries as it was, Damage that could be and was repaired but in the summer/fall of 1940 they didn't have the benefit of hind sight or the foreknowledge of the German plans. The US "bases for destroyers" was signed during the middle of the BoB and lend lease was 6-8 months away, ( signed in March of 1941) so what the British had for factories/equipment was pretty much it. Letting the Germans bomb even part of the county for just a couple of weeks might cause more harm than they were willing to tolerate at the time.


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## cherry blossom (Feb 21, 2014)

Well nobody seemed to like the Reggiane Re 2000 http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...s-otl-atl-v-me-109-a-39988-6.html#post1100901 and I agree although I suspect that a Re 2002 with a 1200 hp R-1830 would have been competitive if too late. 

However, what if Britain had not sent the Leigh Ross Mission to China and if China had thus suffered an economic crisis over 1935-7 that had prevented it opposing Japanese moves. Without a Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan regards Russia as its main enemy. Thus the combination of clashes in 1939 and the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact pushes it towards the Anglo-American camp which Japan calculates will pay them for merchant ships and other equipment as in WW1. Cynically, because they are only doing it to receive manufacturing licences, they declare war on Germany well before the fall of France and the Navy agrees to send a single squadron of its new A6M2 fighters as soon as they are available. Thus these arrive in Britain by flying off Ryujo in early September 1940 after a one month voyage via the Panama Canal (note that these A6M2s have either British or American radios). 

ps. Perhaps we should give these ATL IJN pilots some experience against the Russians in 1939 flying A5Ms against I-16s before throwing them against the Luftwaffe.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 21, 2014)

One squadron of aircraft is not going to change things one way or the other. Please remember that Britain had built about 2000 Hurricanes by the _start_ of the BoB. granted there were operational (and training)losses and Losses in France but 12-16 of ANY kind of fighter is going have about zero impact on the campaign as a whole.


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## stona (Feb 21, 2014)

pbehn said:


> I think that for some of the forward airfields in Kent it was considered to abandon them, they were simply too far forward but politics dictated they remained operational, after Churchills "no surrender" speech he couldnt be seen to do just that.



Can the RAF afford to abandon it's sector airfields? Damage to these left Park on one occasion, and in his own words, flying little more than his desk. Can it afford to lose the south coast Chain Home stations? The temporary loss of two of these led to one of the Luftwaffe's most successful raids of the campaign.

What is too far forward? Just consider 11 Group's sector stations. Biggin Hill? Maybe. Tangmere? Possibly. Certainly Hawkinge which was also an important 'Y service' listening station. Do you fall back as far as London? Kenley, Northholt, North Weald? Do you leave London and it's docks and industry completely undefended? The whole idea is, frankly, ridiculous. The enemy would have to force such a withdrawal on the RAF

The UK air defence system was a co-ordinated system and dislocation (or abandonment) of any part of it would cause problems. There was a plan to withdraw north of the Thames, but only in the event of successful German landings. You can not operate from airfields occupied by the enemy.

The RAF existed as part of the UK's air defence system to defend the UK air space. The UK means from the English Channel (there's a reason it was called that) to the Scottish Isles and beyond. It would have been completely unacceptable to give up any part of this voluntarily. The Luftwaffe tried to force the issue, but it failed.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 21, 2014)

But not having sufficient front line fighters (and pilots) sort of forces the british into making the best of an unpalatable situation. Rather than lose more fighters in a one sided massacre, and thereby pass air supremacy as well as air superiority to the Germans, better to withdraw to lines that they can defend. Until the fighter supply issue was rectified. And that probably means sacrificing or limiting defence of the south east, within the effective range of the 109s. where the 109s cant reach, or even where their loiter times start to thin out, which isnt even as far as London, the defenders (depending on just how short they were of fighters and pilots) could start to react to German attacks. Thats probably where the Fulmar /Defiant argument might have some weight...outside the range of the 109. 

Historically the germans really didnt appreciate the importance of the Chain Home stations as part of the british defence. here we go again, conferring abilities and knowledged to the Germans that they simply did not possess. They knew about radar, they had a dim idea of what the stations did, and they even managed to knock out one or two, but only after a fairly sustained effort to do so. The CH stations were important to the overall defence, but particularly so because the RAF CHOSE to fight "on the beaches" so to speak. Pull back the 50 or 60 miles as suggested, and the RAF has more time to react anyway, which was the primary advantage bestowed by these early stations. 

The RAF fought the way they did, because they did not want to concede any airspace to the germans. In the context of their available resources and strengths, that was absolutely the right thing to do. After Churchill came to power, it was absolutelyt a priority of the British Government to show that were not afraid to stand up to a bully. That courage and guts paid off eventually, and it was within the british capability to do it. Take away their advantage in numbers, and it becomes harder to make an uncompromising stand, and the british are forced to to give some ground and not quite fight the righteous fight that they did. They could still win, but they might not be able to defend every square inch of Britain, just the bits that really mattered a lot. They were sort of forced to do this during the napoleonic war when they pulled out of the Med for a short while, but were soon back once they had rectified their problems

Another way to perhaps buy some time is to pander a litle to the germans. Hitler fought the BoB to extract a concessional peace out of the British. What if the British made some quiet, unobtrusive noises that they were interested, and then after a week or two, simply reject the offer for peace, as they did historically. Get to the same point of defiance, but just take a little longer to get there. might buy some time to recover losses or restore production, or fix whatever was wrong in the British supply chain. Couldnt hurt, put it that way...


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## stona (Feb 21, 2014)

It never happened. Had the Luftwaffe fought a better coordinated and informed (its intelligence was woeful) campaign it might have forced some kind of withdrawal on the RAF without successful landings. Like you I don't believe the Wermacht had the will or ability to actually launch such landings and the Luftwaffe never managed to force such a withdrawal on the RAF by other means. There were always enough aircraft and pilots available, though it was a much closer run thing than the myth would lead us to believe. It's why the British see what was really a draw as a victory.

Withdrawing 60 miles and abandoning the forward posture of 11 Group would have had serious consequences. The distances and timings don't add up. 11 Group's interception rate per squadron 'tasked to raid' was around the 60-70% mark. Even the worst critics suggest a figure around 50%. 12 Group's was much lower. 

By the time aircraft from this new front line had assembled the bombs would already be dropping on, say, the dockyards at Plymouth from unopposed bombers. By the time the aircraft set course to intercept those same bombers would be heading for home. How would you propose that fighters based in Cambridgeshire, Bedfordshire or Suffolk protect shipping in the Channel?
12 Group only made one interception before the bombers bombed in the entire BoB. 11 Group managed often to break up attacking formations thus reducing the effectiveness of the bombing. On admittedly rare occasions its squadrons managed to prevent the intended targets being attacked at all.

The change to night time attacks, principally on the capital, was just another way of trying to force a compromise on the British. That didn't work either.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 21, 2014)

Even if the British abandoned the channel the number of aircraft works alone in south east England ( or No 11 Groups area) is rather large, 

Airspeed in Portsmouth.
Saunders Roe on the Isle of wight 
Short in Rochester
Supermarine in Southhampton

Getting into the south west suburbs of London you have
Hawker in Kingston on Thames
Miles in SW London
Vickers in Weybridge

Going west into No 10 group you had Bristol and Gloster.

This does not require any great omnipresence by the Luftwaffe. Locations (at least towns) were listed in pre-war editions of Jane's all the worlds aircraft. Some of the factories had been in the same locations for a couple of decades. In fact it was only around 1938 that locations of RAF stations began to be withheld from print while civil aerodromes continued to be listed (sometimes with pictures). 

Other ordnance factories were also well known. Granted some of the new ones (shadow factories) might have been a bit harder to find. 

You also need enough Spitfires and Hurricanes to keep the German fighters busy. Defiants and Fulmars just might find their hands full against Bf 110s if the 110s aren't kept busy. 

Some people claim that the home chain radars didn't work all that well _behind_ them. 

We _now_ know that German recon/intelligence was woefully inadequate but for the British to adopt a defensive plan that counted on it would not have been very responsible.


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## stona (Feb 21, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Some people claim that the home chain radars didn't work all that well _behind_ them.



I'm not sure what you mean by 'behind'. CH radars didn't work inland at all. The system was directional and of course directed outwards from the coast. Once a raid passed the coast it was entirely in the hands of the (Royal) Observer Corps. It's information was good in clear weather and only took slightly longer to filter. Nonetheless in anything but ideal conditions a raid could easily be lost or mis-plotted, never to be seen from the fighters being assembled and vectored from the Midlands, even if they got in the relevant area before the Germans had turned and dived (literally) for the French coast. 

There is no space or time in such a confined theatre. German bomber formations spent longer assembling over France than they did flying to their targets in Britain. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 21, 2014)

I will certainly take your word for it.


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## stona (Feb 21, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> I will certainly take your word for it.



I should stipulate that this was the case in 1940. You will see it described as a 'floodlight' system and that 'light' only shone in one direction.

At that time the area relevant to the BoB was covered by only eight Chain Home stations (and a number of Chain Home Low stations) between that at Bromley (Essex) to Ventnor (Isle of Wight). It is a reflection of the poor German intelligence that despite the supposed difficulty of eliminating these stations a concerted effort was never made.

Cheers

Steve


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## redcoat (Feb 21, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> There is also short term and long term. The Bombing of the BSA Factory did not destroy the Factory or stop production for years, bu the loss of 3 months of rifle production in 1940 may or may not have been important. Hitler turned East in 1941 and the loss of several months of rifle production to the British Army diminished in importance. _IF_ the Germans had stayed in France and planned a Spring of 1941 invasion ( probably still doomed) then having lost several months of production may have been much more significant. BSA was the ONLY factory making rifles in 1940 in England. BTW a bomb raid in Aug 1940 burned out one building and the loss of 750 machine tools..


On the 6th June 1940, after the loss of equipment in France the British army still had in stock 1,500,000 SMLE rifles, more than enough for all the regular divisions being re-equipped and raised in the UK at that time. A further 500,000 US surplus rifles were purchased at around this time, these were issued to the Home Guard in late summer 1940.

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## fastmongrel (Feb 21, 2014)

If the LW had destroyed the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield there would have been problems it was the only source of Bren Guns. Rifles werent the problem MGs were.


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## redcoat (Feb 22, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> If the LW had destroyed the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield there would have been problems it was the only source of Bren Guns. Rifles werent the problem MGs were.


By the end of June 1940 the British army had 17,500 Bren guns in stock, half the number required for the 27 Infantry Divisions being raised and re-equipped in the UK at that time. However the British again also received surplus US Lewis MGs (1,157) and BARs (25,000) at around this time, these were used to help equip the regular divisions until towards the end of 1940, when enough Brens had been produced for the US equipment to be transfered to the Home Guard.

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## pbehn (Feb 24, 2014)

stona said:


> Can the RAF afford to abandon it's sector airfields? Damage to these left Park on one occasion, and in his own words, flying little more than his desk. Can it afford to lose the south coast Chain Home stations? The temporary loss of two of these led to one of the Luftwaffe's most successful raids of the campaign.
> 
> What is too far forward? Just consider 11 Group's sector stations. Biggin Hill? Maybe. Tangmere? Possibly. Certainly Hawkinge which was also an important 'Y service' listening station. Do you fall back as far as London? Kenley, Northholt, North Weald? Do you leave London and it's docks and industry completely undefended? The whole idea is, frankly, ridiculous. The enemy would have to force such a withdrawal on the RAF
> 
> ...



Steve

I meant the airfields right on the coast not the sector airfields. Some were so close to the sea they were very vulnerable, and if scrambled to intercept were too close, still climbing and a sitting duck to be bounced.


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## stona (Feb 24, 2014)

Hawkinge was a sector station a few miles inland from Folkestone. It's a very short drive to the rabbit ridden BoB memorial at Capel le Ferne, on the coast.

Lympne is arguably even closer to the coast though not a sector station it was one of the airfields seriously disrupted by the Luftwaffe and considered a serious loss at the time. It was just one of several advanced airfields.

Tangmere, another 11 Group sector station lies close to the coast near Chichester, a few miles inland from Bognor Regis.

The other 11 Group sector stations are around London but this was a coordinated system. The loss of any airfields interrupted the smooth operation of the system. Manston, another airfield virtually on the coast (not a sector station as some who have seen the BoB film seem to believe)) was badly hit leaving a hole in 11 Groups defences which there was a struggle to plug.

The BoB was fought largely over Kent and Sussex precisely because these airfields were able to get fighters airborne to intercept the German raids as they crossed the coast over those southern counties.

There was never any reason to abandon them. Why retreat in the face of an enemy who is unable to force such a decision upon you ? I haven't read one good reason for abandoning the south east of England, its infrastructure and people to the depredations of the Luftwaffe in 1940, but I've given several reasons why not.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Feb 24, 2014)

stona said:


> Hawkinge was a sector station a few miles inland from Folkestone. It's a very short drive to the rabbit ridden BoB memorial at Capel le Ferne, on the coast.
> 
> Lympne is arguably even closer to the coast though not a sector station it was one of the airfields seriously disrupted by the Luftwaffe and considered a serious loss at the time. It was just one of several advanced airfields.
> 
> ...



I wasnt talking about the south of England just the extreme south coast near the channel because they were simply too close. How long was Lympne used for, for example?


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## stona (Feb 24, 2014)

pbehn said:


> How long was Lympne used for, for example?



Until it was devastated by the Luftwaffe sometime in August 1940 (it was the same day that the Luftwaffe seriously disabled Chain Home IIRC). The decision to evacuate the airfield and its destroyed infrastructure was one forced on Fighter Command by the Luftwaffe. The airfield was declared 'unoperational' as a result of enemy action. Hawkinge was just as exposed and suffered significant damage though it (like Manston, similarly damaged) was never declared unoperational.

Despite its geographic proximity to Hawkinge, Lympne was actually a satellite field in the adjacent Biggin Hill sector which is why its loss was keenly felt. West Malling is the next airfield to the coast in this sector and it is much closer to Biggin Hill than the sea!

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Feb 26, 2014)

stona said:


> Until it was devastated by the Luftwaffe sometime in August 1940 (it was the same day that the Luftwaffe seriously disabled Chain Home IIRC). The decision to evacuate the airfield and its destroyed infrastructure was one forced on Fighter Command by the Luftwaffe. The airfield was declared 'unoperational' as a result of enemy action. Hawkinge was just as exposed and suffered significant damage though it (like Manston, similarly damaged) was never declared unoperational.
> 
> Despite its geographic proximity to Hawkinge, Lympne was actually a satellite field in the adjacent Biggin Hill sector which is why its loss was keenly felt. West Malling is the next airfield to the coast in this sector and it is much closer to Biggin Hill than the sea!
> 
> ...


Hi Steve

Its much a quetion of semantics I think. Many airfields were made unoperational, making them operational again depends on the will to do so. With some they did with others they didnt. From Wiki Lympne continued to be used but not by squadrons, for small flights and as an emergency landing strip. No point in re building hangars etc so close to the sea.

cheers peter


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## yulzari (Feb 27, 2014)

redcoat said:


> By the end of June 1940 the British army had 17,500 Bren guns in stock, half the number required for the 27 Infantry Divisions being raised and re-equipped in the UK at that time. However the British again also received surplus US Lewis MGs (1,157) and BARs (25,000) at around this time, these were used to help equip the regular divisions until towards the end of 1940, when enough Brens had been produced for the US equipment to be transfered to the Home Guard.



My grandfather's Home Guard platoon was being issued Vickers and .30 US rifles by August 1940. The Vickers to go in concrete bunkers that were being constructed the same month (they are still there).God Bless the BBC with 'Dad's Army' and kitchen knives on broomsticks but, if you were near the pointy end of an invasion, you got proper rifles and some machine guns fairly soon. Many in his platoon were ex soldiers so they knew what to do with their weapons.


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## stona (Feb 27, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Hi Steve
> 
> Its much a quetion of semantics I think. Many airfields were made unoperational, making them operational again depends on the will to do so. With some they did with others they didnt. From Wiki Lympne continued to be used but not by squadrons, for small flights and as an emergency landing strip. No point in re building hangars etc so close to the sea.
> 
> cheers peter



As I said Hawkinge and Manston are just as close to the sea but were never declared unoperational. The RAF obviously felt that it could afford to give up Lympne but not the other two. They were all satellite fields. The a decision to 'give up' Lympne was forced on Dowding by the Luftwaffe. 

I'd have to check on Manston but Hawkinge was never forced out of operation, though it came close to it on 12th August. It is worth considering that, apart from squadrons based at Hawkinge, about 1 in 3 of ALL 11 Groups squadrons were based there for some period during the Battle. That makes it, a few miles from the coast behind Folkestone, at the heart of 'Hellfire Corner', one of the most important airfields of the entire battle. Had Hawkinge not been available Lympne would have been repaired. 

The original premise of the discussion was that the RAF might voluntarily give up its southern airfields, withdrawing north of London. That was never going to happen and the Luftwaffe was unable to force that decision on the RAF. It's why we see the BoB as a victory.

Cheers

Steve

Edit: Manston was put out of action for 24 hours following those raids on 12th August. It too was a vital forward base and much of what I wrote about Hawkinge could be written of Manston.


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## parsifal (Feb 27, 2014)

> The original premise of the discussion was that the RAF might voluntarily give up its southern airfields, withdrawing north of London. That was never going to happen and the Luftwaffe was unable to force that decision on the RAF. It's why we see the BoB as a victory.



no, the original premise is what might the RAF do if the Spitfire, and/or the Hurricane was in short supply of not there at all. That never happened historically, so your whole position is based on faulty ground, because it simply keeps doubling back to the historical scenario...."they never abandoned those forward fields so they would never abandon those forward fields!". its a classic non-sequita wedge...it never happened so it never would....but fails to take into account the real starting premise.

So, what do you do if you go into the battle short of spitfires. Do you stay forward, and watch the entire FC be decimated because it is being forced into a one sided massacre. i think not. What options are there? One, as suggested is to stay put, fight the historical fight, and really lose. The forward airfields could be lost and Britiain could still survive. The RAF won on many fronts, one as you say was because the germans at no point could claim control of any part of British skies. That, however, was neither the greatest victory, or indeed the essential one. What was esential was that the RAF remain a viable force able to inflict losses on the LW at an unsustainable rate. Similar to the way Lee fought his seven days campaign, in this alternative, you would fight a battle and fall back to safety, fight a battle and fall back to safety. And those batles would be fought outside, or at the limit of the 109 range. Sure it would be preferable to fight a forward defence, and there would be pain because of the loss of airfields, and in 1940 the british could not be certain that Sealion might not be launched, but none of those things were likley to lead to the complete defeat of britain. but the question is, what do you doi if that strategty is simply not availbale. How can the RAF still fight and at least not lose.

Sometimes, if faced with a battle you cant win, you have to adapt to minimise your defeat


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## stona (Feb 27, 2014)

The southern half of Britain could have been left undefended if there was no means to defend it? Is that your suggestion? Of course it could have been. The Germans couldn't invade and in any case it would have been the Royal Navy's job to deal with an invasion (assuming in this rather silly what if the Germans have the means and the will to launch one). 

Next we can assume that the Navy doesn't have any destroyers for some reason, maybe the same reason we don't have Spitfires and Hurricanes. Then we can have a German invasion faced by the Home Guard (the Army also being unavailable for some reason, maybe the same that we have no front line fighters or destroyers) and make ludicrous conjectures about how that might have gone.

If there had been no competitive front line fighters available to the RAF then it would have been forced, by the Luftwaffe, to move out of range of its front line fighters, leaving large swathes of Britain's infrastructure and citizenry undefended, thus failing in the primary reason for Fighter Command's (formerly Air Defence of Great Britain which is self explanatory) existence. The 'shape' of Fighter Command and its defensive posture owed much to the Steel-Bartholomew Committee's report which followed WW1.

I have never denied that the Luftwaffe could have forced any number of contingencies on the RAF but the fact is that it didn't.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 27, 2014)

I agree its a bit of a silly scenario, poorly defined as well. Why are there no or few spitfires. What offsets would be given for example, if the Merlin did not eventuate. If the scenario was a shortage of fighters due to over-use, what impact would that over-engagement have on the Germans. How long would the RAF be forced to operate under conditions of having insufficient fighters. None of this was thought through when the original scenario was posed, and that leaves us all fighting about what it is we are up against. OTOH ive had to deal with worse over the years including some really y problems when I was at Tactical Wearfare School at HMAS Watson. 

Thankfully, this scenario never happened. The RAF was abale to stand toe to toe with the LW and do enough to claim comprehensive victory at the end of it. none of the Germans objectives had been reached, all of the RAF and British objectives were in the bag. It had been costly, but it was successful.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 27, 2014)

One _might_ want to move the fighters back from the foremost fields without actually abandoning them. If the fields are still able to service aircraft ( fuel, arm and minor repair) it extends the distance the British fighters can pursue damaged German aircraft or stragglers. It gives more options to lost pilots or pilots of damaged aircraft. Patch them up, refuel and send back to regular base. It allows more of a defense in depth rather than giving the Germans too much of a "safe" zone.


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## Aozora (Feb 27, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> One _might_ want to move the fighters back from the foremost fields without actually abandoning them. If the fields are still able to service aircraft ( fuel, arm and minor repair) it extends the distance the British fighters can pursue damaged German aircraft or stragglers. It gives more options to lost pilots or pilots of damaged aircraft. Patch them up, refuel and send back to regular base. It allows more of a defense in depth rather than giving the Germans too much of a "safe" zone.



Actually that was a routine practice - smaller "satellite" airfields, such as Rochford (Sector Station Hornchurch) were used as forward bases; fuel and ammunition was trucked in over night (the fuel, for example, was supplied by tanker, usually from a forward fuel depot), one or two squadrons would fly to the field early next morning, operate from the field during the day, then fly back to the sector station or a larger airfield late evening.


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## parsifal (Feb 27, 2014)

which i dont think would change, except that the point of engagement would be somewhat later than historical. historically the RAF was making interceptions well forward, even over the channel, or occasionally even over french terrotory. Certainly a lot of fighting occurred over the coastal areas of SE England. In thisscenario, the point of engagement would be moved back a a ways, so that initial or occasional interceptions (mostly of unescorted or lightly escorted strikes) occurred within effective range of the 109. Most of the escorted raids would need to be intercepted some time after that point. not easy, perhaps not even achievable, but if FC was in a weakened state, its really got no choice. It has to fight to its capability, not to some unachievable standard.

its in those situations, incidentally, that your second line fighters might be able to do some reall good. Endurance of a fulmar, for example, was about twice that of a spitfire, and it carried twice the ammunition loadout. it was, by all accounts, a good gun platform, so use it to spin out or stretch the limited capabilities of a reduced number of Spits/Hurris.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 27, 2014)

> Endurance of a fulmar, for example, was about twice that of a spitfire, and it carried twice the ammunition loadout. it was, by all accounts, a good gun platform, so use it to spin out or stretch the limited capabilities of a reduced number of Spits/Hurris.



...and in one sentence we've gone from constructive and informative discussion of actual historical events to pure fantasy and wishful thinking. The Fulmar entered FAA service in June 1940, yes, in time for the Battle of Britain, but if Fighter Command gets them, what does the FAA get? Also, why would Fighter Command get them when they were built for the FAA? Again, regardless of the desperation of FC's position, sending Fulmars over France would be suicidal - the Fulmar wasn't much faster than the Battle at height. Sorry Parsifal, whilst I find the scenario being proposed entirely plauseable, the introduction of the Fulmar just blew it. Like the initial discussion of this thread, the Brits would have come up with something else other than turning to the Fulmar; it just wasn't fast enough. It would not have met the requirements laid down for an RAF fighter at the time.


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## parsifal (Feb 27, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> ...and in one sentence we've gone from constructive and informative discussion of actual historical events to pure fantasy and wishful thinking. The Fulmar entered FAA service in June 1940, yes, in time for the Battle of Britain, but if Fighter Command gets them, what does the FAA get? Also, why would Fighter Command get them when they were built for the FAA? Again, regardless of the desperation of FC's position, sending Fulmars over France would be suicidal - the Fulmar wasn't much faster than the Battle at height. Sorry Parsifal, whilst I find the scenario being proposed entirely plauseable, the introduction of the Fulmar just blew it. Like the initial discussion of this thread, the Brits would have come up with something else other than turning to the Fulmar; it just wasn't fast enough. It would not have met the requirements laid down for an RAF fighter at the time.




This is one of the weaknesses of the starting scenario. all we are given is that the spifire and hurricane are either not available, or in short supply. We dont know if there is a long lead time to develop a replacement, we dont know if any ofsewts are given like more Fulmars, or a new replacement, or reduced 109 availablity. We dont know if the spitfire/hurricane famine is permanent thing, or just that losses had caused a temporary shaortage in the RAF inventory. We dont know if it was brought on by a shortage of airframes, or a shortage of pilots. We dont know if ther are any compensations or offsets, or what happens in other areas of development. one possibility (but a very remote one) is that greater resources before the war are put into the FAA and the has more Fulmars on strength by June. Say the RAF has 100 Spifires and Hurricanes, and 250 Fulmars on loan from an over resourced FAA as at June 1940, what should it do. Send in 100 fighters against 600+ enemies, send in 350 fighters, 250 of which will be hard pressed by the enemy fighters, in the historical forward defnces, or hang back, outside of the range of the bogey 109s in an effort to pick off some of the stragglers or unescorted bombers. 
None of the options are good, but the last mentioned is by far the better option of the three to choose from. ther is only one other that I can think of and that is not rise up at all, which I think would be a disaster. 

I never said that fulmars should proceed to fight over France with Fulmars. the opposite actually.

Im not suggesting that the Fulmar be pursued as the main fighter for the RAF, but I am suggesting it might be an expedient that could be used in an emergency. I am suggesting that if nothing else was available, it would need to be used, and if that need arose, it would need to be used in a very sparing and careful way. The alternative might be to allow just a few spitfires and hurricanes to be even more heavily outnumbered, or worse, have no fighters at all, giving the LW carte blanche to roam at will and destroy what they needed to do, at almost no cost. the latter is equivalent to total defeat, not just for FC, but for Britain as a whole. Using Fulmars would very much be qa stopgap, a partial solution to a very difficult problem.


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## merlin (Feb 28, 2014)

parsifal said:


> no, the original premise is what might the RAF do if the Spitfire, and/or the Hurricane was in short supply of not there at all. That never happened historically, so your whole position is based on faulty ground, because it simply keeps doubling back to the historical scenario...."they never abandoned those forward fields so they would never abandon those forward fields!". its a classic non-sequita wedge...it never happened so it never would....but fails to take into account the real starting premise.



*NO, that is not the original premise!* 

The question queried the performance of ATL aircraft against the Me-109! It didn't stipulate that there would be no Spitfires or Hurricanes - seems most unlikely, or even drastically less numbers, merely that there could have been other aircraft involved, rather than say the Defiant, Gladiator Blenheim - and hence posed the question how would these fare!? 

We have had some interesting answers, and alternative suggestions, as well as being side tracked - which often happens!


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## yulzari (Feb 28, 2014)

Looking at the original thread; what might one have done with the Gladiator? As a supplement to existing fighters. 

x6 .303" Brownings were a trialed fit (x2 in the upper wings). Not as many as the Spitfire or Hurricane but a closer group so possibly as many hits.

The Mercury seems to be quoted in the 810 to 825ish bhp area irrespective of 87 or 100 octane. Could more be achieved?

Changing from fixed pitch to variable, or better, constant speed 3 blade propellor? Malta Gladiators used ex-Blenheim engines with 3 blade propellors.

The rate of climb compares with a Hurricane MkI.

The Perseus is an alternative engine that got to 920bhp just before the war and the larger Perseus 100 got to 1,200bhp. It was the alternative to the Mercury in the Lysander so it should go into a Gladiator.

Use of different and smaller airfields could reduce the vulnerability of Fighter Command in the south to air attack on it's bases.

Familiar to older pilots so a sweep out of ex fighter pilots from RAF staff could add some pilot numbers and new pilots could skip OCUs for the conversion to type element as Gladiators would be an easier transition from Masters or Furies.

I see the main flying problem as being difficulty in catching the fast bombers in a stern chase. However bombers, especially in formations, operate at cruising speed and the essence of the RDF/control room system was to place the fighters so that they do not need to do a stern chase except after initial engagement.

Comparatively cheap and does not impinge on existing fighter production until the Tornado/Typhoon needs those production facilities. After the BoB ship them off to Malaya and India for extra reserve squadrons using locally trained staff.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 28, 2014)

Ok, lets look at it. 

Without major modifications to the Mercury engine was stuck at 840hp at 13-14,000ft. Just like the Merlin III was _stuck_ at 1030hp at 16,250ft. _ANY_ improvement from 100 octane fuel comes below that height, not above. Using 100 octane fuel the Mercury could go to over 900hp for take-off instead of 725hp for take-off. Using a _two_ pitch prop may help even more ( most Blenheim's had 2 pitch props, called _CP_ for _Controllable Pitch_, they were NOT constant speed). Britain was rather short of constant speed props during the summer of 1940. 

So yes you can improve the performance of the Gladiator but not at the altitudes the fights were _starting_ during the BoB. 

Perseus was a sleeve valve engine and the Perseus 100 was a post war engine (using Centaurus cylinders) that, while advertised, may never have actually been installed in even a flying test bed. Perseus was in low scale production and might have been available in quantities measured in dozens (steal them from Bothas?), It used the exact same bore and stroke as the Mercury so expecting any major change in power is just not happening. 

AS for vast numbers of Pilots having experience with it. It was introduced into service in Feb 1937 (about a year before the Hurricane) but the rate of production was not high and the last planes were not completed until 1940. Eight home squadrons may be the most equipped with it at any one time. It also had a surprisingly high accident rate when first introduced as it handled quite a bit different than the biplanes that proceeded it. 

Going back to the start of the thread. When or what causes the 'shortage' of Hurricanes and/or Spitfires? A Factory fire in July of 1940 or in Nov of 1939?
In other words how much _time_ is there to come up with alternative fighter/s? Are we talking about building _new_ fighters with _new_ engines or taking months (or year) old air-frames and re-engining/modifying them in work shops with what ever is handy?


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## Glider (Feb 28, 2014)

I think one Gladiator was fitted with 6 x 303 on Malta but it was destroyed on the ground before it could go into combat. I also think it was fitted with an engine from a Blenheim, but that might have been a different airframe.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 28, 2014)

The Italians installed the DB-601 engine in their CR.42, for sake of experiment. Clocked about 320 mph. So - how about he Merlin in the Gladiator? Unless we install it in the MB-2...


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## Aozora (Feb 28, 2014)

Glider said:


> I think one Gladiator was fitted with 6 x 303 on Malta but it was destroyed on the ground before it could go into combat. I also think it was fitted with an engine from a Blenheim, but that might have been a different airframe.



Apparently the modified Sea Gladiator was N5531 "Hope", which was fitted with a Mercury XV and C/S propeller from a Blenheim as well as extra Brownings on the upper wings; N5531 was destroyed with "a bomb smack through the centre section" before she could be flown. (From _Malta the Hurricane Years_ page 370).


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## yulzari (Mar 1, 2014)

IIRC the extra two guns in the top wing was a FAA option so the fittings for the lower guns _might_ be used in a straightforward installation.

In the BoB Plymouth was defended by an RAF flight of Gladiators at Roborough as it was then too small for Hurricanes or Spitfires and the Dockyard held FAA Gladiator spares. So they were in BoB service and had only recently been in use in France.

The only major difference to an ex Gauntlet pilot would probably have been the flaps, canopy and radio. Out in the Middle East Gauntlets and Furies were still being used into 1941; albeit in tiny numbers.

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## Shortround6 (Mar 1, 2014)

yulzari said:


> The only major difference to an ex Gauntlet pilot would probably have been the flaps, canopy and radio. Out in the Middle East Gauntlets and Furies were still being used into 1941; albeit in tiny numbers.



From Wiki so usual disclaimer 

"The Gladiator‘s introduction into RAF service was difficult. Although it was well liked by pilots, the accidents during operational training were so numerous that a small replacement batch of 28 Mk IIs was hurriedly produced. Most accidents were caused by pilots being caught out by the fighter’s increased wing loading. Moreover, many aviators had still little experience in landing aircraft with such a wide flap area. The new Gloster biplane stalled more abruptly with the tendency to drop a wing. The Gladiator proved even easier to enter a flat spin, and great skill was needed to recover it."

Now it may not be as bad as that and a few hours of training _before_ going into combat might have gone along way to into easing a pilot into it. However, thinking that you can grab pilots from bomber/transport squadron squadrons who flew Gauntlets and Furies 2-5 years earlier and stick them into Gladiators as an _emergency_ solution might not turn out well. Or thinking that pilots posted to the "new" Gladiator squadrons need _less_ operational flying time after leaving advanced training than pilots posted to Hurricane squadrons. British weren't giving their pilots enough operational (flying service type fighters) training as it was before sending them into combat.


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## Aozora (Mar 1, 2014)

yulzari said:


> IIRC the extra two guns in the top wing was a FAA option so the fittings for the lower guns _might_ be used in a straightforward installation.
> 
> In the BoB Plymouth was defended by an RAF flight of Gladiators at Roborough as it was then too small for Hurricanes or Spitfires and the Dockyard held FAA Gladiator spares. So they were in BoB service and had only recently been in use in France.
> 
> The only major difference to an ex Gauntlet pilot would probably have been the flaps, canopy and radio. Out in the Middle East Gauntlets and Furies were still being used into 1941; albeit in tiny numbers.



In a slightly different context, Hawker Hectors of 613 Sqn were used to dive-bomb and strafe gun positions around Calais in late May 1940: 12 sorties were carried out over two days in support of Lysanders that were dropping supplies to the British troops; two Hectors were damaged by flak (Alex Crawford _Hawker Hart Family_, MMP 2008, pages 98-103):

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## vikingBerserker (Mar 1, 2014)

Wow, I had no idea they had been used during the war. Great info!


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## merlin (Mar 2, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Some of these look attractive at first glance but a bit deeper look reveals the problems. For instance the Supermarine 313 was a larger plane than the Whirlwind, was supposed to use lower powered engines (The Goshawk?) and yet go faster? Something seems off.



The '313' whilst having bigger dimensions was supposedly going to be much lighter than the Whirlwind, also it was offered with an alternative engine - the Aero Engines (Hispano) 12Y engine -just a thought while not bigger than the Peregrine, would it have been *more reliable*, and therefore a viable alternative engine for the Whirlwind?


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## merlin (Mar 2, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> Wow, I had no idea they had been used during the war. Great info!



Yes, but what a perverse tragedy the RAF resort to that, while the Henley was wasted as a target tug!


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## Glider (Mar 2, 2014)

merlin said:


> The '313' whilst having bigger dimensions was supposedly going to be much lighter than the Whirlwind, also it was offered with an alternative engine - the Aero Engines (Hispano) 12Y engine -just a thought while not bigger than the Peregrine, would it have been *more reliable*, and therefore a viable alternative engine for the Whirlwind?



Just a point and that is the Peregrine was as far as I am aware a very reliable engine. I read a report from the squadron leader when he was being pushed to declare the squadron operational during the BOB. He listed a number of problems but engines weren't one of them.

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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2014)

merlin said:


> The '313' whilst having bigger dimensions was supposedly going to be much lighter than the Whirlwind, also it was offered with an alternative engine - the Aero Engines (Hispano) 12Y engine -just a thought while not bigger than the Peregrine, would it have been *more reliable*, and therefore a viable alternative engine for the Whirlwind?



What "Aero engines 12Y engine?" a licensed Hispano or imported? There may have been a _suggestion_ that some company build a license Hispano but it came to nothing. 

The "unreliability" of the Peregrine has been much over blown. A few early _minor_ troubles including taxing with flaps (which controlled the radiator airflow) in the wrong position leading to _ground_ over heating, but the early troubles were soon solved. Until you get to the 12Y-45 the Hispano does NOT offer more power than the Peregrine at altitude.


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## merlin (Mar 9, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> What "Aero engines 12Y engine?" a licensed Hispano or imported? There may have been a _suggestion_ that some company build a license Hispano but it came to nothing.
> 
> The "unreliability" of the Peregrine has been much over blown. A few early _minor_ troubles including taxing with flaps (which controlled the radiator airflow) in the wrong position leading to _ground_ over heating, but the early troubles were soon solved. Until you get to the 12Y-45 the Hispano does NOT offer more power than the Peregrine at altitude.



Quite frankly - I haven't got a clue, I was just going by what I read in Butler's Secret Projects.

Re: engines in general - does it mean that the Merlin DB 601 - were the only 1940 engines capable of high-altitude combat performance?? Whilst Bristol learnt a lot from the Fw-190 engine, was there anything to learn from other earlier LW engines from shot down aircraft!?? 

My imagination wondered, with the Gloster F.5/34 (Grendell) - joining the Hurricanes in France, With the Gloster 'twin' (Guardian) being utilized for photo-recon (faster than the Blenheim), but suffers after being pressed into ground-attack a'la Breguet 693. Following the Fall of France some squadrons are re-equipped with the B-P P88a (Dante) - with Bader being admonished after swopping the cannon for MGs!!


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## Shortround6 (Mar 12, 2014)

merlin said:


> Re: engines in general - does it mean that the Merlin DB 601 - were the only 1940 engines capable of high-altitude combat performance?? Whilst Bristol learnt a lot from the Fw-190 engine, was there anything to learn from other earlier LW engines from shot down aircraft!??



The Merlin III offered the best performance at altitude of engines _commonly_ available in the Summer of 1940, with the Merlin XII and XX staring to come online in the fall. However the Merlins were installed in larger, heavier aircraft than the 109 was so the _combination_ of the Merlin III and Spitfire/Hurricane and the DB 601/109 worked out about the same. 

You can always learn _something_ from captured engines even if it was not as ground shaking as the BMW 801 engine installation ( the _FACT_ that an air-cooled engine could come close to a liquid cooled engine in terms of drag was _ground shaking_ to a lot of people.) Even things like piston ring alloys were analysed to compare with the capturing countries products to see if there might be room for improvement. The German fuel injection systems were looked at pretty closely but rejected for a number of reasons. Some had to do cost, both actual money and time/labor to manufacture.


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## RCAFson (Mar 12, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The Merlin III offered the best performance at altitude of engines _commonly_ available in the Summer of 1940, with the Merlin XII and XX staring to come online in the fall. However the Merlins were installed in larger, heavier aircraft than the 109 was so the _combination_ of the Merlin III and Spitfire/Hurricane and the DB 601/109 worked out about the same.
> 
> You can always learn _something_ from captured engines even if it was not as ground shaking as the BMW 801 engine installation ( the _FACT_ that an air-cooled engine could come close to a liquid cooled engine in terms of drag was _ground shaking_ to a lot of people.) Even things like piston ring alloys were analysed to compare with the capturing countries products to see if there might be room for improvement. The German fuel injection systems were looked at pretty closely but rejected for a number of reasons. Some had to do cost, both actual money and time/labor to manufacture.



A number of Spitfire IIs (~50) and Hurricane IIs (~30) were in service by Sept 22 1940.

Merlin XII production was probably delayed mainly due to Spitfire II airframe production problems.


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## Edgar Brooks (Mar 13, 2014)

merlin said:


> Yes, but what a perverse tragedy the RAF resort to that, while the Henley was wasted as a target tug!


The Henley was designed as a light bomber, carrying just two defensive guns; the wings might have utilised the same jigs as the Hurricane, but the Henley airframe had nowhere near the capability of that aircraft.


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## merlin (Mar 16, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> The Henley was designed as a light bomber, carrying just two defensive guns; the wings might have utilised the same jigs as the Hurricane, but the Henley airframe had nowhere near the capability of that aircraft.



I think you'll find my comment is a reply to post 208 - so yes the Henley was designed as a light-bomber top speed 292 mph, Hector max speed 187 mph, armament 1 x Vickers gun + 1 x Lewis gun, and 2 x 112 lb bombs; whereas the Henley as similar machine-guns, it carried two 250 lb bombs internally, wing points for over-load of another two - as per the spec.
Hence, my comment!!


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## ohogain (May 5, 2014)

GregP said:


> What the heck is OTL and ATL?
> 
> Doesn't compute.



Glad you asked. I would like to know as well. Thanks.


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## fastmongrel (May 5, 2014)

OTL = Official Time Line ie what actually happened.

ATL = Alternate Time Line ie what might have happened if certain changes had been made at certain times in History.


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## parsifal (May 6, 2014)

Man, am i getting old or what....

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